^ ^ u THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCI lOOL OF LAW GIFT OF Professor C. G. Haines v^- PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMOfiAMDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSE I. No. I.— JUNE 8, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, III 25. VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W. V. & S., Ltd.— 37908. T Un 323 b NOTE. It is -proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda will be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League would appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He would also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arratigements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number, Victoria 4503 {two lines). C70431 THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CLAUSE 1. General Notes. Amendments to this subsection fall, broadly, under two heads : those designed to postpone the operation of the Clause, and those intended to limit the scope of the Irish Parliament. It is pioposed to postpone the establishment of an Irish Parliament until after (a) a Referendum ; (b) a General Election ; (c) the Reform of the House of Lords, as promised in the preamble to the Parliament Act ; (d) the acceptance, or establishment, of Home Rule all round. It is sought to limit the scope of the Irish Parliament in various ways, as follows : — (a) By describing the Irish Parliament as " Subordinate." (b) By dropping the words " Parliament " and " House of Commons," and using the expressions, " Legislature," " Legislative Council " and " Legislative Assembly." (c) By defining its powers as those of a subordinate pro- vincial legislature such as are possessed by the South African local legislatures. (d) By excluding Antrim, Armagh, Down and London- derry from the operation of the Act. The questions arising out of the consideration of Subsection (2) are dealt with in the Special Memorandum attached. 2 SPECIAL NOTES ON AMENDMENTS PROPOSING THE POSTPONEMENT OF BILL UNTIL AFTER A REFER- ENDUM OR GENERAL ELECTION. These proposals may be considered together, the object of both being the same : to give the electorate an opportunity of giving its verdict on a great constitutional change. Whether or no the Country has given a Mandate for a revision of the legislative relations of Great Britain and Ireland, it has certainly never assented to the settlement proposed in the Bill. It is one thing to approve self-government as an abstract proposition, and another thing to approve the concrete scheme. Still more is this the case, seeing that the British Empire itself contains very varied types of self-government. If Australia declined to create a Federal Union without direct appeal to the electorate, if it was necessary to take similar steps in Natal prior to the Union of South Africa, it is infinitely more necessary that the people of the United Kingdom should be consulted before breaking up an Union. It is noteworthy that a Democracy such as that of the United States hedges Con- stitutional change with rigid safeguards. Thus in the separate States a three-fifths majority must be shown in a Referendum, to say nothing of the restrictive power of the Supreme Court. A Company may not alter its Articles without special meetings and confirmatory meetings ; a National Constitution is of at least as much value. The policy of taking the popular verdict is emphasised by the fact that the constituencies have twice rejected Home Rule. Especially important is the parallel of the 1893 Bill. In 1892 the electorate affirmed by a small majority the principle of Self-Government ; in 1895, having seen the scheme in practical shape, it gave a huge majority against Home Rule. The opinion of Mr. John Redmond on this point is important. Speaking in the Rotunda, Dublin, on October 8th, 1894, he Special Notes on Amendments proposing the Postponement of Bill until after a Referendum or General Election — continued. pointed out how constitutionally momentous would be the abolition of the House of Lords. He expressly refused to blame the Peers for rejecting the Home Rule Bill, an action which he said had been justified by the new Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery, by the common action of the Government in the House of Lords, and in the eyes of the British people by the apathy of the majority of those who represented Ireland. He continued thus : — " Let the popular will be once emphatically declared in favour of any popular reform, and the House of Lords must, as they have always done in the past, bow to the popular will. . . . Had the rejection of the Home Rule Bill been appealed from by the Govermnent, as every similar rejection of every great reform was appealed from in the past, and if the verdict of the people was in favour of Home Rule, then, I assert, the Home Rule Bill would now be law ; and I say, further, let the election be held to-morrow on the question of Home Rule pure and simple, and if a majority is elected in the constituencies in favour of it, then the House of Lords will not attempt to oppose it." This is a sound constitutional statement. The present Government, however, have destroyed the resisting power of the Upper House, an avowal that popular opinion is still adverse to Home Rule. To force Home Rule on an unwilling people is undemocratic and unconstitutional. Contrast with the action of Mr. Asquith his principles as propounded in his Manifesto of IMarch 1, 1902, in which he writes thus : — " If we are are honest, we must ask ourselves this practical question : Is it to be part of the policy and programme of our party that, if returned to power, it will introduce into the House of Commons a Bill for Irish Home Rule ? The answer in my judgment is. No. And why ? Not because we are satisfied^who is ? — with the results Special Notes on Amendments proposing the Postponement of Bill until after a Referendum or General Election — continued. of six years of Unionist administration. Not because we think that the Irish problem has been either settled or shelved. But because the history of these years . . . has made it plain that the ends which we have always had, and still have, in view — the reconciliation of Ireland to the Empire, and the relief of the Imperial Parliament (not as regards Ireland alone) from a load of unnecessary burdens — can only be attained by methods which will carry with them, step by step, the sanction and sympathy of British opinion. To recognise facts like these is not apostasy ; it is commonsense." In a preface to Home Rule Notes, December 9, 1911, Mr. Asquith indicates a similar conviction. " It is true that to a great extent the power of prejudice is less than it was. The Parliament Act has broken down the bar in perpetuity which had been erected by the House of Lords." (Here Mr. Asquith and Mr. Redmond differ.) " But it is of the essence of the Parliament Act, both in its letter and spirit, that a Bill which becomes law under its operations must have commanded during three consecutive Sessions the un- swerving support of the House of Commons, dependent directly upon a stable and consistent public opinion in the Constituencies." But how, it may be asked, is the public opinion of the Constitu- encies to be ascertained except by an appeal to them, either by way of a Referendum or a General Election ? The former method has the advantage of obtaining a verdict free from complicating factors ; the latter requires no fresh machinery and is a process understanded of the people. The choice of methods may be a matter of question ; it is not a matter of question that a nation, deprived of the safeguard of an effective Second Chamber, should have the opportunity of directly recording its judgment on important measures. Special Notes on Amendments proposing the Postponement of Bill until after a Referendum or General ElecWon— continued. This much the Home Rulers surely should do in their own interest. Stability and permanence is essential for every Constitution, if it is to be successful ; but these qualities can only be obtained if care has been taken to make the measure an agreed Act, supported by public opinion. A Bill introduced and passed into law solely by Party means possesses no more support than that which the Party gives it ; and it is within the power — and under certain conditions would be the duty — of its opponents to repeal it. It matters not so much in the case of domestic legislation ; but Constitutions should be above Party strife. Yet the Home Rule Bill is to-day only being forced into law as a result of the pressure and power of that Party system. This is its weakness and the preventive of its real success as a lasting settlement. NOTES ON THE SUPREMACY OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. Clause 1. Subsection 2. This subsection does undoubtedly assert in a strong form tlie supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. Its " supreme power and authority shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters and things within His Majesty's Dominions." The words are well enough ; how far can they be translated into fact ? The first question is what is the meaning of Supremacy, what will be the power and authority which the Imperial Parliament can exercise ? There are various forms of Parliamentary supremacy within the British Empire. There is the supremacy wielded by the Imperial Parliament over the Dependencies ; there is the supremacy exercised by the Parliaments of the Dominion, the Commonwealth and the Union over the subordinate assemblies of Canada, Australia and South Africa. Is the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom over Ireland to be that which it exercises over Canada or New Zealand, or is it to be that which the Dominion Parliament exercises over Manitoba, or the Commonwealth Parliament has over Victoria ? Theoretically, the Imperial Parliament has complete authority in the Colonies. Legally, it could impose taxes on our dependencies. {See Dicey — Leap in the Dark. Second Edition, p. 4.) In fact, it could do nothing of the sort. It, therefore, inspires doubts as to the efficacy of the Imperial supremacy of Ireland to find it embodied in such words as end the subsection, " all persons, matters and things within His Majesty's Dominions." They promise too much. If the supremacy over Irish affairs is on a par with that over the Colonies, it is a high-sounding phrase but without meaning. Notes on the Supremacy of the Parliament of the United Kingdom — continued. The phrase is ambiguous. It means different things to different people. To the British Devokitionist it means a real and effective control ; to the Irish Home Ruler it means nominal subordination but real independence. The former significance would be justified under the South African system, or, in perhaps less degree, under the Canadian Constitution ; the latter is the only sense in which Supremacy can be construed under the federal system adopted in the Home Rule Bill. In Australia the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament over the State Legislatures is very limited, and there the State Legislatures do not possess the powers of varying taxes imposed by the Central Parliament such as are given to the Irish Legislature. It would seem as if in external and Imperial affairs the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament is secure ; but even there it will be impaired by the exceptions in Subsection 7 of Clause 2, and by the power given to Ireland of varying the Customs duties, which might easily involve relations with external Powers. As to internal affairs it is idle to talk of the Central authority being unaffected, when Ireland will have the power of legislation, the appointment of the Judiciary, and (in six years) the control of the police. The Irish Cabinet will occupy in Ireland the position now occupied by the British Cabinet in regard to the United Kingdom. It will exercise all the ordinary functions of Government so far as concerns most of the internal affairs of Ireland. It will appoint functionaries, levy taxes, have in its hands the protection of property or personal liberty, the prevention and prosecution of Notes on the Supremacy of the Parliament of the United Kingdom — continued. independently of Ministers, since the Governor has no other person to fall back upon to carry out his will. There is one case in point which is peculiarly interesting — that of the con- demned Zulus in 1906. In this case, several rebels in the Zulu rising of 1906 had been condemned to death by Court Martial, and the Governor of Natal informed the Imperial Government that he had consented to the sentence. Now, this was a matter in respect of which the Imperial Government would seem to occupy a strong position. Firstly, because it involved the prerogative of mercy ; secondly, because questions affecting natives were specially reserved under the Act giving Natal responsible government. However, immediately on receiving instructions from the Imperial Government to suspend the executions pending consideration, the Ministry of Natal resigned. The Home Government, being thus rendered powerless, foimd a way out in the assurance of the Governor that the proceedings had been regular, and withdrew their demand for postponement. There is one telegram of the Governor to the Colonial Secretary which may be quoted : — " I trust that with the additional facts contained in this telegram your Lordship will see your way to withdraw objection. I am afraid that very intense feeling will be excited in the Colony by my having suspended execution." Here we have popular sentiment and Ministerial action over-riding the Imperial Government in an action clearly within its rights and even specially reserved to it. What guarantee is there that similar forces would not be arrayed against the Imperial Parliament in any attempt by it to modify administrative Acts in Ireland ? And yet it is peculiarly by administration that wrong might be done in that country. Legislation, enacted in a fierce light of publicity, might preserve some appearance of 10 Notes on the Supremacy of the Parliament of the United Kingdom — continued. decency ; administration, more secret, would have no such restraint. With regard to legislation, the intervention of the Imperial Parliament of late has been confined to matters having Imperial significance, while there has been, as Keith remarks, " a complete abnegation of Imperial control over internal matters "* The case of the Newfoundland Contract is a case in point. That Colony, being in financial distress, made a Contract with a Mr. Reid, whereby he became possessed of practically all the Crown lands of any value, the railways, telegraph and postal service and local sea communications as well as the property in the dock at St. John's. The Imperial Government authorised the Governor to assent, though deploring the transaction. A Petition was presented to the Home Government from Newfound- land asking for the disallowance of the Act on strong grounds. The Colonial Secretary refused in a reasoned Despatch. Para- graph 7 contained these words : — " The right to complete and unfettered control over financial policy and arrangements is essential to self-government, and has been invariably acknowledged and respected by Her Majesty's Government and jealously guarded by the Colonies." Paragraphs 15 and 16 : — " In advising Her Majesty as to the exercise of her pre- rogative of disallowance, the Secretary of State has to consider the legislation submitted from a still more restricted point of view than the Governor. " That prerogative is a safeguard for the protection of those interests for which the Secretary of State is responsible to Her Majesty and to the Imperial Parliament. To advise its exercise in cases where only local interests are concerned would involve the Imperial Government * Respcmsihlc Government in ihe Dominions, Vol. ii., p. 1053. 11 Notes on the Supremacy of the Parliament of the United Kingdom — continued. in liability for matters of the control of which it has divested itself, and for which the Colony has accepted full responsibility." Under this doctrine the Parliament of the United Kingdom is debarred from interfering in legislative Acts of the Irish Parliament relating to the purely internal affairs of Ireland. If it be urged in reply that it is not contemplated that Ireland should have the same independence as Newfoundland, and that this is effected by its limited financial and legislative powers, the position is , not bettered ; in some respects it is made worse. For, with interference would arise friction and difficulty. As long as England does not intervene her authority is dormant, not actual ; as soon as she does intervene all the old troubles, which Home Rule was to end, are revived in an aggravated form. Nor can any perfection in the working of the new Constitution avoid this danger. As Professor Dicey says : — " Ireland may complain that the Imperial Parliament by legislation, or the Privy Council by interpretation, encroaches on her guaranteed rights. Great Britain may complain either that Irish members intermeddle in British affairs, and thus British rights are violated, or that the Privy Council so interprets the Constitution that the prerogatives of the Central Government are unduly diminished. Let us take the most sanguine view possible. Let us grant that both in England and Ireland every minister, every legislature, every judge is inspired with a spirit of disinterestedness and absolute fairness. This concession, immense though it is, does not exclude vital differences of opinion. In our Confederacy, as in every other, there will arise the contest between State rights and federal rights, between the authority of the Central Government and the State Government." 12 Notes on the Supremacy of the Parliament of the United Kingdom — continued. He adds : — " To imagine such complaints is not to assume that the Constitution works badly. They are of necessity inherent in the federal system."* Instances of this are to be found in abundance in Canada and Australia. The friction engendered by the conflict of Imperial and local claims will be enhanced by the presence of Irish representa- tives in the Imperial Parliament. When differences arise between the Imperial Government and the Colonies, they are settled by diplomatic negotiations, and friction is reduced to a minimum, though, as in the case of Natal, it may occasionally threaten danger. In Canada and Australia, when conflicts arise between the central and the local governments, friction is reduced by the fact that the aggrieved State is only one of many. In the case of Great Britain and Ireland neither of these palliatives would exist. The quarrel would always take the form of a small State being bullied by a larger, and the representatives of Ireland would be free to retaliate by interference with the purely domestic affairs of Great Britain. This is, indeed, a fatal defect of the Bill. In the federal Colonies, the representatives of a discontented State cannot embarrass other States ; they can only embarrass the Central Government in respect of matters of interest to themselves. Victoria, for example, cannot punish Queensland or New South Wales for the offences of the Common- wealth, nor can she punish the Commonwealth without hitting at herself. Were there a purely federal system in the United Kingdom, with a Central Government distinct from the four local governments, a similar result would accrue. But to admit Irish members to a Parliament which administers the local affairs of England, Wales and Scotland, is to invite the maximum of evil from differences between the Governments, and to perpetuate the congestion of Parliament which Home Rule was to alleviate. * Leap in the Dark, second edition, p. 18. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. Its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSE 2. (FIRST SERIES OF NOTES.) No. 2.— JUNE 24, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W. V. A S., Ltd.-38005. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda will be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League would appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He would also appreciate it if Members would, be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments thei/ have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster : and the teleplione number, Victoria -ISOS {two lines). CONTENTS. PAGE General Memorandum on Amendments 1 Memorandum on Mr. Sandys' Amendment 4 Industrial Legislation and International Relations .... 8 Power to discuss or pass resolutions . . . . . . .11 Recruiting and Treatment of Soldiers in Ireland 16 The Post Office 20 CLAUSE 2. GENERAL MEIVIORANDUIVI ON AMENDMENTS. Clause 2 defines the respective spheres oi action of the Parliaments of Ireland and the United Kingdom. It does so by giving Ireland all the powers which are not reserved to the Imperial Parliament. With the exception of a very few amendments, standing in the names of Liberal and Nationalist members, the amend- ments on the paper tend to enlarge the scope of the powers reserved to the Imperial Parliament, and, therefore, correspondingly to reduce those given to the Irish Legislature. Naturally, these questions vaiy in importance ; and special memoranda are appended dealing with those of the widest significance in the earlier part of the clause. A further series of memoranda will deal with the later amendments. Professor Morgan {The New Irish Constitution, p. 28) discusses the subject in words which merit quotation both because of his authority and because he is a Home Ruler : — " I cannot help regretting that, inasmuch as the principle has been adopted of giving Ireland general and unenumerated powers, the number of specific exemptions has not been enlarged. It is highly desirable to avoid conflict of laws in the United Kingdom so far as possible. It must be remembered that the Statute Book has, quite apart from the Act of LTnion, boimd Ireland to England by many legislative ties ; there is a uniform system of industrial, commercial, and, to some extent, criminal law for the whole of these Islands — Factory Acts, Companies Acts, the law of negotiable instruments, criminal procedure, old age pensions, and insurance legislation ; in all these there is legislative standardisation, and the tendency of all modern political unions, notably those of the Australian Commonwealth and the German Empire, is in this direction. Confusion, injustice, and economic inequalities constantly occur in a modern State whose inhabitants are living under a ' conflict of laws.' Fiscal considerations point tlie same way. It may be safely assumed that English opinion will not tolerate any considerable divergence between the General Memorandum on Amendments.— continued. fiscal systems of England and Ireland. Moreover, financial considerations apart, the regulation of ' trade ' is, as in every political union, reserved for the central legislature. But to distinguish between ' trade ' on the one hand and ' industry ' on the otlier is not an easy problem, and Ireland may discriminate against England only less effectively by lowering the standard of tlie P\actory Acts than by a tariff, " The ' subject matter ' of the Old Age Pensions Acts, National Insurance Acts, and Labour Exchanges Acts has, it is true, been excluded. It seems regrettable that the category is not enlarged to include the Companies Acts, the Sale of Goods Act, the Bills of Exchange Act, and the Factory Acts. It would be highly undesirable to have the ' industrial minimum ' for the United Kingdom, so laboriously attained by our factory legislation, lowered in the interests of particular interests in Ireland. The advantages of securing uniformity by the inclusion of the three great statutes relating to commercial law is also very obvious. Two of them, indeed, represent a great step in that codification of English law which is the dream of English jurists ; they have been adopted as a model in some of our colonies, and it would setm highly desirable that the standard thus attained should remain fixed. In urging this, I do not forget what I have already said, in connection with the subject of constitutional limitations, as to the undesirability of exacting too rigid a, degree of uniformity in English and Irish legislation, but constitutional limitations are one thing and exceptions quite another. It is very difficult to subject tlie whole field of Irish legislation to juristic principles, but it is comparatively easy to exempt from that field the subject matter of particular Acts. The whole question resolves itself into a consideration of the point at which uniformitj^ should be determined. The Bill seems to fix tlie point much too low. " Of course, one way of dealing with the question would have been to grant Ireland only particular and enumerated powers of legislation, as has been done in the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada. There is much to be said for this. It seems the line of least resistance ; it is always easier to add to powers which appear deficient than to withdraw powers which have proved excessive. But it undoubtedly invites litigation, and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what arc General Memorandum on Amendments.— confinwed. exclusively Irisli matters without in the last resort using some such general term (as is used in the British North America Act) as ' generally all matters of a merely local nature.' . , " The whole weight of control over the Irish legislature is thrown upon the executive and legislative veto of the Imperial Government. Is it sufficient to rely upon the paramount power of the Imperial Parliament to override by statute Irish legislation A\'liich may be inequitable or inexpedient, and upon the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government ? These checks are the exercise of a jorce majeure, which is often invidious and always difficult. Above all they are political. The exercise of them depends on the party in power in Great Britain, and as such it may excite resentment among the Irish people as an invasion of the autonomy granted to them. On the other hand, exceptions and restrictions are a legal, not a political, check — they operate through the agency of the courts of law without the intervention of political considei-ations. Moreover — and this perhaps is the most important con- sideration — they rest upon the consent of the Irish people expressed in the terms of the Home Rule Act to which their representatives are a party. For an Irish Parliament to defy them would be to defy the very Act \vhich was the charter of its existence. But they invite litigation. It all resolves itself into a question of hitting the mean between the dangers of litigation on the one hand and of political pressure on the other." MEMORANDUM ON MR. SANDYS' AMENDMENT. This clause deals with the powers of the Irish ParUament. There are two methods of assigning powers to a subsidiary or subordinate ParUament. Either by the devohition of specific duties and powers to the subordinate Assembly, or by the reserva- tion of certain powers to the supreme Parliament. The latter is the method adopted in the Bill, which thus follows the example of Australia, though in the case of Australia it was the existing subordinate Parliaments whicli were resigning some of their powers to a new Central Parliament and not as here a Central Parliament abandoning powers to a subordinate Parliament. It was natui'al therefore in the Australian case that the powers of the supreme Parliament should be defined. But it affords no justification for following the same plan in the case of an Irish Parliament. Mr. Sandys' amendment, which prescribes the matters in respect of which the Irish Parliament may legislate, follows the precedent of Canada and South Africa, and thus opens the broad discussion on the merits of the rival systems. The difference is one between the federal and the unitary systems. In South Africa federalism is frankly abandoned ; in Canada, though there is an attempt to secure Quebec a definite place by fixing tlie number of its representatives in the Dominion House of Commons, there is, as Keith points out, no really satisfactory federal character about the House at all. In order to secure the definite authority of the Dominion Parliament, the definition of the powers of the Provincial Assemblies is supplemented by a definition of the matters coming exclusively within the purview of the Central Authority. In spite of this, however, Keith (Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol. 11, p. 671) makes this striking observation. " The expectations, if they really held them — for s. 91 (16) seem to show that they realised the prospect of conflict — of the framers of the Act have not been realised. The number of cases which have been raised and decided on the Act is almost appalling, and it is really a matter for serious consideration when the advantages of the form of federal ff,\}G^' Memorandum on Mr. Sandys' AmenimeM— continued. government are considered. Indeed, tJie complication result- ing was one of the main reasons why the framers of the Union of South Africa definitely decided to abandon any idea of having provinces in that country." It is noteworthy that several of these conflicts arose over educational questions in which the Roman Catholic minority claimed that their rights and privileges were violated by illegal enactments of the Provincial Legislatures, e.g., New Brunswick, 1871 ; Prince Edward Island, 1877 ; Manitoba, 1890. See Keith, Vol. 2, pp. 690 seq. Other important cases also arose. From time to time the Provincial Legislatures have attempted to extend their powers and privileges. Some were disallowed, others, Avith some incon- sistency were allowed. Nova Scotia, for instance, legislated in 1876 to secure the power of punishing offenders against the authority of the Legislature, though the Dominion alone has the control of the Criminal law, and the Act purported to make the two Houses in matters of privilege Courts of Record. And this Act was allowed. If such difficulties can arise under the non-federal constitu- tion of Canada, it is not surprising that under the federal system of Australia controversies have been frequent, and infinitely more deep reaching. Indeed, in Australia, the differences have not been confined to legal questions of comparatively narrow sig- nificance, but have arisen on great constitutional issues which might easily have led to the disruption of the Conmionwealth, or at least would have resulted in the reduction of the Federal Parliament to the position of a nonentity. A notable case is that of the Vondel, a Dutch vessel. The Government of South Australia refused to arrest the crew in accordance with the treaty between Holland and Great Britain for the arrest of deserters from merchant vessels. The Imperial Government asked the Governor-General for a report on the matter, and the Commonwealth Government asked the South Memorandum on Mr. Sandys' Amwiment— continued, Australian Government for a report. The latter replied that the matter should be dealt with directly between the Imperial Govern- ment and the Government of South Australia, denying the right of the Commonwealth Government to intervene, and claiming that the Consular representatives should deal with them. The Commonwealth Government contended that the case fell within the provisions of the Constitution as affecting firstly, external affairs ; secondly, trade and commerce with foreign States ; thirdly, navigation and shipping, and considered that the Consular representatives should have approached them and not the South Australian Government. A prolonged controversy ensued, the Imperial Government finally taking the view that the Federal Government was in the right. The question of State rights was again raised on the question of the Imperial Conference in 1907. The Australian States contended that they should be invited as well as the Common- wealth representatives, and described the Commonwealth Govern- ment as practically an agency for the management, under the united control, of the Customs and Excise, postal and defence departments of the six States. It was pointed out that the Federal Government could not represent the States in those matters over which they had control. Keith observes that these contentions received some support in various judgments of the High Court, where the States are talked of as sovereign powers within their own ambits, and placed beside the Commonwealth, also described as a sovereign power. It is admitted, however, that all these bodies are subject to the paramount authority of the Imperial Parliament. So, in the view of the High Court, the Australian States, though not sovereign powers qua their relation to the United Kingdom, are sovereign powers qua their relation to the Commonwealth. And here it may be observed that such powers are claimed, and frequently allowed, although Customs and Excise admittedly belong to the Federal Parliament. The claims would apparently Memorandum on Mr. Sandys' Amendment— con/mwetf. be strengthened had the Austrahan States the power of varying the Customs, Excise and other Federal taxes, whieh is given to Ireland in the Home Rule Bill. Considerable difficulties have also arisen between the State and Federal Governments over many other subjects, and notably on labour disputes. These will arise particularly on amendments removing the Trade Disputes Act from the purview of the Irish Parliament, but, broadly, the result of judicial decisions is this — that the power of Federal Government to end labour disputes even in cases where they affect the whole Commonwealth, and where their settlement is made difficult by the varying legislation of different States, is to a great extent vague and indeterminate. It appears, therefore, that a Federal system, in which the residual powers belong to the several States, is prolific in dis- agreements which threaten the very existence of the Federal Union ; as is shown by the attempts which have been made by the Commonwealth Government to arrogate to itself extended powers. Even such a system as that of Canada, where the constitu- tional system is not Federal, and where the residual powers belong to the Central Government, friction is constant, appeals to the Courts appalling in numbers, and minorities in the Provinces are subject to serious grievances. The unitary system of South Africa alone promises freedom from these grave detects. In that country, where the Provincial Councils are subordinate in the strictest sense of the word, the Parh anient is as free to carry out constitutional reform as the Parliament of the United Kingdom is to-day. While the Provinces manage their local affairs and can raise local taxes for the purpose, they are subject to the review of the Union Parliament. Local grievances there may be, as everywhere ; but constitutional friction is eliminated, the interpretation of constitutional problems is not a constant duty of the Courts, the national business is unhampered by divisional squabbles. INDUSTRIAL LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. There are certain points arising under this Clause whicli appear seriously to impair the supremacy of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, so strongly asserted in Clause 1. By Subsection 4 the Irish Parliament is prohibited from making treaties or entering into relations with Foreign States, or with otlier parts of the Empire. But, though Ireland cannot take positive action in such matters, there is nothing to prevent her from embarrassing the treaty-making power of the Imperial Government. To take one case — Factories and Workshops legislation. Modern tendency is towards the internationalisation of industrial legislation, and rightly, because otherwise industrial reforms, urgently needed, might involve the dislocation or destruction of industries. The nation w^hieh tried most to improve the conditions of its workers might find, probably would find, itself hopelessly handicapped in the competition with other nations less advanced or humane. Already international action has been taken in such matters as the night work of women and the use of white phosphorus. The prevention of sweating and of the use of deleterious substances in certain manufactures are objects which can only be o'btained by similar action, and events appear to be moving towards that consiuiimation. The United Kingdom lias been prominent in this movement, but the passage of the Home Rule Bill must necessarily cripple its action. Let us suppose an Industrial Conference being held such as the Berlin Conference of 1891, or the Berne Con- ference of 1906. Great Britain would be represented, but Ireland could not. Either Ireland would be entirely unrepre- sented at the Conference, or she would have to be represented by the British Delegate. But the British Delegate woidd have no power to bind Ireland to fall into line with the decisions of the Conference, unless he received authority to do so from the \J^C?TA^^ Industrial Legislation and International Re\at\ons.~continued. Irish (Jovernment, since the control of industrial legislation will belong to the Irish Government. Now, if he gets direct authority from the Irish Government, he is to that extent tlie representative of Ireland, and to that extent Ireland will have power, in defiance of Subsection 4, to make agreements with foreign Powers. In that case his instructions from Ireland might differ from his instructions from the Imperial Govern- ment, which would be absurd. If he has no instructions from Ireland and she is unrepresented, she can refuse to pass legislation to meet the decision of the Conference, and the Imperial Govern- ment cannot compel her to do so. Of course the two Govern- ments might arrive at a common basis of policy before entering the Conference, but in either case the authority of the Imperial Government and Parliament is impaired. There are two cases which may be cited in illustration. The Berne Convention of 1906 arrived at an international agreement on the subject of the use of white phosphorus. The Government of the United States was a party to the agreement, but was unable to enforce the decision because industrial legis- lation lay with the State Legislatures. To remedy the defect proposals were even made for an amendment of the Constitution, a proceeding very repugnant to American thought, and it is only recently that the use of white phosphorus has been stopped by the clumsy expedient of placing a prohibitive duty on tlie import, and a prohibitive excise on the manufacture, of matches containing the noxious material. Even such an expedient would be un- availing in the case of Ireland, seeing that that country would have power to reduce the import duty and the excise. The second illustration is to be found in the complications which have occurred between the Imperial Government and Newfoundland over Treaty questions. In 1857 the Imperial Government ratified a Treaty with France regarding French fishing rights, but as the Newfoundland Legislature refused to 10 Industrial Legislation and international Relations. — continued. pass the necessary legislation it never came into force. Similar causes prevented the ratification of the Treaty of Washington, 1888. Similarly, the power to vary Customs duties given to the Irish Parliament might embarrass the Imperial Government in making commercial Treaties. The control of industrial legislation by the Irish Parliament must also gravely impair the power of the Imperial Parliament to legislate for the improvement of the condition of the workers within Great Britain. Industrial affairs tend to become inter- national because it has been found that for their satisfactory settlement the nation is too small a unit. But under this Bill the unit is being still further reduced, with the inevitable result that effective reform in the United Kingdom will be made more difficult. Were Great Britain, for example, to establish an eight- hours day, while Ireland adhered to a ten-hour system, British industry would be handicapped. The repeal of the Trade Disputes Act by Ireland, while it remained in force in Great Britain, would create manifest complications. It is, of course, urged — " trust the Irish people." W^hy, it is asked, should not Irish working men be relied on to secure as good terms for themselves as their British comrades, and that, therefore, the legislation of the two countries would run parallel. The answer is simple. In Ireland urban industries would be politically powerless. The vast majority of the electorate is agricultural, and is largely composed of men owning and culti- vating their own land. No class, perhaps, would be less in sympathy with the demands of industry. The Bill itself places urban industry at a hopeless disadvantage. The borough Members will number only 34 in a House of 164, and the Irish Labour Party are already criticising the Bill in respect of this under-representation of urban industrial districts. United with Great Britain, Irish Labour has protection it cannot secure by itself ; separated from Ireland, British Labour finds its efforts at reform seriously compromised. 11 POWER TO DISCUSS OR PASS RESOLUTIONS. Amendments stand in the names of Captain Craig and others forbidding the Irish Parliament to discuss or pass Resolutions. This is a matter, as Mr. Gladstone admitted in 1893, of great importance. In 1886, in introducing the Home Rule Bill, Mr. Gladstone said : — " I will now tell the House — and I would beg particular attention to this — what are the functions that we propose to withdraw from the cognisance of this Legislative Body." And in 1893, February 13th, referring to the powers to be given to the Irish Legislature, he said : — " That power is subject to a double limitation, which I will describe. First of all it is subject to the necessary and obvious limitation that certain heads are i-eserved to Parliament — not reserved as given to Parliament, but reserved by way of excluding the new Irish Legislature from doing any act in relation to them." In their plain meaning these words prohibit the Irish Legislature from doing anything in respect of reserved matterS;^ In the debate on Lord Wolmer's amendment — similar to those now under discussion — Mr. Gladstone said that the words only referred to legislative action. But such a limited restriction is no safeguard against the serious embarrassment of the Kingdom by the Irish Parliament. There are many things which can be done by Resolution. For example, in 1893, a Resolution was passed by which the Lord Chancellor was pledged to certain conditions in the appointment of Justices of the Peace, a step which would naturally in a Constitutional country require an Act of Parliament. The crisis which arose between Great Britain and Ireland over the Regency question arose on a Resolution passed by Grattan's Parliament. Mr. Grattan refused to proceed by Bill, but the 12 Power to Discuss or Pass Resolutions — continued. Resolution caused all the trouble. The position of the Lord Lieutenant would be made difficult were he liable to Resolutions of Censure whenever he vetoed a Bill. It would be possible for the L-ish Parliament to pass a Resolution condenming a war, or calling for a war, in either case seriously embarrassing the Imperial Government. And experience shows that the tendency of Irish assemblies is to pass Resolutions of such a nature, as was done within easy recollection by the Nationalist County Councils during the South African War. It is on record that the Crimean War was pre- cipitated by the Resolutions and actions of the Peace Party, which made Russia think that Great Britain would not fight. How much more serious would be similar action by a Parliament. Tlie Irish Parliament might pass a Resolution calling for the voluntary formation of a military force — Volunteers. Then again, though Ireland is precluded from making laws in regard to foreign relations, the Parliament might by Resolution send an envoy to a foreign State. This point was strongly urged in 1893, and it is to be noted that Ireland, with the power now to be given her of varying Customs duties, would have much more justification for sending envoys than she had in 1893. Mr. Gladstone objected that the Irish Parliament could not send envoys because it could not pay them without an Act of Parlia- ment or accredit them to a foreign Court. But Mr. Gladstone himself was a party to sending Mr. Errington on a Mission to the Vatican without any provision for his remuneration. As to the accrediting of envoys. Mason and Slideil were not accredited by the Confederate States ; Franklin was not accredited to the French Court, yet he got the American States recognised, and brought about an alliance between them and France. Mr. Freeman Mitford said that in his diplomatic experience he had seen men sent over by enemies of a Government who had seriously embarrassed Ambassadors in negotiations. 13 Power to Discuss or Pass Resolutions — continued. Again, the Irish Parliament migiit pass Resolutions con- demnatory of tlie Acts of Judges in convicting persons for poUtical or quasi-poHtical offences. Mr. Gladstone's objections to I-ord \Volmer's amendment were in substance four : — (1) That it would destroy the riglit of the Irish Parliament to petition. No doubt it would, as a Parliament. But it would not take away the individual right of the Members to petition and Ireland is still to be represented in the Imperial Parliament. Nor would it prevent the Irish Government from making representations to the Imperial Government. (2) That such a restriction would infringe freedom of dis- cussion. But the Bill interferes with freedom of legislation, and if this be no hardship, restriction of fruitless discussion can be no hardship. If it be a hardship, it would show that such discussions would not be fruitless ; they would have tangible results. If so. they would transgress the limitations on the power of the Irish Legislature and should not be permitted. (3) That a Resolution was not an Act, He would prohibit the latter, but not the former. But it is held that a Resolution of Parliament is a serious thing, and that effect should be given to it. Indeed, some important legislation has its origin in Resolutions. For example, the Parliament Bill was founded on Resolutions passed in 1910. And Mr. Asquith himself may be cited as a witness to the force and authority of Parliament"^ ry Resolutions. During the debate on the Parliament Bill, he was charged with having acted unconstitutionally in having obtained certain guarantees from the King. In February he had said, "To ask in advance for a blank authority for an indefinite exercise of the Royal Prerogative in regard to a measure which has never been submitted to or approved by the House of Commons is a request which, in my judgment, no constitutional Statesman can properly make." 14 Power to Discuss or Pass Resolutions — continued. Ccaifruiited witli these words, Mr. Asquith defended himself by si-ying that "The three Resohitions embodied the whole of the principles of the Bill, and were passed by a large majority." According to this dictum, Resolutions may take the place of a measure. (See Hansard, Aug. 7, 1911. Vol. 29, col. 818.) (4) That the prohibition could not be enforced. This, indeed, was I\Ir. Gladstone's main contention, and some of his words deserve quotation. " I would ask whether it is wise, not for the sake of the Irish Legislature, but for our own sake, to make pro- hibitions which we supply no means of enforcing ? " " What would be the position of this House if the prohibitions which we are now asked to impose were dis- regarded ? These prohibitions might be flaunted in the face of this Parliament, and might be disregarded by the Irish Parliament." " I would have no sympathy with the Irish Legislature if it should proceed to perform acts which were manifestly inconsistent with the Act of Parliament ; and I would say : ' If you can stop such acts without inconvenience, stop them.' The diificulty which I feel, however, is that they could not stop them." It is not quite correct to say that there is no power of enforcing the prohibitions, because the Speaker of the Irish Assembly might be precluded from accepting or putting a Resolution dealing with reserved matters. But if Mr. Gladstone's statement was accurate, he proved too much. Mr. Balfour put the point well : — " Is the right hon. Gentleman now going to tell the House that if we make a contract with the Irish Legislature that contract is to be absolutely worthless because it cannot be enforced. By that one argument the right hon. Gentle- man has demolished the whole fabric by which he endeavours to support his Bill. We now know from his own lips, and on his own authority, what value he attaches to these contracts between the British Parliament and the Irish Legislature." 15 Power to Discuss or Pass Resolutions— con/mwerf. Mr. Gladstone also aigueil that Colonial Legislatures had full riglit of passing Resolutions. Against this, there is no limitation on the legislative freedom of the Colonies. Ireland's legislative powers are restricted in respect of certain matters, and it is in respect to them that her power of passing Resolutions would be restricted. The power of passing Resolutions on the reserved subjects would be the method by which Ireland could blackmail England. It would be the motive force of the doctrine: "England's necessity is Ireland's opportunity." Sir John Rigby — Solicitor-General, and tlie only Home Ruler, besides ]Mr. Gladstone, who spoke — said the debate had been very enlightening. Regarding the possible sending of an envoy to a foreign Power, he did not deny that it might be done, but met it with a curious argument. Irish rebels now might send an ambassador to any Power with which we were at war. He omitted to observe that an ambassador from a Parlia- ment would occupy quite a different position to that of a faction. Replying to the case of Mr. Franklin, he said that Franklin was an envoy to our enemies. If he had gone as an ambassador to our friends we would have had just cause to go to war with them, because it is against the law of Nations for a friendly Power to receive an ambassador from the rebels of an ally. The privilege of declaring war does not appear to be a satisfactory solatium for conferring the power of sending ambassadors on Ireland. Moreover, as has been suggested above, Ireland, with the power of varying Customs duties, could very seriously embarrass our representatives in commercial negotiations by sending a representative to expound his views, and could also hinder industrial international agreements by her control of industrial legislation. 16 RECRUITING AND TREATMENT OF SOLDIERS IN IRELAND. Aniendnieuts stand in the names of 3Ir. Rutherford and others prohibiting the Irish Parhanient from making laws deahng with recruiting for the forces of the Crown, or imposing any con- ditions or impediments to recruiting or to service. Sir R. Pole- Carew has an amendment to protect the civil hberties and privi- leges of any portion of the forces of the Crown stationed in Ireland. Tlie necessity for such provisions will be obvious from the following speeches and actions by Irish Nationalists. As an example of how the civil privileges and liberties of soldiers are affected, the following case is instructive. It was reported in the Belfast News Letter, Nov. 8th, 1909 :— " A tenant of the Tobercurry Rural Council, named Leheny, gave lodging accommodation to a Royal Engineer who was engaged in making a survey of the district. It appears that a number of Royal Engineers who have been engaged in the work have been refused lodgings. Leheny's conduct was reported to the Rural Coimcil, when the following discussion took place : — Mr. Anderson, a member, said he would prefer that Irishmen, not Enghsh soldiers, should occupy the Council's cottages. The Clerk : I think the District Coiuicil are under no obligation to provide cottages for sappers. Mr. McManus said that there were plenty of Irishmen who were sappers, whereupon another member retorted that there was always an Irishman who was a traitor. Several members suggested proceedings against the tenant. The rent collector said he wrote to Leheny " to have the soldier cleared out before the next meeting of the Council." Leheney excused himself by saying " the poor man is looking for a house and can get none, and I thought it no harm to let him in for a few weeks." Mr. Henry : Make an order to have him cleared out, and if he has not left before this day week we will prosecute Leheny." An order to this effect was made. 17 Recruiting and Treatment of Soldiers in Irelanti.—continued. The following quotations illustrate the Nationalist attitude t owavds recruiting. In November, 1908, the Corporation of Cork refused to consider and agreed to consign to the wastepaper basket a letter from the Recruiting Officer of the Cork District, intimating that " as a means of mitigating the want of employment in the city during the coming winter," he had been directed by the War Office to call the attention of the Corporation to the Special Reserve, and asking the Corporation to direct anyone wishing to join to the Re- cruiting Officer. It was also agreed, as a set off to this disagreeable incident, officially to invite the American Fleet to visit Cork." — Daihj Independent, Nov. 15th, 1908. Extract from poster issued in Enniscoithy, January, 1909 : — Join the Arjiy. Sell your souls, your country, and your God for the Saxon shilling. Join England's hireling murderers. Your reward will be a life of immoral- ity, and a dog's death in gaol, or by the roadside. Go to India, to murder women and children, and shoot down men who are fighting for liberty. Join the Police. Become one of England's paid spies and murderers. Soldiers and peelers are alike : don't associate with them ; make it impossible for England to get recruits here and her power is at an end. God Save Ireland, and to Hell with England. Resolution passed by Tralee Board of Guardians : — " That we, tlie Tralee Board of Guardians, most strongly protest against the recent Christmas treat being made the occasion of turning the workhouse into a recruiting ground for the British Army." — Kerry People, Jan. 9th, 1909. 18 Recruiting and Treatment of Soldiers in IrelsMi.— continued. The offence on this occasion consisted of having a mihtary band and displaying the Union Jack. Various members of Parhament have also made speeches against enlistment. Mr. Patrick O'Brien. DubUn. Oct. 1st, 1899. " He would not say shame to the Irishmen who belonged to British regiments, because he had hopes that before they lined up against the Boers, they would remember they were Irishmen, and that instead of firing on the Boers they would fire on the Englishmen." Mr. T. O'Donnell. Churchill, Co. Kerry. Sept. 29th, 1901. " He was passing through Tralee that day, and a more sickening, disgraceful sight he had never witnessed than what he saw there. ... To see a fine, brave, hearty lot of young Irishmen marching in red coats down the streets of Tralee . . . was a spectacle that should bring the blush of shame to the cheek of every self-supporting Irishman." Mr. Joyce. Knocklong. Oct. 6th, 1901. " He had pledged himself to denounce on every public platform this system of enlistment in England's coward army." Mr. Joyce. Patrickswell. Oct. 20th, 1901. " He would advise young men, if the recruiting sergeant came within their reach ... to tell him to go to the devil, and to tell him that they had an army at home that they would join, the United League Army." Ml-. John Dillon. Tralee. Oct. 20th, 1911. " I see there is a gentleman coming over here looking for recruits for the Irish Guards. I hope you will put him out of Kerry if he comes here." Major M'Bride, reported in the hilkenntf People, Dec. 4-th, 1909 :— " I appeal to you most earnestly to do all in your power to prevent your countrymen from entering the degraded 19 Recruiting and Treatment of Soldiers in Ireland. — continued. British Army. If you prevent 500 men from enlisting you do nearly as good work, if not quite so exciting, as if you shot 500 men in the field of battle, and also you are making the path smoother for the approaching conquest of England by Germany. Let one of your mottoes be ' No recruits for England.' " Various proclamations have been issued from time to time too long for quotation. Examples are given in the pamphlet " Convicted," edited by Mr. Ian Malcolm, ]M.P. One sentence, however, bears repetition :— " Hearken to the words of Father Kavanagh, the Irish Franciscian Patriot Priest, who pronounces it a heinous crime against Ireland for Irishmen to enter the forces of robber England ; and he who engages in one of England's imjust wars is guilty of deadly sin." THE POST OFFICE. Under the Home Rule Bill the control of the Postal Services, including telegraphs of all kinds and telephones, passes to the Irish Government, In dividing the Postal Services of the Kingdom the Government depart from almost universal pre- cedent. Some German States have separate postal systems, a privilege not unnatural seeing that they are still Kingdoms, and that the federal ties of the Empire are loose. But in all other federal systems the Postal Services are retained in the hands of the Central authority. In 1893 the question was not discussed either in Committee or on Report, owing to the operation of the Closure, but the arguments which might then have been advanced have now added confirmation, owing to the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth and the Union of South Africa. In Australia there were six States, in South Africa four, each with their separate postal systems. But, alike under the unitary constitution of South Africa and the federalism of Australia under which all the residual powers belong to the States, the Postal Services have been unified. The framers of these Constitutions abolished estab- lished and independent organisations, recognised all over the world, under the sense of the urgent necessity of having undivided control. Under the same conviction the States abandoned, doubtless with regret, the privilege of having their own stamps, emblems of their individuality. The grant of Home Rule does not necessitate such heroic measures. All that we have to do is to leave well alone. Instead of that it is proposed to create two postal systems instead of one, and to enrich philately by a new issue of stamps, in pure wantonness and without any shadow of suggestion that the existing system is inimical to Irish interests. Just as adherence to the Colonial precedent would be the easier course to follow, so also do the necessities of our condition 21 The Post Office — continued. make it infinitely more imperative for us. The postal and tele- graph systems of Great Britain and Ireland are far more inter- dependent than were those of the separate Colonies ; they are far more important in their relation to foreign States ; they subserve far greater commercial interests ; they are infinitely more essential to national defence and Imperial administration. The question of letters and parcels does not call for detailed conmient, although if Ireland fovmd herself compelled to econo- mise, considerable inconvenience might be caused in many districts by the withdrawal of facilities which they now enjoy. A similar result might follow in the case of the telegraph service. The limits of free delivery might be reduced, the result of which would be either that the sender of a telegram in England would have to pay more to send the telegram than would the sender in Ireland, or that the recipient of a telegram in Ireland would have to pay more than the recipient in England. In the former case he would get fewer telegrams, in the latter he woidd incur heavier expense, in either case he would suffer. It is, however, principally in regard of the telegraphic service that the division of the postal system threatens to be disastrous. For commerce and industry, unity of administration in the tele- graphs is an absolute essential of efficiency. The system of the great cable companies is based on such unity, and it is that unity, extending to every cable station, whether on British or foreign territory, which enables them to serve the public better than any combination of States. Experienced postal administrators find it most difficult to secure efficiency in the relations between various countries ; and the excellence of the telegraphic com- munications between Great Britain and Ii*eland is due to the unity of administration. It has been said that telegraphs are the nerves of a State, that in respect of them no part of a country can live to itself, all must rejoice or suffer together. 