George Davidson 1825-1911 
 
x^<* 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 ^ 
 
 THE TRUE METHOD OF /REACHING CONCERTED ACTION AND OF* FIND- 
 
 '" 
 
 ING t THE WILL OF A CONCURRING MAJORITY IN THE 
 . ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
 ^ THE PEOPLE. 
 
 THE REMEDY FOR THE EVILS OF THE DELEGATE SYSTEM AND THE 
 l\ EVILS OF PERMANENT PARTY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 THE CIVIL SERVICE EVIL AND ITS REMEDY. 
 
 BY 
 
 THOMAS D. INGRAM, M. D. 
 
 WEST CHESTER, PA.: 
 F. S. HICKMAN, PRINTER, COR. GAY AND CHURCH STREETS. 
 
 1884. 
 
j 
 
 Copyright, 1884, by THOMAS D. INGBAM, M. D. 
 
 (All rights reserved.} 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The following pages are intended to show the force and applica- 
 tion of a method of direct voting, by which the people of a free 
 government may at once reach concerted action in the election of 
 their representatives. 
 
 It requires but a superficial examination by any one familiar with 
 the present methods of selecting our government officials, to dis- 
 cover that a large proportion of the corrupt political practices de- 
 basing our government at its every phase, are to be found in the 
 method of making party nominations, by submitting to a series of 
 delegatings, to caucuses, conventions, conferences and so on ; and, 
 that they still further result from our submission to a government 
 conducted by and wholly emanating from the one or the other of 
 two great permanent parties, into which the people are divided. 
 
 Recognizing that delegates may disregard their instructions, or, 
 may barter away their votes for personal ends, I asked myself the 
 question : Why may not the instructions given to delegates, pro- 
 viding them with successive choices among the candidates so that 
 they may finally reach concerted action, be placed upon paper, and 
 a count from these papers when collected, in imitation of the re- 
 peated ballotings of a convention of delegates, be made to take the 
 place of these delegates meeting in a convention. And then, the 
 further question : If the instructions of a district intended for a 
 delegate, may tkus be placed upon a paper from which they may 
 be counted, why not have each individual voter cast his own com- 
 plete instructions as his vote, and thus have every election decided 
 by the whole body of voters concerned, at one direct election. 
 
IV 
 
 The answers to these queries were satisfactory and complete ; 
 and, when formulated, show that if each voter will name upon his 
 ticket not only his first choice among the candidates in the field, 
 but, provisionally name such succeeding choices to whom he would 
 be willing to yield in order to reach concerted action with his 
 fellows, the voters throughout would thus provide the means or the 
 returns, from which by a simple count, may be determined the can- 
 didate upon whom a majority of the whole number of voters have 
 first concurred. 
 
 This method of reaching concerted action and of finding the 
 candidate upon whom a majority of the whole body of voters will 
 first concur, by one direct election, at once made it evident that 
 submission to the delegate system was no longer necessary. And 
 still further, because by this method of direct voting a final election 
 can be made from among three or more candidates, with as full an 
 opportunity for the whole body of voters to reach a concurring 
 majority as when the candidates have been reduced to two, having 
 each of these the candidate of an organized party, the party 
 method of government, or, having the people divided into two 
 permanently opposing party organizations, was also proven to be 
 unnecessary. 
 
 In other words, it will be shown that the people of a free govern- 
 ment may select their representatives to fill any official position 
 whatsoever, at one direct election by the whole number of voters 
 concerned, reaching concerted action and determining the candi- 
 date upon whom a majority of their whole number will first concur, 
 without resorting to delegates, or, submitting to permanent party 
 organization in any form or manner. 
 
 Since the general enlightenment of the people, and the many and 
 complete means of conveying intelligence to one another and to 
 all parts of the country, have made them so generally familiar with 
 the issues before the country, and equally familiar with the leading 
 men in governmental affairs, it can no longer be argued that dele- 
 gating would secure superior wisdom in making a selection of those 
 
best fitted to fill our public offices. Nor can it well be shown that 
 permanent party organizations are needed to point out or establish 
 great truths or principles for the people to defend. But, when 
 once the people have reclaimed and established their right to select 
 their own representatives, by the proposed method of direct elec- 
 tions, it may well be assumed that an honest and patriotic use of 
 the public press, and other means of extending general information 
 among the people, will still further enlighten them upon their duties 
 as sovereigns of a great country, and with the responsibilities ac- 
 companying the use of the elective franchise. 
 
 After it has been shown that this method of direct voting affords 
 the only true means of reaching concerted action, and that it solves 
 with mathematical exactness the problem of finding upon whom a 
 majority of the WHOLE NUMBER OF VOTERS will first concur, it will 
 still remain as a part of the purpose of these pages, to point out at 
 least some of the more prominent evils connected with the system 
 of delegating in making party nominations, and as a method of 
 electing men to office ; and also, some of the evils resulting from 
 our submission to permanent party organizations among us. 
 
 My aim will be to show, that, by delegating the right to elect men 
 to office, to a few men, we afford professional office seekers the op- 
 portunity to autocratically secure for themselves the offices of the 
 government; and to show further, that this system of delegating is 
 not only unnecessary but dangerous, that submitting to permanently 
 organized political parties in conducting our government is un- 
 natural and unnecessary, and that it is dangerously opposed to the 
 existence and continuation of political freedom among us. 
 
 Believing these propositions to be established beyond question, 
 I confidently urge that committees of individuals, and that schools 
 both public and private should take up the purely philosophical 
 problem herein proposed ; examine into its nature and significance, 
 familiarize themselves with its workings, and teach its truths to the 
 masses of freemen and to their children throughout the land. 
 
 In the greatest sincerity, I further recommend that local or 
 
VI 
 
 corporate organizations of men, and, that communities in conduct- 
 ing their local governments should at once adopt the proposed 
 method of direct voting in the election of all their officers. And 
 that it should be early adopted by the people in conducting their 
 municipal governments ; in the election of all elective officers, and 
 in deciding every issue or question where a choice is to be made 
 from among three or more propositions. 
 
 And still further, I hope to see it soon adopted by the people of 
 the States and Nation, and finally, that our National Constitution 
 shall be so amended, that the methods it directs for .the election of 
 the highest officers of our government, shall be made to conform to 
 the true spirit of popular rule. 
 
 Let no one hastily assume to pronounce, that, although the pro- 
 posed method of direct voting may be right, its introduction is an 
 impracticable scheme. The primary question is, whether it is right. 
 That which is right is always practicable, and may be very readily 
 introduced where the right is respected. 
 
 Respectfully, 
 
 THOS. D. INGRAM, M. D. 
 
 WEST CHESTER, PA., May, 1884. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEK I. INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE STRUCTURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The basis of monarchical or autocratic rule contrasted with the principles of 
 a free government, 1 The importance of establishing the true significance of 
 political freedom, 2 Political freedom defined, 2 The sentiments or convic- 
 tions which arouse the desire for political liberty, 4 The conditions necessary 
 to establish a free government, 4 When these sentiments and conditions exist 
 among men they are impelled to demand political liberty, 4 The evils de- 
 fended under the plea of conservatism, 5 A Free Government is instituted 
 for mutual protection and not for production, 5 Government is a structure in 
 action, and the methods adopted for conducting it are as important as the 
 principles it aims to defend, 6 The people of a Free Government have less 
 use for a " Bill of Eights," than they have for a sure and equitable method of 
 expressing the popular will, 6 Ours, a representative form of free govern- 
 ment, 6 The will of a concurring majority must be acceded to in the selection 
 of representatives, 7 A true method of finding the will of a concurring ma- 
 jority, the only safe defence of equal political rights, 7. 
 
 CHAPTEK II. 
 
 THE TRUE METHOD OF REACHING CONCERTED ACTION, AND OF FINDING THE 
 WILL OF A CONCURRING MAJORITY. 
 
 In conducting an election, if only two candidates are to be selected from, the 
 problem is simple, 8 But, when more than two candidates are to be selected 
 from, the problem becomes more complex, 8 The conditions which this more 
 complex problem presents ; and the necessity which demands that some voters 
 must yield and support a second choice in order to concur with their fellows, 
 8 A method of voting directly for the candidates, which provides the voters 
 a means of reaching concerted action, and which affords the basis for a true 
 solution of the problem of finding upon whom a majority of the whole number 
 of voters will first concur, 9 This method of voting illustrated, 9 The tally 
 sheet or the returns from an election illustrated, 10 The method of summing 
 up the returns from an election illustrated, and the significance of this truthful 
 
VIII 
 
 method of finding the candidate upon whom a majority will first concur, set 
 forth, 11 The method applicable to any number of voters whether in a con- 
 vened body or widely scattered, 11 And applicable to any number of candi- 
 dates, or, to the selection of one from three or more propositions, 12 This 
 method of voting would make it possible to conduct a purely democratic form 
 of government, 12 Its great significance in the selection of representatives of 
 the people by a direct vote of the whole body of voters to be represented, 12 
 The proposed method of a single direct election compared with the present 
 complex method of selecting our official representatives, 12 The requirements 
 of the present method made use of in determining who shall fill an official 
 place, 12 Reasons for the origin and development of the existing complex 
 method, 13 The proposed method of finding the will of a majority compared 
 with its attempted solution by the trial ballotings of a convention, 13 The 
 first ballot of a convention of delegates compared to the primary result by the 
 direct method of voting, 14 The difficulties attending a delegates' making a 
 second choice in order to reach a concurrence with his fellows, 14 The pur- 
 poses for which an individual voter will name a second choice upon his ticket, 
 14 The repeated ballotings of a convention often a mere test of the delegates' 
 endurance, 15 When a delegate adopts a second choice and thus adds his sup- 
 port to those who had before made this candidate their first choice, it has the same 
 significance as when the number of individual voters making a candidate their 
 second choice, are added to those who had before made him their first choice, 
 by the proposed method of direct voting, 15 The trial ballotings of a conven- 
 tion resemble a game of chance, 15 Arbitrary rules adopted by conventions 
 to modify the evils of repeated ballotings, manifestly unfair, 16 The trial 
 ballotings of a convention illogical and uncertain, delegating and redelegat- 
 ing the party voice, the source of evil and of political corruption, 16 The di- 
 vision of the people into permanently opposing political parties unnatural, 
 and the source of danger to our free institutions, 17 Apparent objections to 
 the working of the proposed method of direct voting, anticipated and answered, 
 17 The supposition that a formidable number of candidates will be voted for, 
 unfounded, 17 The fear that but few of the voters will name a second choice, 
 unfounded, 18 Eeasons why many voters will name provisional choices, 18 
 Principles which will guide a voter in naming succeeding choices, 18 Further 
 directions for the summing up of the returns and final solution of the problem 
 in all contingencies, 19 Examples where the actual working of the proposed 
 method of voting has been exhibited, 20 These modest examples exhibit the 
 same problem as that presented in the election of any officer from a town con- 
 stable to the President of the United States, 24 The universal application of 
 this method of solving the problem where a choice is to be made from among 
 three or more persons, or, where a choice is to be made from three or more 
 propositions of things, whatsoever, 24 The adoption of the proposed method 
 of voting would avoid the uncertainties of trial ballotings, the evils of dele- 
 gating, and the corrupt practices of permanent party organizations, 24 It is 
 the universal weapon for the defence of political freedom, 25. 
 
IX 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE ILLOGICAL NATURE, AND THE EVILS ATTENDING THE PRESENT METHOD 
 
 OF REACHING CONCERTED ACTION AND OF FINDING THE 
 
 WILL OF A MAJORITY. 
 
 Permanently opposing party organizations, limited to two, dividing the 
 people of a free government, shown to have no natural or just existence, 26 
 Party organizations continuing to exist after the original purpose of their 
 harmonizing has been accomplished, are opposed to our original compact of 
 National unity, 27 A Party organization becomes permanent in order to con- 
 duct the delegate system, in making the party nominations, 28 Other reasons 
 for permanency of organization, 28 The Evils of the Delegate System, 29 
 The purpose of the delegate method in determining upon a party candidate, 
 29 Why this method of finding the will of a majority of the whole number 
 of voters is illogical and uncertain in its results, 30 Primary delegates 
 represent but added majorities, or often, but added pluralities of the whole 
 number of party voters, 30 State or National delegates need represent but 
 one-fourth of the party voters, and a nomination may be determined by delegates 
 representing the concerted action of but one-eighth of the party voters, 31 
 Taking advantage of these possibilities affords a corrupt means of securing office, 
 31 The system of delegating and re-delegating has no relationship to the 
 principle forming the basis of a representative government, 32 Because the 
 delegate system is illogical, and because it is so complex, it affords the oppor- 
 tunities for the practice of innumerable political evils, 32 It affords party 
 officers, and party managers, and office-seekers an opportunity to control the 
 party nominations, 33 Methods by which a few party managers determine the 
 delegates and thus pervert the will of the people, 33 The corrupt bargainings 
 of office-seekers and party managers in delegate conventions, in caucuses and 
 conferences, and in secret committees, 34 The repeated ballotings of a con- 
 vention of delegates much like the rehearsal of a farce, while their final de- 
 cision has much the nature of the result of a game of chance, 35 The uncer- 
 tainty, and the farcical nature of the repeated ballotings of a convened body 
 exhibited in the election of United States Senators, 35 Recapitulation of the 
 reasons why the delegate system is illogical and uncertain in its results, 36 A 
 review of the opportunities afforded for corrupt political practices, and of 
 some of the evils attending the use of this illogical system in making party 
 nominations, 37 The seeming paradox, why so many intelligent voters should 
 submit to this delegate system, and yet, for themselves take no part in it, 38 
 Their " apathy" frequently rebuked by superficial political philosophers, 39 
 The long habit of not thinking the delegate system to be wrong has given it the 
 superficial appearance of being right, 39 The organizing of Vigilant Com- 
 mittees and their attempts at " political reform" fruitless, for want of concerted 
 action between sufficient numbers, and, because they have known of no means 
 whereby large numbers of voters may reach concerted action except by dele- 
 gating, 40 Reasons why any and every attempt at " Political Reform" must 
 fail so long as the people submit to delegating, 41 The only remedy for these 
 evils to be found in the true method of reaching concerted action, and of find- 
 ing the will of a concurring majority by one direct vote of the whole people, 42. 
 
CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 THE EVILS OF PERMANENT PARTY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 Party organization may be the best, and may often be the only successful 
 means of reaching concerted action in advancing a great public cause, but, by 
 being permanently organized it may become as dangerous a power for evil as it 
 was primarily a power for good, 44 Permanent party organization is opposed 
 to the spirit of compact forming the basis of our government, and is prejudicial 
 to the best interests of the whole people, 45 Opposing political parties in a 
 limited monarchy are natural, there, they represent a continual contest between 
 the desire for freedom, on the one hand, and the defence of monarchy on the 
 other, between the rights of the masses, and the oppression of an aristocracy, 
 45 There can be no permanent contest among the people of a free country, 
 46 Permanent parties among a free people destroy the loyalty and love due 
 to their country, and develop a contest for power, 46 Permanent party 
 organization has substituted a love of party for love of country, 47 Perma- 
 nent party organizations contesting for power have made "spoils" and plunder 
 out of the public offices, and out of every form of government patronage or 
 favor, 47 The great contests for party favor at the party primaries or delegate 
 elections, 48 Party platforms very often but mere platitudes, or schemes to 
 enlist the unwary, 48 Party success and the party name become the watch- 
 words of office-seekers, 48 Permanent party organizations arouse prejudices 
 and jealousies which affect the social and business associations of the whole 
 people, 48 Party organizations from their inherent evils, finally fall by 
 revolution, 49 But, the same pitfalls as before await the organizing of a new 
 party, 49 The contests for power between two opposing political parties have 
 made much of the history of our government, 49 The party in power the one 
 enjoying the fruit of a mere contest for spoils, 50 Submission to party govern- 
 ment, a government emanating from a majority of the office-holders of the 
 dominant party, 50 The decision of a party caucus final, 50 The election of 
 all officers determined by party caucus, and all legislation must submit to the 
 decision of a caucus by the dominant party, 50 Legislation is impeded, and, 
 when one branch of a legislature is dominated by one party and the other 
 branch by the other party, important legislation may be lost, 51 In State 
 Legislatures thus composed, entrusted with the election of United States 
 Senators and with the apportionments of the state, political " dead-locks" en- 
 sue, 51 Every issue in every department or division of the government is 
 made to have a partisan signification, and every question is made to yield a 
 share of " spoils" for partisan purposes, 51 The contests for place within the 
 party, and the opportunities to manipulate the delegate system, the scene of 
 the greatest- personal strivings for office, 52 Office-seekers become party 
 managers and manipulators of the delegate system, 52 How a United States 
 Senator becomes the great party " boss," and how a few United States Senators 
 become a great oligarchy of power in the management of the party, 52 The 
 power of a United States Senator to secure his own reelection, 53 The power 
 of a few United States Senators in determining the party presidential candi- 
 date, 53 The right claimed by these United States Senators, through " sena- 
 
XI 
 
 torial courtesy," to dispose of the great appointments to office and other 
 executive favors, 54 The offices of the government filled by appointment, used 
 as "spoils" and made to purchase a control of those intended to be elective, 
 54 The community of purpose among office-seekers, and their combining to 
 contribute to each other's success, 54 Party managers and party leaders avoid 
 new issues because they disintegrate the party, "Fealty to party" their watch- 
 word, and party glamour and excitement their best hope for personal success, 
 55 All office-holding is afforded an autocratic significance, and office-seeking 
 becomes a life-long profession, because a few men are entrusted with the power 
 to nominate, or, in other cases to finally elect to office, and because these few 
 men may too often be purchased with money or with political favors, 55 
 Our government shown to be an oppressive autocracy, 56 The evils of per- 
 manent party organization and the evils of the delegate system recounted in 
 order to make plain their remedy, 57 Gen. Washington's farewell address, 
 warning the people of the evils sure to result from party organizations in a 
 free government, 57 The dangers from permanent parties characterized by 
 geographical discriminations realized, and the evils resulting from them expe- 
 rienced, 59 Gen. Washington's warnings "against the baneful effects 
 of the spirit of party generally," 60 Political parties permanently de- 
 fending the rights of the people in a monarchical government, natu- 
 ral and defensible, 61 Had the people of this government known how to 
 reach concerted action without submitting to delegates, the evils of delegating 
 and of permanent party organizations, would have been averted, 61 Our 
 government grown cumbersome, and extravagant from submission to the auto- 
 cratic rule of office-seekers, 62 The high hopes of a free government enter- 
 tained by our fathers, not realized, 62 The efforts of the people aiming at po- 
 litical reform have proven fruitless, because they have not removed the cause 
 of the evils ; because they have not known how to avoid delegating, and how 
 to avoid permanent party organizations, as means of reaching concerted ac- 
 tion, 62 To teach the true means of reaching concerted action, and the true 
 method of finding the will of a majority of the whole people in selecting their 
 representatives throughout, the aim and purpose of this work, 63. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE 
 
 ELECTED AT ONE DIRECT ELECTION BY THE 
 
 WHOLE PEOPLE. 
 
 AND, 
 
 UNITED STATES SENATORS SHOULD BE ELECTED AT ONE DIRECT ELECTION 
 BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE. 
 
 Considerations to be regarded in proposing amendments to our National 
 Constitution, 64 The methods directed by the Constitution for the election of 
 the superior officers of the government shown to have been the result of com- 
 promise, 64 Evidence that this nation of people recognize in themselves the 
 only true source of all governmental authority, 65 Notes from Bancroft's 
 History of the Constitution, 65 The Virginia plan of electing an evecutive, 
 
XII 
 
 and of electing United States Senators, 65 James Wilson, the earnest defen- 
 der of the people's right to rule, 66 The mode of electing a President a per- 
 plexing problem, which long baffled the convention, 68 Foremost in undi- 
 minished disapproval of the choice of the executive by the legislature were 
 Washington, Madison, Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Gerry, 70 Wilson's 
 difficulty in finding a satisfactory plan for electing the President, 71 Final 
 submission to an election by electors meeting in their respective States, and, 
 in case of a majority not concurring, the eventual choice to be decided by the 
 House of Representatives, voting by States, 72 Evidence that the most patri- 
 otic members of the convention desired to establish a government with its of- 
 ficial representatives elected directly by the people, 72 Because these true 
 patriots knew of no method by which the whole body of voters could reach 
 concerted action, they were forced to submit to a plan of delegating the power 
 to elect men to office to a few men, 72 Evidence that they submitted to the 
 method of delegating from necessity and not from choice, 73 Electors en- 
 trusted with the election of a President, and State Legislators entrusted with 
 the election of United States Senators recognized by the people as having only 
 the significance of delegates, 73 Electors are not permitted to determine upon 
 a President by their own choice, but are instructed with a precise trust, 73 
 Because electors meeting in separate state colleges or conventions, at once lost 
 all significance toward reaching concerted action, this duty has been trans- 
 ferred to party nominating conventions, 74 How voting for electors, since 
 the adoption of the general ticket system emphasizes the evils of the " unit 
 rule," 75 How it is possible for a minority of the voters of the country to 
 elect a President in defiance of an opposing majority, 75 The evils of the 
 electoral system, and its perversion by the adoption of the general ticket sys- 
 tem pointed out by Senator Ben ton and others in 1824, 75 Senator Benton's de- 
 fense of a plan of direct voting for the President and Vice-President by districts, 
 76 Eeasons why we should not entrust the election of a President to electors, 
 discussed by Benton, 77 The evils then so well pointed out as belonging to 
 the electoral system, now shown to belong to delegates meeting in nominating 
 conventions, 78 Reasons why the gratitude of a President when elected, is 
 given to the few delegates who nominated him, and not to the great mass of vo- 
 ters who elected him to office, 79 Summing up of the evils resulting from our 
 delegating to a few men the power to determine upon party candidates, 80 
 The tendency to bargain for office or favor, when nominations or elections are en- 
 trusted to a few men acting as delegates has proven to be irresistible, 80 The 
 present method of electing United States Senators illustrates the field for in- 
 triguing and corrupt office-seeking afforded by delegating the power to elect men 
 to office in its fullest extent, 81 The method directed by the constitution the re- 
 sult of a compromise, 81 Why it was accepted by the patriotic members of the 
 convention quite irreconcilable, 81 The method defended by the few men hold- 
 ing the offices of State legislators, for selfish purposes, 82 The same personal in- 
 terests the source of the doctrine of " States' Rights," 82 The method urged as a 
 means of defending " aristocratic interests " because it afforded the opportu- 
 nity of retaining power in the hands of the few, 82 James Wilson's pure and 
 patriotic arguments against these doctrines, 83 The people now attempt to 
 
XIII 
 
 instruct their State legislators who to support for the United States Senator- 
 ship, 84 The evils resulting from electing United States Senators by dele- 
 gated authority graver than the evils of delegating in making party nomina- 
 tions, 84 The various series of delegatings joined together in one great com- 
 plex political machine under the control of party managers and party lead- 
 ers, 85 The power of a United States Senator to secure his own re-election 
 determines him as the great party " boss," 85 Conclusive evidence that the 
 language and intent of the Constitution is no longer respected by the people, 
 while the submission to a perverted interpretation of its directions has simply 
 served to complicate and increase the evils of delegating, 86 The remedy for 
 the evils resulting from delegating to be found in the proposed method of 
 direct voting, 87 Amendments of the Constitution proposed which will at 
 once establish for us a Representative Government truthfully emanating from 
 the people's will, 87. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE CIVIL SERVICE EVIL AND ITS REMEDY. 
 
 Why the large number of officers employed in the executive branch of the 
 government may not be elected directly by the people, 88 The method direct- 
 ed by the Constitution for their appointment, 88 The minor grades of these 
 officers known as the civil service of the country, 89 The use made of the 
 appointing power has given rise to the civil service question, 89 The power 
 of appointing men to office made one of the " spoils" of party government, 89 
 Other " spoils" of the party in power, 89 The corrupt use made of the ap- 
 pointing power, 89 Promises of appointments to office exchanged for political 
 services in controlling party nominations, and for aiding in securing an election 
 to office, 89 This corrupt traffic the real civil service evil, 90 Other results of the 
 evil, 90 Removals from office, Political assessments, etc., 90 Why this 
 traffic between the candidates for elective offices, and those seeking offices by 
 appointment is corrupt, 91 Why office-holding throughout is in no way ac- 
 countable to the people, 92 Our government controlled by the few crafty 
 enough to secure its official places, 92 The civil service evil but an outgrowth 
 of the evils of delegating and of permanent party organizations, 92 The 
 motive or consideration influencing the appointing powers but one part of the 
 corrupt contract, 93 Why controlling nominations and deceiving the people 
 in the election of their higher officers is the graver evil, and, is the cause of 
 corruption in making appointments, 93 The importance of applying the 
 remedy to the cause of an evil, 93 The Act of Congress, entitled " An Act to 
 regulate and improve the civil service of the United States" an attempt to re- 
 lieve the servile allegiance of the minor or appointed officers to their superiors, 
 93 Why legislation against the results of the evil, and allowing the cause to 
 continue, will not stop the corrupt traffic in the offices of the government, 94 
 Reasons why competitive examinations should be conducted under the direc- 
 tion of the superior officer in charge of the department or branch wherein the 
 appointments are to be made, 95 Why the recently adopted method will in- 
 vite insubordination, and a want of proper accountability from the minor 
 
XIV 
 
 officers to their superiors, 95 The argument, that, by substituting a commis- 
 sion of examiners, the plan will relieve the President and members of Congress, 
 and others of much distasteful work in finding places for their constituents 
 based upon a half told truth, 96 What evidence can be shown that this com- 
 mission and its examiners will not in time conduct the same traffic in the 
 offices of the government, as that which has heretofore existed, 98 This pro- 
 posed means of reform, but a transfer of certain duties from the higher elective 
 officers, to an appointed commission, 98 Why the warning of penalties and 
 punishments will not correct the moral turpitude of office-holders, 98 Elective 
 office-holders have other means of repaying party-workers, 99 Civil Service 
 Keform cannot be secured by legislative enactments until legislators and 
 the Chief Executive of the nation are made truly accountable to the 
 people, 99 The management of governmental affairs compared to the suc- 
 cessful management of corporate enterprises among men, 99 To successfully 
 conduct a free government requires the same guarded accountability from 
 its officers to the people, 100 The want of proper accountability due 
 from elective officers, traced to our methods of electing, 100 True Civil 
 Service Reform can only come when our elective officers are made 
 truthfully accountable to the people for their election, 100 With the 
 adoption of the proposed method of direct elections, new men, with new 
 principles will be selected as our first servants in the high elective offices, 
 101 These officers will then be made truthfully accountable to the people, 101 
 Men appointed to the subordinate or minor offices will then be made properly 
 accountable to their superiors, 102 No form of "spoils" will then be of 
 value in purchasing an election to office, 102 There will then be no need of 
 laws to prevent the higher or elective officers from corruptly using the ap- 
 pointing power, 103 Laws to restrain the officers entrusted with the law- 
 making powers from evil and corrupt schemes of self aggrandizement will not 
 then be needed, 103 The proposed method of direct elections shown to be the 
 true remedy for the civil service evil and its resulting corruption, 103 Final 
 summing up of the specific evils which will be removed, and of the true prin- 
 ciples which will be established by the adoption of the proposed method of 
 conducting a government truthfully emanating from the people's will, 104. 
 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE STRUCTURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The basis of every grade of monarchical or of autocratic 
 rule is the submission of the many, to the rule of a few indi- 
 viduals, having either greater wealth, greater intelligence or a 
 genius for ruling ; the power of which, they use in controlling 
 the masses. A monarch alone cannot rule, but, by granting 
 extraordinary favors to a few individuals comprising an aris- 
 tocracy, he is supported and aided by these in ruling the 
 many. These few acting together, and establishing a vast 
 army of defense, which they support by taxes wrung from the 
 labor of the masses, rule over these masses and make them 
 their subjects. 
 