22 The Post Office -continued. But if for commercial and industrial purposes telegraphic unity is important, for National pm'poses it becomes a question of life and death. It is almost unnecessary to point to Britain's strategical position and to the conditions which would govern national defence in support of that proposition. She maintains a chain of signalling stations round the coast, from which intelligence is despatched to headquarters and from which head- quarters orders and information from other stations are con- veyed to naval and military commanders. If it be urged that we might rely on Irish co-operation, or that in emergency the Irish telegraph system might be placed at Great Britain's disposal, the answer is that such temporary expedient would not be enough. The efficiency of the telegraphic service in war comes from a careful previous planning and maintenance ; it must be planned beforehand from the military point of view, and its working nuist be familiar if it is to be effective. In this connection, another important point arises. The only place in the United Kingdom where the army can be trained in practical railway telegraph work is Ireland. There the Post Office maintains the railway telegraphs, which in Great Britain are worked by the companies. It, therefore, becomes an important question whether by the severance of the Irish telegraph system, the Engineers will be deprived of the practical training they now obtain in Ireland. No doubt these criticisms will be met by the stereotyped replies — " these matters will be subject to arrangement " and " trust the Irish people." But we cannot ignore the existence of an extreme section of Irish thought, which is not satisfied with the Bill, which will be satisfied with nothing short of Separation, and which will not have its avowed anti-British sympathies modified by the concessions of this measure. This faction, even if numerically the weaker, could delay or frustrate arrangements, and could oppose obstacles to co-operation at a crisis when a moment's delay might spell ruin. The Post Offiee—continued. The questions arising under Clause 2 are of a broad and general character. Sub-section (c) of Clause 44, which provides that " regulations with respect to the relations of the Irish and British Post Offices " may be made by Order in Council, will raise many special questions of a highly important character. For instance, there is the obligation on the Postmaster-General, under 31 and 32 Vict., to set aside special wires for newspaper work at night, and the obligation to provide land wires for cable companies. Will the statutory obligation rest on him, or will he share it with the Irish Postmaster-General ? There is the question of the Post Office monopoly, and the extent to which the Irish Government can infringe it by the grant of licences. There is the question of the wireless stations in Ireland, and who shall control them. There is the question of the landing of submarine cables, permission for which is granted or refused by the Board of Trade. With whom will this power lie in future ? There is the question of terminal and transit rates on tele- grams to and from foreign countries, charges for telegrams and rules for counting words. Are these to remain uniform or not ? This note has been mainly devoted by the telegraphic side of the postal administration, because the mischief of separating the systems is far greater in regard to it than in the matter of postal packets. The latter might cause inconvenience, the former threatens danger as well. And this inconvenience and danger is to be incurred without cause or reason, except perhaps the gratification of a vague national sentiment. There is not even the justification that Ireland should enjoy the proceeds of her postal systems, because that system is now being run at a loss. The proposal, therefore. 24 The Post OtRu— continued. can be considered in the ligiit of some criticisms passed by the Federation of Trades Unions last November on the separation of National Insurance. " We ax'e told," wrote the Secretary of the Federation, " that all the complications following upon the denational- ising of the scheme must be endiu'ed because national senti- ment demands four sets of Commissioners. In the Trade Union movement we have little use for that kind of national sentiment which manifests itself in the creation of divisions between people whose interests are identical, and which proposes to set up anomalies between one country and another." The separation of the Post Offices does not produce compli- cations and anomalies only, it threatens national danger. Lord MacDonnell, writing on Irish Administration under Home Rule {Tfie New Irish Constitution, p. 57) says : — " The Administration of Posts and Telegraphs in Ireland is intimately associated with the Department's Administration in Great Britain, and though Ireland has an indefeasible claim to the great bulk of the patronage within her shores ... I fail to see in that claim sufficient justifica- tion for localising the Irish part of the business and thereby incurring the risk of dislocating the working of a great Imperial Department. And my objection ... is emphasised by the fact that in Ireland this Department is worked at a loss of about a quarter of a million sterling annually. There would, therefore, be a tendency on the part of the new Irish Government to curtail expenditure on the Post Office, to the detriment of the public convenience of the United Kingdom." But control of the Post Office means control of much patronage, iuid there we have the determining factor. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. Its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule BiH. The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4303 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSE 2. (SECOND SERIES OF NOTES.) No. 3.— OCTOBER 8, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER. S.W. V. A S., Ltd.— 39418. 3 NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda wil! be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League would appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He ivould also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary zvill be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number, Victoria 4503 {two lines). CONTENTS. PAGE Educational Institutions — ^Universities 1 Security of Life, Liberty, and Property ....... 8 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of Children ..... .12 The Judiciary 2(5 Factories, Workshops, etc. ......... 33 Tower of Irish Parliament to give Bounties ...... 39 1 EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS— UNIVERSITIES. The Question of Safeguards. Various amendments have been put down on Clauses 2 and 3, the object of which is to protect Trinity College, Dublin, and the Belfast University in respect of their rights, privileges and property. They run as follows : — Mr. Walter Guinness. Clause 2, page 2, line 15, at end, insert : — (5) " Trinitv College, Dublin, or the University of Dublin." Sir P. Magnus. Clause 2, page 2, line 16, at end, insert: — (6) " Queen's University, Belfast." Mr. Peto. Clause 3, page 3, line 23, at end, insert : — " Or impose any disability upon any corporation or institution constituted or existing by virtue of the law of any part of His Majesty's Dominions and carrying on operations in Ireland on account of any person by whom or in whose favour, or the place in which any of its operations are carried on." Mr. Walter Guinness. Clause 3, page 3, line 23, at end, insert : — "Or affect the constitution, endowments, property, rights or privileges of Dublin University, or Trinity College, Dubhn." iTASypi Educational Institutions— Universities— confmued. Mr. James Hope. Clause 3, page 3, line 23, at end, insert : — " Or deprive any existing corporation incorporated by royal charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament (not being a corporation raising for public purposes taxes, rates, cess, dues, or tolls or administering funds so raised) of its rights, privileges or property without due pi'ocesh of law." It is to be remarked that the present Bill contains none of those safeguards for corporations and institutions wliich appeared in the Bills of 1886 and 1893. Clause 4 of the Bill of 1886 ran thus :— 4. The Irish Legislature shall not make any law : — (1) Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or prohibiting the free exei'cise thereof ; or (2) Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, on account of religious belief ; or (3) Abrogating or derogating from the right to establish or maintain any place of denominational education or any denominational institution or charity ; or . . . (5) Impairing, without either the leave of Her Majesty in Council first obtained on an address presented by the Legislative Body of Ireland, or the consent of the corporation interested, the rights, property, or privileges of any existing corporation incorporated by royal charter or local and general Act of Parliament. . . . Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893 followed the first three subsections of the above clause accurately. Subsection (6) ran as follows : — (6) Whereby any existing corporation incorporated by royal charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament (not being a corporation raising for public purj^oses taxes, rates, cess, dues, or tolls, or administering funds so raised) may, unless it consents, or the leave of Her Majesty is first obtained on address from the two Houses of the Irish Legislature, be deprived of its rights, privileges, or property without due process of law. Educational Institutions— Universities— con^mt^ed Thus, as introduced, both these Bills contained strong safeguards. But the safeguards were further extended in Committee in the 1893 Bill. Clause 4, as it left Committee, ran as follows : — 4. The powers of the Irish Legislature shall not extend to the making of any law : — (1) Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, whether directly or indirectly, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ; or (2) Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, advantage, or benefit, on account of religious belief, or raising or appropriating directly or indirectly, save as hereto- fore, any public revenue for any religious purpose, or for the benefit of the holder of any religious office as such ; or (3) Diverting the property or without its consent alter- ing the constitution of any religioiis body ; or (4) Abrogating or prejudicially affecting the right to establish or maintain any place of denominational education or any denominational institution or charity ; or (5) Whereby there may be established and endowed out of public funds any theological professorship or any university or college in which the conditions set out in the University of Dublin Tests Act, 1873, are not observed ; or . . . (9) Whereby any existing corporation incorporated by royal charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament may, unless it consents, or the leave of Her 3Iajesty is first obtained on address from the two Houses of the Irish Legislature, be deprived of its rights, privileges, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents, and so far as respects property without just compensation. Provided nothing in this sub- section shall prevent the Irish Legislature from dealing with any public department, municipal corporation, or local authority, or with any corporation administering for public purposes taxes, rates, cess, dues, or tolls, so far as concerns the same. By a curious irony Trinity College, Dublin, is exposed to the risk of interference from the Irish Parliament because it Educational Institutions— Universities— co^/nfu^^/. is undenominational. Were it a purely Protestant institution, as it was from the 16th century to 1793, it might possibly come within the provisions of Clause 3 of the Home Rule Bill, which prohibits the Irish Parliament from " imposing any disability or disadvantage on account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status." But, just because it is unsectarian, and has thrown open every office, except tliree or four Theological Professorships (expressly excepted from the Tests Act, 1873), it is placed entirely at the mercy of the Irish Parliament. Its endowments might be taken, it nn'ght be merged in the National University, its status and constitution might be radically changed. As an example of what might be done, it may be observed that in 1873 it was actually proposed by the Liberal Government to prohibit the teaching of philosophy and history in the Dublin University in order to make it possible to introduce a Catholic College into the University. It may be urged that such a danger is reduced by the estab- lishment of the New University in 1909. That seems more than doubtful. The National University does not seem to be more acceptable to the Catholic Hierarchy than Trinity College, or the Queen's Colleges, which were denounced as " godless," and which Catholics were prohibited from entering on that account. On June 25th last Cardinal Logue made some instruc- tive observations on the subject. Referring to the National University as " a pagan bantling that had been dropped in their midst," he said that, " please God, if they could they would baptise it and make it Christian. The same prohibition that existed against Roman Catholics going to Trinity College before the establishment of the National and Queen's Universities held out at present." When amendments were moved in 1893 to exclude Trinity College from the purview of the Irish Legislature, Mr. Gladstone laid great stress on the safeguards provided in subsection 6, which, it will be noted, were afterwards extended, but \vhich do Educational Institutions -Universities — continued. not exist in any sliape or form in the present measure. He objected to " transplanting the University of Dubh'n " out of Ireland as would be done by depriving the Irish Legislature of any control. But to this argument it may be replied that many otlier things, not less important, are being " transplanted " by being reserved to the Imperial Parliament. jMr. Kenny, a Catholic, pointed out that even imder Clause 4 of the 1893 Bill it would be possible for the Irish Legislature to create causes of forfeiture, Avhich would l)e made the basis for depriving the University of its chai-ter. But an Irish Parliament might do more. It might create and endow Roman Catholic professorships in Trinity College, and obviously do so by diverting the emoluments of other Chairs. In proof Mr. Gladstone may be quoted. On June 23rd, 1893, he was asked what powers the Irish I>egislature would have of establishing denominational endowments. He said :- - "It is quite clear that to establish a religious endow- ment or anything that is liable to the charge of undue preference as described by the Bill, cannot be done by the Irish Legislature ; but I am not prepared to say on that account that a college establishment of a denominational chai'acter, boimd by certain conditions, is excluded by the Bill. On the contrary, it would be consistent with what we have done that we should hold this ground : that the Irish Legislature should not be precluded from founding any Denominational College which shall put no compulsion on those outside the denomination in respect to instruction or worship, and which shall elect to its professorships, and other appointments, supported by public endowment, irrespective of creed, except such as in their nature are associated with denominational duties.'' {Pari. Deb. col., 1803.) To meet various objections, JMr. IMorley, on the Report Stage, moved the words quoted above in subsection 5 of the Bill as amended. It was then again proposed to omit Trinity College from the control of the Irish Legislature. This was Educational Institutions Universities— co»//Hi«r/. strongly resisted and Mr. Sexton made a remarkable admission. (August 18, 1893, Pari Deh. col. (510.) He said :— " If the promise upon tlic q\iestion of a future University had not been made at the instance of the Chief Secretary, there was no doubt that Trinity College would continue to be the subject of attack from the Catholics of Ireland. There was no doubt that the Catholics would never rest content so long as their right to a I^niversity corresponding to Trinity College was denied. . . . The result, ho>vever, secured was that Trinity College was now safe. No candid man of any creed in Ireland would deny that upon the establishment of a Catholic University the future of Trinity College would be absolutely safe, and that no man in Ireland would think of making or suggesting any attack upon its endowments or privileges, or upon the management of its property." An analysis of this leads to curious results. The Irish members had accepted the Bill. In Conmiittee they had declared vigorously that Trinity College was safe under Clause -i as it stood. Then Mr. Sexton said Trinity College would not be safe, and that the only thing that would give it secvu'ity would be a promise that Ireland might have a College with Catholic theo- logical professorships. But Ireland then had 3Iaynooth, an exclusively ecclesaistical college, whose students could get degrees from the Royal University. Ireland still has Maynooth, and she has the National University, but the National University is a " godless bantling "' ; therefore, Trinity College has no more security than when the Bill of 1893 Avas in Conmiittee, when Mr. Sexton admitted her insecurity. Can the position of Trinity College, which has been constantly denounced as the " citadel of ascendancy," })e regarded as secure when the margin of safety consists only in the contentment of the Irish majority with another University ? Surely not ; because if the other University became popular and needed further endowments — its present endowments arc not Educational Institutions Universities— co/?/iuwerf. large — it might be i'urnished witli those eiKlowineuts at tlie cost of DubUn University and Trinity College. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent it. If the security of Trinity C'oUege was dubious in 1893, its absolute insecurity is positively certain now. Mr. Sexton, in the speech above quoted, ])ointed out that Trinity College was protected because nothing could be done without her consent, or without an address from both the Irish Houses. Botli these protections have disappeared, and even did they remain, the safeguard would be weaker than in 1893. For then, as Mr. Sexton pointed out, the Upper House was elected on a £20 franchise ; now it will l)c nominated by the Nationalist Govern- ment of the day. The amendments above quoted follow two lines :—(l) to reserve the control to the Imperial Parliament, (2) to regulate the control to be exercised by the Irish Parliament. It is submitted that, even though the former provisions be considered unnecessarily stringent, the least that justice demands is that the latter should be granted. 1 SECURrTY OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY. Two amendments stand on the paper in tlie names of Mr. IMacmaster and Mr. Astor. They are identical in terms, and run as follows : — " Any matter whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation." Mr. Macmaster proposes to add these words as subsection 11 to Clause 2. Mr. Astor proposes to add these words, with the exception of the two first, to Clause 3. These words, less " in accordance with settled principles and precedents," formed subsection 5 of Clause 4 of the Home Rule Bill of 1893. After a long debate the words " in accordance, &c." were added, and the amendment now proposed is identical with subsection 8 of Clause 4 of the 1893 Bill, as it passed the Commons. The addition was made because it appeared that " due process of law " was, by itself, ambiguous. On the one hand it was con- tended that they formed a sufficient safeguard ; that, though never rigidly defined and perhaps incapable of accurate definition, their purport was understood and applied by jurists ; and that they were interpreted by reference to an external and general standard. The Unionist Party, on the other hand, contended that there was no obligation to interpret them by an external standard or by recognised principles of common law ; that, as a fact, they had been construed as meaning by the existent processes of law ; and that, therefore, a Legislature would have power to construct processes of law which would deprive the phrase of any validity as a safeguard against wrong. The words " settled principles and precedents " were, therefore, introduced in order to maintain some external standard for the interpretation of the phrase. Security of Life, Liberty, and Properiy— com imwd. It sliould be noted that the Nationahst members protested very strongly against the addition of the words, and, indeed, expressed dissatisfaction with the insertion of subsection 5 in its original form. Subsection 5 was taken from Article 5 of the American (Constitution of 1789. In 1868 the Constitution was amended and Article 14. was passed. That Article prohibited not only the State Legislatures, but the whole of the State, including all its officers, from interfering with the privileges or immunities of any citizen, or from depriving any citizen of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, or from depriving any citizen of the due protection of the law. That was, therefore, an administrative as Avell as a legislative safeguard. The " privileges and immunities " of a citizen have been described by Story and Cooley, the authorities on the American Constitution, as including the following : — the right to pass through or reside in the country, the right to go to a foreign coimtry, the right to claim and have the benefit of a writ of habeas corpus, to initiate and maintain any action at law of any kind, to hold and dispose of property, to use navigable waters. This according to Cooley. Storey extends the list. According to him they included protection by the Government ; enjoyment of life and liberty ; the right to secure and possess property ; the right to pass through and reside in the country ; the right of habeas corpus ; to maintain any action at law ; the pursuit of happiness, subject to the I'cstraints imposed for the general good : right to take and dispose of property ; exemption from higher taxes than were paid by other citizens ; and the exercise of the iranchise as it is regulated by the Constitution. In measuring the safeguards inserted in the Bill of 1893, it is to be remembered that the American Constitution also pro- hibited ex post focfo legislation or legislation impairing the Security of Life, Liberty and Property— continued. sanctity of contracts. Coolcy, in his work, points out the liigii importance of such restrictions as those above mentioned being- inserted in every constitution, tliat it was very necessary in relation to popular Assemblies, and that it would be very unwise to dispense with them. It is, of course, true that the British Constitution contains no such defined limitations on Parliament, for the good reason that it is unwritten ; but the expression " due process of law " is the rendering of the words of [Magna Charta per legem terrcc. In a written Constitution, and especially the Constitution of a subordinate State, such limitations and restrictions cannot be omitted without the risk of grave complications. In 1893, it was declared by Mr. (now Mr. Justice) Barton, that even under subsection 5 the Irish Legislature could alter all Constitutional Statutes, such as Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, as well as the right of trial by jury, bail, habeas corpus, free and open trial, liberty of the Press and speech. The words added, which appear in the amendments of Mr. Macmaster and Mr. Astor, do undoubtedly diminish this danger. The outstanding point, however, is that in the present Bill no safeguard of any kind is inserted, though the Government in 1893 laid stress on the importance of subsection 5. Speaking on June 15th, Mr. Bryce said : — " There is another error which pervades the arguments of lawyers who have spoken in the Debate — that is, that the Irish Parliament could make that due process of law which would not be due process of law. Why, the whole object of the Government is to give a sort of Magna Charta to Ireland — a Constitution. Putting it here makes it impossible for the Irish Parliament to vary it, and so far from interpreting it by the words of the Irish Statute of 1776 it must be inter- preted by the context of this Act."— (P«r/. Deb., col. llo4.) This is an important statement. The Home Rule Bill is a sort of Magna Charta. Yet from it are deliberately omitted Security of Life, Liberty, and Pro^riy—continiwd. safeguards such as the Magna Charta provides for the British people, and the Government of 1893 considered necessary at that time. There are no circumstances which make the restriction less necessary now than then. There are, indeed, circumstances which make it more necessary. By the Bill of 1893 there were to be two Exchequer Judges, appointed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, paid out of Imperial Funds and remov- able by the Sovereign on address from the Imperial Parliament. An appeal lay to these Judges from every court of first instance in Ireland, and in cases where the Government was a party, the case could be heard by them on the application of either of the parties. The omission of any such arrangement from the present Bill is a strong argument in favour of the proposed amendment. 12 MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. The object of the amendments is to inehide laws reguhiting ^larriage. Divorce, and Custody of chikhen among the powers secured to the Imperial Parliament. The question may be considered in two aspects — on broad, general grounds, and in its application to the particular circumstances of Ireland. Broad Principles. On broad principles uniformity of marriage laws is admitted to be desirable. Speaking in Com- mittee on the Home Rule Bill of 1893, Sir Edward Clarke said that it had been long recognised that the Law of Marriage ought to be a matter of International Agreement. That is probably an impossible ideal, but it shows the conviction of those whose attention has been particularly directed to the difficulties and the hardships inflicted by the diversity of marriage laws. One example of tliese hardships will suffice, those which arose under the question of Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister. Legal in certain Colonies, sueli imions were illegal in the United Kingdom. Thus, in the ease of a man married to the sister of his deceased wife in Australia, the children of that marriage would have a legal title to his Australian property, but not to his British. ^Ir. Gladstone, opposing the reservation of these laws to tiie Imperial Parliament in 1893, used the curious argument that there was already a great diversity of laws in the United Kingdom, in the United States and in the Colonies. This, of course, is true, but is it an argument for opening the door to still greater diversity ? But Mr. Gladstone increased the oddity of his argument by denouncing the diversity of the American system as " monstrous," " inconvenient " and " scandalous." Regarding the Colonies, the legalisation of marriage with a deceased wife's sister has removed their principal divergence from the British system, and it may be noted that the advocates of that reform laid great stress on the desirability of having a uniform svstem. 18 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of Ch'Mren— continued. Since Mr. Gladstone spoke, two events have occurred which entirely destroy the force of his Colonial argument — the establish- ment of the Australian Commonwealth and the South African Union. Under Clauses 51 and 52 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, the Commonwealth is given the control of Marriage, Divorce and Matrimonial causes ; and in relation thereto, parental rights and the custody and guardian- ship of infants. Commenting on this Hai'rison Moore, says (The Common- wealth of Australia, p. 474). " It enables the Commonwealth to determine what marriages shall be recognised in the Common- wealth, the forms for the celebration of marriage, the consents of parents, guardians, &c., the capacity of the parties and the establishment or removal of disabilities on inter-marriage." It may be doubted, he remarks, whether it goes further, and enables the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate as to the effect of marriage on the property of the spouses, their contractual and tortious responsibility, and their rights of succession inter se. And he further points out that there is a good deal of diversity in the divorce laws of the States ; owing to the fact that the relation is principally governed by domicile, and that the con- ditions of life in a country like Australia make it particularly difficult to ascertain the domicile. In South Africa, Laws relating to Marriage, Divorce and Custody of children are entirely in the hands of the Union Parliament. In both these cases there has been recognition of the desir- ability of attaining uniformity ; though the antecedent circum- stances in Australia, and the character of the Union, have prevented its being attained in the same degree as in South Africa. In Canada, Marriage and Divorce Laws are reserved to the Dominion Parliament, though the Provinces have the power 14 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of Ch'Mren— continued. of regulating the solemnization of marriages, a provision which has led to extreme complication in the Province of Quebec. This is worthy of careful study for two reasons : — (1) That Mr. Gladstone specially quoted this power of the Provinces in 1893 in support of his policy ; (2) because of its bearing on the working of the Ne Temere decree in Ireland. The Ne Temere Decree was promulgated in Canada in 1907. " Great interest has been displayed throughout the year in the marriage question, and the decree called Ne Temere which was promulgated in Canada in 1907 has been the subject of repeated discussion and finally of an important debate in the Canadian House of Commons on January 22nd, 1912. From the point of view of civil law questions as to the decree arose only in Quebec. In that Province, under the interpretation of the law adopted in some cases by the Courts, and especially in one Court in the case of Hebert v. Clouatre, decided in March, 1911, by Mr. Justice I.aurendeau, it has been asserted that the Civil Courts, in deahng with the question of the validity of a marriage between Catholics shall not exercise an independent judgment but shall follow the decision of the Ecclesiastical Courts, and in the Hebert case the judge confirmed the decree of Archbishop Bruehesi annulling the marriage of two Roman Catholics on the ground that it was celebrated by a Protestant priest. It was accordingly proposed by Mr. Lancaster that the Dominion Parliament should legislate so as to render marriages celebrated by duly authorised officers valid everywhere in Canada whatever the faith of the parties to the marriage. To this it was replied that the power to legislate on this topic did not lie with the Parliament of the Dominion ; it Avas pointed out that the exclusive powers of Provincial Parliaments extended to the " solemnization of marriage," and it was argued that the Dominion Parliament should therefore not attempt to legislate. On the other hand, stress was laid by the advocates of the legislation on the fact that among the subjects which are expressly mentioned 15 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of CMliren— continued. in the British North America Act as faUing within the sphere of action of the Dominion Parhament was ' marriage and divorce ' and that the passing of an Act of the kind contemplated by Mr. Lancaster was clearly within the powers of the Dominion Parliament. The Government proposed and the Parliament accepted the alternative of referring the question as to the extent of the power of the Dominion Parliament to the Supreme Court of Canada for an advisory judgment, on the understanding that the question would be earned to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In accordance with this decision the Minister of Justice has invited all the Provincial Governments of the Dominion to be represented at the hearing of the reference to the Supreme Court. The Government adopted this course in preference to the alternative of obtaining a decisive judgment from the Judicial Committee in the Hebert case on the ground that any decision in that case could not cover the whole area of the question which it was proposed to submit to the Judicial Committee. Since the discussion in Parliament Mr. Justice Charbonneau, of the Supreme Court of Quebec, has declared, on review in February, 1012, that the Hebei-t marriage is valid, establishing in an elaborate judgment that the Ne Temere decree does not in any way override the Civil Code, and that that code recognises the validity of any marriage, whatever the religion of the contracting parties, celebrated by those authorised to keep civil registers." From this statement (taken from Blue Book, Dominions No. 12, Cd. 6091) it appears that, so far as the case has gone, the decision is against the pretensions of the Province. But this is only because the powers in respect of " solemnization of marriage " are held to be inferior to those contained in the words " marriage and divorce." But for the uniformity they secure, a great diversity of marriage laws would be created in the Dominion. 16 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of ChMren— continued. The appeal to the Supreme Court of the Dominion took the form of certain questions, which are here given, with the replies of tlic Supreme Court, and are reprinted from the Times of July SOth, 1912. (1) (rt) Has the Parliament of Canada autliority to enact in whole or in part Bill No. 3 of the first Session of the Twelfth Parliament of Canada, intituled : " An Act to amend the Marriage Act " ? (b) If the provisions of the said Bill are not all within the authority of the I'arliament of Canada to enact, which, if any, of the provisions are within such authority ? (2) Does the law of the Province of Quebec render null and void unless contracted before a Roman Catholic priest, a marriage that would otherwise be legally binding, which takes place in such province, (a) between persons who are both Roman Catholics, or (6) between persons one of whom only is a Roman Catholic. (3) If either (a) or (b) of the last preceding question is answered in the affirmative, or if both of them are answered in the affirmative, has the Parliament of Canada authority to enact that all such marriages, whether (a) heretofore solemnized, or (b) hereafter to be solemnized, shall be legal and binding ? The answers of the learned Judges of the Supreme Coart were in substance to the following effect : — (1) As to the first question the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Davies, Mr. Justice Duff, and Mr. Justice Anglin, were of opinion that the proposed legislation was ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada. Mr. Justice Idington differed. (2) As to the second question all the learned Judges concurred in holding that the law of Quebec does not render null and void unless contracted by a Roman Catholic priest a marriage wliich takes place in that province between persons one of whom only is a Roman Catholic. As to the validity of such marriages between persons who are both Roman Catholics .hixsmMw. ijjjohilO 'i:j i^j)ofa«;(S ,ii^wl!<1 :Mi. I'llVV v.ltl'f.i.l.KI II.- 17 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of ChWiren— continued. the Chief Justice asked permission to dechne to answer. Justices Sir I-ouis Davies, Idington, and Duff were of opinion that they were valid, and Mr. Justice Anghn held that they were null and void. (3) As to the third question, all the Judges except Mr. Justice Idington were of opinion that the Parliament has no power to enact such remedial legislation. The case was then referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, who delivered judgment on July 29th, 1912. The Lord Chancellor, after reciting the above facts, thus continued : — The decision of these questions turns on the construction to be placed on Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867. Section 91 enacts that the Parliament of the Dominion may make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by the Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, and, for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms of the section, it declares that, notwithstanding anything in the Act, the exclusive legisla- tive authority of the ParHament of the Dominion extends to all matters coming within the classes of subjects enumerated. One of these is marriage and divorce. The section concludes with a declaration that any matter coming within any of the enumerated classes shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects by the Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces. Section 92 enacts that in each province 18 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of Ch\\6ren— continued. the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to matters coming within the classes of subjects enumerated in this section. Among these is the solemnization of marriage in the province. The enumeration also includes, inter alia, property, and civil rights, and generally matters of a merely local or private nature in the province. In the course of the argument it became apparent that the real controversy between the parties was as to whether all questions relating to the validity of the contract of marriage, including the conditions of that validity, were within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Dominion Parliament by Section 91. If this is so, then the provincial power extends only to the directory regulation of the formalities by which the contract is to be authenticated, and does not extend to any question of validity. This was the view contended for by one set of the learned counsel who argued the case at their Lordships' bar. Tlie other learned counsel contended that the power conferred by Section 92 to deal with the solemnization of marriage within a Province had cut down the effect of the words in Section 91, and effected a distribution of powers under which the legislature of the Province had the exclusive capacity to determine by whom the marriage ceremony might be performed, and to make the officiation of the proper person a condition of the validity of the marriage. If the latter view is taken, it is clear how the questions must be answered. For it was agreed between counsel that the Bill referred to in the first question was intended to enable a person with any authority to perform the ceremony to perform it validly wiiatever the religious faith of those married by him. On the footing indicated the 8i 19 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of ChiMren— continued. Bill would therefore be tiltra vires of the Dominion Parlia- ment. The third question would also be disposed of, for the Parliament of Canada woidd, in the events indicated in the question, have no authority. The second question con- sequently becomes, not only unimportant, but superfluous. Notwithstanding the able argument addressed to them, their Lordships have arrived at the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament does not, on the true construction of Sections 91 and 92, cover the whole field of validity. They consider that the provision in Section 92 conferring on the Provincial Legislature the exclusive power to make laws relating to the solemnization of marriage in the Province, operates by way of exception to the powers conferred as regards marriage by Section 91, and enables the Provincial Legislature to enact conditions as to solemnization which may affect the validity of the contract. There have doubtless been periods, as there have been and are countries, where the validity of the marriage depends on the bare contract of the parties without reference to any solemnity. But there are at least as many instances where the contrary doctrine has prevailed. The conmion law of England and the law of Quebec before confederation are conspicuous examples, which would naturally have been in the minds of those who inserted the words about solemnization into the statute. Prima facie these words appear to their Lordships to import that the whole of what solemnization ordinarily meant in the systems of law of the Provinces of Canada at the time of confederation is intended to come within them, including conditions which affect validity. There is no greater difficulty in puttmg on the language of the statute this 20 Marriage, Divorce, Custody off Children— con^mwri. construction than there is in putting on it the alternative construction contended for. Both readings of the provision in Section 92 are in the nature of limitations of the effect of the words in Section 91, and there is, in their Lordships' opinion, no reason why what they consider to be the natural construction of the words " solemnization of marriage," having regard to the law existing in Canada when the British North America Act was passed, should not prevail. This conclusion disposes of the questions raised, and their Lordships will humbly advise his Majesty accordingly. The effect of this judgment is to make the powers given to the Province over the solemnization of marriage a determining factor in the validity of the marriage, that is to say, the Ne Temere shall over-ride the Marriage Laws of the Dominion in the Province of Quebec. Another marriage case has occurred in that Province, which is notable as an example of a possible danger in Ireland over the power of legislating in regard to marriage given to the Irish Parliament. In 1904 a marriage was celebrated between two fourth cousins without a dispensation. Five or six years later the marriage was annulled, on the husband's petition, by ecclesiastical authority. The ecclesiastical nullification of the marriage was appealed against by the wife, Madame Tremblay Depatic, but was sustained by Mr. Justice Bruman, of the Quebec Court of Review, on the ground that, failing a dispensation, the marriage was null and void as the contracting parties were within the prohibited degree of consanguinity. It is hardly necessary to point out the inconvenience, to put it mildly, if an Irish Parliament were to invalidate the union of fourth cousins. 21 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of Ch'Mren— continued. Mr. Gladstone's third argument was that there was already a diversity of marriage law in the United Kingdom. He pointed to Scotland, and used these words : — " Scotland has all along possessed her own law of marriage, totally different from that ot England, and highly disapproved, I think, by all great authorities in England ; but we have never ventured to interfere with it against Scotch opinion, feeling and tradition." Surely it is an extraordinary argument that, because Scotland has marriage laws which offend the greatest English authorities, Ireland should be given the power, which she now does not possess, to frame marriage laws which also may offend the best English opinion. Two wrongs will not make one right ; the multiplication of anomalies does not minimise each separate anomaly. Nor does the fact that the marriage and divorce laws of our Colonies differ from ours justify giving an opportunity for divergence between England and Ireland. If it is desirable to have uniformity between England and the Colonies, it is tenfold more necessary between the two neighbouring islands. Writing on the United States, Mr. Bryce says : " A more complete uniformity as regards marriage and divorce might be desirable, for it is particularly awkward not to know whether you are married or not." And the best writers on the American Consti- tution have agreed that nothing is more dangerous to the social system of the United States than the diversity of the marriage laws. But all these arguments are intensified in the case of two countries so contiguous as Ireland and England, so closely connected and with such close interdependence of conditions. 22 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of Children— continued. The Proposal Considered with Special Reference to Irisu Conditions. In this connection it is impossible to ignore the fact that the predominant rehgion of Ireland is Catholic, not in any dogmatic or controversial sense, but merely in its probable influence in producing divergence between the marriage laws of Ireland and England. The views of the Catholic Church regarding marriage and divorce may, or may not be unsound. That is not the ques- tion. The question is will the conscientious convictions of Catholics, translated into action, be productive of inconvenience and injustice, and create disabilities. At the present time the marriage laws of Ireland, though in some respects they may not approve themselves to Catholics, put no inconvenience or dis- abilities upon Catholics, for they are wider than Catholics desire, and therefore Catholics need not avail themselves of provisions of which they disapprove. For example, a Catholic need not marry his deceased wife's sister, nor his first cousin, nor need he marry a Protestant at all, nor need he contract a civil marriage. A Catholic, therefore, suffers no wrong under the present marriage code. But the case would be very different were the power of legislation in marriage and divorce given to a Catholic liCgislatiire. Legislation would then take the form of narrowing the existing provisions, whereby persons would be prevented from contracting or dissolving unions, though the contract, or its dissolution, might accord with their conscientious views. A positive disability and wrong would then be created. It would be open to the Irish Parliament to abolish divorce. By this, relief would be refused to persons who desire it, and who, in obtaining it, have the approval of their conscience. The Irish Parliament might make illegal the marriage of first cousins, or marriage with a deceased wife's sister. Here 23 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of ChMiiren—continued. again, positive wrong would be inflicted on Protestants who see no wrong in such unions. The children of such marriages would be placed in an anomalous position. In Ireland they woidd be bastards, in Great Britain and the Empire generally they would be legitimate. In Ireland the property of their parents would not pass to them ; they would legally succeed to such property outside Ireland. The Irish Parliament might abolish civil marriage, which would be an injustice on those who have conscientious objections to a religious eeren\ony. In their zeal to minimise the recog- nition of civil contract as an element in marriage, the Irish Legislature might relax the provisions, found necessary in English law, of requiring the presence of the Registrar under certain circumstances, whereby grave danger might be caused. The case of Malta is instructive on this point. In that island there is no civil marriage. The parties must be married in Church. From this it resvdts that, in the case of mixed marriages, the marriage is regarded as invalid by the Catholic Church unless performed before a Catholic clergyman, and one of the conditions of a Catholic marriage is that the parties shall not go through any religious ceremony before any non-Catholic Minister of religion. A good many scandals have been the result. This brings us to the question of " Mixed Marriages," which have been brought into prominence by the promulgation of the famous Ne Temere decree and the resultant MeCann case. Into the facts of that case it is vinnecessary to enter. The out- standing points are these : that after some years of marriage McCann deserted his wife on the repi'esentations of the clergy of his Church that he was living in sin ; that the wife was left without means of subsistence; that the childi'cn of the marriage, one about a month old, were stolen from her and that they are kept in hiding and that she is refused access to them. This action has 24 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of ChMAren— continued. been defended by well-known Catholic elergymen, such as Father Finlay, Father Herbert, Father Power, and others. The decree Ne Temere, based on the decrees of the Council of Trent, passed in 1563, was promulgated in Ireland on Easter Day, 1908. The " Catholic Dictionary " Edition of 1905, explains the delay : — " In order to avoid the difficulties which would other- wise have arisen, the decree of Trent was not promulgated in Great Britain, Scandinavia, several German States — indeed in Protestant countries generally ; so that the marriages of Protestants or Catholics, made before the Protestant clergyman or magistrate, or without any functionary in these countries, are valid." From this it follows that in the eyes of the Catholic Church, marriages made since April 19th, 1908, before the Protestant clergyman or Magistrate, are invalid. It may be observed that Germany and Hungary have refused to permit the promulgation of the Decree, and that in Italy no maiTiage is valid unless performed before the magistrate. The difficulties, to avoid which the promulgation of the Decree was delayed for 350 years, have arisen immediately on its promulgation in Ireland, and, as above described, in Canada, a fact which cannot be ignored in connection with giving the Irish Parliament the control of the marriage laws. It will, of course, be argued that the operation of the Decree in Ireland is met by the words of Clause 3 : — " In the exercise of their power to make laws under this Act the Irish Parliament shall not make a law so as to . . . impose any disability or disadvantage, on account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status, or make any religious belief or religious ceremony a condition of the validity of any marriage." 25 Marriage, Divorce, Custody of Children— cow^inwd. This safeguard, imposing on paper, is not likely to be of much effect in practice. Cardinal I^ogue, Mr. Dillon and Mr. Hannay (George Birniinghani) have all derided the efficacy of safeguards in words quoted elsewhere in these memoranda. A single question will show its hollowness. If the McCann case is possible when Irish marriage laws are subject to the Imperial Parliament, what may not be possible when the control of the Imperial Parliament is gone ? Here we come to a vital point, not touched by the legislative safeguard of Clause 3 — the Executive and Administrative powers of the Irish Government. Even were the Irish Parliament to abstain from legislating on the subject of mixed marriages, the Irish Executive could, simply by inaction, connive at the perpetra- tion of injustice and iniquity. Lord Aberdeen's reply to Mrs. McCann's appeal is but a foretaste of what Irish Protestants might expect from the Nationahst Executive. The foregoing memorandum has been mainly concerned with marriage and divorce. The question of the custody of children need not be fully discussed. It naturally follows that the control of the laws respecting custody of children, &c., must accompany the control of marriage and divorce, and so the fore- going arguments can be applied to the question of children. THE JUDICIARY. The anicndiHCiit standiiio in the names of Mr. I'oUoek and IVIr. Butcher runs as follows : — Clause 2, page 2, line 18, at end, insert : — (7) The appointment, tenure of ofJiee, or powers of judges ; or Clause 27 provides that after the passing of the Aet Judges of the Supreme Coin-t or other superior Court in Ireland, or of any County Court, or other Court with a like jurisdiction in Ireland shall be appointed by the Lord Lieutenant, and shall hold oliiee by the same tenure as at present, except that they shall be removable by an address from both the Houses of the Irish Parliament instead of by address from the Imperial Parliament. This Clause follows nuic!) on the lines of Clause 25 of tlie Bill of 1893, as amended. But it differs in an important respect from Clause 27 of the Bill of 1886. lender that Bill the address asking for the removal of a Judge had to be presented to Her Majesty. Under the present Bill, as under that of 189.3, a Judge is removed by the Lord Ivieuteuant. The present position of tlie Irish .Judiciary is this : — \Vith the exception of the ]\hjster of the Rolls, who is appointed under the Great Seal of Great Britain, the Judges arc appointed under the Great Seal of Ireland, that is, by the liOrd Lieutenant on the recommendation of the Irish Lord Chancellor, the Imperial Lord Chancellor being usually also informed of the appointment. They can be removed only on an address from both Houses of Parliament to the Sovereign. 27 The Judiciary— conimu^t/. The future position will be this :- Without exception they will he appointed by tiie Lord Lieutenant. They will be removable by the Lord Lieutenant on an address ironi both Houses of the Irish Parliament. Regarding the appointment of .Judges, the change in procedure is not very great in theory. But in practice it will be considerable. Though the appointment is not made by the Lord Lieutenant-in-Council, it is clear that he must have advice from someone of authority, probably the Irish Lord Chancellor, which would introduce the influence of the Irish Executive. This would be a natural and, indeed, an inevitable power to confer on Ireland were she a sovereign dependency. It was enjoyed by all the Colonies so long as they were self- dependent. But when Canada and South Africa merged into Union, the Provinces were deprived of this power. In South Africa, of course, the Judicial system is unified as is the political system. But in Canada, while the Provinces retained their Legislatures and Lieutenant-Governors, and though the Provinces constitute, organise and maintain the Provincial Courts, the Dominion Government appoints, pays and, if necessary, removes the Judges of the Courts of the Provinces. In Australia, the Connnonwealth Constitution follows the example of the United States, and while preserving to the States their own Judiciary, provides a National Judiciary for enforcing and guarding the Commonwealth powers. Therefore, if Ireland is regarded as bearing towards Great Britain the relation which Ontario or Natal or Queensland respectively bear to the Dominion, Union and Commonwealth, the Colonial precedent is against entrusting her w'ith the appoint- ment of the Judiciary. The Juiiciary -co7itinned. When \V(.' conu' to tlie ivnioval of JiKlgcs the Colonial piTccdcnts air still strongly opposed to the proposals of t!u' 13ill. In Canada and South Ai'rica Judges are removable by the Governor-General on an address from both Houses. In Australia the same procedure is followed in respect of the judges of the Commonwealth. But these are States holding a different relation to the United Kingdom to that whicli Ireland would hold in relation to Great Britain. Taking the subordinate Provinces of the great Dependencies, to which the future position of Ireland would be more analogous, we find that only two have the power of removal which is given to Ireland under the Bill. In Canada and South Africa the Provinces possess no power of removal. In Australia the States have the power of removal in respect of the State Judiciary. The State Judges can be removed on an Address of the two Houses of the State Legislature. But in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and West xlustralia the Address is presented to the Sovereign. In Victoria and Tasmania the rcmo\-al is effected by tiie Governor on an Address fi'oni the two Houses. In tiie matter of removal, therefore, the Colonial precedent is overwhelmingly against the jjrocedure adopted in the Bill. There is another point in which recent precedents cast doubt on the propriety of the provisions of the Bill. In the Con- stitutions of the Commonwealth and South Africa Judges can only be removed for misbehaviour or incapacity, which has to be proved, whereas elsewhere the power to remove on an Address is in addition to the power to remove for misbehaviour. More- over the Commonwealth Act perscribes the minimum number of Justices in the High Court, thus supplying a defect which lias been noticed in the American Constitution. (See Story, on the action of Jefferson in 1802, page 1633). 29 The Judiciary— contirmed. Dealing' with tlic removal of Jucloes, Harrison Moore (Conniionwealth ol Australia, pages 202-3) has some observations worth quotation. " It is not an ideal arrangement which makes the Judges of the Supreme Courts removable on the address of the two Houses of I^egislature. The power of removal upon such address in some Colonies belongs to ' Her Majesty'; in others 'to the Governor in Council.' Where the power is exercisable by Her Majesty, it is upon the advice of the Secretary of State, and it has been established that ' in dismissing a Judge in compliance with addresses from a Local Legislature, and in conformity with that law, the Queen is not performing a mere ministerial act, but adopting a grave responsibility, which Her Majesty cannot be advised to incur without satisfactory evidence that the dismissal is proper.' (Case of Mr. Justice Boothby, Todd, 848). Where on the otiier hand the power under tlie local law is in the Governor he must act as in other matters upon the advice of his Ministry, and tliere is no legal security that the occasion is a proper one for dismissal. It seems clear that in sueii a ease, there is no power to appeal to the Queen in Council." In another passage he says : — " The jMinistry of the day and the two Houses of the Parliament would be practically the sole judges of what con- stituted misbehaviour or incapacity, and when or how such misbehaviour or incapacity was ' proved ' ; their action would not be subject to review in any Court of Law, except perhaps in a case where the procedure was flagrantly unjust." The position of the Judiciary under an Irish Parliament must be considered in the light of certain utterances by Nationalist Leaders. Mr. John Dillon, speaking on various occasions, said : — " When we come out of the struggle we will remember who were the people's friends and who were the people's 80 The Jui'idary— colli imu'd. enemies, and deal out our reward to one and our punish- ment to the other." — Kilmovee, December ')th, 1886. " I tell these peo])le that the time is at hand, and very close at hand, too, when the police will be our servants, when the police will be taking their pay from Mr. Parnell, when he will be Prime Minister of Ireland. And I warn the men to-day who take their stand by the side of land- lordism, and signalise themselves as the enemies of the people that in the time of our power we will remember them." — Castlerea, December 5th, 1886. " If you once get it into tlie heads of Irish landlords that a Home Rule Parliament will be sitting in Dublin they will be timibling over eadi other to sell. . . . They have been very stiff in the past, but if there was a National Parliament they would not bo so stiff at all, and the land- lords know that thej' would not get the price by any means that they got in the past." — Portumnct, (October I5th, 1911. " He (Mr. Dillon) attaclied no importance to these guarantees at all. He did not believe that artificial guaran- tees in an Act of Parliament were any real protection. He did not believe that the wit of man or the skill of a statesman coidd devise guarantees in an Act of Parliament which could protect the people who persisted in bitterly opposing the Avill of the great majority of their countrymen." — Salford, November 22nd, 1911. " The meaning of these threats is quite clear. How are they to be carried out ? If they are to be carried out by process of laAv, the Judiciary will haAc to be the obedient servant of the Parliament, as in old days they were the obedient servants of tyrannical Kings. If the threats are to be carried out without process of law. the Irish Parliament must have the Judiciary under their control, in order that illegal forces may have free play. Mr. Devlin seems to have had this in mind when at New York in 1902. His speech is reported in the frish People of June L'lst, 1902. " I know there are many men in America who think that the means we are operating to-day for the good of 31 The Ju6\c\ary--continued. Ireland are not sullieieiitly sharp and deeisive. ... I would suggest to those who have constituted themselves the eensors of our movement, would it not be well to give our movement a lair chance — to allow us to have as owners the tillers of the land, to have an Irish Parliament that will give our people (ill authoritij over the police and the judiciary and all government in the nation, and when equipped with comparative freedom, then would be the time for those who think we should destroy the last link that binds us to England to operate by whatever means they think best to achieve that great ami desirable end. I am quite sure I speak for the United Irish League in this matter." Here we have the employment of the Judiciary as a political implement nakedly enunciated. The liberty of the Judiciary is threatened as well as the rights and liberties of the people. It is most important to notice in this connection that the Bill of 1893 contained a real and efi'eetive safeguard which is absent from the present measure — the Exchequer Judges. Under the Bill of 1893 there were to be two Exchequer Judges, to be appointed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom and to be removable only by Her Majesty on address from the tAvo Houses of the Imperial Parliament. Mr. Gladstone, introducing the Bill, February 13th, 1893, thus described their functions : — " We provide that two Exchequer Judges shall be appointed under the authority of the Crown — that is to say under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom — for the purpose, mainly perhaps of financial business, but for the purpose, I may say, generally of that business which is Imperial, because there are certain matters in connection with the ordinary action of British law which we are not able to exclude altogether, although I sho\ild be very glad to exclude them, on grounds that will be presently stated." 32 The liuAiciary— continued. The position ol' the Exehequer Judges is dcliiud in Clause 19 (1.) of the Bill ol 1893, as amended— " The Queen in Couneil may make rules respecting all legal proeeedings in Ireland, which are instituted at the instance of or against the Treasury or Commissioners of Customs, or any of their officers, or relate to the election of members to serve in Parliament, or touch any matter not within the powers of the Irish Legislature, or touch any matter affected by a law which the Irish I-egislature have not power to repeal or alter, and subject to such rules, all such proceedings shall, if so required by any party to such proceedings, be heard and determined before the Exchequer Judges, or (except where the ease requires to be deter- mined by two Judges) before one of them, and in any such legal proceeding an appeal shall, if any party so requires, lie from any Court of first instance in Ireland to the Exchequer Judges, and the decision of the Exehequer Judges shall be subject to appeal to Her ^Majesty the Queen in Council and not to any other tribunal." It is not necessary to point out the strength of this safeguard for the people of Ireland on whose rights and liberties encroach- ments might be made by the Irish Parliament or Executive. It provided a Court of Aj^peal to which access was easy and inexpensive compared with the present system, and a Court entirely free from local influences. Even with such a safeguard, it was difficult to approve the power of removal of Judges being given to the Lord lieutenant on address from the Irish Legisla- ture, contrary to Colonial precedents. Under tJie present scheme, the proposal is monstrous. 88 FACTORIES, WORKSHOPS, &c. There are several aimiulincnts to remove the eoiitrul of Factories and the hke I'roni tlie sphere dI' the Irish Parliament. The most comprehensive is that standing in the name of Mr. Middlemore — CI. 2, p. 2, hne 18, at end. insert :-- "Factories, workshops, mines, or the regnhdion of hours of labour or wages of men, women, and ehihhen in factories, ^vorkshops, and mines." It is generally admitted tliat the elTieac\ of industrial legis- lation is proportionate to the area to which it is applicable. And the doctrine gains in force witii the progress of foreign competition. When Great Britain carried out her great industrial reforms in the 19th Century she had a vast industrial pre- dominance and few serious competitors, and so could work on her own lines irrespective of foreign conditions. But, under the conditions of to-day, her liberty of action is considerably restricted. At every turn she finds herself faced by the problem — what effect on British trade will British reforms produce vuiless similar reforms are made by foreign competitors. The necessity, therefore, of enlarging the iniit of industrial legislation becomes every day more urgent. If this be the view of employers, it is no less the view of the employed. The history of Trades Unionism is a standing- proof. The local or sectional strike is giving place to the National strike, and is moving towards the international strike simply because labour sees that the improvement of its conditions in small units is always difficult, sometimes impossible. And so we find men, without grievances, striking out of sympathy with others less fortunate, and sometimes losing their own advantages in the process. As an illustration of this, we may quote from the protest made against the decentralisation of tlie National Insurance 84 Factories, Workshops, ScC— continued. Rill by Mr. W. A. Applcton, the Secretary of the General Federation of Trade Unions : — " This denationalising of the insurance scheme will create serious dilliculties for Trade Unions and Friendly Societies. . . . We are told that all the complications following upon the denationalising of the scheme must be endured because National sentiment demands four sets of Commissioners. In the Trade Union Movement we liave little use for that kind of National sentiment which manifests itself in the creation of divisions between people whose industrial interests are identical, and which proposes to set up anomalies between one country and another. What the workers need is solidarity rather than Nationality." The separation, by the Home Rule Bill, of the industrial unit of the United Kingdom into two is, therefore, industrially retrogressive. Whether it be more injurious to the Irish or the British worker need not be discussed : it is certainly injurious to one or the other, probably to both. It may be urged, as it was in 1893, that an Irish Parliament would have a more intimate acquaintance with the conditions of Irish labour than a Parliament in London. This is quite true ; but it seems doubtful if the greater local knowledge of the Irish Parliament would compensate for the disadvantage of the reduction in the unit of legislation. There is one consider- ation which turns doubt into certainty. Assuming it to be true, as sometimes said, that the industrial conditions of some liish towns are bad, the persons living under those conditions will probably have less chance of reform under an Irish Parliament than under present circumstances. Laboixr has great power in the Imperial Parliament, both from the presence of an organised Labour Party, and because so many of the constituencies are industrial. In Ireland the power of labour would be insignificant. Out of 164 members of the Irisli House of Commons only Si would represent boroughs. 85 Factories, Workshops, 8cc.— continued. and of those boroughs only tiiree or four could be called industrial in the full sense of the word. None of the rural constituencies would contain any industrial clement such as we find, for example, in Essex, Lancashire, Yorkshire or South Wales. The needs and claims of industry would, therefore, be inadequately represented in the Irish Legislature. This objection may be met, as Mr. John Burns met it, by pointing out that the industial reforms in Great Britain were the work of the country gentlemen, representing agricultural constituencies. But the conditions in Ireland will not be quite the same. The agricultural constituencies will be largely com- posed of peasant proprietors who, in most countries, take a more or less narrow view of affairs, and of small traders who cannot be expected to display an active sympathy for movements that may increase working costs. The rural representatives of Great Britain sixty years ago were elected on a limited franchise and had an independence which has greatly diminished in this country, and would be further diminished under Irish conditions. In illustration may be taken the Trade Boards Bill of 1909. On the Second Reading, Mr. Hayden, representing Roscommon, objected to the application of the Bill to Ireland as imposing restrictions not required under the circumstances of that country. Mr. Nannetti, on the other hand, who was one of the Dublin members, said that, as representing working men, they would be disappointed if Ireland were excluded, adding that men were labouring in Dublin under conditions which would not be tolerated in any other country. In the result Ireland got a separate Trade Board, but tlie point here is the clash of opinion between the rural and the urban representative. No doubt Ireland required some differentiation, because of the cottage industries now being developed under the Congested Districts Board, which do not seriously compete with large industries ; but differentiation in 86 Factories, Workshops, 8cc.— continued. respect of such industries as shipbuilding', hnen and such-hke stands on quite a different footing. Sir Charles Dilke, speaking on the Second Reading of the Trade Boards Bill {Pari. Deh., April 28, 1909, col. 382) said : — " I am convinced that any rough and readj"^ plan of cutting Ireland out from the general field of labour legislation will be fatal to the efficiency of Irish labour and the pros- perity of Ireland. Those who recommend that course will be bad friends of Ireland." While Irish labour may suffer by being deprived of the sup- port and protection of British labour, the latter may well suffer through being faced by Irish competition. Suppose the British Parliament to legislate for shorter hours and a minimum wage, while Ireland refused to follow her example, the shipbuilding trade might be diverted from Glasgow or the Tyne to Belfast. Even were legislation not to go so far, and British workers sought to redress grievances by means of a strike, Irish Trade Unionists might be unable to assist them effectively because the Irish Parliament would have the power of repealing the Trade Disputes Act. An illustration of this may be found in the case of Australia. While the States were independent, they were able to protect their workers and secure good industrial conditions by means of Customs Duties. If one State threatened to undersell another in things produced under less onerous conditions, the menaced State coidd reduce the balance by tariffs. With the Common- wealth came inter-State Free Trade, whereupon the State powers of industrial legislation began to breed difficulties. To try to meet this the States and the Commonwealth entered into an Agreement in August, 1909. This Agreement affirmed the importance of each State establishing tribunals for regulating the conditions of labour uniform as far as possible in jurisdiction and powers. It then proceeds to devise a scheme whereby, when conditions 37 Factories, Workshops, &c. — continued. existing in one State lead to a competition which is unfair, tlie matter should be adjusted by the Commonwealth authority ; as when the Court of a State determines on the complaint of an industrial tribunal that (a) injury is caused to an industry carried on within that State ; (b) such injury is caused by competition of persons engaged in the same industry in another adjoining State or States ; (c) such injury is caused solely by the conditions of labour under which employees in the competing industry work ; (d) such conditions whilst making allowances for local circumstances, are unfair to the complaining State ; (e) the industrial tribunals of the States concerned have failed, either jointly or by separate action, to alter the conditions of labour which caused such injury. (Harrison Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, page 620.) This passage is given at length because it shows the diflfi- culties which have arisen in Australia, and which may arise here, from the existence of separate industrial authorities. Possibly the difficulties might be greater here, for want of the complicated machinery by which Australian trade disputes are adjusted, and possibly it might compel this countrj^ to establish some similar legislative machinery, a course which would commend itself to very few. There is yet another aspect of the question which must be considered. International Industrial Conferences have been held and will, no doubt, be held in the future. At the Berlin Conference of 1891 countries having a dual system, such as Austria-Hungary and Sweden and Norway, were represented by several delegates from the separate States, and in many in- stances the representatives of Norway and of Sweden and of Austria and Hungary were found on different sides. What would happen under this Bill ? If Ireland could have a repre- sentative, he might oppose Great Britain, which would be un- fortunate ; if Ireland could not have a representative she would Factories, Workshops, Set. — continued. have a grievance, and might refuse to be bound by resolutions reached without her consent. There was such a case in connection with the Berhn Conference. The Government of India was not represented, and refused to be bound, even on such a question as the employment of women underground. But if Great Britain cannot bind Ireland, her authority in the Conference, as well as her power of legislating for her own people, must be seriously impaired. In this connection reference may be made to another memorandum on " Industrial Legislative and International Relations," which has been circulated already, and covers this point. 39 POWER OF IRISH PARLIAMENT TO GIVE BOUNTIES. Amendment by Mr. James Mason. Clause 2, page 2, line 23, after "disease," insert "The granting of bounties to trades or industries in Irelancl." When tFiis cjuestion was raised in Committee on the Home Rule Bill, 1893 [see Pari. Deb., June 8th, 1893, Col. 541—563), Mr. Gladstone emphatieally stated that, though the Bill would enable Ireland to give " premiums " in aid of the development of Irish industries, the Irish Parliament would not have the power to give " bounties," which he defined as being grants upon an exported commodity. Inasmuch as external trade was reserved to the Imperial Parliament, Ireland could, therefore, not grant bounties. The present Government do not indulge in similar niceties of definition. Asked by Mr. He wins whether the Bill prevents the Irish Parliament from granting bounties . . . which might be employed to give advantage to Irish commerce and industries not enjoyed by their competitors from Great Britain, Mr. Lloyd George replied that the answer was generally in the negative. (April 22nd.) On April 25th the Prime Minister said that under Clause 16, Great Britain is put on an equality with Ireland, and that as regards foreign countries and colonies the Bill prevents any granting of bounties by means of variation of taxation. But this reply becomes a little vague when compared \vith answers given by Mr. Samuel on May 8th and May 15th. On the first day he was asked if the Irish Government would be able to raise the Customs and Excise duties on various articles — sugar, tobacco and spii'its — and then give the Excise back to Irish producers in the form of a bounty. He replied that such action would be an evasion of the provision of Clause 15 (d), which provides that the Excise duty shall correspond to the Customs duty, and would therefore be ultra vires. Pressed on the point, 40 Power of Irish Parliament to give Bounties— cotiHnued. he said it would depend on the merits of the case whether it was ultra vires or not, a matter wfiieh would liave to be settled by the Courts. On May 15th, Mr. Amery again questioned him. The dialogue is interesting. Mr. Amery asked by what provision of the Government of Ireland Bill the Irish Government is restrained from granting bounties which may have the effect of establishing in Ireland a system of protection against Great Britain or from applying the proceeds of any Irish tax for that purpose ? Mr. Herbert Samuel : There is no provision in the Bill preventing the Irish Parliament from making grants from Irish revenues to particular industries. Mr. Amery : Does not that plainly contradict the answer given by the Right Hon. Gentleman the other day ? I want to ask the Right Hon. Gentleman if he considers his answer to-day consistent with the answer he gave me the other day ? Mr. Herbert Samuel : Yes, the Hon. Member's question the other day contemplated a case in which the Irish Parliament imposed an additional Excise duty and then handed back the amount of that duty to the persons from whom it was obtained. That would not be permitted. Mr. Amery : Would it be permitted to grant a bounty if it happened to be equivalent to that Excise duty, or if it happened to be two-thirds or quarter of it, or if it came from another source ? Mr. Herbert. Samuel : It depends upon the particular case. It is, therefore, clear that the Irish Parliament will have the power to make grants from the Irish revenues to particular 41 Power of Irish Parliament to give BouniKS—contintied. industries, and it would appear that under certain conditions it would be possible for the Irish Parliament to do this by a manipulation of the Excise duty. In any ease we have traAclled very far beyond the pro- visions of the Bill t)f 1886, under which no bounties were possible, and a consideiable distance beyond the possibilities afforded by the Act of 1893. In that year Mr. Gladstone was able to explain and defend the granting to Ireland of the power to give " premiums " by citing the grants made under the Land Act of 1891 for aiding and developing agriculture, weaving, spinning, fishing, and the like. Mr. Balfour was then able to show how great a difference there was between assistance given by the Imperial Parliament, representing British workers, to benefit, not par- ticular industries, but poor districts, and premiums given, without consultation with the Imperial Pailiament, to assist particular industries to the detriment, perhaps, of British trade. In a discussion on the question of giving Ireland the control of the Customs, j\Ir. Gladstone made some important remarks on the unity of the trade of the United Kingdom. {Pari. Deh., June 7th, 1893. col. 45.5). " The main consideration is this : that the United Kingdom, from geographical circumstances as well as from circumstances which are social and moral, constitutes one great and vast trade circle. If you depart from the principle of vmiformity in trade matters, you might, perhaps, satisfy to a greater extent the abstract idea of the right of local legislation ; but by satisfying that abstract idea you might inflict an immense practical injury. It is necessary, in the interests of Ireland herself, that this uniformity of conmiercial law should prevail throughout these islands. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Courtney) has not noticed this all-important question— how the producers of this country, the men who regulate and carry on the distribution of the products of its enormous, its immeasur- able industries, would be affected by the introduction of Power of Irish Parliament to give Bounties— continued. different commercial laws within the limits of tlie United Kingdom. ... I base my position on this — that it is vital to the commerce of the Three Kingdoms that there should be uniformity of commercial law from one extremity of the land to the other." The present Bill, by giving Ireland the power to vary Customs and Excise duties, violates the principle of uniformity and solidarity so strongly urged by Mr. Gladstone. The Bill provides, indeed, that no duties shall be levied against British goods, but it is obvious that a Protective policy can also be enforced by the giving of bounties, especially when the limits within which Ireland could give them by manipulation of the Ebccise are so vague as they appear from Mr. Samuel's statements. Mr. Chamberlain {Pari. Deb., June 8th, 1893, col. 558) quoted from an article written by I/Oid INIorley in the Nine- teenth Century : — " There can be little doubt, that, given the chance, Ireland would imitate the example of the United States, Canada, Victoria, and most other countries in the world, by erecting a Protective tariff against woollen cloth, shoes and other manufactured articles. . . . Home Rule, there- fore, in the shape that finds favour with the National Party, means a protective tariff and the introduction of bounties and other fiscal measures which to Englishmen, I say, are an abomination." The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply Information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. Its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT (luring the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSES 2 and 5. (RESERVED SERVICES.) No. 4.— OCTOBER 12. I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W. V, & S., Lta.-39536. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule BUI, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also'upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda will be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League zvould appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He would also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Burean of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number^ Victoria -ioOS {two lines). CONTENTS. PAGE The Reserved Services ....... ... 1 The Royal Irish Constabulary 14 Land Purchase under the Home Rule Bill 27 THE RESERVED SERVBGES. The Services specifically reserved l)y the Imperial rai'lianieut are of three classes. They are enumerated in Clause 2 : and Clause 5 deals with the method of transfer of some of them. Without Clause 5 they would remain imder the control of the Imperial Parliament until the Imperial Parliament otherwise decided. The three classes of reserved services are : — 1. Services reserved in perpetuity : — (a) Collection of taxes. (b) The general subject matter of Acts relating to Land Purchase in Ireland, (c) Public loans made in Ireland })rior to the passing of the Act. Perhaps " (a) Collection of Taxes " is not quite properly included in this category, since by Clause 26 (2) there is a reference to the Irish Parliament and the Irish Government having extended powers with respect to the collection of taxes when the condition of Irish finance admits of the revision contemplated under the Clause. The future of the other " reserved " services is however definitely decided by Clause 5 under the remaining categories. 2. Services to be transferred automatically : — Royal Irish Constabulary, at the end of six years after the appointed day (September 2, 1913). 3. Services to be transferred on demand of the Irish Parliament : — (a) Old Age Pensions Acts, 1908 and 1911. (b) National Insurance Act (Health), 1911. (c) National Insurance Act (Unemployment), 1911, and Labour Exchanges Act, 1909. (d) Post Office Savings Banks ; Trustee Savings Banks ; Friendly Societies, 2 The Reserved Servicer— continued. Two conditions attach to the transfer ol" these services. They are : — (1) A resokition must be passed by both Houses of the Irish Parhament. (2) The transfer cannot be effected within a year of the date of the passing of the resolution. Services (d) are to be transferred on the demand of the Irish Parhament but cannot be transferred within ten years from the appointed day. So far as the provision regulating the transfer of sei-vices (d) is concerned it is not clear whether the time limit of ten years applies : — (a) to the discussion of the resolution ; or (b) to the date of the transfer. If it applies to (a) the effect is to increase the time limit so far as transfer is concerned to eleven years. If it applies to (b) the Irish Parliament could at any time within the ten years pass the resolution which would not however become operative until the ten years had elapsed. There is also to be a suspensory period of six months {see the Prime Minister's speech quoted below) apparently by the operation of Clause 44 (e). Some of the matters in this list are dealt with in separate memoranda, but a general survey of them gives rise to certain considerations which it mav not be amiss to set forth. The Reserved Serwices— continued. First, as to the time limits for transfer : one year, six years, ten years. Are these to be regarded as the measure of tlie sanctity and importance of the respective matters in the Ministerial mind ? If not, why the variation ? If so, the result is curious. The prevention of a run on a Savings Bank, or possible interference with the Ancient Order of Hibernians is apparently more important than the maintenance of law and order. Why should a Friendly Society be kept from the control of the Irish Parliament for nine years or so after that Parliament has obtained administration of the Insurance Act which vitally affects the Friendly Society. A Friendly Society is merely an implement of Insvu-ance. Why then should the Irish Legislature administer Insurance without having control of the implement of Insurance ? Can they in fact do so ? Again, the reservation of the Post Office Savings Banks, while the whole postal service is handed over to Ireland, presents some anomalies. Competent critics, Mr. Lamb and others, have pointed out the inconvenience of separating the post offices, and the possible national danger involved in the separation of the telegraph systems. Are we to understand that such matters are less important than the Savings Banks ? After all, the depositors can always safeguard their own interests by with- drawing their money ; but no one can safeguard the country against the risks involved in separating telegraphs. The proposal to reserve the administration of the Savings Banks for at least ten years is a curious commentary on the catch word, " Trust Ireland," made more curious still by the words in which IMr. Asqiuth referred to the provision. " In regard to Post Office Savings Banks, after ten years there may be a transfer at the wish of the Irish Parliament after an adequate notice — a notice of six months — which The Reserved Services— continued. will enable all depositors who arc so minded to make their arrangements accordingly." — Pari. Deb., April 11th, 1912, col. 1405. Mr. Asquith proceeded to say that he did not suj)pose they would have any disposition or temptation to do so ; but if not, why this delay of ten yeai-s ? As a fact, in 1893 there was a considerable withdrawal of money from the Post Office Savings Banks. The Postmaster-General gave some figures in reply to a question on April lOth, of that year. From February 1st to April 1st, 1892, deposits amounted to £190,947, and withdrawals to £184,405. For the same period 1893, the deposits were £183,905, and withdrawals £278,130. It was alleged at the time that the rim was partly at least artificial, but the evidence in support of the assertion was very slight. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to suppose that savings would be largely withdrawn from institutions under the control of an Irish Government. If this tendency is not yet manifest, it may be due to two causes : — 1. The certainty that the Bill cannot become law for two years ; 2. The provision that for at least ten years more the Banks will be under the Imperial Government. Some other points suggest themselves with regard to the Post Office Savings Banks. The fact that for ten or eleven years the Imperial Government will have the benefit of Irish Savings will constitute a grievance. Mr. Redmond has consented to the arrangement in order, as he has said, to defeat plots to promote a run on the banks. It is doubtful if that would be achieved. Although a nm at this moment — which would have an imfortunate effect on the Bill — might be averted, it might take place as soon as the Irish Parliament demanded the transfer, in which case the Irish Government would be no better off than if they get the Banks now. At the best, they will have averted a run at the cost of ten years' use of the deposits. Ireland will feel the need The Reserved Services— continued. of money most in ilie earlier years of self-government, and during those years will see the savings of her people diverted into Saxon coffers. In order to meet this the Irish Government might institute a bank of its own, to which the people might be induced to entrust their savings under the methods of persuasion familiar to the United Irish League. The creation of such a Patriotic Bank would defeat tlie purposes of CI. 2, Subsection 11, and of CI. 5, But, supposing that all goes well in the direction intended and Ireland takes over the Savings Banks ten years after the appointed day, the position of Great Britain then requires attention. She will have to transfer the deposits to the Irish Government, which may amount to £20,000,000 or more. The operation may cause some inconvenience, especially as the deficit which exists, and which by that time under threatened legislation may have increased, will have to be made good. This is a point, dependent on many contingencies, which prevent its full discus- sion now, but it is one wliich has to be borne in mind. It is not apparent why Old Age Pensions should have been included in the Reserved Services. But it is clear that the fact that it is reserved and can be transferred at any time tends to promote extravagance at the expense of Great Britain. Under the Bill the amount expended on the services of Old Age Pensions will be transferred to the Irish Government as it stands at the time of the transfer of the services. Any savings which the Irish Government afterwards effect in Old Age Pensions do not accrue to the benefit of the Imperial taxpayers. Whatever is paid then out of the Imperial Exchequer to the Irish Exchequer will continue to be so paid in the future whether it be devoted to Old Age Pensions or not. The larger the cost of Old Age Pensions at the time of transfer, tlierefore, the greater will be the benefit to the Irish taxpayer. Great Britain will gain no advantage The Reserved Services— continued. from savings afterwards effected, though she Avill have to bear all the enhanced cost before transfer. It will be perfectly within the power of the Irish Government to swell the cost of Old Age Pensions, by simply reducing the safeguards against extravagance. The local Committees will, in most districts, be in sympathy with the Irish Government, and even where their political sympathies are not strong, would not be indisposed to administer the Act with laxity in view of future benefit. More- over, the officials would have a dual existence in many cases, if not in all, being subject to the Imperial Government in respect of one set of functions, to the Irish Government in respect of another. It is not doubtful which of them they would serve with the greater zeal. Already the Irish Local Government Board admit that Old Age Pensions are drawn by persons not strictly entitled to them, and it only needs a hint to officials to secure greater laxity in the reading of rules and instructions. Under the Bill, however, whenever they are handed over, they are taken over unconditionally as regards the future. The rights of existing pensioners are secured to them by Clause 44 (e) : but there is no liability upon the Irish Parliament to continue the existing law relating to Old Age Pensions. So far as the futuie is concerned the Irish Parliament can reduce the scale of pensions or abolish the pensions altogether. But the Imperial Exchequer has to continue to pay out the amount which Old Age Pensions cost at the time of the transfer, although it may be no longer spent on Old Age Pensions. The Irish Parliament are free to divert it to any other purpose, and by so doing to reheve the Irish taxpayer. The same position arises in respect of other Reserved Services transferred to the Irish Parliament — such as Insurance and Constabulary. The Reserved SerMices—contwued. Ml. John Redmond, speaking at tlie Nationalist Convention at the ]\Iansion House, Dublin, on April 23, 1912, dwelt at length on this provision in terms of approval. He said : — " We get control of the Royal Irish Constabulary at the end of six years and, mark you, when we get control of that force at the end of six years the cost of the service will continue to be paid from Imperial sources, and we will benefit on any economies that we may make. We get control of the Old Age Pensions' system within one year— (hear, hear and a voice : ' We don't want them ') — and again I ask you to mark that the cost of the system will continue to be paid after we have taken it over out of Imperial sources and that any economies we make in the Administration will go to the benefit of Ireland. The same thing is true of the Insurance Act," — Freeman's Journal, April 24, 1912. Such is Mr. Redmond's interpretation, though his statement may be affected by the words at the end of Clause 17 (4), if indeed they have any effect and are not merely words. The position indicated is not at all unlikely to arise in respect of Old Age Pensions, as the interjection shows in the extract just quoted. Mr. Redmond also does not regard the money as well expended on Old Age Pensions. He said in the Hovise of Commons, June 9, 1909, referring to Old Age Pensions : — " I am not afraid to say that in my deliberate judgment in the condition of Ireland at the present moment to spend two and a half millions a year in this way was extravagance, and extravagance which would not have been indulged in by an Irish Parliament, composed of Irishmen responsible to the country and knowing the conditions of ihat country. We have supported Old Age Pensions. I think Ave are glad we have got this proportion of them, but tor the benefit of Ireland, for the future of Ireland would it not have been far better if a large portion of tliat monev were spent, say, on The Reserved SerMices—continxal. increasing transit facilities in Ireland, if a large portion were spent on arterial drainage on Ireland and on the general development of the country." — Parliamentary Debates, June 9, 1909, Col. 304. And at Ashton-under-Lyne on October 12, 1909, he said : — " Do you imagine tliat if an Irish Parliament existed in Dublin, and if they found that they liad two and a half millions a year to spend for the benefit of their country, they would have spent the whole of it in Old Age Pensions. Ladies and gentlemen, nothing of the kind. (A voice : ' You would spend it better perhaps ? ') Yes, we could spend the two and a half millions far better. Some of it would go on Old Age Pensions in Ireland, but the greater part of it could have been spent far better for the develop- ment of Ireland and in other ways." — Freeman's Journal, October 13, 1909. It would not then seem to be at all unlikely that tlie Irish Parliament would amend the law relating to Old Age Pensions in the direction of reduction of Pensions and apply the money to some other purpose. But the money wovdd be found by the Imperial taxpayer who, while willing that it should be spent on Old Age Pensions, might not approve of its expenditure on other objects. Their views, however, would be a matter of indifference to the Irish Parliament which would vote the money for whatever purpose they wished. It is submitted that this position is unfair to Imperial tax- payers, inasmuch as they are denied a voice in the expenditure of the money they find. An amendment to limit the grant to the amount actually expended on Old Age Pensions would remove the injustice. The end desired is attained moi'c com- pletely by the amendments standing in the name of 3Ir. Samuel Roberts and Mr. James Mason to remove Old Age Pensions from the category of " reserved " services and place them among the subjects prohibited to the Irish Parliament. The Reserved Services— ron^jnw^r/. This method is indeed all the better since it enables the rate of Old Age Pensions to be common to the United Kingdom. Possible discontent in the event of the Imperial Parliament raising the rate or lowering the age is avoided, as would not be the case if Old Age Pensions were under the control of the Irish Parliament and the increased benefits were for that reason only- operative in Great Britain. Again the Insurance Act is by no means universally liked in Ireland. An Irish Parliament, certain of no financial loss in respect of its grants from the Imperial Exchequer, would be inclined to repeal or amend it, and apply the money to some other purpose. There would in this way arise two standards of social legisla- tion, the evils of which have already been pointed out in a previous memorandum. {See No. 3. Memorandum on Factories, Work- shops, &c.). It should, however, be pointed out that so far as certain of these reserved services are concerned their retention under the Imperial Parliament, except so far as the cost and legislation are concerned, is a sham. The actual administration as already mentioned in the case of Old Age Pensions will be in the hands of Irish officials, part of whose time only will be given as Imperial officers. It would clearly be impossible, say, in respect of the Post Office Savings Bank for two sets of officials to occupy a Post Office — the Imperial for banking, the Irish for postal services — the former unable to sell a penny stamp, the latter forbidden to take a shilling on deposit. A way has been found by Clause 40 which permits any department of the Government of the United Kingdom to make arrangements for the exercise and performance 10 The Reserved Senic^— continued. on behalf of that department of any powers and duties of tliat department by ofFicers of an Irish department. That is to say, the Irish Post Office officials will carry out the work of the Post Office Savings Banks on behalf of the United Kingdom Post Office. The Clause concludes : — " No such arrangements shall diminish in any respect the responsibility of the department by which the arrangement is made." A humorist must have drafted the proviso. How is responsibility to be maintained ? An Irish official of undoubted capacity in the eyes of the Irish Minister, may yet fail to please the Imperial Minister. How shall he then be deprived of liis Imperial duties without offence ? Who shall be found to take his place if the Irish Minister decides to defend his official ? If the Imperial Department avail itself of Clause 40 — as it must do — it cannot maintain its responsibility for administration. The control is in fact a sham and is only stated in the Bill to give some kind of justification for the financial provision which makes the Imperial Government responsible for the cost of the services. The particular case of the Post Office Savings Banks has been taken, but the conditions are similar in respect of Old Age Pensions, already dealt with, and Land Purchase, treated in a succeeding memorandum. Before dealing at length with the question of the Police and Land Purchase which are the subjects of separate Memo- randa, it will be useful briefly to analyse the amendments which have been placed upon the Paper to Clauses 2 and 5 in respect of the reserved services. It will be remembered that Clause 2 deals with the sei-vices that shall be reserved and Clause 5 with their future transfer. The Reserved Sery'ices— continued. The Unionist amendments, therefore, to Clause 2 proceed upon the plan of transferring the services from the " reserved " category of Clause 2 to the general list in the same clause of subjects which are prohibited to the Irish Parliament, or of adding " services " to the reserved list which would otherwise come under the control of the Irish Parliament at the passing of the Act. Amendments to transfer the services from the category of " reserved services " to that of general pi'ohibition are : — Mr. Horner Royal Irish Constabulary. Mr. Remnant. Col. Burn. Mr. Newman. . . . . . . Land Purchase. Mr. Evelyn Cecil. Mr. J. E. Gordon. Sir Samuel Scott. Mr. James Mason. Mr. Samuel Roberts. . . , . Old Age Pensions. Mr. .James Mason. Mr. MacCallum Scott has an amendment of the same character. Sir George Yovmger. . . . . Collection of Taxes. Viscount Castlereagh. Mr. O. Locker-Lampson. . . Post Office Savings Banks, Trustee Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies. Mr. Wortliington Evans. . . National Insurance Act and Labour Exchanges Act. Mr. James Mason. Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson. Mr. MacCalhma Scott has an amendment of the same character. Mr. George Faber Public Loans made in Ireland before the passing of the Act. Mr. Goldman. 12 The Reserved Services— continued. Other amendments propose additions to the hst of " reserved services : " — Lord Claud Hamilton. .. The fixing of judicial rents, or the Land Law Acts. Mr. Nield. Mr. Nowman. Mr. Godfrey Loclcer-Lampson. Mr. Steel Maitland. . . . . Land Valuation. Mr. James Mason. Mr. Malcolm Congested Districts Board. Viscount Castlereagh. Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson. Viscount Castlereagh Elementary, intermediate and University Education. Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson. Evicted Tenants. Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck. Factory and Workshops Act 1901 and 1907, and the Shops Regulation Acts 1892 to 1904. Mr. Peel. . . , . . . Dublin Metropolitan Police. Mr. Remnant. Mr. Douglas Hall. Sir Randolf Baker. . . . . Postal Services. Mr. Watson Rutherford. Earl Winterton. Sir Alfred Cripps. Sir Gilbert Parker. Turning to Clause 5 which deals only with the arrangements for the future transfer of reserved services the Unionist amend- ments, not consequential upon amendments to Clause 2, are not numerous. Mr. Astor and j\Ir. Godfrey Locker-Lainpson propose to alter the method of the transfer of the Royal Irish Constabulary. Neither would have the transfer automatically effected at the 13 The Reserved Services— continued. end of six years, but ]\Ir. Astor by Order in Council, and Mr. Godfrey Loeker-Lampson by a resolution passed by both Houses of the Parliament of tlie United Kingdom. Other amendments omit the various " reserved services" mentioned in the clause. If the amendments were carried the " reserved services " would be placed in the same position as that occupied by land purchase, no special provision being made for the future. 14 THE ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY. There are several amendments, standing in the names of Colonel Burn, Mr. Remnant and Mr. Horner, the effect of which is to keep the control of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Police under the Imperial Government, and to prohibit the estab- lishment of any armed force by the Irish Parliament. This Memorandum deals generally with the subject, with special reference to the Royal Irish Constabulary, that body having a peculiar organisation and status. The proposal in the Bill is that the Royal Irish Constabulary shall be automatically transferred to Irish control at the end of six years. As will be shown later, this proposal is a complete departure from those made on the subject in former Bills. In its present form it constitutes a change of far-reaching importance. The Royal Irish Constabulary occupies an unique position. Manned by Irishmen, selected for character and intelligence, in which promotion is attained by educational ability as well as by practical service, it has done admirable work under trying circumstances, so as to command the confidence of one section of the people and the respect of the other. While individual members of the force have been able to retain the good will of the people, the force collectively has won the enmity of the Nationalist party. Although it has sometimes been hampered by vacillating and time-serving Ministers, it has always been a mainstay of British rule, and has stood in the eyes of the people of all classes as the embodiment of order and the representative of a fixed law. It has typified the power, if not always the will, of the Government to give full protection to the law-abiding. Its equipment, constitution and cost has been often compared with the police force of Great Britain, to its disadvantage. The answer is that every country gets the police force which it deserves ; that a police force is made for conditions, not conditions for a police force ; that the conditions of Ireland differ widely from those of Great Britain. 15 The Royal Irish Constabulary— continued. The transfer of the R.I.C. to the Irish Government would at once destroy the position it now occupies as described above. Combined with the proposal to transfer the Judiciary also to the Irish Parliament, it means the complete abnegation by Great Britain of a share in the maintenance of law and order. What will be the position of the Imperial Government in that event ? If it finds it necessary to intervene in Irish affairs for the maintenance of order, it has only the military forces on which to rely. But the employment of troops in civil disturbances has always, and rightly, been regarded with disfavour, and has only been resorted to reluctantly as a last resource. The curious hatred which the populace has to the intervention of military in cases where the more violent operations of police would be regarded without resentment must be taken into account. Especially in Ireland would it be vmfortunate that the red coats should be forced into this position. The proposal to transfer the Royal Irish Constabulary as at present constituted to the Irish Government is extremely remarkable when we consider the position taken up by the Liberal Government in 1886 and 1893 with regard to that service. By the Bill of 1886 the Irish Legislative Body was given the power of establishing and maintaining a local police force similar to that in Great Britain. The Royal Irish Constabulary so runs CI. 21 (b) "shall, while that force subsists, continue and be subject as heretofore to the control of the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty." And Great Britain was to bear the charges of the R.I.C. above the sum of £1,000,000. Here we have an Irish local police under the local authorities, existing alongside the R.I.C. which was to remain an Imperial force. In 1893 a different policy was followed. CI. 30 (1) of the 1893 Bill, as amended, ran as follows : — " The forces of the Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Metropolitan Police shall, when and as local police forces are from time to time established in Ireland in 16 The Royal Irish Constabulary— continued. accordance with the Fifth Schedule to this Act, be gradually reduced and idtimately cease to exist as mentioned in that Schedule : (and thereupon the Acts relating to such forces shall be repealed, and no forces organised and armed in like manner, or otherwise than according to the accustomed manner of a civil jjolicc, shall be created under any Irish Act :) and after the passing of this Act, no oflicer or man shall be appointed to either of those forces : — Provided tliat until the expiration of six years from the appointed day, nothing in this Act shall require the Lord Lieutenant to cause either of the said forces to cease to exist, if as representing Her Majesty the Queen he considers it inexpedient." It is important to note that the words enclosed in brackets were inserted on the Report Stage by the Government them- selves. The views of the Government were stated during the Committee Stage by INIr. Gladstone on Jvme 1st, 1893 — " The question might then be asked : ' Do you conceive that it ought to be within the attributes of the Irish Legislature, which you have disabled from establishing any description of military force, to establish a force like the Ii'ish Constabulary.' . . . For myself, I frankly own I do not think the Irish Legislature ought to be in a position to re-create the Irish Constabulary. Such as it is, whether it is to be described as a civil or a military force, it appears to me to be beyond the attributes of a Local Legislature, working for local purposes, having, of course, the resource of the military, and at the discretion of the Executive in case of need, to create such a force. I regard it as an admirable force, but abnormal in many of its con- ditions, and, as such, not lying within the proper attributes of a Local Legislature.'"— Par/. Deb., Col. 1839. When the doctrines, thus enunciated by Mr. Gladstone on June 1st, were grafted into the Bill on July 20th, the Government proposal was strongly opposed by the Nationalist party. Mr. Sexton, desiring that the Irish Parliament should have a central police force, said : — " Do you know what has happened in Ulster ? The Local Authorities there . . . will not be well-affected 17 The Royal Irish Constabulary— continued. to the Government. Political tranquillity may not follow from the adoption of Home Rule. (Hear, hear.) Yes, there may be times of disturbance, and I say that the power to keep order in Ireland should be jfiven to those on whom the responsibility is placed. If you give them the power. I think they will acquit tiiemselves of the responsibility.''^ — Pari. Deb., Col. 135. Mr. J. E. Redmond said : — " The Government of Ireland under an Irish Parliament and an Irish Executive will necessitate for a considerable tinie the existence of some Central Police Force which will be quite apart from the local forces that will be createfl in the different localities." — Pari. Deb., Col. 145. These scarcely veiled threats of the uses to which an armed police would be put are instructive in view of the new police policy adopted by the Government in the present Bill. It is now proposed to hand over the R. I.C, organised an d armed as at present, to the Irish Government at the end of six years. It is interesting to observe the origin of this precise date. Clearly it is taken from the Bill of 1893 (see above), but there the six years is a period within which the Lord liieutenant need not end the Constabulary if he thinks it expedient. The new policy, therefore, represents a complete departure from the ideas of 1886 and 1893. The idea of a local civil police force, which then approved itself, is drojDped as a direct proposal, though the Government may be expected to defend their plan on the ground that the Irish Parliament will only take over the R.I.C. to disband it and replace it by local forces. There is no direction to it to act in that manner. The temptation to retain the R.I.C. will be great. The Irish Government is to be given full control of a military force, an idea which was formerly abhorrent to all. Will it of its free will abandon the power it will thus possess, and make local bodies less dependent upon the Central Government by giving them their own local forces ? 