 In a free government, sovereignty is vested in the whole 
 people. Men are elected to office to serve the people, not to 
 rule over them. When office holders presume to be rulers of 
 the people, freedom is jeopardized. 
 
 From our not having the question, who are our rulers, ab- 
 solutely and definitely established in fact as well as in theory, 
 our government has been the scene of a constant conflict be- 
 tween men aiming to secure an autocratic power, and the 
 spirit of political freedom among the masses. 
 
 At the outset of a discussion it is often of great importance 
 to define the meaning and full significance intended to be 
 given to a subject or proposition, which is itself to be consid- 
 ered, and which is to form the basis of further elucidation and 
 defense. 
 
 Strange though it may seem, in a country that boasts of hav- 
 ing enjoyed more than a century of political freedom and sub- 
 
mission to popular rule, it is even here important to determine 
 a standard for the meaning of political freedom, and for the 
 significance of popular rule, before these terms, and their true 
 signification may be safely used as the basis or subjects of 
 further discussion. 
 
 It was the different acceptations given to the significance of 
 political freedom, even among the leaders of revolutionary 
 times, that delayed the cause of freedom in its struggles against 
 monarchical rule and oppression. It was the wide difference 
 given to the significance of political freedom, that delayed the 
 more complete establishment of our national government, 
 even after the right to liberty had been secured by a long and 
 unequal warfare waged in its defense. It was largely from a 
 difference in the accepted signification given to political 
 freedom and to the right of the people to rule, that our national 
 constitution became a compromise upon questions closely con- 
 cerning our national existence, and upon methods of conduct- 
 ing a national government, which may yet be shown to be of 
 vital concern to the equal rights of men. 
 
 There has been ever since, and there is to-day, a wide dif- 
 ference in the accepted significance of political freedom, or 
 submission to popular rule. So wide indeed, does this differ- 
 ence remain, that selfish though successful politicians among 
 us, greatly enjoy to taunt those who seek to establish political 
 freedom in its fullest sense, and to uphold submission to popu- 
 lar rule in its literal and just signification, as being political 
 dreamers, and searchers after a Utopia. 
 
 This wide range of signification has not by any means been 
 more the result of ignorance of the true meaning of political 
 freedom, or of the enjoyment of civil liberty, than, like many 
 other propositions which affect the interests of men, it has re- 
 ceived a modified acceptation, varying in accordance with a 
 variety of conditions and surroundings affecting their personal 
 interests. 
 
 Political freedom, literally defined, means exemption from 
 the power and control of another. Hence, those men who de- 
 sire to wield a personal political power and control over their 
 fellows attach a modified significance to political freedom. 
 
Political freedom means fairness and equality of rights ; hence, 
 those who desire political place and power for selfish gain at- 
 tach a still further modified significance to their acceptation of 
 political freedom. Political freedom has ever been in conflict 
 with the selfish desire of men to rule over their fellows. 
 Hence, every stage of its successes has fixed a standard to 
 which a large following have submissively yielded. Political 
 freedom has, through all ages, had many able leaders and 
 eager defenders, who have made earnest efforts to secure bet- 
 ter methods for its defense and protection. 
 
 A recent writer, (Prof. Isaac L. Rice, in the N. A. Review 
 for Jan., 1883,) in reaching a definition of civil or political lib- 
 erty, as it has slowly progressed from a long contest with feu- 
 dalism and aristocratic oppression in England, has concluded 
 that: "Civil liberty is the result of the restraint exercised by 
 the sovereign people on the more powerful individuals and 
 classes of the community, preventing them from availing them- 
 selves of the excess of their power to the detriment of the 
 other classes." A definition of civil or political liberty was 
 more directly reached by the fathers of our independence, 
 when they declared these truths to be self evident : " That 
 all men are created equal ; that they are endowed by their 
 Creator with certain unalienable rights ; that among these are 
 life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure 
 these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving 
 their just powers from the consent of the governed." These 
 two definitions combined, probably give us a still more practi- 
 cal comprehension of the signification of political freedom ; 
 for while the one proclaims that it comes by right with the 
 creation of man, the other warns us that it requires a con- 
 stant contest with the selfishness and schemings of men in 
 order to secure its defense and preservation. 
 
 By those who from ignorance as well as from selfishness, 
 disdain to inquire into the causes of surrounding conditions, 
 such a review will be regarded as too " theoretical " and as 
 being of no practical importance. By others, however, who 
 recognize that subtle causes are constantly at work moulding 
 our closest surroundings, an inquiry into the true reasons for 
 
the varied significations given to political freedom, will be re- 
 garded as of the greatest practical value. 
 
 The sentiment or convictions which arouse the desire for 
 civil liberty, and the right to establish a free government, can 
 only come with the advanced degrees of civilization and en- 
 lightenment of a people. It arises in the breasts of men con- 
 scious of their own ability not only to wring from nature the 
 necessities for their own comfort and existence, but of an 
 ability to so order their own conduct in the race for life among 
 their fellows, that they shall be governed by the strictest 
 rules of fairness, and by an acknowledgment of equal social 
 and political rights to all. It requires sufficient philanthropy 
 to accept that others have not only equal rights, but that they 
 have an equal right to exercise their political wisdom and in- 
 telligence ; and, that the combined wisdom of all is superior 
 to the conclusions of a few. It requires that men shall be- 
 lieve in the final success of the right, as far as they may be 
 enabled to secure wisdom to determine upon the right, and 
 each being a factor in determining the final judgment, each 
 must have an abiding faith in the judgment of his fellows. 
 
 To found a free government demands intelligence ; for with- 
 out it, ignorance is but uncertainty, and yields to bigotry and 
 selfishness. To erect a free government demands honesty, for 
 treachery and knavery makes uncertain all that the rest may 
 stand upon, and like ignorance bows to the most selfish pur- 
 poses. To conduct a free government demands above all else, 
 that men shall own a sense of liberality, a sense of justice, and 
 an acknowledgment of political equality among their fellows. 
 These are no imaginary standards, they outline the only possible 
 conditions upon which a free government may be securely es- 
 tablished. When men find themselves possessed of this in- 
 telligence, this honesty, this liberality, and this sense of justice, 
 acknowledging the right to political equality among their fel- 
 lows, they are impelled to demand for themselves and their fel- 
 lows the right to establish and to enjoy a free government. 
 
 Freedom, and equal civil rights have been themes which 
 have stirred every noble heart and hand among every enlight- 
 ened people since the beginning of the history of mankind. 
 
These sentiments have combatted with ignorance and bigotry, 
 with dishonesty and knavery, and with the selfishness of every 
 conceivable form of monarchical, aristocratic, autocratic, and all 
 other methods of tyrannical rule which could possibly be de- 
 vised by men. The conflict still goes on, and the ingenuity of 
 selfishness and knavery only makes necessary the demand 
 that the standard of intelligence, of honesty and liberality 
 shall mount higher in order to secure surer methods for the 
 erection and defense of a government truly by the popular 
 will. 
 
 It is one of the gratuitous, as well as one of the most danger- 
 ous arguments of men, that because social and political edifices 
 are of men's construction, and must necessarily be imperfect, 
 any amount of imperfection must therefore remain unchanged 
 or unmodified, because, as they claim, " man cannot hope to 
 reach perfection." This doctrine, the outcome of men's indo- 
 lence, indifference and ignorance, has been defended by these 
 classes under the plea of conservatism. Under this same plea, 
 set up as a defense lest any innovation or change may bring 
 about injury or destruction of existing conditions, there is found 
 quite another and distinct class of more active workers, whose 
 real object is a selfish defense of conditions and surroundings, 
 which already contribute to some personal advantages for them 
 over their fellows. 
 
 Opposed to all these classes, unfortunately quite large and 
 powerful in numbers, there are still many others who, for the 
 cause of humanity, and not for personal advantages alone, seek 
 to further unravel the just laws of the universe, and find there- 
 in the basis for human structures, both social and political, 
 such as will establish for all mankind a just and equitable re- 
 lationship and protection. 
 
 It must be borne in mind that the true intent of a free gov- 
 ernment is mutual protection. In no sense is the purpose of 
 free government production ; construed to this end its con- 
 duct must soon be perverted to reward the selfishness of the 
 few. A free government, demanding proportionately equal lia- 
 bilities for its support from all its citizens, can afford no dis- 
 criminating advantages to any. As it cannot create, its duty is 
 
6 
 
 simply to protect all, so that the greatest good shall be secured 
 to the greatest number, without violating the actual rights of 
 any. 
 
 The constitution of a wisely established free government 
 depends not more upon the just principles it enunciates, than 
 upon the methods it directs for the conducting and for the 
 preservation of these principles. Government is essentially a 
 structure in action, and a government emanating from the 
 popular will must find its only safe defense in such methods of 
 selecting its official representatives throughout, as will securely 
 make those entrusted with the responsibitity of enacting and 
 executing its laws, truthfully accountable to the whole people, 
 upon whom these laws are to operate. A " Bill of Rights " in 
 a monarchical government is a concession of power from the 
 monarch for the people's protection and defence ; an arbitra- 
 ment to which 'the people may appeal, while the bill of un- 
 alienable rights, in a government whose sovereignty is the 
 popular will, is not limited to a few written texts, liable to be 
 constantly misconstrued and perverted, but remains embodied 
 in the increasing wisdom and philanthropy of an intelligent 
 people. Hence, the true means of defending the primary 
 rights to which the people originally subscribe, must largely be 
 found in that part of their constitution which directs the 
 methods of selecting their representatives, and of conducting 
 their government. 
 
 A people in possession of political liberty should not be forced 
 to be continually on the defense against encroachments of their 
 own government ; but, having secured safe and equitable 
 methods for its continuation, and for a faithful representation of 
 the popular will, should find in its enactments and in their exe- 
 cution a constant reflection of their wisest and most patriotic 
 desires. Any evils, therefore, in the methods of conducting a 
 free government, especially in the selecting of representatives 
 of the people, must weaken the basis of the structure, obstruct 
 its proper action, and bring about discredit upon the just- 
 ness of freedom itself. 
 
 It has long since been decided that ours, from necessity, must 
 be a representative form of free government ; hence, thesignifi- 
 
cance we intend to give to political freedom should be our 
 standard in selecting the people's representatives. Again, the 
 will of a concurring majority has the force of representing the 
 wisdom of the greatest number, and has long been acceded to 
 as representing the popular will. Hence, the selection by the 
 will of a concurring majority of the popular vote, of such 
 representatives as embody in their convictions the highest 
 standard of political freedom, presents the mathematical 
 problem in the conducting of our representative government. 
 This is indeed the great problem, in the true solution of which 
 is to be secured the final defense of equal political rights. 
 War may secure for us the right to liberty, but here in civil 
 methods must we be able to erect and defend our equal rights 
 among each other. The weapon in civil contests is the ballot, 
 and victory is determined by the greater number ; hence, we 
 have reached the problem which requires the finding of the 
 candidate upon whom a majority of the voters will first con- 
 cur. 
 
6 
 
 simply to protect all, so that the greatest good shall be secured 
 to the greatest number, without violating the actual rights of 
 any. 
 
 The constitution of a wisely established free government 
 depends not more upon the just principles it enunciates, than 
 upon the methods it directs for the conducting and for the 
 preservation of these principles. Government is essentially a 
 structure in action, and a government emanating from the 
 popular will must find its only safe defense in such methods of 
 selecting its official representatives throughout, as will securely 
 make those entrusted with the responsibility of enacting and 
 executing its laws, truthfully accountable to the whole people, 
 upon whom these laws are to operate. A " Bill of Rights " in 
 a monarchical government is a concession of power from the 
 monarch for the people's protection and defence ; an arbitra- 
 ment to which' the people may appeal, while the bill of un- 
 alienable rights, in a government whose sovereignty is the 
 popular will, is not limited to a few written texts, liable to be 
 constantly misconstrued and perverted, but remains embodied 
 in the increasing wisdom and philanthropy of an intelligent 
 people. Hence, the true means of defending the primary 
 rights to which the people originally subscribe, must largely be 
 found in that part of their constitution which directs the 
 methods of selecting their representatives, and of conducting 
 their government. 
 
 A people in possession of political liberty should not be forced 
 to be continually on the defense against encroachments of their 
 own government ; but, having secured safe and equitable 
 methods for its continuation, and for a faithful representation of 
 the popular will, should find in its enactments and in their exe- 
 cution a constant reflection of their wisest and most patriotic 
 desires. Any evils, therefore, in the methods of conducting a 
 free government, especially in the selecting of representatives 
 of the people, must weaken the basis of the structure, obstruct 
 its proper action, and bring about discredit upon the just- 
 ness of freedom itself. 
 
 It has long since been decided that ours, from necessity, must 
 be a representative form of free government ; hence, thesignifi- 
 
cance we intend to give to political freedom should be our 
 standard in selecting the people's representatives. Again, the 
 will of a concurring majority has the force of representing the 
 wisdom of the greatest number, and has long been acceded to 
 as representing the popular will. Hence, the selection by the 
 will of a concurring majority of the popular vote, of such 
 representatives as embody in their convictions the highest 
 standard of political freedom, presents the mathematical 
 problem in the conducting of our representative government. 
 This is indeed the great problem, in the true solution of which 
 is to be secured the final defense of equal political rights. 
 War may secure for us the right to liberty, but here in civil 
 methods must we be able to erect and defend our equal rights 
 among each other. The weapon in civil contests is the ballot, 
 and victory is determined by the greater number ; hence, we 
 have reached the problem which requires the finding of the 
 candidate upon whom a majority of the voters will first con- 
 cur. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE TRUE METHOD OF REACHING CONCERTED ACTION, AND OF FIND- 
 ING THE WILL OF A CONCURRING MAJORITY. 
 
 In a representative form of free government the sovereign 
 voters express their will in the selection of representatives. 
 These selected representatives are intended to embody the 
 principles and wishes of the district or community they are 
 entrusted to represent. 
 
 In determining upon an official representative, if only two 
 candidates are to be selected from, the concurrence of a ma- 
 jority of the voters upon one of these candidates would readily 
 be reached by a simple direct vote of the whole body of vo- 
 ters. Usually, however, several candidates, standing for va- 
 rious opinions are offered, so that a simple direct vote would 
 seldom find a majority of the voters concurring upon any one 
 of these candidates. The problem now becomes more com- 
 plex, and some provision must be made by which the voters 
 may further concur. It is unnecessary to urge, that if every 
 voter persistently supports his first choice among the candi- 
 dates, or, that without yielding one to another, the concurrence 
 of a majority upon any one candidate can never be reached. 
 
 The conditions which the problem now presents, are as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 First. There are several candidates offering for the same of- 
 fice in a given district. 
 
 Secondly. The voters of the district are divided in their 
 choice among these candidates, so that if it were left to a sim- 
 ple direct vote no candidate would be the choice of a ma- 
 jority. 
 
9 
 
 Thirdly. In order to reach concerted action or the concur- 
 rence of a majority upon one candidate, at least some of the 
 voters must yield their first choice, and support a second 
 choice among the candidates, thereby concurring with those 
 who have made this candidate their first choice. 
 
 Fourthly. Many voters have a choice among the remaining 
 candidates, and would be willing to name this second choice 
 provisionally, lest their first choice cannot be elected. For 
 instance, a voter whose first choice is A., but fearing that A. 
 cannot be elected, might be willing to concur upon B., in pref- 
 erence to permitting a more objectionable candidate being 
 elected. 
 
 Were all the voters, or even a part of the voters now, to in- 
 dicate upon their tickets not only a first choice among the 
 candidates, but a provisional or second choice and such succeed- 
 ing choices, as each voter saw fit ; and were they to deposit such 
 tickets at their various polling places, the returns, when col- 
 lected, would afford the basis for a true solution of the prob- 
 lem of finding upon whom a majority would first concur. 
 
 Let us suppose that an election is to be made in a district 
 containing 10,000 voters, of whom any number exceeding 
 5000 would be a majority. Let us suppose further, that four 
 candidates, A., B., G., and D. have been named by their re- 
 spective supporters for a position as an official representative 
 of this district. And still further let us suppose, that each can- 
 didate is the first choice of a nearly equal number of these 
 voters, or, so that by a simple direct vote, there would not be 
 the concurrence of a majority upon any one candidate. 
 
 If now each voter in the district, so disposed, should deposit 
 at his polling place a ticket, naming thereon, not only his first 
 choice among these candidates, but provisionally, his second 
 choice, and such succeeding choices as he thought necessary, 
 the returns would afford us the data for a mathematically cor- 
 rect solution of the problem. For example, one voter's ticket 
 might read : 
 
 Another's - Still ' And 
 
 ' 
 
 f' 
 1 % 
 
 Thus, ticket ? *' another's ' , another's 
 
 D. thus > IS. 3. thu8 ' \% thu8 > D. i. 
 
10 
 
 It will be perceived that each voter, by such a ticket, can 
 very fully represent his order of preference among the candi- 
 dates, and that he omits to recognize and thus opposes, an 
 objectionable candidate, by giving him no preference what- 
 ever. 
 
 Let us suppose the tally sheet, when the vote from the va- 
 rious polling places of this district, has been summed up, 
 should read as follows : 
 
 Whole 
 
 A. B. C. D. No. of Maj. 
 
 Voters. 
 
 As 1st choice 2500 3000 2200 2300 10,000 5001 
 
 As 2d choice, .... 4000 1500 500 200 
 
 New relative concurring) 
 
 support, / 6500 4500 2700 2500 
 
 In other words, the returns would show that 2500 voters 
 had made A. their first choice, that 3000 voters had made B. 
 their first choice, that 2200 voters had made G. their first 
 choice, and that the remaining 2300 voters had made D. their 
 first choice; corresponding exactly with the result, had there 
 been only a simple direct vote made, where each voter names 
 only his first choice among the candidates. 
 
 But no candidate has thus received the support of a ma- 
 jority of the whole number of voters, and we must make use 
 of the willingness of some voters to yield, as indicated by their 
 naming a provisional or second choice upon their tickets. 
 
 By reference to the tally sheet again, it will be seen that 4000 
 voters, other than those who had named A. as their first choice, 
 now make him their second choice. Or, as these voters had 
 made either B., G., or D. their first choice, but now make A. 
 their second choice, they have indicated their willingness to 
 concur with the 2500 voters who have already made A. their 
 first choice, or, together they number 6500 voters who would 
 now concur upon A. At the same time the record shows that 
 1500 voters, other than those who had made B. their first 
 choice, are now willing to make B. their second choice, or, in 
 other words, that they are willing to concur with the 3000 
 voters who have before made B. their first choice. These 
 numbers together make B.'s new concurring support reach 
 
11 
 
 4500. In the same manner it will be seen that 500 voters, 
 other than those who had made G. their first choice, now make 
 him their second choice, and that this number added to the 
 2200, who have already made him their first choice, now make 
 his concurring support number 2700. And from the figures 
 it may also be readily seen that the new concurring support of 
 D. reaches 2500 of the voters. 
 
 It is evident that the concurring support of each candidate 
 has now a relative significance only, and does not represent 
 distinct bodies of men standing apart for each individual can- 
 didate. For there are, in truth, a large number of voters who. 
 are represented variously in some two of these numbers. 
 These voters having provisionally yielded and named a second 
 choice, in order to reach concerted action, and thus find the 
 candidate upon whom a majority will first concur, have still 
 remained in the support of their first choice. Actually, these 
 voters have given their support to either of these two candi- 
 dates, in opposition to any other one contesting for the place, 
 but now they make no choice between the two candidates 
 they have thus named. These final numbers, therefore, have 
 the true significance, of comparing the concurring support of 
 one candidate with that of any other candidate successively, 
 and show a relative rather than a distinct support. But they 
 truthfully determine the candidate upon whom a majority of 
 the voters have first concurred. 
 
 As the concurring support of A. alone has reached a ma- 
 jority of the whole number of voters, it is evident that he is 
 the candidate upon whom a majority have first concurred, and 
 that the problem has been solved. 
 
 This is a simple presentation of the true means of reaching 
 concerted action, and of solving the problem of finding upon 
 whom a majority of the voters will first concur. 
 
 It is a method equally applicable to any number of voters. 
 It is applicable to those of the smallest district having such a 
 problem to decide, and equally applicable to the election of a 
 President of the United States by a direct vote of the whole 
 people. It is applicable wherever three or more candidates 
 are to be selected from, and equally applicable, no matter how 
 
12 
 
 many candidates are in the field ; and thus affords the voters 
 an opportunity to find from among any number of candidates, 
 the one upon whom a majority will first concur. 
 
 It affords a mathematically correct solution of a similar prob- 
 lem, presented when one of three or more propositions is to 
 be determined upon by any convened body, or by any num- 
 ber of persons, however near or far they may be separated 
 from each other. In short, by this method of reaching con- 
 certed action and of finding the will of a concurring ma- 
 jority, it is possible to conduct a purely democratic form of 
 government, were such a plan desirable. Thus, it is possible 
 to have every citizen take a direct part in determining every 
 issue, in framing every law, and in directing every matter with 
 which their government may be concerned. No odds how 
 great the number of its citizens, or how widely separated they 
 may be from each other. 
 
 In a representative form of free government, however, this 
 problem has the greatest significance in making it not only 
 possible, but absolutely right that every official representative 
 of the people, who should be accountable directly to the peo- 
 ple, should be selected by a direct vote of the whole body of 
 citizens he is to represent. 
 
 Let us briefly compare this mathematically correct method of 
 finding the will of a concurring majority, with the method now 
 made use of in conducting our government. 
 
 The present method of determining who shall fill an official 
 place, requires, that the voters of the country shall be divided 
 into tivo permanently opposing political parties. 
 
 It requires, that each party shall determine upon a party 
 candidate by means of a preceding or party primary election. 
 
 It requires, that the voters of the party shall vote for dele- 
 gates, and in the case of State or National officers, that these 
 delegates shall again vote for another series of delegates, and 
 so on. 
 
 It requires, that these delegates shall meet in conventions, 
 and that there, by repeated or trial ballotings, shall finally de- 
 termine upon a party candidate. 
 
 It requires, that the party voters shall accept these party 
 
13 
 
 candidates, so determined upon, and that the voters of the dis- 
 trict to be represented shall make the contest between these 
 two candidates, so placed before them. The final voting being 
 merely a test of party strength. 
 
 In the first place, the attempt to solve the problem of finding 
 the will of a concurring majority, has required the people to di- 
 vide into two permanent party organizations, becaus^, hereto- 
 fore, a final direct vote by the whole mass of voters, would not 
 with any certainty secure a concurring majority, unless the 
 candidates were reduced to two, having each of these the rep- 
 resentative of a permanent party organization. 
 
 In the second place, each political party has adopted the 
 delegate system as a method of determining upon a party can- 
 didate, because, there has heretofore been no known means by 
 which a large number of voters widely scattered, could act 
 concertedly or reach the concurrence of a majority, except by 
 reducing the number of voters by some accepted ratio, so that 
 these voters as delegates, could practically meet together in a 
 convention. 
 
 In the third place when these delegates elected by the people, 
 or delegates re-delegated meet in convention, there has been no 
 known means of reaching the will of a concurring majority 
 except by repeated trials, or repeated ballotings. 
 
 Compared with this exceedingly complex procedure, the 
 proposed method of finding the candidate upon whom a ma- 
 jority of the whole mass of voters will first concur, requires 
 but a single direct election. The voter casts a single ballot, 
 but simply expresses thereon besides his first choice, succeed- 
 ing provisional choices among the candidates, in order to pro- 
 vide for concerted action with his fellows, and in order that a 
 majority may finally concur ; and further, that he may have a 
 voice in that concurring majority. 
 
 The counting up of the returns from an election conducted 
 by the proposed method of finding the will of a majority, may 
 very properly be compared to the trial ballotings of a conven- 
 tion of delegates, intended to determine the same problem. 
 Taking the same district as before, and supposing its 10,000 
 voters to be diminished to 100 delegates, or, the number of 
 
14 
 
 voters reduced in the ratio of 100 to 1, and these 100 dele- 
 gates to be assembled in convention ; the first ballot of the 
 convention should correspond exactly, or in the same ratio, to 
 the returns shown from counting the first choice given to each 
 candidate by the method of direct voting. In other words, 
 the count would show, that, A. had received the votes of 25 
 delegates ; B. the votes of 30 delegates ; G. the votes of 22 
 delegates ; and D. the votes of the remaining 23, completing the 
 100 delegates. And as before, the ballot would show that no 
 candidate had the support of a concurring majority. 
 
 In order to reach a concurrence some of the delegates must 
 necessarily yield up their first choice, and adopt a second 
 choice among the candidates. But who is to yield ? This 
 question is not an easy one to decide, amidst the surroundings 
 which here exist after a convention has made its first ballot. 
 
 The individual voter by the proposed method, may make his 
 provisional or second choice upon his ticket at home, guided 
 alone by his knowledge of the several candidates, and by his 
 willingness to yield and accept a second choice, if he has a 
 doubt lest his first choice among them may not be the choice 
 of a majority. He is constrained to make a second choice 
 lest a very objectionable candidate upon the list may have a 
 strong following and be elected by a plurality, in default of a 
 majority concurrence. He does not lose the support he has given 
 to his first choice by providing a second, but only gives his 
 second choice an equal support with the first, in case the sup- 
 port given as second choice to the several candidates has need 
 to be added to that given them as first choice, in order to reach 
 a majority concurrence upon some one of them. 
 
 A voter by naming a second, or even a third choice, where 
 many candidates are in the field, merely names each in turn 
 as a candidate he will willingly support in full opposition to 
 any objectionable candidate that may be contesting for the 
 place. 
 
 The delegate in a convention, however, in order to make a 
 second choice, must yield up his first choice, and vote against 
 him with as much force as he does against the most objection- 
 able candidate on the list. He is constrained, therefore, to hold 
 
15 
 
 on to his first choice, and submit to repeated ballotings, ending 
 in the same result. Thus, the repeated ballotings of a conven- 
 tion very often assume the nature of testing the endurance of 
 the delegates assembled. Finally, when a delegate yields and 
 adopts a second choice, he adds his support to those delegates 
 who had before made this candidate their first choice, upon 
 the same principle and for the same purpose that the number of 
 voters making a candidate their second choice are added to the 
 number who have already made him their first choice, in solv- 
 ing the problem by the proposed method of direct voting. 
 But now, if other delegates were to yield simultaneously, it 
 might happen that a change all around would not greatly alter 
 the new relative support given to the respective candidates. 
 
 Besides, the ballotings of a convention being a test of the 
 endurance, or more often possibly, of the personal interests of 
 the delegates concerned, still other factors join in determining 
 the final result. Because the list of delegates is called in 
 alphabetical order, and the delegates answer with open voice, 
 those called first must make their choice without knowing 
 what those at the X. Y. Z. end of the list intend to do. On 
 the other hand, those voting last have the advantage of know- 
 ing how the A. B. G. members on the list have voted, and may 
 be influenced accordingly. This gives the successive ballotings 
 of a convention much the nature of a game of chance, where 
 at least some advantages are secured to the last player. 
 
 Were the successive ballotings of the convention conducted 
 by secret voting, each balloting would still be nothing more 
 than a trial vote, similar to the schoolboy's effort to solve his 
 problem by testing hypothetical methods, until he finds one 
 which " brings the answer. 1 ' 
 
 These evidences of the illogical nature of attempting to find 
 a concurring majority, by repeated ballotings or repeated trial 
 votes, are often attempted to be modified by arbitrary rules 
 adopted to govern the successive proceedings of the conven- 
 tion. Among these rules there is one, quite often adopted, de- 
 manding that the candidate receiving the lowest number of 
 votes at each succeeding ballot shall be dropped from the list, 
 until the final ballot is a choice between the remaining two. 
 
16 
 
 That such a rule is manifestly unfair, and liable to give an un- 
 truthful result, is made evident by the fact, that not infrequently 
 a candidate who is the first choice of but a few, may be the 
 second choice of many, or, may represent an intermediate 
 opinion or policy, and be the one upon whom a majority of 
 the delegates would have first concurred. Another rule 
 adopted by large conventions, is to permit those whose votes 
 are called for at the A. B. G. end of the list, to change their 
 votes after they have heard the votes of those coming later, or 
 at any time until the result of the ballot has been announced. 
 These changes usually demanded during the balloting very 
 often lead to other changes, and finally bring the proceedings 
 of the convention to a clamorous end. 
 
 Hence, it has been shown that this method of attempting to 
 find the candidate upon whom a majority will first concur, 
 even when the problem is to be determined by a convened 
 body, is at best but illogical and uncertain in its results. But 
 delegates, meeting in a convention, imply that the voice of the 
 party voters has been delegated, and often re-delegated ; and 
 hereafter, it will not be difficult to show that this most illogical 
 system of delegating affords opportunities for a great series of 
 evils and uncertainties, and that it fosters a great field for cor- 
 rupt political practices. 
 
 Again, an election of delegates by party voters, and accept- 
 ing the candidate determined upon by these delegates, as a 
 party candidate, to be supported in opposition to another party 
 candidate at the final election, implies that the sovereign citi- 
 zens of the district or country must be divided into permanent 
 party organizations. In a succeeding chapter, it will be shown 
 that such permanently opposing party organizations among the 
 people of a free country, are not only illogical, unnatural, 
 and opposed to the spirit of freedom, but that they have been 
 the source and defense of so much oppression, of such po- 
 litical corruption, and have brought our attempt at establishing 
 a great free government into such question, yea, in the 
 minds of many intelligent thinking men into such disrepute, 
 that even the wisdom of freedom itself has been questioned. 
 
 Hence, this great complicated method, made use of in at- 
 
17 
 
 tempting to find the will of a concurring majority, in selecting 
 representatives of the people, by dividing the voters into two 
 permanently opposing party organizations, by submitting to 
 delegating and to re-delegating the popular voice ; and finally, 
 having the issue decided by the successive trial ballotings of 
 delegate conventions, when compared to the simple method of 
 solving the problem with mathematical exactness, by one direct 
 vote of the whole people, may be shown to be not only illogical 
 and uncertain in its results, but that it has become a great and 
 growing political excrescence, sapping and defiling our political 
 institutions, so far as to threaten the life or continued existence 
 of political freedom among us. 
 
 In thus submitting an explanation of the problem in its 
 simplest form, it has been intended to avoid if possible all 
 seeming complications which its more complete presentation 
 might arouse, in the minds of those to whom it is for the first 
 time submitted. There remains only, however, to continue the 
 same reasoning already made use of, and applicable to all the 
 conditions of the problem, in order to remove all doubt of its 
 mathematical correctness throughout. 
 
 It will by some be supposed that a formidable number of 
 candidates will enter the field, and, that but few of the voters 
 will name a second choice among this large number of candi- 
 dates, and hence, that the method will fail to find a candidate 
 upon whom a majority of the voters have finally concurred. 
 
 In answer to these apparent objections to the method, it must 
 be comprehended at once, that this is not a political scheme 
 which admits in any way of being construed for the benefit of 
 a few, but, that it is a means of reaching concerted action, and 
 a method of solving a problem belonging to the whole people, 
 which, when properly understood and the force of its simple 
 truths fully comprehended by them, becomes their means and 
 their method of defending their sovereign rights as freemen. 
 
 It is not the candidates for office, who nominate themselves, 
 but it is the people, by placing the names of representative men 
 upon their tickets, who nominate as well as elect by this 
 method. And as every voter wishing to exercise his elective 
 franchise with wisdom, will decide to cast his vote only for a 
 
18 
 
 candidate having some probability of success, he will seldom 
 be foolish enough to waste his voice by naming an unknown 
 or unpopular candidate upon his ticket. Hence, public favor 
 will soon crystalize about the few who have proven them- 
 selves most eminently fitted for the position to be filled. And 
 it may well be assumed, that when nominations shall be left 
 to the people, nominees will not be too numerous. 
 
 That but few of the voters might name a second choice, and, 
 that finally no concurrence of a majority upon any. one candi- 
 date would be found, is a contingency that may truly occur. 
 But it must again be remembered, that the purpose of this 
 method of voting, is to provide a means for reaching concerted 
 action, and for finding the candidate upon whom a majority 
 will first agree. The second choice is made as a provisional 
 one, for the purpose of concurring with other voters, if there 
 has not been a concurrence of a majority upon counting the 
 first or direct choice of each voter. It has already been shown 
 that by this method of voting, the first choice is not lost by 
 making a second, but, that the second choice is only made to 
 equal the first, or in effect, making no choice between these 
 two candidates when the support given to each candidate as 
 their second choice, has need to be added in turn to this can- 
 didate's primary support, in order to find the one upon whom 
 a majority of the voters will first concur. When a voter's 
 second choice is made use of, his voice is thus placed in favor 
 of either of these candidates, but in opposition to any or all 
 other candidates who are contesting for the place. 
 
 If a voter in making up his ticket, has but one choice among 
 the candidates, and does not care who among the remaining 
 candidates may be selected, in case Ms choice is not determined 
 upon, then he may very properly make but the one choice. 
 But, if a voter knowing that several candidates are being 
 prominently supported, has still some doubt whether his first 
 choice among them will be the choice of a majority, and, has 
 a choice among the remaining candidates, then he would be 
 wise to name that second choice upon his ticket. If he has 
 yet further, a choice among the remaining candidates, or, if some 
 prominently supported candidate is very objectionable to him, 
 
19 
 
 then he would be wise to name several successive choices 
 among the others, so as to put his voice if possible in favor of 
 either of these in turn, and opposed to the objectionable one. 
 
 In summing up the returns, after adding the number of vo- 
 ters making a candidate their second choice to those who have 
 already made this candidate their first choice, and so on suc- 
 cessively with each candidate named ; if no candidate has re- 
 ceived the concurrence of a majority of all the voters, we must 
 then proceed another stage in the solution of the problem, and 
 in like manner add to each candidate's now concurring support 
 the number making him their third choice, and again 
 compare their new concurring supports. If, because of many 
 candidates in the field, and from the voters being greatly di- 
 vided among them, there has yet been no concurrence of a 
 majority upon any one candidate, we must add in succession 
 to the support already given to each candidate, those who now 
 make him their fourth choice, and continue in the same man- 
 ner comparing their new concurring numbers at each succes- 
 sive stage until a majority of the voters have concurred upon 
 one. 
 
 If, however, after all the support given to each candidate in 
 turn has been added, and the returns have been exhausted, 
 there is still not a majority of the voters concurring upon any 
 one candidate, then the candidate having the greatest concur- 
 ring support must be declared elected, even though it be but a 
 plurality concurrence. For the same reason, that a final elec- 
 tion must be conclusive or must be submitted to in any 
 method of voting, even though it has been determined by but 
 a plurality concurrence. And, although the proposed method 
 affords the opportunity to always secure a majority concurrence, 
 if the choice between one candidate and another does not 
 arouse sufficient interest among the voters to have them pro- 
 vide for a majority concurrence, then it is no fault of the 
 method at hand. 
 
 It may happen, when but few candidates are in the field, and 
 many of the voters make a second choice, that upon adding 
 the number making each candidate their second choice to those 
 who have made him their first choice, more than one candi- 
 
20 
 
 date may thus receive the support of a concurring majority. 
 When this occurs, the one having the greater number must be 
 declared elected ; for mathematically speaking, if the concur- 
 ring support of each candidate could be found at any point 
 between the successive stages of adding, then the one having 
 the greater number over a majority could be said to have 
 reached the support of a concurring majority first. But more 
 practically, it will be found, that if two candidates have each 
 received the support of more than one half of the whole 
 number of voters, it must be evident that a certain number of 
 voters are common to each of these candidates. In other 
 words, that a certain number of voters have made one of these 
 candidates their first choice, and the other their second choice, 
 and, vice versa; and hence, now make no choice between the 
 two. If these voters common to each, be now taken from 
 each candidate's support, and stand aside, the one having the 
 greater number will still have the greater remainder, and hence, 
 has the stronger support and must be acknowledged as being 
 elected. 
 
 Other apparent objections may arise from a superficial ex- 
 amination of this method of direct voting, but each in turn 
 must yield to the simple truths it sets forth, in affording the only 
 practical and correct solution of the problem of .finding the 
 candidate upon whom a majority of the whole number of 
 voters will first concur. 
 
 It may serve to further illustrate the practical working of this 
 method of direct voting, to introduce here the actual examples 
 afforded by a few instances in which it has been publicly ex- 
 hibited. At a village* meeting it was decided to select a chair- 
 man by the proposed method of voting. There were 42 per- 
 sons present, and the names of Messrs. March, Keenan, Maxton, 
 and Embree were submitted in nomination. Blank slips of 
 paper were handed to the voters, and upon these each voter 
 named his first choice and as far as he saw fit named succeed- 
 ing provisional choices. These tickets were then collected, 
 and following are samples of the tickets voted : 
 
 * Marshalton, Pa., Nov. 25, 1881. 
 
21 
 
 March 1st. 
 Keenan 2d. 
 
 Keenan 1st. 
 Maxton 2d. 
 Embree 3d. 
 
 Maxton 1st. 
 Keenan 2d. 
 
 Embree 1st. 
 
 Upon counting up each candidate's primary or first support, 
 the tally sheet exhibited upon the black-board showed the 
 following result : 
 
 As 
 
 1st choice, 
 
 March, 
 
 13 
 
 Keenan, I Maxton, 
 
 Embree, 
 
 12 
 
 Whole No. of Voters, 
 
 42 
 
 Majority, 
 
 22 
 
 As no candidate had thus received a concurring majority, 
 by counting again from the tickets, the number making each 
 candidate their second choice was found, and this number was 
 added in turn to each candidate's primary support. The tally 
 sheet now presented a new result, as follows : 
 
 March, 
 
 As 1st choice, | 13 
 As 2d choice, 
 New concur- 
 
 ring support, 
 
 19 
 
 Keenan, 
 
 8 
 15 
 
 23 
 
 Maxton, 
 
 18 
 
 Embree, 
 
 12 
 5 
 
 17 
 
 Whole No. of Voters, 
 42 
 
 Majority, 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 For the reason, that six voters who had primarily made 
 other candidates their first choice, have now made Mr. March 
 their provisional or second choice, they have thus signified 
 their willingness to concur with the thirteen other voters who 
 had before made him their first choice. Hence, together they 
 make his new concurring support number nineteen. At the 
 same time fifteen voters who had primarily made other candi- 
 dates their first choice, have now made Mr. Keenan their pro- 
 visional or second choice, and hence are willing to concur with 
 the eight who had before made him their first choice, and so 
 make his new concurring support number twenty-three. For 
 the same reasons and at the same time, the new relative sup- 
 port of Mr. Maxton was found to number eighteen, and that of 
 Mr. Embree to number seventeen. 
 
 As Mr. Keenan alone, had thus received the support of a 
 majority he was declared elected chairman of the meeting. 
 
 Another exhibition of the proposed method of voting was 
 made before a school literary society.* The voters taking part 
 here numbered one hundred and eighty-two, and the names 
 
 * West Chester State Normal School, Dec. 17, 1881. 
 
22 
 
 of Curtis, Holmes, Longfellow, and Whittier were voted upon 
 with the following tabulated result : 
 
 As 1st choice, 
 As 2d choice, 
 New concur- 
 ring support, 
 
 Curtis, 
 
 48 
 22 
 
 70 
 
 Holmes, 
 
 33 
 
 22 
 
 55 
 
 Longfellow, 
 
 49 
 
 88 
 
 137 
 
 Whittier, 
 
 52 
 
 28 
 
 80 
 
 Total No. Voters, 
 
 182 
 
 Majority, 
 92 
 
 
 When the primary support given to each candidate was put 
 upon the black-board, there was quite an applause from the 
 Whittier supporters, they thinking that as he had a plurality 
 over each of the other candidates, he was elected. One 
 hundred and eighty-two votes had been cast, hence, as yet no 
 one had received the support of a majority. Upon adding the 
 number who had made each candidate their provisional or 
 second choice to those who had before made this candidate 
 their first choice, and so with all the candidates in turn, it was 
 found that Longfellow had received the support of one hundred 
 and thirty-seven voters ; and, when compared with the new 
 concurring support of each of the other candidates, was the 
 first and only one to receive the support of a concurring ma- 
 jority. Hence Longfellow was declared elected. 
 
 Still another exhibition of the method was made before the 
 pupils of an academy* and the neighboring citizens. Here, 
 forty-nine voters took part in the election, and the names of 
 Longfellow, Curtis, Whittier, and Phillips were voted upon. 
 The tabulated result of this election was expressed, as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 As 1st choice, 
 As 2d choice, 
 New relative 
 support, 
 
 Longfellow, 
 12 
 23 
 
 35 
 
 Curtis, 
 
 12 
 4 
 
 16 
 
 Whittier, 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 
 20 
 
 Phillips, 
 12 
 
 5 
 17 
 
 Total No. Voters, 
 
 49 
 
 Majority, 
 
 25 
 
 
 
 Here, again, Longfellow was the first to receive the support 
 of a concurring majority, which was reached by adding those 
 who had made him their second choice to those others who 
 had before made him their first choice. At the same time, 
 and in the same manner, finding the new relative or concur- 
 
 *Maplewood Institute, Delaware County, Pa., Feb. 3d, 1882. 
 
23 
 
 ring support of each of the other candidates for the purpose 
 of comparing each with the others. 
 
 The last two of these examples, taking place under similar 
 circumstances, and using almost the same list of candidates, af- 
 ford an opportunity to exhibit the tabulated result of an elec- 
 tion conducted in separate voting districts, quite as well as if 
 they had both been a part of the same contest and had oc- 
 cured at the same time. 
 
 The returns from the two districts may thus be summed 
 up: 
 
 I 
 
 
 I - 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 J 
 
 B 
 
 
 
 i*1 >> 
 
 &$ i 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 f 
 
 
 
 
 !> 
 
 j 
 
 
 
 
 id 
 
 J 
 
 
 
 S 
 
 H 
 
 
 sg (1st District, . . | 48 
 
 33 
 
 49 
 
 52 
 
 
 182 
 
 
 *3:I i 
 
 ^1s I2d District, . . 12 
 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 49 
 
 
 Primary support of each, 60 
 
 33 
 
 61 
 
 65 
 
 12 
 
 231 
 
 116 
 
 ^ f 1st District, . . | 22 
 
 22 
 
 88 
 
 28 
 
 ... 
 
 
 
 ^ 1 2d District, . . 4 
 
 ... 
 
 23 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 22 
 
 111 
 
 35 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 New relative support of 
 each, 
 
 86 
 
 55 
 
 172 
 
 100 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 The supporting of Holmes in one district, and of Phillips in 
 the other, may be used to represent the fact, that for many 
 reasons a local candidate may be supported in one district and 
 not in another ; or for some other reason a district may sup- 
 port a different one. At the same time, however, with the 
 purpose of harmonizing upon one of the more popular candi- 
 dates, the actual contest would be most frequently made 
 between a few of these candidates ; and the direction of a 
 large number of the provisional or second choices made, 
 would often determine the one upon whom a majority would 
 first willingly concur. 
 
 These practical examples, however modest in their significance, 
 amply exhibit the true problem which is presented to every 
 organization of men, when that organization is called upon to 
 
24 
 
 select one from among a number of candidates to represent it 
 in any official capacity whatsoever. And the solution of,this 
 problem, whatever its significance, may be effected by the pro- 
 posed method of conducting a single direct election with as 
 much certainty in any other example as in these which have 
 been thus exhibited. It is applicable to the election of any po- 
 litical officer from a town constable to the highest officer of the 
 United States. It is equally applicable to an election by any 
 organization where a choice of one is to be made from among 
 any number of candidates that may be offered. It is also ap- 
 plicable where a choice of one is to be made from any 
 number of propositions, from among any number of places, of 
 numbers, or of dates. 
 
 Being a vote by ballot, it is equally applicable for the use of a 
 convened body, or, for the use of an organization whose voters 
 are scattered however remotely from each other. In a convened 
 body it avoids the dangers arising from factional delays and 
 from repeated ballotings ; from attempts to deceive and to 
 barter or trade, after the probable purpose of the convention 
 has been disclosed. It avoids the uncertainty of successive 
 trials or ballotings, and solves the problem at once and with 
 mathematical fairness and precision. 
 
 To the scattered voters it affords tbe opportunity to give a 
 nominal support to their favorite, or to a local candidate, and, 
 at the same time to provisionally name as a second choice, 
 one whom they have reason to believe will be more popular, 
 and hence more likely to receive the support of a majority. It 
 gives every voter an opportunity to name and support any 
 number of successive choices in opposition to an objectionable 
 candidate who he has reason to believe has a large or danger- 
 ous plurality following. 
 
 It has its greatest significance in solving political issues. In 
 short, this method of direct voting, by avoiding the supposed 
 necessity of delegating, avoids the great series of evils which 
 have been developed and practiced in conducting the delegate 
 system. It affords the great mass of honest and patriotic vo- 
 ters an opportunity to harmonize and act concertedly, and it 
 further affords them a means of defense against the concerted 
 
25 
 
 manipulations of a few who have heretofore so often suc- 
 ceeded in perverting the popular will, and in placing them- 
 selves in offices of trust and political power. And again, by 
 avoiding the supposed necessity of permanent party organiza- 
 tions, it will free an enslaved people from the fallacies and 
 dangers which permanent party organizations have aroused 
 and developed. 
 
 It is in brief, the true and universal weapon with which 
 honest and patriotic freemen may hereafter successfully blot 
 out and abolish the trickery, the corruption, and the success- 
 ful perversion of the authority of the people's will ; by which 
 means, a few selfish men have long been enabled to rule and rob 
 their fellows. It is the weapon which will hereafter make 
 patriotism mean a philanthropic love of country, and which 
 will keep constantly emblazoned upon the people's banner, 
 that sacred truth which declares that all men are endowed by 
 their creator with equal and with unalienable rights. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE ILLOGICAL NATURE, AND THE EVILS ATTENDING THE PRESENT 
 
 METHOD OF REACHING CONCERTED ACTION AND OF 
 
 FINDING THE WILL OF A MAJORITY. 
 
 " A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appear- 
 ance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom." 
 
 The Author of " Common Sense," 1776. 
 
 In the preceding chapter, the proposed method of reaching 
 concerted action and of finding the will of a concurring 
 majority in the election of representatives of the people, at one 
 direct election by the ivhole body of voters, has been compared 
 with the present complex method ; requiring that the voters of 
 the country or district to be represented, shall be divided into 
 two permanently opposing party organizations ; that the voters 
 of each of these two permanent parties shall lessen their num- 
 bers to delegates, and that these delegates shall meet in con- 
 ventions, and there, by repeated or trial ballotings shall deter- 
 mine upon a party candidate. Requiring further, that the 
 voters of each party shall accept and support these party 
 candidates, and that the final election shall be a contest between 
 these two permanently opposing party organizations. Novel 
 as the proposition may seem, it will here be shown, that per- 
 manently opposing party organizations, limited to two, dividing 
 the people of a free government, can have no natural or just ex- 
 istence, and would not be found among us, except, that they 
 have been developed as a part of the present method, made 
 use of in attempting to reach concerted action, and in attempt- 
 ing to find the will of a concurring majority. 
 
27 
 
 At the birth of a free nation of people, there will be as 
 many parties or combinations of men acting together, as there 
 are varied interests to defend, or, as there are shades of po- 
 litical opinion upon the questions which become an issue before 
 them. That these numerous parties or combinations of men 
 representing special interests, must harmonize, and that a 
 certain number of them will eventually be found acting together 
 in opposition to the remainder, whether this remainder shall 
 act in concert or dividedly, is a true principle in reaching the 
 will of a concurring majority. But that a large body, com- 
 prising one-half of the whole number of voters of a great free 
 country, even though they have harmonized upon a question 
 at issue, should continue to act together after this issue has 
 been decided, in a permanent party organization and in oppo- 
 sition to another permanent organization, is both unnatural and 
 dangerously opposed to their original compact of national unity. 
 
 That there have been great issues before the American 
 people, defended by one party and opposed by the other, is not 
 to be denied. But, that these issues have found the two 
 parties divided and organized, quite as often as they were the 
 cause of division, is equally true. Hence it is true, that party 
 organizations have continued to exist long after they have ac- 
 complished the original purpose of their harmonizing, and it is 
 equally true that party organizations have permanently existed, 
 even after the voters comprising the party have widely dis- 
 sented from each other. With but a choice between the can- 
 didates presented by two permanently organized parties, a voter 
 in order to have any voice in the final contest must cast his 
 lot with the one or the other, and yet he may have but little 
 in sympathy with the controlling forces within either of these 
 permanent party organizations. 
 
 Since it has been shown that it is not only possible, but in 
 every way practicable, for the whole body of voters of any district, 
 without any previous party division or organization whatsoever, 
 to so vote at a final election as to provide for the harmonizing 
 of a majority of their number upon any question or issue, or upon 
 a candidate for office representing that issue, and thus select 
 this candidate from among any number of candidates pro- 
 
28 
 
 posed ; and, as it is both possible and probable that the voters 
 who concur upon this issue, will be divided upon the next is- 
 sue, and that now, new combinations of voters will harmonize 
 and a new majority decide the new question at issue, it is 
 very evident that the voters of the country have been per- 
 manently divided into two opposing party organizations, not 
 because these organizations truly represent a series of per- 
 manently opposing principles, but, because the division into 
 two permanent parties is one of the means or steps made 
 necessary in the present method of finding the will of a ma- 
 jority. 
 
 The present method of solving the problem of finding the 
 will of a majority in the election of representatives, requires 
 at the very outset, that the great body of voters shall be di- 
 vided into two permanent party organizations, before the final 
 vote shall be taken. Because a final vote which limits the vo- 
 ters to but one choice, gives them no further opportunity to 
 concur with each other at this election, and because such an 
 election would not with any certainty determine the will of a 
 concurring majority if several candidates were being sup- 
 ported, it is made necessary that all the harmonizing or con- 
 curring must be accomplished before this final vote is taken. 
 But in order for a party or any great body of men to harmo- 
 nize and act concertedly by means of the delegate system, it 
 is necessary for them to join in permanent party organization. 
 And it is permanency of organization which is here declared to 
 be a great evil, because it is both unnatural and illogical. 
 
 Permanency of party organization has been made necessary 
 in order to conduct the primary or party election, or to determine 
 upon a party candidate by the method of the delegate system 
 and the trial ballotings of successive conventions, for the fol- 
 lowing reasons : To vote for a party delegate implies the 
 promise to vote finally for the party candidate or nominee ; 
 and having voted for the party candidate at a final election, 
 usually affords the only qualification admitting a voter into the 
 councils of the party organization. Hence, it is not only ne- 
 cessary for the voters to be thoroughly organized, but be- 
 cause the voters who have accepted the party candidate 
 
29 
 
 and acted together at the final election upon one issue, are 
 the only ones who are permitted to take part in the elec- 
 tion of delegates in a succeeding issue, the party organization 
 is held together from one issue to another and thus becomes 
 permanently established. Still further, because a party organi- 
 zation in order to conduct a delegate election, and direct its 
 caucuses, conventions, conferences and so on, must have a se- 
 ries of officers, the election of these officers by a certain body 
 of voters, implies the permanent continuance of concerted ac- 
 tion between these voters throughout. And, hereafter, it will 
 be shown that the opportunities for evil and corrupt practices 
 afforded by permanent party organization and the delegate sys- 
 tem of conducting party primary elections, are in themselves 
 strong factors in making a party organization permanent ; and 
 moreover, permanent in the interest of the few who become 
 its officers and managers. 
 
 Having thus far shown that permanent party organization, 
 and the delegate system, and the trial ballotings of conven- 
 tions are respective factors in the present method of attempt- 
 ing to find the will of a majority in electing our representatives, 
 whatever evils may hereafter be shown to belong to these 
 several factors of this most complex and illogical method, must 
 be recognized as belonging to the method or system through- 
 out. In accordance with the purpose of this work, however, 
 aiming to show by logical analysis the evils in the existing 
 methods made use of in conducting our government, and the 
 true remedy therefor ; the inherent evils of each factor will 
 be analyzed separately, and the force of the proposed remedy 
 applied to each in turn. 
 