18 The Royal Irish Constabulary— confrntie^/. Or when thoroiiohly permeated with Leaguers and Hibernians to regard the R.I.C. as the nucleus of the Irish Army of Independence to gain separation ? What makes the new departure tlie more strange is that it coincides with the transfer of the Judiciary to the Irish Parliament. (On this point, See No, 3. Memorandum on the Judiciary.) Having parted with such safeguard as the Exchequer Judges provided in the Bills of 1886 and 1893, the Government also hands over an armed force of some thousands, in the face of the provisions of Section 3 of Clause 2. Mr. Devlin has been at pains to explain the consequences, in a speech at New York, reported in the Irish People of June 21st, 1902 : — " Allow us to have as owners the tillers of the land, to have an Irish Parliament that will give our people all authority over the police and the judiciary and all government in the nation ; and when equipped with comparative freedom, then would be the time for those who think we should destroy tlie last link that binds us to England to operate by whatever means they think best to achieve that great and desirable end. I am quite sure I speak for the United Irish League in this matter." In this Memorandum it is not proposed to deal with the terms of superannuation and the like to be given to the Con- stabulary on their transfer. The point, which however should be considered, is that the Constabulary would have just cause of complaint in being handed over to the control of a party with which the loyal discharge of duty has brought them into conflict. Threats against tlie R.I.C. have been frequent from the Nationalist Party. The following are examples. Not long after the Trevor Hall Convention of the Land League of America on May 18th, 1880, Mr. John Dillon addressed a meeting, at which he said : — " It will be our duty, and we will set about it without delay, to disorganise and break up the Irish Constabulary 19 The Royal Irish Constabulary— continued. that for tlie past 30 years have stood at tlie baek of tlie Irish landhirds — bayonet in hand. Tlie pay of tlicsc men, whicli is taken out of tlie pockets of the Irish tenants, is voted yearly in the Enghsh Parhament, and not an Irish member could be found to ])rotest against it. Let us now see that, instead of the twelve h^n^dred tliousand pounds a year ^vhich is devoted to pay the Irisli Constabulary, that not one hundred thousand will go for that purpose : then I would like to see the landlord who would face the Irish tenant ! (Applause.) I tell you that the hour we take away the bayonet of the Irish policeman that hour the landlords will come to ask us for a settlement of the land question." — Special Commission Report, p. 30. Cross-examined at Cork on March 26, 1891, Mr. John Dillon was questioned on this matter as follows : — Mr. Ronan : Did you say in a speech — " It will be our duty to disorganise and break up the Royal Irish Constabu- lary " ? Mr. Dillon : Yes, and I trust to do it yet. You would break and disorganise the Royal Irish Constabulary ? — No ; I have not tiie power yet, but wl\en I have the power I trust to do it. — National Press, March 27, 1891. At Castlerea on December 5, 1886, Mr. John Dillon, M.P., stated : — " I want to say a word of warning to the Bailiffs, and all that class of people who will side with the landlord in the struggle this winter in Ireland, and that warning is this, that there is no man in Ireland, England, or Scotland who does not know who will have the Government in Ireland within the next few years. (Cheers.) The little potentates are in their own estimation the Lynches or Macdougalls, who have the police to help them to-day, and who think they can ride over the bodies of our people. I tell these people that the time is at hand, and very close at hand too, when the police will be our servants, when the police will betaking their pay from ]Mr. Parnell, when he will be Prime Minister of Ireland. And I warn the men to-day who take tlicir stand by the side of landlordism and signalise them as the enemies of the people, that in the time of our power we will remember them." — Daily News, December 6, 1886. The Royal Irish Constabu\ary— continued. At Bodyke, on Sunday, January 30, 1887, Mr. William O'Brien, M.P.. made the following statement: — " I tell you candidly here to-day that though we allow these policemen to withdraAv from this meeting, because they were weak — a mercy, which 1 am sorry to say, that they have never reciprocated to the people — I tell you, and I wish the Government reporter was here to listen to it, that if our people had power to meet them, man to man, and rifle to rifle — (prolonged cheers) — in the open field, I, for one, would cut short my speech-making this very moment, and the next speeches that the destroyers of your homes would hear would be the speeches out of the mouths of your guns. (Loud cheers.) We cannot meet them like that. Unfortmiately we have not the poewr ; but we have a weapon to-day before which all the power and pride of landlordism is going down like the walls of Jericho. (Cheers.) It is tumbling down at the shout of an enfranchised and imconquerable Irish nation. (Loud and prolonged cheers.)" — Freeman's Journal, January 31, 1887. On March 13, 1887, Mr. John Dillon spoke as follows at Tipperary : — " Believe me, they will not be able to do much with their Coercion Act, and I would tell you what is more, that there is not a magistrate or a policeman — (loud groans) — don't be so excited against the police, because they will be all working under my orders within a year — (great cheering) — there is no magistrate or policeman in Ireland who does not know in his heart that Mr. Parnell will be ruler in this country in a year or two, and do you suppose that they are going to work a Coercion Act bitterly against us ? Not a bit of it. They like their bread and butter as much as anj^body. They know right well that it is not to the landlords they will have to look in the future. They know perfectly well now what they did not believe during the last Coercion Act, that since Mr. Gladstone has come round, the cause is going to Avin, and they know perfectly well, every man of them, that Mr. Parnell will be their master, as he will be the master of this country — (cheers) — within a very short time. Believe me, the Coercion Act will not amount to much. Nobody will be afraid of it. 21 The Royal Irish Constabulary— continued. and tlie only consequence will be we will ask a larger reduction when it comes. I think it would be only fair play that suppose we asked twenty-five per cent, without a Coercion Act, we should ask forty-five per cent, if we got a Coercion Act. (Cheers.) It would be only justice to inflict a fine on a man who beliavcs badly, and if a landlord of the country behaves badly, I don't see why he should not be fined as well as a poor fellow who would behave himself badly in the sti-eet." — Freeman's Journal, March 14, 1887. Their duties often bring them into conflict with the Nationalist Party, especially when the R.I.C. are under instructions to prevent a " proclaimed " meeting being held. This action is taken by the Imperial authorities in the intex'ests of the " intimidated " minority. Would this protection be given when the Irish Parliament control the Executive ? Would the Irish Parliament prevent its members from holding meetings to denounce men obnoxious to their constituents ? There was such a case this year when a Nationalist meeting was prevented. The facts are given in the Clonmel Nationalist (January 24, 1912). There were present no less than three Nationalist M.P.'s — an indication that the meeting was no little village gathering : — " A public meeting under the auspices of the local branch of the United Irish League was announced to be held in the village of Moyglass on Sunday in connection with the local grass lands. ... At two o'clock when the Members of Parliament arrived the little village presented a strange spectacle. There were over 100 police under Mr. Langhorne, County Inspector, and Mr. Norris, D.I., in possession of the village, and the majority of those were drawn up around the platform, the remainder being posted not far away at different parts. . . . Prior to the holding of the meeting the County Inspector waited on Alderman Condon in Mr. Ryan's residence in the village, and informed him that he had instructions to prevent the meeting being held in the village. . . . The County Inspector then entered the room, and asked Alderman Condon if it were his intention to hold a meeting in the village. The Royal Irish Constabulary— fo»//rt»«/. Alderman Condon : That is our intention. Mr. Langhorne : I had instructions not to allow tlie meeting to be held in the village. Alderman Condon : Might I inquire on Avhat authority you are acting ? Mr. Langhorne said he was acting on instructions from the authorities. Alderman Condon : Anj-thing 1 am now going to say, Covmty Inspector, is absolutely impersonal to you. This meeting has been called by myself and my constituents, and M'ithout giving any further reason than that I am entitled as Parliamentary representative in a free country as this is supposed to be to address my constituents. . . . The interview then ended and the County Inspector withdrew. . . . A short time afterwards Alderman Condon, j\LP., accompanied by ]\Ir. J. J. O'Shee, M.P., Mr. John Hackett, M.P., Mr. Michael Slattery, J. P., Chairman South Riding County Coimcil, and Mr. E. Anglim, M.C.C.. proceeded through the village street to where the platform was erected. In front of the platform a strong body of police ^^'as stationed, and as the ^Members of Parliament approached it they were met by the County Inspector and District Inspector Norris. A short parley ensued between Alderman Condon and the County Inspector, Alderman Condon claiming his right to go on the platform. The County Inspector said it could not be allowed. Alderman Condon : Unless I am prevented by brute force I am going to assert my right to address a public meeting. At this juncture a stalwart police sergeant laid his hand on Alderman Condon, assuming a rather aggressive attitude. Alderman Condon : I beg to tell you, Mr. County Inspector — not you personally, but the authorities whom you represent — that it is by brute force alone that we are prevented from holding our meeting, and we will now proceed to hold it in another place. Pointing to the police sergeant already referred to. Alderman Condon said to the County Inspector : ' I will have the name of that man. and I will 23 The Royal Irish Constabulary— con^inut^/. mark him. Tliank God, our day is coming soon when, under a Home Ride Government, we can liold our meetings where we hke.' The Members of Parh'ament, accompanied by tlie crowd and four bands, proceeded to a field the property of Mr. W. Skehan, a sijort distance from the village, where the meeting was held." — Clonmel Nationalist, January 24, 1912. Feeble though the Imperial Executive may be, especiallj' under Mr. Birrell, in actively suppressing open intimidation, at least when it lends the police for protective purposes, it is giving the boycotted minority some assistance. Thei-e were on June 1st, 1912, in Ireland 305 persons under police protection — 53 under constant protection, 252 under the protection of patrols. Presumably the protection is necessary. No one can imagine Mr. Birrell giving it otherwise. But would an Irish Parliament or an Irish Executive be willing to lend their force to protect vmpopular persons from the attention of constituents ? No one can imagine for a moment that an Irish Government returned to power by the United Irish League would employ the police force to protect men whom the United Irish League had condemned. For the Imperial Parliament to surrender its control of the R.I.C. is to abandon entirely the minority, to leave them at the mercy of the LTnited Irish League, and to invite intimidation and agrarian lawlessness. It is of little value to say that in six years, the boycotted and the boycotter will be at peace and the old feuds forgotten. They may, but they may not ; and if they are not, then the Imperial Government ought not to resign its control. Admittedly the Irish Parliament cannot be given the control of its police now. Who can say that matters will have so changed in six years that they will then be fit for the responsi- bility ? Better than automatic transfer at the end of the period, whatever the conditions then existing, woidd be control by the 24 The Royal Irish Constabulary— ron/inj^erf. Imperial Parliament and Imperial Executive, with the power, should they be convinced later that a transfer can be effected with justice and security, to put it into operation. Amendments to this effect stand in the names of Mr. Astor and Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson. Under the present conditions the minority are abandoned after six years : and a police force composed of Leaguers and Hibernians, for no one supposes that the present members of the R.I.C. would not be " retrenched," would be unlikely to hold the balance equally between their fellow Nationalists and the minority. There is also another aspect of the question. The fact that the transfer will not take place for some years will react on the efficiency of the force. The members of the Constabulary will work for six years with transfer before their eyes. Being men, tliey will have regard to their position when the transfer takes place. They will make friends with the mammon of unrighteousness. They will be zealous against the opponents of Home Rule, languid when their duties bring them into conflict with the friends of the party in power. Even under present conditions the timidity or time-serving of a Chief Secretary is reflected by the Constabulary ; no one who knows the country cares to think what the administration of the law would be, when the operations of its servants were controlled by their natural desire to make provision for the future. The Dublin Metropolitan Police come under the control of the Irish Parliament without a period of waiting as is the case with the R.I.C. They are controlled by the Imperial Executive acting through a Conmiissioner in Dublin and in their present form date from 1836 — the year of the reorganisation of the R.I.C. They are purely a civil force, and in this respect differ from the R.I.C. Though the real reason for their immediate transfer is not this difference but the desire to defer to the The Royal Irish Cons\abu\nry—coiUinu((L feelings of the Nationalist Corporation of Dublin, which has strongly protested against paying a contribution towards the cost of a police force over which they have no control. \Yhen the Bill becomes law it will be competent for the Irish Parliament to meet these aspirations by handing over the control to the Dublin Corporation. But it would not seem that the Dublin Coiporation has any legitimate source of complaint with Imperial control of its police force since the London police are also subject to Imperial control. The objections to handing over the control of the Dublin Metropolitan Police to the Irish Parliament at once are the same objections of prmciple which apply to the transfer of the R.I.C. at the expiration of six years. In addition, however, there is the further objection to two police forces in the countiy under the control of different central authorities. The Imperial force— the R.I.C. — woiild have no jurisdiction in the Dublin area, how^ever great the necessity upon the Imperial Government to exercise its authority. Administrative eflficieney, the ends of justice, and the pursuit of criminals, will be delayed by the dual control. No good reason exists for the different periods of transfer : and the immediate surrender of the control of the Dublin force is prompted solely by the desire to please the Dublin Nationalists. One may indeed trace in this different treatment a certain timidity on the part of Irish Nationalists, whatever their public professions. Disorder will arise if Home Rule becomes law — especially in Ulster — and the Irish Nationalists would prefer that its repression should be the work of an Imperial force rather than one under their direction. Even in the South and West contending factions of Nationalists require police intervention. So long as the police act under an Imperial authority, the Irish Parliament have not 26 The Royal Irish Constabulary— contZ/zutY/. to submit to criticism in respect of these party conflicts between Home Rulers. Indeed they are in the favoured position, since they can criticise and condemn the action of tlie Imperial authorities without having to share the responsibility. These considerations do not arise in the case of Dublin, where control over the police is welcome as satisfying Nationalist sentiment. Mr. Remnant's amendment to place the Dublin Metropolitan Police in the same position as the R.I.C. meets these objections. 27 LAND PURCHASE UNDER THE HOME RULE BILL. Under the Government of Ireland Bill " the general subject matter of the Acts relating to Land Purchase in Ireland " is by Clause 2(11) reserved to the Imperial Parliament. Replying to Mr. Ramsay MaeDonald, Mr. T. W. Russell explained the use of the peculiar phraseology : — " It may not be a very happy expression, but it had reference to land purchase enactments which arc spread over a large number of Land Acts that are not specially Land Purchase Acts. This was the real reason of it. It can be considered in Committee if necessary." — Pari. Deb., June 6, 1912, Cols. 274—275. It would probably have been more candid to say that the Government have had recourse to this not " very happy expression " as the outcome of their intention to restrict the power of the Imperial Parliament in relation to land purchase as much as possible. The Irish land purchase policy is part only of the system of Irish land development. It depends for its working upon other land laws, particularly upon the fair rent courts and the Con- gested Districts Board. They are bound together in close relation ; but the Government are trying to divide their functions between the Irish and Imperial Parliaments. While land purchase is a matter for the Imperial Parliament, Mr. Birrell explained that " the rent fixing provisions of the Irish Land Acts are not a reserved matter and the Irish Parlia- ment will have power to legislate with regard to them." — Pari. Deb., April 25, 1912, Cols. 1209-10. So as to the Congested Districts Board, Mr. Birrell stated that :— " The grants, salaries and expenses of the C.D.B., so far as they are not included in the general subject matter of tlie Land Purchase Acts will not be a reserved service. Advances for land purchase will continue to be made from the Imperial Exchequer." — Pari. Deb., April 25, 1912, Col. 1215. 28 Land Purchase under the Home Rule Bill — continued. So far as the law relating to land purchase is concerned it is reasonable that its control should be with the Imperial Parlia- ment, to so large an extent is Imperial credit pledged. The Government have evidently had this in mind ; but to the extent that they have been pressed by Irish Nationalists to grant powers to the Irish Parliament in respect of the land problem, they have taken from the Imperial Parliament powers which it should enjoy if it were completely to control land purchase in a common sense of the term. The following table shows the amount advanced for Irish Land Purchase, and the amount outstanding to March 31, 1911 : — Advanced. Repaid. £ £ Under Landlord and Tenant (Ire- land) Act, 1870 . . . . 518,933 802,143 Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881 240,801 80,392 Tramways and Public Com- panies (Ireland) Act, 1883 . . 42,300 33,111 Purchase of Land (Ireland) Acts, 1885 and 1888 . . 9,971,336 2,094,037 Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act, 1891 13,648,615 2,791,434 Irish Land Acts, 1903 and 1909 45,390,826 710,871 Irish Land Act, 1909 . . 407,164 737 70,219,975 6,012,725 Since March 31, 1911, the advances under the Irish Land Acts, 1903 and 1909, have been increased by £7,670,914, and the repayments, so far as advised, by £266,856. — Mr. Birrell, House of Commons, Pari. Deb., March 28, 1912, Col. 739. It should be clearly understood that these figures relate only to advances made and do not represent either the total value of land purchased or the total for which application for advances has been made. So far as the former is concerned some portion of the purchase money is often paid in cash by the tenant and the total 29 Land Purchase under the Home Rule BiW—coniinued. value of the sales is increased by the amount of money applied for but not yet advanced under the Aets of 1903 and 1909. The following table, from the Estates Commissioners' Report for the year ending March 31, 1911 (Cd. 5888) brings out these two items : — Land Act. Price. Amount of Advances Applied for. Amount of Proposed Cash Payments. 1903 .. 1909 .. £ 82,041,461 1,752,440 £ 81,571,626 1,732,926 £ 469,835 19,514 Some £30,000,000 has been applied for but not yet advanced under the Acts of 1903 and 1909. No exception can be taken to the control by the Imperial Parliament of the law so far as it relates to the conditions vmder which the purchasers pay their annuities. No one could permit the Irish Parliament to alter the rate of interest or change the conditions of repayment in respect of that money already advanced by the Imperial Parliament. But the purchase policy is not completed. Indeed it is only partly through. Varying estimates of the land still to be sold to tenants have been made. They differ widely. The fact however that the purchase policy is not completed renders natural the provision leaving to the Imperial Parliament the duty of bringing the policy to a conclusion ? Other reasons, too, make it advisable that the Imperial Parliament should continue to be the authority for land purchase : the difficulty the Irish Parliament would find in raising the money and the inconveniences which would arise if the Irish Parliament passed land purchase laws differing from those of the Imperial Parliament. Land Purchase under the Home Rule BWl— continued. The Bill admits the necessity of the Imperial Parliament controlling land purchase, but only grudgingly. While out- wardly land purchase is a reserved service, in reality the Bill gives the Irish Parliament considerable indirect power over land purchase. Provided the money for land purchase can be raised it is not too much to say that the pivot upon which it turns is the pro- vision of the Land Acts relating to the fixing of fair rents. Under the land purchase Acts the purchase money is calculated at so many years' purchase of the rent. That rent may be a judicial rent or a non-judicial rent. In fact the cases where it is based upon a judicial rent largely exceed those based upon a non-judicial rent. In the case of direct sales {i.e., sales between landlord and tenant) of tenanted land, under the Wyndham Act to IMarch 31, 1911, where all the purchase money was applied for, and the advances have been made, the number of purchase agreements are 81,421, and of these 55,836 cases wei-e based on judicial rent and 25,585 on non-judicial rents.* Under the Birrell Act the proportion to March 31, 1911, is: — Judicial rents, 615 ; Non-judicial, 326. Direct sales represent the greater part of the transactions, involving since November, 1903, to March, 1911, under the Wyndham and Birrell Acts some £33,100,000 out of £41,100,000 advanced. So having regard to the amount of land still to be sold, according to the Birrell estimate £100,000,000, the importance of rent fixing in connection with land purchase can be appreciated. * These figures do represent the total direct sales of tenanted land which number 213,805 ; but only the number of sales with the conditions mentioned. The remainder have not yet been classified. 31 Land Purchase under the Home Rule E'lW—confinued Even under tlie present system the effect of rent fixing is to reduce rents. Since 1881 there has been an average reduction of 20.7 per cent, of first term rents over the entire country ; second term rents show an average reduction of 19.5 per cent, on first term rents : and the third term rents whicli are now being fixed show a furtlier reduction of 10 per cent. on second term rents. Irish Nationahsts assert that the landlords demand too high prices. That has been the cry from the time the Act of 1903 was passed and Mr. Dillon and Mr. Davitt led a campaign against it. The promise has been held out that Home Rule will mean lower terms of purchase. To take quite a recent example, Mr. Conway, an organiser of the United Irish League, speaking at Ruan on July 7, 1912, said : — " They would succeed in winning Home Rule for Ireland within the next few years, and when they did win it they would be able to deal with those few landloi'ds who were holding out and refusing fair terms." — Clare Champion, July 13, 1912. This is only one example of many, but it shows the hopes that are being held out by official organisers ot the benefits that Home Rule will bring. It is striking, too, that the " unpurchased " tenants are being organised and meetings are being held on their behalf. There are two ways by which Nationalist wishes can be attained : — (i.) By the reduction of the number of years' purchase, or (ii.) By the reduction of the fair rent upon which the purchase money is calculated. To attain the former a struggle between landlord and tenant is necessary, and the tenant must be persuaded to withhold 32 Land Purchase under the Home Rule BWl— continued. offers to purchase unless based upon the Hnes laid down by the agitator. On the other hand the policy of reducing rents has the advantage of being carried out under the cover of the law, and of benefitting tenants immediately, while they are still tenants and are awaiting the opportunity of purchasing. There is therefore sufficient evidence here to show that the control of the rent-fixing Acts by the Irish Parliament — elected it should be remembered to a considerable extent by tenants — would be used in the direction of fixing fair rents upon a lower scale. This no doubt would be effected to some extent by legislation, but also by administration. Regulations Avould be issued indicating to the Commissioners the lines upon which they were to proceed, and it is certain that an Irish department under the control of the Irish Parliament would be influenced by the tenants' views of what they should pay rather than by the opinion of the landlord. The possibilities in the way of effecting changes are all easier inasmuch as the administration of the rent fixing provisions of the Land Acts has never been conducted upon fixed and settled principles but has been largely left to the individual opinion of each valuer. The Dudley Commission reported on this point as follows : — " For over twenty-six years fair rents have been fixed under various Land Acts in Ireland, yet Parliament has never found it possible to frame a definition of a fair rent, nor the Land Commission any definite rules for the guidance of their officials. " The Fry Commission is said to have proved that fair rents were fixed on no settled principle, and that each valuer was forced to rely largely upon his own unaided 33 Land Purchase under the Home Rule B\l\— continued. judgment, and we have had evidence to the same effeet from a very experienced witness (Mr. Commissioner Bailey), who was himself engaged for sixteen years in the adminis- tration of these Acts. Undoubtedly, there has been a great deal of dissatisfaction expressed both by landlords and by tenants as to the fixation of rents, the reality of which is revealed by the great number of fair rents appeals that have to be heard every year." — Col. 4097 of 1908, Para. 159. There is then clearly in respect of these Acts scope for much administrative change which could not be so easily carried out if they were administered upon settled principles. But as it has already been shown judicial rents are directly connected with the principle upon which land purchase is based — and the relationship is even more pronounced than has been mentioned, since by far the greater number of sales are effected within the " zones " — 52,784 out of the 55,836 based on judicial rents under the Wyndham Act and 514 out of the 615 under the Birrell Act, so far as the agreements have been classified.* Sales however can only be carried out within the " zones " so long as the purchase annuity is below the existing judicial rent— between 20 to 40 per cent, in the case of first term rents, and 10 to 30 in the case of second and third term rents. Further reduction in judicial rent would therefore deter the landlord from selling voluntarily ; and since the " zone " system has always been condemned by the Irish Nationalists on the ground that it led the tenant into making improvident bargains, but really because under it sales went through automatically without their interference, it is certain that the Irish Nationalists would lose no opportunity, which control of judicial rents might give them, to break up the system of sales under the " zones." * See footnote on page 30. 34 Land Purchase under the Home Rule BWl— continued. There should also be considered in relation to this question the possible effect of further reductions in fair rents on those tenants who have either purchased or agreed to purchase. Since their annuities woiild have been calculated on a higher fair rent thaii would be prevailing, they would certainly become discontented. The tendency would be in the direction of repudiation. The Irish Nationalists would be hardly likely to devote them- selves to persuading them that their bargains were fair and just and must be respected. Indeed, much of their campaign against the Wyndham Act has been devoted to making them discontented, and suggesting to them that they have entered into improvident bargains, especially in the case of those tenants who have purchased under the " zones." Upon this point the evidence of Mr. John Fitzgibbon, IM.P., the official witness of the United Irish League before the Dudley Commission should be read. (Cd. 3630 of 1907.) In the aggregate these annual payments are very large. The following figures are taken from the Report of the Irish Land Commission (Cd. 6354) for the year ended March 31, 1912 :— Arrears due at 31 March, 1911. Amount of instalments which accrued due during the year ended 3 1 March, 1912. Total amount collectible in the year. Amount collected in the year. Arrears due at 31 March, 1912. 1881-1888 1891-1896 1903 1909 £ 10,906 10,025 18,792 10 £ 339,227 469,993 1.298,429 17,499 £ 350,133 480,018 1,317,221 17,509 £ 339,550 470,051 1,294,457 17,279 £ 10,583 9,967 22,764 230 This does not however represent the whole amount of the annual payments, but only that portion dealing with 35 Land Purchase under the Home Rule BWl-— continued. completed sales. There is a large number of sales awaiting the advancing of the purchase money for completion. Pending the completion the purchasers pay to the Land Commission interest on the amount to be advanced and the Land Commission passes it on to the vendors or others entitled to receive it. The interest collectible during the year ended March 31, 1912, was £1,518,252 and arrears were £30,981, making a total of £1,549,233 ; the amount collected by that date was £1,519,892. In the event of friction between the Imperial and Irish Parliaments matei'ial is to hand for an agitation, especially if the Irish Nationalists desired to obtain control of the land laws in their entirety — not an unlikely ambition. The possible discontent arising from reduction of rent is not the only source of an excuse for the agitation. Nature is not unlikely to render assistance. Bad harvests, or the losses caused by disease — such as the even now existing cattle disease — would give the Irish Nationalists an excuse for an agitation amongst farmers for the postponement or reduction of annuities. The influence of the Irish Nationalists among the farmers is dwindling, to the horror of the politicians ; and they may embark upon desperate courses in an attempt to re-establish themselves in favour. What better excuse, for example, than that afforded to-day by English restrictions on the importation of Irish cattle. The argument would run : "If England for her own purpose, unnecessarily as we think, refuses to take our cattle and so ruins us, we cannot be bound to pay her her annuities. She must in justice relieve us of the annuities so long as she prohibits the importation of our live cattle." 36 Land Purchase under Home Rule Bill — continued. It has actually been used by Mr. J. J. O'Shec, M.P., who, speaking at Claslniiorc, Co. Waterford, on September 2.3, 1012, is reported to have said : — " There is one question that arises for you this autunui in connection with the payment of the November instahnents and that is the question of the sale of store cattle. Now it may be a wis<' and prudent thing- for Mr. Runcinian, the President of the English Board of Agriculture, to adopt a very cautious policy ; it may in the long run be the best course, not merely for England, but above all, it may be the best course for Ireland and the Irish farmer. . . . But we have this to say to the I>and Commission who expect their instalments in November, that so long as the ports ai-e not open for the exportation from Ireland to England of store cattle, we have every reason to ask, and to expect that our request shall be granted, that the Land Commission shall postpone, so long as the ports remain closed, their request for the payment of the November instalments. . . That is a reasonable demand, and one, I think, that shall be conceded, and if it is, the inconvenience of not being able to sell for a month or two will not be so great, because the object of selling store cattle this season is to enable rents and instalments to be paid. — Cork Free Press, September 24, 1912. A further provision of the Bill reduces the personal effect which the repudiation of annuities would cause and to that extent removes difficulties in the way of an agitation of this nature. At present failure to pay an annuity is visited upon the county where the defaulter resides by a deduction from the local taxation grants, a proceeding which involves an increase in the rates of the county. The prompt payment of annuities is encouraged by the pressure local ratepayers place on a defaulter to avoid paying indirectly themselves by an increased rate to make up the deductions from the local taxation grant. 37 Land Purchase under the Home Rule B\\\—contiiuicd. Under the Home Rule Bill, however, by Clause 18 the deduction is to be made from the Transferred Simi. It will be open to the Irish Parliament to continue the present system, so far as the ultimate responsibility is concerned, by deductions from the grant-in-aid of the rates of a county. On the other hand, certainly the more popular course would be, especially with a Parliament the majority of the IMembers of which would be returned for agricultural constituencies, to make the charge a national one, and to replace the deduction from the Transferred Sum by an addition to, say, the Income Tax. To that extent the local responsibility for the payment of annuities is removed ; and the inducement to see that neighbours are prompt in payment is weakened. Deductions from the Transferred Sum would result in feeling not against the defaulters but against Great Britain for insisting upon her " tribute." For of this one can be quite certain, that in the event of a wide- spread refusal to pay annuities ample excuse would be forthcoming from Nationalist sympathisers. Of course it will be denied that an^i:hing like a strike against the payment of annuities is possible ; but as against this derial it shovdd be remembered : — (1) That certain members of the Nationalist Party have been for years past asserting that many purchasing tenants have been led into making improvident bargains. If these tenants for that reason decline to pay their annuities, those who have urged them to believe that their action in purchasing on the terms arranged was improvident will be bound to support them. 38 Land Purchase under the Home Rule BiW—confimwd. (2) That there is now a demand for " compulsory " sale which will grow stronger as time goes on. Compulsion is in fact pai-t of the official programme of the United Irish League. If the Imperial Parliament is not willing to accede to this demand, what stronger weapon can be used against it than a refusal to continue the payment of annuities ? (3) That a " no rent " campaign has already been embarked upon. Little difference in principle exists between this and a " no annuity " campaign. (4) That reductions of rent, through the Rent Fixing Acts, under the direction of the Irish Parliament, are likely to give rise to feelings of dissatisfaction among annuity payers whose annuities are not subject to reductions. The payment of annuities is in fact the strongest weapon that the Irish Parliament can have in disputes with the Imperial Parliament. And although the Imperial Parliament under the Home Rule Bill, has the power of deducting from the Transferred Sum the amount of the default, action of this character would be a declaration of war between the two Parliaments, and would bring to an end any hope of the Home Rule Bill standing as a settlement of the question. Which Parliament might be successful in a struggle of this character is doubtful ; but the provisions of the Home Rule Bill stand condemned since they even place the security for the repayment of annuities in this jeopardy. The paragraphs have so far related to land purchase as between selling owner and purchasing tenant, with the Estates Commissioners as the Government authority, but by the I. and Act of 1909 over the whole of seven counties and portions of two 39 Land Purchase under the Home Rule EWl— continued. others — Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim, Roscommon, Mayo, Galway and Kerry, and portions of Clare and Cork — the Congested Districts Board is the only purchasing authority. Its present area of operation covers more than one-third of Ireland — Congested Districts Board area being 7,658,114 acres ; rest of Ireland, 13,174,631 acres. Under the Home Rule Bill, according to Mr. Birrell — " The grants, salaries and expenses of the Congested Districts Board, so far as they are not included in the general subject matter of the Land Purchase Acts, will not be a reserved service. Advances for land purchase will continue to be made from the Imperial Exchequer." — Pari. Deb., April 25, 1912, Col. 1215. This reply is misleading since it encourages the inference that the Imperial Parliament has reserved to it under the Home Rule Bill some control over the work of the Congested Districts Board in respect of Land Purchase. The fact is that in effect the Congested Districts Board becomes entirely an Irish Department under the control of the Irish Parliament. This is brought out clearly in the concluding paragraph of the Prime Minister's reply to a question addressed to him by Mr. J. F. Mason, M.P. Mr. Asquith stated that the item " Congested Districts Board — £169,500 " — shown on page 7 of Cd. 6154, Outline of Financial Provisions of Government of Ireland Bill — " represents (in round figures) the total of the vote for the Congested Districts Board (Class 11, No. 38). The whole amount of this expenditure will be defrayed by the Irish Government out of the Transferred Sum.''— Pari. Deb., August 6, 1912, Cols. 2933—5. Since " the total of the vote for the Congested Districts Board "— " the Avhole amount of this expenditure " is to be 40 Land Purchase under the Home Rule B\\\— continued. " defrayed by the Irish Government out of the Transferred Sum " the Imperial Parhament retains no eontrol over the operations of the Board. Since the Board has the power of compulsory acquisition over no less than one third of the area of Ireland : and is the only purchasing authority within that area {See Irish Land Act, 1909, Section 58) it is clearly entirely inaccurate to state as did the Prime Minister that " the subject matter of the Irish Land Purchase Act " is a service " reserved for the Imperial Parliament and the Imperial Executive." — Pari. Deb., April 11, 1912, Cd. 1404.) The only objection to this conclusion would seem to lie in the possibility of a refusal on the part of the Estates Com- missioners, as an Imperial Department, to act upon a requisition of the Congested Districts Board calling upon them to take steps to acquire compulsorily an estate or untenanted land. The Sections of the Act of 1909 bearing upon this point are : — 60. (3) If the final offer of the Congested Districts Board is not accepted in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section, the Congested Districts Board may, if they think fit, send to the Estates Commissioners a requisition calling upon the Estates Commissioners to take steps to acquire the estate or untenanted land com- pulsorily in manner provided by Part IV. of this Act. 61. (1) The Estates Commissioners in any case where they propose to acquire compulsorily an estate or untenanted land- (a) in respect of which a final offer has been sent to them and has not been accepted in manner provided by this Act : or (b) in respect of which they have received a requisition under this Act from the Congested Districts Board, 41 Land Purchase under the Home Rule BWl—cotitinued. Shall publisii in the Dublin Gazette a notice containing particulars of the final offer of the Land Connnission or the Congested Districts Board as the case may be, and stating that the Estates Commissioners intend to purchase the estate or untenanted land described in the final offer at the price named in such offer. . . ." It would be a drastic step on the part of the Estates Commissioners to refuse to act : but they might be compelled to do so by the refusal of the Imperial Treasury to advance more than a limited sum in each year for compulsory sales, especially as compulsory sales necessitate paying the vendor m cash. To raise cash now costs the Imperial Treasury some twenty odd per cent, owing to the low price of Land Stock. No one presumes that public confidence will be increased by Home Rule, so that the market price of Land Stock will rise. Consequently the Imperial Treasury out of regard for the Imperial taxpayer will be bound to limit the cash advanced to the Congested Districts Board, as it does now to about one-tenth of the amount raised for land purchase. It is easy then to appreciate the position that would arise. The Estates Commissioners through the action of the Imperial Treasury would be compelled to decline to act on the requisition of the Congested Districts Board. Two public departments would be at loggerheads : and since one department, under the control of the Irish Parliament, would find what it doubtless considered absolutely essential work blocked by the refusal of another department, under the control of the Imperial Parliament, two Governments and two Parliaments would be embroiled. The Irishmen would air their grievances at Westminster, which would not, as the Prime Minister anticipated, be relieved of the burden of Irish business : and the Bill would not be a settlement of the problem of governing Ireland. Land Purchase under the Home Rule B'lM— continued. Of course it may be argued tliat, provided the cash is forthcoming, the Estates Commissioners would not act as a revising authority, and would in practice only register the desires of the Congested Districts Board. If that be the intention, it is, as has already been pomted out, entirely inaccurate to say that land purchase will remain under the control of the Imperial Parliament, for in practice so far as seven counties are concerned the purchasing authority will be the Congested Districts Board under the direction of the Irisli Parliament. This is not merely a problem of landlord and tenant, but seriously affects a third party— the Imperial Taxpayer, whose credit will be pledged by a body over whose actions they have no control. The extent to which the Congested Districts Board are to be a purchasing authority may be gathered from the size of the area over which their operations extend. To the amount required to purchase the land within that area is Imperial credit to be pledged. A problem which also affects the question of Imperial control arises out of the working of the Land Commission offices if the Home Rule Bill becomes law. It has been seen from Mr. Asquith's reply already quoted that the administration of the Congested Districts Board is wholly under the direction of the Irish Parliament, which bears the whole cost, and the power of the Imperial Parliament is limited to legislation affecting the Board only in respect of land purchase. With the Land Commission the position is different. That department as a result of the Bill is divided between the Imperial Parliament and the Irish Parliament. 43 Land Purchase under the Home Rule EMl^continued. Replying to Mr. J. F. Mason, M.P., the Prime ^Minister said " Of the total net sum provided in the Civil Service Estimates, 1912-13, for the Land Commission (in round figures £616,000) it is estimated that £592,000 relates to expenditure in connection with Land Purchase and that £24,000 relates to other services of the Land Commission. The former sum represents the charge which would fall on the Imperial Government under the Government of Ireland Bill, and the latter the charge which would fall on the Irish Government to be met out of the Transferred Sum. The salaries of certain of the Land Commissioners (amounting to £12,000 in all) are borne on the Consolidated Fund, and it is estimated that of this sum £9,000 is expenditure in connection with Land Purchase. In addition to the expenditure in respect of Excess Stock provided for in the Land Com- mission Vote, a further sum of £160,000 for this purpose is provided out of the Ireland Development Grant. (Class VII., Vote 4.) The item Land Purchase — other Charges — £169,000 shown on page 4 of Cd. 6154, includes this sum of £160,000 and the sum of £9,000 for the salaries of the Land Commissioners. The sum of £24,000, being the estimated cost of the services other than Land Purchase provided for on the Land Commission Vote is included in the item Class 111 — Law and Justice — other Services £32,000 sho^vn on page 7 of Cd. 6154."— Pa/-/. Deb., August 6, 1912, Cols. 2933-5. In the interest of efficient administration, how is the division to be effected ? As at present constituted the Land Commission offices are divided as follows : — (1) The Department dealing with the work of the Estates Commissioners. (1a) The Department for distribviting the purchase moneys. 44 Land Purchase under the Home Rule Bill— continued' (2) The Fair Rent Depailment. (3) The Department dealing with the Irish Church Fund. (4) The Secretariat. (5) The Accountant's Department (including the col- lection of Annuities). (6) The Solicitor's Department. (7) The Mapping Department. (1) and (1a) are concerned with land purchase and are to be controlled by tlie Imperial Parliament. (2) and (3) are concerned with matters which are not included in the phrase " general subject matter of the Acts relating to land purcliase in Ireland " and the control of them passes to the Irish Parliament. What of (4) to (7) ? In these cases the division of functions is not clear. Officials are engaged upon matters which affect land purchase and other provisions of the Land Acts— the first a reserved service, the second transferred services. To split the office would be adding another to the nvimerous Irish Boards — besides creating difficulties in the way of inspection of documents and the supply of information. Administration would suffer in efficiency if this solution were adopted. The provisions of Clause 40 of the Home Rule Bill come to the rescue. It provides : — 45 Land Purchase under the Home Rule Bill— continued. " Arrangements may be made by any department of the Government of the United Kingdom for the exereise and performance on behalf of that department of any powers or duties of that department by officers of an Irish Department, or by any Irisli Department for the exereise and performance on behalf of that department of any powers or duties of that department by officers of a department of the Government of the United Kingdom on such terms and conditions as may be agreed : " Provided that no sucli arrangements shall diminish in any respect the responsibility of the department by which the arrangement is made." But how shall the salary of an official be apportioned when he performs work attributable to both transferred and reserved services ? How shall the expense of these hybrid departments be distributed between the Irish and Imperial Exchequers ? How shall the officials be appointed ? By whom ? Upon what qualifications ? Who shall decide in the case of disputes ? What would be the outcome if the Imperial Parliament desired the dismissal of an official who retained the confidence of the Ii-ish Parliament in respect of his services so far as they were concerned with matters that came within the powers of the Irish Parlia- ment ? The permanent head of the Commission will have to serve two masters — an Irish Minister for transferred services, and an Imperial Minister for reserved services. How shall he hold the balance when differences arise ? Surely from an administrative point of view the suggested solution is impossible. 4G Land Purchase under the Home Rule BtW— continued. There is something mere serious than administrative chaos. If the clause is acted upon, the officials will be Irish officials carrying out, in part. Imperial duties. Their associations will be Irish : they will meet day by day Irish Members of Parlia- ment : they will serve Irishmen. Yet they may be called upon to exercise difficult functions in the performance of which Imperial and Irish interests are bound to be antagonistic. The provision in Clause 2 in fact calls for the most detailed explanation from Ministers in charge of the Bill. To treat land purchase as settled, requiring only adminis- tration to produce a peaceful conclusion, is foolish. There are many problems left. Price, as already pointed out, is one. Another is the demand for general compulsion upon all landlords who will not sell. It is part of the official programme of the United Irish League. The original provisions in the Birrell Bill acceded to this demand. Later the measure was amended and the compulsory power limited to the area of the Congested Districts Board and congested estates without that area. Nationalist anger at this amendment was pronounced. Witness the following, from The Times (November 30, 1909) : — " Mr. Stephen Gwynn, M.P., speaking at Charleville, near Tullamore, said whether Mr. Birrell had got from the Lords all the concessions that he might he could not say, but they all thought that he might have gone farther than he did go. They did not promise peace as the price of that Bill ; they promised war." " At a meeting in Claremorris, South Mayo, Mr. Joseph Devlin, M.P., said that whatever Government came back to power after January the land fight would be continued and they Avould compel that Government to restore every 47 Land Purchase under the Home Rule BWl—contimied. clause in the Land Bill wliich had been rejected by the Lords. At the coming elections they would ask Mr. Asquith if he would put Home Rule in the forefront. If he did not they were free as to the exercise of the Irish vote in English constituencies, and they would teach the Government that they could not blow hot and cold with a sacred cause." And also Mr. David Sheehy, M.P., at Kill, November 28, 1909 :— " I regret to say that we have a right to complain of the want of firmness on the part of Mr. Birrell in yielding sub- mission to the Lords' amendments. It surprised me to see Mr. Birrell in the House yielding up what I consider, and what I know he considered, an essential part of liis Bill, to give way to the House of Lords, and the Irish land- lords through their representatives in the House of Lords over that great question. . . . Now it is for the people to employ compulsion themselves as compulsion would not be legalised through the interference of the House of Lords." — Drogheda Independent, December 4, 1909. More candid, indeed, is Mr. M. Reddy, M.P., who said at a demonstration held at Kinnitty on August 18, 1912, under the auspices of the local branch of the United Irish League, that : — " The Home Rule Bill would soon come before the Committee of the House of Commons. They must then have it amended, so as to give them power to deal with land purchase. If not it could be rejected if necessary. . . . When the Home Rule Bill goes into Committee, he said, they would have to have some provision made in it to deal with land purchase." — Midland Tribune, August 24, 1912. !Mr. Reddy's action will be watched with interest in the House of Commons. Such an amendment is unlikely to be carried. Will he then, as he hints, move the rejection of the Home Rule Bill ? 48 Land Purchase under the Home Rule Bill— continued. But the tone of these extracts is to conceal from the Irish people the fact that land purchase is not a subject with wliicli the Irish Parliament can deal. One member — Mr. John Fitzgibbon — (quoted on the next page) allows it to be believed still that such power will be possessed by the Irish Parliament ; another suggests that little difficulty stands in the way of attaining it. Great then will be the disappointment when the truth is out. What possibilities of agitation, should the Imperial Parlia- ment again decline to accede to the request for compulsory piu'chase ! The provisions in the Home Rule Bill for land purchase offer no probability of a settlement : but, by their certainly of producing dispute, do jeopardise the security of the British taxpayer for the repayment of the millions advanced and promised. The insurmountable difficulty of drawing up provisions relating to land purchase which are at the same time compatible with self-government and British financial interests shows the impossibility of Home Rule. The demand will be renewed. Irish members at West- minster will press it. If the Imperial Parliament refuses, how great will be the agitation. Will the Irish Parliament fail to support the Irish representatives at Westminster ? Or the members of the Irish Parliament beseech their constituents not to agitate ? The Home Rule Bill with its complicated provisions affecting land purchase will afford a thousand and one excuses for dis- content and further demands. What country promised self-government : told that it is ripe for self-government would agree that it had self-government when it was refused control of its land system ? \Vhat country 49 Land Purchase under the Home Rule B\\\— continued. would accept a scheme of self-government as final and a settle- ment which denied it power of altering its land laws ? Will Ireland do so, where land has been for years and is now the burning question ? Do the Irish people understand that so far as land purchase is concerned, the Irish Parliament will be dumb and paralysed ? That its Members too must be deaf to tiie demands of its constituents. The answer must be in the negative. Irish Nationalists are not candid. What can be more misleading, for example, than the following extract from a speech by Mr. John Fitzgibbon M.P., at Roundfort, near Ilollymount, on August 18, 1912 : — " We Avant control of our own purely domestic affairs so as to provitle every Irishman who is willing and anxious to remain in his own country with the means of a livelihood. We must begin with the land, no doubt. That is the foundation." — Western People, August 24, 1912. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. Its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSE 2. (POWERS OF TAXATION.) No. 5— OCTOBER 15, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W. , & S., Ud.-39578. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memwanda will be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defetice League would appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary will he glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He zvould also appreciate it if Members zvould be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary ivill he pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number, Victoria 4503 {two lines). [This memorandum has been prepared hj/ Mr. S. Itosenbnum and is circulated in this Series bij permission of the Unionist Central Office.] THE POWERS OF TAXATION. Clause 2, which enumerates tlie matters upon wliich the Irish ParUament shall liave no power to make laws, does not specifically mention the important subject of taxation. The only references to taxation in the Clause are in paragraph 7, Avhich prevents the enactment of laws relating to " trade with any place out of Ireland (except so far as trade may be affected by the exercise of the powers of taxation given to the Irish , Parliament . . . ), and by the inclusion of " the collection of taxes " among the services reserved to the Imperial Parliament. The first reference limits only the area of exemption in regard to laws dealing with external trade ; the second applies only to the authority for administering the taxes legally imposed. In this clause therefore, as drafted, there is no limitation whatever on the powers of taxation which might be exercised by the Irish Parliament. It is true that the words " given to the Irish Parliament " suggest some limitation on the absolute freedom to impose taxes ; but these words might equally apply to unrestricted powers of taxation. As a matter of fact veiy wide powers of taxation are definitely conferred on the Irish Parliament in Clauses 15 and 16, for the full discussion of which 1| days are allowed under the Prime Minister's Closure Resolution. Not only are those powers wide, but in many respects they are novel, having no counter- part in any of the Federal Constitutions, British or foreign, in the world. The actual proposals will be fully discussed in a later memorandum dealina with tiie taxation clauses. Here it is The Powers of Tuxaiton— con irnved. necessary to refer only to so nmcli of the proposals as is necessary for a general discussion of the principle whether any, and if so what, tax powers should be given to the new Irish Parliament, The taxing powers conferred on tlic Irish Parliament in Clauses 15 and 16 are of two classes : — 1. Power to vary Imperial taxes. 2, Power to impose independent taxes. The " power to vary " may be exercised in the following several ways : — (i) Customs and Excise on beer and spirits may be varied indefinitely. (ii) Customs on articles in the Imperial tariff may be reduced to any extent, or discontinued, or increased to yield not more than 10 per cent, additional revenue. (iii) Excise duties may be varied to any extent. (iv) All other Imperial taxes (except certain scheduled Stamp Duties) may be reduced to any extent, or discon- tinued, or increased to yield not more than 10 per cent, additional revenue. The general question is raised in the amendment on the paper in the names of Mr. Hayes Fisher and Sir Geo. Younger, who propose to add after " thereof " in page 1, line 19, the words : — " or to make any laws affecting taxation in Ireland." These words would probably have the effect of depriving the Irish Parliament of all power of independent taxation. It would not however debar it from submitting proposals to the Imperial Parliament for taxation of Ireland by an Imperial Act. This would prove a real safeguard against the possibility of taxation in Ireland being discriminatory as between different ■« «f5T The Powers of Tsixation—roniinued classes of the Irish popaiation. For example, tlie Irish Parlia- ment might desire to reduce the income tax exemption limit from £160 to £100. ITndoubtedly the effect of such a change Avould be to impose a tax which would jail especially on the industrial classes of Ulster. If it were necessary to secure approval tor ruch measures by securing the sanction of an Imperial Act, the possibility of any such discriminatory taxation would be considerably diminished. If this be the intention of Mr. Hayes Fisher's amendment, and it is of course implied in the withdrawal of taxing powers from the Irish Parliament, it would be necessary to amend Clause 17 to enable revenues raised by Imperial Act as a result of representations from the Irish Parliament to be included in the Transferred Sum. It it true that the withdrawal of all powers of taxation has no parallel in the federal systems of the world. Some more or less exiguous powers are given to the provinces of Canada, the States of Australia, the United States of America, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Germany and Switzerland. Thus, the British North America Act 1867, contains the following provision (Clause 92) :— In each province the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to . . . (2) Direct taxation within the province in order to the raising of a revenue for provincial purposes. In every federal constitution, the right to levy customs duties is recognised as the exclusive property of the Federal Government. When it Mas impossible to secure this provision, owing to special circumstances prevailing at the time of Confeder- ation, the arrangement was everywhere expressly regarded as tem- porary. This was the case in the Australian and German Constitutions. -Rait£j?sT to n^wo^ sdt The Powers of TaxMon— continued . In some cases, there is some power given to the States to add to the Customs duties imposed by the Federal Government But this powei differs from the " power to vary " given in the present Home Rule Bill in the following respeets : — 1. The additional duties are to be imposed solely for the purpose of covering the cost of inspection of imported goods. 2. In so far as the revenue from these additional duties exceeds the cost of inspection, the excess revenue must l)e handed over to the Federal Exchequer. This is the case in the States of the United States and of the Australian Commonwealth. In Brazil a larger power of Customs taxation is permitted to the States. Art. 8, See. 3 of the Brazil Constitution runs as follows : — A State is permitted to levy duties on imports of foreign goods only when such goods are intended for consumption within its own territory, the proceeds of the duty reverting, however, to the Federal treasury. This provision, of course, merely adds a power of additional local protection at the exclusive discretion of the State legislature. Under the Home Rule Bill the Irish Parliament has power : — 1. to impose duties on British products {e.g., beer, spirits, &c.) ; 2. to impose duties on foreign products {e.g., tea, sugar, wines, &c,) ; 3. to detain for exclusive Irish use the whole of the proceeds of such taxes. In these respects the Irish proposals are much more generous than those of any other federal system in the world. Generally the States of any Confederation are left with the power of imposing direct taxes and in some cases the^right to le\y direct taxes is exclusively reserved to them. The Powers of Taxation— continued. The proposal, therefore, to deprive the Irish Parliament of any power to impose new taxes might, at first sight, appear to confer on them less than is given in any other Federal Constitution. This is, however, only apparently true, for as has been pointed out, it would still be possible for new taxes to be imposed in Ireland as the result of some formal representations to the Imperial Parliament. This would be a novel procedure ; but this should not, of itself, prove objectionable in a Bill so full of novel features. It can be justified on the grounds of : — 1. The special peculiarities of the Irish peoples and the acknowledged necessity for preventing the imposition of discriminating taxation. 2. The fact that all taxes in Ireland are to be collected under the direct authority of the Imperial Parliament. 3. The necessity for securing that the existing revenues from taxes in Ireland, which are the only security for the large debt which the Imperial Parliament has incurred in Irish interests, shall not be tampered with. 4. The absence of data, materials and experience to enable Irish officials to estimate the revenue or incidence of any proposed tax. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule BilL The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. 6 THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSE 3. No. 6.— OCTOBER 19, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W. y, & a., Ltd.— 39590. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda will be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of tfie Union Defence League would appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He would also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number, Victoria 4503 {two lines). CONTENTS General Notes — Clause 3 Compensation for Property Religious Endowments . Irish Language . The Conscience Clause . Compensation for Malicious Injuries PAGE 1 25 CLAUSE III. GENERAL NOTES. This Clause places a positive restriction on the legislative powers of the Irish Padianient. Besides the more or less shadowy force of the over-riding power of the Imperial Parliament, tlie veto of the Lord Lieutenant, and the right of appeal to the Privy Council — which would be in many cases a nullity owing to the cost — it constitutes the famous " safeguard." So far as it goes it is well enough, but it does not go veiy far. Compared with the restrictive provisions considered necessary in 1886 and 1893, especially the latter, it goes a very little way indeed. Granting that in its present form it removes religious controversies from the sphere of Irish legislation, it leaves untouched other matters just as important, and infinitely more dangerous. The Bill of 1886, besides forbidding the Irish Legislature to legislate on religious qviestions, much in the spirit ot the present Bill, provided that it should not make any law (4) Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public; money without attending the religious instruction at that school. (5) Impairing, without either the leave of Her Majesty in Council first obtained on an address presented by the Legislative Body of Ireland, or the consent of the Corporation interested, the rights, property or privileges of any existing Corporation incorporated by Royal Charter or local and general Act of Parliament. The Bill of 1893 was much more elaborate and far-reaching in its restrictions. Besides the restrictions on interference with religion and on the question of religious education in which it followed the provisions of 1886, the Bill prohibited the Irish Legislature from making any law 2 General Uotes— continued. (5) Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty or property witliout due process of law, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation ; or (6) Whereby any existing Corporation incorporated by Royal Charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament (not being a Corporation raising for public purposes, taxes, rates, cess, dues or tolls, or administering funds so raised) may, unless it consents, or the leave of Her Majesty is first obtained on address from the two Houses of the Irish Legis- lature, be deprived of its rights, privileges, or property without due process of law ; or (7) Whereby any inhabitant of the United Kingdom may be deprived of equal rights as respects public sea fisheries. If Clause III. of the present Bill be compared with Clause IV. of the preceding Bills, with which it corresponds, the extreme weakening of the safeguards is at once apparent. Under this Bill it would be possible to compel a child attend- ing a school in receipt of public money to attend the religious instruction given in the school. This is clearly not provided against in Clause III., because in the preceding Bills it was found necessary to include it as a separate provision. Thus a Protestant child might be compelled to receive Cathohc instruction in a Catholic district, or vice versa, or would be forced to keep away from school altogether. Under this Bill it is open to the Irish Parliament to abolish trial by Jury, to suspend or abolish tlie Habeas Corpus, or to do away with the Petition of Right. In fine, it will be in the power of the Irish Parliament to abolish all the safeguards for personal liberty established in centuries of experience. Nor is it to be forgotten that, under Clause 27, the control of the Judiciary will pass to the Irish Parliament in respect of new appointments. General fiotes—contimied . In most, if not all amalgamations of States, whether under a full or partial Federal system, these powers are withheld from the subordinate States. In Canada the Provineial Legislature cannot deal with criminal laws at all ; the Provinces constitute, organise and maintain the Provincial Courts, but the Dominion Government appoints, pays and, if necessary, removes the Judges of the Courts of the Provinces. In the United States, the right of suspending habeas corpus is withheld entirely in several States, and in the majority can only be exercised in case of rebellion or invasion, while the tendency is towards general prohibition of the power. In Australia, where the States have much wider legal powers than aie given to the Provinces of Canada, Clause 80 of the Commonwealth Act provides " The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held in the State where the offence was committed and if theuflence was not committed within any State the trial siiall be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes." In South Africa the Judicatuie is unified. Thus we find that the enactments of the Home Rule Bill respecting the administration of the law differ in important respects from any other system of federal or quasi-federal self- government. A separate system of judicature is created, without the inclusion of any restrictions on the violation of the system of law or procedure now common to the United Kingdom. Under the Home Rule Bill the Irish Parliament will have the power to pass ex post facto legislation, which is not permitted under the American constitution. Under the Bill the Irish Parliament will have the power of impairing the obligation of contracts. General fiotes— continued. This point was strongly pressed in 1893, and as a result Sir Charles Russell said that it would come up in Clause 35. If that Clause did not at present allow them to put restrictions on the powers of the Irish Legislature, when they came to it they would put in an amendment giving themselves that right. As it happened, Clause 35 was passed undiscussed under the Closure, but it remains on record that the Government recognised the necessity of inserting this safeguard. It is clear that the authors of preceding Home Rule Bills held a strong view of the necessity of placing restrictions on the powers of the Irish Legislature, for they would not otherwise have risked Irisii support by inserting vexatious and frivolous safeguards. And they considered these safeguards necessary, although Great Britain did not wholly divest herself of the control of the Irish Judiciary as she does under the present Bill. Two of the judges of the Supreme Court in Ireland were to be Exchequer Judges, to be appointed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, to be paid out of the Imperial funds and remov- able only by the Queen on address of the two Houses of the Imperial Parliament. These functions were thus defined in the Bill of 1893, Clause 19 (4) :— " all legal proceedings in Ireland which are instituted at the instance of or against the Treasury or Commissioner of Customs or any of their officers, or relate to the election of members to serve in Parliament, or touch any matter within the powers of the Irish Legislature, or touch any matter affected by a law which the Irish Legislature have not power to repeal or alter, shall, if so required by any party to such proceedings, be heard and determined before such Exchequer Judges or (except when the case requires to be determined by two judges) before one ot them, and in any such legal proceedings an appeal shall, if any party so requires," lie from any court of first instance in Ireland to the Exchequer General Notes— continued. Judges, and the decision of the Exchequer Judges shall be subject to appear to Her iMajesty in Council and not to any other tribunal." Under Sub-sect. 5, the Exchequer Judges if not satisfied that their decrees or judgments were duly enforced by the Sheriff or other officer, were to appoint other officers to carry out the duties and such officer was to have the full privileges, powei's and immunities conferred on a Sheriff or his officers. Under Sub-section 3, no alteration of the rules relating to legal proceeding under Clause 19 could be made except by Her Majesty in Council, and the sittings of the Exchequer Judges were to be regulated with the like approval. If then, restrictions were necessary under such a system, how much more important are they under the conditions of the present Bill. Professor Morgan, writing in The Nineteenth Century of June, 1912, uses words which may be quoted in this connection. He admires the Home Rule Bill especially for its empiricism. He rejoices that it breaks away from precedents and takes a line of its own, though it be experimental. He quotes Burke's description of the Constitution, " a permanent body composed of transitory parts," and the words, " the whole moves on through the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, pro- gression," and he then continues : — " So long as we maintain its two fundamental principles — ' the rule of law ' and the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament — we have little to fear from changes of adjust- ment to new conditions." How far the supremacy of Parliament is or can be maintained is discussed elsewhere ; here we are concerned only with the General Holes— continued. maintenance of the " rule of law," It is not to be understood that Professor Morgan thinks that this should be treated empirically ; rather he regards it as a fixed principle which justifies empiricism elsewhere. But under the Home Rule Bill this " rule of law " is being treated empirically. The Bill abandons the limitations and safeguards provided in other countries, and considered essential only twenty years ago in this. Are such experiments safe or justifiable ? The reasons for the omissions were stated by Mr. Asquith when introducing the Home Rule Bill. He said : — "The Bill of 1893 contained, in its Fourth Clause, a number of restrictions upon the powers of the Irish legislature, which we do not in this Bill repeat. We do not do so for the reason, which we think is a good and sufficient reason, first of all that they w^ere very vague in their terms, next because we believe them to be absolutely unnecessary so far as we can foresee the course of events ; further, because they would give rise to infinite opportunity for litigation upon matters which are not very fit to be subject to the cognisance of the Courts of Law, and finally, because we believe that in so far as they were directed against real dangers, those dangers are amply provided against by the other safeguards provided in our Bill." — Pari. Deb., April 11, 1912, Col. 1410. COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY. The amendment standing in the name of Sir Alfred Cripps : — CI. 3, page 3, line 18, after " to," insert, " authorise the taking or injurious affecting of private property without just com- pensation," proposes to place a restriction on the powers of the Irish Legislature which appeared in Sub-section 8 of Clause 4 of the Home Rule Bill, 1893, as amended, and in Sub-section 5 of that Clause as originally introduced. In the 1893 Bill the words " or injurious affecting " did not appear, and the debates on the question turned upon the proposal to insert those words and on the insertion of words to define as far as possible what " just compensation would be." On the present occasion there are three points to be discussed : — 1. Whether the restriction should be placed on the Irish Legislature. 2. Whether compensation should be given for " injurious affecting " as well as for " taking " property. 3. What is just compensation. With regard to No. 1, Sir Charles Russell well stated the object of the Government in inserting the restriction on June 19, " It seems to be suggested that the Irish Legislature is sure to inflict grievous wi-ong on some class or classes of persons, but the very object of this subsection is to prevent that being done," — Pari. Deb., col. 1359. If the Government of 1893 thought it necessaiy to impose this restriction, it is difficult to see why it should not be regarded as desirable now. Mr. Dillon has recently used words which seem to demand such a safeguard. Compensation for Property— continued. Speaking at Portumna, October 15th, 1911, he said : — " I say the best plan to promote and expedite tliat settlement " (of evicted tenants, freedom from landlord tyranny and land purchase) " is by organising the countiy, and by an overwhelming organisation to push forward the National cause of Home Rule. Because if you once get it into the heads of Irish landlords that a Home Rule Parliament will be sitting within two years in Dublin they will be tumbling over each other to sell. Once you convince them that Home Rule is really coming you will find you have a totally different class of men to deal with. They have been very stiff in the past, but if there was a National Parliament they would not be so stiff at all, and the land- lords know that they would not get the prices by any means that they got in the past. ..." " Some landlords never will sell until compelled, and the first necessity for Ireland to-day is an effective, warning, compulsoiy Bill. We have compulsion here under the Boaixl, but it is not the kind we had in the Bill originally, for it gives tliat landlord the bonus and cash, and puts him in a better position than the man who is not compelled. Ii you had a proper compidsory Bill, which would take the land from the landlord without bonus, it would be like the case of the ' Possum up the tree. Don't shoot, I'll come down.' " — Freeman's Journal, October 16, 1911. In the face of that thinly veiled threat of confiscation it can hardly be contended that there is no need for the restriction. But on broad general grounds the restriction is desirable. Sir John Rigby, Solicitor-Genei'al, speaking on the Second Reading of the Bill of 1893 dealt with this point at some length. He was dealing with subsection 5 which forbade the Irish Parlia- ment to pass any law — " Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws or whereby private property may be taken without fust compensation.'' Compensation for Property ^iwuinued. That clause, he said, had a distinguished history. It came down from Magna Charta. A Clause such as this was placed in the first American Constitution, and " after the Civil War between the North and South, the same clause, in another form, was introduced as an amendment to the Constitution, with the view of preventing, in terms, the States from infringing the civil and religious liberties of any of their own citizens." The Clause had stood the test of discussion by jurists and decisions of Courts for many years. Sir John Rigby asked for particular attention for tlie concluding words. He said that if " just compensation " meant what the Irish Legislature might think just " the safeguard would be absolutely illusory." The justice of the compensation would be regulated by the opinion of the Courts on the present basis, and by principles of English law. He denied tiiat the insertion of this restriction was any slight or insult to the Irish Legislature, and used these woids : — " We can never repeat too often, or in too many forms of words, those essential doctrines by which wc intend to guide and govern our own inferior Legislatures, or the conduct of any who are subject to our laws. The desirability and the necessity of repeating these things consists in th's — that everyone's attention, in serious matters such as this, should be drawn to the fact that restrictions are imposed not by reason of want of faith in the honour and honesty of the body to whom powers are to be given, but because it is desirable in the interest of all that all should know the governing principles of our legislation. . . .It is well, therefore, that on a solemn occasion such as this, when we are, as we hope, inaugurating a great Legislative Body for Ireland, we should recapitulate, formulate and make plain to those who are to act under the law the lines on which it is intended they should act." — Pari. Deb., April 11, 1893, cols. 113, 114. 10 Compensation for Property— continued. In view of that utterance, i-ei)re.senting the ideas of the Government of the day, the omission of any such resti'iction in the present Bill is astonishing and inexplicable. And it is the more alarming because other safeguards for the rights of individuals are also conspicuous by their absence. It will be observed that Sir John Kigby laid stress on the fact that compensation would be measured by established principles of English law, and this argument was also urged in Committee against the proposal to define more accurately what just com- pensation should be. In 1893 the Government had this much justification — that the two Exchequer Judges were to be subject to the Queen and the Imperial Parliament, that cases between a citizen and the Irish Government could be heard before them on the demand of either of the parties to an action, and that an appeal lay to them from all Courts of first instance. In this provision there was a real guarantee for impartiality and for continuity of law. Under the present Bill tliat guarantee disappears. There is not in this Bill any guarantee that the protection of the Petition of Right will be left to the citizen. This point was also discussed in 1893, and the answer to it was that the Petition of Right is an antiquated and clumsy expedient, which has been supplanted in the Colonies by a simple and better process, of suing the Minister whose action is complained of. But neither of these processes is provided for in the Bill, and even if they were the tribunal before which actions would be heard would not possess the independence which the Irish Bench has at this moment. The question as to what compensation would be " just " is small Avhen compared with the possibility that there is nothing 11 Compensation for Property— continued. in the Bill to ensure the granting of compensation at ail, but it is still important. In 1893 Mr. H. Hobhouse moved an amendment to substitvite for " just compensation " the words " such com- pensation as he is at present entitled to." Opposing the amend- ment Sir Charles Russell pointed out tliat the construction ot " just compensation " must in this, as in every written consti- tution, be left to the decision of judicial tribunals. He said that if the compensation provided was not just the Act would be null and void, so far as the provisions regarding compensation and those dependent on them were concerned, and he laid stress on the existence of the Exchequer Judges in this connection. Mr. Courtney (noAv Lord Courtney) pointed out that by keeping the Land Laws from the cognisance of the Irish Parliament for three years the Government admitted the possibihty of injustice, and that, therefore, the question of compensation should be care- fully defined. Sir John Rigby, in reply referred to the Exchequer Judges and appeal to the Privy Council. It may be, as Sir Charles Russell pointed out and Sir E. Clarke partly admitted that compensation should not be too rigidly stereotyped, but there was on all sides agreement, though Mr. Hobhouse's amendment was rejected, that fair compensation sliould be secured. The last point is the question of compensation for " injurious affecting," If compensation is to be given at all it should be given not only for property taken away, but for depreciation in property caused by legislative action. For instance the result of drainage works might be to flood land, or to deprive land of necessary water. A road might be raised so as to make access to land difficult. Land might be taken from a farm to the deprecia- tion of the value of the rest of the land. Under the Small Holdings Acts in England, where land is taken from a farm, the farmer is compensated not only for the land taken, but for loss sustained by the taking of the land. Again, compensation was 12 Compensation for Properiy—contmmd . paid by the District Railway Company to owners under whose property the railway passed though no land was taken. A concrete case may be taken. A has a farm, partly upland, partly low-lying, which is marshy and wet in winter. The upland may be taken and he may get just compensation for it. But the loss of the upland may make the low ground almost useless, since the owner will have no place to put his stock in winter. Surely his loss should be taken into account. 13 RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS. Mr. Butcher's amendment to Clause 3, p. 3, line 18, prohibits interference with tlie existing' endowments of any religion. In the Bill of 1893 as amended owing to the criticisms of Mr. Balfour, the following section was inserted by the Government to Clause 4 : — (3) " Diverting the property or without its consent altering the constitution of any religious body." — (See Parliamentari/ Debates, 1893, June 13, Cols. 930—976.) The attitude of Mr. Asquith is in striking contrast to the readiness of Mr. Gladstone's Government to afford protection to the Church of Ireland in the Bill of 1893 botli in regard to the Bill as introduced and the Opposition amendment accepted by Mr. Gladstone. As already pointed out, Mr. Asquith has excused the omission of many sections of Clause 3 on the ground that they were vague, unnecessary, would give rise to litigation, and that any real dangers were amply provided against in the Bill. In reference to the subsections prohibiting the confiscation of religious endowments the above argument is palpably false. The debates in 1893 show that as the Bill stands its provisions wovdd not protect the endowments of the Church of Ireland from the predatory grasp of an Irish House of Commons. Having regard to the views held by the Roman Catholic prelates that the Roman Catholic Cluirch is historically — if not legally — entitled to the fabric of the Cathedrals held by the Church of Ireland, there is every reason to suppose that sooner or later pressure would be brought to bear upon the Irish Parliament to pass legislation in accordance with this opinion. 14 Religious Endowments— (owimwrf. The position taken up by tlie Roman Catholic Churcli at the moment is peculiar. On the one hand it is repeatedly insisted that the Church is historically entitled to the ancient Cathedrals and endowments, and that consequently neither the continuity oi" possession nor the statutory title conferred by the Irish Church Disestablishment Act of 1869, affects the weakness of the original title of the Cluireh of Ireland. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Walsh ridicules the suggestion that in the event of the establishment of a Parliament in Dublin the Cathedrals and other property in Dublin would be exposed to the risk of confiscation for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. If that be true, it seems a mere waste of words to persist in an historical controversy on the question of the confiscation of the property of the Roman Catholic Church in the reign of Henry VIII. {See the Protestant Bishop of Ossory's Synod Address, Dublin Papers, September 22, 1911 ; the Roman Catholic Archbishop Walsh's speech at Ringsend, Freeman'' s Journal, October 30, 1911 ; and the Bishop of Ossory's Letter in the Dublin Daily Express, December 21, 1911.) The speech of Archbishop Walsh is peculiar, because while maintaining the attitude indicated above, he suggests the possibility of a friendly arrangement for the transfer to the Roman Catholic Church of one of the two Protestant Cathedrals. The Bishop of Ossory, in a reply, cites an article in the Roman Catholic Magazine, " The Cross," which refers to his Synod Address, and contains the significant statement that the title by which English Churchmen hold Westminster Abbey or York Minster is simply that of the strong hand of tlie law and that 15 Religious Endowments— (on^mm^/. Avhat the law did in 1869 — when the Irish C'hurcli Disestabhsh- ment Act was passed eonfivming the rights of the Irisli Ciivn-ch in the Cathedrals — it can undo in juiare. In short whatever may be the present views of Archbishop Walsh as to the futiu-e action of an Irish legislature, he insists that on historical and religious grounds the Roman Catholic Church are entitled to the property in the liands of the Church of Ireland, while many of his co-religionists look forward to the time when the Irish House of Commons will be able to confer upon the Roman Catholic Church a legal title to that from which they believe they were wrongfully dispossessed. Whatever importance may be attached to the Archbishop's declarations, it is impossible to deny that the power of the Church is con- siderable and that it may rouse the religious enthusiasm of a Roman Catholic electorate to demand the confiscation of the Cathedrals and endowments at present held by " heretics " — the hereditary enemies of the Roman Catholic Church. The following letter appeared in the Dublin Daily Express (November 8, 1911), and shows that it is by no means an effort of imagination to contemplate a transfer of property to the Roman Catholic Church — even under the Union : — " Shortly after Disestablishment, the ancient churches of Clonmacnois (with the exception of Temple-Connor, which was retained for occasional services) were trans- ferred by the Church of Ireland authorities to the Board of Works, to be preserved as national monuments, on the clear understanding tliat under no circumstances would they be used again for religious purposes. A custodian was appointed by the Board of Works, who safeguarded the buildings, and the arrangement is still in force. 16 Religious Endovtmeni&^continued . " This is one of the historic sites of tiie Chuieli of Ireland, and tlic Roman Church authorities evidently were anxious to get possession of it, as a Bill was introduced into the House of Commons in 1888 for this purpose. The Bill was carefully worded, as will be seen by the text, so as not to arouse suspicion as to what was really sought. Fortunately the writer of this letter noticed in a publislied list of Parliamentary business the item ' Clonmacnois Churches Bill,' and, suspecting something underhand, at once telegraphed to the House of Conmions for a copy of the Bill, and finding that it proposed the handing over of our ancient churches at Clonmacnois to the Roman Catholics, he stirred up the leading Unionist members, with the result that the Bill was withdrawn. Does not this prove the accuracy of the Bishop of Ossory's forecast ? Undoubtedly, if Home Rule passes, those historic spots, which have been transferred by the Chiu-ch of Ireland to the Board of Works, on an honourable imderstanding, will be souglit on some pretext, by the Roman authorities, unless some safeguard is provided in the Bill. " I now give the text of the Bill introduced in 1888 : — " A Bill to permit the Irish Board of Works to make over to trustees any of the ruined chapels of Clonmacnois. "Clause 1. It shall be lawful for the Board of Works to transfer any one or more of these chapels to the custody of any trustees who may be designated by a majority of the surrounding householders. " ' Clause 2. The trustees to whom a chapel or chapels are transferred are to engage to use such chapel or chapels solely for religious purposes. " ' Clause 3. A petition signed by a majority of the householders of the parish in which the chapels are situated, or in such adjoining parish, as the Board of Works may designate, may be held proof of the wishes of the majority of the householders, and the Board of Works are to be the sole judges as to whether the petition is so signed by a majority of assentors.' " 17 IRISH LANGUAGE. Sir Gilbert Parker. Clause 3, page 3, line 17, after " make " insert " any law order or regulation which would provide for an alternative language to the English language to be used ofhcially in the Irisli legislature or in official documents or records." Mr. Ronald M'Neill has a similar amendment at Clause 3, page 3, line 23. Mr. Ian Malcolm. Clause 3, page 3, line 23 at end, insert " or impose any test disqualifying any candidate or official for employment or promotion in an official position on the ground of ignorance or imperfect knowledge of the Gaelic language. These amendments are prompted by the attempts to bring about a general revival of the Irisli language for political and separatist j^urposes. The point was raised on an amendment to the 1893 Bill, but the matter was not then thought worth serious consideration. {Pari. Deb., June 15, 1893, col. 1079.) Since that date the revival of the Irish language has been developed as a powerful instrument in the hands of the separatists in Ireland. The Gaelic League nominally purporting to be an Association for intellectual and educational purposes — but being in fact an Association with strong separatist tendencies — has taken great pains to revive the use of the Irish language, flavouring their campaign with anti-English sentiment. It enjoys too the embarrassing friendship of the Clan-na-Gael and other extreme organisations which probably value the work of the Gaelic League more for political than intellectual reasons. 18 Irish Language— continued. The following declarations of policy by the President of the I>eague, Dr. Douglas Hyde, are indicative of the aims of the I^eague. Speaking at Londonderry in reply to an address from the United Irish League Executive lie said that the United Irish League and tlie Gaelic League were working for the same end, though by different means. Their's was a movement of politics ; the Gaelic League's was of intellect. — {Irish Independent, January 16, 1912.) Again at Castlerea Feis on August 4, 1912, " They (the Gaelic League) were working to-day on the very same principles that they started vipon, and its principles were first of all that Ireland was in itself a Nation and it will never become an inferior third- rate make-believe second-hand English province or anything else." — {Roscommon Messenger, August 10, 1912.) He is also reported in the Freeman's Journal, of October 3, 1911, to have said : — " We ask henceforth the teaching of Irish by Irish teachers and through the medium of Irish, and that every schoolmaster or schoolmistress who cannot teach the three R's in Irish be either exchanged at once or generously pensioned." Mr. Shane Leslie, a Nationalist Candidate at the last election, speaking at New York on behalf of the Irish Gaelic League, on November 10, 1911, is reported to have said : — " And though I know right well that the Gaelic League and its movement preaches rather love of Ii'cland than hate of any other country, thougli we are glad that good relations should be established between the two, thougli we gladly say, ' Let there be reciprocity, and even a dim affection, across the Channel, and let reciprocity abound 19 Irish Language— continued. between the liarboms ol' the two, ami let the pleasantest of feeling exist between the two (iovevnnients, yet even so, let there be no disguise of what wc are after in Ireland. Let there be no second thought upon niy words ; let tiiere be stated the truth, nakedly and unashamed, that \ve who have taken upon oiu'selves to save a dying language and to restore every custom and every legend tliat we can rake out of the past, that we, deliberately and knowingly, have set ourselves — if I may use a great phrase — ' to break the last link ' that lies between Ireland and England." — {Gaelic American, November 18, 1011.) The influence of the (iaelic I^eague is considerable. ]\Ir. Dillon once declared that " Criticism of the Gaelic I^eague is a difficult and dangerous task." — {Freeman's Journal, December 13, 1911.) Certainly Mr. John Redmond is not disposed to criticise it. Speaking at Aughrim on September 25, 1911, he said : — " For my own part I have always been in favour of the Gaelic League, notwithstanding the fact that critics in the Gaelic League have said that I opposed it. I care not for what they say. I say that myself and the members of the Irish Parliamentary Party have not been opposed to the ideals of the Gaelic League. We have done what we could for the ideals of the Gaelic League in Parliament, and the ideals of the Gaelic League are our ideals, and we will struggle for them in the future. However, soon indeed you will find that these ideals will be realised when Ireland will not only be self-governing — and will not be self-governing as a province of a foreign nation but in the sense of a fully self-governed and self-reliant nation dependent on the genius and talent of our own people, a country able to w^ork out her own destinv."^ — {Freeman's Journal, September 26, 1911.) The gro%vth of the movement in the schools is shown by the following figures : — 20 Irish Language— continued. In 1899 teaching in Irish was provided in 105 seiiools lor 1,825 children. In 1911 it was provided in .3,066 scliools lor 180,000 cliildren. The Gaelic League liave been recently successful in their relations with the new^ National University. They have secured that Irish shall be a compulsory subject at the Matriculation examination for entrance to the University. And they have been successful also in influencing the County Councils, through wiiich indeed they brought pressure to bear on the National University, to make Irish a compulsory' subject for the County Council scholarships to the National University. The evidence shows the power of the League which would undoubtedly press for recognition of the Irish language by the Irish Parliament in its debates, its official correspondence, and in its Civil Service. Yet it would be hard to justify Irish as a compulsory subject of examination from the number of persons in Ireland who speak Irish only. The Census Returns of 1911 show them to number no more than 16,873 of the population. Having regard to the proportion which this number bears to the total population of Ireland it is absurd to suggest that there is any necessity for a widespread knowledge of the language among public officials and members of the Civil Service. But there is no doubt that in the event of a Parliament being set up in Dublin the efforts of the Gaelic League would be directed to these ends. In view of the success attending their pressure on the County Councils there is reason to believe that they w'ould 21 Irish LangUSLgQ—rontiniml. exercise the same control in the Irish Parhaincnt. The use of Irish as an alternative to English in official documents and public records, and the compulsory knowledge of Irish by Civil Servants are the two innovations most to be expected. It is easy to imagine that ignorance of the Irish language would be used as an excuse for keeping out " minority " candidates from the Civil Service — particidarly in view of the fact that most of those eligible for the higher posts in the Civil Service would be drawn from the National University and its constituent colleges which are confined in practice for the most part to Catholics and where, as already stated, Irish is to be a com- pulsory subject. The combination of circumstances presents an easy means of practising unfair discrimination against Protestants which could not be prevented by any legislative safeguards against religious intolerance. The Prime Minister and Mr. Birrell, in answer to questions in the House of Commons have admitted that there is nothing in the Bill as it stands to prevent Irish from being made com- pulsory in the State supported schools and for appointments in the Civil Service or from being made the official language in the Law Courts, the Irish Parliament and the public service generally. {Parliamentary Debates, April 25, 1912, Col. 1218) ; May 9, 1912, Cols. 561-2 ; July 2, 1912, Col. 957 — though on the last-named occasion Mr. Birrell suggested that the statutory veto of the Lord Lieutenant would be available against " outrageous legislation." The untenable position of a Lord Lieutenant who found hmiself compelled by the Imperial Executive to veto legislation which was the result of the deternnned policy of the Irish Cabmet supported by a majority in the Irish House of Commons will be more appropriately considered in connection with the amend- ments to Clause 7. 22 THE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE. Mr, Wright has- an amendment at Clause 3, page 3, hne 23, prohibiting legislation which would affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at that school. This amend- ment follows precisely the wording of Clause 4 (4) of the 1893 Bill as introduced, S.S. (6) in the Bill as amended and Clause 4 (4) of the 1886 Bill. There is no specific provision in the present Bill which corresponds to it : and the only reasons so far advanced for its omission are those given by tiie Px'ime Minister and generally applicable to all the omitted paragraphs — (1) vagueness, (2) needless, (3) litigious. His reasons do not apply to this provision which is precise, was found necessary before and should not give rise to litigation. It gives every child a conscience clause and so far as it goes presents legislation overriding conscientious convictions on this matter. True, it might be overcome by the use of grants of public money only on conditions — just as Mr. McKenna imposed the Cowper-Temple Clause on secondary schools by making its operation a condition oi receiving the grant : but any uncertainty in this matter could be removed by the adoption of the amend- ment standing in the name of Mr. Hicks-Beach and Mr. Rupert Gwynne — " Clause 3, page 3, line 17, after ' law ' insert ' or vote or gi-ant any public money '." The amendment is all the more important since Ireland, unlike England has no statutory conscience clause. The Irish elementary schools are controlled centrally by the Board of Commissioners of National Education, of whom one half are Catholics and the other Protestants. One Commissioner — the Resident Commissioner — is paid : the others are unpaid. The system is not ideal but it has maintained the balance in a country where religious strife is fierce. Private managers control rtr.ijor; 23 The Conscience Clause— continued. the affairs of each school : and small schools are numerous since each denomination demands its own separate school. Rate-aid is practically unknown. Parliamentary grants are paid, and the rules laid down by the Commissioners state that : — Religious instruction must be so arranged (1) that each school shall be open to children of all communions ; (2) tliat due regard be liad to parental right and authoritj^ ; (8) tliat accordingly no child shall receive or be present at any religious instruction of which his parents or guardians disapprove ; and (4) that the time for giving it be so fixed tliat no child shall be thereby in effect excluded directly or indirectly from the other advantages which the school affords. (Rules, 1866.) The above is a " fundamental " rule of the Commissioner? ; and " The Commissioners consider that their fundamental rules may be classed as follows : — (1) Those rules which protect the children from interference with their religious opinions. On the faith of these rules parents send children to the National Schools, . . ." — (See House of Commons Paper, No. 6 of 1870.) The Commissioners have voluntarily agreed that no " fundamental " rule shall be altered without the approval of the Lord Lieutenant. Only upon this slender basis does the conscience clause rest in Ireland in respect of National Schools : and as it has been mentioned already, public opinion makes combined education even with the Conscience Clause, almost impossible, and to an extent that only finds a solution in the multiplication of small schools. When education passes to the control of the Irish Parliament what will happen ? The Commissioners and the system 24 The Conscience Clause— continued. education that they have estabhshed will go. They are the object of bitter attack by the Nationalists. Mr. Dillon for instance, speaking at Kells on September 15, 1912, described the Commissioners as " a Board which, for half a century, has sat down patiently and like dumb dogs." — {Freeman^ s Journal, September 16, 1912.) And in the controversy which arose out of this reference, he wrote : — " The system of irresponsible administration which they represent, and which was the inevitable outcome of the Unionist Government of Ireland, is intolerable and cannot be maintained." — {Freeman's Journal, September 23, 1912.) Who shall say that their " fundamental " rules will not also be repealed ? The Conscience Clause is only a " fundamental " rule. What will be established in its place ? At least this amendment secures a statutory Conscience Clause. 25 COMPENSATION FOR MALICIOUS INJURIES. An amendment stands in the name of Mr. Gibbs to Clause 3, p. 3, line 23, prohibiting the Irish Parliament from repealing or amending any provision of any Act imder which compensation for criminal injuries or malicious injuries may be awarded. The subject was discussed fully in the Debate in the House of Commons on the second reading of a Bill introduced by Mr. Ginnell for the repeal of the statutes imder which compensation can be claimed for malicious injuries. {See Pari. Deb., May 21, 1909, col. 729.) The law in Ireland allows compensation, recoverable in the County Court and payable out of the rates, for malicious injuries either to person or property. The statutes in question are : — Grand Jury (Ireland) Act, 1836, 6 & 7 William IV., c. 116, ss. 106, IS.'j, 170. Malicious Injuries (Ireland) Act, 1848. Malicious Injuries (Ireland) Act, 1853. Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898, s. 5, ss. 1 & 4 and s. 56. Appeal is allowed to a judge of Assize if either party is aggrieved by the refusal or decree of the County Court. In England compensation out of the rates is only allowed for malicious injuries caused in the course of a riot. The special provisions in force in Ireland are due to the impossibility of recovering compensation from the actual perpetrators of the damage. The perpetrators of agrarian crime have the sanction 26 Compensation for Malicious Inlur'ies—contimied. of a large section of the community, and they are able by means of organised intimidation to shield themselves behind a dead wall of silence. Cowed by the fear of the Leagues and Secret Societies, witnesses of the acts complained of have not the courage to come forward and give evidence. The statistics of the last few years from the Annual volume of Irish Judicial Statistics (Civil) show that there is no abatement in the resort to malicious injury as a weapon of intimidation. COUNTY COURTS.^ Claims for Awards.* Amount Compensation. Awarded. £ 7,658 1906 710 450 1907 741 444 13,040 1908 852 514 14,502 1909 1028 708 14,468 1910 852 568 9,789 1911 1456 1013 18,065 J These figures do not include the result of appeals to the Assizes. * The balance is made up of dismisses, cases pending and cases settled otherwise. The necessity for the continuance of the compensation statutes is demonstrated by the above figures of the number of cases in which awards are made after careful judicial investigation in the County Court. The ordinary processes of the law are power- less to bring the offenders to justice in face of the intimidation of witnesses and juries. The majority of cases coming before the County Court of persons whose property is injured are small farmers or small occupiers of some house or plot in a village. (See Pari. Deb., May 21, 1909, col. 787.) ^uQmiRfii 10? noitss!f?s©rt*oS 27 Compensation for MaSicious In'iunes— continued . The speeches of Sir John Lonsdale and the lit. Hon. James Campbell in the debate on the Bill relerred to above are instructive on the subject. The Radical Government opposed the Bill, and the speech of Mr. Cherry, the Irish Attorney-General, is worth quoting : — " We are opposing the proposed repeal because we think it only consistent with justice and right tliat this system of compensation for maiming or murdering police ollicers or witnesses and for malicious injury to property, no matter what the object may be, whether political or personal, should go on." — ParL Deb., May 21, 1909, col. 776. The Bill was lost, but in the Division, the Nationalist Party went into the Lobby in a body in favour of the repeal of the Compensation Acts. This was only three years ago. There is no indication of any change of views in that time, and vmless this amendment is inserted the repeal by the Irish Parliament of the Acts giving compensation for malicious injuries will follow- as a matter of eovu-se. The Government might be asked whether — to quote the words of Mr. Cherry — that will be " consistent with right and justice." It may be said without question that its repeal will result in an increase of this form of intimidation. The fact that the compensation does come out of the pockets of the ratepayers is a deterrent, as they do not like paying. Indeed, some particularly costly injury is usually followed by protests from the ratepayers of the district. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. Its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME HULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSE 4. (EXECUTIVE POWER.) No. 7.-OCTOBER 22, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER. S.W. V. & 8., Ltd.— S9627. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda will be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League ivould appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary ivill be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He would also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number, Victoria 4503 {two lines). CLAUSE IV. EXECUTIVE POWER. The Clause deals with exeeutive power in Ireland. The executive power in Ireland eontinues vested in the King. That is the usual provision. Then follows the innova- tion — " except as respects Irish services as defined I'or the purposes of this Act." A distinction is made between Irish services and other services. No distinction was made in the earlier Home Rule Bills. In the Bill of 1886 the Clause ran : — " The Executive Government of Ireland shall continue vested in Her IMajesty, and shall be carried on by the Lord Lieutenant on behalf of Her Majesty with the aid of such officers and such council as Her Majesty may from time to time see fit." In the Bill of 18!>3, as amended, the Clause ran : — " The executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen, and the liOrd liieutenant, or other chief executive officer or officers for the time being- appointed in his place, on behalf of Her Majesty, shall exercise any prerogative or other exeeutive power of the Queen, the exercise of which may be delegated to him by Her Majesty." In the present Bill the clause reads : -- "4. (1) The executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in His jMajesty the King, and nothing in this Act shall affect the exercise of that power except as respects Irish services as defined for the purposes of this Act. Executive Power — continued. " (2) As respects those Irisli services tlie Lord Lieutenant or otlier chief executive officer or officers for the time being appointed in his place, on behalf of His Majesty, shall exercise any prerogative or other executive power of His .Alajesty the exercise of which may be delegated to hun l)y His Majesty." " Irish services " are defined by sub-section 6 as : — " All public services in connection with the administra- tion of the civil government of Ireland except the administra- tion of matters with respect to which the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws, including in the exception all piiblic services in connection with the administration of the reserved matters." The ilifference then between the Bills woidd seem to be that whereas under the Bills of 1886 and 1893 provision w^as made ill them for carrying on of all executive powder in Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant should the Sovereign so delegate it to the Lord liieutenant ; in this Bill the reference in the Bill is only in respect of " Irish services," and then of course to the extent that His Majesty may delegate executive pow^er. The delegation in respect of other services is not referred to in the Bill. It is necessary to draw^ attention to the difference that is established in the Bill between Irish services and other services. The other services are of two kiiids — Imperial services and Irish services reserved to the Imperial Parliament. It would seem probable that the Government have attempted to draw this distinction with the desire to avoid the difficulties in which their predecessors found themselves when the Clause was debated in 1893. No one can read those discussions without becoming aware of the confusion that existed as to the boundaries of the Lord Executive Pov/er—continunl. Lieutenant's capacities as an Irish oliieial and an Imperial official. Lord Morley stated tlien that the actual powers of the Lord Lieutenant would be delegated to him by an instrument setting forth :— (1) That in purely Irish affairs he would net on the advice of Irish ministers ; (2) That in Imperial matters he would be giuded by the instrument. In this Bill, however, the matter is not left entirely to the instrument. It is so left as regards matters M'hich are by the Bill not defined as " Irish services," {i.e. in Imperial affairs and in the " reserved services "), and to whatever extent the instru- ment does delegate power affecting these matters the Lord Lieutenant acts without consulting the Irish Executive. In respect ol " Irish Services " the Sovereign is free, of course, to delegate [lower to what extent he pleases : though the intention is no doubt to delegate all such execvitive poAver, as without such delegation the full system of responsible government would not be established ; but to whatever extent he does delegate power in respect of Irish services to the Lord Lieutenant such power is then only exercisable by the Lord Lieutenant : — (a) Through such Irish departments as may l^e established by Irish Act, or (b) Subject to Irish Act, by the Lord Lieutenant. The heads ot Irish dej)3rtments as determined by Irish Act \\ ill be the Irish Ministers and will be " an executive committee Executive Pont^r— continued. of the Privy Council ol IrclarKl," whose duty will he "to aid and advise the Lord Lieutenant in the exercise ol' his executive power in relation to Irish Services." The provisions of the Clause have then this effect, that the executive power in Ireland in relation to Irish services if delegated to the Lord Lieutenant is no longer exercisable by His Majesty alone or his representative, but is exercised through such Irish Ministers as the Irish Act may determine or by the Lord Lieutenant subject to Irish Act. While there has been in practice a gi'adual transfer of executive power from the Sovereign to responsible Ministers, this Bill gives it statutory i*eeognition. Defining these powers Sir ^Villiam Anson says :— " Some of the powers exercised by the Crown are conferred or defined by Statvite, but some also exist in virtue of custom or Common I^aw. The term Prerogative may be applied to the Avhole of these, but it should be properly limited to the ancient customary powers of the Crown." — Law and Custom of the Constitution. Vol. II. The Crown. Part I., p. 2. Executive power then is of two kinds : — (a) That relating to the prerogatives of the Crown. (b) Tliat arising out of statutes. It should be noticed that tlie position in Ireland is different to that of the Dominions owing to the form of Government which is established by the Home Rule Bill. Under resj)onsible government in British Dominions the whole of the internal affaii's of the Dominion are under the control Executive Povier—rontin urd. of tlic Executive and Parliament of the Dominion. With Ireland, undei- tiiis Bill, the control of internal affairs is divided between : — (a) The Irish Parliament for Irish services. (b) The Imperial Parliament for '■ reserved " Irish services. So that the Lord Lieutenant will occupy a threefold capacity as : — (1) An Imperial Officer in respect of prerogative and executive power over Imperial services. (2) An Imperial Officer in respect of prerdgative and executive power over " reserved " Irish services. (3) An Irish officei- in respect of Irish services. And each of these capacities is divided into cases where the Lord Lieutenant acts — (a) upon his own responsibility. (b) upon the instructions of the Government : the Imperial as respects (1) and (2); the Irish as respects (3). In respect of (3) the difficulties arising out of tlic division have been avoided by the mandatory provision that any prero- gative and executive power delegated shall be exercised through Irish departments on the advice of Irish Ministers, unless by Irish Act by the Lord Lieutenant. Lord Robert Cecil and others have an amendment to the first subsection to omit the Avords — " except as respects Irish services, etc." — and the discussion will afford the Government an opportunity of explaining their intentions, which seem to be dictated by the desire to proclaim with unprecedented emphasis the subordination of the Crown to the Executive, and through it to the Irish Parliament. Executive Povter—contimied. But this provision, tliough it makes the position ot the Lord Lieutenant clear in respect of " Irish services," and defines tiie position of the liOrd Lieutenant in relation to the Irisli Government as respects those services by not leaving it to the instrument, also emphasises the inability of the Irisii Executive to control or advise the Lord Lieutenant in relation to Imperial affairs and the " reserved " Irisli services. In the exercise of executive power in relation to these two matters the Lord Lieutenant is an Imperial official acting sometimes on his own responsibility and sometimes under the ord Lieutenant acts as an Imperial officer. As ah'eady pointed out, the division of Irish affairs into : — Irish " reserved sei'vices " controlled by tlie Imjjerial Parliament, and " Irish services " controlled by the Irish Parliament, is probably responsible for the provision, since the executive power over internal affairs is divided between the Imperial and Irish Parliaments both acting through the Lord Lieutenant — and so establishing a difference from colonial self-government w'here all internal affairs are under the control of the Colonial Govern- ment, and the Governor, except to the extent that he acts on his own responsibilit)^ acts under the instructions or with tlie advice of the local executive alone in respect of tliem. Passing for the moment over the position of the Lord Lieutenant in respect of Imperial affairs, consideration should be given to his position in relation to Irish affairs. 7 Executive Povier— continued. He serves two masters : — (a) The Irisli Govcrniiient for Irish services. (b) The Impcrinl (iovcniiiuMit for Irish "reserved" services. In his I'ornier capacity lie has to act in ;i constitutional manner, to carry out the wishes of his Irisli Ministers, or dismiss them. In the latter capacity he is the servant of the Imperial Government bound to carry out their commands or resign. If the two compartments were water-tight perhaps his position would not be so diflicult : but the two powers overlap to such an extent that in the event of conflicting directions lie is powerless. The possible confusion is the more pronounced since it is by no means certain whether in respect of (b) the Lord Lieutenant Avould always be compelled to ask for or receive the instructions of the Imperial Government. During the debates on the Bill of 189.S the occasions upon which the I^ord Lieutenant was to act upon his ow^n responsibility were never defined : and the Government relied upon the instruc- tions to make the ])osition clear. It should be mentioned too tliat they agreed to an amenchnent whereby the instructions were to be presented to Parliament. No such provision appears in this Bill and it is consequently left to the Government of the day to state upon what occasions the Lord Lieutenant shall act upon the advice of the Imjici-ial Government or upon his own responsibility. Executive Po^tier -continued. The questioix is of importance even in relation to " reserved services." It is not difficult to imagine an occasion of this nature arising. The Irish Government is charged with the duty of maintaining the peace, order and good government of Ireland : but for the present they have little power of so doing, since the control of the Constabulary remains with the TiOrd Lieutenant. In their 7/ Debates, April 11, 1912, col. 1408.) To what extent then does it fultil its purpose either in respect of nomination, numbers and powers. First as to nomination. Can it be said tiiat the iiistory of nominated Second Chambers shows that the Government of the day act in respect of their compositioii in a manner to secure representation of their opponents who are the minority. Evidence is to the contrary. Prof. Morgan in the The Neiv Irish Constitution, a vohune published under the auspices of the Eighty Club, writes : " Colonial experience is not encouraging. Nomination by the Crown means in practice nomination by the Governor, on the advice of the Cabinet of the day, and Ministers in Canada and New South AVales have put this prerogative to such partisan uses as to reduce the Upper House to a very servile condition." — Page 36. Earl Grey, writing in the Daili/ Chronicle (October 24-, 1012), says :— " All the experience available within the Empire is opposed to a nominated Senate. . . . But in Canada and New Zealand the nominated Senate, or the nominated Legislative Council, which the Irish Senate will in principle Clause 8.— The Irish Semte— continued. resemble, are the least satisfactory features of tlieir respective Constitutions. U'hen Sir Wilfrid Laurier first came into office the Senate was over\vhelniin<)Iy Conservative. When Mr. Borden succeeded the Senate was mainly 1-iberal. Xeither Mr. Asquith nor ]\Ir. Redmond can give any guarantee that Irishmen will act differently from Canadians. It is true tliat in Canada Senatois are nominated for life, but in New Zealand, where the members of the Legislative Council hold ollicc. not for life, but for seven years, jmblic opinion equally rejects the principle of nomination. ' A referendum on the question,' says the Dominion (August 26), ' would undoubtedly result overwhelmingly in favour of the elective system as against the present nominative method, and there is not a memlicr of either House of Parliament who does not know that this is the case.' The Nezv Zealand Herald (August 8) declares that ' The nominee system as it now exists is not only indefensible, but it would have been re{)Iaeed many years ago by a representa- tive system had it not suited the tactics of the continuous Governments to control the Upper House by partisan appointments, and to have the means of pensioning veteran supporters." . . . " Let us be frank in this matter. What is the object of the Irish Senate ? Is it desired that it should have any real influence or not ? IMr. Ramsay Macdonald, who opposed the jirineiple of a Second Chamber, supports the proposal for a nominated Senate. His position is quite consistent. He prefers that the Senate, if there must be one, shall be as weak as possible. Is this what the Govern- ment and Mr. Redmond desire ? If so it is absurd to claim, on behalf of such a body, that it provides safeguards for minorities." The above extracts would seem to dispose of the theory that the Senate will afford the minority representation. In spite of the methods adopted by Governments in respect of nominated Second Chambers, some Home Rulers still consider the Irish Senate as a means of bringing into Irish public life a number of valuable elements which are at present excluded. 10 Clause 8.