 The Evils of the Delegate System. 
 
 The delegate system has been adopted by party organiza- 
 tions as a means of determining upon a party candidate, in 
 order : 
 
 1st. That by lessening the number of voters by an accepted 
 ratio, to delegates, these delegates may practically meet in a 
 convention. 
 
 2d. That these delegates when assembled in convention, 
 
30 
 
 and either instructed or uninstructed may, by yielding one to 
 another after repeated trial ballotings, reach a concurring 
 majority and thus determine upon a party candidate or 
 nominee. 
 
 That this method of finding the will of a majority of the 
 whole number of party voters, is both illogical and uncertain 
 in its results, may be readily shown. 
 
 At the outset, delegates are elected in the primary election 
 districts, townships or voting precincts, by a simple direct 
 vote. Hence, when several candidates for any one office, or 
 different delegates representing these candidates are voted for, 
 there may be but a small number of voters concurring upon 
 any one delegate. Very often indeed, but a mere plurality, 
 and at best, but a majority of the voters are needed to deter- 
 mine the delegate and to instruct him. It also occurs that 
 some voting districts are entitled to more than one delegate, so 
 that here, often, a majority or even a plurality of the voters 
 are permitted to elect all of these delegates, thus exercising a 
 sort of miniature " unit rule" over their fellows. 
 
 When these delegates, elected by local majorities, or, as often 
 happens by mere pluralities, meet in county or ward conven- 
 tions to determine upon the party candidates, or else upon 
 secondary delegates to a State or National convention, they 
 cannot be said to fully represent the whole body of party vo- 
 ters, for they truly represent only those pluralities or majori- 
 ties who have supported or elected them. Hence, because 
 added majorities are yet only a majority of the whole number, 
 while added pluralities are but a minority of the whole number 
 of individual voters, when these delegates determine upon a 
 candidate by the concurrence of a mere majority of their num- 
 ber, the number concurring are the delegates actually repre- 
 senting but a trifle over one-half of the majorities or of the 
 pluralities of voters represented in the convention. Or, in 
 other words, a majority of a majority need be but a trifle over 
 one-half of one-half, or one-fourth ; while a majority of a plu- 
 rality may be a number much less than one-fourth of the in- 
 dividual voters. And thus it occurs, that the concerted action 
 of even these smaller fractions of the whole number of party 
 
31 
 
 voters, may be sufficient to determine the nomination of a 
 party candidate. 
 
 Again, it will be readily seen, that when the primary dele- 
 gates meet in a convention to elect by the concurrence of a 
 majority, one or more secondary delegates to a State or Na- 
 tional convention, and these secondary delegates meeting in 
 convention nominate State or National candidates by the con- 
 currence of a majority of their number, then it may be possi- 
 ble for a State or National candidate to need only be the rep- 
 resentative of a majority, of a majority, of a majority. Or, in 
 truth the concerted action of but a trifle over one-eighth of the 
 party voters may be sufficient to determine a State or National 
 party nomination. Thus the system of delegating and re- 
 delegating diminishes the necessary concurrence of the party 
 voters at each new delegating, by a constant geometrical ratio. 
 
 In presenting these possibilities for the purpose of showing 
 the illogical nature of the delegate system, it is not claimed 
 that from these reasons alone, such extremes may often truly 
 occur. But, that a number of voters much less than a con- 
 curring majority, may, by secret and concerted action, take 
 advantage of these possibilities, and secure control of the party 
 nominations, is unquestionably true. To afford a conception of 
 what may be actually accomplished by secretly taking advan- 
 tage of this illogical system, it would be enough to simply refer 
 intelligent observers to the political successes secured to cor- 
 rupt office-seekers by secretly manipulating the numerous cau- 
 cuses, the conventions and conferences, the unit rules and so on, 
 and to the apathy and distrust which this complex method en- 
 forces upon the great mass of party voters, in order to complete 
 the story of political corruption which this system has de- 
 veloped. Because such possibilities can only be reached by 
 successively deceiving friends as well as foes, has proven to be 
 no reason why it may not be acceptably practiced in personal 
 contests for office. 
 
 It may be supposed, in defense of the delegate system, that 
 the principle of acceding to the will of a majority in delegating, 
 is but the same as that made use of in electing representatives 
 and in deciding all other issues in a representative form of 
 
32 
 
 government ; and, that this delegating and re-delegating is but 
 a continuation of a representative system. To this it may be 
 answered, that a people in resorting to a representative form 
 of government must in truth submit to the fact, that they may 
 possibly find themselves governed by less than a concurring 
 majority of the individual voters. But this is no reason why 
 the process of lessening the necessary primary concurrence, 
 should be continued by repetitions of this delegating, while 
 each new delegating may diminish the necessary number of 
 voters acting in secret concert in order to control, by a con- 
 stant geometrical ratio. 
 
 There is practically, however, a still wider difference between 
 entrusting to representatives as law-makers and as executive 
 officers, and, entrusting delegates with the power of making 
 party nominations. The work of representatives as legisla- 
 tors is the open proposition and support of a law, or as execu- 
 tive officers, that of enforcing the laws. While the work of 
 delegates entrusted with the authority of placing men in party 
 nomination, which in a strong party may be equivalent to an 
 election to office, is surrounded by all the secret influences, 
 and with an opportunity to accept all the promises of perso- 
 nal favor, or of official patronage, that an office-seeker in return 
 for favors, may have to bestow, after his election to office. 
 
 If it has been thus sufficiently shown, that the system of 
 delegating and re-delegating is illogical and fallacious, and that 
 the trial ballotings of a convention are at best but uncertain as 
 a method of finding the will of a concurring majority ; then it 
 will not be difficult to point out how the employment of this 
 method in making party nominations, has been attended with 
 a corresponding series of evil and corrupt practices. Not more 
 because a method which is illogical leads to evil, than because 
 the management of this system of delegating, with its caucusses, 
 its conventions, its conferences and so on, is necessarily so ex- 
 ceedingly complex, has the use of the method afforded oppor- 
 tunities for the practice of a series of political evils and party 
 corruption, such as have been quite sufficient to completely 
 pervert and defeat every true expression of the popular will. 
 
 At the very outset and throughout, the use of the system of 
 
33 
 
 delegating affords opportunities for evil and corrupt political 
 practices. It requires for its management the establishing of 
 permanent party organizations, and thus sets up within a party 
 an organized body of party managers, under the plea of being 
 the party officers. These party officers or managers are en- 
 trusted with the duty of directing the party primary or delegate 
 elections, with the calling of caucuses, of conventions, of con- 
 ferences and so on, and being in a position where they may 
 readily arrange with selfish and corrupt office-seekers for secret 
 and concerted action, they too often, by the aid of these office- 
 seekers and their followers, are enabled to control primary 
 caucuses, and thus u set up" the delegates, to barter for and 
 bribe, and thus secure the election of these delegates in the 
 interest of their patrons. When these delegates meet in a con- 
 vention, they are thus placed under the direction of a cabal of 
 office-seekers, each in turn seeking his own advancement by 
 means of promises, by purchase, or by trading or exchanging 
 with his fellows. Much of this corrupt bartering is necessarily 
 done in secret, but so notorious has it become, that it has 
 virtually been accepted and acceded to as a part of customary 
 political methods. It occurs, that even otherwise intelligent 
 citizens submit to a rule which permits an office-seeker who 
 happens to be of the same township, county, ward, or other 
 district with themselves, to become the absolute possessor of 
 their delegate or delegates to use his or their voices in the con- 
 vention, in whatever manner that may best accrue to this can- 
 didate's personal interests. 
 
 Because, in the election of delegates by a simple direct vote, 
 a delegate may often be determined upon by the concurrence 
 of a mere plurality of the party voters, there has been de- 
 veloped a practice, by which a junta of political bosses and 
 office-seekers set up a number of delegates or candidates of 
 good repute, and by means of cunningly directed advice among 
 the more respectable voters, secure for each of these candi- 
 dates a nearly equal following ; while at the same time they 
 secure for a favorite office-seeker the concerted support of all 
 the purchasable or controllable voters in the district, and thus 
 determine his election by securing for him a plurality over each 
 
34 
 
 of the other candidates. The success of this most ingenious 
 and corrupt enterprise, is determined by their ability to place 
 a sufficient number of reputable candidates or their delegates 
 in the field, so that the quotient of respectable voters support- 
 ing each of these candidates, shall be less than the purchasa- 
 ble or controllable voters who may be concerted upon the one 
 candidate in whose interest the work is done. 
 
 At the coming together of these delegates, the management 
 of the temporary organization, and then in succession, the con- 
 trol of the more complete organization of the convention, af- 
 fords the party managers or u bosses " still other opportuni- 
 ties to distort and thwart the people's will. The tricks of 
 caucuses, and the arbitrary rulings of irresponsible com- 
 mittees are here given their fullest significance. These, to be 
 followed by the successive ballotings of the convention, where 
 the basest forms of trickery and of corrupt bargaining are but 
 too often practiced. 
 
 The first ballot of a convention may fairly record the first 
 instructions given to each delegate, but if there be no concur- 
 rence of a majority at this ballot, then some delegate or dele- 
 gates must yield up their first choice and adopt a second, be- 
 fore the concurrence of a majority can be reached. As a 
 rule, an instructed delegate, finding his first choice of candi- 
 dates supported by a large concurrence, or by a plurality over 
 each of the others, would not be inclined to yield up such a 
 choice ; while another delegate concurred with by but a few, 
 would be expected to yield, and adopt a second choice among 
 the apparently stronger candidates. But such a rule cannot 
 be enforced, nor is it right, for it may happen that a strong 
 plurality have with concerted purpose, concurred upon a can- 
 didate who is highly objectionable to the majority ; and it may 
 be that this majority, although ultimately wishing to concur, 
 now find themselves divided among several candidates ; and 
 still further, it may happen that the one candidate representing 
 that happy medium of opinion or purpose, and upon whom 
 this majority would finally concur, has received at first but a 
 meager or small support. If the supporters of this candidate 
 were to withdraw early, and adopt a second choice, their first 
 
35 
 
 choice would thus be so prejudiced at once, as very often to be 
 retired from the contest. Hence it occurs, that delegates in a 
 convention are often led to make repeated ballotings without 
 making any changes, until these senseless repetitions become 
 much like the rehearsal of a farce. The delegates supporting 
 candidates having a strong following, are stimulated by their 
 apparent vantage ground to hold on ; while those supporting 
 candidates who have but a small following are each in turn 
 stimulated by the hope, that an enmity between the stronger 
 candidates or their supporters, will prevent their ever yielding 
 one to the other, and that finally, the now poorly supported 
 candidate may loom up as a "dark horse" 
 
 It is from the fact, that each new balloting of the convention 
 is a new and distinct trial, and also from the fact, that when a 
 delegate persistently holds on to his first choice he may be 
 prejudicing the future prospects of his second choice, or, by 
 giving up his first choice too soon, and placing a second choice 
 in full opposition to his first, he may thus early prejudice the 
 future prospects of this first choice, the successive ballotings 
 of a convention have the character of a game of chance. Were 
 it not that this game is too often played by party managers 
 and selfish office-seekers with loaded dice, the merit of the suc- 
 cessive ballotings of a convention might well be left to the 
 rulings of chance. But, such is the, fact, that a few concerted 
 managers in league with favored office-seekers, and knowing 
 well of the possible combinations that may be had from the 
 delegates' votes before them, may so manipulate and play the 
 game that it shall with certainty win for them the prize. 
 
 Even the honest delegates in a convention are often at a loss 
 how to best secure their constituents' will. Supposing them 
 uninstructed and free to use their best judgment, the questions 
 come, who must yield ? And when to yield ? These are often, 
 indeed, very difficult and tedious questions to decide. In illus- 
 tration of this, it may be readily recalled, how many recent 
 State and National conventions, and, to the same point, how 
 many recent elections of United States' Senators, which ex- 
 hibit the same voting of a convened body, have afforded ex- 
 amples of repeated ballotings sufficient to disgust all intelligent 
 
36 
 
 and patriotic thinkers with such a method of reaching an ex- 
 pression of " the people's will." Thus the repeated ballotings 
 of a convention may become such a farce, that even the actors 
 themselves would often willingly retire from it in disgust. 
 Finally, when the yielding begins new combinations arise, and 
 the changing from one candidate to another spreads as an in- 
 fection, and the delegates on the A., B., G. end of the list, 
 finding themselves outwitted by the X., Y., Z. delegates, seek 
 to avert this strategy by changing their votes before the result 
 of the ballot has been announced. This in turn provokes 
 other clamorous changes until the farce seems to have ended 
 in an inglorious riot. 
 
 To recapitulate: the Delegate System as a method of find- 
 ing the candidate upon whom a majority of the individual vo- 
 ters will first concur, is illogical and fallacious for the reasons : 
 
 First. Because primary delegates are elected by a simple di- 
 rect vote, they need only be the representatives of local ma- 
 jorities, or, quite often of mere pluralities of the whole body 
 of party voters. And when a district is accorded two or more 
 delegates, all of these delegates may be determined by a mere 
 majority, or even by a small plurality of the voters of the dis- 
 trict. 
 
 Secondly. Because a convention of these delegates repre- 
 sents but added majorities, or often, but added pluralities 
 among the whole number of party voters, and, as added ma- 
 jorities still make but a majority of the whole number, while 
 added pluralities may be but a small minority of the whole 
 number of voters, a majority of this body of delegates acting 
 in secret concert, in making a party nomination or in selecting 
 secondary delegates, need but represent a trifle over one-half 
 of a majority, or often, but one-half of a minority of the party 
 voters. 
 
 Thirdly. Because the whole body of these secondary, that 
 is, State or National delegates, selected by secretly concerted 
 action, may thus together represent but one-fourth of the in- 
 dividual party voters, or even less when primary delegates 
 have been elected by pluralities, a majority of their number 
 
37 
 
 in making State or National nominations, need only be the 
 representatives of one-eighth, or, even less of the party voters. 
 
 Fourthly. As the only true significance of a convention is 
 that it affords the opportunity to make repeated ballotings,and 
 because there can be no fixed rule to decide when a delegate 
 in voting should adopt a second choice, as the adoption of a 
 second choice by a delegate is to vote against his first choice 
 with as much force as against the most objectionable candidate 
 on the list, the repeated ballotings of a convention are but 
 repeated trials, each independent of the other, and conse- 
 quently give the whole method of solving the problem the 
 character of a game of chance. 
 
 Again, this most complex method besides being illogical and 
 fallacious, has afforded opportunities for a series of evil and 
 corrupt practices. Of these we may recount : 
 
 That the delegate system requires for its management the 
 erection of a permanent party organization. 
 
 That permanent party organization establishes a body of 
 party officers or party managers who become great political 
 " bosses 11 and their servile " henchmen. 11 
 
 That the management of the permanent party organization 
 and control of the delegate system, affords these " bosses 11 and 
 their assistants an opportunity to aid selfish and corrupt office- 
 seekers in securing the party nomination. 
 
 That corrupt office-seekers and party " bosses 11 and party 
 workers in their employ meet in caucuses and " set up 11 the 
 primary delegates. 
 
 That they secure the election of these delegates by making 
 promises of favors, by purchase, and by using if necessary 
 all the tricks which go to make the voice of small pluralities 
 effective through delegating. 
 
 That these office-seekers barter for with promises, purchase 
 and own, or otherwise corruptly secure a sufficient number 
 of delegates to determine their own nomination ; or, by cau- 
 cuses and secret conferences and bargainings " set up 11 and 
 secure the election of such secondary delegates as are under 
 their control. 
 
 That office-seekers are aided further by party officers or 
 
38 
 
 managers, through their control of the temporary and more 
 complete organization of the convention of delegates, and by 
 the arbitrary rulings of its committees appointed by these 
 officers. 
 
 That office-seekers promise to repay delegates, and party 
 managers, and party workers throughout, with appoint- 
 ments to office in the government employ, with favorable or 
 special legislation, with executive clemency or favor, or with 
 some form of government patronage or benefit. 
 
 That by the secret and concerted bargainings of office- 
 seekers with great party bosses, committee-men, and party 
 workers, so much is known in advance of the probable work- 
 ings of a State or National convention, that nominations to 
 come from these conventions are often "slated" 1 and popular- 
 ized through a subsidiary public press, long before the formal 
 convention has met arid ratified them. Finally, that the suc- 
 cess of these evil practices intended to pervert the popular 
 will, is greatly favored by the complete disgust, distrust and 
 " apathy" of a large proportion of the most intelligent and pa- 
 triotic voters, who neglect and wholly decline to take any part 
 in this system, which they recognize as in some way con- 
 tinually affording great odds against honesty and patriotic 
 intent. 
 
 These recountings are indeed but a faint outline of the ac- 
 tual practices connected with this most complex system of 
 delegating and re-delegating, for the system includes a con- 
 tinual resort to caucuses, and conferences, and unit rules, and 
 recognizes the demand for rotation in office, all of which com- 
 bine to defeat and completely subvert the people's will. 
 
 There yet remains to discuss the peculiarly existing relation- 
 ship between the people, and this delegate system. The fact 
 is notorious and seemingly paradoxical, that a large proportion 
 of the most intelligent and patriotic citizens, entrusted with the 
 sovereignty of this free government, accede to the use of this 
 delegate system in making party nominations, and yet for 
 themselves take no part in it. Superficial political philoso- 
 phers make of this fact a periodical duty to rebuke these or- 
 der loving citizens for their " apathy," and persistent refusal to 
 
39 
 
 take any part in the party primary or delegate elections. These 
 philosophers urge with well fortified arguments, that " this 
 country is governed at the party primaries, 5 ' and that, " who- 
 ever controls the primaries of the dominant party governs the 
 country." Intelligent citizens are forced to accede to these as- 
 sertions, being well aware that selfish office-seekers and cor- 
 rupt party managers control the party primaries, and thus con- 
 trol the government of the country. Yet these honest citizens 
 accede to the use of this delegate system because they have 
 known of no other method of reaching concerted action ; 
 while at the same time they are forced from disgust and dis- 
 trust to take no part in this system, knowing from experience, 
 that it continually affords the greatest odds in favor of a few 
 corrupt office-seekers and party managers acting in secret con- 
 cert. 
 
 Verily, has the long habit of not thinking this system of 
 delegating to be wrong, given to it the superficial appearance 
 of being right. And because honest and patriotic citizens 
 have not known that it is possible to avoid it, and have not 
 known of the true method of solving the problem before them, 
 they have acceded to the delegate system and from its appa- 
 rent necessity have defended it. 
 
 In further evidence of the people's actual distrust and con- 
 demnation, it is safe to say that a large majority of the most 
 patriotic and intelligent of the sovereign voters, have long since 
 ceased to take any active part in the delegate or party primary 
 elections. In some districts they allow the election of delegates 
 to go by default. In others, they submit at once to the ap- 
 pointment of delegates by the party officers or managers. 
 Added to these facts as if to increase the seeming paradox, 
 there has recently developed the organizing of vigilant com- 
 mittees^ made up of honest citizens who go a step further in 
 practically condemning that which they also accede to. These 
 honest voters satisfy themselves by organizing and condemn- 
 ing or renouncing the party nominations, when they are found 
 to be too evidently corrupt, after they have been made by the 
 party managers or "bosses" by means of this delegate system. 
 
 Of these, the " Committee of 100," organized in the city of 
 
40 
 
 Philadelphia, and intended for the purpose of reforming its 
 municipal politics, furnishes a conspicuous example. This 
 body of men, made up of voters originally identified with one 
 of the two great political parties, found from long experience 
 that no effort of theirs, however large their numbers, could 
 succeed against the secret and concerted action of a corrupt 
 few engaged in the management of the system of delegating in 
 making party nominations. 
 
 Knowing of no method whereby large numbers could reach 
 concerted action except by delegating, and knowing from ex- 
 perience that to resort to delegating they must submit to a 
 corruption and perversion of their purpose ; they have sought, 
 by arbitrarily limiting their number so that they may practi- 
 cally convene, and so that each may have a direct voice, first, 
 to publicly rebuke the evidently corrupt nominations of their 
 own political party ; next, to give a preference to, and pub- 
 licly urge the support of the candidate of the opposing party, 
 when this party's candidate is much the preferable of the two 
 nominations ; and finally, to condemn both party nominations 
 and urge a candidate of their own naming, and upon " the peo- 
 ple's recommendation" when both the party candidates are evi- 
 dently too corrupt to be safely entrusted with the official 
 place. 
 
 This Committee of citizens by the force of their good name, 
 being recognized as among the foremost in patriotism, in in- 
 telligence, and in honesty of purpose, have largely succeeded, 
 not in directing or influencing the successive steps in the man- 
 agement of the delegate system in making party nominations, 
 buf^ when they have been supported by the authority and 
 following of the honest masses, they have held a scepter 
 over, and have been ready to strike down these party nomina- 
 tions, the product of the corrupt management of this delegate 
 system, whenever and wherever it seemed in their judgment 
 to be too great a perversion of the people's will. 
 
 Thus has it been, that this u Committee" although acceding 
 to the apparent necessity of making use of this delegate sys- 
 tem in making party nominations, have for themselves denied 
 its use or safety. And, because they have not known of the 
 
41 
 
 true method of finding the will of a concurring majority, and 
 of thus avoiding this delegate system and its evils, they have 
 satisfied themselves with the duty of guarding against wholly 
 corrupt and bad nominations being forced upon them. They 
 accede to a system which permits a few men, having much 
 less intelligence and honesty, and hence, whose patriotic im- 
 pulses and political responsibilities are much inferior, to their 
 own, to make the party nominations ; and are satisfied to 
 come after these party " bosses," and managers of the dele- 
 gate system, and rebuke these nominations and substitute 
 others, when the popular conviction makes it possible for them 
 to do so. 
 
 The same questions, concerning the need for " political re- 
 form" have largely reached the people in their state capacities ; 
 and very recently great revolts have developed against the 
 control of a corrupt few who have long usurped the manage- 
 ment of the dominant party in making its nominations. Igno- 
 rant that the true source of the evil was because the delegate 
 system is illogical and fallacious, and hence must always af- 
 ford an opportunity for the corrupt control of a few, this ques- 
 tion took the nature of an unintelligible dispute, whether " Re- 
 form" should be secured from " within the party," or, whether 
 it must come from "without the party." As true reform could 
 only come from blotting out the use, and with it the abuse of 
 this delegate system, and, as neither the defenders from within, 
 nor the arraigners from without knew how to avoid its use ; 
 and as both factions still acceded to it, those from within ac- 
 cepting its usual corrupt fruit, and those from without resorting 
 to a similar method sure to bring an uncertain or corrupt re- 
 sult, the dispute convinced none, but succeeded in dividing the 
 ranks of the dominant party, and thus, in several instances per- 
 mitted the concerted efforts of the opposing party to defeat 
 them. 
 
 Great and growing, has been the demand for some method 
 of securing political reform, and innumerable schemes have 
 been devised to achieve it. New parties have been proposed 
 to supercede old ones. A change from one old party to the 
 other has been suggested. A general outcry against political 
 
42 
 
 " Bossism" has been indulged in. Numerous rules to regulate 
 and conduct the delegate system have been devised and 
 adopted ; and legislative enactments have been sought to en- 
 force, and to punish the breaking of these rules. Numerous 
 schemes and laws have been devised to remedy the great list 
 of evils resulting from this system of delegating in making party 
 nominations. Of these, laws to prevent corrupt influences 
 being used in primary as well as in general elections. Laws to 
 prevent corrupt influences from being used to determine legis- 
 lation. Laws to prevent corrupt influences from being used 
 to secure executive and judicial favors. Laws to reform or 
 improve the management of the civil service appointments, 
 and to prevent the assessment of civil service office holders for 
 partisan political purposes ; and yet, not one or all of these 
 together have made the first step toward securing political re- 
 form. And why? 
 
 Simply because the people have not known where the 
 source of the evil existed, and remedies have not been di- 
 rected against the true source or cause of these evils. And, 
 because all these schemes have been attempts to reform the 
 motives and acts of men, already enjoying high political posi- 
 tions, and who have been purposely engaged in corrupt and 
 selfish designs. And still further, because the opportunities 
 remain open, and constantly afford such men a greatly favored 
 chance to reap a rich harvest from their selfish and corrupt 
 practices. 
 
 Political reform can never come from " reform legislation " 
 by such men. True reform must come from a more intelli- 
 gent and honest selection of truly representative officials by 
 the people. True political reform can only come when the 
 people of this government have learned the true method of 
 solving the problem presented at the very foundation of its 
 structure. When they have learned that the problem of find- 
 ing a candidate for office upon whom a majority of the whole 
 body of voters will first concur, can only be truthfully solved 
 by the proposed method of direct voting, by the whole people. 
 
 Surely the time is at hand, when patriotism should demand 
 a more honest and economical management of our govern- 
 
43 
 
 mental affairs. The time is at hand, when intelligence should 
 demand a more careful and philosophical inquiry into the 
 causes of our rapidly increasing political corruption. And, is 
 not the time at hand when intelligent citizens, acknowledging 
 themselves the responsible sovereigns of a free government, 
 should at once inquire, why they are submitting to a method 
 of procedure at the very foundation of their governmental 
 structure, which they themselves distrust and avoid, and which 
 they well know, that by avoiding, places the power of governing 
 in the hands of selfish and designing men? 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE EVILS OF PERMANENT PARTY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 To arraign the practice of permanently organizing into oppo- 
 sing political parties, as being unnatural, needless, and harmful; 
 as being dangerously opposed to the very principles underlying 
 our unity and harmony, and, as being a practice which is con- 
 tinually threatening to destroy our patriotism and love of true 
 political freedom, will at once set up a formidable outcry in 
 defence of custom ; for a long habit of not thinking the per- 
 manently organizing of political parties among us to be wrong, 
 has given it the superficial appearance of being right. 
 
 Logically, party organizations permanently dividing the people 
 of a free government have no natural or rightful existence. Nor 
 would permanent parties limited to two, be found dividing the 
 people of this country, were they not a necessary means 
 for the management of the delegate system. 
 
 It is indeed true that great political principles and public 
 causes are only advanced by the concerted action of those who 
 seek the same great end ; and, it is also true that this may be 
 well effected by organized party action. Great schemes of ad- 
 vancement and of general good, may often only be successfully 
 achieved, by being persistently presented to a large number of 
 people. Even the organizing of a great party may be the best 
 and most effectual method of reaching successful concerted 
 action. But a party organization, after having achieved success 
 in the cause which brought it into existence, may, by perma- 
 nently organizing and falling into the hands of a few party 
 managers, become as dangerous a power for evil as it was pri- 
 marily a power for good. It is indeed unnatural that this 
 
45 
 
 same body of voters should continue to act concertedly upon all 
 other issues or questions that may thereafter concern the pub- 
 lic welfare. Nay more, lo be thus permanently linked in party 
 action must necessarily destroy the individuality of the voter, 
 and, losing his personal responsibility, he soon finds himself a 
 mere puppet to be used by scheming political leaders in selfish 
 party contentions. 
 
 The spirit of compact entered into by the whole people in 
 establishing our free government, made no provision and 
 recognized no conceivable necessity for the development of 
 permanent party organizations, or, for permanently opposing 
 divisions among the voting masses. The condition is unnatural, 
 even much more, is prejudicial, and has long proven itself a 
 corroding canker, a veritable curse upon the vital principles 
 underlying our compact of liberty, equality and political inde- 
 pendence. Just as a corporation of stock-holders find that a 
 permanently organized " ring" within their numbers becomes 
 a selfish conclave, prejudicial to the best interests of the whole 
 body, so has the usurpation of our government by either per- 
 manent party organization developed a selfish, extravagant and 
 arrogantly autocratic rule, instead of the economical republican 
 government vouchsafed to us by an honest obedience to the 
 popular will. 
 
 To those who still seek a precedent for our laws and methods 
 of governing, or find sufficient defence for a custom because 
 the same exists in some. similar form in the older and monar- 
 chical governments of Europe, a very brief answer must be 
 sufficient. Opposing political parties among the people of a 
 limited monarchy, by whatever name they may be known, 
 whether Whig or Radical, Tory or Conservative, have but the 
 one significance, that of a contest in defence of popular rights 
 on the one part, against the usurpations of a monarchy and 
 its aristocracy on the other. However modified by a variety 
 of surroundings, the issue there is a permanent one, and will be 
 such, so long as intelligence and the spirit of human justice 
 urges men to oppose, and defend themselves against the op- 
 pression of a few, having the temporary power to deny and 
 
-46 
 
 withhold from their fellows the equal rights given to all men 
 by their creator. 
 
 Wherever there exists any grade of monarchy, or of a pro- 
 tected aristocracy, or oligarchy, or any form of government 
 whatsoever, distinguishing in favor of one class of its people 
 and correspondingly oppressing another class, there will be a 
 permanent contest on the one hand, for the just and equal 
 rights of man, and on the other, for a continuation of the op- 
 portunity of those in power to selfishly oppress their fellows. 
 There can be no such an issue as this among freemen. Nor 
 can any other issue having a permanent character, exist among 
 a people respecting the equal rights of men. A free govern- 
 ment is a compact, it implies an agreement between the whole 
 mass of people, and so long as the compact exists the agree- 
 ment to abide by the will of a concurring majority when 
 clearly and truthfully expressed, is its fundamental law. A 
 monarchical government on the contrary is a perpetual contest, 
 wherein the rich and powerful are continually aiming to 
 aggrandize their wealth and power, and secure these at the ex- 
 pense of, and by oppressing the weaker and more ignorant 
 classes. Intelligence and the desire for political liberty are the 
 weapons which must sooner or later decide this long and un- 
 equal contest in favor of universal freedom for all mankind. 
 
 Permanent parties, therefore, among the people of a mon- 
 archy are natural, and one at least is justifiable, so long as the 
 issue in defence of political liberty remains. Parties among a 
 free people though, can have no permanent issue to defend, 
 and can have no natural or just cause for permanent existence ; 
 but on the contrary, permanent party organizations dividing 
 the people of this government have proven to be the source of 
 great and increasing political evils among us. 
 
 Permanent party organizations among a free people are un- 
 natural, because a permanent political division of the people is 
 directly opposed to the principles of unity and harmony under- 
 lying their compact ; and, because permanent parties greatly 
 destroy that loyalty and love which the citizens of a free 
 country owe to their government. Permanent party organiza- 
 tions have developed a spirit of contest, which takes the place 
 
47 
 
 of, and completely subverts the true principles of unity and 
 fellowship which should bind us together in one great national 
 compact, founded on political freedom and political equality. 
 
 It has already been shown that permanent party organiza- 
 tions are needless. First, That the great mass of voters have 
 been reduced to two contending parties, because a simple direct 
 vote without the opportunity to make any provision for further 
 concurring at our final elections, limits the actual contest to 
 that between the strongest two of the parties in the field, and 
 hence, soon reduces the voters to two contending parties. And 
 further, that parlies have become permanently organized in 
 order to conduct the delegate system with its conventions, con- 
 ferences, caucuses and so on, as a method supposed to be 
 necessary in determining upon a party candidate. But the 
 problem of finding the will of a concurring majority has been 
 shown to admit of but one truthful method of solution, and 
 that, by a single direct election by the whole body of voters, 
 and by a plan which gives each voter an opportunity to name 
 one or more provisional choices in order that a majority may 
 finally concur. 
 
 That permanent party organizations have been the source of 
 much more that is evil may be as readily shown. They have 
 substituted a love of party for love of country ; have made the 
 selfish desire to rule, a measure of patriotism ; and, by as 
 much as they have debased the true spirit of patriotism, the 
 spirit of unselfishness, of equal justice .and of honesty, by sub- 
 stituting party for country, they have introduced the worst 
 forms of corruption, of dishonesty and political trickery into 
 the securing of political offices, by party methods, and for per- 
 sonal ends. Permanent party organizations contesting for 
 power, soon discovered " that to the victors belong the spoils ;" 
 and making "spoils" out of the distribution of official places, 
 and out of every conceivable form of government patronage 
 or favor, soon developed a class of political office-seekers, 
 party leaders and party managers, whose lives are devoted to 
 the securing of public offices. 
 
 The greatest contests for place, are in the primary or personal 
 contests for nomination, and here, in the field of opportunities 
 
48 
 
 afforded for the manipulation of the delegate system, at its 
 caucuses, its delegate elections, its conventions, its conferences 
 and so on, are waged the personal conflicts of office-seekers, 
 with but little respect for the popular will. 
 
 The managers or leaders of each permanent party organiza- 
 tion periodically present a party platform, " principles" so 
 called which are to be defended against those presented by 
 the opposing party. In the absence of questions or issues 
 which have an actual significance, and upon which the people 
 are actually divided in their opinions, mere platitudes, and 
 charges and counter-charges of former political wrongs are 
 spread forth upon the banner of each party in the contest. No 
 matter how little of interest the mass of party voters may 
 have in concert, nay more, no matter how much the individual 
 voters of the party may represent opposing interests, they are 
 expected to act in harmony and accept the party fiat, as well 
 as support the party candidate or nomination for office. 
 
 A party organization may have had its birth in the concerted 
 action of a body of voters aiming to secure a most honorable 
 and just political principle or measure; but, after having 
 achieved its purpose, and having adopted a party name, this 
 very name with its augury of further party success, at once 
 becomes the watchword and hope of scheming party leaders. 
 The history of our government has been the alternate succes- 
 sion in power of two great political parties. The success and 
 continuance of a party in power has not been limited by the 
 achievement of the purpose which called it into existence, but, 
 by reason of the necessity for its permanent organization, in 
 order to conduct the delegate method of making party nomi- 
 nations, it has continued in power even though its leadership 
 has surrounded its once honored name with the most selfish 
 and dishonest methods of political corruption. 
 
 It is true there is no legal restraint commanding voters to 
 continue casting their ballots in the interest of one political 
 party or the other. But their choice is limited to one of the 
 two, and often to a choice between two evils. And there has 
 been developed, through the ignorance and selfishness perma- 
 nent parties have encouraged, such an unbending social re- 
 
49 
 
 straint that but few men have been brave enough to stem the 
 social and business ostracism that has attended a change in 
 one's party, even though a voter's most sincere political con- 
 victions demanded such a change. 
 
 In the nature of things, however, every specific evil is self- 
 limiting, and permanent party organizations because of their 
 inherent corruption, finally fall by revolution. Intelligent 
 voters at first from distrust and disgust become apathetic, and 
 finally revolt against the party leadership and free themselves 
 for the time, from their self-imposed servility to a most arro- 
 gant partisan " bossism." But the same pitfalls as before are 
 awaiting the organizing of a new party, and with its prospects 
 of success it is exposed to the sinister avowals of sympathy, 
 from a crafty volunteer leadership, whose selfish aim is an op- 
 portunity to manipulate the delegate system in making its 
 party nominations, and thereby succeed to the prizes of po- 
 litical office-holding. 
 
 The conflicts between permanent political parties have been 
 incessant throughout our history, and the evils of the one have 
 been the principal weapons of the other, even when these evils 
 were common to both. Patriotic citizens have been entertain- 
 ed, aye, too often have been drawn into these contests, which 
 have proven to be only the personal contests of selfish office- 
 seekers striving for places of official power and for the spoils 
 of office. Partisan leaders have so successfully entertained 
 the unwary with their harranguings and charges of evil against 
 their opponents, each party thus contending against the other, 
 that honest and patriotic, and otherwise intelligent citizens 
 have long been misled, and have too often joined in a contest 
 where they had nothing to gain, and as surely nothing to lose. 
 Party leaders have not hesitated to misrepresent the opinions 
 and aims of others, and have sought to arouse the most bitter 
 jealousies by the constant revival of the traditional errors of 
 their opponents. To offset these charges, the party out of 
 power, being on its good behavior from having no oppor- 
 tunities at hand for evil, is well prepared to point out and de- 
 fine the evils being practiced by the party in power, now 
 flushed with its spoils and successes. It is at such times, 
 
50 
 
 when the corrupt practices of a party flushed with the spoils 
 and favors of long continued office-holding, become so promi- 
 nent, and may be so well pointed out by their opponents, that 
 the mass of honest voters become thus periodically aware of 
 their unnatural association with such corrupt and unprincipled 
 leadership. Honest citizens attempt in vain to unseat these 
 party leaders, hence, in searching for lesser evils are often led 
 to join the opposing party, or else to form a new party organi- 
 zation for the sake of having new leaders. But the history of 
 permanent parties has been the same throughout. Only two 
 such opposing organizations can successfully endure, and of 
 these the one in power is necessarily for the time, the one en- 
 joying the corrupt fruit resulting from a mere contest for spoils. 
 
 Submission to party government, instead of a government 
 emanating from the whole body of citizens, is at best but a 
 government by a majority of the office-holders of the domi- 
 nant party ; and the evils of the system is shown conclusively 
 in every legislative hall throughout the land. Not a law can 
 be passed, not a measure adopted, not an order granted, not 
 even can the legislative body be organized, without submitting 
 each and every question to a party caucus. The decision of a 
 party caucus is final. To oppose the caucus decision is treason 
 to party, a crime which, if not directly punishable by a written 
 law, may be made more offensive than treason to one's 
 country. For in truth, an oath of office violated would be 
 much less certain to be punished, than would such treason to 
 a party be finally followed by an ejectment from the party 
 favor. 
 
 Our National House of Representatives cannot select its 
 speaker by a direct vote of the whole body, but must first sub- 
 mit to the caucus determination arrived at by a majority of 
 the dominant party, even though a majority of the whole body 
 of representatives would most certainly have preferred quite 
 an opposite candidate. So it is throughout with all legislation, 
 for party lines must be kept distinct, and submission to the 
 caucus of the dominant party becomes the law of the land. 
 The same contest between the two parties is found in all our 
 legislative bodies, National, State, and Municipal, and as the 
 
51 
 
 two bodies comprising our legislative assemblies may often be 
 found with one party dominant in one branch, and the other 
 party dominant in the other, each and every question having 
 the least general significance, may be lost from an inability to 
 agree. When State legislatures thus composed, are called 
 upon to elect a United States Senator, or apportion the State 
 into representative or other districts ; or decide upon any ques- 
 tion indeed, where the vantage ground of parties is in the is- 
 sue, a " dead lock " ensues ; which no amount of reasoning, 
 or warning of popular disgust or shame may be able to un- 
 loose. 
 
 All legislation is made to take a partisan course, as if a per- 
 manent autocracy was vested in the dominant party then in 
 power. 
 
 The rule of party reaches as' well to municipal affairs, and 
 here not less than in State and National issues, is the will of 
 the party caucus the fiat of authority. Throughout National, 
 State, Municipal, and even to the most subordinate of our lo- 
 cal organizations, the rule of party is the power in making all 
 appointments to office in the civil service of the country. 
 The power of appointing men to office, the opportunity to fa- 
 vor men by partisan legislation, besides the innumerable ad- 
 vantages with which a partisan administration may in one way 
 or another favor its party workers, are among the spoils and 
 plunder made use of in rewarding the victors in every party 
 strife. 
 
 Not an issue relating to our government, extending through 
 its National, State, Municipal and local sub-divisions, affecting 
 alike its legislative, executive and judicial departments, but that 
 is influenced and affected to at least some extent by the sel- 
 fish spirit of party. The election of a President of the 
 nation is a party contest, and the election of every officer from 
 the President to a town constable inclusive, is a similar party 
 contest. Every legislative act is forced to accept a partisan 
 signification. Executive officers favor party workers and dis- 
 tribute to them the spoils of office ; while even judges and ju- 
 ries have not always measured justice uninfluenced by parti- 
 
52 
 
 san surroundings. What, though the shame has been about 
 us, we have not been entirely unconscious of our guilt ! 
 
 If one permanent party contending against another perma- 
 nent party has debased our patriotism, has made the ends of 
 government a selfish scheme for plunder, with spoils as rich 
 as the most covetous grasp could desire them, then, has the 
 contests for office and favor within the party lines been a still 
 greater scene of political strife and of personal selfishness and 
 its corruption. 
 
 It has already been defined how the personal contests for 
 the party nominations have been conducted by the delegate 
 system and its series of caucuses, conventions, conferences and 
 so on. It would be impossible here to more than outline the 
 personal strivings, the selfish schemings, the corrupt bar- 
 gainings, and the deceptive and debasing methods made use 
 of to secure the coveted prizes of office. And surely, the duty 
 of reviewing them is a most distasteful one. 
 
 The organizing into permanent parties, at once places the 
 party voters under the management or direction of a series of 
 party officers and office-seekers. The securing of a party 
 office, as a committee-man, and each step higher in the service 
 of the party management, becomes a stepping-stone and an 
 advancement from which may be demanded future political 
 preferment. The party officers are not alone its managers, 
 for successful political schemers and workers, office-seekers 
 with money to bestow, and not least, an office holding com- 
 munity already in power and having many favors to distribute, 
 are reckoned high among the managers of a political party. 
 Standing highest in the order of political authority and power 
 as a party manager in his State, is very often the person hold- 
 ing the position of United States Senator. A number of these 
 United States Senators representing a few of the most popu- 
 lous States, may be regarded as an oligarchy of power in the 
 management of the party plans. From these high in power a 
 series representing office-holders and office-seekers of every 
 grade, party officers, and party-workers, and finally la- 
 borers and employes receiving some grade of partisan favor or 
 promises of favor, are all expected to work and vote in the 
 
53 
 
 interest of those whom the party designates as its candidates 
 for official recognition. 
 
 The claims for party recognition arouses often the most bit- 
 ter personal contests, and it is here the ambitious office- 
 seeker, anxious to manipulate and control all the opportuni- 
 ties for favor or vantage ground afforded by the delegate sys- 
 tem of reaching a party nomination, may find his best laid 
 schemes thwarted in a moment, by the decree of some office- 
 holder or office-seeker high in the councils of the party man- 
 agement. 
 
 A United States Senator, directed by the Constitution as one 
 of the counsellors in confirming the highest appointments to 
 office made by the President of the United States, becomes a 
 controlling power in directing the party nominations through- 
 out. Becomes in fact, the recognized great party " boss," to 
 whom minor bosses, and party workers, and party followers 
 acknowledge the most servile allegiance. 
 
 A United States Senator may, by directing through his mi- 
 nor " bosses," the party officers and party workers throughout 
 his State, " set up " and secure the election of such delegates 
 to primary conventions, or so manipulate the caucuses and 
 conferences and conventions as to secure the nomination and 
 election of such State Assemblymen and State Senators, as 
 will in return secure for him a re-election to the United States 
 Senate. The position of United States Senator is thus made 
 nearer one of autocratic power, and he is better enabled to 
 provide for his own re-election than any other officer in our 
 government. Hence he is well recognized as the great party 
 "boss." 
 
 A few of these United States Senators from the more popu- 
 lous States, acting in concert, through their great influence 
 and the opportunities for official favor under their control, are 
 enabled further, each to so order the selection of primary dele- 
 gates, and through them the selection of secondary delegates, 
 and finally, each senator may so control the delegation from 
 his State sent to the party National Nominating Convention, 
 that, by means of the u unit rule," and his acknowledged great 
 influence, he becomes the sole possessor of the voice of his 
 
54 
 
 State in making the party presidential nomination. A presi- 
 dential candidate thus placed before the people by a few of 
 these United States Senators so acting in concert, and stand- 
 ing for the support of the dominant party, becomes when 
 elected to office the pliant servant of these few men, to do 
 their bidding, and is forced by what is known as " senatorial 
 courtesy," to accept their disposal of the appointments to the 
 high offices, and their disposal of the vast political spoils and 
 favors of government patronage. 
 
 The system of party management reaches every grade of 
 official position, and the offices which are filled by appoint- 
 ment are made to purchase a control of those which are in- 
 tended to be elective, by using these appointments with other 
 spoils to repay the efforts of party managers, party delegates, 
 and party workers. Hence not only the offices of the State 
 and Nation, but including those of purely municipal and local 
 concern are made to contribute to one vast and complex sys- 
 tem of selfish partisan and personal aggrandizement. Each local 
 " boss " secures his share in the spoils of public office and pub- 
 lic plunder by servile obedience to his superiors, and by vigor- 
 ously managing the party affairs within his allotted realm. 
 Each in turn to have success must act harmoniously, and 
 together by manipulating that great engine of political evil 
 the delegate system, or party "machine" they have most suc- 
 cessfully defied and debarred the honest masses of citizens 
 from having any just part in their governmental affairs. 
 
 There is not only a common interest existing between office- 
 holders and office-seekers and party officers and party mana- 
 gers throughout, but they become a closely organized ring 
 within the party, distinct from the great mass of party followers. 
 This ring of office-seekers are in truth a secret conclave, in- 
 triguing to control the party nominations, and are stimulated 
 to the greatest activity where the party following is strong 
 enough to secure for them a final election to office. They work 
 together in the closest harmony in order to contribute to each 
 other's success, and are firmly united in their one purpose by 
 the " cohesive power of public plunder." 
 
 It has already been shown, how this ring of office-seekers 
 
55 
 
 and their partisan workers secure the strategic positions in the 
 management of the delegate system, and how they are aided 
 by the illogical nature and fallaciousness of this complex 
 system of delegating, with its caucuses, its conventions, its con- 
 ferences, its unit rules and so on, in deceiving the party follow- 
 ing and in securing the party nominations. Their next aim is 
 to masquerade as party leaders, where they loudly proclaim 
 that " fealty to party" is love of country, that the acceptation 
 of the party candidate is true loyalty and patriotism, and that 
 to " kick" against the party nomination is the worst form of 
 treason and revolution. This ring of office-seekers make the 
 party " platform," and knowing well that new issues disinte- 
 grate a party, they build a platform mainly upon the traditions 
 of the party they seek to save and permanently control ; and 
 appeal to all the former prejudices against the opposing party 
 in order to keep the party lines intact. Having gained the 
 party nominations, " fealty to party" is their watchword, and 
 party glamour and party excitement their best hope for party, 
 or, more truthfully, for personal success. 
 
 All office holding is afforded by these methods and these 
 practices an autocratic significance, and office-seeking becomes 
 a life-long profession. Buying and trading or exchanging fa- 
 vors to secure the support of the few men entrusted as dele- 
 gates, is continually practiced by corrupt men seeking for of- 
 fice. While if such men were forced to seek office directly 
 from the hands of an intelligent community of voters, having 
 their sovereign rights to defend, they would most certainly 
 and justly be denied and rebuked. So long, however, as of- 
 fice-seekers may gain the nomination of a permanent party 
 from the hands of a few men entrusted as delegates, or, what 
 is virtually the same thing, gain an election from the hands of 
 a few men entrusted as State legislators with the election of 
 United States Senators ; and so long as a nomination by a 
 dominant party is equivalent to an election, just so long will 
 selfish and scheming men strive for the spoils of office by 
 promising and purchasing these few men, and then, after gain- 
 ing office will use a part of these spoils to repay these dele- 
 
56 
 
 gates and legislators and party workers for the aid and sup- 
 port given them. 
 
 Instead of our having built up a political structure in de- 
 fence of political freedom, such as promised our fathers the 
 largest share of success in reward for their long struggle for 
 liberty, we have developed a method in the management of 
 our government by submitting to permanent party control, or 
 virtually, to a series of party " bosses " who manipulate the 
 delegate system, or party " machine'' and, thus gaining office, 
 make u spoils " and plunder out of the power given them to 
 make appointments to office, out of special legislation, and out 
 of executive as well as judicial favors, until this method and 
 this management has developed the most autocratic and sel- 
 fish schemes for the encouragement of public plundering and 
 for securing personal power. From a theory of self-govern- 
 ment which promises to mankind the best results that intelli- 
 gence and patriotism can devise, we have arrived at a practice 
 which, were it not for popular sentiment holding it in check, 
 would prove itself the most autocratic and oppressive that the 
 selfishness of men could conceive of. For, instead of the peo- 
 ple having an opportunity to select for themselves true repre- 
 sentatives, it has come to be their whole duty to defend the 
 offices of the government from the rapaciousness and usurpa- 
 tions of an organized ring of scheming and professional of- 
 fice-seekers. 
 
 Surely, indeed, the people of this country must soon learn 
 that allegiance to party is not love of country ; that partisan 
 " stalwartism" is not patriotism ; that political scheming and 
 political trickery is not statesmanship ; and that party supre- 
 macy is not the highest aim for our country's good. That the 
 claim to all the good that pertains to our government, and 
 which really originates from honest patriots among the people, 
 belongs to the party credit, is of the boldest form of effrontery 
 and of demagogism. 
 
 These recountings of the evils of permanent party organiza- 
 tion, and of the evils of the delegate system made use of in 
 making party nominations, yet meagre when compared to the 
 great mass of evil resulting from this most unnatural and 
 
57 
 
 illogical method of conducting our government, would not, 
 even if all were told, bring any new intelligence to the people, 
 were they not accompanied by, and merely offered to make 
 plain the great significance of the only true method of remov- 
 ing them. The remedy for all these evils at once, has already 
 been pointed out and shown to exist in the simple plan of so 
 conducting our elections by one direct vote of the whole body of 
 voters, that truly representative men shall be determined upon 
 to fill the offices of the government by the will of a concurring 
 majority of these voters. So that, instead of being governed 
 by mere political schemers and office-seekers, we may have 
 true statesmen to act as wise servants of the people. So that 
 indeed, we may have an honest government economically ad- 
 ministered, a true " government of the people, by the people, 
 and for the people." 
 
 I cannot refrain from presenting here some of the most 
 prophetic utterances, made use of by the great Father of his 
 country, as showing how early the evils of permanent party 
 organizations were recognized in the history of our govern- 
 ment. To quote somewhat at length from Gen. Washington's 
 farewell address, will afford an opportunity to compare the 
 wisdom of his language with the realizations of less than a 
 century which has since elapsed. 
 
 Gen. Washington said : 
 
 " In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, 
 it occurs as a matter of serious concern, that any ground 
 should have been furnished for characterizing parties by geo- 
 graphical discriminations Northern and Southern Atlantic 
 and Western ; whence designing men may endeavor to excite 
 a belief that there is a real difference of local interests and 
 views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence 
 within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and 
 aims of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much 
 against the jealousies and heart-burnings which spring from 
 these misrepresentations ; they tend to render alien to each 
 other those who ought to be bound together by paternal affec- 
 tion. . . 
 
 " To the efficacy and permanancy of your Union a govern- 
 
58 
 
 ment of the whole is indispensible. No alliance, however 
 strict between the parties, can be an adequate substitute ; they 
 must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions 
 which all alliances, in all time, have experienced. Sensible of 
 this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first 
 essay, by the adoption of a Constitution of government, better 
 calculated than your former for an intimate union, and for the 
 efficacious management of your common concerns. This gov- 
 ernment, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and 
 unawed adopted upon full investigation and mature de- 
 liberation, completely free in its principles, in the distri- 
 bution of its powers uniting security with energy, and 
 containing within itself a provision for its own amendment, 
 has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Re- 
 spect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence 
 in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims 
 of true liberty. The basis of our political system is the right 
 of the people to make and to alter their Constitutions of gov- 
 ernment ; but the Constitution which at any time exists, till 
 changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, 
 is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and 
 right of the people to establish government, presupposes the 
 duty of every individual to obey the established government. 
 
 " All obstruction to the execution of laws, all combinations 
 and associations under whatever plausible character, with the 
 real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular 
 deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are de- 
 structive to this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. 
 They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and 
 extraordinary force, to put in the place of the delegated will 
 of the nation, the will of a party, often a small but artful and 
 enterprising minority of the community ; and, according to the 
 alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public ad- 
 ministration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous 
 projects of fashion, rather than the organ of consistent and 
 wholesome plans, digested by common counsels and modified 
 by mutual interests. 
 
 " However combinations or associations of the above de- 
 
59 
 
 scription may now and then answer popular ends, they are 
 likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent en- 
 gines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will 
 be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp 
 for themselves the reins of government ; destroying, afterwards, 
 the very engines which had lifted them to unjust dominion." 
 
 Since these words were uttered, our country has experienced 
 a government largely administered by one or the other of two 
 contending parties. That we have had bitter factional strifes 
 and have experienced the evils of geographically divided parties, 
 the history we have made more than fully attests. And, it yet 
 remains for future historians to unravel, how much of the bit- 
 terness and animosity the crimination and recrimination, 
 which finally led to our recent terrible and prolonged civil war, 
 should be traced to the ambition and designs of unprincipled 
 men willing to lead in party organization, and not unwilling, for 
 the sake of acquiring power and influence, to misrepresent the 
 opinions and aims of others, or, to use any and all the means 
 at their command, to engender jealousies and even to create 
 open and bloody strife. The true historian inquiring into the 
 subtle influences and causes of that prolonged and bloody war 
 between the people of a common country, will find much less 
 of a field of inquiry, in determining which of the two great 
 geographically divided parties opposing each other, was the 
 greater in the wrong, than he will find awaiting him, a field of 
 inquiry into how much that war was engendered and prolonged, 
 by animosities and by selfishness developed and stimulated 
 into a persistent existence by the ambition and schemings of 
 unprincipled leaders. And still further, as the history of party 
 organizations since the great war, is written on, will the future 
 reader be enabled to recognize how well the true Father of his 
 country prophesied, when he warned us, that, " party organiza- 
 tions are likely in the course of time and things to become 
 potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled 
 men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and 
 to usurp for themselves the reins of government." 
 