— The Irish Senaie—confinued. And this tolerance is to be shown in Inland ol' all places in the world, where political passions run liigh ! To-day the Irish political system excludes valuable elements. NV^hy ? He- cause they refuse to obey the machine. The suggestion is that the Nationalist machine will not perform its functions in respect of the Senate. If the Senate is to be the highest prize of Irish political life, surely the machine will be employed in respect of the Senate to provide rewards for suitable politicians. It is so employed to-day even in respect of such small mattei-s as co-option to District Councils. The following examples can be given. The Roscommon Message of ]May 23, 1908, reports a meeting of the Carnaska Branch of the United Irish League, at which the following Resolution was passed : — " That no person be co-opted as a member of the Strokestown District Council, who cannot claim membership of the United Irish liCague for at least a reasonable time previous to co-option date." At the monthly meeting of the West Waterford Executive of the United Irish League, the following Resolution was adopted : — " That we, the members of the West Waterford Executive call on the Nationalist members of the Dungarvan Urban Council, in the event of vacancies occiu-ring in the Council, to co-opt only Nationalist candidates." — (Freeman's Journal, April 5, 1911.) At the quarterly meeting of the West Clare Executive United Irish League, the following Resolution was adopted : — " That we, the members of the West Clare Executive, respectfully call on the members of the Clare County Council to co-opt none but a Nationalist on that body." — {Clare Champion, January 13, 1912.) Is it then at all likely that when the political machine refuses to co-opt opponents even in respect of small matters of local n Clause 8.-The Irish Senaie— continued. government, it will i)ennit opponents to be co-opted to the Second Chamber of the Irish Parhament ? Besides if the Senate is to be used as a method of obtaining for the Government of the eountry its " valuable elements," it will not even then have secured for the most important purposes the best brains of the eountry. Their relegation to the Senate will not improve matters, since the " valuable elements " will oeeupy n sub- ordinate capacity to the Irish House of Commons. This talk, however, of securing the wise men, without partisanship, in a Second Chamber, follows the ideals of all Constitution makers. The Senate is to be the meeting-place of the wise in theory, but in practice it is controlled by and recruited from the politicians. No Government can afford to have an independent Second Chamber, and the Irish Government is milikely to be an exception to the rule. Perhaps an Irish Nationalist Government is less likely to be an exception, for the political machine governs the Irish Nationalist Party ruthlesslj'. Independence of thought means exclusion, bitter attack, and vehement denunciation as a " factionist." Freedom of political thought within the Nationalist party is forbidden. Political considerations govern movements which in this eountry are outside political con- troversy. What example is, for instance, more striking than that of agricultural co-operation ? Here politicians of both parties meet amicably together to develop the movement. In the eyes of the Nationalist Party it is surrounded by political considerations, and they use their power to prevent it making any headway. Sir Horace Plunkett, we suppose, may be called " a valuable element ? " Who can imagine ]Mr. Dillon or ^Ir. T. W. Russell nominating him a Senator ? Political considerations will exclude all but Nationalists from the Senate, just as they do from the local councils, and the " valuable elements " will have to obey the machine, or, as now, remain outside the government of the country. 12 Clause 8. The Irish Senate— ro)it in xed. Turn to the Senate in its second aspect as a salegnaid ior the minority — its numbers. An Upper House of -JO nienihers cannot I)e leoanled as a sufficient ofl'-set to a Lower House consistint>' ol' 104 members. Even if in its inception tJie Upper House consisted entirely of representatives of the minority, wliich is unimaginable, they Avould be entirely swamped in tiie case of a dead-lock when, umler the provisions of the Bill, the difficulty will have to be solved by a joint sitting of the Houses. It is estimated that having regard to the present division of parties the Irish House of Commons will roughly consist of 12.5 Nationalists to 39 Unionists. In tlie ease of a joint sitting, tiierefore, with all the senator Unionists, there would still be a majority of 46 Nationalists. On this point we again quote Professor Morgan : — " A Senate of only forty members compelled to meet in joint Session a House of Conmions of 164 members every second time that it rejects or objectionably amends a Bill is not likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to legislation. But tlic nomination by the Executive is in any case some- what objectionable, and it would seem better to provide that at the end of the first term of eight years the Senators should ])e appointed by some system of election, whether on a basis of proportional representation or otherwise." — {The New Irish Constitution, page 36.) Small though the Senate is in numbers, it has further no safeguard for the minority in respect of geographical distribution of seats since there is no direction in the Bill to secure any representation of the minorities or of districts in which, in the case of Ireland, the minority resides. Now in Canada, Australia and South Africa, whetlicr senators be nominated or elected, the various districts and provinces secure representation in the Upper House. In Africa each province has 8 senators ; in Australia each State has 6 ; in Canada, Ontario has 24, Quebec 24, Nova Scotia 1 0, 13 Clause 8.- The Irish Senate— continued. New Biunswit'k 10, Prince Edwaici Island i, .Manitoba 4, Saskatchewan i. Alberta i, British C'olnnibia .'}. In these cases we have recognition of tlie fact that districts and varying interests shall have representation in the U|)per as in the Lower House. In Ireland where, if the Senate is to secine even a semblance of representation of minorities, some division of the Senate according to areas is indispensable, no real provision exists. As to tiie third test — the i)owers of the Senate ; as a nojuinated l)ody it is a subordinate body in public opinion, since a nominated body in the eyes of the public never possesses the authority of a body elected upon some representative principle. The Bill again makes it legally a subordinate body by provisions which prevent the Senate having equal powers of legislation or any powers to reject Money Bills, though it appears that it may amend tlie Money Bill in tlie direction of reducing taxation. Tested by these three conditions the Senate cannot in any way Avhatsoever be regarded as a safeguard for the minority. Mr. Redmond, it is true, effusively welcomed the Senate (see Parliamentarif Debates, April 11, cols. 3443-4), but Mr. T. P. O'Connor has announced that he is open to a "deal" on the matter (London, April 13. 1012). So Mr. Dillon does not regard the safeguard as essential. He said at tlie University College, Dublin, April 24, 1912 : — " The nominated Senate is not an essential part of the Bill at all. It is an open qiiestion. ... I myself frankly say I am ii\ favour of a nominated Senate. I am a two-Chamber man ; I believe the best form of government is to be found in a Constitution working by means of two Chambers. ... I, for my part, invite discussion on the nominated Senate. I say it is no essential i^art of the Bill, and if anybody can produce a better alternative I am certain the Government will gladly accept it." — {Freemnn''s Journal, April 25, 1912.) 14 Clause 8.— The Irish Senate— conf In iwd. These quotations show that the Irish XatiouaUst Party (K) not regard a Second Chamber, upon whieJi Mr. Asquitli and tiie Home Rulers place such insistence, as a thing ol' great vahie or importance. The imimportance of the Irish Senate in the eyes of its creators, the Government, may be judged from the single fact that the Bill contains absolutely no directions as to the quaUfica- tions or disqualifications for membership of the Senate. In the great self-governing Colonies these qualifications are strict. In Canada a Senator nmst be 30 years of age ; he must possess property of a certain amount, and he is liable to disqualification for offences against the law, or by ceasing to retain his property qualification. The same conditions obtain in South Africa. In Australia the conditions are less stringent in that a Senator need only be 21 years of age and need not be possessed of any special amount of property, but there is a strict disqualification of anyone who has any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any agreement with the public service of the Commonwealth, except as a member of an Incorporated Company, or who holds any office of profit under the Crown or any pension payable out of the revenues of tire Commonwealth, that condition not applying to ministers, or officers of the Naval and IMilitary Forces of the Empire or the Commonwealth. In Ireland, how- ever, there is no qualification as to age, residence, franchise, property, nor are there any disqualifications named for a Senator, although such conditions exist in respect of members of the Irish House of Commons. In the self-governing Colonies a Senator must be a citizen ; in Ireland apj^arently an alien can sit in the Senate. All we know about qualifications for the Senate is tliat Peers (Clause 12 (3)) and Roman Catholic Bishops (See ParUamentarij Debates, May 20, 1012, col. 1534, IMr. Birrell's reply to Mr. Sandys) are eligible for the position. There is no power given for the removal of Senators for offences against the law, and, most extraordinary of all, there is no provision in the Bill requiring a Senator to take the Oath of Allegiance to the Crown. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply Information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. Its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule BilL The Address Is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. CLAUSES 9-13. No. 9. -NOVEMBER 2, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25. VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W. 9 CONTENTS CLAUSE 9 1 CLAUSE 10 8 CLAUSE 11 11 CLAUSE 12 18 CLAUSE 13 20 NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intewuls dvrin^ the C'oniinitfee and Report Stages of the Home Rule liiU, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issties raised hy the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda ivill be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretari/ of the Union Defence League icould appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary ivill be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and ivill do his best to assist them. He xvould also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each flight during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is, 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number, Victoria 4503 {two lines). CLAUSE 9. COMPOSITION OF IRISH HOUSE OF COMMONS. This clause deals with tlic coiupositioii of tlie Irish House of Commons, the methods of election, tlie duration of the Parliament, and subsequent changes in the mode of election, the qualilieations of electors, and distribution of seats that may be made by the Irish House of Commons, three years after the passing of the Act. The Irish House of Commons will consist of 16J< members : as compared wJth Wa in the 1893 Hill, and 201 in the 1886 Bill. These Members will be returned according to the First Part of the First Schedule to the Act which provides for : — Borough ]Members . . . . 34 County Members . . . . 128 University Members . . . . 2 Total . . 164 Taking as a standard the present division of parties in Ireland, the Irish House of Commons would be divided thus : — Nationalists . . . . . . 125 Unionists . . . . . . 39 Nationalist Majority . . 86 The Clause provides that the first Irish House of Commons will be elected :— (a) On the same electorate ; (b) On the same electoral laws by which Irish ^Members are now returned to serve in the Parlia- ment of the United Kingdom. Clause 9. Composition of Irish House of Commons contiuued. Three years, however, after the passing of the Act, the Irish Parliament may alter as regards the Lower House : (a) The qualilication of the electors ; (b) The mode of election; (c) The distribution of seats ; but, the number of members must not be cihangcd and the re-distribution must be based on the population of the constitu- encies, except, of course, in the case of ITniversity representation. The dui'ation of the Irish Parliament will be for five years, as in the 1893 and 1886 Bills. In the 1893 Bill it was provided that the electoral changes which may be can-ied out by the Irish Parliament should not be introduced until six years after the passage of the Act, instead of three years as in the present Bill. In the 1886 Bill it was provided that these changes could be made after the first dissolution of Parliament. Tlie division of the members between urban and rural constituencies has given rise to considerable criticism in Ireland, where many of the smaller towns desire direct representation in the Irish House of Commons. Resolutions have been passed asking for an amendment of the Bill, in the direction of increased representation for urban centres. Outside Dublin and Belfast, the urban vote is confined to Londonderry, Cork, Limerick, ^Vaterford. No new urban districts have been added : on the contrary, three now represented in the Imperial Parliament — Galway, Kilkenny and Xcwry — lose their direct representation. Irish organised labour has protested. At the nineteentli annual Irish Trades Congress at Clonmel on May 27, 1912, the President, Mr. M. J. O'Lehane, said : — " In dealing with the question of representation, I must express strong disappointment at the fact that, in the proposed measure large urban centres are ignored, and instead Clause 9.— Composition of Irish House of Commons— coniiimcd. of giving repivseiitatioii to towns such us ClonnicI, Tialec, Wexford, Droghcda, Dnndnlk. Sligo. Portadown, I^nrgan and liallymena, it is suggested tliat the important towns of Gahvay, Newry. and Kilkenny are to be deprived of direet representation. This is a pro)iosal to whicli we sti'ongly object, and we must insist upon its amendment ; the urban areas must at the outset get due representation." — {Freenian'.s Jounial, May 28, 1912.) Tiie following resolution was adopted : " That we protest against the arrangements contained in the Government of Ireland Bill whereby the constituencies are so arranged that the industrial workers in the towns are practically left without representation ; that we demand that in any arrangement for representation of towns they shall be left independent of the rural districts, as otherwise they will be at the mercy of the farming classes ; that in all cases where borough members were returned before the redistribution of seats such borough representation shall be restoi-ed, and so enable the workers in such constituencies to be properly represented by men of their own class."' Moving the resolution, Mr. I.arkin said : — " That the farmers of Ireland had neither sotils to save nor bodies to kick, and God help the workers if they were handed over to them under an Irish Parliament. The average wage of the farm labourer in Ireland was 10s. 2d. per week, while in England it was 17s. 4d. and in Scotland 18s. 3d. Bad as were the old landlords they were cultured at least, but the farmers of Ireland were a soulless money grabbing set of people. If the workers did not get representation luider the new Government they would be far worse off than at present when they were governed bj' an alien Parliament." — {Freeman's Journal, May 29, 1912.) Another Irish body which has protested against the division is the Town Tenants League — of which Mr. AVilliam Field, M.P., is chairman. At their Executive Meeting on April 22, 1912, the following resolution was passed :— " (That this meeting, representing the urban population t)f Ireland, is of opinion that the Schedule of Constituencies contained in the Government of Ireland Bill should be so Clause 9.— Composition of Irish House of Commons— coydinued. amended as to give adequate and direct representation to the townspeople, which can best be done by grouping together the chiel' towns in the counties, as is at present done in Scothind in the case of the Scottish Borougiis. Copies of this resohition to be sent to Mr. John E. Redmond, M.P., the National Convention, and the Chief Secretary for Irehvnd.) Continuing, Mr. ^Valker said at Athlone and other centres they considered this matter ol" vital importance, and lie hoped practical effect would be given to the resolution. The resohition, which was seconded by Mr. Russell (Uundalk), and supported by Mr. Payne Thompson (Killaloe). Mr. William Ilogan (Nenagh) and Mr. Holland (Athenry), and other delecatcs. was adopted."— (/Vtrwr7>?'.s' Journah April 23, 1!>12.) The Clause enabling the Irish l*arliament after three years to Alter the franchise ; Change the election laws ; Redistribute the seats ; requires careful consideration. As to the franchise, it could be extended to include women if the Irish Parliament so desired. As to the election laivs, the Corrupt Practices Act, which the Nationalist Party Hnd inconvenient, could be repealed. Sunmiing up in the North Louth Petition, the Judge said : — " The election must be declared void upon the following grounds : Corrupt practices by agents — that is, undue influence, bribery, and treating ; illegal practices by agents — that is, payments otherwise than by the election agent ; payment for conveyance of voters to and from the poll : false statements of fact for the purpose of affecting the return of T. M. Healy in relation to his personal character and conduct, published by the respondent's election agent, and circulated at his expense, and which materially assisted the return of Mr. Ilazleton." Clause 9.— Composition of Irish House of Common%— continued. And ill respect of East Cork, tlie Judge's comment was that " tlie whole election was conducted in complete and reckless disregard of the Act of 1883." Indeed the Judges' reports on these two elections afford many reasons against giving the Nationalist Party in the Irish Parliament jiiower of altering the election laws. Is it ndvisalile to give the Nationalist Party the power of repealing the Acts which have proved so inconvenient an obstacle to their conduct of elections ? As to di.striliution, the limitations are : — (a) The number of 3Iembers (164) must not be altered ; (b) Due regard must be had to the population of constituencies, other than University constituencies. There is no provision for automatic redistribution : and with the growth of population Belfast would be under-represented and the Nationalist parts of Ireland over-represented, as they are to-day, if the Nationalist Govex'nment declined to redistribute when population required it. Universiiy lie presentation. There is no provision in the Bill restricting the Irish Parliament in respect of University repre- sentation. In its power over the law relating to the qualification of electors it could remove the University qualification directly : or nullify University representation by abolishing the plural voter. In the schedule the only university at present represented is Dublin University, which returns two members. By the Bill as it stands at present, Dublin University could be deprived of both its members : of one, who could be given to, say, the National University : or University representation could be Clause 9.- Composition of Irish House of Commons- mntinued. increased by ad(iing representatives of other Tniversitics, always having regard to the provision that the total number of members of the House of Commons must not be alteretl. Of course no one knows at present the exact Avording of the amendment which ^Ir. Birrell promised in the course of the dis- cussion on Mr. Campbell's amendment to include in the list of subjects upon which the Irish Parliament are prohibited from making laws Trinity College, Dublin, and Queen's University, Belfast. But a general prohibition would seem to have the effect of preventing the Irish Parliament either abolishing the repre- sentation of Dublin University or giving Queen's University, Belfast, rcpresentatiou in the Irish Parliament. The provision relating to University representation not being conditional upon popvdation does not appear to be very clearly expressed. University constituencies have no " popu- lation " and regard cannot be had to it in any case. Apparently what is intended is that on any new distribution of seats, the qualifying niunber is to be arrived at by dividing into the popu- lation iiot the full number of members (164). but the nundjer less any representatives of Universities. lUiterncy. The conditions of electoral qualification are important in view of the startling illiteracy of the Irish population. The Censxis returns of 1911 show the percentages of persons unable to read or write in the four Provinces to be as follows : — Ulster 8-7 Munster . . . . . . . . . . 9- ] Connaught . . . . . . . . 15-2 Leinster . . . . . . . . . . 6-8 Upon this point, and this materially afftcts th(' Ulster figure, " Statisticus," in the Morning Post of September 30, 1912, gives the following table representing the proportion of those aged nine years and upwards among those professing different religions who were returned as illiterate, i.e.. unable to read or write : — Clause 9.— Composition of Irish House of Commons, 'contiitucd. Roman Catholics. Pro- testant Episco- palians. Presby- terians. Metho- dists. All other Denomi- nations. Ulster (43-7) Munster (940) . . Leinster (85-2) . . Connaught (96:!) 14-7 9-6 7-9 15-7 «1 10 10 2-2 2-8 0-2 0-5 0.7 1-9 0-3 0-6 0-2 1-8 2-8 4-9 0-8 Totrtl 11-9 41 2-6 1-6 2-3 N.K. Counties (3:51) .. 12-5 5-9 2-0 1-9 1-8 He says : — " The figures in brackets alter the v^arious provinces give the pei'centage of the population in those areas who were Roman Catholics. It will be seen how everywliere the presence ol a large proportion of Roman Catholics is accom- panied by a very large proportion of illiteracy. Thi'oiigh- out Ireland the measure of illiteracy was 11-1 per cent, for Roman Catholics, compared with 4-1 per cent, for Protes- tant Episcopalians, 2-6 per cent, for Presbyterians, 1-6 pcj- cent, for Methodists. Thus the illiteracy among the Roman Catholics was at least three times as large in proportion to population, as among the Protestant population." CLAUSE 10. -MONEY BILLS. Subsection 1 sets forth tlie origin of Money Bills in tiie form common to most if not all Colonial constitutions. INIoney Bills must originate in the Lower House. The provision that the imposition of pecuniary penalties or the exaction of fees shall not be taken to make a Bill a iMoney Bill occurs in tlie Australian and African Constitutions. Subsection 2 follows the precedent of the Canadian and African Constitutions. The effect of Subsection 4 is to prohibit " tacking," and the words are taken from the South African Constitution. The corresponding provision in the Commonwealth of Australia Act is even stronger. It runs thus : — " Laws imposing taxation shall deal only with the imposition of taxation, and any provision therein dealing with any other matter shall be of no effect." It may be argued that the difference in result is but slight, but it appears desirable to make the nullity of provisions of a non-linancial character inserted in Finance Bills as clear as possible. The most debatable subsection in the Clause is No. 3, which defines the powers of the Senate in regard to Money Bills. Prac- tically the Senate is left without any power at all. It may not amend nor reject any Money Bill, nor has it any power to endeavour to induce the House of Commons to alter its proposals. In this respect the Irish Senate is in an inferior position to the Senates of Australia and South Africa. The provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900. on this point, are to be found in Section 53 : — " The Senate may not amend proposed laws imposing taxation, or proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the Government. The Clause 10.— Money R\\\s— continued. Senate may not anientl any proposed law so as to increase any proposed cliarge or burden on the people. The Senate may at any stage return to the House of Representatives any proposed law whieli the Senate may not amend, re- questing, by message, the omission or amendment oi' any items or |)rovisions therein. And the House of Uepresenta- tives may, if it thinks lit. make any of such omissions or amendments, with or without modifications. "Except as provided in this Section, the Senate shall have equal power with the House of Representatives in respect of all ):)roposed la^vs." In Australia, therefore, the Senate cannot amend Money Bills, but it can request the ILouse of Representatives to amend them, and it has the power of rejection. In South Africa, the Senate cannot amend Money Bills, nor has it the power of requesting the Lower House to amend them but it possesses the power of rejection. Thus we find in Clause 63 of the South Africa Act, 1909, which provides for disagreements between the two Houses and tlieir settlement by means of a joint session, the following words : — " Provided that, if the Senate shall reject or fail to pass any Bill dealing with the appropriation of revenue or moneys for the public service, such joint sitting may be convened during the same session in which the Senate so rejects or fails to pass such Bill." In both these Constitutions, then, which presumably repre- sent the most highly developed democratic constitutional theories, the Second Chamlier possesses substantial powers in respect of Money Bills, while the Irish Senate is deprived of any simulation of authority and can take no action except the barren one of discussion. Until October 30th, 1912, it might have been argued in defence of the provisions of Clause 10, Subsection 3, that the Irish Senate was a purelj' nominated Assembly, and as such should Clause 10.— Money 'R'lHs— continued. not have the power of thwarting the will of the elected Chamber, with whom the origination of [Money liills lies in most constitu- tions. lint tliat argument disappeared the moment the Government proposed the substitution of elcetion for nomination in forming the Senate. To prohibit an elected C'liamber from any active share in financial legislation is illogical and opposed to modern democratic thought. In South Africa the Senate is nominative as to one-Hftii of its members, ami the elected members are only indirectly representative ol the people. In Ireland the Senate will be directly representative of the peo|)le, altliough elected by a 69-644..) The provision in the Bill owing to the disparity in the size of the two Chambers does not really put any obstacle in the way of the will of the Irish House of Connnons j^revailing, luiless its will be expressed only by a small majority. The deliberations may be together : the voting nmst be together. The majority necessary to carry the proposals is not a majority of those voting, but of those present at the sitting — a provision which carries with it the necessity for an official record of members present. The amendments to the Clause are concerned for the most part with the addition of conditions attaching to its operation — that the Bill must be carried by a two-thirds majority in the House of Conmions : that it nmst have been sent up to the Irish Senate at least one month before the end of the Session : that the dissolution of the Irish House of Conmions must be more than six months off. 18 CLAUSE 12. POWERS, &C., OF MEMBERS OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. This chuise provides for the powei's, privileges and iiuiminities of the Irish Senate and of the Irish House of Commons, and of the members and Committees of both Houses. These are to be delined by Irish Aet, but so tliat tliey shall never exeeed those enjoyed by the Britisii House of Conunons and its members and committees for the time being. Until defined by Irish Aet these powers, })rivileges and immunities shall be the same as those enjoyed by the British House of Commons, its members and eommittees at the time of the passing of the Act. For these powers, &c. {see Anson — ^Parliament, Chapter IV,, Section IV.). The Bill expressly confers these powers, &c., on the Irish Parliament, as they have already been conferred on many Colonial legislatures, but the limitation is not universal. It appears in the Canadian Constitution (Sec. 18) but not in the Australian {.tee Sec. 49). COMMONS' PRIVILEGES. Tlie privileges of the House of Commons are intended to preserve its dignity and independence. The privileges of free speech, of access to the Crown, and of having the most favourable construction placed upon its pro- ceedings are claimed by the House of Commons at the beginning of every Parliament. The privilege of freedom from arrest is also enjoyed by members of the House. Other " unwritten " privileges are the right to pi-ovide for the constitution of its own body, the right to regulate its own proceedings and the right to enforce its privileges by fine or imprisonment, or, in the case of its own members, by expulsion. 14 CI. 12.- Powers, &c., of Members of ihe Irish FarMzment—cmtd. The House enforces its privileges by an order to :ittcncl at the Bar, or by order for the Speaker to issue a warrant for bringino; the person summoned in custody of the Serjeant. The privilege of freedom from arrest is enjoyed by members of the House of Commons during the continuance of the Session, and for forty days before its commencement and after its conclusion. Punishment for breach of pri\iicge may take the form of admonition, reprimand, or conunitment according to the gravity of the offence. The House can l)y resolution also expel a member. The Courts of Law are not, however, bound by such powers of discipline as are exercised by the House of Commons. According to Anson, the Courts are not deterred from upholding jorivate rights by the fact that questions of parliamentary privilege are involved in their maintenance, and " except as regards the internal regulation of its proceedings by the House, Courts of Law will not hesitate to inquire into alleged jirivilege, as they would into local custom, and determine its extent and application." WHO :\rAY xoT BK me:mbers. Members of the Irish House of Commons shall be subject to the same laws as to qualification and disqualification, and as to the taking of the Oath as apply for the time being to members of the British House of Conmions. According to Sir William Anson the following are dis- qualified for the British House of Commons and consequently, according to this clause, for the Irish House : — i V 15 CI. 12.- Powers, &c., of Members of the Irish Parliament— ^onfrf. Infants. Aliens. Roman Catholic Clergy. Clergy ol' tlic Kstablished Pensioners of the Ci-o\vn (except Chiucl i . Civil Service and Diplomatic .Ministers ol tlic Chinch of Pensioners). Scotland. Persons guilty ol" corrupt Prac- Returning Ollicers for the places tices at a Parliamentary where they are to cause an Election. election to be made. Government Contractors. Bankrupts. Persons convicted of treason Holders of certain olliccs (for or felony. complete list sec Anson's Lunatics or Idiots. " Law and Custom of the Judges. Constitution." Vol. 1. ]). 07). THE OATH. The present oath required of the Ifouse of tConimons is as follows : — " I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King George, his heirs and successors, according to law, so help me God." The Oaths Act (1888) enables any person to make allirmation in all cases wherein an oath is required, on stating either that he has no religious belief or that it is contarry to his religious lielief to take an oath. It should be noted, says Sir William Anson, that a failure to take the oath prevents a member of the House of Commons from sitting and voting as a member of the House, but that he is none the less a member as regards his constituency, and that he is for some pin-poses a member of the House of Commons. His seat is not vacant, and he is capable of discharging all the duties and enjoying all the rights of a member short of sitting within the bar of the House, taking part in its debates, and voting in its divisions. "=*^?n.- 16 CI. 12.— Powers, &c., of Members of the Irish Parliament— contd. TiiK sp:xate. Under tlie Bill (rt,v introduced) no qualifications are required of Senators. There are no disqualifications, and they need not take the Oath of Allegiance. Mr. Hirrcll proposes an amendment applying to the Senators those qualifications, &e.. operating in the case of members of the House of Conmions. Some sucli provisions are required especially since the Senate is now to be elected and not nominated. The following are the qualifications and disqualifications of Senators in Australia. South Africa and Canada. QUALIFICATIONS. Australia. (1) Age 21. (2) Qualification of an elector. (3) Three years' residence within Commonwealth. (4) Natural-born or five years naturalised subject of the King. South Africa. (1) Age not less than 30. (2) The qualification of an elector for the membership of the House of Assembly in one of the provinces. (3) Residence of five years within the Union. (4) British subject of European descent. (5) (In case of an elected senator) registered owner of immovable property within Union of not less than £500 over and above mortgages. Canada. (1) Age not less than 30. (2) British subject either natural-born or naturalised by an Act of Great Britain, of the United Kingdom or a Canadian Act. MH^n-4m-- ■ :'^®lf !^ ,,C:iS ,nsw§^~-^f .15 CI. 13. - Powers, &c., of Members of the Irish Parliament to«/rf. (3) Possession of real property ol' value of 4,000 dollars f)ver and above all encumbrances witliin the Province for which he is appointed : real and personal property of 4,000 dollars value over and above debts. (4) Resident in the Province for which appointed (in case of Quebec cither resident in the division for which appointed or having his real jjroperty qualification there). DISQUAMFKATIONS. Australia. (1) In any \va>- being boimd to allegiance or entitled to riglits as subject or citizen of foreign power. (2) Being attainted of treason or subject to or having been subject to sentence for any offence punishable under Connnonwealtli Law with one year's imprisonment. (3) Being bankrupt (imdischarged). (4) Holding any ofHcc of profit under the Crown or pension payable out of Commonwealth rcA'^enues, except the case of ministers, soldiers, or sailors. (0) Having any pecuniary interest in any agreement with the public service of the Commonwealth except as member of an Incorporated Company of more than 25 persons. (6) Being convicted of certain offences under the Electoral Act (this disqualification is limited to 2 years). Canada. (1) Failing to attend for two consecutive Sessions. (2) Doing any act whereby he becomes a subject or citizen (or entitled to the rights of such) of any foreign power. (3) Being bankrupt, or public defaulter, or applying for the benefit of a law re insolvency. (4) Being attainted of treason or convicted of felony or any infamous crime. (5) Being no longer qualified in respect of property or of residence, unless his change of residence is necessitated _l)y duty as member of Government. 18 CI. 13.- Powers, &c., of Members of the Irish ParWament—contd. South Ajricn. (1) Having been convicted of offence for wliich he has been sentenced to imprisonment without option of fine for not less tlian twelve months unless he has received grant of amnesty or free pardoii or term of imprisonment has expired five years before date of election. (2) Being an iiiux'hubilitaied insolvent. (3) Being insane and decl;!,red so hy (ouri. (4) Holding any ollice of profit (not including that of Minister of State for the Union, or pensioners or soldiers or sailors of the Union not on full-time pay). The Oath of Allegiance is required of Senators in Austr-vlia, Canada, and South Africa. PEERS. Any peer shall be eligible for membership in either House. ^HNISTERS IN BOTH HOUSES. Section 4 gives Irish Ministers the right to speak in both Houses. It is not uncommon in colonial and foreign constitu- tions, though hitherto it has been m\known in tlie constitution of the United Kingdom. Under the Union of South Africa Act, Ministers may speak in either House, but can only vote in that House in which they have seats; and in the case of Ministries, small in mnnbers. the provision would appear to be of value. Zi ,^jS ,^^^^ -M^ 4* 19 CI. 13.— Powers, &c., of Members of the Irish Parliament co/;/^/. OFFICES OF PROFIT. Section 7 of the Clause requires re-election on ap})ointnient to the Ministry unless the new post be in succession to a Minis- terial post. This provision is still part of the procedure of the British House of Comnions, thoujifh the j>ractice has given rise to much inconvenience to all parties. Upon the union of Great Britain and Irehmd in 1801 disqualifications that l)efore were applicable to the British Parliament were extended to members sitting in the United Parliament foi' places in Great Britain, while disqualifications applicable to the Irish Parliament were similarly extended to members sitting in the United Parliament for places in Ireland, and it was declared that oflices accepted immediately or directly from the Crown of the United Kingdom, or by the appointment and nomination, or by any other appoint- ment stibject to the ajiprobotion of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, should vacate seats in I'arli-tment. (May. p. 641.) 20 CLAUSE 13. IRISH REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER. This clause provides for Irish representation in the House of Coninions at Westminster after the Home Rule Act is in force. This particular provision has always been a source of trouble to Liberal (Governments when they were producing the Home Rule Bills and lias a varied history. WA. OUT. In the Bill of 1«8G, there was no provision for Irish repre- sentation at AVestminster, either in the House of Commons or the House of Lords. Said Mr. Gladstone in that year (House of Commons, April 8 and 13) : — " If Ireland is to liave a domestic legislature, Irish peers and Irish representatives cannot come here to control English and Scotch affairs."— (Prt?7. Deb., Vol. 304, col, 10r)5.) "The 103 Irish Members could not possibly continue as now to come here and vote upon all matters, English, Scotch, Irish and Imperial alike. That I conceived to be wholly indisputable."— (P«r/. Deb.. Vol. 304, col. 1537.) Mr. Gladstone a little later was even more emphatic in his language. Speaking at Manchester on June 25, 1886, he said : — " I will not be a party to a legislative body to manage Irish concerns, and at the same time to have Irish Members in London acting and voting on English and Scotch questions." Mr. John Morley said (House of Conmions, April 9, 1886) : — " I have always thought it a cardinal point of policy since this movement began that Irish Members should cease to sit in this Parliament."— (Prt/L Deb., Vol. 304, col. 1277.) This attitude had at that time the strong approval of the Irish Home Rule leaders. 21 Clause 13.— Irish Representation at Ytestm'msier— continued. Mr. John Redmond said in the House of Commons. May 13, 1886 :— " If they got their Irish Assembly, Heaven knew they would have a heavy task . . . whieh would tax all the resources of the talent and all the industry of Irishmen. He did believe that if tliat work was to be satisfactorily performed they could not stand the additional drain rendered necessary by representation in that House.'''' (Poii. Deb., Vol. 305, col. 968.) Mr. John Dillon said in tjie House of Conmions on the same day : — " We do not want at present a representation in this House."— (Par/. Deb., Vol. 305, col. 999.) Mr. Tim Healy said (House of Commons, April 9, 1886) :— " If we had to provide two bodies of representatives we should inevitably send the cream here, and keep the skim at home."— (Par/. Deb., Vol. 304, col. 1218.) This was the first position of the Liberal Home Rulers with regard to Irish representation at Westminster after Home Rule had become law. IN AND OUT. But in the Home Rule Bill of 1893, the Liberal convictions underwent a eomj^lete change. As introduced, the Bill con- tained provisions for 80 Irish Members in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom. The Irish representative peers in the House of Lords were untouched. They were not to sit and vote on all questions. The provisions of Clause 9 (3) were that Irish representative peers and Irish Members of the House of Commons should not be entitled to deliberate or vote on : — (a) Any Bill or motion in relation thereto, the operation of which Bill or motion is confined to Great Britain or some part thereof ; or Clause 13.— Irish Representation at }N estminster- continued. (b) Any motion or resolution relating solely to some tax not raised or to l)e raised in Ireland : or (c) Any vote or appropriation of money made exelusively for some service not mentioned in the Third Schedule to this Act ; or (d) Any motion or resolution exclusively alTecting Great Britain or some part thereof or some local authority or some person or thing therein ; or (e) Any motion or resolution, incidental to any such motion or resolution as either is last mentioned, or relates solely to some tax not raised or to be raised in Ireland, or incidental to any such vote or appropriation of money as aforesaid . This was the famous in-and-out clause ; but it di. Appropriation Bill. Third Reading 29 „ Finance Bill. New Clause re Spirit Duty 45 „ Finance Bill. Reduction of Retail License Duty . . . . . . 50 „ Finance Bill. Exemption of Road- stone from Mineral Rights Duty 52 „ Finance Bill. Reduction on To- bacco Duty . . . . . . 49 It should be remembered also, though Mr. Asquith did not mention it, that the tendency of politics is likely to be in the direction of smaller majorities, with the expansion of the group system which now divides the House of Commons into four parties. Unionists, Liberals, Labour, Nationalists. It is maintained that i\Ir. Asquith 's attempt to minimise the effect of the Irish at Westminster cannot stand examination. The second reason Mr. Asquith advanced for the presence of the Irish was : — (2) That the Imperial House of Commons will still continue to tax the whole of the United Kingdom. This is true ; but it omits to account for the provision of the Bill which enables the Irish Parliament to repeal an Imperial Clause 13.— Irish Representation at Ytesim'inster— continued. tax, so long as they arc fontcnt to liiul the money by Irish taxation so that in elTect the Imperial House of Conunons may not tax the whole of the Ignited Kingdom. If the |)o\ver of Imperial taxation were unalterable by the Irisli Parliament, the presence of Irish representatives could be justified so far as the Imperial Parliament was concerned with the imposition of Imperial taxes, but it would afford no justificntion For the votes or speeches of Irish representatives on local affairs only concerning Great Britain. Mr. Asquith further advanced the reason : — .'3. That the Imperial House of Conmions and the Imperial Executive will be responsible tor the administration of all the reserved services in which Ireland is vitally inter- ested. This again is true to some extent : but the " reserved services " are transferable. Their control by the Imperial Parliament is only of a temporary character except as regards Public T-oans prior to the passing of the Act. Even the " Collection of Taxes " is subject to transference since by Clause 26 (2) there is a reference to the Irish Parliament and the Irish Government having extended powers with respect to the collection of taxes when the condition of Irish finance admits of the revision contemplated under the clause. "Land Purchase " is temporary since its completion has been fore- shadowed by Mr. Birreli. The retention of 42 Irish Members which the Government consider just when the Imperial Parliament controls the following Irish services — the R.I.C, Old Age Pensions, National Insur- ance, Labour Exclianges, Savings Banks, Friendly Societies, Land Purchase, the Collection of Taxes, and Public Loans — 81 Clause 13.— Irish Representation at Westminster— co«lit liave consulted Lord Morley before making the suggestion for a reform of Procedure. The argument so often used that the Home Rule Bill will relieve the <'ongcstion of business in the Imperial Parliament cannot be sustained so long as there are 12 Irish Members at Westminster with unlimited right to bring the Irish view into different schemes in connection with his two Home Rule Bills. It is of interest therefore to compare briefly those schemes \s'\W\ the one now put forAvard. This comparison is shoAra com- pendiously in tabular form as follows : — Financial Princ'iftles— continued. Bill of Bill of Bill of 1893. 1893. Bill of 1886. 1st scheme. 2nd scheme. 1912. Collection of Taxes :— (i) Customs Imperial Imperial Imperial Imperial (ii) Excise Imperial Irish Irish Imperial (iii) Other taxes Irish Irish Irish Imperial (iv) Postal rates Imperial Imperial Imperial Irish Imposition of taxes : — (i) Customs Imperial Imperial Imperial Imperial and Irish (ii) Excise Imperial Imperial Imperial Imperial and Irish Imperial (iii) Other taxes Irish Irish Imperial and Iiish (iv) Postal rates Imperial Imperial Imperial Irish Irish Powers of taxation . other than other than other than varying customs customs existing Imperial and excise taxes taxes and imposing independent taxes Irish Contiibution to Im- £1,702,000* Customs J of gross none pel ial Services revenue plus Irish share of miscell. revenue Sources of Irish Revenue . all collected all other f of gross transferred revenue than Customs revenue sum and postal receipts * Net contribution, as estimated by Lord Welby after allowing for difference between "collected" and "true" revenue in the 1886 Bill. Some of the more important differences between the present scheme aaid those that preceded it axe as follows : — 1. Customs and Excise. These may be raised by the Irish Parliament. In each of the three previous schemes, the imposition, control, and management were reserved exclusively and completely to the Imperial Parhament. 2. Other Taxes. The Irish Parliament can vary Imperial taxes or impose new independent taxes. In the first two Financial Princ\p\es-— continued. schemes the Irish Parliament had full powers to impose any taxes other than Customs and Excise ; in the third scheme any other than " existing taxes." 3. Sources of Irish Revenue. This is to consist of a fixed payment measured by the cost of the transferred services and the yield of Irish taxes. In every previous scheme the amount depended solely on the revenue derived from taxes in Ireland. 4. Contribution. In the first scheme a definite sum, estimated by Lord Welby in " The New Irish Constitution " at £1,702,000, was to be paid towards Imperial services. In the second scheme the Customs revenue, and in the third scheme one-third of the revenue for existing taxes were allo- cated to the same puipose. In the present scheme the revenue is insufficient to meet ordinary expenditme in Ireland, and not only is no contribution demanded, but even the deficit is to be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. THE ASQUITH AND OTHER FEDERAL SCHEMES COMPARED. The present scheme involves a departui-e fi-om every other federal scheme in the world in the following directions : — 1. Customs, which are everywhere in the exclusive control of the central authority, may be levied in Ireland partly by Irish Act and partly by Imperial Act. 2. Duties may be imposed (though not protective duties) in Ireland against the products and manvifactures of Great Britain. In every other fedei-ation the movement of trade from one state to another is absolutely fi-ee. 3. Contribution. In every federation a contribution is required from every constituent state, or a branch of revenue 7 Financial ^ r'mciples— continued. to which every state pays its share, is reserved, for tlie general expenditure of the federation. In the present case Ireland is to pay no contribution and is to receive an addition of £2,000,000 to her revenue. 4. Direct Tcucatimi. Generally the levying of direct taxes is reserved to the constituent states in every confederation, thus keeping federal and state taxes clearly separated and distinct. Here it is proposed to give power to the Irish Parliament to roam freely over the whole field of Imperial taxes, raising and lowering practically at their pleasure, and to impose independent taxes in addition. This is probably the most serious departm-e from precetlent and will be fully dealt with later. THE ASQUITH AND PRIMROSE COMMITTEE SCHEMES COMPARED. It may be said that the conditions with which the present Government are faced differ from those which confronted Mr. Gladstone in 1886 and in 1893, and differ also from the conditions to be found in any other State in relation to the confederation of which it is a member. While this is no doubt true and might be held to justify some departure from practice or precedent, it does not justify the present scheme. The Committee on Irish Finance (presided over by Sir Henry Primrose) which was appointed by the Government to prepare a scheme suited to the same conditions as those with which the Government dealt came to very different conclusions. Indeed almost every one of their recommendations has been abandoned, the plan adopted being almost the exact antithesis of the one recommended. This is seen in the following analysis of the recommendations of the Primrose Committee compared with the Scheme in the Bill. Financial Pr'mctples— continued Recommended by Primrose Committee. 1. All taxes (including Cus- toms) to be imposed and levied by Ireland alone. 2. Ireland should contribute to common expenditure, though amount is to be left in abeyance for the present. 3. Irish Government to take over the whole of the Irish local expenditure. 4. The deficit to be wiped out in a definite period. 5. Double income tax and double stamp duties to be avoided. 6. Ireland to be made responsible for continuing land purchase and the Imperial Parliament to appoint receiver for Irish Customs and Excise in the event of default in pay- ment of annuities. 7. " The ' Contract system ' cannot, under any form, be reconuiiended as a method of providing an Irish Government with funds." 8. "Any settlement should leave as little as possible open for revision at a future date." Proposed in Bill. 1. TJie powers of the Imperial and Irish Parliaments in regard to taxation cover in the main the same area. 2. Ireland to contribute when deficit has been extinguished, the amount or character of such contribution being un- specified. 3. Certain services, nearly all of rising cost, are reserved to the Imperial Parliament. 4. No arrangement made for reducing the deficit {i.e. for " cutting the loss "). 5. The Government scheme permits of additional income tax and certain additional stamp duties to be charged by the Irish Parliament. 6. Imperial Parliament con- tinues its guarantee and admin- istration of land purchase in Ireland. 7. The " transferred sum " is merely a contract payment for the transferred services. 8. When, if ever, revision is undertaken the whole of the financial scheme may be drastically changed. Financial ¥rinc\ples—conii)iued. THE DEFK IT. At bottom, the extraovdinarily (•,0()0 in a measm-able time ; and (2) a eontribution from Ireland to Imperial services. Clause 26 is espeeially pointed to in proof of the wonderful foresight of the (Jo\'ernment who liave thus made provision for a revision of the Imancial arrangements when the deficit has been extinguished, 'i'here is, however, nothing more certain in the Bill than that tliese promises can never be made good. So far from the deficit being ever extinguished, it is more likely to increase, at any rate for the next 20 or 30 years. The reasons for this conclusion are to be found in an exatiiina- tioii of the Bill and the statistics of Irish revenue. There are three ways in which the deficit can be reduced : the revenue from Imperial taxes in Ireland might grow ; the cost of reserved services might fall ; or both Imperial revenue and cost of reserved services might increase, the former, however, more rapidly than the latter. In each of these three cases the Bill j^rovides that the benefit should accrue to the Imperial Exchequer, and to that extent to a reduction of the deficit. It is desirable to examine these possibilities. In his speech on First Reading, ^Ir. Herbert Sanuiel spoke of an increase in Irish revenue amounting to about £200.000 a year. It is difficult to confirm this estimate. How large such a figure is may be judged from the fact that it would correspond to a normal increase in revenue in the Imperial Budget of about £3,600,000 a year. Increased revenue may be due to two causes, viz., additional taxation or improved yield of old taxes. These two causes have been analysed by the Treasury and Mr. Lloyd George (May 13, 1912) in answer to a (piestion by Mr. Maurice Healy stated that the increase in the yield of Irish revenue, other than on account of new taxes, was £364,500 between 1908-9 and 1911-12. This increase includes, 14 Financial Principles —continued. liowever, the item £135,000 in respeet of Post OlHce, mainly in consequence of the taking over of the telephone service, and which ought to be eliminated from this calculation because it is balanced by a corresponding increase of expenditure of about the same amount. This leaves the true increase of revenue at £229,500, or an average of £70,500 per annum instead ot the £200,000 stated by Mr. Samuel. If this rate were continued for, say, ten years, the increased revenue for Imperial taxes in Ireland might be expected to amount to about £750,000. It is of course possible, and it would be within the strict letter of the Home Rule Bill, to extend to Ireland all new taxes to be imposed heieafter. Is that the intention of the Govern- ment ? The Primrose Committee point to the obvious fact that we are at the beginning only of a new era of Social Reform. As these are enacted new taxes will be imposed. We shall therefore be confi-onted with this extraordinary dilemma. If these new social reforms are extended to Ireland, the Imperial Parliament will be legislating for what we are being taught to believe is a purely Irish concern; and moreover we shall be doing so with the guidance of a truncated Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament. If we do not extend these reforms to Ireland we shall encoui-age a determined resistance from Ireland against the taxes which have been called into being to finance them. It is more probable, therefore, that there will grow up the ten- dency of limiting the application of new taxes to Great Britain. So far as that should be the case, the divergence between the Imperial and Irish tax systems will grow ever wider. This is not the end of the difficulty. It is not always possible, some would say it is never possible, to affirm that any service is financed out of a given specified tax under our existing financial system. During the Budget controversies, opposing parties variously contended that the new taxes were necessary on the one hand to finance social reforms (and especially Old Age Pensions), and on the other hand to meet the increased naval 15 Financial i^r\nc\p\es~contlniml. expenditure. 11' new taxes were imposctl would it be possible to decide between these opposing propositions to tlie satisfaction of everybody ? But even this is not the end of the difficulty. Even if it were agreed that new Imperial taxes should not extend to Ireland, tJie necessary corollary is that remissions of taxes arising from any Budget surplus should likewise not extend to Ireland. The Government and the Liberal party profess to be striving to " free the breakfast table." If the time ever arrived when this fiscal revolution could be effected, is it to be expected that the Ii'ish people would tamely acquiesce in a condition of affairs which gave a free breakfast table in Great Britain and a taxed breakfast table in Ireland. On the other hand, what are the prospects of the growtli of expenditure on the reserved services in the next few years ? 1. Old Age Pensions are expected to cost £200,000 in less than 20 years. This is the estimate given in the financial memorandum issued with the Bill (Cd. 6154, p. 2). On the other hand, it should be noted that the Primrose Committee on Irish finance (Cd. 6153, p. 21) say : — " It is certain that for some years to come the cost of Old Age Pensions in Ireland must continue to grow, thougli not at any such rapid rate as from last year to this. On this account we make an addition of £600,000 to the expendi- ture of 1910-11." These two estimates are in direct conflict, for Mr. Herbert Sanmel declared that " the present charge for Old Age Pensions is now practically at its maximum " {Pari. Deb., April 15, col. 67). But both these estimates are based, presumably, on the assumption that the administration of pensions will remain un- changed. At the present time pensions, which would remain a 16 Financial Pr\nc\p\es~rontinue;ement, in so far as this may be neces- sary under the Old Pensions Act. According to the last report the Irish Local Go^■e^nment Board liad i-emitted to it for decision 11,3.j5 appeals during 1910-11. They actually decided in the year 13,500 appeals. These are exclusive of claims for pensions rejected by the Pension Officers and Pension Committees. It is easy to see that under a system of divided control such as is contemplated by tlie Bill, the Pension Officers, the Pension Com- mittees, and the Irish Local Government Board, will be mucli more lenient in their decisions. The meshes in the net would be widened to admit a large number of claims. It would be easy therefore to increase the cost of Old Age Pensions very con- siderably on this account alone. I do not think it is reasonable to anticipate any economy within any reasonable period upon Old Age Pensions, if the system of divided control set up in the Bill is enforced. 2. Land Purchase is expected to cost a further £450,000 in the next ten or fifteen years (Cd. 6154, p. 2). This of course depends on the increase in tJie number of applicants and pro- prietors created under the Land Purchase Acts, involving larger expenditure by the Land Conunission and additional outlay for " bonus." I am unable to check this figure, and therefore accept it. 3. National Insurance and Labour Exchanges: This, it is estimated, will cost a further £300,000 in the next ten or fifteen years (Financial ^Memorandum). This, I believe, is an under- estimate. The cost of the Insurance Act and Labour Exchanges in Ireland in 1912-13 is stated in the Financial Memorandum to be £191,500. This I take to be made up as follows, basing myself on the Civil Service Estimates for 1912-13. 17 Financial Principles— con^wwrf. Health Insurance— £ £ Benefits 120,100 Administration, etc. . . . . 37,700 Share of Joint Committee . . 