 Continuing with his solicitude for the future welfare of his 
 countrymen, General Washington said : 
 
60 
 
 " 1 have already intimated to you the danger of parties in 
 the state with particular reference to the founding of them on 
 geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more com- 
 prehensive view, and warn you, in the most solemn manner, 
 against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. 
 
 " This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, 
 having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. 
 It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less 
 stifled, controlled, or repressed ; but in those of the popular 
 form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst 
 enemy. 
 
 u The alternate domination of one faction over another, 
 sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissensions, 
 which, in different ages and countries, has perpetrated the 
 most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But 
 this leads, at length, to a more formal and permanent despotism. 
 The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the 
 minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute 
 power of an individual ; and sooner or later, the chief of some 
 prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his com- 
 petitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own ele- 
 vation on the ruins of public liberty. 
 
 " Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind 
 (which, nevertheless, ought not to be entirely out of sight), the 
 common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are 
 sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to 
 discourage and restrain it. 
 
 "It serves always to distract the public councils, and en- 
 feeble the public administration. It agitates the community 
 with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms ; kindles the ani- 
 mosity of one part against another ; foments, occasionally, riot 
 and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and 
 corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government 
 itself, through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy 
 and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and 
 will of another. 
 
 "There is an opinion that parties, in free countries, are 
 useful checks upon the administration of the government, and 
 
61 
 
 serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This, within certain 
 limits, is probably true ; and in governments of a monarchical 
 cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, 
 upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, 
 in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be en- 
 couraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will 
 always be enough of that spirit for every salutory purpose. 
 And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to 
 be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A 
 fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to pre- 
 vent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it 
 should consume." 
 
 I have quoted so much and at length of this great man's 
 wise and prophetic words, not more for the purpose of analyz- 
 ing their significance and their application to the history we 
 have made since they were uttered, than to present them as a 
 most logical and forcible warning, which may yet be applied to 
 the dangers from permanent party organizations continuing 
 among us. 
 
 Had the framers of our National Constitution known how to 
 reach the will of a majority of the whole people by a single 
 direct election, and without resorting to the delegate system, it 
 is possible that many of the evils and corrupt practices which 
 have so often thwarted the success of that great national idea, 
 of a government by a majority of the whole people, would 
 have been averted. Without a knowledge of the true solution 
 of this problem of finding the will of a concurring majority of 
 the whole body of voters, there has been a recourse to the 
 complex system of delegating, and as a necessary part of the 
 machinery in order to conduct this system, there have been de- 
 veloped, permanent party organizations ; while the evils of per- 
 manent party organizations in turn, have developed their 
 rankest growth in our midst. 
 
 Since the beginning, party conflicts have been unceasing ; a 
 great civil war has been waged and ended ; and men are still 
 contesting for power and place and for the opportunity to con- 
 trol the patronage of the government of this vast and rapidly 
 growing nation of people. As a people, we have been favored 
 
62 
 
 by resources and opportunities beyond all comparison. We 
 have grown wealthy and intelligent and have advanced in most 
 everything that compares the greatness of one nation of people 
 with another. In all, save in the science of government and 
 in the defence of our political freedom, have we advanced 
 more rapidly than has any other nation upon the earth. In 
 the management of our free inheritance, however, what have 
 we added? Surely but little, except at a cost which would be 
 fabulous indeed, were it the result of a monarchy. We have 
 developed and conducted a method of government, of which 
 we may claim that it has grown great and cumbersome, and 
 not a little oppressive, and which has succeeded in keeping an 
 economical and industrious people constantly agitated and an- 
 noyed, with the ill-founded jealousies and conflicts of partisan 
 leaders and office-seekers. We have, not added in the least to 
 the patriotism and honesty of our fathers, and, if we have suc- 
 ceeded in maintaining our right to civil and political liberty, we 
 have developed a method in our efforts at conducting a govern- 
 ment, which should protect and defend these rights, but, 
 which has indeed, thus far debased the high hopes and proud 
 inspirations, always so fondly promised to a true government 
 by popular rule. We have, indeed, so far failed in establishing 
 a truly representative government wherein the rights of all are 
 equally protected, that ours now stands before the world to be 
 judged by the side of monarchies and aristocracies and other 
 autocratic governments wherein the masses are in constant 
 conflict with the usurpations and oppressions of the governing 
 powers. 
 
 That the people are awakening to these truths, the writings 
 and warnings of honest and intelligent thinkers among our 
 citizens are daily bearing more and more evidence. It would 
 be impossible here, to trace from the beginning the public ex- 
 pressions of leading men who have pointed out the defects and 
 evils of the successive dynasties of permanent party organiza- 
 tions, which have held sway almost continuously since our 
 government has existed. Nor is it necessary, for all that has been 
 said, and all that has been done, either in the defence of parties, 
 or in an arraignment of them, has been in ignorance that it 
 
63 
 
 was possible to solve the first problem which arises in con- 
 ducting a free government, without resorting to, or submitting 
 to permanently opposing party organizations. Hence to point 
 out the true intent and signification of a truly representative 
 government, such as was proposed and defended at the begin- 
 ing by Washington and other unselfish patriots ; and then to 
 show, that the election of such men as truly represent a ma- 
 jority of the whole people may be with certainty effected, 
 without resorting to the delegate system, and without resorting 
 to permanent party organizations ; and hence, without submit- 
 ting to the evils and corrupt practices belonging to these 
 methods, has been the aim, and has afforded the sufficient pur- 
 pose for the presentation of this work. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD 
 BE ELECTED AT ONE DIRECT ELECTION BY THE 
 WHOLE PEOPLE. 
 
 AND, 
 
 UNITED STATES SENATORS SHOULD BE ELECTED AT ONE DIRECT ELEC- 
 TION BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE. 
 
 In presenting a proposition which contemplates a change or 
 an amendment of our National Constitution, it is well to con- 
 sider : 
 
 First, The exact intent and purpose of the clause or parts 
 of the instrument to which the proposed change applies. 
 
 Secondly, To make sure that the existing language, or, that 
 the methods which the Constitution directs, fail to secure that 
 intent. 
 
 And finally, To be equally certain, that the proposed change 
 will better secure the ends aimed at, or else secure an end, 
 still more in harmony with the great purpose of establishing 
 a truly representative government emanating from the peo- 
 ple's will. 
 
 To discover the true intent of the founders of our Constitu- 
 tion, no better means is afforded than to analyze carefully the 
 language used by them during its consideration, and leading to 
 its adoption. 
 
 That the authors and framers of the Constitution were 
 divided in sentiment, and, that the language of the instrument 
 shows the evidence of its being a compromise upon questions 
 establishing the source of governmental authority, or, upon 
 the methods it directs for electing the superior officers of the 
 government, has afforded constitutional reviewers and ex- 
 
65 
 
 pounders, opportunities to give it varied interpretations, ac- 
 cording as they have sympathized with the sentiments of one 
 or another of the convention that framed it. But it must be 
 remembered that it was the people who ordained the Constitu- 
 tion, and, whether or not, we accede to the literal language of 
 its text, the true signification of its spirit and purpose is that 
 which is given it at any time by the people of the nation. 
 
 The spirit or intent of the Constitution as embodied in its 
 preamble, undoubtedly makes the people the source of all 
 governmental authority, for it says, that, " We the people of 
 the United States" for certain purposes named " do ordain 
 and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." 
 As the people through their representatives, were thus ac- 
 knowledged to have ordained and established the Constitution, 
 and, as they have also the power to amend it, and still further, 
 since the spirit of popular rule has been so fully aroused, it is 
 indeed safe at this time to assume, that this nation of people 
 recognize in themselves the only true source of all govern- 
 mental authority. And to assume further, that, whatever 
 duties the people may delegate to others, it is because the 
 method is supposed to be a necessity, or else a matter of ex- 
 pediency. 
 
 * At the Convention which met to frame a Constitution for 
 the United States, the delegates from Virginia under the 
 guidance of Madison had prepared "a plan for a national 
 government." This plan formed the basis or a starting point 
 for the erection of the new Constitution. It contained among 
 other propositions, one, that " ' The national legislature 
 ought to consist of two branches, of which the members of 
 the first or democratic house ought to be elected by the peo- 
 ple of the several states ; of the second, by those of the first, 
 out of persons nominated by the individual legislatures. 1 " 
 And another proposition that there should be, u ' A national 
 executive, chosen by the national legislature, etc.' " 
 
 On the question of a method of electing the two branches 
 of the legislature coming before the convention, a variety of 
 
 * Notes fram Bancroft's History of the Constitution. 
 
66 
 
 opinions were expressed ; " ' Without the confidence of the 
 people,' said James Wilson of Pennsylvania, ; no government, 
 least of all a republican government, can long subsist ; nor 
 ought the weight of the state legislatures to be increased by 
 making them the electors of the national legislature.' Madi- 
 son, though for the senate, the executive, and the judiciary 
 he approved of refining popular appointments by successive 
 4 filtrations,' " THAT is, BY DELEGATED AUTHORITY, "held the 
 popular election of one branch of the national legislature in- 
 dispensable to every plan of free government." 
 
 In the debates of the convention upon the question of how 
 the executive of the United States should be chosen, a variety 
 of methods were proposed. The historian recounts these, to 
 wit : " Should it be chosen directly by the people ? or by 
 electors ? or by state legislatures ? or by the executives of the 
 states ? or by one branch of the national legislature ? or by 
 both branches ? And, if by both, by joint or concurrent bal- 
 lot ? or by lot ? 
 
 "Here the convention marched and countermarched for want 
 of guides," says Bancroft. "Sherman, controlled by the 
 precedents of the confederacy, suggested that : ' the legisla- 
 ture are the best judges of the business to be done by the 
 executive, and should be at liberty from time to time to ap- 
 point one or more, as experience may dictate.' ' 
 
 After " the convention had agreed to clothe the executive 
 ' with power to carry into effect the national laws and to ap- 
 point to offices in cases not otherwise provided for,' Wilson 
 said : ' Chimerical as it may appear in theory, I am for an 
 election by the people. Experience in New York and Massa- 
 chusetts shows that an election of the first magistrate by the 
 people at large is both a convenient and a successful mode. 
 The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose 
 merits have general notoriety.' ' I,' replied Sherman, l am for 
 its appointment by the national legislature, and for making it 
 absolutely dependent on that body whose will it is to execute. 
 An independence of the executive on the supreme legislature 
 is the very essence of tyranny.' 
 
 "How to choose the executive," continues the historian, 
 
67 
 
 " remained the perplexing problem. Wilson, borrowing an 
 idea from the constitution of Maryland, proposed that electors 
 chosen in districts of the several states should meet and elect 
 the executive by ballot, but not from their own body. He 
 deprecated the intervention of the states in its choice. Mason 
 favored the idea of choosing the executive by the people ; 
 Rutledge, by the national senate. Gerry set in a clear light that 
 the election by the national legislature would keep up a con- 
 stant intrigue between that legislature and the candidates ; 
 nevertheless, Wilson's motion was at that time supported only 
 by Pennsylvania and Maryland ; and, from sheer uncertainty 
 what else to do, the convention left the choice of the execu- 
 tive to the national legislature." 
 
 On the question whether the power of removal of the exe- 
 cutive should be given to the national legislature, " ' The mak- 
 ing the executive the mere creature of the legislature,' replied 
 Mason, ' is a violation of the fundamental principle of good 
 government.' '' 
 
 On the question " of electing the first branch of the legisla- 
 ture by the legislatures of the states, and not by the people," 
 being revived, " 'Vigorous authority,' insisted Wilson, ' should 
 flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority, 
 the people. Representation ought to be the exact transcript 
 of the whole society ; it is made necessary only because it is 
 impossible for the people to act collectively.' .... 
 
 "'Under the existing confederacy,' said Mason, ' congress 
 represent the states, and not the people of the states; their 
 acts operate on the states, not on individuals. In the new 
 plan of government the people will be represented ; they 
 ought, therefore, to choose the representatives. Improper 
 elections in many cases are inseparable from republican 
 governments. But compare, these with the advantage of this 
 form, in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human 
 nature !' .......... 
 
 " ' It is essential to the democratic rights of the community,' 
 said Hamilton, enouncing a principle which he upheld with 
 unswerving consistency, ' that the first branch be directly 
 elected by the people.' ' The democratic principle,' Mason re- 
 
68 
 
 peated, l must actuate one part of the government. It is the 
 only security for the rights of the people.' ' An election by 
 the legislature,' pleaded Rutledge, 'would be a more refining 
 process.' ' The election of the first branch by the people,' 
 said Wilson, ' is not the corner-stone only, but the foundation 
 of the fabric.' " 
 
 On recurring to the subject, the historian further recounts, 
 that: "The mode of electing the president long baffled the 
 convention ; and was reached only just before its close. . . 
 
 " The Virginia plan confided the choice of the executive to 
 the national legislature. ' An election by the national legisla- 
 ture,' objected Gouverneur Morris, 'will be the work of intrigue, 
 of cabal, of corruption, and of faction ; it will be like the elec- 
 tion of a pope by a conclave of cardinals ; of a king by the 
 diet of Poland ; real merit will rarely be the title to the ap- 
 pointment.' He moved for an election by the ' citizens of the 
 United States.' Wilson insisted on an election by the people ; 
 should no one have a majority, then, and then only, the legis- 
 lature might decide between the candidates. On a vote being 
 taken by the convention, Pennsylvania stood alone against 
 nine states." ........ 
 
 A variety of objections were offered, and other methods 
 were proposed. Madison, McGlurg and others pointed out, 
 " that a president elected by the national legislature, and looking 
 
 to that body for re-election, would be its dependent 
 
 The discussion brought the convention unanimously to the 
 opinion that if the executive was to be chosen by the national 
 legislature, he ought not to be re-eligible." 
 
 Madison opposed an immediate choice by the people, because, 
 "'the right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the 
 northern states than in the southern ; and that the latter 
 would have no influence in the election on the score of 
 negroes.' To meet this difficulty, King revived Wilson's propo- 
 sition for the appointment of the executive by electors chosen 
 by the people expressly for the purpose ; and Madison prompt- 
 ly accepted it a's, ' on the whole, liable to fewest objections.' ' 
 But the convention decided for the time, that "the national 
 executive should be appointed by electors, proportionately dis- 
 
69 
 
 tributed among the states ; and that the electors should be 
 chosen by the state legislatures So the conven- 
 tion," continues the historian, " hoped to escape from the 
 danger of a corrupt traffic between the national legislature and 
 candidates for the executive by assemblying in one place one 
 grand electoral college, chosen by the legislatures of the several 
 states at the moment for the sole purpose of electing that 
 officer." 
 
 To this plan there at once arose the objection that it would 
 be impracticable to have electors come together, or, that 
 " * the first characters in the state would not feel sufficient 
 motives to undertake the office.' v In the language of another 
 member, u ' that men would not go to the expense and extreme 
 inconvenience of drawing together from all the states for the 
 single purpose of electing the chief magistrate.' So the conven- 
 tion in the weariness of vacillation, returned to the plan of 
 electing the national executive by the national legislature. . . 
 
 " The convention" says Bancroft, " was now like a pack 
 of hounds in full chase, suddenly losing the trail. It fell into 
 an anarchy of opinion, and one crude scheme trod on the heels 
 of another. ......... 
 
 " Wilson, seeing no way of introducing a direct election by 
 the people, made the motion, that the executive should be 
 chosen by electors to be taken from the national legislature by 
 lot. Ellsworth pointed out that to secure a candidate for re- 
 election against an improper dependence on the legislature, the 
 choice should be made by electors. Madison liked best an 
 election of the executive by the qualified part of the people at 
 large. ' Local considerations,' he said, ' must give way to the 
 general interest. As an individual from the southern states, I 
 am willing to make the sacrifice.' 
 
 " Dickinson said : ' Insuperable objections lie against an 
 election of the executive by the national legislature, or by the 
 legislatures or executives of the states. I have long leaned 
 toward an election by the people, which I regard as the 
 best and the purest source. Let the people of each 
 state choose its best citizen, and out of the thirteen names 
 
70 
 
 thus selected an executive magistrate may be chosen, either 
 by the national legislature or by electors. 1 .... 
 
 "Mason recapitulated the seven different ways that had 
 been proposed of electing the chief magistrate. And, concluded 
 that an election by the national legislature, as originally pro- 
 posed, was the best. 
 
 " Foremost in undiminished disapproval of the choice of the 
 executive by the legislature were Washington, Madison, Wilson, 
 
 Gouverneur Morris, and Gerry During the debate 
 
 Gouverneur Morris had declared : ' Of all possible modes of 
 appointing the executive, an election by the people is the best ; 
 an election by the legislature is the worst.' .... Daniel 
 Carroll, of Maryland, seconded by Wilson, renewed the motion, 
 
 that he should be elected by the people Gouverneur 
 
 Morris set forth the danger of legislative tyranny that would 
 follow from leaving the executive dependent on the legislature 
 for his election ; he dwelt once more on the ' cabal and corrup- 
 tion' which would attach to that method of choice." 
 
 The subject was finally " referred to a grand committee of 
 one from each state." In this committee it was "insisted 
 that the eventual election in case a majority of the electors 
 did not concur should be made by the senate ; and this was 
 carried by a coalition of aristocratic tendencies in Gouverneur 
 Morris and others from the large states with the passion of 
 the small states for disproportionate chances for power." 
 
 In the report of this committee " the election was confided 
 to electors to be appointed in each state as its legislature might 
 direct ; and to be equal to the whole number of its senators 
 
 and representatives in congress The electors of 
 
 each state were to meet in their respective states, and vote by 
 ballot for two persons, of whom one, at least, should not be an 
 inhabitant of the same state with themselves. The results of 
 these votes were to be sent to the senate, and there counted. 
 1 The person having the greatest number of these shall be the 
 president, if such number be a majority of that of the 
 electors ; and if there be more than one who has such a ma- 
 jority and an equal number of votes, then, that the senate 
 shall choose by ballot one of them for president ; but if no 
 
71 
 
 person has a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, 
 " the senate," shall choose by ballot the president.' .... 
 
 " Mason, who thought the insulated electoral colleges would 
 almost never unite their votes on one man, spoke earnestly : 
 1 The plan is liable to this strong objection, that nineteen times 
 in twenty the president will be chosen by the senate, an im- 
 proper body for the purpose.' . . . . 4 This subject,' said 
 Wilson, 4 has greatly divided the house, and will divide the 
 people. It is, in truth, the most difficult of all on which we 
 have had to decide. I have never made up an opinion on it 
 entirely to my own satisfaction.' The choice by electors 4 is, 
 on the whole, a valuable improvement on the former plan. It 
 gets rid of cabal and corruption ; and continental characters 
 will multiply as we more and more coalesce, so as to enable 
 the electors in every part of the union to know and judge of 
 them. It clears the way for a discussion of the question of the 
 re-eligibility of the president on its own merits, which the 
 former mode of election seemed to forbid. It may, however, be 
 better to refer the eventual appointment to the legislature than 
 to the senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than five 
 of the candidates.' 
 
 " Sherman," who had been one of the grand committee, 
 and was still " sedulously supporting the chances of the small 
 states, remarked, that if the legislature, instead of the senate, 
 were to have the eventual appointment of the president, it 
 ought to vote by states. 
 
 " Wilson spoke with singular energy, disapproving alike the 
 eventual choice of the president by the equal vote of the 
 states, and the tendency to clothe the senate with special 
 powers. He said, * I am obliged to consider the whole as hav- 
 ing a dangerous tendency to aristocracy, as throwing a dan- 
 gerous power into the hands of the senate.' .... 
 
 " ' The mutual connection of the president and senate,' said 
 Hamilton, 'will perpetuate the one and aggrandize both. I 
 see no better remedy than to let the highest number of ballots, 
 whether a majority or not, appoint the president.' " 
 
 The convention finally decided, " to transfer the eventual 
 
72 
 
 choice to the house of representatives voting by states, the 
 representation from each state having one vote." 
 
 From this very brief review of the language made use of by 
 those whose purposes were by far the most patriotic, and who 
 were foremost in the work of framing the Constitution, it can- 
 not be doubted but that they hoped to establish a true na- 
 tional government receiving its just authority from the whole 
 people. And, that while its measures and purposes should 
 apply to all the people equally in their National relationships, 
 it should not, and would not interfere with their local self- 
 government, either as states, counties, or municipalities. Time 
 has indeed shown that these sentiments and these purposes 
 have persistently prevailed, and at this time, it maybe asserted 
 that "we, the people" are demanding a true republican gov- 
 ernment, which shall be conducted by honestly selected repre- 
 sentatives of the people, and, in the interests of the people in 
 its every part. 
 
 Because the true patriots of the Convention knew of no 
 method by which a President could be elected by a " direct 
 vote of the citizens of the United States," with any certainty of 
 reaching concerted action, or of having a majority concur 
 upon one candidate, they were forced to seek some body of 
 men who could be convened, and to whom this duty could be 
 delegated. In their search for such a body, they were met by 
 numerous reasons why it would not be safe to entrust the elec- 
 tion of a President to any existing legislative body, or to either 
 of those they were about to create. With the hope of evading 
 these dangers, they finally proposed to submit the election to 
 an independent body of electors chosen expressly for the pur- 
 pose. It was then believed that these electors or delegates 
 could not conveniently meet in one grand convention where 
 they might, by repeated ballotings, finally reach a concurring 
 majority ; hence the framers of the Constitution were forced to 
 arrange for the meeting of these electors in the separate states, 
 and then, to still farther provide a final means of election, by 
 submitting the choices made by these separate bodies of elec- 
 tors, to some convened body. Of these, the House of Repre- 
 sentatives seemed to offer the fewest of evils. 
 
73 
 
 It must be admitted, that there were among the members of 
 the Convention that met to frame the Constitution, those who 
 were less patriotic and who were not willing to entrust the 
 election of the President and Vice-President, and the election of 
 United States Senators to a direct vote of the people. There 
 were those, indeed, whose persistent and selfish demands, 
 that an equal representation should be given to the smaller 
 states, and, that the legislative bodies should elect the Presi- 
 dent, showed that they had but little respect for a government 
 emanating fairly and truly from the popular will. 
 
 From a careful analysis, however, it is not more evident 
 that the final methods directed by the Constitution, for the elec- 
 tion of a President and Vice-President, and for the election of 
 United States Senators, were the result of a willing compromise 
 on the part of those who held to the democratic plan of direct 
 elections, than, that these members were forced to submit to 
 some method by which they could delegate the election of 
 these high officers to some convened body, in order to provide 
 a means for reaching concerted action. Whatever the intent 
 or purpose which prevailed then, it may be asserted without 
 fear of question, that the idea of a government emanating from 
 the direct authority of the people, has been the only one which 
 has survived throughout ; and which now, furnishes the basis 
 of the problem in conducting our republican institutions. 
 
 In analyzing still further the use or purpose of electors, and 
 the method directed by the Constitution which submits the 
 election of United States Senators to the legislatures of the 
 several states, we are forced to recognize that these electors 
 and legislators have long been regarded as having nothing 
 more than the significance of being delegates of the people. 
 And, that like delegates they may be either instructed or left 
 uninstructed. 
 
 The supposition that electors would be appointed or elected, 
 in some manner as the " legislature of a state might direct," 
 and that these electors uninstructed would be permitted to de- 
 termine upon candidates of their own choice, and ballot for a 
 President and Vice-President at their own pleasure, has long 
 since proven to have been unfounded. Permanent party or- 
 
76 
 
 dated vote, composed of all its electoral suffrages, clearly in- 
 tended that each mass of persons entitled to one elector, 
 should have the right of giving one vote, according to their 
 own sense of their own interest. 
 
 " The general ticket system now existing in ten states, was 
 the offspring of policy, and not of any disposition to give fair 
 play to the will of the people. It was adopted by the leading 
 men of those states, to enable them to consolidate the vote of 
 the state. It would be easy to prove this by referring to facts 
 of historical notoriety. It contributes to give power and con- 
 sequence to the leaders who manage the elections, but it is a 
 departure from the intention of the Constitution ; violates the 
 rights of the minorities, and is attended with many other evils. 
 
 "The intention of the Constitution is violated because it 
 was the intention of that instrument to give to each mass of 
 persons, entitled to one elector, the power of giving an elec- 
 toral vote to any candidate they preferred. The rights of mi- 
 norities are violated, because a majority of one will carry the 
 vote of the whole state. The principle is the same, whether 
 the elector is chosen by general ticket, or by legislative ballot ; 
 a majority of one, in either case, carries the vote of the whole 
 state. .... To lose their votes is the fate of all minori- 
 ties, and it is theirs only to submit ; but this is not a case of 
 votes lost, but of votes taken away, added to those of the ma- 
 jority, and given to a person to whom the minority was op- 
 posed." 
 
 It is very evident that the evils enumerated here are but the 
 evils of the odious unit rule, so closely associated with the 
 management of delegates in caucuses, in conventions and in 
 conferences and so on, by scheming party leaders. 
 
 Senator Benton, in defending a proposed plan of electing the 
 President and Vice-President, by a direct vote of the people, 
 voting by districts, said further : " TIME and EXPERIENCE have so 
 decided. Yes, time and experience, the only infallible tests of 
 good or bad institutions, have now shown that the continuance 
 of the electoral system will be both useless and dangerous to 
 the liberties of the people, and that the only effectual mode of 
 preserving our government from the corruptions which have 
 
77 
 
 undermined the liberties of so many nations, is, to confide the 
 election of our chief magistrates to those who are farthest re- 
 moved from the influence of his patronage ; that is to say, to 
 the whole body of American citizens. 
 
 " The electors are not independent; they have no superior 
 intelligence ; they are not left to their own judgment in the 
 choice of a President ; they are not above the control of the 
 people ; on the contrary, every elector is pledged, before he is 
 chosen, to give his vote according to the will of those who 
 choose him. 
 
 " Every reason for instituting electors has failed, and every 
 consideration of prudence requires them to be discontinued. 
 They are nothing but agents, in a case which requires no agent ; 
 and no prudent man would, or ought, to employ an agent to 
 take care of his money, his property, or his liberty, when he 
 is equally capable to take care of them himself. 
 
 " But, if the plan of the Constitution had not failed if we 
 were now deriving from electors all the advantages expected 
 from their institution I, for one, would still be in favor of 
 getting rid of them. 
 
 " I should esteem the incorruptibility of the people, their 
 disinterested desire to get the best man for President, to be 
 more than a counterpoise to all the advantages which might be 
 derived from the superior intelligence of a more enlightened, 
 but smaller, and therefore, more corruptible body. I should 
 be opposed to the intervention of electors, because the double 
 process of electing a man to elect a man, would paralyze the spirit 
 of the people, and destroy the life of the election itself. Doubt- 
 less this machinery was introduced into our Constitution for the 
 purpose of softening the action of the democratic element ; 
 but it also softens the interest of the people in the result of the 
 election itself. It places them at too great a distance from their 
 first servant. It interposes a body of men between the people 
 and the object of their choice, and gives a false direction to the 
 gratitude of the President elected. He feels himself indebted 
 to the electors who collected the votes of the people, and not 
 to the people, who gave their votes to the electors. 
 
78 
 
 "It enables a few men to govern many, and, in time, it will 
 transfer the whole power of the election into the hands of a 
 few, leaving to the people the humble occupation of confirm- 
 ing what has been done by superior authority." 
 
 The plan of direct voting, then defended by Senator Ben- 
 ton and others, proposed, simply, to avoid the use of electors, 
 and vote directly for a President and Vice-President ; still vot- 
 ing, however, by districts. The candidate receiving the greatest 
 number of votes in the district to be counted one vote, repre- 
 senting the district. The plan still made a unit of the vote 
 from each sub-district, instead of a single unit of the vote from 
 each state ; and it afforded no further means for the individual 
 voters to reach concerted action beyond the naming of one 
 candidate upon a direct ballot. Its merit was to be found in 
 that it evaded entrusting the popular voice to electors or 
 delegates, and, that it would make it more difficult for a few 
 scheming leaders to thwart the will of the people at their final 
 election. 
 
 The force and application of the truthful and most earnest 
 observations then presented by Senator Benton, when analyzed 
 by the experience of to-day, show conclusively : That the 
 method directed by the Constitution for the selection of elec- 
 tors, and having them meet in separate state colleges or con- 
 ventions, and hence, without the opportunity for the whole 
 body to make repeated ballotings so that they might reach con- 
 certed action, rendered the plan at once null, and void of its 
 intended significance ; that the perversion of the intent of the 
 Constitution, so far as to allow the whole number of electors 
 to which a state was entitled, to be voted for upon one general 
 ticket, gave scheming political leaders an opportunity to make 
 a unit of the voice of the state in the interest of a favored 
 candidate. 
 
 But the voice of a party in making the party nomination is 
 submitted to party delegates meeting in conventions ; hence, it 
 is at a caucus of these delegates acting for the party voters of 
 the state, that scheming party managers now aim to make a 
 unit of the party voice, and then wield this voice in the interest 
 of their personal choice of candidates. It is not difficult, there- 
 
79 
 
 fore, to see that the whole list of dangers and of evil political 
 practices, so plainly pointed out by Senator Benton as be- 
 longing to the plan of submitting to electors, have, since 
 electors have lost all active significance, been transferred to 
 delegates meeting in party nominating conventions. It has 
 indeed, been very thoroughly shown how scheming political 
 leaders not only manage party primary elections, determine 
 the delegates and control these delegates in caucuses, in con- 
 ventions, and in conferences and so on, but, that they thus 
 betray the liberties of the people, and corrupt and pervert the 
 popular will in the election of all public officers. And because 
 the double process of electing delegates, to elect or nominate a 
 party candidate paralyzes the spirit of the people, perverts the 
 democratic principle, makes the masses apathetic and negligent 
 of the primary elections, and lessens their interest in the final 
 election, it adds to the opportunities of these scheming office- 
 seekers to thwart the will of the people. And finally, because 
 a few party leaders and their servile delegates may thus de- 
 termine the party nominee, his gratitude will be given to these 
 few men instead of to the whole body of people when he is 
 elevated to any high office having the disposal of governmental 
 patronage or favors. 
 
 Hence it is now, the delegate system submitted to in making 
 party nominations which enables a few men to govern the 
 many, and which transfers the whole power of nominating 
 into the hands of a few, leaving to the great mass of party 
 voters the humble occupation of confirming what has been 
 done by superior authority. 
 
 Thus it has been shown, that the dangers pointed out by the 
 most patriotic members of the convention that framed the Con- 
 stitution, which would most certainly ensue were the election 
 of a President to be entrusted to the state or national legisla- 
 tures, to the national senate, or to the governors of the states ; 
 the cabal and corruption, and the intriguing between the can- 
 didates and these small bodies entrusted with their election, 
 resulting in real merit being rarely the title to the appoint- 
 ment ; and since then, the evils and dangers pointed out by 
 Benton and others as belonging to the electoral system, are 
 
80 
 
 all to be found practically illustrated in the present method of 
 submitting to party nominations, made by the system of dele- 
 gating and having these delegates meet in caucuses, and in 
 great national nominating conventions. 
 
 To sum up ; the whole story when tersely told amount to 
 this : The sovereignty of this country since our Fathers estab- 
 lished its liberty, has ever been, and continues to be vested in 
 the will of a majority of the whole people. 
 
 The people have thus far yielded to methods in the election 
 of their President and other officers as well, which delegate 
 and re-delegate their voices to a few men, because they have 
 believed this delegating to be a necessity in order to reach 
 concerted action. 
 
 The plan directed by the Constitution submitted the election 
 of a President to a few electors or delegates, but, because these 
 electors were directed to meet separately in state colleges or 
 conventions, no opportunity was afforded for the whole body 
 to reach concerted action by repeated ballotings, and the 
 method was at once made void of any active significance. 
 
 Permanent party organizations, then took up the work of 
 harmonizing upon a candidate prior to the general or final elec- 
 tion. And the work intended for electors was thus transferred 
 to party delegates, meeting in great party nominating conven- 
 tions. 
 
 And now, the endless intriguings and bargainings for place, 
 the corrupt scheming to thwart the people's will, so well an- 
 ticipated by the framers of the Constitution, had the power of 
 electing a President been delegated to any convened body, 
 they were then familiar with ; and since then, the evils and 
 dangers, so well pointed out by Benton and others, as be- 
 longing to electors, have found the opportunity for their 
 fullest development, and are to-day bearing their richest 
 harvest in political corruption, though a little more obscured, 
 in the great complex system by which the people submit to 
 party candidates being determined upon by successive conven- 
 tions of delegates. 
 
 In short, whenever and wherever the masses delegate or en- 
 trust to a few men the power to nominate or to elect men to 
 
81 
 
 high office ; the opportunity is afforded, and the temptation for 
 these few electors or delegates to bargain away the offices of 
 the people on the one part, and, for the candidates to promise 
 appointments to place, or other government favor in return, on 
 the other, has proven to be so great as to be irresistible. Or 
 in other words, an autocratic method of holding power in 
 spite of the people's will, is favored by this system of delega- 
 ting. 
 
 The illogical nature and the evils attending the method 
 directed by the Constitution for the election of United States 
 Senators by the state legislative bodies, illustrate the results 
 of intriguing and of corrupt office-seeking, even more fully 
 than any other part of our governmental system. 
 
 The Constitution directs that the Senators from each state 
 shall be chosen by the legislature thereof. That the conven- 
 tion yielded to this method of choice, seems to have been 
 wholly the result of a compromise with those who claimed 
 that they "feared " the state governments would be prejudiced 
 by the supremacy of a national government. 
 
 Why the patriotic members of the convention should have 
 yielded to such a method for electing United States Senators, 
 by the state legislatures while they at the same time con- 
 demned the election of a President by the national legislature, 
 as being the worst possible plan that had been proposed to 
 them, is quite irreconcilable. If they could then foresee that 
 an election of a President by the national legislature, "would 
 be the work of intrigue, of cabal, of corruption, and of faction," 
 and that " real merit would rarely be the title to the appoint- 
 ment ;" what has experience shown us, but that they should 
 have seen further, that the same series of evils would result 
 from submitting to such a similar method of electing United 
 States Senators, by the state legislatures. What, indeed, has 
 experience taught us, with United States Senators looking to a 
 state legislature for their re-election, but, in too many instances 
 of one continuous series of intriguing, and of political corrup- 
 tion. 
 
 Let us analyze this method of entrusting the election of 
 
82 
 
 United States Senators to the few men constituting the state 
 legislative bodies still further : 
 
 The method really found its excuse in the selfishness and 
 jealousies of those who had a personal interest in controlling 
 the offices of the state governments. And, it was this personal 
 interest of a few men, and not the interest of the mass of 
 citizens of any state, that gave birth to the doctrine of " State 
 Sovereignty" and " States' Rights/' 
 
 It was argued at the framing of the Constitution, by those 
 who were opposed to the democratic principle of popular rule, 
 that senators elected by the state legislatures would better 
 represent, or better defend the interests of an individual state, 
 than they would if elected by the people of the state. And, 
 that the "aristocratic interests" would find therein a better 
 means of self-defence. But what argument, indeed, could 
 have possibly been offered toward establishing, that any just 
 cause would not be as well defended by senators elected di- 
 rectly by the people of the state, as they would by senators 
 elected by legislators who had themselves been elected by the 
 people ? 
 
 James Wilson offered the best and most patriotic reasons 
 against this doctrine. " ' The states,' he said, i are in no danger 
 of being devoured by the national government ; I wish to keep 
 them from devouring the national government. Their exis- 
 tence is made essential by the great extent of our country. I 
 am for an election of the second branch by the people in large 
 districts, subdividing the districts only for the accommodation 
 of voters.' " 
 
 Mason urged, that, " < The state legislatures ought to have 
 some means of defending themselves against encroachments 
 of the national government,' " and by way of compromise, pro- 
 posed that the state legislatures should be permitted to elect 
 the United States Senators, and thus " 'make these legislatures 
 a constituent part of the national establishment.' ' Later on, 
 " Wilson said : ' When I consider the amazing extent of country, 
 the immense population which is to fill it, the influence which 
 the government we are to form will have, not only on the 
 present generation of our people and their multiplied posterity, 
 
83 
 
 but on the whole globe, I am lost in the magnitude of the object. 
 We are laying the foundation of a building in which millions 
 are interested, and which is to last for ages. In laying 
 one stone amiss we may injure the superstructure ; and what 
 will be the consequence if the corner-stone should be loosely 
 placed ? A citizen of America is a citizen of the general gov- 
 ernment, and is a citizen of the particular state in which he may 
 reside. The general government is meant for them in the first 
 capacity ; the state governments in the second. Both govern- 
 ments are derived from the people, both meant for the people ; 
 both, therefore, ought to be regulated on the same principles. In 
 forming the general government we must forget our local habits 
 and attachments, lay aside our state connections, and act for 
 the general good of the whole. The general government is 
 not an assemblage of states, but of individuals, for certain po- 
 litical purposes ; it is not meant for the states, but for the in- 
 dividuals composing them ; the individuals, therefore, not the 
 states, ought to be represented in it.' He persisted to the 
 last in demanding that the senate should be elected by electors 
 chosen by the people." 
 
 Against these pure and profoundly patriotic sentiments there 
 were opposed, those who from a personal interest desired to 
 maintain and enlarge the powers of state legislators ; those, 
 with aristocratic associations and hopes for official power, who 
 feared to trust the democratic masses ; and still further, those, 
 coming from the smaller states who sought, by having United 
 States Senators elected by the state legislatures, and then, by 
 having each state equally represented in the National Senate, 
 to gain a selfish advantage for the smaller states. 
 
 As the purposes of these less patriotic members of the con- 
 vention prevailed, or, whatever the reason of its adoption, 
 because the language of the Constitution directs that United 
 States Senators shall be chosen by the few men constituting 
 the state legislatures, it not only gives to these few men the 
 power to wield a great sovereign authority, actually belonging 
 to the whole people, but, it has thus afforded scheming po- 
 litical leaders an opportunity to intrigue and bargain with these 
 men for the great offices submitted to their gift. 
 
84 
 
 That the language of the Constitution, directing that United 
 States Senators shall be chosen by the state legislatures has 
 been interpreted to mean, that these few men shall exercise a 
 sovereign right to determine upon a National Senator, respect- 
 ing only their own personal choice, or their own personal 
 interests, has been abundantly proven to be true. 
 
 That, by thus elevating a body of state legislators to an oli- 
 garchy exercising original sovereign powers, it has afforded 
 the opportunity for these few men to autocratically continue 
 themselves in. power, and, thus to succeed in building up an 
 aristocracy of office-holders in defiance of the people's will, 
 has also proven to be true. 
 
 And still further, because this method directed by the Con- 
 stitution, places within the power of these few men the oppor- 
 tunity to bargain for and dispose of the places of United States 
 Senators, it affords a United States Senator seeking a re-elec- 
 tion, an opportunity to intrigue and bargain in turn with these 
 few men, and thus autocratically secure his own re-election. 
 
 But the people are denying the right of legislators to exercise 
 their individual authority in the selection of United States 
 Senators, and now, not infrequently the voters attempt to in- 
 struct these legislators at the time of their election, who to 
 support for the United States Senatorship. Hence it may be 
 asserted, that the literal interpretation of the language of the 
 Constitution is no longer accepted by the people. That they 
 construe the authority given to state' legislators to be but that 
 accorded to delegates of the people, whom they may instruct 
 with a more or less precise trust at the time of their election. 
 
 The evils, therefore, in the method of electing United States 
 Senators by state legislators, are but an exaggeration of the 
 evils of the delegate system. And, so long as the language of 
 the Constitution remains, it stands not only as a menace to 
 popular rule, but as an excuse for Legislators to authoritatively 
 usurp the sovereign power of the people. But the evils of 
 this method are still greater than the evils of delegating in 
 making party nominations, because here, the delegated author- 
 ity has the final voice in electing to office, and hence no oppor- 
 
85 
 
 tunity is afforded the people to change or avoid even the most 
 evident disregard of their expressed will. 
 
 To sum up, it has been shown, that the language of the Con- 
 stitution directing that United States Senators shall be chosen 
 by the state legislatures was an attempt to engraft an aristo- 
 cratic scheme or purpose, with its autocratic methods of de- 
 fence, upon a government belonging to the whole people. 
 That the people have since interpreted the method directed by 
 the Constitution, as permitting them to consider their state 
 legislators, when exercising the trust of electing United States 
 Senators to be but delegates whom they may instruct with a 
 definite duty. But, because the people must conform to the 
 method directed by the Constitution, they are forced to submit 
 to delegates exercising a final and deciding vote in the choice 
 of these officers. Hence, just as it has been shown, that the 
 plan of the Constitution directing that we shall submit to 
 electors in the election of a President, has become a submis- 
 sion to delegates meeting in national nominating conventions, 
 so have state legislators entrusted with the election of United 
 States Senators come to be recognized, as but another series of 
 delegates, exercising a sovereign duty belonging to the whole 
 people. 
 
 It has already been pointed out in a former chapter, how 
 these various series of delegates have been joined together by 
 party managers, in one great complex structure, making to- 
 gether a vast political machine. And it has been shown, how this 
 vast and intricate political machinery in the hands of the party 
 leaders or partisan office-seekers, has become a great engine 
 for the securing of public offices, by perverting and defying the 
 people's will. 
 
 Among the graver evils of this great complex system of dele- 
 gating it has still further been shown, how a person holding 
 the office of United States Senator becomes the favored politi- 
 cal leader. That from his autocratic powers, and ability to 
 provide for his own re-election, he becomes the acknowledged 
 great party " boss" directing through his well-trained assistants 
 or minor party bosses, and their co-workers, the great distri- 
 
86 
 
 bution of political favors among his subservient following of 
 office-seekers with but little respect for the people's will. 
 
 In conclusion, it may be summed up, that the method di- 
 rected by the language of the Constitution for the election of 
 the President and Vice-President has long since ceased to be 
 respected. That a perverted compliance with the electoral 
 system, by having the vote of each state cast as a unit for can- 
 didates for President and Vice-President, may readily serve to 
 elect a candidate who has received but a minority of the votes 
 of the people of the nation. And, that submission to the 
 election of United States Senators by the state legislatures, 
 simply serves to entrust their final election to delegates of the 
 people, giving the masses no means of redress against a corrupt 
 use of this delegated authority. And it now remains but to 
 urge, that the whole series of evils resulting from the present 
 methods of electing these and all other officers, are but the 
 evils of this great complex system of delegating. And, that 
 the whole mass of political corruption, permeating and befoul- 
 ing our government in its every part, has resulted because the 
 people have thus far supposed that it was necessary to yield to 
 this system of delegating in order to reach concerted action. 
 And then, because by entrusting the election of men to high 
 office, to a few men acting with delegated authority, these men 
 have found the opportunity, and have too often yielded to the 
 great temptation to barter and bargain away for personal ends, 
 the great sovereign responsibilities entrusted to them. 
 
 The remedy for these evils, great and growing and extending 
 to every political question throughout our land ; and the remedy 
 for the vast evils belonging to our system of submitting to 
 permanent party organizations, has been shown to be in the 
 method of solving the simple problem which teaches the peo- 
 ple of every free government, that they may reach concerted 
 action in selecting their representatives, without delegating and 
 re-delegating their sovereignty to a few men, in order that these 
 few may meet in conventions and there by repeated ballotings 
 reach a concurrence. 
 
 The REMEDY, and the only true solution of the problem of 
 finding the will of a majority of the people of the whole 
 
87 
 
 country, or of the district to be represented, has been shown 
 to be, the proposed method of direct voting, completing the work 
 at one election, at which each individual voter simply names 
 succeeding choices among the candidates upon his ticket, and 
 thereby provides a true means of reaching the final concur- 
 rence of a majority of his fellows. 
 
 Let an amendment of the Constitution direct : That the 
 President and Vice-President of the United States shall be 
 elected by a direct vote of the qualified voters of the whole 
 country. That each voter shall be permitted to name a first 
 choice, and such succeeding provisional choices upon his ballot 
 as he may see fit, or deem necessary in order to provide for the 
 final concurrence of a majority of the voters upon one candidate. 
 And, that the candidate upon whom a majority of the whole 
 number of voters have first agreed, shall be elected. Or, in 
 case there has not been a majority concurrence after each 
 successive provisional support has been exhausted, then, that 
 the candidate receiving the greatest concurring support shall be 
 elected. 
 
 Let another amendment of the Constitution direct : That 
 United States Senators shall be chosen by a direct vote of the 
 qualified voters of the state, by the same method of direct 
 voting. And the people of this country will have made the 
 first certain step toward establishing a truly representative 
 government emanating from the people's will. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE CIVIL SERVICE EVIL AND ITS REMEDY. 
 
 In the executive branch of our National government, through- 
 out its various departments, it is necessary to employ a large 
 number of officers superior and minor officers with nu- 
 merous clerks and assistants. 
 
 It is not practicable that even the higher grades of these 
 officers should be elected directly by the people. Nor, is it 
 desirable that they should be. They constitute a part of each 
 executive administration, and in order that the laws may be 
 vigorously, justly, and equitably administered throughout, every 
 department and every division and subdivision of the executive 
 branch should be accountable to the one head, the chief execu- 
 tive or President of the nation. And, when the President of 
 the United States shall have been truthfully selected by the 
 whole body of sovereign people, and is thus made directly ac- 
 countable to them, it may well be assumed that the whole 
 executive trust will be made through him accountable to the 
 people of the country. 
 
 The Constitution directs, that " the President shall nominate, 
 and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall 
 appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
 Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United 
 States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise pro- 
 vided for, and which shall be established by law ; but the Con- 
 gress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior offi- 
 cers, as they may think proper, in the President alone, in the 
 courts of law, or in the heads of departments." 
 
89 
 
 It is this body of executive appointments, and by usage 
 especially referring to the minor grades of these officers, who 
 are known as constituting the civil service of the country. And 
 it is the significance attending the use made of the appointing 
 power, vested so largely in the President and Senate, in the 
 Heads of Departments, and entrusted by usage to the chief of- 
 ficers of the various divisions of each department, which 
 has given rise to the civil service question. 
 
 Since our government so early became a government by 
 parties, or a government resulting from a contest between two 
 permanently organized political parties, the power of appoint- 
 ing men to office has ever been regarded as one of the prizes 
 of the conflict. 
 
 The appointing power is by no means the whole extent of 
 patronage or " spoils " which thus falls to the distribution of 
 the victorious party. The spirit of party government has but 
 little respect for the interests of the whole people, and makes 
 " spoils " and patronage and favor out of every political issue 
 with which it is concerned. Out of legislative enactments, 
 out of executive favors, and, even judicial bias may be in- 
 cluded among the " spoils " of the party in power. 
 
 But the power of appointing men to office has a direct personal 
 signification. And it has come to be considered the personal 
 "spoils" of those having an influence or a control in making 
 the government appointments. 
 
 It places a vast army of office-holders, office-seekers and 
 party workers, and their families and friends in secret concert 
 with the appointing power. Hence the power to appoint men 
 to office has a very significant value in the securing of the great 
 elective offices of the country. 
 
 The power to appoint men to office, as the perquisite of an 
 executive officer, or, the ability of a legislator to influence the 
 appointing power, has undoubtedly been long recognized and 
 used as an efficient agency in securing the support of party 
 workers or party managers, in determining party nominations, 
 and in controlling elections. 
 
 On the other hand, receiving the promise of an appointment 
 in the government service, has ever been regarded by party 
 
90 
 
 workers and office-seekers, as a sufficient incentive to arouse 
 their most earnest and devoted political activity. And it is 
 THIS CORRUPT TRAFFIC, between elective office-holders having the 
 power to appoint men in the civil service employ of the 
 government, on the one part ; and party managers, party 
 workers, and office-seekers having the power to corruptly in- 
 fluence and control party nominations, and thus determine the 
 election of certain candidates, on the other, which constitutes 
 the civil service evil. 
 
 But the results of the evil do not stop here. If elective 
 officers may thus appoint a vast number of men to office in 
 the government employ, in consideration of these men having 
 given their active work at manipulating the primary and final 
 elections in favor of the former, then, these higher officers con- 
 ceive also their right to displace or remove these civil ser- 
 vants, for any neglect or indifference to continue their partisan 
 or personal political efforts. And still further, these elective 
 officers claim also the right, in general as a party, to impose 
 a tax upon the salaries of each of these government em- 
 ployees ; making it a contribution to a general fund to be used 
 in advancing the interests of the whole body of partisan can- 
 didates. This levy is known as " political " or " partisan as- 
 sessments." 
 
 That but little respect is paid to the proper qualifications of 
 a candidate for an appointment in the civil service, is not more 
 true, than that quite as little respect is paid to the proper 
 qualifications of a candidate for an elective office, who is to be 
 entrusted thereafter with the making of these appointments. 
 Hence, so long as candidates for office may with certainty 
 win an election, because of their skill and superiority in the 
 management of the political machinery used in determining 
 party nominations,~and because of their powers at successful 
 electioneering and in the control of partisan political methods, 
 it cannot be expected that candidates for the offices to be filled 
 by appointments made by these men, will be required to have 
 other qualifications than that they _are efficient party workers 
 and party managers. And it is evident, therefore, that this 
 
91 
 
 phase of the civil service evil adds nothing new to its general 
 character throughout. 
 
 If now, we analyze more carefully the specific nature of the 
 civil service evil, it must at once be accepted that the evil is 
 found in the corrupt bargaining and contracting going on 
 between the seekers after the elective offices, and those seek- 
 ing offices by appointment. 
 
 That this bargaining is corrupt, is because it is an attempt 
 by each party to the contract to deliver that which does not 
 belong to them. 
 
 It is corrupt on the part of a candidate seeking an elective 
 office to promise to deliver, or make appointments in the civil 
 service of the government, in consideration of active political 
 management or work securing for this candidate the party 
 nomination, and finally an election to the office sought for. 
 
 It is corrupt on the part of a candidate seeking an office by 
 appointment, in consideration of a promise from a candidate 
 for election, to endeavor to control and secure the nomination 
 and final election of this candidate by all the schemes known 
 to the political machinery of the DELEGATE SYSTEM, and to other 
 partisan methods. 
 
 And finally, it is corrupt throughout, because this traffic in 
 the offices of the government robs the people of their elective 
 franchise, violates their right to select their own representa- 
 tives, and thus control their own government. It is, indeed, 
 but an exhibition of the very principles which form the basis 
 of an autocratic rule. 
 
 Let us make no mistake about this being the exact nature of 
 the civil service evil, so that we may in the end accept no error in 
 discerning its proper remedy. 
 
 So long as professional office-seekers and office-holders may 
 thus bargain with men who seek employment in the govern- 
 ment service ; with men who seek special or favoring legisla- 
 tive enactments ; with men who seek executive clemency or 
 favor ; and still further, with men who would have justice bi- 
 ased or perverted toward their personal advantage ; and have 
 this list of men aid them in successfully manipulating the ma- 
 chinery now submitted to by the people in making party nomi- 
 
92 
 
 nations ; and then, by arousing all the jealousies and schem- 
 ings of partisan methods, be enabled to secure for themselves 
 the offices sought for, just so long will office-holding through- 
 out be in no way accountable to the people to whom. this 
 government rightfully belongs. 
 
 Men who hold the higher or elective offices of the govern- 
 ment because they have received a party nomination by man- 
 ipulating the complex methods of the delegate system, and 
 then, have been elected to office because of our blind fealty to 
 permanent party organization, are in no way accountable to 
 the people, and owe them neither gratitude nor respect. How 
 then, can it be hoped that men appointed to office in the civil 
 service of the government, in consideration of their being po- 
 litical workers and wire-pullers in the management of this 
 delegate system, shall have either gratitude or respect for the 
 wishes of the people, to whom they are in no way accounta- 
 ble for their appointment ? 
 
 For these reasons, and these reasons alone, our government 
 is not a government truthfully emanating from the people's 
 will. And it is not a government economically administered 
 in the interests of the people at large. But, just so far as such 
 office-seekers may thus secure the places of power in the 
 management and direction of the government, and may thus 
 safely direct it in their own personal interests, just this far has 
 it become a government by the few, crafty enough to secure 
 its official places. 
 
 From these conclusions it is made evident, that the civil ser- 
 vice evil is but an outgrowth or part of the great general po- 
 litical evil to which we have so long been submitting. For, it 
 has already been shown that a great series o'f corrupt political 
 methods and evil practices have been favored and developed 
 by our submitting to the delegate system in making party 
 nominations, and by our submission to permanent party or- 
 ganizations among us. And it has also been fully shown that 
 these methods are responsible for so perverting and defacing 
 our government, as to make it in truth but the mockery of a 
 government emanating from the people's will. 
 