2,800 160,600 Unemployment Insurance and Labour Exchanges 30,900 £191,500 The figure of £120,100 for health benefits in Ireland is in excess of the actuaries' estimate (Cd. 5983, p. 19), by £20,000 or 20 per cent. The period to which the actuaries' estimate relates is nearly the same, i.e., it assumes the Act to come into force on July 1st, instead of July 15th. The actuarial estimate for the cost of health benefits on Ireland, including administration, is as follows : — 1912-13 £101,900 1913-14 269,800 1914-15 309,300 1915-16 330,200 1916-17 338,500 1917-18 347,900 1922-23 383,700 1927-28 410,100 1932-33 433,300 In fifteen years the cost of benefits and administration alone was estimated by the actuaries to increase by £308,000. Seeing that the cost in 1912-13 is, exclusive of administration, 20 per cent, more than the estimates, it is evident that the charge in future is likely to be much heavier than was anticipated. A further £100,000 on this account would not be unreasonable, making an additional £400,000 for Health Insurance. In addition to Health Insurance some allowance must be made for the increased cost of Unemployment Insurance in Ireland. For this I assume a further £50,000. This would make the total additional requirements for Insurance (health and unemployment) including Labour Exchanges as £450,000. 18 Financial Principles— ron^mwerf. 4. Collection of Taxes. No allowance is made for increases in the cost of collection of taxes. It is fixed at £298,000. That this assumption is unjustifiable is based on these grounds : — (a) In the past the cost of collection of taxes in Ireland has increased steadily. (b) It must be more expensive to administer the new fiscal arrangements proposed in the Bill. (c) Some allowance must be made for collecting Irish taxes imposed by Irish Act. The cost of the expenditure on collecting Irish taxes during the last twenty years is as follows : — £ 1892-3 . 224,000 1897-8 241,000 1902-3 246,000 1907-8 242,000 1910-11 298,000 1912-13 (estimated) 298,000 The figure assumed in the Financial Memorandum is that actually incurred in 1910-11. No allowance is made for auto- matic increase, for enlarged fiscal powers, and for collecting new Irish taxes. The Bill does not permit the Exchequer Board to deduct any sum for the cost of collecting Irish taxes. Clause 15 (2) (c) provides that " the proceeds as determined by the Joint Exchequer Board of any Irish taxes imposed in Ireland by the Irish Parliament " shall be included in the transferred sum. And Clause 24, defines " proceeds collected in Ireland as the proceeds of the tax in Ireland." The proceeds are the gross proceeds. There is no power given for deducting the cost of collecting Irish taxes. Hence some allowance must be made for this item. Altogether I think it would not be unreasonable to fix the additional requirements on account of collection of taxes at £100,000. Altogether, therefore, probable increases in the near future are : — •i 19 Financial Principles— confint^e d. £ 1. Land Purchase 450,000 2. Insurance, &c. . . . . . . 4.50,000 3. Collection of Taxes . . . . 100,000 £1,000,000 Against this increase of expenditure must be set the fact that the Imperial grant will diminish from £500,000 to £200,000. The most optimistic view of the financial prospects is, therefore, that during the next ten years Imperial taxes may produce an additional £750,000 and that reserved services will cost a further £700,000. The chances of " cutting the loss " are thus seen to be exceedingly remote. If there were any real desire to " cut the loss " the Bill should have provided that after given intervals the loss should diminish and after a certain interval it should cease. Thus it might charge on the transferred sum any loss exceeding £1,000,000 after five years, any loss exceeding £500,000 after 10 years, and all loss after 15 years. Only by some such means would the Irish Parliament be forced to economise and liquidate the deficit. THE EXCHEQUER BOARD. The Exchequer Board is to consist of five persons appointed, two by the Treasury, two by the Irish Treasury, and one by the King. There is no provision in the Bill for providing the Board with a staff, or for the payment of salaries to them. As will be shown the duties thrown upon them are considerable, and it would be impossible for these duties to be efficiently discharged without some considerable expenditure for offices and salaries. It is their duty to act on instructions from the two 20 Financial Principles— continned. Treasuries jointly, but again there is no provision for the contingency that the two Treasuries may be unable to agree on the terms of reference to the Board. Otherwise they are responsible to no one for their decisions. The Bill says (Clause 22) : " the decision of the Board on any matter which is to be determined by them shall be final and conclusive." That is, there is no appeal from their decisions which, once come to, would have statutory effect. Their decisions would probably in every case be debated in the two Parliaments, but in both cases the Government would be able to put forward a defence of non posstimus. The following is a complete catalogue of the powers and duties of this body : — (1) They must determine the cost of services trans- ferred at the passing of the Act. (Clause 14 (2) (a).) (2) They must determine the proceeds of Irish taxes imposed by Irish Act. (Clause 14 (2) (c).) (3) They must decide whether any proposed Irish tax is substantially the same as an Imperial tax. (Clause 15 (1).) (4) They must estimate the loss to the Imperial revenue, and therefore of the transferred sum, arising from the reduction or discontinuance of an Imperial tax in Ireland. (Clause 17 (2).) (5) They must decide whether the 10 per cent, limit of yield from additional Irish taxes has been exceeded, and by how much. (Clause 17 (3).) (6) They must decide the increase of the transferred sum to accompany any transfer of a reserved service. (Clause 17 (4).) (7) The Board may manage any Irish debt arising from loans secured on the transferred sum. (Clause 23 (1).) (8) They must make estimates of " true " revenue. 21 Financial Principles— con^inwed. (9) They must report when, for three successive years, Irish revenue has exceeded expenditure on Irish services. (Clause 26.) (10) They must direct the Treasury to pay cash into the Irish Treasury during transitional period. (Clause 43.) It is obvious that the duties and powers of the Board are delicate, difficult, complicated and onerous. Take, for example, the second of them in the foregoing list. They are to determine the proceeds of Irish taxes. These taxes may be (a) additions to Imperial taxes ; (b) new taxes not substantially the same as Imperial taxes ; (c) withdrawal of exemptions enjoyed under Imperial Act. If a 25 per cent, additional tax yields 10 per cent, more revenue, what is the sum to be transferred ? Clearly for every £100 previously collected there would now be £110. One- fifth of this or £22 is the proceeds of the Irish tax and must be paid over to the Irish Treasury. The Imperial Exchequer will therefore retain only £88 or £12 less than before. Will there not be angry debates in the House of Commons at a decision which was so obviously unjust to the Imperial Exchequer ? Again, on Item 6, much trouble and opportunity for difference must arise. If, for example. Old Age Pensions or Insurance were to be transferred, the Exchequer Board would have to decide what sum represents the cost of these services at the date of transfer, as well as the probable cost during the following ten years. Upon both these services the estimates of different authorities might show considerable variation. So long as the same opportunities for difference continue to exist, must there not be much friction and trouble between the two Governments and the two Parlia- ments ? Take another important case, that covered by Item 9. The Board are to decide when the revenue in Ireland exceeds Financial Principles— continued. the expenditure on Irish services. Suppose the Irish Parhament as they frequently did before 1800, and as the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer did before 1817, met increasing expenditure by loans. They might refuse to meet their deficits by new taxation. Such a course would increase the expenditure on Irish services {i.e., on interest, sinking fund and management of Irish debt) but would keep down the proceeds of Irish taxes. By such means the occasion ot Clause 26 could be indefinitely postponed. Would the Exchequer Board be allowed to take the full circumstances into account ? We know that in Germany the adoption of borrowing instead of taxation is no proof that new taxes could not be usefully imposed. The language of the Bill, however, does preclude the possibility. In this last connection it is interesting to observe that in the Bill of 1886 there was a specific provision that all expenditure was to be met by taxes, which would have precluded the possi- bility of borrowing for the purpose of balancing a budget. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply Information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. Its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. The Transferred Sum. No. II.— NOVEMBER 6, I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET. WESTMINSTER, S.W. , 4 S., Ltcl.-39949. 11 i^.ii. -M. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals (Juri)i^ tJie Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised bi/ the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda will he circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League ivould appreciate suggestions for further increasing their iitiliti/. The Secrelary zvill be glad to hear from Members zvho may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and zvill do his best to assist them. He ivould also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open uritil 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Ride question. The address of tJie Union Defence League is 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number Victoria 4503 {tzvo lines). This Memorandum has been prepared by Mr. S. Roscnbaun this series by permission of the Unionist Central Office. THE TRANSFERRED SUM. The principle of the Transferred Sum is one of the most striking departures in the Bill from any of the earlier financial schemes. It appears to have been borrowed from the South African Union Constitution. Section 118 of the South Africa Act (1909) is as follows : — The Governor-General in Council shall, as soon as may be after the establishment of the Union, appoint a commis- sion, consisting of one representative from each province, and presided over by an ofTieer from the Imperial Service, to institute an inquiry into the financial relations which should exist between the Union and the provinces. Pending the completion of that inquiry and until Parliament other- wise provides, there shall be paid annually out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund to the administrator of each province : — (a) an amount equal to the sum provided in the estimates for education, other than higher edueation, in respect of the financial year, 1908-9, as voted by the Legislatxu'e of the corresponding colony during the year nineteen hundred and eight ; (b) such further sums as the Governor-General in Council may consider necessary for the due performance of the services and duties assigned to the provinces respectivel}'. Until such inquiry shall be completed and Parliament shall have made other provision, the executive committees in the several provinces shall annually submit estimates of their expenditure for the approval of the Governor-General in Council, and no expenditure shall be incurred by any executive committee which is not provided for in such approved estimates. In this case, the arrangement was a temporary one, and the sum to be paid might vary from year to year. It was temporary, inasmuch as a Commission was to be appointed immediately after the Union was established to inquire into the financial relations which should exist between the Union and the provinces. The amount was variable because it consisted of The Transferred Sum— conHnued. a fixed payment lor education and " such rurtlicr sums as the Governor-General in Council may consider necessary for the due performance of the services and duties assigned to the provinces respectively." In the Home Rule Bill the transferred sum is permanent in duration and stereotyped in amoimt so long as the services transferred are not increased. In both respects therefore the features of this transferred sum are the exact opposite of the scheme approved b}' this Government in the South Africa Act. The objections to the transferred sum are three-fold : — (1) It implies that a sum will be at the disposal of the Irish Parliament which they have not been directly respon- sible for raising ; (2) In the form adopted in the Bill it represents a payment for certain services out of the Imperial Exchequer, utterly regardless of what the services may cost hereafter, and without any control being retained by the Imperial Government in respect of those services ; (3) It prevents that separation between Imperial and State finance which in all federal systems is considered of the first importance. The first of the foregoing objections is emphasised by the Report of the Primrose Committee. On page 20 of theiv Report they state : — It is a first principle of sound government that the same authority that has the spending of revenue should also have the burthen, and not infrequently the odium, of raising that revenue. That one should have the impopular duty of providing the means, and another the privilege of expending them, is a division of labour that leads to disaster." The following passages from the Report signed Lord Farrer, Lord Welby and Bertram Currie in the Fiixancial Relations Commission Repox't, strengthen the same view. In paragraphs vii. and viii. (page 51) they state : — We believe that the expenditure of public funds cannot be wisely and economically controlled unless those who have the disposal of public money are made responsible for The Transferred Sum— continued. raising it as well as spending it. We tiiink that the history of the past relations between Great Britain and Ireland justifies the assumption that grants of money made by Parliament are more likely to impoverish than to enrich the community which receives them, tending as they do to weaken the spirit of independence and sclf-relianee. The absence of these qualities has in our opinion been the main cause of the backward condition which so exceptionally distinguishes Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom. One sure method of redressing the iiiequality which has been shown to exist between (ireat Britain and Ireland would be to put upon the Irish people the duty of levying their own taxes and of providing for their own expenditure, leaving to the wisdom of Parliament to decide the question of contribution out of Irish taxes to the Imperial Exchequer. In the debate on the creation of an Imperial Council at the Imperial Conference last year, Sir Wilfrid I^aurier laid it down as a general guiding principle in Federal Finance that "if there is one system which I think is indefensible it is the creation of a body which should have the power to expend at its own sweet will without having the responsi- bility of providing for the revenue to earrv on the expendi- ture " (Cd. 5745, p. 68). The second of the above objections is that it embodies a system denounced by all financial experts, namely the " contract " system. Referring to the evidence by Sir S. Edgerley on the Indian Provincial Settlements given to the Primrose Committee the conclusion is drawn (page 14) : — The " contract system "... offers but little attraction in a case ^vhere the elements of controversy abound, and where neither of the parties is in complete subordination to the other. And on page 16 the Committee state as one of their conclusions : — (iv.) That the " contract system " cannot, under any form, be recommended as a method for providing an Irish Government with funds. The Transferred Sum— continued. That the term " contract system " as used and denounced by the Primrose Connnittee is the system in the present Bill is exhibited in the following further sentences (p. 15) : — The contract system may take many shapes. It may take the form of a lump siun assignment, as in the Irish Council Bill, or it may take the form of the assignment of one or more given heads of revenue, or of painfully computed percentages thereof. But in each and every case it involves an intricate and laborious balancing of competing claims ... If the assignment were fixed with reference to existing conditions, within five years those conditions would be changed. The third objection is probably the most serious. The " contract system " implies a continued dependence of one Government on the other for its financial position. It stamps " provisional " across the settlement. It is a settlement which does not settle anything. It is always regarded as of the first importance in any federal financial system that the finances of the federal Government and of the constituent States shall be abso- lutely free and independent of one another. Addressing the Convention in 1898 at Melbourne, on the principles which should govern the financial relations of the States and the future Commonwealth, Mr. Deakin said : — It may be possible and must be found desirable, in the course of time, to frame a financial system which shall prac- tically cut the several States entirely free from the Common- wealth, or, at all events, leave them with only certain fixed financial relations with it. We should, as far as possible, exclude from the consideration of the Commonwealth Parliament the finances of the States as States, and exclude from the States as States any consideration of the financial position of the Conmion wealth. That is the position that has been secured in the United States of America. This ideal was, hoAvever, not attained in the Commonwealth Act which was subsequently passed. A clause (the famous The Transferred Sum— coiiiinuaJ. Braddon Clause) was embodied in it giving back to the States three-fourths of the Customs duties collected under authority of the Commonwealth. Almost from the beginning this provision was found to be exceedingly embarrassing. If the Commonwealth needed money it was compelled to raise by Customs four times as much as was needed. If it reduced taxation it could only reduce duties by one-fourth of the amount it could have sacrificed solely on account of revenue. If the one-fourth quota was in part unspent, various and conflicting demands were made by the States on the CommouAvealth for the disposal of the surplus. Conference after conference was held in different parts of Australia to effect a settlement of this vexed question. The matter was only finally disposed of at the IMclbourne Con- ference in 1906, when it was resolved unanimously : — That, before altering the constitution so as to increase the powers of the Commonwealth in regard to the State debts, it is desirable that the Commonwealth and the States should agree to a scheme whicli will secure the settlement of the financial problems of the Comiuonwealth by jiroviding for : — (a) Giving financial security to the States ; (b) Leaving the Commonwealth and the several States financially independent, each witliin its own sphere. In submitting this motion, Mr. Kidston, Treasurer of Queens- land, stated : — " The ideal, I think, ought to be to make such an arrangement as will leave the States and the Commonwealth alike free and independent in the management of their financial affairs, and that will secure a complete divorce between Federal finance and State finance. Nothing will do that which will limit the Commonwealth in its operations, and nothing will do that which will leave the States dependent on the good will of the Commonwealth in financial matters. The ideal ought to be to leave each free and financially The Transferred Sum— cont in ued. independent. I tliink all these stipulations are required in any schenu- which is woi'thy ol" oiu' serious discussion, and unless those things are provided no selieme will meet our requirements. But, I tliink, if they ;ire provided, such a scheme will fairly solve the diflieulty witli which we are faced." The Transferred Sum, as emVjodied in the preseiit Bill, is given a most objectionable and obnoxious shape, and will continually provide opportunities for acute difference and bitter controversy. Originally it will consist of 1 wo items, the cost of the trans- ferred services and the subsidy. Later there will be added the proceeds of Irish taxes, including independent taxes as well as additions to Imperial taxes. As new services are transferred corresponding additions to the transferred sum will be made. If Imperial taxes are reduced by the Irish Government the trans- feri'ed suni will be correspondingly diminished. In a very few years the transferred sum will consist of hundreds of items, each indefinite in amount, each fixed only by an " estimate " of the Joint Exchequer Board based on uncertain data from which different conclusions will be reasonably deducible by different people. The proceeds of an addition to an Imperial tax or the loss from any reduction are illustrations of the kind of case which will present this difficulty to tlie fullest degree. It seems scarcely to have been realised that the transferred smn is in its essence only a book-keeping item. It does not represent the cash paid over to the Exchequer Board. Still less does it represent the free cash at the disposal of the Irish Govern- ment for any services in Ireland. The Home Rule Bill is per- meated with charges and deductions to be made by the Treasury before handing the balance over to the Exchequer Board ; charges which the Exchequer Board may make from the sum that reaches them ; and with further liabilities which the Irish Government must meet, and which, in the first instance, it will The Transferred Sum— cotuinued. be able only to meet out of the final balance that reaches them from the Exchequer Board. The following is a brief summary of these eliarges : — The principal prior charges are : — (1) Loss to Imperial revenue due to reduction or discontinuance of Imperial tax in Ireland. (Clause 17 (2).) (2) Charges under the Land Purchase Acts now falling on the Guarantee Fund, which at present stands at about £1,200,000. (Clause 18.) (3) Irish Church Temporalities Fund, Any deficit arising out of the management of this fund is to be charged on the transferred sum. (Clause 20.) (4) The service (interest, sinking fund and management) of any Irish debt secured on the transferred sum. (Clause 23.) (5) Irish share of the Lord Lieutenant's salary. (Clause 31.) (6) Salaries and pensions of all existing judges and Irish Established Civil Servants. (Clause 32.) (7) Superannuation and other allowances to existing Irish unestablished Civil Servants after passing of Act. (Clause 33.) (8) Pensions to Constabulary at the time of the transfer or afterwards. (Clause 35 and 37 (4).) It is impossible for me to estimate the aggregate cost of these separate charges. Some part is contingent, and can arise only in circumstances it is impossible to forecast. Another part can only be estimated by the Treasury with the fuller information at its disposal. Seeing, however, that the pensions for the Constabulary alone are more than £400,000 or nearly 30 per cent, of the entire Constabulary vote, it must be a very moderate estimate to put the entire pension charge in respect of the transferred services at a like amount. Together with the salaries The Transferred Sum— continued. of established Civil Servants, &c., tlie aggregate deductions will probably be more nearly £1,500,000. Instead of transferring £6,100,000, there would if these anticipations were verified, be only £4,600,000. If taxes are remitted the sum would l)e correspondingly less. After this sum reaches the Irish Treasury there are the following liabilities to be met out of it : — (1) Charges on Consolidated Fund in respect of Insh services — principall}- judiciary, about £150,000. (2) Grants to Irish local taxation, about £1,500,000. (3) Grants for Irish services hitherto paid out of Imperial Funds. Together these items would not fall short of about £2,000,000. The amount at the free disposal of the Irish Government would therefore be reduced to £2,600,000. The UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE will be glad to supply information on the HOME RULE QUESTION. its INTELLIGENCE BUREAU will remain OPEN UNTIL 10.30 EACH NIGHT during the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Address is . . . 25, VICTORIA STREET, TELEPHONE : WESTMINSTER. VICTORIA 4503 (2 lines). PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. 12 THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. Clause 14. No. I2.-N0VEMBER II. I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25. VICTORIA STREET. WESTMINSTER. S.W. , * s., i>ta.— 10012. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and licport Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised bij tlte provisions of the Bill. The memoranda ivill be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League zvould appreciate suggestions for further increasing their utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and ivill do his best to assist tJiem. He would also appreciate it if Members xvoidd be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Ride question. The address of the Union Defence League is 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number Victoria 4503 {two lines). This Mnnoramlum has been prepared b;j Mr. S. Rose.nbaum, and is circulated this scries bij permission of thf Unionist Central Office. CLAUSE 14. The Postniastor-Gt'ueral adinittt-d on Thursday (Nov. 7) tJiat the " donnnant fact" in the financial relations between Groat Britain and Ireland was tlie existence of a deficit. This fact was responsible, he said, for tlie complexities of the Bill and |)resented for solution a problem which was unprecedented amon^' the framers of previous constitutions. Clause 14 deals mainly with this deficit and the fundamental complexities of the fuiancial provisions to wliich it gives rise. It is thus one of the most important clauses of the Bill. Yet it Avas proposed origin- ally to give less than a day for its discussion, and only after Mr. Bonar Law's protest was the amount of time increased to 1 ;\ days. The following is a summary of the leading matters of principle raised by this clause : — (1) The creation of a separate Irish Exchequer. (2) The payment of the proceeds of all taxes, Imperial and Irish, into the Imperial Treasury. (3) The transferred sum. (i) The placing of the burden of the deficit on the British taxpayer. (5) The subsidy ol £500,000, diminishing to £200,000. (6) The repayment of the proceeds of Irish taxes to the Irish Government. (7) All payments from the Imperial Exchequer in aid ot local taxation to cease. (8) Loans by Public AVorks Loan Commissioners and the Local Loans Fund shall cease. (0) The setting up of the Joint Exchequer Board. These questions all arise from positive and direct references in the clause. There are many otlier matters of principle Clause 14 continued. which, however, could only be discussed oi- wjiicli could be best discussed on this clause and which .uc not diveelly mentioned. Among tJiese arc : - (1) Whether a contribution i)) any I'orni should be jiaid by Ireland. (2) Whether the burden of the dehcit on the British taxpayer should be secured against iiicrcase. (3) Whether the Bill provides any guarantee for its reduction and ultimate disappearance. (4) Whether a separate account shall be kept of Irisli revenue and any payments in excess (jf this sum should nut be voted in eacli year. (5) ^Vhether the cost of collecting Irish taxes should not be a first charge on the corresponding proceeds. (6) Whether the obligation of the Imperial Parliament in respect to grants-in-aid and other payments to local authorities in Ireland should be continued by payments out of the Imperial Exchequer and deducted from the transferred sum, or if paid out of the Irish Exchequer whether some guarantee should not be given that these payments will be continued in fvdl. (7) Whether the services in respect of which payments are included in the transferred sum may be discontinued without any diminution of the transferred sum. These two lists of matters which ought to be discussed on the clause clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of the time allowed for its discussion. Mr. Locker- Lampson' .1 Amendment. An important amendment is that which stands in the name of Mr. Locker-Lampson, who proposes to add in i^age 9, line 37, after "taxes " the words " and all other revenues." The immediate effect of this amendment would be to cause all the revenues from the Post Office to pass into the Imperial Exchequer Clause 1A— continued along witii tiic tax-rcvenuo. It would not ackl niatenally to the work at the Exchetiucr ; and it would not cause any inconvenience to the Irish Governnieut. The payments for the cost of the Postal Services could then be included iu the Transferred Sum. There is no logical distinction betwceii revenue derived from taxes and from revenue-producing services. They pass into one Exchequer now and they might with advantage continue to do so. The acceptance of the amendment would remove an ambiguity in the clause as it stands. The Postal Services in Ireland were estimated in the Wiiite Paper to cost £1,600,000 and the revenue to amount to tl, 354,000, leaving a loss on the Irish Exchequer of £24.6,000. It is of course intended that the amount to be paid to the Irisli Government under the Bill sliould be only €246,000. But is it quite certain that the words "net cost " in line do not mean the total cost of £1,600,000? If the words legally have the second and iiot the first inter- pretation the transferred sum would be improperly increased by £1,354,000. If at all doubtful words should be added to make it clear ; but the leceptanee of the amendment would make any words less liable to misinterpretation. There is a fiu'ther object which could be secured by this amendment. The Bill provides that the proceeds of all taxes pass into the Imperial Exchequer, and that any reductions of Imperial taxes should be followed by corresponding reductions in the transferred sum. It would be possible, therefore, for the Irish Parliament to reduce Imperial taxation to any extent and thus to reduce the proceeds of taxes reaching the Exchequer. The guarantee which the Bill intended to establish for the pay- ment of certain contingent charges and liabilities for which the Imperial Government had made itself responsible woidd thus be seriously prejudiced and might even disappear entirely. This is only true, it might be said, if no other taxes were imposed to Clause 14 -continued. make good the (lelieiciu-ics in Irisli revenue thus ercated. It has been too readily assumed however that a revenue ean be raised only by taxation. The Socialists at any rate would not accept that view. All sorts ol' monopolies might be created — a subject whose discussion was prevented by the operation of the guillotine on Clause 2. Tiie railways and harbours might be nationalised, and operated to provide a revenue for the Irish Government. Or the example of other countries might be followed and the Irish Government might create monopolies for the manufacture and sale of matches, tobacco, spirits and other products. If such monopolies were established the tax-revenue woidd certainly suffer ; but as the proceeds of such monopolies could not be regarded as taxes they would pass direct into the Irish Exchequer and miglit tims provide an adequate supplement to the Irish revenue to thf diminished Transferred Siun. Mr. Ca-sseV.s Anioidnicnf. A question o\ a \'ery different kind is raised by the first amendment standing in Mr. Cassel's name. He proposes to add words in page 9, line 40, to secure that the proceeds referred to in this clause should be carried to a separate Irish account at the Imperial Exchequer. The apparent object of this amend- ment and the necessary eonsequentials is to secure that all the payments both in respect of the transferred sum and the reserved services shoukl fall to be paid in the first instance out of the monies in the Irish account. In so far as this sum proves insufficient the necessary additional sums would have to be met out of monies voted annually by Parliament. THE DEFICIT. The general question of the deficit is dealt with fully in No. 10 (pages 9 — 19) of this series. Here it is only necessary to explain tlie proi)osals standing in the names of various members for reducing or limiting its amount. Clause 14- coNliniird. Mr. Worthin'^ton-l'Adns' AinoKbiu-iil. By tliis amendment Mr. Worthington-Evans essays to remove tlie burden of the deficit from British to Irish shoulders and further to secure a contribution to Imperial services. The effect of the amendment if carried would be to charge the Irish Parliament with about £2,000,000 on account of tlic deficit in, say, 1912-13 and another £3,.}00,000 for Imperial contribution. If this were carrico;i [two lines). [Tftis mfmornndum has bi'cn pnijarn/. by Mr. S. Rasrnbdum. and is cirruhted in this srrirs by pirmission of the Unionist (Jmtrul OfJ'ur. Mr. Hosrnbaiim tciU br u7idcr the Galltry dnrimj the ibhatcs on Ihr Fimiwinl Cktiiscs.} CLAUSE 15. This clause, to<>ctlKr w itJi the tiniplincations in Clause 25 and the limitation in Clause 17 (3) contain the whole of the taxing powers the Bill proposes to confer on an Irish Parliament. The following is a full sununary of those powers, together with the references to the clauses in which these powers are mentioned : — (1) Any Imperial tax (except certain scheduled stamp duties) may be varied by way of addition, reduction,* or discontinuance. [15 (1).] (2) If the Excise duty on any article subject to a Customs duty is varied, the rates must not j»ive any protection to Irish industries. [15 (1) (d).] (3) Customs and Excise duties on beer and spirits may l^e varied to anv extent, subject only to the limitation in 2. [15 (1) (b).] (4) Other Customs duties, income tax and deatli duties can be i-cduced to any extent, or discontinued or increased to yield not more tlian 10 per cent, of the proceeds as an Imperial tax. [15 (1) (b) and 17 (3).] (5) All other Imperial taxes, including all Excise duties, except on articles subject to Customs duties, can be varie(l indehnitely. [15 and 15 (1) (b).] (G) The vdie of income tax cannot be \aried. ((Tovern- nient auK^ndmcnt.) (7) The abatements, exemptions and i-eliefs in any tax can be varied indefinitely. [25.] (8) " Independent " taxes may be imposed. [15 (l).j * Since the above was written an amendment has been put down by the Govern- ment whose effect is to prevent any reduction or discontinuance of a Customs duty or corresponding Excise duty. Clause 15 — continued. (9) No Custoins (liitv can hi- lc\ icd on any article not in the Iniperittl tiirilT. [i.") (1) (a)|. (10) Customs duties or death tluties nuist not he vai-ied so as to grant preference to Colonies or to discriminate between different classes of property, ((iovernment amend- ment.) It will be seen that tlie powers of taxation conferred by this Bill are, in some respects greater, in other lespects more limited, than in the previous Bills. They are greater from the point of view of the theoretical area over which the Irish Parlia- ment might operate ; they are less from the point of view of the limitations on the exercise of their taxing powers. In the 1886 Bill Customs and Excise weie imposed and collected solely by tlie Imperial Parliament ; the contribution and other payments to the Imperial P^xchequer due from the Irish Government were deducted from the proceeds and the balance paid over. The Irish Parliament had unlimited power over the imposition and levy and collection of all other taxes. In the 1893 Bill as introduced Customs and Excise Avere still imposed and collected by Imperial authority, and the Ii'ish Parliament were given unfettered powers with regard to all other taxes. As amended the financial plan in the 1893 Bill cut down the taxing powers of the Irish Parliament very considerably. All Imperial taxes were imposed in Ireland as well as Great Britain. The Irish Parliament Avere precluded from imposing any taxes similar to those existing in Ireland, but were ]iermitted to impose and collect any other taxes. The one rigid principle from which these three plans never departed was that the right to levy and collect Customs and Excise duties was vested exclusively in the Imperial Parliament. A second principle, only less rigidly adhered to, was that the Irish Parhament could not interfere with Imperial taxes ; in two out of the three schemes Clause IS— continued. they niiojit, it' tlicy so ik-siicd. impose double taxes (r.^., double income tax, double licence duties, &c.), but tlic second tax had to be levied by the Irish Parliament, collected by Irish officers and paid direct into the Irish Exchequer. In the present case the whole of the Imperial taxes (except certain stamp duties) can be operated on by the Irish Parliament, and it is the Imperial Parliament who will have to present a full account to the Irish Parliament of the results of the changes introduced. Infinite opportunities for difference and friction must arise between ihe two Parliaments, and much time will certainly be demanded in both assemblies for their discussion. Besides these powers exercised within the Imperial tax-area, tlie Irish Parliament has fiuther powers to impose " any independent tax not being in the opinion of tlie .Joint Exchequer Board substantially the same as an Imperial tax." (1.5 (1).) These words appear to mean something analogous to the words " other than the existing taxes in Ireland " used in the amended scheme of the 1893 Bill. (12 (2).) They suggest, however, something more restrictive than was intended on that occasion. What is the meaning of " substantially the same " ? How near may an " independent " Irish tax approximate to an Imperial tax without being disallowed ? What is the purpose of the restric- tion, imless it be to prevent Irish taxes being imposed which would affect injuriously the yield of Imperial taxes ? If this be the intention what becomes of the claim, many times repeated by the Postmaster-General, that the intention of the Govern- ment, fully expressed in the Bill, is that full credit will be given to the Imperial Parliament for the proceeds of Imperial taxes, and it is only the surplus above this fixed datum line which will be regarded as the proceeds of Irish taxes ? Why limit the increase to 10 per cent, if the yield of the Imperial portion of the tax is a first charge on the total proceeds of the joint tax ? Clause \5— continued. Furtlier, no del'eiice has been oiieied for tlie proposed limita- tion upon the Irish Parliament to impose any measure of proteetion for Irish industries even though sueh a measure eould be adopted without prejudice to Great Britain. Leading Free Traders liave certainly not refrained from denouncing t}»e Free Trade system as applicable to Ireland. Two quotations will suffice to demon- strate this. The first is taken from a book by Mr. Thomas Lough, M.P., called " England's Wealth Ireland's Poverty." On pp. 47 — 48 he says: — However it may be explained, we cannot help being- struck with the inopportuneness of the fiscal policy which Parliament now adopted. Ireland had just passed through the most terrible ordeal to which any nation can be subjected. One-fourth of her population had been swept away, and every interest in the country had })een shaken to its founda- tion. After this dark period the dawn was breaking, and Irish hearts, ever hopefid, Avere beginning the slow work of getting the social system reconstituted. But an the famine receded the effects of the Free Trade Policy began to operate and the country had not long to wait to discover in the movement which was carrying riches and prosperity to Great Britain, the certain signs of further trial and disaster for her. The population, insufficiently fed and housed, could not be expected to refuse admission to the cheap and inferior food and clothes which began to be thrust in at all the ports. The groiving of wheat commenced to decay, the corn mills in every village, ivhich had supplied the wants of the people from time im- memorial, became idle and fell into ruins. The local industries which had abounded in every part of the country were destroyed by the competition of the manufacturing towns in Great Britain. Every class of Irish producer saw its prosperity undermiiud and ruin staring it in the face. One cannot look back at that period in which the fate of the eoimtry for the next half-century was decided, without seeing what good might have been accomplished, if even a little consideration had been extended. The nation collectively could have lived better, if not more cheaply, if it had continued to grow its oivn food and make its own clothes. But the trader zvith cheap Clause 15 rontinuerl. foreign goods to offer appealed to the individual consumer, and thus the home market for each class of producers was gradually spoiled. The italics arc not in tlic original. Otherwise the statement is exactly as it appeared in the first edition in 1896, and repeated in the new edition issued recently. Tlie second extract is from the Report of the Financial Relations Commission (1896), in the main report of which occurs the following passage (pp. 10 — 11) referring to the change brought about m Ireland by the introduction of Free Trade. " The change," to use Mr. Childers' words, " is usually considered to have been advantageous to a population, the great bulk of which had come to depend not upon agriculture, but upon manufacturing industry and commerce. It is evident that the change has not been so advantageous to Ireland, a country in which there is but little trade or manu- facturing industry, as it has been to England ; that, although as consumers, the Irish population may have gained in some cases by the abolition of duties on foodstuffs, yet that, on the otlier hand, as producers chiefly dependent upon agricultin-c, they have Jost in a far greater degree bj' the cheap prices in the British markets produced, in part at least, by tlie free and untaxed supply of foreign corn, livestock, dead meat, butter, cheese, eggs and other articles of food ; and that, at the same time, the taxation of Ireland has, since 1853, been increased by the imposition of income tax and the enhancement of the spirit duties, changes effected partly for the very purpose of facilitating the remissions of taxation in question, and also in order to ' lighten the springs ' of a manufacturing industry in which her share is but small. Ireland, being a country mainly inhabited by agricultural producers, could support its present populatioii upon the corn and meat produced there without having recourse, under ordinary circumstances, to a foreign supply of these articles, and could at the same time export a surplus of these food- stuffs. The population of Ireland consumes a rather large amoimt, in proportion to its wealth, of spirits, tea and tobacco. This being so, it docs not appear that a fiscal Clause "15— continued. system wliieh raises no revenue from foreign food stuffs, but does raise a large revenue from spirits, tea and tobacco is advantageous to the population of Ireland, although it may be advantageous to the population of the United King- dom, looked at as a whole. It may, perhaps, be said that just as Ireland suffered in the last century from the pro- tective and exclusive commercial policy of Great Britain, so she has been at a disadvantage in this century from the adoption of ;ui almost unqualified Free Trade policy for the Ignited Kingdom." It is quite dear from these views that some justification should have l)ecn offered for disregarding the opinions of these authorities. POSSIBLE YIELD OF IRISH TAXES. It is, of course, impossible to saj' what sum it might be possible to raise from "independent taxes," without some state- ments which have not been made of the possible forms of taxa- tion open to the Irish Parliament under this provision. As to the other powers, how'ever, some approximate estimate is possible. The following is a statement of the yield in 1911-12 of the duties in Ireland which might be raised under the Bill by an Irish Parliament : — If/- of Unlimited increase. Customs : — £ £ Spirits 346,000 Excise : — Spirits Beer Other articles and duties . . 1,992,000 1,035,000 321,000 Other taxes ; Stamps (2 /3 of £353,000) . . Land Value duties 236,000 1,000 3,931,000 Clause 15— continued. Power oj Limited increase. Customs : — Articles other tli;m spirits . . 2,.SG1,00() Income Tax 1.501,000 Death duties 1)30,000 No power of Variation. Stamp duties (1 /8 of £3.5.%000) . . 117,000 .801.000 117,000 £9,349,000 For the year 191*2-13 the loliowing estiiuales were ojveu by Mr. Lloyd George on Aj)ril 2.1 in reply to a question l)y IMr. Lees Smith : — Duties subject to 10 per cent, limitation . . £5,333,000 Duties not subject to limitation . . . . £3,906,000 It may be taken lor granted that no further revenue can be obtained by additions to the spirits duties. This leaves £1,600,000 as the present revenue from taxes liable to unlimited increase. Assuming a maximum average increase of 20 per cent, these could yield about £320,000. The duties upon which limited inci'ease is permitted now yield £5,301,000. These include the duties on tea (£583,000), sugar (£283,000) and other food duties (£95,000). Upon these it may be assimied that the Irish Parliament would not attempt to increase the duties. This leaves £4,340,000 as the yield of the duties upon which the maximum increase of 10 per cent, is theoretically possible. Allowing for the fact that upon some of these duties it will be undesiral)]e to operate and upon others it will be inexpedient to operate to the full 10 per cent, limit it is certain that the revenue which could conceivably be raised from this source would not exceed about £300,000 to £350,000. Thus the powers of increasing Imperial taxes might conceivably be used to produce about £650,000, or about 7 per cent, of the present tax-revenue. Clause 15 — conthmed. cr^STOMS AND EXCISE. It is mainly in respect of the powers of the Irish I'arhaineiit to vary the Customs unci Excise duties that the criticism of the Government scheme lias been levelled. In each of the three previous schemes the whole of the powers for imposing and collecting Customs and Excise duties were completely vested in the Imperial Parliament. These were matters in which the Irish Parliament had no power to interfere. In this respect those schemes merely followed the universal example of every federation in the world. Or rathci- in every other case the Customs are reserved to the Central federal authority ; the Excise being in some cases within the province of the constituent States. This differentiation is possible where a protective system is in existence. The application of tlie same principle to the United Kingdom, by a Government pledged to Free Trade, itnplies that the Customs and Excise must be left in the absolute control of the same authority. The reason alleged for the Government's departure from the universal practice and their own precedents is the existence of the large deficit on Irish account. The argument apparently is that owing to the deficit a scheme liad to be evolved that retained the main control of taxation in Ireland in the present authorities. The possibilities of independent taxation are very limited and therefore some power must be given to the Irish Parliament to operate on Imperial taxes. And as it would be necessary in general to limit that power, in order to protect Imperial revenue, only a meagre sum could ever be raised by the Irish Parliament imless this power is extended to Customs and Excise which are the staples of tax-revenue in Ireland. Tliis argument assumes too much. It assumes that the possible revenue from independent taxes in Ireland could never be appreciable. This is a task which, it may be granted, would Clause \S — continued. never prosont any real dilViculty to an iiitclligout and rtsourcerul Chancellor of the Exchequer. A tax on grass-lands has l)een frequently reconnnended in Ireland (would such a tax he " substantially the same " as the undeveloped land duty ?) or a corporation tax, or new kinds of licence duties. Again, why was it necessary to deprive them of the power to impose Customs duties on articles which are not, for the time being, in the Imperial tariff. This particular limitation covdd not be required in the interests of Free Trade because that is independently secured. It would not have added materially to the work of the Customs officers, because that already extends to all imports as soon as the Irish Parliament varies any Imperial tax or even earlier for the purpose of collecting information as to imports and exports under the authority of Clause 16 (1). The objections to separate Customs and Excise have come from many different quarters. Before the Bill Avas introduced, Mr. J. M. Robertson (Parliamentary Secretary to tlie Board of Trade) said at Lincoln on February 7, 11)12 :— There was, however, just one thing that must remain one for the three kingdoms, and that was the fiscal system, Customs and Excise. // was a federal Union xve imnted, a federal State. And he proceeded to explain more clearly and to rebuke over- zealous advocates of Home Rule by adding : — If they were to do as some of his unreflecting Home Rule friends, Irish and English, have done, and demand that Ireland should not only have power to lay taxes but to iix Castoms and Excise, then they had no State left at all. This is, however, what his " unreflecting " friends have actually done. They are to " fix " Customs and Excise by variations in the rates of duty. 10 Clause 15 continued. There is another kind of objection stated l)y .Mr. Ilashini (N. Monmouth) on Xovemher 7 as rei)resenting tJu- views of the great majority of Liberal members. He asserted : — I beheve I am riglit in saying that a great majority of Members on tJiis side of the House are not in favour of allowing the Irish Parliament to rediiee Customs and Kxeise duties. (Col. 1540.) Later in his speeeii he explained the groimds of tlieir objeetion : — Supposing the tobacco duties were redueere tliau in the case of any otlicr class of duty, difficulties would arise in the determination of the yield of that portion of the tax due to the Irish Parliament. (5) It would be impossible to avoid some elements of protection, to the prejudice of British trade, in the adjust- ments to be made between Customs and Excise rates. THE BADGE OE SOVEREIGNTY. Regarding (1) it may be recalled that there are a few cases of foreign federal systems {e.g., the United States and Brazil) in which tiic states may impose additional Customs duties on foreign products in order to give an additional local protection against foreign <'ompetitive goods. The Central Authority is, however, fulh acknowledged even in tliese cases by providing that the revenue from such additional duties shall be paid over in full to the Central Treasury, subject only to a deduction for expenses. There is no case where Customs duties can be levied by one state against the products of another state of the same federation, like the power in this Bill for putting duties on British beer, spirits, cigars, cigarettes, «S:c. Mr. Dillon has indicated very clearly the importance he attaches to this power wlien he said, in a speech at University College, Dublin, on April 24, 1912 :— " Therefore I saj' on this question of financial indepen- dence we have in this Bill far more financial independence than is enjoyed by tiie kingdom of Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemburg, and far more financial independence than the State of New York or any of the great Southern States of the Union."' — {Freeman's Journal, April 25, 1912.) The Act of Union appears to recognise the same principle when in the preamble the measare is recommended : — in order to promote and secure the essential interests of Great Britain and Ireland, and to consolidate the strength, power and resources of the British Empire. 12 Clause 15 — continued. Fiscal union was an essential part of the plan of Union. The Sixth Artiele runs :— . . . All Articles, tlie Growth, Produce, or Manufac- ture of either Country (not hereinafter enumerated as subject to specific duties) shall from theneefortli be imported into each country from the other, free from duty. . . . Complete absence of duties could not be attained immediately just as it was impossible to avoid, for a time, different customs in Western Australia from the rest of the Commonwealth. In the same connection, also, the following extracts from a Report of the Privy Council in 1849 relating to the proposed Constitution for Australia which was then projected are interesting : — l^EPORT OF Committee for Trade and Plantations of Privy Council on Proposed Australian Constitution, " There yet remains a question of considerable difficulty. By far the larger part of the revenue of the Australian Colonies is derived from duties on Customs. But if, when Victoria shall have been separated from New South Wales, each province shall be authorised to impose duties according to its own wants, it is scarcely possible but that in process of time differences should arise between the rates of duty imposed upon the same articles in the one and in the other of them, , , . So great indeed w ould be the evil, and such the obstruction of the inter-Colonial trade, and so great the check to the development of the resources of each of these Colonies, that it seems to us necessary that there should be one tariff common to them all, so that goods might be carried from the one into the other with the same absolute freedom as between any tw'o adjacent coxmties in England. 13 Clause 15— continued. " We are further of opinion that the same tariff should l)e estabhshed in Van Diemen's Land also, because the intercoiuse between that Island and the neighbouring Colonies in New Holland has risen to a great importance and extent, and has an obvious tendency to increase. Yet fiscal regulations on either side of the intervening strait must of necessity check, and might perhaps to a great extent destroy, that beneficial trade." — (Dated May 1, 1849.) The second paragraph deals especially with the case of two portions of tlie same kingdom separated by sea. HIGH COST OF COLLECTION. In the case of no other tax will the variation by the Imperial Parliament be so comparatively costly. At present all traflfic between Great Britain and Ireland is free from the delays and obstacles interposed by the Customs officers. The task of collecting any duties to wh'ch imports may have been liable has been, presumably, fully performed when they originally arrived from foreign or Colonial ports. They may have paid duty immediately or passed into bond ; in the latter case the duty would have been collected when the clearance from bond was effected for the purpose of despatch to any place in the United Kingdom. It could therefore have been always assumed that all goods passing between Great Britain and Ireland had paid the full duty to which they were liable. As soon, however, as any article subject to Customs or Excise duties is varied by the Irish Parliament a very considerable proportion of the total trade must pass under the inspection of the Customs officers. Clause 16 shows that that inspection will be necessary at both the port of shipment and arrival. Thus if the duty on tobacco is increased or reduced in Ireland, the following transactions will be necessary in the case of any manu- ■'■Si gf.b-sir? u Clause 15— continued. factures of tobacco passing from one country to the other, say, from Belfast to Liverpool. (1) Duty on tobacco (raw) upon arrival in Belfast. (2) Drawback on cigarettes, cigars, &c., on despatch from Belfast to Liverpool. (8) Duty on cigarettes, cigars, &c., on arrival at Liver- pool. The last tMo transactions have become necessary as soon as any variation of the duty on tobacco is made in Ireland by the Irish Parliament. It is obvious that the additional adminis- trative expenses must be considerably enhanced. Attention may also be drawn to the fact that the actual number of separate transactions must be enormously increased. Raw tobacco is generally imported in large bulk ; manufactured tobaccos are generally despatched in comparatively small parcels. The additional work involved in paying drawbacks and collecting the new duties must be very considerably multiplied. Finally, the examination of goods passing between the two countries cannot be confined to the articles whose duties have been varied. It must be made to extend to every class of goods in which it might be possible to conceal contraband. Having regard to the ease with which such contraband can be concealed it is certain that a very large proportion of the trade will be subjected to that vexatious inspection to which all Free Traders object, and which in this instance has not the recommendation that it can be of any benefit to the industries affected. Some idea of the magnitude of the trade of Ireland which might be subjected to this special inspection may be gathered from the following figiu-es relating to 1911 : — '^,i 93S5&I0 15 Clause 1 5 —continued. Imports. I. Farm Produce, Food and Drink £ Exports. £ Stuffs 24,284.,00() 34,156,000 II. Haw Materials , . . . 9,606,000 III. Manufactures 32,843,000 4,121,000 26,931,000 Total 66,733,000 65,208,000 The Board of Trade Relurirs show that the direct imports into Irish ports amounted to £15,000,000, and the direct exports £1,600,000. Hence the trade between Great Britain and Ireland nuist have been in 1911 : — Imports into Ireland from Great Britain . . £51,700,000 Exports from Ireland to Great Britain . . 63,600,000 Total £115,300,000 Even assuming that one-lialf of this trade is of a character not requiring special inspection for detecting contraband there would still remain nearly £60,000,000 worth of trade — mostly in small lots — requiring inspection. It is of course true that some additional machinery would be required for the purpose of collecting the information needed for the piupose of ascertaining the " true " revenue from dutiable commodities. This alone could be secured by very much less elaborate machinery. The imports of dutiable goods in 1911 into Ireland Avas £6,000,000, and the exports £4,900,000. It would be comparatively simple to enact that declarations be made to a revenue officer of these goods without extending this requirement to all goods. It is only with respect to the move- ment of dutiable goods that information is required for the ascertainment of the "true" revenue. These facts make it clear that this particular provision will entail very considerable additions to the cost of collection, certainly very large in relation to any revenue which might be Hi 16 Clause 15— continued. derived from it. It is not any more (lesirable because tliis additional expense will have to be borne in its entirety out ot Imperial funds. DIFFICUITIES OF DETERMINING THE PROCEEDS. The consumption of commodities is very sensitive to any variation of duties. A small increase in the tea duty may be expected to be followed by a peix-eptible diminution in the consumption. Thus a 10 per cent, increase in the tea duty might produce a 5 per cent, decline in the consumption with a consequential decline in the yield. If the increase is consider- able, as when Mr. Lloyd George added 3s. 9d. per gallon to the whisky duty, the consumption might be so far reduced that the yield at the higher duty is less than at the lower duty. Even income tax shows jierturbations of a similar kind ; the higher the duty the more numerous are the claims for refvmd. The effect is small, however, by comparison with commodity taxes. It is negligible with the former class ; it cannot be ignored with the latter class. This effect will prove of serious importance in connection with the determination of the proceeds of any Irish tax. The Postmaster-General declares that the Government's intention in the Bill is that if as a result of any Irish addition to an Imperial duty the revenue is raised from £1,000,000 in one year to £1,050,000 in the following year, the proceeds of the Irish tax will be £50,000. In the opinion of the writer the Bill completely fails to carry out this intention. Section 16 (4.) clearly enunciates a different principle. The proceeds are there defined as the difference between what would have been collected in Great Britain and in Ireland. There is no reference to the proceeds in any previous year. Thus, if in one year 10 lbs. of tea are con- sumed when the duty is 5d. and in the next year only 9 lbs. are consumed when the duty is raised in Ireland to 6d., the proceeds of the Irish duty will not be the difference between 54d. and 17 Clause 15— continued. 50d. or 4d. but the diriereiicc between 5id. and 1'h\. or Od, That appears to be the phiin instruetion in the Bill. Tlie result is that tlie Imperial Exehcquer will have lost 5d. out of every 50d., or 10 per eent. of revenue, and eoinplaints will consequently be made. Take another ease. The yield of the spirits duty in Ireland is about £2,000,000. Suppose the Irish Parliament, for the sake of argument, increased the duty by 50 per eent. and thereby diminished the yield to £1,500,000. There is no provision in the Bill, says Mr. Samuel in answer to a question, for charging the Transferred Sum with this loss of Imperial Revenue. Surely this wotdd prove a grievance to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, who wovUd find his revenue materially reduced by an Irish Parliament. As construed by the writer the proceeds of the Irish tax would probably be determined on the assumption that as one-third of the total tax is Irish, one-third of the proceeds is likewise Irish ; and therefore that £500,000 of the above sum must be added to the transferred sum, leaving to the Imperial Exchequer only £1,000,000 instead of £2,000,000, or a loss of £1,000,000 as the proceeds of the Imperial tax. Any other hypothesis would be unworkable and illogical ; this particular hypothesis is objectionable because of the reaction on Imperial revenues. These difficulties are inherent in any system of overlapping Customs and Excise duties. It has been admitted they would not be so serious in the case of direct taxes. PROTECTION UNAVOIDABLE. The last objection to a power of varying Customs and Excise duties is that with the best will in the world some elements of protection are unavoidable ; and if the Irish Parliament desired it would be possible to work this power to introduce very 18 Clause 15 — continued. considerable protect ion lor Irish imlustries. Tliis protective effect could be obtained by tlie adjustments of the relations between Customs, Excise ami drawback rates. The Bill provides that the Customs and Excise rates nuist differ by not more than will suffice to cover the cost of revenue restrictions, and of submitting to certain regulations in the processes of manufacture imposed by the revenue officers for the puri)ose of protecting the revenue. The following are cxanijiles of these differences in the present Imficrial tariff. Customs. Excise. Diff. s. d. s. d. d. 8 3 8 3 15 2 14 5 3 9 3 9 Beer, per 3G galls. (1055^) . . Spirits, per gall. Playing cards, per doz. packets Tobacco, with 10 per cent, or more of moistin-e 8 8 3 6 2 The determination of these differences will, if the Amend- ment in the name of the Postmaster-General be introduced into the clause, be calculated by the Joint Exchequer Board instead of the Treasury as before. The calculation is by no means easy and must vary with the conditions in existence at different establishments. They might arrive at a different figure as applicable to average Irish conditions than was reached by the Treasury as applicable to average conditions over the entire kingdom. At once a protective advantage would be secured to Irish manufaetiu-crs, brewers and distillers which must prejudice British trade. Further, the Government Amendment provides against such excessive drawbacks as would give any tariff advantage to an Irish manufacturer. It is true that, as Sir John Simon said, drawbacks are calculated so as to be equivalent to the duties paid on the materials used in manufacture and any additional expenses due to Excise regulations. The calculation is, however, empirical. There is and can be no standard applying to different conditions, and calculated bv different authorities. 19 Clause 15 — continued. The plan proposed by the Bill of limiting the addition to Imperial duties on the basis of the yield and not of the rate would permit a more serious form of protection. Suppose it were desired to encourage and develop an Irish sugar (growing and manufacturing) industry. The Customs duty could be raised to a point which would make importation almost pro- hibitive. It is here that the Excise would have to be raised to a corresponding height. But there is nothing in the Bill to prevent the payment of bounties on sugar production which would practically mUlify the Excise duties. This bounty might be paid on area under sugar-beet, or on sugar-beet crop, or on sugar produced. The general effect might be the same in each case. This operation could of course be made by gradual stages so as to give time for the development of a sugar industry in Ireland. In this way Ireland could certainly cater for the valuable sugar market in Great Britain, and practically destroy the whole of the British refining industry. AMENDMENTS. A large number of matters are raised by the various amendments on the paper, many of which are covered by the foregoing observations. The general object of most of tlie amendments is to limit or vary the powers of taxation granted by the clause. In addition to these, the questions of bounties ; monopolies ; ti-ansit charges, tolls or harbour dues ; commercial travellers' regulations ; the balancing of budgets wholly by taxation are also raised by various members. Mr. Herbert SamueVs Amendment. Though not the first on the paper it may be convenient to refer to Mr. Herbert Samuel's proposed amendment to the clause. As it first appeared on the paper the effect of the amendment was to limit the Irish Parliament, in so far as income 20 Clause 15 — continued. tax was concerned, to power to vary the exemptions, abatements and reliefs granted by the Imperial Parliament, and thus to prevent the Irish Parhament from varying the rate. Thus it was, and is still possible under the amendment to alter the £160 exemption limit or to vary the abatements under £700, or to alter the relief in respect of children under 16, or to reduce the fraction of one-sixth of any income as the maximum abate- ment which might be claimed in respect of life insurance premiums. The reason given for the new limitation was that, owing to the large proportion of the income tax collected at the source, it would have been impossible to administer a change of rate leviable on Irishmen or Irish earnings without very considerable difficulty. A railway company could not be expected to inqixire or to decide which of its shareholders was liable to a deduction of 14d., and which, say, 15d. in the £ from their dividends. The amend- ment still leaves it doubtful whether the Irish Parliament could increase the rate on " earned " incomes. If the difference be regarded as a relief this power would still remain ; but if the 9d. tax is a separate rate then, presumably, any change would be prevented by the amendment. There would be no difficulty, of course, in administering this particular change, if it were exercised. The relief for " earned " income must be personally claimed ; and, therefore, as these personal claims would be followed by direct assessments it would be as easy to assess earned incomes at any Irish rate. Some opportunity should be sought, therefore, for discovering whether this is the intention of the Government. Are they giving the Irish Parliament power to vary the rate of " earned " income while depriving them of the power to vary " unearned " income tax rates ! The difference is certainly an anomalous one. Further, the amendment specifically reserves super-tax as a tax whose rate is capable of variation by the Irish Parliament. 21 Clause ^5— continued. Together with tin- power for altering the exemptions and abatements it wouhl be possible to reduce the exemption Hmit from £5,000 to, say, £700, and the abatement from £3,000 to, say, £200. In this way the protection to the income-tax payer given in one part of the amendment is taken away in the other part. The only liniit to this variation is that the yield should not exceed one-tenth. But the practical effect of this limitation depends on whether super-tax is a separate tax or part of the income tax. In 1912-13 the estimated Irish revenue from income tax is £1,512,000. This includes super-tax. It is probably a high figure to assume that super-tax in Ireland produced as much as £100,000. But taking this figure, for the sake of argument, the amount of variation is limited to £10,000 if super-tax is a separate tax and to £150,000 if it is part of the income tax. In support of the second view it may be noted that in the Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910, Section 66 (1), this tax is imposed as " an additional duty of income tax (in this Act referred to as a super- tax)." Further in the case of Bowles V. Attorney General it was decided by Mr. Justice Parker (8 December, 1911) that " supei'-tax was an additional income tax, and one oi the ' duties of income tax ' within Section 30 of the Customs and Ireland Revenue Act, 1890." The case is reported in [1912] 1 Ch. 123. Mr. Samuel's amendment has been added to since it was first put on the paper to effect a further restriction, in express words, which IMr. Samuel said had always been the intention of the Bill. The words of this additional restriction are : — So far as any Customs duty or any death duty is concerned (the power of the Irish Parliament to vary an Imperial tax) shall only be exercised so as to vary equally the rate of the duty as a whole, without discriminating in that variation between any articles or property liable to the duty, or otherwise altering the provisions with respect to the duty. •).hc. 22 Clause 15 — continued. The intention of tins provision so far as it relates to Customs differentiation was Urns stated by Mr. Sanuief in nun-ing the Finaneial Ilesohition in Committee (November 7, 1912, Col. 1499) :— Tlie Irish Parhament is not allowed to effeet any differentiation in the duties. They may not, for example, take the Tea Duty and say, " We will impose an addition to Chinese tea and not an addition to Ceylon tea," and so embark on a poliey of so-ealled Tariff Reform, and establish for themselves any measure of Imperial Preference. It appears therefore from this admission there was some danger that the Irish Parliament might have wanted to extend a measure of Imperial Preference, but the present Government concerned as they are to " trust Ireland," must take it on them- selvse to prevent the Irish Parliament from adopting such a measure, even though by no stretch of imagination could it have had any effect on the revenues or industries of Great Britain. It may be doubted if any words, least of all the words of the amendment, could secure the intention of the Government, if the Irish Parliament were minded to the contrary. The sugar duty for example consists of a series of separate rates of duty varying with the degree of polarisation of the sugar, that is, with the degree of purity. Owing to the fact that in the main Colonial sugar arrives in this country of a different polarisation than foreign beet sugar it would not be impossible so to vary the rates on sugars of a different polarisation as to secure a substantial measure of preference for Colonial sugars. The same is true of the wine duties. Similarly with regard to the death duty, though the expressed intention is to prevent any discrimination between, say, realty or personalty, or between persons owning property in Ireland or elsewhere, the powers left to the Irish Parliament are still sufficient to permit this being done. 23 Clause 15— continued. Mr. Hewins' and Mr. Mason's Amendments. Two amendments appear on the paper relating to boimtics. The first, standing in Mr. Hewins' name, deprives the Irish Parhament of any power to grant bounties of any description. The second, standing in tlie name of Mr. Mason, would prohibit the establishment of certain classes of monopolies and " the grant of bounties to trades or industries in Ireland." Should any question arise as to the relevancy of this question of bounties to the clause dealing with taxation it may be pointed out that in the Commonwealth Act these matters are dealt with in the same clause. Section 86 runs : — On the estal)lishment of the Commonwealth, the collec- tion and control of duties of Customs and Excise, and the control of the payment of bounties, shall pass to the Execu- tive Government of the Commonwealth. This precedent further justifies the amendment, wliich would have the effect of reserving the grant of bounties exclusively to the central executive. The necessity for such a reservation arises not merely from the universal practice of all federal constitutions, but follows logically from the declared intention of the Government that the Irish Parliament are to have no powers which would enable them to protect Irish industries. Whether granted on export (which is declared to be impossible in view of the prohibition in Clause 2 against the Irish Parliament deahng with matters relating to " trade with any place out of Ireland ") or on production or by way of grant the substantial effect is the same. The Irish pro- ducers would be placed in a position of advantage in competition with the British producer of similar articles. When this question was raised in an amendment by Mr. G. Bartley in 1893 Mr. Gladstone said, referring to what he preferred 24 Clause 15 — continned. to call the " prcniiunis " wliicli, uiukr the Land Act of 1891, could be given for " aitling and developing agricidture, forestry, the breeding of live stock, and poidtry, weaving, spinning, fishing, &c." I have no great ft)nduess for such pi'ovisioiis ; but if I were asketl AvJicther Ireland had to l)e entirely free to do foi- herself what tlic Imperial Parliament had thought proper to do for her, I do not hesitate for a moment to accept that view. In tlie course of the same debate Mr. J. Chamberlain quoted the following passages from an ai-ticle by Mr. John Morley in a recent issue of the Nineteenth Cenfiin/ : — There can be little doidjt that, given the chance. Ireland woidd inutate the example of the United States, Canada, Victoria, and most other countries in tlie world, by exacting a Protective tariff against woollen cloth, shoes, and other manufactured articles. And he goes on : — Home Rule, therefore, in the shape that finds favour with the National Party, means a Protective Tariff and the introduction of bounties and other fiscal measures Avhich to Englishmen. I say, are an abomination. The further question raised by Mr. Mason's amendment regarding monopolies has been dealt with in No. 12. It may be pointed out that if this amendment were carried it would not prevent the continuance of the payments of bounties to Irish tobacco growing or of grants from the Development Finid. These would be paid by the authority of the Imperial Parliament, whose supremacy has been declared to be " undiminished over all persons, matters and things in Ireland " in Clause 1. 25 Clause 15 — continued. Mr. Ameffffi Amendment. TJie questions of Customs and Excise is specifically raised by the series of amendments standin40.) Jlr. Ildi/e.s Fisher's ^liiioidnicnf (line 27). The effeet of this amendment would be to take away tlie whole of the " power to vary " Imperial taxes and to leave Ireland solely with the power of imposing " independent taxes " as defined in the Bill. The substanee of the first part of this amendment has been already discussed. The sole question which remains is whether the power of raising " independent taxes " would provide the Irish Parliament with adequate resources. In the Bill " independent taxes "' would have to provide not merely for extra needs to meet new Irish expendi- ture but also any loss of revenue resulting from such remissions of Imperial taxes as the Irish Party are pledged to carry under Home Rule. By the amendment " independent taxes " would have to provide only for the first purpose, and for this would have the resources set free by the savings in the Transferred services, which the Irish party claim must result from an Irisli administration of these departments. Mr. Newman'' s Amendment. Xo limits to the powers of an Irish Parliament to vary land taxes are set by the Bill. They could therefore impose any additional burdens on all land, or particular kinds of land. They might add to the undeveloped land duty to any extent. 27 Clause iS—coHtiuKcd. or they might impose gradiuitcd duties on the eapitul vahies or site vahies of land so as to fall with the greatest weight on urban lands. Mr. Newman's amendment prescribes, in effect, that if land f^axes are desired they must be levied at the same rate on all kinds of land, and the basis of any assessment must be tJie ratcalile value and not the capital value. Mr. Shirleij Benn's and Sir Harry Samuel's Aviendmenis. Some matters of considerable importance are raised l)y amendments standing, respectively, in the names of Mr. Shirley Benn and Sir Harry Samuel. Both these amendments have substantially the same effect. Both aim to secure that a person in Ireland shall not be liable to pay additional duties in respect of any earnings or property he may derive from or own outside Ireland. Additional income tax shall apply only to his Irish income : additional death duty only to his Irish property, and so on. If a capital or corporation tax were imposed by Irish Act only that portion of the capital employed in Ireland would alone be liable to taxation. Unless some provision of this kind is secured, it seems likely that many Irish businesses, departments or branches of larger British businesses will disappear, and the business carried on from a centre in Great Britain. CLAUSE 27. JUDICIARY. Notes on this Clause will be found in Memoranda No. 3, pages 26—32. PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. Clause 26. No. 14.— NOVEMBER 30. I9I2. UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25, VICTORIA STREET. WESTMINSTER, S.W. V. & s., r.m. -40339. 14 CONTENTS: page Clause 26 (1) )2) . 1 Clause 26 (3) . . 9 I mn m*. NOTE. It is proposed to issue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by tJie provisions of the Bill. The memoranda will be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretary of the Union Defence League would appreciate suggestions for further increasing tlieir utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He would also appreciate it if Members would be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Secretary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number Victoria 4.'503 {tivo lines). [This nwtiiorandum lias been prepared by Mr. S. Roaenbaum, and is circulated in this series by permission o/ the Unionist Central Offke. Mr. Rosenbaum will be under the Gallery durinrj the debates on the Financial Clauses.] CLAUSE 26 (1) (2) FINANCIAL REVISION. Clause 26 deals with the very iniportaut question of tlie occasion when a revision of the financial relations of Ireland and the United Kingdom may be undertaken. On Wednesday last (November 27) notice was given of tiie adoption by the Government of an important amendment standing in the name of Mr. Lees Smith, whicli has been on the order paper since Jime 7 last, the effect of which is to revolutionise the financial portion of this clause and must have serious consequences on the efficiency of tliat portion of tlie financial plan already dis- cussed. In order to appreciate the magnitude of the proposed change it is desirable to explain first the scheme in the Bill. What the Bill proposes is that the occasion for revision will arise when, in three successive years, the proceeds of Imperial taxes and Irish taxes, togetlier with Ireland's share of the mis- cellaneous revenue of the United Kingdom, exceed the transferred simi and the cost of the reserved services. This definition of the " occasion " will be greatly simplified if it be written in the form of an equation. The " occasion " for revision will tlierefore be when, in Ireland, Imperial taxes 4 Irish taxes + share of miscellaneous revenue = Transferred sum + Cost of Reserved Services. It may be recalled that by Section 14 the Transferred Sum consists of three items, viz. : — (i) Cost of transferred services ; (ii.) Irish taxes : and (iii.) the subsidy. Substituting these items in the foregoing equation we obtain the following : — Imperial taxes -f- Irish taxes + share of miscellaneous revenue = Cost of transferred services -f- Irish taxes + subsidv -f reserved services. Clause 2S— continued. It will be noted, first, that " Irish taxes " occurs on the two sides of the equation and therefore cancel. Also, the mis- cellaneous revenue, with a shai-e of which Ireland is to be credited for the purposes of this section, is estimated to amount to £3,453,000 in 1912-13. What share is to be allotted to Ireland is nowhere stated. It is to be any share " which the Joint Exchequer Board may consider Ireland to be entitled." If it were made on the basis of population, Ireland's share would be over £300,000. It is more reasonable to assume however that the apportionment would be made on the basis of relative contribution to tax-revenue. On that basis Ireland's share would be about £200,000, which is the same as the subsidy after eight years, before which date no one imagines that the occasion for revision could possibly arise. In that case the Irish share of miscellaneous revenue cancels the subsidy in the previous equation, which then assumes the following greatly simplified form : — Impei'ial taxes = Sum paid on accoimt of transferred services -f- Cost of reserved services. The words of the Bill are thus seen to have concealed the fact that the proceeds of Irish taxes have no effect in determining when revision shall take place. Further, since tlie sum paid on account of transferred services is a fixed amount (subject only to the variable charge possible in connection with the transfer of a reserved service), the only variables are Imperial taxes and cost of reserved services. If the cost of reserved services should fall (which is unlikely) the equation would be satisfied earlier ; if it should increase the occasion would be correspondingly delayed. Subject to the effect produced by this growth in tlie cost of I'eserved services the deficit could only be extinguished when Imperial taxes have increased by this amount {i.e., £1,515,000 on the basis of the Treasury estimates). Clause 26. continued. It is an essential part of this scheme that only the fixed sum paid on account of the transferred services entered into the question of revision. The sum paid to, however, is not the same as the cost incurred by, the Irisli (iovernment for these services. They might spend more or less on these services ; nevertheless the effect on the deficit and therefore on the occasion for revision would be nil. This was pointed to as a particularly important feature of the Government sclieme. It means that if the Irish Government effected in tlic transferred services any economies such as have been alwaj's claimed as possible, the Irish Exchequer alone would benefit. If the Irish Government acquiesced in a reduction of the transferred sum corresponding to the whole or part of such economies the occasion for revision would thereby be accelerated. In his speech, on introducing the first Financial Resolution, Mr. Herbert Samuel clearly explained this part of the Bill in the following passage :— " The purpose of the Bill is to secure to the Irish Parliament the rights and benefits of their own economies, and I think that is a sound principle. If Ireland is a])le to make economics which we have failed to make, and which could not be got under the present system of government, then the Irish people, I submit, are entitled to the benefit of these economies, either in the form of reduction of taxation upon the poorer classes or in the form of greater benefits in other <1irections, or in the form of money spent upon education or for other purposes which they may wish. I think that should be allowed. An Amend- ment may be necessary to effect this and to inform tlie Imperial Chancellor of the Exchequer that they would accept and transfer the sum reduced on account of their own economies in order to make earlier tlie date when the deficit will be ended and for the readjustment of the financial relations between the two countries to take place. These are the reasons for those provisions of the Bill." — Pari. Deb., November 7, 1912, cols. 1505-1506. The Government amendment proposes an entirely different test for the arrival of the period of revision. It proposes to Clause 26. continued. substitute " total cost of Irish services " for " amount of tiic Transferred Sum " in line G (p. 17). Restatiu^r our equation in this amended form we f>et Imperial taxes +Irish taxes f Irish share of miscel- laneous revenue = total cost of Irish services -f-cost of reserved services. " Irish Services " are defined in Section 4 (6) as " all public services in connection with the admiuistration of tlie civil govern- ment of Ireland except the administration of matter,^ with respect to wliich the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws." This definition would include all transferred services and anv new services which the Irish Parliament, within their powers, undertake. " Irish taxes " represent of coarse the difference between the cost of these new services and the economies in tiie transferred services. This again permits the following simplifica- tion in the equation defining the occasion for revision : — Imperial taxes 4-Ii'ish economies in transferred services -|- Irish share of miscellaneous revenue =payment for trans- ferred services +cost of reserved services. It will be seen therefore that the substantial difference between the amended plan and the original plan is that economies in the transferred services and the Irish share of miscellaneous revenue will tend to shorten the period which will elapse before revenue takes place. Assuming that economies are possible, and that the Irish Parliament desii-e a financial revision — which will involve them in an Imperial contribution — this amendment enables the Irish Parliament to accelerate the period of revision. If, however, revision is for any reason deemed inexpedient by the Irish Parliament the effect of the amendment will be to induce the Irish Parliament to restrain from effecting possible economies Clause 26— continued. in these services. FuiHicr, if the transferred services slioiild not be capable of beino; ran at smaller cost : and if in fact the total cost siiould increase — which is not impossible in view of the commitments now being made in respect of education — this amendment will have the effect of postponing the revision period still further. It is unfair that the Committee should be asked to discuss the amended scheme without submitting some information on the probable future cost of the transferred services. Mr, Nield's Amendment. Mr. Nield proposes to omit from the first line of the clause all the words after " if." The words in the clause are redundant if all that the Exchequer Board has to do is to determine questions of fact. The proceeds of Imperial taxes and of Irish taxes, the Transferred Sum, ai\d the cost of reserved services, are all definite amounts. Once determined, they are, so far as the Bill is concerned, removed from the region of specidation and are mere arithmetical quantities. There is only one doubtful element, and that is the " share in any miscellaneous revenue of the United Kingdom to which the Joint Exchequer Board may consider Ireland to be entitled." So far as this item is concerned an instruction shoidd certainly be included in the Bill describing the method of apportionment of this item for the purposes cf this clause. Should it be apportioned on the basis of population or on the relative taxable capacity or on the proportionate contribution to taxes or the total revenue ? This ought certainly not to be left to the Joint Exchequer Board without guidance from Parliament. But once this instruction is incorporated in the Bill, as it must be, there is nothing whicli would justify the retention of such words as "if it appears to the Joint Exchequer Board tl^at . . . ," and the calculation is a purely arithmetical one whicli coidd be performed by any schoolboy. Clause 2B— continued. Sir Harry SarmieVs Amendment. Sir Harry Samuel proposes to insert words which would have the effect of stating in clear terms without such circumlocu- tion as is contained in the Bill that the period of revision will arrive when the deficit has been extinguished in any year, or when during three successive years the deficit has not exceeded one-fortieth of the Transferred Sum. The term " deficit " is defined in Clause 47 and with that definition Mr Herbert Samuel on Mondaj' night admitted he had no quarrel. It is exceedingly unlikely that in any year the Irish revenue would increase so considerably as to make the surplus in that year an unfair criterion of the ability of the Irish Parliament to undertake financial revision. To insist that a surplus shall exist for three successive years may unduly prolong the deficit period and postpone almost indefinitely the occasion for a revision. The second part of the amendment proposes that not only if the deficit has been extinguished in one year shall there be a revision, but that this shall also be undertaken if during three successive years Irish revenue has approached within Irish expenditure by one-fortieth of the Transferred Sum, Wlien the constabulary is transferred, and if Old Age Pensions are trans- ferred, the Transferred Sum will amount to about ten millions. In that case the amendment suggests that a revision should take place if dtu-ing three successive years the deficit has not been moi-e than £250,000. To extinguish the deficit would only require the Irish Government to increase taxes in Ireland to the extent of about 2 J per cent. Mr. James Hope's Amendment. This amendment is intended to give effect to the simplified statement of the occasion for revision which is set out at the Clause 26 — continued. beginning' of this Memoramluni. If carried, the clause would read : " If it appears to the Joint Kxx-hequer Board tliat during any three successive years after the passing of this Act tlie aggregate of tlie total proceeds of Imperial taxes levied in Ireland, as determined by the Board, exceeded in each of those years the net cost to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom at the time of transfer of the services transferred from the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Ireland after the passing of this Act, together with the cost of any services which are for the time being reserved services, the Board shall present a report," «&c. It has been shown above that the effect of this alteration in the clause would not be to make any change in the deficit period. It would merely simplify the clause and make perfectly clear what is meant, namely that the Government's original proposal was that the occasion for revision would arise only when the proceeds of Imperial taxes in Ireland are calculated to be in excess of the sum paid to the Irish Parliament in respect of transferred services together with the cost to the Imperial Parliament of the reserved services. Mr. Herbert SaimieVs Amendment. The Government have put down another amendment, the effect of which is to require the Joint Exchequer Board to bring into the account of Irish revenvies for the purpose of this sub- section " any other revenue available for the cost of Irish services." It is not quite clear what these words mean unless it be that the term " taxes " would not include revenues from Crown Lands in Ireland, and certain miscellaneous revenues, amoimting to £112,000, which at the present time pass into the Imperial Exchequer. This amendment appears to provide a favourable Clause 26 continued. opportunity for suggesting that any sum arising from the opera- tion of Section 17 (3), namely any revenue whi<'h is in excess of the one-tenth Hmit in that subsection is not to be treated as an Irish tax ; shouhl be brought into the account of Irisli revenues for tlie purpose of this subsection. It is certainly not an Imperial tax ; and it is declared to be not the proceeds of an Irish tax. Words ought to be introduced to effect this amendment. CLAUSE 26 (3) IRISH DELEGATION. When the time eoiiics lor a revision of the financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland, the Irish members of the Imperial House of Commons are to be reinforced by a delegation from the Irish House of Commons. The numbers of that delegation are to be regulated according to population, and are to be such as will make the representatives of Ireland in the Imperial House of Conniions equivalent to the representatives of Great Britain. The sunmioning of the delegation is to be by Order-in- Council. No indication is given of the method to be adopted. The delegates may be selected en bloc by the Irish Ht)use of Commons. It is an important point. Under this method of selection, while Ireland will get larger representation, the majority need not, and probably will not, share in that larger representa- tion. Thus, assuming that of the 42 permanent Irish members eight are Unionist, the majority against them is *26. When the delegates arrived, the majority against them would be increased by the number of the delegation. In this respect the Bill is worse than that of 1886, which is apparently the precedent on which the proposal under review is based. Clause 39 of the Bill of 1886 provided for the special representation of Ireland at Westminster when large alterations of the Act should be reqviired. But in such cases both Irish Houses were to be represented, or, if there were no upper House, 28 Irish representative Peers were to be elected as at present. The delegates from the Lower House were not to be chosen en bloc. The Irish House of Conmions had to select one Member from each Constituency, or two Members if the Constituency returned four. There was thus a guarantee that all shades of opinion in the Irish House should be represented. Under the present arrangement there is none. Clause 26 — continued. Again, Mr. Gladstone's proposal in 1886 was logical, because under that measure Ireland was to have no representation at all at Westminster, and obviously organic changes in the Home Rule Act could not be effected in the absence of any Irish Members. Under the present Bill Ii eland will have 42 Members always at Westminster. What, then, is the inference to be drawn from Subsection 3 of Clause 26 ? Surely, that that representation is unfair. If it be fair, why should it have to be reinforced only for the revision of the Financial Relations. There is no special representation when other clauses of the Bill are considered. The Act can be repealed. The Irish have no increased vote on the question ; but on the much smaller question of amending certain clauses, her representation is to be augmented. Yet the only argument for bringing over the delegation is that the permanent representation is inadequate to the proper protection of Irish interests. This leads to another anomalous consideration. Ireland is to have her full legitimate representation only when she is solvent and prosperous. While she is poor, struggling and in urgent need of having her interests protected, she is to have only about two-thirds of the representation to which she is presumably entitled. Moreover, this full representation is to be ephemeral. As soon as the new Financial arrangements are concluded, the delegation will retire. From that it follows that when Ireland is contributing her fair quota to the Imperial Services she is to have a smaller representation in the Imperial Assembly. Such an arrangement is not likely to reconcile Ireland to the Imperial contribution or increase her zeal in the Imperial Service. 11 Clause 26 — continued. Tliere are other points on which expHcit information should be given, especially the method of selection of the delegates by tlie Irish House of Commons. Are they to be elected by the Irish House without restriction ? Are they to represent minorities as well as majorities ? If minorities are to be represented, is the proportion to be based on the strength of parties in the Irish Parliament or in the Imperial Parliament ? Amendments to secure the representation of minorities stand in the names of Mr. Newman, who proposes the election of delegates by the transferable vote, and by Mr. Murray Macdonald. Mr. Rothschild proposes that the financial revision shall be entrusted to a Committee of thii'ty members appointed by the Parliaments of the two countries, whose decisions shall be embodied in a Bill to be considered by the two Parliaments sitting separately, the representation of the two Parliaments on the Committee being based on tlie proportion of tlie popula- tions of Great Britain and Ireland. A final question is the effect of the special delegation upon the Government at Westminster. Clearly the intrusion might be sufficient to defeat a Government holding office by a small majority. It would enjoy the confidence of the House in respect of general business, but would be in a minority in respect of this particular matter. Would it continue, accepting amendments to its plan of financial revision, or resign in favour of an ad hoc Government for the sole purpose of passing into law the revised 12 Clause 2S— continued. scheme of financial relations. Meanwhile general legislation would be hung uj), since the ad hoc Government would not enjoy the confidence of the House on general business, and general administration would be conducted contrary to the opinions of the majority of the representatives at Westminster entitled to express an opinion. On the other hand if the Government did not resign, it would be under the painful necessity of passing a financial scheme into law against its views, but for which it would have to accept the responsibility. PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. 15 THE HOME RULE BILL IN COMMITTEE. MEMORANDA ON AMENDMENTS. Clauses 29 and 31. No. 15— DECEMBER 2, I9I2. CONTENTS: Clause 29 Clause 31 UNION DEFENCE LEAGUE, 25. VICTORIA STREET. WESTMINSTER, S.W. V. & S., Ltd.— 40379. NOTE. It is proposed to hsue at intervals during the Committee and Report Stages of the Home Rule Bill, memoranda on some of the amendments placed on the Order Paper, and also upon some of the issues raised by the provisions of the Bill. The memoranda ivill be circulated to Unionist Members of Parliament, and the Secretari/ of the Union Defence League would appreciate suggestions for further inci-easing their utility. The Secretary will be glad to hear from Members who may desire information in respect of amendments they have placed on the Order Paper, and will do his best to assist them. He ivould also appreciate it if Members ivould be good enough to call his attention to important matters arising out of amendments they have placed on the paper for discussion. Arrangements have been made for the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Defence League to remain open until 10.30 each night during the debates on the Committee Stage of the Home Rule Bill. The Sea-etary will be pleased to supply information on the Home Rule question. The address of the Union Defence League is 25, Victoria Street, Westminster ; and the telephone number, Victoria 4503 {two lines). CLAUSE 29. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. Mr. Asquith, speaking in the House of Commons, on April 11th, 1912, on the introduction of the Home Rule Bill, said : — " Now I come to the powers of the Legislature. If any question arise as to the vaHdity of an Irish Act, as to whetlier it is or is not within the powers conferred by this Statute, the question will be settled — if it arise in the course of ordinary litigation which involves any such point — first of all by an appeal to the Irish Court of Appeal, and from it to the Judicial Conmiittee of the Privy Council, and next — even if the matter does not arise at all in the course of litigation — at the instance either of the I.ord-Lieutenant or of the Secretary of State here by a special reference to the Judicial Committee which shall determine the point even before the Act has come into operation at all." — (Par^ Beh., April 11, 1912, col. 1412.) Clause 29 is referred to in the last portion of the extract from Mr. Asquitli's speech. It gives the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State power to submit any Irish Act or Irish Bill, or any provision thereof to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Its limitation should be noticed. Matters under this clause are not those arising in the course of litigation which are dealt with by Clause 30 but are general questions upon which legal opinion is required. The clause is substantially the same as that contained in the Bill of 1893 but is more extended in its application since it covers not only Irish Acts but Irish Bills. The extension is clearly intended to cover those eases in which the United Kingdom Government is in doubt whether the Lord-Lieutenant ought not to exercise his Veto in respect of an Irish Bill. It is an attempt, it will be seen, to shift the responsibility arising out of the exercise of the Veto. 2 Constitutional Questions— continued. By Clause 7 the Lord-Lieutenant is — (a) to comply with instructions given to His Majesty in respect of any Bill ; (b) to postpone giving assent, if so directed, by His Majesty, to any Bill for a stated period. The instruction might be a direction to refer the Bill to the Judicial Committee, and the period of postponement until the Judicial Committee had given their decision upon the question that was in doubt. This would seem to be an innovation in Constitutional practice. The giving or withholding of the Royal Assent is an act exercised by His Majesty on the advice of his Ministers. Ministers find no difficulty in advising His Majesty in respect of Colonial legislation and of stating the opinion which leads them to advise the withholding of the Royal Assent. They do not require a Court of Law to settle the matter for them. In respect of Irish legislation, however, their own knowledge is insufficient. They shrink from giving advice. They dare not interpret the Home Rule Act. We cannot believe that they consider their legal knowledge imperfect. There must be another reason. It is not far to seek. If the United Kingdom Ministry advised His Majesty not to assent to an Irish Bill the quarrel would be between the Government at Westminster and the Irish Government. The Irish members at Westminster would raise the question in the United Kingdom House of Commons ; and a Government at Westminster dependent for office — as now — on the Irish vote would find themselves in difficulties. Hence the shifting of responsibility from a political body — the United Kingdom Constitutional Questions— continued. Government — to a legal body — tlic Judieial Connnittee — against whom, it is presumed, charges of political bias eould not so easily be brought ; nor the consequences of a decision adverse to the wishes of the Irish Parliament be visited upon the United Kingdom Government. The result, however, would be deplorable. By Clause 28 the Judicial Committee is made the Court of Appeal for Irish cases dealing with matters of ordinary litigation. By Clause 29 they are to decide questions which are matters of political controversy. If, in respect of matters arising under this clause, they decide against the Irish Parliament, they will be subjected to considerable criticism by the Irish Parliament and the Irish members in the Imperial Parliament. They will be accused of an anti-Irish bias and consequently their impartiality in respect of appeals in the course of ordinary Irish litigation will suffer. The refusal of the United Kingdom Government to accept the responsibility for advising His Majesty when to withhold the Royal Assent to Irish Bills will thus bring about unfortunate and regrettable consequences. So far only the provisions have been touched upon in respect of its opinion on Irish Bills ; but the Judicial Committee may also be called upon to decide the validity of an Irish Act. Writing in 1893 on this subject, Prof. Dicey says : — The Enghsh Privy Council may nullify the effect of Irish legislation in two ways. It may as an administrative body give a decision that an Act is void. This power can be exercised only upon the apphcation of the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State, and it is a power which we may expect will be but rarely employed, for its use would at once give rise to a direct conflict between the Irish Parliament and the English Privy Council. Let it be noted in passing that this provision for the decision of constitutional questions is foreign to the habits and traditions of English Courts ; no judge throughout the United Kingdom ever pronounces [ Constitutional Questions— continued. a speculative opinion upon the extent, operation, or validity of an Act of Parliament. It is the inveterate habit of our judges to deal witli particular cases as they come before them, and with particular cases alone. They will find themselves greatly perplexed when they come to pronounce judgment upon abstract questions of law. This is not all. The proposed arrangement is as foreign to the spirit of American Federalism as it is to the spirit of Enghsh law. The Supreme Court of the United States never in strictness pronounces an Act either of Congress or of a State Legislature void. What the Court does is to treat it as void in the decision of a particular case. Tocquevillc and other critics have directed special attention to the care witli which the Federal tribunals, by dealing only with given cases as they arise, avoid as far as possible coming into conflict with any State. They determine the rights of individuals ; they do not determine directly what may be the legislative compe- tence of the State, or for that matter of the Federal, Legislature. The extraordinary power given to the Privy Council violates a fundamental principle of federalism, which by the way is violated in other parts of the Home Rule Bill. It brings, or tends to bring, the central power, represented in this ease by the Privy Council, into direct conflict with one of the States of the Federation." — {Leap in the Dark. Ed. 1911. pp. 90, 91.) No precisely analogous provision is to be found in the constitution of the great self-governing Dominions. In the South Africa Act, Clause 98, Subsection 3 (b), the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court are given jurisdiction in matters in which the validity of any provincial ordinance comes into question. In the Commonwealth of Australia Act, Section 75, the High Court is given original jurisdiction in all matters between States, and under Clause 76 the Parliament of the Commonwealth may confer original jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. The nearest parallel to the proposal of Clause 29 is to be found in the Supreme Court Act, Chapter 139 of the Revised Statutes 1906 of the Dominion of Canada. The Constitutional Questions— continued. Supreme Court ol' CiiiicTfla. which wns constituted in 1875 as a General Court of Appeal, has a ciu-ious original jurisdiction. The Governor-General-in-Couneil can refer to it any important question affecting the interpretation of the British Xortii- America Acts 1867 to 1886, the constitutionality of any Dominion or Provincial Act, the appellate Jurisdiction in educatioixal matters, whether given by the British North America Act or by subsequent Acts of the Provincial Constitution, the powers of the Parliament of Canada and the Legislatures of the provinces or their governments in regard to any particular matter, and any other matter which the Governor-General-in-Council deems fit to submit. The judgments or answers in such a question, though merely advisory, are to be treated as a final judgment foi- the purpose of reference to the Privy Council. In determining the Irish constitutional questions referred to it the Judicial Committee must consist of not less than four Lords of Appeals and " at least one member who is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court in Ireland." (Claase 28.) AMENDMENTS. Amendment by Mr. Salter. Under the clause its provisions can be put in operation only by— The Lord Lieutenant, or A Secretary of State. Persons interested " may be " allowed to appear and be heard. The power of individuals in respect of the operation of the clause is limited to petition (Subsection 3). Mr. Salter proposes that " any person affected " may put the clause into operation. Constitutional Quesiions -continued. The amendment considerably widens the scope ol the clause ; which it is clear is intended to be a safeguard for the Imperial Government when in doubt. The private individual cannot test the validity of Irish legislation except in the ordinary course of litigation and under the provisions of Clause 30. The real question is the efficacy of petition under Subsection 3. If it is of small value, the private individual, however much he conceived an Irish Bill or Irish Act to be invahd, could not test the matter under this clause unless he could persuade the Lord Lieutenant or Secretary of State to take action, *Ordinary litigation which he might initiate woidd only affect a particular case and would not be a general decision that a particular law was unconstitutional. Power to the private individual to take action, limited so as to avoid action on the part of irresponsibles, would be a greater safeguard to the minority than is the clause as at present drafted. The amendment is all the more reasonable as the result of the amendment by the Government in respect of Irish services and the Joint Exchequer Board. The scope of the clause by this amendment is so much widened from its original limitation to the decision of grave constitutional questions that the private individual may with greater appropriateness be permitted a voice in the operation of the clause. Amendment by Lord Castlereagh. The amendment extends the operation of the clause to " whether any executive power in Ireland has been unlawfully exercised." The object of the amendment is to extend to executive power the reference to the Judicial Committee which the clause imposes upon legislative power. It is the fact that injustice to minorities is effected more easily by an abuse of * By the Attorney-General's amendment to Clause 30, this course applies to decisions of Joint Exchequer Board. Constitutional Questions— continued. executive power than by the operation of legislation. There were many cases in connection with educational administration especially during the regime of Mr. McKenna at the Board of Education, and recently there has been Form IV. and the Gibson-Bowles case. The scope of the clause would be very considerably widened if the Judicial Committee were given the power of passing executive as well as legislative acts under review. On the other hand the Government amendment extends to executive acts the operation of the clause by giving the Joint Exchequer Board the power to obtain an interpretation of the law before performing an executive act. The step is but short to give the Lord-Lieutenant as head of the Irish Executive power to consult the Judicial Committee in eases of doubt where his Ministers advise some executive act which seems to him to conflict with the law. While there are safeguards iix the Bill in respect of legislation, there are no direct safeguards in respect of executive acts. In all cases probably the executive act would be tested as arising from legislation ; but a direct appeal to the Judicial Committee in respect of an executive act would simplify matters and present a more perfect safeguard than that afforded by ordinary litigation. The Attorney-GeneraV s Amendment. The amendment and one to Clause 30 arise out of a promise given during the debate on Clause 14 (Pari. Deb., November 21, col. 611), and more definitely stated by Mr. Herbert Samuel on November 25 {Pari. Deb., col. 828). The amendment, it should be noticed, entirely changes the scope of the clauses. As introduced the clause covers only legislative acts of the Irish Parliament concerning which the Lord-Lieutenant or Secretaiy of State is in doubt. It is a clause deahng with Constitutional questions — obviously matters of grave import. Constitutional Questions— continued. By the amendment to Clause 29, however, the Judieial Committee have to assist : — (a) the Lord-Lieutenant or Secretary of State by defining the words " Irish services " ; (b) the Joint Exchequer Board by interpreting — (1) the Act ; (2) other questions of law arising m connection with tlie duties under the Act. This is an extension of the terms of the clause from Constitutional decisions to decisions respecting the interpretation of the Act itself. The Judicial Committee therefore — the highest Court of the Empire— may be called upon to advise a body in the exercise of their departmental duties. That the amendment is admittedly necessary is proof of the bad structure of the Bill. If the Sandys amendment to Clause 2 had been adopted " Irish services " would have been defined by the Home Rule Act and there would have been no need to call upon the Judicial Committee to interpret the term. Again, if the financial clauses of the Act were definite in respect of the relations between Great Britain and Ireland instead of indefinite, a body, such as the Joint Exchequer Board, would be unnecessary and the consequent appeal to the Judicial Committee for legal assistance would not be required. By this amendment the Government are seeking a way out of unnecessary difficulties which they have themselves created. CLAUSE 31. THE LORD LIEUTENANT. The Clause deals with the office of the Lord Lieutenant. The provisions of the Clause remove the two conditions which differentiate the Lord Lieutenant from the position of Governors of the self-governing Dominions. Subsection 1 abolishes the religious disqualification of the Lord Lieutenant and Subsection 2 makes the office non-political. The Lord Lieutenant will no longer be a member of the Imperial Ministry changing as Governments change at Westminster. His will be a non-political appointment for a fixed period of six years. This change, it should be noted, marks the surrender by the Imperial Parliament of control of Irish affairs. So long- as the Imperial Government was responsible for Irish affairs, it was not out of place that one of their Members should occupy the office of Lord Lieutenant, in order to secure that the adminis- tration in Ireland should be conducted in accordance with the views of the Government at Westminster ; but this arrangement goes as Ireland is given self-government. The salary of the Lord Lieutenant, £20,000 a year, has always been the object of much criticism on the part of the Irish Home Rulers who have instanced it as an example of the extrava- gance of Irish administration. The matter is dealt with by Subsection 3 of the Clause. The Home Rulers' objections are met by the provisions which reduce the charge on the Irish Parliament to £5,000 a year ; but with characteristic lack of directness it is left open for the Imperial Parliament to fix the amount of the Lord Lieutenant's salary and expenses. This sum might be fixed b)^ the Imperial Parliament at £-4,000 a year, in which case the Imperial Treasury would benefit to the extent of £1,000 a year. On the other hand, in reading the Clause, the distinct impression is left that it is the intention of the Government not to limit the amount to £5,000 a year, but only to regard that amount as a contribution from the Irish Parliament towards the 10 The Lord Lieutenant -continued. salary and expenses of the Lord Lieutenant. What amount that may be is n.ot stated ; but if it were the intention to limit it to £5,000 a year, there would be no need for those remarkable words in the Clause, " the salary and expenses of the Lord Lieu- tenant shall be paid out of the monies provided by the Parliament of the United Kingdom." Why should the Parliament of the United Kingdom be responsible for the salary and expenses of the Lord Lieutenant ? The provision is against precedent in our self-governing constitutions. The salaries of Governors of Colonies enjoying responsible government are in every case paid by the Colonies. The Parliament of the United Kingdom is not responsible for the salary of the Governor-General of Canada or of the Governor-General of the Australian Commonwealth, and so on. Also in each case the amount is provided by a per- manent Act, and not voted annually. Li this case the amoimt is indefinite, and has to be voted annually by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The provision placing on the United Kingdom Parliament the responsibility for the payment of the salary of the Lord Lieu- tenant approximates to the provision in the British North America Act which places the salaries of the Lieutenant-Governors of the Provinces on the Parliament of Canada. They are fixed and provided by the Dominion Parliament. While in this respect the Lord Lieutenant is in the position of a Lieutenant-Governor, he is not so in respect of his appointment, for he is appointed by His Majesty, whereas the Lieutenant-Governors are appointed by the Governor-General. This provision well illustrates the confusion which runs throughoat the Bill. The Government cannot make up their minds whether Ireland, under the Home Rule Bill, is to occupy the position of a self-governing Dominion or only the more subordinate position of a Province. Conse- quently we find throughout the Bill, as we do in respect of this Clause, that some of the provisions lead to the conclusion that Ireland is to be as Canada or Australia ; and others that she is oiily to occupy the less important position of Manitoba or Ontario. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. Form L9-Spries -1939 UN IV