 The specific evil which has heretofore been recognized in 
 
93 
 
 our civil service system, and which an effort has been made to 
 correct or evade, is the corrupt motive or consideration influ- 
 encing and controlling the appointing powers. Yet this is but 
 one of the two parts of the contract, made up necessarily of 
 two parties, with two considerations passing between them. 
 If any distinction may be made in the grade of evil significa- 
 tion between the one and the other of these two bargains, 
 then it must at once be seen that the work of perverting 
 party nominations, and thus deceiving the people in the elec- 
 tion of their higher representatives, has the claim to priority 
 in existence and is by far the graver evil in its significance. 
 And because this party work and control of the party ma- 
 chinery, thus intended' to secure the election of a certain can- 
 didate or certain candidates, may be repaid with money or 
 with many other valuable considerations, which may be wrung 
 from the government as " spoils of office," it may be asserted 
 that this part of the contract not only precedes the other, but 
 gives rise to it and is its cause. 
 
 In applying a remedy to any evil, it is of first importance to 
 discover its cause, and, if possible apply a remedy for the re- 
 moval of this cause. Remedies having but a palliative pur- 
 pose are of but little significance toward the relief of a long 
 standing evil. 
 
 Thus far in our analysis of the civil service evil, we have 
 found no want in the accountability due from the minor or in- 
 ferior officers of the civil service toward those entrusted with 
 their appointment. But a marked defect has been developed 
 toward the opposite extreme, making these inferior officers owe 
 a servile allegiance to the appointing powers. 
 
 Hence, the question is before us, whether we should attempt 
 by legislative measures to lessen this allegiance and diminish 
 the accountability of these minor officers to their superiors, 
 or, after searching out the cause of this unnatural relationship, 
 find the true means of averting it. 
 
 The former of these plans, however, has already been 
 placed under trial. It has been made a law of the country by 
 an act of Congress, entitled, " An Act to regulate and improve 
 the civil service of the United States." 
 
94 
 
 This scheme or measure requiring all candidates for certain 
 of the subordinate offices which are filled by appointment, to 
 pass a competitive examination before a distinct civil service 
 commission, or by examiners appointed by such a commission, 
 would seem to indicate that the gravity of the existing civil 
 service evil was in the fact, that men of insufficient qualifica- 
 tions were the ones who most often secure these minor ap- 
 pointments. And again, laws demanding that new appointments 
 in these offices shall only be made at the lowest grade, and 
 that appointments in the public service shall be carefully ap- 
 portioned among the several states and territories and the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia upon the basis of their population, would 
 seem to make a violation of these principles among the graver 
 evils in the civil service question. While a law forbidding 
 political assessments being made for partisan purposes would 
 purport, that a large share of the evil existed at this point. 
 
 It must, indeed, be very evident that these and all other 
 similar laws or efforts to accomplish civil service reform, are 
 but attempts to remove the results of a great evil, and do not 
 remove or lessen, except in a remote manner and to but a 
 limited degree, the true CAUSE of our civil service corruption. 
 
 The true nature of the civil service evil has been distinctly 
 defined, to be the corrupt traffic between office-holders en- 
 trusted with the appointing power and seeking re-elections, 
 and, those who are seeking the offices which are filled by ap- 
 pointment. 
 
 To whatever extent it is hoped that the proposed attempts 
 to " improve the civil service " will obstruct this corrupt 
 traffic, by laws which take away or aim to complicate and 
 make less certain the power to deliver or fulfill the promises 
 made by an elective officer to those who have assisted in the 
 management of his election, the means are at least of doubt- 
 ful utility. And, while it is true, that the traffic can only be 
 of grave significance, when it is possible that each party to the 
 contract shall be enabled to deliver the consideration agreed 
 upon ; that is, to perform effective work in controlling nomi- 
 nations and elections on the one part ; and, to fulfill the 
 promise of an appointment on the other; it is by no means 
 
95 
 
 certain that any of the proposed measures will to any consid- 
 erable extent obstruct this traffic. 
 
 And still further, it is very evident that so long as the graver 
 and more significantly corrupt work, that of controlling nomi- 
 nations and elections to office, remains undisturbed, all at- 
 tempts to legislate against, or to obstruct the minor evils re- 
 sulting from abuses of the appointing power, will be fruitless, 
 and futile toward accomplishing true civil service reform. 
 
 The proposed means of improving the civil service of the 
 government admit of still further elucidation. 
 
 It is one of the results of the corrupt traffic between the 
 higher grade offices, and those filled by appointment, that 
 the men who are appointed are not selected because of their 
 true qualifications or especial fitness for the places to be filled ; 
 but, that they are appointed for personal and for political rea- 
 sons alone. 
 
 To attempt to remedy this specific result, by demanding that 
 no appointments shall be made except of such candidates as 
 have passed a competitive examination before a separate and 
 distinct commission, arouses the question, whether the exami- 
 nations of candidates for offices requiring an especial qualifica- 
 tion, if property conducted, would not be better determined by 
 their being submitted to those superior officers directly con- 
 cerned, and under the direction of whom the newly appointed 
 officers are to serve. 
 
 The proposed method introduces another and still graver 
 question : Whether by taking any part of the control over the 
 appointment of the minor officers away from their superiors, 
 it will not to some extent prove to be a defence, if not a cause 
 for subsequent insubordination from these inferiors. The same 
 question is aroused to a certain degree by the propositions, 
 that removals should be governed by law ; that original ap- 
 pointments may only be made in the lower grades ; and, that 
 vacancies occurring in the higher grades shall be filled only by 
 promotions. 
 
 The superior officer or Secretary in control of either of the 
 executive departments of the government, is largely responsible 
 for the successful management of the branch entrusted to him. 
 
96 
 
 While each of the officers of his selection entrusted with the 
 charge of conducting the special divisions of this department, 
 have not only the responsibility of its successful management 
 resting upon them, but not infrequently are required to give 
 bonds of security against any pecuniary loss resulting from 
 untrustworthiness, from carelessness, or, from any mismanage- 
 ment by their subordinates. 
 
 To say by law, that these chief officers, made responsi- 
 ble for the successful and harmonious working together of a 
 large number of minor officers, clerks and assistants, and also 
 made pecuniarily responsible for losses resulting from any 
 neglect or malfeasance in office, shall have any part of their 
 control over these minor officers withdrawn, or shared with 
 them by a distinct commission, controlling competitive exami- 
 nations, is, if not contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, at 
 least of such a nature as to lessen the proper respect ; weaken 
 the accountability; and, invite insubordination among these 
 inferior officers. 
 
 The Constitution, by directing that appointments shall be 
 made by the President and Heads of Departments, evidently 
 intended that the executive trust should be centered in and 
 controlled from one source or head, in order to have it 
 vigorously, and justly, and equally administered throughout. 
 Any scheme, therefore, having the intent or significance of 
 lessening to any degree the proper respect or accountability, 
 due from an assistant or minor officer to his superior or 
 superiors, must weaken the plan of the government, and be 
 at variance with the spirit and intent of the Constitution. 
 
 It has been one of the favorite arguments urged by those 
 who have defended these proposed schemes of civil service 
 improvement or reform, to claim, that by removing the weight 
 of personal influence, held by the President, by Senators, and 
 by members of the National House of Representatives and 
 others toward securing appointments in the government ser- 
 vice, it would free these high officers from a source of exces- 
 sive annoyance and labor, either in securing for favorites the 
 places asked for, or, in denying the many who present unsatis- 
 factory claims. 
 
97 
 
 There is more than one fallacy, either purposely or eva- 
 sively intended to be conveyed by this specious argument. 
 That a host of office-seekers, capable as well as incapable for 
 the positions they seek, crowd about the doors of every newly 
 elected officer having any share in the appointing power, that 
 they literally "besiege" and annoy beyond comfortable en- 
 durance, the President and other officers at the incoming of 
 each new administration, is undoubtedly true. This, however, 
 is but one side of the story. The other part has already been 
 enacted. It is because men seeking the elective offices, AS CAN- 
 DIDATES, have employed a vast number of party workers, party 
 managers, manipulators, and schemers, to control the party 
 nominations by the opportunities afforded by the delegate 
 system and by permanent party organization, and, have 
 promised to repay these workers by using their influence, or, by 
 securing for them an appointment in the civil service of the 
 government ; and further because, they have promised offices to 
 more of these political workers than they can find places for, 
 they have now this vast army of office-seekers " besieging " 
 them. 
 
 Every seeker after an office by appointment goes armed in 
 some manner with a recommendation, or, has either a real or 
 fancied claim upon some person elected to an office in the 
 government, who has or is supposed to have an influence 
 with the appointing powers. That cranks and other self-sus- 
 tained claimants for recognition, urged on by their own measure 
 of supposed partisan or personal political services, enter the 
 ranks of office-seeking and demand a reward, is not to be de- 
 nied or wondered at. It is an effort toward securing an oc- 
 cupation, which requires methods especially repulsive to some 
 characters and minds, while to others, less self-respecting, it 
 affords a field of possible success at once inviting and en- 
 couraging to their unstable natures. 
 
 The argument, then, that substituting a commission of ex- 
 aminers will effectually remove u the pressure" brought upon 
 the President and other high officers of the government for 
 their influence or control over the appointing powers, is un- 
 founded and fallacious, because it is based upon a half told 
 
98 
 
 truth. It aims to place the whole responsibility upon the dis- 
 gusting rabble of office-seekers who swarm about the offices 
 of each new administration, where, it does not wholly belong. 
 
 Further than this : what evidence may be ventured, that 
 time will not prove that a commission of examiners directed 
 by Congress and appointed by a President, will not in turn be 
 as readily corrupted, and that they will not take the same 
 place in the exchanging of favors between the offices which 
 are elective, and those which are filled by appointment, as that 
 heretofore held by these high elective officers themselves. 
 This commission must necessarily hold at least, a part of the 
 same position, and it must have a similar political significance 
 to that which has heretofore influenced or determined the civil 
 service appointments. And, because that which has developed 
 a corrupt traffic, heretofore, remains to demand a corrupt traffic 
 still, but little can be hoped from such a mere transfer of re- 
 sponsibilities. 
 
 This proposed scheme or measure of civil service reform, 
 signifies then, but a transfer of certain duties belonging to high 
 officers elected by the people, to this commission. And the 
 moral and legal accountability, requiring these high elective 
 officers to make appointments in the civil service wholly in the 
 interests of the people and of good government, and which, 
 by the plan of our government has been supposed to be amply 
 protected by our right to elect or reject these high officials, is 
 by this plan, transferred to an appointed commission, and a 
 penalty and punishment is attached warning this commission 
 not to violate these imposed moral duties. That the fear of a 
 penalty will correct this moral turpitude in men holding office, 
 can hardly be expected ; but, that making the plan of the 
 government more complex, will serve to obscure, and thus 
 protect from the just condemnation of the people, this moral 
 baseness which has from the beginning to the end been the true 
 source of our civil service corruption, all former experience 
 has proven to be true. 
 
 Hence, so long as candidates for the elective offices of the 
 government can employ the services of men to aid them in 
 securing a party nomination, by means of the corrupt methods 
 
99 
 
 of the delegate system, and then secure their election by party 
 glamour and partisan deception, so long will they find a means 
 of repaying these men either with appointments to office, or, 
 with some form of " spoils" wrested from the people's govern- 
 ment, to be used for personal ends. 
 
 To anticipate effective reform legislation from a source which 
 is itself so largely a factor in making our civil service system 
 corrupt, is as unnatural as it would be to seek the flow of a 
 stream at a higher level than its source. Legislative enact- 
 ments will never have a true significance toward removing the 
 source of the evils in our civil service system until our legisla- 
 tors in both branches of Congress, and the President also, have 
 become true representatives of the people, by being made 
 wholly and directly accountable to the people for their election 
 to office. 
 
 The true principles underlying a wise and economical ad- 
 ministration of our government throughout all its varied 
 phases, are not widely different from those which guide to suc- 
 cess any well conducted corporate or business enterprise 
 among men. 
 
 A large corporation having the interests of its stockholders 
 for its only concern, must wisely select its board of directors 
 and its executive head. This executive, then, must appoint 
 the minor and subordinate officers, and through them appoint 
 the assistants and laborers throughout. 
 
 Primarily, the board of directors and the chief executive 
 must be truly and fully accountable to the whole body of stock- 
 holders in order that the interests of these stockholders may 
 be properly guarded and preserved. And, this accountability 
 can only be secured when these officers have been honestly 
 and fairly selected by them. 
 
 It next follows, that the officers directing each branch of the 
 business must be accountable, each in turn to his superior, and 
 thus finally, through the chief executive officer every part of 
 the enterprise will be made accountable to the corporate body. 
 
 By a system, therefore, which makes every part of the 
 enterprise successively accountable to the original authority or 
 body of stockholders ; and, which places the responsibility 
 
100 
 
 where it maybe properly shared throughout, there is establish- 
 ed an organization fitted to successfully conduct any just enter- 
 prise with which it may be concerned. 
 
 To successfully conduct a free government wherein the whole 
 body of people are its stockholders, will demand a no less 
 guarded accountability, and will succeed with no less wisely 
 placed responsibilities, than that demanded and required for 
 the success of a corporate or business enterprise. 
 
 If there is any fault in the accountability due from the 
 minor or inferior officers to their superiors, then, the conduct 
 of the government will be uncertain, and the responsibility 
 would be properly traced to the superior officers who should 
 have full control over these inferiors. 
 
 If, however, there is a fault in the accountability due from 
 the superior officers of a free government to its sovereign 
 people, then, just so far will their government become a 
 government by the few ; and the responsibility of its not 
 being a government truthfully representative of the people's 
 will, must be traced to some neglect or fault of the people 
 themselves. 
 
 It has already been definitely traced and shown, that the 
 great series of evils existing in our government arise from the 
 want of a proper accountability due from the higher or elective 
 officers of the government, to the people. And it has further 
 been definitely shown, that this want of accountability is 
 because the people submit, in the election of these officers, 
 first, to a government wholly conducted by the one or the other 
 of two permanent party organizations contending for power ; 
 and then, further submit to the delegate system in making the 
 parly nominations. 
 
 Hence, let us no longer seek political reform through these 
 office-holders, from reform legislation, but, having traced the 
 responsibility to the people themselves, let us look to better 
 methods for the selection of these, our first servants, such as 
 will make them truthfully our representatives, and make them 
 directly accountable to us. Then, and not until then, will the 
 management of our government in all its parts be made 
 
101 
 
 through these true representatives, truthfully accountable to 
 the sovereign people of the country. 
 
 Having thus determined upon the only true plan of estab- 
 lishing a remedy for our civil service evils, it but remains to 
 point out how the method of direct voting already described 
 as the only true means of reaching concerted action in con- 
 ducting our elections, will not only remove the direct evils of 
 the delegate system, and of permanent party organization, but, 
 will also remove the corrupt practices attending our civil ser- 
 vice appointments, and the evils resulting from them. 
 
 At the outset, when elections shall come to be determined by 
 the whole people at one direct election, and by the proposed 
 method of voting, candidates for the elective offices will no 
 longer be assured of success because they are skilled in the 
 methods of perverting the people's will, by manipulating the 
 machinery of delegating, of caucuses and conventions, and 
 conferences, and unit rules and so on ; and, such candidates 
 will no longer be able to claim themselves already elected, 
 because they have been made the nominee of a dominant 
 party ; for these methods of securing official places will have 
 ceased to exist. 
 
 A new kind of material will come to be candidates for of- 
 fice, new men, with widely different purposes from those who 
 have too often ruled over us, will be called to the front, when 
 the people are permitted by this truthful method of procedure 
 to select their own representatives. 
 
 When we have thus erected a government truthfully ema- 
 nating from the people's will, with the President of the 
 United States selected directly by the whole people of the 
 nation ; with our National Senators selected directly by the 
 people of the state ; and with the members of the National 
 House of Representatives selected by the people of their dis- 
 trict, and, by the proposed method of direct voting, without 
 the intervention of delegates, and without permanent party 
 organizations having any part in its concern, we will then have 
 a government in which these servants will be truly accountable 
 to the whole people. 
 
 When these great office-holders are thus made truly ac- 
 
102 
 
 countable to the people, it may well be assured that the people 
 have made no corrupt contracts with them ; and, that there 
 has been no bartering with them for " spoils" of any kind to 
 be returned for the favor of an election. 
 
 When the people shall once rule in this government through 
 honestly selected representatives, there can be no such a thing 
 as " political spoils," or party favor, or government patronage 
 to be distributed among a few political managers. The promise 
 of an appointment to office, or the use of any form of govern- 
 ment patronage in repaying personal political services, has 
 only been significant because the services of a FEW, skilled in 
 manipulating the machinery of the delegate system in nomi- 
 nating, and in arousing the jealousies of partisan numbers in 
 final elections, have been of greater weight in determining 
 elections, than have the votes of the many. Hence, when the 
 voice of every citizen shall come to be counted with equal 
 force in every election, there will be no opportunity to value 
 the effort of one above another in the support he has given 
 toward the successful election of any person to office. 
 
 With a new character of men, TRUE STATESMEN NOW, repre- 
 senting the people in their elective offices, there will be new 
 influences at work guiding them in selecting the best men for 
 the civil service appointments. Our first SERVANTS will be 
 made rigorously and truthfully accountable to a true majority 
 of the whole people, and they will see to it, that men appoint- 
 ed to the subordinate or minor offices throughout are as truth- 
 fully accountable to them. 
 
 In a government thus made responsive to the people's will 
 at its every phase, there will be no possibility of a corrupt 
 barter at any point, without its being at once descried and 
 promptly rebuked, by an enlightened people made jealous of 
 their rights, from long political oppression. 
 
 In such a government no form of political patronage or fa- 
 vor will afford " spoils " for those selected to fill its offices. 
 The government itself will no longer be extended so rapidly 
 beyond its just and necessary domain. New places for new 
 officers will not be made for the simple purpose of favoring 
 family relatives or political friends. Legislative enactments 
 
103 
 
 will then come to be determined upon by their merit, and not 
 because they have a partisan or a personal signification. Exe- 
 cutive administration will be required to be just and equal 
 throughout, without favor or distinction to either friend 
 or foe. While judicial and jury decisions may then be trusted 
 to be equity and simple justice. 
 
 There will then be no need for laws to lesson the control 
 of, or to remove the appointing power from those best fitted to 
 exercise it, as directed by the Constitution. No need for laws 
 to prevent the high officers of the government from removing 
 civil service officers for purely personal or political ends. And 
 no need for laws to prevent these elective officers from assess- 
 ing the weaker or appointed officers and making them con- 
 tribute to the former's election expenses. In such a govern- 
 ment the paradox, or proposition requiring innumerable laws 
 to restrain from evil, or from corrupt and personal schemes of 
 aggrandizement those elective officers whom the people have 
 already entrusted with the law-making powers, will not be 
 necessary, and will not be exhibited in its plan. 
 
 Thus, the remedy for our civil service evils, has been shown 
 to be the one remedy for the great series of evils in the exist- 
 ing methods of selecting representatives of the people. It is 
 the remedy already so earnestly recommended, that of con- 
 ducting all elections by a method of direct voting, by which, 
 at one election, A MAJORITY OF THE WHOLE BODY OF VOTERS CON- 
 CERNED, may reach concerted action with certainty and with 
 equal fairness to all. 
 
 A brief review of the specific effects this true method of es- 
 tablishing political reform will have upon the civil service of 
 our country, will still further compare it with the scheme or 
 measure recently adopted by Congress for the purpose of 
 " regulating and improving the civil service of the United 
 States." 
 
 At the outset, this method of reform applies with equal 
 force to the whole series of evils existing in our civil service 
 system throughout. It is not limited in its application only to 
 the lower grade officers in the civil service employ, but, has 
 equal significance in removing the corrupt relationship between 
 
104 
 
 the high elective officers of the government and those filling 
 the higher offices held by appointment. The public plundering 
 of the " spoils system " so far as it applies to the minor or 
 subordinate officers of the civil service, has been a mere trifle, 
 a bagatelle, when compared to the great fortunes amassed by 
 superior officers in custom houses, in the offices of surveyors 
 and collectors of ports, and in other high places under certain 
 administrations. The significance, also, of the personal politi- 
 cal influence which may be exerted by these high officials ex- 
 ceeds by many fold that which may be corruptly used by a 
 minor or subordinate official in the civil service employ. 
 
 With the adoption of this true method of civil service reform, 
 an incoming President will have no personal or partisan 
 political debts to pay, arid, no obligations or promises of reward 
 for personal work, in the manipulation of a corrupt method 
 which had secured his nomination and election to office, will 
 confront him. 
 
 No throng of place-seekers, of party-workers, party bosses, 
 and manipulators of party machinery will then crowd the 
 offices of the incoming Chief Magistrate, and the offices of 
 those having an influence with him, demanding their promised 
 reward for personal services rendered. 
 
 The President, and Heads of Departments, and every other 
 officer entrusted with the appointing power being accountable 
 to the people for the positions they hold, will then endeavor to 
 secure the best talent and trustworthiness to be found, and 
 will be guided only by the question of merit in making ap- 
 pointments and promotions in the civil service employ. And, 
 removals from office will only be made for just cause. 
 
 There will then be adopted the very best methods of es- 
 tablishing competitive examinations, such as will secure the 
 best possible talent and trustworthiness, and acquirements 
 suited to the offices to be filled. Such examinations are rightly 
 conducted by the higher officers employed in the department or 
 division where the appointment is to be made. These ex- 
 aminers will then determine upon a candidate's practical as 
 well as his theoretical acquirements, will take into considera- 
 tion his habits of industry and economy, recognizing every 
 
105 
 
 phase of a candidate's especial fitness for the place in which he 
 is required. This method of conducting examinations and of 
 awarding appointments and promotions in the service, has 
 already been fully tried in several of the departments and 
 branches of the public employ ; and its success in each of these 
 instances where it was consistently applied, was such as to 
 fully recommend its universal adoption throughout. 
 
 By this means of establishing civil service reform, the offices 
 of the government will fairly and properly compete with pri- 
 vate and corporate enterprises in securing an equal degree of 
 talent and trustworthiness in their employ ; and, for which a 
 corresponding rate of recompense will be demanded, and will 
 also be secured. 
 
 It will establish a career in the public employ upon exactly 
 the same basis of fitness and accountability, as will correspond 
 to the same grade of duties and responsibilities in private or 
 corporate employments. And it will also afford the same se- 
 curity for continued employment and for promotions in the 
 public service, as that which exists in the higher grades of pri- 
 vate enterprises. 
 
 Compared still further, with the provisions offered by the 
 scheme recently adopted by Congress, " to improve the civil 
 service of the United States," this method of reform is in 
 strict conformity with the spirit and plan of the Constitution, 
 On the other hand, as it has already been shown, the intro- 
 duction of a distinct civil service commission with its exami- 
 ners and so on, is an intrusion upon the duties and upon the 
 proper responsibilities of the higher officers of the govern- 
 ment. It is a fact, that, when competitive examinations have 
 been conducted by the superior officers of a department, or of 
 a division wherein the applicants were to be employed, they 
 have greatly aided in the efficiency of the work done in these 
 divisions and departments. But this does not afford any real 
 basis whatever for the argument offered, that these examina- 
 tions should be transferred to a distinct commission. Such a 
 commission must inevitably introduce new influences, and 
 make the system of the civil service employment more com- 
 plex, without affording it any corresponding advantages what- 
 
106 
 
 ever. No business man, nor corporation would employ a 
 separate commission to examine into the qualifications, either 
 of applicants for new appointments, or of applicants for pro- 
 motions, in his or their employ. 
 
 Nor is that part of the scheme, demanding that appointments 
 to the minor offices of the government shall be apportioned 
 among the States and Territories, etc., in proportion to their 
 population, based upon any true principle of good government. 
 Nor, will it be of any true value to the service. 
 
 The subordinate offices of the government are not intended 
 to be sinecures for a certain number of persons from each 
 state, and there is no need of establishing any routine method 
 for filling these offices. They represent a certain work to be 
 accomplished, and, in a fair and economically conducted govern- 
 ment, this labor should properly compete with equal labor en- 
 gaged in corporate or private enterprises without let or 
 hindrance. 
 
 It is a scheme of " reform" which cannot be applied to the 
 higher grade offices of the civil service, and hence, will still 
 permit the gravest of the civil service evils to remain un- 
 disturbed. Elective officers, entrusted with the appointments 
 of these higher officers will still distribute the great " spoils" 
 and prizes attending these high places in the civil service of 
 the country, where they will secure the most active and efficient 
 personal* and partisan service in determining a party nomina- 
 tion and an election to office. 
 
 It is u Civil Service Reform" with its vengeance directed 
 against the weaker parties to the crime. Its defence is false 
 and uncertain throughout, because it is based upon but half- 
 told truths. And it will fail for these reasons, and because it 
 is complex and uncertain in its application, and above all, 
 because it is not based upon the true principles of a govern- 
 ment made securely accountable to the people's will at its 
 every part. 
 
 True civil service reform can only be secured by the pro- 
 posed method of conducting direct elections, so that our 
 elective officers entrusted with the appointing power shall be 
 made truly accountable to the people. 
 
107 
 
 This method of establishing a true government by the peo- 
 ple, and of securing true political reform throughout, contem- 
 plates no change in the principles of our existing government. 
 It is a radical change in the method of conducting elections, 
 only. It introduces no new habits of thought or change of 
 purpose among the voting masses. By a simple provision, 
 however, on the part of the individual voter, it will afford him 
 an opportunity to act in concert with his fellows, while at 
 the same time it will secure for him an equitable share in the 
 control of his government. 
 
 The Political Reform which may be secured by the proposed 
 method of directly electing our official representatives, rests 
 wholly with the people, offering them the merit of the plan as 
 a recommendation for its adoption. And, it will with such 
 certainty secure for them an efficient means for the defence 
 and preservation of their political rights, that it may safely be 
 adopted by the people at once, by common consent. 
 
 Because, however, this method of directly electing the 
 people's representatives is a fundamental means in truthfully 
 conducting a representative government, it will require of the 
 people of this government the necessary effort to make it 
 a part of our written Constitution ; amending the existing 
 methods directed by the Constitution for the election of the 
 higher officers of our government, which have proven to be 
 unsafe, and, which have been shown to be alarmingly dangerous 
 to the existence and to the continuation of political freedom 
 among us. 
 
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 LD 21A-50m-3,'62 
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 General Library 
 
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 THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY