COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CORPORATIONS OF EVERY CLASS BY JOHN W. SMITH, LL D., OF THE CHICAGO BAR Author of " Receiverships," " Equitable Remedies of Creditors ' BEING A REVISED, RE-WRITTEN AND ENLARGED EDITION OF BEACH ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I INDIANAPOLIS THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY 1903 Copyright 1903 BY THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY T 1903 THE HOLLENBECK PRESS INDIANAPOLIS PREFACE TO THE MODERN LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. The changing conditions of the past ten years have brought about an extensive development of the Law of Municipal Corporations. These changes are so numerous and are of such importance that this new edition is practically a new treatise. Some of the chapters are greatly enlarged, many of them are entirely rewritten and a num- ber of entirely new chapters have been added to treat phases of the subject which have developed since the publication of Beach on Pub- lic Corporations. The cases decided during these last ten years have been carefully examined, and especial care has been taken to cite them accurately. The author has endeavored to make this a complete and up-to-date treatment of the subject of Municipal Corporations. Chicago, January 1, 1903. ' John W. Smith. (iii) ^ri.^.O,QQ PREFACE TO BEACH ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. In these volumes I have attempted to consider all the law of public corporations, including municipal corporations, and governmental or political corporations of every class. The scope of the work is, there- fore, somewhat wider than that of any other with which I am ac- quainted. I have proposed to myself the task of making a treatise wiiich shall cover the entire field of public company law in all its de- tails, using the term "public companies" in its widest modern sense, and I have studiously undertaken in the volumes in hand not to omit the law, as declared in the decided cases or defined by statute, of any sort of a public corporation. This work, therefore, and my "Private Corporations" (Chicago, 1891) complement each other, and, taken together, are intended to constitute a complete treatise, in four uniform volumes, on Company Law in all its phases, from the federal government at the one extreme — wliich, in this country at least, is the first of public corporations (United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 109 (per Marshall, C. J.) ; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506), possessing defined and limited cor- porate powers, with the capacity to contract and be contracted with, to sue in its corporate name ("The Government of the United States," Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 261) and to be sued by consent, and which, having been duly created as a corporation by the people of the several original states, acquired a true corporate entity, and went into operation, or commenced the transaction of its business, on Wednes- day, March 4, 1789 (Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420) — to the most insignificant joint-stock association or local incorporation, at the other extreme. Within this wide range should seem to be included (v) VI PREFACE. every sort of an association among men which passes for a corporation or a company, aside from partnerships on the one hand, and political sovereignties on the other. The subject of Public or Municipal Corporations, as compared with that of Private Corporations, is, both in this country and in England, largely statutory, and the intelligent reader will, therefore, perhaps not be surprised at the space given in the text to the con- sideration of many local statutes and ordinances. Sometimes these statutes are types of classes of statutes found in many states, but per- haps more frequently are distinct and sui generis^ and must, there- fore, in a treatise designed to be general, be separately considered. In collecting and arranging the matter for so large and compre- hensive a work as this, I have, of necessity and as of course, relied very much upon the intelligent and faithful labor of several young men in my office upon whose assistance I have come very much to depend in work of this character, and without which, in view of my other engagements, it would have been altogether impossible for me to prepare the work in its present shape. I trust that what has been here collected, collated and digested upon this important title may be accorded the same generous and indulgent reception which my other works have had at the hands of my professional brethren. New Yorl', February i, IS 93. Charles F. Beach, Jr. TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME I. CHAPTER L INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. Section Page 1. The genus corporation defined 1 2. Species of corporations -3 3. Public corporations, quasi-public corporations and private cor- porations 4 4. Subdivisions of public corporations 6 5. Municipal and public quasi-corporations defined 7 6. Subdivisions of strictly public corporations 7 7. Definition of the municipal corporation 9 8. Definition of the public quasi-corporation 11 9. Examples of municipal and public quasi-corporations 12 10. Counties 13 11. The New England towns 14 12. The same subject continued 16 13. The state 17 14. Long Island towns 18 15. The development of the municipal corporation — (a) In general 19 16. (b) Greece and Rome 20 17. (c) Italy and France — The mediteval cities 21 18. Conclusion 22 CHAPTER II. OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. 19. The Teutonic town 26 20. The old English town 27 21. The same subject continued 28 22. Guilds 30 23. The English boroughs 31 (vii) VIU TABLE OP CONTENTS VOL. I. Section Page 24. The same subject continued 33 25. Creation of modern English municipal corporations 34 26. Municipal corporations created by charter from the crown 35 27. Municipal corporations created by act of parliament 36 28. Municipal corporations at common law and by prescription in England 37 29. Municipal corporation by implication in England 38 30. The Municipal Corporations Reform Act of 1835 39 31. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 40 32. The American town — Local self-government 42 33. The power to create municipal corporations in the United States — Where vested — (a) In the state 44 34. (b) In the federal government 45 35. Municipal corporations created by the federal government — (a) Territories 46 36. (b) The District of Columbia 47 37. Municipal corporations by prescription in the United States 48 38. The same subject continued — Instances of incorporation by pre- scription in the United States 49 39. Municipal corporations by implication in the United States 49 40. The same subject continued 50 41. Creation of municipal corporations in the United States — (a) In general 51 42. (b) By special charter 52 43. (c) By general municipal incorporating acts 53 44. Constitutional limitations of legislative power to create mu- nicipal corporations 53 45. Construction of such constitutional limitations — (a) Corpora- tions "for municipal purposes" and "bodies politic or cor- porate" 54 46. (b) "Corporate powers" 55 47. Miscellaneous instances of such constitutional limitations 56 48. Incorporation by courts 56 49. The same subject continued 58 50. Classes of cities under general incorporating acts 59 51. The corporate limits — Territory of the corporation 59 52. Acceptance of charters by corporators not necessary 61 53. The same subject continued 61 54. Substantial compliance with incorporating acts necessary 62 55. Instances of irregularities in incorporation 63 56. Notice of incorporation 64 57. Validity of incorporation — How tested 64 58. The same subject continued 65 59. Existence not questioned collaterally 65 60. The charter of a municipal corporation is a law 66 61. The American township 67 62. Local self-government a delegation of legislative power 68 63. The same subject continued 68 64. Corporations de facto 69 65. Effect of incorporation 70 TABLE OF CONTEIS'TS VOL. I. IX CHAPTER III. THE CHARTER. Section Page 66. Early charters 72 67. Political element in charters 73 68. Charters at the present day 74 69. Municipal charters not within the rule of the Dartmouth College case 75 70. The present English statutes 76 71. The municipal corporation acts and the royal prerogative 77 72. Contents of charter 78 73. Prominent features of special charters 79 74. What charters can not confer 80 75. Wherein the constitutional limitation consists 81 76. Acceptance — When necessary 82 77. The same subject continued 83 78. Compulsory acceptance 84 79. Charters, how proved 85 80. Proof of fact of incorporation 86 81. Proof of corporate existence 87 82. General rules of construction of charters 87 83. Can charters be modified 89 84. How far the state can enforce 'performance of local duties 90 85. Change in municipal boundaries 91 86. Effect of amendments of charter on city ordinances 91 87. Reorganization under general law — Effect of 92 88. Reorganization must be strictly according to statute 93 89. The same subject continued 93 90. Effect of adoption of a new constitution 94 91. How far special legislation is permissible 94 92. Written constitutions — Operation of 95 93. Power to make by-laws — How limited 97 94. Conflict of by-laws and general acts 97 95. The ordinance, when passed, must be reasonable 99 96. Reasonableness — How determined 100 CHAPTER IV. AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. 97. The power of the state to amend, repeal or modify the charters of municipal corporations 102 98. The charter of a municipal corporation not within the rule of the Dartmouth College case 104 99. Construction of repealing and amendatory acts — (a) General principles 105 X TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL, I. Section Page 100. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together — Repeal by im- plication 106 101. Municipal charter not repealed by subsequent general law unless intent to repeal is clear 107 102. The same subject continued 108 103. Instances of repeal of charter by general acts 108 104. Repeal and amendment of charter by subsequent amendment of state constitution 109 105. Repeal of general laws by enactment of municipal charter 110 106. Repeal of general laws by municipal ordinance Ill 107. The same subject continued Ill 108. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made applicable only to cities of a certain class 112 109. Effect of legislation upon the charter of a city organized under special law, and not by its acceptance thereof subject to the general law 113 110. Miscellaneous instances of effective repealing and amendatory acts 114 111. The same subject continued 115 112. What is an amendment or repeal of a municipal charter? 116 113. Repeal— Effect of 117 114. Acceptance of amendment 117 115. Manner of acceptance 118 116. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature to amend or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general 118 117. (b) Special legislation 119 118. (c) Vested . rights — Impairment of obligation of contracts — Recognition by constitution 120 119. (d) Title of amendatory or repealing acts 121 120. The same subject continued 121 121. Forfeiture of charter in England 122 122. The same subject continued 123 123. Instances of forfeiture of charter under English law 123 124. The charter of a municipal corporation in the United States can not be forfeited by judicial action 124 125. The same subject continued 124 CHAPTER V. MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP PERSONAL LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION. 126. Definitions — Membership — Citizenship 126 127. Qualifications for membership in English municipal corpora- tions 127 128. The same subject continued 128 129. Qualifications for membership in American municipal corpora- tions 128 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. XI Section Page 130. Citizenship in England 129 131. The same subject continued 130 132. Citizenship in the United States 131 133. Natural citizens 131 134. The same subject continued 132 135. Naturalized citizens 132 136. The same subject continued 133 137. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive lands 134 138. The status of Chinese before the law 135 139. The status of American Indians before the law. . . .' 135 140. Privileges and immunities of citizens 136 141. The same subject continued 137 142. Rights of citizens 139 143. The same subject continued 140 144. Personal liability of members of the corporation 140 145. The same subject continued — Russell v. The Men of Devon 141 146. Personal liability of members of public quasi-corporations in New England 142 147. The same subject continued 143 148. Beardsley v. Smith — (a) The reason for the New England doc- trine of personal liability of members 143 149. (b) The doctrine in England 144 150. (c) The doctrine in Massachusetts and Maine 145 151. (d) The doctrine in Connecticut 146 152. Limitations upon the personal liability of members of New England public quasi-corporations 148 CHAPTER VI. OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 153. Legislative power to create officers and agents 150 154. Legislative control over officers and agents 151 155. Who are officers? 151 156. Conduct of elections — Construction of election statutes 152 157. Miscellaneous instances of the construction of election statutes. J53 158. Validity of election — General principles 155 159. The same subject continued — Illustrations 155 160. English rule as to majority 157 161. Election by ballot 158 162. Election by city council 159 163. Election by definite bodies generally — Majority and plurality.. 160 164. The same subject continued — Quorum majority 161 165. Informal ballot 163 166. Tenure of office 163 167. Tenure of office where city passes from one class to another. . . . 165 168. Power to hold over — English and American rules 166 169. The same subject continued 167 Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. Section Page 170. Appointment of officers 168 171. Validity of appointment 170 172. Appointment by de facto officers 171 173. Compensation of officers — In general 171 174. The same subject continued — Failure of corporate funds 174 175. The same subject continued — Illustrations 176 176. Miscellaneous instances 177 177. Extra compensation 178 178. Compensation of attorneys 181 179. The same subject continued 182 180. Compensation — Power of legislature to control 183 181. Compensation in case of removal 184 182. Qualifications for office-holding 185 183. Official oath 186 184. The same subject continued 187 185. Duties of officers 187 186. Powers of mayor 188 187. The same subject continued — Statutory provisions 190 188. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous powers 191 189. Miscellaneous instances of powers of municipal officers 192 190. De facto officers — General statement 194 191. The same subject continued — Color of title 195 192. Incumbent of an unconstitutional office 196 193. Possession of office by de facto officer 197 194. Rights and liabilities of de facto officers 197 195. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office 198 196. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignation 199 197. Removal of officers and agents — How effected 200 198. Causes for removal — English and American rules 202 199. Preferring of charges 203 200. Power of corporation to remove officers and agents 204 201. The same subject continued 205 202. Notice of proceeding to remove 206 203. The same subject continued 207 204. By whom discharged 208 205. All persons charged with notice of duties and powers of munici- pal agents 210 206. Liability of officers to the corporation 210 207. Instances of fraudulent acts of municipal agents 211 208. Liability of corporation to officers 212 209. Indictment of municipal officers 213 CHAPTER VII. PERSONAL LIABILITY OP OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 210. Liability on contracts — Presumption against liability 215 211. The same subject continued — Negotiable instruments 216 212. The same subject continued — Excess of authority, fraud, etc.. 217 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. Xlll Section Page 213. Exemption from liability for legislative acts 218 214. The foregoing rule qualified — Breach of trust 219 215. Liability of judicial officers considered 220 216. Quasi-judicial officers — Corrupt motive 221 217. Liability of ministerial officers 222 218. The same subject continued 223 219. No personal liability for strictly public acts 224 220. Default of subordinates 225 221. Ejection of member of council by order of mayor 226 222. Negligence of recorder of deeds 228 223. The same subject continued 229 224. Liability of assessor of taxes 229 CHAPTER VIIL THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION FOR THE ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, 225. Introductory 232 226. Liability ex contractu — Requirements for valid contracts 232 227. Contracts within scope of powers of corporation 233 228. The same subject continued 234 229. The doctrine of ultra vires applied with greater strictness to public than to private corporations 235 230. The reason for the rule 235 231. Municipal bonds void when ultra vires 236 232. The same subject continued 236 233. Ultra vires — How modified by estoppel 237 234. The same subject continued — Hitchcock v. Galveston 237 235. Irregularity in exercise of power 239 236. Ultra vires — How modified by the doctrine of implied contract — General principles 239 237. The same subject continued 240 238. Illustrations of the doctrine of implied contracts 241 239. The same subject continued 242 240. Liability of the corporation to repay taxes illegally collected.. 242 241. The same subject continued — Restrictions 243 242. Illegality of assessment 244 243. Actual receipt of taxes by the corporation 244 244. Compulsory payment of taxes 245 245. The same subject continued 246 246. Illustrations of the rule 246 247. The same subject continued 247 248. The doctrine of the federal supreme court considered 248 249. The same subject continued 249 250. Contracts within the scope of powers of officer or agent 249 251. The same subject continued — Clark v. Des Moines 250 252. All persons contracting with strictly public corporations charged with knowledge of scope of powers of officer or agent 252 SIV TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. Section Page 253. The same subject continued 253 254. Liability of corporation for act of its officers or agents in viola- tion of law 254 255. The same subject continued 255 256. Effect of representation of officer or agent as to authority 255 257. The same subject continued 256 258. Ratification of contracts 257 259. The same subject continued 257 260. Ratification by authorized officers necessary 258 261. Manner of ratification 259 262. Manner of execution of contracts by officers and agents 259 263. The same subject continued 260 264. Contracts by ordinance or resolution 261 265. Signature of contract 262 266. The same subject continued 262 267. Liability ex delicto — (a) In general 263 268. (b) Discretionary and legislative acts 263 269. (c) The same subject continued 264 270. (d) Ministerial acts 265 271. (e) Public as contradistinguished from private duties 265 272. The rule applied to public quasi-corporations 266 273. Conclusion. 267 CHAPTER IX. PUBLIC BOARDS. 274. Corporate assemblies of the old English corporations 269 275. The same subject continued — Notice at common law 270 276. The same subject continued — Presence of the mayor 271 277. Regular or stated meetings — Time for holding 272 278. Adjournments 273 279. Special meetings 274 280. Adjourned meetings 274 281. Notice of special meetings 275 282. The same subject continued — Specification of object of meeting. 277 283. Adjourned meetings — Time for holding 278 284. Corporation represented by governing boards 279 285. The same subject continued — Meeting essential to official action. 279 286. The same subject continued — Delegation of powers 281 287. The same subject continued 283 288. Delegation of powers — A Pennsylvania case 283 289. The same subject continued — The rule limited 284 290. Constitution of council 286 291. The same subject continued 286 292. Conflicting councils — Kerr v. Trego 287 293. Acts of de facto councils 288 294. Quorum of definite body 289 TABLE or CONTENTS VOL. I. XV Section Page 295. The same subject continued 291 296. The same subject continued — An exception to the rule 291 297. The same subject continued — Special charter provisions 292 298. Quorums and majorities further considered — The rule in Eng- land 292 299. The same subject continued — Decisions in the United States. . . . 293 300. Further application of majority principle 294 301. Execution of authority vested in two persons 295 302. Presiding officer 295 303. The same subject continued 297 304. Commitment for contempt — Whitcomb's case 298 305. Ayes and nays 299 306. Parliamentary law 300 307. Reconsideration and rescission — General power 301 308. The same subject continued 301 309. Power to reconsider and rescind qualified 302 310. The same subject continued 303 311. Reconsideration distinguished from appeal 304 312. Joint assemblies of definite bodies — Constitution and proceed- ings 305 313. Record of meetings 305 CHAPTER X. OFFICIAL BONDS. 314. Official bonds— Definition 308 315. What officers must give bonds 308 316. Form and requisites of bond 309 317. Effect of signing official bonds in blank 309 318. The same subject continued 310 319. Construction of courts on bonds improperly approved 310 320. Defective bonds valid as common-law obligations 311 321. The same subject continued 312 322. Time when an official bond takes effect 312 323. Effect of not filing bonds within the time prescribed by statute. . 313 324. The same subject continued 313 325. Liability of sureties on a treasurer's bond 314 326. The same subject continued 315 327. Mingling of and defalcation out of two funds 316 328. Liability of sureties as affected by subsequent legislation 317 329. Liability of surety when subsequent legislation imposes new duties of the same general character 317 330. The same subject continued 318 331. Liability of officer on his bond where the loss is occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy 319 332. The same subject continued 320 333. Duty of obligee to notify sureties of increased risk, etc 320 XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. Section Page 334. Liability of sureties on successive bonds — (a) Wtiere differ- ent sureties are given on each bond 321 335. The same subject continued 322 336. (b) Where funds received by the officer during his first term remain in his hands during liis second term 322 337. (c) "When the sureties of the first term are liable for money converted or collected by the officer during his second term. . 323 338. (d) When an officer before entering on his second term makes a report to or settlement with the proper authorities 323 339. The same subject continued 324 340. (e) Where the officer applies money received in his second term to pay deficiencies in his first term 325 341. (f) Where the bond is given for a term of office or a certain period of time 326 342. Laches or negligence of other officers or principal 326 343. Liability of sureties where additional bonds are given 327 344. Liability of surety where the official occupies two or more offices 327 345. Liability of surety for unofficial acts of officer 328 346. The same subject continued 329 347. Liability of sureties for acts done under color of office 329 348. The same subject continued — Lammon v. Feusier — The doc- trine of the federal supreme court 330 349. The same subject continued 330 350. The same subject continued — The doctrine of the state courts.. 331 351. The same subject continued 332 352. Illustrations of the doctrine 333 353. Distinction between judicial and ministerial duties 333 354. Illustrations of the doctrine 334 355. The same subject continued 335 CHAPTER XI. MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 356. Town meeting in New England and elsewhere 338 357. Right to meeting — Mandamus to enforce 339 358. Application for and authority to call a meeting 340 359. Secondary authority to call a meeting 341 360. General purpose of a warning 341 361. Designation of time and place of meeting 342 362. General and formal requisites of a warrant 343 363. The same subject continued 344 364. Service of warrant 345 365. Time of service 346 366. Return of service 347 367. Notice of annual meetings 348 368. The same subject continued 349 369. Time of meeting 349 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. XVll Section Page 370. Place of meeting 350 371. Organization of meeting — Tlie moderator 350 372. The same subject continued — Cleric and clerk pro tempore 351 373. Adjournments of meetings 352 374. The same subject continued 353 375. The power of adjournment limited 354 376. Adjourned meetings 354 377. Reconsideration and rescission — The general rule 355 378. The same subject continued — Illustrations 356 379. The same subject continued — The rule qualified 357 380. Ratification of doings of invalid meetings 358 381. Parliamentary law in town meetings 359 382. The same subject continued — Illustrations 359 383. Validity of votes as determined by the warrant — Illustrations.. 360 384. The same subject continued 361 385. Invalidity of votes — Illustrations 362 386. The same subject continued 363 387. Votes at town meeting — General rules of construction 364 388. Record of proceedings 364 389. Parol evidence of proceedings 365 390. Doings of meetings not legally called 366 391. Presumptions in favor of ancient meetings 367 392. Notice of election 368 393. Qualification of voters — Power to prescribe 369 394. Registration acts 370 395. Place of election 371 396. The same subject continued 372 397. Popular elections — Plurality 373 398. The same subject continued — Majorities, etc 374 399. Voting by ballot 374 400. The same subject continued 375 401. The Australian ballot and cumulative voting 376 402. Absolute accuracy not required in a ballot 377 403. Votes for ineligible candidates 378 404. Putting up offices at auction — Tax collector 379 405. City council as judge of election and qualification of its mem- bers 380 406. Canvass and return and contest of elections 380 CHAPTER XII. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. 407. How effected 382 408. Power of legislature 383 409. Constitutionality of laws for annexation 383 410. Delegation of legislative power 384 1 Smith — ii XVlll TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. Section Page 411. Illinois decisions 385 412. Maryland decisions 386 413. Michigan decisions 387 414. Missouri and Tennessee decisions 387 415. Ruling as to Baltimore City 388 416. Rule as declared in Washington 389 417. Powers of cities under the laws 389 418. The same subject continued 390 419. What may be annexed — General rule 391 420. The same subject continued — Construction of statutes 392 421. The same subject continued 392 422. Right of taxation as to annexed lands 393 423. Taxation for antecedent indebtedness 394 424. Remedy of taxpayer 395 425. Effect of consolidation 395 426. The same subject continued 396 427. Annexation proceedings — Notice 396 428. Mode of voting 397 429. Jurisdiction and procedure 398 430. The same subject continued 399 431. Reasonableness of annexation 400 432. Validity of annexation 400 433. Procedure to test validity 401 434. The same subject continued 402 435. Special acts as to reorganization 403 436. Nebraska act 403 437. Effect of reorganization 404 438. The same subject continued 405 439. The same subject continued — Decisions in California and Ten- nessee 405 440. Validity of reorganization — Special cases 406 441. Invalid reorganization 407 442. Property rights passing to new corporation 408 443. For what the reorganized corporation becomes liable 409 444. Further scope of the foregoing doctrine 410 445. What are such liabilities 410 446. Remedy of creditors of the old corporation 411 CHAPTER XIII. PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION, (a) Partition. 447. Partition — General rule 415 448. Validity of partition 416 449. Rules as to division of counties and towns 417 450. Procedure for division not applicable in vacating a town 418 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. XIX Section Page 451. Indiana rules 419 452. Michigan rules 420 453. Rules as to severing territory 421 454. Pennsylvania rule 421 455. Constitutionality — Wisconsin 422 456. Rulings as to constitution of Wisconsin on division of counties. 423 457. The same subject continued — Uniformity of system of govern- ment 424 458. Title of act 425 459. Florida decisions on constitutionality of acts 426 460. Kansas decisions 427 461. How partition affects officers 427 462. Where unorganized territory has been attached to a county.. 429 463. Settlement of inhabitants 430 464. Territory severed from an old to form a new corporation is a part of the old until the new is fully organized 431 465. Some Wisconsin acts construed 431 466. Provisions of act as to county sites 432 467. Apportionment of liabilities 433 468. Rules as to property and liabilities 434 469. The same subject continued 435 470. A Wisconsin case on property rights 436 471. Rules as to apportionment of liabilities and remedies 437 472. Rules in North Carolina as to settlement between new and old counties 438 473. Rules for adjustment of liabilities 439 474. Liabilities which fall upon the portion severed 440 475. Defenses to claims growing out of partition 441 476. Enforcement of obligations of old and new 443 477. Miscellaneous 444 (b) Dissolution. 478. Dissolution — How effected in general 445 479. The same subject continued 446 480. Surrender of charter 447 481. The same subject continued 448 482. Florida decisions on constitutionality of acts to dissolve 449 483. Vacated towns 450 484. This was no dissolution 451 485. Effect of dissolution as to liabilities and funds in hand 451 486. Effect of dissolution upon liabilities 452 487. What does not affect liabilities and remedies 454 488. Repealing charters 455 489. The same subject continued 456 490. Receiver for a city 457 491. The same subject continued 458 492. Where such a receiver was appointed 459 X2 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. CHAPTER XIV. ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. Section Page 493. Introducton 462 494. By-laws, ordinances and resolutions 462 495. Distinction between ordinance and resolution 463 496. The same subject continued — Illustrations 464 497. The province of ordinances 465 498. Power to make. ordinances 466 499. The same subject continued 467 500. By whom the power is to be exercised 469 501. Validity generally 469 502. Validity in respect of form — (a) Meeting of council 470 503. (b) The same subject continued 471 504. (c) Quorum and votes 472 505. ( d ) The same subject continued 474 506. (e) Mode of enactment 476 507. (f ) The same subject continued 478 508. (g) The signing of the ordinance 479 509. (h) The same subject continued 480 510. The veto power 481 511. (i) Publication of the ordinance — When mandatory 482 512. (j) The same subject continued — When directory 483 513. (k) The same subject continued — Amendments and re-enact- ments 484 514. (1) Manner of publication 485 515. (m) The same subject continued , 486 516. (n) Time and proof of publication 487 517. (o) Title of the ordinance 488 518. (p) Record of the ordinance 490 519. Validity in respect of matter — (a) Constitutionality 491 520. (b) The same subject continued 492 521. (c) Consistency with statute and charter 493 522. (d) The same subject continued 494 523. (e) Consistency with general penal law 495 524. ( f ) The same subject continued 497 525. (g) Reasonableness of the ordinance 499 526. (h) The same subject continued — Illustrations 502 527. (i) The same subject continued — Reasonableness a question of law 505 528. (j) Vagueness of the ordinance 506 529. (k) Ordinances void for want of notice 507 530. (1) Ordinance granting arbitrary power 508 531. (m) Ordinance delegating power 509 532. (n) Ordinances which are contracts 510 533. (o) Ordinances as to improvements — Valid 511 534. (p) Ordinances as to improvements — Invalid 512 535. (q) Miscellaneous ordinances — Valid and invalid 513 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. XXi Section Page 536. (r) Jurisdictional matters in relation to ordinances 514 537. (s) Curative ordinances 514 538. (t) Scope, force, effect, etc., of ordinances 515 539. Motives of council not to be impeached 516 540. Construction of ordinances 516 541. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous 518 542. Ordinances void in part 519 543. Amendment and repeal — By subsequent ordinance 520 544. Repeal by act of the legislature 522 545. Repeals by implication 523 546. Power to impose penalties 526 547. Mode of enforcement of ordinances — By a purely civil action. . . 527 548. Jurisdiction of proceedings 529 549. Imprisonment in default of payment of fine 529 550. Imprisonment as a penalty 531 551. Forfeitures 531 552. The same subject continued 533 553. Cumulative fines and fines for continuous and repeated offenses. 534 554. Enforcement by complaint — Nature of the proceedings 535 555. The complaint — General requisites 536 556. The same subject continued — Pleading 537 557. Pleading further considered ' 538 558. Proof of ordinances 539 559. Right to trial by jury 541 560. The same subject continued 542 561. Certiorari and habeas corpus 543 CHAPTER XV. EXPRESS CORPOEATE POWERS. 562. Powers of a municipal corporation generally 546 563. Delegation of powers 547 564. Delegation of power by the municipality 549 565. Power which may be delegated 551 566. The same subject continued 551 567. Exercise of powers 552 568. Mode of exercise 553 569. Proceedings not reviewable 554 570. The same subject continued 555 571. Constitutionality of acts granting powers 556 572. The same subject continued 557 573. Validity of acts granting powers 558 574. Power to "trade" should not be granted 558 575. Power of towns as to villages within them 560 576. Power as to issue of commercial paper 561 577. As to trusts 563 578. Purchase at tax sales 564 rxu table of contexts — vol. i. Section Page 579. Granting exclusive franchises 565 580. The same subject continued 567 581. Contracts not exclusive 568 582. Improvements generally 569 583. Costs of improvements 570 584. Gas and water supply 571 585. Natural gas companies 573 586. Establishment of electric plant 574 587. Public property 576 588. The same subject continued 577 589. Parks ^ 578 590. Wharves 579 591. The same subject continued 579 592. Markets 580 593. The same subject continued 581 594. Streets generally 582 595. Construction of statutory provisions 583 596. Protection of streets 584 597. Obstructions in streets 585 598. Use of streets by street-railways 585 599. Telegraph and telephone poles in streets — Removal 586 600. Vacation of streets 586 601. Grading of streets 587 602. Allowing the use of streets by railroads 588 603. The same subject continued 588 604. Regulations as to railroads using streets 589 605. The same subject continued 590 606. Crossings of railways 591 607. Miscellaneous matters relating to streets 592 608. Sewers 593 609. Fire-limits— Public health 594 610. Directions as to buildings 595 611. Police power 596 612. The same subject continued 597 613. Regulation of liquor traffic 599 614. To promote health 600 615. General welfare, etc 601 616. To license 602 617. Occupations 602 618. The same subject continued 603 619. Public offenses 606 620. The same subject continued 606 621. Nuisances 607 622. Holidays, etc 608 623. Power to purchase, lease and convey real estate 608 624. Power to subscribe for stock 609 625. Power over watercourses 610 626. Power to aid private charities 610 627. Miscellaneous 611 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. XXlll CHAPTER XVI. ULTRA VIRES. Section Page 628. General statement of the rule 613 629. Purchase of land for use of a railroad 615 630. Illustrations of the general rule 616 631. Grant of power to regulate highways construed 617 632. Contracts for exclusive privileges in highways 618 633. Strictly official duties not to be confided to non-official persons. . 619 634. Police ordinances — Wooden buildings 619 635. The same subject continued — Railroad crossings 620 636. The same subject continued — Markets, etc 622 637. Donations 622 638. The same subject continued 623 639. Subscribing to stock of railroads 624 640. City council as judge of elections 625 641. Governing authorities of school districts 626 642. The same subject continued 627 643. Purchase of real estate for school purposes — Texas ruling 628 644. Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits 628 645. Diversion of lands dedicated to public uses 629 646. Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls 630 647. Appropriations for highways and school-buildings 631 648. Power to purchase realty does not authorize giving notes 632 649. Work on public buildings, etc 633 650. Issuing of bonds 634 651. The same subject continued — Municipal aid 635 652. The same subject continued — Public improvements 636 653. Contracts abrogating control of streets 637 654. General legislation — Offers of rewards 638 655. Contracts for water supply 639 656. The same subject continued 639 657. Contracts for lighting streets 640 658. Grant of exclusive privileges 641 659. Curative legislation 642 660. Ratification 643 661. Estoppel 644 662. Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notice 646 663. Corporations may contest ultra-vires contracts 646 664. Liability upon ultra-vires contracts 647 665. The same subject continued 648 666. Ultra vires, when not a defense to actions by the corporation . . 649 667. Taxpayers' resistance 650 668. Taxpayers' suits 651 669. The same subject continued 652 670. Suits to restrain the enforcement of contracts. 653 671. Injunction the proper remedy 654 672. The same subject continued 655 XXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. CHAPTER XVII. IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN. (a) Implied Poweks. Section Page 673. General statement of the rule 658 674. Compromise of claims 659 675. The same subject continued — Application of the rule in Iowa. . . 659 676. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case 660 677. Compromise of ultra-vires claims 661 678. Submission to arbitration 662 679. Employment of attorneys 663 680. Power to hold property in trust 664 681. Acquisition of property for other than municipal purposes 665 682. The same subject continued — Discretion in erecting public buildings 665 683. Power to indemnify officers 666 684. The same subject continued 667 685. Offers of rewards 669 686. The same subject continued — The power generally denied 669 687. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule qualified 670 688. Expenditures in obtaining or opposing legislation 671 (b) Eminent Domain. 689. Nature and definition 672 690. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitations 673 691. What property may be taken 674 692. Quantity of estate 675 693. What constitutes a taking 676 694. The same subject continued — The leading case 676 695. The same subject continued — Constitutional amendments 678 696. Property already appropriated to public use 678 697. The same subject continued 679 698. Change of grade 680 699. Change of use — Additional use 681 700. The same subject continued — Electric railways 682 701. Grant of power to municipal corporations 684 702. Public use and necessity of appropriation, by whom deter- mined 685 703. Legislative declaration conclusive 686 704. Public use as respects municipalities — Parks and streets 687 705. The same subject continued — Water, gas, etc 688 706. The same subject continued — Cemeteries, sewers, etc 689 707. The same subject continued — Leasing for public use 690 708. The same subject continued — Ornamental purposes 691 709. Notice of proceeding — Necessity for 692 710. Parties entitled to notice 693 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. XXV Section Page 711. Service of notice 693 712. Treaty with the owner 694 713. The application or petition 695 714. The tribunal 697 715. Right to jury trial 698 716. Right to abandon proceedings 699 717. Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings 700 718. Compensation 701 719. Elements in estimating compensation 702 720. The same subject continued 703 721. Benefits 704 722. Payment 705 723. Review of proceedings — Certiorari 706 724. The same subject continued — Appeal 707 CHAPTER XVIII. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. 725. Municipal contracts — General 709 726. Contracts — By whom made 709 727. What is municipal contract 712 728. Implied contracts 713 729. Ratification of contracts 714 730. Rescission of contracts 716 731. Modification or alteration of contracts 717 732. Acceptance of work under contract 718 733. Performance of contract 719 734. Waiver of performance 720 735. Breach of contract — Remedy 721 736. Payments on contract 721 737. Validity of contracts — General 723 738. Contracts which have been held valid 725 739. Invalidity of contracts 728 740. Construction of contracts 736 741. Extras 738 742. Exclusive franchises and privileges 739 743. Contracts ultra vires 740 744. Liability of municipality on contracts 741 745. Estoppel 745 746. Letting of municipal contracts 747 CHAPTER XIX. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. 747. Legislative control subject to limitations 755 748. Powers that the state can not relinquish 756 749. Impairment of legislative grants 757 XXVI TABLE OF CASES VOL. I. Section Page 750. The same subject continued 758 751. Remission of forfeitures 758 752. Property held for public Uses 759 753. Tenui'e of office of municipal officers 760 754. Agencies of municipal administration 760 755. Diversion of funds 761 756. The same subject continued — Public interest paramount to pri- vate right 762 757. Application of revenues 762 758. The same subject continued 763 759. Impairment of obligations to individuals 763 760. The same subject continued 764 761. Impairment of remedies against the corporation 765 762. The same subject continued — Control of taxing power limited.. 765 763. Vacating assessments of damages 766 764. The rule summarized 767 CHAPTER XX. TORTS AXD CRIMES. 765. Torts by the sovereign power 770 766. The state not liable for officers' torts — No respondeat superior. . 771 767. Suits against United States — Court of claims 772 768. Suits against New York — Board of claims 773 769. Counties, etc., as divisions of the state 774 770. The same subject continued 775 771. Non-liability of New England towns 776 772. Liability of New York towns 777 773. Liability of towns, etc., as to special duties 778 774. Non-liability of school districts and drainage districts 779 775. Non-liability for separate boards and bodies 780 776. Non-liability for torts of independent officers 781 777. The same subject continued — Who are independent officers 782 778. The same subject continued — Applied in New York City, etc. . . . 783 779. Liability of municipal corporations in tort — General principles. 784 780. Liability in performance of public or governmental functions. . 785 781. Duties which are mandatory and discretionary 786 782. Duties legislative or judicial 787 783. Liability for torts of public officers 787 784. Liability for torts of officers not public 788 785. Liability in making improvements, etc 789 786. Torts in diverting watercourses, surface water, etc 790 787. Respondeat superior not applicable to public officers 791 788. Negligence as an element of tort 793 789. Liability for collision of vessels 795 790. Torts of independent contractor 795 791. Miscellaneous matters in relation to torts 796 TABLE OF COXTENTS — VOL. II, XXvii Section Page 792. Non-liability for firemen 797 793. Non-liability for police 798 794. Liability for acts of mobs 799 795. Private interests must yield to public 800 796. The same subject continued — Destroying buildings to check fire. 802 797. Non-liability for negligence in public service 802 798. Liability in matters of arrest 804 799. Non-liability as to jails 804 800. Non-liability as to hospitals 806 801. Non-liability as to fireworks 807 802. Liability as to city wells and water 808 803. Non-liability to trespassers 809 804. Liability for nuisances 810 805. Municipal liability in general 812 806. Chartered cities, etc., distinguished from counties, etc. — The conflict 812 807. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers 814 808. Liability commensurate with duty 816 809. Municipal liability as to water front 817 810. Liability for fright of horses 817 811. Municipal liability for acts of officers and agents 818 812. Not liable for ultra-vires acts of officers 819 813. Non-liability in the exercise of discretionary powers 819 814. The same subject continued — New York and Georgia rule 821 815. The same subject continued — Drainage 821 816. Non-liability for errors of judgment 822 817. Liability for trespass 823 818. Liability for waste 825 819. Liability after notice — Implied notice 826 820. The same subject continued — Statutory notice 827 821. The same subject continued — New York decisions 829 822. Impeaching municipal legislative acts for fraud 829 823. Indictment for torts 830 824. Not indictable for felony 832 VOLUME II. CHAPTER XXI. FISCAL MANAGEMENT, (a) Power to Incur Indebtedness. 825. Manner of contracting 834 826. Construction of statutory provisions 835 827. Borrowing money 837 828. The same subject continued 838 829. Employment of attorneys 840 XXVlll TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. Section Page 830. Contracts for construction of county buildings 840 831. Support of the poor 841 832. Taxation for scliool purposes 843 833. Tlie same subject continued 844 834. The same subject continued — Validity of resolutions 845 835. Levy of taxes 846 836. Contracts for water supply and lighting 847 837. School boards and directors 848 838. Erection of school-houses 849 . 839. School district boards — Contracts for building 851 839a. Contracts with teachers 852 840. Authority of county treasurer, etc 853 841. Authority of officers in particular instances 854 842. The same subject continued 855 843. Powers of a trustee of a school township 856 844. Town selectmen, etc 857 845. The same subject continued 858 846. Township boards 859 847. The same subject continued — Michigan decisions 860 848. Town trustees — Indiana decisions 861 849. The same subject continued 862 850. Directors of schools — Illinois decisions 864 851. Town supervisors — Illinois and Minnesota decisions 865 852. Power of towns and town officers in Maine 866 853. Powers of towns in Massachusetts 866 854. Michigan decisions 867 855. Selectmen in New Hampshire 868 856. Towns and town officers in New York 869 857. Vermont decisions ' 870 858. Debts which are valid 871 859. Debts which are invalid 872 860. Miscellaneous matters pertaining to municipal debts 872 (b) Limitation of Indebtedness. 861. Limitation on power to create municipal indebtedness 873 862. Indebtedness depending on popular vote 874 863. Indebtedness limited by a per cent, of valuation 875 864. Preliminary provisions for a sinking fund 875 865. Aggregate indebtedness — How determined 875 866. Evasion of constitutional limitations 880 867. Indebtedness in excess of limit not a defense, when 882 868. Construction of constitutional provisions 882 869. Rulings of the United States supreme court 884 870. Rulings in California 885 871. Rulings in Colorado 886 872. Rulings in Illinois 887 873. Rulings in Indiana 889 874. Rulings under the Iowa constitution 890 875. The same subject continued 891 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. Xxix Section Page 876. Rulings under the Oregon and "Washington constitutions 891 877. Rulings under Texas laws 892 878. Rulings in West Virginia 893 879. Special statutory provisions 893 880. The same subject continued 894 881. Indebtedness for water and lights 895 882. Effect of exceeding the limit 896 883. Remedy of taxpayers against increase of debt 897 CHAPTER XXII. MUNICIPAL FUNDS. (a) Care and Disbursement of Funds. 885. Funds appropriated to specific uses 900 886. Custodians of funds 901 887. The same subject continued 903 888. Compensation of treasurers 904 889. The same subject continued 905 890. Settlements with treasurers 906 891. Actions to recover county funds. 907 892. Actions on treasurer's bonds 908 893. Public depositories 909 894. Examination of county, officers' accounts 910 895. Liability of custodians of funds 911 896. Liabilities on bonds of custodians of school funds 912 897. Investment of school funds 913 898. Loan of school funds 913 899. Liability of officers and agents of towns 914 900. Miscellaneous expenditures 915 (b) Appropriations. 901. Appropriations out of special funds 916 902. Appropriations anticipating revenue 917 903. Special funds 918 904. The same subject continued — Construction of statutes 918 905. Statutory provisions further considered 919 906. Appropriations for schools 920 907. The same subject continued 922 908. Budget 923 909. Annual appropriations 924 910. Appropriation of taxes to sinking fund 924 911. Validity of appropriations 925 912. Appropriations held to be void 926 XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. (c) UxLAWFUL Expenditures. Section Page 913. The New York statute providing for investigation 926 (d) Claims. 914. Presentation of claims for allowance 928 915. Notice — Sufficiency, etc 929 916. Notices which have been held sufficient or insufficient 929 917. Statute applies to claims for tort 930 918. Decision based upon notice not final 930 919. Miscellaneous matters concerning presentation 931 920. Interest on claims 931 921. Compromise of claims 932 922. Presentation of claims continued 932 923. The same subject continued 933 924. The same subject continued — Verification of claim 935 925. Presentation of claims for injuries 935 926. Presentation as a condition precedent to right of action 937 927. Allowance of claims 938 928. The same subject continued — Procedure 939 929. The same subject continued — Adjudication by the board 940 930. Conclusiveness of adjudication 941 931. Proceedings after disallowance of claim 942 932. Malfeasance in over-allowance 943 933. Proper and improper charges against a county 943 934. The same subject continued 944 935. Apportionment of indebtedness upon division of a county 945 936. Claims of contractors for extra work 946 937. Claims for services to indigent persons 947 938. Proceedings to enforce payment of judgments 948 939. Mandamus to county officers 949 (e) Warrants. 940. Character of warrants as evidences of indebtedness 950 941. How drawn 953 942. Mandamus to compel the signing of a warrant 954 943. How payable — From what fund 955 944. Duty of officers in drawing warrants 956 945. Validity of warrants 957 946. Actions upon warrants 958 947. Mandamus to compel payment of warrants 960 948. Defenses to actions on warrants 961 949. Notes of counties 963 950. Notes of towns 964 951. Township orders 965 952. The same subject continued 966 953. School board orders 967 954. School warrants 968 TABLE OF COXTEXTS — VOL. II. XXXI CHAPTER XXIII. BONDS AXD COUPOXS. Section Page 955. Implied power to issue bonds 971 956. The doctrine' of the supreme court of the United States 973 957. The same subject continued — Brenham v. German-American Bank 974 958. Same continued — State decisions 975 959. Agency in issuing 977 960. The corporation must have a legal existence 977 961. No right of action on void bonds 978 962. Constitutional limitations — Public purpose 978 963. Aid to manufacturing enterprises 980 964. Internal improvements 981 965. Municipal aid to railroads — Express legislative authority es- sential 981 966. Railway aid bonds — Legislature may authorize 982 967. The same subject continued — Negotiable bonds 984 968. Conditions precedent 984 969. Bonds — Constitutional requirements 985 970. The same subject continued — Assent of taxpayers 986 971. The same subject continued — Election 987 972. Conduct of election continued 989 973. Conditional subscriptions 990 974. The same subject continued 991 975. Ratification 992 976. The same subject continued 994 977. Effect of consolidation of companies on authority to subscribe. 994 978. Effect of constitutional prohibitions 995 979. The same subject continued 996 980. Recitals in municipal bonds 997 981. Negotiability of bonds 1012 982. Signature to bonds 1013 983. Sealing 1014 984. Date— Ante-dating 1015 985. To whom payable 1015 986. Place of payment 1016 987. Time of maturity 1016 988. Delivery 1017 989. Quality of municipal bonds as commercial paper 1018 990. Coupons 1019 991. Payment of coupons 1019 992. Interest upon interest 1020 993. Refunding, substituted and renewal bonds 1020 994. The same subject continued 1022 995. Estoppel by matter in pais 1022 996. Estoppel to set up overissue in violation of statute 1023 997. Overissue in violation of the constitution — No estoppel by re- citals 1024 XXXll TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. Section Page 998. The same subject continued — The rule qualified 1024 999. Bona fide holders 1025 1000. The same subject continued 1026 1001. Defenses available against bona fide holders 1027 1002. The same subject continued 1028 1003. Validity of bonds 1028 1004. Invalidity of bonds 1029 1005. Sale of bonds 1030 1006. Miscellaneous 1033 CHAPTER XXIV. CHARITIES AND CORRECTIGlSr. 1007. General rules governing directors of poor, etc 1034 1008. Rulings in Massachusetts as to overseers of the poor 1036 1009. Rulings in Maine and New York 1036 1010. Contracts by governing boards for the support of the poor 1037 1011. Discretionary powers of governing boards 1039 1012. Medical treatment for the poor 1040 1013. The same subject continued 1041 1014. Settlement of paupers — Generally 1041 1015. The same subject continued 1042 1016. The same subject continued — Illegitimate children 1043 1017. Massachusetts decisions on settlement of soldiers mustered out of service 1044 1018. Settlement of married women 1045 1019. Settlement acquired by residence and payment of taxes 1046 1020. The same subject continued 1047 1021. Constitutionality of laws for the removal of paupers 1048 1022. Rulings on removal of paupers 1049 1023. Notice in cases for removal of paupers 1050 1024. Notice of charge by one town to another 1051 1025. "What corporations are liable for support of paupers 1052 1026. No implied liability 1053 1027. Special liabilities 1054 1028. Various rulings as to the poor 1054 1029. Support of patient at state lunatic asylum — Persons "in need of immediate relief" 1055 1030. The same subject continued 1056 1031. Support of insane poor further considered 1057 1032. Aid to children 1058 1033. Liability of corporations to those furnishing support to pau- pers 1058 1034. The same subject continued 1059 1035. Duty to furnish immediate relief 1060 1036. Proceedings to compel relative to support paupers 1061 1037. Liability of a pauper for his support 1062 1038. Municipality can not recover for voluntary aid 1062 TABLE OP CONTENTS — VOL. II. XXxiii Section Page 1039. Actions for support of paupers 1063 1040. The same subject continued 1065 1041. Statutes prohibiting bringing paupers from other states 1066 1042. Liability to paupers for negligence of employes 1068 1043. Support of the insane 1068 1044. The same subject continued 1069 1045. Soldiers' homes 1070 1046. Reformatories 1070 1047. Liability of counties for the care of prisoners 1072 1048. Care of prisoners continued 1073 1049. Hiring of convicts 1073 1050. Liability for personal injuries to prisoners 1074 1051. The same subject continued 1075 CHAPTER XXV. PUBLIC HEALTH — BOARDS OF HEALTH AND QUARANTINE. 1052. Municipal regulations for the promotion of public health 1078 1053. Power of the state legislature 1078 1054. Declaring nuisances is not an exercise of judicial functions. . . .1079 1055. Extent of authority illustrated 1079 1056. The same subject continued 1080 1057. Regulation of occupations 1080 1058. Powers conferred on boards of health not exclusive 1081 1059. Power to control manufactures 1082 1060. Limitations of police power over occupations 1082 1061. Establishment of sanitary districts 1083 1062. The same subject continued 1083 1063. Reasonableness of ordinances 1084 1064. Regulating removal of garbage 1085 1065. Regulating burials and burial permits 1086 1066. Boards of health generally 1087 1067. Powers of town trustees in Iowa as boards of health 1087 1068. Power of boards of health as to employment of physicians 1088 1069. Owner of property condemned as a nuisance entitled to a hearing 1088 1070. The same subject continued 1089 1071. Conclusiveness of determination by board of health 1090 1072. Power of board of health as a corporation — New Jersey deci- sions 1091 1073. The same subject continued 1091 1074. Injunction upon application of hoard of health in New Jersey. .1092 1075. Abatement of nuisances under general authority to promote health 1093 1076. Power to forbid the exercise of an offensive trade 1093 1077. Actions by town boards of health to suppress nuisances by in- junction 1094 1 Smith — iii XXXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. Section Page 1078. Expenditures by boards of health, to what municipal corpora- tion chargeable 1095 1079. No corporate liability for torts of health officers 1096 1080. The same subject continued 1096 1081. Personal liability of members of board of health for negli- gence 1097 1082. The same subject continued , 1098 1083. Quarantine regulations generally 1098 1084. Extent of power of municipal authorities 1099 1085. Liability of owner of vessel for quarantine expenses 1100 1086. Power and duty of boards of health under Florida quarantine laws 1100 1087. Charge against vessels in quarantine 1101 1088. A limitation upon quarantine regulations 1101 CHAPTER XXVI. SUPPRESSION OP NUISANCES. 1089. Nuisance defined 1103 1090. Not protected by constitution 1104 1091. What are nuisances 1105 1092. Prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance 1106 1093. City can not create or maintain a nuisance 1106 1094. Abatement of 1107 1095. Public nuisance 1107 1096. Private nuisance 1108 1097. Legalized nuisance 1108 1098. License of nuisance 1110 1099. Damages 1111 1100. Liability for public and private acts 1113 1101. Nature of the power of public authorities to suppress nui- sances ■. .1113 1102. The same subject continued — A police power 1114 1103. Abatement of nuisances by destruction of property 1114 1104. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitation 1115 1105. Discretion of municipal bodies in regulating and abating nuisances 1116 1106. The power of municipal corporations as to declaring what is a nuisance Ill 6 1107. The extent of the power to abate nuisances 1117 1108. Abatement of decayed and noisome tenement houses 1118 1109. Removal of occupants — Express authority or extraordinary peril 1118 1110. Power to define nuisances not absolute 1119 1111. The same subject continued 1119 1112. Limitation of power to define nuisances further illustrated. .1120 1113. Municipality confined to mode prescribed in the charter or statute 1121 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. IL XXXV Section Page 1114. The same subject continued 1121 1115. Abatement of structures endangering public safety 1122 1116. Person charged with maintaining a nuisance entitled to notice or hearing 1122 1117. Construction of statutes requiring notice to owners to remove nuisances 1123 1118. Proceedings in equity for abatement of nuisances — New Jersey decisions 1124 1119. The same subject continued — Minnesota decisions 1125 1120. The same subject continued — The rule in other states 1126 CHAPTER XXVII. PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. 1121. Public improvements generally 1129 1122. Necessity for public improvements 1129 1123. Cost of improvement 1131 1124. Necessary funds a prerequisite 1132 1125. Passage of ordinance 1132 1126. Petition for improvement 1133 1127. Statutory requirements strictly construed 1138 1128. Conclusiveness of determination of council 1138 1129. Including several streets in one improvement 1139 1130. Notice of proposed improvements 1140 1131. Consent of owners to improvements 1141 1132. What must be specified in an ordinance 1142 1133. Ordinance as a basis of improvements 1143 (a) Necessity of ordinance 1144 (b) Sufficiency of — 1144 (c) Validity of— 1146 ( d ) Reasonableness of — 1148 (e) Recitals in— 1149 (f ) Curative acts 1149 1134. Formality and irregularity in proceedings 1149 1135. Improvement of streets 1150 1136. Grade of streets 1151 1137. Resolution as a basis of improvements 1152 1138. Agreements to repair streets 1155 1139. Railroad bridge across a street not a local improvement 1155 1140. Rule as to repaving, etc., in Pennsylvania 1156 1141. Opening and widening streets 1156 1142. Reconstruction of streets and sidewalks — Second assessment. .1157 1143. Paving streets 1157 1144. Paving and repairing distinguished 1158 1145. Repairs of streets, etc 1159 1146. Lawful improvements 1160 XXXVl TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II, Section Page 1147. Curative legislation 1160 1148. Supervisors of a county ordering improvements in a town. 1160 1149. Sidewalks 1161 1150. Contracts in restraint of right to control or improve streets. .1162 1151. Discretion of municipal authorities 1162 1152. The same subject continued 1163 1153. Streets with railways intersecting them 1163 1154. Local assessments 1164 1155. Local improvement defined 1165 1156. Legality of assessments for local improvements 1166 1157. Special taxation in Illinois 1167 1158. Constitutionality of assessments for sidewalks 1167 1159. Fee in land condemned a part of the cost of an improvement. .1168 1160. Highways 1169 1161. Opening highways 1170 1162. Repairing highways 1170 1163. Bridges 1171 1164. Construction of bridges 1171 1165. Sewers 1173 1166. Construction of sewers 1175 1167. The same subject continued 1175 1168. Contracts for construction of sewers 1175 1169. Power as to drains and sewers discretionary 1176 1170. Local assessments for drains and sewers 1177 1171. Drainage continued 1178 1172. Liability of the corporation 1179 1173. The same subject continued — Rights in percolating water 1180 1174. Massachusetts decisions as to assessment for sewers 1181 1175. Use of street for private drain 1182 1176. Improvements by street-railway companies 1182 1177. The same subject continued 1183 1178. Street-railway company bound to repair 1183 1179. Lighting of streets 1184 1180. Contracts — Construction of 1185 1181. The same subject continued — Advertisements for bids, etc 1187 1182. Conditions precedent to recover by contractor, etc 1188 1183. Indiana decisions as to letting contracts 1189 1184. Effect of assignment of a contract 1192 1185. When a contract is complete 1193 1186. Letting contract after returning bids., 1193 1187. Discretion of municipal authorities 1194 1188. Approval of contract by council — Rejection 1195 1189. Repaying of street 1195 1190. Title to street essential to jurisdiction 1195 1191. Opening and improving streets in one proceeding 1196 1192. Description of work in resolution 1197 1193. Conclusiveness of assessor's or other oflficial's action 1197 1194. Assessment for paving streets and constructing sidewalks 1198 1195. When cost of repairing can not be charged to abutters 1198 1196. Power of assessment illustrated and limited 1199 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. XXXvii Section Page 1197. The same subject continued 1200 1198. Collateral attack of assessments 1201 1199. Suit to restrain assessment 1202 1200. Actions to vacate assessments 1202 1201. Allegations necessary 1203 1202. Evidence — Proof required 1204 1202a. Actions to recover money paid upon illegal assessments 1205 1203. Power to assess abutting owners 1205 1204. The same subject continued 1206 1205. Rule in Texas as to homestead 1206 1206. Liability of the corporation for negligence 1207 1207. The same subject continued 1208 1208. Damages for improper construction 1208 1209. The same subject continued — Constitutional provisions .1209 1210. Damages from defective streets. . .• 1210 1211. Measure of damages 1210 1212. Offset against damages 1211 1213. Unauthorized modification of contract 1212 1214. Rights of abutters 1213 1215. Interest of abutters in streets 1214 1216. Liability of corporation for consequential injuries 1215 1217. Flowage of surface water from streets 1216 1218. The same subject continued 1217 1219. Flowage of water by construction of a levee 1218 1220. Damages for change of grade 1218 1221. The same subject continued — Connecticut rule 1221 1222. The same subject continued — "Damage" clause in constitu- tions 1222 1223. The same subject continued — Measure of damages 1222 1224. Damages by change of grade further considered 1222 1225. The same subject continued — Common-law action 1223 1226. Estoppel of landowner 1224 1227. Actions by abutters — Pleading, etc 1225 1228. Questions for the jury 1226 CHAPTER XXVIII. LOCAL OR SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS. 1228a. Special assessments defined — Nature of 1230 1229. Express legislative authority requisite 1232 1230. A continuing power 1233 1231. Purposes for assessment illustrated 1233 1232. Decision of council conclusive 1235 1233. Preliminary steps to valid assessment 1235 (a) The ordinance 1236 (b) Petition for improvement 1236 (c) Notice of improvement 1236 sxxviu - table of contexts vol. ii. Section Page ( d ) What record must show 1237 (e) Cost of improvement 1240 (f ) Drawings and specifications 1240 (g) Compliance with preliminaries 1240 1234. Notice of improvement 1240 1235. Hearing of property owners 1242 1236. What property assessable 1243 (a) Property enumerated in statute 1243 (b) Must be abutting property 1243 (c) Must be on property benefited 1243 (d) Unplatted or unsubdivided property 1244 (e) Public property not subject 1244 (f) Abutting property for lateral improvements 1245 (g) Property at termination of street 1245 (h) Part of undivided tract may be 1245 (i) Property on extended street 1246 (j) Title not involved 1246 (k) Improvements on two streets not assessable on one 1246 1237. Exempt property liable to special assessments 1246 1238. Assessments against elevated street railways 1248 1239. Assessments against railroad right of way 1248 1240. Assessment districts 1252 1241. Same subject continued 1253 1242. Prescribed formalities must be strictly followed 1254 1243. Same subject continued 1255 1244. Ordinance or resolution 1256 1245. Petition 1257 1246. Same subject continued 1258 1247. Description of improvements and property 1259 1248. Delegation of matters of detail 1261 1249. Personal liability of landowner 1261 1250. Recovery of money paid on illegal assessments 1263 1251. Same subject continued 1264 1252. Same subject continued — "Coercion in law" 1265 1253. Apportionment of assessment 1266 (a) Assessment only to extent of benefits 1266 (b) Excess over benefits to be paid by city 1266 (c) Where costs in some blocks greater than in others 1266 (d) Equality must be basis of assessment 1267 (e) Frontage rule 1267 (f) Apportionment by superficial area 1270 (g) Rule in absence of statutory mode 1271 (h) Apportionment between city and property owners 1271 (i) Both sides of street must be assessed 1272 ( j) City can not subdivide property, etc 1272 1254. Report of commissioners — When conclusive 1273 1255. Objections to special assessment 1274 (a) Necessity of filing 1274 (b) When objections are to be made 1274 (c) Sufficiency of objections 1274 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL, II, XXxix Section Page (d) When objection sustained 1276 (e) When objection not sustained 1276 (f) Failure to appeal 1276 (g) Waiver of defect in notice 1276 1256. Confirmation of assessment 1277 (a) Want of notice 1277 (b) Jurisdiction to confirm 1277 (c) Evidence on hearing of confirmation 1277 (d) Judgments — May be separate 1277 (e) Collateral attack of 1278 1257. Appeal from judgment confirming — Certiorari 1278 (a) Limitation of time 1278 (b) Effect of appeal 1279 (c) Presumption on appeal 1279 (d) What considered on appeal 1279 1258. Remedy of property owner 1280 (a) By appeal 1280 (b) Remedy in equity 1280 (c) Remedy by statute 1281 (d) Remedy may be lost 1282 (e) Tender— Jury trial 1282 1259. Defenses when available and when not available 1282 1260. Assessments enjoined, when 1284 1261. Estoppel 1285 1262. Reassessment — When made 1286 1263. Injunction against illegal assessments 1287 1264. Evidence in matters of special assessment 1289 (a) In application for judgment 1289 (b) Presumptions 1289 (c) Burden of proof 1289 (d) Certificate of clerk 1290 1265. General principles as to validity of assessments 1290 1266. Special assessments held valid 1293 1267. Special assessments held invalid 1295 1268. Curative acts 1298 1269. Benefits— What are — How determined 1299 (a) What are benefits 1299 (b) Method of ascertaining 1299 (c) Assessment not to exceed benefit. .' 1299 (d) Review of benefits by courts 1300 1270. Abutting owner and property — Liability 1300 1271. Legislative power with reference to assessments 1301 1272. Collateral attack of assessment 1303 1273. Lien of special assessment 1304 1274. Recovery of money paid on illegal assessments 1304 1275. Liability of city in special assessments 1305 1276. Miscellaneous matters relating to special assessment 1307 (a) Repaving and repairs 1307 (b) Sale in special assessments 1307 (c) Double taxation 1307 xl TABLE OF CONTEXTS — VOL. II. Section Page (d) Deposit of bonds by contractor 1308 (e) Stay of improvement — Effect of 1308 (f) Payment — By cotenant — By city 1308 (g) Repeal of ordinance — Effect of 1308 (h) What are public improvements 1308 (i) Liability of city in 1308 (j) Liability of abutter 1309 (k) Personal judgment not proper 1309 (1) Reducing assessment 1309 CHAPTER XXIX. STREETS, ALLEYS, WHARVES, ETC. ' 1277. Street defined 1313 1278. Alley defined 1313 1279. Sidewalk defined 1314 1280. Methods of acquiring lands for streets and alleys 1314 1281. Dedication must be accepted 1315 1282. Care of streets, alleys, etc 1315 1283. Power to vacate streets 1317 1284. Vacation is discretionary 1320 1285. Abandonment of streets 1321 1286. Discretion in improving unused streets 1321 1287. Use of streets for private purposes 1322 1288. Powers not to be surrendered 1323 1289. Liability of municipality for defective streets 1323 1290. Negligence of municipality in regard to 1324 (a) Ditches in street 1324 (b) Holes in street 1324 (c) Injury at other than street crossing 1325 (d) Liability for others and oflficers 1325 (e) Not relieved by delegation of work 1325 (f) Negligence generally 1325 (g) Negligence is a question of fact for jury 1326 1291. Contributory negligence , 1326 1292. Knowledge of defects— Effect of 1327 1293. Illustrations of contributory negligence 1328 1294. What is not contributory negligence — Illustrations 1329 1295. Contributory negligence a question for the jury 1331 1296. Negligence must be proximate cause of injury 1331 1297. Notice of defective condition of street or sidewalk 1333 1298. Notice may be constructive 1333 1299. To whom notice should be given 1334 1300. When notice is not required 1335 1301. Notice required by statute or charter 1336 1302. Notice inferred from lapse of time 1336 1303. Time sufficient to impute notice for the jury 1337 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. xli Section Page 1304. Sidewalks 1337 (a) Sidewalk defined 1337 (b) Control over and liability in regard to 1338 (c) Presumption as to condition of sidewalk 1338 (d) Duty to erect barriers and signals 1338 (e) Liability for defective sidewalks 1338 (f ) Miscellaneous illustrations of liability 1339 (g) Liability of owner for failure to repair 1340 (h) Liability of city for failure to repair 1340 (i) Michigan rule of liability for failure to repair 1341 (j) Liability for accumulations of snow and ice 1342 1305. Right of municipality to indemnity 1344 1306. Power of park board over streets 1345 1307. Extent of municipal control 1346 1308. Franchise in the use of streets 1347 1309. The use of streets and alleys 1347 (a) Power of legislature over 1347 (b) Nature of public interest in 1347 (c) Use by gas company 1348 (d) Use by telephone company 1349 (e) Use by railroad company 1349 (f) Use by street railway company 1350 (g) The right of railways to use of streets limited 1353 (h) Regulating speed of cars 1355 (i) Regulating trains at crossings 1357 1310. Obstructions in streets 1358 (a) Care of streets in regard to obstructions 1358 (b) Presumption as to streets 1359 (c) Notice of obstruction 1359 (d) Negligence in regard to obstructions 1361 (e) Who placed the obstruction not material 1362 (f ) Exemption from liability by charter 1362 (g) Nature and character of obstructions 1362 (h) Removal of obstructions 1365 ( i ) Notice of injury — Statutory 1365 (j) Obstructions sometimes allowable 1367 1311. Removal of shade trees 1368 1312. Surface water 1369 1313. Awnings 1370 1314. Control of wharves 1370 1315. Limit upon liability in control of docks 1372 1316. Reconstruction and repair of sidewalks, streets, etc 1373 (a) Reconstruction 1373 (b) Repair and results of failure 1373 (c) Degree of care required 1374 1317. Sewers 1376 1318. Establishing grade of streets 1378 Xlii TABLE OP CONTENTS — VOL. II. CHAPTER XXX. POLICE POWERS. Section Page 1319. Nature of the police power 1381 1320. Exercise of police powers by municipal corporations 1383 1321. Delegation of police power 1383 1322. Scope of municipal legislation for police regulation 1384 1323. Limitations on exercise of police power 1384 1324. Power to regulate 1385 1325. Power to prohibit , 1386 1326. Regulation is not prohibition 1387 1327. License 1387 (a) Scavengers 1387 (b) Barbers 1387 (c) Milk dealers 1388 (d) Removal of kitchen refuse 1388 (e) Public scales 1388 (f ) Sale of meats and provisions 1388 1328. Privilege tax 1389 1329. Regulation of telegraph and telephone lines in streets 1389 1330. Regulation of dangerous business 1390 1331. Regulation of buildings — Building permits, etc 1390 1332. Regulating the removal of dead animals 1392 1333. Regulating the removal of garbage 1392 1334. Regulation of fire escapes 1393 1335. Regulating livery stables 1393 1336. Abatement of nuisances 1394 1337. Property destroyed by a mob 1394 1338. Hawkers and pedlers 1395 1339. Hackmen, draymen, etc 1396 1340. Auctioneers 1397 1341. Book canvassers — Interstate commerce 1399 1342. Intoxicating liquors 1399 1343. Hackstands and hotel runners 1401 1344. Regulation of markets 1402 1345. Disorderly houses 1403 1346. Discrimination against non-residents 1404 1347. Ordinances relating to licenses 1404 1348. Miscellaneous 1406 CHAPTER XXXI. MUNICIPAL COURTS AND RECORDS. (a) Municipal Courts. 1349. Introductory 1408 1350. The same subject continued — Scope of subject 1409 1351. Creation — Abolition — Increase of power 1409 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. xliii Section Page 1352. The same subject continued 1410 1353. Jurisdiction — Criminal, civil and special 1411 1354. The same subject continued 1412 1355. Summary powers 1413 1356. The same subject continued 1414 1357. The same subject continued — Felonies and misdemeanors 1415 1358. Jurisdictional limitation 1415 1359. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitations 1416 1360. Qualifications of officers — Judges and jurors 1417 1361. Appeals 1418 1362. Method of procedure 1419 1363. The same subject continued 1420 (b) Municipal Records. 1364. Recording of ordinances 1421 1365. Evidential character — Originals 1421 1366. The same subject continued — Copies 1422 1367. Proof of records— By originals 1423 1368. The same subject continued — By certified copies 1424 1369. Parol evidence 1425 1370. The same subject continued 1426 1371. Amendments 1426 1372. The same subject continued 1427 1373. Right of abstract makers to take transcripts of public records. 1428 1374. The same subject continued 1428 1375. Remedial rights 1429 CHAPTER XXXII. FIEEMEN AND POLICEMEN. 1375a. Organization of fire department 1431 1376. Liability of corporation for removal of firemen 1432 1377. Certiorari to review dismissal of firemen 1432 1378. Policemen unknown to the common law 1433 1379. Qualification of officers — Non-partizan boards 1434 1380. Police fund— Legislative control of 1434 1381. Suspension pending trial on charges of misconduct 1435 1382. The tribunal to hear charges 1436 1383. The hearing 1437 1384. Counsel and witnesses 1437 1385. Examining the accused as a witness 1438 1386. Neglect and absence from duty 1439 1387. Violating regulations 1440 1388. Evidence of intoxication 1441 1389. Conduct unbecoming an officer 1442 1390. The same subject continued 1443 xliv TABLE OP CONTENTS — VOL. II. Section Page 1391. Severity of punishment 1443 1392. Review of proceedings by certiorari 1444 1393. Recovery of salary after restoration upon certiorari 1445 1394. City marshals 1446 CHAPTEE XXXIII. :WATER AND LIGHTS. 1395. Power of municipality as to water supply 1447 1396. Contracts for water supply 1448 1397. Limitations upon power to contract 1449 1398. Contracts further illustrated 1450 1399. The same subject continued — Monopolies 1451 1400. Construction of contracts 1452 1401. The same subject continued 1452 1402. No exclusive right 1453 1403. Rent of hydrants 1454 1404. Water-works companies under New Jersey statutes 1454 1405. Infringement of riparian rights 1455 1406. The right to waters of a stream 1456 1407. Connecting pipes 1458 1408. Liability of water-works companies 1459 1409. The same subject continued 1459 1410. Water-rates 1460 1411. The same subject continued 1460 1412. Collection of water-rents 1461 1413. Power of municipality to contract for lights 1462 1414. The same subject continued 1463 1415. Authorized contracts illustrated 1464 1416. Unauthorized contracts 1465 1417. Contract for gas lighting construed 1465 1418. The same subject continued 1466 1419. Construction of statutory and charter provisions 1467 1420. The same subject continued 1467 CHAPTER XXXIV. PUBLIC EDUCATION. 1421. Introductory 1469 1422. Constitutional provisions and state statutes 1470 1423. Legal status of school system 1471 1424. State board and superintendent of education 1471 1425. County superintendents 1472 1426. Change of boundaries of school districts 1473 1427. Presumption of legal organization of district 1474 TABLE OP CONTENTS — VOL. II. xlv Section Page 1428. District school boards 1475 1429. Meetings of district school boards 1477 1430. Prescribing text-books — Rescission of resolution 1478 1431. Power of board of school trustees to contract 1479 1432. Power to require parents to sign and return teacher's report. .1480 1433. Fiduciary capacity 1481 1434. Limitation of power 1482 1435. Personal liability of directors 1483 1436. Meetings of district electors — Elections 1484 1437. Term of school officer — Holding over 1486 1438. School fund 1487 1439. The same subject continued — Mandamus to state comptroller. .1487 1440. School taxes 1489 1441. School lands 1489 1442. School bonds 1490 1443. School-teacher — Appointment — Contract — Removal 1490 1444. Pupils 1492 1445. Race question in schools 1493 1446. Bible in schools 1494 1447. Actions and defenses 1495 CHAPTER XXXV. TAXATION. 1448. Taxation defined 1497 1449. Distinction between "tax" and "assessment" 1498 1450. Situs of taxable property 1499 1451. Subjects of taxation 1502 1452. Property subject to taxation 1504 1453. Constitutional restrictions 1505 1454. Implied power of taxation 1506 1455. License fees and taxes on business 1507 1456. The same subject continued — The power strictly construed 1509 1457. Local taxation of transportation companies 1509 1458. Banks 1510 1459. Water companies 1511 1460. Gas companies 1512 1461. Miscellaneous corporations 1512 1462. Apportionment by benefits 1513 1463. Agricultural lands 1514 1464. Taxation after changing the corporate limits 1516 1465. Effect of change of corporate limits 1518 1466. Equality and uniformity 1519 1467. Taxation to pay debts 1521 1468. Limitation of state control 1523 1469. Other limitations of taxing power 1524 1470. Effect of annulling the municipal charter 1525 xlvi TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL, II. Section Page 1471. Mandamus 1526 1472. When mandamus is improper 1528 1473. Proceedings in equity 1529 1474. Execution 1529 1475. Implied obligations to levy tax 1530 1476. Legislative control 1531 1477. Taxing powers 1532 1478. Implied powers 1534 1479. Charter limitations 1534 1480. Taxation to aid private enterprises 1535 1481. Discrimination against non-residents 1537 1482. State control 1537 1483. Execution of charter powers 1538 1484. Voting the tax 1539 1485. Purposes for which the tax may be levied 1542 1486. Proceedings to collect 1543 1487. Application of taxes 1543 1488. Lien of taxes 1544 1489. Exemptions 1544 1490. Exemptions further considered — Whiting v. West Point 1546 1491. Validity of taxes 1548 1492. Invalidity of taxes 1549 1493. Recovery of tax illegally paid 1550 1494. Miscellaneous 1553 CHAPTER XXXVI. HIGHWAYS. 1495. Highways defined— Different kinds 1556 1496. Modes of creating highways 1557 1497. Dedication of highways — Nature and requisites 1559 1498. Dedication continued — Evidence and presumptions 1560 1499. Conditional or qualified dedication — Revocation 1561 1500. Acceptance of highway — Nature of 1562 1501. Dedication by state — By cities 1563 1502. Dedication continued 1563 1503. Acquiring streets by prescription 1564 1504. Same subject continued — Prescription in various states 1566 1505. Appropriating lands for highways — Damages 1568 1506. Laying out highways 1568 1507. Property exempt from 1569 1508. Private owners' rights 1570 1509. Proceedings to establish highways — Parties — Notice 1571 1510. Petition — Jurisdictional facts 1572 1511. Abandonment of highway by non-user 1573 1512. Discontinuing or vacating highways 1574 1513. Bridges — Part of highway, etc 1575 TABLE OF COXTEXTS — VOL. II, xlvii Section Page 1514. Bridges over navigable rivers and waters 1575 1515. Bridges between states — Between counties 1576 1516. County bridges 1577 1517. City bridges 1578 1518. Bridges in towns, townships and boroughs 1579 1519. General duty to repair bridges 1580 1520. Abutting owners' rights and easements 1581 1521. Liability for defective construction 1583 1522. Defective highway plan — Liability for 1584 1523. Same subject continued 1585 1524. Duty to keep streets reasonably safe 1586 1525. Primary municipal duty to repair — Abutting owners' liability. 1587 1526. Municipal and abutting owners — Statutory liability 1588 1527. Limited liability for acts, etc., of independent contractor 1590 1528. Municipal duty of supervision over others 1591 1529. General municipal liability for neglect of streets 1592 1530. Municipal liability in Michigan 1592 1531. Same subject continued — Rule in other states 1594 1532. Liability for ways which public is invited to use 1596 1533. Municipal recourse against third persons 1598 1534. Liability when defects concur with other causes 1599 1535. Plaintiff's concurring act in cases of danger and exigency 1601 1536. Limited liability in grading streets 1602 1537. Liability in respect to latent defects 1603 1538. Municipal liability for snow and ice 1604 1539. Same subject continued — Notice 1607 1540. Obstructions— Liability for 1608 1541. Obstructions for private convenience 1609 1542. Liability for structures over the street 1611 1543. Municipal liability for fright of horses 1612 1544. Notice of defect in highway 1614 1545. Notice when a question for the jury 1616 1546. When notice is not necessary 1618 1547. To whom notice may be given 1620 1548. Notice of injury 1621 1548a. The same subject continued — Requisites of notice 1322 1549. Illustrations of sufficient notice 1623 1550. Pleading of notice — Evidence of 1624 1551. Evidence in personal injury cases 1626 1552. Instructions to jury 1628 1553. Exercise of care by person injured 1631 1553a. Duty to look and listen 1635 1554. Pedestrians' duty to use crossings and sidewalks 1637 1555. Infirm persons — Duty of caution 1639 1556. Violation of ordinance, etc., as contributory negligence 1641 .xlviii TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. CHAPTER XXXVII. MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. (a) Mandamus. Section Page 1557. Mandamus — General 1644 1558. Mandamus where discretion may be exercised 1645 1559. Reinstatement of officer — Canvass of election 1647 1560. Premature application — Laches 1647 1561. Control of official discretion 1648 1562. Same subject continued 1649 1563. Same subject continued — Board of assessment 1650 1564. Same subject continued — Improvement of highways 1650 1565. Same subject continued — Rebuilding bridge 1651 1565a. Petition for mandamus 1651 1566. Relator's right 1652 1567. Instances illustrating use of mandamus 1653 1568. Private parties as relators 1654 1569. Acts in excess of officer's powers 1656 1570. Michigan decisions — Control of discretion 1656 1571. Restoration to office 1657 1572. To restore removed officials 1658 1573. To obtain possession of office 1659 1574. To compel performance of judicial functions 1659 1575. To compel payment of judgment 1660 1576. To compel audit of claims 1661 1577. Payment of claims and warrants 1662 1578. For payment of claims 1663 1579. To compel payment of claims continued 1664 1580. To compel public boards to reverse their decisions 1665 1581. To compel subordinate officials to recognize board 1665 1582. Removal of obstructions in streets 1666 1583. Same subject continued — Control of discretion 1667 1584. To appoint school trustees 1669 1585. Apportionment, etc., of school moneys 1669 1586. To restore school funds 1670 1587. To compel signing of teacher's warrant 1670 1588. To dissolve injunction against city 1671 1589. To compel approval of official bond 1672 1590. To compel execution of tax deed 1673 1591. To compel approval of contract 1673 1592. To a county treasurer to refund taxes 1674 1593. Abatement of public nuisance — Canvass of election — To police commissioners to enforce law 1674 1594. Obstructions in streets — Contract for improvement 1675 1595. Title to office and custody of records 1676 1596. License to sell liquors 1677 1597. Hearing of complaint : 1677 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. xlix Section Page 1598. By taxpayer to compel investment of funds 1678 1599. To levy tax to pay judgment — Previous demand 1679 1600. Peremptory and alternative 1680 1601. Practice— Parties 1681 1602. Parties further considered 1681 1603. Pleading 1682 1604. Enforcement of public duties 1683 1605. When mandamus will lie — General 1684 1606. When mandamus will not lie — General 1686 (b) Quo Warranto. 1607. Scope of proceeding — Title to office — Policeman 1688 1608. Validity of incorporation — Evidence 1688 1609. Against municipal officers under void organization 1689 1610. Usurpation of franchise by city — Parties 1689 1611. Common council as judge of election 1690 1612. Mandamus and quo warranto distinguished 1690 1613. Florida decisions on quo warranto — Council as judges of elec- tions 1691 1614. Practice in Massachusetts — Contest of elections 1692 1615. Quo warranto against municipal corporation 1693 1616. Jurisdiction of court 1693 1617. Election contests — Rules in Colorado 1694 1618. Title to office— Practice in Michigan 1695 CHAPTER XXXVIIL INJUNCTION AND CERTIORARI. (a) Injunction. 1619. Equitable jurisdiction in municipal affairs 1696 1620. Rights and remedies of abutting owners 1697 1621. Restraining power of equity in municipal affairs 1700 1622. Injunction in matters of special assessment 1701 1623. To restrain the enforcement of an ordinance 1702 1624. To restrain the passage of an ordinance 1703 1625. Restraining the execution of contracts 1704 1626. Restraining the collection of assessments 1704 1627. Restraining the vacation or grading of streets 1705 1628. Restraint of railroads in streets 1705 1629. When injunction sustained — Illustrations 1706 1630. When injunction not sustained — Illustrations 1708 (b) Certiorari. 1631. Jurisdiction in 1711 1632. Miscellaneous 1713 1 Smith — iv TABLE OF CONTEXTS — VOL. II. CHAPTER XXXIX. taxpayers' actions. Section Page 1633. Introductory 1714 1634. Remedies for illegal taxation — In general 1716 1635. Injunctions against taxes 1717 1636. Requisites for injunction 1719 1637. No injunction against irregular taxes 1720 1638. Void taxes 1721 1639. Injunctions against municipal taxation 1721 1640. Taxes on personal property 1722 1641. Taxes on real property 1722 1642. Certiorari 1723 1643. Recoveries by taxpayers of taxes paid 1725 1644. Actions against officers 1726 1645. Misappropriations '. 1727 1646. Injunction further illustrated 1729 1647. The same subject continued 1730 1647a. Suits by taxpayers generally 1731 CHAPTER XL. actions by and against public corporations. 1648. Capacity to sue and be sued — Whether a county is subject to suit 1733 1649. The same subject continued 1735 1650. Service of process 1737 1651. Corporate name in suits 1738 1652. Authority to bind town by appearance 1738 1653. Pleading in suits upon bonds 1740 1654. Bill of interpleader by public officer 1741 1655. Writ of prohibition in behalf of a town — Office of the writ. . . .1742 1656. Execution against municipal corporation 1743 1657. Garnishment of municipal corporations 1744 1658. Presentation of claims — Charter provisions construed 1746 1659. Action by contractor — Remedy by tax-bill when not exclusive. .1747 1660. Corporate liability to qui tarn action for penalties 1748 1661. Statutory liability for injuries to sheep by dogs — Filing of statement 1748 1662. The same subject continued — Massachusetts decisions 1750 1663. Liability for acts of officers in killing dogs running at large. . .1751 1664. Suits by the municipality 1752 1665. Suits against the municipality — Defenses 1752 1666. Damages, measure of 1753 1667. Recovery of money wrongfully paid 1754 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. ' , H Section • Page 1668. Limitations against suits 1754 1669. Miscellaneous 1755 1670. Application of estoppel in municipal affairs 1756 1671. When estoppel applies to municipality 1756 1672. When estoppel does not apply to municipality 1758 1673. Estoppel of persons and corporations 1759 CHAPTER XLI. MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS. 1674. Creation of departments 1761 1675. Board of health 1761 1676. Board of education 1763 1677. Board of police — Department of police 1764 1678. Fire department 1767 1678a. Department of parks 1769 CHAPTER XLII. DAMAGES IN MUNICIPAL MATTERS. 1679. Elements of damages 1771 1680. The measure of damages 1773 1681. Damages to adjoining owners 1774 1682. Damages from change of grade 1776 1683. Damages in case of independent contractor 1778 1684. Damages where city fails to assess 1779 1685. Damages in miscellaneous matters 1780 CHAPTER XLIII PLEADING.- 1686. Necessary allegations 1783 1687. Unnecessary allegations 1785 1688. Sufficiency of allegations 1785 1689. Insufficiency of allegations 17S7 1690. The declaration, complaint, or petition 1788 1691. Bill in chancery — Allegations of 1791 1692. Variance between allegations and proof 1792 1693. Instructions to jury 1793 lii TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. CHAPTER XLIV. evidence. Section Page 1694. Admissibility of evidence 1795 1695. Sufficiency of evidence 1799 1696. Burden of proof 1800 1697. Questions of fact are for the jury 1801 1698. Contributory negligence — Evidence of 1803 1699. Record of council— Proof of 1804 1700. Presumptions 1805 1701. Miscellaneous 1805 CHAPTER XLV. FRANCHISES. 1702. Power to grant franchises — Limited 1807 1703. Franchise may be a contract 1808 1704. Franchises with reference to streets 1808 1705. Grant of exclusive franchises 1809 1706. Validity of franchise 1810 1707. Franchises subject to police power 1811 1708. Revocation, forfeiture and surrender 1811 1709. Acceptance of franchise — Conditions 1813 1710. Franchises to street railways 1813 1711. Miscellaneous 1814 CHAPTER XLVI. CIVIL SERVICE AND VETERANS ACTS, (a) Civil Service Acts. 1712. The scope and purpose of civil service laws 1816 1713. Civil service laws — When introduced — New York statute 1817 1714. To whom applicable 1819 1715. Civil service rules and regulations 1820 1716. Appointments — Meaning of , etc 1821 1717. Removal, reasons for 1822 1718. Reinstatement 1823 1719. Miscellaneous provisions 1824 1720. Constitutionality of civil service laws 1825 (b) Veterans Acts. 1721. Scope and purpose of acts 1826 1722. Removal and discharge 1828 1723. Applies to subordinates only 1829 1724. Hearing 1829 1725. Miscellaneous 1830 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Aaron v. Broilles, 64 Tex. 316, Abbett V. Board &c., 114 Ind. 1097 61, 9, 1076 Abbott V. City of Mobile, 119 Ala. 595, 1336 V. Mills. 3 Vt. 521, 1559 Abel V. City of Minneapolis, 08 Minn. 89, 1774, 1776 Abell V. Prairie Civil Tp. &c., 4 Ind. App. 599, 1750 Abells V. City of Syracuse, 40 N. Y. S. 233 739 Abendro~th V. Manhattan E. Co., 122 N. Y. Ij 1581 Aberdeen v. Blackmar, 6 Hill 324, 1599 Aberuathy v. Phifer, 84 N. C. 711, 941 Abram v. State, 28 S. W. 818, 499 Abrams v. Carlisle, 18 S. C. 242, 334 Ackerman v. Huff, 71 Tex. 317, 694 Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135, 1000, 1018 Adams v. Brenan, 177 111. 194, 734, 1699, 1701. 1764 V. Chicago R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 1214, 1582 V. City of Beloit, 105 Wis. 363, 1554 V. City of Modesto, 131 Cal. 501, 928 V. City of Oshkosh, 71 Wis. 49, 829, 1609, 1619 V. City of Salina, 58 Kan. 246, 800 V. City of Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 1150, 1243, 1266. 1302, 1304, 1707 V. Crowell, 40 Vt. 31, 366 V. Fisher, 23 Tex. 651, 1206 V. Green. 74 Mo. App. 125, 1301 V. Hyde, 27 Vt. 221, 1540 V. Inhabitants &c., 147 Mass. 440, 1586. 1606, 1616 V. Logan Co., 11 111. 336, 757 V. Mack, 3 N. H. 493, 1421, 1422 V. Mayor &c., 2 Head 363, 1508, 1521 V. Memphis &c. R. Co., 2 Coldw. 645, 977 V. Ohio Falls Car Co., 131 Ind. 375, 585, 1322 V. Paige, 7 Pick. 542, 211 V. Pratt. 109 Mass. 59, 365 V. President &c., 1 Greenl. 361, 7, 142, 148, 342, 776, 965 V. Richardson, 43 N. H. 212, 221, 335 V. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 414, 453, 1565 V. Stanyon, 24 N. H. 405, 348, 367 V. State, 82 111. 132. 864, 1483 V. State, 65 N. H. 188, 1484 V. Tator. 42 Hun 384, 197 V. Thomas. 11 Ky. L. 701, 1492 .V. Tyler. 121 Mass. 380, 1745 Adams Co. v. City of Quincy, 130 III. 566, 511, 1145, 1245 Adamson v. Nassau Electric R. Co., 33 N. Y. S. 732, 89 Hun 261, 1811, 1349 Adcock V. City of Chicago, 160 111. 611, 1237, 1278 Addis V. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 379. 260 Addison v. Saulnier, 19 Cal. 82, 1508 Addy V. City of Janesville, 70 Wis. 401, 1180 Addyston Pipe &c. Co. v. City of Corry, 197 Pa. St. 41, 741, 874 Adkins v. Brewer. 3 Cow. 206, 335 V. Quest, 79 Mo. App. 36, 1259, 1260 Adleman v. Pierce, 55 Pac. 658, -751 Adley v. Reeves, 2 Man. & S. 53, 528, 531 Adrian Water-works v. City of Adrian. 64 Mich. 584. 1453 Adsell V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Gray 526. 362 Adsit V. Brady, 4 Hill 630, 222, 224 ^^Ltna L. Ins. Co. v. City of Burrton, 75 Fed. 962, 609 V. Mabbett, 18 Wis. 698. 321 Aitna Mills v. Inhabitants &c., 126 Mass. 422, 695 Affeld V. City of Detroit, 112 Mich. 560, 916 Agawam Nat'l Bank v. Inhabitants &c.. 128 Mass. 503, 233, 237 Agnew V. City of Corunna, 55 Mich. 428. 820. 1613 V. Beall, 124 111. 312, 194, 659, 662 Agricultural Branch R. Co. v. Win- chester, 13 Allen 29, 994 Ahern v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203. 1095 Ah You, In re, 82 Cal. 339, 1415, 1417 Ah You, In re. 88 Cal. 99, 1404 Aiken Co. v. Murray, 35 S. C. 508, 915 Aikman v. School Dist., 27 Kan. 129, 1485 Aitcheson v. Huebner, 90 Mich. 643, 1673 Akers v. Mayor &c., 35 N. Y. S. 1099. 1326, 1335 Akin v. Akin, 78 Ga. 24, 786 Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 Ohio St. 328, 1776 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Citv of Bes- semer. 113 Ala. 668. 605 V. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221, 4, 6 Alamango v. Albany Co., 25 Hun 551. 805 Albany v. Abbott, 61 N. H. 157, 869 V. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165, 253 V. Savannah &c. R. Co., 71 Ga. 158, 1503 Albany &c. Bank v. City of Albany, 92 N. Y. 363. 240, 257, 715 Albany &c. Mining Co. v. Auditor- General, 37 Mich. 391. 1288. 1717 Albany &c. R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345, 680 Albee v. Ward, 8 Mass. 79. 335 Alberger v. Mayor &c., 64 Md. 1, 1194, 1242 (liii) liv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ Albers' retition, In re, 113 Mich. 640, 1318 Albrecht v. City of St. Paul, 47 Minn. 531, 1202 Albrittin v. Mayor &c., 60 Ala. 486, 85, 86, 265, 1324, 1614, 1616 Albro V. City of Fall River, 175 Mass. 590, 1782 Albuquerque v. Zeiger, 5 N. M. 674, 1256 Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652, 61, 83, 1270 V. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. St. 494, 1233 Alden v. Alameda Co., 43 Cal. 270, 1527 V. City of Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 254, 680, 1215 V. City of Springfield, 121 Mass. 27, 1291 V. Roundsville, 7 Met. 218, 1485 Alderman v. School Directors, 91 111. 179, 1691 Alderson v. Commissioners, 31 W. Va. 633, 381 Alderton v. Binder, 81 Mich. 133, 1655 Aldrich v. Collins, 3 S. D. 154, 631 Aldridge v. Tuscumbia R. Co., 2 St. & P. 199, 685 Aleppo School District's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 76, 1474 Alesandi'o Irr. Dist. v. Savings &c. Co., 88 Fed. 928, 1030 Alexander v. Bennett, 60 N. Y. 204, 1410 V. City of Big Rapids, 76 Mich. 282, 1586 V. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 264, 1216, 1222 V. City of Vicksburg, 68 Miss. 564. 797 V. Johnson, 144 Ind. 82, 1700 V. Oneida Co.. 76 Wis. 56, 966 V. People, 7 Colo. 155, 374, 556 V. Town Council &c., 54 Miss. 659, 1392 V. Town of New Castle, 115 Ind. 51, 228 Alexander Ave., In re, 17 N. Y. S. 933, 1249. 1251 Alexandria v. Fairfax, 95 TJ. S. 774. 1737 Alexandria Coal Co. v. Swann, 5 How. 83. 662 Alexandria &c. R. Co. v. Alexandria &c. R. Co., 75 Va. 780, 684 Alford V. City of Dallas, 35 S. W. 816. 1286 V. Jones, 71 Tex. 519, 430 Alger V. City of Lowell, 3 Allen 402, 1597, 1641 V. Curry, 40 Vt. 437, 344. 361 V. Inhabitants &c., 119 Mass. 77, 1727 Allaire v. Hartshorne, 21 N. J. L. 665, 1019 Allee V. Reece, 39 Fed. 341, 220, 334 Alleghany City, Appeal of, 41 Pa. St. 60, 1544 Alleghany City v. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St. 81, 239, 649 V. People's Nat'l Gas &c. Co., 172 Pa. St. 632, 1347 Allegheny City v. Western &c. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 375. 1251 Allegheny Co. v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397. 799, 800, 1394 v. Watt. 3 Pa. St. 462, 1073 Allen V. Archer, 49 Maine 346, .347, 364, 1727 V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 114 U. S. 311, 1717 V. Borough of Du Bois, 181 Pa. St. 184, 1331 V. City of Burlington, 45 Vt. 202, 343, 344, 363, 871, 1551 Allen V. City of Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis. 430, 1216 V. Citv of Davenport, 107 Iowa 90, 490, 540, 725, 735, 879, 881, 1030, 1151, 1231, 1298, 1300, 1301, 1376, 1701 V. City of Galveston, 51 Tex. 302, 260, 1206, 1254 V. City of Portland, 35 Or. 420, 720, 1134, 1135, 1259, 1284 V. Commonwealth. 83 Va. 94, 223 V. Cook, 21 R. I. 525, 1344, 1361 V. Dallas &c. R. Co., 3 Woods 316. 1027 V. District Tp., 70 Iowa 434, 1473 V. Drew, 44 Vt. 174. 1148, 1234, 1268 V. Gray, 11 Conn. 95, 536 V. Hostetter, 16 Ind. 15, 420 V. Inhabitants &c., 60 Maine 124, 559, 979. 153S V. Inhabitants &c., 19 Pick. 485, 576, 867 V. Intendant &c., 89 Ala. 641, 855, 856 V. Jones. 47 Ind. 438, 684 V. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 986 V. Mavor &c., 53 N. J. L. 522, 1582 V. Metcalf, 17 Pick. 208, 1483 v. People. 84 111. 502, 115 V. State. 61 Ind. 268, 327 V. Watts, 88 Ala. 497, 967 Allentown v. Henry, 73 Pa. St. 404, 1232, 1235 Allentown School Dist. v. Derr, 115 Pa. St. 439, 1017 Alley V. Board &c., 76 111. 101, 990 V. City of Lebanon, 146 Ind. 125. 1280 V. Inhabitants &c., 53 Maine 446, 1542 Alline v. Le Mars City, 71 Iowa 654, 1637 Allison V. Louisville &c. R. Co., 9 Bush 247, 651 Allman v. District of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 8, 1243 Allwood V. Cowen, 111 111. 481, 1699 Almand v. Atlanta &c. R. Co., 108 Ga. 417, 71, 586 Almy V. Coggeshall, 19 R. I. 549, 1777 Altgelt V. City of San Antonio, 17 S. W. 75, 1451, 1512 Altman v. City of Dubuque, 111 Iowa 105, 481. 1151 Alton V. Mulledy, 21 111. 76, 210 Altvater v. Mayor &c.. 31 Md. 462. 264 Alves' Ex'r v. Town of Henderson, 16 B. Mon. 131. 629 Alvis V. Whitney, 43 Ind. 83, 1519 Alvord V. City of Syracuse, 58 N. Y. S. 854. 1273. 1281 V. City of Syracuse, 163 N. Y. 158, 1285, 1303 V. Syracuse &c. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599, 1023 Amador Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Cal. 458. 602 Amberson Ave., In re, 179 Pa. St. 634, 1299 Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351, 607 American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U. S. 288, 1031 American Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 59 Iowa 696, 216, 217 American &c. Ins. Co. v. Fyler, 60 Conn. 448, 1488 American Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 248, 673. 1114 American Salt Co. v. Heidenheimer, 80 Tex. 344. 1028, 1029 American &c. Tel. Co. v. Hess, 125 N. Y. 641, 1390, 1581 TABLE OF CASES. Iv [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.-] American Tnion Kx Co y. City of St. Joseph. 6(5 Mo t..i>,„ ^nwi Amery v. City of Keokuk, '^^^owa^^^^ AmeJ'v.' City of San Francisco 76 ^^^ V. I.ake Superior &c. CO., -J- ^^^ Minn. 241, ., p Amesbury v. Howditch &c. Ins. Co., ft f^nv ^OG Amesbury &c.'co. v. Inhabitants &<•- .^ Ame^^^MUr^i^c, .4 How. J64.^^;^ V. Mayor &c., 14 Ohio St. 472, 1535 Amherst v. HoHis. 9 N H 107 104- Amos V. City of Fond du Lac, ^o^^^^ Amy'v.'Du'£ue98IT.S470, 1020 \. Selma. 77 Ala. l^S.^^^, 452, 453 V. Smith. 1 Litt 326 ' Ig AndeUrTn^r^i ^^f,^"' {^ ^°^T1?ak^er.^&'Yld'l3r ''''^ ^69 V. Bitzer, 20 Ky. L. ^1||0. ^^89 V. Caldwell, 91 Ind. 451 698 V. City Council &c., 58 N. J. L. ^„^ 1^ CMty of Bath. 42 Maine 346 1332 v. City of Detroit, 124 Mich.^^^^ v^City of Mayfield. 93 Ky 230. 928 V. Cit'y of Wellington. 4.^ Kan. ^^^ V. Equitable Gas Light Co., 12 Daly 462. . . i. TnH v^ Kerns Draining Co., l^^Ind.^^^^ V. Mayor &c.. 8 Houst. 516 1180 V. Mayor &c., 2 Penn 28, 1362, 1364 V. Meeker Co.. 46 Mi?°- 237 15 Arnold' v. 'Blaker, L. R. 6 Q. B. 433 lODJ- V. City of Cambridge, 106 Mass.^^^^ pity of Ft. Dodge, ni^lowa^;'^^ v."city of St. Louis, 152 Mo.^^^^ v^Holbrook. L. R. 8 Q. B. 96. 1561 V. Hudson River R. Co., 55 N. Y 661 6(4. b7b V.' Mayor &c., 21 R. I._, 15, 717, 737 V. Mayor &c.. 4 Man. & G. 860. 261 V. Styles, 2 Blackf. 391. 420 V. Village of Decatur, 29 Mich. ^^^ Arnoult v. City of New Orleans, 11 La. An. 54, . , , .^ ^ '^^^ Arthur v. City of Charleston, 46 ^.^^^^ Artz^v^' Chicago &c. R. Co., 34 Iowa 153, '^°'^ Ivi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol II, pp. 833-1830.-\ Asbell V. Mayor &c., 80 Ga. 503, 28*, 14a7 Ash V. City of Independence, 79 Mo. Add 70 '"*■* V People, 11 Mich. 347, 1403, 1508 Ashby V. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938 ; s. c. 1 Salk. 19, 221, 222, 225 Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, 1399 Ashley v. Board &c., 16 U. S. App. 6.56: s. c. 60 Fed. 55; 8 C. C. A. 455, 66, 69, 70, 1002. 1^01|^. . ?9f'*y«^^«^^«™79?fmtl217 V. Town of Calliope, 71 Iowa 466, , 58 Ashman v. Pulaski Co., 73 Fed. 907 1006 Ashton V. City of Newton, 134 Mass. 507 1598 V. City of Rochester, 14 N. Y. S 855 *^^ Ashueiot Nat'l Bank v. Lyon Co., 81 Fed 127, 87» V. School Dist.. 41 Fed. 514, 1490 Ashueiot R. Co. v. Elliott, 57 N. H. 397 102U Askew V. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639, 7, 9, 13, 14, 434, 441, 774 Askin V. London &c., 1 Up. Can. Q- ^^^ B. 292, 174 Askins v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 275, 457 Aspinwall v. Board &e.. 22 How. 364, 103, 625, 982. 996, 997, 1524 Astor, In re, 53 N. Y. 617, 1234 Astor V. Hoyt, 5 Wend. 603, 693 V. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. 567, 294 V. Miller, 2 Paige 68, 1571 Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124, 54, 55 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Board &c., 25 Kan. 261. 9?1 V. Commissioners, 17 Kan. 29, 992 V. Missouri &c. R. Co., 31 Kan. 660, 1353 V. Peterson, 5 Kan. App. 103, 1249, 1303 V. Wilhelm, 33 Kan. 206, 1535 Athearn v. Independent Dist. &c., 82 Iowa 686. 281 Atkins V. Phillips, 26 Fla. 281, 476 V. Town of Randolph, 31 Vt. 226, 1538 Atkinson v. Bowman, 42 Hun 404, 19 V. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis. 141, 499 V. Marietta &c. R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21, 54 V. Wvkoff. 58 Mo. App. 86, 1317 Atlantic &c. Tel. Co. v. Chicago &c. K. Co., 6 Biss. 158, 681 Atlantic City &c. Co. v. Atlantic City &c. Co., 15 Atl. 581, 561 Atlantic City Water-works Co. v. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367, 1448 V. Atlantic City, 48 N. J. L. 378, 1465 V. Consumers' Water Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 427, 1455 V. Read, 50 N. J. L. 665, 233, 1449, 1450 Atlas Bank v. Brownell, 9 R. I. 168, 321 Attaway v. Mayor &c., 68 Ga. 704. 1075 Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567. 381 V. Board &c., 64 Mich. 607, 381, 433, 1665 V. Boards &c.. 120 Mich. 357, 1086 V. Brown. 1 Wis. 513, 106. 150 V. Cahill. 169 Mass. 18, 209 V. Cain, 84 Mich. 223, 1688 Attorney-General v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 54 V. City of Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 124, 651 V. City of Cambridge, 16 Gray 247, 1177 V. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400, 559, 610, 666 V. City of Salem, 103 Mass. 138, 124 V. Common Council &c., 112 Mich. 145, 209 V. Connors, 27 Fla. 329, 1446 V. Corporation of Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220, 123, 446 V. Crocker, 138 Mass. 214, 195, 351, 352, 365 V. Ely. 4 Wis. 420, 152. 377 V. Fitzpatrick. 2 Wis. 542, 436 V. Heishon. 18 N. J. Eq. 410. 1105 V. Lombard &c. R. Co., 10 Phila. 352. 586 V. Manderson. 12 Jur. 383, 325 V. Marston, 66 N. II. 485. 185 V. Mayor &c.. 1 Bligh 312, 651 V. Mayor &c.. 2 Mylne & Cr. 406. 667 V. McCabe, 172 Mass. 147. 1763 V. Metropolitan R. Co., 125 Mass. 515. 591, 682 V. Pingree. 120 Mich. 550, 609 V. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425. 106 V. Rice. 64 Mich. 385. 62, 415 V. Shepard, 62 N. H. 383. 117. 118, 162, 294 V. Simonds. Ill Mass. 256, 273 353 355 V. Stevens. 1 Saxt. Ch."369, ' 634 V. Town of Dover, 62 N. J. L. 138, 70 V. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 296 V. Varnum, 167 Mass. 477, 171 V. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 1782 V. Wilson. 1 Craig & Ph. 1. 651 Attorney-General's Opinions, 448. 538. 869. 870 Atwater v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Conn. 223, 142, 341, 965 v. Trustees &c., 124 N. Y. 602, 801 8*^3 Atwell V. Zeluflf, 26 Mich. 118, 1552, 1725 Atwood V. Austin. 16 Johns. 180, 278 V. I'artree. 56 Conn. 80. 1675 V. Town of Lincoln, 44 Vt. 332. 363 Auburn &c. Plank Road Co. v. Doug- lass. 9 N. Y. 444. 568 Auchenbach v. Seibert, 120 Pa. St. 159, 156 Auditor-General v. Board &c., 89 Mich. 552, 418 V. Lake George &c. R. Co., 82 Mich. 426, 192 Auditors v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176, 197, 213 Auer V. City of Dubuque, 65 Iowa 650, 1239 Augusta Bank v. City of Augusta, 49 Maine 507, 983 Augusta City Council v. Hudson, 88 Ga. 599, 1579 Augusta Factory v. City Council &c., 83 Ga. 734, 623 Augusta &c. R. Co. v. City Council &c.. 100 Ga. 701, 586 Aulanier v. Governor, 1 Tex. 653. 196, 1508 Auld V. Walton, 12 La. An. 129, 370 Aurora City v. West. 7 Wall. 82. 1020 Aurora Water Co. v. City of Aurora, 129 Mo. 540, 490 TABLE OF CASES. Ivii [References are to Pages. Toi. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830. '\ Austin V. Allen, 6 Wis. 134, 343, 096 V. Colgate, 27 S. W. 896, 1337 V. District Tp. &c., 51 Iowa 102, 807 V. Inhabitants &c., 57 Maine 304, 344, 363 V. Murray, 16 Pick. 121, 100, 505, 508, 1086, 1087 Austrian v. Guy, 21 Fed. 500, 49 Avant V. Plvnn. 2 S. I). 153, 593 Avery v. Slack, 19 Wend. 50, 193 V. Stewart, 1 Cush. 496, 362, 364 V. Township Board, 73 Mich. 622, 965, 966 Axt V. Jackson School Tp., 90 Ind. 101, 210 Ayer v. City of Norwich, 39 Conn. 376, 1612 V. Lawrence, 59 N. Y. 192, 651, 825 Ayeridge v. Commissioners, 60 Ga. 404, 106, 122 Ayers v. Hatch, 175 Mass. 489, 203, 1830 Ayres v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 52 N. J. L. 405, 1561 V. Village of Hammondsport, 7 N. Y. S. 174, 1607 B Baader v. Town of Cullman, 115 Ala. 539, 120 Baar v. Klrby, 118 Mich. 392, 463 Babbage v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 1349 Babbitt v. Selectmen &c., 3 Cush. 530, 668 V. State, 10 Kan. 9, 339 Babcock v. Beaver Creek, 64 IMich. 601, 1551, 1552 V. City of Buffalo, 56 N. Y. 268, 1093, 1110 V. City of Helena, 34 Ark. 499, 88 V. Gififord, 29 Ilun 186, 224 V. Hanselman, 56 Mich. 27, 1695 V. Scranton Traction Co., 1 Lack. Leg. N. 223, 463 V. Town of Granville, 44 Vt. 325, 1551, 1723 V. Welsh, 71 Cal. 400, 1574 Babington v. Parish of St. Charles, 27 La. An. 321, 651 Babson v. Inhabitants &c., 101 Mass. 93, 1601 Bachelder v. Epping, 28 N. H. 354, 868 Bachelor v. New Hampton, 60 N. H. 207, 697, 1572 Back V. Carpenter, 29 Kan. 349, 49 Backhaus v. People, 87 111. App. 173, 525 Backman v. Charlestown, 42 N. H. 125, 257 Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 637, 698, 1323 Bacon v. Bacon, 3 Cro. Car. 601, 130 V. City of Antigo, 103 Wis. 10, 930 V. City of Tacoma, 19 Wash. 674, 1662 V. Mayor &c., 86 Ga. 301, 1145, 1208 V. Mayor &c.. 105 Ga. 62, 1129. 1235. 1294, 1300 V. Robertson. 18 How. 480, 445, 446 V. Texas, 163 TT. S. 207. 1808 Badger v. Citv of New Orleans, 49 ^La. An. 804, 926 Badkins v. Robinson, 53 Ga. 613. 1403 Bagg V. City of Detroit, 5 Mich. 336, 1234 Bagwell V. Town of Lawrenceville, 94 Ga. 654, 600 Bailey v. Buell, 59 Barb. 158, 1551 V. City of Cambridge, 174 Mass. 188, 1344 Bailey v. City of Centerville, 108 Iowa 20, 1796 V. Fulton Co., Ill Ga. 313, 792 V. Inhabitants &c., 126 Mass. 416, 688 V. Lawrence Co., 2 S. Dak. 533, 1652 V. Mayor &c., 3 Hill 531, 4, 6, 222, 437, 459, 7(!2, 779, 783, 809. 811, 1113, 1546 V. State, 30 Neb. 855, 540, 1422 V. Winn, 101 Mo. 649, 1412 Bally V. Commonwealth (Pa.), 10 Atl. 764, 903 V. Commonwealth, 20 W. N. C. (Pa.) 221, 1035 Bainbridge v. Downie, 6 Mass. 253, 216 Baird v. Daly. 08 N. Y. 547, 1627 v. Todd, 27 Neb. 782, 884 Baker v. Board, 40 Iowa 226, 556 v. Chambles, 4 Greene 428, 217 V. City of Boston, 12 Pick. 184, 823, 1093, 1112, 1121 V. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534, 1508, 1521 V. City of Grand Rapids, 111 Mich. 447, 1329, 1336, 1339, 1377 V. City of Lexington, 21 Ky. L. 809, 518, 520, 527 V. City of Portland, 58 Maine 199, 1641 V. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. 576, 892, 916 V. City of Utica. 19 N. Y. 326, 175 V. City of Washington, 7 D. C. 134, 690 V. Cushman, 127 Mass. 105, 301, 302 V. Inhabitants &c., 13 Maine 74, 668, 866 V. Johnson, 41 Maine 15, 960 V. Panola Co., 30 Tex. 86, 1551 V. Preston, 1 Gilm. 235. 211, 324 V. Schofleld, 58 Ga. 182, 491, 1425 V. Shephard, 24 N. H. 208, 346, 361 V. Tobin, 40 Ind. 310. 1191 V. Town of Normal. 81 111. 108, 519 V. Village of Maguon, 9 111. App. 155 541 Balch v! City of Utica, 5 N. Y. S. 513, 1393, 1394, 1755 V. County Com'rs, 103 Mass. 106, 689 Balcom, In re, 58 N. Y. S. 1097, 1825, 1830 Balcombe v. Northrup, 9 Minn. 172, 217 Baldwin v. Carter, 15 Johns. 496, 278 v. City Council, 53 Ala. 437, 1533 v. City of Bangor, 36 Maine 518, 684 V. City of Chicago. 68 111. 418, 542 V. City of Elizabeth, 42 N. J. Eq. 11, 564 V. City of Oswego, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 62, 722 V. City of Springfield, 141 Mo. 205. 1373 V. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 140 V. Green, 10 Mo. 410, 97, 468, 494 V. Marshall, 2 Humph. 116, 228 V. Mayor &c., 42 Barb. 549, 1522 V. Murphy, 82 111. 485, 523 V. Nickerson, 3 Wyo. 208, 1486 V. Smith, 82 111. 162, 522 V. Town of North Branford. 32 Conn. 49, 343, 345, 363, 364 V. Tucker, 16 Fla. 258. 1722 Bales V. Pidgeon, 129 Ind. 548, 1566 Balfe V. Lammers. 109 Ind. 347, 1288 Ball V. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481, 169, 540, 1425 V. Town of Woodbine, 61 Iowa 83, 808 Ballard v. Davis, 31 Miss. 525, 294, 1485 V. Gay, 108 N. C. 544, 1419 Iviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I. pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Ballard v. Tomlinson. L. R. 29 Ch. 1). 115, 809 Ballerino v. Mason. 83 Cal. 447, 230 Ballinger v. New York &c. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 42, 823 Baltimore &c. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395, VOO Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. City of Sey- mour, 154 Ind. 17. 1806 V. Fifth Baptist Church, 137 U. S. 568. 1111 V. North. 103 Ind. 486, 679 Baltimore Trust &c. Co. v. Mayor &c., 64 Fed. 153, 510, 522 Baltimore Tpk. Co., In re, 5 Binn. 481, 1540 Bamber v. City of Rochester, 63 How. rr. 103. 1097 Bambrick v. Campbell, 37 Mo. App. 460, 479 Bancroft v. City of Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438, 689 V. Inhabitants &c., 18 Pick. 566, 667, 668 Bangor &c. R. Co. v. McComb, 60 Maine 290. 701 V. Smith, 47 Maine 34, 1813 Bangor Savings Bank v. City of Still- water. 46 Fed. 899. 840, 974 V. City of Stillwater, 49 Fed. 721, 963 Bank &c. See also, President &c ; Name of Bank. Bank &c. v. Brainerd School Dist., 49 Minn. 106, 780 V. Bridges, 30 N. J. L. 112, 115 V. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467. 58. 83. 520. 1539 V. City of Louisville, 88 Fed. 398, 1740, 1757 V. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 421, 245 V. City of Port Townsend, 16 Wash. "450, 1753 V. Earl. 38 U. S. 519, 1807 V. Farrar, 1 La. An. 49, 523 V. Mavor &c.. Dud. 130, 1510, 1511 V. Mayor &c., 43 N. Y. 184. 242. 246, 1205, 1551. 1725, 1727 V. Mavor &c., 7 Ohio 354. 973, 977 V. Patterson, 7 Cranch 29D, 240, 257, 260, 262 V. Peel, 11 Ark. 750. 378 V. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 907, 4, 6, 7 V. Town Council &c., 10 Rich. L. 104, 1511 V. Town of Stateville, 84 N. C. 169. 257, 644 V. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38. 983 V. Wray, 4 Strob. 87, 217 Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540, 685, 687, 688 Barber v. City of Chicago, 152 111. 37, 1146, 1245 V. City of East Dallas, 83 Tex. 147, 410 V. City of Roxbury, 93 Mass. 318, 1612 Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. City of Denver, 72 Fed. 336, 1305. 1306 V. City of Harrisburg, 62 Fed. 565, 1309 V. City of Harrisburg, 64 Fed. 283, 1305 V. Citv of New Orleans, 43 La. An. 464, 918 V. Gogreve, 41 La. An. 251, 1257, 1268 V. Hezel, 155 Mo. 391, 511, 1307 V. Hezel, 76 Mo. App. 135, 726 V. Hunt, 100 Mo. 22, 479 Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Lampton, 70 Mo. App. 286. 1259 v. Ullman. 137 Mo. 543, 524, 725, 1146. 1155, 1282 V. Watt, 51 La. An. 1345, 1240, 1269, 1290, 1310 Barber Surgeons v. Pelson, 2 Lev. 252, 85 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 492, 509 Barbour v. City of Ellsworth, 67 Maine 294. 820 V. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine 608, 364 Barbour Co. v. Brunson, 36 Ala. 362, 774 V. Horn, 48 Ala. 649. 774 Barce v. City of Shenandoah, 106 Iowa 426. 1329, 1802 Barclav v. City of Boston, 167 Mass. 596, 931 V. City of Boston, 173 Mass. 310. 1753 V. Howell's Lessees, 6 Peters 498. 675 1559 Bard v. Poole, 12 N. Y. 495, ' 1576 Barden v. City of Portage, 79 Wis. 126. 1218 Bardick v. Dillon. 7 Okl. 535, 1700, 1704 Bardsley v. Sternberg, 17 Wash. 243, 173, 711, 951, 958 Bargate v. Shortridge, 5 II. L. Cas. 297, 1001. 1016 Barhite v. Home Tel. Co.. 63 N. Y. S. 659, 1349, 1787, 1788, 1809 Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 238, 16.50, 1727 Barker v. Board &c., 45 Kan. 681, 1169. 1225, 1569 V. City of Omaha, 16 Neb. 269, 1288 v. Hovey, 26 Pac. 585. 1169, 1225. 1569 V. People, 3 Cow. 686, 185, 369 v. Smith. 10 S. C. 226, 523 V. Southern Const. Co., 20 Ky. L. 796, 186. 711. 753, 1267, 1290 V. State, 18 Ohio 514, 1516 V. Torrey, 69 Tex. 7, 1489 V. Town of Oswegatchie, 10 N. Y. S. 834, 858, 1172 V. Town of Oswegatchie, 16 N. Y. S. 727, 554 Barklev v. Levee Com'rs, 93 U. S. 258. 1529 Barksdale v. City of Laurens, 58 S. C. 413, 790 Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307, 467, 499 Barlow v. City of Tacoma, 12 Wash. 32, 1241 V. Waters. 16 Ky. L. 426, 1373 Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich. 162, 228 V. Campbell. 55 N. Y. 456, 991 V. Knox Co.. 105 Mo. 382, 883 Barnert v. Mayor &c., 48 N. J. L. 39.5. 289, 472, 473 Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388. 86. 87, 1475 v. Brookman. 107 111. 317, 311 V. Chapin, 4 Allen 444. 1613 V. Common Council, 89 Ala. 602. 1425 V. District of Columbia. 91 U. S. 540, 8, 46, 48. 103. 265. 782. 783, 788. 813. 1207, 1317. 1592 V. Dyer. 56 Vt. 469, 1261, 1297, 1498 V. Marshall Co., 56 Iowa 20. 1674. 1723. 1726 V. Town of Bakersfleld, 57 Vt. 375. 178 V. Town of Lacon, 84 111. 461, 43, 982. 1531 V. Town of Marcus, 96 Iowa 675, 1327, 1339, 1802 TABLE OF CASES. lix [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1~S32; Vol. II, pp. S.33-18S0.'] Barnett, Ex parte, 51 Ark. 215, 1074 Barnett v. Contra Costa Co., 67 Cal. 77, 788 V. Dennison, 145 U. S. 135, 1000, 1757 V. President &c., 28 III. 62, 482, 11.32 Barney v. Dewey, 13 John.s. 224. 15U9 Barney Dumping Boat Co. v. Mayor &c., 40 Fed. 50, 784, 788 Barnum v. Oilman. 27 Minn. 466, 378 V. Mayor &c., 62 Md. 275, 563, 664 V. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393, 1033, 1757 Barnum &c. Iron Works v. Speed, 59 Mich. 272, 1672 Baron v. Krebs, 41 Kan. 338, 1256 Barr v. City of Kansas City, 105 Mo. 550, 1598, 1618, 1636 V. City of Omaha, 42 Neb. 341, 1211 V. City of Philadelphia, 191 Pa. St. 438, 874, 882, 916 V. Denniston, 19 N. H. 170, 651 V. Mayor &c., 58 N. J. L. 255, 470 V. Stevens, 1 Bibb 292, 708 V. Village of Auburn, 89 111. 362, 477, 540, 1424 V. Village of Bainbridge, 59 N. Y. S. 132, 1337, 1364 Barrett v. Black, 56 Maine 498, 810 V. City of Cambridge, 10 Allen 48, 1725 V. Crane, 16 Vt. 246, 341 V. Falls City &c. Stone Co., 21 Ky. L. 669, 1240, 1275, 1373, 1799, 1805 V. Ocean City, 62 N. J. L. 588, 751 V. Savor. 12 N. Y. S. 170, 1486 V. School Dist., 37 N. W. 445, 1480 V. Schuyler Co. Court, 44 Mo. 197, 992 Barron v. Mayor &c., 7 Peters 243, 673 Barrow v. Davis, 46 Mo. 394, 1288, 1722 Barrows v. City of Sycamore, 150 111. 588, 1111, 1112, 1347, 1348, 1703 Barry v. City of New York, 56 N. Y. S. 1049, 737 V. Goad. 89 Cal. 215. 852 V. Lowell. 8 Allen 127. 1216 V. Terkildsen, 72 Cal. 254, 1636 Bartemeyer v. Iowa. 18 Wall. 129, 137 Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 1*. & W. 253, 298. 526, 528, 529, 1410 Barthet v. City of New Orleans. 24 Fed. 563, 503, 605 Bartholomew v. Town of Harwinton, 33 Conn. 408, 859 Bartle v. City of Des Moines, 38 Iowa 414, 891 Bartlett v. Board of Education, 59 111. 364, 310 V. Crozier, 15 Johns. 250, 222 v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439, 1591 V. Governor, 2 Bibb 586. 318 V. Ilooksett, 48 N. H. 18, 1612 V. King. 12 Mass. 537. 523 V. Kinsley, 15 Conn. 327, 352, 361, 1485 V. Town of Clarksburg. 45 W. Va. 393. 785, 808, 1394 V. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336, 217 Barton v. City of Pittsburgh, 4 Brews. 373, 540, 1257, 1421 V. City of Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54, 812, 821, 1159, 1208 V. Incorporation &c. of Gads- den. 69 Ala. 495, 521 V. Sweptson. 44 Ark. 437, 210 Barton Co. v. Walser. 47 Mo. 189, 14 Bartram v. City of Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 122. 1261 Bass V. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698, 757 V. Mavor &c.. 30 Ga. 845, 992 V. State, 34 La. An. 494, 673 Bassett v. City of St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290, 1580, 1750 v. Den, 17 N. J. L. 432, 186, 187 V. Fish, 12 Hun 209, 222 v. Fish, 75 X. Y. 303, 1632 V. I'orter, 4 Cush. 487, 48, 86, 87, 1475 Bassford, In re, 50 N. Y. 509, 1253 Bass Foundry &c. v. Board &c., 115 Ind. 234, 841, 943 Bastrop Co. v. Hearn, 70 Tex. 563, 905 Katchelder v. Kpping, 28 N. H. 354, 672 Bateman v. Mathes, 54 N. J. L. 536, 1045 V. Mid Wales R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 499, 971 Bates V. Bassett, 60 Vt. 530, 666, 871 V. City of Houston, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 287, 792 V. City of St. Louis, 153 Mo. 18. 180 V. Gregory, 22 Pac. 683, 1736 V. Inhabitants &c., 151 Mass. 174, 1377, 1775 V. Mayor, 46 Ala. 158, 1500, 1508, 1510 V. Overseers &c., 14 Gray 163, 339, 1429 V. Porter, 74 Cal. 224, 900 V. Village of Rutland, 62 Vt. 178, 782, 827 Bates Co. v. Winters, 97 U. S. 83, 1027 Batesville Institute v. Kaufifman, 18 Wall. 151, 459 Bath Co. V. Amy, 13 Wall. 244, 1528 Bathurst v. Course, 3 La. An. 260, 1427 Battle V. Corporation &c., 9 Ala. 243, 1502 Battles V. Laudenslager, 84 Pa. St. 446, 1027 Bauer v. City of Rochester, 35 N. Y. St. 959, 1609 Baum V. Whatcom Co., 19 Wash. 626, 754 Bauman v. City of Detroit, 58 Mich. 444, 264 V. Ross, 167 U. S. 548. 1273. 1302, 1778 Baumgartner v. Hastv, 100 Ind. 575, 11, 490, 594, 647, 1110, 1115. 1391, 1394 Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317. 1340, 1800 Baxter v. City of Seattle, 3 Wash. 352, 595 V. State. 9 Wis. 38, 1488 V. Thomas. 4 Okla. 605, 492 V. Winoonski Turnpike Co., 22 Vt. 114, 9, 148, 777 Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249, 374, 1539 Bay Co. v. Brock. 44 Mich. 45, 1672 V. Bullock. 51 Mich. 544, 387, 420 Bayland v. Mayor &c., 1 Sandf. 27, 251, 647 Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286, 1017 Bayliss v. Pearson, 15 Iowa 279, 216 Baysinger v. People, 115 III. 419, 213 Beach v. City of Elmira, 58 Hun 600, 1180 V. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23, 12, 56 v. People, 157 ill. 659, 512, 1277 Beades v. Board &c.. 122 Mich. 366, 1506 Beal V. Ray. 17 Ind. 554. 308 Bealafeld v. Borough of Verona, 188 Pa. St. 627, 1378 Beall V. Athens Tp., 81 Mich. 536. 1593, 1600, 1613 V. Mill Co., 45 Ga. 28, 1814 Beals V. Board &c.. 28 Cal. 449. 436 V. Board &c.. 35 Cal. 624. 763, 1522 V. Inhabitants &c., 174 Mass. 1, 1281, 1299 V. James. 173 Mass. 501. 1241 Beaman v. Board &c., 42 Miss. 237, 974 Ix TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Bean v. Board &c., 51 Iowa 53, 934 V. City of Middlesboro, 57 S. W. 478. 792 V. Inhabitants &c., 23 Maine 117, 662 V. People, 7 Colo. 200, 1429 V. Tliompson, 19 N. H. 290, 348 V. Town of Concord, 48 Vt. 30, 829 Bear v. Commissioners &c., 124 N. C. 204. 1686 Bearce v. Fossett, 34 Maine 575, 347, 366 Beard v. City of Brooklyn. 31 Barb. 142, 722, 1306, 1748 V. City of Decatur, 64 Tex. 7, 177 V. City of Hopkinsville, 95 Ky. 239, 877, 880, 881 Bearden v. City of Madison, 73 Ga. 184, 466 Beardsley v. City of Hartford, 50 Conn. 529, 1221 V. Smith. 16 Conn. 368, 142, 143, 148, 342, 965, 1526 Beaser v. City of Ashland, 89 Wis. 28, 1702 Beaslev v. Town of Beckley, 28 W. Va. 81, 543, 1724 V. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 225, 772 Beaston v. Farmers' Bank &c., 12 Peters 102, 3 Beattv V. City of St. Joseph, 57 Mo. App. 251, 789 Beatty Co. v. Sibley Co., 32 Minn. 470. 904 Beauchamp v. Board &c., 45 111. 274, 1701 Beaumont v. City of Wilkesbarre, 142 Pa. St. 108, 113. 4'.)0. 1268, 1421 Beaver v. State, 124 Ind. 324, 909 Beaver Co. v. Armstrong, 44 Pa. St. 63, 1019 Beaver Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528, 276 Beavers v. Trimmer, 25 N. J. L. 97, 1095 Beazley v. Kennedy, 52 S. W. 791, 750 Beck V. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283, 810 V. City of Buffalo, 63 N. Y. S. 499, 1242, 1328 V. Hanscom, 29 N. H. 213, 305 Becker v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 17 Ind. App. 324, 1261, 1294, 1298 V. City of Henderson, 100 Ky. 450, 305 V. City of Washington. 94 Mo. 375. 477, 481. 506. 539. 540. 1146 V. Keokuk Water-woi-ks, 79 Iowa 419, 1368, 1459, 1542 Beekman v. Mayor &c., 41 N. Y. S. 900, 1334 Beck St., In re. 44 N. Y. S. 1087, 1754 Beckwith v. Whalen, 70 N. Y. 430, 1573 Bedell v. Long Island R. Co., 44 N. Y 367, 1109 v.' Village of Sea Cliff, 46 N. Y. S. 226, 791 Bedford v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 46 Mo. 456, 1109 Beebe v. City of Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39, 648. 741, 1321 Beecher v. City of Detroit, 92 Mich. 268, 587, 1255 V. Clay Co., 52 Iowa 140. 1.550, 1727. Beechwood Ave. &c.. In re, 194 Pa. St. 80, 1275, 1307 Beeder v. Village of Little Falls, 100 X. Y. 343. 1597 Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. 544, 228 V. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 3 Paige 45, 673. 685, 698 V. Third Ave. R. Co., 153 N. Y. 144, 586, 1351 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 32, 80, 1082 Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 770 V. Botsford, 3 Day 159. 142 V. Pinney, 12 Wend. 309, 1599 Beesman v. City of Peoria, 16 111. 484, 1418 Beeson v. City of Chicago, 75 Fed. 880, 1351, 1698 Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 111. 591, 377 Beikman's Case, 11 Abb. Pr. 164, 1133 Belling v. City of Evansville, 144 Ind. 644, 600 Belcher v. Farrar, 8 Allen 325. 1089, 1094 Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo. 121, 1354 Belfast &c. R. Co. v. Inhabitants &c., 60 Maine 568, 344, 361, 988 V. Inhabitants &c., 62 Maine 148, 304, 355, 356 Belisle v. Clark, 49 Ala. 98, 217 Belknap v. City of Louisville, 99 Ky. 474, 874 V. Reinhart, 2 Wend. 375, 215 Bell V. Borough of Waynesboro, 195 Pa. St. 299, 872, 1032 V. City of Boston, 101 Mass. 506, 1157 V. City of Platteville, 71 Wis. 139, 666 V. City of Rochester, 33 N. Y. St. 739, 1095 V. Mayor &c., 79 Ga. 152, 990 V. Mayor &e., 105 N. Y. 139, 1530 V. McKinnev, 63 Miss. 187, 221 V. Mobile &c. R. Co., 4 Wall. 598 983 v." Nashville Bank, Peck 269, 45 V. Ohio &c. R. Co., 25 Pa. St. 161, 629 Bell Co. V. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350, 564, 664 Bellinger v. New York &c. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 42. 1603 Bellows V. Courter, 53 Hun 631, 1064 V. President &c., 2 Mason 31, 1806 Belo V. Commissioners, 76 N. C. 489, 985, 1023 Beloit V. Morgan. 7 Wall. 619, 1023 Belt V. Prince George &c. Abstract Co., 73 Md. 289, 1428, 1429 Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, 346 Benedict v. Goit, 3 Barb. 459, 682 Benjamin v. Webster, 100 Ind. 15, 1539 Bennet v. United States, 2 Wash. T. 179, 1737 V. Wheeler. 15 Gray 486, 335 Bennett v. Burch, 1 Denio 141, 341 V. City of Buffalo, 17 N. Y. 383, 1261, 1533 V. City of Marion, 102 Iowa 425, 1754 V. City of New Bedford, 110 Mass. 433, 301 V. People, 30 111. 389, 1400 V. State, 58 Miss. 556, 314 V. Whitney. 94 X. Y. 302. 222, 224 Benoist v. City of St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179, 387, 1513, 1535 V. Inhabitants &c.. 8 Mo. 250, 958 Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 300. 700 Benson v. Mayor &c., 9 Iloust. 359, 1369 V. Mavor &c., 10 Barb. 223, 757 V. Mayor &c.. 24 Barb. 248, 763 V. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125. 246, 248 V. Village of Waukesha, 74 Wis. 31, 1322 Benton v. City of Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. 411, 693, 1390 TABLE OF CASES. Ixi [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Benton v. City of Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 368, 1254 V. Hamilton, 110 Ind. 294, 637 V. Taylor, 46 Ala. 388, 1712, 1723 V. Trustees &c., 140 Mass. 13, 806 Bepler v. City of Cincinnati, 23 Wk. L. Bui. 221). 1263 Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. 428, 277, 532 Berghoflfen v. City of New York, 64 N. Y. S. 1082, 752 Bergman v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 88 Mo. 678, 489 V. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 533, 700, 701 Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 611 Berket v. City of Peoria, 185 111. 369, 1272, 1275 Berks St., In re, 12 W. N. C. 10, 1251 Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266, 61. 69, 81, 83, 90, 103, 404 Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. City of San Antonio. 62 Fed. 882, 730, 735 V. City of San Antonio, 50 S. W. 408, 915, 1308 V. City of San Antonio, 92 Tex. 388. 717, 872, 1021, 1785. 1790 V. Wagner, 57 Hun 346, 10 N. Y. S. 840, 1173, 1580 Bernard v. City of Hoboken, 27 N. J. L. 413, 184 V. Torrance, 5 Gill & J. 383, 216 Bernards Tp. v. Morrison, 133 U. S. 523, 634, 1004, 1011 V. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 341, 1014 Berrenberg v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. 231, 1626 Berrien Co. Treasurer v. Bunbury, 45 Mich. 79, 192 Berry v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. L. 462, 908 V. McComb City, 69 Miss. 882, 1560 Berry Horn &c. Co. v. Scruggs &c. Co., 62 Mo. App. 93, 1348 Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 770 Bertonmeau v. Directors &c., 3 Woods 177, 1494 Berwind v. Galveston &c. Ins. Co., 20 Tex. Civ. App. 426, 719, 743 Bessinger v. Dickerson, 20 Iowa 260, 322, 324, 328 Best V. Allen, 30 111. 30, 1111 Betham v. City of Philadelphia, 196 Pa. St. 302, 787 Bethune v. Hughes, 28 Ga. 560, 100, 1403 Betts V. Bagley, 12 Pick. 572, 341 V. Village of Gloversville, 8 N. Y. 795, 1584 Bevans v. United States, 13 Wall. 56, 319 Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479, 221 Bibel V. People, 67 111. 172, 282, 547 Bickerdike v. City of Chicago. 185 111. 280, 511, 512, 1173, 1174, 1252, 1279 Bickerstaff, In re. 70 Cal. 35, 1401, 1405 Bickford v. Inhabitants &c., 173 Mass. 552, 1780 Bicknell v. Widner School Tp., 73 Ind. 501, 862 Riddle v. Willard. 10 Ind. 62, 200 Bidelman v. State, 110 N. Y. 232. 1579 Bldwell V. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 412. 802 V. Town of Murray, 40 Hun (N. T.) 190, 1591 Bieling v. City of Brooklyn, 120 N. Y. 98. 788, 1612 Bienville Water &c. Co. v. City of Mobile, 95 Fed. 539, 740 Bigelow V. Bridge, 8 Mass. 275, 326 Bigelow V. City of Chicago, 90 111. 49, 1252, 1268, 1272 V. Hillman, 37 Maine 52, 301, 521, 987 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Pick. 267, 1613 V. Inhabitants &c.. 14 Gray 541, 148. 778, 780, 803, 807, 1076 V. Inhabitants &c., 25 N. J. L. 297, 1232, 1425 V. West Wis. R. Co., 27 Wis. 478, 517 V. Wilson, 1 Pick. 485, 346 Biggs V. Huntington, 32 W. Va. 55, 1638 V. McBride, 17 Or. 640, 150 Bigler v. Mayor, 5 Abb. N. C. 51, 894 Bill V. City of Denver, 29 Fed. 344. 1306 V. Dow, 56 Vt. 562, 357 Billings V. City of Chicago, 167 111. 337, 1248, 1272 V. City of Worcester, 102 Mass. 329. 1586, 1600 V. Kneen, 57 Vt. 428, 1041 V. Lafiferty, 31 111. 318, 221 Bills V. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 463. 481, 485, 503, 506, 605, 1405 Kinde v. Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285, 1492 Binell V. City of Kankakee, 64 111. 249, 977 Bingaman v. City of Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. St. 353, 1258 Binghamton Opera House Co. v. City of Binghamton, 156 N. Y. 651, 1759 Rinsse v. Wood. 37 N. Y. 526. 1599 Bird V. Mayor &c., 33 Hun 396, 193 V. Merrick, L. & R. 115. 369 V. Perkins. 33 Mich. 463, 64 V. Wasco Co.. 3 Or. 282. 183 Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73, 282, 285, 468, 547, 552, 572 Birdseye v. Village of Clyde, 61 Ohio St. 27, 1759 Birge v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co., 16 N. Y. S. 596. 361 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 65 Iowa 440. 693 V. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507, 794 Birket v. City of Peoria, 185 111. 369, 1272 Birmingham v. Rumsey, 63 Ala. 252, 1529 Birmingham &c. R. Co. v. Birmington &c. R. Co., 79 Ala. 465, 568, 1184 V. Reg., 6 Ry. Cas. 625, 699 Bish V. Johnson, 21 Ind. 299, 994 Bishop V. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289, 994 V. Cone. 3 N. H. 513, 367, 1427 V. Fahay. 15 Gray 61, 1751 V. Lucy, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 326, 223 V. Marks, 15 La. An. 147, 1270, 1520 V. Mayor &c., 7 Ga. 200, 1385 V. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1, 655 V. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472, 229 V. Williamson, 11 Maine 495, 225 Bissell V. City of Jeffersonville. 24 How. 287, 285. 1001 V. City of Kankakee, 64 111. 249, 624, 980, 1524, 1525 V. Davidson, 65 Conn. 183, 1762 V. New York &c. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61, 1559 V. Saxton, 66 N. Y. 55, 324 V. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 191. 322 V. Spring Valley Tp., 110 U. S. 162. 863, 1014 Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 588, 1386 Bittinger v. Bell, 65 Ind. 445, 987 Bitzer v. Leverton, 9 Kan. App. 76, 585 Ixii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-18S0.'i Bitzer v. O'Bryan, 21 Ky. L. 1307, 1787, 1806 Black V. Brinkley, 54 Ark. 372. 403 V. City of Columbia, 19 S. C. 412, 264 V. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621, 992 V. Commissioners &c., 8 Neb. 440. 940 V. Common Council &c., 119 Mich. 571, 710. 744, 915 V. Cornell, 30 Mo. App. 641, 627, 848, 1480 V. Mayor &c.. 50 Md. 235, 699, 701 Blackburn v. Inhabitants &c., 9 Pick. 97, 362 Blackett v. Blizzard, 9 B. & C. 851, 473 Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 547, 1018 Blackmore v. Vestry &c., L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 451, 812 Blackstone v. White. 41 Pa. St. 330, 86 Blackwell v. Hill, 76 Mo. App. 46. 1369 Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464, 253 Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165. 106 Blair v. City of Charleston, 43 W. Va. 62, 1299. 1774, 1777, 1778 V. City of Waco, 75 Fed. 800, 550 V. Cuming Co., Ill U. S. 363, 980. 981, 1014 V. Forehand. 100 Mass. 136, 1751 V. Hanna. 87 Ind. 298, 1571 V. Luniug. 76 Cal. 134, 1259 V. People, 181 111. 460, 297 V. Ridgelv, 41 Mo. 63, 369 V. West Point, 2 McCrary 459, 51 Blake V. City of Dubuque, 13 Iowa 66, 705 V. City of Lowell, 143 Mass. 296, 1586, 1621 V. City of Pontiac, 49 111. App. 543. 789 V. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48, 1368 V. Inhabitants &c., 68 Maine 365, 1587 V. Johnson. 1 N. H. 91, 1727 V. Mayor &c.. 53 Ga. 172, 1730 V. Orford, 64 N. H. 299. 345, 632 V. People, 109 111. 504, 1691 V. Portsmouth &c. R. Co., 39 N. H. 435. 410 Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 198, 218 V. City of Trov. 18 Hun 167, 1615 Blakelv Tp. v. Devine. 36 Minn. 53, 1126 Blakemore v. Dolan. 50 Ind. 194, 521 Blakie v. Staples. 13 Grant 67. 651 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96, 384. 392. 393, 463, 480. 1132. 1517 V. City of Kansas, 16 Fed. 444, 1209 V. Inhabitants &c., 102 Mass. 343, 262 Blanchford v. Dow. 82 Maine 557, 1727 Blanden v. City of Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 441. 1777, 1778 Blank v. Kearney, 59 N. Y. S. 645, 1152, 1185 V. Kearnv. 61 N. Y. S. 79, 728 Blanton v. Board &c., 101 N. C. 532. 1021 Blashfield v. Empire State &c. Co., 18 N. Y. S. 250, 1581 Blatchley v. Moser, 15 Wend. 215, 496, 1085 Bledsoe v. Gary, 95 Ala. 70. 1409, 1411, 1412 Blessing v. City of Galveston, 42 Tex. 641, 104, 446 Bleu V. Bear River Co., 20 Cal. 602. 714, 992 Blight V. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535. 132 Bliss V. City of Chicago, 156 111. 564. 1277 V. Hosmer, 15 Ohio 44, 674 Bliss V. Inhabitants &c., 145 Mass. 91, 1595 Blize V. Castlio, 8 Mo. App. 290, 708 Block V. Commissioners &c., 99 U. S. 686, 1000, 1018 V. President &c., 36 111. 301, 488. 540, 1424 Blodgett V. City of Boston, 8 Allen (Mass.) 237, 1595 V. Holbrook, 39 Vt. 336, 361, 364, 1540 Bloodgood V. Mohawk &c. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 705 Bloom V. City of Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461, 1182 Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean 158, 67, 520 Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121. 15. 342, 344, 348, 358, 366, 867, 858, 964. 1022, 1522, 1526 Bloomfield &c. Co. v. Richardson, 68 Barb. 437, 689 Bloomington v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 134 HI. 451, 1248 Bloomington Cemetery Assn. v. Peo- ple, 139 111. 16, 1160, 1245 Blomington School Tp. v. National School Furnishing Co., 107 Ind. 43. 210, 857, 862 Bloor V. Town of Delafield, 69 Wis. 273, 1614 Blount V. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 648, 558 Blue V. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 1762 Blush V. Town of Colchester, 39 Vt. 193, 342, 344, 363 Bly V. City of Haverhill, 110 Mass. 520, 1613 V. Village of Whitehall, 120 N. Y. 506. 1632, 1638 Blythe v. Tompkins. 2 Abb. Pr. 468. 385 Board &c. See also. Name of Coun- ty ; County Com'rs ; Commis- sioners. Board &c. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.. 90 Fed. 222. 838, 952, 1011, 1757 V. Arnold. 112 111. 11. 1491, 1701 V. Arrighi, 54 Miss. 668, 648 V. Aspinwall. 24 How. 376, 1527 V. Auditor, 27 Mich. 165, 1712 V. Bacon, 96 Ind. 31, 1625 V. Bailey, 122 Ind. 46, 1575, 1577, 1578 V. Baker, 24 111. App. 231, 1483 V. Baker. 34 111. App. 620, 914, 1488 V. Barnett. 107 111. 507. 681 V. Beckwith. 10 Kan. 608, 675 V. Bird. 31 Cal. 66. 313 V. Blodgett. 155 111. 441. 973 V. Board &c., 15 Colo. 320, 439 V. Board &c., 32 Ind. 234, 419, 1519 V. Board &c., 128 Ind. 295, 1577 V. Board &c., 26 Kan. 181. 427, 1519 V. Board &c., 74 Mich. 721, 444 V. Board &c., 124 Mich. 491, 106 V. Board &c., 58 Miss. 619, 1517 V. Board &c., 62 Miss. 325. 441 V. Board &c.. 63 N. J. L. 371, 1785 V. Board &c., 46 N. Y. St. 376, 1073 V. Board &c.. 30 W. Va. 424, 1474 V. Bond, 3 Colo. 411, 1745 V. Boswell, 4 Ind. App. 133, 805, 1076 V. Bowen. 4 Lans. 24. 662 V. Boynton. 30 Ind. 359. 841, 1040 V. Bradford. 72 Ind. 455. 670 V. Brawner. 100 Ky. 166 201 V. Brown. 89 Ind. 48. 1575. 1577. 1579, 1625 V. Brown. 4 Ind. App. 288, 1060 V. Brown, 33 La. An. 383. 826 V. Brush. 77 111. 59. 281. 1539 V. Burkey, 1 Ind. App. 565. 1057 TABLE OF CASES. Ixiii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol II, pp. 838-1830.1 Board &c. v. Rurtis. lOS N. Y. 130, 1737 V. Byrne, (!7 Iiid. Ul, 841 V. Capital Gas &c. Co., 16 Ky. L. 780, 726 V. Carter, 2 Kan. 115, 1538 V. Casey, 98 N. Y. St. 251, 10!»5 V. Catlett. 86 Va. 158. 941 V. Chissom. 7 Iiid. 688, 535 V. Chit wood, 8 Ind. 504, 1480 V. Cluircliil], 21 Va. 528, 1680 V. Cincinnati Steam Heating Co., 128 Ind. 240. 841 V. City of Kingston, 50 Ilun 435, 1066 V. City of Lincoln, 81 111. 156, 1084, 1756 V. City of Springfield, 63 111. €6, ' 762, 1084 V. Clark, 92 N. Y. 391, 178, 318 V. ColHuliury. 1 Mich. 355, 311, 312 V. Cole, 2 Ind. App. 475, 611 V. Common Council &c., 128 Cal. 369, 1550 V. Cowan, 60 Miss. 876, 1522, 1531 V. Cox, 6 Ind. 403, 251, 410, 445, 647 V. Crotty, 9 Colo. 318, 1672 V. Cutter, 3 Colo. 349, 1552 V. Darrow, 13 Colo. 460, 208, 380 T. Davies, 1 Wash. 290, 108, 109, 403 V. Dav, 19 Ind. 450, 959, 960, 971 V. Deprez, 87 Ind. 509, 1579 V. Dombke, 94 Ind. 72, 1580 V. Edwards, 76 111. 544, 1743 V. Emmerson, 95 Ind. 579, 1625 V. Fahlor, 114 Ind. 176, 947 V. Parwell. 25 111. 181, 973 V. Fonda, 77 N. Y. 350, 311, 322, 1014 V. FuUen, 111 Ind. 410, 947, 1233 V. Fullen, 118 Ind. 158, 947 V. Gantt, 73 Md. 521, 845, 1669 V. Giron, 46 La. An. 1364, 499, 541 V. Gorrell. 20 Gratt. 484, 684 V. Hall, 47 Wis. 208, 291' V. Harrodsburg Educational Dist., 9 Ky. L. 605. 921 V. Hayden, 13 Colo. App. 36, 787, 1688 V. Henzler, 41 Atl. 228, 477, 539, 540, 1762 V. Hicks, 2 Ind. 527, 1660 V. Hildebrand. 1 Ind. 555. 1063 V. Hill, 115 Ind. 316, 632, 889, 947 V. Hill, 122 Ind. 215, 841 V. Hinchman, 31 Kan. 729, 715 V. Hogan. 39 Kan. 606, 695, 1572 V. Holman, 34 Ind. 256, 841, 1035 V. Hon. 87 Ind. 356, 841, 1040 V. Howard, 27 C. C. A. 531, 1757 V. Hubbard, 45 111. 139, 1013 V. Huflf. 91 Ind. 333. 1567 V. Inhabitants &c., 18 Ohio St. 221, 629 V. Jenks. 65 111. 275. 1287 V. Jennings, 104 Ind. 108, 188, 841 V. Jewell, 44 Minn. 427, 319, 912 V. Johnson, 21 Fla. 578, 961 V. Johnson, 124 Ind. 145, 207, 1473, 1672 V. Johnson, 127 Ind. 238, 178, 945 V. Judice, 39 La. An. 896, 326 V. Kimberlin. 108 Ind. 449, 1736 V. Leavitt. 4 N. M. 37, 108, 109 V. Les:g. 98 Ind. 523. 1577, 1579 V. Legg. 110 Ind. 479, 1575 V. Leggett, 115 Ind. 544, 943 V. Lomax, 5 Ind. App. 567, 841, 842, 1040 V. Markle, 46 Ind. 96, 521 V. Mason &c. Co., 100 Ky. 48, 120 V. Mayor &c., 57 N. J. L. 452, 715 Board &c. v. McClintock, 51 Ind. 325, 17.30 V. JIcLeod. 34 Kan. 306, 1035 V. McManus. 54 Ark. 446, 1662 V. McNamar, 10 Neb. 276, 981 V. Mighels. 7 Ohio St. 109, 7, 13, 82, 803, 813, 1076, 1734 V. Miguos, 32 La. An. 923, 1509 V. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 1495 V. Misenheimer. 78 111. 22, 1483 V. Moore. 17 Minn. 412. 780 V. Morrison, 22 Miss. 178, 1714 V. Motherwell Iron &c. Co., 123 Ind. 3(!4. 841 V. Muhlenbacker, 18 Kan. 129, 696 V. Murray, 99 Ky. 422, 1145 V. National Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. 228, 712, 999, 1005, 1011, 1021 V. Neidenberger, 78 III. 58, 1530 V. Newlin, 132 Ind. 27, 946, 947 V. New York Horse Manure Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 1, 1125 V. Norman, 51 La. An. 786, 515 V. O'Connor, 86 Ind. 531. 1191, 1530 V. Osburn, 4 Ind. App. 590, 842, 943, 1035, 1040 V. rashley, 19 S. C. 315, 1537 V. Patterson, 56 111. Ill, 629 V. I'ayne, 123 N. C. 435, 984 V. People, 13 Colo. App. 553, 203, 204 V. People, 36 111. 299, 1538 V. I'eople, 65 III. 360, 152 V. I'eople, 110 111. 511, 1084, 1514 V. People, 24 111. App. 410, 1665 V. People, 38 111. App. 239, 1655 V. I'eople, 78 111. App. 586, 1687 V. Pierce, 6 N. Mex. 324, 452 V. Piatt, 79 Fed. 567, 879 V. Quick, 99 N. Y. 138. 178 V. Kevnolds, 49 111. 186, 1041 V. Risley, 40 Mo. 356, 579 V. Ristine, 124 Ind. 242, 1063 V. Ritter, 90 Ind. 362, 841, 1040 V. Roehr, 23 111. App. 629, 628, 1486 V. Rogers, 55 Ind. 297, 664 V. Ross, 46 Ind. 404, 663 V. Schmoke, 51 Ind. 416, 1063 V. School Dist, 56 Ark. 354, 1247 V. School Dist.. 81 Wis. 548, 1487 V. Seaton, 90 Ind. 158, 841, 1040 V. Sherwood, 27 U. S. App. 458, 952, 1758 V. Shields, 62 Mo. 247, 55. 65, 66, 69, 70, 1001 V. Shields, 130 Ind. 6. 1038, 1039 V. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491, 465, 947 V. Spltler, 13 Ind. 235, 419 V. Springfield. 68 111. 66, 240 V. State, 61 Ind. 379, 1672 V. State, 86 Ind. 8, 1525 V. State, 115 Ind. 64, 997 V. State. 122 Ind. 333. 1490 V. State. 42 N. J. L. 263, 1577 V. State, 45 Ohio St. 555, 1493 V. Stone. 22 Kv. L. 25, 502, 1554 V. Strader. 18" N. J. L. 108, 814, 832 V. Sutliff, 97 Fed. 270, 998, 1031 V. Tate, 10 Neb. 193, 664 V. Tavlor, 123 Ind. 148, 663, 840 V. Taylor, 99 N. C. 201, 1232 V. Templer,- 34 Ind. 322. 909 V. Templeton, 116 Ind. 369. 179 V. Texas &c. R. Co., 46 Tex. 316, 562 V. Thomas, 12 Kv. L. 832, 1487 V. Thompson, 106 Ind. 534, 1579 V. Tinnon. 26 Kan. 1. 1494 V. Tower. 28 Minn. 45. 319 V. Union Bank &c.. 96 Fed. 293. 993 998 V. Valentine, 32 N. Y. St. 919, '1095 Ixiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Board &c. v. Walbridge, 38 Wis. 179, 991 V. Ward, 69 Tnd. 441, G63, 670 V. Watson, 5 Bush 660, 1507 V. Webb, 47 Kan. 104. 8.")5 V. Weeks, 130 Ind. 162, 854, 855 V. Welder, 64 111. 427, 1701 V. Wertz, 112 Ind. 268, 932 V. Wood. 126 Ind. 168, 909 V. Woods, 77 Mo. 197, 576 Boardman v. Board &c., 85 N. Y. 359. 1723 V. Halliday, 10 Paige 223, 197 Boardman Tp. v. Flagg, 70 Mich. 372 860 Bobbett V. State, 10 Kan. 9, 1655 Bock V. City of New York, 64 N. Y. 777, 179, 180 Bodge V. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. St. 492 784 Bodwic V. Fennell, 1 Wils. 233, 528 Boehm v. Mayor &c., 61 Md. 259, 1086, 1388 Boehme v. City of Monroe, 106 Mich. 401, 470 Bogart V. Green, 8 Mo. 115, 329 V. Lamotte Tp., 79 Mich. 294, 233, 235, 634, 635 Bogert V. City of Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 568, 1297 V. City of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134, 1086 V. Jackson Circuit Judge, 118 Mich. 457, 1704 V. Trustees, 43 N. J. L. 358, 340, 343 Bohen v. City of Waseca, 32 Minn. 176, 265, 1612 Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195, 1508, 1521 Bohlman v. Railway Co., 40 Wis. 157, 187 Bohm V. Metropolitan El. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 576, 1581 Bohmv V. State, 21 Tex. App. 597, 494 Bolan'd v. City of Kansas, 32 Mo. App. S, 1634 Bolger V. Foss, 65 Cal. 250, 1574 Bolles V. Brimfleld, 120 U. S. 759, 642, 992, 993, 1033 Bolton V. Gilleran, 105 Cal. 244. 510, 1702 V. Village of New Rochelle, 32 N. Y. S. 442, 811 Bonaparte v. Camden &c. R. Co., 1 Bald. 205, 4, 6 Bond V. City of Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284, 558 V. Hiestarid, 20 La. An. 139, 106 Bonestell v. Mayor, 22 N. Y. 162, 638, 1212 Bonnell v. Allen, 53 Ind. 130, 656 V. Nuckolls Co., 28 Neb. 90, 884 V. Nuckolls Co., 32 Neb. 189, 884 Bonner v. McPhail, 31 Barb. 100, 1415 V. State. 7 Ga. 473, 1691 Bonsall v. IMayor &c., 19 Ohio St. 418. 1198, 1262 Boodv V. Fnited States, 1 Woodb. & M. 150, 318 Book V. Enrle, 87 Mo. 246, 638. 883 Booker v. Young, 12 Gratt. 303, 162 Boom V. City of LTtica. 2 Barb. 104, 251, 253, 647, 1106 Boom Co. V. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, .591, 694, 1168, 1222 Boone v. People. 4 III. App. 231. 1483 Boone Co. v. Armstrong, 23 Neb. 764. 933 V. Jones. 54 Iowa 699, 211, 310. 324 V. Keck. 31 Ark. 387. 1745 Booth V. Hillsborough Co., 45 N. H. 1.39, 1067 Booth V. Town of Carthage, 67 111. 102. 523, 524 V. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 859 Boothbay v. Giles, 68 Maine 160, 311 Boots V. Washburn, 79 N. Y. 207, 1173 Bordages v. Fliggins, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 1206, 1207 Bordeaux v. Meridan Land &c. Co., 67 Miss. 304, 843, 1489 Bore V. Bush. 6 Mart. N. S. 1. 335 Boring V. Williams, 17 Ala. 510, 1415 Bork V. City of Buffalo, 127 N. Y. 64, 894 V. City of Buffalo, 2 N. Y. S. 559, 1288 Borough of Avoca v. Pittston &c. R. Co., 7 Kulp 470, 1347 Borough of Bathurst v. MacPherson, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 256, 812, 831 Borough of Belzhoover v. Heirs of Belzhoover, 173 Pa. St. 213, 1252 Borough of Bethlehem v. Haus, 26 W. N. C. 348. 1177 Borough of Blooming Valley, 56 Pa. St. 66, 1517 Borough of Chartiers' Appeal, 8 Atl. 181, 1220 Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374, 1522 Borough of Freemansburg v. Rogers, 8 Atl. 872, 1214 Borough of Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253. 218, 516, 992 Borough of Greensburg v. Laird, 138 Pa. St. 533. 1195 V. Young, 53 Pa. St. 280, 1198 Borough of Harrisburg v. Crangle, 3 W. & S. 460, 693 Borough of Lansdowne v. Springfield Water Co., 7 Del. Co. R. 506, 1388 Borough of Little Meadows, 35 Pa. St. 335, 1517 Borough of Manchester v. Reserve Tp., 4 Pa. St. 35, 1474 Borough of Mauch Chunk v. Shortz, 61 Pa. St. 319, 1234 Borough of Milford v. Milford Water Co., 134 Pa. St. 610, 1450 Borough of Millerstown v. Bell, 123 Pa. St. 151, 1396 Borough of Mt. Pleasant v. Balti- more &c. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 565, 1249 Borough of New York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 391, 669 Borough of Norristown v. Fitzpat- rick. 94 Pa. St. 121. 798, 799, 808 V. Norristown &c. R. Co., 148 Pa. St. 87, 1182 Borough of Port Royal v. Graham, 84 Pa. St. 426, 958 Borough of Sayre v. Phillips, 148 Pa. St. 482. 502 Borough of Shamokin v. Shamokin &c. R. Co.. 196 Pa. St. 166, 1814 Borough of St. Peter v. Bauer, 19 Minn. 327. 1411 Borough of Susquehanna Depot v. Simmons, 112 Pa. St. 384, 1182 Borough of Warren v. Lewis, 16 Pa. Co. R. 176. 599 Borough of West Chester v. Town of Apple. 35 Pa. St. 2S4, 1615 Boss V. Hewett, 15 Wis. 285, 1018 V. Litton. 5 Car. & P. 407, 1637 Boston Belting Co. v. City of Bos- ton. 149 Mass. 44. 1180 Boston Elec. Co. v. City of Cam- bridge. 163 Mass. 64, 739 Boston &c. Glass Co. v. City of Bos- ton, 4 Met. 181, 1551 TABLE OF CASES. Ixv [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} Boston &r. R. Co. v. City of Boston, 140 Mass. 87, 15.57 V. FoKsom. 4G N. H. 64, 70G V. Lowoll &c. U. Co., 124 Mass. :U',S. 679 Boston Rolling: Mills v. City of Cam- bridge. 117 Mass. 30(5, 817, 1112 Boston &c. Society v. Mayor, 116 Mass. 181, 1247 Boston Tpk. (^o. V. Town of Pom- fret, 20 Conn. 590, 1427 Bostwick V. Barlow. 14 Ilun 177, 224 V. Van Voorhis, 91 N. Y. 353, 321 Bothey v. City of Seattle, 17 Wash. 263, 1328 Boucher v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 456, 1591, 1592, 1619 Bonldin v. Mayor &c., 15 Md. 18, 1255 Boulton V. Crowther, 2 B. & C. 703, 801 Bound V. Wisconsin &c. R. Co.. -iZ Wis. 543, 623. 651, 997, 1738 Bounds V. Kirven, 63 Tex. 159, 678 Bourget v. City of Cambridge, 156 Mass. 398, 1595 Bourland v. Peoria Co., 16 111. 538, 1780 Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 926 Bourne v. State. 35 Neb. 1, 1481 Bouton V. Board &c., 84 111. 384, 619 V. City of Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375, 1204, 1723 Bow V. Allenstown, 34 N. II. 351, 48, 49, 50, 87, 1475 Bowditch V. Boston. 101 U. S. 16, 802 V. Superintendent &c., 168 Mass. 239, 1240. 1281, 1712 Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. 112, 1538 Bowen v. Mayor &c., 79 Ga. 709, 988 V. Morris, 2 Taunt. 374, 262 V. Newell, 16 R. I. 238, 1546 V. Peate. L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 321, 745 V. State, 108 N. Y. 166, 18 Bower v. Peate. 1 Q. B. D. 321, 1779 Bowers v. County Com'rs, 8 Ohio St. 285, 384 V. Fleming. 67 Ind. 541, 328 Bowler v. Perrin, 47 Mich. 154, 187 Bowlin V. Furman. 28 Mo. 427, 629 Bowman v. City of Colfax, 17 Wash. 344, 1779 V. City of Omaha, 59 Neb. 84, 1338 V. Ross, 167 U. S. 549, 1230 V. Tripp. 14 R. I. 242, 1621 V. Venice &c. R. Co., 102 HI. 459, 693, 695 Boyce v. Auditor General, 90 Mich. 314, 859, 860 Boyd V. Alabama, 94 IT. S. 645, 1082 V. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140. 90, 103. 760, 1410 V. City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 456, 1185, 1186 V. Insurance Patrol &c., 113 Pa. St. 269, 8, 9 V. Mill Creek School Tp., 114 Ind. 210, 857, 861, 1482 V. State, 88 Ala. 169, 1493 V. Town of Readsboro, 52 Vt. 522 829 Boyden v. Brookline. 8 Vt. 284, 177 V. United States. 13 Wall. 17. 319 Boye V. City of Albert Lea, 74 Minu. 230, 788, 793 V. Girardey, 28 La. An. 717, 1508, 1521 Boyle V. Borough of Hazelton, 171 Pa. St. 167, 1362 V. City of Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 1. 1257 V. City of New Orleans, 23 Fed. 843. 651 V. City of Saginaw, 124 Mich. 348, 1796 1 Smith — v Boynton v. People, 155 111. 66, 1278 V. People, ^^,<) III. 553, 1283 Boyt V. Dougherty Co.. 79 Ga. 211, 990 Bozarth v. McGillicuddy, 19 Ind. App. 26, 749 Brabham v. Board &c.. 54 Miss. 363, 9 Brackenridge v. Fitchburg, 145 Mass. 160, 1639 Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. 335, 1191 ISraden v. McNutt, 114 Ind. 214, 1477, 1489 Bradford v. City of Chicago, 25 111. 411, 244 V. City of Pontine, 165 III. 612, 550, 1142. 1144, 1241. 1282 V. City &c. of San Francisco, 112 Cal. 537, 729, 1700 V. Mayor &c., 92 Ala. 349. 1.581 Bradish v. Lucken, 38 Minn. 186, 1722 V. Tucker, 16 Fla. 258, 1722 Bradley v. Amis, 2 Havw. 399, 1111 V. City of Eau Claire, 56 Wis. 168, 942 V. City of Frankfort, 99 Ind. 417, 697 V. City of Rochester, 7 N. Y. S. 237, 1395, 1405 V. Fall Brook I. D., 68 Fed. 948, 1242 V. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 220 V. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 638, 992 V. Love. 76 Iowa 397. 920 V. McAtee, 7 Bush 667, 1234 V. Town of Richmond, 6 Vt. 121. 1745 V. Village of W. Duluth, 45 Minn. 4. 1157 Bradshaw v. City of Omaha, 1 Neb. 16, 104, 393, 1517 V. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103, 674 Bradstreet v. Supervisors, 13 Wend. 546, 134 Bradwell v. State. 16 Wall. 130. 137, 140 Brad.y, Petition of. 85 N. Y. 268, 1253 Brady v. City of Bayonne, 57 N. J. L. 379, 463, 727 v. City of Lowell, 3 Cush. 124, 776, 1594 V. City of Lowell, 4 Cush. 310, 814 V. Howe. 50 Miss. 607, 171 V. King, 53 Cal. 44. 1255 V. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. 312. 235. 251, 257, 28©, 644, 645, 647, 715 V. Mayor &c., 1 Barb. 584. 6G2 V. Northwestern Ins. Co.. 11 Mich. 425, 1121, 1391 V. Rogers, 63 Mo. App. 222, 1136 V. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157, 1114 Braidy v. Theritt, 17 Kan. 468, 197 Braley v. Dickinson, 48 Vt. 599, 347, 1485 Bramah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963, 971 Bramlett v. City of Laurens, 58 S. C. 89, 1778 Bramwell v. Guheen, 2 Idaho 1069, 363 Branch v. Commonwealth, 2 Call 510. 333 V. Town of Marengo, 43 Iowa 600, 1510 Brand v. City of San Antonio, 37 S. W. 340, 550, 743 Brandirff v. Harrison Co., 50 Iowa 164, 652 Brandon, Ex parte, 49 Ark. 143, 1074 Brandt v. City of Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 386, 1319 Braney v. Inhabitants &c., 167 Mass. 16, 739 Branham v. Mayor &c., 24 Cal. 585, 629, 646 Brannon v. County Court, 33 W. Va. 789, 893 Ixvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Brattleboro Sav. Bank v. Board &c., 98 Fed. 524, 1003, 1033 Brauer v. City of Portland, 35 Or. 471, 1769 Braun v'. Sauerwein, 10 Wall. 218, 455 V State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 236, 1407 Bravin v. City of Tombstone, 56 Pac. 719 1687 Bray v.' Town of Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416. 148 1745 Brayton v. City of Fall River, 113 "Mass. 218, 817, 830, lti5 Breaiix v. Parish of Iberville, 23 La. An. 232, 636 Breckenridge, In re, 160 N. Y- 12^'-.ooa 1828, looU Breed v. Conley, 14 Iowa 269, 229 Breen v. Morris &c. R. Co., I Beas. 165, 1015 Breese v. Poole, 16 111. App. 551, 700 BreggnsUa v. Borough of Vineland, 53"N. J. L. 168, 606 Brehm v. Mayor &c., 104 N. Y. 186, 1746 V Mayor" &c., 39 Hun 533, 1265 Breicbbiel v. Powles, 39 N. Y. St. 856, 1055 Breil v. City of Buffalo, 144 N. ^-^^^ 163, „ 1336 V. City of Buffalo, 35 N. Y. S. 3.^9. 1336 Brenan v. People, 176 111. 620, 52, 1823, 1824, 1825 Brenham v. fierman-American Bank, 144 U. S. 173. ^^,„ 561, 839, 972, 975, 1013 Brennan^v. City of Buffalo, le^^N-^g^, V. City of St. Louis, 92 Mo. 482, 1580, 1627, 1790 V. City of Weatherford, 53 Tex. 330, 395 Bress v. Louviere. 37 La. An. 736, 1490 Brevoort v. City of Detroit, 24 Mich. 322, • 1266 Brewer v. Bowman. 9 Oa. 37, 687 V. City of Springfield, 97 Mass. 152, 1722 V. Watson. 71 Ala. 299, 1429 Brewer Brick Co. v. Inhabitants &c., 62 Maine 62. 979, 980, 1503, 1542, 1545 Brewis v. City of Duluth, 3 McCrary Brewster v. City of Hornellsville, 54 . N. Y. S. 915, 931 V. City of Peru, 180 111. 124, 1144, 1379 V. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. 1261 V. Hyde, 7 N. H. 206. 341, 34.5 Brickill v. Mavor &c., 7 F'ed. 479, 779 Bricklavers v. Plasterers, Palm. 396, 467 Brick Presby. Church v. Mayor &c., 5 Conn. 538, 1086 Bridge v. Wyckoff, 67 N. Y. 130. 1561, 1574 Bridge Co. v. City of Frankfort, 18 B. Mon. 41, 649 V. United States, 105 U. S. 470, 1576 Bridgeford v. City of Tuscumbia, 4 Woods 611, 1425 V. City of Tuscumbia, 16 Fed. 910, 1029 Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 210 Bridgeport Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 34 N. Y. 27.^. 1599 Bridges v. Mavor &c., 33 Ga. 113, 1501 V. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 562, 150 Briegel v. Citv of Philadelphia, 135 Pa. St. 451, 1180 Briel v. City of Buffalo, 156 N. Y. 699, 1300 Brientnall v. City of Philadelphia, 103 Pa. St. 156, .593 Brieswick v. Mayor &c., 51 Ga. 639, 530 Briggs V. Borden. 71 Mich. 87, 362, 626, 652, 1486, 1496 V. Borough of West Newton, 164 Pa. St. 341, 1331 V. Coleman, 51 Ala. 360, 222 V. Murdock, 13 Pick. 305, 343. 346, 347, 348 V. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 356, 335 V. Whipple. 6 Vt. 95, 668 Brigham v. Edmunds, 7 Gray 359, 823 Bright V. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, 426, 1508 V. Supervisors. 18 Johns. 242, 178 Brightman v. Inhabitants &c., 65 Maine 426, 800, 1394 V. Kerner, 22 Wis. 54, 1247, 1513 Brill Co. V. City of Philadelphia, 167 Pa. St. 1. 1208 Brimmer v. Boston. 102 Mass. 19, 637 Brinckerhoffi v. Board &c., 6 Abb. Pr. 428, 1744 Brink v. Borough of Dunmore, 174 Pa. St. 395, 824 Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187, 8, 225, 774, 786 Briscoe v. Bank. 11 Peters 257, 18 Bristol V. Bristol &c. W. W. Co., 19 R. I. 413, 1760 V. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123, 1721 V. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524, 61, 83, 434, 1519 Bristol &c. Co. v. City of Bristol, 97 Va. 304. 595, 1706 Britton v. Inhabitants &c., 107 Mass. 347, 1595 V. Platte City, 2 Dill. 1. 847 Brizzolari v. State, 37 Ark. 364, 607 Broad v. City of Paris, 66 Tex. 119, 316, 324 Broadbelt v. Loew, 44 N. Y. S. 159. 1363 Broadfoot v. City of Fayetteville, 124 N. C. 478, 117 Broadwav Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Biish 508, 1262 Broberg v. City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 523, 1621 Brockman v. City of Creston, 79 Iowa 587. 98, 577, 624, 652, 653 Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee. 19 Wis. 624, 548, 980 Brodie v. McCabe, 33 Ark. 690, 1523 Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244, 1388 Brokaw v. City of Terre Haute, 97 Ind. 451, 699 V. Commissioners &c., 130 111. 482, 1644, 1668 Brome v. Cuming Co., 31 Neb. 362. 664 Bronson v. Borough of Wallingford, 54 Conn. 513, 1207 V. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St. 476, 557 V. Town of Washington, 57 Conn. 346. 1741, 1748 V. Woolsey, 17 Johns. 46, 216 Brook V. Horton, 68 Cal. 554, 1317 Brook Ave., In re, 40 N. Y. S. 949, 1273. 1774 Brooklyn v. Insurance Co., 99 U. S. 362, 1026 Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 629. 675, 685. 759, 760 Brooklyn &c. R. Co. v. Brooklyn &c. R.'Co., 32 Barb. 358, 97, 468 Brooklyn Street, In re, 118 Pa. St. 640. 1560 Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Town of He- bron, 51 Conn. 22, 346. 359, 365 Brooks V. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173, 56, 63, 91 TABLE OF CASES. Ixvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol II, pp. 833-1830.'] Brooks V. Inhabitants &c., 100 Mass. 271. 101!), 177!) V. Mansian, 80 Mich. 57G. 1390, 1404 V. Mitchell, 9 U. & W. 15. 1018 V. I'ollv Co.. 52 Iowa 400, 1515 V. ItifliiiK. 40 Ind. 15. 1214 V. Shelton, 47 Miss. 243, 1717 Broom's Case. 152 Mass. 1. 1412 IJrophv V. Citv of Perth Amboy, 44 N. J. L. 217, 536 V. Hyatt, 10 Colo. 223, 170, 300, 1085 V. Landman. 28 Ohio St. 542, 1254 Brothers v. Commissioners, 70 N. C. 720. 883 Broughton v. Manchester Water Works, 3 Barn. & Aid. 1. 971 V. Pensacola. 93 V. S. 200, 92. 405, 409. 410, 454 Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf. 158, 83 Brown's Case. 152 Mass. 1, 1412 Brown v. Austin, 1 Mass. 208, 210 V. Beattv, 34 Miss. 227, 073, 700 V. Board &c., 103 Cal. 531, 741 V. Board &c., 124 Cal. 274, 1317, 1712 V. Board &c., 22 Ky. L. 483. 874 V. Board &c.. 49 Ohio St. 578. 1070 V. Bon Homme Co., 1 S. D. 210, 635 992 V. Carl, 111 Iowa 008. 144!) V. City of Atchison, 39 Kan. 37, 240. 743 V. City of Cape Girardeau, 90 Mo. 377, 1541 V. City of Chicago, 110 111. 186, 1399 V. City of Denver. 3 Colo. 109. 1253 V. City of Grand Rapids, 83 Mich. 101. 802. 1200 V. City of Houston, 48 S. W. 760. 752 V. City of Lowell. 8 Met. 172, 680 V. City of Saginaw, 107 Mich. 643. 1235 V. Commissioners &c., 38 Kan. 436. 381 V. County Com'rs. 18 Neb. 355. 1577 V. County Com'rs, 21 Pa. St. 37, 523 V. County Com'rs, 2 McCrary 469, 836 V. Crego. 32 Iowa 498. 1528 V. Duplessis. 14 La. An. 842, 591 V. Finlev. 3 McArthur 77, 1745 V. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131, 11, 1529 V. Green, 46 How. Pr. 302, 1001 V. Hicks, 1 Ark. 232, 1423 V. Hines. 10 Ind. App. 1, 1314 V. Hummel. 6 Pa. St. 80, 5 V. Illius. 27 Conn. 84. 809 V. Ingalls Tp., 81 Fed. 485, 988, 989. 998, 1029 V. Inhabitants &c., 05 Maine 402, 1096 V. Inhabitants &c., 79 Maine 305, 353. 357, 362, 854 V. Inhabitants &c., 155 Mass. 587. 860 V. Insurance Co., 3 La. An. 177. 447 V. .lerome. 102 111. 371, 1412 V. Lunt, 37 Maine 423, 195 V. Mayor &c., 57 Mo. 156, 1580 V. Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. 239. 259, 644 V. Mosely. 11 Sm. & M. 354, 331 V. Powell, 25 Pa. St. 229, 1571 V. Rome &c. R. Co., 86 Ala. 206. 696 V. Ruse. 69 Tex. 589. 955 V. Russell. 166 Mass. 14, 1827 V. School Dist.. 64 N. H. 303, 631 V. Smith. 24 Barb. 419. 1727 T. Spofford, 95 U. S. 474, 1032 Brown V. Spragne, 5 Denio 545, 1757 V. State, 82 Ga. 224, 1677 V. Town of Canton. 4 Lans. 409, 870 V. Town of Guyaudotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 1394 V. Town of Jacobs, 77 Wis. 27, 959, 966, 968. 1495 V. Town of Louisburg, 126 N. C. 701. 1325 V. Town of Southbury, 63 Conn. 212, 1623 V. Winterport, 79 Maine 305, 257, 302, 360 V. Witham, 51 Maine 29, 347 Browne v. Turner, 170 Mass. 9. 1310 Brownell v. Palmer, 22 Conn. 107, 355, 367 V. Town of Greenwich, 114 N. Y. 518, 1017 Browning v. Board. 44 Ind. 11, 1577 V. City of Chicago, 155 III. 314, 1145, 1243, 1277 V. City of Springfield, 17 111. 143, 267 Brownlee v. Board &c., 81 Ind. 186, 857 Brownsville Com'rs v. Loague, 129 U. S. 493, 1525 Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101, 607, 1420 Bruceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 111. 06. 734 Bruck V. Broesigks. 18 Iowa 393, 565 v. Collier. 56 Mo. 160, 1373 Bruecker v. Village of Port Chester, 101 N. Y. 240. 1205, 1264, 1551 Bruggerman v. True, 25 Minn. 123, 698 Bruker v. Town of Covington. 69 Ind. 33. 1329, 1639 Brumby v. Harris. 107 Ga. 257, 1298 Brunner v. Downs, 17 N. Y. S. 633, 595 Brunott v. McKee. 6 W. & S. 513. 332 Brunswick v. McKean, 4 Maine 508. 306 Brunswick Gaslight Co. v. Brunswick Village Corp., 92 Maine 493. 1173 Brush V. City of Carbondale, 78 111. 74, 591, 1322 V. Inhabitants &c., 64 N. J. L. 365, 1143 Brush Electric &c. Co. v. City Coun- cil &c.. 114 Ala. 433. 713, 739, 931 V. Lefevre. 93 Tex. 304, 1791 Brusso v. City of Buffalo. 90 N. Y. 679, 1590, 1618, 1631, 1637 Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa 538. 183. 1445 V. City of Lincoln, 50 Neb. 620. 988 V. United States, 1 Black 140, 322 V. Wear, 4 Mo. 100, 1424 Bryant v. City of St. Paul. 33 Minn. 289, 774. 780, 1096 V. Inhabitants &c., 86 Maine 450, 784 V. Bobbins. 70 Wis. 258. 1178 V. Town of Randolph, 133 N. Y. 70, 778 V. Town of Randolph, 14 N. Y. S. 844. 811, 816 V. Woods. 11 Lea 327. 312 Brydon v. Campbell, 40 Md. 331, 228 Bryson v. Johnson Co., 100 Mo. 76, 887, 1171 Buchanan v. Borough of Beaver, 171 Pa. St. 567, 1698 v. City of Duluth, 40 Minn. 402. 1179 v. Curtis. 25 Wis. 99. 1559 v. Litchfield. 102 U. S. 278. 636, 877, 880, 884, 1000. 1001, 1003, 1005, 1007. 1009 V. School Dist., 25 Mo. App. 85, 618, 627 Ixviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol II, pp. 833-1830.'] Buck V. City of Eureka, 124 Cal. 61, 184, 713, 878 V. City of Lockport, 6 Lans. 251. 1527 V. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 330 Buckinghouse v. Gregg, 19 Ind. 401, 420 Buckley v. Briggs. 30 Mo. 452, 260 V. City of Kansas City, 156 Mo. 10, 1359 V. City of Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253, 1155, 1185 V. Drake, 41 Hun 384, 706 Buckman v. Landers, 111 Cal. 347, 1279 Bucknall v. Storey, 36 Cal. 67. 1232, 1723 V. Story, 46 Cal. 589, 246, 248 Buckner, Ex parte, 9 Ark. 73. 1724 Buckner v. Gordon, 81 Ky. 665, 90, 103, 370 V. Trustees &c., 1 A. K. Marsh. 9. 629 Buckton V. People, 12 Colo. App. 86, 298 Bucroft V. City of Council Bluffs, 63 Iowa 646, 648. 1301, 1305, 1306 Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa 282, 516. 830, 1515, 1517 V. Buckingham, 16 Iowa 284, 472 V. State, 45 Ark. 336, 1403 Buffalo, In re, 78 N. Y. 362, 1421 Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton, 156 N. Y. 702. 754 Buffalo &c. Cemetery v. City of Buf- falo, 46 N. Y. 503, 1198, 1246, 1247, 1512, 1545 Buffalo &c. Co. V. City of Buffalo, 58 N. Y. 639, 818 V. Knight Templar &c. Assn., 17 Colo. 30. 1422 Buffalo &c. R. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 5 Hill 209, 658, 1356 V. Dudley. 14 N. Y. 336, 994 V. Falconer, 103 U. S. 821, 996 Bufifett V. Troy &c. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 168, 233 Buffham v. City of Racine, 26 Wis. 449, 1745 Buford V. State, 72 Tex. 182, 115, 124, 402, 407, 446 Bull V. Bull, 43 Conn. 455, 1488 V. City of Quincy, 9 111. App. 127, - 1548 V. Conroe, 13 Wis. 233, 558 V. Read, 13 Graft. 78, 58, 61 Bullitt V. Clement, 16 B. Mon. 193, 221 V. Selvage, 20 Ky. L. 599. 1130, 1267, 1298 Bullitt Co. V. Washer, 130 U. S. 142, 284 Bullock V. Curry, 2 Met. 171, 1536, 1539 V. Geomble. 45 111. 218, 533 V. Mayor &c., 99 N. Y. 654, 1587, 1631 V. Town of Durham, 19 N. Y. S. 635, 1581 Bulow V. City Council, 1 N. & Mc. 527, 1511 Bump V. Smith. 11 N. H. 48. 1473 Bunch V. Town of Edenton, 90 N. C. 431. 1329, 1633 Bundv V. Town of Wolcott, 59 Vt. 665, 1552 Bunn V. People. 45 111. 397, 177 Bunting v. Willis. 27 Graft. 144, 200 Burch V. Hardwicke, 30 Graft. 24. 798. 1432 Burchell v. Mayor &c., 9 N. Y. S. 196. 1265 Burchfleld v. City of New Orleans, 42 La. An. 235, 233, 235, 710 Burden v. Stein. 27 Ala. 104, 688 Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va. 347, 608 Burdick v. Uichmund, 16 R. I. 502, 937 Burditt V. Swenson, 17 Tex. 489, 1387 Burford v. City of Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98, 264 Burger v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. St. 41, 1361 Burgess v. Citizens' Pass. R. Co., 148 Pa. St. 87, 468 V. Pue, 2 Gill 11, 58, 1532 V. Pue, 2 Gill 254. 275 V. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 1033 Burhans v. Village of Norwood Park, 138 111. 147. 1174 Burk V. Ayers. 19 Hun 17, 689 V. Collins. 51 Ga. 391, 1428 V. Galveston Co., 76 Tex. 267, 1490, 1495 V. State. 5 Lea 349, 93, 408 Burke, Matter of, 62 N. Y. 224, 1233 1234 V. Jeffries. 20 Iowa 145, " ' '53 V. Supervisors, 7 W. Va. 371, 381 V. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 317, 772 Burleigh v. Town of Rochester, 5 Fed. 667, 1014, 1018 Burleson v. City of Reading, 110 Mich. 512. 1333 Burley v. Bethune. 1 Marsh. 220, 221 Burlington v. Dennison, 42 N. J. L. 165, 284 Burlington &c. R. Co. v. Clay Co., 13 Neb. 367, 1535 v. Spearman, 12 Iowa 112, 384, 1251, 1517 Burlington Tp. v. Beasley, 94 U. S. 310, 981 Burlington Water Co. v. Woodward, 49 Iowa 58, 877, 891 Burlington Water Works Co. v. City of Burlington, 43 Kan. 725, 572, 1454 Burmeister, In re, 76 N. Y. 174, 1233, 1234 Burnett, Ex parte, 30 Ala. 461. 1118, 1415 Burnett v. City of Boston, 173 Mass. 173, 1130 v. Mayor &c., 12 Cal. 76, 1253, 1258 V. Mayor &c.. 55 N. Y. S. 893, 1377 Burnham v. Brown, 23 Maine 400, 1018 V. City of Chicago. 24 111. 496, 1195 V. City of Fond du Lac, 15 Wis. 193, 1745 V. City of Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 379, 1741 Burns v. Bender, 36 Mich. 195, 861 V. Clarion Co., 62 Pa. St. 422, 1522 V. Mayor «&c., 2 Kan. 454, 47, 982, 1535 V. Norton, 59 Hun 616, 221 V. Town of Le Grange, 17 Tex. 415, 1414 Burnside, Ex parte. 6 S. W. 276, 1677 V. Lincoln Co. Court, 86 Ky. 423, 1677 Burr V. Charlton Co., 2 McCrary 603, 992 V. City of Atlanta, 64 Ga. 225, 1395. 1537 V. City of Carbondale, 76 111. 455, 845, 1004 V. Inhabitants &c., 121 Mass. 241. 680 V. Town of Newcastle, 49 Ind. 322. 1378 Burrill v. City of Boston, 2 Cliff. 590, 647, 715 Burroughs v. Lowder. 8 Mass. 373, 311 Burrows. In re, 55 Ark. 275, 1074 Burt V. Brigham, 117 Mass. 307. 701 V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 223, 1505 TABLE OF CASES. Ixix [References are to Pages. Vol. J, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. St. 89, 541, 141S nyler v. Aslier. 47 III. 101. " .•'.TO Byles V. Golden Tp., 52 Mich. 612, 868 Byi-am v. City of Detroit, 50 Mich. 56. 128S V. Foley. 17 Tnd. App. 629, 12S1 Ryrd, Kx parte. 84 Ala. 17, 1402 Byrne v. Drain, 127 Cal. 66."?, 1285 Byrnes v. City of Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 204. 790, 811, 1217 V. City of St. Paul, 78 Minn. 205. , 184 V. Mayor &c., 64 N. J. L. 210, 507 Byrum v. Peterson, 34 Neb. 237, 1654 Burt V. Winona &c. R. Co., 31 Minn. 372, 197, 289 Burton v. Burton, 1 Keves 359, 132 V. Fnlton. 49 Pa. St. 151. 222 V. Inhabitants &c.. 34 Vt. 345, 871 V. Town of Koshkonong, 4 Fed. 373, ^ 764 V. Tuite. 78 Mich. 363, 1428 Burwoll V. Board &c.. 03 N. C. 73, 676 Busbee v. Commissioners, 93 N. C. 143. 1230, 1499 Busenbark v. Clements, 22 Ind. App. 557, 1149, 1246. 1282, 1782 Bush V. Board &c., 42 N. Y. S. 417, 872 V. Coler. 53 N. Y. S. 679, 932, 1757 V. Giesy, 16 Or. 355, 961 V. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393. 1373 V. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418, 100, 580, 1402 V. State. 100 Wis. 549, 157 V. Wolfe. 55 Ark. 124, 949 Bushel V. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 S. & R. 173. 4. 5 Bushnel v. Whitlock. 77 Iowa 285, 1087 Buskirk v. Strickland. 47 Mich. 389, 676 Busse V. Town of Central Covington, 19 Ky. L. 157, 1314 Bussey v. Gilmore, 3 Maine 191, 1542 Butcher v. City of Camden, 29 N. J. Eq. 478, 201 Butchers' Assn. v. City of Boston, 139 Mass. 290. 1557 Butchers' Union &c. Co. v. Crescent City &c. Co., Ill U. S. 746, 1403, 1811 Butler, Appeal of, 73 Pa. St. 448, 1389, 1507 Butler V. Board &c., 46 Iowa 326, 1674, 1726 V. Board &c., 15 Kan. 178. 182, 743 V. City of Charleston, 7 Gray 12, 253. 280, 663. 1212 V. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 493, 668 V. City of Muscatine, 11 Iowa 433, 1515 V. City of Passaic, 44 N. J. L. 171. 1091 V. Dunham, 27 111. 473, 983, 1023 V. Kent, 19 Johns. 223, 225 V. McLean Co., 32 111. App. 397, 671 V. Nevin, 88 III. 575. 1255 V. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 81. 183, 756 V. Regents &c., 32 Wis. 1241, 177 V. Sullivan Co.. 108 Mo. 630. 855 V. ITnited States, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 272. 310, 312 V. Village of Edgewater, 53 Hun 633, 1180 V. Worcester. 112 Mass. 541, 1178 Butte Co. V. Bovdstun. 68 Cal. 189, 556 V. Morgan, 76 Cal. 1. 328, 906 Butterfield v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Al- len 187, 253 V. Klaber, 52 How. Pr. 255, 1104 Butterfoss v. State, 40 N. J. Eq. 325, 1125 Button v. City of Port Worth. 78 Tex. 227. 316, 317 Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen 172. 798. 1076, 1433 Butz V. Cavanagh, 137 Mo. 503, 1112, 1790 V. City of Muscatine. 8 Wall. 575. 89. 453. 764, 1531, 1535 V. Kerr, 123 III. 659. 1084 Butzman v. Whitbeck. 42 Ohio St. 223. 1509 Buxton V. Chesterfield, 60 N. H. 357, 1053 Byerly v. City of Anamosa, 79 Iowa 204, 1632 Cabot V. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 1211, 1775, 1779 Cadwallader v. Durham, 46 N. J. L. 53, 1056 Caffrey, In re, 65 N. Y. S. 470, 1782 Cagwin v. Town of Hancock, 84 N. Y. 532, 1010 Cahill, In re, 110 Pa. St. 167, 1410, 1411 Cahoon v. Coe, 52 N. H. 518, 346 Cain V. City of Omaha, 42 Neb. 120, 1291 V. City of Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83, 263, 821 V. Commissioners, 86 N. C. 8, 1269 V. Warner, 60 N. Y. S. 769. 1766 Cairo v. Zane, 149 U. S. 122, 1007. 1757 Cairo &c. R. Co. v. Sparta. 77 111. 505. 43, 985, 1017, 1531 V. Turner, 31 Ark. 494, 673, 706 Calaway Co. v. Foster, 93 U. S. 567, 995 Calder v. Police Jury, 44 La. An. 173. 1170 Caldwell v. City of Alton, 33 111. 417, 502, 1402, 1403 V. Cornell, 21 Ky. L. 812, 1806 V. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755. 295 V. Justices, 4 Jones Eq. 323, 43, 1532 V. Rupert. 10 Bush 179, 1232 V. State, 55 Ala. 133. 530 Caldwell Co. v. Harbert, 68 Tex. 321, 854. 1491. 1495, 1522 Calhoun, Ex parte, 87 Ga. 359, 1426 Calhoun v. Little. 106 Ga. 336, 513 V. Millard. 121 N. Y. 69, 1004 California v. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1. 45, 46. 1807 California Imp. Co. v. Moran. 128 Cal. 373. 1276. 1291. 1298, 1543 v. Reynolds, 123 Cal. 88, 749, 1141. 1786. 1800 California &c. R. Co. v. Board &c.. 18 Cal. 671, 990, 1724 Calking v. Baldwin. 4 Wend. 667. 706 Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn. 57. 1618 V. City of Springfield, 167 Mass. ' 68 133X Call v.'chadbourne, 46 Maine 206, 58, 61, 83 Callaghan v. Town of Alexandria. 52 La. An. 1013, 490, 989 Callahan v. City of Boston, 175 Mass. 201, 1756 V. Inhabitants &c., 30 N. J. L. 160. 814 V. Mayor, 66 N. Y. 656, 1412 Callan v. Wilson. 127 U. S. 540. 543, 1413 Callanan v. Oilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 1582, 1609. 1610 Callaway Co. v. Foster, 93 U. S. 567, 1001 Ixx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'i Callen v. City of Junction City, 43 Kan. 627, 384 Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418, 680, 801 Canister v. Kochersperger, 168 111. 334, 1283 Calwell V. City of Boone, 51 Iowa 687, 263, 798, 1076 Cambridge v. Railroad Com'rs, 156 Mass. 161, 1578 Cameron v. School Dist., 42 Vt. 507, 366 Camp V. City of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 461. 396 V. State, 27 Ala. 53, 1400 Campau v. City of Detroit, 106 Mich. 414, TIS V. Langlev, 39 Mich. 451, 533, 1085 Campbell, Ex parte, 74 Cal. 20, 1399 V. City Council &c.. 53 Ala. 527, 799 V. Cit'v of Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St. 463, 478. 1133 V. City of Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194, 643, 992 V. Cobb, 2 Sneed 18, 323 V. Dwiggins, 83 Ind. 473, 692 V. Evans. 45 N. Y. 356, 1085 V. Kennpdv. 34 Iowa 494, 1370 V. Morris, "3 Har. & McH. 535, V. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 1104, 'lll9 V. Thompson, 16 Me. 117, 536 Campbell Co. v. Knoxville &c. R. Co., 6 Coldw. 598, 982, 984 Campton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 1716 Canal Co. v. Commissioners &c., 26 La. An. 740, 675 V. Garritv, 115 111. 155, 588 Canal St., In re, 12 N. Y. 406, 1419 Canal St., In re, 11 Wend. 154, 1297 Canal Trustees v. City of Chicago, 12 111. 403, 1246 Canepa v. Mayor &c., 92 Ala. 358, 1391 Canfield v. Bavfleld Co.. 74 Wis. 60, 593 Cannifif v. Mayor &c., 4 E. D. Smith 430, 187 Cannon v. City of St. Joseph, 67 Mo. App. 367, 791 V. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577, 579, 1101, 1537 Canosia Tp. v. Grand Lake Tp., 80 Minn. 357, 411 Canova v. State, 18 Fla. 512, 433, 434, 442, 444, 955 Canterbury v. City of Boston, 141 Ma.ss. 215, 1622 Canto. Ex parte. 21 Tex. App. 61. 1402 Cantrell v. Clark Co.. 47 Ark. 239, 1052 Cantwell V. City of Appleton, 71 Wis. 463, 1620, 1636 Canyonville &c. Road Co. v. Doug- lass Co., 5 Or. 280. 708 Cape Girardeau Co. Court v. Hill, 118 U. S. 68, 106 Cape Girardeau &c. Road v. Dennis, 67 Mo. 438, 686 V. Renfroe, 58 Mo. 265, 682 Cape May &c. R. Co. v. City of Cape Mav. 35 N. J. Eq. 419, 522 Capen v. Foster. 12 Pick. 485, 370 Capital Bank v. School Dist., 1 N. D. 479. 851, 968 V. School Dist., 6 Dak. 248, 1486 Capital City Gaslight Co. v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 51 Iowa 31, 1512 Capital Gas Co. v. Young, 109 Cal. 140, 732 Capital Printing Co. v. City of Ra- leigh. 126 N. C. 516. 1801 V. Hoey, 124 N. C. 767, 1687 Capman v. Inhabitants &c., 76 Maine 427, 1622 Card V. City of Ellsworth, 65 Maine 547, 1613 Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205, 157G Carey v. Board of Police &c., 53 N. J. L. 311, 143& V. City of Ann Arbor, 124 Mich. 134, 1364 V. City of Duluth, 38 Minn. 218, 411 V. City of East Saginaw, 79 Mich. 7*-i 118!^ V. 'state, 34 Ind. 105, 331, 333 Carhart v. Auburn G. L. Co., 22 Barb. 297, 1108 Carland v. Commissioners &c., 5 Mont. 579, 288 Carle v. City of De Soto, 156 Mo. 443, 1797, 1799 Carleton v. Franconia &c. Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216, 810 V. Inhabitants &c., 88 Maine 293, 1336 V. Inhabitants, 102 Mass. 348, 1552 V. People, 10 Mich. 250, 66. 69, 70, 195, 197, 289, 296 V. Rugg. 149 Mass. 550. 1107 Carlin v. Cavender, 56 Mo. 286, 1259 Carling v. Mayor &c., 64 N. J. L. 223, 1713 Carlisle v. Wilson, 110 Ga. 860, 1365 Carll V. Village of Northport, 42 N. Y. S. 576, 1777 Carlton v. Newman, 77 Maine 408, 1531 V. Reddington. 21 N. H. 291, 1095 Carlyle Water &c. Co. v. City of Car- lyle, 31 111. App. 325. 639, 889 Carmack v. Commonwealth, 5 Binn. 184, 329, 332 Carman v. Steubenville R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 399, 745 Carmichael v. City of Texarkana. 94 Fed. 561, 1106. 1109 Carney v. Village of Marseilles. 136 III. 401, 1324, 1524. 1580, 1795 Carpenter v. Aldrich, 3 Met. 58, 1740 V. City of Cohoes, 81 N. Y. 21, 1579 1597 V. City of New York, 60 N. Y. S. 633, 1781 V. City of New York, 64 N. Y. S. 839, 1212 V. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn. 232, 1139 V. Gwvnn. 35 Barb. 395, 1559 V. Inhabitants &c., 51 Mo. 483. 1001 V. People. 8 Colo. 116. 90, 103, 114 Carr v. Ashland. 62 N. H. 665. 828 V. City of Easton, 142 Pa. St. 139. 1632 V. City of St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191, 97, 468. 494 V. McCampbell. 61 Ind. 97. 1429 V. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324, 204. 820, 830 V. State. 103 Ind. 548, 697, 1573 V. United States. 98 U. S. 433, 770 Carrico v. People, 123 111. 198, 1473, 1485 Carrier v. Town of Shawangunk, 10 Fed. 220, 1001 Carrington v. City of St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 1802 Carroll v. City of St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444, 181, 663 V. Langan, 63 Hun 380, 1413 V. Mayor. 12 Ala. 173, 1724 V. Siebeuthaler. 37 Cal. 193. 213 V. Wall. 35 Kan. 36, 296, 297, 475 Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 V. S. 556. 374. 1008. 102G Carrollton &c. ISIfg. Co. v. City of Carrollton. 20 Ky. L. 818. 707 Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. L. 594, 1257 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.^ CaiTothers v. Board &c., IG W. Va. r.iiT. 1717. 1719 Carskaddon v. City of South Bend, 141 Ind. 59G, 713 Carson v. City of Hartford, 48 Conn. CS. 700, 701 V. Mavor &c.. 94 Ga. 017, G04 V. Mcl'lietridge. 15 Ind. 327, 368 Carstesen v. Town of Stratford, 67 Conn. 428, 793, 797, 1328 Carswell v. Mayor &c., 2 Marv. 3(i0, 13.59, 1362 Carter v. City of Augusta, 84 Maine 418, 1053 V. Citv of Portland, 4 Or. 339, 652 V. ClaVlv, 89 Ind. 238, 682 V. Dow, 16 Wis. 298. 1521, 1751 V. McFarland. 75 Iowa 196, 274 V. Ottawa. 24 Fed. 546. 1026 V. Town of Monticello, 68 Iowa 178. 1618, 1620 Carter Co. v. Sinton. 120 U. S. 517, 441 Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268. 1382 Cartlian v. Lang. 69 Iowa 384, 652 Cartright V. Belmont, 58 Wis. 370, 1597 Cartwright v. Board of Health &c., • 56 N. Y. S. 731, 1406 Carvin v. City of St. Louis, 151 Mo. 334, 1361 Cary v. City of Ottawa. 8 Fed. 199, 1001 V. City of Pekin, 88 111. 154, 1515, 1516 V. Mayor &c.. 49 N. J. L. 110, 1397 Cascade Co. v. City of Gt. Falls, 18 Mont. 537. 1315 Cascaden v. City of Waterloo. 106 Iowa 673. 291, 522, 1707 Case V. Blood, 71 Iowa 632, 1487 -V. Favier. 12 Minn. 89. 571 V. .Johnson, 91 Ind. 477. 1201 V. Mayor &c.. 30 Ala. 538. 85. 537 Casinello, Ex parte, 62 Cal. 538, 1081 Caskev v. City of Greensburg, 78 Ind. 233. 313 Cason V. City of Lebanon, 153 Ind. 567, 724. 731, 736. 1151, 1710, 1792 Caspary v. City of Portland, 19 Or. 496, 819 Cass V. Bellows, 31 N. H. 501, 1422, 1427 V. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 106. 607, 763, 995 V. People, 166 111. 126, 511, 512, 1144, 1261 Cass Co. V. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585. 995, 996, 1026 V. Green, 66 Mo. 498, 1026 V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360, 373. 374. 473. 1001 Cass Farm Co. v. Citv of Detroit. 124 Mich. 433, 721. 748. 1174, 1506 Cassadv v. City of Covington, 12 Ky. L. 980, 1157 Cassedv v. Town of Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391. 1641 Cassidy v. City of Bangor, 61 Maine 434, 275, 301 Cassin v. Zavalla Co., 70 Tex. 419. 275 Caswell V. City of Mashalltown, 101 Iowa 598. 179 Cate V. Martin, 69 N. H. 610, 155, 1787 Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590, 424, 432 Catron v. Lafayette Co., 106 Mo. 659, 896, 1001, 1740 Cavan v. City of Brooklyn, 5 N. Y. S. 758, 1746 Cavanagh v. Board &c., 59 N. Y. 412, 1766 V. City of Boston, 139 Mass. 426. 823 Cavanaugh v. Smith. 84 Ind. 380, 1572 Caviel v. Coleman, 72 Tex. 550, 1491 Cavis V. Robertson, 9 N. H. 524, 367 Cawley v. People, 95 111. 249, 211, 313 Cedar Hapids &c. R. Co. v. Cowan, 77 Iowa 535, 1674 Cemetery Ass'n v. Meninger, 14 Kan. 312, 571 Center &c. R. Co. v. Black, 32 Ind. 468, 1720 Center St., In re, 115 Pa. St. 247, 1200, 1261. 1262 Central Bridge Co. v. City of Lowell, 15 Gray 106, 279. 471, 674 Central City Horse R. Co. v. Fort Clark Horse R. Co., 81 111. 523, 674 Central Crosstown R. Co. v. Metro- politan St. R. Co., 44 N. Y. S. 752, 1351 Central Irr. Dist. v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351, 1421 Central R. Co. v. State, 32 N. J. L. 220, 591 Central W. & W. Co. v. City of Corpus Christi. 23 Tex. Civ. App. 390, 735 Cerf V. Pfleging. 94 Cal. 131. 1560 Chadbourn v. Town of Newcastle, 48 N. H. 196, 1394 Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527, 1403, 1508 Chadwick v. McCausland, 47 Maine 342, 1561 Chafee v. City of Aiken, 57 S. C. 607, 1321 Chaffee v. Middlesex R. Co., 146 Mass. 224, 335. 1019 Chaffee Co. v. Potter, 142 U. S. 335, 998. 1003, 1005, 1009, 1011, 1024 Chafin V. Waukesha Co., 62 Wis. 463, 536, 542 Chahoou v. Commonwealth, 21 Graft. 822, 1411 Chakin v. School Dist., 30 N. H. 25, 1485 Chalk v. White, 4 Wash. 156, 1645 Chains V. Atchison &c. R. Co., 16 Kan. 117, 685 V. Parker, 11 Kan. 394, 1252 Challiss V. Board &c.. 15 Kan. 49, 1717 Chamberlain v. Bell, 7 Cal. 292, 228 V. City of Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 551, 1231. 1256 V. City of Evansville, 77 Ind. 542, 500, 523 V. City of Litchfield, 56 111. App. 652. 599 V. Elizabethport Steam Cordage Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43, 684 V. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356, 1105, 1112. 1613 V. Inhabitants &c.. 13 Maine 466, 350, 352, 354, 358, 1428 V. Taylor, 36 Hun 24, 1166, 1550 Chamberlain of London v. Compton, 7 I). & R. 597. 100, 500 Chamberlin v. Gleason, 163 N. Y. 214, 1241 V. Morgan, 68 Pa. St. 168, 689 Chambers v. City of St. Joseph, 33 Mo. App. 536, 1747 V. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543, 563, 665 V. Furry. 1 Yeates 167, 681 v. King &c. Bridge Co., 16 Kan. 270, 1737 v. Lewis. 9 Iowa 583. 706 V. Saterlee. 40 Cal. 497. 673 78S 1234 V. Territory, 3 Wash. T. 280. ' 1663 Chambers Co. v. Clews, 21 Wall. 317. 985, 1000. 1002 Champaign City v. Patterson, 50 111. 61, 1596 Champlin v. Village of Penn Yan. 34 Hun 33, 1612 Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt. 416. 168, 340, 361 Ixxii TABLE OF CASES. [.References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Chandler v. City of Boston, 112 Mass. 200, 384, 1517 V. Hanna, 73 Ala. 390, 556 V. Teople, 161 111. 41. 1241 V. Railroad Commissioners, 141 Mass. 208, 1743 V. Reynolds, 19 Kan. 249, 427, 1519 Chapin v. School Dlst., 30 N. H. 25, 345, 346 V. School Dist., 35 N. H. 445, 664 Chaplain v. Brown, 15 R. I. 579, 1214 Chaplin v. Hill. 24 Vt. 528, 644 Chapman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 721, 325 V. Clark, 49 Mich. 305, 187 V. County Com'rs, 79 Maine 267, 287 V. Douglass Co., 107 U. S. 348, 240, 242, 632 V. Ferguson, 1 Bart. El. Cas. 267, 377 V. Gates, 54 N. Y. 132, 705 V. Milton. 31 W. Va. 384, 1596, 1620 V. Oshkosh &c. R. Co., 33 Wis. 629. 701 V. Swan, 65 Barb. 210, 1563, 1567, 1568 Charles v. City of Marion, 98 Fed. 166. 1284 V. Finchley Local Board, 52 L. J. Ch. 554, 809 V. Haskins, 11 Iowa 329, 332 V. Mayor &c.. 27 N. J. L. 203. 294 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. 758, 1323 Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47, 528. 1389. 1507, 1509 Charlotte &c. Co. v. Gow, 59 Ga. 685. 821 Charnock v. District Tp. &c., 51 Iowa 70, 1530 Chartiers Tp. v. Phillips, 122 Pa. St. 14.5, 1332, 1600 Chase v. Chase, 95 N. Y. 373. 1205 V. City of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 505, 1344 V. City of Lowell, 7 Gray 33. 163 V. City of Oshkosh, 81 Wis. 313, 582. 1322. 1369 V. City of Portland. 86 Maine 367. 1211. 1219 V. City of Worcester, 108 Mass. 60, 1182 V. City Treasurer &c.. 122 Cal. 540. 1152. 1280, 1284, 1285 V. Middleton, 123 Mich. 647. 779 V. President &c., 19 Pick. 564, 142. 342, 965, 1526 V. Saratoga Co.. 33 Barb. 603, 1661 V. Stephenson. 71 III. 383, 1494 V. Town of Rutlant]. 47 Vt. 393, 697 Chatterton V. Parrott, 46 Mich. 432, 1570 Chawk V. Beviile, 21 Ky. L. 1769. 1275 Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330, 69, 384. 393, 1515. 1516, 1517 Cheatham v. Shearon, 1 Swan 213, 1105 v. United States. 92 U. S. 85. 1718 Cheeney v. Inhabitants &c.. 60 Mo. 53. 233, 647, 960 Cheetham v. Ilampson. 4 T. R. 318, 1095 Che'ezen v. State. 2 Ind. 149, 524 Chegaray v. Jenkins, 5 N. Y. 376, 229 Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 Gray 1, 326 Chemung Bank v. Supervisors, 5 De- nio 517. 253 Chenery v. Inhabitants &c., 16 Gray 125, 1750 Cherokee &c. Co. v. Justices &c., 28 Ga. 121, 1511 Cherokees v. Georgia, 5 Peters 1, 136 Cherry v. Board &c., 52 N. J. L. 544, 1156 V. City of Rock Hill, 48 S. C. 553 1777 V. Fewell, 26 S. E. 498, 1777 Chesapeake &c. Canal Co. v. Balti- more &c. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1, 123 Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Bradford, 6 W. Va. 220. 699 V. Hoard. 16 W. Va. 270, 106 Chesapeake &c. Tel. Co. v. Mayor &c., 89 Md. 689. 715, 727, 1349, 1704 Cheshire Prov. Inst. v. Stone, 52 N. II. 365. 1055 Chess V. Manown, 3 Watts 219. 681 Chesshire v. People, 116 111. 493, 1689 Chester v. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568, 1252 Chester Co. v. Barber, 97 Pa. St. 455. 663 V. Brower, 117 Pa. St. 647, 678 Chester &c. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 72 N. C. 486, 374, 985 Chestnutwood v. Hood, 68 111. 132, 1533, 1701 Chicago V. Babcock. 143 HI. 358, 1635 V. C. & W. Ind. R. Co., 105 111. 73, 1757 V. Robbins, 2 Black 418, 8, 1345, 1599 V. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50. 510. 764, 1183 V. Shober &c. Co., 6 Bradw. 560, 210 V. Taylor, 125 U. S. 161. 678 Chicago Board of Trade v. People, 91 III. 80. 1812 Chicago Dock &c. Co. v. Garrity, 115 111. 155, 88 Chicago League Ball Club v. City of Chicago. 77 111. App. 124. 1385 Chicago Packing Co. v. City of Chi- cago. 88 III. 221, 496, 604 Chicago Pub. Stock Exch. v. Mc- Claughry. 148 III. 372, 1697 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ayers. 106 111. . 511. 1219 V. Baldridge, 177 111. 229, 1554 v. Board &c.. 49 Kan. 399. 991 V. Chicago Citv R. Co., 62 HI. App. 502. 1348 V. City of Chicago, 91 HI. 573, 1248 V. City of Chicago, 140 III. 309, 591. 1249 V. City of Chicago, 148 HI. 141. 059. 1236 V. Citv of Chicago. 172 HI. 66. 465 V. City of Chicago. 174 HI. 439, 465. 525. 1151. 1152. 1379 V. City of Chicago, 178 HI. 429. 1132. 1147. 1154 V. City of Chicago, 184 III. 154, 504, 512, 1798 V. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 226. 1774 V. City of Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa 425. 481, 591 V. City of Joliet, 79 III. 25. 1117, 1349 V. City of Joliet. 153 HI. 649, 1249. 12.50, 1251. 1300. 1308 V. City of Milwaukee. 89 Wis. 506. 1249, 1250, 1251 V. City of Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 418. 1379 V. City of Ottawa, 148 111. 397, 1697 V. Citv of Qnincv, 136 III. 489. 1700 V. City of Quincy, 136 111. 563, 1249. 1355 V. City of Quincy, 139 III. 355. 1156, 1162 V. City of Quinrv. 158 HI. 64. 1240 v. Cole. 75 111. 591. 1720 v. Commissioners &c., 38 Kan. 597, 996 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxiii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 83S-18S0.'] Chicago &f. R. Co. V. Dunbar, 95 111. 571. 1S12 V. lOngle, Tfi III. ?.17, 540, 14-j:{ V. Foil. 22 III. aS.S. 1711 V. First Methodist Episcopal Church &c., 102 Fed. 85, lOG V. Francis, 70 III. 23cS. 1G02 V. (Jcncral Electric R. Co., 74 III. App. 405, 1351 V. Ilaggarty. 07 111. 113, 1350 V. Hall, 90 111. 42, 1002 V. Ilaller, 82 III. 208, 1002 V. nines, 82 111. App. 488, 488 V. Hock, 118 111. 587. 691) V. Iowa, 94 IT. S. 155. 6, 574 V. .Tacobs. 110 111. 414, 701, 702 V. .Tones, 149 111. 301, 548 V. Lake, 130 111. 42, 1812 V. Langlade Co., 56 Wis. 614, 196, 425, 432 V. Loeb, 118 111. 203, 1602, 1603 V. Maher, 91 111. 312. 1602 V. Makepeace, 44 Kan. 676, 991 V. MeOinnis, 79 III. 209, 1706 V. Minnesota &c. R. Co., 14 Fed. 525. 521 V. Moffltt, 75 111. 524, 592 T. People, 73 111. 541, 1812 y. People, 91 111. 251, 1349 V. People, 104 111. 256, 1277 V. People, 120 III. 104. 1249, 1250 V. People, 79 111. App. 529. 515, 590 V. Phillips, 111 Iowa 377, 1284, 1285. 1295. 1299 T. Pinckney, 74 111. 277, 983, 988. 996 V. Quaintance. 58 111. 389, 1109 V. Siders, 88 111: 320. 1288, 1717 V. Smith, 62 111. 268, 983 T. South Park Com'rs, 11 111. App. 562, 1249 T. Stein, 75 111. 41, 1603 V. Sutton. 130 Ind. 405, 1569 v. Town of Kentwood, 49 La. An. 931, 66 V. Town of Lake, 71 111. 333, 684, 685 V. Town of Oconto. 50 Wis. 189, 415 V. Village of Klmhurst. 165 111. 148. 1248. 1249, 1300, 1303, 1308 V. West Chicago Park Commis- sioners. 151 111. 204. 1349 V. Wiltse, 116 111. 449, 591 V. Winters, 65 111. App. 435. 540 Chickering v. Robinson. 3 Cush. 543. 334 Chicora v. Crews, 6 S. C. (N. S.) 243, 45 Chicot Co. V. Kruse, 47 Ark. 80, 1525, 1646 Chidsey v. Town of Canton, 17 Conn. 475, 777 Child V. Chappell. 9 N. Y. 246, 1564 V. City of Boston, 4 Allen 41, 821, 1585 V. Colburn, 54 N. H. 71, 344. 359. 361, 363 V. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. Wms. 207, 526 Childrey v. Rady, 77 Va. 518. 313 Childs V. Nelson. 69 Wis. 125. 1106. 1322 V. Village of West Troy, 23 Hun 68, 1625 Chilton V. Town of Gratton, 82 Fed. 873, 1011 Chiniquy v. People, 78 111. 570, 991 Chinn v. Trustees. 32 Ohio St. 236. 12S8 Chin Van, Ex parte, 60 Cal. 78, 1406 Chirae v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 132 Chisholm v. City of Montgomery, 2 Woods 584, 838 V. Georgia. 2 Dall. 419. 17, 45, 770 Chittenden v. City of Lansing, 120 Mich. 539, 714 Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y. 345, 1699. 1820, 1826 V. Wurster, 153 N. Y. 064, 1824 Choato V. City of Buffalo, 57 N. Y. S. 383, 609 V. Inhabitants &c., 13 Gray 92, 1047, 1048 Chope V. City of Eureka, 78 Cal. 588, 788 Chopin V. City of Worcester, 124 Mass. 464. 1178 Chosen Freeholders &c. v. State, 24 N. .1. L. 718, 61, 274, 276 Choteau v. Rowse, 50 Mo. 65, 222 Chouteau v. City of Roxbury, 7 Gray 374, 258 Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duv. 63, 221 Christensen, In re, 43 Fed. 243, 1400 V. City of Fremont, 45 Neb. 160, 573 Christian v. City of St. Louis, 127 Mo. 109, 1098 Christian Church v. Johnson, 53 Ind. 273, 260 Christian Co. v. Rockwell, 25 111. App. 20, 1040 Christman v. Phillips, 58 Hun 282, 842. 1039 Christopher v. Van Liew, 57 Barb. 17, 335 Christy v. Commissioners &c., 41 Ohio St. 711. 664 V. Newton, CO Barb. 332, 1573 V. Whitmore. 67 Iowa 60, 1087 Chumasero v. Gilbert, 20 111. 39, 378 Church V. City of Detroit, 64 Mich. 571, 1341, 1593 V. I'eople, 174 111. 366. 1147, 1283, 1291, 1292 V. People, 179 111. 205. 1146, 1147, 1153. 1293 V. President &c.. Ill Mich. 298. 1326 Churchman v. City of Indianapolis, 110 Ind. 259. 240. 1255 Chytraus v. City of Chicago, 160 111. 18, 1148 Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero. 176 111. 9, 508, 1202, 1316, 1318 1346, 1347. 1348. 1703. 1709 Cicero &c. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 176 111. 501, 1248 Cihak V. Klekr. 17 111. App. 124. 1564 Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio 257, 534 V. Kasselman, 23 Wk. Law Bui. 392. 1234 V. Morgan, 3 Wall. 275, 1001 V. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499, 1181 Cincinnati &c. Assurance Co. v. Rosen- thal, 55 111. 85, 137, 254 Cincinnati Gas Light &c. Co. v. Avon- dale, 43 Ohio St. 257, 602 Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Commission- ers &c.. 1 Ohio St. 77, 703, 983 V. Incorporated Village of Cum- minsville. 14 Ohio St. 523, 590, 682 Citizens' Gas &c. Co. v. Town of El- wood, 114 Ind. 332, 466. 560. 569, 614 Citizens' &c. Ins. Co. v. Sortwell. 8 Allen 217, 273, 291 Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Lyon, 29 N. J. Eq. 110, 651 Citizens' R. Co. v. Ford. 93 Tex. 110. 518 V. .Tones, 34 Fed. 579, 1184, 1351 Citizens' Sav. &c. Ass'n v. Perry Co., 156 IT. S. 692, 1000, 1002, 1757 Citizens' &c. R. Co. v. Ballard. 22 Ind. App. 151, 1327, 1359 V. City of Memphis, 53 Fed. 715, • 510 City — See also. Common Council ; Mayor ; Name of City. Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.-] City V. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 643, 959 City &c. V. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483, ^^^ City Bank v. Bogel, 51 Tex^g^f^'ign City Council &c., Ex parte, 64 Ala. 463 lo6z V. Ashley Phosphate Co., 38 SC. 541, 527, 537, 1415, 1420, 1423, 1425 V. Belser, 53 Ala. 379, 543 V. Birdsong, 126 Ala. 632, 1276, 1282, 1290, 1506 V. Capital City Water Co., 92 Ala. 361, f§9 V. Chur, 2 Bailey 164, 537 V. Dawson Water-works Co., 106 Ga. 696, 742, 745, 874 V. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387, 1232, 1499, 1501 V. Dunn, 1 McC. L. 333, 540, 1423 V. Hudson, 94 Ga. 135, 790 V. Hutchinson, 13 Ala. 573, 1093 V. King. 4 McCord 487, 1412, 1418 V. Lombard, 99 Ga. 282, 790 V. Marks, 50 Ga. 612, 704 V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 7 Wis. 484, „^ odl V. Montgomery &c. R. Co., 31 Ala 76 64o V. Murphey, 79 Ga. 101, 1200, 1232 V. National Bank, 47 Ga. 562, 1503 V. Owens. Ill Ga. 464. 2b5 V. Parker, 114 Ala. n8. ^^^^ ^^^^ V. Pepper, 1 Rich. l^-^H^^^^,^ ^^^, V. Port Royal &c. R. Co., 74 Ga. 658, 586 V. Saver, 65 Ala. 564, 171 ( V. Sciirameck. 96 Ga. 426, 1211 V. Seeba. 4 Strobh. L. 319, 537 y. State, 38 Ala. 162, 1533 V. Sweeny. 44 Ga. 463, 201 V. Townsend, 84 Ala. 478, 678, 1225, 1226, 1227 V. Walton, 37 Ga. 620, 1503, 1533 V. Walton, 77 Ga. 517, 564 V. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strob. 306, 520. 522, 594, 1086 V. Youmans, 85 Ga. 708. 371 City Imp. Co. v. Broderick, 125 Cal. ' 139, 752 City Item &c. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 51 La. An. 713, 1549, 1732 City of Albany v. McNamara, 117 N. Y. 168, 1062 City of Albia v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 102 Iowa 624, 1164 City of Alleghany v. Western &c. R. Co., 92 Pa. St. 100, 1250 City of Allentown v. Adams, 8 Atl. 430, „^1-^1 City of Alton v. ^tna Ins. Co., 82 111. 45. 1542 V. 111. Transp. Co., 12 111. 38, 629 y. Kirsch. 68 111. 261, 536, 537 V. Madison Co., 21 111. 115, 638 V. Middleton's Heirs, 158 111. 540 1145, 1146 V. Mulledy, 21 111. 76. 260. 285, 465 City of Altoona v. Bowman, 171 Pa. St. 307, 477 V. Lotz, 114 Pa. St. 2.38. 1632 City of Ana v. Boren, 77 111. App. 408, 1795 City of Anderson v. Bain, 120 Ind. 054 1776 V. Kast, 117 Ind. 126, 264, 820 V. O'Conner, 98 Ind. 168, 1079 Citv of Antonio v. Antonio St. R. Co., 22 Tex. Civ. Apn. 148. 932 City of Argentine v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 55 Kan. 730, 727 City of Argentine v. State, 46 Kan. 430. 1160 City of Ashland y. Chicago &c. R. Co., 105 Wis. 398, 586 V. Wheeler, 88 Wis. 607, 510 City of Atchison v. Acheson, 9 ' Kan. App. 33, 1326, 1331, 1333, 1348 V. Butcher, 3 Kan. 104, 982 V. Challiss, 9 Kan. 603, 1585 V. King, 9 Kan. 550. 488 V. Price. 45 Kan. 296, 1234 V. Twine, 9 Kan. 350, 1394 City of Atlanta v. Champe, 66 Ga. 659. 1614 V. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 1247 V. Gabbett, 93 Ga. 266, 1260 V. Gates City Gaslight Co., 71 Ga. 106, 1467, 1813 V. Green, 67 Ga. 386, 678 v. Hamlein, 96 Ga. 381, 1296 v. Holiday, 96 Ga. 546, 1369 v. Ilunnicutt, 95 Ga. 138, 1211 V. Milam, 95 Ga. 135, 1341 City of Atlantic City v. GrofC, 64 N. J. L. 527, 1315 City of Auburn v. Paul, 84 Maine 212, 1177 City of Augusta v. Hafers, 61 Ga. 48, 161T V. North, 57 Maine 392, 458, 1532 City of Aurora v. Colshire, 55 Ind. 484, 1596 V. Pox, 78 Ind. 1, 1255, 1425 V. Hillman, 90 111. 61, 1618, 1620. 1634, 1641 V. McGannon, 138 Mo. 38, 1506, 1507 V. Reed. 57 111. 29, 680 V. Scott, 185 111. 539, 1801 V. Scott, 82 111. App. 616, 1796 V. West, 22 Ind. 88, 982. 990, 1010, 1027 V. West, 22 Ind. 503, 982. 1010 City of Austin v. Austin Cemetery Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330. 599, 1703 V. Austin City Cemetery Ass'n, 28 S. W. 1023, 506 V. Austin Gas-light &c. Co., 69 Tex. 180, 1512, 1520, 1547 V. Colgate, 27 S. W. 896, 1360 V. Johns, 62 Tex. 179, 182 V. Ritz, 72 Tex. 391. 1618, 1628, 1629 V. Walton, 68 Tex. 507, 182, 538 City of Ballard v. Thompson, 21 Wash. 669, 326 City of Bangor v. Inhabitants &c., 71 Maine 535. 1063 City of Bedford v. Neal, 143 Ind. 425 1327, 1639 V. Woody, 23 Ind. App. 401, 1789, 1792, 1793 City of Belleville v. Citizens' Horse R. Co., 152 111. 171. 520. 1812 City of Belton v. Sterling, 50 S. W. 10'>7 712, 742 v. Turner, 27 S. W. 831, 1339. 1376 City of Belvidere v. Crichton, 81 111. App. 595, 1337 City of Bethany v. Howard, 149 Mo. 504, 1752 City of Big Rapids v. Combstock, 65 Mich. 78. 1106 City of Binsrhamton v. Binghamton &c. R. Co., 61 Hun 479, 1183 City of Blair v. Santry, 21 Neb. 247, 901 City of Bloomington v. Bay, 42 111. ^503 1355, 1596 v. Brokaw. 77 HI. 194, 1530 v. Chicago &c. R. Co.. 134 111. 451. 1155, 1149, 1235. 12.50 1253, 1300 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxv [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] City of Bloomington v. Costello, 05 111. App. 4{»7, 1107, 1775 V. Daiikwardr, 73 Iowa 170, 1403 V. Latham, 141.' 111. 4(!1.', 1149, l:Jll V. rollock. 141 111. 34(!. 405. 1151. llill, IL'19, 1222, 1223 V. Keeves, 177 111. 161, 1134, 1147, 1279 V. Smith. 123 Ind. 41, 1012 V. Wahl, 40 111. 4S9, 100, 1403 V. Wil.soii. 14 Ind. App. 470, 825 Citv of Hhitrion v. McAfee, 23 Ind. App. 112, 1339 City of Bolden v. Fowler, 11 Colo. 300, 1177 City of Bonham v. Taylor, 81 Tex. 59, 041, 918 City of Booneville v. Ormrod, 20 Mo. 193, 1571 City of Boston v. Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315, 1417 V. Boston &c. R. Co., 170 Mass. 95. 1271 V. Coon, 175 Mass. 283, 1752 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Cash. 538, 1422 V. Richardson, 13 Allen 140, 586 V. Shaffer. 9 Pick. 415, 1404 V. Shaw, 1 Met. 130, 500, 505 V. Simmons. 150 Mass. 461, 211, 219 City of Boulder v. Niles, 9 Colo. 415, 205, 1594, 1605, 1029 City of Bowling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush 64. 100, 1402 City of Bradford v. Fox, 171 Pa. St. 343 1286 City of 'Brazil v. McBride, 69 Ind. 244. 174, 201 City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 567, 640, 041, 1451 City of Bridgeport v. Ilousatonic R. Co., 15 t'onn. 475, 233. 645. 763, 982. 983, 992 V. New York &c. R. Co.. 30 Conn. 255. 592, 1240, 1250 City of Brockton v. Cross, 138 Mass. 297. 940 City of Broken Bow v. Broken Bow Water-works Co., 57 Neb. 548, 731 City of Brooklyn v. Breslin. 57 N. Y. 591, 408, 500, 505, 547, 552, 1405 V. Brooklyn &c. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475. 1345, 1598 V. Cleves, 1 Hill & D. 231, 528 V. Furey, 30 N. Y. S. 349, 590, 599, 611 V. Nassau &c. R. Co., 61 N. Y. S. 33. 1386 City of Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101. 536 City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532, 240. 260, 464. 044, 003 City of Buffalo, In re, 18 N. Y. S. 771. 1415 V. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y. 103, 595 V. Collins Baking Co., 57 N. Y. S. 347. 503 V. Schliefer, 25 Hun 275. 530 City of Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa 073, 1509, 1532 V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 41 Iowa 134, 1532 V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 49 Iowa 144, 510, 522 V. Dankwardt, 73 Iowa 170, 021. 1402 V. Dennison, 42 N. J. L. 105, 464, 1091 V. Gilbert, 31 Iowa 356, 050, 1224, 1259 V. Kellar, 18 Iowa 59, 97, 468, 530, 531 >Tt7a RSI 119 I V. Lawrence, 42 Iowa 681, 112 City of Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 1(12, 465, 1507 V. Quick, 47 Iowa 222. 1262 V. Stock well, 5 Kan. App. 569, 1110 City of Butte v. Cohen, 9 Mont. 435, 315 City of Cadillac v. Woonsocket Inst., 7 C. C. A. 574, 1002, 1013, 1757 City of Cairo v. Adams Kxp. Co., 54 111. App. 87, 003 V. Allen, 3 III. App. 398, 1530 V. Bross, 101 111. 475, 581 V. Coleman, 53 111. App. 680, 550, 604 City of Caldwell v. Prunelle, 57 Kan. 511, 792 City of Camden v. Allen, 26 N. .1. L. 398, 458, 530 City of Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439, 97, 468, 494 V. Wagner, 54 Ohio St. 329, 1141 City of Cape Girardeau v. Fougen, 30 Mo. App. 551. 464 V. Rilev, 52 Mo. 424, 485 V. Riley, 72 Mo. 220, 494, 500 City of Cape May v. Cape May &c. R. Co., 60 N. J. L. 224, 507. 1365 V. Cape May Transp. Co., 64 N. J. L. 80, 1388, 1548. 1784 City of Carlinville v. McClure, 156 111. 492, 1144, 1151 City of Carlyle v. Clinton Co., 140 111. 512, 854. 1235 City of Carlysle v. Carlvsle Water &c. Co., 52 111. App. 577. 733 City of Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 111. 284, 502, 503 V. Clark, 21 111. App. 74, 296 City of Carthage v. Badgley, 73 Mo. App. 123, 1780, 1788, 1792 City of Cassville v. Jimerson, 75 Mo. App. 420, 528 City of Cedar Rapids v. Bechtel, 110 Iowa 196, 876 City of Centerville v. Miller, 57 Iowa 50, 526 City of Central v. Sears, 2 Colo. 588, 177, 404, 465 City of Champaign v. Forrester, 29 111. App. 117, 1177 V. Harmon, 98 HI. 491, 565 V. Jones, 132 111. 304, 1609 City of Chariton v. Barber, 54 Iowa 360. 606 V. Holliday, 60 Iowa 391, 297 City of Charleston v. Cadle, 166 111. 487. 1296, 1310 V. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681, 594, 1392 City of Charlestown v. Commission- ers, 109 Mass. 270. 700. 707. 1724 City of Charlotte v. Shepard, 120 N. C. 411. 1549 V. Shepard. 122 N. C. 602, 986 City of Cherokee v. Fox, 34 Kan. 16, 536, 1395 City of Chester v. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568. 593, 1160 V. Eyre, 181 Pa. St. 642, 515. 1147, 1246 V. Pennell, 169 Pa. St. 300, 1298 V. Wabash &c. R. Co., 182 111. 382. 586 City of Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 306, 1248, 1266 V. Baker. OS Fed. 830, 1779. 1798 V. Baptist Theological Union, 115 111. 245, 1498 V. Barbian, SO 111. 482, 705 V. Bartel. 100 111. 61. i:{95 V. Brophv. 79 111. 277. 1(!20 V. Burcky. 158 111. 103, 1318 V. Colby, 20 111. 614, 1246 Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 111. 445. 134S, 1697, 1600, 1702 V. Dalle. 115 111. 386, 826, 1614 V. Duffy, 179 111. 447, 737 V. Edwards, 58 111. 252, 205 V. English, 180 111. 476, 1798, 1806 V. English, 80 111. App. 163, 1033, 1804 V. Evans, 24 111. 52. 1703 V. Ferris Wheel Co., 60 111. App. 384, 1703 V. Fidelity Bank, 11 111. App. 165, 1725, 1726 V. Fitzgerald, 75 111. App. 174, 1327 V. Frazer. (10 111. Anp. 404. 712 V. Gage, 95 III. 593, 211, 309, 313 V. Gallagher, 44 111. 295, 1584 V. Galpiii, 183 111. 399, 714, 881 V. Haslev, 25 111. 485, 1530, 1743 V. Hav. 75 111. 530, 1612 V. Jackson, 88 111. App. 130. 1772, 1774 V. Johnson, 53 111. 91, 1620 V. Keefe. 114 111. 222, 1595 V. Kohlhof. 64 111. App. 349, 1316 V. Laflin, 49 III. 172, 1093, 1110 V. Langlass, 66 111. 361, 1584 V. Larned, 34 111. 203, 1168, 1268, 1514 V. Law, 144 III. 569, 1165 V, Manhattan Cement Co., 178 111. 372, 1394, 1395 V. McCarthy. 75 111. 602, 1615 T. McCoy, 136 111. 344, 486 V. McDonald, 176 111. 404, 878, 880, 881 V. McDonald, 57 111. App. 250, 1316 V. McLean, 133 111. 148, 1636 V. Xetcher, 1S3 111. 104, 492, 13S7 V. Nichols, 177 111. 97, 1129, 1130, 1699, 1700 V. People, 56 111. 327. 931, 1306, 1780 V. Powers, 42 III. 169, 1578, 1617 V. Quimby. 38 111. 274, 535 V. Richardson, 75 111. App. 198, 1802 V. Roth, 26 111. 456, 1757 V. Rumpff, 45 111. 90, 568, 614, 642 V. Sawyer. 160 111. 290, 1314, 1758 V. Seben, 165 111. 371, 787 V. Seben, 62 111. App. 248, 1377 V. Sexton, 115 111. 230, 1757 V. Shober &c. Co., 6 111. App. 560, 926 V. Stratton. 162 111. 494, 548, 549, 551, ]105, 1393, 1394 V. Stratton, 58 111. App. 539, 505 V. Trotter, 136 111. 430. 500. 508, 605 V. Turner, 80 111. 419, 789 V. Union Bldg. Ass'n, 102 III. 379. 678, 1703 V. Union Stock Yards Co., 164 111. 224. 1349 V. Weir, 165 111. 582, 739 V. Williams, 182 111. 135, 711, 916, 1753 V. Williams, 80 111. App. 33, 732, 916 V. Wright, 32 111. 192, 1254, 1533 V. Wright. 69 111. 318. 571, 1697 City of Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo. App. 609, 603, 1402 City of Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio 625, 1232, 1397 V. Buckingham. 10 Ohio 257. 532, 1402 V. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336. 547 V. Guckenberger, 60 Ohio St. 353, 733, 872 V. Gwynne. 10 Ohio ]92. 530, 1412 V. Janes, 55 Ohio St. 180, 1705 V. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499, 10o2 City of Cincinnati v. Seasongood, 46 Ohio St. 296, 1256 V. Sherike. 47 Ohio St. 217, 1138 V. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38, 1779 City of Circleville v. Sohn, 59 Ohio St. 285, 1338, 1359 City of Cleburne v. Brown, 73 Tex. 443, 640 V. Gulf &c. R. Co., 66 Tex. 457, 578 City of Cleveland v. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 93 Fed. 113, 592, 1321 V. King, 132 U. S. 295, 817 v. State Bank &c., 16 Ohio St. 236 233 V. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 303. 1234 City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co.. 24 Iowa 455, 103 V. Phillips, 58 111. 102, 500 v. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655, 879, 881, 1149 City of Cohoes v. President &c.. 47 N. Y. St. 612, 1558, 1561 City of Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474, 1174, 1536 City of Columbus v. Hydraulic Wool- len Mills Co., 33 Ind. 435, 680 v. Ogletree, 96 Ga. 177, 1326, 1335 V. Storey, 35 Ind. 97, 1255 v. Street R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 98. 1509 City of Concordia v. Hagaman, 1 Kan. App. 35, 742 City of Connersville v. Hydraulic Co., 86 Ind. 184, 960 V. Merrill, 14 Ind. App. 303, 1145 City of Conyers v. Kirk, 78 Ga. 480, 896, 1463 City of Coolidge v. General Hospital Soc. &c., 9 Kan. App. 891, 998 City of Corpus Christi v. Central W. & W, Co., 8 Tex. Civ. App. 94, 735 City of Corsicana v. Tobin, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 492, 1805 City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Or, 139, 497 City of Council Bluffs v. Stewart, 51 Iowa 385, 890 City of Covington v. Arthur, 12 Ky. L. 163, 1514 V. Bovle, 6 Bush 204, 1267 V. Casey, 3 Bush 698, 1258 V. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. 105, 1504 V. Elliott, 21 Kv. L. 895, 1783 V. Ludlow, 1 Met. 295. 295, 1425, 1427 V. McKenna, 99 Kv. 508, 729 V. Powell. 2 Met. i22r>. 1503, 1725 V. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491, 393. 1517 Citv of Crawfordsville v. Bond, 96 Ind. 236. 1179, 1619 V. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, / 552 575 576 City of Cynthiana v. Board &c., 21 Kv. L. 731, 1.554, 1764 City of Dallas v. Atkins, 32 S. W. 780. 1286 V. Beeman, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 315. 411, 1780, 1781 V. Cooper, 34 S. W. 321, 793 v, Ellison, 10 Tex, Civ. App. 28. 1286 V. Emerson. 36 S. W. 304, 1309 V. Jones. 93 Tex. 38, 1330. 1340. 1359, 1793, 1801 V. Jones, 54 S. W. 60R. 1796 V. Kahn. 9 Tex. Civ. App. 19, 1219 V. McAllister. 39 S. W. 173, 1713 V, Meyers, 55 S. W. 742. 1361, 137.5, 1796 V. Leake, 34 S. W. 338, 1211 TABLE OF CASES. l.wvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] City of Dallas v. Webb, '_'"J Tex. ("iv. App. 4S, 1325, 1S02, 1803 V. Western Electric Co., 83 Tex. 248, 1745 City of Danville v. Danville Water Co., ISO 111. 235, 573, 877, 92G, 931 V. :M(Adauis, 153 III. 216, 1140 V. iMilchell. 63 111. App. 647, 1744 City of Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa 524. 535, 1420 V. Kelley, 7 Iowa 102, 1403 V. Peoria &c. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa 276, 457, 1529 V. Stevenson, 34 Iowa 225, 264 City of Davton v. Robert, 8 Ohio C. C. 649, 1707 V. Taylor, 62 Ohio St. 11, 1335, 1804 City of Decatur v. Stoops, 21 Ind. App. 397, 1330 City of Delphi v. Bowen, 61 Ind. 29, 1722 V. Evans, 36 Ind. 90, 299. 300, 464 477, 1233, 1258. 1421, 1425, 1426 V. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520, 1422, 1578, 1617 v. Startzman, 104 Ind. 343, 651 City of Denison v. Foster, 28 S. W. 1052, 1756 City of Denver v. Aaron, 6 Colo. App. 232, 1335, 1375 V. Bach, 26 Colo. 530, 502 V. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 1652 V. Baldasari, 61 Pac. 397, 1375 V. Beede. 25 Colo. 172, 1710 V. Brown, 11 Colo. 337, 1745 V. Capelli, 4 Colo. 25, 1208 V. Deane, 10 Colo. 375, 1621 V. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 1375 V. Girard, 21 Colo. 447, 492, 652, 1319, 1758 V. Hickey, 9 Colo. App. 137, 1346 V. Johnson, 8 Colo. App. 384, 1333 V. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204, 1230, 1268 V. Moewes, 15 Colo. App. 28, 1374 V. IMullen, 7 Colo. 345, 1117 V. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554, 1207, 1217 V. Saulcey, 5 Colo. App. 420, 1333 V. Sherret, 88 Fed. 226, 1361 V. Williams, 12 Colo. 475. 1592 City of Depere v. Hibbard, 104 Wis. 666, 1339, 1804 City of Des Moines v. Chicago &c. R. Co.. 41 Iowa 567, 522, 1510 V. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa 210, 1121, 1392 V. Layman, 21 Iowa 153, 698 V. Rice, 40 Iowa 638, 1802 City of Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich. 125, 1215, 1344, 1586 V. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84, 8, 9. 814, 1341, 1592 V. Board &c.. 108 Mich. 494, 573 V. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80, 1.589 V. Corey, 9 Mich. 165, 1546 v. Daly, 68 Mich. 503, 587, 1253 V. Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co., 64 Fed. 628, 1350 V. Detroit City R. Co., 37 Mich. 558. 1352 v. Detroit &c. Plank R. Co., 43 Mich. 140, 595 V. Ft. Wayne &c. R. Co., 90 Mich. 646, 1355 V. Hosmer, 79 Mich. 384, 1464, 1672 V. Martin, 34 Mich. 170, 245, 247, 1263, 1552 V. Putnam, 45 Mich. 263, 814, 1341, 1593 V. Weber, 29 Mich. 24, 322 City of Dubuque v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 196, 1534 City of Duhu(]ne v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 39 Iowa 56, 1510 v. Northwestern &c. Ins. Co., 29 Iowa 9. 1501, 1509, 1513 V. Rebman, 1 Iowa 444, 1414, 1418 City of Dulutb v. Krupp, 46 Minn. 435. 1395 V. Mallet, 43 Minn. 204, 590, 1357 V. ArcDonnell, 61 Minn. 288, 1754 City of Dunkirk v. Wallace, 19 Ind. App. 298, 743 City of Dunleith v. Reynolds, 53 111. 45, 1499 City of Duquoin v. Kelly, 176 111. 218, 1554 City of Durango v. Remsberg, 16 Colo. 327, 1420 City of East Dallas v. State, 73 Tex. 370. 391, 402 City of East St. Louis v. Board &c., 6 111. App. 130. 1528 V. Donahue, 77 111. App. 574, 1327 v. I'^ast St. Louis Gas-light Co., 98 111. 415, 639, 649, 848, 877, 889 V. Flannigan, 26 111. App. 449, 219, 848, 887 V. Flannigan, 34 111. App. 596, 903 V. Flannigen, 36 111. App. 50, 922 v. Maxwell, 99 111. 439, 106, 107 V. O'Flvnn, 119 111. 200, 1320 V. People, 124 111. 655, 893 V. Rhein. 139 111. 116, 896 v. St. John, 47 111. 463, 684 V. Thomas, 11 111. App. 283, 282 V. Trustees &c., 102 III. 489, 1509 V. Wehrung, 50 111. 28. 281, 547, 1589 City of Effingham v. Surrells, 77 111. App. 460, 1780 City of Elgin v. Eaton, 83 111. 535, 1224, 1885, 1602 V. Hoag. 25 111. App. 650, 1177 City of Elizabeth v. Force, 29 N. J. Eq. 587, • 1027 v. New Jersey R. Co., 53 N. J. L. 491, 1566 City of Elkhart v. Simonton, 71 Ind. 7, 699 V. Wickwire, 121 Ind. 331. 1201, 1288 City of Elk Point v. Vaughn. 1 Dak. 118, 111, 495, 496. 1401 City of Ellsworth v. Rossiter, 46 Kan. 237, 177, 743 City of Emporia v. Gilchrist, 37 Kan. 532, 1161 v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236, 485 V. Schmidling, 33 Kan. 485, 1625, 1627 V. Smith, 42 Kan. 433, 384, 393 V. Soden, 25 Kan. 588, 688 V. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, 535 V. Wagoner, 6 Kan. App. 659, 505 City of Enterprise v. Fowler, 38 Kan. 415, 935 City of Erie, Appeal of, 91 Pa. St. 398, 883, 889 V. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 247, 1779 T. Erie Canal Co., 59 Pa. St. 174, 81 V. First Universalist Church, 105 Pa. St. 278, 1247 v. Knapp, 29 Pa. St. 173, 1745 V. Magill. 101 Pa. St. 616, 16.39 V. Phelps, 56 Kan. 135, 1334 V. Piece of Land &c., 175 Pa. St. 523. 1250 City of Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588, 233 City of Eureka v. Jackson, 8 Kan. App. 49, 520 V. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 1363 Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol II, pp. 833-1830.^ City of Evansville v. Decker, 84 Ind. 325. 1177, 1179 V. Dennett, 161 U. S. 434, 1005, 1010 V. Frazer, 24 Ind. App. 62S, 1360, 1376 V. Hall. 14 Ind. 27, 1511 V. Martin, 41 Ind. 145, 503 V. Miller, 146 Ind. 613, 515 V. Page. 23 Ind. 525, 392 V. Pfisterer, 34 Ind. 36, 1723 V. State, 188 Ind. 426. 1432, 1433. 1443, 1532 City of Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 254. 537 City of Fairfield v. Hornick, 53 111. App. 558. 1333 V. Ratcliffe, 20 Iowa 396, 1232 City of Fayette v. Shafroth, 25 Mo. 445, 1412 City of Fayetteville v. Carter, 52 Ark. 301, 1405 City of Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Hotel Co., 80 Minn. 165. 650 City of Findlav v. Pendleton, 62 Ohio St. 80, 712, 729 V. Pertz, 66 Fed. 427. 714 City of Flora v. Naney. 136 111. 45, 1743 V. Pruett. 81 111. App., 161. 1802 City of Fort Dodge v. Moore, 37 Iowa 388. 1546 City of Fort Madison v. Moore, 109 Iowa 476, 713, 754 City of Fort Scott v. Peck, 5 Kan. App. 593, 798, 794 City of Fort Wayne v. Breese, 123 Ind. 581, -1631 V. Codv. 43 Ind. 197. 1253 V. De Witt, 47 Ind. 391, 1624, 1625 V. Lehr, 88 Ind. 62, 233, 1541 v. ShoafC, 106 Ind. 66. 616. 1199. 1288 City of Fort Worth v. Crawford, 64 Tex. 202, 264 V. Davis, 57 Tex. 225, 1255 V. Shero. 16 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 928 City of Frankfort v. Aughe, 114 Ind. 77, 497 City of Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440, 225 City of Fulton v. Northern 111. Coll., 158 111. 333, 741 City of Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705, 1523 V. Corwith. 48 HI. 423, 977, 1021 City of Galesburg v. Galesburg Water Co.. 34 Fed. 675. 746 V. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152, 91, 1519 V. Searles, 114 111. 217. 1143, 1167, 1513 City of Galveston v. Hemmis, 72 Tex. 558, 16.39 V. Morton, 58 Tex. 409. 715 V. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 8, 9, 11, 265, 266, 813 V. Sydnor. 39 Tex. 236. 1551 City of Geneseo v. Geneseo &c. Co.. 55 Kan. 358, 609. 734, 735 City of Geneva v. Geneva Tel. Co., 62 N. Y. S. 172, 1390 City of Gladstone v. Throop, 71 Fed. 341, 1018 City of Goshen v. Alford, 154 Ind. 58, 1789, 1805 V. Croxton, 34 Ind. 239, 535 V. England, 119 Ind. 368, 1627 V. Kern, 63 Ind. 468. 537 V. Mvers. 119 Ind. 196, 1578. 1579 City of Grand Rapids v. Blakelv, 40 Mich. 367, 245. 1716 v. Brandy, 105 Mich. 870, 604, 605 v. De Vries, 123 Mich. 570, 726, 1392 V. Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co., 66 Mich. 606, 1451, 1452 City of Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co., 33 N. W. 15, 637 V. Hughes. 15 Mich. 54, 526 v. Loose, 92 Mich. 92, 1156 y. Newton, 111 Mich. 48, 501 v. Normaii, 110 Mich. 544, 524 y. Wyman. 46 Mich. 576, 1614, 1621 City of Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94, 541, 542 V. Hamman, 17 Colo. 30, 1421, 1422 City of Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204, 300, 477 City of Greensboro v. McGibbony, 93 Ga. 672, 1362 City of Greensburgh v. Corwin, 58 Ind. 518, 535 City of Greenville v. Greenville Water Works Co., 125 Ala. 625, 716, 724, 737 v. Kemis. 58 S. C. 427, 1388 City of Guthrie v. T. W. Harvey Lum- ber Co.. 9 Gkla. 464, 71 y. Wylie. 6 Okla. 61. 70, 733 City of Hagerstown y. Witmer, 86 Md. 293, 1105 City of Hamilton y. Ashbrook, 62 Ohio St. 511, 612 City of Hammond v. Evans, 23 Ind. App. 501. 951 City of Hannibal v. Price, 29 Mo. App. 280. 1396 V. Richards, 82 Mo. 330, 1079 City of Harrisburg v. McCormick, 129 Pa. St. 213. 593, 1160, 1252 y. Segelbaum, 151 Pa. St. 172, 1195 y. Sheek. 104 Pa. St. 53. 107 v. Shepler, 190 Pa. St. 374, 715, 726, 730, 872, 1132, 1273 City of Hartford v. Graves, 8 Kan. App. 677. 1365 y. Hartford Electric L. Co.. 65 Conn. 324, 724, 752 v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525, 1588 y. West Middle District, 45 Conn. 462, 1247 City of Harvard v. Crouch, 47 Neb. 133, 1211, 1380 City of Helena v. Gray, 7 Mont. 486, 506, 1401 y. Harvey. 6 Mont. 114, 696 y. Mills, 94 Fed. 916, 873 V. Turner, 36 Ark. 577, 650 City of Henderson v. Clayton, 57 S. W. 1, 790 v. Lambert. 8 Bush 607, 387, 1513 y. White. 49 S. W. 764, 1325 City of Ilolvoke v. Hadley &c. Co., 174 Mass. 424. 1752, 1798 City of Honey Grove v. Lamster, 50 S. W. 1053, 1785 City of Hopkins v. Kansas City &c. Co., 79 Mo. 98, 1683 ■ City of Houston v. Emery, 76 Tex. 2S2. 321, 1738 City of Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan. 249. 490 City of Iluntingburg v. First. 22 Ind. App. 66, 1335, 1787, 1803 City of Huntington v. Boyd, 25 Ind. App. 250, 1787, 1793 y. Breen, 77 Ind. 29. 1632 v. Burke, 12 Ind. App. 133, 1788, 1789 V. Cheesbro, 57 Ind. 74. 538 V. First, 22 Ind. App. 66, 1317, 1330 v. Force. 152 Ind. 36S, 738 V. McClurg, 22 Ind. App. 261, 1330. 1339. 1793 V. Pease. 56 Ind. 305. 537, 538 City of Huron v. Meyers, 13 S. D. 420, 220 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxix [References are to Pages. Yol. I, City of Huron v. S(M'ond Ward Sav. Bank, SU Fed. i;";.!, loo... 1011. l(o<. I'-JO City of Independence v. ^^tes.^Q^-^^iooe ^.^''Mo.'.re, 32 Mo. 392, " ' 52G V Tronvalle. 1.5 Kan. 70. 540. ^1424 City of Indianapolis v. Consumers ^Gas &c. Co.. 140 Ind. 10.. 'jf V Coolv. 99 Ind. 10. ^ 1G09 v! l-nuuelman. lOS Ind. 530 .9., V. Gaston. 58 Ind. 224, 1580, 1639 V Holt. 155 Hid. 222, l^'^ 150b V. Ilueiielc. 115 Ind._581, 496, 498 V. IlutlVr. oO Ind. 235. 11<9 V. Imberry, 17 Ind. Uo. ^^^^ ^^^5 V. Indianapolis Gas Light &c- Co., 66 ind. 396, 103, ^-^-o^^^'i^^^l V. Kingsbury. 101 Ind. 200, 693 V. LaN\Ter. 38 Ind. 348. lU^ V. Mann. 144 Ind. 17o, '14, 8.4 V. Man.sur. 15 Ind. 112. i--^;* V. McAvoy, 80 Ind. oS(, --ii V. Miller. 27 Ind. 394. lllo V. Patterson, 112 Ind. 344 390 V. Ritzinger, 24 Ind^^App.^6o. ^ ^^^^ V. Scott, 72 Ind. 196, 1625 V. Vaien. Ill Ind. 240, 15o2 City of Indianola v. Gulf &c. K. L.o.,^^^^ v^ J^nes,^!!' Iowa 282. ^ 299, 477 City of Ida v. Sugg, 8 Kan. App.^^^^ City of jaclison v. Newman, 59 Miss. ^ City oV Jacksonville v. Akers, 11 l^^-^^f^^ v.''Allen.'^25 111. App. 54, 200,1445 V. Hamill. 178 111. 235. 12 < 2 12.3 V. Jacksonville R. Co., 67 111. ^^^ f "iedwitli, 26 Fla. 163, 580, 606 V L'Rngle. 20 Fla. 344. 426 v. Loan^65 111. App 218, 1774 V. Smith. 78 Fed. 292, ^„ ^^"> City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 ^^^ ^''lla'rkoe, 18 Wis. 350, 106, 108 V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 7 Wis. 404 539, boo City of Jefferson v. Whipple, 76 Mo.^^^^ City of' Jeffersonville ^-^,^1^%^^. -.741 Ind. App. 532. 1210, 1221, 1 . 41 V. Patterson, 26 Ind. 16 ., l^-O City of Joliet v. Blower, 155 HI- 414. ^~ V. Johnson, 177 111. 178, 13.33. 1334, 1341, 1.93 V. Looney. 159 111 471, 1334 V. Verbv. 35 111. 58, ^ ,^ ^ 1596 City of Joplin V. Lecke, 78 Mo. App-^^^^ City "of Junction City v. Blades, 1 ^ ^Kan. App 85 I'Sf V. Webb, 44 Kan. 71. ->-"t City of Kalamazoo v. Kalamazoo Heat &c. Co.. 124 Mich. 74. ^513. 1813 City^of^Kankakee v. Potter.^ 1^19 ^Hl.^ ^^^ City o"f Kansas v. Baird, 98 ^l°-25e^'i568 V. Clark. 68 Mo, 588, " '521 V. Collins, 34 Kan. 434, 1395 V. Flanagan. 69 Mo. 22, 536 V. Hill. 80 Mo. 523, 698 V. Kansas City R. Co., 102 Mo.^^^^ ?^ McAleer. 31 Mo. App. 433, 1119 V. Payne, 71 Mo. 159, 1544 pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. S33-lS30.-\ City of Kansas v. Vindquost, 36 Mo. App. 584, 1389 V. White. 69 Mo. 20. 521 V. Zahner, 73 Mo. App. 396. City of Kansas City v. Gray (Kan.), 61 Pac. 746, 12S.> v. Grubel. 57 Kan. 436, 519 V. Hanson, 60 Kan. 833, 720, 725, 726 V. Hart, 60 Kan. 684, 1375 V. Kimball, 60 Kan. 224, 1134, 1276 V. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 89, 110, 1146 V. McDonald. 60 Kan. 481, 503. 1326, 1331. 1.363, 1753, 1797 V. O'Connell. 99 Mo. 357, 1176, 1368 V. Orr. 62 Kan. 61. 1361, 1375 V. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 189, 100. 113. 117 V. Trotter. 9 Kan. App. 222, 1235 V. Wyandotte Gas Co., 9 Kan. App. 325. 647, 8.2 City of Kearney v. Downing, 59 Neb. 549, 882 V. Thoemason, 25 Neb. 147. 1179, 1370 City of Keokuk v. Independent Dist., 53 Iowa 352, 1588 V. Scroggs. 39 Iowa 447, 1121, 1392 City of Kingston v. Terry, 53 N. Y. S. 652. 1781 City of Kinmundy v. Mayhan, 72 111. 462. 282. 531, 547 City of Knoxville v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 83 Iowa 636. 526. 608 City of Kokomo v. Boring, 24 Ind. App. 552. 1327 V. Mahan. 100 Ind. 242, 1177, 1190, 1224, 1233. 1301 City of La Crosse v. Town of Mel- rose, 22 Wis. 459, 1623 City of Laddonia v. Poor, 73 Mo. App. 465. , ^ 505 City of Lafayette v. Asylum, 4 La. An 1 124. V. Blood. 40 Ind. 62, „„ 1624 V. Cox, 5 Ind. 38, §8, 982 V. Cummins. 3 La. An. 673, lo20 V. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140, 1233 V. James, 92 Ind. 240, 319 V. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70, 54 V. Nagle, 113 Ind. 425, 17.6 V. Shultz. 44 Ind. 97, <05 V. State, 69 Ind. 218. 368 V. Timberlake. 88 Ind. 330, 264. 774, 815. 820 V. Wortman. 107 Ind. 404, 1224 City of Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 507. 502. 520 City of Lampasas v. Talcott, 97 Fed. 457, 9" City of Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. jr^o 1.080 vl Van Gorder, 24 Mich. 456, 1748 City of Lake View v. Tate, 130 111. 247 1148, 13o( City of Laporte v. Gamewell &c. Co., 146 Ind. 466, „ ^ 880 City of Laredo v. Macdonell, 52 Tex. 511 "44 V. Nalle. 65 Tex. 859, 1746 City of Lawrence v. Davis, 8 Kan. App ''^5 1339 V. Littel,'9 Kan. App. 130. 1790. 1793. 1801, 1804 V. Webster, 167 Mass. 513. ^_^^^ City of Lead v. Klatt, 13 S. D. 140. ^^^ Ixxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 City of Leadville v. Matthews, 10 Colo. 125, 172 City of Leavenworth v. Mills, 6 Kan. 288, 741, 1306, 1748 V. Norton, 1 Kan. 432, 1535 V. K!ankin, 2 Kan. 355, 233, 255, 646 V. Stille, 13 Kan. 539, 741 City of Lebanon v. Twiford, 13 Ind. App. 384, 1370 City of Lexington v. Aull, 30 Mo. 480. 1513 V. Butler, 14 Wall. 282, 959, 1000. 1001, 1016, 1018 V. Headley. 5 Bush 508, 540, 1227, 1254, 1421, 1425 V. McQuillan, 9 Dana 513. 1271 V. Rennick, 20 Ky. L. 1924, 174 City of Lin-coln v. Pirner, 59 Neb. 634, 1334, 1336, 1339 V. O'Brien, 56 Neb. 761, 930, 1338 V. Smith, 28 Neb. 762. 1598 V. Walker. 18 Neb. 244, 1330 V. Woodward, 19 Neb. 259, 1614 City of Linneus v. Duskey, 19 Mo. App. 20, 607 City of Litchfield v. Whitenack. 78 111. App. 364. 1107. 1112 City of Littlefleld v. Anglim, 83 111. App. 65, 1803 City of Little Rock v. Board &c.. 42 Ark. 152, 280, 1199 V. Katzenstein. 52 Ark. 107, 1253 V. Parish, 36 Ark. 166, 90, 103 City of Logansport v. Blakemore, 17 Ind. 318, 996 V. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319, 300. 468, 477, 1425, 1427 V. Dick, 70 Ind. 65, 1590 V. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15, 299. 889, 1038, 1201 V. Humphrey, 84 Ind. 467, 260, 565 V. Justice, 74 Ind. 378, 1620 V. La Rose, 09 Ind. 117, 1660 V. Legg, 20 Ind. 31.">, 291, 292, 1256 V. Pollard. 50 Ind. 151. 1224 V. Seybold. 59 Ind. 225, 395 V. Shirk. 88 Ind. 563, 675 V. Wright, 25 Ind. 512, 1180, 1208 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 124 Cal. 368. 610. 1707 V. Southern Pacific R. Co., 67 Cal. 433, 1510 V. Teed. 112 Cal. 319, 1021 City of Louisville v. Bannon, 99 Ky. 74, 1319 V. Cassady. 20 Ky. L. 1348, 1800 V. City of Louisville Rolling Mill Co., 3 Bush 416, 1776 V. Coleburne. 22 Ky. L. 64, 1772 V. Commonwealth. 1 Duv. 295. 572, 1529, 1546 V. Gosnell, 104 Ky. 201. 1292 V. Hegan, 20 Ky. L. 1532, 1774, 1776 V. Henaing. 1 Bush 381, 1501, 1.503 V. Hyatt, 5 B. Mon. 199, 1306 V. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 9. 1681 V. Leatherman, 99 Ky. 213, 1244, 1306 V. Louisville Water Co., 20 Ky. L. 12.59, 1351 V. McOill. 21 Ky. L. 718. 1754, 1793 V. McKegney, 7 Bush 651, 1424 V. Mehler, 21 Ky. L. 62, 1308 V. Murphy, 86 Ky. 53, 663 V. O'Malley, 21 Ky. L. 873. 1753, 1754 V. Seibert, 21 Ky. L. 328, 1754 V. Selvage, 21 Ky. L. 349, 512. 725, 1296, 1310 V. Shannahan, 22 Ky. L. 163, 795 V. Western Bank, 21 Kv. L. 1075, 512 City of Louisville v. Wilson, 99 Ky City 598, 173 of Lowell V. French, 6 Cush. 223, 1262 V. Hadley, 8 Met. 180. 1198 V. Parker, 10 Met. 309, 329 V. Simpson, 10 Allen 88, 468 V. Wheelock, 11 Cush. 391, 1254, 1424 City of Ludlow v. Mackintosh, 21 Ky. L. 924, 1775 V. Trustees. 78 Ky. 357. 1249, 1253 City of Lynchburg v. Norfolk &c. R. Co., 80 Va. 237, 1508 V. Slaughter. 75 Va. 57, 1026 City of Lynn v. City of Newburyport, 5 Allen 545, 1049, 1052 v. County Com'rs, 148 Mass. 148, 1485 City of Lyons v. Cooper, 39 Kan. 324, 1401 City of Madison v. Baker, 103 Ind. 41. 1624 V. Korblv. 32 Ind. 74, 169, 200, 207 V. Smith, 83 Ind. 502, 1201 V. Whitney, 21 Ind. 261, 1511 City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 1072, 1410 V. Fowler. 32 Minn. 364, 1398 City of Marion v. Eppler, 5 Ohio St. 250, 1266 V. Robertson. 84 111. App. 113, 596 City of Marionville v. Henson, 65 Mo. App. 397, 1129, 1236. 1291 City of Marshall v. Cleveland &c. R. Co.. 80 111. App. 531. 611, 932 V. Rainey, 78 Mo. App. 416, 751, 1236. 1279 City of Marshalltown v. Blums, 58 Iowa 184, 1537 City of Maysville v. Shultz, 3 Dana 10, 92 City of McGregor v. Cook, 16 S. W. 936. 1743 City of McKeesport v. Citizens' &c. R. Co., 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 249, 1811 V. IMcKeesport &c. R. Co., 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 242, 1384 v. Soles, 178 Pa. St. 363, 1244 City of McPherson v. Nichols, 48 Kan. 430. 1423 City of Memphis v. Adams, 9 Heisk. 518, 181, 663 V. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 508, 701, 702, 704 V. Brown, 20 Wall. 289, 181, 741, 1305, 1306 V. Hernando Ins. Co., 6 Baxt. 527, 1531 V. Laski. 9 Heisk. 511, 1745 V. Memphis Water Co., 5 Heisk. 495, 456 City of Michigan City v. Leeds, 24 Ind. App. 271, 724 City of Middlesboro v. Coal & Iron Bank, 22 Ky. L. 380, 1544, 1554 V. New South Brewing &c. Co., 56 S. W. 427, 1548 City of Miles City v. Kern, 12 Mont. 119. 538. 1419 City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Co., 95 Wis. 424. 1504 V. Milwaukee &c. Co., 7 Wis. 85, 1171 City of Mineral Wells v. Darby, 51 S. W. 351. 563 City of Mitchell v. Smith, 12 S. D. 241. 876. 1021 Citv of Mobile v. Craft, 94 Ala. 156, 602 V. Louisville &c. R. Co., 124 Ala. 132, 585 City of Monett v. Beatty, 79 Mo. App. 315, 528 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxi [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] City of Morrison v. Ilinkson, 87 III. 587, 1111. 15,30, 1743 City of Mt. Carmel v. Blaokbnrn, .5.3 111. App. 658, 1.328, 1.341 V. Shaw, 155 111. 37, 1319, 1369 City of Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa 399, 606 City of Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 22 Kv. L. 358, 1407 V. Jephsou, 21 Ky. L. 1028, 1777 City of Mt. Vernon v. Holbn, 22 Ind. App. 282, 1361, 1364, 1786, 1793 V. Hovey. 52 Ind. 563, 983 City of Muscatine v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 79 Iowa 645, 1251 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 88 Iowa 291. 1245 V. Keokuk &c. Co.. 45 Iowa 185, 246 V. Steck, 7 Iowa 505, 1418, 1420 City of Napa v. Easterby, 76 Cal. 222. 480, 482. 486, 489 City of Nashville v. Smith, 86 Tenn. 213. 1546 City of Natchez v. Shields, 74 Miss. 871. 1326 City of Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 525, 9 City of Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo. 546, 1251 City of New Albany v. Lines, 21 Ind. App. 380, 1377 V. McCulloch, 127 Ind. 500. 889, 1324 V. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481, 1499, 1500, 1502, 1550 V. Slider, 21 Ind. App. 392, 812, 1107 City of Newark v. Funk, 15 Ohio St. 462, 1746 V. Stout, 52 N. J. L. 35. 164 City of New Bedford v. Inhabitants &c., 9 Allen 207, 1036 City of Newburyport v. Creedon, 148 Mass. 158, 1069 City of New Haven v. Fairhaven &c. R. Co., 38 Conn. 422, 1248 V. Sargent. 38 Conn. 50, 1109, 1378 City of New Kiowa v. Craven, 46 Kan. 114, 806 City of New London v. Brainard. 22 Conn. 552. 651, 668, 1730 City of New Orleans v. Abbagnats, 62 Fed. 240, 800 V. Boudra, 14 La. An. 303, 85, 538 V. Brooks, 36 La. An. 641, 274 V. Carondelet &c. Co., 36 La. An. 396, 1545 V. Cazelar, 27 La. An. 156, 1513, 1516 V. Collins. 52 La. An. 973. 106. 1383 V. Commercial Bank, 10 La. An. 735, 1510 V. Costello, 14 La. An. 37. 1413 V. Danneman, 51 La. An. 1093, 1391 V. Elliott. 10 La. An. 59, 1520 V. Fisher. 91 Fed. 574, 1755 V. Fourchv, 30 La. An. 910. 1503 V. Grafflna. 52 La. An. 1082, 1386 V. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 23 La. An. 61. 1530, 1744 V. Hoyle, 23 La. An. 740. 104 V. Kaufman. 29 La. An. 283, 1520 V. Kerr. 50 La. An. 413. 786 V. Kientz. 52 La. An. 950, 580 V. Louisiana &c. Co., 31 La. An. 826, 1502 V. Lozes, 51 La. An. 1172, 1406 V. Mechanics' &c. Bank, 15 La. An. 107, 1510 V. Michoud, 10 La. An. 763. 393 V. Morris, 3 Woods 103, 581, 1529 1 Smith — vi City of New Orleans v. New Orleans &c. Co.. 32 La. An. 105, 1513, 1546 V. People's Bank, 32 La. An. 82, 1503 V. St. Louis Church, 11 La. An. 244. 301 V. Ship Windemere, 12 La. An. 84, 1100 V. Southern Bank, 11 La. An. 41, 1510 V. Southern Bank, 15 La. An. 89, 106 V. Stafford, 27 La. An. 417, 580, 1402, 1403 V. Staiger, 11 La. An. 68, 1520 V. Steinhardt, 52 La. An. 1043, 1142, 1713, 1809 V. Turpin, 13 La. An. 56, 1508 V. Warden «&c., 11 La. An. 244, 987, 1086 V. W^arner, 175 U. S. 120, 952 V. Wire, 20 La. An. 500, 1262 City of Newport v. Commonwealth, 21 Ky. L. 42, 1815 V. Newport &c. Co., 84 Ky. 166. 636. 1466 V. Newport &c. Co., 89 Ky. 454, 571. 1466. 1467 V. Newport &c. Co., 90 Ky. 193, 622 V. Phillips. 19 Ky. L. 352, 716, 717 V. South Covington &c. R. Co., 89 Ky. 29. 1509 City of Newton v. Belger. 143 Mass. 598, 508, 605, 621 V. Bergbower, 63 111. App. 201, 518 City of New Whatcom v. Bellingtou Bay Improv. Co., 16 Wash. 131, 1274 City of New York, In re, 61 N. Y. S. 431, 1311 V. Brady, 30 N. Y. S. 1121, 1367 V. Brown, 57 N. Y. S. 742, 1337, 1338 V. Dimick, 2 N. Y. S. 46. 1589 City of Nokomis v. Salter, 61 111. App. 150. 1330 City of Norfolk v. Young, 97 Va. 728. 1166 City of North Platte v. North Platte Water Works Co., 56 Neb. 403, 290, 730 City of North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 1179 City of Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540. 281. 292. 547 City of Oklahoma City v. Myers, 4 Okla. 686, 1339 V. Welsh, 3 Okla. 288, 1330, 1335 City of Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 453, 92, 440, 1519, 1530 V. Wharf. 115 111. 519, 588, 678 City of Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389. 594. 1392 City of Omaha v. Bowman, 52 Neb. 293 1338 V. City of South Omaha, 31 Neb. 378, 62, 391 V. Croft. 60 Neb. 57, 824, 825 V. Flood, 57 Neb. 124, 1107, 1772, 1774 V. Harmon, 58 Neb. 339, 513 V. Kountze, 25 Neb. 60. 1263 V. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 1211, 1222 V. Megeath. 46 Neb. 502, 1700 V. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446, 1418 V. Richards, 49 Neb. 244. 794, 1331, 1338 V. Williams, 52 Neh. 40, 1778 City of Opdike v. Daniel, 59 Ala. 211, 983 City of 'Ord v. Nash, 50 Neb. 335. 1337, 1374 City of Osage City v. Larkins, 40 Kan. 206, 1608 Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] City of Osborne v. Hamilton, 29 Kan. 1, 1621 City of Oshljosh v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 74 Wis. 534, 1667 V. Sohwartz, 55 AVis. 483, 536, 542 City of Oswego v. Canal Co., 6 N. Y. 257. 1374, 1559, 1563, 1567 V. Collins, 38 Hun 171, 1401 City of Ottawa v. Black, 10 Kan. App. 339, 931, 1329, 1367, 179G V. McCreery, 10 Kan. App. 443, 1787 V. People, 48 111. 233, 1683 V. Spencer, 40 111. 121, 1168, 1268, 1514 City of Ottumwa v. Chinn, 75 Iowa 405, 1126 V. Schaub, 52 Iowa 515, 540, 1422, 1424 V. Zekind, 95 Iowa 622, 502, 503 City of Ouray v. Corson, 14 Colo. App. 345, 600, 1763 City of Owensboro v. Hickman, 90 Ky. 629, 371 V. Sparks, 18 Ky. L. 269, 526, 527, 599 City of Padueah v. Cully, 9 Bush 323, 322 City of Palestine v. Hassell, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 519, 1336, 1337 V. West, 37 S. W. 783, 201 City of Parkersburg v. Tavener, 42 W. Va. 486, 1272, 1786 City of Paterson v. Society of Manu- facturers, 24 N. J. L. 385, 1246 City o^f Pawtucket v. Bray, 20 R. I- City of Paxton v. Frew, 52 111. App. 393, 1335 City of Pekin v. Brereton, 67 111. 477 1385 V. McMahon, 154 111. 141, 794, 816 V. Reynolds. 31 111. 529, 931, 1016 V. Smelzel, 21 111. 464, 1400 City of Pensacola v. Sullivan, 23 Fla. 1, 1541 City of Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 111. 317, 500 V. Crawl, 28 111. App. 154, 1180 V. Gerber, 68 III. App. 255, 1332 V. Gugenheim, 61 IIJ. App. 374, 492, 502 V. Johnston. 56 111. 45, 401 V. Kidder. 26 111. 351, 1246 City of Philadelphia v. Ball, 147 Pa. St. 243, 1256 v. Bowman, 175 Pa. St. 91, 522 V. Dibeler, 147 Pa. St. 261, 1156 V. Dickson, 38 Pa. St. 247, 705 V. Duncan, 4 Phila. 145, 530 V. Dyer, 41 Pa. St. 463, 705 V. Kvans. 139 Pa. St. 483, 1158 V. Flanigan, 47 Pa. St. 21, 638, 647 V. Gavagnin, 62 Fed. 617, 795, 1333 V. Germantown Pass. R. Co., 10 Phila. 165. 687 V. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. St. 146, 1112 V. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136, 198, 1445 V. Gorges, 180 Pa. St. 296, 1292 V. Greble. 38 Pa. St. 339, 458, 1544 v. Madden, 8 Pa. Dist. R. 532, 547 V. Miller, 49 Pa. St. 440, 1238 V. Nock. 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 44. 1307 V. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 58 Pa. St. 253. 629, 1106 Y. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 177 Pa. St. 292 1252 V. Presbyterian Hospital, 143 Pa. St. 367, 1247 V. Rink (Pa.), 2 Atl. 505. 1445 V. River Front R. Co., 137 Pa. St. 334, 1350 V. Rule, 93 Pa. St. 15, 1271 City of Philadelphia v. Smith, 23 W. N. C. 242, 1614, 1616 V. Smith, 16 Atl. 493, 1637 V. Tryon, 35 Pa. St. 401, 593, 1234 V. Union Burial Grounds, 178 Pa. St. 533, 1246, 1294 V. Wistar, 35 Pa. St. 427, 593 V. Wright. 100 Pa. St. 235, 1220 V. Yewdall, 190 Pa. St. 412, 1272 City of I'iqua v. Zimmerlin, 35 Ohio St. 507, 519 City of Pittsburg, Appeal of, 118 Pa. 458, 1503 V. Broderson, 10 Kan. App. 430, 1360, 1797 V. Epping Carpenter Co., 194 Pa. St. 318, 1707 V. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54, 1112, 1113 V. Reynolds, 48 Kan. 360, 485 City of Platteville v. Hooper, 63 Wis. 385. 312, 315 City of Plattsburg v. Riley, 42 Mo. App. 18. 395 City of Plattsmouth v. Boeck, 32 Neb. 297, 1209, 1211 City of Pleasanton v. Rhine, 8 Kan. App. 452. 1333 City of Plymouth v. Milner, 117 Ind. 324, 1634 V. Schultheis, 135 Ind. 701, 508 City of Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164, 225, 801, 1322 V. Talbot Pav. Co., 94 Fed. 65. 722, 741 City of Port Huron v. Chadwick, 52 Mich. 320, 1214 City of Portland v. City of Bangor, 65 Maine 120, 1415 V. Portland Water Co., 67 Maine 135, 1502, 1512 City of Poughkeepsie v. King, 57 N. Y. S. 116, 527 V. Quintard, 136 N. Y. 275, 875 V. Wiltsie. 36 Ilun 270, 179 City of Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 272, 216, 262 V. Union R. Co., 12 R. I. 473, 523, 524 City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 Colo. 593, 1205, 1267 City of Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204, 1666 City of Quincy v. Ballance, 30 111. 185, 535 V. Bull, 106 111. 337, 519. 522, 1812 v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 92 111. 21, 464 V. Jones, 76 111. 231, 1355, 1776 V. O'Brien, 24 III. App. 591, 607 City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32. 570, 1230, 1255. 1262, 1267. 1269 City of Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233. 90, 103 V. Savage, 120 Pa. St. 198. 43 City of Rensselaer, 64 N. Y. S. 704, 1652 City of Richmond v. Crenshaw, 76 Va. 936. 1717, 1728 V. Daniel, 14 Gratt. 385, 1501, 1503 V. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 503, 685 V. Long, 17 Gratt. 375, 806, 1075, 1096 V. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192, 837 v. Mulholland, 116 Ind. 173, 1635 V. Richmond &c. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 604, 1247, 1513. 1533, 1545, 1548 V. Scott, 48 Ind. 568, 1520 City of Roanoke v. Shull, 97 Va. 419, 1793, 1798 City of Rochester v. Bell Tel. Co.. 64 N. Y. S. 804. 1390 V. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405. 1345, 1587, 1598 TABLE OF CASES. Ix: [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] City of Rochester v. Close, 35 Ilun 2(18. 1308 V. Krickson. 4fi Barb. 92, 1125 V. Montgomery, 72 N. Y. 05, 1344, 1598 V. Town of Rush, 80 N. Y. 302, 572, 153G, 1546 V. Upman, 19 Minn. 108. 537, 1507 V. AA'est. 53 N. Y. S. 1101. 1386 City of Rock Falls v. WeUs, 59 111. App. 155. 1316 City of Rock ford v. Rannie, 77 III. App. 065. 1343 Citv of Kock Islaiifl V. Vanlandschoot, 7S III. 4S5. 1641 City of Uockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App. 305. 520 City of Roodhouse v. Christian, 53 111. App. 107. 1341 V. .lennings, 29 111. App. 50, 611 V. Johnson. 57 111. App. 73. 178 City of Rosedale v. Goldiug. 55 Kan. 107, 1315 City of Rushville v. Rushville Nat. Gas Co., 132 Ind. 57o, 553. 569, 573, 574 City of Sacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal. lin, 1508 V. Fowle, 21 Wall. 119, 1737 V. Kirk, 7 Cal. 419, 996 City of Saginaw v. Saginaw Circuit Judge. 106 Mich. 32. 604 V. Swift Electric L. Co., 113 Mich. 660, 504 City of St. Charles v. Eisner, 155 Mo. 671. 1388 V. Hackman, 133 Mo. 634, 1752 City of St. Joseph v. Anthony. 30 Mo. 537. 1131, 1533 V. Farrell. 106 Mo. 437, 1270 V. Hamilton, 43 Mo. 282, 699 V. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 39 Mo. 476, 1513 V. Levin. 128 Mo. 588, 604 V. O'Donoghue. 31 Mo. 345. 1253 V. Owen, 110 Mo. 445, 1175, 1206 V. Vesper. 59 Mo. App. 450. 499 City of St. Louis v. Alexander. 23 Mo. 483, 485, 1010 V. Allen, 13 Mo. 400, 104, 384, 1515, 1517 V. Allen. 53 Mo. 44, 1206 V. Arnot. 04 Mo. 275. 1462 V. Bell Tel. Co.. 96 Mo. 623. 615 V. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61, 495, 496, 1085 V. Boatman's Ins. &c. Co., 47 Mo. 150, 1507 V. Bofflnger. 19 Mo. 13. 466, 1099 V. Bowler, 94 Mo. 630, 1389 V. Brown, 155 Mo. 545. 512. 1244, 1274 V. Bucher, 7 Mo. App. 169, 1507 V. Caflferata, 24 Mo. 94, 104. 495. 496, 601, 1085 V. Clemens, 36 Mo. 467, 1499 V. Clemens, 42 Mo. 69, 1192 V. Connecticut L. Ins. Co., 107 Mo. 92, 1588 V. Davidson, 102 Mo. 140. 235, 239, 255, 649 V. Dorr, 136 Mo. 370, 1391 V. Excelsior Brewing Co., 96 Mo. 677. 1252 V. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582. 538 V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513, 299, 477, 485. 540, 1422 V. Coebel. 32 Mo. 295. 516 V. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468, 1508, 1521 V. Grone, 46 IMo. 574, 1396 V. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414, 1602 V. Heitzebei'g Packing &c. Co.. 141 Mo. 375. 1394 V. Herthel, 88 Mo. 128, 517, 615 City of St. Louis v. Knox, 74 Mo. 79. 538 V. Knox, 6 Mo. App. 247, 502 V. Laclede Gas Light Co., 155 Mo. 1, 746 V. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 5.59, 615, 1508, 1509 V. McCoy, 18 Mo. 238, 1099 V. aieyrose Lamp Mfg. Co., 139 Mo. 560, 1390 V. Oeters. 36 Mo. 456, 1234, 1253 V. Ranken. 96 jMo. 407, 1254 V. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, 541, 612 V. Russell, 9 Mo. 507, 94, 104, 383, 1517 V. Russell. 116 Mo. 248, 1393 V. St. Louis R. Co., 89 Mo. 44, 539 V. St. Louis R. Co., 14 Mo. App. 221, 519 V. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 496, 601, 607 V. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145, 1507 V. Stearn. 3 Mo. App. 48, 1003 V. Sternberg, 4 Mo. App. 453, 1508 V. Sternburg, 69 Mo. 289, 1520 V. Vert, 84 Mo. 204. 481. 493, 536, 607 V. Weber, 44 Mo. 547. 100. 502, 1084, 1403, 1406 V. Weitzel. 130 Mo. 600, 602, 605 V. Western U. Tel. Co., 63 Fed. 68, 604, 729 V. Wiggin Ferry Co., 40 Mo. 580. 1499, 1502 V. Withaus. 90 Mo. 646. 274. 471 City of St. Paul v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 566, 1350 V. Colter, 12 Minn. 41, 500, 501, 1148 V. Gilflllan, 36 Minn. 298, 621, 1120 V. Laidler. 2 Minn. 100, 575, 1403 V. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297, 1590 V. Stoltz, 33 Minn. 233, 1389 V. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248, 1403 City of Salem v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431. 1080. 1090. 1110, 1116, 1123, 1762 V. Maynes, 123 Mass. 272, 1121, 1122 City of Salina v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 544, 1641 City of San Antonio v. Berry, 92 Tex. 319, 1549, 1786 V. Jones, 28 Tex. 19. 983 V. Lane. 32 Tex. 405, 983, 1018 V. Mackey, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 210. 825 V. Mackey, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 793 V. Micklejohn, 89 Tex. 79, 463 V. Mullaly. 11 Tex. Civ. App. 596. 1211 V. Peters. 40 S. W. 827, 1304 V. San Antonio St. R. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 1811 V. Smith. 94 Tex. 266. 1708 V. Walker. 56 S. W. 952, 1304 V. White. 57 S. W. 8.58, 804 City of San Diego v. Granniss, 77 Cal. 511, 404 City of Sandwich v. Dolan, 133 111. 177. 1634 V. Dolan. 141 111. 430, 1631 City of San Francisco v. Burr, 108 Cal. 460, 1319 v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541. 90, 103, 629, 1537 V. Hazen, 5 Cal. 169, 202 V. Itsell, 80 Cal. 57. 630 City of San Jose v. Welch, 65 Cal. 358, 328 City of San Luis Obispo v. Fitzger- ald, 126 Cal. 270, 470 Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-8.32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] City of Santa Barbara v. Sherman, 61 Cal. 57, 535 City of Santa Cruz v. Santa Cruz R. Co., 56 Cal. 143, 527 v..Waite, 98 Fed. 387, 1021, 1031 City or Santa Rosa v. Coulter, 58 Cal. 537, 1515 City of Savannah v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 3 Woods 432, 1533 V. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54, 685, 687, 1568 V. Kelly, 108 U. S. 184, 982 City of Scranton v. Barnes, 147 Pa. St. 461, 1256 V. Catterson, 94 Pa. St. 202, 1609, 1621 V. Gore, 124 Pa. St. 595, 1637 V. Hill, 102 Pa. St. 378, 1637 V. Hvde Park Gas Co., 102 Pa. St. 382, 959 V. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 105 Pa. St. 445, 1199 City of Seattle v. Baxter, 20 Wash. 714, 1284 V. Pearson, 15 Wash. 575, 520 V. Smvth, 22 Wash. 327, 492 V. Yesler, 1 Wash. Ter. 571. 47. 1262 City of Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411, 260 City of Seward v. Conroy, 33 Neb. 430, 399 City of Seymour v. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148, 1179 V. Jeffersonvllle &c. R. Co., 126 Ind. 466, 678 City of Shawneetown v. Baker. 85 HI. 503. 257, 662 v. Mason, 82 111. 337, 704 City of Sherman v. Nairey, 77 Tex. 291, 1581 City of Shreveport v. Gregg, 28 La. An. 836, 1498 V. Levy. 26 La. An. 671. 493 v. Prescott, 51 La. An. 1895, 1131, 1132, 1248 V. Robinson, 51 La. An. 1314, 503 V. Roos, 35 La. An. 1010. 526 City of Sioux City v. Weare, 59 Iowa 95, 876 City of Sioux Palls v. Kirby, 6 S. D. 62, 596 City of Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan. 211. 540, 1421 City of Somerset v. Smith, 20 Ky. L. 1488, 290, 729 City of Somerville v. City of Bos- ton, 120 Mass. 574, 1045 City of South Bend v. Paxon, 67 Ind. 228, 1625 City of South Omaha v. Cunningham, 31 Neb. 316. 1210 V. Powell, 50 Neb. 798, 1374 City of South Pasadena v. Los An- geles &c. R. Co., 109 Cal. 315, 513 City of South St. Paul v. Lamprecht, 88 Fed. 449, 871, 986. 1012, 1029 City of Spokane Falls v. Brown, 3 Wash. 84, 1254 City of Springfield v. Baker, 56 Mo. App. 637, 1240 V. Burns, 51 111. App. 595, 1341 V. Davis, 80 Mo. App. 574, 1550 V. Dovle, 76 HI. 202, 1014 V. Edwards, 84 111. 385, 219, 881, 895, 897, 917, 1699, 1730 V. Green, 120 111. 269, 512, 1211, 1268, 1303 V. Harris. 107 Mass. 532, 1159 V. Le Claire, 49 111. 476, 787, 1620 V. Mathus, 124 III. 88, 1146, 1259 V. Rosonmever. 52 111. App. 301, 13'_'8 V. Sale, 127 HI. 359, 1234, 1259 City of Springfield v. Schmook, 68 Mo. 394, 704 V. Tomlinson, 79 111. App. 399, 1364 V. Weaver, 137 Mo. 650, 1144, 1146, 1157 City of Spring Valley v. Gavin, 182- 111. 232, 1794, 1803. 1805 City of Sterling v. Gait, 117 III. 11, 512, 1142, 1143, 1259, 1268, 1272 1273, 1300, 1303 V. Merrill, 124 111. 522, 1334, 1614, 1629 City of Stockton v. Creanor, 45 Cal. 643, 282 V. Western &c. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. 621, 114 City of Streator v. Chrisman, 182 III. 215, 13.34 V. Chrisman, 82 111. App. 24, 1330 V. Hamilton, 61 HI. App. 509, 1330 City of Sumner v. Scaggs, 52 111. App. 551. 1326 City of Superior v. Norton, 63 Fed. 357, 729 City of Syracuse v. Reed, 46 Kan. 520, 903 City of Tampa v. Mugge, 40 Pla. 3*^6 1543 vrsalomonson, 35 Fla. 446, 520, 551 City of Taunton v. Inhabitants &c., 153 Mass. 192, 1047, 1057 v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254, 468, 552, 1094, 1125. 1126 City of Terre Haute v. Beach, 96 Ind. 143, 1572 V. Evansville &e. R. Co., 149 Ind. 147, 1782 v. Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542, 820, 1207 y. Mack, 139 Ind. 99. 1702 v. Turner. 36 Ind. 522. 680 City of Terrell v. Dessaint, 71 Tex. 770, 892 City of Texarkana v. Leach, 66 Ark. 40. 1317 City of Toledo v. Board &c., 48 Ohio St. 43, 1247 City of Topeka v. Cowee, 48 Kan. 345, 1561, 1566 V. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 113, 119, 401 V. Noble, 9 Kan. App. 171, 1794, 1801 V. Ravnor. 60 Kan. 860, 490, 1394 V. Sells, 48 Kan. 512. 1224 City of Trov v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 11 Kan. 519. 540 v. Winters, 2 Hun 63, 594, 1392 City of Tulare v. Hevren, 126 Cal. 226, 1787 City of Uvalde v. Spier, 91 Fed. 594, 1012, 1029 City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1, 11. .568. 632. 647. 651, 848 877, 880, 889, 897, 1038, 1465 V. Hagen. 153 Ind. 337, 1708 City of Vicksburg v. Butler, 56 Miss. 72, 1552 v. Hennessey, 54 Miss. 391. 1586, 1633 V. Herman, 72 Miss. 211, 1219 City of Vincennes v. Callender, 86 Ind. 484. 1038 V. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 132 Ind. 114, 568, 569 City of Virginia v. Hall, 96 111. 278. 1262 v. Plummer, 65 111. App. 419. 1344 City of Wabash v. Carver, 129 Ind. 552, 1578. 1579 City of Waco v. Chamberlain, 92 ' Tex. 207, 748, 1153 v. Prather, 90 Tex. 80, 1144 V. Prather, 35 S. W. 958, 1144 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxv [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. SSS-ISSO.] City of Wahoo v. Dickinson, 2^1 Neb. 4-Jfi. 3S5 V. Keodcr, 27 Neb. 770, 1.3 City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1. 740, 876, 880, 881 City of Waltliam v. Citv of Newbury- port. ir.o Mass. 50;), 1045 City of Warsaw v. Duulap, 112 Ind. .'->T0. I(il5 City of Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa 437, 155J> City of Waterton v. Robinson, 69 Wis. 230, 1737 City of Water Valley v. Davis, 73 Miss. 521. 1752 City of Wasahachie v. Brown, 67 Tex. 519. 628, 883 City of Waycross v. Youmans, 85 Ga. 708, 199 City of Wellston v. Morgan, 59 Ohio St. 147, 734 City of Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141, 116, 388 V. Mastin, 62 Mo. App. 647, 463, 550, 1295 City of Wheeling v. Mayor &c., 1 Hughes 90, 579 City of Whitewrigbt v. Taylor, 23 Tes. Civ. App. 486, 1376 City of Wilkes Barre v. Meyers, 113 Pa. St. 395. 1446 City of WMlliamsport v. Beck, 128 Pa. St. 147, 1195 V. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. St. 48. 977 City of Willow Springs v. Withaupt, 61 Mo. App. 275. 515 City of Wilmington v. Macks, 86 N. C. 88, 1.507 V. Yopp. 71 N. C. 76, 1230 City of W'inchester v. Redmond. 93 Va. 711. 638, 741 City of Winfield v. Peeden, 8 Kan. App. 671. 180, 790 City of Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254, 537 V. School Dist., 40 Minn. 13, 1473, 1474 City of Worcester v. Inhabitants &c., 4 Allen 574, 1047 V. Keith. 5 Allen 17, 697 City of Wyandotte v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603, 54, 55 V. Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649. 646 City of Yonkers v. Yonkers R. Co., 64 N. Y. S. 955. 503, 1407 City of Ysleta v. Babbitt, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 788. 789, 816 City of Zanesville v. Richard, 5 Ohio St. 589, 1513, 1521, 1534 City R. Co. V. Citizens' St. R. Co., 166 U. S. 557, 566, 1351. 1756. 1808, 1813 City &c. R. Co. V. Mayor &c., 77 Ga. 7.S1. 594. 1358 City Sav. Bank v. Huebner, 84 Mich. 391, 910 City St. Imp. Co. v. Babcock, 123 Cal. 205, 1131 Civil Service Com'rs v. Kenyon, 86 111. App. 547. 1686 Claflin V. City of Chicago, 178 III. .549, 11.53 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Gray 502, 668 V. McDonough. 3.3 Mo. 412. 1263 Claiborne Co. v. Brooks. Ill U. S. 400, 562. 625. 637, 972, 974. 984 Clapp V. Camp, 122 Mass. 481, 1779 V. City of Hartford, 35 Conn. 66, 1239, 1270, 1271 V. Davis, 25 Iowa 315, 1745 Clapper v. Town of Waterford, 131 N. Y. 382, 778 (Maridge v. lOvelyn, 5 B. & Aid. 81, 378 Clarissy v. Metropolitan Fire Dept., 7 Abb. Pr. 352, 1744 Clark V. Barnard, 108 TI. S. 436, 18 v. Board &c., 27 111. 305. 973 V. Board &c., 24 Iowa 266. 1494 V. Board &c., 126 Mass. 282, 378 V. Board &c., 9 Neb. 516. 653 V. Board &c., 107 N. Y. 553, 853 V. City of Austin, 38 Minn. 487, 828, 1590 V. City of Columbus, 23 Wkly. L. Bui. 289, 837 V. City of Davenport, 14 Iowa 494, 106, 846, 1232, 1535 V. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199, 217, 234, 250, 252. 253, 638. 941 952, 960, 977, 1232, 1368. 1459 V. City of Dunkirk, 75 N. Y. 612, 1197 V. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 119. 484, 837, 973 V. City of Portsmouth, 68 N. H. 263, 180 V. City of Richmond, 83 Va. 355, 795 1595 V. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446, 76:5, 983 V. City of South Bend. 85 Ind. 276, 575, 1121, 1391 V. City of Utica, 18 Barb. 451, 698 V. City of Worcester, 167 Mass. 81, 1792 V. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129, 66, 69, 70, 197 V. Fry. 8 Ohio St. 358, 745 V. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202. 1108 V. Holdridge, 58 Barb. 61. 220 V. Inhabitants &c., 63 Maine 393, 1613 V. Inhabitants &c., 128 Mass. 567, 803, 807 V. Jeffersonville &c. R. Co., 44 Ind. 248, 656 V. Le Crete, 9 B. & C. 52, 100, 500 V. Lincoln Co., 1 Wash. 518, 9 V. Manchester. 62 N. H. 577, 795, 803, 804, 810. 815. 816, 827 V. Mayor &c., 12 Wheat. 40, 261, 282 V. Mayor &c., 13 Barb. 32, 1093 V. McKenzie, 7 Bush 523, 381 V. Miller. 54 N. Y. 528. 222 V. Mobile School Com'rs, 36 Ala. 621, 1745 V. Montague, 1 Gray 446, 1740 V. Peckham. 10 R. I. 35, 1112 V. People, 146 111. 348, 1278 V. Phelps, 4 Cow. 190. 335, 1570 V. Polk Co., 19 Iowa 248. 252. 941 952 9.59 V. Robinson, 88 111 498, ' "' 377 V. School Directors, 78 111. 474, 864 V. School District, 3 R. I. 199, 973, 977 V. Sheldon, 106 N. Y. 104, 925, 1678 V. State, 109 Ind. 388. 1490 V. State. 142 N. Y. 101, 175 V. Thompson, 37 Iowa 536, 12 V. Village of Dunkirk, 75 N. Y. 612. 1288 V. Village of Dunkirk, 12 Hun 181. 1717 V. Village of North Muskegon, 88 Mich. 308. 17,38 V. Warden. 55 Maine 61, 347, 348 V. Worcester. 125 Mass. 226. 675 Clark Co. v. Hine. 49 Ark. 145. 1052 Clarke v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 354, 1153, 1277 Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ Clarke v. City of Rochester, 5 Abb. Pr. 107, 447 V. Butcher, 9 Cow. 674, 245, 248 V. Inhabitants &c., 81 Mo. 503, 576 V. Locke, 9 N. Y. S. 918, 1541 V. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181, 181, 663, 714, 1736 T. Manchester. 56 N. H. 502, 699 V. May, 2 Gray 410. 335 V. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446, 11 V. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43, 58, 61 Clarksburg Electric Light Co. v. City of Clarksburg, 47 W. Va. 739, 1811 Clason V. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316, 499, 502, 506, 1406 Classen v. Shaw, 5 Watts 468, 311 Clay V. Nichols Co., 4 Bush 154, 982 V. Wright, 44 Vt. 538, 871 Claybrook v. Board &c., 117 N. C. 450, 993 V. City of Owensboro, 23 Fed. 634, 1494 Clayburgh v. City of Chicago, 25 111. 535, 1224 Clay Co. V. McAleer, 115 U. S. 616, 1525, 1662 V. Simonsen, 1 Dak. 403, 319, 904, 908 V. Society &c., 104 U. S. 579, 998, 1006 Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64, 369 V. McWilliam.s. 49 Miss. 311, 960 Clearfield v. Ind. School Dist., 79 Pa. St. 419, 1485 Clear Lake &c. v. Lake Co., 45 Cal. 90. 1394 Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. 25, 5 Cleary v. Eddy Co., 2 N. Dak. 397, 1654 Cleburne Water &c. Co. v. City of Cleburne, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 141, 1752 Clegg V. School Dist., 8 Neb. 178, 56 Cleghorn v. Po^elthwaite, 43 111. 428, 1720 Cleland v. Porter, 74 111. 76, 372 Clemence v. City of Auburn, 66 N. Y. 334, 812, 1584. 1587, 1603 Clemens v. Mayor &c., 10 Md. 208, 1262 Clement v. Burns, 43 N. H. 609, 696, 1572 V. City of Philadelphia, 137 Pa. St. 328, 1192 v. Everest. 29 Mich. 19, 66, 69 Clementine v. State. 14 Mo. 112, 1105 Clements v. Lee, 114 Ind. 397, 1150, 1190 v. Village of West Troy, 10 How. I'r. 199, 1559 Clerk V. Tucket, 3 Lev. 281, 531, 532 Cleveland v. Amy, 88 Mich. 374, 1486, 1491 V. City Council &c., 54 S. C. 83, 986, 999, 1033, 1709 V. City of Bangor, 87 Maine 259, 1333 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 42 Vt. 449, 1109 V. Heisley, 41 Ohio St. 670, 1518 V. King, 132 U. S. 295, 1591, 1594, 1609 v. State Bank, 16 Ohio St. 236, 210 V. Steward, 3 Ga. 283, V. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50. 1239, 1242, 1268 Cleveland Cotton Mills v. Commis- sioners &c., 108 N. C. 678, 835 Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. City of Cleve- land, 94 Fed. 385, 1707 v. Dunn, 63 111. App. 531, 66 V. O'Brien, 24 Ind. App. 547, 1200 V. Wynant, 114 Ind. 525, 1613, 1614 Clevenger v. Town of Rushville, 90 Ind. 258, 537 Clews V. Lee Co., 2 Woods 474, 1528 Click V. Lamar Co., 79 Tex. 121, 1568 Clifford V. Commissioners, 59 Maine 262, 697 Clifton V. Cook, 7 Ala. 114, 152 V. Wvnne, 80 N. C. 145, 1528 Clingman v. People, 183 III. 339, 1308 Clinton v. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 90 V. City of Portland, 26 Or. 410, 1141, 1260 V. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 47 Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51, 771, 773 Cloherty, In re, 2 Wash. 137, 1410 Close V. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 104 Cloud V. Town of Norwich, 57 Vt. 448, 212 Clough V. Hart, 8 Kan. 487, 181, 664 V. Holden, 115 Mo. 336, 586 Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn. 405, 1624 Cluggish V. Koons, 15 Ind. App. 599. 1286. Coal Float V. City of Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15, 500 Coan V. City of Marlborough, 164 Mass. 206, 789 Coast Co. V. Mayor &c., 56 N. J. Bq. 615, 70, 1731 Coast Line R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 30 Fed. 646, 510, 1183 Coates V. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498, 980 V. Mayor &c., 7 Cow. 585, 528, 611, 1079, 1086, 1105, 1114, 1119 Coatesville Gas Co. v. Chester Co., 97 Pa. St. 476, 1512 Cobb V. City of Boston, 112 Mass. 181. 701, 702 V. City of Portland, 55 Maine 381. 799 V. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197, 90, 103 V. Lucas. 15 Pick. 1, 707 V. Ramsdell. 14 N. Y. S. 93, 1065 V. School Dist., 63 Vt. 647. 853, 1491 Coburn v. Bossert, 13 Ind. App. 359, 1705 V. Ellenwood, 4 N. II. 99, 50 Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa 75, 189. 286, 288, 296 V. Village of Park Ridge, 138 111. 295, 1146, 1174 Cochrane v. Mayor &c., 81 Md. 54, 599, 812 Cocke V. Halsey, 16 Pet. 71, 70, 195, 197 Cocker v. Du Coteau Landing Co., 16 Rap. Jud. Que. S. C. 72, 550 Cockerel! v. Cholomeley, 1 Russ. & Mvl. 418. 429, 1014 Codman v. Winslow, 10 Mass. 146, 348 Codner v. Bradford. 10 Wis. 443, 1596 Coe V. Bearup, 14 Week. Dig. 246, 1564 V. Caledonia &c. R. Co., 27 Minn. 197. 990 V. Meriden, 45 Conn. 155, 115 V. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64. 1107 V. Smith, 24 Wend. 341, 10,50 Coffey V. Edmonds, 58 Cal. 521, 158 Coffeyville &c. Co. v. Citizens' Gas &c. Co., 55 Kan. 173, 1347 Coffin V. City of Portland, 43 Fed. 411, 29» V. Inhabitants &e., 162 Mass. 192, 1317 V. Nantucket. 5 Cush. 269, 281 V. Richards, 59 I'ac. 562, 986 V. State. 7 Ind. 157, 183 Coggeshall V. City of Des Moines, 78 Iowa 235, 837, 1188 V. Peltou, 7 Johns. Ch. 292, 664 TABLE OP CASES. Ixxxvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Coggswell V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Cush. 307, 1597 Cohen V. City of Alameda, 11*4 Cal. 504, 115:5, 1506 V. Mayor &c., 11.3 N. Y. 532, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1609, 1610 V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 34 Kan. 158, 701 Coin V. Brown, 111 Mich. 657, 75 Colburn v. Ellis, 5 Mass. 427, 198 V. Mayor &c., 17 Am. L. Reg. 191, 562 Colchester v. Seabor, 3 Burr. 1870, 445 Colden v. Botts, 12 Wend. 234, 544 V. Thurbur, 2 Johns. 424, 1559 Cole V. Black River Falls, 57 Wis. 110. 196, 447 V. City of Newburyport, 129 Mass. 594, 818 V. Citv of Shreveport, 41 La. An. 839, 719, 1306 V. City of St. Louis, 132 Mo. 633. 1219, 1380 V. Favorite, 69 111. 457, 1757 V. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1, 559, 980 V. Laws. 108 N. C. 185. 226 V. Medina, 27 Barb. 218, 2G3 V. People, 161 111. 16, 725 V. Skrainka, 105 Mo. 303, 1131 V. Trustees &c., 27 Barb. 218, 820 Cole Co. V. Schmidt, 10 S. W. 888, 906 Coleman, In re. 30 Hun 544, 1723 V. Board &c., 50 Cal. 493, 991 V. City of Fargo, 8 N. D. 69, 930 V. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 865. 1421, 1422 V. Ormond, 60 Ala. 328, 328 V. Pike Co., 83 Ala. 326, 906, 907 V. Second Ave. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 201. 637 V. State, 47 N. Y. St. 609, 773 Coler V. Board &c., 89 Fed. 257, 1633, 1700 V. Board &c., 6 N. Mex. 88, 1014 V. Cleburne, 131 U. S. 162, 614. 1014, 1015 Coles V. Madison Co., 1 111. 154, 61, 83, 759 V. Trustees &c., 10 Wend. 659, 291 Coles Co. V. Allison, 23 111. 383, 437, 1691 Colin V. Board &c., 114 Cal. 404, 872 Coll V. City Board &c., 83 Mich. 367, • 1665 Collander v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418. 824 College Street, In re, 5 R. I. 474, 1247 Collensworth v. City of New What- com, 16 Wash. 224. 796 Collett V. Mayor &c., 64 N. Y. S. 693, 1358, 1362, 1375, 1376 Collier v. Hyatt, 110 Ga. 317, 1787 Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Vent. 413, 130 Collins V. City of Louisville, 2 B. Mon. 134. 1254 V. City of New Albany, 59 Ind. 396. 392 V. City of Waltham, 151 Mass. 196. 1179 V. Holyoke. 146 Mass. 298. 285 V. Inhabitants &c.. 6 Cush. 396, 1618 V. Inhabitants &c., 172 Mass. 78, 815, 816 V. King Co., 1 Wash. 416. 1052 V. McDaniel. 66 Ga. 203, 223 V. Russell, 107 Oa. 423, 201 V. Welch, 58 Iowa 72, 660, 661 Collopy V. Cloherty, 18 Ky. L. 1061, 290 Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass. 105, 343 V. Shattnck. 62 N. Y. 348, 187 Colorado Pav. Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28. 1687, 1704 Colter V. Casteel, 37 S. W. 791, 754 Colter V. Morgan, 12 B. Mon. 278, 318 Colton V. Ilanchett, 13 111. 615, 1701 Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Treadw. Const. 213, ,529 v. Hunt, 5 Rich. 550, 1232 Columbia Bridge Co. v. Kline, Bright. 320, 564 Columbia R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 TJ. S. 202, 1G27 Columbia Tp. v. Pipes, 122 Ind. 239, 1749 Columbus &c. R. Co. v. Board &c., 05 Ind. 427, 1539 Columbus Water-works Co. v. City of Columbus, 48 Kan. 99, 74G Colville v. Judy, 73 Mo. 651, 696 Colwell V. May's Landing Co., 19 N. J. Fq. 245, 517 Comanche Co. v. Lewis, 138 U. S. 198, 86, 974 Comb V. Bell, 2 Minn. 295, 1165 Comer v. Bankhead, 70 Ala. 493, 216 V. Folsom, 13 Minn. 219, 992 Comesky v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 41 App. Div. 245, 1773 Commercial Elec. &c. Co. v. City of Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288, 789 Commercial Nat. Bank v. City of lola, 2 Dillon 353, 55, 980, 982 V. City of Portland, 24 Or. 188, 741, 1306 Commissioner v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471. 224 Commissioners. — See also, Board ; Name of county. Commissioners &c.. In re, 49 N. J L. 488, 564 Commissioners &c.. Matter of, 47 Hun 302, 1248 V. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307, 103 V. Anderson, 20 Kan. 298, 212 V. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, 1011 V. Auditor &c., 1 Ohio St. 322, 434 V. Babcock, 5 Or. 472, 229 V. Baker, 44 Md. 1, 8 V. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104, 1001, 1002, 1006, 1007, 1022 V. Brewer, 9 Kan. 307, 182, 743 V. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498, 427, 434 V. Call. 123 N. C. 308, 986, 999 V. Clark, 94 U. S. 278, 1002, 1014, 1017, 1031 V. Claw, 15 Johns. 537, 708 V. Commissioners «&c., 92 U. S. 307, 14, 434, 767, 1517, 1532 V. Commissioners &c., 79 N. C. 565, 434 V. Commissioners &c., 101 N. C. 520, 1043 V. Commissioners &c., 107 N. C. 291, 438, 439 V. Commissioners &c., 16 Ohio 466, 436 V. Commissioners &c., 2 Ohio St. 508, 436 V. Covey, 74 Md. 262, 509, 595, 1391, 1392 V. Directors &c., 7 Ohio St. 65, 1063 V. Durham, 43 III. 86. 705 V. Frank, 1 Jones L. 436, 539 V. Griffin, 134 111. 330, 1712 V. Harris, 7 Jones L. 281, 507 V. Ilearne, 59 Ala. 371, :!()0 V. Jackson, 165 111. 17, 879 V. January, 94 U. S. 202. 1001, 1006 V. Johnston, 71 N. C. 398, 704 V. Keller, 6 Kan. 510, 941, 952. 959, 960 V. Kent, 5 Neb. 227, 278 V. Leckey, 6 S. & R. 166. 295 V. McCombs, 19 Ohio St. 320, 629 V. McDaniel, 7 Jones L. 107, 196 Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. {References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Commissioners &c. v. National Land Co.. 23 Kan. 106, 245 V. Nelson. 19 Kan. 234, 427 V. Newell, 80 111. 587, 977, 1532 V. Norris, 62 Ga. 538, 1725 V. Northern Liberties Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318, 500, 502, 506, 508 V. Osborn, 4G Ohio St. 271, 938 V. Quinn. 136 III. 604. 1170 V. Ranney, 13 Ohio St. 388, 938 V. Rather, 48 Ala. 433, 412 V. Rollins & Sons, 178 U. S. 255 998 V. Smuggs, 121 N. C. 394, 986 V. Supervisors &c.. 27 111. 140, 1724 V. Thaver. 94 U. S. 631, 990, 1001 V. Tomlinson. 9 Kan. 167, 1072 V. Village of East Peoria, 75 III. App. 450. 610 V. Walker. 8 Kan. 431, 1263, 1552 V. Zimmerman, 101 Ky. 432. 993. 1021 Common Council &c. v. Board &c., 87 Mich. 113, 1163 V. Huron Copper Min. Co.. 57 Mich. 547. 628, 1536 V. State. 5 Ind. 334, 664 Common Schools v. Commissioners &c., 20 Md. 449. 845 Commonwealth, Appeal of, 9 Atl. 524, 1320 V. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 508, 578 V. Adams. 3 Bush 41, 308 V. Adams, 114 Mass. 323. 1642 V. Albur^er, 1 Whart. 469, 629 V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 594, 1115, 1382 V. Allen, 70 Pa. St. 465, 380, 1690, 1694 V. Arrison, 15 S. & R. 127, 296 V. Athearn, 3 Mass. 285, 1429 V. Baldwin, 1 Watts 54, 1734 V. Bean. 14 Gray 52, 552 V. Bennett. 108 Mass. 30, 84 V. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234, 1106 V. Brennan. 150 Mass. 63. 428 V. Brooks, 109 Mass. 355, 509, 552 V. Central Bridge Corporation, 12 Cush. 243, 1575 V. Chase, 6 Cush. 248, 1423, 1424 V. City of Boston, 16 Pick. 442, 1557 V. City of Frankfort, 92 Ky. 149. 588 V. City of Louisville, 20 Ky. L. 893, 1756 V. City of Pittsburg. 14 Pa. St. 177. 168, 285, 301 V. Clulev, 56 Pa. St. 270, 378 V. Cochran, 5 Binn. 87, 1667 V. Comly, 3 Pa. St. 372, 319 V. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. St. 383. 123, 296 V. Commissioners &c., 6 Binn. 5, 1662 V. Commissioners &c., 16 Serg. & R. 443. 1527 V. Commissioners &c., 9 Watts 466. 295 V. Commissioners &c., 1 Whart. 1, 1662 V. Commissioners &c., 32 Pa. St. 218, 990 V. Commissioners &c., 37 Pa. St. 277, 1016, 1522, 1527, 1530 1534, 1667 V. Coolev. 10 Pick. 37. ^■''H V. Coombs. 2 Mass. 489. 634 V. Corcoran. 9 Knlp 507. 297 V. Council &c., 41 Pa. St. 278. 977. 983 V. County Com'rs. 5 Rawle 75. 371 V. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, 447, 1813 Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen 266, 517, 539, 552, 597 V. Cutter, 156 Mass. 52, 500. 507, 538, 597, 1419 V. Davis. 140 Mass. 485. 484. 485. 500, 509, 602 V. Dean, 110 Mass. 357, 84 V. De Camp, 177 Pa. St. 112, 731 V. Delaware Canal Co., 123 Pa. St. 594, 1521 V. Dow, 10 Met. 382, 517, 519 V. Downing. 6 Mass. 72, 707 V. Dugan. 12 Met. 233. 1433 V. Emminger, 74 Pa. St. 479, 381 V. Emorv. 11 Cush. 406, 1418 V. Erie &c. R. Co.. 27 Pa. St. 339. 97. 468. 592, 1352 V. Fahey. 5 Cush. 408. 536, 1086 V. Fairfax, 4 Hen. & M. 208, 326 V. Fenton, 1.39 Mass. 195, 1395 V. Fowler, 10 Mass. 290, 1690 V. Gabhert. 5 Bush 438. 318 V. Genther, 17 S. & R. 135, 211 V. George. 148 Pa. St. 463, 582 V. German Society, 15 Pa. St. 251. 207 V. Goodrich. 13 Allen 546, 10S6 V. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383, 1811 V. Hankes, 123 Mass. 525. 1418, 1420 V. Ilargest. 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 333, 305 V. Hastings, 9 Met. 259. 1433 V. Heffron. 102 Mass. 148. 1422 V. Holmes. 17 Mass. 336, 1106 V. Holmes, 25 Gratt. 771, 317, 319 V. Howard, 149 Pa. St. 302, 281 V. Hublev, 172 Mass. 58, 1386 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Mass. 406, 1739 V. Inhabitants &c., 1 Pick. 180, 684 V. Inhabitants &c., 2 Pick. 70, 290 V. Johnson, 2 Binney 275. 960 V. .lohnson. 6 Pa. St. 136, 1734 V. Judges. 8 Pa. St. 391. 58. 61 V. Justices &c., 2 Pick. 414. 1683 V. Kepner. 10 Phila. 510. 286, 296 V. King. 13 Mete. 115. 1105, 1587 V. Leech, 44 Pa. St. 332. 380. 556, 1690 V. Lennon, 172 Mass. 434, 1362 V. Lowell Gas Co., 12 Allen 75. 4. 1511, 1512 V. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. 328, 1160 V. Matthews. 122 Mass. 60. 487 V. McCafCerty, 145 Mass. 384. 483, 500, 552, 601 V. McClelland, 83 Ky. 686, 370 V. McCombs, 56 Pa. St. 436. 66. 69, 70. 197 V. McDonald, 16 Serg. & R. 390. 1559 V. McGroartv. 6 Kulp 105. 84 V. McWilliams. 11 Pa. St. 61. 983 V. Meeser. 44 Pa. St. 341, 380, 1690 V. Mitchell, 82 Pa. St. 343, 1667, 1687 V. Mohn, 52 Pa. St. 243, 1105 V. Moorehead. 118 Pa. St. 344, 1106 V. Mulhall. 162 Mass. 496. 1348 V. New York &c. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 58. 1681 V. Odenweller, 156 Mass. 234, 539, 1420 V. Page, 155 Mass. 227. 597. 1397. 1402 V. Painter. 10 Pa St. 214. 58, 61, 82 V. Parks, 155 Mass. 531. 595 V. Patch. 97 Mass. 221. 494. 502. 597. 1085. 1094 V. Pennsylvania Benef. Institute, 2 S. & R. 141, 206 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxix [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Comstook V. Incorporated Village of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 2S8, Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Canal Co.. (56 ra. St. 41. 674 V. People's &c. P.ank, 5 Allen 4L'8, 1520 V. Perkins. 7 Pa. St. 42. 1G67 V. Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 400, 983, 1520, 1.530 V. Peters. 3 Mass. 229, 695, 1572 V. Philadelphia, 132 Pa. St. 288. 1467 V. Pindar. 11 Met. 539. 1411 V. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 468, 493, 500. 551. 552, 1433. 1434 V. Proprietors &c., 2 Gray 339, 831, 832 V. Quarter Sessions. 8 Barr 391. 82 V. Reid, 175 Mass. 325, 1386 V. Rice. 9 Met. 253, 580, 1402 V. Roark, 8 Cush. 210, 1411 V. Robertson, 5 Cush. 438. 500, 517, 1084 V. Rowe, 141 Mass. 79, 537 V. Roxburv. 9 Gray 451, 15 V. Roy. 140 Mass. 432, 506 V. Rush, 14 I'a. St. 186, 629 V. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90, 1417 V. Schiibmehl, 3 Lack. Leg. N. 186, 305 V. Select &c. Council. 34 Pa. St. 496, 971, 1523, 1526, 1528. 1530 1535, 1667 V. Select &c. Council, 88 Pa. St. 66, 1527, 1529 V. Shaw, 7 Met. 52, 347, 348, 851, 362 V. Shaw, 1 Pittsb. 492, 1415 V. Sheldon. 3 Mass. 188, 706 V. Smith. 132 :\Iass. 289. 308 V. Springfield &c. Co., 10 Bush 254, 990 V. Stark, 2 Cush. 556, 538 V. Steffee. 7 Bush 161, 500 V. Stockley. 12 Phila. 316, 1405 V. Stockton, 5 T. B. Mon. 192, 332 V. Stodder, 2 Cush. 502, 467. 506, 519, 552, 1389, 1404 V. Sutherland, 3 S. & R. 145, 200 T. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55, 594 V. Towanda Water-Works, 15 Atl. 440, 1688 V. Towles, 5 Leigh 743, 137 V. Union &c. Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230, 1693 V. Upton, 6 Gray 473, 1106 V. Went worth. 145 Mass. 50, 360, 362 V. West Chester, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 542, 1666 V. Westfield Borough, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 369, 1655 V. Wilkins, 121 Mass. 356. 535, 1403 V. Williamson. 10 Phila. 490, 1494 V. Winthrop. 10 Mass. 177, 707 V. Woelper. 3 S. & R. 29, 185 V. Wolbert, 6 Binn. 292, 650 V. Woods, 44 Pa. St. 113, 593. 1243, 1253 V. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462, 500, 505. 529. 536, 551 V. Wyman. 137 Pa. St. 508, 166, 287 V. Yost, 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 323. 1763 V. Young, 135 Mass. 526. 468, 552 Company &c. v. Atkinson, 6 East 507. 326 Compher v. People. 12 111. 290. 318 Comstock V. City of Grand Rapids, 54 Mich. G41, 802. 1200 V. City of Syracuse, 5 N. Y. 874, 895, 896 720, 728, 745 V. School Committee &c., 17 R. I. 827, 364 Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa 90. 85. 491, 5.38, 1418 Concord v. Burleigh, 67 N. II. 106, 1110 V. Boscawen, 17 N. II. 465. 1536, 1542 V. Concord Horse R. Co., 65 N. II. 30, 282 V. Merrimack Co., 60 N. H. 521, 1055 V. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165, 562, 625, 645. 981, 984 Concord R. Co. v. Greeley, 17 N. I-I. ^ 47, 685 Condict V. Mayor &c., 46 N. J. L. ^ 157, 781, 1096 Condran v. City of New Orleans. 43 La. An. 1202, 710, 743 Conery v. New Orleans Water-Works Co., 142 U. S. 79. 767, 768 V. New Orleans Water-Works Co., 39 La. An. 770, 650 V. New Orleans Water-Works Co., 41 La. An. 910. 572, 636 Congreve v. Morgan, 18 N. Y. 84, 1599 V. Morgan, 5 Duer 495, 745 Conklin v. City of Elmira, 42 N. Y. S. 518. 1342 V. City of Keokuk, 73 Iowa 343, 1227 V. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218, 807 Conklyn v. New York &c. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 107, 1603 Conley v. Chedic. 6 Nev. 222, 1722 V. Supervisors &c., 2 W. Va. 416, 523 Conlin v. Aldrich, 98 Mass. 557. 1657, 1692 V. Board &c.. 99 Cal. 17. 926 Connecticut &c. Ins. Co. v. City of ' Chicago, 185 111. 148, 1295 V. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 41 Barb. 9, 1014 Connecticut River R. Co. v. County Com'rs, 127 Mass. 50, 1743 Connellsville Borough v. Gilmore. 15 W. N. C. 343, 1124 Conner v. Beret. 1 Mo. 235. 7-59 V. Board &c., 57 Ind. 15, 841, 1040 V. Elliot. IS How. 591, 137 V. Mayor. 2 Sandf. 355, 199, 201 Connett v. City of Chicago, 114 111. 233, 1349 Connolly v. Inhabitants &c., 151 Mass. 437, . 641, 672 Connor v. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. 285, 183 Connors v. Carp River Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168. 106 Conover v. Devlin, 15 How. Pr. 470, 197 Conoway v. Ascherman, 94 Ind, 187, 696 Conrad v. Stone, 78 Mich. 635, 161, 162 V. Trustees &c.. 16 N, Y, 158, 9. 782, 812. 821, 1587, 1591, 1592 Conroe v. Bull, 7 Wis. 408, 1737 Conservators &c, v. Ash, 10 Barn. & Cress. 349. 38 Consolidated &c. Ass'n v. Avingo, 28 La. An. 552. 1027 Consolidated Traction Co. v. East Or- ange Tp., 63 N. J. L. 669. 592, 1791, 1814 Construction of Sewer &c.. In re, 30 Pittsb, L. J. 18, 1266 Consumers' Gas &c. Co. v. Congress Spring Co.. 15 N. Y. S. 624. 681 Continental &c. Co. v. Riggen. 31 Or. 336. 879 Continental Const. Co. v. City of Al- toona, 92 Fed. 822, 551, 730 sc TABLE OF CASES. IBeferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Converse v. City of Fort Scott, 92 U. S. 503, 991 V. McArthur, 19 Barb. 410, 1062 V. Porter, 45 N. H. 385, 352, 361, 1569 Conway v. City of Beaumont, 61 Tex. 10, 263 V. Russell, 151 Mass. 581, 222 V. St. Louis, 9 Mo. App. 488, 197 v. O'Brien, 11 Ind. 41i). 97, 468 V. President &c., 15 lud. 150, 1252, 1500 Cook V. Boston, 9 Allen 393, 243 V. City of Anamosa, 66 Iowa 427, 776. 1620 V. City of Ansonia, 66 Conn. 413, 1211 V. City of Beatrice, 32 Neb. 80, 985 V. City of Charlestown, 98 Mass. 80, 1613 V. City of Menasha, 103 Wis. 6. 932 V. Commissioners &c., 6 McLean 612, 836 V. Crandall, 7 Utah 344, 1515 V. Harris, 61 N. Y. 448, 1559, 1562 V. number, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 33, 127 V. Inhabitants &c., 115 Mass. 571, 1613 V. Luckett, 2 C. B. 168, 128 V. Manufacturing Co., 1 Sneed 698, 982 V. Mayor &c., 54 Ga. 468, 798, 1075 V. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 1395 V. Sanitary Dist. &c., 177 111. 599 524 V. Slocum, 27 Minn. 509, 1196, 1253 V. Sudden, 94 Cal. 443, 1560 V. Town of Barton, 63 Vt. 566. 1575 Cook Co. V. Chicago Indust. School, 125 111. 540, 1495 V. Harms, 108 III. l.".!. 1756 V. McCrea, 93 111. 230, 835 Cooke V. School Dist., 12 Colo. 153, 435, 1487 Cook Farm Co. v. City of Detroit, 124 Mich. 426, 1303 Cool V. Crommet, 13 Maine 250, 693, 1570 Cooley V. Chosen Freeholders «S:c., 27 N. J. L. 415, 832 Coolidge V. Inhabitants &c., 114 Mass. 592, 10, 641, 671 Coolman v. Fleming, 82 Ind. 117, 697 Coombs V. County Com'rs, 68 Maine 484, 1321 V. Inhabitants &c., 38 Maine 204, 1332 V. MacDonald, 48 Neb. 632, 740 Coonley v. City of Albany, 132 N. Y. 145, 817, 830, 1557 V. City of Albany, 57 Hun 327, 620, 1372 Cooper V. City of Brooklyn, 42 N. Y. S. 762, 550 V. District of Columbia, Mac- Arth. & M. 250, 519 V. Lampeter Tp., 8 Watts 125, 284 295 V. People, 41 Mich. 403, ' 536 V. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149, 249 V. Schultz. 32 How. 107. 1079 V. Sullivan Co., 65 Mo. 542, 990 V. Town of Delavan. 61 111. 96, 865 v. Village of Waterloo, 88 Wis. 433, 1375 Copcutt V. City of Yonkers, 59 Hun 212, 1256 Cope V. Collins, 37 Ark. 649. ]528 V. Thames Haven Dock & R. Co., 3 Kxch. 841. 261 Copeland v. Packard, 16 Pick. 217, 687, 1739 Copeland v. State, 126 Ind. 51, 1672 Copes V. Mayor &c., 10 Rich. L. 491, 992 Copp V. Henniker, 55 N. H. 179, 698 Corbalis v. Newberry Tp., 132 Pa. St. 9, 816 Corbett v. City of Troy, 6 N. Y. S. 381, 1607 Corbett v. Widber, 123 Cal, 154, 1553 Corbin v. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co., 66 Iowa 73, 699 V. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. St. 461, 1801 V. Wisconsin R. Co., 06 Iowa 269, 1573 Corcoran v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 149 111. 291, 170& V. Village of Peekskill, 108 N. Y. 151, 1627 Cotdell V. New York &c. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 535, 1641 V. State, 22 Ind. 1, 524 Cordiell v. Frizell, 1 Nev. 130, 168 Corev V. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 1763 Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash, C. C. 371, 137 Corkle v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch. 413, 1725 Corliss V. Corliss, 8 Vt. 373, 340 Cormack v. Wolcott, 37 Kan. 391, 1429 Cornell v. Barnes, 7 Hill 35, 309 v. People, 107 111. 372, 1538 V. Town of Guilford, 1 Denio 510, 210, 251, 252, 253, 647 Cornell College v. Iowa Co., 32 Iowa 520, 652 Corning v. Gould. 16 Wend. 531, 1574 V. Greene, 23 Barb. 33, 58, 61 Cornwell v. Metropolitan &c. Com'rs, 10 Exch. 771, 1561 Corporation &c. v. Mayor &c., 5 Cow. 538, 611 Corporation of Amite City v. Clem- ents, 24 La. An. 27, 52(> Corporation of Bluflfton v. Mathews, 92 Ind. 213, 1624 V. Studabaker, 106 Ind, 129, 861 Corporation of Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Treadw. Const. 213, 528, 534 V. Hunt, 5 Rich. L. 550, 1101 Corporation of Easton v. Neff, 102 Pa. St. 474. 820 Corporation of Gloucester v. Osborn, 1 H. L. Cas. 272, 563 Corporation of Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea 121, 11-1, 1392 Corporation of Marshall v. Snediker, 25 Tex. 460, 1551 Corporation of I'embroke Tp. v. Can- ada &c. R. Co., 3 Ont. R. 503, 1349 Correll v. City of Cedar Rapids, 110 Iowa 333, 1753, 1754 Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541. 1149, 1406 Cory V. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 1494 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 100 Mo. 282, 694 V. Somerset Freeholders, 44 N. J. L. 445, 259 Cosgrove v. City Council &c., 103 Ga. 835, 1387 Cosner v. City of Centerville, 90 Iowa 33, 1802 Costello V.I State, lOS Ala. 45, 585, 1364 V. Wyoming. 49 Ohio St. 202. 557 Coster V. Tidewater Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 54, 685, 687 Cotes V. City of Davenport, 9 Iowa 227, 680 Cothran v. City of Rome, 77 Ga. oSZ, 839 Cottnm V. Oregon Citv. 98 Fed. 570, 1767 Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio 394, 532 TABLE OP CASES, XCl [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-8S2; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Cotterill v. Starkey, 8 Car. & P. G91. 1637 Cotton V. Atkinson, 53 Ark. 98, 328 V. Commissioners &c., 6 Fla. 610, 858, 983 V. Davies. 1 Str. 53, 157 V. Kllis. 7 Jones L. 545, 183 V. Inhabitants &c., 47 N. J. L. 401. 1741 V. Mississippi &c. Co., 22 Minn. 372. 45 V. Phillips. 56 N. H. 220, 185, 198 Coughlan v. City of Cambridge, 166 Mass. 268. 790 Cougot V. City of New Orleans, 16 La. An. 21, 581 Coulson V. City of Portland. Deady 481, 877, 880, 952 Coulter V. Coulter, 81 Ind. 542. 1095 V. Robertson. 24 Miss. 278. 410 Council &c. V. Hardson, 88 Ga. 599. 1333 V. People, 78 111. 382, 1668 County — See Board ; Commissioners ; County Com'rs : Name of County. County Com'rs v. Baker, 44 Md. 1, 223 V. Burgess. 61 Md. 29. 1632 V. Chandler, 96 U. S. 205, 981 V. County Com'rs &c., 50 Md. 245, 7, 13, 14 V. County Com'rs, 1 Wyo. Ter. 140, 438 V. Diebold State &c. Co., 133 U. S. 473, 1191 V. Duckett, 20 Md. 468, 218, 222, 1546 V. Duvall, 54 Md. 351. 226 V. Hunt, 5 Ohio St. 488, 655 V. King. 13 Fla. 451. 280. 427, 433. 443, 1528, 1529 V. Lineberger. 3 Mont. 231, 319 V. Melviu. 89 Md. 37, 1685 V. People. 11 111. 202, 1683 V. President &c.. 51 Md. 465. 393 V. State, 24 Fla. 263, 425, 426, 432 County Court v. Bareman, 34 W. Va. 362. 893 V. Griswold. 58 Mo. 175, 685 V. People, 58 111. 456, 624 V. Robinson. 27 Ark. 116, 1494 Courser v. Powers, 34 Vt. 517, 187, 198 Courtney v. Louisville, 12 Bush 419. 983. 1515, 1517 Covington v. City of East St. Louis, 78 111. 548, 54, 106, 494, 845, 1517 V. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231. 74. 90, 104. 120, 713 V. Rockingham. 93 N. C. 134. 1717 Covington Co. v. Dunklin, 52 Ala. 277. 1527 Covington &c. R. Co. v. City of Cov- ington. 9 Bush 127, 586 V. Ingles, 15 B. Mon. 637, 1806 V. Mayor &c., 85 Ga. 367. 233, 235, 589 Cowart V. Foxworth. 67 Miss. 322, 843, 1489 Cowdin V. HufC. 10 Ind. 83. 183 Cowdrey v. Town of Canadea, 16 Fed. 532, 990 Cowen V. Village of West Troy, 43 Barb. 48. 97. 468. 494. 644 Cowie V. City of Seattle. 22 Wash. 659. 1329. 1359. 1362, 1801 Cowles V. Brittam, 2 Hawks 204, 1714 V. School Dist.. 23 Neb. 655. 1472 Cowlev V. City of Spokane, 99 Fed. 840. 1291 V. Town of Rushville, 60 Ind. 327. 521 Cox V. City of Chicago. S3 111. App. 540, 1798 Cox V. City of Des Moines, 111 Iowa 646, 1328 V. City of St. Louis, 11 Mo. 431, 85, 538 V. James, .59 Barb. 144, 1564 Coy V. City Council. 17 Iowa 1, 1526. 1527, 1530, 1680 Coykendall v. Hood, 55 N. Y. S. 718, 514, 1710 Coyle V. Gray, 7 Houst. 44, 577 Crabtree v. Gibson, 78 Ga. 230, 1172, 1288 Crafford v. Supervisors &c., 87 Va. 110, 3 Craft V. Loflnck, 34 Kan. 365, 427 Crafts V. Inhabitants &c., 47 Maine 141, 1744 Craig V. Burnett. 32 Ala. 728, 1507 V. Charle.ston, 78 111. 372, 789 V. City of Charleston, 180 HI. 154, 812 V. City of Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 265, 1254, 1271 V. City of Sedalia. 63 Mo. 417, 1580 V. City of Vicksburg, 31 Mass. 216, 1012 V. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42. 374 V. Rochester &c. R. Co., 39 N. Y. 404, 1582 V. Secrist. 54 Ind. 419, 664 V. Town of Andes, 93 N. Y. 405, 987 Cram v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 265, 1173. 1174 Cramer v. City of Burlington, 45 Iowa 627, 1797 V. City of Charleston, 176 111. 507, 511. 1289 Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 651, 653, 1698, 1728 Crandall v. Amador Co., 20 Cal. 72, 1679 V. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 138 V. State. 10 Conn. 339, 137 Crane v. City of Fond du Lac, 16 Wis. 196, 13, 1527, 1530 V. City of Janesville, 20 Wis. 321, 1254 v. School Dist., 61 Mich. 299, 852 V. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 481, 1309, 1378, 1449 Cranston v. Augusta, 61 Ga. 5T2, 544 Craw V. City of Tolono. 96 III. 255, 1143. 1262. 1268. 1300, 1303 Crawford v. Bradford, 23 Fla. 404. 1721 V. Dunbar, 52 Cal. 36, 185, 378 V. Meredith. 6 Ga. 552, 310 V. Town of Rutland. 52 Vt. 412, 1573 V. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 824 V. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504, 1475 Crawford Co. v. Iowa Co., 2 Pin. 368. 424 Crawfordsville Music Hall Ass'n v. Clements. 12 Mo. App. 464, 1286 Crawn v. Commonwealth. 84 Va. 282, 315 Crawshaw v. City of Roxbury, 7 Gray 374. 669, 715 Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush 696, 210. 646 Creager v. Wright School Dist., 62 Mich. 101, 1480 Crebs v. City of Lebanon. 98 Fed. 549, 403. 716. 882. 1752 Creed v. Hartmann, 29 N. Y. 591. 212, 745 Cregier v. Mayor &c., 11 Daly 171, 178 Creighton v. Board &c., 42 Cal. 446. 763, 1522 v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 142, 313 V. Manson. 27 Cal. 613. 480 V. Piper. 14 Ind. 182. 185 V. Scott, 14 Ohio St. 438, 1262 xeu TABLE OP CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Crepps V. Burden. Cowp. 640, 535 Crescent City G. L. Co. v. New Or- leans G. L. Co., 27 La. An. 138. 1808 Crescent Tp. v. Anderson, 114 Pa. St. 643, 1633 Creston Water Works Co. v. City of Creston. 101 Iowa 687, 720, 876 Crist V. Brownsville Tp., 10 Ind. 461, 295 Crites v. City of New Richmond, 98 W^is. 55, 1803 Crittenden v. Terrill. 2 Llead 588, 329 Crittenden Co. v. Shanks, 88 Ky. 475, 916 Crocker v. McGregor, 76 Maine 282, 1614 Crockett v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 182, 687, 1159 Crofut V. City of Danbury, 65 Conn. 294, 638 Croll V. Village of Franklin, 40 Ohio St. 340, 523 Cromartie v. Commissioners &c., 87 N. C. 134, 1528 Crommett v. Pearson, 18 Maine 344, 294, 866 Cromwell v. Sac Co., 96 U. S. 51, 1000, ,1018, 1020, 1026, 1027 Cronan v. Municipality &c., 5 La. An. 537, 1305 Cronin v. Patrick Co., 89 Fed. 79, 999 V. People, 82 N. Y. 318. 611, 1402 V. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271, 197, 311, 313 Cronlv V. City of Tucson, 56 Pac. 876, 988 Crook V. People, 106 111. 237. 90, 103 Cropper v. City of Mexico, 62 Mo. App. 385, 1335 Crosby v. Hanover. 36 N. H. 404. 1323 Cross V. Cherry. 122 Pa. St. 417, 561 V. City of Kansas, 90 Mo. 13. 1224 V. Hecker, 75 Md. 574. 1413. 1417 V. Mayor &c., 18 N. J. Eq. 305, 259. 464. 465, 1106. 1254, 1288 V. School Directors, 24 111. App. 191, 1482 Crossett v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 420, 680 Crouse, Ex parte, 4 Whart. 9. 1071 Crow v. Board &c.. IIS Ind. 51, 1038 V. Oxford. 119 V. S. 215, 645 Crowder v. Town of Sullivan, 128 Ind. 486, 568. 877, 889, 1038 Crowell V. Crispin, 4 Daly 100. 215 V. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313. 788, 814 Crowly V. Copely. 2 La. An. 329. 1270 Crewmen v. Wellsville Water Co., 3 N. Y. S. 177, 1456 Crudup V. Ramsey. 54 Ark. 168, 9.58 Cruger v. Dougherty, 43 N. Y. 107, 1533 V. Hudson River R. Co., 12 N. Y. 190. 698 Cruickshank v. City of Chicago, 181 111. 415, 512 Cruikshanks v. City Council, 1 Mc- Cord 360. 1714 Crume v. Wilson, 104 Ind. 583, 699 Cudd V, Calvert, 54 S. C. 457. 610 Cudden v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 143. 9 Culbertson v. City of Fulton. 127 111. 30. 877. 880. 883, 888, 923 v. Coleman. 47 Wis. 193. 558 Cullen v. Town of Carthago, 103 Ind. 196. 663, 664, 861 Culver V. Armstrong. 77 Mich. 194. 1496 V. Citv of Streator. 130 111. 238. 799 V. People. 161 111. SO, 1289 V. Third Nat. Bank. 64 III. 528. 524 Culverson v. City of Maryville, 67 Mo. App. 343. 1328 Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids, 46 Mich. 150, 1253 Cumins v. Lawrence Co., 1 S. Dak. 158, 1024 Cumming v. Mayor &c., R. M. Charlt. 26, 1500, 1508 V. Mayor &c., 11 Paige 596, 175, 741, 1306 V. United States, 22 Ct. CI. 344, 772 Cummings v. Brown, 43 N. Y. 514, 332 V. City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259, 577, 629, 1698 V. Clark, 15 Vt. 653, 198 V. Huse &c. Ice Co., 156 Mo. 28, 1373 V. Peters, 56 "Cal. 593, 688 V. Village of New Rochelle, 56 N. Y. S. 701. 1326, 1330 V. West Chicago Park Com'rs. 181 111. 136, 1136, 1149, 1236 Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491, 647. 1177, 1179. 1776 V. Des Moines &c. R. Co.,. 63 Iowa 397. 701 V. District Tp. &c., 42 Fed. 644, 1024 V. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 1288 Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. 178, 335 V. Campbell, 33 Ga. 625, 697 V. City of Cleveland. 98 Fed. 657, 728, 740, 744, 882 V. Citv of Denver, 23 Colo. 18, 1333 V. Citv of Griffin, 107 Ga. 690, 599 V. City of Peoria, 157 111. 499, 1135, 1244 V. Corporation &c. of Almonte, 21 Up. Can. C. P. 459, 521 V. Macon &c. R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 18 V. Squires, 2 W. Va. 422. 1419 Cupp V. Board &c., 19 Ohio St. 173. 692 Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304, 410, 760 V. Citv of Boston. 151 Mass. 505, 8 V. City of Louisville, 83 Ky. 628, 1574 V. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427, 1571 Currier v. Concord, 68 N. H. 294, 930 Currv V. District of Columbia, 14 App. D. C. 423. 1809 V. District Tp. &c.. 62 Iowa 104, 12 V. Jones, 4 Del. Ch. 559. 1288 V. Mavor &c.. 64 Ga. 290. 1530 V. President &c., 15 111. 320. 591 Curtis V. Butler Co.. 24 How. 435. 1014 V. Gowan. 34 111. App. 516, 181, 664, 941 V. Lyman. 24 Vt. 338. 229 V. Pocahontas Co.. 72 Iowa 151, 1572 V. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350. 548, 610, 980, 1542 Gushing v. Frankfort, 57 Maine 521, 289 V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Cush. 389, 662, 664 V. Inhabitants &c., 125 Mass. 526, 823 Cushman v. Smith, 34 Maine 247, 705 Cutcomp V. TTtt. 60 Iowa 156. 12.57 Cutler V. Inhabitants &c., 121 Mass. 588, 215 V. Town of Russellville, 40 Ark. 105, 299. 477 Cutliff v. Mavor &c.. 60 Ga. 597, 1520 Cutter V. Demmon, 111 Mass. 348. 211 Cuyler v. Trustees &c., 12 Wend. 165, 251, 647 Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, ■ 2 Met. 350, 689 TABLE OF CASES. XCIU [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] D Dabney's Adm'r v. Smith, 5 Leigh 13, 323 Dadv V. Mayor &c., 57 Hun 456, 1176 Dafoe V. Ilarshaw, 60 Mich. 1200, 186 Daggett V. City of Cohoes, 54 Hun 639. 1180 V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 369, 370, 371 V. Town of Mendon. 64 Vt. 323, 367 Dailey v. State, 8 Blaclsf. 329, 185 Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367, 1269, 1270, 1532 Dair v. United States, 16 Wall. 1, 310 Dale V. Citv of St. Joseph, 59 Mo. App. 566. 1211 V. Delaware &c. R. Co., 73 N. Y. 468. 1627. 1628 V. Irwin, 78 111. 170, 353, 372 V. Webster Co., 76 Iowa 370, 1802 Dalev V. Norwich &c. R. Co., 26 Conn. 591, 794 Dallas V. Posdick. 40 How. Pr. 249, 1494 Dallas Co. v. McKenzie, 110 U. S. 686, 998, 1024 Dallas Elect. Co. v. City of Dallas, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 323, 751, 875 Dalton V. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740, 829, 1779 V. City of Salem, 139 Mass. 91, 1624 V. State, 43 Ohio St. 652, 381 V. Upper Tyrone Tp., 137 Pa. St. 18, 816 Daly V. City of San Francisco, 72 Cal. 154, 647, 1186 V. Georgia &c. R. Co., 80 Ga. 793, 586, 590 V. Morgan, 69 Md. 460, 383, 386. 388, 1521 Dalzpll V. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa 437, 680 Dammann v. City of St. Louis, 152 Mo. 186. 1801 Damon v. Inhabitants &c., 2 Pick. 345, 7. 284, 286. 290, 294, 357 Dana v. City of Boston, 176 Mass. 97. 1772 Danaher v. City of Brooklyn, 119 N. Y. 241. 808 Dane v. Gilmore. 51 Maine 544. 329 Danforth v. Durrell. 8 Allen 242, 1561 V. Village of Hinsdale, 177 111. 579. 1144, 1277 Daniel v. City of New Orleans, 26 La. An. 1, 1257 V. Mayor &c., 11 Humph. 582, 90, 103, 663 Daniels v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 35 Iowa 129. 706 V. ntv of Des Moines, 108 Iowa 484, " 175 V. Intendant, 55 Ga. 609, 1577 V. Lebanon, 58 N. H. 284, 1639 V. Long, 111 Mich. 562, 1685 V. Municipal Council &c., 10 Up. Can. Q. B. 478, 211 V. Tearnev, 102 U. S. 415. 649, 650 Dannot v. Mayor, 66 N. Y. 585, 722 Danolds v. State, 89 N. Y. 36, 771 D'Antiguac v. City Council, 31 Ga. 700, 1254 Danville v. Shelton. 76 Va. 325, 1521 Danville &c. Co. v. Park, 88 111. 463. 1513 Dapper v. City of Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 88. 1343. 1806 Darbv v. Sharon Hill, 112 Pa. St. 66. 422 Darcantel v. People's Slaughter House &c. Co.. 44 La. An. 632, 481. 582 Dargan v. Mayor &c., 31 Ala. 469, 1075 Darling v. City of Bangor, 68 Maine 108, 1585 V. City of St. Paul, 19 Minn. 389. 282, 1405 V. Gunn, 50 111. 424, 1238 V. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401, 1614, 1618 Darlington v. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St. 68, 692, 1425 V. Jackson Co., 101 U. S. 688, 1001 V. Laclede. 4 Dill. 200, 1024 V. Mayor &c., 31 N. Y. 164, 799, 800, 1083, 1394, 1744 Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417, 169, 185 Darst V. People. 51 111. 286, 606 Dartmouth v. County Com'rs, 153 Mass. 12, 290 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 2, 4, 74, 75, 81, 84 510, 767, 771 Dartmouth Sav. Bank v. School Dis- tricts, 16 Dak. 332, 626, 1485 Dasent, In re, 2 N. Y. S. 609, 935 Dasey v. Skinner, UN. Y. S. 821, 1235 Dashiell v. Mayor &c., 45 Md. 615, 1262 Daugherty v. Brown, 91 Mo. 26, 1225, 1568 Dausch V. Crane, 109 Mo. 323. 303 Davenant v. Hurdis, Moor. 576, 467 Davenport v. Buffington, 97 Fed. 234, 1698 v. Dodge Co., 105 U. S. 237, 1528 V. Inhabitants &c., 10 Maine 317, 362, 866 V. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502, 569, 642, 848, 897 V. Kleinschmidt. 8 Mont. 467, 897 V. Mayor &c., 67 N. Y. 456, 185 V. Ruckman, 37 N. Y. 568, 1592, 1639 V. Town of Johnson, 49 Vt. 403, 871 Davenport &c. Ass'n v. Schmidt, 15 Iowa 213, 1570 Davenport &c. Co. v. City of Daven- port. 13 Iowa 229, 468, 491, 1417 Davenport &c. R. Co. v. Lowry, 51 Iowa 486, 1726 Davey v. Baker, 4 Burr. 2471, 538 Davidson v. City of Chicago, 178 111. 582, 1146. 1148, 1154 V. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 454, 930 V. County Commissioners, 18 Minn. 482, 983 V. Mayor &c., 27 How. Pr. 842, 103, 763, 1394 V. Mayor &c., 54 N. Y. S. 51, 785 V. New Orleans. 96 Tt. S. 97, 559, 694. 1238. 1239, 1262, 1302, 1715 Davies v. City of Galveston, 16 Tex. App. 13, 1143 V. City of Los Angeles, 86 CaL 37, 692 V. City of Saginaw. 87 Mich. 439, 1193, 1236, 1253, 1255, 1261 V. Fairbairn, 3 How. 636, 111, 495 V. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369, 369 V. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587, 500, 533 V. New York &c. Co., 48 N. Y. Super. Ct. 492, 210 Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657, 210. 233, 637, 890, 981. 9S2. 998, 1000 V. Huidekoper, 98 U. S. 98. 999, 1001 Davis V. Berger. 54 Mich. 652, 187 V. Brace. 82 III. 542, 1540 V. Capper, 10 B. & C. 28, 221 V. City Council &c., 51 Ala. 139. 264. 820 V. City of Austin, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 1799 XCIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ Davis V. City of Bangor, 42 Maine 522. '831, 832. 1112. 1613 V. City of Clinton, 55 Iowa 549, 1714 V. City of Crawfordsville, 119 Ind. 1, 1220 V. City of Des Moines, 71 Iowa 500, 891 V. City of Dubuque, 20 Iowa 458, 1516 V. City of Kingston, 5 N. Y. S. 506, 1617 V. City of Knoxville, 90 Tenn. 599, 805, 1075 V. City of Litclifleld, 145 III. 313, 1146, 1149, 1300, 1498 V. City of Litctifield, 155 III. 390, 522, 1236, 1300 • V. City of Lynctiburg. 84 Va. , 861, 1268 V. City of Newarlj, 54 N. J. L. 144. 595. 1248 V. City of Omalia. 47 Neb. 836, 1333 V. East Tennessee &c. R. Co., 87 Ga. 605, 586, 590 V. Inliabitants &c., 4 Allen 557, 1332, 1601 V. Inhabitants &c., 140 Mass. 422. 1622 T. Masschusetts, 167 U. S. 43, 1406 V. Mayor &c., 61 Mich. 530, 714, 1586 T. Mayor &c., 14 N. Y. 506. 568 579. 586, 637, 1108. 1323, 1352. 1610 V. Mayor &c., 1 Duer 451. 516, 708 V. Mayor &c., 64 Ga. 128. 1507, 1520 V. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587. 100 V. Patterson, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 479. 1644 V. Read. 65 N. Y. 566. 282. 1539 V. School Dist., 24 Maine 349. 259, 644, 1212 V. School Dist., 81 Mich. 214, 852. 1473, 1491 V. School Dist., 43 N. H. 381, 366 V. School Dist.. 44 N. H. 398, 370 V. Smith, 130 Mass. 113. 687 V. Town of Anita, 73 Iowa 325, 500. 1368 V. Town of Point Pleasant. 32 W. Va. 289. 62, 1518 V. Woolnough. 9 Iowa 104, 1413 V. Yuba Co., 75 Cal. 452. 1017 Davison v. Otis. 24 Mich. 23. 543 Dawes v. Jackson, 9 Mass. 260. 216 Daws V. Town of Elmwood, 34 Fed. , 114. 1017 Dawson V. Aurelius Tp., 49 Mich. 479, 1726 Dawson Co. v. Clark, 58 Neb. 756. 1548. 1554 Dawson &c. Co. v. Carver, 95 Ga. 565, 1709 Day v. Board &c., 102 Mass. 310, 1743 V. City of Clinton, 6 111. App. 476, 521 V. City of Morristown, 63 N. J. L. 353, 106 V. Day, 94 N. Y. 153. 1579 V. Gallup, 2 Wall. 97, 330 V. Green, 4 Cush. 433, 281, 468, 1759 V. Inhabitants &c., 5 Allen 98. 1592, 1612 V. Putnam Ins. Co., 16 Minn. 408. 671 V. Reynolds. 23 Hun 131, 228 V. Savage. Hob. 212, 467 Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77, 500 Dayton Tp. v. Rounds, 27 Mich. 82, 1529 Deady v. Village of Lyons, 57 N. Y. S. 448, 1549, 1553 Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236, 559, 1234 V. City of New York, 61 N. Y. S. 374. 722 V. Davis. 51 Cal. 406. 4, 5, 1084 V. Lufkio. 54 Tex. 265, 1535 V. Randolph, 132 Mass. 475. 815 Deane v. Inhabitants &c., 132 Mass. 475, 803, 1159 V. Todd. 22 Mo. 90, 1722 De Baker v. Southern &c. R. Co., 106 Cal. 257, 797, 1208 De Blois V. Barker, 4 R. I. 445, 1198 De Boest v. Gambell, 35 Or. 368, 175, 1769 Debs. In re, 158 U. S. 564, 1706 Decatur v. Stoops, 21 Ind. App. 397 1330 Decatur' Co. Board &c. v. State, 86 Ind. 8. 1525 Decatur Gas &c. Co. v. City of De- catur, 24 111. App. 544, 639, 1468 Dechert v. Commonwealth, 113 Pa. St. 229. 1667 Decorah v. Dustan, 38 Iowa 96, 1405 Decraw St., Matter of, 18 Wend. 568 123.3 Deeds v.' Sanborn. 26 Iowa 419. 1516 Deel V. City of Pittsburgh, 3 Watts 363 529 Deems v. Mayor &c., 80 Md. 164, 600. 1703 Defer v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. 346, 1215 Defiance Water Co. v. City of Defi- ance. 90 Fed. 753, 728. 1132 De Forth v. Wisconsin &c. R. Co., 52 WMs. 320, 987 De Fremery v. Austin, 53 Cal. 380, 1551 De Grave v. Mayor &c., 4 Car. & P. 111. 288 Dehail v. Morford. 95 Cal. 457, 1259 De Hart v. Atlantic City, 62 N. J. L. 586. 75 V. McGuire. 10 Phila. 359. 322 Dehm v. City of Havana, 28 111. App. 520, 888 Deiman v. Citv of Fort Madison, 30 Iowa 542, 1516 Deitz V. City of Central, 1 Colo. 323, 47, 528, 529 DeLacey v. City of Brooklyn, 12 N. Y. S. 540, 165 Delacey v. Neuse &c. Co., 1 Hawks 274. 207 Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill 159, 253, 258. 259, 715 V. Illinois, 26 Wend. 192. 217 v. Village of Westfeld, 58 N. Y. S. 277, 722 Delahanty v. Warner, 75 111. 185. 207. 1697 Delamater v. City of Chicago. 158 111. 575. 511, 1275, 1277 Delancv, Matter of, 52 N. Y. 80, 1205 De Lano v. Dovle. 120 Mich. 258, 1393 Delano v. Mayor &c.. 32 Hun 144, 1265 Delany v. Gault. 30*Pa. St. 63, 693 Delaware &c. Canal Co. v. Camden &c. R. Co.. 1 C. E. Green 321, 584 V. Village of Whitehall. 90 N. Y. 21. 591 Delaware Co. v. McClintock. 51 Ind. 325. 982 V. McDonald. 46 Iowa 170. 1068 Delaware &c. R. Co. v. City of Buf- falo. 158 N. Y. 266. 1365 Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206. 1501 Delcamhre v. Clere, 34 La. An. 1050, 1532 TABLE OF CASES. XCV [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Delgado, In re, 140 U. S. 586, 1666 V. Chavez, 5 N. M. 646, 1666 Dells V. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, 370 Delmonico v. New York, 1 Sandf. 222, 811 De Loge v. New York &e. R. Co., 157 N. Y. 688, 483 Demarcst v. Mayor &c., 74 N. Y'. 161, 74, 90, 103 V. Wickham, 63 N. Y. 320, 288, 297 Demby v. City of Kingston, 14 N. Y. S. 601, 1111 Dempsey v. City of Rome, 94 Ga. 420, 1317 Dempster v. City of Chicago, 175 111. 278, 1276, 1280 Denair v. City of Brooklyn, 5 N. Y. S. 835, 1746 Denham v. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 202, 687, 1557 Deni^on &c. R. Co. v. James, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 358, 1152, 1380. 1777 Denman v. St. Paul R. Co., 26 Minn. 357, 1641 Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 III. 627, 1399 Dennett v. Nevers, 7 Maine 399, 866 Denning v. Roome, 16 Wend. 651, 1422, 1423. 1424, 1559, 1560, 1562 V. Yount. 9 Kan. App. 708, 516, 525 Dennis v. Maynard, 15 111. 37, 1084 Dennison v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. 416, 1257, 1258 Denniston v. Clark. 125 Mass. 216, 335 V. School Dist., 17 N. H. 492, 339, 341, 343, 1485 Denny v. City of Spokane, 79 Fed. 719. 741, 879 V. Denny. 113 Ind. 22, 655 Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320, 50, 1536 Denver &c. R. Co. v. Barsaloux, 15 Colo. 290, 1652 V. City of Denver, 2 Colo. App. 34, 1405 V. City of Denver, 21 Colo. 350, 1505 V. Domke, 11 Colo. 247, 1352, 1652 v. Glasscott, 4 Colo. 270, 1614 V. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 1652 De Pauw Plate Glass Co. v. City of Alexandria, 152 Ind. 443, 1552 De rierris. Petition of, 82 N. Y. 243, 1256 Dermont v. Mayor &c., 4 Mich. 435, 1215 Dermott v. State. 99 N. Y. 101, 568 Derry v. Rockingham Co., 62 N. H. 485, 1043 De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216, 18 Desha Co. v. Newman, 32 Ark. 788, 945 Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 1493 Desmare v. United States, 93 U. S. 605. 1042 Des Moines Co. v. Harker, 34 Iowa 84, 17 Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines. 44 Iowa 505. 110, 466. 568, 618, 1371. 1703. 1704 Des Moines Water Co.'s Appeal. 48 Iowa 324. 1511, 1512 Des Plaines v. Poyer, 22 111. App. 574. 1120 D'Esterre v. City of Brooklyn &c., 90 Fed. 586, 1007, 1013, 1031 Detroit v. Martin. 34 Mich. 170. 245. 247. 1263, 1552 v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 817. 1341, 1342, 1593 Detroit &c. Ass'n v. Highway Com'rs, 34 Mich. 36, 628 Detroit &c. Plank Road Co. v. Ma- comb Circuit Judge, 109 Mich. 371, 1707 Detroit &c. R. Co. v. Bcarss, 39 Ind. 598, 348 V. City of Detroit, 64 B'ed. 628, 1351, 1812 v. City of Detroit, 110 Mich. 384, 1351 V. City of Grand Rapids, 106 Mich. 15, 1250 V. Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 682, 683 De Turk v. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. St. 151, 185 Deufel V. Long Island City, 46 N. Y. S. 355, 1342 De Varaigue v. Fox, 2 Blatchf. 95, 675. 685, 759 Devay v. Mayor &c.. 35 Barb. 264, 150 Devenish v. City of Spokane, 21 Wash. 77, 1337 Deyenpeck v. Lambert, 44 Barb. 596, 1567 Dever v. City of Junction City, 45 Kan. 417, 1194 Devereaux v. City of Brownsville, 29 Fed. 742, 455, 1524 Devlin v. Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. 8, 1192 V. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470, 1591 Devoe V. School Dist., 77 Mich. 610. 852, 1491 Devor v. M'Clintock, 9 W. & S. 80, 1519 Devore's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 163, 1517 De Voss V. City of Richmond, 18 Gratt. 338, 1017 Den V. Carson, 26 N. J. L. 228, 1234 V. Judges, 3 Hen. & Mun. 1, 1657 De Walt V. Bartley, 146 Pa. St. 529, 376 Dewein v. City of Peoria, 24 111. App. 396, 1177 Dewey v. Central Car Co., 42 Mich. 399. 1737 V. City of Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 1262 V. City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa 416. 1130, 1139. 1242 Dewhurst v. City of Allegheny, 95 Pa St 437 802 Dewire'v. Bailey, 131 Mass. 169, 1587 De Witt V. Village of Ithaca, 15 Hun 568, 1564 De Wolf V. Watterson, 35 Hun 111, 1491 Dexter v. City of Boston, 176 Mass. 247, 1271, 1305 V. Town Council &c., 17 R. I. 222, 1401 Dey V. Lee, 4 Jones L. 238, 301 V. Mayor &c., 19 N. J. Eq. 412, 253, 279, 481, 1212 Deyo V. Otoe Co., 37 Fed. 246, 992, 1022 Diamond v. City of Brooklyn, 36 N. Y. S. 97, 1325 Dibble v. Town of New Haven, 56 Conn. 199, 859 Dickerson v. Franklin, 112 Ind. 178, 1516 Dickey v. City of Chicago, 164 111. 37, 1144 V. City of Chicago, 179 111. 184, 1153 V. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343, 368 V. People, 160 111. 633, 1303 V. Polk. 58 Iowa 287, 1726 V. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373, 687 Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65, 647, 851 V. Mayor &c., 92 N. Y. 584, 1746 V. Worcester, 7 Allen 127, 1216 Dickinson Hardware Co. v. Pulaski Co., 55 Ark. 437, 619 XCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Tol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Dickson v. City of Racine, 61 Wis. 545, 561, 1499 V. Kewanee &c. Co., 53 III. App. 379, 1348 Diecljmann v. Sheboygan Co., 89 Wis. 571, 1236 Diefentlialer v. Mayor &c.. Ill N. Y. 331, 244, 246, 1203, 1264 Dieschel v. Town of Maine, 81 Wis. 553, 281 Dietz V. City of Neenah, 91 Wis. 422, 1242, 1701 Diggins V. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, 1206 V. Hartsliorne. 108 Cal. 154, 1270 Dilcher v. Raap, 73 111. 266, 223 Dill V. Inhabitants &c., 7 Met. 438, 210, 251, 646 V. Roberts. 30 Wis. 178, 558 Dillard v. Webb, 55 Ala. 468, 282 Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547, 48, 86, 87, 1475, 1727 Dillon V, City of Raleigh, 124 N, C. 184, 1329, 1332, 1362 V. City of Syracuse, 9 N. Y. S. 98, 1212 V. Myers, Bright. 426, 197 Dimock v. Town of Suffleld, 30 Conn. 129, 1612 Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544, 675. 685, 689 Dingman v. People, 51 111. 278, 1105 Dingwall v. Common Council, 82 Mich. 568, 292, 297 Dinwiddie v. President &c., 37 Ind. 66, 1288 Directors &c. v. Donnelly (Pa.), 7 Atl. 204, 948 V. Houston, 71 111. 318, 4, 6 V. Malany, 64 Pa. St. 144, 1063 Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212, 152, 349, 368, 381, 1508 District &c. V. District &c., 18 Mo. App. 266, 1495 V. Macloon, 4 Wis. 79, 436 V. People, 75 111. App. 539, 1806 District of Clifton «&c, v, Schneider, 21 Ky. L. 212, 1307 District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519, 1617 V. Ashton, 14 App. D. C. 571, 1328 V. Crumbaugh, 13 App. D. C. 553, 1804 V. Dempsey, 13 App, D, C. 533, 1337 V. Haller. 4 App. D. O. 405, 1317 V. Lyon, 161 U. S. 200. 1306 V. Payne, 13 App. D. C. 500, 1334, 1799 V. Sullivan, 11 App. D. C. 533, 1325 V. Waggaman, 4 Mackey 328, 500 V. Washington &c. R. Co., 1 Mackev 361, 1183 V, Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450, 817, 1594 District Tp. &c. v. District Tp. &c., 11 Iowa 506, 240 V. Hardenbrook. 40 Iowa 130, 1483 V. Rankin, 70 Iowa 65, 662 V. Thomas, 59 Iowa 50, 624 Dively v. City of Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa 565, 1417 V. City of Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa 227, 891 Diveny v. City of Elmira. 51 N. Y. 506, 812. 826, 1417, 1587 Dix V. School Dist., 22 Vt. 309, 362 V. Town of Dummerstown, 19 Vt. 262, 662 Dixon V. City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 240, 1419 V. City of Detroit, 86 Mich. 516, 1287 V. City of New York, 63 N. Y. S. 794, 744, 745 Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 U. S. 83. 634, 636, 885, 998, 999, 1000, 1002. 1006, 1008, 1009 Doane v. Houghton, 75 Cal. 360, 1259 V. Lake St. El. R. Co., 165 111. 510, 1706 Doctor V. Hartman, 74 Ind. 221, 697 Dodd V. City of Hartford, 25 Conn. 232, 1718, 1722 Dodds V. Henry, 9 Mass. 262, 351 Dodge V. City of Memphis, 51 Fed. 165, 978, 984 V. Com'rs &c., 3 Met. 380. 706 V. Gallatin, 130 N. Y. 117, 1426 V. Gridley, 10 Ohio 173, 106 V. People, 113 111. 491, 447 V. Piatt Co., 82 N. Y. 218, 1010 V. Van Buren Circuit Judge, 118 Mich. 189, 1707 Dodson V. City of Cincinnati, 34 Ohio St. 276, 680 V. Mayor &c., 33 Ark. 508, 399, 400 Doe V. Deavors, 11 Ga. 79, 1714 V. Jones, 11 Ala. 63, 1559 V. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf. 335, 1540 Doering v. State. 49 Ind. 56. 1433 Doggett V. Cook. 11 Cush. 262, 335 Doherty v. Buchanan, 173 Mass. 338, 171 V. Citv of Galveston, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 708. 297 Dolan V. Joint School Dist., 80 Wis. 155. 1480 V. Mayor &c.. 68 N. Y. 274. 197. 198. 212. 1258, 1445 Dolese v. McDougall. 182 111. 486, 1145 V. McDougall. 79 111. App. 629. 1145 V. Pierce, 124 111, 140, 385, 396 Doll V, Devery, 57 N. Y. S. 767, 579 Dollar Sav. Bank v. Ridge, 79 Mo. App. 26, 1174, 1295 v. United States. 19 Wall. 239, 1734 Dolliver v. Parks. 136 Mass. 499, 198 Dolloflf V. Inhabitants &c., 162 Mass. 569, 713 Donaghy v. Macy. 167 Mass. 178. 201 Donahew v. City of Kansas City. 136 Mo. 657. 796. 1377. 1801 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Maine 279, 221, 222, 1495 Donahue v. Graham, 61 Cal, 276, 109 V. Will Co., 100 111. 94, 1711 Donaldson v. Butler Co., 98 Mo. 163, 1740 v. City of Boston, 82 Mass. 508, 1592 Donley v. City of Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 348, 1160 Donnellv v. City of Brooklyn, 7 N. Y. 49, 934 V. City of Brooklyn, 121 N. Y. 9, 931 V. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 1030, 1768 V. Decker, 58 Wis. 461, 1084 V. Town of Ossining, 18 Hun 352, 870 V, Tripp, 12 R. I. 97, 818 Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 111. 229, 396 Donough V. Dewey. 82 Mich. 309. 66, 69, 196, 273, 276. 1473 Donovan v. City of Oswego, 59 N. Y. S. 759. 931, 1756 V. Mayor &c., 29 Miss. 247, 532 V. Mayor &c., 44 Barb. ISO. 894 V. Mayor &c.. 33 N. Y. 291, 210, 252, 233, 253, 645 V. McAIpin. 85 N. Y. 185. 225 V. Partridge, 69 N. H. 88, 223 V. President &c., 1 Pin. 81, 412 Doolan v. City of Manitowoc, 48 Wis. 312, 174 TABLE OF CASES. XCVll [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} Dooley v. Muse. 31 Neb. 424, 14 < 3 V. Town of Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451 820, 1100 Doolittle V. County Ct, 28 W. Va. 258, 1651 V. Selectmen &c.. 50 Conn. 402, lOSl V. Walpole. 67 N. II. 554, 2GG Doon Tp. V. Cummins. 142 U. S. 366. 800. 002, 903. 008 Dorau v. Barnes. 54 Kan. 238, 1702 V. City of Camden. 40 Atl. 724. 1406 Dorchester v. Youngman. 60 N. H. 385, 4(2 Dore V. City of Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 108, 1224 Doremus v. People, 161 111. 26, 1237, 1289 Dorev v. City of Boston, 146 Mass. 336, 28o Dorgan v. City of Boston. 12 Allen 223, 687. 1177. 1231 Dorman v. City Council &c.. 81 Maine 411. 695. 606, 1572 V. City of Jacksonville, 13 Pla. 538, 680, 1776 Dorn V. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261, 220 V. Backer. 61 Barb. 507. 1727 Dorrance St.. Matter of. 4 R. I. 230. 1266 Dorsev v. City of Racine, 60 Wis. 292 1622 V. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 1111 V. Smyth, 28 Cal. 21, 1445 Dorsev Co. v. Whitehead, 47 Ark. 205, 210, 957 Dosdall V. Olmsted. 30 Minn. 96, 9 Doster v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. 233, 805 v. Howe. 28 Kan. 353. 664 Dotterer v. Bowe. 84 Ga. 769, 1745 Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co., 56 N. Y. 1, 1627 Dougherty v. Borough of Norwood, 196 Pa. St. 92. 721 V. Hitchcock, 35 Cal. 512, 1255 V. Miller, 36 Cal. 83, 708 V. Trustees &c.. 159 N Y. 154, 1364 Doughty V. Hope, 3 Denio 249, 348, 1533, 1540 Douglas V. Commonwealth, 2 Rawle .->(!■-> 1392 V. "commonwealth, 108 Pa. St. 559. 753 V. Craig. 4 Kan. App. 99, 1271 V. Downing. 9 So. 297, 968 V. Kansas Citv. 147 Mo. 428, 1388 V. Mayor &c.. IS Cal. 643, 570, 651 V. Pike Co.. 101 IT. S. 677, 1524 V. Town of Chatham, 41 Conn. 211. 983 V. Town of Harrisville. 9 W. Va. 162, 1287, 1520 Douglas Co. V. Bardon. 79 Wis. 641, 315 V. Timme, 32 Neb. 272, 173 Douglass V. Board &c., 23 Fla. 419, 274 V. City Council &c., 118 Ala. 599. 1705 V. Pike Co.. 101 U. S. 677, 1001 V. State. 31 Ind. 429. 1445 V. Wickwire, 19 Conn. 489. 195 Douglasville v. .Tones. 62 Ga. 423. 242 Dousman v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 387. 1198 Dovaston v. Payne, 2 Sm. L. Cas. 142 1559 Dover v. McMurphy. 4 N. H. 158, 1.58 V. Twombly, 42 N. H. 59, 326 Dow V. Bullock. 13 Gray 136, 168 V. Norris. 4 N. H. 16. 517 Dowell V. City of Portland, 13 Or. 248. 746 Dowlan v. Sibley Co., 36 Minn. 430, 1 Smith — vii Downend v. Kansas City, 156 Mo. 60, 1341, 1373, 1374 Downer v. Lent. 6 Cal. 94. 1091 Downing v. City of Miltonvale, 36 Kan. 740. 488, 538, 5.39 V. Herrick, 47 Maine 462, 221 v. Mason Co., 87 Ky. 208, 9 V. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178. 27.5, 205, 1485, 1.539 Downs V. Board &c., 4 Wash. 309, 1737 V. City of Ansonia, 73 Conn. 33, 791 V. Commissioners &c.. 2 Pen. 132, 86, 1350. 1360. 1787 Dows V. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108. 1007. 1717. 1718. 1722 V. City of Elmwood, 34 Fed. 114, 993 Dowty V. Pittwood, 23 Mont. 113, 186 Doxey v. Board &c.. 67 Mich. 601, 626 Doyle V. City of Duluth, 74 Minn. 157, 931 V. Falconer, L. R. 1 P. C. 328. 205 Drainage Com'rs v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 158 111. 353, 1249 Drake v. City of Lowell, 13 Met. 202. 1592, 1612 V. Grout. 21 Ind. App. 534, 1272 V. Hudson River R. Co., 7 Barb. 508. 464. 1706 V. Inhabitants &c.. 6 Cush. 303, 662 V. Phillips, 40 Ind. 388. 651, 1232 Dranga v. Rowe, 127 Cal. 506, 1550 Draper v. Cambridge. 20 Ind. 268. 1494 V. Town of Springport, 104 U. S. 501. 261, 1014, 1015 Drath v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 15 Neb. 367, 699 Dressman v. Farmers' &e. Bank, 100 Ky. 571, 1304 Drew v. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. 191, 312 Drexel v. Town of Lake, 127 111. 54, 591 Dreyfus v. Lonergan, 73 Mo. App. 336, 506. 1685 Drhew v. City of Altoona, 121 Pa. St. 401. 897, 919 Driftwood &c. Co. v. Board &c., 72 Ind. 226. 234, 260, 647 Driggs V. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77, 1105, 1559. 1573, 1574 Drisko v. Inhabitants &c., 75 Maine 73, 362 Dritt V. Snodgrass. 66 Mo. 286. 221, 222 Dronberger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420. 608 Drott V. Riverside. 4 Ohio C. C. 312, 175 Drucker v. Manhattan R. Co., 106 N. Y. 157, 1581 Druiff V. Parker, L. R. 5 Eq. 131, 1015 Druliner v. State, 20 Ind. 308. 158 Drummond v. City of Eau Claire, 79 Wis. 97, 1255 Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24, 310 Dryberry School Dist. v. Mercer, 115 Pa." St. 550. 1491 Drvden v. Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89, 378 Dubach v. Hannibal &c. R. Co.. 80 Mo. 483. 588, 1354 Dubois V. City Council &c., Dudley . 30. 494 Du Bois V. Decker. 130 N. Y. 325. 1068 Dubuque &c. College v. District Tp. &c.. 13 Iowa 555. 258. 715, 1480 Dudley v. Board &c., 80 Fed. 672, 998 V. Grayson, 6 T. B. iMon. 259, 1424 V. Mavhew, 3 N. Y. 9. 556 Duer V. Small. 4 Blatchf. 2B3. 1510 Duffield V. Williamsnort School Dist., 162 Pa. St. 476. 1762 Duffy V. City of Dubuque. 63 Iowa 171, 1375, 1.595, 1612 Dugan V. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 383. 288, 296 XCVlll TABLE OF CASES, [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. U, pp. S33-iS30.] Dugan V. United States, 3 Wheat. 172, 217 Duggen V. McGruder, Walk. 112, 1724 Dugro, In re, 50 N. Y. 513, 1234 Duke V. Beeson, 79 Ind. 24, 1571 V. Brown. 96 N. C. 127, 370, 646 V. Mayor '&e., 20 Ga. 635, 821, 822 Diillam V. Wilson, 52 Mich. 392, 207 Dullanty v. Town of Vaughn, 77 Wis. 38, 623 Dumas v. Patterson, 9 Ala. 484. 323, 327 Dunavon v. Board &c.. 47 Hun 13, 1491 Dunbar v. Board &c., 49 I'ac. 409, 873, 1707, 1731 Duncan y. Board &c., 101 Ind. 403, 285, 1038 V. City of Buffalo, 2 N. Y. S. 503. 1606 V. City of Lynchburg, 34 S. E. 964, 1805 V. City of Terre Haute, 85 Ind. 104, 693, 1571 V. Findlater, 6 CI. & F. 894, 225 V. State, 7 La. An. 377, 326 Duncombe v. City of Fort Dodge, 38 Iowa 281. 261 V. Prindle, 12 Iowa 1, 446 Dunda.s v. City of Lansing, 75 Mich. 499, 1618. 1620. 1626. 1638 Dundy v. Board &c., 8 Neb. 508, 54, 56 Dunham v. City of New Britain, 55 Conn. 378, 1116 V. People, 96 111. 331, 1084 V. Trustees &c.. 5 Cow. 462, 100. 499, 501, 505, 532, 1148, 1389 V. Village of Hyde Park, 75 111. 371, 684 V. Williams. 37 N. Y. 251. 1565 Dunleith &c. Bridge Co. v. City of Dunleith, 32 Iowa 427, 1513 Dunlop V. Keith, 1 Leigh 430, 530 V. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 225 Dunn V. Long Beach &c. Co., 114 Cal. 605, 1699 V. McNeely, 75 Mo. App. 217, 719 V. Town of Barnwell, 43 S. C. 398, 1376 Dunne v. W. Chicago Pk. Com'rs, 159 111. 60, 1237 Dunnell Mfg. Co. v. Newell, 15 R. I. 233, 1551, 1552 Dunning v. Railroad Co., 2 Ind. 437. 86, 87 Dunnovan v. Green, 57 111. 63. 1521 Duntley v. Davis, 42 Hun 229, 313 Duperier v. Viator, 35 La. An. 957. 1539 Dupont V. City of Pittsburg, 69 Fed. 13, 875 Durach's Appeal. 62 Pa. St. 491, 1503 Durant v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 469, 1722 V. Iowa Co., 1 Woolw. 69, 883, 1026 V. Kauffman, 34 Iowa 194, 1515, 1516, 1517 V. Palmer, 29 N. J. L. 544. 1597 Durfev v. Town of Worcester, 63 Vt. 418, 1051 Durham v. Hyde Park, 75 111. 371, 591 Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 558 Durr V. Howard. 6 Ark. 461. 1411 Durvea v. Mayor &c.. 26 Hun 120, 1790 "v. Smith, 16 N. Y. S. 688, 1225 Dusenbury v. Mutual Tel. Co., 11 Abb. N. C. 440, 681. 1581 Dutten V. Village of Hanover, 42 Ohio St. 215, 340. 448 Dutton V. City of Aurora, 114 111. 138, 524. 848 Dwight V. Mayor, 12 Allen 322. 1501 Dwyer v. Hackworth, 57 Tex. 245. 562, 974 V. Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 521, 1330 Dyar v. Farmington Village Corpora- tion, 70 Maine 515, 1178 Dyckman v. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. 434, 684 Dyer v. Brogan. 70 Cal. 136, 1426 V. City of St. Paul, 27 Minn. 457, 801, 1215 V. Fl.vdenfeldt, 4 West Coast Rep. 585, 1255 V. Smith, 12 Conn. 384, 220 Dyer Co. v. Railroad Co., 87 Tenn. 712, 1379 Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446, 745 Dyker &c. Improvement Co. v. Cook, 38 N. Y. 222, 1247 E Eachus V. Los Angeles &c. R. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 1211 Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9, 1263 Eager, In re. 46 N. Y. 100, 1255 Eagle V. Beard, 33 Ark. 497, 434 Eagle Mfg. Co. v. City of Davenport, 101 Iowa 493. 1299 Eames v. Savage, 77 Maine 212, 142, 1526 Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. 285, 877, 879 Earl of Excester v. Smith, 2 Keb. 367, 467 Earl of Exeter v. Smith, Cart. 177, 467 Early v. Hamilton, 75 Ind. 376, 696 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Company, 10 How. 511. 767 East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N. H. 57, 1571 East Missouri v. Horseman, 16 LTp. Can. Q. B. 576, 211 East Oakland Tp. v. Skinner, 94 IT. S. 255, 233, 636. 998 East 168th St.. In re. 157 N. Y. 409. 1319 East 169th St., In re, 56 N. Y. S. 819. 1781 East River &c. Co. v. Donnelly. 93 N. Y. 557, 225, 753, 1687 East St. Louis v. Albrecht, 150 111. 506, 1235 V. Amy, 120 U. S. 600, 109. 1525 v. Board of Trustees, 6 111. App. 130, 897, 898 V. East St. Louis Gas &c. Co., 98 HI. 415. 239 V. People. 6 111. App. 76, 897 V. United States, 110 U. S. 321, 1524. 1528. 1529 East Syracuse, In re, 20 Abb. N. C. 131. 927, 1199 East Tenn. Tel. Co. v. City of Rus- sellville. 21 Ky. L. 305. 586 East Tenn. University v. Knoxville, 6 Baxt. 166, 10 Easterly v. Town of Irwin, 99 Iowa 694, 792 Eastman v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 44 N. H. 146. 1095 V. Concord, 64 N. H. 263. 936 V. Meredith. 36 N. H. 284. 9, 15, 36, 89. 148. 776. 786, 803. 807 810, 820. 830, 1076, 1113 Easton v. Colander, 11 Wend. 90, 1727 Easton &c. R. Co. v. City of Easton, 133 Pa. St. 50.5, 1122 Eaton v. Berlin, 49 N. H. 219, 869 V. Boston &c. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504, 676, 677 V. Chesebrough, 82 Mich. 214. 1544 V. Miner, 5 N. H. 542, 345 V. Supervisors &c., 44 Wis. 489. 13, 14 Eberhardt v. Wood. 6 Lea 467, 312 Eberhart v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 70 111. 347. 1602 Eby V. Board &c., 87 Cal. 166, 1682 TABLE OF CASES. XCIX [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Epkert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502. icr.i Kckniiiii V. Brady Tp., 81 Mich. 70. lO.'jO ICcoiiomidfS v. Ilinricks, 48 La. An. ;!70, 605. Kcorse Tp. Board &c. v. Board &c., 75 Mich. •2VA, 1580 I':cr(),vd V. ("ogsrcshall, 21 R. I. 1, 7-'7 i:dd,v V. Board &c.. 10 Phila. 94, 1119 V. (Jransior. 19 R. L 105, 1315 V. Villasve of Ellicottville, 54 N. Y. S. 800, 804 V. Wiison, 43 Vt. 362, 355, 356. 360, 366, 666 Kde V. Cuneo, 55 Pac. 388. 1287 V. Cunco, 126 Cai. 167, 1310 Edgar v. Greer. 14 Iowa 211, 1711 Edgecnmbe v. City of Burlington, 46 Vt. 218, 689 Edgerly v. Concord. 62 N. H. 8, 266. 786. 787. 803, 820 lOdgerton v. First Municipality &c., 1 La. An. 435, 1743 V. Goldsboro ^Vater Co., 126 N. C. 93, 1507 V. Huff, 26 Ind. 35, 675 V. Mayor &c., 19 Fla. 140, 1269 Edinburg American Land Co. v. City of Mitchell, 1 S. D. 593. . 850, 959, 968 Edminson v. City of Abilene, 7 Kan. App. 305, 465, 1021 Edmunds v. Banburv. 28 Iowa 267. 370 V. City of Boston, 108 Mass. 535, 701, 703, 1182 V. Gookins, 20 Ind. 477, 383. 1517 V. Gookins, 24 Ind. 169, 392 Edmundson v. School Dist., 98 Iowa 639, 876 Edward C. Jones Co. v. Perry, 26 Ind. App. 554, 1309 Edwards v. Berlin, 123 Cal. 544. 748, 1153. 1290 V. City of Chicago, 140 111. 440, 1174, 1253 V. City of Watertown, 24 Hun 426, 285 V. Common Council &c., 102 Mich. 153. 1327 V. Davis, 16 Johns. 682, 1069 V. Ferguson. 73 Mo. 686, 221 V. Kearzly. 96 T'. S. 595. 412. 766 V. Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. 268, 806, 813 V. Trustees &c., 30 111. App. 528. 1487 V. United States. 13 Otto 471, 199 V. Williamson. 70 Ala. 145. 412 Eels V. American &c. Tel. Co., 20 N. Y. S. 600, 1581 Effingham &c. Co. v. Hamilton, 68 Miss. 523, 1646 Egan V. City of Chicago, 5 111. App. 70, 465 Ege V. Koontz, 3 Pa. St. 109, 242 Eggleston v. President &c., 18 Hun 146, 1612 Egleston v. City Council, 1 Mill Const. 45, 1411 Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, 1205, 1206, 1270, 1292, 1508, 1521 Ehrgott V. Mayor &c., 96 N. Y. 264, 265, 783. 788, 1592 E. H. Rollins & Sons v. Board &c., 80 Fed. 692, 49 U. S. App. 399, 986. 1031 Eichels v. Evansville &c. R. Co.. 78 Ind. 261. 103. 108, 586. 590 Kidam v. Finnegan. 48 Minn. 53. 1713 Eilert v. City of Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 637. 1255 Ela V. Smith, 5 Gray 121, 189, 191 Elbin V. Wihson. 33 Md. 135, 221 Elder v. Bemis, 2 Met. 599, 335 V. Cnssilly, 21 Ky. L. 1274. 1243 V. Dwight Mfg. Co., 4 Gray 201, 1412 V. Territory, 3 Wash. T. 438. 1486, 1496 Electric Power Co. v. Mayor &c., 60 N. Y. S. 590, 573 Eleventh Ave., Matter of, 81 N. Y. 436, 1564 Elias v. City of Rochester, 61 N. Y. S. 712, 1361 Elk V. Wilkins, 112 IT. S. r)4, 135 Elliot V. City of Minneapolis, 59 Minn. Ill, 752 Elliott V. City of Louisville, 101 Ky. 262. 490, 1389 V. City of Oil City, 129 Pa. St. 5V0. 1180 V. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. St. 347, 798 V. City of Pittsburgh, 6 Pa. Dist. R. 455, 753 V. Fair Haven &c. R. Co., 32 Conn. 579. 590 V. Palmer, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 427, 1419 V. Sackett, 108 U. S. 132, 1015 V. Supervisors, 58 Mich. 452, 859, 1088 V. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137, 1725 V. Williamson. 11 Lea 38, 1541 V. Willis. 1 Allen 461, 195 Ellis V. Academy &c., 120 Pa. St. 608. 1565 V. City of Cleburne, 35 S. W. 495. 714, 734 V. City of Lewiston, 89 Maine 60, 1342 V. City of Peru, 23 111. App. 35, 1631 V. County Com'rs, 2 Gray 370, 1657 V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 77 Wis. 114, 622 V. Page. 1 Pick. 43, 523 V. Sheffield Gas &c. Co., 23 L. J. Q. B. 42. 745 V. Washoe Co., 7 Neb. 291, 663, 664 Ellison V. Alderman, 89 N. C. 125. 204 V. Allen, 30 N. Y. S. 441. 1369 V. Linford, 7 Utah 166. 1515 Elmendorf v. Mayor &e., 25 Wend. 693, 167, 299, 477, 480, 1421 Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs, 135 111. 269, 267, 772. 780 V. Overton, 104 Ind. 548. 220, 222 Elmore Co. v. Long, 52 Ala. 277. 1527 Elmwood Tp. v. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289. 992, 1001. 1005 El Paso Gas &c. Co. v. City of El Paso. 22 Tex. Civ. App. 309, 723 Elrod V. Bernadotte. 53 HI. 368. 1530 Elsberry v. Seay, 83 Ala. 614. 1494, 1495 Elson V. O'Dowd. 40 Ind. 300, 656 Elster V. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82, 582, 809, 1181 Elston V. Board &c., 20 Ind. 272. 383, 1517 Elwell V. Tucker, 1 Blackf. 285, 757 Elwood V. Bullock, Q. B. 383. 500, 1405 Ely V. Board &c.. 36 N. Y. 297. 800 V. Campbell, 59 How. Pr. 333, 620, 1610 V. City of Des Moines, 86 Iowa 55. 1638 V. City of Rochester. 26 Barb. 133. 666 V. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83. 225. 226 V. St. Louis R. Co., 77 Mo. 34, 1627 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. SSS-ISSO.] Elyton Land Co. v. Ayres, 67 Ala. 413, 651, 1287 Emblei- v. Town of Walkill, 132 N. Y. 222, 1632 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511, 675 Bmeric v. Gilman. 10 Cal. 404, 1743 Emerich v. City of Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 279, 1677 Emerson v. Babcock. 66 Iowa 258, 1368 V. Inhabitants &c.. 13 Pick. 377, 715 Emery v. Bradford. 29 Cal. 75, 708 V. City of Lowell, 127 Mass. 138. 246 V. Hapgood, 7 Gray 55, 211 v.- San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345, 1256, 1266, 1269 Emlen v. Lehigh Coal &c. Co., 47 Pa. St. 76, 1020 Emmitt v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. S. 887, 178, 183 Emmons v. City of Lewiston, 132 111. 380, 1395 Emorv V. City of Lowell, 104 Mass. 13, 817 Empire v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 87, 995, 1026 Empire City Subway Co. v. Broad- way &c. R. Co., 159 N. Y. 555, 740 Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680, 1026, 1033 Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford &c. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 1323 Engle V. New York. 40 Fed. 51, 784 English V. Chicot Co., 26 Ala. 454, 982 V. Mayor &c., 2 Marv. 63, 1242, 1292. 1302 V. People, 96 111. 566, 624, 979 V. Smock, 34 Ind. 115, 656 English &c. Inv. Co. v. Hardy, 93 Tex. 289. 1644 Engstad v. Dinnie, 8 N. D. 1, 925, 1549 Engstrom v. City of Minneapolis, 28 Minn. 200. 1366 Enos V. City of Springfield. 113 111. 65, 1143, 1158, 116G. 1107, 1268, 1303 Enriarht v. Falvey, 4 L. R. Ir. 397, 321 Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 1166, 1505 Episcopal School, Matter of, 75 N. Y. 324, 1139 Episcopal Society v. Dedham Episco- pal Church. 1 Pick. 372, 258 Erie v. Bootz, 72 Pa. St. 196, 106 Erie City v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. St. 384 265 Erie Co.' v. City of Erie, 113 Pa. St. 360, 1546 Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 111. 94. 58 Ernst V. Kunkle, 5 Ohio St. 520. 1192 Erschler v. Lennox. 42 N. Y. S. 805, 1550 Erskine v. Steel Co., 87 Fed. 630, 992 V. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. (82 IT. S.) 75, 1551, 1552, 1726 Erving v. Mayor. 131 N. Y. 133, 753 Erwin v. Central Union Tel. Co., 148 Ind. 365, 1700 V. City of Jersey City, 60 N. J. L. 141. 479 Escanaba &c. Co. v. City of Chi- cago. 107 U. S. 678, 801 Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md. 71, 1262, 1544 Eslava v. Jones, 83 Ala. 139, 222 Espy V. Town of Ft. Madison, 14 Iowa 226, 1725 Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 I^. S. 334, 768 Essex Turnpike Corp. v. Collins, 8 Mass. 292. 304 Essroger v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 420, 512 Estep V. Keokuk Co., 18 Iowa 199, 251, 647 Estes V. Owen, 90 Mo. 113, 589, 1233 Estey V. Starr. 56 Vt. 690, 301, 35(> Estopinal v. Peyroux, 37 La. An. 477, 335 Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 67, 520, 1384. 1390 Eureka Springs v. O'Neal, 56 Ark. 350, 520 Eustace V. Jahns. 38 Cal. 3, 1588 Eustis V. City of Henrietta, 37 S. W^ 632, 66 Evanisch v. G. C. & S. F. R. Co., 57 Tex. 123, 794 Evans v. City of Council Bluffs. 65 Iowa 238, 421, 1516 V. City of Denver, 26 Colo. 193, 1290 V. City of Utica, 69 N. Y. 166, 1587, 1631 V. Etheridge. 96 N. C. 42, 223 V. Hughes Co., 6 Dak. 102, 596 V. People, 139 111. 552, 1241 V. Sharp, 29 Wis. 564, 558 V. Town of Stanton, 23 Minn. 368, 865 Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660. 8, 265, 1324 Evansville v. Dennett, 161 U. S. 434. 609 Evansville &c. Co. v. State, 73 Ind. 219, ♦ 1571 Evansville &c. R. Co. v. City of Ev- ansville. 15 Ind. 395, 282 Eve V. Simon, 78 Ga. 120, 1677 Everett v. City of Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa 66. 1117 V. Deal, 148 Ind. 90, 306. 1711 V. Smith. 22 Minn. 53, 374, 473 Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Beecher, . 53 Conn. 551. 689 V. City of New Haven, 43 Conn. 234, 680 Everill v. Swan, 17 Utah 514, 152 Everson v. City of Syracuse, 100 N. Y. 577. 818 Everts v. District Tp. &c., 77 Iowa 37, 618. 1480. 1482 Evertson v. National Bank, 66 N. Y. 14, 1019 V. Sutton, 5 Wend. 280. 335 Ewart V. Village of Western Springs, 180 111. 318, 1144, 1148. 1310 Ewbanks v. President &c., 36 111. 177, 527. 528, 1132, 1419 Ewing V. State, 81 Tex. 172, 1689 Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St 1 1721 V. Lewis Co., 28 W. Va. 273, 216 , Exeter v. Glvde. 4 Mod. 33, 207 ^ V. Starre. 2 Show. 158, 536 Eyerly v. Board &c.. 81 Iowa 189, 1674 V. Jasper Co., 72 Iowa 150, 1674 V. Jasper Co., 77 Iowa 470, 1674 Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145, 526, 1499 Eyke v. Lange. 90 Mich. 592, 1656 Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. 422, 1508, 1521 F Faake v. City of Seattle, 16 Wash. 90, 1325 Face V. City of Ionia, 90 Mich. 104, 1557, 1593 Facey v. Puller, 13 Mich. 527, 297 Fagan v. City of Chicago, 84 111. 227, 1268. 1272 Fair V. Citv of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 309. 1378 Fairbanks Co. v. Kirk, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 1744 Fairchild v. City of St. Louis, 97 Mo. 85, 1697 TABLE OF CASES. CI [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 FaiiThild v. City of St. Paul, 4G iMimi. n40, 11 GS V. Kpilh. 29 Ohio St. 15G, 3:i4 V. Wall, 03 Cal. 401, 1194 Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch G03, 13L', 134 Fairfield v. Gallatin Co., 100 U. S. 47. 99r>. 996 Falconer v. Buffalo &c. R. Co., (!9 N. Y. 491, 990, 99G V. Cami)bell, 2 McLean 195, 45 V. Shores, 37 Ark. 38G. 313 Falk V. Strother, 84 Cal. 544, 939, 16G4 Falkner v. Hunt, IG Cal. 170. 1725 Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 551, 1302 Faller v. City of Grand Rapids, 105 Mich. 529. 825 Fallon, In re, 59 N. Y. S. 849, 873 Fall River Works v. City of Fall River. 110 Mass. 428, 701 Falls V. Cairo, 58 III. 403. 246, 247 Fane's Ca.se, 1 Doug. 149. 200 Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 IIow. 524, 2G1, 565 Farley v. Board &c., 126 Ind. 4G8. 1419 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 36 III. App. 517, 906 V. Mayor &c., 41 N. Y. S. 622, 1363, 1364 Farmers' &c. Bank v. School Dist., 6 Dak. 255, 627, 851 Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Borough of Ansonia, 61 Conn. 76. 1250 V. City of Galesburg, 133 TT. S. 156, 746, 1028 Farmington River &c. Co. v. County Com'rs, 112 Mass. 206, 706, 707, 1724 Farnham v. Benedict. 39 ITun 22, 212 V. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 1071 Farnsworth v. City of Rockland, 83 Maine 508, 1583 V. Pawtucket, 13 R. I. 83, 526 Farnum v. Town of Concord, 2 N. H. 392, 148. 777 V. Town of Ellington, 46 Hun 41, 1591 Farquar v. City of Roseberg, 18 Or. 271, 2G5 Farr v. Brackett. 30 Vt. 344, 523 V. IloUis, 9 B. & C. 315, 318 V. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 167 111. 355, 1310 Farraker v. City of Keokuk, 111 Iowa 310, 1141 Farrar v. City of St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379, 1183, 1206, 1233, 1257 Farrel v. Mayor &c., 12 Up. Can. Q. B. 343, 536 V. Town of Derby, 58 Conn. 234, 671, 857 Farrell v. City of Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 91, 1432 V. King, 41 Conn. 448. 1427 V. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. S. 672. 620, 1370 V. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 182 III. 250. 1136, 1149, 1270, 1287 Farrlngton v. Citv of Mt. Vernon, 64 N. Y. S. 863. 519. 1274 V. New England &c. Co., 1 N. D. 102, 593 V. Turner, 53 Mich. 27, 372 Fai-well V. City of Chicago, 71 111. 269, 604 Fass V. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, 559. 708, 1163 Fath V. Koeppel, 72 Wis. 289, 1090 Fatout V. Board &c., 102 Ind. 223. 147G Faulk V. McCartney, 42 Kan. 695, 849, 1491 Faulkner v. City of Aurora, 85 Ind. 130, 774, 820 Faveill v. Eastern &c. R. Co., 2 Exch. 344, 662 Favrot V. I'arisb of East Baton Rouge, 34 La. An. 491, 1529 Fay v. City of Springfield, 94 Fed. 409, 1297, 1505 V. Reed, 128 Cal. 357, 1153, 1154 Fayssoux v. De Chaurand, 36 La. An. 547, 1255 Fecheimer v. City of Louisville, 84 Ky. 306, 1537 Federgreen v. Town of Fallsburgh, 25 Hun 152, 870 Fee v. Columbus Borough, 168 Pa. St. 382, 1335 Feeley v. Wurster, 54 N. Y. S. lOGO, 218, 1732 Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380. 18 Ky. L. 238, 712, 1298 Feiten v. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494. 700, 701 Felch V. Gilman. 22 Vt. 38. . 1570 V. Town of Weare, 69 N. II. 617, 266 Feldman v. City Council &c., 23 S. C. 57, 979, 1542 Felker v. City of New Whatcom, 16 Wash. 178. 1141, 1294 Fell V. State, 42 Md. 71, 467 Fellowes V. City of New Haven, 44 Conn. 240. 680 Fellows V. Gilman, 4 Wend. 414, 309, 311 V. Walker, 39 Fed. 651, 981 Felton V. Short Route &c. Co., 85 Ky. 640, 1575 Fender v. Neosho Falls Tp., 22 Kan. 305, 1519 Fenelon's Petition, 7 Pa. St. 173. 1266 Fenton v. Salt Lake Co., 4 Utah 466, 934 Fenwick v. East London R. Co., L. R. 20 Eq. 544, 1448 Ferdinand v. Mayor &c., 59 Ilun 623. 1193 Fergus Falls Water Co. v. City of Fergus Falls, 65 Fed. 586, 726 Ferguson v. City of Selma. 43 Ala. 398, 1115, 1118. 1382 V. Columbus &c. R. Co., 75 Ga. 637, 794 V. Crittenden Co.. 6 Ark. 479, 291 V. Earl of Kinnoull, 9 U. & P. 251, 222 V. Landram, 5 Bush 230, 650 Fernald v. Lewis, 6 Maine 264, 142, 342, 965 Fernbach v. City of Waterloo. 76 Iowa 598. 1628, 1641 Ferrari v. Board &c.. 24 Fla. 390. 1101 Ferree v. School Dist., 76 Pa. St. 376, 675 Ferrier, In re, 103 III. 367, 1071 Ferris v. City of Chicago, 162 111. Ill, 1237 Ferron v. Alloway, 14 Bush 580, 1252 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 1464 Feusier v. Lammon. 6 Nev. 209. 331 Fidelity &c. Co. v. City of Louisville, 174 U. S. 429. 192 V. Lawrence Co., 92 Fed. 576, 610 Field V. Barling, 149 HI. 556. 1316, 1703 V. City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575, 673, 802, 1122 V. City of Shawnee, 7 Okia. 73, 740 V. Commonwealth. 32 Pa. St. 478. 200, 213 V. Field, 9 Wend. 394, 373 Cll TABLE OP CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Field V. Girard College, 54 Pa. St. 233, 200 V. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. J. Eq. 118, 790, 1216 V. Malsten, 88 Md. 691, 194, 209, 541 V. Mayor &c., 6 N. Y. 179, 1191 v. People, 3 111. 79, 151 V. Village of Western Springs, 181 111. 186, 514, 1703 Fields V. Stokley, 99 Pa. St. 306, 802, 1121 Fife V. City of Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 540, 1344, 1375 Fifleld V. Marinette Co., 62 Wis. 532 593, 1204 Fifth Ave., In re, 36 N. Y. S. 141, 1280 Fifty-fourth St., In re, 165 Pa. St. 8, 1243 Filbert v. City of Philadelphia, 181 Pa. St. 530, 717 Finch V. Board &c., 30 Ohio St. 37, 9, 225, 780 Findlav V. McAllister, 113 U. S. 104, 1526 Fink V. City of St. Louis, 71 Mo. 52, 1608 V. Village of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26, 1419 Finley v. City of Philadelphia, 32 Pa. St. 381, 1499, 1500 V. Dietrick, 12 Iowa 516, 1517 Finn v. City of Adrian, 93 Mich. 504, 1638 Finney v. City of Oshkosh, 18 Wis. O09 1254 V. State, 126 Ind. 577, 912, 1483 Fire Department &c. v. Davles, 25 Misc. 683. 88 V. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136, 137 V. Kip, 10 Wend. 267, 61, 83 V. Noble. 3 E. D. Smith 441, 137 Fire Extinguisher Mfg. Co. v. City of Perrv. 8 Okla. 429, 728 Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. St. 624, 797 Fireman's Ins. Co., Ex parte, 6 Hill 243, 1674 First Baptist Church Soc. v. Rail- road Co., 5 Barb. 79, 1109 First Municipality v. Blineau, 3 La. An. 688, 503, 1110, 1121 V. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 1 Rob. 279, 92 V. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335, 464, 517, 580, 1402 V. McDonough, 2 Rob. 244, 977 V. Orleans Theatre Co., 2 Rob. 209, 992 First Nafl Bank v. Arthur, 12 Colo. App. 90, 956, 1688 V. City of Ottawa, 43 Kan. 294, 1744 V. Cook. 77 111. 622, 1717 V. Keith, 84 111. App. 103, 525 V. Keith, 183 111. 475, 722, 926 V. Mavor &c., 68 Ga. 119, 1551 V. Meredith, 44 Mo. 500, 1511 V. Peck. 43 Kan. 643, 910 V. Rush School Dist., 81 y2 Pa. St. 307, 863 V. Saratoga Co., 106 N. Y. 488, 963 V. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201. 57.5, 1391, 1707 . V. Scott. 14 Minn. 77, 1027 V. Town of Arlington, 16 Blatchf. 57. 1014 V. Town of Concord, 50 Vt. 257. 987 V. Town of Dorset, 16 Blatchf. 62, 987 First Nafl Bank v. Union School Tp., 75 Ind. 301, 862 V. Watkins, 21 Mich. 483, 1551 V. Yankton Co., 101 T'. S. 129, 992 First Presbyterian Church v. City of Ft. Wayne, 36 Ind. 338, 1232 First St., Matter of, 66 Mich. 42, 637, 1323 Fish V. Dodge, 38 Barb. 163, 222 V. Perkins, 52 Conn. 200, 1054 Fishburn v. City of Chicago, 171 111. 338, 734 Fisher v. Board &c., 44 La. An. 184, 850 V. Bountiful City, 21 Utah 29, 610 V. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87, 263. 797, 803, 807, 820, 1096 V. City of Mt. Vernon, 58 N. Y. S. 499. 1360 V. City of Portland, 24 Or. 188. 130e V. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 482, 130S V. Deans, 107 Mass. 118, 334, 335 V. Ilarrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. 291. 500, 506, 526. 1084. 1406 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Cush. 494, 644 V. McGirr, 1 Gray 1, 519 V. Municipal Council &c., 10 Up. Can. Q. B. 492, 1256 V. People, 84 111. 491, 1533 V. People, 157 111. 85, 1283, 1289 V. Prowse, 2 B. & S. 770, 1561 V. Village of Cambridge, 133 N. Y. 527, 1581, 1642 Fisk V. City of Hartford, 69 Conn. 375, 1710 V. City of Kenosha, 26 Wis. 23, 982 V. Hazard. 7 R. I. 438, 668 V. Jefferson &c. Jury, 116 U. S. 131, 1525 Fiske, Ex parte, 72 Cal. 125, 1392 Fitch V. Board &c., 122 Cal. 285, 194 V. Mayor &c., 40 Hun 512, 188 V. McDiarmid. 26 Ark. 482, 1652 V. Pinckard, 5 111. 76, 86, 87, 540, 1254, 1423 Fitchburg R. Co. v. Grand Junction &c. R. Co.. 1 Allen 552, 195 Fitzgerald v. City of Troy, 7 N. Y. S. 103, 1616 V. Commonwealth, 5 Allen 509, 1072 V. Inhabitants &c., 109 Mass. 204. 1586, 1606, 1626 V. Walker. 55 Ark. 148. 855 Fitzhugh V. City of Bay City, 109 Mich. 581, 1286 Fitzpatrick v. Board &c., 87 Ky. 132, I486 Fitzsimmons v. City of Brooklyn, 102 N. Y. 536. 213. 1445 Flack V. Green Island Village. 122 N. Y. 107, 1558, 1559- V. Harrington, 1 111. 213. 335 Flagg V. Inhabitants &c., 142 Mass. 280. 1601 V. Mayor &c.. 33 Mo. 440, 1015 V. Palmyra. 33 Mo. 440, 1527 V. Parish of St. Charles, 27 La. An. 319. 651 V. Worcester. 13 Gray 601, 1216 Flatan v. State, 56 Tex. 93, 314 Flatcher v. Boodle, 18 C. B. 152, 128 Fleckner v. President &c., 8 Wheat. 338, 260, 261 Fleming v. City of Appleton, 55 Wis. 90, 942 V. City of Springfield. 154 Mass. ' 500. ■ 1616. 1620, 1621 V. Dyer, 20 Ky. L. 689, 1685 TABLE OF CASES. cm [References are to Pages. Vol. I, Flamming v. Clerk &c., 30 N. J. L- -,„ "SO, _J.-i-o Fletcher v. Auburn &c. R. Co., 25 Wend. 46-_'. ^, ^„ ..^^ l^*^"^ V. City of Ellsworth, 53 Kan. V City of Lowell, 15 Gray 103, 189 v! City of Oshkosh, 18 ^^is . ;: Collins, 111 Ga. 253 . 192 .. ^inhabitants |c..^ ^,^l^S,s5 ' V. Inhabitants &c., 77 Maine oo I iU4i V. reck, 6 Crancn Si. 7il Flewellin v. Troetzel, 80^3f>^^ioJl, 'i255 Flint V. Webb, 25 Minn. 93, 1234 Flood V. Atlantic City, 63 N. J. L. ^^^ f ^State. 19 Tex. App. 584, 494 Flora V. Sachs, 64 Ind. lo5, o^" Floral Springs W. Co. v. Rives, 14^^.^^ Flori^v.'st. Louis, 69 Mo. 341, 9 142 Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville 17 lud 1G9, --■""• Floyd v! Atlanta Banking Co., 109 ^^^ f kSr. 12 coke 23, 2^0 v^^Commissioners &c.^^^l4^^Ga.^^^^ V. Gilbreath, 27 Ark. 675,^^ ^^^^ Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall 666^ ^^^^ Fluty V. School Di^t., 49 Ark. 94,' 618 Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md 312. 1588 V. City of Boston, 153 Mass. 070 ^'^' V. liurd. 118 N. Y. 19. 1579 V. Inhabitants &c., 173 Mass. 108 iooi. V. Little Falls &c. Co.. 74 Minn iQO 109, 734, 735, 1700 i® Taylor, 127 N.Y. 596 1582 Fobes V. Rome &c. R. Co., 121 N. Y 505 io».i Fogg V. Dummer, 58 N. H. 505, 869 V. Inhabitants &c., 98 Mass. gYg 818, IrfdJ Foland v. Town of Frankton, 142 Ind 546 7Jo, 9-o Foley V.' City' of Haverhill, 144 Mass. v.-City of Troy, 45 Hun ^396,^^^^ V. East Flamborough Tp., 29 Ont. 139, ^^^ l^-^q' V. Tvler. 161 111. 167, 381 Folsom v. Apple River L. D. Co., 41 Wis. 602, ^^ ^„ .„„l5^2 V. School Directors, 91 111. 402, 864 V. Town of Underbill, 36 Vt. 580. 16 ii V. 'Township &c., 159 V. S. 611 lOdd Folts Street &c., In re, 46 N, ^^.^^^-j-jg^ Foltz^ V. Kerlin, 105 Ind. 221, 185. 198 Pones Hardware Co. v. Erb, 54 Ark. 645, '''-•^ Foot V. County Court &c., 1 McCrary 918 10-4 V. rrowse. 1 Str. 625, 166 V. Stiles. 57 N. Y. 399, 311. 697 Foote V. American Product Co., 195 Pa St 190 l.3_o V. Board "&c., 67 Miss. 156, 1647 V Brown. 60 Miss. 155, 84c5 V. City of Cincinnati. 11 Ohio 408 61, 82, 117, 118 pp. 1-822; Yol. II, pp. S33-1830.1 Foote V Linck, 5 McLean 616. 1721 V IMke Co., 101 U. S. 688. 1001 V Town of Hancock, 15 Blatchf. 343, 1*^27 Fopper V. Town of Wheatland, 59 Wis 623, lh26 Forbes v. Appleton, 5 Cush.^^115,^^^^^ V. Board &c., 28 Fla. 26. " ' 1101 V Mayor &c., 1 Marv. 186, 51b Force v. Town of Batavia, 61 HI- 9^, Forcey v. Caldwell, 9 Atl. 466, 217 Ford V. Booker, 53 Ind. 395, 521 V. Chicago &c, R. Co., 14 ^ is. 609. """^ V. City of New York, 56 N. Y. ?: *Clough, 8 Maine 334.^ ^^^^ "^^ V McGregor, 20 Nev. 446, 229, 230 V. New York &c. R. Co., 53 N. Y. S. 764, 549 V Parker, 4 Ohio St. 576, 22» V. School Dist., 121 Pa. St. 543 147^4 V. Standard Oil Co., 53 N. Y. S. 48, 504 V. Thralkill, 84 Ga. 169. 594, 608, 1392 V. Town of North Des Moines, 80 Iowa 626, ^^ ^^_^ 57, 392, 397. 400, 1518 V. Umatilla Co.. 15 Or. 313, 1641 Foreman v. Town of Marianna, 43 Ark. 324, ^. 400 Forest Co. v. Langlade Co.. 76 Wis. 605 423, 424, 436, 444 Forker v. Borough of Sandy Lake. 130 Pa. St. 123, 1638, 1639 Forks Tp. V. King. 84 Pa. St. 230, 1633 Forshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill 154. l_bd Forsyth v. Dunnagan, 94 Cal. 438, 1561 V. Krueter. 100 Ind. 27. 1258 V. Mayor &c., 45 Ga. 152 821 Forsvthe v. City of Hammond, 142 Ind 505 ^'^ V Ellis, '4 J. J. Marsh. 298, 332 Fortin 'v. Inhabitants, 145 Mass. 196. 161' Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N Y. 44, 568 Fort Smith v. Dodson, 46 Ark. 296, 533 Fort Worth v. Crawford, 64 Tex. of)o 80-1 FortVorth City Co. v. Smith Bridge Co., 151 U. S. 294, 1306 Fortune v. City of St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59 1<4D Foshav' V. Town of Glen Haven, 25 Wis ''88 lbl.i Foss V. City of Chicago. 56^111.^54.^^^^ v. Crisp. 20 Pick. 121. _ 134 Fossett V. Bearce, 29 Maine 523, ^^^ Foster v. Board &c., 102 Cal 483, 499 V. CJty of CapeMay,^60_V^.T. ^^^ y' City of Kenosha, 12 Wis. 616. , o „ 548 v. City of Wilmington, 8 Houst. 415 V. Clinton Co., 51 Iowa 541, 775 V. Coleman, 10 Cal. 278 6.38 V. Fowler. 60 Pa. St. 27, 4, 5, 1530 V. Lane. 30 N. H. 305, ^ „ ^^ V. Lookout &c. Water Co., 3 T An 49 ' **** V. Scarff, 15 Ohio St. 532 349 368 Fourth School Dist. v. Wood, lo Mass. 193, ' CIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Fowle V. Common Council &c., 3 Pet. 398, 9, 92, 822, 1388 Fowler v. Atkinson, 6 Minn. 578, 216 V. Bebee, 9 Mass. 231. 197, 1420 V. Perkins, 77 111. 271, 1668 Fox, Appeal of, 73 Conn. 68, 1279 V. City of Bay City, 122 Mich. 499, 737 V. City of Fostoria, 60 Ohio St. 340. 91 V. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 154, 254 V. City of Richmond, 19 Ky. L. 326. 713, 792 V. Drake, 8 Cowen 191, 215 V. Ellison. 43 Minn. 41, 1416 V. Middleborough Town Co., 16 Ky. L. 455, 1286 V. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 607 V. Shipman, 19 Mich. 218, 861 V. Sloo, 10 La. An. 11, 710 V. Village of Fort Edward, 48 Ilun 363, 87 Foxworthy v. City of Hastings, 25 Neb. "133, 1596. 1608 Frace v. City of Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69, 1549 Fractional School Dist. v. Board of Inspectors, 63 Mich. 611, 1486 V. Malary, 23 Mich. Ill, 861 Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. St. 47. 753 Francis v. Howard Co., 50 Fed. 44, 839 892 V. Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. 152, 'lll2 Frank v. Steamship &c. Co., 20 La. An. 25. 1111 Franke v. Padiicah &c. Co., 88 Ky. 467, 282, 1458 Frankel v. City of New York, 2 N. Y. 294, 1608 Frankfort v. Inhabitants &c., 54 Maine 250. 672 Franklin v. Cromwell. Dal. 95, 467 V. House, 104 Tenn. 1. 1333 V. Westfall. 27 Kan. 614, 523 Franklin Bank v. Cooper, 36 Maine 179, 321 Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80, 45 Franklin Co. v. Henry Co., 26 111. App. 193, 1042, 1052 V. Layman, 34 111. App. 606, 840 Franklin Co. Com'rs v. Lathrop. 9 Kan. 453. 629 Franklin County Court v. Deposit Bank. 87 Ky. 370, 1545 Franklin Tp. v. Lebanon Tp., 51 N. J. L. 93, 1045 Franklin Wharf Co. v. City of Port- land, 67 Maine 46. 817. 1106 Frantz v. Jacob. 88 Ky. 525. 839 Eraser v. Lewiston. 76 Maine 531. 148 Frasher v. Rader. 124 Cal. 132, 1712 Frazier v. Butler Borough, 172 Pa. St. 407, 1335 Frederick v. City Council &c., 5 Ga. 561, 992, 1542 V. Douglas Co.. 96 Wis. 411, 1731 V. People. 83 111. App. 89, 192, 714 Freeholders &c. v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108, 8 Freeman v. Davis. 7 Mass. 200, 311 V. Howe, 24 How. 450, 331 V. Otis. 9 Mass. 260, 216, 218 Preemont v. Boling, 11 Cal. 380. 1288 Freemont Bldg. Ass'n v. Sherwin. 6 Neb. 48. 981 Freeport v. Isbell. 83 111. 440. 264 Freeport St. R. Co. v. City of Free- port. 151 111. 451, 1248. 1250. 1286 Freeport Water-works Co. v. Prager. 129 Pa. St. 605, 1453 Freetown v. County Com'rs, 9 Pick. 46, 706 Fremont &c. R. Co. v. Brown Co., 18 Neb. 516, 429 V. Whalen. 11 Neb. 585, TOl French v. Benton, 44 N. H. 28, 1053 V. Burlington, 42 Iowa 614, 883 V. City of Boston, 129 Mass. 592. 263. 814 V. City of Burlington, 42 Iowa 614, 876. 881 V. Common Council &c., 85 Mich. 135, 1676 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Allen 9, 666 V. Spalding. 61 N. H. 395. 346 V. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518, 982 Frenchtown Tp. v. Board &c., 89 Mich. 204, 1580 Frenner v. .Sunnyside Land Co., 124 Cal. 437, 1309 Frey v. Michie, 68 Mich. 323, 1695 Frick V. Brinkley. 61 Ark. 397. 732 V. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. 512. 735 V. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26, 536 Friend v. City of Pittsburg, 131 Pa. St. 305. 931 V. Hamill. 34 Md. 298. 221 Priesner v. Common Council &c., 91 Mich. 504, 555 Frith V. City of Dubuque, 45 Iowa 406, 264 Fritsch v. City of Allegheny, 91 Pa. St. 226, 1613 Frommer v. City of Richmond, 31 Gratt. 646, 1520 Frorer v. People, 141 111. 171, 734 Frosh V. City of Galveston, 73 Tex. 401, 1255 Frost V. Beekman, 1 Johns. 285, 228 V. City of Casselton, 8 N. D. 534. 928, 929 V. City of Chicago, 178 111. 2.50, 503 V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Allen 152, 651, 672 V. Leatherman. 55 Mich. 33, 1255 V. Mayor &c.. 5 EI. & B. 531, 1657 V. Slick. 1 Dak. 131. 1717 Fry Y. Albemarle Co.. 86 Va. 195, 774, 775 Fuchs V. City of St. Louis, 133 Mo. 168, 793 Puhrman v. Mayor &c., 54 Ala. 263. 535 FuUam v. Inhabitants &c., 9 Allen 1, 262 Fuller V. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 80. • 680 V. Citv of Chicago, 89 111. 282, 882 V. Colfax Co., 33 Neb. 716, 933 V. Hampton. 5 Conn. 416, 142 V. Heath. 89 111. 296. 844. 845. 898, 1132. 1133 V. Inhabitants &c., 11 Gray 340, 362. 667. 668 V. IMavor &c.. 82 Mich. 480. 1341 v. Morrison Co., 36 Alinn. 309. 1522, 1531 v. Mower. 81 Maine 380. 966 Fullerton v. Spring. 3 Wis. 667, 524 Fullinm v. City of Muscatine, 70 Iowa 436. 1634 Fullilove V. Police Jury &c., 51 La. An. 359, 1543 Pulton V. City of Davenport, 17 Iowa 404, ■ 1517 v. Citv of Lincoln, 9 Neb. 358, 260, 1255 V. Cummings. 132 Ind. 453, 554 V. Short Route R. &c. Co., 85 Kv. 640. 1213 Fulton St., In re, 29 How. Pr. 429, 1158 TABLE OF CASES. CV [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ Fuhvoilor v. City of St. Louis, 61 Mo. 470. 1417 Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44, 89 Furman St., In re, 17 Wend. G49, 12:i2 G Cachet v. McCall, 50 Ala. 307. 1551 Gaddis v. Kicliland Co., 92 111. 119, 982, 985 Gaffney v. Gough, 30 Cal. 104, 1262 Gagan v. City of Janesville, lOG Wis. 662, 1366 Gage V. City of Chicago, 162 111. 313, 1146 V. City of Chicago, 178 III. 530. 1154 V. Citv of Hornellsville, 106 N. Y. 667, 936 V. Currier, 4 Pick. 399. 230 V. Dudley, 64 N. II. 437, 1542 V. Evans. 90 III. 569. 1287 V. Graham, 57 111. 144. 1531, 1721 Gage Co. v. Pulton. 16 Neb. 5, 1041 r.alalian v. Gardner, 7 .Tohns. 106, 1567 <;all)raith v. Lettiech, 73 III. 209, 1425 Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App. 380. 1259 Gale V. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine 174. 669 V. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344, 282, 568. 618, 637, 642. 1389. 1403 Galena &c. R. Co. v. Appleby, 28 111. 283, 1105 Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152, 11, 385 V. Searles, 114 111. 217, 1268 Gall V. Citv of Philadelphia, 18 Ohio St. 563, 1403 Gallagher v. City of St. Paul, 28 F^ed. 305, 1609 V. Keating. 57 N. Y. S. 632, 1731 V. Partridge, 69 N. H. 88. 223 Gallaher v. Smith. 55 Mo. App. 116, 551 Galloway v. Corbitt. 52 Mich. 460, 1724 Gallup V. Tracv. 25 Conn. 10. 295 V. Woodstock. 29 Vt. 347. 684 Gait V. City of Chicago, 174 111. 605, ■ 522, 1294 Galveston City Co. v. City of Gal- veston. 56 Tex. 486, 245 Galveston Gas Co. v. Galveston Co., 54 Tex. 287, 1552 Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Harris. 36 S. W. 776. 488 v. White. 32 S. W. 186, 1362 Galveston Wharf Co. v. Citv of Gal- veston, 63 Tex. 14, ' 1546 Galway v. Metropolitan El. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 132. 1582 Gamble v. Marion Co., 85 Iowa 675, 943 Gamewell Fire Alarm &c. Co. v. City of Laporte. 96 Fed. 664. 744, 873 V. City of Laporte, 102 Fed. 417, 736, 744, 745 V. Mayor &c.. 31 Fed. 312, 938 Gandv v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 30 Iowa 420. 1109 Gans V. Citv of Philadelphia, 102 Pa. St. 97. 1124 Gardiner &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 5 Maine 133. 1500, 1510 Gardner. Matter of, 68 N. Y. 467. 1657 V. City of New Berne, 98 N. C. 228. 901 V. Haney, 86 Ind. 17. 992, 1012, 1529 V. People, 20 111. 430, 1400 V. State, 21 N. J. L. 557. 1510 V. Trustees &c., 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 674, 688, 691 (Garfield v. Douglass, 22 III. 100, 221 Gargan v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 89 Ky. 212. 1213, 1575 Garland v. City of Denver, 11 Colo. 534. 538 v. .lackson, 7 La. An. 68, 1480 Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, 29 N. Y. 297. 224 Garnett v. City of Slater, 56 Mo. App. 207, 1341, 1373 Garrard v. Davis, 53 Mo. 322, 228 Garrard Co. Court v. Bayle Co. Court, 10 Bush 208, 1576 Garrett v. City of St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505. 1206, 1269 V. State, 49 N. J. L. 693, 1111 Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. 196. 767 Garside v. City of Cohoes, 12 N. Y. S. 192, 160 Garvey, Petition of, 77 N. Y. 523, 1234 Garvie v. City of Hartford, 54 Conn. 440. 179 Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429. 1239 V. Wells, 8 Iowa 286, 85, 5.38 Garza, Ex parte, 28 Tex. App. 381, 1388 Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435, 568. 1394. 1463, 1464 Gas &c. Co. V. Borough of Dowring- ton, 175 Pa. St. 341, 572 Gas L. Co. V. Memphis, 93 Tenn. 612, 746 Gashwiler v. Willis. 33 Cal. 11, 1212 Gaskill V. Dudley, 6 Met. 546. 142, 342, 965, 1526 Gastenau v. Commonwealth, 56 S. W. 705. 1385 Gaston V. Babcock, 6 Wis. 503, 423 Gatch V. City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa ^ . ^^^' X. , 1239 Gates V. Delaware Co., 12 Iowa 405, 199, 200 V. Hancock. 45 N. H. 528. '>60 V. School Dist.. 53 Ark. 468. 853 Gatlin v. Town of Tarboro, 78 N C r. \'^^' „. 1508. 1521 Gaughan v. City of Philadelphia, 119 Pa. St. 503. 1596 Gause v. City of Clarkcsville. 5 Dill. 165, 636, 637, 838, 974. 1022 Gaussen v. United States, 97 U. S. 584. .31, s. 319 Gavett v. City of Jackson, 109 Mich. 415. 13''5 Gay V. Bradstreet. 49 Maine 580. 1321 v. City of Cambridge, 128 Mass. 387. 1622 G. C. R. Co. V. G. C. S. R. Co., 63 Tex. 529, 1352 Gear v. Dubuque &c. R. Co., 20 Iowa ^ 523. 700 Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 2''4 12.55. 1423. 142.5, 1540 Geer v. Board &c.. 97 Fed. 435, 998 V. School Dist. &c., 97 Fed. 732, 1006 Geist's Appeal. 104 Pa. St. 351. 1192 Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque. 1 Wall 175, 764. 983, 1013, 1016, 1018 1020, 1524 Gemmil v. Arthur, 125 Ind. 258, 944 Genesee &c. Bank v. Board &c., 53 Barb. 223, 1724 Genesee Tp. v. McDonald, 98 Pa. St ^ 444, 278. 1480 Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296, 1199 Geneva v. Cole, 61 111. 397, 65 Genois v. Lockett. 13 La. 545. 192 Genovese v. Mavor &c., 55 N Y Super. Ct. 397. 'l212 Gentle v. Board &c.. 73 Mich. 40, 1486 George v. Dean, 47 Tex. 73, 1719 CVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol II,' pp. 833-1830.'\ George v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Met. 497, 344, 345, 355, 356, 360, 1485 V. Oxford Townsbip, 16 Kan. 72, 988, 1027 •V. Wyandotte &c. Light Co., 105 Mich. 1, 733 George P. Blaise Mfg. Co. v. Sanitary Dist. &c., 77 III. App. 287, 742, 748 George's Creels &c. Co. v. County Com'rs, 59 Md. 255, 1552 V. New Central &c. Co., 40 Md. 425, 693 Georgia v. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315, 770 V. Stanton. 6 Wall. 50, 17 Georgia R. &c. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 1379 Georgia State Bank and Loan Ass'n V. Owens, 88 Ga. 224, 1415 Gerald v. City of Boston, 108 Mass. 580, 1638 Gerber v. Ackley, 32 Wis. 233, 331 Gerberling v. Wunenberg, 51 Iowa 125, 1561 Gerdes v. Christopher &e. Co., 124 Mo. 347. 1361 Gere v. Supervisors &c., 7 How. Pr. 255, 1054 Gerhard v. Seekonk &c. Com'rs, 15 R. I. 334. 1317 Gerken v. Siblcv Co.. 39 Minn. 433, 904 Gerlach v. Brandreth, 54 N. Y. S. 479, 1700 Germaine v. City of Muskegon, 105 Mich. 213. 1328 German American Bank v. City of Brenham, 35 Fed. 185, 974 German American Sav. Bank v. City of Spokane. 17 Wash. 315, 1296 German Ins. Co. v. City of Manning, 78 Fed. 900, 1007 V. City of Manning, 95 Fed. 597, 519, 878. 973, 1031 V. City of Minden, 51 Neb. 870, 513 German Sav. Bank v. Franklin Co., 128 U. S. 526, 100, 990. 1002 Germania Bank v. City of St. Baul, 79 Minn. 29. 1307, 1553 Gerrard v. Omaha &c. R. Co., 14 Neb. 270. 693 Gerrish v. Brown, 51 Maine 256, 817 Getchell v. Benton, 30 Neb. 870, 981 V. Inhabitants &c., 55 Maine 4.33, 355 Getzoff V. City of New York, 64 N. Y. S. 636'. 1340 Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co., 158 N. Y. 510. 1349 Gibbon v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 1502 Gibbons v. Mobile R. Co., 36 Ala. 410, 983 V. United States, 8 Wall. 269. 771 Gibbs V. Commissioners, 19 Pick. 298. 1724 V. Consolidated Gas Co., ISO U. S. 396, 104 Giboney v. City of Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141, 1516, 1517 Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168, 345, 347, 367, 1427 V. Kavser, 16 Mo. Anp. 404, 1233 V. Mason, 5 Nev. 283. 151 V. Wood, 20 Ky. L. 1547. 186 Gififen v. Cltv of Lewiston (Idaho), 55 Pac, 545, 930, 1327. 1331 1338, 1358 Gifford V. New .Jersey &c. R. Co., 10 N. J. Fq. 171. 651 V. Town of White Plaines, 25 Hun 606, 870 Gilbert v. Board &c., 45 Kan. 31, 316, 913 Gilbert v. Hebard. 8 Met. 129, 1743 V. Luce, 11 Barb. 91, 199 Gilchrist v. Little Rock, 1 Dill. 261, 1017 V. Schmidling, 12 Kan. 263, 533 Gilder v. City of Brenham, 67 Tex. 345, 1374 Gildersleeve v. Board of Education, 17 Abb. Pr. 201. 273, 305 Giles V. City of Shenandoah, 111 Iowa 83. 1367 V. School Dist., 31 N. H. 304, 12, 341, 1485 Gilham v. President «&c., 2 Scam. 245, 378 V. Wells, 64 Ga. 192, 500, 598 Gilkey v. City of Merrill, 67 Wis. 459, 652 V. Town of How. 105 Wis. 41, 70 Gill V. Brown, 12 Johns. 385. 216 V. City of Oakland, 124 Cal. 335, 1241, 1304 Gillan V. Hutchinson. 16 Cal. 153, 705 Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. St. 144, 795, 810 Gillett V. Board &c., 67 111. 256, 285 V. McGonigal, 80 Wis. 158, 1568 Gillette v. City of Denver, 21 Fed. 822. 1239, 1242. 1270 V. City of Hartford, 31 Conn. 351, 386, 1513, 1516 Gilliam Co. v. Wasco Co., 14 Or. 525, 444 Gillmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio 281. 671 Gilluly V. City of Madison, 63 Wis. 518, 265, 517, 811 Oilman v. City of Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 801, 1576 V. City of Sheboygan, 2 Black 510, 1520. 1531, 1547 V. Contra Costa Co., 8 Cal. 52. 1743 v. Inhabitants &c., 15 Gray 577, 1635 V. Laconia. 55 N. H. 130, 8, 265 v. School Dist.. 18 N. H. 215, 958 V. Gilby Tp., 8 N. D. 627. 951 Gilmanton v. Sanbornton, 56 N. H. 336. 1058 Gilmer v. Hunnicutt, 57 S. C. 166, 1686 V. Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47, 695 Gilmore v. American &c. Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 366, 1713 v. City of Utica, 131 N. Y. 26, 278. 284, 1143, 1200, 1201, 1260 V. Ilentig, 33 Kan. 156, 1146, 1153 V. Holt. 4 Pick. 258, 348 V. Morton. 10 Kan. 491. 55 Gilpatrick v. City of Biddeford, 86 Maine 534, 789' Gilpin V. City of Ansonia, 68 Conn. 72, 71 Gilrov V. School Dist., 17 Or. 522, 1491 Gilson V. Board &c., 128 Ind. 65. 1659 Gimbel v. Stolte. 59 Ind. 446. 693. 1571 Giovanni, The. v. City of Philadel- phia, 59 Fed. 303, 795, 1333 Girard v. City of New Orleans, 2 La. An. SOS. 563 V. Philadelphia. 7 Wall. 1. 90, 92. 103. 383. 396, 459, 564. 1517 Girvin v. Simon, 116 Cal. 004, 1280 V. Simon. 127 Cal. 491. 1237, 1279 Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n. 100 Mo. 508, 590 Glasgow V. City of St. Louis. 107 Mo. 198, 801, 829, 1317. 1320. 1574, 1697 V. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479. 1508, 1520, 1521 Glasier v. Town of Hebron, 131 N. Y. 447. 816, 1587 Glass V. Ashbury, 49 Cal. 571, 554 TABLE OF CASES, evil IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Gleason v. Barnett, 20 Ky. L. 1004, 1147, 1281 V. Barnett, 20 Ky. L. 1865, 476 V. City of Boston, 144 Mass. 25, 1058 V. Peerless Mfg. Co., 37 N. Y. S. 207, 482, 499 V. Slopor, 24 Pick. 181, 706 V. Waiiliesha Co., 103 Wis. 225, 1141, 1549 Glenn v. Wray, 126 N. C. 730. 9S4, 993 Glidden v. Town of Reading, 38 Vt. 52, 1639 - Globo &c. Mills V. P.ilbrough, 19 N. Y. S. 176, 1412 Glover v. City of Terre Haute, 129 Ind. 593, 391, 395 Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, 116S. 1177. 1178. 1198 V. City of Boston, 20 Pick. 407, 106 V. Inhabitants &c., 84 Maine 499, 788 Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 120, 609, 983 Goeltz V. Town of Ashland, 75 Wis. 642, 1597 Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. ■ 420, 221 Goetler v. State, 45 Ark. 454, 1388 Goettman v. Mayor &c.. 6 Hun 132, 199 Goetzman v. Whittaker, 81 Iowa 527, 945 Goforth V. Rutherford &c. Co., 96 N. C. 535. 989 Going V. Dinwiddle, 86 Cal. 633, 221 Goins V. City of Moberly, 127 Mo. 116, 1316 Gold V. City of Peoria, 65 111. App. 602, 880 Goldm.Tu V. Conway Co., 10 Fed. S8S. 959 Goldschniid v. Mayor &c., 43 N. Y. S. 447, 796 Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Com'rs, L. R. 1 Eq. 161. 809 Goldsmith v. Board &c., 115 Cal. 36, 1744 V. Mavor &c., 120 Ala. 182, 524 Goldthwaite v. City Council &c., 50 Ala. 486. 537 Gooch V. Association &c., 109 Mass. 558 807 V. Gregory. 65 N. C. 142. 1530 Goodale v. Brocknor; 61 How. Pr. 451, 1066 V. Fennell. 27 Ohio St. 426, 1531 V. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513, 1063 Goodel V. Baker, 8 Cowen 286, 352 Goodenow v. Buttrick. 7 Mass. 140, 523 Goodfellow V. City of New York, 100 N. Y. 15. 826 Goodhue v. Town of Beloit, 21 Wis. 636, 409 Good'U V. Cincinnati &c. Canal Co., IS Ohio St. 169, 703. 1222 Goodman v. Simond.s. 20 How. 343, 1018, 1032 Goodnow V. Board &c., 11 Minn. 31, 941, 973 Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa 291. 85. 537, 1411 V. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 5.59. 1300 V. City of Watervllle, 88 Maine 39. 730 V. Winchester &c., 26 Ind. 119, 1269 Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 133. 676 Goodwillie v. City of Lake View, 137 111. 51, 1283, 1292 Goodwin v. Roberts. L. R. 1 App. Cas. 476. 1018 V. State, 142 Ind. 117, 208 Goodyear v. School Dist., 17 Or. S17. 1491 Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake School Tp., 1 N. I). 26, 647, 968, 1487, 1491 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133, 1511 V. City of Richmond. 83 Va. 436, 1594, 1631, 1632, 1635 V. Clifford, 28 N. II. 402, 349 V. Comes, 47 N. Y. 608. 12.5.3, 1514, 1.5.38 V. IMayor &c., 5 Gill 231, 1511 Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45, 1018 Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 811 V. Springfield. 21 Maine 58. 58. 61 (Joring v. McTaggart, 92 Ind. 200. 617, 1288, 1722 Gorman v. Sinking Fund Com'rs, 25 Fed. 641. 1020 Gorley v. City of Louisville, 20 Ky. L. 602, 184 Gormley v. Day, 114 111. 185, 522, 1648 Gorton v. Erie R. Co., 45 N. Y. 060. 1641 Goshenv. Myers, 119 Ind. 196. 1578, 1579 Goshen Trustees &c. v. Springfield &c. R. Co.. 12 Ohio St. 624, 1023 Gosling v. Voley. 12 Q. B. 328, 100. 161, 162, 293, 373, 378, 463, 500 Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa 296. 533, 1085 Gossigi v. City of New Orleans, 41 La. An. 522, 1403 Goswell V. City of Louisville, 57 S. W. 476, 719 Goszler v. Corporation of George- town, 6 Wheat. 593. 579, 587, 824 Gottschalk v. Becher, 32 Neb. 653, 394, 397 Gougle V. Dorsev, 27 Wis. 119. 423 Gould V. City of Paris, 68 Tex. 511, 893 V. City of Rochester, 105 N. Y. 46, 1095 V. City of Topeka, 32 Kan. 485, 1584 V. Glass. 19 Barb. 179. 198 V. Sterling. 23 N. Y. 439, 982, 985, 1010, 1539 Gouldey v. City Council &c.. 63 N. J. L. 537. 1710 Gove V. Epping. 41 N. II. 539. 668 Governor v. Allen. 8 Humph. 176, 312 V. Dodd. 81 111. 162, 223 V. Gibson. 14 Ala. 326. 322 V. Hancock. 2 Ala. 728, 331 V. McEwen. 5 Humph. 241, 456 V. Meredith. 4 T. R. 794, 801 V. Perrine. 23 Ala. 807, 328, 333 V. Ridgeway, 12 111. 14, 318 V. Robbins. 7 Ala. 79. 323, 327 Govett V. City of Jackson, 109 Mich. 408, 1344 Gowen v. Philadelphia Exchange Co.. 5 W. & S. 141, 1561 Goyne v. Ashley Co., 31 Ark. 552, 945 Grade Crossing Com'rs &c.. In re, 64 N. Y. S. 1074. 1779 Grading of Shiloh Street, In re, 165 Pa. St. 386. 1152 Graf V. City of St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 562. 694 Graff V. Mayor &c., 10 Md. 544, 699, 700. 1196 Graffty v. City of Rushville, 107 Ind. 502. 614. 1404 Grafton Bank v. Kimball, 20 N. H. 107. 366 Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Texas 62. 58. 66. 395, 397, 1517 V. Hartnett, 10 Neb, 517, 1566 v. State, 1 Pike 171, 1410 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Gram v. Village of Greenbush, 3 N. Y. S. 76, 1G04 Grand Ave. R. Co. v. People's R. Co., 132 Mo. 34, 1697 Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 355, 1001, 1031 Grand Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Buck, 53 Miss. 246, . 1513 Grand Island Gas Co. v. West, 28 Neb. 852, 1467 Grand Lodge v. Waddill, 36 Ala. 313. 585 Grand Rapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich. 367, 242 V. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co., 58 Mich. 641. 694 Grand Rapids &c. Co. v. Grand Rapids &c. Co., 33 Fed. 659, 621, 1351 V. Jarvis. 30 Mich. 308, 677 Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Alley, 34 Mich. 16, 693 V. Gray, 38 Mich. 461, 1411, 1415, 1417 V. Huntlev, 38 Mich. 540, 1618 V. Sanders, 54 How. Pr. 214, 1019 V. West Side St. R. Co., 48 Mich. 433, 683 Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37, 14 Granger Cases, 94 U. S. 155, 164. 5, 6 Grant v. Bartholomew, 58 Neb. 839, 1236, 1237 V. Board of Water Com'rs &c., 122 Mich. 694, 745 V. Camp. 105 Ga. 428, 549 V. City of Davenport. 36 Iowa 396, 651, 876, 877, 879, 889, 917 V. City of Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420, 264. 786, 820 V. Common Council &e., 91 Mich. 274, 1195, 1674 V. Courter, 24 Barb. 232, 763 V. Davenport. 36 Iowa 396. 1511 Grant Co. v. Lake Co., 17 Or. 453. 883 Grantland v. City of Memphis, 12 Fed. 287, 413 Gratton Tp. v. Chelton, 97 Fed. 145. 1006 Gravel Hill School Dist. v. Old Farm School Dist., 55 Conn. 244. 1474 Graves v. City of Bloomington, 17 111. App. 476, 1086 V. Colbv. 9 Ad. & Kl. 356. 528 V. .Tasper School Tp.. 2 S. Dak. 414, 1486 V. Lebanon Nat'l Bank, 10 Bush 23. 320, 321 Gray v. Bavnard, 5 Del. Ch. 499, 623 V. Board &c., 139 Mass. 328. 1182 V. Citv of Erooklvn, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 267. 90, 103 V. City of Brooklyn, 10 Abb. Pr. 186, 763. 829 V. City of Detroit, 113 Mich. 657. 792 V. Granger. 17 R. 1. 201, 169 V. Mayor &c., 2 Marv. 257, 494 V. Mayor &c., Ill Ga. 361. 266. 792. 804 V. Richardson, 124 Cal. 460. 723. 733 V. Richardson. 55 Pac. 603, 12S7 V. State, 2 Harr. 76. 1416 V. Town of Cicero. 177 111. 459, 1146. 1174, 1378 Gravham v. County Court &c., 9 "Dana 184, 318 Grayson v. Latham, 84 Ala. 546. 957. 959. 962, 963 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster, 45 N. H. no. 1055 Greeley v. City of .Tacksonville. 17 Fia. 174. ■ 106., 520 Green v. Burke, 23 Wend. 490, 198 Green v. City of Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45, 464, 644, 1091 V. City of Indianapolis, 22 Ind. 192, 538 V. City of Indianapolis, 25 Ind. 490, 490, 1424 V. City of Springfield, 130 111. 515 1259 V. City of Tacoma, 51 Fed. 622, 823 V. County Com'rs, 27 5. C. 9, 939 947 V. Eden, 24 Ind. App. 583, ' 151 V. Harrison Co., 61 Iowa 311, 1076 V. Mayor &c., R. M. Charlt. 368, 1500, 1508 V. Mayor &c., 1 Burr. 127, 2S9, 296 V. Miller. 6 Johns. 39, 294 V. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. Sr. 462, 563 V. Shanklin, 24 Ind. App. 608, 718 V. State, 73 Cal. 29, 18 V. Town of Canaan, 29 Conn. 157, 1559 V. Town of Dyersburg, 2 Flip. 477, 984, 1017 V. Ward, 82 Va. 324. 1232, 1255, 1261, 1262 V. Wardwell. 17 111. 278, 309 Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207, 347. 353, 359, 666 Green Bay &c. Co. v. Kaukauna &c. Co.. 70 Wis. 635, 666 V. Outagamie Co., 76 Wis. 588, 593 Greencastle Tp. v. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 401 Greene v. Damrell, 175 Mass. 394, 106 V. Mumford, 5 R. I. 472, 1717. 1718, 1722 Greene Co. v. FAibanks. 80 Ala. 204, 14 Greenfield v. Wilson. 13 Gray 384. 332 Greenley v. People. 60 111. 19, 666, 1084 Greenville Co. v. Runion, 9 S. C. 1, 915 Greenville Water-Works Co. v. City of Greenville. 7 So. 409, 571, 640. 1450 Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 T^. S. 13, 104, 510, 1184 V. Hassett. 61 Pac. 173. 1141, 1259 v. Louisville, 13 Bush 226. 264 V. Morrison, 128 Cal. 350, 752, 1294 V. State, 6 Baxt. 567, 607 Greer, In re, 56 N. Y. S. 938, 1379 V, Rowley, 1 Pittsb. 1, 1745 Gregg Tp. V. Jamison. 55 Pa. St. 468, 196 Gregory, Ex parte, 20 Tex. App. 210, 1397, 1406 V. Brooks. 37 Conn. 365. 222 V. BrGV>'n.'4 Bibb 28, 221 V. Burk. 35 Alb. L. J. 278. 1177 V. City of Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76. 281. 285, 668 V. Mayor &c., 113 N. Y. 416. 176. 626 V. Small, 39 Ohio St. 346, 221, 222 Gregston v. City of Chicago, 145 111. 451, 1349 Grenada Co. Supervisors v. Brogden. 112 TT. S. 261, 642. 643, 992 Grey v. Mavor &c., 58 N. J. Eq. 1, 1107 V. Mayor &c., 60 N. J. Eq. 385, 1710 Gribble v. City of Sioux City, 38 Iowa 390. 1635 Grider v. Tally. 77 Ala. 422, 222, 223 Gridlev v. Citv of Bloomington. 68 111. 47. 1168, 1349. 1596 V. Citv of Bloomington. 8S 111. 555. 1032, 1587 Grier v. Shackleford, 3 Brev. 491, 156 Griffin v. Mavor &c.. 3 Bosw. 483, 1112 V. Mayor &c.. 9 N. Y. 456. 263, 830, 1159 V. Rising. 11 Met. 339. 230 TABLR OK CASES. CIX [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Griffith \. Carter. 8 Kan. 505, 1500 V. Commissioners, L'O Ohio 609, 98H V. Sebastian Co.. 49 Ark. 24, 173G V. Watson, 19 Kan. 23, 1500 Griffltb Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Pac. 383, 738 Griggs V. St. Croix Co.. 27 Fed. 333, 1489 (Jrim V. Weissenberg School Dist., 57 Pa. St. 433, 1551 Grimes v. Hamilton Co., 37 Iowa 290, 659, 660 Grimraell v. City of Des Moines, 57 Iowa 144. 1270 Grimmett v. Askew, 48 Ark. 151, 274 Grimsley v. State. 116 Ind. 130, 912 Grindlev v. Barker, 1 Bos. & P. 229, 294 Griswold v. Brega, 160 111. 490. 1707 Grofif V. City of Philadelphia, 150 Pa. St. 594. 1220 V. Mayor &c.. 44 Md. ISO, 104 Grogan v. Broadway Foundry Co., 87 Mo. 321, 1375 V. City of San Francisco. 18 Cal. " ' 590, 43. 242. 630. 631, 757 V. City of Worcester, 140 Mass. 227. 1623 V. Town of Hayward, 4 Fed. 161, 1214 Grondin v. Logan, 88 Mich. 247, 1648 Gross V. City of Grossdale, 176 111. 572, 1294 V. City of Lampass, 74 Tex. 195. 1179 V. City of Portsmouth, 68 N. H. 266, 266, 789 Grove v. City of Ft. Wayne, 45 Ind. 429, 1115, 1612 Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich. 476. 526. 533. 1085 V. Inhabitants. 11 Allen 88, 344, 362 Griimon v. Raymond. 1 Conn. 40. 335 Grundy Co. v. Hughes, 8 111. App. 34, 1064 Grusenmeyer v. City of Logansport, 76 Ind. 549, 1095, 1660 Gubasko v. City of New York, 1 N. Y. S. 215, 1615 Guenther v. Whiteacre. 24 Mich. 504, 335 Guerin v. Borough of Asbury Park, 57 N. J. L. 292. 605 Guernsey v. Burlington Tp., 4 Dillon 372, 981 Guerrero. In re. 69 Cal. 88, 1539 Guest V. City of Brooklyn. 69 N. Y. 506. 1202. 1719 V. Commissioners &c., 90 Md. 689. 790, 791 Guild V. City of Chicago, 82 111. 472, 90, 103 Guillotte V. City of New Orleans. 12 La. An. 432. 534 ■ Guldin V. Schuylkill County, 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 197, 173 Gulf &c. R. Co. V. Gasscamp, 69 Tex. 545, 1631 Gulick V. New, 14 Ind. 93. 189. 379, 1418, 1672 Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 804, 805 Gulline v. City of Lowell, 144 Mass. 491, 1595 Gumotte v. Egelhoff, 2 Mo. App. 963. 1295 Gundling v. Chicago. 177 U. S. 183, 518 V. Chicago. 176 111. 340. 469. 604. 658. 1382, 1384, 1388 Gunn V. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 996 V. Pulaski Co.. 3 Ark. 427. 1527 Gunnison Co. v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, 173 U. S. 255. 1001, 1003, 1005, 1031, 1032 Gunter v. Fayetteville, 56 Ark. 202. 398. 400 Gurley v. City of New Orleans, 41 La. An. 75, 233, 235, 019 Gurnee v. Brunswick Co., 1 Hughes 270, 941 V. City of Chicago, 40 111. 165, 1233 Gurney v. Inhabitants &c., 93 Maine 360. 1336 Gusher v. City of New York, 56 N. Y. S. 1002, 710, 1707 V. City of New York, 58 N. Y. S. 967. 578 Gustin V. Inhabitants &c., 10 Gray 259, 1533 Guthrie v. Armstrong, 5 B. & Aid. 628, 295 V. City of Philadelphia, 73 Fed. 688, 795 V. Swan, 3 Okl. 116, 1330 Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. City of Guth- rie, 173 T^ S. 528. 69 Gwynn v. Turner. 18 Iowa 1, 229 Gwynne v. Burnell, 7 CI. «& F. 572, 325 V. Pool, Lutw. 290, 220 Haaren v. High. 97 Cal. 445, 1166, 1505 Ilackensack Water Co. v. Mayor &c., 51 N. J. L. 220, 1448, 1449 Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86. 979, 980, 1001. 1004 Hackstack v. Keshena Imp. Co., 66 Wis. 439, 1218 Hackworth v. Louisville &c. Stone Co.. 20 Ky. L. 1789, 1166. 1505 Haddox v. Clarke Co., 79 Va. 677, 368 Iladley v. Citizens' Sav. Inst., 123 Mass. 301. 1573 V. State, 66 Ind. 271. 1483 Hadsel v. Inhabitants &c., 3 Gray 526, 667 Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 16 Gray 297. 263. 797. 803. 807. 820, 1097 Hagan v. City of Brooklyn, 126 N. Y. 643. 172, 184 Hagar v. Board &c., 47 Cal. 222. 1714 V. Brainard. 44 Vt. 294. 693. 1571 V. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701. 559. 694. 1238. 1239. 1302. 1714 Hager v. City of Burlington, 42 Iowa 661. 1258 Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299, 419 Ilagner v. Heyberger. 7 W. & S. 104, 297 Hagood V. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 18 Hague V. City of Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527, 235, 253, 257, 258, 644, 645 Haight V. City of Elmira, 59 N. Y. S. 193. 1342 V. Keokuk. 4 Iowa 199. 681 V. New York. 24 Fed. 93, 781 Haile v. Palmer, 5 Mo. 403, 1423 Haines v. Campion, 3 Ilarr. 49, 645 V. School Dist.. 41 Maine 246, 243 Haisch v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 43.5. 1185. 1298. 1704 Halbert v. Mayor &c., 10 Abb. Pr. 439. 187 V. State, 22 Ind. 125, 319 Halcombe v. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 346, 1542 Haldeman v. Pennsylvania R. Co.. 50 Pa. St. 425. 675 Hale V. City of Kenosha. 29 Wis. 599. 1231 1520 V. Commonwealth. 8 Pa. St."4l'5. 328 V. Risley, 69 Mich. 596, 1496 Haley v. City of Alton, 152 III. 113. 719, 1241, 1283 ex TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. S33-1S30.} Haley v. Whitney, 53 Hun 119, 229 Hall V. Baker. 74 Wis. 118, 424, 445, 659 V. City of Buffalo, 1 Keyes 193, 1191 V. City of Chippewa Palls, 47 Wis. 267. 1255 V. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507, 216 V. Corporation of Washington, 4 Cranch 722, 530 V. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485. 138. 1493 V. Inhabitants &c., 116 Mass. 172. 357 V. Inhabitants «&c., 133 Mass. 433, 824 V. People, 57 111. 307, 339, 695, 1683 V. School Dist., 46 Vt. 19, 362 V. Smith. 2 Bing. 156, 225 Halleck v. Inhabitants &c., 117 Mass. 469, 365, 1425 Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377, 983 Hallman v. City of Platteville, 101 Wis. 94. 789 Hallock V. inhabitants &c., 2 Met. 558, 705 Halloran v. Carter, 13 N. Y. S. 214. 1647 Hall's Free School Trustees v. Home. 80 Va. 470, 1493 Halsey v. People, 84 111. 89, 1253 V. Rapid Transit St. R. Co.. 47 N. .7. Eq. 380, 279, 554, 682 Halstead, Ex parte, 89 Cal. 471, 1413 V. Mayor. 3 Comst. 430. 233. 251. 253, 647, 664, 668 V. Village of W'arsaw, 59 N. Y. S. 518, 1364 Ham V. City of Salem, 100 Mass. 350. 688 V. Greve, 34 Ind. 18, 321 V. Mayor &c., 70 N. Y. 459, 781, 788, 1097 Hamar v. Covington, 3 Met. 494. 831 Hambleton v. Town of Dexter, 89 Mo. 188, 448, 1683 Hamilton v. Ci'ty of Detroit, 105 Mich. 514. 1336, 1348 V. Gambell. 31 Or. 328. 1713 V. Inhabitants &c., 55 Maine 193, 347, 3.58 V. Mayor &c., 52 Ga. 435, 265, 1112 V. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 1768 V. Newcastle &c. R. Co., 9 Ind. 359, 260 V. President &c., 24 111. 22, 64 V. State. 3 Ind. 452, 339 V. State. 3 Tex. App. 643. 607 V. Vicksburg &c. R. Co., 119 IT. S. 280. 1576 Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632, 1512 Hamlin v. Dingman, 5 Lans. 61. 197, 289 V. Kassafer, 15 Or. 456. 195. 196, 197 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146. 593. 1195. 1231. 1233. 1297, 1537 Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541. 107 V. School Board &c., 109 Mich. 676, 1506 Hammonds v. Richmond Co., 72 Ga. 188. 805 Hampshire Co., In re. 143 Mass. 424. 1249 Hampson v. Taylor, 15 R. I. 83. 1566. 1632 Hancock v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 122, 1739 V. District Tp. of Perry, 78 Iowa 5.50. 1474 Hancock St. Extension, 18 Pa. St. 26, 1234 Hand v. Fellows, 148 Pa. St. 456, 583 Hand v. Inhabitants &c., 126 Mass. 324, 824 V. Newton. 92 N. Y. 88, 19 Handley v. Palmer, 91 Fed. 948, 563 Handy v. City of New Orleans, 39 La. An. 107. 650 Ilaney v. City of Kansas, 94 Mo. 334, 1180 V. Marshall, 9 Md. 194. 137 Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 455 V. City of Des Moines, 52 Iowa 193, 670 Hankins v. Calloway. 88 111. 155, 186 V. People, 106 111. 628, 496 Bianlon v. Partridge. 69 N. H. 88. 223 Hanna v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 20 Ind. 30, 994 Ilannewinkle v. Georgetown. 15 Wall. 547. 1697, 1717, 1718, 1722 Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Marion Co., 36 Mo. 294, 285, 1539 Ilannon v. Agnew. 96 N. Y. 439, 282 V. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115, 185 V. Grizzard, 96 N. C. 293, 221 V. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313, 778 Hanover School Tp. v. Gant, 125 Ind. 557. 1476 Hanscom v. City of Boston, 141 Mass. 242. 1615 V. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 1231, 1253, 1499 Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315. 1292, 1505 V. Hirsch. 27 Or. 487, 1315 Hanson, Ex parte, 28 Fed. 127, 1404 V. Borough of Warren, 14 Atl. 405. 1605 V. Eichstaedt. 69 Wis. 538, 1428 V. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 983, 1536, 1537, 1542 V. Wm. A. Hunter Elec. L. Co., 86 Iowa 722, 1467 Hapgood V. Doherty, 8 Gray 373, 699 Harbaugh v. City of Monmouth, 74 111. 367, 519 Harbeck v. City of Toledo,* 11 Ohio St. 219, 692 Harcoui-t v. Good. 39 Tex. 455, 983 Hardaker v. Idle Dist. Council, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 335. 796 Hardcastle v. State. 27 N. J. L. 551. 348 Hardenbrook v. Town of Ligonier, 95 Ind. 70, 493, 530. 539 Hardenburgh v. Van Keuren, 4 Abb. N. C. 43, 994 Harder v. City of Minneapolis. 40 Minn. 446, 828, 1623 Hardestv v. Fleming. 57 Tex. 395, 1552 Hardin v. Carrico. 3 Met. 289, 333 V. Colquitt. 63 Ga. 588, 1694 Hardin Co. v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 92 Kv. 412, 281. 625 V. McFarlan, 82 111. 138, 835. 977 V. Wright Co., 67 Iowa 127, 1063 Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich. 316, 277 V. Goodlet. 3 Yerg. 40. 685 v. Rockford &c. R. Co., 65 111. 90. 973, 988 V. Vandewater. 40 Cal. 77, 275, 732 V. Woodcock. 137 V. S. 43, 223 Hardmann v. Bowen, 39 N. Y. 196. 311 Hardy v. City of Orange, 61 N. J. L. 620. 163 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Met. 163. 576, 867 V. Keene. 52 N. H. 370, 820 V. Keene. 54 N. 11. 449. 1573 V. McKinnev. 107 Ind. 364. 708 V. Merriweather. 14 Ind. 203, 071 Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1, 795, 810 V. Hopper, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 195, 127 TABLE OF CASES. CXI [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.ii Ilargro v. Ilodfrdon, 80 Cal. 023, If.fio Ilarsroves v. Cooke, 1") Oa. 321, 14S8 Hark v. Gladwoll, 40 Wis. 17:!, 300, :i(;o Harkei- v. Mayor, 17 Wend. 199, 85, 538 Harlem Gaslijiht Co. v. Mayor &c., 3 liobt. 100, 894 Harlow v. Borough of Beaver Falls, 188 ra. St. 2G3, 741 Harman v. City of St. Louis, 137 Mo. 494. 1112 V. Harwood. 58 Md. 1. 150 V. Tappenden, 1 East 555, 207 Harmison v. City of Lewistown, 153 111. 313, 1117 Harmon v. City of Chicago. 110 111. 400, 466. 492, 621, 1120 V. City of Omaha, 17 Neb. 548, 1209. 1301 V. Inhabitants &c., 9 Cush. 525, 1519 Harmony v. Bingham. 12 N. Y. 99. 1263 Harness v. Chesapeake &c. Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 248. 674 V. State. 76 Tex. 566, 93, 164 Harnev v. Benson, 113 Cal. 314, 1281 V.' Heller, 47 Cal. 15, 1256 V. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 32 Ind. 244, 651 Harper v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365, 811, 1112, 1208 V. Commissioners &c., 23 Ga. 566, 1714 V. Lexington &c. R. Co., 2 Dana 227. 693 V. Mayor &c., 94 Ga. 801, 596 Harper Co. Com'rs v. Rose, 140 U. S. 71, 978 Harrell v. Storrie, 47 S. W. 838, 1268 Harrigan v. City of Wilmington, 8 Houst. 140. 1180 V. Village of Hoosick Falls, 1 N. Y. S. 57. 1604 Harriman v. City of Boston, 114 Mass. 241, 1616 Harrington v. City of Buffalo, 2 N. Y. S. 333, 1599. 1606 V. Commissioners &c., 2 McC. 400, 335 V. County Com'rs. 22 Pick. 263, 705 V. Woffoi-d. 46 Miss. 31, 693 Harris, Ex parte, 52 Ala. 87, 1672 V. Baker, 4 M. & S. 27, 225 V. Board &c.. 105 111. 445. 1084 V. Chickasaw Co., 77 Iowa 345, 944 V. City of Atlanta, 62 Ga. 290, 798. 1075 V. City of Fond Du Lac, 104 Wis. 44, 930 V. City of St. Joseph, 99 Fed. 246. 723 V. Hanson, 2 Fairf. 241, 330, 332 V. Nesbit, 24 Ala. 398. 124 V. Pepperell. L. R. 5 Eq. 1. 1015 V. School Dist., 8 Fost. (28 N. H.) 58. 12. 348. 366. 1480, 1485 V. Thompson. 9 Barb. 350, 685 V. T'ehplhoer, 75 N. Y. 169, 1639 V. Wakeman, Sav. 254. 467, 536 V. Whitcomb. 4 Gray 433. 370, 1424 V. Wood, 6 T. B. Mon. 641. 1714 Harrison v. Augusta Factory, 73 Ga. 447. 1214 V. Board &c.. 51 ,Wis. 645, 1216 V. Brooks. 20 Ga. 537, 1387 V. City of Elgin, 53 111. App. 452. 1348 V. City of Milwaukee, 49 Wis. ■247. 246. 1726 V. City of New Orleans. 40 La. An. 509. 854 V. Mayor &c.. 1 Gill 264. 594, 1079, 1099, 1100, 1391 Harrison v. Town of Plainview, 27 Minn. 224. 1539, 1728 V. William.s, 3 B. & C. 162. 11 Ilarriss v. Wright, 121 N. C. 172, 104 Ilarshman v. Bates Co., 92 U. S. 569, 210, 994, 095 V. Knox Co. Court, 122 U. S. 306, 1525 Hart V. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 629, 630, 1743 V. City of Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226. 1198 V. City of New Orleans, 12 Fed. 292, 1529, 1530 V. Lancashire &c. R. Co., 21 L. T. 261. 1627 V. Mayor &c., 9 Wend. 571, 527, 532, 535, 620. 1085, 1115 V. Mayor &c., 3 Paige 213, 1081, 1121 V. Poor Guardians, 81 1^ Pa. St. 406. 319 V. T'nited States, 118 U. S. 62, 773 Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562, 995 Hartford Bridge Co. v. Town of East Hartford. 16 Conn. 149, 435, 1519 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Peoria. 156 111. 420, '542 612 Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St. 441, 199 Hartman v. City of Muscatine, 70 Iowa 511, 1635 Hartnall v. Ryde Com'rs, 4 B. & S. 361, 812. 831 Ilartrick v. Town of Farmington, 108 Iowa 31, 1162 Hartshorn v. Schoflf. 58 N. H. 197. 287 Hart Tp. V. Oceana Co., 44 Mich. 417 ; 48 Mich. 319. 868 Hart well v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. 166, 689. 1084 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Pick. 229. 1427 Harvey v. Aurora &c. R. Co., 186 111. 283. 492. .508 V. Benson. 113 Cal. 314, 1130 v. City of Clarinda, 111 Iowa 528. 1329. 1333 V. Commissioners &c., 32 Kan. 159. 173 V. De Woody, 18 Ark. 252. 1115 V. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 32 Ind. 244. 1730 V. Thomas. 10 Watts 63, 673. 674 V. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, 694 Plarward v. St. Clair &c. Co., 51 111. 130, 624 Harwinton v. Catlin, 19 Conn. 520. 684 Harwood v. City of Lowell, 4 Cush. 310. 814. 1594 V. Marshall. 9 Md. 83, 187 Hasbrouck v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, 548. 1523. 1534. 1538 V. City of Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 122, 1534 Haskell v. Bartlett. 34 Cal. 281, 486 V. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208, 817 Hassell V. Long, 2 M. & S. 363. 326 Hassen v. City of Rochester, 65 N. Y. 516, 1288 Hastings v. Bolton, 1 Allen 529, 1740 V. City of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 49, 1734 V. Columbus. 42 Ohio St. 585, 487 V. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293. 136 Hatch V. City of Buffalo. 38 N. Y. 276. 1724 V. Hawkes. 126 Mass. 177. 335. 1570 V. Inhabitants &c.. 97 Mass. 533, 318 V. Willamette &c. Bridge Co., 7 Saw. 127, 1576 exii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Hatcheson v. Tilden, 4 Harr. & McII. 279, 379 Hathaway v. Inhabitants &c., 48 Maine 440, 352, 353 V. Sacliett. 32 Mich. 97, 664 V. Town of Homer, 5 Lans. 267, 870 Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 Wall. 294, 410. 764, 1029 Haven v. Asylum, 13 N. H. 532, 1425 V. City of Lowell, 5 Met. 35, 280, 362 V. Grand Junction R. &c. Co., 109 Mass. 88, 1019 Havens v. Lathem, 75 N. C. 505, 319 Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v. Coun- ty Com'rs, 103 Mass. 120, 685 Hawes v. City of Chicago, 158 111. 653, 501, 504, 1130, 1148, 1710 V. Town of Fox Lake, 33 Wis. 438, 1597 Hawk V. Marion Co., 48 Iowa 472, 669, 670, 671 Hawkes v. Inhabitants &c., 7 Mass. 461, 1526 V. Inhabitants &c., 107 Mass. 414, 11.59 Hawk Eye &c. Co. v. City of Marion, 110 Iowa 468, 1553 Hawkins v. Board &c. of Carroll Co., 50 Miss. 735, 982, 986 V. Common Council &c., 120 . Mich. 390, 1685 V. County Com'rs, 2 Allen 254, 693, 1571 V. Dougherty, 9 Houst. 156, 1682 V. United States, 96 U. S. 689, 647 Hawley v. City of Atlantic, 92 Iowa 172, 794 V. City of Gloversville, 38 N. Y. S. 647, 1343 V. Fairbanks, 108 U. S. 543, 1528 V. Mayor &c., 82 N. C. 22, 1526 Hawthorn v. City of St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59, 1745 Hawthorne v. City of East Portland, 12 Or. 271. 1254 Hay V. City of Springfield, 64 111. App. 671, 672, 877 V. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159. 823 Hayden v. Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817, 1269 V. City Council «&c., 100 Tenn. 582, 203, 204 V. Inhabitants &c.. 7 Grav 358. 1597 V. Memphis. 100 Tenn. .582, 1712 V. Noyes. 5 Conn. 39], 100, 342. 363 V. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214. 1119 Hayes v. City of Cambridge, 136 Mass. 402. 1.584 V. City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 781. 797. 1096 V. City of West Bay Citv. 91 Mich. 418. 1325 V. Douglas Co., 92 Wis. 429. 1242, 1279 V. Hanson, 12 N. H. 284, 1569 V. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120, 233, 636. 986, 994 V. Inhabitants &c., 153 Mass. 514, 1601 V. Missouri. 120 IT. S. 68, 139 V. Porter. 22 Maine 371, 223 V. Symonds, 9 Barb. 260, 1054 Hayford v. County Com'rs &c., 78 Maine 153, 696 ITavgood V. .Tustices &c.. 20 Ga. 845, 9 Ilaynes v. Bridge, 1 Coldw. 32. 329 V. City of Cape May, 50 1 N. J. L. 55. 5C»0 v. Citv of Cape May, 52 N. J. L. 180, 602, 1396 V. Covington, 21 Miss. 408, 646 V. Washington Co., 19 III. 66. 431 Hays V. City of Cincinnati, 62 Ohio St. 116. 12.59, 1311 V. City of Oil City, 11 Atl. 63, 181 V. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 518. 5, 376 V. Ilogan, 5 Cal. 241, 1725 V. Pacific &c. Co., 17 How. 596, 1502 Hayward v. Inhabitants &c., 2 Cush. 419, 340, 1485 V. Mayor &c., 8 Barb. 486, 689 Haywood v. Charlestown, 34 N. H. 23, 1572 V. Mayor &c., 12 Ga. 404, 107, 468. 491 Ilayzlett v. City of Mt. Vernon, 33 Iowa 229. 1545 Hazard v. City of Council Bluffs, 79 Iowa 106, 1179 V. Wason, 152 Mass. 268, 1740 ilazen v. Lerche, 47 Mich. 626, 1480, 1485 Hazzard v. Heacock, 39 Ind. 172, 1262 Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127, 253, 638 Headrick v. Whittemore, 105 Mass. 23, 693 Ilealey v. City of New Haven, 49 Conn. 394, 1224 Healy v. Mayor &c.. 3 Hun 708, 1641 Heard v. City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 242, 675 V. Harris, 68 Ala. 43, 334 Heath, Ex parte, 3 Hill 42, 1418, 1692 V. Barmore, 50 N. Y. 302. 675 V. Des Moines &c. R. Co., 61 Iowa 11, 1368 V. McCrea, 21 Wash. 342, 1311 Hebard v. Ashland Co.. 55 Wis. 145, 883 Hebron G. R. Co. v. Harvey, 90 Ind. 192, 1177 Hechinger v. City of Maysville, 57 S. W. 619. 1385 Hecht V. Boughton, 2 N. Y. 385, 1540 Heckel v. Sandford, 40 N. J. L. 180, 4.52 Heckscher v. City of Philadelphia, 9 Atl. 281, 1738 Iledenberg v. City of Chicago, 163 111. 129. 1145 Hedges v. Madison Co., 1 Oilman 567, 267, 775 Heeney v. Sprague. 11 R. I. 456, 5'^8 158S V. Trustees &c.. 33 Barb. 360'. 134 Ileffleman v. Pennington Co., 3 S. Dak. 162, 958, 959 Heffner v. Commonwealth. 28 Pa. St. 108. 339, 1655, 1681 Heffran v. Hutchins, 160 111. 550. 209, 1697 Ileick V. Voight, 110 Ind. 279, 1572 Heidelberg v. San Francois Co., 100 Mo. 69, 260, 1171 Heidelberg School Dlst. v. Horst, 62 Pa. St. 301, 262 Heidenway v. Citv of Philadelphia, 168 Pa. St. 72, 808 Heilbron, Ex parte, 65 Cal. 607, 1079 V. Mayor &c.. 96 Ga. 312. 572 Heilman v. Lebanon &c. St. R. Co., 175 Pa. St. 188, 1706 Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655, 458. 1526. 1528. 1529. 1544. 1719 Heinemann v. Heard, 62 N. Y. 448, 1204 Ileinerberg v. Village of Hyde Park, 130 111. 156. 1175 Ileinrich v. City of St. Louis. 125 ISIo. 424, 1318, 1698 TTeins v. Lincoln. 102 Iowa 69. 479, 1021 ITeiple V. Clackamas Co., 20 Or. 147, 1169 Heiser v. Hatch, 86 N. Y. 614, 1599 TABLE OF CASES. CXIU reference, are to Paoe. Vol. I, PP. /-«; Vol. U. »• M-«^W Ileiscr Mayor &c.^l04, N. V.^|.^^^3 Heiskell v. Mayor &c., Go .>Id. 1^2;^ ^^^ HelaiKl_v. City of Lowell, I" AHen ___^ Held'*v''Baswell. 58 Iowa ISO, ^'^'l^^j^riQ He len v. Noe. 3 Ired. I>- 49:?. r..«. 1093 Hlllenkamp v. City of Lafayette, ^ Heller v. At_chison &c. R. Co., -^'^^^.j, vi^city'of Garden City, 58 Kan.^^^^ ?''Mayor &c.. 53 MO. 159 264 "786 Helms V. Chadbourne 45 \V is. 60 1,.;^T TTpimn V Vllon. ^'^>C^ Mo. 5.U, .>*ib. i-- J ""'"v llandlin. .59 Mo. App. 49n. 1U>.. V. McNamara. 77 Mo. App. 1. 1-84 V. St. Louis Merchants &e. ^-O-' „,„ 75 Mo. App. 372 Mo "'"rnn'^Tso''" "• """ '' 5?5: 551 Hembljng v. City of Big Rapids. 89 ^^^ Mien. 1. . . , i c „ oQ Heminway v. ^ Inhabitants &c., •^-ij.j.^^ Hemphlirv. c'uy of Boston, 8 Cush.^^^^ Hempsfead v. City of Des Moines, ^^ 52 Iowa 313. r,i — Hempsl^ead^Co. v. Howard Co.,^ol ^^^ Hendershott V. City of Ottumwa, 46 Iowa 658, . . „ ij^ Henderson v. City of Covington, 14 V. City ol" Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 054 1-10 V. City of Minneapolis, 32 M_inn. ^^^ ?!Jcity of S. Omaha, 60 Neb.^^^^ v" Davis. 106 N. C 88. 64 V. Mayor, 3 La. 563 191 V. Mayor &c., 8 Md. ^3o2.^^^^ ^^^^ V. Smith. 26 W. Va. 829, 221 Henderson &c. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. 173, ^ .00 Hendricks v. Board &c., 35 Kan^^4S3^^^^ V. Johnson, 45 Miss. 644, ^, 960 Hendrickson v. City of New York, 160 N. Y. 144. f-p M ' Y V. City of New York, 56 N. Y. Q PiQO X -1 T" i- v.' Decow. 1 Saxt. 577. 474 Henev v. Pima Co.. 17 Pac. .263. 944 HeSlst V. City of Cincinnati, 7 Ohio.^^^^^ Henion.^Ex'parte. .55 Pac 326 1713 Henke v. McCord. 55 Iowa 3 18. 5S Henker v. City of Fond du Lac Wis. 616, Henline v. People, 81 111. 269, _ SeSly V. Mayor of Lyme Reg.s.,^5 ^^^ Henn'lkef-v' Weare. 9 N H |73r-1046 V. Wyman. 58 N. H. 528. »fJJ Henry v. Dubuque 10 Iowa 540. <<>-^ V. Gregory. 29 Mich. 68. i'p- V Ho?stick. 9 Watts 412. 1551 V. Lansdowne, 40 Mo. ^pp.^^^^ f Selvage. 99 Ky. 232, 1275 V. State? 98 Ind. 38^1 911 V. Taylor. 57 Iowa 72, 41b V. Thomas. 119 Mass. 583, 12o8 V. Town of Chester, 15 Vt. 460, '■^^^ 1 Smith— viii 71 1589 696 llenrv Co. v. Nicolay, 95 U. S. 619, 995 Henshaw v. Cotton, 127 Mass. 00, 1.4.{ v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312, ]-J» Ilentig v. Gilmore. 33 Kan. 234, H-*^ Hepburn v. City of Philadelphia, 149^^^.^ nequ^mbom|'v^ City of Dunkirk,^2 ^^^ Hercules I- Works^ v. ,^'ot f412%413 Herhold v. City of Chicago, 108 lH-^j-gg Heriofs' Hospital v. Ross, 12 CI. & IT, F;n7 '-' •" Herman V. City of Crete, 9 Neb 350 240 v. City of Oconto, 100 W^|. 39L ^^^ V. Wolf. 23 Mo. App. 200 ' " '1234 Herrj^.^City of Lebanon, 149 P|-3|t-jgoo Herri^k'v. Carpenter. 54 Iowa 340", 556 V. Stover. 5 Wend. 581, -.J Herring v. Wilmington R. Co., 10 I red 402. ^"'* Herrington v. District Tp. of Liston, 47 Iowa 11, . ^ iin V. Village of Lansingburg. H^^gg^ HersS v.' Boal-d &c.. 16 Wis. 198 1288 V Board &c.. 37 Wis. 75. 1550 1720 Hershberger v. City of Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St. 78. . oq ^ Herzo v. City of San Francisco 33 Cal 134 ""^ ' ^^^^ Hesketh V. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1847, ^^^ Hess V. Pegg. 7 Nev. 23. , W* Hessler v. Drainage Com rs, 53 111. ^^^ Hester v. Fortner, 2 Bmn. 40. — » Heth V. City of Fond du Lac, 63 Heth Tp. vT Lewis. 114 Ind. 508, 862 Heugh^e^^v.^Board^of Education &c.. ^^^ Hewes v.Reis,-40 Cal. 2|5, ^^^^ ^^55 v. Village of Crete, 175 HI- 348 xo-x v. Village of Winnetka, 60 II'-.^q^^ App. 654. Hewison v. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 136, ^ „_ -"'* V. City of New HY'?594 1612 Conn. 475, 8, «14. lOJt, x"^^- Hewitfs Appeal, 88 Pa.^ St. 55. ^^ ^^^^ V. Board &c., 94 HI- 528, 973. 977 V. Miller. 21 Vt. 402. 1474 V State. 6 Har. & J. 95, 322 V White. 78 Mich. 117 606 Hexamer v. Webb. 101 N. Y. 377. 1591 Hey?iTn v. Mahoney 9 Mont 497, 371 HeVlman. Ex parte. 92 Cal. 492. 13J& HeVmann v. Cunningham, 51 Wis. "-^^Z-SJli^8?"f?|.il2^m V. Mayor &c.. 7 N.. Y. 314. 675. 685 Hibbard V. City of Chicago, l^^^^l "^gig v^'ciark. 56 N. H. 155. ' 530 Hickey V. Board &c., 62 Mich. ^4,^^^^ V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 6 111. App. ^^^ HickS V. O'Neil 10 Cal. 292 1411 Hickok V. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 5-3, od* CXIV TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ Hlckok V. Town of Shelburne, 41 Vt. 409. 351, 355, 362, 1424 V. Trustees &c., 15 Barb. 427, 222 Hicks V. Dorn. 42 N. Y. 47, 222 V. Ward, 69 Maine 436. 1321 Higbee v. Peed, 98 Ind. 420, 1573 Higert v. City of Greencastle, 43 Ind. 574. 1624 Higgins V. Ausmuss, 77 Mo. 351, 1262 V. Bordages. 88 Tex. 458, 1262 V. City o'f Chicago, 18 111. 276, 705 V. City of New York, 131 N. Y. 128, 172 V. Citv of San Diego, 115 Cal. 170, 609 V. Curtis, 39 Kan. 283, 301 V. San Diego Water Co.. 118 Cal. 524. 725, 734, 877, 925 V. Village of Salamanca, 6 N. Y. St. 119, 826 Higginson v. Inhabitants &c., 11 Al- len 530. 687. 692 V. Turner. 171 Mass. 586, 70, 563 Hight V. Board &c., 68 Ind. 575. 663, 670 Highway Com'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. 173. 223, 335 ' V. Van Dusen, 40 Mich. 429, 634, 643 Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn. 436, 485 V. Bunce, 10 Conn. 567, 482 Hilbish V. Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154, 979 Hildman v. City of Phillips, 106 Wis. 611. 1366 Hildreth v. City of Lowell, 11 Gray 345. 689 V. Mclntire, 1 J. J. Marsh. 206, 289, 296 Hill V. Board &c., 72 N. C. 55, 225, 264, 808. 830, 1388 V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344. 9, 15, 129, 142, 148, 469, 776, 777 783, 803. 810, 814, 820. 1068 1526. 1585, 1594 V. City of Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242, 1588 V. City of Indianapolis, 92 Fed. 467. 711. 1710 V. City of Kahoka, 35 Fed. 32. 454 V. Commissioners &c., 22 Ga. 203. 467 V. Commissioners &e., 67 N. C. 367. 983 V. Fitzpatrick. 6 Ala. 314. 323 V. Higdon. 5 Ohio St. 243. 1231. 1253. 1269, 1502, 1521 V. Kemble, 9 Cal. 71, 328 V. Mayor &c., 72 Ga. 314. 541. 542, 1413 V. Memphis. 134 U. S. 198. 562, 635, 637, 973, 974, 978, 982 984, 1013 V. Mohawk &c. R. Co., 5 Denio 206. 701 V. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 11 La. An. 292. 743 V. Portland &c. R. Co., 55 Maine 438, 1618 T. School Dist., 17 Maine 316, 1480 V. Scotland Co., 34 Fed. 208. 1031 V. Selectman &c.. 140 Mass. 381, 608 V. State, 4 Sneed 443. 213, 831 V. Tionesta Tp., 146 Pa. St. 11, 1635 V. Tottenham &c. Council, 79 L. T. CN. S.) 495. 1358 V. Warrell. 87 Mich. 135. 1234 V. Winsor. 118 Mass. 251. 1595 Hiller v. Village of Sharon Springs. 28 Hun 3'44, 1619 riillesum v. Mayor &c., 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 596, 1626 llilliard v. City of Asheville, 118 N. C. 845. 1268, 1269, 1701 Hills V. Peekskill Sav. Bank, 101 N. Y. 490, 1022 Hillsborough v. Deering, 4 N. H. 86, ■ 1058 Hilton V. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339, 229 Himmelman v. Danos. 35 Cal. 441, 1255 Hinchman v. Paterson Horse R. Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75, 590 Hincks v. City of Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 559, 558, 1589 Hine v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 478, 509, 673, 1392 Hiner v. City of Fond du Lac, 71 Wis. 74, 1589, 1629 Flines v. City of Charlotte, 72 Mich. 278, 820, 830 V. City of Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186, 1253. 1269 V. City of Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236, 224. 778. 812. 821 Hingham &c. Co. v. Norfolk Co., 6 Allen 353, 685, 1178, 1252 llinkle v. Commonwealth, 4 Dana 518, 539 Hinrichs v. City of New Orleans, 50 La. An. 1214. 735 Hintrager v. Richter, 85 Iowa 222, 891, 959, 960 Hintze v. City of Elgin, 186 111. 251, 1260, 1276 Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15, 106 Ilisey V. City of Charleston, 62 Mo. App. 381, 463 V. Citv of Mexico, 1 Mo. App. Repr. 393. 1370 Hiss v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 52 Md. 242. 591 Ilisser v. Grafton, 33 W. Va. 548, 1639 Hitch V. Lambright. 66 Ga. 228, 221 Hitchcock V. City of Galveston, 48 Fed. 640, 4 Woods 308, 1529, 1655 V. City of St. Louis, 49 Mo. 484. 549. 1730 V. Danbury &c. R. Co., 25 Conn. 516. 1570 V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341, 238, 239, 240. 285. 547. 633, 649 719, 746, 836, 978, 1232, 1261, 1305 1306, 1309 Hitchins v. Mayor &c., 68 Md. 100, 791, 820, 1208 Ilite V. Whitley Co. Court. 91 Ky. 168, 805 Ilixon V. City of Lowell. 13 Gray 50. 814. 1594. 1612 Hoadlev V. Citv of San Francisco, 124 TT. S. 639. 630 V. City of San Francisco, 50 Cal. 265. 630. 1214 V. Citv of San Francisco, 70 Cal. 320, 630 Hoag v. Citv of Mt. Vernon, 58 N. Y. S. 581. 1378 V. Durfey. 1 Aik. 286. 1425. 1427 Iloagland v. Culvert. 20 N. J. L. 387. 187 Ho Ah Kow V. Nunan. 5 Saw. 552. 517 Hobart v. Milwaukee City R. Co., 27 Wis. 194, 591 V. Supervisors. 17 Cal. 23. 58, 83'. 763 Hobbs V. Board &c.. 116 Ind. 376. 1201 v. City of Yoiikers. 102 N. Y. 13. 174. 175 V. Inhabitants &c.. 19 Pick. 405. 571. 15.59 Iloblyn V. King, 6 Bro. P. C. 511, 289 TABLE OF CASES. CXV [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-^32; Yol. II, pp. 833-]830.'\ Iloboken v. I'pnnsylvauia R. Co., 124 v. S. (ir>(;, 15G3 Iloboken Land &c. Co. v. Mayor &c., :?(> N. J. L. .-)40, 1563 Ilockady v. Board &c., 1 Colo. App. ;!r,L', 916 Ilockett V. State, 105 Ind. 2.50, 6, 574 Ilodgos V. Citv of Buffalo, 2 Denio 110, 210. 251. 252. 253. 644, 646. 66S, 715 V. City of Waterloo, lOi) Iowa 444. 1342, 1343 V. Perciva!, 132 111. 53, 1627 V. Runyan. 30 Mo. 461, 217 V. Western Union &c. Co., 72 Miss. 910. 134S Ilodgman v. Chicago &c. R. Co.. 20 Minn. 4S, 090, 991, 1540 Hodgson V. Dexter, 1 Cranch 345, 215, 216 Iloester v. Sammelmann, 101 Mo. 619, 586 Iloey V. Gilrov. 129 N. Y. 132, 584, 1370 V. Gilrov, 37 N. Y. St. 754, 620, 644 Hoffeld V. City of Buffalo, 130 N. Y. 387. 1197, 1287 Hoffman v. San Joaquin Co., 21 Cal. 426, 814 Hogan V. Citv of Watervliet, 59 N. Y. S. 103. 1343 Hoge v. Railroad Co.. 99 U. S. 348, 104 Hogenson v. St. Taul &c. R. Co., 31 Minn. 224. 1215 Hoggard v. Mayor &c., 51 La. An. 6S3, 597 Iloglan V. Carpenter. 4 Bush 89, 185 Hoitt v. Burnham, 61 N. H. 620, 346 Hoke v. City of Atlanta, 107 Ga. 416, 1304 V. Henderson, 4 Dev. 1, 183, 199 v. Perdue, 62 Cal. 545, 1287 Holbrook v. Faulkner, 55 N. H. 311, 302, 360, 632, 1485 Holcomb V. Town of Danby, 51 Vt. 428, 828 Holdane v. Trustees &c., 23 Barb. 10H. 1556 v. Trustees «S:c., 21 N. Y. 474, 1559, 1560. 1562 Holden v. City of Alton, 179 111. 318, 749, 1698 V. City of Chicago, 172 111. 263, 1154 Holder v. City of Yonkers, 56 N. Y. S. 912, 609 Holladay v. Frisbie, 15 Cal. 630, 629. 1529, 1744 Holland v. City of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 361. 554 v. Davies, 36 Ark. 446. 372, 1485 v. Mavor &c., 11 Md. 186, 88, 108, 1236, 1257, 1533, 1722 V. State, 23 Fla. 123, 284 Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95 111. 14,S. 775, 1076 Holleran v. City of Boston, 176 Mass. 75. 783 Holliday v. People, 10 111. 214. 759 V. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. 192, 225, 807 Holliraan v. Carroll's Adm'r, 27 Tex. 23, 332 Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 45 La. An. 222, 986 V. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, 45. 770 Holloway v. Delano. 64 Hun 27, 1565 V. Ogden School Dist.. 62 Mich. 153. 1491 Hollwedell. Ex parte, 74 Mo. 395, 1420 Holly V. Bennett. 46 Minn. 386, 1424 Holman v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Met. 297, 776 Iloiman v. School Trustees, 77 Mich. 605, 1481, 1493 Holmes V. Common Council &c., 120 Mich. 226, 750 V. Mayor &c., 12 N. J. Eq. 299, 1233. 1374 V. Village of Hyde Park, 121 III. 128, 571, 1175, 1280, 1283 Holt's Appeal. 5 R. I. 603, 1485 Holt V. City Council, 127 Mass. 408, 300, 675, 1178, 1256 Ilolten V. Board &c., 55 Ind. 194, 665 Ilolton V. City of Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 27, 1233 Holtz V. Diehl, 56 N. Y. S. 841, 578 Iloltzman v. United States, 14 App. D. C. 454, 1344 Home B. & C. Co. v. City of Roanoke, 91 Va. 52, 1208 Home Ins. Co. v. City Council, 50 Ga. 530. 1508 V. Holway, 55 Iowa 571, 320 Hommert v. Gleason, 14 N. Y. S. 568 : 38 N. Y. St. 342, 189, 221 Honey Creek School Tp. v. Barnes, 119 Ind. 213, 626, 1482 Hood V. Finch. 8 Wis. 381, 698 V. Mayor &c., 1 Allen 103. 251, 637, 647, 668 V. Trustees &c.. 12 Ky. L. 813, 1155 Hooksett V. Amoskeag &c. Co., 44 N. H. 105, 526 Hoole V. Kinkaid, 16 Nev. 217, 753 Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375, 15, 776, 866, 1536 v. Goodwin, 48 Maine 79, 195, 196 Hoops V. Village of Ipava, 55 111. App. 94. 1117 Hope V. Deaderick, 8 Humph. 1, 44 Hopkins v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 6 Mackey 311. 1354 v. City of Duluth, 81 Minn. 189. 117 V. Mayor &c., 4 M. & W. 621, 466 V. Town of Elmore, 49 Vt. 176, 342 965 V. Town of Rush River, 70 Wis'. 10, 1633 Hopper V. Covington, 118 U. S. 148. 637 V. Town of Covington, 8 Fed. 777. 1001 Hopple V. Trustees &c., 13 Ohio St. 311, 983 Horan v. Board &c., 58 N. J. L. 533. 164 v. Lane, 53 N. J. L. 275, 159, 170 Horey v. Village of Haverstraw, 124 N. Y. 273, 1573 Horn V. City of St. Paul, 80 Minn. 369, 173 V. Mayor &c., 30 Md. 218, 646 V. Town of New Lots. 83 N. Y. 100. 1205. 1264. 1551 V. Whittier. 6 N. H. 88. 312, 869 Hornblower v. Duden, 35 Cal. 664, 181, 663, 664 Horner v. City of Philadelphia, 194 Pa. St. 542, 1340 V. Wood. 23 N. Y. 350, 1192 Hornung v. McCarthv. 126 Cal. 17, 1283 v. State. 116 Ind. 458. 298 Horsley v. Bell. 1 Bro. C. C. 101. n., 216 Ilorton v. City of Taunton, 97 Mass. 266. 818 V. Harrison. 23 Barb. 176, 295 V. Mobile School Com'rs, 43 Ala. 598. 55 V. Newell. 17 R. I. 571. 818 V. Parsons. 37 Hun 42, 187, 198 V. Town of Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513, 644, 1022 CXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol I, pp. 1-832; Vol II, pp. 833-1830.'] Hosier v. Higgins Tp. Board, 45 Mich. 340, 867 Hoskius V. Brantley, 57 Miss. 814, 378 Hosmer v. City of Gloversville, 59 N. Y. S. 559, 1379 Hospers v. Wyatt. 63 Iowa 264, 652 Hospital V. Philadelphia Co., 24 Pa. St. 229, 1725 Hotchkin v. Borough of Phillipsburg, 8 Atl. 434, 1632 Hotchkiss V. Plimkett, 60 Conn. 230, 667 Hot Springs v. Curi-y, 64 Ark. 152, 1406 Hot Springs R. Co. v. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429, 678 Hotz V. School Dist., 1 Colo. App. 40, 1491 Hough V. City of Bridgeport, 57 Conn. 290, 301 Houghton V. Davenport, 23 Pick. 235 348 V. Swarthout, 1 Denio 589, 335 Houghton Co. v. Auditor-General, 36 Mich. 271, 1649 House V. Board &c., 60 Ind. 580, 1580 V. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 631, 1618 V. State. 41 Miss. 737, 1389, 1400 House Bill No. 231, In re, 9 Colo. 624, 946 Householder v. City of Kansas, 83 Mo. 488, 1209. 1602 House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197, 1071 Houston V. City of Lancaster, 191 Pa. St. 143, 882 V. Houston, 67 Ind. 276, 1571 V. Hutching. 33 S. W. 269, 1219 V. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 132 Houston &c. R. Co. v. Carson, 66 Tex. 345, 1354 V. Odum, 53 Tex. 343, 491 Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113, 222. 224, 336, 778 Hovey v. Mayo. 43 Maine 322, 680, 1287 v. State, 119 Ind. 386, 150 Howard v. Brown, 21 Maine 385, 311 V. City of Augusta, 74 Maine 79, 1551 V. City of Providence, 6 R. I. 514, 701 v. City of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 52, 264 V. City of Worcester, 153 Mass. 426. 803, 810 V. Cornett. 8 Ky. L. 52, 1486 V. Drainage Com'rs, 126 111. 53 708 V. ' First Ind. Church, 18 Md. 451. 1266 V. Francis Co., 50 Fed. 44, 974 V. Kiowa Co., 73 Fed. 406, 1013 V. McDiarmid, 26 Ark. 100, 104 V. Proctor. 7 Grav 128. 1540 V. Shaw. 18 N. E. 313, 70S V. Shields, 16 Ohio St. 184, 152 V. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 111. 185. 189, 192, 1418 V. Trustees &c., 10 Ohio 365. 1063 Howard St.. In re, 142 Pa. St. 601, 1320 Howe V. City of Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388. 1178, 1714 V. Keeler, 27 Conn. 538, 715, 992 V. Mason, 14 Iowa 510, 221 V. Treasurer &c., 37 N. J. L. 145, 607, 1412. 1414 Howe Ins. Co. v. City Council, 50 Ga. 530, 1521 Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush 493. 1266. 1538 V. City of Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 512, 722, 1232, 1533, 1726 V. City of Millville, 60 N. J. L. 95, 747, 1184 Howell V. City of Peoria, 90 111. 104, 897 v. City of Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 471, 458, 1544 V. State. 3 Gill 14, 1502 Howes V. Cush, 131 Mass. 207, 1631 Ilowland v. City of Chicago, 108 111. 496, 1399 V. Eldred^e, 43 N. Y. 457, 1649 v. School Dist., 15 R. I. 184, 347, 365, 1485, 1489 V. Wright Co., 82 Iowa 164, 177 Howlett V. Camp, 115 Ala. 499, 499 Hoyt V. City of Danbury, 69 Conn. 341, 1338 V. City of Des Moines, 76 Iowa 430. 1626, 1627 V. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39, 590, 1131, 1201, 1252 1255, 1271 V. Citv of Hudson, 27 Wis. 656. 1216 V. Thompson, 19 N. Y. 207, 714 Hubbard v. City of Taunton, 140 Mass. 467, 608 V. Elden, 43 Ohio St. 380, 332 V. Newton, 52 Vt. 346, 344, 360, 362 V. Russell. 24 Barb. 404, 1095 V. Town of Medford, 20 Or. 315, 594. 1392 V. Town of Williamstown, 01 Wis. 397, 346, 368 V. Winsor, 15 Mich. 145, 274 Hubbell V. City of Viroqua, 67 Wis. 343, 1157 V. City of Yonkers, 104 N. Y. 434, 816, 817, 1587 Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112, 369 Iluddleston v. City of Eugene, 34 Or. 343, 820 Hudson V. City of Little Falls, 68 Minn. 463, 1326 56, 681 V. Cuero Land &c. Co., 47 Tex. V. Mayor &c., 64 Ga. 286, 260, 895 Hudson Co. v. State, 24 N. J. L. 718, 273, 274 Hudson Electric L. Co. v. Inhab- itants &c., 163 Mass. 346, 716 Hudspeth v. State, 55 Ark. 323, 1473 Huels V. Ilahn, 75 Wis. 468, 154 Huesing v. City of Rock Island, 128 111. 465, 581, 615 Huff V. Citv of Jacksonville, 39 Fla. 1, 1304 V. City of Lafayette, 108 Ind. 14, 1517 V. Cook. 44 Iowa 639, 185 V. Preuitt, 53 S. W. 844, 62, 63 Huffman v. Bayham Tp., 26 Ont. App. 514, 1376 V. Board &c., 23 Kan. 281, 182, 663, 743 V. San Joaquin Co.. 21 Cal. 426, 788 ITuffsmith v. People, 8 Colo. 175, 1400 Ilugg V. City Council &c., 29 N. J. Eq. 6, 181, 664 Huggans v. Riley, 125 N. Y. 88, 1159, 1580 V. Rilev, 51 Hun 501, 4 N. Y. S. 282, 1171, 1173 Huggins V. Hinson, 1 Phil. 126. 1727 Hughes V. Bingham, 135 N. Y. 347, 1563, 1574 V. Carl, 21 Ky. L. 6, 1,504 V. City of Fond du Lac. 73 Wis. 380, 558. 1612, 1620 V. City of Momence, 163 111. 535, 1132, 1283. 1289 V. City of Momence, 164 111. 16, 1294 V. Monroe Co., 147 N. Y. 49, 786 TABLE OF CASES. CXVll [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. SSS-ISSO.I Hughes V. Overseers of Chat ham, 5 Man. & «. 54, 1 1'S V. I'arkor, L'O N. IT. 5S. i;".>7 V. I'oople, S Colo. 53(5, GO" V. Recorder's Court, 75 Mich. 574, 140.3 V. School Dist., 72 Mo. 043, 92 ITuRhson V. Cvane, 11.1 Cal. 404. 1030 Huidekoper v. Buchanan Co., 3 Dill. 175, 1001 V. City of Meadville, S3 Pa. St. 15(5. 1195 Ilulaniski v. City of Ogden City, 20 Utah T.V.i, 152 Iluling V. Kaw Val. R. &c. Co., 130 U. S. 559. 694 Hull V. City of Chicago, 156 111. 384, 1147 V. Independent School Dist., 82 Iowa (586, 852, 1480, 1492 V. Marshall Co., 12 Iowa 142, 217 V. People, 170 111. 246, 1272 V. West Chicago Park Commis- sioners, 185 111. 150, 511, 1274, 1275 IluUin V, Second Municipality, 11 Rob. 97, 699, 700 Hultz V. Commonwealth, 3 Grant's Cas. 61, 310 Humboldt Co. v. Churchill Co. Com- missioners, 6 Nev. 30, 426 V. Dinsmfire, 75 Cal. 604, 1570, 1572 V, Lander Co., 24 Nev. 461, 1552 Humboldt Tp. v. Long, 92 IT. S. 642, 998, 1001. 1009, 1012, 1018, 1023 Hume V. Conduitt, 7(3 Ind. 598, 1572 V. Mayor &c.. 47 N. Y. 639, 680, 826, 1592, 1611, 1612 Humes v. City of Ft. Smith, 93 Fed. 857. 549. 1554 Ilumiston v. School Trustees, 7 111. App. 122, 1483 Humphreys v. City of Norfolk, 25 (iratt. 97, 1501, 1513 V. Mears, 1 M. & R. 187. 225 V. Woodstorm. 48 N. J. L. 588. 1106 Hungerman v. City of Wheeling, 46 W. Va. 761, 1.333, 1374 Hunneman v. Fire District, 37 Vt. 40, 353, 362 V. Inhabitants &c.. 10 Met. 454, 355, 356, 357, 359 Hunnerberg v. Village of Hyde Park, 130 111. 156, 1283 Hunnewell v. Citv of Charleston, 106 Mass. 350. 1722 Hunsaker v. Borden, 5 Cal. 288, 774 V. Wright. 30 111. 146, 1502 Hunt v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 121 111. 638, 1706 V. City of Dubuque, 96 Iowa 314. 1334 V. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 541 V. City of New York, 62 N. Y. S. 184. 1544 V. City of Oswego, 107 N. Y. 629, 936 V. City of Salem, 121 Mass. 294. 1595 V. City of TTtica. IS N. Y. 442, 722 V. Genet, 14 Daly 225, 1415 V. Gorton, 20 R.'l. 103, 1157 V. Kansas &c. Bridge Co., 11 Kan. 412, 1576 V. School District, 14 Vt. 300. 340, 363, 1485 V, State, 22 Tex. App. 396. 980 v. Town of Pownal, 9 Vt. 411, 1600 Hunter, Appeal of, 71 Conn. 189, 1292, 1310 Hunter, In re, 163 N. Y. 542, 1315 Hunter v. Moblev. 26 S. C. 192, 920, 1662 v. Nolf. 71 Pa. St. 282, 033 V. Weston, 111 111. 184, 1374 ITupert V. Anderson, 35 Iowa 578, 701 Ilurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336, 680, 1254 Ilurla V. City of Kansas City. 46 Kan. 738, 384, 393, 1515 Ilurlev V. Inhabitants &c., 88 Maine 293, 1336 Huron v. Bank, 57 U. S. App. 593, 876 Huron Water-Works Co. v. City of Huron, 7 S. D. 9, 609 Hursen v. City of Chicago, 85 111. App. 298, 1328 Ilurtado V. People, 110 IT. S. 516, 1715 Huse V. City of Lowell, 10 Allen 149, 1480 V. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 1576 Hussner v. Brooklyn R. Co., 114 N. Y. 433, 1582 Huston V. City of Council Bluffs, 101 Iowa 33, 1342, 1343 V. Iowa Co., 43 Iowa 456, 776 Huston Overseers v. Jav Overseers, 9 Pa. Co.' Ct. R. 412, 1049 Huston Tp. Poor Dist. v. Benzette Tp. Poor Dist., 135 Pa. St. 393. 1047 Ilutchcraft v. Shrout's Heirs, 1 T. P.. Mon. 206, 327 Ilutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 1243. 1282, 1297, 1506 V. Storrie, 48 S. W. 785, 477, 540, 1146, 1235, 1267, 1295 Hutchings v. Inhabitants &c., 90 Maine 131, 930, 1346 V. Scott, 9 N. J. L. 218, 1412 Ilutchins V. City of Boston, 12 Allen 571, 1612 Hutchinson v. City of Parkersburg, 25 W. Va. 226. 678 V. City of Ypsilanti, 103 Mich. 12, 1336, 1344 V, Pratt, 11 Vt. 402, 351, 491, 1422 V. State, 39 N. J. Eq. 569, 1093 V. Town of Concord, 41 Vt. 271, 263, 820 V. Western &c. R. Co., 6 Heisk. 634, 7 Hutchinson Tp. v. Filk, 44 Minn. 536, 1125, 1126 Hutchisson v. City of Mt. Vernon, 40 111. App. 19, 1421 Huthsing v. Bousquet, 7 Fed. 833, 215 Ilutson V. Mayor. 9 N. Y. 163, 222, 812, 816, 1159, 1592 Hutt V. City of Chicago, 132 111. 352, 1234 Hutton V. City of Camden, 39 N. J. L. 122, 1123 Hyatt V. Bates, 40 N. Y. 164. 556 Hyde V. Brush. 34 Conn. 454, 370 V. State, 52 Miss. 665. 183 V. Town of Jamaica. 27 Vt. 443, 777 Hydes v. Joyes. 4 Bush 464, 282, 509. 1198 Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. St. 332, 794 Hyer v. City of Janesville, 101 Wis. 371. 1343 Hymes v. Aydelott. 26 Ind. 431. 698 Hynes v. City of Chicago. 175 111. 56, 511 Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. City of St. Louis, 2 Dill. 70. 579 Illinois Conf. Female College v. Cooper, 25 111. 133, 97, 468, 491 CXVlll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. S33-1830.'i Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Beers, 27 111. 185, 994 V. Chicago, 176 U. S. 646, 1814 V. City of Bloomington, 76 111. 447, 1379 V. City of Chicago, 141 111. 509, 1249, 1250 V. City of Chicago, 141 111. 586. 591. 1379 V. City of Decatur, 126 111. 92, 12.50. 1256 V. City of Decatur, 154 111. 173, 1165. 1246, 1249 V. City of Galena. 40 111. 344. 517 V. City of Kankakee, 164 111. 608, 1249 V. City of Mattoon, 141 111. 32, 1249, 1250 V. City of Winona, 163 111. 288, 1282. 1310 V. Commissioners, 129 111. 477, 1246, 1249 V. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190. 1230. 1246. 1249, 1490 V. McLean Co., 17 111. 291, 1502 V. People, 161 111. 244, 470, 1289, 1309 V. Zimmer. 20 111. 654, 1813 Illinois Trust &c. Bank v. Arkansas City W. Co., 67 Fed. 196, 734. 739 V. City of Arkansas City. 76 Fed. 271, 547, 566. 672 Imlay v. Fnion Branch R. Co, 26 Conn. 249, 682 Incorporated Town of Scranton v. Danenbaum, 109 Iowa 95, 541 Incorporated Town of Spencer v. Andrew, 82 Iowa 14, 605 Incorporated Village of Inglehart v. Glenville. 19 Ohio C. C. 285. 932 Independent School Dist. v. Duser, 45 Iowa 391. 1472 V. Gookin, 72 Iowa 387, 1495, 1496 V. Kellev, 55 Iowa 568, 1480 V. McDonald. 39 Iowa 564, 324 V. Wirtner, 85 Iowa 387, 281 Indiana Bond Co. v. Shearer, 24 Ind. App. 622, 1304 Indiana Imp. Co. v. Wagner, 138 Ind. 658, 60 Indiana &c. R. Co. v. Oakes, 20 Ind. 9. 706 Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 795 V. Mansur, 15 Ind. 112, 1234 Indianapolis R. Co. v. Horst, 93 IT. S. 291. 1016 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Capital Pav. Co.. 24 Ind. App. 114. 1151, 1243, 1245, 1249, 1251 Ingerman v. State, 128 Ind. 225. 1651, 1653 Inglis V. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Peters 121, 132 Ingraham, In re, 64 N, Y. 310, 1204 Ingraham, Matter of. 4 Hun 495, 1564 V. Camden &c. Water Co., 82 Maine 335, 1457, 14.58 Ingram v. McCombs, 17 Mo. 558, 323 Inhabitants &c.. Petitioners, 6 Pick. 470. 1739 V. Bailey, 12 Maine 254, 1480 V. Bell, 9 Met. 499. 325 V. Benjamin. 125 Mass. 15, 325 V. Boston &c. R. Co., 23 Pick. 24, 1345 V. Brazer, 11 Mass. 447. 662 V. Camden Village Corporation, 77 Maine 530, 666 V. Chapin, 132 Mass. 470. 211 V. City of Maiden, 141 Mass. 580, 1065 Inhabitants &c. v. City of Taunton, 152 Mass. 484, 104» V. Cole, 3 Pick. 232, 294, 664 V. Commissioners, 26 Maine 206, 695, 696 V. Commissioners, 16 Pick. 572, 1500, 1501 V. Connecticut River R. Co., 4 Cusb. 63, 679 V. Connecticut River R. Co., 144 Mas.s. 325, 1631 V. County Com'rs, 37 Maine 112, 696 V. County Com'rs, 49 Maine 143, 1321 V. County Com'rs, 5 Allen 13, 707 V. County Com'rs, 7 Cush. 394, 1572 V. County Com'rs, 12 Cush. 351, 696 V. County Com'rs, 4 Gray 500, 688. 1546 V. County Com'rs, 16 Gray 341, 707 V. County Com'rs, 1 Met. 336, 1739, 1743 V. County Com'rs, 3 Met. 202, 634 V. County Com'rs. 9 Met. 423, 1740 V. County Com'rs, 12 Met. 211, 1724 V. County Com'rs, 9 Pick. 46, 173» V. County Com'rs, 10 Pick. 519, 1739 V. County Com'rs &c., 18 Pick. 60, 763, 117T V. County Com'rs, 20 Pick. 71, 706, 173» V. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 68, 1557 V. County Com'rs, 117 Mass. 416, 1572 V. County Com'rs, 154 Mass. 424, 680 V. County Com'rs, 157 Mass. 94, 1739 V. County Com'rs, 31 N. E. 693, 1742 V. Cushman, 16 Mass. 393, 1068 V. Cutler, 114 Mass. 344, 1159 V. Delano, 1 Pick. 469, 1068 V. Dilley. 24 N. J. L. 209, 697 V. Dunning, 7 Mass. 445, 435 V. Easton &c. R. Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 217, 1109 V. Eaton, 12 Mass. 328, 1002 V. Eaton, 13 Mass. 371. 665 V. Estlow, 43 N. J. L. 13, 52.^ V. Farrar, 11 Allen 398, 1125 V. Field. 1 Conn. 279, 696, 1717 V. Fiske. 8 Cush. 264, 211 V. Fleming, 8 Gray 613, 309 V. Grubbs, 80 Mo. App. 433. 1304. 1311 V. Hackensack Imp. Com., 60 N. J. Eq. 229. 411 V. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528. 1577 V. Haughton. 7 Conn. 543, 311. 1015 V. Hazzard, 12 Cush. 112. 211, 319 V. Heard, 103 Mass. 543, 1727 V. Holbrook. 9 Allen 17. 745 V. Huntress, 53 Maine 89, 310 V. Hurd. 74 Maine 101. 1726 V. Inhabitants &c., 5 Conn. 384. 1048 V. Inhabitants &c., 2 Greenl. 28. 1538 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Greenl. 136. 1048 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Greenl. 223. 367 V. Inhabitants &c., 5 Greenl. 143. 1048, 1058 V. Inhabitants &c., 1 Maine 93, 1046 V. Inhabitants &c., 11 Maine 190, 1058 TABLE OF CASES. CXIX [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 15 Maine 434, 104G V. Inhabitants &c., 1(5 Maine 45, SfiG V. Inhabitants &c., 17 Maine 117. 1040 V. Inhabitants &e., 21 Maine 58, 83, 384 V. Inhabitants &e., 26 Ma 1G7, V. Inhabitants &c., 32 Ma 60, V. Inhabitants &c., 30 Ma 235. V. Inhabitants &c., 36 Ma 390, V. Inhabitants &c., 42 Ma 463, V. Inhabitants &e., 47 Ma 481. V. Inhabitants &c., 54 Ma 250. V. Inhabitants &c., 55 Ma 55, V. Inhabitants &c., 58 Ma 353. V. Inhabitants &c., 60 Ma 879. V. Inhabitants &c., 63 Ma 231, V. Inhabitants &c., 64 Ma 246. V. Inhabitants &c., 64 Ma 412. V. Inhabitants &c., 65 Ma 167. V. Inhabitants &c., 66 Ma 78, V. Inhabitants &c., 70 Ma 114, V. Inhabitants &c., 79 Ma 473. V. Inhabitants &c., 82 Ma 524, V. Inhabitants &c., 83 Ma 75, V. Inhabitants &c., 83 Ma 219. V. Inhabitants &c.. 3 Mass. 322. 1045 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Mass. 123, 1042, 1046 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Mass. 384, 430, 435, 1519 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Mass. 676, 430 V. Inhabitants «&c., 10 Mass. 411. 1065 V. Inhabitants &c., 12 Mass. 355. 1064 V. Inhabitants &c., 12 Mass. 400, 48, 86 V. Inhabitants &c., 13 Mass. 461. 1047, 1048 V. Inhabitants &c.. 13 Mass. 547. 1042, 1043 V. Inhabitants &c., 14 Mass. 186. V. Inhabitants &c., 14 Mass. 216. V. Inhabitants &c., 14 Mass. 253. V. Inhabitants &c., 14 Mass. 384. V. Inhabitants &c., 15 Mass. 237. V. Inhabitants &c., 16 Mass. 16. 1519, 1537 V. Inhabitants &c., 16 Mass. 76. 1519, 1538 V. Inhabitants &c.. 16 Mass. 86, 435 V. Inhabitants &c., 16 Mass. 102, 1052 1048 1048 1046 1048 1415 537 866 1058 131 1044 ne 672, 866 ne 1058 1053 866 1058 1053 1058 1043 1044 1036 1065 142 430 1047 1042 Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 10 Mass. 396, 662 V. Inhabitants &c., 103 Mass. 358, 1045 V. Inhabitants &c., 108 Mass. 128, 1.577 V. Inhabitants &c., 115 Mass. 336, 1045 V. Inhabitants &c., 119 Mass. 479, 1057 V. Inhabitants &c., 132 Mass. 312. 1575 V. Inhabitants &c., 138 Mass. 109. 105G V. Inhabitants &c., 138 Mass. 256. 1048, 1052 V. Inhabitants &c., 139 Mass. 372. 1492 V. Inhabitants &c., 153 Mass. 192. 1057 V. Inhabitants &c., 155 Mass. 428. 1044, 1045 V. Inhabitants &c., 3 Met. 428, 1048 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Met. 433. 1048 V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Met. 484, 430 V. Inhabitants &c.. 10 Met. 115, 1041 V. Inhabitants &c., 12 Met. 35, 1048 V. Inhabitants &c., 13 Met. 192. 1036, 1047 V. Inhabitants &c., 1 Pick. 123. 866. 1036, 1047 V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Picls. 358, 1049, 1052 V. Inhabitants &c., 7 Piclt. 42. 1046 V. Inhabitants &c., 10 Pick. 150. 1065 V. Inhabitants &c., 15 Pick. 19, 1065 V. Inhabitants &c., 18 Pick. 379. 1057 V. Inhabitants &c.. 19 Pick. 389. 1042 V. Inhabitants &c., 19 Pick. 480, 1048 V. Inhabitants &c., 21 Pick. 233. 1048 V. Inhabitants &C..21 Pick. 349. 662 V. Inhabitants &c., 23 Pick. 170. 1042 V. Inhabitants &c., 24 Pick. 166, 1042, 1047 V. Inhabitants &c., 50 N. J. L. 509, 431 V. Johnson. 53 Maine 437, 866 V. Kennard. 151 Mass. 563. 509 V. Leadbetter, 16 Maine 45. 659 V. Leai-oed. 16 IMass. 215, 1062, 1063 V. Lord. 51 Maine 599. 1540 V. Lowell. 20 Maine 178. 6.59 V. Lowell. 70 Maine 437, 320 V. Lyons, 131 Mass. 328, 1063 V. Mayo. 109 Mass. 315, 673. 1125 V. Mayor &c., 116 Mass. 193. 1245 V. Mayor &c.. 55 N. J. Eq. 505, 110 V. McFachron. 33 N. J. L. 339. 319 V. Morton, 146 Mass. 476, 1541 V. Morton, 25 Mo. 593. 692. 1205, 1206, 1499 V. Mnllikin. 7 Oray 280. 1526 V. Norfolk. 117 Mass. 416, 696 V. North Yarmouth, 34 Maine 411, 90. 103 V. O'Connor. 53 Mo. 468, 537, 538 V. Paul. 173 ]Nrass. 148, 609 V. Pease. 19 Maine 184, 363 V. Peirce. 122 Mass. 270. 3.17 V. Pennell. 69 Maine 357, 320 V. Railway Co.. 4 Cnsh. 63, 634 V. Randall. 105 Mass. 295. 322 V. Reed. 152 Mass. 568. 1159 V. Searle. 127 Mass. 502. 362. 1540 V. Skillings, 45 Maine 133. 90. 103. .383. 4.35. 1538 V. Smith. 65 Maine 203, 345. 353. 355. 358. 361 V. Smith. 120 Mnss. 96. 1100 V. Sonle. 175 I\[ass. 400, 315 V. Spoflford, 12 Maine 487. 343, 347 cxx TABLE OF CASES. ^References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Inhabitants &c. v. Stanley, 47 Maine 515 325 V. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148, 155, 290, 341, 473, 1429, 1439 V. Stratton, 128 Mass. 137, 1063 V. Sudbury, 12 Pick. 1, 1047 V. Tripp, 81 Maine 24, 193 V. Turner, 14 Mass. 227, 1003 V. Weir, 9 Ind. 224, 251, 647 V. Welsh. 166 Mass. 133, 1340 V. WigRins, 137 Mass, 94, 1742 V. Wood, 13 Mass. 193. 11, 50, 144, 662, 1526 Inkster v. Carver, 16 Mich. 484, 517 Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 520, 1217 Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238, 1101, 1537 Innes v. W.vlie, 1 C. & K. 257, 207 Inos V. Winspear, IS Cal. 397, 335 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 138 V. Sanders, 36 N. H. 252, 273 Intendant &c. v. Chandler, 6 Ala. 379, 543 V. Pippin. 31 Ala. 542, 1079, 1722 V. Sorrell, 1 Jones L. 49. 286, 289, 601 International Bank v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 105, 959 International &c. Ins. Co. v. Commis- sioners, 28 Barb. 318, 1500 Interstate &c. Co. v. City of New Or- leans, 52 La. An. 1859, 223 Interstate Nafl Bank v. Ferguson, 48 Kan. 732, 909 Interstate Vitrified Brick &c Co. v. Philadelphia, 164 Pa. St. 477, 753 Inwood V. State, 42 Ohio St. 186, 541 Iowa Brick Co. v. City of Des Moines, 111 Iowa 272, 744 Iowa &c. Co. V. Webster Co., 21 Iowa 221, 517 Iowa &c. Land Co. v. Carroll Co., 39 Iowa 151, 14 Iowa R. &c. Co. V. Sac Co., 39 Iowa 124, 1530 Ipsom V. Mississippi &c. R. Co., 36 Miss. 300, 698 Iredell v. Barbee, 9 Ired. L. 250, 312 Irion V. City of Saginaw, 120 Mich. 295, 1328 Iron R. Co. v. City of Ironton, 19 Ohio St. 299, 1323 Irvin V. Gregory, 86 Ga. 605, 844, 1486, 1492, 1493 V. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 94 111. 105, 1502 Irvine v. Citv of Chattanooga, 101 Tenn. 291. 785 V. Wood, 51 N. Y. 224, 1611 Irving V. Burgess &c., 194 Pa. St. 648, 1708 V. Ford, 65 Mich. 241, 1161, 1379 Irwin V. Exton. 125 Cal. 622, 1755 V. Lowe, 89 Ind. 540, 1540 V. Town of Ontario, 3 Fed. 49, 1001 Isbell V. New York &c. R. Co., 25 Conn. 556, 365 Iske V. City of Newton, 54 Iowa 586, 1712 Israel v. .Tewett, 29 Iowa 475. 704 V. President &c., 2 111. 290, 527, 528 Ivanhoe v. City of Enterprise, 29 Or. 45, 1309 Ives V. City of Omaha, 70 N. W. 961, 1140, 1141 V. Irev. 51 Neb. 136, 1153 Ivinson v. Hance, 1 Wyo. Ter. 270, 835 Jack V. Moore, 66 Ala. 184- 663, 664 V. Weiennett, 115 III. 105, 1498 Jacks V. City of Helena, 41 Ark. 213, 990 Jackson, Ex parte, 45 Ark. 158, 1074 V. Burns, 3 Binn. 75, 132 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 31 Iowa 176, 1109 V. City of Greenville, 72 Miss. 220, 1347 V. Collins. 16 N. Y. S. 651, 41 N. Y. St. 590, 281, 934 v. Edwards, 7 Paige Ch. 386, 693 v. Fitzsimmons, 10 Wend. 9, 134 v. Green, 7 Wend. 333, 134 V. Hartwpll, 8 Johns. 422, 563 V. Lunn, 3 Johns: Cas. 109, 132 V. Norris, 72 HI. 364, 1701 V. People, 9 Mich. Ill, 543, 1724 V. Rankin, 67 Wis. 285, 696, 1572 V. Rutland &c. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150. 675 V. Simonton.'4 Cranch C. C. 255, 313 V. Smith, 120 Ind. 520, 220, 1201 V. State, 104 Ind. 516, 1256 V. Town of Bellevieu, 30 Wis. 250, • 1332 V. White, 20 Johns. 313, 132 v. Young, 5 Cow. 269, 1569 Jackson Co. v. Waldo, 85 Mo. 637, 1568 Jackson &c. R. Co. v. Interstate &c. R. Co., 24 Fed. 306, 566, 1352 Jackson School Tp. v. Hadley, 59 Ind. 534, 626 Jackson Tp. v. Wagner, 127 Pa. St. 184, 1586, 1600 .Jacksonville v. Ledwith. 26 Fla. 163. 1402 Jacksonville Elec. Light Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 229. ' 573 Jacksonville R. Co. v. Citv of Jack- sonville, 114 111. 562, 550, 1142, 1250 Jacksonville &c. R. Co. v. Virden, 104 111. 339, 987 V. Walsh, 106 111. 253, 701 Jacobs, In re, 9S N. Y. 98, 1382 V. City of Chicago, 178 111. 560, 1153, 1154 V. Hamilton Co., 1 Bond 500. 779 V. Inhabitants &c., 16 Maine 187, 1633 Jacquemin v. Andrews, 40 Mo. App. 507, 914 James v. City of Darlington, 71 Wis. 173. 587, 621 V. Citv of Louisville, 19 Ky. L. 447, 1296 V. City of Portage, 48 Wis. 677. 1597 V. Citv of Seattle, 22 Wash. 654, 180, 955 V. Pine Rluflf. 49 Ark. 199, 12.58 V. Sammis. 132 N. Y. 239, 1567 James Co. v. Hamilton Co., 89 Tenn. 237, 417 Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257. 49, 50, 64, 65, 86, 87 Jamison v. Citv of Springfield, 53 Mo. 224. 706 Janewav v. City of Duluth, 65 Minn. 292, 572 Jansen v. City of Atchison, 16 Kan. 3.^8, 1588 Jardine v. Mayor &c., 11 Daly 110, 1187 Jarrett v. City of Chicago, 181 111. 242. 512 Jarrolt v. JMoberly, 103 TT. S. 580, 996 Jarvis v. Dean. 3 P.ing. 447. 571, 1559 Jasper Co. v. Ballou, 103 O. S. 745, 992, 1020, 1022, 1023, 1029 TABLE OF CASES. CXXl [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Jasper Co. v. Osborn, 59 Iowa 208, 1063 Jebb V. Sexton. ,S4 111. App. 45, 1284 Jeffers v. Johnson, 18 X. J. L. 382, 322 V. Lawrence. 42 lovA'a 408, 1533 Jefferson v. Cowan, 54 Mo. 234. 125T V. lOdwards, 37 Mo. App. G17, 1736 V. Hartley, 81 Ga. 716, 332 Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, 66 Pa. St. 202, 284 Jefferson &c. R. Co. v. Hazem, 7 La. An. 182. 1448 Jefferson School Tp. v. Litton, 116 Ind. 467, 857. 922, 1495 Jeffersonville v. Myers, 2 Ind. App. 532. 1210, 1221, 1741 Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 4S, 137 Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa 498, 982, 996, 1542 Jefts V. York, 10 Cush. 392, 217 Jegglin V. Roeder, 79 Mo. App. 428, 1348 Jeliff V. City of Newark, 48 N. J. L. 101, 1233 Jelly V. Dills, 27 W. Va. 267, 1399 Jenal v. Green Island Draining Co., 12 Neb. 163, 689 Jenkins v. City of Cheyenne, 1 Wyom. Ter 287 535 V. Inhabitants &c., 103 Mass. 94, 980 V. Lemonds, 29 Ind. 294, 331, 332 V. Mayor &c.. 35 Ga. 145, 497, 1412 V. School Dist., 39 Maine 220, 294 V. Stetler, 118 Ind. 275. 1163, 1255 V. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114. 221 Jenne v. Sutton. 43 N. J. L. 257, 807 Jenner v. Joliffie, 9 Johns. 381, 222 Jennings v. Le Breton. 80 Cal. 8, 268 V. Van Shaick. 108 N. Y. 530, 1349 V. Wood. 20 Ohio 261, 228 Jensen, In re, 59 N. Y. S. 653, 873 V. Board &c.. 47 Wis. 298, 1538 V. City of Waltham, 166 Mass. 344. 792 Jernee v. Board &c., 52 N. J. L. 553, 1577 Jerome v. Ross. 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 674 Jersey City v. Qiiaife, 2 Dutch. 63, 175 Jersey City &c. R. Co. v. Jersey City &c. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 61. 590 Jessem v. Pierce. 25 Ind. App. 222. 1310 Jessup V. United States, 106 U. S. 147, 311 Jester v. Overseers. 11 Pa. St. 540, 1062 Jewell V. Mills, 3 Bush 62, 332 Jewett V. City of New Haven. 38 Conn. 368, 264. 820. 1097 Jewhnrst v. City of Syracuse. 108 N. Y. 303. 1596, 1597 Jex V. Mayor &c., 103 N. Y. 536. 1205, 1264 Jimison v. Adams Co., 130 111. 558. 1472 Jobson v. Bridges, 84 Va. 298. 154. 163 John v. Cincinnati R. Co., 35 Ind. 539, 983 John Hancock &c. Ins. Co. v. City of Huron. 80 Fed. 652, 1030 V. City of Huron, 100 Fed. 1001, 875 Johns v. County Com'rs, 28 Fla. 626. 955 V. People. 25 Mich. 499. 195 Johnson v. Campbell. 49 111. 316, 624 V. Campbell. 39 Tex. S3. 960 V. City Council &c.. 2 Or. 327. 1501 V. City Council &c., 11 Tex. Civ. App. 469. 204 V. City of Kansas City, 78 Mo. 661, 1541 V. City of Lexington, 14 B. Mon. 648. 1501. 1503 V. City of Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315, 559, 1702 Johnson v. City of Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402, 1209 v. City of Rock Hill, 57 S. C. 371, 750. 1449 V. City of Troy, 48 N. Y. S. 998. ISGG V. City of Winfleld, 48 Kan. 129, 539 V. City of Worcester, 172 Mass. 122, 132G v. Commonwealth, 7 Dana 338, 1511 v. District of Columbia, 1 Mackey 427, 1207 v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 417, 1502 v. Dunn, 134 Mass. 522, 335 V. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 363, 312 V. Lewis. 13 Conn. 303, 1095 V. Mann, 77 Va. 265, 31,3 V. Martin, 68 Wis. 330, 1423, 1424 V. Mayor &c., 46 Ga. 80, 1417 V. Mayor &c., 62 Ga. 645, 1520, 1532 V. People. 177 111. 64, 1303 V. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 445, „ , . 517, 1406 V. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550, 673 V. Sanitary Dist., 163 III. 285, 753 V. Santa Clara Co., 28 Cal. 545, 638 V. School Dist.. 67 Mo. 319, 1171 V. Simonton. 43 Cal. 242, 1079 V. Smith, 64 Ind. 275, 445 V. Stark Co., 24 111. 75, 624, 1013, 1016 V. State, 116 Ind. 374, l-^oi V. State. 94 Tenn. 499, isi V. Wakulla Co., 28 Fla. 720 934 V. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202, I171 Johnson City v. Wolfe, 103 Tenn 277, 789 Johnson Home &c. v. Village of Sen- eca Falls. 55 N. Y. S. 803, 1504 Johnson School Tp. v. Citizens' Bank, 81 Ind. 515, 857, 863 Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U. S. 19. 263, 787, 821 V. Moorman, SO Va. 131, 221, 334 V. People's Natural Gas Co., 5 Cent. R. 564. 689 V. Wilson. 2 N. H. 202, 198 Joint Free High School Dist. v. Town of Green Grove, 77 Wis. 532, 844 Jonas V. City of Cincinnati. 18 Ohio 318, 1533 Jones V. Blanton, 6 Ired. Eq. 115, 327 V. Board &c., 104 Mass. 461. 1234, 1266 V. Board &c.. 88 Mich. 371, 1479 V. Borough of Bangor. 144 Pa. St. 638, 802, 1220, 1603 V. City of Albany, 151 N. Y. 223, 930 V. City of Albany, 17 N. T. S. 232. 937 V. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 75, 1612 V. City of Camden, 44 S. C. 319. 1032 V. City of Clinton, 100 Iowa 333. 796 V. City of Greenboro, 124 N C. 310. 1334. 1360 V. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 1, 814. 1594 V. City of New York, 62 N. Y. S. 284. 721 V. City of Portland, 35 Or. 512, 721, 955 V. City of Seattle, 19 Wash. 669, 752, 1141 V. City of Troy. 4 N. Y. S. 792, 1607 V. Commissioners, 107 N. C. 248. 984 V. Davis, 35 Wis. 376, 1566 CMXll TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. S33-1830.'] Jones V. Erie &c. R. Co., 169 Pa. St. 883. 1350 V. Firemen's &c. Ins. Co., 2 Daly 307, 466 V. Foster. 50 N. Y. S. 738, 505 V. Gridley. 20 Kan. 584, 368 V. Hays. 8 Ired. Eq. 502, 327 V. Housatonic R. Co., 107 Mass. 261. 1613 V. Inhabitants &c., 66 Maine 585, 343 V. Inhabitants &c., 9 Pick. 146, 294 V. Kolb. 56 Wis. 263, 1532 V. Le Tombe. 3 Dallas 384, 215 V. Loving, 55 Miss. 109, 218 V. Mayor &e., 8 M. & W. 605, 174 V. Mayor &c., 25 Ga. 610, 982 V. Mayor &c., 37 Hun 513, 1265 V. Mavor &c.. 9 N. Y. St. 247, 781 V. McAlpine. 64 Ala. 511, 521 V. New Orleans &e. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227, 701 V. Pendleton Co. Court, 19 S. W. 740, 842, 1039 V. People, 19 111. App. 300, 332 V. Savage, 53 N. Y. S. 308, 717, 747 V. Town of Lind, 79 Wis. 64. 1041 V. Town of Tonawanda, 158 N. Y. 438, 1142, 1287 V. Williams, 11 M. & W. 176, 1115 Jones Co. v. Perry, 26 Ind. App. 554. 1309 Jonesboro v. Cairo &c. R. Co., 110 U. S. 192, 992 Jonesboro Co. v. Baldwin, 57 Ind. 86, 1639 Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312. 791, 1377 v. Hanson, 49 N. H. 199, 334 V. Osceola Co., 59 Iowa 388, 840 V. School Dist., 38 Maine 164, 358, 365, 1424 Joslyn V. City of Detroit, 74 Mich. 459, 1325, 1609 Jossplvn V. Stone. 28 Miss. 753. 1734 Joyes"v. Shadburn (Ky.), 13 S. W. 361, 1271 Joyner v. Inhabitants &c., 3 Cush. 567, 245 Judd V. Thompson, 125 Mass. 553. 365 V. Town of Pox Lake, 28 Wis. 583, 652 Judevine v. Town of Hardwick, 49 Vt. 180, 871 Judge V. City of Meriden. 38 Conn. 90, 820, 1207 Judge of Probate v. Webster, 46 N. H. 518, 1055 Judges &c. V. Tavlor, 8 Bush 206, 1543 Judkins v. IJiU. 50 N. H. 140, 155 Judson V. Reardon. 16 Minn. 431, 493 V. Smith. 104 Mo. 61, 908 Juker V. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. St. 484, 371 Julia Bldg. Ass'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, 681 Junction R. Co. v. Citv of Philadel- phia. 88 Pa. St. 424. 1251 Jung v. City of Stevens Point, 74 Wis. 547, 1632 Jussen V. Board &e., 95 Ind. 567. 277, 987 Justice V. City of Logansport. 101 Ind. 326, 1544 Justices v. Smith, 2 J. J. Marsh. 472, 312 Justices &c. v. Paris &c. Tpk. Co., 11 B. Mon. 143, 1.529 Jutte & Folev Co. v. City of Altoona, 94 Fed. 61, 873 Kahn v. Board &c., 79 Cal. 388, 1137 V. Sutro. 114 Cal. 316, 55, 82 Kaime v. Harty, 4 Mo. App. 357, 521 Kaine v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 490, 1494 Kaiser v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 22 Minn. 149, 682, 1582 Kalbrier v. Leonard, 34 Ind. 497, 1516 Kamp V. People, 141 111. 9, 168S Kane v. City of Charleston, 161 111. 179, 1021 V. City of Fond du Lac, 40 Wis. 495, 662 V. City of Troy. 1 N. Y. S. 536. 1609 V. City of Yonkers, 60 N. Y. S. 216, 43 App. Div. 599, 1794, 1801, 1802 V. Commissioners. 86 N. C. 8, 1230 V. Footh. 70 111. 587, 1668 V. Independent School Dist., 82 Iowa 5. 890 V. Mavor &c., 15 Md. 240, 688 V. New York El. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 164, 1581 V. Parker. 4 Wis. 123, 423 V. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. St. 502, 1801 Kankakee Co. v. Etna L. Ins. Co., 106 U. S. 668, 1013 Kanouse v. Town of Lexington, 12 111. App. 318, 530 Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 88, 551, 1308 V. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450. 1272, 1279, 1772 V. Corrigan, 86 Mo. 67. 468. 492 v. Duncan, 135 Mo. 571, 551, 177.S V. Hallett. 59 Mo. App. 160. 499 y. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 89, 110, 1146 V. McDonald. 80 Mo. App. 444, 754 V. Trieb, 76 Mo. App. 478, 501 v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172. 110. 879 Kansas Cit.y Grading Co. v. Holden, 107 Mo. 305, 802 Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Albright, 33 Kan. 211, 1535 V. Alderman, 47 Mo. 349, 900. 905 V. Campbell, 62 Mo. 585. 604 V. Fitzsimmons. 22 Kan. 686. 704 V. Rich Tp.. 45 Kan. 275, 985, 988 Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Commissioners • &c., 16 Kan. 587, 245, 247, 1551 Kansas Town Co. v. City of Argen- tine, 59 Kan. 779. 1131. 1293 Kaseman v. Borough of Sunbury, 197 Pa. St. 162. 1326 Kassell v. Mayor &c., 109 Ga. 491. 498 Kassman v. City of St. Louis. 153 Mo. 203. 1374 Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 16 Fed. 745. 082 V. Aberdeen, 121 JJ. S. 172, 643. 904 v. Lawo, 90 Tenn. 235, 1357 Kavanasrh v. Citv of Brooklyn. 38 Barb. 232. 820. 1586 V. Mobile &c. R. Co., 78 Ga. 271, 586. 500 Kavenv v. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 571. 1604. 1605, 1606, 1607 Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88, 64 Kavsville City v. Ellison, 18 Utah ■ 163, 1549 Kean v. Rizer. 90 Md. 507. 1658 Keane v. Gushing. 15 Mo. App. 06. 479 V. Village of Waterford, 2 N. Y. S. 182. 160.5 Kearney y. Andrews, 10 N. J. Eq. 70. 313 y. City of Covington, 1 Met. 339, 1306, 1748 TABLE OF CASES, CXXlll IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} Kearney Co. v. Tuttle, 10 Neb. 34, 907 Keasy v. City of Louisville, 4 Dana 154, 680 Keating v. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 141, 680, 1602 V. City of Kansas, 84 Mo. 415, 646 V. McDonald, 73 Conn. 125, 1808 Keator v. Dalton, 62 N. Y. S. 878, 712, 1698, 1788 Keck V. City of Cincinnati, 6 Ohio Dec. 97, 580 Keefer v. Schwartz, 47 Pa. St. 503, 1058 Keehn v. McGillicuddy, 15 lud. App. 580, 1379, 1380 Keeler v. Frost, 22 Barb. 400, 294 V. Milledge, 24 N. J. L. 142. 536, 537, 1419 Keenan v. Cook, 12 R. I. 52. 221 Keene &c. Saving Bank v. Lyon Co., 90 Fed. 523, 878 Keeney. Ex parte, 84 Cal. 304, 1086 V. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L. 449, 260 Keese v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. 112, 1236, 1270, 1288 Keffe V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207, 794 Kehn v. State. 93 N. Y. 291. 174, 175 Kehrer v. Richmond. 81 Va. 745, 1602 Kehrig v. Peters, 41 Mich. 475, 1509 Keifer v. City of Bridgeport, 68 Conn. 401, 1157 Keiflfer v. Ehler, 18 Pa. St. 388, 1026 Keihl V. Citv of South Bend, 76 Fed. 921, 877 Keil V. City of St. Paul, 47 Minn. 288, 1219 Keith' V. Bingham, 100 Mo. 300. 1206, 1253 V. Citv of Philadelphia, 126 Pa. St. 515. 1271 V. Howard. 24 Pick. 292, 222 V. Inhabitants &c.. 2 Allen 552, 1013 Kellar v. Savage, 17 Maine 444. 348, 352, 364 Keller v. People, 100 111. 179, 1237, 1278, 1289 V. State. 11 Md. 525. 1537 V. Wilson. 90 Ky. 350. 564 Kellev V. Citv of Columbus, 41 Ohio St. 263. 1597 V. City of Madison, 43 Wis. 638, 828, 942 V. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 170, 1516. 1518 V. Cook, 21 R. I. 29, 804. 805 V. Kennard. 60 N. H. 1. 472, 1155 V. Mavor &c.. 4 Hill 263, 260 V. Milan. 127 U. S. 139. 562. 637 974, 981, 984, 993. 996, 1523, 1531 Kellinger v. Forty-second St. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 206. 1317. 1582 Kellogg V. Carrico, 47 Mo. 157. 486 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 26 Wis. 223. 1109 V. Fly. 15 Ohio St. 64. 1723 V. Inhabitants &c.. 4 Gray 65. 1507 V. Malin. 50 Mo. 496. 675 V. Mayor &c.. 44 N. Y. S. 39, 928 Kellow V. Citv of Scranton, 195 Pa. St. 134, 1339 Kelly V. City of Chicago, 62 HI. 279, 753. 1687 V. City of Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 468. 1252 V. Citv of Minneapolis, 63 Minn. 125. 876 V. City of Minneapolis, 77 Minn. 76, 930 V. City of Pittsburg, 85 Pa. St. 170, 405 V. Corporation &c. of Toronto, 23 U. C. Q. B. 425, 1403 Kelly V. Gahn. 112 111. 23, 153 V. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. 29, 132 V. Mayor &c., 4 Hill 263, 977 V. Mayor &c., 11 N. Y. 432, 1591 V. ]\[ayor &c., 53 Md. 134, 1730 V. McCormiek. 28 N. Y. 318, 1014 V. Jleeks, 87 Mo. 396, 384, 393, 400 V. Moon, 51 Ala. 304. 335 V. Multnomah Co.. 18 Or. 356, 1072 V. New York &c. R. Co., 9 N. Y. S. 90, 1631 V. Owen. 7 Wall. 496. 132 V. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 78. 11. 1536, 1714 V. Southern R. Co., 28 Minn. 98, 1627 V. Town of Fond du Lac, 31 Wis. 179, 1597 V. York. 59 N. Y. S. 30. 1829 Kelly Tp. v. Union Tp., 5 W. & S. 535, 1043 Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708, 1112 V. King. 32 Barb. 410. 684 V. King, 1 Trans. App. 133, 1565 Kelso V. City of Boston, 120 Mass. 297, 1724 Kemp V. Neville. 10 C. B. 523, 221 Kemper v. Campbell, 45 Kan. 529. 1160 V. City of Louisville. 14 Bush 87, 1418 V. King, 11 Mo. App. 116, 1199, 1234 Kempner v. Galveston Co., 73 Tex. 216, 907 Kenady v. City of Lawrence, 128 Mass. 318, 1622 Kendall v. City Council &c., 47 N. J. L- 64, 1692 V. City of Albia, 73 Iowa 241, 1630, 1635, 1802 V. Post, 8 Or. 141. 698 V. Powers, 4 Met. 553, 335 V. Stokes. 3 How. 87, 230 Kenfleld v. Irwin. 52 Cal. 164. 368 Kennard v. Cass Co., 3 Dill. 147, 1740 Kennedy v. Board &c., 82 Cal. 483, 1492, 1659 V. Board &c.. 2 Pa. St. 366, 1116 v. City of New York, 54 N. Y. S. 261. 930 V. City of Sacramento. 19 Fed. 580. 90. 103. 1526 V. City of Troy, 77 N. Y. 493. 1197. 1287, 1724 V. City of Troy, 14 Hun 308. 1717 V. Corporation of Washington, 3 Cr. C. C. 595. 580 V. Jones, 11 Ala. 63. 1214 V. Le Van, 23 Minn. 513. 15.59 V. Newman. 1 Sandf. 187. 1422 V. Phelps, 10 La. An. 227, 607, 1081, 1093, 1121 V. Trustees &c.. 8 Dana 50. 629 Kennett Square v. Entriken, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 469. 1271 Kenney v. Goergen. 36 Minn. 190. 198 Kennirott v. Supervisors, 83 LT. S. 452. 1001, 1005 Kennison v. Inhabitants &c., 146 Alass. 467. 1781 Kensington v. Glenat. 1 Phila. 393. 528 Kensington Electric Co. v. City of Philadelphia. 187 Pa. St. 446. 518. 955 Kent v. Town of Lincoln, 82 Vt. 591. 1617 V. Village of Enosburg Falls. 71 Vt. 2,55: 1236. 1548 V. Village of North Tarrytown, 56 N. Y. S. 885. 1753 Kents V. Village of North Tarrytown, 64 N. Y. S. 178, 715 exxiv TABLE OF CASES, [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Kentufky Lead &c. Co. v. New Al- bany Water-Works, 62 Ind. 63. 1512 Kentucky Public Kiev. Co. v. Cols- ton. 50 S. W. 1)81, 1307 Kenworthy v. Ironton. 41 Wis. 647, 8 Keuyon v. City of Spokane, 17 W'ash. 57. 955 Keokuk &c. Bridge Co. v. People, 161 111. 132. 1554 Keokuk &c. Co. v. City of Quincy, 81 111. 422. 517 Keough V. Board &c., 156 Mass. 403, 1693 V. City of St. Paul, 66 Minn. 114, 1152 Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St. 124, 465, 480 Kernochan v. New York El. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 559, 1582 Kerns v. Schoonmaker, 4 Ohio 331, 335 Kerr v. Central Board &c., 25 Pitts. Leg. J. 54, 752 V. City of Bellefontaine, 59 Ohio St. 446, 711, 737, 744 V. City of Corsicana, 89 Tex. 461. 1286 V. City of Corsicana, 35 S. W. 694. 1701, 1709 V. Hitt, 75 111. 51. 486 V. Jones, 19 Ind. 351. 185, 206 V. Seaver, 11 Allen 151, 1751 V. Trego. 47 Pa. St. 292. 287 Kersten v. City of Milwaukee. 106 Wis. 200, 1236, 1243, 1279, 1285 Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154, 524 Ketcham v. Wagner. 90 Mich. 271, 428 Ketchum v. City of Buffalo. 14 N. Y. 356, 576, 658, 977 V. Duncan, 96 U. S. 659. 1019 Kettering v. City of Jacksonville, 50 111. 39, 64, 520, 1691 Keyes v. City of Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa 509. 1327. 1335 V. Inhabitants &c.. 17 Pick. 273, 294 V. Village of Marcellus, 50 Mich. 439 1587, 1597 Keymer, In re, 148 N. Y. 219. 1828 Keys V. Marin Co.. 42 Cal. 252. 706 Keyser v. McKissan, 2 Rawle 139, 198 V. School Dist., 35 N. H. 477, 295, 644 Khron v. Brock. 144 Mass. 516. 811 Khroop V. Forman. 31 Mich. 144, 1572 Kick V. Merry, 23 Mo. 72, 671 Kidder v. City of Peoria, 29 111. 77, 692 V. Inhabitants &c.. 7 Gray 104, 1601 Kieffer v. Hummelstown Borough, 151 Pa. St. 304, 1600 Kielley v. Carson. 4 Moo. P. C. 63. 298 Kierman. In re. 62 N. Y. 457. 1257. 12.58 V. Mayor &c., 43 N. Y. S. 538. 1339 Kies V. CitV of Erie, 135 Pa. St. 144, 797 V. City of Erie. 169 Pa. St. 598, 790 Kiichli V. Minnesota &c. Blec. Co., 58 Minn. 418, 730 Kilbourne v. St. John, 59 N. Y. 21. 1699 V. Thompson. 103 U. S. 168, 205 Kilev V. City of Kansas City, 69 Mo. "102, 1616 V. City of Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103, 8, 265, 820 V. Cranor. 51 Mo. 541, 1427 V. Oppenheimer, 55 Mo. 374, 1131 Kilgore v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. St. 495, 106 Kilham v. Ward. 2 Mass. 236. 132 Killion V. Van Patten. 42 Kan. 295, 172 Kilnatrick v. Smith. 77 Va. 347. 313 Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151, 197 V. Board &c.. 46 Cal. 19. 698 V. City of Boston, 1 Allen 417, 798 Kimball v. City of Cedar Rapids, 100 Fed. 802, 724 V. City of Peoria, 140 111. 157, 1143 V. Corn Exch. &c. Bank, 1 111. App. 209. 1551, 1727 V. Cushman, 103 Mass. 194, 1779 V. Lamprev, 19 N. H. 215, 1429 V. Marshall, 44 N. II. 465, 273, 279, 305. 354 V. Merchants' &c. Co., 98 111. 611, 1699, 1721 V. Olmstead, 20 Wash. 629, 209, 1686, 1687 V. People, 160 111. 653, 1289 V. Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407, 54, 992 V. School Dist., 28 Vt. 8, 1480 Kimble v. City of Peoria, 140 111. 157, 483. 511, 1259, 1267 Kimmel. In re, 41 Fed. 775, 1399 Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 137 Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa 430, 9, 142, 775, 776, 1076 King V. Beeston, 3 T. R. 592, 295 V. Bellringer. 4 T. R. 810, 473 V. Buller. 8 East 389, 305 V. City of Buffalo, 10 N. Y. 564, 170 V. City of Chicago, 111 111. 63, 923 V. City of Kansas City, 58 Kan. 334, 1.378 V. City of Madison. 17 Ind. 48, 1511 V. City of Oshkosh, 75 W'is. 517, 827, 1609 V. City of Portland, 2 Or. 146, 1268, 1269 V. Commissioners, 8 B. & C. 355 801 V. Davenport, 98 111. 305, 673, 1391, 1707 V. Granger, 21 R. I. 93, 1781 V. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936, 207 V. Inhabitants &c., 5 B. & Ad. 469. 1559 V. Inhabitants &c., 1 East 13. 345 , V. Inhabitants &c., 4 T. R. 591, 667 V. Inhabitants &c., 6 T. R. 534, 345 V. Ireland. 68 Tex. 682, 311 V. Lamb. 117 Cal. 401. 1140 V. Mahaska Co., 75 Iowa 329, 633. 648 V. Market St. Com'rs, 4 B. & Ad. 333. 699 V. Mayor &c., 6 Ad. & El. 349, 1657 V. Mayor &c., 2 T. R. 259, 1657, 1691 V. ]\Iavor &c.. 4 T. R. 699, 1657 V. IMcDrew, 31 111. 418, 1743 V. Miller, 6 T. R. 268. 305 V. Minneapolis Union R. Co., 32 Minn. 224, 701, 702. 703, 1222 V. Morris &c. R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 397, 1109 V. Nichols. 16 Ohio St. 80. 318 V. Parry. 14 East 549, 378 V. President &c.. 3 111. 305, 527 V. Russell, 6 East 427, 1610 V. Theodorick, 8 East 543. 344 V. Tizzard. 9 B. & C. 418. 185 V. Williams, 2 Man. & S. 141, 305 V. Wilson. 1 Dill. C. C. 555. 1717 King Co. V. Collins. 1 Wash. 469, 1052 Kinsrhorn v. Corporation &c. of Kingston. 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 130, 540 Kingman v. City of Brockton, 15."^ Mass. 255, 559, 917 V. Inhabitants &c., 2 Cush. 426. 644. 1480 Kingman &c.. Petitioners, 153 Mass. 566. 1252 Kingsbury v. Inhabitants &c., 13 AI- ■^len 186. 1613 V. School Dist., 12 Met. 99. 294, 343, 362, 1485 TABLE OF CASES. CXXV [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Klngsland v. Mayor &c.. 5 Daly 448, 894 V. Mayor &c.. 110 N. Y. 569, 620 Kingsley v. Bowman, 53 N. Y. S. 426, 751 V. Norris, 60 N. H. 131, 715 . Kingston &c. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 33 Barb. 196, 326 Kinkaid's Appeal. 66 Pa. St. 411, 1086 Kinmimdy v. Mahan, 72 111. 462, 1539 Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 111. 332, 82, 771, 792 Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 369, 370, 371 Kinney v. City of Tekamah, 30 Neb. 605. 1338 V. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 567, 1604 Kinsey v. Pulaski Co., 2 Dill. 253, 836 Kinsley v. City of Chicago, 124 111. 359. 469. 601, 604, 1387, 1399 Kip V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. S. 685, 175, 190 V. Mayor &c.. 26 N. J. L. 298, 100. 500. 536. 537, 1507, 1509 Kipley v. Luthardt, 178 111. 525. 1824, 1825 Kirby v. Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 14 Gray 249, 1588 V. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258, 81, 1514, 1516. 1520 Kirchenor v. Flint, 11 N. Y. S. 741, 1417 Kirchman v. People, 159 111. 265, 1289 V. West &c. R. Co., 58 111. App. 515 11.35 Kirk V. Brazos Co.. 73 Tex. 56, 1064 y. Norvill, 1 T. R. 118, 532 Kirkendall y. City of Omaha, 39 Neb. 1. 1211 Kirkham v. Russell. 76 Va. 956. 500 Kirkpatrick y. Commissioners, 42 N. J. L. 510. 1198 V. Taylor. 118 Ind. 329. 708 Kirkwood y. Soto. 87 Cal. 394. 173 Kirtland y. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 138. 1500, 1501 Kisler v. Cameron. 39 Ind. 488. 381 Kissell V. Anderson. 73 Ind. 485, 1095 Kistner y. City of Indianapolis, 100 Ind. 210, 264 Kitchel V. Board &c.. 123 Ind. 540. 555 Kitchell y. Manchester &c. R. Co., 79 Mo. App. 340, 1813 Kitson y. Mayor &c.. 26 Mich. 325. 1507 Kittinger y. Buffalo Traction Co.. 160 N. Y. 377, 273, 482, 506 y. Monroe School Tp.. 3 Ind. App. 411, 8.50. 851, 1480 Kittle y. Freemont. 1 Neb. 328, 1574 V. Sherwin. 11 Neb. 65. 1521 Kittredge v. Inhabitants &c., 138 Mass. 286. 344, 361 V. Town of Walden. 40 Vt. 211, 362 Klatt y. City of Milwaukee. 53 Wis. 196. 776. 1615 Klauder v. McGrath. 35 Pa. St. 128. 212 Klein v. Board &c.. 54 Miss. 254, 1527 V. City of Dallas, 71 Tex. 280. 1619. 1629 V. New Orleans. 99 TJ. S. 149. 1530 V. St. Paul &c. R. Co.. 30 Minn. 451. 708 Klemer y. City of Madison, 104 Wis. 330 1339 Kline y. City of Tacoma, 11 Wash. 193. 1155 Kling y. City of Buffalo, 156 N. Y. 700. 1343. 1344 Klingler v. Bickel, 119 Pa. St. 326, 1122. 1392 Klix V. Nieman. 68 Wis. 271. 795 Klosterman y. Loos. 58 Mo. 290. 217 Knapp y. Grant, 27 Wis. 147, 992, 1538 Knapp V. Mayor &c., 50 111. 213, 1526 Knapp, Stout & Co. y. City of St. Louis, 156 Mo. 343, 1318 y. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 126 Mo. 26, 1337 y. St. Louis &c. R. Co.. 153 Mo. 560, 586, 1697, 1698, 1705 Knecht y. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 875, 1243 Kneedler y. Borough of Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368. 500, 506, 532, 594, 1392 Kneeland y. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454, 1502 Knell y. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. S. 233, 1186, 1256. 1257 Knight y. City of Philadelphia, 15 W. N. C. 307, 797 V. Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22, 215. 216, 217 V. Inhabitants &c., 70 Maine 500, 1054 V. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 70 Mo. 231, 540. 1422 V. Town of Ashland, 61 Wis. 233, 409, 424 V. Town of Ashland, 65 Wis. 166. 411 y. Town of West Union, 45 W. Va. 194, 524, 986 V. Woods, 129 Ind. 101, 1472 Kniper y. City of Louisville, 7 Bush 599. 1507. 1509 Knoblock y. Chicago &c. R. Co., 31 Minn. 402, 1357 Knoop's Estate, In re, 11 N. Y. S. 773, 1415 Knostman y. City of Dayenport, 99 Iowa 589. 1377 Knowles y. Dayis. 2 Allen 61, 335 V. Seale. 64 Cal. 377. 1301 y. Yeates. 31 Cal. 82, 371 Knowlton y. Board &c., 9 Wis. 410, 548, 1513, 1520, 1721 Knox y. Board &c., 45 Kan. 152, 1494 V. Challonor, 42 Maine 150, 1106 y. Mayor &c.. 55 Barb. 404, 1790 y. Peterson, 21 Wis. 247, 565, 1254 Knox Co. y. Arms. 22 Hi. 175, 1743 y. Dayis. 63 III. 405. 372 V. Johnson, 124 Ind. 145, 1473 Knox Co. Court y. United States, 109 U. S. 229. 1525 Knoxyille v. Cox. 103 Tenn. 368. 1804 Knupfle y. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488, 1588 Kobs y. City of Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 159, 1215 Koch V. City of Ashland, 88 Wis. 603. 1327, 1343 y. City of Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 220. 714 y. City of Williamsport. 195 Pa. St. 488. 1363, 1801 Koehler y. Hill, 60 Iowa 543. 151 Koestenbader y. Price. 41 Iowa 204. 704 Koester y. City of Ottumwa, 34 Iowa 41, 776 Koethe v. Ringer. 46 Minn. 259, 1419 Kokes y. State. 55 Neb. 691. 16S6 Kolb V. Mayor &c.. 64 N. J. L. 163. 469 V. O'Brien. 86 111. 210. 223 Kolkmeyer v. City of Jefferson, 75 Mo. App. 678. 1144. 1149. 1166 Kollock V. Dodge. 105 Wis. 187. 183 Konrad v. Rogers, 70 Wis. 492. 666 Koonce v. Board &c.. 106 N. C. 192. 1664 Koons y. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 65 Mo. 592, 794 Koontz V. Burgess &c.j 64 Md. 134. 289. 1540 CXXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, Kopelka v. City of Bay City, 125 Mioh. 625. 1342 Koppikus V. State Cap. Com'rs. 16 Cal. 248, 881, 917 Korah v. City of Ottawa, 32 111. r^l^ 524, 520 Kornbur'g v. Board &c., 10 Mont. 325, „ 941 Koslikonong v. Burton, 104, U. S. CG8, ' 1020 Kosmak v. Mayor &c., 53 Hun 329. 1180 Kossman v. City of St. Louis, 153 Mo. 293. 1794 Kottman v. Aver, 3 Strob. 92, 313 Kountze v. City of Omaha, 5 Dill. 443, 151a Kraft V. City of Keokuk, 14 Iowa 46, 1725 Krall V. City of New York, 60 N. Y. S. 661 ; 44 App. Div. 259. 1784, 1793 Kramer v. Cleveland &c. R. Co.. 5 Ohio St. 140. 692, 698 Kramrath v. City of Albany, 127 N. Y. 575, 894 V. City of Albany, 53 Hun 206, 284 Kranz v. Mayor &c., 64 Md. 491, 822, 1208 Kreidler v. State, 24 Ohio St. 22, 168 Kreigh v. City of Chicago, 86 111. 407, 1355 Kress v. State. 65 Ind. 106. 220, 334 Krickle v. Commonwealth, 1 B. Mon. 361. Rlfi Krippendorf v. Hvde, 110 U. S. 276. 331 Kriseler v. Le Valley, 122 Mich. 576. 170. 207. 209, 930 Kroeger v. Pltcairn. 101 Pa. St. 311. 217 Kroop V. Forman. 31 Mich. 144. 628 Krueger v. Council &c., 64 N. J. L. 523. 201 Kucheman v. Chicago &c. R. Co.. 46 Iowa 366, 682 Kudinger v. City of Saginaw, 59 Mich. 355, 1417 Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 263, 825 Kuehner v. City of Freeport. 143 III. 92, 1248, 1249, 1250 Kuhls V. City of Laredo, 27 i S. W. 791, 730 Kuhn V. Board &c., 4 W. Va. 499, 104 v. Citv of Port Townsend. 12 Wash. "605, 66. 1759 Kuhns V. Wisconsin &c. R. Co., 76 Iowa 67, 1797 Kundinsjer v. City of Saginaw, 59 Mich. 355. 694 Kunkle v. Town of Franklin, 13 Minn. 127, 902 Kunz V. Citv of Troy, 104 N. Y. 344. 1591. 1608. 1614, 1615. 1616 V. City of Troy, 16 N. Y. St. 459, 826 Kuschke v. City of St. Paul, 45 Minn. 005 1210 Kyle V. Kvle, 55 Ind. 387, 1572 V. Malin, 8 Ind. 34. 88. 1232. 1258. 1533 Kynaston v. Mayor &c., 2 Str. 1051, 270, 271 L Laager v. Citv of San Antonio. 57 S. W. 61, 1775, 1810 Labs V. Cooper, 107 Cal. 656. 1260 Lacv V. Arnett. 33 Pa. St. 169. 1814 Lad'd V. City of East Portland, 18 Or. 87, 479, 491 V. City of Gambell, 35 Or. 393. 879. 1506 V. Clements, 4 Cush. 476, 340, 341 pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1 830.} Ladd V. Town of Franklin, 37 Conn. ro 85S Lade'v. Shepherd, 2 Str. 1004, 1559 La Fave v. City of Superior, 104 Wis. 454. 1802 Lafavette &c. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 1S5, 58, 61, 83, 982 v. Smith, 6 Ind. 249, 706 V. Winslow, 66 111. 219, 701 La Flamme v. City of Albany, 158 N. Y. 699. 930 Lafon V. Dufrocq, 9 La. An. 350, 1418 Lahr v. Metropolitan &c. R. Co.. 104 N. Y. 268, 620. 1582 Laird v. City of De Soto, 22 Fed. 421, 407. 409, 454 Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 111. 596. 1142 V. Hurley. 66 Cal. 473, 1493 V. State. 18 Fla. 501. 54 V. Trustees &c., 4 Denio 520. 1232 Lake Co. v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674, 885, 998, 999, 1000, 1003. 1008 1009, 1024 V. Rollins, 130 TJ. S. 662, 881, 885 Lake Erie &c. R. Co. v. Boker, 9 Ind. App. 428. 1249 V. Cluggish, 143 Ind. 847. 1379 Lake Pleasanton W. Co. v. Contra Costa W. Co.. 67 Cal. 659, 688 Lake Shore Foundrv v. City of Cleve- Imid. S Ohio C. C. 671, 750 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 97 111. 506, 591 V. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 116 Ind. 578. 679, 692, 1572 V. City of Chicago, 56 111. 454, 1142 V. Citv of Chicago. 144 111. 391, 550 V. City of Cleveland, 32 Week. L. Bui. 206. 1321 Lake St. R. Co. v. City of Chicago. 183 111. 75. 1248. 1249, 1276 Lally V. Holland, 1 Swan 396, 228 Lamar v. Board &c., 4 Ind. App. 191. 1073 Lamar &c. Co. v. City of Lamar, 140 Mo. 145, 877 Lamb V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 39 Iowa 333, 416. 1519 V. Citv of Cedar Rapids, 108 Iowa 629, 1325 V. Lane. 4 Ohio St. 167, 698, 699 Lambar v. City of St. Louis, 15 Mo. 610. 1585 V. Village of East Tawas, 86 Mich. 14. 1627 Lambert v. People. 76 N. Y. 220. 196 V. Thornton. 1 Ld. Raym. 91. 467 Lamborn v. County Com'rs, 97 TT. S. 181. 242. 245. 248, 1552 Lament v. Haight, 44 How. Pr. 1. 224 Lamm v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 45 Minn. 71, 1575. 1582 V. Port Deposit &c. Ass'n, 49 Md. 233, 258 Lammert v. Lidwell, 62 Mo. 188, 58 Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17, 329, 330 Lamoille Vallev R. Co. v. Town of Fairfield. 51 Vt. 257, 982 Lampe v. Citv of San Francisco, 124 Cal. 546. 1379 Lamson v. City of Newburyport. 14 Allen 30. 1053, 1054 Lancaster Co. v. Fulton, 128 Pa. St. 48. 633 Lancaster Co. Poor Directors v. Hart- man, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 177, 1057, 1062 Land v. Allen, 65 Miss. 455. 957 Land &c. Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. 294, 54, 560, 561, 1515, 1516 TABLE OF CASES. CXXVU [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. SSS-ISSO.] Land &c. Co. v. Mclntyre, 100 Wis. 245, 1731 Landers v. Staten Island R. Co., 53 N. Y. 450, 1411 Land Grant R. Co. v. Board &c., 6 Kan. 256, 997, 1576 Landsrove v. Town of Plymouth, 52 Vt. 503, 1058 Landis v. Borough of Vineland, 54 N. J. L. 75, 493, 520 V. Borough of Vineland, 60 N. J. L. 264, 1141 V. Hamilton, 77 Mo. 554, 1373 Lane, Kx parte, 76 Cal. 587, 1419 V. Baker. 12 Ohio 237, 1494 V. City of Saginaw, 53 Mich. 442, 695 V. City of Syracuse, 42 N. Y. S. 219, 1326 V. Commonwealth, 103 Pa. St. 481, 150 V. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17. 222 V. Inhabitants «&c., 72 Maine 354, 364. 1001, 1013 V. Inhabitants &c., 10 Met. 462, 259, 644 V. Schomp, 20 N. J. Eq. 82, 1023 Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 530 Lanfear v. Mayor, 4 La. 97. 534, 1115 Langan v. City of Atchison, 35 Kan. 318, 1631 Langdon v. Chartiers Tp., 131 Pa. St. 77, 188 V. Town of Castleton, 30 Vt. 285, 177, 181 Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12, 221 Langford v. Commissioners, 16 Minn. 375, 692 V. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 770. 772 Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Gratt. 661. 983. 1532. 1548 Langlois v. City of Cohoes, 58 Hun 226; 11 N. Y. S. 908. 1155, 1579 Langsdale v. Bonton. 12 Ind. 467, 1425 Langston v. South Car. R. Co., 2 S. C. 248, 1020 Langworthv v. City of Dubuque. 13 Iowa 86, 401. 1517 V. City of Dubuque, 16 Iowa 271. 104 Lanier v. Mayor &c., 59 Ga. 187, 1508 V. Padgett. 18 Pla. 842, 858 Lanigan v. New I'ork Gaslight Co., 71 N. Y. 29. 1632 Lanning v. Carpenter, 20 N. Y. 447, 64 Lanpher v. Dewell, 56 Iowa 153, 335 Lansing v. Caswell, 4 Paige 519. 1570 V. County Treasurer, 1 Dill. 522. 765, 1531 Lapham v. Rice, 55 N. Y. 472, 1579 Lareau v. Davignon. 5 Abb. Pr. 367, 134 Largue v. State, 76 Tex. 323, 94, 117. 451 Larkin v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 85 Iowa 492. 521 V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 91 Iowa 654. 483 V. City of Boston, 128 Mass. 521, 1622 Larned v. Allen, 13 Mass. 295, 323 V. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393, 335 V. Burlington, 4 Wall. 275. 838 V. City of Syracuse, 44 N. Y. S. 857, 749 Larney v. City of Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 599, 536 Larsh v. City of Des Moines, 74 Iowa 512. 1630. 1634 La Salle Co. v. Simmons, 10 111. 513. 931, 1780, 1806 Lasbury v. McCague, 56 Neb. 220, 1290, 1291 Lasley v. District of Columbia, 14 App. D. C. 407, 1388 Lassen Co. v. Shinn. 88 Cal. 510, 840 Latham v Village of Wilmette, 168 111. 153, 1144 Lathrop v. State, 6 Blackf. 502, 1483 V. Town of Sunderland. 64 Vt. 35, 1473 Latta V. Williams. 87 N. C. 126, 1509 Lauenstein v. City of Fond du Lac, 28 Wis. 336, 282 Lauman v. Des Moines Co., 29 Iowa 310, 1726 Launder v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 291, 604 Laundry License Cases, 22 Fed. 701, 1405, 1406 Launtz v. People. 113 111. 137, 161, 162, 293, 296, 298, 473 Lavalle v. Soncy, 96 111. 467, 1677 Lavery v. Hannigan, 20 J. & Sp. 463, 1610 Law V. Johnson. 118 Ind. 261. 1239 V. People, 87 111. 385. 834. 881, 917 V. Town of Fairfield, 46 Vt. 425, 829 Lawbaugh v. Board &c., 177 111. 572, 1763 Lawrence v. Bassett, 5 Allen 107. 1740 V. City of Boston, 119 Mass. 126, 701, 702 V. City of Ellensburg, 13 Wash. 341, 1316 V. Hanley. 84 Mich. 399, 1657 V. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52, 158, 159, 160, 161, 167, 294, 298 373, 474 V. Inhabitants &c., 35 Maine 100. 1613 V. Inhabitants &c., 5 Gray 110, 803 V. Traner, 136 III. 474. 276, 281, 843. 844. 845, 1478. 1489 Lawrence Co. v. Chattaroi R. Co., 81 Ky. 225. 14 V. Hudson. 41 Ark. 494, 904 Lawton v. Commissioners, 2 Caines 179, 1419 V. Erwin, 9 Wend. 233. 309 Lay V. Wissman, 36 Iowa 305, 1019 Laycock v. City of Baton Rouge. 35 La. An. 475. 233. 646. 895 Layton v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515, 384. 394, 1517. 1522 Lea V. City of Memphis, 9 Baxt. 103, 1551 V. Hernandez. 10 Tex. 137. 446 Leach v. Cargill, 60 Mo. 316, 1131. 1255 V. People. 122 111. 420. 196, 197 V. Wilson Co., 68 Tex. 358, 961, 962 Leake v. City of Phila.. 171 Pa. St. 125, 1309 Learned v. Burlington, 2 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) .394. 1.535 Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315, 1639 Leath v. Summers, 3 Ired. L. 108. 696 Leavenworth Com'rs v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, 983 Leavenworth Co. v. Barnes, 94 TJ. S. 70. 1001 Leavenworth &c. R. Co. v. County Court, 42 Mo. 171. 986, 987 Leavitt V. Bell, 55 Neb. 57. 1237 V. Eastman, 77 Maine 117, 1425. 1485 Lebcher v. Board &c., 9 Mont. 315. 638 Le Claire v. City of Davenport. 13 Iowa 210. 100, 1403 Le Clerq v. Trustees &c., 7 Ohio 217, 629 CXXVlll TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-8S2; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Lecoul V. Police Jury, 20 La. An. 308, 686, 1448 Le Couteulx v. City of Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333, 658 Ledey v. City of Amsterdam, 64 N. Y. S. 1036, 1782 Le Due V. City of Hastings, 39 Minn. 110, 1502 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102, 1557 Lee V. City of Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 13, 680, 801, 1215 V. Inhabitants &c., 13 Gray 476, 247, 1725 V. Munroe, 7 Cranch 366, 217 V. Pendleton Co. Court, 14 Ky. L. 159, 842, 1039 V. School Dist., 71 Mich. 361. 1491 V. Thomas, 49 Mo. 112, 1513, 1515 V. Trustees &c., 7 Dana 28, 670 V. Village of Greenwich, 63 N. Y. S. 160, 1366 V, Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 442, 819 V. Wallis, 1 Kenyon 292, 531, 532 V. Waring, 3 Desau. 57. 311 Lee Co. v. Lackie, 30 Ark. 764, 1052 V. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181, 89 Leech v. State, 78 Ind. 570, 199 Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. 372, 684. 822, 1177, 1748 Leeper v. City of South Bend, 106 Ind. 375, 1516 Lees V. Child. 17 Mass. 351, 706 Lehew V. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546, 1494 Lehigh Co. v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. St. 119, 264, 820, 830 V. Kleckner, 5 Watts & S. 181, 17.38 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. City of Chicago, 26 Fed. 415, 1301 Lehigh Valley Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 81 Pa. St. 398, 1737 Lehigh Water Co.'s Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 515. 1810 Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 V. S. 388, 568 Lehman v. City of San Diego, 73 Fed. 105, 993 Lehmers v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 3.54, 1154 Lehn v. City of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 76, 1207 Leigh V. State. 69 Ala. 261, 381 Leisse v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 2 Mo. 105, 701 V. St. Louis &c. R. Co.. 72 Mo. 561, 700 Leitch V. People, 183 111. 569, 1310 V. Wells, 48 N. Y. 586. 1020 Leloup V. Port of Mobile, 127 TJ. S. 640, 1399 Leman v. City of Lake View, 131 111. 388. 1283 Lemmon v. People. 20 N. Y. 562, 137 Lemon v. City of Newton, 134 Mass. 476, 823 Le Neve v. Vestry &c., 8 El. & Bl. 1054, 1561 Lennehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 123, 1779 Lennon v. Mayor &c., 55 N. Y. 361. 468, 1287 Lent V. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 1137 V. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 559. 1242, 1302 Lenz V. Sherrott, 26 Mich. 139, 523 Leonard v. Cassidy, 8 Ohio C. C. 529. 1705 V. ritv of Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 498. ' 1530 Leonard v. City of Canton, 35 Miss. 189, 88, 245, 655 V. City of Holyoke, 138 Mass. 78, 1624 V. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. St. 607, 369 V. Peacock, 8 Nev. 157, 247, 1724 V. Sparks, 63 Mo. App. 585, 1240 Lepnick v. Gaddis, 72 Miss. 200. 795 Le Roy v. Mayor &e., 4 Johns. Ch. 352, 1720, 1721 Leroy v. Mayor &c., 20 Johns. 430, 1724 Lescouzere v. Ducatel, 18 La. An. 470, 328 Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. St. 268, 612 Leslie v. City of Grand Rapids, 120 Mich. 28, 1316, 1374 Lester v. Mayor &c., 29 Md. 415, 1726 Lethbridge v. Mayor &c., 15 N. Y. S. 562. 177 Lever v. McGlachlin, 28 Wis. 364, 28» Levi V. Coyne, 22 Ky. L. 493, 1275, 1276, 1373 Levis V. City of Newton, 75 Fed. 884, 470 Levy V. City of Chicago, 113 111. 650, 512 V. Salt Lake City, 5 Utah 302, 1180 V, State, 6 Ind. 281, 1085 Lewey's Island R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Maine 451, 346 Lewis V. Albertson, 152 Ind. 693, 1294 V. Albertson, 23 Ind. App. 147, 1141, 1148, 1151, 1284, 1759, 1785 V. Board &c., 2 McCrary 464, 981 V. Borough of Homestead. 194 Pa. St. 199, 1776. 1782 V. City of Denver, 9 Colo. App. 328, 1746 v. City of Shreveport, 3 Woods S. 282, 210, 233, 257, 562, 643 981, 998 V. City of Shreveport, 3 Woods 205, 992 v. City of St. Louis, 4 Mo. App. 563, 1133 V. Commissioners &c., 12 Kan. 186. 1027 V. Commissioners &c., 12 Kan. 230. 986 V. Commissioners &c., 16 Kan. 102. 381 V. Mayor &c.. 9 C. B. 401, 663, 667 V. New York &c. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 496, 1567 V. Spencer, 7 W. Va. 689, 1720 V. STtate. 21 Ark. 209, 1412 V. State, 96 N. Y. 71, 770. 771, 773 V. Town of Brandenburg, 20 Ky. L. 1011, 206, 290 Lexington &c. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8" Dana 2S9. 1213 L'Herault v. City of Minneapolis, 6 Minn. 261. 1337 L'Hote V. City of New Orleans, 51 La. An. 93. 1404 Libby V. Anoka Co., 38 Minn. 448. 905 V. Town of West St. Paul, 14 ISIinn. 248. 1725 Liberty Bell, The, 23 Fed. 843. 1717, 1728 Lichtenstein v. Mavor &c., 159 N. Y. 500, 1343 Lieberman v. City of Milwaukee. 89 Wis. 336. 1295. 1702 Liebnian v. Citv of San Francisco, 11 Sawyer 147, 1157 Liffln V. Inhabitants &c., 145 Mass. 549. 1622 Ligare v. City of Chicago. 139 III. 46, 588, 611, 1111 TABLE OF CASES. exxix [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Lilgat V. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 456, 698 Light V. State, 14 Kan. 489, 368 Lightburne v. Taxing Dist., 4 Lea 219. 1507 Lightner v. City of Peoria, 150 IH. 80, 1248, 1250 Lilly V. Taylor, 88 N. C. 489, 1522, 1523, 1534 Lima v. Cemetery Ass'n, 42 Ohio St. 128, 1247 Lincoln v. Board &c., 176 Mass. 210, 1279, 1290, 1293. 1299, 1301 V. City of Boston, 148 Mass. 578, 263, 799, 803 V. City of Worcester, 8 Cush. 55, 1724 V. Inhabitants &c., 75 Maine 141, 234. 647, 715 V. Iron Co., 103 U. S. 412. 1001 Lincoln Co. v. Oneida Co., 80 Wis. 267, 938 Lincoln Land Co. v. Village of Grant. 57 Neb. 70, 743 Linden v. Board «&c., 45 Cal. 6, 339, 1681, 1682 Lindley v. Polk Co., 84 Iowa 308, 805. 1076 Lindsay v. City of Chicago, 115 111. 120, ^ 540, 1424 T. City of Des Moines, 68 Iowa 368, 1598 V. City of Des Moines, 74 Iowa 111, 1628, 1630 V. City of Sherman, 36 S. W. 1019, 1337 V. Mayor &c.. 104 Ala. 257, 603 Linegar v. Rittenhouse. 94 111. 208, 381 Linehan, In re, 72 Cal. 114, 1080 V. City of Cambridge, 109 Mass. 212. 662 Linford v. Pitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240, 221 Lingle v. City of Chicago, 178 111. ' 628, 1153 Lingo V. Burford, 112 Mo. 149, 1225, 1568 Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay 1, 334 Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506. 1631 Linton v. Mayor &c., 53 Ga. 588, 1516 Lionberger v. Rowse. 43 Mo. 67, 1511 Lipes V. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 698, 704, 1177, 1179 Lippelman v. Citv of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio C. C. 327, 1163 Lippincott v. Town of Pana. 92 111. 24, 98.5. 996. 1006 Lippman v. City of South Bend, 84 Ind. 276. 538 Lipns V. City of Philadelphia. 38 Pa. St. 503, 593 Lisso V. Parish of Red River, 29 La. An. 590. 615 List V. Citv of Wheeling, 7 W. Va. 501, 882, 893, 1524 Litchfield v. Ballon, 114 U. S. 190, 885 V. Londonderry, 39 N. H. 247. . 1058 V. McComber, 42 Barb. 288, 1261, 1262 V. Parker. 64 N. H. 443. 616 v. Polk Co., 18 Iowa 70, 652 V. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123. 12.33, 1252, 1533 Litten v. Wright School Tp., 127 Ind. 81, 857. 1480 Little V. City of Madison. 49 Wis. 605, 808 V. City of Portland, 26 Or. 235. 1309 V. Coggswell, 20 Or. 345, 879 1 Smith — ix Little V. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543, 230, 340, 841, 1485 V. Moore, 4 N. J. L. 74, 220 Little Palls Electric &c. Co. v. City of Little Palls, 102 Fed. 663, 716, 725. 1347, 1709 Little Falls Tp. v. Bernards Tp., 44 N. J. L. 621, 1045 Littlefleld v. City of Norwich, 40 Conn. 406, 1221 V. State, 42 Neb. 223, 603 Little Miami &c. R. Co. v. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 510, 678 Little Rock v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 308, 978, 1020 v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572, 8 Littlewort v. Davis. 50 Miss. 403, 1471 Livermore v. Board &c., 31 N. J. L. 505, 814, 832, 1577 Livingston, Matter of, 121 N. Y. 94, 1288 v. Lynch, 4 Johns Ch. 573, 1088 v. Mayor &c., 8 Wend. 85, 1233, 1564 V. Paducah. 80 Kv. 656, 1521 V. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542, 210 V. School Dist. &c., 11 S. D. 150. 1030 V. Wider, 53 111. 302, 1531, 1538 Livingston Co. v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407, 764, 1514 V. First Nat'I Bank &c., 128 LT. S. 102. 1004, 1006 Lloyd V. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. 364. 779, 788 Loague v. Taxing Dist. &c., 29 Fed. 742, 455 Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. 549, 559, 624, 890, 983, 1523 1534. 1537, 1542 Locke V. Central City, 4 Colo. 65, 174, 177 V. Davison. Ill 111. 19, 835 V. Postmaster-General, 3 Mason 446, 320 Lockhart v. City of Troy, 48 Ala. 579. 289 V. Craig &c. R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 419, 682. 683. 1352 Lockwood V. City of St. Louis. 24 Mo. 20, 1206, 1231, 1247. 1722 Loder v. McGovern, 48 N. J. Eq. 275, 1193 Lodie V. Arnold. 2 Salk. 458, 1115 Loeb V. City of Attica, 82 Ind. 176, 1400 Loesnitz v. Seelinger. 127 Ind. 422, 1169, 1288 Loewere v. City of Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431. 1641 Loftin V. Citizens' Bank, 85 Ind. 341. 1520 Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa 524, 568, 618, 641 V. Taylor, 31 111. App. 263, 913 Lohr V. Phillipsburg Boi-ough, 165 Pa. St. 555. 1337 Loker v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Pick. 343, 233. 638. 647 London v. City of Wilmington, 78 N. C. 109. 1521 London &c. Land Co. v. City of Jel- lico. 103 Tenn. 320. 732, 746 Londoner v. People, 15 Colo. 557, 165 Long V. Boone Co., 36 Iowa 60. 648 V. City of Duluth. 49 Minn. 280, 565. 567. 1351, 1809 V. Puller, 68 Pa. St, 170, 689 V, Long, 57 Iowa 497, 223 V. Mayor &c., 81 N. Y. 425. 197 V. Straus. 107 Ind. 94. 857 V. Taxing Dist. &c.. 7 Lea 134. 499 Longan v. Taylor, 81 111. App. 263, 1483 cxxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Look V. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine 375, 1'-" Loomis V. Spencer, 1 Ohio St. 153, 983 V. Wadhams, 8 Gray 5.58, 1740 Loop V. Woodward, 1 Ind. App. 105, 913 Lorbeer v. Hutchinson, 111 Cal. •^j-) 171- Lord" \"' City of Anoka, 36 Minn. 170, 276, 2(<, (32 V. City of Mobile, n|^ Ala.^BOO,^^^^ V. City of Oconto, 47 Wis. 386, 282, 029 V. City of Saco, 87 Maine 231, 1306 V. Governor &c., 2 Phill. 740, 296 V. Mayor &c., 65 N. J. L. 27, 1311 V. Meadville Water Co., 135 Pa. St. 122, 1456 Lorence v. City of Ellensburgh, 13 WaKh. 341. 1330. 1336 Lorillard v. Town of Monroe, 11 N- ^.^.r Y 392, 830, 1097 Lorrilard v. Town of Monroe, 12 Barb. 161, l'-6 Los Angeles &c. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720, ^^ ^^^ 547, 566, 672, 712, 724, 727 786, 1703, 1806, 1814 Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Toberman, 61 Cal 199 -"^ Loser v! Board &c.. 92 Mich. 633. 1070 Lott V. Mayor &c., 84 Ga. 681, 877, 896 V. Morgan, 41 Ala. 246, 1537 V. Ross, 38 Ala. 156, 1232, 1254 V. Swezev, 29 Barb. 87, 1265 Lotze V. City of Cincinnati, 61 Ohio St. 272, 1772, 1776 Loud V. City of Charleston, 99 Mass. 208. 1722 V. City of Charleston, 103 Mass. 278. 1499 Louden v. East Saginaw, 41 Mich. 18. 1552 Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500, 685 Loughran v. City of Des Moines, 72 Iowa 382, 1180 Loughridge v. City of Huntington, 56 Ind. ^253, 487 Louis V. Brown Tp., 109 U. S. 162, 1026 Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711. 18 T. Mayor &c., 109 IT. S. 285, 412. 799, 800, 1524 V. Pilsbury, 105 IT. S. 278, 412, 521, 764, 1520 V. Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716, 1523, 1529 V. Taylor, 105 IT. S. 454, 995 V. Wood, 102 IT. S. 294, 237, 240, 633, 1015 LoTiisiana Const. &c. Co. v. Illinois &e. R. Co., 49 La. An. 527. 566 Louisiana Ice Mfg. Co. v. City of New Orleans. 43 La. An. 217. 1163 Louisville v. Bank of Louisville, 174 U. S. 439. 977 V. Henning. 1 Bush 381, 248 v. Hyatt. 2 B. Mon. 177, 1257 v. Nevin. 10 Bush 549. 1245. 1247 v. Savings Bank, 104 IT. S. 469. 995 Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louis- ville. 81 Ky. 189. 1499, 1514 Touisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' &c. Co.. 115 IT. S. 683, 104, 566, .569. 1347 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Boney, 117 Ind. .501. 1249 v. City of East St. Louis, 134 111. 656. 1162, 12.50. 1300 V. City of Louisville, 4 Bush 478, 1509 V. City of Louisville, 8 Bush 415, 466, 1093 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Common- wealth. 13 Bush 388, 1109 V. Davidson Co. Court, 1 Sneed 637, 374, 983, 985 V. Dryden, 39 Ind. 393, 698 V. Etzler, 3 Ind. App. 562, 1566 V. Louisville, 8 Bush 415, 250 V. Orr. 91 Ky. 109, 1554 V. Patchen, 167 111. 204, 540 v. Shires, 198 111. 617, 64, 87, 98, 1424 V. Smith, 91 Ind. 119, 1379 V. Sonne, 21 Ky. 848, 1705 V. State, 122 Ind. 443, 1251 V. State. 8 Ind. App. 377, 1249 Louisville Steam Forge Co. v. Ander- son. 22 Ky. L. 397, 513 Louisville Tr. Co. v. City of Cincin- nati, 73 Fed. 716, 1758 V. City of Cincinnati, 76 Fed. 296, 13,50, 1759 Louisville Water Co. v. Clarke, 143 U. S. 1. 104 Loute V. Allegheny, 2 Pittsb. 411, 951 952 Love V. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129^ 785, 797 V. City of Raleigh, 116 N. C. 296, 672, 808 V. Mayor &c., 11 Vroom 456, 201 Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379, 1017 Loveland v. City of Detroit, 41 Mich. 367, 670 Lovell V. City of St. Paul, 10 Minn. 290. 1262 V. Seeback, 45 Minn. 465, 1048 Loverin v. School Dist., 64 N. H. 102, 1495 Lovingston v. Board &c., 99 HI. 564, 1483 Low V. Lewis. 46 Cal. 549, 1546 V. Mayor &c., 5 Cal. 214. 570 V. Pettengill, 12 N. H. 513, 1427 Lowber v. Mayor &c., 5 Abb. Pr. 325, 11, 446 Lowe V. Board &c., 94 Ind. 553, 457, 1245 V. City of Omaha, 33 Neb. 587, 1222 V. Commissioners, R. M. Charlt. 302, 168, 1414, 1420 V. Inhabitants &c., 133 Mass. 526, 1623 Lowell V. City of Boston. Ill Alass. 454. ' 549, 559, 979. 1534, 1542 V. Watertown Tp., 58 Mich. 568. 1803 Lowell Sav. Bank v. Inhabitants &c., 8 Allen 109. ' 210 Lower v. Wallick, 25 Ind. 68, 530 Lower Augusta v. Selinsgrove, 64 Pa. St. 166, 1043 Lower Augusta Tp. v. Northumber- land Co., 37 Pa. St. 143, 1057 Lowndes Co. v. Hunter, 49 Ala. 507. 1734 Lowrev v. City of Delphi, 55 Ind. 250, 1578 Lowry v. Polk Co., 51 Iowa 50, 319, 902 Lozie'r v. Newark. 48 N. J. L. 452, 494 Luburg, Appeal of, 17 Atl. 245. 1486 Lucas V. Board &c., 44 Ind. 524. 419 V. City of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 463. 554 V. Hunt. 5 Ohio St. 488. 242 V. Shepherd. 16 Ind. 368, 308 Luce V. Board &c.. 153 Mass. 108, 1692 V. Fensler, 85 Iowa 596, 556 Luckett V. Buckman. 8 Ky. L. 255. 1489 Ludington Water Supply v. City of Ludington, 119 Mich. 480. 726, 740, 875, 931, 1758 Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356. 129, 130, 131 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXl IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'} liuehrman v. Taxing Dist., 2 Lea 4-2r,. 189, 446, 455. 456. 457, 1526 Lufkin V. City of Galveston, 58 Tex. 545, 1206, 1234 Luke V. City of Brooklyn, 43 Barb. 54, 1394 Luling V. City of Racine, 1 Biss. 314, 1023 Lum V. City of Bowie, IS S. W. 142, 390, 395, 407 V. McCarthy. 39 N. J. L. 287, 1428 Xiumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H. 31, 1426 V. Stearns. 4 Cush. 60, 688 Lumsden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485, 697 V. Cross, 10 Wis. 282, 548, 558 Lund V. Inhabitants &e., 11 Cush. 563, 1601 Lundberg v. City of Chicago, 183 111. 572, 1235 Lundborn v. City of Manistee, 93 Mich. 770, 1288 Lundon v. City of Chicago, S3 111. App. 208, 1339 Lunues v. Inhabitants &c., 77 Maine 186, 1536 Lusk V. City of Chicago, 176 111. 207. 512, 1148 V. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238, 958 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 151 Lutterloh v. Mayor &c., 15 Fla. 306, 681, 1111 Luzader v. Sargeant. 4 Wash. 299. 988 Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218, 181. 233, 637, 645 Lydecker v. Bells, 3 N. Y. S. 323, 1128 V. Village of Nyack, 39 N. Y. S. 509, 713 Lyell V. Supervisors &c., 3 McLean 580. 1744 V. Supervisors &c., 6 McLean 446, 951 Lyman v. Commonwealth, 55 S. W. 686. 157, 204 V. Gedney, 114 111. 388, 576 V. Hampshire Co., 138 Mass. 74, 1623, 1624 Xynch. Ex parte, 2 Hill 45, 870, 1674 V. Clark. 1 Sandf. Ch. 584, 131 V. Eastern &c. R. Co., 57 Wis. 430. 1728 V. Lafland. 4 Coldw. 96, 90, 103. 456 V. Mayor &c., 76 N. Y. 60. 1603 V. Mayor &c.. 47 Hun 524, 1640 V. People. 16 Mich. 472. 539 Lynchburg &c. R. Co. v. Board &c., 109 N. C. 159. 855 Lynde v. County, 16 Wall. 6. 1011, 1016 Lyon V- Adams, 4 S. & R. 443, 1527 V. Adamson. 7 Iowa 509, 217 V. Alley. 130 V. S. 177. 1254 V. Fairfield Co., 2 Root 30, 1735 V. Ooree. 15 Ala. 360, 222 V. Irish. 58 Mich. 518, 216 V. Jerome, 15 Wend. 569, 674 V. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485, 282. 547, 705, 1539 V. Munson, 2 Cow. 426. 1573 V. Rice, 41 Conn. 245. 339. 341 V. Town of Tonawanda, 98 Fed. 361, 1166. 1285. 1792 Lyon Co. v. Keene &c. Bank, 97 Fed. 159. 999 V. keene &c. Bank, 100 Fed. 337. 876. ion. 1032 Lyons v. City of Cambridge, 132 Mass. 534. 1622 V. City of Red Wing, 76 Minn. 20, 930, 1330. 1796 v. Inhabitants &c., 119 Mass. 491. 1595 V. Munson, 99 U. S. 684, 1001 Lyth v. City of Buffalo, 48 Hun 175, 188 M Maanum v. City of Madison, 104 Wis. 272, 1800 Macauley v. Mayor &c., 67 N. Y. 602, 817, 1557 Mace V. Nottingham-West, 1 N. H. 52, 1053 Mack V. Jones, 21 N. H. 393, 623, 1545 MacKenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. An. 944, 485 Mackey v. City of Vicksburg, 64 Miss. 777, 794, 816 V. Columbus Tp., 71 Mich. 227, 1172 Mackie v. City of West Bay City, 106 Mich. 242, 1331 Macklin v. Trustees &c., 88 Ky. 592, 844. 1489 Macklot V. City of Davenport, 17 Iowa 379, 221, 1725 MacLean v. Speed, 52 Mich. 257, 1672 Macomber v. Nichols. 34 Mich. 212, 1556 Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 1262 Macon Co. v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272 995. 1000, 1001, 1018 Macy V. City of Duluth, 68 Minn. 452 731 V. City of Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267, • 1177 Madden v. Smeltz, 2 Ohio C. C. 168 544 Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. 56. 280, 983, 1.526, 1527, 1528, 1681 V. Neal. 45 Ark. 121, 1494. 1496 Maddux v. City of Newport, 12 Ky. ,. ,.L- 657, -'1157 Madi.son v. Harbor Board, 76 Md ,. ,.3«5. 1687 Madison &c. Church v. Baptist Church, 5 Robt. 649, 290 Madison Overseers v. Poor Directors 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 435, 1049 Madison Tp. v. Dunkle, 114 Ind 262 ivr ^ r, ^ 861, 903 Madry v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538, 394, 404, 1518 Magee v. City of Troy, 48 Hun 383, 1 N. Y. S. 24. 935. 1609. 1617 V. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. St. 35S. 593, 1267 V. Supervisors, 10 Cal. 376. 381 Magie v. Stoddard. 25 Conn. 565. 198 Magill V. Kauffman. 4 S. & R. 317 240 Magneau v. City of Fremont. 30 Neb. 843, 195, 274. 276. 278, 1508 Maguire v. Mayor &c., 76 Ga. 84. 1177 V. Middlesex R. Co., 115 Mass. 239. 1618 V. Smock, 42 Ind. 1, 1258 V. State Saving Inst., 62 Mo. 344, 1725 Mahady v. Bushwick R. Co., 91 N. Y. 498, 1599 Mahaska Co. v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa 81, 324 Maher v. City of Chicago. 38 111. 266. 239. 649. 1306 v. City of Ottawa, 114 111. 659. 624 Mahon v. Mayor &c., 31 N. Y. S. 676. 783 Mahoney v. Dankwart. 108 Iowa 321, 540 Mahony v. Bank. 4 Ark. 620. 50 Main v. Fort Smith, 49 Ark. 480. 285. 1259 Maine Water Co. v. City of Water- ville. 93 Maine 586. 722. 725. 1548 Mairs v. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 160. 721 V. Manhattan &c. Ass'n, 89 N. Y. 498, 1599 V. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. S. 351. 720, 736 CXXXll TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, VV. 1-832; Vol. II, VV- SSS-mO.I Kauffman, 35 Ohio St. Makemson v. i^iiuumnu, ^^ ..^.v, ~-^2RR Makinnon v. Tenson, 25 Eng. L. & Ea 457 Makleyv. Whitmore, 61 ^^^l^l^.m'! \^^^ Malcam v. City of Boston, 173 Mass.^^^^ Mall v7 City of Portland, 35 O^.^^^^ Mallett V. Uncle Sam &c. Co., 1 Nev. 1 <^nk Maneval^v. Jackson Tp., 9 Pa. ^Ca ^_^ Mangam'v.' Brooklyn. 98 N. Y. 585 183 Manhattan Co. v. Van Keuren, 23 N._^ 7 Ea '^51 -Li'-" Manhattan R. Co., In re, 102 N. ^- 301 y—j^ Manhattan Sav. Inst. v. New York &c. Bank. 59 N. Y S 51, 101^ Manice v. Mayor &c., 8 N. Y. 120^^^ ^^^^ Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo. J50^^^^ ^^^ Manley v. Emlen. 46 Kan. 655. 1450 Mann V. City of Le Mars, 109 Iowa ^^^ v^Citv of Yazoo. 31 Miss. 574. 324 Manning I City of Lowell, 130 Mass.^^^_ v^ben. 90 Cal. 610, 1262 V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Pick. 6^^^ ^^^^ Mannix v. State, 115 Ind 245, 1676 Manor v. McCall. 5 4 V. Pike, 121 111. 288, ' 401 McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33, 1234, 1288, 1297, 137S McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457. 299, 310, 1421 V. Burt, 95 111. 263, 221, 222, 1495 V. City of Harrisburg, 129 Pa St. 213, 1273 V. Moss. 41 111. 352. 393 McCortle v. Bates, 29 Ohio St. 419, 280, 1480 McCoy V. Briant, 53 Cal. 247, 554. 646. 982, 1133 V. Corporation of Chilicothe, 3 Ohio 370, 1722 V. Curtice. 9 Wend. 17, 295 V. Washington Co., 3 Phila _ „290, 1016 McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, 242, 259, 291 292 553, 631, 637 V. Soucy, 29 111. App. 619, 198 V. Village of Markesan, 76 Wis. 499. 1641 McCrary v. City of Commanche, 34 S. W. 679. 66 McCraw V. Williams, 33 Gratt. 510, 196 McCray v. Town of Fairmount, 46 W. Va. 442. 1379, 1774 McCrea v. Chahoon, 54 Hun 577, 219 9.39 V. Jacobs, 19 Abb. N. C. 188, 'l415 McCready v. Guardians, 9 S. & R. 94. 295. 616 V. Sexton, 29 Iowa 356, 1166, 1505 V. Virginia. 94 IT. S. 391, 137 McCrickart v. City of Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 133, 246 McCrowell v. City of Bristol, 89 Va. 652. 509 V. Mayor &c., 5 Lea 685, 831 McCue V. Wapello Co., 56 Iowa 698, 198 McCulloch V. Ayer, 96 Fed. 178, 1393 V. Maryland. 4 Wheat. 316. 45. 46 McCullough V. Moss, 5 Denio 567, 1088 V. Talladega Insurance Co., 46 Ala. 376. 260 McCune v. Norwich Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521, 4. 6 McCunney v. Citv of New York, 58 N. Y. S. 138, 180 McCurdy v. Bowes. 88 Ind. 583, 863 V. Rogers, 21 Wis. 199. 217 McCiitcheon v. Common Council &c., 43 Mich. 483. 814. 1586 v. Homer. 43 Mich. 483. 8 McDade v. City of Chester. 117 Pa. St. 414. 264, 820, 830 McDaniel v. Richards. 1 McC. 187. 134 :McDaniell v. Tebbetts. 60 N. H. 497, 229 McDaniels v. Flower Brook &c. Co., 22 Vt. 274. 352 McDermott v. Board &c., 5 Abb. Pr. 422. 466 McDonald v. City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 1210 v. Citv of New York, 59 N. Y. S. 16, 164. 928. 929. 031 V. City of Toledo, 63 Fed. 60, 1344 CXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 McDonald v. City of Troy, 36 N. Y. St. 704, 828 V. English. 85 III. 232, 1112 V. Massachusetts Gen'l Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. 806 V. Mayor &c.. 68 N. Y. 23, 210, 233, 252, 253, 254, 257, 260 644. 645, 649. 894, 1212 V. Murphree, 45 Miss. 705, 1288 V. Payne, 114 Ind. 359. 679 McDonogh v. Murdoch, 15 How. 367, 563, 664 McDouough V. Gilman, 3 Allen 264, 811, 1095 McDougal V. Board &c., 4 Minn. 184, 1744, 1745 McDowell V. Massachusetts &c. Const. Co., 96 N. C. 514, 370 McElhaney v. Gilleland, 30 Ala. 183, 331 McEIroy v. City Council &c., 65 Ga. 387, 798, 1075 V. Kansas City, 21 Fed. 257, 678. 1209 McEneney v. Town of Sullivan, 125 Ind. 407, 1258 McEwan v. City of Spokane, 16 Wash. 212, 741. 1779 McEwen v. City of Nashviiie, 36 S. W. 968, 739 McFadden v. Board &c., 74 Cal. 571, 1461 V. Town of Dresden, 80 Maine 134, 854 McFarland v. Gordon, 70 Vt. 455, 173 V. Triton Ins. Co., 4 Denio 392, 1422 McFarlane v. City of Chicago, 185 HI. 242, 1297, 1301 V. City of Milwaukee, 51 Wis. 691. 1588 McGafflgan v. City of Boston, 149 Mass. 289, 1616 McGaffin v. City of Cohoes, 11 Hun .531. 1625 McGar v. Borough of Bristol, 71 Conn. 652. 1380, 1777, 1786 McGargell v. Hazleton Coa! Co., 4 W. & S. 424. 196 McGarry v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104, 1375, 1595 McGartv v. Deming, 51 Conn. 422. 107. 1414 McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. L. 213, 539. 541. 542, 1413 McGee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470, 1317, 1319 McGee v. Laramore, 50 Mo. 425, 217 V. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143, 760 V. State, 103 Ind. 444. 1676 McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40, 1270. 1508. 1521 V. Mavor &c.. 69 Ga. 581, 1725 McGill V. Bruner. 65 Ind. 421. 1150 McGinnis v. Inhabitants &c., 176 Mass. 67. 792 McGinty v. City of Keokuk, 66 Iowa 725. 1802 McGivney v. Pierce, 87 Cal. 124. 115 McGlue V. City of Philadelphia, 10 Phila. 348. 893 McGonigle v. City of Allegheny. 44 Pa. St. 118. 1498 McGoodwin v. City of Franklin, 18 Kv. L. 752. 874 McGorty v. Deeming. 51 Conn. 422. 1419 McGovern v. Board &c., 57 N. J. L. 580. 753 McGowan v. Deyo. 8 Barb. 340. 311 McGrath v. City of Chicago. 24 111. App. 19, 92, 160. 167 McGrnw v. Town of Marion, 98 Ky. 673. 804 McGraw's Estate, 111 N. Y. 66, 1487 McGrew v. Governor, 19 Ala. 89, 334 McGruder v. State, 83 Ga. 616. 106 McGuiness v. School Dist., 39 Minn. 499. 1491 McGuinn v. Peri, 16 La. An. 326, 1257 McGuire v. Atlantic City, 63 N. J. L. 91. 609 V. Brockman. 58 Mo. App. 307. 1308 V. City of Rapid City, 6 Dak. 346. 637 V. Galligan. 57 Mich. 38, 222 V. Spence, 91 N. Y. 303, 1375, 1595, 1631, 1635 V. Williams. 123 N. C. 349, 986 McGurn v. Board of Education, 133 111. 122, 121, 1474 McHale v. Easton &c. Transit Co., 169 Pa. St. 416. 1205. 1346 McHarrey v. School Trustees, 68 111. 140, 1483 McHenry v. Selvage. 18 Ky. L. 473. 1799 v. Township Board &c., 65 Mich. 9. 1675 Mcllvain v. State, 87 Ind. 602. 530 Mclnerney v. Citv of Denver. 17 Colo. 302. 496. 531, 532. 541. 542. 543 Mclnery v. City of Galveston, 58 Tex. 334. 174, 175 Mclnstrv v. Tanner, 9 Johns. 135, 195 Mclntire v. State, 5 Blackf. 384, 704 V. Williamson, 8 Kan. App. 711, 1554 Mcintosh V. City of Charleston, 45 S. C. 584, 563 Mclntyre v. Board &c., 15 Colo. App. 78, 612. 1698 V. School Trustees, 3 111. App. 77, 322 McKay v. City of Buffalo, 9 Hun 401, 1097 V. Citv of Buffalo, 74 N. Y. 619. 1097 V. Welch, 6 N. Y. S. 358. 1050 McKeague v. City of Green Bay, 106 Wis. 577. 1366 McKean v. City of Mt. Vernon. 51 Iowa 306. 415 McKechnJe Brew. Co. v. Trustees &c.. 44 N. Y. S. 317. 1281. 1297, 1299 McKecknie v. Ward. 58 N. Y. 541. 320 McKee v. Bidwell. 74 Pa. St. 218, 1627 V. Brown. 23 La. An. 306, 1257 V. Lamon, 159 TT. S. 317, 1700 V. McKee, 8 B. Mon. 433. 533 V. Town of Pendleton, 154 Ind. 652. 1151, 1266 V. Vernon Co., 3 Dill. 210. 998. 1014, 1022. 1023 McKeigue v. City of Janesville, 68 Wis. 50, 936. 1620. 1632 McKellar v. City of Detroit, 57 Mich. 158. 1586 McKenna, Ex parte. 126 Cal. 429. 1387. 1388 V. Citv of New York, 34 App. Div. 152. 88 V. Citv of St. Louis. 6 Mo. App. 320. 264 V. Fdmundstone. 91 N. Y. 231. 106 V. Kimball. 145 Mass. 555. 1474 McKibbin v. Fort Scott, 35 Ark. 352, 533 McKinney v. Robinson, 84 Tex. 489. 902. 904 V. State, 68 Miss. 284. 909 V. Town of Salem, 77 Ind. 213, 1677 McKinnon v. Penson, 8 Ex. 319, 831 McKissick v. City of St. Louis, 154 Mo. 588, 1801 McKnight v. City of Pittsburgh, 91 Pa. St. 273, 802 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXVll [References are to Pages. Vol. I, McKnight v. Grant Parish, 30 La. An. 361, 1530 McKusick V. City of Stillwater, 44 Miun. 372, 1197 McLain v. Mariche, 60 Neb. 3.53, 1698 V. Snyder Tp. School Dist., 12 Pa. St. 204, 1480 McLaughlin v. Burroughs, 90 Mich. 311. 16!56 V. Municipality. 5 La. An. .504, 700 V. Stephens, 3 Cr. C. C. 148. 607 McLauren v. City of Grand Forks. 6 Dak. 397, 570, 1131, 1259 McLaury v. McGregor City, 54 Iowa 717, 1637 McLean Co. v. City of Bloomington, 106 111. 209, 1245 V. Humphreys, 104 III. 378, 1071 McLellan v. Board &c., 15 Mo. App. 362, 1492 V. Young. 54 Ga. 399, 1744 McLendon v. City of La Grange, 107 Ga. 356, 1506 McLin V. City of New Berne, 70 N. C. 12, 1402 McLorinan v. Bridgewater Tp., 49 X. J. L. 624, 1045 McLoud V. Selby, 10 Conn. 390, 142, 341, 965, 1735 McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 107 Iowa 62, 789 V. Mayor &c.. 66 Ga. 217. 370 McMannis v. Butler, 51 Barb. 436, 1559, 1562 McManus v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa. St. 304. 744 V. McDonough, 107 111. 95, 698 V. People, 183 111. 391. 511, 1149, 1274, 1277 McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts 292, 1233, 1266 McMicken v. City of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio St. 394. 697 McMillan v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, 694, 1.537 V. Richards. 9 Cal. 365, 417, 1725 V. School Com'rs, 107 N. C. 609, 1494 McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, 1238, 1239 McNallv V. City of Cohoes, 53 Hun 202. 829, 1615 McNamara v. Estes, 22 Iowa 246. 1232 V. Village of Clintonville, 62 Wis. 207, 1802 McNeal v. City of Waco, 89 Tex. 83. 724 V. Mayor &c., 51 N. J. L. 444, 1738 McNernev v. Reading City, 150 Pa. St. 611, 1340 McNultv V. City of Cambridge, 130 Mass. 275. 1622 McNutt V. Livingston, 7 Sm. & M. 641, 226 McOsker v. Burrell. 55 Ind. 425. 221 McPheeters v. Wright, 110 Ind. 519, 1489 McPherson v. Citv of Buffalo, 43 N. Y. S. 609. 1344 V. Foster, 43 Iowa 48. 890. 891, 1023, 1368, 1459. 1524 V. Village of Chebanse, 114 HI. 46. 494 McPike V. Pen. 48 Mo. 525, 1722 V. Pen, 51 Mo. 63. 368 McQueen v. City of Elkhart, 14 Ind. App. 671. 789 McQuiddy v. Smith, 67 Mo. App. 205. 1132. 1299 McQuillen v. Hatton. 42 Ohio St. 202, 685 McRea v. Mayor &c., 59 Ga. 168, 496 pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] McSpedon v. Mayor &c., 7 Bosw. 601, 253 McTeer v. Lebow, 85 Tenn. 121, 222 McTwiggan v. Hunter, 19 R. I. 265, 745 McVeany v. Mayor &c., 80 N. Y. 185, 213, 380 McVerry v. Boyd, 89 Cal. 304, 1233 McVichie v. Town of Knight, 82 Wis. 137, 340. 344. 346, 347 McWhorter v. People, 65 111. 290. 973 Meacham v. Fitchburg R. Co., 4 Cush. 291, 704 Mead v. City of Chicago, 186 111. 54, 511, 512, 1275, 1279 V. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 72, 1097 V. City of Pittsburgh, 194 Pa. St. 392. 1773 V. Inhabitants &c., 139 Mass. 341. 559, 672 Meadowcraft v. People, 154 111. 416. 1303 Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Maine 547, 994 Meagher v. Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244, 196, 213, 1445 Means v. Hendershott. 24 Iowa 78, 671 V. Webster. 23 Ind. 432, 957 Meares v. Commissioners &c. of Wil- mington, 9 Ired. L. 73, 8, 265 Mears v. Citv of Spokane, 22 Wash. 323. 1366 Medical Inst. v. Patterson, 1 Den. 61, 51, 84 Medland v. Linton, 60 Neb. 249, 1239. 1240, 1241. 1244, 1277 Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198, 720, 1232 Meek v. McClure, 49 Cal. 623. 1552. 1725 Meeker v. Van Rensselaer. 15 Wend. 397, 1122, 1394 Meggett V. Citv of Eau Claire. 81 Wis. 326. 558. 593, 1204, 1252, 1253 Meiners v. City of St. Louis, 130 Mo. 274, 1373 Meinzer v. City of Racine, 68 Wis. 241. 1225 Meissner v. Bovle, 20 Utah 316. 174. 1767 Mellor V. Burgess &c., 191 Pa. St. 562. 1331 Melon St., In re, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 63, 1318 Melvin v. Lisenby. 72 111. 63. 991 Memphis v. Brown. 97 U. S. 300, 1531 V. Laski. 9 Heisk. 511. 1745 V. United States, 97 U. S. 293, 765. 1529. 1531 Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor &c., 4 Coldw. 419, 685 Memphis Gaslight Co. v. State, 6 Coldw. 310. 1512 Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700. 706 V. Railroad Com'rs, 112 U. S. 619, 1689 Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S. 81. 995. 1001 Mendel v. City of Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233, 264, 786. 1394 Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570, 59, 64, 87, 393, 1514 Mendocino Co. v. Morris. 32 Cal. 145. 310 Menges v. City of Albany, 56 N. Y. 374. 697. 1829 Menken v. City of Atlanta, 78 Ga. 66S, 497 Menominee Water Co. v. City of Menominee, 124 Mich. 386. 848 Meranda v. Spurlin, 100 Ind. 3S0. 696, 1573 CXXXVlll TABLE OF CASES. iReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. S33-J830.'\ Mercantile &c. Co. v. Collins &c. R. Co., 101 Fed. S47, 1813 Merced Co. v. Fleming. Ill Cal. 46, 540 Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450, 1314 V. Flovd. 53 N. y. S. 433, 926 V. Woodgate, L. R. 5 Q. B. 26, 1557, 1561 Mercer Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83, 1000, 1001, 1006, 1007, 1018, 1031 V. Pittsburg &c. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 389. 1010 V. Provident Life &c. Co.. 72 Fed. 623. 1002. 1032, 1757 Merchants' &e. Bank v. Bergen Co., 115 U. S. 384. ^ „ 210, 1000, 1027, 1028 Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 405, 142 V. State Bank. 10 Wall. 604. 1004 Merchants' Nafl Bank v. McKinney, 2 S. Dak. 106, 967 Merchants' Realty Co. v. City of St. Paul, 77 Minn. 343, 1310 Meredith v. City of Perth Amboy, 63 N. .7. L. 520, 1284 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 81. 103. 10.^., 124, 142. 233, 457, 458 629. 1522. 1526. 1529. 1533, 1544 Merkee v. City of Rochester, 13 Hun 157, 530 Merrell v, Campbell, 49 Wis. 535, 1745 Merriam, Petition of, 8 N. Y. 596, 1539 V. City of New Orleans, 14 La. An. 3i8. 517, 1520 Merrick v. Burlington &c. Co., 11 Iowa 74, 260, 715 V. Inhabitants &c., 12 Allen 500, 1514 V. Mavor &c.. 43 Md. 219. 699 V. Wallace. 19 III. 486, 228 Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 1585 Merrill v. Alibott, 62 Ind. 549, 1254 V, Humphrey, 24 Mich. 170. 1288 V. Inhabitants &c., 26 Maine 234. 1613 V. Inhabitants &c., 78 Maine 200. 1633 V. Marshall Co., 74 Iowa 24, 1674 V. Monticello. 138 IT. S. 673. 562. 636. 838. 971. 973. 978, 1013 V. Plainfleld. 45 N. H. 126. 651, 668, 1730 V. Shields. 57 Neb. 78. 1793 V. Town of Monticello, 14 Fed. 628, 863 Merrill &c. Co. v. City of Merrill, 80 Wis. 358, 877 Merrimack Co. v. City of Concord, 66 N. H. 389, 1069 Y. Grafton Co.. 63 N. H. 550. 1042 Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. City of Lowell. 152 Mass. 556, 1461 Merritt v. City of Kewanee, 175 111. .537, 1134, 1135 V. Farriss. 22 111. 303, 1485 V. Hinton, 55 Ark. 12, 172 V. School Dist., 54 Ark. 468. 1487. 1496 V. Village of Portchester. 71 N. Y. 309. 570. 1133. 1201. 1255 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 686, 8 Merwin v. City of Chicago, 45 111. 133, 1745 V. Rogers, 24 N. Y. St. 496. 334 V. Rogers. 28 N. Y. St. 404. 221 Merwine v. Monroe Co., 141 Pa. St. 162, 905, 006 Merz V. City of Brooklyn, 33 N. Y. St. 577, 829 Merz V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 88 Mo. 672. 589. 1850 Merzbach v. City of New York, 163 N. Y. 16, ISO iNIesseck v. Board &c., 50 Barb. 190, 1718 Metcalf V. Andrews. 7 Atl. 4, 164 V. City of St. Louis, 11 Mo. 102, 467, 109» V. State, 21 Tex. App. 174, 1493 Metcalfe v. City of Seattle, 1 Wash. 297, 374, 989 Methodist &c. Church, In re, 66 N. Y. 395, 1525 Methodist Church v. Mayor, 6 Gill 391, 1216 Metropolitan Board &c. v. Barrie. 34 N. Y. 657. 1083, 1811 V. Heister. 37 N. Y. 661, 1083 Metropolitan &c. Co. v. Newton, 4 N. Y. S. 593, 617 Metropolitan City R. Co. v. City of Chicago. 96 111. 620, 1706 Metropolitan Gas Light Co., Matter of, 85 N. Y. 526, 1256 Metropolitan Tel. Co. v. Colwell Lead Co., 67 How. Pr. 365, 1581 Metsker v. Neally, 41 Kan. 122, 190 Metzger v. Attica R. Co., 79 N. Y. 171, 825 Menser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239, 282 Meyer v. Brown, 65 Cal. 583, 1522 V. City of Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384. 1001. 1016 V. Fromm. 108 Ind. 208, 482, 1258 V. Jones. 20 Ky. L. 1632, 1392 V. School Dist., 4 S. D. 420, 998 V. Village of Teutopolis, 131 111. 552. 1317. 1347 Meyers v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 57 Iowa 555. 500 V. City of Jeffersonyille, 145 Ind. 431. 1700 y. Hudson Co. Elec. Co.. 63 N. J. L. 573, 586. 1791 Michael y. City of Mattoon, 172 111. 394. 1278 Michel V. Police Jury, 9 La. An. 67, 1306 Michener v. City of Philadelphia. 118 Pa. St. 53.5. 593, 1195. 1234. 1252 Michie &c.. In re, 11 Up. Can. C. P. 379. 1258 Michigan &c. R. Co. y. Barnes, 44 Mich. 222. 702 Michigan Tel. Co. y. City of Charlotte. 93 Fed. 11. 586 IMiddlesborough Town &c. Co. y. Knoll. 21 Ky. L. 1399, 719. 1283. 1789 Middlesex Co. y. City of Lowell, 149 ■Mass. 509. 1177 Middlesex R. Co. y. City of Charles- ton, 8 Allen 330. 1509 V. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 261, 11.59, 1355 Middleton y. Greeson. 106 Ind. 18. 626. 863. 1479. 1480 y. Mullica Tp.. 112 V. S. 433. 1013 y. Railroad Co., 26 N. J. Eq. 269. 524 v. State, 120 Ind. 166. 308. 650 Midland School Districts. 40 Mich. 551, 861 Mikesell v. Durkee, 34 Kan. 509. 585. 1322 Miles V. City of Lynn, 130 Mass. 398, 1366 y. City of Worcester. 154 Mass. 511. 810 v. Town of Albany. 59 Vt. 79, 1541 V. Wells. 22 Utah 55. 1652 Milhau y. Sharp. 27 N. Y. 611. 568, 579, 618, 637, 1106 TABLE OP CASES. CXXXIX [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. S33-1SS0.'\ Milhau V. Sharp. 15 Rarb. 103, 830 V. Sharp, 17 Rnrb. 435. 282, 586 Milk V. Kent, GO Ind. 226, 419 Millard v. Board &c., 19 111. App. 48, 1476 V. Jenkins. 9 Wend. 298, 221 Mill Creek Sewer, In re, 196 Pa. St. 183. 1311 Miller V. Board, 66 Ind. 162, 971 V. Board &c., 37 N. Y. S. 766, 742 V. Bradford. 12 Iowa 14, 228 V. Brown. 56 N. Y. 383. 335 V. Callaway, 32 Ark. 666. 198 V. City of Amsterdam. 149 N. Y. 288, 1134, 1135, 1236 V. City of Milwaukee, 14 Wis. 699. 1306 V. City of Minneapolis, 75 Minn. 131, 785 V. City of St. Paul. 38 Minn. 134, 264, 1585, 1614 V. Embree, 88 Ind. 133, 944 V. Eni?lish, 21 N. J. L. 317, 371 V. Gorman. 38 Pa. St. 331, 1717 V. Grice, 2 Rich. L. 27. 335 V. Horton, 152 Mass. 540. 595, 1080, 1116 V. Jones. 80 Ala. 89. 622 V. Lerch. 1 Wall. Jr. 210. 564 V. Mayor &c., 47 Ala. 163, 1257, 1258 V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. Eq. 62. 1180, 1216 V. Mayor &c., 109 U. S. 385, 801 V. McWilliams, 50 Ala. 427. 142, 1527 V. Moore. 3 Humph. 189, 323 V. O'Reilly. 84 Ind. 168. 535 V. Perris Irr. Dist., 85 Fed. 693, 1028 V. Perris Irr. Dist., 99 Fed. 143. 1006 V. Rucker, 1 Bush 135, 221 V. Supervisors. 25 Cal. 93. 187, 199 V. Town of Berlin, 13 Blatchf. ' 245. 1027 V. Trustees &c.. 88 111. 26. 1712 V. Warner, .59 N. Y. S. 956, 1820 V. Webster City. 94 Iowa 162. 580 V. White River School Tp., 101 Ind. 503. 862 Millett V. People, 117 111. 294. 734 Millholland v. Bryant. 39 Ind. 363. 158 Milliard v. City of Lafayette, 5 La. An. 112, 700 Milliken v. City Council &c., 54 Tex. 388, 501, 502 Million V. Soule. 15 Wash. 261. 958 Mills V. Belbrough, 19 N. Y. S. 176, 1409 V. Board &c., 50 Ind. 436. 1725 V. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400. 558. 1.531. 1538 V. City of Brooklyn. 32 N. Y. 489. 263, 819, 821, 1159, 1208. 1584 1585. 1586 V. City of Chicago. 182 111. 249, 512 V. Gleason. 11 Wis. 470, 258. 287. 715. 837. 971, 973, 992 V. Hall. 9 Wend. 316. 1106 V. Richland Tp.. 72 Mich. 100, 416 V. Thornton, 26 111. 300. 1499 V. Williams, 11 Ired. 558. 104, 105 Millsaps V. Mayor &c., 37 La. An. 641, 615 Mills Co. V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 66, 659 Milner v. City of Pensacola, 2 Woods 632, 92. 405, 409, 410, 1519 Miltenberger v. Cooke, 18 Wall. 421. 633 Milward v. Thatcher, 2 T. R. 81. 185, 198 Milwaukee v. Koeffler, 116 U. S. 219, 1697, 1723 Milwaukee Electric &c. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 39, 1247, 1812 Milwaukee Industrial School v. Su- pervisors &c., 40 Wis. 328, 1071, 1072 Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. City of Faribau.c, 23 Minn. 167, 591, 686 Mims V. West. 38 Ga. 18, 1026 Miner v. Loggins, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 15, 9.58 V. President &c., 27 N. Y. 155, 1510 Mineralized Rubber Co. v. City of Cleburne, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 621, 730 Miners' Bank v. United States, 1 Greene 553. 4, 6 Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543. 5. 233, 253 Minick v. City of Troy. 19 Hun 253, 1625 V. City of Troy, 83 N. Y. 514. 1746, 1790 Minis V. Minis, 35 Ala. 23, 228 Minneapolis Gas-Light Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 159, 191. 282. 1539 Minneapolis &c. R. Co. v. Becket, 75 Iowa 183, 1674 V. Woodworth. 32 Minn. 452. 708 Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468. 1202, 1232 Minnesota &c. R. Co. v. District Court. 71 N. W. 27, 1287 Minnesota Trans. R. Co. v. District Court &c.. 68 Minn. 242, 1299 Minor v. Bank, 1 Peters 46, 211 v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 140, 369 Minot V. Curtis, 7 Mass. 441. 435 V. Inhabitants &c., 112 Mass. 1, 641, 671 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435, 88, 565, 598, 627, 642 Missano v. Mayor &c., 160 N. Y. 123, 250, 929 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475. 1488 Mississippi &c. R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U. S. 485, 1109 Missouri v. Lewis, 101 TJ. S. 22, 140, 1410 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. City of Wy- ■ andotte. 44 Kan. 32, 489," 1133 V. Hennessey. 75 Tex. 155, 1627 V. Houseman. 41 Kan. 300, 694 V. Humes. 115 V. S. 512, 698 Missouri River &c. R. Co. v. Com- missioners &c., 12 Kan. 230. 260. 986 Missouri &c. Trust Co. v. Smart, 51 La. An. 416. 522 Mitchell V. Brown, 18 N. H. 315. 303. 351. 355. 358 V. Burlington. 4 Wall. 270. 561, 764. 838. 972. 985 V. City of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 92. 1702. 1722 V. City of Negaunee, 113 Mich. 359. 1549 V. City of Plattsburg, 33 Mo. App. 555, 1627 V. City of Rockland, 41 Maine 363. 1099 V. City of Rockland. 45 Maine 496. 234. 251. 647 V. City of Rockland. 52 Maine 118. 9. 148. 1097, 1433 V. City of Worcester, 129 Mass. 525. 1622 V. Harmony, 13 How. 115. 1385 V. Illinois &c. R. Co., 68 111. 286, 698 cxl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.^ Mitchell V. Inhabitants &c., 81 Maine 482. 967 V. Tallapoosa Co., 30 Ala. 130. 774' V. Treasurer &c., 25 Ohio St. 143. 13 V. United States, 21 Wall. 350, 1042 Mitchell Co. V. City Nat'l Bank, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 172, 874 Mix V. People, 106 III. 425, 1276 V. Ross, 57 111. 121. 1544 Moberly v. Hogan. 131 Mo. 19, 1284 Moberry v. City of Jeffersonville. 38 Ind. 198. 1191, 1256. 1258 Mobile V. United States, 116 U. S. 289. 124 V. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 71. 409, 412, 454 Mobile Co. v. Kimball. 102 U. S. 691, ■ 771, 817, 1230, 1372. 1557 1576, 1577 Mobile &c. R. Co. v. Kennerly, 74 Ala. 566, 1545 Mobile Sav. Bank v. Board &c., 24 Fed. 110, 991, 1027. 1028 Mock V. City of Santa Rosa. 126 Cat. 330, 218. 1731, 1755 Moede v. Stearns Co., 43 Minn. 312. 1496 Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. St. 188, 119, 763 Moffett V. South Park. 138 111. 620, 1561 Moffit V. Brainard. 92 Iowa 122, 1317 V. Jordan, 127 Cal. 622, 1240, 1283, 1800 V. State, 40 Ind. 217, 1095 Moger V. Escott, L. R. 7 C. P. 158. 128 Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica &c. R. Co.. 6 Paige 554, 568, 584 Moiles V. Watson, 60 Mich. 415. 1487 Moir V. Hopkins. 16 111. 313, 212 Molett V. Keenan, 22 Ala. 484, 692 Moll V. School Directors, 23 111. App. 508. 907. 1495 Mollandin v. Union Pac. R. Co., 14 Fed. 394. 678 Moller V. City of Galveston. 23 Tex. Civ. App. 693, 989, 1015, 1018 Monaghan v. Citv of Philadelphia, 28 Pa. St. 207. 1527 Monie V. Citv of Grand Rapids. 122 Mich. 645. 929. 1325 Monk V. Town of New Utrecht. 104 N. Y. 552. 777. 778. 816. 1324. 1574 Monongahola Bridge Co. v. Bevard. 11 Atl. 575, 1631 Monongahela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa. St. 9, 1587, 1597. 1598 Monroe v. City of Lawrence, 44 Kan. 007. 601 V. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665. 369, 370. 371 Monroe Co. v. City of Rochester, 34 N. Y. S. 533. 1296 V. Flvnt. 80 Ga. 489. 1735 V. Teller, 51 Iowa 670, 1068 Montford v. Allen, 111 Ga. 18. 1295, 1543 Montgomery v. Board &c., 22 Wis. 69. 663 V. City of Des Moines, 55 Iowa 101, 1619 - V. Flernande!!. 12 Wheat. 129. 455 V. St. Mary's Tp., 43 Fed. 362. 1014 V. Wasem, 116 Ind. 343. 1201 Montgomery Co. v. Auchley, 92 Mo. 126, 1487, 1740 V. Anchley, 103 Mo. 492. 914. 1487 V. Menefee Co. Court, 93 Ky. 33, 440. 1540 Montgomerv Gasliarht Co. v. Citv Council, 87 Ala. 245, 1465. 1466 Montgomery St. R. Co. v. Sayre, 72 Ala. 443. 698 Montieth v. Parker. 36 Or. 170, 952 Montrose v. State, 61 Miss. 429, 1417 Moody v. Mayor. 43 Barb. 282, 1095 v. Village of Saratoga, 45 N. Y. S. 305, 1377 Moody & Co. V. Chadwick, 52 La. An. 1888, 1271, 1309 Mooers v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch. 28. 1287, 1718 Mooney v. Clark, 69 Conn. 241. 710, 1699, 1731 v. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551, 85, 538 Moor V. City of Richmond, 85 Va. 538, 1626 Moore v. Atlanta. 70 Ga. 611, 1209 V. Beattie, 33 Vt. 219, 344, 362 V. Board &c., 2 Wyo. 8, 1725 V. City of Albany, 92 N. Y. 396, 257. 720, 1205 V. City of Mattoon, 163 111. 622, 1148 V. City of Minneapolis, 43 Minn. 418. 602 V. City of Platteville, 78 Wis. 644, 1210 V. City of Richmond. 85 Va. 538, 1636 V. City of St. Paul, 61 Minn. 427, 604 V. City of Waco. 85 Tex. 206, 1566 V. Cline, 61 Ind. 113, 1191 V. Commissioners &c., 62 N. J. L. 386. 506 V. Directors, 59 Pa. St. 232, 1728 V. District of Columbia, 12 App. D. C. 537. 502 V. Fessenbeck. 88 HI. 422. 1483 V. Gadsden. 93 N. Y. 12. 1345, 1588 V. Graves, 3 N. II. 408, 312 V. Huntington. 31 W. Va. 842. 1631, 1634. 1635, 1636, 1638 V. Illinois. 14 How. 13, 607 V. Inhabitants &c., 32 Maine 46. 1599. 1635 v. Inhabitants &c., 38 Maine 204. 1332 v. Madison Co., 38 Ala. 670, 322 V. Mayor &c., 107 Ga. 704. 1805 V. Mayor &c.. 73 N. Y. 238, 233. 239. 240. 655. 746 v. TMayor &c., 4 Sandf. 456. 693 V. Newfield, 4 Maine 44, 344, 365. 965. 1485 V. School Directors, 59 Pa. St. 232. 1540 V. State. 9 Mo. 334. 300 V. State. 11 Lea 35. 533 V. Village of Fairport, 32 N. Y. S. 633. 1373 Moose V. Carson, 104 N. C. 431. 1214 Mooser v. White. 29 Mich. 59. 1540 Moral School Tp. v. Harrison, 74 Ind. 93. 217 Moran v. Commissioners of Miami Co.. 2 Black 722. 1000. 1018 V. Linden. 52 Mo. 229. 1259 V. Long Island City, 101 N. Y. 439. 88. 108 V. Mayor &c., 58 N. J. L. 653. 1291 V. New Orleans. 112 U. S. 69. 492 V. Pullman &c. Co., 134 Mo. 641. 527. 786, 1790 V. Rennard. 3 Brewst. 601. 221 V. Thompson. 20 Wash. 525. 513, 712. 737 Morano v. Mayor. 2 La. 217, 580. 581. 1402, 1403 Morbeck v. State. 28 Ind. 86. 319 Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H. 373, 1751 TABLE OF CASES. cxli [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Morford v. TTnger, 8 Iowa 82, 58, 61, 83, 122. 38:^, 393. 426, 1517 Morgan v. Beloit, 7 Wall. 613, 383, 424, 438 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 36 Mich. 428. 693 V. City of Denver, 14 Colo. App. 147, 208, 210 V. City of Dubuque, 28 Iowa 575, 1306 V. City of Ilollowell, 57 Maine 375. 814, 1594 V. City of Rhinelander, 105 Wis. 138, 928 V. Commonwealth, 55 Pa. St. 456, 1522 v. Cree, 46 Vt. 773, 1545 V. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. 693, 221 V. Long. 29 Iowa 434, 328 V. Menzies, 60 Cal. 341, 254 V. Parham. 16 Wall. 471, 1502 V. Quackenbush, 22 Bai-b. 72, 197, 381 V. Village of Penn Yan, 59 N. Y. S. 504, 1328, 1360 Morgan Co. v. Seaton, 122 Ind. 521, 842, 1040 Morgan Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board &c.. 118 U. S. 455, 1101 Morlev v. Mayor &c., 12 N. Y. S. 609. 177, 203 V. Town of Metamora. 78 111. 394, 211. 322, 324 V. Village of Buchanan, 124 Mich. 128, 791 Morrell v. Sylvester. 1 Greenl. 248, 308 Morrill v. State, 38 WMs. 428, 1537 V. Tehema Mills &c. Co., 10 Nev. 25, 1737 v. Thurston. 46 Vt. 732. 335 Morris v. Baltimore. 5 Gill 244, 247 V. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 5 Lack. Leg. N. 129. 725 v. Board &c.. 131 Ind. 285, 1075 v. City of Columbus, 102 Ga. 792. 1762 V. Kasling, 79 Tex. 141, 671 v. Mayor &c.. 6 Lea 337, 1517 v. People. 3 Denio 381, 763 V. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. St. 372, 1340 V. Powell, 125 Ind. 281. 371 V. Sea Girt Land Imp. Co., 38 N. J. V,q. 304. 688 V. State, 62 Tex. 728, 120 V. State. 65 Tex. 53, 448 V. Taylor, 31 Or. 62. 876. 1021 Morris & Cummings Dredging Co. v. Mayor &c.. 64 N. J. L. 587. 1352 Morris &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 64 N. J. L. 148. 1251 V. Pruden. 20 N. J. Eq. 530, 1706 Morris Square. 2 Hill 14. 1724 Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219, 819. 1424 V. City of Madison, 96 Wis. 452, 1326, 1802 V. City of Syracuse, 65 N. Y. S. 939. 1316, 1326, 1374 V. Fayette Co.. 127 Pa. St. 110, 940 V. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271. 1234, 1245. 1271 V. Howe, 120 Mass. 565, 335 V. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. J. L. 219. 1741 V. Lawrence. 98 Mass. 219. 299 V. McDonald, 21 Maine 550, 189, 192 V. McFarland, 51 Ind. 206, 221, 222 V. Wasson. 79 Ind. 477. 1721 Morrow v. Weed, 4 Iowa 77, 693 Morrow Co. v. Hendrvx, 14 Or. 397, 434 Morse v. City of West Port, 110 Mo. 502, 582, 1129 V. City of W^estport. 136 Mo. 276, 11.3!). 1147 V. City of Worcester, 139 Mass. 389. 811 V. Hitchcock Co., 19 Neb. 566, 429 V. Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 30 Minn. 65. 1627 V. Stocker, 1 Allen 150, 1178 V. Town of Richmond, 41 Vt. 435. 1112, 1613 V. Williamson, 35 Barb. 472, 335 Morseman v. City of Ionia, 32 Mich. 283. 695 Morton v. Carlin, 51 Neb. 202, 1030. 1698 V. Comptroller-General, 4 S. C. 430, 224 V. Mayor &c., Ill Ga. 162, 1387 V. Youngerman, 89 Ky. 505, 162 Morville v. American Tract. Soc, 123 Mass. 129, 240, 633 Moser v. Shamleffer, 39 Kan. 635, 165, 168 Moses v. Pittsburg &c. R. Co., 21 111. 515, 588, 1706 V. St. Louis Sectional Dock Co., 84 Mo. 242. 694 Mosher v. Independent School Dist., 44 Iowa 122. 890 Mosier v. City of Des Moines, 31 Iowa 174. 415 Mosley v. Walker. 7 B. & C. 40. 1402 Moss y. City Council &c., 93 Ga. 797. 788 v. Cummings, 44 Mich. 359, 1727 y. Harpeth Academy, 7 Heisk. 283. 971 V. Overseers of St. Michael, 7 Man. & G. 72, 128 v. Shear, 25 Cal. 38. 1519 v. State, 10 Mo. 338, 326 v. Village of Oakland, 88 111. 109, 488 Mossman v. Forest, 27 Ind. 233, 696 Mott V. Hicks, 1 Cowen 513, 216 V. Lewis. 65 N. Y. S. 31, 1773 V. United States Trust Co., 19 Barb. 568, 1017 Motz y. City of Detroit. 18 Mich. 496, 1224. 1253, 1268. 1269, 1723 Moulton y. City of Eyansville, 25 Fed. 382. 998. 1007. 1023 v. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine 127, 1332, 1601 Moultrie Co. v. Fairfield, 105 U. S. 370. 995, 996 V. Rockingham &c. Say. Bank, 92 U. S. 631. 1001, 1022 Moundsville v. Fountain. 27 W. Va. 182. 1399. 1415. 1418 Mount Adams &c. R. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 25 Wkly. Law Bull. 91, 615. 616 Mount Morris. In re. 2 Hill 14. 1723 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith. 100 U. S. 514, 71. 74. 89. 383 408. 412. 424, 445, 1529 V. Breeze. 11 Iowa 399, 526 Mount Pleasant Borough v. Balti- more &c. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 365, 1250 Mountain v. Multnomah Co.. 16 Or. 279. 638 Mower v. Inhabitants &c.. 9 Mass. 247, 7. 9. 148. 776. 777. 778. 17.50 Mowrv V. Mowrv, 20 R. I. 74. 1549 MozIpV v. Alston, 1 Phill. 790. 296 Mnhler v. Hedekin. 119 Ind. 4R1. 202 Mulberger v. Beurhaus. 102 Wis. 1. 1731 Mulcairns v. City of Janesville, 67 Wis. 24, 818 cxlii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Mulholland v. Mayor &c., 113 X. Y. 631, 1188 MuUarky v. Town of Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa 21, 282, 977 Mullen V. Mayor &c., 12 N. Y. S. 269, 183 Muller V. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 3 V. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 1677 Mulligan v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 96, 1338 V. Smith. 59 Cal. 206. 694. 1134, 1137, 1236, 1258 Mullikin v. State, 7 Blackf. 77, 1483 Mumford v. Memphis &c. R. Co., 2 Lea 393. 319 Mumma's Appeal, 127 Pa. St. 474. 1062 Muncey v. Joest, 74 Ind. 409, 693, 1572 Mundell v. City of Pasadena, 87 Cal. 520. 183 Municipality v. Duncan, 2 La. An. 182. 1520 V. Dunn, 10 La. An. 57, 1230. 1233, 1514 , V. Louisiana State Bank, 5 La. An. 394, 1510 V. Michaud. 6 La. An. 605, 1515 V. Millaudon, 12 La. An. 769, 1533 V. Morgan. 1 La. An. Ill, 520 V. White. 9 La. An. 446. 1514 Municipal Sec. Co. v. Baker Co., 33 Or. 338. 952 Munn, In re. 63 N. Y. S. 22. 1278, 1296 V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113. 5, 6, 574, 1386 Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 9. 134 Munsfield v. People. 164 111. 611, 1144 Munson v. Fenno, 87 111. App. 655, 541 V. Mayor &c., 3 Fed. 338, 779 V. Minor, 22 111. 595. 1721 Murdock v. Academy. 12 Pick. 244. 207 V. District of Columbia, 22 Ct. CI. 464, 1185 Murdough v. Inhabitants &c., 165 Mass. 109. 711 Murphy v. City of Albina, 22 Or. 106, 1212 V. City of Brooklyn, 98 N. Y. 642, 1557 V. City of Chicago. 29 111. 279, 1706 V. City of Chicago, 186 111. 59, 1132 V. CitV of Indianapolis, 83 Ind. 76. ■ 1632 V. City of Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318, 670. 858 V. City of Louisville. 9 Bush 189, 646. 647. 1254 V. City of Peoria, 119 111. 509. 1175. 1378 T. City of Yonkers, 60 N. Y. S. 940. 736, 739 , V. Commissioners, 14 Minn. 67, 1064 V. Dayton, 8 Ohio Com. PI. 354, 1374 V. Fast Portland. 42 Fed. 308. 892 V. Farmers' Bank &c., 20 Pa. St. 417, 1693 V. Hall. 68 Wis. 202. 559 V. Inhabitants &c., 176 Mass. 422 792 vr'Mayor &c., 6 Houst. 108, 1725, 1727 V. People, 183 111. 18.5, 1310 V. People, 2 Cow. 815, 1414 V. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 47 V. Southern R. Co., 99 Ga. 207. 1707 Murray. In re. 46 N. Y. S. 172, 1823 V. CitV of Chicago. 175 111. 340. 1287 V. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 1049 Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110, 1018, 1020 V. Richmond &c. R. Co., 93 N. C. 92 1633 V.' Tucker, 10 Bush 240, 707 Muscatine &c. R. Co. v. Horton, 38 Iowa 33. 221 Muscatine Turnverein v. Funck, 18 Iowa 469. 447 Musgrave v. >sevison, 1 Str. 584, 271 Musgrove v. St. Louis Church, 10 La. An. 431, 1086 Mussell V. Tama Co., 73 Iowa 101, 1052 Musselman v. Commonwealth, 7 Pa. St. 240. 309 V. Manley, 42 Ind. 462, 300 Musser v. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74, 217 Mutchler v. Easton City, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 613, 754 Mutual &c. Co. v. Wilcox, 8 Biss. C. C. 197, 310 Mutual &c. Ins. Co. v. City of Eliza- beth. 42 N. J. L. 235, 645 V. Eastern &c. R. Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 132, 693 Mutual Loan &c. Ass'n v. Price, 16 Fla. 204. 326 Muzzy V. Shattuck. 1 Denio 233, 319 Myers v. City of Jeffersonville, 145 Ind. 431, 741 V. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 113 111. 386, 1637 V. Irwin. 2 S. & R. 368, 51, 84 V. People, 26 111. 173. 1411. 1412 V. School Trustees, 21 111. App. 223, 1490 V. United States, 1 McLean 493, 322 V. United States, 22 Ct. CI. SO. 772 Mygatt V. City of Green Bay, 1 Biss. 292. 1001, 1016 V. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316, 229 Myrick v. City of La Crosse, 17 Wis. 456, 1201 N Naegely v. City of Saginaw, 101 Mich. 532, 525, 715 Naegle v. City of Centralia, 81 111. App. 334, 509 Nagel V. City of Buflfalo, 102 N. Y. 108. 312, 1790 V. City of Buffalo, 34 Hun 1, 1625 Nagle V. Mullison, 34 Pa. St. 48. 1111 V. Wakey, 161 111. 387, 772, 1342 Nail &c. Iron Co. v. Furnace Co., 46 Ohio St. 544, 1573 Nalick Gas Light Co. v. Inhabitants &c., 175 Mass. 246. 1778 Nalle V. City of Austin, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 595. 1293 Xally V. Hartford Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524, 1627 Nance v. Johnson, 84 Tex. 401. 655 Napa c&c. R. Co. v. Board &c., 30 Cal. 435. 685 Napier v. Citv of Bi'ooklyn, 58 N. Y. S. 506, 1770 Napman v. People, 19 Mich. 352. 467, 501, 539 Nash V. Citv of St. Paul,, 8 Minn. 172. 235, 645 V. City of St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174, 644 V. Lowrv. 37 Minn. 261, 565, 735 Nashville &c. R. Co. v. City of At- talla. 118 Ala. 362, 1383. 1710 Nason v. Directors of Poor. 126 Pa. St 445. 319. 903. 1035 Natal V. Louisiana. 139 U. S. 621. 542. 580, 1402 National Bank v. City of Flmira. 53 N. Y. 49, 229, 242, 1724 TABLE OP CASES. cxliii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] National Bank v. City of St. Josciib, SI Fed. 2](), 64(j. 1027 V. CoMiraouwealtli. Wall. 353, 1.501 V. Kimball, 10.3 U. S. 732, 1708 V. Kiihv. 108 Mass. 497, 1018 V. Mattliews, 08 U. S. G21, 650 V. Sohastian Co., 5 Dill. 414, 766 V. Towu of Grenada, 41 Fed. 87, 491, 988 V. Town of Grenada, 44 Fed. 262, 463, 483, 484 V. Yankton, 101 U. S. 129, 47 National Life Ins. Co. v. Board &c., 62 Fed. 778, 27 U. S. App. 244, 10 C. C. A. 637. 66, 09, 1005, 1029, 1757 V. Mead, 13 S. D. 37. 876, 998, 1007 National Lumber Co. v. City of Wy- more, 30 Neb. 356, 941 National &c. R. Co. v. Central R. Co.. 32 N. J. Eq. 755, 591 National State Bank v. Independent Dist. of Marshall, 39 Iowa 490, 891 National Tube-Works Co. v. City of Chamberlain, 5 Dak. 54, 648 National Water-works Co. v. Kansas City. 62 Fed. 853, 737 V. School District, 48 Fed. 523. 1452 Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195, 692 Naumann v. Board &c., 73 Mich. 252, 153 Naiiroo v. Ritter. 97 U. S. 272, 1001 Nave V. Flack, 90 Ind. 205, 1331 Naylor v. City of Galesburg, 56 111. 285, 521 V. Field, 29 N. J. L. 287, 106 V. Sharpless, 2 Mod. 23, 295 Nazworthy v. City of Sullivan, 55 111. App. 48, 465 Neal V. Commissioners &c., 85 N. C. 420, 1043 V. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 140 V. Town of Marion, 126 N. C. 412, 1329. 1784 Neale v. County Court &c., 43 W. Va. 90, 610. 1017 Neales v. State. 10 Mo. 498, 1415 Neary v. Robinson, 98 N. Y. 81, 948 Nebraska Citv v. Campbell, 2 Black 590, 8, 813 V. Lampkin. 6 Neb. 27, 680 V. Northcutt. 45 Neb. 456, 1219 Needham v. School Dist., 62 Vt. 176, 1474 Neelv V. Yorkville. 10 S. C. 141, 210, 646 Neenan v. Smith. 50 Mo. 525, 1262. 1268 NeflE V. Covington Stone &c. Co.. 21 Ky. L. 1454. 751. 1151, 1275 v. Inhabitants &c., 148 Mass. 487, ' 815, 1036, 1068 Neill V. Gates, 152 Mo. 585, 491. 518, 732 Neirer v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 1 S. W. 386, 1356 Neitzel v. City of Concordia, 14 Kan. 446, 535 Neitzev v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 5 Mackey 34. 1354 Nelden v. Clark, 20 TTtah 382, 712 Nelson v. City of Laporte, 33 Ind. 258. 1232. 1543 V. City of Saginaw, 106 Mich. 659, 1281 V. Inhabitants &c., 7 Pick. 18, 357, 667. 668. 1534 V. Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. 535. 242, 894 V. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. S. 688, 729 V. McArthur, 38 Mich. 204. 45 V. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194, 347 Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 521 V. Tlnited States, 22 Ct. CI. 159, 772 v. Village of Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 89, 265 Nesbit V. Independent Dist. of Riv- erside, 144 U. S. 610, 890, 1024 V. Independent School Dist., 25 Fed. 63.5, 1098 V. Matthews, 16 N. Y. S. 202, 1413 V. Trumbo, 39 111. 110, 687 Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick, 104 U. S 111. 1510 V. Steinmitz, 64 Cal. 301, 991 Nevil V. Clifford. 55 Wis. 161, 652 Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492, 478 l'>5'? Nevins v. City of Fitehburg, 174 Mass. 545, 1775 V. City of Peoria, 41 111. 502 680, 1.385 New Albany &c. R. Co. v. Connelly, 7 Ind. 32, •" 706 Newark Aqueduct Board v. City of Passaic. 46 N. J. Eq. 552, 1092 Newark City Bank v. Assessor, 30 N. J. L. 13, 1500, 1501 Newaygo Co. Mfg. Co. v. Echtinaw, 81 Mich. 416, 277 ^gy New Bedford &c. R. Co. v. Achush- net &c. R. Co., 143 Mass. 200, 108 Newbery v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141, „ „ , ^ 233, 235, 250, 645 New Boston v. Dunbarton, 12 N. H 409, ' 45 V. Dunbarton, 15 N. H. 201, XT T, ■ , . „ 48, 49, 87 New Brighton Borough v. Peirsol X. ^rf^I^- ^*- 280, 1220, '1603 New ^Buffalo v. Iron Co., 105 U. S. 73, 995 Newby v. Free, 72 Iowa 379, 1496 Newcastle &c. R. Co. v. Peru &e. R. Co., 3 Ind. 464, 637 New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal Co.. 37 Md. 537, 685 New Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala. 432 616 New England &c. Co. v. James, 77 Mo. App. 616, 1297 Newgass v. City of New Orleans, 42 La. An. 163. 636, 839, 974 New Haven v. Sargent, 38 Conn. 50, 1221 New Haven &c. Co. v. City of New Haven, 72 Conn. 288. 1773, 1781 New Haven &c. R. Co. v. Town of Chatham, 42 Conn. 465, 365. 1023. 1427. 1428 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164, 771 v. Yord. 95 IT. S. 104. 510. 1184 New Jer.sey &c. Co. v. Fire Com'rs, 34 N. J. Eq. 117, 233 New Jersey Car Spring &c. Co. v. City of Jersey City, 46 Atl. 649, 71.^, 715 Newlan v. President &c., 14 111. 364, 541 Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 376, 517 Newling v. Francis. 3 T. R. 189, 185 Newman v. Ashe. 9 Baxt. 289. 1.5.36 V. Board &c.. 45 N. Y. 676, 1551 V. City of Chicago, 153 111. 469, 1146. 1266. 1300 V. City of Emporia. 32 Kan. 456. 259. 1254, 1256 V. Justices &c., 1 Heisk. 787, 1527 V. Justices, 5 Sneed 695, 1528 V. Metropolitan &c. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 618. 705 V. Svlvester. 42 Ind. 112, 217 V. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 205, 773 V. Wait, 46 Vt. 689, 1510 cxliv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. SSS-IS-SO.] Newmeyer v. Missouri &c. R. Co.. 52 Mo. 81, 618, 651 New Orleans v. Claris, 95 TT. S. 644, 259, 405, 1522 V. Morris, 105 U. S. 600, 1530 V. New Orleans &c. Co., 142 U. S. 79, 90 V. Piatt. 99 U. S. 676, 1026 V. Poutz, 14 La. An. 856, 992 V. Warner, 175 U. S. 120. 716. 873, 1245. 1752 New Orleans &e. Co. v. City of New Orleans. 30 La. An. 1371, 1725 V. City of New Orleans, 42 La. An. 188, 569, 1404, 1465 V. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471, 1703. 1704, 1808 New Orleans Drainage Co. Cases, 11 La. An. 338. 1084 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 IT. S. 650. 566. 1183, 1184. 1347, 1808 New Orleans R. Co. v. Frederic, 46 Miss. 1. 693 New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 26 La. An. 478, 629 V. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501. 510 V. Lasarde. 10 La. An. 150, 705 V. Moye. 39 Miss. 374, 704 V. Stratham, 42 Miss. 607, 1111 New Orleans Taxpayei's' Assn. v. City of New Orleans, 33 La. An. 567. 651 New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674. 510. 1347. 1808. 1810 New Providence Tp. v. Halsey, 117 U. S. 336. 1000, 1018 Newsom v. Georgia R. Co., 62 Ga. 339. 1614 Newson v. City of Galveston, 76 Tex. 559, 1403 Newton v. Beiger. 143 Mass. 598. 503 v. Carberry, 5 Cranch C. C. 632. 1813 V. City of Worcester, 174 Mass. 181. 1344 V. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548. 81, 757 V. Ellis. 85 Eng. C. L. 123. 1599 V. Leal. 56 8. W. 209, 1644 V. Worcester. 174 Mass. 181, 1799 New York v. Furze. 3 Hill 612, 816 New York &c. Co. v. Brooklyn. 71 N. Y. 580, 781, 788 New York Health Department v. Van Cott, 51 N. Y. Super. 413, 193 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Staats, 21 Barb. 570. 295 v. White. 17 N. Y. 469. 228 New York &c. R. Co., Matter of, 66 N. Y. 407, 1573 New York &c. R. Co., Matter of, 77 N. Y. 248, 1557 V. Bristol, 151 TT. S. 556. 710 V. City of New Britain, 49 Conn. 40. 1251 V. City of New Haven, 42 Conn. 2T9. 1250 V. City of Waterbury, 55 Conn. 19, 480 V. Forty-Second St. &c. R. Co., 50 Barb. 285. 1352 V. Marsh. 12 N. Y. 308. 1725 V. Marvin. 11 N. Y. 276. 1419 V. Mayor &c., 1 Hilt. 562. 829 V. Mftropolitan Gas Co., 63 N. Y. 32G, 4. 6 V. Van Horn. 57 N. Y. 473. 644. 1532 V. Villnse of New Rochellp. 60 N. Y. 904. 637. 732. 1151 V. Wheeler. 72 Conn. 481, 710 New York Security &c. Co. v. City of Tacoma, 21 Wash. 303. 956 Ney V. City of Troy, 3 N. Y. S. 679, 1607 V. Swinney. 36 Ind. 454, 695 Niagara &c. Bridge Co. v. Bachman, 66 N. Y. 261, 1559. 1564 Nichol V. Mayor &c., 9 Humph. 252, 88, 982 Nicholas V. People, 165 111. 502. 1261, 1276 Nlcholasville W. Co. v. Board &c., 64 S. W. 1133. 734, 742, 751 Nichols, In re, 48 Fed. 164, 1399 V. Boston, 98 Mass. 39. 189, 191, 811 V. City of Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189, 673, 692, 704, 1233. 1266, 1572 V. City of Duluth, 40 Minn. 389, 801 V. City of Minneapolis, 30 Minn. 545, 827 V. City of St. Paul, 44 Minn. 494, 1210 V. Incorporated Town of Lau- rens, 96 Iowa 388, 793 V. Inhabitants &c., 66 Maine 402, 1613 V. MacLean, 101 N. Y. 526, 198 V. Stevens, 123 Mo. 96. 586 V. United States, 7 Wall. 122, 1718 V. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 557 Nicholson v. Commissioners &c., 121 N. C. 27. 1785 V. Philadelphia, 194 Pa. St. 460. 1804 Nicol V. City of St. Paul, 80 Minn. 415. 1367 Nicolay v. St. Clair Co., 3 Dill. 163, 1011. 1024 Nicoll V. New York &c. R. Co.. 12 N. Y. 121, 759 Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168, 1402 Niklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. 289, 1201 Niles v. Patch. 13 Gray 254, 360 Niles Water-Works Co. v. Mayor &c.. 59 Mich. 311. 260. 847, 877, 880 Nims V. Mavor &c., 59 N. Y. 500. 1208 Nisbet V. City of Atlanta, 97 Ga. 650. 786 Nivan v. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. 619. 1587. 1632 Niver v. Village of Bath on Hudson. 58 N. Y. S. 270. 1151. 1281 Nixon V. City of Biloxl, 76 Miss. 810. 275. 1711 v. City of Newport, 13 R. I. 454. 803, 807 V. State, 96 Ind. 211, 902 Noble V. Citv of Vincennes, 42 Ind. 125. 987 Noble School Furniture Co. v. Wash- ington School Tp., 4 Ind. App. 270. 856. 857 Noel V. City of San Antonio. 11 Tex. Civ. App. 580. 712. 729, 743, 1758 Noel Young &c. Co. v. Mitchell Co., 21 Tex. Civ. App. 638. 1031 Nolan V. King. 97 N. Y. 565, 1633 V. Mayor. 4 Yerg. 163. 1104 Nolan Co. v. Simpson. 74 Tex. 218. 903 V. State. 83 Tex. 182, 576. 839, 892 Noll V. Dubuque &c. R. Co., 32 Iowa 66. 673 Nolton V. Dyersburg. 127 U. S. 160. 981 Noonan v. City of Albany. 79 N. Y. 470. 8. 265. 790, 811. 1217 V. City of Lawrence, 130 Mass. 161. 1366 V. Citv of Stillwater. 33 Minn. 198. " 1165. 1589 V. People. 183 111. 52, 522, 1310 TABLE OF CASES. cxlv IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.^ Noroross v. Thorns 51 M^ineSOS 1108 Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70 N. <-• o;>;*' ^y.f.:^ NorMk City v. Ellis, 26 Gratt. 224 1209 Norfolk &c. R. Co. v. Ely, 95 N. C. _,^^ Normand v. Board &c., 8 Neb. 18. 651 Norris v. City of Wa^co, ^J^J;f^,%%,s V. Eaton, 7 N. H. 284, 345 V. Mayor &c., 44 Md. 598^^^^ ^^^^ V. Mayor &c., ^I^^^^J^^, 1517 V. Staps. Hob. 211, 85 Norristown v. Moyer, 67 Pa. bt. '^3''j'gg2 North V. Cleveland &c. R. Co.. 10 Ohio St. 548, ^, Jy North Beach &c. R. Co.'s Appeal, 3 Cal 499, 1248, l&UU North Carolina R. Co. v. Commi_ssion- ers &c., 77 N. C. 4. looO, 1725 North Chicago City R. Co. v. Town of LakeView,105^ni.207,_^^^^^^^3^ North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Dudgeon 184 111. 477, 1^1"^ North Lebanon v. Arnold, 4< Fa. »t. _^ 488 j-'i-' North Menheim Tp. v. Arnold, 119 Pa. St. 380, . , , /, ^^ "^ North Missouri R. Co. v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515, , ..^ *"" V. Stephens, 36 Mo. 150^^^^ ^^^^ North Pac. Lumbering &c Co. v. City of East Portland, 14 Or. 3, 11»9 North Penn. R. Co. v. Adams, 54 Pa- st 94, ivzo North River Electric &c. Co. v. City of New York, 62^N. Y-^S. 726, ^^^ North Springs Water Co v. City of Tacoma, 21 Wash. 517, 1810. 1814 North Terrace Park, In re, 48 S. W. ggQ 551, loUo Northampton Co. v. Innes, 26 Pa. St. 156 lUia NortherA Bank &c.v Porter Tp Trus- tees, 110 TT. S. 608, 256, 644, 646. 88o 1001, 1003. 1008. 1009, 1024. 1757 Northern Indiana B. Co. v. Connel- ly. 10 Ohio St. 159. 1248 Northern Liberties v. St. Johns Church. 13 Pa. St. 104, ^^593, 1247 V. Swain. 13 Pa. St. 113 1234 Northern &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 21 Md. 93. , ^ ^, ., 28 J Northfield v. Merrimack Co., 43 N. H 165 iU4.i Northrop v.' Burrows, 10 Abb. Pr. 365 1110 Northrup v. Town of Pittsfleld, 2 N. Y. Super. Ct. 108. 870 Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park. 97 U. S.^659.^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ V. Village of Hyde Park. 70 HI. 634, 1^"^ Northwestern &c. Ins. Co. v. 0"^er- holt. 4 Dill. 287. 1017 Northwestern Lumber Co. v. City ot Aberdeen. 20 Wash. 102. 742 V. City of Aberdeen. 22 Wash. 404, ^°*^ Northwestern Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dill 454, °°^ Northwestern &c. Packet Co v. City of Louisiana. 4 Dill. 1".^.^ - ^*" Northwestern Tel. &c Co. v City of Minneapolis. 81 Minn. 140, 13J0 1 Smith — x Northwood v. Barrington, 9 N. H. Norton ;. Board &c., 129 U. S. 479 996 v. City of East St. Louis, 36 HI. Ann 171 °°® v. City of New Bedford, 166 Mass. 48 V. City of St. Louis, 97 Mo. 537^^^^ V. Dyersburg, 127 U.J. 160.^ ^^^^ V. Peck. 3 Wis. 714. ^^'J^R V. Petrie, 59 Conn. 200. 1419 ^•^riS^-'l96,'2i9,'89r977,993 V. Walkill &c. R. Co., 63 Barb. lyY 1571 Norwich &c. Co. V. Norwich City Gas Co.. 25 Conn. 19. ^A^^' Norwood V. Baker, 172 U.J. 269. ^ ^.^^^^ 1291. 1296. 1300. 1.302,' 1708,' 1709 V. Gonzales Co., 79 Tex. 218, 1569 Nott's Case, 11 Maine 208. 1415 Nottage V. ^ty of Por land. 3^| Or.^_^^^ Nowell V. Wright. 3 Allen 166, -2- Noxon V. Hill. 2 Allen 21.5. 335 Noyes v. Inhabitants &c., 11 Cush.^^^^ ?!^|paulding. 27 Vt. 420 994 V. Stillman. 24 Conn. 15. 1095 V. Town of Mason City, 53 Iowa 303 l--* Nuckolls Co. V. Peebler, 91 N. W. ^^^ Xudd"v^'Hobbs, 17 N. H 524. 1561 Nugent V. Supervisors, 19 Wan.^241.^^^ V Wrinn. 44 Conn. 273, 278 Nuneaton Local Board v. Sewage Co., L. R. 20 Eq. 127 . „« Nunemacher v. City of Louisville, 98 JCxr ^^4- ( oU NurnbergVr v. Town of Barnwell, 42 S. C. 158, l'^54 O Oakes V. Hill, 10 Pick. 333, 129 V. Hill. 14 Pick. 442, _ 1423 Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal. 540^^^^ Oaklev v. City of Atlantic City. 63 N. J. L. 127. 482. .514, 747, 750, 1184 O'Brien, In re, 119 Mich 540. 1162 V. City of New York, 32 N. Y. S. 34 v.^'City of Philadelphia, 1^50^Pa^g^3 v.-City'ofSt.Paul.l^5Minn.^331.^^^ V City of Worcester.^l72^Mas.^^^ V Mayor &c., 55 NY. S 50, 932 V. Mayor &c., 160 N. Y 691. 932 V. Pennsylvania &c. R. Co., 119 Pn St 184. "'^ V Wheelock, 95 Fed. 883. 1029 1030 Ocean Grove &c. Assn. v. Berthall, 63 N. J. L. 312. ^ ^ 593 O'Connor v. City of Memphis, 6 Lea 730 V. Pittsburg, 18 Pa. St. 1|7,^ ^^OQ V. Town of Waterbury, 69 Conn. '>06. - ^"^^ Oconto City Water &c. Co. v. C'ty of Oconto. 105 Wis. 76. 1507, 1554 O-Dea V. City of Winona, 41 Minn.^^^^ Odelf v'^City of Atlanta, 97 Ga. 670, 598 cxlvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Odiorne v. Rand. 59 N. H. 504, 229 O'Donnell v. Eailey, 24 Miss. 386, 1511, 1532 O'Donovan v. Wilkins, 4 So. 789, 1100 O'Dowd V. City of Boston, 149 Mass. 443, 205 O'Farrell v. Colby, 2 Minn. 180, 381 Ogden V. City of Pliiladelphia. 143 Pa. St. 430. 1220, 1603 V. Daviess Co., 102 U. S. 634, 625, 646, 982, 984 V. Ravmond, 22 Conn. 379, 216 V. Town of Lake View, 121 III. 422, 1259, 1290 Ogden City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387, 1404 Ogg V. City of Lansing. 35 Iowa 495, 225, 797, 798, 822, 1096, 1768 Ogle V. Mayor &c., 90 Md. 59, 1315 O'Hara v. City of Buffalo, 57 N. Y. S. 367, 1365, 1378 V. City of New York, 59 N. Y. S. 36, 181, 184 V. Town of Park River, 1 N. D. 279, 174. 175, 483 Ohio V. Treasurer &c., 22 Ohio St. 419, 1480 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Lawrence Co., 27 in. 50. 1724 Ohio Valley Iron Works v. Town of Moundsville. 11 W. Va. 1. 624. 980 Ohlquest v. Farwell, 71 Iowa 231, 1713 Oil City V. McAboy, 74 Pa. St. 249, 1738 Oil City &e. Bridge Co. v. Jackson, 114 Pa. St. 321. 1596 O'Laughlin v. City of Dubuque, 42 Iowa 539, 1638 Olcott V. Supervisors, 16 Wall 678, 55. 983, 1026, 1524 Old Colony &c. R. Co. v. City of Fall River, 147 Mass. 455, 1287 Oldis V. Donmille, Show. P. C. 58, 1743 Oldknow V. Wainwright, 2 Burr. 1017, 157, 161, 473 O'Leary, Ex parte, 65 Miss. 80. 1120 V. City of Mankato, 21 Minn. 65 1627 V. Sloo, 7 La. An. 25, 1238 Oliphant v. Commissioners &c., 18 Kan. 386, 695, 696, 1569 Olive V. West Mount, 16 Rap. Jud. Que. C. S. 426, 1342 Olive Cemetery Co. v. City of Phila- delphia, 93 Pa. St. 129, 1247 Oliver v. City of Denver, 13 Colo. App. 345, 1338. 1362 V. City of Omaha, 3 Dill. 368, 1515, 1516 V. City of Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 459, 756, 803. 813, 814, 815 1068, 1112, 1113. 1371, 1594 V. Keightley, 24 Ind. 514. 651 V. Memphis &c. R. Co., 30 Ark. 128, 1720 V. Washington Mills, 11 Allen 268. 137. 1500, 1537 Olmstead v. Board. 24 Iowa 33, 652 V. Camp. 33 Conn. 532. 685 Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378. 198. 199. 222, 289 Olp V. Leddick, 59 Hun 627, 856 Olson V. City of Worcester, 142 Mass. 536, 1614 V. Town of Luck, 103 Wis. 33. 1796 Omaha Nat'l Bank v. City of Omaha, 15 Neb. 333. 990 O'Maley v. Borough of Freeport, 96 Pa. St. 24. 500 O'Malia V. Wentworth, 65 Maine 129, 537 0"Malley v. Borough of Parsons, 191 Pa. St. 612, 1338. 1802, 1804 O'Mally V. McGinn. 53 Wis. 353, 1423 O'Mara v. Railroad Co., 20 La. An. 25, 1111 O'Marrow v. City of Port Huron, 47 Mich. 585. 310 O'Meara v. Green, 16 Mo. App. 118, 1199 v. Green, 25 Mo. App. 198, 1233 V. Mayor &c., 1 Daly 425, 1097 Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490. 239, 649 O'Neil V. Battle, 15 N. Y. S. 818, 1480 V. Board &c., 41 N. J. L. 161, 699 V. City of West Branch, 81 Mich. 544. 1596 V. Hanscom, 175 Mass. 313, 1794, 1801 V. People, 166 111. 561, 1144 V. Village of West Branch, 81 Mich. 1023, 1593 O'Neill V. City of New Orleans, 30 La. An. 220. 8, 265 V. Register, 75 Md. 425, 1433 Onions v. Covington &c. R. Co., 21 Ky. L. 820, 1554 Ontario v. Hill, 99 N. Y. 324. 1010 Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend. 186. 1511 Ontario &c. R. Co. v. Taylor, 6 Ont. Rep. Q. B. D. 338. 701 Opening of Beck Street, In re, 44 N. Y. S. 1087. 1754 Opening of Berks St., In re, 12 W. N. C. 10. 1251 Opening of E. 169th St., In re, 56 N. Y. S. 819. 1781 Opening of Whitlock Ave., In re, 64 N. Y. S. 717, 1294, 1311 O'Phinney v. Trustees &c., 42 Atl. 58, 120 Opinion of Judges, 58 Maine 591, 1542 Opinion of Justices, 6 Cush. 578, 384 Opinions of Court. 58 N. H. 623, 1524 Orange v. Whittingham, 58 N. J. L. 655, 1378 Orange &c. R. Co. v. City Council, 17 Graft. 176. 1512. 1534, 1545 Orchard v. School Dist., 14 Neb. 378. 988 Oregon v. Jennings. 119 IT. S. 74. 256, 1001, 1004, 1019 V. Pyle, 1 Or. 149, 183 Oregonian R. Co. v.' Oregon &c. R. Co., 10 Saw. 464, 649 O'Reiley v. Kankakee Val. &c. Co., 32" Ind. 169, 687 O'Reillev v. City of Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439. 1197. 1198, 1258. 1268 O'Reillv V. City of Syracuse, 63 N. Y. S. 520. 1375 V. Kankakee Drain Co., 32 Ind. 169. 1084 V. Village of Sing Sing, 15 N. Y. St. 905. 1 N. Y. S. 582, 826, 1640 Orford v. Benton, 36 N. H. 395. 366 Orkney St.. In re, 194 Pa. St. 425, 1246 Orleans v. Piatt, 99 U. S. 676. 1004. 1008 Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Dunn, 51 Ala. 128, 982 Orleans Village v. Perry, 24 Neb. 831, 1638 Orman v. Cheworth. 6 Mad. 163. 1557 Oroville &c. R. Co. v. Supervisors &c., 37 Cal. 354. 1679 Orphan Asylum's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 135. 1233, 12.34 Orr V. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. 4.53. 132 V. Quimby. 54 N. H. 590, 705 Orser v. Hoag, 3 Hill 79. 132 Orton V. State, 12 Wis. 509, 181 TABLE OF CASES. cxlvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} Osborn v. I'eople, 103 III. 224, 1691 V. President &c.. 9 Wheat. 738, 4, 4(5 V. Seleotmen &.C., 2 Allen 207, 1751 V. Village of Oakland, 49 Neb. 340. 66 Osborne v. Adams Co., 106 U. S. 181, 980, 981 V. Borough of Springlake, 64 N. J. L. 362, 1788 V. Detroit. 32 Fed. 36, 1592, 1617 V. Kerr, 12 Wend. 179, 215 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co,, 147 U. S. 248. 1706 V. United States, 86 U. S. 577, 326 Osgood V. Blake, 21 N. H. 550, 346, 366 V. City of Boston, 165 Mass. 281. 711 Oshkosh City R. Co. v. Winnebago Co., 89 Wis. 435, 1251, 1303 Oshkosh Water-works Co. v. City of Oshkosh, 106 Wis. S3, 930, 931 Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y. 222, 212, 825, 1054 Ostrander v. City of Lansing, 111 Mich. 693, 1377 O'Sullivan v. City of New Orleans, 49 La. An. 616, ISO Oswald V. Gosnell, 21 Ky. L. 1660, 482 V. Mayor &c., 5 H. L. Cas. 856, 318 Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. Fish, 1 Barb. Ch. 547, 568 Otis V. City of Chicago, 161 111. 199, 511, 512, 1145 V. De Boer, 116 Ind. 531, 1201 V. Stockton, 76 Maine 506, 992 V. Strafford. 10 N. H. 352, 1053 Otoe Co. V. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1. 643. 992 Otsego Lake Tp. v. Kirsten, 72 Mich. 1. 965 Ottawa V. Carey, 108 U. S. 110, 559. 624. 643. 980. 982, 984 V. First Nat'l Bank, 103 U. S. 770, 1000 V. National Bank, 105 U. S. 342, 980, 1001. 1018 Ottawa Com'rs v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234, 1520 Ottawa Gas Co. v. McCaleb, 81 111. 556. 1513 Ottawa Gas Light &c. Co. v. People, 138 111. 336. 840 V. Thompson, 39 111. 598, 1112 Ottendorfer v. Fortunato, 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 495, 1187 Ottie V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 89 Wis. 127, 1802 Ottoman Cahvey Co. v. City of Phil- adelphia, 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 524. 210 Ottumwa Brick &c. Co. v. Ainlev. 109 Iowa 386, 1176, 1246. 1308 Ould V. City of Richmond. 23 Gratt. 464. 1507. 1520 Outagamie Co. v. Town of Greenville. 77 Wis. 165, 938, 942 Ouverson v. City of Grafton, 5 N. D. 281, 1330 Over V. City of Greenfield, 107 Ind. 231, 261 Overholt v. Vieths. 93 Mo. 422, 1790 Overing v. Foote. 65 N. Y. 263, 1238 v. Russell, 32 Barb. 263, 134 Overseers &c. v. Guardians &c., L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 723, 1043 V. McCoy, 2 P. & W. 432, 1043 V. Overseers &c., 19 N. J. L. 173. 1056 V. Overseers &c., 32 N. J. L. 66. 430 V. Overseer &c., 51 N. J, L. 93. 430, 431 Overseers v. Overseers &c., 3 Johns. 193, 430 V. Overseers &c., 15 Johns. 436, 193 v. Overseers, 18 Johns. 407, 192, 210, 647 V. Overseers &c.. 15 N. Y. 341, 253 v. Overseers &c., 114 Pa. St. 394, 1043 V. Overseers &c., 118 Pa. St 84, 1044 v. Overseers &c., 148 Pa. St. 333, 1048 V. Overseers &c., 148 Pa. St. 38(X 1046 V. Overseers &c., 3 Penny. 107, 1046 V. Overseers &c., 18 W. N C 161, 1046 V. Overseers &c., 2 Vt. 151, 1058 V. Sears, 22 Pick. 122, 109 Ovitt V. Cha.se, 37 Vt. 196, 344 36-7 Owen V. City of Ft. Dodge, 98 Iowa 281, 1335 V. Hill, 67 Mich. 43, 1484 Owens V. City of Lancaster, 182 Pa. St- 257. 1106 V. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 461. 1726 V. O'Brien, 78 Va. 116, 313 V. State, 64 Tex. 500. 158 Owings V. Jones, 9 Md. 108. 1095 V. Speed. 5 Wheat. 420. 86, 87 14'>'> Owners &c. v. Mayor &c., 15 Wend r, ^"4' . . , 688, 692 Owners of Lands v. People, 113 111. 296. 1084 Oxby V. Board of Supervisors &c., 124 Mich. 463, 1659 Oxford &c. Society v. West &c. Soci- ety, 55 N. H. 463, 564 Ozier v. Town of Hinesburg, 44 Vt. 220, 1598 Pace V. Ortiz, 72 Tex. 437, 1663 V. People, 50 111. 432, 200 Pacific Bridge Co. v. Clackamas Co., 45 Fed. 217, 834 Pacific Coast S. S. Co. v. Kimball, 114 Cal. 414, 609 Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 111. 602, 1513 Pacific Imp. Co. v. City of Clarks- dale, 74 Fed. 528, 743 Pacific Pav. Co. v. Mowbray, 127 Cal. 1. 952 Pacific R. Co. V. Cass Co., 53 Mo. 17, 1513 Pacific Road Co. v. Renshaw, 18 Mo. 210. 994 Pack V. Mayor &c., 8 N. Y. 222, 1591 Packard v. Bergen Neck R. Co., 54 N. J. L. 229, 11.56 V. Board, 2 Colo. 338. 652, 985. 990 V. Mendenhall, 42 Ind. 598, 1572 V. Railroad Co., 48 N. J. Bq. 281, 592 Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, 579 V. St. Louis. 100 U. S. 423. 1537 V. Sorrels. 50 Ark. 466. 629 Packwood v. Kittitas Co., 15 Wash. 88. 1021 Paddleford v. Mayor &c., 14 Ga. 438, 1500, 1508 Padgett V. State. 93 Ind. 396. 1660 Paducah &c. Co. v. Stovall, 12 Heisk. 1. 704 Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, 1460 Page V. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338, 370, 651 V. Chicago &c, R. Co., 70 111. 324, 1603 cxlviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} Page V. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. G48, 200, 207, 3G9, 1660 V. Mayor &c., 34 Md. 558, 1704 V. O'Toole, 144 Mass. 303, 675 Painter v. Inhabitants «&c., 43 N. J. Eq. 317, 1541 Palmer v. Burnham, 47 Pac. 599, 728 V. City of Danville, 154 111. 156, 1149, 1231, 1299, 1300 V. Citv of Danville, 166 111. 42, 1310 V. Citv of Helena. 19 Mont. 61. 876 V. City of Syracuse, 57 N. Y. S. 600. 1304 V. Dearing, 93 N. Y. 7, 1631, 1632 V. Donev. 2 Jolans. 346, 1540 V. Fitts, 51 Ala. 489, 1538 V. Hayes, 112 Ind. 289, 1757 V. Highway Com'rs, 49 Mich. 45, 1572 V. Mayor &c., 2 Sandf. 318. 178 V. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 559 V. Stumph. 29 Ind. 329, 1224, 1268 V. Vandenbergh, 3 Wend. 193, 193, 1054 V. Way, 6 Colo. 106, 1198, 1230 Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529, 1002, 1004, 1020, 1026 Paola &c. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 16 Kan. 302, 275, 277, 280, 732 Pappenheim v. Metropolitan R. Co., 128 N. Y. 436, 1773 Papworth v. City of Fitzgerald, 106 Ga. 378, 513 V. City of Milwauliee, 64 Wis. 389, 1589 Paralee v. Camden, 49 Ark. 165, 1403 Parcher v. Marathon Co., 52 Wis. 388, 1551, 1552 Pardridge v. Village of Hyde Park, 131 111. 537, 521 Pareley v. Incorporated Town of Mechanicsville. 101 Iowa 266, 1784 Paret v. Bayonne. 39 X. J. L. 559, 662 Parfitt V. Ferguson. 38 N. Y. S. 466, 739 v. B\u-geson, 159 N. Y. Ill, 1349 Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341, 685 Paris V. People, 27 111. 73. 213 Paris Mountain Water Co. v. City Council &c., 53 S. C. 82, 1778 Parish v. Golden, 35 N. Y. 462. 12.'.5 V. Town of Eden, 62 Wis. 272, 1621 V. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494. 650 Parish School Board v. Packwood, 42 La. An. 468. 849, 1483 Park V. Board &c.. 3 Ind. App. 536. 1076 V. City of Boston. 15 Pick. 198, 1571 V. Independent School Dist., 65 Iowa 209. 1496 V. Mayor &c.. 8 Pick. 218. 1724 V. Modern Woodman, 181 111. 214. 734, 1752 Park Ave. Sewer, In re, 169 Pa. St. 433, 1244 Park Co. v. Jefferson Co., 12 Colo. 585, 1064 Parke v. City of Seattle, 5 Wash. 1, 1602 Parker v. Board &c.. 54 Mich. 308, 1675 V. Board &c., 106 N. Y. 392, 852, 933, 964 V. Buckner, 67 Tex. 20, 1495 V. Ch.nllis. 9 Kan. 155. 1253. 1268 V. Citv of Atchison. 58 Kan. 29. 791 V. City of Boston, 175 Mass. .501, 1336, 1361 V. Citv of Springfield, 147 Mass. 391. 1631. 1634. 1636 V. Citv of St. Paul, 47 Minn. 317. 1.5.59. 1573 V. City of Syracuse, 31 N. Y. 376, 1191 V. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. St. 507, 69 Parker v. Mayor &c., 39 Ga. 725, 1112, 1375 V. Smith, 3 111. App. 356, 990 V. Titcomb, 82 Maine 180, 345, 355. 357, 627, 1474 V. Zeisler, 139 Mo. 298, 13 V. Zeisler, 73 Mo. App. 537, 518 Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 TT. S. 487, 653. 979. 980, 1535, 1536 Parkhill v. Town of Brighton, 61 Iowa 103, 1634, 1802 Parkhurst v. Capital City R. Co., 23 Or. 471, 13.51 Parkinson v. Parker, 48 Iowa 667, 230 Parks V. City of Boston, 15 Pick. 198. 693 V. Greenville, 44 S. C. 168, 789 V. Mayor &c., 8 Pick. 218, 687, 1320 V. Newburyport, 10 Gray 28, 1216 Parmelee v. City of Chicago, 60 111. „ 267, ^ 1248 Parnell v. Commissioners, 34 Ala. Parr v. President &c., 72 N. Y. 463, 262, 491. 638, 851 Parrett v. Shaubhut. 5 Minn. 323, 228 Parry v. Berry. 1 Comyns 269, 289, 296 Parsons. Ex parte. 1 Hughes 282, 1.534 V. Brainard. 17 Wend. 522, 228 V. Inhabitants &c., 11 Pick. 396, 251. 257. 647, 867, 1542 V. Inhabitants &c., 70 Maine 262. 974 V. Jackson. 99 U. S. 434. 1012, 1027 V. McGavock, 2 Tenn. Ch. 581, 1745 V. Trustees, 44 Ga. 529, 491, 1425 Passage v. Board &c., 19 Mich. 330, 1485 Patoka Tp. v. Hopkins, 131 Ind. 142. 791 Patrick v. Robinson, 83 Ala. 575, 1742 Patten v. Green, 13 Cal. 325. 1238 Patterson v. Barlow. 60 Pa. St. 54, 370 V. Baumer, 43 Iowa 477, 689 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 75 111. 588. 1706 V. City of Austin, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 201. 1326 V. City of Austin, 29 S. W. 1139, 1316, 1335 V. City of Macomb, 179 111. 163. 1134 V. Inhabitants &e., 38 N. J. L. 255. 322 V. Mayor &c.. 83 Ga. 606, 1491 V. Miller. 2 Met. 493. 197. 198 V. Munyan. 93 Cal. 128. 1561 Patton V. Board &c.. 9,6 Ind. 131, 1580 V. Caldwell. 1 Dall. 419. 1757 V. City of Philadelphia, 175 Pa. St. 88. 1219 V. City of Springfield, 99 Mass. 627. 1514 V. Stephens, 14 Bush 324, 669, 670 Patty V. Colgan. 97 Cal. 251. 926 Paul V. City of Detroit, 32 Mich. 108. 698 V. City of Kenosha, 22 Wis. 266. 237 V. City of New York, 61 N. Y. S. 570, 710. 1753 V. Pacific R. Co., 4 Dill. C. C. 35. 1720 Paulsen v. Portland. 149 V. S. 30. 1302 Paulson V. City of Portland. 16 Or. 450, 1205, 1253. 1288 Pause V. Citv of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92. 1773. 1775 Paxson V. Sweet, 13 N. J. L. 196. 506. 1198 Payne v. Rittman. 66 Ark. 201, 209 V. Town of Dunham, 29 111. 105 1042 vr Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 630, 1537 TABLE OP CASES. cxlix [References are to Pages. Vol. I, j)p. J-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Payne v. Village of Soulli Springfield. 19 V. Hughitt. 5 Lans. 89. 987 V. Hulett. 15 N. Y. S. 630. 1412 V. Hurford, 167 111. 226. 1144, 1146 V. Hurlbert. 46 N. Y. 110, 988 V. Hurlbut. 24 Mich. 44. 9. 44. 90, 764, 1432 V, Hutton, 18 Hun 116. 990 V. Hvnds. 30 N. Y. 470, 1568 V. Inilay, 20 Barb. 68, 137 TABLE OF CASES. cliii [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 People V. Irwin, 21 Wend. 128, 134 V. Jackson, S Mich. 110. 1419 V. Jaehne, ](»3 X. Y. 182, 115 V. Jansen, 7 Johns. 332, 771 V. Johnson, G Cal. 409, 883 V. Johnson, 30 ("al. 9S, 535 V. Johr, 22 Mich. 461, 309, 312 V. Jones, 112 N. Y. 597, 554 V. Jourdan, 15 Wkly. Dig. 278, 1443 V. Judge &c., 31 Mich. 45G. 1672 V. Judge &c., 40 Mich. 64, 695, 1572 V. Judges &c., 23 Wend. 360, 1370 V. Justices, 74 N. Y. 406, 1413 V. Justices, 12 Hun 65, 537 V. Kane, 161 N. Y. 380. 218. 872, 1793 V. Kearney. 62 N. Y. S. 1097, 1823 V. Keir, 78 Mich. 98. 487, 603, 1402 V. Keller, 157 N. Y. 90. 1784 V. Keller, 158 N. Y. 187. 1784 V. Keller. 54 N. Y. S. 1011, 1820 T. Keller, 61 N. Y. S. 746, 171, 178 V. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475, 922, 1576, 1578 V. Kelly. 5 Abb. N. C. 383, 486, 894 V. Kennedy, 37 Mich. 67, 377 V. Kenney, 96 N. Y. 294, 376 V. Kent, 160 111. 655, 752, 753 V. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188, 1083, 1352, 1582 V. Kilduff, 15 111. 492, 158, 1645 V. Kilman, 69 N. Y. 32, 1580 V. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 1390 V. King, 42 N. Y. S. 961. 1828 T. Kingman, 24 N. Y. 559. 1556, 1561, 1570 V. Kingston &c. Road Co., 23 Wend. 193. 123 V. Kipley, 171 111. 44, 1644, 1817, 1824 V. Knauber. 60 N. Y. S. 298, 1822 V. Kniffln, 21 How. Pr. 42, 353 V. Knight. 13 Mich. 230, 1695 V. Knowles, 47 N. Y'. 415, 988 V. Kopplekorn, 16 Mich. 842, 370 V. La Grange, 40 N. Y. S. 1026, 201, 1769 V. Laine, 33 Cal. 55. 370 V. Lane, 55 N. Y. 217, 1657 V. Langdon, 40 Mich. 673, 1688 V. Lansing. 55 Cal. 393, 1473 V. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526. 1689 V. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 137, 1252 V. Lawrence, 54 Barb. 589, 708 V. Lawrence. 6 Hill 244. 668, 960 V. Leavitt. 41 Mich. 470. 544 V. Leavy, 59 N. Y. S. 408. 192 V. Leitner. 62 N. Y. S. 969, 1823 V. Leonard. 73 Cal. 230, 185 V. Lingle. 165 111. 65, 1278 V. Lippincott, 81 III. 193, 1021 V. Loehfelm, 102 N. Y. 1, 1559, 1562, 1583 V. Loeffler, 175 111. 585, 1824, 1825, 1826 V. Lohnas, 54 Hun 604, 1261 V. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303, 106. 114, 380, 1694 V. Lucas, 93 N. Y. 585, 328, 332 V. Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368, 1829 T. MacLean, 13 N. Y. S. 685. 1441, 1442 V. MacLean, 14 N. Y. S. 77, 1444 V. MacLean. 17 N. Y. S. 475. 1442 V. Mahaney, 18 Mich. 481. 183. 756, 1433 V. Maher, 56 Hun 81. 1255 V. Mallorv. 46 How. Pr. 281, 620 V. Mangold. 71 Mich. 335. 1417 V. Manhattan R. Co., 20 Abb. N. C. 393, 1669 People V. Many, 35 N. Y. S. 78, 1286 V. Markley, 166 111. 48, 1144 V. Martin, 12 Cal. 409, 368 V. Martin, 60 Cal. 153, 1399 V. Martin, 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 22, 274, 352, 353, 354 V. Martin, 131 N. Y. 196, 1435, 1648 V. Martin, 8 N. Y. S. 516, 1438 V. Martin, 10 N. Y. S. 511, 1444 V. Maxon, 139 111. 306, 1349, 1422 V. May, 9 Colo. 404, 882, 887, 958 V. May, 27 Barb. 238, 708 V. Maynard, 14 111. 419, 1418 V. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 420, 1730 V. Mayor &c. 51 111. 17, 43, 1531, 1538 V. Mayor &c., 130 111. 406, 1489 V. Mayor &c., 179 111. 615, 1685 V. Mayor &c., 2 Neb. 166, 1745 V. Mayor &c., 4 N. Y. (4 Comst.) 419, 673, 763, 1165, 1234, 1252, 1261 1266, 1499, 1522 V. Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. 291, 294 V. Mayor &c., 144 N. Y. 63. 722, 1755 V. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. S. 538, 206 V. Mayor &c., 45 N. Y. S. 900, 1687 V. Mayor, 18 Abb. N. C. 123. 620 V. Mayor &c., 5 Barb. 43, 169, 1724 V. Mayor &c., 9 Barb. 535. 1724 V. Mayor &c., 32 Barb. 102. 673 V. Mayor &c., 2 Hill 9, 554. 1419 V. Mayor &c.. 7 How. Pr. 81, 85, 538 V. Mayor, 59 How. Pr. 277. 620, 1610 V. Mayor &c., 3 Johns. Ch. 79, 1657 V. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. 680, 753, 763 V. Mays, 17 111. App. 361, 1492 V. McAllister, 10 Utah 357. 209 V. McCarthy, 45 How. Pr. 97. 541 V. McCartney, 53 N. Y. S. 1047, 1830 V. McClave, 123 N. Y. 512, 1438, 1439 V. McClave, 8 N. Y. S. 515, 1445 V. McClave, 9 N. Y. S. 263, 1443 V. McClave, 10 N. Y. S. 441, 1442 V. McClave, 10 N. Y. S. 561, 1440, 1444 v. McClave, 13 N. Y. S. 340, 1439 v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432, 1287, 1498. 1522 V. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489, 55, 61 V. McPall, 26 111. App. 319. 1477, 1494 V. McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374, 150, 1432 V. McLean, 8 N. Y. S. 511, 1441 V. McMurray, 27 Colo. 277. 1652 V. McRoberts, 62 111. 88. 1209, 1224 V. McWethy, 165 111. 222. 1282. 1296, 1308 V. McWethy. 177 111. 334. 719. 1259, 1308 V. Meach, 14 Abb. Pr. 429, 1173 V. Mead. 24 N. Y. 114, 1009 V. Meakim, 133 N. Y. 214, 816. 832 V. Meakim. 56 Hun 626, 1678 V. Mellen, 32 111. 181, 122 V. Merrick, 16 N. Y. S. 246. 169 V. Mersereau, 74 Mich. 687, 332 V. Metropolitan Police, 19 N. Y. 188. 1083 V. Metzker. 47 Cal. 524, 380 V. Mevers. 95 N. Y. 223, 598 V. Miller. 16 Mich. 205, 1695 V. Miller. 38 Hun 82, 1403 V. Mills. 32 Hun 459. 301. 303 V. Minck, 21 N. Y'. 539, 1424 eliv TABLE OF CASES, [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 People V. Mitchell. 35 N. Y. 551, 982, 983 • V. Molitor, •_'3 Mich. 341, 378, 1095 V. Mollov. K51 N. Y. 6121. 1305 V. Molloy. 54 X. Y. S. 1084, 1684 V. Morgan, 55 N. Y. 587, 991 V. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563, 183, 415, 428 V. Morris. 13 Wend. 325. 4, 5. 9. 61, 81. 83. 90, 103, 453, 456 V. Mosher, 163 N. Y. 32, 1820. 1821, 1822 V. Mosher, 61 N. Y. S. 452, 1825, 1826 V. Moss, 56 N. Y. S. 1032, 201, 208, 1767 V. Moss, 63 N. Y. S. 912, 1765 V. Mount, 87 111. App. 194, 525, 1800 V. Murray, 57 Mich. 396, 540, 1422, 1423 V. Murray, 70 N. Y. 521, 1826 V. Murray. 73 N. Y. 535. 171, 454 V. Nearing. 27 N. Y. 306. 689 V. Newbrand. 60 N. Y. S. 588, 194 V. Newell. 13 Barb. 86. 295 V. Newton. 126 N. Y. 656. 1648 V. New York, 82 N. Y. 491, 200 V. New I'ork Board &c., 52 N. Y. Super. 520, 1492 V. New York &c. R. Co., 74 N. Y. 302. 591 V. New York &c. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 565. 19 V. Nichols. 79 N. Y. 582, 200, 206 V. Niles. 35 Cal. 282, 1499 V. Nixon, 158 N. Y. 221. 152, 209, 1829 V. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375. 197, 198, 206, 289, 294 V. Nyland, 41 Cal. 129, 1412 V. OBrien, 111 N. Y. 1, 75, 521, 595 V. Olmsted. 45 Barb. 644, 1650 V. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251, 115 V. Organ, 27 111. 26, 310 V. Osborn, 20 Wend. 186, 708 V. Osborne. 7 Colo. 605, 150 V. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48, 595 V. Oulton. 28 Cal. 44. 168. 213 V. Pacheco. 27 Cal. 175, 763 V. Page. 6 TTtah 353. 59, 113, 115 V. Palmer. 52 N. Y. 84. 294 V. Palmer, 152 N. Y. 217, 1819 V. Parkes, 58 Cal. 624, 980 V. Pennock, 60 N. Y. 421, 319, 328 V. Perkins, 85 Cal. 509, 187. 313 V. Peters. 4 Neb. 254. 1485 V. Phillips, 1 Denio 388, 185 V. Phippin. 70 Mich. 6. 137 V. Phcpnix Bank. 24 Wend. 431. 259 V. Pinckney. 32 N. Y. 377, 103. 1083 V. Police .Tnstices. 7 Mich. 455, 1419 V. Pope. 53 Cal. 437, 1214 V. Porter, 6 Cal. 26, 199. 368 V. Potter, 63 Cal. 127. 187, 213, 1445 V. Power, 25 111. 187, 103, 762, 1084, 1522 V. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68. 611 V. President &c., 64 Barb. 55, 1108 V. President &e., 32 Hun 508. 535 V. President &c., 29 N. Y. St. 723. 1649 V. President &c., 9 Wend. 351, 61. 83. 123. 404 V. President &c., 23 Wend. 254, 1578 V. Provines. 34 Cal. 520, 223 V. Quigg. 59 N. Y. 83. 106 V. Rathbone, 145 N. 1'. 434. 1829 V. Raymond, 37 N, Y. 428, 150, 1083 V. Reardon. 49 Hun 425, 1649 V. Reat, 107 111. 581, 1260 People V. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, V. Regents &c., 4 Mich. 1560, 1562 98, 339, 1655 168 61, 83 V. Reid, 11 Colo. 138, V. Reynolds, 10 III. 1, V. Riordan, 73 Mich. 508, 1689, 1690 V. Robb, 5 N. Y. S. 869, 1445 V. Robb, 8 N. Y. S. 418, 456, 1445 V. Robb, 9 N. Y. S. 831, 1438, 1442 V. Robb. 55 II un 425, 1441 V. Roberts. 148 N. Y. 360, 1829 V. Roberts. 103 N. Y. 70, 1662 V. Roche, 124 111. 9, 1489, 1496 V. Romero. 18 Cal. 89. 1679 V. Roosevelt, 43 N. Y. S. 73. 1766 V. Roosevelt, 44 N. Y. S. 655. 1766 V. Roosevelt. 44 N. Y. S. 1003, 1806 V. Roosevelt. 48 N. Y. S. 578, 1823 V. Roosevelt. 57 N. Y. S. 11, 1765 V. Rosborough. 14 Cal. 180, 368 V. Runkle, 9 .Tohns. 147, 167, 288 V. Russell. 4 ^Vend. 570, 771 V. Ryan. 156 111. 620, 1277, 1278 V. Sacramento, 6 Cal. 422, 526 V. Saele, 52 Cal. 620. 1473 V. Salomon. 51 111. 37. 55. 61. 82. 83. 1084, 1546 V. Sanderson. 30 Cal. 160, 185 V. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428, .505 V. Scannell, 65 N. Y. 832, 1768 V. Scannell. 54 N. E. 670, 1830 V. Scannell, 56 N. Y. S. 117. 194, 1828 V. Scannell. 59 N. Y. S. 480, 1822 V. Scannell, 59 N. Y. S. 950, 1684, 1821, 1823 V. Scannell, 62 N. Y. S. 682, 1684 V. Scannell. 62 N. Y. S. 930, 1768 V. Scannell, 62 N. Y. S. 1064. 171, 202 V. School Trustees. 78 111. 136, 1471 V. Schuyler. 4 N. Y. 173. 332 V. Schuvler. 5 Barb. 166. 331 V. Scrugham. 20 Barb. 302. 1657, 1691 V. Seaman. 5 Denio 409. 377 V. Shea. 64 N. Y. S. 426, 1823 V. Sheffield. 47 Hun 481. 1659 V. Shephard, 36 N. Y. 285, 798, 1432, 1433 V. Sherman, 83 111. 165. 1276 V. Simis, 45 N. Y. S. 940, 1828 V. Sisson, 98 111. 335. 362, 1473 V. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595. 684. 685, 692, 698 V. Smith. 45 N. Y. 772, 1009 V. Smyth. 28 Cal. 21. 213 V. Son, 19 N. Y. S. 309. 901 V. Soncy. 26 111. Anp. 505, 1663 V. Spencer. 55 N. Y. 1. 988 V. Squire. 107 N. Y. 593. 1390 V. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499. 756. 984 V. State Treasurer, 24 Mich. 468. 984. 1429 V. Staton, 73 N. C. 546. 171, 196 V. Stephens.'71 N. Y. 527, 729. 771 V. Stevens, 5 Hill 616, 171, 288 V. Stevens. 13 Wend. 341, 496 V. Stewart. 28 Cal. 395. 763 V. Stewart. 111. App. 62, 328 V. Stocking. 50 Barb. 573, 869, 1661 V. Stone. 78 Mich. 635, 373, 1486 V. Stott. 90 Mich. 343. V. Stout. 23 Barb. 338. V. Stowell, 9 Abb. N. C. 456. 187, 280 V. Stupp. 49 Hun 544, 919 V. Suburban R. Co., 178 111. 594. 585, 1351. 1813 V. Summers. 30 N. Y. S. 614. 1649 V. Supervisors &c., 67 111. 57, 1756 1415 61. 69, 83 TABLE OF CASES. clv [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] People V. Supervisors, 88 111. 469. 986, 988 V. Supervisors &c., 100 111. 332, 1681 V. Supervisors &c., S Mich. 47."), 1665 V. Supervisors &c., 14 Mich. 336, 860 V. Sui)crvisors tV:c., 26 Mich. 22, 1238 V. Supervisors &c., 36 Mich. 377, 1652 V. Supervisors &c., 11 N. Y. 563, 1539, 1652, 1669 V. Supervisors &c., 20 N. Y. 252, 1252 V. Supervisors, 11 Abb. Pr. 114, 1522 V. Supervisors &c., 15 Barb. 607, 1668 V. Supervisors &c., 1 Hill 195, 1723 . V. Supervisors. 1 Hill 362. 175, 178 v. Supervisors &c., 12 Johns. 414. 1668 V. Supervisors «&c., 10 Wend. 363. 1529 V. Supervisors, 12 Wend. 257, 179 V. Sutphin, 66 N. Y. 49, 1712 V. Swift, 31 Cal. 26. 258, 259, 631, 714 V. Taylor, 57 Cal. 620. 313 V. Tazewell County, 22 111. 147, 1016 v. Ten Evck, 13 Wend. 448, 323 V. Thompson. 99 N. Y. 641, 1676 V. Throop, 12 Wend. 183, 499 V. Thurber. 13 111. 554, 137 V. Tisdale. 1 Doug. 59, 377 V. Titner. 63 N. Y. S. 209, 1822 V. Toal. 85 Cal. 333, 196, 1410 V. Tompkins, 74 111. 482. 318 V. Town, 37 N. Y. S. 864, 712 V. Town Auditors. 75 N. Y. 316. 224 V. Town Board &e., 59 N. Y. S. 248. 1662 v. Town of Fairbury. 51 111. 149, 168 V. Town of Linden. 107 Cal. 94. 63 V. Town of Mt. Morris, 137 111. 576. 1651 V. Town of Oran. 121 111. 650, 442 V. Town of Waynesville. 88 111. 469. 991 V. Township Board &c., 20 Mich. 452. 983, 1536 V. Tracy, 54 N. Y. S. 1070, 208 V. Tracy, 1 Denio 617, 1681 V. Treasurer &c., 39 Mich. 554, 646 v. Tremain, 17 How Pr. 142, 1662 V. Trustees, 78 111. 136. 1538 V. Trustees &c.. 54 Hun 16, 1649 V. Tweed. 63 N. Y. 202. 103 V. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 296. 1511 V. Van Alstvne, 65 N. Y. S. 451. 1712 V. Van Cleve. 1 Mich. 362. 380 V. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396, 1115 V. Van Houten, 35 N. Y. S. 186. 541 V. Van Slvck. 4 Cowen 297. 381 V. Van Tassel, 19 N. Y. S. 643. 299 V. Van Wart, 25 Misc. 215. 88 V. Van Wyck, 159 N. Y. 509, 209, 1829 V. Van Wyck, 59 N. Y. S. 134. 152, 209, 1829 V. Vilas, 36 N. Y. 459. 178 V. Vilas. 3 Abb. Pr. 252. 308. 318 V. Village of Highland Park. 88 Mich. 653. 155 V. Village of Holly, 119 Mich. 637. 638 V. Village of Hyde Park, 117 HI. 462, 700 V. Village of New Rochelle, 45 N. Y. S. 836. 1549 V. Village of Rochelle, 31 N. Y. S. 592. 1243 V. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 490 People V. Wagner, 7 Lans. 467, 987 v. Walker, 9 Mich. 328, 14.30 V. Walker, 23 Barb. 304, 270 V. Walter, 68 N. Y. 403, 554 V. Warfleld, 20 111. 160, 374, 1150 V. Waring, 62 N. Y. S. 579, 1828, 1830 V. Warner, 7 Hill 81, 183 V. Warren, 14 111. App. 296, 663 V. Wattles, 13 Mich. 446, 214 V. Wearing, 27 N. Y. 306, 1261 V. Weber, 86 HI. 283, 197, 198, 1668 V. Weber, 89 III. 347, 170 •>60 V. Welde, 59 N. Y. S. 474, 1820 V. Welde, 59 N. Y. S. 1030, 152 V. Weldon, 14 N. Y. S. 447, 1037 V. Weller, 11 Cal. 49, 368 V. Welles, 45 N. Y. S. 713, 1766 V. Wendell, 71 N. Y. 171, 960 V. Wendell. 57 Hun 362, 1649, 1682 I;, West Bay Sugar Co., 83 N. " • 228, 1318 V. Whalen, 5 Weekly Dig. 410, 869 V. Whitcomb, 55 HI. 172, 401 V. White, 24 Wend. 520, 70, 197, 289, 296 V. Whitman. 10 Cal. 38, 185 V. Wiant. 48 HI. 263, 374, 1150 V. Williams. 51 111. 57, 687 V. Wilson, 15 HI. 388. 1410 V. Wilson. 62 X. Y. 186, 370 V. WiLson, 119 N. Y. 515, 1650 V. Wilson, 62 Hun 618, 1491 V. Wilson, 3 N. Y. S. 326, I'^Hg V. Wilson, 16 N. Y. S. 583. 584 V. Wong Wang. 92 Cal. 277, „, ^ , ^ 1411, 1412, 1420 V. Woods, 7 Cal. 579, 1531 V. Woods, 57 N. Y. S. 71.5, 1711 V. Wren. 5 HI. 269, 61, 83, 447, 1084 V. Wright. 34 Mich. 371, 1483 V. Wurster, 35 N. Y. S. 89, 1828 V. lancey. 167 III. 255, 1310 V. Yeazel, 84 111. 539. 1483 V. York. 53 N. Y. S. 947, 208. 1684 V. lork, 59 X. Y. vS. 418. 1687, 1712 V. lork, 60 N. Y. S. 208, 1766 V. York, 64 N. Y. S. 2, 1766 V. York. 65 N. Y. S. 606. 1766 y-.York. 65 N. Y. S. 1074. 1768 People's Nat'l Bank v. Ayer, 24 Ind App. 212, 1033 V. City of Ennis, 50 S. W^ 632 T> , , T. ^ 1548. 1554 People's R. Co. v. Memphis R. Co.. 10 Wall. 38. 637. 1323 Peoria &c. R. Co. v. People. 116 HI 401, 1533 V. Peoria &c. R. Co., 66 111. 174, 1323 V. Schertz. 84 HI. 135. 1706 Pepper v. Smith. 15 Lea 551, 406, 407 Peppin V. Cooper. 2 B. & Aid. 431, 326 Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586. 467 Pereles v. City of W^atertown, 6 Biss. X, ''P- ^ 765 Pereria v. Wallace, 129 Cal. 397, 1791, 1809 Perin v. Carey. 24 How. 465. 564. 664 Perine v. Lewis. 12S Cal. 236, 1237. 1245. 1276, 1290, 1790 V. Moran, 127 Cal. 18. 1259 Perine &c. Co. v. Citv of Pasadena, 116 Cal. 6. ' 510. 7.54 Perkin v. Proctor. 2 W^ils. 382. 220 Perkins v. Board &c.. 56 Iowa 476. 1481 V. City of Burlington, 77 Iowa 553. 1514, 1518 V. Citv of Lawrence, 136 Mass. 305. 824 V. City of New Haven, 53 Conn. 214, 798 clvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'i rerkins v. City of Watertown, 5 Biss. 320, 1737 V. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103, 1410 V. Crocker. 109 Mass. 128, 1485 V. Inhabitants, 68 Maine 152, 1587, 1597 V. Ledbetter, 68 Miss. 327, 1401 V. Sanders. 56 Miss. 733, 1813 V. Slack, 86 Pa. St. 270, 894 V. Weston, 3 Cush. 549, 1429 Perkinson v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App. 322. 210 Perley v. Inhabitants &c., 7 Gray 464. 1726 V. Muskegon Co., 32 Mich. 132, 319 Perrin v. Lyman, 32 Ind. 16, 216 Perrine v. Farr, 22 N. J. L. 356, 687 Perry v. Brown, 21 Ky. L. 344, 1788 V. City Council &c.. 7 Utah 143, 1401 V. City of Rockdale, 62 Tex. 451, 1531 V. Cheboygan, 55 Mich. 250, 178 V. Cumberson, 39 Hun 436, 1564 V. Inhabitants &c., 12 Pick. 206. 348, 1485 V. Keene, 56 N. H. 514, 979, 983 V. Kinnean, 42 111. 160, 1701 V. People. 155 111. 307, 1304 V. State, 9 Wis. 19, 424 V. Torrence, 8 Ohio 521, 1502 V. Town of Putney, 52 Vt. 533, 829 V. Tynen. 22 Barb. 137. 294, 295 V. Washburn. 20 Cal. 318, 458 Perry Co. v. City of Du Quoin, 99 111. 479, 1041 V. Conway Co., 52 Ark. 430, 934 Perryman v. Bethune. 89 Mo. 158. 1486 V. City of Greenville, 51 Ala. 507, 85, 86 Peru &c. R. Co. v. Hana, 68 Ind. 562, 1249, 1251 Peruvian &c. R. Co. v. Thames &c. Ins. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 617. 971 Pesterfleld v. Vickers, 3 Coldw. 205. 97. 468, 1075 Peterborough v. Lancaster. 14 N. H. 382. 348, 367 Peters v. Bell, 51 La. An. 1621, 209. 1820 V. City of Lynchburg, 76 Va. 927. 1520 V. Litchfield. 34 Conn. 264. 1060 V. Town of Fergus Falls. 35 Minn. 549. 1126 Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321, 8 Petersilea v. Stone. 119 Mass. 465. 195, 196 Peterson v. Mayor &c., 17 N. Y. 449, 210, 240, 252. 260, 644, 894 Petrie v. Doe, 30 Miss. 698, 294 Pettibone v. Beardslee, 1 Luzerne Leg. Reg. 180. 1745 Pettigrew v. Bell. 34 S. C. 104. 1486 V. Village of Evansville, 25 Wis. 223, 1177, 1218 Pettingill v. Town of Olean. 48 N. Y. St. 96. 1604 Pettis V. Johnson, 56 Ind. 130. 585. 1322, 1757 Pettit V. Duke. 10 Utah 311. 1298 Petty V. Looker. 21 N. Y. 267, 185 V. Myers, 49 Ind. 1. 983 Peyser v. Mavor &c.. 70 N. T. 497. 244, 1205. 1263. 1265, 1551 Pfeflferle v. Board &c.. 39 Kan. 432, 1076 Pfefferling v. Mayor &c.. 88 Md. 475. 513 Pfeiffer v. People. 170 III. 347. 1272 Phelan v. City of New York. 14 N. Y. S. 785. 176 V. Mavor &c.. 119 N. Y. 86, 1189 Phelon V. Granville, 140 Mass. 386, 176 Phelps V. City of Detroit, 120 Mich. 447, 1172, 1781 V. City of Mankato, 23 Minn. 276, 1596, 1627 V. City of Mattoon, 177 111. 169, 1274, 1278 V. City of Tacoma, 15 Wash. 307, 1553 V. Lewiiston, 15 Blatchf. 131, 1001 V. Lodge, 60 Kan. 122, 1685 V. Mayor &c., 112 N. Y. 216, 242, 244, 246, 282, 509, 1186 1263, 1264, 1552 Philadelphia's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 179, 1192 V. Bowman, 166 Pa. St. 393, 1282 V. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. St. 451, .14 V. Kddlemar. 169 Pa. St. 452, 1309 V. Fox, 64 I'a. St. 169. 10, 74, 90, 103, 422. 459. 563, 756 V. Lockhardt. 73 Pa. St. 211, 1192 V. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 41, 1250. 1251 V. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 52 Pa. St. 177, 1503 V. Providence Trust Co., 132 Pa. St. 224, 1116 V. Scott, 81 Pa. St. 80, 673 V. Smith (Pa.). 16 Atl. 493, 1588 V. Stewart, 195 Pa. St. 309, 617, 1738 V. Verner, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 79, 1234 Philadelphia Ass'n &c. v. Wood, 39 Pa. St. 73. 549 Philadelphia Ball Club v. City of Philadelphia, 192 Pa. St. 632, 1772, 1779 Philadelphia Citv v. Dungan, 124 Pa. St. 52. 1124 V. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320, 1252 Philadelphia &c. Iron Co. v. City of Chicago, 16 Ky. L. 455, 1286 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Howai'd, 13 How. 307, 1748 V. Mayor &c.. 38 Fed. 159. 788 V. Williams. .54 Pa. St. 103, 693 Philips V. City of Stevens Point, 25 Wis. 594, 1724, 1726 Phillips V. Allen. 41 Pa. St. 481, 532 V. Ash, 63 Ala. 414, 556 V. Board &c.. 5 Kan. 412, 1725 V. City of Boston, 150 Mass. 491. 184 V. City of Olympia, 21 Wash. 153, 1286 V. City of Tecumseh, 5 Neb. 812, 1400 V. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. St. 197. 213. 1112 V. Foxhall, L. R. 7 Q. B. 666, 321 V. Harrow. 93 Iowa 92. 563 V. Mavor &c., 1 Hilt. 483, 183 V. Reed. 107 Iowa 331. 878. 881. 956 V. Ritchie Co.. 31 W. Va. 477. 1633 V. School Dist., 79 Mich. 170. 840. 1496 V. Town of Albanv. 28 Wis. 340. 345. 623. 983 V. Wickham, 1 Paige Ch. 590. 447 Phillips Co. V. Lee Co.. 34 Ark. 240. 441 Phiuizy v. City Council &c., 47 Ga. 260, 1112 Phoenix, In re. 65 N. Y. S. 719, 1309 Piatt V. People. 29 HI. 54. 152 Piatt Co. V. Goodell. 97 HI. 84. 443 Pickard v. Collins. 23 Barb. 444, 1387 Pickens Tp. v. Post, 99 Fed. 659. 1010. 1032 Pickering v. De Rochemont. 66 N. H. 377. 341. 343, 1485 V. Pickering. 11 N. H. 141, 365 TABLE OF CASES. clvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.-i Pickering v. Sbotwell, 10 Barr 23, 5G3 V. State, 106 Ind. 228, 1201 Pickett V. Adams. 12 Ky. L. 957, 1472 V. Ilari-od, 86 Ky. 485, 1472 V. Hastings, 47 Cal. 2G9, 629 V. School Dist., 25 Wis. 551, 291 Pickford v. Mayor &c., 98 Mass. 491, 706 Pickles V. Dry Dock Co., 38 La. An. 412, 572 Pickard v. Smith. 10 C. B. 470, 1779 Pidgeon v. McCarthy. 82 Ind. 321, 49 Pierce v. Benjamin, 14 IMck. 356, 1727 V. City of Aurora, 81 111. App. 670, 503 V. Citv of New Bedford, 129 Mass. 534, 263 V. Dart, 7 Cow. 609. 1112 V. Drew. 136 Mass. 75, 681 V. Emery, 32 N. H. 484. 1689 V. Mayor &c., 2 Marv. 306. 1328. 1359, 1374 V. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306, 1427 V. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127. 810 Pierce Mfg. Co. v. Bleckwenn, 12 N. Y S 768 922 Piercy v. Averill. 37 Hnn 360, 222, 224 Pieri v. Mavor &c.. 42 Miss. 1493. 1093 Pierie v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. St. 573. 178 Pierson v. City of Chicago, 162 111. 383 1144 V. Glean, 14 N. J. L. 36, 1095 Pike V. City of Chicago. 155 111. 656. 1299 V. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491, 221 Pike Co. V. Hosford, 11 111. 170, 931, 1780 Pillsbury v. Brown, 47 Cal. 477, 1420 V. Mavor &c., 79 Maine 71, 1320 V. Moore, 44 Maine 154. 1095 Pimental v. City of San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351. 241, 291. 292. 631. 653 Pine Bluff W. & L. Co. v. City of ' Pine Bluff. 62 Ark. 196. 1712 V. Sewer Dist. &c.. 56 Ark. 205, 1175 Pine City v. Munch. 42 Minn. 342. 1126 Pine Civil Tp. v. Iluber Mfg. Co.. 83 Ind. 121. 210, 647, 857, 862 Pine Co. v. Willard. 39 Minn. 125. 321 Pine Grove Tp. v. Tallcott, 19 Wall. 666. 983 Pinkerton v. Bailey, 8 Wend. 600, 1488 Pinkham v. Inhabitants &c., 104 Mass. 78, 1586, 1606 Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164. 282, 283, 349, 363 Piollet V. Simmers, 106 Pa. St. 95, 1613, 1614 Piper V. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624. 100. 507 V. City of Spokane. 22 Wash. 147. 929. 930. 1334. 1797, 1798 V. Pearson. 2 Gray 120, 335 V. Singer. 4 Serg. & R. 354. 1546 Pipher v. People. 183 111. 436. 1274 Piqua Branch &c. v. Kuoop, 16 How. 369. 90, 103 Piscataway Tp., In re, 24 Atl. 759, 1569 Pitman v. City of El Reno, 2 Okl. • 414. 1.331 Pittelkow V. Citv of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 651. 1774 Pittman v. Citv of El Reno. 4 Okl. 638. ■ 1326 Pitts V. Citv of Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 181. 598 V. District of Opelika, 79 Ala. 527. 482 Pittsburg V. Clarksville. 58 N. H. 291. 15S0 V. Cluley, 74 Pa. St. 262, 1425 I'ittsburg v. Danforth, 56 N. H. 272, 342, 362, 363 V. Grier, 22 I'a. St. 54, 811, 817 v. Murphy, 95 Fed. 57, 1311 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Bennett, 9 Ind. App. 92, 466 V. Board &c., 172 U. S. 32, 1097 V. City of Chicago, 159 111. 369. 1349 V. Gilleland, 56 I'a. St. 445, 1108 V. Hays. 17 Ind. App. 261. 1131. 1249, 1250, 1251, 1309 V. Hood, 94 Fed. 618, 511, 515 V. Rose, 74 I'a. St. 362, 701 V. Swinney, 97 Ind. 586, 699, 700 V. Town of Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421, 502 Pittsburg R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306, 1633 I'itzman v. Village of Freeburg, 92 111, 111, 982 Pixley v. Clark. 35 N, Y. 520, 824 Place V. City of Providence, 12 R. I, 1, 651 V. City of Yonkers, 60 N. Y. S. 171. 929 V. Taylor, 22 Ohio St. 317, 334 Placer Co. v. Campbell (Cal.), 11 Pac. 602, 938 Piano Mfg. Co. v. Rasey, 69 Wis. 246, 942 Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe Water- Works &c. Co., 52 La. An. 1243, 786 Plaquemines Police Jury v. Mitchell, 37 La. An. 44, 1544 Platenius v. State, 17 Ark. 518, 770 Piatt V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 31 N. W. 883. 1319 V. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531. 250. 1805 Platte Co. V. Gerrard. 12 Neb. 244, 664 Platter v. Board &c.. 103 Ind. 360, 210, 644. 647. 1038, 1190, 1660 Pleuler v. State. 11 Neb. 547. 1508 Plimpton V. Town of Summerset, 33 Vt. 283. 1414 Plumer v. Board &c., 46 Wis. 163, 1550 V. Harper, 3 N. H. 88, 1095 Plummer v. City of Milan, 79 Mo. App. 439, 1796, 1801 V. Sheldon, 94 Cal. 533, 1561, 1574 Plymouth Tp. v. Graver, 125 Pa. St. 24. 816 Pocontico Water-Works Co. v. Bids, 4 N. Y. S. 317. 1456 Poe V. Machine Works, 24 W. Va. 517, 543 Poillon V. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 132, 666 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270. 18 Point Pleasant Bridge Co. v. Town of Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 328. 62 Point Pleasant Land Co. v. Trustees &c.. 47 N. J. L. 235. 374. 846, 1486 Police Com'rs v. City of Louisville. 3 Bush 597, 1433 Police Jury v. Britton. 15 Wall. 566, 562. 635. 637. 863. 971. 972, 973 V. Mavor &c.. 38 La, An, 630. 12 v. McCormack, 32 La, An. 624, 629 V, McDonough. 8 La. An. 341, 983 V. Michel. 4 La. An. 84. 1743 V. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 661. 104 Polinsky v. People, 11 Hun 390. 496 Polk V. Cosgrove, 4 Biss. 437. 228 V. Plummer. 2 Humph. .500, 311 Pollard V. Hagan. 3 How. 212. 673 Pollock V, Lawrence Co,, 2 Pittsb, 137, 9.51 V. Louisville, 13 Bush 221, 1075, 1097 clviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ Polly V. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 9 Barb. 449. G92 Pomeroy v. Inhabitants &c.. 154 Mass. 462. 1601, 1602, 1638 Pomerov Salt Co. v. Davis, 21 Ohio St.' 555. 1499 Pomfrev v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 104 N. Y. 459. 224. 336. 826, 936 1542, 1562, 1604, 1614, 1617. 1631 Pompton V. Cooper Union, 101 U. S. 196, 1001 Pond V. Mcdwav. Quincy 193, 707 V. Negus. 3" Mass. 230, 301, 521. 1569 Poock V. Lafayette Bld'g Ass'n, 71 Ind. 357. 650 Pool V. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 219, 671 V. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297, 689 Pooler V. Reed, 73 Maine 129, 198 Poolev V. City of Buffalo, 122 N. Y. 592, 1264 Poor Dist. V. Byers (Pa.), 11 Atl. 242, 947 V. Poor Dist., 13 Atl. 742, 1046 Pope V. Phifer, 3 Ileisk. 682, 1538 Pope Mfg. Co. V. Granger, 21 R. I. 298, 872, 926 Popel V. Citv of Monmouth, 81 111. App. 512. 604 Poppen V. Holmes. 44 III. 218, 533 Popper V. Broderiek, 123 Cal. 456, 110 Poquet V. Town of North Hero, 44 Vt. 91, 1041 Port Clinton &c. v. Shafer. 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 583, 499 Porter v. City of Chicago. 176 111. 605, 1276, 1290 V. N. Missouri R. Co., 33 Mo. 128 1354 V. Rockford &e. R. Co., 76 III. 561. 1513 V. State. 78 Tex. 591, 1487, 1669 V. Village of Attica, 33 Hun 605, 1562 Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565, 88 Port Jervis Water-Works Co. v. Vil- lage of Port Jervis, 151 N. Y. 111. 714, 930 Portland v. Improvement Co., 33 Or. 307, 1752 Portland &c. R. Co. v. City of Port- land. 14 Or. 188, 578 V. Inhabitants &c.. 58 Maine 23. 356. 984. 990. 991, 1022 V. Inhabitants &c.. 65 Maine 63. 365. 987 Portland Sav. Bank v. City of Evans- ville. 25 Fed. 389, 1020 Portland Stoneware Co. v. Tavlor. 17 R. I. 33. 1665. 1682 Port of Mobile v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 585 Portsmouth Oas Co. v. Sanford. 97 Va. 124, 1746 Portsmouth Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield. 4 Fed. 276. 998. 1023 v. Village of Ashley, 91 Mich. 670. 634 Portwood V. Board &c., 52 Miss. 523. 1519. 1522 Post V. City of Boston, 141 Mass. 189. 1586 V. Kendall Co., 105 V. S. 667. 210 V. Pearshall, 22 Wend. 425. 1564 V. Pulaski Co., 47 Fed. 282, 988 V. Supervisors &c.. 105 U. S. 667. 986 V. Township Board &c., 63 Mich. 323. 1673, 1675 Postal Tel. &c. Co. v. Mayor &c., 79 Md. 502, 604 I'ostmaster-General v. Munger, 2 Paine C. C. 189, 318, 327 V. Rice, Gilpin 554, 650 Potter V. Canaan, 37 Conn. 224, 859 V. City of New Whatcom, 20 Wash. 589, 956 V. Collis, 46 N. Y. S. 471, 577, 1684 V. Common Council &c., 59 Mich. 8, 1675 V. Douglas Co., 87 Mo. 239. 883 V. Town of Castleton, 53 Vt. 435. 1597 V. Town of Greenwich, 26 Hun 326, 1017 Pettier &c. Co. v. Taylor, 3 MacAr- thur 4, 1745 Pottner v. City of Minneapolis, 41 Minn. 73, 1180 Potts V. Breen. 167 111. 67, 1763 V. City of Pittsburgh, 14 W. N. C. 38, 1738 V. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. St. 619, 721, 751 V. State, 75 Ind. 336, 960 Poulters' Co. v. Phillips, 6 Bing. N. C. 314, 517 Pound V. Supervisors &c., 43 Wis. 63, 570, 1133, 1255 V. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 1576 Powell V. Board &c., 46 Wis. 210, 1552 V. Boraston, 18 C. B. 175, 127 V. City of Louisville, 21 Ky. L. 554. 1276, 1543 V. City of Madison, 107 Ind. 106. 876 V. City of Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698, 108, 1722 V. Farmer, 18 C. B. 168. 127 V. Heisler. 45 Minn. 549, 915 V. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 601 V. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 396, 295, 1539 Power V. Village of Athens, 99 N. Y. 592, 568 Powers. Appeal of, 29 Mich. 504. 1232, 1540 Powers. In re, 25 Vt. 261. 1414 V. Bears. 12 Wis. 214. 697 V. City of Council Bluffs, 50 Iowa 197, 1207, 1208 V. City of St. Paul, 36 Minn. 87. 827 V. County Com'rs, 8 Ohio St. 2.58, 1517 V. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 794 V. Hazelton &c. R. Co., 33 Ohio St. 429. 695 V. Inferior Court, 23 Ga. 65, 983 V. Mayor vtc. 54 Ala. 24. 1405 V. Town of Woodstock. 38 Vt. 44. 1575 Poweshiek Co. v. Cass Co., 63 Iowa 244. 1052 Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 111. Ill, 1697 V. Village of Des Plaines, 18 111. App. 225. 1120 V. Village of Des Plaines. 22 111. App. 576. 1406 Prather v. Jeffersonville &c. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16, 1448 Pratt V. Baupre, 13 Minn. 187, ■ 217 V. Board &c., 15 Utah 1, 201 V. Gardner, 2 Cush. 63, 220 V. Lincoln Co., 61 Wis. 62, 593, 1204 V. Short. 53 How. Pr. 506, 655 V. Town of Swanton. 15 Vt. 147, 346, 644 Pray v. Mayor &c., 32 N. .7. L. 394. 8. 9, 814, 1594 Preble v. City of Portland, 45 Maine 241, 285 TABLE OF CASES. clix [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 42(5. 180. 192, 488, .536, 540, 1424 Prescott V. Hayes. 42 N. II. 5(5. 198 V. State. 19 Ohio St. 184, 1071 President &c. v. Anthony, 18 Pick. 288, 320 V. Ranlv &(•., 16 lud. 105, 1511 V. r.(>ll, 4;! Wis. 488. 536, 542 V. P.oard &.C.. 104 Mass. 470, 1247 V. Chopin. 8 Met. 40. 1019 V. City of Buffalo. 56 N. Y. S. 970. ■ 1141. 12:?7. 1277, 1282. 1283 V. City of Indianapolis, 12 Ind. 620. 457, 629 V. Cook. 4 Pick. 405. 776 V. DandridiiP. 12 Wheat. 64. 169. 240. 2(!(», 313. 1029. 1421, 1813 V. Diffobach. 1 Yeates 367. 695 V. District of Columbia, 4 Mac- Arthur 43. 1725 V. Dusouohett. 2 Ind. 586, 1639 V. Edward, 5 Ired. L. 516, 1513 V. Frick, 34 111. 405. 992 V. Hamlin. 14 Mass 178, 1422. 1424 V. Holland. 19 111. 271, 529, 535 V. Iowa, 12 How. 1. 47 V. LaSalle Co.. 12 111. 339, 107 V. Mappin. 14 111. 193. 662 V. Mayor &c., 7 Ohio 31. 88, 837, 971 V. McConnell. 12 III. 138, 1501 V. McKean, 10 Johns. 154, 86. 87 V. McKean. 11 Johns. 98. 1422, 1423 V. McKernan. 54 Wis. 487, 536 V. O'Mailey, 18 111. 407, 1422, 1427 V. Richardson, 1 Maine 79, 1813 V. Root, 2 Met. 522. 320 V. Schroeder. 58 III. 353. 1076 V. Society &c.. 24 N. J. L. 385, 36, 58, 61, 69, 81, 82, 83, 103 453, 1769 V. State, 45 Ala. 399. 1514. 1531, 1538 V. Thompson. 20 111. 197, 447. 1691 V. Village of Canandaigua, 96 Fed. 449. 1810 V. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431, 571 1559 Press Pub. Co. v. Holahan. 62 N. Y. S. 872, 710, 1698, 1788 Presser v. Bice. 142 Pa. St. 263. 1412 Pressman v. Borough of Dickson City. 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 236. 1803 Preston v. City of Boston, 12 Pick. 7, 245, 1551 V. City of Cedar Rapids, 95 Iowa 71. 518. 1211 V. Culbertson, 58 Cal. 198, 372 V. Roberts, 12 Bush 570, 1253 V. Rudd, 84 Ky. 150, 1273 Prettyman v. Supervisors &c., 19 111. 406, 1016 Prewett v. Mississippi Co., 38 Ark. 213, 1052 Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491, 276, 277, 1150, 1201 Price V. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co.. 13 Ind. 58, 291, 1256 V. Grant. 7 N. Y. S. 904, 1415 V. Inhabitants &c., 92 Mo. 378, 1559 V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 27 Wis. 98, 702. 1218 V. Thompson. 48 Mo. 361. 629 Price Co. v. City of Atlanta, 105 Ga. 3.58. 1205 Prichett v. Stanislaus Co., 73 Cal. 310. 184 Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point. 43 Wis. 513. 1584. 1597 Priest V. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617. 133 Priestly v. Foulds, 2 Scott N. R. 205, 123 Priet V. De La Montanya, 85 Cal. 148. 314 V. Reis, 93 Cal. 85, 900 Prince v. City of Fresno, 88 Cal. 407, 177 V. City of Lynn. 149 Mass. 193. 163 V. City of Quincy, 105 111. 138. 233. 848. 895 V. City of Quincy, 128 111. 443. 881, 888, 893 V. City of Quincy, 28 111. App. 490. 796 V. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 1699 V. Lewis. 5 B. & C. 363. 1402 Prince's Case, The, 8 Co. 1, 72 Prindle v. Fletcher, 39 Vt. 255, 1615 Prior Ave, In re, 71 N. W. 27, 1287 Pritchard v. Atkinson, 3 N. H. 335. 1572 Pritchett v. People, 6 111. 525, 288, 311 Privett V. Bickford, 26 Kan. 52, 378 Procter v. Andover, 42 N. H. 348, 687 Proctor V. Town of Lewiston, 25 111. 153, 1214 Proprietors &c. v. Battles, 6 Vt. 395. 86, 87 V. Chandler. 6 N. H. 271, 345 V. Hoboken Land &c. Co., 2 Beas. 81, 584 V. Horton, 6 Hill 501. 61, 83 V. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35. 674 V. Page, 6 N. H. 182, 345. 347, 380. 1427. 1540 V. Proprietors &c., 11 Pet. 420. 565. 584, 1463 V. Proprietors &c., 7 Pick. 344, 1813 V. Stalk, 7 Cush. 226, 1429 Prospect Park &c. R. Co. v. William- son, 91 N. Y. 552, 680 Prosser v. Davis, 18 Iowa 367, 681 V. Secor, 5 Barb. 607, 229 Protestant Orphan Asylum's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 135, 1233, 1234 Prout V. Inhabitants &c., 154 Mass. 450, 662 Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161, 8 Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15, 689, 1512 Providence Institution v. Gardner, 4 R. I. 484, 1510 Providence &c. Plank R, Co. v. City of Scranton, 1 Lack. Leg. N. 183. 727 Providence &c. R. Co. v. Wright. 2 R. I. 459. 1248. 1509 Provident Inst. v. Mayor &c., 113 U. S. 506. 1234. 1344 Provident Life &c. Co. v. Mercer Co., 170 IT. S. 593, 1011, 1031 Provost V. Mayor &c.. 3 N. Y. S. 531, 1607 Prowse V. Foot, 3 Bro. P. C. 167, 314 Pruden v. Grant Co., 12 Or. 308, 1735 V. Love. 67 Ga. 190. 221 Pryor v. City of Kansas City, 153 Mo. 135, 106 Public Park Com'rs, In re, 47 Hun 302, 1250 Public School Trustees v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618, 109 Pueschell v. Kansas City W. & I. Works, 79 Mo. App. 459, 1363 Pugh V. City of Little Rock. 35 Ark. 75. 540. 1424 V. Edison &c. Co.. 19 Ohio C. C. 594. 652 Puitt V. Commissioners, 94 N. C. 709. 1494 Pulaski Co. v. County Judge, 37 Ark. 339. 434 V. Pollock. 9 S. F. 1065, 911 V. Reeve. 42 Ark. 54, 7, 14 elx TABLE or CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Pulaski Co. v. Thompson, 83 Ga. 270, 911 Pulitzer v. City of New Yorli, 62 N. Y. S. 587, 1790 Pulliam V. Runnels Co., 79 Tex. 3«3. 1490 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsyl- vania. 141 U. S. 18, 1399 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 160, 673, 791 Purcell V. Booth, 6 Dak. 17. 1419 V. Long Island City, 36 N. Y. S. 290. 742 V. Town of Bear Creek, 138 111. 524, 908 Purdy V. Lansing, 128 U. S. 557, 991 V. People, 4 Hill 384, 55, 117 Purinton v. Inhabitants &c., 174 Mass. 556, 1791 Purrington v. Town of Warren, 49 Vt. 19. 829 Pursell V. Mayor &c., 85 N. Y. 330, 1205. 1264 Pusey V. City of Allegheny, 98 Pa. St. 522. 680, 1220 Putnam v. Douglas Co.. 6 Or. 328, 704 V. Langley, 133 Mass. 204. 302, 1692 Pybus V. Gibb, 6 El. & Bl. 902, 318 Pye V. City of Mankato, 36 Minn. 373. 1215 V. City of Mankato, 38 Minn. 536, 827 V. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312, 594, 1392 Q Quaw V. Paflf. 98 Wis. 586, 1731 Queen v. Aberdare Canal Co., 14 Q. B. 854. 346 V. Abingdon, L. R. 5 Q. B. 406, 1043 V. Board. L. R. 8 Q. B. 227, 1517 V. Inhabitants &c., L. R. 1 Q. B. 227. 1043 V. Justices, 4 Q. B. D. 522. 529 v. Gilbert. 2 Pug. & B. 619, 531 V. Governors &c., 8 Ad. & El. 632. 200 V. Local Government Board, L. R. 8 Q. B. 227. 37 V. Mayor &c., 8 Ad. & El. 633, 213 V. Mayor &c., 10 Ad. & El. 281, 11 V. Mayor &c., 19 Q. B. D. 602, 832 V. Milledge. 4 Q. P.. D. 332. 529 V. Paramore, 10 Ad. & El. 286, 11 V. Saddlers' Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 404. 207 V. SaintiflP, 6 Mod. 255. 1561 V. St. Ives. L. R. 9 Q. B. 467, 1043 V. St. Leonard. 1 Q. B. 21, 1043 V. Thompson. 5 Q. B. 477, 11 V. Town Council &c., 4 Q. B. 891. 971 V. Worcester, L. R. 9 Q. B. 340. 1043 V. York. 2 Q. B. 847, 11 Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83, 1528 Quick V. Board &c., 20 Ky. L. 1457. 1346 V. Village of River Forest, 130 111. 323. 1175 Quigg V. Evans, 121 Cal. 546, 183 Quigley v. City of Aurora, 50 Ind. 28. 535 Quill v. City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292. 632. 889 V. Mayor &c.. 55 N. Y. S. 889, 785 Quimbv v. Vermont &c. R. Co., 23 Vt. 387. 675 Quinchard v. Board &c., 113 Cal. 664. 1712 Quincy v. Cooke, 107 IT. S. 549, 992 v. Jackson, 113 U. S. 332, 1535 Quincy &c. R. Co. v. Morris, 84 111. 410, 983 Quinette v. City of St. Louis, 76 Mo. 402, 516, 523 Quinhard v. City of New I'ork, 64 N. Y. S. 904. 184 Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun 217, 1617, 1625 Quinn v. Mayor &c., 45 N. Y. S. 7, 719 V. State, 35 Ind. 485, 369 Quint V. City of Merrill, 105 Wis. 406, 490 Quintini v. Board &c., 64 Miss. 483, 1119 Quong Woo, In re, 13 Fed. 229, 1400, 1405, 1539 R Racho V. City of Detroit, 90 Mich. 92, 1593 Radcli"ff V. Mayor &c., 4 N. Y. 195, 820, 823. 1603, 1776 Rader v. Southeasterly Road Dist., 36 N. J. L. 273, 453 Radway v. Briggs, 37 N. Y. 256, 1557 Rae V. Mayor &c., 51 Mich. 526, 859, 1088 Raff V. Town of Calhoun, 110 Ga. 806, 1793 Ragan v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., Ill Mo. 456, 1568 Rahway Sav. Inst. v. Mayor &c., 53 N. J. L. 48, 1741 Rail V. Potts, 8 Humph. 225, 222 Railroad Comm. Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 5, 6 Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 101 TJ. S. 832. 18 V. Bentlev, 64 111. 438, 591 V. Chicago, 90 111. 573, 1248 V. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 510 591 V. City of Defiance, 52 Ohio St. 262, 1352, 1379 V. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 543, 1552 V. Dodge Co. Com'rs, 98 U. S. 541. 1717 V. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 1524 V. Georgia. 98 U. S. 359. 104 V. Hansing. 15 Wall. 649, 1779 V. Houston, 95 IT. S. 697, 1633 V. Maine, 96 U. S. 499. 104 V. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14, 1031 V. Otoe Co., 16 Wall. 667, 983 V. Otoe Co.. 1 Dill. 338, 1740 V. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 510, 596, 1358 V. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 18 V. Town of Lake. 71 111. 333, 591 V. Village of Belle Center, 48 Ohio St. 273. 678 Railroad Nat'l Bank v. City of Low- ell, 109 Mass. 214, 237 Railway Co. v. City of Louisville, 8 Bush 415. 588 V. Philadelphia. 101 IT. S. 528, 1509 V. Sprague. 103 U. S. 756, 1027 V. Stone. 54 Kan. 83. 1375 V. Wilson Co., 89 Tenn. 597, 1546 Raines v. Simpson. 50 Tex. 495, 224 Rains v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 403, 65 Raisler v. Mayor &c., 66 Ala. 194, 24.5. 1551 Raleigh &c. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451, 4, 6, 673 Ralls Co. v. Douglass, 105 U. S. 728. 995 Ralls "co. Court v. United States, 105 IT. S. 733. 412. 1523. 1528. 1.533, 1534. 1535 Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W. Va. 544, 1754 TABLE OF CASES. clxi [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Ramlsh v. Ilartwell, 126 Cal. 443. 10128. Ilfi6. 1310, 1.505 Ramsay v. Iloeger. 76 111. 432, 1721 Ramsey v. National Contracting Co., 63 N. Y. S. 286. 1303 V. People, 142 III. 380. 734 V. Ramsey. 121 Ind. 215, 1063 V. Rilev. 13 Ohio 157. 221 Ramson v. Mayor &c.. 24 Barb. 226, 664 Ramthun v. Halfman. 58 Tex. 551. 1561 Rand v. Wilder, 11 Cush. 294, 343, 348 Randall v. Christiansen, 76 Iowa 169. 1571 V. Conway. 63 N. H. 513, 1569 V. Eastern &c. R. Co., 106 Mass. 276. 263 V. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. 60, 262, 263 Randolph v. Good. 3 W. Va. 551. 369 V. I'nited States, 21 Ct. CI. 282, 773 Randolph Co. v. Post, 93 TT. S. 502, 991, 995. 1001 Ranney v. Bader, 67 Mo. 476, 618, 638 Rannsh v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443, 719 Ransom v. Boal. 29 Iowa 68. 629 V. City of Belvidere, 87 111. App. 167. 1364 Ranv V. Governor. 4 Blackf. 2, 326 Rapelve v. Prince, 4 Hill 119. 1757 V. Van Sickler, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 175, 1471 Rapho Tp. V. Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404, 1575 Rathbon v. Budlong, 15 Johns. 1. 216 Rathbone v. Board &c., 73 Fed. 395, 973, 1006. 1030 V. Board &c., 83 Fed. 125 ; 49 U. S. App. 577. 10, 12, 1031 V. Wirth. 150 N. Y. 459, 1829 Rathbun v. Acker, 18 Barb. 393, 1254 Ratliffe v. County Court, 36 W. Va. 202. 902 Raton Water-works Co. v. Town of Raton. 9 N. M. 70, 728 Rau V. Little Rock. 34 Ark. 303, 519 Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118. 621 Rawlings v. Biggs. 85 Ky. 251. 708 Rawson v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 87. 511, 1294 V. School Dist.. 100 Mass. 134, 1533 V. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40, 1538 Ray v. Bank. 3 B. Mon. 510, 1725 V. City of Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 567. 1261 v. City of Manchester, 46 N. H. 59. 264, 820 V. City of St. Paul, 40 Minn. 458. 1597 V. City of St. Paul, 44 Minn. 340. 827 V. Wilson, 29 Fla. 342, 960 Ray Co. v. Bentlev. 49 Mo. 236. 776 V. Vansycle. 96 U. S. 675. 995. 1023 Raymond v. City of Lowell, 6 Cush. ' 524. 1637. 1638 V. City of Sheboygan, 70 Wis. 318. 1588 V. Fish. 51 Conn. 80, 1080. 1091, 1098. 1114, 1386 Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342, 221 222 Read v. City of Buffalo, 74 N. Y. 463. 963 V. City of Camden, 54 N. J. L. 347. 544, 592. 1164 V. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568. 992, 1522 V. Town of Calais. 48 Vt. 7, 829 Reading City v. Bitting. 167 Pa. St. 21, 603 V. Reiners, 167 Pa. St. 41, 1341 1 Smith — xi Keardon v. City of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 678 V. City of St. Louis, 36 Mo. 555, 776 Reassessment &c., In re, 68 Minn. 242. 1287 Rebenack, In re, 62 Mo. App. 8, 1762 Reckner v. Warner, 22 Ohio ^t. 275, 699 Rector v. State, 6 Ark. 187, 1411 Red V. City Council &c., 25 Ga. 386, 301, 987 V. Supervisors of Henry Co.. 31 Gratt. 695, 987, 1023 Reddell v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444, 688 Reddick v. People. 82 111. App. 85, 1644 Redersheimer v. Flower, 52 La. An. 2089, 1142 Redford v. City of Woburn, 176 Mass. 520. 1365, 1801 V. Coggeshall. 19 R. I. 313. 1358 Red Rock v. Henry. 106 U. S. 596. 995 Reed v. City of Madison, 83 Wis. 171. 1595 V. City of Spokane, 21 Wash. 218. 1803 V. City of Toledo, 18 Ohio 161, 1232 V. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, 221 V. Erie, 75 Pa. St. 346. 1313 V. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443, 812 V. Inhabitants &c., 20 Maine 246, 776 V. Inhabitants &c., 117 Mass. 384. 354. 355, 362 V. Inhabitants &c., 152 Mass. 500. 280, 843. 1037 V. Town of Orleans, 1 Ind. App. 25, 857, 1741 Reeder v. State, 98 Ind. 114, 229 Reemelin v. Mosby, 47 Ohio St. 570, 169 Rees V. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 141, 142. 458, 1523, 1526, 1529, 1737 Reeve School Tp. v. Dodson. 98 Ind. 497. 210, 647, 863 Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash. 17, 75 V. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 333, 689. 1084 Reeves Co. v. Pecos Co., 69 Tex. 177, 444 Regenstein v. City of Atlanta. 98 Ga. 167, 1130. 1705 Regents &c. v. Detroit &c. Soc, 12 Mich. 138. 262 v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 472, 756 Regina v. Bailiffs, 2 Ld. Raym. 1232, 207, 286 v. Bewdlev, 1 P. Wms. 207. 92, 445 v. Blizzard. L. R. 2 Q. B. 55, 199 V. Bowen, 1 Denison 23. 539 V. Bradley. 3 El. & El. 634, 378 V. Coaks, 3 El. & Bl. 249, 378 V. Councillors of Derby, 7 Ad. & El. 419. 155 V. Cumberlege, 36 L. T. 700, 174 V. Franklin, 6 Ir. R. C. L. 239, 378 V. Grimshaw. 10 Q. B. 747, 276 V. Hiorns. 7 Ad. & El. 960, 155 V. Howard. 4 Ont. 377, 1392 V. Justices &c.. 8 Ad. & El. 173, 346 V. Lander, 1 Ir. R. C. L. 225, 346 V. Lane. 2 Ld. Raym. 1304. 199 V. Ledgard, 8 Ad. & El. 535. 155 V. Mayor &c., 7 Ad. & El. 963, 157 V. Mayor &c., 9 Ad. & El. 670, 127 V. M.nyor &c., 10 Ad. & El. 66, 128 V. M.iyor &c., 10 Ad. & El. 281. 667 V. Mayor &c., L. R. 3 Q. B. 629, 155, 37.8 V. Mayor &c., L. R. 4 Q. B. 114, 127 V. Mayor &c., 6 Q. B. 433, 261 V. Mayor &c., 7 Q. B. 908, 128 clxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. S33-1830.'[ Regina v. Mayor &c., 20 L. J. Q. B. 281, 128 V. Mayor &c., 11 L. T. (N. S.) 417, 35, 77, 78 V. Mayor &c., 28 L. T. 629. 202 v. Overseers of Christ Church, 7 E. & B. 409. 157 V. I'aramore, 10 Ad. & El. 286, 667 V. Petrie, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 207, 1559 V. Rippon. 1 Q. B. D. 217, 157 V. Rowley. 3 Q. B. 143, 157 V. Sainthill, 2 Ld. Raym. 1174, 1575 V. Staples, 9 Best & S. 928, 1693 V. Tavlor. 11 A. & E. 949. 123 V. Thomas, 8 Ad. & El. 183, 276 V. Town Council &c., 4 Q. B. 893. 667 V. Whipp, 4 Q. B. 141, 276 Rehberg v. Mayor &c., 91 N. T. 137, 826. 1375, 1592, 1594, 1621 Rehmke v. Goodwin. 2 Wash. 676, 892 Reid V. Board &c.. 128 N. Y. 364. 1205 V. City of Chicago, 83 111. App. 554. 1333. 1335, 1339 V. Humphreys, 7 Jones L. 258, 312 V. Mayor &c., 80 Ga. 755, 1494 Reiff V. Connor, 10 Ark. 241, 301, 522 Reighard v. Flinn, 29 Pittsb. Leg. J. 338. 1373 Reilly v. City of Albany, 112 N. Y. 30, 741. 1186. 1306. 1755 V. City of New York, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 463, 1187 V. City of Racine, 51 Wis. 526, 1322, 1563 Reily, Ex parte, 85 Cal. 632, 1410 Reineman v. Covington &c. R. Co., 7 Neb. 310. 982 Reinhard v. Mayor &c., 2 Daly 243, 526. 1596 Reining v. City of Buffalo, 102 N. Y. 308. 829, 1746. 1790 V. New York &c. R. Co., 128 N. Y 157. 588, 1581 Reinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind. 382, 1234 Rellstab v. Borough of Belmar, 58 N. J. L. 489, 66 Remington v. Harrison Co. Court, 12 Bush 148, 662 Reno W. &c. Co. v. Osburn, 25 Nev. 53, 749 Rens v. City of Grand Rapids, 73 Mich. 237, 233, 235. 1189, 1212 Rensselaer &c. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137, 675, 686 Rentz V. City of Detroit, 48 Mich. 544. 1206 Renwick v. Hall, 84 111. 162. 1689 Republic &c. Co. v. Pollak, 75 111. 292, 1513 Requa v. City of Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129. 816. 826. 1592. 1639 Resley v. Village of Howell, 64 Fed. 453, 1011 Respublica v. Dallas, 3 Yeates 300, 189, 1418 V. Duquet, 2 Yeates 495, 526, 1121, 1392 Ressegieu v. City of Sioux City, 94 Iowa 543, 1219 Retreat v. City of Buffalo, 53 N. Y. S. 1113. 1285. 1289 Rettinghouse v. City of Ashland, 106 Wis. 595. 174 Reubelt v. School Town of Noblesville. 106 Ind. 478, 1038 Reusch V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 57 Iowa 687. 674 Renter v. Lame, 94 Wis. 300, 1758 Renting v. City of TItusville, 175 Pa. St 512, 711, 753, 1136 Revill V. Pettit, 3 Met. 314, 335 Rex V. Amory, 2 T. R. 515, 445 V. Andover, 1 Ld. Raym. 710, 200 V. Ashwell. 12 East 22, 520, 521 V. Atkins. 3 Mod. 3, 166. 271 V. Axmouth, 8 East 383, 128 V. Bailey, 1 Mood. C. C. 23, 127 V. Bankes, 3 Burr. 1452. 1657 V. Bellringer, 4 T. R. STO, 157, 270, 290 V. Bird, 13 East 367, 520, 521 V. Bower, 1 B. & C. 492, 157, 270, 290 V. Bridge, 1 M. & S. 76. 378 V. Bridgewater. 3 T. R. 550, 128 V. Buller, 8 East 389, 272 V. Bumstead. 2 B. & Ad. 699, 185 V. Burgess, 2 Burr. 908, 1557, 1561 V. Carlisle, Fortesc. 200, 202 V. Carroll, 1 Leach 237, 127 V. Carter, Cowp. 58, 270 V. Chalke. 1 Ld. Raym. 225, 204, 207 V. Chitty, 5 Ad. & El. 609, 185 V. Company &c.. 8 T. R. 356, 270 V. Corry, 5 East 372. 272 V. Coventry, 1 Ld. Raym. 391, 200 V. Croke, Cowp. 26, 296 V. Cross, 3 Camp. 224, 1610 v. Dawes, 4 Burr. 2277, 270 V. Derby, Cas. temp Hardw. 154, 207 V. Devonshire, 1 B. & C. 609, 157, 270, 290 V. Doncaster, 2 Burr. 738, 207 V. Ellis. 9 East 252, 187 V. Faversham Fishermen's Co., 8 T. R. 352. 207, 520 V. Foxcroft, 2 Burr. 1017, 378 V. Gaborian. 11 East 77, 271, 272 V. Greet, 8 B. & C. 363. 157 V. Grimes. 5 Burr. 2598. 171, 270 V. Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 198, 123, 446 V. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936, 274, 276 V. Harris, 3 Burr. 1420. 1666 V. Hawkins. 10 East 211, 378 V. Head, 4 Burr. 2515, 289, 296 V. Headlev. 7 B. & C. 496, 157, 290 V. Hearle. 1 Stra. 626, 166 V. Hebden. Andr. 389, 171, 270, 272 V. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 270, 271 V. Holmes. Hil. 9 Geo. II, B. R., 1657 V. Home, 2 Corp. 672. 538 V. Hoyte, 6 T. R. 430, 157 V. Inhabitants &c., 13 East 220, 123, 446 V. Jones. 1 B. & Ad. 677, 198 V. Jones, 3 Camp. 230. 1610 V. Lathrop, 1 W. Bl. 468, 270 V. Lisle, Andr. 163. 2 Stra. 1090. . 171, 195, 270, 272, 1657 V. Liverpool. 2 Burr. 723. 207 V. Lyme Regis, 1 Doug. 149, 201, 204, 207 V. Mason, 2 T. R. 581, 538 V. May, 4 B. & Ad. 843, 157 V. May. 5 Burr. 2681, 270. 271 V. Mavor &c., 4 D. P. C. 562. 1409 V. Mavor &c., 5 T. R. 66. 171, 270 V. Mavor &c., 2 Burr. 723. 204, 277 V. Mayor &c., 4 Burr. 2008. 1657 V. Mayor &c., Mich. 33 Car. II, 2 Show. 262, 123 V. Mayor &c., 8 Mod. Ill, 289 V. Mayor &c., 8 Mod. 127, 445 v. Mayor &c., 1 Ld. Raym. 426. 296 V. Mavor &c., Cas. temp. Hardw. 147, ■ 271 V. Mavor &c., 1 Lev. 291. 200 V. Medley, 6 Car. & P. 292. 809 V. Miller, 6 T. R. 268, 157, 270, 446 TABLE OF CASES. clxiii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Rex V. Monday, Cowp. 530, 157, 270, 293, 378 V. JForris, 3 lOast 214, 445 V. IMoiTis, 4 Kast 17, 270 V. Oakcliainpton. Burr. S. C. 5, 128 V. Osbounio, 4 Kast 326, 445 V. Oxford, 2 Salk. 428, 200 V. Oxfordshire, 20 Eng. C. L. 289, 1577 V. rarrv, G A. & E. 810, 123 V. Pasmore. 3 T. R. 199, 92, 445 V. Philips, 1 Stra. 394, 166 V. Ponsonby. 1 Ves. Jr. 1. 204 V. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517, 201, 204, 207 V. Saunders. 3 East 119. 123, 446 V. Sefton, Russ. & Ry. 202, 127 V. Sparling, 1 Stra. 497. 538 V. Sponrer, 3 Burr. 1827, 185 V. Steward &c., 5 B. & Aid. 691. 1409 V. Stewart. 4 East 17. 445 V. St. Luke's Hospital, 2 Burr. 1053. 128 V. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231, 201, 204 V. Theodorick. 8 East 543, 270, 271 V. Thornton. 4 East 294, 166, 270 V. Tidderlev. 1 Sid. 14. 204 V, Tizzard. 9 B. & C. 418, 108 V. Trapshaw. 1 Leaoh 427, 127 V. Trew. 2 Barnard. 370, 272 V. Tripp. Mich. T. 1836, 128 V. Tucker, 1 Barnard. 26, 271 V. Varlo, Cowp. 248, 270, 373 V. Wake. 1 Barnard. 80, 271 V. Warrington. 1 Salk. 152, 295 V. Westwood, 4 B. & C. 781. 289, 296 V. Weymouth, 7 Mod. 373, 185 V. White, 5 A. & E. 613, 123 V. Williams, 2 Mau. & S. 141, 272 V. Wilton, 5 Mod. 257, 207 Rexford v. Knight, UN. Y. 308, 705 Reynolds. In re. 42 N. Y. S. 1, 1684 V. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162, 189, 286, 296 V. Board of Education &c., 53 N. Y S 75 788 V.' City of Waterville. 92 Maine 292. 881 V. Commissioners &c., 5 Ohio 204, 629 V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Met. 340, 343, 344, 965 V. Lyon Co., 97 Fed. 155, 1029 V. Mayor &c.. 8 Barb. 597, 666 V. Reynolds, 15 Conn. 83, 687 V. United States. 98 U. S. 145, 47 Reynolds Land &c. Co. v. McCabe, 72 Tex. 57. 362, 1473 Rhea v. Umatilla Co.. 2 Or. 300, 1287 Rhine v. City of McKinnev, 53 Tex. 354. 698 Rhoda V. Alameda Co., 69 Cal. 523, 934 Rhode Island Mortgage &c. Co. v. City of Spokane. 19 Wash. 616. 742 Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159, 680, 811 V. Otis, 33 Ala. 578, 1814 Rhyner v. City of Mena.sha. 107 Wis. 201, 1324, 1360, 1801 Rice V. City of Des Moines, 40 Iowa 638, 891 V. City of Evansville, 108 Ind. 7, 1179 V. City of Flint, 67 Mich. 401. 1217 V. City of Milwaukee, 100 Wis. 516. 879, 1731 V. Foster, 4 Harr. 479. 69, 520 V. Gwinn. 49 Pac. 412, 179. 955 V. Plymouth Co., 43 Iowa 136. 619, 1088 Rice V. Smith, 9 Iowa 570, 556, 651 V. State, 3 Kan. 141, 1412 V. Town of Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470, 1597 V. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 211 Rich V. City of Chicago, 59 111. 286, 299. 477. 478, 1146, 1421 V. City of Chicago, 152 111. 18, 499, 550, 1249, 1250 V. City of Naperville, 42 111. App. 222, "^ 508 V. City of Rockland, 87 Maine 188, 1335 V. Errol, 51 N. H. 350, 868 V. Mentz Tp., 134 U. S. 632, 987 V. Player, 2 Show. 262, 295 V. Town of Mentz, 19 Fed. 725, 990 Richards v. Brice, 15 Daly 144, 1419 V. City of Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 506. 1234 V. City of Oshkosh, 81 Wis. 226, 1802 V. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491, 202 V. Independent School Dist., 46 Fed. 460. 969 V. Inhabitants &c., 13 Gray 344. 1601 V. Mayor &c., 16 J. & Sp. 315. 783 V. Osceola Bank. 79 Iowa 707, 910 V. Supervisors, 69 Iowa 612, 897 V. Town of Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491. 204, 279, 286 Richardson v. Boston. 24 How. 188, 576 V. City of Marceline, 73 Mo. App. 360. 1337, 1796 V. City of Syracuse, 58 N. Y. S. 487. - 1330 V. City of Webster City. Ill Iowa 427, 1776, 1780 V. Davis. 91 Md. 390, 1315 V. Heydenfeldt, 46 Cal. 68, 509 V. Morgan. 16 La. An. 429, 1270 V. Smith. 59 N. II. 517, 706 V. Vermont &c. R. Co., 25 Vt. „. ^465. 676 Richardson Co. v. Barstow, 26 Abb. N. C. 150. 1.583 V. Frederick, 24 Neb. 596, 1068 V. Smith. 25 Neb. 767. 1069 Richcreek v. Moorman, 14 Ind. Ann. „. , 370, "^^ 1286 Riche V. Bar Harbor Water Co., 75 Maine 91, 688 Richeson v. People, 115 111. 450, 991 Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co.. 12 111. 1. 89, 103, 761. 1084, 1537, 1538 V. Village of Richland Center, 59 Wis. 591. 1509 Richlicke v. City of St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497, 1180 Richmond v. City of Lynchburg, 81 Va. 473, 1269 V. Judah, 5 Leigh 305. 246 Richmond City v. Epps. 98 Va. 235. 1687 Richmond &c. Co. v. Town of West Point, 94 Va. 668, 609 Richmond Co. &c. Co. v. Town of Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228, 566, 618. 642, 1404 Richmond Mayoralty Case, 19 Gratt. 673. 1411 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Louisa &c. R. Co., 13 How. 71. 585. 1323, 1463 Richter v. City of New York, 54 N. Y. S. 150. 1280 Rickert v. Drainage Dist., 27 N. E. 86, 1544 Ricketson v. City of Milwaukee. 105 Wis. 591. 724, 7.50, 1704. 1711 Ricketts v. Corporation &e. of Mark- dale, 31 Ont. 610, 1363 elxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Eicketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371, 1201, 1288 V. Village of Hyde Park, 85 111. 110, 707, 719 Rickords v. City of Hammond, 67 Fed. 380. 1705 Riddel v. School District, 15 Kan. 168, 326 Riddick v. Amelin, 1 Mo. 5, 47 Riddle v. Bedford Co., 7 S. & R. 386. 197, 198, 289 V. Proprietors &c., 7 Mass. 169, 7, 142, 776 V. Village of Westfleld, 65 Hun 432, 1625 Rideout v. Inhabitants &c., 1 Allen 232, 362, 1485 Rider v. City of Amsterdam, 65 N. Y. S. 579, 791 Rider Life Raft Co. v. Roach, 97 N. Y. 378, 746 Ridge Av. &c. R. Co. v. Philadelphia City, 124 Pa. St. 219. 1159 Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371, 532 Ridley v. Doughty, 85 Iowa 418, 303 V. Sherbrook, 3 Coldw. 569. 369 Riest V. City of Goshen. 42 Ind. 339, 1639 Riggs V. Board &c.. 29 Mich. 262, 1317 V. Boylan, 4 Biss. 445, 228 V. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166. 1523, 1527, 1528 Rigler v. Charlotte &c. R. Co., 94 N. C. 604, 1633 Rigney v. City of Chicago, 125 U. S. 161, 678 Riker v. Jersey City, 88 N. J. L. 225, 242 Riley v. City of Kansas, 31 Mo. App. 439. 1432 V. City of Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64, 1536 Ring V. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83 1.599 V. Grout, 7 Wend. 341, 1485 V. Johnson Co., 6 Iowa 265, 1014 Ripley v. Board &c., 40 N. J. L. 45, 1577 V. Warren, 2 Pick. 592. 1739 Risley v. Village of Howell, 64 Fed. 453, 1002, 1005 Rison V. Farr, 24 Ark. 161, 369 Ritchie v. City of South Topeka. 38 Kan. 368, 166. 1288, 1534 V. Franklin Co., 22 Wall. 67, 643 V. People, 155 HI. 98, 734 Ritter v. Patch, 12 Cal. 298, 1720, 1722 Ritterskamp v. Stifel, 59 Mo. App. 510, 1373 Rives V. City of Columbia. 80 Mo. App. 173. 223, 796, 1773 Rivers v. City Council &c., 65 Ga. 376, 821, 830 Rivet V. City of New Orleans, 35 La. An. 134, 651 Roach V. City of Ogdensburg, 36 N. Y. S. 112. 793 Road Case, In re, 17 Pa. St. 71, 987 Road in Roaring Brook Tp., In re, 140 Pa. St. 632. 1170 Roads of Sadsbury Tp., In re, 147 Pa. St. 471, 1170 Roanoke Gas Co. v. City of Roanoke, 88 Va. 810, 587, 1162 Robb v. Carter. 65 Md. 321. 168, 183 V. Maysville &c. Tpk. Co., 3 Met. 117, 702 Robbins v. Board &e., 91 Ind. 537, 842 V. Board &c., 104 Ind. 321, 1040 V. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657, 1587. 1590. 1598 V. Inhabitants &c., 20 Pick. 345, 1042 Robbins v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 6 Wis. 636, 704 V. Shelby Co. Taxing Dists., 120 U. S. 489, 1399 Robert v. Board &c., 158 N. Y. 673, 1346 V. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, 1494 V. Sadler, 104 N. Y. 229, 1214 Roberts v. Bolles, 101 U. S. 119, 1001, 1004, 1005 V. Broadfield, 12 App. D. C. 453, 1731 V. City of Cambridge, 164 Mass. 176, 714 V. City of Detroit, 102 Mich. 64, 1376 V. City of Louisville, 93 Ky. 95, 1371, 1372 V. City of Montreal, 16 Rap. Jud. Que. C. S. 342, 1377 V. Commissioners, 10 Kan. 29, 1072 V. First Nafl. Bank, 8 N. D. 504. 732, 1260, 1268 V. Inhabitants &c., 140 Mass. 129, 1624 V. Ogle, 30 III. 459, 607, 1085 V. People. 9 Colo. 458, 932 V. Village of St. James, 76 Minn. 456, 930 V. Williams, 15 Ark. 43, 687 Roberts & Co. v. City of Paducah, 95 Fed. 62, 519, 872 Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex. 316, 628, 837, 839, 1728 V. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. 718, 725, 1298 V. City of Rockford, 21 111. 451, 103, 983 V. Frank Bros. Co., 132 U. S. 17. 1263 V. Lambertville, 38 N. J. L. 69, 537 V. Sickel, 127 U. S. 507, 225 Robie V. Trustees &c., 35 Barb. 319 48, 87 Robins v. Ackerly, 91 N. Y. 98, 19 Robinson, Ex parte, 12 Nev. 263, 1508, 1521 V. Benton Co., 49 Ark. 49, 189, 1413 V. Burlington, 50 Iowa 240, 247 V. Chamberlain, 34 N. Y. 389, 222, 224 V. City Council &c., 2 Rich. 317, 245, 1521 V. City of Cedar Rapids, 100 Iowa 662, 1331 V. City of Evansvllle, 87 Ind. 334, 264, 774 V. City of St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488, 262 V. Fitchburg &c. R. Co., 7 Gray 92, 1618 V. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625, 799, 808, 820 v. Hague. 63 Iowa 273. 1490 V. Hamilton, 60 Iowa 134, 1078 v. Mayor &c., 8 Houst. 409, 1327, 1340 V. Mayor &c., 1 Humph. 156, 1509 V. Oceanic &c. Co., 112 N. Y. 31.5. 137 V. Pioche, 5 Cal. 460. 1641 V. Rippev. Ill Ind. 112, 696, 1201 V. Rohr. 73 Wis. 436. 224 V. Rowland, 26 Hun 501, 229, 230 V. Supervisors, 43 Cal. 353. 1523, 152.5, 1529, 1531 v. Swope, 12 Bush 21, 687 Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484, 154, 169, 186, 193, 288 Rochefort v. Inhabitants &c., 154 Mass. 140, 1585. 1616 Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N. Y. 65, 1599 TABLE OF CASES. clxv [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Eochestor &c. Co. v. Clarke Nat'l. Kaiik. 60 Barb. 234. 195 Rocbe.ster White Lead Co. v. City of Hochester, 3 N. Y. 463, 1208 Kock V. City of New York, 63 N. Y. S. 825, 179 V. Katzenstein, 52 Ark. 107, 1205 V. Stinger, 36 Ind. 346, 319 Rock Creek Tp. v. Strong, 96 TT. S. 271, 1016, 1017 Rockingham &c. Bank v. Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 17, 1722 Rock Island Co. v. Sage, 88 111. 582, 1084 Rodger v. City of Philadelphia, 181 I 'a. St. 273, 1778 Rodman v. Harcourt, 4 B. Mon. 224 185, 198 V. Justices, 3 Bush 144. 1529 V. Town of Washington, 122 N. C. 39, 986 Roe V. Lincoln Co., 56 Wis. 66, 652, 1702 V. Town of Phillipi, 45 W. Va. 785, 880 Roeller v. Ames, 33 Minn. 132, 1744 Rofflgnac St., In re, 4 Rob. 357, 699 Rogan V. City of Watertown, 30 Wis. 259, 623 Rogers v. Brunton, 10 Q. B. 26, 467 V. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, 561. 634, 972, 983, 1001 V. City of Bloomington, 22 Ind. App. 601, 1329 V. City of St. Charles, 3 Mo. App. 41, 701 V. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494, 1139, 1165, 1253 V. City of St. Paul, 79 Minn. 5, 1553, 1791 V. Common Council &c., 123 N. Y. 173, 1825 V. Jones, 1 Wend. 237, 19, 98, 495, 496, 519 V. People, 68 111. 154, 12 V. Randall, 29 Mich. 41, 1101 V. Slonaker, 32 Kan. 191, 190, 275 V. Trustees &c., 11 Ky. L. 934, 1490, 1492 V. Voorhees, 124 Ind. 469, 947 Rogge V. City of Elizabeth, 64 N. J. L. 491, 1782 Rohde V. Seavey. 4 Wash. 91, 408 Rohland v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 89 Mo. 180, 1416 Rolf V. City of Greenville, 102 Mich. 544, 1344 Rolfs, In re, 30 Kan. 758, 1414 Rollins V. Board &c., 80 Fed. 692, 49 TT. S. App. 399. 986, 1031 V. Lake Co., 34 Fed. 845, 887 V. Town of Chester, 46 N. H. v 411. 359, 363 V. Wright. 93 Cal. 395, 1166, 1505 Rollstone Nat'l Bank v. Carleton, 136 Mass. 226, 329 Rolph V. City of Fargo, 7 N. D. 640, 1242, 1269, 1292. 1302, 1303 Rommeney v. City of New York. 63 N. Y. S. 186, 1329, 1363 Ronde v. Mayor &c., 18 Fed. 719. 1027 Rondot V. Rogers Tp., 99 Fed. 202, 1002. 1005, 1029, 1031, 1033 , Ronkendorff v. Taylor, 4 Pet. 349. 1422 Rooney v. Inhabitants &c., 128 Mass. 580, 1584 Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N. Y. 318, 17.30 V. Godard. 52 Barb. 533, 517 Root V. Alexander, 18 N. Y. S. 632. 10G6 Roper V. Inhabitants &c., 28 Maine 193, 340, 343 V. McWhorter, 77 Va. 214, 629, 651 Roper V. Town of I^aurinburg, 90 N. C. 427, 181, 663, GG4 V. Trustees &c., 91 111. 518, 211, 321, 324 Rose V. City of St. Charles, 49 Me. 509, 1420 V. Trestrail, 62 Mo. App. 352, 1149 V. Turnpike Co., 3 Watts 46, 447 Rosebaugh v. SatHn, 10 Ohio 31, 532 Rosenbaum, In re, 6 N. Y. S. 184, 1186 V. City of Newbern, 118 N. C. 83, 600, 797, 1703 Roseboom v. Jefferson Tp., 122 Ind. 377, 626, 1479 Rosenthal v. Taylor R. Co., 79 Tex. 325, 1582 Rosetta Gravel &c. Co. v. JoIIisaint, 51 La. An. 804, 1284, 1304 V. Kennedy, 51 La. An. 1535, 1754 Rosevere v. Borough of Osceola Mills, 169 Pa. St. 555, 1337 Rosewell v. Prior. 2 Salk. 460, 1095 Ross V. Brown, 74 Maine 352, 216 V. City of Madison, 1 Ind. 281, 261 V. City of Philadelphia, 115 Pa. St. 222, 710 V. Clinton, 46 Iowa 606, 1217 V. Stackhouse, 114 Ind. 200, 947, 1190, 1191, 1201, 1259 V. Williamson, 44 Ga. 501, 313 Rossire v. City of Boston, 4 Allen 57. 253 Rossiter v. City of Lake Forest, 157 111. 489, 1291, 1702 v. Peek, 3 Gray 538, 341 Rotenberry v. Board &c., 67 Miss. 470, 556 Roth V. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329, 1071 Rothrock v. School District, 133 Pa. St. 487, 172 Rounds V. Mansfield, 38 Maine 586, 222, 311 V. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154, 517 V. Waymart, 81 Pa. St. 395. 106 Roundtree v. City of Galveston, 42 Tex. 612, 1207 Rouse V. Moore, 18 Johns. 407, 7 Kowe V. Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291. 1208 Kowell V. City of Lowell, 7 Gray 100, 1601 V. Horton, 58 Vt. 1, 308 V. Town of Vershire, 62 Vt. 405, 1058 V. Tunbridge School Dist., 59 Vt. 658. 1480 Rowland v. Mayor &c., 83 N. Y. 372, 206 Rowlett V. Eubank. 1 Bush 477, 311 Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl. 906, 222 Rowzer v. Pierce. 75 Miss. 846, 1698 Roy V. Eaton, Lift. 23, 130 Royal St., In re, 16 La. An. 393, 1257 Royce v. Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 401, 792 Royster v. Board &c., 98 N. C. 148, 957. 962 Rozell V. Andrews, 103 N. Y. 150, 1567 Rozier v. Francois Co., 34 Mo. 395, 981 Ruby V. Shain, 54 Mo. 207, 618 Rudderow v. City of Philadelphia, 166 Pa. St. 241. 1219 Rude V. City of St. Louis, 93 Mo. 408, ' 1697 Rudy V. School Dist., 30 Mo. App. 113. 1491 Rugby Charity v. Merryweather, 11 East 376. 1559 Ruggles V. Board of Trustees &c., 88 Cal. 430, 167 V. City of Fond du Lac, 53 Wis. 436, 247, 942, 1551 clxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Ruggies V. Collier, 4r? Mo. 353, 281, 1539 V. Inhabitants &c., 11 Cush. 433, 281 V. Town of Nevada, 63 Iowa 1S5. 1618, 1626 Ruhland v. Supervisors, 55 Wis. 664. 344 Rummel v. New York &c. R. Co., 30 N. Y. St. 235, 1564 Rumsey v. City of Philadelphia, 171 Pa. St. 63, 793 V. People, 19 N. Y. 41, 64 Rumslv &c. Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants &c., 21 Mo. App. 175. 464 Rund V. Town of Fowler, 142 Ind. 214, 600 Rundle v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 275, 4, 6 V. Mayor &c., 28 .Md. 356, 1724 Runion v. Latimer. 6 S. C. 126, 197 Runkle v. Commonwealth, 113 Pa. St. 229, 1667 Runvan v. Coster. 14 Pet. 122, 1576 Ruohs V. Athens, 91 Tenn. 20, 408, 977 Rusher v. City of Dallas, 83 Tex. 151, 799 Rushton V. City of Alleghany, 192 Pa. St. 574, 1800 Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rushville, 121 Ind. 200, 161, 162, 293, 298, 473, 474 Russell V. Cage, 66 Tex. 428, 552, 841, 892 v. City of Chicago, 22 111. 283, 108 V. City of New Haven, 51 Conn. 259, 1725 T. City of St. Louis, 9 Mo. 507. 1515 V. Dver, 40 N. H. 173, 345 V. Hubbard. 59 111. 335, 1814 V. Inhabitants &c., 74 Mo. 480, 827, 1608. 1618. 1619, 1790 V. Mayor &c., 2 Denio 461, 673, 802, 1114 V. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, 142, 776, 777, 1734 V. Tate, 52 Ark. 541, 212, 219, 623, 651, 919 V. Town of Monroe, 116 N. C. 720. 1317, 1329. 1331 V. Town of Steuben, 57 111. 35, 775 V. Turner, 62 Maine 496, 697 V. Village of Canastota, 98 N. Y. 496. 1587 V. Wellington, 157 Mass. 100, 471 V. Williamsport, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 129, 173 Ruston V. Grimwood, 30 Ind. 364, 1570 Rutgers v. Mayor &c., 42 N. J. L. 51, 760 Rutherford v. City of Holly, 105 N. Y. 632, 1217 v. Davis, 9.5 Ind. 245, 1570 V. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543, 274. 276 V. Swink, 90 Tenn. 152, 1422, 1423 V. Swink, 96 Tenn. 564, 525 v. Taylor. 38 Mo. 315, 629 Rutter V. Chapman. 8 M. & W. 1, 35, 77 Ruttle V. City of Covington, 10 Ky. L. 766. 1352 Rutz V. Kelm, 143 111. 558, 576 Ryan v. City of Central City, 21 Ky. L. 1070, 1554 V. City of Chicago, 79 111. App. 28, 1333 V. Copes, 11 Rich. 217, 1111 v. Dakota Co.. 32 Minn. 138, 303 V. Martin, 91 N. C. 464, 650 V. Town of Sumner, 17 Wash. 228, 1243 V. United States. 86 TT. S. 514. 327 Ryder v. City of Alton, 175 111. 94. 305, 512. 1173 V. Railroad Co., 13 111. 516, 86 Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333. 685 V. Laketon Tp.. 52 Mich. 509, 1532 Ryney v. City of Chicago, 102 111. 64, 1219 S Sachs V. City of Sioux City, 109 Iowa 224, 1755 Sackett v. City of New Albany, 88 Ind. 473, 651, 889, 895 V. State, 74 Ind. 486, 274 Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311. 685, 087 Safety Insulated Wire &c. Co. v. City of Baltimore, 74 Fed. 363, 740 V. Mayor &c., 66 Fed. 140, 547 Sage V. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189, 705 V. Laurain, 19 Mich. 137, 223, 225, 335 V. Town of Fifield, 68 Wis. 546, 652 Saginaw Gas &c. Co. v. City of Sagi- naw, 28 Fed. 529, 510, 566, 567, 1351, 1465 St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo. 634, 727 St. Clair v. School Board's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 252, 1721 St. Francis Co. v. Cummings, 55 Ark. 419, 1073 St. Helena W. Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182, 688 St. Helen's Mill Co., In re, 3 Sawy. 88, 1212 St. Joseph &c. Ins. Co. v. Leland, 90 Mo. 177, 222 St. Joseph &c. R. Co. v. Buchanan Countv Court, 39 Mo. 485, 369, 370 V. Linn Co. Court. 39 Mo. 485. 983 St. Joseph's Orphan Society v. Wol- pert, 80 Ky. 86. 1063 St. Joseph School Board v. Gaylord, 86 Mo. 401, 1490 St. Joseph Tp. v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 374, 473. 646, 983. 1005. 1018, 1027, 1150. 1407, 1792 St. Louis V. Babcock, 156 Mo. 154, 1407, 1792 V. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61, 607 V. Cafferata. 24 Mo. 94, 607 V. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423, 1499, 1500, 1502 V. Insurance Co., 12 R. I. 435, 1513 v. Western U. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 510 St. Louis Bridge Co. v. City of Fast St. Louis, 121 111. 238, 1500, 1514 St. Louis Co. Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175, 68S St. Louis Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Louis, 46 Mo. 121, 1451, 1518 St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468, 1247 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167, 701 v. Bell. 81 111. 76. 794 V. Capps. 67 111. 607, 1602 v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412, 1628 St. Marv's Indust. School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310, 549, 654 St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Paul, 78 Minn. 39. 721, 737 St. Paul &c. R. Co. V. City of Minne- apolis. 35 Minn. 141. 679 V. City of St. Paul, 21 Minn. 256, 1247 St. Peter v. Denison. 58 N. Y. 416, 823 St. Vincent Orphnn Asylum v. City of Trov, 76 N. Y. 108, 1106 Sale v. Aurora &c. Tpk. Co., 147 Ind. 324, 1639 TABLE OF CASES. clxvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Salom Tpk. &c. Co. v. Essex Co., 100 Mass. 282, 1514, 1519 Salem Water Co. v. City of Salem. 5 Or. 29, 848, 877, 881 Saleno v. City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627. 470, 877 Salisbury v. Hershenroder, 106 Mass. 458. 1612 V. Merrimack Co., 59 N. H. 359, 1055 Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L. 97, 160, 285, 286 Saloman v. United States, 19 Wall. 17, 743 Saloy V. City of New Orleans, 33 La. An. 79, 651 Salscheider v. City of Fort Howard, 45 Wis. 519. 1720 Saltenberry v. Loucks, 8 La. An. 95, 333 Salt Lake City v. liollister, 118 U. S. 256, 616, 812 Samis v. King. 40 Conn. 298, 169. 213. 1427, 1430 Sam Kee, In re, 31 Fed. 680, 1082 Sample v. Davis, 4 Greene 117, 328 Samples v. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga. 110. 1328 San Antonio v. Barnes, 96 U. S. 316, 1001 V. Berry, 48 S. W. 496, 1293 V. Lewis, 9 Tex. 69, 261 V. Lewis. 15 Tex. 388, 629 V. Mehaffy, 96 U. S. 312. 1001, 1014 San Antonio &.c. R. Co. v. Bergsland, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 97. 1350 San Antonio St. R. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 341, 1553 Sanborn v. Machiasport, 53 Maine 82, ■ 347 V. Neal, 4 Minn. 126. 217 V. School Dist.. 12 Minn. 17, 302, 343, 348, 357. 1480 V. Town of Deerfield, 2 N. H. 251, 868 Sanders v. Inhabitants &c., 154 Mass. 475, 1584 V. Southern &c. R. Co., 147 Mo. 411 1385 V. Town Com'rs, 30 Ra. 679. 1388, 1503, 1533 Sanderson v. Aston, L. R. 8 Ex. 73. 320 San Diego Inv. Co. v. Shaw, 129 Cal. 273, 1272 San Dieso Water Co. v. City of San Diego, 59 Cal. 517, 644 Sands v. City of Richmond, 31 Graft. 571, 1198 V. Manistee &c. Co., 123 U. S. 288, 1576 Sanford v. Inhabitants &c., 32 Maine 536. 776 V. Mayor &c., 52 Miss. 383, 1560 V. Prentice, 28 Wis. 358, 356, 374, 1150 San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water- Works. 48 Cal. 493, 55 San Francisco &c. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 6 Cal. 190, 464. 465 San Francisco &c. Factory v. Brick-- wedel. 60 Cal. 166, " 506 San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel, 62 Cal. 641. 920 V. City of San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453, 649, 714. 746, 756 San Francisco &c. R. Co. v. City of Oakland. 43 Cal. .502, 553 Sangamon &c. R. Co. v. Morgan Co., 14 111. 16.3, 1499 Sanger v. City of Waco. 15 Tex. Civ. App. 424, 1746 Sanger v. Commissioners, 25 Maine 291, 339, 1681 V. Craigue, 10 Vt. 555, 228 Sangster v. Commonwealth, 17 Graft. ^ .l-»- 330, 332 Sanitary Dist. &c. v. Goo. F. Blake Mfg. Co., 179 111. 107, 742, 743, 748, 1756 v. McGuirl, 86 111. App. 392, 1773 V. Ricker. 91 Fed. 833, 717, 754 Sanitary Reduction Works v. Califor- nia &c. Co., 94 Fed. 693, 1393 San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614, 1689 Sank V. City of Philadelphia, 4 Brews. 133, 304. 1133 San Luis Obispo Co. v. Hendricks, 71 Cal. 242, 472, 488 V. White. 91 Cal. 432, 368 San Mateo Co. v. Southern &c. R. Co.. 13 Fed. 722, 1.39 Sansbury v. Middleton, 11 Md. 296, 168 Sansom v. Mercer, 08 Tex. 488, 421 Santa Ana Water Co. v. Town of Buenaventura, 65 Fed. 323, 186. 715, 730 v. Town of San Buenaventura, 56 Fed. 339, 672 Santa Cruz &c. Co. v. Broderick, 113 Cal. 628, 711, 714, 1155 V. Ileaton, 105 Cal. 162, 1155 Santa Rosa City R. Co. v. Central St. R. Co.. 38 Pac. 986, 479 Santo V. State, 2 Iowa 165, 520 Sargent v. City of Evanston, 154 111. 368. 1146 V. City of Lynn. 138 Mass. 599. 1624 V. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18, 564, 664, 665 V. Gorman. 131 N. Y. 191, 1647 V. Webster, 13 Met. 497, 274 Sarles v. Mayor &c., 47 Barb. 447, 800 Sarpy v. Municipality No. Two, 9 La. An. 597, 1214 Satterfleld v. People, 104 111. 448, 328 Satterlee v. City of San Francisco, 23 Cal. 314, 631 V. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, 1160 V. Matthewson, 2 Peters 380, 992 V. Strider, 31 W. Va. 789, 1651 Sauer v. Mavor &c., 41 N. Y S 957, 1779 V. Mayor &c., 60 N. Y. S. 648, 1772, 1775 Sauerhering v. Iron Bridge &c. R. Co., 25 Wis. 447, 987 Saulsbury v. Village of Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27. 821, 1587, 1614 Sault Ste. Marie High Com'rs v. Van Duson, 40 Mich. 429. 868 Saunders v. City of Ft. Madison, 111 Iowa 102. 818 v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145, 378 V. Lawrence, 141 Mass. 380, 160 V. Nashua. 69 N. H. 492, 519 V. Provisional Municipality &c., 24 Fla. 226. 390 V. Taylor, 9 B. & C. 35. 321 V. Townsend, 26 Hun 308, 1556 Saunderson v. Herman, 95 Wis. 48. 1295 Sauntman v. Maxwell, 154 Ind. 114, 1142, 1173 Savage v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. S. 101, 1254 Savannah &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 45 Ga. 602. 591 Savidge v. Supervisors &c., 10 Wis. 49, 9.59 V. Village of Spring Lake, 112 Mich. 91, 874, 1699 Saving & Loan Soc. v. Austin, 46 Cal. 415, 1717 clxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Saving Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175, 491 Savings Ass'n v. Topeka, 3 Dillon 376, 55 Savings Banli v. City of Nashua, 46 N: H. 389. 1501 V. Davis, 8 Conn. 191, 260, 277 V. Inhabitants &c., 8 Allen 109, 252 V. Ward, 100 U. S. 195. 228 Sawyer v. City of Chicago. 183 111. 57, 512, 736, 1553 v. City of San Francisco, 50 Cal. 370, 630 V. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230, 222, 265 V. Manchester &c. R. Co., 62 N. n. 135, 362 V. State Board &c., 125 Mass. 182, 468, 552 Saxton V. Beach, 50 Mo. 488, 286 V. City of Peoria, 75 111. App. 397, 1386 V. City of St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153, 286 V. Nimms. 14 Mass. 315. 348, 365 Saylor v. City of Montesano, 11 Wash. 328, 1334, 1346. 1361 Sayre v. Borough of Phillips, 148 Pa. St. 482, 1404 V. Mayor &c., 60 N. J. Eq. 361, 593, 1378 V. Tompkins, 23 Mo. 443, 1288, 1474, 1722 Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 16, 274, 289 Scaine v. Inhabitants &c., 39 N. J. L. 526, 454 Scales V. Ordinary &c., 41 Ga. 225, 12, 775 Scalf V. Collins Co., 80 Tex. 514, 577 Scammon v. City of Chicago, 40 111. 146, 1533 V. City of Chicago, 44 III. 269. 1536 V. Scammon. 28 N. H. 419, 187, 346 Scanlan v. City of Watertown, 43 N. Y. S. 618, 1325 V. Wright, 13 Pick. 523, 134 Scarling v. Criett, Moo. 75, 467 Schaefifer v. Jackson Tp., 150 Pa. St. 145. 1332, 1600 V. Bonham, 95 111. 368, 1023 Schafif V. Upper Connecticut &c. Co., 57 N. H. no. 1571 Schaffer v. Cadwallader, 36 Pa. St. 126, 457 Schaller v. City of Omaha, 23 Neb. 325, 678 Scheerer v. Edgar, 76 Cal. 569, 953 Schefbauer v. Board &c., 57 N. J. L. 588, 747 Scheftels v. Tabert, 46 Wis. 439, 524 Schell V. Stein, 76 Pa. St. 398, 229 Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dill. 267, 1540 V. Peay. 1 Woolw. 175, 287, 295 Schenectady &c. Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102, 994 Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 29. 282, 547, 1160, 1232, 1233, 1539 Schermerhorn v. City of Schenec- tady, 3 N. Y. S. 435, 177 Schettler v. City of Ford Howard, 43 Wis. 48, 1550 Schipper v. City of Aurora, 121 Ind. 154, 746 Schively v. Borough of Jenkintown, 180 Pa. St. 196. 1360 Schlachter v. Stokes, 63 N. J. L. 138. 599 Schloss V. White, 16 Cal. 65, 333 Schmidt. Ex parte, 24 S. C. 363, 1413 V. Kansas City Dist. Co., 90 Mo. 284, 795 Schmidt v. Stearns Co., 34 Minn. 112, 715 Schmitt V. City of New Orleans, 48 La. An. 1440, 1155. 1162 Schneck v. City of Jefifersonville. 152 Ind. 204. 981. 993, 10.30 Schneider, Ex parte, 11 Or. 288, 1389 Schoen v. City of Atlanta, 97 Ga. 697, 1392 Schoff V. Gould, 52 N. H. 512, 346, 348, 867 V. Town of Bloomfield, 8 Vt. 472, 349 Schofield V. Eighth School Dist., 27 Conn. 499, 1730 School V. Williams, 38 Ark. 454, 12 Schoolbred v. Corporation of Charles- ton. 2 Bay 63, 1529 School Com'rs v. Dean, 2 St. & P. 190, 50 School Directors v. Crews, 23 111. App. 367, 1491 V. Ewington, 26 111. App. 379, 1492 V. Jennings, 10 111. App. 643, 1485 V. McBride, 22 Pa. St. 215, 1480 V. School Directors, 105 111. 653, 443 V. School Directors &c., 135 111. 464, 1473 V. Sippv, 54 111. 287, 864 V. Vogelman. 76 111. 189, 864 School Dist. V. Atherton, 12 Met. 103, 168, 367 V. Bennett, 52 Ark. 511. 1476, 1480 V. Board &c., 73 Mo. 627, 1519 V. Board &c., 9 Neb. 405, 1670 V. Bodenhamer, 43 Ark. 140, 1471 V. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507, 348, 367 V. Carr. 55 N. H. 452, 1485 V. Carr, 63 N. H. 201, 193 V. Clark, 90 Mich. 435, 850, 1029, 1426 V. Cushing, 8 Kan. App. 728, 1033 V. Deshon, 51 Maine 454, 1483 V. Driver, 50 Ark. 346. 1489 V. Everett. 52 Mich. 314, 1490 V. First National Bank, 19 Neb. 89, 1014, 1015 V. Fuess, 98 Pa. St. 600. 1035 V. Gage. 39 Mich. 484, 1745 V. Greenfield. 64 N. H. 84, 1474 V. Howe, 62 Ark. 481, 1504 V. Insurance Co., 101 U. S. 472, 54 V. Insurance Co., 103 U. S. 707, 55 V. Jant Board &c., 27 Mich. 3. 1724 V. Lombard, 2 Dill. 493, 941, 952 V. Lord, 44 Maine 374. 340, 366, 1429, 1485 V. Macloon, 4 Wis. 98, 1471 V. Maury, 53 Ark. 471. 1492 V. Prentiss, 66 N. H. 145, 1487 V. Randall. 7 Cush. 478, 1483 V. Riverside Tp., 67 Mich. 404, 1483 V. Roach, 41 Kan. 531, 1472 V. Roach, 43 Minn. 495, 1482 V. Root, 61 Mich. 373, 1486 V. School Dist., 20 Kan. 76, 1473 V. School Dist. &c., 63 Mich. 51, 658. 1471. 1473, 1474 V. School Dist.. 94 Mo. 612, 1485 V. Selectmen. 63 N. H. 277. 1495 V. State, 29 Kan. 57, 66, 69, 70 V. Stone, 106 U. S. 183, 863, 1007, 1012 V. Sullivan, 48 Kan. 624, 618 V. Tebbetts, 67 Maine 239, 14S3 V. Thplander, 31 Minn. 333, 1483 V. Thompson, 5 Minn. 280, 1471 V. Town of Bridport, 63 Vt. 383. 1475, 1487 V. Twitchell, 63 N. H. 11, 1487 V. Union School Dist, 81 Mich. 339, 1473 TABLE OF CASES. clxix [References are to Pages. Vol. I, jyp. J-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] School Dist. V. Wlckersham, 3-1 Mo. App. 337, 1489 ScbooUield v. City of Lynchburg, 78 Va. 3(5(;. 1520 School Fund, In re, 15 Neb. 684, 913 Schools V. Risley. 10 Wall. 91, 579 School Town of Milford v. I'owner, 126 Ind. 528. 285, 1491 V. Zeigler, 1 Ind. App. 138, 285, 853, 1491, 1492 School Town of Monticello v. Ken- dall. 72 Ind. 91, 217 School Tp. &c. V. School Town &c., 109 Ind. 559. 445 Schopp V. City of St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131, 1698 Schott V. People. 89 111. 195, 540 Schriber v. Town of Langlade, 66 Wis. 616. 447 Schroder v. Overman, 61 Ohio St. 1, 1272, 1285 Schroeder v. City Council, 2 Treadw. Const. 726. 1400 V. City of Baraboo, 93 Wis. 95, 1377 Schroth V. City of Prescott, 68 Wis. 678, 1617 Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts 453, 225, 226 Schuett V. City of Stillwater, 80 Minn. 287, 791 Schulenberg &c. Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 63 111. App. 214, 219, 796. 1505 V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 129 Mo. 455, 1697 Schultz V. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St. 659, 517 V. City of Albany, 57 N. Y. S. 965, 1304, 1707 V. City of Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 254, 264 Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143, 210, 279, 645 Schuvler Co. v. Mercer Co., 9 111. 20, 1668 V. Thomas, 98 F. S. 169, 995, 1001 Schwartz v. F.arry. 90 Mich. 267, 910 V. City of Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 490, 483. 541. 1421 V. Thirty-two Flatboats, 14 La. An. 243, 1539 V. Wilson, 75 Cal. 502, 886, 920 Schwiesau v. Mahon. 128 Cal. 114. 1153 Schwingschlegle v. City of Monroe, 113 Mich. 683, 1328. 1803 Schwuchow V. City of Chicago, 68 III. 444. 598 Scofield V. City of Council Bluffs, 68 Iowa 695, 648, 1306 V. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437, 282 Scoles V. Wilsey, 11 Iowa 261, 229 Scollans v. Rollins, 173 Mass. 275, 1013 Scotland Co. v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107, 995, 1026 V. Thomas. 94 U. S. 682, 995, 1001 Scotland Co. Court v. United States. 140 U. S. 41, 1534 Scott V. Chickasaw Co., 53 Iowa 47, 1550, 1727 V. City of Davenport, 34 Iowa 208, 890, 893 V. City of New Orleans, 75 Fed. 373 1331 V. City of Shreveport, 20 Fed. 714, 644 V. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 558, 674 v. Paulen, 15 Kan. 162, 276, 277 v. State, 46 Ind. 203, 328 V. Union Co., 63 Iowa 583, 276 Scott Co. V. Hinds, 50 Minn. 204, 569, 1271 Scotten V. City of Detroit, 106 Mich. 564, 1303 Scovill V. City of Cleveland. 1 Ohio St. 126, 90, 103, 288, 1232, 1253 Scoville V. Mattoon, 55 Conn. 144, 1473, 1474 V. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, 1337, 1343 Scranton v. Levers, 9 Pa. Dist. R. 176, 1506 Scranton City v. Kingsbury, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 555, 1297 Scripture v. Burns, 59 Iowa 70, 1655 Scudder v. Mayor &c., 146 N. Y. 245, 1704 V. Trenton &c. Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694, 685, 698 Scully V. O'Leary, 11 Chicago Legal News 27, 1414 Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woesten, 147 Mo. 467, 469, 712, 717, 737, 752, 1289 Seabury v. Howland, 15 R. I. 446, 346, 362, 365, 1477, 1485 Seagraves v. City of Alton, 13 III. 366, 241, 1041, 1084 Seaman v. Baughman, 82 Iowa 216, 364, 849 V. Hicks, 8 Paige 655, 687 V. Mayor &c., 80 N. Y. 239, 1373 1557 V. Patten, 2 Caines 312, ' 1091 Searing v. Heavysides, 106 111. 85, 1699, 1722 Searle v. Abraham, 73 Iowa 507, 897. 1462 Searles v. Manhattan R. Co., 101 N. Y. 661, 1600 Sears v. Board &c.. 173 Mass. 71, 1271, 1291, 1292, 1310 V. Inhabitants &c., 105 Mass. 310. 1601 V. Street Com'rs &c., 173 Mass. 350, 1271, 1300, 1378, 1506 V. Street Com'rs &c., 173 Mass. 876, 1299 Seaver v. City of Seattle, 17 Wash. 361, 1758 Sebastian v. Bryan, 21 Ark. 447, 322, 327 Secombe v. Railroad Co., 23 Wall. 108, 694 Second Cong. Church Soc. &c. v. City of Omaha, 35 Neb. 103, 587 Second St. R. Co. v. City of Phila- delphia. 51 Pa. St. 465, 1503 Second Ward Sav. Bank v. City of Huron. 80 Fed. 660. 1007, 1021, 1029 Secrist v. Delaware Com'rs, 100 Ind. 59. 1191 Seebold v. Shitler, 34 Pa. St. 133, 629 Seeger v. Mueller, 133 111. 86. 627, 648, 1759 Seeley v. City of Pittsburg, 82 Pa. St. 360, 1195, 1254, 1271, 1499 V. Peters, 5 Gilm. 130, 607 V. Town of Westport, 47 Conn. 294. 1263 Seely v. Sebastian, 4 Or. 25, 689 Seibert v. Botts, 57 Mo. 430, 628 Seibold v. People, 86 111. 33, 110 Seibrecht v. Citv of New Orleans. 12 La. An. 496. 233, 254. 260, 647 Seifert v. City of Brooklyn. 101 N. Y. 136, 263. 787, 790 V. City of Brooklyn, 15 Abb. N. C. 97. 822 Seitzinger v. Borough of Tamaqua, 187 Pa. St. 539. 751 V. Steinberger, 12 Pa. St. 379. 1417 Selbv V. City of Portland, 14 Or. 243, 1433, 1445 clxx TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.-[ Selby V. Levee Com'rs, 14 La. An. 434, 1520 Seljgman v. City of Santa Rosa, 81 Fed. 524. 1699 Selleck v. City of Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 1798 Selma &c. R. Co., Ex parte, 45 Ala. 696, 983 V. Camp, 45 Ga. ISO. 704 Selpbo V. City of Broolslyn, 39 N. Y. S. 520, 754 Seneca Co. Supervisors v. Allen, 99 N. Y. 532. 904 Senlipnn v. City of Evansville, 140 lud. 675. 1361. 1362 Serrill v. City of Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355, 386, 1513, 1516 Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 Ohio St. 349, 689, 1084 Severin v. Cole, 88 Iowa 463, 693 Severy v. Nickerson Co., 120 Mass. 306, 810 Sewall V. Brainard, 38 Vt. 364, 1019 V. City of St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511, 1202, 1254 Seward v. City of Rising Suu, 79 Ind. 351. 1500 V. Rheiner, 2 Kan. App. 95, 1130, 1759 Sewell V. City of Cohoes, 75 N. Y. 45, 1596, 1627 Sexton V. Cook Co., 114 111. 174, 619 V. Pepper, 28 Hun 31, 1552 Seymer v. Town of Lake, 66 Wis. 651, 1641 Seymore v. Carter. 2 Met. 520, 1159 Seymour v. School Dist., 53 Conn. 502, 1745 V. Van Slyck. 8 Wend. 403, 771 Shadrock v. Columbus, 51 Ohio St. 317, 1268 Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331. 1S9, 192, 541. 607, 1085, 1414 Shaffer v. Welch, 34 Kan. 595. 1258 Shakespear v. Smith, 77 Cal. 638. 968, 1482 Shaller v. City of Omaha, 23 Neb. 325, 1222 Shanewerk v. City of Fort Worth, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 271, 798 Shanfelter v. Mayor &c., 80 Md. 483, 541 Shaukland v. Phillips, 3 Tenn. Ch. 556, 1480 Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Peters 242, 132 Shannon v. City of Huron, 9 S. D. 356, 872, 878, 956 V. O'Boyle. 51 Ind. 565, 629 V. Portland, 38 Or. 382, 751, 1131, 1259 V. Portsmouth. 54 N. H. 183, 626 V. Reynolds, 78 Ga. 760, 950 V. Town of Tama City, 74 Iowa 22, 1596 V. Village of Hinsdale, 180 111. 18, 1148, 1153, 1166 Shapleigh v. City of San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646, 66, 71, 737, 1029 Sharp, In re, 56 N. Y. 257, 1257. V. Contra Costa Co., 34 Cal. 284, 774, 1522, 1743 V. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon. 223, 1515, 1517 V. .Johnson, 4 Hill 92, 1261, 1533 V. Mayor &c., 40 Barb. 256. 870 V. Smith, 32 111. App. 336, 915 V. Spier, 4 Hill 76, 341, 565, 1134, 1232, 1533 Sharpe v. Robertson. 5 Graft. 518, 183 Sharpless v. Mayor &c.. 21 Pa. St. 147, 81. 763, 979, 983, 1536, 1538 Shaver v. Starrett. 4 Ohio St. 494, 6S7 Shaw V. Crocker, 42 Cal. 435, 680 Shaw V. Dennis, 10 111. 405, 763, 983, 1084. 1252, 1514 V. Independent School Dist. &c., 77 Fed. 277, 1030 V. Kennedy, N. C. Term R. 158, 533 V. Mayor &c., 19 Ga. 468, 212 V. Norfolk R. Co., 5 Gray 162, 992 V. President &c., 74 Wis. 105, 1618 V. Reed, 16 Mass. 450, 335 V. Statler. 74 Cal. 258, 886, 920 Shay, In re, 15 N. Y. S. 488, 1680 Shea V. City of Muncie. 148 Ind. 14. 490, 501. 843, 1383 V. Inhabitants &c., 145 Mass. 525, 711, 1037 V. Inhabitants. 145 Mass. 528, 280 Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass. 445, 1420 V. Gleeson. 46 Mo. 100, 282 V. Good Samaritan's Hospital, 50 Mo. 155. 1206. 1247, 1513 V. Martin. 10 Mo. App. 285, 1199 V. Owen. 82 Mo. 458, 1131 V. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 1493 Sheehy v. City of New York, 160 N. Y. 139, 930 V. Clausen, 55 N. Y. S. 1000, 1346 V. Kansas City &c. R. Co.. 94 Mo. 574, 678, 1602, 1776 Sheel V. City of Appleton. 49 Wis. 125, 828, 942. 1615 Sheehan v. Mayor &c., 4 N. J. L. J. 92, 872 Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wall. 177, 346 Sheffield v. Watson, 3 Cai. 69, 216 Sheffield School Tp. v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157, 260, 863, 971 Sheidley v. Lynch, 95 Mo. 487, 916 Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 195 Shelby Co. Court v. Cumberland &c. R. Co., 8 Bush 209. 996 Sheldon v. City of Asheville, 119 N. C. 606. 1785 v. Litchfield Co., 1 Root 158. 1735 V. Village of Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383, 1726 Shelev v. City of Detroit, 45 Mich. 431, 1233, 1268 Shellabarger v. Binns, 18 Kan. 345, 316 Shellev v. St. Charles Co., 30 Fed. 603, 1522 Shellhouse v. State, 110 Ind. 509, 1566 Shelton v. Borough of Birmingham, 61 Conn. 518, 1221 V. Mayor &c., 30 Ala. 540, 520 V. Piatt, 139 U. S. 591, 1697 V. Town of Derby, 27 Conn. 414. 693, 1571 Shenandoah Borough v. Erdman, 12 Atl. 814, 1639 Shepard v. Tulare Irr. Dist., 94 Fed. 1, 1644. 1755, 1784 Shepardson v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 6 Wis. 605, 705 v. Supervisors &c., 28 Wis. 593, 1702 Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 13 Ga. 443, 228 V. District Tp.. 25 Iowa 595. 952 V. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250, 222, 226 V. Staten. 5 Heisk. 79. 197 Sheppard v. Pulaski Co., 13 Ky. L. 672 803 Sherbourne v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113, 9. 797 Sheridan v. City of Salem, 148 Mass. 196, 1179 V. City of Salem. 14 Or. 328, 89. 116. 936, 1594 V. Colvin. 78 111. 237, 591. 845. 1697 V. Mavor &c.. 33 N. Y. S. 71. 793 S'lerley v. City of Louisville, 21 Ky. L. 945, ' 1543 Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99, 1333 TABLE Oli' CASES. clxxi [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-lS30.'\ Sherlock v. Kansas City &c. Co., 142 Mo. 172, 1697 Sherman v. Board &c., 84 Mich. 108, 1G46 V. Buicli, 32 Cal. 241, G87 V. Carr, 8 R. I. 4.31, 663. 667 V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 40 Wi.s. 645. 682 V. Peterson. 91 Mich. 480, 1.^>C.8 V. Torrey. 99 Mass. 472, 362 Sherman Co. v. Simons. 109 U. S. 735. 13. 998. 1003, 1009. 1011, 1024 Sherry v. Gilmore. 58 Wis. 324, 49 Sherwin v. Biigbee, 16 Vt. 439, 86, 87. 343, 349, 355, 1475 V. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337. 344. 353. 1485 Sherwood v. City of Lafayette. 109 Ind. 411. 693. 1571 V. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 127, 1571 Shields v. Chase, 32 La. An. 409, 1528 V. McGregor, 91 :Mo. 534, 155 V. Ohio. 95 U. S. 319, 510 V. Town of Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 805. 1784 Shietart v. City of Detroit, 108 Mich. 309. 1316 Shiflett V. City of Cedartown. Ill Ga. 834. 1801 Shilas V. dinger, 50 Iowa 571. 1387 Shiloh St., In re, 165 Pa. St. 386, 1152 Shimmons v. City of Saginaw, 104 Mich. 511. 1705 Shinbone v. Randoph Co., 56 Ala. 183. 1527. 1528 Shinners v. Proprietors &c., 154 Mass. 168, 1627 Shipley v. Baltimore &c. R. Co.. 34 Md. 336, 704, 705 V. Hackeney, 34 Or. 303, 931, 953 V. Mechanics' Bank, 10 Johns. 484. 1674 Shipman v. State, 42 Wis. 377, 233 Shippy V. Mason, 90 Mich. 45, 949 V. Village of Au Sable, 65 Mich. 494, 1586 Shirk V. Pulaski Co., 4 Dill. 209. 941, 944 Shock V. City of St. Louis, 85 111. 377. 1111 Shoemaker v. LTnited States, 147 U. S. 282, 1302 Sholl V. German Coal Co., 118 111. 427, 685 Shontz V. Evans, 40 Iowa 139. 1540 Shook V. City of Cohoes, 108 N. Y. 648, 1608, 1631 Short V. Symmes, 150 Mass. 298. 198 Shorter v. Mayor &c.. 52 Ga. 621, 1001 Shrader, Ex parte, 33 Cal. 279. 1079. 1081 Shreve v. Town of Cicero, 129 111. 226, 1174, 1261 Shriver v. Pittsburg, 66 Pa. St. 446. 1500. 1508 Shuck V. City of Lebanon, 21 Ky. L. 969. 1554, 1784 Shue V. Highway Com'rs. 41 Mich. 638, 697 Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69, 217 Shulz V. City of Albany. 59 X. Y. S. 235, 1281. 1732 Shuman v. City of Fort Wayne. 127 Ind. 109, 603, 604 Shumway v. City of Burlington, 108 Iowa 424, 1798. 1802 Sias V. Village of Reed City, 103 Mich. 312. 1328, 1803 Sibbald v. Buckell. 36 Atl. 1032, 157 Sibley v. City of Mobile, 3 Woods 535. 1523, 1528 Sidener v. Essex, 22 Ind. 201, 701 Sides V. Portsmouth. 59 N. IT. 24, 1608 Sidner v. Alexander, 31 Ohio St. 378, .323 Siefert v. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136, 1180 Sievers v. City of San Francisco, 115 Cal. 648, 788, 792 Sights V. Yarnalls, 12 Gratt. 292, 1507 Sikes V. Hatfield, 13 Gray 347, 281 V. Town of Manchester, 59 Iowa 65, 1615 Sill V. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 297, 440 Silliman v. Fredericksburg &c. R. Co., 27 Gratt. 119, 217 Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich. 561, 1536 Silver v. Cummings, 7 Wend. 181, 193 V. People, 45 111. 224, 1G80 Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370. 239, 649 Silvey v. Boyle, 20 Utah 205, 201 Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298, 693 Simis V. Brookfleld, 34 N. Y. S. 695. 1370 Simmer v. St. Paul, 23 Minn. 408, 8 Simmerman v. Borough of Wildwood, 60 N. J. L. 367, 477 Simmes v. Chicot Co., 50 Ark. 566, 944 Simmons v. City of Camden, 26 Ark. 276. 680 V. City of Toledo, 5 Ohio C. C. 124, 654 V. State, 12 Mo. 268, 1508 Simms v. City of Paris, 8 Ky. L. 344, 1516 V. Kern, 92 Pa. St. 455, 1124 Simon v. Northrup, 27 Or. 487, 1147, 1315 Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick. 120, 216 v. Parker, 1 Met. 508. 1740 Simons v. City of Camden, 29 Ark. 276, 1776 Sims V. Board &c., 39 Ind. 40, 1095 V. City of Frankfort, 79 Ind. 446. 585, 1322 V. Hines, 121 Ind. 534, 707 Singer Mfg. Co. v. City of Elizabeth, 42 N. J. L. 249. 1017 Single V. Marathon Co.. 38 Wis. 364. 994 Sinnatt v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 81 Wis. 95, 589 Sinnett v. Moles, 38 Iowa 25, 556 Sinton v. Asbury, 41 Cal. 525, 1317, 1522 Sioux City &c. Co. v. Trust Co. &c., 27 C. C. A. 73, 1758 Sioux City R. Co. v. Sioux City. 138 U. S. 98, 104, 510 Sipe V. Murphy, 49 Ohio St. 536, 1398 Skaggs V. City of Martinsville, 140 Ind. 476. 501 Skaneateles W. W. Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 161 N. Y. 154. 1349, 1814 Skillman v. Board &c., 64 N. J. L. 489, 1765 Skinker v. Herman, 2 Mo. App. Repr. 1095. 502. 1293, 1701 Slack V. Blackburn. 64 Iowa 373. 988 V. Maysville &c. R. Co., 13 B. Mon. 1, 983 V. Town of Norwich, 32 Vt. 818. 1726 Slater v. Wood, 9 Bosw. 15, 189, 191 Slatten v. Dps Moines &c. R. Co., 29 Iowa 148, 1108 Slattery, Ex parte, 3 Ark. 484. 1411, 1415 Slaughter v. Commonwealth. 13 Gratt. 767. 137. 1508, 1521 V. Mobile Co.. 73 Ala. 134. 412 V. O'Berrv, 126 N. C. 1S1. 517. 612 V. People, 2 Doug. 334, 497, 1414 clxxii TAELE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 83S-1830.-\ Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 1403 Slee V. Bloom. 5 Johns. Ch. 366, 167 Sleeper v. P.uUen, 6 Kan. 300. 1723 V. Sandown. 52 N. H. 244, 1640 Sleight V. People. 74 111. 47, 1538 Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487, 532 Slevin v. Board &c., 123 Cal. 130, 1(65 Slingerland v. International Cent. Co.,_ 43 App. Div. 215. 1<'3 Sloan V. Beebe. 24 Kan. 343. „„1234 V. State, 8 Blackf. 361, 75, 76, 103 Slocomb V. City of Fayetteville, 125 N. C. 362, 1506 Small V. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine 359, 459. (56 V. Orme, 79 Maine 78, 160, 298 V. Town of Prentice, 102 Wis. 256, 930, 1799 Smally v. City of Appleton, 75 Wis. 18^ 1587, lb2J Smathers v. Commissioners, 125 N. C. 480, 986 Smead v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 11 Ind. 104. 251 Smedley v. Irwin. 51 Pa. St. 445, 685 V. Kirbv. 120 Mich. 253, 192 Smeltzer v. "White. 92 U. S. 390. 959 Smiley v. MacDonald. 42 Neb. 5. 740 Smith, Ex parte. 38 Cal. 702, 1079, 1399 Smith, In re, 99 N. Y. 424, 1158, 1234 V. Aston. Freem. Ch. 308, 1014 V. Bangs, 15 111. 399, 401 V. Birmingham W. Co., 104 Ala. 315, 1708 V. Board &e., 45 Fed. 725, 86, 93, 94, 153, 156, 343, 368 V. Board &c., 46 Fed. 340, 774 V. Board &c., .59 111. 412, 318 V. Board &c.. 148 N. Y. 187, 1829 V. Bradley, 20 N. H. 117, 1569 V. Chicago, 38 Fed. 388. 1604 V. City of Appleton, 19 Wis. 468, 1531 V. City of Boston. 7 Cush. 254. 1575 V. City of Brooklyn, 46 N. Y. S. 141, 1370 V. City of -Buffalo, 35 N. Y. S. 635, 1160 V. City of Buffalo, 159 N. Y. 497 1244. 1298, 1311 T. City of Buffalo. 1 Sheld. 493, 1133 V. City of Chicago. 169 111. 257. 1147 V. City of Des Moines, 106 Iowa 590, 1260. 1301 V. City of Detroit, 120 Mich. 572, 1287 v. City of Eau Claire, 78 Wis. 457, 1222 V. City of Jackson, 106 Mich. 136. 1329 V. City of Louisville, 9 Ky. L. 779, 1397 V. City of Madison, 7 Ind. 86. 88, 112 V. City of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 69, 1255 V. 'city of Newburgh, 77 N. Y. 130, ' 257, 200. 644, 894 V. City of Newcastle, 178 Pa. St. 298. 1330 V. City of Omaha, 49 Neb. 883, 1300, 1774 V. City of Philadelphia. 13 Phila. 177. 662 V. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506, 797. 815. 819. 1097. 1768 V City of Rochester. 92 N. Y. 463, 676 V. City of St. Joseph, 45 Mo. 449, I'OO V. City of San Antonio. 17 Tex. 643 1414. 1420 V. City of Sedalia. 152 Mo. 283. 1708 Smith V. City of Spokane, 16 Wash. 403, 1328 City of Syracuse, 44 N. Y. S. 852, 749, 750 V. City of Toledo, 24 Ohio ?t. 126, 1255 V. City of Vicksburg, 54 Miss. 615, 1503 V. City of Waterbury, 54 Conn. 174, 182 V. City of Wilmington, 98 N. C. 343. 370, 371 V. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58, 986, 995, 1001, 1016 V. Cofran, 34 Cal. 310, 1533 V. Commissioners, 21 Kan. 669, 1035 V. Commonwealth, 41 Pa. St. 335, 175 V. Commonwealth. 25 Graft. 780, 317 V. Corporation of Aberdeen. 25 Miss. 209, 1270 V. Corporation &c. of Wash- ington. 20 How. 135. 801, 824 V. Cosgrove. 44 Atl. 73, 165 V. Cronkhite. 8 Ind. 134, 313 V. Crutcher, 92 Ky. 586, 368 V. Davis. 30 Cal. 536, 1533 V. Dedham. 144 Mass. 177, 896 V. Directors &c.. 40 Iowa 518, 1494 V. Engle, 44 Iowa 265. 1201 V. Epping. 69 N. H. 558, 977, 997 V. Farrelly. 52 Cal. 77, 1552 V. Ferris, 6 Hun 553, 1571 V. Gould, 61 Wis. 31. 212, 1216, 1218 V. Green, 109 Cal. 228, 1814 V. Holmes. 54 Mich. 104, 226 V. Hubbard. 1 Pickle 306, 1172 V. Inhabitants &c., 27 Maine 145. 1725 V. Inhabitants &c., 144 Mass. 177, 848, 877 V. Jefferson Co., 10 Colo. 17, 1472 V. Kernochen, 7 How. 198. 108 V. Kockersperger, 180 111. 527, 1285, 1711 V. Law. 21 N. Y. 296, 274 V. Magourich. 44 Ga. 163, 651 V. Marston, 5 Tex. 426, 536 V. Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 531. 181, 663, 664 V. Mavor &c., 81 Mich. 123. 387, 1518, 1654, 1655 V. Mayor &c., 40 N. J. L. 186, 181 V. Mayor &c., 10 N. Y. 504. 253 V. Mayor &c., 42 N. Y. S. 522, 719 V. Mayor &c., 45 N. Y. S. 239. 793 V. Mavor &c., 4 Lea 69, 664, 668 V. McCarthy. 56 Pa. St. 359, 58, 61. 82. 83, 384, 1517 V. McDowell, 148 111. 51, 1703 V. Milwaukee &c. Exch., 91 Wis. 360. 596 V. Minto, 30 Or. 351. 1286 V. Morse. 2 Cal. 524. 282. 547, 1539 V. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 464. 572 V. New York, 37 N. Y. 518, 183 V. People. 154 111. 58. 53 V. Proctor, 6 N. Y. S. 212, 1486 V. Proctor. 130 N. Y. 319, 989 V. Proprietors &c.. 8 Pick. 178. 1806 V. School District, 69 Mich. 589, 852, 1491 V. Schroeder, 15 Minn. 33. 1725 V Sherrv. 50 Wis. 210. 1516, 1518 V. Simmons, 103 Pa. St. 32, 1182 v Smith. 3 Dessaus. 557. 445 V. Stapler. 53 Ga. 300. 333 V. State, 23 N. J. L. 712. 1105. 1106 V. Syracuse Imp. Co., 101 N. Y. 484 750, 1136 V. Tobener. 32 Mo. App. 601. 471 V. Town of Westerly, 19 R. I. 437 1809 TABLK OF CASES. clxxiii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Smith V. Village of Adrian, 1 Mich. 495. 'JO, 103 V. Wcldon, 73 Ind. 454, 696 V. Wildes, 143 Mass. 556, 1G39 V. Wright, 24 Barb. 170, 222 V. Wright, 27 Barb. 621, 1591 V. Zaner, 4 Ala. 99. 134 Smoot V. Mavor &c-., 24 Ala. 112, 85 Smout V. Ilberv, 10 M. & W. 1, 217 Smyrk v. Sharp, 82 Md. 97, 524 Smyth V. City of Baugor, 72 Maine 249, 1336 V. Titcomb, 31 Maine 272, 58 Snedicor v. Davis, 17 Ala. 472, 226 Sneeson v. Kiipfer, 21 K. I. 560, 1340 Snell V. Bridgewater &c. Co., 24 Pick. 296, 106 V. Corporation &c., 30 U. C. Q. B. 81, 1403 Snelling v, Joffrion, 42 La. An. 886, 636, 835 Snipes v. City of Winston, 126 N. C. 374, 730 Snodgrass v. Morris. 123 Ind. 425, 1487 Snow V. Inhabitants &c., 109 Mass. 123, 680 Snyder v. City of Albion, 113 Mich. 275, 930 V. City of Lexington, 20 Ky. L. 1562, 785, 1373 V. City of Mt. Pulaski, 176 111. 397. 1105, 1316, 1758 V. City of North Lawrence, 8 Kan. 82, 517 V. Foster, 77 Iowa 638, 633, 652 V. Kantner. 190 Pa. St. 440, 1708 V. Plass. 28 N. Y. 465, 1570~ V. President &c.. 6 Ind. 237. 1776 V. Trumpbour, 38 N. Y. 355, 1570 Snyder Tp. v. Bovaird, 122 Pa. St. 442, 623, 966 Society &c. v. City of London, 29 Conn. 174, 983. 986 V. Pawlet. 4 Peters 480. 51, 64, 84 V. Vandyke. 2 Whart. 309, 206 Society of Bethany v. Sperry, 10 Conn. 200, 340, 343 Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481. 1029 Soens V. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 270, 548, 558 Solomon v. City of Kingston, 24 Hun 562, 800 Solon V. Williamsburg Sav. Bank, 35 Ilun 1, 987, 988 Somerset Co. v. Parson, 105 Pa. St. 360, 295 Sonoma Co. Tax Case, 13 Fed. 789, 1550, 1.552 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 492 Soper V. Henry Co.. 26 Iowa 264, 14, 776 V. Inhabitants &c., 28 Maine 193, 346, 364, 1485 V. State, 48 Kan. 540, 902 Soule V. City of Passaic, 47 N. J. En. 28, 1216 V. Thelander. 31 Minn. 227. 14S3 South V. Maryland. 18 How. 396, 329 Southard v. Inhabitants, 53 Maine 389. 341, 358 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4, 1576 South Covington &c. R. Co. v. Ber- ry. 13 Ky. L. 943. 596 Southerland v. Board &c., 96 N. C. 49. 370, 374 Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. City of Richmond. 98 Fed. 671. 525 Southern Electric &c. Co. v. City of Philadelphia. 191 Pa. St. 170. 1548 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Reed, 41 Cal. 256, 682 Southern Pav. Co. v. City of Chat- tanooga, 48 S. W. 92, 726 Southern Plank R. Co. v. Hlxon, 5 Ind. 165, 207, 296 Southern R. Co. v. Atlanta R. &c. Co., Ill Ga. 679, 1710 v. City of Jackson. 33 Miss. 334, 1247 South Hampton v. Hampton Falls, 11 N. II. 134, 1048 South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 429, 210 South Park Comrs. v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 107 111. 105, 1249, 1250, 1251 South Platte Land Co. v. Buffalo Co., 15 Neb. 605, 393 V. City of Crete, 11 Neb. 344, 1717 Southport V. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128, 97, 408, 494, 523 South School Dist. v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227, 344. 350. 362. 1422. 1485 Southwell V. City of Detroit, 105 Mich. 514. 1336 Sower V. City of Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St. 231, 464 Sowles V. Village of St. Albans. 71 Vt. 418, 1273. 1274, 1293 Spalding v. Kelly, 66 Mich. 693. 420 Spangler v. City &c. of San Fran- cisco, 84 Cal. 12, 1180 V. Jacoby, 14 111. 297. 299, 1421 Spann v. Board. &c.. 64 Ga. 498, 895 Sparhawk v. Union R. Co., 54 Pa. St. 501. 1104 Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 45 Atl. 596. 610 Sparland v. Barnes. 98 111. 595, 1528 Sparrow v. F>ansville &c. R. Co., 7 Ind. 369. 994 Spaulding v. Andover, 54 N. H. 38, 757 V. Arnold, 125 N. Y. 194, 925, 1678 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 30 Wis. 110. 1109 V. City of Lowell. 23 Pick. 71, 210. 23.3, 251. 647, 666, 867, 1402 V. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. 134. 289 V. City of Waverly, 44 N. Y. S. 112. 930 V. Inhabitants &c., 153 Mass. 129. 640 V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 57 Wis. 304. 708 V. North San Francisco &c. Assn., 87 Cal. 40. 1137, 1194 V. Wesson. 115 Cal. 441, 1151, 1291 Speaker v. Glass. L. R. 3 P. C. 560, 205 Spearbracker v. Town of Larrabee. 64 Wis. 573. 1618. 1622. 1631 Specht V. City of Detroit, 20 Mich. 168. 628 Speedling v. Worth Co., 68 Iowa 152. 1068 Speer v. Board &c., 60 U. S. App. 38, 32 C. C. A. 101, 88 Fed. 749. 66. 69, 70. 547. 951, 952, 1757 v. Mayor &c.. 85 Ga. 49. 1253 Speight V. People, 87 111. 600, 845 Speir V. Brooklyn. 19 N. Y. S. 665. 1111 V. City of Brooklyn, 18 N. Y. S. 170. 807 V. City of New Utrecht. 121 N. Y. 420. 1374. 1567 Spellman v. City of New Orleans, 45 Fed. 3. 1399 V. Inhabitants &c., 131 Mass. 443. 1623 Spelman v. City of Portage, 41 Wis. 144. 1218 Spencer v. Andrew, 82 Iowa 14. 1368 V. Merchant. 100 N. Y. 585. 1242 V. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345. 559, 1238. 1239. 1242. 1252. 1302 V. Perry, 17 Maine 413, 335 clxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Spencer v. Pierce, 5 R. I. 63. 1020 V. Sully Co., 4 Dak. 474, 939 Spengler v. "Trowbridge, 02 Miss. 46, 611 Spicer v. Board &c., 120 Ind. 369, 1578, 1579 V. Hoop, 51 Ind. 365, 056 Spidell V. Johnson, 128 Ind. 235, 947 Spiller V. Inhabitants &c., 12 Allen 127, 1495 Spilman' v. City of Parkersburg, 35 W. Va. 605, 877, 879, 880, 881, 893, 1394 Spltzer V. Village of Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234, 034 Spitznogle v. Ward, 64 Ind. 30, 221 Spooner v. Inhabitants &c., 139 Mass. 235, _ 1624 Sprague v. Brown. 40 Wis. 612, 150 V. City of Rochester, 34 N. Y. S. 1126 1335 V. City of Rochester, 64 N. Y. S. 846, 1'797 V. City of Rochester, 159 N. Y. oQ 1361 V. 'Coenen, 30 Wis. 209, 564 V. Norway. 31 Cal. 173, 152 Sprigg y. Garrett Park, 89 Md. 406, 1406 Spring y. Inhabitants &c., 137 Mass. 554, 823 Springer v. City of Chicago, 135 HI. 552, 1-11' 1602 y. City of Chicago, 159 111. 515, 1290 V. City of Philadelphia, 12 Atl. 490 1605 y. Clay Co., 35 Iowa 241, 959 Springfield" V. La Claire. 49 111. 476, 1618 y Walker, 42 Ohio St. 543, 662 Springfield &c. Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseyille, 148 N. Y. 46, 785, 786, 790 V. Village of Keeseyille, 29 N. Y. S. 1130, 780 Springfield R. Co. v. City of Spring- field. 85 Mo. 676, 1574 Spring Valley Coal Co. y. City of Spring Valley. 65 111. App. 571, 800 y. People, 157 111. 543. 1548 Spring Valley Water-works y. City of San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286. 1460. 1461 V. San Mateo Water-works. 64 Cal. 123, 685, 1448 V. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 6, 104 V. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 106, 109, 1689 Springwells Tp. y. Wayne Co. Treas- urer, 58 Mich. 240, 409 Sproul y. City of Seattle, 17 Wash. 256, 793, 796 Sprowl y. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674, 313 Spurrier v. Wirtner, 48 Iowa 486, 708 Squire y. Preston. 31 N. Y. S. 174, 716 Stack, In re, 50 Hun 385, 1220 y. City of East St. Louis, 85 111. 377, 588 Stackhouse y. City of Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17, 1179, 1180 y. Clark. 52 N. J. L. 291. 355, 356 Stackpole v. Ilealy, 16 Mass. 33, 1570 Stadler y. City of Detroit, 13 Mich. 346. 200, 212 V. Fahey, 87 111. App. 411, 514. 518 V. Roth", 59 Mo. 400. 1427 Stafford v. City of Oskaloosa, 57 Iowa 748. 1598 y. City of Oskaloosa, 64 Iowa 251, 1609 y. Mayor &c., 7 .Tohns. 541, 701 Stnhlhut V. Bauer, 51 Neb. 64, 209 Staldter y. City of Huntington, 153 Ind. 354, 745 Staley v. Mayor &c., 50 N. Y. S. 237, 1343 Stalleup y. City of Tacoma. 13 Fed. 337. 1032 Stamford Water Co. y. Stanley, 39 Hun 424, 688 Stamp V. Cass Co., 47 Mich. 330, 670 Stamper y. Temple, 6 Humph. 113, 671 Standart y. Burtis, 46 Ilun 82. 212 Standish y. Washburn, 21 I'ick. 237, 1618 Stanford y. City of San Francisco, 111 Cal. 198, 1369 Stanhart y. Sitley, 19 Atl. 464, 1415 Stanley y. City of Davenport, 54 Iowa 463. 591, 1612 y. McGeorge, 17 Wash. 8. 874 Stanton v. Camp, 4 Barb. 274, 262 y. City of Chicago, 154 111. 23, 1145 y. City of Salem, 145 Mass. 476, 1605 y. City of Springfield. 12 Allen 566, 1586, 1606, 1612 Staples y. Town of Canton, 69 Mo. 592, 1580 Stapleton y. City of Newburgh, 41 N. Y. S. 96, 1315, 1343 Starbird y. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine 101, 841 Starbuck y. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, 692 Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439, 635, 982 Stark y. Lancaster, 57 N. H. 88, 1596 Starkey y. City of Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203. 260 Starr y. City of Burlington, 45 Iowa 87, 466, 1255 y. Trustees, 6 Wend. 564, 1418, 1724 Starwin v. Genoa. 23 N. Y. 439, 1010 State y. Adams. 65 Ind. 393, 1694 y. Adams, 58 Vt. 694. 357 V. Addison, 2 S. C. 499. 1545 y. Alexander, 107 Iowa 177, 206, 297 y. Allen, 21 Ind. 516, 206 V. Allen, 23 Neb. 451, 905 V. Allen, 7 Jones L. 564, 333 V. Allen, 2 McCord 55, 1048 V. Ailing, 12 Ohio 16, 171 V. Alter. 5 Ohio C. C. 253, 163 ' V. Anderson, 26 Fla. 240, 1691 y. Anderson, 44 Ohio St. 247, 113, 120 V. Anderson Co., 8 Baxt. 249, 1528 y. Andrews, 11 Neb. 523. 1400 V. Andrews. 15 R. I. 394, 154 y. Apgar. 3l N. J. L. 358, 1724 y. Appleby. 25 S. C. 100, 933, 1664 y. Applegate, 49 N. J. L. 376, 950 y. Armstrong, 30 Neb. 493, 417 y. Assessors &c., 43 N. J. L. 338, 1522 y. Assessors &c., 51 N. J. L. 279. 1540, 1663 y. Atkins. 35 Ga. 315, 17 V. Atkinson. 65 N. J. L. 171, 1686 V. Atlantic City. 49 N. J. L. 558. 645. 848, 877. 880. 881, 897, 1449 V. Bahcock, 19 Neb. 230, 1536 y. Babcock, 20 Neb. 522, 1255 y. Babcock, 21 Neb. 599, 985 y. Babcock. 22 Neb. 278. 973 V. Babcock, 23 Neb. 179, 981 V. Babcock, 25 Neb. 709, 59, 61, 83 y. Bacon, 31 S. C. 120. 950 y. Bader, 56 Ohio St. 718. 1698 y. Baker. 43 La. An. 1168, 1404 V. Baker. 44 La. An. 79, 537. 1419 V. Baker. 38 Wis. 71, .369, 370 y. Baldwin. 45 Conn. 134. 524 y. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 12 Gill & J. 399, 763 y. Bank, 45 Mo. 528, 217 TABLE OF CASES. clxxv [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'i State V. Barbour, 5.*$ Conn. 76, 1.-)!). l(i(), 162, 301, 302 V. r.ardou, lo:? Wis. 297, 931 V. Barnes, 22 Fla. 8, 921 V. Baruet. 46 N. J. L. 62, 464 V. Barllett, 30 Miss. 624, 311, 312 V. Bartlett, 35 Wis. 287, 536 V. Bateman, 96 N. C. 5, 1491 V. Baxter. 50 Arlj. 447, 614 v. Bavs. 31 Neb. 514, 1654 V. Beacbam, 125 N. C. 652, 550 V. B.ean. 91 N. C. 554, 1403 V. Beattie. 3 6 Mo. App. 131, 607 V. Beeman, 35 Maine 242, 346, 362 V. B.eirce. 27 Conn. 319, 538 V. Bell, 34 Obio St. 194. 282, 547, 1132 V. Bennett, 22 Neb. 470, 1434 V. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532, 1501, 1724 V. Benton, 29 Neb. 460, 1489, 1490 V. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185, 585, 1313, 1322 V. Bergman, 6 Or. 341, 607 T. P.erkelev. 140 Mo. 184, 186 V. P.errv, 12 Iowa 58, 106, 695 V. Berrv, 14 Obio St. 315, 380 V. Berrv, 47 Obio St. 232, 380, 1690 V. Berrv, 13 Wasb. 708, 66 V. P.evers, 86 N. C. 588, 233 V. Bieler, 87 Ind. 320, 1676 V. Bilbv, 60 Kan. 130, 63 V. Bill." 13 Ired. L. 373, 543 V. Binder, 38 Mo. 450, 112, 290, 374 V. Bisbop. 39 N. J. L. 226, 684 V. Blackstone, 63 Wis. 362, 988 V. Blair, 32 Ind. 313, 309 V. Blair, 76 N. C. 78, 328 V. Blake, 35 N. J. L. 208, 645 V. Blake, 36 N. J. L. 442, 673 V. Blend, 121 Ind. 514, 1432, 1434 V. Blohm, 26 La. An. 538, 326 V. Bloom, 19 Neb. 562, 1487 V. Bloom. 17 Wis. 521, 196 V. Blossom, 19 Nev. 312, 197 V. Bloxham, 26 Fla. 407, 173 V. Boal. 46 Mo. 528, 378, 379 V. Board &c., 17 Fla. 29, 381 V. Board &c., 27 Fla. 438, 1681 V. Board &c., 25 Ind. 210, 1660 V. Board &c., 45 Ind. 501, 1659 V. Board &c., 63 Ind. 497, 1659 V. Board &c., 131 Ind. 90, 1659, 1660 V. Board &c., 39 Kan. 657. 1027 V. Board &c., 41 Kan. 630, 1518 V. Board &c., 40 La. An. 298, 924 V. Board &c., 51 La. An. 1142, 872 V. Board &e., 27 Minn. 442. 1139, 1198 V. Board &c., 14 Neb. 22, 1535 V. Board &c.. 17 Nev. 96, 1487 V. Board &c., 37 N. J. L. 254, , 667 V. Board &c., 39 N. J. L. 632, 1447 V. Board &c., 39 N. J. L. 660, 1525, 1527 V. Board &e., 40 N. J. L. 302, 1575, 1577, 1578 V. Board &c., 41 N. J. L. 135, 663 V. Board &c., 49 N. J. L. 170, 1437, 1445 V. Board, 50 N. J. L. 457, 1689, 1693 V. Board &c., 51 N. J. L. 240, 1657 V. Board &c., 52 N. J. L. 69, 1670 V. Board &c., 53 N. J. L. 531, 855 V. Board &c., 54 N. J. L. 325, 1091, 1092 V. Board &c., 57 N. J. L. 588, 514 573 V. Board &c., 63 N. J. L. 55. 1711 V. Board &c., 65 N. J. L. 307, 1809, 1810 V. Board &c., 8 Atl. 509, 190 V. Board &e., 27 Obio St. 96, 1529 State V. Board &c., 35 Ohio St. 368, 1478 V. Board &c., 24 Wis. 683, 1646. 1673, 1687 V. Board &c., 61 Wis. 275, 418 V. Board &c., 63 Wis. 234, 1481 V. Board &c., 70 Wis. 485, 561 V. Board &c., 71 Wis. 321, 837 V. Boardman, 93 Maine 73, 1407 V. Boden, 51 N. J. L. 114, 303 V. Boecker. 56 Mo. 17, 199 V. Bolcbe, 1 S. W. 234, 1683 V. Boll, 59 Mo. 321, 1119 V. Boneil, 42 La. An. 1110, 526 V. Bonnell, 119 Ind. 494, , 1677 V. Bonner. 72 Mo. 387, 328 V. Borough &c., 52 N. J. L. 32, 54 V. Borough of Vineland, 60 N. J. L. 264. 1153 V. Bradford. 32 Vt. 50, 1689 V. Bradley, 54 Conn. 74, 48, 1474 V. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484, 90, 103 107, 108, 453, 1500, 1501, 1513 V. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, 195 V. Brewer, 64 Ala. 287, 1533 V. Briel, 58 Minn. 152, 1299 V. Brigantine Borough, 54 N. J. L. 476. 856 V. Brinkerhoff. 66 Tex. 45, 185, 198 V. Brittain, 89 N. C. 574, 494 V. Brittin, 52 La. An. 94, 180, 183 V. Brodboll, 28 Neb. 254. V. Broodbelt, 89 Md. 565, V. Brossfield, 67 Mo. 331, V. Brown, 11 Ired. L. 141, V. Brown, 112 Ind. 600, V. Brown, 54 Md. 318. V. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, V. Brown, 53 N. J. L. 922 603 638 331 912 332 1071, 1072 162, 1514, 1515 V. Browning, 28 N. J. L. 556, 1485 V. Bryce. 7 Ohio 414, 207 V. Burbridge, 24 Fla. 112, 371 V. Burdge. 95 Wis. 390, 1763 V. Burton, 45 Wis. 150, 1472 V. Button, 25 Wis. 109, 431 V. Butts, 31 Kan. 537, 370, 371 V. Buttz, 9 S. C. 156. 198 V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880. 507, 519, 537, 606 V. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402, 601 V. Canal &c. R. Co., 50 La. An. 1189. 505 V. Canterbury, 28 N. H. 195, 61, 83 V. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 519, 530 V. Carleton, 1 Gill 249, 317 V. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97, 501, 538, 1419 V. Carr, 129 Ind. 44, 172 V. Carr, 5 N. H. 367, 64 V. Carroll. 38 Conn. 449, 66, 69, 195, 196, 197, 289, 1420 V. Cather, 22 Neb. 792, 950 V. Cavers, 22 Iowa 343, 381 V. Chamberlin, 37 N. J. L. 388, 519 V. Chamber of Commerce &c., 20 Wis. 63. 626 V. Chapman, 44 Conn. 595, 301, 302 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 80 Iowa 586. 692 V. Churchill. 41 Mo. 41, 313 V. Cincinnati Gas &c. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262, 516, 566, 568, 1464, 1808 V. Circuit Court, 15 Atl. 272, 561 V. City Council, 74 Ala. 226, 991, 1027 V. City Council, 30 N. J. L. 365, 1268 V. City Council &c., 31 N. J. L. 547. 1257 clxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 State V. City Council, 34 N. J. L. 99, 1234 V. City Council &c., 39 N. J. L. 416, 1657 V. City Council &c., 46 N. J. L. 124, 1540 V. City Council &c., 47 N. J. L. 64. 1694 V. City Council &c., 50 N. J. L. 87, 97, 108, 119, 493 V. City Council, 5 Rich. L. 561, 1511 V. City Council &c., 10 Rich. L. 240, 1537 V. City Council. 12 Rich. 702. 1198 V. City Council &c., 2 Speers L. 623. 1507 V. City Council &c., 2 Speers L. 719, 1500, 1507 V. City of Bayonne, 35 N. J. L. 335. 463, 465 V. City of Brunswick, 32 N. J. L. 548, 1234 V. City of Camden, 50 N. J. L. 87, 97. 108, 119, 493 V. City of Camden, 63 N. J. L. 186. 612 V. City of Cape May, 58 N. J. L. 565. 1350 V. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178. 1494 V. City of Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18, 54, 55, 119 V. City of Columbia, 27 S. C. 137, 1500 V. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa 335. 1526. 1527, 1528. 1533 V. City of Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 70 V. City of Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533, 666, 688 V. City of Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 330. 1250 T. City of Elizabeth. 37 N. J. L. 432. 465, 1257 V. City of Elizabeth, 54 N. J. L. 462, 592 V. City of Elizabeth, 58 N. J. L. 619. 502 V. City of Emporia. 57 Kan. 710. 1543 V. City of Great Falls, 19 Mont. 518, 879 V. City of Hudson, 29 N. J. L. 115, 645 V. City of Jersey City, 54 N. J. L. 310. 1432 V. City of Jersey City, 42 Atl. 845. 754 V. City of Kansas City, 60 Kan. 518. 1166 V. City of Kearney, 25 Neb. 262, 1653 V. City of Kearney, 49 Neb. 337, 737 V. City of Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 122, 89 V. City of Minneapolis.. 32 Minn. 501, 901 V. City of New Albany, 127 Ind. 221, 1667, 1675 V. City of Newark, 48 N. J. L. 101, 1234, 1253 V. City of New Orleans, 30 La. An. 129, 1526. 1531 V. City of New Orleans, 34 La. An. 477. 1529 V. City of New Orleans, 34 La. An. 1149, 1525 V. City of New Orleans, 41 La. An. 91, 411, 636. 1465 V. City of New Orleans. 50 La. An. 880, 617, 953, 955 State V. City of New Orleans, 51 La. An. 99, 194, 722 V. City of New Orleans, 51 La. An. 699, 722 V. City of New Whatcom, 3 Wash. 7. 389 V. City of Orange, 54 N. J. L. Ill, 486, 1156 V. City of Orange, 13 Atl. 240, 1404 V. City of Passaic, 4 N. J. L. 90, 260, 528, 1254 V. City of Passaic, 42 N. J. L. 87, 535 V. City of Passaic, B4 N. J. L. 340, 1249 V. City of Passaic, 63 N. J. L. 208, 732 V. City of Perth Amboy, 38 N. J. L. 425, 645, 1254 V. City of Phillipsburg, 23 Mont. 16, 737. 1662 V. City of Plainfleld, 54 N. J. L. 526. 584 V. City of Portage, 12 Wis. 562, 558, 593, 1234 V. City of Portland, 74 Maine 268. 831 V. City of St. Anthony, 10 Minn. 433. 1485 V. City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19, 20O V. City of St. Paul, 36 Minn. 529. 1544 V. City of Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112 1543 V. City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76, 541. 1415 V. City of Trenton, 35 N. J. L. 485, 186, 187, 547 V. City of Waxahachie, 81 Tex. 626. 390, 391, 398, 402 V. Clark, 4 Ind. 315, 1038 V. Clark. 42 Mo. 519, 1740 V. Clark, 52 N. J. L. 291, 846, 1486, 1489 V. Clark. 73 N. C. 255, 319 V. Clarke. 69 Conn. 371, 506 V. Clarke, 50 Mo. 17, 501 V. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17. 110. 111. 112, 495. 500, 519, 1574 V. Clarke, 25 N. J. L. 54, 111, 494, 495 V. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566, 185, 199 V. Clary. 25 Neb. 403. 1472, 1473 V. Clay Co.. 46 Mo. 231, 1526 V. Clavton. 27 Kan. 442. 199, 20O V. Cleveland. 80 Mo. 108. 212 V. Cleveland. 3 R. I. 117. 527 V. Clevenger. 27 Neb. 422. 1518 v. Clothier. 80 N. J. L. 351, 1724 V. Cobb. 64 Ala. 127, 1027 v. Cockrell. 2 Rich. L. 6. 156 V. Cole Co. Court. 80 Mo. 80, 1055 V. Collins. 43 N. J. L. 562. 1502 V. Collins. 60 N. J. L. 367, 1504 V. Colvig. 15 Or. 57, 313 V. Commercial Bank, 13 Sm. & M. 569. 123 V. Commissioners. 6 Ohio St. 280. 1527, 1528 V. Commissioners &c., 21 Ohio St. 648. 663 V. Commissioners &c., 36 Ohio St. 526, 753 V. Commissioners &c., 37 Ohio St. 526, 881 V. Commissioners, 49 Ohio St. 301, 1648 V. Commissioners &c., 17 Ohio C. C. 275, 1685 V. Commissioners &c., 2 N. C. Law 617. 213 V. Commissioners, 4 Dev. 345, 214 TABLE OF CASES. clxxvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-lS.W.'\ State V. Commissioners, 17 Nev. 96, 922, 923 V. Commissioners, 38 N. J. L. 190, 1261 V. Commissioners &c., 46 N. J. L. 116, 1198 V. Common Council &c., 25 N. J. L. 536, 200, 205, 626 V. Common Council &c., 33 N. J. L. 110, 340 V. Common Council &c., 36 N. J. L. 198. 106. 1106 V. Common Council &c., 45 N. J. L. 279. 592 V. Common Council &c., 7 Wis. 688, 837, 971, 973 V. Common Council &c., 15 Wis. 80, 280, 410. 1527, 1531, 1681 V. Common Council &c.. 20 Wis. 87, 1526, 1527, 1528. 1530 V. Common Council &c.. 42 Wis. 287, 694 V. Common Council &c.. 90 W^is. 612, 203, 204. 880, 875. 878, 986 V. Compton, 28 Neb. 485, 627, 1473, 1484 V. Conlin, 27 Vt. 318, 541, 1414 V. Conlon. 65 Conn. 478, 504 V. Conover, 28 N. J. L. 224, Q90 331 V. Conover, 63 N. J. L. 191, " 'l504 V. Constantine, 42 Ohio St. 437, 369, 376 V. Consumers' Water Co., 51 N. J. L. 420, 584, 1454 V. Cooper, 20 Fla. 547. 955 V. Copeland. 74 Minn. 371, 1684 V. Corner, 22 Neb. 265. 369, 370 V. Corning. 44 Kan. 442, 943 V. Cornish. 66 N. H. 329. 1067 V. Corporation of Savannah, 1 T. W. P. Charl. 235. 497 V. Corporation of Shelbyville, 4 Sneed 176. 831 V. Corrigan &c. St. R. Co., 85 Mo. 263. 510. 590, 1158, 1183 V. Council, 106 Iowa 731, 58 V. Council &c., 38 N. J. L. 430, 667 V. Council &c.. 47 N. J. L. 64, 153 V. Council, 2 Speers L. 623. 1500 V. County Board &c., 20 Neb. 595, 627 V. County Com'rs, 21 Fla. 1, 443 V. County Com'rs, 22 Fla. 29. 1683 V. County Com'rs, 23 Fla. 483. 121 v. County Com'rs, 23 Kan. 264, 381 V. County Com'rs, 6 Neb. 129. 695 V. County Com'rs, 31 Neb. 465, 1490 V. County Com'rs. 28 S. C. 258, i664 V. County Court, 19 Ark. 360, 1502 V. County Court, 34 Mo. 546, 1538 V. County Court. 44 Mo. 230, 313 V. County Court, 44 Mo. 504, 983 V. County Court. 64 Mo. 30. 1540 V. County Court, 33 W. Va. 589, 1651 v. County Court, 47 W. Va. 672. 1687 V. County Judge, 5 Iowa 380, 1527 V. County Judge, 7 Iowa 186, 339, 381 V. Court of Common Pleas, 36 N. J. L. 72, 84 V. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102, 45. 150. 1433 V. Cowan. 29 Mo. 330. 104, 497 V. Cowgill &c. Mill Co.. 156 Mo. 620, 463. 714, 1812 V. Cozzens. 42 La. An. 1069, 1357 V. Cram, 84 Maine 271. 1411, 1412, 1415 V. Cram, 16 Wis. 343. 424 V. Crane. 36 N. J. L. 394, 697, 1254 1 Smith — xii State V. Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877, 507 V. Crites, 48 Ohio St. 142, 1680 V. Croolts, 7 Ohio 221, 326 V. Crosley. 36 N. J. L. 425, 301 V. Cross, 18 S. W. 170, 1074 V. Cruickshank. 71 Vt. 94, 538 V. Crummery, 17 Minn. 72, 496 V. Culver. 65 Mo. 607, 1574 V. Currah, 12 Ark. 321, 61. 83 V. Custer, 11 Ind. 210, 1472 V. Dahl. 65 Wis. 510. 901 V. Dallas Co. Court, 72 Mo. 329, 996 V. Daly, 49 N. J. L. 403, 955 V. Daly. 50 N. J. L. 356, 935, 954 V. Davidson. 50 La. An. 1297, 1386 V. Davidson, 32 Wis. 114. 342, 359 V. Daviess Co. Court, 64 Mo. 30 991 V. Davis, 17 Minn. 429, 1679 V. Davis, 44 Mo. 129, 183 V. Dawson, 22 Ind. 272, 1813 V. Dean, 23 N. J. L. 335, 1233 V. Deane, 38 Fla. 121, 1675 V. De Bar. 58 Mo. 395. 110, 112 V. De Gress, 53 Tex. 387, 185 V. Deliesseline. 1 McC. 52, 156 V. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 1075, 1432, 1433, 1532 V. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 509 V. Deshler, 25 N. J. L. 177, 1475 V. Dillon, 125 Ind. 65, 162 V. District Board &c., 76 Wis. 177. 1494, 1495 V. District Court &c., 29 Minn. 62, 1140 V. District Court &c., 33 Minn. 164. 1198 V. District Court &c., 33 Minn. 235, 302 V. District Court &c., 33 Minn. 295. 1139, 1140 V. District Court &c., 41 Minn. 518. 480 V. District Court &c., 47 Minn. 406. 1287 V. District Court &c., 66 Minn. 161. 1310 V. District Court. 68 Minn. 242. 1251 V. District Court &c., 75 Minn. 292, 1287. 1293, 1310 V. District Court &c., 77 Minn. 248, 1287 V. District Court &c., 78 Minn. 464. 1159 V. District Court &c.. 80 Minn. 293. 513. 1275. 1293, 1303, 1307 V. District Court &c., 4 N. W. 1107, 697 V. District of Narragansett, 16 Atl. 901. 56 V. Doherty, 25 La. An. 119, 200 V. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382. 118, 171 V. Donahay, 30 N. J. L. 404, 348 V. Donovan, 89 Maine 448, 209 V. Douglass, 33 N. J. L. 363, 1503 V. Dousman. 28 Wis. 541. 54 V. Dowling. 50 Mo. 134, 1511, 1724 V. Downs. 60 Kan. 788. 611 V. Drake, 33 N. J. L. 194, 1238 V. Druly. 3 Ind. 431. 332 V. Duffv. 7 Nev. 342, 1494 V. Dulaney, 43 La. An. 500, 508 v. Dunbar, 43 La. An. 836, 537, 1420 v. Dunn. 11 La. An. 549, 326 v. Dunson, 71 Texas 65, 93, 402. 407, 408, 446 V. Durvea, 45 N. J. L. 258, 1248 v. Dwver. 21 Minn. 512, 494 v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789, 606 V. Eastman. 109 N. C. 785. 1556 V. Easton R. Co., 36 N. J. L. 181, 679, 1571 clxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.-] 1655 1745 1486 1474 1711 1811 425, 440 424 State V. East Orange, 41 N. J. ^^^^J'^qq V. Eberhai-dt, 14 Neb. 201, V. Kberlv. 12 Neb. 616, V. Echols. 41 Kau. 1. V. Edison, 76 Tex. 302._ V. Ellis, 43 La. An. 82o._ V Ellis, 52 La. An. lOOo, v'. Elvins. 82 N. J. L. .".62, V. Elwood. 11 Wis. It, V Engelmann, 106 Mo. 628, 1568 V. Everett, 52 Mo 89, 1683 V. Executors &c., 8 La An. 171, 563 V. Faber, 50 La. An 952, 5-« V. Fagan, 42 Conn. 32 297, 3^ V. Falconer, 44 Ala. 696, 313 V. Falkenburg, 15 N. J. L 320, 1<24 V. Farr, 47 N. J. L. 208, ^ ^^^_ ^^^ V. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 383, 197 V. Fenton, 29 Neb. 348, 921 V. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424 526, 581 V Ferluson. 31 N. J. L. 107, 199 v. Fiedler, 43 N._^J L. 400 9.54 V Fillmore Co.. 32 Neb. 8(0, 1645 V. Findley. 10 Ohio 51, V. Finlev. 74 Mo. App. 213, V. Fishblate, 83 N. C. 654, V. Fiske, 9 R. L 94. 282, 547, 1539 V. Fitts. 49 Ala. 402, 200 V. Fitzgerald, 44 Mo. 425 1692 V. Fitzpatrick. 64 Mo. 185, 3^- V. Flannigan, 67 Ind. 140 lira V. Fleetwood. 16 Mo. 448, 538 313 1658 213 1683 Iowa 1526 1522 538 1419 301 528 549 1694 69 1118 1714 J 694 V. Fletcher, 39 Mo. 3 V. Floyd Co. Judge, 5 380 V Foley, 30 Minn. 350, V. Follet, 6 N. H. 53, V. Folwell, 20 Atl. 1079. V. Forest Co., 74 Wis.^610, ^^^^ ^^^ V. Forman, 50 La. An. 1022, 506 V. Forney, 21 Neb. 223, 4- J V. Fosdick, 21 La. An. 434, 137 V. Foster. 7 N. J. L. 101, V. Fountain. 14 Wash. 236, V. Fox, 63 N. E. 19, v. Francis, 88 Mo. 557, V. Francis, 95 Mo. 44, V. Franklin. 40 Kan. 410, T. Frazier, 48 Ga. 137. V. Frazier, 28 Neb. 438. V. Freeman, 88 N. H. 426. ^ ^^^_ ^^^ T. Frost, 103 Tenn. 685. 63 V. Froth, 34 N. J. L. 377, 1106 T. Fuller, 96 Mo. 165, 64 V. Fuller, 34 N. J. L-Jf >,266, 1268 V. Gafifney. 34 N. J. L. 133, 1546 V. Gallagher, 22 Minn. 449, l-i V. Gandv. 12 Neb. 232. V. Garibaldi, 44 La. An. 809, V. Garroutte. 67 Mo. 445, V. Gastinel, 20 La. An. 114, V. Gates, 43 Conn. 533, V. Gates, 35 Minn. 385, V. Gayhart. 34 Neb. 192. V George, 23 Fla. 585, 167, 185, 186 V. Georgia Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608, 97, 468, 494 V. Gilman. 33 W. Va. 146, 137 V. Gisch, 31 La. An. 544 1403 V. Glasgow. N. C. Conf. 386, 21.3 V. Glavin. 67 Conn. 29. 504 V. Gleason. 12 Fla. 190, 1691 V Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 541, 141.3 V. Goetze. 22 Wis. 363, 349, 368 V. Goff. 15 R. L 505. 198 V. Goldstucker, 40 Wis. 124, 1.51 V. Good, 41 N. J. L. 296, 368 State V. Goowin, .69 Tex.||; ^-g, .88 V. Gordon, 60 Mo. 383, 496 V. Gorton, 33 Minn. 34.o, 1491 V. Gouldey, 52 N. J. L. 62, 163 V. Gouldihg, 44 N. IL 284 o38 V. Gouldy, 58 N. J. L. 562, 527 V. Grace. 20 Or. 154,^.^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ V. Gracey, 11 Nev. 233, 1545 V. Graffmuller, 26 Mmn. 6, o3b V. Graham. 21 Neb. 329, 1490 V. Grammer. 29 Ind. 530, 211, 324 V. Graves, 19 Md. 351.,^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ V Gray, 93 Ind. 303, ^„^^i I: Gray, 23 Neb. 365, 164, 296, 475 V. Green, 15 N. J. L. 88, l»< v.Green,37 0hioSt^2^^^^3_^^3 V. Green Co., 54 Mo. 540, 986 V. Grimes. 49 Minn. 443, 526 V Grimes. 50 Minn. 123, 607 V. Grimshaw, 1 S. W. 363.^^^^ ^^^^ V. Grosvenor, 19 Neb. 494, 1491 V. Grubb, 85 Ind. 213 1494 V. Guiney. 26 Minn. 313, 295 V. Gumber, 37 Wis. 298, 524 V. Gutierrez, 15 La. An. 190, 1413 V. Haben, 22 Wis. 660, lo38 V. Hadley, 27 Ind. 496, 31 j. ;:ga'M3~9N:fL.e40, 699,?fo V. Hamilton, 40 Kan. 323 446 V. Hamilton, 69 Miss. 116. 1492 V. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 435, 557 V Hammond. 40 Minn. 43, V Haney. 2 Dev. & B. 390, V. Hanna. 97 Ind. 469, V. Hannibal &c. R- CO;, ^^ M*^-,^,-. 908 623, 1520, 154o, 1547 V. Hansen, 20 Nev. 401, I486 V. Hanson, 23 Tex. 232, ,„„11?^ V. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377 48 ^ 519 V. Harney, 57 Miss. 863, V. Harper, 42 La. An. 312, V. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607, V. Harris. 50 Minn. 128, V. Harris, 96 Mo. 29, V. Harris, 19 Nev. 222, V Harris, 17 Ohio St. 608, 960 1403 996 378 377 380 1673 617 539 706 312 1399 319 602 623 1486 1529 V. Harris,' 52 Vt. 216, 351, 375, 376 274 168, 207 381 435, 945 401 646 217. 1737 282, 285 199, 200 V. Harrison. 67 Ind. 71, V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434, y. Harrison, 38 Mo. 540, V. Harshaw. 73 Wis. 211, V. Ilarwi, 36 Kan. 588. V. Haskell, 20 Iowa 2i6, V. Hastings. 10 Wis. 518, V. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155, V. Hauss. 43 Ind. 105, V. Hawes, 112 Ind. 323. ^ ^^^^ ^^^ V. Hayes, 7 La. An. 118, 325, 326 V. Haves, 61 N. H. 264, V. Haynes, 72 Mo. 377, V Haynes. 50 N. J. L. 97, V. Hays, 50 Mo. 578, V. Heath, 20 La. An. 172, V. Heidenhain, 42 La. An.^4|3.^^^3 V. Heidorn. 74 Mo. 410, 485 V Heisev, 56 Iowa 404, -si- v.- nllfrid. 2 N. & McC. 233 1410 V. Henderson, 38 Ohio St. 644 V. Herdt. 40 N. .1. L. 264. v. Herod, 29 Iowa 12.3. v. Herrmann. <5 Mo. 340, V Higgins, 76 Mo. App. 319, 467 279, 576 163, 954 217 663 480 530 1510 113 1658 TABLE OF CASES. clx: [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.'\ State V. lliggs, 126 N. C. 1014, 509, 13G5, 1387 V. Ilil], 54 Ala. 67, 77H V. Hill. 10 Iiid. 219, 1559 V. Hill, 10 Neb. 58. 381 V. Hill. 126 N. C. 1139, 1387 V. Ilinckli'. 37 Ark. 532, 945 V. Hipp. 38 Ohio St. 199, 1509 V. Ilobe. lOG Wis. 411, 1311 V. Iloff. 20 S. \V. 672. 157 V. Ilohu, 50 La. An. 432, 514 V. Hokomb. 68 Iowa 107, 1086 V. Ilolden, 19 Neb. 249, 403 V. Holmes. 43 La. An. 1185, 172 V. Herd, 122 N. C. 1092, 1388 V. Horn, 94 Mo. 162, 311 V. Home, 115 N. C. 739, 599 V. Horton, 19 Nev. 199. 1486 V. Hotaliug, 44 N. J. L. 347, 1233, 1546 V. Houston, 78 Ala. 576, 320 V. Howes. 112 Ind. 323, 863 V. Hoyt, 2 Or. 246. 301, 987 V. Hudson Co. Com'rs, 37 N. J. L. 12. 68 V. Hudson &c. R. Co., 38 N. J. L. 548, 637 V. Huggins. 47 Ind. 586, 1317 V. Huggins, Harp. L. 94, 156 V. Humphreys, 25 Ohio St. 520, 1535 V. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578, 1433 V. Hunter, 106 N. C. 796, 503 V. Hurff. 38 N. .1. L. 310, 1485 V. Hutchin.s, 33 Neb. 335, 1475 V. Hutchinson, 60 Iowa 478, 324 V. Hutchinson, 39 N. J. Eq. 218, 1092 V. Hyman, 19 Ohio C. C. 622, 1768 V. Tndependent School Dist., 42 Minn. 357. 1473 V. Inhabitants &c., 37 Maine 451. 831. 1577, 1587 V. Inhabitants &c., 30 N. J. L. 137. 1112, 1577 V. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. J. L. 79, 617 V. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. J. L. 499, 645, 695 V. Inhabitants &c., 38 N. J. L. 95, 468 V. Inhabitants &c., 44 N. J. L. 610, 532 V. Inhabitants &c.. 45 N. J. L. 318. 275. 276. 519, 528, 529, 534, 1447 V. Inhabitants &c., 49 N. J. L. 188, 1043 V. Inhabitants &c., 49 N. J. L. 401, 1301 V. Inhabitants &c., 51 N. J. L. 498. 496 V. Inhabitants &c., 52 N. J. L. 483, 194, 747 V. Inhabitants &c., 53 N. J. L. 132, 502, 598 V. Inhabitants &c., 54 N. J. L. ^2't u u. 584 V. Inhabitants &c., 58 N. J. L. ■ 506, 465 V. Inhabitants &c., 60 N. J. L. 394. 795 V. Inhabitants &c., 60 N. J. L. 402, 514, 725 V. Ironton Gas Co., 37 Ohio St. 45, 6, 1406 V. Irvin, 126 N. C. 989. 506, 1389 V. Isabel, 40 La. An. 340, 1677 V. Itzkovitch. 49 La. An. 366, 1406 V. Jack. 90 Tenn. 614, 1074 V. Jackman, 69 N. H. 318, 493 V. Jacksonville St. R. Co., 29 Fla. 590. 1653 V. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143, 171, 288, 429 State V. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419, 58, 90, 103 V. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 536, 207 V. Johnson, 100 Ind. 489, 313 V. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, •>->3 V. Jones, 19 Ind. 356, 349, 368, 1508 V. Jones, 155 Mo. 570, 1652 V. Jones, 18 Tex. 874, 1569 V. Judge &c., 13 Ala. 805, 378 V. Judge &c., 51 La. An. 1768, 592 V. Judges, 35 Ln. An. 1075, 204 V. Julian, 93 Ind. 292, 1483 V. Justice, 24 N. J. L. 413, 301 V. Justices &c., 4 Hawks 194, 213 V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69, 274, 519, 521, 1405 V. Ivawinagh, 24 Neb. 506. 1652 V. KeaTns, 47 Ohio St. 566, 153, 163, 170, 199, 206 V. Keith, 94 N. C. 933. 497, 498 V. Keith Co., 16 Neb. 508, 981 V. Kempf, 69 Wis. 470, 380, 1692, 1694 V. Kennedy, 69 Conn. 220, 306 V. Kilroy, 86 Ind. 118, 1676 V. King, 37 Iowa 462, 537, 540, 1424 V. King, 34 Neb. 196, 1654 V. Kirk, 46 Conn. 395, 276 •>97 V. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401, 185 V. Kirkley. 29 Md. 85, 516, 646 V. Kirkwood, 15 Wash. 298, 203 V. Knight, 31 S. C. 81, 1648 V. Knight, 82 Wis. 151, 901 V. Kraft, 18 Or. 550, 156, 380 V. Labatut, 39 La. An. 513, 495 523 V. Laclede Gas-Light Co., 102 Mo. 472, 573 V Lafayette Co. Court, 41 Mo. 221, 1649 V. Lambertville. 45 N. J. L. 282 465 V. Lancaster. 63 N. H. 135, 137 V. Lane, 16 R. I. 620, 1487, 1688 V. Lane, 21 Atl. 302, 159 170 V. Lanier, 31 La. An. 423, 3'>o V. Larkins, 44 S. C. 362, 541 V. Larrabee. 1 Wis. 200, 403 V. Lashar, 71 Conn. 540, 169 V. Laughton, 19 Nev. 202, 313 V. Laverack, 34 N. J. L. 201, 681 V. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81 49, 58, 65 V. Leaver, 62 Wis. 387, 582, 1322, 1369 V. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, ^ ^ 536, 541, 607, 1412 V. Lefflngwell, 54 Mo. 458, ^ T 4. ^o . 13' 14, 54, 55 V. Leverton, 53 Iowa 483, 1473 V. Lewis, 35 N. J. L. 377, 846 V. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496. 6''6 V. Litus, 47 N. J. L. 89, 1560 v. Lockett, 52 La. An. 1620, 1644 V. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403, 1415 V. Logan, 43 N; J. L. 421, 645 V. Long. 8 Ired. L. 415, 328, 331 V. Long, 94 N. C. 896. 1556 V. Long Branch Com'rs, 42 N J. L. 375, 1133 V. Long Branch Police &c. Com., 59 N. J. L. 371, 730 V. Longstreet, 38 N. J. L. 312, 706 V. Lowery, 49 N. J. L. 391, 499, 1081 V. Lucas, 9 Houst. 396, 1108 V. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202, 1085 V. Macon Co. Court, 41 Mo. 453. 995 V. Macon Co. Court, 68 Mo. 29, 1524, 1542, 1646 V. Madison St. R. Co., 72 Wis. 612 1812 V. Mahner, 43 La. An. 496, 508, 605 clxxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 State V. Maniteau Co. Court, 45 Mo. App. 387, 1711 V. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470, 141.5 V. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 114, 380 V. Martin, 27 Neb. 441, 190, 659, 920, 924 V. Mason, 43 La. An. 590, 1426 V. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 926, 1793 V. Mathenv, 7 Kan. 327, 187, 313 V. Mav, 22 Ark. 445, 1483 V. Mavbew, 2 Gill 487, 386, 1714 V. Mavor &c., 24 Ala. 701. 90, 92, 104 V. Mayor &c., 5 Port. 279, 681 V. Mayor &c., 22 Fla. 21, 960, 961, 1679, 1680 V. Mayor &e., R. M. Charl. 250, 89, 90, 103 V. Mayor &c., 23 La. An. 358, 917 V. Mayor &c., 30 La. An. 129. 1526, 1531 V. Mavor &c., 49 La. An. 1322, 1686 V. Mayor &c., 52 La. An. 1604, 1684 V. Mayor &c., 29 Md. 85, 646 V. Mayor &c.. 73 Mo. 435, 94, 117 V. Mayor &c., 19 Mont. 518, 547, 718, 723. 731, 1684 V. Mayor &c., 32 Neb. 568, 1682 V. Mayor &c., 3 N. J. L. 57, 107 V. Mayor &c., 23 N. J. L. 280, 1507 V. Mayor &c., 25 N. J. L. 309, 273, 275, 277, 284, 1539 V. Mayor &e., 26 N. J. L. 399, 1132 V. Mayor &c., 26 N. J. L. 444, 282, 1533 V. Mayor &c., V. Mayor &c., V. Mayor &c.. V. Mayor &c., 27 N. J. L. 185, 1247, 1249, 1250, V. Mayor &c., 27 N. J. L. 493, V. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. 104, 1254, V. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. 115, V. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. 170. 100, 107, 543, 1093, 1110, V. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. 441. V. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. 475 481, 645, 30 N. J. L. 93, 30 N. J. L. 303, 645, 32 N. J. L. 49. 693, 1257, 1259, V. Mayor &c., 33 N. J. L. 57, 111 V. Mayor &c., 34 N. J. L. 163, 281, 468, 552, V. Mayor &c., 34 N. J. L. 236, V. Mayor &c., 34 N. J. L. 445, V. Mayor &c.. 35 N. J. L. 157, 1512, V. Mayor &c., 35 N. J. L. 190, V. Mayor &c., 35 N. J. L. 381, V. Mayor &o., 36 N. .T. L. 159, V. Mayor &c., 36 N. J. L. 291. V. Mayor &c., 37 N. J. L. 348, V. Mayor &c., 37 N. J. L. 415. 1197, 1257, 1271, V. Mayor &c., 38 N. J. L. 110. 479, V. Mayor &e., 40 N. J " V. Mayor &e., 40 N. J V. Mayor. &c., 40 N. J L. 186 L. 257, L. 550, 54. 55 V. Mayor &c., 41 N. J. L. 71. V. Mayor &c., 44 N. J. L. 137, V. Mayor &c., 45 N. J. L. 104, V. Mayor &c.. 45 N. J. L. 482, V. Mayor &c., 46 N. J. L. 140. V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 15. V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 117, V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 286. 499, V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 449, 1724 465 1724 645 1117 707 1724 481 1257 1571 , 494 1539 468 1259 1545 1657 1724 645 1297 499 1297 519 664 116 119 1388 368 1200 1233 168 1140 547 519 893 V. Mayor &c., 63 N. V. Mayor &c., 63 N. State V. Mayor &c., 49 N. J. L. 308, 494, 62G V. Mayor &c., 49 N. J. L. 384, 1528 V. Mayor &c., 49 N. J. L. 515, 1689 V. Mayor &c., 51 N. J. L. 428. 1379 V. Mayor &c., 52 N. J. L. 65, 617, 1352 V. Mavor &c., 52 N. J. L. 88. 475 V. Mayor &c. 52 N. J. L. 332, 1657, 1666, 1682 V. Mayor &c., 53 N. J. L. 299, 1253 V. Mayor &c., 53 N. J. L. 544, 1437 V. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. 102, 584 V. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. Ill, 486, 115& V. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. 293, 587, 105a V. Mavor &c., 54 N. J. L. 437, 614 V. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. 476, 592 V. Mayor &c., 55 N. J. L. 241. 877, 881 V. Mayor &c., 57 N. J. L. 252, 1315, 1365 V. Mayor &c., 57 N. J. L. 293, 1351 V. Mayor &c., 58 N. J. L. 262, 514, 723 V. Mayor &c., 62 N. J. L. 621, 1135, 1236 L. 61, 1273, 1283 L. 96, 186, 206 V. Mayor &c., 63 N. J. L. 148, 1828 V. Mayor &c., 63 N. .7. L. 202, 1266, 1282, 1297 V. Mayor &c., 14 Ohio St. 472, 106. 449, 995, 1534 V. Mayor &c., 10 Rich. L. 491, 594, 983 V. Mayor &c., 12 Rich. 480, 1413 V. Mavor &c., 11 Humph. 217, 214 V. Mayor &c., 15 Lea 697, 176 V. Mavor &c., 10 Wash. 4, 203 V. Mayor &c., 71 Wis. 502. 1232 V. Mayor &c., 88 Wis. 599, 1240 V. Mayor &c., 101 Wis. 208, 1286 V. McCann. 21 Ohio St. 198, 1493 V. McOaiilev. 15 Cal. 429. 917 V. McCIura:, 27 N. J. L. 253. 1724 v. McCormack, 50 Mo. 568, 323 v. McCov. 116 N. C. 1059. 499 V. McOullough, 20 Nev. 154, 1694 V. McOurdy, 62 Minn. 509, 727 v. McDaniel. 78 Miss. 1, 32& V. McDonald, 26 Minn. 445, 697 V. McFadden, 23 Minn. 40, 434 V. McOovern. 100 Wis. 666, 66 V. McGrath. 91 Mo. 386, 753, 1687 V. McKee. 20 Or. 120, 298, 351 V. JIcMahon. 62 ISIinn. 110, 604 V. McMahon, 69 Minn. 205, 1387 V. McMillan, 108 Mo. 153, 376 V. McNinch. 87 N. C. 567. 606 V. McRevnolds, 61 Mo. 203, 1515, 1517 v. Mead. 71 Mo. 266, 986 v. ^leadows. 1 Kan. 90, 446 v. Medbery, 7 Ohio St. 522, 917 V. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138, 137, 138 V. Merrill, 37 Maine 329, 466, 601 V. Merriman. 6 Wis. 14. 423, 424 V. Merritt, 83 N. C. 677, 537, 606 V. Messolongitis, 74 !Minn. 165, 519 V. Miller, 41 La. An. 53, 589, 1356 V. Miller. 66 Minn. 90. 1827, 1830 V. Miller, 30 N. J. L. 368, 115 V. Miller, 45 N. J. L. 251, 290, 1657 V. Mills, 29 Wis. 322, 700 V. Mills. 34 N. J. L. 177, 110 V. Milwaukee, 20 Wis. 87. 13 V. Minnesota &c. R. Co., SO Minn. 108, 711, 733, 735, 746 V. Mitchell, 58 Iowa 567, 156(> TAI5LH OF CASES. clxxxi [References are to Pages. Tol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 8.33-J830.] State V. Mitchell. ."^1 Ohio St. 18, V. Moiitgomer.v. 74 Ala. IJliG, 085 V. Mooro. 10 Mo. .-if!!). 332 V. Mooro. 74 Mo. 413, 310 V. !\[()on\ 54 X. J. L, 121, 1455 V. >ro..io. 104 N. O. 714, GOO V. Mooivs. 5(! Neb. 1, 1G5 V. Morris, 47 La. An. IfiGO, 600 V. Morris. 14 Wash. 2G2. 381 V. Morse. 50 N. II. 0. 695, 1572 V. Morton. 27 Vt. 310, 539 V. Moss. 2 Jones G6. 1414 V. Mote. 4.S Nel). 6S3, 60 V. Mott, ()1 Md. 207. 502 V. Mullonlioff. 74 Iowa 271, 1677 V. Murphv. 130 Mo. 10. 1347 V. Murphy. 134 Mo. 54S. 741, 1348 V. Murray. 41 Minn. 123, 153 V. Murray. 28 Wis. 9G. 185 V. Mutchler, 41 X. J. L. 96, 1717, 1720 V. Namias. 49 La. An. 618, 138G V. Natal. 39 La. An. 439, 91 T. Natal. 41 La. An. 887, 581 V. Neidt, 19 Atl. 318. 1124 V. Nelson. 41 Minn. 25, 1550 V. Nelson. 34 Neb. 162, 418 V. Nelson. 57 Wis. 147, 1257 T. Nevin. 19 Nev. 162, 319 V. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 550. 54, 55, 119 V. Newman. 96 Wis. 258. 520 V. New Orleans &c. R. Co.. 52 La. An. 1570. 721, 726 V. Newton. 33 Ark. 276. 324 V. Noble, 20 La. An. 325, 541 V. Nolan. 37 Minn. 16, 1400 V. North. 42 Conn. 79, 1475 V. North. 27 Mo. 464, 1503, 1537 V. Norton. 63 Minn. 497, 1274 V. Noyes. 30 N. H. 279, 61, 83, 84 V. Noyes, 25 Nev. 31. 713 V. O'Brien, 47 Ohio St. 464. 380, 1690 v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting, 59 N. J. L. 110. 550 V. O'Connor. 78 Wis. 282, 1169 V. O'Day. 69 Iowa 368. 152 V. Odom. 86 N. C. 432. 327 V. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507. 496, 607 V. Olinger. 109 Iowa 669. 173 V. O'Neill, 49 La. An. 1171, 1390, 1406 V. Orr, 68 Conn. 101. 740, 1386, 1388, 1797 V. Orr. 61 Ohio St. 384, 200 V. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235. 349, 368, 1508 V. Osawkee Tp., 14 Kan. 418, 549, 559, 979, 1050, 1060 V. Osborne, 36 Kan. 530. 446 V. Osborne, 32 Mo. App. 536, 1493 V. Owen, 50 La. An. 1181, 1387 V. Page, 140 Mo. 501, 1S6 V. Painter, 34 Neb. 173, 418 V. Pamperin, 42 Minn. 320, 508 V. Parker. 25 Minn. 215. 1680 V. Parker, 33 N. J. L. 313, 1502 V. Parker, 35 N, J, L. 575, 1724 V. Patterson &c. Co., 21 N. J. L. 9, 1693 V. Payssan, 47 La. An. 1029. 499, 600. 752 V. Peck. 53 Maine 284. 310 V. Pender, 66 N, C. 313, 1411 V. Pendergrass, 106 N. C. 664. 600, 1403 V. Penney, 10 Ark. 621, 133 V. Pepper. 31 Ind. 76. 310 V. Perkins. 24 N. .1. L. 400, 187 V. Phillips. 79 Maine 506. 160, 302, 803 V. Pinto. 7 Ohio St. 355, 522 State V. Police Board &c., 51 La. An. 941. 1G86 V. Police Com'rs, 16 Mo. Ai)i). 48, 1435 V. Police Com'rs &c., 80 Mo. App. 206. lo.-„s, 1765 V. Police Jury, 34 La. An. 673. 1523 V. Porter, 7 Ind. 204, 313 V. Porter. 113 Ind. 70. 290, 292 V. Powell. 40 La. An. 234, 325, 326 V. Powell. 67 Mo. 305. 319 V. Powell. 07 N. C. 417. 1413, 1420 V. I'resident &c.. 2 Iloust. 99, 1510 V. I'riester. 43 Minn. 37;!. 476 V. Proctor, 90 Mo. 334. 1568 V. Proprietors &c.. 46 N. J. L. 405. 685 V. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98, 55 V. Purse. 4 McCord 472, 1104, 1105 V. Randall, 35 Ohio St. 64, 381 V. Rathbun. 22 Wash. 651, 1311 V. Reckards. 21 Minn. 47, 537 V. Reis, 38 Minn. 371. 1165, 1232. 1234. 1268 V. Renick. 37 Mo. 270, 374, 473 V. Rhoades. 6 Nev. 352, 324 V. Rice, 97 N. C. 421, 507 V. Rich, 20 Mo. 393, 66, 70 V. Richmond, 26 N. H. 232, 697, 1573 V. Ricker. 32 N. H. 179, 1412 V. Ring. 29 Minn. 78, 313 V. Riordan, 24 Wis. 484, 54 V. Robb. 17 Ind. 536. 221 V. Roberts. 13 N. J. L. 132, 323 V. Robinson, 42 Minn. 107. 603, 1396 V. Robinson. 29 N. II. 274, 538 V. Roderick, 23 Neb. 505, 1670 V. Rodman. 43 Mo. 256. 381 V. Rogers. 86 N. C. 357, 155 V. Rogers. 22 Or. 348. 879 V. Roggen, 22 Neb. 118, 988 V. Rowe. 72 Md. 548, 98, 622 V. Ruff, 30 La. An. 407. 531 V. St. John. 47 Minn. 315, 1574 V. St. Louis Co. Court, 47 Mo, 595. 1724 V. St. Louis Police Comm., 16 Mo. App. 48. 200 V. St. Paul &c. R. Co.. 35 Minn. 131. 592 V. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 78 Minn. 331. 735 V. Saline Co.. 45 Mo. 242. 1010 V. Saline Co. Court. 48 Mo. 390, 1001 V. Sappington, 67 Mo. 529. 327 V. Saxon. 25 Fla. 702. 1645 V. Scates, 43 Kan. 330. 935 V. School Dist., 10 Neb. 544, 986 V. School Dist., 21 Neb. 725. 1477, 1485 V. School Dist., 22 Neb. 48. 1482 V. School Dist.. 30 Neb. 520. 1654 V. School Dist.. 31 Neb. 552. 1481. 1493. 1670 V. Schuchardt. 42 La. An. 49, 594, 619. 1392 V. Scott. 17 Mo. 521. 58, 61 V. Seavey, 22 Neb. 454, 1433, 1434 V. Severance. 40 Mo. 401, 517 V. Severance. 55 Mo. 378. 115 V. Seymour. 35 N. J. L. 47, 1432 V. Shakspeare, 43 La. An. 92, 1645, 1658 V. Shay, 101 Ind. 3G, 1604 V. Sheppard. 64 Minn. 280. 1316 V. Sheriff &c.. 48 Minn. 236, 558 V. Sberrard. 117 N. C. 716, 409 V. Shropshire. 4 Neb. 411, 1652 V. Sickles, 24 N. J. L. 125, 1540 V. Simon. 20 Or. 365. 167 V. Simons. 32 Minn. 540, 58 V. Sims, 16 S. C. 486, 1433 clxxxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} State V. Sinks, 42 Ohio St. 345, 1509 V. Skirving. 19 Neb. 497, 349, 80S V. Slociim, 34 Xeb. 368, 940, 1660 V. Sly. 4 Or. 277. 541 V. Smith, 67 Conn. 541, 13SS V. Smith, 72 Conn. 572, 203 V. Smith, 22 Minn. 218, 273, 275, 276, 479 V. Smith, 26 Mo. 226, 325 V. Smith, 46 Mo. 60, 401 T. Smith, 87 Mo. 158, 945 V. Smith. 89 Mo. 408, 933 V. Smith, 104 Mo. 661, 1647 V. Smith, 31 Neb. 590, 1646 V. Smith. 100 N. C. 550, 1556 V. Smith, 25 Pac. 389, 351 V. Smith, 19 Wash. C44, 1820 V. Smith, 11 Wis. 65. 378, 1527 V. Smith, 14 Wis. 497, 185 V. Smith. 52 Wis. 134, 542 V. Snodgrass. 1 Wash. 305, 374 V. Somers. 96 N. C. 467, 198 V. Sooy. 39 N. J. L. 135, 321 V. Sovereign. 17 Neb. 173, 911 V. Spaude, 37 Minn. 322, 108, 109 V. Spidel, 44 Kan. 439, 943 V. Stanley. 66 N. C. 59, 187 T. Stark, -18 Fla. 255, 54, 449 V. Starkey. 40 Minn. 503, 468 V. State Board &c., 18 Nev. 173, 1478 V. Staten, 6 Coldw. 233, 369 V. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 1488 V. Stearns, 11 Neb. 104, 1652 V. Stearns, 31 N. H. 106, 536 V. Steen. 43 N. J. L. 542, 119 V. Steers. 44 Mo. 223, 381 V. Sterling, 20 Md. 502. 386 V. Stevens. 21 Kan. 210. 124, 125 V. Stevens, 40 Maine 559, 1105 V. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620. 1084, 1178 V. Stovall. 103 N. C. 416. 601 V. Strader, 25 Ohio St. 527, 1535 v. Strong. 47 S. W. 1103, 1554 V. Stroud. 52 S. W. 697, 585 V. Stumpf. 21 Wis. 579, 152 V. Sullivan, 36 N. J. L. 89, 846 v. Sullivan Co. Court, 51 Mo. 522, 995 996 vrSummerfield, 107 N. C. 895.' 600 V. Superior Court &c., 105 Wis. 651. 514, 1703 V. Supervisors &c., 23 Minn. 521, 340, 341, 345 v. Supervisors &c., 20 Wis. 80, 1527 V. Supervisors, 58 Wis. 291, 340 V. Sutterfield, 54 Mo. 391, 374 V. Sweeney. 103 Wis. 404, 1764 V. Symonds, 57 Maine 148, 369 V. Taff. 37 Conn. 392. 367 V. Taft. 118 N. C. 1190. 504 V. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664. 610, 979 V. Taxing Dist. &c., 16 Lea 240. 607 V. Taylor, 20 Ind. 517. 1104, 1105 V. Tavlor. 26 Neb. 580. 154 V. Tavlor. 108 N. C. 196, 195, 196 v. Tenant. 110 N. C. 609, 503, 504 V. Tennv, 58 S. C. 215, 1311 v. Thaver. 74 Wis. 48, 1492 V. Thompson, 49 Mo. 188, 311 V. Tiedmann. 69 Mo. 515, 1480 V. Timme, 54 Wis. 318. 419 V. Titus, 47 N. J. L. 89, 1577 V. Tool. 4 Ohio St. 553. 312 V. Toomer. 7 Rich. L. 216, 313 V. Towers, 71 Conn. 657. 1688 V. Towle, 103 Wis. 388, 1764 V. Town Council &c.. liice 158, 534 V. Town Council &c.. 6 Rich. L. 404, 532, 534 State V. Town of Kaird, 79 Tex. 63, 60 V. Town of Belvidere, 44 N. J. L. 350, 99, 1148 V. Town of Bergen, 33 N. J. L. 39, 465, 476 V. Town of Burlington, 36 Vt. 521, 831 V. Town of Compton, 2 N. H. 513, 831 V. Town of Guttenberg, 38 N. J. L. 419, 1523 V. Town of Harrison, 46 N. J. L. 79, 1447 V. Town of Hoboken, 53 N. J. L. 64, 1140 V. Town of Maysville, 12 S. C. 76, 1523. 1533 V. Town of Somerset, 44 Minn. 549. 1651 V. Town of Tipton, 109 Ind. 73, 65 V. Town of Union, 32 N. J. L. 343. 1421 V. Town of Union, 33 N. J. L. 350. 426, 468 V. Town of Vershire, 52 Vt. 41, 351 V. Town of West Hoboken, 43 Atl. 535, 1241 V. Town of Winter Park, 25 Fla. 371, 64. 1769 V. Town of Wittingham, 7 Vt. 390; 831 V. Townshij) Board &c., 19 Ohio C. C. 574, 1652 V. Tracy, 48 Minn. 497, 1693 V. Trask, 6 Vt. 355, 1559 V. Treasurer &c., 43 Mo. 228, 960 V. Treasurer &c., 43 N. J. L. 139, 1415 V. Ti-easurer &c., 44 N. J. L. 350, 500, 501 V. Treasurer &c., 45 N. J. L. 288. 519, 528, 536 V. Treasurer &c., 53 N. J. L. 329. 507. 527, 528 V. Trimbell, 12 Wash. 440, 1684 V. Troth. 34 N. J. L. 377. 90, 103 V. Trustees &c., 5 Ind. 77, 445 V. Trustees &c., 43 N. J. L. 358. 1485 V. Trustees &c., 49 N. J. L. 607. 374, 1486 V. Trustees &c., 52 N. J. L. 104. 362 V. Trustees &c., 8 Ohio St. 394. 1002 V. Trustees &c., 14 Ohio St. 569. 983. 1002 V. Trustees &c., 22 Ohio St. 288. 291 V. Trvon, 39 Conn. 183, 466 V. Tuflv. 19 Nev. 391. 151 V. Tunis. 23 N. J. L. 546. 1511 V. Turnev. 8 Oill & J. 125, 323 V. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45, 369, 370 v. Tyler. 48 Conn. 145, 8.59 V. I'nion Dist. School Trustees, 46 N. J. L. 76. 1493 V. Vail. 53 Mo. 97. 378 V. Vallei, 41 Mo. 29. 783 V. Vallius. 140 Mo. 523, 164 V. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J. L. 463. 301. 303 V. Van ITorne. 7 Ohio St. 327. 1002 V. Vanosdal. 131 Ind. 388, 274, 291 V. Van I'elt. 1 Ind. 304, 322 V. Van Winkle, 25 N. J. L. 73. 1422, 142.^^ V. Van Wvck. 20 W^ash. 39. 953 V. Varnum. 81 Wis. 593, 1568, 1656 V. Vickers, 51 N. .T. L. 180. 1693 V. Village of Bradford, 32 Vt. 50, 1693 TABLE OF CASES. elxxxiii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1S30.] State V. Village of Reads, 78 N. W. 883, 117 V. Village of South Orange, 49 N. J. L. 104, 1255 V. Votaw, 8 Rlackf. 2. 419 V. Vreelnnd, 79 Iowa 46G, 1486 V. Wartflell. 40 Minn. 5(t(l. 578, 1345 V. Wadhams, 04 Minn. 318, 171 V. Waggoner. 88 Tenn. 290, 446 V. Wakelv. 2 Nott & McC. 410, 1725 V. Waldron. 17 X. .T. L. 369, 700 V. Walker, 85 Mo. 41. 638 V. Walker, 17 Ohio 135, 428 V. Walker, 7 Cent. L. J'. 390, 1G46 V. Wall. 47 Ohio St. 499. 113 V. Walsh. 70 Mo. A]))). 142. 378 V. Wapello Co., 13 Iowa 405, 979 V. Wapello Co., 13 Iowa 388, 983 V. Warden. 153 Mo. 319, 1549 V. Ware. 13 Or. 380. 339 V. Water Com'rs, 30 N. J. L. 247. 645 V. Watts, 23 Ark. 304, 323, 327 V. Webber, 107 N. C. 962, 503, 520, 606 V. Weir, 33 Iowa 134, 69 V. Welch, 36 Conn. 215, 497, 601 V. Wells, 46 Iowa 662, 1415, 1417 V. Wells. 8 Nev. 105, 168 V. West. 33 La. An. 1261. 198 V. West Duluth Land Co., 75 Minn. 456. 551. 1033 V. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 Maine 518, 1177 V. Wharton, 103 Wis. 307, 880 V. Wheeler. 27 Minn. 76, 1400 V. White, 29 Neb. 288, 921, 1664, 1670 V. White, 10 Rich. L. 442, 328 V. AVhitford. 54 Wis. 150, 1472 V. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245, 133 V. AVilcox, 42 Conn. 364, 84 V. Wilcox. 45 Mo. 458, 58. 61 V. Wilcox. 17 Neb. 219. 1670 V. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480. 1556 V. Williams, 25 Maine 561. 347. 348, 367 V. Williams, 30 N. J. L. 102. 1105 V. Williams. 11 S. C. 288, 601, 607 V. Williams. 6 S. D. 119, 184, 209 V. Williams, 5 Wis. 308. 195, 369 V. Williamson, 44 N. J. L. 165, 106 V. Wilmington, 3 Harr. 294, 189, 373 V. Wilson, 42 Maine 9. 1373 V. Wilson. 24 Neb. 139, 381 V. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 347, 177 V. Wilson, 12 Lea 290. 446 V. Winter, 148 Ind. 177, 157 V. Winter. 15 Wash. 407, 551, 612 V. Wish, 15 Neb. 448. 524 V. Witter. 107 N. C. 792, 1400 V. Wolever. 127 Ind. 306. 189, 220 V. Woodbury. 76 Jlaine 457. 60 V. Woodruff. 37 N. .7. L. 139, 1534 V. Woodward. 89 Ind. 110, 1677 V. Woodward. 23 Vt. 92, 1105 V. Wordin, 56 Conn. 216, 1078 V. Wright, 8 Blackf. 65. 1475 V. Wright. 54 N. J. L. 130, 584 V. Wright. 56 Ohio St. 540, 168 V. Wright. 80 Wis. 648, 1420 V. Yates. 19 Mont. 239. 290. 297 V. Young, 3 Kan. 445, 47. 65, 88, 1410 V. Young, 17 Kan. 414, 110 V. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L. 262. 507, 527, 536 V. Zeno. 79 Minn. SO. 1388 V. Zurich, 49 La. An. 447. 1391 State Bank v. City Council, 3 Rich. L. 343, 1511 State Bank v. City of Madison. 3 Ind. 43, 1510, 1511 V. Curran. 10 Ark. 142. 198 V. Oibbs, 3 McCord 377, 7 V. Knoop, 16 How. 309, 75 State Board &c. v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. •^•18, 240 V. Citizens' St. R. Co., 47 Ind. 407, 649 State &c. Co. v. Commonwealth Ins &c. Co., 39 Minn. 219, 1379 State Railroad Tax Cases. 92 U. S 575. I(i97. 1708. 1717. 1720. 1721 State Sav. Bank v. Davis, 22 Wash 406, i(5S5 State Warrants, In re, 6 S. D. 518. 876 Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31. 580 Stearns v. City of Richmond, 88 Va. 992, 1602 V. Village of Wyoming, 53 Ohio St. 352, 381 Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172 50, 51,' 662 V. Kay, 4 N. Y. S. 566 : 51 Hun 589, 1255 l'>68 V. Mayer. 38 Kan. 573. 489* 1446 V. Merritt, 10 Cush. 27. 14'>1 V. Village of Oneida," 5 N. Y. S. 483;.23N. Y. St. 702. 826,1616.1625 Steckert v. City of East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104, 291. 299. 300. 477, 1421 Steckman v. Brooks, 17 Colo. 248, 1430 Stedman v. City of Rome, 34 N. Y c. ,^- '^^^^ 1335 Steel V. Borough of Huntington, 191 Pa. St. 627, 1315 Steele's Petition, 44 N. H. 220, 1573 V. Calhoun, 61 Miss. 556, 158, 372 V. City of Boston, 128 Mass. c. P^^' 263, 803 Steele Co. v. Erskine, 98 Fed. 215, 644 Steenberg v. People, 164 111. 478, 1278 Steffan v. City of Buffalo, 21 N. Y. W. Dig. 289. 8''6 Steffen v. City of St. Louis, 135 Mo. 44, 1306 Stehmeyer v. City Council, 53 S. „^ . C. 259. 1449, 1554 Stein V. Bienville Water &c. Co., 34 Fed. 145, 567 V. Bienville Water &c. Co., 141 U. S. 67. 1810 v. City of Council Bluffs, 72 Iowa 180, 1619 V. Mayor &c., 17 Ala. 234. 1511, 1512 V. Mayor &c., 24 Ala. 591. 983. 1511, 1546 V. Mayor &c.. 49 Ala. 362, 1512 Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 Mo. 167. 986, 1001 Steinme.ver v. City of St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 256. 1585 Steinmuller v. City of Kansas Citv. 3 Kan. App. 45. 1136. "1701 Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St. 527. 1550. 1552 Stephani v. City of Manitowoc, 89 Wis. 467. 790 Stephens v. City of Macon, 83 Mo. 345. 1618 v. City of Spokane, 14 Wash. 298. 1306 V. Felton. 99 Ky. 395. 13 v. Mayor &c.. 84 Ga. 630, 370. 371 v. Murray. 132 Mo. 468. 609 Sterling v. Parish of West Feliciana. 26 La. An. 59. 636 v. Thomas. 60 111. 265, 8 Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 134 111. 557, 840 elxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Stern v. People. 96 III. 475, 322 Stetson V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 75 111. 74. 170G V. Keinpton, l.S Mass. 272, 15, 251. 647. 608, 867. 1532. 1542 Steuart v. Mayor &c., 7 Md. 500, 699. 705, 1196 Steubenville v. Culp, 38 Ohio St. 18, 213 Steven v. Nebraska &c. Ins. Co., 29 Neb. 187. 1419 Stevens v. Borough of Danbury, 53 Conn. 9, 699 V. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72, 1812 V. Commonvrealth. 6 Met. 241, 539 V. Dudlev. 56 Vt. 158. 223 V. Eden &c. Soc, 12 Vt. 688. 1425 V. Patterson &c. R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 532. 1378 v. Rutland &c. R. Co., 29 Vt. 546. 651 V. St. Marv's Training School. 144 111. 336. 1701. 17.59 V. Truman. 127 Cal. 155. 953 Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich. 44, 491. 1421 V. District Tp.. 35 Iowa 462. 1528 v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 31 S. W. 793, 1350 V. Weber, 29 La. An. 105. 651 Stevens Point &c. Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis. 295. 54 Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335, 58 Stewart v. Board &c.. 30 Iowa 1, 983 V. Board &c., 45 Kan. 708. 1225 V. Cambridge. 125 Mass. 102. 260 V. City of Clinton, 79 Mo. 603. 491. 1426 V. City of Council BIufiEs, 58 Iowa 642, 285 V. City of Council Bluffs, 84 Iowa 61, 1221 V. City of Nashville. 96 Tenn. 50, 1326 V. Lee, 3 Cal. 364. 309 V. Otoe Co., 2 Neb. 177. 632 V. Philadelphia. 7 Atl. 192, 1271 V. Sherman, 4 Conn. 553, 1060 V. Southard, 17 Ohio 402. 221 222 1494 V. State, 4 Ind. 396.~~ ' """' 168 Stickley v. Chesapeake &c. R. Co., 93 Kv. 323. 1554 Stickney v. City of Salem, 3 Allen 374. 1595, 1601 v. Village of Bangor, 30 Maine 404, 1727 Stidger v. City of Red Oak, 64 Iowa 465. 233 Stifel V. Brown. 24 Mo. App. 102, 1273 Stiffler V. Board &c., 1 Ind. App. 368, 945 Stiles V. Town of Middlesex, 8 Vt. 436. 699 Still V. Trustees &c.. 16 Barb. 107, 629 Stillwater v. Green. 9 N. J. L. 59. 430 Stillwater Water Co. v. City of Stillwater. 50 Minn. 498. 587 Stillwell V. Coons. 122 N. Y. 242, 1050 V. Kennedy. 51 Hun 114, 1050 V. JIayor &c., 19 Abb. Pr. 376. 763 V. Mayor &c.. 17 J. & Sp. 360, 8.30 Stilwell V. Coope. 4 Den. 225. 1488 Stilz V. City of Indianapolis. 55 Ind. 515. 384. 1518 V. City of Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 5S2. 1519. 1717 Stinchfield v. Little. 1 GreenL 231, 216 Stine V. Berry. 96 Ky. 63. 381 Stinson v. City of Gardiner, 42 Maine 248. 1595 v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366, 1165 Stirling v. City of Camden, 65 N. J. L. 190. 1406 Stockdale v. Wayland School Dist., 47 Mich. 226. 304 Stockton. Ex parte. 33 Fed. 95. 1399 v. Powell. 29 Fla. 1. 273. 570. 1014 Stockton &c. R. Co. v. Common Coun- cil &c., 41 Cal. 147, 685, 983 V. City of Stockton, 51 Cal. 328. 990 Stockwell V. State. 101 Ind. 1, 1487 V. White Lake Tp., 22 Mich. 341. 861 Stoddard v. Oilman, 22 Vt. 568. 301, 305, 345, 356 V. Inhabitants &c., 154 Mass. 149. 1.585 V. Johnson, 75 Ind. 20, 277 V. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469. 1019 V. Village of Saratoga Springs, 52 Hun 610. 1179 Stodler v. Pahey, 87 III. App. 411. 173 Stokes V. Corporation of New York, 14 Wend. 87, 535, 601 V. Early. 45 N. J. L. 478, 706 Stone V. Bank of Commerce. 174 U. S. 412. 646. 1713. 1719 V. City of Boston. 2 Met. 220, 707 V. City of Cambridge, 6 Cush. 270, 1259 V. City of Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214, 387. 1519 V. City of Poughkeepsie, 44 N. Y. S. 609. 1344 V. Commercial R. Co., 4 M. & C. 122, 699 V.' Elliott, 11 Ohio St. 252, 1026 V. Godfrey, 5 De G., M. & G. 76. 249 V. Inhabitants &c., 8 Cush. 592, 340, 1485 V. Inhabitants &c., 100 Mass. 49, 1332, 1626 V. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. 157. 802 V. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814. 1390, 1677, 1811 V. Seymour, 15 Wend. 19, 325 V. Small, 54 Vt. 498, 354 V. Viele. 38 Ohio St. 314. 1724 V. Woodbury Co.. 51 Iowa 522, 1726 Stoneham v. London &c. R. Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 1. 1571 Stoner v. Plournoy. 28 La. An. 850. 1516, 1518 Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 1302 Storrs V. City of Grand Rapids, 110 Mich. 483. ' 1786 V. City of IJtica, 17 N. Y. 104, 745, 1546, 1590 Storv V. New York &c. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122. 620, 682. 1563, 1564, 1582 Stout V. Chosen Freeholdei's, 25 N. J. L. 202. 684 V. Woods. 79 Ind. 108. 1572 Stoutenburgh v. Hennick. 129 IT. S. 141. 13, 46, 48. 1399 Stow V. Common Council, 79 Mich. 595. 163 V. Nvsc. 7 Conn. 214, 275, 733 Stowers v. Gilbert, 156 N. Y. 600, 1773 Stoystown &c. Co. v. Craver, 45 Pa. St. 386. 1212 Strack v. Ratterman, 18 Ohio C. C. 36. 748 Strahan v. Town of Alalvern, 77 Iowa 454, 615 Stratman, In re, 39 Cal. 517, 1411 Stratton v. City of Oregon, 35 Or. 409. 1033 V. Commonwealth, 10 Met. 217, 707 TABLE OF CASES. clxxxv {References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 TT. S. 303, 140 Strauss v. City of Cincinnati, 23 Wis. Law Bui. 359, 1255 V. Mayor &c.. 97 Ga. 475, 499 Streator v. Chrisman, 82 111. App. 24, 1360 Street v. Board &<-., 70 N. C. 644. 883 V. Laurens. 5 Rich. Eq. 227, 322 Street R. Co. v. West Side R. Co., 48 Mich. 433, 1352 Strenny v. City Council &c., 86 Ala. 340. 1287 Striclcland v. City of Stillwater, 63 Minn. 43, 1305 V. Giede, 31 Or. 373. 879 Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 674 Strieb v. Cox, 111 Ind. 299, 632, 889, 947, 1201 Stril?e V. Collins, 54 L. T. 152, 1403 Striker v. Kelly, 7 Ilill 9. 299. 476, 480, 1421 Strobel v. City of New York, 36 N. Y. S. 814, 1336 Strom V. City of Iowa City, 47 Iowa 42, 1730 Strong, Petitioner, 20 Pick. 484, 1688, 1692 V. Campbell. 11 Barb. 135, 225 V. City of Brooklyn, 68 N. Y. 1, 1564 V. City of Stevens Point, 62 Wis. 255, 1595 V. District of Columbia, 4 Mackey 242, 280, 715 V. Makeever, 102 Ind. 578. 1567 V. United States, 6 Wall. 788, 318 Strosser v. Citv of Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443, 401, 647. 1769 Stroud V. City of Pliiladelphia, 61 Pa. St. 255. 593, 1234 Strough V. Supervisors of Jefferson, 119 N. Y. 212. 1678 Strudgeon v. Village of Sand Beach. 107 Mich. 496. 1336, 1786 Strunk v. Ocheltree, 11 Iowa 158, 332 Strusburg v. Mavor &c., 87 N. Y. 452, 1198. 1202, 1205, 1264. 1551 Struthers v. Railway Co., 87 Pa. St. 282, 591 Stryker v. Skellman, 14 N. J. L. 189, 1765 Stuart V. Inhabitants &c., 48 Maine 477, 1641 V. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 595, 692, 1237, 1238, 1242 V. School Dist. &c., 30 Mich. 69, 1730 V. Town of Warren, 37 Conn. 225, 347, 360 Stubbs V. Lee, 64 Maine 195, 198 Studabaker v. Studabaker, 152 Ind. 89. 1792 Studeor v. Village of Gouverneur, 44 N. Y. S. 122, 1364 Stuhr V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 147, 484 Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203, 638 Sturm V. School Dist., 45 Minn. 88, 343. 1485 Sturtevant v. City of Alton, 3 Mc- Lean 393, 977 Stutsman Co. v. Mansfield, 5 Dak. 78, 902 Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 588, 97, 468, 1256 Sublett V. Bedwell, 47 Miss. 266. 378 Suburban Elec. Co. v. Citv of Eliza- beth, 59 N. J. L. 134, 925 Suburban Elec. &c. Co. v. Inhabit- ants of E. O. Tp., 41 Atl. 865, 1811 Suburban Elec. &c. Co. v. Town of Hempstead. 38 App. Div. 355, 735 Suburban &c. Transit Co. v. Mayor, 128 N. Y. 510, 582 Suffolk Sav. Bank v. City of Bos- ton, 149 Mass. 364, 1026 Sullivan, Matter of, 28 N. Y. St. 566. 55 Hun 285, 1649, 1659 V. Board &c.. 58 Miss. 790, 674 V. City of Boston, 126 Mass. 540, 803 V. City of Leadville, 11 Colo. 483, 299, 729, 923, 1193 v. Gilroy. 8 N. Y. S. 401, 1659 V. Holyoke, 135 Mass. 273. 815, 1159 V. Jones, 2 Gray 570, 335 V. Pausch, 5 Ohio C. C. 196. 299 V. School Dist., 39 Kan. 347, 258, 1480 V. Shanklin. 63 Cal. 247, 224 V. State. 121 Ind. 342, 854 V. Walton. 20 Pla. 552, 1021, 1540 Summers v. Board &c., 103 Ind. 262, 210, 774, 797, 1076 Sunapee v. Lempster, 65 N. H. 655, 1046 Sunderland v. Martin, 113 Ind. 411. 1287 Sun Printing &c. Ass'n v. Mayor &c.. 152 N. y. 257, ■ 872 V. Mayor &c., 40 N. Y. S. 607. 711 Superintendents &c. v. Nelson, 75 Mich. 154, 1067 Supervisors &c. v. Bates, 17 N. Y. 242. 253 V. Birdsall. 4 Wend. 453, 662 v. Cook, 38 111. 44, 1023 V. Dorr, 25 Wend. 440. 320 V. Durant. 9 Wall. 415, 1527 V. Galbraith, 99 U. S. 214. 995. 1001. 1016, 1018 V. Horton, 75 Iowa 271, 275, 276, 277, 301. 302, 732 V. Minturn, 4 W. Va. 300. 1651 V. Morgan, 4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 335, 1056 V. O'Malley, 47 Wis. 332, 409, 450 V. People, 25 111. 163, 299 V. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772. 257, 992, 998, 1001, 1002 1018. 1023 V. Stimson, 4 Hill 136, 192, 193, 198 V. Supervisors &c., 74 Mich. 721. 433, 434 v. Supervisors &c., 58 Miss. 619. 434 V. Supervisors &c., 13 Wis. 490. 423 V. United States, 4 Wall. 435, 8, 847, 1201, 1527, 1531 V. United States, 18 Wall. 71, 846, 1542, 1646 V. Van Campen, 3 Wend. 49, 309 V. Wisconsin R. &c. Co., 121 Mass. 460, 990 Surget V. Newman, 43 La. An. 873, 1426 Surgi V. Snetchman, 11 La. An. 387. 1520 Susquehanna Bank v. Board &c., 25 N. Y. 312, 1287, 1717 Sutliff V. Lake Co.. 47 Fed. 106, 887 V. Lake Co., 147 U. S. 230. 998. 1003, 1008, 1009 Sutphen v. Town of North Hemp- stead, SO Hun 409, 1374 Sutro V. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332. 210. 233, 234. 235. 236, 237. 250 V. Rhodes, 92 Cal. 117, 886 Sutton V. City of Louisville, 5 Dana 28, 704 clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES. ^References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. S33-1830.'] Sutton V. City of Snohomisli. 11 Wash. 24, 1310. i:r,n, 1335, 1347 V. Clarke, 6 Taiiut. I'O, 225 V. McConnell. 40 \yis. 209, 536 V. School Citv of Montpelier, 28 lud. App. 315. 1244 V. Spectacle Makers' Co., 10 L. T. 431, 261 Sutton's Hospital Case, 10 Co. 1, 38 Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis. 486, 64 Swan V. Gray, 44 Miss. 393, 1672 V. Mayor &c., S Gill 150, 1724 V. AA'illiams, 2 Mich. 427, 692 Swann v. Burk. 40 Miss. 268, 106, 183 Swart V. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. S. 98, ^ 1636 Swarth v. People, 109 111. 621, 1404 Swartwood v. Walbridge, 10 N. Y. S. 862, 1492 Swartz V. Large, 47 Kan. 314, 1690 Sweany v. Kansas City R. Co., 54 Mo. App. 265, 1251 Sweatt V. Faville. 23 Iowa 321. 556 Sweeny v. City of Butte, 15 Mont. 274, 1336, 1340 Sweet V. Buffalo &c. R. Co., 79 N. Y. 293, 1168 V. City of Buffalo, 158 N. Y. 695, 929 V. Village of Gloverville, 12 Hun 302, 1615 Sweetser v. Hay, 2 Gray 49, 311 Sweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo. 309, 483 Swenson v. City of Lexington, 69 Mo. 157, 264 Sv^epston V. Barton, 39 Ark. 549, 155 Swift V. City of Newport. 7 Bush 37, 1515. 1516, 1517 V. City of Poughkeepsie, 37 N.. Y. 511, 229, 1205 V. City of Topeka, 43 Kan. 671, 517 V. Klein, 163 111. 269, 515 V. Mavor &c., 83 N. Y. 528. 788 Swindell v. State, 143 Ind. 153. 477, 499. 525 Switzer v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 250, 1744 Sykes v. City of St. Cloud, 60 Minn. 442, 720 V. Mayor &c., 55 Miss. 115, 643, 994, 1524 V. Town of Pawlet, 43 Vt. 446, 1597 Sylvester v. Incorporated Town of Casey, 110 Iowa 256. 1797, 1802 Sylvester Coal Co. v. City of St. Louis, 130 Mo. 323, 599, 1703 Svme V. Bunting. 91 N. C. 48, 327 Symonds v. Clav Co., 71 111. 355, 9. 142, 772 Symons v. Citv of San Francisco, 115 Cal. .555, 1318 Syracuse Water Co. v. Citv of Syra- cuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 233, 566, 567, 568, 618 Taber v, Ferguson, 109 Ind. 227, 1150, 1191 v. Grafmiller, 109 Ind. 206. 1259 Tacoma Gas &c. Co. v. City of Ta- coma. 14 Wash. 288, 110, 573 Tacoma Land Co. v. City of Tacoma. 15 Wash. 133, 1286 Tacoma Light &c. Co. v. City of Tacoma. 13 Wash. 115. 718 Taft V. Gifford. 13 Met. 187, 320 V. Inhabitants &c., 14 Mass. 282. 044. 1212 V. Town of Pittsford, 28 Vt. 286, 260, 646 Taft V. Wood, 14 Pick. 362. 230, 1533 Taggart v. Detroit, 71 Mich. 92, 14U3 V. Newport St. R. Co., 16 R. I. 008, 682, 683 Tainter v. City of Worcester, 123 Mass. 311, 263, 786 V. Lucas, 29 Wis. 375, 1720 V. Mayor &c., 19 N. J. Eq. 46, 1106 Talt's ICx'r V. Ceutral Lunatic Asy- lum, 84 Va. 271, 685 Talbot V. Dent, 9 B. Mon. 526, 845, 983, 1534, 1536 V. Hudson, 16 Gray 417, 685 V. Inhabitants &c., 76 Maine 415, 176 Talbot Pav. Co. v. City of Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 752, 1687 V. Common Council &c., 91 Mich. 262, 1673 Talcott V. City of Buffalo, 125 N. Y. 280, 514, 825 V. City of Buffalo, 57 Hun 43, 655 Talkington v. Turner, 71 111. 234, 378 Tallant v. City of Burlington, 39 Iowa 543. 1258 Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66, 1533 Tammany W. W. v. New Orleans W. W., 120 U. S. 64, 1808 Tamworth v. Freedom, 17 N. H. 279, 1046, 1047 Tapley v. Martin, 116 Mass. 275, 320 Tappan v. Gray, 7 Hill 259, 296 V. Long Branch &c., 59 N. J. L. 371. 291 V. Merchants' «&c. Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 1501 V. I'eople, 67 111. 339, 1483 V. Young. 9 Daly 357, 506, 572 Tarba v. City of Rochester, 58 N. Y. S. 755, 1359, 1360 Tarbox v. Sughrue, 36 Kan. 225, 155 Tarbutton v. Town of Tennille, 110 Ga. 90, 787 Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. D. 314, 1779 Tash V. Adams, 10 Cush. 252, 668, 1730 Tate V. Missouri fcc. R. Co., 64 Mo. 149, 1354 Tatham's Appeal. 80 Pa. St. 465, 894 Tatlock V. Louisa Co., 46 Iowa 138, 840 Taubert v. City of St. Paul, 68 Minn. 519, 1358 Taverner's Case, Dyer 322, 467 Tawas &c. R. Co. v. Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 204, 1672 Tawney v. Lynn &c. R. Co., 16 L. J. Eq. 282, 699 Taxes Delinquent &c., In re, 75 Minn. 450. 1033 Taxpayers &c., In re, 51 N. Y'. S. 612, 1701 Taxpayers &c.. Matter of, 43 How. Pr. 263, 988 Taxpayers of Green, Matter of, 38 How. Pr. 51.5, 987 Taxpayers of ^Nlilan v. Tennessee &c. R. Co., ]1 Lea 330, 982. 996 Taxpayers of Plattsburg, In re, 157 N. Y. 78, 871 Taxpayers of Webster Parish v. Po- lice Jury. 52 La. An. 465. 1760 Taylor, Ex parte, 58 Miss. 478, 1395 V. Baltimore &c., B. Co.. 33 W. Va. 39. 1108 V. Board &c., 31 Pa. St. 73. 246. 1551. 1725. 1726 V. Boulware. 17 Tex. 74. 1517 V. Citv of Carondelet. 22 Mo. 105. 510. 532 V. City of Coboes, 105 N. Y. 54, 1746 TABLE OF CASES. clxxxvii [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Yol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Taylor v. City of Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274. 384, 1517, 17G9 V. City of Oweusboro, 98 Ky. -•71, 804 V. City of Pine Bluff, 34 Ark. ('.0:5. 4G7 V. City of Yonkers. 105 N. Y. 202. 15li;». 1C05, 1(>06, 1(507 V. Clemson, 11 CI. & F. 610, 695 V. Commissioners &c., 2 Jones Kq. 141. 118 V. Commissioners, 88 111. 526. 1170 V. Common Council &c., 43 N. J. Eq. 107. 1464 V. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 401, 150 V. County Court, 2 Ftah 405, 1735 V. District Tp. of Wayne, 25 Iowa 447, 052, 10S8 V. Dunn. 80 Tex. 652. 1367, 1368 V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 304. 1108 V. Henry, 2 Pick. 397. 352. 353. 355, 365, 1429 V. Hepper.'2 Hun 646. 1565 V. Hopper. 62 X. Y. 649, 1564 V. Inhabitants &c., 8 Met. 462, 802 V. Kercheval. 82 Fed. 497, 182G V. Knipe. 2 Pearson 151. 1745 V. Lake Shore R. Co., 45 Mich. 74. 1588 V. Lambertville, 43 N. J. Eq. 107. 240 V. Mayor &c., 39 Ga. 59. 543 y. Mayor &c.. 64 Md. 68. 815 V. McFadden. 84 Iowa 262. ' 279. 553, 1150, 1534 V. Mott. 123 Cal. 497, 926 V. Newberue, 2 Jones Eq. 141, 61 V. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240. 480, 487, 1192, 1262 V. People, 66 HI. 322, 244 V. People. 6 Park. Cr. 536. 1106 V. Phillippi. 35 W. Va. 554, 1574 V. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 687 V. Skrine. 3 Brev. 516, 70, 197 V. Taylor. 10 Minn. 107, 374, 381 V. Thompson. 42 111. 9. 845 V. Town of Constable, 10 N. Y. S. 607. 1631 V. Town of Constable, 15 N. Y'. S. 795. 778 Taylor Co. v. Standley, 79 Iowa 666. 605, 840 Taylor.s of Ipswich v. Sherring, 1 Rol. 4. 123 Taylor Tp. v. Morton, 37 Iowa 550, 319 Tay mouth Tp. v. Koehler. 35 Mich. 22. 644, 1029. 1540 T. B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida Co.. 72 Wis. 158. 561 Tearney v. Smith, 86 111. 391. 224 Teater v. Citv of Seattle. 10 Wash. 327. 1329 Teegarden v. City of Racine, 56 Wis. 545, 555, 561, 12.53 Teft V. Size. 10 III. 432. 541 Temple v. Mead. 4 Vt. 535. 158 Ten Evck v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 18 N. J. L. 200, 4, 6 Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich. 328, 297. 1665 Tensas &c. Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566. 239 Terhune v. Mayor &c., 88 N. Y. 248, 172. 213. 798 Terrail v. Tinney. 20 La. An. 444, 335 Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Clem. 123 Ind. 15. 1627 V. Earn. 21 III. 291. 904 V. McKinly. 33 Ind. 274. 1108 V. Nelson. 1.30 Ind. 258. 1163 V. Voelker, 129 111. 540, 491 Terre Haute &c. R. Co, v. Voelker, 31 111. App. 314, 1424 Terrell v. Andrew Co., 44 Mo. 309, 228 V. Strong, 35 N. Y. S. 1000. 751 Terrett v. Town of Sharon. 34 Conn. 105. 651. 1730 Territory v. Armstrong, 6 Dak. 226, 1689 V. Board &c., 8 Mont. 396, 946 V. Cole, 3 Dak. 301, 330 V. Stewart, 1 Wash. 98, 57 Terry v. City of Hartford, 39 Conn. -91. 1253 V. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 490, 950 V. City of Richmond, 94 Va. 537, 743, 796 V. Town of Waterbury, 35 Conn. 526, 1573 Tesh V. Commonwealth, 4 Dana 522, 1410 Tevis V. Randall. 6 Cal. 632, 309 Texarkana v. Leach, 66 Ark. 40, 1705 Texas Banking Ins. Co. v. State, 42 Tex. 636, 1508, 1521 Texas &c. R. Co. v. City of New Or- leans. 40 Fed. 11. 1183 Thaler v. W. Chicago Pk. Com'rs, 174 HI. 211, 1298 Tharp V. Witham, 65 Iowa 566, 699. 706 Thatcher v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 120 111. 560, 837 V. City of Toledo, 19 Ohio C. C. 311. 477 V. Commissioners, 13 Kan. 182, 663, 664 V. Humble. 67 Ind. 444, 656 V. People. 79 111. 597. 1720 Thayer v. City of Boston. 19 Pick. 511. 811. 819. 820. 1112 V. Montgomery Co., 3 Dill. 389, 1740 V. Stearns. 1 Pick. 109. 347, 348 V. United States, 20 Ct. CI. 137, 773 Thelian v. Porter. 14 Lea 622, 1115 Theisen v. McDavid. 34 Fla. 440, 599 Third Nat'l Bank &e. v. Town of Seneca Falls, 15 Fed. 783. 1001 Third School Dist. v. Atherton. 12 " Met. 105. 365. 965, 1425, 1427, 1485 Thomas. Ex parte. 71 Cal. 204, 1537 V. Ashland. 12 Ohio St. 124. 54 V. Citizens' Horse R. Co., 104 HI. 462, 276 V. City of Burlington, 69 Iowa 140. 247. 891. 1552 V. City of Grand Junction. 13 . Colo. App. 80. 488. 1710. 1810 V. City of Olympia, 12 Wash. 465. 1306 V. City of Port Huron, 27 Mich. 320. 984 V. City of Richmond. 12 Wall. 349. 74. 88, 233, 254. 638 V. Dakin. 22 Wend. 9, 3, 45, 50 V. Gain. 35 Mich. 155. 1238. 1254. 1267. 1270. 1297, 1303 V. Incorporated Village of Ash- land. 12 Ohio St. 124. 1410 V. Leland. 24 AVend. 65. 763. 1531. 1514. 1538 V. Morgan Co.. 39 111. 496. 1017 V. Owens, 4 Md. 189. 168. 198. 369 V. Pacific R. Co., 9 Wall. 579. 7 V. Town of Brooklyn, 58 Iowa 438, 1556 V. Town of Grafton, 34 W. Va. 299. 1.394 V. Town of Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio 290. 529, 1418 V. White, 12 Mass. 367, 311 clxxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Thomason v. Ashwortli, 73 Cal. 73, 88, 108 Thomasson v. State, 15 lud. 449, 1508 Thompson v. Abbott, 61 Mo. 176, 383, 14(4 V. Allen Co., 115 IT. S. 550. 15:^9 V. Androscoggin River Imp. Co., 54 N. n. 545. ^'^\^^" V. Board of Trustees, 30 111. 99. » 865 V. Citizens' St. R. Co., 152 Ind. 461, 51^ V. City of Corpus Christi, 38 S- W 37*3 1786 V." City' of Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 490 89, 1-1 V. 'Holt. 52 Ala. 491, . 223 V. Independent School Dist., 10^_ Iowa 04, ^ ^. 8'76, «<9 V. Inhabitants &c., 7 Pick. 188, looy T Kelly, 2 Ohio St. 647, 995 v! Mayor &c., 52 x\. Y. Super. 427 '*'° M\ Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 27 Wis 93 1-1 o V. Mora'n. 44 Mich, 602, 088 V. New York &c. R. Co., 3 Sand. Ch 6''5 5v'o V. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806 643 870 V. Perrine. 106 U. S. 589, 1019 V. Schermerhorn. 6 N. Y'. 92, 281, 509, 547, 572, 1232, lo39 V. Searcy Co., 6 C. C. A. 674 9j>2 V. State, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 3(0, 93 V. Town of Mamakating, Si Hun 400, ^ ^ .. 10-8 V. Treasurer of "^ ood Co., 11 Ohio St. 678, ^^ ^^. 1084 V. Village of Quincy, 83 Mich 173 l-io V. Whipple, 54 Ark. 203, 227 Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. City of Newton, 42 Fed. <23. 552, 553, 574, 576. 881 Thompson N. W. Co. v. City of Chi- cago, 79 Fed. 984, „ '9o Thomson v. L-^ Co.,„ 3 ^Wall. J- (^^^^ V. Mayor &c., 61 Mo. ^^282.^_ ^.^^ V. Pacific R. Co.. 9 Wall. 579, 45 V. People, 184 I11.J7, ^^^^^ ^^^^ Thorn v. Sweenev, 12 Nev. 251, 688 V. W. Chicago Com'rs, 130 111. 594, 1149, l^oi Thornton v. City of Clinton, 148 Mo. 648. ^ ^ ..^^-^^ V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 42 Mo. App. 58. 671 V. Smith. 1 Wash. 81, „l'^-0 Thorp V. Town of Brookfleld, 36 Conn. 320, ^^ ^r^^^^^ V. Rutland &c. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140 80. 1381 Thurston v. City of St. Joseph. 51 Mo 510, 1112. 1602. 1802 Tice V. Bay City. 84 Mich. 461, 1210 v. City of New Brunswick, 64 N. J. L. 399. 175 Tidd V. Smith. 3 N. H. 178, 346 Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 G. & J. 479, , ^ 186 Tidewater Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518, 1297 Tiede v. Schneidt. 105 Wis. 470. 727 Tiedt V. Carstensen, 61 Iowa 334, ^ ^ Tie Log, In re, 26 Fed. 611, ' 1083 Tierney v. Brown. 65 Miss. 563, 277 V. Dodge. 9 Minn. 166, 107, 115, 1419 Tifft V. City of Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204, 675 V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. S. 633, 1234, 1255 Tighe V. City of Lowell, 119 Mass. 472, 1595 Tilden v. Metcalf, 2 Day 259, 1735 Tilford V. City of Olathe, 44 Kan. 721. 393 V. Mayor &c., 37 N. Y. S. 185, 804 Tilyou V. Town of Gravesend, 104 N. Y. 356, 615 Times Pub. Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 752 Tims V. State, 26 Ala. 165, 1414. 1418 Tindley v. City of Salem, 137 Mass. 171, 803, 807, 1068, 1096 Tingley v. Vaughn, 17 111. App. 347, 1492 Tingue v. Village of Port Chester, 101 N. Y. 294, 1204, 1288 Tinsley v. Kirby. 17 S. C. 1. 289 Tinsman v. Belvidere Del. R. Co., 26 N. J. L. 148. 4, 6 V. Monroe Probate Judge, 82 Mich. 562. 1178 Tippets V. Walker. 4 Mass. 595. 216 Tipton Co. V. Locomotive Works, 103 U. S. 523, 995 Tisdale v. Inhabitants &c., 8 Met. 388. 776 V. Inhabitants &c., 167 Mass. ''48 1339 V. President &c., 46 III. 9, 64, 486. 529, 1691 Title Guarantee &c. Co. v. City of Chicago. 162 111. 505. 501. 1130, 1147, 1174. 1244, 1296 Titus V. Inhabitants &c., 97 Mass. 258, 818, 1332, 1601 Titusville Electric Light & Power Co. V. City of Titusville, 196 Pa. St. 3, 1185 Tobev V. City of Hudson, 2 N. Y'. S. 180, , 1606 Tobin, In re, 66 N. Y. S. 97, 1768 V. Portland &c. R. Co., 59 Maine 183, 810 Todd V. Birdsall. 1 Cow. 260, 192, 193 V. City of Laurens, 48 S. C. 395, 875, 879 V. City of Troy, 61 N. Y. 506. 1587, 1591, 1607 Todemier v. Aspinwall. 43 111. 401, 1571 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. City of Jackson- ville. 67 111. 37. 501, 1148 V. Detroit &c. R. Co., 62 Mich. 564. 637 V. Munson. 57 Mich. 42, 696 V. President &c.. 43 111. 209. 526 Toledo R. Co. v. Toledo Electric R. Co.. 6 Ohio C. C. 362. 1422 Toll Bridge Co. v. Bitsworth, 30 Conn. 380. 1806 Tomason v. Justices. 3 Humph. 233, 1672 Tomlin v. City of Cape May. 63 N. J. L. 429. 527, 550, 592 Tomlinson v. Jessup. 15 Wall. 454, 104 Tompert v. Lithgow. 1 Bush 176. 207 Tompkins v. North Hudson R. Co.. 63 N. J. L. 322. 1348 V. Sands. 8 Wend. 462, 221, .335 Tone V. Mavor &c.. 70 N. Y. 157. 781 Toop V. Citv of New York, 13 N. Y. S. 280. 1176 Tootle vT Wells, 39 Kan. 452, 316 Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kan. 690, 1.584 Topeka Water Supply Co. v. City of Potwin Place. 43 Kan. 404. 1177 Topsham v. Rogers. 42 Vt. 189, 258 Torbett v. City of Louisville. 9 Ky. L. 202, 1514 TABLE OF CASES. clxxxix [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} Torbush v. City of Norwich, 3S Conn. •2-25, 204 Torr V. Corcoran, 115 Ind. 188, 276 Torrent v. Common Council &c., 47 Mich. 115, 6G6 Torre.v v. Inhabitants &c., 21 Picli. 64, 301 V. Willard, 8 N. Y. S. 392, 1489 Tory V. Lexington &c. R. Co., 2 Met. 314, 994 Tower v. Tower, 18 Pick. 202, 1751 Towie V. Brown, 110 Ind. 65, 445 V. Brown, llO Ind. 599, 1487 V. Marrett, 3 Maine 22, 106 V. State, 110 Ind. 120, 1518 Town Council &c. v. Court, 1 El. & El. 770, 276 V. Elliott. 5 Ohio St. 113, 629, 990 V. McComb, 18 Ohio 229, 811 V. Ohlandt, 24 S. C. 158, 1414, 1418 V. Pressley. 33 S. C. 56, 594. 1079 V. Railroad Co., 10 R. I. 365, 591 592 V. Smart, 11 Rich. 551, 'l403 Town &c. See also, Inhabitants &c. ; Name of Town. Town of Ackley v. Town of Vilas, 79 Wis. 157, 440 Town of Albuquerque v. Zeiger, 5 N. M. 074. 1207, 1288 Town of Areata v. Areata &c. R. Co., 92 Cal. 639, 589 Town of Arkadelphia v. Clark, 52 Ark. 23, 1120 Town of Atchison v. Butcher, 3 Kan. 104, 992 Town of Auburn v. Eldridge, 77 Ind. 120, 537 Town of Aurora v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 119 111. 240, 1542 Town of Bavard v. Baker, 70 Iowa 220, ' 300, 477, 478, 487, 489 Town of Beacon Falls v. Town of Seymour. 44 Conn. 210, 1051 Town of Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178, - 1539 Town of Bergen v. State, 32 N. J. L. 490, 408 Town of Bethlehem v. Town of Watertowu, 51 Conn. 490, 1051 Town of Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa 399. 496. 607 Town of Boswell v. Wakley, 149 Ind. 04, 1325, 1328, 1329 Town of Brookville v. Gagle, 73 Ind. 177, 528, 535 Town of Bruce v. Dickey, 110 111. 527, 003. 715. 805, 1349 Town of Burlington v. Schwarzman, 52 Conn. 181, 1109 Town of Burton v. Town of Wake- field, 4 N. H. 47, 1046 Town of Butternut v. O'Malley. 50 Wis. 333, 409, 451 Town of Byron v. State, 35 Wis. 313, 831 Town of Cabot v. Britt, 36 Vt. 349, 1425 Town of Camden v. Bloch^ 65 Ala. 236, 543, 1418 Town of Canaan v. Derush, 47 N. H. 212, 240 Town of Cantril v. Sanier, 59 Iowa 26, 519 Town of Central Covington v. Park, 21 Ky. L. 1847, 1244 Town of Charleston v. Town of Lunenburgh. 21 Vt. 488, 1737 Town of Chittenden v. Town of Bar- nard, 61 Vt. 145, 1042 Town of Cicero v. Williamson, 91 Ind. 541, 1572 Town of Coloma v. Eaves. 92 U. S. 484, 256, 257, 885, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1000, 1007, 1008 1009. 1010, 1011. 1029 Town of Colorado City v. Townsend, 9 Colo. App. 249, 710 Town of Concord v. I'ortsmouth Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 025, 990. 1023 Town of Covington v. Nelson, 35 Ind. 532, 1288 Town of Cromwell v. Connecticut &c. Quarry Co., 50 Conn. 470, 629 Town of Crowley v. West, 52 La. An. 526, 1387 Town of Croydon v. Sullivan Co., 47 N. H. 179, 1042, 1058 Town of Dakota v. Town of Winne- conne. 55 Wis. 522, 1063 Town of Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325, 1132, 1256, 1548 Town of Darlington v. Atlantic Tr. Co., 68 Fed. 849, 610 V. Ward, 48 S. C. 570, 501 Town of Davis v. Filler, 47 W. Va. 413, 208 Town of Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa 12, 288, 289, 296 V. Dunstan, 38 Iowa 96, 523, 1405 Town of Depere v. Town of Bellevue, 31 Wis. 120, 409, 424, 436 Town of Derby v. Ailing, 40 Conn. 410. 1109 Town of Dixon v. Mayes, 72 Cal. 166. 1515 Town of Douglasville v. Johns, 62 Ga. 423, 244 Town of Dover v. Tawressey, 2 Marv. 285. 1738 Town of Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. 177, 982, 902. 1010, 1532, 1538, 1539 Town of Durango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257, 259, 260, 715, 729. 1193 Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 111. 292, 991. 1013 Town of East Chester, In re, 53 Hun 181. 92T Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 536, 90, 103, 758 Town of East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801, 995. 1001, 1023 Town of Edenton v. Wool, 65 N. J. L. 218. 1412 Town of I'^ldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa 32. 519, 541 Town of Elkhart v. Ritter, 66 Ind. 130, 1580, 1024 Town of Flora v. Lee, 5 111. App. 629, 477, 539, 540 Town of Fox v. Town of Kendall, 97 111. 72, 1084 Town of Freeport v. Board of Super- visors, 41 111. 495. 1042 Town of Geneva v. Cole. 61 III. 397, 1691 Town of Gloster v. Harrell, 77 Miss. 793, 311 Town of Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416. 103. 965 Town of Grand Isle v. Kinney, 70 Vt. 381. 721 Town of Greenburg v. International Tr. Co., 94 Fed. 755, 1031 Town of Guilford v. Board &c., 13 N. Y. 143. 703. 1522 V. Board &c., 18 Barb. 615. 1521 Town of Hackettstown v. SwacR- hamer. 37 N. J. L. 191, 634, 974 Town of Hamden v. Bethany, 43 Conn. 212, 1051 v. New Hampshire R. Co., 27 Conn. 158. 1108 V. Rice, 24 Conn. 350, 664 cxc TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Town of Hamilton v. Chopard. Wash. ^3:>2. 1290 Town of Hampton v. CoflQn, 4 N. H. 517, 705 Town of Hai'dwick v. Town of Paw- let. 3G Vt. 320, 1058 Town of Harrisonburg v. Roller, 97 Va. 5S2. 551, 587, 1708 Town of Hendersonville v. Price, 96 N. C. 423, 650 Town of Jacksonport v. Watson, 33 Ark. 704, 651, 1730 Town of Jamestown v. Chicago «&c. R. Co.. 69 Wis. G48. 1171, 1667 Town of Jericho v. Town of Under- hill, 64 Vt. 362, 1055 Town of Kirkwood v. Newbury, 122 N. Y. 571, 1580 V. Newbury, 45 Hun 323, 1172 Town of Klamath Falls v. Sachs, 35 Or. 325, 882. 999, 1011, 1030, 1033 Town of Kosciusko v. Slomberg, 68 Miss. 469, 1102 Town of Lake View v. Letz, 44 111. 81, 503 Town of Latonia v. Hopkins, 20 Ky. L. 620, 1505 Town of Laurel v. Blue, 1 Ind. App. 128, 1076 Town of Lemington v. Blodgett, 37 Vt. 215, 240, 345 Town of Lemont v. Singer &c. Co., 98 HI. 94, 1717, 1720 Town of Levis v. Black River Imp. Co., 105 WMs. 391, 725 Town of Lewiston v. Proctor, 23 111. 483, 535, 1420 Town of Lexington v. Union Nat. Bank, 75 Miss. 1, 998, 1014, 1029 Town of Ijondonderry v. Town of Andover. 28 Vt. 416, 86, 87 Town of Lyndon v. Miller, 36 Vt. 329, 325 Town of Lyons v. Cook, 9 111. App. 543, 1551 v. Cooledge, 89 111. 529, 865 Town of Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 1198, 1252, 1297 Town of Madison v. Newsome, 39 Fla. 149. 711 Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio 427, 90, 103, 522 Town of Martinsville v. Frieze, 33 Ind. 507, 539 Town of Mentz v. Cook, 108 N. Y. 504, 1023 Town of Middlebury v. Waltham, 6 Vt. 200. 1042 Town of Middleport v. ^tna Life Ins. Co., 82 111. 562, 625, 996 Town of Milwaukee v. City of Mil- waukee, 12 Wis. 93, 424, 437, 1519 Town of Montgomery v. Le Sueur Co., 32 Minn. 532, 1095 Town of Monticello v. Banks, 48 Ark. 251, • 1271 v. Cohn, 48 Ark. 254, 650 Town of Montpelier v. Town of East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12, 459, 1519 Town of Moundsville v. Velton, 35 W. Va. 217. 538, 1420 Town of Mt. Vernon v. Patton, 94 111. 65, 663, 865 Town of Mt. Zion v. Gillman, 14 Fed. 123. 1720 Town of Muskego v. Drainage Com'rs, 78 WMs. 40, 1178 Town of New Athens v. Thomas, 82 111. 259, 260 Town of New Castle v. Lake Erie &c. R. Co., 155 Ind. 18, 1810 Town of New Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa 498, 532, 1400 Town of New Hartford v. Town of Canaan. 52 Conn. 108, 1054 Town of New Haven v. Town of Middlebury, 63 Vt. 399. 1060 Town of New Shoreham v. Ball, 14 R. I. 506, 665 Town of Norman v. Ince, 8 Okl. 412, 1782 Town of North Hempstead v. Town of Hempstead. Hopk. 288. 1536 Town of North Hempsted v. Town of Hempsted, 2 Wend. 109, 7, 50, 435. 445, 1519 Town of Ocean Springs v. Green, 77 Miss. 472, 488, 549 Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353, 772, 789 Town of Olin v. Meyers, 55 Iowa 209, 299, 1421 Town of Opelousas v. Andrus, 37 La. An. 699, 480 Town of Pacific v. Seifert, 79 Mo. 210. 516 Town of Pana v. Lippincott, 2 111. App. 466. 989, 992, 1027 Town of I'aris v. Farmers' Bank, 30 Mo. 575, 1513 Town of Parkland v. Ganis, 88 Ky. 563, 1271 Town of Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111. 193, 659 V. Metzker, 21 111. 205. 97, 468, 494 Town of Pierrepont v. Loveless, 72 N. Y. 211, 1591 Town of PlaiufleM v. Village of Pla infield. 67 Wis. 525, 948 Town of Platteville v. Galena &c. R. Co., 43 Wis. 493, 1540 Town of Plattsmouth v. Fitzgerald, 10 Neb. 401, 1022 Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 490, 1246 Town of Plymouth v. Paniter, 17 Conn. 585, 195 Town of Poplin v. Town of Hawke, 8 N. II. 305, 1058. 1064 Town of Prairie v. Lloyd, 97 111. 179, 1017 Town of Princeton v. Vierling, 40 Ind. 340, 242, 245 Town of Reading v. Town of West- port, 19 Conn. 561, 1042 Town of Remington v. Ward, 78 Wis. 539, 587, 858 Town of Rensselaer v. Leopold. 106 Ind. 29. 687, 1301 Town of Rhine v. City of Sheboygan, 82 Wis. 352, 1059 Town of Rockingham v. Springfield, 59 Vt. 521, 948, 1042 Town of Roswell v. Dominice, 9 N. M. 624. 1236 Town of Rushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 47.5. 1612 Town of Rutland v. Paige, 24 Vt. 181. 1015 Town of Rvegate v. Town of Wards- boro, 30 Vt. 746. 1058 Town of Salem v. McClintock, 16 Ind. App. 656, 151 Town of Saukville v. State, 69 Wis. 178. 831 Town of Searcy v. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269, 64. 629 Town of Sliebovgan v. Sheboygan &c. Co.. 21 Wis. 675. 1171 Town of Solon v. Williamsburg Sav. Bank, 114 N. Y. 122. 1014, 1022. 1027 Town of Somerset v. Town of Glas- tenbury, 61 Vt. 449, 62 TABLE OF CASES. CXCl [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.] Town of South Ottawa v. Foster, 20 III. 296, 775 V. Terkins. 04 U. S. 260, 986, 998 Town of Spiceland v. Alier, 98 Ind. 467. 1625 Town of Springfield v. Teutonia Sav. Bank, 84 N. Y. 403, 987 Town of Stamford v. Town of Reads- boro, 46 Vt. 606, 1042 Town of State Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa 249, 500. 506, 508. 1396, 1405, 1406 Town of Sullivan v. Phillips, 110 Ind. 320. 1177 Town of Swanton v. Pratt, 15 Vt. 147, 1213 Town of Thornton v. Fugate, 21 Ind. App. 537, 1780. 1800 Town of Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. 380, 464, 526. 540, 1421, 1422 Town of Topsham v. Town of Chel- sea. 60 Vt. 219, 1058 Town of Tumwater v. Pix, 15 Wash. 324. 1241 Town of Tupelo v. Beard, 56 Miss. 532, 1552 Town of Union v. Durkes, 38 N. J. L. 21, 1216 Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494, 885. 1001, 1003, 1009, 1539 V. Woodruff. 62 N. Y. 462, 1010 Town of Wakefield v. Town of Alton. 3 N. H. 378, 1047 Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 346, 82, 265, 267, 772, 775, 1342 Town of Warrensbui'gh v. Miller, 77 Mo. 56, 1727 Town of Washington v. Hammond, 76 N. C. 33, 497 V. Town of Kent, 38 Conn. 249. 1052 Town of Waterville v. County Com'rs, 59 Maine 80, 1252, 1522 Town of Wauwatosa v. Gunyon, 25 Wis. 25, 1536 Town of Weare v. Town of New Boston. 3 N. H. 203. 1046 Town of Wellsborough v. New York &c. R. Co.. 76 N. Y. 182, 988 Town of Westbrook's Appeal, 57 Conn. 95, 1379 Town of West Hartford v. Board &c., 44 Conn. 361, 572 Town of Weyauwega v. Ayling, 99 U. S. 112. 1001, 1015 Town of Whiting v. Doob, 152 Ind. 157, 519, 1789 Town of Williamsport v. Liske, 21 Ind. App. 414, 1325, 1329 Town of Winamac v. Huddleston, 132 Ind. 217. 632, 655 Town of Windham v. Town of Leb- anon, 51 Conn. 319, 1052 Town of Windsor v. Hallett, 97 111. 204, 1013 Town of Woodbury v. Brown, 101 Tenn. 707. 63 Town of Woodstock v. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587. 691 Town of Worcester v. Town of East Montpelier. 61 Vt. 139. 1042 Town of Worthington v. Morgan, 17 Ind. App. 603. 1316 Townsend. In re, 39 N. Y. 171. 979, 983 V. City of Manistee, 88 Mich. 408. 918, 1202 V. Copeland. 56 Cal. 612, 1712 V. Greely. 5 Wall. 326, 1743 V. Hovle, 20 Conn. 1. 684 V. Lamb. 14 Neb. 324, 990 Township Board &c. v. Hackman, 48 Mo. 243. 689 V. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528, 732 Tracy v. Cloyd. 10 W. Va. 19. 225 V. Elizabethtown &c. R. Co., SO Ky. 259, 685 V. Goodwin, 5 Allen 409, 330, 332 V. People. 6 Colo. 151, 299 300. 477. 478, 729, 1133. 1193 V. Town of Phelps, 22 Fed. 634. , 1028 V. Williams. 4 Conn. 107, 335, 536 Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis. 101 Tenn. 181, 1389, 1704 Trafton v. Alfred, 3 Shepl. 258, 211 Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 1399 Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 523. 1116, 1600 Trammell v. Lee. 94 Ala. 194. 1074 V. Town of Russellville, 34 Ark. 105, 1075 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635. 680, 801, 1317 V. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 1576 V. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273, 1502, 1537 Transylvania University v. City of Lexington. 3 B. Mon. 25, 1213 Trapnell v. Red Oak Junction, 76 Iowa 744, 1620 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. City of Denver, 11 Colo. 434, 953, 961 V. Mayor &c., 99 Fed. 663, 1032 Traver v. Merrick Co., 14 Neb. 327, 981 Travis v. Uttley, 1 Q. B. 233, 1376 Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. 236, 646 Treasurer &c. v. Mulford, 26 N. J. L. 49, 543, 1257, 1712 Tredwell v. City of Brooklyn, 43 N. Y. S. 458, 1281, 1291 Tremain v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163. 824 Trench v. Nolan. 6 Ir. R. C. L. 464, 37S Trenor v. Jackson, 15 Abb. Pr. 115, 620 Trent v. Cartersville Bridge Co., 11 Leigh 521, 1463 Trescott v. City of Waterloo, 26 Fed. 592, 263, 822 Trester v. City of Sheboygan, 87 Wis. 496, 587 Trigally v. Mayor &c., 6 Coldw. 382, 526, 1414 Trigg V. Trustees &c., 2 Bush 594. 1499 Trimble v. City of Mt. Sterling, 11 Ky. L. 727, 1503 Trimmer v. City of Rochester, 130 N. Y. 401. 1205, 1264 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354. 989 Trinity Co. v. Polk Co., 58 Tex. 321, 434 Tripler v. Mayor &c., 125 N. Y. 617, 1263, 1265 Tritz V. City of Kansas, 84 Mo. 632, 1580 Trost V. Eastern R. Co., 64 N. H. 220, 795 Trott V. Warren, 11 Maine 227, 48. 49 Trotter v. City of Chicago, 33 111. App. 206, 605 Trowbridge v. Inhabitants &c., 144 Mass. 139, 809, 1180 V. Mayor &c.. 46 N. J. L. 140. 519 Troxel v. City of Vinton, 77 Iowa 90. 1617, 1635 Troy V. A. & N. B. Co., 11 Kan. 519. 1423 Truax v. Pool. 46 Iowa 256. 1517 Truchelut v. City Council, 1 N. & McC. 227, 468, 763, 1420 True V. Davis, 133 111. 522. 103, 383, 386. 396, 888, 1347 Truesdale v. Peoria Grape Sugar Co., 101 111. 651, 1706 Truesdell's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 148, 1540 V. Combs. 33 Ohio St. 186, 335 Trumbo v. People, 75 111. 561, 1691 excu TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Yol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Trustees &c. v. City of Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181, 1247 V. City of Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515, 92, 491 V. City of Jacljsonville, 61 111. App. 199, 741 V. Coweu, 4 Paige 510, 1109, 1556, 1564 V. Demott, 13 Ohio 104, 1063 V. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38, 1529 V. Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515. 523, 1421 V. Foster. 30 N. Y. S. 686, 1340 V. Garvey, 80 Ky. 159, 1540 V. Gibbs, 2 Cush. 39, 155 V. Hills, 6 Cowen 23, 288 V. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1, 233, 253, 648 V. Inhabitants &c., 175 Mass. 118. 1290, 1550 V. Jameson, 12 Ky. L. 719, 850, 1472 V. Keeting. 4 Denio 341, 115 V. King, 12 Mass. 546, 563 V. Kirk. 68 N. Y. 459, 19 V. Lefler, 23 111. 88. 85, 538, 540, 1132 V. Mayor &c., 33 N. J. L. 13, 629, 1374 V. McConnell, 12 111. 138, 1520 V. Mecox Bay &c. Co., 116 N. Y. 1, 1° V. Merryweather, 11 East 376, 1556 V. Moodv, 62 Ala. 389, 261 V. Otis, 37 Barb. 50, 1567 V. Parks, 10 Maine 441, 50 V. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317, 664 V. People, 121 111. 552, 1495, 1496 V. Perkins, 3 B. Mon. 437, 629 V. Rausch, 122 Ind. 167, 1185 V. Rautenberg. 88 III. 219, 216 V. Roome, 29 Ilun 391, 901 V. Salmond, 11 Maine 109, 637 V. Satchwell. 71 N. C. Ill, 45 V. Shepard, 22 K. I. 112, 1321 V. Sheperd. 139 111. 114, 1483 V. Southward, 31 111. App. 359, 914 V. Strong, 60 N. Y. 57, 19 V. Tatman, 13 111. 27. 103, 1084, 1537 V. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618, 76, 80, 81 V. Trustees. 81 111. 470, 1480 V. White, 48 Ohio St. 577, 938 V. Winston, 5 St. & P. 17, 7 V. Woodward, 1 N. H. Ill, 75 Tubesing v. City of Buffalo, 69 N. Y. S. 399. 1339 Tuckahoe Canal v. Tuckahoe &c. R. Co., 11 Leigh 42, 679 Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113, 196, 344, 351, 362, 379 V. City of Utica, 54 N. Y. S. 855, 1247 V. Justices &c., 13 Ired. L. 434, 301 V. Justices &c.. 34 Ga. 370, 1533 V. Rankin, 15 Barb. 471, 1568 V. Sellers. 130 Ind. 514, 1287 Tucker & Frankfort Sts., In re, 166 Pa. St. 336. 1220 Tudor V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 154 111. 129, 515 Tuebner v. California &c. St. R. Co., 66 Cal. 171, 1108 Tufts V. City of Charlestown, 4 Gray 537, 702 V. State, 119 Ind. 232, 1476 V. Town of Chester, 62 Vt. 353, 1059 Tugnian v. City of Chicago. 78 111. 405, 500. 502, 503, 614, 1357 Tuley V. State, 1 Ind. 500. 1483 Turflcr. In re, 44 Barb. 46, 1533 Turnbull v. Alpena Tp., 74 Mich. 621, 1551 Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54, 1515, 1552, 1725 V. City of Chicago, 76 111. App. 649, 174 V. City of Indianapolis, 96 Ind. 51, 1624 V. City of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301, 826, 1375, 1590, 1625, 1636 V. Commissioners, 10 Kan. 16, 1655 V. Cruzen, 70 Iowa 202, 242, 655 V. Dartmouth. 13 Allen 291, 1216 V. Iladden, 62 Barb. 480, 1063 V. Killian, 12 Neb. 580, 332 V. Mayor &c., 78 Ga. 683, 620 V. Newburg, 109 N. Y. 301, 1586 V. Sisson. 137 Mass. 191, 332 V. Thomas, 10 Mo. App. 338, 217 V. Wilson. 49 Ind. 581, 530 V. Woodbury Co., 57 Iowa 440, 9, 775 Turney v. Town of Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412, 860, 916, 927 Turpen v. County Com'rs, 7 Ind. 172, ' 183 Turrill v. Grattan, 52 Cal. 97, 1258 Tutt V. Hobbs. 17 Mo. 486. 216 Tuttle V. Cary, 7 Maine 426, 347 V. Everett. 51 Miss. 27, 242, 248 V. Polk. 92 Iowa 433, 876, 881 V Town of Weston, 59 Wis. 151, 349 Twenty-sixth St., Matter of, 12 Wend. 203, 1233 Twiss V. City of Port Huron, 63 Mich. 528. 1257 Twist V. City of Rochester, 55 N. Y. S. 850, 793, 1316, 1332, 1362, 1802 Twogood V. Mayor &c., 102 N. Y. 216, 1621 Tyerman, In re, 48 Fed. 167, 1399 Tyler v. Alford, 38 Maine 530, 335 V. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648, 685, 980 V. Capeheart, 125 N. C. 64, 993 V. Elizabethtown &c. R. Co., 9 Bush 510, 92 V. Henry, 2 Pick. 397, 1425 V. Inhabitants &e., 147 Mass. 609, 688 V. Nelson. 14 Graft. 214, 322, 323 V. State. 63 Vt. 300, 1420 V. Sturdy, 108 Mass. 106, 1557, 1561 V. Township Board &c., 75 Mo. App. 561, 1686 V. Williston, 62 Vt. 269, 1575, 1622 Tyree v. Wilson, Graft. 59, 323 Tyrrell v. City of New York, 159 N. Y. 239, 180, 181 Tyson v. City of Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 78, 680 V. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9, 1542 U Fhl V. Board &c., 6 Lea 610, 1526 Uhrig V. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458, 1266 Ulam V. Boyd, 87 Pa. St. 477, 262, 263 Uline V. New York &c. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 1603, 1773 rilman v. Mayor &c., 165 U. S. 719, 1302 ITlman v. Mayor, 72 Md. 587. 1237, 1242, 1267 TTnderhill v. City of Manchester. 45 N. H. 214, 800, 1394 V. Gibson. 2 N. H. 352, 868 Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana 309. 1725 V. Greene, 42 N. Y. 140, 1110 V. Stuyyesant, 19 Johns. 181, 1559 TTnion v. Crawford, 19 Conn. 331, 142 Union Bank &c. v. Board &c., 116 N. C. 339, 993 TABLE OF CASES. CXClll [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.'] Union Bank &c. v. Board &c., 90 Fed. 7, 1758 V. Commissioners &c.. 119 N. C. 214, 736. 984. 985. 993, 1030, 1680 V. State. 9 Yerpr. 489, 1501, 1532 Union Civil Tp. v. Berryman, 3 Ind. App. 344, 1076 Union Co. v. Knox Co., 90 Tenn. 541, 418 V. Slocum, 16 Or- 237. 944 Union Co. Court v. Robinson, 27 Arli. 116. 1540 Union Depot &c. R. Co. v. Smith, 6 191 S. 427 1697 1758 16 Colo. 361, Union Tac. R. Co. v. Board &c. Kan. 256. V. Chevenne. 113 U. S. 516. V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 10 U App. 98. V. City of Kansas City, 42 Kan 497, 390 V. Commissioners &c., 98 U. S. 541, 242. 243, 245, 246, 247, 248 V. Commissioners «&c., 4 Neb. 450. 981 V. Dunden, 37 Kan. 1. 794 V. Foley, 19 Colo. 280. 652 V. Merrill Co., 3 Dill. 359. 1022 V. Lincoln Co., 3 Dill. 300. 981. 985, 1022, 1717 V. Merrick Co., 3 Dill. 359. 985 V. Montgomery, 49 Neb. 429, 483 Union Paving &c. Co. v. McGovern, 127 Cal. 638, 726. 1240 Union School Tp. v. First Nafl Bank. 102 Ind. 464, 647. 857, 862 Union St. R. Co. v. Stone. 54 Kan. 83. 1325, 1332, 1336 Union Tp. v. Rader. 41 N. J. L. 617, 452 V. Smith. 39 Iowa 9. 319 LTnion Trust Co. v. Monticello &c. R. Co., 63 N. Y. 311. 1019 V. Trumbull. 137 111. 146, 524 V. Weber. 96 111. 346. 1721 United Brethren Church v. Vandusen, 37 Wis. 54, 291 United Hebrew Ass'n v. Beushimol, 130 Mass. 325, 524 United N. J. R. &c. v. National Docks &c. R. Co., 57 N. J. L. 523, 1319 United States v. Adams. 24 Fed. 348, 328 V. Alexander, 46 Fed. 728, 195 V. American Water-works Co., 37 Fed. 747, 1462 V. Anthony. 11 Blatch. 200, 369 V. Arredonda. 6 Pet. 691, 615 V. Austin, 2 Cliff. 325, V. Board &c.. 20 Fed. 294, V. Booth, 11 Gill & J. 373, V. Boyd. 5 How. 29, V. Boyd, 15 Peters 187, V. Brown. 9 How. 486. V. City Bank of Columbus, 21 How. 356, 256 V. City of New Orleans, 31 Fed. 537 948 V. City of Sterling, 2 Biss. 408, 847, 1529 V. Clark Co., 95 U. S. 769. 1525. 1646. 1680 V. Clark Co.. 96 U. S. 211. 1524 V. County Court, 4 McCrary 218. 1525, 1526 V. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542. 137, 138, 369 V. Davis. 3 McLean 483, 1734 V. Dashiel, 4 Wall. 182, 319 V. Giles, 9 Cranch 212. 322 V. Gilmore, 8 Wall. 330, 1790 V. Girault. 11 How. 22, 324 V. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645, 772 1 Smith — xiii 179 1529 1734 324 317, 322 175 United States v. Green, 8 Mack. 230, 1413, 1415 V. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 140 V. Harris, 1 Sumner 21, 675, 685 V. Hillegas, 3 Wash. C. C. 70, 770 V. Hine. 3 McArth. 27, 332 V. Hodson, 10 Wall. 395, 311 V. Holly, 3 Cr. C. C. 656, 607 V. Hoyt. 1 Blatchf. 326. 327 V. Hudson. 7 Cranch 32, 205 V. Humason, 6 Sawyer 199, 312, 819 V. Insurance Co., 22 Wall. 99, 45 V. Irwin. 127 U. S. 125, 772 V. .Jefferson Co., 5 Dill. 535, 15'^3 V. Jefferson Co., 1 McCrary 356, 996 V. Jones, 109 U. S. 513. 673, 697, 698 V. Justices &c., 5 Dill. 184, 1525 V. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83, 319 V. Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514, 1528 V. Kirkpatrick. 9 Wheat. 720. 317, 318, 319, 326, 771 V. Labette Co.. 2 McCrary 25, 1646 V. Le Baron, 19 How. 73, 313 V. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 18, 770. 772, 1721 V. Lincoln Co., 5 Dill. 184, 764 V. Linn. 15 Peters 290, 311, 1014 V. Macon Co., 99 U. S. 582, 1523. 1524. 1525. 1528, 1534, 15.35 V. Maurice. 2 Brock. C. C. 96, 312 V. Mayor &c., 2 Woods 230, 1523 V. Mayor &c., 2 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 394, 1535 V. McCortney, 1 Fed. 104, 318 V. McDougall, 121 U. S. 89, 772 V. McKelden. MacArth. & M. 162 349, 355, '368 V. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284 387. 394, 1516. 1517, 1518, 1.531 V. Miller Co.. 4 Dill. 233, 847 V. Moore, 2 Brock. C. C. 317, 330 V. Morgan. 11 How. 153. 319 V. Morgan, 3 Wash. C. C. 10, 309 V. Nelson, 2 Brock. C. C. 64, 310 V. New Orleans. 98 U. S 381 838 1522. 1523. 1530; 1533. 1534. 1660 V. Nicholl. 12 Wheat. 505, 317, 771 V. Pacific Railroad, 120 U. S 227, "'-1385 V. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51. 1423 V. Port of Mobile, 12 Fed. 768 ; 4 Woods 536, 67, 412 15''5 V. Powell. 14 Wall. 493, 318 V. Prescott, 3 How. 578, 319, 865 V. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 Mc- Lean 317, 687 V. Reese. 92 U. S. 214. 138, 369 V. Rogers, 28 Fed. 607, 311 V. Russell. 13 Wall. 623, 1385 V. Silverman, 4 Dill. 224, 15''8 V. Singer, 15 Wall. Ill, 318 v. Slater. 4 Wood 356. 369 V. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30, 211 V. Thomas. 15 Wall. 337, 319 V. Tingey. 5 Peters 115, 311 V. Twenty-five Cases of Cloths, Crabbe 356, 106 V. Union Pac. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72. 1018 V. Van Zandt, 11 Wheat. 184, 317, 771 V. Villato. 2 Dallas 370, 132 V. Watts, 1 N. Mex. 553, 319 V. Wells. 2 Cr. C. C. 45, 607 V. Wiley. 11 Wall. 508. 455 V. Williams. 5 McLean 133, 1734 V. Wright, 1 McLean 509, 199 United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago. 112 111. 19, 1399 United States &c. Ins. Co. v. Poil- lon, 7 N. Y. S. 834, 1397 cxcrv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. S33-1830.'i United States Mort. Co. v. Gross, 93 111. 4S3, 643 United States Trust Co. v. United States Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. 199. G02 United States Water-Works Co. v. Borough of Du Bois, 176 Pa. St. 439. 717 University &c. v. Skidmore, 87 Tenn. 15.5, 1502 Unwin v. Wolseley, 1 T. R. 674. 216 Updegrafif v. Crans, 47 Pa. St. 103, 297 V. Palmer. 107 Ind. 181, 1573 Upliam V. Marsh. 128 Mass. 546. 335 Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232, 1421 Uppington v. City of New York, 58 N. Y. S. 533, 1378 Upton V. People &c., 176 HI. 632, 1260 V. Stoddard, 47 N. H. 167, 364 Urquhart v. City of Ogdensbui-g, 67 N. Y. 71. 1159 V. City of Ogdensburg, 91 N. Y. 67, 821, 1584 Urtel V. City of Flint, 122 Mich. 65, 1334, 1802, 1803 Utter V. Franklin, 172 U. S. 416, 993 Vacation of Center St., In re. 115 Pa. St. 247, 1200, 1261, 1262 Vacation of Howard St., In re, 142 Pa. St. 601, 1320 Vail V. City of Attica, 8 Kan. App. 668, 610 V. Long Island R. Co., 106 N. Y. 283, 1563 V. Morris &c. R. Co., 21 N. J. L. 189. 1572 Vale Mills v. Nashua, 63 N. H. 136, 822 Valentine v. City of Boston, 22 Pick. 75, 1557 V. City of St. Paul, 34 Minn. 446, 244 Valley Co. v. Robinson, 32 Neb. 254, 908 Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 1501 Van Alstine v. People, 37 Mich. 523 1133 Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich. 258, 604, 1405 Van Bergen v. Bradley, 36 N. Y. 316. 1568 Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 128 N. Y. 50, 1175 Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368. 496, 606 Van Camp v. Board &c., 9 Ohio St. 406, 1494 Vance v. City of Little Rock. 30 Ark. 435, 1232. 1527, 1532, 1535 V. Hadfleld. 22 N. Y. St. 858. 509 Van Cott V. Board &c., 18 Wis. 247, 1722 Vandemark v. Porter, 40 Hun 397, 1559, 1567 Van Denburgh v. President &c., 66 N. Y. 1, 521 Vanderbeck v. Inhabitants &c., 39 N. .7. L. 345. 434 Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cowen 349, 673, 1079 Vanderhurst v. Tholcke, 113 Cal. 147, 1369 Vanderpool v. Husson. 28 Barb. 196, 745 Vanderslice v. City of Philadelphia, 103 Pa. St. 102, 1620 Vanderstolph v. Highway Com'rs, 50 Mich. 330, 706 Van De Vere v. City of Kansas, 83 Mo. 488, 1602 V. Kan.sas City, 107 Mo. S3. 1697 Van Doren v. Mayor, 9 Paige 388, 1723 Vandrice's Petition, 6 Pick. 187. 1085 Van Dusen v. Fridley, 6 Dak. 322, 421 Vandyke v. State, 24 Ala. 81, 770 Vane v. City of Evanston, 150 111. 616, 511 Van Eppes v. Board &c., 25 Ala. 460, 774 Van Frachen v. City of Ft. Howard, 88 Wis. 570, 1790 Van Hastrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291, 1001 Van Hook v. Barnett, 4 Dev. L. 268. 312 V. City of Selma, 70 Ala. 361, 502. 1405, 1507 Van Horn v. City of Des Moines. 63 Iowa 447, 264. 786, 14.59 V. Kittitas Co., 59 N. Y. S. 883. 872 Van Ilusan v. Heames, 91 Mich. 519, 583, 584 Van Loan v. Village of Lake Mills, 88 Wis. 430. 1366 Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill 243, 199 Vauover v. Davis, 27 Ga. 354, 845, 1542, 1717 Van Pelt v. City of Davenport, 42 Iowa 308, 1207, 1585 V. Littler, 14 Cal. 194. 332 Van Rensselaer v. City of Albany, 15 Abb. N. C. 457, 822 V. Palmatier. 2 How. Pr. 24, 1737 v. Petrie, 2 How. Pr. 94, 1737 Van Sant v. Harlem Stage Co., 59 Md. 330, 622 Van Schaick v. Sigel, 60 How. Pr. 122, 226, 228 Van Sicklen v. Town of Burlington, 27 Vt. 70, 1542 Van Steenbergh v. Bigelow, 3 Wend. 42, 335 Van Swarton v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa. St. 131, 1414 Van Valkeubergh v. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 146, 328 Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 369 V. City of Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 574, 700, 701 V. Earley, 1 Luz. Leg. Beg. 216, 1745 Van Valkenburgh v. Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. S. 6, 1770 Van Vrankin v. Village of Clifton Springs, 33 N. Y. S. 329, 1363 Van Wormer v. Mayor &c., 15 Wend. 263, 1079, 1083 Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86. 532, 534 Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige 137, 68ii Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 152 V. Manchester, 58 N. H. 430, 1595 Vason V. City of Augusta, 38 Ga. 542, 497, 1410 Vaughan v. Johnson, 77 Va. 300, 313 Vaughn v. Congdon, 56 Vt. Ill, 335 V. Village of Portchester, 15 N. Y. S. 474, 1264 Vaught V. Board &c., 101 Ind. 123. 1580 Vaughtman v. Town of Waterloo. 14 Ind. App. 649, 787, 804 Vaux V. Nesbit, 1 McC. Ch. 352, 134 Vawter v. Franklin College, 53 Ind. 88, 300 Veale v. City of Boston, 135 Mass. 187, 803 Veder v. Town of Lima, 19 Wis. 298. 1028 Veghte V. Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 142, 1814 Venable v. Curd, 2 Head 582. 197 Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41, 1401 Verbeck v. Scott. 71 Wis. 59. 373 Verder v. Village of Little Falls, 100 N. Y. 343, 1579 Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 1521 Verdin v. City of St. Louis. 131 Mo. 26, 749. 1701 TABLE OF CASES. cxcv [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Vermont &c. R. Co. v. County Com'rs. 10 Cush. 12, 1743 Vestal V. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321, 391, 392, 393, 398, 399, 400 Vestrv &c. v. Jacobs, L. R. 7 Q. B. 47. 1561 Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563, 1574 V. Tobin. 100 U. S. 430, 1537 Vicksburg &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 48 La. An. 1102, 514 V. Mayor &c.. 89 Md. 689, 1349 Vidal V. Mayor &c., 2 How. 127, 563, 664 Vidalat v. City of New Orleans, 43 ■ La. An. 1121, 801 Vider v. City of Chicago, 164 111. 354, 931. 1780 Vigeant v. City of Marlborough, 175 Mass. 459, 1777 Vigo Tp. V. Board &c.. Ill Ind. 170, 947, 957 Village of Belknap v. Miller, 52 111. App. 617. 477 Village of Ballston Spa v. Markham, 11 N. Y. S. 826, 1395 Village of Betholto v. Conley, 9 IlL App. 339, 541 Village of Braceville v. Doherty, 30 111. App. 645. 503. 1404 Village of Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 111. 429. 676 Village of Buffalo v. Harling, 50 Minn. 551, 1736 V. Webster, 10 Wend. 99. 100, 505, 580, 1412 Village of Bureau Junction v. Long. 56 111. App. 458, 1332. 1358 Village of Carthage v. Frederick. 122 N. Y. 268. 658. 1328, 1383 Village of Cerro Gordo v. Rawlings, 135 111. 36. 1395 Village of Corning v. Rector &c., 33 N. Y. St. 766. 564 Village of Coulterville v. Gillen, 72 III. 599. 1400 Village of Cullom v. Justice, 161 111. 372, 1786 Village of Bvart v. Postal, 86 Mich. 325, 314 Village of Fort Edward v. Fish, 33 N. Y. S. 784. 734 Villaare of Fulton v. Tucker. 3 Hun 529, 1344. 1588. 1598 Village of Glenville v. Englehart, 19 Ohio C. C. 285. 180 Village of Grandville v. Jenison, 84 Mich. 54, 1566 Village of Green Bay v. Holsinger, 76 Mo. App. 567. 1386 Village of Hammond v. Leavitt. 181 111. 416. 1131. 1148. 1277 Village of Hartington v. Luge. 33 Neb. 623. 392. 399 Village of Harvey v. WMlson, 78 111. App. 544, 611 Village of Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 111. 312. 512 Village of Hyde Park v. Borden, 94 111. 26. 571, 1175, 1283 V. Carton, 132 III. 100, 501, 1130, 1259 V. City of Chicago, 124 111. 156, 396. 401 Village of Itasca v. Schroder, 182 111. 192, 1708 Village of Jefferson v. Chapman, 127 111. 438. 1590, 1619, 1620 Village of Kent v. Dana, 100 Fed. 56, 1006, 1018 V, Dethridge &c. Glass Co., 10 Ohio C. C. 629, 783 Village of Ladd v. Jones, 61 111. App. 584, 573 Village of Le Roy. In re, 55 N. Y. S. 611, 1131 Village of Lockporte v. Richards, 81 HI. 533, 1333 Village of Louisville v. Webster, 108 111. 414, 1392 Village of Mansfield v. Moore, 24 111, 133, 1330, 1334, 1596, 1628, 1629 Village of Marysville v. Schoonover, 78 111. App. 189, 646, 926, 1800 Village of Morgan Park v. Gahan, 136 111. 515, 1186 V. Gahan, 35 111. App. 646, 754 V. Wizwall, 155 111. 262, 1231, 1235 Village of Niagara Falls v. Salt, 45 Hun 41, 1401 Village of North Alton v. Dorsett, 59 111. App. 612. 1211 Village of North Springfield v. City of Springfield. 140 111. 165. 397 Village of Oak Harbor v. Kallager, 52 Ohio St. 183, 1363 Village of Pine City v. Munch, 42 Minn. 342, 1107, 1108, 1125, 1737 Village of Ponca v. Crawford, 23 Neb. 662. 1638 Village of I'ort Jervis v. First Nafl Bank, 96 N. Y. 550, 134.5, 1598. 1599 Village of Rankin v. Smith, 63 111. App. 592, 13.59 Village of St. Bernard v. Kemper, 60 Ohio St. 244, 1136. 1246 Village of St. John v. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 72, 830 Village of St. Johnsbury v. Thomp- son, 59 Vt. 300, 110, 111, 466 Village of St. Marvs v. Lake Erie &c. R. Co., 60 Ohio St. 136, 505, 590 Village of Seneca Falls v. Zalinski, 8 Hun 571. 1599 Village of Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio St, 549, 1324 Village of Sheridan v. Hibbard, 119 111. 307, 1628 Village of Sorento v. Johnson, 52 111. App. 659, 794 Village of Stamford v. Fisher, 17 N. Y. S. 609, 1395 Village of Tarrytown v. Pocontico Water-works Co., 1 N. Y. S. 394, 1448 Village of Vicksburg v. Briggs, 102 Mich. 551. 599 Village of Wapella v. Davis, 39 111. App. 592. 1422. 1423 Village of West Duluth v. Norton, 65 N. W. 935, 1274 Village of Western Springs v. Hill, 177 111. 634, 519, 1167 Village of Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282, 526 Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. An. 247, 516, 1403 Vinal V. Inhabitants &c.. 7 Gray 59, 1612 Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268, 4, 6, 46. 47. 447 Vincennes Water-Supply Co. v. White. 124 Ind. 376, 745 Vincent. In re. 57 N. Y. S. 771. 1823, 1828 v. Board &c., 52 Mich. 340, 1675 v. Cram. 57 N. Y, S. 771, 1823, 1828 v. Inhabitants &c,, 12 Cush. 103, 210, 251, 647, 668 V. Lincoln Co., 30 Fed. 749, 1736 Violette v. City Council &c., 92 Va. 561, 1242, 1243, 12G8, 1269 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 140 Virginia &c. R. Co. v. County Com'rs &c., 6 Nev. 68. 990 V. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358, 698, 701. 702 CXCVl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages. Tol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. 11, pp. 833-1830.'] Virgo. In re, 20 Ont. App. 435, 1387 Vivian v. Otis, 24 Wis. 518, 322, 324 Voegtiy V. Pittburgli &c. R. Co., 2 Grant Cas. 243, 093 Vogel V. City of Antigo, 81 Wis. 642, 828, 942 V. City of West Plains, 73 Mo. App. 588, 1331 V. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 335. 392 V. Little Rock, 55 Ark. 609. 391. 398. 399 Vogelgesang v City of St. Louis. 139 Mo. 127. 1333. 13.4 Voght V. City of Buffalo, 133 N. Y. 463, 720. 119 < V. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. 547 1310 Von Der Leith v. State, 60 N. J. L. 46. , 524 Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy. 4 W^all. 535, 89, 412, 4.53, 765, 766 1523, 1527, 1531 Von Phul V. Hammer. 29 Iowa 222, 54 Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151- „^ 644, 733, 873 Voorhies v. Mayor &c., 70 Tex. 331, 919 Vosburg V. McCrary, 77 Tex. 568, ^_^_ Vose V. Inhabitants &c., 64 Maine 229 ""'' Vroman'v. Dewey, 23 Wis. 530, 423 W Wabash &c. Co. v. Beers, 2 Black 448, <60 Wabash R. Co. v. City of Defiance, 52 Ohio St. 262, 10 Ohio C. C.^27. ^ ^^^^ Wabash &c. R. Co. v. Farver, 111 Ind. 195. '45 V. McCleave, 108 111. 368. 1528 Wabaska Elec. Co. v. City of Wymore. 60 Neb. 199, 788, 1384, 1407, 1704 W^aco Water &c. Co. v. City of Waco, 27 S. W. 675, <40 Wade V. Borough of Oakmont, 16.3 Pa. St. 479, _ ^ '27 V. City of Newbern, 77 N. C. 460T 260. 261, 262 V. City of Richmond. 18 Gratt. 583. 384. 387. 651. 1517, 1519 V. Travis Co., 174 U. S. 499, 916 Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 ^^f^l^t^^'-^^c,^ Wadsworth v. Supervisors, 102 LT. S. 534 625, 99o V. Wadsworth, 12 N. Y. 376, 134 V. Wendell, 5 Johns. Ch. 224, 1015 Waffle V. Short, 25 Kan. 503. 316 Wager v. Troy Union R. Co., 25 N. Y. 526, 682 Waggeman v. Village of North Peoria. 155 111. 545. 1211 W'aggener v. Town of Point Pleasant, 42 W. Va. 798, 1341 Wagon Co. v. Byrd, 119 N. C. 460, 99.3 Wahle V. Reinbeck, 76 111. 322. 1104 Wahlgreen v. City of Kansas City, 42 Kan. 243. 1258 Waite V. Citv of Santa Cruz. 89 Fed. 619, 195. 197. 999. 1005. 1011. 1021 Waitz V. Ormsby Co.. 1 Nev. 370. 1736 Wakefield v. Newport. 62 N. H. 624. 266 V. Patterson, 25 Kan. 709, 350, 372, 1473 V. Phelps. 37 N. H. 295. 523 Wakeham v. St. Clair Tp.. 91 Mich. 15. 1603. 1632 Wakelev v. City of Omaha, 58 Neb. 245, 1237. 1286 Walchus v. Highlands. 4 Bush 547. 1252 Walden v. Dudley, 49 Mo. 419. 1515 Waldo V. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569, 189, 192, 1418 Waldraven v. Mayor &c., 4 Coldw. 431, 169. 201 Waldron v. Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582, 803, 815, 1159 V. Lee, 5 Pick. 323. 1519 Wales' V. City of Muscatine, 4 Iowa 302, 1745 Walish V. City of Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 16. 1776 Walker v. British Guarantee Ass'n, 18 Q. B. 277, 320 v. Chapman, 22 Ala. 116, 318 V. City of Ann Arbor, 111 Mich. 1, 1338 V. City of Ann Arbor, 118 Mich. 251, 1269 V. City of Aurora. 140 111. 402, 500. 1175, 1234. 1271. 1421 V. City of Cincinnati. 21 Ohio St. 14, 983 V. City of Evansville, 33 Ind. 393. 465 V. City of Kansas City. 99 Mo. 647. 1374. 1580. 1597 V. City of Sedalia, 74 Mo. App. 70, 1772, 1776 V. City of Springfield. 94 111. 364. 549, 1508, 1521 V. Decatur Co., 67 Iowa 317, 1802 V. District of Columbia. 6 Mackey 352. 1232 V. Eastern Counties R. Co.. 6 Hare 594. 699 V. .Tameson, 140 Ind. 591, 515, 740 V. Osgood. 98 Mass. 348, 211 V. People, 166 111. 96, 1144 V. People. 170 111. 410, 1294 V. Rogan, 1 Wis. 597, 295 V. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 563, 1725 V. Swartwout, 12 Johns. 444. 215. 216 V. Town of Reidsville, 96 N. C. 382. 1633 V. Village of Morgan Park, 175 111. 570. 1710 V. Wasco Co.. 19 Pac. 81. 1735 Walklev v. City of Muscatine. 6 Wall. 481. 1526, 1527, 1529 Wall V. City of Portland. 35 Or. 89, 1033 V. Monroe Co., 103 U. S. 74. 863. 951, 978 V. Trumbull. 16 Mich. 228. 860 Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co.. 172 U. S. 1, 491. 723. 735. 1347. 1382. 1702, 1808 Wallace v. City of Menasha. 48 Wis. 79. 781. 818. 1726 V. City of New York. 65 N. Y. S. 85.5, 1305 V. City of Richmond. 94 Va. 204. 1384 V. Fletcher, 30 N. H. 434, 1566 V. Karlenoweski. 19 Barb. 118, 705 V. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501, 1191, 1745 V. Mayor &c., 29 Cal. 180, 210. 236, 646 V. Muscatine, 4 Greene 373. 8 V. Shelton, 14 La. Ati. 498. 1269, 1270 V. Trustees &c.. 84 N. C. 164, 104 Waller v. Wood. 101 Ind. 138. 1095 Wallick v. Citv of Manitowoc. 57 Wis. 9. 1222 Walling V. Mayor &c.. 64 N. J. L. 203. 1815 Wallingford v. Southington. 16 Conn. 435. 1054. 1060 Wallis V. .Johnson School Tp.. 75 Ind. 368. 216. 217. 862 Wain's Heirs v. City of Philadelphia. 99 Pa. St. 330, 482 TABLE OF CASES. CXCVll . T, ^o vni T r>n 1-S32: Vol. II, PP. 833-1830.1 ^References are to Pages, ^ol. I, PP-JJ'^'^^^^^^ ;f ^^^^ ^^^_. walnut V. wade, ^Il,%%%\s,^l020 Walnut Tp. v. Jordan, 38 Kan.^ ^62,^ ^^^ Walsh V. Barron, Gl Ohio St.^l|^.^^ ^^^^ V. City of Buffalo, 44 N. Y. S.^^^^ ^''^City of union, 13 Or. 589.^ ^^^ V. Mayor &c.. 107 NY. 220 157| V. Trustees &c., 96 N. Y. 427, lo.» V. Village of Rutland, 56 Vt. Walston' V. Nevin, 128 U. S. 57^8.^^ ^^^^ Walter. Matter of, 75 NY 354; ' 1140 Walters, Ex parte 65 Cal -69 i^^^ ^^'^"i:-^Du\"e:ii;f:a\^-|4 1508, 1521 V. Town of Lake, 129 ^^^- ^jf^Q ^272 Waltham v. Town of Mullally, 27^^^^ Neb. 483. ^„„ r-Q^ Walther v. Warner. 25 Mo -77, ^g^^ WarS'nCo. v. Marcy.^97 U^S.^96. ^ ^^^^ V. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 97 ^L^^g ?: Post, 97 U. S. 110 1026 V Ward, 21 Iowa 84. ^-^ WarJin v Baldwin, 105 N Y. 534. 934 Wartman^v. CUy of P^^^ladelpma. 33^^^ Washburn v. Board &c., 1^04 Ind.J21,^^^ V. City of Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453, 103, 1515, 1516, 1517, 1518 V. Phillips, 2 Met. 296 1,43 Washer v. Bullitt Co., 110 U. S. 558^^^ Washington v. Mayor &c.^^l^ ^^198,^^271 V. Mayor &c., 2 Swan 364 ' 1168 V. State, 13 Ark. 752, 1508 1521 Washington Ave., In re, 69 1^.^;. »^- „ 352, 1195, 1231, 1254. 12(1, 1538 Washington Cemetery v. Pi"ospect Park &c. R. CO., 68 N^^l. 591, ^^^^ Washington &c. Church v. New York, 20 Hun 297, ^ ^„ _ 1^21 Washington Co. v. Wild Co., 12 Colo.^^^ Washington Gas Co. v. Seminary, 52 Mo. 480, ^ ^^. -1* Washington Ice Co v. City of Chica- go, 147 111. 327, 465, 1151 V. Lav. 103 Ind. 48, 343, 1567 Washington &c. R. Co. v. Lacey, 94 Va 460 ^ Washington Tp. v. Coler, 2 C. C. A^.^^^ Wate'ilury v. Board &c., 10 Mont. 515,^^ V City of Laredo, 60 Tex. 519, 181 V City of Laredo. 68 Tex. 565, 640 v! Town of Darien, 8 Conn. l0'*:48 water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. ^566, ^^^^ Waterloo Woolen Mfe Co. v. Sban- ahan, 128 N. Y. 345, oca Waters v. Bonvouloir, 172 Mass. -^''^^e V. Carroll. 9 Yerg 102, 327 v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110 ^^^\7m V. Townsend. 65 Ark. 613 1407 V. Village of Bay View. 61 Wis 64'' D ^^*^,^;?rTe^'^^^M.^4f^f^^'^^^"^ Watertown V. fady 20 Wis^Stn 13 Watertown F. Ins. Co. v. Simmons. 131 Mass. 85. Tn'>'> ''63, 820, 821, 1159, 1506, 1603 V. Mayor &c., 4 E. D. Smith 675^, ^ V. Neal. 23 Fed. 129, 956 V. Pelton. 40 Ohio St. 306, 1263 V Peverly, 1 Am. L. Cas. 785, 226 V. Poole. 33 Ind. 443, 617, 1288 V. Roberts. 11 C. B. N. S. 50, 127 V. Rockford &c. R. Co., 59 111. 273. '05 V. Salamanca, 99 V. S. 499. 885. 995. 998, 1001, 1005, 1009, 1023 V. School District, 32 N. H. 118 12, 259. 644, 1213, 1480 V Simmons, 89 Maine 242, 1369 T. Sutter Co. Supervisors, 47 Cal. 91. 1547 V. Town of Spafford. 32 N. Y. 532, 1609 V. "Township Board &c., 87 Mich. 240, 1569 V. Wall, 6 Wall. 83. ^^ 136 V. Waltersville School Dist., 44 Conn. 157, 344, 363, 148.5 V. Webber, 157 N. Y. 693, 754 Wilson Co. V. National Bank, 103 V-^^ S. 770, 1018 Wiltse V. Town of Tilden, 77 Wis. -[50 1587 Winans'"v. Williams, 5 Kan. 227, 1475 Winbigler v. Mayor &c., 45 Cal. 36. 9, 788, 814, 1594 Winbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. An. 246, 219 Winchester v. Cheshire Co., 64 N. H-^^^ 100, 1064 Windfall Mfg. Co. v. Emery, 142 Ind. 456. ^^ 63 Windsor v. City of Des Moines. 110 Iowa 175. 715. 747. 878. 879. 881 V. Polk Co., 109 Iowa 156, 1504 Wing V. Glick, 56 Iowa 473, 216 Wingate v. City of Tacoma, 13 Wash. 603, 1286 Winham v. Commissioners, 26 Mo. 406, 1572 Winn V. Board of Park Com'rs. 12 Ky. L. 339. 118 V. Citv Council &c., 21 Ga. 275, 992 V. State, 7 So. 353, 1473 Winona &c. R. Co. v. City of Water- town. 1 S. D. 46. 1268 V. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515, 674 Winpenny v. I'hiladelphia, 65 Pa. St. 135, 817 Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197, 1600, 1613 Winslow V. Commissioners &c., 64 N. C. 218, 1528, 1530 Winspear v. District Tp. &c., 37 Iowa 542, 12 V. Holman Tp., 37 Iowa 542. 890 Winston v. City of Ft. Worth, 47 S. W. 740, 926, 1833 V. Tennessee &c. R. Co., 1 Baxt. 60, 985, 1542 V. Westfeldt, 22 Ala. 760, 1026 Winter v. City Council &c., 65 Ala. 403, 1551 Wintz V. Board, 28 W. Va. 227, 1651 Winzer v. City of Burlington, 68 Iowa 279, 1552 Wisconsin Indust. School &c. v. Clark Co., 103 Wis. 651, 1549 Wisconsin Keeley Inst. Co. v. Mil- waukee Co., 95 Wis. 153, 548, 610 Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Ashland Co., 81 Wis. 1, 300, 372, 593, 1204 V. Lincoln Co., 67 Wis. 478, 593 V. Taylor Co., 52 Wis. 37, 1513, 1520 Wise V. Foote, 81 Ky. 10, 1373 Wiser v. Blachlv, 1 Johns. Ch. 607, 1015 Wisner v. Davenport, 5 Mich. 501, 860 V. People. 156 111. 180, 1145. 1281 Wistar v. City of Philadelphia. 80 Pa. St. 505. 1149, 1196 V. Citv of Philadelphia, 92 Pa. St. 404, 1196 V. City of Philadelphia. Ill Pa. St. 604. 1196, 1233, 1499 Witheril v. Blosher, 9 Hun 412, 786 Witherop v. Titusville School Board, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 451. 1476, 1485 Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84, 673 Witherspoon v. City of Meridian, 69 Miss. 288, 1560, 1574 Withington v. Inhabitants &c., 8 Cush. 66, 355, 356, 357, 1728 Witkowski v. Bradley, 35 La. An. 904, 1535 V. Skalowski. 46 Ga. 41, 1724 Witman v. City of Reading, 169 Pa. St. 375. 1244, 1268 Witte V. Stifel. 126 Mo. 295, 1790 Witter V. Damitz, 81 Wis. 385. 1561. 1568 Woffenden v. Board of Supervisors &c., 1 Ariz. 237, 1654 Wohrden v. Northwestern R. Co., 54 S. C. 492. 1786 Wolcott V. Lawrence Co., 26 Mo. 272, 638. 1171 V. Town of Wolcott, 19 Vt. 37, 284, 295 Wolf V. Brass, 72 Tex. 133. 1599 V. City of Keokuk, 48 Iowa 129. 1271 V. City of Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St. 2,5. 12.34, 1261 Wolfe V. Erie &c. Tel. Co., 33 Fed. 320. 1609 Wolff V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 233. 412. 766, 1523, 1531, 1534 Wolfson V. Township Board &c., 63 Mich. 49. 1675 Wolsey V. Board, 32 Iowa 130. 1572 Wong'v. City of Astoria. 13 Or. 538, 541 Wood, In re. 54 N. Y. S. 30, 1505 v. Bangs. 1 Dak. 179. 840 v. Bartling. 16 Kan. 109. 378 V. Board &c., 125 Ind. 270, 909 TABLE OF CASES. CCIU [References are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-832; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.1 Wood V. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 425, 97, 468, 494, 530 V. City of Danbury, 72 Conn. 69, 1804 V. City of Galveston, 76 Tex. 126, 1206. 125G V. City of Hinton, 47 W. Va. 645, 811, 1394 V. City of Seattle, 23 Wash. 1. 470, 506, 508. 513, 1812, 1815 V. City of Watertown, 58 Hun 298. 1591 V. Cutter, 138 Mass. 149, 302 V. Ensel, 63 Mo. 193. 1757 V. Inhabitants. 11 Cush. 487, 363 V. MeGrath. 150 Pa. St. 451, 1182 V. Nation Water-Works Co., 33 Kan. 590. 572 V. President &c., 9 Cow. 194, 61, 83, 1422, 1423 V. Simmons, 51 Hun 325, 1066 V. Simons. 110 Mass. 116, 365 V. Stirman, 37 Tex. 584, 1727 V. Strother, 76 Cal. 545, 1256, 1649 V. Town of Oxford, 97 N. C. 227, 370, 984 Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1 N. J. L. 213, 431 Woodbury v. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 274, 1198 V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Pick. 227, 867 V. Parshlev. 7 N. H. 237, 1814 Woodcock V. Bolster. 35 Vt. 632, 1475 V. City of Worcester, 138 Mass. 268, 1626 Woodhull V. City of New York, 150 N. Y. 450, 792 Woodman v. Metropolitan R. Co., 149 Mass. 335, 1779 V. Tufts, 9 N. H. 88, 1095 Woodruff V. Catlin, 54 Conn. 277. 710 V. Eureka Springs, 55 Ark. 618, 391 399 V. Fisher, 17 Barb. 224, 'l084 V. Neal, 28 Conn. 165, 629, 1221 V. Okolona, 57 Miss. 806. 1017 V. Paddock, 130 N. Y. 618, 1574 V. Stewart, 63 Ala. 206. 529 V. Town of Glendale, 23 Minn. 537. 1025. 1026 V. Town of Glendale, 26 Minn. 78, 1125 Woods V. City of Chicago, 135 III. 582. 511, 1145 V. Colfax Co.. 10 Neb. 552, 9 V. Dennett. 9 N. II. 55, 1053 V. Henry, 55 Mo. 560. 1517 V. Inhabitants. Ill Mass. 357, 1613 V. Miller, 30 App. Div. 232, 1768 Woodward v. Collett, 20 Ky. L. 1066, 747, 749 V. Town of Rutland. 61 Vt. 316. 174 Woodyer v. Hadden. 5 Taunt. 125, 1559 Wo Lee, In re. 26 Fed. 471. 1400 Woolley V. Baldwin, 101 N. Y. 688, 222 Worcester v. Ballard. 38 Vt. 60, 1059 V. Proprietors &c., 16 Pick. 541. 1625 Worden v. City of New Bedford. 131 Mass. 23. 811. 1068 V. Inhabitants &c., 131 Mass. 23, 666 Work V. State. 2 Ohio St. 296. 1414 Workman v. Citv of New York, 63 Fed. 298. 795 Worley v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493, 64 V. Town of Cicero, 110 Ind. 208. 1552 Wormley v. District Tp., 45 Iowa 666, 1480 Wormwood v. City of Waltham, 144 Mass. 184, 936 Worster v. Forty-Second St. R. Co, 50 N. Y. 203, 'iios Worth V. Commissioners, Winst. Eq 70, 1500, 1507, 1722 Worthey v. Badgett, 32 Ark. 496, 1535 Worthington v. City of Covington, 82 Ky. 265. 260, 1254 ^ V. Wade. 82 Tex. 26, 1561 Wortman, Matter of, 22 Abb N C 1^'' 1649 Worts V. City of Watertown, 16 Fed 534, 1737 Wragg V. Penn Tp., 94 111. 11, 607 ^^ray v. Mayor &c., 46 Pa. St. 365 593, 1233, 1234 Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41, 1093 Wren v. Luzerne Co., 9 Pa. Co Ct 22. ■ 173 Wright V. Bishop, 88 111. 302 ^ n ^ o, .. 651, 1699, 1701 V. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 76, 682 V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 7 HI App. 438, 527 V. City Council &c., 78 Ga. 241, 263 V. City of Boston, 9 Cush. 233 1234. 1498. 'l726 V. City of Chicago, 20 111. 252, 1101 'l''32 V. City of Mt. Vernon, 60 N Y " S. 1017, ■ 71 V. City of San Antonio. 50 S. W 406 576. 1549, 1685. 1800. 1805 Y- City of Tacoma, 3 Wash. T. 410. io5g V. City of Wilmington, 92 N. C. 156. ' goo y. Corporation of Georgetown, 4 Cranch C. C. 534, 1994 V. Forrestal. 65 Wis. 341, 476. 1399 V. Harris, 31 Iowa 272, 393 y Inhabitants &c., 132 Mass. 49, 1639 V. Linn. 9 Pa. St. 433, 664 V. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, ^ XT ^-u o -u ,^'^^- 565, 1463, 1808 V. North School Dist.. 53 Conn. E^?i , o^ T ^5^- 363, 1477, 1485 V. People, 87 111. 582, 1253, 1540 V. Rouss, 18 Neb. 234, 335 V. Simpson, 6 Ves. 714, 399 V. Southwestern R. Co., 64 Ga. 782, 1988 y. Town Clerk of Stockport, 5 Man. & G. 33, i > ^ ^^^ V. Town of Victoria, 4 Tex. 375, 628 Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Jasper Tp., 68 Mich. 441, ^ 867 V. Town of Attica, 2 N Y S 359, • ^-1172 Wullenwaber v. Dunigan, 30 Neb. 877, gqQ V. Dunigan. 33 Neb. 477. 988 Wurts V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606. 698 Wyandotte &c. Br. Co. v. Commis- sioners. 10 Kan. 331. 339 Wyandotte City v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603 119 Wyandotte Elec. L. Co. v. City of Wyandotte, 124 Mich. 43. 1.809, 1812 Wyatt V. City of Rome, 105 Ga 312 797 Wyker v. Francis, 120 Ala. 509 166'' Wyley v. Wilson, 44 Vt. 404, 344 36.3 Wyman v. City of Philadelphia, 175 Pa. St. 117, 1343 Wynehamer v. People. 13 N. Y. 378, 677 Wynn v. State, 67 Miss. 312, 1486 Wynne v. Mayor &c., 105 Ga. 614, 1550 V. Wright, 1 Dev. & B. L. 19. 1537 Wyoming Coal Co. v. Price. 81 Pa. St. 156. 675 Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588, 1494 CCIV TABLE OF CASES. IReferences are to Pages. Vol. I, pp. 1-S32; Vol. II, pp. 833-1830.} Yaggy V. District Tp. &c., 80 Iowa 121. 1487 Yale V. West Middle School Dist., 59 Conn. 489, 1492 Yanisli v. City of St. Paul, 50 Minn. 518, 587 Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. 603, 170, 653 Yates V. City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 352, 1247, 1709 V. Lansing. 5 Johns. 282, 220 V. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 676, 1110, 1117. 1121 V. Town of West Grafton, 34 W. Va. 783, 1352 V. Village of Batavia, 79 111. 500. 1697 V. Yates, 9 Barb. 324, 664 Yavapai Co. v. O'Neil, 29 Pac. 430, 937 Yeager y. Town of Fairmount, 43 W. Va. 259, 1777 Yeakel v. City of Lafayette, 48 Ind. 116, 1191 Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. An. 220. 1270. 1520 Yellow River &c. Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214. 5.58 Yelton V. Addison. 101 Ind. 58. 708 Yesler v. City of Seattle. 1 Wash. 308, 374, 489, 1014, 1150 Yick Wo V. Flopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 492, 503, 508, 1083, 1400 York Co. v. Watson, 15 S. C. 1, 320 Yorty V. Paine, 62 Wis. 154, 197, 424 Young V. Black Hawk Co., 66 Iowa 460, 282, 1088 V. Buckingham. 5 Ohio 485. 294 V. Carev. 184 111. 613, 415, 1684 V. Carey. 80 111. App. 601, 1686 V. Charleston. 20 S. C. 116, 8 V. City Council &c., 20 S. C. 116, 814 V. City of Kansas, 27 Mo. App. 101, 1179. 1180 V. City of St. Louis, 47 Mo. 429, 1199, 1256 V. City of Webb City, 150 Mo. 333, 1359. 1360 V. Clarendon Tp., 132 U. S. 340, 562 637. 973, 974, 981, 982, 1017, 1576 V. Commissioners &c., 2 N. & McC. 537, 8 Young V. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30, 703 V. Laconia, 59 N. H. 534, 697 V. Leedom, 67 Pa. St. 351, 811 V. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 673 V. People, 155 111. 247, 1145 V. State, 7 Gill & J. 253, 309, 310 V. Town of Henderson, 76 N. C. 420, 1508, 1521 Young &c. Amuse. Co. v. Atlantic City. 60 N. J. L. 125, 527 Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 1506, 1509. 1522, 1722 Youngerman v. Murphy, 107 Iowa 686, 1554 Yule V. City of New Orleans, 25 La. An. 394, 786 Z Zaack v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. S. 821, 1314 Zable V. Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home. 92 Ky. 89, 1247 Zabriskie v. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 23 How. 381, 253 V. Jersey City &c. R. Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 314. 1706 V. Railroad Co., 23 How. 381, 61 Zanesville v. Farman, 53 Ohio St. 605. 1375 V. Gas Light Co., 47 Ohio St. 1, 574 Zartman v. State, 109 Ind. 360. 445, 1489 ' Zeigler v. Chapin. 126 N. Y. 342, 639 V. People, 156 111. 133, 1145 Zeiler v. Central R. Co.. 84 Md. 304, 301 Zettler v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 195. 1637 Ziegler v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. S. 783, 193 V. Flack, 54 N. Y. Super. 69, 1254 V. Hopkins, 117 U. S. 683. 1236, 1257, 1258 V. People, 164 111. 531. 1261 Zimmerman v. Canfleld, 42 Ohio St. 463. 689 V. Snowden, 88 Mo. 218. 1257 Zoeller v. Kellogg. 4 Mo. App. 163, 1297 Zorger v. City of Greensburgh, 60 Ind. 1. 516 Zottman v. City of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96. 254. 255. 554, 631, 638. 1212. 1254 Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 Bay 382, 535, 1415 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. CHAPTEE I. INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. Section 1. The genus corporation defined. 2. Species of corporations. 3. Public corporations, quasi-public corporations and private cor- porations. 4. Subdivisions of public corpora- tions. 5. Municipal and public quasi-cor- porations defined. 6. Subdivisions of strictly public corporations. 7. Definition of the municipal cor- poration. 8. Definition of the public quasi- corporation. Section 9. Examples of municipal and pub- lic quasi-corporations. 10. Counties. 11. The New England towns. 12. The same subject continued. 13. The state. 14. Long Island towns. 15. The development of the munici- pal corporation — (a) In gen- eral. 16. (b) Greece and Rome. 17. (c) Italy and France — The me- diaeval cities. Conclusion. 18 § 1. The genus corporation defined. — The definition of a corpora- tion most familiar to American jurisprudence is that of Chief Justice Marshall, which declares a corporation to be "an artificial being, in- visible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."^ This ^ The full text of the decision from which the quotation in the text is an extract is as follows: — "A corpora- tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con- templation of law. Being the mere creature of law it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality; and, if the expression may be al- lowed, individuality; properties by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single indi vidual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and end- less necessity of perpetual convey- ances for the purpose of transmit- ting from hand to hand. It is chief- (1) § 1 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 2 phrase of the chief justice, however, though forcible and suggestive, is, as Judge Dillon observes,^ rather a description than a definition; and the same observation may be made of Mr. Justice Story's state- ment in the same ease, that a corporation is an artificial person existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers and fran- chises, which, though they must be exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet considered as subsisting in the corpora- tion itself as distinctly as if it were a real person.^ Chancellor Kent defines a corporation as "a franchise possessed by one or more indi- viduals who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, and are vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting in several respects, however numerous the association may be, as a single individual."* So, Lord Coke had de- fined a corporation to be "a body to take in possession framed as to its capacity by policy, and therefore called by Littleton (section 413) a body politic; it is called a corporation or body corporate because the persons are made into a body, and are of capacity to take, grant,, etc., by a particular name."^ These definitions, or rather descrip- tions, are, however, too general to be of practical use, except as sug- gestions; and they insist too much on the theory that a corporation is strictly a legal or artificial person or individual ; ignoring the fact that, while a corporation in most of its relations acts as a unit, and may therefore for the most part be conveniently regarded as a legal person, it is in many of its relations properly conceived of as composed of an aggregation of persons.® As has been said, the effort of practical ly for the purpose of clothing bod- lor, in the preface of his work on ies of men in succession with those Corporations, declares that the fic- qualities and capacities that cor- tion of the "legal person" has out- porations were invented and are lived its usefulness, and is no longer in use. By these means a perpetual adequate for the purposes of an ade- succession of individuals are capable quate treatment of the legal rela- of acting for the promotion of the tions arising through the prosecu- particular object like one immortal tion of a corporate enterprise. In an being. But this being does not share article in the American Law Review, in the civil government of the coun- Professor Pomeroy approves and am- try, unless that be the purpose for plifies the idea contained in Mr. Tay- which it was created:" Dartmouth lor's remark, and calls attention to College V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, the fact that many modern corpora- 636. tions differ in essentials very little - 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. 37. from partnerships, except that they ^ Dartmouth College v. Woodward, can sue and be sued, make contracts, 4 Wheat. 518, 667. acquire rights and incur liabilities in * 2 Kent Com. 267. and by their corporate names, and ^ Co. Litt. 250a. that a change of membership does ' 1 Beach Priv. Corp. 3. Mr. Tay- not work their dissolution. He re- INTRODUCTOllY — HISTORICAL VIEW. jurisprudence should bo to reg-ard it as a unit or collection of persons according to the relation in which it acts in a given instance.'^ The most accurate and serviceable definition of a corporation is, perhaps, that of the earliest writer on the subject, who defines it to be "a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomi- nation, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and Vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting prop- erty, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of en- joying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or any subsequent period of its existence."* § 2. Species of corporations. — For the purposes of this work, cor- porations may be properly classified into public and private corpora- tions. This division is recognized by all writers on the subject, al- though they differ somewhat in limiting the precise boundary between the two classes. In the Dartmouth College case, Mr. Justice Washing- ton discussed at length the proper method of division of corporations. marks further that the English courts have always carefully distin- guished between the statutory joint- stock companies with limited liabil- ity (which are practically identical with the corporations formed under the statutes of our several states) and common-law corporations: "Le- gal Idea of a Corporation," 19 Am. Law Rev. 114, 115, 116. So, also, it has been held in the supreme court of the United States that a suit by or against a corporation is to be re- garded for jurisdictional purposes as a suit by or against the stockholders of the corporation: Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444. Where the word "per- sons" is used in a statute, "corpora- tions are to be deemed and consid- ered as 'persons' when the circum- stances in which they are placed are identical with those of natural per- sons expressly included in such stat- utes:" Beaston v. Farmers' Bank &c., 12 Peters 102, 134, 135; Crafford v. Supervisors &c., 87 Va. 110; s. c. 12 S. E. 147; 10 L. R. A. 129. ^ 1 Beach Priv. Corp. 4. For ex- planatory discussions of this ques- tion, see the essay of Prof. Pomeroy above cited, "The Legal Idea of a Corporation," 19 Am. Law Rev. 114, 116, and Lowell Transfers of Stock, § 2. Mr. Lowell insists on the the- ory that a corporation is strictly dis- tinct from its members. He says: "A corporation is distinct from its members in the same sense that a state is distinct from its citizens. The parallel, indeed, between a state and a corporation is very close." *Kyd Corp. 13. See also, for a good definition of a corporation, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, where it is said that a corpora- tion aggregate is an artificial body of men composed of divers individu- als, the ligaments of which body are the franchises and liabilities be- stowed upon it, and which bind and unite all into one, and in which con- sists the whole frame and essence of the corporation. § 3 PUBLIC COIU'OKATIOXS. 4 He said: "Public corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes and counties ; and in many respects they are so, although they involve some private interests; but, strictly speaking, public corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes when the whole interests belong also to the government. If, therefore, the founda- tion be private, though under the charter of the government, the cor- poration is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder or the nature and objects of the institution. For instance, a bank created by the government for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by the government, is in the strictest sense a public corporation. So a hospital created and endowed by the government for general charity. But a bank whose stock is owned by private persons is a private corporation, al- though it is erected by the government, and its objects and operations partake of a public nature. The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies. In all these cases the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corporations are private; as much so, indeed, as if the franchises were vested in a single person."^ The division suggested by Mr. Justice Washington may, however, be properly modified in these modern days of immense private corporations, such as railways, canal companies, telegraph companies and express companies, involving public interests and sub- ject to the orders of the public, although maintained generally only for private emolument and of private foundation. The division set forth in a California case seems to conform more nearly to the re- quirements of modern conditions. § 3. Public corporations, quasi-public corporations and private cor- porations. — Considering the general scope and purpose of corpora- « Dartmouth College v. Wood- 521; New York &c. R. Co. v. Metro- ward, 4 Wheat. 518, 668. See also, politan Gas Co., 63 N. Y. 326; Peo- on this subject, Osborn v. Presi- ple v. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325, dent &c., 9 Wheat 738; Bank of 337; Bailey v. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Y.) 531; Ten Eyck v. Delaware &c. Wheat. 907; Vincennes University v. Canal Co., 18 N. J. L. 200; Tinsman Indiana, 14 How. 268; Rundle v. v. Belvidere Del. R. Co., 26 N. J. L. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 148; Bennett's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 275, 290; Bonaparte v. Camden &c. 242; Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa. St. 27; R. Co., 1 Bald. 205; Raleigh &c. R. Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 Co. V. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) S. & R. (Pa.) 173,186; Directors &c. 451; Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Kidd, 29 v. Houston, 71 111. 318; Miners' Bank Ala. 221; Commonwealth v. Lowell v. United States, 1 Greene (Iowa) Gas Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 75; Mc- 553; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406. Cune V. Norwich Gas Co., 30 Conn. 5 INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW. § 3 tions in this country, they may be divided into three general classes, — the first class being public municipal corporations, the object of which is to promote public interests, and which may be called strictly public corporations; the second class being quasi-public corporations, which are technically private but are of a quasi-public character, having in view some public enterprise in which the public interests are involved and owing certain duties to the public as such, — for example, railroad, turnpike and canal companies; and the third class being strictly pri- vate corporations, of private foundation, maintained strictly for pri- vate emolument and having in view only strictly private enterprises.^** The difference between strictly private and strictly public corporations is obvious and radical; the former being formed by the voluntary ac- tion of the corporators, between whom there exists a contract whereby each subjects his interest, with certain restrictions, to the control of the corporate management for the accomplishment of the ends for which the company was formed ;^^ and the latter not being in the same sense voluntary associations, and no contract existing between the members.^- The distinction, however, between quasi-public and private corporations is much less clearly marked. These quasi-public corporations partake both of the nature of private and of public cor- porations. They are private corporations in that they are voluntary in their inception, that they are maintained for private gain, and that there subsists a contract between their incorporators. They are pub- lic in that they have in view a public enterprise in which the public interests are involved, that their property is devoted to a use in which the public has an interest, and that they are therefore controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of that interest. ^^ The old principle of law enunciated by Chief Justice Hale, that when "private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only,"" has been greatly extended and amplified in this coun- try by the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois,^ ^ which doctrine was further applied in the line of decisions known as the "Granger Cases" and the "Railroad Commission Cases." This doctrine is succinctly stated and the limits of the power of the government over these quasi-public cor- porations is clearly defined in Munn v. Illinois, where it was said: " Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbacli, Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 37 Cal. 543. S. & R. (Pa.) 173; People v. Morris, "Beach Priv. Corp. 42; Clear- 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325, 337; Dean v. water v. Meredeth, 1 Wall. 25; Hays Davis, 51 Cal. 406. V. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 518; "Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 86; 126. Hare Amer. Const. Law 600. " 1 Hargrave's Law Tracts 78. '- Bennett's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. " 94 U. S. 113. 242; Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa. St. 27; § 4 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 6 "When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to the control."^® § 4. Subdivisions of public corporations. — It is manifest from the scheme of division indicated in the preceding section that public cor- porations are naturally divided into the two great classes of strictly public and quasi-public corporations. The courts of this country, however, although, as shown in the preceding section, they have gone to great lengths in enforcing governmental control over quasi-public corporations, have not generally applied the term "public" or "quasi- public" to such corporations, but have with practical unanimity held that if the whole interest does not belong to the government, or if the corporation is not created for the administration of political or municipal power, it is a private corporation.^" In reading the cases on this subject, therefore, public corporations are not generally con- sidered to include what we have denominated quasi-public corpora- tions. ^«Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 126. The doctrine in that case was applied to grain elevators. It has been also applied to railroads: See the "Granger Cases:" — Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. Chicago &c. R. Co.. 94 U. S. 164, 178; also the "Railroad Commission Cases," 116 U. S. 307; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 334, 348, 349, 388, 391, 1191. It has been applied to telephones: Hock- ett V. State, 105 Ind. 250; s. c. 5 N. E. 178. Also to gas and water compa- nies: State V. Ironton Gas Co., 37 Ohio St. 45; Spring Valley Water- Works V. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 350; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 48. See on this subject, 1 Beach Priv. Corp. 34-37, 55-59 ; "The Dartmouth College Case and Private Corporations," by Wil- liam P. Wells, 9 Am. Bar. Assoc. Rep. 229; Address by James A. Gar- field, 5 Leg. Gaz. 408; "The Doctrine of Presumed Dedication of Private Property to Public Use," by George Ticknor Curtis (John Wiley & Sons, N. Y., 1881). " Rundle v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 275, 290; Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Bonaparte v. Camden &c. R. Co., 1 Bald. 205; Ala- bama R. Co. V. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221; New York &c. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Gas Co., 63 N. Y. 326; Bailey v. May- or &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531; Directors &c. v. Houston, 71 111. 318; Miners' Bank v. United States, 1 Greene (Iowa) 553; Ten Byck v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 18 N. J. L. 200; Tins- man V. Belvidere Del. R. Co., 26 N. J. L. 148; McCune v. Norwich Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521; Raleigh &c. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 451. It has been held in Georgia that a corpora- tion deriving part of its support from the government was not neces- sarily a public corporation: Cleve- land v. Steward. 3 Ga. 283. And the 7 INTRODUCTOUY — TtlSTORlCAL VIEW. § 5 § 5. Municipal and public quasi-corporations defined. — Public cor- porations may be subdivided into municipal corporations and public quasi-corporations. Municipal corporations embrace incorporated cities, villages and towns, which are full-fledged corporations, with all the powers, duties and liabilities incident to such a status; while public quasi-corporations possess only a portion of the powers, duties and liabilities of corporations. As instances of the latter class may be mentioned counties, hundreds, townships, overseers of the poor, town supervisors, school districts and road districts.^* It must be borne in mind that public quasi-corporations and quasi-public corporations are entirely distinct classes ; the former being represented, as we have said, by townships, counties and such governmental subdivisions of the state, the latter being represented by corporations, the property of which is devoted to a use in which the public has an interest, such as railroads, grain elevators, telegraph companies and similar cor- porations. § 6. Subdivisions of strictly public corporations. — The generic dif- ference between these two classes of corporations lies in the fact that municipal corporations are created at the request or with the consent of their members, and for the promotion of their convenience and welfare; while public quasi-corporations are merely local subdivisions of the state, created by the state of its own sovereign will, without any particular solicitation or request on the part of the members of the corporation, and created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large. The municipal corporation is asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces; the public quasi-corpora- tion is superimposed by a sovereign and paramount authority. ^^ fact that a corporation was employed ^'* County Com'rs &c. v. County in the service of the government Com'rs &c., 50 Md. 245; Pulaski Co. has been held not to malie it a public v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 54; Askew v. corporation: Thomson v. Pacific R. Hale, 54 Ala. 639; Board &c. v. Co., 9 Wall. 579. If the state is a Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Rouse v. stockholder in a corporation or one Moore, 18 Johns (N. Y.) 407; Town of the corporators, the corporation of North Hempstead v. Town of is not a public corporation: Bank of Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109; United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Fourth School Dist. v. Wood, 13 Wheat. 904; Hutchinson v. Western Mass. 193; Mower v. Inhabitants, 9 &c. R. Co., 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 634. But Mass. 247; Damon v. Granby, 2 see, contra, Trustees &c. V. Winston, Pick. (Mass.) 345, 352; Riddle v. 5 St. & P. (Ala.) 17. In South Caro- Proprietors &c., 7 Mass. 169; Ad- lina a corporation owned in toto by ams v. President &c., 1 Maine 363. the state was held to be a private '" Board &c. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. corporation: State Bank v. Gibbs, 3 109. This case contains a clear dis- McC. (S. C.) 377. cussion of the difference between municipal corporations and public PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 8 From this fundamental difference in inception flow many minor and consequential differences between the two classes of corporations under discussion. These differences will be more fully considered later herein. The principal differences arise from the fact that public quasi-corporations are purely auxiliaries to the state, and have no powers, duties or liabilities except as conferred expressly by statute; and as a result, in many cases municipal corpoi'ations are held re- sponsible for damages to persons injured through negligence or default of the corporation, where there is no express provision of law to that effect;^" while public quasi-corporations, being mere subdivisions of quasi-corporations. See also, the cases cited in the preceding section. ="'The rule stated briefly seems to be, that where a municipal corpora- tion acts for a purpose purely and essentially public — acts as an agent of the state, and nothing more — the corporation is regarded as a part of the sovereign state, and can not be sued for a tort, unless express per- mission by statute to bring such a suit has been given. But where municipal corporations act, as pri- vate corporations, for the local bene- fit and advantage of their members, they are liable in tort just as a pri- vate corporation would be: Mayor &c. v. Lasser, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 757; O'Neill v. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 220; Brinkmeyer v. City of Bv- ansville, 29 Ind. 187; McConnell v. Dewey, 5 Neb. 385; Kenworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis. 647; Wallace V. Muscatine, 4 Greene (Iowa) 373; Simmer v. St. Paul, 23 Minn. 408; Young v. Commissioners &c., 2 N. & McC. (S. C.) 537; Cur- ran V. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 505; s. c. 24 N. E. 781; 21 Am. St. 465; 8 L. R. A. 243; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 506; McCombs v. Town Council &c., 15 Ohio 474; Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470; s. c. 35 Am. R. 540; Sterling v. Thomas, 60 111. 265; Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475; Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 73; Oilman v. La- conia, 55 N. H. 130; s. c. 20 Am. R. 175; Commissioners &c. v. Baker, 44 Md. 1; Boyd v. Insurance Patrol &c., 113 Pa. St. 269; s. c. 6 Atl. 536; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 551; Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 418; Mayor &c. v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189; Weightman v. Washing- ton, 1 Black 39; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black 590; Supervisors &c. V. United States, 4 Wall. 435; Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 321; Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103; Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572; Makinnon v. Penson, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 457; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. (N. S.) 686. In New Jersey, Michigan and South Carolina it is held, as an application of this principle, that a municipal corporation is not liable in damages at the suit of one who is injured by its failure to perform the statutory duty of keeping highways in repair, no right of action being expressly given by the statute: Freeholders &c. V. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108; Pray v. Mayor &c., 32 N. J. L. 394; City of Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84 s. c. 4 Am. R. 450; followed in Me Cutcheon v. Homer, 43 Mich. 483 s. c. 5 N. W. 668; 38 Am. R. 212 Young V. Charleston, 20 S. C. 116 s. c. 47 Am. R. 827. But these cases are opposed to the overwhelming weight of authority: City of Galves- ton V. Posnainsky, 62 Texas 188, in INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. the state, and created solely for a public purpose, are not liable in tort in the absence of a statute expressly creating such liability and au- thorizing an action thereon. ^^ The doctrines just enumerated have the support of an overwhelming majority of the cases on the subject. There are, however, authorities holding that municipal corporations are not in any case liable in tort unless such liability is established by express statute.'- § 7. Definition of the municipal corporation. — In the English Mu- nicipal Corporations Act, 1882, the municipal corporation is defined to be "the body corporate constituted by the incorporation of the in- habitants of a borough,"^^ and in the same section the borough is defined to be "a city or town to which this act applies." The munici- pal corporation has also been tersely defined to be "the investing of the people of a place with the local government thereof."^^ An old writer has said: "The essence of a municipal corporation is consti- tuted by uniting the several circumstances between a corporation and other communities."^^ The meaning of this statement seems to be which the authorities are exhaust- ively cited and discussed (City of Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Texas 525, where a contrary rule was applied, is deprived of any value); Dillon Munic. Corp., § 996 et seq.; Beach Contr. Neg., § 244. ^^ Sherbourne v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; s c. 81 Am. D. 151; Mower v. Inhabitants, 9 Mass. 247; s. c. 6 Am. D. 63; White v. Bond Co., 58 111. 297; s. c. 11 Am. R. 65; Clark v. Lincoln Co., 1 Wash. 518; s. c. 20 Pac. 576; 25 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 211; Haygood v. Justices &c., 20 Ga. 845; Symonds v. Clay Co., 71 III. 355; Abbett v. Board &c., 114 Ind. 61; s. c. 16 N. E. 127; City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118; Woods V. Colfax Co., 10 Neb. 552; s. c. 7 N. W. 269; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; Plori v. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 341; Mitchell v. Rock- land, 52 Maine 118; Conrad v. Trust- ees, 16 N. Y. 158; Baxter v. Winoons- ki Tpk. Co., 22 Vt. 114, 123; Fowle v. Common Council, &c., 3 Peters 398; Boyd V. Insurance Patrol &c., 113 Pa. St. 269; s. c. 6 Atl. 536; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H.' 284; s. c. 72 Am. D. 302; Dosdall v. Olmsted, 30 Minn. 96; s. c. 14 N. W. 458; Brabham v. Board &c., 54 Miss. 363; Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 351; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332; White v. Chowan Co., 90 N. C. 437; s. c. 47 Am. R. 534; Watkins v. County Court, 30 W. Va. 657; s. c. 5 S. E. 654; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 305; Downing v. Mason Co., 87 Ky. 208; s, c. 8 S. W. 264; 12 Am. St. 473; Kincaid V. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa 430; s. c. 5 N. W. 589; 36 Am. R. 236; City of De- troit V. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84; Tur- ner V. Woodbury Co., 57 Iowa 440; s. c. 10 N. W. 827; Finch v. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St. 37; Pray V. Mayor &c., 32 N. J. L. 394. -- Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139; s. c. 4 S. W. 450; 4 Am. St. 32; 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 347; Winbigler v. Mayor &c., 45 Cal. 36. -^ English Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, § 10. "-* Cudden v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 143. This definition has been quoted with approval in People v. Morris, 13 Wend (N. Y.) 325, 334, and in Peo- ple V. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44. ^^ Glover Munic. Corp. 6. § 7 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 10 that by combining the characteristics of a community, such as a city, with those of a corporation, the idea of a municipal corporation is obtained. Bouvier defines a municipal corporation to be a public corporation created by the government for political purposes and hav- ing subordinate and local powers of legislation.-*^ The idea of a mu- nicipal corporation has been frequently defined and described by the courts of this country. Thus it has been said in Missouri that the definition of a municipal corporation would only include organized cities and towns and other like organizations with political and legis- lative powers for the local civil government and police regulation of the inhabitants of particular districts included in the boundaries of the corporation.-^ In Pennsylvania a municipal corporation has been declared to be a public corporation created by the government for political purposes, and having subordinate and local powers of legisla- tion, — an incorporation of persons, inhabitants of a particular place or connected with a particular district, enabling them to conduct its local civil government, and to be merely an agency instituted by the sovereign for the purpose of carrying out in detail the objects of the government.^* In a Tennessee decision it was said that a municipal corporation was a body corporate and politic established by law to share in the civil government of the country, but chiefly to regulate the local or internal afEairs of the city, town or district incorpo- rated.^^ These definitions, though useful, are too narrow to meet the requirements of a broad and general definition of the idea. The following excellent definition has been given: "A municipal cor- poration is a body politic specially chartered by the state or voluntarily organized under a general legislative act, including both territory and inhabitants, for the purpose of local government subsidiary to that of the state; or (as in England) it may be a similar body which has acquired governmental powers and privileges by prescription."^" Judge Dillon's fine definition leaves little if anything further to be desired. He says: "We may therefore define a municipal corpora- tion, in its historical and proper sense, to be the incorporation by the authority of the government of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exer- '" Bouvier's Law Diet, tit. Munic- continuing: "A municipal corpora- ipal Corporations. tion, in its broader sense, is a body " Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309. politic, such as a state, and each of -* Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. the governmental subdivisions of 180. the state, such as counties, parishes, ^ East Tennessee University v. townships, hundreds, New England Knox\ille, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166. towns, and school districts, as well ^° 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law as cities and incorporated towns, vil- 952, tit. Municipal Corporations, § 1, lages and boroughs." 11 INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. § 8 cise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper."^^ The definition should, how- ever, be amplified to embrace the well-settled principle that the term "municipal corporation" embraces both the territory and its inhabit- ants.''- It follows from this definition that the citizens of the in- corporated territory, together with that territory, form the municipal corporation.^^ Neither the municipal government nor the officers of that government are the corporation : they are merely its agents.^* As popularly and loosely used, the term "municipal corporation" fre- quently includes the public quasi-corporations, such as counties, school districts, and like bodies, the nature of which has been dis- cussed in the preceding sections. § 8. Definition of the public quasi-corporation, — The preceding sections indicate the essential differences between the municipal and the public quasi-corporation. The latter may be defined to be an involuntary political or civil division of the state, created by general laws to aid in the administration of government. ^^ An eminent judge has said of this class of corporations: "They may be considered under our institutions as quasi-corporations with limited powers, co-extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage, but restrained by the general use of authority which belongs to these metaphysical persons by the common law."^** Counties, townships, school districts, road districts and like public quasi-corporations do not usually possess corporate powers under special charters; but they exist under general laws of the state, which apportion the territory of the state into political divisions for convenience of government, and require of the people residing within those divisions ^'^ Dillon Mimic Corp., § 20. Williams, 3 B. & C. 162; Queen v. ==- Kelly V. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 78; Paramore, 10 Ad. & El. 286; Queen Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152, v. Mayor &c., 10 Ad. & El. 281; 156; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451. Queen v. Mayor &c., 41 L. J. Q. B. ^^Lowber v. Mayor &c., 5 Abb. Pr. 115; Queen v. Mayor &c., 4 Q. B. 796; (N. Y.) 325; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 s. c. Dav. & M. 143; Queen v. Thomp- Barb. (N. Y.) 446. son, 5 Q. B. 477; s. c. Dav. & M. 497. =** Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. ^^ Dillon Munic. Corp., § 25. This 575; City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, definition is applied by Judge Dillon 97 Ind. 1; s. c. 49 Am. R. 416; to counties only, but is sufficiently Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131; Low- general to answer as a definition of ber V. Mayor &c., 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) the class. 325; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. ^"^ Opinion of Parker, C. J., in In- (N. Y.) 446; Queen v. York, 2 Q. B. habitants &c. v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193, 847; s. c. 2 G. & D. 105; Harrison v. 197. § 9 rUBLlO COHrOKATlONS. 12 the performance of certain pnblic duties as a part of the machinery of the state, and, in order that they may be able to perform these duties, vest them with certain corporate powers.^'' § 9. Examples of municipal and public quasi-corporations. — As may be gathered from the preceding sections, the distinction between these two classes of corporations is obvious. As a result, however, of looseness of nomenclature in the statutes of the various states affecting this subject, it is frequently a matter of doubt to which class a particular corporation should be assigned. Thus where the Mis- souri statute provided that no person should be eligible to a certain office who held office under a municipal corporation, it was held that the incorporated board of public schools was not a municipal corpora- tion within the meaning of the act.^^ And in general, school districts are considered public quasi-corporations of the most limited powers.^* On the other hand, the constitution of Iowa prohibited a political or municipal corporation from incurring indebtedness to an amount ex- ceeding five per cent, on the taxable property of the corporation, and a school district township was considered to come within the pro- hibition.*" The police juries of the Louisiana parishes are considered municipal corporations.*^ In the constitution of Wisconsin the term ^' Cooley Const. Lim. 294. In City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Texas 118, a quasi-corporation is spoken of as "a subdivision of a state, created solely for a public purpose, by a gen- eral law applicable to all such sub- divisions;" and again, as being "cre- ated to carry out a policy common to the whole state, and not mainly to advance the interest of the par- ticular locality, and to bring ad- vantage or emolument to the in- habitants of the municipality." Still again, "they are created for a public purpose as an agency of the state through which it can most conve- niently and effectively discharge the duties which the state, as an organ- ized government, assumes to every person and by which it can best promote the welfare of all." See also, the cases cited in the preceding section. ''^ Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309. '"' Harris v. School District, 8 Fost. (.N. H.) 58. In this case it was said: — "These little corporations have sprung into existence within a few years, and their corporate pow- ers and those of their officers are to be settled by the constructions of the court upon a succession of crude, unconnected and often experimental enactments. School districts are in New Hampshire quasi-corporations of the most limited powers known to the law." See also, Foster v. Lane, 30 N. H. 305; Giles v. School Dis- trict, 31 N. H. 304; Wilson v. School District, 32 N. H. 118; Rogers v. People, 68 111. 154; Scales v. Chatta- hoochee Co., 41 Ga. 225; Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23. '"Winspear v. District Tp. &c., 37 Iowa 542; Curry v. District Tp. &c., 62 Iowa 104; s. c. 17 N. W. 191; Clark V. Thompson, 37 Iowa 536. See also. School Dist. v. Williams, 38 Ark. 454. " Police Jury &c. v. Mayor &c., 38 La. An. 630. V 13 INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. § 10 "municipal corporation" has been held not to include towns; and con- sequently, when the same term is used in the statutes of that state, towns are not considered to be within the meaning of the provisions of the statute unless the legislative intent to include them is clear.*- The term "city," of course, applies only to municipal corporations,''^ as does the word "village."** The District of Columbia is a munici- pal corporation.'*^ § 10. Counties. — Counties are, of course, to be classified as public quasi-corporations under the scheme of division that has been indicated in this chapter ; as a county is an involuntary civil division of the state created by statute to aid in the administration of the government. In an Ohio case it is said : "Counties are at most but local organiza- tions, which, for the purposes of civil administration, are invested with a few functions characteristic of a corporate existence. * * * They are local subdivisions of a state, created by the sovereign power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular solici- tation, consent, or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them. The former organization [referring to municipal corpora- tions] is asked for, or at least assented to by the people it em- braces; the latter [referring to counties] is superimposed by a sover- eign and paramount authority."**' But notwithstanding this radical difference, the county is much more nearly allied to the municipal corporation than are other quasi-corporations, such as school districts, townships, and other like bodies, as the county has a much more com- pact organization than those corporations, and possesses generally much fuller pov/ers. Consequently there is some conflict in the de- cisions as to whether the term "municipal corporation" should be construed to include counties. In the large majority of cases the natural division is followed and counties are held not to be included by that term.*^ But both in Iowa and in Minnesota counties have "Eaton V. Supervisors &c., 44 Wis. Parker v. Zeisler, 139 Mo. 298; s. c. 489; Norton v. Peck, 3 Wis. 714; 40 S. W. 881. State V. Milwaukee, 20 Wis. 87; Wa- •" City of Wahoo v. Reeder, 27 Neb. tertown v. Cady, 20 Wis. 501; Crane 770; s. c. 43 N. W. 1145. v. Fond du Lac, 16 Wis. 196. As to '^ Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. what constitutes a corporation ere- S. 141; s. c. 9 S. Ct. 256. ated "for municipal purposes," see " Board &c. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. State V. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458. 109; County Com'rs &c. v. County '^ Mitchell V. Treasurer &c., 25 Com'rs &c., 50 Md. 245. Ohio St. 143. As to what is not a "Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; municipal corporation, see Stephens s. c. 25 Am. R. 730; Board &c. v. V. Felton, 99 Ky. 395; s. c. 35 S. W. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Sherman 1116; 18 Ky. L. 248. A city is not a Co. v. Simons, 109 U. S. 735; s. c. 3 political subdivision of the state: S. Ct. 502; Commissioners &c. v. 11 ruBLic coKPOI{ATlo^^s. 14 been declared to be miinieipal corporations witbin tbe meaning of statutes affecting sueb corporations;*** and a provision in the constitu- tion of Alabama authorizing "municipal corporations" to take prop- erty by right of eminent domain was held to include counties.'*'* In Pennsylvania, also, a city which was coterminous with a county, and which had assumed the liability of the county, was held to be bound by a statute imposing a liability on "counties.''^" § 11. The New England towns. — The New England town represents an intermediate stage between the municipal and the public quasi- corporation, having many of the powers peculiar to the former class, and at the same time performing many of the functions of a township or county, and being subject in many respects to the limitations of a public quasi-corporation. It lacks the representative feature that is generally so essential in the government of a municipal corporation. As was said in a Massachusetts decision: "The marked and charac- teristic distinction between a town organization and that of a city is that in the former all of the qualified inhabitants meet, deliberate, act and vote in their natural and personal capacities, whereas in a Commissioners &c., 92 U. S. 307; Maury Co. v. Lewis Co., 1 Swan (Tenn.) 236; Barton Co. v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189; Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37; Green Co. v. Bubanks. 80 Ala. 204; Lawrence Co. v. Chattaroi n. Co., 81 Ky. 225; County Com'rs &c. v. County Com'rs &c., 50 Md. 245; Pulaski Co. v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 55; Soper v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa 264; State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458; Peo- ple v. Common Council &c., 28 Mich. 228. In the case just cited Judge Cooley said: — "It is because, where an urban population is collected, many things are necessary for their comfort and protection which are not needed in the country, and which the county and townhip or- ganizations, with their imperfect powers and machinery, can not well supply, that the state is then called upon to confer larger powers, and to make of the locality a subordinate commonwealth, which, while it shall perform for the state, wholly or in part, what the county and township officers performed before, shall also be endowed with capacities to pro- vide for its citizens such matters of necessity or convenience as their health, protection, comfort or enjoy- ment as a political community may demand." In Wisconsin, also, the term "counties" or "municipal cor- porations" has been construed to in- clude only cities and villages and other strictly municipal corpora- tions, but not to include school dis- tricts and like bodies: Eaton v. Su- pervisors &c., 44 Wis. 489. ^ Iowa &c. Land Co. v. Carroll Co., 39 Iowa 151; Dowlan v. Sibley Co., 36 Minn. 430; s. c. 31 N. W. 402. In the latter case the term was used in the amendment to the constitution of the state concerning the assess- ment of property for local improve- ments. '"Ex parte Selma &c. R. Co., 45 Ala. 696. See also, Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; s. c. 25 Am. R. 730; Greene Co. v. Eubanks, 80 Ala. 204. '" Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. St. 451. 15 INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. § 11 city government this is all done by their representatives."^^ These towns have only the powers conferred on them by statute. As was said by Mr. Justice Gray in the supreme court of the United States: "Towns in Connecticut, as in the other New England towns, differ from trading corporations and even from municipal corporations else- where. They are territorial corporations, into which the state is divided by the legislature from time to time at its discretion, for polit- ical purposes and the convenient administration of government; they have those powers only which have been expressly conferred upoii them by statute, or which are necessary for conducting municipal affairs, and all the inhabitants of the town are members of the quasi-corpo- ration."^^ This plan of municipal government by the citizens with- out representation is of course impracticable when the towns become populous; and accordingly, as the -population of the county increased, regularly incorporated cities, governed on the principle of representa- tion, were created by the legislature ; so that in New England the two classes of municipalities now exist side by side, the smaller towns being governed and administered by the whole body of citizens, while the affairs of the larger cities are directed by a representative body, or common council, such as is to be found in the cities of other states. The people of New England were and still are, with reason, much' attached to their peculiar local system of town government, and only adopted with reluctance the representative system. Thus in Massa- chusetts the legislature incorporated no city before 1820, and Boston retained its town government, where each citizen had an immediate voice in the direction of its policy, until 1822, although it had at that time about seven thousand qualified voters. ^^ The statutory pro- visions regulating the powers of these towns are numerous, and have been frequently judicially construed. They will be considered at length in a subsequent portion of this work.^* This peculiar system, " Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray relating to English municipal corpo- (Mass.) 84, 101. See also, an inter- rations are but remotely applicable esting essay on the "Municipal Court to New England towns, inasmuch as of Boston, and its Justices," 2 L. English municipal corporations are. Rep. 225. for the most part, voluntary corpora- ''- Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, tions, between which and the gov- 121 U. S. 121; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 865. ernment contractual relations ex- ''^Hill V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. ist; while New England towns are 344; Quincy Munic. Hist, of Boston, involuntary corporations, having ch. 1. See also, as to the subject of given no assent to their creation, New England towns. Commonwealth and having been incorporated by V. Roxbury, 9 Gray (Mass.) 451; 1 virtue of no contract, express or im- Swift's System 116; Eastman v. plied, with the state. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284. In the lat- "^ See Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. ter case it is said that the decisions 272; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375; § 12 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 16 exhibiting an example of pure democracy, has worked well, giving to these towns an honest, virile and independent government/'''^ § 12. The same subject continued. — By some of the earliest legis- lation, under the charter of the province of Massachusetts, the bounda- ries of all existing towns were confirmed, and the towns were em- powered to assess and levy taxes to maintain schools and support the poor, and meet other necessary charges, and were declared for the first time capable of suing and being sued.^^ When the constitution of the state was adopted it was declared that "the inhabitants of every town within this government are hereby declared to be a body politic and corporate."^ ''^ In Massachusetts, which may be taken as the typical New England state, no provision was made for incorporat- ing cities proper until 1820, when the second amendment to the constitution of that state was passed.^® In Howard's Local Constitu- tional History of the United States, we find these interesting state- ments regarding the New England town : "It was the parish of the Stuarts, already in some places passing into the hands of an irresponsi- ble oligarchy, the select vestry, with which the pioneers of New Eng- land were acquainted. But it was not this institution which they in- troduced into the new world. In the transplanting of English local organisms to American soil two remarkable phenomena attract atten- Coolidge V. Inhabitants, 114 Mass. ties, not repugnant to the constitu- 592. Judge Dillon has exhaustively tion, as the general court shall deem discussed this subject in his work necessary or expedient for the regu- on Municipal Corporations, §§ 28-30. lation and government thereof, and '^ Quincy Munic. Hist, of Boston, to prescribe the manner of calling ch. 1; Bryce Amer. Com., chs. and holding public meetings of the 48, 49. ' inhabitants in wards or otherwise, ^Prov. Stats. 1692-93 (4 W. & M.), for the election of officers under the ch. 28; 1694-95 (6 W. & M.), ch. 13; constitution, and the manner of re- 1 Prov. Laws (State ed.), 64, 66, turning the votes given at such 181; Anc. Chart., 247, 249, 279. meetings: Provided, that no such "Stat. 1785, ch. 75, § 8; Rev. Stat., government shall be erected or con- ch. 15, § 8; Gen. Stat., ch. 18, § 1. stituted in any town not containing °* The second amendment to the twelve thousand inhabitants, nor un- constitution of Massachusetts pro- less it be with the consent on the vides that "the general court shall application of a majority of the in- have full power and authority to habitants of such town, present and erect and constitute municipal or voting thereon, pursuant to a vote city governments in any corporate at a meeting duly warned and town or towns in this common- holden for that purpose; and pro- wealth" (thus recognizing the differ- vided also, that all by-laws made by ence between the existing towns and such municipal or city government a true city government), "and to shall be subject at all times to be grant to the inhabitants thereof annulled by the general court." such powers, privileges and immuni- 17 INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. § 13 tion. On the one hand there is so much that is new in constitutional names and functions, so much of original expedient and experimenta- tion, as to render New England town government almost unique, while, at the same time, its continuity in general outline with that of the mother country can be plainly discerned. On the other hand occurs a most interesting example of institutional retrogression, — many features of the primitive village community are revived. The colonists go back a thousand years and begin again ; or, to speak with greater accuracy, new life is infused into customs which, though pass- ing into decay, are yet not wholly extinct in the old English home. All this is perfectly natural. It is a case of revival of organs and functions on recurrence of the primitive environment."^^ § 13. The state. — A state is a body politic, or society of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and ad- vantage by the joint efforts of their combined strength.^** In this country the term is, of course, applied to the members of the United States. The definition given above applies to the states of this coun- try, and it is clear from that definition that each state is in many important respects a corporation. Although consisting of many mem- bers, it acts as a unit, under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and is vested with the capacity of acting in many respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued."^ But the state is sovereign, and all other corporations are its creatures — saving the corporations created by the federal gov- ernment. The state, therefore, notwithstanding its similarity or identity in essentials with a corporation, is not so denominated in the ordinary nomenclature of the subject. Thus, in Iowa, it has been held that the term "bodies political and corporate," as used in the statute of limitations, does not include the state f^ and in Geor- gia the state is not included in the term "corporation" used in the United States revenue statutes.*'^ The state, being sovereign, ^^ Local Const. Hist, of the United laws to which they submit with one States, by Greorge E. Howard, 1889, accord:" Burlamaqui Polit. Law, ch. vol. 1, ch. 2. 5. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. ™Cooley Const. Lim. 1; Vattel, b. 419, 457; Des Moines Co. v. Harker, 1, ch. 1, § 1; Story on Const. 207; 34 Iowa 84; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wheaton Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 2; Wall. 50. Halleck Int. Law 63; Bouvier's Law ""^ See § 1, ante. Diet., tit. State. It is defined by °- Des Moines Co. v. Harker, 34 Burlamaqui to be "A multitude of Iowa 84. people united together by a com- "^ State v. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315. In munion of interest, and by common that case, Erskine, J., conceding that 1 Smith — 2 § 14 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 18 can only be sued by its own permission and consent/* and to this consent any conditions may be attached, according to the pleasure of the state.*''^ The state may be said to be a public quasi-corporation, differing from other public quasi-corporations in that it is sovereign and voluntary. § 14. Long Island towns. — Long Island towns were a somewhat different organization. They were nearly all created by royal char- ter. The patents were intended not only to create the corporate bodies and thus clothe the inhabitants with the power of government, but they also served the purpose of grants, and conveyed to the in- habitants the title to the land within the town boundaries.*^^ There was never any supremacy of the Dutch over Long Island at its eastern end, and the rights and titles of the towns there are all of English origin, dating to the grant of the Duke of York and the royal charters issued under his government. These charters usually granted the lands described to certain named persons as inhabitants, and created them a body corporate under a given name, and the charter usually recognized the existence of a civil community already occupying the lands granted, having some form of government, and when it did so the oflficers of that government were made patentees; and it was pro- vided that the lands granted should have relation to the town in the term in its most comprehensive mined just as those of a private signification would comprise a state, person: Bowen v. State, 108 N. Y. said: — "So far as my limited re- 166; s. c. 15 N. E. 56; Green v. State, searches go, I am unable to discover 73 Cal. 29; s. c. 11 Pac. 602; 14 Pac. a single case in the supreme court, 610. A suit nominally against an or in any of the circuit or district officer, but really against a state, to courts of the United States, wherein enforce performance of its obliga- it has been decided that the term tion in its political capacity, will 'corporation' — body corporate or not lie: In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; politic — when used in a statute, in- s. c. 8 S. Ct. 443; Hagood v. South- eludes a state, or where the one ern, 117 U. S. 52; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 608; term is used as a synonym for the Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711; other." s. c. 2 S. Ct. 128. But if an officer, ** Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 claiming to act as such, invade pri- ll. S. 337; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, vate right under color of constitu- 101 U. S. 832; Briscoe v. Bank, 11 tional laws, it is otherwise: Poin- Peters 257. This immunity can, dexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270; nowever, be waived by appearing: s. c. 5 S. Ct. 903, 962; Cunningham Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436; s. v. Macon &c. R. Co., 109 U. S. 446; c. 2 S. Ct. 878. s. c. 3 S. Ct. 292, 609; United States ^=De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196; s. c. 1 S. Ct. S. 216; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1053. But under 240. those conditions the rights and lia- "" Trustees &c. v. Mecox Bay &c. bilities of the state must be deter- Co., 116 N. Y. 1; s. c. 22 N. E. 387. 19 INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW, § 15 general, "for the well government thereof." But the cases show conclusively that alterations have been repeatedly made by act of legislature in the privileges and charters of these towns, just as if originally created by the legislature.^'^ § 15. The development of the municipal corporation — (a) In general. — It is of course unnecessary and impossible within the limits of a legal text-book, designed for the use of practicing lawyers, to make any effort towards giving any but the barest outline of the inter- esting history of the development of municipalities. It is believed, however, that a brief sketch of the course of that development will prepare the mind of the reader for a more intelligent appreciation of the laws now governing the corporations of which this volume is to treat. There have been, of course, since mankind first emerged from barbarism, gatherings and centers of population. These rude and formless bodies gradually obtained a higher degree of compact- ness and organization, until even in very remote antiquity there seem to have been cities of great wealth and splendor, which could only have been maintained by a system of municipal government by no means contemptible, although in every respect repugnant to modern theories. The earliest myths and legends that are known to us seem to recognize the existence of towns and cities; and the explorations and excavations of modern times, revealing the ruins and relics of civilizations wholly vanished, show that men have gathered together for purposes of mutual protection from the earliest times. The storied splendors of the prehistoric cities of Egypt and India, of Central Asia, of Mexico, of Central and South America, have been shown to be not wholly mythical ; while in our own country the mound- builders and the cliff-dwellers, mysterious peoples who have left no trace on the pages of history, seem also to have had their towns and villages. From the faint traces of knowledge that remain to us of these prehistoric cities, we can gather little or nothing of their organi- zation. The cities of Egypt and of the East in general seem to have been the seat of great wealth and splendor, where the government was in the hands of a small class, who ruled the masses by the forces of superstition and military power, and where no municipal govern- ment in its modern sense existed. As each nation worked out its development and rose in the scale of civilization, a process of evolu- tion changed the unformed village or country settlement into a body «^ Trustees &c. v. Strong, 60 N. Y. 565; Trustees &c. v. Kirk, 68 N. Y. 57; Hand v. Newton, 92 N. Y. 88; 459; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Robins v. Ackerly, 91 N. Y. 98; Peo- Y.) 237; Atkinson v. Bowman, 42 pie V. New York &c. R. Co., 84 N. Y. Hun (N. Y.) 404. §16 PUBLIC CORPOKATIONS. 20 more highly organized, more capable of action as a unit, — in a word, brought it nearer to the idea of the modern municipal corporation. This process, of course, has varied radically in the case of ditferent nations, but its general trend and effect have been to convert an unor- ganized into an organized body; as the formless mass of protoplasm, helpless and unorganized, is developed, according to the theories of the school of modern evolution, into the highly organized and efficient forms of life to be found in the higher grades of the animal kingdom.^* § 16. (b) Greece and Rome. — In the typical Grecian civilization the city was the state. In the earlier stages of Hellenic development, before the corrupting influence of the Macedonians and the Eomans was felt, each state, with few exceptions, consisted of a city with a surrounding strip of farm land, cultivated by the dwellers in the city. These cities were governed in general by the whole body of free citizens, who met in the agora and discussed and voted on questions of domestic and foreign policy. This form of government is closely akin in many respects to the present government of the New England towns, to which reference has been made, with the important excep- tion that in the Hellenic cities the voters were only the free inhabit- ants of the city, while the slaves, who generally constituted the large majority of the population of the city, performed the manual labor, were the hewers of wood and drawers of water; so that the free citi- zens had an. abundant leisure to engage in the practical government of their city. It is to be noted that this system, in spite of the differ- ences, produced the same virile and public-spirited government that exists to-day in the New- England towns. With the decadence of the Hellenic civilization before the power of Eome and of Macedon, this democratic form of government was superseded by a stifling despot- ism, and the formerly autonomous cities and states became mere tributaries and puppets in the hands of foreign powers.^® The his- tory of Rome is the history of the greatest municipal corporation the world has seen. Taking its origin in the city by the Tiber, the Roman republic was but a development and an extension of that city, preserv- ing in many respects the essentially municipal features of the parent government. The bestowal of Roman citizenship upon the inhabitants of a conquered and assimilated city made those inhabitants members of the great municipal corporation of which Rome was the head. The cities subdued under the Roman dominion were accorded various ^ See "Hist, of Munic. Corp. and sertation on the Assemblies of the Boroughs," 13 Law Mag. 401. Athenians, 346; Grote Hist, of ^ See Heeren Polit. Hist, of Greece Greece, vol. 2; 1 Kent Com. 268. (edit. Oxford, 1834) ; Schomann Dis- 21 INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL VIEW, § 1'^ degrees of liberty, the municipal towns having the full privilege of Eoman citizenship, while the prefectures and colonies enjoyed a lesser freedom. The Eoman republic, and the empire erected upon its foundations, were both remarkable for the great power and influ- ence of the municipalities, in which were centered all of the wealth and culture of the period — the country villas of the rich being only summer houses, for the most part, and not permanent residences. The great city of Eome itself was on the whole well governed. The plunder of the world had given its citizens unbounded resources to adorn and beautify the imperial city. Its great aqueducts and sewers, its immense public baths and public buildings, its arches and its mon- uments, were worthy of its power and its greatness. Its citizens had nominally great powers of local self-government; but these pow- ers seem to have been for the most part frustrated and evaded, first by the wealthy patricians with their trains of clients, and after- wards by the successful generals and statesmen, who were able by the prestige and power gained by successes abroad to determine and control the policy of the government of the city. Under the empire the autonomy of the city became an empty name. The servile maxim of the Eoman law, "That which has pleased the prince has the force of law," shows the spirit of the municipal as well as of the national government. The city was at the mercy of the emperors, who were in turn controlled largely by the insolent soldiery of the Praetorian Guard. The Eoman populace was lapped into indolence and degrada- tion by public supplies of food, and were amused by the great public spectacles furnished at the expense of the empire. The general de- cadence and corruption of the times rendered the great government an easy prey to the fierce and hardy barbarians who assailed it from every side.'^*' § 17. (c) Italy and France — -The mediaeval cities. — In the an- archy that involved civilization after the fall of the Eoman empire, the cities preserved what was left of knowledge, of culture and of art. In that unhappy time there seems to have been but little sem- blance of municipal or of other organized government. The city, like the state, was at the mercy of roving bands of plundering barbarians ; and only by passive resistance and the power of wealth were they able to maintain any appearance of government. Out of this dark- ness Europe emerged with the rise of Christianity and the feudal system. In that system the cities played but a small part. The castle ^"Liddell Rome, ch. 27; Lauci- of Civ. Europe (edit. Oxford) 42; ani Ancient Rome in the Light of Recent Excavations of the Roman Recent Discoveries; Guizot Hist. Forum, 13 Irish L. T. 346. § 18 PUBLIC COKPORATIONS. 22 of the baron and not the town hall of the burgess was the unit of government. The towns, however, went on their way, prospering under the security afforded by the military protection of king and baron, for which the towns paid by tax and largess. By degrees this brought greater rights of self-government, until the great cities of Italy and of the Hanseatic league acquired a complete independence and became sovereign states. In Italy the great cities of Venice, Florence, Pisa and Genoa, by the power of wealth and intellect, became great powers in Europe. The representative system begins to appear in the government of these cities, but their rulers were for the most part the commercial aristocracy. Like all plutocracies, the period of their freedom was short; and torn by internal strife, and betrayed by their own citizens, they soon became subservient to foreign powers. In France the towns early obtained a high degree of independence. They bought or forced from the king or the feudal barons charters conferring privileges and immunities, and so became true municipal corporations. Their government was democratic, every citizen, under certain restrictions, voting on questions of public policy. As the feudal system declined and the power of the king be- came absolute, the towns gradually lost their independence, and with the rest of France became subject to the will of the king, by whose appointees they were governed. ^^ A brief view of the development of the municipal corporation in England will be given in the next chapter. Our American municipal corporations are so closely con- nected in many respects with their English prototypes that a more extended consideration than has been given in the case of other countries will be necessary. § 18. Conclusion. — The lesson that is taught from a view of the course of development of the municipal corporation seems to be that good government is only to be secured by the active co-operation of good citizens in the government of the municipality. A city governed by an aristocracy, whether of birth or of wealth, though it may be splendidly adorned with all that wealth and taste can afford, will still lack the virility and independence that can only be secured by the active interest of the governed in the government. It will contain the seeds of decay, that will ultimately cause the decadence of civic spirit and the consequent degi'adation of its citizens. On the other hand, where the upper classes, absorbed in the pursuit of wealth and of pleasure, scornfully neglect the details of the government of the municipality, the ignorant and the vicious, controlled by unscrupulous "See Hallam Middle Ages, ch. France, § 19; Adam Smith Wealth 11, part 2; Guizot Hist, of Civ. in of Nations, book 6, ch. 111. 23 INTRODUCTORY — HISTORICAL VIEW. § 18 and self-seeking demagogues, will infallibly plunge the municipal government into extravagance and corruption. It is to the criminal indifference of the educated classes that is due the great scandals of maladministration in the populous cities of our country. The remedy for the evil is obvious and has been pointed out time and again. The property-owning and tax-paying classes, who suffer most, from a material point of view, through the corruption of municipal administration, have the remedy in their own hands if they choose to exercise it. By discarding political prejudices, and by taking the active and intelligent interest in the administration of their public property that they manifest in the conduct of their private affairs, a clean and economical municipal administration can be secured. When the citizens of our great cities recognize the fact that the ad- ministration of city affairs is a matter of business and not of politics, and that it is to the advantage of all classes that the co*nduct of municipal affairs should be along the same lines of honesty and of common sense on which business men manage their private enterprises, the day of reform in municipal administration will be at hand. These truths are trite, but they are disregarded, and until they are generally acknowledged and put into practice, no permanent reform can be expected. They have been acted upon in the government of some cit- ies, — notably Glasgow and Berlin, which afford excellent examples of a city government managed as a business and not as a political enterprise. In our own country the government of the great cities is almost entirely in the hands of professional politicians, and while their shrewdness has generally kept them from plunging into the ex- cesses of dishonesty and crime that characterized the rule of Tweed in New York city, the whole system of government is maintained on false and vicious principles, which make the offices of the city govern- ment the reward for political influence instead of capacity and hon- esty, and which pile upon the shoulders of the taxpayer a heavy burden for an indifferent municipal government.'''^ It is to be hoped ''^ For intelligent discussions of the government of New York city is interesting subject of municipal re- fully analyzed in an essay by Mr. form the reader is referred to Mr. John Franklin Jameson on "The J. A. Roebuck's essay on "The Re- Origin and Development of the Mu- form of Municipal Corporations," 30 nicipal Government of New York Westminster Review 48; to "Con- City," in 8 Mag. of Am. Hist. 598; siderations on Municipal Govern- and the same subject is treated in an ment," 95 Fraser's Mag. 34; and to article on "Municipal Reform in an intelligent discussion of the sub- New York and the Cumulative ject of "Municipal Government" by Vote," in 8 L. Mag. & Rev. (N. S.) Mr. Dorman B. Eaton in 5 American 206. An entertaining and instruc- Journal Soc. Sci. 1. The municipal tive account of the great Tweed con- § 18 ■ PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. M that the general adoption of what is generally known as civil service reform, and an honest and faithful effort to carry out its principles, will be highly beneficial in redeeming municipal governments from the odium cast upon them. The existing laws we have upon this subject are more or less defective, and, in some cases, have been found not in harmony with established legal principles and consti- tutional restrictions, as will be seen later on, yet on the whole their general effect has been salutary. spiracy will be found in a series of A. Rev. 362; and in an essay by Mr. articles by Mr. C. F. Wingate on Samuel J. Tilden on "Municipal Cor- "The Tweed Ring," to be found in ruption — The New York Ring," 2 L. 119 N. A. Rev. 359; 120 N. A. Rev. Mag. & Rev. (N. S.) 225. 119; 121 N. A. Rev. 113; and 123 N. CHAPTEK II. OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. Section 19. The Teutonic town. 20. The old English town. 21. The same subject continued. 22. Guilds. 23. The English boroughs. 24. The same subject continued. 25. Creation of modern English mu- nicipal corporations. 26. Municipal corporations created by charter from the crown. 27. Municipal corporations created by act of parliament. 28. Municipal corporations at com- mon law and by prescription in England. 29. Municipal corporation by im- plication in England. 30. The Municipal Corporations Re- form Act of 1835. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882. The American town — Local self- government. 33. The power to create municipal corporations in the United States — Where vested — (a) In the state. (b) In the federal government. Municipal corporations created by the federal government — (a) Territories. (b) The District of Columbia. 37. Municipal corporations by pre- scription in the United States. 38. The same subject continued — Instances of incorporation by prescription in the United States. 39. Municipal corporations by impli- cation in the United States. 31. 32. 34. 35. 36. Section 40. The same subject continued. 41. Creation of municipal corpora- tions in the United States — (a) In general. 42. (b) By special charter. 43. (c) By general municipal incor- porating acts. 44. Constitutional limitations of legislative power to create municipal corporations. 45. Construction of such constitu- tional limitations — (a) Corpo- rations "for municipal pur- poses" and "bodies politic or corporate." 46. (b) "Corporate powers." 47. Miscellaneous instances of such constitutional limitations. 48. Incorporation by courts. 49. The same subject continued. 50. Classes of cities under general incorporating acts. 51. The corporate limits — Territory of the corporation. 52. Acceptance of charters by corpo- rators not necessary. 53. The same subject continued. 54. Substantial compliance with in- corporating acts necessary. 55. Instances of irregularities in in- corporation. 56. Notice of incorporation. 57. Validity of incorporation — How tested. 58. The same subject continued. 59. Existence not questioned collat- erally. 60. The charter of a municipal cor- poration is a law. (25) § 19 PUBLIC conroRATiONS. 26 Section Section 61. The American township. 63. The same subject continued. 62. Local self-government a delega- 64. Corporations de facto. tion of legislative power. 65. Effect of incorporation. § 19. The Teutonic town. — The germ from which the great cities of the Anglo-Saxon peoples have developed is to be found in what a modern English historian calls the "farmer commonwealths" of the primitive Teutons on the continent of Europe. In Sleswick, in the fifth century, we find the first historical record of Englishmen known as such. The same historian to whom we have referred gives a graphic and interesting description of the government of these early forefath- ers of our nations. "The blood-bond gave both its military and social form to old English society: Kinsmen fought side by side in the hour of battle, and the feelings of honor and discipline which held the host together were drawn from the common duty of every man in each little group of warriors to his house. And as they fought side by side on the field, so they dwelled side by side on the soil. Harling abode by Harling and Billing by Billing; and each 'wick' or 'ham* or 'stead' or 'tun' took its name from the kinsmen who dwelt together in it. The home or 'ham' of the Billings would be 'Billingham,' and the 'tun' or township of the Harlings would be Harlington. Biit in such settlements the tie of blood was widened into the larger tie of land. Land with the German race seems at a very early time to have become the accompaniment of full freedom. The freeman was strictly the freeholder, and the exercise of his full rights as a free member of the community to which he belonged was inseparable from the pos- session of his 'holding.' The landless man ceased for all practical purposes to be free, although he was no man's slave. In the very earliest glimpse we get of the German race we see them a race of land- holders and land-tillers. Tacitus, the first Eoman who sought to know these destined conquerors of Eome, describes them as pasturing on the forest glades around their villages and ploughing their village fields. A feature which at once struck him as parting them from the civilized world, to which he himself belonged, was their hatred of cities, and their love, even within their little settlements, of a jealous independence. 'They live apart,' he says, 'each by himself, as wood- side, plain or fresh spring attracts him.' And as each dweller within the settlement was Jealous of his own isolation and independence among his fellow settlers, so each settlement was Jealous of its inde- pendence among its fellow settlements. Of the character of their life in this early world, however, we know little save what may be gath- ered from the indications of a later time. Each little farmer com- monwealth was girt in by its own border or 'mark,' a belt of forest 27 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORrORATION. § 20 or waste or fen, which, parted it from its fellow villages, a ring of common ground which none of its settlers might take for his own, but which sometimes served as a death ground where criminals met their doom, and was held to be the special dwelling-place of the nixie and the will-of-the-wisp. If a stranger came through this wood or over this waste, custom bade him blow his horn as he came, for if he stole through secretly he was taken for a foe, and any man might lawfully slay him. Inside this boundary the 'township,' as the village was then called, from the 'tun' or rough fence and trench that served as its simple fortification, formed a ready-made fortress in war, while in peace its intrenchments were serviceable in the feuds of village with village or house with house. Within the village we find from the first a marked social difference between two orders of its indwellers. The bulk of its homesteads were those of its freemen or 'ceorls,' but amongst these were the larger homes of 'eorls,' or men distinguished among their fellows by noble blood, who were held in an hereditary reverence, and from whom the leaders of the village were chosen in war time, or rulers in time of peace. But the choice was a purely voluntary one, and the man of noble blood enjo3^ed no legal privilege among his fellows. The hpldings of the freemen clustered around a moot hill or sacred tree where the community met from time to time to order its own industry and to frame its own laws. Here plough-land and meadow-land were shared in due lot among the villagers, and field and homestead passed from man to man. Here strife of farmer with farmer was settled according to the 'cus- toms' of the township, as its 'elder men' stated them, and the wrong- doer was judged and his fine assessed by the kinsfolk; and here men were chosen to follow headman or 'ealderman' to hundred court or war. It is with a reverence such as is stirred by the sight of the head- waters of some mighty river that one looks back to these tiny moots where the men of the village met to order the village life and the village industry, as their descendants, the men of a later England, meet in parliament at Westminster to frame laws and do justice for the great empire that has sprung from this little body of farmer commonwealths in Sleswick."^ § 20. The old English town. — The same form of government de- scribed in the preceding section was carried by the ,Angles, the Saxons, and the Jutes to Britain. "War was no sooner over than the warrior settled down into a farmer, and the home of the peasant churl rose beside the heap of goblin-haunted stones that marked the site of the villa he had burnt. Little knots of kinsfolk drew together in 'tun' ^ Green Short Hist. Eng. People (Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), § 1, p. 3. § 21 rUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 28 or 'ham' hcsidc the Thames and the Trent as they had settled beside the El])e or the Weser, not as kinsfolk only, but as dwellers in the same plot, knit together by their common holding within the same bounds. Each little village commonwealth lived the same life in Britain as its farmers had lived at home. Each had its moot hill or sacred tree as a center ; its 'mark' as a border; each judged by witness of the kins- folk, and made laws in the assembly of its freedmen, and chose the leaders for its governance, and the men who were to follow headman or ealderman to hundred court or war."^ The necessities of war and conquest, however, modified this primitive and democratic form of government. The temporary war leader of the earlier times became a permanent king; and a military nobility of "thegns" sprang up around him. The nobility gradually superseded the ealderman of the primitive society. Under the king and the "thegns" the powers of the townsmen became less. Local self-government was no longer as absolute as it had been. The beginnings of a feudal system were to be seen. With the conquest and the attendant increase in power of the military classes, and the consequent temporary subjugation of the masses, the towns continued to lose the free and independent system of self-government so characteristic of the Teutonic townships. The feudal system was for the time firmly established in England,, and in that system, as has been said, towns played but a small part. Thus, the municipal system of England became affected by Norman principles of government, which were based on the Roman law. This fact explains why the commons had so little voice in the creation of corporations in England for so long; for the Norman nobles and clergy controlled all the departments of state, and William, the Con- queror and his sons were thorough Normans in their predispositions and prejudices. The Norman cities gained their charters slowly. Eouen and Falaise are said to have been the first incorporated towns in that duchy, their privileges l)eing acquired by grant in 1207. The characteristic of the earlier English charters, being in fact conces- sions from a military superior to his subjects, was that they conferred the right to protection of person and property, rather than any right of self-government.^ § 21. The same subject continued. — That right the people were not yet disposed to demand. They were not yet in a position to defend themselves, and security of life and property seemed a great enough - Green Short Hist. Eng. People See also, as to Scotch municipalities, (Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), § 2, p. 15. "Municipal Corporations in Scot- ' History of Municipal Corpora- land," 24 Westm. Rev. 156. tions and Boroughs, 13 L. Mag. 401. 29 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION". § 31 boon to acquire. But as the nation became settled, and communities gained wealth by trade, they were encouraged to beg, buy or demand greater privileges, — more voice in their own private local affairs; so, little by little, local self-government again became the feature of municipalities, after so long an abeyance that it is often deemed to have had its origin at this point in history."* And in the great struggles for liberty and law by which the English people wrested from king and priest their birth-right of freedom, the towns w^ere al- ways arrayed against arbitrary power. "In the silent growth and elevation of the English people the boroughs led the way; unnoticed and despised by prelate and noble, they had alone preserved or won back again the full tradition of Teutonic liberty. The rights of self- government, of free speech in free meeting, of equal justice by one's equals, were brought safely across the ages of tyranny by the burghers and shop-keepers of the towns. In the quiet, quaintly-named streets, in town-mead and market place, in the lord's mill beside the stream, in the bell that swung out its summons to the crowded borough-mote, in merchant-gild, and church-gild and craft-gild, lay the life of Englishmen who were doing more than knight and baron to make England what she is, the life of their home and their trade, of their sturdy battle with oppression, their steady, ceaseless struggle for rights * We quote here the description of levy the old duties, and become re- the rise of municipalities given in sponsible for the funds committed Angell and Ames' Treatise on the to their care. As managers of the Law of Private Corporations, in the community, therefore, they were introduction: "§ 21. In the reign of bound to fulfill its obligations to the Henry the First of England, who superior, and by a very natural ex- was a contemporary of Louis le tension of the same principle, it was Gros, the inhabitants of London had finally understood that they might begun to form their tolls and duties, be prosecuted for all its debts. The and they obtained a royal charter society was thus viewed in the light for that purpose. The example of of body politic, or fictitious person, London was soon followed by the capable of legal acts and executing other trading towns, and from this every kind of transaction by means time forward the existence of the of trustees. This alteration in the municipal corporations called 'bor- state of English towns was accompa- oughs' became more and more con- nied by many other improvements; spicuous. The arrangement just they were placed in a condition that mentioned in relation to tolls and enabled them to dispense with the duties seems to have suggested the protection of their superior; and idea of a borough, considered as a took upon themselves to provide a corporation. Some of the principal defense against foreign invaders, inhabitants of a town undertook to and to secure their internal tran- pay the yearly rent which was due quillity. In this manner they ulti- to the superior, and in consideration mately became completely invested of which they were permitted to with the government of the place." § 23 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 30 and freedom. It is difficult to trace the steps by which borough after borough won its freedom. The bulk of them were situated in the royal demesne, and, like other tenants, their customary rents were collected and justice administered by a royal officer. Amongst our towns London stood chief, and the charter which Henry granted it became the model for the rest. The king yielded the citizens the right of justice; every townsman could claim to be tried by his fellow- townsmen in the town court or hustings, whose sessions took place every week. They were subject only to the old English trial by oath, and exempt from the trial by battle which the Normans had intro- duced. Their trade was protected from toll or exaction over the length and breadth of the land. The king, however, still nominated in London, as elsewhere, the portreeve or magistrate of the town, nor were the citizens as yet united together in a commune or corpora- tion; but an imperfect civic organization existed in the Vards' or quairters of the town, each governed by its own alderman, and in the 'gilds' or voluntary associations of merchants or traders, which in- sured order and mutual protection for their members. Loose, too, as these bonds may seem, they were drawn firmly together by the older English traditions of freedom which the towns preserved. In London, for instance, the burgesses gathered in town-mote when the bell swung out from St. Paul's, to deliberate freely on their own affairs under the presidency of their aldermen. Here, too, they mus- tered in arms if danger threatened the city, and delivered the city banner to their captain, the Norman baron, Fitz- Walter, to lead them against the enemy. Few boroughs had as yet attained to power such as this, but charter after charter during Henry's reign raised the townsmen of boroughs from mere traders, wholly at the mercy of their lord, into customary tenants, who had purchased their freedom by a fixed rent, regulated their own trade, and enjoyed exemption from all but their own justice."^ § 22. Guilds. — In England, as indicated in the preceding section, the increase and encouragement of commerce was at the basis of municipal rights. For, long before municipalities acquired their chartered privileges, associations of tradesmen secured from the crown, for a consideration, franchises and privileges in the line of their par- ticular business. These guilds were little centers of trade; around them towns grew up ; the members of the guild being electors or franchise-holders in the towns. To these ^towns, as their trade-homes, they became attached. The town and guild became more and more identified, and eventually the privileges they sought were for the towns ■> Green Short Hist. Eng. People (Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), § 6, p. 93. 31 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 23 themselves, — and these privileges were given by the king in charters. The privileges conferred in these charters were sufficient to build up a class rivaling in power the great lords and barons. Glover traces the successive steps of the English municipality in the introduction to his work on Municipal Corporations; saying: "Kespecting the early constitution of municipal corporations in England and Wales, it is certain that many of their institutions were established in prac- tice long before they were settled by law. In some places, as at New- castle-upon-Tyne, Carlisle and Scarborough, the forms of the munici- pal government were defined by an express composition between the magistracy and the people." The same writer continues : "It is prob- able that the powers of government in all ordinary cases were exercised by the superior magistracy, but that in extraordinary emergencies the whole body of burgesses was called upon to sanction the measures which interested the community. The difficulty of conducting busi- ness in such an assembly seems to have suggested the expedient of appointing a species of committee, which acted in conjunction with the burgesses, and which was dissolved when the business was con- eluded." These boroughs, thus organized, had subsequently represen- tation in parliament. Later, as they acquired influence in parliament, they were able to modify the character of its laws. New principles took root : the people were having a voice in the making of the laws that were to affect them ; so that equality and public good were in- creasingly prevailing considerations in legislation.^ § 23. The English boroughs. — The development of the English boroughs under the influence of civic spirit made formidable by the power of commerce and wealth is clearly traced by Mr. Green in his admirable History of the English People. First came the "frith- guild" or peace-club, a voluntary association of neighboring land- owners for the purposes of order and self-defense. This rude organi- zation is but a step removed from the primitive Teutonic town. In the beginning these early English boroughs were but gatherings of farmers. The first Dooms of London provide especially for the recovery of cattle belonging to the citizens. But with the growth of commerce and the security of peace, which enabled each peasant farmer to dwell apart on his own field, the town and the country were more sharply distinguished. The frith-guilds became merchant- ^ Glover, cited above, treats fully municipal institutions to the Mii- of the history and growth of mu- nicipal Corporations Act (5 & 6 nicipalities in England, Wales, Scot- Will. IV). See also, Hallam Mid- land and Ireland. Judge Dillon, in die Ages, vol. 3, ch. 8; 1 Stephen his introductory, historical view English Const, ch. 3, p. 62. (Dillon Munic. Corp., ch. 1), traces § 23 PUBLIC CORrORATIOXS. 32 guilds. The active members of these guilds were the landed burghers — land-owners as well as merchants. Around them gathered a mass of new settlers, "composed of escaped serfs, of traders without landed holdings, of families who had lost their original lot in the borough, and generally of the artisans and the poor, who had no part in the actual life of the town." The burgher class, secure in their wealth and their land, ground the faces of the landless artisans, who for protection formed "craft-guilds" or associations of artisans, the pro- tot3q3es of the labor unions of modern times. These associations of workingmen gained charters from the king, and thus obtained a legal standing in the civic government. The struggle between these "craft- guilds" and the old and powerful "merchant-guilds" was long and bitter. Little by little the monopoly of power over trade and the municipal government, which the merchant-guilds had gained, was won from them by the craft-guilds, which in time obtained an almost absolute control of trade, and stand with the merchant-guilds in the government of the municipality.'^ As these English boroughs, towns and cities developed, charters were obtained from time to time from the crown. In the beginning they were not incorporated and could not be called bodies politic ; nor were they represented in parliament. The charter of London was granted by Henry I, during the early years of the twelfth century, and was secured afterwards by express provision of Magna Charta; in fact, all of the privileges granted by the borough charters were of a local character in every respect. Judge Dillon in the portion of his work just cited gives an excellent historical sketch of the English boroughs, to which the reader is referred. The material for this section is largely taken from that sketch. During the reign of John, indeed, the principal towns and boroughs received charters and the power of local self-government.^ But it was not until Edward I that the right of electing representatives in parliament was formally accorded to the boroughs,^ although as early as A. D. 1365, Earl Simon of Montford summoned two citizens from each borough to sit in parliament. Until the time of Edward I, however, these burgess-members attended irregularly and had but a slight influence. That king, driven by need of money to carry on the wars ^ Green Short Hist. Eng. People elusive jurisdictions, a merchant- ( Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), ch. 4, guild, the appointment of the vari- § 4, pp. 193, 201. See also, Bren- ous officers for the administration tano's Essay, prefixed to "Ordi- of justice, fairs and markets, with nances of English Guilds." freedom from all tolls." n Dillon Munic. Corp.. § 8, quot- "Green Short Hist. Eng. People ing 1 Stephen English Const, ch. 3, (Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), ch. 4, p. 62: "The principal liberties § 2, pp. 177-179. granted in the early charters are ex- 33 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 24 of his reign, summoned two burgesses from "every city, borough and leading town." These burgesses were at first the active supporters of the Icing. He used them to brealc tlie power of the great barons of the realm; and the burgesses in turn sought the protection of the king against the oppression of the nobility. But with the advance of the autocratic power of the king under the Tudors and the Stuarts, these burgesses stood out as leaders in the fight for the liberties of the people. Under Charles II the municipal corporations of England were the especial objects of royal displeasure. The city of London and many other municipalities were deprived of their charters by process of quo warranto. But under William and Mary the charters of these cities were restored. § 24. The same subject continued. — Many of these boroughs, how- ever, early lost the independence which had characterized their early government. "The borough franchise was suffering from the general tendency to restriction and privilege which in the bulk of towns was soon to reduce it to a mere mockery. Up to this time (the fifteenth century) all freemen settling in a borough and paying their dues to it became, by the mere settlement, its burgesses; but from the reign of Henry the Sixth this largeness of borough life was roughly cur- tailed. The trade companies, which vindicated civic freedom from the tyranny of the older merchant guilds, themselves tended to become a narrow and exclusive oligarchy. Most of the boroughs had by this time acquired civic property; and it was with the aim of securing their own enjoyment of this, against any share of it by 'strangers,' that the existing burgesses for the most part procured charters of incorporation from the crown, which turned them into a close body, and excluded from their number all who were not burgesses by birth, or who failed henceforth to purchase their right of entrance by a long apprenticeship. In addition to this narrowing of the burgess- body, the internal government of the boroughs had almost universally passed, since the failure of the communal movement in the thirteenth century, from the free gathering of the citizens in borough-mote_ into the hands of common councils, either self -elected or elected by the wealthier burgesses ; and it was to these councils, or to a yet more restricted number of 'select men' belonging to them, that clauses in the new charters generally confined the right of choosing their rep- resentatives in parliament. It was with this restriction that the long process of degradation began which ended in reducing the represen- tation of our boroughs to a mere mockery."^" Thus in the course of "Green Short Hist. Eng. People (Harper & Bros., ed. 1889), ch. 6, § 1, p. 272. 1 Smith— 3 § 25 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 34 time the system of borough representation in England became rotten with abuses. The famous Reform Act of 1832 abolished in great measure the abuses of the system, by placing the government of the boroughs in the hands of a larger electorate, and by doing away with many of the ^'pocket boroughs" which had dwindled into petty vil- lages, owned by neighboring landlords, for whose personal ends the burgesses were elected. In 1835 the Municipal Corporations Eeform Act^^ restored to the members of municipal corporations the rights of local self-government, of which they had been deprived since the fourteenth century. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 con- solidated and codified all the previous legislation on the subject of municipal corporations in England.^' § 25. Creation of modern English municipal corporations. — The modern English municipal corporation is created either by char- ter granted by the king under the general provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 or by act of parliament. The general stat- ute provides that if, on the petition to the queen of the inhabitant householders of any town or towns or district in England, or of any of those inhabitants, praying for the grant of a charter of incorpora- tion, her majesty, by the advice of her privy council, thinks fit by charter to create such town, towns or district, or any part thereof specified in the charter with or without any adjoining place, a mu- nicipal borough, and to incorporate the inhabitants thereof, it shall be lawful for her majesty by the charter to extend to that municipal borough and the inhabitants thereof so incorporated the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act.^^ The corporation created by charter from the crown under the general statute possesses in general "5 & 6 Will. IV, ch. 76. 278; Vaughan Revel, in Eng. Hist., "For a full treatment of the inter- book 2, ch. 8; Frothingham Rise of esting subject outlined in the pre- the Republic 14. ceding sections, see Dillon Munic. '' Municipal Corporations Act of Corp., in loco; Green Short Hist. 1882, § 210. The crown has always _Bng. People (Harper & Bros., ed. possessed, says an English writer, 1889), pp. 92-95, 129, 156, 177, 194- the power of creating corporations 201, 272, 402, 663, 843; Norton and conferring franchises (see 1 Comm. on Hist. Const, and Char- Kyd Corp. 61); but where privi- tered Franchises of the City of Lon- leges and powers are to be conferred don; 3 Hallam Middle Ages, ch. 8, which are not recognized by the parti; 1 Stephen Eng. Const., ch. 3; common or statute law, an act of Hearn Gov. of Eng., ch. 15; Will- parliament is necessary. This act cock Munic. Corp. 513; Glover Corp., (the Municipal Corporations Act of ch. 38; Crabbe Hist, of Eng. Law, 1882), though even without the sav- ch. 2; 1 Bl. Com. 114; 2 Kent Com. ing provision contained in section 35 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. 26 all the common-law powers and qualities of a corporation, except as limited by express provision of the charter;^* while parliament has power to confer upon the corporations created by its act special and unusual powers not incident to common-law corporations.^^ § 26. Municipal corporations created by charter from the crown. — This class of corporations, as indicated in the preceding section, pos- sesses the powers and attributes of common-law corporations, and no other. These powers and attributes are of course subject to the re- strictions imposed by the charter. It is a fundamental principle that the crown can impose no charter upon a community without the acceptance and consent of the people of the community. "And as acceptance was necessary to make the king's charter operativ^e, it will 259 it would not at all abridge the common-law prerogative of the crown, nevertheless prevents its granting charters of incorporation with the powers conferred by this act, save with the advice of the privy council and on petition by "the inhabitant householders." Raw- linson Municipal Corporation Acts (8th ed. by Thomas Geary, 1884) 293, note. The saving provision mentioned prescribes that nothing in this act shall prejudicially affect her majesty's royal prerogative, and the enabling provisions of this act shall be deemed to be in addition to and not in derogation of the powers exercisable by her majesty by virtue of her royal prerogative: Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, § 259. Of this provision the same writer from whom we have quoted says: "This seems merely re-affirming the old doctrine that the crown is not af- fected by any statute unless express- ly named therein:" Rawlinson Mu- nicipal Corporation Acts (8th ed. by Thomas Geary, 1884) 339, note. See on this topic generally, "Munici- pal Corporations — How Organized and Dissolved," a note by H. B. Johnson, 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 43. See on the subject of the common- law prerogative of the crown to grant charters, Rutter v. Chapman (in error, in the exchequer cham- ber), 8 M. & W. 1; Reg. V. Mayor &c., 11 L. T. (N. S.) 417; s. c. 13 W. R. 90. It is further provided that every petition for a charter under this act shall be referred to a com- mittee of the lords of her majesty's privy council; and that at least one month before the petition is taken into consideration by the committee, notice thereof and of time at which it will be so taken into considera- tion shall be published in the Lon- don Gazette and otherwise as the committee direct, for the purpose of making it known to all persons in- terested: Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, § 211. " See, for American cases on the powers of corporations created by charter from the crown. People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451; s. c. 18 Am. R. 107; President &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 385. See also, 1 Kyd Corp. 61; Willcock Munic. Corp. 30; Angell & Ames Corp., § 69. ^^ Rawlinson Municipal Corpora- tion Acts (8th ed. by Thomas Geary, 1884) 293, note (d) ; Willcock Mu- nic. Corp. 63, 64; 1 Kyd Corp. 61; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. 33; Glover Munic. Corp. 24. § 27 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 86 bp foimd that the municipal charters which he gave were all given to existing communities, having a recognized and organized existence, and in the habit of acting as one body through elections or agencies and officers. So far as we can judge from history, they were to all intents and purposes already as complete corporations for all practical purposes as are simpler municipal bodies, and accustomed to what was practically corporate action, and known as quasi-corporations. But even these could get nothing from the royal grant but liberties or franchises. Any coercive or exclusive power, which by the principles of the common law could not be granted by the king's charter, could only be given by act of parliament."^'' A royal charter is a formal authorization, documentary in form, under the great seal, to the per- sons named therein, to incorporate themselves in a certain place and for certain purposes. It is addressed to all the subjects of the king. The king's charter is wholly inoperative until the persons named therein as incorporators accept it. Their assent is essential to give life to the charter, and this assent must be to the very charter proffered them. In case of partial acceptance the charter avails nothing, unless the modification be approved by ,the king. In the case of a new cor- poration, however, a partial acceptance is considered an acceptance of the whole charter. It is said to have been a settled principle at common law that the king had a prerogative right to grant charters — municipal as well as private. But this only meant that he had a prerogative to confer privileges. He had no power to impose polit- ical obligations on any person or community, unless they were in the form of conditions, nor could he compel the acceptance of any char- ter. ^^ After the charter has been accepted, the crown can not withdraw the charter and thereby destroy the life of the corporation, its crea- ture, without the consent of the members of the corporation.^® § 27. Municipal corporations created by act of parliament. — In contrasting parliamentary with royal incorporations, it must be borne in mind that the charters granted by the crown were given to existing communities having a recognized organized existence. Inas- much as their assent was necessary to render the charter operative, in no other way could it have been signified except by a body acting through agencies or officers. The powers of parliament regarding "1 Kytl Corp. 61. See President dent &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; 385. Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; 'n Dillon Munic. Corp., §§ 33, 34; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451; Kyd Corp. 61 et seq.; Willcock Am. & Bng. Encyc. of Law, tit. Mu- Munic. Corp. 30; Angell & Ames nicipal Corporations, p. 956. Corp., § 69. '^Willcock Munic. Corp. 30; Presi- 37 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION". § 28 ihc institution of nninifipal corporations are plenary; for, as we have ^een, there is only one party, the public, concerned in the creation of a municijial corporation, and the persons incorporated have no contractual riahts under their charter. The charter of a corporation created by parliament is the act of parliament. No assent is necessary to render an act of parliament operative. Not only that, but without assent the incorporated individuals may be deprived of the fran- chises origirmlly given. ]\Ioreover, the powers granted may even be contrary to the usual rules of law ; only, if that be so, there must be no ambiguity in terms, as such grants are not to be implied. ^^ Par- liament can create corporations the privileges of which can never be affected by subsequently-granted royal charters, and can at the same time control and alter any corporation instituted under permission from the crown. While it has been said that no assent is prerequisite in the case of parliamentary corporations, it must be stated in quali- fication that an act of parliament usually contains provisions for the conditions of incorporation. The English statute for local govern- ment in "towns and populous districts"-" provides that this local gov- ernment is to be adopted by the people who are to exercise the power ; for example, in a corporate borough the council adopt the provisions of the act; and in a place under commissioners the adoption would be by resolution of the commissioners. This adoption of the provi- sions of the act, and complying with the conditions therein prescribed, is equivalent to an assent of the persons to be incorporated.^^ Parlia- mentary corporations at first were usually such as were to be invested with extraordinary privileges or powers. When the ordinary powers alone were to be given the charter of the king was sufficient. If a Toyal charter gave too much power, it was to that extent void, and parliament could validate it by enactment. But under the Municipal Corporations Act now in force in England,^- nearly all corporations are parliamentary in their origin. Such laws establish uniform con- ditions, confer uniform privileges, to all who will meet the prescribed requirements. These general statutes will now be considered. § 28. Municipal corporations at common law and by prescription in England. — Although municipal corporations in England can be created only by one of the two methods pointed out in the pre- ceding section, — by charter from the crown or by act of parliament, — still many municipal corporations which owe their origin to neither ^^ Glover Munic. Corp. 24; Will- =^ Queen v. Local Government cock Munic. Corp. 21 et seq.; 1 Dil- Board, L. R. 8 Q. B. 227. Ion Munic. Corp., § 34. ==* Act of 1882. ="> 21 and 22 Vict., ch. 98, § 12. § 29 PUBLIC CORPORATIOISrS. 38 of these two sources are in existence in tliat country. Those are di- vided into two classes, known as municipal corporations at common law and municipal corporations by prescription. As the law never presumes the continued existence of anything unlawful, a legal incep- tion for both classes is presumed. Municipal corporations at common law are those to which several capacities have been annexed, in virtue of their political character, by the universal assent of the community, from the most remote period to which their existence can be traced. These corporations have existed, enjoying and exercising corporate ■ rights, from time immemorial. This immemorial usage is the basis of their continuing right. The second clas,s — corporations by prescrip- tion — are presumed to owe their origin to a charter from the crown or an act of parliament, that has been lost or destroyed. Such corpo- rations are of course much more common in England than in the United States, although public corporations by prescription have been held to exist here.^^ Prescriptive corporations have a definite legal status. The powers and privileges they have customarily enjoyed are conceded to them — the supposition being that the customs and usages regulating them were defined and prescribed in the lost charter. These customs are not always so strictly interpreted as those under a charter of modern origin ; for, as has above appeared, the earliest charters were granted in the days when the power of the king had few if any parliamentary restrictions, and hence he could confer greater privileges, and create corporations with ampler powers, than the sovereign to-day.^* § 29. Municipal corporation by implication in England. — The mu- nicipal corporation by implication, as it is styled, does not constitute a class of municipal corporations distinct by origin from the corpora- tions discussed in the preceding sections. Where the royal charter or act of parliament plainly intends to constitute a corporate munici- pal body, yet fails expressly to confer on that body any attribute or power essential to corporate existence, the law "ut res magis valeat quam pereat" implies from the intention of the charter or act such attribute or power ; and the body so created is considered to be validly incorporated. Such a municipal corporation is called a mu- nicipal corporation by implication.^^ There are many instances of these corporations by implication in the early English cases. Thus a ^ See post, §§ 37, 38, 39, 40. 2 Bro. & G. 292; Conservators =^Co. Litt. 250a. &c. v. Ash, 10 B. & C. 349; 1 Dillon ^Kyd Corp. 63; Grant Corp. 43; Munlc. Corp., § 42, from whose text Case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. the instances given in this section 1, 27a; Borough of Yarmouth Case, are taken. 39 OF THE CKEATIOX OF THE CORFORATION. § 30 grant of incorporation to the burgesses of Yarmouth was held by Lord Coke to be good although it failed expressly to confer incorpora- tion upon their successors ;'*' and a royal grant to the men of a district authorizing them to elect a mayor, and to plead and be impleaded by the name of the mayor and commonalty, was considered sufficient to incorporate them.^^ A grant of land by the king to the inhabit- ants of B, their heirs and successors, rendering rent, was held to con- stitute them a corporation.-^ Also a grant by the crown to the men of a certain locality that they be discharged of tolls was thought to incorporate them for that purpose at least. ^^ § 30. The Municipal Corporations Reform Act of 1835. — In the reign of William IV the question of reforming the municipalities of the realm was agitated in the house of commons. An investigating committee, composed of barristers, was finally appointed, and they made a thorough tour of the kingdom. They separated into several subdivisions, and facilitated their labor by all the expedients known to the English parliamentary investigating committees. The state of facts disclosed was startling. It was, among many other things, discovered that in nearly all the municipalities the governing bodies were self-constituted and self-electing, and that these governing bodies appointed the municipal officers from their own clique or ring, thus giving unbounded opportunity for corruption and oppression. The committee reported that no uniform judicial system existed ; that there was no equable and uniform fiscal policy pursued ; that the mag- istrates were not often qualified by education or birth for the offices they held; the juries were improperly and partially impaneled; the corporations denied accountability; that responsibility could not be fastened anywhere; and that the constabulary was ill-organized, and the usual duties of a municipality wholly neglected. In short, the absence of system, the nonexistence of definitely prescribed regula- tions of law, was manifest everywhere throughout the two hundred and forty-six municipalities which the report of the commissioners showed to exist. The commission pointed out that the corporations existed independently of the communities in which they had been established, and that there was no identity of interest between them, and that in some cases the franchises of corporation had been bestowed not on selected individuals of the community, but sometimes on non- resident freemen. Altogether it was found that among the inhabit- =* Borough of Yarmouth Case, 2 "* 2 Jac. Law, tit. Corporation, p. Bro. & G. 292. 94. ^^21 Edw. IV, 56. ='Vin. Abr., Corp. F., p. 6; Bagott's Case, 7 Edw. IV, 29. § 31 PUBLIC COUrORATIONS. 40 ants of the English municipalities generally dissatisfaction existed with their form of local government. The report closed by stating that the commissioners felt it to be their duty to represent to his majesty that the municipal corporations of England and Wales neither possessed nor deserved the confidence and respect of his majesty's sub- jects; and they suggested that a thorough reform be effected, in order that they might become useful and efficient instruments of local gov- ernment. ^° In consequence of this report, an act was passed the same year, 1835,^^ which in its main provisions still obtains, and is at the basis of the municipal system both of England and the United States. It provided that the governing bodies and existing magistrates of every corporation should be removed that year; that town councils were to be elected triennially by the burgesses; that any one was eligible to be a burgess who had been rated three years to support the poor. It enumerated in schedules all the existing municipalities, and provided for their reincorporation under the name of the mayor, aldermen and burgesses — or citizens, as the case might be — of so- and-so, and that by such name it should "have perpetual succession, and shall be capable in law, by the council hereinafter mentioned of such borough, to do and sutfer all acts which now lawfully they and their successors respectively may do and suffer by any name or title of incorporation." The act further settled the metes and bounds of the reorganized municipalities, provided for courts therein, settled the qualifications and mode of election of the city or borough officers, and organized a constabulary. It authorized the councils to make by-laws, provided for the municipal funds, abolished chartered ad- miralty jurisdiction, laid down various rules of procedure, and finally authorized the crown to grant charters of incorporation "upon peti- tion" of the inhabitant householders in any municipality alluded to in the act.^^ § 31. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882. — The preamble to this act states clearly the reasons actuating parliament in its passage. "Whereas divers bodies corporate at sundry times have been consti- tuted in the cities, towns and boroughs of England and Wales to the intent that the same might forever be and remain well and quietly governed: And whereas, the act of the session of the fifth and sixth ^"Municipal Corporations Rep. 49. in 1836 and 1837, and are known as See also, Reform of Municipal Cor- The Municipal Boundaries Act; The porations, by J. A. Roebuck, 30 Municipal Funds Act; The Munici- Westm. Rev. 48. pal Jurisprudence Act; The Record- ^' 5 and 6 Will. IV, ch. 76. ers' Courts Act; The Municipal Elec- ^' The principal municipal corpo- tions Act; The Municipal Rates Act. ration amendment acts were passed 41 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 31 years of the reign of King William the Fourth, chapter seventy-six, *to provide for the regulation of municipal corporations in England and Wales,' applies to most of those hodies constituted before the passing of that act, and to every of the bodies constituted after the passing of that act; and that act having been from time to time much altered and added to by other acts, it is expedient that all the acts aforesaid be reduced into one act with some amendments: Be it therefore enacted," etc.^^ The act is chiefly a consolidation statute, the alterations being generally merely for the purpose of accommo- dating its meaning to that of the previous statutes as defined by sub- sequent decisions.^* The previous legislation affecting municipal corporations was expressly repealed with some qualifications and exceptions by the act.^^ Under the provisions of the act no one can be enrolled as a burgess or citizen unless he is of full age ; has for twelve months occupied a house, warehouse, country house, shop or other building in the borough; has during the whole of those twelve months resided in the borough or within seven miles thereof; has been rated for and paid all poor-rates in respect to the property so occupied for those twelve months; is not an alien; has not received for twelve months any union or parochial relief or other alms; or is not disentitled under the act of parliament.^*^ The council of the borough is composed of the mayor, aldermen and councilors of the ^^ Municipal Corporations Act of bilities of the universities of Oxford 1882, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. 50. and Cambridge; or the ecclesiastical ^ Rawlinson Municipal Corpora- jurisdiction over cathedral pre- tion Acts (.ISlu ed. by Thomas Geary, cincts; or shall prejudicially affect 1884) 1. her majesty's prerogative; or shall ^ See, for list of repealed enact- affect anything done or suffered be- ments, Rawlinson Municipal Corpo- fore the commencement of this act ration Acts (8th ed. by Thomas under any enactment repealed by Geary, 1884) 342-346. It is pro- this act, or pending at its commence- vided in the saving clauses of the ment; or any established jurisdic- act that nothing therein contained tion or practice; or the terms on shall prejudicially affect any charter which money has been borrowed be- granted before the commencement fore the commencement of this act of the act; or alter the boundaries under any enactment repealed by of any borough or the number, ap- this act, together with other savings portionment or qualification of the and exceptions less important. And aldermen or councilors thereof or it is further provided that the re- the division thereof into wards; or peal effected by this act shall not ex- the respective jurisdiction of county tend to Scotland or Ireland: Mu- and borough justices; or the effect nicipal Corporations Act of 1882, 45 of any local act of parliament; or and 46 Vict., ch. 50, §§ 250-260. the effect of the Prison Acts; or the ^Municipal Corporations Act of rights, knowledge, duties and lia- 1882, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. 50, § 9. § 32 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 42 boroiigh.^^ The aldermen are elected by the council out of the number of the .councilors or persons qualified to be councilors; and if a coun- cilor is elected to and accepts the office of alderman he thereby va- cates his office of councilor.^® The councilors are elected by the burgesses. There are numerous qualifications necessary in order to be chosen councilor, chief of which is the requirement that a person must be enrolled or qualified to be enrolled as a burgess, and must be seized or possessor of property in the borough of one thousand pounds if the borough has four or more wards ; and if the borough has a less number of wards, of five hundred pounds. ^^ No one holding any oi^ce or place of profit in the gift of the council, except the office of mayor or sheriff, can be elected councilor; nor can a minister of the church of England or of a dissenting congregation be elected.**' The mayor is elected by the council from among ten aldermen or coun- cilors or persons qualified to be such.*^ It is of course impossible within the scope of this work to give any detailed outline of the general provisions of the act. The essential distinction between the system of municipal government established by the act in England, and the system most general in this country, is that in the English municipalities the entire government is practically confided to the council, generally consisting of from twelve to sixty-four members, of whom the mayor is one ; while in our system the powers of govern- ment are generally divided between the mayor and the common council or board of aldermen. Both, systems have their advantages; but on the whole the English plan is simpler, and affords less oppor- tunities for evasion or shifting of responsibilities.*^ § 32. The American town — Local self-government. — As this coun- try was founded l^y Englishmen and its government established on the lines of the common law of England so modified as to meet the requirements of a republic, our municipal corporations were estab- lished in accordance with the English principles of liberty. They generally possess, however, powers of local self-government far greater than those of the English towns. Thus in Pennsylvania it is provided by the constitution of that state that the general assembl}^ shall not " Municipal Corporations Act of " Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, 45 and 46 Vict., ch. .50, § 10, 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 15. subdiv. 2. " See Dillon Munic. Corp., § 36, ^ Municipal Corporations Act of citing an excellent article by Mr. 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 14. Shaw on Existing Municipal Govern- ^^ Municipal Corporations Act of ment in Great Britain, Political 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 11. Science Quarterly, vol. 4, p. 97. ■'° Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, 45 and 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 12. 43 OF THE CREATION' OP THE COErORATION. § 32 pass any local or special law regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships or like bodies.''''' Thus it has been said by an eminent writer: "In contradistinction to those governments where power is concentrated in one man or in one or more bodies of men whose supervision and active control extends to all the objects of government within the territorial limits of the state, the American system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital idea of which is that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities and general affairs only by the central authorities."'** These municipal corpora- tions are peculiarly the sul)ject of state as distinguished from federal control. They are the creatures of the state legislatures, and must remain subject to the wise control of their creators within constitu- tional limitations. It was said by an eminent New York justice: "When the present constitution was formed, the entire territory of the state was separated and appropriated by its civil divisions, its counties, cities and towns. These civil divisions are coeval with the government. The state has never existed a moment without them. All our thoughts and notions of civil government are inseparably associated with counties, cities and towns. They are permanent elements in the frame of government; they are institutions of the state, durable and indestructible by any power less than that which gave being to the organic law. They are, however, subject to control and regulation by the legislature. It may enlarge or circum- scribe their territorial limits, increase or diminish their members, separate them into parts and annex some of the parts to others; but they must still assume the form and be known and governed only as counties, cities or towns. The state at large is and ever has " City of Reading v. Savage, 120 are entitled to the benefits of local Pa. St. 198; s. c. 13 Atl. 919; Mc- self-government." Caldwell v. Jus- Carthy v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa, tices, 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 323. In St. 243; s. c. 2 Atl. 423. the last cited case Ruffin, J. " Cooley Const. Lim. 223; People (whom Judge Dillon calls "one of v. Common Council &c., 28 Mich, the ablest of American common-law 228; s. c. 15 Am. R. 204. In the judges"), exhaustively discusses the famous Detroit Park Case just cited, inherent and hereditary right of lo- it was held that the legislature could cal self-government. See also, Gro not compel a city to issue bonds for gan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; the purchase of land for a park People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; against the will of the city council. People v. Mayor &c., 51 111. 17; s. c. In his opinion Judge Cooley says: — 2 Am. R. 278; Barnes v. Lacon, 84 "It is a fundamental principle in 111. 461; Cairo &c. R. Co. v. Sparta, this state, recognized and perpetu- 77 111. 505. This subject will be ated by express provision of the con- more fully treated post, in discuss- stitution, that the people of every ing legislative control of municipal hamlet, town and city of the state corporations. § 33 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 44 been an aggregate of these local bodies."*^ In addition to the usual municipal corporations, such as cities, towns and villages, it has been the policy of American legislation to incorporate, at least for some purposes, many minor subdivisions of the state, such as townships, school districts, road districts and similar bodies, thus organizing to the highest degree the state government and affording the greatest liberty of action to even the unimportant branches of state admin- istration.'*'^ § 33. The power to create municipal corporations in the United States — Where vested — (a) In the state. — Public as well as private corporations must in this country, as a rule, with but irregular and unimportant exceptions, derive their right to corporate existence from the force of legislative authority. This authority is exercised by the state, upon which descended this power along with the other prerogatives vested in the crown, upon the emancipation from British dominion. It had been, as we have seen, the peculiar prerogative of the crown to grant charters to municipalities; and, although parlia- ment has usurped this prerogative along with the other royal powers, the acts of parliament conferring charters upon these bodies to this day direct that it shall be lawful for the crown, under the circum- stances contemplated by the statute, to grant a charter to the inhabit- ant householders of any district in England.*'^ As the states upon our separation from Great Britain became sovereign, and succeeded to the powers and prerogatives of the crown, it became the peculiar prerogative of the law-giving power of the state to confer the gift of corporate existence upon public as well as private corporations. Consequently the several sovereign states have power to grant charters to municipal and other public corporations, subject only to the prohi- bitions and limitations imposed by the charters of the respective states;** and subject also to the limitation that this power must be exercised in a manner consistent with the powers delegated by the states to the federal government. These principles are established beyond all question.*^ And this sovereign power of the states has ■''* People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 561, towns preceded the state govern- per Brown, J.; People v. Albertson, ment: See Arnold's History, ch. 7. 55 N. Y. 50; People v. Hurlbut, 24 "Municipal Corporations Act of Mich. 44; s. c. 9 Am. R. 103. 1882, § 210. ^"Cooley Const. Lim. 223, note. « See post, §§ 44, 45, 46. As an instance of a body possessing ^'1 Beach Priv. Corp., § 2; People unusually pure and immediate form v. City of Riverside, 70 Cal. 461; s. of self-government the New England c. 11 Pac. 759; Hope v. Deaderick, 8 town is remarkable. It is curious Humph. (Tenn.) 1; s. c. 47 Am. D. to note that in Rhode Island the 597; New Boston v. Dunbarton, 12 45 OF TTTE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 34 been so f;ir recognized that the courts have held that it Avas not with- drawn even though the state exercising it had at the time of such exercise seceded from the Union and was engaged in war with the United States.^" § 34. (b) In the federal government. — To define the power of the federal government to create public corporations it is necessary to consider the general powers possessed by that government, as no ex- press authority to create corporations is granted by the states to that government in the constitution. "'^ There being, then, no express dele- gation of power in the constitution to create corporations, there can be no implied power to do so, except as a means or instrument by which to accomplish the objects for which the federal government was cre- ated.^ ^ The federal government, therefore, has no power to create public or private corporations except where such a power is necessary in order to carry out some power expressly delegated in the constitu- tion to that government. ^^ The federal government has, consequently, N. H. 409. And for cases affirming, in regard to private as well as pub- lic corporations, this fundamental principle, see Franklin Bridge Co. V. Wood, 14 Ga. 80; Bell v. Nash- ville Bank, Peck (Tenn.) 269; Fal- coner V. Campbell, 2 McLean 195; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 103; Nelson v. McArthur, 38 Mich. 204; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Cotton v. Mississippi &c. Co., 22 Minn. 372; Angell & Ames Corp. (11th ed.), § 71. '^" United States v. Insurance Co., 22 Wall. 99. But it has been con- sidered inexpedient to recognize the existence of a corporation so created by the state, in aid of such a war: 1 Beach Priv. Corp., § 2; Trustees &c. v. Satchwell, 71 N. C. Ill; Chi- cora V. Crews, 6 S. C. (N. S.) 243. '^ 1 Beach Priv. Corp., § 3, where it is said: "In the convention of states which framed the constitution an effort was made to invest the congress with power to grant acts of incorporation, but after three days of debate the proposition was voted down, eight out of the eleven states represented voting in the neg- ative;" citing Madison Papers, Sep- tember 14, 1787, and citing also "Ar- guments by Simon Sterne in Oppo- sition to the Signature by the Presi- dent of the United States of Senate Bill No. 1305 (50th Congress, 2d Ses- sion), to Incorporate the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua (Gib- son Brothers, Washington, 1889)"; 4 Jefferson Memoirs, Correspondence, etc., 523, 526 (Charlottesville, Va., 1829). One of the reasons of the rejection urged in debate was that congress would then have power to create a bank, which would render the great cities, where there were prejudices and jealousies on that subject, averse to the adoption of the constitution. " 1 Beach Priv. Corp., § 3, citing McCulloch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. ^^ Beach Priv. Corp. §§ 3-6; U. S. Const, Amend. 10; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Thomson v. Pacific R. Co., 9 Wall. 579; Cali- fornia V. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1, 39; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1073; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; HoUingsworth § 35 PUBLIC COKPORATIOXS. 4G under the power to govern the public domain, the incidental and aux- iliary power to create municipal corporations in the territories and in the District of Columbia, a district ceded by Virginia and Mary- land to the United States as a seat of government.^* To recapitulate, the power of the state to create public corporations is incidental to its sovereignty, and may be exercised for any lawful purpose not repug- nant to its constitution or to the voluntary limitations imposed upon itself by its ratification of the federal compact; while the power of the federal government to create public corporations is an implied power, and exists only in so far as it is necessary for the federal gov- ernment to create such corporations in order to carry out powers expressly delegated to that government by the states in the constitu- tion. § 35. Municipal corporations created by the federal government — (a) Territories. — By virtue of this implied power of the federal government to create corporations where it is necessary to erect such bodies in order to exercise a power expressly delegated in the consti- tution to that government, the congress of the United States has power to provide for the creation of municipal and other public corporations in the territories, as incidental; and it has been provided by act of V. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378; Osborn v. an extension of this implied power President &c., 9 Wheat. 738; Story is found in the charter granted by on Constitution, § 1266. See, on the fiftieth congress in its second this topic, "National Corporations," session to the Maritime Canal Com- 21 Cent. Law J. 428; Hare Amer. pany of Nicaragua, a company or- Const. Law (Boston, 1889) 98, 105, ganized for the purpose of con- Ill, 249, 1310. For statutes exer- structing, equipping and operating cising this power, see 19 U. S. Stat, a ship canal from the Atlantic to at Large 38; 12 U. S. Stat, at Large the Pacific ocean through the terri- 665; 3 U. S. Stat, at Large 266. tory of Nicaragua or Nicaragua and ^^Vincennes University v. Indi- Costa Rica. To the mind of the ana, 14 How. 268; Barnes v. District writer that extension is unwarrant- of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; Stouten- able, as the charter in question can burgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; s. c. not be considered as necessary to 9 S. Ct. 256. This power of the con- the exercise of any power expressly gress to create municipal corpora- delegated to the federal government tions stands upon the same basis and in the constitution: 1 Beach Priv. is governed by the same principles Corp., § 6; "Argument by Simon as its power to create a national Sterne in Opposition to the Sigaa- bank: McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 ture by the President of the United Wheat. 316; Osborn v. President &c., States of Senate Bill No. 1305 (50th 9 Wheat. 738; or its power to au- Congress, 2d Session), to Incorpo- thorize the construction of railroads rate the Maritime Canal Company of through the territories: California Nicaragua (Gibson Brothers, Wash- v. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1, 39; s. c. ington, 1889)." 8 S. Ct. 1073. A curious instance of 47 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION, § 36 congress that the legislative assemblies of the several territories shall not grant private charters or especial privileges, but may by general incorporation acts permit persons to associate themselves together as bodies corporate for mining, manufacturing and other industrial pursuits.^^ And this act has been held to prohibit territorial legisla- tures from incorporating municipal corporations by special act^*^ auxiliary to the express power possessed by the federal government to govern the public domain.^^ This power possessed by the federal government is delegated to the territorial legislature, generally by a provision in the act creating the territory that the power of the terri- torial legislature shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation. The general clause embraces the power to create municipal and other corporations.^^ § 36. (b) The District of Columbia. — The District of Columbia was organized under the act of congress of February 21, 1871.^^ Under this act it was authorized to "exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation not inconsistent with the laws and constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act," — with the usual powers to sue, be sued, contract, have a seal, etc. It is declared to be, in the first section of the act, a body corporate for municipal purposes. The United States supreme court, having occasion to consider the powers '^R. S. U. S., §§ 1889, 1890. 98 U. S. 145; National Bank v. Yank- ^"City of Seattle v. Yesler, 1 ton, 101 U. S. 129; Murphy v. Ram- Wash. Ter. (N. S.) 571. sey, 114 U. S. 15; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 747. " Vincennes University v. Indiana, In the last named case it was de- 14 How. 268; People v. City of Butte, cided that congress had power to ex- 4 Mont. 174; s. c. 1 Pac. 414; Burnes elude polygamists from voting. V. Mayor &c., 2 Kan. 454; President ^'* Vincennes University v. Indiana, &c. V. Iowa, 12 How. 1; Story on 14 How. 268; Burns v. Mayor &c., 2 Const., § 1266; "National Corpora- Kan. 454; Deitz v. City of Central, 1 tions," 21 Cent. Law J. 428; Beach Colo. 323. This power also neces- Priv. Corp., § 3, ad finem; Cooley sarily carries with it the right to Const. Lim. 37. The legislation of make by-laws and ordinances to the territorial legislatures must not, control the members of the munici- of course, be at variance with the pal corporation: State v. Young, 3 territorial organic act, conferring Kan. 445. In Riddick v. Amelin, 1 the power to legislate; but such a Mo. 5, the question was raised variance will be presumed to be ap- whether a territorial legislature, not proved by congress if disregarded being sovereign, could create a cor- for a number of years after the at- poration. It was held that the con- tention of congress has been called gross had the power to create corpo- to the conflict of legislation: Clin- rations under the limitations set ton V. Bnglebrecht, 13 Wall. 434. forth, and could lawfully delegate For cases showing the complete con- that power, trol of the congress over the terri- ^^ 16 U. S. Stat. 419. tories, see Reynolds v. United States, § 37 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 48 of the district po con sti tilted, and the powers of certain of its depart- ments, nses the following language, expressing clearly some of the relations of municipalities : "A municipal corporation in the exercise of all of its duties, including those most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the state. The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is capable of receiving, making it an immature state within its locality. Again, it may strip it of every power, leaving it a corporation in name only; and it may create and recreate these changes as often as it chooses, or it may itself exercise directly within the locality any or all the powers usually committed to a municipality. We do not regard its acts as sometimes those of an agency of the state, and at others those of a municipality, but that, its character and na- ture remaining at all times the same, it is great or small according as the legislature shall extend or contract the sphere of its action."®* § 37. Municipal corporations by prescription in the United States. — The general rule being that corporations must in this country derive their origin from express legislative enactment, municipal cor- porations by prescription are in the United States the rare exception ; but such municipal corporations concededly exist. Thus, in New York, the existence of a public quasi-corporation, such as a school district, has been proved by prescription.®^ And in Massachusetts and other New England states, it has been decided that where no char- ter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be proved to be a town by reputation, or it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of a town, with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption, for so long a period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.®^ In Illinois the same doctrine has been approved, the opinion of the court stating ^ Barnes v. District of Columbia, '^ Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants 91 U. S. 540; Stoutenburgh v. Hen- &c., ' 12 Mass. 400; Dillingham v. nick, 129 U. S. 141; s. c. 9 S. Ct. 256. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; Bow v. Allens- "Robie V. Trustees &c., 35 Barb, town, 34 N. H. 351; Bassett v. Por- (N. Y.) 319. And it is further held ter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487; New Bos- in this case that prescriptive proof ton v. Dunbarton, 15 N. H. 201; of the existence of such a corpora- Trott v. Warren, 11 Maine 227; State tion also proved that the body pos- v. Bradley, 54 Conn. 74; s. c. 5 Atl. sessed all the powers given by law 861; 2 New Eng. R. 711. In a Mas- to such corporations. The case is a sachusetts case the judge remarked, fair example, as it was one where in allowing public reputation to be the trustees of the school district put in as evidence of incorporation, and their predecessors had under that it was well known that the pub- the same name and title exercised lie records had been in a large part their functions as such trustees for destroyed by fire: Dillingham v. forty years, without objection. Snow, 5 Mass. 547. 49 OF THE CKEATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 38 that municipal corporations are created for the public good and de- manded by the wants of the community ; and the law, after long con- tinued use of corporate powers with public acquiescence, will presume in favor of their legal existence. °^ The question as to whether in any given instance the municipality is to be deemed incorporated by pre- scription is one of fact and not of law, and is to be decided by the jury and not by the Judge.*'* i< 38. The same subject continued — Instances of incorporation by prescription in the United States. — In Indiana, Gen. William Henry Harrison made a map of an addition to the city of Vincennes in which he marked a certain lot as "General Harrison's Eeserve." This lot was assessed and taxed by the city government for sixty years without question or opposition. This fact was considered sufficient to show that the lot was within the corporation limits.*'^ So in a Wisconsin case, proceedings by which a certain territory was added to a town were considered regular after twenty years.®® And ten years has been held a sufficient period to perfect a defective incorporation against collateral attack.®^ § 39. Municipal corporations by implication in the United States. — The general principles governing the creation by implication of municipal corporations have already been considered in discussing ^ Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257. however, existed de facto and levied See also, State v. Leatherman, 38 taxes. Certain town lots were sold Ark. 81, where the original incorpo- at a tax sale, and a subsequent own- ration of the municipality was in a er of the lots instituted proceedings court lacking jurisdiction; and it to clear up the title. It was held was held that the state itself was that the incorporation of the town estopped by long acquiescence in could not be thus collaterally inl- and recognition of the incorporation peached after such a lapse of time, as valid, from quo warranto proceed- The principles elucidated in the text ings attacking the incorporation. were applied to a somewhat differ- •" Cooley Const. Lim. 238; New ent state of facts in a Kansas case, Boston V. Dunbarton, 15 N. H. 201; where a city was, as a matter of Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; fact, included in a certain class Trott V. Warren, 11 Maine 227. of cities, although, according to a *" Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, tit. strict legal classification, the city in Municipal Corporations, vol. 15, p. question belonged to a different 956; Pidgeon v. McCarthy, 82 Ind. class. It was held that as the city 321. was universally recognized to belong *° Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. 324; to the former class, it could law- s. c. 17 N. W. 252. fully act as belonging to that class, " Austrian v. Guy, 21 Fed. 500. although de jure belonging to the In that case original incorporation latter: Back v. Carpenter, 29 Kan. of the town was invalid. The town, 349. 1 Smith — 4 § 40 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 50 the creation of English mnnicipal corporations. These principles hold good, of course, in the case of American as well as of English municipalities; and they have often been applied by the courts of this country. So, where the legislature confers or imposes upon a certain body of men powers or liabilities of such a character as to render it necessary to incorporate such body in order to give effect to the legislative intention, the body is considered incorporated to such an extent as to carry out the design of the legislature. For example, in Massachusetts the legislature confers upon the inhabitants of the different school districts power to raise money to erect, repair or pur- chase a school-house, with other incidental powers of legislation. It was decided in the appellate courts of that state that this legislative act created the inhabitants of the school district a corporation for the purpose of bringing an action on a contract to build a school-house.**® And in New Hampshire, where a certain territory was annexed by the legislature to the town of Allentown, — the words of the act de- scribing Allentown as a municipal corporation, — such action of the legislature was considered sufficient to create Allentown a municipal corporation by implication.*'^ There are many cases in the books where similar principles have been applied in this country. '^'^ § 40. The same subject continued. — In a leading New York case Chancellor Kent elaborated the principles indicated in the preceding section. The town of Hempstead, Long Island, was settled in 1644, under a patent from William Kieft, the governor at that time of the Butch province. By this patent the tract of land comprised in the town was granted to six persons, named therein, with their associates, their heirs and successors, to build a town * * * ^^^^ ^q g^ect a body politic or civil combination among themselves, etc. The chan- cellor says : "I should conclude that such a grant as this, proceeding from the English government, would have given a qualified corporate capacity to the inhabitants of Hempstead," and he then shows that this is true a fortiori of a Dutch grant, since under the common law of the Dutch, corporations were created with "less ceremony and diffi- culty even than with us."''^ The implication is in every case that the «' Inhabitants &c. v. Wood, 13 nings, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 172; Mahony Mass. 193; 1 Dillon Mimic. Corp., v. Bank, 4 Ark. 620; Trustees &c. v. § 43. Parks, 10 Maine 441 ; People v. Farn- "^Bow V. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351. ham, 35 111. 562; Jameson v. People, '"Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. (N, 16 111. 257; s. c. 63 Am. D. 304; Y.) 9; Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. School Com'rs v. Dean, 2 St. & P. Ch. (N. Y.) 320; Town of North (Ala.) 190; Cooley Const. Lim. 238; Hempstead v. Town of Hempstead, 2 Angell & Ames Corp., § 77. Wend. (N. Y.) 109; Coburn v. Ellen- "Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. wood, 4 N. H. 99; Stebbins v. Jen- (N. Y.) 320. 51 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 41 intent of the creating power was to erect a corporation ; and as the intent of that power is controlling, the corporation is deemed to have been therei;pon erected. The words "creation by implication," with- out having in mind the above qualifications, are misleading. But the intent of the legislature must be clearly shown, as the onus probandi rests on those who endeavor to prove the existence of a corporation by implication.'^- So it has been held that creation by implication will not be recognized by the courts, unless it appears that the powers conferred by the legislature can be enjoyed only through such implied incorporation, and in no other way.'^ And it has even been declared that the doctrine of creation by implication will be upheld only where a contract made in good faith can not otherwise be enforced.'* The creation of corporations by implication, as the term is used, relates not so much to the act of creating as to the method of proving cor- porate existence. The presumption of corporate existence, after a long space of time, when proof exists of the continued exercise of cor- porate functions, is not unreasonable, and particularly so where the legislature has by acts recognized such corporate existence. § 41. Creation of municipal corporations in the United States — (a) In general. — Until comparatively recent times there were no gen- eral laws regulating and providing for the incorporation of municipal- ities under general rules. In this country, as in England, each district, as its population increased to a point where incorporation became necessary or expedient, applied to the legislature for a special charter, by virtue of which it assumed corporate existence. But this system of incorporation was open to grave and obvious abuses. Being in the nature of special legislation, it possessed all the disadvantages inci- dent to such legislation. The privileges granted by the special charter were greater in the case of one city than of another; and these dis- parities, with their consequent jealousies, gave just cause for popular dissatisfaction for the system of incorporation by special charter. A remedy was found in establishing general laws under which each dis- trict could, by a method of procedure established by the statute, pro- cure its own incorporation whenever it became necessary or desirable. Under these general and uniform laws there was no longer any dis- parity in the privileges of the different municipalities. Each village, town, city or school district was one of a certain class sharing alike "Society &c. v. Pawlet, 4 Peters Corp., § 43; Cooley Const. Lim. 238; 480; Medical Institution v. Patter- 15 Am. & Bng. Encyc. of Law 960. son, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 61; s. c. 5 ''^ Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. Denio (N. Y.) 618; Myers v. Irwin, (Mass.) 172. 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 368; Wells v. Bur- '^ Blair v. West Point, 2 McCrary bank, 17 N. H. 393; 1 Dillon Munic. 459. § 42 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 52 the powers and liabilities of the class according to the provisions of the general incorporating act. The great advantage of this system has been universally recognized, and it is used in all of the United States at the present day. In most of the states the legislature is expressly forbidden to incorporate towns or cities by special charter, but it is still allowed in several of the states.''^ In many of the states by constitution or statutory enactment cities operating under special charters are permitted to reorganize under the general law by compli- ance with certain statutory methods of procedure. Where a city is incorporated under a special charter, and reincorporates under a gen- eral law, and the latter contains no provisions relating to schools, it does not abrogate the provisions of the special charter relating to schools. It is only where the provisions of the special charter are in- consistent with the general law that they are repealed.'^'' § 42. (b) By special charter. — Judge Dillon gives an excellent out- line of the provisions of the ordinary special charter creating a munici- pal corporation. He observes that while these charters were on the whole constructed according to one general model, there was great va- riety in the particular provisions of the difEerent charters as to the powers conferred and the liabilities imposed on the corporation. Fol- lowing his outline of the provisions of such a charter, we find that the first incorporating clause of the instrument usually declares "that the inhabitants of the town of Dale are hereby constituted a body politic and corporate by the name of 'The Town of Dale,' and by that name shall have perpetual succession, may use a common seal, sue and be sued, purchase, hold and sell property," etc. The charter then pro- ceeds to provide for the legislative body of the municipal corporation, usually called the town or city council, regulating the number of councilmen or aldermen and the organization of the body. The quali- fications of voters are then prescribed and the manner of holding elec- ''^ In the following states the legis- Alabama: 15 Am. & Bng. Encyc. of lature was allowed to create munici- Law, tit. Munic. Corp., p. 958, n. 3. pal corporations by special act: New The constitution of Missouri pro- York (Constitution 1846, art. 8, § 1) ; hibits the creation of any municipal Michigan (Constitution 1850. art. 15, corporation by special act, unless the § 1); California (Constitution 1849, city contain at least five thousand art. 4, § 31) ; Minnesota (Constitu- inhabitants; and in that case the tion 1857, art. 10, § 2) ; Oregon (Con- special charter must be approved by stitution 1857, art. 11, § 2); Louisi- a vote of the people: Constitution ana (Constitution 1864, title 7, art. 1865, art. 8, § 5. 121); Nevada (Constitution 1864, '« Brenan v. People, 176 III. 620; s. art. 8, § 1). Also in Maine, Mary- c. 52 N. E. 353. land, North Carolina, Texas and 53 OF THE CREATION OF TPIE CORPORATION. § 43 tions for the members of tlie eouncil and for the executive officers of the town. The powers and duties of these executives are defined and limited. The charter generally closes with a specific enumeration of the powers of the city council, which are numerous, and include the right to levy taxes for municipal purposes, to enact ordinances to pro- tect the healtli and safety of the citizens of the town, and in general to exercise those subordinate powers of local legislation which the state deemed it necessary and expedient to delegate to the council for the purposes of local self-government.' ' §43. (c) By general municipal incorporating acts. — The legisla- tures of the several states, in compliance with the provisions of their constitutions respectively, and subject to the limitations imposed by those provisions, have passed general incorporating and enabling acts providing for the incorporation and government of municipalities within the limits of the state. These acts generally provide in sub- stance that all corporations organized for purposes of municipal gov- ernment shall be divided into certain specified classes, according to the number of inhabitants of the city, town or village. The manner of incorporating each class, and the powers, duties and liabilities of the several classes, are fully prescribed by the act. The method of incorporation, and the powers, duties and liabilities of each class, differ from those of the other classes ; but the method of incorporation, the powers, duties and liabilities of the corporations included in any one of the classes, are always uniform. It is sometimes provided in these acts that all special charters theretofore granted shall be re- pealed and abolished, and that all the municipal corporations of the state, whether created before or after the passage of the act, shall be governed by its provisions.'^® On the other hand, it is at times pre- scribed that municipalities previously incorporated by special act of the legislature shall not be affected by the passage of the general act, unless such corporation shall elect to come in and submit to the pro- visions of the general act.^^ § 44. Constitutional limitations of legislative power to create municipal corporations. — In many of the states there are constitu- tional provisions that the legislature shall provide by general law for '" 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 39. a given subject, the special charter ''^ See post, ch. 4. on that subject remains in force if ^^ Burke v. Jeffries, 20 Iowa 145. the general law provides that all Where a city, organized under a spe- laws and parts of laws not inconsist- cial charter, reorganizes under a ent therewith shall remain in force: general law and there is no provi- Smith v. People, 154 111. 58; s. c. 39 sion of the general law applicable to N. E. 319. § 45 rUBLTC CORPOllATIONS. 54 the organization of cities, towns and municipalities, and the creation of municipal corporations by special act is expressly forbidden.®" Some of the states have provided that their legislatures shall create a uniform system of county, town and municipal government.**^ Mas- sachusetts®^ provides that the legislature may charter cities in towns having more than twelve thousand inhabitants. Pennsylvania®^ and Texas®* have the same provision in regard to towns of over ten thou- sand. In Missouri®^ and California,®'' the remarkable provision ex- ists that any city having a population of more than a hundred thou- sand may frame a charter for itself. This, as of course, is subject to special restrictions, and the method in which the charter shall be framed is carefully deiined. § 45. Construction of such constitutional limitations — (a) Corpo- rations "for municipal purposes" and "bodies politic or corporate." — The constitutions of Missouri and Illinois, of California and of Ala- ™This is the case in Ohio (Consti- tution, art. 13, § 6); Illinois (Con- stitution, art. 10, § 6); Michigan (Constitution, art. 15, § 13); Wis- consin (Constitution, art. 11, § 3); Kansas (Constitution, art. 12, § 5); Nebraska (Constitution, art. 10, §§ 4, 5) ; Virginia (Constitution, art. 6, § 20); North Carolina (Constitu- tion, art. 8, § 4) ; Missouri (Con- stitution, art. 9, § 7); Arkansas (Constitution, art. 12, § 3) ; Califor- nia (Constitution, art. 11, § 6); and Nevada (Constitution, art. 8, § 8). Also in Iowa, New Jersey, West Vir- ginia, Tennessee, Florida and Indi- ana. This constitutional provision is construed in Ohio by Thomas v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St. 124; Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85; Atkinson v. Marietta &c. R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21; State V. City of Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; in Illinois by Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548; in Wis- consin by State v. Forest Co., 74 Wis. 610; s. c. 43 N. W. 551; At- torney-General V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425; Kimball v. Rosen- dale, 42 Wis. 407; s. c. 24 Am. R. 421; Stevens Point &c. Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis. 295; Land &c. Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. 294; s. c. 40 N. W. 482; 3 L. R. A. 472; in Kansas by City of Wy- andotte V. Wood, 5 Kan. 603; Atchi- son V. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124; in New Jersey by State v. Mayor &c., 40 N. J. L. 550; State v. Borough &c., 52 N. J. L. 32; s. c. 18 Atl. 694; 6 L. R. A. 57; in Missouri by State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458; in Nebraska by Dundy v. Board of Com'rs &c., 8 Neb. 508; in Indiana by City of La- fayette V. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70; in Iowa by Von Phul v. Hammer, 29 Iowa 222. See also, School District V. Insurance Co., 101 U. S.. 472; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., §§ 45-49; Morawetz Corp. (2d ed.), §§ 9-13. "Wisconsin (Constitution, art. 4, § 23) ; Missouri (Constitution, art. 9, § 7) ; California (Constitution, art. 11, § 4; Nevada (Constitution, art. 4, § 25); Georgia (Constitution, art. 11, § 31); Florida (Constitution, art. 4, § 21). See State v. Riordan, 24 Wis. 484; State v. Dousman, 28 Wis. 541; State v. Forest Co., 74 Wis. 610; s. c. 43 N. W. 551; State v. Stark, 18 Fla. 255; Lake v. State, 18 Fla. 501. ^- Constitutional Amendments, 2. *' Constitution, art. 15, § 1. ^ Constitution, art. 11, § 4. "^ Constitution, art. 9, § 16. «» Constitution, art. 11, § 8. 55 OF Tllli CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 46 baina, prohibit the creation ])y special act of corporations "for munici- pal purposes." In Missouri it has been held that such a corporation must be connected with the municipal corporation itself and must be connected with the municipalities;^'^ and a corporation formed for the purpose of filling up ponds in the city of St. Louis was considered to Ije for municipal purposes within the meaning of the act.^^ In Illinois an act organizing a board of park commissioners was held to be constitutional under this restriction.**" In an Alabama case a special act creating a corporation to carry on a public school was held to be constitutional. ^"^ A county in California has been held not to be a corporation for municipal purposes;®^ and it has also been held that under this constitutional limitation no powers can be conferred upon a corporation created for other than municipal purposes, except by general acts.*'- The constitution of New York provides that a two-thirds majority of the general assembly shall be necessary for the passage of any act "creating, continuing, altering or renewing any body politic or corporate." The term "body politic or corporate" has been construed to include public as well as private corporations.®^ § 46. (b) "Corporate powers." — In Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio and New Jersey there are constitutional provisions that the legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers. This prohibi- tion has been held in Kansas and Ohio to apply to acts creating munici- pal corporations;®* but in New Jersey the provision has been con- strued to include only private corporations.®^ In Nebraska an act authorizing a school district to issue bonds to build a school-house "State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458. »* In re City of Council Grove, 20 ^' Board &c. v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247. Kan. 619; City of Wyandotte v. «» People v. Salomon, 51 111. 37. Wood, 5 Kan. 603; Atchison v. Bar- ^Horton v. Mobile School Com'rs, tholow, 4 Kan. 124; Gilmore v. Mor- 43 Ala. 598. ton, 10 Kan. 491; State v. City of «' People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489; Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; State v. s. c. 22 Pac. 851; 29 Am. & Eng. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 18; State v. Corp. Cas. 37. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592; State v. ^= San Francisco v. Spring Valley Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98; s. c. 1 N. E. Waterworks, 48 Cal. 493. The dual 439. See generally on this subject: nature of the municipal government Commercial Nat. Bank v. City of of the county and city of San Fran- lola, 2 Dillon 353; s. c. 20 Wall. 655; Cisco explained, in Kahn v. Sutro, Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678; 114 Cal. 316; s. c. 46 Pac. 87; 33 L. Savings Assn. v. Topeka, 3 Dillon R. A. 620. 376; School Dist. v. Insurance Co., »'Purdy V. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 103 U. S. 707. 384; rev'g s. c. 2 Hill (N. Y.) 31. »= State v. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 550. § 47 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 56 "was considered void as coming within the prohibition of the provi- sion.^® § 47. Miscellaneous instances of such constitutional limitations. — A provision in the Ehode Island constitution that when any bill shall be presented to create a corporation for any other than for religious, literary or charitable purposes, or for a military or fire company, it shall be continued till another election of members of the general assembly shall have taken place, and public notice of its pendency shall be given, does not apply to public corporations.^'^ In California there is a constitutional provision that the charters of cities must be consistent with and subject to the constitution of the state. Under this prohibition it has been held that charters repugnant in some of their provisions to the general laws of the state are not entirely valid. ''^ Constitutional limitations on the legislative power to incor- porate towns and cities must of course be construed with reference to other portions of the constitutions and the statutes.^ ^ § 48. Incorporation by courts. — The legislatures of certain states authorize and empower a court to incorporate a certain district upon the petition of a designated number of the inliabitants of the district. The constitutionality of such acts has been questioned as being an undue delegation of legislative powers. In Iowa such an act has "^Clegg V. School Dist, 8 Neb. 178; and change the boundaries of the Dundy v. Board &c., 8 Neb. 508. In towns in their respective counties;" Kansas, however, an act for the and a special act divided Forest same purpose has been upheld as not county into three towns, and pro- unconstitutional : Beach v. Leahy, vided that none of said towns should 11 Kan. 23. "be divided, vacated or have the "^ State V. District of Narragan- boundaries thereof changed by the sett, 16 R. I. 424; s. c. 16 Atl. 901. board of supervisors of said county ^^ In re Strand (Cal.), 21 Pac. 654; until the question of said division," Brooks V. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173; s. c. etc., "be submitted to a vote of the 21 Pac. 652; 4 L. R. A. 429. legal electors of the town or towns ^ So when the constitution of Wis- to be affected thereby," on petition consin provided that "the legislature of two-fifths of such legal voters, — it may confer on the boards of super- was held that such act was not un- visors of the several counties, . . . constitutional because it was a dis- such powers, of a local, legislative crimination between counties, as the and administrative character, as legislature has power to resume the they shall from time to time pre- authority conferred by sections 670, scribe;" and the statutes (R. S., §§ 671, upon the county boards: State 670, 671) delegated to the county v. Forest Co., 74 Wis. 610; s. c. 43 N. board of the several counties the W. 551. power "to set off, organize, vacate 57 OF THE OKKATION OF THE CORrORATIOX. 48 been upheld as not being unconstitntional.^"" A similar ruling has been made in the courts of Colorado."^ But in Wisconsin an act authorizing the district judge to declare a town or village incorporated upon the petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants praying for such incorporation, was declared unconstitutional as being a dele- gation of legislative functions to a judicial court.^"^ In Arkansas, 100 rpjjg code of Iowa provides that where the inhabitants of any part of any county not embraced in any in- corporated city or town shall desire to be organized into a city or town, they may apply to the district court by petition signed by not less than twenty-five of the qualified electors of such territory, and the court shall appoint commissioners to call an election in the territory; and, if the election be in favor of the incorpo- ration, the clerk shall give notice of the result, and copies of all the pa- pers and record entries shall be filed in the recorder's office of the county and in the office of the secretary of state; and when such papers are filed, and officers elected, the incor- poration shall be complete. The sections further provide for the an- nexation of territory to an incorpo- rated city or town on the filing of a like petition and having like pro- ceedings. It v/as held that the act is not unconstitutional as authoriz- ing the creation of a municipal cor- poration by judicial act instead of by the legislature, since the only power thereby conferred on the court is the appointment of com- missioners of the election: Ford v. Town of North Des Moines, 80 Iowa 626; s. c. 45 N. W. 1031. •"> People V. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553; s. c. 16 Pac. 298. See also. Mayor &c. V. Shelton, 1 Head (Tenn.) 24. '"= Territory v. Stewart, 1 Wash. 98; s. c. 23 Pac. 405; 8 L. R. A. 106; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 22, where the judge expressly dissented from the doctrine of People v. Fleming, supra; and quoted Judge Cooley (Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 141), as follows: — "We think the better doctrine is that laid down by Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, which is as follows: — 'The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears to be that except in those cases where, by the constitu- tion, the people have not expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision, the function of legislation can not be exercised by them even to the extent of accepting or neglecting a law which has been framed for their consideration.' " But the same learned author quoted by the judge in the case just cited says elsewhere, after referring to the power of the legislature to create and abolish mu- nicipal corporations without refer- ence to the desires of the Incorpo- rators: — "Nevertheless, as the cor- porators have a special and peculiar interest in the terms and conditions of the charter, in the powers con- ferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general question wheth- er they shall originally be or after- wards remain incorporated at all or not, and as the burdens of municipal government must rest upon their shoulders, and especially as by be- coming incorporated they are held in law to undertake to discharge the duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their voice should be heard on the question of their incorporation, and that their decisions should be conclusive un- less for strong reason of state policy and local necessity it should seem important for the state to overrule 49 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 58 also, the courts have decided that the legislature can not delegate to the courts the power to create municipal corporations."^ § 49. The same subject continued. — In order that the courts may- acquire jurisdiction under these acts it is necessary for the petition for incorporation to be signed by the proportion of inhabitants re- quired by the statute.^"* The findings of the court in these cases will not in general be disturbed by appellate courts ;^*'^ and the the opinion of the local majority. The right to refer any legislation of this character to the people pecu- liarly interested does not seem to be questioned and the reference is by no means unusual:" Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 139; citing Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 78; Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 33; Mor- ford V. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; President ■&c. V. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Maine 58; Commonwealth v. Judges &c., 8 Pa. St. 391; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214; Call v. Chadbourne, 46 Maine 206; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Hobai't V. Supervisors &c., 17 Cal. 23; Bank &c. v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467: Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. (Del.) 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill (Md.) 11; Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185; Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43; People v. City of Butte, 4 Mont. 174; s. c. 1 Pac. 414; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Smyth v. Titcomb, 31 Maine 272; Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 111. 94; Lammert v. Lid- well, 62 Mo. 188; Mayor &c. v. Fin- ney, 54 Ga. 317; Response to House Resolution, 55 Mo. 295; People v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553; s. c. 16 Pac. 298; Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Tex. 62; s. c. 2 S. W. 742. '"" State y. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81; State v. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419. See also. State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540. Under Iowa Code, §§ 569, 570, — proceedings to incorporate a town, — application must be presented to the court and not the judge: State v. Council, 106 Iowa 731; s. c. 77 N. W. 474. ^"^ So under the Pennsylvania stat- ute it has been held that where a court finds that it is doubtful if a petition for the incorporation of a borough is signed by a majority of the freeholders residing within the proposed limits, it loses jurisdiction to entertain the petition or take further proceedings thereunder: In re Borough of Taylorsport (Pa.), 18 Atl. 224. And in the same case it was held that the court could not acquire jurisdiction by reducing the territorial limits so that there would be a majority of freeholders left, whose names are on the peti- tion: In re Borough of Taylorsport (Pa.), 18 Atl. 224. "^ As when, upon proceedings by a village under Iowa Code, §§ 440- 446, to be severed from the lim- its and control of an incorporated town, the trial court has found in favor of the petitioners, the supreme court will not disturb such finding, unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion: Ashley v. Town of Calliope, 71 Iowa 466; s. c. 32 N. W. 458. And where the Texas stat- ute required that, before an election to determine if a city should be in- corporated should be ordered by a county judge, proof should be made before him that the territory sought to be incorporated contained the requisite number of inhabitants, the finding of a county judge in such a case was considered conclusive, as no provision was made for revising 59 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORrORATION-. § 50 provisions of the statiile are construed with considerable liberal- ity.'"" § 50. Classes of cities under general incorporating acts. — As in- dicated in the preceding sections, it is customary under the general municipal incorporating acts for the municipal corporations of the state to be divided into classes according to the number of inhabitants of the incorporated territory. Under these statutes the municipality takes its position in the class to which it belongs without any accept- ance by the incorporators of their allotment to that class. For exam- ple, the Utah law divides cities into classes, and provides the way, but not an exclusive one, by which cities shall determine to which class they belong. Under this provision it was decided that the court would take judicial notice of the class to which a city belongs, and that the city would become a member of its proper class without any- thing done on its part.^^^ And likewise by the Nebraska statute, which provides that "all cities, towns and villages containing more than fifteen hundred and less than fifteen thousand inhabitants shall be cities of the second class, and be governed by the provisions of this chapter, unless they shall adopt a village government, as herein- after provided," — all towns and villages containing more than fifteen hundred and less than fifteen thousand inhabitants are created by the force of such act into cities of the second class, without any ac- ceptance or other act of such town or city, or of its inhabitants.^"® § 51. The corporate limits — Territory of the corporation. — The general incorporating acts make provision for determining the cor- it: State v. Goowin, 69 Tex. 55; s. er upon the probate court to de- c. 5 S. W. 678. Clare any town or village incorpo- ^"^ In Pennsylvania, a proposed bor- rated upon petition, the probate ough which contains a small assem- court has power to declare a town to blage of houses, collocated on the be incorporated as a village: Men- plan of streets and lanes, is entitled denhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570; s. to incorporation by the courts, with c. 22 Pac. 558. Where the report of the concurrence of the grand jury, a grand jury, on a petition for in- under act of Pennsylvania of 1834, corporation of a borough, referred § 1 (Brightly Purd. Dig., p. 196, to "the annexed petition," and it ap- § 1), which provides that "the sev- peared that the petition was en- eral courts of quarter sessions folded with it, but not attached to within the commonwealth shall have the report, it was not error for the power, by and with the concurrence court to order the clerk to attach it: of the grand jury of the county, to In re Incorporation of Pennsburgh incorporate any town or village (Pa.), 13 Atl. 93. within their respective jurisdic- ^"People v. Page, 6 Utah 353; s. tions:" In re Borough of Edgewood, c. 23 Pac. 761. 130 Pa. St. 348; s. c. 18 Atl. 646. And ^«** State v. Babcock, 25 Neb. 709; under General Statutes Kansas, s. c. 41 N. W. 654. 1868, ch. 108, § 1. conferring pow- 51 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 60 porate limits of the municipalities created under those acts; and in the case of incorporation by special act, the limits of the city or town are expressly defined in the act of incorporation. The Pennsylvania statute provides that whenever an application shall be made, by the freeholders of any town, for incorporation into a borough, and the boundaries embrace lands exclusively used for farming, the court of quarter sessions of the county where such application is made may, at the request of the party aggrieved, change such boundaries so as to exclude such land. The proposed boundaries can be modified, "at the request of the party aggrieved," only at the time the charter is before the court for approval.^"** In Texas the fact that the corporate limits include a number of acres of purely agricultural land will not invalidate the corporation."** The description of the territory to be incorporated should be sufficiently definite to allow identification of the territory. Thus in Maine, a description wliich, in a deed by the state, would be sufficient to describe a plantation, sufficiently describes it in the record of a meeting for its organization."^ ^"^ In re Borough of Wilkinsburg, 131 Pa. St. 368; s. c. sub nom. Ap- peal of Singer, 18 Atl. 931. In the same state it has been held that a village seeking to incorporate with itself adjacent territory, with the consent of its landowners, should not be denied the privilege because of objection, made by persons out- side the disputed territory, that tax- able property would be thereby withdrawn from their control: In re Borough of Edgewood, 130 Pa. St. 348; s. c. 18 Atl. 646. And in the same case it was decided that the existence of a natural boundary line between two villages, such as a deep, wooded ravine, is not such division of territory as requires separate corporate existence; and where a majority of the landowners on each side of the ravine demand incorpo- ration with one of the villages into a borough, it can not be said that the limits of that village would be unduly extended, or adjacent terri- tory of the neighboring village in- vaded by granting the application: In re Borough of Edgewood, 130 Pa. St. 348; s. c. 18 Atl. 646. "" State V. Town of Baird, 79 Tex. 63; s. c. 15 S. W. 98. And under the same Texas statute, where a town has been incorporated by a legal election, its incorporation will not be declared invalid because there is in- cluded within the corporate limits land not laid off into lots or blocks, and the house of one relator, who, though he does no business in the town, yet attends church in it, and sends his children to school there; State V. Town of Baird, 79 Tex. 63; s. c. 15 S. W. 98. The law does not contemplate the inclusion of farm lands not adapted to municipal pur- poses in corporate limits: State v. Mote, 48 Neb. 683; s. c. 67 N. W. 810. The fact that creating certain territory into a borough may not be immediately advantageous to a few property owners will not prevent in- corporation, where it will be greatly advantageous to the entire com- munity: In re Borough of Prospect Park, 166 Pa. St. 502; s. c. 31 Atl. 257. It may include unplatted farm land: Indiana Imp. Co. v. Wagner, 138 Ind. 658; s. c. 38 N. E. 49. "' State V. Woodbury, 76 Maine 457. 61 OF THK CRKATJOX OF I'llI': COlil'OIJATION. § 53 § 52. Acceptance of charter by corporators not necessary. — It is now well .si'ttk'd that the consent of the corporators is not necessary to the validity of the incorporation of niunici[)a]ities. The acts, whi'ther general or special, creating municipal corporations, are laws, and as such are binding upon all persons subject thereto, whether consenting or unwilling."- Although this power of the legislature to force a municipal corporation u})on unwilling corporators is un- doubted, the exercise of such power has been held to be contrary to the genius of our government.^^^ § 53. The same subject continued. — ^Although the legislature is not bound to consider the wishes of the corporators in creating munic- ipal corporations, it is constitutional for the legislature to submit a proposed charter to the inhabitants of the district to be incorpo- rated, to be adopted or rejected by a vote of those inhabitants.^^* Thus, the question of the consolidation of Pittsburg and certain ad- jacent districts into one corporation was submitted to the vote of the persons interested ; and the act submitting the proposed measure was considered constitutional."^ On the same principle it has been held in New York that a statute atfecting a certain municipality shall terminate unless assented to by the voters of the corporation within a fixed time.^^® "= People v. City of Butte, 4 Mont. 174; s. c. 1 Pac. 414; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Maine 58; Berlin v. Gorham. 34 N. H. 266; State v. Can- terbury, 28 N. H. 195, 218; Bristol V. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; State v. Curran, 12 Ark. 321; People v. Wren, 5 111. 269; Coles v. Madison Co., 1 111. 154; Warren v. Mayor &c., 2 Gray (Mass.) 84; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; Fire Depart- ment v. Kip, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 267; People V. President &c., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 351; People v. Stout, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 349; Proprietors &c. v. Hor- ton, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 501; Wood v. President &c., 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 194; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; Tay- lor V. New Berne, 2 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 141; State v. Babcock, 25 Neb. 709; s. c. 41 N. W. 654; Zabriskie v. Rail- road Co., 23 How. 381. "^President &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 385. '"Mayor &c. v. Finney, 54 Ga. 317; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652; Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43; Call v. Chadbourne, 46 Maine 206; People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489; s. c. 22 Pac. 851; People v. Salomon, 51 111. 37; People V. Reynolds, 10 111. 1; Presi- dent &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; Chosen Freeholders &c. v. State, 24 N. J. L. 718; In re Henry St., 123 Pa. St. 346; s. c. 16 Atl. 785; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214; Commonwealth v. Judges, 8 Pa. St. 391; Bull V. Read, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 78; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State V. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Lafay- ette &c. R. Co. V. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279; Foote V. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio 408. "= Smith V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359. ""Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 33. § 54 PUBLIC COKPORATIONS. 62 ^ 54. Substantial compliance with incorporating acts neces- sary. — If the requirements of the acts authorizing the creation of municipal corporations are substantially followed, the courts will in general uphold the proceedings, and will not declare the incorporation void because unessential formalities have been overlooked in whole or in part. So in Nebraska, where it was apparent that a city of the second class had in fact been duly organized in good faith, mere irregularities in some of the proceedings would not, it was held, render the organization void.^^^ Following this principle, the courts will presume that the necessary formalities were performed in the absence of proof to the contrary."^ Nor is it always necessary for the records to show on their face that all the conditions required, by the statute were present.^ ^^ "' City of Omaha v. City of Soutti Omaha, 31 Neb. 378; s. c. 47 N. W. 1113. lis por instance, where a commit- tee was appointed by the court to establish the divisional line between towns in response to a petition in accordance with the Vermont stat- ute, it was presumed, on exceptions to the committee's report, that all the facts alleged in the petition, and which were necessary to be estab- lished in order to entitle the peti- tioner to the relief prayed for, were either admitted or proved at the pre- liminary hearing: Town of Somer- set V. Town of Glastenbury, 61 Vt. 449; s. c. 17 Atl. 748. And in the same case it was held that it was not necessary that it should appear by the report of the committee that they were sworn as required by law: Town of Somerset v. Town of Glastenbury, 61 Vt. 449; s. c. 17 Atl. 748. "» By the code of West Virginia of 1887, ch. 47, § 49. it is provided that the corporate limits of towns containing a population of less than two thousand inhabitants shall be changed by a vote ordered by the council, the result of which vote, if in favor of the change, shall be certified to the circuit court. Sec- tion 49 provides that the circuit court shall enter an order approv- ing and confirming the change, and directing a copy certified to the council, etc. It was held to be not necessary to the validity of the or- der approving such change that it should show on its face that the town contained less than two thousand inhabitants: Davis v. Town of Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289; s. c. 9 S. E. 228; Point Pleasant Bridge Co. v. Town of Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 328; s. c. 9 S. B. 231. See also, At- torney-General V. Rice, 64 Mich. 385; s. c. 31 N. W. 203. But where the Pennsylvania statute required that a petition for the incorporation of a borough should be signed by the pe- titioners within three months im- mediately preceding its presentation to the court, that fact need not be stated in the petition, but must ap- pear in the record: In re Summit Borough, 114 Pa. St. 362; s. c. 7 Atl. 219; In re Osborne, 101 Pa. St. 284. The prelimianry steps in re- gard to the formation of a munici- pal corporation are usually pre- scribed by the statute and must be substantially complied with, as to notice, petition, description and otherwise. The requirements pre- liminary to organization are man- datory: Huff V. Preuitt (Tex. Civ. App.), 53 S. W. 844; State v. Frost, 63 OF THE CEEATIOX OP THE CORPORATION. § 55 § 55. Instances of irregularities in incorporation. — The Pennsyl- vania act of 1834, relating to the incorporation of boroughs, pro- vided for a reference of an application for incorporation to the grand jury, and that, if a majority thereof, "after a full investigation of the case, shall find that the conditions presented by this act have been complied with, and shall believe that it is expedient to grant the prayer of the petitioners, they shall certify the same to the court." Under this provision an indorsement of "approved" on the petition by the foreman of the grand jury, with his signature, was not considered a sufficient certificate.^-'' But the failure to mark as "filed" a plot of a borough, sought to be incorporated, at the time it was presented, can be cured by an order for it to be so marked nunc pro tunc, according to a decision in the same state.^^^ The constitution of California relat- ing to the adoption of city charters provided that the charter should be "submitted to the legislature for its approval or rejection as a whole, without power of alteration or amendment, and if approved by a majority vote of the members elected to each house, it should become the charter of such city." The resolution of approval need not be in the form of a bill passed in the ordinary manner, and approved by the governor, as the constitution does not make the governor a part of the legislature. ^^^ The sufficiency of the petition as to reasons for annexation is in the discretion of the authority passing upon it.^^^ On an application to a county judge for an election to determine the question of incorporation, a hearing is necessary ; and it is not enough that the judge is satisfied of his own knowledge that the proposed territory has the requisite number of inhabitants.^^* Commission- ers, in incorporating a city of the third class, must state in the order that a majority of the taxpayers are in favor of it ; that the town con- tains over 250 and less than 2,000 inhabitants; and must designate the metes and bounds. ^^^ Piling of a certified copy of the order of the board of supervisors declaring a municipality duly incorporated is necessary to a valid incorporation.^^® 103 Tenn. 685; s. c. 54 S. W. 986; s. c. 21 Pac. 652; 4 L. R. A. 429; In Angel v. Town of Spring City (Tenn. re Strand (Cal.), 21 Pac. 654. Ch.), 53 S. W. 191. An attempted ^=^ Windfall Mfg. Co. v. Emery, organization without complying 142 Ind. 456; s. c. 41 N. E. 814. But with the statutory requirements is see Forsythe v. City of Hammond, void: Town of Woodbury v. Brown, 142 Ind. 505; s. c. 41 N. E. 950; 30 101 Tenn. 707; s. c. 50 S. W. 743. L. R. A. 576. ^-" In re Summit Borough, 114 Pa, ^^ Huff v. Preuitt (Tex. Civ. App.), St. 362; s. c. 7 Atl. 219. 53 S. W. 844. ^"Appealof Gross, 129 Pa. St. 567; ^== State v. Bilby, 60 Kan. 130; s. s. c. 18 Atl. 557. c. 55 Pac. 843. "== Brooks V. Fischer, 79 Cal, 173; '^People v. Town of Linden, 107 Cal. 94; s. c. 40 Pac. 115. § 56 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 64 § 56. Notice of incorporation. — It is frequently provided in the acts relating to the incorporation of municipalities that notice of the proposed incorporation be published for a prescribed period. In Florida it has been held that where such notice has been given, the proceedings for incorporation may be had on the last day of the notice.^^'^ In that case the statute required the notice to be published "for a period of not less than thirty days." According to the judicial construction of this requirement, it was complied with if thirty days' notice had been given by excluding the first and including the last day; and it was held that the statute did not mean thirty clear days.^^^ The notice must be sufficiently explicit to enable the proposed cor- porators to vote intelligently upon the question of incorporation.^^'' And where all the parties interested in proceedings to incorporate a municipality are in court, they can not be heard to object that the notice of the proceedings was insufficient.^^'* § 57. Validity of incorporation — How tested. — The state, being the creator of municipal corporations, is the proper party to impeach the validity of their creation ; and, consequently, where the corporation is acting under color of law and is recognized by the state as so acting, its corporate existence can not be collaterally attacked.^^^ This doc- trine applies even though the validity of the incorporation may be '^' State V. Town of Winter Park, "" In re Edgewood Borough, 130 25 Fla. 371; s. c. 5 So. 818. Pa. St. 348; s. c. 18 Atl. 646. '=" State V. Town of Winter Park, ^'^ Society &c. v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 25 Fla. 371; s. c. 5 So. 818. 480; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich. 28 *=®A notice by the county super- People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 visors of an election to decide upon banning v. Carpenter, 20 N. Y. 447 the incorporation of a California Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41 city, on petition of proper parties, Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis. 486 the notice stating that the "petition Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257; s. c. set forth the boundaries of the pro- 63 Am. D. 304; Tisdale v. President posed corporation, and stated the &c., 46 111. 9; Kettering v. Jackson- number of inhabitants therein to be ville, 50 111. 39; Town of Searcy v. about three thousand," was decided Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269; s. c. 1 S. W. to be a sufficient notice to enable 319; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Shires, the voters to classify the proposed 108 111. 617; Henderson v. Davis, municipal corporation under the 106 N. C. 88; s. c. 11 S. E. 573; Kay- law in cities of the sixth class, ac- ser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; State v. cording to the statute of that state. Fuller, 96 Mo. 165; s. c. 9 S. W. 583; and to vote intelligently upon the State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 367; Hamilton question of incorporation: People v. President &c., 24 111. 22; Worley v. City of Riverside, 70 Cal. 461; s. v. Harris, 82 Ihd. 493; Mendenhall c. 11 Pac. 759. V. Burton, 42 Kan. 570; s. c. 22 Pac. 558. 65 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION". § 58 attacked on constitutional grounds. ^^- In Illinois a town brought an action against a citizen to recover a tax on property in the town, and it was decided by the court that the validity of the incorporation of the town could not be impeached in such an action. ^^^ If the state acquiesces in the validity of a municipal corporation and recognizes the corporation as valid for a long period, it will be estopped from denying the validity of the incorporation.^^* In the words of Judge Cooley : "The state itself may justly be precluded, on the principle of estoppel, from raising such an objection where there has been long acquiescence and recognition."^^^ § 58. The same subject continued. — And it may be laid down as a general principle that where the validity of the incorporation of a mu- nicipality is attacked, the presumption is strongly in favor of its va- lidity.^^" In a Wisconsin case it was held, following this principle, that the complaint in an action against a city need not allege that the defendant was a municipal corporation.^^^ A striking application of this doctrine is found in an Indiana case, where an information in a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto to test the legality of the organization and incorporation of a city, which averred that a census was not taken as required by law, and that a majority of the legal voters of the town did not vote in favor of the adoption of a city charter, but which failed to aver that the clerk and inspector did not do their duty, and make a suitable record as required by law, was held bad on demurrer, because such record was considered conclusive as to all questions except as to whether a majority of the votes cast- were in favor of the proposed change. ^^^ § 59. Existence not questioned collaterally. — When a municipal body has assumed under color of authority, and exercised, for any con- ^^^ Board &c. v. Shields, 62 Mo. the same case the information was 247. also held bad on demurrer, because "' Geneva v. Cole, 61 111. 397. it did not show that the plaintiff "* State v. Leatherman, 38 Ark. did not vote in favor of adopting 81; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich, the city charter, or otherwise con- 463; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 43a. cur in the proceedings of which he ^^ Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) complains. And it was further de- 310. cided that the averment that a ma- ^^^ People V. Farnham, 35 111. 562; jority of the legal voters did not Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257; State vote in its favor was not equivalent V. Young, 3 Kan. 445; and cases to an averment that a majority of cited in preceding section. the votes cast were not favorable: "'Rains v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 403. State v. Town of Tipton, 109 Ind. "'State V. Town of Tipton, 109 73; s. c. 9 N. E. 704. Ind. 73; s. c. 9 N. B. 704. And in 1 Smith — 5 S GO PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 66 siderable time, with the consent of the state, the powers of a public corporation, of a kind recognized by the organic law, neither the corporation nor any private party can, in private litigation, question the legality of its existence,^ ^'^ The state being the creator of mu- nicipal corporations, it is the proper party to impeach the validity of their creation ; and where it acquiesces in the validity there can be no collateral attack.^'* ° § 60. The charter of a municipal corporation is a law. — The power of the legislature over the charters of municipal corporations finds its origin in the fact that the acts, whether general or special, creating such corporations, are statutes binding upon the persons affected thereby ; and are not contracts as are the charters of private corpora- tions. Being public statutes or laws they can be amended or re- pealed at the pleasure of the legislature, provided no contractual rights are injured. Unlike the decision of a court, the act of the legislature of this year can not bind the legislature of next year. Each represents a sovereignty, the people, and possesses the same "' Speer v. Board &c., 60 U. S. App. 38; s. c. 88 Fed. 749; National L. Ins. Co. V. Board &c., 27 U. S. App. 244; s. c. 62 Fed. 778; Ashley V. Board &c., 16 U. S. App. 656; s. c. 60 Fed. 55; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463; School Dist. &c. v. State, 29 Kan. 57; Board &c. v. Shields, '62 Mo. 247; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; State v. Rich, 20 Mo. 393; Clement v. Everest, 29 Mich. 19; Donough v. Dewey, 82 Mich. 309; s. c. 46 N. W. 782; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250; Clark v. Com- monwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129; Com- monwealth V. McCombSj 56 Pa. St. 436; Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Dunn, 61 111. App. 227; Rellstab v. Borough of Belmar, 58 N. J. L. 489; s. c. 34 Atl. 885; Eustis v. City of Henri- etta (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 632. "« Shapleigh v. City of San An- gelo, 167 U. S. 646; s. c. 17 S. Ct. 957; Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Tex. 62; s. c. 2 S. W. 742. The constitutionality of the act under which a municipal corporation is created, and the legality of the or- ganization, can not be attacked col- laterally: Chicago &c. R, Co. v. Town of Kentwood, 49 La. An. 931; s. c. 22 So. 192. Quo warranto and not injunction is the appropriate remedy for testing the legality of a corporation: Osborn v. Village of Oakland, 49 Neb. 340; s. c. 68 N. W. 506. In a suit against a railroad for killing stock in the city limits the court can not determine the le- gality of annexing territory: Cleve- land &c. R. Co. V. Dunn, 63 111. App. 531; or in an action to restrain the collection of a tax: Kuhn v. City of Port Townsend, 12 Wash. 605; s. c. 41 Pac. 923; 50 Am. St. 911; 29 L. R. A. 445; or in an action against a property owner to recover taxes: McCrary v. City of Commanche (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 679. A corporation organized under a void act may be rendered valid by a cur- ative act: State v. Berry, 13 Wash. 708; s. c. 42 Pac. 622. A corpora- tion defectively organized may be legalized by the legislature, and its acts rendered valid, where there are no vested rights intervening: State V. McGovern, 100 Wis. 666; s. c. 76 N. W. 593. G7 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § f)l powers, and the same right to exercise its discretion. An illus- tration of this is that a proposed law is often adopted by one legisla- ture which has been rejected by its predecessors for several years. Unless, therefore, an act of legislature assume the form of a contract, it can not be irrevocable.' Otherwise, if a permanent charter could be given by legislation, the most injurious consequences would result. Its policy on great interests, once crystallized into a law, would be fixed and unchangeable. This would retard, perhaps materially injure, the general prosperity. Consequently every legislative body, unless restricted by the constitution, may modify or abolish the acts of its predecessors.^*^ In fact the constitution, as Judge Cooley points out in his treatise on Constitutional Limitations,^*" in conferring the legislative authority, has prescribed to its exercise certain limitations. These limitations were such as the people chose to impose, and no other power but that of the people can superadd other limitations. "To say that the legislature may pass irrepealable laws is to say that it may alter the very constitution from which it derives its authority; since, in so far as one legislature could bind a subsequent one by its enact- ments, it could in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its successors." ^*^ § 61. The American township. — Every state in the Union is as to its internal affairs essentially independent of every other. We might, therefore, expect to see such individuality in the municipal cor- porations erected by the several states as characterized the English local bodies of the seventeenth century. But practically there are three distinct kinds or types of township organizations, which we can call the Pennsylvania., the New York and the Minnesota types. The *first, since practically adopted by Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas and Missouri, has this general structure: it gives the people local self- government; the townships are the state agencies; the officers are the local administrative body; each township has the power of self-taxation, and usually controls the public schools. But there is no right of representation on the county board, nor is there anything corresponding to the town meeting — or folkniote, as it has been called. The county authority is superior to and controls the township, and the inhabitants have no voice except such as is expressed in electing officers at the polls. The New York plan, followed in Michigan, "1 Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean annotations to case of United States 158. V. Port of Mobile, 12 Fed. 768, 772, "= Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.), by Robert Desty; "Legislative Con- ch. 5, p. 149. trol of Municipal Corporations," by "' Upon "Altering Charter," see W. P. Wade, 8 Cent. L. J. 3. § 63 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. G8 Illinois, Wisconsin and Nebraska, gives freest expression to the ^'spirit of localism." Each township is constituted on a general model — it has a definite symmetrical organism; there is a town-meeting, which has powers sufficient to> deal with all local requirements and emergencies; there is subordination, as in the former instance, to the county organization, but the supervisors of the township have seats in the county board, and so the township has fair representation. The Minnesota plan is less perfect; there is no representation on the county board; but the powers possessed are greater than under the Pennsylvania plan, for there is a town-meeting, endued with authority to choose officers and enact by-laws and local ordinances. The New York plan has, it appears, many points of superiority as compared with either of the others. As has been said, it prevails in the Northwest, and may possibly and might well be adopted more widely. § 62. Local self -government a delegation of legislative power. — When municipalities are erected under general or special laws, they are vested with the right of local self-government, carrying with it, expressly or by implication, the right to pass by-laws and ordi- nances; that is, to legislate for local purposes. But it is one of the settled constitutional axioms that the power vested in the legislature to enact laws can not be by that body delegated to any other body or individual. Locke, in his Essay on Civil Government, has the fol- lowing impressive passage: "These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government. First. They are to govern by promulgated, estab- lished laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough. Secondly. These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people. Thirdly. They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the con- sent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. * * * Fourthly. The legislature neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." § 63. The same subject continued. — We have then a seeming conflict — the fact that municipalities have a sort of legislative power which they habitually exercise, as opposed to the principle that legislative power can not be delegated.^** In the first place we ob- 1^ People v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553; State v. Hudson County Com'rs, 37 69 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. § 04 serve that the conferring of powers upon municipalities to pass or- dinances is not a delegation of power ;^*^ and, in the second place the bestowal of these subordinate powers of legislation does not trench on the maxim that legislative power must not be delegated, "since that maxim is to be understood in the light of the immemorial practice of this country and of England, which has always recognized the proprie- ty and policy of vesting in the municipal organizations certain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties immediately in- terested may fairly be supposed more competent to judge of their needs than any central authority. As municipal organizations are mere auxiliaries of the state government in the important business of municipal rule, the legislature may create them at will from its own views of propriety or necessity, and without consulting the parties interested ; and it also possesses the like power to abolish them without stopping to inquire what may be the desire of the corporators on that subject."^ *^ § 64. Corporations de facto. — As in the case of private corporations, so also in the case of municipal corporations, there may be a corpo- ration de facto. When a municipal body has assumed under color of authority, and exercised for a considerable period of time, with the consent of the state, the powers of a public corporation, of the kind recognized by the organic law, neither the corporation nor any pri- vate party can, in private litigation, question the legality of its exist- ence.^*''^ There must be two things existing to constitute a corporation of this character: (1) a law under which the corporation might be created, and (2) a bona fide attempt to organize under the law. A municipality organized under a law afterwards held unconstitutional is a de facto corporation, and its officers are de facto officers until N. J. L. 12; State v. Weir. 33 Iowa 778; 10 C. C. A. 637; Ashley v. Board 134; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 &c., 16 U. S. App. 656; s. c. 60 Fed. Pa. St. 507; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 55; 8C. C. A. 455; People v. Maynard, (Del.) 479; People v. Stout, 23 15 Mich. 463; School Dist.&c. v. State, Barb. (N. Y.) 349. 29 Kan. 57; Board &c. v. Shields, 62 "* State v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44; s. c. Mo. 247; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 8 S. W. 1. 449; Clement v. Everest, 29 Mich. "^Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 19; Donough v. Dewey, 82 Mich. 140; citing President &c. v. Society 309; s. c. 46 N. W. 782; Carleton v. &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; Cheaney v. People, 10 Mich. 250; Clark v. Com- Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 330; Ber- monwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129; Com- lin V. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266. monwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. St. "' Speer v. Board &c., 88 Fed. 749. 436 ; Guthrie Nat. Bank v. City of Cf. National Life Ins. Co. v. Board Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528; s. c. 19 S. Ct. &c., 27 U. S. App. 244; s. c. 62 Fed. 513. S G5 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 70 a writ of ouster and removal has been issued. ^'*^ It is sometimes con- tended that there can be no de facto corporation under an unconstitu- tional law. The acts of a de facto corporation or officer under an unconstitutional law, before its invalidity is challenged or declared by the judicial department of the government, can not be avoided, as against the interests of the public or third parties who have acted or invested in good faith in reliance upon their validity, by any ex post facto declaration or decision that the law under which they acted was void.^*** But where there is no law authorizing a de jure corpo- ration there can be no de facto corporation.^ ^*^ It must be understood of course that it will be treated as a de facto corporation until the law has been declared unconstitutional. And so an officer acting under an unconstitutional law is acting under color of law and is an officer de facto.^^^ § 65. Effect of incorporation. — The incorporation of a town as a city does not destroy its identity, and property held in trust for the former will be held in trust for the latter without a decree, of court vesting it in the latter.^^^ And where a municipal corporation is or- ganized it has jurisdiction over all valuable improvements within the "^ Attorney-General v. Town of Dover, 62 N. J. L. 138; s. c. 41 Atl. 98. "" Speer v. Board &c., 88 Fed. 749; Ashley v. Board &c., 16 U. S. App. 656; s. c. 60 Fed. 55; 8 C. C. A. 455; People V. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463; State V. City of Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521; s. c. 65 N. W. 818; 59 Am. St. 381; 31 L. R. A. 186; State v. Rich, 20 Mo. 393; Board &c. v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247. "° Speer v. Board &c, 88 Fed. 749. Cf. Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425; s. c. 16 S. Ct. 1121; School Dist. &c. V. State, 29 Kan. 57; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463; State v. City of Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521; s. 0. 65 N. W. 818; 59 Am. St. 381; 31 L. R. A. 186; State v. Rich, 20 Mo. 393; Board &c. v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247. ''^'Taylor v. Skrine, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 516; Cocke v. Halsey, 16 Pet. 71; People v. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250; Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129; Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. St. 436; City of Guthrie v. Wylie, 6 Okla. 61; s. c. 55 Pac. 103. Because a general stat- ute for the formation of boroughs is held unconstitutional in a pro- ceeding to test the de jure existence of one corporation under such stat- ute, it does not affect the de facto existence of another corporation un- der the same act: Coast Co. v. Bor- ough of Spring Lake, 56 N. J. Eq. 615; s. c. 36 Atl. 21. A city organ- ized before the passage of the or- ganic act of May 2, 1890, did not be- come a corporation de jure or de facto: City of Guthrie v. Wylie, 6 Okla. 61; s. c. 55 Pac. 103. Facts alleged held sufficient to establish a de facto corporation, in Gilkey v. Town of How, 105 Wis. 41; s. c. 81 N. W. 120. "^ Higginson v. Turner, 171 Mass, 586; s. c. 37 N. E. 172. 71 OF THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATION. 65 corporate limits made by the county prior to the incorporation. ^^^ Cor- porations legally effected do not become responsible for debts of volun- tary associations previously existing. ^^* While the repeal of a charter abolishes the old corporation, where, however, substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation, either with extended or restricted limits, the new corporation is treated in law as the successor of the old and is entitled to its property rights and subject to its liabilities.^^^ 153 Where the owner of land subdi- vided it and dedicated the streets to the public and constructed private sewers in the streets, independent of and in no way connected with the village sewers, and subsequently the village is incorporated as a city, and the city constructed a main sewer through the subdivision which ren- dered of no value the private sewers, the city is liable for their value, plaintiff having only parted with an easement: Wright v. City of Mt. Vernon, 60 N. Y. S. 1017; s. c. 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 574; Almand v. Atlanta &c. R. Co., 108 Ga. 417; s. c. 34 S. E. 6. '""City of Guthrie v. T. W. Har- vey Lumber Co., 9 Okla. 464; s. c. 60 Pac. 247, A statute making new corporation liable for debts of the old — incorporation is constitutional: White V. City of Quanah (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 839. 1°= Shapleigh v. City of San An- gelo, 167 U. S. 646, 653; s. c. 17 S. Ct. 957; Mount Pleasant v. Beck- with, 100 U. S. 514,-520; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 398. Where the new corporation succeeds to all rights and is subject to all the obligations of the old cor- poration, it may proceed to assess benefits and appraise damages occa- sioned by change in the grade by the old corporation, no action hav- ing been taken by the latter: Gilpin V. City of Ansonia, 68 Conn, 72; s. c. 35 Atl. 777. CHAPTER III. THE CHARTER. Section 66. Early charters. 67. Political element in charters. 68. Charters at the present day. 69. Municipal charters not within the rule of the Dartmouth College case. 70. The present English statutes. 71. The municipal corporation acts and the royal prerogative. 72. Contents of charter. 73. Prominent features of special charters. 74. "What charters can not confer. 75. Wherein the constitutional limi- tation consists. 76. Acceptance — When necessary. 77. The same subject continued. 78. Compulsory acceptance. 79. Charters, how proved. 80. Proof of fact of incorporation. 81. Proof of corporate existence. 82. General rules of construction of charters. 83. Can charters be modified? Section 84. How far the state can enforce performance of local duties. 85. Change in municipal bound- aries. 86. Effect of amendments of char- ter on city ordinances. 87. Reorganization under general law — Effect of. 88. Reorganization must be strictly according to statute. 89. The same subject continued. 90. Effect of adoption of a new constitution. 91. How far special legislation is permissible. 92. Written constitutions — Opera- tion of. ■93. Power to make by-laws — How limited. 94. Conflict of by-laws and general acts. 95. The ordinance, when passed, must be reasonable. 96. Reasonableness — How deter- mined. § 66. Early charters. — The word "charter" is derived from the Latin word "charta," which signified first a leaf of the Egyptian papy- rus, through the Greek 6 Ka/anys, and then any material to write upon, and subsequently any instrument or writing under seal. Charta regia or a royal charter, was an instrument in writing conferring a grant from the crown on any person or persons, or any body politic, of any rights, liberties, franchises or privileges.^ The early charters were called "muniments," as they "fortified and defended that which was granted,"^ In a history of Charles V, by Dr. Eobertson, the manner ^ Bracton, fol. 336; The Prince's a muniendo, quia muniunt et de- Case, 8 Co. 1. fendunt hsereditatem : " 4 Co. 153. ^ "Chartae sont appelle 'muniments' (73) 73 THE CHARTER. § 67 in which the early charters were granted is exhaustively examined. The learned author points out that during the existence of the feudal system, and the turbulence and disorder attendant upon it throughout Europe, personal safety was the first great object of every individual. The barons, being the great military lords, were the only ones strong enough to afford protection, and hence the people, for the sake of their protection, would become their vassals, and surrender some rights or a part of their independence in exchange. But when a large number of persons came to be assembled in communities, their number and the fortifications of the place were equally reliable means of defense. So charters, were either granted by or wrung from the lords, or drawn up among the individuals of the community, in which they bound themselves under solemn oath to aid in the mutual defense, and the redress of any injury or affront to any individual member. Any one subsequently entering the community had to subject himself to the same oaths and conditions. Little by little local regulations, developing later into a system or code of law, were made and enforced. In addition to the obligation to aid in maintain- ing the personal security of every member of the community, the charter usually required every member to buy a house or land, or to keep a considerable amount of his personal property within the town, so that he might thus be interested in the common security of prop- erty. The community usually was subject to some fixed tax payable to the feudal superior, who was grantor of the charter, and which, was accepted by him in lieu of arbitrary imposts and taxes; and the pay- ment of this sum was evenly distributed. So general, in short, was the practical independence of members of such communities that they were called "libertates." § 67. Political element in charters. — Security of life and then se- curity of property having been acquired, a desire for a higher inde- pendence arose. In England, the dominant idea, both of lords and people, being the encouragement of commerce, the custom soon ob- tained of allowing the merchants to form guilds, with power of making their own regulations. We have already seen the manner in which the privileges of the guilds grew into the privileges of towns. A measure of domestic jurisdiction was given to the more important towns ; that is, the towns in which the larger guilds were located. The guild might continue separate and distinct from the town, or it might become merged in and identified with it. But wheresoever there was an identification of the two, a political character was immediately given to the community interests. The object of the members was to ac- quire greater local independence, and less interference by any outside § G8 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 74 and superior powers. And the financial importance of the merchants of England was the means by which they secured many of their rights and privileges. Many charters had been granted and enjoyed before the principle was generally held that the towns so enfranchised were corporations; and many towns were deemed corporations without ex- press words of incorporation having been used. In the reign of Henry VI^ occurred the first reported instance of allusion to a com- monalty as a body corporate. But no charters, it is believed, really incorporated the burgesses or commonalty of any municipal body until the eighteenth year of the same monarchy in which Kingston-upon- Hull was incorporated.* § 68. Charters at the present day.— A charter of incorporation is the evidence of the act of a legislature, governor, court or other au- thorized department or person, by which a corporation is or was cre- ated.^ A municipal corporation being regarded as a mere agent of government and a depository of political power conferred by the legis- lature, its charter is not a contract, as is the charter of a private cor- poration." It is the absence of the contractual element which leaves a municipal corporation at the mercy, so to speak, of the power that created it; for the reason that there is no vested right to the franchises conferred — they are revocable at the will of the creating power. '^ For the same reason the municipal corporation can exercise only such priv- ileges and rights as are expressly granted to it in its instrument of incorporation, or charter, or by some statute amending or extending it.^ And the creating power, being practically the only party having a voice in giving these privileges, can change, modify or recall any such franchises as the exigencies of the public service or welfare may require. This is now well settled in the decided cases.** ^Year Book, 7 Henry VI, 43. 'Philadelphia v. Pox, 64 Pa. 169; * There are proofs of earlier char- Chase Blackstone 189, n.; 1 Dillon ters being granted to this town; one Munic. Corp. 54. by Edward I, confirmed by Edward ** Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. II, Edward III, Richard II, Henry S. 514, 524. IV and Henry V. But actual terms " Thomas v. City of Richmond, 12 of incorporation were not used prior Wall. 356; Demarest v. New York, to the charter of Henry VI. 74 N. Y. 161. "A municipal corpo- ^ Anderson Law Diet., tit. Char- ration may be viewed in different ter. A charter of a municipality is aspects — that which it has to the not a contract within the meaning citizen, and that which it bears to of the constitution: Covington v. the state. Seen in the latter rela- Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231; s. c. 19 S. tion it is a revocable agency, consti- Ct. 383. tuted for the purpose of carrying " Dartmouth College v. Wood- out in detail such objects of the gov- ward, 4 Wheat. 518, 624, 712. ernment as may be properly in- 75 THE CHARTER. 69 § 69. Municipal charters not within the rule of the Dartmouth College case. — Tlie prohibition in the federal constitution against tliu passage of state laws impairing the obligations of contracts, and the rule in the Dartmouth College case applying this prohibition to stat- utes amending or repealing the charters of private corporations, have no application to public and municipal charters.^^ But while the pro- hibition does not extend to the municipal charter itself, it is applica- ble to contracts made by the municipality prior to the enactment of the amending or repealing statute; and obligations incurred or rights vested prior thereto are not affected by subsequent legislation.^^ Mu- nicipal corporations have vested in them merely a small portion of the public administration, and their charters may be changed at the will of the legislature.^- As has been said, they are established only for the local government of towns or particular districts. The special powers conferred upon them are not vested rights as against the state, but, being wholly political, exist only during the will of the general legislature.^^ These powers can at any time be abrogated by the legislature, either by a general law operating upon the whole trusted to a subordinate, having no vested right to any of its forms or franchises, and entirely under the control of the legislature, which may enlarge or circumscribe its ter- ritorial limits or functions, may change or modify its various de- partments, or extinguish it with the breath of arbitrary power:" 1 Hare Amer. Const. Law 628; 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law 976. It is a continu- ing right not exhausted by one exer- cise: Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash. 17; s. c. 42 Pac. 625. A municipal corporation can be dissolved only by consent of the legislature, or pur- suant to its legislation; nonuser for a time is not sufficient: Coin v. Brown, 111 Mich. 657; s. c. 70 N. W. 337. A statute may provide that the grant of municipal powers shall take effect on the adoption of the representative body: De Hart v. At- lantic City, 62 N. J. L.; s. c. 41 Atl. 687. "The distinction between private and public charters in this regard was fully discussed in Dartmouth College V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, and the ratio decidendi of the case in the federal court as against the decision of the New Hampshire court turned upon the private na- ture of the institution whose char- acter was in question. The sanctity of charters granted to private corpo- rations was freely admitted by the state tribunal in Dartmouth College V. Woodward, 1 N. H. 111. See Beach Priv. Corp., § 17. "People V. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; s. c. 18 N. E. 692; 7 Am. St. 684; "Mu- nicipal Debts Not Discharged by Repeal of Charter," annotations by H. H. Ingersoll, 21 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 181. Cf. "Relations of Munici- pal Corporations to the State," an address before the Alleghany Coun- ty Bar Association by W. S. Pier, in 1886; "Municipal Corporations: Can the Legislature of a State Empower Them to Amend Their Own Char- ters?" 2 Cent. L. J. 33. ^- State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 380. "Sloan V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361. § 70 PUBLIC COIU'ORATIONS. 76 state, or by a special act altering the powers of the corporation, or they may be repealed by an amendment to the constitution, inconsistent with the provisions in the charter.^* The reason is distinct; for were this not the case, there would have been numberless petty governments existing within the state, forming part of it, but independent of its control.^^ Political Frankensteins are the dread of all governments. The creation of corporations would rapidly have to determine if, when created, they became equal or superior to the power that created them." § 70. The present English statutes. — It will be interesting here to give in substance the English statutes regarding the granting of charters. They are included in what have been already referred to as the Municipal Corporation Acts.^'^ "§ 210. If on the petition to the queen of the inhabitant householders of any town or towns, or district in England, or of any of those inhabitants, praying for the grant of a charter of incorporation, her majesty, by the advice of her privy council, thinks fit by charter to create such town, towns or dis- trict, or any part thereof specified in the charter, with or without any adjoining place, a municipal borough, and to incorporate the inhabitants thereof, it shall be lawful for her majesty, by the charter, to extend to that municipal borough and the inhabitants thereof so incorporated, the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Acts." "§ 211. (1) Every petition for a charter under this act shall be referred to a committee of the lords of her majesty's privy council" (in this part called the committee of council). "(2) One month at least before the petition is taken into consideration by the committee of council, notice thereof and of the time when it will be so taken into consideration shall be published in the London Gazette, and other- wise in such manner as the committee direct, for the purpose of mak- ing it known to all persons interested." The queen, having received such a petition, and the council having examined and approved there- of, if she determines to grant a charter of incorporation, has certain powers regarding the election and officers in the new boroughs. She can fix the number of councilors, and also the number and bounda- ries of the borough wards, and assign the councilors among the wards. She may also "fix the years, days and times for the retire- ment of the first aldermen and councilors, — thus giving the crown " Trustees of Public Schools v. ^" See the chapter on Legislative Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; Mayor &c. Control, post, v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369. " See Rawlinson Municipal Corpo- ^•^ Sloan V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) ration Acts, 8th ed.; also 45 & 46 361. Vict., ch. 50. See also, ante, §§ 30, 31. 77 THE CHARTER. § 71 the power of fixing the time of elections."^'' The committee of coun- cil, before approving a petition to the queen, may settle a scheme for the adjustment of the powers, rights, privileges, franchises, duties, property and liabilities of any then existing local authority whose dis- trict comprises the whole or part of the area of that borough, either with or without any adjoining or other place, and also of any officer of that authority. This scheme is not binding if objected to by the inhabitants or a part of them, unless confirmed by parliament, and it must in any wise be submitted for approval to the secretary of state and the local government board. ^^ Section 216 of this act further provides that "A charter creating a municipal borough, which pur- ports to be granted in pursuance of the royal prerogative and in pur- suance of or in accordance with this act, shall after, acceptance be deemed to be valid and within the powers of this act, and her majes- ty's prerogative, and shall not be questioned in any legal proceeding whatever." This section was intended to prevent the necessity, which so frequently arose before the passing of these acts, of having acts of parliament to confirm different charters."** § 71. The municipal corporation acts and the royal prerogative. — Sir Christopher Eawlinson, whose compilation of the municipal cor- poration acts is a standard English work, calls attention to the sec- tion concerning the queen's power to grant charters : '^'The crown has always possessed the power of creating corporations and conferring franchises (see 1 Kyd on Corporations, 61) ; but where privileges and powers are to be conferred which are not recognized by the common or statute law an act of parliament is necessary. This act, though it would not at all abridge the common-law prerogative of the crown, nevertheless prevents its granting charters of incorporation with the powers conferred by this act, save with the advice of the privy council, and on petition by 'the inhabitant householders.' The petition to the queen must be by the inhabitant householders. It seems a compound householder is included under the term."^^ Notwithstanding the pro- vision of section 216, quoted above, as to the validity of charters purporting to he granted in pursuance of this act, there is an inter- esting case regarding the validity of a l)orough charter granted under 5 and 6 Will. IV, ch. 76, § Ul, and 7 Will. IV, and 1 Vict., ch. 78, § 49, both of which sections were repealed by 40 and 41 Vict,, ch. 69, but ^MO & 41 Vict., ch. 69; 45 & 46 § 9; 18 and 19 Vict., ch. 31; 20 and Vict., ch. 50, § 212; Rutter v. Chap- 21 Vict, ch. 10. man, 8 M. & W. 1. -' See Reg. v. Mayor &c., 11 L. T. ^M5 & 46 Vict, ch. 50, § 214. (N. S.) 417; s. c. 13 W. R. 90; 41 ^"See also, 40 and 41 Vict, ch. 69, and 42 Vict, ch. 26, § 14; 42 and 43 Vict, ch. 10. g 73 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 78 substantially reproduced in this act. It was the case of Rutter v. Chapman,-^ decided in the court of exchequer chamber, and it related to the charter of Manchester. It appears that a petition, which had 'been agreed upon at a meeting of the rate-payers of the parliamentary borough of Manchester, convened by public advertisement, and wliich was in fact attended (and which petition was afterwards signed) by four thousand inhabitant householders of the borough, was presented to her majesty, praying for the grant of a charter of incorporation to the inhabitants of such borough under the provision of the act. Afterwards, and before the day appointed for this petition being taken into consideration by the privy council, a counter petition, signed by six thousand of such inhabitant householders, was presented to her majesty, praying her not to grant such charter. The whole number of inhabitant householders in Manchester was at that time forty-eight thousand. The court of exchequer chamber held as follows: First, that the second petition did not necessarily, in point of law, deprive her majesty of the power to grant such charter upon the first petition ; but that whether the first petition was, under all the circumstances, the petition of the inhabitant householders of the borough, so as to authorize the exercise of the powers conferred by the act, was a question of fact for a jury, and that the determination of the privy council to advise the crown to grant the charter upon such petition was not conclusive of its validity. The court further held that the grant of such charter of incorporation is an exercise of the common- law prerogative of the crown, although it also extends to the new corporation the powers of the municipal act,^^ which the crown has power to do only by virtue of the sections of this act. Moreover, the charter may be granted to a part only of the borough, from the whole of which the petition emanated, and is not necessarily to be "conferred on the inhabitant householders of the whole borough. The decision went much further into detail than this brief summary. The point first mentioned was upheld by a subsequent decision, to the effect that when the first petition had once given the crown power to act under these sections, such power could not be taken away by anything that happened subsequently.^* § 72. Contents of charter. — In the United States, the charter being an act of the legislature usually, either specially directed to the incorporation of one separate city therein named, or general in its provisions, it is instructive to take up and examine an illustrative example of a special charter. The general laws of the states have ^^8 M. & W. 1. ''Reg. V. Mayor &c., 11 L. T. (N. ==5 and 6 Will. IV, ch. 76. S.) 417; s. c. 13 W. R. 90. 79 THE CHARTER. § 73 already been discussed. Selection may be made almost at random among special municipal incorporations, for the general features are the same. The city of Auburn was incorporated by the people of the state of New York, represented in senate and assembly, by an act passed March 21, 1848. The act sets out the territorial outline of the proposed municipality, and declares that it "shall hereafter be known by the name of The City of Auburn, and the inhabitants residing therein shall bo a corporation under the name and style of The Mayor and Common Council of the City of Auburn, and as such may sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law or equity in this state." The city is then set ofE in wards. Then follow provisions as to the election of ward and city officers, and the powers and duties of the "common council" are then enumerated. The powers conferred are the powers of the city relating to its domestic economy, its con- stabulary and its finances. Subordinate legislative powers are dele- gated, "such as are necessary to carry into full effect the powers given to said council by this act." The duties of the city officers are next defined, after which the subject of municipal taxes is fully treated. The common council are constituted commissioners of highways to keep the streets and roads in repair. Additional powers are conferred on them with regard to prevention of fires, to establishing school dis- tricts, to caring for the poor, to regulations as to pestilence and dis- ease, and numerous subordinate miscellaneous duties. .Such in brief is the outline of a special municipal charter. § 73. Prominent features of special charters. — In the charter just examined, it will be seen that the act is more minute and specific regarding the powers and privileges given than in any other part. It would seem as if local self-government were so great and valuable a right that the people feel that it is to be exercised only upon terms and conditions ; and the determination of what these terms and condi- tions shall in a given instance be is to be left to the wisdom and discretion of the legislature, which bears the relation of mouth and voice to the body of the people. This succinctness in stating what powers are conferred makes it possible to know exactly the limits of the city's jurisdiction; and, in case of the passage of general acts subsequently, the charter is the criterion of inconsistency between the special and the general acts. But under a general law — which may be said to be a species of divisible charter, as many municipalities may at the same time point to it as containing the enumeration of their charter rights — the provisions are much the same ; only, general terms are used, such as "any * * * complying with the provi- sions of this act * * * shall," etc. A royal charter is an instru- § 74 PUBLIC CORrORATIOXS. 80 ment in writing setting forth the privileges or an assurance of rights granted by the sovereign to the people. ^^ When it establishes a mu- nicipal corporation, it prescribes the territorial limits, the form, methods and franchises of the proposed municipality, very much as an act of parliament would. It is, however, addressed by the king to all his subjects, and names the persons to be incorporated, and con- stitutes them and their successors a body corporate. ^^ Whether, then, the incorporation be by means of a formal, special document, such as a charter proper, or by means of a particular enactment of the gov- erning body, or whether it be concealed in a general statute, such as the Municipal Corporations Act, it is equally the criterion of every right and privilege enjoyed. It is the constitution of the municipality. If the power of the common council, or of the city executive, be called in question, the charter, in whatever form it exist, has to be judicially examined and construed. If the right to lease ferry privi- leges is controverted, the charter is the controlling witness to the exist- ence or lack of the right. § 74. What charters can not confer. — Judge Hare, in his learned treatise on American Constitutional Law,^^ in discussing charters of incorporation, and particularly whether or not charters confer con- tractual rights which can not be violated consistently with the consti- tution, draws a distinction between public and private corporations in this regard, and points out not only that the powers delegated are liable to recall, but that many powers can not, by reason of their very nature, be delegated irrevocably. "Many powers,'^ he argues, "and among them the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, the police power and that of eminent domain, are not only sovereign, but so essential to the care which the state should have for the lives and fortunes of its citizens that they can not be vested irrevocably in private hands, or exercised save for a pub- lic purpose ; and any attempt made by the state to alienate its author- ity in these regards will be merely void, and may be so treated by the courts."^^ The same writer states certain qualifications of this general proposition as follows: "A state may forego the power of taxation, but can not confer it ; or, in other words, may covenant not to tax the covenantee, though not that he shall have the right to tax 2= 3 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, "' Vol. 1, p. 608. tit. Charter. "' Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. ^'A royal charter may, however, S. 32: Thorpe v. Rutland &c. R. Co., empower another to prescribe the 27 Vt. 140; Trustees of Public form, appoint the officers and give a Schools v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618. proper name to the municipality: Glover Munic. Corp. 24. 81 THE CHARTER. § 75 other people.^^ So the powers requisite for municipal and local gov- ernment may be delegated to a natural or artificial person appointed by the state, or chosen by the inhabitants of a town or district, but can not be vested irrevocably in the appointee; and a stipulation to that effect will be nugatory." § 75. Wherein the constitutional limitation consists. — It appears, therefore, from the preceding section, that the federal constitution, in providing that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, looks to the protection of property rights and not political rights. The latter are vested in the people at large, but can not be vested in communities. The constitution is general, and embraces in its scope every citizen. No absolute political rights, then, can vest in any one individual or collection of individuals, as against the legis- lature, representing the people at large, or as against any other indi- vidual or individuals.^*' If the state, therefore, chooses to organize governmental agencies, — as all public corporations are shown to be under the rule of the Dartmouth College case,'"^ — this agency can be modified or revoked at any time by the state. "This is true of all public corporations," says Judge Hare, in the treatise to which refer- ence has already been made,^^ "and applies with full force to the charters which confer the right of local self-government on towns and boroughs."^ ^ "One distinctive feature of such an agency is that the legislature creates the body which it employs and authorizes, another that the corporation contracts in its own name, and not on the credit of the citizens individually, or of the state. Hence, when it is dissolved, the entire fabric crumbles, and if another is substituted, it will not necessarily inherit the obligations of its predecessor."^^ ^ In Trustees of Public Schools v. ^^ Hare Amer. Const. Law, § 43. Taylor, 30 N. J. Bq. 618, 622, the ='= Sharpless v. Mayor &c., 21 Pa. court declared it was impossible for St. 147, 149; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. the legislature to clothe a munici- St. 258; City of Erie v. Erie Canal pality with the power of taxing Co., 59 Pa. St. 174; President &c. v. state property. "Taxation," to quote Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; Berlin the language of the master, "is, in v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; Butler v. its essence, an exercise of sovereign Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Newton power over an inferior; it is an ex- v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548. action, payment of which by the in- ^^ Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. ferior is compelled by the superior." 472. Further on, the extent to ^"People V. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. which municipal obligations rest Y.) 325, 337. upon the organization that takes ""a Dartmouth College v. Wood- the place of one that has been dis- ward, 4 Wheat. 518. solved will be more fully discussed. 1 Smith — 6 § 76 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 82 § 76. Acceptance — When necessary. — As in the case of private corporations, so also in the case of strictly municipal corporations, such as cities, there must be an acceptance of the charter either ex- press or implied. In this respect they differ from public quasi-corpo- rations. Cities are regarded as corporations created for their own benefit ; while inhabitants of a district invested by statute, in invitum, with particular powers, arc made corporations without their consent.'* One feature by which a city is distinguished from a county is in that the powers under a county government are conferred by the legisla- ture irrespective of the will of the inhabitants of the county ; whereas the inhabitants of a city must determine whether they will accept the corporate powers offered them to be exercised by the officers of their own selection.'^ In other words, municipal corporations proper are called into existence through the direct solicitation, or by the free consent of the people who compose them. Counties are the legal subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them.^** An act in- corporating a municipality takes effect without acceptance, as an act ; and yet without organization thereunder it would be a dead letter.^^ The legislature may provide that any particular charter shall not take effect until accepted ; and it can prescribe the way in which the accept- ance shall be signified ; as that it must be by a majority vote of the in- habitants. And if such provision is not unconstitutional, as has been repeatedly held,'^ there is no tenable ground to take against its going further, and prescribing the manner in which such majority vote shall be ascertained. Thus, in the Ohio case just cited, the township and city occupying identical territorial limits, and the legislature having provided that an amendment to the city charter should be accepted by a majority of the voters of the city, the vote was proceeded to, but the council ordered the vote to be taken at the township polls ; and this was held not to be a city vote, and not an acceptance within the provisions of the act, for the voters of the city and township had to possess different qualifications. ** Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 ^ Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 111. 346; Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 359; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 171 111. 332; s. c. 49 N. E. 536. Barr (Pa.) 214; Commonwealth v. 3»Kahn v. Sutro. 114 Cal. 316; s. c. Quarter Sessions, 8 Barr (Pa.) 391; 46 Pac. 87; 33 L. R. A. 620. President &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. =" Board &c. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. L. 385; People v. Salomon, 51 111. 109. 37; Foote v. City of Cincinnati, 11 "State V. Haines, 35 Or. 379; s. c, Ohio 408. 58 Pac. 39. 83 THE CHARTER. § 77 § 77. The same subject continued. — A royal charter was never operative until the acceptance of those to be incorporated was signi- fied. The proposed body of incorporators were supposed to receive and consider the charter, and then to accept or reject it. If they ac- cepted it, their acceptance was irrevocable; but the acceptance had to be of the whole charter, or it was deemed to be rejected; and if the crown assented to the proposed alterations, then the amended charter was offered again as a new charter. And in the case of the creation of a corporation hj the legislature, the acceptance of the charter, or indeed, whether there need be any acceptance, is wholly for the legis- lature to say. It was at first thought unconstitutional for the legis- lature to provide that a charter shall not take effect until accepted by a majority of the inhabitants, on the ground that it is a delega- tion of legislative power. The courts have, however, interpreted it otherwise, holding such a provision to be wholly constitutional. It is not a delegation of legislative power, but merely the declaration by the legislature of a condition precedent to incorporation ; to wit, the vote of a certain proportion of the inhabitants.^^ By the same rea- soning, the legislature can make the right to make certain improve- ments or incur certain liabilities depend upon a vote of the people interested.'*^ And the power of the police regulation, one of the most essential attributes of sovereignty, may be committed to the majority of the citizens in separate communities.*^ The right of the legisla- '" Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. Geiger, Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf. (N. 34 Ind. 185; Hobart v. Supervisors, Y.) 158; People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 17 Cal. 23; Call v. Chadbourne, 46 (N. Y.) 338; State v. Babcock, 25 Maine 206; Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Neb. 709; s. c. 41 N. W. 654; Berlin Y. 467; People v. Salomon, 51 111. v. Gorham, -34 N. H. 266; State v. 37; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652; Canterbury, 28 N. H. 195; Bristol v. President &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Inhabit- J. L. 385; People v. Reynolds, 10 ants &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 21 111. 1; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279; Maine 58; State v. Curran, 12 Ark. Sedgwick Constr. of Stat. & Const. 321; People v. Wren, 5 111. 269; Law 135, n. A statute submitting Coles v, Madison Co., 1 111. 154; to the people of several munici- Warren v. Mayor &c., 2 Gray (Mass.) palities the question whether they 84; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; shall be consolidated is valid: Smith People v. City of Butte, 4 Mont. V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359. 174; s. c. 1 Pac. 414. ■"' For decisions holding accept- " The "local option" liquor laws ance not to be essential, see People are instances in point. These have V. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; been declared constitutional in many People v. President &c., 9 Wend. (N. courts. Said the supreme court of Y.) 351; Fire Department v. Kip, 10 errors of Connecticut: — "The law is Wend. (N. Y.) 267; Proprietors &c. perfect and complete as it comes v. Horton, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 501; Wood from the hands of the law-making V. President &c., 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 194; power:" State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn. § 78 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 84 tiire to organize mimicipalities regardless of the consent of those to he affected rests on the very theory of our government. That theory is that it is a government hy the people, who act through their repre- sentatives. They delegate their authority to their agents, who speak and act for them in making laws, and hence they are hound hy prop- erly enacted laws promulgated by their agents. They give their con- sent to these laws by clothing their agents with power and authority to make them, and there is, therefore, no reserved power in the people to consent to or reject laws properly enacted by their lawfully consti- tuted agents.'*^ § 78. Compulsory acceptance. — In no respect is the distinction be- tween private and public corporations, such as counties, more marked than in the fact that no private corporation, or rather body of indi- viduals, can be incorporated compulsorily, while in the case of public corporations the rule is otherwise. The reason is evident; for a pri- vate corporation by its incorporation enters into a contract with the legislative power; when it accepts its charter the grant is irrevocable, and the contractual rights can not be impaired or destroyed by any subsequent act of legislation;*^ but when the legislative body deter- mines that the public interest demands that a city or other municipal corporation should be incorporated, it can confer the necessary fran- chises and impose the necessary duties on the inhabitants of the place. As a matter of fact the prevalence of general laws on the sub- ject of the incorporation of municipalities makes this question of acceptance of less importance, inasmuch as under a general law it is only possible to prescribe under what conditions certain communities can avail themselves of the provisions of the act and become munici- palities. Acceptance, then, is implied when a particular community avails itself of the said provisions, and is constituted a municipality.*** 364; s. c. 19 Am. R. 536; Common- 480. Under the classification of wealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 30; cities made by Pennsylvania act of Commonwealth v. Dean, 110 Mass. May 23, 1874, a city having more 357; State v. Noyes, 10 Foster (N. than ten thousand population by the H.) 279; State v. Court of Common last decennial census became ipso Pleas, 36 N. J. L. 72; s. c. 13 Am. R. facto a city of the third class with- 422. out accepting or adopting the provi- ■•-Angell & Ames Corp., § 79, and sions of the act: Commonwealth v. cases cited; People v. City of Butte, McGroarty, 6 Kulp (Pa.) 195. 4 Mont. 174; s. c. 1 Pac. 414; Medi- ^* Dartmouth College v. Wood- cal Inst. V. Patterson, 1 Den. (N. ward, 4 Wheat. 518. Y.) 61; s. c. 5 Den. (N. Y.) 618; "A failure to proceed in the man- Myers V. Irwin, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 368; ner prescribed invalidates the char- Wells V. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; So- ter: People v. Gunn, 85 Cal. 238; s. ciety &c. v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Pet. c. 24 Pac. 718. 85 THE CHARTER. § 79 Supposing that the general law provides that whenever the inhabit- ants, or a majority thereof, of a commnnity containing at least so many inhabitants, desire to be incorporated as a municipality, they shall express such desire by a petition to a certain authority, and upon such petition an election shall be held to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants, with similar regulations, after which the community shall be a village or town, or city of the first, second or third class, as the case may be, the incorporation becomes the voluntary act of the incorporators, and is compulsory only in cases where there is dis- sent on the part of a minority, who are bound by the majority's action. § 79. Charters, how proved. — The charter of a municipality incor- porated by the legislature is matter of public record and knowledge, like any other act of the legislature ; consequently the courts will take judicial notice thereof. This is as of course when the charter is de- clared to be a public statute ; but.there are a number of cases — for ex- ample, in Alabama*^ — holding that, even when the act of incorpora- tion is merely public or general in its nature and purposes, and is not expressly declared to be a public statute, the courts will judicially notice it. But while the charter is judicially noticed by the courts, the laws or ordinances enacted by the municipality are not so noticed unless by the courts of the municipality. This is true both in England and America."*® Therefore, when any such by-laws or ordinances are to be pleaded they. must be pleaded in substance. If the charter or a statute directs the courts judicially to notice such ordinances, the statute prevails over the general rule and the courts are bound by it. How, then, is this charter brought before a court ? How is it proved ? Courts will take judicial notice of a charter of a municipality whether it be in the form of a general statute or be declared to be general or public in its character or purposes. It being an expression of the supreme will of the state, the courts will presume it to be a matter of universal knowledge within the state; therefore it need not be spe- cially pleaded.*'^ But if it prove necessary to establish the fact that a *'Albrittin v. Mayor &c., 60 Ala. Wells, 8 Iowa 286; Conboy v. Iowa 486; Ferryman v. City of Greenville, City, 2 Iowa 90; Cox v. City of St. 51 Ala. 507, 510; Case v. Mayor &c., Louis, 11 Mo. 431; People v. Mayor 30 Ala. 538; Smoot v. Mayor &c., 24 &c., 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 84; Harker Ala. 112, 121. V. Mayor &c., 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 199; ^''Norris v. Staps, Hob. 211; s. c. City of New Orleans v. Boudra, 14 Willc. 166, pi. 403; Willc. 172, pi. La. An. 303; Trustees v. Lefler, 23 423; Willc. 173, pi. 425; Broadnac's 111. 90; Mooney v. Kennett, 19 Mo. Case, 1 Vent. 196; Barber Surgeons 551. v. Pelson, 2 Lev. 252; Goodrich v. ^^ Smoot v. Mayor &c., 24 Ala. 112, Brown, 30 Iowa 291; Garvin v. 121; Case v. Mayor &c., 30 Ala. 538; § 80 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 86 municipality was duly incorporated, the charter itself — ^that is to say, the act or a true copy thereof, certified or otherwise authenticated — is admissible, and such evidence would be primary. In the absence of primary evidence, it is proper to produce secondary or parol evi- dence.*'^ § 80. Proof of fact of incorporation. — Although the charter of a city may be judicially noticed, yet it may be the case that the corporate existence of a municipality is alleged, while there is no charter for the courts judicially to notice. This would occur in the case of a corpora- tion by prescription. In such case, proof of user of corporate privi- leges is admissible, and it is competent to show that the town has for many years exercised corporate powers. Or it may be that the legis- lature has passed an act conferring some additional right or duty on the town, thus giving it, as it were, legislative recognition.'*^ The principle is that the public is the party interested in the incorporation of municipalities, and if the public chooses to consider an existing unincorporated municipality as incorporate, and waives its right to refuse its recognition, no one else is in a position to assert that it is not a corporate body. Eeputation and user are therefore competent to be proven to establish corporate existence.^ '^ While there may have been irregularities in the incorporation of a municipality, yet the courts will not favor their interposition long afterward to disprove corporate existence. ^^ And in no case can the legal character of a Ferryman v. City of Greenville, 51 ates to cure all defects in steps lead- Ala. 507; Albrittin v. Mayor &c., 60 ing up to the organization, and Ala. 486. makes a de jure out of what before ** Proprietors &c. v. Battles, 6 Vt. was only a de facto corporation:" 395 (a certified copy from the secre- Brewer, J., in Comanche Co. v. Lew- tary of state was admitted when is, 133 U. S. 198, 202; s. c. 10 S. Ct. the original could not be found in 286. the town clerk's office); Blackstone ^"Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388; Bas- V. White, 41 Pa. St. 330 (a sworn sett v. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487; copy — not official — held to be proper Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; secondary evidence); Inhabitants Ryder v. Railroad Co., 13 111. 516, &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 12 Mass. 400 523; President &c. v. McKean, 10 (a case of proof by parol). Courts Johns. (N. Y.) 154; Owings v. will not take judicial notice of an Speed, 5 Wheat. 420; Town of Lon- act incorporating a city and of the donderry v. Town of Andover, 28 powers granted in the charter: Vt. 416; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. Downs v. Commissioners &c., 2 Pen. 439. (Del.) 132; s. c. 45 Atl. 717. "Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 111. 69, 76; ^""It is universally affirmed that Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257; Dun- when a legislature has full power to ning v. New Albany &c. R. Co., 2 create corporations, its act recogniz- Ind. 437. See also, Smith v. Board ing as valid a de facto corporation, &c., 45 Fed. 725. whether private or municipal, oper- 87 THE CHARTER. § 81 de facto municipal corporation be collaterally impeached by private citizens : it belongs to the state alone, by the proper officers, to insti- tute proceedings in which the regularity of its incorporation may be determined. ^- §81. Proof of corporate existence. — A recent writer has said: *'The charter or the act of incorporation of a municipality, like rec- ords generally, are [is] to be proved by inspection, or by copies [a copy] properly authenticated; but if there be sufficient proof of the loss or destruction of the record, much inferior evidence of its contents may be admitted."^^ When the inquiry into the corporate existence of a municipality is merely collateral, only that the municipality exists de facto need be proved.^* The incorporation of a town may be proved by reputation, or by long user of corporate powers, or, as we have pre- viously seen, by grants from the legislature implying a corporate exist- ence.^^ It is not conclusive proof of no previous corporate existence that a town has been incorporated under act of the legislature, for it may have desired to obtain the rights and privileges given by virtue of some general statute; at the most it would be a question for the jury. So in an action against a village, it was held that a recital in a statute to the effect that the village had been incorporated was proof of such incorporation.^^ § 82. General rules of construction of charters. — "It is a well- settled rule, in regard to acts of incorporation, that they must be strictly construed, and especially municipal corporations, for the rea- son that as they are invested with a portion of the authority which properly appertains to the sovereign power of the state, they must be confined to those powers which are clearly granted, as it is only by such grants that the government proper can surrender its just ^'Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan, bee, 16 Vt. 439; Town of London- 570; s. c. 22 Pac. 558. derry v. Town of Andover, 28 Vt. "15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 416; Dunning v. New Albany &c. R, tit. Municipal Corporations, § 10, p. Co., 2 Ind. 437; Owings v. Speed, 5 965. Wheat. 420. See also, the preceding ^* Parol proof of incorporation: section. Robie v. Trustees, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) °= See Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 319; President &c. v. McKean, 10 351; New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 154, 159; Billing- N. H. 201. ham V. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; Bassett '"Fox v. Village of Fort Edward, V. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487; 48 Hun (N. Y.) 363; s. c. 1 N. Y. S. Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 111. 76; Jame- 81. See, as to manner of proving son v. People, 16 111. 257; Barnes v. organization under a general act, Barnes, 6 Vt. 388; Proprietors &c. v. Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Shires, 108 Battles, 6 Vt. 395; Sherwin v. Bug- 111. 617. 83 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 88 authority."^^ But where the inquiry is merely as to whether there is a corporation, the foregoing rule does not apply, and every intend- ment must be taken in favor of the sufficiency of the legislative ac- tion. ^^ And where the extent of the powers conferred has been ascer- tained by the cardinal rule of interpretation, the exercise of authority within the recognized limits is favored by the courts."** The charter of a city in Michigan empowered the common council to" "issue new bonds for the refunding of bonds and evidences of indebtedness al- ready issued;" and in deciding that a judgment against the city was within the language quoted Judge Cooley said: "When a power is conferred which in its exercise concerns only the municipality and can wrong or injure no one, there is not the slightest reason for any strict or literal interpretation with a view to narrowing its con- struction. '"^^ That is good sense, and it is the application of correct principles in municipal affairs. The whole instrument, all preceding charters, the general legislation of the state, and the object of the legislature in the erection of municipalities, should be consulted in constrmng particular provisions of charters.^^ " Leonard v. City of Canton, 35 Miss. 189, 190; Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435; City of Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; President &c. v. Mayor &c., 7 Ohio (pt. 2) 31; Thomas v. City of Richmond, 12 Wall. 349; Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247; Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565, 574; s. c. 10 N. W. 23; Nichol v. Mayor &c., 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 252; Henderson v. City of Covington, 14 Bush (Ky.) 312; Sedgwick Constr. of Stat. & Const. Law 338; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 91; 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 1041. =" State V. Young, 3 Kan. 445. ='Kyle V. Malin, 8 Ind. 34. "The strictness to be observed in giving construction to municipal charters should be such as to carry into effect every power clearly intended to be conferred on the municipality and every power necessarily implied in order to the complete exercise of the powers granted:" Smith v. City of Madison, 7 Ind. 86, 87. ^''Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565, 574; s. c. 10 N. W. 23. "1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 87; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73; s. c. 14 Pac. 615; Chicago Dock &c. Co. V. Garrity, 115 111. 155; s. c. 3 N. E. 448; Holland v. Mayor &c., 11 Md. 186; Moran v. Long Island City, 101 N. Y. 439; s. c. 5 N. E. 80; Bab- cock V. City of Helena, 34 Ark. 499. Construction of charter of Greater New York in relation to board of assessors: People v. Feitner, 156 N. Y. 694; s. c. 51 N. E. 1093. Con- struction of charter of Greater New York in relation to abolishing Rich- mond Hill and effect upon officers: Fire Department &c. v. Davies, 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 683; s. c. 54 N. Y. S. 1077. Construction of charter of Greater New York in relation to of- ficials in justices' courts: People v. Van Wart, 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 215; s. c. 55 N. Y. S. 68; McKenna v. City of New York, 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 152; s. c. 54 N. Y. S. 634. Charter of Kansas City, Mo., is constitutional: City of Kansas City v. Bacon (In re North Terrace Park), 147 Mo. 259; s. c. 48 S. W. 860. Construction of charter of the city of Kansas City in relation to eminent domain: City of 89 THE CHARTER. • § 83 § 83. Can charters be modified ? — All public corporations created for municipal purposes may be controlled, and have their charters amended and altered, at the pleasure of the legislature.®^ Still, it is conceivable that the legislature may in incorporating a municipality make a grant in the nature of a contract with the municipality, which contract it can neither impair nor resume.®^ And moreover, the power of the legislature to change existing charters at pleasure is modified by the constitution of the United States. For example, no state can so legislate as to prevent an existing municipality from performing any contract it may have entered into, for the reason that no state can pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts.®* Mr. Justice Clifford, in discussing the relations of the legislature to municipalities which it has created, said:®^ "Corporations of a municipal character, such as towns, are usually organized in this country by special acts or pursuant to some general state law; and it is clear that their powers and duties differ in some important particulars from the towns which existed in the parent country before the Eevolution, when they were created by special charters from the crown, and acquired many of their privileges by prescription, without any aid from parliament. Corporate franchises of the kind granted during that period partook much more largely of the nature of private corporations than do the municipalities cre- ated in this country, and known as towns, cities and villages.®® Power exists here in the legislature, not only to fix the boundaries of such a municipality when incorporated, but to enlarge or diminish the same subsequently, without the consent of the residents, by annexa- tion or set-off, unless restrained by the constitution, even against the remonstrance of every property holder and voter within the limits of the original municipality."®'^ Neither a charter of a municipal Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 " Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 Mo. 458; s. c. 41 S. W. 943. U. S. 514, 532; Von Hoffman v. City «= State v. Mayor &c., R. M. Charl. of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 554. See (Ga.) 250. And amendatory acts Lee Co. v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181, 184; are not local or private within the Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall, meaning of constitutional provi- 575, 583; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall, sions requiring such laws to em- 44, 62; Dillon Munic. Corp., § 69; brace only one subject, and that to State v. City of Milwaukee, 25 Wis. be expressed in the title: Thompson 122; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Arm- V. City of Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 492; strong, 45 N. Y. 234. s. c. 34 N. W. 402. See also, Sheri- "^ Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 dan v. City of Salem, 14 Or. 328; s. U. S. 514, 531. c. 12 Pac. 925. ''The dissimilarities are well set '* Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co., forth by Chief Justice Perley, in 12 111. 1. Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284. '^ See further, as to repeal or § 84 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 90 corporation nor any statute regulating the use of property held by the municipality for governmental or public purposes is a contract within the meaning of the federal constitution.*'* § 84. How far the state can enforce performance of local duties. — Where the legislative control is confined simply to municipal corpora- tions as agencies of the state in its government, then this legislative control is ample/® because in all matters of general concern there is no local right to act independently of the state. The local authori- ties of a city have no right, and can not be permitted, to determine for themselves whether, for example, they will contribute through taxation to the support of the state government, or assist, when called upon by the state, to suppress insurrection, or aid in the enforcement of the police laws. Upon all subjects the state may exercise compul- sory authority and may enforce the performance of local duties.''*' But at the same time the fact remains and must not be lost sight of, that municipal corporations have objects and purposes peculiarly local, in which the state at large has legally no concern whatever, and in wliich it is not its function to intermeddle, except in so far as it confers the powers and can regulate their exercise.''^ change of charter, Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 551; Pi qua Branch &c.v.Knoop, 16 How. 369; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; State v. Mayor &c., 24 Ala. 701; City of Little Rock v. Par- ish, 36 Ark. 166; State v. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419; Crook v. People, 106 111. 237; State v. Troth, 34 N. J. L. 377, 379; State v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; Mayor &c. v. Jersey City R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 360; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; City of Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233; Buckner v. Gordon, 81 Ky. 665; Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140; In re Hinkle, 31 Kan. 712; s. c. 3 Pac. 531; Dema- rest v. Mayor &c., 74 N. Y. 161; Gray v. -City of Brooklyn, 2 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 267; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; Berlin v. Gor- ham, 34 N. H. 266; Cobb v. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197; Smith v. Village of Adrian, 1 Mich. 495; Roberts Case, 51 Mich. 548; s. c. 17 N. W. 50; Inhabi- tants &c. V. North Yarmouth, 34 Maine 411; Inhabitants &c. v. Skill- ings, 45 Maine 133; Carpenter v. Peo- ple. 8 Colo. 116; s. c. 5 Pac. 828; Clin- ton V. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455; State v. Mayor &c., R. M. Charl. (Ga.) 250; Mayor v. Steam- boat Co., R. M. Charl. (Ga.) 342; People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; City of San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541; Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio St. 427; Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; Lynch v. Lafland, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 96; Daniel v. Mayor &c., 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 582; Guild v. City of Chicago, 82 111. 472; Ken- nedy v. City of Sacramento, 19 Fed. 580. "^ Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S_. 231; s. c. 19 S. Ct. 383; New Orleans V. New Orleans &c. Co., 142 U. S. 79; s. c. 12 S. Ct. 142. "'• People V. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44. ""People V. Council &c., 28 Mich. 236, by Cooley, J., who treats the subject in an exhaustive essay with characteristic clearness and learn- ing. ■' Cf. "Power of the Legislature to Compel Levy of Tax by Municipal 91 THE CHARTER. ' § 85 § 85 Change in municipal boundaries. — The right to increase or diminish the area of a municipality must be given by the legislature — the same power which is competent to amend the charter; for any change in the boundaries of a municipality — whether the territory be enlarged or diminished, or whether a division of territory be made, or any change whatsoever be effected in boundaries or otherwise — must necessarily contract or enlarge the sphere of the municipal jurisdiction; and therefore it constitutes pro tanto an amendment of an existing charter. The power is thus clearly legislative, and it is, in general, incapable of being delegated. In that it is legislative it can not be conferred on the judiciary. The courts can not then determine to what extent a city can acquire additional territory, or whether it can or can not acquire it, except in so far as such ques- tions may arise in construing and interpreting the city charter. The legislature may, however, delegate to the municipal corporation itself power and authority to make changes in its boundaries ; because this is not in fact a delegation of legislative power; it is in legal intent only a provision by the legislature that if certain exigencies arise and certain conditions then exist, then, and in that event, the boundaries may be altered or enlarged. No discretion is given; and if the city proceeds to enlarge its boundaries, supposing the conditions to exist when as a matter of fact they do not, the courts will pronounce the action invalid and void.'^ § 86. Effect of amendments of charter on city ordinances. — It is often necessary to inquire whether the ordinances of a city passed prior to the enactment of certain amendments to the city charter are affected thereby. It is the better view to hold that they are not the less binding on that account. The acquisition of a new charter by a city does not abrogate city ordinances passed under the old charter unless they are clearly inconsistent therewith ;'^^ nor would the ordi- nances of a city, or the provisions of its charter,^* be affected by a general law, unless they were obviously inconsistent. Thus, in Mis- Corporations," a note by T. Burwell, " Under a constitutional provision 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 80. that city charters must be "consist- " City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, ent with and subject to the constitu- 75 111. 152, 156. A city partly situ- tion and laws of this state/' a char- ated in two counties has its situs in ter will not be declared invalid in the county where its municipal of- toto because a few of its provisions fices and government are located: may conflict with general statutes: Fox v. City of Postoria, 60 Ohio St. Brooks v. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173; s. c. 340; s. c. 54 N. B. 370. 21 Pac. 652; 4 L. R. A. 429; In re "State v. Natal, 39 La. An. 439; Strand (Cal.), 21 Pac. 654. s. c. 1 So. 923. § 87 PUBLIC CORPORATION'S. 92 souri the court held, in a case where the city charter authorized the mayor and aldermen to remove for cause any person holding an office created by the charter or by ordinance, that it was not inconsistent with, and therefore not repealed by, a general act providing for the removal from office of any officer who did not actually spend his time in performing the duties of his office, or of any official guilty of will- ful violation or neglect of his official duty.'^ § 87. Reorganization under general law — Effect of. — When a char- ter is amended, we have elsewhere seen that it has no effect on ordi- nances passed prior to the amendment which are not inconsistent with the charter as amended. It is usually held that a mere amend- ment of a charter has no effect on city officers, so as to determine their tenure of office. But suppose an incorporated municipality reorgan- izes under a general incorporation act, it is clear that the reorganiza- tion must have some effect upon the officers under the old charter. This effect is to abrogate their tenure of office, unless the general law contains some saving clause continuing them in office.'^® "Where a new form is given to an old municipal corporation, or such corporation is reorganized under a new charter, taking in its new organization the place of the old one, embracing substantially the same corporators and the same territory, it will be presumed that the legislature in- tended a continued existence of the same corporation, although dif- ferent powers are possessed under the new charter, and different offi- cers administer its affairs ; and in the absence of express provision for their payment otherwise, it will be presumed that the legislature in- tended that the liabilities as well as the rights of property of the corporation in its old form should accompany the corporation in its reorganization."'^'^ The United States circuit court has held that the reorganization of the city of Pensacola under a general law of the state of Florida was merely, in legal effect, an assumption by the city of the new powers and privileges which the act conferred.''^ ^'Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo. 50 111. 453; City of Maysville v. 430; s. c. 6 S. W. 372. Shultz, 3 Dana (Ky.) 10; State v. ™McGrath v. City of Chicago, 24 Mayor &c., 24 Ala. 701; O'Connor v. 111. App. 19. City of Memphis, 6 Lea (Tenn.) "15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 972, 730; Hughes v. School Dist, 72 Mo. 973; citing Broughton v. Pensacola, 643; Tyler v. Elizabethtown &c. R. 93 U. S. 266; Rex v. Pasmore, 3 T. Co., 9 Bush (Ky.) 510. R. 199; Reg. v. Bewdley, 1 P. Wms. '«Milner v. City of Pensacola, 2 207; Mayor &c. v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. Woods 632; Fowle v. Common Coun- 339; Trustees &c. v. City of Erie, 31 oil &c., 3 Pet. 398; First Municipal- Pa. St. 515; Girard v. Philadelphia, ity v. Commissioners of Sinking 7 Wall. 1; People v. Board &c., 21 Fund, 1 Rob. (La.) 279. An elec- Cal. 668; City of Olney v. Harvey, tion to incorporate under a general 93 TUB CIIAKTEI!. § 88 § 88. Reorganization must be strictly according to statute. — The statutes often ])rovi(lo, wliere a city wishes to be incorporated and ap- plication is made to a judge of the county to order an election to be held, that proof must be made upon such application that the terri- tory sought to be incorporated contains the requisite number of in- habitants.'^^ Whatever finding the court makes on the proof as pre- sented to him is in such cases conclusive.*'* And when a petition con- tained the necessary statement of the number of inhabitants, which was supported by an express finding, but the notice of election was deficient in that particular, the court declined to adjudge the subse- quent proceedings invalid on account of the mere irregularity.^^ The provisions of the statutes are usually held to be mandatory. For ex- ample, the town of Nacogdoches, in Texas, kept up its corporate existence until about the year 1882, having been originally incorpo- rated in 1859. The revised statutes of the state prescribe the manner in which an existing municipal corporation may surrender its corpo- rate existence and reincorporate under the general act. Notwith- standing this, steps were taken in 1887 as for the original incorpora- tion of a city or town. The court held that these proceedings did not operate to create a corporation, nor to dissolve the one existing prior to their institution.*^ / § 89. The same subject continued. — A town in Louisiana was or- ganized under a general law. Subsequently it obtained and reorgan- ized under a special charter. This charter being repealed, it was held to be no longer an incorporated town.*^ The legislature, in pro- viding for the amendment of a municipal charter or for the reorgani- zation of the municipality, may expressly provide that the act shall law may be ordered while the town the original corporate existence re- is in existence under a special act: mains: Harness v. State, 76 Texas Thompson v. State, 23 Tex. Civ. 566; s. c. 13 S. W. 535; 29 Am. & App. 370; s. c. 56 S. W. 603. Eng. Corp. Cas. 50. An act permit- " For example, Rev. Stat. Tex., ting certain towns to reincorporate art. 508. that had attempted to incorporate **" State V. Goowin, 69 Tex. 55; s. under a previous void act was con- c. 5 S. W. 678. strued not as a validating act, but '' Smith V. Board &c., 45 Fed. 725. as a grant of a new power, under '^ State V. Dunson, 71 Texas 65; s. which a town might reincorporate c. 9 S. "W. 103. Where a municipal with a larger territory than was in- corporation attempts to reincorpo- eluded in the first attempt: In re rate under a statute which does not Campbell, 1 Wash. 287; s. c. 24 Pac. authorize such reincorporation, but 624. only an original incorporation, the "^ Burk v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.) proceedings are without effect, and 349. § 90 PUBLIC conroHATiONS. 94 take effect only upon the assent of the people of the municipality or a given majority thereof. '^^ But if such an act be adopted or consented to, acts amendatory thereof do not require additional consenting, un- less the amendatory act itself calls for such assent.**^ § 90. Effect of adoption of a new constitution. — The constitution of 1846 adopted by the state of New York was a constitution not framed for a people entering into a political society for the first time, but for a community already organized, and furnished with legal and political institutions adapted to all or nearly all the purposes of civil government. It was not intended to abolish these institutions, except where they might be repugnant to the new constitution. In its first article it provides that all the acts of the legislature then in force, and not repugnant to it, should continue to be the law of the state, subject to such alterations as the legislature might see fit to make. What effect, then, did the adoption of this general law, this new consti- tution, have upon existing municipalities and their officials? By the acts of the legislature, thus continued in force, a great number of of- fices had been created, and among them, and constituting numerically far the largest portion of all the functionaries of the state, were the county, city, town and village offices, by which the local government was carried on. As to these existing offices and their incumbents, it is clear that neither their functions nor rights changed at all in conse- quence of this new general act.^^ Wlrat, then, was its effect? It was to set up a criterion, a standard, by which to determine whether the legislature, in creating, amending or repealing municipal franchises, is acting in contravention of any vested right. But it affected no office or officer not antagonistic to or inconsistent with the provisions thereof. § 91. How far special legislation is permissible. — It is the busi- ness of the legislature to adjust in the interest of the whole people of the state the distribution of the powers of government, taking care that no direct provision of the constitution is violated, and that no arrangement which it has made is incidentally disturbed. Plenary ^* Mayor &c. v. Finney, 54 Ga. 317; property within the proposed limits In re Henry St., 123 Pa. St. 346; s. may have an injunction restraining c. 16 Atl. 785; State v. Mayor &c., 73 the canvassing of the returns: Smith Mo. 435; City of St. Louis v. Russell, v. Board &c., 45 Fed. 725. 9 Mo. 507; Largen v. State, 76 Tex. '''15 Am. & Bng. Encyc. of Law 323; s. c. 13 S. W. 16L An election 972. held in disregard of the registry **" People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, laws does not effect an incorporar 540. tion, and a nonresident owner of 95 THE CHARTER. § 92 power in the legislature for all purposes of civil government is the rule. As a political society the state has an interest in the repression of disorder and the maintenance of peace and security in every locality within its limits; and if, from exceptional causes, the public good requires that legislation, either permanent or temporary, be directed toward any particular locality, whether consisting of one county or of several counties, it is within the discretion of the legislature to apply such legislation as in its judgment the exigency of the case may require; and it is the sole judge of the existence of such conditions. The representatives of the whole people, convened in the two branches of the legislature, are, subject to constitutional limitations, the organs of the public will in every district or locality of the state. It follows, therefore, that to the legislature belongs the arranging and distributing of the administrative functions; committing such portions as it may deem suitable to local jurisdictions, and retaining other portions to be exercised by officers appointed by the central power. As to the constitutional limitations, they are not so much limitations of the legislature as of the power of the people them- selves, self-imposed by the constitutional compact. So, when a law is declared unconstitutional, it amounts to saying that the sovereign power of the people in that regard has been abdicated by themselves. Otherwise the legislature is untrammeled, and can legislate in cases of local disorder as it will.^'^ § 92. Written constitutions — Operation of. — Limitation upon leg- islative power is one of the purposes to be effected by a written constitution. Its necessity lies in the fact that, if no limitations existed, the government could have no elements of permanence and durability ; and the distribution of its powers and the vesting of their exercise in separate departments would be an idle ceremony. The right of self-government in the local bodies and the power of the peo- ple of those communities to select the local officers and conduct the local administration would utterly disappear, or exist only at the pleasure of the legislature. But the theory of the constitution is that the several counties, cities, towns and villages are of right entitled to choose whom they will have to rule over them f^ and this right can not be taken from them, or the electors and inhabitants be disfran- chised, by any act of the legislature, or of any or all the departments *' People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532- its system of administration re- 537. moved tlie strongest inducement for *' The Roman empire tottered into its constituent peoples to maintain ruin because all power was centered the status quo. at Rome. This cardinal defect in 92 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 96 of the state government combined. Therefore a written constitution must be interpreted, and effect given to it, as the paramount law of the land, equally obligatory upon the legislature as upon other de- partments of government and individual citizens. Nor must it be literally construed. A written constitution would be of little avail as a practical and useful restraint upon the different departments of government, if a literal reading only were to be given it, to the ex- clusion of all necessary implication, and the clear intent ignored. Broad, reasonable interpretations must be placed on its provisions in order that it may operate equally and beneficently. The difference be- tween a written and an unwritten constitution, according to Hare,'''^ is similar to that which "distinguishes the natural integuments, which yield to the motions of the body and expand with the growth of every limb, from an artificial covering that may become too narrow in the course of time. A country that is bound by fixed rules- prescribed by a former generation, which can not be altered without a long and com- plicated process, may find itself powerless in the face of some unfore- seen exigency, and be obliged to violate its organic law as the price of safety ."^« '^''l Hare Amer. Const. Law 214, 215. "" Daniel Webster, in his speech on the Independence of the Judiciary (Works, vol. 3), said: — "It can not be denied that one great object of written constitutions is to keep the departments of government as distinct as possible; and for this purpose to impose restraints de- signed to have that effect. And it is equally true that there is no de- partment on which it is more neces- sary to impose restraints than upon the legislature. The tendency of things is almost always to augment the power of that department in its relation to the judiciary. The ju- diciary is composed of few persons, and those not such as mix habitu- ally in the pursuits and objects which most engage public men." Then he comments upon the legis- lature, and its liability, if in no wise restrained, to encroach upon the judiciary: — "The constitution being the supreme law, it follows, of course, that every act of the legis- lature contrary to that law must be void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the constitu- tion ceases to be a legal, and becomes only a moral, restraint upon the leg- islature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be conformable to the constitution, then the constitution is admonitory or advisory only, not legally bind- ing; because if the construction of it rests wholly with them, their dis- cretion in particular cases may be in favor of erroneous and dangerous constructions. Hence, the courts of law necessarily, when the case arises, must decide on the validity of particular acts. Without this check, no certain limitation could exist on the exercise of legislative power." 97 TILE CHARTER. § 93 § 93. Power to make by-laws — How limited. — "The power of mu- nicipal corporations to make by-laws," said Judge Cooley/^ "is limited in various ways: 1. It is controlled by the constitution of the United States and of the state. The restrictions imposed by those instruments which directly limit the legislative power of the state rest equally upon all the instruments of government created by the state. If a state can not pass an ex post facto law, or law impair- ing the obligation of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under the state with delegated authority.^^ By-laws, therefore, which in their operation would be ex post facto or violate contracts, are not within the power of municipal corporations; and whatever the people by the state constitution have prohibited the state govern- ment from doing, it can not do indirectly through the local govern- ments. 2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general laws of the state, and with the provisions of the municipal charter. Whenever they come in conflict with either the by-law must give way.'"*^ It is often the case, however, that the charter contains a provision that the general laws of the state on some par- ticular subject shall not be operative in that particular city, and that the corporation may pass local laws at discretion. But this exclusive privilege, when granted, can be at any time recalled.^* And this privilege of passing local by-laws, although denied to other cities by a general law, if not inconsistent with the general law is not affected by it, and can stand together with it. § 94. Conflict of by-laws and general acts. — "It is said that the by-law of a town or corporation is void if the legislature have regulated "Cooley Const. Lim. 238; "Power drews v. Insurance Co., 37 Maine of Municipal Corporations to Make 256; City of Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio By-Laws," 15 Sol. J. & Rep. 209 and St. 439; Carr v. City of St. Louis, 9 230; "Municipal Ordinances," by Mo. 191; Commonwealth v. Erie &c. Irving Browne, 27 Alb. L. J. 284. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; City of Bur- "^Cooley Const. Lim. 238; citing lington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa 59; Con- Stuyvesant v. Mayor, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) well v. O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419; March 588; Brooklyn &c. R. Co. v. Brook- v. Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) lyn &c. R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 358; 25. See also, Baldwin v. Green, 10 Illinois Conf. Female College v. Mo. 410; Cowen v. Village of West Cooper, 25 111. 148. Troy, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; State v. "'Cooley Const. Lim. 238; citing Georgia Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608; Wood V. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. Pesterfield v. Vickers, 3 Coldw. (N. Y.) 425; Mayor &c. v. Nichols, 4 (Tenn.) 205; Weith v. City of Wil- Hill (N. Y.) 209; Town of Peters- mington, 68 N. C. 24. burg V. Metzker, 21 111. 205; South- ^ State v. City of Camden, 50 N. port V. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128; An- J. L. 87; s. c. 11 Atl. 137. 1 Smith — 7 § 94 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 98 the subject by law. If the legislature have passed a law regulating as to certain things in a city," says Mr. Justice Woodworth,'''^ "I ap- prehend the corporation are not thereby restricted from making further regulations. Cases of this kind have occurred and never been questioned on that ground ; it is only to notice a case or two out of many. The legislature have imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile labor on Sunday; the corporation of New York have passed a by-law, imposing the penalty of five dollars for the same offense. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legislature and corporation have each imposed the same penalty. Suits to recover the penal- ties have been sustained under the corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never been taken that there was a conflict with the state law." In a case in Mobile, where the validity of a municipal by-law was questioned, which provided a fine of fifty dollars for assault and battery committed within the city limits, the court held: "The object of the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the ordinance itself, was not to punish for an offense against the criminal justice of the country, but to provide a mere police regu- lation, for the enforcement of good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation. It is altogether immaterial whether the state tribunal has interfered and exercised its powers in bringing the de- fendant before it to answer for the assault and battery; for whether he has been punished or acquitted is alike unimportant. The offense against the corporation and the state are distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecution at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis: the one contemplates the observance of the peace and good order of the city; the other has a more enlarged object in view, the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the state."®*' The power to pass a city ordinance must be vested in the governing body of the city by the legislature in express terms, or be necessarily or fairly implied in and incident to the powers expressly granted, and must be essential to the declared purposes of the corpo- ration, — not simply convenient, but indispensable. ■ Any fair or reason- able doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.®^ Powers ''^ Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. 10 Am. St. 175; 2 L. R. A. 110; Y.) 237, 261. Brockman v. City of Creston, 79 *« Mayor &c. v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400. Iowa 587; s. c. 44 N. W. 822; State Cf. "Proper Relations of the State v. Rowe, 72 Md. 548; s. c. 20 Atl. to Municipal Institutions," by H. M. 179; Vosburg v. McCrary, 77 Tex. White, 5 Tenn. Bar Assn. Rep. 159. 568; s. c. 14 S. W. 195; Louisville "' Anderson v. City of Wellington, &c. R. Co. v. Shires, 108 111. 617. 40 Kan. 173; s. c. 19 Pac. 719; 99 THE CHARTER. 95 encroaching npon the rights of the public or of individuals must be plainl}^ and literally conferred by the charter.''^ § 95. The ordinance, when passed, must be reasonable. — A city, although fully authorized to enact ordinances, can not therefore pass unreasonal)le ones. The ordinance of a city must be reasonable ; not inconsistent with the laws of the state; not repugnant to funda- mental rights; it must not be oppressive; it must not be partial or unfair; it must not make special or unwarranted discriminations; in short, it must not contravene common right. The Kansas courts held, in a case where an ordinance was passed directed at the street parades of the Salvation Army and interdicting them, that if was illegal and void, as being partial, unreasonable and in contravention of common right."® All charters and laws and ordinances must be ^ State v. Town of Belvidere, 44 N. J. L. 350; Horr & Bemis Munic. Police Ord. 18. ="• Anderson v. City of "Wellington, 40 Kan. 173; s. c. 19 Pac. 719; 10 Am. St. 175; 2 L. R. A. 110. The reasoning of the court is interest- ing: — "The object of this ordinance, and the danger apprehended and to be avoided by its enactment, as ex- pressed by its terms, is to prevent the calling together of a large or unusual crowd of people on any of the streets, avenues or alleys of the city of Wellington. Then the ques- tion is this: Is a street parade with music or singing legally objection- able in itself? or does it threaten the public peace or the good order of the community? This ordinance pre- vents any number of the people of the state attached to one of the sev- eral political parties from marching together with their party banners and inspiring music, up and down the principal streets, without the written consent of some municipal officer. The Masonic and Odd Fel- lows organizations must first obtain consent before their charitable steps desecrate the sacred streets. Even the Sunday-school children can not assemble at some central point in the city and keep step to the music of the band as they march to the grove without permission first had and obtained. The Grand Army of the Republic must be preceded in its march by the written consent of his honor the mayor, or march with- out drums or fife, shouts or songs. It prevents a public address upon any subject being made on the streets. It prevents an unusual con- gregation of people on the streets under any circumstances without permission. The ordinance is framed on the theory that an unusual crowd or congregation of people upon one of the public streets of a city is either of itself a distrubance of the public peace, or that it threatens the good order of the community. A crowd of people is one of the most ordinary incidents of every-day life in any city of considerable size in this country. It is not a fair esti- mate of the character and habits of the American people to assume that the public peace is threatened when numbers of them congregate. We do not believe that the legislative grant of power to the city council can be so construed as to authorize the city council to take from the people of a city and the surrounding country a privilege exercised by them in every locality throughout § 96 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 100 capable of constrnction, and must be oonstrued in accordance with constitutional principles and in harmony with the general laws of the land; and any ordinance that violates any of the recognized rights and privileges, or the principles of legal and equitable rights, is necessarily void so far forth, and void entirely if it can not be applied according to its terms. "'^ § 96. Reasonableness — How determined. — How shall it be deter- mined whether or not a by-law of a city is unreasonable ? There are various conditions which such a by-law should fulfill. The objects, for which a corporation is created, and to accomplish which its powers are given, are usually definite and certain. No by-law, therefore, should be passed which does not in some degree look to the accomplish- ment of these objects. For example, a power to license certain em- ployments is generally granted to cities. This does not mean that the license can be so fixed as to prohibit an employment by reason of its large amount ; nor that the license shall be imposed solely for the sake of revenue, for that would be an exercise of the power of taxation, which power, to be rightfully exercised, must be distinctly enumerated in the charter or incorporating act. A by-law ought also to be cer- tain. ^''^ It should be in harmony with common sense and common law.^*'^ It should not abridge rights or privileges conferred by the general laws of the state, unless express authority can be pointed out for it in the charter. It is quite possible that some things have a the land, to form their processions Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110; Ex and parade the streets with banners, parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Austin music, songs and shouts. The pow- v. Murray, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 121; er to pass such an ordinance should Western U. Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 be clear and controlling before it can Mich. 525; State v. Freeman, 38 N. be upheld. Public parades of this H. 426; State v. Mayor &c., 29 N. .J. character are not unlawful in their L. 170. intent, purpose and result; they are '°^ Mayor &c. v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55; not mala in se. If they are to be Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624. mala prohibita it ought to be by "'= Village of Buffalo v. Webster, some general law and not by local 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 99; Bush v. Sea- regulation." bury, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 418; City of '<*"Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 396; s. Bowling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush c. 30 N. W. 72; 6 Am. St. 310. See (Ky.) 64; Le Claire v. City of Dav- also, Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & enport, 13 Iowa 210; City of St. J. 587; Chamberlain of London v. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; City of Compton, 7 D. & R. 597; Clark v. Bloomington v. Wahl, 46 111. 489; Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52; Gosling v. Bethune v. Hughes, 28 Ga. 560; Kip Veley, 12 Q. B. 328; Dunham v. Trus- v. Mayor &c., 26 N. J. L. 298. See tees &c., 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462; Mayor Cooley Const. Lim. 245, note, and &c. V. Winfield, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) the cases cited. 707; Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; 101 THE CHARTER. § 96 greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in the cities than in smaller towns and in rural places. This may justify reasonable pre- cautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can ex- tend beyond the scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action altogether can be granted at all. That which is an actual nuisance can be suppressed just so far as it is noxious, and its noxious character is the test of its wrongfulness. There may be substances, like some explosives, which are dangerous in cities under all circumstances, and made dangerous by municipal conditions ; but most dangerous things are not so differ- ent in cities as to require more than increased or qualified safeguards ; and to suppress things not absolutely dangerous as an easy way of get- ting rid of the trouble of regulating them is not a process tolerated under free institutions. Eegulation, and not prohibition, unless un- der clear authority of the charter, and in cases where it is not oppres- sive, is the extent of municipal power.^"^ "^Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 396; s. c. 30 N. W. 72; 6 Am. St. 310. See chapter 14, post, on Ordinances. CHAPTER IV. AMENDMENT^ EEPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. Section 97. The power of the state to amend, repeal or modify the charters of municipal corpo- rations. 98. The charter of a municipal cor- poration not within the rule of the Dartmouth College ease. 99. Construction of repealing and amendatory acts — (a) Gen- eral principles. 100. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together — Repeal by implication. 101. Municipal charter not repealed by subsequent general law unless intent to repeal is clear. 102. The same subject continued. 103. Instances of repeal of charter by general acts. 104. Repeal and amendment of char- ter by subsequent amend- ment of state constitution. 105. Repeal of general laws by en- actment of municipal charter. 106. Repeal of general laws by mu- nicipal ordinance. 107. The same subject continued. 108. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made ap- plicable only to cities of a certain class. 109. Effect of legislation upon the Section charter of a city organized under special law, and not by its acceptance thereof subject to the general law. 110. Miscellaneous instances of ef- fective repealing and amend- atory acts. 111. The same subject continued. 112. What is an amendment or re- peal of a municipal charter? 113. Repeal— Effect of. 114. Acceptance of amendment. Manner of acceptance. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature to amend or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general. (b) Special legislation. (c) Vested rights — Impairment of obligation of contracts — Recognition by constitution. (d) Title of amendatory or re- pealing acts. The same subject continued. 121. Forfeiture of charter in Eng- land. 122. The same subject continued. 123. Instances of forfeiture of char- ter under English law.^ 124. The charter of a municipal cor- poration in the United States can not be forfeited by judi- cial action. 125. The same subject continued. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. § 97. The power of the state to amend, repeal or modify the char- ters of municipal corporations. — The charter of a strictly public corporation is granted for purposes of the local government of the district incorporated. The powers conferred by this charter are not (102) 103 AMENDMENT^ REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 97 vested rights as against the state, but, being wholly political, exist only during the will of the legislature; otherwise, as was declared in an Indiana case, there would be numberless petty governments existing within the state, forming a part of it, but independent of the control of the sovereign power. Such powers may at any time be repealed or abrogated by the legislature, either by general law operating upon the whole state, or by special act altering the powers of the corpora- tion.^ For the same reasons the state has power to amend or modify municipal charters at its will ; and it may be stated as a general propo- sition, that the legislature of the state has full power to amend, repeal or modify the charters of the municipal corporations within the boundaries of the state, subject only to constitutional limitations of that power.- As is said by Judge Cooley, restraints on the legislative ^ Sloan V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361. = Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; Kennedy v. City of Sac- ramento, 19 Fed. 580; s. c. 5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 553; Commissioners &c. V. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307; Gi- rard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511; Piqiia Branch &c. V. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Aspinwall v. Commissioners &c., 22 How. 364; Cobb v. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197; Ber- lin V. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; Town of Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416; Inhabitants &c. v. North Yar- mouth, 34 Maine 411; Inhabitants &c. V. Skillings, 45 Maine 133; Demarest v. Mayor &c., 74 N. Y. 161; People V. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 202; Peo- ple V. Pinckney, 32 N. Y. 377; Peo- ple V. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; David- son V. Mayor &c., 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 342; Gray v. City of Brooklyn, 2 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 267; People V. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; Crook v. People, 106 111. 237; s. c. 5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 460; True v. Davis, 133 111. 522; s. c. 22 N. E. 410; 6 L. R. A. 266; Guild v. City of Chicago, 82 111. 472; People v. Power, 25 111. 187 ; Robertson v. City of Rockford, 21 111. 451; Trustees of Schools V. Tatman, 13 111. 27; Rich- land Co. V. Lawrence Co., 12 111. 1; Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio 427; Scovill v. City of Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; City of San Francisco V. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541; People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; City of Reading V. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361; Eichels V. Evansville &c. R. Co., 78 Ind. 261; s. c. 41 Am. R. 561; City of Indian- apolis V. Indianapolis Gas &c. Co., 66 Ind. 396; Roberts' Case, 51 Mich. 548; s. c. 17 N. W. 50; Smith v. Vil- lage of Adrian, 1 Mich. 495; Lynch V. Lafland, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 96; Daniel v. Mayor &c., 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 582; Buckner v. Gordon, 81 Ky. 665; s. c. 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 395; Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140; State v. Troth, 34 N. J. L. 377, 379; President &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; State v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; Mayor &c. v. Jersey City &c. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 360; Wash- burn V. City of Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453; s. c. 19 N. W. 364; Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Carpenter v. People, 8 Colo. 116; s. c. 5 Pac. 828; 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 110; City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455; City of Little Rock v. Parish. 36 Ark. 166; State v. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419; State v. Mayor &c., R. M. Charl. § 98 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 104 power of control must be found in the constitution of the state, or they must rest alone in the legislative discretion.^ Where the legis- lature by a general statute reserves the right to amend or repeal the charters of municipal corporations, the exercise of such power will not be questioned.* § 98. The charter of a municipal corporation not within the rule of the Dartmouth College case. — Municipal corporations do not, of course, come within the rule of the Dartmouth College case,** by which the charters of private corporations were declared to be con- tracts, and as such protected by the constitutional prohibition of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. This is one of the funda- mental differences between strictly public and other corporations. This difference and the reasons therefor are thus stated by Judge Pearson: "The substantial distinction is this: Some corporations are created by the mere will of the legislature, there being no other party interested or concerned. To this party a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be exercised for the general good, and subject at all times to be modified, changed or annulled. Other cor- porations are the result of contract. The legislature is not the only party interested; for, although it has a public purpose to be accom- plished, it chooses to do it by the instrumentality of a third party. (Ga.) 250; Police Jury v. Shreve- Jessup, 15 Wall. 454, 458; Railroad port, 5 La. An. 661; City of New Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499, 510; Rail- Orleans v. Hoyle, 23 La. An. 740; In road Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, re Hinkle, 31 Kan. 712; s. c. 3 Pac. 365; Hoge v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 531; 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 369; 348, 353; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. State v. Mayor &c., 24 Ala. 701; City S. 700, 720; Greenwood v. Freight of St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; Co., 105 U. S. 13, 21; Close v. Glen- City of St. Louis V. Allen, 13 Mo. wood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 476; 400; City of St. Louis v. Russell, 9 s. c. 2 S. Ct. 267; Spring Valley Wa- Mo. 507; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; ter Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, Wallace v. Trustees &c., 84 N. C. 352; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 48; Louisville Gas 164; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. (N. Co. v. Citizens' &c. Co., 115 U. S. C.) 558; Langworthy v. City of Du- 683, 696; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 365; Gibbs v. buque, 16 Iowa 271; Howard v. Mc- Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396, Diarmid, 26 Ark. 100; Bradshaw v. 408; s. c. 9 S. Ct. 553; Sioux City R. City of Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Kuhn v. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98, 108; Board of Education, 4 W. Va. 499; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 226; Louisville Water Hess V. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Groff v. Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1, 12; s. c. 12 Mayor &c., 44 Md. 180; Mayor &c. v. S. Ct. 346. Under constitution of Sehner, 37 Md. 180; Blessing v. City North Carolina, as amended in 1875, of Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. the legislature has power to amend ^ Cooley Const. Lim. 229. See the charter of a city: Harriss v. also, §§ 57, 63, 64, 69, 70. 78, 79, ante. Wright, 121 N. C. 172; s. c. 28 S. E. * Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 269. 231; s. c. 19 S. Ct. 383; Tomlinson v. *a 4 wheat. 518. 105 AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. 99 These two parties make a contract. The legislature for and in con- sideration of certain labor and outlay of money confers upon the party of the second part the privilege of being a corporation with certain powers and capacities. The expectation of benefit to the public is the moving consideration on one side; that of expected remuner- ation for the outlay is the consideration on the other. It is a contract, and therefore can not be modified, changed or annulled without the consent of both parties."^ § 99. Construction of repealing and amendatory acts — (a) General principles. — The great principle controlling the construction of re- pealing and amendatory acts, as of all other statutes, is that the inten- tion of the legislature must be ascertained and carried into efEect. In addition to this fundamental principle, it is also to be constantly borne in mind in construing these acts, that the courts require the clearest expression of the intention on the part of the legislature to repeal or alter existing laws. Where the two statutes can be so con- strued as to allow both to stand, the courts will always adopt such a construction. In order to effect repeal the later statute must either expressly repeal the former, or its provisions must be so entirely repugnant to those of the earlier statute that by no reasonable con- 's Mills V. Williams, 11 Ired. (N. C.) 558; Cooley Const. Lim. 334- 337. See § 97, ante. It is con- ceded learning that the charter of a municipal corporation is not a contract. In order to obviate the difBculties arising from the fact that the charters of private corpora- tions are contracts, and as such in- violable, many of the states have constitutional provisions and gen- eral statutes reserving the right of amendment and repeal of such char- ters: 1 Beach Priv. Corp., § 36, and cases cited. "In consequence of the decision in that case (Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518), a gen- eral law was spread upon the statute book of nearly all, if not quite all, the states of the Union, reserving to the legislature power to alter or modify all such charters as should be thereafter granted, according to its will and pleasure:" "Legislative Power to Amend Charters," by Wm. L. Royall, Esq., 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 1, where several phases of the exercise of this power are discussed. Such constitutional and statutory reservations are unnecessary in the case of strictly public corporations. As was said by Justice Field in an important case, considering the effect of legislation by which the municipal government of Mem- phis vi^as abolished: — "There is no contract between the state and the public that the charter of a city shall not at all times be subject to legislative control. All persons who deal with such bodies are con- clusively presumed to act upon knowledge of the power of the legis- lature. There is no such thing as a vested right held by any individual in the grant of legislative power to them: Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. See also, an article by H. Campbell Black, Esq., on "Legisla- tion Impairing the Obligation of Contracts," in 25 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 81, 83. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. lOG striiction can the two acts stand together, as the law does not favor repeals by implication.^ § 100. (b) Statutes in pari materia construed together — Repeal by implication. — An excellent illustration of the rule is found in a Maryland case, where an amendment to the charter of the city of Cumberland prohibited the mayor and common council from pledging ^ Cape Girardeau Co. Court v. Hill, 118 U. S. 68; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 951; Mc- Cool V. Smith, 1 Black 459; United States V. Twenty-five Cases of Cloths, Crabbe 356; Henderson's To- bacco, 11 Wall. 652; Snell v. Bridge- water &c. Co., 24 Pick. (Mass.) 296; Goddard v. City of Boston, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 407; Towle v. Marrett, 3 Maine 22; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513 ; Attorney-General v. Rail- road Companies, 35 Wis. 425; City of Janesville v. Markoe, 18 Wis. 350; In re Henry Street, 123 Pa. St. 346; s. c. 16 Atl. 785; McFate's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 323; Kilgore v. Common- wealth, 94 Pa. St. 495; Rounds v. Waymart, 81 Pa. St. 395; Erie v. Bootz, 72 Pa. St. 196; McKenna v. Edmundstone, 91 N. Y. 231; People V. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83; Covington v. City of East St. Louis, 78 111. 548; City of East St. Louis v. Maxwell, 99 111. 439; State v. Williamson, 44 N. J. L. 165; Naylor v. Field, 29 N. J. L. 287; Water Works Co. v. Burk- hart, 41 Ind. 364; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Hirn v. State. 1 Ohio St. 15, 20; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; State v. Mayor &c., 14 Ohio St. 472; Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio 173; Clark V. City of Davenport, 14 Iowa 494; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa 58; Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Hoard, 16 W. Va. 270; Ex parte Schmidt, 24 S. C. 363; McGruder v. State, 83 Ga. 616; s. c. 10 S. E. 281; Greeley v. City of Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174; City of New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. An. 89; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611; s. c. 42 N. W. 1124; 4 L. R. A. 751; Connors v. Carp River Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168; s. c. 19 N. W. 938; In re Ryan, 45 Mich. 173; s. c. 7 N. W. 819; Ayeridge v. Social Cir- cle Com'rs, 60 Ga. 404; People v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303. See also, cases cited in preceding note; 1 Dil- lon Munic. Corp., §§ 86, 87; 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 974, 975, tit. Municipal Corporations; Annotated Case by M. D. Ewell, Esq., 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 20, 25, containing a full citation of cases upon the gen- eral subject of repeals by implica- tion. Mich. Act of 1899, No. 154, is not inconsistent with Grand Rapids Charter Act of 1893, No. 206: Board &c. V. Board &c., 124 Mich. 491; s. c. 83 N. W. 209. An act of New Jer- sey entitled "An act concerning cities" does not apply to "incorpo- rated towns": Day v. City of Morris- town, 63 N. J. L. 353; s. c. 43 Atl. 1098. Power given to a city to im- prison certain designated classes of persons is a delegation of power to pass prohibitory penal ordinances where, for a violation, imprison- ment is to follow: City of New Or- leans V. Collins, 52 La. An. 973; s. c. 27 So. 532. Construction of Mass. St. 1892, ch. 419, in reference to per- mits for buildings: Greene v. Dam- rell, 175 Mass. 394; s. c. 56 N. E. 707. Kansas City charter construed in reference to revenues: Pryor v. City of Kansas City, 153 Mo. 135; s. c. 54 S. W. 499. Construction of Oakland City, Cal., city charter under consti- tution: People V. City of Oakland, 123 Cal. 145; s. c. 55 Pac. 772. Mo. Rev. St. 1889, § 1880, construed in City of Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 189; s. c. 52 S. W. 723. 107 AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 101 the credit of the city for any sum exceeding $10,000 without first suhmittinjj the question to the voters after notice, and a subsequent statute authorized those officers to issue bonds for the purpose of raising money to build a certain bridge. The courts decided that there was no repugnancy between the amendment and the subsequent act, and that the^ exercise of the new power must be subject to the proviso previously annexed to the effective part of the charter. It was declared in the opinion that where two laws only so far differ as that by any other construction they may both stand, the rule "leges post- eriores priores contrarias abrogant" does not apply, and that the later law is no repeal of the earlier act.'^ As is said by Judge Cooley : "Ee- peals by implication are not favored, and the repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant a court in holding that the later in time repeals the other when it does not in terms do so. This rule has peculiar force in the case of laws of special and local application, which are never to be deemed repealed by general legis- lation except upon the most unequivocal manifestation of intent to that effect."^ § 101. Municipal charter not repealed by subsequent general law unless intent to repeal is clear. — As the charter of a municipal cor- poration is a special act, a general law passed subsequent to the charter will not repeal the provisions of the charter either by impli- cation or by a general clause repealing all acts contrary to its pro- visions, unless the intent of the legislature to effect such repeal is clear. '^ For example, a city in California adopted in its charter the methods of the general revenue act, at that time in force, for col- lecting and assessing the municipal taxes, and when that general revenue act was repealed and a general law regulating the creation and government of municipal corporations and containing provisions for the assessment and collection of the city taxes was passed, the courts held that the provisions of the charter were not repealed by 'Mayor &c. v. Magruder, 34 Md. Salle, 12 111. 339; City of East St. 381. Subsequent laws do not repeal Louis v. Maxwell, 99 111. 439; Hay- former ones by containing different wood v. Mayor &c., 12 Ga. 404; May- provisions; they must be contrary: or v. Inman, 57 Ga. 370; McGarty Bond v. Hiestand, 20 La. An. 139. v. Deming, 51 Conn. 422; City of >* Cooley Const. Lim. 183; 18 Am. Harrisburg v. Sheck, 104 Pa. St. 53; L. Reg. (N. S.) 20, 25. In re Egypt Street, 2 Grant Cas. ^ State v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; (Pa.) 455; In re Commissioners &c., State v. Mayor &c., 3 N. J. L. 57; 50 N. Y. 493; People v. Clunie, 70 State v. Common Council &c., 36 N. Cal. 504; s. c. 11 Pac. 775; Bond v. J. L. 198; State v. Mayor &c., 29 N. Hiestand, 20 La. An. 139; Mayor J. L. 170; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. &c. v. Magruder, 34' Md. 381; Ham- 166; President &c. v. County of La mond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541. § 103 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 108 the passage of the subsequent legislation, and that the municipality should continue to assess and collect its taxes according to the meth- ods prescribed in its charter.^" § 102. The same subject continued. — Where the two statutes are so inconsistent that they can not be construed to stand together, the usual principles governing the construction of statutes must be ap- plied in order to ascertain whether it was the intention of the legisla- ture that the charter should be superseded by the general statute, or whether the charter is excepted from the operation of the general law. In order to arrive at the intention of the legislature, the char- ter and the general act must be considered in the light of the general legislation on the subject, and each provision of the charter or the general statute must be read with reference to the other provisions.^^ § 103. Instances of repeal of charter by general acts. — Thus, an act of the New Jersey legislature which in terms applied to all cities was construed to apply to all, and to repeal all inconsistent charter provisions, because the constitution of that state prohibited special legislation, and if any city were excepted from the operation of the act in question, it would be a special law and unconstitutional. Therefore, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the interpretation which validated the law was adopted. ^^ And so^, where a chapter of a Min- nesota statute provided that every village incorporated under the general statutes should thereafter be governed according to the pro- >" People V. Clunie, 70 Cal. 504; s. 198; State v. Spaude, 37 Minn. 322; c. 11 Pac. 775. In New Jersey a s. c. 34 N. W. 164; Holland v. Mayor similar case arose, in which the &c., 11 Md. 186; City of Janesville same principle was upheld and a v. Markoe, 18 Wis. 350; Powell v. provision in a city charter concern- City of Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698; ing taxation was declared to remain Board &c. v. Davies, 1 Wash. 290; in force notwithstanding the pas- s. c. 24 Pac. 540; Thomason v. Ash- sage of a subsequent general act worth, 73 Cal. 73; s. c. 14 Pac. 615; regulating that subject: State v. Eichels v. Evansville &c. R. Co., 78 Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484. See also, Ind. 261; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 87. last note to preceding section, and As an illustration of the doctrine of § 86, ante, as to effect of amendment the text in a Maryland case, the of charter upon existing ordinances, definition in a later statute of a " State V. City of Camden, 50 N. J. term used in an earlier law was L. 87; s. c. 11 Atl. 137; New Bedford considered by the courts in constru- &c. R. Co. V. Achushnet &c. R. Co., ing the prior statute: Holland v, 143 Mass. 200; s. c. 9 N. B. 536; Mayor &c., 11 Md. 186. See also. Board &c. v. Leavitt, 4 N. M. 37; s. § 82, ante. c. 12 Pac. 759; Moran v. Long Island " State v. City of Camden, 50 N. J. City, 101 N. Y. 439; s. c. 5 N. E. L. 87; s. c. 11 Atl. 137. 80; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 109 AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 104 visions of that chapter, to the end that uniformity of village govern- ment and equal privileges to all might be secured, it was held that in view of this expressed intention, and the fact that the general statutes contained no provision as to village government, the section applied to all villages incorporated under any general law of the state.^'^ § 104. Repeal and amendment of charter by subsequent amend- ment of state constitution. — In this case as in other cases of repeal, the intention of the legislature is the point to be considered, but with the qualification that the courts incline strongly to declare the charter provisions void if there be any inconsistency, and do not go so far in their efforts to reconcile the two laws. This, of course, is due to the greater weight of the constitution as the organic law of the state. Thus, in a California decision, the provisions of a city charter referring to streets were considered to have been repealed by the enactment of a new state constitution containing provisions thought by the court inconsistent with the charter provisions.^* And so, where the charter of the city of East St. Louis contained a limitation on the power of taxation for the payment of bonded indebtedness, that limitation was held to be abrogated by an inconsistent provision of a state constitution subsequently adopted.^^ ^^ State v. Spaude, 37 Minn. 322; existing corporations are authorized s. c. 34 N. W. 164. Laws N. M., to adopt its provisions as to govern- 1884, chs. 37, 39, relating to the in- ment and classification: Board &c. corporation, disincorporation and v. Davies, 1 Wash. 290; s. c. 24 Pac. reincorporation of cities, are in 540. In the last cited case it was pari materia, and must be read to- declared, in accordance with the doc- gether, and be taken as part of the trine of the text^ that where two same act; and their joint effect is to statutes embracing the same sub- continue the existence of municipal ject-matter are passed at the same corporations created under the act session of the legislature, they of February 11, 18^0, entitled "An should be construed as one act if act for the incorporation of cities," possible, but if in irreconcilable and to enable them, if they choose, conflict the later statute should pre- either to reincorporate under the vail. Minn. Gen. Laws, 1885, ch. 145, provisions of ch. 39, laws 1884, § 2, applies to all villages previously or to dissolve their corporation ab- governed by general laws: Flynn v. solutely: Board &c. v. Leavitt, 4 N. Little Falls &c. Co., 74 Minn. 180; s. M. 37; s. c. 12 Pac. 759. Act Wash., c. 78 N. W. 106. March 27, 1890, providing for the or- " Donahue v. Graham, 61 Cal. 276. ganization of municipal corpora- ^^ East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. tions, affects existing corporations, 600; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 739; Public School since by its terms it provides for Trustees v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; corporations attempted to be organ- Mayor &c. v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369. ized under a previous void act, and § 105 PUBLIC COHPOKATIONS. IIO' § 105. Repeal of general laws by enactment of municipal char- ter. — The principles considered iu the preceding sections ninst be applied in considering the question whether the enactment of a municipal charter repeals the provisions of a prior general law. The intention of the legislature to repeal the general law by the enactment of the charter must be clear and beyond uncertainty. The rule that repeals by implication are not favored is strictly applied in this relation.^^ The ordinances of a municipal corporation, if authorized by its charter, have the same effect within its limits and with respect to persons upon whom they lawfully operate that an act of the legis- lature has upon the people at large. ^'^ Consequently, where an or- dinance authorized by the charter of the municipality is in apparent or real conflict with a general law, the same principles must be applied in deciding whether the general law and the ordinance can stand together, or whether they are fatally inconsistent; as, where the provision of the charter itself is in question. When the constitu- tion authorizes cities to frame their own charters and make regula- tions subject to and not in conflict with general law the latter is paramount.^^ A charter which provides that, after its ratification and adoption, it shall supersede all laws of the state, makes the charter paramount to all general laws in conflict therewith.^'' Where the constitution provides that a city may frame and amend its char- ter, such special charter and its amendments supersede general stat- utes that conflict in so far as mere municipal regulations are con- cerned.^" Where a city is organized under a special charter the gen- eral law is inapplicable.^^ Upon the division of a corporation the old corporation retains the title to the property, unless there is a stat- utory provision to the contrary.^" ^^ Ex parte Garza, 28 Tex. App. be found in the chapter on Ordi- 381; s. c. 13 S. W. 779; 19 Am. St. nances and By-Laws, post. 845; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; ^* Tacoma Gas &c. Co. v. City of State V. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395; Village Tacoma, 14 Wash. 288; s. c. 44 Pac. of St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 655. Vt. 300; State v. Young, 17 Kan. i'' Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 414; State v. Mills, 34 N. J. L. 177; 172; s. c. 35 S. W. 600. Seibold v. People, 86 111. 33. See =° City of Kansas City v. Marsh Oil also, §§ 77, 94, ante. Co., 140 Mo. 458; s. c. 41 S. W. 943. "Village of St. Johnsbury v. =^' City of Kansas v. Zahner, 73 Thompson, 59 Vt. 300; Des Moines Mo. App. 396. Act of Cal., March 8, Gas Co. V. City of Des Moines, 44 1897, does not apply to San Fran- Iowa 505, 508; s. c. 24 Am. R. 756. cisco: Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. This is conceded learning. The 456; s. c. 56 Pac. 53. cases supporting the doctrine will " Inhabitants &c. v. Mayor &c., 55 N. J. Eq. 505; s. c. 37 Atl. 63. Ill AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CTIARTER. § lOG § 106. Repeal of general laws by municipal ordinance. — In a Vermont case there is a strong and interesting presentation of the learning on this point. A general law of the state of Vermont authorized the selectmen of villages to license vietualing-honses. With this law in force the village of St. Johnsbury was incorporated by act of the legislature with a charter authorizing the village to pass by-laws regulating the licensing of victualing-houses. Under this charter the village adopted a by-law authorizing its trustees to license victualing-shops. The validity of the by-law was called into question, and in the opinion of the court it was said : "The by-laws of municipal corporations, when authorized by the charter, have the same effect within its limits, and with respect to persons upon whom they lawfully operate, that an act of the legislature has upon the people at large. -^ So if the by-law is authorized by the charter it has the effect of a special law of the legislature within the limits of the village, and supersedes the general law upon the subject of victualing-houses therein; for the charter giving the village power to pass the by-law inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the general law, by necessary implication operated to repeal the general law, within the territorial limits of the village, on the principle that pro- visions of different statutes which are in conflict with one another can not stand together, and in the absence of anything showing a different intent on the part of the legislature, general legislation upon a particular subject must give way to later inconsistent special legis- lation upon the same subject."^* § 107. The same subject continued. — An interesting application of the principles discussed in the last section is to be found in the efforts of various municipalities to license houses of prostitution, where such houses are prohibited by the general criminal statutes of the state. In a recent Texas case this question arose. ^^ By its charter the city of San Antonio, which was incorporated by special act of the legislature, was empowered inter alia to suppress and re- "^ Village of St. Johnsbury v. under a law authorizing it to tax the Thompson, 59 Vt. 300. sale of liquor may be required to ^1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 88; 4 pay an additional license under a Kent Com. 466, note; In re Snell, city ordinance authorized by a char- 58 Vt. 207; s. c. 1 Atl. 566; State v. ter granted after the county license Mayor &c., 33 N. J. L. 57; State v. was issued: City of Elk Point v. Clarke, 25 N. J. L. 54; Daviess v. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; s. c. 46 N. W. Fairbairn, 3 How. 636; In re God- 577. See § 88, ante, dard, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504; State v. '= Ex parte Garza, 28 Tex. App. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Mark v. State, 97 381; s. c. 13 S. W. 779; 19 Am. St. N. Y. 572. One licensed by a county 845. § 108 PUBLIC CORPOEATIONS, 112 strain disorderly houses, bawdy-houses and houses of prostitution, to enact ordinances to restrain and punish prostitutes and to prevent and punish the keeping of houses of prostitution within the city. Under these powers the city council passed an ordinance licensing houses of prostitution within the city. At the time of the passage of the ordinance houses of prostitution were prohibited by the penal code of the state. It was claimed on the one hand that the ordinance was void as being repugnant to a general law of the state, while on the other hand it was contended that by the passage of the charter provisions authorizing the city to restrain, regulate and suppress such establishments, the general law was, although not expressly, still by necessary implication, repealed. The former view was upheld by the courts, and in the opinion it was said: "If it was the intention of the legislature to repeal this general law within the corporate limits of said city, it is reasonable to presume that such intention would have been plainly and expressly declared, and not left to be implied merely. It is reasonable to presume that if it had been in- tended to grant the power to license such houses, the legislature would, as it did in the charter of the city of Waco, have expressly granted such power. That such was not the legislative intent is also, and to our minds very cogently, shown by the fact that the power to license other occupations was expressly conferred upon the city."^^ § 108. Construction of amendatory and repealing acts made ap- plicable only to cities of a certain class. — The provisions of amenda- tory and repealing statutes are sometimes made applicable in terms only to cities of a certain grade or class. In construing these acts the question often arises as to whether they take effect, ipso facto, upon the city reaching the required population, or whether it is neces- sary for the city to comply with the statutory formalities required in order to formally raise the city from the lower to the higher grade -•' Ex parte Garza, 28 Tex. App. St. Louis to suppress bawdy-houses, 381; s. c. 13 S. W. 779; 19 Am. St. while by an amendment the city was 845. The opinion also refers to the further empowered to regulate and Missouri case on the same subject, suppress these resorts. In another where it was held that the power to Missouri decision it was held that a regulate included the power to li- special act of the legislature ex- cense: State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17. pressly conferring upon the city of See also, State v. De Bar, 58 Mo. St. Louis the power to permit beer 395; Smith v. City of Madison, 7 saloons to remain open on Sunday Ind. 86; City of Burlington v. Law- operated within the city limits a re- rence, 42 Iowa 681. But it is to be peal of the general statute prohibit- noted, as is remarked in the opinion, ing such act: State v. Binder, 38 that in the Missouri case the origi- Mo. 451. nal charter authorized the city of 113 AMENDMENT^ REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 109 before the acts take effect. In a recent Utah case, where certain sections of a statute amendatory of city charters were by express terms made applicable to cities having a population of over twenty thousand, and pointed out a manner in which the number of in- habitants of a given city might be determined, the court nevertheless enforced the act by taking judicial notice of the population as shown by the last decennial census without anything being done on the part of the city.^^ On the other hand, under the Ohio statute providing that "existing corporations organized as cities of the second class shall remain such until they become cities of the first class," a mere increase of population has been held not to advance such cities from the second to the first class, but to accomplish that end the pro- visions of the statute must be complied with.^^ § 109. Effect of legislation upon the charter of a city organized under special lav^r, and not by its acceptance thereof subject to the general law. — Where it is provided, as is frequently the case, that a city organized by special act may elect to become subject to a subse- quent general law providing for the creation of municipalities throughout the state, and any city refuses to make such election and remains subject to its original special charter, legislation affecting cities organized under the general law does not effect an amendment or repeal of the provisions of that special charter. So the city of Wilkesbarre, never having accepted the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute regulating the government of cities, and making the petition of a majority of the lot-owners a condition precedent to the pavement of a street, was held to be not subject thereto, but to be governed by its own charter, which did not require such petition.^^ And in "People v. Page, 6 Utah 353; s. e. ^Beaumont v. City of Wilkes- 23 Pac. 761; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. barre, 142 Pa. St. 198; s. c. 21 Atl. Cas. 57. See also, § 48, ante. The 888. And in construing the same courts will in general take judicial general statute^ it was held accord- notice of the population of a city ingly that the statute in question, as ascertained by the federal cen- the act of May 23, 1874 (P. L. Pa. sus: State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340; 231), and the supplemental act of State V. Anderson, 44 Ohio St. 247; April 11, 1876 (P. L. 21), establish- s. c. 6 N. E. 571; City of Topeka v. ing a uniform and general system of Gillett, 32 Kan. 431; s. c. 4 Pac. 800. government for all cities, was not ^ State V. Wall, 47 Ohio St. 499; designed to repeal any municipal s. c. 24 N. E. 897. Amendment of charter previously created by spe- charters of cities of over 100,000 cial enactment, and a city which population in Missouri, — see City of has not accepted the act is not sub- Kansas City V. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. ject to its provisions: In re Henry 189; s. c. 52 S. W. 723. St., 123 Pa. St. 346; s. c. 16 Atl. 785. 1 Smith — 8 § no PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 114 Colorado and California similar rulings were made even in the case of constitutional provisions affecting cities organized under the gen- eral law.^" § 110. Miscellaneous instances of effective repealing and amenda- tory acts. — Where a repealing or amendatory act expressly declares that the act shall apply to all cities and towns of the state, of course those charters of cities and towns within the state which are incon- sistent with the provisions of the act are thereby repealed or altered, as the intention of the legislature to efEect such repeal or amendment is expressly indicated.^^ Where the earlier and later legislation are ^° The constitution of Colorado, article 14, § 13, authorized the general assembly to provide by gen- eral laws for organization and clas- sification of cities and towns, and to define by general laws the powers of each class^ so that all of the same class shall possess the same powers, etc. Section 14 provided that the general assembly should make pro- vision by general law whereby any city incorporated by special law might elect to become subject to the general law. The city of Denver never elected to be reincorporated under the general laws; but, on the contrary, its charter was often amended. It was decided that the constitution, article 7, § 12, pro- viding that the general assembly shall by general law designate the courts and judges by whom election contests shall be tried^ did not in effect repeal an existing provision in the Denver city charter authorizing the city council to determine con- tests as to the election of mayor, nor did it invalidate a subsequent amendment to such provision: Peo- ple V. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303; s. c. 22' Pac. 764; 6 L. R. A. 444; Carpenter V. People, 8 Colo. 116; s. c. 5 Pac. 828; 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 110. The complaint in an action by a California city organized under a special charter was according to the form prescribed by a section of the charter. There was nothing to in- dicate that such section had been repealed or modified prior to the adoption of the constitution of Cal- ifornia of 1879, or that the city as a corporation ever reorganized under the act of 1883 (acts Cal. 1883, p. 235), providing for the organization of cities under general laws. The court held that the complaint was not obnoxious to the constitution of California of 1879, article 11, § 6, providing that "corporations for municipal purposes shall not be cre- ated by special laws; but the legis- lature, by general laws, shall pro- vide for the incorporation, organiza- tion and classification in proportion to population of cities, towns," etc.: City of Stockton v. Western &c. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. 621; s. c. 15 Pac. 314. ^^ Thus a clause in an act declaring that "this act shall apply to all cities and towns in this state, anything in their charters to the contrary not- withstanding," makes the act oper- ative in those cities whose charters have contrary provisions: In re House Resolution Relating to House Bill No. 116, 12 Colo. 289; s. c. 21 Pac. 484; In re Senate Resolution Relating to Senate Bill No. 1, 12 Colo. 290; s. c. 21 Pac. 484. Also it has been decided that laws of Utah, 1888, ch. 48, article 20, § 5, providing that the sections there- of specifying the number of wards, and the officers to be elected, in cities of certain classes, shall apply 115 AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 111 obviously and fatally inconsistent, the later act repeals the former. Thus, a Texas statute which incorporated the town of Henderson, with limits one mile square, the court-house being in the center, was impliedly repealed by a subsequent act incorporating the same town, with limits extending "one-half mile in every direction from the court-house."^- In the famous cases in which the members of the board of aldermen of New York, known as the "boodle" aldermen, were indicted for receiving bribes in connection with the purchase by Jacob Sharp of the franchise to operate a street railway through Broadway, the charter of the city provided a penalty in the case of municipal officials for the crime of receiving bribes. A provision of the penal code adopted after the passage of that charter provision imposed a greater penalty upon the same offense. The provision of the penal code was held to supersede and repeal the charter pro- vision.^^ § 111. The same subject continued. — In general it may be stated that where a question arises as to whether the provisions of a munici- jial charter are repealed by subsequent legislation, the intention of the legislature must be ascertained according to the general rules govern- ing the construction of statutes, subject to the special limitations in- dicated in the preceding sections; and where, either expressly or by clear and necessary implication, the intention of the legislature to amend or repeal the provisions of the charter is apparent, such amend- ment or repeal is effected.^* to cities already organized, effects 270, providing for the preservation an amendment of the charters of of the public health, etc., being gen- such cities, though the act contains eral in its application, repeals and no repealing clause: People v. Page, supersedes the provisions of a vil- 6 Utah 353; s. c. 23 Pac. 761. See lage charter relating to the same also, Trustees «S:c. v. Keeting, 4 subject: People v. Daley, 37 Hun (N. Denio (N. Y.) 341; Bank v. Bridges, Y.) 461. The provision of the city 30 N. J. L. 112; Coe v. Meriden, 45 charter of Oakland, granted in 1854, Conn. 155; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 giving the common council exclusive Minn. 166. jurisdiction to determine an elec- ^^Buford V. State, 72 Texas 182; s. tion contest for the office of council- c. 10 S. W. 401. man, was impliedly repealed by 3^ People V. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251; Code Civil Proc. Cal., § 1111 et seq., s. c. 16 N. E. 68; People v. Jaehne, providing that any elector of a coun- 103 N. Y. 182; s. c. 8 N. E. 374. ty or city, or any political subdivi- =*Buford V. State, 72 Texas 182; sion of either, may contest for s. c. 10 S. W. 401; State v. Sever- causes therein stated, and that such ance, 55 Mo. 378; State v. Miller, 30 contest must be determined by a spe- N. J. L. 368; s. c. 86 Am. D. 188; cial session of the superior court: Allen V. People, 84 111. 502, and cases McGivney v. Pierce, 87 Cal. 124; s. already cited. N. Y. Laws 1885, ch. c. 25 Pac. 269. The construction of 112 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 116 § 112. What is an amendment or repeal of a municipal charter? — The constitution of the state sonietinies prescribes specific methods according to which the amendment or repeal of municipal charters may be effected. Under these constitutional provisions it is necessary to determine whether legislative or other action is an amendment or a repeal of the charter within the meaning of the statute. In Missouri it has been decided that an ordinance extending the limits of a city, the boundaries of which had been originally defined by its charter, was an amendment to the charter.^^ But an act of the legis- lature, conferring upon a city powers additional to what it already had under its charter, was regarded in an Oregon case as supplemental to the charter, and not as an amendment or revision of it, within that provision of the constitution which provides that when an act is revised, or a section amended, the act or section so revised or amended shall be set forth at full length.^** The charter of the city of New York originally provided that the aldermen of that city should sit as judges of the court of general sessions; and it was held that an act depriving the aldermen of that right was an act amending the charter, and, ^s such, required a vote of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature. Such an act passed without that vote was declared void.^^ municipal ordinances is governed by the same rules that are applied to statutes in similar cases: State v. Mayor &c., 40 N. J. L. 257; s. c. an- notated 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 20. ^^ The constitution of Missouri, article 9, § 16, provides that any city having a population of one hundred thousand may frame a charter for its own government, which must be approved by four-sevenths of the qualified voters, and which, when "so adopted, may be amended by a proposal therefor made by the law- making authorities of such city, . . . and accepted by three-fifths of the qualified voters of such city, . . . and not otherwise." Kan- sas City adopted such a charter, one of whose provisions defined the ter- ritorial limits of the city. It was held that an ordinance to extend such limits was an amendment to the charter, and must be accepted by three-fifths of the voters, as re- quired by the constitution. And, al- though the same section of the con- stitution further provided that "such charter shall always be . . . subject to the constitution and laws of this state," this was decided to confer no authority on the legisla- ture to authorize amendments to the charter otherwise than as pro- vided by the constitution; and hence act of Missouri, March 10, 1887, providing that the territorial limits of such a city may be ex- tended by ordinance, was held to be void so far as it proposes to dis- pense with the assent of three-fifths of the qualified voters of the city to such ordinance: City of Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141; s. c. 15 S. W. 68. 3" Sheridan v. Salem, 14 Or. 328; s. c. 12 Pac. 925. ==^Purdy V. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 384. 117 AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 113 § 113. Eepeal — Effect of. — Where a charter is repealed and a new one granted for the same territory, property and corporators, and the property of the okl corporation passes to the new without con- sideration, the new corporation becomes responsible for the debts of the old.^** The express repeal of an existing charter does not re- vive the original charter, but the municipality ceases. The repeal of the charter suspends the statute of limitations until the corporation is organized under a new charter and takes benefits from the property of the old corporation.^*^ An amendment, unless otherwise provided by law, takes effect on its approval. *° § 114. Acceptance of amendment. — The legislature has, in the absence of constitutional limitations to the contrary, the power to impose an amendment of the charter without the consent of the inhabitants of the municipality, as it has the power to impose the original charter without such consent ;*^ but it is frequently provided that an amendment of the charter shall not become a law until the municipal government or the inhabitants of the municipality shall, in a manner indicated by the statute, signify their acceptance of the amendment.'*- The provision of a state constitution that new char- ters or amendments thereto shall be sumbitted for ratification to the voters of the city whose charter it is proposed to change is not in violation of the constitution of the United States, article 4, sec- tion 4.^3 ^ Broadfoot v. City of Fayette- charter, "whenever in the judgment ville, 124 N. C. 478; s. c. 32 S. E. of the board of aldermen" an amend- 804. ment became necessary or desirable. ^^ State V. Village of Reads The act prescribed the manner of (Minn.), 78 N. W. 883; Broadfoot proposing and voting upon amend- V. City of Fayetteville, 124 N. C. ments, and further provided that 478; s. c. 32 S. E. 804. "no amendments shall be proposed *" City of Kansas City v. Steg- or submitted by any board of alder- miller, 151 Mo. 189; s. c. 52 S. W. men which shall contravene, or be 723. repugnant to, the constitution or *^ See §§ 56, 72, 77, 78, ante. statute laws of this state." The " Attorney-General v. Shepard, 62 constitutionality of this law is dis- N. H. 383; In re Henry Street, 123 cussed by a correspondent of the Pa. St. 346; s. c. 16 Atl. 785; Lar- Central Law Journal, who arrives gen V. State, 76 Texas 323; s. c. 13 at the conclusion that it is not ob- S. W. 161; State v. Mayor &c., 73 noxious to the maxim which forbids Mo. 435; Foote v. City of Cincin- a delegation of legislative author- nati, 11 Ohio 408; Mayor &c. v. Fin- ity: 2 Cent. L. Jour. 33. See also, ney, 54 Ga. 317; §§ 53, 77, 78, ante. People v. Bagley, 85 Cal. 343; s. c. The legislature of Texas passed an 24 Pac. 716; and §§ 43, 48 ante, act empowering "any incorporated *' Hopkins v. City of Duluth, 81 town or city" to amend its own Minn. 189; s. c. 83 N. W. 536. § 115 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 118 § 115. Manner of acceptance. — Where this acceptance is made a condition of tlie amendment, it must be signified according to the method prescribed by the statute in order to validate the amendment. Thus in Ohio it was provided that an amendment to a city charter should take effect when adopted "by a majority of the voters of the city." The city and the township were coterminous, but different qualifications for voters were in force in the two corporations. The vote on the acceptance of the amendment was held at the township polls; and the courts declared that the election was void and the amendment ineffectual, on the ground that the statutory provision contemplated a vote at the city polls.** A substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute is, however, sufficient.*^ When no provision is made by the amending act for the assent of the munici- pality or its citizens, it is proper for the court to infer that assent from such acts of the citizens as show their willingness to become subject to the amendment.*'^ § 116. Constitutional limitations on power of legislature to amend or repeal municipal charters — (a) In general. — It has been already stated that the sole restrictions on the power of the legislature to amend, repeal or alter the charters of municipal corporations are to be found in the constitutions of the United States and of the several states. These restrictions are the same that are imposed on other forms of legislation, and they are the sole restraints on the legislative power of control of municipal corporations, except the power of public opinion and the power of the people, expressed through their votes. As is said by Judge Cooley: "If the legislative action in these cases operates injuriously to the municipalities or to individuals, " Foote V. City of Cincinnati, 11 torney-General v. Shepard, 62 N. H. Oliio 408. 383. See also, Winn v. Board of *^Thus, where Laws of New Park Com'rs, 12 Ky. L. 339; s. c. 14 Hampshire, 1881, ch. 255, §§ 1, 3, 11, S. W. 421; §§ 49, 54, 56, 88, 89, ante, provided that an amendment of the ""' Taylor v. Commissioners &c., 2 charter of the city of Concord Jones Eq. (N. C.) 141. In this case' should not become a law unless the the assent of the city of New Berne city government or the inhabitants to an amendment of its charter of the city should by "a majority was inferred from the election by vote of the legal voters present and its citizens of legislators who made voting thereon by ballot determine the adoption of the amendment an to adopt the same;" and at a meet- issue in their canvass, and were ing of the board of aldermen six of elected as favoring the amendment, the seven members were present. See also, § 78, ante. Failure of three of whom voted in the affirma- clerk to record amendment does not five on the question and three re- affect the validity thereof: State v. fused to vote, it was held that the Doherty, 16 Wash. 382; s. c. 47 Pac. amendment was legally passed: At- 958; 58 Am. St. 39. 119 AMENDMENT, TvEPEAL AXD FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 117 the remedy is not with the courts. The courts have no power to in- terfere, and the people must be looked to to right through the ballot- box all these wrongs."*^ In considering whether an act amending or repealing a municipal charter is constitutional or unconstitutional, the same criteria are to be applied as in considering other legislation. If such an act impairs the obligation of a contract ; if it deprives any person of his private property without due process of law; in short, if it violates any provision of the federal constitution or of the con- stitution of the state by the legislature of which it is enacted, it is unconstitutional and void, as all other legislation would under like circumstances be unconstitutional and void. § 117. (b) Special legislation. — It is prescribed by the constitu- tions of several of the states that no special or local law shall be enacted affecting municipal corporations. This prohibition has been held in New Jersey to apply to a law altering the ward limits of a city and changing the time of election of certain of the municipal officers.'*^ The Pennsylvania constitution prohibits the passage of any law creating, renewing or extending the charter of more than one corporation. An act enlarging the powers of several municipal cor- porations v/as not considered unconstitutional under this prohibi- tion.*^ In Ohio and Kansas, statutes extending or defining the cor- porate limits of the municipality have been declared to be within the constitutional prohibition of special acts.^'' A curious instance of an attempt to evade this prohibition is to be found in an Ohio statute which allowed certain privileges to cities having at the last federal census a population of sixteen thousand five hundred and twelve. The city of Akron was the only city in the state to which the federal census had given that exact figure of population, and the statute was *" Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 230. city charter may, in New Jersey, be ** State v. Mayor &c., 40 N. J. L. repealed by a special act: State v. 550; s. c. 29 Am. R. 266. Under the Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542. See also, same prohibition it has been held § 44, ante. that where a general statute is en- ^* Moers v. City of Reading, 21 acted, applying to all cities in the Pa. St. 188. state, all special laws inconsistent ^'' State v. City of Cincinnati, 20 therewith are repealed by the gen- Ohio St. 18; Wyandotte City v. eral repealing clause of the statute, Wood, 5 Kan. 603; City of Topeka as otherwise the statute would not v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431; s. c. 4 Pac. apply to all cities and would, there- 800; 23 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 778, fore, be unconstitutional as special and a valuable note (p. 785) by local legislation affecting munici- Frank P. Pritchard, Esq., on the palities: State v. City Council &c., general topic of local and special 50 N. J. L. 87; s. c. 11 Atl. 137; 17 legislation. Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 638. But a § 118 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 120 very properly declared unconstitutional as being special legisla- tion.-" § 118. (c) Vested rights — Impairment of obligation of con- tracts — Recognition by constitution. — Where the amendatory or re- pealing acts aliect vested rights of creditors, the right of private property, or the obligation of contracts, they must be closely inspected to see that they are not avoided by the restrictions imposed by the constitution of the United States and of the several states upon such legislation. For a detailed statement of the learning on these diffi- cult and obscure points, reference is made to a subsequent chapter.^^ As was declared in a Texas case, the repeal of a municipal charter can not deprive of their vested rights those to whom the municipality is under obligation. ^^ But if the constitution makes mention of a municipal corporation and recognizes it as such, it is not thereby secured against legislative control.^* And it has been held in numer- ous cases in Indiana that a provision in the state constitution con- tinuing in existence certain municipal corporations until their char- acters were "modified" or "repealed" by the legislature did not pro- hibit amendments to charters so as to enlarge territorially or other- wise the jurisdiction of the corporate authorities.^^ Eepeal of the old charter by the adoption of a new one, providing that all existing laws, resolutions and ordinances should remain in force until repealed or modified, continues in force only such as are in consonance with the new charter.^'' All rights, liens and liabilities under the old charter continue under the new as existing at the time the new charter goes into effect. ^'^ Where an original contract has been impaired by an amendment to the charter, the corporation only has a right to corn- plain.^^ Where a charter reserved the power to amend by the legis- lature, and subsequently by an act of the legislature certain reservoir property was exempted from city, county and state taxes, and subse- quently another statute was passed subjecting the property thereto- fore exempt to taxation, it was held that subjecting the property to taxation was not in violation of the federal constitution in relation to impairing the obligation of contracts: the legislation did not con- stitute a contract. ^^ " State V. Anderson, 44 Ohio St. ^^ Baader v. Town of Cullman, 115 247; s. c. 6 N. E. 571. Ala. 539; s. c. 22 So. 19. °^ See chapter on Legislative Con- " Board &c. v. Mason &c. Co., 100 trol, post. Ky. 48; s. c. 18 Ky. L. 543; 37 S. W. '^=' Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728. 290. =^ Mayor &c. v. State, 15 Md. 376; =' O'Phinney v. Trustees &c. s. c. 74 Am. D. 572. (Md.), 42 Atl. 58. " Wiley V. Corporation of Bluff- ^'■' Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. ton, 111 Ind. 152; s. c. 12 N. E. 165, S. 231; s. c. 19 S. Ct. 383. and cases there cited. 121 AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 119 § 119. (d) Title of amendatory or repealing acts. — The constitu- tions of many states provide tlial no statute sluill embrace more than one object, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. Legislative acts amending or repealing municipal charters are, of course, obnox- ious, along with other legislation, to this provision. The object of such provision is, of course, to enable legislators to see at a glance the general scope of the act which they are called upon to pass, and thus to prevent the passage of vicious legislation through the inattention of the law-giving body. It is evident that this object will be at- tained if the title of the act is sufhciently particular to show the general object and effect of the statute, even though details may be omitted from the title. This is well illustrated by a Minnesota case. The constitution of Minnesota contained such a provision. A special law entitled "An act to define the boundaries of and establish a municipal government for the city of Duluth," by repealing a former act extinguished a village organization and annexed its territory to the city. The constitutionality of the act was attacked on the ground that its title did not comply with the constitutional requirement. The courts upheld the statute, and in the opinion it was said: "It would be impracticable to require all these minor subjects to be expressed in the title: all that is required is that they and the provisions in respect to them shall be germane to the subject expressed in the title ; such as have a just and proper reference thereto; such as by the nature of the subject indicated are manifestly appropriate in that connection. It could not be required that every other law repealed by implication because of repugnancy or inconsistency shall be men- tioned in the title of the new act.""*^ § 120. The same subject continued. — The constitution of Wiscon- sin provides that local and private acts "shall not embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title.'' It has been decided in that state that amendments to the charter of the city of IMilwaukee are not local or private acts within the meaning of the constitutional provision.®^ But under a similar provision in the constitution of Illinois it was held that a statute entitled "An act to repeal certain acts therein named," by which the previous acts of incorporation of a city were repealed, and the former city reincor- porated into a town, was unconstitutional, on the ground that the repealing portion of the act was alone designated by the title, and ^ State V. Gallagher, 42 Minn. 449; 193; McGurn v. Board of Education, s. c. 44 N. W. 529; State v. County 133 111. 122; s. c. 24 N. E. 529. Com'rs &c., 23 Fla. 483; s. c. 3 So. "^Thompson v. City of Milwaukee, 69 Wis. 492; s. c. 34 N. W. 402. § 121 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. . 123 that the subsequent clauses were not designated in the title according to the requirement of the constitution.^" .In an Iowa case a stat- ute entitled "An act to amend the act to incorporate the city of Muscatine," extended the limits of that city, which limits had been defined by the original act of incorporation. The courts held that the object of the statute was sufficiently set forth in its title and that the act was not unconstitutional.®^ The constitution of Georgia con- tained a clause providing that no law or ordinance should be passed "which refers to more than one subject-matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof." A subsequent statute entitled "An act to prescribe the manner of incorporating towns and villages," which contained a clause amending existing char- ters, was held to be void, as not complying with the constitutional re- quirement."* § 121. Forfeiture of charter in England. — The charter of an English municipal corporation can be declared forfeited by the courts for misuser or non-user on the part of the corporation of the pro- visions of its charter."^ This forfeiture of charter and consequent dissolution of the municipality is accomplished by quo warranto and scire facias proceedings, as in the case of private corporations. The former proceeding is in form a criminal but in its essence a civil proceeding, and was originally used where there was a defect in incorporation whereby the municipality had merely a de facto cor- porate existence and could not legally exercise its powers. In later times, however, it was used not only as an appropriate means for testing the right to exercise corporate franchises, but also as the proper remedy for the abuse thereof. The writ of scire facias, on the other hand, is properly used where the municipality is properly in- corporated, but has misused or non-used its franchises.®" "- People V. Mellen, 32 111. 181. corporating the city of Brunswick "^ Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82. and for other purposes" therein In the same state a statute entitled mentioned was also declared uncon- an amendment to a municipal char- stitutional and void on the same ter was declared void as containing ground. See also, 1 Dillon Munic. objects not mentioned in the title: Corp. (4th ed.), § 51, where many- Williamson v. City of Keokuk, 44 cases on this point are collected. Iowa 88. "= Willcock Corp. 325. "* Ayeridge v. Commissioners, 60 "" For a discussion of this subject Ga. 404. See also, Brieswick v. and of the authorities relating Mayor &c., 51 Ga. 639, where a thereto, with especial reference, statute entitled "An act to consoli- however, to private corporations, date and amend the several acts in- see 1 Beach Priv. Corp., § 53. 123 AMENDMENT, HKPKAL AND F0K1M!;ITIJI{E OF CIIAKTKR. § 123 § 122. The same subject continued. — The Englisli dootrinc that the charters of uuinieipal as well as of private corporations are liable to forfeiture b}- quo warranto and scire facias" proceedings arises from the fact that there is an implied condition upon the grant of any charter, public or private, that the franchises thereof shall not be neglected or abused.*''^ It is conceded that this doctrine applies to private corporations in this country.*^** But as will be shown in the succeeding sections, the charters of municipal corporations can not in the United States be declared forfeited by the courts for any cause. § 123. Instances of forfeiture of charter under English law. — The boroughs and cities of England had always been the centers of intellectual activity, and consequently of restiveness, under the at- tempted tyranny of the Tudors and the Stuarts. When Charles II was restored to the throne he took measures to quell the rebellious cities, and notably the great capital of London, by attacking the char- ters which were the source of their independence. A servile judiciary subserved his aims, and on frivolous grounds the charter of London was declared forfeited. ®® The charter was only restored to the city upon conditions w^hich virtually vested in the crown the power of appointing the municipal officers. London was not alone in this ^"1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 165; People v. Kingston &c. Road Co., citing Bl. Com. 485; 2 K^d Corp. 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 193; s. c. 35 Am. 447; Willcock Corp. 325; Taylors of D. 551 and note; State v. Com- Ipswich v. Sherring, 1 Rol. 4, 5; Rex mercial Bank, 13 Sm. & M. (Miss.) V. Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 198; Smith's 569; s. c. 53 Am. D. 106; Chesapeake Case, 4 Mod. 53, 55, 58; Rex v. &c. Canal Co. v. Baltimore &c. R. Saunders, 3 East 119; Mayor &c. v. Co., 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 1; People v. Henley, 2 CI. & P. 331; Rex v. In- President &c., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 351; habitants &c., 13 East 220; Priest- Penobscot &c. Corp. v. Lamson, 16 ley V. Foulds, 2 Scott N. R. 205, 225; Maine 224; Commonwealth v. Com- Attorney-General v. Corporation of mercial Bank &c., 28 Pa. St. 383. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220. Where it The exercise of this power in this is clear that the object of the quo country is exclusively vested in the warranto against an individual courts; because a legislature can member of the corporation is to call not, as a rule, declare a private in question the validity of the char- charter forfeited: 1 Beach Priv. ter granted to it by the crown, the Corp., § 45, and cases cited, court will refuse it: Reg. v. Taylor, ''° 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 8; cit- 11 A. & E. 949. The writ will not, ing Rex v. Mayor &c., Mich. 33 Car. however, be refused merely because 2; s. c. 2 Show. 262. See also, Pull- the granting it may or even will dis- ing, Laws &c. of London, 14; Nor- solve the corporation: Rex v. White, ton Comm. on Hist. &c of London, 5 A. & E. 613; Rex v. Parry, 6 A. & book 1, ch. 10; The Lease of the City E. 810, 820. of London, 8 How. State Trials 1340. ^1 Beach Priv. Corp., § 45; citing § 124 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 124 predicament. Jud^e Dillon states that eighty-one quo warranto in- formations were lirought against English municipal corporations by Charles II and James II. These efforts of tyranny extended to the American colonies, which were at that early time vigorous in their opposition to unconstitutional despotism. The charters of Massa- chusetts, of Rhode Island and of Connecticut were abrogated. But after the revolution these wrongs were righted, and the charters of all corporations forfeited during the reigns of Charles II and James II were restored by act of parliament. '^° § 124, The charter of a municipal corporation in the United States can not be forfeited by judicial action. — The English law al- lowing the forfeiture of municipal charters by quo warranto and scire facias proceedings has no place in the American system of juris- prudence. The power to dissolve a municipal corporation is vested wholly and exclusively in the legislative branch of our government.''^ This distinction seems to arise from the fact that the English munic- ipal corporation was, in the incipiency of its existence as a corpora- tion, a body of burgesses within the borough — a close corporation which controlled the town but was not itself the town. This charter of this close corporation, in many respects conducted for private ad- vantage although performing at the same time the function of a governing body over the town or city, was considered to be subject to forfeiture for wilful misuser or non-user in regard to matters which went to the essence of the contract between it and the crown, just as a private corporation is subject to such forfeiture. The same tacit condition was considered to be annexed to the charters of these corporations that is annexed, as is everywhere conceded, to the char- ters of private corporations; that is, that the corporation shall be subject to dissolution, by forfeiture of its charter effected through regular judicial proceedings, for wilful misuser or non-user of the franchises of that charter. § 125. The same subject continued. — But in the United States our municipalities are free from any such vestige of an earlier ™1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 8; 2 Mass. 460; Attorney-General v. City Chandl. Com. Debs. 316; 1 Stephen of Salem, 103 Mass. 138; Buford v. English Const, ch. 7, p. 455; Ma- State, 72 Tex. 182; s. c. 10 S. W. caulay Hist, of Eng., vol. 3, ch. 15. 401; Harris v. Nesbit, 24 Ala. 398. ^^ Mobile V. United States, 116 U. Non-user of corporate powers is not S. 289; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 398; Meriwether a forfeiture of corporate existence: V. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Welch v. State v. Stevens, 21 Kan. 210; s. c. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon 130; Attor- (annotated) 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) ney-General v. City of Boston, 123 43, 46. 125 AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. § 125 stage of development. The American municipal corporation is simply and purely a strictly public corporation. It is a corporation of citizens, for citizens and by citizens. Its* sole object is local gov- ernment. Being maintained, therefore, only for the public advan- tage, it is manifestly unjust and even impossible that the charters of our municipal corporations should be forfeited by judicial pro- ceedings. To give such a power to the judiciary would be to make them co-ordinate with the legislature in their control of local gov- ernment and local legislation. The illegal acts of municipal officials can be avoided and enjoined by various methods of judicial procedure, but the charter itself being the creature of the legislature can be de- stroyed only by the same power that created. We have seen that the power of the legislature over municipal charters is unlimited except by constitutional limitations and by the power of the ballot-box. We may further add that this power of control has no rival, and that neither the judicial nor the executive departments of our govern- ment can create nor destroy a municipality, which is a subdivision of the state government. There are to the knowledge of the writer no cases in which this exclusive control of the legislature has been successfully questioned."^ "See, upon this point, 1 Dillon collaterally: §§ 57, 80, ante. The ef- Munic. Corp., § 168; 2 Dillon Munic. feet of dissolution of corporations Corp., § 896; State v. Stevens, 21 by legislative action will be fully Kan. 210; s. c. (annotated) 18 Am. treated in the subsequent chapter L. Reg. (N. S.) 43, 46. Regularity on Partition and Dissolution, of incorporation can not be attacked CHAPTER V. MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP PERSONAL LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION. Section 126. Definitions — Membership — Citizenship. Qualifications for membership in English municipal corpo- rations. The same subject continued. Qualifications for membership in American municipal cor- porations. 130. Citizenship in England. 131. The same subject continued. Citizenship in the United States. Natural citizens. The same subject continued. 135. Naturalized citizens. 136. The same subject continued. 137. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive lands. The status of Chinese before the law. The status of American In- dians before the law. Privileges and immunities of citizens. 127. 128. 129. 132. 133. 134. 138. 139. 140. Section 141. The same subject continued. 142. Rights of citizens. 143. The same subject continued. 144. Personal liability of members of the corporation. 145. The same subject continued — Russell V. The Men of Devon. 146. Personal liability of members of public quasi-corporations in New England. 147. The same subject continued. 148. Beardsley v. Smith — (a) The reason for the New England doctrine of personal liability of members. 149. (b) The doctrine in England. 150. (c) The doctrine in Massachu- setts and Maine. 151. (d) The doctrine in Connecti- cut. 152. Limitations upon the personal liability of members of New England public quasi-corpo- rations. § 126. Definitions — Membership — Citizenship. — ^Membership is the state of being a member.^ Citizenship is the state of being vested with the rights and privileges of a citizen.- A member is an individ- ual of a community or society. Every citizen is a member of the state or body politic. So the individuals of a club, a corporation, or confederacy, are called its members.^ A citizen is strictly a member of a commonwealth (civitas), possessing all the rights which can be enjoyed or exercised under its fundamental laws.'* A citizen is the native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privi- leges of the city in which he resides; the freeman of a city, as dis- ' Webster Diet. * Webster Diet. " Webster Diet. ^Burrill Law Diet. (2d ed.). (120) 127 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP. § 127 tinguishcd from a foreigner, or one not entitled to its franchises; in tlie United States, a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising tlie elective franchise, or the qualifications which enable him to vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real estate;^ any person who, under the constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people;® a free inhabitant, born within the United States, or naturalized under the laws of congress.'^ § 127. Qualifications for membership in English municipal cor- porations. — Before the passage of the statute known as the Munici- 2>al Corporations Act of 1883, the qualifications for members or officers of municipal corporations depended upon the charter, usage or by- laws of the particular corporation : the usual qualifications being that the person claiming to be admitted to the freedom of the corporate town should be the son of a freeman, or should have served an ap- prenticeship to a freeman, or — in some instances — married his daugh- ter, or acquired the privilege by gift or franchise.'^ But this was changed by the said act of 1882, and under it no person is entitled to be enrolled as a burgess unless he is qualified as follows: (a) Is of full age;^ and (b) is on the 15th of July in any year, and has been during the whole of the then last preceding twelve months, in occupation, joint or several,^" of any house,^^ warehouse, counting- house, shop or other building,^^ in this act referred to as qualifying property^^ in the borough. ^Webster Diet. S. 459; Reg. v. Mayor &c., 9 Ad. & «3 Story on Const. 1687 (Isted.). El. 670; Rex v. Sefton, Russ. & Ry. ^2 Kent Com. 258, note. 202; In re Evans, 9 Ad. & El. 679. *1 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), Where a burgess occupies a "house,"' § 36, note. and is described as occupying a ® It should seem from these words "counting-house," his name must be that it is sufficient if the person expunged from the burgess roll: seeking to be enrolled were of full Reg. v. Mayor &c., 44 L. J. Q. B. 82. age at the time of the revision of In cases where a house is let out to the lists. But see Hargreaves v. separate tenants, and each tenant Hopper, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 195. has complete control over his por- " A joint occupation gives the mu- tion, see Rex v. Trapshaw, 1 Leach nicipal franchise: Reg. v. Mayor &c., (4th ed.) 427; Rex v. Bailey, 1 L. R. 4 Q. B. 114. Mood. C. C. 23; Rex v. Carroll, 1 ^^ This may include part of a Leach (4th ed.) 237; Reg. v. Mayor house, when separately occupied: &c., 9 Ad. & El. 670; Cook v. Hum- Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, ber, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 33; s. c. 31 L. § 31. J. C. P. 73; Wilson v. Roberts, 11 ^=See Powell v. Parmer, 18 C. B. C. B. (N. S.) 50; s. c. 31 L. J. C. P. (N. S.) 168; Powell v. Boraston, 18 78. C. B. (N. S.) 175; Re Creek, 3 B. & '" This property need not be the § 128 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 128 § 128. The same subject continued. — This statute further pro- vides that no person shall be entitled to be enrolled as a burgess unless he "(a) has during the whole of those twelve months resided in the borough or within seven miles thereof;^'* and (b) has been rated^^ in respect of the qualifying property to all poor rates made during those twelve months for the parish wherein the property is situate; and (c) has on or before the twentieth of the same July paid^'' all such rates,^^ including borough rates (if any), as have be- come payable by him in respect of the qualifying property^* up to the then last preceding fifth of January." Every person so qualified shall be entitled to be enrolled as a burgess, unless he "(a) is an alien; or (b) has within the twelve months aforesaid received union or parochial relief or other alms; or (c) is disentitled under any act of parliament.^' ^^ § 129. Qualifications for membership in American municipal cor- porations. — The question whether a person is a member of a public corporation, strict or quasi, is in this country determined by the resi- dence of the person in question. If he lives within the limits of the same during the twelve months: See § 33, Rawlinson Municipal Cor- porations Act of 1882 (8th ed.), p. 118. " As to the mode in which this distance is to be measured, see Raw- linson Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 (8th ed.), § 231. '^ It is now established that, in or- der to constitute a good rating, the name of the party intended to be charged must appear on the rate: Moss V. Overseers of St. Michael, 7 Man. & G. 72. See also. Lord Mans- field's reasons in the judgment in Rex v. St. Luke's Hospital, 2 Burr. 1053, 1063; and the cases collected on this subject in Elliott Regis- tration ("2d ed.) 190; and Rex "v Tripp, M. T. 1836; Glover Corp. 693. ^^ Payment by another person act- ing as a volunteer, and without any authority from the person liable, is not sufficient: Reg. v. Mayor &c., 10 Ad. & El. 66. But where the pay- ment is made by the landlord in consequence of an agreement be- tween him and the tenant, by which the tenant was to pay additional rent in respect thereof, such pay- ment is sufficient: Wright v. Town Clerk of Stockport, 5 Man. & G. 33; Moger V. Escott, L. R. 7 C. P. 158; Cook V. Luckett, 2 C. B. 168; Hughes V. Overseers of Chatham, 5 Man. & G. 54. The decisions on settlement cases accord with this view: Rex v. Axmouth, 8 East 383; Rex v. Oake- hampton, Burr. S. C. 5; Rex v. Bridgewater, 3 T. R. 550. " See Rawlinson Municipal Cor- porations Act of 1882 (8th ed.), §§ 144, 197. The non-payment of an il- legal rate does not disqualify the party: Reg. v. Mayor &c., 7 Q. B. 908. As to the payments of compo- sitions for poor-rate under local acts, see Reg. v. Mayor &c., 20 L. J. Q. B. 281. '' See Flatcher v. Boodle, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 152. '" Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, § 9. 129 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP. § 130 corporation he is considered a member of the corporation; if he lives without those limits he is not a member. The decision of the ques- tion is not affected by the wishes either of the person or of the cor- poration. In the case of private corporations the question is of course decided in an entirely different manner: one who holds stock in the corporation is considered a member.-*' § 130. Citizenship in Engiand. — Natural citizenship is created in England by birth within the allegiance of the king. By a statute of the reign of Edward III-^ it was provided that children "which henceforth shall te born out of ligeance of the king, whose fathers and mothers at the time of their birth be and shall be at the faith and ligeance of the king of England, shall have and enjoy the same benefit and advantage, to have and bear inheritance within the same ligeance as the other inheritors aforesaid in time to come, so also that the mothers of such children passed the sea by the license and will of their husbands." The question whether this statute was in- troductory of a new rule or simply declaratory of the previous law was considered in a New York case, and the conclusion was reached, "that it is perhaps not easy to determine from the statute, itself, taken in connection with its history, whether it was in truth an ena- bling or a declaratory act."-- Judge Selden, however, continued his consideration of the question by saying: "Principles, however, have since the statute been thoroughly settled, which is my view and deci- sion of the question. The subject of alienage was very elaborately examined in Calvin's Case.^^ Among the principles settled in that case and which have remained unquestioned since are these: (1) That natural allegiance does not depend upon locality or place; that it is purely mental in its nature, and can not, therefore, be confined ^"Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pick. (Mass.) a citizen there (if possessed of ttie 333, 346 j Overseers of Poor &c. v. requisite qualifications as to age, Sears, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 122, 130. etc., and if tie remains the requisite "In all quasi-corporations, as cities, length of time), whatever may be towns, parishes, school districts, the desire of himself or the town." membership is constituted by living See also, Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th within certain limits:" Per Shaw, ed.), chs. 2 and 3; People v. Cana- C. J., in Overseers of Poor &c. v. day, 73 N. C. 198; s. c. 21 Am. R. Sears, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 122, 130; 465. Hill V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. " 25 Edw. Ill, ch. 2. 344, 356; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332. In " Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356, Oakes v. Hill, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 333, 363. 346, Judge Morgan says: — "When a "7 Co. 1; 6 James I. man moves into a town he becomes 1 Smith — 9 § 131 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 130 within any certain boundaries; or, to use the language of Coke, that 'ligeance, and faith and truth, which are her members and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man, and can not be circumscribed within the predicament of ubi.' (Page 76.) (2) That it is not suffi- cient, in a plea of alienage, to aver that the plaintiif was born out of the kingdom or out of the jurisdiction of the king, but every such plea must aver that the plaintiff is not of the allegiance of the king; and judgment was given for the plaintiif in Calvin's Case 'for that the plea in this case doth not refer faith or liegeance to the king indefinitely and generally, but limiteth and restraineth faith and liegeance to the kingdom.' (Id., p. 10a.) (3) That allegiance and protection — namely, the rights and the duties of citizenship — are reciprocal, the one being the consideration for the other. (Id., p. 6a.) (4) That a British subject, although residing abroad, still owes allegiance to the king of England."^* § 131. The same subject continued. — From liis consideration of the cases and authorities the learned judge finally reaches the con- clusion "that the children of English parents, though born abroad, are nevertheless regarded by the common law as natural-born citizens of England.'' He continues: "Now upon what ground can allegi- ance in such cases be claimed ? If natural allegiance or allegiance by birth does not depend upon boundaries or place, as Calvin's Case asserts, upon what does it depend? There can be but one answer to the question. It is impossible to suggest any other ground for the obligation than that of parentage. It must, I apprehend, be trans- mitted from the parents to the child or it could not exist. This being then the nature of permanent allegiance, it follows that the king of England may properly claim allegiance from the children of liis sub- jects wherever born. If, then, the child of English parents, though born abroad, is, subditus natus, a born subject of the king, he must also be a born citizen of the kingdom. Allegiance and citizenship are, as we have seen, correlative terms, the one being the considera- tion of the other. So long, therefore, as the parents continue to owe allegiance to the crown of England, so long will their children, by the rules of common law, whethei born within or without the king- =* Brooke Abridgment, tit. Den- 29, § 4, p. 698; Liidlam v. Ludlam, izen, 21; Roy v. Eaton, Litt. 23; 26 N. Y. 356, 364. The learned judge Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Vent. 413, continued his collation and analo- 422; 1 Jenk. Cent., case 2; Bacon v. gies of authorities, referring to Bacon, 3 Cro. Car. 601 ; 2 Phillimore Cobbledike's Case, cited in Calvin's Int. Law 4; Halleck Int. Law, ch. Case, p. 9b. 131 IHEMBERSIIIP AND ClTIZJ.XSllir. § 133 clom, owe similar allegiance, and bo entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship. "-•''' § 132. Citizenship in the United States. — There are in the United States two classes of citizens — natural and naturalized citizens. Citi- zenship of the former class is created by the birth of the citizen within the jurisdiction of the United States. Citizenship of the latter class is created by the performance of certain requirements defined by statute. The naturalized citizen is from the time of naturaliza- tion a full-tledged citizen, entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a natural citizen, saving certain disabilities which relate back to the period during which he was an alien. It is conceded learning that birth within the jurisdiction of the United States creates natural citizenship whether the parents of the citizen are aliens or citizens.^" To this rule the aboriginal Indians of this coun- try furnish an exception that is, however, only apparent. A child of Indian parents born in this country is not considered to have been born within the jurisdiction of the United States, and is not therefore a citizen.^^ § 133. Natural citizens. — Where a person is born within the juris- diction of the United States he is a natural citizen.^^ Likewise a person Ijorn in a foreign country and out of the jurisdiction of the United States is a citizen of the United States if at the time of his birth his father was a citizen thereof."^ ^ Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356, lar case, the question whether one 365. born out of the United States is a -■^ Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. citizen is to be determined by the Y.) 584; In re Loolt Tin Sing, 21 common law as it existed, irrespect- Fed. 905; s. c. 17 Chic. Leg. N. 57. ive of English statutes, at the adop- In the latter case a child born in tion of the federal constitution. It the United States of alien Chinese was accordingly held that where a parents was declared to be an Amer- citizen of the United States went to ican citizen. See § 138, post. Peru at the age of eighteen years. " See post, § 139. with the intention of indefinite con- ^ Fourteenth Amend, to Fed. tinuance there for the purpose of Const.; In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. trading, but took no steps to be 905; s. c. 17 Chic. Leg. N. 57; Lynch naturalized in Peru or to indicate V. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 583, an intention or a permanent change 639. of domicile, otherwise than as be- ^U. S. Rev. Stat., § 1993; Ludlam fore stated, his child, born to him in V. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356; Inhabitants Peru of a wife a native of that coun- &c. V. Inhabitants &c., 58 Maine 353. try, is a citizen of the United States: In the absence of any law of the Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356. United States governing the particu- § 134 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 133 § 134. The same subject continued. — Where a citizen of the United States marries an alien woman who might be naturalized, she becomes a citizen f^ and if the husband is naturalized after mar- riage, the wife becomes a citizen."^ In cases where a citizen leaves this country and either takes with him a son born in the United States or has one born abroad, and either the father or son elects to and does become a subject of the country to which they have emigrated, they both become aliens, and neither one can inherit real property in the United States.^^ § 135. Naturalized citizens. — In the United States citizenship may be acquired by naturalization.^^ Under the United States stat- utes an applicant for admission to citizenship must possess certain qualifications and comply with certain rules before he is entitled to admission to citizenship.^* =<• U. S. Rev. Stat., § 1996. '1 10 U. S. Stat, at Large, p. 604, § 2; Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496; Burton v. Burton, 1 Keyes (N. Y.) 359; White v. White. 2 Met. (Ky.) 385. ^'^ Shanks v. Dupont. 3 Peters 242; Jackson v. White, 20 Johns. jN. Y.) 313; Orser v. Hoag, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 79; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236. The division of an empire works no forfeiture of previously vested prop- erty rights: Kelly v. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 29; Jackson v. Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 109! A person born in the United States who left the country before the dec- laration of independence and never returned became thereby an alien, and incapable of subsequently tak- ing land by descent: Inglis v. Sail- ors' Snug Harbor, 3 Peters 121. See also, Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch 603; Jackson v. Burns, 3 Binn. (Pa.) 75; Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. 453; Blight v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535. ^^ Congress controls exclusively the rules which govern naturaliza- tion: Houston V. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1. As to the time when the power of naturalization takes effect, see Chi- rac V. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; United States V. Villato, 2 Dallas 370. ^ These requirements are defined by statute as follows: — (1) "Any alien, except Chinese, may be natu- ralized and become a citizen of the United States on the following con- ditions: — The applicant shall de- clare on oath or affirmation before some state court of record, having a seal and clerk, and having com- mon-law jurisdiction, or before a United States district or circuit court, or before a clerk of any of the said courts, two years at least before his admission, that it is his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce for- ever his allegiance to his own sov- ereignty, which must be in peace with the United States at the time. (2) At his final admission to citizen- ship he shall declare on oath or af- firmation before some of the courts aforesaid that he will support the United States constitution, and that he renounces all allegiance to any foreign sovereign, and especially to his own, whereof he was subject be- fore his application for citizenship. (3) He must prove by at least two witnesses who are citizens that he has resided within the United States five years at least and within the state or territory where the court is located at least one year; that dur- 133 MEMBERSHIP AXD CITIZENSHIP. 136 § 136. The same subject continued. — Congress has made special provisions by which alien seamen may become naturalized citizens. Under the act he must first declare his intention of becoming a citi- zen before the proper court, and then serve three years on a United States merchant vcssel.^^ A clerk has no power to admit a person to citizenship: the admission must be granted by the court, as it is a judicial act.^*^ But the applicant may make his declaration of intention to become a citizen before the recording officer of a court of record, and it is properly receivable by the clerk, as he acts in that capacity ministerially and not judicially.^'^ ing that time he has been a good moral person, attached to the prin- ciples of this government, and is well disposed in this regard. (4) He must renounce all titles to no- bility, if he has any. (5) Any alien (except a Chinese) who is a minor, who shall have resided within the United States three years next pre- ceding his arriving at his majority, and who shall continue to reside therein at the time of making appli- cation for citizenship, may, after reaching his majority, and having resided in the United States at least five years, including the three years of his minority, be given citizenship without any preliminary declara- tion. (6) Any alien (except a Chi- nese) who is twenty-one years of age or over, enlisting in the armies of the United States, either in the regular or volunteer, and who shall be honorably discharged therefrom, can be admitted to citizenship with- out the preliminary declaration of his intentions, but he must prove one year's residence in the United States. (7) The children of parents duly naturalized, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization, shall, if re- siding in the United States, be con- sidered as citizens. (8) If an alien who shall have declared his inten- tions shall die before he is actually naturalized, his widow and children shall be considered citizens on tak- ing the oath prescribed by law. (9) No alien who shall be a citizen, deni- zen or subject of any country, state or sovereign with whom the United States shall be at war at the time of his application shall be then ad- mitted to be a citizen of the United States: U. S. Rev. Stat., tit. 30. =^ Act of congress of 1872, § 29; 17 Stat, at Large 268. ^"McCarthy v. Marsh, 5 N. Y. 263; The Acorn, 2 Abb. 434; Clark's Case, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 444. ^^ Butterworth's Case, 1 Woodb. & M. 323; State v. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245; Ex parte Cregg, 2 Curtis 98. As to naturalization of a married woman without her husband's con- sent, see Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 617. The necessary witnesses must be present in court and examined there openly and pub- licly; and affidavits taken outside of the court as to the applicant's char- acter and residence are not admissi- ble: In re , An Alien, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 137. Where a father becomes naturalized, and at that time has a son residing in the United States, but who is a minor, the son becomes a citizen by reason of his father's naturalization: State v. Penney, 10 Ark. 621. For the privileges and immunities to which a naturalized person is entitled, see 2 Kent Com. 66. § 137 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 134 § 137. Right of naturalized citizens to hold and receive lands. — Where a person becomes naturalized he has the same right as a natu- ral-born citizen to hold, inherit and receive lands, but the capacity tp take by descent must exist at the time the descent happens.^ ^ Where an alien, having acquired lands -by purchase, is afterward naturalized before office found, his title becomes thereby confirmed, so that he may hold even as against the state. Otherwise where his claim is by descent.^® ^ People v. Conklin, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 67; Heeney v. Trustees &c., 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 360; Vaux v. Nesbit, 1 McC. Ch. (S. C.) 352. M., an American citizen, died seized of certain lands in 1779, leaving no lawful issue and no blood relatives, save such as were aliens. By his will he devised all his real estate to his wife, also an American citizen, to hold during her life, remainder to his two sisters and seven nephews and nieces, as tenants in common, in fee; empow- ering his executors to sell the lands after his wife's death, and divide the proceeds equally among the devisees in remainder. The will further provided that in case any of the devisees in remainder died, be- fore such division, leaving lawful issue, the latter .should take the share to which the parents, if living, would have been entitled. The dev- isees in remainder all died aliens prior to September, 1828, one of them (a nephew) leaving a son named E. E., who became natural- ized September 3, 1828. The widow died in 1832. In ejectment by the people claiming the lands devised on the ground of their having escheated to the state, it was held that E. E, took no interest in them, either as devisee or heir, which could avail him as against the plaintiffs, and that the latter were entitled to re- cover. The fee was not in abey- ance during the life of the widow, but the remainder vested in interest on the death of the testator; and though the devisees in remainder died before they were entitled to the possession, their estate would have descended had they left heirs ca- pable of inheriting: People v. Conk- lin, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 67. Judge Bronson, in his opinion, says: — "Al- though the devisees in remainder were aliens, they could take lands by purchase, which includes a title by devise and any other form of ac- quiring the land by purchase;" and cites as supporting his view, Fairfax V. Hunter, 7 Cranch 603, 619; Vaux V. Nesbit, 1 McC. Ch. (S. C.) 352; 1 Powell Dev. (ed. 1838) 259. The learned judge further says: — "The statute of 1830 will not help E. E. because it was passed since the death of M.;" and cites Jackson v. Green, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 333; Jack- son V. Fitzsimmons, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 9. And see People v. Irvin, 21^ Wend. (N. Y.) 128. ^^ People V. Conklin, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 66. See also, Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch 603; Bradstreet v. Supervis- ors, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 546; Lareau V. Davignon, 5 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 367; Overingv. Russell, 32 Barb. (N. Y.)'263; Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 9; Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 12 N. Y. 376; Scanlan v. Wright, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 523; Wilbur v. Tobey. 16 Pick. (Mass.) 177; Foss v. Crisp, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 121; Smith v. Zaner, 4 Ala. 99. The naturaliza- tion must be complete: McDaniel v. Richards, 1 McC. (S. C.) 187. 135 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP. § 138 § 138. The status of Chinese before the law. — The Chinese form an exception to our naturalization laws. A Chinese person, not born in this country, can not become a citizen of the United States by- naturalization.'*" A Chinese, however, if born within the limits of this country, even though of alien parents, is a citizen of the United States and of the state wherein he resides. This question was de- cided by Justice Field. *^ The learned judge held that birth within the jurisdiction of the United States conferred citizenship; that this rule was in force, except as to Africans and their descend- ants, before the passage of the fourteenth amendment, which was intended to abolish that exception.*^ In this respect the Chinese share that privilege which our laws bestow on all persons born witliin cur dominion, except in the case of aboriginals of our country. § 139. The status of American Indians before the law. — The status of American Indians in this country is anomalous. Although born within the limits of the United States and subject to taxation and the other burdens of citizenship, they are yet debarred from enjoying any of its privileges. They are not considered to be within the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, which pro- vides that "all persons born and naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."*^ The Indian tribes *° In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawyer 155. See right of citizens of the United States also, the United States statutes of to vote shall not be denied or 1882 and 1884, restricting Chinese abridged by the United States or by immigration. any state on account of race, color " In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. or previous condition of servitude." 905; s. c. 17 Chic. Leg. N. 57. The court denied his right to vote on " It is to be noted, however, that the ground that he was not subject the children of Chinese ambassadors to the jurisdiction of the United or persons otherwise employed in States within the meaning of the the service of the Chinese govern- fourteenth amendment, and was not, ment are not citizens, though born therefore, a citizen of the United in this country. This results from States. It was held that an Indian the familiar rule that the residence is a resident alien in a condition of an ambassador is considered a similar to that of the children of part of his own country: In re Look foreign ministers born in this coun- Tin Sing, 21 Fed. 905; s. c. 17 Chic, try; that the Indian owes allegiance Leg. N. 57. to his tribe and not to our govern- ^^Elk V. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94; s. ment, and that he can become a citi- c. 5 S. Ct. 41. Here an Indian zen only by naturalization or by claimed the right to vote under the treaty. From this opinion Justice clause of the fourteenth amendment Harlan and Justice Woods dissented, quoted in the text, and also under contending that the Indian was the fifteenth amendment, that "the within the purview of the four- 140 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 136 are regarded as alien peoples living within our boundaries, but not of us. And it is also held that the consent of the United States is necessary in order to enable the members of any tribe to become citizens of the United States by naturalization. They can not become naturalized citizens of their own motion without such consent, which must be expressed by treaty or statute.^'* § 140. Privileges and immunities of citizens. — ^Although a full discussion of the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as secured by the federal constitution and the consti- tutions of the several states, and defined by judicial- interpretation of those constitutional provisions, is obviously beyond the scope and plan of this work, it will be well to indicate briefly the fundamental principles upon which these rights, privileges and immunities depend. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states."*^ "Although the precise teenth and fifteenth amendments. See also, Crow Dog's Case, 109 U. S. 556; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 396; Cherokees v. Georgia, 5 Peters 1; New York In- dians' Case, 5 Wall. 761; Hastings v. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293; Pells v. Web- quish, 129 Mass. 469. "Wilson V. Wall, 6 Wall. 83, and cases cited in preceding note. *^ Const, of United States, art. 4, § 2. Judge Washington discusses this provision as follows: — "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of all free govern- ments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their be- coming free, independent and sov- ereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enum- erate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: — Protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to ac- quire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain hap- piness and safety, subject, never- theless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to insti- tute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an ex- emption from higher taxes or impo- sitions than are paid by the citizens of the other state, — may be men- tioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citi- zens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens 137 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP. 141 meaning of 'privileges and immunities' is not very conclusively set- tled as yet, it appears to be conceded that the constitution secures in each state to the citizens of all other states the right to remove to and carry on business therein; the right, by the usual modes, to acquire and hold property, and to protect and clef end the same in law ; the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the enforcement of other personal rights; and the right to be exempt in property and person from taxes or burdens which the property or persons of citizens of the same state are not subject to."*° § 141. The same subject continued. — "No state shall make or en- force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."*^ But it is an un- of each state in every other state was manifestly calculated (to use the expression of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) 'the better to secure and perpetuate mu- tual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states of the Union:'" Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380. The supreme court prefers to decide each case as it comes up, and will not de- fine and describe those privileges in a general classification: Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. See also. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217; s. c. 9 S. Ct. 277; Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562; People v. Im- lay, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 68; Robinson V. Oceanic &c. Co., 112 N. Y. 315; s. c. 19 N. E. 625; 2 L. R. A. 636; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Peti- tion of Bliss, 63 N. H. 135; State v. Lancaster, 63 N. H. 267; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. An. 434; State v. Oilman, 33 W. Va. 146; s. c. 10 S. E. 283; 6 L. R. A. 847; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 340; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Thurber, 13 111. 554; Cincinnati &c. Assur. Co. V. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85; Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Hen- dricks, 41 Ind. 48; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6; s. c. 37 N. W. 888; Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 441; Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 326; Campbell v. Mor- ris, 3 Har. & McH. (Md.) 535, 554; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Graft. (Va.) 767; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh (Va.) 743; Slaugh- ter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. *'"' Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 490; citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & McH. (Md.) 535, 554; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen (Mass.) 268. "Const, of United States, 14th Amend. As laid down by Judge Cooley: — "The line of distinction between the privileges and immuni- ties of citizens of the United States and those of citizens of the several states must be traced along the boundaries of their respective spheres of action, and the two classes must be as different in their § 141 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 138 doubted fact that many rights and privileges depend upon actual residence; and a statute which allows process by attachment against a non-resident debtor, even though such process is not admissible against a resident, does not violate the constitutional provisions.*^ nature as are the functions of the respective governments. A citizen of the United States, as such, has the right to participate in foreign and interstate commerce, to have the benefit of the postal laws, to make use in common with others of the navigable waters of the United States, and to pass from state to state, and into foreign countries, be- cause over all these subjects the ju- risdiction of the United States ex- tends, and they are covered by its laws: Story on Const. (4th ed.), § 1937. These, therefore, are among the privileges of citizens of the United States. So every citizen may petition the federal authorities which are set over him in respect to any matter of public concern; may examine the public records of the federal jurisdiction; may visit the seat of government without being subjected to the payment of a tax for the privilege: Crandall v. Ne- vada, 6 Wall. 35; may be purchaser of the public lands on the same terms with others; may participate in the government if he comes with- in the condition of .suffrage, and may demandlthe care and protection of the United States when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government: Slaughter- House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. The priv- ileges suggest the immunities. Wherever it is the duty of the United States to give protection to a citizen against any harm, incon- venience or deprivation, the citizen is entitled to an immunity which pertains to federal citizenship. One very plain and unquestionable im- munity is exemption from any tax, burden or imposition under state laws, as a condition to the enjoy- ment of any right or privilege under the laws of the United States. A state, therefore, can not require one to pay a tax as importer, under the laws of congress, of foreign mer- chandise: Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 163; nor impose a tax upon travelers passing by public convey- ances out of the state: Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; nor impose con- ditions to the right of citizens of other states to sue its citizens in the federal courts: Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445. These in- stances sufficiently indicate the gen- eral rule. Whatever one may claim as of right under the constitution and laws of the United States by virtue of its citizenship is a privi- lege of a citizen of the United States. Whatever the constitution and laws of the United States entitle him to exemption from, he may claim an immunity in respect to: Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. And such a right or privilege is abridged whenever the state law in- terferes with any legitimate opera- tion of the federal authority which concerns his interest, whether it be an authority actively exerted, or resting only in the express or im- plied command or assurance of the federal constitution or laws:" Coo- ley Princ. Const. Law 246. See United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U S. 542; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 Kirkland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 *' State V. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH (Md.) 535. 139 MEMBERSHIP AXD CITIZEXSIIIP. § 14^ § 142. Rights of citizens. — The fourteenth amendment to the con- stitution hay f;everal objects, and among others it declares the inviola- bility of the public debt of the United States, and forbids the United States or any other state assuming or paying any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave. It also dis- qualifies from holding federal or state offices certain persons who shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.*'' This amend- ment does not profess to secure the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies to all persons in the United States. But great diversi- ties may and do exist in these respects in difEerent states. All that a person can demand under the last clause of section 1 of the four- teenth amendment is that he shall have the same protection under the laws as is given to other classes and persons under like circum- stances in the same place. ^° ^'•Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 14. Judge Field says of this amend- ment: — "That amendment was un- doubtedly proposed for the purpose of fully protecting the newly-made citizens of the African race in the enjoyment of their freedom, and to prevent discriminating state legisla- tion against them. The generality of the language used necessarily ex- tends its provisions to all persons of every race and color. Previously to its adoption the civil rights act had been passed, which declared that citizens of the United States of ev- ery race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, should have the same rights in every state and territory to make and enforce con- tracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, own and convey real and per- sonal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop- erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and should be subject to like punish- ment, pains and penalties, and to none other. The validity of this act was questioned in many quarters, and complaints were made that, not- withstanding the abolition of slav- ery and involuntary servitude, the freedmen were in some portions of the country subjected to disabilities from which others were exempt. There were also complaints of the existence in certain sections of the southern states of a feeling of en- mity growing out of the collisions of the war toward citizens of the north. Whether these complaints had any just foundation is imma- terial; they were believed by many to be well founded; and to prevent any possible legislation hostile to any class from the causes men- tioned, and to obviate objections to legislation similar to that embodied in the civil rights act, the four- teenth amendment was adopted. This is manifest from the discus- sions in congress with reference to it. There was no diversity of opin- ion as to its object between those who favored and those who opposed its adoption:" San Mateo County v. Southern &c. R. Co., 13 Fed. 722. ^° Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 350; Missouri v. Lewis, § 143 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 140 § 143. The same subject continued. — On this subject Judge Strong says: "A state acts by its legislative, its executive or its judi- cial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional pro- vision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the state, or of the ofhcers or agents by whom its powers are executed, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws. Who- ever by virtue of public position under a state government deprives another of property, life or liberty without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name of and for the state, and is clothed with the state's authority, his act is that of the state. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no mean- ing."^^ It is declared by the fifteenth amendment to the constitu- tion of the United States that the rights of citizens of the United States shall not be abridged or denied by any state, or by the United States, on account of previous condition of servitude, color or race.^^ § 144. Personal liability of members of the corporation. — At com- mon law and under the statutes of all our states save those of New England, the members of municipal corporations are not personally liable for the debts of the municipality. As is said by Mr. Justice Field in the case in which the creditors of the city of Memphis en- 101 U. S. 22. For taxation of rail- 678; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 656, 763; United roads as a class, see Kentucky R. R. States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629; s. c. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; s. c. 6 S. 1 S. Ct. 601. Ct. 57. " As to these amendments, see "Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339. Story on Const. (4th ed.), chs. 46, This view was approved in Neal v. 47, 48, and appendix to vol. 2. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397. The Women are not entitled to vote by fourteenth amendment does not, reason of the new amendments: says Judge Bradley, "invest con- Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; gress with power to legislate upon Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130. See subjects which are within the do- also, note 1 in Cooley Const. Lim. main of state legislation, but to pro- (6th ed.) 15. The fourteenth vide modes of relief against state amendment gave colored persons the legislation or state actions of the right to be protected from unfriend- kind referred to. It does not au- ly legislation solely on account of thorize congress to create a code of their color, the rights of citizenship, municipal law for the regulation of and exemption from legislation private rights; but to provide modes which might lessen their rights, of redress against the operation of tend to reduce them to the condition state laws and the action of state of a subject race, or lower them in officers, executive and judicial, when civic society: Ex parte Virginia, 100 these are subversive of the funda- U. S. 370; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. mental rights specified in the amend- S. 313; Strauder v. West Virginia, ment:" Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 100 U. S. 303; Neal v. Delaware, 103 3; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 18. On this see U. S. 370. also, Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 141 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP. § 145 deavored to satisfy the debts of the corporation out of the private property of its citizens:"^ "In no state of the Union, outside of New England, does the doctrine obtain tliat the private proj^erty of indi- viduals within the limits of a municipal corporation can be reached by its creditors and subjected to the payment of their demands. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, and perhaps in other states in New England, the individual liability of the inhabitants of towns, parishes and cities for the debts of the latter is maintained, and executions upon judgments issued against them can be enforced against the private property of the inhabitants. But this doctrine is admitted b\^ the courts of those states to be peculiar to their jurisprudence, and an exception to the rule elsewhere prevailing. Elsewhere the private property of the inhabitants of a municipal body can not be subjected to the payment of its debts except by way of taxation; but taxes, as we have already said, can only be levied by legislative authority. The power of taxation is not one of the functions of the judiciary; and whatever authority the states may, under their consti- tutions, confer upon special tribunals of their own, the federal courts can not by reason of it take any additional powers which are not judi- cial. In Eees v. City of Watertown,^^ from which we iiave already quoted, the power asserted by the decree was claimed by counsel, but was rejected by the court. 'Assume,' said the court, 'that the plaintitf is entitled to the payment of his judgment, and that the defendant neglects its duty in refusing to raise the amount by taxation, it does not follow that the court may order the amount to be made from the private estate of one of its citizens. This summary proceeding would involve a violation of the rights of the latter. He has never been heard in court. He has had no opportunity to establish a defense to the debt itself, or, if the judgment is valid, to show that his prop- erty is not liable to its payment. It is well settled that legislative ex- emptions from taxation are valid, that such exemptions may be per- petual in their duration, and that they are, in some cases, beyond legislative interference. The proceeding supposed would violate the fundamental principle contained in chapter twenty -ninth of Magna Charta, and embodied in the constitution of the United States, that no man shall be deprived of his property without due process of law ; that is, he must be served with notice of the proceeding and have a day in court to make his defense.' " § 145. The same subject continued — Russell v. The Men of Devon. — This doctrine that the members of a municipal corporation are not personally liable for its debts is of early authority. In the famous «' Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. " 19 Wall. 116, 122. 472, 519. § 146 PUBLIC COKI'ORATIONS. 142 English ease of Russell v. The ]\Ien of Devon,^^ where the plaintiff brought suit against the inhabitants of the county of Devon for neg- ligence on the part of the county for allowing a public bridge to re- main in a dangerous condition, through which the plaintiff sustained injury, it was decided that, as the county possessed no public fund out of which the judgment, if recovered, could be satisfied, the action could not be maintained. The court refused to sanction the doctrine of the personal liability of the inhabitants of the county, on the ground that, if that doctrine were enforced, the judgment might be satisfied out of the private property of one or more of the inhabit- ants, and that the persons whose property had been applied in satis- faction of the judgment would have no remedy over against the other inhabitants except by an impracticable multiplicity of actions. The doctrine of this case has been followed in the American cases; and, as has been said, the members of a municipal corporation are person- ally liable for its debts nowhere in this country outside of New England. °'' § 146. Personal liability of members of public quasi-corporations in New England. — By a curious and unique custom the members of pub- lic quasi-corporations in New England are held to be personally liable for the debts of the corporation; and a judgment obtained against the public quasi-corporation can be satisfied out of the private prop- erty of any of its members. ^'^ The reason for this peculiar practice seems to have been that judgments against these quasi-corporations could not be satisfied out of any corporate fund, as no such fund ex- 5^2 T. R. 667. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 Am. "^Cooley Const. Lim. 300; 1 Dillon R. 332; Adams v. President &c., Munic. Corp. (4t]i ed.) § 962, n.; 1 Greenl. (Maine) 361; Fernald v. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Lewis, 6 Maine 264; Beers v. Bots- Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall, ford, 3 Day (Conn.) 159; Puller v. 107, 116; Symonds v. Clay Co., 71 Hampton, 5 Conn. 416; Atwater v. 111. 355; North Lebanon v. Arnold, Inhabitants &c., 6 Conn. 223; Mc- 47 Pa. St. 488; Flori v. City of St. Cloud v. Selby, 10 Conn. 390; Union Louis, 69 Mo. 341; Kincaid v. Har- v. Crawford, 19 Conn. 331; Cooley din Co., 53 Iowa 430; s. c. 5 N. W. Const. Lim. 297. In Maine it has 589; Miller v. McWilliams, 50 Ala. been decided that a statute provid- 427. ing that judgments against the town " Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn, may be collected from the private 368; Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 property of members of the town is Pick. (Mass.) 405; Riddle v. Propri- not in contravention of the constitu- etors &c., 7 Mass. 187; Inhabitants tional prohibition against the taking &c. V. Inhabitants &c., 14 Mass. 216; of private property without due Chase v. President &c., 19 Pick, process of law: Eames v. Savage, 77 (Mass.) 564; Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Maine 212. Met. (Mass.) 546; Hill v. City of 143 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP. § 147 isted, and therefore it was necessary to resort to the private prop- erty of the members of the corporation. This private property could be reached either by taxation or execution, and in the New England states the inconvenient and unjust system of levying execution on private property in order to satisfy judgments against the corpora- tion has been adopted.^ ^ § 147. The same subject continued. — In the other states of the Union judgments rendered against public quasi-corporations which, have no corporate fund out of which to satisfy judgments are satis- fied by taxation of the members of the corporation instead of by exe- cution. As is said by Judge Cooley : "So far as this rule [that is, that members of a public quasi-corporation are personally liable for its debts] rests upon the reason that these organizations have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by which demands against them can be enforced, it can not be considered applicable in those states where express provision is made by law for compulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment recovered against the corporate body — the duty of levying the tax being imposed upon some officer who may be compelled by mandamus to perform it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are aware, grown up in any of the newer states like that which' had so early an origin in New England. More just, convenient and inexpensive modes of enforcing such demands have been established by statute, and the rules concerning them are conformed more closely to those which are established for other corporations."^^ § 148. Beardsley v. Smith — (a) The reason for the New England doctrine of personal liability of members. — In this leading case^° the learning relating to this peculiar custom of New England is so clearly stated in the opinion by Judge Church in the supreme court of errors of Connecticut that we quote his words at length: "We know that the relation in which members of municipal corporations in this state have been supposed to stand in respect to the corporation itself as well as to its creditors has elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have treated them for some purposes as parties to cor- porate proceedings, and their individuality has not been considered as merged in their corporate connection. Though corporators, they have been holden to be parties to suits by or against the corporation and individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not been =" See post, § 148, where the rea- ='' Cooley Const. Lim. 300, 301. sons for the custom are fully set *" Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn, forth in the opinion in Beardsley v. 375. Smith, 16 Conn. 368, 375. § 149 PUBLIC COKPOKATIONS, 144 doubted as to the inhabitants of towns, located ecclesiastical societies and school districts. From a recurrence to the history of the law on this subject, we are persuaded that the principle and usage here rec- ognized and followed in regard to the liability of the inhabitants of towns and other communities were very early adopted by our ances- tors; and whether they were considered as a part of the common law of England, or originated here as necessary to our state of society, it is not very material to inquire. We think, however, that the prin- ciple is not of domestic origin, but to some extent was operative and applied in the mother country, especially in cases where a statute fixed a liability upon a municipality which had no corporate funds. The same reason and necessity for the application of such a principle and practice existed in both countries. Such corporations are of a public and political character; they exercise a portion of the govern- ing power of the state. Statutes impose upon them important public duties. In the performance of these they must contract debts and liabilities which can only be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxation or execution. Taxation in most cases can only be the result of the voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon the contingent will of a majority of the corporators and upon their tardy and uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors, be- cause they have no power over it. Such reasons as these probably operated with our ancestors in adopting the more efficient and cer- tain remedy by execution which has been resorted to in the present case, and which they had seen to some extent in operation in the countries whose laws were their inheritance. The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or quasi-corporations the close principles applicable to private corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking, corporations, but only municipal bodies without pecuniary funds, it will not do to apply to them literally and in all cases the law of corporations."^^ § 149. (b) The doctrine in England. — The individual liability of the members of quasi-corporations, though not expressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in the case of Eussell v. The Men of Devon.''- It was alluded to as a known principle in the case of The Attorney-General v. The Mayor &c. of Exeter,*'^ applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes. That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are considered as the real parties to suits against the parish is now supposed to be well settled ; and it was so decided in • «' Citing Inhabitants &c. v. Wood, '= 2 T. R. 667. See ante, § 145. 13 Mass. 192. «' 2 Russ. 45; s. c. 26 Rev. Rep. 2. 145 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZEXSIIIP. § 150 the cases of The King v. The Inhabitants of AYoburn*** and The King V. The Inliabitants of Hardwick;"^ and in support of tliis principle reference was made to the form of the proceedings, as that they were "against the inhabitants," etc. § 150. (c) Doctrine in Massachusetts and Maine. — In the state of Massachusetts, the individual responsibility of the inhabitants of towns for town debts has long been established. Distinguished coun- sel in the case of The President &c. of the Merchants' Bank v. Cook,®^ referring to municipal bodies, says: "For a century past the practical construction of the bar has been that, in an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corporation is a party to the suit." In several other cases in that state the same principle is repeated.. In the case of Eiddle v. The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack Eiver,®''' Parsons, C. J., in an allusion to tliis private responsibility of corporators, remarks: "And the sound reason is that, having no corporate fund and no legal means of obtaining one, each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the corporation." So in The Inhabitants of Brewer v. The Inhabi- tants of New Gloucester,^* the court says : "As the law provides that, when judgment is recovered against the inhabitants of a towTi, exe- cution may be levied upon the property of any inhabitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party." In the case above referred to of President &c. v. Cook, Parker, C. J., expresses the opinion of the court upon this point thus : "Towns, parishes, precincts, etc., are but a collection of individuals with certain corporate powers for political and civil purposes, without any corporate fund from which a judgment can be satisfied; but each member of the community is liable in his person and estate to the execution which may issue against the body; each individual, therefore, may be well thought to be a party to a suit brought against them by their collective name. In regard to banks, turnpike and other corporations the case is dif- ferent." The counsel concerned in the case of Mower v. The Inhabi- tants of Leicester,'''^ without contradiction speak of the practice of subjecting individuals as one of daily occurrence. The law on this subject was very much considered in the case of Chase v. The Presi- dent &c. of the Merrimack Bank,^*' and was applied and enforced against the members of a territorial parish. "The question is," said the court, "whether on an execution against a town or parish the "10 East 395. ««^ 14 Mass. 216. «' 11 East 578. *^ 9 Mass. 247. =M Pick. (Mass.) 405. ^"19 Pick. (Mass.) 564. " 7 Mass. 169, 187. 1 Smith — 10 § 151 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 146 body or estate of any inhabitant may be lawfully taken to satisfy it. This question seems to have been settled in the affirmative by a series of decisions, and ought no longer to be considered an open question." The state of Maine when separated from Massachusetts retained most of its laws and usages as they had been recognized in the parent state, and among others the one in question. In Adams v. President &c. of Wiscasset Bank/^ Mellen, C. J., says : "It is well known that all judgments against quasi-corporations may be satisfied out of the property of any individual inhabitant." § 151. (d) The doctrine in Connecticut. — "The courts of this state from a time beyond the memory of any living lawyer have sanc- tioned and carried out this usage as one of common-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical societies and school districts. The forms of our process against these communities have always corresponded with this view of the law. The writs have issued against the inhabit- ants of towns, societies and districts as parties. As early in the his- tory of our jurisprudence as 1705, a statute was enacted authorizing communities such as towns, societies, etc., to prosecute and defend suits, and for this purpose to appear either by themselves, agents or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as parties individually and liable to the consequences of judgments against such communities as parties, there would have been a glaring impro- priety in permitting them to appear and defend by themselves ; but if parties, such a right was necessary and indispensable. Of course this privilege has been and may be exercised. '^^ Our statute provid- ing for the collection of taxes enacts that the treasurer of the state shall direct his warrant to the collectors of the state tax in the several towns. If neither this nor the further proceedings against the col- lectors and the selectmen authorized by the statute shall enforce the collection of the tax, the law directs that then the treasurer shall issue his execution against the inhabitants of such town. Such an execution may be levied upon the estate of the inhabitants; and this provision of the law was not considered as introducing a new princi- ple or enforcing a novel remedy, but as being only in conformity with the well-known usage in other cases. The levy of an execution under this statute produced the case of Beers v. Botsford.'^^ There the execution which had been issued against the town of Newton by the treasurer of the state had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an inhabitant of that town, and he had thus been compelled "1 Greenl. (Maine) 361. "3 Day (Conn.) 159. " 1 Swift System 227. 147 MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP. § 151 to pay the balance of a state tax due from the town. He sued the town of Newton for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most distinguished professional gentlemen^ in the state were engaged as counsel in that case; and it did not occur, either to them or to the court, that the plaintiff's property had been taken without right; on the contrary, the case proceeded throughout on the conceded principle of our common law that the levy was properly made upon the estate of the plaintiff. And without this the plaintiff could not have recov- ered of the town, but must have resorted to his action against the officer for his illegal and void levy. In Fuller v. The Town of Hampton,^* Peters, J., remarked that if costs are recovered against a town the writ of execution to collect them must have been issued against the property of the inhabitants of the town; and this is the invariable practice. The case of Atwater v. The Inhabitants &c. of Woodbridge''^ also grew out of this ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of Bethany had been taxed by the town of Woodbridge for its money at interest, and the warrant for the col- lection of the tax had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff and the tax had thus been collected of him, who was an inhabitant of the located society of Bethany. Brainard, J.., who drew up the opinion of the court, referring to this proceeding said: 'This prac- tice with' regard to towns has prevailed in New England, so far as I have been able to investigate the subject, from an early period — from its first settlement; — a practice brought by our forefathers from England, which had there obtained in corporations similar to the towns incorporated in New England.' It will here be seen that the principle is considered as applicable to territorial societies as to towns, because the object to be attained was the same in both — 'that the town or society should be brought to a sense of duty and make provision for payment and indemnity;' — a very good reason and very applicable to the case we are considering. The law on this subject was more distinctly brought out and considered by this court in the late case of McLoud v. Selby,'^® in which this well-known practice, as it has been applied to towns and ecclesiastical societies, was extended and sanctioned as to school districts; 'else it would be breaking in upon the analogies of the law.' 'They are communities for different purposes, but essentially of the same character.' And no doubt can remain, since the decision of this case, but that the real principle of all the cases on this subject has been and is that the inhabitants of quasi-corporations are parties individually as well as in their corporate capacities to all actions in which the corporation " 5 Conn. 416. '° 10 Conn. 390. " 6 Conn. 223. § 153 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 148 is a party. And to the same effect is the language of the elementary writcrs."'^^ g 152. Limitations upon the personal liability of members of New England public quasi-corporations. — It may be noted here, although the subject will be more thoroughly discussed in a subsequent por- tion of this work, that while the members of these New England public quasi-corporations are personally liable for the debts of the corporation, still this liability is much curtailed by the doctrine, which is well settled, that these corporations, like counties and other quasi-corporations, are not liable for torts, unless a statute expressly creates such liability. '^^ This rule is, however, subject to limitation in the ease of New England public quasi-corporations. It is not applicable in cases where the injury arises from a neglect of special duties or the abuse of special authorities, imposed or conferred upon the town with its consent or at its request.'^^ "Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. v. President &c., 1 Greenl. (Maine) 368; 2 Kent Com. 221; Angell & 361; Mitchell v. Rockland, 52 Maine Ames Corp. 374; 1 Swift Digest 72, 118; Frazer v. Lewiston, 76 Maine 794; 5 Dane Abr. 158; 2 Dillon 531; Farnum v. Concord, 2 N. H. Munic. Corp., § 962, n.; Cooley 392; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. Const. Lim. 297-300. Judge Cooley 284; s. c. 72 Am. D. 302; Baxter v. cites and approves Beardsley v. Winoonski Turnpike Co., 22 Vt. 114; Smith, supra, and quotes at length Bray v. Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416; the opinion of Judge Church. Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368; '^ See chapter on Torts, post; Cooley Const. Lim. 30; 2 Dillon Mower v. Inhabitants &c., 9 Mass. Munic. Corp., §§ 962-965. 247; s. c. 6 Am. D. 63; Bigelow v. "* Bigelow v. Inhabitants, 14 Gray Inhabitants, 14 Gray (Mass.) 541; (Mass.) 541; Eastman v. Meredith, Hill V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 36 N. H. 284; Hill v. City of Boston, 344, 351; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332; Adams 122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332. CHAPTEE VI. OFFICERS AND AGENTS. Section 153. Legislative power to create of- ficers and agents. 154. Legislative control over officers and agents. 155. Who are officers? 156. Conduct of elections — Construc- tion of election statutes. 157. Miscellaneous instances of the construction of election stat- utes. 158. Validity of election — General principles. 159. The same subject continued — Illustrations. 160. English rule as to majority. 161. Election by ballot. 162. Election by city council. 163. Election by definite bodies gen- erally — Majority and plurality. 164. The same subject continued — Quorum majority. 165. Informal ballot. 166. Tenure of office. 167. Tenure of office where city passes from one class to an- other. 168. Power to hold over — English and American rules. 169. The same subject continued. 170. Appointment of officers. 171. Validity of appointment. 172. Appointment by de facto offi- cers. 173. Compensation of officers — In general. 174. The same subject continued — Failure of corporate funds. 175. The same subject continued — Illustrations. Section 176. Miscellaneous instances. 177. Extra compensation. 178. Compensation of attorneys. 179. The same subject continued. 180. Compensation — Power of legis- lature to control. 181. Compensation in case of re- moval. 182. Qualifications for office-holding. 183. Official oath. 184. The same subject continued. 185. Duties of officers. 186. Powers of mayor. 187. The same subject continued — Statutory provisions. 188. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous powers. 189. Miscellaneous instances of pow- ers of municipal officers. 190. De facto officers — General state- ment. 191. The same subject continued — Color of title. 192. Incumbent of an unconstitu- tional office. 193. Possession of office by de facto officer. 194. Rights and liabilities of de facto officers. 195. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office. 196. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignation. 197. Removal of officers and agents — How effected. 198. Causes for removal — English and American rules. 199. Preferring of charges. (149) 153 PUBLIC CORPORATION'S. 150 re- re- Section 200. Power of corporation to move officers and agents. 201. The same subject continued. 202. Notice of proceeding to move. 203. The same subject continued. 204. By whom discharged. 205. All persons charged with no- tice of duties and powers of municipal agents. Section 206. Liability of officers to the cor- poration. 207. Instances of fraudulent acts of municipal agents. 208. Liability of corporation to of- ficers. 209. Indictment of municipal offi- cers. § 153. Legislative power to create officers and agents. — The au- thority that makes the laws has a large discretion in determining the means through which they shall be executed ; and the performance of many duties for which they may provide by law may be referred either to the chief executive of the state, or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial officer, or even to a person specially named for the duty.^ Whatever power or duty is expressly given to, or imposed upon, the executive department, is altogether free from the interference of the other branches of the government. Especially is this the case where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive officer, either by the constitution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested in him it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the government can control its exercise, and from those duties which the constitution requires of him he can not be excused by law.^ But other powers or duties the executive can ^ Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. 5, p. 133; Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 562; People v. Osborne, 7 Colo. 605. ^ Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513. The legislature may ap- point a state board if the constitu- tion does not expressly empower the governor to do so: People v. Free- man, 80 Cal. 233; s. c. 22 Pac. 173. See also, State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Biggs v. McBride, 17 Or. 640; s. c. 21 Pac. 878; 5 L. R. A. 115; Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 386; s. c. 21 N. E. 890. It is not unconsti- tutional to allow the governor to supply temporary vacancies in of- fices which, under the constitution, are elective: Sprague v. Brown, 40 Wis. 612. If the governor has the power to appoint, with the consent of the senate, and to remove, he may remove without such consent: Harman v. Harwood, 58 Md. 1; Lane V. Commonwealth, 103 Pa. St. 481. As to discretionary powers, see Coo- ley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 54, 55. An appointment to office was said, in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 401, to be intrinsically an executive act. Where an office is elective, the legislature can not fill it by appointment or by extend- ing the term of the incumbent: Peo- ple V. McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374; Peo- ple V. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57; Devoy v. Mayor &c., 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 264; s. c. 22 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 226; People V. Blake, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; People v. Raymond, 37 N. Y. 428; People v. 151 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 154 not exercise or assume, except by legislative authority, and the power which in its discretion it confers it may also in its discretion with- hold or confide to other hands. ^ § 154. Legislative control over officers and agents. — Although, by their constitution, the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty: they retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the three departments dre responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon.'* The maxim which lies at the founda- tion of our government is that all political power originates with the people. But since the organization of government it can not be claimed that either the legislative, executive or judicial powers, either wholly or in part, can be exercised by them. By the institution of government the people surrender the exercise of all the sovereign functions of government to agents chosen by themselves, who at least theoretically represent the supreme will of their constituents. Thus all power possessed by the people themselves is given and centered in their chosen representatives.^ § 155. Who are officers? — It is sometimes difficult to determine who is an officer and entitled to the rights and privileges pertaining to an office. The distinction between an officer and employe is not always well defined. In general it may be stated that a person elected or appointed, whose duties are fixed by statute or ordinance, is an officer.^ Neither is it at all times apparent whether an officer is Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50; State v. Gold- "^ The employment of a person as stucker, 40 Wis. 124; Opinion of superintendent of water-works does Justices, 117 Mass. 603. not make him an officer in the ab- ^ Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. sence of an ordinance or resolution 5, p. 134. "In deciding this ques- creating the office and specifying his tion [as to the authority of the gov- duties: Town of Salem v. McClin- ernor], recurrence must be had to tock, 16 Ind. App. 656; s. c. 46 N. E. the constitution:" Field v. People, 3 39; 59 Am. St. 330. Operators of an 111. 79, 80. ambulance under a contract with * Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. the city, who are required by con- 17, p. 747. tract to answer all calls from the ' Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283, 291. city dispensary, and are under the See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; direction of the dispensary surgeon, Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543; s. c. 14 are not municipal agents, and are N. W. 738; 15 N. W. 609; State v. personally liable for the negligent Tufly, 19 Nev. 391; s. c. 12 Pac, 835; acts of the driver: Green v. Eden, 3 Am. St. 895. 24 Ind. App. 583; s. c. 56 N. E. 240. § 156 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 152 a public or state oflficer, or a municipal officer. He may be appointed by the municipality, and yet the functions, duties, etc., pertaining to the office be such as to make him a state officer.^ Nor does the payment of liis salary by the city necessarily make him a municipal officer.® A statute which d^efines and enumerates village officers, and regulates their choice and term of office, applies to all villages, whether they exist under general law or special charter.^ § 156. Conduct of elections — Construction of election statutes. — The statutes of the different states point out specifically the mode in which elections shall be conducted; but, although there are great diversities of detail, the same general principles govern them all. Election statutes are to be tested like other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality in view of the great public purposes which they accomplish; and except where they specifically provide that a thing shall be done in the manner indicated, and not otherwise, their pro- visions designed merely for the information and guidance of the officers must be regarded as directory only, and the election will not be defeated by a failure to comply with them, provided the irregular- ity has not hindered any who were entitled from exercising the right of suffrage, or rendered doubtful the evidences from which the result was to be declared.^" Commissioner of jurors under Great- of New York, 32 N. Y. S. 34; s. c. er New York charter is not the head 84 Hun (N. Y.) 50. of a department, but is a city of- * In re Board of Health &c., 60 N. ficer: People v. Welde, 59 N. Y. S. Y. S. 27; s. c. 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1030. New York and Brooklyn 236. bridge commissioners held to be " Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. local and not state officers: People 17, pp. 776, 777; People v. Cook, 14 v. Nixon, 158 N. Y. 221; s. c. 52 N. Barb. (N. Y.) 259; s. c. 8 N. Y. 67. E. 1117. Commissioners appointed See also, Clifton v. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; to construct a bridge over East river Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212 ; Attor- are municipal officers: People v. ney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420; Peo- Van Wyck, 59 N. Y. S. 134. A city pie v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Piatt v. justice of the peace is a city officer: People, 29 111. 54; Board &c. v. Peo- Hulaniski v. City of Ogden City, 20 pie, 65 111. 360; State v. Stumpf, 21 Utah 233; s. c. 57 Pac. 876. Wis. 579; Sprague v. Norway, 31 'Policemen are public or state of- Cal. 173; Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio fleers, although appointed through St. 184; Sheppard's Election Case, 82 the instrumentality of a municipal Pa. St. 295; Wheelock's Election corporation: Everill v. Swan, 17 Case, 82 Pa. St. 297; State v. O'Day, Utah 514; s. c. 55 Pac. 681. 69 Iowa 368; s. c. 28 N. W. 642. All ^ A person holding office by ap- votes received after the polls should pointment of court is not a city of- be closed are illegal: Varney v. Jus- ficer, though his salary is paid by tice, 86 Ky. 596; s. c. 6 S. W. 457. the city treasurer: O'Brien v. City Where a city council passes an ordi- 153 OFFICERS AXn AGENTS. 157 § 157. Miscellaneous instances of the construction of election statutes. — Where a city council i« the sole judge of the election and qualifications of its members, it can not, after having seated a member on investigation, at a subsequent meeting order a second investiga- tion. Certiorari may issue in such case without waiting for the report and final order.^^ If there is a tie in the election for mayor between the incumbent and another candidate, and the city council fails to choose one of them for mayor by lot, as required by the city charter, equity will not interfere to restrain the incumbent from nance redistricting the city into wards, a special election thereunder is specifically prohibited by the re- vised statutes of Ohio; and hence, where a special election is at- tempted to be held for the selection of members of the council under such ordinance, such special election is inoperative, and persons holding seats in the council by virtue of certificates based upon such special election may be ousted by quo war- ranto: State V. Kearns, 47 Ohio St. 566; s. c. 25 N. E. 1027. A town was incorporated by a special act, its managers to consist of five trus- tees, to be elected. It was held that a subsequent general act, repealing all inconsistent provisions in earlier acts, and fixing a day for the election of all town officers, made that day the day on which the five trustees should be elected: Kelly v. Gahn, 112 111. 23. Where a statute provid- ing for an election by the inhabit- ants within the boundaries of a proposed municipal corporation, at which the question of incorporation shall be submitted to the people, fails to provide for any census or enumeration of the people prelimi- nary to such proceedings, a failure to make such enumeration will not affect the validity of the election, where the board of county commis- sioners make a record in their pro- ceedings declaring the number of inhabitants: Smith v. Board &c., 45 Fed. 725. Testimony of the village clerk that the names contained in the petition for the election repre- sented a majority of the taxpayers of the village, as contained in the last assessment roll, is sufficient proof that the petitioners repre- sented a majority of the taxpayers: People V. Bird, 55 Hun (N. Y.) 610; s. c. 8 N. Y. S. 801. The laws of Minnesota of 1885, as amended by laws of 1887, designating the second Tuesday of March as the day upon which the city council of St. Paul shall elect a corporation " attorney, absolutely prohibit an election upon a day antecedent to that speci- fied: State V. Murray, 41 Minn. 123; s. c. 42 N. W. 858. " State V. Council &c., 47 N. J. L. 64; s. c. 54 Am. R. 117. The laws of the state of Michigan, 1887, No. 208, providing for the correction of frauds and mistakes in the canvass and returns made by inspectors of elections, does not apply in the case of elections for aldermen for the city of Detroit; and an application for an investigation of the returns of such election should be made to the board of aldermen: the city charter, as amended in 1887, provid- ing that the board of aldermen shall be the judges of the election and qualifications of its own members, and shall have power to determine contested elections to said board: Naumann v. Board &c., 73 Mich. 252; s. c. 41N. W. 267. 157 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 154 exercising the functions of the office.^^ When once the polls are closed in accordance with the law they can not be legally reopened and votes received.^ ^ The mere fact that the number of officers to be elected to fill vacancies was not determined prior to the election does not make the election void.^* Where the charter provides that the board ^=Huels V. Hahn, 75 Wis. 468; s. c. 44 N. W. 507. i^The Virginia code of 1887, § 5, subd. 16, provides that the word "city" shall be construed to mean a town containing a population of five thousand or more, and having a cor- poration or hustings court. It was held that § 1016, providing that of- ficers provided for in the "charter of the several cities shall be elected or appointed- as the charters may prescribe: provided, that the coun- cilmen ... of each ward of a city shall be chosen by the qualified voters of such ward," does not apply to a town which has less than five thousand population, and no corpo- ration or hustings court: Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484; s. c. 12 S. E. 965. The act of Pennsylvania, passed March 20, 1862, provided for the election of six supervisors by the qualified voters of Hempfield town- ship at the first succeeding election, and made it the duty of such super- visors to then divide the township into six districts, giving each dis- trict a supervisor. The court de- cided that this act repealed by im- plication the act of February 26, 1853, authorizing the election of one supervisor each by two particular districts, and of two by the third; and that each district of the town- ship was entitled to one supervisor, who was to be elected, however, by the voters of the whole township: Martz V. Long, 110 Pa. St. 502; s. c. sub nom. In re Martz's Election, 1 Atl. 419. " An election of five town council- men of North Providence, R. I., un- der Pub. St. R. I., ch. 37, § 1, provid- ing that there shall be annually elected in each town not less than three nor more than seven council- men, is not void by reason of the voters' failing to determine, in ad- vance of the election at the annual meeting, the precise number to be elected, as required by § 6; the num- ber of five having been fixed upon in 1874, and that number having ever since remained unchanged, but no formal vote on the point having been taken except in 1875, 1878 and 1882, the number being considered as having been fixed by common ac- quiescence or consent: State v. An- drews, 15 R. I. 394; s. c. 6 Atl. 596. Where the vacancy in the office of township supervisor, caused by res- ignation, has not been filled by ap- pointment, as prescribed by Comp. St. Neb., ch. 26, § 103, (1) by the town board; (2) where the offices of the town board are all vacant, by the township clerk; (3) where there be no township clerk, by the county clerk, — the same may be filled by election at a special town meeting, when properly convened, under Comp. St. Neb., ch. 18, providing that electors at special town meet- ings, when properly convened, shall have power to fill vacancies in any of the town offices when the same shall not have already been filled by appointment: State v. Taylor, 26 Neb. 580; s. c. 42 N. W. 729. The acts of Virginia, 1883-4, § 12, amend- ing the charter of the city of Ports- mouth, and providing that the city council shall judge by a majority vote of the qualifications of its members, has application only where a seat is contested: Jobson v. Bridges, 84 Va. 298; s. c. 5 S. E. 529. » 155 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 158 of aldermen shall be the final judge of the election and qualification of its members, the election contest can not be tried by any other tribunal.^''' § 158. Validity of election — General principles. — In Judge Coo- ley's admirable work on Constitutional Limitations it is said that it is a little dillicult at times to adopt the true mean between those things which should, and those which should not, defeat an election ; for while, on the one hand, the laws should seek to secure the due expression of his will by every legal voter, and guard against any irregularities or misconduct that may tend to prevent it, so, on the other hand, it is to be borne in mind that charges of irregularity or misconduct are easily made, and that the danger from throwing elec- tions open to be set aside or controlled by oral evidence is perhaps as great as any in our system. An election honestly conducted under the forms of law ought generally to stand, notwithstanding the in- dividual electors may have been deprived of their votes, or unquali- fied voters allowed to participate.^*^ The admission of illegal votes at an election will not necessarily defeat it, but to warrant its being set aside on that ground it should appear that the result would have been different had they been excluded.^^ § 159. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — An erroneous recital in the proclamation of a clause as part of the act, which clause was stricken out before the passage of the act, will not invalidate the election, the date and title of the act being properly given, and it not appearing that the result of the election was in any way affected »=Cate V. Martin, 69 N. H. 610; s. Ark. 549. In England candidates c. 45 Atl. 644; People v. Hanshaw, 60 are nominated and known prior to Mich. 200; s. c. 26 N. W. 879; 1 Am. election day, and the system of vot- St. 498. ing was known as open voting, and ^^ Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. some cases there favor the proposi- 17, p. 785. See also, People v. Village tion that votes which were cast for of Highland Park, 88 Mich. 653; s. a disqualified person are not good, c. 50 N. W. 660. and the other candidate is elected: "Inhabitants &c. v. Stearns, 21 Reg. v. Ledgard, 8 Ad. & El. 535; Pick. (Mass.) 148; Trustees &c. v. Rawlinson Corp. (5th ed.) 64, note; Gibbs, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 39; Ex parte Reg. v. Councillors of Derby, 7 Ad. Murphy, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 153; Jud- & El. 419; Reg. v. Hiorns, 7 Ad. & kins V. Hill, 50 N. H. 140; State v. El. 960. But if the voter is ignorant Rogers, 86 N. C. 357; Shields v. Mc- of his candidate's disqualification, Gregor, 91 Mo. 534; s. c. 4 S. W. 266; the vote is counted in determining People V. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; Tar- whether an opposing candidate has box V. Sughrue, 36 Kan. 225; s. c. 12 a majority: Reg. v. Mayor &c., L. R. Pac. 935; Swepston v. Barton, 39 3 Q. B. 629. 159 PUBLIC CORrOEATlONS. 156 by the error,^* Although the statute requires that notice shall state the number of inhabitants within the boundaries of the proposed corporation as ascertained by the board of commissioners, a failure to do so is a mere irregularity, which can not prejudice a non-resident property-owner and will not affect the validity of the election.^'' Where the statute provides for the calling of an election of officers 1* In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319; s. c. 18 Atl. 67. The New York laws of 1871, creating the board of water commissioners of the village of Dun- kirk, and granting them specific powers, creates a new office within the meaning of the constitution of New York, art. 10, § 2, which pro- vides that all city, town and village officers for whose election or ap- pointment the constitution makes no provision, shall be elected by the city, etc., or some authority thereof, and all other officers for whose elec- tion or appointment the constitu- tion makes no provision, and all officers whose offices shall there- after be created by law, shall be elected by the people or appointed in such manner as the legislature may direct, and is not unconstitutional because it names the persons who are to constitute the commission: Hequembourg v. City of Dunkirk, 2 N. Y. S. 447. Un- der the laws of Pennsylvania of 1874, § 208, providing that cases of contested elections of the fourth class (embracing municipal council- men) shall be tried and determined by the court of quarter sessions, and laws of Pennsylvania of 1887, p. 204, providing that "each branch of councils shall judge of the qualifica- tions of its members, and contested elections shall be determined by the courts of law," the court of quarter sessions has no jurisdiction to pass upon the qualification of a council- man, but only upon the regularity of the election: Auchenbach v. Sei- bert, 120 Pa. St. 159; s. c. 13 Atl. 558. The charter of the city of A., § 22 (Sess. Acts Oreg. 1889, p. 240), provides that the council shall be the judge of the qualifications of its members, and, in case of a contest between two persons claiming to have been elected thereto, must de- termine the same, subject to the re- view of any court of competent jur- isdiction. The court decided that this is not exclusive of the jurisdic- tion of the circuit courts, under the general statutes of the state, to de- termine such contests in the first instance: State v. Kraft, 18 Or. 550; s. c. 23 Pac. 663. See also, State v. Muggins, Harp. L. (S. C.) 94; State V. Deliesseline, 1 McC. (S. C.) 52; Grier v. Shackleford, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 491; State v. Cockrell, 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) 6. " Smith V. Board &c., 45 Fed. 725. The laws of New Hampshire provide that "city councils shall have power to provide for the appointment or election of all necessary officers for the good government of the city, not otherwise provided for." It was decided that a city council has no right to determine when a board of assessors shall exercise their power to choose one of their number as clerk of the board: Weeks v. Den- nett, 62 N. H. 2; holding also, that a notice of an election to determine the question of incorporation, signed by the county auditor, who is ex officio clerk of the board of commis- sioners, and in which it appears that the election was ordered by the board, is a sufficient compliance with the provision of the statute that such notice shall be given by the board of commissioners. 157 OFFICEUS AM) A(!I:NTS. IGO upon a petition signed by a majority of the electors voting at the last general election then next preceding, as appears from the poll-list, the petition must be signed by a majority of the electors appearing on the poll-list.^° An election at a time not fixed for such pui-pose by the law is void, and a person previously appointed to fill the vacancy will hold over under the appointment, though voted for and declared elected at the illegal election.-^ But where no time for election of officers is fixed by law the mayor and council may do so."^ A town does not lose its corporate existence by a failure to elect officers.^^ § 160. English rule as to majority. — Although it is clear that, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, the corporate body are bound by the acts not only of the major part of them, but by the major part of those who are present at a regularly convened corporate meeting, yet where the corporate body consists of a definite number, and it is provided that an act shall be done by the body for the time being, or a major part of them, a majority of the whole must meet for the purpose; and if the body be so reduced that a majority of the whole definite number no longer remains, the act can not be done unless permitted by the charter or by usage.^* =°Bush v. State, 100 Wis. 549; s. c. 76 N. W. 606. ^^ Lyman v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 55 S. W. 686; State v. Winter, 148 Ind. 177; s. c. 47 N. E. 462; Sibbald V. Buekell (N. J.), 36 Atl. 1032. " State v. Hoff (Tex. Civ. App), 29 S. W. 672. '^ State v. Hoff (Tex. Civ. App), 29 S. W. 672. -*Rex v. Hoyte, 6 T. R. 430; Rex V, Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810, and the cases there cited. But a majority of those present, when legally as- sembled, will bind the rest: Rex v. Miller, 6 T. R. 268. See also. Rex v. Monday, Cowper 530, 538; Rex v. Devonshire, 1 B. & C. 609; Rex v. Bower, 1 B. & C. 492. See further, as to plurality and majority rule at pop- ular elections, the chapter on Meet- ings and Elections, post, and the rules governing elections by definite bodies, §§ 164, 165, post; Rex v. May, 4 B. & Ad. 843; Rex v. Greet, 8 B. & C. 363; Rex v. Headley, 7 B. & C. 496; Cotton v. Davies, 1 Str. 53; Old- know v. Wainwright, 2 Burr. 1017; s. c. 1 W. Bl. 229; Reg. v. Overseers of Christ Church, 7 E. & B. 409. Where an election of four council- ors had taken place on the first of November, three of whom were to supply ordinary vacancies, and the fourth an extraordinary vacancy, but no distinction had been made between them, either in the notice of election, the voting papers or in the publishing of the names of the four persons elected, such election was held to be irregular and void: Reg. V. Rowley, 3 Q. B. 143; s. c. in the exchequer chamber, 6 Q. B. 668. See also, Reg. v. Rippon, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 217; Reg. v. Mayor &c., 7 Ad. & El. 963. § 161 PUBLIC COPtl'OlJATIONS. 158 § 161. Election by ballot. — The mode of voting in this country, at all general elections, is almost universally by ballot.-'^ "A ballot may be defined to be a piece of paper or other suitable material, with the name written or printed upon it of the person to be voted for; and where the suffrages are given in this form, each of the electors in person deposits such a vote in the box or other receptacle provided for the purpose and kept by the proper officers."^^ »Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. 17, p. 760. =^Cush. Leg. Assemb., § 103. "In this country, ancT indeed in every country where officers are elective, different modes have been adopted for the electors to signify their choice. The most common modes have been either by voting viva voce, — that is, by the elector openly nam- ing the person he designates for the office, — or by ballot, which is depos- iting in a box provided for the pur- pose a paper on which is the name of the person he intends for the of- fice. The principal object of this last mode is to enable the elector to express his opinion secretly, without being subject to being overawed or to any ill will or prosecution on ac- count of his vote for either of his candidates who may be before the public. The method of voting by tablets in Rome was an example of this manner of voting. There cer- tain officers appointed for that pur- pose, called "diribitores," delivered to each voter as many tablets as there were candidates, one of whose names was written upon every tablet. The voter put into a chest prepared for that purpose which of these tab- lets he pleased, and they were after- wards taken out and counted. Cicero defines tablets to be little billets, in which the people brought their suffrages. The clause in the con- stitution directing the election of the several state officers was un- doubtedly intended to provide that the election should be made by this mode of voting to the exclusion of any other. In this mode the free- men can individually express their choice without being under the ne- cessity of publicly declaring the ob- ject of their choice; their collective voice can be easily ascertained, and the evidence of it transmitted to the place where their votes are to be counted, and the result declared with as little inconvenience as pos- sible: Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 535, 541. In the case last cited, and in Henshaw v. Poster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 312, it was held that a printed ballot complies with a constitutional pro- vision which requires all ballots for certain state officers to be "fairly written." Common lines on ruled paper do not render the election void: People v. Kilduff, 15 111. 492. But where the law prohibits "any device or mark" by which a ticket may be distinguished, a dotted line under the title of an office for which no candidate is named is sufficient to condemn the whole ballot: Steele V. Calhoun, 61 Miss. 556. See also, Druliner v. State, 29 Ind. 308; Mill- holland v. Bryant, 39 Ind. 363. A different method from the one usu- ally in force in printing the names of officers will not make the ballot void: Coffey v. Edmonds, 58 Cal. 521; Owens v. State, 64 Tex. 500. The board of aldermen having no power to elect except by ballot, no action by them ratifying their previous action can make such elec- tion valid: Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422. A pro- vision of the rules of the council, that officers whose salaries are pay- 159 OFFICERS AXD AGENTS. 1G3 § 162. Election by city council. — Under the laws or constitution of some states the council or city government has the power to elect officers or fill vacancies by vote.^^ Where city ordinances require able from the city treasury shall be elected by ballot, applies only to elective officers to be chosen by the council under the charter, and not to subordinate appointees whose compensation is fixed by the mayor and aldermen: Williams v. City of Gloucester, 148 Mass. 256; s. c. 19 N. E. 348. A city council was empow- ered to appoint, in joint convention, a prosecuting attorney. No mode was prescribed, and there was no power of removal. The convention balloted, and A. received a majority of the votes cast. It was held that A.'s title to the office was not af- fected by the fact that a resolution declaring him elected was lost, and that a resolution declared the ballot void by reason of errors which did not in fact exist, and that another resolution declared another person elected (Park, C. J., dissenting): State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; s. c. 22 Atl. 686; 55 Am. R. 65. ^ Under the charter of the city of Knoxville, the board of mayor and aldermen is composed of a mayor and nine aldermen. By section 4 the mayor can not vote, except in case of a tie. Section 5 pro- vides that a majority of the board shall form a quorum. An or- dinance provides that any vacancy on the board of education shall be filled by an election by the mayor and aldermen. At such an election eight of the aldermen and the mayor were present. Complainant re- ceived four voteSj there were three scattering votes and one blank. The mayor did not vote, but declared complainant elected. It was held that a majority of the eight alder- men present was necessary to elect complainant, and the blank vote must be counted to show that he did not receive such majority. Nor was the action of the mayor, in declaring complainant elected, equivalent to a vote for him: Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422. See this case cited and compared with other authorities in §§ 164, 165, post. An election ordered by officers de facto is held a good election: State V. Goowin, 69 Tex. 55; s. c. 5 S. W. 678. A common council, constituted as it will be when a term of office about to expire shall end, and hav- ing authority to appoint the succes- sor of the incumbent, may lawfully make such appointment before the expiration of the current term: Horan v. Lane, 53 N. J. L. 275; s. c. sub nom. State v. Lane, 21 Atl. 302, where it is also held that when a statute empowers the council to ap- point to a certain office, an ordi- nance of the council which. If en- forced against succeeding councils, would defeat or materially impair their power of appointment, is void. Under the charter of the city of Hartford, providing that the com- mon council should appoint a prose- cuting attorney, but giving no direc- tion as to the mode of appointment, the council met, and a member moved that the convention proceed to ballot for a prosecuting attorney, which motion prevailed. A ballot was taken, giving relator a majority of votes. The result having been announced, another member offered a resolution declaring relator elected, which was lost. Two reso- lutions were then offered and passed, one declaring the ballot for relator null and void by reason of errors in the same, and the other declaring defendant elected to the office. It was held that the relator was elected when the result of the first ballot 163 PUBLIC CORPOEATIONS. 160 that its city solicitor shall be chosen by a concurrent vote of both branches of the city council, he can not be legally chosen unless by a concurrent vote; and the fact that the record untruly states that a vote was in concurrence, when it also states facts showing that it was not, does not show a valid election.-^ Where, by the city charter, the mayor is allowed a casting vote in the city council, in accordance with the statute of Maine, his act is sufficiently formal for that purpose if he determines and declares which of two candidates is elected, although he may not go through the formality of casting a ballot.2o § 163. Election by definite bodies generally — Majority and plu- rality. — When an election is to be made by a definite body of electors, as by a board of aldermen or common council, the authorities are not in accord as to whether a majority is requisite to elect a candidate or whether a mere plurality is sufficient. On the one hand it is asserted by the supreme court of Tennessee to be "well settled" and "not open to controversy" that in such cases a majority is necessary.^" was announced, there being no error therein, and the convention had no power afterwards to deprive him of the office (Park, C. J., dissenting): State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; s. c. 22 Atl. 686; 55 Am. R. 65. The elec- tion of an assessor by the board of aldermen at a legal meeting can not be reconsidered at an adjourned session, and another person elected in his place: State v. Phillips, 79 Maine 506; s. c. 11 Atl. 274. ^ Saunders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass. 380. Since the Illinois act of 1875, providing a new mode for the assess- ment and collection of taxes, and au- thorizing the appointment of a city tax commissioner, is unconstitu- tional and void, an ordinance, under which such a city tax commissioner was elected, is void, and incapable of conferring any rights upon him: McGrath v. City of Chicago, 24 111. App. 19. A common council, being the sole judges of the election of its members, may, upon a contest re- specting the election of one of its members, appoint a committee to take testimony, and to report the facts and the evidence to the coun- cil: Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L. 97; s. c. 11 Atl. 151. ^ Small V. Orne, 79 Maine 78; s. c. 8 Atl. 152. See the sections on Pre- siding Officers in the chapter on Public Boards, post. The charter of the city of Cohoes provides that "the mayor and aldermen of the city shall constitute the common council thereof," and that the com- mon council "shall be judge of the election and qualification of its own members." It was held that the common council was not the judge of the election of mayor, he not being one of their "own" mem- bers within the spirit or intent of the charter: Garside v. City of Co- hoes, 12 N. Y. S. 192; s. c. 58 Hun (N. Y.) 605. Under the general law of Illinois there is no office of city marshal in the absence of an ordi- nance creating it: People v. Blair, 82 111. App. 570. ^^ Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 6 L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St. 870; citing Dillon Munic. Corp., § 282 (wherein the author 161 OFFICEKS A\D AGENTS. § IG-i On the other hand, it was held by the supreme court of Michigan in a recent case that "in this country it is generally understood that, in the absence of any statutory provision expressly requiring more, a plurality of the votes cast will elect. It is only in cases where the statute so provides that a majority of all the votes cast is necessary to the choice of an officer."^^ This is the only case, so far as the author's examination has enabled him to discover, where it has been distinctly decided that a candidate may be chosen by a definite body without receiving more votes than all of his competitors combined. § 164. The same subject continued — Quorum majority. — Assum- ing that a majority is necessary to elect, shall it be (1) a majority of those present — provided they constitute a quorum, (3) a majority of the quorum voting, or (3) simply a majority of those, however few, who vote ? According to the Tennessee case cited in the preceding section, a majority of those who are present must concur to do any valid act, including the election of officers. ^^ In respect to the second and third questions, some of the courts draw a distinction between elections and ordinary business of the board.^^ And the rule requir- says a majority must concur to do any valid act), and 6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 331. Turney, C. J., dissented. He does not affirm, how- ever, ttiat a plurality is sufficient, but differs from the majority of the court on another ground, to be no- ticed in the following section. Al- though the court deemed this to be the settled common-law rule, the in- trinsic value of the case is seriously impaired by the fact that the char- ter provided for the transaction of business only by a majority of a quorum, and gave the mayor a right to vote when a majority thereof could not decide, "thereby conclu- sively showing," said the court, "that a majority must concur or there is no result:" Idem, p. 62. "Conrad v. Stone, 78 Mich. 635, 639; s. c. 44 N. W. 333. In this case there were three candidates, and, of a board of sixteen members present, eight voted for one, seven for an- other, and one for the third. The first was declared elected. 1 Smith — 11 '^Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 6 L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St. 870, where a blank ballot was not counted as a vote, Turney, C. J., dissenting. The court quotes from Dillon Munic. Corp., § 217, in support of its conclusion; and the same section is also quoted in Rush- ville Gas Co. v. City of Rushville, 121 Ind. 206, 210; s. c. 23 N. E. 72; 6 L. R. A. 315; 16 Am. St. 388, to sus- tain exactly the opposite contention. The latter case related to business of the body, not an election, and is cited with other authorities in the chapter on Public Boards, post. =^ State V. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227; Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137, 143; Oldknow V. Wainwright (or Rex v. Foxcraft), 2 Burr. 1017; Gosling v. Veley, 4 H. L. Cas. 679. These cases decide that if a quorum be present the majority can not defeat an elec- tion by refraining from voting, al- though they might by such conduct block the business proceedings of a meeting. 165 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 162 ing only a majority of those actually voting for a candidate is de- clared by a decided preponderance of authority.^* Those who refrain from voting are conclusively presumed to acquiesce in the action of those who do, and even an express protest on the ground that a quo- rum has not voted is unavailing.^^ § 165. Informal ballot. — An interesting point regarding an "in- formal ballot," so called, was determined in a recent case by the supreme court of Michigan. A statute provided for the election by ballot of a school examiner on a certain day by the chairman of the board of school inspectors. At a meeting convened for that purpose five informal ballots were taken, with the same result, and at a sub- sequent meeting on the same day a candidate was formally elected. It was decided that the person who had a plurality on the informal ballots was duly chosen. The court said: "When the law requires certain persons to be elected by ballot, there is and can be no such thing as an 'informal ballot.' All ballots cast under statutory re- quirements are formal and final if there is an election, and can not be repeated. Informal ballots are sometimes taken in a caucus or in a nominating convention, but they have no place in an election required by law for the election of officers."^^ ^Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137, 143 (extending the rule to a vote on the approval of the bond of the offi- cer thus elected) ; Booker v. Young, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 303 (private corpo- ration); Attorney-General v. Shep- ard, 62 N. H. 383 (where it was held not necessary for a quorum to vote in any case). See also, cases cited in preceding note, and Rushville Gas Co. V. City of Rushville, 121 Ind. 206, 210; s. c. 23 N. E. 72; 16 Am. St. 388; 6 L. R. A. 315. State v. Dillon, 125 Ind. 65; s. c. 25 N. E. 136, holds that if a candidate re- ceives a majority of those voting, which is less than a majority of those present, but is a majority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum, it is sufficient. - - - It is competent for a council to adopt a rule that a majority of those elect- ed, and voting, may choose a candi- date: Morton v. Youngerman, 89 Ky. 505; s. c. 12 S. W. 944. « Gosling V. Veley, 4 H. L. Cas. 679; Willcock Munic. Corp., § 546; State V. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227. In Conrad v. Stone, 78 Mich. 635; s. c. 44 N. W. 333, it is stated as a gen- eral rule that a plurality suffices to elect. In the cases cited in the pre- ceding note, a majority of those vot- ing, though less than a quorum, sat- isfies the law. All actually voted in the former case, and in none of the latter cases were there more than two candidates competing. Suppose there are three or more candidates — Quaere: May a plurality (that is, less than a majority) of less than a quorum of votes elect, a quorum be- ing present? ^"Conrad v. Stone, 78 Mich. 635; s. c. 44 N. W. 333, holding also that it was not necessary for the chairman to declare the candidate elected; on which point see also. State v. Bar- bour, 53 Conn. 76; s. c. 22 Atl. 686; 55 Am. R. 65. 163 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 1G6 § 166. Tenure of office. — The term of office for which an officer is elected to serve is, as a general rule, fixed by the ordinance or law under which he is elected or appointed.^^ Where a statute pro- " The New York City consolida- tion act of 1882 says that clerks of the district courts "shall hold office for the term of six years from the date of appointment." It was held to include the case of a clerk ap- pointed to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation of a clerk during his six years: People v. Breen, 53 N. Y. Super. 167 (Truax, J., dissenting). The revised statutes of Ohio, re- lating to municipal corporations, provide that members of the council in office shall, unless a vacancy soon- er occurs, serve until the end of their respective terms. Section 8 pro- vides that any person holding an of- fice or public trust shall continue therein until his successor is elected, or appointed, and qualified. It was decided that members of the coun- cil were entitled to hold over under this section: State v. Kearns, 47 Ohio St. 566; s. c. 25 N. E. 1027. The New Jersey statute of 1886, by which the term of office of the mem- bers of the city council, etc., is made three years, does not apply to the alderman of Atlantic City, who is ex officio a member of the common council, and elected annually: State V. Gouldey, 52 N. J. L. 62; s. c. 18 Atl. 695. See also, State v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L. 97; s. c. 11 Atl. 151; Job- son V. Bridges, 84 Va. 298; s. c. 5 S. E. 529. The Michigan statute of 1889, entitled "An act to amend § 4 of Act No. 282 of the local acts of 1877, entitled 'An act to revise the charter of the city of Grand Rap- ids,' " provides "that the elective of- ficers now holding ofllce within that part of the said city comprised of the third, eighth, ninth and tenth wards, as created by this act, shall continue to hold the oflSces for which they were respectively elected, and to discharge the duties of said of- fices for the whole of the territory for which they were elected until the officers are duly elected and qualified, as provided by the city charter at the annual charter elec- tion on the first Monday of April, A. D. 1890, and after said date the sev- eral aldermen whose terms of office shall not have expired shall only rep- resent the territory within the ward in which they shall then respective- ly reside, and at said annual charter election in 1890 aldermen and other ward officers shall be elected in ac- cordance with the provisions of the charter of said city and the require- ments of this act." It was decided that the provision for the aldermen to continue in the office to which they were elected, in the wards in which they reside, until such se- lected term expires, is not an ap- pointment of city officers by the leg- islature, and that sufficient provi- sion is made for the election of al- dermen in the new wards: Stow v. Common Council, 79 Mich. 595; s. c. 44 N. W. 1047. A superintendent is not rendered an agent of the city by an ordinance which provides that "he shall continue in office until re- moval, or until a successor be chos- en:" Prince v. City of Lynn, 149 Mass. 193; s. c. 21 N. E. 296. One elected under a statute which fixes the term of office at a longer period than the constitution allows can not exercise the duties of such office for any period: State v. Alter, 5 Ohio C. C. 253. When the term of an officer is not fixed by law an appointment for a specified time is a contract when accepted: Hardy v. City of Orange, 61 N. J. L. 620; s. c. 42 Atl. 581; Chase v. City of Lowell, 7 Gray (Mass.) 33; Horan v. Board &c., 58 § 166 PUBLIC COKPORATIOXS, 1C4 vides that, before the election of town councilmen, the number to be elected shall be determined, an informal acceptance of five as the number to serve, accepted by common consent through several years, will be deemed as valid a determination of the number of councilmen to serve in that capacity as a decision by formal vote of the electors.^^ The constitution of Colorado provides that every person holding a civil otBce in a municipality shall, unless removed according to law, exercise the duties of such office until his successor is duly qualified. It was held that where a candidate for mayor is by the proper can- vassing board declared elected, files his oath and enters upon the discharge of his official duties, the outgoing mayor vacating the office without objection, the court may, on the election being con- tested and adjudged illegal, order him to yield the office to the N. J. L. 533; s. c. 33 Atl. 944. Where policemen may be appointed for a probationary term it does not apply to the chief of police: State v. Val- lins, 140 Mo. 523; s. c. 41 S. W. 887. As to appointment of auditors by comptroller under Greater New York charter, see McDonald v. City of New York, 59 N. Y. S. 16; s. c. 42 App. Div. (N. Y.) 263. ^^ Metcalf v. Andrews (R. I.) , 7 Atl. 4. In this case a city charter pro- vided that certain officers, including the city treasurer, should be ap- pointed by the common council, to continue in office until the office should be declared vacant^ or an- other person should be appointed to succeed him, and that the city treasurer should, before entering on his duties, give bond with sureties for the faithful performance of his duties. S. was appointed treasurer in January, 1867, and continued in office until January, 1875. He gave bond, with sureties, in con- formity with the city charter. In an action on the bond, the sure- ties pleaded that, by the rules and usages of the common council, all the officers appointed by it, includ- ing the city treasurer, were ap- pointed for one year, subject to removal at pleasure, and, when not reappointed at the expiration of the term, were suffered to hold over at pleasure; and that they executed the bond with a knowledge of the said rules and usages of the com- mon council^ and on assurances, made by the common council and the plaintiffs, that they would be bound as such only for the term of one year. The court held that the provisions of the charter as to the mode of appointment and term of office must be strictly followed, and this plea presented no defense: City of Newark v. Stout, 52 N. J. L. 35; s. c. 18 Atl. 943. Incumbents super- seded by councilmen elected under or by virtue of void proceedings are entitled to be restored by due proc- ess of law; but the legal organiza- tion of the city, and the acts of the councilmen de facto, within the pur- view of the statutes, will be recog- nized and upheld: State v. Gray, 23 Neb. 365; s. c. 36 N. W. 577. Per- sons who are acting as town officers under an incorporation which is void because of a pre-existing valid charter will be ousted on proceed- ings in quo warranto, when the boundaries of the districts from which they were elected are not co- terminous with those prescribed in the original charter: Harness v. State, 76 Tex. 566; s. c. 13 S. W. 535. 165 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 167 president of the board of supervisors; since a Colorado statute pro- vides that in case of a vacancy in the office of mayor the president of the board of supervisors shall act.^" § 167. Tenure of office where city passes from one class to an- other. — When, under a statute, cities are divided into classes, and no provision is made by the statute for the election of new officers, the officers in office at the time of the passing of the statute remain in office until new officers are elected and qualified.*" ^" Londoner V. People, 15 Colo. 557; s. c. 26 Pac. 135. Brooklyn city charter 1888, tit. 3, § 4, provides that persons appointed to certain city offices "shall severally execute a bond to the corporation in such penalty and with such sureties as the common council may require, conditioned for the faithful per- formance of their respective duties. . . . Such sureties shall qualify in such form as the common council shall prescribe; and the bonds there- by required, after having been fully approved, shall be filed in the office of the city clerk, . . . before any of the officers required to exe- cute the same shall enter upon the duties of their respective offices." City Ordinances, tit. 9, § 2, provides that "the clerk of the common coun- cil shall also indorse and certify on each bond, before the same shall be filed, the resolution of the common council approving the same, and at the time of such approval." 1 Rev. St. N. Y. (8th ed.), p. 397, § 9, pro- vides that every officer shall hold over after "his term of office shall have expired, until a successor in such office shall be duly qualified." It was decided that an incumbent of one of the enumerated offices is en- titled to hold over after the expira- tion of his term of office, and to draw the salary therefor, until the bond is approved and filed as re- quired by the city charter and ordi- nances, and an approval by a justice of the supreme court is not suffi- cient: De Lacey v. City of Brooklyn, 12 N. Y. S. 540. Under New York constitution, art. 10, § 5, see Peo- ple V. Board &c., 59 N. Y. S. 476; s. c. 42 App. Div. (N. Y.) 510. Under Neb. laws of 1897, p. 54, ch. 10, § 102, where the mayor-elect is ineligible the president of the council becomes entitled to the office and not the former mayor: State v. Moores. 56 Neb. 1; s. c. 76 N. W. 530. The term of an officer in a city under the gen- eral law of Illinois whose term is not fixed by the ordinance creating the office, is two years, unless changed by ordinance during the time: People v. Blair, 82 111. App. 570. The Vt. act of 1896, p. 169, § 278, repeals all prior acts inconsist- ent therewith, and the latter act de- termines the term of the chief of po- lice: Smith V. Cosgrove, 71 Vt. 196; s. c. 44 Atl. 73. ■"> Under the laws of Kansas, 1885, after a city of the third class is or- ganized into a city of the second class, the mayor is to be elected on the first Tuesday of April of each odd-numbered year, and a vacancy must be filled at a special election called and held for that purpose, as provided by ordinance; and where no one is elected mayor of such a city, after its organization, on the first Tuesday of April of an odd- numbered year, and no special elec- tion is called by ordinance, the may- or of the city of the third class will hold over: Moser v. Shamleffer, 39 Kan. 635; s. c. 18 Pac. 956. When a 168 PUBLIC COnrORATIONS. 1G6 § 168. Power to hold over — English and American rules. — For- merly in England the law was well settled that the term of olKce of the mayor or other head officer was annual and expired at the end of the year, and that he could not hold over until his successor was provided, unless there was a special provision in the statute to that effect."*^ But the American courts have not adhered to the strict English rule, but have decided that the chief officer, unless the legis- city of the third class is made a city of the second class, under the Kan- sas statute, the city officers continue until new officers are elected and qualified: Ritchie v. City of South Topeka, 38 Kan. 368; s. c. 16 Pac. 332. The Pennsylvania act of 1889, relating to the division of the cities of the state into three classes in ac- cordance with their population, pro- vides (§2) that at the election oc- curring not less than one month after a city has changed classes "the proper officers shall be elected to which the city shall become entitled under the change in classification; and upon the first Monday next suc- ceeding thereto the terms of all offi- cers of said city then in office, whose offices are superseded by reason thereof, shall cease and determine." The court decided that, where a city passed from the third into the sec- ond class, it was entitled to such new officers as were provided for in cities of the second class which did not exist in cities of the third class only, and the terms of such of its existing officers only as were abol- ished in cities of the second class ex- pired; and where the city had twen- ty-six councilmen under the third class, and was entitled to but thir- teen under the second class, and the terms of thirteen of such council- men would expire during the cur- rent year, it was not necessary to elect new councilmen, as all the old members held over for their respect- ive terms: Commonwealth v. Wy- man, 137 Pa. St. 508; s. c. 21 Atl. 389. The Pennsylvania act of 1887, dividing the cities of the state into seven classes, and providing that in the fourth to the seventh classes the persons then in office should hold for the terms for which they were elected, except as otherwise pro- vided, the provisions of the charter of a city of the fifth class for the election and installation of members of the council apply until the terms of all the members then in office ex- pire, at which time the provisions of the act of 1887, in relation thereto, will take effect; and the provisions that the councils then in office should hold until their "successors" should be installed, according to tlie act, and that at the first election under the act the members should be chosen, etc., do not show a con- trary intention; there being a pro- vision that the terms of members in cities of the fourth class should cease at the end of that municipal year: Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. St. 266; s. c. 16 Atl. 356. See also, Pitts- burgh's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401; s. c. 21 Atl. 757, 759, 761. "Rex V. Hearle, 1 Str. 626, 627; Rex V. Thornton, 4 East 308; Rex v. Atkins, 3 Mod. 3, 12; Mayor of Dur- ham's Case, 1 Sid. 33; Foot v. Prowse. 1 Str. 625; s. c. 3 Bro. 167, 169; Glover Corp. 173. Some char- ters provided that the chief officer should hold office until his successor was provided, although his original term of office was only one year: Rex V. Philips, 1 Str. 394. For the manner in which this was changed, see 9 Anne, ch. 20, § 8. 167 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 169 lative intent to the contrary is apparent, holds over until his succes- sor is appointed.'*- The reorganization of a city under the general incorporation law is an abrogation of its former charter, and deter- mines the tenure of all ollicers under it, except such as are within the saving clause of the general law.*^ § 169. The same subject continued. — In this country it is gener- ally held that an annual officer of whatever grade, especially if his duties consist in the safe-keeping and current management of prop- erty committed to his custody, holds over until the appointment and qualification of another in his place. That conclusion was reached *-2 Kent Com. 238; Elmendorf v. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 693; Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 366, 378; People v. Runkle, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 147. By the general mu- nicipal incorporation act of Cali- fornia, 1883, it is provided that offi- cers chosen at a special election to be held within two weeks after the vote in favor of reorganization shall hold their respective offices only un- til the next general municipal elec- tions. By § 752 it is provided that all elective officers of cities of the fifth class shall be chosen at a gen- eral municipal election to be held therein in each odd-numbered year; the marshal, assessor, etc., to hold office for two years, and the trustees for four years; but there is a fur- ther proviso that the first board of trustees elected under the provision of this act shall so classify them- selves by lot that three of their number shall go out of office at the expiration of two years, and two at the expiration of four years. It was decided that the elective officers, except members of the board of trustees, are to hold of- fice for two years, and they for four years, and that an election must be held every two years: Ruggles v. Board of Trustees &c., 88 Cal. 430; s. c. 26 Pac. 520. The New York consolidation act, 1882, provides that the terms of all officers, when- soever actually appointed, shall com- mence on the 1st day of May in the year in which the terms of office of their predecessors shall expire; but the commissioner of public works to be appointed on the expiration of the term of the present incumbent in December, 1884, shall hold from the 1st day of May succeeding such month. It was held that it was clearly the intention that the com- missioner's term should begin May 1, 1885, and it was immaterial that the termination of his predecessor's term was erroneously stated to be in December, 1884: People v. Barrett, 8 N. Y. S. 677. '"McGrath v. City of Chicago, 24 111. App. 19. Where, upon the re- vision of a city charter, the term and mode of election to a city office are omitted, though the office is con- tinued in existence, the then incum- bent rightfully in possession holds over until superseded by proper leg- islative action: State v. Simon, 20 Or. 365; s. c. 26 Pac. 170. A certifi- cate issued by the recorder of the board of aldermen, which is not au- thorized by law, notifying complain- ant of his election, and signed "by order of the board," is no evidence of ratification of previous invalid action: Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 17 Am. St. 870; 6 L. R. A. 308. See also. State V. George, 23 Fla. 585; s. c, 3 So. 81. 170 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 168 upon a review of the authorities by the supreme court of California in 1865, Avhere the doctrine was placed upon considerations of public convenience and necessity,''* And the court of appeals of Maryland, in a comparatively recent case, makes the following comprehensive statement : "Unless there is some clearly expressed and positive pro- hibition which, by its terms, operates as an ouster, the person filling the office should continue to discharge those duties until a successor is qualified, no matter whether the office is created by the constitution, by an act of the general assembly, or by a municipal ordinance. Ubi eadem est ratio, eadem est lex."*^ The same rule obtains in many other jurisdictions.**' § 170. Appointment of oflSicers. — Where a city council is author- ized to elect officers, and no particular mode of election is prescribed, it may appoint them by resolution,*^ and has complete control over « People V. Oulton, 28 Cal. 44. In that case the office of state librarian was in contention, but the remarks of the court show that the rule would certainly be applied to subor- dinate officers of a municipal cor- poration. It is often expressly de- clared by statute that an incumbent shall hold over. «Robb v. Carter, 65 Md. 321, 335; s. c. 4 Atl. 282 (where a city solici- tor, appointed under ordinance, held over) ; Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189; Marshall v. Harwood, 5 Md. 423; Sansbury v. Middleton, 11 Md. 296. « School Dist. V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.) 105; Dow v. Bullock, 13 Gray (Mass.) 136; Chandlery. Brad- ish, 23 Vt. 416; Kreidler v. State, 24 Ohio St. 22; Stewart v. State, 4 Ind. 396; State v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; s. c. 16 N. E. 384; People v. Town of Fairbury, 51 111. 149; People v. Fer- ris, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 219; Cordiell v. Frizell, 1 Nev. 130; State v. Wells, 8 Nev. 105; Ex parte Lawhorne, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 85; Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266; People v. Reid, 11 Colo. 138; s. c. 17 Pac. 302; Moser v. Shamleffer, 39 Kan. 635; s. c. 18 Pac. 956; Wier v. Bush. 4 Litt. (Ky.) 429. For a construction of statutes relating to the holding over of offi- cers, see cases cited in Throop Pub- lic Officers, § 325 et seq.; Mechem Public Offices and Officers, § 398 et seq. Where municipal officers are elected or appointed for a fixed term they hold over until the election or appointment and qualification of their successors: People v. Blair, 82 111. App. 570. While a mayor holds over after his term by reason of no election of a successor there is no vacancy: State v. Wright, 56 Ohio St. 540; s. c. 47 N. E. 569. ^' People V. Bedell, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 196; Commonwealth v. City of Pitts- burg, 14 Pa. St. 177; Low v. Com- missioners of Pilotage, R. M. Charl. (Ga.) 302; State v. Mayor &c., 46 N. J. L. 140; Russell v. City of Chicago, 22 111. 283; Wilder v. City of Chicago, 26 111. 182. Where the charter pro- vides that the mayor and aldermen shall constitute the council, and that in case of a tie the presiding officer may vote, an ordinance requiring a majority to appoint to a city office, and 10 out of 12 are present and 6 vote for the appointment, it is not a tie and the mayor is not entitled to a vote: In re Dudley 53 N. Y. S. 742; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 465. Where, by charter, a board was cre- ated, the members of which were to 169 OFFICERS AND AGEN'TS. 170 all oflficcs and officers existing under by-laws, unless specially re- stricted by law.''® Where the statute provides for the appointment of be appointed by the mayor, who was to be ex officio a member and author- ized to preside at all meetings when present, and which board was au- thorized to appoint a street commis- sioner, it was held that an election of such commissioner at a meeting of such board, when the mayor was presiding, on a motion declined to be put by the mayor, but put by a member and carried, was void: State V. Lashar, 71 Conn. 540; s. c. 42 Atl. 636. '* People V. Conover, 17 N. Y. 64; People V. Mayor &c., 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 43; Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298; Wadraven v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 431; City of Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74, 79; Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481. The acts of artificial per- sons afford the same presumptions as the acts of natural persons: Chief Justice Story, in President &c. (Bank) v. Dandridge, 12 "Wheat. 64, 70, and cases there cited. The con- stitution of Virginia providing that all city, village and town officers whose election or appointment is not provided for by the constitution shall be elected by the electors of such cities, towns and villages, or ap- pointed by such authorities as the general assembly shall designate, is merely enabling, and does not pro- hibit the legislature on incorporat- ing a town from appointing officers until an election is held: Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484; s. c. 12 S. E. 965. The public laws of Rhode Island, 1890, providing for the appointment by the mayor of Providence, in Feb- ruary, 1891, and triennially there- after, of a commissioner of public works, and requiring that the com- missioner "now in office and those hereafter to be appointed" should have control of the city engineering department, and should appoint a city engineer on the first Monday in May of each year, abolished the then- existing office of city engineer after the first Monday in May, 1890, and did not provide for an additional city engineer to be connected with the board of public works: Gray v. Granger, 17 R. I. 201; s. c. 21 Atl. 342. Laws of New York, 1888, ch. 214, tit. 3, § 2, provides for the ap- pointment of city officers, and de- clares that^ if the council shall fail to appoint any such officer within three weeks after any vacancy oc- curs, it shall be the duty of the may- or, immediately on the expiration of said three weeks, to appoint such of- ficer and fill such vacancy. It was held, where the city engineer re- signed, that after the expiration of three weeks the power of the council to fill such vacancy ceased: People V. Merrick, 16 N. Y. S. 246; s. c. 61 Hun (N. Y.) 396. A municipal board having been abolished by a special act and its duties transferred to a new one, the members of the old board can not enjoin the appoint- ment of the members of the new board on the ground that the special act is unconstitutional: Reemelin v. Mosby, 47 Ohio St. 570; s. c. 26 N. E. 717. The public laws of Rhode Island, 1890, which provide that "the town councils of the several towns throughout the state, and the may- ors of the several cities, except the city of Providence, shall each elect an inspector of buildings, who shall be paid such amount for his serv- ices as shall be determined by the town or city council electing him," require such inspectors to be ap- pointed by the mayors, and not by the city councils, of the cities of Pawtucket, Woonsocket and New- port: In re Building Inspectors, 17 R. I. 819 ; s. c. 21 Atl. 913. The charter of § m PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 170 such village officers as shall be provided for by ordinance, a village ordinance creating the office of deputy marshal is legal.*® § 171. Validity of appointment. — The appointment of a person to a city office by a mayor under a law which requires confirmation by the council gives the appointee no right to the office without such confirmation by the proper and legal city council.^" Where a statute empowers the council of a city to appoint to a certain office, an ordinance providing that the council shall elect, every three years, a fit person to such office, who shall hold his office for the term of three years, and until his successor is elected, is void, as impairing the power of appointment of succeeding councils.^^ Where officers are to be appointed by the mayor to hold at the pleasure of the ap- Los Angeles ( Act Cal., Jan. 31, 1889 ) , directing the city council to ap- point as a depositary of the public moneys the bank offering the high- est rate of interest therefor, and the treasurer to deposit the city funds there daily, is void, being inconsist- ent with that provision of the con- stitution of California which pro- vides that the legislature shall not delegate to any private corporation, company or individual the right to interfere with or control any county, city or municipal money, and that the public moneys shall be deposited with the treasurer, and that making any profit out of such moneys shall be a felony; and also with the penal code of California, punishing by im- prisonment the misappropriation of public moneys by the person charged with keeping them: Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. 603; s. c. 25 Pac. 767. ^''Kriseler v. Le Valley, 122 Mich. 576; s. c. 81 N. W. 580. =" People V. Weber, 89 111. 347. Un- der an ordinance providing for the annual appointment of a gas in- spector by the city council, an ap- pointment to such office "subject to the further orders of the council" is invalid: King v. City of Buffalo, 10 N. Y. 564; s. c. 57 Hun (N. Y.) 586. "Horan v. Lane, 53 N. J. L. 275; s. c. sub nom. State v. Lane, 21 Atl. 302. Proceedings had under the act of New Jersey, approved April 6, 1889, providing for an election to determine whether the mayor of a city shall have the power to appoint certain officers, are not invalidated by a misrecital of some of the pro- visions of the act in the proclama- tion of an election; the act not re- quiring their insertion in the proc- lamation, and there being nothing to show that the error affected the re- sult of the election: In re Cleveland, 52 N. J. L. 188; s. c. 19 Atl. 17. The record of the appointment of a vil- lage marshal was read and approved by the board of trustees, as being in accordance with the facts. The va- lidity of his appointment was ques- tioned because the record was inter- lined. It was held that the inter- lineation was immaterial: Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo. 223; s. c. 15 Pac. 399. The appointment by a city council of a member thereof to an office which the statutes of Ohio make a mem- ber of council ineligible to fill, and his acceptance thereof, do not work an abandonment of his office as councilman, for the appointment to the second office is absolutely void: State v. Kearns, 47 Ohio St. 566; s. c. 25 N. E. 1027. 171 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 172 pointing power no confirmation is required. °^ Where an officer is appointed by the mayor and the appointment is confirmed by the coun- cil under the provisions of the charter, the confirmation exhausts the power of the council.^^ The power to appoint heads of departments is an executive power, where the business of a city is administered through departments.^* Where no record was kept of an appointment, no commission or writing issued to the appointee, and no services per- formed, a new board need not recognize the appointment.^^ § 172. Appointments by de facto officers. — Whether an appoint- ment to oHice by one who is himself only a de facto officer gives a good title to the appointee is not settled. In England, where a town burgess was appointed by a de facto mayor, and the latter was ousted upon a quo warranto, the judgment was held conclusive in a like proceeding against the former.'^*' In North Carolina and Ohio such appointments are brought within the general rule touching the va- lidity of acts of de facto officers in which the public have an interest, and the appointee continues to hold the office after the ouster of his superior.^'' The supreme court of New York, on the other hand, has held that a judgment in an action in the nature of a quo war- ranto, whereby an officer is ousted and his contestant declared en- titled, is evidence in favor of an appointee of the latter against one who derives title from the former.^" § 173. Compensation of officers — In general. — It is a general rule of law that a corporation is liable to its officers for their salaries ^^ State V. Doherty, 16 "Wash. 382; imperative, although an applicant s c. 47 Pac. 958. was under 30 when the charter took ^' State V. Wadhams, 64 Minn. 318; effect, and at that time was eligible: s. c. 67 N. W. 64. People v. Scannell, 62 N. Y. S. 1064; ^Attorney-General v. Varnum, 167 s. c. 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 244. Mass. 477; s. c. 46 N. E. 1. =°Rex v. Lisle, Andr. 163; s. c. ^ == People v. Keller, 61 N. Y. S. 746. Str. 1090. See also. Rex v. Mayor Board of health of Woburn, Mass., &c., 5 T. R. 66; Rex v. Grimes, 5 is appointed by the mayor, without Burr. 2598; Rex v. Hebden, Andr. confirmation of the city council: 389. Doherty V. Buchanan, 173 Mass. 338; "People v. Staton, 73 N. C. 546; s. c. 53 N. E. 878. Where a charter State v. Ailing, 12 Ohio 16; State v. requires a certificate of appointment Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143. See also, Mal- to a city office to be made by the lett v. Uncle Sam &c. Co., 1 Nev. council, a certificate by the mayor is 188; Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607. not in compliance with such char- ^^ People v. Anthony, 6 Hun (N. ter: In re Dudley. 53 N. Y. S. 742; s. Y.) 142. See also. People v. Murray, c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 465. Where 73 N. Y. 535; and a dictum, contra. a charter limits the appointment of by Bronson, J., in People v. Stevens, firemen to those under 30 years it is 5 Hill (N. Y.) 616. 173 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 173 when the work has actually been done; but it is highly necessary that great care should be exercised in appointing or electing the officers to their positions, as the least omission or technicality may be fatal to their appointment or election, in which event they have no right to comj^ensation.^'' The salary of an official may be reduced ^'An act passed in Pennsylvania May 23, 1874 (P. L. 252), provided that the city comptroller "shall have the supervision and control of the fiscal concerns of all departments, bureaus and officers of the city and school districts. ... He shall be paid a fixed yearly salary." The school district of Baston did not ac- cept this act, but continued to act under a special law. It had poWer to appoint an auditor to the school accounts. The city comptroller au- dited the school accounts, the school board having passed a resolution that it was his duty as city comp- troller to do so. It was decided that, not having been appointed auditor by the school district, he could not recover compensation for such serv- ices: Rothrock v. School District, 133 Pa. St. 487; s. c. 19 Atl. 483; 25 W. N. C. (Pa.) 510. Under the gen- eral statutes of Colorado, § 3326, which provides for annual appropri- ation bills by the city councils of municipalities, and that the objects and purposes for which an appropri- ation is made shall be specified, an appropriation bill by the city of Leadville, which recites a total ap- propriation of a certain amount, sub- divided into appropriations for the following specific objects or pur- poses, — to wit, "salary fund," "streets," "fire," "gas," "Interest," and "contingent expenses," — is a sufficient compliance with the stat- ute to entitle a street commissioner duly elected, whose salary is fixed by ordinance or resolution of the city council, to resort to the salary fund for payment of his salary; and it is not necessary that the bill should specify each particular office, and the exact sum to be paid the incum- bent thereof: City of Leadville v. Matthews, 10 Colo. 125; s. c. 14 Pac. 112. A laborer in the employ of a city, who was dismissed and after- wards reinstated, under laws of N. Y., 1887, ch. 464, providing for preference of honorably discharged Union soldiers as employes upon public works, etc., can not recover from the city wages for the time be- tween his removal and reinstate- ment, where his position was filled by another, who performed the duties thereof, and was paid there- for by the city: Higgins v. City of New York, 131 N. Y. 128; s. c. 30 N. E. 44; reversing s. c. 14 N. Y. S. 554; 60 Hun (N. Y.) 578 (mem.); and following Terhune v. Mayor &c., 88 N. Y. 248; and adhering to the general rule that payment to a de facto officer is a defense to an ac- tion brought by the de jure officer to recover the same salary. See also, Hagan v. City of Brooklyn, 126 N. Y. 643; s. c. 27 N. E. 265; and for a contrary view, State v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44; s. c. 28 N. E. 88; and a criti- cism of the prevailing rule by Mr. Freeman in a note to Andrews v. Portland, 79 Maine 484; s. c. 10 Atl. 458, in 10 Am. St. 284. Where a con- testant recovers a public office from the incumbent, he is also entitled to recover from the latter the salary received by him during the term which belonged to the former: Kil- lion V. Van Patten, 42 Kan. 295; s. c. 22 Pac. 382. See also. State v. Holmes, 43 La. An. 1185; s. c. 10 So. 172. But it must be shown that the incumbent actually received the sal- ary: Merritt V. Hinton, 55 Ark. 12; s. c. 17 S. W. 270. The clerk of the city 173 OFi'ICKl^S AM) ACiENTS. 173 durincT his term of office/'" But an officer can not be com- and county of New York, having been designated by that title for years before the passage of laws of N. Y., 1857, ch. 628, is the city clerk with- in the provision of § 23 of that act, that bonds taken pursuant thereto by excise commissioners, from appli- cants for licenses, shall, in cities, be filed "in the city clerk's office;" and such clerk is therefore entitled, for filing each such bond, to the fee of six cents allowed him by Code Civil Proc. N. Y., § 3304, for filing any pa- per required by law to be filed in his office other than is expressly pro- vided for, no special fee being pre- scribed therefor by any statute: People V. Giegerich, 14 N. Y. S. 263. Policemen appointed without au- thority can not recover compensa- tion: Foster v. City of Wilmington, 8 Houst. (Del.) 415; s. c. 32 Atl. 348. An act granting certain cities power to fix the compensation of mayors and limiting the salary to the amount so fixed is not self- executory, and if no ordinance is passed is of no effect: State v. din- ger, 109 Iowa 669; s. c. 80 N. W. 1060. It is a fundamental rule that a man can not be judge in his own case; and an alderman can not, therefore, determine his own com- pensation: McFarland v. Gordon, 70 Vt. 455; s. c. 41 Atl. 507. The Min- nesota laws of 1891, ch. 6, § 11, abro- gated the authority, under the char- ter of St. Paul, to compensate for legal services rendered by one not a member of the regular legal depart- ment: Horn V. City of St. Paul, 80 Minn. 369; s. c. 83 N. W. 388. Com- pensation voted councilmen, where there is no provision of law for such compensation, is a misappropriation of public funds: In re Borough of Dickson City (Com. PI.), 2 Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 133. Where elective of- ficers receive salary as prescribed by charter an ordinance providing for compensation of councilmen is invalid in the absence of charter au- thority: Bardsley v. Sternberg, 17 Wash. 243; s. c. 49 Pac. 499. "" Harvey v. Commissioners &c., 32 Kan. 159; s. c. 4 Pac. 153; Hoboken V. Gear, 27 N. J. L. 265. Unless prohibited by the constitution: Douglas Co. V. Timme, 32 Neb. 272; s. c. 49 N. W. 266. Municipal officers, such as policemen, are not public officers within a constitu- tional provision that no law shall in- crease or diminish the salary or emoluments of a public officer after his election or appointment: Rus- sell V. Williamsport, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 129. See further, for a construction of such provisions, State v. Blox- ham, 26 Fla. 407; s. c. 7 So. 873; Kirkwood v. Soto, 87 Cal. 394; s. c. 25 Pac. 488; Wren v. Luzerne Co., 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 22; s. c. 6 Kulp (Pa.) 37; Guldin v. Schuylkill Co. (Pa. C. P.), 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 197. Where the power to appoint exists the power to reduce the salary of the appointee for future services exists in the absence of a constitutional or statutory prohibition: Wilson v. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 328; s. c. 31 Misc. (N. Y.) 693. The con- stitution of 1870, Illinois, prohibits a change of salary during the term of office: Stodler v. Fahey, 87 111. App. 411; and see City of Louis- ville V. Wilson, 99 Ky. 598; s. c. 36 S. W. 944. In Illinois an officer's salary can neither be increased nor diminished during the term for which he was elected or appointed, and an ordinance reducing the sal- ary does not take effect until his term expires: City of Roodhouse v. Johnson, 57 111. App. 73. But where the law provides that the salary of an officer shall not be diminished during the term for which he was 174 PUBLIC COlil'OllATIONS. 174 pelled to take less compensation for his services than that fixed by statute."^ § 174. The same subject continued — Failure of corporate funds. — If no salary is attached to an oflice in a municipal corporation, the corporation is not liable, as the officers are deemed to have been famil- iar with the law or ordinance creating the office when they accepted the position, and there is no implied contract for compensation. ^^ Where an officer accepts the amount of compensation, his acceptance of that sum estops him from claiming more/'^ If the salary of an elected, it may be changed before the commencement of his term: Wesch V. Common Council &c., 107 Mich. 149; s. c. 64 N. W. 1051. Such statute does not apply to an officer or employe having no fixed term: City of Lexington v. Rennick, 20 Ky. L. 1924; s. c. 50 S. W. 1106. The city council of the city of Chicago may, by ordinance, fix the term of office of an officer, not exceeding two years, when it has power to appoint such officer, ^nd may fix the salary of such official in the annual appro- priation bill for one year, and for each year thereafter, but, having once fixed the salary for the year it can not increase or diminish such salary during the year: Turner v. City of Chicago, 76 111. App. 649. That it can not be changed during his term, see Meissner v. Boyle, 20 Utah 316; s. c. 58 Pac. 1110. It has been held, however, that where the law provides that the city council, in February of each year, shall fix the compensation of an employe for the ensuing year and that it shall not be changed during such year, a contract by such officer, made with the mayor, for a different compen- sation, is invalid: Rettinghouse v. City of Ashland, 106 Wis. 595; s. c. 82 N. W. 555. "People V. Board of Police, 75 N. Y. 38; People v. French, 91 N. Y. 265; Kehn v. State, 93 N. Y. 291. Under the Vermont act of 1884, No. 12, § 2, which provides that highway taxes shall be collected by the town collector when there are no street commissioners, the tax bills were not given by the town to plaintiff, who was first constable and ex officio collector, but were col- lected by the town treasurer. It was held that where the declaration in a suit for the fees for such col- lection claimed no agreement for fees as collector, as provided by R. L. Vt., § 2724, nor alleged any serv- ices rendered, the town was not li- able therefor, and a subsequent promise to pay such fees would be without consideration: Woodward V. Town of Rutland, 61 Vt. 316; s. c. 17 Atl. 797. ^- Locke V. Central City, 4 Colo. 65 ; City of Brazil v. McBride, 69 Ind. 244; Doolan v. City of Manitowoc, 48 Wis. 312; s. c. 4 N. W. 475; Jones V. Mayor &c., 8 M. & W. 605; Askin v. London &c., 1 Up. Can. Q. B. 292; Pringle and McDonald, In re, 10 Up. Can. Q. B. 254; Reg. v. Cumberlege. 36 L. T. (N. S.) 700. "=■' Hobbs V. City of Yonkers, 102 N. Y. 13; s. c. 5 N. E. 778; Mclnery v. City of Galveston, 58 Tex. 334. If an officer renders a bill purporting to cover the whole of his services, but really for less than he is en- titled to, and it is allowed and paid, he is debarred from recovering more in the absence of surprise, accident or mistake of fact: O'Hara v. Town of Park River, 1 N. D. 279; s. c. 47 N. W. 380. It has been held that 175 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 174 official is prescribed by an ordinance or by law as being payable in a certain manner or out of certain assessments or taxes, and such assessments or taxes have not been collected, and the corporation is not guilty of negligence in not collecting them, the corporation is not liable for the salary until they have been collected.^* the acceptance of less than the sal- ary fixed by law operates as an es- toppel from claiming the residue: Hobbs V. City of Yonkers, 102 N. Y. 13; s. c. 5 N. E. 778; O'Hara v. Town of Park River, 1 N. D. 279; s. c. 47 N. W. 380; De Boest v. Gam- bell, 35 Or. 368; s. c. 58 Pac. 72, 353; Mclnery v. City of Galveston, 58 Tex. 334. But see Kehn v. State, 93 N. Y. 291; Clark v. State, 142 N. Y. 101; s. c. 36 N. E. 817. A statute authorizing a city to agree with an officer for a salary less than that fixed by law is constitutional (see Pub. L. N. J., p. 161, 2 Gen. St., p. 2123, § 8): Tice v. City of New Brunswick, 64 N. J. L. 399; s. c. 45 Atl. 781. A police matron appointed by ordinance at a fixed salary can not recover the statutory salary fixed for such officer: Daniels v. City of Des Moines, 108 Iowa 484; s. c. 79 N. W. 269. An agreement to take less salary than is provided by law is valid and enforceable: Tice v. City of New Brunswick, 64 N. J. L. 399; s. c. 45 Atl. 781. "* Andrews v. United States, 2 Story 202; People v. Supervisors, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 362; Baker v. City of Utica, 19 N. Y. 326; Gumming v. Mayor &c., 11 Paige (N. Y.) 596; Smith V. Commonwealth, 41 Pa, St. 335; Jersey City v. Quaife, 26 N. J. L. 63; United States v. Brown, 9 How. 486; McClung v. St. Paul, 14 Minn. 420. The charter of the city of Buffalo provided that the comp- troller should, on or before the 1st day of April in each year, furnish to the council a financial statement for the current year, together with an estimate of the current expenses of each department. Heads of de- partments were also required to fur- nish estimates of the amounts re- quired by their respective depart- ments for the current year. The council might amend such estimates, and were required to pass upon them not later than May 1st. The expenditures of each department were required to be kept within the estimates made for it; each office or purpose being debited with the whole sum appropriated, and cred- ited with the salaries and other fixed sums to be paid therefrom, and "the other expenditures" were not to exceed the remainder of the esti- mate. Contracts for amounts ex- ceeding such remainder should not bind the city as to the excess. The mayor fixed the salary of the secre- tary of the civil service commission at $600 per annum, payable monthly, but the council only appropriated $50 for the expenses of the commis- sion for the whole year. After pay- ing all the fixed expenses of the may- or's department, a balance remained to its credit of less than the amount of salary due the secretary. It was held that the latter could recover the $50 appropriated for the ex- penses of the commission and the unexpended balance to the credit of the mayor's fund, but no more: Kip V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. S. 685; s. c. 27 N. Y. St. 52. But a superin- tendent employed by a village for the erection of a public building can not recover his salary if the statutory certificate that the money necessary was in the village treas- ury was not issued by the village clerk: Drott v. Riverside, 4 Ohio C. C. 312. § 175 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 176 § 175. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where a stat- ute requires the appointment of a town collector pro tempore to be made by writing under the hands of the selectmen, it is not satisfied by a writing signed with the names of all by one selectman, in the absence of the others, and with no other authority than that which is implied by their having agreed that the party should be appointed ; and a collector thus appointed can not maintain an action against the town for compensation for his services in collecting the taxes."^ Where the recorder of a city is vested under the code of the state with concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace of all actions, civil and criminal, arising within the corporate limits of the city, and it is provided that he shall receive such fees for his services as may be allowed by law to justices of the peace for like services, except that for his services in criminal prosecutions for violations of ordinances he shall be entitled to recive only such monthly salary as the board of trustees shall by ordinance prescribe, he is vested with a dual juris- diction as recorder and justice, and the fines he receives for violations of the penal code are to be paid over to the county treasurer, and he "■"^Phelon v. Granville, 140 Mass. 386; s. c. 5 N. E. 269. A city charter provided that the mayor's compen- sation should be $2,400 per annum, and might be changed, but not dur- ing his term of office. It was de- cided that an ordinance declaring that, after the expiration of the ex- isting term, the mayor should serve without compensation, was void, and that a mayor elected with knowl- edge of the ordinance could claim a salary, even though as an induce- ment to his election he had said that he would serve without com- pensation: State V. Mayor &c., 15 Lea (Tenn.) 697; s. c. 54 Am. R. 427. A statute making no provision for the payment of a school agent, a promise on the part of the town to pay for his services is not implied from the fact of his election and the rendition of service: Talbot v. In- habitants &c., 76 Maine 415. The aqueduct commissioners of the city of New York have power under the New York statute to employ and dis- miss inspectors of the work of con- structing the aqueduct, but have no power to suspend such an inspector without pay, there being no provi- sion in the statute for such suspen- sion; and an inspector may recover pay for the time during which he was so suspended: Mullen v. Mayor &c., 12 N. Y. S. 269; s. c. 34 N. Y. St. 913; following Gregory v. Mayor &c., 113 N. Y. 416; s. c. 21 N. E. 119. And although the New York statute au- thorizes the aqueduct commission- ers of New York city to suspend without pay an inspector of the work of constructing the aqueduct, and also authorizes them to appoint and fix the compensation of inspectors, such an inspector, who was sus- pended, is estopped from claiming his pay where he signed a writing which recited his appointment, and provided that, if he should at any time be suspended, his pay should cease: Phelan v. City of New York, 14 N. Y. S. 785; s. c. 38 N. Y. St. 805. 177 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 176 must be paid for liis services as in the case of justices.®" If the com- pensation of an ollicer is not fixed by the laws of the state, his services, if of a strictly official nature, must be gratuitous.*'^ It was decided in an Iowa case that where the mayor of an incorporated town was in- vested by the code of that state with the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal cases, which did not, however, make any provision for compensation, he was not entitled to recover from the county the reasonable value of his services in the hearing and trial of a criminal case in which, the prosecution failed.''^ § 176. Miscellaneous instances. — One who is appointed a member of a committee to superintend the construction of water-works for a city, because of his knowledge and experience as a civil engineer, is not such a public officer as to preclude him from recovering com- pensation for the services rendered under such appointment, where no compensation therefor has previously been specifically provided.^^ «« Prince v. City of Fresno, 88 Cal. 407; s. c. 26 Pac. 606. Under the New York act, passed February 27, 1883, entitled "An act to supply the city of Schenectady with water," and providing for the appointment of three commissioners, who, "for the first year after the commence- ment of the construction of water- works as hereinafter prescribed, shall each receive such salary as the common council shall fix, . . . which shall not exceed $500," and empowering them to adopt and re- port any feasible plan for the works, "embracing the purchase of any water-works," the commissioners are entitled to compensation for the adoption and the recommendation to the council of a plan for purchas- ing works and for their control and management of the works after the purchase: Schermerhorn v. City of Schenectady, 3 N. Y. S. 435; s. c. 50 Hun (N. Y.) 331. "Boyden v. Brookline, 8 Vt. 284; Langdon v. Town of Castleton, 30 Vt. 285; City of Central v. Sears, 2 Colo. 588; Locke v. Central City, 4 Colo. 65. °* Rowland v. Wright Co., 82 Iowa 1 Smith — 12 164; s. c. 47 N. W. 1086, two judges dissenting. «' City of Ellsworth v, Rossiter, 46 Kan. 237; s. c. 26 Pac. 674. See also, Bunn v. People, 45 111. 397; Butler V. Regents &c., 32 Wis. 124, 131; State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St. 347, 349. In the absence of any statutory authority for the suspen- sion of an assistant engineer in the department of public works of the city of New York, appointed under laws of N. Y. 1882, at a certain sal- ary per year, he may recover such salary for the time during which he is so suspended and is not allowed to render service: Morley v. City of New York, 12 N. Y. S. 609; s. c. 35 N. Y. St. 262; Lethbridge v. Mayor &c., 15 N. Y. S. 562; s. c. 39 N. Y. St. 385, where a clerk in a city depart- ment maintained an action under similar circumstances. A city hav- ing a treasurer duly appointed and qualified under the general act of incorporation can not defeat his right to commissions for disburse- ment of the municipal funds by plac- ing them in the hands of the mayor for disbursement: Beard v. City of Decatur, 64 Tex. 7; s. c. 53 Am. R. 177 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 178 If there is an omission in a village charter to make provision for compensation to members of a certain board, and it is apparent that such omission was intentional, the members can not recover any compensation^" Where an inspector, under suspension without pay, executes a written agreement with aqueduct commissioners which recites his previous appointment, and thereby agrees that if he is suspended or discharged for any cause whatever while in the employ of such commission, his pay as such inspector shall cease from and after the time of such suspension, subject to the direction of the com- missioners, he is estopped from claiming the invalidity of the agree- ment as to any period of suspension which follows its execution. '^^ § 177. Extra compensation. — It has long been a fixed rule of law that one who accepts a public office which has a definite salary at- tached to it must perform all the duties of the office without extra compensation, and even if after he enters into office his duties are increased he can not compel payment of extra compensation.'^- Where 735. A selectman, overseer of the poor and town agent, secured a pen- sion for one of the town's paupers, and appropriated the amount re- ceived, in pursuance of a previous agreement with the pauper, to the settlement of the town's claim against the latter for support. This amount the pauper subsequently re- covered from the selectman by suit. It was held that the selectman was not entitled to compensation from the town for the expenses incurred by him in this suit: White v. In- habitants &c., 77 Maine 396. A per- son having a fixed salary, certain continuous duties not menial &c., is a public officer: People v. Keller, 61 N. Y. S. 746. 70 Perry v. Cheboygan, 55 Mich. 250; s. c. 21 N. W. 333. Under the Vermont statute which provides that auditors shall not allow any claim for personal services except when compensation is fixed by law or by vote of the town, a tax-lister can recover only such compensation as the town votes him: Barnes v. Town of Bakersfield, 57 Vt. 375. Chapter 52 of New York laws of 1880, amending the charter of New York City, fixes at $3,000 the salaries of "the clerks of the police courts." This provision has been held not to include the clerk's assistant: Cre- gier V. Mayor &c., 11 Daly (N. Y.) 171. '"■ Emmitt v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. S. 887; s. c. 38 N. Y. St. 355. " People V. Vilas, 36 N. Y. 459, and cases cited; Mayor &c. v. Kelly, 98 N. Y. 467; Board &c. v. Clark, 92 N. Y. 391; Board &c. v. Quick, 99 N. Y. 138; s. c. 1 N. E. 533; Board &c. V. Johnson, 127 Ind. 238; s. c. 26 N. E. 821; Pierie v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. St. 573; s. c. 21 Atl. 90; Nuckolls Co. V. Peebler (Neb.), 91 N. W. 289. Right of salaried officer of a public corporation to claim extra compen- sation on the ground that the duties of his office have been increased or new duties added since his salary was fixed, — see People v. Supervi- sors, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 362; Wendell v. City of Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 204; Palmer v. Mayor &c., 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 318. See also, Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309. Right of officer to recover when duty performed is outside of his regular official duty, — see Bright v. Supervisors, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 242; Mallory v. Supervisors, 179 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 177 an officer's fees are fixed for an actual day's work, and liis duties embrace the work of two or more departments, he can not re- cover further compensation than the amount fixed by statute.''' Where a constitutional provision forbids a municipality to pay or grant any extra compensation to a public officer, or to increase his compensation during his continuance in office, it has been decided that a city council, the members of which receive no regular pay, has no right to vote compensation to members for sjiecial services performed as a committee."* Where the statute provides that me- chanics, workmen and laborers of a municipal incorporation, or for a contractor of the corporation, shall receive the prevailing wages, such statute has no reference to an appointee who receives a regular salary.''^ When an officer's compensation is fixed, and the law pro- 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 531; People v. Super- visors, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 257. " Under the Indiana statute of 1879, providing that the per diem of township trustees for each actual day's service shall be $2, to be paid out of the township fund, and that for services as overseer of the poor he shall be paid out of the county treasury, one who is the duly elected township trustee, and has been paid $2 per day out of the township fund for his services, can not claim a further compensation out of the county treasury, for the same time, for services as overseer of the poor: Board &c. v. Templeton, 116 Ind. 369; s. c. 19 N. E. 183. If extra services are performed by direction of the proper authorities, having no connection with the duties of the of- fice, the officer may be allowed com- pensation therefor: United States v. Austin, 2 Cliff. 325 ; United States v. Chassell, 6 Blatchf. 421. In case of an emergency which involves the corporate existence it is within the power of the mayor and council to employ counsel to protect its inter- ests: Rice V. Gwinn (Idaho), 49 Pac. 412. Employment of assistant coun- sel several times by the judiciary committee of the council, which was approved and ratified by the council, does not establish a custom binding on the city where an ordinance pro- vides that such employment shall be at the discretion of the mayor or council: Caswell v. City of Mar- shalltown, 101 Iowa 598; s. c. 70 N. W. 717. ■* Garvie v. City of Hartford, 54 Conn. 440; s. c. 7 Atl. 723. Where a statute fixes the city treasurer's salary, and says that he shall not receive "any other fee or reward whatever," he can claim nothing for collections of county taxes which it is made his duty to collect as such officer: City of Poughlieepsie v. Wiltsie, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 270. But when the functions of two appoint- ments or offices are separate and dis- tinct, one person may be entitled to recover compensation for both: Mar- vin V. United States, 44 Fed. 405. " Rock V. City of New Yorlt, 63 N. Y. S. 825. To the same effect is Bock V. City of New York, 64 N. Y. S. 777; s. c. 31 Misc. (N. Y.) 55. The New York laws of 1897, ch. 415, applies to laborers, mechan- ics and workmen of municipalities engaged on public works, as well as employes of contractors with the city to do like work : McAvoy v. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 274; s. c. 52 App. Div. (N. Y.) 485. The right of an employe to receive the pre- vailing rate of wages given by stat- § 177 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 180 vides that no other compensation shall be allowed, he is not entitled to interest on public funds deposited by him in a bank, either as compensation, or for care of public fund, or liability for losses.''® Where the charter provides that in case of the absence of the mayor, the president of the council, or speaker of the house of delegates, if the former be absent, shall perform the duties of mayor and receive the same compensation as the mayor while so acting, it does not mean that the salary shall accrue to the acting officer during the interim and does not mean that any absence of the mayor shall cause a re- duction in his salary.''^ In the absence of express or implied author- ity, and where the expenditures of a member of the council are not necessarily essential for municipal purposes, the council has no legal warrant to authorize payment.'^® Knowledge of the mayor and alder- men that an officer is performing certain services does not entitle him to compensation beyond that fixed by the ordinances.''^ The evi- dence must clearly show that one claiming a salary larger than hereto- fore received is entitled to such advance.^" In a suit by an employe to recover notarial fees, in addition to his regular salary, the burden of proof that such services as notary were voluntary is on the defend- ant.*^ "Where an officer receives an annual salary he is not entitled to pay for extra services rendered on Sunday in the absence of a statute allowing it.*^ ute is not a vested right and may be failing to keep him employed. He repealed, and after such repeal the is not an officer, though appointed right to recover prevailing wages by resolution, and is not entitled to for services rendered prior thereto pay for time he does not work: in an action brought thereafter will White v. City of Alameda, 124 Cal. not be sustained: Bock v. City of 95; s. c. 56 Pac. 795. New York, 64 N. Y. S. 777; s. c. 31 ^^ Village of Glenville v. Englehart, Misc. (N. Y.) 55. A person who 19 Ohio C. C. 285. is in the performance of labor in "Bates v. City of St. Louis, 153 lieu of his poll-tax is a laborer Mo. 18; s. c. 54 S. W. 439. of the city and comes under the ''^ James v. City of Seattle, 22 relationship of employer and em- Wash. 654; s. c. 62 Pac. 84. ploye: City of Winfield v. Peeden, "Clark v. City of Portsmouth, 68 8 Kan. App. 671; s. c. 57 Pac. 131. N. H. 263; s. c. 44 Atl. 388. Unless a person is hired as a me- *" State v. Brittin, 52 La. An. 94; chanic and does mechanic's work, he s, c. 26 So. 753. is not to be regarded as such and *^ Merzbach v. City of New York, entitled to the benefits of New York 163 N. Y. 16; s. c. 57 N. E. 96. laws of 1894, ch. 622, regarding "" Tyrrell v. City of New York, 159 wages of mechanics: McCunney v. N. Y. 239; s. c. 53 N. E. 1111. The City of New York, 58 N. Y. S. 138; general rule is that officers on sal- s. c. 40 App. Div. (N. Y.) 482. A ary are not entitled to charge for driver of a street wagon and en- services: O'Sullivan v. City of New gaged in the care of the city's horses Orleans, 49 La. An. 616; s. c. 21 So. can not recover from the city for 854. As to extra allowance to com- 181 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 178 § 178. Compensation of attorneys. — A public corporation, unless restrained by its charter, has the power to employ attorneys to con- duct and carry on such legal business as comes within its corporate capacity;*^ and it is bound to pay for such services.^* Likewise such corporation may employ extra counsel to prosecute or defend certain suits or to do certain legal work either in conjunction with the city solicitor or alone.®^ Where a charter gives power to a municipal corporation to employ an attorney when necessary, and a subsequent chapter provides for a law department, and a chief officer to be called the attorney and counsel, with a salary, the department to have charge of and conduct all the law business of the corporation, the subsequent chapter is an implied repeal of the power to employ an attorney under the charter.®^ The retaining of extra counsel must be authorized by the corporation.^'^ missioners of estimate and assess- ment under charter of Greater New York, see In re Board of Street Opening &c., 53 N. Y. S. 354; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 137. Hostlers only under N. Y. laws of 1894, ch. 368, are entitled to extra pay: Tyrrell v. City of New York, 159 N. Y. 239; s. c. 53 N. E. 1111. Where a person is il- legally discharged and is reinstated he can not recover costs and counsel fees in addition to his salary: O'Hara v. City of New York, 59 N. Y. S. 36; s. c. 28 Misc. (N. Y.) 258. Where a city officer, acting under a salary, is vested with the powers of a justice of the peace he is not en- titled to justice fees: Johnson v. State, 94 Tenn. 499; s. c. 29 S. W. 963. A police officer on a salary is not entitled to the fees of a con- stable, although he has the powers vested in him as a constable: John- son V. State, 94 Tenn. 499; s. c. 29 S. W. 963. ''State V. Mayor &c., 40 N. J. L. 186; Smith v. Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 531. " Langdon v. Town of Castleton, 30 Vt. 285. «Hugg V. City Council &c., 29 N. J. Eq. 6. See also, Curtis v. Gowan, 34 111. App. 516. ^^ Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218; s. c. 10 N. E. 155. Where an action was brought by a city at- torney to recover for services per- formed for the city, it was decided that the preparation of a digest or a codification of the laws applicable to such city was within the line of his duty as laid down by the city charter, which provided that he' "should do all and every professional act incident to the office which might be required of him" by the officers of said city: Hays v. City of Oil City (Pa.), 11 Atl. 63. " City of Memphis v. Adams, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518; s. c. 24 Am. R. 331; Clarke v. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181; City of Memphis v. Brown, 20 Wall. 289, 321. See Roper v. Town of Laurinburg, 90 N. C. 427; Water- bury V. City of Laredo, 60 Tex. 519. See also, Hornblower v. Duden, 35 Cal. 664, 666; Clough v. Hart, 8 Kan. 487. Compensation of city attorney, —see Orton v. State, 12 Wis. 509; Carroll v. City of St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444; Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), chapter on Corporate Officers. Where the mayor may be employed as at- torney and counsel, — see Mayor &c. V. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61; s. c. 20 Am. R. 670. If a county attorney goes be- yond the limits of his county with the consent and at the instance of the county board, he may recover § 1"9 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 183 § 179. The same subject continued. — The duties and compensation of attorneys are generally regulated or fixed by statute or ordinance. And a state statute which, without limitation, gave the city attorney of a city fees for the trial of cases, was held in a Connecticut case not to be restricted in its application to cases tried in the city courts.^^ Where a city has power to allow its attorney "fees," it may also allow him a commission on all sums of money collected for the city; and under an ordinance authorizing such allowance, no distinction can be taken between collections in civil and in criminal cases.^^ When it is forbidden by statute to increase the compensation of the attorney for the city during his term of otlfice, the fact that the city advances from the second to the first class during the attorney's term of office does not abrogate the statutory prohibition.^" reasonable compensation in addition to his salary: Commissioners &c. v. Brewer, 9 Kan. 307; White v. Polk Co., 17 Iowa 413; Butler v. Board &c., 15 Kan. 178; Huffman v. Board &c., 23 Kan. 281. ^' Smith V. City of Waterbury, 54 Conn. 174; s. c. 7 Atl. 17. In the last cited case it was held that the words "continuance in office," in the constitution of Connecticut, amend- ment 24, prohibiting the legislature from increasing the salai'y of any public officer during his "continu- ance in office," mean continuing of- fice under one appointment; and the act of 1881, providing that "the city attorney [of Waterbury] shall be entitled to fees for his services in cases tried for the city," is not un- constitutional, so far as it affects that officer upon his re-appointment to that position in 1881, at the expi- ration of his former term. And also that a statute giving a city attorney fees for "cases tried for said city" is not restricted in application to technical "cases" in courts of justice, but applies also to a trial of certain matters for the city before a rail- road commission. ^^ City of Austin v. Johns, 62 Tex. 179. Under an ordinance which gives a city attorney ten per cent, on all sums of money collected for the city, such percentage is not re- stricted to sums which the attorney actually assisted to collect: City of Austin V. Walton, 68 Tex. 507; s. c.5 S. W. 70, where it was also decided that an ordinance which gives a city attorney ten per cent, of all sums of money collected for the city is not repugnant to a subsequent ordinance giving him a salary and fees in addition in specified cases, and is not impliedly repealed there- by. - - - A city ordinance, passed in 1880, gave the city attorney a sal- ary in lieu of all other compensa- tion. A subsequent statute gave him fees for the trial of cases. It was held that the compensation given by the statute, not being in terms in lieu of all other compensation, was cumulative, and that the city attor- ney was entitled both to the salary given by the ordinance and the trial fees given by the statute: Smith v. City of Waterbury, 54 Conn. 174; s. c. 7 Atl. 17. ^ Under an Arkansas statute which provided that a city council should not increase the salary of a city of- ficer during his term in office, when the council of a city of the second class had fixed the salary of the city attorney, it could not, after be- coming a city of the first class, in- crease his salary during his term in 1S3 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 180 § 180. Compensation — Power of legislature to control. — The state legislature, ex(-e})t as restrained by the eonstitution, has the power to increase, diminish, or cut off entirely, the salary of an official.''^ Likewise the legislature may increase the duties without enhancing the compensation, or may diminish the compensation without lessen- ing the duties.^^ office: Barnes v. Williams, 53 Ark. 205; s. c. 13 S. W. 845. ''^Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Connor v. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. 285; affirming s. c. 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 355;^- People V. Morrell, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 563; People v. Warner, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 81; s. c. 2 Denio (N, Y.) 272; Phillips V. Mayor &c., 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 483; Smith v. New York, 37 N. Y. 518; Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Cooley Const. Lim. 276; People V. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Bird V. Wasco Co., 3 Or. 282; Oregon V, Pyle, 1 Or. 149; Coffin v. State, 7 Ind. 157; Turpen v. County Com'rs, 7 Ind. 172; Cowdin v. Huff, 10 Ind. 83; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa 538, 553, per Wright, C. J.; Cotton v. Ellis, 7 Jones L, (N. C.) 545; Hoke V. Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1. Po- lice officers of cities are not within the constitutional provision forbid- ding legislation to change the com- pensation of public officers while in office: Mangam v. Brooklyn, 98 N. Y. 585; s. c. 50 Am. R. 705. An offi- cer who held over, and discharged his official duties until his succes- sor qualified, was held to be en- titled to pay for his services, al- though there was no such provision of law: Robb v. Carter, 65 Md. 321; s. c. 4 Atl. 282. Held that city attor- ney of New Orleans, in office at the adoption of the new constitution of 1898, was limited to salary under constitution and laws of 1879: State V. Brittin, 52 La. An. 94; s. c. 26 So. 753. Construction of Madison city charter in reference to payment of salary of surveyor: Kollock v. Dodge, 105 Wis. 187; s. c. 80 N. W. 608. Officers have no vested rights in future unearned compensation: In re Wilkins Place, 54 N. Y. S. 65. Services rendered outside the city but for the city create a liability: Quigg V. Evans, 121 Cal. 546; s. c. 53 Pac. 1093. »' State V. Davis, 44 Mo. 129; Hyde V. State, 52 Miss. 665; Wilcox v. Rod- man, 46 Mo. 322; Sharpe v. Robert- son, 5 Graft. (Va.) 518. The Califor- nia statute of 1883 provided that marshals of cities of the sixth class should receive a compensation to be fixed by ordinance by the board of trustees; also prescribed the mar- shal's duties, and provided that he should, for service of any process, receive the same fees as constables. The court decided that the compen- sation fixed by the trustees under the statute was for all duties im- posed on the marshal: Mundell v. City of Pasadena, 87 Cal. 520; s. c. 25 Pac. 1061. Under the New York statute authorizing the aqueduct commissioners of the city of New York to appoint and fix the compen- sation of inspectors of the work of constructing the aqueduct, the com- missioners have no power to sus- pend such an inspector without pay, there being no provision in the stat- ute for such suspension; and an in- spector may recover pay for the time during which he was so sus- pended: Emmitt v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. S. 887; s. c. 38 N. Y. St. 355; following Mullen v. Mayor &c., 12 N. Y. S. 269; s. c. 34 N. Y. St. 913. Under the California statute of 1883, municipal corporations are divided into classes, and by che same § 181 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 184 § 181. Compensation in case of removal. — Where an officer was illegally removed from office and was reinstated, and was at all times ready and willing to discharge his duties, he is entitled to compensa- tion for the time he was kept from his duties."^ And where an officer is subject to civil service law, is illegally reduced in rank and salary, and is reinstated, he is entitled to his original salary, the compensation being an incident to the office.^* Where, after his term expired, an officer continued to render services with knowledge of the city council, the members of which expressed satisfaction, and when his bill for services was presented, made no objection, there is an implied promise to pay.^^ Where two cities consolidate, an em- ploye of one of the cities, who occupied a subordinate position, and who does not apply for reinstatement under the charter of consolida- tion, and performs no services thereunder, is not entitled to a salary for the time after the consolidation.^^ An appointee unlawfully removed, who has made no complaint to the mayor or council and no attempt to secure reinstatement, can not recover salary for the period when no services were rendered.®^ It has been held, however, that an un- lawful removal creates no vacancy ; and where no one else is appointed to the position and paid for performing the duties, the salary may be recovered.''^ After the removal of a city officer and the filling of his place by another, to whom the salary has been paid, such officer can not maintain suit for salary accruing after the removal until he has been declared entitled to the office in a direct proceeding for that purpose.®^ act the board of trustees of cities of '^ Buck v. City of Eureka, 124 Cal. the fifth and sixth classes are au- 61; s. c. 56 Pac. 612. thorized to fix by ordinance the com- '" Quinhard v. City of New York, pensation of city marshals. In an 64 N. Y. S. 904, 51 App. Div, (N. Y.) action by the marshal of a city (of 233. the sixth class) to recover for serv- ^^ Byrnes v. City of St. Paul, 78 ices rendered, the complaint failed Minn. 205; s. c. 80 N. W. 959. Cf. to state that the board of trustees Hagan v. City of Brooklyn. 126 N. of such city had passed any ordi- Y. 643; s. c. 27 N. E. 265; Phillips v. nance fixing the compensation of the City of Boston, 150 Mass. 491; s. c. marshal, or to state to what class of 23 N. E. 202; Bernard v. City of Ho- municipal corporations such city be- boken, 27 N. J. L. 413. longed. It was decided that the "* O'Hara v. City of New York, 62 complaint was demurrable: Pritch- N. Y. S. 146; s. c. 46 App. Div. (N. ett v. Stanislaus Co., 73 Cal. 310; s. Y.) 518. c. 14 Pac. 795. "* Gorley v. City of Louisville, 20 '5 O'Hara v. City of New York, 59 Ky. L. 602; s. c. 47 S. W. 263. The N. Y. S. 36; s. c. 28 Misc. (N. Y.) general rule is that compensation 258. ceases with removal from oflice: "People v. Feitner, 63 N. Y. S. State v. Williams, 6 S. D. 119; s. c. 209; s. c. 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 101. 60 N. W. 410. 185 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 182 § 182. Qualifications for office-holding. — Where neither by consti- tutiou nor by statute are the qualifications for office prescribed, any one is eligible who possesses the elective franchise. It may happen, therefore, that one may be an officer who is not a citizen of the United States; for in a number of the states aliens, who have declared their intention to become citizens, and have the qualification of residence, are given the franchise.*"" The state constitution or statutes gen- erally lay down the qualifications of officers.*"* Eligibility to office belongs not exclusively or specially to electors enjoying the right of suffrage : it belongs equally to all persons whomsoever are not excluded by the constitution,*"- and can not be changed by any ordinance or acts of the corporation.*"^ If the statute provides that the accept- "" McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507. "'State V. Murray, 28 Wis. 96; State V. Smith, 14 Wis. 497; Wheat V. Smith, 50 Ark. 266; s. c. 7 S. W. 161; Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115. Cf. Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417; s. c. 8 Pac. 661; People v. Hamilton, 24 111. App. 609. If a person already holding an office is elected or ap- pointed to another incompatible with the one which he holds, and he accepts and qualifies to the second, such acceptance and qualification op- erate, ipso facto, as a resignation of the former office: State v. Brink- erhoff, 66 Tex. 45; s. c. 17 S. W. 109. Cf. Attorney-General v. Marston, 66 N. H. 485; s. c. 22 Atl. 560; People V. Hanifan, 96 111. 420; King v. Tiz- zard, 9 B. & C. 418; Milward v. Thatcher, 2 T. R. 87. See De Turk V. Commonwealth, 12 Pa. St. 151; s. c. 18 Atl. 757; Cotton v. Phillips, 56 N. H. 220. Sometimes it is pro- vided that no person shall hold two lucrative offices, or offices in two de- partments of the government, at the same time: Davenport v. Mayor &c., 67 N. Y. 456; People v. Brooklyn Common Council, 77 N. Y. 503; s. c. 33 Am. R. 659; Re Corliss, 11 R. I. 638; Dailey V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 329; Rodman v. Harcourt, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 224, 499; State v. De Gress, 53 Tex. 387; State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566; People v. Leonard, 73 Cal. 230; s. c. 14 Pac. 853; Creighton v. Piper, 14 Ind. 182; Kerr v. Jones, 19 Ind. 351; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. Ill; State v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401; Foltz V. Kerlin, 105 Ind. 221; s. c. 4 N. E. 439; 5 N. E. 672; People v. Whit- man, 10 Cal. 38; People v. Sander- son, 30 Cal. 160; Crawford v. Dun- bar, 52 Cal. 36; Hoglan v. Carpen- ter, 4 Bush (Ky.) 89. Women may be school officers in Massachusetts; 115 Mass. 602; also in Iowa: Huff v. Cook, 44 Iowa 639. '"- Barker v. People, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 686, 703. See State v. George, 23 Fla. 585; s. c. 3 So. 81. '"^People V. Phillips, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 388; Petty v. Looker, 21 N. Y. 267; Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 29; Rex v. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1827; Newling v. Francis, 3 T. R. 189; Rex v. Bumstead, 2 B. & Ad. 699; Rex v. Chitty, 5 Ad. & El. 609; Rex V. Weymouth, 7 Mod. 373. Where the charter of a city provides that the mayor, recorder and alder- men, when assembled, shall consti- tute the common council, and fur- ther provides that the common coun- cil shall be judge of the election and qualification of its members, this power extends to the election and qualification of the mayor; and be- ing conclusive, the court will not grant a quo warranto after the coun- 183 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 186 ance by an officer of another office shall cause the first office to become vacant, the acceptance disqualifies such officer from further acting in his original capacity, and without a judicial determination.^'** Where the law provides that no person shall be eligible to the office of alderman unless he shall have been a resident of his ward for at least one year preceding such election, it means one year next pre- ceding the election. ^°^ § 183. Official oath. — Public officers are usually required by stat- ute to take an oath before entering upon the duties of the office. ^''^ Where the form is prescribed by law it should be substantially fol- lowed; a literal adherence is not necessary,^'^^ but a material variation cil has taken action: Dafoe v. Har- 55 Pac. 913. Where a charter requires Shaw, 60 Mich. 200; s. c. 26 N. W. 879. When the government of a city or town is controlled by the gen- eral municipal incorporation act of Florida, neither six months' resi- dence nor registration is requisite to eligibility to office in such city or town, in the absence of any consti- tutional or statutory provision to that effect: State v. George, 23 Fla. 585; s. c. 3 So. 81. The legislature incorporating a town may appoint the officers to exercise their func- tions until a regular election, not- withstanding the constitution pro- vides that town officers shall be elected by the electors of such towns: Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484; s. c. 12 S. B. 965. Where the law provides that no person shall be elected to a city office who is at the time in arrears in his city taxes, a person who pays his arrears at 9 o'clock on the morning of the elec- tion is not disqualified: State v. Berkeley, 140 Mo. 184; s. c. 41 S. W. 732. But not so if not paid until after election: State v. Page, 140 Mo. 501; s. c. 41 S. W. 963. One who owns and pays taxes on person- alty and who owns realty, but is not liable for taxes for the current year by reason of acquirement since the date of assessment, is eligible for mayor under a statute requiring the mayor to be a taxpaying freeholder: Mayer v. Sweeney, 22 Mont. 103 ; s. c. a residence of three years in the city as a condition to eligibility, one who has resided three years in ter- ritory annexed to the city is eligible: Gibson v. Wood, 20 Ky. L. 1547; s. c. 49 S. W. 768. That an officer elected has qualified is not to be presumed, but must be shown: O'Connor v. City of Fond du Lac, 101 Wis. 83 ; s. c. 76 N. W. 1116. In the absence of a statute a person may hold two of- fices: Santa Ana Water Co. v. Town of San Buena Ventura, 65 Fed. 323. A nonresident of state can not hold office: Barker v. Southern Const. Co., 20 Ky. L. 796; s. c. 47 S. W. 608. Oath must be filed with the clerk of the village under N. Y. laws of 1892, ch. 687, § 3, instead of with the clerk of the county: In re Board of Health &c., 60 N. Y. S. 27; s. c. 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 236. >"* Oliver v. Mayor &c., 63 N. J. L. 96; s. c. 42 Atl. 782; Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 223; s. c. 48 N. E. 1038; 39 L. R. A. 278; 63 Am. St. 270. ^"^Dowty V. Pittwood, 23 Mont. 113; s. c. 57 Pac. 727. "» The subject of Official Bonds is discussed in a special chapter, post. ^"^ State V. City of Trenton, 35 N. J L. 485 ; Bassett v. Den, 17 N. J. L. 432; Tide Water Canal Co. v. Arch- er, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 479; Hankins v. Calloway, 88 111. 155, 187 OFFICERS AND AGENTS, § 184 will invalidate the oath.^"^ It need not be in writing or subscribed unleas the statute expressly so provides.^"'' The odieer who is re- quired to administer the oath can not lawfully refuse, to do so on account of the ineligibility of the person elected.^^" § 184. The same subject continued — According to the weight of authority in this country, statutory provisions fixing the time within which an official oath must be taken are construed to be directory; and a delay does not ipso facto vacate the office, provided the oath is taken before the office is declared vacant by judicial proceedings.^^^ But a contrary doctrine is declared in several cases, holding that such statutes are not directory where the delay is caused by neglect or refusal.^ ^^ A statute requiring an oath to be administered by a particular officer was decided in New York to be directory, and it was held that the oath might be taken before any officer authorized by a general statute. ^^^ § 185. Duties of officers. — As a rule, the duties of officers are fixed by the ordinance or statute creating them; but in a New York case^^^ ^•^ State V. City of Trenton, 35 N. J. L. 485; Bowler v. Perrin, 47 Mich. 154; s. c. 10 N. W. 180; Chapman v. Clark, 49 Mich. 305; s. c. 13 N. W. 601; Bohlman v. Railway Co., 40 Wis. 157. An oath "faithfully to discharge their duties" does not ful- fill a prescribed form to discharge their duties "impartially, and to the test of their judgment": In re Cam- bria Street, 75 Pa. St. 357. See, for other defects pronounced merely formal, Horton v. Parsons, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 42, a strong case; Colman v. Shattuck, 62 N. Y. 348; People v. Stowell, 9 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 456; Hoagland v. Culvert, 20 N. J. L. 387; People V. Perkins, 85 Cal. 509; s. c. 26 Pac. 245; Bassett v. Den, 17 N. J. L. 432. And for evidence that the oath has been taken, Halbeck v. Mayor &c., 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 439; Harwood v. Marshall, 9 Md. 83; Scammon v. Scammon, 28 N. H. 419; State V. Green, 15 N. J. L. 88. ^'** Davis V. Berger, 54 Mich. 652; s. c. 20 N. W. 629. ""People V. Dean, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 438, case of an infant. See also. Miller v. Supervisors, 25 Cal. 93. "^Throop Public Officers, § 173, and numerous cases there cited. "-Throop Public Officers, §§ 173, 174, 175; citing (on p. 188) State v, Matheny, 7 Kan. 327; Courser v. Powers, 34 Vt. 517, where a justice of the peace, sued for an arrest, could not justify unless he had tak- en the oath of office before the ar- rest, although he took it on the same day. The oath need not be taken while a contest is pending to deter- mine who is legally entitled to the office: Mechem Public Offices and Officers, § 262; citing People v. Pot- ter, 63 Cal. 127; Pearson v. Wilson, 57 Miss. 848. "='Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 42; Canniff v. Mayor &c., 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 430. See also, State v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59; and contra, Rex V. Ellis, 9 East 252, note; s. c. 2 Str. 994. But irregularities of this nature do not prevent the applica- tion of the rule validating acts of de facto officers: State v. Perkins, 24 N. J. L. 409. "' People V. Cook, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 259; s. c. 8 N. Y. 67. § 1S6 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 188 it was held that "statutes directing the mode of proceeding hy public officers are directory, and are not regarded as essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves unless it be so declared in the statute." Where from the nature of the office the officer is called upon to exer- cise duties involving judgment and discretion, he can not delegate his power.^^^ Where all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the meaning of the constitution have been made use of, it may still hap- pen that the construction remains a matter of doubt; and in such a case every one called upon to act, where, in his opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful constitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain from acting/^^ It is frequently provided by statute that the incumbents of certain municipal offices shall not be in any manner interested in contracts for which the corporation is liable: these statutes are generally strictly construed.^^'^ § 186. Powers of mayor. — The mayor is the chief officer or execu- tive magistrate of the corporation, and his powers depend entirely "= The duty to examine and pass upon resolutions and ordinances of the common council, and determine whether they shall be approved, imposed by the city charter on the mayor, is a duty calling for the ex- ercise of his judgment and expe- rience, and can not be delegated to the mayor's clerk: Lyth v. City of Buffalo, 48 Hun (N. Y.) 175. The mayor of Hudson, not being one of the officials designated in laws of New York of 1890, was not obliged to take the test oath required of such officials by § 3 of the same act: People v. Gregg, 13 N. Y. S. 114; s. c. 59 Hun (N. Y.) 107. "«Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.), ch. 4, p. 88. The revised statutes of Indiana make it the duty of a town- ship trustee to grant temporary re- lief to one, not an inhabitant of the township, who is sick or in distress, and without money or friends, etc. It was decided that the trustee is not precluded from acting by the fact that such a person has been re- ceived into a house from charitable motives, and has been and is being cared for: Board &c. v. Jennings, 104 Ind. 108; s. c. 3 N. B. 619. The fact that a supervisor, at the request of citizens of the town, built a side- walk at the expense of the town, did not impose on him any duty to repair as an individual; that duty rested upon the persons who di- rected him to build the walk: Langdon v. Chartiers Tp., 131 Pa. St. 77; s. c. 18 Atl. 930; 25 W. N. C. (Pa.) 202. "' The New York acts of 1882 de- clare that no clerk in the employ of New York City shall become inter- ested in the performance of any con- tract, work or business, the price of which is payable by the city. It was held that a clerk could not become a lecturer in an evening school under an appointment from the board of education: McAdam v. Mayor &c., 36 Hun (N. Y.) 340. New York laws of 1882 prohibit an officer of the cor- poration of New York from being interested in the performance of any work to be paid for from the city treasury. It was held that an examiner in lunacy could not be a sanitary inspector in the vaccinat- ing corps: Fitch v. Mayor &c., 40 Hun (N. Y.) 512. 189 OFFICEIiS AND AGENTS. 186 upon the provisions of the charter or constituent act of the corpora- tion and valid by-laws passed in pursuance thereof;"^ and although his duties are primarily executive and administrative, judicial duties are often superadded to those which properly appertain to the office of mayor ; and he is invested by legislative enactment with the author- ity to administer not only the ordinances of the corporation, but also judicially to administer the laws of the state."® Munic. Corp. (4th ed.) Corp. (4th ed.) Wallace, 12 Ind. '" Dillon 291. ''" Dillon Munic. 291, 292; Waldo v 569. See also. Slater v. Wood, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 15; Morrison v. Mc- Donald, 21 Maine 550; Respublica v. Dallas. 3 Yeates (Pa.) 300; State v. Wilmington, 3 Harr. (Del.) 294; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 425; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. Ill; Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411. The power to take general affidavits vested in justices of the peace by the Arkansas statutes (Mansf. Dig., § 2918) may be exercised by the mayors of incorporated towns within the limits of their corporations, by virtue of the statute (Mansf. Dig., § 797) which confers upon such mayors "all the powers and jurisdic- tion of a justice of the peace in all matters, civil and criminal, arising under the laws of the state, to all in- tents and purposes." Such mayor may consequently take an affidavit to be used in prosecuting an appeal from a judgment of the county court to the circuit court: Robinson v. Benton Co., 49 Ark. 49; s. c. 4 S. W. 195. When the mayor has judicial authority to conduct criminal ex- aminations he is not personally li- able in damages for refusal to pro- ceed with an examination until the following day. and to accept bail, and for directing that the accused be locked up until the following day: Hommert v. Gleason, 14 N. Y. S. 568. If he has acquired complete jurisdic- tion he enjoys the same immunity from personal liability for subse- quent excesses of authority that is accorded to the judges of courts gen- erally: State V. Wolever, 127 Ind. 306; s. c. 26 N. E. 762. For the his- tory and nature of office of mayor, see Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), §§ 13. 174, 253, 260, 271, 331, 428; Norton Com. 90, 402, 403; Pull- ing Laws, Customs &c. of London, eh. 2, 16 m; 2 Bouvier Law Diet. 150; i Jacobs Law Diet. 264, 265; 2 Toml. Law Diet. 540; Fletcher v. City of Lowell, 15 Gray (Mass.) 103; Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray (Mass.) 121; Nichols V. Boston, 98 Mass. 39; Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa 75, 82. Under the code of Iowa, § 506, providing that "the mayor of each city or in- corporated town shall be a magis- trate or conservator of the peace, and, within the same, have the jur- isdiction of a justice of the peace in all matters civil and criminal; . . . but the criminal jurisdiction shall be coextensive with the county in which such city or town is situ- ated," it was held that the mayor is given the same jurisdiction in civil cases as a justice of the peace; and, therefore, his jurisdiction extends to a case brought before him by a resident of his incorporated town against a resident of the county, but not of the corporation nor of the township in which it is situated, by a notice served on the defendant within his township, but outside the limits of the corporation, and of the 187 PUBLIC COKI'OUATIONS. lyo § 187. The same subject continued — Statutory provisions. — It is often provided by statute that the duties of the mayor shall fall, iu his absence, upon the president of the council or a similar officer.^^* The New York statute, authorizing the mayor of each city to prescribe civil service rules and to employ suitable persons to make inquiries and examinations and prescribe their duties, gives the mayor povrer to designate a secretary for the civil service commission appointed by him under the act and to fix his salary. ^^^ The mayor and city council of a Nebraska city have power to compromise claims against the city arising under a contract to erect a system of water-works for the city.^"^ The mayor may administer oaths to city officers; and township wherein it is situated: Weber v. Hamilton, 72 Iowa 577; s. c. 34 N. W. 424. ^-" Upon an issue as to title to a municipal office, the power of ap- pointment to which is vested in the mayor, proof of appointment by the president of the council, who is au- thorized to act as mayor in certain cases, is not sufficient without show- ing the facts upon which the right to exercise such power depends: State V. Board of Health (N. J.), 8 Atl. 509. Where the charter pro- vides that in case of the absence of the mayor from the city another of- ficer shall act in his place, only such an absence as will render the mayor unable to perfom his duties is in- tended: Mayor &c. v. Moran, 46 Mich. 213; s. c. 9 N. W. 252. Under a provision in the charter of Jersey City authorizing the president of the council to act as mayor In the absence of the latter from the city, except in making certain appoint- ments, the president may issue a proclamation as mayor pro tempore, submitting the adoption of the act to the voters of the city, that power being vested in the mayor by said act: In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319; s. c. 18 Atl. 67. The New Jersey statute, approved 1889, authorizes the mayors of the cities of the state to appoint the principal municipal officers, in case the act should be ac- cepted at a popular election, and au- thorizes the respective mayors of the cities, by proclamation, to call such election. It was decided that in case the mayor was absent, and the charter, in such contingency, vested the powers of the mayoralty in a specified officer, such officer could proclaim the election: In re Cleveland, 52 N. J. L. 188; s. c. 19 Atl. 17. See also^ In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319; s. c. 18 Atl. 67. '■' Kip V. City of Buffalo, 7 N. Y. S. 685; s. c. 27 N. Y. St. 52. A mayor, supposing that he had power to make an ad interim appointment of a city officer, attempted to exercise that power, and that alone. But it was held that, if he did not have the power which he attempted to exer- cise, the appointment could not be deemed an appointment for a full term, which the mayor had the pow- er, but not the intention to make: People V. Hall, 104 N. Y. 170; s. c. 10 N. E. 135. "- State V. Martin, 27 Neb. 441 ; s. c. 43 N. W. 244. The mayor of a city of the first class does not have the authority to suspend the city en- gmeer under compiled laws of Kan- sas, ch. 18, defining the powers of mayors of such cities and vesting such authority in the corporation itself: Metsker v. Neally, 41 Kan. 122; s. c. 21 Pac. 206. Under the general statutes of New Hampshire, ch. 42, § 3, mayors of cities are au- thorized to administer oaths to al- 191 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 188 under the New York statute he may appoint municipal officers inde- pendently of the board of aldermen. ^-^ § 188. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous powers. — Un- der authority to preserve the public peace the mayor may resist the lawful police force when they are attempting to commit an unlawful act, and may call to his aid a rival body of police.^^* Where both by charter and ordinance the mayor is vested with certain executive power, it is not abridged by an ordinance confiding authority in the particular case to another official also;^^'' and if the law requires that a certain fact "be made to appear to" the mayor as a condition pre- cedent to action by him, his judgment is conclusive and protects him from civil liability.^^'' In Louisiana the supreme court sustained a suit by the mayor in his official capacity to restrain a contemplated violation of the charter by other municipal officers. "We can not dermen and common councilmen, and by ch. 40, § 2, all provisions of the statutes relating to selectmen and town clerks of towns are con- strued to apply to mayors, alder- men and city clerks of cities; and, the former being authorized by statute to administer oaths to all town officers, the mayor of a city has that authority in relation to city officers: Drew v. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. ^=3 The laws of New York of 1884, ch. 43, § 1, entitled "An act to center responsibility in the municipal gov- ernment of the city of New York," which provides that all the appoint- ments to office in the city of New York previously made by the mayor, and confirmed by the board of alder- men, shall thereafter be made by the mayor without such confirmation, applies to excise commissioners in New York, the power to appoint whom was previously vested in the mayor, subject to confirmation by the aldermen, although they may be, in a technical sense, state officers: People V. Andrews, 104 N. Y. 570; s. c. 12 N E. 274. The charter of the city of Minneapolis (Sp. L. of Minn. 1881. ch. 76, subch. 4, § 5, subd. 11) authorized the city council by ordi- nances "to erect lamps, and to pro- vide for lighting of the city," and "to cre'ate, alter and extend lamp districts." And it was held that the power so conferred requires the ex- ercise of judgment and discretion, and can not be delegated to a com- mittee of the council, so that the determination of the committee will be final, either as to establishing new lamps or discontinuing those already established: Minneapolis Gas-Light Co. v. City of Minneapo- lis, 36 Minn. 159; s. c. 30 N. W. 450. See further, as to delegation of pow- ers, the chapter on Public Boards, post. ^^' Slater v. Wood, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 15. ^-^ Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray (Mass.) 161. A city can not by or- dinance confer a greater power upon its mayor than that given by char- ter: Union Depot & R. Co. v. Smith, 16 Colo. 361; s. c. 27 Pac. 329. ""Ela V. Smith, 5 Gray (Mass.) 121. He may order the abatement of a public nuisance: Henderson v. Mayor, 3 La. 563; and notice to him of a nuisance on city property is no- tice to the city: Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39. 189 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 192 prescribe to him," said the court, "the course which he is to pursue in the discharge of his official duties. The power to see the charter faithfully executed being given to him, the selection of the means necessar}^ to its exercise is left to his discretion, and we can not inter- fere with them if they violate no law."^^'' Authority conferred upon the mayor to punish summarily infractions of police regulations is not an encroachment upon the judicial power vested elsewhere by the constitution.^-* § 189. Miscellaneous instances of powers of municipal officers. — At the common law, in addition to suits by individuals and corpora- "^ Genois v. Lockett, 13 La. 545, which is questionable law, according to Judge Dillon: Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 208. That public officers need not be expressly au- thorized to bring suit, but that their capacity to sue is commensurate with their public trusts and duties, see Auditor-General v. Lake George &c. R. Co., 82 Mich. 426, 429; s.c.46N. W. 730; citing Supervisor v. Stimson, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 136; Overseers v. Overseers, 18 Johns. (N, Y.) 407; Todd V. Birdsall, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 260; Berrien Co. Treasurer v. Bun- bury, 45 Mich. 79; s. c. 7 N. W. 704. The execution of an appeal bond by a mayor on behalf of a city is not incidental to the power to prosecute appeals, and therefore does not bind the city: Mayor &c. v. Railroad Co., 21 Md. 50. ""Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331. Cf. Waldo V. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. Ill; Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Maine 550; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426. Where the city council exceeds its power by the appropriation of mon- ey to pay the salary of an officer having no legal existence, the mayor may refuse to sign treasury war- rants for his services while acting as such officer: Ward v. Cook, 78 111. App. 111. Where a license is re- quired to be granted and signed by the mayor he has no discretion in the matter: In re O'Rourke, 30 N. Y. S. 375; s. c. 62 N. Y. St. 74. Where the mayor is in the city, but absent from a meeting, the power of the council is to choose a tempo- rary chairman, only to preside, who has not the power of a mayor: Peo- ple V. Blair, 82 111. App. 570. Where a city is divided into districts and resident physicians appointed in each under a provision of the char- ter which requires the physicians so appointed to be residents of the dis- trict in which they are appointed, the mayor has no right to assign such physicians to other districts: People V. Leavy, 59 N. Y. S. 408; s. c. 28 Misc. (N. Y.) 246. The mayor can not grant the exclusive right to sell intoxicating liquors within the corporate limits: Fletcher v. Col- lins, 111 Ga. 253; s. c. 36 S. E. 646. Where electric light has been fur- nished the city and the city council has audited the claims and ordered warrants therefor, it is the duty of the mayor to sign the orders, al- though the contract may have been invalid: Frederick v. People, 83 111. App. 89. The mayor may decide a tie vote of the council: Smedley v. Kirby, 120 Mich. 253; s. c. 79 N. W. 187; but is not counted in deter- mining a quorum: People v. Brush, 31 N. Y. S. 586; s. c. 83 Hun (N. Y.) 613. A city attorney has no right to bind a city by an agreement that certain suits shall abide the result of other suits: Fidelity Trust &c. Co. V. City of Louisville, 174 U. S. 429; s. c. 19 S. Ct. 875. 193 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 189 tions, there are some collective bodies, which, although not strictly corporations, have been invested by law with certain corporate powers, and may sue in respect to the matters specially committed to their charge; and in general, all public officers, although not expressly au- thorized by statute, have a capacity to sue commensurate with their public trusts and duties.^^** A town treasurer has no power to con- vey real estate in behalf of the town, unless expressly authorized by vote, and a note given in payment of such unauthorized deed is without consideration and void.^^° Councilmen of a town ap- pointed by its charter, who enter upon and perform the duties of their office, are de facto officers, and, though the charter be uncon- stitutional, their acts in levying a license tax, as authorized by it, are binding.^^^ "° Supervisor v. Stimson,4Hill (N. Y.) 136; Overseers &c. v. Overseers &c., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 436; Todd v. Birdsall, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 260, and cases cited in note. See also. Palm- er V. Vandenbergh, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 193; Silver v. Cummings, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 181; Avery v. Slack, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 50; Dillon Munic. Corp. (4tli ed.), § 237. ""Inhabitants &c. v. Tripp, 81 Maine 24; s. c. 16 Atl. 327. Town selectmen have no right to inquire into the legality of the vote of a school district to raise money; they have only to assess the tax voted, and may be compelled to do so by mandamus: School District v. Carr, 63 N. H. 201. The laws of New York of 1886, ch. 335, annexing the town of New Lots to the city of Brooklyn, authorized the mayor and other officers of the city to purchase the property and franchises of a water company incorporated in the town, at such price as might be agreed upon by such officers and the company, and, if they should be un- able to agree upon a price, power to acquire the property and franchises by right of eminent domain was giv- en the city "within two years here- after." No agreement was made for the purchase of the property, and 1 Smith — 13 no proceedings were taken to ac- quire title to it within two years after the passage of the act. But it was held that the power of the offi- cers named to buy expired with the two years to which the right to take by eminent domain was limited: Ziegler v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. S. 783; s. c. 126 N. Y. 342; 27 N. E. 471. "^ Roche V. Jones, 87 Va. 484; s. c, 12 S. E. 965. The board of estimate and apportionment of New York City have no power to transfer money to pay clerks employed by the commis- sioners of accounts, the appropria- tion for their payment having been stricken off from the provisional estimate: Bird v. Mayor &c., 33 Hun (N. Y.) 396. Where a county physi- cian refuses to treat a person in urgent need of medical attendance, a township trustee has authority to employ another, and his declara- tions concerning payment are com- petent: Washburn v. Board &c., 104 Ind. 321; s. c. 3 N. E. 757; 54 Am. R. 332. A department of the city government which has permitted another department to use buildings can not resume possession of them against the will of the department occupying them: New York Health Department v. Van Cott, 51 N. Y. Super. 413. Where a party, before 190 PUBLIC COErORATIONS. 194 § 190. De facto officers — General statement. — The leading modern case wherein de facto oflicers are defined and the general rules relat- ing to their acts succinctly stated and supported by a vast array of authorities, in an opinion of great intrinsic weight, is State v. Car- roll,^^- decided by the supreme court of errors of Connecticut. Chief Justice Butler summarizes the law as follows: An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon prin- ciples of policy and justice, will hold valid, sO' far as they involve the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised: First, without a known appointment or elec- tion, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people without inquiry to submit to or in- voke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be. Second, under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent re- quirement or condition; as, to take an oath, give a bond, or the like. Third, under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or the expiration of the time for an ap- peal from a judgment in favor of a municipal corporation, proposes to compromise with the council by pay- ing one-half of such judgment and costs, such council does not exceed its powers by settling with such party in the manner proposed: Ag- new V. Brail, 124 111. 312; s. c. 16 N. E. 230. The laws of New Jersey of 1888, p. 366, provide that "the board of aldermen, common council, . . . township committee, ... or other board, body or department of any municipal corporation in this state having the charge or con- trol of the water supply of such mu- nicipal corporation," may make a contract for obtaining or furnishing a supply of water for extinguishing fires and other proper purposes; and that "any such contract and agreement, when so made, shall be a valid and lawful contract of such municipal cor- poration." And it was held that under this act the township com- mittee may make a contract with a water company for a supply of wa- ter, and order the levy of a tax to pay therefor: State v. Inhabitants &c., 52 N. J. L. 483; s. c. 19 Atl. 966. Duties of tax commissioners under charter of Greater New York not limited to the boroughs from which they are selected: People v. Feitner, 156 N. Y. 694; s. c. 51 N. E. 1093. Construction of New Orleans char- ter in relation to municipal officers and vacancies: State v. City of New Orleans, 51 La. An. 99; s. c. 24 So. 620. What constitutes a confidential relation under New York laws of 1898, ch. 184: People v. Scannell, 56 N. Y. S. 117. Construction of statute of Maryland in relation to visitors to jail: Field v. Malsten, 88 Md. 691; s. c. 41 Atl. 1087. Construction of California act of March 7, 1881, p. 54, in relation to supervisors and malfeasance in oflSce: Fitch v. Board &c., 122 Cal. 285; s. c. 54 Pac. 901. Construction of New York laws of 1897, ch. 414, 368: People v. New- brand, 60 N. Y. S. 588. 1=^38 Conn. 449; s. c. 9 Am. R. 409. 195 OFnCERS AND AGENTS. § 191 irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public. Fourth, under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.^^^ A de facto officer is one whose title is not good in law, but who is in fact in the unobstructed possession of an office and discharging its duties in full view of the public, in such manner and under such circumstances as not to pre- sent the appearance of an intruder or usurper.^^* Whether one was or was not a de facto officer at the time when he assumed to perform duties belonging to a public office is a mixed question of law and fact.^^^ Where there is no ordinance providing for the election or appointment of a city marshal, as required by statute, a person claim- ing to act as such is neitlier an officer de jure nor de facto ;^^® there can neither be a de jure or de facto officer where there is no office to fill."^ § 191. The same subject continued — Color of title. — It was for- merly deemed essential to the validity of the acts of an officer de facto that he should be in possession under color of title by an election or appointment ;^^^ but although that rule is still maintained by some of the authorities,^^" the later tendency is toward more liberal "3 State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425; s. c. 9 Am. R. 409, sustaining a con- s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1121. victlon for crime in a court presided ^^^ Ward v. Cook, 78 111. App. Ill; over by a de facto judge. The acts Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425; done must be such as an officer de s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1121. jure might lawfully do: Shelby v. '^ Rex v. Lisle, 2 Str. 1090; s. c. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273; s. c. 72 Am. D. Andr. 163. 169. See also, generally, on the sub- "* Cocke v. Halsey, 16 Pet. 71; ject of de facto officers, Throop Pub- Fitchburg R. Co. v. Grand Junction lie Officers, ch. 27, and Mechem Pub- &c. R. Co., 1 Allen (Mass.) 552; lie Offices and Officers, ch. 8. Brown v. Lunt, 37 Maine 423; Hoop- la Waite V. City of Santa Cruz, 89 er v. Goodwin, 48 Maine 79; Carle- Fed. 619, 627; Petersilea v. Stone, ton v. People, 10 Mich. 250; Doug- 119 Mass. 465; Johns v. People, 25 lass v. Wickwire, 19 Conn. 489; Mich. 499; Attorney-General v. State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. Crocker, 138 Mass. 214; Hamlin v. 278; Town of Plymouth v. Painter, Kassafer, 15 Or. 456; s. c. 15 Pac. 17 Conn. 585; Elliott v. Willis, 1 Al- 778; State v. Vfilliams, 5 Wis. 308; len (Mass.) 461; People v. Albert- Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 son, 8 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 363; People Neb. 843; s. c. 47 N. W. 280. v. Collins, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 549; Mc- "^Waite V. City of Santa Cruz, 89 Instry v. Tanner, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) Fed. 619, 627; State v. Taylor, 108 135; Rochester &c. R. Co. v. Clarke N. C. 196; s. c. 12 S. E. 1005; United Nat'l Bank, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 234; States V. Alexander, 46 Fed. 728. ' Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) "8 Ward V. Cook, 78 111. App. Ill; 281; Commissioners v. McDaniel, 7 § 192 PUBLIC CORPOEATIONS. 196 views in favor of the public. "Third persons, from the nature of the case, can not always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office, even so far as to see that he has color of title to it by virtue of some appointment or election. If they see him publicly exercising its authority, if they ascertain that this is generally ac- quiesced in, they are entitled to treat him as such officer, and, if they employ him as such, should not be subjected to the danger of having his acts collaterally called in question."^*" While the acts of a mere usurper or intruder without color of right are utterly void,^*^ such a person may, by public acquiescence, gain sufficient color of author- ity to support him as an officer de facto. ^'*- § 192. Incumbent of an unconstitutional office. — It is no impeach- ment of the acts of an officer who is otherwise de facto that his appointment or election is unconstitutional; as, for instance, where he is appointed in violation of a constitution providing for his elec- tion. ^*^ But where no office legally exists, there can be no de facto officer. This qualification of the rule was declared in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Field of the supreme court of the United States, and an unconstitutional act creating an office "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.""* Jones L. (N. C.) 107; McGargell v. See also. Leach v. People, 122 111. Hazleton Coal Co., 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 420; s. c. 12 N. E. 726; Meagher v. 424; Gregg Tp. v. Jamison, 55 Pa. Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244; Lambert v. St. 468; Aulanier v. Governor, 1 People, 76 N. Y. 220; State v. Bloom, Tex. 653. 17 Wis. 521; Cole v. Black River ""Per Devens, J., in Petersilea v. Falls, 57 Wis. 110; s. c. 14 N. W. Stone, 119 Mass. 465, 467. See also, 906; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio St. People V. Staton, 73 N. C. 546; State 610; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; s. c. 9 Am. s. c. 9 Am. R. 409. R. 409; People v. Peabody, 6 Abb. "* Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. Pr. (N. Y.) 228, 233; s. c. 15 425, 442; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1121. Mr. How. Pr. (N. Y.) 470; Throop Public Justice Field says that the last para- Agents, § 624; "Who is a de facto Of- graph of Chief Justice Butler's defl- ficer?" 11 L. R. A. 105. nition (§ 190, ante) "refers not to "'State V. Taylor, 108 N. C. 196; the unconstitutionality of the act s. c. 12 S. E. 1005; 12 L. R. A. 202; creating the office, but to the uncon- McCraw V. Williams, 33 Graft. (Va.) stitutionality of the act by which 510; Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Maine the officer is appointed." See also, 79, 80; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113; Ex parte Reilly, 85 Cal. 632; s. c. 24 Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Or. 456; s. c. Pac. 807; People v. Toal, 85 Cal. 333; 15 Pac. 778; 3 Am. St. 176. s. c. 24 Pac. 603; "Acts of de facto "^ State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; Councils" in chapter on Public s. c. 9 Am. R. 409; Mechem Public Boards, post. Cf. Donough v. Dewey, Offices and Officers, §§ 319, 321. 82 Mich. 309; s. c. 46 N. W. 782, "^ Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Langlade where it was held that if a law pro- Co., 56 Wis. 614; s. c. 44 N. W. 844. viding for two school inspectors was 197 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 193 And the same rule is applied where an office is abolished by statute: thenceforth there can be no de facto incumbent. ^^'^ An officer elected under an unconstitutional law, where the interests of the public or a third party arc concerned, is an officer de facto J*" § 193. Possession of office by de facto officer. — In order to confer validity on the acts of a de facto officer he must be in possession and control of the office. There can not be a joint occupancy by two persons of a single otiice ;^'*^ and if both are assuming to act officially, the one who is destitute of legal title can perform no valid act.^** Where each of two rival claimants held possession for three days, the court decided that neither could sustain the character of an officer de facto.^*^ § 194. Rights and liabilities of de facto officers. — An officer de facto can neither maintain nor defend suits in his official capacity for his own benefit. When he sets up a title by virtue of his office he must show an unquestionable right. ^^° An infant is not justified in serving unconstitutional because only one was authorized, the acts of both in- cumbents would be valid until the law should be declared unconstitu- tional. "'^ Long V. Mayor &c., 81 N. Y. 425; Ex parte Snyder, 64 Mo. 58; Conway V. St. Louis, 9 Mo. App. 488; In re Hinlde, 31 Kan. 712; s. c. 3 Pac. 531; Yorty V. Paine, 62 Wis. 154; s. c. 22 N. W. 137; Burt v. Winona &c. R. Co., 31 Minn. 472; s. c. 18 N. W. 285, 289; Leach v. People, 122 111. 420; s. c. 12 N. E. 726. But cf. State v. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 383. ""State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; Taylor v. Skrine, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 516; Cocke v. Halsey, 16 Peters 71; People V. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250; Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129; Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. St. 436. The signing and de- livery of bonds of officers de facto are, as to third persons, as valid as if they were officers de jure: Waite V. City of Santa Cruz, 89 Fed. 619. "' Boardman v. Halliday, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 223, 232. See also, Throop Public Officers, § 641; Mechem Pub- lic Offices and Officers, §§ 322, 323; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 72, 80; Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Or. 456; s. c. 15 Pac. 778; 3 Am. St. 176. "« State V. Blossom, 19 Nev. 312; s. c. 10 Pac. 430; Auditors v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Cronin v. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271. "* Conover v. Devlin, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 470. See also, Braidy v. Theritt, 17 Kan. 468; Runion v. Lat- imer, 6 S. C. 126; Ex parte Norris, 8 S. C. 408; Ex parte Smith, 8 S. C. 495. ''^^ Adams v. Tator, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 384; Dolan v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 274; Venable v. Curd, 2 Head (Tenn.) 582; Shepherd v. Staten, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 79; Riddle v. Bed- ford Co., 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 386 People V. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375 Dillon V. Myers, Bright. (Pa.) 426 Fowler v. Bebee, 9 Mass. 231; Ham lin V. Dingman, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 61 Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151; Peo pie V. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520 Patterson v. Miller, 2 Met. (Ky.) 493; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 574; People v. Weber, 86 111. 283; 195 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 198 process as a constable.'" Actual incumbency, merely, gives a public officer no right to recover salary or fees either by suit against the mu- nicipality or against private persons ;^^^ nor can be bring a suit in his official title for pecuniary penalties.^^^ § 195. Resignation by acceptance of incompatible office. — Where a person holds an office which he is at liberty to relinquish at his own pleasure, the acceptance of another and incompatible office vacates the first office,^^* and it requires no legal proceedings to effect this result.^^^ If a person be elected simultaneously to two incompatible offices, by qualifying for either he signifies his refusal of the other.^^^ But where the officer is holding over by law until his successor is chosen, it seems that he may continue the exercise of the first without prejudice to the second;^" and where the acceptance of the last s. c. 89 111. 347; Nichols v. MacLean, 101 N. Y. 526; s. c. 5 N. E. 347; Mil- ler V. Callaway, 32 Ark. 666; Olm- sted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; Keyser V. McKissan, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 139. But he will be protected in public expenditures for lawful purposes: McCracken v. Soucy, 29 111. App. 619. '^' Green v. Burke, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 490. See also, Short v. Symmes, 150 Mass. 298; s. c. 23 N. E. 42; Col- burn V. Ellis, 5 Mass. 427; Cum- mings V. Clark, 15 Vt. 653; Courser v. Powers, 34 Vt. 517; Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202; Pearce v. Hawk- Ins, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 87; People v. Weber, 86 111. 283; s. c. 89 111. 347; Miller v. Callaway, 32 Ark. 666; Pat- terson v. Miller, 2 Met. (Ky.) 493; Rodman v. Harcourt, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 224. "^Dolan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 274; s. c. 23 Am. R. 168; People v. Hop- son, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 574; Mayfield V. Moore, 53 111. 428; McCue v. Wa- pello Co., 56 Iowa 698; s. c. 10 N. W. 248; Prescott v. Hayes, 42 N. H. 56; Riddle v. Bedford Co., 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 386; City of Philadelphia v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136; Dolliver v. Parks, 136 Mass. 499. He can not recover, for instance, if he omitted to take the oath required by statute: Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189; City of Philadelphia v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136. "^ Gould V. Glass, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 179; Supervisor v. Stimson, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 136; Horton v. Parsons, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 42; People v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375. ^"People V. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375; People v. Carrique, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 93; Magie v. Stoddard, 25 Conn. 565; State Bank v. Curran, 10 Ark. 142; Pooler v. Reed, 73 Maine 129; Stubbs V. Lee, 64 Maine 195; State V. Goff, 15 R. I. 505; s. c. 9 Atl. 226; People V. Hanifan, 96 111. 420; Foltz V. Kerlin, 105 Ind. 221; s. c. 4 N. E. 439; 5 N. E. 672; State v. West, 33 La. An. 1261; Kenney v. Goergen, 36 Minn. 190; s. c. 31 N. W. 210; State V. Brinkerhoff, 66 Tex. 45; s. c. 17 S. W. 109. ^=^= State V. Buttz, 9 S. C. 156, and cases cited in the preceding note. ^^^ Cotton V. Phillips, 56 N. H. 220. Formerly, in England, in the case of incompatible offices, the incumbent was held to retain the superior, but such is not now the rule: Rex v. Jones, 1 B. & Ad. 677; Milward v. Thatcher, 2 T. R. 81; Rex v. Tiz- zard, 9 B. & C. 418; Com. Dig., tit. Officer, K. 5. ^" State V. Somers, 96 N. C. 467; s. c. 2 S. E. 161. 199 OFFICEKS AND AGENTS. § 196 office is made compulsory, under a penalty,'^® or in case of ineligibil- ity to occupy the same/ •'*'■' there is no implied abandonment of the first office. "Where one office is not subordinate to the other," said the court of common pleas of New York, "nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incom- patibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word in its application to this matter is that from the nature and relations to each other of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the at- tempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other."^*^° § 196. Acceptance and withdrawal of resignation. — At common law it was an indictable offense for one to refuse an office in a public corporation to which he had been duly elected.^*^^ This principle has been applied by the English and several American authorities so as to render a resignation of such an officer after entering upon his office ^''^ wholly ineffective without the express or implied assent of the appointing power.^^^ But the rule is not settled: many authori- ties holding that the office becomes ipso facto vacant when a resigna- tion is transmitted and received.^'''* Where such is the law, a resig- nation is as irrevocable as an appointment, and if it be unconditional ^^'^ Goettman v. Mayor &c., 6 Hun (N. Y.) 132. Cf. Hartford Tp. v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St. 441. "« State v. Kearns, 47 Ohio St. 566; s. c. 25 N. E. 1027. ""People V. Green, 5 Daly (N. Y.) 254; s. c. 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 168. See also, for a collection of English and American rulings on incompati- bility, Throop Public Officers, § 35 et seq. "^ State V. Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. 107; Com. Dig., tit. Officer, B. 1. See also, Edwards v. United States, 13 Otto 471; Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 223. ^^- There can be no resignation by one who has not qualified: Miller v. Supervisors, 25 Cal. 93; Reg. v. Bliz- ard, L. R. 2 Q. B. 55. See also. In re Corliss, 11 R. I. 638. "'Reg. V. Lane. 2 Ld. Raym. 1304; Edwards v. United States, 13 Otto 471. Cf. United States v. Wright, 1 McLean 509; Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 243 (where Cowen, J., said it is entirely clear that the resignation may be either in writing or by parol, express, or even by impli- cation, so that there be an intent to resign on one side and an accept- ance on the other) ; State v. Fergu- son, 31 N. J. L. 107; Hoke v. Hen- derson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1, 29; State V. Clayton, 27 Kan. 442; Rogers v. Slonaker, 32 Kan. 191; s. c. 4 Pac. 138; City of Waycross v. Youmans, 85 Ga. 708; s. c. 11 S. E. 865; State v. Boecker, 56 Mo. 17. "'Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; citing Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 91; People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; State V. Hauss, 43 Ind. 105; Leech V. State, 78 Ind. 570; Gates v. Dela- ware Co., 12 Iowa 405; State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566; Conner v. Mayor, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 355; s. c. 5 N. Y. 285, 295. § 197 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 200 it can not be withdrawn. ^*^^ But a prospective resignation may be withdrawn with the consent of the authority accepting where no new rights have intervened.^'"* § 197. Removal of officers and agents — How effected. — The power of a corporation to remove its officers depends greatly upon the tenure of office of such officers; as, where the power of removal is discre- tionary, they may be removed without notice or hearing; but if their term of office is during good behavior, or where the removal can only be for for certain causes, they can not be removed except after notice and hearing.^'*'^ The power to remove is incidental to a corporation at large, and unless delegated to a select body or part, it must be exercised by the whole corporation.^®^ In the absence of a constitu- "5 State V. Fitts, 49 Ala. 402; Gates V. Delaware Co., 12 Iowa 405; Bunt- ing V. Willis, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 144; State V. Hauss, 43 Ind. 105; Pace v. People, 50 111. 432. ^""Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 62, 66; State v. Clayton; 27 Kan. 442; s c. 41 Am. R. 418. See also, Throop Public Officers, ch. 17. ^"People V. New York, 82 N. Y. 491; Queen v. Governors &c., 8 Ad. & El. 632; Rex v. Oxford, 2 Salk, 428; Bagg's Case, 11 Coke 93 (b) ; In re Ramshay, 83 Eng. Com. Law 174, 189; Rex v. Coventry, 1 Ld. Raym. 391; Rex v. Mayor &c., 1 Lev. 291; Dr. Gaskin's Case, 8 T. R. 209; Willcock Munich. Corp. 253, 254; 2 Kyd Corp. 58, 59; Rex v. Andover, 1 Ld. Raym. 710; Field v. Common- wealth, 32 Pa. St. 478; In re Hen- nen, 13 Peters 230. For removal, where duration of term is not fixed, see People v. Comptroller &c., 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 595; People v. Nich- ols, 79 N. Y. 582; Field v. Girard College, 54 Pa. St. 233; Common- wealth V. Sutherland, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 145; State v. City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19; s. c. 1 S. W. 757; State V. Doherty, 25 La. An. 119; s. c. 13 Am. R. 131; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648; City of Madi- son V. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74; Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346. The New York statutes of 1887 and 1888 pro- vided that conductors on the Brook- lyn bridge, who were soldiers in the war of the rebellion, and honorably discharged, must be notified of all charges against them before being removed from their positions. It was held, on mandamus to reinstate such a soldier, who had been re- moved from such position as con- ductor without a hearing, that, as he was entitled to a hearing without re- gard to the merits of his case, an or- der for a bill of particulars was un- necessary, and should be reversed: People V. Howell, 13 N. Y. S. 217; s. c. 37 N. Y. St. 181. The charter of the city of Jacksonville provided that no officer could be i^emoved by the city council without first being heard in his defense. It was de- cided that the hearing must be had before the city council itself, and not before one of its committees: City of Jacksonville v. Allen, 25 111. App. 54. A board of police com- missioners is not guilty of an arbi- trary and unwarrantable exercise of authority in suspending an officer pending a trial before the board on charges which, if true, would in- volve his disrhissal: State v. St. Louis Police Comm., 16 Mo. App. 48. "'- State V. Common Council &c., 25 N. J. L. 536; Fane's Case, 1 Doug. 201 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. tional restriction a statute may shorten the term of an oOice before the expiration of the time for which a person has been elected. ^^^ And so the term of office may be shortened by an amendment to the char- ter abolishing the office, and placing the duties upon other officers.^^" The notion that an appointment for a term, under an ordinance providing that the officer shall be removable for cause, without more, is a contract that the office shall be kept up for the term irrespective of the public welfare, can not be sustained.^'' ^ A board of public works established under the discretionary power conferred by statute may be abolished at any time.^'^^ But the abolishing of an office is a matter about which courts will examine as to the good faith of the action.^'^^ While the power which creates an office can abolish it at pleasure, yet where an officer is appointed to hold dur- ing good behavior and an ordinance is passed abolishing the office, but before it takes effect a new ordinance is passed reviving the office and another person is appointed to the office, the first incumbent will hold.i^*^ 149, 153; Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Str. 819; Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517; Rex v. Taylor. 3 Salk. 231; Rex v. Lyme Regis, 1 Doug. 149, 153; 2 Kyd Corp. 56; Grant Corp. 240, 241; Glover Corp. 329. Where the pre- ferring of charges and an opportu- nity to be heard are required by law, summary action is void: Pratt V. Board &c., 15 Utah 1; s. c. 49 Pac. 747. The N. Y. act of 1898, ch. 186, § 3, prohibiting removals from office without an opportunity for defense applies to the city of New York: People v. Dalton, 53 N. Y. S. 291. On investigation of the police commissioners against a po- liceman he has no right to complain that his witnesses were not sworn where their testimony is received and given the same consideration as . if sworn: People v. Moss, 56 N. Y. S. 1032; s. c. 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 630. Under New Jersey act of 1897, the council can not declare an office va- cant without a hearing on notice if practicable, and proof of facts legal- ly authorizing such action: Krueger v. Council &c., 64 N. J. L. 523; s. c. 45 Atl. 780. An inspector of water supply held not to be a clerk and entitled to a hearing, although he may perform some clerical duties: People V. Dalton, 159 N. Y. 235; s. c. 53 N. E. 1113. ^""Collins V. Russell, 107 Ga. 423; s. c. 33 S. E. 444. ^'"Donaghy v. Macy, 167 Mass. 178; s. c. 43 N. E. 87; People v. Davie, 114 Cal. 363; s. c. 46 Pac. 150. '" Butcher v. City of Camden, 29 N. J. Eq. 478; Love v. Mayor &c., 46 N. J. L. 456; Mayor &c. v. Gear, 27 N. J. L. 265; City Council v. Swee- ney, 44 Ga. 463; Waldraven v. Mayor &c., 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 431; Marden v. Portsmouth, 59 N. H. 18; City of Brazil v. McBride, 69 Ind. 244, 256; Conner v. Mayor &c., 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 355; City of Pales- tine V. West (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 783. "- Board &c. v. Brawner, 100 Ky. 166; s. c. 37 S. W. 950; 38 S. W. 497. "^ People V. La Grange, 40 N. Y. S. 1026; s. c. 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 311. "^Silvey v. Boyle, 20 Utah 205; s. c. 57 Pac. 880. The fire commis- sioner may properly, on economic grounds, abolish a position held by 198 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 202 § 198. Causes for removal — English and American rules. — It is said in Kyd on Corporations^'^^ tliat "the offenses for which a corpo- rator may be disfranchised, or a corporate officer removed, have been distributed into three distinct classes: First, such as relate merely to his corporate or official character and amount to breaches of the condition tacitly or expressly annexed to his franchise or office. ^'^® Secondly, such as have no immediate relation to his corporate or official character, but are in themselves of so infamous a nature as to render the offender unfit to enjoy any public franchise; such as perjury, forgery, etc. x'knd thirdly, offenses of a mixed nature, being not only against his corporate or official duty, but also indictable at common law."^'^'' employes under him: People v. Scannell, 62 N. Y. S. 1064; s. c. 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 244. The adop- tion by a city of the general law for the incorporation of cities abolishes eo instanti the office of city mar- shal: People V. Blair, 82 111. App. 570. An office of the state can not be abolished by the city: Marquis v. City of Santa Ana, 103 Cal. 661; s. c. 37 Pac. 650. ^" 2 Kyd Corp. 62. "spagg's Case, 11 Coke 93, 98a. "'Rex V. Carlisle, Fortesc. 200; s. c. 11 Mod. 379. As to rescind- ing an invalid amotion, see Reg. V. Mayor &c., 28 L. T. (N. S.) 629. For amotion and disfranchise- ment, see 2 Kent Com. 278, 297; and Angell & Ames Corp., ch. 12 (where the doctrine of the English decisions is presented and earlier cases cited) ; Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491; s. c. 4 S. B. 774. Dis- franchisement destroys and takes away the franchise or right of being a member of a corporation: Will- cock Munic. Corp. 245-276; Grant Corp. 250, 263; 2 Kyd Corp. 50-94; Glover Corp., ch. 16, pp. 327, 328. Under the code of West Virginia, which provides that "all the corpo- rate powers of the corporation shall be exercised" by the common coun- cils of towns or villages to which said chapter applies, the power of amotion of officers for misconduct, which at common law is vested in the "corporation at large," is con- ferred on such councils: Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491; s. c. 4 S. E. 774. The revised statutes of Indiana confer express authority upon the common council of a city to expel or remove, by a two-thirds vote, any member thereof, or any officer of the corporation, whether elected or appointed, and require the council to make provision as to the mode in which charges shall be preferred and heard. Section 4265 Burns R. S. 1901 provides that the common council shall be authorized, through a committee, to investigate the books and papers, together with all matters pertaining to the man- agement of the water-works, and, in case of neglect of duty or malfeas- ance on the part of any officer con- nected therewith, to remove the of- fender. And it was held that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the council of a city from proceeding to investigate charges preferred against trustees of the water-works in the mode provided by the by-laws and ordi- nances of the city: Muhler v. Hede- 203 OFFICERS AXD AGENTS. 199 § 199. Preferring of charges. — Sometimes the grounds for re- moval are stated in the constitution as misconduct and malfeasance in office,"® but most usually they are specified in the statute,"® but may be embodied in the charter.^^** The removal of an officer from his office being a judicial act,^**^ it is necessary that formal charges be made in order that the officer charged may know the grounds of accusation and be prepared to meet them if he can.^^- The grounds kin, 119 Ind. 481; s. c. 20 N. E. 700. Acts of an officer, after his suspen- sion, in seeking and accepting other employment, are not admissible against him to show that he under- stood, when he received notice of suspension, that he was discharged: Morley v. Mayor &c., 12 N. Y. S. 609; s. c. 58 Hun (N. Y.) 610. ^" Where the constitution provides that officers not subject to impeach- ment shall be subject to removal for misconduct and malfeasance in of- fice in such manner as provided by law, and the statute is silent on the subject of causes for removal, the only grounds for removal are those specified in the constitution: Board &c. V. People, 13 Colo. App. 553; s. c. 59 Pac. 72. ^"^ Where the law provides that a village officer shall not be interested in contracts with the village, and he admits the violation, he should be removed. It is not a defense that he received no more on the contract than other contractors and acted in good faith: In re Smith, 63 N. Y. S. 1018; s. c. 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 634. A person in office when a law goes into effect prohibiting an officer becoming interested in a con- tract, who does not deny knowledge of the law, and knew of similar provisions in a previous law, does not show good faith: In re Smith, 63 N. Y. S. 1018; s. c. 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 634. *^ Where the charter authorizes the removal of officers for incapac- ity, or other just cause, an officer may be removed, notwithstanding there is no ordinance prescribing the mode of removal, if the action of the council is in proper form: State V. Smith, 72 Conn. 572; s. c. 45 Atl. 355. ''' People V. Board &c., 39 N. Y. S. 607; s. c. 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 399. A village trustee who prefers charges against an officer is not com- petent to sit as a member of the board on a hearing of the charges: People V. Board &c., 39 N. Y. S. 607; s. c. 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 399. But see State v. Common Council &c., 90 Wis. 612; s. c. 64 N. W. 304. ^*- In stating a ground for removal the facts should be alleged to have been wilfully done: State v. Mayor &c., 10 Wash. 4; s. c. 38 Pac. 761. Where a charter provides that the mayor may remove for cause which he may deem sufficient, and the rea- son assigned was "the good of the service," it is sufficient as a matter of law: Ayers v. Hatch, 175 Mass. 489; s. c. 56 N. E. 612. In formal pleading this statement would be quite insufficient, as it is but a mere conclusion and conveys no in- formation to the officer charged. Formal charges for removal by a municipal board are essential in Tennessee: Hayden v. City Council &c., 100 Tenn. 582; s. c. 47 S. W. 182. Where an officer goes to trial on charges not sufficiently specific he waives the question of suffi- ciency: State V. Kirkwood, 15 Wash. 298; s. c. 46 Pac. 331. 300 PUBLIC COEPOllATIONS. 204 which have been hohl siifTieient for the removal of an officer are many and can not be enumerated in detail.^ "^ § 200. Power of corporation to remove officers and agents. — One of the common-hiw incidents of all corporations is the power to re- move a corporate officer from his office for just and reasonable cause. ^^* The leading case on this subject is Eex v. Richard- ^^^ An inspector of buildings wtio entered a saloon and committed an assault was held to be properly re- moved: People v. Brady, 62 N. Y. S. 603; s. c. 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 128. Where a collector of city revenues was removed for incompetency, the removal will not be disturbed where such officer offered no explanation of his inability to balance his books and could not add correctly his col- lections: People V. Coler, 159 N. Y. 569; s. c. 54 N. E. 1094. Where a board of trustees is made exclusive- ly the judge of the qualifications of its members, the refusal of the may- or to recognize certain members, the permitting of persons not mem- bers to sit and vote, the casting of a vote by the mayor when not au- thorized, are not grounds of removal, since the right of appeal from any ruling or decision exists: Board &c. V. People, 13 Colo. App. 553; s. c. 59 Pac. 72. Prosecution and convic- tion for misdemeanor in a court of competent jurisdiction is essential as a ground of removal: Board &c. V. People, 13 Colo. 553; s. c. 59 Pac. 72. It is misfeasance and malfeas- ance in a city attorney to stipulate not to appeal a case and report to the council that he had done noth- ing to prevent an appeal: People v. Common Council &c., 33 N. Y. S. 165; s. c. 85 Hun (N. Y.) 601. It is not malconduct for an officer to strike a person with a pistol and no cause for removal: .Johnson v. City Council &c., 11 Tex. Civ. App. 469; s. c. 33 S. W. 150. Where the mayor solicited and collected from the heads of departments large sums of money to reimburse himself for campaign expenses it is ground for removal: State v. Common Council &c., 90 Wis. 612; s. c. 64 N. W. 304. Town officers having power to re- quire an additional bond of an offi- cer appointed to fill a vacancy have power to declare the office vacant upon the appointee refusing to give bond as required: Lyman v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 55 S. W. 686. Under a charge against a member of a municipal board of asking for a bribe he can not be removed for merely failing to disclose to the council that a bribe had been offered him: Hayden v. City Council &c., 100 Tenn. 582; s. c. 47 S. W. 182. The removal of a collector of city revenues will not be disturbed where he was unable to balance his books and could not add correctly his collections and made no expla- nation of his inability: People v. Coler, 57 N. Y. S. 636; s. c. 40 App. Div. (N. Y.) 65; s. c. aff'd 159 N. Y. 569; 54 N. E. 1094. '"'Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 212; Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491; s. c. 4 S. E. 774; State V. Judges, 35 La. An. 1075; Ellison V. Aldermen &c., 89 N. C. 125; Rex V. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517; Rex v. Mayor &c., 2 Burr. 738; Rex v. May- or &c., 2 Burr. 723; Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Str. 819; Jay's Case, 1 Vent. 302; Rex v. Lyme Regis, 1 Doug. 149, 153; Rex v. Ponsonby, 1 Ves. Jr. 1; Rex v. Taylor, 3 Salk. 231; Rex V. Tidderley. 1 Sid. 14, per Hale, C. B.; 2 Kyd Corp. 50-94, where the old cases are digested; Rex V. Chalke, 1 Ld. Raym. 225; 1 205 OFFICKRS AND AOEXTS. 201 son,'"'''' ill which it was decided that a corporation, in the absence of an express grant of authority, had the incidental power to make a by- hnv to remove ollicers for just cause.^**" Where the charter of a mu- nicipal corporation gives lo the common council express power to "expel a member for disorderly conduct," the right to expel depends upon the construction of the words "disorderly conduct."^**^ § 201. The same subject continued. — The revised statute of Mis- souri which revised the city charter of Sedalia provided that the mayor should have power, with the consent of the board of aldermen, to remove from office any person holding office, created by charter or ordinance, for cause. It was held that this statute was not repealed by a subsequent statute which provided for the removal from office of persons who failed to devote their time to their duties, or who were guilty of wilful or fraudulent violation of duty; and in an action for wrongful ouster from office, it was held not error to permit plaintiff to strike out an allegation as to the power of defendant mayor and aldermen to remove for cause the incumbent of an office created by charter or ordinance, as the state of facts on which the action was based remained unaltered.^ ^^ Where a charter prohibits a sal- Roll. Rep. 409; s. c. 3 Bulst. 189; Willcock Munic. Corp. 246; Grant Corp. 240; 2 Kent Com. 297. ^= 1 Burr. 517. ^^« Dillon Munic. Corp. (4tli ed.), § 251. The Massachusetts statutes of 1885 provide that subordinates of the various city boards of Bos- ton may be removed by the board "for such cause as they may deem sufRcient, and shall assign in their order for removal." The court de- cided that it does not require that a subordinate shall be given a hearing before the board, on charges pre- ferred against him, before he can be removed: O'Dowd v. City of Boston. 149 Mass. 443; s. c. 21 N. E. 949. Charter power of removal, at any time, without cause, of a police patrol appointed for a year, — see City of Chicago v. Edwards, 58 111. 252. '*' State v. Common Council &c., 25 N. J. L. 536. For power to punish for contempt in England, see Doyle V. Falconer, L. R. 1 P. C. 328; Speaker v. Glass, L. R. 3 P. C. 560. Power of courts in United States to punish for contempt: Burr's Trial, 355; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32. Power of congress: 12 U. S. Stats, at Large 333; 11 U. S. Stats, at Large 155. See also, Kil- bourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. '^''Manker v. Paulhaber, 94 Mo. 430; s. c. 6 S. W. 372. The Missouri constitution of 1875 provided that all laws in force at the adoption of the constitution, and not inconsist- ent therewith, should remain in force until altered or repealed by the general assembly. It was ac- cordingly decided in the case last cited that the act of March 18, 1873, as amended by an act of 1875, revis- ing the charter of the city of Se- dalia, and providing for the removal of city officers by the mayor and board of aldermen for cause, is not repugnant to said constitution of 1875, regarding the duties of per- sons holding offices of trust or profit. § 202 PUBLIC COllPORATIONS. 206 aried officer from holding any other public office during his incum- bency, the acceptance of a commission in the United States army operates as a forfeiture of the office notwithstanding a resolution of the council to the contrary. ^^^ § 202. Notice of proceeding to remove. — Before an officer whose tenure of otlice is not discretionary can be removed, he is entitled to a personal notice of the proceeding against him; which notice must contain the fact that a proceeding to amove is intended, and the time when and place where the trial body will meet.^'*" The charges and the power of the general as- tion: State v. Kearns, 47 Ohio St. sembly to provide for their removal 566; s. c. 25 N. B. 1027. Where the for violation or neglect of official charter provided for the appoint- duty. Implied power of removal ment of an officer at a specified for cause by appointing power: meeting who should hold his office Willard's Appeal, 4 R. I. 595, 597, for one year and until his successor per Ames, C. J. In an action for was appointed, a successor can not damages for wrongful removal from be appointed at a subsequent meet- office by the mayor and aldermen of ing: State v. Alexander, 107 Iowa a city, the refusal by the court to 177; s. c. 77 N. W. 841. A statute permit defendants to read the pro- visions of the city charter giving them authority to remove for cause is erroneous: Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo. 430; s. c. 6 S. W. 372. The consolidation act of New York pro- vides that the heads of all the de- providing for filling the vacancy in an entire board of trustees by the county court appointing a board does not conflict with an amendment authorizing the county judge to fill a vacancy in the board, and the lat- ter does not repeal the former: partments of New York City may be Lewis v. Town of Brandenburg, 20 removed by the mayor, after oppor- Ky. L. 1011; s. c. 47 S. W. 862; 48 tunity to be heard. It was decided S. W. 978. that the violation of the provision ^'^ People v. Drake, 60 N. Y. S. 309 ; in the act that no head of the de- s. c. 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 325; Peo- partment shall become interested pie v. Duane, 121 N. Y. 367; s. c. 24 directly or indirectly in the pur- N. E. 845; State v. Mayor &c., 63 chase of real estate by the corpora- N. J. L. 96; s. c. 42 Atl. 782; Kerr tion constitutes sufficient cause for v. Jones, 19 Ind. 351; Rowland v. removal by the mayor, and it is im- Mayor &c., 83 N. Y. 372; People v. material that the act also contains a Nostrand, 46 N. Y, 375; People v. provision for the punishment of Common Council &c., 77 N. Y. 503; such offense: People v. Mayor &c., State v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516. 5 N. Y. S. 538; s. c. 52 Hun (N. Y.) 483. Where judgment of ouster is pronounced against persons holding ^^ People V. Benevolent Society, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 216; People v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582; In re Nichols, seats in a city council, and they are 6 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 474; s. c. 57 ousted therefrom on the ground How. Pr. (N. Y.) 395; People v. that the wards from which they Commissioners &c., 106 N. Y. 64; s. claim to have been elected had no c. 12 N. E. 641; Commonwealth v. legal existence, such ouster does not Pennsylvania Benef. Institute, 2 S. create vacancies in the council & R. (Pa.) 141; Society v. Vandyke, which may be filled by a special elec- 2 Whart. (Pa.) 309; Delacey v. 207 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 203 must be specially stated with substantial certainty ;^®^ and the accused must be given time to produce his testimony and present his answer, and is entitled to be represented by counsel and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.^"- § 203. The same subject continued. — WTien the charge is not ad- mitted it must be examined and proved. ^"^ Before an officer can be ousted by authority other than the appointing power, he is entitled to a hearing, for the reason that the question whether he shall be ousted is a judicial one, and a decision given without affording him time and opportunity to be heard is ineffectual.^"* Where the charge stated does not justify the removal, or where the removal is erroneous, the officer is entitled to be restored by mandamus.^"^ Neuse &c. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.) 274; Southern Plank R. Co. v. Hixon, 5 Ind. 165; Innes v. Wylie, 1 C. & K. 257; Queen v. Saddlers' Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 404; State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio (pt. 2, 82) 414, 416; Rex v. Rich- ardson, 1 Burr. 517; Rex v. Liver- pool, 2 Burr. 723; Rex v. Doncaster, 2 Burr. 738. See King v. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936; Exeter v. Clyde, 4 Mod. 33; Bagg's Case, 11 Coke 93a; Rex V. Wilton, 5 Mod. 257; Willcock Munic. Corp. 264, 265; Reg. v. Bail- iffs &c., 2 Ld. Raym. 1240. When no- tice may- be dispensed with, — see Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 254. ^^1 Bagg's Case, 11 Co. 93a; s. c. 1 Roll. 224; Tompert v. Lithgow, 1 Bush (Ky.) 176; Willcock Munic. Corp. 267; Glover Corp. 334; Rex v. Lyme Regis, 1 Doug. 177. ^''- Murdock v. Academy, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 244; State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio (pt. 2, 82) 414; Rex v. Chalke, 1 Ld. Raym. 225; Rex v. Derby, Cas. temp. Hardw. 154; Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517; Rex v. Liverpool, 2 Burr. 723. Under § 95 of the charter of Greater New York it is not neces- sary to give notice to remove offi- cials whose terms have expired: People V. Feitner, 51 N. Y. S. 1094; s. c. 30 App. Div. (N. Y.) 241; s. c. affirmed 156 N. Y. 694; 51 N. E. 1093. A removal is not effective un- til the person removed has been no- tified: Kriseler v. Le Valley, 122 Mich. 576; s. c. 81 N. W. 580. No- tice by a village clerk of removal by the village president is not suf- ficient: Kriseler v. Le Valley, 122 Mich. 576; s. c. 81 N. W. 580. 193 Murdock v. Academy, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 244; Willcock Munic. Corp. 267; Glover Corp. 334; Harman v. Tappenden, 1 East 555; Rex v. Fa- versham, 8 T. R. 352. ''"Board &c. v. Johnson, 124 Ind. 145; s. c. 24 N. E. 148; 19 Am. St. 88; Dullam V. Willson, 53 Mich. 392; s. c. 19 N. W. 112; 51 Am. R. 128; Peo- ple V. Freese, 83 Cal. 453; s. c. 23 Pac. 378; Williams v. Bagot, 3 B. & C. 772; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648. The power to oust an officer rightfully in office is essen- tially a judicial one, except where it is exercised by the appointing power: State v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; s. c. 16 N. E. 384; 3 Am. St. 663. "» State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 536; Commonwealth v. German So- ciety, 15 Pa. St. 251; City of Madi- son V. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74; Reg. v. Ispwich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1232. Equity will not enjoin the corporate au- thorities from making an unlawful removal or appointing a successor: Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), ch. 21 and § 847; Delahanty v. Warner, 75 111. 185; s. c. 20 Am. R. 237. One 204 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 208 § 204. By whom discharged. — (a) By city council. — As a rule an office created by the city council may be abolished by it in the absence of constitutional or statutory restrictions.^^" When the stat- ute provides that the council shall appoint a certain officer to continue in office during its pleasure it is within the power of the council to remove such officer summarily at any time without notice or charges j)referred.^°^ If the right of removal is given by the charter to the council the right is not taken away by fixing the term of office by ordi- nance at one year.^''* And where the council is authorized from time to time to elect and appoint an officer he may be removed and his successor appointed at pleasure. ^^® But where an officer is removable by the city council his removal by a committee of such council is not effective until ratified by the council: the power can not be delegated.''^*' If the power of removal is in the council a member is not disqualified by reason of his having preferred charges against the officer.-"^ But where the statute declares that an office may be who has been duly elected, quali- fied and inducted into office as a city alderman can not be summarily removed, by resolution of the board, upon a charge of disqualification, without notice and without hearing or investigation of any kind: Board &c. V. Darrow, 13 Colo. 460; s. c. 22 Pac. 784. Where the sufficiency of an explanation rests entirely with the removal officer, after a full hear- ing his action will not be disturbed on appeal: People v. Brady, 62 N. Y. S. 603; s. c. 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 128. As to the effect of the con- solidation of New York with por- tion of Queens County in relation to policemen, see People v. York, 53 N. Y. S. 947; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 573. As to commissioner of city works, see People v. Dalton, 53 N. Y. S. 1060; s. c. 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 6; In re Fuller, 53 N. Y. S. 1090; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 617. As to wages after consolidation, where no services were rendered there- after, see Ford v. City of New York, 56 N. Y. S. 4; s. c. 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 292. In order to maintain a suit for his salary by a person who was illegally removed from his office it is not necessary to be reinstated by mandamus: Morgan v. City of Den- ver, 14 Colo. App. 147; s. c. 59 Pac. 619. A petition for reinstatement which does not state the nature of petitioner's duties, but merely al- leges that he is a regular clerk so as to be entitled to a hearing, is not sufficient: People v. Dalton, 159 N. Y. 235; s. c. 53 N. B. 1113. Where a policeman is remanded to patrol duty and waits two years before be- ginning proceedings for restoration, he is guilty of laches and will not be heard: People v. Moss, 58 N. Y. S. 1051; s. c. 42 App. Div. (N. Y.) 196. Petition for reinstatement under N. Y. laws of 1898, ch. 186, must state that petitioner's position was classi- fied as competitive: People v. Dal- ton, 159 N. Y. 235; s. c. 53 N. E. 1113. ^"•^ Goodwin v. State, 142 Ind. 117; s. c. 41 N. E. 359. "' Town of Davis v. Miller, 47 W. Va. 413; s. c. 35 S. E. 6. ^"^ Mathis V. Rose, 64 N. J. L. 45; s. c. 44 Atl. 875. ^™' Mathis V. Rose, 64 N. J. L. 45; s. c. 44 Atl. 875. "'^ People V. Tracy, 54 N. Y. S. 1070; s. c. 35 App. Div. (N. Y.) 265. -"' People V. Common Council &c., 209 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 204 declared vacant by the common council for a failure to give IjoikI the failure of itself is not a vacation : there must be action by the coun- cil.-"- (b) By the mayor. — Necessarily the power of the mayor to xe- move an officer is more restricted than that of the council. Where a charter provision authorizes the mayor and council to remove an officer for cause the mayor alone can not do so.-"^ A statute granting a mayor the right to appoint and remove officers does not apply to assistants who are employed in departments and who are employed by the chief.-"* In the absence of a law authorizing it the mayor can not remove without cause an officer, though appointed by him, when the term is a fixed and definite one.^**^ (c) By head of department, bureau, etc. — Sometimes the power of removal, and particularly of those who occupy a confidential relationship, is given to the chief of the department. -°^ 33 N. Y. S. 165; s. c. 85 Hun (N. Y.) 601. ="= Kriseler v. Le Valley, 122 Mich. 576; s. c. 81 N. W. 580. Under Spo- kane charter the majority of the city council, after recommendation of the mayor, may remove a mem- ber of the board of health without preferring charges: Kimball v. Olm- sted, 20 Wash. 629; s. c. 56 Pac. 377. A vacancy of the office of city mar- shal in a city of the second class must be tilled by the city in Arkan- sas: Payne v. Rittman, 66 Ark. 201; s. c. 49 S. W. 814. '"^ State V. Donovan, 89 Maine 448; s. c. 36 Atl. 982. Power of removal by mayor and council under Mass. laws of 1896, ch. 415, and laws of 1897, ch. 95, construed: Attorney- General V. Cahill, 169 Mass. 18; s. c. 47 N. E. 433. ^-^ Peters v. Bell, 51 La. An. 1621; s. c. 26 So. 442. 205 Field V. Malster, 88 Md. 691; s. c. 41 Atl. 1087. The removal of an officer by the mayor, under the stat- ute, takes effect at once and de- prives the officer removed of his right to discharge further the func- tions of the office, though his action may be subsequently reviewed by the council: Heffran v. Hutchins, 1 Smith — 14 160 111. 550; s. c. 43 N. B. 709. Power to appoint does not include power to remove: People v. McAl- lister, 10 Utah 357; s. c. 37 Pac. 578. For construction of charter of Greater New York and laws as to the power of the mayor to make re- movals, see People v. Van Wyck, 159 N. Y. 509; s. c. 54 N. E. 31; Peo- ple V. Nixon, 158 N. Y. 221; s. c. 52 N. E. 1117; People v. Van Wyck, 54 N. Y. S. 675; s. c. 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 573. Power of removal under Mich. St. (Ann.), § 653: Attorney- General V. Common Council &c., 112 Mich. 145; s. c. 70 N. W. 450. Pow- er of removal under Neb. Comp. St., ch. 13a, §§ 21, 28: Stahlhut v. Bauer, 51 Neb. 64; s. c. 70 N. W. 496. Under laws of S. D. 1890, ch. 37, the power of the mayor to re- move officers appointed by him is absolute: State v. Williams, 6 S. Dak. 119; s. c. 60 N. W. 410. -'^ As to power of removal by heads of departments under charter of Greater New York, see People v. Brady, 59 N. Y. S. 322; s. c. 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 60. The decision of the commissioner of public works in dismissing an employe on charges preferred will not be reversed on appeal where the evidence before § 205 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 210 § 205. All persons charged with notice of duties and powers of municipal agents. — The statutes prescribe the powers and duties of officers and agents of a public corporation; and all persons dealing with them are charged with the knowledge of the nature of these duties and the extent of these powers.^"'^ § 206. Liability of officers to the corporations. — Public officers elected pursuant to statute by a municipal corporation are not the servants or agents of the corporation in such a sense as will enable the corporation, in the absence of a statute giving the remedy, to the commissioner is sufficient to sustain his action: People v. Dalton, 65 N. Y. S. 426; s. c. 52 App. Div. (N. Y.) 627. A person who is the head of a bureau simply and not the head of a department has no right to remove or appoint his subordi- nates: Morgan v. City of Denver, 14 Colo. App. 147; s. c. 59 Pac. 619. The removal of police commission- ers by the supreme court where they acted in good faith and without in- tention to violate law is in the dis- cretion of the court: In re Rupp, 53 N. Y. S. 927; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 468. 207 -pijg pioyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666; Merchants' Bank v. Bergen Co., 115 U. S. 384; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Den. (N. Y.) 110; Cornell v. Town of Guilford, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 510; McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143; Lowell Sav. Bank v. Inhabi- tants «S:c., 8 Allen (Mass.) 109; Perkinson v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App. 322; Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.) 696; Cleveland v. State Bank, 16 Ohio St. 236; s. c. 88 Am. D. 445; Chicago v. Shober &c. Co., 6 Bradw. (111.) 560; Alton v. Mulledy, 21 111. 76; Pine Civil Tp. v. Huber Mfg. Co., 83 Ind. 121; Summers v. Board &c., 103 Ind. 262; s. c. 2 N. E. 725; Axt V. Jackson School Tp., 90 Ind. 101; Reeve School Tp. v. Dodson, 98 Ind. 497; Platter v. Board «S:c., 103 Ind. 360; s. c. 2 N. E. 544; Bloom- ington School Tp. v. National School Furnishing Co., 107 Ind. 43; s. c. 7 N. E. 760; Barton v. Sweptson, 44 Ark. 437; Dorsey Co. v. Whitehead, 47 Ark. 205; s. c. 1 S. W. 97; Wal- lace V. Mayor &c., 29 Cal. 180; Sutro V. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332; s. c. 16 Pac. 7; 5 Am. St. 442. See also, White- side V. United States, 93 U. S. 247; Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 U. S. 569; McClure v. Oxford Tp., 94 U. S. 429; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Lewis v. City of Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 634; Dix- on Co. V. Field, 111 U. S. 83; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 315; Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 539; Post V. Kendall Co., 105 U. S. 667; Da- viess Co. V. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 897; Mayor &c. v. Ray. 19 Wall. 468; Vincent v. In- habitants, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 103; Dill V. Inhabitants, 7 Met. (Mass.) 438; Spaulding v. City of Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 71; Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; Donovan v. Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. 291; McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23; s. c. 23 Am. R. 144; Overseer &c. v. Overseers &c., 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 382; Davies v. New York &c. Co., 48 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 492 ; Appleby v. May- or &c., 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 428; Peterson v. Mayor «S:c., 17 N. Y. 449; Ottoman Cahvey Co. v. City of Phila- delphia (Pa.), 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 524; Livingston v. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542; People v. Baraga Tp., 39 Mich. 554; Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141. 211 OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 207 maintain actions against such officers for negligence in the discharge of their official duty.^"^ When an officer who is about to enter upon the discharge of his duties for a second term makes a report to, or a settlement with, the proper authorities, from which it appears that he has on hand at the close of his first term a certain sum of money, such settlement is, in the opinion of many of the courts, conclusive upon him, if the officers with whom the settlement is made acted in good faith and have no knowledge that the sum of money which he reports is not actually in his hands.-*^'* § 207. Instances of fraudulent acts of municipal agents. — Munici- pal officers and agents are held to a strict accountability in their deal- ings with or on behalf of the corporation, and will be held personally liable in case of injury arising either to the corporation or a third party out of any tortious act in their official capacity. If a member of a municipal board authorized to select and purchase a site for pub- lic purposes agrees with a third person to inform the latter of the site selected by such board, and that the latter shall thereupon purchase such site, and then sell it to the hoard at a profit, and the agreement is carried out through the aid of the officer, and the municipality is thereby made to pay a higher price for the property than it could have been purchased for from the original owner, an action can be sustained against the officer and his confederate for the amount of profit realized by them.^^*^ 2»8 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4tli ed.), 37 Am. R. 229; State v. Grammer, § 236; Wilson v. Mayor &c., 1 Denio 29 Ind. 530; Baker v. Preston, 1 (N. Y.) 595; Minor v. Bank, 1 Pe- Gilm. (Va.) 235; Morley v. Town of ters 46, 69; Inhabitants &c. v. Cha- Metamora, 78 111. 394; s. c. 20 Am. pin, 132 Mass. 470; Inhabitants &c, R. 266; Roper v. Trustees &c., 91 v. Fiske, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 264, 266; 111. 518; s. c. 33 Am. R. 60; City of Dewey, J., in White v. Inhabitants Chicago v. Gage, 95 111. 593; s. c. 35 &c., 10 Met. (Mass.) 108; Trafton v. Am. R. 182; Cawley v. People, 95 Alfred, 15 Me. 258; Inhabitants &c. 111.249. v. Hazzard, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 112; ^^"City of Boston v. Simmons, 150 Commonwealth v. Genther, 17 S. & Mass. 461; s. c. 23 N. E. 210; 15 Am. R. (Pa.) 135. Whether municipal St. 230; Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass. councilors are liable to the corpora- 348; Cutter v. Demmon, 111 Mass. tion for misappropriating its funds, 474; Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, — see Municipality of East Missouri 135; s. c. 18 Am. R. 459; Adams v. v. Horseman, 16 Up. Can. Q. B. 576. Paige, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 542, 550; For payment of money on illegal United States v. State Bank, 96 U. order or resolution, see Daniels v. S. 30, 35; Emery v. Hapgood, 7 Municipal Council &c., 10 Up. Can. Gray (Mass.) 55, 58; s. c. 66 Am. Q. B. 478. D. 459. All who aid in the com- ^'^ Boone Co. v. Jones, 54 Iowa mission of a tort are joint tort- 699; s. c. 2 N«. W. 987; 7 N. W. 155; feasors, and, as such, jointly liable § 208 PUBLIC CORPORATION'S. 212 § 208. Liability of corporation to officers. — Corporations are in general liable for their officers' salaries while they continue in office, and if they improperly remove them, they still remain liable.- ^^ A highway surveyor, however, can not recover from the town an amount expended by him in excess of the tax committed to him.^^^ And it has been decided that a municipal officer who is kept out of his office and has not performed his duties can not maintain an ac- tion against the city to recover the fees accruing from the office.^ ^^ for the result of their act: Creed v. Hartmann, 29 N. Y. 591; s. c. 86 Am. D. 341; Klauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa. St. 128; s. c. 78 Am. D. 329; Moir v. Hopkins, 16 111. 313; s. c. 63 Am. D. 312. Defendants, who are mem- bers of the town council, with oth- ers, entered into a bond in a certain sum for the purpose of building a court-house in the town. After- wards the town council, of which defendants were members, illegally appropriated $1,000 of the town funds to aid in building the court- house, a portion of which sum was immediately paid over. The court held that the defendants were li- able for the amount thus paid, in an action brought by the taxpay- ers for its recovery: Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541; s. c. 13 S. W. 130. The laws of New York, 1881, ch. 531. provide that municipal officers "and other persons acting for or on be- half of any town, county, village or municipal corporation" may be en- joined, in a suit by taxpayers, from committing any illegal official act, or from committing waste or in- jury to any property, funds or es- tate of such town, etc. It was held that an action will lie against city officers to prevent them from com- promising for a nominal sum a final judgment in favor of the city against persons for violation of the excise law, the proceeds of which be- long to the poor fund. And in such action the judgment debtors, who are alleged to be acting in collusion with the officers, are properly joined as defendants: Standart v. Burtis, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 82. The Missouri statute making town, city, state and county officers liable, etc., for converting public moneys to their own use, embraces township offi- cers: State V. Cleveland, 80 Mo. 108. Town officers who, in con- structing a ditch, act according to their best judgment, refraining from unnecessary injury, are not liable for errors of judgment in choosing the location or method of construc- tion: Smith V. Gould, 61 Wis. 31; s. c. 20 N. W. 369. Town bonds were delivered by the town to a railroad company in exchange for its stock. A. received them as president of the company and sold them for the com- pany. A, was also town supervisor. The court held that as he acted for the company, he was not liable to an action by the town for having sold them to bona fide purchasers, know- ing them to be invalid: Farnham v. Benedict, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 22. ="^Stadler v. City of Detroit, 13 Mich. 346; Shaw v. Mayor &c., 19 Ga. 468. Where overseers of the poor procure supplies on their own credit, instead of following the pro- cedure laid down in the statute, they are not precluded from charg- ing the same to the town, and de- manding that the account be audited by the town board of audit: Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N. Y. 222. ='- Cloud v. Town of Norwich, 57 Vt. 448. ="Dolan V. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 274, 279; Commissioners &c. v. An- 213 OFFICEGS AND AGENTS. 209 § 209. Indictment of municipal officers. — Provision is generally made by statute for the indictment of municipal officers for wilful misfeasance or nonfeasance in their official capacity. Thus in North Carolina "a public officer intrusted with definite powers to be exer- cised for the benefit of the community, who wickedly abuses them or fraudulently exceeds them, is punishable by indictment."-^* And it has been held in the state of Tennessee that the mayor and aldermen may be indicted for neglecting to keep the streets of a city or town in reasonable repair.-^^ derson, 20 Kan. 298. See also, Ter- hune V. Mayor &c., 88 N. Y. 247; Mc- Veany v. Mayor &c., 80 N. Y. 185; Steubenville v. Gulp, 38 Ohio St. 18; Auditors &c. v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176. But where an officer's removal was reversed on certiorari, he was en- titled to recover for the time dur- ing which he was deprived of his of- fice, without deduction for wages earned in another capacity. This is because there is no contract in favor of the officer as there is in the ordi- nary relation of master and servant. He receives his salary as an inci- dent to his office: Fitzsimmons v. City of Brooklyn, 102 N. Y. 536; s. c. 7 N. E. 787; and Andrews v. Port- land, 79 Maine 484; s. c. 10 Atl. 458, to the same point, although the sal- ary had been paid to a de facto in- cumbent. Such is also the rule in California: People v. Oulton, 28 Cal. 44; People v. Potter, 63 Cal. 127; People V. Smyth, 28 Cal. 21; Meagher v. Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244; Carroll v. Siebenthaler, 37 Cal. 193. Courts of equity will not, as a rule, enjoin the payment of the salary to the incumbent pending a contest: Field V. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. St. 478; Ex parte Ramshay, 83 Eng. C. L. 174; Queen v. Mayor &c., 8 Ad. & El. 633. Persons who are neither officers de jure nor de facto can not recover the salary of an oflScer: Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298. =" State V. Glasgow, N. C. Conf. 386, 387; State v. Justices &c., 4 Hawks (N. C.) 194. See also. State v. Fishblate, 83 N. C. 654; State v. Commissioners &c., 2 N. C. Law 617; Paris V. People, 27 111. 73. The Illinois statutes make it a criminal offense for a town officer to with- hold the town records from the county clerk's oflJce, on the discon- tinuance of the township system in the county. But it was held that the indictment need not state the manner in which the town office was abolished, and that it was not necessary to a conviction that a de- mand should have been made on the officer for the records withheld: Baysinger v. People, 115 111. 419; s. c. 5 N. E. 375. -^=^Hill V. State, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 443. See also, Phillips v. Common- wealth, 44 Pa. St. 197. The mayor and aldermen of a city are indict- able for any wilful or negligent fail- ure to discharge the duties devolved upon them by the city charter. They can not with impunity arbi- trarily refuse to exercise the pow- ers with which they are invested, nor can they wilfully prevent them from being exercised. But they constitute a part of a city govern- ment distinct from the board of audit and finance of the city, and the two can not be jointly indicted for refusal or failure to perform their duties under the charter: State V. Hall, 97 N. C. 474; s. c. 1 S. E. 683. For requisites of indict- ment for non-performance of ofl5- § 209 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 314 cial duty, see the case last cited; 345. One who procures himself to also 3 Chitty Crim. Law 586, 606; be sworn into a public office to State V. Mayor, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) which he knows he has no title is 217; People v. Wattles, 13 Mich, indictable at common law: Scarlet's 446; State v. Com'rs, 4 Dev. (N. C.) Case, 12 Coke 98. CHAPTEE VII. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. Section 210. Liability on contracts — Pre- sumption against liability. 211. The same subject continued — Negotiable instruments. 212. The same subject continued — Excess of authority, fraud, etc. 213. Exemption from liability for legislative acts. 214. The foregoing rule qualified — Breach of trust. 215. Liability of judicial officers considered. Section 216. Quasi-judicial officers — Corrupt motive. 217. Liability of ministerial officers. 218. The same subject continued. 219. No personal liability for strict- ly public acts. 220. Default of subordinates. 221. Ejection of member of council by order of mayor. 222. Negligence of recorder of deeds. 223. The same subject continued. 224. Liability of assessor of taxes. § 210. Liability on contracts — Presumption against liability. — Upon considerations of public iDolicy a distinction has been estab- lished between the personal liability of public agents on contracts made in behalf of their principal, and that of private agents under like circumstances. It is presumed that persons dealing with public officers do not rely upon their individual credit ; and in order to make them personally liable there must be a clear intent to that effect.^ It 'Willett V. Young, 82 Iowa 292; s. c. 47 N. W. 990; 11 L. R. A. 115 (where trustees of a township were held not liable on an order directed to the town clerk to be paid out of township funds, and signed by them with the word "trustees" added to their signatures, as it was manifest from the whole instrument that there was no intention to as- sume liability; nor would the inva- lidity of the order given for prop- erty purchased for the township af- fect the case) ; Huthsing v. Bous- quet, 7 Fed. 833 (where supervisors offered a reward beyond their power; but as the offer as published clearly appeared to be intended as official, they were held not liable as individuals) ; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch 345 (a leading case by Chief Justice Marshall); Knight v. Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22; s. c. 2 Atl. 780; 57 Am. R. 534; Cutler v. Inhabitants &c., 121 Mass. 588; Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 Dallas 384; Crowell v. Crispin, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 100; Fox v. Drake, 8 Cowen (N. Y.) 191; Bel- knap V. Reinhart, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 375; s. c. 20 Am. D. 621; Walker v. Swartwout, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 444; s. c. 7 Am. D. 334; Osborne v. Kerr, (215) 311 PUBLIC CORPORATIO>:S. 216 makes no difference whether the contract be written, by parol, or sealed.^ But where it is evident that the officer intended to pledge his private responsibility he is liable.^ § 211. The same subject continued — Negotiable instruments. — A public agent is not personally liable on negotiable instruments executed by him in his official capacity; but in the absence of intent to the contrary evident on the face of the instrument the presump- tion is that the agent acts in his private character, and is therefore individually liable ;"* that is, the distinction between public and pri- vate agents in respect of personal liability on contracts has teen said not to apply to negotiable paper; and where a note is signed by an agent in his own name, the addition of his official title will not free him from responsibility if the body of the obligation purports to bind him personally.^ There are cases, however, which have taken what 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 179; Rathbon v. Budlong, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 1; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cowen (N. Y.) 513; s. c. 13 Am. D. 550; Sheffield v. Watson, 3 Cai. (N. Y.) 69; Bronson v. Wool- sey, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 46; Brown V. Austin, 1 Mass. 208; s. c. 2 Am. D. 11; Tippets v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595, 597; Bainbridge v. Downie, 6 Mass. 253; Dawes v. Jackson, 9 Mass. 464; Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 260; s. c. 6 Am. D. 66; Comer v. Bankhead, 70 Ala. 493; Wallis v. Johnson School Tp., 75 Ind. 368; Perrin v. Lyman, 32 Ind. 16; McClenticks v. Bryant, 1 Mo. 598; s. c. 14 Am. D. 310; Tutt V. Hobbs, 17 Mo. 486; Lyon v. Irish, 58 Mich. 518; s. c. 25 N. W. 502; Stinchfield v. Little, 1 Me. 231; s. c. 10 Am. D. 65; Ber- nard V. Torrance, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 383. It has been said, however, that this rule in regard to public officers does not apply in favor of the officers of a municipal corpora- tion, which is capable of making contracts for itself and is liable to be sued thereon: Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 120; Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507. And see City of Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 272; s. c. 23 Am. R. 453. ' Hodgson V. Dexter, 1 Cranch 345; Knight v. Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22; s. c. 2 Atl. 780; 57 Am. R. 534; Unwin v. Wolseley, 1 T. R. 674; Walker v. Swartwout, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 444; s. c. 7 Am. D. 334. ^ Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 120; s. c. 34 Am. D. 41; Og- den V. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379; s. c. 58 Am. D. 429; Bayliss v. Pearson, 15 Iowa 279; Wing v. Click, 56 Iowa 473; s. c. 9 N. W. 384; 37 Am. R. 142, n.; Trustees &c. v. Rautenberg, 88 111. 219; Ross v. Brown, 74 Maine 352; Fowler v. Atkinson, 6 Minn. 578; Sheffield v. Watson, 3 Cai. (N. Y.) 69; Gill v. Brown, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 385; Exchange Bank v. Lewis Co., 28 W. Va. 273; City of Provi- dence V. Miller, 11 R. I. 272; s. c. 23 Am. R. 453; Horsley v. Bell, 1 Bro. C. C. 101, n. * Story Agency, § 306; 1 Daniel Neg. Inst., § 445; Tiedeman Comm. Paper, § 137; Mechem Public Offices and Officers, § 821 et seq. ° Trustees &c. v. Rautenberg, 88 111. 219; Fowler v. Atkinson, 6 Minn. 578; Wing v. Click, 56 Iowa 473; s. c. 9 N. W. 384; 37 Am. R. 142, n.; Exchange Bank v. Lewis Co., 28 W. Va. 273; Ross v. Brown, 74 Maine 352; Bayliss v. Pearson, 15 Iowa 279; American Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 217 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS, § 213 is termed by a standard text-writer" "a praiseworthy step" in holding that the official designation is not a mere descriptio persona?, but indicates an intent to charge the corporation.'^ Whether parol evi- dence is admissible to show that a note containing a promise, indi- vidual in form, but executed officially, was intended to bind the corporation, is a question not settled. It was held in Iowa that extrinsic evidence could not be resorted to in such a case;" but in Minnesota and Missouri the prevailing rule in cases of private agency is applied, and the ambiguity may be explained.^ § 212. The same subject continued — Excess of authority, fraud, etc. — The rule that all persons are bound to know the law precludes them from alleging ignorance of the limits and extent of authority conferred on a public officer ;^° which is no more than saying that the latter does not ordinarily warrant the validity of his contracts; but his express representations of matter of fact relating to his agency are binding upon him;^^ and he must answer for fraudulent conceal- ments or misstatements of such facts. ^^ So he may, by denying his 59 Iowa 6%; s. c. 13 N. W. 763; For- 10 Mo. App. 338. See Second Nat. cey V. Caldwell (Pa.), 9 Atl. 466. Cf. Lyon v. Adamson, 7 Iowa 509; Baker v. Chambles, 4 Greene (Iowa) 428. ^ Tiedeman Comm. Paper, § 137. ^ School Town of Monticello v. Kendall, 72 Ind. 91; s. c. 37 Am. R. 139; Moral School Tp. v. Harrison, 74 Ind. 93; Andrews v. Estes, 11 Maine 267; Wallis v. Johnson School Tp., 75 Ind. 368. See also, Knight V. Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22; s. c. 2 Atl. 780; 57 Am. R. 534 (case of a sealed note); Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 126; s. c. 77 Am. D. 502; Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172; Balcombe v. Northrup, 9 Minn. 172; Hodges v. Runyan, 30 Mo. 491; McGee v. Lara- more, 50 Mo. 425. * American Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 59 Iowa 696; s. c. 13 N. W. 763. "Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 126; s. c. 77 Am. D. 502; McClellan v. Reynolds, 49 Mo. 312. See also, Pratt V. Baupre, 13 Minn. 187; Musser V. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74; s. c. 97 Am. D. 316; Shuetze v. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69; Washington Gas Co. v. Semi- nary, 52 Mo. 480; Klosterman v. Loos, 58 Mo. 290; Turner v. Thomas, Bank v. Midland &c. Co., 155 Ind. 581; s. c. 58 N. E. 833. "Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 366; The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 680; Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 247; Hull v. Marshall Co., 12 Iowa 142; Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199; s. c. 87 Am. D. 423; Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 112; Mayor &c. v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276, 283; Mayor &c. v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1; s. c. 83 Am. D. 535; State v. Hays, 52 Mo. 578; State v. Bank &c., 45 Mo. 528; People v. Bank, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 431; Delafleld v. Illinois, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 192; Silliman v. Fredericksburg &c. R. Co., 27 Gratt. (Va.) 119; State v. Hastings, 10 Wis. 518. See also, § 205, ante. " Belisle v. Clark, 49 Ala. 98; Jefts V. York, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 392; Bart- lett V. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; s. c. 6 Am. R. 240; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311; s. c. 47 Am. R. 718; Bank &c. V. Wray, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 87; s. c. 51 Am. D. 659; McCurdy v. Rog- ers, 21 Wis. 199; s. c. 91 Am. D. 468. "Smout V. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1; Bank &c. v. Wray, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 87; s. c. 51 Am. D. 659; Kroeger v. § 213 PUBLIC COKrOHATIONS. 218 agency, estop himself from subsequently asserting it to avoid liabil- ity ;^^ and the obligation may be enforced against him where his prin- cipal is a legal niyth.^* To hold an officer liable for conspiracy to defraud the city it must be shown that he was a party to the con- spiracy, or had knowledge, or reason to know that certain bills paid were wrong.^^ Where the charter provides that if any city officer shall commit any fraud on the city he shall be guilty of a misde- meanor, an indictment charging the approval of certain unauthorized bills, knowing no contract had been made, and that the acts were in violation of law and were done with intent to commit a fraud on the city, is not sufficient without charging that the bills approved created a charge against the city.^*' Where acts of officers are done under color, and in excess, of authority, and in consequence the city and plaintiff suffer injury, recovery may be had against them in their official capacity, and as individuals, although sued only as officers. ^^ A suit alleging a conspiracy to defraud between the mayor and a street commissioner has been sustained. ^^ § 213. Exemption from liability for legislative acts. — It is a well- settled and salutary rule that the motives of the individual members of a legislative assembly in voting for a particular law can not be inquired into and its supporters made personally liable upon an alle- gation that they acted maliciously towards the person aggrieved by the passage of the law. Whenever the officers of a municipal corpo- ration are vested with legislative powers, they hold and exercise them for the public good, and are clothed with all the immunities of government, and are exempt from all liability for their mistaken use.^" Thus where a mayor sought to recover damages from the aldermen of a town by reason of an ordinance by which they "un- lawfully and maliciously deprived him of his legal rights, fees, privileges and emoluments, and of his office of mayor," a demurrer was sustained although the defendants might have exceeded the meas- ure of their authority in passing the ordinance in question. ^° Mem- Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311; s. c. 47 Am. ^^ Saxe v. City of Burlington, 70 R. 718. Vt. 448; s. c. 41 Atl. 438. ^^^ Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 272; s. "County Com'rs v. Duckett, 20 c. 6 Am. D. 66; McClenticks v. Bry- Md. 469; Borough of Freeport v. ant, 1 Mo. 598. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253. See also, "Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193. Cooley Torts (2d ed.) 443. ^^ Feeley v. Wurster, 54 N. Y. S. -" Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109. 1060; s. c. 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 544. "If they exceeded their authority, ^'^ People V. Kane, 161 N. Y. 380; s. it was a brutuni fulmen, and could c. 55 N. E. 946. not for one moment have deprived " Mock V. City of Santa Rosa, 126 the plaintiff of any privileges, emol- Cal. 330; s. c. 58 Pac. 826. uments or fees of his office. If he 219 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OrFICERS AXD AGENTS. § 214 bers of a coimcil are not liable officially or individually for voting to repeal an ordinance.-^ § 214. The foregoing rule qualified — Breach of trust. — But if the conduct of members of a municipal legislative board amounts to a breach of trust, or a conversion of trust money belonging to the municipality, they are personally liable for tort. A declaration in an action by a city against a former chairman of its water board and another person alleged that the board was authorized to buy land for the city for a reservoir; that the chairman, of whose position, knowledge and authority the other defendant had knowledge, knew and shared in determining the action of the board regarding the purchase; that both together, taking advantage of this and intending to defraud the city, corruptly agreed that the chairman should im- part to the other the doings of the board in selecting the land and the parcel it considered fit for a reservoir site, whereupon such other was to become the purchaser thereof; that the board should after- wards buy it at an advanced price from him and that the profits should be divided between them ; that in pursuance of this agreement the chairman revealed the particular lot thought suitable by the board to the other, who thereupon bought it,, and the board, infiu- enced by the chairman, subsequently purchased it from him at an advance ; and that the two divided the profits of the transaction. A demurrer was overruled on the ground that a good cause of action was disclosed against both defendants for the injury sustained by the city.^" The aldermen of a town, having executed a bond binding themselves to build within the corporate limits a court-house to be given to the county, illegally voted an appropriation of a sum out of the municipal funds to aid in such building, which was immedi- ately paid by the treasurer on the order of the mayor. It was held that the taking of the money by the defendants was the conversion of a trust fund for which they were liable.^^ Where a treasurer collected a tax, which was levied to pay certain warrants, and di- verted the money, the remedy is against the officer and not the city.-* chose voluntarily to yield obedience " City of Boston v. Simmons, 150 to a void law, it was his own folly, Mass. 461; s. c. 23 N. E. 210. for which the courts can afford him -^ Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541 ; no relief by awarding damages s. c. 13 S. W. 130. against the individuals voting for " Schulenberg &c. Co. v. City of the ordinance." See also, McCrea v. East St. Louis, 63 111. App. 214; s. c. Chahoon, 54 Hun (N. Y.) 577; s. c. 166 111. 232; 46 N. E. 728; City of 8 N. Y. S. 88. Springfield v. Edwards, 84 111. 626; "' Winbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. An. City of East St. Louis v. Flannigan, 246; s. c. 16 So. 856. 26 111. App. 449. § 315 PUBLIC CORrOKATIONS. 230 An officer of the city who has in good faith paid interest coupons and turned them over to the city is entitled to credit therefor.-'* § 215. Liability of judicial officers considered. — As long ago as in the time of Lord Coke it was said : "Such as are by law made judges of another shall not be criminally accused or made liable to an action for what they do as judges;"-** and the principles which should gov- ern such actions have been settled by a vast number of cases, although their application is sometimes difficult. Where there is no jurisdic- tion at all there is no judge,^' and the protection extends only to judicial decisions or acts of a judicial character and not to mere administrative acts. But where the court, though of limited juris- diction, has, in a given case, jurisdiction of the subject-matter^** and of the person interested, a judicial officer is not civilly liable for an erroneous decision, however gross the error may have been or how- ever bad the motive which inspired it.''* Thus, where the mayor of a city had the same jurisdiction as justices of the peace he was held not liable to a civil action for false imprisonment for "corruptly and maliciously" retaining jurisdiction and imposing a fine and imprison- ment in default of payment, after the defendant had upon proper affidavit moved for a change of venue, the statute requiring him to grant the motion under such circumstances.^" ^° City of Huron v. Meyers, 13 S. 14; Throop Public Officers, in loco; D. 420; s. c. 83 N. W. 553. Mechem Public Offices and Officers, =« Floyd V. Barker, 12 Coke 23. § 619 et seq.; and particularly State ='Perkin v. Proctor, 2 Wils. 382; v. Wolever, 127 Ind. 306; s. c. 26 N. Marshalsea Case, 10 Coke 68-76. E. 762, where the subject of im- ^*' By which is not meant simply munity of judicial officers from pri- jurisdiction of the particular case vate suits is fully discussed. "A then occupying the attention of the judicial act is one which involves court, but jurisdiction of the class the exercise of a discretion, in which of cases to which the particular case something has to be heard and de- belongs: Jackson v. Smith, 120 Ind. cided. A ministerial act is one 520, 522; s. c. 22 N. E. 431; Yates v. which the law points out as neces- Lansing, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 282. sary to be done under the circum- ^Gwynne v. Pool, Lutw. 290, 297; stances without leaving any choice Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; of alternative courses:" Clerk & Kress v. State, 65 Ind. 106; Elmore Lindsell Torts 574. The act of a v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548; s. c. 4 N. mayor in issuing a warrant of arrest E. 197; 54 Am. R. 343; Pratt v. Gard- for the violation of an illegal and ner, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 63; Allec v. void ordinance is judicial and gives Reece, 39 Fed. 341 ; s. c. 40 Alb. L. J. no cause of action against him, or 226; Little v. Moore, 4 N. J. L. 74; the officer executing it, or the city Clark V. Holdridge, 58 Barb. (N. itself: Trammell v. Town of Rus- Y.) 61; Dyer v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384. sellville, 34 Ark. 105. There is an interesting and instruc- "" "The ruling on such a motion is tive discussion in Cooley Torts, ch. a judicial act:" State v. Wolever, 221 PEHSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGExN'TS, § 210 § 216. ftuasi-judicial officers — Corrupt motive. — Tliere are various duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion which never- theless are on the border-line between those of a strictly judicial and those of a ministerial nature. In such cases the rule is laid down in many decisions that the test of personal liability for error in their performance is that of honest or corrupt motive.^^ Thus, a superiu- 127 Ind. 306; s. c. 2G N. E. 762. The reader will find, by consulting the authorities and text-writers cited in this section, that the principles here enunciated are of general applica- tion; and as the proceedings of mu- nicipal courts furnish no peculiari- ties or exceptions, the author does not deem it expedient to enter into a more minute consideration of the topic. See also, Hommert v. Glea- son, 38 N. Y. St. 342; s. c. 14 N. Y. S. 568, which is almost identical with the case cited above; Bell v. McKinney, 63 Miss. 187; Johnston V. Moorman, 80 Va. 131; Merwin v. Rogers, 28 N. Y. St. 404; s. c. 7 N. Y. S. 633; Burns' v. Norton, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 616; Going v. Dinwiddle, 86 Cal. 633; s. c. 25 Pac. 129; the lead- ing case of Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12; the title on "False Imprison- ment," in 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law 661 et seq.; and an article by Ar- thur Biddle, Esq., on "Liability of Officers Acting in a Judicial Ca- pacity," 15 Am. Law Rev. 427 (July, 1881). ^'^Cooley Torts (2d ed.) 482; Lin- ford V. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240; Kemp V. Neville, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 523; s. c. 31 L. J. C. P. 158; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 913; 4 L. T. 640; 10 W. R. 6; Davis V. Capper, 10 B. & C. 28; Burley v. Bethune, 1 Marsh. 220; Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938; s. c. 6 Mod. 45; 1 Salk. 19; Pruden v. Love. 67 Ga. 190; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Maine 379; s. c. 61 Am. D. 256; Downing v. Herrick, 47 Maine 462; Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479; s. c. 81 Am. D. 618; Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Md. 135; Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342; s. c. 5 N. W. 403; 38 Am. R. 189; McCormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263; s. c. 35 Am. R. 163; Billings v. Laf- ferty, 31 111. 318; Garfield v. Doug- lass, 22 111. 100; Drift v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286; s. c. 27 Am. R. 343; Ed- wards V. Ferguson, 73 Mo. 686; Pike V. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491; Reed v. Con- way, 20 Mo. 22; Henderson v. Smith, 26 W. Va. 829; s. c. 53 Am. R. 139; Keenan v. Cook, 12 R. I. 52; Ramsey V. Riley, 13 Ohio 157; Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio St. 346; Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio 402; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 Vt. 352; Hitch v. Lam- bright, 66 Ga. 228; Spitznogle v. Ward, 64 Ind. 30; Morrison v. Mc- Farland, 51 Ind. 206; State v. Robb, 17 Ind. 536; McOsker v. Burrell, 55 Ind. 425; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 693; Bullitt v. Clement, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 63; Miller v. Rucker, 1 Bush (Ky.) 135; Gregory V. Brown, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 28; McCord V. High, 24 Iowa 336; Howe v. Ma- son, 14 Iowa 510; Macklot v. City of Davenport, 17 Iowa 379; Muscatine &c. R. Co. V. Horton, 38 Iowa 33; Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88; Adams v. Richardson, 43 N. H. 212; Hannon v. Grizzard, 96 N. C. 293; s. c. 2 S. E. 600; Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. (N. Y.) 39; Jenkins v. Wald- ron, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 114; Millard V. .Jenkins, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 298; Wickware v. Bryan, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 545; Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 462; Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. 420; Peavey v. Robbins, 3 Jones L. (N. C.) 339; Moran v. Rennard, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 217 PUBLIC COItrORATlONS. tendent of schools is not liable for a mere mistake in his decision on the subject of licensing a teacher ;^^ but an action lies if he refuses a license from corrupt or malicious motives ;^^ and the same rules control liability for dismissing a teacher.^* In Connecticut it was held that proof of actual malicious intent would .sustain an action against a wharfmaster for ordering the removal of a vessel from a dock.^^ § 217. Liability of ministerial officers. — A ministerial officer is under constant obligation to discharge the duties of his office with reasonable skill and care, and if he fails in these and damage ensues to one specially interested in the discharge of such duties he becomes liable.^ "^ Conversely, as it is the duty of a purely ministerial officer 601; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 35; Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 225; McTeer v. Lebow, 85 Tenn. 121; s. c. 2 S. W. 18; Throop Public Officers, § 722; Mechem Public Offices and Officers, § 640; Bishop Non-Contract Law, § 789. ^2 Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio 402; s. c, 49 Am. D. 463; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Maine 376; s. c. 61 Am. D. 256. ^'Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548; s. c. 4 N. E. 197; 54 Am. R. 343; Bur- ton v, Fulton, 49 Pa. St, 151. 3* Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio St. 346; Morrison v. McFarland, 51 Ind. 206; McCormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263; s. c. 35 Am. R. 163; Dritt v. Snod- grass, 66 Mo. 286; s. c. 27 Am. R. 343. ^ Gregory v. Brooks, 37 Conn. 365. ''Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl. 906; Ashby V. White, 2 Ld, Raym. 938; Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17; Fergu- son V. Earl of Kinnoull, 9 CI. & F. 251; Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136; Henly v. Mayor &c., 5 Bing. 91; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 230; s. c. 94 Am. D. 445; Lyon v. Goree, 15 Ala. 360; Briggs v. Cole- man, 51 Ala. 561; Eslava v. Jones, 83 Ala. 139; s. c. 3 So. 317; Bassett V. Fish, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 209; Piercy v. Averill, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 360; Bart- lett V. Crozier, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 250; Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 250; Jenner v. Joliffe, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 381; Bailey v. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531; Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 630; s. c. 38 Am. D. 669; Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 595; s. c. 43 Am. D. 719; Hickok v. Trustees &c., 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 427; Robinson v. Chamber- lain, 34 N. Y. 389; s. c. 90 Am. D. 713; Smith v. Wright, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 170; Fish v. Dodge, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 163; Hutson v. Mayor, 9 N. Y. 163; Hicks v. Dorn, 42 N. Y. 47; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113; Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N. Y. 302; Woolley V. Baldwin, 101 N. Y. 688; s. c. 5 N. E. 573; Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528; McCarthy v. City of Syra- cuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Keith v. Howard, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 292; Conway v. Russell, 151 Mass. 581; s. c. 24 N. E. 1026; Williams v. Powell, 101 Mass. 467; Nowell v. Wright, 3 Allen (Mass.) 166; Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342; s. c. 5 N. W. 403; 38 Am. R. 189; McGuire v. Galligan, 57 Mich. 38; s. c. 23 N. W. 479; Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422; s. c. 54 Am. R. 65; Choteau v. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65; St. Joseph &c. Ins. Co. v. Leland, 90 Mo. 177; s. c. 2 S. W. 431; 59 Am. R. 9; Rounds v. Mansfield, 38 Maine 586; Stevens v. Dud- ley, 56 Vt. 158; County Com'rs v 223 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. 218 to do, not reason whv,^' he incurs no liability for injuries suffered without negligence or corrupt intent on his part.^® A judicial or quasi-judicial officer may also have ministerial functions to perform; and in respect of these, the absolute protection commonly afforded to officers in the exercise of judicial or legislative functions does not extend.^" Where a city is liable to an abutting property owner for damages sustained by street grading the officers who participate are also liable as co-trespassers.*" § 218. The same subject continued. — A ministerial act has been defined to be "official action, the result of performing a certain and specific duty, arising from fixed and designated facts ;"*^ and again, as "one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a pre- scribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, with- out regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propri- ety of the act done."*^ Owing to the multitude and complexity of Duckett, 20 Md. 468; County Com'rs V. Baker, 44 Md. 1; Hayes v. Porter, 22 Maine 371; Long v. Long, 57 Iowa 497; s. c. 10 N. W. 875; McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336; Kolb v. O'Brien, 86 111. 210; Dilcher v. Raap, 73 111. 266; Governor v. Dodd, 81 111. 162; McClure v. Hill, 36 Ark. 268; Collins v. McDaniel, 66 Ga. 203. Allen v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 94; s. c. 1 S. E. 607, holds that where a duty is of such a character as to leave no mar- gin whatever for the exercise of judgment the law must be obeyed to the very letter. - - - The repeal of the law making officers civilly and criminally liable for neglect of duty does not affect the common-law ac- tion for neglect of duty: Hanlon v. Partridge, 69 N. H. 88; s. c. 44 Atl. 807; Donovan v. Partridge, 69 N. H. 88; s. c. 44 Atl. 807; Gallagher v. Partridge, 69 N. H. 88; s. c. 44 Atl. 807. ''"Mechem Public Offices and Offi- cers, § 661. ^'^ Sage V. Laurain, 19 Mich. 137; Highway Com'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. 173, 175. In such cases he can not, under any principle of law, be made a trespasser: Harding v. Woodcock, 137 U. S. 43; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 6. ^"Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422; s. c. 54 Am. R. 65; Thompson v. Holt, 52 Ala. 491; People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520; People v. Bush, 40 Cal. 344; Throop Public Officers, § 539. '"Rives V. City of Columbia, 80 Mo. App. 173. But this rule was not applied where a barge was hired by the commissioner of public works for the use of the city and the barge was sunk from improper loading: Interstate &c. Co. v. City of New Or- leans, 52 La. An. 1859; s. c. 28 So. 310. In the absence of evidence that a city marshal knew of the un- healthy condition of a cell in which he placed a prisoner and that he had control of the cells he is not liable for injuries: Bishop v. Lucy, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 326; s. c. 50 S. W. 1029. ^^Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422; s. c. 54 Am. R. 65. '- Flournoy v. City of Jefferson- ville, 17 Ind. 169. See also. Ex parte Batesville &c. R. Co., 39 Ark. 82; Pennington v. Streight, 54 Ind. 376; Evans v. Etheridge, 96 N. C. 42; s. c. 1 S. E. 633. And further defini- tions in State v. Johnson, 4 Wall. § 219 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 324 the duties annexed to public offices, the courts in many instances find considerable difficulty in determining whether a particular act is judicial or ministerial. It is held in some states that highway offi- cers charged by statute with the duty of keeping highways in repair, and provided with funds for that purpose, act in a ministerial ca- pacity, and are liable for injuries suffered by their neglect. '*•'' The board of street commissioners of a Wisconsin city, disregarding the requirement of the charter that all work for the city should be let by contract, resolved that the work of repairing and reconstructing a bridge should be done by themselves under the supervision of their committee and the superintendent appointed by them. The court decided that although they were not amenable to any one for their adoption of plans and specifications, yet in the execution of the work they were mere ministerial officers and not judicial or legislative, and accordingly they were liable to third persons for negligence or mis- feasance.** § 219. No personal liability for strictly public acts. — An officer can not be subjected to a private action for neglect of a duty to be discharged exclusively for the benefit of the public even by a person specially injured thereby, and though the act was wilful and mali- cious.*^ *'He must show the wrong which he specially suffers," said Judge Cooley, "and damage alone does not constitute a wrong."*** Thus in the case last cited, where a county supervisor approved the bond of a treasurer knowing him to be in default, but not disclosing the fact to the surety, no right of action accrued to the latter.*'^ And 475, 498; Sullivan v. Shanklin, 63 360, holding the mayor and alder- Cal. 247, 251; Morton v. Comptroller- men of a city liable; Hines v. Lock- General, 4 S. C. 430, 474; Commis- port, 50 N. Y. 236; Weed v. Ballston sioner v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471; Arberry Spa, 76 N. Y. 329; Pomfrey v. Vil- v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457; Raines v. lage of Saratoga Springs, 104 N. Y. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495; s. c. 32 Am. 459; s. c. 11 N. E. 43; McCord v. R. 609; Clerk & Lindsell Torts 574. High, 24 Iowa 336; Tearney v. « Bennett v. Whitney, 94 N. Y. Smith, 86 111. 391 ; Bostwick v. Bar- 302; People v. Town Auditors, 75 N. low, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 177. Y. 316; People v. Town Auditors, 74 *" Robinson v. Rohr, 73 Wis. 436; s. N. Y. 310; Warren v. Clement, 24 Hun c. 40 N. W. 668; 9 Am. St. 810. (N. Y.) 472; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 •= Held v. Bagwell, 58 Iowa 139; N. Y. 113; Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill (N. s. c. 12 N. W. 226. Y.) 630; s. c. 40 Am. D. 305; Robin- ^"Cooley Torts (2d ed.) 449. son V. Chamberlain, 34 N. Y. 389; s. *' Held v. Bagwell, 58 Iowa 139; s. c. 90 Am. D. 713; Babcock V. Gifford, c. 12 N. W. 226. If a policeman 29 Hun (N. Y.) 186; Lament v. were to neglect his duty to preserve Haight, 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 1; Gar- the peace and protect property, linghouse v. Jacobs, 29 N. Y. 297; whereby some person was injured Piercy v. Averill, 37 Hun (N. Y.) by violence or his house robbed, it is 225 PEESOXAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 220 where the charter of a city required that certain work should be awarded by the aldermen to the lowest bidder, but those officers, in violation of their duty, gave the contract to one whose bid was higher than the plaintiff's, the latter being in fact the lowest, it was ad- Judged that the aldermen were not liable, their duty being of an essentially public nature.*® The same is true, also, of the official act of a highway commissioner in improperly opening or discontinu- ing a road to the prejudice of an individual,*^ and the neglect of a quarantine officer to take ordinary precautions to prevent the spread of contagion.^*' § 220. Default of subordinates. — Public officers or agents engaged in the public service, or acting for public objects, whether their ap- pointment emanates from particular public bodies or is derived from general laws, and whether those objects are of a local or general nature, are not responsible for the misfeasances or positive wrongs, or for the nonfeasance or negligence or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by and un- der them in the discharge of their official duties. ^^ But the principal is liable if he directs or authorizes the wrong,^- or fails to require his deputies to observe statutory regulations,^^ or if he neglects to superintend properly the discharge of their duties,^* or negligently clear that there is no private rem- 462; Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. edy against the officer: Cooley Torts 507; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1286. See also, (2d ed.) 448; Shearman & Redf. Neg. Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. (5th ed.), § 316. S.) 192; Duncan v. Findlater, 6 CI. **East River &c. Co. v. Donnelly, & F. 894; Humphreys v. Hears, 1 M. 93 N. Y. 557. See also, Strong v. & R. 187; Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. Campbell, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 135; Mar- 29, 34; Harris v. Baker, 4 M. & S. tin v. Mayor &c., 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545; 27; Hall v. Smith, 2 Bing. 156; Don- Butler V. Kent, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) ovan v. McAlpin, 85 N. Y. 185; s. c. 223; Ashby v. White, 1 Salk. 19. 39 Am. R. 649; Finch v. Board &c., " Sage V. Laurain, 19 Mich. 137. 30 Ohio St. 37; s. c. 27 Am. R. 414. ™ Cooley Torts (2d ed.) 450; cit- =*- Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83 ; s. c. ing City of Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 10 Atl. 499; Tracy v. Cloyd, 10 W. 440; White v. Marshfield, 48 Vt. 20; Va. 19. Brinkmeyer v. City of Bvansville, ^^ Bishop v. Williamson, 11 Maine 29 Ind. 187; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 495, where a postmaster was held Iowa 495; Western College &c. v. liable for the default of one whom Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375; Hill v. he allowed to have the care of the Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55; s. c. 21 Am. mails without being sworn accord- R. 451; City of Pontiac v. Carter, 32 ing to law. Mich. 164. =* Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242; "Story Agency (9th ed.), § 319; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts (Pa.) Story Bailments (9th ed.), §§ 461, 453; Ford v. Parker, 4 Ohio St. 576. 1 Smith — 15 § 231 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 226 employs or retains unfit or improper pcrsons.^^ There is also an important distinction to the effect that if the inferior or subagent holds not an office known to the law, but his appointment is private and discretionary with the officer, the latter is responsible for his acts.^^ This is illustrated in a recent Connecticut case, where a selectman, for the purpose of cleaning a highway obstructed by the growth of trees and shrubbery, directed a laborer employed by him "to cut the brush and the trees and make the road passable." No trees were pointed out and no limits given, nor any expression of judgment of the selectman, but the matter was left to the judgment and discretion of the laborer, who, in good faith, cut down some trees on the land of an adjoining owner, the removal of which was not necessary. The selectman was held liable for the damage.^'^ So, also, an officer is liable for the defaults of his private servant or agent within the scope of his employment ;^^ and ministerial officers generally, who are charged with the performance of duties to indi- viduals, as distinguished from purely public duties, are subject to the rule of respondeat superior. ^^ § 221. Ejection of member of council by order of mayor. — A statute provided that the mayor should be ex officio president of the council and preside at its meetings, and he was also authorized by an ordinance "to preserve order and decorum and to decide all ques- tions of order, subject to an appeal to the council." An alderman's behavior was insulting and disorderly, but did not threaten personal ^^ Wiggins V. Hathaway, 6 Barb. ^^ Mechem Public Offices and Offi- (N. Y.) 632; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 cers, § 802. Watts (Pa.) 453. See also, Throop '^'' Such as recorders of deeds: Van Public Officers, § 592. Schaick v. Sigel, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) ^* The distinction is more fully 122. See also, Smith v. Holmes, 54 stated in a note to the case of Wil- Mich. 104; s. c. 19 N. W. 767. Clerks son V. Peverly, 1 Am. L. Cas. (5th of courts: McNutt v. Livingston, 7 ed.), top p. 785. In Shepherd v. Sm. & M. (Miss.) 641; Snedicor v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 250, it Davis, 17 Ala. 472. Sheriffs: Mech- was held, Cowen, J., delivering the em Public Offices and Officers, § 798. opinion, that a superintendent of A register of deeds is liable for the repairs on the canals of the state penalty imposed by statute for the is personally liable in an action on issue of a marriage license without the case for damages sustained by reasonable inquiry as to the age of an individual through the negli- the parties, if either is under eight- gence of workmen employed in mak- een, where a blank license signed by ing repairs. him is filled up by a person specially ^^ Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83; s. deputized by him for the purpose, c. 10 Atl. 499. See also. County though the deputy made inquiry: Com'rs V. Duvall, 54 Md. 351. Cole v. Laws, 108 N. C. 185; s. c. 12 S. E. 985. 227 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 221 injury nor arrest the progress of business, and, failing to observe the mayor's admonition, he was conducted out of the council chamber by the chief of police under an order from the mayor. The court held that the obstreperous member was entitled to an action for damages against both the mayor and chief of police.*"^ "The ordinance is only declaratory of the common law,*' said the court; "it neither in terms nor spirit increases or extends the duties or powers usually pertaining to the position [of the president of the council]. What then are such duties and powers according to the general usages of deliberative bodies? They comprise the duty and power to preserve order and decorum during the deliberations of the body. It is .said to be the privilege of any member, and the special duty of the pre- siding officer, to take notice of any offense during deliberation, and to call the attention of the assembly to it. In such cases the presi- dent declares to the assembly that a member named is guilty of irreg- ular or improper conduct, and specifies it. When it has been stated by the president, the member is entitled to be heard in exculpation.*'^ * * * When the president has called an offending member to order, and stated the matter of the offense to the house, it seems that he has discharged his duty and exhausted his power in the premises. He ther-eby transmits the further disposition of the matter to the house. The power to punish is not among his prerogatives; that belongs exclusively to the house, and he can never exercise it save as it is expressly ordered by the house. If he has other powers, the fact has escaped the recognition of writers. * * * j£ noise or tumult in the house, breaches of good order and decorum in the course of pro- ceeding, or an exhibition of disrespect and contempt for the president, would justify a forcible exclusion by him of an offending member, it can not be that the history of proceedings in deliberative bodies would furnish no instance of the assumption of such power."*'^ *" Thompson v. Whipple, 54 Ark. der that a member be excluded:" 203; s. c. 15 S. W. 604. Thompson v. Whipple, 54 Ark. 203; ^^ "Delicacy and custom require s. c. 15 S. W. 604. that he wlthdrav/ in order that the " "It is said that the power of the matter may be fully discussed and speaker is well stated by Mr. Speak- considered, free from any restraints er Lenthall, who, when Charles I of his presence. If a sense of pro- came into the house of commons priety does not constrain him to and asked him whether any of Ave withdraw, the house may order that members that he came to apprehend he do so; but his failure to do it is were in the house, whether he saw a matter for the action of the house, them, and where they were, replied: If the member disregards its order, 'May it please Your Majesty, I have the president may enforce it. Thus neither eyes to see nor tongue to far, and no farther, can we find that speak in this place but as the house the president is authorized to or- is pleased to direct, whose servant I 222 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 228 § 222. Negligence of recorder of deeds. — Where a recorder of deeds is employed by the owner of land to make a search of title, he is not liable for an error to one who lends money on the faith of it and loses it, at least in the absence of knowledge that it was to be used for procuring a loan.''^ He is undoubtedly liable for damage resulting from an erroneous record of a conveyance, although it be the negligence of a deputy;®* but who is entitled to sue, and the measure of damages, are often very nice and difficult questions; the decisions are conflicting, and depend more or less on the language of the statutes. While some courts hold that a grantee's title is valid, notwithstanding defective record, if he has filed his deed for record,®'^ others decide that all persons may rely upon the record actually made, and that the negligence of the recorder is, in effect, imputed to tlie one who employed him, when the rights of third par- ties are concerned.®*' am.' " Idem, p. 206. But it was con- ceded that the president might or- der an arrest to prevent an injury being done to another member with- out waiting for the action of the house, as that would be no more than any other person would be jus- tified in doing anywhere: Idem, p. 207. Parsons v. Brainard, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 522, was controlled by a New York statute, and is without force out of that state. It was there held that the presiding officer of a town meeting, with statute authority to maintain order, may make a valid order for the removal of a disorderly person, though no violence was threatened. A verdict for fifty cents damages was reversed. "^ Day V. Reynolds, 23 Hun (N. Y.) 131. Cf. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, and the dissenting opinion. •^Van Schaick v. Sigel, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 122. •"^Merrick v. Wallace, 19 111. 486, 497; Polk v. Cosgrove, 4 Biss. 437; Riggs V. Boylan, 4 Biss. 445; Gar- rard v. Davis, 53 Mo. 322; Minis v. Minis, 35 Ala. 23. '^ Frost V. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 285, 298; s. c. reversed, but not on this ground, Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 544; New York Life Ins. Co. v. White, 17 N. Y. 469; Chamberlain v. Bell, 7 Cal. 292; Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 13 Ga. 443; Miller v. Bradford, 12 Iowa 14; Brydon v. Campbell, 40 Md. 331; Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich. 162; Barrett v. Shaubhut, 5 Minn. 323; Terrell v. Andrew Co., 44 Mo. 309; Hester's Lessee v. Fortner, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 40; Lally v. Holland, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 396; Jennings' Lessee v. Wood, 20 Ohio 261; Baldwin v. Marshall, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 116; Sanger v. Craigije, 10 Vt. 555; Cooley Torts (2d ed.) 454; Throop Public Officers, § 742. On the ques- tion of proximate cause of an injury to a second grantee by reason of the negligence of the recorder combined with the fraudulent act of the grant- or (a point which Judge Cooley leaves unsolved — Cooley Torts 455 456), cf. Beach Contrib. Neg. (2d ed.), § 32, p. 38, n. 3, and cases there cited, with Alexander v. Town of Newcastle, 115 Ind. 51; s. c. 17 N. E. 200, cited in Beach Contrib. Neg. (2d ed.), § 245, p. 325. And see Wharton Neg., § 134. 229 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS. § 223 § 223. " The same subject continued. — Where the error consists in omitting to index or in indexing incorrectly, the decisions are also at variance. In some of them the index is deemed a mere collateral convenience for the benefit of the recorder, an error in which does not prejudice the grantee's title. ^^ But where the statute requires the index to give information of the contents of the deed, the record is not constructive notice of anything which is not disclosed by the index.''^ § 224. Liability of assessor of taxes. — Tax assessors are not liable for innocent mistake when acting within the scope of their author- ity;*^^ but they must be careful not to assume a jurisdiction which the law does not confer upon them: if they decide upon the rights of others in cases which the law has not confided to their judgment, they are liable to the same extent as if they possessed no official char- acter whatever. In the leading ease in New York it was held that an action could be maintained by a bank to recover a tax levied under an assessment upon its capital stock contrary to a statute which provided, instead, for the taxation of the stockholders. "The dis- tinction," said Chief Justice Church, "is between an erroneous and an illegal assessment. The former is where the officers have power to act, but err in the exercise of the power; the latter where they have no power to act at all, and it does not aid them to decide that they have."^** In assessing property not taxable, or in deciding er- roneously as to a taxable inhabitant, they act ministerially and not " Schell V. Stein, 76 Pa. St. 398; mira, 53 N. Y. 49; rev'g s. c. 6 Lans. Bishop V. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472; s. (N. Y.) 116; Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. c. 2 Am. R. 533; Commissioners &c. Y. 261; reversing s. c. 61 Barb. (N. V. Babcock, 5 Or. 472; Curtis v. Ly- Y.) 597; Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N. Y. man, 24 Vt. 338. 339. See also, Mygatt v. Washburn, ^'^Reeder v. State. 98 Ind. 114; 15 N. Y. 316; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 Gwynn v. Turner, 18 Iowa 1; Breed N. Y. 281; Chegaray v. Jenkins, 5 N. V. Conley, 14 Iowa 269; Scoles v. Y. 376; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Wilsey, 11 Iowa 261. Denio (N. Y.) 117; Prosser v. Secor, ^^ National Bank &c. v. City of El- 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 607; Swift v. City mira, 53 N. Y. 49; reversing s. c. 6 of Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y. 511; Haley Lans. (N. Y.) 116; and reviewing v. Whitney, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 119; s. the New York cases; Williams v. c. 6 N. Y. S. 342. It was said in Ap- Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30; s. c. affirmed, gar v. Hayward, 110 N. Y. 225; s. c. 100 U. S. 547; Robinson v. Rowland, 18 N. E. 85, that if assessors had no 26 Hun (N. Y.) 501; Ford v. Mc- jurisdiction to make a certain in- Gregor, 20 Nev. 446; s. c. 23 Pac. crease which they did make, they 508; McDaniell v. Tebbetts, 60 N. H. would not be liable for property 497; Cooley Taxation 553; Wilson v. taken to pay the tax, but only for Marsh, 34 Vt. 352; Odiorne v. Rand, the difference between the correct 59 N. H. 504. and erroneous tax. '" National Bank &c. v. City of El- 224 PUBLIC COIirORATIONS. 330 judicially.''^ On the other hand, if they have jurisdiction both of the person taxed and of the subject-matter, there is no individual lia- bility, however erroneous or unequal the tax may be, provided they act in good faith. ^- Thus where the statute required an assess- ment upon the market value of certain shares of stock, and it was made upon the par value, there was no remedy against the assessors.''^ It was held in New York that an assessor, in determining the value of property, is protected irrespective of motive;^* but it is believed that the prevailing rule makes him liable for a malicious overesti- mate.'^^ "Ford v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 446; s. c. 23 Pac. 508. " Williams v. Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30; s. c. affirmed, 100 U, S. 547; Bal- lerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447; s. c. 23 Pac. 530, quoting from Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98; Apgar v. Hay ward, 110 N. Y. 225; s. c. 18 N. E. 85. "Williams v. Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30; s. c. affirmed, 100 U. S. 547. See also, an excellent case, Robinson v. Rowland, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 501. " Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 117. But see Apgar v. Hay- ward. 110 N. Y. 225, 232; s. c. 18 N. E. 85. "^'^ Parkinson v. Parker, 48 Iowa 667, 669; Ballerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447; s. c. 23 Pac. 530, where, how- ever, the court held that an aver- ment that the defendant "wilfully and against law" assessed property too high was not an allegation of malice or of intent to wrong or in- jure the owner. They are exempt by statute in Massachusetts except for want of integrity (Pub. Stat, of Mass., p. 113, § 94); but formerly in that state the rule was more severe than that adopted elsewhere: Gage V. Currier, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 399; Taft V. Wood, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 362; Lit- tle V. Merrill, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 543. Assessors are not liable for an unin- tentional omission to tax a person, whereby he loses his vote: Griffin v. Rising, 11 Met. (Mass.) 339. CHAPTER VIII. THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION FOR THE ACTS OP ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS. Section 225. Introductory. 226. Liability ex contractu — Re- quirements for valid con- tracts. 227. Contracts within scope of pow- ers of corporation. 228. The same subject continued. 229. The doctrine of ultra vires ap- plied with greater strictness to public than to private corporations. The reason for the rule. Municipal bonds void when ultra vires. The same subject continued. Ultra vires — How modified by estoppel. 234. The same subject continued — Hitchcock V. Galveston. Irregularity in exercise of power. Ultra vires — How modified by the doctrine of implied con- tract — General principles. The same subject continued. Illustrations of the doctrine of implied contracts. The same subject continued. Liability of the corporation to repay taxes illegally col- lected. 241. The same subject continued — Restrictions. 242. Illegality of assessment. 243. Actual receipt of taxes by the corporation. 244. Compulsory payment of taxes. 245. The same subject continued. 246. Illustrations of the rule. 230 231 232 233 235. 236. 237 238 239 240 Section 247. The same subject continued. 248. The doctrine of the federal su- preme court considered. 249. The same subject continued. 250. Contracts within the scope of powers of officer or agent. 251. The same subject continued — Clark V. Des Moines. 252. All persons contracting with strictly public corporations charged with knowledge of scope of powers of officer or agent. 253. The same subject continued. 254. Liability of corporation for act of its officers or agents in violation of law. 255. The same subject continued. 256. Effect of representation of of- ficer or agent as to authority. 257. The same subject continued. 258. Ratification of contracts. 259. The same subject continued. 260. Ratification by authorized offi- cers necessary. 261. Manner of ratification. 262. Manner of execution of con- tracts by officers and agents. 263. The same subject continued. 264. Contracts by ordinance or reso- lution. 265. Signature of contract. 266. The same subject continued. 267. Liability ex delicto — (a) In general. 268. (b) Discretionary and legisla- tive acts. 269. (c) The same subject con- tinued. (231) § 225 PUBLIC CORPORATIOiVS, 232 Section Section 270. (d) Ministerial acts. 272. The rule applied to public 271. (e) Public as contradistin- quasi-corporations. guished from private duties. 273. Conclusion. § 225. Introductory. — A municipal corporation, like other corpo- rations, can of course act only through its agents. Every liability of such a corporation is in a sense a liability for the acts of its offi- cers or agents. A more detailed statement of the different classes of liabilities incident to municipal corporations will be found in the subsequent chapters of this work. It is the writer's purpose in this chapter to consider the liability of the corporation for the acts of its officers and agents with special reference to the powers and authority of those agents, and the extent to which the municipality is bound by those acts. The liability of the corporation is naturally considered under two heads: every liability is either a liability ex contractu or a liability ex delicto ; in other words, the act of the officer or agent by which the municipality is sought to be bound is claimed to be either a contract or a tort. The principles governing these two classes of liability, though similar in many respects, differ materially in others; and in considering any specific question of liability we must first inquire whether that liability arises from contract or from tort, before we attempt to decide whether the corporation is bound by the acts of its officer or agent. § 226. Liability ex contractu — ^Requirements for valid con- tracts. — A municipal corporation is liable, just as is a private corpo- ration or a natural free person, upon contracts properly assumed by the corporation. There may be said to be three requirements neces- sary for a valid and enforceable contract by a municipal corporation. In the first place the contract must be within the scope of the powers of the corporation ; that is to say, the corporation must be authorized, either expressly or impliedly by its charter or other statute by virtue of which it has come into existence, to make such a contract. In the second place the contract must be made by the proper officers or agents. The officers or agents through whom the corporation acts in assuming the contract liability must be within the authorized scope of their powers in making the contract on behalf of the municipality. Finally, if the manner in which the municipal corporation must make its contracts is expressly and imperatively prescribed by manda- tory statutes, the contract must be made according to the manner pre- scribed by law in order to be valid. ^ If these requirements are ob- ^ See post, ch. 18, where these different requirements are discussed in detail. 233 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. 227 served the municipal corporation is liable to private persons upon its contracts to the same extent as a private corporation or a natural person. The constitutional prohibition of laws impairing the obli- gation of contracts applies in favor of private creditors of the munici- pality, whether they be corporations or persons, maintaining inviola- ble the rights of these creditors against any subsequent legislation.- § 227. Contracts within scope of powers of corporation. — The municipal corporation being an artificial person and deriving its existence and power to act solely from the express or implied provi- sions of its charter or other creating statute, it can not make a valid contract which is wholly beyond the scope of its powers. Conse- quently no officer or agent can make a binding contract on behalf of the municipal corporation, if such contract is wholly beyond the express or implied powers of the corporation.^ It now seems well- 2 Wolff V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. The proposition in the text is of course conceded learning, and it is needless to quote in this con- nection more of the great number of cases which establish the doctrine. ^ Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 897; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 785; Lewis v. City of Shreve- port, 108 U. S. 282; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 634; East Oakland Tp. v. Skin- ner, 94 U. S. 255; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Thomas v. City of Richmond, 12 Wall. 349; City of Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 358; Bogart V. Lamotte Tp., 79 Mich. 294; s. c. 44 N. W. 612; Reus v. City of Grand Rapids, 73 Mich. 237; s. c. 41 N. W. 263; Newbery v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141; s. c. 33 N. W. 333; 5 Am. St. 830; Burchfield v. City of New Or- leans, 42 La. An. 235; s. c. 7 So. 448; Gurley v. City of New Or- leans, 41 La. An. 75; s. c. 5 So. 659; Laycock v. City of Baton Rouge, 35 La. An. 475; Seibrecht v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 496; Spauld- ing V. City of Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 71; Loker v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Pick. (Mass.) 343; Mayor &c. V. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272; Stidger v. City of Red Oak, 64 Iowa 465; s. c. 20 N. W. 762; State v. Severs, 86 N. C. 588; City of Fort Wayne v. Lehr, 88 Ind. 62; Covington &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 85 Ga. 367; s. c. 11 S. E. 663; City of Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; New Jersey &c. Co. v. Fire Com'rs, 34 N. J. Eq. 117; Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332; s. c. 16 Pac. 7; 5 Am. St. 442; Miners Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543; Agawam Bank v. Inhabitants &c., 128 Mass. 503; Atlantic City &c. 'Co. v. Read, 50 N. J. L. 665; s. c. 15 Atl. 10; Prince V. City of Quincy, 105 111. 138; Trustees &c. v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1 ; City of Cleveland v. State Bank &c., 16 Ohio St. 236; Shipman v. State, 42 Wis. 377, 381; Syracuse W. Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167; s. c. 22 N. E. 381; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218; s. c. 10 N. E. 155; Moore v. Mayor &c., 73 N. Y. 238; McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23; Buffett v. Troy &c. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 168; Donovan v. Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. 291; Mayor &c. v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165; Halstead v. Mayor &c., 3 N. Y. 430; Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. St, 162; Barley's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 273; Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 327; Cheeney v. Inhabitants &c., 60 Mo. 53; City of Bridgeport v. Hous- § 228 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 234 established law that where the contract is properly ultra vires, — that is to say, where it is wholly beyond the express or implied powers of the corporation, — it is absolutely void, , and can not be ratified by performance or by acceptance of benefit thereunder. As is said in a recent California case, neither the doctrine of estoppel or of ratifica- tion nor of bona fide holding can be invoked to support such a con- tract.* § 228. The same subject continued. — There is, however, much conflict in the cases bearing on this point. The great preponderance of authority is undoubtedly in favor of the doctrine of our text, but in many cases the judges seem to have allowed their desire to prevent the defeat of substantial justice by the interposition of the technical defense of ultra vires to obscure their judgment in deciding the legal rights of the parties. Thus, in a case in which the city of St. Louis sued to recover upon a contract, which the court acknowledged to be void, but under which the defendant had enjoyed benefits, it was held that the defendant was estopped from impeaching the validity of the contract. The decision was also placed upon the doubt- ful ground that a contract made by a municipal corporation, although ultra vires, was yet not illegal if not prohibited by its charter; and that while the corporation might successfully set up the plea of ultra vires if sued upon such a contract, still the party contracting with the corporation could not set up that plea against the corporation after receiving and retaining benefits under the contract. The deci- sion may be justified on the ground of estoppel under the particular facts of the ease; but the general doctrine laid down that a city may recover upon an ultra vires contract unless such contract is expressly prohibited by law, is certainly dangerously broad. The concluding sentence of the decision seems to indicate the real ground of the decision: "In ruling thus we give no sanction to a municipal corpo- ration leaving the narrow pathway marked out by its charter, nor do we intimate that we would enforce an ultra vires contract if execu- atonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; Clark cent cases in the different states, by V. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199; consulting which other authorities Lincoln v. Inhabitants &c., 75 Maine in the reports of that state may be 141; Mitchell v. City of Rockland, ascertained. 45 Maine 496; Driftwood &c. Co. v. * Sutro v. Petti t, 74 Cal. 332; s. c. Board &c., 72 Ind. 226. The cases 16 Pac. 7; 5 Am. St. 442. And this above cited are but a few of a great doctrine has the high authority of number which support the proposi- Judge Dillon: 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., tion of the text. The writer has en- § 457; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 935. deavored to cite the leading and re- See cases cited in preceding note. 235 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 229 tory; we merely hold that good morals and even-handed justice de- mand that the defendant should disgorge."^ § 229. The doctrine of ultra vires applied with greater strictness to public than to private corporations. — In a Minnesota case,** a contract for grading the streets was made by the officers of a town in the first instance, although the charter required that the duty to make the improvement should he first imposed upon the adjacent proprietors. In a well-considered opinion the contract was adjudged ultra vires and void. The court said: "The doctrine of ultra vires has with good reason been applied with greater strictness to munici- pal bodies than to private corporations, and in general a municipality is not estopped from denying the validity of a contract made by its officers when there has been no authority for making such a con- tract.'^ A different rule of law would in effect vastly enlarge the powers of public agents to bind a municipality by contracts not only unauthorized but prohibited by the law. It would tend to nullify the limitations and restrictions imposed with respect to the powers of such agents, and to a dangerous extent expose the public to the very evils and abuses which such limitations are designed to prevent."^ § 230. The reason for the rule. — The reason for the stringent application of the doctrine of ultra vires to strictly public corpora- tions is well stated by Judge Cooley: "The powers conferred upon municipalities must be considered with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies of the state in local government. The state can create them for no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no other end, without at once coming into conflict with the constitutional maxim that legislative power can not be delegated, or with other maxims designed to confine all the agen- ° City of St. Louis v. Davidson, 102 icy is void, notwithstanding the Mo. 149; s. c. 14 S. W. 825; 22 Am. fact that the city has received some St. 764. benefits thereunder. "Newbery v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141; s. ® See to the same effect, Burch- c. 33 N. W. 333; 5 Am. St. 830. field v. City of New Orleans, 42 La. ■'Citing Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. An. 235; s. c. 7 So. 448; Gurley v. 468; Brady v. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. City of New Orleans, 41 La. An. 75; 312; Hague v. City of Philadelphia, s. c. 5 So. 659; Rens v. City of Grand 48 Pa. St. 527; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., Rapids, 73 Mich. 237; s. c. 41 N. W. § 457; Nash v. City of St. Paul, 8 263; Bogart v. Lamotte Tp., 79 Mich. Minn. 172. In Covington &c. R. Co. 294; s. c. 44 N. W. 612; Sutro v. Pet- V. Mayor &c., 85 Ga. 367; s. e. 11 S. tit, 74 Cal. 332; s. c. 16 Pac. 7; 5 E. 663, it is decided that a contract Am. St. 442; and cases cited in pre- entered into by a city outside of its ceding sections, powers and contrary to public pol- § 831 PUBLIC COKl'ORATIONS. 236 cies of government to the exercise of their proper functions; and wherever the municipality shall attempt to exercise powers not within the proper province of local self-government, whether the right to do so be claimed under express legislative grant or by implication from the charter, the act must be considered as altogether ultra vires and therefore void."^ § 231. Municipal bonds void when ultra vires. — An interesting instance of the application of the preceding doctrines is found in a California case already cited.^° The legislature of that state au- thorized the board of supervisors of the county of San Luis Obispo to issue bonds "not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of forty thou- sand dollars" for the purpose of erecting a court-house. By some means bonds to the amount of forty-two thousand dollars were issued. Under the California statutes such bonds could be legal only by virtue of the express authority of the legislature. The court held that the action of the supervisors in issuing the bonds in excess of forty thousand dollars did not bind the county, as the county had no power to issue bonds without legislative sanction ; that the bonds were absolutely void. "It is quite probable," said the opinion of the court, "that the respondents paid full par value for these bonds and that they will lose their money," but "those who contract with a municipal corporation are bound to know the extent of the power of its officers. ^^_ Eespondents would have discovered the worthlessness of the bonds upon the slightest inquiry. At all events, hard cases can not be allowed to make bad law. An overissue of twenty thousand dollars would have been no less valid than the overissue of two thousand dollars, and any other rule would put the people of a county in the complete power of careless or unscrupulous public officers." ^^ § 232. The same subject continued. — The supreme court of the United States has, however, decided, where municipal bonds are by »Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) ^= Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332; s. c. 261. And Judge Dillon says:— "The 16 Pac. 7; 5 Am. St. 442, 445. In the history of the workings of munici- same case the board of supervisors pal bodies has demonstrated the attempted to correct their error by salutary nature of this principle, ordering the bonds to be redeemed, and that it is the part of true wis- The court very justly held this tp be dom to keep the corporate wings brutum fulmen, saying: — "The char- clipped down to the lawful stand- acter of one void act of public offi- ard:" 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 457. cers can not be changed by a second ^^ Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332; s. c. void act of the same officers declar- 16 Pac. 7; 5 Am. St. 442. ing the first act to be valid." " Citing Wallace v. Mayor &c., 29 Cal. 180. 237 THE LIABILITY OF TIIK CORPORATION. § 233 virtue of misrepresentations contained in the bonds themselves ap- parently valid, and are sold to bona fide purchasers, and the purchase price received and appropriated by the city, that the city is liable to the purchasers for the price paid for the bonds upon an implied contract to restore money illegally obtained.^^ But the doctrine of the case cited in the preceding section^* has often been sustained, and under the circumstances of the individual case it has been decided in several instances in Massachusetts that the holders of void munici- pal bonds were without remedy.^° § 233. intra vires — How modified by estoppel. — The foregoing principles are to be applied cautiously, however; and it does not al- ways follow from the fact that the municipality has undertaken an ultra vires act, that the other contracting party is without remedy for the corporation's default. As has been before indicated, the courts are reluctant to apply the hard doctrine of ultra vires, and have to some extent used the same expedients to evade that doctrine which have in the case of private corporations so far restricted its application. The doctrine of estoppel is frequently invoked against the plea of ultra vires. Thus, to use the words of Judge Dillon, "where an act in its external aspect is within the general powers of the corporation, and is only unauthorized because it is done with a secret unauthorized intent, the defense of ultra vires will not pre- vail against a stranger who in good faith dealt with it without notice of such intent." i« § 234. The same subject continued — Hitchcock v. Galveston. — A notable instance is to be found in a case in the federal supreme "Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. 294. void bonds than are the state courts So also, in a Wisconsin case, the — possibly because the federal tri- same doctrine was upheld, and it bunal feels less keenly the local dan- was also decided that it was not gers of allowing careless or un- necessary under those circumstances scrupulous public officers to trifle for the holders to offer to return with the financial obligations of the the bonds before bringing action: corporations whose servants they Paul V. City of Kenosha, 22 Wis. 266. are, and consequently is more at lib- " Sutro V. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332; s. c. erty to exercise the natural feeling 16 Pac. 7; 5 Am. St. 442. of pity for the bondholders who '^ Agawam Nat'l Bank v. Inhabi- have become the victims of that tants &c., 128 Mass. 503; Railroad carelessness or unscrupulousness. Nat'l Bank v. City of Lowell. 109 ^^ 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 936; cit- Mass. 214. See chapter on Bonds and ing 5 Am. L. Rev. (Jan. 1871) 272, Coupons, post. It will be noticed which, says the distinguished au- that the supreme court of the United thor, sums up the result of the States is more lenient towards bona- English cases to that date substan- fide holders for value of irregular or tially in the language of the text. § 234 PUBLIC COIU'OHATIOXS. 238 court," where the city of Galveston contracted with certain parties to pave its streets. This was within the scope of the powers of the corporation, but a clause in the contract provided for the issue of negotiable municipal bonds in payment for the contract, which was ultra vires the corporation. The contractors proceeded with the work, and when partially completed brought action against the city on the contract. The plea of ultra vires was set up and sustained in the trial court, but overruled in the supreme court. The grounds of the decision were stated by Mr. Justice Strong as follows: "They [the plaintiff contractors] are not suing upon the bonds, and it is not necessary for their success that they should assert the validity of those instruments. It is enough for them that the city council have power to enter into a contract for the improvement of the side- walks; that such a contract was made with them; that under it they have proceeded to furnish materials and do work as well as assume liabilities; that the city has received and now enjoys the benefit of what they have done and furnished; that for these things the city promised to pay, and that after receiving the benefit of the contract the city has broken it. It matters not that the promise was to pay in a manner not authorized by law. If payments can not be made in bonds because their issue is ultra vires, it would be sanctioning rank injustice to hold that payment need not be made at all. Such is not the law. The contract between the parties is in force, so far as it is lawful. There may be a difference between the case of an engagement made by a corporation to do an act expressly prohibited by its charter or some other law and a case of where legislative power to do the act has not been granted. Such a distinction is asserted in some decisions. But the present is not a case in which the issue of bonds was prohibited by any statute. At most the issue was unauthorized; at most there was a defect of power. The promise to give bonds to the plaintiffs in payment of what they undertook to do was therefore at furthest only ultra vires; and in such a case, though specific performance of an engagement to do a thing trans- gressive of its corporate power may not be enforced, the corporation can be held liable on its contract. Having received benefits at the expense of the other contracting party, it can not object that it was not empowered to perform what it promised in return in the mode in which it promised to perform. This was directly ruled in The State Board of Agriculture v. The Citizens Street Eailway Com- pany. ^^ There it was held that 'although there may be a defect of " Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. ^' 47 Ind. 407. 341. 239 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION^. § 235 power in a corporation to make a contract, yet if a contract made by it is not in violation of its charter or of any statute prohibiting it, and the corporation has by its promise induced a party, relying on the promise and in execution of the contract, to expend money ■ and perform his part thereof, the corporation is liable on the con- tract.' "1^ § 235. Irregularity in exercise of power. — And in pursuance of the same policy the courts have held that where the officers of the municipal corporation enter into contract which is within the scope of the powers of the corporation, but do so in an irregular manner, the corporation is estopped from setting up ultra vires against one who has contracted in good faith.^'' And in an Illinois case it was decided that where a municipal corporation enters upon a contract in reliance upon a power which it is subsequently discovered not to possess, it will not be relieved of its obligation if that obligation can be satisfied by -the exercise of a power which it lawfully pos- sesses.^^ § 236. Ultra vires — How modified by the doctrine of implied con- tract — General principles. — The elementary principle that the law presumes a contract to restore to the rightful owner property ob- tained through fraud or. mistake is applied to municipal corporations with effects that greatly modify and ameliorate the doctrine of ultra vires. "This doctrine of implied municipal liability applies to cases where money or other property of a party is received under such cir- cumstances that the general law, independent of express contract, imposes the obligation upon the city to do justice with respect to the *® Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. the city was based upon the con- 341; citing Alleghany City v. Mc- tract, and the court did not decide Clurkin, 14 Pa. St. 81; Maher v. the question of the validity of the City of Chicago, 38 111. 266; Oneida bonds. The arguments of the opin- Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490; ion quoted in the text were consid- Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. ered applicable even if the bonds 255; Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 were conceded to be illegal and void. Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 370. The deci- It will be noted that the conclusions sion of the lower court in this case of this case are close in principle to (Hitchcock V. Galveston) was sup- City of St. Louis v. Davidson, 102 ported, in the opinion of the court. Mo. 149; s. c. 14 S. W. 825, already by Tensas &c. Jury v. Britton, 15 cited and considered. See to the Wall. 566, and Mayor &c. v. Ray, 19 same effect, East St. Louis v. East Wall. 468, where it was held that a St. Louis Gas &c. Co., 98 111. 415. municipality has inherently no im- ^^ Moore v. Mayor &c., 73 N. Y. 238. plied power to issue bonds. But in " Maher v. City of Chicago, 38 111. the Galveston case the liability of 266. § 237 PUBLIC COKPOKATIONS. - 240 same."-- These words of Chief Justice Field indicate the great breadth and vagueness of the doctrine and the consequent great difficulty in its application to individuals. There are few subjects in the law of public corporations in which it is more difficult to lay down general principles from the adjudications. The general prin- ciple of the liability of corporations on an implied contract, where the law presumes a contract to restore money or property obtained by mistake or without authority of law, is supported by a vast num- ber of authorities.^^ The difficulty is to determine under what circumstances the general rule applies. § 237. The same subject continued. — The law must be determined from the circumstances of each case, and generalities will be little more than indications of the trend of the decisions. The result of this state of things is that which always follows when the law is in the breast of each judge. There is great and irreconcilable conflict in the cases. A few general rules are laid down, however, by Chief Justice Field which may be studied with advantage. "If the city obtain money of another by mistake or without authority of law, it is her duty to refund it — not from any contract entered into by her on the subject, but from the general obligation to do justice which binds all persons, whether natural or artificial. If the city obtain other property which does not belong to her it is her duty to restore it; or, if used by her, to refund an equivalent to the true owner from the like general obligation ; the law, which always intends justice, implies a promise. In reference to money or other property, it is not difficult to determine in any particular case whether a lia- bility with respect to the same has attached to the city. The money must have gone into her treasury or been appropriated by her; and when it is property other than money it must have been used by her or be under her control. But with reference to services rendered the 2^ Argenti V. City of San Francisco, s. c. 10 Atl. 809; Board &c. 16 Cal. 255. v. Springfield, 63 III. 66; Town of =^ Chapman V. Douglass Co., 107 U. Canaan v. Derush, 47 N. H. 212; S. 348; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 62; Louisiana v. State Board &c. v. Aberdeen, 56 Wood, 102 U. S. 294; Mayor &c. v. Miss. 518; Herman v. City of Crete, Ray, 19 Wall. 468; President &c. 9 Neb. 350; s. c. 2 N. W. 722; District (Bank) v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, Tp. &c. v. District Tp. &c., 11 Iowa 74; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 506; Morville v. American Tract So- 341; Albany City Nat'l Bank v. City ciety, 123 Mass. 129; Brown v. City of Albany, 92 N. Y. 363; Moore v. of Atchison, 39 Kan. 37; s. c. 17 Pac. Mayor &c., 73 N. Y. 238; Peterson v. 465; City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. Mayor &c., 17 N. Y. 449; Bank v. 532; Town of Lemington v. Blodgett, Patterson, 7 Cranch 299; Taylor v. 37 Vt. 215; Magill v. Kauffman, 4 S. Lambertville, 43 N.J. Bq. 107; & R. (Pa.) 317. 241 THE LIABILITY OP THE CORPORATION. § 238 case is different. Then acceptance must be evidenced by ordinance to that effect. If not originally authorized, no liability can attach upon any ground of implied contract. The acceptance upon which alone the obligation to pay could arise would be wanting. As a gen- eral rule, undoubtedly a city corporation is only liable upon express contracts authorized by ordinance. The exceptions relate to liabili- ties from the use of money or other property which does not belong to her or to liabilities springing from the neglect of duties imposed by. the charter from which injuries to parties are produced. There are limitations even to these exceptions in many instances ; as, where money or property is received in disregard of positive prohibitions; as, for example, the city would not be liable for moneys received upon the issuance of bills of credit, as this would be in effect to support a proceeding in direct contravention of the inhibition of the charter."-* § 238. Illustrations of the doctrine of implied contracts. — In an Illinois case the municipal corporation was bound by its charter to support its paupers. An action was brought by a person who had furnished necessaries to a pauper, after having applied to the munici- pal authorities for relief, which was refused. The city was held liable under an implied contract to remunerate the person who had thus performed what was the duty of the city.^^ The cases in which said doctrine is more frequently applied arise where the city has obtained through mistake or fraud money or other property, and an implied contract to return the property thus obtained is presumed by the law. So in a famous series of California cases, known as the "City Slip Cases," where the municipal officers conveyed real estate by virtue of an ordinance which was void, it was held that the sales were absolutely void ; that no title passed to the supposed purchasers, and that the corporation was liable in an action brought by them to recover the purchase-money, although that money had already been appropriated for municipal purposes.^^ '^ Argenti v. City of San Francisco, made repeated applications to the 16 Cal. 255. city authorities for relief, which was -^ Seagraves v. Alton, 13 111. 366. refused. If Reeves was a pauper in In the opinion it was said by the fact, the plaintiff by continuing to court: — "In the present case the maintain him pursued the course evidence tended to the conclusion that humanity prompted and the that Reeves was a pauper and prop- law approved, and he ought to be re- erly chargeable to the corporation, munerated." It also clearly appeared that the "'^ Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 plaintiff, with whom Reeves resided, Cal. 351; Grogan v. San Francisco, 1 Smith — 16 § 239 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 243 § 239. The same subject continued. — In an interesting case in the federal supreme court a Nebraska county purchased certain lands for a poor farm, and paid for the same partly in cash and partly in promissory notes. It was subsequently decided by the state courts that the promissory notes were ultra vires and void. Suit was brought that the sum due on account of the purchase price should be paid or that the county should reconvey the lands. The supreme court held that the contract was void only so far as the mode of payment was concerned, and that the county was liable for the balance due on account of the purchase price, and decreed that that balance should be paid within a reasonable time or the property reconveyed to the rightful owners.^^ The courts have frequently decided, in accordance with the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity,'* that a municipal corporation which seeks to be relieved from a con- tract must, if it has received benefits under that contract, restore the benefits it has received before its prayer will be granted. ^^ § 240. Liability of the corporation to repay taxes illegally col- lected. — A liability on an implied contract arises under proper cir- cumstances where the municipal corporation has collected and re- ceived illegal taxes. The principles upon which this liability is based are clearly the same as those which have been discussed in the preceding sections. The law presumes a contract on the part of the corporation to repay the taxes to the rightful owner, if the con- ditions are such that the municipality has not equitably a right to retain the money collected as taxes. ^^ The money thus received is 18 Cal. 590; McCracken v. San of implied contracts will be more Francisco, 16 Cal. 591. In a New fully discussed in the chapter on York case sewers were furnished Contracts. As has been indicated, under an unauthorized contract, the cases are conflicting, and it is The courts held that the contractor perhaps impossible to lay down gen- could not recover on the express con- eral rules on the subject to which tract, but indicated in a dictum that many exceptions are not to be found, "if, as alleged, the city has obtained ^ National Bank «S:c. v. Elmira, 53 his property without authority, but N. Y. 49; Bank &c. v. Mayor &c., 43 has used and received the avails of N. Y. 184; Grand Rapids v. Blakely, it, it would seem that independently 40 Mich. 367; Tuttle v. Everett, 51 of the express contract an implied Miss. 27; Douglasville v. Jones, 62 contract would arise to make com- Ga. 423; Lamborn v. County Com'rs, pensation:" Nelson v. Mayor &c., 63 97 U. S. 181; Union Pacific R. Co. v. N. Y. 535. Commissioners &c., 98 U. S. 541; "Chapman v. Douglass Co., 107 U. Phelps v. Mayor &c.. 112 N. Y. 216; S. 348; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 62. s. c. 19 N. E. 408; Ege v. Koontz, 3 =« Turner v. Cruzen, 70 Iowa 202; Pa. St. 109; Town of Princeton v. s. c. 30 N. W. 483; Lucas v. Hunt, 5 Vierling, 40 Ind. 340; Riker v. Jer- Ohio St. 488. The difficult subject sey City, 38 N. J. L. 225; Haines v. 243 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 241 considered in law to be money had and received for the rightful owners, the taxpayers, and can be recovered by them in an action in assumpsit on this common-law liability independently of the statutory provisions on the subject that are in force in several of the states. § 241. The same subject continued — Restrictions. — It is mani- fest, however, that a loose application of the doctrine enunciated in the preceding section would be fraught with grave damage to the corporation. If the town, city or other strictly public corporation could be held liable to repay all taxes irregularly collected, even if paid voluntarily, it is evident that great public inconvenience would ensue. Such a condition of things would afEord unlimited opportu- nity to demagogues to appeal to the natural avarice of mankind. Actions would be brought to recover taxes, necessary and legal in their essentials, but collected irregularly or by virtue of legislation in which some technical defect could be found. The administration of government would be seriously impeded, and the just and equitable principle of the common law would be distorted into an instrument of injustice. The courts have therefore wisely hedged about the application of the doctrine with stringent rules. These rules are stated by Judge Dillon with his usual succinctness and clearness: "Ac- tions against a municipal corporation to recover back money upon the ground of the illegality of the tax or assessment are upon principle and the weight of authority maintainable when, and in general only when (if there be no statute enlarging the liability), the following requisites coexist: 1. The authority to levy the tax or to levy it upon the property in question must be wholly wanting, or the tax itself wholly unauthorized, in which case the assessment is not simply School Dist., 41 Maine 246; Cook v. covered back. And the fact that the City of Boston, 9 Allen (Mass.) 393. party at the time of making the pay- The liability of the corporation for ment files a written protest does not the repayment of taxes illegally col- make the payment involuntary. But lected exists under the proper condi- where a party not liable to taxation tions at common law independent of is called upon peremptorily to pay statute, and has been recognized by upon such a warrant, and he can the supreme court of the United save himself and his property in no States. "Where a party pays an il- other way than by paying the illegal legal demand with a full knowledge demand, he may give notice that he of all the facts which render such so pays it by duress and not vohm- demand illegal without an immedi- tarily, and by showing that he is not ate and urgent necessity therefor, or liable recover it back as money had unless to release his person or prop- and received:" Union Pacific R. Co. erty from detention or to prevent v. Commissioners &c., 98 U. S. 541; an immediate seizure of his person cited and quoted in 2 Dillon Munic. or property, such payment must be Corp., § 947. deemed voluntary, and can not be re- § 242 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 244 irregular but absolutely void. 2. The money sued for must have been actually received by the defendant corporation and received by it for its own use and not as an agent or instrument to assess and collect money for the benefit of the state or other public corporation or person. And 3. The payment by the plaintiff must have been made upon compulsion; as, for example, to prevent the immediate seizure of his goods or the arrest of the person, and not voluntarily. Unless these conditions concur, paying under protest will not, without statutory aid, give a right of recovery."^^ § 242. Illegality of assessment. — According to the first rule laid down in the preceding section, the assessment must be absolutely void and not merely irregular in order to justify a recovery by the taxpayer of the money paid in as taxes. Thus, where property ex- empt by law from taxation is illegally taxed, the assessment is void and the money may be reeovered.^^ And in accordance with this principle it has been held in several cases that where the corporation levies an assessment upon property for street improvement and the like, and the assessment is void in law, the sum paid under the assessment can be recovered.^^ This rule is also applied when the corporation levies an assessment and afterwards fails to carry out the improvement for which the assessment was levied.^^ In con- formity with the general policy of the law in restricting the applica- tion of the doctrine under consideration, it is conceded learning that the assessment is considered prima facie valid, and the burden of proof of its illegality is thrown upon the person attempting to recover money paid under that assessment.^* § 243. Actual receipt of taxes by the corporation. — The second restrictive rule prescribed by Judge Dillon is well illustrated in a Massachusetts case. The taxpayers of a town paid a sum of money under a void assessment in order to build a schoolhouse. This money was paid by the treasurer of the town to a building committee ^° 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 940. on its face, the payment of the as- ^* City of Indianapolis v. McAvoy, sessment, being a mere mistake of 86 Ind. 587. law, is not such a payment as to •^^ Taylor v. People, 66 111. 322; justify a recovery: Phelps v. Mayor Bradford v. City of Chicago, 25 111. &c., 112 N. Y. 216; s. c. 19 N. B. 408. 411; Diefenthaler v. Mayor &c.. Ill '''Bradford v. City of Chicago, 25 N. Y. 331; s. c. 19 N. E. 48; Peyser 111. 411; Valentine v. City of St. V. Mayor &c., 70 N. Y. 497; Mayor Paul, 34 Minn. 446; s. c. 26 N. W. &c. v. O'Callaghan, 41 N. J. L. 349. 457. But it is held in a New York case '* Town of Douglasville v. Johns, that when the assessment is made 62 Ga. 423; and cases cited in pre- under an ordinance which is void ceding sections. 245 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 244 of the school district. A taxpayer brought action against the school district and recovered his proportionate share of the money from the school district, although the town had levied the assessment."'''* It is indeed obvious where the corporation exercises only a naked agency, and pays over the money collected to a third person, natural or artificial, that the actual beneficiary is liable in an action brought to recover the money so paid. This principle is, however, applied with discretion, and the money must be actually paid over to the third person before the corporation can claim exemption under the rule. Thus, where the city of Grand Eapids illegally collected a tax for street improvement, and an action was brought to recover the money so paid, it was claimed by the defendant that the fund was not for city use and that the city was not therefore liable. The court held very properly that the plea was untenable, saying : "Where the party entitled demands restoration, it is no answer for the city to say it holds the funds for somebody else."^® § 244. Compulsory payment of taxes. — In order to justify a re- covery by the taxpayer, it is not only necessary that the assessment be void and that the corporation actually receive the money, but it is also necessary that the payment be made involuntarily and under compulsion. It is by the application of this rule that these actions are, if unsuccessful, generally defeated, and consequently there are a great number of cases regulating and defining the application of the rule. There is considerable variety and some actual conflict in the cases on this subject. It is, however, upon the whole, well settled that the payment must be made under direct and immediate compul- sion, and under such circumstances that the person called upon to pay the tax can save himself or his property only by paying the illegal demand.^'' The stringent application of this rule often results in ^^ Joyner v. Inhabitants &c., 3 is believed that the doctrine of the Cush. (Mass.) 567. text is also supported by the follow- ^^ City of Grand Rapids v. Blakely, ing cases: Galveston City Co. v. 40 Mich. 367. City of Galveston, 56 Tex. 486; " Union Pac. R. Co. v. Commis- Town of Princeton v. Vierling, 40 sioners &c., 98 U. S. 541. In this Ind. 340; Commissioners &c. v. Na- case the rule is laid down by Chief tional Land Co., 23 Kan. 196; Kan- Justice Waite as in the text. The sas &c. R. Co. v. Commissioners &c., language of the rule is taken from 16 Kan. 587; Detroit v. Martin, 34 the decision of Chief Justice Shaw Mich. 170; Bank &c. v. City of New in Preston v. City of Boston, 12 Pick. Orleans, 12 La. An. 421; Robinson v. (Mass.) 7, 14, which is cited and ap- City Council &c., 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) proved by Chief Justice Waite in his 317; Leonard v. City of Canton, 35 opinion. See also, Lamborn v. Miss. 189; Raisler v. Mayor &c., 66 County Com'rs &c., 97 U. S. 181. It Ala. 194; Clarke v. Butcher, 9 Cow. § 345 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 246 hardship in individual cases, but, for the reasons already stated, the general beneficence of the rale is undoubted. § 245. The same subject continued. — Under the rule just laid down, it will be seen that it is necessary for the payment to be made under compulsion. Therefore, if the payment be voluntary, and made only through ignorance of law, and not through mistake of fact, the money so paid can not be recovered even if it was paid under an illegal assessment. ^^ There is some conflict in the cases on the question as to what constitutes such compulsion as is necessary in order to recover money paid for illegal taxes. The supreme court of the United States has taken a rather extreme position on this point, as appears by a case already cited, in which an illegal assess- ment had been laid upon certain real estate of a railroad company, and a tax warrant had been issued for the collection of the tax; but the warrant had not actually been levied, nor had any property actually been seized to satisfy the tax. Under these circumstances the company paid the tax under protest. The court did not con- sider this payment to have been made under the compulsion which the law requires as a prerequisite to the bringing of an action to recover the money so paid.^® Chief Justice Waite seems to have rested this decision on the ground that it was absolutely necessary for the payment to have been made under such circumstances that the taxpayer could have saved himself in no other way than by paying the illegal demand. "The real question in this case is," he says, "whether there was such an immediate and urgent necessity for the payment of the taxes in controversy as to imply that they were made under compulsion."**' § 246. Illustrations of the rule. — The hard doctrine of the federal supreme court is in accordance with the decisions of some of the (N. Y.) 674; City of Muscatine v. s. c. 11 N. E. 301; McCrickart v. Keokuk &c. Co., 45 Iowa 185; Falls City of Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 133; v. City of Cairo, 58 111. 403; Harri- Taylor v. Board &C., 31 Pa. St. 73. son v. City of Milwaukee, 49 Wis. ^ Union Pacific R. Co. v. Commis- 247; s. c. 5 N. W. 326; Mayor &c. v. sioners &c., 98 U. S. 541; Emery v. Judah. 5 Leigh (Va.) 305; Phelps v. City of Lowell, 127 Mass. 138; Mayor &c., 112 N. Y. 216; s. c. 19 N. Mayor &c. v. Judah, 5 Leigh (Va.) E. 408; Diefenthaler v. Mayor &c., 305; Bank &c. v. Mayor &c., 43 N. Ill N. Y. 331; s. c. 19 N. E. 48; Bank Y. 184; Falls v. City of Cairo, 58 111. &c. V. Mayor &c., 43 N. Y. 403. See also, cases cited in pre- 184; Bucknall v. Story, 46 Cal. ceding section. 589; Emery v. City of Lowell, 127 =° Union Pacific R. Co. v. Commis- Mass. 138; Benson v. Monroe, 7 sioners &c., 98 U. S. 541. Cush. (Mass.) 125; Churchman v. *" Union Pacific R. Co. v. Commis- City of Indianapolis, 110 Ind. 259; sioners &c., 98 U. S. 541. 247 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 247 states, but its rigor is modified in others. Thus, in a Michigan ease, an assessment was laid upon real estate under an unconstitutional statute, and the land was to be sold to satisfy the tax. In order to avoid the threatened sale the owner paid the tax under protest. Even under these circumstances the payment was considered volun- tary, and the right of the owner to recover the tax money was denied on the ground that as the law was unconstitutional and void the sale would also have been void, and would not therefore have dis- turbed the owner's title.* ^ As has already been indicated, it is held in many cases that some overt act towards collecting the tax must have been taken before the tax can be considered to have been paid under such compulsion as the law requires. The mere issuing of a tax warrant or the mere threat to collect the tax does not, according to these authorities, create the compulsion required by law.*^ § 247. The same subject continued. — As an instance of a less rigorous application of the rule may be cited an Iowa case, where the owner of real estate paid without protest the first instalment of an illegal assessment. His right to recover the money thus paid was affirmed by the court on the ground that no protest was required by the ordinance.*^ And in the same state money paid under pro- test for illegal taxes is considered as paid under compulsion, although no active steps were taken to enforce the payment of the tax.*'* In Mississippi it has been held that if the legislation imposing the tax is void, and if the tax has been paid to the officer who appeared to be authorized to collect it, the money can be recovered, even if paid "Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170. be sustained. Having a knowledge See also, to the same effect, Falls v. of all the facts it is held that he City of Cairo, 58 111. 403; Lee v. Tern- must be presumed to know the law, pleton, 13 Gray (Mass.) 476; Kansas and in the absence of any fraud or &c. R. Co. v. Commissioners &c., 16 better knowledge on the part of the Kan. 587. In Lamborn v. Commis- officer receiving payment, he can not sioners &c., 97 U. S. 181, the rule of recover back money paid under such the text is upheld. The court said: — a mistake." "If the legality of the tax is merely " Union Pacific R. Co. v. Commis- doubtful, and the validity of the sale sioners &c., 98 U. S. 541; Morris v. would depend upon its legality ac- Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 244; and cording to the law of Kansas, the cases cited in preceding section, party, if he chooses to waive the *=* Robinson v. Burlington, 50 Iowa other remedies given him by law to 240. See also, Ruggles v. City of test the validity of the tax, must Fond du Lac, 53 Wis. 436; s. c. 10 N. take his risk either voluntarily to W. 565. pay the tax and thus avoid the ques- ^ Thomas v. City of Burlington, tion, or to let his land be sold at the 69 Iowa 140; s. c. 28 N. W. 480. hazard of losing it if the tax should § 248 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS, 248 without protest.*^ The Kentucky rule seems to hold that money paid under mistake of law, as well as of fact, can be recovered.**' § 248. The doctrine of the federal supreme court considered. — To the mind of the writer, the rule laid down in the Union Pacific Eailroad case*' seems unnecessarily harsh. With all deference to the great ability of that court, and especially to the clear and forcible intelligence of the justice who delivered the opinion in the case under consideration, it would seem that all the useful objects of the rule which prescribes that the compulsory payment of illegal taxes is an essential requisite to the maintaining an action to recover the money so paid would be attained by a less rigorous construction of that rule. It is difficult to perceive why it should be necessary for the taxpayer to wait supinely until active steps are taken to collect the tax before attempting to save his rights by paying under protest the sum demanded, and then testing in the courts the validity of the legislation purporting to impose the tax. Nor, in the opinion of the writer, does the decision of Chief Justice Shaw in Preston v. City of Boston,*® warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom by Chief Justice Waite. In the Massachusetts case it was said: "Where a party not liable to taxation is called upon peremptorily to pay upon such a warrant, and he can save himself and his property in no other way than by paying the illegal demand, he may give notice that he so pays it by duress and not voluntarily, and by showing that he is not liable, recover it back as money had and received." Says Chief Justice Waite, after quoting this passage: "This, we think, is the true rule, b,ut it falls far short of what is required in tliis case." In the Union Pacific Eailroad case, a warrant had been issued to the treasurer of the county, in the nature of an execution running against the property of the parties charged with taxes. By virtue of this warrant the treasurer was authorized to seize and sell the goods of the company to satisfy the tax. It is to be noted also that the railroad company had had no opportunity of testing in court the validity of the tax act. Under these conditions the company paid *^ Tuttle v. Everett, 51 Miss. 27. taxpayer in an action in assumpsit ^^ Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush on the implied contract: Ijamborn v. (Ky.) 381. This broad proposition Commissioners &c., 97 U. S. 181; is, however, clearly opposed to the Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. (Mass.) great weight of authority in the 125; Bucknall v. Story, 46 Cal. 589; federal and state courts, which eon- Clarke v. Butcher, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) clusively establish the rule that 674. money, if paid under mistake of fact " Union Pacific R. Co. v. Commis- may be recovered, but if paid with- sioners &c., 98 U. S. 541. out compulsion under mere mistake *^ 12 Pick. (Mass.) 7, 14. of law can not be recovered by the 249 THE l.IABILITY OF THE COKPORATIOX. § 249 the amount of the taxes to the treasurer under a general protest, and with notice that suit would be commenced to recover back the full amount that was paid. The company certainly seems to have done everything that prudence and respect for the laws could have dictated, unless it was necessary for it to wait until the treasurer had actually seized its property. There can be no reason why its inaction should have been carried to that point. To allow its prop- erty to be so seized would have caused great inconvenience to the company and to the public, and it can not be the policy of the law to require such useless and detrimental delay on its part. § 249. The same subject continued. — Moreover, the action of the company seems to have brought it within the letter and the spirit of the rule as laid down by Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts. The issuing of the warrant, it may fairly be said, placed the railroad company in such a position that it could save itself and its property in no other way than by paying the illegal demand. By its protest it gave notice that it so paid the demand by duress and not volunta- rily, and by showing tliat it was not liable it was entitled to recover the amount paid by it as money had and received. These considera- tions are strengthened by the fact that "there is a strong tendency in the later cases, both English and American, to give relief where justice requires it, against a common mistake of law, although there may be no element of actual fraud."*^ This tendency is in the direc- tion of modifying the hidebound rules of the common law and adapt- ing them to the natural and equitable principles of justice dictated by reason. It is believed by the writer that the rigorous application in the Union Pacific Eailroad case of a rule the general wisdom of which is undoubted defeats the very objects of that rule, and, by requiring of taxpayers an unreasonable and useless delay, stimtilates them to evade the operation of the statutes, which the rule is intended to support. § 250. Contracts within the scope of powers of officer or agent. — As has already been indicated, the contract must not only be within *° Dillon Munic. Corp., § 945, n., of the general law of the land and ad finem; citing 1 Spence Equity one relating to a matter of private 632, 633; Bispham Equity, §§ 185- right, the latter being considered as 188; Story Equity Juris., § 212a, a matter of fact rather than of written by Judge Redfield; Cooper law); Stone v. Godfrey, 5 De G., M. v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149; s. c. 17 & G. 76; In re Saxon Life Assurance Irish Ch. R. 73, 79 (noting luminous Soc, 2 J. & H. 408; In re Condon, L. judgment of Lord Westbury draw- R. 9 Ch. App. 609. ing a distinction between a mistake § 2^51 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 250 the scope of the powers of the corporation, but it must be within the scope of the powers of the officer or agent by whom the contract is made on behalf of the corporation. In other words, the contract, in order to be valid, must not only be a contract which the corporation is authorized expressly or impliedly by its charter or by other legisla- tion to make, but the officer or agent who makes the contract for the corporation must be properly authorized to make the contract. The rule that the doctrine of ultra vires is more stringently applied in the case of strictly public than in private corporations finds its ap- plication in this class of contracts as well as in those contracts when the question arises whether the contract is ultra vires the corporation. We have seen that the rule is in force in the case of contracts which are without the scope of the powers of the corporation itself.^" In conformity to the principle underlying the rule, the actual powers of public officers or agents are more closely scrutinized than are the powers of agents of private corporations ; and acts within the apparent scope of the powers of public agents, but actually without those powers, are frequently held invalid, when in the case of the agents of a private corporation the contrary view would be held by the courts. In general it may be said that the contract of a public officer or agent, if beyond the actual scope of his powers, will not bind the corporation unless the officer is authorized by the corporation to rep- resent himself as duly empowered to make the contract. ^^ The city is liable for acts of officers who are engaged within the scope of their duties, and the fact that the public may be benefited does not make it a public function.^^ Officers who derive their authority from the city charter, while acting within the scope of their authority, render the city liable for their acts.^^ § 251. The same subject continued — Clark v. Des Moines. — An excellent illustration of the rule is found in an Iowa case,^^^ where action was brought upon warrants or orders of the city of Des Moines by an innocent assignee of those warrants or orders. It appeared that the charter granted no express or implied power to the officers who undertook to execute the warrants to issue negotiable paper in ^° See ante, § 229 et seq. 48 Md. 272. See also, cases cited in " Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 succeeding section. Iowa 199; s. c.87Am.D.423,andcases '= Missano v. Mayor &c., 160 N. Y. there cited; Siitro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 123; s. c. 54 N. E. 744. 332; s. c. 16 Pac. 7; 5 Am. St. 442; ^^ Piatt v. City of Waterbury, 72 Newbery v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141; s. c. Conn. 531; s. c. 45 Atl. 154. 33 N. W. 333; 5 Am. St. 830; Louis- "^a Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 ville &c. R. Co. V. Louisville, 8 Bush Iowa 199; s. c. 87 Am. D. 423. (Ky.) 415; Mayor &c. v. Musgrave, 251 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 251 the name and on behalf of the corporation. It was held that these warrants were negotiable paper, but that they were void ab initio from the want of power on the part of the officers to issue the paper; that the bona fide holders of the warrants were bound at their peril to ascertain the nature and extent of the powers of the officer and of the city; and that the fact that these warrants were in the hands of innocent bona fide holders for value could not validate them. An opinion is delivered by Judge Dillon, who lays down the fundamental principles with his usual perspicuity and force: "The general prin- ciple of law is well known and definitely settled that the agents, officers, or even city council, of a municipal corporation can not bind the corporation when they transcend their lawful and legitimate powers. This doctrine rests upon this reasonable ground: The body corporate is constituted of all the inhabitants within the cor- porate limits. The inhabitants are the corporators. The officers of the corporation, including the legislative or governing body, are merely the public agents of the corporators. Their duties and powers are prescribed by statute. Every one, therefore, may know the na- ture of these duties and the extent of these powers. These consider- ations, as well as the dangerous nature of the opposite doctrine, dem- onstrate the reasonableness and necessity of the rule that the cor- poration is bound only when its agents, by whom from the very necessities of its being it must act, if it acts at all, keep within the limits of their authority. Not only so, but such a corporation may successfully interpose the plea of ultra vires; that is, set up as a de- fense its own want of power under its charter or constituent statute to enter into a given contract or to do a given act in violation or ex- cess of its corporate power and authority."^* ■^ See also, Hodges v. City of Bui- Cush. (Mass.) 103; Stetson v. Kemp- falo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; Halstead ton, 13 Mass. 272; s. c. 7 Am. D. 145; v. Mayor, 3 N. Y. 430; Martin v. Parsons v. Inhabitants &c., 11 Pick. Mayor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545; Boom v. (Mass.) 396; Hood v. Mayor &c., 1 City of Utica, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 104; Allen (Mass.) 103; Spaulding v. Cornell v. Town of Guilford, 1 Denio City of Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 71; (N. Y.) 510; Boyland v. Mayor &c., Mitchell v. City of Rockland, 45 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 27. It is observed Maine 496; s. c. 66 Am. D. 252; An- by the distinguished judge that the thony v. Inhabitants &c., 1 Met. cases asserting these principles are (Mass.) 284; Western College v. numerous and uniform, and that City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375; some of the more important ones Board &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; In- need only be cited; Mayor &c. v. habitants &c. v. Weir, 9 Ind. 224; Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165; Cuyler v. Trus- Smead v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co. 11 tees &c.. 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 165; Dill Ind. 104; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y. V. Inhabitants &c., 7 Met. (Mass.) 312; Appleby v. Mayor, 15 How. Pr. 438; Vincent v. Inhabitants &c., 12 (N. Y.) 428; Estep v. Keokuk Co., 352 rUBLlU COIM'OKATIONS. 353 § 252. All persons contracting with strictly public corporations charged with knowledge of scope of powers of officer or agent. — Since the powers of public officers and agents arc defined either by the charter or other constituent act, and since tliese statutes are open to public inspection and "afford to every person the certain means of ascertaining the authority of these officers,"*'''^ "it is fundamental," says Judge Folger, "that those seeking to deal with a municipal cor- poration, through its officials, must take great care to learn the nature and extent of their power and authority ."^^ 18 Iowa 199, and cases cited by Cole, J.; Clark v. Polk Co., 19 Iowa 248. ^^ Clark V. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199; s. c. 87 Am. D. 423. ^^ McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23; s. c. 23 Am. R. 144; citing Hodges V. City of Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; Cornell v. Town of Guilford, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 510; Sav- ings Bank v. Inhabitants &c., 8 Al- len (Mass.) 109. In McDonald v. Mayor &c., supra, the plaintiff sued for the value of materials furnished the city of New York. The defense set up was that plaintiff had failed to comply with statutory regula- tions providing that the necessity for such materials should be certi- fied to by the head of the depart- ment of public works and the ex- penditure therefor authorized by the common council; and further pro- viding that the materials should be furnished upon sealed bids or pro- posals made in compliance with pub- lic notice advertised. The defense was supported by the court under the circumstances of the case. Judge Folger's opinion is valuable: — "It is plain," says he, "that if the restrictions put upon municipalities by the legislature for the purpose of reducing and limiting the incur- ring of debt and the expenditure of the public money may be removed upon the doctrine now contended for (that is, that the defendant, having appropriated the materials of the plaintiff and used them, is bound to deal justly and pay him the value of them), there is no leg- islative remedy for the evils of mu- nicipal government which of late have excited so much attention and painful foreboding. Restrictions and inhibitions by statute are prac- tically of no avail if they can be brought to naught by the unauthor- ized action of every official of low- est degree, acquiesced in or not re- pudiated by his superiors. Dono- van V. Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. 291, seems to be an authority in point, though the exact question now presented was not considered. And incidental remarks of Denio, J., in Peterson v. Mayor &c., 17 N. Y. 449, are to the same import. And see Peck V. Burr, 10 N. Y. 294. The views here set forth are not to be extended beyond the facts of the case. It may be that where a mu- nicipality has come into the posses- sion of the money or the property of a person without his voluntary in- tentional action concurring therein, the law will fix a liability and im- ply a promise to repay or return it. Thus money paid by mistake, mon- ey collected for an illegal tax or as- sessment, property taken and used by an official as that of the city when not so — in such cases it may be that the statute will not act as an inhibition. The statute may not be carried further than its inten- tion, certainly not further than its letter. Its purpose is to forbid and prevent the making of contracts by unauthorized official agents for sup- 253 TTiK LiABiiJTV oi'^ riii-: roui'oi; A rio>^. 253 § 253. The same subject continued. — 'i'lie rule of the preceding section i.< conceded learning in its general sense. There is, however, difficulty in its application to individual cases. This difficulty lies in deciding to what extent the rule is modified by the doctrine of estoppel, of implied contracts, and of ratification. It may be safely stated, however, that when the authority of the agent is statutory, and therefore a matter of record, the rule is strictly applied.^^ Now in general the intention of the legislature in imposing the statutory restrictions on the power of the public officer must be considered, and it is a cardinal question whether the abrogation of the restric- tions in the particular case under consideration wdll defeat the general intention of the legislation. In other words, in the opinion of the writer, the question will generally be best determined by ascertain- ing whether the particular case at bar is of such a nature that a decision in favor of the contracting party will invalidate the precau- tions imposed by the legislature. If so, the restriction should be enforced; if, on the other hand, the case is such that a decision in favor of the plaintiff will not affect the general policy of the charter or other legislation as evidenced by the restrictions therein defined. plies for the use of the corporation. This opinion goes no further than to hold that where a person makes a contract with the city of New York for supplies to it without the requirements of the charter being observed, he may not recover the value thereof upon an implied li- ability." =' Clark V. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199; s. c. 87 Am. D. 423; Dela- field V. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 159, 174; Hodges v. City of Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; Supervisors v. Bates, 17 N. Y. 242; Overseers &c. v. Overseers &c., 15 N. Y. 341; Butter- field V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Allen (Mass.) 187; Rossire v. City of Bos- ton, 4 Allen (Mass.) 57; Zabriskie V. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 23 How. 381; Chemung Bank v. Supervisors, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 517; Mayor &c. v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Mayor &c. v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1; Marsh v. Ful- ton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Hague v. City of Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527; Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127; White V. City of New Orleans, 15 La. An. 667; Dey v. Mayor &c., 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Butler v. City of Charleston, 7 Gray (Mass.) 12; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464; Bonesteel v. Mayor &c., 22 N. Y. 162; Mayor &c. v. CunlifE, 2 N. Y. 165; Halstead v. Mayor, 3 N. Y. 430; Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545; Boom V. City of Utica, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 104; Cornell v. Town of Guil- ford, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 510; Appleby V. Mayor &c., 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 428; McSpedon v. Mayor &c., 7 Bosw. (N. Y.) 601; Donovan v. Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. 291; Smith v. Mayor &c., 10 N. Y. 504; Miners' Ditch Co. V. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543; Trustees &c. v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1. See also, cases cited in preceding sec- tions. For many of the authorities cited in this note the writer is in- debted to the exhaustive brief of D. J. Dean, Esq., assistant counsel to the corporation of the city of New York, in McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23; s. c. 23 Am. R. 144. 254 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 254 and will also satisfy the nat...al laws of justice and equity, then the corporation may be safely held liable.'^*' § 254. Liability of corporation for act of its officers or agents in violation of law. — A contract made by the officers or agents of a pub- lic corporation in contravention of express law is, of course, void, and the corporation can not be held liable therefor.^'' Thus, where a contract was made by individual members of the common council of a municipal corporation in a manner not authorized by its charter, in disregard of the forms therein directed to be observed in the mak- ^This rule is not, so far as the Code, Const. 4, liber 2, tit. 54; Ibid., writer has ascertained, definitely laid down in the cases. It is, how- ever, shadowed forth in many of the opinions, and it is believed that the best-considered decisions fall within its scope. ™ Fox v. City of New Orleans, 12 I.a. An. 154, where the action was brought upon an alleged contract between the plaintiff and defendant. This contract was for filling in cer- tain city lots. The statute provid- ing that all contracts for public or other work ordered by the munici- pality should be let out to the low- est bidder at auction was disre- garded, and the court held that the contract was void, saying: — "No action can be maintained upon a contract made in violation of law. If by overriding this statute munici- pal officers could saddle the city with the expenses of the contracts they choose to make in defiance of its mandates, the taxpayers would become an easy prey to the jobbing contracts which it was the com- mendable object of the statute to de- feat;" citing Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. An. 11. See also, Seibrecht v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 496, where it is said in the vernacular of the civil law: — "Corporations pos- sess only jura minorum. They have not the power of contracting on all subjects like persons of full age and sui juris. Respublica mi- norum jure solet, ideo que auxilium, restitutionis implorare potest. Const. 3, liber 11, tit. 29; Ibid., Const. 4, liber 11, tit. 31." "A con- tract made by a corporation which is expressly prohibited by statute is so far void that the corporation can not maintain an action upon a contract even though the statute does not in terms declare that such a contract shall be void, but merely prescribes a penalty for making it. Whenever the legislature prohibits an act, or declares that it shall be unlawful to perform it, every rule of interpretation must say that the legislature intended to interpose its power to prevent the act, and as one of the means of its prevention that the courts shall hold it void. This is as manifest as if the statute had declared that it should be void. That the legislature imposes by a subsequent section of the act a pen- alty for the violation of the law does not in the remotest degree le- galize or give validity to the con- tract. It but shows that the general assembly intended to adopt such measures as should compel the ob- servance of the law:" Cincinnati &c. Assurance Co. v. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85. See also, to the same effect: Morgan v. Menzies, 60 Cal. 341; Zottman v. City of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96; City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas &c. Co., 66 Ind. 396; Mayor &c. v. Bowman, 39 Miss. 671; McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23; s. c. 23 Am. R. 144; Thomas V. City of Richmond, 12 Wall. 349. 255 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORrORATION. § 255 ing of its contracts, it was decided that such a contract was not the ground of any claim against the corporation; and where the charter required the contract to 1x3 made by the common council, a contract made by a special committee of that body was adjudged to be prima- rily invalid, and it was further decided that no subsequent action of the common council could confer validity upon it.^" § 255. The same subject continued. — The doctrine of the preced- ing section is so clearly and positively established that attempts have been made by the courts so to extend it as to validate contracts which, although beyond the scope of the powers of a public corpora- tion, are yet not positively prohibited by its charter or other legisla- tion. ■ Thus, in a Missouri case already mentioned, a contract was made by the city of St. Louis for the services of prisoners in its workhouse to a private person. The charter of the city provided that all persons in the city workhouse should "work for the city at such labor as his or her strength will permit, within or without said workhouse, or other place, not exceeding ten hours each work- ing day, and for such work the person so employed shall be allowed, exclusive of his or her board, fifty cents per day for each day's work" on account of the fine and costs imposed upon the prisoner. This statutory provision clearly did not allow, even if it did not prohibit, the hiring out of the workhouse prisoners to private persons. The court held, however, that the contract, though ultra vires, was not absolutely void, and that the city could recover upon a bond given by a contractor to the city to secure the performance of a contract upon his part, saying in the opinion : "It will be observed that the charter of the city, while it does not permit, yet does not prohibit, the making of such a contract as the one before us ; so that although the contract is ultra vires the corporation, yet it is not illegal because not pro- hibited by the charter. This is a distinction clearly marked out by the authorities.""^ § 256. Effect of representation of officer or agent as to author- ity. — The general rule is well settled that since parties dealing with municipal corporations are charged with knowledge of the extent of the powers of the officers and agents of these corporations, therefore a contract beyond the scope of the powers of the officer or agent is not to be enforced against the principal corpora- tion.*'^ But to this rule there are exceptions due to the application ""Zottman v. City of San Fran- 102 Mo. 149; s. c. 14 S. W. 825; 22 Cisco, 20 Cal. 96; City of Leaven- Am. St. 764. worth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357. "= See ante, §§ 252, 253, and cases " City of St. Louis v. Davidson, there cited. In United States v. § 257 PUBLIC CORI'OKATIONS. 256 of the rules of estoppel. Thus, where the public officer or agent is charged with the sole duty of ascertaining whether a condition pre- cedent to the issuing of municipal bonds has been performed, the recital in the bond that such condition precedent has been performed will estop the corporation from setting uj) the defense of non-perform- ance of the condition precedent against an innocent purchaser for value of the bonds.^^ § 257. The same subject continued. — The decisions on the rule stated in the last sentence arise chiefly in deciding the validity of municipal or public bonds, and will be fully discussed in a subsequent chapter.®* For the present it is sufficient to quote the rule as laid down in the supreme court of the United States : "When legislative authority has been given to a municipality or to its officers to sub- scribe for the stock of a railroad company and to issue municipal bonds in payment, but only on some precedent condition, such as a popular vote favoring the subscription, and where it may be gathered from the legislative enactment that the officers of the municipality were invested with power to decide whether the condition precedent has been complied with, their recital that it has been, made in the bonds issued by them and held by a bona fide purchaser, is conclusive City Bank of Columbus, 21 How. and that consequently the plaintiff 356, the cashier of the defendant could not recover. "We think the corporation wrote a letter stating safe rule," said Mr. Justice Wayne, that the bearer was authorized to "in all instances of acts done by the contract on behalf of the bank for officers of corporate companies or by the transfer of money from the east those who have the management of to the south or the west for the their business from which contracts federal government. Acting upon are alleged to have been made, is to this letter the then secretary of the test that fact by an inquiry into the treasury, Hon. Thomas Corwin, de- corporate ability that has been giv- livered to the bearer a draft to be en them and to their subordinate transferred to New Orleans for officers or which the directors of the $100,000, which the bearer cashed, company can confer upon the latter but the proceeds of which he did not to act for them." transfer or account for. The United "^ Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. States brought action against the 74; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 124; Anderson Coun- City Bank of Columbus to recover ty Com'rs v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227; s. the sum advanced as aforesaid upon c. 5 S. Ct. 433; Northern Bank &c. the authorization of the cashier of v. Porter Tp. Trustees, 110 U. S. the bank. It was held that the 608; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 254; Town of Colo- act was entirely beyond the scope of ma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484. the power of the cashier; that his '"See the chapter on Bonds and representation concerning the power Coupons, of the bearer did not bind the bank, 257 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 258 of the fact and binding upon the municipality, for the recital is itself a decision of the fact by the appointed tribiinal."®^ § 258. Ratification of contracts. — A most important distinction exists between tlie two classes of ultra vires contracts of public corpora- tions that we have just considered. The distinction is in respect of the power of the corporation to ratify by subsequent acquiescence, active or passive, the unauthorized contract. If the contract be wholly beyond the scope of the powers of the corporation it is void ab initio, and no subsequent acquiescence can validate it.^** Like a still-born child, it lacks any element of life that may be fostered into active force. This strict rule is based on the general principles which determine the validity or invalidity of ultra vires municipal contracts. Eatification is a species of estoppel, and as the contracts we are considering are absolutely void, no principles of estoppel will be allowed to control. § 259. The same subject continued. — If, on the other hand, the contract itself be within the scope of the powers of the corporation, but be unauthorized only because the officer or agent, while not for- bidden by the law to make the contract, was not properly authorized to do so, in that case the contract may be ratified and validated by subsequent assent of the corporation.'''^ Thus, in a Kansas case, one ^ Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484. In the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Strong refers to the statement by Judge Dillon of this rule in his work on Municipal Cor- porations (1 Dillon Munic. Corp.. § 523), and gives the rule in the words quoted in the text as a re- statement of Judge Dillon's proposi- tion. ^ Lewis v. City of Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 634; Smith V. City of Newburgh. 77 N. Y. 130 McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23 Brady v. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. 312 Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676 City of Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 111. 563; Hague v. City of Phila- delphia, 48 Pa. St. 527; Parsons v. Inhabitants &c., 70 Maine 262; Bank v. Town of Statesville, 84 N. C. 169. See ante, §§ 227, 228, and cases cited. An examination of the 1 Smith — 17 cases will show that the rule of the text applies both to cases where the act is from its nature entirely beyond the charter powers, express or implied, of the corporation, and also to cases where the officer or agent acted wholly beyond his stat- utory authority in making the con- tract, so that the act of the officer or agent is virtually in contraven- tion of the law. "Bank &c. v. Patterson, 7 Cranch 299; Supervisors &c. v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772; Moore v. City of Albany, 92 N. Y. 396; Albany &c. Bank V. City of Albany, 92 N. Y. 363; Brady v. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. 312; Backman v. Charlestown, 42 N. H. 125; City of Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 111. 563; Brown v. Win- terport, 79 Maine 305; s. c. 9 Atl. 844; People v. Common Council &c., 28 Mich. 228; Dubuque Female Col- § 260 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 358 member of a school board made a contract for the building of a school- house. This contract was a perfectly proper one in its nature, but was unauthorized because made by only one member of the board. The full school board afterwards accepted the contract, which was thereby ratified and validated.*'^ § 260. Ratification by authorized officers necessary. — It is obvious that the officer or officers who undertake to ratify an unauthorized contract must possess an authority which in the beginning would have enabled them properly to make the original contract in behalf of the corporation.®'' In a leading case in New York this principle was forcibly enunciated. By a statute of the state of Illinois, certain officers or agents of the state were authorized to borrow money for public use, and for that purpose to sell its bonds or public stocks at not less than their par value. These officers sold the bonds at par, to be paid for in future instalments without interest, while the bonds drew interest from the time of sale. This was held to be a sale below par, and therefore unauthorized and invalid. It was con- tended by the bondholders that the act of the governor in signing the bonds with knowledge of the terms of sale operated as a ratification of the sale. On this point the court said: "We are now brought to the inquiry whether the contracts have been ratified so as to be obligatory upon the state of Illinois. I felt some difficulty on the question upon the argument, but after reflecting upon it, I am unable to say that there has been a ratification. The appellant relies on the fact that the governor, after he knew of the first contract, signed the bonds and caused them to be delivered, and that some of the other public officers of the state acted under the contracts, drawing for money and receiving payments. But the difficulty is that, the gov- ernor was no more than an agent for the state, and he as well as the commissioners acted under a limited authority; and the same remark is applicable to the auditor and other public officers. None of them lege v. District Tp., 13 Iowa 555; ture of public funds. A subsequent Lamm v. Port Deposit &c. Assn., 49 assent by the proper officials to such Md. 233; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. expenditure will, in the absence of 470, 493; Chouteau v. City of Rox- express statutory prohibition, ratify bury, 7 Gray (Mass.) 374; Sullivan the expenditure: See cases cited, su- v. School Dist., 39 Kan. 347; s. c. 18 pra. Pac. 287; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. "^ Sullivan v. School Dist., 39 Kan. 26; Episcopal Society v. Dedham 347; s. c. 18 Pac. 287. Episcopal Church, 1 Pick. (Mass.) "» Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. 372; Topsham v. Rogers, 42 Vt. 189. Y.) 159; Marsh' v. Fulton Co., 10 This doctrine frequently finds its Wall. 676; Hague v. City of Phila- application in cases where unau- delphia, 48 Pa. St. 527. thorized officers have made expendi- 259 THE LIABILITY OP THE COHl'ORATION. § 261 had authority to make such contracts as these were; and if they could not make tliem originally tliey could not ratify them. Katification must come from the principal — the state of Illinois."''" § 261. Manner of ratification. — When a certain mode of execution of a contract is prescribed by statute, the act of ratification of an unauthorized contract must comply with the provisions of the statute regulating the manner of entering into the original contract.''^ This rule is, however, to be taken with the modification that if the statu- tory method of procedure be regarded as merely directory and not mandatory, then a different method of procedure may be allowed in the act of ratification.^^ Thus, where the council of the corporation is empowered by the charter to make certain contracts by ordinance, and the contract is made by resolution, the subsequent ratification must be by ordinance. The mere use by the corporation of unauthor- ized improvements, such as school buildings, does not amount to rati- fication, unless the circumstances are such that it would have been natural and proper to have refused such use, or unless it is proven that the use was after knowledge of the unauthorized character of the improvement.''^ § 262. Manner of execution of contracts by officers and agents. — Nothing is more certain, under the modern adjudications, than that the methods prescribed by charter or other statute must be observed by the corporation in entering into contracts, if these statutory pro- visions are mandatory and intended by the legislature to act as wise restrictions upon the power of the corporation to contract. If, then, there are mandatory and restrictive enactments requiring the corpo- ration to contract only under certain formalities and conditions, then contracts made by the officers or agents of the corporation which are not executed according to those statutory requirements do not bind the '" Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. 644. It has been held in some cases Y.) 159, 175; citing People v. Phoe- that under the circumstances men- nix Bank, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 431. tioned in the text, the subsequent " McCracken v. City of San Fran- ratification does not operate to vali- cisco, 16 Cal. 591; Cross v. Mayor date the original contract, even &c., 18 N. J. Eq. 305; Town of Du- though the ratification be by ordi- rango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257; s. nance: See Newman v. Emporia, c. 7 Pac. 14. 32 Kan. 456; s. c. 4 Pac. 815, and ■'^ Cory v. Somerset Freeholders, cases cited. '44 N. J. L. 445; Brown v. Mayor &c., "Wilson v. School Dist, 32 N. H. 63 N. Y. 239; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. 118; Lane v. School Dist, 10 Met. 26; Cross v. Mayor &c., 18 N. J. Eq. (Mass.) 462; Davis v. School Dist, 305; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 24 Maine 349. § 263 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 260 municipality.'^* But where the statutory provisions prescribing the mode of executing contracts are merely directory and are not in- tended to be restrictive of the powers of the corporation or its of- ficers to contract, then a failure to comply with those provisions is not necessarily fatal. '^^ § 263. The same subject continued. — It is frequently provided by statute that all public contracts shall be in writing. This being a mandatory provision and restrictive of the power of the corporation to contract, it must be complied with, else the contract is invalid.'^^ And the same rule applies in regard to contracts under seal. "The ancient rule of the common law that corporations could not bind themselves by a contract not under seal is no longer efficacious in this country."'''^ In this connection it may be noted that by the pro- " President &c. (Bank) v. Dan- dridge, 12 Wheat. 64; Smith v. City of Newburgh, 77 N, Y. 136; Brady v. Mayor etc., 20 N. Y. 312; Allen v. City of Galveston, 51 Tex. 302; City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; McBrian V. City of Grand Rapids, 56 Mich. 95; s. c. 22 N. W. 206; Argenti v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Toberman, 61 Cal. 199; Town of Durango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257; s. c. 7 Pac. 14; People v. Weber, 89 111. 347; Worthington v. City of Covington, 82 Ky. 265; Addis v. City of Pitts- burgh, 85 Pa. St. 379; Keeney v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L. 449; s. c. 1 Atl. 511; State v. City of Passaic, 41 N. J. L. 90; Seibrecht v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 496; Mayor &c. v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Taft v. Town of Pittsford, 28 Vt. 286; Ful- ton V. City of Lincoln, 9 Neb. 358; s. c. 20 n! W. 724; Hudson v. Mayor &c., 64 Ga. 286; City of Logansport v. Humphrey, 84 Ind. 467; Gates v. Hancock, 45 N. H. 528; Heidelberg V. San Francois Co., 100 Mo. 69; s. c. 12 S. W. 914; Niles Water Works V. Mayor &c., 59 Mich. 311; s. c. 26 N. W. 525; Wilhelm v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa 254; Driftwood &c. Co. v. Board &c., 72 Ind. 226. The general principles enunciated in the text will be more fully illustrated in a subsequent portion of the work: See the chapter on Contracts. '^Kelley v. Mayor &c., 4 Hill (N. Y.) 263; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 449, and cases cited. '" Starkey v. City of Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203; McDonald v. Mayor &c., 68 N. Y. 23; Stewart v. Cam- bridge, 125 Mass. 102. " 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 1090, tit. Municipal Corporations; citing City of Alton v. Mulledy, 21 111. 76; Wade v. New Berne, 77 N. C. 460; City of Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411; Town of New Athens v. Thomas, 82 111. 259; Watson v. Ben- nett, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 196; Bank &c. V. Patterson, 7 Cranch 299; Sav- ings Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191; Hamilton v. Newcastle &c. R. Co., 9 Ind. 359; Peterson v. Mayor &c., 17 N. Y. 449; Missouri River &c. R. Co. V. Commissioners &c., 12 Kan. 482; Fleckner v. President fee, 8 Wheat. 338; President &c. (Bank) v. Dand- ridge, 12 Wheat. 64; Christian Church v. Johnson, 53 Ind. 273; Mc- Cullough V. Talladega Ins. Co., 46 Ala. 376; Buckley v. Briggs, 30 Mo. 452; Whitford v. Laidler, 94 N. Y. 145; Sheffield School Tp. v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157; Merrick v. Burlington &c. Co., 11 Iowa 74; 261 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 264 visions of the ^Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, every English corporation shall continue to have a common seal/^ and certain contracts are required to be made under the corporate seal.'^^ § 264. Contracts by ordinance or resolution. — The city council being the agents of the corporation, the acts of that body, if intra vires and regular, are of course binding upon the corporation ; and a contract made by ordinance or resolution of the council is, so far as regularity of execution is concerned, valid and binding in the absence of express statutory provisions regulating the mode of exe- cution of corporate contracts. ^^ Judge Story has said on this sub- ject : ''The acts of such a body or board, evidenced by a written vote, are as completely binding upon the corporation and as complete authority to their agents as the utmost solemn acts done under the corporate seal."**^ On the question whether such a contract is with- out the statute of frauds, there is doubt. A New York case approves the doctrine that a contract made by ordinance and duly entered on the official corporate minutes, which are signed by the clerk, is valid. ^^ The decision in this case is at least tacitly approved by Judge Dil- lon,^^ and seems a reasonable adaptation of the law to modern Trustees &c. v. Moody, 62 Ala. 389. See also, Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S. 501. '" Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, § 250, subd. 1. '" The appointment by a corpora- tion of an attorney to conduct their suits or manage their affairs must be under the common seal, other- wise he can not recover against the corporation even though they had by resolution expressly directed the business to be done: Arnold v. May- or &c., 4 Man. & G. 860; Sutton v. Spectacle Makers' Co., 10 L. T. (N. S.) 411. So, an agreement by a cor- poration with one of its officers for an increase of the salary of an of- fice retained by him as compensa- tion for the loss of another office of which he was deprived under the act of 1835, though upon an executed consideration, is not binding upon the corporation if not under the common seal: Reg. v. Mayor &c., 6 Q. B. 433. See also. Cope v. Thames Haven Dock & R. Co., 3 Exch. 841; Mayor &c. v. Hardwicke, L. R. 9 Ex. 13. It has, however, been held that an agreement for the use of a dock need not be under seal: Wells v. Mayor &c., L. R. 10 C. P. 402. See Rawlinson Municipal Corporations Act (8th ed. by Thomas Geary) 100, n. *° Fleckner v. President &c., 8 Wheat. 338; Over v. City of Green- field, 107 Ind. 231; s. c. 5 N. E. 872; Ross V. City of Madison, 1 Ind. 281; People V. Board &c., 27 Cal. 655; Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524; Mayor &c. v. Jackson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 106; Abby v. Billups, 35 Miss. 618; Clark v. Mayor &c., 12 Wheat. 40; Wade v. City of New- bern, 77 N. C. 460; San Antonio v. Lewis, 9 Tex. 69. *' Fleckner v. President &c., 8 Wheat. 338. **- Argus Co. V. Mayor &c., 55 N. Y. 495. See also, Duncombe v. City of Fort Dodge, 38 Iowa 281. " Dillon Munic. Corp., § 449. § 265 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 262 methods of corporate governpient when the business of the corpora- tion is conducted by a council ; but in a North Carolina case a contract made in a similar matter was declared obnoxious to the objection that it did not comply with the statute of frauds.** § 265. Signature of contract. — It frequently happens that the of- ficers or agents of municipal corporations in executing contracts on behalf of the corporation sign their individual names and affix their individual seals instead of using the corporate name and seal. The preponderance of American authorities seems to establish the rule that such contracts are valid and binding upon the corporation, if made by the proper officers and intra vires the corporation; but that they are valid and binding only as simple contracts, and that the seal of the individual officer or agent does not supply the place of the corporate seal.*^ There is some conflict of opinion, but it is believed that an examination of the cases will show this rule to be sustained in the United States.^*' § 266. The same subject continued. — Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the rule of the preceding section prevails, it is far safer for municipal contracts to be signed and sealed by the proper officers with the corporate name and seal. Thus, in a leading New York case cited by Judge Dillon,*'^ a contract relating to public mat- ters was made between a committee appointed for that purpose by the city and a natural person. This contract purported to be "be- tween . . . , a committee appointed by the corporation of the city of Albany for that purpose, of the first part, and . . . , "* Wade V. City of Newbern, 77 N. "Where officers or agents of a corpo- C. 460. ration duly appointed and acting *" Parr v. President &c., 72 N. Y. within the scope of their authority 463; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 in executing an instrument in behalf Johns. (N. Y.) 60; Stanton v. Camp, of the corporation sign their own 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 274; Heidelberg names and affix their own seals. School Dist. V. Horst, 62 Pa. St. 301; such seals are simply nugatory, and Blanchard v. Inhabitants &c., 102 the instrument, according to the Mass. 343; Robinson v. City of St. weight of modern judicial opinion, Louis, 28 Mo. 488; Regents &c. v. is to be regarded as the simple con- Detroit &c. Soc, 12 Mich. 138; tract of the corporation and will Bowen v. Morris, 2 Taunt. 374. But bind the corporation, and not the in- see contra. Bank &c. v. Patterson, 7 dividuals executing it, where the Cranch 299; Fulham v. Inhabitants purpose to act for the corporation is &c., 9 Allen (Mass.) 1; City of Provi- manifest from the whole paper and dence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 272; Ulam where there are no words evincing v. Boyd, 87 Pa. St. 477. an intention to assume a personal li- *" See 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 452, ability." where the learned author says: — *^ 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 453. 263 THE LlABIhlTY OF THE COHJ'ORATIOX. § 267 of the second iDart," and was signed and scaled with the individual names and seals of the persons composing tHe committee. The court decreed the enforcemeiit of the contract, against the corporation, as being a public contract.*^* But in Pennsylvania under very similar circumstances the committeemen were made personally liable.^" § 267. Liability ex delicto — (a) In general. — It is wholly impos- sible within the limits of this chapter to lay down with any degree of precision or minuteness the rules governing the liability of public corporations for the tortious acts or omissions of their officers and agents. The rules governing the decision of these questions will be set forth and discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters. For this chapter the effort of the writer will be to state broadly the general principles according to whicli the liability of the corporation for the torts of its officers and agents is determined — less with a view to practical utility than to prepare the mind of the reader for an in- telligent consideration of the particular rules obtaining in the dif- ferent classes of cases in whicli this liability is sought to be enforced. "No rule on this subject can be so precisely stated as to embrace all the torts for which it has been held by some court or another that a private action will lie against a municipal corporation."®*' § 268. (b) Discretionary and legislative acts. — Where torts are committed by the officers or agents of the public corporation in the exercise of those discretionary and legislative powers which are dele- gated to them by the legislature ; when those officers or agents in exercising those powers, or by failure to exercise them, incidentally commit torts against natural persons or private corporations, — the municipality is wholly free from liability.®^ The reason for this rule, ^' Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Lincoln v. City of Boston, 148 Mass. Johns. (N. Y.) 59. 578; s. c. 20 N. E. 329; French «^ Ulam v. Boyd, 87 Pa. St. 477. v. City of Boston, 129 Mass. ^Conway v. City of Beaumont, 61 592; Tainter v. City of Worcester, Tex. 10. 123 Mass. 311; Pierce v. City of New »' Johnston v. District of Colum- Bedford, 129 Mass. 534; Steele v. bia, 118 U. S. 19; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 923; City of Boston, 128 Mass. 583; Ran- Trescott v. City of Waterloo, 26 Fed. dall v. Eastern &c. R. Co., 106 Mass. 592; Seifert v. City of Brooklyn, 101 276; Fisher v. City of Boston, 104 N. Y. 136; s. c. 4 N. E. 321; Cole v. Mass. 87; Hafford v. City of New Medina, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 218; Wil- Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 297; son V. Mayor &c., 1 Denio (N. Y.) Wright v. City Council &c., 78 Ga. 595; Cain v. City of Syracuse, 95 N. 241; Weller v. City of Burlington, Y. 83; Mills v. City of Brooklyn, 32 60 Vt. 28; s. c. 12 Atl. 215; Hutch- N. Y. 489; Griffin v. Mayor &c., 9 N. inson v. Town of Concord, 41 Vt. Y. 456; Whitsett v. Union D. & R. 271; Calwell v. City of Boone, 51 Co., 10 Colo. 243; s. c. 15 Pac. 339; Iowa 687; s. c. 2 N. W. 614; Schultz § 209 PUBLIC CORrOHATlOXS. 264: with an outline of the classes of acts which are deemed discretionary and legislative within the protection of the doctrine, is clearly and forcibly stated by Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limita- tions. One passage is quoted from that work in the following section. § 269. (c) The same subject continued. — "As no state," says this eminent publicist, "does or can undertake to protect its people against incidental injuries resulting from its adopting or failing to adopt any proposed legislative action, so no similar injury resulting from municipal legislative action or non-action can be made the basis of a legal claim against a municipal corporation. The justice or pro- priety of its opening or discontinuing a street, of its paving or refus- ing to pave a thoroughfare or alley, of its erecting a proposed public building, of its adopting one plan for a public building or work rather than another; or of the exercise of any other discretionary authority committed to it as a part of the governmental machinery of the state, is not suffered to be brought in question in an action at law and sub- mitted to the determination of court and jury. If, therefore, a city temporarily suspends useful legislation; or orders and constructs public works from which incidental injury results to individuals; or adopts unsuitable or insufficient plans for public bridges, buildings, sewers, or other public works; or in any other manner, through the V. City of Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 254; Crawford, 64 Tex. 202; Black v. City s. c. 5 N. W. 342; City of Anderson of Columbia, 19 S. C. 412; Hill v. V. East, 117 Ind. 126; s. c. 19 N. E. Board &c., 72 N. C. 55; Van Horn v. 726; Wheeler v. City of Plymouth, City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 447; s. 116 Ind. 158; s. c. 18 N. E. 532; City c. 19 N. W. 293; Preeport v. Isbell, of Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 83 111. 440; Miller v. City of St. Paul, 330; Heller v. Mayor &c., 53 Mo. 159; 38 Minn. 134; s. c. 36 N. W. 271; McKenna v. City of St. Louis, 6 Mo. Mendel v. City of Wheeling, 28 W. App. 320; Robinson v. City of Evans- Va. 233; Wheeler v. City of Cincin- ville, 87 Ind. 334; Ray v. City of nati, 19 Ohio St. 19; Greenwood v. Manchester, 46 N. H. 59; Altvater Louisville, 13 Bush (Ky.) 226; Jew- v. Mayor &c., 31 Md. 462; Bauman ett v. City of New Haven, 38 Conn, v. City of Detroit, 58 Mich. 444; s. 368; Torbush v. City of Norwich, 38 c. 25 N. W. 391; Burford v. City of Conn. 225; Howard v. City of San Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98; s. c. 18 Francisco, 51 Cal. 52; Davis v. City N. W. 571; Western College v. City Council &c., 51 Ala. 139; Lehigh Co. of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375; Frith v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. St. 119; s. c. 9 V, City of Dubuque, 45 Iowa 406; Atl. 177; McDade v. City of Chester, City of Davenport v. Stevenson, 34 117 Pa. St. 414; s. c. 12 Atl. 421; Iowa 225; Swenson v. City of Lex- Grant v. City of Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420; ington, 69 Mo. 157; Kistner v. City Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. of Indianapolis, 100 Ind. 210; White St. 324. See Cooley Const. Lim. v. Corporation of Yazoo City, 27 257; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 950. Miss. 357; City of Fort Worth v. 265 THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION. § 270 exercise or failure to exercise its political authority, causes incidental injury to individuals, an action will not lie for such injury. The reason is obvious. The maintenance of such an action would transfer to court and jury the discretion which the law vests in the munici- pality ; but transfer them not to be exercised directly and finally but indirectly and partially by the retroactive effect of punitive verdicts upon special complaints."®^ § 270. (d) Ministerial acts. — The converse of the propositions laid down in the two preceding sections is equally true with those propositions; that is to say, the municipal corporation is liable for the tortious acts and omissions of its officers or agents when those acts or omissions are violations of absolute and ministerial duties.®^ This rule is well established and rests upon the principle that a municipal corporation is, like all other persons natural or artificial, liable for the proper performance of duties which are not discretionary or legis- lative in their nature, but which are absolute and ministerial. This doctrine is, however, to be modified by the rule that this duty must, even though ministerial, be not for the public but for the private advantage of the corporation, as more fully explained hereafter. § 271. (e) Public as contradistinguished from private duties. — The whole doctrine of the liability of public corporations for the torts of their officers or agents is affected and modified by the prin- ciple that the tortious act or omission must be in violation not of a *=Cooley Const. Lim. 253-255. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323; Gilluly v. ^'Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660; City of Madison, 63 "Wis. 518; s. c. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 24 N. W. 137; City of Boulder v. U. S. 540; City of Galveston v. Pos- Niles, 9 Colo. 415; s. c. 12 Pac. 632; nainsky, 62 Tex. 118; s. c. 13 Am. & Gilman v. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130; Eng. Corp. Cas. 484; Nelson v. Vil- Hewison v. City of New Haven, 34 lage of Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 89; s. c. Conn. 136; Kiley v. City of Kansas, 2 N. E. 473; Ehrgott v. Mayor &c., 87 Mo. 103; Albrittin v. Mayor &c., 96 N. Y. 264; Noonan v. City of Al- 60 Ala. 486. Many additional cases bany, 79 N. Y. 470; Hamilton v. could be cited in support of the doc- Mayor &c., 52 Ga. 435; Erie City v. trine of the text, but it is believed Schwingle, 22 Pa. St. 384; Sawyer to be useless to do so. The proposi- v. Corse, 17 Graft. (Va.) 230; Far- tion of the text is indeed conceded quar v. City of Roseburg, 18 Or. 271; learning in this country. Where s c. 22 Pac. 1103; Bohen v. City of the evidence clearly shows that the Waseca, 32 Minn. 176; s. c. 19 N. W. injury was a ministerial act and 730; O'Neill v. City of New Orleans, not governmental, as in the opera- 30 La. An. 220; McCombs v. Town tion of a quarry, it is proper to re- Council &c., 15 Ohio 474, 476; Town fuse an instruction on the general of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 346; subject of governmental functions: Meares v. Commissioners &c., 9 Ired. City Council &c. v. Owens, 111 Ga. L. (N. C.) 73; Wilson v. City of 464; s. c. 36 S. E. 830. § 273 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 2GG public but of a private duty. The reason and the essence of this rule is clear and easily to be understood, but its application to the specific cases is often of great difficulty. The rule is laid down in a recent Texas case, and is approved by courts as a rule, as follows: "So far as public corporations of any class and however incorporated exercise powers conferred on them for ]3urposes essentially public — purposes pertaining to the administration of general laws made to en- force the general policy of the state — they should be deemed agencies of the state, and not subject to be sued for any act or omission occur- ring while in the exercise of such power, unless by statute the action be given. In reference to such matters they should stand as does sovereignty, whose agents they are, subject to be sued only when the state by statute declares they may be. In so far, however, as they exer- cise powers not of this character, voluntarily assumed, — powers intended for the private advantage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants, — there seems to be no sufficient reason why they should be relieved from that liability to suit and measure of actual damage to which an individual or private corporation exercising the same powers for purposes essentially private would be liable.'"^* Where officers, as town selectmen, are independent public officers with duties prescribed by law, the city is not liable for their default in the performance of duties.^^ Where a municipality is in the exercise of government func- tions it is not liable in damages; as where a person is arrested by the police and confined in a city prison and injured by reason of improper construction and maintenance of such prison.^® § 272. (f ) The rule applied to public quasi-corporations. — The rule of non-liability of a public quasi-corporation is illustrated in a decision of the supreme court of Illinois. A drainage district en- larged its boundaries, thus discharging more water on the plaintifii's land than it had a right to do, and the work was also performed neg- ligently. In declaring that there was no corporate liability the court said: "That a private corporation, formed by voluntary agreement for private purposes, is held to respond in a civil action for its neg- ligence or tort, goes without saying; and yet, in deciding the mooted question at issue in this case, it seems convenient to restate that «*15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 19; Wakefield v. Newport, 62 N. H. 1141; City of Galveston v. Posnain- 624; Bdgerly v. Concord, 62 N. H. 8; sky. 62 Tex. 118; s. c. 13 Am. & Eng. Gross v. City of Portsmouth, 68 N. Corp. Cas. 484. H. 266; s. c. 33 Atl. 256. ""^ Felch V. Town of Weare, 69 N. "" Gray v. Mayor &c., Ill Ga. 361 ; H. 617; s. c. 45 Atl..591. Cf. Doolittle s. c. 36 S. E. 792. V. Walpole, 67 N. H. 554; s. c. 38 Atl. 267 THE LIABILITV OK TIIK CORl-ORATION, § 273 proposition. So, also, it is admitted law that mimicipal corporations proper, such as villages, towns and cities, which are incorporated by special charter or voluntarily organized under general laws, are liable to individuals injured by their negligent or tortious conduct, or that of their agents and servants in respect to corporate duties. In regard to public involuntary quasi-corporations the rule is other- wise, and there is no such implied liability imposed upon them. These latter, such as counties, townships, school districts, road dis- tricts and other similar quasi-corporations, exist under general laws of the state which apportion its territory into local subdivisions for the purposes of civil and governmental administration, and impose upon the people residing in said several subdivisions precise and limited public duties and clothe them with restricted corporate func- tions coextensive with the duties devolved upon them. In such or- ganizations the duties and their correlative powers are assumed in invitum, and there is no responsibility to respond in damages in a civil action for neglect in the performance of duties, unless such action is given by statute.''^ The grounds upon which the liability of a municipal corporation proper is usually placed are that the duty is voluntarily assumed and is clear, specific and complete, and that the powers and means furnished for its proper performance are ample and adequate.^® In such case there is a perfect obligation, and a consequent civil liability, for neglect in all cases of special private damages. The non-liability of the public quasi-corporation unless liability is expressly declared is usually placed upon these grounds: that the corporations are made such nolens volens; that their powers are limited and specific ; and that no corporate funds are provided which can, without express provision of law, be appropri- ated to private indemnification. Consequently in such the liability is one of imperfect obligation, and no civil action lies at the suit of an individual for non-performance of the duty imposed.'"*'^ § 273. Conclusion. — The writer has endeavored in the preceding sections to give a very general outline of the principles governing the liability of the corporation for the torts of its officers and agents. These rules are necessarily broad and general to a degree which perhaps deprives them of any considerable practical value. They will serve, however, to show the general trend of the adjudications in "2 Dillon Munic. Corp., §§ 761, »« Browning v. City of Springfield, 762; Cooley Const. Lim. 240, 247; 17 111. 143. Hedges v. Madison Co., 1 Oilman ^^ Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs, 135 (111.) 567; Town of Waltham v. 111. 269; s. c. 25 N. E. 1010; 34 Am. Kemper, 55 111. 346. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 491. § 273 PUBLIC COEPOBATIONS, 368 this country on the subject under consideration. As has been re- marked by almost evei*y writer on this topic, it is impossible to lay down rules of greater definiteness. The particular circumstances of each case must be carefully considered and the decisions relating to the class of torts to which belongs that which forms the subject- matter of the action must be examined before the law upon any specific case can be determined. The general results of these rules may be stated to be as follows: If the tort is one for which the mu- nicipality is expressly made liable by statute, that fact of course concludes the liability of the corporation. If such is not the case, then the tort must consist — in the case of public corporations other than public quasi-corporations — of the violation of a private duty imposed for private corporate advantage; and not of a public or governmental duty imposed for the benefit of the public at large. In the case of public quasi-corporations, the general rule is that they are liable only for those torts for which the statute expressly pre- scribes that they shall be liable. CHAPTER IX. PUBLIC BOARDS. Section 274. Corporate assemblies of the old English corporations. 275. The same subject continued — Notice at common law. 276. The same subject continued — Presence of the mayor. 277. Regular or stated meetings — Time for holding. 278. Adjournments. 279. Special meetings. Adjourned meetings. Notice of special meetings. The same subject continued — Specification of object of meeting. Adjourned meetings — Time for holding. Corporation represented by gov- erning boards. 285. The same subject continued — Meeting essential to official action. 286. The same subject continued — Delegation of powers. 287. The same subject continued. 288. Delegation of powers — A Penn- sylvania case. The same subject continued — The rule limited. Constitution of council. The same subject continued. Conflicting councils — Kerr v. Trego. 293. Acts of de facto councils. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 289. 290. 291. 292. Section 294. Quorum of definite body. 295. The same subject continued. 296. The same subject continued — An exception to the rule. 297. The same subject continued — Special charter provisions. 298. Quorums and majorities fur- ther considered — The rule in England. 299. The same subject continued — Decisions in the United States. 300. Further application of majority principle. 301. Execution of authority vested in two persons. 302. Presiding officer. 303. The same subject continued. 304. Commitment for contempt — Whitcomb's case. 305. Ayes and nays. 306. Parliamentary law. 307. Reconsideration and rescission — General power. 308. The same subject continued. 309. Power to reconsider and re- scind qualified. 310. The same subject continued. 311. Reconsideration distinguished from repeal. 312. Joint assemblies of definite bodies — Constitution and pro- ceedings. 313. Record of meetings. § 274. Corporate assemblies of the old English corporations. — In England to constitute a corporate assembly there must at common law be present the mayor or other head officer/ a majority of each defi- *He must be the ofllcer de jure and not merely de facto: Rex v. Heb- (269) 275 PUBLIC COlil'OHATJONS. 270 nite integral part," and some members of the indefinite class nsually called the commonalty."'' The latter class is generally cither by pre- scription or by charter represented by a common council, and when this body exists an assembly of such is deemed a corporate assembly, and the presence of the legal president is necessary although not required by charter.* Where there is no definite class entitled to participate in corporate acts, and the governing body consists wholly of a definite or select class, it is necessary, to constitute a corporate assembly (sometimes termed in this case a select assembly), that a majority of the select class or classes shall be present. But the attendance of the mayor is not required at a meeting of this kind unless it is ex- pressly so provided.^ § 275. The same subject continued — Notice at common law. — Where the days and times for the transaction of particular business are appointed by usage, statute, charter or by-laws, all the members are presumed to have knowledge thereof, and no notice is necessary.^ When a meeting is assembled for a special purpose, every member who has a right to vote is entitled to notice,''^ unless he has quit the munici- pality without either retaining a house or leaving his family within its limits.* The notice must be issued by order of some one who has den, Andr. 388, 391; Rex v. Dawes, 4 Burr. 2277, 2279; Rex v. Mayor &c., 5 T. R. 66, 72. And he must attend in that capacity: Rex v. Carter, Cowp. 58. 2 That is, a majority of that num- ber by which each of these parts is constituted, and not merely a ma- jority of the surviving or existing members: Rex v. Morris, 4 East 17, 26; Rex v. Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810, 823; Rex v. Thornton, 4 East 294. 307; Rex v. Miller, 6 T. R. 268, 278; Rex V. Devonshire, 1 B. & C. 609, 614; Rex v. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 441; Rex V. Lathrop, 1 W. Bl. 468, 471. ' Rex V. Varlo, Cowp. 248, 250; Rex V. Monday, Cowp. 530, 539; Rex v. Bower, 1 B. & C. 492, 498; Rex v. Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810, 822. * Willcock Munic. Corp., § 126. ^ Willcock Munic. Corp., §§ 92, 106. By the English Municipal Corpora- tions Act of 1835 (5 & 6 Wm. IV, ch. 76, § 69) one-third of the council by which the corporation is represented constitutes a quorum. The mayor presides, but if he is absent a pre- siding officer is chosen who has a casting vote. «Rex V. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 441, 443; Willcock Munic. Corp., § 59. But if it is intended to do any other act of importance at such a meeting, a notice is necessary: Rex v. Mayor &c., 2 Burr. 723, 734; Rex v. Mayor &c., 2 Burr. 738, 744; Rex v. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 442; Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East 543, 545. 'Rex V. Mayor &c., 2 Burr. 723, 731; Rex v. May, 5 Burr. 2681; Rex V. Mayor &c., Cas. temp. Hardw. 147, 151; Rex v. Lisle, Andr. 163, 173; Kynaston v. Mayor &c., 2 Str. 1051; Rex V. Theodorick, 8 East 543, 546; Rex V. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 441. In- cluding every member of an "indefi- nite" body, if the incidental powers of the corporation are still exer- cised by the body at large: Rex v. Company &c., 8 T. R. 356. «Rex V. Grimes, 5 Burr. 2598; Rex 371 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 276 authority to assemble the corporation for that particular purpose,* It must be personally served upon him, but in case of his temporary absence it may be left with his family or at his last place of abode. ^^ It must be given a reasonable time before the hour of meeting ; and if the meeting be not at the usual place it should contain an intimation of that circumstance.^^ It is not necessary to state what business is to be transacted when it relates only to the ordinary affairs of the corporation; but when it is for the purpose of election, a motion, or making ordinances, the fact should be stated, for some may "feel it their duty to attend upon such occasions, to counteract the spirit of party and preserve the fundamental principles of their constitu- tion."^^ "If every member of a select body be present either at a meeting on the charter day, or specially convened, or even by acci- dent at a proper place and time, they may by unanimous consent^^ dispense with notice, and transact any extraordinary business within their peculiar province."^'* Their unanimity is only necessary for entering upon the business, after which it may be transacted in the same manner as if the assembly had met upon proper notice. ^^ § 276. The same subject continued — Presence of the mayor. — It is the common-law privilege attached to the office of mayor that he is an integral part of the corporation, and that no corporate act done in his absence is valid. ^''' He must preside not only at the transaction V. Mayor &c., Cas. temp. Hardw. grove v. Nevison, 1 Str. 584; s. c. 147. It is no sufBcient excuse for 2 Ld. Raym. 1358; Rex v. May, 5 omission of notice that the officer Burr. 2682. serving it heard and believed he had ^^ Willcocli Munic. Corp., § 74; Rex: departed, if such was not the fact: v. Tucker, 1 Barnard. 26; Rex v. Willcocl?; Munic. Corp., § 68. Mayor &c., Cas. temp. Hardw. 147; 'But the want of authority may Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East 543; Rex be waived by the presence and con- v. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 441. sent of all: Rex v. Hill, 4 B. & C. "It ought to appear plainly by 426, 444; Rex v. Gaborian, 11 East their conduct that they are unani- 77, 86, n.; Rex v. Atkins, 3 Mod. 3; mous: Willcock Munic. Corp., § 80. s. c. 2 Show. 237. At common law a "Willcock Munic. Corp., § 79; meeting can be summoned only by Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East 543; Rex the mayor: Willcock Munic. Corp., v. Wake, 1 Barnard. 80. § 94. 1^ Willcock Munic. Corp., § 81. ^" Rex V. Mayor &c., Cas. temp. But if the charter requires a special Hardw. 147; Kynaston v. Mayor &c., notice, this can not be dispensed 2 Str. 1051. It need not be in writ- with, even by unanimous consent: ing: Rex v. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 442. Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East 543. "Rex V. Hill, 4 B. & C. 426, 442. ^^ Rex v. Atkins, 3 Mod. 3; s. c. 2 The guildhall is the proper place, Show. 237; Tremaine 233; Rex v. but if there be none some particular Gaborian, 11 East 77, 87, n.; 1 Rol. place should be appointed: Mus- Abr. 514, tit. Corporations (G), pi. § 277 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 272 of those affairs which are merely voluntary or convenient, such as the election of new members into the corporation, or an indefinite class, but at those which are of the utmost necessity, as the filling of vacancies or the annual election of the officers.^'' The mayor must also propose the particular business or acquiesce in the proposal of another ;^^ and he must preside from the beginning to the conclu- sion of each distinct transaction.^® In some instances, however, either by immemorial usage or by the terms of the charter, the pres- ence of the head officer is dispensed with, and an alternative sub- stituted. In such cases all the requisites of legality must exist in the office of the person substituted, and if he hold by delegation from the head officer, he must not only be the legal deputy, but appointed by the legal j^rincipal.-" § 277. Regular or stated meetings — Time for holding. — The meet- ings of corporate bodies are either (1) regular or stated, (2) special, or (3) adjourned meetings. Unless the time for the stated meetings of the governing body is fixed hy charter or statute, or otherwise provided for by law, the power of determination resides with the body itself. Where a city charter requires the council to hold "stated meetings," and omits to designate the time, the council may upon simple motion prescribe such, time, which, may be changed by the council alone; also upon mere motion, although it has been previ- ously fixed by a formal resolution, approved by the mayor and pub- lished.^^ All the members of the board are presumed to have knowl- edge of the times for holding the stated meetings ; and if any member fails to attend he voluntarily waives his right to participate in the 7; Rex v. Trew, 2 Barnard. 370. "Rex v. Lisle, Andr. 163, 174; Rex "The doctrine of the English courts v. Hebden, Andr. 388, 392. as to the old corporations in that ^* Rex v. Gaborian, 11 East 77, 86, country, that the mayor was an n., 87, n.; Rex v. BuUer, 8 East 389, integral part of the corporation, 392; 1 Rol. Abr. 514, tit. Corpora- and that the acts of the corpora- tions; Rex v. Williams, 2 Mau. & tion in his absence were invalid, S. 141, 144. has, it is believed, no application to ^^ See cases cited in preceding the office of mayor in this country, note. With us, the powers and duties of ^"Willcock Munic. Corp., § 105; the mayor depend entirely upon the Rex v. Gaborian, 11 East 77, 86, n.; provisions of the charter, or the act Rex v. Corry, 5 East 372, 381; s. c. under which the corporation is or- 1 Smith 543. ganized, and the by-laws passed in "^ It requires only such action on pursuance of such authority:" Mar- their part as expresses the will of tindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411, 413; the body: State v. Kantler, 33 Minn. Welch V. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon 69; s. c. 21 N. W. 856; 6 Am. & Eng. 130. Corp. Cas. 169. 373 PUBLIC BOAPx-DS, 278 business of the meeting, and is bound by whatever is done within the ordinary range of the duties of the board.-- § 278. Adjournments. — At a meeting duly called a majority of a quorum have the incidental right to adjourn to another time, either on the same or on a future day.^^ And if an adjournment is irregu- lar because of the want of a quorum, but the adjourned meeting is attended by all the members, who participate without objection in the proceedings, the irregularity is cured, and in the absence of any find- ing the court will presume that all did so attend.^* But under an ""People V. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128; Gildersleeve v. Board of Educa- tion, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201, 208. As to presumptions in favor of the regularity of meetings, see Hudson Co. V. State, 24 N.J. L. 718; State v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218; Insurance Co. V. Sanders, 36 N.H. 252; State v. May- or &c., 25 N. J. L. 309. But in People V. Batchelor, supra, where the board of aldermen at a stated meeting adopted a resolution to meet in con- vention with the mayor on the same day, for the purpose of making cer- tain appointments, it was held that those absent from the stated meet- ing were entitled to reasonable notice of the time for holding the convention. For construction of city charter of Buffalo ' (laws of N. Y. 1891, ch. 105), see Kittinger v. Buf- falo Traction Co., 160 N. Y. 377; s. c. 54 N. E. 1081. 23 In re Newland Ave., 38 N. Y. St. 796; s. c. 15 N. Y. S. 63; Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; s. c. 14 N. W. 660; 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 153; citing Dillon Munic. Corp. 287. The power is incident to special as well as reg- ular meetings: Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1; s. c. 10 So. 688. By par- liamentary law if only a minority have assembled they may adjourn to the next day on which the body can meet for the transaction of busi- ness: People V. Common Council &c., 5 Lans. (N, Y.) 142, 147. Arbi- trary adjournment by presiding offi- 1 Smith — 18 cer, — see § 303, post. "The rule, as we understand, applicable to all de- liberate bodies, is that any number have power to adjourn, though they may not be a quorum for the trans- action of business:" Kimball v. Mar- shall, 44 N. H. 465, 468 (board of al- dermen). "It is not at all unusual, and never has been supposed to be unlawful, for meetings of corpora- tions to be adjourned for want of a quorum, without transacting any other business." This remark was made in a case where a town meet- ing adjourned to a certain day (not the day of a regular meeting), with- out the choice of a moderator. But the learned judge seems not to have confined his statement to adjourn- ments of popular meetings: Attor- ney-General V. Simonds, 111 Mass. 256, 260. "The law is silent as to the power of the board [of school inspectors] to adjourn. We think they have the right to adjourn, for any sufficient reason, both as to time and place; and unless it be made to appear that such adjournment was an abuse of the corporate functions, and operated to the detriment of those affected, or to be affected, by the proceedings, such action is not subject to review:" Donough v. Dewey, 82 Mich. 309, 312; s. c. 46 N. W. 782. "-' State V. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. See also, on the last point, Citizens' &c. Ins. Co. V. Sortwell, 8 Allen § 279 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 274 act providing that sessions "shall continue six days, if business shall so long require, and no longer," a board has no power to adjourn beyond six days, and proceedings at such an adjourned session are coram non judice and void.^^ § 279. Special meetings. — It is competent for a public board, un- less expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute, to call special meet- ings for the transaction of business proper to come before it; and where a regular meeting was adjourned to the next regular meeting without taking final action on a certain matter, and at a special meeting called and held during the interval it was again taken up and disposed of, the validity of the proceedings was sustained.^^ Where the charter expressly provided that the action of the city as- sembly at a special session called by the mayor should be confined to the objects specially stated to them when assembled, the language was interpreted to exclude legislation upon matters communicated to it by the mayor during the session but after the time when it assembled.^^ § 280. Adjourned meetings. — An adjourned meeting of either a regular or special meeting is a continuation of the same meeting, and any business which it would have been proper to consider at the meeting may be acted upon at the adjourned meeting.^® Conversely, (Mass.) 217, 223; Sargent v. Web- 1 La. An. 412; Hudson Co. v. State, ster, 13 Met. (Mass.) 497. 504; 24 N. J. L. 718; People v. Batchelor, Chosen Freeholders &c. v. State, 24 22 N. Y. 128; Smith v. Law, 21 N. N. J. L. 718; Rutherford v. Hamil- Y. 296; People v. Martin, 5 N. Y. 22; ton, 97 Mo. 543; s. c. 11 S. W. 249. Rex v. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936; Scad- The use of the word "recess" by the ding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 16. clerk instead of "adjourn" is imma- Where the statute requires that a terial: Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. township officer be elected at a reg- 365; s. c. 14 Pac. 888. ular meeting held on a particular ^Grimmett V. Askew, 48 Ark. 151; day. such officer may properly be s. c. 2 S. W. 707. elected at a meeting, held at a later -" Douglass V. Board &c., 23 Fla. day, which is an adjournment of the 419; s. c. 2 So. 776. In this case, regular meeting: Carter v. McFar- however, no stated time for meet- land, 75 Iowa 196; s. c. 39 N. W. ings was prescribed by statute. See 268; State v. Vanosdal, 131 Ind. 388; also, People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. s. c. 31 N. E. 79. See also, State v. 128. Harrison, 67 Ind. 71; Sackett v. ^' City of St. Louis v. Withaus, 90 State, 74 Ind. 486. A statute re- Mo. 646; s. c. 3 S. W. 395. quired supervisors to act at their ^ Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 "session in October." It was held Neb. 843; s. c. 47 N. W. 280; that they might act at an adjourned Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385; session: Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 City of New Orleans v. Brooks, Mich. 145. Where a regular meet- 36 La. An. 641; Street Case, Ing adjourns for a particular pur- 275 PUBLIC BOARDS. 281 an adjourned meeting is limited to those subjects upon which it was competent for the original meeting to take action. Thus, where a charter provided that no ordinance should be passed by the common council unless introduced at a previous stated meeting, and the rec- ord showed that the ordinance in question was introduced at a previ- ous adjourned meeting, without disclosing whether it was an ad- journed meeting of a stated or of a special meeting, the defect was held to be fatal.-'' § 281. Notice of special meetings. — A charter provision requiring a city council to meet "at such time and place as they by resolution may direct" is mandatory but not prohibitory, and a valid meeting may be convened at a time not fixed by resolution.^" Every member entitled to be present at a special meeting is entitled to notice of the time and place thereof, which must be served upon him personally, if practicable, or unless some other mode of notice is prescribed by statute or charter.^ ^ Where a charter provided that the mayor should pose, the adjourned meeting is not confined to that purpose, but may take up other legislative business: Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; s. c. 14 N. W. 660. In this country an ad- journed meeting of a special meet- ing is not limited to matters actu- ally begun, but unfinished, at the first meeting, and may, in Judge Dillon's opinion, consider proper business ab initio: Dillon Munic. Corp., § 287, n. See also, Cassidy v. City of Bangor, 61 Maine 434, 441. Action taken at an adjourned regu- lar meeting is legal, though no pro- vision is made in the code for re- cess or adjournment: Nixon v. City of Biloxi, 76 Miss. 810; s. c. 25 So. 664. =« State V. Mayor &c., 25 N. J. L. 309. See also, State v. Inhabitants &c., 45 N. J. L. 318; s. c. 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 38. Where the gov- erning body consists of two branches, the unfinished business of either body must be taken up in the next year de novo: Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 414. ="* State V. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. Code of Iowa, § 303, provides that the board of supervisors, at any reg- ular meeting, shall have power "to provide for the erection of all bridges." The code provides for special meetings, but does not pre- scribe the kind of business that may be transacted. It was held that the statute does not prohibit making provision for the erection of bridges at a special meeting, or reconsider- ing at a special meeting provisions made at a regular meeting: Super- visors &c. V. Horton, 75 Iowa 271; s. c. 39 N. W. 394. '' Rogers v. Slonaker, 32 Kan. 191; s. c. 4 Pac. 138; People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128; Harding v. Vande- water, 40 Cal. 77; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill (Md.) 254; Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178; Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214; Paola &c. R. Co. V. Commissioners, 16 Kan. 302, an excellent case, in which Brewer, J., shows that the rule is not arbitrary, but founded upon the clearest dic- tates of reason; Wiggin v. Elder &c., 8 Met. (Mass.) 301; Ex parte Rog- ers, 7 Cowen (N. Y.) 526, n.; Balti- more Tui'npike, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 481; Cassin v. Zavalla Co., 70 Tex. 419; s. c. 8 S. W. 97. See also, § 275, ante. And for a construction of provisions § 281 PUBLIC CORPORATIOXS. 276 he ex oflRcio a member of a board of road commissioners and preside at its meetings when present, but without a vote except in case of a tie, it was held that he was entitled to notice of a meeting, although there was not a tie vote in the particular instance.^^ But the omission of notice is cured by the presence and consent of all the members,^^ relating to notice in the English Municipal Corporations Act, 5 & 6 Wm. IV, ch. 76, § 69 (Consolidated Act, 1882, § 22), see Town Council &c. V. Court, 1 Bl. & El. 770; Reg. v. Whipp, 4 Q. B. 141; Reg. v. Grim- shaw, 10 Q. B. 747, 755; Reg. v. Thomas, 8 Ad. & El. 183; Rex v. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936. ^" State V. Kirk, 46 Conn. 395, hold- ing also that a written notice to a member absent from the state, left at the store of his son, which he was in the habit of visiting daily when in town, was sufficient. Code of Iowa, § 301, provides that, on re- quest for a special meeting of the board, the auditor shall fix a day for such meeting, and give notice in writing to each supervisor person- ally or by leaving a copy thereof at his residence, at least six days be- fore the day appointed, and also give notice by publication in news- papers published in the county, or, if there be none, by causing notice to be posted at the court-house and at two other places, one week be- fore the time set. Held, that the six days' limitation of the notice refers to the copy left at the residence, and not to the personal notice; and the one-week limitation of the public notice refers to the posted notice, and not the publication in a news- paper: Supervisors &c. v. Horton, 75 Iowa 271; s. c. 39 N. W. 394. Charter provisions as to notice must be strictly pursued: Lord v. City of Anoka, 36 Minn. 176; s. c. 30 N. W. 550. See also, Scott v. Union Co., 63 Iowa 583; s. c. 19 N. W. 667. The notice may be oral, provided all the members receive it in time to at- tend: Scott V. Paulen, 15 Kan. 162; White V. Fleming, 114 Ind. 560; s. c. 16 N. E. 487. Two days' notice for persons all residing in the city, and whose duty it is to reside in the city and to be ready to perform the functions of their office, is not so clearly a short notice that on a plead- ing it will be pronounced insuf- ficient: People V. Walker, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 304, 305. In Whiteside v. People, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 635, the notice was served at 2 o'clock p. m. for a meeting at 5 p. m. of the same day. Where notice of a meeting of school inspectors was required by law to be given by the township clerk, who was ex officio clerk of the board, it was sufficient though signed by him as "clerk of the board": Donough v. Dewey, 82 Mich. 309; s. c. 46 N. W. 782. ^' Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 Neb. 843; s. c. 47 N. W. 280; People V. Frost, 32 111. App. 242; Thomas V. Citizens' Horse R. Co., 104 111. 462; Lawrence v. Traner, 136 111. 474; s. c. 27 N. E. 197; Beaver Creek V. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528; s. c. 18 N. W. 250; State v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. But if third parties have a right to be heard, — for example, tax- payers, — the notice is jurisdictional, and can not be waived by the con- sent of a majority of those inter- ested: Gentle v. Board &c., 73 Mich. 40; s. c. 40 N. W. 928. There is a presumption in favor of regularity: State V. Inhabitants &c., 45 N. J. L. 318; s. c. 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 39; Chosen Freeholders &c. v. State, 24 N. J. L. 718; Rutherford v. Ham- ilton, 97 Mo. 543; s. c. 11 S. W. 249; Torr V. Corcoran, 115 Ind. 188; s. c. 17 N. E. 286; Prezinger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491; s. c. 16 N. E. 495, and 277 PUBLIC BOARDS. 282 "or at least of all who were not properly notified."^* § 282. The same subject continued — Specification of object of meeting. — It was held in a very early case in New Jersey that if the particular purpose of a special meeting is stated in the call, acts of the meeting foreign to the purpose specified are invalid.^^ But a con- trary rule is laid down in a recent decision of the supreme court of er- rors of Connecticut. A charter authorized the court of common council to provide by ordinance for the warning of its meetings, but no pro- vision of charter or ordinance required information to be given of the matters to be considered. It was held that the notice of a special meeting need not specify the oljject thereof, nor could the scope of authority of the council be confined to purposes actually specified in such notice. "The familiar rule of notice," said Judge Prentice, "as applicable to meetings of towns and communities, is one pre- scribed by statute. It has no application to meetings of governmental representative bodies like courts of common council. Their status and right to act are more allied to those of the governing bodies of private corporations and of the general assembly, and are governed by the same rules."^" Where all the members of the council and the Indiana cases there cited; Stoddard V. Johnson, 75 Ind. 20; Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563; s. c. 5 So. 104; 7 Am. St. 679; Scott v. Paulen, 15 Kan. 162. Cf. State v. Mayor &c., 25 N. J. L. 309; Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich. 316, 321; s. c. 42 N. W. 942; Newaygo Co. Mfg. Co. v. Echtinaw, 81 Mich. 416; s. c. 45 N. W. 1010. Where the county auditor is em- powered to call special meetings of the board of commissioners, when the public interests require it, by giv- ing at least six days' notice, unless in his opinion an emergency requires a shorter notice, in which case he may fix it at his discretion, his determi- nation is final and conclusive: Jus- sen V. Board &c., 95 Ind. 567; Prez- inger v. Harness, 114 Ind. 491; s. c. 16 N. E. 495. If want of notice af- firmatively appears, it is fatal: Pa- ola &c. R. Co. V. Commissioners, 16 Kan. 302. '* Lord V. City of Anoka, 36 Minn. 176; s. c. 30 N. W. 550, 551. Com- missioners chosen at a regular meet- ing of the board to let a bridge con- tract and superintend the construc- tion, who protested against the le- gality and the sufficiency of the no- tice of a subsequent special meeting in which the former action was re- considered, but took no part in the whole of such meeting, and at- tempted by so doing to accomplish their purposes, are estopped to deny the sufficiency of the notice of the special meeting: Supervisors &c. v. Horton, 75 Iowa 271; s. c. 39 N. W. 394. ==' Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (N. J. L.) 428. The court thought the object of a special meeting ought al- ways to be mentioned in the notice: referring to Rex v. Mayor &c., 2 Burr. 723, 735. ^"Whitney v. City of New Haven, 58 Conn. 450, 461; s. c. 20 Atl. 666; citing Cooley Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 155, 189; Savings Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 192; Town of Westbrook's Ap- peal (fee, 75 Conn. 95; s. c. 17 Atl. 368. See also, Wilson v. Board &c.. § 283 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 278 mayor meet and act as a body, they may at such special meeting, or any adjourned session, transact any business within the powers conferred by law, notwithstanding no written call for the meeting was made, or in case one was made which failed to indicate the purpose of the meeting. ^^ § 283. Adjourned meetings — Time for holding. — When a meeting is adjourned to a fixed hour, and only a part of the members attend at the precise time and others arrive later, or some depart before any action is taken, it becomes important to determine when the pro- ceedings may lawfully begin. Upon this question the supreme court of New Hampshire said: "The law has fixed no time at or within which such meeting must be organized, called to order or proceed to business. It has been held that an appearance within the hour after the time fixed will save the default of a party summoned to appear at court at a particular hour;^^ and in former times the proceedings of town meetings have been set aside by the legislature where a party have been in attendance precisely at the hour, and have at once com- menced and dispatched the business of the meeting and adjourned finally before the arrival of the members of another party, who, rely- ing upon the usual dilatory mode of commencing such meetings, had made no haste, and had not arrived. And it seems to have been very properly done. A reasonable time should be allowed for parties in- terested to be present, and an hour may in ordinary cases be well regarded as a reasonable time. Special cases must of course rest on their own circumstances where they show cause for greater delay. * * * And we apprehend no more definite rule can be laid down than this: that where parties assemble in pursuance of a notice or appointment, and remain together for the purpose of attending to the business as soon as it is found convenient or practicable, the pro- ceedings will be held regular, though the delay may seem unreasona- ble to impatient persons or to those who have engagements elsewhere ; 68 Ind. 507; Commissioners &c. v. cil, is not lost because he made a Kent, 5 Neb. 227; Genesee Tp. v. mistake in his attempt to publish it, McDonald, 98 Pa. St. 444, 451. where there is no evidence that any '■ Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 one was misled or harmed thereby: Neb. 843; s. c. 47 N. W. 280. The Gilmore v. City of Utica, 131 N. Y. court said, however, that the deci- 26; s. c. 29 N. E. 841; aff'g s. c. 15 sions of the courts are conflicting N. Y. S. 274. upon the question whether the call ^^ Or even a few minutes over the must specify the object of the meet- hour: Nugent v. Wrinn, 44 Conn, ing when the statute is silent. - - - 273. See also, Wilde v. Dunn, 11 The power of a city clerk to issue a Johns. (N. Y.J 459; Baldwin v. Car- notice for bids for a public improve- ter, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 496; Atwood ment, as directed by the city coun- v. Austin, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 180. 279 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 284 and no one of the persons thus assembled would be heard to object to the regularity of the proceedings if he should go away without having made a suitable ciTort to induce the proper officers or persons to proceed with the business; and no third person would be heard to object unless he could show that his rights were affected by the delay."39 § 284. Corporation represented by governing boards. — The cor- porate body at large of a municipal corporation is usually represented by a common council or other municipal board.*" Where corporate powers were conferred in general terms upon "townships," the power was decided to belong to the board of directors, and not to the citizens en masse, to select and purchase a site for a township hall.*^ So, under a charter which imposes upon the common council the duty "to manage, regulate and control the property, real and personal, of the city," the expediency of destroying and removing or repairing a city building is to be determined exclusively by the council; and the fact that a majority of the voters of the city have expressed themselves against the destruction under an order of a prior council submitting the question to them does not affect this power.* ^ The legislative and discretionary powers of the council can be exercised only by the coming together of the members who compose it, and its purposes or will can be expressed only by a vote embodied in some distinct and definite form.*^ If no method is prescribed by law, it is left free to act either by resolution or ordinance.** § 285. The same subject continued-rMeeting essential to oiRcial action. — As a general rule the individual members of a public body possessing deliberative functions have no authority to bind the mu- ^* Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H. do no valid act except as a board, 465, 467. and such act must be by ordinance *" Richards v. Town of Clarksburg, or resolution or something equiva- 30 W. Va. 491; s. c. 4 S. E. 774; 20 lent thereto"); Dey v. Mayor &c., 19 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. Ill; Central N. J. Eq. 412. Cf. Taylor v. McFad- Bridge Co. v. City of Lowell, 15 Gray den, 84 Iowa 262; s. c. 50 N. W. 1070, (Mass.) 106; Dey v. Mayor &c., 19 N. where a resolution for the levy of a J. Eq. 412; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 tax was offered at the meeting of a N. J. Eq. 143; Mayor &c. v. Poult- city council and certified to the audi- ney, 25 Md. 18. tor, but the record failed to show " State V. Haynes, 72 Mo. 377. that it was adopted by the council, *- Whitney v. City of New Haven, and the adoption, notwithstanding 58 Conn. 450; s. c. 20 Atl. 666. this omission, was inferred from the *=• Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. fact that it was offered and ordered Eq. 143 ("The mayor and common to be so certified, council," said the court in that case, ** Halsey v. Rapid Transit R. Co., "exist only as a board, and they can 47 N. .J. Eq. 380; s. c. 20 Atl. 859. 285 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 280 nicipality b}'^ unoflficial statements made at different times and places.'^ "The public for whom they act/' said the supreme court of Ohio, 'Tiave the right to their best judgment after free and full discussion and consultation among themselves of and upon the public matters intrusted to them in the session provided for by the statute."*^ *^ "It would be of most dangerous, not to say fatal tendency, to sanction the notion that parol testimony of witnesses, were it clear and unquali- fied, could be admitted at the end of ten or twelve years to establish a contract of any kind by a municipal agency required by law to act within a very narrow range of power and to keep a record of its public trans- actions:" Strong V. District of Co- lumbia, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 242, 249; s. c. 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 568. That the corporate body at large is represented by its governing body, acting collectively and not as indi- viduals, is illustrated by decisions in mandamus proceedings to com- pel the performance of a corporate duty. The peremptory writ may be directed to the corporation in its corporate name, or to the proper officers in their corporate ca- pacity and official style with- out naming them, and resigna- tions by officers after service of the alternative writ do not abate the proceedings: Commissioners v. Sel- lew, 99 U. S. 624 (in which case the court said: — "The board is in effect the officer, and the members of the board are but the agents who per- form its duties") ; City of Little Rock V. Board &c., 42 Ark. 152; County Com'rs &c. v. King, 13 Fla. 451; Mad- dox V. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56; State V. Common Council &c., 15 Wis. 33; Pegram v. Commissioners &c., 65 N. C. 114; People v. Collins, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 56. 68. «McCortle v. Bates, 29 Ohio St. 419, where a written contract signed by a majority of the members of a township board of education, which stipulated that the subscribers would formally ratify the same at a legal meeting, was held to be con- trary to public policy, and not en- forceable against them personally. The decision is recognized as "un- doubtedly sound," in People v. Sto- well, 9 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 456, but not deemed to render invalid a reg- ular resolution of the common coun- cil because the majority acted in pursuance of a mutual pledge made before the body met: Reed v. In- habitants &c., 152 Mass. 500; s. c. 25 N. E. 974. But a committee chosen by a town to erect a building is an agent, not a board of public officers, and may act by the agreement of the individual members separately ob- tained: Shea V. Inhabitants &c., 145 Mass. 528: s. c. 14 N. E. 764; Haven V. City of Lowell, 5 Met. (Mass.) 35. "The vestrymen of a church, as the representatives of a corporate body, must meet in order to take official action. They can not act singly, upon the street or wherever they may be found. This is because they are re- quired to deliberate. It is the right of the minority to meet the major- ity and by discussion and delibera- tion to bring them over if possible to their own views:" Rittenhouse's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 172, 176; s. c. 21 Atl. 224; Paola &c. R. Co. v. Commis- sioners &c., 16 Kan. 302, 309. It was held, obiter, in Butler v. City of CharlestoM-n, 7 Gray (Mass.) 12, that if the mayor and aldermen had power to retain counsel on behalf of the city it must be exercised by their official act at a lawful meeting of the 381 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 286 § 286. The same subject continued — Delegation of powers. — It is well settled that the legislative powers of a municipal corporation can not be delegated to others; such powers are in the nature of public trusts conferred upon the legislative assembly of the corpora- tion for the public benefit, and can not be vicariously exercised. Thus, where a charter provided that a city council should have power "to restrain, prohibit and suppress dram-shops,*' etc., an ordinance of that body prohibiting the sale of liquor without a license, but au- thorizing the city treasurer to fix the fee for a license, and the term thereof, within certain limits, was held to be void, as an unwarranta- ble transfer of discretion designed to be exercised by the council alone.*'^ So, also, where the charter of a street railway company board, and a contract made by a majority of the board informally would not be binding, nor could a custom of the city to pay bills con- tracted in that manner create a valid claim. See also, on the last point, Sikes v. Hatfield, 13 Gray (Mass.) 347. The fact that the chairman of a town board of super- visors, in the presence of another supervisor, told the pathmaster to fix up a town road so that it could be traveled, and that the board after- wards allowed him a portion of his claim for the work done, does not amount to the making of a contract with him by the board so as to en- title him to sue the town for the balance of his claim. "To bind the town the supervisors must act as a town board:" Dieschel v. Town of Maine, 81 Wis. 553; s. c. 51 N. W. 880; Hardin Co. v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 92 Ky. 412; s. c. 17 S. W. 860; Independent School Dist. v. Wirtner, 85 Iowa 387; s. c. 52 N. W. 243; Com- monwealth V. Howard, 149 Pa. St. 302; s. c. 24 Atl. 308; Jackson v. Col- lins, 16 N. Y. S. 651. See.however, for modified views, Athearn v. Inde- pendent Dist. &c., 33 Iowa 105; Hull V. Independent Dist. &c., 82 Iowa 686; s. c. 46 N. W. 1053. A bill to enjoin collection of a school tax al- leged that the determination to levy was not made by the school di- rectors at a regular or special meet- ing, nor in their corporate capacity, but as individuals. Held, that such allegations did not charge that the directors acted in the matter with- out meeting together: Lawrence v. Traner, 136 111. 474; s. c. 27 N. E, 197. *'City of East St. Louis v. Weh- rung, 50 111. 28. See further, as to the delegation by various municipal bodies of powers vested in them, the exercise of which involves questions of expediency. Day v. Green, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 433; Coffin v. Nantucket, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 269; Ruggles v. In- habitants &c., 11 Cush. (Mass.) 433 State V. Mayor &c., 34 N. J. L. 163 Ruggles V. Collier, 43 Mo. 353. 359 Board &c. v. Brush, 77 111. 59; Mayor &c. V. Scharf, 54 Md. 499; Cooley Const. Lim., § 204; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92. In Matthews v. City of Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115, and City of Oakland v. Car- pentier, 13 Cal. 540, cities empow- ered to build and regulate wharves undertook to confer the right upon lessees or contractors. Cf. Gregory V. City of Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76 (where under an express power to "ordain by-laws relating to wharves,' and a general authority to appoint necessary officers to carry by-laws into effect, an ordinance appointing a superintendent of wharves with 386 PUBLIC COKPOKATIONS. 282 contained a provision that "said railroad shall he laid out by the mayor and aldermen in like manner as highways are laid out," and a single track railroad was laid out by the mayor and aldermen with- out any turnouts, but with a provision in the record of the laying out that "said horse railroad company may construct such suitable turnouts on either side of said center line as they may find necessary in the prosecution of the business," etc., it was held that the company could not construct a turnout, although necessary for their business and required for public convenience, without a laying out by the mayor and aldermen.*^ power to order and regulate the mooring of vessels was held to be valid); Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73; State v. Bell, 34 Ohio St. 194; Northern &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 21 Md. 93; Evansville &c. R. Co. v. City of Evansville, 15 Ind. 395; State v. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155; Phelps v. May- or &c., 112 N. Y. 216; s. c. 19 N. E. 408; Young v. Black Hawk Co., 66 Iowa 460; s. c. 23 N. W. 923; Han- non V. Agnew, 96 N. Y. 439; City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis &c. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Hickey v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 6 111. App. 172; Bibel v. People, 67 111. 172, 175; Davis v. Read, 65 N. Y. 566; In re Trustees &c.. 57 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500; City of Kinmundy v. Mayhan, 72 111. 462; Darling v. City of St. Paul, 19 Minn. 389; Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239; State V. Fiske, 9 R. I. 94; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Whyte v. Mayor &c., 2 Swan (Tenn.) 364; Franke v. Paducah &c. Co., 88 Ky. 467; s. c. 11 S. W. 432, 718; Gale v. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; s. c. 9 Am. R. 80; Lord v. City of Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; s. c. 2 N. W. 785; Schenley V. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 62; Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush (Ky.) 464; s. c. 96 Am. D. 311; State v. Mayor &c., 26 N. J. L. 444; State v. Mayor &c., 42 N. J. L". 395; State v. Mayor &c., 51 N. J. L. 498; s. c. 18 Atl. 116; 28 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 161; Clark V. Mayor &c.. 12 Wheat. 40; Minne- apolis Gas Light Co. v. City of Min- neapolis, 36 Minn. 159; s. c. 30 N. W. 450 (holding that power con- ferred by the city charter on the city council to provide for lighting the city and altering lamp districts can not be delegated to a committee for final decision) ; Dillard v. Webb, 55 Ala. 468; City of East St. Louis v. Thomas, 11 111. App. 283; Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164; s. c. 22 Atl. 430; Mullarky v. Town of Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa 21; Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 435; s. c. 27 N. Y. 611; Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 485; s. c. 37 Am. D. 271; Thom- son V. Mayor &c., 61 Mo. 282; Sco- field V. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437; Lauenstein v. City of Fond du Lac, 28 Wis. 336; Sheehan v. Glee- son, 46 Mo. 100; City of Stockton v. Creanor, 45 Cal. 643 (holding that a common council can not confer upon a committee of its own members a power vested in it to accept a bid or award a contract for grading a street). *'^ Concord v. Concord Horse R. Co., 65 N. H. 30; s. c. 18 Atl. 87. Where a statute provides that cer- tain powers thereby conferred upon a mayor and council shall be exe- cuted by them in a certain manner, the unauthorized doings of an officer who undertakes to act for them can not be validated by ratification: the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to such a case: Mayor &c. v. Porter, 18 Md. 289; s. c. 79 Am. D. 686. 283 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 287 § 287. The same subject continued. — By statute in Connecticut it is the duty of tlie selectmen to "superintend the concerns of the town."'*" The person first named on a plurality of ballots is first selectman, "and, in the absence of a special appointment, shall be ex officio the agent of such town.'"^** A board of selectmen appointed a superintendent of highways and a "town agent." The town had previously at a legal meeting designated the first selectman as super- intendent of highways, but had made no special appointment of a town agent. It was held that both appointments by the selectmen were void. In respect of the first. Chief Justice Andrews said: "The selectmen had no authority to make such an appointment. The selectmen of a town are, to be sure, its general prudential officers, and are charged with the duty of superintending the concerns of the town, but in so doing they act as the agents of the town and exercise a delegated authority. Their powers are for the most part conferred by some statute. In respect to the matters mentioned in these stat- utes they can not go beyond the special limits of the statute. In other matters long usage has given to the selectmen of towns certain powers. In either case their authority is in the nature of a personal trust to be performed by themselves. They have no power to appoint another to perform the duties that devolve on them." And, touching the appointment of town agent, he continued : "Undoubtedly a town, like any other corporation, may appoint an agent for any proper purpose. Possibly a town may appoint an agent to perform any or all duties usually performed by the selectmen, except such as are specifically imposed on the selectmen by the constitution or by some statute. But the selectmen, being themselves agents, can not appoint another or one of themselves to be an agent for their own town. That rule of law governs which is found in the maxim "Delegata potestas non potest delegare." Certainly they could not unless specially em- powered so to do. They would have no such authority by virtue of their general powers."^^ This is an application of correct principles to municipal boards. § 288. Delegation of powers — A Pennsylvania case. — A Pennsyl- vania statute provided that two county commissioners should form a board for the transaction of business, and when convened in pursu- ance of notice or according to adjournment should be competent to perform the duties appertaining to their office. The commissioners " Gen. Stats. 1888, § 64 et seq., ™ Gen. St. 1888, § 48. where certain duties are also par- " Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164; ticularized. s. c. 22 Atl. 430. § 289 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 284 contracted with one D. to build a court-house. """'^ D. made a contract with the phiintiff to supply him with brick. After the plaintiff had delivered part of the brick called for by his contract he refused to deliver the rest on the ground that D. had not paid for the bricks already delivered; Avhereupon two of the commissioners went to the plaintiff, and with D.'s assent told him to proceed with the delivery of the bricks and that they would pay him. At that time there was more than enough money due to D. from the county to pay the plain- tiff for the bricks to be delivered. It did not appear that the other commissioners were informed of or consulted about the matter or that it was discussed at any regular session of the board. The court submitted the question to the jury whether the two commissioners acted in their official capacity or merely as individuals, and a verdict against the county was sustained. The decision "may be supported on the ground that the contract of the commissioners was merely an incident to the main contract for the building, regularly made, and that the county could not possibly be subjected to any liability under it in excess of the amount provided in the original undertaking with D. But the opinion of the court does not touch these features of the case, and its reasoning is superficial and inadequate of itself to justify the ruling of the court below.^^ § 289. The same subject continued — The rule limited. — But while a council or a similar body can not delegate all the power conferred upon it by the legislature in a given instance, it may like every other corporation do its ministerial work by agents or committees.^* Where ^- This seems to have been done at ney v. City of New Haven, 58 Conn, a regular meeting of the board. 450; s. c. 20 Atl. 666, where a char- ''^ Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, 66 Pa. ter provision that the board of pub- St. 202. See Cooper v. Lampeter lie works should execute all orders Tp., 8 Watts (Pa.) 125 (making a of the council relating to parks, distinction between acts done by one etc., did not deprive the council of member in the ordinary routine of authority to delegate to the city his duty and others of a nature de- auditor the work of destroying a manding consultation and delibera- public building situated in a park; tion — between the repairing of an Gilmore v. City of Utica, 131 N. Y. old bridge and the building of a new 26; s. c. 29 N. E. 841; aff'g s. c. 15 one) ; Wolcott v. Town of Wolcott, N. Y. S. 274, where clerk of council 19 Vt. 37; Throop Public OflBcers, directed to publish notice of meet- § 109. ing was permitted to fix the day; ^Holland v. State, 23 Fla. 123; s. distinguishing State v. Mayor &c., c. 1 So. 521; Burlington v. Denni- 25 N. J. L. 309; Bullitt Co. v. son, 42 N. J. L. 165; Kramrath v. Washer, 130 U. S. 142; s. c. 9 S. Ct. City of Albany, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 206; 499. Under a statute authorizing s. c. 6 N. Y. S. 54; Damon v. Inhabi- the county commissioners "to audit tants &c., 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345; Whit- the accounts of all officers having 285 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 289 a cit}' council was vested with power to cause sidewalks in the city to be constructed, the supreme court of the United States decided that it might authorize the mayor and the chairman of a committee on streets and alleys to make in its behalf and pursuant to its directions a contract for doing work, and also give to the owners of abutting lots the privilege of selecting one of several specified materials, re- serving to the chairman of the committee authority to select in case the lot-owners failed.^^ So, also, in the exercise of a like authority, the council may refer applications for the location or alteration of streets to a committee to inquire into the matter and report.^'' And where the council is the sole judge of the election of its members, it may upon a contest appoint a committee to take testimony and to re- port the facts and evidence to the council.^^ the care, management, collection or disbursement" of county moneys, the commissioners have power to contract with an expert to examine the county treasurer's accounts: Duncan v. Board &c., 101 Ind. 403; School Town of Milford v. Zeigler, 1 Ind. App. 138; s. c. 27 N. E. 303; Gil- lett v. Board &c., 67 111. 256; City of Alton V. Mulledy, 21 111. 76; Stew- art v. City of Council Bluffs, 58 Iowa 642; s. c. 12 N. W. 718; State V. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155; Edwards v. City of Watertown, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 426. The English Municipal Corpo- rations Act of 1882, § 22, provides that "the council may appoint out of their body such and so many com- mittees as they think fit, for any purpose which in the opinion of the council would be better regulated and managed by means of such com- mittees; but the acts of every such committee shall be submitted to the council for their approval." See also, Gregory v. City of Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76, cited in note 47 to § 286, ante. ^'^ Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341. In the same case it was also held that, if the committee were ex- ercising an unlawful delegation of power, it was competent for the council to ratify their acts. See also, as to ratification. School Town of Milford v. Powner, 126 Ind. 528; s. c. 26 N. E. 484; Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L. 97; s. c. 11 Atl. 151; Han- nibal &c. R. Co. V. Marion Co., 36 Mo. 294. But where the common council was required by charter to cause certain work to be done by contract or otherwise, an ordinance directing the superintendent of streets to "cause the work to be done" was declared to be unauthor- ized: Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73. '"Preble v. City of Portland, 45 Maine 241. It is no objection to a sewer assessment that the mayor and aldermen called in another per- son to assist them in making it: Collins V. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298; s. c. 15 N. E. 908. Council may or- der a sewer to be built by a com- mittee: Dorey v. City of Boston, 146 Mass. 336, 339; s. c. 15 N. E. 897, and cases cited. Where the members of the council have per- sonal knowledge of a fact, they may act without any further or formal inquiry: Bissell v. City of Jefferson- ville, 24 How. 287, 296; Main v. Fort Smith, 49 Ark. 480; s. c. 5 S. W. 801; Commonwealth v. City of Pitts- burg, 14 Pa. St. 177. " "This is a well-known course of proceeding in every body having power to judge of the election of its own members, in case an election is § 290 PUBLIC COKrOKATIONS. 286 § 290. Constitution of council. — In the old English municipal corporations, when the mayor or other chief officer was not present at a corporate assembly, it could transact no business of the corpora- tion, for without his presence at its head no corporate act done was valid. ^^ City charters in this country do not always agree in the constituents of the council or governing body. In some cases there is a separate council which is only one of the parts of the city legis- lature, and requiring the approval of another board or of the mayor acting separately, as the governor does, to complete their action. But most of our cities, in their earlier stages, if not permanently, have had a council where the mayor sits in person and over whose action he has no veto. In all such corporations he has been deemed a member as clearly as the aldermen.^® Where the charter provided "that the intendant of police shall have a seat in the board of commis- sioners, and when present shall preside therein; in his absence the board shall appoint a chairman pro tempore," it was held that the intendant was constituted a member of the board. ®° And when the language of the organic act is that "the mayor and councilmen shall have power," etc., the co-ordinate action of both is required before their action can have any binding or obligatory force. ^^ § 291. The same subject continued. — If, however, by a fair con- struction of the law the body is composed exclusively of trustees or councilmen, the mayor is not a member of the council and has no right to preside or vote therein.^- It was decided by the United contested:" Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. ^"Intendant &c. v. Sorrell, 1 Jones J. L. 97, 100; s. c. 11 Atl. 151. The L. (N. C.) 49. Judge Dillon says powers of committees may be re- that "whether the mere fact that a voked by the appointing power or single unauthorized person is by a controlled by new members added, mistaken construction of the char- who can not be lawfully excluded ter allowed to participate in the from participation in their proceed- transactions of a meeting of the ings: Damon v. Inhabitants &c., 2 council would in this country be Pick. (Mass.) 345. held necessarily to avoid them is a ^** Richards v. Town of Clarksburg, question which perhaps remains yet 30 W. Va. 491, 497; s. c. 4 S. E. 774; to be settled:" Dillon Munic. Corp., 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. Ill; Will- §273, n. cock Munic. Corp., §§ 94, 102; Reg. " Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488, v. Bailiffs, 2 Ld. Raym. 1232. See Saxton v. City of St. Joseph, 60 Mo. § 276, ante. 153. ^^ People V. Harshaw, 60 Mich. "^ Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa 200; s. c. 26 N. W. 860, holding that 75. See also, Reynolds v. Baldwin, a provision in a charter that "the 1 La. An. 162; Commonwealth v. mayor, recorder and aldermen, when Kepner, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 510; Ach- assembled together, shall constitute ley's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 35. the common council," makes the "Where a charter provided that the mayor a member of the council. "common council shall consist of the 287 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 292 States circuit court that under a statute providing for the appoint- ment and qualification of a board of tax commissioners to consist of a definite number, the board was not in existence until all had duly qualified, and the proceedings of a majority were therefore of no vaiidity.^^ A change in the membership of a board pending proceed- ings before it does not require that the matters be taken up de novo. Thus, a county commissioner may act with his associates in steps preliminary to laying out a way, and his successor may afterwards act in his place in completing the proceedings, where the acts of the former are separable from those of the latter.®* § 292. Conflicting councils — ^Kerr v. Trego. — Where two bodies claim to be regularly organized as the common council of a city, and each is proceeding to act as such, to the great detriment of the public interests, may the wrongful body be restrained from acting by means of the equity remedy of injunction? This was the question which arose and was determined by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Kerr v. Trego. ''^ An ordinance of the common council of Phila- delphia provided that the clerk and assistant clerk elect should con- tinue in office until the organization of a new council (after an elec- tion) and until their sucessors should be duly elected, and it appeared mayor and aldermen," etc., and that a vote to levy a certain tax should be passed by two-thirds vote of the "members elect," it was held that the mayor was not entitled to vote to make up the two-thirds: Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. ^^ Schenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175. But see Hartshorn v. Schoff, 58 N. H. 197. ^ "The board are a court, and the court, is not dissolved by one com- missioner going out and another coming in. It continues to be the sariie court though its personality be changed:" Chapman v. County Com'rs, 79 Maine 267, 269; s. c. 9 Atl. 728. As to the common mode of organizing a municipal body where part of its members are con- stantly in office, and some new mem- bers are annually infused, see Kerr V. Trego, 47 Pa. St. 292. Under Pa. act of 1887, § 4, providing for certain new executive officers in cities, "which shall be chosen by city coun- cils," the existing council at the time of change should choose such officers: Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Pa. St. 508; s. c. 21 Atl. 389. Where two justices of the peace "whose terms will soonest expire" were constituted members of a board, it was not necessary that the record should show affirmatively that the two justices present ful- filled the requirement. If they ap- peared and acted, the presumption is that they were entitled to sit as members: Newaygo Co. Mfg. Co. v. Echtinaw, 81 Mich. 416; s. c. 45 N. W. 1010. Where the members of a common council sit as a court to try charges against an oflSicer, if one of their number presides over the tri- bunal he has a right to vote upon the question of guilt in the absence of any statute or ordinance to the contrary: Asbell v. Mayor &c., 80 Ga. 503; s. c. 5 S. E. 500. ^ 47 Pa. St. 292. § 293 PUBLIC conpoiiATiONS. 288 that on the day and at the hour appointed by law for the organization of the new council there were present twenty-three members whose terms had yet one year to run, among whom was the president of the preceding year. The clerk and president were in their usual places and proceeded first to call the roll of all the members whose terms of office had not yet expired, and then to call on the new members to present their certificate of election that their names might be en- rolled. Further business was interrupted by the disorderly conduct of the new members, who proclaimed one of their number as presi- dent, and at a subsequent meeting assumed to act as the lawful common council. The court held, 1. That there was a wrong sub- ject to redress by judicial power; 2. That injunction was the ap- propriate remedy; 3. That one of the conflicting bodies might main- tain the action against the other, the attorney-general not having the sole right to file such a bill ; 4. That the maintenance of the reg- ular forms of organization was the test of right; 5. That the mode of organization by the members who continued in office was legiti- mate and according to common usage ; 6. That an intention by the complainants to use their power fraudulently did not defeat their right to the injunction. The opinion of the court is interspersed with wise and liberal observations in respect of the proper limits of judicial interference in cases of this kind, and is strongly supported by the temperate judgment of Judge Dillon.^® § 293. Acts of de facto councils. — In applying the principle that the acts of de facto officers, properly so called, are valid, no distinction is made between officers whose duties are executive or administra- tive and those who compose the council or other municipal legis- lative body.''^ But an office which has no de jure existence can not «« Dillon Munic. Corp., § 275, n. ens, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 616; Pritchett v. See, however. In re Sawyer, 124 U. People, 6 111. 525; Cochran v. Mc- S. 200; s. c. S. Ct. 482, and the dis- Cleary, 22 Iowa 75, 84; Town of De- senting opinion of Chief Justice corah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa 12; Car- Waite; Demarest v. Wickham, 63 land v. Commissioners &c., 5 Mont. N. Y. 320; High Injunctions, § 1312. 579; s. c. 6 Pac. 24; State v. Goowin, "Roche v. Jones, 87 Va. 484; s. c. 69 Tex. 55; s. c. 5 S. W. 678 (where 12 S. E. 965; De Grave v. Mayor &c., a municipal election ordered by de 4 Car. & P. Ill; State v. Jacobs, 17 facto mayor and aldermen was de- Ohio 143; Williams v. Inhabitants clared valid); Dugan v. Farrier, 47 &c., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75; Scovill v. N. J. L. 383; s. c. 1 Atl. 751 (where City of Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; a member of the board who was in- Trustees &c. v. Hills, 6 Cowen (N. eligible to the office of president Y.) 23; People v. Runkle, 9 Johns, claimed the right to preside and as- (N. Y.) 147; People v. Bartlett, 6 sumed the chair. The board acqui- Wend. (N. Y.) 422; People v. Stev- esced and proceeded to appoint a 289 PUBLIC BOARDS. 294 have a de facto inciimbent."^^ Accordingly, where a town attempted to reorganize under an act wliieh did not apply to it, a new council differently constituted from that of the old corporation was declared to have no power to pass a valid ordinance."* Where a county court was abolished by act of the legislature and its powers transferred to a board of county commissioners, who proceeded to issue bonds under their new authority, and the statute was subsequently held to be unconstitutional, the bonds were without validity even in the hands of bona fide holders.^" § 294. ftuorum of definite body. — "The quorum of a body may be defined to be that number of the body which when assembled in their proper place will enable them to transact their proper business, or, in other words, that number that makes the lawful body, and gives them the power to pass a law or ordinance."^** When the statute law creating it is silent as to what shall constitute a legal assembly of a definite body, the common law, both in England and in this country, is well settled that the majority of the members elect shall constitute a legal body.'^^ This rule of the common law can not be county collector. The action of the board was sustained) ; Spaulding v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. 134; s. c. 47 N. W. 444; In re Strahl, 16 Iowa 369. See also, Koontz v. Burgess &c., 64 Md. 134; s. c. 20 Atl. 1039; Lockhart v. City of Troy, 48 Ala. 579; Rex v. Mayor &c., 8 Mod. Ill; People V. Hopson, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 574; People v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375; Hamlin v. Dingman, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 61; Olmsted v. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; Riddle v. Bedford Co., 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 386; Lever v. Mc- Glachlin, 28 Wis. 364; Cushing v. Frankfort, 57 Maine 521. As to ap- pointment of an officer by less than a quorum, see § 296, post. It was held in a well considered case in England that an act done by a defi- nite body was not invalid because officers de jure and officers de facto united in the doing of it: Scadding V. Lorant, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 16. See and compare: Intendant &c. v. Sorrell, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 49; Will- cock Munic. Corp., § 68; Parry v. 1 Smith — ly Berry, 1 Comyns 269; Green v. May- or &c., 1 Burr. 127; Rex v. West- wood, 4 B. & C. 781, 799, 818; Rex v. Head, 4 Burr. 2515; Hoblyn v. King, 6 Bro. P. C. 511. ''a Burt v. Winona &c. R. Co., 31 Minn. 472; s. c. 18 N. W. 285, 289; Tinsley v. Kirby, 17 S. C. 1, 8; Carle- ton V. People, 10 Mich. 249; People V. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520, 540; Welch V. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon 130; Hildreth's Heirs v. Mclntire's Devisees, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 206. Cf. State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; § 184, ante. ^^ Town of Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa 12 (by Dillon, C. J.). ■» Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1121. See § 184, ante. ™Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 65 Md. 125, 149; s. c. 4 Atl. 116. "Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 65 Md. 125; s. c. 4 Atl. 116; Blacket v. Bliz- ard, 9 B. & C. 851; Barnert v. Mayor &c., 48 N. J. L. 395; s. c. 16 Atl. 15; State v. Farr, 47 N. J. 294 PUBLIC COliPORATlONS. 290 abrogated by an act of the municipal body itself, unauthorized by statute or charter:'- it can neither enlarge nor diminish the num- ber required to constitute a quorum. Thus^, in the case already cited, where one of the co-ordinate branches of a city council adopted a rule prohibiting action unless two-thirds of its members were present, it was held that an ordinance might be repealed at a meeting consisting of a majority only, and this although the charter contained a pro- vision authorizing those bodies "to settle their rules of procedure."^^ Where a statute provides that a majority of the members elected shall be a quorum, the removal of an alderman from his ward is to be deemed a resignation, after which a quorum will consist of a majority of the remaining members.'^* Where the mayor has a right to vote only in case of a tie, he is not to be counted a member in determining whether a quorum is present.'^^ Where the rules may be suspended by a three-fourths vote, four out of six may suspend, one of the latter having resigned and one being absent.'^^ It is immaterial that some of the town trustees voting were ineligible where the vote was unani- mous and the quorum was composed of eligible persons. '^^ L. 208; s. c. 4 Atl. 323; State v. Mil- ler, 45 N. J. L. 251; 5 Dane Abr. 150; Dartmouth v. County Com'rs, 153 Mass. 12; s. c. 26 N. E. 425; Ex parte Willocks, 7 Cowen (N. Y.) 402, 410; Rex v. Devonshire, 1 B. & C. 609; Rex v. Headley, 7 B. & C. 496; Rex V. Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810; Rex V. Bower, 1 B. & C. 492. One who has a right to vote only in case of a tie can not be counted in determin- ing whether there is a quorum pres- ent: State V. Porter, 113 Ind. 79; s. c. 14 N. B. 883. In the New Eng- land towns, where the corporate power is primarily exercised by the citizens at large, any number, though less than a majority of the whole, when assembled at a legal meeting, have the power to act for the whole, unless otherwise provided by law: Damon v. Inhabitants &c., 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345, 355; Common- wealth V. Inhabitants &c., 2 Pick. (Mass.) 70; State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450; Madison &c. Church v. Baptist Church, 5 Robt. (N. Y.) 649; Will- iams v. Inhabitants &c., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75; Inhabitants &c. v. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 148. '- "Of the power of the general as- sembly to fix and determine what should be a quorum there can be no possible doubt:" Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 65 Md. 125, 147; s. c. 4 Atl. 116. ^^ "It would be an anomaly in- deed," said the court, "if the coun- cil itself could deprive itself of the right that it admittedly had:" Heis- kell V. Mayor &c., 65 Md. 125, 152; s. c. 4 Atl. 116. « State V. Orr, 61 Ohio St. 384; s. c. 56 N. E. 14. '^ City of Somerset v. Smith, 20 Ky. L. 1488; s. c. 49 S. W. 456. "City of North Platte v. North Platte Water Works Co., 56 Neb. 403; s. c. 76 N. W. 906. "Lewis V. Town of Brandenburg, 20 Ky. L. 1011; s. c. 47 S. W. 832; 48 S. W. 978. As to what constitutes a quorum, and validity of acts of council, see State v. Yates, 19 Mont. 239; s. c. 47 Pac. 1004; Col- lopy V. Cloherty, 18 Ky. L. 1061; s. c. 39 S. W. 431; Tappan v. Long 291 PUBLIC liOARDS. § 295 § 295. The same subject continued. — But it is also essential to the validity of action upon a proposition submitted to the board that a majority of all the members qualified to vote in the particular instance shall be present; and members having a direct pecuniary interest in the matter adverse to the municipality which they repre- sent are excluded in counting a quorum. '^^ The physical presence of a sufficient number constitutes a legal quorum. Thus, where half of the members of a board in regular session for the purpose of choos- ing an officer, after several hundred ineffectual ballots, withdrew from the place of balloting and took places among the bystanders, but without leaving the room, it was held that the quorum was not broken, although they refused to vote and protested against further action.''^ § 296. The same subject continued — An exception to the rule. — The principle that upholds the acts of de facto officers prevails over the rule requiring the presence of a quorum for the transaction of business by public bodies. The charter of the city of Detroit pro- vides for the designation by the common council of the aldermen in each ward to the election districts therein, and also for the ap- pointment of qualified electors in each district, who with the alder- men shall act as chairmen respectively of the board of inspectors and of registration in these districts. These appointments must be made at least two weeks previous to a general election. At the last meeting of the council prior to a general election when these appoint- ments could lawfully he made, the minority faction of the council withdrew, and the majority, though not constituting a quorum, pro- Branch &c., 59 N. J. L. 371; s. c. 35 est is clearly set forth by Judge Atl. 1070. A resolution adopted at a Cooley in Steckert v. City of East meeting when a majority of the Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104. As a general whole number of the council is not rule acts done by less than a quorum present is void under code of Iowa: are void: State v. Trustees &c., 22 Cascaden v. City of Waterloo, 106 Ohio St. 288; Pimental v. City of San Iowa 673; s. c. 77 N. W. 333. Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; McCracken "* "Perhaps the only recognized ex- v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591; ception to this rule is the case where City of Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. the body or board is permitted to fix 315; Ferguson v. Crittenden Co., 6 the compensation of its members: Ark. 479; Price v. Grand Rapids &c. Board &c. v. Hall, 47 Wis. 208; s. c. 2 R. Co., 13 Ind. 58. As to presump- N. W. 291; Pickett v. School Dist., 25 tions in favor of a quorum, see Citi- Wis. 551; United Brethren Church v. zens' &c. Ins. Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen Vandusen, 37 Wis. 54; Walworth (Mass.) 217 (private corporations). Bank v. Farmers' Loan &c. Co., 16 '''State v. Vanosdal, 131 Ind. 388; Wis. 629; Coles v. Trustees &c., 10 s. c. 31 N. E. 79. See Beach Priv. Wend. (N. Y.) 659. The distinction Corp., §§ 276, 295. between a remote and a direct inter- § 297 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 292 eeeded to make the appointments. The court held that the acts of the officers thus aj^pointed were valid, as they were officers de facto, but that the council would be compelled by mandamus to designate immediately, at a lawful meeting, the chairmen of the different boards of inspectors to take the place of those illegally appointed at the former meeting.^** § 297. The same subject continued — Special charter provisions. — Where a charter provided that no ordinance or resolution should be passed except by a majority of all the members elected, and one of the members resigned after election, it was held that a bare majority of those remaining was not empowered to act.^^ But if the majority is constituted a quorum to do business "at all meetings" of the board, such a number may organize and act at the first meeting, as well as at any subsequent meeting, although it is provided that "the board," etc., shall assemble for the purpose of organization.^^ The power of removing certain officers was conferred upon a city council, to be exercised "by a vote of two-thirds of that body," and the court inclined to the opinion that (aside from the French text of the charter, which disposed of any doubt) only two-thirds of the body as legally constituted by the presence of a quorum was required.^ ^ But where the language was that "the com- mon council, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members thereof," might order, etc., two-thirds of the whole number was declared necessary to make a valid order.** And where a charter requires a two-thirds vote of the members of a council on certain measures, and the body is composed of a president and six others, five members must concur.*^ § 298. Quorums and majorities further considered — The rule in England. — It is not yet settled by the authorities whether the busi- ness of a common council or other governing board can be conducted by a bare majority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum, or whether the passage of a measure requires the assent of a majority ™ Dingwall v. Common Council, 82 "^ City of Oakland v. Carpentier, Mich. 568; s. c. 46 N. W. 938. See 13 Cal. 540. also, as to acts of de facto councils, '^^ Warnock v. City of Lafayette, 4 § 293, ante; and of de facto officers La. An. 419. and agents generally, § 291, ante. "* City of Logansport v. Legg, 20 " City of San Francisco v. Hazen, Ind. 315. See also, State v. Porter, 5 Cal. 169; McCracken v. City of 113 Ind. 79; s. c. 14 N. E. 883. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591; Pimental "^Whitney v. Common Council &c., V. City of San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351. 69 Mich. 189; s. c. 37 N. W. 184, 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, n. 293 PUBLIC J50AEDS. § 299 of those present where more than a quorum are in attendance. Baron Martin, in delivering his opinion in Gosling v. Veley,**'' adopted and explained a remark by Lord Mansfield*^ suggesting a distinction between elections and the transaction of other corporate business. "It is clear law," said the baron, " * * * that for the transaction of business, — namely, making a law, imposing a tax, making a by- law, in fact, transacting any business whatever, — there must be, first, a lawful meeting, and secondly, a vote of the majority ; and unless the majority votes for the law, tax or by-law, it is not carried." And it was accordingly held that a valid church rate could not be made at a vestry meeting where the majority of those present refrained from voting.^^ § 299. The same subject continued — Decisions in the United States. — The distinction noticed in the preceding section has been recognized and applied in election cases by the supreme courts of Ohio®^ and Illinois.^'* In a recent case in Indiana®^ it appeared that a resolution was introduced at a meeting of a common council for the adoption of the report of a committee relating to lighting the city. Three of the six members composing the council, all being present, voted in favor of the resolution, but the other three declined to vote, and the mayor declared that it was adopted. The court sustained this view, and said: "The rule is that where there is a quorum present, and a majority of the quorum vote in favor of a measure, it will prevail, although an equal number should refrain from voting. It is not the majority of the whole number of members present that is required; all that is requisite is a majority of the number of mem- bers required to constitute a quorum."'*- The same doctrine is ^= 4 H. L. Cas. 679, 740. would hesitate to affirm that the res- " In Rex v. Monday, Cowp. 530, olution was duly passed; and it can 538. make no difference whether four or *" Gosling v. Veley, 4 H. L. Cas. 679. six members are present, since it is "' State V. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227. always the vote of the majority of "" Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137. the quorum that is effective. The " Rushville Gas Co. v. City of mere presence of inactive members Rushville, 121 Ind. 206; s. c. 23 N. E. does not impair the right of the ma- 72; 6 L. R. A. 315. jority of the quorum to proceed with " Rushville Gas Co. v. City of the business of the body. If members Rushville, 121 Ind. 206; s. c. 23 N. present desire to defeat a measure E. 72 ; 6 L. R. A. 315. The court con- they must vote against it, for inac- tinued: — "If there had been four tion will not accomplish their pur- members of the common council pose. Their silence is acquiescence, present, and three had voted for the rather than opposition. Their re- resolution and one had voted against fusal to vote is, in effect, a declara- it, or had not voted at all, no one tion that they consent that the ma- 300 PUBLIC CORPORATION'S. 294 affirmed in New Hampshire ;"^ while in Tennessee^* the opposite ex- treme is reached in holding that a majority of all present is necessary even to a valid election. § 300. Further application of majority principle. — Where author- ity to do an act of a public nature is given by law to three or more per- sons, if the act is merely ministerial in its character, a majority at least must concur and unite in the performance of it; but they may act separately and need not be convened in a body or notified so to convene for that purpose; but if the act is one which requires the exercise of discretion and judgment, in which case it is usually termed a judicial act, unless special provision is otherwise made, the persons to whom the authority is given must meet and confer together and be present when the act is performed, in which ease a majority may perform the act, or, after all have been notified to meet, a majority having met will constitute a quorum or sufficient number to perform the act. As a general rule, the act may then be legally done by the direction or with the concurrence of a majority of the quorum so assembled.^^ jority of the quorum may act for the body of which they are members." Judge Dillon, in referring to this case, says: — "It deserves further consideration whether this result is consistent with the majority rule ap- plicable to definite bodies:" Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 292, n. The court is silent as to any distinction between elections and business pro- ceedings, although it cites cases in support of its decision where the dif- ference was clearly recognized. "^ Attorney-General v. Shepard, 62 N. H. 383. "* Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 6 L. R. A. 308; 17 Am. St. 870. '^Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn. 192; Damon v. Inhabitants &c., 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345, 354, which makes a dis- tinction between committees ap- pointed by a public corporation of its own members and committees of persons not members, requiring unanimity in the latter case; Bal- lard v. Davis, 31 Miss. 525; Petrie v. Doe, 30 Miss. 698; ^ rindley v. Bar- ker, 1 Bos. & P. 229; Keeler v. Frost, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 400; Perry v. Ty- nen, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 137; In re Rogers, 7 Cowen (N. Y.) 526; Astor V. New York, 62 N. Y. 567, 576, 580; In re Beekman, 31 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 16; In re Sewer in Thirty-fourth St., 31 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 42. Upon the death of one, where no provision ex- ists for filling the vacancy, the power vests in the survivors: People v. Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. 291; citing Peo- ple v. Palmer, 52 N. Y. 84; and dis- tinguishing People V. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375. The presumption is that all were notified and that all met: Astor V. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. 567, 576; Young v. Buckingham, 5 Ohio 485, 489; Charles v. Mayor &c., 27 N. J. L. 203. See also, Jones v. Inhabit- ants &c., 9 Pick. (Mass.) 146; In- habitants &c. V. Cole, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 232, 244; Keyes v. Inhabitants &c., 17 Pick. (Mass.) 273; Kingsbury v. School Dist, 12 Met. (Mass.) 99; Crommett v. Pearson, 18 Maine 344; Jenkins v. School Dist., 39 Maine 220; Green v. Miller, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 295 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 301 § 301. Execution of authority vested in two persons. — Where power is conferred upon two persons, or where a larger number has by death or vacancy become reduced to two, nothing can be done with- out the consent of both."" Such is the general rule; yet there are au- thorities which hold clearly that to prevent a failure of justice one may act alone without consulting the other; as, if one be dead or inter- ested or absent when immediate action is necessary. '*'' Moreover, the common presumption in favor of the performance of official duty dispenses with affirmative proof that the act of one was assented to by the other, and it has been held that this presumption can be re- butted only by the testimony of him whose assent was denied."^ So far, also, as their duties are ministerial, it is competent for one to act as the agent or deputy of both with the other's consent; which is only an application of the general rule that one of a board may be au- thorized to act in behalf of the whole in the execution of whatever measure they may resolve upon."^ § 302. Presiding officer. — In England"" and generally in the United States it is one of the duties of the mayor to preside at cor- 39; King v. Beeston, 3 T. R. 592; Guthrie v. Armstrong, 5 B. & Aid. 628 ; Keyser v. School Dist., 35 N. H. 477; Wolcott V. Town of Wolcott, 19 Vt. 37; Throop Public Officers, § 106; McCoy V. Curtice, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 17, 19; Horton v. Harrison, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 176; State v. Guiney, 26 Minn. 313; s. c. 3 N. W. 977; Schenck V. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175, 187; People v. Harrington, 63 Cal. 257; Walker V. Rogan, 1 Wis. 597; In re Broad- way Widening, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 572; Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178; Somerset Co. v. Parson, 105 Pa. St. 360; Cooper v. Lampeter Tp., 8 Watts (Pa.) 125; Commonwealth v. Commissioners, 9 Watts (Pa.) 466, 471; Baltimore Turnpike, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 481; Commissioners v. Leckey, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 166; McCready v. Guardians, 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 94; Cald- well V. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755; Crist V. Brownsville Tp., 10 Ind. 461; Gal- lup V. Tracy, 25 Conn. 10, holding that a town committee to stake out oyster grounds, having no fixed place of acting or consulting, no record. no clerk, and no time and mode of proceeding, need not be assembled to act, and may act by a majority of such as are competent. ■"Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178; Pell v. Ulmar, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 500; New York Life Ins. Co. V. Staats, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 570; Per- ry V. Tynen, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 137; Powell V. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 396. "6 Vin. Abr., tit. Coroner (H.), pi. 7; 14 Vin. Abr., tit. Joint and Several (B.), pi. 1; Rex v. Warring- ton, 1 Salk. 152; Naylor v. Sharpless, 2 Mod. 23. And see Auditor Curie's Case, 11 Coke 2; Rich v. Player, 2 Show. 262; Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178, 183. '^ Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178. ''^Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 178; People v. Commissioners, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 599. See also. People V. Newell, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 86; s. c. rev'd 7 N. Y. 9, but not on this point. See § 286 et seq., ante, on delegation of powers. 100 "Prior to the Municipal Corpo- § 303 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 296 porate meetings; but he has not, in virtue of his office alone, any right to preside, which in all cases depends upon a construction of the charter, organic law or constituent act of the corporation.^"^ When the charter provides that the city council shall elect one of their number to be the president of the board, but does not prescribe the number of votes necessary to a choice, the votes of a majority of a quorum duly met are sufficient.^"^ The presiding officer, although he be the mayor, can not vote unless he is a member of the body, or is authorized by the charter to give the casting vote in case of a tie.^°^ A right to preside over the meeting of the council is a "fran- chise," and if denied, a remedy may be had by quo warranto or infor- mation in that nature; but a bill in equity is not a proper proceeding for that purpose unless so provided by statute.^"* Where the statute rations Act of 1835 the powers and duties of mayors, including the right to preside, depended upon charters, regal and parliamentary, usages, cus- toms, etc.:" Dillon, J., in Cochran V. McCleary, 22 Iowa 75, 82; citing 4 Jacob's Law Diet. 264, 265; 2 Bouv. Law Diet. 150. ^"^ Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa 75. ^°- State v. Farr, 47 N. J. L. 208; s. c. 4 Atl. 323. In Dugan v. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 383; s. c. 1 Atl. 751, the point was raised that the organiza- tion of the board, including the se- lection of a presiding officer, is es- sential to the valid exercise of its other functions, but the question was left undetermined by the court. "'City of Carrollton v. Clark, 21 111. App. 74; Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137; s. c. 55 Am. R. 405; Carroll V. Wall, 35 Kan. 36; s. c. 10 Pac. 1; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250; Town of Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa 12; People v. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520; State v. Gray, 23 Neb. 365; s. c. 36 N. W. 577; Hildreth v. Mcln- tire, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 206; Rex V. Westwood, 4 B. & C. 781, 799; Rex V. Head, 4 Burr. 2515; Rex v. Croke, Cowp. 26; Green v. Mayor &c., 1 Burr. 127, 131; Parry v. Berry, Comyns 269. Where the charter makes the president a member of the council with the right to vote in every case and a casting vote in case of a tie, he may vote on a question and give an additional vote if there is a tie: Whitney v. Common Coun- cil &c., 69 Mich. 189; s. c. 37 N. W. 184; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, n. ^•"Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa 75, where the question is discussed by Judge Dillon; Commonwealth v. Arrison, 15 S. & R. (Pa.) 127, 130; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 482; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162, where the right of a re- corder of a municipality, who was ex officio president of its council, to vote in cases where there was not a tie, was tested on quo warranto; Rex V. Mayor &c., 1 Ld. Raym. 426; Com- monwealth V. Kepner, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 510; Tappan v. Gray, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 259; Commonwealth v. Com- mercial Bank, 28 Pa. St. 383, 389; Southern Plank R. Co. v. Hixon, 5 Ind. 165; Markle v. Wright, 13 Ind. 548; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358; Attorney-General V. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 371; People v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; People V. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Pea- body V. Flint, 6 Allen (Mass.) 52; Mozley v. Alston, 1 Phill. 790; Lord V. Governor &c., 2 Phill. 740; Hag- ner v. Heyberger, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 297 PUBLIC BOARDS. § 303 requires all appointments of city officers to be made by a majority vote of the whole number elected, in case of a tie the mayor has no right to cast the deciding vote,^"" Where the charter makes the mayor a member of the council its action in dismissing a public officer does not require the consent of the mayor.^°" A statute making a member of the council ineligible to any office, employment or agency chosen directly by the council, does not prevent the council from electing one of its members to fill a vacancy in the office of mayor, where such member has resigned before the expiration of his term.^"'^ § 303. The same subject continued. — The functions of the pre- siding officer are as official as any part of the meeting of the board, and can not be exercised by one who is not a member.^"^ It is his duty to announce the result of a vote according to the fact, and his de- cision may be attacked collaterally ;^''® and mandamus will lie to com- pel him to reverse his decision illegally declaring a resolution carried, and to declare it lost, unless the resolution is itself illegal upon its face.^^° He can not arbitrarily adjourn a meeting in defiance of the majority present. ^^^ When the mayor has a right to appoint by and with the consent of the council and also to vote in case of a tie, he may give a casting vote to confirm his own appointment. ^^^ And the declaration of a presiding officer that a resolution is 104 ; Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N. Y. the council has no power to elect a 320; Hughes v. Parker, 20 N. H. 58; mayor pro tern, when the mayor is Ex parte Strahl, 16 Iowa 369; Upde- absent from a council meeting on graff V. Crans, 47 Pa. St. 103; Facey account of sickness, though not ab- V. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527. The remedy sent from the city: Blair v. People, (by quo warranto) does not exist as 181 111. 460; s. c. 54 N. E. 1024. When a matter of right, and in offices of mayor a constituent part of coun- short duration there is not much to cil, — see State v. Yates, 19 Mont, favor interference in ordinary cases: 239; s. c. 47 Pac. 1004. People V. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200; s. ^«* State v. Kirk, 46 Conn. 395, 398. c. 26 N. W. 879, where it was held ^'^ City of Chariton v. Holliday, 60 that a charter providing that the Iowa 391; s. c. 14 N. W. 775; State v. common council should have power Fagan, 42 Conn. 32. to determine contested elections of "" Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich, its members made the decision of 328; s. c. 48 N. W. 577. But the rem- that body conclusive and not subject edy by mandamus is discretionary, to review. and in this case it was denied on ac- ^"^ State V. Alexander, 107 Iowa count of the patent illegality of the 177; s. c. 77 N. W. 841. resolution. ^•^ Doherty v. City of Galveston, 19 "^ Dingwall v. Common Council Tex. Civ. App. 708; s. c. 48 S. W. 804. &c., 82 Mich. 568; s. c. 46 N. W. 938. ""Commonwealth v. Corcoran, 9 '^Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36; s. c. Kulp (Pa.) 507. Under Starr & Cur- 10 Pac. 1. tis Ann. Stat. 111., ch. 24, art. 2, § 4, § 304 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 298 adopted has been held to be a casting vote in its favor, if the other votes are equally divided ;^^^ otherwise, where the vote is required to be by ballot."* When the chairman announces the appointment of a secretary in the presence of the meeting, and the secretary serves without objection from any one, the act of the chairman is the act of the meeting.^^^ Where the president of the board is vested with power to appoint a committee and does so his action is not nullified by a resolution of the board continuing an old committee. ^^^ § 304. Commitment for contempt — Whitcomb's case. — By the law of England a town or city council had no power without express act of parliament to commit for contempt of its authority. ^^'' The only case directly in point in this country, so far as the author's reading goes, is Whitcomb's case,^^^ decided in 1876 by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. A witness having been duly summoned to testify before a special committee of the common council of Boston, appointed with full powers to investigate and report upon certain charges of corruption against its members, declined to answer a ques- tion relating to the matter, and was committed for contempt by a regu- lar order of the council. It was held that the council was neither a legislature nor a court, nor in the accurate use of language was it vested with any judicial functions whatever, although the charter gave it authority to decide upon all questions relative to the qualifications, election and returns of its members, and that a statute conferring power to imprison and punish without right of appeal or trial by jury was unconstitutional.^^® "^Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137; "^ State v. McKee, 20 Or, 120; s. c. Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rush- 25 Pac. 292. ville, 121 Ind. 206; s. c. 23 N. E. 72; "'' Buckton v. People, 12 Colo. App. 6 L. R. A. 315. Contra, Hornung v. 86; s. c. 54 Pac. 871. State, 116 Ind. 458; s. c. 19 N. E. 151, "' Grant Corp. 84-86; Parke, B., in where a candidate, being a member Kielley v. Carson, 4 Moore P. C. 63, of the board, voted for himself, thus 89; Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 P. making a tie, and the chairman, er- & W. (Pa.) 253. roneously assuming that the vote "'*120 Mass. 118. was valid, declared him elected, and "" Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118. there was no dissent. See also, In re Mason, 43 Fed. 510, "^ Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. which holds that the power to pun- 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 6 L. R. A. 308; ish for contempt is not an incident 17 Am. St. 870. Cf. Small v. Orne, to the mere exercise of judicial func- 79 Maine 78; s. c. 8 Atl. 152, where, tions. In In re Hammel, 9 R. I. 248, under a particular statutory provl- upon habeas corpus it appeared that sion, a declaration by the presiding the petitioner was summoned to tes- officer was deemed a casting vote, tify before a town council on a mat- though the voting was by ballot. ter pending before that body, and, refusing to take an oath or aflirma- 299 PUBLIC BOARDS. 30; § 305. Yeas and nays. — A provision in a charter that tho yeas and nays ''shall" be called and published was held by the supreme court of New York to be directory merely and not indispensable to the validity of a vote.^-*' But the weight of authority and reason is decidedly in favor of the view that such a provision is mandatory, and that proceedings in contravention thereof are void.^^^ And where the record showed the names of those present at the opening of the meeting, and that a certain resolution was "adopted unani- mously on call," it was declared to be an insufficient compliance with a requirement that the votes "shall be entered at large on the tion, he was ordered to be committed to jail for contempt of court. The proceeding was declared to be illegal for the reason that no definite term of punishment was named. The court cited no authorities and ex- pressly refrained from passing upon "other questions raised." A city charter gave a committee of the com- mon council power to issue a sum- mons to any person to appear and testify in any matter pending before it, and provided a penalty of impris- onment for refusal to obey the sum- mons or to "answer any proper or pertinent question," but contained no express provision authorizing the committee to compel the production of books and papers. It was held that there was no power to commit for contempt for refusing to produce them: People v. Van Tassel, 19 N. Y. S. 643; s. c. 64 Hun (N. Y.) 444; affirming s. c. 17 N. Y. S. 938. ^=° Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 9; s. c. affirmed 2 Denio (N. Y.) 323. ^^'Steckert v. City of Bast Sagi- naw, 22 Mich. 104 (where Judge Coo- ley said: — "The purpose, among oth- er things, is to make the members of the common council feel the respon- sibility of their action when these important measures are upon their passage, and to compel each member to bear his share in the responsibil- ity by a record of his action which should not afterwards be open to dis- pute"); Town of Olin v. Meyers, 55 Iowa 209; s. c. 7 N. W. 509; Cutler v. Town of Russellville, 40 Ark. 105; s. c. 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 414; Tracey v. People, 6 Colo. 151; s. c. 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 373; Rich v. City of Chicago, 59 111. 286; Morri- son V. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219; Sulli- van v. City of Leadville, 11 Colo. 483; s. c. 18 Pac. 736; City of Lo- gansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15 ; s. c. 17 N. E. 587 (where, however, the reason for the rule was held not to apply); Coffin v. City of Portland, 43 Fed. 411. See also, Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111. 297; Supervisors &c. V. People, 25 111. 163; McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457 (holding that a provision requiring ordinances to be passed by "a majority of all the aldermen," that is, of all the mem- bers elect, would necessitate the re- cording of the number if not the names of the voters on each side) ; City of Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90. In such cases a single vote by yeas and nays on several ordinances grouped together is not a passage of any of them: Sullivan v. Pausch, 5 Ohio C. C. 196. The New York case (Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 9) is cited and approved in City of St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; but here the yeas and nays were not required and the cases are easily distinguish- able. City of Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa 282; In re Carlton Street, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 497; In re Mount Mor- ris Square, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 14, 20; El- mendorf v. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 693. § 306 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 300 niiniites."^^^ But the omission may be supplied by an order nunc pro tune causing the entry to be made.^^^ If the record fails to dis- close that any other members were present than those who voted "yea," it need not state that the nays were called for.^-*, A charter pro- viding that a vote shall "in all cases" be taken by yeas and nays and entered at length upon the journal does not apply to votes taken upon motions to adjourn.^ ^^ § 306. Parliamentary law. — In speaking of the action of county boards it was said: — "It will not do to apply to the orders and reso- lutions of such bodies nice verbal criticism and strict parliamentary distinctions, because the business is transacted generally by plain men not familiar with parliamentary law. Therefore their proceedings must be liberally construed in order to get at the real intent and mean- ing of the body."^^" And it was declared in another case that if muni- cipal bodies exercising legislative functions pursue a method of pro- ceeding understood by themselves which arrives at substantial results, their action should not be overthrown upon any technical rules or strict construction of parliamentary law.^^'^ It was held to be no objection to the validity of an assessment that the order did not receive, in either branch of the city council, two several readings before its passage, as required by the rules. "It is within the power of all deliberative bodies," said the court, "to abolish, modify or waive their own rules, intended as security against hasty or inconsiderate action."^^* Where a rule of the council provides that on the indefi- "'Non constat that all who met cey v. People, 6 Colo. 151; s. c. 4 Am. remained through the proceedings: & Eng. Corp. Cas. 373. Steckert v. City of East Saginaw, 22 "* Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76 Mich. 104. A formal call of the roll Iowa 220; s. c. 40 N. W. 818; 23 Am. is not required if the votes are oth- & Eng. Corp. Cas. 126. erwise ascertained and recorded: ^-'^ City of Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo, 223; s. c. Wis. 204; s. c. 6 N. W. 503. 15 Pac. 399. ^-« Hark v. Gladwell, 49 Wis. 172; '-'City of Logansport v. Crockett, s. c. 5 N. W. 323; quoted and ap- 64 Ind. 319; Vawter v. Franklin Col- proved in Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. lege, 53 Ind. 88; Mayhew v. District Ashland Co., 81 Wis. 1; s. c. 50 N. of Gay Head, 13 Allen (Mass.) 129; W. 937. Commissioners v. Hearne, 59 Ala. '-^But the effect of what is done 371; Musselman v. Manly, 42 Ind. must be gathered from the record 462; City of Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. and not from testimony of members 90. The fact must appear upon the as to their understanding of it: face of the record, and can not be Whitney v. Common Council &c., 69 proved aliunde: In re Carlton Street, Mich. 189; s. c. 37 N. W. 184; 30 Am. 16 Hun (N. Y.) 497. The record is & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453. n. not supported by presumption : Tra- '=^ Holt v. City Council, 127 Mass. 301 l'ri5Ll(: J'.OAKDS. 307 nite postponemont of a question it shall not be acted upon or con- sidered again at the same session it prevents action on a question substantially the same at the same session.^^" Failure of the council to conform to the rules of parliamentary usage will not invalidate their proceedings if the requisite number have agreed to a particular measure.^"'"' § 307. Reconsideration and rescission — General power. — It is the undoubted rij^lit of corporate bodies, unless clearly restrained by legislative enactment, to reconsider a vote as often as they see fit, or to rescind the same, provided vested rights are not disturbed, up to the time when by a conclusive vote, accepted as such by itself, a determination has been reached.^ ^^ They may adopt rules as to the time when reconsideration may be moved ;^^^ and it is not neces- sary to the validity of a resolution to reconsider that it should be moved by one who voted originally with the majority ;^^^ and a board of aldermen which has indefinitely postponed action on a resolution of the common council can afterwards rescind that action and pass the resolution. ^^* § 308. The same subject continued. — An order may be rescinded by implication ; as where a meeting voted to proceed to an election of a city attorney by ballot, and subsequently made an appointment 408, 411; citing Bennett v. City o£ New Bedford, 110 Mass. 433. '-"■' Zeiler v. Central R. Co., 84 Md. 304; s. c. 35 Atl. 932. '™Mann v. City of Le Mars, 109 Iowa 251; s. c. 80 N. W. 327. "• Higgins v. Curtis, 39 Kan. 283; s. c. 18 Pac. 207; State v. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J. L. 463; State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; s. c. 22 Atl. 686; 55 Am. R. 65; State v. Chapman, 44 Conn. 595; Baker v. Cushman, 127 Mass. 105; State v. Poster, 7 N. J. L. 101 ; State v. Justice, 24 N. J. L. 413; State v. Crosley, 36 N. J. L. 425; Mayor &c. V. State, 30 N. J. L.-521; Bigelow v. Hillman, 37 Maine 52; Common- wealth V. City of Pittsburgh, 14 Pa. St. 177; Reiff v. Connor. 10 Ark. 241; People V. Mills, 32 Hun (N. Y.) 459; State V. Hoyt, 2 Or. 246; Red v. City Council &c., 25 Ga. 386; Road Case, 17 Pa. St. 71, 75; City of New Or- leans V. St. Louis Church, 11 La. An. 244; Dey v. Lee, 4 Jones L. (N. C.) 238; Tucker v. Justices &c., 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) 434; Bstey v. Starr, 56 Vt. 690, where a town meeting re- scinded a vote authorizing a sub- scription in aid of a railroad, no sub- scription having actually been made; Stoddard v. Oilman, 22 Vt. 568; Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass. 230. "' State V. Womack, 4 Wash. 19; s. c. 29 Pac. 939. ™ People V. Common Council &c., 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 11. They may re- consider at an adjourned meeting a vote taken at a previous meeting: Supervisors &c. v. Horton, 75 Iowa 271; s. c. 39 N. W. 394; People v. Common Council &c., 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 11; Cassidy v. City of Bangor, 61 Maine 434. '"* Hough V. City of Bridgeport, 57 Conn. 290; s. c. 18 Atl. 102. § 309 PUBLIC COIM'OKATIONS. 302 by resolution viva voce.^^^ A committee appointed by a board for the purpose of making a contract on its behalf acquires no vested right and may be deprived of its power by subsequent action of the board ;^^^ and a town school committee may reconsider its vote elect- ing a superintendent of schools at the same meeting, and before it has been communicated to the person so elected. ^^'^ A resolution adopted at a meeting when such action was illegal may be cured by subsequent valid proceedings in consummation thereof.^^^ § 309. Power to reconsider and rescind qualified. — As intimated in the preceding section, when the rights of third parties have accrued under proceedings of a public body they can not be affected by a declaration of its change of mind. Thus, a vote ratifying a contract made by town officers without due authority can not be rescinded so as to discharge the town from its obligation. ^^'' The point at which the election of a public officer by a meeting convened for that purpose passes beyond its control and becomes irrevocable has been considered in several cases. While it is universally admitted that a ballot may be set aside for some irregularity or illegality before the election is declared,^*'' it was stoutly maintained by the supreme court of errors of Connecticut that a common council, having ap- pointed an officer by ballot whom it had no power to remove, could not nullify the appointment by a mere declaration that there was error in the ballot when there was none, and by a subsequent appoint- ment of another person. ^^^ It was also held, in Maine, that after "^ It would have been more regular the chapter on Meetings and Elec- to have first formally rescinded the tions, post. previous order: State v. Chapman, ""Supervisors &c. v. Horton, 75 44 Conn. 595. In Holbrook v. Faulk- Iowa 271; s. c. 39 N. W. 394. ner, 55 N. H. 311, a school district "'Wood v. Cutter, 138 Mass. 149. meeting voted to dismiss an article ^^ State v. District Court &c., 33 in the warrant, and afterwards Minn. 235; s. c. 22 N. W. 625; 7 Am. passed a vote which was not within & Eng. Corp. Cas. 206. the scope of any article except the ^^ Brown v. Winterport, 79 Maine one rejected. The court held it to be 305; s. c. 9 Atl. 844. See also, in invalid (for another reason also), point, Sanborn v. School Dist., 12 and simply remarked that "no at- Minn. 17. tempt appears to have been made to ""State v. Phillips, 79 Maine 506; reconsider the vote dismissing the s. c. 11 Atl. 274; Putnam v. Langley, . . . article." These cases may 133 Mass. 204, where the result of a evidently stand together, for the first recount, differing from the first related to the mode of proceeding, count, was acquiesced in by the meet- the latter to the proceeding itself, ing; Baker v. Cushman, 127 Mass. Neither case is cited in the opinion 105. in the other. See further, for recon- "^ State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; s. sideration, etc., at town meetings, c. 22 Atl. 686, where the authorities 303 PUBLIC BOARDS. a cit}' officer has been declared to be chosen by the board of aklermen and the declaration recorded, the board can not at an adjourned meeting held the next day, reconsider its action and choose an- other.i" § 310. The same subject continued. — Where an officer's resigna- tion is accepted by the proper board, which then confirms the mayor's nomination of a successor, the latter action is entirely inconsistent with the idea that the matter of resignation remains open for further deliberation ;^*^ and a board of county commissioners having rejected a claim duly presented to it can not, at a subsequent meeting, allow any part of it.^** Wliere by statute a vote of two-thirds of the members of a common council is necessary to pass a resolution, a are examined and adverse views crit- icized. There was a motion to pro- ceed by ballot for prosecuting attor- ney, and the court held that the an- nouncement of the result by the pre- siding officer was a finality without an express declaration by him that the relator was thereby elected. 1*= State V. Phillips, 79 Maine 506; s. c. 11 Atl. 274. But a motion to re- consider may be adopted at a subse- quent meeting, where a legal rule of the board permits it. "All contracts implied from a resolution," said the court, "are subject to the right to change it by another resolution, passed in accordance with the rules of the board:" People v. Mills, 32 Hun (N. Y.) 459. "^ State v. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J. L. 463. Act N. J. March 20, 1860, § 5 (Revision, p. 1201, § 45), provid- ing that when two or more candi- dates for the same office have re- ceived the same number of votes at the annual meeting, the town com- mittee shall at their next meeting thereafter elect between those hav- ing an equal number of votes, unless they shall deem a special meeting advisable, and in that case shall have power to call such special meeting, as now provided by law, is manda- tory, and, the township committee having failed to elect, and ordered a special election, and caused notices to be posted, can not at a subsequent meeting rescind their action: State V. Boden, 51 N. J. L. 114; s. c. 16 Atl. 58. ^"Ryan v. Dakota Co., 32 Minn. 138; s. c. 19 N. W. 653. "A vote may be reconsidered at an adjourned meeting if it has not been so acted on that it can not thereby be ren- dered nugatory:" Mitchell v. Brown, 18 N. H. 315 (school district meet- ing). But in that case such proceed- ings had been taken in pursuance of the vote that the status quo could not be restored. A resolution once adopted and again read and ap- proved can not be repealed after the lapse of a year, and when the board has been partly changed by the retir- ing of members and the election of others, on the ground that it was er- roneously entered, upon the mere memory of the members and without notice to the parties affected there- by: Ridley v. Doughty, 85 Iowa 418; s. c. 52 N. W. 350. And a resolution authorizing the mayor to compro- mise with the claimants of certain commons by conveying the land claimed at a certain price can not be repudiated so as to affect the valid- ity of a deed given while it remained unrevoked: Dausch v. Crane, 109 Mo. 323; s. c. 19 S. W. 61. § 311 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 304 like vote is required to reconsider or rescind it, in the absence of a contrary rule of the council regulating the practice upon motions for reconsideration.^*^ But in another case, where subscriptions to stock were required to be passed by a two-thirds vote, and a proposal was made by the requisite number, it was held it might be withdrawn before acceptance, by less than a majority, and very likely by any number greater than one-third.^*^ § 311. Reconsideration distinguished from repeal. — A limitation of the power of municipal legislative bodies to reconsider their ac- tions, and the distinction between a resolution to reconsider and a vote to repeal, are illustrated in a recent decision of the supreme court of New York. An ordinance passed by the common council was vetoed by the mayor and passed over his veto. A resolution to recon- sider was thcD adopted, vetoed, and passed over the veto. It was contended that the ordinance was by these proceedings rescinded. The court said: "The ordinance in question may be repealed, but it can not be reconsidered, for the reason that when it was passed over the mayor's veto it became a law, and thereby passed beyond the power and control of the municipal council to reconsider it. According to the uniform practice of legislative bodies, where a motion to reconsider has been passed in the affirmative, the question immediately recurs upon the question reconsidered. The question reconsidered was never acted upon in this case; therefore, if the common council had the power to reconsider the ordinance, it never rescinded it, because the question reconsidered was never acted upon. There is another fatal point in this case, which is that the ordinance, when passed over the mayor's veto, could not be again reconsidered. It is a rule well settled by parliamentary law that a vote on the reconsideration of a vetoed bill can not be reconsidered again."^*^ "' Whitney v. Common Council &c., N. Y. S. 855, 858; s. c. 60 Hun (N. 69 Midi. 189; s. c. 37 N. W. 184; 30 Y.) 372; citing to the last point, Bar- Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, n.; Stock- clay Const. Man. 197; Fish Amer. dale V. Wayland School Dist., 47 Man. Pari. Law 90. See also, Sank Mich. 226; s. c. 10 N. W. 349. In the v. City of Philadelphia, 4 Brewst. case first cited it was held that a vote (Pa.) 133. But there seems to be is rendered nugatory by the passage no technical nor substantial differ- of a resolution to reconsider it, al- ence between reconsideration and though it be not afterwards re- rescission in the proceedings of town scinded. meetings. Thus, where a town voted "" Belfast &c. R. Co. v. Inhabitants to raise a tax, but at a subsequent &c., 62 Maine 148; citing Essex Turn- legal meeting, the collector having pike Corp. v. Collins, 8 Mass. 292. taken no steps in the matter, it was "'Ashton V. City of Rochester, 14 voted to "reconsider" the former 305 rUBLIC BOARDS. § 312 ^ 312. Joint assemblies of definite bodies — Constitution and pro- ceedings. — 111 England it is clearly (^stal)lislio(l that where an act is to be performed by a joint meeting of two or more definite bodies, a majority of each body is essential to constitute a legal assembly, and if, after having met, one of the integral parts withdraws while a proposition is pending, further action thereon by those remaining is invalid.^*^ But this stringent rule has been materially relaxed by some of the courts in this country. Thus, it is held in New York that although all the bodies — that is, a majority of each — must come together for consultation and deliberation, yet, when they do, the vote of the majority of persons present controls, notwithstanding one of the bodies should leave before the vote is taken.^*^ The su- preme court of Xew Hampshire has taken a more radical departure from the rule, holding in one case that a legal vote of one body to meet in convention is sufficient without the attendance of a quorum of such body at the joint meeting ;^^*' and in a later decision, that a vote by one body to meet the other, assented to by the latter, who were then in session, but with less than a quorum present, which members alone attended the convention, was equivalent to a vote to meet by both bodies.^''^ § 313. Record of meetings. — The record of the council, kept by the proper officer, except subject to the rights of the council itself to correct, is to be accepted as correct in the absence of fraud. ^^^ Min- utes may be amended by the council even after approval where no in- tervening rights have accrued.^ ^^ When the officer in charge of mu- nicipal records produces them in court as the council record they can only be impeached for fraud.^^* The minutes of a preceding meet- ing may be corrected at the next succeeding meeting in order to show yeas and nays in compliance with the statute. ^^^ A nunc pro tunc vote, the court held that the tax was first instance, see Commonwealth v. not lawfully levied: Stoddard v. Gil- Hargest, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 333. man, 22 Vt. 568. «» Beck v. Hanscom, 29 N. H. 213. ^^King V. Williams, 2 Mau. & S. "^Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H. 141; King v. Buller, 8 Bast 389; 465. King v. Miller, 6 T. R. 268. • "- Commonwealth v. Schubmehl, 3 "» Gildersleeve v. Board of Educa- Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 186. tion, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201; White- "^ Ryder's Estate v. City of Alton, side v. People, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 634; 175 111. 94; s. c. 51 N. E. 821. reversing s. c. 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; ^^ Ryder's Estate v. City of Alton, Ex parte Humphrey, 10 Wend. (N. 175 111. 94; s. c. 51 N. E. 821. Y.) 613. That all must meet in the ^'^^ Becker v. City of Henderson, 100 Ky. 450; s. c. 38 S. W. 857. 1 Smith— 20 § 313 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 306 order is competent to make the minutes speak the truth.^^® The record of a council is not binding in a quo warranto proceeding, and may be contradicted/'^^ 166 Everett v. Deal, 148 Ind, 90; s. ^" State v. Kennedy, 69 Conn. 220; c. 47 N. E. 219. s. c. 37 Atl. 503. CHAPTER X. OFFICIAL BONDS. Section 314. Official bonds — Definition. 315. What officers must give bonds. 316. Form and requisites of bond. 317. Effect of signing official bonds in blank. 318. The same subject continued. 319. Construction of courts on bonds improperly approved. 320. Defective bonds valid as com- mon-law obligations. 321. The same subject continued. 322. Time when an official bond takes effect. 323. Effect of not filing bonds with- in the time prescribed by statute. 324. The same subject continued. 325. Liability of sureties on a treas- urer's bond, 326. The same subject continued. 327. Mingling of and defalcation out of two funds. 328. Liability of sureties as affected by subsequent legislation. 329. Liability of surety when sub- sequent legislation imposes new duties of the same gen- eral character. 330. The same subject continued. 331. Liability of officer on his bond where the loss is occasioned by the act of God or the pub- lic enemy. 332. The same subject continued. 333. Duty of obligee to notify sure- ties of increased risk, etc. 334. Liability of sureties on succes- sive bonds — (a) Where dif- ferent sureties are given on each bond. Section 335. The same subject continued. 336. (b) Where funds received by the officer during his first term remain in his hands during his second term. 337. (c) When the sureties of the first term are liable for money converted or collected by the officer during his sec- ond term. 338. (d) When an officer before en- tering on his second term makes a report to or settle- ment with the proper au- thorities. 339. The same subject continued. 340. (e) Where the officer applies money received in his second term to pay deficiencies in his first term. 341. (f) Where the bond is given for a term of office or a cer- tain period of time. 342. Laches or negligence of other officers or principal. 343. Liability of sureties where ad- ditional bonds are given. 344. Liability of surety where the official occupies two or more offices. 345. Liability of surety for unofficial acts of officer. 346. The same subject continued. 347. Liability of sureties for acts done under color of office. 348. The same subject continued — Lammon v. Feusier — The doctrine of the federal su- preme court. 349. The same subject continued. (307) § 314 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 308 Section Section 350. The same subject continued — 353. Distinction between judicial The doctrine of the state and ministerial duties, courts. 354. Illustrations of the doctrine. 351. The same subject continued. 355. The same subject continued. 352. Illustrations of the doctrine. § 314. Official bonds — Definition. — Every bond which is required or authorized by statute to be executed by an officer is an official bond.^ Accordingly an official bond is a contract with the people for the faithful discharge of the official duties of the officer;^ and such a bond given by a public officer for the faithful performance of his duties is an official bond, although not in the form prescribed by statute.^ § 315. What officers must give bonds. — Those officers who receive public moneys, as well as those who from the nature of their duties receive money or property for the benefit of private individuals, or whose duties and powers bring them into conflict with the rights of individuals, or involve the seizure and disposal of the property of individuals, are generally required by statute to give bonds with sure- ties for the faithful performance of their duties.'* The Indiana statute provides that the mayor and other municipal officers therein named, including city clerk, shall, before entering on their duties, execute a bond, in such penal sum as the council shall direct, "con- ditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office and the payment of all moneys received by him according to law and the ordinances of such city." The supreme court of that state ac- cordingly held that a bond filed by a city clerk with the statutory conditions was authorized by the statute though there could be no "money received by him according to law and the ordinances of such city."^ ^ Commonwealth v. Adams, 3 Bush officer, whether judicial, executive (Ky.) 41, 46. or military, in authority under this ^ Judge Grover, in People v. Vilas, state," to take the oath of office. It 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 252; s. c. was held that municipal officers — 36 N. Y. 459. listers of taxes, for instance — are ^ Lucas V. Shepherd, 16 Ind. 368. not included in this requirement: *Throop Public Officers, § 170; Rowell v. Horton, 58 Vt. 1; s. c. 3 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 297; Atl. 906. A town may lawfully re- Glover Corp. 305; Grant Corp. 76. quire any of its officers to furnish, ■^Middleton v. State, 120 Ind. 166; bonds with sureties that he will s. c. 22 N. E. 123; construing § 3530 faithfully perform the duties of his Burns R. S. Ind. 1901. The Ver- office: Morrell v. Sylvester, 1 Greenl. mont constitution requires "every (Maine) 248. 309 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 3 TO § 316. Form and requisites of bond. — Where a statute or charter provides for the filing of an ollieial bond it almost invariably states the requisites of the bond; but a substantial compliance with the stat- ute or charter is all that is necessary/ unless the statute or charter expressly declares that it shall follow the exact wording of the stat- ute or charter.'' And it has been repeatedly held that a defect in the acknowledgment of the bond, or a failure to approve or acknowl- edge it, does not release the principal or surety ; and where the bond has been approved or acknowledged before an officer having no au- thority to approve or acknowledge it, the principal or surety is not released by reason of this irregularity from liability on the bond.® § 317. Eifect of signing official bonds in blank. — A party execut- ing a bond knowing that there are blanks in it to be filled up by inserting particular names or other words necessary to make it a perfect instrument must be considered as agreeing that the blanks may be thus filled up after he has executed the bond. If the party signing the paper shall insert in the appropriate places the amount of the penalty, or the names of the sureties, or any other thing he may deem of importance as affecting his interest, he may in that way protect himself against being bound otherwise than as he shall thus specify. But if, relying upon the good faith of the principal, the surety shall permit him to have possession of a bond signed in blank, the surety will. have clothed the principal with an apparent authority to fill up the blanks at his discretion, in any appropriate manner consistent with the nature of the obligation to be given ; so that, as against the obligee receiving the bond without notice or negligence, and in good faith, the surety will be estopped to allege that he exe- cuted the instrument with a reservation or upon a condition in respect of the filling of such blanks ; and this whether the blanks to be filled have reference to the penalty of the bond, the names of co- sureties or other matter.^ " Tevis V. Randall, 6 Cal. 632. 22 Mich. 461; Green v. Wardwell, 17 ^People V. Holmes, 2 Wend. (N. 111. 278; State v. Blair, 32 Ind. 313; Y.) 281; Supervisors &c. v. Van People v. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286. The Campen, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 49; Fel- bond must not impose penalties lows V. Oilman, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) greater than those required by the 414; Lawton v. Erwin, 9 Wend. (N. statute: Stewart v. Lee, 3 Cal. 364; Y.) 233; Cornell v. Barnes, 7 Hill United States v. Morgan, 3 Wash. (N. Y.) 35. C. C. 10. ** Musselman v. Commonwealth, 7 " City of Chicago v. Gage, 95 111. Pa. St. 240; Young v. State, 7 Gill & 593. This is a case where a printed J. (Md.) 253; Inhabitants &c. v. form of a city treasurer's bond was Fleming, 8 Gray (Mass.) 613; Moore executed by himself in blank and V. State, 9 Mo. 334; People v. Johr, sent by him to his sureties, who' 318 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 310 § 318. The same subject continued. — An important decision on this point was rendered by the supreme court of the United States in 1874. This was a suit upon the bond of an internal revenue collector executed by the collector as principal and by several sureties. One of these sureties pleaded that when he signed and sealed the bond it was a printed form, with names, dates and amount of penalty in blank ; that he delivered it to the collector under an express agreement that the latter should fill the blank with a penalty of a certain amount only and procure two other sureties within certain territorial limits each worth a certain amount, otherwise the bond was to be null and void and returned to him; and that the collector fraudulently filled the bond with a greater penalty than that agreed upon and with two additional sureties, neither of whom resided within the agreed ter- ritorial limits and both of whom were insolvent. The court decided that the plea was bad and that the sureties were liable.^'' § 319. Construction of courts on bonds improperly approved. — Where a statute does not especially require strict compliance with its provisions as to the acknowledgment and execution of official bonds to render them valid, courts are very liberal in their construction of the law prescribing the mode of execution.^^ The omission of an signed it in blank and returned it to the principal, who some time after- wards took it to the office of the cor- poration counsel, and had the blanks filled in, when the bond was re- turned to the city clerk and pre- sented to and approved by the com- mon council as the official bond of said treasurer. The treasurer de- faulted, suit was brought on the bond, and the sureties entered pleas of non est factum. The court held that the sureties were liable, and that the case of People v. Organ, 27 111. 26, was overruled, or, more cor- rectly speaking, that the old com- mon-law rule upon which the decis- ion in People v. Organ is based has been overborne by the applica- tion of the doctrine of estoppel in pais. Where a bond has been exe- cuted in blank and delivered to the proper official, he may fill in the blank, and the bond is a good and valid one: Hultz v. Commonwealth, 3 Grant Gas. (Pa.) 61. See State V. Pepper, 31 Ind. 76. For con- trary decision, see United States v. Nelson, 2 Brock. C. G. 64. 1" Butler V. United States, 21 Wall. 272. See also, Dair v. United States, 16 Wall. 1; Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24; Inhabitants &c. v. Huntress, 53 Maine 89; State v. Pepper, 31 Ind. 76, and cases there cited; McGor- mick V. Bay Gity, 23 Mich. 457; State V. Peck, 53 Maine 284; Bart- lett V. Board of Education, 59 111. 364; Mutual &c. Go. v. Wilcox, 8 Biss. G. G. 197; s. c. 4 Myer Fed. Dec, § 635. " Young V. State, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 253; Boone Go. v. Jones, 54 Iowa 699; s. c. 2 N. W. 987; 7 N. W. 155; 37 Am. R. 229; Mendocino Go. v. Morris, 32 Gal. 145. For cases where a bond was held to be vitiated by reason of a defective approval, see O'Marrow v. Gity of Port Huron, 47 Mich. 585; s. c. 11 N. W. 397; Grawford v. Meredith, 6 Ga. 552. The sureties on a town treasurer's 311 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 320 excise commissioner to execute an official bond, approved by the super- visor of the town, does not create a vacancy; at the utmost, it only furnishes cause for a forfeiture of the office ; a vacancy can be effected only by a direct proceeding for that purpose. ^^ Thus, where an excise commissioner failed to procure the approval of the supervisor to the bond presented and filed by him, and at a subsequent town meeting, on the supposition that the failure to have the bond approved vacated the office, votes were cast electing another excise commis- sioner "to fill vacancy, if any exist," it was held that the failure of the first commissioner to have his bond approved did not vacate the office, and that there was no vacancy to fill.^^ § 320. Defective bonds valid as common-law obligations. — It is a well-settled rule of law where a defective bond is given and the officer enters upon and discharges his duties, that the bond is good as a common-law obligation, and the sureties thereon are liable, unless such rule would be contrary to public policy or is expressly forbidden by statute.^* Thus, where the board of education of a union free school, incorporated under a common school act, by mis- take and in good faith, instead of taking a bond from one elected as its treasurer, as required by said act, accepted a writing in the form of a bond, but not under seal, the same was held valid and enforceable against the sureties thereto.^^ bond are liable on the bond for a 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 500; Lee v. War- failure to pay over or account for ing, 3 Desau. (S. C.) 57; Board &c. moneys received notwithstanding v. Coffinbury, 1 Mich. 355; Barnes v. the bond was approved by resolution Brookman, 107 111. 317; Pritchett v. instead of ordinance: Town of Glos- People, 6 111. 525. See also, McGow- ter v. Harrell, 77 Miss. 793; s. c. 23 en v. Deyo, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 340 So. 520, 941; 27 So. 609. Classen v. Shaw, 5 Watts (Pa.) 468 " People V. Common Council &c., State v. Thompson, 49 Mo. 188 77 N. Y. 503. Freeman v. Davis, 7 Mass. 200; Bur- ^^Cronin v. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. roughs v. Lowder, 8 Mass. 373; How- 271; following Foot v. Stiles, 57 N. ard v. Brown, 21 Maine 385; Row- Y. 399. lett V. Eubank, 1 Bush (Ky.) 477; " United States v. Tingey, 5 Pe- Williams v. Shelby, 2 Or. 144. ters 115; United States v. Linn, 15 ^^ Board of Education v. Fonda, 77 Peters 290; Jessup v. United States, N. Y. 350 (distinguishing Hardmann 106 U. S. 147; s. c. 1 S. Ct. 74; v. Bowen, 39 N. Y. 196); Rounds v. United States v. Rogers, 28 Fed. Mansfield, 38 Maine 586. See also, 607; Inhabitants &c. v. Haughton, 7 Boothbay v. Giles, 68 Maine 160; Conn. 543; State v. Horn, 94 Mo. United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 162; s. c. 7 S. W. 116; State v. Bart- 395; Thomas v. White, 12 Mass. 367. lett, 30 Miss. 624; Sweetser v. Hay, A bond without any specified 2 Gray (Mass.) 49, and cases there obligee has been held valid as a com- cited; King v. Ireland, 68 Tex. 682; mon-law obligation: Fellows v. Gil- s. c. 5 S. W. 499; Polk v. Plummer, man, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 414, 419. 321 PUBLIC COEPORATIONS. .312 § 321. The same subject continued. — Where the statute prescribes certain obligees to whom an othcial bond is to be made payable, and a bond is given payable to an obligee other than the one prescribed by statute, and the bond in other respects complies with the require- ments of the statute, it is good as a common-law bond/® And where parties being under no legal disability, and capable of making con- tracts, enter into a voluntary bond based on a good and valid con- sideration and for a lawful purpose, the bond is binding on them at common law." § 322. Time when an official bond takes effect. — An official bond resembles a deed in that it takes effect from the date of delivery thereof.^® Thus, it has been held by the supreme court of the United States that where a bond was delivered to the obligee for accept- ance, and it was accepted afterwards, it took effect from the date of delivery and not from the acceptance thereof. ^^ The court said: "A bond may not be a complete contract until accepted by the obligee ; but if it has been delivered to him to be accepted if he should choose to do so, that is not a conditional delivery which will postpone the obligor's undertaking to the time of its acceptance, but an admission that the bond is then binding upon him and will be so from that time if it should be accepted."^*' "United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. C. C. 96, 115; Iredell v. Bar- bee, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 250; Reid v. Humphreys, 7 Jones L. (N. C.) 258; Williams v. Ehringhaus, 3 Dev. L. (N. C.) 297. See also, Moore v. Graves, 3 N. H. 408; Horn v. Whit- tier, 6 N. H. 88; Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 176; Van Hook V. Barnett, 4 Dev. L. (N. C.) 268; Justices V. Smith, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 472. "Archer v. Hart, 5 Fla. 234. It has been held that where an officer occupying two official positions, having filed a bond for his due and faithful performance of one of them, voluntarily gives a bond for the per- formance of the duties of the other position, the latter bond is a valid common-law obligation, even though he was not required by statute to give such a bond: State v. Harney, 57 Miss. 863. See also. Board &c. v. Coffinbury, 1 Mich. 355; People v. Johr, 22 Mich. 461; City of Platte- ville V. Hooper, 63 Wis. 385; s. c. 23 N. W. 583. For contrary opin- ions, see State v. Heisey, 56 Iowa 404; s. c. 9 N. W. 327; United States V. Humason, 6 Sawyer 199; State v. Bartlett, 30 Miss. 624. ^' Johnson v. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 363; Eberhardt v. Wood, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 467; s. c. 2 Tenn. Ch. 488; Bryant v. Woods, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 327. " Butler V. United States, 88 U. S. 272. ="See also. State v. Tool, 4 Ohio St. 553. Where a collector's bond has been filed within the time pre- scribed by statute, but is not ac- cepted until the statutory time has elapsed, the acceptance relates back to the time of filing and the bond is valid: Drew v. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. Where a statute requires an of- ficial bond to be given and makes no special provision for the mode of its delivery, it has been held that 313 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 323 § 323. Effect of not filing bonds within the time prescribed by statute. — The weight of the American authorities is decidedly in favor of the doctrine that if a statute fixes the time within which bonds are to be given the provision is directory and not mandatory; and that unless it expressly declares that the failure to give the bond by the time prescribed ipso facto vacates the office, the bond may be given at any time if no vacancy has been declared. ^^ And it has been held where the statute requires an officer to file a bond every year that his mere failure to do so does not vacate the office.^^ § 324. The same subject continued. — But the cases are not unani- mous on this point; and in some states it has been held that the fail- ure to give the bond within the prescribed time vacates the office, with- out any proceedings to declare it vacant ; so that it can not be restored by any subsequent compliance with the statute.'^ Thus, in a Texas the filing thereof is a delivery: Board &c. v. Bird, 31 Cal. 66. =^ Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 214; United States v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73; People v. Holley, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 481; People v. Ferguson, 20 Week. Dig. (N. Y.) 276; Duntley v. Davis, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 229; Cronin V. Stoddard, 97 N. Y. 271; People v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Kearney v. Andrews, 10 N. J. Eq. 70; President &c. (Bank) v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64; State v. Churchill, 41 Mo. 41; State V. County Court, 44 Mo. 230; Ross V. Williamson, 44 Ga. 501; Paine Elections, § 232; Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674; State v. Fal- coner, 44 Ala. 696; Smith v. Cronk- hite, 8 Ind. 134; State v. Colvig, 15 Or. 57; s. c. 13 Pac. 639; State v. Findley, 10 Ohio 51; State v. Ring, 29 Minn. 78; s. c. 11 N. W. 233; Cawley v. People, 95 111. 249. For the effect of the failure of a city marshal to give his bond in time, see State V. Porter, 7 Ind. 204. For city treasurer's bond, see City of Chicago V. Gage, 95 111. 593; Caskey v. City of Greensburg, 78 Ind. 233. "Clark V. Ennis, 45 N. J. L. 69. Where a statute required the master in chancery within three weeks after his election to tender his bond for approval, and upon its approval to deposit it with the treasurer and sue out his commission, and that "upon his failure to do so within the said time his office shall be deemed absolutely vacant, and shall be filled by election or appointment as heretofore provided," it was held that the failure to comply with this requirement was only cause of for- feiture, but not a forfeiture ipso facto: State v. Toomer, 7 Rich. L. (S. C.) 216. See also. State v. Laughton, 19 Nev. 202; s. c. 8 Pac. 344; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 79, n.; Sprowl V. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674; Kottman v. Ayer, 3 Strob. (S. C.) 92. ^^Throop Public Officers, § 173; In re Attorney-General, 14 Fla. 277; Creighton v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 142; Falconer v. Shores, 37 Ark. 386; Vaughan v. Johnson, 77 Va. 300; Childrey v. Rady, 77 Va. 518; Owens V. O'Brien, 78 Va. 116; State V. Johnson, 100 Ind. 489; State v. Matheny, 7 Kan. 327; People v. Per- kins, 85 Cal. 509; s. c. 26 Pac. 245; People V. Taylor, 57 Cal. 620; State V. Hadley, 27 Ind. 496; Kilpatrick v. Smith, 77 Va. 347; Johnson v. Mann, 77 Va. 265. See also, Jackson v. Simonton, 4 Cranch C. C. 255; Ben- § 325 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 31-i case,^* it was held that a statute requiring an officer to qualify within a certain time was directory, only where the delay was caused by something over which he had no control, and not in case of his re- fusal or neglect to qualify. § 325. Liability of sureties on a treasurer's bond. — The sureties on a city treasurer's bond pleaded that by ordinance it was the duty of the mayor to supervise the conduct of the treasurer, and, in case of misconduct of the treasurer, to* transmit information to the com- mon council; and that the mayor was invested with full power to examine all books in the custody of the treasurer ; and that it was the duty of the common council to examine into the conduct of the treas- urer, and to remove him in case of any violation of his duty ; and that defendants became sureties, relying on the protection afEorded them by the faithful discharge of the said duty; and that the mayor and the common council refused to perform such duty, and knowingly suffered the breaches. The court decided that the duty to discharge the official would arise, and the non-performance of it be a defense to the sureties, only after knowledge of the officer's dishonesty was brought home to the common council; and that on the averments in this plea defense was made on the neglect of duty by the mayor ; and that his neglect of duty was no defense.^^ But a plea by the sureties nett V. State, 58 Miss. 556. For the bond are liable: Priet v. De La Mon- English rule, see Prowse v. Foot, 3 tanya, 85 Cal. 148; s. c. 24 Pac. 612. Bro. P. C. 167; Anonymous, Free. A complaint alleged that a city 474. treasurer failed to pay over accord- ^ Flatan v. State, 56 Tex. 93. ing to law money which came into ^ Mayor &c. v. Stout, 52 N. J. L. his hands as treasurer. Plaintiff 35; s. c. 18 Atl. 943. A new bond offered books kept by the treasurer given by a village treasurer at the which showed parties indebted to request of the village council, and the city who had, in fact, paid the thereafter treated and accepted as treasurer; also an ordinance provid- his official bond, is binding upon ing that the treasurer should keep him and his sureties, although no a true account of all moneys re- formal resolution requiring the ceived by him. Defendants pointed bond and no resolution approving it to a provision that the city treas- were recorded: Village of Evart v. urer should receive one-sixth of all Postal, 86 Mich. 325; s. c. 49 N. W. moneys collected by him, and also 53. Payment by a city treasurer offered the treasurer's books which of a warrant which he knows to be showed the amount collected and illegal out of money set apart for turned into the city, and that on the payment of the legal warrant this amount the treasurer had re- substituted for that which was il- ceived only ten per cent. The court legal, thereby exhausting the fund decided that the additional six and out of which the former was pay- two-thirds per cent, should have able, is a misappropriation of the been considered in bar of recovery fund for which the sureties on his against the sureties under a general 315 Ol'^nCIAL JiONDS. 326 on a city treasurer's l)on(l that tlie city, contriving and intending to injure defendnnts, wilfully neglected to examine the treasurer's ac- counts annually, and otherwise permitted, encouraged and induced and were privy to the alleged breaches, is good."" § 326. The same subject continued. — A county treasurer's bond reciting that the treasurer and his sureties are each severally bound, and that they bind themselves severally, is not rendered void so as to relieve the sureties from liability by the failure of the treasurer to execute the bond.-'' Application of payments by a public officer is binding on his sureties; and they can not escape liability for his failure to pay over money collected during the term for which they were sureties by showing that he wrongfully applied such moneys to the payment of deficiencies occurring during the preceding term.-* denial of the complaint: City of Butte v. Cohen, 9 Mont. 435; s. c. 24 Pac. 206. Where officers of a town are negligent in discovering the defalcation of the treasurer within such time as would have enabled the sureties to protect themselves it will not discharge the sureties: In- habitants &c. V. Soule, 175 Mass. 400; s. c. 56 N. E. 575. =" Mayor &c. v. Stout, 52 N. J. L. 35; s. c. 18 Atl. 943; following May- or V. Dickerson, 45 N. J. L. 38. ^ Douglas Co. V. Bardon, 79 Wis. 641; s. c. 48 N. W. 969. Opposite the signature of each bondsman was set the amount for which he was ob- ligated. In the body of the instru- ment, after the part specifying these amounts, was the phrase, "for the payment of which, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, representatives, administra- tors and assigns, jointly and sever- ally, by these presents." Compiled statutes of Montana, § 631 (Code Civil Proc), provides that in the construction of the instrument the intention of the parties is to be pur- sued, if possible, and when a gen- eral and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount; and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. Section 336 provides that when an agreement has been in- tended in a different sense by the different parties to it, the sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other under- stood it; and, when different con- structions are equally proper, that is to be taken which is most favor- able to the party in whose favor the provision was made. In an action on the bond the complaint alleged that "defendants have forfeited the bond and become and are indebted to plaintiff in the respective sums set after their names in said bond." It was held that the instrument bound the sureties severally for the amount only expressly stated as re- spectively undertaken: City of Butte V. Cohen, 9 Mont. 435; s. c. 24 Pac. 206. A bond of a town treas- urer complying with the statute, ex- cept that it is executed to the su- pervisors of the town or their suc- cessors in office, instead of "to the town by its name," is valid, and an action thereon may be maintained by the town: City of Platteville v. Hooper, 63 Wis. 385; s. c. 23 N. W. 583. ^ Crawn v. Commonwealth. 84 Va. 282; s. c. 4 S. E. 721; 10 Am. St. 839; § 340, post. A city does not, by ap- Q o W-) IV PUBLIC CORrORATlOiSrS. 316 § 327. Mingling of and defalcations out of two funds. — Where the treasurer of a hoard of education was also the general manager of a private corporation, and had the control of its funds as well as of the school funds, and he deposited its funds and the school funds to- gether in a national bank, in the name of the private corporation, with the knowledge and consent of the officers of the bank, such funds to be subject to his control, and to his checks for schools and school corporation purposes, as well as for the private corporation purposes, — it was held that although as manager of the private cor- poration he drew out the funds in the bank so as to cause a deficit in the amount of the school funds on deposit at the time of the execution of a second bond, still, as more than enough moneys were afterwards deposited by him as treasurer of the private corporation to liquidate and satisfy the shortage, such deficit ceased to exist, and for a subsequent defalcation in the school funds the sureties on the second bond were liable."^ And wdiere a city treasurer was custodian of a school fund in respect of which the sureties on his official bond were hot liable, and the money received by him was kept in one mass without any means of determining to which fund any part of it belonged, and he misappropriated some of the funds so that it was proving the reports of the city treas- fund: Broad v. City of Paris, 66 urer from time to time, estop itself to sue on the treasurer's bond after the end of his term, for embezzle- ment or defalcation prior to such approval. "We do not think," said the court, "that the approval by the city of the treasurer's reports amounted to an assertion that the treasurer actually held in his hands the money so appearing by the re- ports:" Britton v. City of Fort Worth, 78 Tex. 227, 231; s. c. 14 S. W. 585; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 411. Under the revised statutes of Texas, ch. 3, tit. 78, art. 3791, pro- viding that treasurers of cities hav- ing management of schools shall have the same powers and perform the same duties as county treas- urers, and art. 3728, providing that county treasurers shall execute special bonds as school treasurers, the sureties on the general bond of a city treasurer are not liable for his defalcations out of the school Tex. 119; s. c. 18 S. W. 342. -" Gilbert v. Board of Education, 45 Kan. 31; s. c. 25 Pac. 226; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 399. "In all cases where accounts exist between par- ties," said the court, "including bank accounts, a cause of action does not exist with reference to each item of the account, but only as to the balance that may be due to one or the other of the parties; and it exists in favor only of that party in whose favor the balance is due: Waffle V. Short, 25 Kan. 503; Tootle V. Wells, 39 Kan. 452; s. c. 18 Pac. 692. And each new item added to the account, in favor of the person against whom the balance is due, operates as payment or partial pay- ment of such balance; and it will generally operate in payment or par- tial payment of the oldest item of the account not yet paid or satis- fied: Shellabarger v. Binns, 18 Kan. 345; 1 Morse Banks and Banking, § 355." 317 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 328 impos^sible to say that any sum less than the whole that was mis- appropriated l)elongecl to either, it was presumed in an action upon his official bond that he embezzled a pro rata proportion of each fund.-''" § 328. Liability of sureties as affected by subsequent legislation. — In a Virginia case'"^ it was held tliat tlie regulations prescribed by law for the settlement of officers' accounts at stated intervals, being intended for the benefit of the government, to secure punctuality and promptness in its officers, were directory merely and did not enter into and form part of the contract of the sureties, so as to pre- vent the legislature from altering or extending the times of settle- ment at pleasure without the assent of the sureties ; and therefore, and from the nature of the officer's obligation and duties, and of the condition of the bond, such an extension did not operate as a dis- charge of the surety. This doctrine was approved in a case^^ where the surety of a treasurer who had defaulted to the state claimed to be discharged of his obligation by the act of the assembly which ex- tended the time of payment by the debtor, and thus enabled him, as was alleged, to default by postponing the time of the discovery of his delinquencies.^^ § 329. Liability of surety when subsequent legislation imposes new duties of the same general character. — A public officer takes his office with the obligation to j^erform all the duties incident to or connected with it then existing, or that may be added by the legisla- ture, provided the nature and character of the duties remain the same ; it is indispensable to the proper management of public af- fairs, and serious injury to the public interest would occur were the rule otherwise. The obligation is for a faithful performance by the principal of all the duties of the office during the term of his appoint- ment, not of duties as they exist at any particular moment. His duties vary with the requisitions of the statute; and whatever the ^^ Britton v. City of Fort Worth, own security and protection and to 78 Tex. 227; s. c. 14 S. W. 585; 34 regulate the conduct of its own offi- Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 411. cars. They are merely directory to " Commonwealth v. Holmes, 25 such officers and constitute no part Graft. (Va.) 771. of the contract of the surety." On " Smith V. Commonwealth, 25 this point see also, United States v. Gratt. (Va.) 780» Boyd, 15 Peters 187-208; United =«In the case of United States v. States v. Van Zandt, 11 Wheat. 184; Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, Judge United States v. Nicholl, 12 Wheat. Story says these regulations as to 505, 509; State v. Carleton, 1 Gill settlements "are provisions of law (Md.) 249. created by the government for its 330 PUBLIC COKPOKATIONS. 318 statute imposes or withdraws becomes or ceases to be a part of his duty. The only limitation to this rule is that the duties imposed shall be of the same general nature and character.^* § 330. The same subject continued. — Mr. Justice Clifford, in de- livering the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, said that "any substantial addition by law to the duties of the obligor of a bond, after the execution of the instrument, materially enlarging his liabilities, will not impose any additional responsibility upon his sureties unless the words of the bond, by a fair and reasonable con- struction, bring such subsequently imposed duties within its pro- visions."^^ In a later case substantially the same rule was laid down by Judge Lowell, of the United States circuit court. ^^ And in England it was said by Chief Justice Campbell that "the question is whether the nature and functions of the office or employment are changed; for if they are, it is not the same office within the meaning of the bond."^^ Thus, where a superintendent of water-works whose ^People V. Vilas, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 252; s. c. 36 N. Y. 459; Mayor &c. v. Ryan, 35 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 408; Strong v. United States, 6 Wall. 788; White v. Fox, 22 Maine 341; Marney v. State, 13 Mo. 7; Col- ter V. Morgan, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 278; Walker v. Chapman, 22 Ala. 116; Bartlett v. Governor, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 586; Governor v. Ridgeway, 12 111. 14; Compher v. People, 12 III. 290; Grayham v. County Court &c., 9 Dana (Ky.) 184; Hatch v. In- habitants &c., 97 Mass. 533. See also, Gaussen v. United States, 97 U. S. 584. The imposition by the board of supervisors of a county upon the CQunty treasurer during his term of office of the duty of rais- ing, keeping and disbursing large sums of money in addition to the usual and ordinary duties of his of- fice, — for instance, the raising and disbursing money during a war for bounty purposes, — does not dis- charge the sureties upon his bond from liability: Board &c. v. Clarke, 92 N. Y. 391. '= United States v. Powell, 14 Wall. 493, 504; holding, however, that a distiller's bond for the faithful per- formance of all the provisions of law relating to his duties was broad enough to cover duties subsequently imposed by law: Farr v. Hollis, 9 B. & C. 315, 322. Cf. United States V. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, 738; United States v. Singer, 15 Wall. Ill; People v. Tompkins, 74 111. 482. ^"United States v. McCortney, 1 Fed. 104; citing Postmaster-General V. Munger, 2 Paine C. C. 189; White V. Fox, 22 Maine 341; Governor v. Ridgway, 12 111. 14; Boody v. United States, 1 Woodb. & M. 150; Smith v. Board &c., 59 111. 412; People v. Vilas, 36 N. Y. 459, 465; Mayor v. Sibberns, 3 Abb. App. Dec. (N, Y.) 266; Bartlett v. Governor, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 586; Colter v. Morgan, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 278; Commonwealth v. Gabbert, 5 Bush (Ky.) 438; Marney V. State, 13 Mo. 7; King v. Nichols, 16 Ohio St. 80; Gaussen v. United States, 2 Woods 92; s. c. 97 U. S. 584; United States v. Powell, 14 Wall. 493; United States v. Singer, 15 Wall. 111. "Pybus V. Gibb, 6 El. & Bl. 902. which holds that the surety is en- tirely discharged. See also, Os- wald V. Mayor &c., 5 H. L. Cas. 856, ;n9 OFFICIAL BONDS. 331 duties were not defined by law gave a bond for the performance of liis duties, including the accounting for moneys, and an ordinance was then passed requiring him to collect water rents, his sureties were not deemed to guaranty his fidelity in respect of such rents.^^ § 331. Liability of officer on his bond where the loss is occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy. — It is tlie doctrine of the supreme court of the United States that a public officer who has given a bond for the faithful performance of his duties, and the keeping, accounting for and paying over of the moneys which come to his hands, is relieved from liability for loss only where it is occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy.^® This general rule is affirmed in many of the state courts ;*° where it is accordingly held that if money is lost by the failure of a bank in which it was deposited, the officer and his sureties are liable regardless of negligence.*^ But several cases in the United States enforced the obligation of the bond in respect of duties im- posed by law at the time it was exe- cuted, and declared it void as against the sureties only for the extension: United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 771; Gaus- sen V. United States, 97 U. S. 584. See also, Marquette Co. v. Ward, 50 Mich. 174; s. c. 15 N. W. 70. ^^ City of Lafayette v. James, 92 Ind. 240; s. c. 47 Am. R. 140; Peo- ple V. Pennock, 60 N. Y. 421; Mum- ford V. Memphis &c. R. Co., 2 Lea (Tenn.) 393; s. c. 31 Am. R. 616; White S. M. Co. v. Mullins, 41 Mich. 339; s. c. 2 N. W. 196. ^United States v. Prescott, 3 How. 578 (the leading case, where Mr. Justice McLean does not consid- er the law of bailments appli- cable to the case, and places the li- ability on the breach of the express contract, and fortifies it by consid- erations of public policy) ; Bevans v. United States, 13 Wall. 56; United States V. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83; Boy- den v. United States, 13 Wall. 17; United States v. Dashiel, 4 Wall. 182; United States v. Morgan. 11 How. 153; United States v. Thomas, 15 Wall. 337; United States v. Hu- mason, 6 Sawyer 199. '» State V. Clark, 73 N, C. 255, and United States v. Watts, 1 N. Mex. 553, carrying the rule to the utter- most limits; Inhabitants &c. v. Haz- zard, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 112; Com- monwealth V. Comly, 3 Pa. St. 372; Inhabitants &c. v. McEachron, 33 N. J. L. 339; Board &c. v. Jewell, 44 Minn. 427; s. c. 46 N. W. 914; Board &c. V. Tower, 28 Minn. 45; s. c. 8 N. W. 907; County Com'rs v. Line- berger, 3 Mont. 231; State v. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607; State v. Nevin, 19 Nev. 162; s. c. 7 Pac. 650; State v. Moore, 74 Mo. 413; Taylor Tp. v. Morton, 37 Iowa 550; Rock v. Stinger, 36 Ind. 346; Morbeck v. State, 28 Ind. 86; Halbert v. State, 22 Ind. 125; Clay Co. v. Simonson, 1 Date 403; s. c. 46 N. W. 592. See also. Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 233; Union Tp. v. Smith, 39 Iowa 9. " Havens v. Lathene, 75 N. C. 505; Lowry v. Polk Co., 51 Iowa 50; s. c. 49 N. W. 1049; Nason v. Poor Direc- tors, 126 Pa. St. 445; s. c. 17 Atl. 616; Hart v. Poor Guardians, 81i/^ Pa. St. 466; State v. Powell, 67 Mo. 395; Perley v. Muskegon Co., 32 Mich. 132. § 332 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 320 § 332. The same subject continued. — On the other hand, several state courts of high authority have arrived at a contrary conclusion. Thus, in New York, it was held that there was no liability on the bond of a county treasurer for the loss of money by theft without negli- gence on his part.*- In Alabama "the highest amount of care, dili- gence and vigilance" is exacted of the officer; but if he is roblied despite great prudence and circumspection, which is a question of fact for the jury, it constitutes a good defense.*^ The same rule is declared in Maine,** South Carolina,*^ and by implication at least in Louisiana.*® § 333. Duty of obligee to notify sureties of increased risk, etc. — The question has frequently arisen between private corporations and the sureties on the official bonds of their agents whether the obligee is bound to communicate to the guarantor facts which materially increase the risk, such as the previous dishonesty or default of the agent. It is declared in Massachusetts that "the creditor owes no duty of active diligence to take care of the interest of the surety. It is the business of the surety to see that his principal performs the duty which he has guaranteed and not that of the creditor. * * * Mere inaction of the creditor will not discharge the surety unless it amounts to fraud or concealment."*^ This is also the rule in lowa,*^ ^-Supervisors v. Dorr, 25 Wend. 196; citing Wright v. Simpson, 6 (N. Y.) 440; s. c. 7 Hill (N. Y.) Ves. 714; President &c. v. Anthony, 583. And in the same state the 18 Pick. (Mass.) 238; Taft v. Gifford, sureties of a surrogate were not li- 13 Met. (Mass.) 187; Tapley v. Mar- able for the loss of money deposited tin, 116 Mass. 275; and disapproving with a banker in good credit, who Sanderson v. Aston, L. R. 8 Ex. 73; afterward failed: People v. Faulk- s. c. 4 Eng. Rep. 452. See also, ner, 107 N. Y. 477; s. c. 14 N. E. President &c. v. Root, 2 Met. (Mass.) 415; rev'g s. c. 38 Hun (N. Y.) 607. 522; Locke v. Postmaster-General, 3 '^ State V. Houston, 78 Ala. 576; Mason 446; McKecknie v. Ward, 58 State V. Houston, 83 Ala. 361; s. c. N. Y. 541. Cf. Graves v. Lebanon 3 So. 859. Nat'l Bank, 10 Bush (Ky.) 23; s. c. " Inhabitants &c. v. Pennell, 69 19 Am. R. 50, where the directors of Maine 357. See, for a qualification a bank published a statement show- of this defense. Inhabitants &c. v. ing its affairs to be in good condi- Lowell, 70 Maine 437. tion, when by reasonable diligence *^ York Co. V. Watson, 15 S. C. 1. they would have discovered that the ^" State V. Lanier, 31 La. An. 423. cashier was a defaulter. This was See also. Walker v. British Guaran- held to discharge one who became a tee Ass'n, 18 Q. B. 277; s. c. 21 L. J. surety of the cashier upon the faith Q. B. 257. of their statement. "'' Watertown F. Ins. Co. v. Sim- ^^ Home Ins. Co. v. Holway, 55 mons, 131 Mass. 85; s. c. 41 Am. R. Iowa 571; s. c. 8 N. W. 457. 321 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 334 Wisconsin,*® Illinois,^" Rhode Island," and New York;^^ but it is ojjposed to the doctrine in England,"'^ New Jersey,^* Maine/° and Kentucky.'^® Admitting the tortious quality of a neglect to notify the surety in such cases, it would be difficult to maintain that the sureties on the bond of a public officer are discharged by a failure to inform them of previous defaults. It was expressly decided in Min- nesota that knowledge by a board of county commissioners when they accepted a treasurer's bond that the officer had converted funds during a prior term did not release the sureties.^'^ Nor would the members of the board be personally liable under the same circum- stances.^® § 334. Liability of sureties on successive bonds — (a) Where dif- ferent sureties are given on each bond. — When successive bonds with different sureties have been given for the faithful jjerformance of the duties of the same officer, and a breach has taken place in the con- ditions of the bonds in not accounting for and paying over moneys by him received, considerable difficulty may be experienced in deter- mining upon which bond and its sureties the liability shall fall. With respect to the general principle applicable to such cases there is no great contrariety of opinion; but in the application of those principles to existing cases considerable judicial dissension has been manifested. There is no doubt that an official bond may be so drawn as to render the sureties answerable for the past as well as for the future derelictions of their principal. Thus, if the condition of a bond is that the officer shall pay all sums of money which he has re- ceived, and all which he shall hereafter receive, this language will impose on the sureties the liability for past as well as for future defaults. ^9 *^ ^tna L. Ins. Co. v. Mabbett, 18 ='= Graves v. Lebanon Nat'l Bank, Wis. 698. 10 Bush (Ky.) 23. See also, Char- ™ Roper V. Trustees &c., 91 111. lotte &c. Co. v. Gow, 59 Ga. 685. 518. See also. Ham v. Greve, 34 " "If the bond was sufficient it was Ind. 18. their duty to accept it:" Pine Co. v. "Atlas Bank v. Brownell, 9 R. I. Willard, 39 Minn. 125; s. c. 39 N, 168. W. 71. "Bostwick V. Van Voorhis, 91 N. ^ Held v. Bagwell, 58 Iowa 139; Y. 353. s. c. 12 N. W. 226, holding, as inti- "* Phillips V. Foxhall, L. R. 7 Q. B. mated in the case last cited, that the 666; Enright v. Falvey, 4 L. R. Ir. duty of approving bonds is purely 397; Sanderson v. Aston, L. R. 8 Ex. public. 73. '** Saunders v. Taylor, 9 B. & C. " State V. Sooy, 39 N. J. L. 135. 35. But the construction of all offi- ^'^ Franklin Bank v. Cooper, 36 cial bonds, in the absence of express Maine 179, 197. provision to the contrary, is pros- 1 Smith — 21 335 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. S22 § 335. The same subject continued. — In other words, it may be said that the sureties of an oil leer are answerable only for those acts or defaults of their principal which occur subsequently to the execu- tion of his ofhcial bond. So, if after an official bond has been given a further bond is executed for any reason for the same othcer, the sureties on this last bond are answerable only for such moneys as may be received by their principal after its execution.^*' The de- faults of a prior term are not chargeable against the sureties on an official bond for a subsequent term.**^ § 336. (b) Where funds received by the officer during his first term remain in his hands during his second term. — If, however, the moneys which have been collected during the first term of office remain in the custody of the officer when he enters upon the discharge of his duties for the second term, the sureties for the latter term immediately become answerable therefor, and those of the former term are relieved from further liability.®^ It is sometimes the duty of an officer, notwithstanding the expiration of his official term, to proceed to complete some matter which has devolved upon him offi- cially. In that event his sureties remain liable for his acts done pective rather than retrospective. If the principal in the bond has re- ceived moneys, prior to its execu- tion, whether before or after his appointment to the office, the bond will not be construed as having re- gard to such moneys; and his de- fault in not properly accounting for them will not be regarded as a breach of such bond: United States V. Boyd, 15 Peters 187; United States V. Giles, 9 Cranch 212; Gov- ernor V. Gibson, 14 Ala. 326; Sebas- tian V. Bryan, 21 Ark. 447; Jeffers V. Johnson, 18 N. J. L. 382; Myers v. United States, 1 McLean 493; Mc- Intyre v. School Trustees, 3 111. App. 77; Stern v. People, 96 111. 475. '^ Bessinger v. Dickerson, 20 Iowa 260; Thompson v. Dickerson, 22 Iowa 360. "Bissell V. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 191; Patterson v. Inhabitants &c., 38 N. J. L. 255; Street v. Laurens, 5 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 227; Heuitt v. State, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 95; s. c. 14 Am. D. 259; Inhabitants &c. v. Randall, 105 Mass. 295; s. c. 7 Am. R. 519. The sureties upon the last bond should be treated precisely as if their prin- cipal had not been the incumbent of the office during the preceding term: City of Paducah v. Cully, 9 Bush (Ky.) 323; City of Detroit v. Weber, 29 Mich. 24; Vivian v. Otis, 24 Wis. 518; s. c. 1 Am. R. 199. For cases where the sureties were held not liable for moneys which either in fact or in contemplation of law came into his possession during the term subsequent to that for which they became his sureties, see Bryan V. United States, 1 Black 140; Tyler V. Nelson, 14 Graft. (Va.) 214; Heuitt V. State, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 95; s. c. 14 Am. D. 259. ^ Board of Education v. Fonda, 77 N. Y. 350; De Hart v. McGuire, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 359; Moore v. Madison Co., 38 Ala. 670; State v. Van Pelt, 1 Ind. 304; Morley v. Town of Met- amora, 78 111. 394; s. c. 20 Am. R. 266. 323 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 337 after the termination of his oflicc. Thus, if a sherifT has levied a writ, it will be his duty to proceed to advertise. And if a public administrator, or one who from his odicial position is charged with the administration of the estates of decedents, has had committed to him the administration of a particular estate, it is his duty to proceed to the completion of such administration, though the period for which he was elected has expired. In either case the officer may be re- elected and enter upon the discharge of his duties for a second term, but if he does so the sureties of the first term are answerable for his defaults.«=^ § 337. (c) When the sureties of the first term are liable for money converted or collected by the officer during his second term. — The proper test in such cases seems to be to inquire whether the offi- cer had so far entered upon the execution of a writ before his first term expired that it would have been his duty to continue in the execution of such writ, even if he had not been re-elected; where this is the ease the sureties for the first term have in many states been held liable.®* On the other hand, it has been held in some states that the liability of the sureties attaches upon the receipt of the writ, whether anything is done under it during the term or not.*^^ In Missouri and Alabama the rule is that those who were sureties at the actual time of the conversion are liable, though the officer began to serve the writ during his prior term of office. ®® § 338. (d) When an officer before entering on his second term makes a report to or settlement with the proper authorities. — It has been held in many states that where an officer who is about to enter *^ People V. Ten Eyck, 13 "Wend. Where a writ is received by a public (N. Y.) 448; Tyler v. Nelson's officer during the first term and re- Adm'r, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 214; Dab- mains in his hands wholly unexe- ney's Adm'r v. Smith, 5 Leigh (Va.) cuted until he enters upon the duties 13; State v. Watts. 23 Ark. 304. In of the office for the second term, the Tennessee it has been held that if sureties for the last term are liable the sheriif, after collecting a portion for his neglect to execute it, or to of the county taxes, is required to pay over the moneys which may be give a new bond and does so, his received under it: State v. Roberts, sureties on such new bond are liable 12 N. J. L. 132. for the moneys collected before ^ State v. Turney, 8 Gill & J. its execution: Miller v. Moore, 3 (Md.) 125; McCormick v. Moss, 41 Humph. (Tenn.) 189. 111. 352. '*Larned v. Allen, 13 Mass. 295; «" Warren v. State, 11 Mo. 583; In- Tyree v. Wilson, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 59; gram v. McCombs, 17 Mo. 558; State Campbell v. Cobb, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) v. McCormack, 50 Mo.- 568; Governor 18; Hill V. Pitzpatrick, 6 Ala. 314; v. Robbins, 7 Ala. 79; Dumas v. Pat- Sidner v. Alexander, 31 Ohio St. 378. terson, 9 Ala. 484. 339 PUBLIC CORPORATION'S. 324 upon the discharge of his duties for a second term makes a report to, or a settlement with the proper authorities, from which it appears that he has on hand at the close of his first term a certain sum of money, such settlement is conclusive upon his sureties for the second term as well as upon himself if the officers with whom the settlement is made act in good faith and have no knowledge that the sum of money which he reports is not actually in his hands.®^ On the other hand, it has been held that an official bond is not retrospective ; that the sureties thereto are only bound for the public money in the hands of the officer when the bond was executed and for that which subsequently came into his possession, and can not be held for past derelictions of duty by their principal.*^ ^ § 339. The same subject continued. — If a public officer — such, for instance, as a receiver of public moneys — gives receipts for moneys which he has not in fact received, whereby a fraud is perpetrated on the United States, his sureties at the time are doubtless estopped from denying that he received such money.'' ^ But where the sure- ties for a subsequent term are pursued a different question arises: the weight of authorities favors the rule that the sureties of a public officer are not estopped by reports made by their principal during or at the close of the preceding term.^*' «' State V. Grammer, 29 Ind. 530; Morley v. Town of Metamora, 78 111. 394; s. c. 20 Am. R. 266; Baker v. Preston, 1 Gilm. (Va.) 235; Roper v. Trustees &c., 91 111. 518; s. c. 33 Am. R. 60. The reasoning on this sub- ject has been more forcibly stated by the supreme court of Iowa than elsewhere in deciding the case of Boone Co. v. Jones, 54 Iowa 699; s. c. 2 N. W. 987; 7 N. W. 155; 37 Am. R. 229. As against the officer himself, his reports are conclusive: State v. Hutchinson, 60 Iowa 478; s. c. 15 N. W. 298. '^ Mahaska Co. v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa 81; Bessinger v. Dickerson, 20 Iowa 260; Warren Co. v. Ward, 21 Iowa 84; Independent School Dist. v. Mc- Donald, 39 Iowa 564. Where at the time of settlement by a county treas- urer the board of supervisors did not in fact insist on the production of the moneys which his account showed to be on hand, but permitted him to make an apparent showing with checks and certificates of de- posit which they knew to be either spurious or worthless, it was held that the sureties on his bond for the second term were not estopped by such settlement, and could be re- lieved from liability by showing the real amount which their principal had on hand at the end of his former term of office : Webster Co. v. Hutch- inson, 60 Iowa 721; s. c. 9 N. W. 901; 12 N. W. 534. "" United States v. Girault, 11 How. 22. ™Bissell V. Saxton, 66 N. Y. 55; Mann v. Yazoo City, 31 Miss. 574; Broad v. City of Paris, 66 Tex. 119; s. c. 18 S. W. 342; State v. Newton, 33 Ark. 276; State v. Rhoades, 6 Nev. 352; Vivian v. Otis, 24 Wis. 518; s. c. 1 Am. R. 199. The leading case on this subject is that of United States V. Boyd, 5 How. 29, in which the court said: — "It has been con- 325 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 340 § 340. (e) Where the officer applies money received in his second term to pay deficiencies in his first term. — The right of an officer to direct the api)lication of i)aynieiits made by him seems now to be as well established as that of a private individual, though in directing such application he may, in effect, take moneys which he has col- lected during his second term, and with them satisfy the deficiency which existed at the close of the former term, and thus shift the responsibility for such deficiency from the sureties of his first term to those oi the second.''^ The reasoning sustaining these decisions is that the sureties of the second term are responsible for any misappro- priation of the moneys collected during that term; and the taking of such moneys, and with them paying a deficiency existing during a preceding term, is as much a misappropriation as though they were taken and used in payment of a private debt of the principal, or for any other purpose to which he had no right to apply them.'^^ tended that the returns of the re- ceiver to the treasury department after the execution of the bond, which admit the money to be then in his hands to the amount claimed, should be conclusive upon the sure- ties. We do not think so. The ac- counts rendered to the department of money received properly authenti- cated are evidence in the first in- stance of the indebtedness of the offi- cer against the sureties, but subject to explanation and contradiction. They are responsible for all the pub- lic moneys which were in his hands at the date of the bond, or that may have come into them afterwards, and not properly accounted for, but not for moneys which the oflacer may choose falsely to admit in his hands in his accounts with the govern- ment. The sureties can not be con- cluded by fabricated accounts of their principal with his creditors; they may always inquire into the reality and truth of the transactions existing between them. The princi- ple has been asserted and applied by this court in several cases." '"■ Stone V. Seymour, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 19; Inhabitants &c. v. Benjamin, 12.5 Mass. 15; Town of Lyndon v. Miller, 36 Vt. 329; Attorney-General v. Manderson, 12 Jur. 383; Williams V. Rawlinson, 10 Moore 362, 371; State V. Smith, 26 Mo. 226; s. c. 72 Am. D. 204; State v. Smith, 32 Mo. 524; State v. Hayes, 7 La. An. 118, 121; State v. Powell, 40 La. An. 234; s. c. 4 So. 46; 8 Am. St. 522; Inhab- itants &c. V. Bell, 9 Met. (Mass.) 499; Gwynne v. Burnell, 7 CI. & F. 572; s. c. 2 Bing. N. C. 7; Chapman V. Commonwealth, 25 Graft. (Va.) 721; § 326, ante. " Where a public official pays mon- ey without any direction respecting its application, and the officers to whom the payment is made know the source from which the moneys were obtained, and the application of them which ought in justice and equity to be made, they are not at liberty to make an application which will divert the moneys from the dis- charge of the obligation to which they ought to be applied. Hence, if such officers know that moneys have been collected by an official during his present term of offi.ce, and he does not direct their application, they are not at liberty to apply them to the satisfaction of a balance due from him for some preceding term: Inhabitants &c. v. Stanley, 47 Maine 515; Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510. § 341 PUBLIC C0KP01{AT10NS. 336 ;? 341. (f ) Where the bond is given for a term of office or a certain period of time. — The American doctrine seems to be that where persons have become sureties on an official bond for a stated period of time or during a particular term of office their liability can not be continued indefinitely by reason of the failure of the suc- cessor of their principal to qualify. And it makes no difference whether their principal is re-elected, or some other person is chosen in his stead : new bonds must be given. The liability of the sureties will not terminate immediately upon the expiration of the official term ; but if no officer qualifies within a reasonable time they will be discharged from all further responsibility, although their principal may in fact continue in the discharge of the duties of the office. '^^ When the office is in fact annual, although not so recited in the bond, still the bond only covers the official acts of the year for which it was given.'^* § 342. Laches or negligence of other officers or principal. — Sure- ties on official bonds can not set up laches or omissions of other officers of the state as a ground of discharge of their own liability; nor is the ineligibility or disqualification of their principal any de- fense to an action against them on his bond.'^^ And it has been held that even if the government is guilty of negligence, or the principal has committed fraud, the surety is not discharged by reason thereof.^^ '^United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 are elected and qualified: City of Wheat. 720; Kingston &c. Ins. Co. Ballard v. Thompson, 21 Wash. 669; V. Clark, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 196; s. c. 59 Pac. 517. Mayor &c. v. Crowell, 40 N. J. L. '"■ Peppin v. Cooper, 2 B. & Aid. 207; s. c. 29 Am. R. 224; Welch v. 431; Hassell v. Long, 2 M. & S. 363; Seymour, 28 Conn. 387; Bigelow v. Wardens of St. Saviours v. Bostock, Bridge, 8 Mass. 275; Rany v. Gov- 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 175; Company &c. ernor, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 2; Mutual v. Atkinson, 6 East 507; Arlington v. Loan &c. Ass'n v. Price, 16 Fla. 204; Merricke, 2 Saund. 411. s. c. 26 Am. R. 703; Dover v. Twom- "'^ State v. Hayes, 7 La. An. 118; bly, 42 N. H. 59; Commonwealth v. Duncan v. State, 7 La. An. 377; State Fairfax, 4 Hen. & M. (Va.) 208; Wa- v. Dunn, 11 La. An. 549; Mayor v. pello Co. v. Bigham, 10 Iowa 39; s. c. Merritt, 27 La. An. 568; Board &c. 74 Am. D. 370; Moss v. State, 10 Mo. v. Brown, 33 La. An. 383; State v. 338; s. c. 47 Am. D. 116; State v. Blohm, 26 La. An. 538; Board v. Ju- Crooks, 7 Ohio (pt. 2) 221; Riddel dice, 39 La. An. 896; s. c. 2 So. 792; V. School Dist., 15 Kan. 168; State v. Powell, 40 La. An. 234; s. c. Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 Gray 4 So. 46; 8 Am. St. 522. The case of (Mass.) 1. The sureties of a town Mayor v. Blache, 3 Miller (La.) 618, treasurer who holds over for a sec- learnedly and scientifically disposes ond term without giving a new bond of the defense of error based on con- are not liable, notwithstanding the cealment or failure to give notice of law provides that the term of officers prior defalcation, shall continue until their successors '^ Osborne v. United States, 86 U. 327 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 343 § 343. Liability of sureties where additional bonds are given. — Where a bond given by an ollicial is regarded as inadequate in amount, he is sometimes required to give an "additional bond" in such further amount as may be required by competent authority. The sureties on the additional bond are not liable for any defalca- tion committed by their principal prior to its date, nor are the sure- ties on the prior bond given by him released from liability for any of his defalcations, past or future;''^ both bonds become concurrent securities that the principal will faithfully perform his duties after the giving of the last bond. But it must not be understood that the term "additional bond" indicates that it is a bond which can be re- sorted to only after the remedies against the other bond have been exhausted ; for on the contrary, the liability of the sureties on the two bonds is the same regarding acts committed after the signing of the last bond, as if they had become sureties at the same time and by the same bond.'^® § 344. Liability of surety where the official occupies two or more offices. — When one person at the same time occupies two or more offices, they should be treated, as far as possible, as though they were occupied by different persons. The result is, that a default in one office can not be charged against the sureties on the official bond of the officer as the incumbent of the other offiee.'^^ Thus, where a sheriff is ex officio tax collector, but the offices are separate and distinct, separate bonds being given for each, the sureties on his bond as col- lector are not liable for acts committed by him as sheriff ; nor can they take advantage of the statutory time within which actions must be brought upon a sheriff's bond.^'' But where a person holds two offices, one of them ex officio, and they are so closely connected that only S. 577; Ryan v. United States, 86 U. State v. Sappington, 67 Mo. 529; s. S. 514. c. 68 Mo. 454; Jones v. Blanton, 6 "Postmaster-General v. Munger, 2 Ired. Bq. (N. C.) 115, 120; Allen v. Paine 189; Sebastian v. Bryan, 21 State, 61 Ind. 268; s. c. 28 Am. R. Ark. 447. If moneys collected before 673. the additional bond was executed " People v. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286. It are afterwards converted by the has been held that where a clerk of principal, the sureties on both the the court is appointed receiver in a original and the additional bond are suit being carried on therein, the liable: Governor v. Robbins, 7 Ala. sureties on his official bond are not 79; Dumas v. Patterson, 9 Ala. 484. liable for acts committed by him in '* Jones V. Hays, 3 Ired. Eq. (N. the course of receivership: Waters C.) 502; s. c. 44 Am. D. 78; Hutch- v. Carroll, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 102; craft v. Shrout's Heirs, 1 T. B. Mon. State v. Odom, 86 N. C. 432; Syme v. (Ky.) 206; s. c. 15 Am. D. 100; Bunting, 91 N. C. 48. United States v. Hoyt, 1 Blatchf. »" People v. Burkhart, 76 Cal. 606; 326; State v. Watts, 23 Ark. 304; s. c. 18 Pac. 776. 345 PUBLIC COEPOKATIONS. 338 one bond is given for both, his sureties are liable for an act committed in either otfice, although only one may be named in the bond.^^ § 345. Liability of surety for unofficial acts of officer. — It is of course contemplated by the sureties on an official bond in incurring their liability that the acts of the officer for which they bind them- selves shall be of an official character; that is to say, these acts must be such as the law imposes upon the incumbent of the office which their principal has assumed. As a natural consequence it flows from this consideration that the sureties are liable only for the official acts of their principal.*^ Thus, where money was paid to a notary public to be applied by him in canceling a mortgage, his sure- ties were not held liable for his defalcation, as the receipt of money for such a purpose was not among the official duties of a notary pub- lic.^^ And in a California case, where a city assessor collected taxes without statutory or other authority to make such collections, it was decided that his sureties could not be held.^* "Van Valkenbergh v. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 146; People v. Stewart, 6 111. App. 62; Satterfield v. People, 104 111. 448. In the case of Butte Co. V. Morgan, 76 Cal. 1; s. c. 18 Pac. 115, it was shown that the defendant at the same time held the offices of tax collector and treasurer of the same county, and that in his capac- ity of tax collector he made a settle- ment with the county auditor in which they agreed upon the amounts then due to the county, and the aud- itor thereupon gave a certificate which stated that "William J. Mor- gan, tax collector, has this day the amount as given below, to be paid into the county treasury." The aud- itor handed the certificate to Mor- gan, who took it away with him, and the auditor credited the tax collec- tor with the amount as paid, and charged the treasurer with it. Suit was brought against the sureties of Morgan as treasurer, and they set up the defense that there was no evi- dence to show that Morgan had be- come answerable as treasurer by ceasing to be liable as tax collector. The court decided, however, that there was, and found for the plain- tiff. ^^ United States v. Adams, 24 Fed. 348; People v. Lucas, 93 N. Y. 585; Ward V. Stahl, 81 N. Y. 406; People V. Pennock, 60 N. Y. 421; Governor V. Perrine, 23 Ala. 807; State v. Blair, 76 N. C. 78; State v. Long, 8 Ired. L. (N. C.) 415; Cotton v. Atkin- son, 53 Ark. 98; s. c. 13 S. W. 415; Bowers v. Fleming, 67 Ind. 541; Scott V. State, 46 Ind. 203; Wright V. Harris, 31 Iowa 272; Morgan v. Long, 29 Iowa 434; Bessinger v. Dickinson, 20 Iowa 260; Sample v. Davis, 4 Greene (Iowa) 117; Coleman V. Ormond, 60 Ala. 328; City of San Jose V. Welch, 65 Cal. 358; s. c. 4 Pac. 207; Hill v. Kemble, 9 Cal. 71; Lescouzeve v. Ducatel, 18 La. An. 470; State v. Bonner, 72 Mo. 387; Watson V. Smith, 26 Pa. St. 395; Hale V. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. St. 415; State v. White, 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 442; State v. Conover, 28 N. J. L. 224. ^^ Lescouzeve v. Ducatel, 18 La. An. 470. >*^City of San Jose v. Welch, 65 Cal. 358; s. c. 4 Pac. 207. A similar 329 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 346 § 346. The same subject continued. — In several states it has been held that the sureties of a constal)le are not liable for his default in failing to account for moneys collected by him, when the claims were placed in his hands for collection in a personal and not in an official capacity;^'' and a similar doctrine has been applied in Ten- nessee to the liability of the sureties of a sheriff. ^^ So, also, the sure- ties of a sheriff are not liable for his failure to protect a person from an attack of a mob.^'^ Where the sheriff of a Maine county served a writ without lawful authority to do so, no liability was thereby im- posed upon his sureties.^® It is to be noted, however, that when the act is done under color of office, the sureties may be held liable even for an unauthorized and illegal act of the officer; as in the case of a Massachusetts constable who seized goods under color of a process which he had no legal power to execute: his sureties were not- withstanding held to be liable on the ground that although he had no sufficient warrant for taking them, he was still responsible to third parties because such taking was a breach of his official duty.*" The sureties on the bond of the mayor are liable for his acts done under color of office and in the line of his official duty, but which are beyond his authority.'"' § 347. liability of sureties for acts done under color of office. — There are many acts which, although illegal, are yet performed under color of office, and are therefore official acts; for these acts the sure- ties on official bonds are of course liable. This question frequently arises where the officer seizes under an execution or a writ of attach- ment or other similar process the property of a person other than the defendant in the action. The question whether under these circum- stances the sureties on the bond of the officer are liable for his act has been differently decided in different states. In the supreme court of the United States and in the courts of most of the states it is now well settled that the act is an official act, as done under color of office, and that the sureties on the bond are therefore liable."^ doctrine obtains in the case of pri- tenden v. Terrill, 2 Head (Tenn.) vate corporations. Thus, the sure- 588. ties of an assistant clerk in a bank ^^ Haynes v. Bridge, 1 Coldw. are not liable for his default as (Tenn.) 32. bookkeeper: Manufacturers' Nat'l " South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396. Bank v. Dickerson, 41 N. J. L. 448; ^* Dane v. Gilmore, 51 Maine 544. s. c. 32 Am. R. 237; Rollstone Nat'l '"City of Lowell v. Parker, 10 Met. Bank v. Carleton, 136 Mass. 226. In (Mass.) 309. the last-cited case the doctrine stated ^ State v. McDaniel, 78 Miss. 1; s. is not expressly affirmed but is c. 27 So. 994. strongly implied. "Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17; '^Bogart V. Green, 8 Mo. 115; Grit- s. c. 4 S. Ct. 286; Carmack v. Com- § 348 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 330 The law on this subject was laid down and the authorities collated in an able and exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Gray in a recent case in the supreme court of the United States, which, is quoted in the succeeding sections.®^ § 348. The same subject continued — Lammon v. Feusier — The doctrine of the federal supreme court. — "The marshal, in serving a writ of attachment on mesne process, which directs him to take the property of a particular person, acts officially. His official duty is to take the property of that person, and of that person only ; and to take only such property of his as is subject to be attached, and not property exempt by law from attachment. A neglect to take the attachable property of tliat person, and a taking, upon the writ, of the property of another person, or of property exempt from attachment, are equally breaches of his official duty. The taking of the attachable property of the person named in the writ is rightful; the taking of the prop- erty of another person is wrongful ; but each, being done by the mar- shal in executing the writ in his hands, is an attempt to perform his official duty, and is an ofScial act. A person other than the defendant named in the writ, whose property is wrongfully taken, may indeed sue the marshal, like any other wrong-doer, in an action of trespass, to recover damages for the wrongful taking; and neither the official character of the marshal, nor the writ of attachment, affords him any defense to such an action. ^^ But the remedy of a person, whose prop- erty is wrongfully taken by the marshal in officially executing his writ, is not limited to an action against him personally. His official bond is not made to the person in whose behalf the writ is issued, nor to any other individual, but to the government, for the indemnity of all persons injured by the official misconduct of himself or his depu- ties f* and his bond may be put in suit by and for the benefit of any such person." § 349. The same subject continued. — "Wlien a marshal, upon a writ of attachment on mesne process, takes property of a person not named in the writ, the property is in his official custody, and under the coi;itrol of the court whose officer he is, and whose writ he is exe- monwealth, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 184; Arch- °= Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17; er v. Noble, 3 Greenl. (Maine) 418; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 286. Harris v. Hanson, 2 Fairf. (Maine) =>' Citing Day v. Gallup, 2 Wall. 97; 241, 243; Tracy v. Goodwin, 5 Allen Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334. (Mass.) 409; Sangster v. Common- "^ See United States v. Moore, 2 wealth, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 124. And Brock. C. C. 317. see other cases cited in the succeed- ing sections. 331 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 350 euting; and, according to the decisions of this court, the rightful owner can not maintain an action of replevin against him, nor recover the property specifieally in any way, except in the court from which the writ issued."" The principle upon which those decisions are founded is, as declared hy Mr. Justice Miller in Buck v. Colbath,^" above cited, 'that whenever property has been seized by an officer of the court, by virtue of its process, the property is to be considered as in the custody of the court, and under its control for the time being; and that no other court has a right to interfere with that possession, unless it be some court which may have a direct supervisory control over the court whose process has first taken possession, or some su- perior jurisdiction in the premises.' Because the law had been so settled by this court, the plaintiff in this case failed to maintain re- plevin in the courts of the state of Nevada against the marshal, for the very taking which is the ground of the present action."^ For these reasons the court is of opinion that the taking of goods, upon a writ of attachment, into the custody of the marshal, as the officer of the court that issues the writ, is, whether the goods are the property of the defendant in the writ or of any other person, an official act, and therefore, if wrongful, a breach of the bond given by the marshal for the faithful performance of the duties of his office." § 350. The same subject continued — The doctrine of the state courts. — "Upon the analogous question, whether the sureties upon the official bond of a sheriff, a coroner, or a constable are responsible for his taking upon a writ, directing him to take the property of one per- son, the property of another, there has been some difference of opin- ion in the courts of the several states. The view that the sureties are not liable in such a case has been maintained by decisions of the supreme courts of New York, New Jersey, North Carolina and Wis- consin, and perhaps receives some support from decisions in Alabama, Mississippi and Indiana.'"^^ °^ Citing Freeman v. Howe, 24 v. Hancock, 2 Ala. 728; McEltianey How. 450; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 v. Gilleland, 30 Ala. 183; Brown v. U. S. 276; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 27. Mosely, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 354; ''« 3 Wall. 334, 341. Jenkins v. Lemonds, 29 Ind. 294; ■" Citing Feusier v. Lammon, 6 Carey v. State, 34 Ind. 105. "But," Nev. 209. continues the opinion, "in People v. ^'Citing Ex parte Reed, 4 Hill (N. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 173, the judgment Y.) 572; People v. Schuyler, 5 Barb, in 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 166, was reversed, (N. Y.) 166; State v. Conover, 4 and the case of Ex parte Reed, 4 Hill Dutch. (N. J.) 224; State v. Long, (N. Y.) 572, overruled by a major- 8 Ired. L. (N. C.) 415; State v. ity of the New York court of ap- Brown, 11 Ired. L. (N. C.) 141; Ger- peals, with the concurrence of Chief ber V. Ackley, 32 Wis. 233; Governor Justice Bronson, who had taken part § 351 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 332 §351. The same subject continued. — Mr. Justice Gray continues: "And the liability of the sureties in siieli eases lias been affirmed by a great preponderance of authority, including decisions in the highest courts of Pennsylvania, Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Virginia, Ken- tucky, Missouri, Iowa, ISTebraska, Texas and California, and in the supreme court of the District of Columbia.'"*^ In State v. Jen- nings^ ^^ Chief Justice Thurman said: "The authorities seem to us quite conclusive, that a seizure of the goods of A under color of process against B is official misconduct in the officer making the seizure; and is a breach of the condition of his official bond, where that is, that he will faithfully perform the duties of his office. The reason for this is, that the trespass is not the act of a mere individual, but is perpetrated colore officii. If an officer, under color of a fi. fa., seize property of the debtor that is exempt from execution, no one, I imagine, would deny, that he had broken the condition of his bond. Why should the law be different if, under color of the same process, he take the goods of a third person ? If the exemption of the goods from the execution in the one case, makes their seizure official miscon- duct, why should it not have the like effect in the other? True, it in deciding Reed's case. The final decision in People v. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 173, has been since treated by the court of appeals as settling the law upon this point: Mayor &c. v. Sib- berns, 3 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 266; s. c. 7 Daly (N. Y.) 436; Cummings V. Brown, 43 N. Y. 514; People v. Lucas, 93 N. Y. 585." In addition to the state courts mentioned by the learned justice as holding that the sureties are not liable under the cir- cumstances under consideration may be mentioned the supreme court of Maryland: State v. Brown, 54 Md. 318. It is also to be noted that State V. Druly, 3 Ind. 431, is in conflict with Jenkins v. Lemonds, 29 Ind. 294, the former case affirming the liability of the sureties under the circumstances considered. ®* Citing Carmack v. Common- wealth, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 184; Brunott V. McKee, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 513; Archer v. Noble, 3 Greenl. (Maine) 418; Harris v. Hanson, 2 Fairf. (Maine) 243; Greenfield v. Wilson, 13 Gray (Mass.) 384; Tracy v. Good- win, 5 Allen (Mass.) 409; Sangster V. Commonwealth, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 124; Commonwealth v. Stockton, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 192; Jewell v. Mills, 3 Bush (Ky.) 62; State v. Moore, 19 Mo. 369; State v. Fitzpat- rick, 64 Mo. 185; Charles v. Haskins, 11 Iowa 329; Turner v. Killian, 12 Neb. 580; s. c. 12 N. W. 101; Holli- man v. Carroll's Adm'r, 27 Tex. 23; Van Pelt v. Littler, 14 Cal. 194; United States v. Hine, 3 MacArth. (D. C.) 27. The courts of Georgia and Illinois also concur in the con- clusions of Mr. Justice Gray: Jeffer- son V. Hartley, 81 Ga. 716; s. c. 9 S. E. 174; Jones v. People, 19 111. App. 300. In addition to these cases cited in Lammon v. Feusier may be men- tioned as supporting the doctrine of the text, Strunk v. Ocheltree, 11 Iowa 158; Hubbard v. Elden, 43 Ohio St. 380; s. c. 2 N. B. 434; Forsythe V. Ellis, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 298; Turner v. Sisson, 137 Mass. 191; Peo- ple V. Mersereau, 74 Mich. 687; s. c. 42 N. W. 153. ''a 4 Ohio St. 418. 333 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 352 may sometimes l)o more diffieult to ascertain the ownership of goods, than to know wliether a jjarticukir piece of property is exempt from execution ; but this is not always the case, and if it were, it wouhl not justify us in restricting to litigants, the indemnity afforded by the otlicial bond, thus leaving the rest of the community with no other indemnity against oflicial misconduct than the responsibility of the officer might furnish." § 352. Illustrations of the doctrine. — In some cases where the offi- cer or agent had the legal right and authority to receive the money in respect to which he defaulted, he did not receive the funds accord- ing to the manner prescribed by statute. Thus, in North Carolina, a judgment debtor paid a sheriff before the issue of execution a sum of money to be applied in payment of the judgment. The sheriff defaulted in respect to the money, and his sureties were exonerated from liability on the ground that the receipt of the money by the sheriff before execution issued was an unofficial act."** It is not suffi- cient that there is a custom authorizing the defaulting officer to re- ceive the money in respect to which he has defaulted: it must be his legal right and duty to receive the funds ;^"^ and the general rule may be stated to be that the sureties of an officer incur no liability in respect to money received by him where the statute does not require him to receive the money. "^ § 353. Distinction between judicial and ministerial duties. — The same distinction between the judicial and the ministerial acts of public officers obtains in this branch of the subject under discussion as where the personal liability of officers and agents and the liability of the corporation for their acts was considered. ^"^ As the officer is not in general personally liable for his misfeasance or nonfeasance in the discharge of a judicial duty, and as the corporation itself is ""State V. Allen, 7 Jones L. (N. the last-cited case it was pleaded C.) 564. And in several states it that there was a custom that the has been held where an officer seized clerk should receive all moneys paid property under process, and after- into court, although there was no wards by agreement of the parties statutory authority for his doing so. sold that property in a manner dif- His sureties were held not liable on ferent from the mode prescribed by the ground that the receipt of the law, that the sureties were not liable moneys by him was not an official for default of the officer in respect act. to the proceeds of the sale: Webb v. "-Ward v. Stahl, 81 N. Y. 406; Anspach, 3 Ohio St. 522; Governor Smith v. Stapler, 53 Ga. 300; Branch V. Perrine, 23 Ala. 807; Schloss v. v. Commonwealth, 2 Call (Va.) 510; White, 16 Cal. 65. Saltenberry v. Loucks, 8 La. An. 95. "" Carey v. State, 34 Ind. 105; Har- "* Ante, § 215 et seq. din V. Carrico, 3 Met. (Ky.) 289. In § 354 ruBLic coRPouATioNS. 334 not liable in such case, so the sureties upon his bond can not be held for such act or omission.^"* This general rule is obvious, but there is often great difficulty in determining whether the particular act under consideration is a judicial or a ministerial act. This is espe- cially the case in considering the liability of the sureties of justices of the peace and of highway commissioners — from the nature of each office it is evident that it is frequently difficult to differentiate these two classes of duties. It is perhaps impossible to lay down any gen- eral rule to determine to which class a particular act belongs; the circumstances of each case must be considered before a conclusion can be reached. § 354. Illustrations of the doctrine. — The act of a justice of the peace in entering judgment and issuing execution thereon before the time prescribed by law has been held in South Carolina to be a judi- cial and not a ministerial act.^°^ And so, also, the adjournment of a case against the objection of the plaintiff, where the defendant did not appear, was considered in a recent New York case to be an act of a judicial character, although by the provisions of the statute the jus- tice was required to enter judgment upon the failure of the defend- ant to appear.^**" These acts being judicial in character, it is not competent for the court to inquire into the motive of the justice; and neither the justice nor his sureties incur any liability therefor.^"^ ^'^ Place V. Taylor, 22 Ohio St. 317; where the law gave him no authority McGrew v. Governor, 19 Ala. 89. This to do so: White v. Morse, 139 Mass. is of course a necessary consequence 162; s. c. 29 N. E. 539. Entering of the freedom of the officer and the judgment for less than the sum corporation from liability for the er- proved to be due: Kress v. State, 65 rors of the officer in the performance Ind. 106. Accepting an informal of a judicial duty. recognizance: Chickering v. Robin- I'^'Abrams v. Carlisle, 18 S. C. 242. son, 3 Gush. (Mass.) 543. Error in "^Merwin v. Rogers, 24 N. Y. St. refusing to grant an appeal: Jordan 496. V. Hanson, 49 N. H. 199. Error in ^•"Throop Public Officers, § 733. determining the sufficiency of bail: The learned author collates a num- Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay (S. C.) 1. her of cases in each of which the act See also, on this subject, Fisher v. of the justice was decided to be ju- Deans, 107 Mass. 118; Johnston v. dicial and not ministerial in its char- Moorman, 80 Va. 131; Heard v. Har- acter. Among them may be men- ris, 68 Ala. 43. The following acts of tioned the following: — An error of justices of the peace have been held the justice in directing the writ to to be ministerial; for these acts, the sheriff or any constable, where therefore, their sureties would be the statute required that the writ bound: — Refusing to issue a writ of should be directed to the sheriff: Al- execution upon a judgment entered lee V. Reese, 39 Fed. 341. The act of by him: Fairchild v. Keith, 29 Ohio a justice in giving judgment for costs St. 156. Issuing an execution void 335 OFFICIAL BONDS. § 3; g 355. The same subject continued. — The same rule applies in coiisideriug the liability of t^urcties upon the bonds of highway com- missioners. The duties of these officers as of justices of the peace are of a twofold nature: some of these duties are judicial, others are ministerial. Their judicial duties, according to Mr. Throop, include those which are connected with the opening, discontinuing, closing and general management of highways, together with the assessment of damages or of benefits thereon. For any act done in the perform- ance of these duties they, and consequently their sureties, are not lia- ble so long as the act is within the jurisdiction of the officer as de- fined by statute.^"* It is, however, a ministerial duty for these offi- cers to keep the highways in repair if they have sufficient funds to do so; and it is also a ministerial duty for them, if practicable, to upon its face: Noxon v. Hill, 2 Allen (Mass.) 215. Rendering a judgment exceeding his jurisdiction : Estopinal V. Peyroux, 37 La. An. 477. Issuing a warrant of attachment or of arrest in a case where he was not author- ized at law to issue such process: Wright V. Rouss, 18 Neb. 234; s. c. 25 N. W. 80; Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohio St. 186. See also, for similar instances collated in Throop Public Officers, § 734: Inos v. Winspear, 18 Cal. 397; Briggs v. Wardwell, 10 Mass. 356; Sullivan v. Jones, 2 Gray (Mass.) 570; Fisher v. Deans, 107 Mass. 118; Albee v. Ward, 8 Mass. 79; State v. Carrick, 70 Md. 586; s. c. 17 Atl. 559; Spencer v. Perry, 17 Maine 413; Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Tracy v. Williams, 4 Conn. 107; Flack v. Harrington, 1 111. 213; Adkins v. Brewer, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 206; Clarke v. May, 2 Gray (Mass.) 410; Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray (Mass.) 120; Doggett v. Cook, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 262; Shaw v. Reed, 16 Mass. 450; Welch v. Gleason, 28 S. C. 247; s. c. 5 S. E. 599; Kelly v. Moore, 51 Ala. 364; Lanpher v. Dew- ell, 56 Iowa 153; s. c. 9 N. W. 101; Revill V. Pettit. 3 Met. (Ky.) 314; Bore V. Bush, 6 Mart. N. S. (La.) 1; Terrail v. Tinney, 20 La. An. 444; Tyler v. Alford, 38 Maine 530; Ken- dall V. Powers, 4 Met. (Mass.) 553; Knowles v. Davis, 2 Allen (Mass.) 61; Guenther v. Whiteacre, 24 Mich. 504; Evertson v. Sutton, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 280; Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 462; Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 178; Hough- ton V. Swarthout, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 589; Christopher v. Van Liew, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; Blythe v. Tomp- kins, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 468; Kerns V. Schoonmaker, 4 Ohio 331; Miller v. Grice, 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) 27; Mor- rill V. Thurston, 46 Vt. 732; Vaughn V. Congdon, 56 Vt. 111. ^<« Throop Public Officers, § 736; citing Elder v. Bemis, 2 Met. (Mass.) 599; Benjamin v. Wheeler, 15 Gray (Mass.) 486; Morrison v. Howe, 120 Mass. 565; Denniston v. Clark, 125 Mass. 216; Hatch v. Hawkes, 126 Mass. 177; TJpham v. Marsh, 128 Mass. 546; Johnson v. Dunn, 134 Mass. 522; Sage v. Lau- rain, 19 Mich. 137; Highway Com'rs V. Ely, 54 Mich. 173; s. c. 19 N. W. 940; Lamed v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393; s. c. 29 N. W. 22; Clark v. Phelps, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 190; Van Steenbergh V. Bigelow, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 42; Mil- ler V. Brown, 56 N. Y. 383; Morse v. Williamson, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 472; Harrington v. Commissioners &c., 2 McC. (S. C.) 400. Contra, Adams v. Richardson, 43 N. H. 212. § 355 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 336 obtain the requisite and necessary funds ; and for their official default in respect to these duties their sureties are considered to be liable.^''^ i»»Throop Public Officers, § 737; N. E. 43; People v. Board &c., 75 N. citing Pomfrey v. Village of Sara- Y. 316; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. toga Springs, 104 N. Y. 459; s. c. 11 113; and other cases. CHAPTEE XI. I MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. Section Section 356. Town meeting in New England 382. The and elsewhere. 357. Right to meeting — Mandamus to enforce. 358. Application for and authority to call a meeting. 359. Secondary authority to call a meeting. 360. General purpose of a warning. 361. Designation of time and place of meeting. General and formal requisites of a warrant. The same subject continued. Service of warrant. Time of service. Return of service. Notice of annual meetings. 368. The same subject continued. 369. Time of meeting. 370. Place of meeting. 371. Organization of meeting — The moderator. The same subject continued — Clerk and clerk pro tempore. Adjournments of meetings. The same subject continued. The power of adjournment lim- ited. Adjourned meetings. Reconsideration and rescis- sion — The general rule. 378. The same subject continued — Illustrations. The same subject continued — The rule qualified. Ratification of doings of inval- id meetings. Parliamentary law in town meetings. 1 Smith— 22 (337) 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 379. 380. 381. same subject continued — Illustrations. Validity of votes as determined by the warrant — Illustrations. The same subject continued. Invalidity of votes — Illustra- tions. The same subject continued. 387. Votes at town meeting — Gen- eral rules of construction. Record of proceedings. Parol evidence of proceedings. Doings of meetings not legally called. Presumptions in favor of an- cient meetings. 392. Notice of election. 393. Qualification of voters — Power to prescribe. Registration acts. Place of election. The same subject continued. Popular elections — Plurality. The same subject continued — Majorities, etc. Voting by ballot. 400. The same subject continued. 401. The Australian ballot and cu- mulative voting. 402. Absolute accuracy not required in a ballot. 403. Votes for ineligible candidates. 404. Putting up offices at auction — Tax collector. 405. City council as judge of elec- tion and qualification of its members. 406. Canvass and return and contest of elections. 383. 384. 385. 386. 388. 389. 390. 391. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. ^ 356 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 338 § 356. Town meetings in New England and elsewhere. — In a pre- ceding chapter we have discussed the rules of law by which the meet- ings and proceedings of public boards are regulated.^ We shall now consider some of the statutory and judicial regulations of "town meetings," a term which we apply generically to all popular meetings of the inhabitants of local communities — whether of strictly munici- pal corporations or of public quasi-corporations, such as school dis- tricts. The institution of town meetings in this country is coeval with the settlement of New England; and it is in the decisions of the courts of the states composing that section that we find the great body of the law on this subject. These gatherings of the people have been jjronounced by students of political science who have closely ex- amined their methods of operation and the influence exerted by them, to be the most potent agents in promoting the art of self-government that the world has ever known. "In a New England township the people directly govern themselves; the government is the people, or, to speak with entire precision, it is all the male inhabitants of one- and-twenty years of age and upwards. The people tax themselves. Once each year, usually in March, but sometimes as early as February or as late as April, a 'town meeting is held at which all the grown men of the township are expected to be present and to vote, while any one may introduce motions or take part in the discussion.' In early times there was a fine for non-attendance, but this is no longer the case; it is supposed that a due regard to his own interests will induce every man to come. The town meeting is held in the town house, but at first it used to be held in the church, which was thus a meeting house 'for civil as well as ecclesiastical purposes.' At the town meeting measures relating to the administration of town afEairs are discussed and adopted or rejected; appropriations are made for the public expenses of the town, or, in other words, the amount of the town taxes for the year is determined and town officers are elected for the year."^ But the administration of local affairs by means of town meetings is not now confined to the towns of New England, al- ^ Public Boards, ch. 9, ante. political training-school in exist- ^ Prof. Fiske's "Civil Government ence. Its educational value is far in the United States," p. 19. In an- higher than that of the newspaper, other part of this work, which is an which in spite of its many merits interesting and eloquent dissertation as a diffuser of information is very on town meetings, the author apt to do its best to bemuddle and says: — "In the kind of discussion sophisticate plain facts." Ibid., p. which it provokes, in the necessity 31. See also, 'American Political of facing argument with argument. Ideas," by the same author, ch. 1, and of keeping one's temper under Town Meetings, control, the town meeting is the best 339 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 357 though these are perhaps invested with more ample powers than are conferred upon tliem elsewhere: in many of the western states the township system with its town meeting for deliberative purposes is steadily supplanting or ceasing to become subordinate to the system of county government, and when tried under favorable conditions is not likely to be abandoned, except when of necessity an increase of population demands a representative borough or city government.^ § 357. Right to meeting — Mandamus to enforce. — In Connecticut "special town meetings may be convened when the selectmen shall deem it necessary or on application of twenty inhabitants qualified to vote in town meetings." By judicial construction the last clause of this provision is mandatory to the selectmen, and the requisite number of voters have a right to demand that a meeting be called for any legitimate and proper purpose.* Although it is not compe- tent for the petitioners to dictate to the selectmen the day and hour for the meeting to be held, it is no objection to the petition that it specifies the day and hour, for the selectmen may call a meeting at any reasonable time.^ If, however, those officers neglect to perform their duty in the premises, the remedy is by mandamus; but all the selectmen must be made parties to the proceeding, and the writ can only issue in the name of the state as plaintiff.*' ^ See Prof. Fiske's treatise cited in the writ or whether it may be pros- the preceding note, p. 89 et seq. ecuted by any inhabitant of the town * But the purpose must not be un- as relator is a question on which the lawful or manifestly frivolous or im- authorities differ. It is held by some proper. See dissenting opinion of that any person having a general in- Phelps, J., in Lyon v. Rice, 41 Conn, terest in the subject-matter may be 245, 251. There is no clear legal a relator and prosecute the writ in right to have a meeting called "to the name of the state: People v. take action on resolutions to be of- Collins, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 56; Ham- fered [in the legislature] for the re- ilton v. State, 3 Ind. 452; State v. peal of the charter of the borough." County Judge, 7 Iowa 186; Hall v. The court said that "the borough People, 57 111. 307. By others it is meeting is not the proper tribunal to held that it can only be prosecuted pass upon that question:" Peck v. by a public officer: People v. Re- Booth, 42 Conn. 271, 274. gents &c., 4 Mich. 98; Heffner v. "Lyon V. Rice, 41 Conn. 245. Cf. Commonwealth, 28 Pa. St. 108; Bob- Denniston v. School Dist., 17 N. H. bett v. State, 10 Kan. 9; Linden v. 492, where it was held that the Alameda Co., 45 Cal. 6; Sanger v. choice of day by the petitioners must Commissioners, 25 Maine 291; Bates not be disregarded. v. Overseers &c., 14 Gray (Mass.) <=Peck V. Booth, 42 Conn. 271, 274; 163." See also, Wyandotte &c. Br. Lyon V. Rice, 41 Conn. 245. In the Co. v. Commissioners, 10 Kan. 331; case last cited the court said: — Territory v. Cole, 3 Dak. 301; s. c. "Whether the prosecuting officer 19 N. W. 418; State v. Ware, 13 Or. alone may apply for and prosecute 380; s. c. 10 Pac. 885. And cf. State § 358 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 340 § 358. Application for and authority to call a meeting. — Where a board has autliority to call a meeting upon the application of a cer- tain umuber of voters or freeholders the petition need not describe them as such;" and the decision of the board that the subscribers are qualified is final and conclusive.® An application for a school-district meeting bearing date before the town meeting at which it should be determined whether the district would bo permitted to hold a meeting is premature and all action under it void.^ Any signer of the peti- tion may withdraw his name before action has been taken, and if a sufficient number do not remain the duty to call the meeting ceases.^'' A board of trustees having authority to call a meeting when in their judgment the interests of the district require it can act only at a reg- ular session; and a call signed by two without notice to the other, who afterward refuses to sign it, is without any legal efficacy. ^^ A meeting may be called by officers de facto : provided, of course, that . the same officers de jure would have that power. ^- Where a school district has exercised a statutory right to prescribe the manner in which meetings shall be called they can not be convened in any other way so long as the vote remains unrescinded.^^ V. Common Council &c., 33 N. J. L. 110; People v. Brooklyn Council, 77 N. Y. 503. ^ "It is sufficient if they are such:" Fletcher v. Inhabitants &c., 20 Maine 439. A meeting called upon the ap- plication of less than the required number of persons is void: McVichie V. Town of Knight, 82 Wis. 137; s. c. 51 N. W. 1094. * State V. Supervisors &c., 23 Minn. 521. Except, perhaps, the court said, upon a review in a direct proceed- ing. Contra, Ladd v. Clements, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 476; Fletcher v. In- habitants &c., 20 Maine 439. See also, cases cited in the following section. ^ School Dist. V. Lord, 44 Maine 374. " Dutten V. Village of Hanover, 42 Ohio St. 215. The application need not be recorded: Roper v. Inhab- itants &c., 28 Maine 193. And a statute requiring it is directory merely: State v. Supervisors, 58 Wis. 291; s. c. 17 N. W. 20. " Bogert V. Trustees, 43 N. J. L. 358. ^-Williams v. Inhabitants &c., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75. Cf. Little v. Mer- rill, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 543. " Hayward v. Inhabitants &c., 2 Cush. (Mass.) 419. The power given by statute to an ecclesiastical body to prescribe the mode of warning its meetings does not enable it to dis- pense with a warning by the com- mittee: Society of Bethany v. Sper- ry, 10 Conn. 200. See further, for a construction of statutes and by-laws conferring authority to call school- district meetings, Stone v. Inhab- itants &c., 8 Cush. (Mass.) 592 (au- thority to warn not authority to call ) ; Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 543; Mason v. School Dist, 20 Vt. 487; Corliss v. Corliss, 8 Vt. 373. And that an application will be presumed, Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt. 416; Mason v. School Dist, 20 Vt 487. 341 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 359 § 359. Secondary authority to call a meeting. — Anthority to call meetings is frequently given by statute to a certain officer or board contingent upon tlie neglect or refusal of others to perform the duty east upon them in the first instance. In such cases the well-estab- lished principle that nothing can be presumed in favor of the juris- diction of the parties acting under special authority^* is generally applied, and the existence of the conditions precedent becomes an issuable fact; and if successfully controverted the result is so fatal that a tax collector appointed at a meeting founded on the call can not justify in an action of trespass. ^'^^ But where a school-district committee upon due application for a meeting on a day certain re- fused to call it, and, within the time allowed by statute, called a meeting for a day one month later than that specified, the court held it to be a "neglect * * * after application," etc., which author- ized the selectmen to call a meeting;^'' and the same construction of the statute was adopted in a case where the meeting called upon the original application would have been illegal for want of sufficient notice.^® § 360. General purpose of a warning. — The rationale of warnings of New England town meetings is, perhaps, placed upon a firmer foundation by Justice Gray of the United States supreme court than by any other jurist who has had occasion to discuss the subject. "In Connecticut, as in Massachusetts and Maine," said he, "by common law or immemorial usage the property of any inhabitant may be taken on execution upon a judgment against the town.^^ A town "Little V. Merrill, 10 Pick. &c. v. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 148. (Mass.) 543; Rossiter v. Peck, 3 Cf. State v. Supervisors &c., 23 Minn. Gray (Mass.) 538; Barrett v. Crane, 521, cited in note 8, ante. 16 Vt. 246; Betts v. Bagley, 12 Pick. ''^ Dennlston v. School Dist, 17 N. (Mass.) 572; Bennett v. Burch, 1 H. 492. If the committee could ig- Denio (N. Y. ) 141; Sharp v. Spier, nore the petitioner's desire in re- 4 Hill (N. Y.) 76. spect of the time, "it is plain," said "a Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H. 206; the court, "that no special meeting Giles V. School Dist., 31 N. H. 304; could ever be held against their Starbird v. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine will." In Connecticut the officers 101. A justice of the peace having are not in default if the day fixed by authority to call a meeting upon ap- them is within a reasonable time: plication after an unreasonable re- Lyon v. Rice, 41 Conn. 245. fusal of the selectmen, is powerless ^"Pickering v. De Rochemont, 66 to act if the majority of the se- N. H. 377; s. c. 23 Atl. 88, where it lectmen have not been requested: was held that the warrant need not Southard v. Inhabitants, 53 Maine recite the neglect. 389; citing Ladd V. Clements, 4 Cvish. ^"Citing Atwater v. Inhabitants (Mass.) 476; Fletcher v. Inhabit- &c., 6 Conn. 223, 228; McLoud v. Sel- ants &c., 20 Maine 439; Inhabitants by, 10 Conn. 390; Beardsley v. § 361 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 342 can not contract or authorize any officer or agent to make one except by vote in a town meeting duly notified or warned; and the notice or warning must specify the matter to be acted on in order that all the inhabitants (whose property will be subject to be taken on execution to satisfy the obligation of the town) may know in advance what busi- ness is to be transacted at the meeting,"^** This reason has also been adduced: "If the object of the meeting is specified it will present a motive to the inhabitants to be present and they will leave business even if it be pressing, provided they feel an interest in the subject to be determined. On the other hand, if the object is unimportant and any of the inhabitants should feel no concern in the result, they may with safety pursue their ordinary business; and this certainly is matter of convenience. The warning designating the object of the meeting is fair and in prevention of those little artifices which some- times endanger the public peace and throw communities into animos- ities and divisions."^ ^ Again, it is to enable the people "to give the subject consideration previous to the meeting,"-" and "that the will of individuals may not be subjected to the will of a majority any fur- ther than it is subjected by law."-^ § 361. Designation of time and place of meeting. — A statute pro- vided that annual town meetings should be held at the place where the last meeting was held or at such other place as should have been ordered at a previous meeting. There was also a general provision that the doings of town meetings might be reconsidered upon motion made within a certain time.^^ It was decided that the mere fact that a majority of the ballots for town officers cast at a regular meeting contained words indicating the will of the voters that the next meet- ing should be held at a certain place named thereon M^as not a suffi- cient designation within the intent of the law. The proposition should have been submitted to the meeting as a deliberative body, and the election of an officer in the following year at the place as- signed was declared to be void.^^ If an annual meeting neglects to Smith, 16 Conn. 368; 5 Dane Abr. ^^ Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391, 158; Chase v. President &c., 19 396. Pick. (Mass.) 564, 569; Gaskill v. -"Blush v. Town of Colchester, 39 Dudley, 6 Met. (Mass.) 546; Adams Vt. 193, 196. V. President &c., 1 Greenl. (Maine) -'Pittsburg v. Danforth, 56 N. H. 361; Fernald v. Lewis, 6 Greenl. 272. (Maine) 264; Hopkins v. Town of "- The power to reconsider does not Elmore, 49 Vt. 176; Rev. Stats. N. H. depend on statute: See § 377 et seq., 1878, ch. 239, § 8. See also, ch. 5, post. ante. '' State v. Davidson, 32 Wis. 114. '* Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, A charter provision that all warn 121 U. S. 121; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 865. ings of city meetings "shall be is- 343 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 362 appoint a timo and place under the power conferred by statute, and the hitter makes no provision in case of such a failure, the proceedings of a meeting duly called by the proper authorities will be upheld;^* but a statute providing for such an omission is mandatory.-^ A by- law prescribing seven days' notice of meetings is reasonable f^ but an ordinance requiring a notice of not less than three months is void for unreasonableness.^'^ ^ § 362. General and formal requisites of a warrant. — The statutes, with only slight dilfereuces in phraseology, require the time, place and objects of a meeting to be specified in the notice, or warrant, as it is usually termed. It is not essential that it be addressed to the inhabitants or voters,^^ or that the application be recited in it;^* and, in the absence of statute, no seal is required.^** A date is not in- dispensable;^^ and if a warrant be issued by freeholders under statu- tory authority their naked signatures suffice.^" It is valid if signed by a majority of the board having power to issue it;^^ and a meeting is "called by the * * * committee" when the warrant is signed by the clerk "by order of the * * * committee;"^'* but it is not "under the hands of the selectmen" where only one of the board sued by the mayor and published in the manner designated in the by- laws of the city" delegates to the city the right to fix by a standing by-law the time and extent of such publication, and is not controlled by the general statutes which prescribe how town meetings shall be warned: Allen V. City of Burlington, 45 Vt. 202. -' Otherwise no annual meeting could ever afterwards be held: San- born V. School Dist, 12 Minn. 17. -^ Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 646; s. c. affirmed, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 526. =« Rand v. Wilder, 11 Gush. (Mass.) 294. -^ Jones v. Inhabitants &c., 66 Maine 585. ^ Baldwin v. Town of North Branford, 32 Conn. 47. See also, Pickering v. De Rochemont, 66 N. H. 377; s. c. 23 Atl. 88. ^ Roper V. Inhabitants &c., 28 Maine 193; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439. See also, Pickering v. Ue Rochemont, 66 N. H. 377; s. c. 23 Atl. 88; Mason v. School Dist, 20 Vt. 487. ™Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass. 105; Kingsbury v. School Dist., 12 Met. (Mass.) 99; Inhabitants &c. v. Spofford, 12 Maine 487. ^^ Denniston v. School Dist, 17 N. H. 492; Briggs v. Murdock, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 305. ^- Sturm v. School Dist, 45 Minn. 88; s. c. 47 N. W. 462; citing Willis V. Sproule, 13 Kan. 257; Austin v. Allen, 6 Wis. 134; Washington Ice Co. V. Lay, 103 Ind. 48; s. c. 2 N. E. 222. ^^ Reynolds v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Met. (Mass.) 340. Cf. Bogert v. Trustees, 43 N. J. L. 358, cited in § 358, ante. ^* Kingsbury v. School Dist.. 12 Met (Mass.) 99. See also. Smith v. Board &c., 45 Fed. 725. Otherwise if there is no previous authority or subsequent ratification: Society of Bethany v. Sperry, 10 Conn. 200. S 3G3 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 344 signs "by order of the selectmen ;"^'^ and it is not "issued" by the mayor unless signed by him;^° and a warrant signed by the proper officer, but without any official designation or anything in the docu- ment to indicate his official character, is fatally defective.^'^ The year of the meeting ought to be specified,^® and the hour^" and place*" are of vital importance.*^ § 363. The same subject continued. — Technical accuracy is not required, nor is the warrant to be construed with the same strictness as a power of attorney, or a penal statute,*^ or a special plea:*^ the law is satisfied if the propositions to be submitted are indicated with such reasonable certainty that no person interested can be misled.** Where the design is to raise money the subjects need not be set forth with greater particularity than is expressed in the statute' which au- thorizes the town to vote money for the purposes named in the war- rant.*^ If the application for a meeting contains precise and enu- merated articles and the warrant is annexed thereto upon the same ^'' Reynolds v. Inhabitants, 6 Met. (Mass.) 340. And see s. c, p. 344. ^^ Allen V. City of Burlington, 45 Vt. 202. " McVichie v. Town of Knight, 82 Wis. 137; s. c. 51 N. W. 1094. ^^ Wilson V. Waltersville School Dist., 44 Conn. 157, which, however, does not decide that it is indispen- sable. "" If this is omitted in the record of the warning, parol evidence is in- admissible to show that the original did in fact fix the hour, or that all the legal voters were present and voted: Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337; s. c. 16 Vt. 439. See also. King v. Theodorick, 8 East 543; Moor v. Newfield, 4 Maine 44. '"Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439. A warrant calling a meeting at a certain hall may imply that it is in the town and known to the voters: George v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Met. (Mass.) 497. " The presence and consent of all the inhabitants at a meeting not le- gally warned is not a waiver of the defect: Moor v. Newfield, 4 Maine 44. See also, Ruhland v. Supervis- ors, 55 Wis. 664; s. c. 13 N. W. 877. " Belfast &c. R. Co. v. Inhabitants &c., 60 Maine 568; Grover v. Inhabit- ants &c., 11 Allen (Mass.) 88; Kitt- redge v. Inhabitants &c., 138 Mass. 286. '^ South School Dist. v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227. «Wyley v. Wilson, 44 Vt. 404; Ovitt V. Chase, 37 Vt. 196; Moore v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 219; Austin v. In- habitants &c., 57 Maine 304; Alger V. Curry, 40 Vt. 437; Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 865. "They are the lan- guage of plain men for practical purposes:" Per Redfield, J., in Hub- bard V. Newton, 52 Vt. 346; Blush V. Town of Colchester, 39 Vt. 193. A statute requiring the subject-mat- ter to be "distinctly stated" adds no force to the intent of a former stat- ute providing that the "intent and design" should be specified: Child V. Colburn, 54 N. H. 71, 80. See also, cases cited in the two preced- ing notes; and for a more particular examination of the subject, § 383 et seq., post. "' Alger V. Curry, 40 Vt. 437. See also, Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113. oio MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 3G-i paper calling a meeting to act on those articles, they are a part of the warrant as ett'ectually as if they were embodied in it;*" and a meeting is called for each and every article in the warrant, although one article requires a majority vote and another a two-thirds vote.*'' Where the action of a town was invalid because of want of power and also because there was no notice in the warning of the subject which was considered, an act of the legislature referring to such pro- ceedings as "without authority of law," and confirming them, heals all the invalidities.*^ § 364. Service of warrant. — The statutes generally require an attested copy of the warrant to be posted in two or more public places a certain time before the meeting.*^ The original may be posted, although the letter of the law specities a copy, and the original to be returned with the officer's doing thereon.^'' The notice must be put up the required length of time,''^ but not necessarily in the usual place. ^- The words "public places," as used in statutes, are construed to mean such places as in comparison with others in the same town are those where the inhabitants and others most fre- quently meet or resort or have occasion to be, so that a notice there would for that reason be most likely to be seen. The character of the town and the situation and use of the place and the amount of resort to it, if disputed, are matters of fact for a jury; but if the facts are apparent it is a question of law what is a public place.^^ A *" George v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Met. =° Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H. 206; (Mass.) 497. Norris v. Eaton, 7 N. H. 284. See ^'Inhabitants &c. v. Smith, 65 also, Eaton v. Miner, 5 N. H. 542; Maine 203. King v. Inhabitants &c., 6 T. R. 534; ^* Baldwin v. Town of North Bran- King v. Inhabitants &c., 1 East 13. ford, 32 Conn. 47. Copies should include all the signa- " It has been said that this duty is tures to the original: Chapin v. personal and can not be delegated; School Dist., 30 N. H. 25. but the officer's return that he '^^ And the record may be amended "caused" the notice to be posted im- to record the fact that it was not, plies that it was done under his and thus invalidate the action of the own eye: Parker v. Titcomb, 82 meeting: Blake v. Orford, 64 N. H. Maine 180; s. c. 19 Atl. 162. Cf. Phil- 299; s. c. 10 Atl. 117. There were lips v. Town of Albany, 28 Wis. 340, no vested rights, "if in a case of this where the officer employed others to character the question is material," do the posting, and the court was said the court. loath to believe that an objection °- Stoddard v. Oilman, 22 Vt. 568. was seriously taken; "if it is, it is '^^Proprietors &c. v. Chandler, 6 seriously overruled:" S. C, p. 356. N. H. 271, 279; Gibson v. Bailey, 9 Presumption in favor of regularity: N. H. 168, 175, 178; Wells v. Bur- State V. Supervisors &c., 23 Minn, bank, 17 N. H. 393; Proprietors &c. 521. See also, Town of Lennington v. Page, 6 N. H. 182, 190; Russell v. V. Blodgett, 37 Vt. 210. Dyer, 40 N. H. 173, 186, 187; s. c. 43 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 346 "conspicuous" place is not synonymous with '^public"; both words are sometimes used in conjunction to insure the posting of notice in a public place in such a position that it may readily be seen.^* § 365. Time of service. — It was held in England that where notice was required "at least sixteen days before" a meeting, both the day of tbe notice and the day of the meeting were to be excluded in the computation f^ but according to the unifonn rule in this country wherever the question has arisen only one of these days is excluded f^ it was so decided where the language was "at least twelve days before the time appointed;"^'' and where it was "at least five days inclusive before the meeting is to be held."^^ Where notice is published the date of a newspaper is presumed to be the date of its publication,'^'' al- though it is printed and many copies sent out on the preceding day.*''* Statutory provisions relating to the period of notice of public meet- N. H. 396, 397, 398; Wells v. Jack- son &c. Co., 47 N. H. 235, 255; Ca- hoon V. Coe, 52 N. H. 518, 522; French v. Spalding, 61 N. H. 395, 401. A shoemaker's shop is not a public place: Tidd v. Smith, 3 N. H. 178. Prima facie a blacksmith shop is: Soper v. Inhabitants &c., 28 Maine 193. And an inn and a post- office: Hoitt V. Burnham, 61 N. H. 620. And houses of public wor- ship: Scammon v. Scammon, 28 N. H. 419. But not the inside of the door if it is kept locked: Osgood v. Blake, 21 N. H. 550, 562. And a grist-mill: Fletcher v. Inhabitants &c., 20 Maine 439. A stage office may be: Baker v. Shephard, 24 N. H. 208, 212. And a schoolhouse; a building formerly used as a grain building; a large board fastened on the roadside wall: Seabury v. How- land, 15 R. I. 446; s. c. 8 Atl. 341. For other cases relating to desig- nated or public places and depend- ing upon special facts, see Chapin V. School Dist., 30 N. H. 25; Briggs V. Murdock, 13 Pick. (Mass.)' 305; Soper V. Inhabitants &c., 28 Maine 193; State v. Beeman, 35 Maine 242. An allegation in a complaint that the notice was not posted in the most public place is a sufficient averment of fact, and not merely of a legal conclusion, to withstand a demur- rer: McVichie v. Town of Knight, 82 Wis. 137; s. c. 51 N. W. 1094. ^* A neglect to heed this distinc- tion is fatal: Lewey's Island R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Maine 451; Wardens &c. V. Woodward, 26 Maine 172. ^^ Reg. V. Justices &c., 8 Ad. & El. 173. See also, Reg. v. Lander, 1 Ir. R. C. L. 225. ^^ Mason v. School Dist., 20 Vt. 487; Hunt v. School Dist, 14 Vt. 300; Hubbard v. Town of Williams- town, 61 Wis. 397; s. c. 21 N. W. 295; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Town of Hebron, 51 Conn. 22; citing Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wall. 177; Bigelow v. Wilson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502. See also, Osgood v. Blake, 21 N. H. 550, 562. " Pratt v. Town of Swanton, 15 Vt. 147. ^^ Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Town of Hebron, 51 Conn. 22. ^^ Schoff V. Gould, 52 N. H. 512. '" "General publicity can not fair- ly be said to be given to anything contained in it till the day of its date and general circulation:" Queen v. Aberdare Canal Co., 14 Q. B. 854. MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 366 ings are mandatory, and a strict compliance therewith is an indispen- sable prerequisite to valid action/^ but a defect in this particular may be cured by act of the legislature." - § 366. Return of service. — A return of service of a warning is necessary even if no statute requires it.^^ The return need not be dated/* nor is the date conclusive of the time of service.®^ If it is signed "B, Constable/^ without adding "of the town of," etc., it is sufficient.*'® In Maine, where the statute requires the return to state "the manner of notice and the time it was given," it must show spe- cifically and precisely that the notice was served in exact conformity with the statute.**^ «^ McVichie v. Town of Knight, 82 Wis. 137; s. c. 51 N. W. 1094; Green- banks V. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207; Stuart v. Town of Warren, 37 Conn. 225; and the preceding notes to this section. If the warning is not dated and is not required to be, the posted copy need not be dated, in which case parol evidence is admis- sible to show when it was put up: Braley v. Dickinson, 48 Vt. 599. "= Stuart v. Town of Warren, 37 Conn. 225. See also, Allen v. Arch- er, 49 Maine 346. But a statute validating the "doings" of certain cities, etc., in respect of bounties, contemplates only the doings of meetings legally held: Sanborn v. Machiasport, 53 Maine 82. ^^ "Such has been the invariable practice from time immemorial in towns and parishes in Massachu- setts and in this state since its or- ganization : " Tuttle V. Gary, 7 Maine 426. 430. " Briggs V. Murdock, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 305. ^■^ Williams v. Inhabitants &c., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75; Inhabitants &c. v. Spofford, 12 Maine 487. "It is the common practice and sanctioned as legal" to date it on the day of the meeting: Ford v. Clough. 8 Maine 334; Tuttle v. Gary, 7 Maine 426, 430; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 109. ®* Commonwealth v. Shaw, 7 Met. (Mass.) 52. "" General statements in regard to time or place are insufficient: War- dens &c. V. Woodward, 26 Maine 172; Bearce v. Fossett, 34 Maine 575; Tuttle V. Gary, 7 Maine 426; Allen v. Archer, 49 Maine 346; Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194; Gibson v. Bai- ley, 9 N. H. 168, 178; Proprietors &c. V. Page, 6 N. H. 182; Clark v. Ward- well. 55 Maine 61; Hamilton v. In- habitants &c., 55 Maine 193; State V. Williams, 25 Maine 561, a thor- oughly considered case. See also, Rowland v. School Dist., 15 R. I. 184; s. c. 2 Atl. 549; 8 Atl. 337. It must state that the copies were "at- tested:" Fossett V. Bearce, 29 Maine 523. The court will not take ju- dicial notice that the "Baptist," etc., meeting-houses or the "schoolhouse over the hill" are within the town: Brown v. Witham, 51 Maine 29. Cf. Marble v. McKenney, 60 Maine 332. The original is admissible if the statute does not require a record of it: Inhabitants &c. v. Spofford, 12 Maine 487. The rule is otherwise than as stated in the text where the statute does not prescribe the mode except that it shall be as the town may agree: Inhabitants &c. v. Spof- ford, 12 Maine 487; Ford v. Clough, 8 Maine 334. Notices presumed to be legally posted in case of ancient S 367 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 348 § 367. Notice of annual meetings. — Although the proceedings of special meetings are founded wholly upon a rigid compliance with the provisions of the statute relating to notice, it is held in some cases and intimated in others that these regulations are not mandatory in every particular when applied to annual meetings; indeed, it was declared in New York that no notice whatever is essential to the legal- ity of an annual school-district meeting held at a time and place previously fixed according to law.^^ Somewhat more guarded expres- sions are iised elsewhere. "The annual election of town officers," said Justice Gray, "or any other act which the statutes require to be done by the inhabitants at each annual meeting, might perhaps be suffi- ciently proved by what was done at the meeting without proving a special notice of it in the warning.®'' But wdth these exceptions such a notice is a necessary prerequisite to the validity of any act of the town either at annual meetings or at a special meeting.""" And Judge Cooley says: "Where, however, both the time and place of an election are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to take notice of the law and to deposit his ballot at the time and place appointed. meetings: School Dist. v. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507, 514 (more than twenty years) ; Adams v. Stanyon, 24 N. H. 405; Willey v. Portsmouth, 35 N. H. 303, 309; Peterborough v. Lancaster, 14 N. H. 382 (thirty-eight years); and especially, Schoff v. Gould, 52 N. H. 512 (thirty years). And these defects are amenable according to the facts: Kellar v. Savage, 17 Maine 444; Harris v. School Dist.. 28 N. H. 58; Clark v. Wardwell, 55 Maine 61. An omission to return may be supplied: Bean v. Thomp- son, 19 N. H. 290. The amendment can be made only by the officer: Fossett v. Bearce, 29 Maine 523. In Massachusetts the question was for- merly one of doubt, the ground tak- en being that it required the for- mality of an officer's return in a civil suit: Perry v. Inhabitants &c., 12 Pick. (Mass.) 206; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 109; Gil- more V. Holt, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 258. But under the latest exposition of the law a general return of service "according to law" is sufficient: Briggs V. Murdock, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 305; Houghton v. Davenport, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 235; Rand v. Wilder, 11 Gush. (Mass.) 294. See also. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 7 Met. (Mass.) 52; Sanborn v. School Dist., 12 Minn. 17; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 594; Detroit &c. R. Co. v. Bearss, 39 Ind. 598; Codman V. Winslow, 10 Mass. 146; State v. Donahay, 30 N. J. L. 404. Cf. Hard- castle V. State, 27 N. J. L. 551. The Massachusetts and Maine cases are reconciled in State v. Williams, 25 Maine 561, the distinctness of the Maine statute controlling the deci- sions in that state. Return can not be impeached by parol; if false, the officer may be indicted: Saxton V. Nimms, 14 Mass. 315. •^^ Obiter, Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 646; s. c. affirmed, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 526. •"* Citing Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 109; Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 258. "" Bloomfleld v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 865. 349 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 368 notwithstanding the ofTicial whose duty it is to give notice of the elec- tion has failed in that duty/''^ § 368. The same subject continued. — Where annual town meetings are empowered to raise money for the support of the poor, and for defraying all other proper charges and expenses of the town, and to direct the institution and defense of all actions in which the town is a party or interested, the meeting may vote to allow a certain sum in settlement of a claim for the support of a pauper without previous notice that such claim would he presented.'^- It was said in a Con- necticut case that a vote at an annual town meeting appointing a superintendent of highways was void for the reason that there was nothing in the warning to notify the inhabitants that such an officer would be chosen. '^^ A by-law of a corporation, fixing a time but not a place for an annual election, does not dispense with the public notice required by its charter or render that provision of the charter merely directory.''* § 369. Time of meeting. — A town meeting should be held sub- stantially at the hour specified in the warning.'^ ^ It ought to be opened within a reasonable time after the hour appointed. What would be a reasonable time depends in some measure upon the cir- cumstances. It is frequently the case that a meeting is named to be holden at nine o'clock in the forenoon and not opened until some hours afterward. If the delay is for the mere purpose of enabling " Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) " Per Andrews, C. J., in Pinney v. 759; citing People v. Cowles, 13 N. Brown, 60 Conn. 164; s. c. 22 Atl. Y. 350; Peoifle v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 430. Note, however, that in Con- 477; State v. Jones, 19 Ind. 356; necticut a superintendent of high- People V. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; ways is an officer unlinown to the Dishon V. Smith, 10 Iowa 212; State statute. In Gordon v. Clifford, 28 V. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; State v. N. H. 402, it was objected to the le- Goetze, 22 Wis. 363; State v. Skirv- gality of the election of selectmen ing, 19 Neb. 497; s. c. 27 N. W. 723. that the warning did not specify the Contra, Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio St. purpose of the meeting, and the case 532. See also, Warner v. Mower, 11 sent up to the supreme court did not Vt. 385, at p. 391. Of course, there show affirmatively that the warrant can be no contention where the stat- was perfect, yet the court presumed ute by fair implication dispenses that it was sufficient until the con- with notice of annual meetings, trary should be shown, and such is held to be the case if the " United States v. McKelden, statute requires notice only of spe- MacArth. & M. 162. cial meetings: Schoff v. Town of '^ See Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. Bloomfield, 8 Vt. 472. 439. "Tuttle V. Town of Weston, 59 Wis. 151; s. c. 17 N. W. 12. § 370 PUBLIC COIU'OKATIOXS. 350 the inhabitants to assemble, and without prejudice to any one, it would be outrageously unjust to hold the proceedings illegal. But, on the other hand, if it is such as to create a general belief that no meeting will be held, and thereby induce the great body of the inhabitants to disperse, and a few afterwards open the meeting and pass votes which could not have been passed except for the delay, it would be unjust to hold them legal and binding. The presumption is that a meeting was opened at a suitable and proper time in the day and in pursuance of the warning, and the burden of proving unreasonable delay is upon him who attacks the legality of the proceedings. It has been decided that a meeting opened one hour and five minutes after the hour fixed is not illegal as a matter of law, although only a few persons remained. The others might have gone away for the very purpose of preventing the meeting from acting. '^^ § 370. Place of meeting. — We have seen that the warrant must point out the place of meeting, and it is undoubtedly essential to the validity of the proceedings that the inhabitants assemble at that place.^^ But in the absence of fraudulent intent the courts permit a reasonable adaptation to circumstances, and the doings of a gathering at another place are not always and as a matter of law illegal. Thus, a meeting was called at a school building in which it was usually held, and the clerk having lost the key stationed a boy at the door to direct persons to a hall where the proceedings were afterwards con- ducted in due form with an average attendance. An election at this meeting was held to be valid.'^^ When, however, there is evidence of unfairness or oppression, the acts of parties who deviate a hair's breadth from the strictly legal course will be overthrown. When, for instance, the place appointed is a schoolhouse, it is taken to mean within its walls; and a few persons, including the town clerk, who meet in the highway in front of the building and formally ad- journ to a distant part of the town, whereby other citizens are de- signedly prevented from participating in the transaction of impor- tant business, will have only their trouble for their pains. Such conduct would not be tolerated even if the first meeting were legally held.''^ § 371. Organization of meeting — The moderator. — The business of a meeting can not be conducted without a presiding officer, or ^« South School Dist. v. Blakeslee, '^Wakefield v. Patterson, 25 Kan. 13 Conn. 227. 709. "Chamberlain v. Inhabitants &c., ""Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Maine 13 Maine 466; Wakefield v. Patter- 466. See also, § 375, post, son, 25 Kan. 709. 351 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 31.2 "moderator," according to the terminology of New England town meetings.'*'* It is usually made the duty of the town clerk, by statute, to preside until a moderator is chosen; and it has been said that his duty to do so is an incident to his office, without any positive require- ment.^^ It is not necessary that a moderator be elected by ballot or be sworn unless the statute prescribes it.*" And where he neglects to take an oath as provided by statute, "whether the doings of towns can, in an}' case, be held void on that account, and if in any in what cases, may be questions of no little difficulty," to quote from the opinion of the court in an early New Hampshire case. It was there held, at any rate, that a tax collector chosen at such a meeting was a good de facto officer.*^ And, likewise, the acts of a moderator ap- pointed in violation of a statute requiring a check-list, were sus- tained on the principle which upholds the acts of de facto officers.** And where a moderator elected at an annual town meeting was called without another election to preside at a meeting held during the year, and there was no objection on the part of any one, a voter who was present was estopped from contesting the validity of the pro- ceedings of the meeting.^ ^ § 372. The same subject continued — Clerk and clerk pro tem- pore. — The town clerk is the proper officer to record the doings of a meeting ; but the fact that the statute provides for the appointment of a clerk when there is a vacancy does not preclude the meeting from appointing a clerk pro tempore in the absence of the regular clerk;®® and an appointment by the moderator acquiesced in by the meeting will be an appointment by the meeting. ^'^ Where the selectmen with- out authority appointed a clerk pro tempore, who thereupon acted as *" Attorney-General v. Crocker, 138 cited in the preceding note seem to Mass. 214. As to the power to ad- dispose of the difficulty suggested journ before appointing a modera- in Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113, 140, tor, see § 374, post. quoted in the text. As to the ef- ^' Dodds v. Henry, 9 Mass. 262, feet of a protest if it were made holding that he is the proper person when the moderator first assumed to to receive and count the votes given act, qusere: Attorney-General v. for moderator. Crocker, 138 Mass. 214, 219. "Mitchell V. Brown, 18 N. H. 315. "'' Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402; ^Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113, citing Hawkins P. C. 18, § 3. See 140. also, Hickok v. Town of Shelburne, *** Attorney-General v. Crocker, 138 41 Vt. 409. There can not be a rec- Mass. 214. See also. Common- ord without a clerk: Attorney-Gen- wealth V. Shaw, 7 Met. (Mass.) 52, eral v. Crocker, 138 Mass. 214. 56. "State v. McKee, 20 Or. 120; s. c. "" State V. Town of Vershire, 52 25 Pac. 292; State v. Smith (Or.), 25 Vt. 41. Cf. State v. Harris, 52 Vt. Pac. 389. 216. These cases and the cases 373 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 352 such with the acquiescence of the meeting, his record of the proceed- ings was valid as the act of an officer de facto.^^ At a meeting of a school society a clerk pro tempore was appointed in the absence of the , regular clerk, but he did not take the oath of office provided by law until some months afterward, nor make any record of the business of the meeting before that time, and then only from memoranda and recollection. The record was held to be perfect. The court said: "It is sufficient if the oath be administered before the official acts required of the clerk are performed, so that those acts are done under its influence and sanction. Many acts of public meetings must of necessity transpire before the clerk be sworn; such as the choice of a presiding officer and the appointment of clerks themselves. It is not necessary that a clerk be a witness of the proceedings of a meet- ing under his official oath; it is sufficient if he record them or sanc- tion the record of them after he has been sworn."^^ § 373. Adjournments of meetings. — When a meeting is fairly or- ganized it can not be doubted that it possesses the incidental power of adjournment to another time and place, unless it is prohibited by statute.^" Wliere the voters and officers by unanimous consent, but ^ Attorney-General v. Crocker, 138 Mass. 214. It was held that a pro- test made by a voter, after the elec- tion of town officers at a meeting where such a clerk acted, "as to the legality of their election," did not show that he was not reputed to be town clerk. The court refrained from deciding what the effect would have been if a protest had been dis- tinctly and seasonably made: S. C, p. 219. ^^ Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Conn. 327. A statute requiring a record to be made of the persons sworn into office is directory, and it does not prevent the fact from being oth- erwise proved when there is no such record. So held where the record of a town meeting was certified by a clerk pro tem. whose oath of office was not on record : Kellar v. Savage, 17 Maine 444. ** "Nor is it necessary that the rec- ord should state any reason for the adjournment. The voters are the sole judges of that:" Hathaway v. Inhabitants &c., 48 Maine 440, at p. 444. It is a measure which can be taken only at a regular meeting held at the place appointed in the warn- ing: Chamberlain v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Maine 466. A statute providing that a town meeting shall be held open only between sunrise and sun- set does not require it to be kept open from the rising until the set- ting of the sun. It may adjourn from forenoon to afternoon: People V. Martin, 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 22, hold- ing, further, that although the stat- ute prescribes the place of meeting it is competent for a meeting first convened there to adjourn to anoth- er place; citing Goodel v. Baker, 8 Cowen (N. Y.) 286. Reasonable pre- sumptions will be made in favor of regularity and good faith: Converse V. Porter, 45 N. H. 385. See also, McDaniels v. Flower Brook &c. Co., 22 Vt. 274. Adjournment to a par- ticular day can not be proved by parol; it must appear of record: Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 353 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 374 without any formal adjournment or vote, go out into the open air in front of the place of meeting for greater convenience, and there vote without objection on the part of any person, and no one is preju- diced in any way, tlie action is legal. "^ A town meeting called to vote aid to a railroad under a statute which requires a two-thirds vote may adjourn by a majority vote."- § 374. The same subject continued. — Where the town clerk presides at the opening of a meeting, though it is not competent for the meet- ing to transact business until the appointment of a moderator, it may nevertheless adjourn ; and so, a fortiori, where a moderator presides who is illegally chosen."^ If a meeting legally held is adjourned to another day without specifying the hour, the proceedings of the ad- journed meeting are invalid. "Theoretically, it might be well enough to establish it as a general rule that when a meeting called at or ad- journed to a particular hour votes an adjournment without naming any hour, it shall be taken to be the same hour as that fixed in the warning or in the last vote for adjournment in which the hour is named. We are inclined, on the whole, however, to think that the reasons arising from a consideration of the practical consequences likely to flow from the one rule and the other weigh most strongly in favor of putting the vote of adjournment upon the same ground and under the same rule as has already been established in the case referred to above*** as to the omission in the warning to name any hour for the meeting.'"*^ But where at a March meeting it was "voted that this meeting stand adjourned to the April meeting," and it was shown to have been the uniform custom for fifty years to hold 397. See also, Andrews v. Inhabi- stating that any vote was taken, tants &c., 110 Mass. 214. And where sufficiently shows that it was the act the record shows an adjournment to of the meeting: Hathaway v. In- another place and proceedings there habitants &c., 48 Maine 440, at p. had it can not be contradicted by 444. parol evidence of an adjournment "- Inhabitants &c. v. Smith, 65 without day: Hunneman v. Fire Maine 203. District, 37 Vt. 40. "Recess" and "'Attorney-General v. Simonds, "adjournment" are synonymous: 111 Mass. 256. People V. Martin, 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 24, '* Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337; 27; Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365; s. c. 16 Vt. 439. s. c. 14 Pac. 888. "' Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. " Brown v. Inhabitants &c., 79 207. If the record of an adjourn- Maiue 305; s. c. 9 Atl. 844; citing ment omits the hour, a town clerk Dale v. Irwin, 78 111. 170; People v. chosen at the adjourned meeting can Kniffin, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 42. A not amend it: Taylor v. Henry, 2 record stating that the meeting "was Pick, (Mass.) 397, 402. then adjourned to," etc., without 1 SiMlTH — 23 § 375 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 354 a meeting on the first Monday of April, it was decided that the regu- lar April meeting called by an independent warrant was also a legal adjourned meeting.'"' § 375. The power of adjournment limited. — A limit to the power of the majority to adjourn a meeting is well illustrated in a Vermont case, where the charter made it imperative on a village at every annual meeting to elect its officers; and the court held that the majority of the meeting could not adjourn the same without day in fraud of the law and the minority ; and that if a legal minority immediately follow- ing such a fraudulent adjournment reorganizes the meeting and elects officers they will be entitled to hold their offices. "This corporation is governmental in its functions," said the court, "and invested with certain powers, rights and privileges that it may perform the duties cast upon it, and it can not by refusing to perform those duties be permitted to defeat the provisions and purposes of the law of its creation. At a meeting duly constituted and organized a majority of the voters present, in the absence of any statute or other restrain- ing authority to the contrary, have an implied right to adjourn the meeting to another time and place. But even this we apprehend must be fairly done and for no improper purpose. In People v. Martin,"^* Paige, J., says: 'I think that the power of adjourning a town meet- ing to another time and place may under peculiar circumstances be oppressively exercised and lead to a defeat of the public will. This power ought not to be exercised except in a case of extreme necessity.' Chancellor Kent, in speaking of cases where the members of a corpo- ration are directed to be but are not annually elected, says that the omission to elect does not take away the power incident to the corpo- ration to elect afterwards, when the annual day has passed, by some means free from design or fraud. Now, in the case at bar it was by design that the last annual meeting was adjourned without day, and such adjournment was a fraud both upon the law and upon the minority who were in favor of abiding by the law.'"''^ § 376. Adjourned meetings. — It is too well settled to require com- ment that all corporations, whether municipal or private, may tran- ""Reed v. Inhabitants &c., 117 make no legal adjournment to such Mass. 384. a time as would defeat the perform- ^s. 5 N. Y. 24, 27. ance of the prescribed duty, and the "' Stone v. Small, 54 Vt. 498. Row- minority might keep the meeting in ells, J., concludes his opinion on this existence till the duty was done." point by quoting from Kimball v. See also. People v. Martin, 5 N. Y. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465 (see § 283, 24, 27; Chamberlain v. Inhabitants ante), where Bell, C. J., said in a &c., 13 Maine 466. similar case: — "The majority could 355 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 377 sact any business at an adjourned meeting which they could have done at the original meeting ; it is but a continuation of the same meeting ; whether the meeting is continued without interruption for many days, or by adjournment from day to day or from time to time, many days intervening, it is evident it must be considered the same meeting without any loss or diminution of powers.^^ If a moderator is chosen at the original meeting in violation of a statute requiring a check- list, all that is done while he presides is of no binding force; and if town officers are elected ai that meeting, the town may, at an ad- journed meeting, elect a moderator regularly, and different town officers, who will be entitled to their offices as against those claiming under the first election.^'' On the other hand, an adjourned meeting has no more authority than the original meeting ; if the latter be void for want of legal notice, or otherwise, no capacity can be acquired by adjournment ;^*'° in otjier words, there can be no increase of mo- mentum without the application of new force. g 377. Reconsideration and rescission — The general rule. — The general rule is settled beyond dispute that action taken by a town meeting may be reconsidered and rescinded at the same meeting, or at any adjourned or any other subsequent meeting.^"^ And a vote '* Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385, held insufficient. But in that case 391; Inhabitants &c. v. Smith, 65 the record of the original meeting Maine 203. "A regular and proper did not show an adjournment which adjournment of a town is a continu- was, in fact, taken, ation of the same meeting:" Attor- ""Attorney-General v. Simonds, ney-General v. Simonds, 111 Mass. Ill Mass. 256. 256. An adjourned meeting of a "" United States v. McKelden, Mac- special meeting may transact busi- Arth. & M. 162; Sherwin v. Bugbee, ness under the original call: Hickok 16 Vt. 439; s. c. 17 Vt. 337. V. Town of Shelburne, 41 Vt. 409. '"'Marsh v. Inhabitants &c., 153 See also, Reed v. Inhabitants &c., 117 Mass. 34; s. c. 26 N. E. 412; Parker Mass. 384, 331; Withington v. In- v. Titcomb, 82 Maine 180; s. c. 19 habitants &c., 8 Gush. (Mass.) 66; Atl. 162; Hunneman v. Inhabitants Hunneman v. Inhabitants &c., 10 &c., 10 Met. (Mass.) 454, 456; Bel- Met. (Mass.) 454. The record of a fast &c. R. Co. v. Inhabitants &c., 62 vote stating that it was passed "at Maine 148; Mitchell v. Brown, 18 N, a meeting," etc., "legally holden by H. 315; Getchell v. Inhabitants &c., adjournment," is sufficient prima 55 Maine 433; George v. Inhabitants facie evidence that it was a legal &c., 6 Met. (Mass.) 497; Eddy v. Wil- meeting: Brownell v. Palmer, 22 son, 43 Vt. 362; Stackhouse v. Clark, Conn. 107. See, however, Taylor v. 52 N. J. L. 291; s. c. 19 Atl. 462; Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 397, where a Withington v. Inhabitants &c., 8 record of doings "at an adjourned Cush. (Mass.) 66. Of course, such meeting," without showing of what action, to be effective, must be with- meeting it was an adjournment, was in the scope of the warning. See § 378 PUBLIC cocroRATiONS. 356 not to reconsider a previous vote taken at the same meeting does not abridge the power of future meetings over that vote.^°^ Where there is a vote in the negative the voters may nevertheless at the same or any other meeting rescind the vote and pass measures in the afhrma- tive;"^ or they may take inconsistent action without formally re- scinding the vote:^*** if the votes are repugnant the former is re- scinded by implication.^"'^ Where the law requires the assent of a town to be indicated by a two-thirds vote, a proposal passed by the requisite number may be reconsidered by a bare majority of the voters before it has become binding by the acceptance of the party to whom it is made.^°® When a motion to reconsider a vote is adopted the vote ceases to have any effect, just as if it had never been passed.^**^ § 378. The same subject considered — Illustrations. — A town au- thorized by the legislature to subscribe to the capital stock of a rail- road and voting to do so at a lawful meeting may at a subsequent meeting rescind the vote if the rights of third parties have not inter- vened and nothing has been done under the original vote.^°^ So, also, where the voters at any legally called meeting were authorized to appropriate a certain sum for building a schoolhouse, which they accordingly did, but at a subsequent meeting the resolution was rescinded, it was held that they might, at a still later meeting, make the appropriation.^''^ After a vote to levy a tax has been reconsidered the collector can not lawfully proceed to collect it.^^" A town voted to let an inhabitant, who sent his children to school in another town, "draw his proportion of school money," and reconsidered this vote before the money was paid. It was held that assumpsit could not be § 383 et seq., post, and also § 307 et could not, by a mere majority, vote seq.; ante, relating to reconsidera- to waive the condition: Portland &c. tion and rescission by public boards. R. Co. v. Inhabitants &c., 58 Maine "'- Hunneman v. Inhabitants &c., 23. 10 Met. (Mass.) 454, 457. ^"' Withington v. Inhabitants &c., "^Stackhouse v. Clark, 52 N. J. L. 8 Cush. (Mass.) 66; Stoddard v. Gil- 291; s. c. 19 Atl. 462. man, 22 Vt. 568. ^'* Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt. 362. "^ "If, therefore, the town when ^* George v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Met. clothed with an optional power may (Mass.) 497. rescind action once taken in its cus- 100 Perhaps even a minority con- ternary municipal affairs, no reason sisting of more than one-third can be assigned why it may not. un- might do so: Belfast &c. R. Co. v. der like circumstances, do the same Inhabitants &c., 62 Maine 148. under a grant of power unusual in Where a vote to issue bonds to a its municipal affairs:" Estey v. railroad was passed by the neces- Starr, 56 Vt. 690, 693. sary two-thirds, with a condition an- '°^ Sanford v. Prentice, 28 Wis. 358. nexed to it, a subsequent meeting "° Stoddard v. Oilman, 22 Vt. 568. 357 MEETINGS AXD ELECTIONS. § ?uO maintained ao^ainst tho town for the amount of taxes assessed njmn and ])aid by him for the support of sehools.^^^ Under autliority to divide, unite and alter school districts from time to time, wlicn deemed necessary, a town at an annual meeting set one district over to another. It was competent at a subsequent meeting to rescind the vote and reinstate the district.^^- § 379. The same subject continued — The rule qualified. — The power to reconsider and rescind is subject to several just and neces- sary qualifications. If a vote of the town has given a cause of action against it, no subsequent proceedings can impair or destroy this vested right.^^^ Thus, the appointment of a committee to make a contract on behalf of the town can not be reconsidered and the au- thority of the committee withdrawn so as to avoid an intervening contract. ^^* A resolution which constitutes an acknowledgment so as to take a debt out of the statute of limitations can not be taken back and the claim brought within the bar of the statute."^ And, gen- erally, rights of third parties resting on a vote can not be divested by rescission.^ ^"^ Again, if a vote has accomplished its purpose and worked out the intended result, its force is spent, and an attempt to reconsider it is futile. For instance, a statute required each town at its annual meeting to vote on the question of abolishing the school -district system and adopting the town system, and that the result of the vote should be certified to the secretary of state. At a town meeting the first vote was a tie, and another was taken at the same meeting resulting in the abolition of the district system. It was held that the vote first taken was final and conclusive, and exhausted the authority of the town in the premises, and that an election of officers of the town system was illegal. ^^^ "^ Withington v. Inhabitants &c., tee directed not to proceed till the 8 Cush. (Mass.) 66. meeting was dissolved:" Hunneman "'Bill v. Dow, 56 Vt. 562. v. Inhabitants &c., 10 Met. (Mass.) "' Hall v. Inhabitants &c., 116 454, 456. Cf. Damon v. Inhabitants Mass. 172; Nelson v. Inhabitants &c., &c., 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345. 7 Pick. (Mass.) 18. A vote ratify- "'Sanborn v. School Dist., 12 ing the doings of selectmen in bor- Minn. 17. rowing money and giving a note "" Where an unauthorized pay- therefor in behalf of the town can ment by a town treasurer was rati- not be rescinded at a subsequent fled it could not be rescinded and meeting: Brown v. Inhabitants &c., the amount recovered from him: 79 Maine 305; s. c. 9 Atl. 844. Inhabitants &c. v. Peirce, 122 Mass. "* Not even at an adjourned meet- 270. ing. "To have been affected by the "'State v. Adams, 58 Vt. 634; s. c. adjournment the subject should 4 Atl. 228. See also, Parker v. Tit- have been suspended or the commit- comb, 82 Maine 180; s. c. 19 Atl. 162. 380 rUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 358 § 380. Ratification of doings of invalid meetings. — "V^Hicre the doings of a town nuH'tiiig arc invalid by reason of a defoctive warn- ing, or are lacking in some technical requisite, a subsequent meeting may supersede the vitiating effect of such irregularities by ratifi- cation.^^** A vote at an illegal meeting which has been spread upon the records may be expressly referred to in such a way as to become part of a vote at a subsequent valid meeting. ^^^ But the courts are altogether averse to an implied ratification; and a resolution adopting previous defective proceedings will have effect only to the precise extent indicated by its terms. ^-'* "Thus, a vote to reconsider certain votes passed at a former meeting does not recognize the validity of other acts of the same meeting ;^-^ and a vote not to rescind certain A school district voted to raise money, and it became the duty of the clerk to certify the vote to the selectmen, who were thereby re- quired to assess a tax for the amount. At a subsequent meeting the selectmen not having assessed the tax a motion was made to re- consider, which the moderator re- fused to put to vote. At a later meeting it was voted to reconsider, but in the meanwhile the tax had been assessed. Held, that the action of the moderator was unwarrant- able, but it did not operate to re- verse or impair the vote to raise the money; and the vote to reconsider was of no effect, because the assess- ment had intervened: Mitchell v. Brown, 18 N. H. 315. "* But this can not be proved by parol: Jordan v. School Dist., 38 Maine 164; and the meeting must be duly warned. "The vote of those who attend a town meeting being of no validity against the town or its inhabitants unless the object of the vote is set forth in the notice or warning of the meeting, the town can no more ratify an act after- wards than authorize it beforehand, except by a vote passed pursuant to a previous notice specifying the ob- ject. Without the indispensable pre- requisite of such a notice those pres- ent at a meeting have no greater power to bind the town indirectly by ratification or estoppel than they have to bind it directly by an origi- nal vote:" Per Justice Gray, in Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 865. This is the same principle that controls in the well-settled doctrine that acts absolutely ultra vires can not be ratified. See chapter on Liability of the Corporation for Acts of its Officers and Agents. Ex nihilo nihil fieri potest. ""Inhabitants &c. v. Smith, 65 Maine 203, at p. 207. ^-° Hamilton v. Inhabitants &c., 55 Maine 193. In Southard v. Inhabit- ants &c., 53 Maine 389, 391, the court said: — "We can not presume the town intended to ratify the pro- ceedings of a meeting not legally called. If such was the intention of the town, it should have used language so clear and explicit that there could be no doubt of its pur- pose." '^^ "It should have been one of the articles in the warrant to see wheth- er the town would ratify those do- ings and an affirmative vote had thereon before they could be con- firmed so as to be binding on the town:" Chamberlain v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Maine 466, 474. 359 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 381 doings does not give tliom any efficac-y.''^- Where a town voted, at a meeting not legally held, to aeeept the provisions of an act abolishing school districts, and afterwards, at a meeting called under an article 'Ho see if the town will reconsider their action" relating to school districts under the act, specifying it, "and return to the old school-district system," it was voted that this article be indefinitely postponed, it did not legalize the action of the previous meeting. ^'^ § 381. Parliamentary law in town meetings. — "With the excep- tion of the election of those officers which the statute prescribes shall be elected by ballot, all or nearly all of the functions of a towai meeting are such as pertain to a deliberative body or assembly. The subjects upon which a town meeting may take action are numerous and di- versified. The course of procedure wdiich is to be pursued is not fully mai'ked out by statute, and I deem it only safe to say that when the statute does not give direction the general rules of parliamentary law, so far as they may be applicable, should be observed and enforced in conducting the business of a town meeting. It will necessarily follow that propositions upon which the town meeting may lawfully act may be submitted to it by motion or resolution or in the form of proposed by-laws or orders by any elector of the town for the con- sideration of the meeting. It also follows from such application of the rules of parliamentary law that the chairman of the meeting can not prevent action upon any subject within the power conferred upon the meeting by neglecting or refusing to present the same to the meet- ing for its action."^^* It has also been said, however, that "the tech- nical rules of a legislative body, framed for its own convenient action and government, are not of binding force on towns unless such rules have been so acted upon and enforced by the town in their regular meetings as to create a law for themselves and binding on the in- habitants."!" § 382. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — A school-dis- trict meeting voted to dismiss an article in the w^arrant and after- '""The immunity of the district 46 N. H. 411; and, for a relaxation was perfect; no subsequent inaction of the rule where the town has ac- could affect it; it could be taken quired property in pursuance of de- from it only by positive vote upon fective votes, Greenbanks v. Bout- clear notice that it would pay:" well, 43 Vt. 207. Wright v. North School Dist., 53 ^* Per Lyon, J., in State v. David- Conn. 576. See also, Brooklyn Trust son, 32 Wis. 114. Co. v. Town of Hebron, 51 Conn. 22, ^-^ Hunneman v. Inhabitants &c., a strong case. 10 Met. (Mass.) 454, 457 — not a very ^^^ Child v. Colburn, 54 N. H. 71. perspicuous statement. See also. See also, Rollins v. Town of Chester, § 306, ante. § 383 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 360 ward passed a vote which was not germane to any article except the one dismissed. For that and another reason the court held the vote to be invalid.^-® A motion was put to vote and rejected. Afterwards an amendment was passed, but the original resolution was not again submitted to the meeting. It was adjudged that it could not be amended without a reconsideration and therefore there was no vote.^^^ Although in strict parliamentary law the acceptance of the report of a committee will not be an affirmance by the constituent body of the matters contained in it, yet when a matter is referred to a recognized permanent department of a municipal corporation, like selectmen, with authority to take or propose some definite action on the subject, and they make a report accordingly without suggesting any separate vote or resolution for more effectually carrying the measure into effect, a vote accepting the report has been deemed of itself an adapta- tion and execution of the measure proposed.^-® Where there was a spontaneous adjournment of a meeting to the open air, without a vote, the court in approving the proceeding invoked the maxim of parliamentary law that anything as to the mode of action may be done by unanimous consent. ^-^ § 383. Validity of votes as determined by the warrant — Illustra- tions. — The measure of exactness which the law requires in specifying the subject-matter in a warrant has already been discussed in general terms, and is now reverted to for the purpose of showing a few illus- trations of the well-recognized rules. A liberal construction has always been given to the language of warrants so as to include all that is properly, even if incidentally, embraced in the subject to which they relate, and the articles they contain are mere abstracts or heads of the propositions to be laid before the inhabitants.^^" The question of granting money need not be distinctly set forth if the subject- matter to be acted on be one which is likely to require an appropria- tion.^^^ Thus, a tax may be voted under an article "to see what "" On this point the court re- ^^ Brown v. Winterport, 79 Maine marked that "no attempt appears to 305, 311; s. c. 9 Atl. 844. have been made to reconsider the "" Commonwealth v. Wentworth, vote dismissing the . . . arti- 145 Mass. 50, 52; s. c. 12 N. E. 845, cle:" Holbrook v. Faulliner, 55 N. "These municipal divisions of the H. 311. Cf. Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt. state [school districts] are created 362, and George v. Inhabitants &c., to work out beneficial results to the 6 Met. (Mass.) 497, cited in § 377, people in education and other vital ante. mattei's to the well-being of the ^^ Stuart V. Town of Warren, 37 state, and their acts should not be Conn. 225. too sharply criticized:" Hubbard v. '^Niles V. Patch, 13 Gray (Mass.) Newton, 52 Vt. 346. 254, 261. See also, Hark v. Glad- "' Blackburn v. Inhabitants &c., 9 well, 49 Wis. 172; s. c. 5 N. W. 323. Pick. (Mass.) 97. 361 MEETIXGS AXD ELECTIONS. § 384 method the district will take to pay the expense" of the school ;^^- and an article "to see what measures the town will take to build" a bridge, "or any matters and things relating thereto," will authorize the raising of money for that purpose.^^^ A tax may be laid under a warrant "to take into consideration the expediency of raising money for the use of schools ;"^^* and a warrant "to see if the town would make an appropriation towards purchasing a fire-engine" is sufficient authority for a vote "to raise and appropriate" a sum for that pur- pose. ^^^ Under a warrant to raise money by a tax the town may instruct the collector to pay it to the selectmen, although it is the usual course to pay it to the town treasurer.^^'^ § 384. The same subject continued. — A public act authorizing town aid to railroads need not be noticed in the warrant to see if the town will vote such aid.^^^ So, also, "to see if the town will vote to subscribe for and hold shares in the capital stock of" the road; "to see if the town will vote to become an associate for the formation of the" road; and "to see what action the town will take in regard to raising money to aid in building" the road, — will support a vote au- thorizing a committee to borrow money and gives notes and bonds therefor.^^® On the other hand, if a public act conferring authority is referred to by title, page and chapter, its provisions need not be recited. ^^^ And a subscription for stock is within the scope of the warrant "to see if the town will loan its credit to aid in the con- struction of the railroad."^**' An agent to build a road may be ap- pointed under a warrant "to choose all necessary town officers."^*^ Where a warrant was to see if the town would raise money to pay the bounty "promised" to soldiers, a vote to pay the bounty "offered" to soldiers followed the warning.^*' A town may vote to unite two exist- ing districts under an article of the warrant "to see if the town will alter the boundaries of any of the school districts."^*^ In a warning ^^- Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt. 416. ''' Kittredge v. Inhabitants &c., i33Foj.(j y_ Clough, 8 Maine 334. 138 Mass. 286. ^^Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Conn. ^^^ Child v. Colburn, 54 N. H. 71. 327. See also, Birge v. Berlin Iron Bridge '=5 But if the warrant had been to Co., 16 N. Y. S. 596; s. c. 62 Hun (N. see if the town would appropriate to Y.) 618 (mem.). a specific object money already in "" Belfast &c. R. Co. v. Inhabitants the treasury, it seems the town could &c., 60 Maine 568. not have laid a tax for that purpose: "^ He is not strictly a town officer: Torrey v. Inhabitants &c., 21 Pick. Baker v. Shepard, 24 N. H. 208. (Mass.) 64. "= Blodgett V. Holbrook, 39 Vt. 336. ''" Alger V. Curry, 40 Vt. 437. "' Converse v. Porter, 45 N. H. 385. "' Inhabitants &c. v. Smith, 65 Maine 203. 385 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. dG2 to act upon the acceptance of a town way a general description of the way is sufficient.^** A vote to purchase hmd for a schoolhouse is sus- tained by an article of the warrant "to see wdiat measures the district will take in relation to building a schoolhouse."^*'^ Many other cases where votes have been tested by the warrant and declared valid are cited in the note.^*® § 385. Invalidity of votes — Illustrations. — The subject-matter being plainly referred to may properly include authority to act upon minute specifications and particulars included and necessarily in- volved in it, which need not be in particular terms enumerated. ^*^ But when the main proposition is narrow and restrictive it can not be extended. Thus, where a town meeting voted to dispense with an article in the warrant providing for bounties to men who were drafted between certain dates, and voted a bounty to all, it was held that a subsequent meeting, called to see if the town would ratify "the vote or article" of the previous meeting to pay a bounty to those described in the rejected article, could not legally appropriate money for any ^" State V. Beeman, 35 Maine 242. "=Dix V. School Dist, 22 Vt. 309. "" Brown v. Inhabitants &c, 79 Maine 305; s. c. 9 Atl. 844; Daven- port V. Inhabitants &c., 10 Maine 317; Drisko v. Inhabitants &c., 75 Maine 73 ; Sawyer v. Manchester &c. R. Co., 62 N. H. 135; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113; Moore v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 219; Hubbard v. Newton, 52 Vt. 346; Weeks v. Batchelder, 41 Vt. 317; Ovitt v. Chase, 37 Vt. 196; Hickok V. Town of Shelburne, 41 Vt. 409; Kittredge v. Town of Walden, 40 Vt. 211; Hunneman v. Fire Dist., 37 Vt. 40; Hall v. School Dist, 46 Vt. 19; Commonwealth v. Went- worth, 145 Mass. 50, 52; s. c. 12 N. E. 845; Matthews v. Inhabitants &c., 131 Mass. 521; s. c. 134 Mass. 555; Inhabitants &c. v. Searle, 127 Mass. 502; Reed v. Inhabitants &c.. 117 Mass. 384; Whitney v. Inhabitants &c.. Ill Mass. 368; Sherman v. Tor- rey, 99 Mass. 472; Grover v. Inhabit- ants &c., 11 Allen (Mass.) 88; Rideout v. Inhabitants &c., 1 Allen (Mass.) 232; Fuller v. Inhabitants &c., 11 Gray (Mass.) 340; Hadsell v. Inhabitants &c., 3 Gray (Mass.) 526; Avery v. Stewart, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 496; Kingsbury v. School Dist., 12 Met. (Mass.) 99; Haven v. City of Lowell, 5 Met. (Mass.) 35; Williams v. Inhabitants &c., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 75; Blackburn v. Inhabitants &c., 9 Pick. (Mass.) 97; Seabury v. How- land, 15 R. I. 446; s. c. 8 Atl. 341; South School Dist. v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227; People v. Board of Edu- cation, 1 N. Y. S. 593; s. c. 48 Hun (N. Y.) 618; State v. Trustees &c., 52 N. J. L. 104; s. c. 18 Atl. 683; Briggs V. Borden, 71 Mich. 87; s. c. 38 N. W. 712; Mason v. Kennedy, 89 Mo. 23; s. c. 14 S. W. 514; Williams- town &c. School Dist. V. Webb, 89 Ky. 264; s. c. 12 S. W. 298; Reynolds Land &c Co. v. McCabe, 72 Tex. 57; s. c. 12 S. W. 165; People v. Sisson, 98 111. 335. "' Pittsburg V. Danf orth, 56 N. H. 272. If the warning has been re- corded a copy of the record is the usual evidence; the original need not be produced: Commonwealth v. Shaw, 7 Met. (Mass.) 52. 363 MEETINGS AXD ELECTIONS. § 386 except those persons wlio came within the description in the rejected article. ^''■^ The method as well as the object of raising money is a matter of substantial interest to the taxpayers, and a vote to borrow money can not be founded on a proposition to levy a tax.^*^ Sweep- ing clauses, such as "to do other town business," are entirely nugatory and do not extend the scope of the specifications preceding tliem.^^'^ § 386. The same subject continued. — A meeting warned to con- sider "the question of raising money," etc., "for school purposes for the ensuing year," can not vote money for the purpose of building a high-school building.^^^ An article "to see if said town vrill accept and adopt the report of the committee to alter school districts" au- thorizes such alterations as the committee recommend and no others.^^^ It seems that a meeting called "to take action with regard to rescinding the doings" of a former illegal meeting can not vote to ratify.^^^ An article in the warrant "to see if the town will vote to pay the same bounty to those who may enlist," etc., "as is now paid to those who enlisted," etc., docs not authorize a vote to pay a larger bounty. ^^* A school-district meeting was called "for the purpose of obtaining information with regard to the recent assessments upon the property of the district." At the meeting a vote was passed appoint- ing a committee to make the investigation, with power to employ coun- sel. It was held that the district was not liable for the services of counsel who instituted legal proceedings. ^^^ Other cases where the doings of meetings have been pronounced to be extraneous to the pur- poses specified in the warrant, and therefore invalid, are cited in the note.^^^ "^Pittsburg V. Danforth, 56 N. H. ^^^ Allen v. City of Burlington, 45 272. Vt. 202. i*» Blush V. Town of Colchester, 39 ^'•'- Wyley v. Wilson, 44 Vt. 404. Vt. 193 ; Atwood v. Town of Lincoln, ^^ Wright v. North School Dist, 44 Vt. 332. 53 Conn. 576; s. c. 5 Atl. 708. ^^'Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; "^Austin v. Inhabitants &c., 57 Baldwin v. Town of North Bran- Maine 304. ford, 32 Conn. 47; Hunt v. School ^^= Wright v. North School Dist., Dist, 14 Vt. 300; Child v. Colburn, 53 Conn. 576; s. c. 5 Atl. 708. 54 N. H. 71. Although a meeting be '"" Inhabitants &c. v. Pease, 19 duly warned for some purposes, ix a Maine 184; Allen v. City of Burling- vote is had upon some subject not ton, 45 Vt. 202; Rollins v. Town of specified in the warning, as to that Chester, 46 N. H. 411; Wood v. In- vote the meeting is void: Pinney v. habitants, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 487; Brown, 60 Conn. 164; s. c. 22 Atl. Wilson v. Waltersville School Dist., 430. 44 Conn. 157; Bramwell v. Guheen, 2 Idaho 1069; s. c. 29 Pac. 110. § 387 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 364 § 387. Votes at town meeting — General rules of construction. — Votes upon questious pending iu town meetings may be given in any recognized manner in the absence of specific requirements, and need not be by ballot.^" Nor do the courts expect or demand a scrupulous observance of the most approved formalities; if the proceedings are in substance what they should be, and intelligible, it would be mis- 'chievous to set them aside for the want of technical precision; a liberal and favorable construction prevails, especially when no one is injured by it or deprived of any right. ^"^ Thus, instruments not nnder seal executed in pursuance of a vote directing an issue of "bonds" were held to be valid obligations;^^® and a vote to pay a cer- tain bounty "to each drafted man who may be accepted by the board of enrollment" is not void for uncertainty as being applicable to all drafted men wherever they may belong, but only refers to the men drafted to fill the quota of thfe town.^^® The same rule that applies in construing a statute under the constitution is applied in construing the votes and acts of towns under a law of the state, and if the valid parts of a vote are separable from those that are void, they will be sustained.^'^** § 388. Record of proceedings. — Where the statute requires that a vote shall be passed by two-thirds of the voters present, a record of a meeting which states that it was "voted," etc., is not sufficient un- ^" Where a constitution required a town in raising money shall be that all elections by the people expressed in the vote is that the should be by ballot it was held that vote should indicate in general the meetings of district townships terms the purpose or object for were not designed to be elections which the money is raised, and if within the meaning of the term, no that purpose or object is such as judges of election being provided comes within the scope of the pow- for, etc.: Seaman v. Baughman, 82 ers of the town it is sufficient: Blod- lowa 216; s. c. 47 N. W. 1091. Un- gett v. Holbrook, 39 Vt. 336. der a statute providing that any ^='* Lane v. Inhabitants &c., 72 town may, at a town meeting, abol- Maine 354. ish all school districts therein, a '=" Baldwin v. Town of North town divided into voting districts Branford, 32 Conn. 47. A description can not legally vote in district meet- of a school district as "all the ter- ings on the question of abolishing ritory between" two given lines is school districts: Comstock v. School not necessarily defective: Allen v. Committee &c., 17 R. I. 827; s. c. 24 Archer, 49 Maine 346. See also, Atl. 145. Avery v. Stewart, 1 Cush. (Mass.) ^"a Soper V. Inhabitants, 28 Maine 496. 193 ; Kellar v. Savage, 17 Maine 444. '"" Barbour v. Inhabitants &c., 51 "All that is necessary in respect to Maine 608; Upton v. Stoddard, 47 the manner in which the purpose of N. H. 167. 365 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 389 less it shows that it was carried by two-thirds.^®^ And where a record that a meeting is "duly or legally notified" is made prima facie suffi- cient by statute, a record simply stating that the meeting was held "according to notice" is defective.^^^ A record of a vote passed "in legal meeting assembled" is not proof that the meeting was specially warned for that purpose. ^'^^ A town was empowered by special act to guaranty a certain amount of the bonds of a railroad company, pro- vided the vote should be passed by ballot at a meeting called for that purpose. The record of a meeting showed that it was warned to vote by ballot on the subject and that the vote in question was "passed." The vote was not, in fact, passed by ballot, but by a divi- sion of the house, and the record was subsequently amended by order of the court. In the meanwhile the company, on the strength of the vote, had expended money and made contracts for the delivery of the bonds. The court held that the town was estopped from insisting on Ihe invalidity of the vote.^^* § 389. Parol evidence of proceedings. — The official record is the proper evidence of the doings of the meeting, and it is not open to contradiction, enlargement or explanation by parol. This general rule applies to the records of towns, parishes, school districts and all similar organizations,^*^^ But in an action against a town to recover ^" The maxim "Omnia prsesumun- ^"^ Willard v. Warden &c., 8 Conn, tur rite," etc., does not apply: Port- 248, 253. See Isbell v. New York land &c. R. Co. v. Inhabitants &c., &c. R. Co., 25 Conn. 556, for a suffi- 65 Maine 63; Andrews v. Inhabi- cient record in such a case, tants &c., 110 Mass. 214. Cf. Attor- "■* New Haven &c. R. Co. v. Town ney-General v. Crocker, 138 Mass. of Chatham, 42 Conn. 465. Cf. Brook- 214, 215. An amendment by the lyn Trust Co. v. Town of Hebron, 51 clerk stating that "to the best of Conn. 22. my recollection" the vote was passed ^"^ Halleck v. Inhabitants &c., 117 by two-thirds does not cure it. If, Mass. 469; Andrews v. Inhabitants however, he had stated it as a fact, &c., 110 Mass. 214; Wood v. Simons, the record could not be contradicted 110 Mass. 116; Adams v. Pratt, 109 by parol testimony, but he might be Mass. 59 ; Mayhew v. District of Gay liable for fraudulent conduct in his Head, 13 Allen (Mass.) 129; Third office: Judd v. Thompson, 125 Mass. School Dist. v. Atherton, 12 Met. 553. (Mass.) 105; Saxton v. Nimms, 14 ^^^Seabury v. Howland, 15 R. I. Mass. 315; Manning v. Inhabitants 446; s. c. 8 Atl. 341. It was held &c., 6 Pick. (Mass.) 6; Taylor v. that a record is not objectionable be- Henry, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 397; Picker- cause it omits to state the hour the ing v. Pickering, 11 N. H. 141, 144; meeting was held when it describes Jordan v. School Dist., 38 Maine the meeting as that which was noti- 164; Moore v. Newfield, 4 Maine 44. fied and the notice appoints the Parol evidence can not be admitted hour: Howland v. School Dist., 15 to show that a vote was passed R. I. 184; s. c. 2 Atl. 549; 8 Atl. 337. which the record does not show: § 390 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 366 a sum voted to the plaintiff for injuries received by him while in the employ of the town, parol evidence was admitted to show that the amount voted was a mere gratuity and not supported by any claim of legal liability against the town.^''° § 390. Doings of meetings not legally called. — Where a meeting is not legally warned, all the officers that are chosen hold their offices without authority of law; and a vote to raise money is not binding upon the inhabitants and can not be the proper and legal foundation for the assessment of any tax.^" A person elected at such a meeting, though sworn into office, can draw from that election no justification for acts done under color of the office ;"^ but his acts would be valid and binding to the extent of the rule which applies to the doings of officers de facto. ^''^ "No one can rely upon a vote of a town as giving him any rights against the town without proving a sufficient notice or warning of the meeting at which it was passed ;"^^*' and an indictment Orford v. Benton, 36 N. H. 395, 403; Harris v. School Dist, 28 N. H. 58, 66. Nor is evidence admissible of what the voters intended to do or supposed they had done: Adams v. Crowell, 40 Vt. 31, 34; Cameron v. School Dist, 42 Vt. 507. The record of a school district showed that "it was voted that the district build a new schoolhouse; 16 for and 11 against it." Evidence that seven who voted in the affirmative were not legal voters in the district was properly rejected in replevin for property taken by the tax collector. "The records of the proceedings of municipal public corporations can not be collaterally attacked and overthrown by evidence of this character:" Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt. 362. Cf. Davis v. School Dist, 43 N. H. 381, where counsel claimed to appear for a school-district defend- ant under authority of a vote of the district. The plaintiff offered evi- dence that at a subsequent meeting the authority was revoked. The court admitted evidence that the vote of revocation was passed by il- legal votes. These cases may, per- haps, be reconciled on the ground that in the former the question arose between strangers to the pro- ceedings, while in the latter the dispute was between the parties. Where, according to the usual course of proceeding, the warrant is either recorded or preserved in the office of the town clerk, it can not be proved by parol unless a suffi- cient reason is shown for not pro- ducing the original or a certified copy: Brunswick v. McKean, 4 Maine 508. But it is not in the pow- er of a clerk to destroy the effect of the action of a meeting by failing or refusing to record the proper papers to show that the meeting was regu- larly called and notified so long as clear proof of those facts can be made aliunde: Marble v. McKenney, 60 Maine 332. '"" Matthews v. Inhabitants &c., 134 Mass. 555. '"Osgood V. Blake, 21 N. H. 550, 564; Grafton Bank v. Kimball, 20 N. H. 107. i'^' Bearce v. Fossett, 34 Maine 575. '""School Dist V. Lord, 44 Maine 374. "" Per Justice Gray in Bloomfield V. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 865. A contract made with a school district by a member 3G7 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 391 against a person for illegal voting at a town meeting can not be sus- tained unless the meeting was legally warned. ^^^ § 391. Presumptions in favor of ancient meetings. — No presump- tion is indulged in favor of the essential regularity of recent proceed- ings of town meetings ;^'^^ but it is otherwise where from lapse of time there is a probability that the officers who made the record are no longer living, or have lost a recollection of the facts so that no amendment can be made, or where it is proved that such officers have deceased so that the records can not be corrected. ^'^^ After the lapse of thirty years it was held that a jury might presume that a warrant for a town meeting which was shown to have been properly posted remained posted during the time required by law.^'^'* The records of the proprietors of a town purporting to have been made in 1738 contained the proceedings of a meeting held at that time. It did not appear that there was any notice for the meeting, nor did the records appear to be attested by any clerk or recording officer, but they were produced by the town clerk, who testified that he received them from his predecessor in office together with the other records of the town. They were held to be competent evidence to be submitted to a jury as to the doings of the meeting.^'' ^ thereof at a meeting not legally warned is binding upon neither par- ty: School Dist. V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.) 105. "^ State V. Williams, 25 Maine 561. But after a decree of foreclosure in favor of a town, a vote at a meeting not warned for that purpose extend- ing the period of redemption is suffi- cient in equity to prevent the decree from becoming absolute upon the day named: Daggett v. Town of Mendon, 64 Vt. 323; s. c. 24 Atl. 242. ^'- Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 865; Cavis V. Robertson, 9 N. H. 524; overruling Bishop V. Cone, 3 N. H. 513, 515. ^"' Cavis V. Robertson, 9 N. H. 524; Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168. It was said in those cases that under such circumstances it may be submitted to a jury to presume from a defect- ive record of the election of a town officer and from his having acted un- der the appointment that the meet- ing was duly held, the proceedings of the town regular and the officer duly sworn; but this can not be done where the proceedings are recent and no reason is shown why the rec- ord can not be amended if the truth will warrant it: Brownell v. Pal- mer, 22 Conn. 107 (twenty-five years sufficient) ; State v. Taff, 37 Conn. 392 (fifteen years too short a time) ; Peterborough v. Lancaster, 14 N. H. 383 (thirty-eight years sufficient). "* "It does not appear that the offi- cers who made the record are dead, but it is a fair presumption that they have lost recollection of the fact," etc.: Schoff v. Gould, 52 N. H. 512, and cases there cited. "It is not to be presumed that the meeting is not both legal and regular because there is now no record showing that it was so:" Willey v. Portsmouth, 35 N. H. 303, 309. See also. School Dist. V. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507, 514. "^ Adams v. Stanyan, 24 N. H. 405 ; citing as to want of attestation. In- habitants &c. V. Inhabitants &c., 3 § 392 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 368 § 392. Notice of election. — Where both the time and place of a general election are fixed by law the requirement of notice is di- rectory, and the election is not vitiated by the failure of the authori- ties to make the publication."*^ But in the case of special elections, when either the time or place is not prescribed by law, the provision for notice is mandatory^"^ when notice is necessary. An election called l)y an unauthorized person is void; it has no greater validity than the unauthorized action of a mass meeting would have.^'^^ But where notice is to be given by a board, a notice signed by the clerk in which it appears that the election was ordered by the board is sulScient.^^'^ Where the statute confers upon the mayor of a city the power of proclaiming an election, it may be exercised in the mayor's absence by one whom the charter vests with the powers of Greenl. (Maine) 223. The record of the choice of a person as hog-reeve and field driver and proof of his service as such for one year suffices for the presumption in question: Northwood v. Barrington, 9 N. H. 369 (forty years). i'« Smith V. Crutcher, 92 Ky. 586; s. c. 18 S. W. 521; Paine Elections, § 384; citing Carson v. McPhetridge, 15 Ind. 327; Light v. State, 14 Kan. 489; People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People V. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; People v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; s. c. 70 Am. D. 754; People v. Brenham, 3 Cal. 477; Cooley Const. Lim. 759; Dickey V. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343; State v. Jones, 19 Ind. 356; s. c. 81 Am. D. 403; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; s. c. 86 Am. D. 70; City of Lafayette v. State, 69 Ind. 218; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212; Jones V. Gridley, 20 Kan. 584; State v. Or- vis, 20 Wis. 248; State v. Goetze, 22 Wis. 363; People v. Martin, 12 Cal. 409; People v. Rosborough, 14 Cal. 180. See also. Commonwealth v. Smith, 132 Mass. 289; State v. Skirv- ing, 19 Neb. 497; s. c. 27 N. W. 723. As to notices of vacancies to be filed at a regular election, see Peo- ple V. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People V. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; s. c. 70 Am. D. 754; People v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616; Beal V. Ray, 17 Ind. 554; State v. Good, 41 N. J. L. 296; People v. Ros- borough, 29 Cal. 415; People v. Por- ter, 6 Cal. 26; People v. Martin, 12 Cal. 409; Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio St. 532. "■ United States v. McKelden, Mac- Arth. & M. 162; State v. Mayor &c., 44 N. J. L. 137; Kenfield v. Irwin, 52 Cal. 164; Hubbard v. Town of Will- iamstown, 61 Wis. 397; s. c. 21 N. W. 295; People v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616; Haddox v. Clarke Co., 79 Va. 677. Unless an election is fixed by law there must be some notice, though none is required by the stat- ute: McPike V. Pen, 51 Mo. 63. 178 porce V. Town of Batavia, 61 111. 99. ^■'' Smith V. Board &c., 45 Fed. 725. See also, Williams v. People, 132 111. 574; s. c. 24 N. E. 647; and § 362, ante. An error in the proclamation must, in order to invalidate the elec- tion, appear from proofs or by nec- essary intendment to have so affect- ed the election as to have changed the result. On this point the court will not indulge in speculation or mere conjecture: In re Petition of Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319; s. c. 18 Atl. 67; 52 N. J. L. 188; 19 Atl. 17; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 230. See also, San Luis Obispo Co. v. White, 91 Cal. 432; s. c. 24 Pac. 864; 27 Pac. 756, where the clerk affixed a scroll to the proclamation instead of a seal required by statute. 3G9 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 393 mayoralty in such a contingency;^"" and the service of notice by an officer cle facto will not affect the validity of the election. ^^^ § 393. Qualifications of voters — Povirer to prescribe. — The quali- fications of voters are fixed by the constitutions or statutes of the states, and the right of each state to define the qualifications of its voters is complete and perfect, except so far as it is controlled by the fifteenth article of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, which provides that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."^^^ But it is not competent for the legislature to add a substantive quali- fication to those prescribed by the constitution, unless that instru- ment confers the power in express terms or by necessary implica- tion. ^^^ Thus, where the constitution requires residence in the state for a certain period, a statute which requires residence in the ward, city or township is void.^®* And a provision in a village charter limiting the right to vote to those who have resided within the village ™ In re Petition of Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 319; s. c. 18 Atl. 67; 52 N. J. L. 188; 19 Atl. 17; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 230. ^'^Bird V. Merrick, Lor. & R. (Mass. Elec. Cas.) 115. ^"- Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63; s. c. 97 Am. D. 248; Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; United States v. Cruik- shank, 92 U. S. 542; Minor v. Hap- persett, 21 Wall. 162; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; s. c. 11 N. E. 916; 59 Am. R. 105; Van Valkenburg V. Brown, 43 Cal. 43; s. c. 13 Am. R. 136; Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112; Ridley v. Sherbrook, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 569; United States v. An- thony, 11 Blatch. 200; State v. Sta- ten, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 233. The state may also regulate nominating con- ventions and caucuses: Leonard v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. St. 607; s. c. 4 Atl. 220; In re House Bill, 9 Colo. 624; s. c. 21 Pac. 472. ^"'Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485; s. c. 9 Am. R. 754; Rison v. Parr, 24 Ark. 161; s. c. 87 Am. D. 52; Thomas 1 Smith — 24 V. Owens, 4 Md. 189; Clayton v. Har- ris, 7 Nev. 64; State v. Symonds, 57 Maine 148; State v. Corner, 22 Neb. 265; s. c. 34 N. W. 499; 3 Am. St. 267; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; s. c. 11 N. E. 916; 59 Am. R. 105; St. Joseph &c. R. Co. v. Buchanan Coun- ty Court, 39 Mo. 485; Barker v. Peo- ple, 3 Cowen (N. Y.) 686; s. c. 15 Am. D. 322; People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; s. c. 21 Am. R. 465; White V. Commissioners &c., 13 Or. 317; s. c. 10 Pac. 484; 57 Am. R. 20, n.; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665;, Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548; s. c. 3 N. E. 538; 54 Am. R. 832; State V. Constantine, 42 Ohio St. 437; s. c. 51 Am. R. 833; State v. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45; s. c. 9 N. W. 791; State V. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; State v. Will- iams, 5 Wis. 308; Davies v. McKee- by, 5 Nev. 369; State v. Staten, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 233; United States V. Slater, 4 Wood 356; Randolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551; McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. St. 109. ^«* Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485; s. c. 9 Am. R. 754. § 394 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 370 for twenty days immediately preceding the election conflicts with a constitution prescribing residence for no definite period. ^**'^ An act which restricts the right to vote to taxable inhabitants is repugnant to a constitution which is silent respecting property qualification.^®^ § 394. Registration acts. — It is held by the decided weight of au- thority tliat when the constitution is silent on the subject of registra- tion it is competent for the legislature to require voters to be regis- tered a reasonable time before the election, or to be debarred of the right to vote.^-'^ "The true rule is that whenever a registration is ordered it should give the voters an opportunity as near the day of election as practicable for qualifying themselves as electors. All the authorities agree in holding that if the length of time between the closing of the registration and the election is unreasonable, the elec- "^ State v. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45; s. c. 9 N. W. 791. See also, People v. Can- aday, 73 N. C. 198; s. c. 21 Am. R. 465; Klnneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; s. c. 11 R E. 916; 59 Am. R. 105. '"« St. Joseph &c. R. Co. v. Buchan- an County Court, 39 Mo. 485. Cf. Mc- Mahon v. Mayor &c., 66 Ga. 217; s. c. 42 Am. R. 65; Buckner v. Gordon, 81 Ky. 665. ^"Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 485; s. c. 23 Am. D. 632; Hyde v. Brush, 34 Conn. 454; People v. Kop- plekom, 16 Mich. 342; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa 267; s. c. 4 Am. R. 177; People v. Laine, 33 Cal. 55; Webster v. Byrnes, 34 Cal. 273; By- ler v. Asher, 47 111. 101; People v. Wilson, 62 N. Y. 186; Davis v. School Dist., 44 N. H. 398; Patterson v. Bar- low, 60 Pa. St. 54; Auld v. Walton, 12 La. An. 129; Harris v. Whitcomb, 4 Gray (Mass.) 433; Smith v. City of Wilmington, 98 N. C. 343; s. c. 4 S. E. 489; Southerland v. Board &c., 96 N. C. 49; s. c. 1 S. E. 760; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 393; Duke v. Brown, 96 N. C. 127; s. c. 1 S. E. 873; McDowell v. Massachusetts &c. Const. Co., 96 N. C. 514; s. c. 2 S. E. 351; Wood V. Town of Oxford, 97 N. C. 227; s. c. 2 S. E. 653; State v. Baker. 38 Wis. 71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665; Daggett v. Hudson. 43 Ohio St. 548; s. c. 3 N. E. 538; 54 Am. R. 832; State v. Butts, 31 Kan. 537; s. c. 2 Pac. 618; In re Polling Lists, 13 R. I. 729; People v. Hoff- man, 116 111. 587; s. c. 5 N. E. 596; 8 N. E. 788; 56 Am. R. 793; Stephens V. Mayor &c., 84 Ga. 630; s. c. 11 S. E. 150; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 282; State v. Corner, 22 Neb. 265; s. c. 34 N. W. 499; 3 Am. St. 267; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453; McMa- hon V. Mayor, 66 Ga. 217; s. c. 42 Am. R. 65; People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; s. c. 21 Am. R. 465; Com- monwealth V. McClelland, 83 Ky. 686. See also, Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; s. c. 11 N. E. 916; 59 Am. R. 105; Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 756 et seq.; McCrary Elections, § 95 et seq.; Paine Elec- tions, § 340 et seq.; Mechem Public Offices and Officers, § 149. Contra, Page V. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338; Dells V. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555; s. c. 6 N. W. 246, 381; White v: Commission- ers &c., 13 Or. 317; s. c. 10 Pac. 484; 54 Am. R. 832, n.; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 485; State v. Corner, 22 Neb. 265; s. c. 34 N. W. 499; 3 Am. St. 267; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 453, holds that the voter can not be deprived of the right to register at any time before the closing of the polls. 371 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 395 tion should be held void."^^^ Accordingly, a law which allowed only seven days in the year for voters to register was declared to be sub- versive of constitutional right and therefore void;^'*'-' and a statute providing that no person thereafter naturalized should be entitled to be registered within thirty days after such naturalization was open to the same objection ;^'"' but an act fixing three weeks before the elec- tion for the completion of the registry was sustained.^ "^ § 395. Place of election. — Where a statute incorporating a munici- pality enumerates the officers to be chosen and prescribes the qualifi- cations of voters, but does not designate any polling-place, the voters have the implied right to supply the omission.^ ^^ But if elections are required by law to be held at fixed times and places these can not be changed except by direct legislative authority ;^^^ time and place are of the substance of every election, and statutory provisions by which they are definitely fixed are mandatory and must be obeyed.^''* Where the polls were opened at a distance of three miles from the place appointed, without any just excuse, the election was void.^'*'^ Chief Justice Thompson, of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, expounded the law in point as follows: "I will not say that in case of the de- struction of a designated building on the eve of an election, the elec- ^"^ Stephens v. Mayor &c., 84 Ga. 281; s. c. 25 N. E. 221; Stephens v. 630; s. c. 11 S. E. 150; 30 Am. & Bng. Mayor &c., 84 Ga. 630; s. c. 11 S. E. Corp. Gas. 282. Laws regulating the 150. When an eligible person has exercise of the right of suffrage must been duly registered he continues to be reasonable, uniform and impar- have the right to vote until he loses tial, and must be calculated to facil- or is dispossessed of it according to itate and secure rather than to sub- law. Where the mayor and alder- vert or impede the exercise of the men without authority ordered a right to vote: Daggett v. Hudson, new registration, the election was 43 Ohio St. 548; s. c. 3 N. E. 538; 54 void: Smith v. City of Wilmington, Am. R. 832; Monroe v. Collins, 17 98 N. C. 343; s. c. 4 S. E. 489. Ohio St. 666, 687. ^°' State v. Burbridge, 24 Fla. 112; ^™ Daggett V. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. s. c. 3 So. 869. 548; s. c. 3 N. E. 538; 54 Am. R. 832. ^^^ City Council v. Youmans, 85 Ga. i^'Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 708, 712; s. c. 11 S. E. 865. 497; s. c. 11 N. E. 916; 59 Am. R. ^"^ McCrary Elections (3d ed.), § 105. This was because the regula- 141; Paine Elections, § 327. tion was not uniform and impartial. ^"^ Heyfron v. Mahoney, 9 Mont. ^"^ People v. Hoffman, 116 111. 587; 497; s. c. 24 Pac. 93; Knowles v. s. c. 5 N. E. 596; 8 N. E. 788; 56 Am. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82, 92. See also, Com- R. 793. And ten days was held rea- monwealth v. County Com'rs, 5 sonable: State v. Butts, 31 Kan. 537; Rawle (Pa.) 75; Juker v. Common- s. c. 2 Pac. 618. For unreasonable wealth, 20 Pa. St. 484; Miller v. En- registration laws, see City of Owens- glish, 21 N. J. L. 317; Ex parte Rob- boro v. Hickman, 90 Ky. 629; s. c. 14 inson, 3 Pug. (N. B.) 389. S. W. 688; Morris v. Powell, 125 Ind. § 396 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 372 tion might not l)c held on the pamc or contiguous ground as a matter of necessity — necessitas non habct legem. But then the necessity must be absolute, discarding all mere ideas of convenience. * * * To move the place of an election three miles from that designated by law or to a place more than half a mile distant therefrom without authority or any absolute controlling circumstances must render the election therein void.''^"'' But the circumstances which do not affect the result when the place designated has been changed are shown in another case, where the polls were opened a short distance from and in plain view of the place appointed, the owner of the house selected having objected to the use of it for that purpose, and no voter being misled or deprived of his vote. The court held that the election was legal.i" § 396. The same subject continued. — A statute provided that "whenever it shall become impossible or inconvenient to hold a town meeting at the place designated therefor, the town board of in- spectors, after having assembled at or as near as practicable to such place and opened the meeting and before receiving any votes, may adjourn such meeting to the nearest convenient place for holding the same." They were also required to make proclamation of the ad- journment and to station a proper person at the door to notify electors as they arrived. Polls were to be opened at town meetings at nine o'clock. The record showed that a meeting was legally called, and upon motion it was voted to adjourn to a certain place, where the board met pursuant to the adjournment and called the meeting to or- der at nine o'clock. The court held that the law would presume the first meeting to have been opened only a few minutes before nine; that whether the place was impossible or inconvenient and whether the adjourned meeting was held at the nearest and most convenient place were matters solely for the judgment of the board ; and that a failure to make proclamation or to station any one at the door to give notice would not avoid the election unless there was affirmative proof that the electors were thereby kept from the meeting.^^® The neglect to close the polls at the prescribed time is not a fatal irregularity if the result of the election is not afEected;^^^ and an election was pro- "«Melvin's Case, 68 Pa. St. 333, 18 N. W. 544; Wakefield v. Patter- 338. son, 25 Kan. 709. ^°' Preston v. Culbertson, 58 Cal. ^^^ Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Ashland 198, 209; in quatuor pedibus. Dale Co., 81 Wis. 1; s. c. 50 N. W. 937. V. Irwin, 78 111. 170, 180. See also, ^""Holland v. I^avies, 36 Ark. 446; Steele v. Calhoun, 61 Miss. 556; Far- Knox Co. v. Davis, 63 111. 405; Cle- rington v. Turner, 53 Mich. 27; s. c. land v. Porter, 74 111. 76. 373 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 397 nounced valid whoro the closing of the polls was one hour premature, no elector havinfj Ix'en thereby deprived of his right.-"'* § 397. Popular elections — Plurality. — "It is the theory and general practice of our government that the candidate who has but a minority of the legal votes cast docs not become a duly elected olTicer. But it is also the theory and practice of our government that a minority of the whole body of qualified electors may elect to an office, when a majority of that body refuse or decline to vote for any one for that office. Those of them who are absent from the polls in theory and practical result are assumed to assent to the action of those who go to the polls."^°^ Furthermore, it is not necessary that a candidate for office shall have an absolute majority of all the votes cast at a popular election. "At an election, by common law, it is only necessary that there should be a majority for one candidate over every other [any other] candidate. There may be as many candidates as there are electors, less one, and the votes of two would carry the election, how- ever numerous the electors, if all the others voted for separate can- didates, and the vote of one would be a lawful election if no other elector voted."^"^ =» People V. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67. ■201 pgj. Folger, J., in People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451, 461; Verbeck v. Scott, 71 Wis. 59; s. c. 36 N. W. 600; Rex V. Varlo, Cowp. 248; Field v. Field, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 394. "All qualified voters who absent themselves from an election duly called ai'e presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting, unless the law providing for the election other- wise declares. Any other rule would be productive of the greatest incon- venience, and ought not to be adopt- ed unless the legislative will to that effect is clearly expressed:" Cass Co. V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360, 369, per Waite, C. J. ="' Gosling V. Veley, 4 H. L. Cas. 679, 740, per Martin, B.; Throop Pub- lic Agents, § 139; citing Paine Elec- tions, §§ 173, 174; Naar Elections 147; Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 779. See also. State v. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227; People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451, 461; Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 6 L. R. A. 308; and especially. People v. Stone, 78 Mich. 635, 639; s. c. 44 N. W. 333, cited in § 156, ante, where the plurality rule was applied to elections by definite bodies; and a fortiori, that doctrine would govern in popular elections. State v. Wil- mington, 3 Harr. (Del.) 294, lays down a contrai'y rule as the common law, but Harrington, J., dissented, "as it would seem, with reason," says Judge Dillon: Dillon Munic. Coi'p., § 277, n. A dictum in ^State V. Fagan, 42 Conn. 32, 35, is squarely opposed to the text. The matter in issue was the validity of a (popular) school district election. The court said: — "Viewing the questions raised in this case to be determined, as we do, entirely by statute, it is quite unnecessary to consider what the rule of the common law may be as to the effect of a plurality vote, or the necessity for a majority vote to make a valid election. Our govern- ment and our institutions rest on the principle that controlling power 398 PUBLIC CORPOKATIONS. 374r § 398. The same subject continued — Majorities, etc. — The follow- ing expressions in statutory or constitutional provisions as to an elec- tion have been held to mean a majority, two-thirds, etc., as the case may be, of those actually voting, and not a majority of all who might have voted: "a majority of such, electors ;"^°^ "two-thirds of such qualified voters ;"-°'* "wishes of a majority of the members * * * expressed at a church election;"-"^ "majority of the legal voters ;"^'^*' "two-thirds of the qualified voters of the township voting at such election ;"-*'^ "three-fifths of the voters of said city f^"^ "three-fifths of the voters therein voting;"-**'* "two-thirds of the qualified voters;"-^** "majority of the voters ;"^^^ "majority of the legal voters."^^- § 399. Voting by ballot. — Where a statute provides that the elec- tion of certain officers at a town meeting shall be by ballot if called for, this does not necessarily imply that they must be voted for each is vested in the majority. In the absence of any provision by law to the contrary, the will of any com- munity or association, body politic or corporate, is properly declared only by the voice of the majority." '"« Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249; Ev- erett v. Smith, 22 Minn. 53. ="* State v. Renick, 37 Mo. 270. See also, State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450. "'^ Craig V. First Presbyt'n Church, 88 Pa. St. 42. ^""'St. Joseph Tp. V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644. ''°'Cass Co. V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360. ^'^ Yesler v. City of Seattle, 1 Wash. 308; s. c. 25 Pac. 1014. =» Metcalfe v. City of Seattle, 1 Wash. 297; s. c. 25 Pac. 1010; State v. Snodgrass, 1 Wash. 305; s. c. 25 Pac. 1014. ^"Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 539. Contra, State v. Sutterfleld, 54 Mo. 391; Southerland v. Board &c., 96 N. C. 49; s. c. 1 S. E. 760. ^^ Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Davidson County Court, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 637; People V. Wiant, 48 111. 263; People V. Warfield, 20 111. 160; People v. Garner, 47 111. 246, holding that the vote cast at a general election is prima facie evidence of the number of legal voters in the county; Tay- lor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107, to the same point; State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450. Contra, People v. Brown, 11 111. 478. "A vote of the majority of qual- ified voters therein:" Chester &c. R. Co. V. Commissioners &c., 72 N. C. 486. "^- "Legal voter" means a "qualified elector" who does in fact vote: San- ford V. Prentice, 28 Wis. 358. "Pro- vided that a majority of," etc., "shall be present . . . and shall vote," prevents action by less than a major- ity of the whole: Point Pleasant Land Co. v. Trustees, 47 N. J. L. 235; State V. Trustees, 49 N. J. L. 607; s. c. 10 Atl. 191. See also, an article by Irving Browne, Esq., on "What Constitutes a Majority of Electors?" in 22 Alb. L. J. 44. Under a consti- tutional provision that the legisla- ture shall have no power to remove a county seat, and that no county seat shall be removed unless a ma- jority of the electors vote for its re- moval, the legislature may provide that there shall be no removal unless two-thirds of the electors vote for it: Alexander v. People, 7 Colo. 155; s. c. 2 Pac. 894. 375 . MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 400 upon a separate and single ballot and in succession, one after another : it would bo competent for the meeting to direct by vote properly taken that all the officers to be elected, or a part of them as might be deemed expedient, be voted for together on the same ballot in a manner similar to that in which state and county officers are voted for; this would give each voter the right and opportunity to cast his vote for tbe very man of his choice for each office by making up his ballot with the names of such men. But this can not be done where a ticket is nominated by a committee and the voters are re- quired to accept or reject the whole report. The privilege of voting for some of the nominees and against the rest, and for somebody else in their stead, — to "scratch the ticket," as the modern expression is, — can not be lawfully denied to the voter. And although the mode of voting on a ticket as an entirety may have been used without objection in previous meetings, it does not become binding upon any one; it is not a case for the loss of a right by non-user or acquiescence or the gaining of a right by adverse use."^^ § 400. The same subject continued. — At a village meeting a ballot was taken for moderator. Many were present besides lawful voters, who were mixed indiscriminately in the crowd and were participating in the excitement and uproar that characterized the scene. Tellers with hats made their way through the crowd, and it was impossible to know whether some voters, legal or illegal, did not deposit more than a single vote, or that a single voter did not put a vote or votes into more than one hat. The court in condemning the proceedings said: "However proper such a mode of voting may be on some special occasions when the voters are few and are well-known and reliable men, and the excitement of hostile interests is not operating to prompt to anything but fair and legal voting, and when it would at once be manifest if illegal votes should be cast, nothing that could be said upon the subject could make more palpable the gross impropriety of taking the vote as it was done in this case. It was but a burlesque and a mockery of all sensible and sober ideas of a ballot answerable to the lawful right of the citizen and to the soundness with which the exercise of that right is hallowed in the speech, at least, of the dema- gogue, as well as of the ingenuous citizen. It is of no avail to say that it was difficult to take the vote in any other way. It would have been in point and cogent to answer that it better not have been taken at all than to be taken as it was.. It is at the bottom of all honest and just ideas of a proper vote that some mode should be adopted by which it may be known by persons authorized to determine a ques- "^ State V. Harris, 52 Vt. 216, 226. § 401 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 376 tioned right to vote what persons oiTer to cast votes, or to vote by voice or by count, that the right of any such may be challenged and jjroperly determined, and that in voting by ballot it may, with all practicable certainty, be known whether more votes have been cast than there are legal voters to cast them."-^'* § 401. The Australian ballot and cumulative voting. — The Aus- tralian ballot system, as it is called, has been adopted by statute in many of the states.-^ ^ The main feature of this system is that each voter is provided with an official ballot. Upon this the names of the candidates are printed, and the use of any other paper as a ballot is forbidden. But blank spaces are left for the insertion of any names that may be desired. These statutes are not in conflict with the con- stitutional requirement that "elections shall be free and equal," although the privilege of having ballots printed at the expense of the state is granted only when the number of those who support a par- ticular ticket is equal to a certain percentage of the whole number of votes cast at a previous election. ^^® An attempt has been made in Ohio and Michigan to provide for minority representation by statute in the absence of express constitutional authority ; and in New York there has been legislation sanctioning cumulative voting in certain cases. The supreme court of Ohio held that every elector is entitled to vote for every candidate who is to be elected, and a law which de- nied the right to vote for more than two of the jiersons to be chosen was declared to be unconstitutional;*^'^ and this rule has been fol- lowed in Michigan.^^^ The question has been twice before the court of appeals of New York, but the tribunal has found a way of dis- posing of the cases without passing upon the constitutionality of the law.^^® It is significant, however, that all the other states which ='■* State V. Harris, 52 Vt. 216, 222. -'^ For an enumeration of ttie states The court lield tliat quo warranto and a citation of tlie legislative acts, lies against a moderator elected by see Amer. Dig. Ann. 1891, p. 1417, the vote of those who had no right § 66; Ibid., 1892, p. 1634, § 93 et to vote, and that where the statute seq. requires an election to be by ballot, -^''' De Walt v. Hartley, 146 Pa. St. "if called for," it is the right of a 529; s. c. 24 Atl. 185; State v. Mc- single voter to have a ballot upon Millan, 108 Mo. 153; s. c. 18 S. W. his demand when heard and under- 784. stood by the presiding officer. If a -'" State v. Constantine, 42 Ohio St. moderator who is illegally chosen 437. See also. Hays v. Common- presides at a meeting, and a distinct wealth, 82 Pa. St. 518. and contemporaneous protest is '^^ Maynard v. Board &c., 84 Mich. made, it is at least doubtful if the 228; s. c. 47 N. W. 756. proceedings are of any validity what- ™ People v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616; ever. See on this point, § 372, n. 88, People v. Kenney, 96 N. Y. 294. ante. 377 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 402 have authorized such voting have submitted it to the people for their adoption as part of their fundamental law, and it is not likely that it can be successfully introduced in any other way, § 402. Absolute accuracy not required in a ballot. — Voting is usu- ally required to be by ballot, but that method is not imperative in the absence of such a requirement.^^'' Voting by proxy is not per- mitted, but a ballot deposited by another in the voter's presence and at his request would not be rejected.--^ The names of the persons voted for should be expressed with reasonable certainty, but incorrect spelling will not vitiate a ballot if the name is idem sonans. The rule was recently stated by the supreme court of Illinois, as follows: ^'A ballot is indicative of the will of the voter. It is not required that it should be nicely or accurately written, or that the name of the candidate voted for should be correctly spelled. It should be read in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the election and the voter, and the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable cer- tainty. The ballot should be liberally construed, and the intend- ments should be in favor of a reading and construction which will Tender the ballot effective rather than in favor of a conclusion which "will on some technical ground render it ineffective. At the same time it is not admissible to show that something was intended which is contradictory of what was done, and if the ballot is so defective as to fail to show any intention whatever, it must be disregarded."-^^ -^•^ Mechem Public Oflfices and Offi- Behrn, Benhmyer, Berhenmeyer and cers, § 190. Behrsyer. Considerable deviations '■^'- Opinion of Justices, 41 N. H. and omissions are allowed where 550; People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich, there is no other candidate of the 127; Clark v. Robinson, 88 111. 498. same name, such as the omission of ^^- Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 111. a middle letter: People v. Kennedy, 591; s. c. 26 N. E. 704. Accordingly, 37 Mich. 67; State v. Gates, 43 Conn, in that case, where the plaintiff was 533 (a wrong middle letter; cf. Opin- a candidate and his name, though ion of Judges, 38 Maine 598) ; or of properly pronounced in four sylla- a suffix: People v. Cook, 14 Barb. bles, was sometimes syncopated into (N. Y.) 259; s. c. 59 Am. D. 451. two, it was held lawful to count for Initials of the first name are suffi- liim ballots on which the name was cient: Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 written respectively: Behrenmeyer, Wis. 420; People v. Ferguson, 8 Behrsmeyer, Bauersmyer, Bernsh- Cowen (N. Y.) 102; People v. Sea- myer, Benshmyer, Benshmyre, Ben- man, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 409; People v. ere, Bensmyer, Bernsmere, Borns- Cook. 8 N. Y. 67; Chapman v. Per- moer, Berhensmeyer, Bernstmeyer, giison, 1 Bart. El. Cas. 267. Contra, Berensmyer, Bernmyer, Bernsmier, People v. Tisdale, 1 Doug. (Mich.) Behrensmier, Benmyr, Berenmyer, 59; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Behrnsmeyer, Berntsmire, Behrens, s. c. 61 Am. D. 491; People v. Cicott, § 40^ PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 378 § 403. Votes for ineligible candidates. — It is the rule in England that if an ineligible candidate has a majority of valid votes the per- son having the next highest numher is not elected, and there must be a new election. If the voter is ignorant of the fact of disqualifica- tion,^^^ or of disqualification as a conclusion of law,^^* his vote is valid for the purpose of being counted.--''' In the United States "the great current of authority sustains the doctrine that the ineligibility of the majority candidate does not elect the minority candidate, and this without reference to the question as to whether the voters knew of the ineligibility of the candidate for whom they voted. It is considered that in such a case the votes for the ineligible candidate are not void."--'' But the authorities are not entirely uniform. Thus, in New York, as in England, knowledge is an element in the 16 Mich. 282; s. c. 97 Am. D. 141. See also, Opinion of Judges, 64 Maine 596; ' Clark v. Board &c., 126 Mass. 282. Common abbreviations of the first name are not fatal: Reg. v. Bradley, 3 El. & El. 634; People v. Ferguson, 8 Cowen (N. Y.) 102; Chumasero v. Gilbert, 26 111. 39; Gillham v. President &c., 2 Scam. (111.) 245; Bank v. Peel, 11 Ark. 750. Nor in one case was its total omis- sion: Talkington v. Turner, 71 111. 234. But if there is a radical depar- ture the ballot must be thrown out: People V. Cicott, 16 Mich. 282; State V. Judge &c., 13 Ala. 805. See also, on this subject, Paine Elections, § 540 et seq.; Mechem Public Offices and Officers, § 199 et seq. --' Gosling V. Veley, 7 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 406; s. c. 4 H. L. Cas. 679; Reg. V. Mayor &c., L. R. 3 Q. B. 629; Reg. V. Coaks, 3 El. & Bl. 249; Claridge v. Evelyn, 5 B. & Aid. 81; Rex v. Mon- day, 2 Cowp. 530; Rex v. Hawkins, 10 East 211; Rex v. Bridge, 1 M. & S. 76. "' Reg. V. Mayor &c., L. R. 3 Q. B. 629, holding that the maxim "Igno- rantia legis non excusat" has no ap- plication. --^ See also, for the rule in Ireland, In re Tipperary Elec. 9 Ir. R. C. L. 217; Reg. v. Franklin, 6 Ir. R. C. L. 239; Trench v. Nolan, 6 Ir. R. C. L. 464; s. c. 27 L. T. R. 69. But the next highest candidate is elected if the ineligibility both as to fact and law was known and notorious: Rex V. Hawkins, 10 East 211; King v. Parry, 14 East 549; Gosling v. Veley, 7 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 406; s. c. 4 H. L. Cas. 679; Rex v. Monday, 2 Cowp. 530; Rex v. Foxcroft, 2 Burr. 1017; Reg. V. Coaks, 3 El. & Bl. 249; Trench v. Nolan, 2 Moak 711. See also, Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 780. --"Privett V. Bickford, 26 Kan. 52, 57; Crawford v. Dunbar, 52 Cal. 36; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; In re Corliss, 11 R. I. 638; State v. Smith, 11 Wis. 65; State v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497; People v. Molitor, 23 Mich. 341; Hoskins v. Brantley, 57 Miss. 814; Sublett v. Bedwell, 47 Miss. 266; s. c. 12 Am. R. 338; Wood V. Bartling, 16 Kan. 109, 114; Bar- num V. Gilman, 27 Minn. 466; s. c. 8 N. W. 375; State v. Gastinel, 20 La. An. 114; State v. Boal, 46 Mo. 528; State v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97; Dryden V. Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89; Com- monwealth V. Cluley, 56 Pa. St. 270; State V. Walsh, 7 Mo. App. 142, where the death of the majority candidate befoi-e the polls were opened, though it was known to the voters, did not result in giving the election to the next highest. 379 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. § 401 case, but information of both fact and law must be brought directly to the notice of the voter in order to render the vote a nullity;^" while in Indiana it is held that voters are conclusively presumed to know of a candidate's constitutional disqualification by reason of holding another office within the election district, and the next highest candidate is elected.--*^ § 404. Putting up offices at auction — Tax collector. — The office of tax collector was set up at auction in a town meeting and struck off to the lowest bidder, and the town afterwards at the same meeting chose the same person collector. It was held that the proceeding was illegal. The court said : "Of the impropriety of putting up any office at auction I can entertain no doubt. * * * The direct tend- ency of such a practice is to introduce unsuitable persons into public employment — to induce the electors to give their suffrages to him who will work cheapest instead of him who is best qualified. And if an office which is supposed to be onerous and to deserve compensa- tion may be offered to him who is disposed to serve for the lowest wages, it is not apparent why those to which some honor is attached may not be offered to him who is willing to give most for the privilege of executing them. The formality of an election may be had after- wards in the one case as well as in the other. In fact, the office of collector has, in one instance at least, been deemed such an object of competition as to produce an offer of a nominal even if it was not an actual consideration duly paid. In a case recently tried in another county the following was among the records produced: 'Voted, that the collectoTship should be set up to the best bidder. J M agreed to give one and a half mugs of toddy for the privilege of collecting.' No evidence of the impropriety of setting up the office at auction more conclusive than this would be desired or furnished. And there is no necessity for such a practice. The town may fix upon a suitable compensation in the first instance ; or it may be left for such compensation to be afterwards made as the services rendered shall appear to demand ; and in either case there is no inducement to elect an unsuitable person."--^ "' People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451. in a concurring opinion said: — "A ^^* Gulick V. New, 14 Ind. 93; s. c. collector thus chosen is not fit to be 77 Am. D. 49. See also, Hatcheson trusted with the power to seize the V. Tilden, 4 Harr. & McH. (Md.) 279; goods and arrest the bodies of citi- State V. Boal, 46 Mo. 528. zens, especially of citizens who did 229 Per Parker, J., in Tucker v. Ai- not concur in the choice. And if an ken, 7 N. H. 113, 129, 130. But the action of trespass had been brought court held that the collector was an against [the defendant] for taking officer de facto. Richardson, C. J., the goods mentioned ... he § 405 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 380 § 405. City council as judge of election and qualification of its members. — It is the settled doctrine in some jurisdictions that where provision is made hy statute for contesting elections, the statutory- proceeding is the exclusive remedy ;^^° but the weight of authority is to the contrary : holding that where common councils are made the judges of the elections and qualifications of their members the com- mon-law remedy of quo warranto is not prohibited unless the power of the council is expressly declared to be final. -^^ And w^here there is no such office as that which a claimant assumes to fill, or there is no authority for his election thereto, the attempt by him to exercise its functions is a mere usurpation. In such a case a proceeding to contest his election is inapplicable and inappropriate, and if the puljlic exigencies demand it he may be ousted by quo warranto; as, for instance, Avhere a person claims to be elected a member of a council from a ward which has no legal existence,^^^ or from a ward which is already fully represented.-^^ In the latter case the court said: "The supreme court can not inquire whetlier the election was regularly conducted, for that duty belongs to the branch of the council in wliich the seat is claimed; but tliey can decide the question w^hether there was an oi^ce or vacancy to be filled."^^* § 406. Canvass and return and contest of elections. — "It is well settled that the duties of canvassing officers and boards are ministerial merely, and not judicial. Their duty is to count the votes as cast^ and they have no authority, unless expressly granted, to hear evidence or to pass upon or correct alleged errors, irregularities or frauds."- ^^ would probably have found it very 34 N. W. 226; 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. difficult to show a legal defense:" Cas. 388; State v. Gates, 35 Minn. S. C, p. 140. See also, Proprietors 385; s. c. 28 N. W. 927; Board &c. v. &c. V. Page, 6 N. H. 182. Darrow, 13 Colo. 460; s. c. 22 Pac. =*' State V. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 784; 30 Am. & Eng, Corp. Cas. 342; 114; State v. Berry, 14 Ohio St. 315; People v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303; s. State V. Berry, 47 Ohio St. 232; s. c. c. 22 Pac. 764; State v. Kraft, 18 Or. 24 N. E. 266; State v. O'Brien, 47 550; s. c. 23 Pac. 663; 30 Am. & Eng. Ohio St. 464; s. c. 25 N. E. 121; 34 Corp. Cas. 337. Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 361; People v. ='- State v. O'Brien, 47 Ohio St. 464; Metzker, 47 Cal. 524 (see, however, s. c. 25 N. E. 121; 34 Am. & Eng. People V. Bingham, 82 Cal. 238; s. c. Corp. Cas. 361. 22 Pac. 1039); People v. Harshaw, -" Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Pa. 60 Mich. 200; s. c. 26 N. W. 879; St. 341. Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa. St. -'^* Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Pa. 332. Cf. Commonwealth v. Allen, 70 St. 341. Pa. St. 465. "''' Mechem Public Offices and Offi- -" McVeany v. Mayor &c., 80 N. Y. cers, § 208; citing People v. Van 185; People v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117; Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; s. c. 53 Am. D. State V. Kempf, 69 Wis. 470; s. c. 69; People v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 253, 581 MEETINGS AND ELECTIONS. 406 Genuine and regular returns are to be accepted without question by the canvassers, whose function is simply to declare the api)arcnt re- sult of the voting, and not to investigate or pass upon the legality of the election.-''"' They may be compelled to act by mandamus;-''^ and when they have completed their task their powers are exhausted, and they become functi officio.-^® The common-law remedy for a defeated candidate who wishes to contest the finding and certificate of elec- tion is by an information in the nature of a quo warranto; but where the statute prescribes the mode of procedure it is generally exclusive.-^^ Where an ordinance enacted pursuant to the charter provides for a contest before the council, that is the only method;-**^ and the action of the council in regard to the election of its members is not reviewable on error.^*^ Where the council is made the judge of the election and qualification of its members courts have no juris- diction in the matter of contests.-"*^ 321; s. c. 97 Am. D. 141; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 72; Dalton V. State, 43 Ohio St. 652; s. c. 3 N. E. 685; Opinions of Court. 58 N. H. 621; State v. Steers, 44 Mo. 223; People v. Van Slyck, 4 Cowen (N. Y.) 297; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 42, 47; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212; State v. Cavers, 22 Iowa 343; Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 749; State v. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256; State v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 540; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; O'Farrell v. Colby, 2 Minn. 180; Leigh V. State, 69 Ala. 261; State v. Wilson, 24 Neb. 139; s. c. 38 N. W. 31; Maxwell v. Tolly, 26 S. C. 77; s. c. 1 S. E. 160. -^^ Paine Elections, § 603; Lewis v. Commissioners, 16 Kan. 102; s. c. 22 Am. R. 275; State v. Board &c., 17 Fla. 29; Peebles v. Commissioners, 82 N. C. 385; State v. Steers, 44 Mo. 223. "They have no discretion to hear and take proof as to frauds, even if morally certain that mon- strous frauds have been perpe- trated:" Attorney-General v. Bar- stow, 4 Wis. 567. ^^ Brown v. Commissioners &c., 38 Kan. 436; s. c. 17 Pac. 304; Lewis v. Commissioners &c., 16 Kan. 102; s. c. 22 Am. R. 275; State v. County Com'rs, 23 Kan. 264; State v. Wilson, 24 Neb. 139; s. c. 38 N. W. 31; State v. Hill, 10 Neb. 58; s. c. 4 N. W. 514; Magee v. Supervisors, 10 Cal. 376; Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488; State V. County Judge, 7 Iowa 186; Clark V. McKenzie, 7 Bush (Ky.) 523; At- torney-General V. Board &c., 64 Mich. 607; s. c. 31 N. W. 539; Common- wealth V. Emminger, 74 Pa. St. 479; Burke v. Supervisors, 4 W. Va. 371; Alderson v. Commissioners, 31 W. Va. 633; s. c. 8 S. E. 274. "-^ State v. Randall, 35 Ohio St. 64, ^'"See Paine Elections, § 811; Mechem Public Offices and Officers, § 215 et seq. ^^ostine V. Berry, 96 Ky. 63; s. c. 27 S. W. 809. -" Stearns v. Village of Wyoming, 53 Ohio St. 352; s. c. 41 N. E. 578. '^" Foley V. Tyler, 161 111. 167; s. c. 43 N. E. 845; Linegar v. Rittenhouse, 94 111. 208. But this may not bar quo warranto mandamus: Linegar V. Rittenhouse, supra; State v. Mor- ris, 14 Wash. 262; s. c. 44 Pac. 266. CHAPTER XII. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. Section 407. How effected. 408. Power of legislature. 409. Constitutionality of laws for annexation. 410. Delegation of legislative power. 411. Illinois decisions. 412. Mai-yland decisions. 413. Michigan decisions. 414. Missouri and Tennessee decis- ions. 415. Ruling as to Baltimore City. 416. Rule as declared in Washing- ton. 417. Powers of cities under the laws. 418. The same subject continued. 419. What may be annexed — Gen- eral rule. 420. The same subject continued — Construction of statutes. 421. The same subject continued. 422. Right of taxation as to annexed lands. 423. Taxation for antecedent indebt- edness. 424. Remedy of taxpayer. 425. Effect of consolidation. 426. The same subject continued. 427. Annexation proceedings — No- tice. 431 432 433 434 435 437. 438. 439. Section 428. Mode of voting. 429. Jurisdiction and procedure. 430. The same subject continued. Reasonableness of annexation. Validity of annexation. Procedure to test validity. The same subject continued. Special acts as to reorganiza- tion. 436. Nebraska act. Effect of reorganization. The same subject continued. The same subject continued — Decisions in California and Tennessee. 440. Validity of reorganization — Special cases. 441. Invalid reorganization. 442. Property rights passing to new corporation. For what the reorganized cor- poration becomes liable. Further scope of the foregoing doctrine. What are such liabilities. Remedy of creditors of the old corporation. 443. 444. 445. 446. § 407. How effected. — Municipal corporations may be consolidated by act of the legislature, or may extend their boundaries by annexation of territory adjacent by proper proceedings according to the procedure named in the acts of the legislature providing a mode in which this can he accomplished, and proper tribunals for hearing on the merits, and trial of the issues involved between the parties desiring annexa- tion and those remonstrating against it. Reorganization is accom- plished by a new act of incorporation, in the form of a new charter from the legislature, or through the forms and modes provided in. (382) 383 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. g 408 general laws existent in many of the states for the incorporation, re- organization, etc., of such corporations. § 408. Power of legislature. — The power to divide large munici- palities, to annul their old charters and to reorganize them, and to consolidate small ones as well as to detach portions of territory from one and annex it to another, to meet the wishes of its residents or to promote the public interests, as understood by it, is conceded to the legislature. This power is full, in the absence of constitutional re- striction.^ And the legislature by the passage of a general law pre- scribing modes by which adjacent territory may be annexed to mu- nicipal corporations does not surrender its power and obligation to enlarge or diminish the corporate limits of any town or city whenever the public exigency demands that it should be done.^ § 409. Constitutionality of laws for annexation. — Questions have frequently been made upon the constitutionality of laws providing for the annexation of territory to municipal corporations; generally the laws have been upheld. The principal cases will be herein referred to. That property brought by annexation within the corporate limits of a municipal corporation will be subject to taxation to discharge its pre-existing indebtedness is no constitutional objection to the exercise of the power of compulsory annexation, this being a matter, in the absence of special constitutional restrictions, belonging wholly to the legislature to determine.^ The supreme court of Ohio has held that ^ Mount Pleasant v. Beckwlth, 100 lature shall have no power to sus- U. S. 514; Morgan v. Beloit, 7 Wall, pend any general law for the benefit 613; Thompson v. Abbott, 61 Mo. of individuals inconsistent with the 176; Mayor &c. v. Seaber, 3 Burr, general laws of the land." Cant- 1866; Inhabitants &c. v. Skillings, well, J., said: "By these [general] 45 Maine 133; Girard v. Philadel- laws the power to create or abolish, phia, 7 Wall. 1; s. c. 19 L. ed. 53; enlarge or diminish, municipalities Story on Const., §§ 1385, 1388; Dil- is reposed in the legislature. The Ion Munic. Corp. 139 ; Cooley Const, power of annexation by a prescribed Lim. (6th ed.) 228, and cases cited method was conferred on citizens in notes; True v. Davis, 133 111. 522; and freeholders concerned; and at s c. 22 N. E. 410; 6 L. R. A. 266; the same time the inherent power of Daly V. Morgan, 69 Md. 460; s. c. 16 annexation by special act was left Atl. 287. in the legislature. The situation - Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. was as that of two laws, coexisting, 487; s. c. 15 S. W. 364. where a legis- by either of which the same result lative act annexing territory to might be accomplished, and in which Nashville was sustained as not in- resort to one will not be inconsistent consistent with the general laws in with or a suspension of the other." respect to annexation, and not in ^ Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; conflict with Const. Tenn., art. 11, Elston v. Board &c.. 20 Ind. 272; Ed- § 8, cl. 1, providing that "the legis- munds v. Gookins, 20 Ind. 477; Mor- § 410 ruBLic conroKATioxs. 384 proceedings to annex contiguous territory to the corporate limits of a town, in pursuance of their statute upon the subject, are not in con- ' travention of the provisions of the constitution of the state.* The statutes of Kansas, conferring on cities of the second chiss power to extend their boundaries so as to inchide adjacent hind that has been subdivided into blocks and lots, have been held not to be unconstitu- tional because of the provision of the constitution of Kansas which gives the power to the legislature to confer on the tribunals transact- ing county business such powers of local legislation and administra- tion as it may deem expedient, as such power is not exclusive, but can be conferred on other local agencies.^ § 410. Delegation of legislative power. — The laws for enlarging the limits of municipal corporations have been frequently assailed upon the ground that they amount to a delegation of legislative power and are therefore repugnant to the constitutions of the differ- ent states. The supreme court of Kansas has held the first class city act (1887), which provides that "any city of the first class may enlarge or extend its limits or area by an ordinance specifying with accuracy the new line or lines to which it is proposed to enlarge or extend such limits or area," not to be such a delegation of legislative power to the officers of a municipality as will vitiate the act.*' The Missouri act conferring on cities power to extend their limits has been held not to be an unconstitutional delegation of power.'^ In a similar case in Nebraska it was urged that a statute providing that, ford V. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; Burling- =* City of Emporia v. Smith, 42 ton &c. R. Co. V. Spearman, 12 Iowa Kan. 433; s. c. 22 Pac. 616. 112; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. "^ Hurla v. City of Kansas City (Ky.) 330; Layton v. City of New 46 Kan. 738; s. c. 27 Pac. 143, an Orleans, 12 La. An. 515; Arnoult v. action to set aside the proceedings City of New Orleans, 11 La. An. 54; by which the boundaries of Kansas Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants &c.. City, Kan., were extended to include 21 Maine 59; Opinion of Justices, 6 the original cities of Kansas City, Cush. (Mass.) 578, 580; Warren v. Armourdale and Wyandotte and Mayor &c., 2 Gray (Mass.) 84, 104; other contiguous territory; follow- Chandler v. City of Boston, 112 ing Callen v. City of Junction City, Mass. 200; City of St. Louis v. Rus- 43 Kan. 627; s. c. 23 Pac. 652. sell, 9 Mo. 503; City of St. Louis v. "Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396. See Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Smith v. Mc- on same point, Stilz v. City of In- Carthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Norris v. dianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; Taylor v. Mayor &c., 1 Swan (Tenn.) 164; City of Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274; Wade V. City of Richmond, 18 Graft. People &c. v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451; (Va.) 583; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96; § 248. People v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86; De- * Powers V. County Com'rs, 8 Ohio vore's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 163; Dillon St. 285. Munic. Corp., § 183. 385 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § 411 after a city council has voted to annex any contiguous territory, the district court shall, on petition by the city and after notice to the owners of such territory, determine the truth of the allegations of the petition, and whether all or any part of such territory would receive material benefit from annexation to the city, and whether justice and equity require such annexation, and shall enter a decree accord- ingly, — was an attempt to invest the court with extra-judicial powers — a legislative power. The court held that, as a condition of such an- nexation, the questions required to be determined by the court were entirely of a judicial character, and that it was properly invested with jurisdiction in such matters.*^ § 411. Illinois decisions. — The act of the legislature of Illinois amendatory of "An act to revise the law in relation to township or- ganization," so far as it attempted to change the boundaries of cities and incorporated villages, was held to be in violation of the Illi- nois constitution, as embracing more than one subject.® But the *City of Wahoo v. Dickinson, 23 Neb. 426; s. c. 36 N. W. 813. The court, in not giving assent to Gales- burg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152, relied upon by objectors to the law, conceded "that an arbitrary annexa- tion of territory to a city or town, where the benefits to be received by the territory annexed are not con- sidered, can only be accomplished by legislation, either by the legislature itself or with a tribunal clothed with power for that purpose, and that a court under our [Nebraska] consti- tution could not be clothed with such legislative power." ^Dolese v. Pierce, 124 111. 140; s. c. 16 N. E. 218, the court saying: — "Under the title of the act of 1887, the legislature had the right to pro- vide, as it did, for the change of township boundaries, but this right did not carry with it, as an incident, the power to change the boundaries of cities and villages, unless the change of the latter was necessary to effectuate a change of the former, or at least to promote such object. Nothing of this kind is pretended. The only thing claimed — or which 1 bMlTH — 25 can be truthfully claimed — is, that there is some resemblance, or that there are common characteristics, between townships and cities and villages. But this is equally true of all corporate bodies. While town- ships are regarded as municipal cor- porations, in the general sense of that term, yet they stand upon a plane altogether different from that occupied by cities and villages. The latter are possessed of a much high- er order of corporate existence than the former, and differ from them in many essentia] particulars. They are, in law and in fact, as distinct from one another as any two artifi- cial beings could be, whatever their supposed resemblance may be. This is equally so with respect to their or- ganization and jurisdiction. In the exercise of the powers conferred upon them, they act wholly inde- pendent of each other, even where their jurisdiction extends over the same people and territory. . . . Looking at the act as a whole, it is difficult to repel the conviction that it is nothing more than a method of extending, almost indefinitely, the § 413 PUBLIC COlirORATlONS. 38G annexation of two or more cities, incorporated towns and villages to each other, all of which are indebted, the indebtedness of some being in excess of the limit allowed by the constitution of Illinois, is not prohibited by the section providing that no municipal corporation shall become indebted to an amount "in the aggregate exceeding five per cent, on the taxable property therein ;" and that any such corpora- tion incurring indebtedness "shall provide for the collection of a direct tax" for the payment of the same.^" § 412. Maryland decisions. — It was objected to a legislative act in Maryland, which provided that until the year 1900 the rate of taxa- tion for city purposes on all taxable property within the districts to be annexed to the city of Baltimore should not exceed the existing rate in Baltimore county, that it. conflicted with the article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of Maryland which declares that "every person in the state, or person holding property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of the government according to his actual worth in real or personal property." The supreme court of the state sustained the law over this contention, holding that the principle of equality in taxation is fully gratified by making local taxation equal and uniform as to all property within the limits of the taxing-district; and that equality and uniformity, as between different taxing-districts, whether the district be an entire city or parts of a city, is not required in local taxation. ^^ limits of the great cities of our state " Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460, 468; without consulting the people living s. c. 16 Atl. 287, the court saying: in them, or at least but a small por- — "The effect of the provisions of tion of them, and all this without a the nineteenth section is to make word in the title of the act to indi- the territory annexed under it a sep- cate such a purpose." arate taxing-district, within the '"True v. Davis, 133 111. 522; s. c. limits of the city as thus extended, 22 N. E. 410; 6 L. R. A. 266, 267, and the legislature itself, exercising where the court said: — "If, then, its reserved right of taxation, fixes there is no constitutional restriction for a limited period the rate of as- upon annexation of municipalities, sessment and taxation for local pur- and no constitutional right to ex- poses within such district. That it empt the property of taxpayers may exercise this power instead of from burdens other than debts con- delegating it to the local authorities tracted by the municipality while is well settled in this state." The the property or person was within court cites State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill its jurisdiction, it would seem inevi- (Md.) 487; State v. Sterling, 20 Md. tably to follow that there is no con- 502, and as sustaining the same con- stitutional ground to object that the struction refers to Serrill v. City of burden of some taxpayers will be Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355; Gil- larger in consequence of annexation lette v. City of Hartford, 31 Conn, than it would otherwise have been." 351; City of Henderson v. Lambert, 387 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § 413 §413. Michig-an decisions. — The Michigan act consolidating the two cities of Saginaw and East Saginaw, which comprised distinct representative districts, has hcen held not to contravene that section of the constitution of Michigan which provides for the division of the state into representative districts and enacts that such division shall remain unaltered until the return of another enumeration, which is to be had ever}' ten years; as the act expressly provides that it shall not change in any respect the boundaries of the existing representa- tive districts, or the manner of electing representatives, and preserves the old voting precincts intact. Also, that if the act, which author- ized and made it the duty of the council of the consolidated city to issue bonds to raise money to purchase a site for and erect a city hall, and provided that this requirement should not be abrogated "without the assent of a majority of the aldermen, and should be con- strued as in the nature of a contract between the two cities, was un- constitutional, it did not affect the validity of the rest of the act. And further, that where it appears that the consolidation of two or more cities is for the interest of the inhabitants thereof, an act of consoli- dation is not contrary to public policy, and does not abridge the rights of citizens.^" § 414. Missouri and Tennessee decisions. — Kansas City, Missouri, governed by a special charter under the constitutional provision re- lating to cities of a population of more than one hundred thousand 8 Bush (Ky.) 607; Benoist v. City of — "The power of the legislature to St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179; United States consolidate two municipal corpora- T. Memphis, 97 U. S. 293. tions is not questioned. In a new " Smith v. Mayor &c., 81 Mich, and growing state, cases must often 123; s. c. 45 N. W. 964; Local acts arise where it is for the interest of Mich., 1889, No. 455. The relator in the people that territory lying in this application for a mandamus re- different representative districts lied upon People v. Holihan, 29 should, for the purpose of local self- Mich. 116, to sustain his contention government, be comprised in one that the act of consolidation was un- municipality. . . . The constitu- constitutional. The court thus dis- tional provisions are fully satisfied tinguished the case cited: — "In Peo- when the legislative districts are pie v. Holihan the legislature made preserved intact, and the territories no provision for preserving the in- united for municipal purposes only, tegrity of the representative dis- preserving to the electors the neces- trict from which the territory was sary provisions for electing their detached, but, by the very terms of representatives;" citing Bay Co. v. the act, the boundaries of two repre- Bullock, 51 Mich. 544; s. c. 16 N. W. sentative districts were changed, 896; Stone v. City of Charlestown, the electors of one district trans- 114 Mass. 214; Wade v. City of Rich- ferred to another and the preserva- mond. 18 Graft. (Va.) 583; Opinion tion of the district made impossi- of Judges, 33 Maine 587. ble." Further, Grant, J., said: § 415 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 388 inhabitants, by an ordinance attempted to annex a large adjacent ter- ritory including the city of Westport. In a case involving the validity of this annexation ordinance it was held that the ordinance was void ; that it was an amendment to the charter, and the constitution of the state denied the city the right thus to extend its limits without first submitting the proposition to and procuring the consent of three- iifths of its voters, which it had failed to do.^^ The placing of prop- erty within the corporate limits of a given town is not a taking of private property, as the ownership remains unchanged; and a Ten- nessee statute providing for annexation of land to the city of Nash- ville was held not to be in conflict with the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which provides that "private prop- erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation," nor with the constitution of Tennessee, containing similar provisions ;^^^ nor was said act repugnant to the provisions of the constitution of Tennessee providing that "no corporation shall be created or its pow- ers increased or diminished by special laws," as this clause applies only to private corporations.^* § 415. Ruling as to Baltimore City. — The act of Maryland extend- ing the limits of Baltimore City by including therein parts of Balti- more County has been held not to violate the provision of the constitu- tion of Maryland, relating to the organization of new counties and the location of county seats, which provides that the lines of a county shall not be changed without the consent of a majority of the Voters of the territory sought to be taken from one and added to another coun- ty. ^^ It was further held that the legislature of the state had the power to extend the limits of a city by including therein parts of the county adjoining, the city itself being a part of the county.^® In sup- port of this holding Robinson, J., said : "Counties are political divi- sions of the state, organized with a view to the general policy of the state, and the functions and powers exercised by them have reference mainly to such policy. Besides, their representation in the general assembly is fixed by the constitution, and we can understand why it was deemed proper to make some provision in regard to the organiza- tion of counties, and the annexation of part of one county to another. Towns and cities, however, are ordinarily chartered at the instance, and mainly with reference to the interest, convenience and advantage, "City of Westport v. Kansas City, ^^ Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460; s. c. 103 Mo. 141; s. c. 15 S. W. 68. 16 Atl. 287. "a So held in Williams v. Nash- '" Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460; s. c. ville, 89 Tenn. 487; s. c. 15 S. W. 364. 16 Atl. 287. "Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487; s. c. 15 S. W. 364. "89 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § JlG of persons residing within the particular locality incorporated. They are chartered by the legislature, and their boundaries are fixed by it, and the power to extend tlicm, whenever in its judgment the public interests require it, has been exercised by the legislature from the earliest days of the colony. No reason has been suggested why the constitution should prohibit the exercise of this power, and it would seem strange that it should provide for the annexation of parts of one county to another, and deny to the legislature the power to extend the limits of a city, by including therein parts of an adjoining county, even though such county should be a separate and independent terri- torial division of the state." § 416. Rule as declared in Washington. — The constitution of Washington declares that municipal corporations shall not be created by special laws, but the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for their incorporation, organization, etc. This does not prevent two existing municipal corporations, or one existing corporation and an adjacent body whose incorporation was void, from being consolidated under a law authorizing a special election on the question of consoli- dation.^'^ § 417. Powers of cities under the laws. — A Florida statute gave municipal authorities the power to extend their territorial limits, and " State v. City of New Whatcom, uniformity it provides that existing 3 Wash. 7; s. c. 27 Pac. 1020; it be- cities and towns may, without leg- ing held that the title, "An act pro- islative compulsion, drop their spe- viding for the organization, incorpo- cial charters and take up the organi- ration and government of municipal zation of their respective classes un- corporations," was sufficiently broad der such general laws as may be en- to cover provisions authorizing the acted. To do this," he says, "is in consolidation of two municipal cor- no sense to destroy or disincorporate porations and the holding of a spe- a city or town. The territory covered cial election on the question. Pur- is to be the same. The name is con- ther, that the act of Washington, tinned and the people are identical. March 27, 1890 (acts, p. 138), pro- But when two existing corporations viding that "two or more contiguous are to be consolidated the prelimi- municipal corporations may become nary thing to be accomplished is the consolidated into one corporation disincorporation of the old, and then after proceedings had as required in follows the incorporation of a new this section," and authorizing a municipality, in which there must be special election to be held on the new territory, a new name (at least question of consolidation, applied to as to a part of the new territory) and pre-existing corporations created by uew people. This operation . . . special charter, as well as those or- may be accompanied by either a gen- ganized under general incorporation eral or a special election, as the leg- laws. Stiles, J., says of the constitu- islature may direct." tional provision, that "to encourage §418 PUBLIC CORPORATIOXS. 390 defined generally the powers and duties of municipalities. Another statute established provisional governments for cities whose charters were repealed for indebtedness, appointing con)missioners with certain general powers, and declared the defunct cities to be provisional mu- nicipalities, "the boundaries of which shall be coextensive with the boundaries of such defunct cities and towns," giving to the officers thereof the same powers vested in the officers of such defunct cities under the act of 1869. It has been held that the provisional munici- palities had power to extend their territorial limits." Under the Indiana statutes the common council of a city, while having authority, without the consent of the owner, to annex territory, and extend its boundaries so as to include lots platted adjoining it if the plat has been acknowledged and properly recorded, can not annex land of a married woman, platted by her husband, without her authority and knowledge, even though she may have erroneously supposed it to be included in another plat before made by herself and husband and duly acknowledged and recorded.^^ The limits of a city can not be ex- tended by vote of the electors thereof, without the consent of the voters of the territory to be annexed, under the Texas statutes.-" The power to annex teritory is not affected by the fact that part of it is occupied as a rural homestead ; nor by the fact of the territory being used for agricultural and grazing purposes. ^^ And it is immaterial that it lies on several sides of a city, if the territory proposed to be annexed by one proceeding comprises but one body of land.^^ § 418. The same subject continued. — A city of the first class under the Kansas statute can not extend its limits so as to include unplatted territory of over five acres against the protest of the owner thereof, unless the same is circumscribed by platted territory that is taken into said city.^^ Under the Nebraska statute providing that a city of the metropolitan class may include within its corporate limits an area not to exceed twenty-five square miles, including any township " Saunders v. Provisional Munici- poration, except that they may be pality &c., 24 Fla. 226; s. c. 4 So. 801; extended by additional territory Act Fla., Feb. 4, 1869 (McClel. Dig. whenever the majority of the quali- 255, § 44), as amended, Fla. laws fled electors of said territory shall 1879, ch. 3161, § 2. indicate a desire to be included with- ^^ City of Indianapolis v. Fatter- in the limits of the corporation, son, 112 Ind. 344; s. c. 14 N. E. 551; "State v. City of Waxahachie, 81 Burns R. S. Ind. 1901, § 3658. Texas 626; s. c. 17 S. W. 348. ""Lum v. City of Bowie (Tex.), IS == State v. City of Waxahachie, su- S. W. 142. Sayles Civil St. (Tex.), pra. art. 343, enacts that the limits of a "^ Union Pac. R. Co. v. City of Kan- city accepting titles 17 and 18 shall sas City, 42 Kan. 497; s. c. 22 Pac. remain as fixed by the act of incor- 633. 391 CONSOLIDATION' AXD KEORGAKIZATION. § 419 or village organization within such limits, and that such organization shall thereupon cease and terminate, such a city can not divide the territory of a village and annex a portion thereof, but it must include the entire village.'* Nor can it extend its limits so as to include a city of the second class. ^° The revised statutes of Texas, providing for annexation of adjacent territory to the limits of a city, have been construed, and it was held that by the words "to the extent of a half mile in width" it was not intended to confine the authority to make an annexation of territory to an area neither more nor less than half a mile wide, but it was intended to limit the area of territory which might be added to a city to half a mile wide ;-** and so long as the territories added are only a half mile wide, their outer boundaries may be extended until they intersect, though the corner thus formed is more than a half mile from the original city limits.-^ § 419. "What may be annexed — General rule. — If it does not ap- pear that the territory as a whole should be annexed, it is error to annex any part of it.-^ Such land must have great value for urban purposes.-*^ Land which evidence shows represents a city's growth beyond its limits, and that it derives its value from actual or pros- pective use for town purposes, is a proper subject for annexation though a considerable part thereof may be used for agricultural pur- poses.^" Where suburban property is platted into lots, and marked in such way as to impress on it the character of urban property as distinguished from rural use, the fact that the lots are larger than ordinary city lots will not exclude them from the operation of the laws of Indiana authorizing a city to annex suburban territory which has been platted into lots.^^ "* City of Omaha v. City of South " State v. City of Waxahachie, 81 Omaha, 31 Neb. 378; s. c. 47 N. W. Tex. 626; s. c. 17 S. W. 348. 1113; Comp. St. Neb., ch. 12a, § 3. ^Vestal v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. =^City of Omaha v. City of South 321; s. c. 15 S. W. 891; 16 S. W. 291. Omalia, supra. "" Woodruff v. Eureka Springs, 55 ^''City of East Dallas v. State, 73 Ark. 618; s. c. 19 S. W. 15; the court Tex. 370; s. c. 11 S. W. 1030; the expressing a doubt as to whether an- court deeming it reasonable to pre- nexation could be justified upon the sume an intention of the legislature ground alone that the city desired to to restrain "a tendency on the part establish, maintain and preserve of thriving and ambitious cities to water-works upon it. extend the limits of the municipal- ™ Vogel v. Little Rock, 55 Ark. ity beyond the urban population and 609; s. c. 19 S. W. 13, where an an- to subject to taxation persons and nexation was held to be right and property who neither need nor re- proper under the rule established in ceive any protection from the city Vestal v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 321; government." s. c. 15 S. W. 891; 16 S. W. 291. '^Glover v. City of Terre Haute, § 420 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 392 § 420. The same subject continued — Construction of statutes. — Territory separated from a city by a navigable river is "contiguous" within the meaning of a statute authorizing municipal corporations to annex contiguous territory lying in the same county. Therefore, an unincorporated town on one side of an intervening river may be annexed to a city on the other side, although at the time the only means of communication are two toll-bridges and a number of small boats operated by private persons for hire.^^ The annexation of un- platted land which is touched on two sides to its entire extent by plat- ted lands will not be set aside on appeal because it is vacant, low, flat and wet and covered with timber, since it may have been needed for town purposes, and may have needed organized local government to reclaim it.^^ As ordinarily the territory of a municipal corporation is subdivided into lots and blocks, and the residents therein do not de- pend on the cultivation of the soil for a livelihood, it is not the policy of the law to annex large tracts of agricultural lands to a village or city unless under the circumstances such lands should be subdivided and sold as village lots.^* The act of Pennsylvania of April, 1876, authorizing the court of quarter sessions to annex the lands of persons resident in one township or borough to another township or borough for school purposes, does not authorize the annexation of land to a non-adjacent township.^ ^ § 421. The same subject continued. — Under the act of Pennsyl- vania of April 3, 1851, as amended by act of June 11, 1879,^^ provid- ing for the annexation to a borough of "any lots, outlots or tracts of land adjacent" thereto, on application of the inhabitants of such land, annexation may be decreed if the land of all the petitioners, taken as one tract, adjoins a borough, though land not annexed may 129 Ind. 593; s. c. 29 N. E. 412. See North Des Moines, 80 Iowa 626; s. c. also, Collins v. City of New Albany, 45 N. W. 1031. 59 Ind. 396; City of Evansville v. ^* Village of Hartington v. Luge, Page, 23 Ind. 525; Edmunds v. Gook- 33 Neb. 623; s. c. 50 N. W. 957; the ins, 24 Ind. 169. court saying that "the principal ben- ^'Vogel V. Little Rock, 54 Ark. efit in this case would be to the vil- 335; s. c. 15 S. W. 836. lage by adding to the taxable prop- ^' So held in Vestal v. Little Rock, erty therein, but this of itself is not 54 Ark. 321; s. c. 15 S. W. 891; 16 sufficient." They reversed the judg- S. W. 291, a proceeding on the part ment of the district court as to all of the city under Mansf. Dig. Ark., the lands not subdivided into lots. § 922, to annex contiguous territory; ^ In re Heidler, 122 Pa. St. 653; citing as to where there is an inter- s. c. 16 Atl. 97. vening river, Blanchard v. Bissell, °* Purd. Dig., p. 199, § 20 et seq. 11 Ohio St. 96, and Ford v. Town of 393 COXSOLIDATIOX AXD REORGANIZATION". § 422 intervene between the borough and some of the tracts.''^ A city of the first chiss in Kansas has the power to extend and enlarge its boundaries so as to include within it a continuous body of land lying contiguous to the prior limits of said city, when the ordinance pro- viding for such extension is approved, by the district court of the county within which such city is situated. This extension may in- clude several tracts of land, some of which adjoin the city, and others adjoining those that do adjoin the city, so as to form one contiguous body, the annexation ordinance being approved by the district court in the manner and under the conditions and requirements of the statute.^^ Where owners have platted into blocks and lots their farm- ing land adjacent to a city in a manner to bring it within the laws of Kansas providing for it, such subdivision may be annexed by ordi- nance to the city.^" Agricultural land distant a half or three-quarters of a mile from any settlement, to which no streets or other city im- provements extend, and which is not needed nor at present adaptable for city uses, should not be annexed to a city.*" § 422. Right of taxation as to annexed lands. — Land within the limits of a city, annexed to it by legal, regular proceedings, although used only for agricultural and horticultural purposes, is subject to be taxed for ordinary city revenues.*^ It has been held that where a town incorporated, including within its boundaries unplatted lands, and was afterwards incorporated as a city of the first class with the same boundaries, and levied municipal taxes upon these unplatted lands, the then owners of the lands who had paid the taxes could not maintain an action for the recovery of those taxes.*^ The owner of "Appeal of Brinton, 142 Pa. St. ha, 1 Neb. 16; County Com'rs v. 511; s. c. 21 Atl. 978. President &c., 51 Md. 465; 2 Dillon ^So held in Hurla v. City of Kan- Munic. Corp., § 795 and note; Bor- sas City, 46 Kan. 738; s. c. 27 Pac. ough of West Philadelphia, 5 W. & 143. S. (Pa.) 281; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. =^ Tilford V. City of Olathe, 44 Kan. 396. 721; s. c. 25 Pac. 223; following City "Hurla v. City of Kansas City, 46 of Emporia v. Smith, 42 Kan. 433; Kan. 738; s. c. 27 Pac. 143; following s. c. 22 Pac. 616. Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570; ^^ So held in Vestal v. Little Rock, s. c. 22 Pac. 558. 54 Ark. 321; s. c. 15 S. W. 891; 16 " McClay v. City of Lincoln, 32 S. W. 291; citing People v. Bennett, Neb. 412; s. c. 49 N. W. 282; the 29 Mich. 451; s. c. 18 Am. R. 107, court relying, to sustain their judg- 111; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. ment, upon South Platte Land Co. (Ky.) 330; City of Covington v. v. Buffalo Co., 15 Neb. 605; s. c. 19 Southgate, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 491; N. W. 711; and especially upon Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; City Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96, of New Orleans v. Michoud, 10 La. where the supreme court of Ohio re- An. 763; Bradshaw v. City of Oma- versed a decree of perpetual injunc- § 433 rUBLIC COKI'OKATIONS. 394 land annexed to a city upon the finding of a court as provided for in a Nebraska statute can not claim exemption from taxation by the cor- poration, which is provided for in another section touching voluntary annexations.*^ But a person whose land has been annexed to a city under the first-mentioned statute, and become liable, by another sec- tion, to subdivision into lots and blocks, with streets and alleys, and subject to taxation for the city's antecedent debts, and who has taken no appeal from the judgment of annexation, can not in another action complain that the statute was unconstitutional in that it authorized the taking of private property for public use without compensation.** § 423. Taxation for antecedent indebtedness. — Property included in the extended limits of a municipality becomes, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, subject to taxation for all municipal in- debtedness existing before the limits were extended.*^ tion against the collection of munic- ipal taxes upon lands annexed to the city of Toledo under a statute sim- ilar to the one in Nebraska; the Ohio court holding on review that "the territory so annexed was con- tiguous to the original city; that such annexation might be ordered without the consent and against the remonstrance of a majority of the persons residing in the annexed ter- ritory; and the lands were liable to local taxation on account of pre-ex- isting city debts." *^ Gottschalk v. Becher, 32 Neb. 653; s. c. 49 N. W. 715; the court thus distinguishing the two sec- tions: — "Territory annexed volun- tarily under § 95 may be so situated that it would be against equity to compel it to share prior burdens. The policy of the statute encourages annexation and municipal accretion and wealth. Territory can only be annexed under § 99 when the court shall find that 'it would receive ma- terial benefit,' or 'that justice and equity require it.' Upon such find- ings and resulting annexation the taxation must be uniform under the constitution, art. 9, § 6." •" Gottschalk v. Becher, supra. ^=>Madry v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538; s. c. 11 S. W. 541; citing Layton v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515, where it was held that where the act annexing additional territory (a city) provided that it should be sub- ject to taxation to meet such debts only as had been created by itself, a subsequent act of the legislature might subject property to a higher rate of taxation than was necessary to meet such indebtedness, even though the tax thus raised went to discharge indebtedness of the corpo- ration to which it was attached ex- isting before the consolidation. Cit- ing also. United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 289, where it was held that an act subsequent to one annexing territory to a city relieving the an- nexed territory from taxation to meet the cost of paving, the most of which was done after annexation, and outside of the annexed territory, was valid; the court saying, how- ever, that the act of annexation, though it might have done so, not having exempted this property from the tax, "the people resident [there- in] became at once entitled to a com- mon ownership of the city's property and privileges, subject to the same duties as those resting on others. Had the [subsequent] act never been 395 COXSOLIDATIOX AND REORGANIZATION. § 424 § 424. Remedy of taxpayer. — An injunction will lie to restrain taxes levied by a city on annexed territory where the city has voted to extend its limits without the consent of the electors of the territory sought to be annexed.*" The fact that personal property of one who resides within territory annexed by ordinance of a city extending its boundaries as allowed by law. has thus become subject to municipal taxation does not justify an assault on his part upon the validity of that ordinance.*" In an action to enjoin the collection of taxes levied upon annexed suburban platted territory, the motive of a city in an- nexing it can not be inquired into.** § 425. Effect of consolidation. — The city of Philadelphia, when it covered about two miles square, was made by the will of Stephen Girard trustee to administer the trusts of that will. By various acts of the legislature culminating in the "consolidation act" of 1854, the twenty-eight municipal corporations, comprising "districts," bor- oughs and townships, making the residue of the county of Phila- delphia, were brought into one city. A bill was filed by testator's heirs alleging, among other things, that the new city became incom- petent to act as a trustee. The dismissal of this bill was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States, it being held that, by the supplement to the act incorporating the city (commonly called the "consolidation act"), the identity of the corporation was not de- stroyed; nor could the changes in its name, the enlargement of its area or increase in the number of its corporators affect its title to property held at the time of such change. It was further held that passed it must be conceded that they " City of Plattsburg v. Riley, 42 would have been on exact equality Mo. App. 18. with all other owners of property in *** Glover v. City of Terre Haute, the city, equally entitled with them 129 Ind. 593; s. c. 29 N. E. 412, where to all municipal rights and privi- it was objected that the city had leges and equally subject to all mu- been neglectful of its duty in ex- nicipal burdens and charges." tending water-works, street improve- ^"Lum v. City of Bowie (Tex.), 18 ments and lights into this portion of S. W. 142; the court distinguishing the city, and that by such neglect Brennan v. City of Weatherford, 53 the right to treat it as a part of the Tex. 330, and Graham v. City of city had been forfeited, though it Greenville, 67 Tex. 62; s. c. 2 S. W. had maintained a school therein; 742, in that the validity of the ex- and it was contended that the pur isting corporations in those cases pose and object of the city in mak- was disputed, and it seemed this ing the annexation v/as simply to could only be done by quo warranto increase the revenues of the city by proceedings. Here there is no ques- the taxation of this property. See tion made as to the validity of the also. City of Logansport v. Seybold, corporation. 59 Ind. 225; Burns Rev. Stats. Ind. 1901, §§ 3658. 3659, and notes. § 426 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 396 the corporation, -under its amended charter, had every capacity to hold and every power and authority necessary to execute the trusts of the will.*'^ § 426. The same subject continued. — It has been held that the effect of the provision of the Minnesota statute consolidating the cities of St. Anthony and Minneapolis, and providing that "all ordi- nances and resolutions heretofore made * * * ^y the city coun- cil of * * * St. Anthony or by the common council of * * * Minneapolis * * * shall be and remain in force until altered, modified or repealed by the city council of said city," was not to extend the ordinances of each city over the new city, but to confine their operation within their former territorial limits until changed by the new city council.^ ° A village lying within the limits of an incor- porated town does not, by annexation to an adjacent city, the limits of which are coterminous with those of another town, become part of the latter town.^^ § 427. Annexation proceedings — Notice. — The rule in Michigan is that the "notice in writing" to be posted on application to detach ter- ritory from one township and attach it to another may be printed, and the names attached printed if properly authenticated.^^ The annexa- *''Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. Coke 86; Haddock's Case, T. Raym. 1. On p. 14, as to the power of the legislature in the premises, Grier, J., says: "The legislature may alter, modify, or even annul the franchises of a public municipal corporation, although it may not impose burdens on it without its consent;" and con- tinues: "In this case the corporation has assented to accept the changes, assume the burdens and perform the duties imposed upon it; and it is difficult to conceive how they can have forfeited their right to the charities which the law makes it their duty to administer. The ob- jects of the testator's charity remain the same while the city, large or small, exists; the trust is an existing and valid one, the trustee is vested by law with the estate and the full- est power and authority to execute the trust." As to change of name or enlargement of franchises not de- stroying the identity of a municipal corporation, see Luttrel's Case, 4 435; s. c. 1 Vent. 355. ^" Camp V. City of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 461; s. c. 23 N. W. 845. " City of East St. Louis v. Rhein, 139 111. 116; s. c. 28 N. E. 1089; the court conceding that the question of annexing the village to the city had been properly submitted to the voters of the same, but the question of detaching a part of the town (em- braced in the village) and attaching it to the other town had not been submitted to the voters of the towns. The ruling was based upon People v. Brayton, 94 111. 341; Dolese v. Pierce, 124 111. 140; s. c. 16 N. E. 218; Vil- lage of Hyde Park v. City of Chicago, 124 111. 156; s. c. 16 N. E. 222; Don- nersberger v. Prendergast, 128 111. 229; s. c. 21 N. E. 1; 111. laws 1887, 300; 3 Starr & C. Anno. St. (111.) 522; 111. laws 1889,- 66, 361; 2 Starr & C. Anno. St. (111.) 2410; True v. Davis, 133 111. 522; s. c. 22 N. E. 410. " Pelton V. Ottawa Co. Supervisors, 52 Mich. 517; s. c. 18 N. W. 245. 397 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § 428 tion of adjacent tfrrilory undci- the Nebraska statute is a judieial proceeding in which the bindowner is entitled to all the rights of contravention and appeal/''' l^arties appearing and contesting the proceedings for annexation of adjacent territory to a borough on application of the inhabitants, in accordance with the Pennsylvania statute, after notice, can not complain that the notice was not in the form prescribed by the act.°* The Iowa code provides for the incor- poration of a town or the annexation of territory thereto by proceed- ings in the district court. It was held that the code did not require that the notice of election should be made of record : it was sufficient that the record showed that notice was duly given. Also, that where all the proceedings relating to the annexation of territory to an in- corporated town were regular, and the town had assumed iinquestioned jurisdiction of the territory, the annexation was not invalidated by the fact that the copies of the proceedings filed in the office of the county recorder and of the secretary of state, as required, were not certified to be correct copies; especially where the proper certificates were supplied even after the sufficiency of the annexation was called in question by actions commenced. ^^ § 428. Mode of voting. — The revised statutes of Illinois give the county judge a discretionary power to submit the question of annexa- tion "at either a special election called for that purpose, or at any mu- nicipal election, or at any general election," "to be holden in each of said incorporated cities, towns or villages." That such a ques- tion was voted upon in a village at its regular municipal election, and in the city at its regular municipal election held on another day, has been held not to invalidate the election.^'' The construction of the Texas statutes as to the vote on questions of annexation is that the voters are allowed to express their preferences on the subject by any method of voting which is satisfactory to themselves and to the city council ; and that when it is shown by the proper affidavit that a ma- jority have favored annexation the city council is authorized to receive the territory of their residences into the city limits. ^^ A construction " So held in Gottschalk v. Becher, 29 N. E. 849, where the annexation 32 Neb. 653; s. c. 49 N. W. 715. proceedings were sustained; the " Appeal of Brinton, 142 Pa. St. court further holding that the cor- 511; s. c. 21 Atl. 978; citing Incor- poration first voting would retain its poration of Edgewood Borough, 130 separate corporate existence until a Pa. St. 349; s. c. 18 Atl. 646. majority of the voters of the other ^^ Ford v. Town of North Des had declared in its favor, when the Moines, 80 Iowa 626; s. c. 45 N. W. consolidation would be completed 1031. and go into effect. ^® Village of North Springfield v. ^'Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 City of Springfield, 140 111. 165; s. c. Tex. 62; s. c. 2 S. W. 742, which v/as § 429 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 398 has been placed iipon the x\rkansas statute providing that "when any municipal corporation shall desire to annex any contiguous territory thereto, lying in the same county, it shall be lawful for the council to submit the question to the qualitied electors at least one month before the annual election," to the effect that the council was required to make an order at least a month before the annual election for the submission of the question at that election, and not to submit the question at an election held one month before the annual election.^^ § 429. Jurisdiction and procedure. — By the laws in which the legis- latures of the different states have provided modes for annexation of territory to the limits of municipal corporations, 'there is provision made for voluntary and involuntary annexation in so far as the own- ers of the lands are concerned. Therefore, a procedure and a juris- diction for the trial of the issues presented has been named, and the general rule is that there must be strict compliance with the require- ments of the statutes to make the annexation valid. ^^ ISTo part of a specified territory can be annexed to a city without a public notice of the hearing before the county court, as prescribed by statute, even though a majority of the -property holders of such territory voluntarily appear at the hearing and consent to the annexation.''*' The supreme court of Nebraska reversed the court below in a proceeding for an- nexation of territory to a city of the second class and dismissed the petition, for the reason that the record did not show that a resolution followed in State v. City of Waxa- the court of quarter sessions as to liachie, 81 Tex. 626; s. c. 17 S. W. the annexation of this land having 348, where a majority of the voters been lost, the record from the re- signed a paper which was presented corder's office was evidence and to the city council on the affidavit of could not be questioned. The pre- three of the number, which stated, sumption in such a case is that the among other things, that the signers court required strict compliance with thereby "cast our [their] votes" in the provisions of the act before the favor of the annexation, and de- decree was made and recorded; this scribed the territory. being especially true after lapse of ^^ Vogel V. Little Rock, 55 Ark. time and proof that the persons re- 609; s. c. 19 S. W. 13. siding thereon had after the time of ^^ McFate's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 323, such record acted as if the decree where it was held, in a proceeding were valid. to restrain a borough from exercis- "" Gunter v. Fayetteville, 56 Ark. ing jurisdiction over a section in- 202; s. c. 19 S. W. 577; the court say- eluded in its enlarged limits, which ing: — "This class of cases is anoma- enlargement was under the provis- lous, — the court acts upon the terri- ions of the act of April 1, 1834 (P. tory as a whole, without the power L. Pa. 163), that the petition and de- of dividing it or of severing any cree in the matter having been re- part;" citing Vestal v. Little Rock, corded in the recorder's office as re- 54 Ark. 321, 323; s. c. 15 S. W. 891; quired by the statute, the records of 16 S. W. 291. 399 CONSOL]DATJO\ AXD KKORGANIZATION'. § 430 to annex such territory had been adopted by the city council by a two-thirds vote of all the members elect of such body, which by statute was the first step to be taken, and a condition precedent to the author- ity of the district court in the premises.*'^ § 430. The same subject continued. — In an action to annex terri- tory to a village it must appear from the facts stated in the petition that some portion of the territory sought to be annexed will be bene- fited from the annexation; and the particular facts showing such benefits with justice and equity of the relief sought must be alleged.**^ A petition for annexation in Pennsylvania must state that the land adjoins the township to which the court is asked to annex it.®^ An- nexation cases, when appealed from the county court to the circuit court, should be tried de novo, and such proceedings had and such judgment rendered as though that court had original jurisdiction.®* The circuit court may therefore permit amendments such as would be proper in the county court to the petition in such cases to exclude part of the land included in it; but such an amendment can not be made in the supreme court: the cause must be remanded to the cir- cuit court, the amendments made there and the case tried de novo.*^^ But neither the court on its own motion, nor the attorney of the cor- poration by leave, has the right to make such amendments except upon terms that permit remonstrance to be fairly heard upon the petition as amended."® No ordinance of the council of the city is necessary to empower the attorney to make such amendment.®'^ An ordinance of a city submitting to the electors the question of annexa- tion of contiguous territory, which properly describes the land, is not rendered invalid by reason of its omitting to recite that the land is contiguous.®* Under the Pennsylvania statutes, in proceedings to "City of Seward v. Conroy, 33 Eureka Springs, 55 Ark. 618; s. c. Neb. 430; s. c. 50 N. W. 329. 19 S. W. 15. ®= Village of Hartington v. Luge, 33 "^ Woodruff v. Eureka Springs, 55 Neb. 623; s. c. 50 N. W. 957. Ark. 618; s. c. 19 S. W. 15. The court 'Un re Heidler, 122 Pa. St. 653; said:— "The fact, and not the recital s. c. 16 Atl. 97. of contiguity, authorizes the council ** Dodson v. Fort Smith, 33 Ark. to act; and where the fact exists 508, 515. there is nothing that requires that "^ Vestal V. Little Rock, 54 Ark. it appear by a recital upon the rec- 321; s. c. 15 S. W. 891; 16 S. W. 291. ords of the council. The council ^'^ Woodruff V. Eureka Springs, 55 acts in a legislative, and not in a Ark. 618; s. c. 19 S. W. 15, remand- judicial, capacity; and the rules ing the case with directions to allow which require that the jurisdiction amendments upon such terms. of inferior courts shall appear of rec- '^Vogel V. Little Rock, 55 Ark. ord are not applicable." 609; s. c. 19 S. W. 13; Woodruff v. § 431 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 400 annex adjacent territory to a borough, no appeal on the merits lies to the supreme court;, and the expediency of such annexation can not be considered."'' The statute of Arlvansas probably never intended an appeal in annexation cases, as it borrows its provisions from states where the acts prescribed to be performed by the county court are ad- ministrative purely, and where no appeal is allowed ; but the right to appeal in that state is well established.^" § 431. Reasonableness of annexation. — The supreme court of Mis- souri has held that the power of a city to annex by ordinance contigu- ous territory to its limits is restricted to a reasonable and proper exercise of such power.^^ The supreme court of Arkansas, after fully considering the various cases in different jurisdictions upon this sub- ject, summed up their conclusions in what may be styled an excellent rule to guide courts in the determination of applications for annexa- tion ; the court said : "That city limits may reasonably and properly be extended so as to take in contiguous lands: (1) when they are platted and held for sale or use as town lots; (2) whether platted or not, if they are held to be bought on the market and sold as town property when they reach a value corresponding with the views of the owner; (3) when they furnish the abode for a densely settled com- munity, or represent the actual growth of the town beyond its legal boundary; (4) when they are needed for any proper town purpose, as for the extension of its streets, or sewer, gas or water system, or to supply places for the abode or business of its residents, or for the ex- tension of needed police regulation; and (5) when they are valuable by reason of their adaptability for prospective town uses; but the mere fact that their value is enhanced by reason of their nearness to the corporation would not give ground for their annexation if it did not apl^ear that such value was enhanced on account of their adapta- bility to town use."^^ But an objection that an extension of the limits of a town, otherwise reasonable, is unreasonable in that it includes and subjects to taxation for municipal purposes land lying along a river and subject to overflow, will not be allowed in lowa.'^^ § 432. Validity of annexation. — Land of an owner who had not platted and made a map of the same, but which had been included «« Appeal of Brinton, 142 Pa. St. "Vestal v. Little Rock, 54 Ark. 511; s. c. 21 Atl. 978. 321, 323; s. c. 15 S. W. 891; 16 S. W. ™Gunter v. Fayetteville, 56 Ark. 291. 202; s. c. 19 S. W. 577; Dodson v. "Ford v. Town of North Des Mayor &c., 33 Ark. 508; Foreman v. Moines, 80 Iowa 626; s. c. 45 N. W. Town of Marianna, 43 Ark. 324. 1031. '* Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396. 401 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION", § 433 in a proposed addition to a city and platted by another owning the most of this addition, has been hekl iiot to have become a part of the city, although there was an ordinance of tlie city attempting to make the addition. ■'•* And tlio fact that plaintiff had paid a municipal tax upon his lands was held not to be a ratification on his part of the annexation to the city, nor to estop him from denying the validity of the annexation. If plaintiff had acquiesced in the annexation proceedings, stood by and without objection seen the city appropriate money or make improvements upon the faith of the validity of the proceedings by which the land was attempted to be annexed to the city, it would have bound him.'^^ Where a county seat, in accordance with the laws of Kansas, by an election of citizens has been located in a town site, the officers of the county have no right to remove the courthouse and records to an addition to said town site which has been with the original town site incorporated as a city of the same name.''® § 433. Procedure to test validity. — The property of an incorpo- rated village being in the nature of a trust fund, which the corporate authorities hold for the use of the public, any unlawful interference with it calculated to inflict irreparable injury upon the community presents a clear case for equitable relief. Therefore, a bill for in- junction as a mode of testing the validity of an alleged law by which it was attempted to annex the village to the city and on which the latter relied to justify its usurpation of authority over the property of the former has been approved.''^ A writ of certiorari to quash an order of annexation of territory to a town or city, which was granted upon the petition of owners of the annexed territory, should be re- fused unless such owners or the persons named in the petition as authorized to act for them should be made parties. Laches in apply- " Armstrong v. City of Topeka, 36 ™ State v. Harwi, 36 Kan. 588; s. c. Kan. 432; s. c. 13 Pac. 843; reversing 14 Pac. 158; the court saying: — "An a refusal to restrain the defendant addition to a county seat is not, from opening a street through plain- strictly speaking, a part of the orig- tiff's land. Cf. City of Topeka v. Gil- inal town site;" citing State v. lett, 32 Kan. 431; s. c. 4 Pac. 800. Smith, 46 Mo. 60. See Comp. L. Kan. 1879, ch. 78, § 1. " Village of Hyde Park v. City of '" Armstrong v. City of Topeka, 36 Chicago, 124 111. 156; s. c. 16 N. E. Kan. 432; s. c. 13 Pac. 843. See also, 222; citing City of Peoria v. John- Strosser v. City of Ft. Wayne, 100 ston. 56 111. 45, 52; Smith v. Bangs, Ind. 443; Langworthy v. City of Du- 15 111. 399; People v. Whitcomb, 55 buque, 13 Iowa 86; Greencastle Tp. 111. 172; McCord v. Pike, 121 111. 288; v. Black, 5 Ind. 557. s. c. 12 N. B. 259. 1 SivnTH— 26 § 434 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 402 ing for the writ is also ground for its refusal.''^ The jurisdiction for testing the validity of a reorganization of a municipal corporation in Texas is in the district courts ; and an information in the nature of a quo warranto against the officers of the assumed reorganized corpora- tion was allowed hy the district judge.'''' And passing an ordinance of annexation, taking steps preparatory to levying a tax on the new territory, and recognizing it as a ward of the city, are a sufficient indi- cation of the purpose to exercise the corporate franchises of the city over the territory to sustain such quo warranto to determine the valid- ity of the annexation.*** § 434. The same subject continued. — ^Vhere a town is made a part of a city by an unconstitutional act, equity may restrain the city from exercising municipal jurisdiction over it, and interfering 'with its property in a manner calculated to inflict on the community irrepara- ble injury.*^ Under the code of civil procedure of California, which declares that an action may be brought by the attorney-general in the name of the people against any "person" who usurps or unlawfully exercises any franchise, and under the police code, declaring that the word "person" shall include a corporation as well as a natural person, it was held that a municipal corporation was a person within the meaning of said section; and that where such a corporation claimed the right to govern and tax the inhabitants of territory claimed to have been annexed to it, but which was not described as being in its boundaries as named in its recognized charter, the right thus claimed was a franchise in addition to and distinct from that of being a cor- poration, and the exercise of such right was a usurpation for which the attorney -general was authorized to bring an action.*- If a ma- jority of the qualified electors vote for annexation, others can not complain that the proceedings were kept secret and put through in haste.*^ One who delays eight months in filing a petition to annul ^» Black v. Brinkley, 54 Ark. 372; "State v. Dunson, 71 Tex. 65; s. c. s. c. 15 S. W. 1030; the court say- 9 S. W. 103; Buford v. State, 72 Tex. ing:— "It is fair to presume that 182; s. c. 10 S. W. 401. jurisdiction has been assumed over ^"City of East Dallas v. State, 73 the annexed territory with whatever Tex. 370; s. c. 11 S. W. 1030. of expense is necessarily incident " Village of Hyde Park v. City of thereto, that taxes had been assessed Chicago, 124 111. 156; s. c. 16 N. E. and paid for municipal purposes, 222. and that the citizens residing within *- People v. City of Oakland, 92 the annexed territory had partici- Cal. 611; s. c. 28 Pac. 807. pated in electing town officers. Great ^^ State v. City of Waxahachie, 81 confusion would have arisen from Tex. 626; s. c. 17 S. W. 348. the quashal of the order." 403 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § 435 an order of annexation to a town and offers no excuse for the delay can not question its legality.®* § 435. Special acts as to reorganization. — The act of Washington, entitled "An act providing for the organization, classification, incor- poration and government of municipal corporations," has been held sufficient to include sections relating to the enlargement and consoli- dation of municipal corporations. Held, also, that by implication it repealed a prior act providing for extending the corporate limits of cities by modes prescribed therein. ^^ The provisions of the Utah statute entitled "An act providing for the incorporation of cities, relating to municipal government, and the mode of election of city officers," were held not applicable to an incorporated city the charter of which provided for the manner of electing its officers, existing at the time the act went into effect, until it had become reincorporated under a section which provides that when the common council call an election to determine whether the city shall be reincorporated under the act they shall give notice of the class to which the city will belong if reincorporated.^® § 436. Nebraska act. — It has been held that the statute of Ne- braska classifying cities within the state had the effect to transform a village of the proper number of inhabitants into a city of the second class — in other words, to reorganize it; and a mandamus was issued to the officers to divide the village into wards under the law and pro- vide for an election of city officers.®"^ To' make this statute effectual, it was not necessary that the corporation accept its provisions.*'^ In ^* Black v. Brinkley, 54 Ark. 372; state, and the annexed territory not s. c. 15 S. W. 1030. being liable for the debts of the old. ''^ Board &c. v. Davies, 1 Wash. '« Watson v. Corey, 6 Utah 150; s. 290; s. c. 24 Pac. 540; reversing the c. 21 Pac. 1089; affirming the quashal court below and sustaining the of a mandamus to register a voter board of commissioners in their re- otherwise than as a voter in the city fusal to act under the repealed pro- at large. vision and order an election as re- ^"a State v. Holden, 19 Neb. 249; quested. By the new act change of s. c. 27 N. W. 120. boundaries of a municipal corpora- *' State v. Holden, 19 Neb. 249; s. tion is effected on a petition of one- c. 27 N. W. 120; the court saying fifth or more of the electors of the that the rule which applies to pri- municipality to the council, which vate corporations in that regard has submits the question to the electors no application to municipal corpora- within and without the city, a ma- tions, unless the act of incorpora- jority of each body of electors being tion is made conditional. They necessary to carry annexation, and then quote from People v. Morris, 13 an abstract of the vote being re- Wend. (N. Y.) 325, as follows: — quired to be sent to the secretary of "The distinction between public and § 437 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 404 such cases the village government must, from the nature of the case, continue until superseded by the city. § 437. Effect of reorganization. — The city of San Diego is built around three sides of a bay, shaped like a horseshoe, and was origin- ally a pueblo, whose water-line was the bay. A peninsula began near the mouth, and at one side of the bay, running nearly in the center, and more than half way up the bay, around which the water for an indefinite distance was called the "Ship's Channel." A special act re- incorporated the city, with the same limits on the land side as before, but provided that the "water-front line should be the Ship's Channel," and gave the city jurisdiction of the bay and of the sea for one league from shore. A section of the act divided the peninsula into wards for voting purposes, and drew the boundary line of one ward from one point to another across the mouth of the bay; thus including, practically, the whole peninsula. Other sections restricted the elec- tive franchise to residents of the city, and authorized the city to ac- quire land outside of its boundaries for municipal purposes only. It has been held that the act included the peninsula within the city lim- its.^® A Texas municipality, originally a town, but afterwards re- incorporated as a city by the legislature, with an extension of its boundaries, has been held liable for bonds donated by the town to a railroad company, in a proceeding to restrain the collection of a city tax for payment of these bonds, on lands in the enlarged limits. One contention was that the lands of complainants were agricultural lands removed from the benefits to be derived from municipal government, and therefore improperly brought within the limits of the city. Upon this it was held that whether this addition of territory was necessary or proper was a question addressed to the legislature, and not subject to review by the court.^® private corporations is strongly mere trustees, who hold and exer- marked, and as to all essential pur- cise such powers for the public good. poses they correspond only in name. The only interest involved is the We speak of the erection of a town public interest, and no other is Con- or county, and the term would be cerned in their creation, continu- just as appropriate when applied to ance, alteration or renewal." Citing cities or villages. They are sever- also, Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; ally political institutions erected to Warren v. Mayor &c., 2 Gray be employed in the internal govern- (Mass.) 84; People v. President, 9 ment of the state. There is no con- Wend. (N. Y.) 351; 1 Dillon Munic. tract between the government and Corp., § 23 and notes, the governed, for but one party is ^'' City of San Diego v. Granniss, concerned — the public; and the in- 77 Cal. 511; s. c. 19 Pac. 875. habitants upon whom the powers ** Madry v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538; s. c. and privileges are conferred are 11 S. W. 541; affirming the dissolu- 405 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § 438 § 438. The same subject continued. — A city which had been incor- porated with c(M-taiii boundaries, afterwards, under the general law of California alh^wing it in a certain prescribed mode, was reincor- porated, the new charter naminc: the same boundaries as did its original charter. Before the adoption of this last charter in terms of law, there had been proceedings to annex territory to the city under the general law of the state providing a procedure for that purpose. It was held in a quo warranto proceeding against the city inquiring into its right to exercise municipal authority over this annexed ter- ritory that the result of the annexation proceedings was to amend its original charter as to its boundaries, and that the effect of the re- incorporation later with the original boundaries was to supersede the amended as well as the original charter, and that the city had no municipal authority over the annexed district."" The Florida statute, entitled "An act to provide for the incorporation of cities and towns and to establish a uniform system of municipal government in this state," provided "that all the powers and privileges conferred in and by this act may be exercised by any city or town within the limits of this state heretofore incorporated ; and it shall be lawful for any pre- viously incorporated city to reorganize their municipal government under the provisions thereof by a voluntary surrender of their charters and privileges and by an organization under this act; and upon a failure on the part of any incorporated town or city to accept the provisions of this act within nine months after its approval, all the acts vesting such city or town with power are hereby repealed." This last clause was construed by Woods, J., to provide merely for a sus- pension of the powers of the municipal corporations failing to reor- ganize under the act and not for a dissolution of the corporation itself. "1 § 439. The same subject continued — Decisions in California and Tennessee. — A statute of California upon the organization, incorpora- tion and government of municipal corporations provides that any tion of the injunction temporarily Pensacola to reorganize under the granted. Cf. Norris v. City of Waco, act within nine months after its pas- 57 Tex. 635; New Orleans v. Clark, sage did not put an end to its corpo- 95 U. S. 644; Kelly v. City of Pitts- rate existence, and that its subse- burg, 85 Pa. St. 170; Martin v. Dix, quent reorganization under the first 52 Miss. 53. six sections of the act did not create ^" People V. City of Oakland, 92 a new but was merely the rehabilita- Cal. 611; s. c. 28 Pac. 807. tion of an old corporate body. Ap- " Milner's Adm'r v. City of Pensa- proved in Broughton v. Pensacola, cola, 2 Woods 632, 640, where it v.-as 93 U. S. 266, 270; and cited in § 443, held that the failure of the city of post. § 440 rUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 406 municipal corporation organized prior to January 1, 1880, may reor- ganize imder its provisions. The constitution of the state provides that ''any city * * * j^ay frame a charter for its own government consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of this state/' by taking certain steps therein specified for preparing and publishing a proposed charter, which shall become effective when approved by the legislature; and further, that municipal corporations "shall not be created by special laws, but the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization and classification * * * of cities and towns," etc. It has been held that since the act, although a general law, was simply permissive, a city incorporated thereunder might reincorpoate in the manner provided by the con- stitution, and that when the charter so framed was affirmed by the leg- islature it superseded the old charter.*'^ In a Tennessee case, where a town had been incorporated by the legislature, and afterwards a peti- tion had been presented for a reincorporation and change of bounda- ries to the county court and the prayer of the petition granted, a suit for a license fee imposed under the ordinances of the town before the action of the county court was defended on the plea that the effect of the reincorporation was a surrender of the old charter and a dissolution of the same, and therefore the last corporation had no power to collect the tax. It was held that to make the surrender by the corporators of their charter of incorporation effectual it was neces- sary that it be accepted by the government and a record thereof be made; hence, if the inhabitants of the town, incorporated by an act of the legislature, accepted the act of incorporation, and subsequently, in pursuance of the reincorporation act, were reincorporated, with an enlargement of the incorporated district, the charter granted by the legislature was not thereby surrendered.®^ § 440. Validity of reorganization — Special cases. — There is in Tennessee, in the act which prescribes a mode by which municipal corporations Avhich have been dissolved in any manner may reorganize, a provision for a "petition of a majority of the voters within the lim- its of such town or city at the time of the repeal or surrender of the charter." The supreme court of the state has construed this provi- sion and held that the words "at the time of the repeal" merely define the limits of the town, and do not qualify the word "voters."®* And "= People v. Bagley, 85 Cal. 343; s. °^ Norris v. Mayor &c., 1 Swan c. 24 Pac. 716, where the council (Tenn.) 164. elected under the charter of rein- "^ Pepper v. Smith, 15 Lea (Tenn.) corporation was held to be the true 551, where the reorganization of the council of the city of Stockton. town of Lynnville into the taxing- 407 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § 441 it was held also that the motives of one of the petitioners for the re- organization of a town into a taxing-district could not affect the rights of the other petitioners, if they constituted a majority of the voters, nor could the motives of any of the petitioners be inquired into under a bill filed to contest the legality of the reorganization, nor his character be impeached."^ A reorganization in 1887 of the territory of a town incorporated in 1859, under the act of January 27, 1858, in Texas, was held to be void, as, in the opinion of the court, the laws in force since the adoption of the revised statutes do not provide for the reorganiza- tion of an}^ municipal corporation by the acceptance of the general law ill lieu of a former charter, whereby the former corporation is practically dissolved in any manner other than that prescribed in article 340 of the revised statutes. Any effort on the part of the in- habitants of territory within an existing corporation otherwise than as so provided was held to be without authority and of no legal effect. So, also, as to any effort to increase the boundaries of such corporation otherwise than as provided by existing statutes.^® § 441. Invalid reorganization. — An invalid reorganization of an incorporated town as a city can not effect its corporate existence. ^'^ A reincorporation of a town ]:)y an adoption of an article in the Texas statute®* by vote of electors was held to be void; it could adopt that article only in the manner prescribed therein "by a two-thirds vote of the city council.'""* The organization of a town as a munici- pal corporation under the act of Tennessee of 1869-70 superseded its organization under the code. A repeal of that act, accepted and ac- quiesced in, did not restore its old organization, but left it without district of Lynnville was held to be made . . . that in the reorganl- valid and in compliance with the zation of a city the boundaries, as law. determined by the former charter, °^ Pepper V. Smith, 15 Lea (Tenn.) remain, unless additional territory 551. be added at the desire of a majority "" State V. Dunson, 71 Tex. 65; s. c. of the qualified voters residing with- 9 S. W. 103; the court saying: — in the territory to be added: Rev. "The act of March 15, 1875, incorpo- Stats., arts. 343, 503." In Buford v. rated in the revised statutes, State, 72 Tex. 182; s. c. 10 S. W. 401, changed the method by which a the reincorporation of the town of town or city already incorporated Henderson was held void upon this might surrender its corporate exist- construction of the revised statutes. ence and reincorporate under that "" Laird v. City of De Soto, 22 Fed. general law (January 27, 1858). 421. The revised statutes, art. 340, pro- '" Sayles Civil Stat. Tex., tit. 17, vide that this may be done by a two- ch. 1, art. 340. thirds vote of the city council of "" Lum v. City of Bowie (Tex.), 18 such city. A further change was S. W. 142. g 442 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 408 municipal organization.^*"* It was held that a city having a special charter did not by force of the act of Washington entitled "An act providing for the organization, classification, incorporation and gov- ernment of municipal corporations," become reincorporated there- imder.^"^ A town in Texas was reincorporated in 1859, and its cor- ])orate organization kept up at intervals till 1882. In 1887 steps were taken as for the original incorporation of a city or town, with boun- daries larger than those of the original town. It was held that the corporation created in 1859 could not be presumed to be dissolved by the failure to elect officers; and that as the statute provides the only manner in which a city or town may surrender its corporate existence and reincorporate under the general law, and that the boundaries of such a city shall remain as they were fixed by the former charter, unless additional territory be afterward annexed in the manner therein prescribed, the proceedings had in 1887 did not create a corporation, nor dissolve the one previously existing. ^''^ § 442. Property rights passing to new corporation. — Where a mu- nicipal corporation is legislated out of existence and its territory an- nexed to other corporations, the latter, unless the legislature other- wise provides, become entitled to all its property and immunities, and severally liable for a proportionate share of all its subsisting legal debts, and vested with its power to raise revenue wherewith to pay them by levying taxes upon the property transferred and the persons residing therein. ^''^ So, too, when a municipal corporation with fixed boundaries is divided by law and a new corporation is created by the legislature for the same general purposes but with new boundaries embracing less territory, but containing substantially the same popu- lation, the great mass of the taxable property and the corporate prop- erty of the old corporation, which passes without consideration and for the same uses, the debts of the old corporation fall upon the new cor- poration as the legal successor, and powers of taxation to pay them, which it had at the time of their creation and which entered into ""So held in Ruohs v. Athens, 91 Wash. 91; s. c. 29 Pac. 768, where it Tenn. 20; s. c. 18 S. W. 400, in which was determined that such a city, the court further ruled that as an not having been reincorporated as attempted reorganization afterwards provided for in the act, could not be was void for an irregularity the embraced within the classifications town could plead the invalidity of of such act. its organization in defense of a suit "-State v. Dunson, 71 Tex. 65; s. brought on bonds. Burke v. State, c. 9 S. W. 103. 5 Lea (Tenn.) 349, was followed in "' Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 this case. U. S. 514. "' So held in Rohde v. Seavey, 4 409 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION, § 443 the contracts, also survive and pass into the new corporation.^"* The right to a liquor tax levied but not collected by a town previous to its annexation to a city is not transferred by this annexation to the latter."^ § 443. For what the reorganized corporation becomes liable. — Where an incorporated town is reorganized as a city, the latter becomes liable for the debts of the former.^"*^ In holding the city of Pensacola liable for the bonds issued by the former city of Pensacola, which it was contended had been dissolved by failure of the city to reorganize within nine months after the approval of an act providing for a uni- form system of municipal government in the State of Florida, Woods, J., concluded that the present city was the same corporate body as that by which the bonds were issued ; reorganized and clothed with a new charter and with new powers and privileges, it is true, but still the same municij)al corporation.^"^ Where a town has been vacated by a county board exercising legislative power in the mode prescribed by the law of the state, and its territory in part annexed to another, the latter becomes liable for the debts of the former; as, for instance, for a sum due to an attorney for prosecuting an action for the former town against the latter, the action being dismissed on the annexa- tion.^"* And it is not within the power of a legislature, by the repeal ^<* Mobile V. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; tion by the decree in quo warranto, s. c. 6 S. Ct. 398; holding the port of is the legitimate successor of the Mobile liable for bonds issued by the town of De Soto which issued the city of Mobile in aid of a railroad, bonds, being composed of the same and in the contract connected there- trustees and the same people, and is with the dissolved corporation had only a change in the name of the provided for the payment of the corporation and in its mode of gov- same by levy of a certain tax. ernment;" citing Broughton v. Pen- '"' So held in Springwells Tp. v. sacola, 93 U. S. 266. Wayne Co. Treasurer, 58 Mich. 240; "' Milner's Adm'r v. City of Pensa- s. c. 25 N. W. 329; the court saying: cola, 2 Woods 632, 642, cited in — "Detaching part of a township § 438, ante. does not affect the ownership of any- ^""^ Knight v. Town of Ashland, 61 thing but lands. All debts or rights Wis. 233; s. c. 21 N. W. 65; the court incorporeal continue to be owned by saying: — "The general power of the the township unless provision is legislature to apportion the property made by law to the contrary." and the liabilities of a vacated town ^•"^ Laird v. City of De Soto, 22 among the towns to which its terri- Fed. 421. Miller, J., says: — "If the tory is attached is recognized by city organization of 1877 was abso- this court in Town of Depere v. lutely void, the town of De Soto re- Town of Bellevue, 31 Wis. 120, 125; mained, and the city organization Goodhue v. Town of Beloit, 21 Wis. now sued, which was created by or- 636; Supervisors &c. v. O'Malley, 47 der of the county court after the Wis. 332; s. c. 2 N. W. 632; Town of dissolution of the first city organiza- Butternut v. O'Malley, 50 Wis. 333; 444 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 410 of the charter of a municipal corporation, to invade the rights of its creditors and cancel its indebtedness; such legislation impairs the obligation of contracts and is unconstitutional."^ § 444. Further scope of the foregoing doctrine. — A change in the charter of a municipal corporation, in whole or in part, by an amend- ment of its provisions, or the substitution of a new charter in place of the old one, embracing substantially the same corporators and the same territory, will not be deemed, in the absence of express legisla- tive declaration otherwise, to affect the identity of the corporation, or to relieve it from its previous liabilities, although different powers are possessed under the amended or new charter, and different officers administer its affairs.^^** § 445. What are such liabilities. — The word "debts" in the Texas statute repealing the charter of East Dallas and annexing its terri- tory to the city of Dallas, placing the liability for the debts of the former upon the latter, has been held to include a liability for dam- ao-es resulting from the tortious acts of the municipal officers in, re- moving a private dwelling and tearing down a fence preparatory to taking the land for a public street."^ A law imposing political obli- s. c. 7 N. W. 248." In the case of Supervisors &c., v. O'Malley, supra, it was held that the county hoard of supervisors had all the powers of the legislature in vacating towns. ^"^Milner's Adm'r v. City of Pen- sacola, 2 Woods 632, 642; citing 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 114, where are cited in support of this view, Cooley Const. Lim. 290, 292; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304; Thompson V. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327; Havemeyer V. Iowa Co., 3 Wall. 294; 2 Kent Com. 307, n.; Board &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Coulter v. Robertson, 24 Miss. 278; State v. Common Council &c., 15 Wis. 30; Blake v. Portsmouth &c. R. Co., 39 N. H. 435. "" Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266. Leading up to this conclu- sion, on p. 269 Field, J., says: — "Although a municipal corporation, so far as it is invested with subordi- nate legislative powers for local purposes, is a mere instrumentality of the state for the convenient ad- ministration of government, yet, when authorized to take stock in a railroad company and issue its obli- gations in payment of the stock, it is to that extent to be deemed a pri- vate corporation, and its obligations are secured by all the guaranties which protect the engagements of private individuals. The inhibition of the constitution, wnich preserves against the interference of a state the sacredness of contracts, applies to the liabilities of municipal corpo- rations created by its permission; and although the repeal or modifica- tion of the charter of a corporation of that kind is not within the inhi- bition, yet it will not be admittea, where its legislation is susceptible of another construction, that the state has in this way sanctioned an evasion of or escape from liabilities, the creation of which is authorized.'' "' Barber v. City of East Dallas, 83 Tex. 147; s. c. 18 S. W. 438; the court saying: — "Although in the na- 411 CONSOLIDATION AND KEOUOANIZATION. § 4 iU gations — as, for instance, the issuing of bonds for the purpose of build- ing a city hall — upon a municipal corporation, which by a subsequent act of the legislature was specially abolished and the same territory reincorporated as a city, with the same name even, is not effectual to impose the same obligations upon the latter.^ ^^ The city of New Orleans has been held liable and burdened with the contract obliga- tions entered into by two cities with a gas company prior to an act consolidating them with the city of New Orleans. ^^^ An attorney agreed to prosecute an action of the town of L. against the town of A. for a certain sum, which, also, he was to have if the action should be discontinued without his consent. Pending the action L. was vacated and A. made its successor, and A. obtained the discontinuance of the action. It was held that A. was liable to the attorney for the sum agreed upon.^^'' A new town set off from another is not released or discharged from the payment of a debt created prior to the sepa- ration. ^^° Where an act consolidating two cities provides that the corporation as consolidated shall pay all the lawful debts of the an- nexed corporation, the consolidated corporation was held liable for damages to land caused by the wrongful digging of a ditch by the annexed corporation.^^*' Under a statute of New Jersey providing a mode of equitable adjustment and apportionment of the indebtedness and assets when a portion of a township has been set off, it was held that a borough set off from a township was not liable for the pre- viously contracted debts of the township.^ ^'^ § 446. Remedy of creditors of the old corporation. — The remedy of creditors of an extinguished municipal corporation is in equity ture of a tort, the liability is a fixed tort, ought not to be cut off, rather one, growing out of the exercise of than of a purpose to require the new power conferred upon the defend- municipality, whose charter was ap- ant by law, and although the law parently complete in Itself, to per- prescribed the manner in which form whatever political duties had property may be condemned and been by law specifically imposed taken for the use of a street." upon the former city." "^ So held in Carey v. City of Du- "' State v. City of New Orleans, 41 luth, 38 Minn. 218; s. c. 36 N. W. La. An. 91; s. c. 5 So. 262. 459; the court construing the Ian- "* Knight v. Town of Ashland, 65 guage of the act charging the rein- Wis. 166; s. c. 26 N. W. 565. corporated city with responsibility "■' Canosia Tp. v. Grand Lake Tp., for the "legal debts, obligations and 80 Minn. 357; s. c. 83 N. W. 346. liabilities" of the former city to be "" City of Dallas v. Beeman, 23 "indicative merely of a purpose to Tex. Civ. App. 315; s. c. 55 S. W. 762. transfer to it the pecuniary or legal ^^" Inhabitants &c. v. Hackensack responsibility of the extinguished Imp. Com., 60 N. J. Eq. 229; s. c. 46 municipality in favor of those whose Atl. 782. rights, springing from contract or 446 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 412 against the corporation succeeding to its property and powers."^ A reorganized municipal corporation, legal successor to one dissolved, is a proper party-defendant in a suit to recover for claims and obliga- tions entered into by the dissolved corporation, and a judgment against the new corporation settles all questions of its liability for the debts of the old."^ The United States circuit court, on a judgment obtained by a bondholder against the reorganized corporation on such a debt of the dissolved one, ordered a peremptory mandamus to be issued to the officers of the form(>r to levy a tax to raise money for the payment of this judgment. This was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States.^-" Wliere judgment is recovered against a municipal corporation which is subsequently dissolved and another created in its place, scire facias is the proper proceeding to revive the judgment against its successor. Such a case is distinguishable from scire facias against an heir to subject him to liability for his ancestor's debt : the heir is not liable for the debt, but only the property in his hands; while the successor of the municipal corporation is liable, be- "^ Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514. 1'" United States v. Port of Mobile, 12 Fed. 768. See also, Dousman v. President &c., 1 Pin. (Wis.) 81. ^^o Mobile V. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 298, where it was con- tended that as the act chartering the new corporation made simply a pro- vision for an adjustment, through commissioners to be appointed for the purpose, of the claims against the dissolved corporation, there was no power given to the reorganized corporation to levy such a tax. The court's reason for such ruling was as follows: — "The remedies for the en- forcement of such obligations as- sumed by a municipal corporation, which existed when the contract was made, must be left unimpaired by the legislature, or if they are changed a substantial equivalent must be provided. Where the re- source for the payment of the bonds of a municipal corporation is the power of taxation existing when the bonds were issued, any law which withdraws or limits the taxing pow- ers and leaves no adequate means for the payment of the bonds is for- bidden by the constitution of the United States and is null and void: Citing Von Hoffman v. City of Quin- cy, 4 Wall. 535; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; Ralls County Court v. United States, 105 U. S. 733; Louisi- ana V. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Louisiana v. Mayor &c., 109 U. S. 285; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 211. Cf. and as supporting the doctrine: Commis- sioners &c. V. Rather, 48 Ala. 433; Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145; Slaughter v. Mobile Co., 73 Ala. 134. See also, Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 368. Cf. Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103, where it was held that the Alabama act of February 17, 1883, incorporating the same territory and inhabitants under another name, made the. new corporation the successor of the dissolved one, and bound it to the payment of the debts and to the satisfaction of the liabili- ties of the dissolved corporation, and made it a necessary party to a bill filed by the commissioners ap- pointed under the act of 1882. 413 CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION. § 446 cause it is the same debtor under a different name, and scire facias lies against such successor although equity is administering the assets of the former municipality.^-^ "^Grantland v. City of Memphis, 12 Fed. 287. CHAPTEE XIII. PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. (a) Partition. Section 447. Partition — General rule. 448. Validity of partition. 449. Rules as to division of counties and towns. 450. Procedure for division not ap- plicable in vacating a town. 451. Indiana rules. 452. Michigan rules. 453. Rules as to severing territory. 454. Pennsylvania rule. 455. Constitutionality — Wisconsin. 456. Rulings as to constitution of Wisconsin on division of counties. 457. The same subject continued — Uniformity of system of gov- ernment. 458. Title of act. 459. Florida decisions on constitu- tionality of acts. 460. Kansas decisions. 461. How partition affects officers. 462. Where unorganized territory has been attached to a county. 463. Settlement of inhabitants. 464. Territory severed from an old to form a new corporation is a part of the old until the new is fully organized. 465. Some Wisconsin acts construed. 466. Provisions of act as to county sites. 467. Apportionment of liabilities. 468. Rules as to property and liabil- ities. 469. The same subject continued. 470. A Wisconsin case on property rights. Section 471. Rules as to apportionment of liabilities and remedies. 472. Rules in North Carolina as to settlement between new and old counties. 473. Rules for adjustment of liabil- ities. 474. Liabilities which fall upon the portion severed. 475. Defenses to claims growing out of partition. 476. Enforcement of obligations of old and new. 477. Miscellaneous. (b) Dissolution. 478. Dissolution — How effected in general. 479. The same subject continued. 480. Surrender of charter. 481. The same subject continued. 482. Florida decisions on constitu- tionality of acts to dissolve. 483. Vacated towns. 484. This was no dissolution. 485. Effect of dissolution as to liabil- ities and funds in hand. 486. Effect of dissolution upon lia- bilities. 487. What does not affect liabilities and remedies. 488. Repealing charters. 489. The same subject continued. 490. Receiver for a city. 491. The same subject continued. 492. Where such a receiver was ap- pointed. (414) 415 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 447 (a) Partition. § 447. Partition — General rule. — The power to divide counties and form new ones of portions of the old, to divide towns, and to sever territory from one municipal corporation and attach it to another, is not questioned. This power is lodged in the legislatures of the states; but its exercise over corporations different from counties is in some cases delegated by general law to the ruling bodies of the counties of the state. It has been held in New York that a county may be divided by the legislature into two or more counties by a mere majority vote, it not being necessary that a bill for such purpose should receive the as- sent of two-thirds of all the members.^ Where, since the passage of an act organizing a township, the supervisors of the county out of which the township was formed have undertaken to form two other townships out of that organized by the legislature, without seeking a bill, and on a petition not appearing on its face to be signed by any freeholders of the township organized by the legislature, their action can not stand in the way of the legislative organization, or interfere with the rights of an officer duly elected for such township.- The word "town" as used in the constitution of Wisconsin denotes a civil division com- posed of contiguous territory ; and under the power granted to county boards by the statute, such a board can not make a valid order chang- ing the boundaries of a town so that it shall consist of two separate and detached tracts of land.^ ^Vliere a severance has been allowed by order of court on an application, it may be held erroneous if, under the circumstances, justice and equity did not require it.* Provisions of a previous statute relating to severance of territor}^ have been held applicable alike to cities and towns organized under the general incorporation law and those previously organized under special char- ters.^ Such statutory provisions are applicable to territory within the city or town whether it is or is not laid out into lots and blocks. If so laid out, the severance would, it seems, operate as an extinguishment of the rights of the corporation in the streets and alleys of such por- tion.*^ Where the application for division of a township is properly 1 People V. Morrell, 21 Wend. (N. « McKean v. City of Mt. Vernon, 51 Y.) 563. Iowa 306; s. c. 1 N. W. 617; Way v. = So held in Attorney-General v. Town of Center Point, 51 Jowa 708; Rice, 64 Mich. 385; s. c. 31 N. W. s. c. 1 N. W. 692. Where the stat- 203. utes provide a method of detaching ^ Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Town of territory embraced in a village the Oconto, 50 Wis. 189; s. c. 6 N. W. trustees have no discretion where 607. the preliminary steps have been * Hosier v. City of Des Moines, 31 taken, in accordance with the stat- lowa 174. ute: Young v. Carey, 184 111. 613; ' Whiting V. City of Mt. Pleasant, s. c. 56 N. E. 960. 11 Iowa 482. § 448 PUBLIC conroRATiONS. 41 G made, the board of supervisors has no discretion, and may be com- pelled by mandamus to make such division.'^ A new township formed out of an old one does not become independent until its complete or- ganization — when the officers elected for it enter upon the discharge of their duties.® In Iowa, upon the formation of a new township, no elec- tion except that upon the question of formation of such township can be held until after the 1st of January following; special elections contemplated or authorized by law to be held prior to that time must be held in the old or original township.^ § 448. Validity of partition. — The statute of New York does not, it seems, require that the published copy of notice of the application of twelve freeholders for the erection of a new town shall contain the names of such applicants : it is sufficient that the notice posted should be thus described. And an affidavit that a notice was left with another person to be posted up, "which was done," has been construed as a positive averment of the posting.^" Where, in the partition of a town, and forming a new one from a portion thereof, the dividing line only was described in the act of the board of supervisors, it has been held that the uncertainty was cured by the reference in such act to the petition, etc., upon which it was founded, and from which it appeared that the new town was to lie south of the line of division, and by proof aliunde that the place named in the act for holding the first town meeting was south of such line.^^ The question whether a town has been legally erected may be tested in an action in the nature of quo warranto against one claiming to exercise the office of supervisor of such town.^" Where an act of supervisors or other officers author- ized to divide municipal corporations is attacked for irregularities or otherwise, the burden of disproving a compliance with the conditions imposed by law as requisite to the exercise of the power is upon those who would impeach it ; the act of the officers is one of a legislative character, in favor of the regularity of which all presumptions are to be indulged. ^^ The supreme court of Michigan has held that the legality of the division of a township, consisting of two governmental towns, can not be raised in an action attacking the validity of a tax, on the ground that the assessment rolls for the old township did not contain the lands included in the new one.^* 'Henry v. Taylor, 57 Iowa 72; s. c. '"People v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86. 10 N. W. 308. " People v. Carpenter, supra. * Lamb v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 39 ^^ People v. Carpenter, supra. Iowa 333. "People v. Carpenter, supra. "Williams v. Poor, 65 Iowa 410; "Mills v. Richland Tp., 72 Mich, s. c. 21 N. W. 753. 100; s. c. 40 N. W. 183. 417 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 449 § 449. Rules as to division of counties and towns. — An act to create two counties, etc., which tlividccl the territory of two existing counties so that a large part of the one was cut off and attached to the other to form one of these new counties, and the other new county was formed of the halance left of the first, violated that provision of the constitution of Idaho which declares that "no county shall be divided unless a majority of the qualified electors of the territory proposed to be cut off, voting on the proposition at a general election, shall vote in favor of such division."^ "^ Where the constitution of a state provides that no county shall be formed of an area less than a fixed number of square miles, a county board can not lawfully submit a proposition to divide a county where the new counties would be less in area than the constitutional limit. ^*' A county board can not lawfully submit to be voted upon at the same election two propositions to erect from a county two new counties when the territory described in one proposi- tion embraces a part of that included in another, under a provision in a statute that on a proper petition the county board shall submit to the electors of the county affected the question of the division of the county. ^^ An act of Tennessee abolishing the county of James and restoring its territory to the counties of Hamilton and Bradley, from which it was formed, was held to be void under that article of the constitution of Tennessee providing for the formation of new coun- ties with the consent of the voters of the territory taken to form such counties, and particularly prescribing how such new counties may be established, but giving no authority to abolish an old county entirely.^* Where one town is set off by the legislature from the territory of an- other town, the boundary between them being a stream of water, the center of the stream is the dividing line between the two.^^ Commis- sioners in proceedings to alter township lines are not restricted to the approval or rejection of the line established by the report of the first commissioners who viewed. Xor are reviewers in such proceed- ings required to go within any particular distance of the proposed line, if they go near enough to get a view that will enable them to form an intelligent opinion. ^° The constitution of Nebraska, declaring that "no county shall be divided, or have any part stricken therefrom, without first submitting the question to a vote of the people of the ''^ People v. George, 2 Idaho 813; s. ^' James Co. v. Hamilton Co., 89 c. 26 Pac. 983. Tenn. 237; s. c. 14 S. W. 601. "State V. Armstrong, 30 Neb. 493; "Flynn v. City of Boston, 153 s. c. 46 N. W. 618. Mass. 372; s. c. 26 N. E. 868. " State V. Armstrong, supra. -" Exeter &c. Township Line, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 524. 1 Smith — 27 § 450 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 418 county, nor unless a majority of all the legal voters of the county voting on the question shall vote for the same/' is a restriction upon the powers of the legislature to the extent named, but does not prohibit a law requiring a three-fifths vote.^^ The auditor-general of Michigan apportioned the state taxes for 1891 to a county from which a part had been taken by an act passed May 21, 1891, but not to go into effect until October 2, 1891, and with parts of other counties formed into a new county, without reference to the new county, and applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors of that county to levy the tax. It was held that the writ should be denied ; that the auditor-general should separate the legalized valuation, and apportion the taxes to the old county in proportion to the valuation of the prop- erty therein, after deducting the valuation of the townships or parts of townships taken from that county to form the new county.^^ An act detaching certain territory from a county and annexing it to an adjoining one, which brought the line between the counties within less than six miles of the court-house of the county from which the territory was detached, was held to be void as repugnant to the consti- tution of Tennessee, which provides that the line of any new county formed shall not approach the court-house of an old county from which it may be taken nearer than eleven miles.^^ No appeal lies from a statutory proceeding for the division of a township unless expressly allowed by statute.^* § 450. Procedure for division not applicable in vacating a town. — The Wisconsin statutes prescribe a procedure for division of towns and for vacating towns. It has been held that the only limitation upon the powers of the county board in setting off, organizing, vacat- ing and changing the boundaries of towns is contained in the statute that a town shall not be vacated unless a majority of the members elected to seats therein shall so desire.^^ ^^ State v. Nelson, 34 Neb. 162; s. c. a failure to take the steps provided 51 N. W. 648; State v. Painter, 34 for in this section made the action Neb. 173; s. c. 51 N. W. 652. of the county board void. The court " Auditor-General v. Board &c., 89 held this section not applicable in Mich. 552; s. c. 51 N. W. 483. proceedings to vacate a town. The -^ Union Co. v. Knox Co., 90 Tenn. court say that the ordinance can 541; s. c. 18 S. W. 254. not be said "correctly [to be] one "'' In re Division of Valley Tp., 146 dividing the town of Dexter. It va- Pa. St. Ill; s. c. 23 Atl. 222. cates that town absolutely, and then "^ State V. Board &c., 61 Wis. 278; proceeds to attach the territory s. c. 21 N. W. 55, in which it was thereby left unorganized to certain contended that the provisions of the organized towns adjacent thereto. It section relating to the division of was the clear duty of the board to towns applied to the case, and that extend organized town government 419 TARTITION AXD DISSOLUTION. § 451 § 451. Indiana rules. — The legislature may, on division of a county, divide property of the same.^" It has been held in Indiana that the legislature may delegate the power to organize new counties ; furtlior, that their act of ]\Iarch, 1857, upon this subject was not in conflict with their constitution; that no legislative power was dele- gated by that act."^ Provisions for the establishment of boundaries of existing counties and provisions for formation of new counties are matters which may be properly embraced in the same act of the legis- lature.^* Under the act of March, 1857, a single county containing the requisite area might be divided by its own board of commissioners, acting through a single committee of freeholders.^^ By the establish- ment of boundaries of a new county, under the provisions of the sup- plementary act of March 5, 1859, it becomes simply an organized po- litical body ; the jurisdiction of courts is not affected thereby ; in such case the courts of the old county continue to hold Jurisdiction in ac- tions concerning real estate, situate within the boundaries of the new county, until the time is fixed by the judge for holding the first term in the new county.^" Change of boundaries of two adjoining counties by boards of commissioners, subsequent to action of the assessors of townships of the county from which a portion was detached, in making their enlistments and returning their list of taxation to the auditor of the county, and prior to the day when the rate of taxation was fixed, will not affect the right of the county to collect against persons re- siding in the detached territory; but even if the county from which such j)ortion was detached were in the wrong in attempting to collect such taxes, the one having a part of its territory attached to it would not be a proper party to enjoin it: a taxpayer should move in such matters. ^^ A bill of revivor of a bill in chancery filed in an old over such territory. Under existing nature of things can not be — until laws it is only through the machin- the ordinance vacating the town has ery of town government that prop- taken effect. See State v. Timme, 54 erty outside of municipalities can be Wis. 318; s. c. 11 N. W. 785. Hence, assessed for taxation, or taxed, or when that part of the ordinance that electors not residing in munici- which attached the territory once palities can exercise the right of situated in the town of Dexter to suffrage. [There is] no good reason other towns became operative, there why provision may not be made in was no town of Dexter to divide." the same ordinance for vacating a =° State v. Votaw, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) town and for extending the town 2; Lucas v. Board &c., 44 Ind. 524. government over the unorganized "' Board &c. v. Spitler, 13 Ind. 235; territory which constituted the va- Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299. cated town, as well as to make two -■* Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299. ordinances to accomplish the same "" Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299. result. In either case the provisions =° Milk v. Kent, 60 Ind. 226. for attaching the territory to organ- " Board &c. v. Board &c., 32 Ind. ized towns are not operative — in the 234. § 453 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 42Q county respecting land situate in the old county at the time of decree should be filed in the same county, notwithstanding by a change of boundaries the land was afterwards in another county; for this latter county had no jurisdiction of the cause, and a bill of revivor merely continues the original suit.^^ And an action to foreclose a mortgage when brought in the proper county can not be defeated by a subsequent division of the county, as the division of the county by commissioners would not be complete till a court was so organized in the new county as to enable suits to be instituted. ^^ A division of a county by commissioners in such a case is a matter of proof.^'* It was not the intention of the legislature to exclude other evidence as to whether petitioners for formation of new counties formed a majority of the voters, in providing, as a mode of ascertaining that fact, a reference to the number of votes cast at the last preceding congres- sional election.^^ i § 452. Michigan rules. — An act to organize a new county out of parts of three old counties provided for an election upon the forma- tion of the new county by the electors of the three counties "at the township meetings in said county," etc. The new county organized under this act with the assent of the voters of the parts of those counties embraced within its boundaries was held to be properly or- ganized: the act being construed not to require that the question be submitted to the voters of the whole of those counties from which it was organized, but only to those within the new county.^*' The con- stitutional prohibition in Michigan against reducing any county to less than sixteen townships is meant to prevent its unreasonable re- duction in size and to preclude the division of survej^ed townships, if convenience requires, in organizing new counties. It was not violated where a county was left with fifteen whole and two half townships.^^ It is competent for the legislature in creating a now county out of the territory taken from two old ones to enact that suits pending on a certain date in any court in either of the old counties shall be prosecuted to final judgment in the county where commenced. ^^ =^ Arnold v. Styles, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) new county and new township held 391. Illegal in People v. Maynard, 15 ^^ Buckinghouse v. Gregg, 19 Ind. Mich. 463. See People v. Board &g., 401. 41 Mich. 647; s. c. 2 N. W. 904, as to '■'* Buckinghouse v. Gregg, supra. illegal division of township. '^ Allen V. Hostetter, 16 Ind. 15. ^^ So held in an ejectment case ^^ People v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114. brought in the new county: Spalding '''Bay Co. v. Bullock, 51 Mich. 544; v. Kelly, 66 Mich. 693; s. c. 33 N. W. s. c. 16 N. W. 896. Acts creating 803. 421 TARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 453 § 453. Eules as to severing territory. — An act for the creation of a new count}' out of portions ol' two old ones provided "that a portion of K. county and a portion of S. county, hereby proposed to ])e segre- gated, shall not be cut off unless the question of segregation shall be first submitted to the vote of the people of K. county, and also to the voters of that part of range 69 proposed to be detached from S. county, at a special election called for that purpose. * * * In case a majority of the legal voters of said K. county, and of said range 69, voting, shall vote in favor of said segregation, then this act shall be in full force and effect." It was held that a majority of the aggre- gate vote cast in both counties was insufficient, but a majority of each was necessary to the creation of the proposed county.^'' Lands within the limits of a city, used wholly for agricultural purposes, not bene- fited by their connection with the city and not needed for city pur- poses, will be severed on petition of the owners ; and if not liable for municipal taxes the severance can not be conditioned on the payment of any part of the municipal indebtedness.*" A Texas act which amends and is a part of a title of the revised statutes provides for elections to withdraw territory from corporate limits, but does not direct the manner thereof. It was held that the act was not, therefore, invalid, but that the election in question should be held as other elec- tions provided for in the title.*^ The same act directs that, npon a petition by fifty qualified voters of territory within the limits of a mu- nicipal corporation, the mayor shall order an election to determine whether such territory shall be allowed to withdraw from the munici- pality, provided that such municipality be not thereby reduced to an area of less than one square mile, or one mile in diameter around the center of the original corporate limits. It was held that where there was no dispute that the requisite number of qualified voters had signed, and that the withdrawal in contemplation would leave the requisite area, the act of ordering the election involved no exercise of discretion, and mandamus would lie against the mayor in case of re- fusal.*2 §454. Pennsylvania rule.— A municipal corporation" is merely an agency instituted by the sovereign for the purpose of carrying out in detail the objects of government, — essentially a revocable agency, — having no vested right to any of its powers or franchises, the charter or act of erecting being in no sense a contract with the state, and =»Van Dusen v. Fridley, 6 Dak. " Sansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488; 322; s. c. 43 N. W. 703. s. c. 5 S. W. 62. *» Evans v. City of Council Bluffs, ^= Sansom v. Mercei% 68 Tex. 488; 65 Iowa 238; s. c. 21 N. W. 584. s. c. 5 S. W. 62. § 455 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 4:22 therefore fully subject to the control of the legislature, who may enlarge or diminish its territorial extent or its functions, may change or modify its internal arrangement, or destroy its very existence with the mere breath of arbitrary discretion. Sic volo, sic jubeo, that is all the sovereign authority need say. This much is undeniable and has not been denied.*^ The supreme court of Pennsylvania held the power of an original borough supreme over a portion of its territory which had been detached by proceedings in the court of quarter ses- sions, and constituted a part of a new borough erected in those pro- ceedings, as there was no power in the court in the manner employed to change the limits of a borough. Under the act governing such changes the procedure is by an application made for the purpose, signed by a majority of the freeholders residing within the limits of the borough ; due notice must be given as directed by law, and it must be approved by the grand jury and confirmed by the court. An omis- sion to take these steps was fatal, and the new borough was not prop- erly formed as to the part it detached from the original borough.** § 455. Constitutionality — Wisconsin. — A part of a town had been detached by act of the legislature from one county and annexed to another county. By legislative edict it was restored to the former. In the meantime taxes had been collected and paid to the county to which it was annexed. It was contended that an act passed subse- quently, ordering the treasurer of the latter county to pay over the taxes collected and to assign titles to land bought in for such taxes to the county from which the town was originally detached, was un- constitutional because it purported to create an indebtedness from the first county to the second,' which the legislature could not do. The " Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. coextensive with the corporate lim- 169. its. Their responsibility as public " Darby v. Sharon Hill, 112 Pa. St. agents exists mainly in the perform- 66; s. c. 4 Atl. 722; the court say- ance of acts for the public benefit, ing: — "The legislature may by ap- but they have also a distinctly legal propriate general laws to that effect, personality; they may make con- preserving the vested rights of third tracts, purchase property, create parties, either enlarge or contract debts, borrow money, and they have the boundaries of boroughs; may a right, to the extent of the limits consolidate several such corpora- fixed by their charter, to corporate tions into one or divide one into sev- existence; their rights and responsi- eral. But it is incompetent for the bilities are in this regard analogous court to dismember a borough, ex- to those of private corporations, sub- cept as they may be authorized by ject only to the action of the law- law; the charter of a municipal cor- making power, as we have stated, poration grants privileges and im- The courts of quarter sessions in munities which are perpetual, and this respect have just such powers their privileges and immunities are as the legislature has given them." 423 PAHTITlOy AND DISSOLUTION". § 456 court conceded tliat the legislature was not competent to create such an indebtedness, but overruled the contention. They said : "But if money had been paid by mistake, growing out of hasty legislation in annexing a town in one county to another without making any provision as to the effect of the change, it would be competent for the legislature to provide in what manner this mistake should be cor- rected."*^ An act providing for the ajipointment of commissioners to adjust and settle the rights of the old and new counties is not a con- ferring of judicial ])Owers upon them, where an appeal is given from their decisions to the regularly constituted courts of the state, which would make it repugnant to the constitution of Wisconsin.*® The division of existing towns and the creation of new towns by direct action of the legislature is not the "enacting of any special or private law for incoi^porating any town/' within the meaning of the state constitution.*^ § 456. Rulings as to constitution of Wisconsin on division of coun- ties. — The constitution of Wisconsin forbade the division of a county with an area of nine hundred square miles or less without submitting the question to a vote of the people of the county and a majority of all the voters voting on the same. It has been held that bodies of water, such as Lake j\Iichigan or a part thereof, lying within the boundaries of the county, are to be computed ; and the act for the formation of a county from Washington county, which with the water area had more than nine hundred square miles, was not repug- nant to this section of the constitution.*® The original surveys of the United States government are not to be taken as conclusive by pre- sumption of law : they may be rebutted and impeached as to their correctness; but, prima facie, they are to be presumed to be correct until their accuracy has been properly impeached.*'* The accuracy of these surveys may be put in issue by the pleadings, and be deter- mined like other questions of fact.^° Where a county from which territory was detached appeared by the United States surveys to con- *^ Supervisors &c. v. Supervisors Wis. 605; s. c. 45 N. W. 598. Cf. &c., 13 Wis. 490, in which it was Gough v. Dorsey, 27 Wis. 119, 131, held that an action for the amount 133; Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 503, claimed could not be sustained until 507. the plaintiffs had submitted the ^' State v. Forest Co., 74 Wis. 610; claim to the defendants and it had s. c. 43 N. W. 551. been disallowed. This act gave no ^ State v. Larrabee, 1 Wis. 200. additional remedy, unless perhaps a ^^ State v. Merriman, 6 Wis. 14. mandamus to compel the treasurer See also, Kane v. Parker, 4 Wis. 123, to comply with its provisions. 128; Vroman v. Dewey, 23 Wis. 530. ^ Forest Co. v. Langlade Co., 76 ^° State v. Merriman, 6 Wis. 14. § 457 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 434 tain just nine Imndred square miles, the act forming a new county of the same was only prima facie unconstitutional; but the burden was upon those who supported the act to show that the county contained more.^^ The provision to submit to a vote is not merely directory to the legislature: it is inhibitory and imperative.^^ An act which sub- mitted the act itself to popular vote of the electors of the county, but by its entire scope evidently intended only to submit the question of division to popular vote, was held valid notwithstanding the apparently unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by its inaccurate lan- guage, and was held to have provided constitutionally for a division of the county. ^^ A county having originally less than nine hundred square miles in area may have attached to it a part of one which can spare the territory ; and if by this addition its area is thus increased to more than the area required in this provision of the constitution, it can be divided to form a part or the whole of a new county without submitting the question to a vote.^* § 457. The same subject continued — TTniformity of system of gov- ernment. — The creation or division of counties, and the adjustment of the respective rights and liabilities of the new and old counties as to the assets and debts of the latter, are not part of the system of county government, which by the constitution of Wisconsin is required to be uniform.^^ To make the town board in such a case also the county board of a new county is no infringement of the rule of unity or the rule of uniformity required by the constitution as to a system of town and county government. ^^ Kor was an act for dividing a "State v. Merriman, 6 Wis. 14; N. W. 104; State v. Forest Co., 74 followed in Perry v. State, 9 Wis. 19. Wis. 610, 615; s. c. 43 N. W. 551. "State v. Merriman, 6 Wis. 14. '*" Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. See also, State v. Elwood, 11 Wis. 17. 590; s. c. 14 N. W. 833. The court ^^ State V. Elwood, 11 Wis. 17. say: — "There may be necessity for ^* State V. Cram, 16 Wis. 343. more than one town, and yet there ^° Forest Co. v. Langlade Co., 76 may be necessity for a county. But Wis. 605; s. c. 45 N. W. 598. Cf. a county necessitates a board of su- Crawford Co. v. Iowa Co., 2 Pin. pervisors, and if it contains but one (Wis.) 368; Town of Milwaukee v. town, then there can be but one City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; Mor- chairman in such town, and it would gan v. Beloit City, 7 Wall. 613; Town hardly be claimed that one person of Depere v. Town of Bellevue, 31 should constitute such board. [Where Wis. 120; Mount Pleasant v. Beck- there are several towns in a new with, 100 U. S. 514; Knight v. Town county the law here provided that of Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; s. c. 21 N. the chairman of the supervisors of W. 65; Schriber v. Town of Lan- the different towns should constitute glade, 66 Wis. 616, 629, 631; s. c. 29 the county board.] It [the board of N. W. 547, 554; Yorty v. Paine, 62 the town] supplies a necessity, and Wis. 154, 161; s. c. 22 N. W. 137; is as nearly uniform as practicable, Hall v. Baker, 74 Wis. 118; s. c. 42 and preserves the unity of the sys- 435 TARTITIOX AND DISSOLUTION. 458 county into three towns in violation of the same constitutional pro- vision.'" § 458. Title of act. — An act which expressed its object to be to ^'incorporate" a certain township, but only mentioned one of the town- ships from which it was to be taken, is not repugnant to the constitu- tion of New Jersey, providing that the object of an act must be ex- pressed in its title, because of its omission of the other township fur- nishing a portion of its territory.^* As to the objection to the title not embracing all the subject-matter of the bill, it was held that the title, "An act to create and establish the county of Lake from portions of Sumter and Orange counties," was broad enough to cover any pro- vision as to the location of the county site or a change of the same at any period or stage of the existence of the county.^® tern in that it constitutes the county board from town supervisors." " Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Langlade Co., 56 Wis. 614; s. c. 14 N. W. 844. The court say: — "It is the one sys- tem which is to be as nearly uniform as practicable. It is that which is to be protected against legislative en- croachment. This system which is to be thus guarded is nothing more nor less than the plan or scheme by which the town and county are to be governed. Within the limits of the constitution this plan or scheme of governing either town or county may be changed by the legislature without any interference with the other. The mere fact that the legis- lature, in a given case, prescribes a particular method of organizing new towns and bringing them into the one established system, does not nec- essarily imply that the plan or scheme of governing such new towns, after they are thus brought into the system, is to be any differ- ent from that in other towns. The incipient steps leading towards or- ganization should not be mistaken for the more advanced stages. A town implies inception and progres- sion as well as completed organiza- tion. The same is true of a county. Induction into the family of local governments is quite a different thing from exercising the functions of such government after having been thus inducted. The one in- volves action prior to reaching the system, the other implies action after becoming a constituent part of it. The unity and uniformity re- quired apply to the organization when completed rather than the methods to bring about such organi- zation." =^* State V. Elvins, 32 N. J. L. 362; the court saying: — "Any statement in the title, as to the territory to be taken to form the new town, was unnecessary. Such statement goes beyond the mere expression of the object of the statute, and is a par- ticularity which the constitution does not require." «" County Com'rs &c. v. State, 24 Fla. 263; s. c. 4 So. 795; the court say- ing: — "Provisions for such change, whether from a temporary or a per- manent, an original or a subsequent location, are a part of the county government established. Any pro- vision relating to its organization or government,, though for use in the future, is as much matter properly connected with the establishment of the county as are those relating to the earliest stages of its existence. § 459 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 426 § 459. Florida decisions on constitutionality of acts. — A section of the Florida statutes providing for the incorporation of cities and towns autliorized the county commissioners to prescribe new bound- aries of an incorporated town, when, on the petition of five registered inhabitants of tlie town setting forth that "the boundaries of the town are of unreasonable and unnecessary extent," it shall be found by the commissioners that the boundaries of such town "are extended beyond necessary and useful limits, and include an undue amount of vacant farming lands." Another section of the law authorized the county commissioners to enlarge the boundaries of any city or town on the application of the corporate authorities thereof. This act has been held constitutional over an objection that it conferred judicial func- tions upon the county commissioners. "^^ Neither was the grant of power to a board of county commissioners of a new county, or a ma- jority of them, to locate the temporary county site, a delegation of the lawmaking power; nor was it prohibited by the constitution of Florida in legislation organizing a new county.^^ In another case there was a contention that the legislature had annulled and abrogated a contract between the county and bondholders, by disrobing the county, without her consent, in creating new counties from the terri- tory composing the county at the time of issuing the bonds. It was held that severing a portion of the territory of a county by act of the The subject of the establishment of build bridges, and similar powers a county, within the meaning of the and duties, they merely exercise constitutional provision in question, such judgment and discretion, adopt- includes not merely what is neces- ing such measures under the law as sary to put it on its feet as a county, to them may seem conducive to but anything that may concern its the public convenience and public future existence or operation. Noth- needs." At the same time the court ing is more properly connected with held that the power to sever a part the subject of establishing a county of a town solely for the purpose of than making provision for a change annexing it to another was not con- of the county site in the future." ferred by this act. The court cited Cooley Const. Lim. "^ County Com'rs &c. v. State, 24 144; Morford v. linger, 8 Iowa 82: Fla. 263; s. c. 4 So. 795; the court Whiting V. City of Mt. Pleasant, 11 saying: — "Where the legislature has Iowa 482; Bright v. McCullough, 27 the power to do a thing by law, and Ind. 223; Mayor &c. v. State, 30 Md. the constitution has not prescribed 112; State v. Town of Union, 33 N. the manner of doing it, or the nature J. L. 350; Humboldt Co. v. Churchill of the thing is not such as to require Co. Com'rs, 6 Nev. 30. that it be done directly by the legis- "" City of Jacksonville v. L'Engle, lature, it may, through the provis- 20 Pla. 344; the court saying that, ions of its law, use any proper in- "like the powers to hear and deter- strumentality for effecting the result mine applications to lay out, open to be accomplished." and discontinue roads, locate and 42^ PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 460 legislature was not a taking of "private property for public use with- out a just compensation."*'" § 460. Kansas decisions. — A Kansas statute, which was intended in its language to make liable for bonds issued by an original old town- ship for building a bridge tlie people of a new township which had before the building of the bridge been detached from the old one, was held unconstitutional and void, because under the facts and circum- stances of the case such people were under no moral obligation to assist in paying such bonds.°^ A former act containing slightly different provisions was held valid upon the theory that it simply furnished a remedy for the enforcement of a pre-existing moral obligation.®'* A vote does not create any liability or any contract, but merely gives authority to afterward create such liability or contract.®^ § 461. How partition affects officers. — Where a county is divided and two separate and distinct counties formed out of it by act of the legislature, to one of which a new name is given, whilst the other, it is declared, shall be and remain a separate and distinct county by the name of the county as it existed previous to the division, judges of ^" County Com'rs &c. v. King, 13 Fla. 451; the court not being able to "perceive how the state can be sub- stituted as the debtor, and liable to pay the debts of the county, by the action of the legislature in changing her boundaries." «= Craft V. Lofinck, 34 Kan. 365; s. c. 8 Pac. 359. The people of the old township had voted for the building of a bridge. Before it was done the new township was detached from it. Afterwards the new township built a bridge which was "an imperative public necessity." The old township built the one for v/hich the bonds in this case were issued. It did not ap- pear that this one was needed. The view of the court was that it is nec- essary in order to enable the legisla- ture by retrospective legislation to impose a legal liability upon the peo- ple owning property in a portion of a township or other subdivision of the territory of a state where no such liability existed before, that a pre-existing moral obligation should rest upon such people to discharge such liability. And in such a case, though it is clearly within the prov- ince of the legislature in the first instance, to determine the question whether such a moral obligation ex- ists or not, yet it is not exclusively within its province. The determina- tion of the question finally devolves upon the court. The court distin- guished cases where an act of 1873, ch. 142, had been interpreted. That act made detached territory liable only for bonds that had been "au- thorized and issued" prior to the de- tachment of the territory; while § 2 of the act of 1883 made the detached territory liable only where a vote authorizing the township to issue its bonds was had prior to the detach- ment. "* Commissioners &c. v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498. Cf. Commissioners &c. v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234; Board &c. v. Board &c., 26 Kan. 181; Chandler V. Reynolds, 19 Kan. 249. '''■• Union Pac. R. Co. v. Board &c., 6 Kan. 256. § 461 PUBLIC coitroRATioxs. 428 county courts appointed previous to the division who happen to reside in that portion of the territory distinguished as a county with a new name, under the operation of an act requiring judges of county courts to reside within the counties for which they are appointed, lose their offices, and are no longer competent to act under their commissions; those continuing in the portion which retains the original name con- tinue to the expiration of their term.®^ It seems that by express enactment the legislature might have continued these judges in office ; but failing to do that the office is gone.**® On similar reasoning the supreme court of Ohio have held that the county commissioners of any of the counties from which a now county is formed whose resi- dences are thrown into the new county lose their offices.*'^ Where a town is divided by the incorporation of a part of it as a new town, such new town remains in the same judicial district as the old one, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the statute incorporating it."'' A provision in an act annexing the larger portion of a village to a city that the taxes in the annexed territory shall be collected as if the act had not been passed does not have the effect of retaining a former treasurer of the village in office for the purpose of collecting the taxes.'^^ Where a portion of a township is declared by proclamation a city of the second class, the residue retains its organization ; and the members of the township board are still de facto officers at least, ^'People V. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; or territorial limits of the corpora- ttie court distinguishing Ex parte tions to which the offices in question M'Collum, 1 Cowen (N. Y.) 550, and belonged; much less an actual dis- people V. Garey, 6 Cowen (N. Y.) solution of those corporations. 642, in the first of which the court '^'' Cases cited in preceding note, held that a legislative organization "" State v. Walker, 17 Ohio 135. of a new county by combining sev- "" Commonwealth v. Brennan, 150 eral definite subsisting towns of oth- Mass. 63; s. c. 22 N. E. 628; where er counties, and declaring that the it was held that a justice of the justices already appointed for those peace with authority to issue war- towns respectively should hold for rants in criminal cases anywhere the residue of their terms in the within the district, whose residence same towns, and relatively to the fell within the new town, might con- new county, was constitutional; and tinue to issue warrants in such the last holding that in a similar cases as above therein as well as erection of the county of Orleans elsewhere within the district, from definite subsisting towns of '^ So held in Ketcham v. Wagner, Ontario county, the legislature had 90 Mich. 271; s. c. 51 N. W, 281, a no power to abridge the term of of- case where the former treasurer re- fice for which the several justices sided in the portion of the village had been appointed while their annexed to the city of Detroit, by towns belonged to Ontario. The local act 1891, No. 214, and an elec- distinction was that in neither case tion of a new treasurer for the vil- was there even a change in the name lage had become necessary. 429 PAKTITIOX AND DISSOLUTION. § 4.G2 although they reside within the limits of the new city.''^ Under the statutes of Xebraska concerning township organization, when, in a new town erected by the county board, in the division of the county into towns or townships, at the first meeting of said board, the offices of the town board as well as the town clerk are all vacant, it is the duty of the county clerk to fill such vacancies as well as all other vacancies in the offices of such town by appointment.'^^ Although com- missioners living within the territory taken from their county cease to be commissioners unless they remove to parts of the county remain- ing unaffected by the division, still, if before removal they appoint a county treasurer, their act will be valid as that of de facto officers.'* § 462. Where unorganized territory has been attached to a county. — The Nebraska statute'^ which provides for attaching unor- ganized territory to the "nearest organized county directly east for election, judicial and revenue purposes" has been construed; and it has been held that an unorganized county did not thereby become a part of the organized one, but for certain purposes therein named was placed under its care; and that, therefore, after the organization of such unorganized territory as a county and the qualification of its officers, taxes on property in the county were payable to them and not to officers of the county to which it was formerly attached. '^^ So, also, where after the officers of an organized county have levied taxes on property in an unorganized county attached thereto, and before the taxes become due the unorganized county is organized, the taxes are payable to the treasurer of the new county.'^'^ Garfield county, which, was created by the laws of Kansas, 1887, chapter 81, was by chapter 132 attached with other unorganized counties to Hodgeman county for judicial purposes; chapter 1-12 provided for district courts in Gar- field county. These acts were approved by the governor the same day. Chapter 132 was published March 11th, and repealed conflicting pro- visions, and chapter 1-42 on March 10th. Upon the question of legality "Walnut Tp. v. Jordan, 38 Kan. '« Fremont &c. R. Co. v. Brown 562; s. c. 16 Pac. 812. Co., 18 Neb. 516; s. c. 26 N. W. 194; "State V. Forney, 21 Neb. 223; s. the court saying that, "being an or- c. 31 N. W. 802; where this particu- ganized county, the ligament that lar township was formed of terri- bound it to the former county is tory not theretofore constituting a severed by the force of the organiza- precinct or town, and containing tion and it takes its place as one of within its boundaries no person the counties of the state, and its elected as a town oflBcer at any elec- officers become amenable to the law tion. for the faithful performance of their " State V. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143. duty." '" Compiled Stats, of Neb., ch. 18, "Morse v. Hitchcock Co., 19 Neb. § 146. 566; s. c. 27 N. W. 637. g 4G3 PUBLIC CORPOIIATIONS. 430 of the detention of a prisoner by the sheriff of that county, it was licld that the several acts must be considered together, and that Gar- field county was attached to Hodgeman county for judicial purposes only until organized; after its organization courts should be held in Garfield county." By the laws of Texas, 1856, page 41, Archer county was attached to Clay county for judicial purposes. By the laws of 1866, page 94, it was attached to Jack county "for judicial and other purposes." By the laws of 1870, page 53, it was attached to Montague county "for judicial purposes" only. This last act was superseded by the laws of 1874, page 53, changing the terms of court, which omitted the clause attaching Archer to Montague. In 1879 (laws of 1879, p. 150) it was attached to Clay "for judicial and other purposes." It was held that, under the operation of the foregoing statutes, Archer county was not attached to Clay for any purpose in August, 1875, and that the registration in the latter county of a deed of land situate in the former was not constructive notice.^® § 483. Settlement of inhabitants. — AYhen part of the territory com- posing a township is by the act of the legislature formed into a new township, those persons Avho at the time of separation had a legal settlement in the old township, and resided on the territory so cut off, acquire ipso facto a legal settlement in the new township.®*' The court said: "This doctrine seems to flow from what may reasonably be presumed to have been the object of the legislature in creating the new township ; namely, that instead of the public relations previously existing between the inhabitants and the old township, there should be substituted similar relations between them and the new town- ship."®^ This rule was adopted by statute in Massachusetts as early as 1793, but the courts of that state deemed it a principle of the common law deducible from the nature of corporate rights and duties.®^ Chief Justice Shaw speaks of the statute as "little more than an authorita- tive declaration of rules which had been before established as the rules by which persons had been held to acquire settlements."®^ The New York court was divided on this question, but the principle adopted in Massachusetts was approved by Chief Justice Kent.®* In New Jersey '*'In re Hall, 38 Kan. 670; s. c. 17 «5:c. v. Inhabitants &c., 4 Mass. 676, Pac. 649. 678; Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants ™ Alford V. Jones, 71 Tex. 519; s. c. &c., 14 Mass. 253, 256. 9 S. W. 470. *' Inhabitants &c v. Inhabitants >'» Overseer &c. v. Overseer &c., 51 &c., 6 Met. (Mass.) 484, 486. N. J. L. 93; s. c. 16 Atl. 184. ** Overseers &c. v. Overseers &c., 3 "Overseer &c. v. Overseer &c., Johns. (N. Y.) 193. Cf. Stillwater v. supra. Green, 9 N. J. L. 59; Overseers &c. *' Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants v. Overseers &c., 32 N. J. L. 66. &c., 4 Mass. 384, 390; Inhabitants 431 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION". § 4G t a residence of ten consecutive years in the same dwelling, begun while the dwelling-place is in one township and ended after it has been comprised by act of the legislature within the limits of another town- ship, will confer a legal settlement in the latter township by force of the statute,^^ which has been held to be retrospective.*** § 464. Territory severed from an old to form a new corporation is a part of the old until the new is fully organized. — Wbere part of a town is detached from it and incorporated as a city by an act of the legislature, which provides for an election of city officers by a certain time, and the election is not held, thus leaving the organization of the city in abeyance, it continues to be a part of the town until the organization of the city is completed.^**^ § 465. Some Wisconsin acts construed. — An act of the legislature provided for a division of a county, by which the territory of one town and fractions of other towns was erected into a new county. The con- struction placed upon this act by the supreme court of Wisconsin was *«Rev. Supp. N. J. 800; Overseer &c. v. Overseer &c., 51 N. J. L. 93; s. c. 16 Atl. 184. ^^ Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 50 N. J. L. 509; s. c. 14 Atl. 595; Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1 N. J. L. 213. ^a state V. Button, 25 Wis. 109; the court holding that the act did not proprio vigore sever this part of the town so completely as to make the votes of its inhabitants in the town illegal. The court cite as sus- taining their view, Haynes v. Wash- ington Co., 19 111. 66, where the court said: — "Grants of corporate powers for purposes of local munici- pal government, such as belong to towns and cities, are a delegation of a portion of the general sovereignty of the state designed to enable the inhabitants of particular localities to establish and maintain police reg- ulations and to advance their com- mon prosperity. A charter or act of incorporation is but evidence of the powers delegated, and which powers remain dormant or in abeyance un- til in the mode pointed out in the charter the inhabitants for whose benefit those powers are granted bring them into life and exercise by an organization of the local govern- ment. Here the law incorporating the town in authorizing the inhabit- ants to form by the means provided a local government was evidently intended for the benefit of the in- habitants, and is presumed to have been made at their instance and not upon the consideration that the common good and policy of the state demanded the establishment of such local government and the separation of the particular territory for such purpose from the jurisdiction of county authority. Until an organi- zation by an election and qualifica- tion of the number of persons being the several integral parts of the cor- poration, and forming the political body provided for in the laws, there could be in being no municipal cor- poration or government; and the condition of the inhabitants within the limits named in the law as to rights and duties would continue unchanged and unaffected by the law authorizing them in a corporate capacity to exercise municipal pow- ers." § 466 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 432- that the original county had jurisdiction for governmental purposes over the detached territory only until the organization of the new county was effected; and that as it emhraced Ijut one complete town the supervisors of that town became the board of supervisors of the new county, and the new county was at once an organized county. Upon the organization of the new county the whole of its territory became for the purposes of town government one town ; and the or- ganized town was in effect enlarged so as to embrace the whole of such territory.*^ This act was not repugnant to the constitution, which was intended to prohibit the enactment of any special or private law for incorporating any town or village by special charter, or for the amendment of such charter. This has no reference to quasi-corpora- tions like the towns which exist as political subdivisions in this state.^* A new county having been formed of a part of another, the same act providing for an appointment of officers for the new county by the governor, though the suspension of the power of the people to elect their own officers might be invalid, the offices were properly created and existed de jure ; and the persons appointed thereto having entered upon the duties of such offices were officers de facto whose official ac- tion could not be questioned collaterally. ^'^ § 466. Provisions of act as to county sites. — In Florida an act cre- ating a new county has been held constitutional over an objection that by its provisions it allowed the commissioners of the new county to establish a temporary county seat and afterwards order an election for a permanent county seat; it being urged that this amounted to a re- moval of the county seat, and the constitution forbade removal of county seats except by a general law.^° The supreme court of Michi- **' Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. acting as a county board was prop- 590; s. c. 14 N. W. 833, which sus- erly made for the next year, tained the authority of the supervis- "^ Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. ors of the town to levy and appor- 590; s. c. 14 N. W. 833. tion taxes upon such property as ^^ Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Langlade was situated in the original town, Co., 56 Wis. 614; s. c. 14 N. W. 844 and the sales of such property made (action to set aside an assessment by the county treasurer of the new of taxes on the ground of lack of au- county, after he was elected, as to thority of the officers of a new coun- the period before an election of the ty to assess, etc.). other county officers. The election ^ County Com'rs &c. v. State, 24 of town officers for the town as en- Fla. 263; s. c. 4 So. 795; the court larged by virtue of the statute after- holding that the proviso, "that in wards was also held to have been the formation of new counties the proper, and assessment, apportion- county seat may be temporarily es- ment and levy of taxes made by tablished by law," qualifies the con- their town supervisors so elected stitution, art. 8, § 4, providing that 433 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 467 gan has also held that an elootion of a permanent county scat under the provisions of tlie laws of jMichigan organizing the county of Iron, and naming a tem])orary county seat until the next general election, when it provided for the election of a permanent one, could not be re- garded as the removal of a county seat once established, and that the law was not unconstitutional for not conforming to the requirements of the constitutional provision for such removals."^ But the supreme court of West Virginia has held that the provisions of the statute law of West Virginia, prescril)ing the manner in which the county seat of any county may be relocated by a vote of the people at a general election, apply to all the counties in the state, including those whose county seats were declared permanent in the special act of the legisla- ture creating such counties. ^^ § 467. Apportionment of liabilities. — ^AHien a county, city or town is divided and its territory reduced or set apart by legislative au- thority, the legislature may make regulations not only to apportion the property of the corporate body among the new members or com- munities created, but to throw the obligation to pay the debts of the entire body upon the several parts in proportion to the taxable wealth of each.^^ The Michigan statute relating to settlements between the respective boards of supervisors wdiere two counties are formed out of one has been held not to contemplate any other division than of ex- isting property and liabilities, nor to provide for the assumption by one county of the W'hole burden of state taxation for both counties un- til the next equalization.®* And a provision requiring state taxes to be levied for five years on the basis of the last equalization, has been "the legislature shall have no power the power to create and do every- to remove the county seat of any thing necessary and proper to its county, but shall provide by general perfect organization that is not pro- law for such removal," so far as it hibited by other portions of the con- was a limitation upon the power of stitution. and a county site is, to say the legislature. By the proviso there the least, a proper, if not necessary, was reserved to the legislature the element of county organization." power to establish for the new coun- ''^ Attorney-General v. Board &c., ty a temporary county seat, which 64 Mich. 607; s. c. 31 N. W. 539. should not be subject to such limita- °- Welch v. County Court &c., 29 tion, but should be the county seat W. Va. 63; s. c. 1 S. B. 337. only until the permanent county '^ Canova v. State. 18 Fla. 512. seat should be established in the See, where this is well considered, manner provided by the act organiz- County Com'rs v. King, 13 Fla. 451, ing the county. The court said: — 472. "... The power to make a "-^ Supervisors &c. v. Supervisors county . . . necessarily Includes &c., 74 Mich. 721; s. c. 42 N. W. 170. 1 Smith— 28 § 468 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 434 held not to mean that when two counties are made out of one the old county must bear the whole burden of state tax as before the division, until the next equalization; the proportion which the assessment rolls of the year when the last equalization was made, of all the towns in the new county, bear to the aggregate assessments of all the towns then in the old (undivided) county, furnishes the rule of apportionment for the two counties until the next equaliza- tion.^^ The Xew Jersey act which divided the township of Hacken- sack into the townships of Ridgefield, of Englewood and of , Palisades, and which declared that the inhabitants of said townships should be liable to pay their just proportions of the debts of the inhabitants of the township of Hackensack, did not, proprio vigore, make any single township legally responsible for any particular debt, even though the debt had been wholly contracted for work done within its- terri- torial limits.^® The legislature has power to divide counties and towns at its pleasure, and to apportion the common property and the common burdens in such manner as to it may seem reasonable and equitable. ^'^ Where the general assembly created a new county out of territory formerly belonging to other counties, and to compensate such counties added territory to them from adjoining counties, it was competent also to provide that the county receiving the accession should levy an equitable proportion of the indebtedness of the county from which such territory was taken. ^'^ § 468. Rules as to property and liabilities. — Upon the division of a municipal corporation and the organization of a new one out of a portion of the old, in the absence of legislative provision to the con- trary, the old corporation owns all the public property within its new limits and is responsible for all the debts of the corporation contracted before the act of separation was passed; the new corpora- tion has no claim to any of the property except what falls within its boundaries and to which the old corporation has no claim. ^'^ Where ''•''Supervisors &c. v. Supervisors v. County Judge, 37 Ark. 339; Super- &c., 74 Mich. 721; s. c. 42 N. W. 170. visors &c. v. Supervisors &c., 58 "« So held in Vanderbeck V. Inhabi- Miss. 619; Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. tants &c., 39 N. J. L. 345; sustaining 497; State v. McFadden, 23 Minn, a nonsuit which had been ordered in 40; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; an action brought by one on a claim Commissioners &c. v. Commission- against Hackensack township for ers &c., 79 N. C. 565; Commissioners work done on Engle street, which be- &c. v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498. came a part of Englewood. ®^ Commissioners &c. v. Auditor "^ Morrow Co. v. Hendryx. 14 Or. &c.. 1 Ohio St. 322. 397; s. c. 12 Pac. 806. See also. Can- '■'"Commissioners &c. v. Commis- ova V. State, 18 Fla. 512; Trinity Co. sioners &c., 92 U. S. 307; Bristol v. V. Polk Co., 58 Tex. 321; Pulaski Co. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524. 435 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 4G9 two separate towns are created out of one, cadi in the absence of any statutory regulation is entitled to hold in severalty the puljlic prop- erty of the old corporation which falls within its limits.^"" If a town is divided and a part of its territory with the inhabitants therein is incorporated into a new town, the old town will retain all the prop- erty and be responsible for the existing liabilities, unless there is some legislative provision to the contrary; but upon such division the legislature has constitutional authority to provide that the prop- erty owned by the original town sball be apportioned or held for the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of both towns, and to impose upon each town the payment of a share of the corporate debts. ^"^ An act creating a new county out of territory formerly embraced in another county failing to provide for a division of the school fund, the whole fund belonging to it before the division may be retained by the parent county. ^"^ § 469. The same subject continued. — Upon the formation of a new county out of a portion of another, the debt of the latter to the state was apportioned between the two, and each issued certificates for its share. By the acts under which the debt was originally incurred a railroad company for whose benefit it was incurred was required to pay certain sums into the state treasury to apply on the debt. It was held that the sums paid by such company should be applied to the certificates of the two counties in proportion to the share of debt as- sumed by each.^°^ A general law providing for the apportionment of debts and credits in all cases where new counties are created does not ^°°Town of North Hempsted v. '"-Cooke v. School Dist., 12 Colo. Town of Hempsted, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 453; s. c. 21 Pac. 496, 719; the court 109; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Town of holding that a making of the esti- East Hartford, 16 Conn. 149, 171. mate of what proportion of the '" Inhabitants &c. v. Skillings, 45 school-fund of a county belongs to Maine 133. In support of first the several school districts by the clause, see Inhabitants &c. v. In- county superintendent under gen- habitants &c., 4 Mass. 384, and In- eral statutes of Nebraska, § 3067, habitants &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 16 was not of itself sufficient to vest m Mass. 86, where the same doctrine is the several school districts the own- reiterated. In support of second ership of their respective shares; clause, see Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabi- therefore concluding that the coun- tants &c., 4 Mass. 278; Inhabitants ties and not the school districts re &c. V. Inhabitants &c., 4 Mass. 315; owners of the school-funds until Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 4 they are accredited to the several Mass. 384; Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass. school districts. 441; Inhabitants &c. v. Dunning, 7 '"'State v. Harshaw, 73 Wis. 211; Mass. 445; Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabi- s. c. 40 N. W. 641. tants &c., 16 Mass. 16; Inhabitants &c. V. Inhabitants &c., 16 Mass. 76. § 470 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 436 deprive subsequent legislatures of the power to provide otherwise as to counties created by them.^°* The divided county has the same rights, duties and burdens as before in respect to the remaining ter- ritory, except as changed by the legislature.^"^ School districts are corporations for certain specified purposes, and neither their rights nor their obligations are affected by a change of their names or altera- tion of their boundaries.^°*' In the change of county lines whereby territory is detached from one county and attached to another, the county acquiring the additional territory is not entitled to demand from the other any portion of the funds in its treasury. ^°'^ If part of the territory of a town is separated from it by annexation to another, or by the creation of a new corporation, without any provision for con- tribution to the debts of the old town, and that retains all its property and franchises, such detached portion is not liable therefor. ^°^ A county from which territory is detached to form part of a new county is entitled to deduct its existing indebtedness from the bridge fund, as well as other moneys previously collected and remaining in its treasury at the time of the division ; and the balance only, after mak- ing the deduction, is required to be divided between the old and new counties. ^''^ If an equitable claim exists against a new county in favor of an old county growing out of its being erected from the latter, it is competent for the legislature to create by law a board of commis- sioners to ascertain, settle and report the amount due, and further, to compel the board of supervisors of the county to levy a special tax to pay the amount reported to be due.^^° It has been held in Cali- fornia that a claim of an old county against a new one formed out of it for the payment of its proportion of the debt of the old is of an equitable nature only, and that it requires legislation to enable the old county to enforce it.^^^ The act forming the new county was held not to require the new county to pay interest on its proportion of the debt of the old."^ § 470. A Wisconsin case on property rights. — The towns of Wis- consin by operation of the laws of the territory became the owners of lands which were held for the benefit of those corporations. When the territory became a state these rights were preserved by the constitu- lot Forest Co. v. Langlade Co., 76 "' Town of Depere v. Town of Wis. 605; s. c. 45 N. W. 598. Bellevue, 31 Wis. 120. '"^ Attorney-General v. Fitzpatrick, ^"^ Commissioners &c. v. Commis- 2 Wis. 542. sioners &c., 2 Ohio St. 508. "« District No. 3 v. Macloon, 4 Wis. "" People v. Board &c., 26 Cal. 641. 79. "' Beals v. Board &c., 28 Cal. 449. ^"'Commissioners &c. v. Commis- "^ Beals v. Board &c., supra, sioners &c., 16 Ohio 466. 437 I'AirnTiox and dissolution, § 471 tion and laws of tlie state: the partition of a town and the annexa- tion of a portion of its territory to another municipality which was incorporated as a city made no change in these rights: the town continued to hold its title to this real estate. The legislature had an undoubted right to change the territorial limits of municipal corpora- tions, and to detach this territory from one and annex it to another, and in so doing might provide for an equitable division of the com- mon property ; but where this detaching and annexation is done without providing for the disposal of the land, under such circum- stances that the assent of the town to part with its title can not be presumed, it continues the owner notwithstanding the separation ; the legislature has not the power, either directly or indirectly, to di- vest a municipality of its private property without the consent of its inhabitants.^^^ § 471. Rules as to apportionment of liabilities and remedies. — A village may be created out of the territory of a city, and as between the city and the village the legislature may apportion the existing indebtedness; but when the corporation which created the debt is shorn of its population and taxable property to such an extent that there is no reasonable expectation of its meeting its present indebted- ness, and it is unable to do so, the creditors at least can enforce the proportionate share of their obligations against the two corporations carved out of one, both being liable to the extent of the property set off to each respectively.^^* Where a coxinty has been divided by 113 Town of Milwaukee v. City of person. Its rights of property once Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93. Dixon, C. acquired, though designed and used J., said: — "The difficulty about the to aid it in the discharge of its du- question is to distinguish between ties as a local government, are en- the corporation as a civil institution tirely distinct and separate from its or delegation of merely political powers as a political or municipal power, and as an ideal being en- body. It might sell its property, or dowed with the capacity to acquire the same might be lost or destroyed, and hold property for corporate or and yet its power of government other purposes. In its political or would remain. In its character of a governmental capacity it is liable at political power, or local subdivision any time to be changed, modified or of government, it is a public corpora- destroyed by the legislature; but in tion, but in its character of owner of its capacity of owner of property, property it is a private corporation, designed for its own or the exclusive possessing the same rights, duties use and benefit of its inhabitants, its and privileges as any other." See vested rights of property are no also, Bailey v. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. more the subject of legislative inter- Y.) 531. ference or control, without the con- "' Brewis v. City of Duluth, 3 Mc- sent of the corporators, than those Crary 219. of a merely private corporation or § 473 PUBLIC COKPORATIONS. 438 an act of the legislature, one portion thereof retaining the forrnor name, county seat, county organization, county buildings and all other county property, and the other portion being formed into new counties, the county retaining such name and organization is responsi- ble and liable solely for the entire indebtedness of the county at the time of such division, and can not bring an action for contribution against the counties thus set off, unless specially authorized to do so by a legislative provision.^ ^^ Where a city was created out of a town by an act of the legislature, which made the city and the town liable proportionately for the indebtedness of the town created before the city and town were separated, it was held that as the apportionment of this liability between the town and the city, depending upon accounts and computations founded upon the proper assessment roll, could not be made in an action at law, a bill in equity was the proper remedy to apportion such indebtedness between the two municipali- ties, especially as authority to tax for the payment of municipal lia- bilities, in cases like this, was in the nature of a trust. ^^'^ But where it appears that the property left to the old corporation has increased rapidly and is sufficient to meet the debt apportioned to it, there is no legal or equitable reason for going beliind the legislative apportion- ments^'^ § 472. Rules in North Carolina as to settlement between new and old counties. — Where a new county was created providing that "that portion of the citizens and taxable property taken from" two other counties "and attached to the" new county "shall not be re- leased from their portion of the outstanding public debts" of the two counties "contracted before the passage of the act;" and the matter to be adjusted by the county commissioners of the three counties in such manner and mode as might be agreed upon, and one of these counties appointed a commissioner, but the new county took no action whatever, — it was held that the county appointing a commissioner could maintain an action against the new county to have an account taken to ascertain the indebtedness at the passage of the act, and obtain judgment for the amount found due as the new county's pro- portion, and for mandamus to compel its county authorities to levy upon the people and property detached from the complainant county to pay said judgment. ^^^ The interest and claims of the two coun- "■' County Com'rs v. County "' Morgan v. City and Town of Com'rs, 1 Wyo. Ter. 140. Beloit, supra. "" Morgan v. City and Town of "'^ Commissioners &c. v. Commis- Beloit, 7 Wall. 613. sioners &c., 107 N. C. 291; s. c. 12 S- E. 39. 439 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 473 ties from which territory was detached against the new county being several, it was not necessary to join tlie other coimty as a party- phiintifT."^ The following rulings were made upon tlie merits: The act created no change in the liability of the people and property taken from the com])lainant county: it continued their liability just as it stood at the time of the separation, and as if no separation had taken place. The court established this rule for determination of the indebtedness of the complainant county. Judgments rendered against it before the separation and paid after with money raised before should be deducted. The total indebtedness at the time of separation should be reduced by the balance of taxes collected or collectible in the year before and on hand six months after the separation, since such balance was applicable to the jjayment of indebtedness outstand- ing one year before the separation. But such indebtedness should not be reduced by the amount of the taxes collected for the year before separation, and applied to the current expenses for the six months after, since those taxes were expressly designed by law for that pur- pose. Nor should it be reduced by an amount equal to the value of certain lands held at the time of separation, in excess of the needs of the county. The people detached had no right to have such lands sold to pay the county debt, in the absence of an appropriation to that purpose before the separation.^-*' § 473. Rules for adjustment of liabilities. — Power being reposed in the commissioners of an old and a new county formed from it to apportion the debt of the old between the two, and to adjust and settle all matters of revenue proper to be done on account of the formation of the new county, the new county is liable for its share of the existing debt, without making any deduction on account of cash in the treas- ury of the old county, or of unpaid taxes due to it.^"^ And such new county is liable in praesenti to the old county for its share of the debt though part of the debt is not due.^-^ And claims against the old county which are the subject of pending litigation, and the validity of which is denied by that county, can not be included in the debt to be apportioned. ^^^ Where, upon the formation of a new town out of "' Commissioners &c. v. Commis- On the organization of a new bor- sioners &c., 107 N. C. 291; s. c. 12 S. ougli out of part of an old one E. 39. wiiich has a funded debt, under act '-"Commissioners &c. v. Commis- of Pennsylvania, May 29, 1889 (P. sioners &c., supra. L. 393), the rights and liabilities of '" Board &c. v. Board &c., 15 Colo, the old borough and its creditors 320; s. c. 25 Pac. 508. may be adjusted under act of Penn- '" Board &c. v. Board &c., supra, sylvania, June 1, 1887 (P. L. 285), "^ Board &c. v. Board &c., supra, which provides for adjusting the lia- § 474 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 440 part of the territory of an old one, a part of the indebtedness of the old town is prorated to the new under the revised statutes of Wisconsin, section 672, requiring the new town to pay its proportion of the in- debtedness of the old, but the board divides this indebtedness accord- ing to the assessment roll of the old town next preceding the last, instead of according to the last one as required by that statute, where- by the new town is charged with less than it would have been had the apportionment been made as required, the new town can not resist payment of its proportion on the ground that the apportionment was not in accordance with the statute. ^^* Under the same statute, after an apportionment of the debt the old town can sue for the amount due from the new town if it refuses to pay.^^^ Where a new county including a portion of an old one has been created under an act which declared that the detached portion of the old county should remain liable for the payment of certain old bonds of the latter, and after the date of this act the old county had refunded a portion of those bonds and issued new ones, it was held that the new bonds were only evidence of the old debt, and the detached portion of the old county still remained a part of it for the payment of the bonds. ^^^ § 474. Liabilities which fall upon the portion severed. — In the division of towns the legislature may apportion the burdens between the two, and may determine the proportion to be borne by each.^^''' A new county may be made liable for a ratable proportion of the ex- isting liabilities of the counties out of which it is created under the constitution of Nebraska.^^* Where territory, parts of two townships, was subjected to certain incumbrances in its former relations, justice requires that the same incumbrances should go with the territory when taken for a new town.^-" A county created from a portion of another has been held in Arkansas, in a proceeding to determine its pro-rata indebtedness on account of liabilities of the old county as pro- vided in the act creating it, to be liable for its pro-rata share of such bilities for "all indebtedness" of a 376; City of Olney v. Harvey, 50.111. borough when proceedings are com- 453; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, menced for changing its limits: Bor- 52 Pa. St. 374. ough of Sharon Hill, 140 Pa. St. ^"^ In re Establishment of New 250; s. c. 21 Atl. 394. Counties, 9 Colo. 639; s. c. 21 Pac. ^^ Town of Ackley v. Town of 478. Vilas, 79 Wis. 157; s. c. 48 N. W. 257. '-' State v. Elvins, 32 N. J. L. 362, 125 Town of Ackley v. Town of holding an assessment upon the in- Vilas, supra. habitants of a portion of the new ^-''' Montgomery Co. v. Menefee Co. town for a debt of the town from Court, 93 Ky. 33; s. c. 18 S. W. 1021. which it was formed, of which these '-' Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. prosecutors were not residents, Y. 297; Mayor &c. v. State, 15 Md. valid. 441 rAKTITJOX AND DISSOLUTION. § -475 portion of the Ijonds signed before the division of territory for the purpose of building a court-house and jail, as were absolutely nego- tiated and sold, as well as interest from the date of negotiation. There was a contention that as they had been all signed and placed in the hands of the county commissioners the new county was bound for its share of the whole. This the court overruled for the reason that as long as they were in the hands of the old county's agents un- negotiated they were the property of the county, and there was no debt or liability. ^^° Under an act creating a new county, A, out of parts of old counties, among which was B, and providing that the new county "shall pay its portion of the debts of the counties respectively from which said county is formed, said proportions to be determined by the assessed value of the * * * property within its limits," the supervisors of the old counties continued to be the auditing boards of the new as to all pre-existing debts. It was also held that where bonds issued by the supervisors of B county for a debt existing at the time of the creation of A county were voluntarily paid off by the offi- cers of B county without objection by A county, the latter was Ijound to contribute to B her portion of the debts thus paid.^^^ Where the only provision in a statute organizing a new county from parts of oth- ers in reference to its liabilities because of the territory detached is that the property taken from these several counties respectively shall be subject to taxation "for the pro-rata proportion of any debts" due ' by the several counties, it subjects the county to a proportionate liability for debts, but not for contingent liabilities arising out of a breach of duty.^^- § 475. Defenses to claims growing out of partition. — Where a new county has been formed from another by an act providing that it should issue its pro-rata share of bonds for an indebtedness of its parent county to a third from which it was severed, for which it would ^='' Hempstead Co. v. Howard Co., parts of the county set off to form 51 Ark. 344; s. c. 11 S. W. 478. See other counties which were inter- also, Phillips Co. V. Lee Co., 34 Ark. ested in the bonds remained for the 240, purposes of the debt a part of Carter ^" Board &c. v. Board &c., 62 Miss, county. A suit against it on ac- 325. Where Carter county. Ken- count of the bonds is a suit against tucky, had issued bonds, and por- the parts set off, and a judgment tions of its territory had been taken against the county was held to be to form other counties by acts which payable out of taxes collected within provided that the citizens and prop- the boundaries of the original coun- erty within the old limits should re- ty: Carter Co. v. Sinton, 120 U. S. main liable to taxation for the pay- 517; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 650. ment of those bonds as though "this "^ Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639. act had never been passed," the § 475 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 442 receive its share of railroad stock issued to the original county in exchange for its bonds under the internal improvement laws of Florida, the depreciation of such railroad stock constitutes no valid reason for the refusal on the part of the new county to pay its propor- tion of the indebtedness/^^ Before a county from which a new one is formed can proceed to compel the latter to issue bonds for its pro- rata share of the bonded indebtedness of the former to the one from which it was formed, it must appear that the plaintiff county has issued and delivered its bonds for the whole amount to its parent county. ^^■^ In the same case the fact that the new county was not a party to mandamus proceedings of the original county against the parent county was held not to affect its liability; and it was not pre- cluded by a judgment in that case from showing the true amount of its liability in any proceedings of its parent county to compel the payment of its pro-rata share of the indebtedness to the original county. The court ruled, however, that a mere answer that a sum stated was not the correct amount was not sufficiently specific; that a return to an alternative writ of mandamus should, for the purpose of making an issue, set up a positive denial of the facts, or should state other facts sufficient to defeat relator's right. Under the Illinois statutes, providing that, when a portion of one town is taken there- from and added to a second town, the second town shall bear a due proportion of the debts of the first town, to be apportioned by the supervisors and assessors of the two towns, a suit was brought for mandamus to compel the supervisors and assessors of the town re- ceiving the addition to comply with the law, but this action was not commenced until more than ten years after the cause accrued. It was held that there was no such trust made out by the case as to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations.^^^ This was a case simply in- volving private rights, — a matter of indebtedness between two cor- porations ; no public rights were involved or the rule would have been different."^ "^Canova v. State, 18 Fla. 512; reversing an order granting a man- the court saying that "the act damus. . . . did not create an indebted- "^ People v. Town of Oran, 121 111. ness and impose it upon [the newj 650; s. c. 13 N. E. 726, in which a county, but intended that its due proceeding to apportion the indebt- proportion of the debt [due from the edness of the old and the new town county of which it was formed to an formed from it, of the bonded in- original county from which this last debtedness of the former, was held was formed] should be paid by it as barred by the statute of limitations, though there had been no division of under which it should have been ba- the parent county." gun within five years from the time '^ Canova v. State, 18 Fla. 512; the right accrued. '=° People v. Town of Oran, 121 111. 443 PARTITIOX AND DISSOLUTION. § 476 § 476. Enforcement of obligations of old and new. — Under the acts severing a })art of a coiinty and creating of it new counties, with a provision that the new counties should compensate the old county ac- cording to the relative and pro-rata assessed valuation of the property in the territory detached, it was held neither necessary nor practicable to make the new counties parties in a proceeding against the old county to enforce collection of its bonds. ^^^ A county had received in exchange for its bonds, under the internal improvement act of Florida, an equivalent in shares of a railroad company. A new county Avas formed afterwards of a part of its territory. The new county issued its bonds, and upon delivery to the commissioners of the original county the latter duly assigned over to the commissioners of the new county shares of this railroad stock to equal the amount of the new county's bonds. It was held that this assignment trans- ferred to the new county a proprietary interest in that stock, and that the county could enforce its right to have those shares trans- ferred on the books of the railroad company whenever it was de- sired. ^^"^ And the proprietary rights of the new county were not affected by the fact that the old county, after the assignment, had voted the whole number of the shares originally given to it for its bonds, which were still standing in its name : it had parted with its right of property and the new county had gained it.^^® The acceptance by a new county of its share of the railroad stock issued to the old county from which it was severed in exchange for its bonds, and the issuing of the bonds of the new to the old therefor, fixed upon the new county the liability for its bonds ; and the supreme court of Florida ordered a peremptory mandamus to the officers of the new county to levy a tax to pay them.^*° Where by the error of the auditor-general the whole tax, after the division of its territory, has been paid by the old county, its remedy is by an action at law 650; s. c. 13 N. E. 726. See also, plead or have pleaded against them Piatt Co. v. Goodell, 97 111. 84; the statute of limitations." School Directors v. School Directors, "' County Com'rs v. King, 13 Fla. 105 111. 653; in the first of which the 451. rule is stated as "our [the court's] "* State v. County Com'rs, 21 understanding of the law is, that as Fla. 1. respects all public rights, or as re- "^ State v. County Com'rs, 21 spects property held for public use Fla. 1. upon trusts, municipal corporations "" State v. County Com'rs, 21 Fla. are not within the operation of the 1. The respondent in this case filed statute of limitations; but in regard several defenses, and asked that the to contracts or mere private rights issues be tried by a jury. The court the rule is different, and such corpo- denied the motion, holding that the rations, like private citizens, may issues in such matters were triable only by the court. § 477 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 444 against the new county to recover the latter's proportionate share; and not by mandamus to compel a settlement between the respective boards of supervisors.^'*^ The legislature has power, upon the crea- tion of a new county by division of an old one, to make special provi- sions for adjusting the debts and credits between them, and the en- forcement of their respective claims; and they are not obliged to en- force such claims in the manner prescribed in general statutes.^'*- A township can not divest itself of its liability to pay its indebtedness by altering its boundaries and changing its name.^*^ The obligation of a new county to issue its bonds or to pay its debts in the manner provided in the act creating the same is not affected or controlled by subsequent constitutional or legislative enactment: the obligation of the contract can not be thus impaired.^** § 477. Miscellaneous. — When a new county is created out of a part of an old county, the old county takes the county property and becomes liable for the whole of the county indebtedness, in the absence of legis- lative provision to the contrary, and is therefore liable to pay the whole of the state levy of taxes charged upon the whole county at the time of the division. ^''^ An act of Texas authorized the organization of Eeeves county out of a portion of the territory of Pecos county, but, owing to the delay of the commissioners and Judges of Pecos county, such organization was not perfected until the lap.se of several months ; and meantime the inhabitants of that portion included in the new county paid taxes into the treasury of Pecos county. It was held that the delay of the officers of Pecos county to do their duty did not give Eeeves county the right to recover such taxes from Pecos coun- ty.^**' In Wisconsin the county of M. was organized out of territory theretofore embraced in the county of 0., and it was enacted that each county should be the exclusive owner of all real property within its boundaries, and that the treasurer of 0. county should, upon demand by the treasurer of ]\I. county, "assign to the county of M. all tax cer- tificates in his office upon lands situated in the county of M." It was "^ So held in Board &c. v. Board warrants issued by the original &c., 74 Mich. 721; s. c. 42 N. W. 170. township. "= Forest Co. v. Langlade Co., 76 "' Canova v. State, 18 Fla. 512. Wis. 605; s. c. 45 N. W. 598. ""^Gilliam Co. v. Wasco Co., 14 Or, "^So held in Walnut Tp. v. Jor- 525; s. c. 13 Pac. 324. dan, 38 Kan. 562; s. c. 16 Pac. 812; ">= Reeves Co. v. Pecos Co., 69 Tex. in which, after a city of the second 177; s. c. 7 S. W. 54; upon the prin- class had been proclaimed as to a ciple that a new county organized portion of a township, the city there- out of a portion of the territory of by detached from it was adjudged an old one is not entitled to any to be liable for its pro-rata share of funds nor subject to any obligations of the latter. * 445 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION". § 478 held that the act itself did not pass to M. county the legal title to tax certificates on lands in that county held by 0. county, but that the legal title remained in the latter county until the assignment pro- vided for was made.^''' The constitution of Colorado requires that each new county, on its establishment, shall be made responsible for a ratable proportion of the "then existing liabilities of the county or counties" from which it is formed. Two new counties were carved out of an old one, under acts providing for the enforcement of this mandate and that "all county records and other property" theretofore belonging to the old county should remain its property. They further provided for a tribunal to adjust and settle all matters of revenue proper to be done on account of the formation of the new counties, and to apportion the indebtedness of the old county. It was held that the new counties were not entitled to any part of the surplus funds of the old county.^** On the division of a township into two townships, each is entitled to the public property which, falls within its territorial limits; but, as to money and choses in action, the re- spective claims must be adjusted upon principles of equity, and the new township is entitled to a proportionate share of the funds realized from taxes, based on the amount of taxable property in the territory taken from the old township and the number of persons therein against whom a poll-tax was assessed, while it should receive a propor- tionate share of the special school-fund, based on the school enumera- tion of such territory. ^■^^ (b) Dissolution. § 478. Dissolution — ^How effected in general. — In England a mu- nicipal corporation may be dissolved by an act of parliament ;^^° by the loss of an integral part;^^^ by a surrender of its franchises ;^^- or "'Hall v. Baker, 74 Wis. 118; s. c. v. School Town &c., 109 Ind. 559; s. 42 N. W. 104. c. 10 N. E. 578. "« Washington Co. v. Weld Co., 12 '='''2 Kyd Corp. 447; Coke Litt. 176, Colo. 152; s. c. 20 Pac. 273. and note; Rex v. Amery, 2 T. R. "^Towle V. Brown, 110 Ind. 65; s. 515; Glover Corp. 408; Angell & c. 10 N. E. 626; following Johnson v. Ames Corp., § 767; 2 Kent Com. 305; Smith, 64 Ind. 275. As to equity Board &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; State v. jurisdiction and adjustment upon Trustees &c., 5 Ind. 77. equitable principles, see 1 Dillon ^" Rex v. Morris, 3 East 214; Rex Munic. Corp., §§ 173, 186, 189; Zart- v. Stewart, 4 East 17; Rex v. Pas- man V. State, 109 Ind. 360; s. c. 10 N. more, 3 T. R. 199; Reg. v. Bewdley, E. 94; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 1 P. Wms. 207; Banbury Case, 10 100 U. S. 514. As to rights of prop- Mod. 346; Rex v. Mayor &c., 8 Mod. erty in general, see 1 Dillon Munic. 127; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. Corp. (3d ed.), § 188; Town of North 1870; Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. Hempstead v. Town of Hempstead, 480; Smith v. Smith, 3 Dessaus. (S. 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109; School Tp. &c. C.) 557. •"Rex V. Osbourne, 4 East 326; § 479 PUBLIC COKPOEATIONS. 446 by forfeiture of its charter.^^^ In the United States the law is dif- ferent in some respects. Incorporated towns and cities being but arms and instrumentalities of the state government, creatures of the legislature, and subject to its control and will, it may, as it can estab- lish, also abolish them at its pleasure. ^^* The supreme court of California say : "And as a city may, by legislative enactment, spring from the body of the county, being the first subdivision of the terri- tory and political power of the state, there is no reason in law why it may not be resolved back to its original elements, or why the power that has called this political being into existence may not again de- stroy it. There is no limitation on the power of the legislature in this respect, and economy and convenience may often require that an act incorporating a city should be repealed, and the inliabitants thereof placed in their original situation."^^^ § 479. The same subject continued. — There is no constitutional restriction upon the power of the legislature to abolish municipal and county organizations in Kansas, and the existence of the power is not disputed and can not be doubted.^^^ A municipal corporation is not dissolved by the failure to elect officers ;^^^ the existence of a corpo- ration does not depend upon the existence of officers; the people have the right to elect them but they are mere agents of the people ; the corporation might become dormant or be suspended by the re- moval of all the people from it, but the failure to elect officers while the right or capacity to elect them remains will not dissolve a corpora- tion. ^^^ Wilson, Justice, in a dissenting opinion, discussing the Rex v. Miller, 6 T. R. 268; Howard's 36 Kan. 530; s. c. 13 Pac. 850. See Case, Hutton 86; Grant Corp. 306. also, Division of Howard Co., 15 '"Rex v. Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 198; Kan. 194; In re Hinkle, 31 Kan. 712; Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 53, 55; Rex v. s. c. 3 Pac. 531; State v. Meadows, 1 Saunders, 3 East 119; Rex v. Inhabi- Kan. 90; Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 tants &c., 13 East 220; Attorney- Iowa 1; Dillon Munic. Corp., §§ 46, General v. Corporation of Shrews- 65. bury, 6 Beav. 220. '"State v. Dunson, 71 Tex. 65; s. '^'Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. c. 9 S. W. 103; followed in Buford v. 487; s. c. 15 S. W. 364. See also. State, 72 Tex. 182; s. c. 10 S. W. 401, Luehrman v. Taxing Dist., 2 Lea in which case the court declined to (Tenn.) 425, and authorities there follow Lea v. Hernandez, 10 Tex. cited; State v. Wilson, 12 Lea 137, where such facts were held to (Tenn.) 290, 246; State v. Waggon- evidence a civil death — a dissolution er, 88 Tenn. 290; s. c. 12 S. W. 721; of the corporation — although not ex- Cooley Const. Lim. 230, 231. pressly overruled in Blessing v. City "■•■ People V. Hill, 7 Cal. 97, 103. of Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. "«So held in State v. Hamilton, 40 '■'*' 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), Kan. 323; s. c. 19 Pac. 723; approv- § 166. See also. Bacon v. Robertson, ing and following State v. Osborne, 18 How. 480; Lowber v. Mayor &c., 5 447 PARTITION' AXD DISSOLUTION. § 480 power of a legislature to destroy a county, to prevent a misapprehen- sion of the opinion of the Illinois court in Coles v. Madison Coun- ty^iso where such a power, by way of illustration, was conceded, says: "The only manner that occurs to my mind, by which a legislature can destroy a county, is by annexing it to one or more organized counties. No interregnum would then take place ; the government of the county to which it was annexed would be extended over and embrace it simul- taneously with its annexation ; and thus no evil or inconvenience would occur."^*''^ A municipal corporation is not dissolved by an amendment of its charter which is unconstitutional in whole or in part, as to the election of officers; as the offices previously existed de jure, the persons holding them under the void law are de facto officers, and the organization continues.^''^ The effect of a judgment of ouster on an information in the nature of a quo warranto against a municipal corporation and its officers is to immediately dissolve the corporation, whether it existed de jure or de facto, and work its disso- lution, and take away all its rights, liberties, privileges and fran- chises;^*'- a dissolution in this manner, as in the death of a natural person, operates as an absolute revocation of all power and authority on the part of others to act in its name or in its behalf.^"^ § 480. Surrender of charter. — Judge Dillon thus states the doc- trine : "Since all of our charters of incorporation come from the leg- islature a municipal corporation can not dissolve itself by a surrender of its franchise. The state creates such corporations for public ends, and they will and must continue until the legislature annuls or de- stroys them or authorizes it to be done."^®* As to the power of a mu- nicipal corporation to surrender any of its franchises, — for instance, the franchise of collecting tolls on freight passing over a certain chan- nel connecting another bay with the bay upon which the city was situ- ated, — it has been considered an extremely doubtful power ; as not only Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 325; Clarke v. City Schriber v. Town of Langdale, 66 of Rochester, 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) Wis. 616; s. c. 29 N. W. 547, 554. 107; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dill. ^^^ Breese (111.) 154. 130; Philips v. Wickham, 1 Paige ^'° People v. Wren, 5 111. 269, 279. Ch. (N. Y.) 590; Commonwealth v. Holt, C, in Walnut Tp. v. Jordan, 38 Cullen, 1 Harris (Pa.) 133; Presi- Kan. 562, 565; s. c. 16 Pac. 812, dent &c. V. Thompson, 20 111. 197; quotes this and highly commends Rose V. Turnpike Co., 3 Watts (Pa.) the doctrine. 46; People v. Wren, 5 111. 269; ^'^^ Cole v. Black River Falls, 57 Brown v. Insurance Co., 3 La. An. Wis. 110; s. c. 14 N. W. 906. 177; Green Township, 9 W. & S. '"= Dodge v. People, 113 111. 491; (Pa.) 22; Vincennes University v. s. c. 1 N. E. 826. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Muscatine "'^ Dodge v. People, supra. Turnverein v. Funck, 18 Iowa 469; '"1 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 167. See also, Idem, §§ 37, 43, 54. § 481 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 448 the corporation but a large portion of the state's population residing- without the city's limits as well as of the commercial world were in- terested. ^^'^ Towns incorporated under the general law of Missouri can be disincorporated only in the manner therein authorized. ^^^ A charter granted by the legislature to a municipal corporation must be surrendered to and accepted by the legislature. Where, therefore, a town formerly incorporated was reincorporated under a general law, this was held not to amount to an eifectual surrender of the charter: it should have been accepted and a record made of this fact; the action of the county court extending the limits of the corporation in proceedings to reincorporate was a mere amendment of the char- ter.i" § 481. The same subject continued. — The Ohio revised statutes provide the mode by which municipal corporations may surrender their municipal powers. It has been held that upon the presentation of a petition to the council for an election upon the question of sur- render it was the duty of the council before taking action thereon to satisfy itself that it contained the requisite number of qualified peti- tioners, and for that purpose they might refer the same to a commit- tee to make the requisite examination. Before an election is ordered petitioners may withdraw their names, and if thereby the number is reduced below the number required, the council should refuse to order an election. Query, if an election had been ordered, whether they could withdraw their names. In a mandamus proceeding to compel a council to order an election, whether there has been a petition with the requisite number of signers presents an issue not of right triable by a jury, and an appeal properly lies from the judgment of the common pleas thereon.^''^ In Ohio, an act "to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages," in its first section repealing "all laws" then "in force for the organization or government" of municipal corporations, was held not to annihilate the old corporations ; it recre- ated' them ; it was a reorganization, not a dissolution ; neither their corporate existence nor corporate identity was afEected by it. Some of them took, under its operation, a different legal designation, — as, in- 165 Morris v. State, 65 Tex. 53. undertake to dissolve the old corpo- "•^ So held in Hambleton v. Town ration; nor did the law authorize the of Dexter, 89 Mo. 188; s. c. 1 S. W. incorporation of a new town out of 234, where the effect of reincorpora- a part of the inhabitants and terri- tion under this law was held not to tory already incorporated. have disincorporated the old town, '"" Norris v. Mayor &c., 1 Swan because there was no notice given as (Tenn.) 164. required by the law; neither did the '""* Diitten v. Village of Hanover, 42 order of the county court attempt or Ohio St. 215. 449 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 482 corporatod villages instead of towns ; the particular made of their organization was somewhat changed, and their powers, privileges, rights and duties were restricted, enlarged or modified; but their territorial limits remained the same as before; legal obligations in- curred by or to them remained unchanged.'"^ There is no method provided, under the Idaho statutes defining the power of town trus- tees, whereby they can dissolve the corporation or effect a disincorpo- ration, and it is not within their power to abandon such incorporation and procure a reincorporation; therefore, the acts done by a board of trustees of a lawfully incorporated town in an attempt to abandon or disincorporate such municipality, and set up a new government, were held to be without authority of law, and void.^^** § 482. Florida decisions on constitutionality of acts to dissolve. — The Florida statute which provided a mode for dissolution of munici- pal corporations owing bonded debts was held unconstitutional in that its object was not solely to dissolve, but manifestly to reincorporate at once, and by this mode of reincorporation by vote of a certain number of bondholders and citizens leading up to an appointment of the officers of the municipality by the governor of the state, it de- parted from the usual rule as to such bodies, and was in contravention of that provision of the constitution which provides that "the legis- lature shall establish a uniform system of county, township and mu- nicipal government.''^'^^ "An act to dissolve" municipal corporations under circumstances therein stated "and to provide provisional gov- ernments for the same," providing that "whenever any city or town incorporated under the general municipal-corporation act * * * jg indebted to the amount of $200,000, and has defaulted and still de- faults in the payment of its interest account, the charter of such city or town shall be, and is hereby declared to be, repealed and the incor- poration thereof dissolved," was held not to be a special law within the prohibition of the constitution, but a general law; the fact that ^^^ State V. Mayor &c., 14 Ohio St. void; tlie court especially wishing it 472. understood that they "do not decide ""People V. Bancroft, 2 Idaho 1077; or hold that the legislature can, un- s. c. 29 Pac. 112. der the constitution, authorize the "1 State V. Stark, 18 Pla. 255; giv- holders of one-half of the bonds of ing a judgment of ouster against the an indebted municipal corporation mayor of Fernandina appointed by to dissolve such corporation;" nor to the governor under this act, and vir- say "that the act, stripped of the dis- tually holding that the attempted cretion vested in the bondholders, dissolution in the mode provided would be constitutional." therein of the original city was 1 Smith— 29 § 483 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 450 there may have been but one municipality of the class named at the time of the approval of the act not of itself rendering the statute creat- ing this class special and unconstitutional.^^^ § 4S3. Vacated towns. — Where a town had recovered a judgment in a suit and was afterwards vacated and abolished, the ordinance providing that the town to which it was to be attached should be the successor to the vacated town in its actions at law, the ownership of such judgment became entirely vested in the last town.^^^ It was contended also that the board of supervisors of the county had no au- thority to make any distribution of the property of the county, and that so much of the ordinance abolishing this town and making the one of which it was constituted a part of its successor as the owner of this judgment was void. It was held that under the constitution, which empowers the legislature to confer upon boards of county supervisors "powers of a local legislative and administrative charac- ter," when any subject of legislation is intrusted to county boards by general words in a statute they acquire a right to pass any ordi- nance necessary or convenient for the purpose of disposing of the whole subject so committed to them, and for that purpose have all the powers of the state legislature over that subject, unless the statute restricts the power or directs its exercise in a certain way.^^* And ""Ex parte Wells, 21 Pla. 280; the not creating rules for the regulation court summing up its conclusions as of future controversies between par- follows: — "Unless there is a limita- ties, it is simply, as it were, shap- tion in the constitution restraining ing its own instrumentality. . . . the legislature, it can at will dis- Municipal corporations can, inde- solve one city or many municipali- pendent of constitutional limita- ties and leave others in existence. It tions, be dissolved without violating could, moreover, dissolve all existing the principle suggested for petition- municipalities and prevent the same er." The principle referred to was communities from reorganizing, yet that "it [the statute] does not pre- provide for others to incorporate, scribe a rule of civil conduct," but . . . The legislature has not pre- deals only with the past and present, tended to either compel communities and not with the future, to organize as municipalities, nor "^ Supervisors &c. v. O'Malley, 47 when so organized to remain such, Wis. 332; s. c. 2 N. W. 632. but has expressly provided for sur- ^^* Supervisors &c. v. O'Malley, 47 render of its franchises by any city Wis. 332; s. c. 2 N. W. 632; holding or town. We are not satisiied that, also, that under revised statutes, having the power to authorize one or § 670, the county board had power to many to surrender its corporate ex- abolish an existing town, attach dif- istence, it can not for satisfactory ferent parts of its territory to other cause dissolve any one of them. The existing towns and provide that one legislature, in repealing or modify- of the latter should succeed to the ing the charter of a municipality, is rights of the old town in specified 451 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 484 when substituted in such suits the successor is entitled to costs.^'^^ § 484. This was no dissolution. — The qualified electors of a corpo- ration in Texas elected a city council known to be in favor of disso- lution, which, at a regular meeting in the year of their election, made a full, complete and permanent settlement of all corporate business with a view to its dissolution ; when they resigned, after unanimously passing an ordinance declaring the several municipal ofhces forever thereafter vacant. It was held that the only law relating to the dis- solution of municipal corporations by their own action was the act authorizing cities of a certain population to accept its provisions in lieu of any existing charter by a two-thirds vote of the council, and on compliance with certain requirements ; and that this attempted disso- lution by vote of the mayor and aldermen, and a subsequent incorpora- tion under laws relating to unincorporated towns and cities, was void. And being void, dissolution could not be presumed from acquiescence and lapse of time. The court, on the argument that the dissolution of the corporation should be presumed from the period of time which had elapsed since the city had acted under its original char- ter, said "that presumptions can not be indulged in opposition to facts which show that the fact sought to be established by presumption can have no existence." ^^*^ In a similar case it was held that as a munic- ipality could not at will abandon its special charter and reorganize un- der general laws, a corporation under a special charter, whose officers had been ousted, was not dissolved by its failure to elect new officers, nor by an attempt to reorganize it under the general laws of the state.i" § 485. Effect of dissolution as to liabilities and funds in hand. — Where a road district had been incorporated from a portion of a town- ship with power to contract debts for certain purposes, and had done so, and was afterwards dissolved by a repeal of its charter with a pro- vision that the repeal should not in any way impair any legal contracts which its board of commissioners had made and which might remain unexecuted, it has been held that it was the intention of the legisla- ture to impose upon the township committee the liabilities which the commissioners had legitimately contracted within the scope of their duties and for the object of their appointment. Such are claims for property — in this case a judgment ^"^ Town of Butternut v. O'Malley, against third parties. The appeal in 50 Wis. 333; s. c. 7 N. W. 248. this case was dismissed because the ^'''Largen v. State, 76 Tex. 323; s. successor (town of Butternut) had c. 13 S. W. 161. not been substituted and the appeal "^ Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dill. taken in its name. 130. § 486 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 453 compensation, etc., of the surveyor and his assistants, for services of a clerk and for sewer-pipe for use in making improvements.^''** The repeal of an act incorporating a portion of a township as a polling- district dissolves such a government corporation and abolishes its officers. The result is that any funds in the hands of its treasurer, raised by taxation for public purposes, come immediately under the control of the legislature; and in obedience to its direction by the general laws applicable in such cases, it is the duty of that treasurer to pay over to the proper officer of the township from which this poll- ing-district was formed whatever he has in hand.^'^^ An act of the legislature of Alabama to vacate and annul the charter of and dissolve a municipal corporation was held to operate a dissolution of the corpo- ration — a withdrawal from it of all governmental power which, had been confided to it, except so far as the act authorized the continued exercise of such power; but upon debts and liabilities which had been created or contracted by the corporation in the exercise of a power with which it had been clothed by the general assembly it was without operation; these debts or liabilities were not lessened in obligation nor extinguished; nor was it within the competency of legislative power to lessen them in obligation or to extinguish them.^^** The su- preme court of New Mexico has construed its disincorporating act, as it may be styled, and held that the effect of its sections providing for a settlement of the debts of a disincorporated city was to make of the county a mere auditing and collecting agent for the creditor of a defendant municipal corporation, empowered to make by special tax out of the assets of the dead city, in the manner prescribed, a sufficient amount to discharge all claims duly presented and allowed, and not to transfer the liability of the city to the county. ^^^ § 486. Effect of dissolution upon liabilities. — The legislature, in the exercise of its supreme power over municipal corporations, may ''* Union Tp. v. Rader, 41 N. J. L. within six montlis from tlie time the 617. city of Las Vegas was discorpo- "" Meckel v. Sandford, 40 N. J. L. rated. Laws of New Mexico, 1884, 180. ch. 38, provide for disincorporation ""Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103. of cities, and § 3 declares that the ^" Board &c. v. Pierce, 6 N. Mex. commissioners of the county in 324; s. c. 28 Pac. 512, where it was which such cities are situated shall held that the plaintiff could not audit claims against such cities, and recover of the county because he that persons having such claims had not followed the provisions of shall present them within six months the disincorporating act in the pre- and not afterwards. Section 6 pre- sentation of his claims, etc.; and vides for publishing notice to claim- that the claims were barred by rea- ants and issuing warrants for son of not having been presented amounts allowed. Section 9 provides 453 PARTITION AXD DISSOLUTION". § 486 repeal their charters at any time, in its discretion. The only limita- tion on tlie operation of such a repeal is as to creditors, — that it shall not operate to impair the obligation of existing contracts, or deprive them of any remedy for enforcing such contracts which existed when they were niade.^*^^ In a case, therefore, where a part of a township had been incorporated for the purpose of laying out, opening and im- proving streets, with full power through its commissioners to borrow money, issue bonds, etc., but owning no property, and debts had been incurred in accordance with the statute incorporating it, and this charter was repealed and the corporation thereby dissolved, the act of repeal was held constitutional, inasmuch as it preserved the debts and imposed upon the authorities of the township the duties of the com- missioners of the dissolved corporation as to assessment, and other steps for compromise, adjustment and settlement of those claims.^*^^ Upon the contention that the act of the legislature of Alabama dis- solving the old corporation of "The City of Selma" and reincorpo- rating it as "Selma" was in contravention of the constitution of the state, in that it impaired the obligation of contracts "by destroying or impairing the remedy for their enforcement," the act was sustained ; the court stating its conclusion as follows : "An act to dissolve a mu- nicipal corporation is not objectionable so far as it authorizes the ap- pointment of commissioners with authority to take charge of, collect and control the assets of the dissolved corporation, making of them the application required by law, Nor is it objectionable so far as it names a court and authorizes the commissioners to apply on the equity side of that court for instruction, direction and protection in the perform- ance and discharge of their duties. Nor is it objectionable so far as in this respect it may be considered a grant of jurisdiction to said court, nor in the mode of procedure which it prescribes."^** A town- ship by act of the legislature was converted into a city. By subse- quent act of repeal the later corporation was dissolved. It was held that the effect of the dissolution of the city, it embracing the same inhabitants and the same boundaries, was to revive the township municipality, to cast upon it the ownership of the municipal property, and to make it liable for the debts of the city, and that the suit was that approved accounts shall be pre- &c. v. Society &c., 24 N. J. L. 386; sented within four months from the Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 date of notice and not afterwards. Wall. 535; Butz v. City of Muscatine, "- Rader v. Southeasterly Road 8 Wall. 575. Dist, 36 N. J. L. 273; People v. Mor- ^'^^ Rader v. Southeasterly Road ris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; State v. Dist, 36 N. J. L. 273. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; President '"' Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103. § 487 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 454 properly brought against the township for a deht incurred by the city.i^^ " § 487. What does not affect liabilities and remedies. — Even if a municipal corporation can forfeit its franchises by non-user, such forfeiture will not operate to extinguish del)ts of the corporation contracted before the forfeiture was incurred or declared. Further- more, if corporate creditors are not made parties to the proceeding by which the forfeiture is ascertained and declared, they are not bound by the judgment of ouster. Municipal corporations can not extin- guish their debts by changing their names or reorganizing under new charters, or by failing to exercise their corporate powers; a debt once contracted by a municipal corporation will survive as a debt against whatever corporate entity is subsequently created to take its place and exercise its power of local government over substantially the same people and territory. ^^"^ The legislation of Tennessee, in repealing the charters of cities and providing subsequently for com- promise of their debts by the "taxing-districts" formed in their stead, and the attempts (as generally construed) to force this by withholding the power to tax to meet the obligations of the dissolved corporations, has had much attention in the courts. It has been held that any power of taxation, provided as a means of paying their debts, theretofore granted to the original municipalities, devolved as readily as the obli- gation to pay them, and by operation of the federal constitution, upon those successors, notwithstanding the attempted statutory prohibition. As a sequence, a mandamus might be issued to the officials appointed for the general purposes of the local government, who can exercise the power of taxation, which was in the inhabitants of the given terri- tory and which was never taken away, as they do all governmental "^ Scaine v. Inhabitants &c., 39 N. the change made was the substitu- J. L. 526; the court saying: — "The tion of other instrumentalities." legal inference must be that it was '"''' Hill v. City of Kahoka, 35 Fed. the intention of the legislature, by 32 ; holding the city of Kahoka liable the repeal of the city charter, not so for bonds in aid of railroads issued much to abolish the government of by the town of Kahoka, the charter the district in question, as to alter of which had been forfeited for non- its form. The charter was revoked, user, and the last corporation formed but there was no interregnum, for of the same inhabitants and terri- the township organization instantly tory; following Broughton v. Pen- revived and took its place, the repeal sacola, 93 U. S. 266; Mobile v. Wat- and revival being accomplished uno son, 116 U. S. 289; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 398; flatu. The object of the city charter Laird v. City of De Soto, 22 Fed. 421; was not abandoned; that object was People v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 535; the local government; and to effect this last as to judgment of ouster not binding those not parties. 455 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 488 power of that local character.^" It was also held that where a state, with the deliberate purpose of obstructing a creditor, repeals a munici- pal charter, whereby there is no organization to be sued, and the creditor is disabled from proceeding, the time of such obstruction will be excluded from the limitation of the statute, the legislative inten- tion to suspend it being implied as in case of war. Besides, it may be set up as an equitable defense in proceedings by mandamus. ^^^ § 488. Repealing charters. — The legislation of Tennessee repeal- ing the charters of municipal corporations and establishing taxing- districts was the most extensive in this direction that has ever been resorted to in the United States. There has been much litigation growing out of it and important decisions made upon the questions raised in the various cases. We will present here some of the most important rulings of the supreme court of the state upon the consti- tutionality of those acts. First on the title of the act. It was held that "An act to repeal the charters of certain municipal corporations and to remand the territory and inhabitants thereof to the government of the state" is not rendered unconstitutional by a provision that the property used by such corporation for municipal purposes is trans- ferred to the custody and control of the state to remain public prop- erty for the uses to which it has been hitherto applied. ^-^ And "A bill to establish taxing-districts in this state and to provide the means of local government for the same," which grants municipal franchises to the communities within the territorial limits of the taxing-districts, and gives to the corporation thus created all the necessary legislative, judicial and police powers of an incorporated city, and contains speci- fications of offenses committed against the corporation or by its offi- cials with penalties and punishments, contains only one subject within the meaning of the constitution.^^'' An act which provides "that the several communities embraced in the territorial limits of all such municipal corporations in the state as have had or may have their charters abolished, or as may surrender the same under the pro- visions of the act, are hereby created taxing-districts, in order to pro- \dde the means of local government for the peace and safety and gen- ^" Devereaux v. City of Browns- ery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129, 134. ville, 29 Fed. 742; Loague v. Taxing As to equitable defense, see Angell Dist. &c., 29 Fed. 742. & Ames Corp. (11th ed.), §§ 715, "8 Cases cited in the preceding 721; High Extr. Rem. (2d ed.), §§ 14, note. See also, as to the effect of 457 et seq. being disabled to sue. Hanger v. Ab- '*" Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. &c., 2 bott, 6 Wall. 532; United States v. Lea (Tenn.) 425. Wiley, 11 Wall. 508, 513; Braun v. ""Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. &c., 2 Sauerwein, 10 Wall. 218; Montgom- Lea (Tenn.) 425. § 489 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 456 eral welfare of such district," and further provides for the surrender of all charters of municipal corporations in the state to enable the communities within their limits to be governed by the new act, is in form a general law and can not be held to be intended as a special law, even if the courts can inquire into the intention of the legisla- ture, although mainly framed or designed for a particular locality, Avhere the acts of the same session of the legislature show a repeal of the charters of thirty-seven municipal corporations, all of whose com- munities fall at once within the provisions of the act.^®^ § 489. The same subject continued. — The supreme court of Ten- nessee held an act constitutional which repealed the charter of a single municipal corporation, upon the principle that municipal cor- porations are within the absolute control of the legislature, and may be abolished at any time in its discretion.^^^ They further held that an act which grants municipal franchises to the communities within the territorial limits of certain districts in order to provide the means of local government, and creates the "agencies and governing instru- mentalities" of a municipal corporation, with the usual legislative, executive and judicial powers, although it may style the creations "taxing-districts," in reality organizes the people and territory of the district into municipal corporations.^®^ It was competent for the legislature, in the act creating taxing-districts of these dissolved cor- porations, to provide for the appointment of provisional officers to hold for a reasonable time, and not have them elected by the people "^Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. &c., 2 is a power so essential to sovereign- Lea (Tenn.) 425. ty and the preservation by the state ^^- Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. &c., 2 of its control over its instrumental- Lea (Tenn.) 425. Cooper, J., gives ities of local rule, that it can not this as the obvious reason: — "Being well be considered as cut off except created as instrumentalities or arms by a positive provision to that effect. of the government, they can not be The restriction is against the powers continued in that capacity whenever of a corporation being 'diminished' the public exigency, of which the leg- by special laws, not against their en- islature alone is judge, demands that tire abolishment. And we may con- they should cease to act." See also, ceive of cases where, by the vicissi- People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) tudes of trade, as in the case of old 325, 331; City of Memphis v. Mem- Sarum in England, and some of the phis Water Co., 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 495, mining towns of California, the spe- 527 ; Governor v. McEwen, 5 Humph, cial repeal of a particular charter (Tenn.) 241; McCallie v. Mayor &c., might be demanded by public policy 3 Head (Tenn.) 317; Lynch v. Laf- when a general repeal would be a land, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 96. In an- remedy worse than the disease." other place he speaks of the power "'' Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. &c., 2 to repeal charters as follows:— "This Lea (Tenn.) 425. 457 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION. § 490 of the district; this was merely to put the new system in motion.^''* So also, the legislature in this state could reserve to itself the right to impose directly the necessary taxes for the support of municipal cor- porations.^^^ § 490, Receiver for a city. — The United States circuit court on a bill filed by the bondholders of the city of Memphis appointed a re- ■ceiver for the city, and ordered a surrender of the property and assets of the city, and the receiver asked an injunction afterwards against the officer appointed under the laws of Tennessee for the taxing-district of Shelby county to receive this property and these assets in order that the same might be administered by the court as a court of equity through its officer. The supreme court of the United States on appeal gave the subject full consideration. The court was agreed upon the propositions which follow: Upon the repeal of the charter of a city, property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves, landing places, fire-engines, hose and hose-carriages, engine-houses, engineering instruments, and generally everything held for governmental purposes, passes under the imme- diate control of the state, the power once delegated to the city in that behalf having been withdrawn.^''*' Nor could the decree of the court below, so far as it subjected to the payment of the debts of the city the private property of all persons within its territorial limits, be sus- tained.^^'^ But whatever property a municipal corporation holds sub- ject to the payment of its debts will, after its dissolution, be adminis- tered for the benefit of the creditors of such a corporation, and applied by a court of equity. Private property of the corporation such as it holds in its own right for profit or as a source of revenue not charged with any public trust or use, and funds in its possession unappropriated to any specific purpose, may be so administered. In this respect the position of the extinct corporation is not dissimilar to that of a deceased individual; it is only such property as is pos- sessed free from any trust, general or special, which can go in liqui- dation of debts. ^^® The majority of the court reversed the court be- low, and held that as it involved the power of the court to levy taxes ^"Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. &c., 2 der, 36 Pa. St. 126; City of Daven- Lea (Tenn.) 425. The court in the port v. Peoria &c. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa foregoing case rely largely upon 276; Askins v. Commonwealth, 1 Judge Cooley's opinion in People v. Duv. (Ky.) 275; President &c. v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44. City of Indianapolis, 12 Ind. 620; ^''"Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. &c., 2 Lowe v. Board &c., 94 Ind. 553. Lea (Tenn.) 425. ^^ Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. ^"^ Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. 472. See also, Schaffer v. Cadwalla- "" Meriwether v. Garrett, supra. § 491 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. • 458 the appointment of the receiver could not be sustained. It was their judgment that taxes levied according to law before the repeal of a charter of a city other than such as were levied in obedience to the special requirement of contracts entered into under the authority of law, and such as were levied under judicial direction for the payment of judgments recovered against such city, can not be collected through the instrumentality of a court of chancery at the instance of the cred- itors of the city.^^^ § 491. The same subject continued. — Upon the contention that the creditors of the city of Memphis would be remediless if the federal courts did not come to their relief as to the taxes levied before the repeal of its charter, Field, Justice, says: "But the conclusion does not follow. The taxes levied pursuant to writs of mandamus issued by the circuit court are still to be collected, the agency only for their collection being changed. The receiver appointed by the governor has taken the place of the collecting officers of the city. The funds re- ceived by him upon the special taxes thus levied can not be appropri- ated to any other use. The receiver, and any other agent of the state for the collection, can be compelled by the court, equally as the former collecting officers of the city, to proceed with the collection of such taxes by the sale of property or by suit, or in any other way au- thorized by law, and to apply the proceeds upon the judgments."^"** Justices Strong, Swayne and Harlan dissented, holding that the com- plainants were entitled to some of the relief granted them in the de- cree. A case was made in their opinion for the appointment of a re- ceiver to take into the possession of the court those taxes which had been levied by judicial direction for the payment of judgments re- covered against the city — taxes which had been only partly paid. They placed this upon the principle that a trust had been created with which those taxes had been charged ; that the creditors were cestuis que trustent — the city having only the naked title to this fund; that the city had been, in its neglect to collect and apply these taxes, a faithless trustee, and the court, as in other cases of individual trus- tees, in this of a municipal corporation as trustee, could and should appoint another.-"^ Further, Justice Strong said, on page 528: "" Meriwether V. Garrett, 102 U. S. town, 19 Wall. 107, 116; Heine v. 472. See also, as to taxes and power Levee Com'rs, 1 Woods 246; s. c. 19 of court to collect. City of Augusta Wall. 655. V. North, 57 Me. 392; City of Cam- -»» Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. den V. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Perry 472, 520. V. Washburn, 20 Cal. 318; City of '" Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. Philadelphia v. Greble, 38 Pa. St. 472, 527. Justice Strong said, speak- 339; Howell v. City of Philadelphia, ing of the city: — "Its character as [a 38 Pa. St. 471; Rees v. City of Water- municipal corporation] does not af- 459 PARTITION AND DISSOLUTION-. § 492 If the city, as contended, by the legishitivc act of repeal of its charter "ceased to have any legal existence, * * * the case then became one of a trust without a trustee, pre-eminently fit for equitable inter- ference. A court of equity will not permit a private trust to fail for want of a trustee. And this rule is applicable to cases in which a mu- nicipal corporation has been nominated the trustee."^°^ § 492. Where such a receiver was appointed. — There has been an instance in which a receiver was appointed for a city, a history of which we will give. When the city of Nashville, Tennessee, had been in 1869 brought to the verge if not to a state of bankruptcy by reck- less issuing of money obligations and wasteful mismanagement and fraudulent uses of its finances on the part of its regularly elected officials, there was an attempt to have a receiver appointed through a bill filed by citizens and creditors. The first chancellor dismissed the application. On a second application before another chancellor they were more successful and a receiver was appointed. A third chancellor, on application before him to discharge the orders of the second chancellor, approved the action of his predecessor in interven- ing to annul the operation of the charter of the city. There was ex- tended the old rule that in meeting emergencies for which the law has provided no remedies, equity will interpose. Judge East, the chancellor, ascribed to the government of a city a twofold character: first, as an arm of the legislature; secondly, as a private corporation, the creation of the legislature. Among other things he said: "The functions of a municipality are twofold ; first, political, discretionary, legislative; secondly, ministerial. While acting within the sphere of the former they are exempt from liability, inasmuch as the corpo- fect the nature of its obligations to obligations it has not." See also, its creditors or its cestuis que trust, Bailey v. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.) or impair the remedies they would 531; Small v. Inhabitants &c., 51 have if the city was a common Maine 359; Oliver v. City of Worces- debtor or trustee. While as a mu- ter, 102 Mass. 489. nicipal corporation the city had pub- -"- See also, Girard v. Philadelphia, lie duties to perform, yet in con- 7 Wall. 1; Philadelphia v. Pox, 64 tracting debts authorized by the law Pa. St. 169; Town of Montpelier v. of its organization, or in performing Town of East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12; a private trust, it is regarded by the Batesville Institute v. Kauffman, 18 law as standing on the same footing Wall. 151, where it is said: — "It is, as a private individual, with the however, within the power of a court same rights and duties and with the of equity to decree and enforce the same liabilities as attend such per- execution of the trust through its sons. Over its public duties, It may own officers and agents, without the be admitted, the legislature has intervention of a new trustee;" cit- plenary authority. Over its private ing Story Eq. Jur. 976-1060. § 493 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 460 ration is a part of the government to that extent, and its officers to the same extent are public officers, and as such entitled to the protection of this principle; but within the sphere of the latter (ministerial duties) they drop the badges of governmental officers and become, as it were, the representatives of a private corporation in the exercise of private functions. The distinction between those legislative powers which it holds for public purposes as a part of the government of the country and those private franchises which belong to it as a creature of the law is well taken." The receiver appointed administered the affairs of the city, receiving its revenues and disbursing the same to whomsoever entitled until there was a change of administration, a restoration of home rule, and the city's representatives by act of the legislature issued bonds with which to compromise and settle the fraudulent debt imposed upon it by a band of scheming conspirators; never, however, in any of its actions conceding the justice or propriety of paying one dollar of that debt. This ended the receivership of the city of Nashville.2«=' -"^ Lucius S. Merriam, Esq., in 25 Am. L. Rev. 393. CHAPTER XIV. ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. Section Section 493. Introductory. 518. 494. By-laws, ordinances and resolu- 519. tions. 495. Distinction between ordinance 520. and resolution. 496. The same subject continued — 521. Illustrations. 497. The province of ordinances. 522. 498. Power to malie ordinances. 499. The same subject continued. 523. 500. By whom the power is to be ex- ercised. 524. 501. Validity generally. 525. 502. Validity in respect of form — (a) Meeting of council. 526. 503. (b) The same subject contin- ued. 527. 504. (c) Quorum and votes. 505. (d) The same subject contin- ued. 528. 506. (e) Mode of enactment. 529. 507. (f) The same subject continued. 508. (g) The signing of the ordi- 530. nance. 509. (h) The same subject contin- 531. ued. 510. The veto power. 532. 511. (i) Publication of the ordi- nance — When mandatory. 533. 512. (j) The same subject contin- ued — When directory. 534. 513. (k) The same subject contin- ued — Amendments and re-en- 535. actments. 514. (1) Manner of publication. 536. 515. (m) The same subject contin- ued. 537. 516. (n) Time and proof of publica- 538. tion. 517. (o) Title of the ordinance. (461) (p) Record of the ordinance. Validity in respect of matter — (a) Constitutionality. (b) The same subject contin- ued. (c) Consistency with statute and charter. (d) The same subject contin- ued. (e) Consistency with general penal law. (f) The same subject continued. (g) Reasonableness of the ordi- nance. (h) The same subject contin- ued — Illustrations. (i) The same subject contin- ued — Reasonableness a ques- tion of law. (j) Vagueness of the ordinance. (k) Ordinances void for want of notice. (1) Ordinance granting arbi- trary power. (m) Oi'dinance delegating pow- er. (n) Ordinances which are con- tracts. (o) Ordinances as to improve- ments — Valid. (p) Ordinances as to improve- ments — Invalid. (q) Miscellaneous ordinances — Valid and invalid. (r) Jurisdictional matters in relation to oi^dinances. (s) Curative ordinances. (t) Scope, force, effect, etc., of ordinances. § 493 PUBLIC CORPOKATIONS. 462 Section Section 539. Motives of council not to be im- 550. Imprisonment as a penalty. peached. 551. Forfeitures. 540. Construction of ordinances. 552. The same subject continued. 541. The same subject continued — 553. Cumulative fines and fines for Miscellaneous. continuous and repeated of- 542. Ordinances void in part. fenses. 543. Amendment and repeal — By 554. Enforcement by complaint — subsequent ordinance. Nature of the proceeding. 544. Repeal by act of the legislature. 555. The complaint — General requi- 545. Repeals by implication. sites. 546. Power to impose penalties. 556. The same subject continued — 547. Mode of enforcement of ordi- Pleading. nances — By a purely civil ac- 557. Pleading further considered, tion. 558. Proof of ordinances. 548. Jurisdiction of proceedings. 559. Right to trial by jury. 549. Imprisonment in default of pay- 560. The same subject continued. ment of fine. 561. Certiorari and habeas corpus. § 493. Introductory. — The public corporation in its usual accepta- tion, excluding the state and the federal governments, is for some purposes a miniature state. Its council represents the state legis- lature and the ordinances of that council represent the statutes of the state. These ordinances, if valid, have, as we shall see, upon those subject to the control of the corporation, the same force and effect that the general statutes of the state have upon the people at large. It is easy to see, therefore, the great importance of the subject which it is proposed to discuss in this chapter. Of the cases concerning public corporations it is probable that those which relate to municipal ordinances are more numerous than those which touch upon any other single point. ^ The validity of the ordinance is generally the point in question, and consequently by far the greater portion of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of the various questions which determine the validity of a particular ordinance. These questions are grouped under two heads: (1) validity in respect of form; (2) validity in respect of matter. It will be found that while an ordinance has, if valid, the force and effect of a general law upon those persons who are within the jurisdiction of the council, still the powers of the council are naturally very much more circumscribed than are those of the legislature, and that an ordinance must be most carefully ex- amined both in respect of its form and in respect of its matter before it can be pronounced undoubtedly valid. § 494. By-laws, ordinances and resolutions. — The by-laws of a mu- nicipal corporation are usually known as ordinances, while in the ^ For a further treatment of the subject see the chapter on The Po- lice Power in vol. 2. 463 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 495 English cases and text-books the former term is generally used.^ There is, therefore, little if any distinction between the by-laws and the ordinances of a municipal corporation. The terms in their ordi- nary sense imply one and the same thing. ^ A resolution is generally of a more special and temporary character than an ordinance, and re- quires less solemnity of enactment.* Where a power is to be exer- cised by a. municipality, and particularly if it is legislative in its nature, it must be done by ordinance, a mere resolution not being suflficient.^ But where there is no law prescribing whether a license shall be by ordinance or resolution, it may be by resolution, and especially if the act is a ministerial act rather than legislative." An office created by ordinance can not be abolished by resolution.'^ And, as a rule, an ordinance can not be changed by a resolution.^ It is not material whether an ordinance required to be submitted to the electors is submitted by an ordinance or a resolution, provided the latter has all the essentials of an ordinance.® And it has been held that an elec- tion may be called by a resolution as well as ordinance.^" Concerning the power of veto of resolutions, by the mayor, where the express power to veto resolutions is not given, it would seem clear that if the resolution is, in effect, an ordinance the right of veto exists, as where a resolution transfers money from one fund to another.^^ § 495. Distinction between ordinance and resolution. — All legis- lative and permanent acts regulating the affairs of the corporation should be in the form of ordinances and not in the form of resolutions. Thus, the issuing of bonds to aid in constructing a sewer would be a ^ Beach Priv. Corp., § 510; Bac. franchise is granted by an ordi- Abr., tit. By4aw. See Sumley By- nance, but a contract based upon a laws, eh. 1; Gosling v. Veley, 19 L. consideration in relation to the same J. (N. S.) Q. B. Ill, 135, per subject-matter may be by resolution: Parke, B. State v. Cowgill &c. Mill Co., 156 Mo. ^National Bank &c. v. Town of 620; s. c. 57 S. W. 1008. A resolution Grenada, 44 Fed. 262; Bills v. City is as effective as an ordinance in the of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 225; s. c. 20 absence of a statute: Brady v. City N. E. 115; 3 L. R. A. 261. of Bayonne, 57 N. J. L. 379; s. c. 30 *A resolution is an order of coun- Atl. 968. cil of a special and temporary char- ' City of San Antonio v. Mickle- acter; an ordinance prescribes a per- John, 89 Tex. 79; s. c. 33 S. W. 735. manent rule of conduct or govern- * Hisey v. City of Charleston, 62 ment: Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio Mo. App. 381. St. 96, 103; State v. City of Bayonne, " Crebs v. City of Lebanon, 98 Fed. 35 N. J. L. 335. 549. ^ City of Westport v. Mastin, 62 " Crebs v. City of Lebanon, 98 Fed. Mo. App. 647. 549. ^ Babcock V. Scranton Traction Co., " Baar v. Kirby, 118 Mich. 392; s. 1 Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 223. Thus a c. 76 N. W. 754. § 496 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 464 legislative proceeding such as would have to be by ordinance.^- But where a corporation only desires to do some ministerial act a resolution is sufficient. ^^ An ordinance may, however, be in the form of a reso- lution, and if enacted with the formalities required by law in the case of an ordinance will generally be valid and binding.^* In Louisiana it has been held that where there was a general power to make ordi- nances and by-laws and no form in which these should be enacted or passed was prescribed, an ordinance containing a prohibition and annexing a penalty was valid, notwithstanding it purported by its terms to be a resolution. In substance it was an ordinance and the form in which it was passed did not make it void.^^ But in Missouri it was decided that in the absence of an affirmative showing that a resolu- tion is passed with the same formalities, and notified to the public in the same manner as an ordinance, an act which a municipal charter requires to be done by ordinance can not be done by resolution; nor can a general ordinance authorize it so to be done.^*^ § 496. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — When the charter of the municipality expressly requires a certain act to be done by ordinance, it is safer to use the form of an ordinance rather than of a resolution.^'^ To decide whether a resolution is sufficient for any certain purpose, it is necessary to consider the nature of the act sought to be authorized, the language of the general laws and of the charter relating to municipal ordinances, and the question whether the formalities required in case of ordinances have been followed in passing and publishing the ordinance. It has been held in Pennsyl- vania that a new street could be opened by resolution. ^^ In New Jersey a resolution has been considered sufficient to bind the corpora- tion for the purchase of fire-department apparatus;^® and for the 1- State V. Barnet, 46 N. J. L. 62. ^^ First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 "City of Quincy v. Chicago &c. R. La. An. 335. Co., 92 111. 21. A resolution does not '" City of Cape Girardeau v. Fou- require the approval of the mayor: geu, 30 Mo. App. 551. City of Burlington v. Dennison, 42 "City of Central v. Sears, 2 Colo. N. J. L. 165. 588; City of Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. " Sower V. City of Philadelphia, 35 90; State v. Barnet, 46 N. J. L. 62; Pa. St. 231; San Francisco &c. Co. v. Cross v. Mayor &c., 18 N. J. Eq. 305; City of San Francisco, 6 Cal. 190; Mayor &c. v. Toney, 10 Lea (Tenn.) Drake v. Hudson River R. Co., 7 643; City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. Barb. (N. Y.) 508; Town of Tipton 532. V. Norman, 72 Mo. 380; Rumsly &c. '^ Sower v. City of Philadelphia, 35 Mfg. Co. V. Inhabitants &c., 21 Mo. Pa. St. 231. App. 175. '" Green v. City of Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45. 465 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 497 construction of a se.wer;^'' and for the acceptance of a dedication.^* In Iowa the amount of a license previously authorized to be imposed has been allowed to be imposed by resolution. ^^ In Indiana a reso- lution was sufficient to authorize street improvements.^^ Eesolu- tions have been held sufficient by the courts of Illinois to direct munic- ipal agents to make specified contracts and also to appoint municipal agents.^* A resolution confirming certain acts of the city of San Francisco was held sufficient."^ On the other hand in New Jersey an ordinance has been held essential for the following purposes; namely: for grading a street;^® for altering the width of a street sidewalk;-*'^ and for appointing a commissioner to assess damages. ^^ In Colorado the courts have held that an ordinance was necessary in fixing the compensation of city officers under the charter of the city.^^ § 497. The province of ordinances. — The by-laws of a municipal corporation are in the nature of local laws passed by the proper assembly or governing body of the corporation, and thus valid ordi- nances have the same effect within the corporate limits and with '"State V. Mayor &c., 27 N. J. L. 493. " State v. City of Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 432. " City of Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 102. Under an ordi- nance authorizing the city council to fix a license fee from time to time as it deems proper it may be fixed by resolution: Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Arkadelphia, 56 Ark. 370; s. c. 19 S. W. 1053. ==* Board &c. v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; City of Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175. =* City of Alton v. Mulledy, 21 111. 76; Egan v. City of Chicago, 5 111. App. 70. ^ San Francisco &c. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 6 Cal. 190. ^^ State V. City of Bayonne, 35 N. J. L. 335. The general practice is that the grade of a street must be fixed by ordinance: Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 174 111. 439; s. c. 51 N. E. 596; City of Bloomington v. Pollock, 141 111. 346; s. c. 31 N. E. 146; Washington Ice Co. v. City of 1 Smith— 30 Chicago, 147 111. 327; s. c. 35 N. E. 378; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 172 111. 66; s. c. 49 N. E. 1006; State v. City of Bayonne, 35 N. J. L. 335; Nazworthy v. City of Sullivan, 55 111. App. 48. A resolu- tion is a much less formal act than an ordinance: State v. Lambert- ville, 45 N. J. L. 282; Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St. 124. -"a Cross V. Mayor &c., 18 N. J. Eq. 305. " State V. Town of Bergen, 33 N. J. L. 39. Leasing of real estate must be by ordinance and not resolution: State V. Inhabitants &c., 58 N. J. L. 506; s. c. 33 Atl. 852. And so con- sent to lay tracks in streets must be by ordinance: West Jersey Tract. Co. V. Shivers, 58 N. J. L. 124; s. c. 33 Atl. 55. A mere resolution is not sufficient in Kansas: Edminson v. City of Abilene, 7 Kan. App. 305; s. c. 54 Pac. 568. -* City of Central v. Sears, 2 Colo. 588. See also. Walker v. City of Ev- ansville, 33 Ind. 393. § 498 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 466 respect to persons upon whom they hiwfully operate that an act of the legislature has upon the people at large. ^'^ A municipal ordi- nance is a "local law prescribing a general and permanent rule."^° As the state has all power necessary for the protection of the prop- erty, health and comfort of the public, it can delegate its power in this respect to local municipalities in such manner as may be deemed desirable and the state may resume it when deemed expedient. There- fore, legislation in respect to matters affecting only certain localities and not affecting the people at large in any considerable degree will be committed to a local municipal government.^ ^ A municipality may under the authority of its charter, or of the general law, or under its implied right to pass by-laws, establish all suitable ordinances for administering the government of the city, for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants and the convenient transaction of business within its limits, and for the performance of the general duties re- quired by law of municipal corporations.^^ The particular instances in which public corporations have seen fit to exercise this power are, of course, innumerable. IMany examples will be found under the subsequent discussion of the validity of ordinances.^^ § 498. Power to make ordinances. — It is clearly established that only the legislature of a state is empowered to make laws; yet this proposition must be taken with the qualification that the legislature ^ Village of St. Johnsbury v. to come within the province of a by- Thompson, 59 Vt. 300, 305; s. c. 9 law to declare dense smoke from any Atl. 571; Des Moines Gas Co. v. City locomotive or boat to be a nuisance, of Des Moines, 44 Iowa 505, 508; and to prescribe a penalty therefor. Bearden v. City of Madison, 73 Ga. This ordinance was held also not to 184; City of St. Louis v. BofRnger, impose such regulation on commerce 19 Mo. 13; State v. Tryon, 39 Conn, as to interfere with the constitu- 183; Starr v. City of Burlington, 45 tional prerogative of congress to reg- lowa 87; Jones v. Firemen's &c. Ins. ulate commerce. Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.) 307; McDermott '= State v. Merrill, 37 Maine 329. V. Board &c., 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 422; A city government has the right un- Heland v. City of Lowell, 3 Allen der the usual grant of power to reg- (Mass. ) 407. In England a by-law ulate the use and enjoyment of pri- lawfully passed has been held to vate property in the city so as to have the same effects within its lim- prevent its proving pernicious to the its as an act of parliament: Hopkins citizens generally, and may, when V. Mayor &c., 4 M. & W. 621, 640; the use to which the owner devotes Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Bennett, 9 his property becomes a nuisance, Ind. App. 92; s. c. 35 N. E. 1033. compel him to cease so to use it and '"" Citizens' Gas & M. Co. v. Town of punish him for refusal to obey: Lou- Elwood, 114 Ind. 332; s. c. 16 N. E. isville &c. R. Co. v. City of Louis- 624. ville, 8 Bush (Ky.) 415. '^^ Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 ^^ See also, the chapter on The Po- 111. 400, 408. In this case it was held lice Power, post, vol. 2. 467 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 499 is empowered to delegate to municipal corporations the power to make by-laws and ordinances regulating such subjects as fall within the proper province of an ordinance. That such power can be law- fully delegated is undoubted.^'' The power of the corporation to pass by-laws is in many English cases said to be derived from custom — ancient and long-continued usage ripening into a prescriptive right on the part of the municipal corporation.^^ But no such ground can he urged in this country, where the power to pass by-laws and ordi- nances proceeds entirely from legislation of comparatively recent dates.^" Consequently there is in our courts no occasion to inquire into these customs, their validity and mode of proof .^^ § 499. The same subject continued. — This power of the legislature to delegate limited powers of local legislation to municipal corpora- tions is not, however, so extended as to permit the delegation of any power of general state legislation.^^ "The power of municipal cor- porations to make by-laws," says Judge Cooley, "is limited in various ways: 1. It is controlled by the constitution of the United States and of the state. The restrictions imposed by those instruments which directly limit the legislative power of the state rest equally upon all the instruments of government created by the state. If a state can not pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obliga- tion of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under ^ Hill V. Commissioners &c., 22 Ga. ments," which claimed to make 203; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586; statutes or laws for the rule and Markle v. Town Council &c., 14 Ohio government of the miners in that 586; Metcalf v. City of St. Louis, 11 district. "Some of their rules or Mo. 102; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279; ordinances were simply declarations Pell v. State, 42 Md. 71. of the customs prevailing in the dis- ^^ Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 trict, but others contained regula- Cush. (Mass.) 562, 568. For English tions as to the modes of working, cases bearing on these customs the and as to the conduct of the per- reader is referred to Chamberlain of sons engaged therein. They appear London's Case, 5 Coke 63; Day v. to have depended for validity upon Savage, Hob. 212; Davenant v. Hur- the ancient customs of the country." dis. Moor. 576; Lord Crumwell's See Rogers v. Brunton, 10 Q. B. 26; Case (Taverner's Case), Dyer 322; Harris v. Wakeman, Say. 254. Franklin V. Cromwell, Dal. 95; Earl '"Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 of Excester v. Smith, 2 Keb. 367; 3. Cush. (Mass.) 562, 575; Barling v. c. sub nom. Earl of Exeter v. Smith, West, 29 Wis. 307; Taylor v. City of Cart. 177; Lambert v. Thornton, 1 Pine Bluff, 34 Ark. 603; Napman v. Ld. Raym. 91; Scarling v. Criett, People, 19 Mich. 352. Moo. 75; Bricklayers v. Plasterers, "^Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Palm. 396. There were ancient as- Cush. (Mass.) 562, 568. semblies in Cornwall, termed "stan- =^ State v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264, 314. nary convocations," or "parlia- 499 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 468 the state with delegated authority. By-laws, tlierefore, which in their operation would be ex post facto or violate contracts, are not within the power of municipal corporations; and whatever the people by the state constitution have prohibited the state government from doing, it can not do indirectly through the local governments. 2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general laws of the state and with the provisions of the municipal charter. Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must give way."^'' There is, however, no constitutional objection to state legis- lation authorizing a city council to empower a particular board of officers who have charge of the whole or a portion of the affairs of a certain department to make reasonable police rules and regulations.**^ In such case, however, the department regulations are ministerial and 3»Cooley Const. Lim. 238, 239; cit- ing under the first limitation, Stuy- vesant v. Mayor &c., 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 588; Brooklyn &c. R. Co. v. Broolilyn &c. R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 358; Illi- nois Conf. Female College v. Cooper, 25 111. 133; Davenport &c. Co. v. City of Davenport, 13 Iowa 229; Western Saving Society v. City of Philadel- phia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Haywood v. Mayor &c., 12 Ga. 404; People v. Chi- cago &c. R. Co., 118 111. 113; s. c. 7 N. E. 116; Kansas City v. Corrigan, 86 Mo. 67. And citing under the sec- ond limitation. Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 425; Mayor &c. v. Nichols, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 209; Town of Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 111. 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128; Andrews v. Union &c. Ins. Co., 37 Maine 256; City of Can- ton V. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439; Carr v. City of St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191; Com- monwealth V. Brie &c. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339 ; City of Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa 59; Conwell v. O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419; March v. Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; Cowen v. Village of West Troy, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; State V. Georgia Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608; Pesterfield v. Vickers, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 205; Weith v. City of Wilmington, 68 N. C. 24. See also, on this subject, Burgess &c. v. Citi- zens' Pass. R. Co., 148 Pa. St. 87; s. c. 23 Atl. 1062; "Power of Municipal Corporations to Make By-laws," 15 Sol. J. & Rep. 209 and 230; "Munici- pal Ordinances," by Irving Browne, 27 Alb. L. J. 284. An ordinance which is invalid for want of power of the corporation to enact it is le- galized by a statute which expressly recognizes it as valid: State v. Starkey, 49 Minn. 503; s. c. 52 N. W. 24; Lennon v. Mayor &c., 55 N. Y. 361; City of Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319; Truchelut v. City Coun- cil, 1 N. & McC. (S. C.) 227; State v. Town of Union, 33 N. J. L. 350: Town of Bergen v. State, 32 N. J. L. 490; State v. Mayor &c., 34 N. J. L. 236. Cf. State v. Inhabitants &c., 38 N. J. L. 95. *° Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375; s. c. 19 N. E. 224; citing City of Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73; State V. Mayor &c., 34 N. J. L. 163; City of Taunton v. Taylor. 116 Mass. 254; Sawyer v. State Board &c., 125 Mass. 182; Commonwealth v. Young, 135 Mass. 526; and recognizing as sound but not antagonistic to the foregoing. Day v. Green. 4 Cush. (Mass.) 433; City of Lowell v. Simp- son, 10 Allen (Mass.) 88; In re Fra- zee, 63 Mich. 396; s. c. 30 N. W. 72. 469 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 500 not Icijislative. An ordinance may derive its validity from several dift'erent grants of power contained in the charter.*^ And where the statute authorizes the licensing of various kinds of business an exer- cise of that power may be in relation to one kind of business only. The exercise of the power may be assumed from time to time as occa- sion may require.'*" § 500. By whom the power is to be exercised. — The ordinances which the municipality is thus empowered to make mUvSt be adopted by the proper body and in the manner prescribed by law. The legislative assembly of the corporation is usually a select or representative body elected by the qualified voters of the corporation. This representa- tive body is the agent of the corporation and its authorized acts are the acts of the corporation. Its members are not the municipal cor- poration or a corporation of any kind.*^ In many New England towns the legislative body is not representative, but is composed of all the citizens of the town, who meet in person and administer the public affairs of the town.'*^ As the power of a public corporation to pass ordinances emanates only from the legislature, this power must be exercised strictly within the limits prescribed by the general and. special legislation on the subject."*^ § 501. Validity generally. — In regard to the general validity of ordinances it may be stated that there arises a presumption in Tefereuce to their validity unless their repugnance to the charter clearly appears.*^ So where an ordinance is passed granting the use " Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 cable in modern times. It is iden- 111. 340; s. c. 52 N. E. 44; Kinsley v. tical in principle with the system of City of Chicago, 124 111. 359; s. c. 16 government of Athens, where all the N. E. 260. free men met in the 'Xyosd ; of the *" Kolb V. Mayor &c., 64 N. J. L. Teutonic hamlet, where all freemen 163; s. c. 44 Atl. 873. voted in the folkmote; and of many " Dillon Munic. Corp. 270, and medieval cities, in which every cases cited. burgher voted directly in public " For the Massachusetts statutes meeting on all questions of public relating to these towns see Gen. St. welfare. The democracy of the 1860, ch. 18 and ch. 19. For an elab- New England form of government orate discussion of the distinctions is, however, far pui^er than those between towns and cities see the mentioned; for every adult votes, learned opinion of Gray, C. J., in while in the other instances there Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. was always a large slave population 344; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332. This form which had no voice in the meeting. of government affords an example ^^ Horr & Bemis Munic. Police of the pure democracy which the in- Ord., in loco. crease of population and the consoli- '"^ Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woesten, dation of nations has made impracti- 147 Mo. 467; s. c. 48 S. W. 939. § 502 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 470 of streets for electric lighting, but it is not disclosed whether it is for public or private purposes, it will be presumed that it is for public purposes, and thus render valid the ordinance.*^ And the onus is upon the one who asserts the invalidity to show wherein the ordi- nance is invalid.*® An ordinance nia}^ under some circumstances,, be given the same force and effect as a statute. Thus where a statute provides that a city may by ordinance fix the time and manner of hold- ing an election, such ordinance has the same power and effect, and is to be construed as part of the statute itself.*'' Where the formali- ties in regard to the passage of an ordinance are not mandatory, Imt simply directory, their omission will not invalidate the ordinance. Thus it is not necessary to the validity of an ordinance that the minutes shall show notice required by charter.^" Nor is an ordi- nance rendered invalid by the failure of the clerk to certify when it was presented to and returned by the mayor. ^^ Nor by a provision- that it shall go into effect earlier than the statute provides.^ ^ Thus when the statute provides that an ordinance shall not be in force until ten days after its publication and the ordinance provides that it shall take effect on its passage, the statute prevails. ^^ § 502. Validity in respect of form — (a) Meeting of council. — The ordinance must be passed at a legally convened meeting of the legis- lative body. The subject of corporate meetings is more fully dis- cussed elsewhere,^* but a few illustrations bearing on the validity of ordinances may be given. The provisions respecting New England town meetings are peculiar and must be especially studied. ^^ The councils of ordinary cities and towns are, as has been stated, repre- sentative bodies, elected by the qualified voters of the corporation, and consisting of a number of members fixed by law. It is the legis- lative agent of the corporation, and through it only can the corpora- tion take legislative action and be bound. The legislative and cor- porate powers of a municipality whose exercise is by the charter or constituent acts committed to the council or governing body can be exercised only at a corporate meeting duly held, and the corporate " Levis v. City of Newton, 75 Fed. ^- Anderson v. City Council &c., 5S 884. N. J. L. 515; s. c. 33 Atl. 846. *' Wood V. City of Seattle, 23 =^= Illinois &c. R. Co. v. People, 161 Wash. 1; s. c. 62 Pac. 135. 111. 244; s. c. 43 N. E. 1107. ^° City of San Luis Obispo v. Fitz- ^* See the chapter on Public gerald, 126 Cal. 279; s. c. 58 Pac. 699. Boards, ante. ^^ Barr v. Mayor &c., 58 N. J. L. '''' See the chapter on Meetings and 255; s. c. 33 Atl. 477. Elections, ante. " Boehme v. City of Monroe, 106 Mich. 401; s. c. 64 N. W. 204. 471 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAAVS. § 503 will must be ascertained by vote and embodied in a definite forib.^* The meetings of such legislative municipal assemblies are either (1) stated or regular meetings or (2) special meetings.^^ The charter or some ordinance generally fixes the time for holding regular or stated meetings, and the members are thus charged with notice; and no further or special notice is necessary unless specially required by law. But notice of a special meeting must, unless express provision to the contrary is made by law, be given to each member entitled to be pres- ent.^^ There are frequently provisions in charters or in ordinances relating to the calling of meetings of councils to the effect that upon assembly the mayor or other presiding officer shall specially state to them when assembled the objects for which they have been convened, and that their action shall be confined to such object. So under a charter containing such provisions it has been decided that statements in the opening message that the mayor would propose other legisla- tion, and sul)sequent messages proposing other legislation not spe- cifically alluded to in the first message, would not authorize legis- lation on such subjects j^** and that the mayor could not enlarge the scope of legislation by stating in his message calling such session that "he was not averse to submitting any measure" during the ses- sion, if deemed of public interest, and that an ordinance passed at the submission of the mayor during the session was void.^** The charter of Kansas City provides that, "whenever a special session of the common council shall have been called by the mayor, he shall state to them, when assembled, the cause for which they have been convened, and their action shall be confined to such cause or causes." It was held that the common council had power, at a special session called for the purpose of acting upon a special ordinance to pave a street, to enact another ordinance for paving the same street, their action not being limited to the ordinance mentioned in the mayor's message, but extending over the subject-matter of the ordinance.®^ § 503. (b) The same subject continued. — The ordinance must be passed by a council which has the legal authority and right to pass ^* Central Bridge Co. v. City of the council does not prevent per- Lowell, 15 Gray (Mass.) 106, 116. sonal notice: Russell v. Wellington, "See also, the chapter on Public 157 Mass. 100; s. c. 31 N. E. 630. Boards, ante. ^^ City of St. Louis v. Withaus, 16 ^* See chapter on Public Boards, Mo. App. 247. ante. The provision of a city char- "" City of St. Louis v. Withaus, 16 ter declaring that the mayor may Mo. App. 247. call special meetings of the council "' Smith v. Tobener, 32 Mo. App. "by causing notice to be left at the 601. usual residence of each member" of § 504 PUBLIC COKPORATIONS. 472 such a by-law. Thus an ordinance passed at a meeting of a county board of supervisors, held pursuant to an act of the legislature which had been previously repealed, is void.®^ The meeting of the council at which the ordinance is passed must be held at the time prescril)ed by law. Consequently under charter of the city of Rochester in New York, which provided that at the next meeting of the council after a disapproval by the mayor, it should proceed to reconsider the resolu- tion disapproved, and, if it should be passed by two-thirds of all the members, it should have full force and effect notwithstanding the disapproval, the courts decided that the council must consider the reso- lution at the next meeting after the disapproval comes in, and could not postpone it until a subsequent meeting.^'^ The formal regularity of the meeting will be generally presumed; as where in Nebraska, on certificate of the conviction of a person for the sale of liquor on Sunda}^, a resolution revoking his license directed the marshal to notify the licensee of such revocation "by the mayor and council," it was decided it need not otherwise appear that the mayor was pres- ent, and that it would not be presumed that he was not, as under the Nebraska statute''* it is his official duty to preside at all meetings of the council."^ The provisions relating to New England town meet- ings are peculiar. Thus it has been held in New Hampshire that de- fendants in certain suits were not disqualified by interest from voting in a town meeting called to take action on such suits.®® And it was held that a vote at a meeting of citizens, called under the New Hamp- shire statute®'^ authorizing the mayor and aldermen to call a meeting on the written request of one hundred legal voters, was merely ad- visory and did not control the action of the city council.®^ § 504. (c) Cluorum and votes. — Unless there be some special pro- vision by charter or law to the contrary, the common-law rule as to quorums and majorities of bodies of definite number obtains with reference to city councils. That is to say, a majority of the whole number must be present to constitute a legal quorum; and a majority of that quorum is necessary to do any valid act."" So where a city "- County of San Luis Obispo v. "' N. H. Gen. Laws, ch. 46, § 18. Hendricks, 71 Cal. 242; s. c. 11 Pac. "" Kelley v. Kennard, 60 N. H. 1. 682. "^Regents &c. v. Williams, 9 Gill & «^Peck V. City of Rochester, 3 N. J. (Md.) 365; In re Willcocks, 7 Y. S. 872; s. c. 18 N. Y. St. 244. Cow. (N. Y.) 402; Buell v. Bucking- «*Comp. St. Neb., eh. 13, § 20. liam, 16 Iowa 284; Barnert v. Mayor •== Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371; s. c. &e., 48 N. J. L. 395; s. c. 6 Atl. 15. 36 N. W. 554, Maxwell, J., dissenting. See also, the chapter on Public "" Dorchester v. Youngman, 60 N. Boards, ante. H. 385. 473 ORDINAN'CES AND BY-LAWS. 504 charter does not prescribe the number of votes necessary to an elec- tion of a presiding officer by the council, the votes of a majority of a quorum elect. '^'^ If the charter or statute contains no provision mak- ing a less or greater number than a majority of the members a quorum, then the council has no power to declare by ordinance that a number less or greater than the majority shall constitute a quorum. The common-law rule must hold unless superseded by the express pro- vision of a statute or the charter.'^ ^ If more than a quorum be present, and a majority of the quorum vote in favor of a given measure, but not a majority of those present, some members refraining from voting at all, the preponderance of authority seems to be that such vote is suf- ficient, although there are decisions to the contrary. So in Indiana it has been held that a resolution may be legally adopted by the vote of three of the six members of a city council, where the other three are present but refuse to vote, as the vote of the majority of the quorum present is effective.'^- In that case it is said : "If there is a sufficient quorum present, a majority of those voting is sufficient.""^ ■» State v. Farr, 47 N. J. L. 208. " Heiskell v. Mayor &c., 65 Md. 125. In this case the council de- clared two-thirds of the members elected to be necessary for a quorum, although there was no provision of statute or charter on the subject. It was decided that the ordinance was void on the ground stated. See also. Blackett v. Blizzard. 9 B. & C. 851; Barnert v. Mayor &c., 48 N. J. L. 395; s. c. 6 Atl. 15. "Rushville Gas Co. v. City of Rushville, 121 Ind. 206; s. c. 23 N. E. 72; 16 Am. St. 388; 6 L. R. A. 315. See §§ 157, 288, 289, ante. " Willcock remarks to the same effect: — "After an election has been properly proposed, whoever has a majority of those who vote, the as- sembly being sufficient, is elected, al- though a majority of the entire as- sembly altogether abstain from vot- ing, because their presence suffices to constitute the elective body, and if they neglect to vote it is their own fault, and shall not invalidate the act of the others, but be con- strued as an assent to the determina- tion of the majority of those who do vote:" Willcock Munic. Corp., part 1, § 546. "Those who were present, and who help to make up the quo- rum, are expected to vote on every question, and their presence alone is enough to make the vote decisive and binding, whether they actually vote or not. The objects of legisla- tion can not be defeated by the re- fusal of any one to vote when pres- ent. If eighteen are present and nine vote, all in the affirmative, the measure is carried, the refusal of the other nine to vote being con- strued as a vote in the affirmative so far as any construction is neces- sary:" Horr & Bemis Munic. Police Ord., § 43. See also. State v. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227; Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137; Cass Co. v. Johns- ton, 95 U. S. 360; St. Joseph Tp. v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644; State v. Remick, 37 Mo. 270; Everett v. Smith, 22 Minn. 53; Oldknow v. Wainwright, 2 Burr. 1017; King v. Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810; Inhabitants &c. V. Stearns, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 148. § 505 PUBLIC CORPOKATIONS. 474 ^ 505. (d) The same subject continued. — In a Tennessee case, ]io\vev(!r, the conlrarv doctrine was sustained.'^* In that case the aklermcn of the city of Knoxville, nine in number, and the mayor, constituted a board, the majority of which had the power to elect a certain city officiaL The mayor had no vote except in case of a tie vote among the aklermen, in which case his vote was final. Eight aldermen were present — a quorum under the statute — of whom four voted for one LawTence, three for another candidate, and one cast a blank ballot. The mayor declared Lawrence elected. The court re- versed this decision, distinguishing between elections by an indefinite and a definite body of voters, and holding that in the latter case the validity of the act depends upon the concurrent votes of a majority of those present. In the opinion delivered it was said : "It appears * * * that the rule is settled that a majority of a definite body present and acting must vote for a candidate in order to elect him, and that it is not sufficient that he receive a plurality of votes cast, or a majority if blank ballots are excluded. His claim must not de- pend upon the negative character of the opposition, but upon the affirmative strength of his own vote; that it is not sufficient that a majority were not cast against him, to be elected. The majority must be cast for him." With reference to the blank vote cast, and the contention that it should not count at all, and that therefore only seven ballots were cast, and a majority, four, elected Lawrence, the court said: "It is true that the blank vote can not be, in the tech- nical sense, a ballot, but it is nevertheless an act of negation, — affirma- tive in showing that another voter acted, negative in determining the majority. It was one of eight attempted to be cast with the purpose of not supporting complainant, and is only to be counted in showing that he did not get a majority, just as would have resulted had it been an illegal vote, as being for two candidates or otherwise."'^^ Where " Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. at an election where the number of 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 17 Am. St. electors is indefinite, or where the 870; 6 L. R. A. 308. law does not require a majority of ^^ Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn. all the members of a body having a 52; s. c. 12 S. W. 422; 17 Am. St. definite number, as opposed to a ma- 870; 6 L. R. A. 308. From this view jority of those voting, is by voting of the case, however, the chief jus- for another candidate; and the tice dissented, following the rule as fact that a majority enters a pro- stated in the preceding section, and test against the minority candidate, citing Rushville Gas Co. v. City of voted for at a regularly called elec- Rushville, 121 Ind. 206; s. c. 23 N. tion, will not defeat the election if E. 72. To this same effect is the no other candidate is voted for;" language used in 6 Am. & Eng. citing Hendrickson v. Decow, 1 Saxt. Encyc. of Law 331:— "The only way 577. See also, §§ 156, 157, ante, to defeat the election of a candidate 475 ORDIXAXCES AXD BY-LAWS. § 505 the law express!}' requires a certain proportion of votes in order to pass a measure, it can not be reconsidered by a less proportion.'*^ There are very frequently special provisions in the charter or in the statutes prescribing a certain 2)roportion of votes in order to pass any measure. These requirements must be strictly observed. So, where the charter of Hoboken provided that if, after the veto of an ordi- nance by the mayor, two-thirds of the members of the common council elected should pass the same, it should take effect as a law, and under the charter eight members were elected, one of whom died, it was held that it required the votes of six members to pass an ordi- nance over the mayor's veto.'' Under the Kansas statute giving a casting vote to the mayor when the council is equally divided, and elsewhere saying that he shall appoint by and with the assent of the council, on the question of the confirmation of an appointment he has the casting vote.'* And under the Nebraska statutes'^ applying to cities of the second class, of less than five thousand population, and providing that "to pass or adopt any by-law, ordinance, or resolution or order to contract, a concurrence of the majority of the whole num- ber of members elected to the council or trustees shall be required;" and providing that the mayor shall preside at all council meetings and have a casting vote when the council is equally divided, and none other, — an ordinance to redistrict the city, voted for by two members of a council of four and by the mayor, is void.®" The Florida munici- pal charter act provides that a majority of the members of the council shall be required to form a quorum for the transaction of business. A rule of proceeding adopted by a council prescribed that a proposed ordinance might be passed on its first reading by a majority vote of the members present, and then placed on a second reading by a like vote, and if passed on its second reading might then be read as passed as a whole on such second reading, but no ordinance should be put on its third reading at the same meeting at which it was read the first time except by "unanimous consent of the council." It was decided that the phrase quoted means all the members who may be present at the time the action as to putting the ordinance on its third reading '" A resolution of a village coun- ^^ State v. Mayor &c., 52 N. J. L. cil, to adopt which the charter re- 88; s. c. 18 Atl. 685. quires a two-thirds vote, can not be '^Carroll v. Wall, 35 Kan. 36; s. c. reconsidered by a majority less than 10 Pac. 1. two-thirds: Whitney v. Common '« Comp. St. Neb. 1885, ch. 14, art. Council &c., 69 Mich. 189; s. c. 37 1, § 76. N. W. 184. See § 297 et seq. and ""State v. Gray, 23 Neb. 365; s. c. § 377 et seq., ante. 36 N. W. 577. § 506 PUBLIC CORrOKATIONS. 476' is taken, whether a bare quorum or more. It does not require that every member of the council shall be present and consent.**^ § 506. (e) Mode of enactment. — The mode 5f enacting the ordi- nance is generally prescribed in the charter or an ordinance, and their requirements should be strictly complied with. So where the charter prescribes that no by-law shall be passed unless introduced at a pre- vious meeting, the provision has been held to be mandatory, and a by-law passed in violation thereof to be void.®- Where, however, a city charter requires a resolution to lie over "at least four weeks after its introduction," a resolution introduced on Monday night may be acted on on the fourth Monday thereafter.®^ The rules relating to the passage of by-laws must be construed with reference to the other provisions on the subject. Thus where a clause in the charter of the city of Minneapolis provided that no ordinance should be passed at the same session at which it was introduced except by the unanimous consent of all the members of the council present, it was decided that this provision did not require a unanimous vote upon the final passage of the ordinance, but only unanimous consent that it be put to a vote for its passage, since the same section further provided that all ordi- nances should be passed by an affirmative vote of a majority of all the members, etc.®** The charter frequently prescribes that the ayes and noes shall be called and published whenever the council votes on an improvement requiring a tax, or on some similar subject. Such a provision has been held in New York to be merely directory.®^ And "Atkins V. Phillips, 26 Fla. 281; son v. Barnett, 20 Ky. L. 1865; s. c. s. c. 8 So. 429. 49 S. W. 1060. "= State V. Town of Bergen, 33 N. ^'^ State v. Priester, 43 Minn. 373; J. L. 39, in which case an ordinance s. c. 45 N. W. 712. for opening a street was introduced '*^ Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.) at one meeting, and at the next 9, 24, 29. It is to be noted that in meeting the name of one of the com- this case Mr. Justice Bronson dis- missioners was changed and the or- sented, and the case was subsequent- dinance was passed. The court held ly reversed on other grounds in 2 that the ordinance was void, as the Denio (N. Y.) 323. Mr. Justice name of the commissioner who was Bronson's argument against the de- substituted should have been laid cision of the other judges is as fol- over to a subsequent meeting. lows: — "It is well known that men ^^ Wright V. Forrestal, 65 Wis. 341; acting in a body, especially when s. c. 27 N. W. 52. Where a charter under the cover of corporate privi- provides that at least two weeks leges, will often do what no one of shall elapse between the passage of them would be willing to do if act- a,n ordinance from one branch of ing alone and upon his individual the council to another, from April responsibility. And they will some- 5 to April 19 will be sufficient: Glea- times say aye, or permit a matter to 477 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 506 so although the code of Iowa requires the yeas and nays to be taken and recorded on the passage of an ordinance, it has been considered immaterial that the nays do not appear to have been called where only five members of a council composed of eight were shown by the record to have been present, all of whom voted in the affirmative.*^ In Wisconsin it has been held that this requirement has no applica- tion to motions to adjourn." But in many states the provision has been held mandatory, and ordinances passed without due observance of the requirement are considered void.®* When such a provision is considered mandatory the proceeding must be entered on the jour- pass sub silentio, when they would not venture to record their names in favor of the measure. To guard against such evils and protect the citizens against the imposition of unnecessary burdens, it was pro- vided that the ayes and noes should be called and published whenever a vote of the common council should be taken on any proposed improve- ment involving a tax or assessment upon the citizens. The language is imperative — the ayes and noes shall be called when the particular mode in which the corporation is to act is specially declared by its charter. I think it can only act in the pre- scribed forms. The contrary doc- trine wants the sanction of legal au- thority, and is fraught with the most dangerous consequences. It would place corporations above the laws, and there is reason to fear that they would soon become an intolerable nuisance." See also, Elmendorf v. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 693; In re Mount Morris Square, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 14; City of St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; City of Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa 282; § 305, ante. ^''Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa 220; s. c. 40 N. W. 818. Where the charter says the yeas and nays on the passage of all ordinances shall be entered in the journal the provision is directory: Village of Belknap v. Miller, 52 111. App. 617; Barr v. Village of Auburn, 89 111. 362. Where the statute requires ordinances to be submit- ted in writing at a regular meet- ing, and to be enacted at a subse- quent meeting, a substantial altera- tion of the ordinance at the time of its passage renders it invalid: Sim- merman v. Borough of Wildwood, 60 N. J. L. 367; s. c. 40 Atl. 1132. There is no presumption as to the regularity of the passage of an ordi- nance: City of Altoona v. Bowman, 171 Pa. St. 307; s. c. 33 Atl. 187. In pleading an ordinance it need not set forth all the formalities in ref- erence to the passage: Board &c. v. Henzler (N. J.), 41 Atl. 228. See also, Becker v. City of Washington, 94 Mo. 375; s. c. 7 S. W. 291; Town of Flora v. Lee, 5 111. App. 629. " City of Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204; s. c. 6 N. W. 503. ^'^ Cutler V. Town of Russellville, 40 Ark. 105; Steckert v. City of Bast Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; City of Del- phi V. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; s. c. 10 Am. R. 12; City of Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319; Swindell v. State, 143 Ind. 153; s. c. 42 N. E. 528; 35 L. R. A. 50; Tracy v. People, 6 Colo. 151; Rich v. City of Chicago, 59 111. 286. A statute requiring a resolution to be read on three sepa- rate days is mandatory, and unless so done, proceedings thereunder are void: Thatcher v. City of Toledo, 19 Ohio C. C. 311. A violation of par- liamentary rules in the passage of an ordinance does not render it void: Hutcheson v. Storrie (Tex. Civ. App.), 48 S. W. 785. § 507 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 478 nal or other record of the meeting, and the regularity of the vote can be evidenced from no other source.**" § 507. (f ) The same subject continued. — These rules can generally be suspended by a unanimous vote of the council or by a vote of a large proportion of that body. By such suspension the usual formalities of enactments are dispensed with and the ordinance is passed more speedily than the ordinary procedure would allow. A statutory re- quirement that all ordinances of a permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days unless three-fourths of the members elected dispense with the rule is mandatory; and where the rule was dispensed with as to several of such ordinances upon one and the same vote, which were thereupon passed by a single vote, it was held to be a violation of the provision, the latter being construed to require a separate suspension as to each ordinance.'"' Such sus- pension of the rules is sometimes presumed prima facie to be regular from the record showing that the rules were suspended without specifying the procedure of suspension. So when it was provided by the charter of a city that "no ordinance shall be passed until it shall have been read in such board [of aldermen] at two several meet- ings," etc., "unless this provision be suspended by a vote of all mem- bers," etc., and the record showed that certain ordinances were in- troduced "which were read and ordered to be read a second time," etc., "the second reading being dispensed with," etc., it was decided that the second reading was properly shown to be dispensed with, although it was not dispensed with at a subsequent meeting, and although the record of the subsequent meeting did not show that the second read- ing had been dispensed with.**^ Statutory provisions as to passage, where mere formalities, are construed as directory when the language of the provision permits."^ Provision is often made that no ordinance *' Rich v. City of Chicago, 59 111. pend" the rules, there being no sub- 286; Tracy v. People, 6 Colo. 151; In stantial difference in the terms: re Carlton Street, 16 Hun (N. Y.) Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76 Iowa 497. See § 305, ante. 220; s. c. 40 N. W. 818, construing ""Campbell v. City of Cincinnati, code of Iowa, § 489. 49 Ohio St. 463; s. c. 31 N. E. 606. '■'- So where both houses adjourn on "^ Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492; s. c. the day a bill is presented to the 5 S. W. 546. And it is also held in mayor, and the bill is signed by the Iowa that under a statute providing mayor, and filed in the city regis- that an ordinance shall be read on ter's office, it becomes a valid ordi- three different days unless three- nance, though it is not returned to fourths of the council vote to "dis- the house in which it originated, as pense" with the rules, an ordinance required by art. 3, § 23, of the char- is valid if passed by a three- ter; as there is no provision in the fourths vote on a motion to "sus- charter which prescribes that no bill 479 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 508 shall be passed without a certain publication beforehand. This pro- vision has been held in many cases to be mandatory, and an ordinance passed without such prescribed publication is void.^^ The formalities of the passage of an ordinance must be completed before the ordi- nance takes effect.'''* Where a city has recognized an ordinance, and treated it as adopted, it will be presumed to have been approved by the mayor.^^ The president of the council may approve an ordinance in the absence of the mayor. ""^ § 508. (g) The signing of the ordinance. — The charter or statute frequently contains provisions that every ordinance must be signed by the mayor or other presiding officer. Whether in such a case the signature of the mayor is essential to the validity of the ordinance or not depends chiefly upon the language of the charter or act. If the charter or act makes the signature essential, the ordinance is void if unsigned ; if on the other hand the charter does not make the sig- nature of the presiding officer an essential condition precedent to the validity of the ordinance, the provision has frequently been regarded as directory. Thus an ordinance passed by the common council of the city of East Portland could not take effect until approved by the mayor, and all proceedings had under such ordinance before its ap- proval were held to be nullities.^^ It has also been decided that under shall become an ordinance which cution of a new ordinance takes shall not be returned to the house place before it becomes operative, no in which it originated: Barber charge made in invitum against a Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo. property-owner by virtue of the pro- 22; s. c. 13 S. W. 98. And an ordi- ceeding thereunder acquires any va- nance of the city of St. Louis pro- lidity: Keane v. Gushing, 15 Mo. viding for street improvement is not App. 96. invalid because the board of public ^^ Santa Rosa City R. Co. v. Cen- improvements, after submitting it to tral St. R. Co. (Cal.), 38 Pac. 986. the municipal assembly, by whom it °'^ A statute requiring all resolu- was returned amended, adopted it as tions, and other matters, to be fur- amended, and recommended its pas- nished the mayor for consideration sage, instead of preparing a new or- applies to acts which are legislative dinance: Bambrick v. Campbell, 37 in character only: Erwin v. City of Mo. App. 460. Jersey City, 60 N. J. L. 141; s. c. 37 ^^ So when a statute prescribes Atl. 732. In Iowa a resolution of that no assessment resolution shall the city council of a city of first or be passed without previous publica- second class must be signed by the tion for three days a resolution mayor or passed over his veto: passed without such publication is Heins v. Lincoln, 102 Iowa 69; s. c. void: Ex parte Smith, 52 N. Y. 526; 71 N. W. 189; Saleno v. City of Neo- In re Phillips, 60 N. Y. 16; State v. sho, 127 Mo. 627; s. c. 30 S. W. 190. Mayor &c., 38 N. J. L. 110; State v. " Ladd v. City of East Portland, Smith, 22 Minn. 218. 18 Or. 87; s. c. 22 Pac. 533. For an- °* If any essential step in the exe- other instance where the signature § 509 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 480 a city charter requiring the mayor to "approve" of every vote, reso- lution, order, etc., of the common council in order to render it opera- tive, the approval must be in writing, and a resolution will not take effect without the mayor's written approval, although it has never been customary for him to express his approval affirmatively in writing of any action of the common council except general ordi- nances.®** § 509. (h) The same subject continued. — There are many cases, however, where such a provision has been held directory only, and an ordinance otherwise legally passed has been sustained although un- signed. An ordinance of a municipal corporation that was actually passed by the council in the exercise of its authority, and in accord- ance with all legal requirements, and was duly promulgated and passed into execution, was held in Louisiana not invalid because it was not signed by the mayor or president of the council.®^ And a legislative provision requiring the presiding officer of a municipal council to sign all ordinances has been considered in the same state directory merely. ^""^ If the ordinance is signed by the proper person. is made essential by charter, see State V. District Court, 41 Minn. 518; s. c. 43 N. W. 389. Tlie charter of the city of South St. Paul, Minn. (Sp. laws 1887, ch. 1), provides that all ordinances and resolutions shall, before they take effect, be presented to the mayor, and, if he approves thereof, he shall sign the same; and such as he shall not sign he shall return to the common council. A resolution so returned can be passed by a two-thirds vote of the council. It was decided that reso- lutions of the council in proceed- ings to assess real estate for street improvements were of no effect where not approved and signed by the mayor, and it did not appear that they were ever presented to him. »*New York &c. R. Co. v. City of Waterbury, 55 Conn. 19; s. c. 10 Atl. 162. To the same point, Whitney v. City of Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268; s. c. 50 N. W. 316. See also. Striker V. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 9; Elmen- dorf V. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 693; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Mayor &c. v. Dupuis, 30 La. An. 1105. "" MacKenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. An. 944; s. c. 3 So. 128. 100 Town of Opelousas v. An- drus, 37 La. An. 699. In ac- cordance with this principle an ordinance, published in a news- paper, which was authenticated thus: — "In board of trustees finally passed this 23d day of January, 1879, J. H., President of the Board of Trustees of the City of N. Attest: J. N. W., Clerk." — and the copy of which as published contained the following addition; — "Published by order of the board. J. N. W., Clerk," — was decided in a California case to be sufficiently authenticated: City of Napa v. Easterby, 76 Cal. 222; s. c. 18 Pac. 253. To this effect see also, State v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St. 644; Wain's Heirs v. City of Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St. 330; Kepner v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. St. 124 Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240 Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal. 613 481 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 510 even although not expressly in the proper capacity, the validity of the ordinance will be sustained. ^°^ And where a city ordinance author- ized a suit for a penalty for carrying concealed weapons on the written report of the chief of police, a report signed with the chief's name by a subordinate is considered sufficient. ^"^ If the signature is made essential, however, the defect is vital and can not be cured by amendment. ^"^ § 510. The veto power. — Frequently the charter, or other statute, gives the mayor the power to veto the ordinances and resolutions of the council, in case they shall not meet with his approval. The wis- dom of conferring upon the chief executive authority in a munici- pality veto power is not to be questioned under our form of gov- ernment; and indeed, its peculiar potency in the administration of municipal government ought not to be questioned by any one fa- miliar with the practical working and exercise of legislative functions in our larger cities. And this veto power should by no means be restricted to ordinances which are purely legislative in their nature. The functions of the municipal legislative body are dual in their nature, and frequently its ministerial acts are quite as important and State V. Mayor &c., 30 N. J. L. 93; State V. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. 475; Dey v. Mayor &c., 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411. Where the statute requires or- dinances to be signed by the mayor it is mandatory, and unless so done the ordinance is of no effect: Chi- cago &c. R. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa 425; s. c. 80 N. W. 564; Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30; s. c. 55 S. W. 955. Where the law requires the mayor to sign or veto and return all resolutions before they shall take effect, the act is mandatory; and a resolution for improvement and the special tax for such purpose are void without the mayor's action: Altman v. City of Dubuque, 111 Iowa 105; s. c. 82 N. W. 461. 101 Thus, where revised statutes of Missouri 1879, § 4948, provided that no bill should become an ordinance until signed by the president of the board of aldermen and the mayor, 1 Smith— 31 and § 4965 provided that the mayor should preside at all meetings of the board of aldermen, it was decided that an ordinance which had been signed by the mayor as such, and not by him as ex officio president of the board of aldermen, was valid: Becker v. City of Washington, 94 Mo. 375; s. c. 7 S. W. 291. A con- stitutional provision that certain or- dinances shall obtain the concurrent approval of the board of health is satisfied by such approval although it was at first refused: Darcantel v. People's Slaughter House &c. Co., 44 La. An. 632; s. c. 11 So. 239. ^"^ City of St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo. 204. "^As where, under the Indiana statute requiring ordinances to be signed by the presiding officer, and attested by the clerk, and to be re- corded, the defects can not be reme- died by a motion: Bills v. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221; s. c. 20 N. E. 115. § 511 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 482 far-reaching in their effects, so far as the well-being of the city is concerned, as are its legislative acts. As a general rule where the veto power is given to tlie mayor there is also provision made for overrnling the veto by a vote of the council larger than the ordinary quorum, but usually fixed according to the total number of members. The veto should be in writing, addressed to the council, pointing out specifically wherein the act is objectionable, and suggesting such amendments as may seem suitable, in case the ordinance is not rad- ically wrong.^"* § 511. (i) Publication of the ordinance — When mandatory. — An ordinance, being a law, must be published in some way in order to give notice to those affected thereby of its existence. It is generally re- quired by law that the ordinance shall be published, and the statu- tory or charter regulations on this point should be closely followed in order to avoid any question as to the validity of tlie ordinance. When there was no requirement as to the publication of an ordinance of an Alabama town except a constitutional provision that no person should be punished but by virtue of a law established and promul- gated prior to the offense and legally applied, a publication of seven days was held sufficient in the absence of proof of insufficiency of such publication. The court said: "The matter therefore is vested in the discretion of the municipal government but not an arbitrary dis- cretion. A reasonable opportunity must be given to the public within the corporate limits to be informed as to the ordinances they are commanded to obey before they can be punished for their violation. ^"^ In general when the charter or general law requires publication, it must be made according to the requirement, else the ordinance will be void and no penalty can be enforced under it.^"" Thus under a pro- ^'^ Where a charter requires every ordinance, see Oswald v. Gosnell, 21 resolution to be signed, or returned Ky. L. 1660; s. c. 56 S. W. 165. After with the mayor's objections, the a veto, a resolution by the requisite mere writing of a letter suggesting number is sufficient, though in terms amendments is not a compliance it does not express to be a "recon- with the charter: Kittinger v. Buf- sideration" of the previous action: falo Traction Co., 160 N. Y. 377; s. Oakley v. City of Atlantic City, 63 c. 54 N. E. 1081. The veto power is N. J. L. 127; s. c. 44 Atl. 651. not confined alone to legislative ^"^ Pitts v. District of Opelika, 79 acts: Gleason v. Peerless Mfg. Co., Ala. 527. 37 N. Y. S. 267; s. c. 72 N. Y. St. 592. '""Meyer v. Fromm, 108 Ind. 208; A resolution to expend money may s. c. 9 N. E. 84; City of Napa v. Eas- be vetoed: People v. Common Coun- terby, 61 Cal. 509; Wain's Heirs v. cil &c., 90 Hun (N. Y.) 488; s. c. 36 City of Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St. 330; N. Y. S. 59. As to what will not Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn. 567; Bar- amount to a veto by the mayor to an nett V. President &c., 28 111. 62; 483 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 513 vision in the general town-incorporation laws of Dakota which pro- vided that "every by-law, ordinance or regulation, unless in case of emergency, shall be published in a newspaper in said town, if one be printed therein, or posted in five public places, at least ten days before the same shall take effect," a by-law passed by the town trustees, but never published or posted, in a case where no emergency was alleged or shown, was considered to be of no force or effect, even as to such per- sons as had notice of its passage by the trustees. ^"'^ An ordinance providing a penalty must be published in Nebraska. ^°^ A statute requiring an ordinance to be published a specified time, with notice of the time of its consideration, is mandatory.^"" Parol proof may be made where no proof is on file in the office of the proper cus- todian.ii" §512. (j) The same subject continued — When directory. — But under a city charter providing that all ordinances passed by the city council, within thirty days after they became laws, should be pub- lished, but that the failure to publish should not render void or affect the validity of any such ordinance, unless delay might cause the ordi- nance to act retrospectively on the rights of individuals, it was held in Missouri that an ordinance went into effect from the date of pas- sage and became a law without publication.^^^ And it has been de- cided in Massachusetts that a requirement by ordinance that city or- dinances shall be published two weeks successively in three daily newspapers published in the city was directory; that it contemplated publication after the enactment of the ordinance, and that compliance with it was not a condition precedent to the validity of the ordinance. The ordinance in question prohibited any one from delivering an ad- dress on the Boston common without permission of a committee of Schwartz v. City of Oshkosh, 55 Wis. "" Larkin v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 490; s. c. 13 N. W. 450. 91 Iowa 654; s. c. 60 N. W. 195. ^"^ O'Hara v. Town of Park River, Wliat is a sufficient publication, — see 1 N. D. 279; s. c. 47 N. W. 380; Na- De Loge v. New York &c. R. Co., 157 tional Bank &c. v. Town of Grenada, N. Y. 688; s. c. 51 N. E. 1090. 44 Fed. 262. The mere fact that the "' Sweitzer v. Liberty, 82 Mo. 309. city officials may have exceeded So also, under St. Mass. 1850, ch. their authority in incurring a debt 184, § 20, an ordinance of the city of for publication does not invalidate Lynn need not be published, as a the ordinance: Kimble v. City of condition precedent to its validity. Peoria. 140 111. 157; s. c. 29 N. E. It takes effect upon its passage, if 723. no time therein is limited or named: "^ Union Pac. R. Co. v. Montgom- Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145 ery, 49 Neb. 429; s. c. 68 N. W. 619. Mass. 384; s. c. 14 N. E. 451. ^"•Herman v. City of Oconto, 100 Wis. 391; s. c. 76 N. W. 364. § 513 PUBLIC COHrORATlONS. 484 the common council. The court, however, did not support their de- cision sustaining the validity of the ordinance on this ground alone, holding that the ordinance was a re-enactment or continuance of an older ordinance, and that in such cases publication was under the Massachusetts laws unnecessary. "- § 513. (k) The same subject continued — Amendments and re-enact- ments. — In considering the question whether publication is requisite to the validity of an ordinance, the decision must generally be gath- ered from the language of the legislation relating to that subject.^ ^^ As the object of publication is of course to give notice of the ordi- nance to those who must obey it, the importance of publication varies according to the nature of the ordinance. Thus, publication of a police ordinance restricting personal liberty should be strictly carried out, while an administrative ordinance, even though directed to be published, has been held valid in New Jersey before completion of the publication required by law.^^* In a recent Louisiana case it was decided that an ordinance ordering a vote of the taxpayers on the question of a special tax, though supplemented by an amendment after it was advertised, would not be vitiated thereby, provided the amend- ment did not materially affect its essential parts.^^^ Where an ordi- "^ Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485, 487; s. c. 4 N. E. 577. "^ So where § 25 of the Colorado act concerning towns and cities pro- vides that "all by-laws of a general or permanent nature, and those im- posing any fine, penalty or forfeit- ure, shall be published, . . . and it shall be deemed a sufficient de- fense to any suit or prosecution for such fine, penalty or forfeiture to show that no such publication was made," and enacts that "such by- laws and ordinances shall not take effect and be in force until the ex- piration of five days after they have been published," it was decided that the last provision applied as well to by-laws and ordinances "of a gen- eral or permanent nature" as to those imposing a fine, etc.: National Bank &c. v. Town of Grenada, 44 Fed. 262, 266. And it was further stated by Philips, J., quoting from the opinion in Clark v. City of Janes- ville, 10 Wis. 135, that "the object of such provision for publication was the protection of the people by pre- venting their rights and interests from being affected by laws which they have no means of knowing." ''' Stuhr V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 147. In this case the city charter forbade any change in the salaries of municipal officers during their terms of office; and also required all ordi- nances to be published twenty days before taking effect. An ordinance was passed changing the salary of one of the officers. After its enact- ment but before the expiration of the twenty days of publication a new incumbent was elected. It was held that he was entitled to the increased salary provided by the ordinance, and that within the intent of the charter the ordinance took effect as soon as passed. This construction would not perhaps be given in the case of a police ordinance restricting personal rights. "^ MacKenzie v. Wooley, 39 La. An. 485 ORDIXANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 514 nance is a mere re-enactment or combination of an older ordinance it is not necessary, unless expressly required by law, that it should be republished.^^" § 514, (1) Manner of publication. — In considering the mode of publication requisite in any particular case, reference must be made to the general principles governing the interpretation of statutes, since the manner of publication is almost always regulated by legis- lation. When alternative modes of publication are contemplated by the statute, and it is expressly provided that election between these modes must be made by the corporation, an ordinance published by order of the town clerk without election by the council as to the mode of publication is void.^^'^ But when the law did not expressly enjoin upon the council the duty of designating the newspaper but was silent upon that point, it was concluded in New York that the clerk might properly designate the newspaper.^^^ In California the charter of a city required that ordinances be published. An ordinance con- taining an order directing that the ordinance be published once in a city newspaper, which publication was duly made, was held to be sufficiently published.^^® 944; s. c. 3 So. 128. This rule is sometimes abrogated by statutory re- quirements, as wliere in Indiana the courts declared that if the defects may be supplied by supplemental ordinance, the latter must be pub- lished before it can take effect, the ordinance imposing a penalty for its violation, and revised statutes of Indiana 1881, § 3100 (Burns R. S. 1901, § 3535), requiring such a pub- lication of every penal by-law: Bills V. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 227; s. c. 20 N. E. 115. "•^ Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485; s. c. 4 N. E. 577; Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo. App. 125, 130; City of St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483, 509; City of St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; City of Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 Mo. 424; State v. Heidorn, 74 Mo. 410. But see, contra, City of Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236 "'Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn. 436; s. c. 10 Conn. 567. This was an ordi- nance of the town of Canaan. The statute directed that publication should be made in a newspaper printed in the town, or in the town nearest to such town in which a newspaper was printed, or in some other newspaper generally circulated in the town where such by-law was made, as the town should direct. The ordinance in question was published in a newspaper printed in a town nearest to Canaan, and which cir- culated generally in Canaan, but such publication was made by order of the town clerk wholly without di- rection from the council. The court held that the town council alone could elect in what newspaper pub- lication should be made. "Mn re Durkin, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 269. "Mn re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88, 93; s. c. 10 Pac. 261. A statute relating to the printing of "legal notices and advertisements" was held to have no application to city ordinances: City of Pittsburg V. Reynolds, 48 Kan. 360; s. c. 29 Pac. 757. C § 515 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 486 § 515. (m) The same subject continued. — Under the constitution of Illinois, which provides that "all olKcial writings and the executive, legislative and judicial proceedings shall be published in no other than the English language," it was decided that the city of Chicago could not publish its ordinances at the public expense in a German newspaper.^-" And according to a recent decision in New Jersey, under a statutory requirement that city ordinances shall be pub- lished in a German newspaper, they must, in the absence of legis- lative direction to the contrary, be printed in the English language, since a statute or ordinance, as there declared, has no legal existence except in the language in which it is passed. ^^^ In Missouri it was held, where the charter provided that all municipal ordinances should be published in some newspaper published in the city, that the pro- vision was sufficiently complied with by distributing printed copies of the ordinances witli the copies of a newspaper, and this although the copies were not printed in the city.^^^ It is not necessary that the publication should be in a newspaper devoted entirely to current general news. Newspapers devoted exclusively to legal news have been held proper vehicles for the publication of ordinances. ^^^ If publica- tion in a newspaper printed and published in the city is required, it is sufficient if the newspaper be edited and issued in the city, although its type-work and presswork be done elsewhere. ^^* Under a law re- quiring the publication of the ordinances of ^ city as an essential of their validity, maps and books referred to in such ordinances need not be published. ^-^ Where it is prescribed that the publication shall be in a paper of general circulation, it is not considered necessary in Illinois that it be a local paper. Publication in a newspaper issued in a city near at hand, and circulating generally in the corporation, is sufficient. ^^"^ ^-"City of Chicago v. McCoy, 136 the term "newspaper" in this con- Ill. 344; s. c. 26 N. E. 363, Craig, J., nection. They hold that any period- dissenting, leal purveying news of interest to ^=' "The publication of the transla- any considerable class will suffice, tion may be regarded as a proper ^-* State v. Mayor &c., 44 N. J. L. explanatory adjunct of the English 131. copy, but can not be accepted as a ^-- City of Napa v. Easterby, 76 legal substitute for it:" State v. Cal. 222; s. c. 18 Pac. 253. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. Ill; s. c. 22 i^« Tisdale v. President &c., 46 111. Atl. 1004. 9. But if the newspaper had no gen- "^ Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo. App. eral circulation in the corporation, 125, 130. such publication would be insuffi- ^^^Kerr v. Hitt, 75 111. 51; Kellogg cient: Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal. v. Carrico, 47 Mo. 157. See these 281. cases for discussion of meaning of 487 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 51 fi § 516, (n) Time and proof of publication. — The provisions as to time and proof of publication are generally construed with liberality by the courts. So where publication for one week is required, a single insertion in a weekly newspaper is sufficient.^^^ Where the law required that an ordinance be published for twenty days before taking effect, it was decided in New Jersey that the ordinance would take effect on the twenty-first day after the first publication, and that it was not neces- sary that twenty days should intervene between the first and last publication.^'^ Where publication for three weeks was required in Indiana, the court considered publication for twenty-one days to be necessary, and that three insertions in a weekly paper, covering a period of fifteen days, did not suffice.^ -^ In a California case it was decided that an ordinance wliich provided for its publication for five successive days in a daily newspaper was properly published by pub- lication for five successive week-days, although a Sunday intervened on which there was no issue of the paper.^^° As to the proof of publi- cation of ordinances, the cases hold that where there is prima facie evidence of such publication the ordinance will be sustained in the absence of rebutting evidence. So where an ordinance was certified by the recorder as having been passed by the council on a given day, and he testified that it was published in a certain newspaper on a day named, the publication was considered in an Iowa case sufficiently proved, though the newspaper was not shown to be of a general cir- culation in the town, as required by statute ; as that fact would, it was said, be presumed, it being the officer's duty to select such a news- paper.^^^ And likewise when the record of an ordinance had a note appended thereto, stating, among other things, that the ordinance was ^' State V. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377; Com- occurred August 10, 1889. The pro- monwealth v. Matthews, 122 Mass. visions of the city charter relative to 60; Mayor &c. v. Gear, 27 N. J. L. the publication of ordinances, and 265. the time of their taking effect, are 128 Mayor &c. v. Gear, 27 N. J. L. that "all ordinances shall be pub- 265. lished for three successive days, ^^ Loughridge v. City of Hunting- . . . and shall take effect in ten ton, 56 Ind. 253, 260. days after their enactment; pro- i^"Ex parte Piske, 72 Cal. 125; s. c. vided, however, that the common 13 Pac. 310. So also, in Taylor v. council may fix and prescribe a dif- Palmer, 31 Cal. 240. In Ohio publi- ferent period, and that no ordinance cation in a newspaper printed only shall take effect before one publica- on Sunday suffices: Hastings v. Co- tion thereof." It was held that the lumbus, 42 Ohio St. 585. An ordi- ordinance was in force at the time nance of the city of Detroit provided of the act complained of: People v. that it should take immediate effect, Keir, 78 Mich. 98; s. c. 43 N. W. 1039. and was approved August 2, 1889. ^^^ Town of Bayard v. Baker, 76 The violation thereof by defendant Iowa 220; s. c. 40 N. W. 818. § 517 PUBLIC COllPORATIONS. 488 duly published, and the date of its publication, the ordinance was decided to be valid, unless it was shown that said ordinance was not published, and the burden of such proof was held to rest on the de- fendant.^^- Also where the county-government act of California provided that an ordinance of the board of supervisors should be pub- lished once a week in some newspaper published in the county, and that an order entered in the minutes should be prima facie proof that it had been duly published, it was held that the statute did not re- quire that an order for the publication of an ordinance should be made; but if such order was made, and a certain paper designated therein, the fact that the ordinance was published in another paper in the county did not invalidate it.^^^ § 517. (o) Title of the ordinance. — The charter or the general law often prescribes that an ordinance shall have only one subject and that such subject shall be clearly expressed in the title of the ordinance. Provisions such as these are commonly construed with considerable liberality. So an ordinance which provided both for the grading and paving of an alley was not considered invalid under the provi- sion of the charter of the city of St. Louis, relating to the passage of ordinances, which prohibited a bill from containing more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in its title. ^^* And a sec- tion providing for the giving of danger signals, and for the equip- ment of railroad-cars, was held in Missouri to be embraced in the title "^ Downing v. City of Miltonvale, ly weapon" is valid, ttie subject be- 36 Kan. 740; s. c. 14 Pac. 281. ing deadly weapons, or criminal acts "^County of San Luis Obispo v. connected therewith: Town of Ocean Hendricks, 71 Cal. 242; s. c. 11 Pac. Springs v. Green, 77 Miss. 472; s. c. 682. See also, as to proof of ordi- 27 So. 743. An ordinance to pur- nances, City of Atchison v. King, 9 chase an existing water-works plant, Kan. 550; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. and, in case of a failure, to con- 426; Moss v. Village of Oakland, 88 struct a system of its own and con- Ill. 109; Block v. President &c., 36 tract a specified indebtedness, is not 111. 301. void as embracing two subjects: "* Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 601. A constitutional provision that 13 Colo. App. 80; s. c. 56 Pac. 665. legislative acts shall embrace but An enacting clause is not essential one subject which shall be expressed to the validity of an ordinance: Chi- in the title does not apply to ordi- cago &c. R. Co. v. Hines, 82 111. App. nances: Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 488. See contra, Galveston &c. R. 412; s. c. 44 Pac. 725. Where the Co. v. Harris, 36 S. W. 776. Con- statute provides that an ordinance struction of ordinance as to its sufR- shall contain but one subject clearly ciency in expressing its purpose, — set forth in the title, an ordinance see In re Beechwood Ave., 194 Pa. entitled "An ordinance to prevent St. 86; s. c. 45 Atl. 127. the carrying or exhibiting of a dead- 489 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 517 of an ordinance entitled "An ordinance to regulate the speed within the city limits of cars and locomotives propelled by steam. "^^^ And where the board of trustees of a city in California made an order directing certain work to be done on one of the streets, the language used being, "The board order," etc., it was held, under the charter of the city, which provided that the enacting clause of ordinances should be, "The board of trustees of the city of N. do hereby ordain as follows," and a statutory provision that the board might pass "by-laws, resolutions and ordinances," — that the order referred to was valid, not being an ordinance, and the charter provision concerning the enacting clause being merely directory. ^^"^ But on the contrary, under the Washington statute which authorized the council of a city, by ordinance, to submit to the voters a plan for the construc- tion of water, light and sewerage systems, "either or both," it was decided that an ordinance on these subjects was clearly authorized to be either single, double or triple; and hence it suspended the re- striction imposed by the city charter of Seattle, that "no ordinance shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."^^'' Also an ordinance, the title of which was to prohibit animals from running at large, but which also provided that no per- son should keep a dog without paying a tax, and directing the city marshal to kill dogs running at large whose owners had not complied with this regulation and making the owner liable to criminal prosecu- tion for failure to comply therewith, was held to be void under the provisions of the Kansas statutes, that no ordinance should contain more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in the title.^^^ And an ordinance of a city of the second class, whose title and body embraced the two distinct subjects of extending the limits of the city, and of appropriating funds to build a bridge, was considered void under the Kansas statute providing that no ordinance of such city should contain more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in its title; and this though the latter clause of the ordi- nance was of no effect because the council had no authority to make the appropriation.^^'' An ordinance entitled "An ordinance control- ling the keeping and use of jacks, stallions and bulls," which prohibits the use of such animals in public places, was thought in Iowa not to go beyond the object and scope of its title.^*^ 1^ Bergman v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., '"* Stebbins v. Mayer, 38 Kan. 573; 88 Mo. 678; s. c. 1 S. W. 384. s. c. 16 Pac. 745. "•^City of Napa v. Easterby, 76 ^=^ Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. City of Cal. 222; s. c. 18 Pac. 253. Wyandotte, 44 Kan. 32; s. c. 23 Pac. ^"Yesler v. City of Seattle, 1 950. Wash. 308; s. c. 25 Pac. 1014. ""Town of Bayard v. Baiter, § 518 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 490 g 518. (p) Record of the ordinance. — The same principles apply in discussing the necessity of recording ordinances that have been set forth in connection with our treatment of their signature by the mayor or other presiding officer. If the charter or other statute makes it essential that the ordinance should be recorded in order to be valid, it is necessary that it should be recorded. If, however, the language of the charter or act, read in connection with the other legislation on the subject, does not appear to make the recording of the ordinance an essential prerequisite, the provisions relating thereto are considered as directory only. Accordingly when a city charter provided that all ordinances should be recorded, within thirty days after their passage, in a book to be provided for the purpose, "and to be kept by the mayor" for inspection, without charge, of all persons interested, and that they should not be valid or in force until so recorded, it was de- cided that an ordinance recorded in a book provided for the purpose, and temporarily kept, at the mayor's request, in the city office of the court-house, at a short distance from his office, because he had no safe at his office, was valid.^*^ And when an incorporated town was changed into a city, and the statute prescribed that the existing town ordinances should continue valid, provided that they should be re- corded within four months thereafter, the provision was con- sidered merely directory, and the town ordinances were upheld 76 Iowa 220; s. c. 40 N. W. 818. in statutes enacted by the legisla- An ordinance concerning certain ture: Callaghan v. Town of Alexan- licenses in the city of Louisville dria, 52 La. An. 1013; s. c. 27 So. 540. is held sufficiently specific as to title, "' Beaumont v. City of Wilkes- in Elliott V. City of Louisville, 101 Barre, 142 Pa. St. 198; s. c. 21 Atl. Ky. 262; s. c. 19 Ky. L. 414; 40 S. W. 888. A statute requiring that all or- 690. The provision of the constitu- dinances shall, within a reasonable tion prohibiting any bill from con- time, be recorded, signed, etc., at- taining more than one subject which tested, etc., is directory: Shea v. City ' shall be expressed in the title, is not of Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; s. c. 46 N. applied to city ordinances: City of E. 138. An ordinance not recorded Topeka v. Raynor, 60 Kan. 860 pursuant to the requirement of a (mem.); s. c. 58 Pac. 557. Cf. Ex charter which is merely directory is parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412; s. c. 44 not void: Allen v. City of Daven- Pac. 725; Green v. City of Indianap- port, 107 Iowa 90; s. c. 77 N. W. 532; olis, 25 Ind. 490; Baumgartner v. Quint v. City of Merrill, 105 Wis. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575; s. c. 50 Am. 406; s. c. 81 N. W. 664. An ordi- R. 830' City of Humboldt v. Mc- nance is not invalid because the min- Coy, 23 Kan. 249; People v. Wag- utes do not show the mayor was ner, 86 Mich. 594; s. c. 49 N. W. 609. present, when the ordinance was It is not essential to the validity signed by him: Aurora Water Co. v. of an ordinance that it shall be pre- City of Aurora, 129 Mo. 540; s. c. 31 ceded by a title such as is required S. W. 946. 491 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 519 although unrecorded."- But where a city charter required that all ordinances should be recorded, and that no ordinance should be carried into, operation in less than two weeks after the same should be so recorded, an unrecorded ordinance has been held to be void.^*^ Apart, however, from the validity of the ordinance, the municipal records of the transactions of the municipal council are the best evi- dence of those transactions."* It is therefore important that accurate and legible record be made of every legislative act of the municipality. The recording of an ordinance is, however, a purely ministerial act. It may be performed by a subordinate or deputy, and a clerical error will not operate so as to invalidate any ordinance properly and legally enacted."^ The neglect of a ministerial duty is not deemed fatal to the validity of municipal proceedings.^*** Whatever is said as to the necessity of recording ordinances will apply equally well to the ad- visability of recording every resolution or regulation which the council may make. But contractual relations may be created by the mere passage of a resolution, and will be unaffected by its record, or non- record.**^ § 519. Validity in respect of matter — (a) Constitutionality. — The power of a municipal council to enact by-laws being delegated by the legislature can not, of course, be more extensive than the power of the delegating body. Consequently the by-laws or ordinances enacted by the council must not be in contravention of the constitution of the United States or of tlie state. Hence a by-law impairing the obliga- tion of a contract is void as being unconstitutional.**^ And if an ordi- nance is accepted, and thereby a contract is created, subsequent or- "- Trustees &c. v. City of Erie, 31 Portland, 18 Or. 87; s. c. 22 Pac. 533; Pa. St. 515; Amey v. Mayor &c., 24 Western &c. R. Co. v. Young, 83 Ga. How. 364. 512; s. c. 10 S. E. 197. "^ Verona's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 83. "' Parr v. President &c., 72 N. Y. "* Stewart v. City of Clinton, 79 463. Mo. 603; Parsons v. Trustees, 44 Ga. "^Illinois Conf. Female College v. 529; Baker v. Schofield, 58 Ga. 182. Cooper, 25 111. 133; Haywood v. "'Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402; Mayor &c., 12 Ga. 404; Saving So-. Houston &c. R. Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. ciety v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; 343. Davenport &c. Co. v. City of Daven- "•^ Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich, port, 13 Iowa 229. An ordinance 44; Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa 90. which impairs a contract is cogniza- Acts requiring record to be made of ble under the United States constitu- ordinances will usually be held di- tion and laws: Walla Walla City v. rectory, and failure to observe will Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; not invalidate the ordinance: Na- s. c. 19 S. Ct. 77. An ordinance at- tional Bank &c. v. Town of Grenada, tempting to impair the existing 41 Fed. 87. See also, Terre Haute rights of a person under a contract &c. R. Co. v. Voelker, 129 111. 540; s. is unconstitutional: Neill v. Gates, c. 22 N. E. 20; Ladd v. City of East 152 Mo. 585; s. c. 54 S. W. 460. § 520 PUBLIC CORrORATlONS. 492 dinances can not impair its obligation.^*" So an ordinance by whicli a license tax was imposed on owners of tugboats running between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico was declared void as being a regulation of commerce between the states. ^°" But a penal ordinance of Chicago, pronouncing steamboats emitting dense smoke to be nuisances, is reasonable and not unconstitutional as affecting vessels on the Chicago river.^^^ An ordinance making it unlawful to require or permit a day-laborer or mechanic to work on the public works more than eight hours in a day is unconstitutional.^^^ An ordinance which prohibits any person, firm or corporation, from selling, or exposing for sale, any meat and other specified articles in a place where dry-goods and other specified property are sold is unconstitu- tional and void.^^^ § 520. (b) The same subject continued. — Likewise ordinances giv- ing the municipal authorities undue power in allowing or withhold- ing licenses to laundries, by which the Chinese were discriminated against, were held void as being in contravention of the fourteenth amendment.^^* A city ordinance of St. Louis affixing a penalty for ""People v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 118 111. 113; s. c. 7 N. E. 116; Kan- sas City V. Corrigan, 86 Mo. 67. Where a license is granted and acted on and money expended under it a subsequent ordinance prohibiting the use of part of the streets covered by the license is a nullity: Harvey V. Aurora &c. R. Co., 186 111. 283; s. c. 57 N. B. 857. ""Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69-; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 38. An occupa- tion tax against all persons selling, or offering for sale, goods within the city is unconstitutional and void as to non-residents: Baxter v. Thomas, 4 Olda. 605; s. c. 46 Pac. 479. ^" Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 111. 400; s. c. 51 Am. R. 698. "'City of Seattle v. Smyth, 22 Wash. 327; s. c. 60 Pac. 1120. "^ City of Chicago v. Netcher, 183 111. 104; s. c. 55 N. E. 707. ^^^Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1064; In re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. 611. Ordinances of similar character, where reasonable, have been upheld: Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 730; Barbier v. Connolly,. 113 U. S. 27; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 357. An ordinance providing that license shall not be issued to sell intoxicating liquors, except on petition of a certain num- ber of property-owners in the block, is not void as discriminating be- tween different blocks or diffei'ent persons: Martens v. People, 186 111. 314; s. c. 57 N. E. 871. An ordi- nance which is not enforced against every one is not discriminating: City of Denver v. Girard, 21 Colo. 447; s. c. 42 Pac. 662. But an ordi- nance which discriminates between pei'sons of the same class is void: City of Peoria v. Gugenheim, 61 111. App. 374. Where the statutes im- pose upon the municipality the duty of keeping highways free from ob- structions of snow, or other things that impede travel or render it dan- gerous, an ordinance which imposes upon property-owners the duty of keeping sidewalks in front of their premises free from snow imposes a burden which does not bear upon all 493 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAAVS. § 521 carrying concealed weapons was not considered unconstitutional.^''"''' And a penalty for violating a town ordinance has been d^ecided not to be a debt within the constitutional prohibition against imprison- ment for debt.^^° A Minnesota city ordinance directing a certain officer to arrest and detain until the extinguishment of a fire any per- son refusing to obey his directions was held unconstitutional as de- priving the sufferer of his liberty without process of law or trial by jury.^^" And an ordinance of the city of Shreveport in Louisiana giving to one sect a privilege which it denied to another was held unconstitutional and void.^^'^ But constitutional provisions securing freedom of religious worship were not designed to prevent the adop- tion of reasonable rules and regulations for the use of streets and public places, and a member of a religious organization while playing on a cornet in a street-parade and creating no disturbance is an itinerant musician within the meaning of an ordinance relating to such persons and is not protected by the fact that his act was done as a matter of religious worship only.^^^ § 521. (c) Consistency with statute and charter. — As a munici- pal corporation can not enact valid laws in contravention of the con- stitution of the United States or of the state, so it can not enact laws contrary to the statute of the state. For a legislature to delegate powers which might be used in hostility to the general laws of the state would be a felo de se that might render all general legislation inoperative within the limits of the corporation. Thus the ordinances of a city council imposing upon the city solicitor the duties which are required by statute to be performed by the receiver of taxes were held in a recent New Jersey case to be unauthorized and illegal.^^** In the same state, under a statute authorizing the mayor "in his discre- tion * * * to impose a fine not exceeding twenty dollars" for a certain offense, an ordinance prescribing a fine of not less than three nor more than twenty dollars for the same offense was held to be void, as an additional limitation of the mayor's discretion. ^^'^ And in gen- citizens alike, and is a denial of the vasion of the right of personal lib- equal protection of the law; since erty is void: Ex parte Smith, 135 a sidewalk is part of the highway: Mo. 223; s. c. 36 S. W. 628. State V. Jackman, 69 N. H. 318; s. '''City of Shreveport v. Levy, 26 c. 41 Atl. 347; 42 L. R. A. 438. La. An. 671. "' City of St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo. '=" Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 204. Mass. 375; s. c. 19 N. E. 224. '=•= Hardenbrook v. Town of Ligo- ''" State v. City of Camden, 50 N. nier, 95 Ind. 70, and cases there J. L. 87; s. c. 11 Atl. 137. cited. '"'Landis v. Borough of Vineland, '"Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 54 N. J. L. 75; s. c. 23 Atl. 357. 431. An ordinance which is an in- § 522 PUBLIC coiU'onATiONs. 494 eral all ordinances which irreconcilably conflict either with the charter or with the state statutes are void. 1 U2 § 522. (d) The same subject continued. — But the by-laws of a mu- nicipal corporation, when authorized by its charter, have the effect of a special law of the legislature, and supersede to a great degree the general law within the territorial limits of such corporation.^"' This question is discussed in an able and thorough opinion in a Vermont case, where the charter of a village granted to the village certain powers of licensing eating-houses repugnant to the general statute in force at the time of passage of the charter. The court said : "If the by-law is authorized by the charter it has the effect of a special law of the legislature within the limits of the village and supersedes the general law on the subject of victualing-houses therein ; for the charter giving the village power to pass the by-law inconsist- ent with and repugnant to the general law operated to repeal the general law within the territorial limits of the village, on the prin- ciple that provisions of different statutes which are in conflict with one another can not stand together ; and in the absence of anything show- ing a "different intent on the part of the legislature, general legislation upon a particular subject must give way to later inconsistent special legislation upon the same subject."^*^* In Louisiana, however, it has "^ State V. Georgia Medical So- vides that the city council shall not ciety, 38 Ga. 608; State v. Brittain, have power to pass any ordinance 89 N. C. 574; Weith v. City of Wil- exempting any person from the oper- mington, 68 N. C. 24; Flood v. State, ation of an ordinance, or municipal 19 Tex. App. 584; Bohmy v. State, 21 regulation, an ordinance requiring a Tex. App. 597; s. c. 2 S. W. 886; license from all milk-sellers except Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb, those selling less than twenty quarts (N. Y.) 425; Cowen v. Village of a day is invalid: Gray v. Mayor &c., West Troy, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; 2 Marv. (Del.) 257; s. c. 43 Atl. 94. Mayor &c. V. Nichols, 4 Hill (N. Y.) "^Village of St. Johnsbury v. 209; Mays v. City of Cincinnati, 1 Thompson, 59 Vt. 300; ^. c. 9 Atl. Ohio St. 268; City of Canton v. Nist, 571; McPherson v. Village of Che- 9 Ohio St. 439; Carr v. City of St. banse, 114 111. 46; s. c. 28 N. E. 454; Louis, 9 Mo. 191; Baldwin v. Green, Covington v. City of East St. Louis, 10 Mo. 410; Town of Petersburg v. 78 111. 548; State v. Dwyer, 21 Minn. Metzker, 21 111. 205; Southport v. 512; State v. Clarke, 1 Dutch. (N. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128; Andrews v. J.) 54; Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. Union &c. Ins. Co., 37 Maine 256; (Mass.) 504; Commonwealth v. State V. Mayor &c., 49 N. J. L. 311; Patch, 97 Mass. 221. s. c. 8 Atl. 295; Lozier v. Newark, 48 ^"'Village of St. Johnsbury v. N. J. L. 452; s. c. 2 Atl. 815; State v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300; s. c. 9 Atl. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 117; City of 571; citing 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., Cape Girardeau v! Riley, 72 Mo. 220; § 88; 4 Kent Com. 466, n.; In re Dubois v. City Council &c., Dudley Snell, 58 Vt. 207; s. c. 1 Atl. 566; (Ga.) 30. Where the statute pro- State v. Mayor &c., 33 N. J. L. 57; 495 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 523 been decided that a grant of power conferred by the legislature in the charter of a municipal corporation, to pass and enforce ordi- nances to suppress and punish the sale of adulterated drinks, was not recalled by a subsequent general statute providing for the prosecution of the same olfense throughout the state.^"^ In many cases it has Ijeen held that this power given by charter can be subsequently re- voked by the legislature ; and at any rate both statute and ordinance may stand together if not fatally inconsistent.^*"' § 523. (e) Consistency with general penal law. — It would seem to flow as a necessary consequence from the principles enunciated in the last section that the corporation can not pass ordinances imposing further penalties for an act which is already a penal offense under the general laws of the state; but on this question there is great and serious conflict of opinion in the cases. It is the opinion of Judge Cooley that the clear weight of authority is to the effect that an act may be a penal offense under the laws of the state and that further penalties, under proper legislative authority, may be imposed for its commission by municipal by-laws, and the enforcement of the one would not preclude the enforcement of the other. ^'^'^ The arguments of those who hold that municipal ordinances may impose further pen- alties for the commission of acts already penal offenses under the general statutes are set forth by Collier, C. J., in an Alabama case cited by Judge Cooley, where a city ordinance imposed a fine for assault and battery committed within the city limits, and its validity was questioned. He said : "The object of the power conferred by the charter and the purpose of the ordinance itself was not to punish for an offense against the criminal justice of the country, but to provide a mere police regulation for the enforcement of good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation. So far as an offense has been committed against the public peace and morals, the corporate au- thorities have no power to inflict punishment, and we are not informed that they have attempted to arrogate it. It is altogether immaterial whether the state tribunal has interfered and exercised its powers in bringing the defendant before it to answer for the assault and battery ; for whether he has thus been punished or acquitted is alike unim- State v. Clarke, 25 N. J. L. 54; v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400; City of St. Davies v. Fairbairn, 3 How. 636; Louis v. Cafflerata, 24 Mo. 94; City State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Mark v. of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; State, 97 N. Y. 572. Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) ^•=5 State V. Labatut, 39 La. An. 237; City of Elk Point v. Vaughn, 1 513; s. c. 2 So. 550. Dak. 113; s. c. 46 N. W. 577. "^ People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. ^"'^ Cooley Const. Lim. 239. 611; s. c. 42 N. E. 1124; Mayor &c. § 523 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 496 portant. The offense against the corporation and the state, we have seen, are distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecu- tion at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis: the one contemplates the observance of the peace and good order of the city; the other has a more enlarged ol)ject in view — the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the state.""^ There are many cases upholding the propositions set forth in the last-cited authority; indeed, the nrmiber of American cases supporting this view far exceeds the num- ber of the cases which hold the contrary. Thus, it has been de- cided in New Jersey that certain acts which are indictable as offenses against the state may also be by the legislature constituted offenses against the police regulations of municipalities so as to subject the offender to the mode of trial incident to proceedings for the violation of ordinances, and that where in such cases the legislature has not made special provision for a trial by jury it can not be demanded as matter of right.^*^^ Conformably to these views it was held in Mis- souri that although by the state statutes it was a misdemeanor to cruelly beat any domestic animal, municipal corporations might pro- hibit the same act by ordinance and punish offenders. ^^"^ And in Arkansas, although carrying concealed weapons, disturbing the peace, and selling liquor on Sunday are each made offenses by statute, the power to prohibit the same acts was considered to be given cities and towns by the statute authorizing the passage of ordinances, not incon- sistent with the laws of the state, to suppress disorderly conduct, provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience of the cor- poration and its inhabitants.^^ ^ Likewise in Indiana the statute which "s Mayor &c. v. Allaire, 14 Ala. City of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 400. 61; State v. Crummery, 17 Minn. ^''^ State V. Inhabitants &c., 51 N. 72; State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507; J. L. 498; s. c. 18 Atl. 116. See also, s. c. 5 N. W. 959; City of Elk Point to the same effect, City of Indianapo- v. Vaughn, 1 Dak. 113; s. c. 46 N. lis V. Huegele, 115 Ind. 581; s. c. 18 W. 577; Chicago Packing Co. v. City N. B. 172; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend, of Chicago, 88 111. 221; Hankins v. (N. Y.) 237; Mclnerney v. City of People. 106 111. 628; McRea v. Mayor Denver, 17 Colo. 302; s. c. 29 Pac. &c., 59 Ga. 168; Town of Bloomfield 516; Mayor &c. v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. v. Trimble, 54 Iowa 399; s. c. 6 N. Smith (N. Y.) 156; Polinsky v. Peo- W. 586. pie, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 390; People v. ""City of St. Louis v. Schoen- Stevens, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 341; busch, 95 Mo. 618; s. c. 8 S. W. 791. Blatchley v. Moser, 15 Wend. (N. "^ Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. Y.) 215; City of St. Louis v. Caffer- 368; s. c. 14 S. W. 38. See also, ata, 24 Mo. 94; State v. Gordon, 60 State v. Inhabitants &c., 51 N. J. L. Mo. 383; City of St. Louis v. Schoen- 498; s. c. 18 Atl. 116. busch, 95 Mo. 618; s. c. 8 S. W. 791; 497 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 524 prohibited towns or cities from making acts punishable by ordinance which are made public offenses and punishable ])y the state did not, it was held, apply to an ordinance making it an offense to sell intoxi- cating liquors within the limits of the city without first obtaining a city license, on the ground, however, that such act was not an offense against the state law.^^^ § 524, (f ) The same subject continued. — With due deference to the weighty opinion of Judge Cooley, and to the mass of authorities submitted by him in support of his opinion, to the mind of the writer the cases holding the contrary view though fewer in number are better considered, and more truly founded on principle. In a Missouri ease it was decided that one who had been punished under a municipal ordinance could not be afterwards indicted under the state law. The court said: "The constitution forbids that a person shall be twice punished for the same offense. To hold that a party can be prosecuted for an act under the state laws after he had been punished for the same act by the municipal corporation within whose limits the act was done would be to overthrow the power of the general assembly to create corporations to aid in the management of the affairs of the state. For a power in the state to punish after a punishment had been inflicted by the corporate authorities could only find a support in the assumption that all the proceedings on the part of the corpora- tion were null and void. The circumstance that the municipal au- thorities have not exclusive jurisdiction over the acts which constitute offenses within their limits does not affect the question. It is enough that their jurisdiction is not excluded. If it exists — although it may be concurrent — if it is exercised, it is valid and binding as long as it is a constitutional principle that no man may be punished twice for the same offense." ^^* The logic of these considerations seems to show irresistibly that to permit the same act to be punished under the general law and under an ordinance must either lead to a viola- tion of the constitution or must cause an election to be made between the two methods of procedure, so that in case the act is punished under one provision the other becomes inoperative and void. This "^City of Frankfort v. Aughe, 114 of Augusta, 38 Ga. 542; State v. Cor- Ind. 77; s. c. 15 N. B. 802. poration of Savannah, 1 T. U. P. "* State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330. See Charl. (Ga.) 235; s. c. 4 Am. D. 708; also, City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. (Mich.) Or. 139; State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 334; State v. Keith, 94 N. C. 933; 215; Menken v. City of Atlanta, 78 Town of Washington v. Hammond, Ga. 668; s. c. 2 S. E. 559; Jenkins v. 76 N. C. 33. Mayor &c., 35 Ga. 145; Vason v. City 1 Smith— 32 524 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 498 would produce an anomalous condition of criminal procedure in such cases that could hardly have been contemplated either by the legislature or the city council. In a well-considered North Caro- lina decision it was held that an ordinance of a city or town which made an act, which was punishable as a criminal offense under the general law of the state, an offense against the town, punishable by fine or imprisonment, was void.^'^^ On the same line authority given to a city in Oregon "to prevent and restrain disturbances" was not thought to include the right to take jurisdiction and punish for the crime of an assault with a dangerous weapon. ^'^*' It is not uncom- monly provided by statute that acts which are public offenses punish- able by statute shall not be punishable by city ordinance. In such cases there is no question that such an ordinance is void."'^ Where "^ State v. Keith, 94 N. C. 933. rupt the board of metropolitan po- Where there is a penal statute pre- lice commissioners in any act of scribing a punishment for certain acts an ordinance subsequently passed prescribing a penalty for the same acts is invalid in the absence of an express provision granting the city power to pass it: Kassell v. Mayor &c., 109 Ga. 491; s. c. 35 S. B. 147. An ordinance which is identi- cal in terms with the penal code is void. A city has no power to pass an ordinance covering the same acts as are covered by the penal code: Ex parte Wickson (Tex. Civ. App.), 47 S. W. 643. ""Walsh V. City of Union, 13 Or. 589; s. c. 11 Pac. 312. "' So, under revised statutes of Indiana 1881, § 1640 (Burns R. S. Ind. 1901, § 1709), providing that any act made a public offense against the state, and punishable by any statute, shall not be made pun- ishable by any city ordinance, the wrongful interference with a police- man in making an arrest, prohibited by an ordinance of the city of In- dianapolis, is not punishable by that ordinance; such act being made a public offense, and punishable by § 10 of the metropolitan police act (acts 1883, p. 89, acts 1897, p. 90, Burns' R. S. Ind. 1901, § 3726), pro- viding that any person who shall, in any manner, interfere with or inter- theirs while in the legal discharge of their duties, or of the police force, shall, upon conviction, be fined, etc.: City of Indianapolis v. Huegele, 115 Ind. 581; s. c. 18 N. E. 172. To the same effect is a California case. Sec- tion 3 of ordinance No. 192 of the city of Stockton, California, makes it unlawful for two or more persons ta assemble, be or remain in any room or place for the purpose of smoking opium, or inhaling the fumes there- of. Section 307 of the state penal code declares that every person who visits or resorts to any place where opium, or any of its prepara- tions, is sold or given away to be smoked at such place, for the pur- pose of smoking opium, or its said preparations, is guilty of a misde- meanor, and punishable by fine or imprisonment. It was held that the ordinance, in so far as it made criminal precisely the same acts that were declared a crime by ihe state law, was in conflict therewith; and under constitution, art. 11, § 11, limiting the power of municipal cor- porations to the passage of ordi- nances not in conflict with general laws, was void, and that persons ac- cused of assembling in a room for the purpose of smoking opium therein could not be prosecuted 499 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 535 there is no ordinance shown justifying a sentence to hard labor the court will presume that any ordinance passed by the council con- formed to the statute, and will modify the judgment to conform to it.^^® The fact that a general statute covers the same subject as an ordinance does not render the latter invalid. ^''^ But not so if they are in conflict.^*" The legislature has no power to authorize the pas- sage of ordinances contrary to the general laws of the state ;^®^ and 'SO, ordinances which violate subsequently-enacted statutes are not •enforceable ;^^^ but it may make additional requirements.^^^ An or- fdinance is not oppressive when in harmony with general law.^^* § 525. (g) Reasonableness of the ordinance. — It is a well-settled principle that a municipal by-law or ordinance must be reasonable. If it be not reasonable, the courts will decline to enforce it, and it will be declared void as matter of law.^®^ But, as was said by Nib- thereunder: In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142; s. c. 14 Pac. 405; Ex parte Solomon, 91 Cal. 440; s. c. 27 Pac. 757; In re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99; s. c. 25 Pac. 974. ^'^'City of Lead v. Klatt, 13 S. D. 140; s. c. 82 N. W. 391. ""In re John, 55 Kan. 694; s. c. 41 Pac. 956. See contra, State v. McCoy, 116 N. C. 1059; s. c. 21 S. E. 690. But see Board of Police v. Giron, 46 La. An. 1364; s. c. 16 So. 190. It has been held, however, that a city ordinance prescribing a fine of from $5 to $100 is not void where the state law fixes a penalty for the same offense at not exceeding $1,000: City of St. Joseph v. Vesper, 59 Mo. App. 459. And see Kansas City V. Hallett, 59 Mo. App. 160. '«'' State V. Sherrard, 117 N. C. 716; s. c. 23 S. E. 157; Abram v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 818: ^^^ Hewlett V. Camp, 115 Ala. 499; s. c. 22 So. 137. ^^-^ Strauss v. Mayor &c., 97 Ga. 475; s. c. 25 S. E. 329. "^Foster V. Board &c., 102 Cal, 483; s. c. 37 Pac. 763. "^ State V. Payssan, 47 La. An. 1029; s. c. 17 So. 481. An ordinance for drainage into Lake Michigan is not against public policy and not, therefore, void: Rich v. City of Chi- cago, 152 111. 18; s. c. 38 N. E. 255. An ordinance passed by a council in violation of its rules is void: Swin- dell V. State, 143 Ind. 153; s. c. 42 N. E. 528. The constitution of Ida- ho prohibits ordinances in conflict with the general law: In re Riden- baugh (Idaho), 49 Pac. 12; Port Clinton &c. v. Shafer, 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 583. A charter which requires the passage of an ordinance over the mayor's veto on the "next regu- lar meeting," invalidates an ordi- nance passed at the same meeting to which the veto is returned: Glea- son V. Peerless Mfg. Co., 37 N. Y. S. 267; s. c. 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 257. ^^^ Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis. 141; s. c. 18 N. W. 764; Clason V. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307; People v. Throop, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 183; Dunham v. Trustees &c., 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462; People v. City of Rochester, 44 Hun (N. Y.) 166; Mayor &c. v. Beasly, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 232; Mayor &c. v. Winfield, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 707; Long v. Taxing District &c., 7 Lea (Tenn.) 134; Whyte v. Mayor &c., 2 Swan (Tenn.) 364; State v. Mayor &c., 37 N. J. L. 348; State v. Lowery, 49 N. J. L. 391; s. c. 8 Atl. 513; State v. 525 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 500 lack, J., in an able opinion delivered in an Indiana case: "An ordinance can not be held to bo unreasonable which is expressly au- thorized by tlie legislature. The power of a court to declare an ordi- nance unreasonable and therefore void is practically restricted to cases in which the legislature has enacted nothing on the subject- matter of the ordinance, and consequently to cases in which the ordi- nance was passed under the supposed incidental power of the corpora- tion merely."^ ^^ So when the legislature expressly authorizes the municipality to pass any certain ordinance, that ordinance will be upheld, regardless of the opinion of the court as to its reasonableness or unreasonableness.^**'^ This principle was fully discussed in a cele- Mayor &c.,, 47 N. J. L. 286; State v. East Orange, 41 N. J. L. 127; Kip V. Mayor &c., 26 N. J. L. 298; Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77; City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 111. 430; s. c. 26 N. E. 359; Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 111. 405; City of Clinton v. Phillips, 58 111. 102; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; s. c. 30 N. W. 72; Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 291; Commissioners &c. v. Northern Liberties Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; O'Maley v. Borough of Freeport, 96 Pa. St. 24; Kneedler v. Borough of Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368; Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 438; City of Boston V. Shaw, 1 Met. (Mass.) 130; Ped- rick V. Bailey, 12 Gray (Mass.) 161; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 462; Commonwealth v. Da- vis, 140 Mass. 485; s. c. 4 N. E. 577; Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145 Mass. 384; s. c. 14 N. E. 451; Com- monwealth V. Steffee, 7 Bush (Ky.) 161; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606; Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 Cal. 78; State V. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Mayor &c. V. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Kirkham V. Russell, 76 Va. 956; Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110; Davis v. Town of Anita, 73 Iowa 325; s. c. 35 N. W. 244 ; Town of State Center v. Baren- stein, 66 Iowa 249; s. c. 23 N. W. 652; Meyers v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 57 Iowa 555; s. c. 10 N. W. 896; Gil- ham V. Wells, 64 Ga. 192; City of Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. 220. For English cases, see 2 Kyd Corp. 107; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587; Chamberlain of London v. Compton, 7 D. & R. 597; Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52; Gosling v. Veley. 12 Q. B. 328; Master &c. v. Brooking, 3 Q. B. 95; Elwood v. Bullock, 6 Q. B. 383. In the last-cited case an or- dinance imposing uni'easonable re- strictions on the licensing of booths was held invalid. The reasonable- ness and sufficiency of an ordinance are not to be tested in all cases by its application to extreme cases: Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 382; s. c. 19 N. E. 224. Perhaps a proper construction might not admit of their being included within it: Commonweolth v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 52; s. c. 29 N. E. 1146. See also. Walker v. City of Aurora, 140 111. 402; s. c. 29 N. E. 741. ^^^ Coal Float v. City of Jefferson- ville, 112 Ind. 15, 19; s. c. 13 N. E. ns. ^^' Coal Float v. City of Jefferson- ville, 112 Ind. 15; s. c. 13 N. E. 115; Chamberlain v. City of Evansville, 77 Ind. 542; City of Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; State v. Treas- urer &c., 44 N. J. L. 350; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; City of Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 111. 317; City of St. Paul V. Colter, 12 Minn. 41; Haynes v. City of Cape May, 50 N. J. L. 55; s. c. 13 Atl. 231; District of Columbia V. Waggaman, 4 Mackey 328. A reasonable penalty being prescribed 501 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 525 brated and extreme case in Missouri. The charter of the city of St. Louis authorized the city to regulate hawdy-houscs. The court con- strued this provision to allow the passage of an ordinance licensing bawdy-houses, and in discussing the reasonableness of such an ordi- nance it was said: "It is naked assumption to say that any matter allowed by the legislature is against public policy. The best indica- tions of public policy are to be found in the enactments of the legis- lature. To say that such a law is of unvisual tendency is disrespectful to the legislature, who, no doubt, designed to promote the morals and health of the citizens. Whether the ordinance in question is cal- culated to promote the object is a question with which the courts have no coneern."^*'^ But the fact that an ordinance is passed under power conferred by statute does not preclude the question of reasona- bleness, where it leaves the details to be fixed by the ordinance, for the reason that the exercise of a power may be unreasonable. The reasonableness of the power granted is one thing, and the reasonable- ness of the exercise of that power quite another thing.^^^ The rule that an ordinance specifically authorized by a statute can not be im- peached for unreasonableness does not apply to an ordinance for the construction of a sewer, passed under a general power over the sub- ject. Where a grant of power is general in its nature and its exercise may either be reasonable, or arbitrarily unreasonable and oppressive, the grant is subject to the implied limitation that its exercise shall be reasonable, and courts have power to pass upon and determine that question. ^^"^ in an ordinance, it is not unconsti- Ward, 48 S. C. 570 ;.s. c. 26 S, E. 906; tutional because the statute under Skaggs v. City of Martinsville, 140 which it is enacted does not limit Ind. 476; s. c. 39 N. E. 241; Kansas the penalty the ordinance may im- City v. Trieb, 76 Mo. App. 478. pose: State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn. ^**' State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 36, 97; s. c. 22 Atl. 497. It is a part of See Dillon Munic. Corp., § 328. the common law that an ordinance ^^° Hawes v. City of Chicago, 158 not expressly authorized must be 111. 653; s. c. 42 N. E. 373; Wice v. reasonable: Wice v. Chicago &c. R. Chicago &c. R. Co., 193 111. 351; s. c. Co., 193 111. 351; s. c. 61 N. E. 61 N. E. 1084; City of St. Paul v. 1084; Milliken v. City Council &c.. Colter, 12 Minn. 41; Dunham v. 54 Tex. 388; Napman v. People, 19 Trustees &c., 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462; Mich. 352; Hawes v. City of Chicago, State v. Treasurer &c., 44 N. J. L. 158 111. 653; s. e. 42 N. E. 373; To- 350. ledo &c. R. Co. V. City of Jackson- "" Title &c. Co. v. City of Chicago, ville, 67 111. 37; City of Grand Rap- 162 111. 505; s. c. 44 N. E. 832; Vil- ids v. Newton, 111 Mich. 48; s. c. 69 lage of Hyde Park v. Carton, 132 111. N. W. 84; 35 L. R..A. 226; Shea v. 100; s. c. 23 N. E. 590; Hawes v. City of Muncie, 148 Ind. 14; s. c. 46 City of Chicago, 158 111. 653; s. c. 42 N. E. 138; Town of Darlington v. N. E. 373. § 526 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 502 § 526. (h) The same subject continued — Illustrations. — The pre- sumption is always in favor of the reasonableness of the ordinance, and unless it is unreasonable on its face or is proved to be so by proper evidence, the ordinance will be upheld.^"- Of course each case in which the reasonableness of an ordinance is questioned must be de- cided on the facts of that particular case. No general rule can be laid down defining what ordinances are unreasonable and what or- dinances are not. But certain broad principles can be followed. Thus an ordinance must not be so vague that its precise mean- ing can not be ascertained. This question is discussed in the suc- ceeding section. Also the ordinance must not be oppressive. ^^^ It must not be in restraint of trade.^^* It must not be contrary to common right. Thus an ordinance of a Texas city forbidding the renting of private property to lewd women, or to any person for their use, was held to be a prescriptive denial of shelter to that class, and null and void as in contravention of common right.^^^ It must "''Van Hook v. City of Selma, 70 Ala. 361; State v. Inhabitants &c., 53 N. J. L. 132; s. c. 20 Atl. 1076; Com- monwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. Cf. City of St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; City of St. Louis v. Knox, 6 Mo. App. 247; Clason v. City of Mil- waukee, 30 Wis. 316; Moore v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 12 App. D. C. 537. An ordinance regularly passed and signed will not be held unreasonable except from its inherent character, or from evidence of its operation: State V. City of Elizabeth, 58 N. J. L. 619; s. c. 34 Atl. 146. "^ Mayor &c. v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Mayor &c. v. Winfield, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 707; City of St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Commissioners V. Northern Liberties Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318. An ordinance under im- plied power may be declared by the court as unreasonable and oppres- sive: Skinker v. Heman, 2 Mo. App. Repr. 1095; Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Town of Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421; s. c. 45 N. B. 587; 35 L. R. A. 684; City of Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 507. ^"'Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 111. 405; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606; Caldwell v. City of Alton, 33 111. 417; Borough of Sayre v. Phillips, 148 Pa. St. 482; s. c. 24 Atl. 76. A license fee of $10 per day, making no dis- crimination on account of the extent of business, or length of time to be carried on, is unnecessarily burden- some, in restraint of trade and pro- hibitory: City of Carrollton v. Baz- zette, 159 111. 284; s. c. 42 N. E. 837. And so an ordinance fixing license of itinerant merchants at $200 per month is unreasonable and exorbi- tant: City of Peoria v. Gugenheim, 61 111. App. 374. A license to tran- sients of $250 per month, or $25 per day, is unreasonable and void: City of Ottumwa v. Zekind, 95 Iowa 622; s. c. 64 N. W. 646. And so is a li- cense of $10 per day on itinerant merchants: City of Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 111. 284; s. c. 42 N. E. 837. ^^"Milliken v. City Council &c., 54 Tex. 388. See also. State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297, and cases cited post. An ordinance prohibiting any person, firm or corporation from keeping open, within the limits of a city, cer- tain enumerated stores, to expose, or offer for sale, or give away mer- chandise therein on Sunday, is void as to dealers in clothing: City of 503 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 526 be impartial and general in its operation. ^'^'^ So far as it restricts the absolute dominion of an owner over his property it should furnish a uniform rule of action, and its application can not be left to the arbi- trary will of the governing authorities.^"^ Thus, an ordinance which Denver v. Bach, 26 Colo. 530; s. c. 58 Pac. 1089. An ordinance prohib- iting cars to be run without vesti- bules during winter months is in- valid: City of Yonkers v. Yonkers R. Co., 64 N. Y. S. 955; s. c. 57 App. Div. (N. Y.) 271. An ordinance pro- hibiting laundries, except in brick and stone buildings, is unreasonable in that it does not apply to other kinds of business using machinery: City of Shreveport v. Robinson, 51 La. An. 1314; s. c. 26 So. 664. An ordinance regulating the weight of bakers' bread is void: City of Buf- falo V. Collins Baking Co., 57 N. Y. S. 347; s. c. 39 App. Div. (N. Y.) 432. And so is an ordinance prohibiting the sale of loaves of bread weighing less than one and a half pounds and providing a penalty: City of Buffalo V. Collins Baking Co., supra. An ordinance making it unlawful to cover any package or parcel of fruit, etc., with any colored netting or other material having a tendency to conceal the true color or quality of such goods sold or offered for sale has been held to be unreasonable and void: Frost v. City of Chicago, 178 111. 250; s. c. 52 N. E. 869. 196 pirst Municipality v. Blineau, 3 La. An. 688. An ordinance making it a misdemeanor to drive faster than an ordinary gait in the city streets is unreasonable if applied to a fire-department in driving to a fire: City of Kansas City v. McDon- ald, 60 Kan. 481; s. c. 57 Pac. 123. An ordinance relating to the license of milk-dealers must be uniform; and if it undertakes to exempt cer- tain persons of a class, — as, a milk- dealer having less than two cows, — who sell to their neighbors by hand, it is void : Pierce v. City of Aurora, 81 111. App. 670. An ordinance pro- hibiting persons temporarily resid- ing in a city from selling goods at auction without license is void where residents are not required to pay license: City of Carrollton v. Baz- zette, 159 111. 284; s. c. 42 N. E. 837. It has been held that requiring tran- sient merchants to pay a license does not discriminate in favor of residents: City of Ottumwa v. Ze- kind, 95 Iowa 622; s. c. 64 N. W. 646. An ordinance prohibiting the pur- chase of lots for burial purposes within the corporate limits, but per- mitting further burials on lots al- ready owned, is discriminative and therefore unreasonable: Ex parte Bohen, 115 Cal. 372; s. c. 47 Pac. 55; 36 L. R. A. 618. ^" State V. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609; s. c. 14 S. E. 387; citing Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 598; s. c. 10 N. E. 464; City of Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112; s. c. 28 N. E. 312; Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1064; May v. People, 1 Colo. 157; s. c. 27 Pac. 1010; Mayor &c. v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Anderson v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 173; s. c. 19 Pac. 719; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; s. c. 30 N. W. 72; Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 111. 405; Village of Braceville v. Doherty, 30 111. App. 645; Barthet v. City of New Orleans, 24 Fed. 563; Bills v. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221; s. c. 20 N. E. 115; Town of Lake View v. Letz, 44 111. 81; City of Evansville v. Martin, 41 Ind. 145; Horr & Bemis Munic. Police Ord., § 13. See also. State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962; s. c. 12 S. E. 598; State v. Hunter, 106 N. C. 796; s. c. 11 S. E. 366. A license fee of not less than $1 and not exceeding $100 for those engaged in transient business as au- § 526 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 50-i proviflos that no person shall erect, add to, or generally change any building without first obtaining the permission of the board of alder- men, is void for the reason indicated.^"® An ordinance prohibiting any carriage, hack or vehicle, used to carry passengers or freight for hire, from stopping or standing on specified streets in front of any public hotel, except when actually engaged in receiving or delivering passen- gers or freight, and making it a misdemeanor, is unreasonable and oppressive.^"'' An ordinance requiring a street-car company to sprinkle its track, and providing a penalty of twenty-five dollars for each breach, and twenty-five dollars per day for its continued viola- tion, with a further provision that if the penalty is not paid officers shall have power to stop the running of cars, is unreasonable and void.^**" An ordinance imposing a fee of one-half cent per gallon for inspecting kerosene oil where no restrictions are imposed upon the inspector and no rules prescribed regulating his conduct, or the frequency of inspection, is void as oppressive on trade and commerce, it appearing that the fee is eight and one-third per cent, of the value of the oil inspected.^"^ An ordinance compelling the construction of a cement sidewalk in lieu of a substantial plank walk, comparatively new, is unreasonable and void.^°^ And so is an ordinance prohibiting the importation of second-hand clothing and furniture for the purpose of sale.^"^ Where a license fee sufficient to pay the reasonable cost of issuing is authorized it can not be made for the purpose of revenue.^"* An ordinance is not invalid as oppressive and unreasonable where the improvement is in the discretion of the city and it is presumed de- fects in the improvement will be remedied.-*'^ An ordinance impos- ing an inspection tax of fifty cents for each pole of an electric com- pany when the actual cost of inspection does not exceed five cents is unreasonable.^*"' The following ordinances have been held to be reasonable : An ordinance compelling a passenger to use his transfer within a time-limit and prohibiting him from transferring or selling thorities may direct is void: State ™' Hawes v. City of Chicago, 158 V. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478; s. c. 33 Atl. 111. 653; s. c. 42 N. E. 373. 519. -'"^ State v. Taft, 118 N. C. 1190; s. ^"^ State V. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609; c. 23 S. E. 970. s. c. 14 S. E. 387. =" State v. Glavin, 67 Conn. 29; s. "^ Ex parte Battis, 40 Tex. Cr. App. c. 34 Atl. 708. 112; s. c. 48 S. W. 513. '^"'Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of '°° Appeal of Chester Traction Co., Chicago, 184 111. 154; s. c. 56 N. E. 6 Del. Co. Ct. (Pa.) 397, 587; s. c. 410. 40 W. N. C. (Pa.) 183. '-"•'City of Saginaw v. Swift Elec- 201 Ford v. Standard Oil Co., 53 N. trie L. Co., 113 Mich. 660; s. c. 72 Y. S. 48; s. c. 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) N. W. 6. 596. 505 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 527 it, or giving it away;^"' an ordinance prohibiting the sale of lemon- ade, etc., by the device of throwing at a dummy without a license;-"'' an ordinance requiring a railroad company to light its track with electricity within twenty days after notice of the passage of the ordinance;-"^ an ordinance estahlishing a hack-stand ;2i'' an ordi- nance requiring bicycle riders to ring a bell upon approach towards cross walks ;^^^ an ordinance making it unlawful to make a noise on the streets and sidewalks by the use of drums or musical instruments, or otherwise, of such character, extent and duration as to annoy and disturb others ;^^^ an ordinance limiting the speed of trains to five miles an hour and requiring a bell to be rung while in the city lim- its ;-^^ an ordinance requiring a street-car company to sprinkle its tracks on a street in which its track is laid — not only reasonable, but a proper exercise of police power ;^^* an ordinance prohibiting a person going on the premises of a railroad company to solicit patron- age for a hotel ;^^^ a license of peddlers exempting mechanics of the state selling their own products and farmers selling their produce;-^® or requiring irregular dealers, having no regular place of business, to pay a license in excess of that paid by regular merchants ;"^^ restrain- ing certain occupations, — such as shoddy- and carpet-cleaning in cer- tain locations ;^^'^ or keeping a livery-stable in a certain locality.^^^ § 527. (i) The same subject continued — Reasonableness a question of law. — It is, of course, a question of law and not of fact, for the court and not for the jury, whether any specific ordinance is so unreasonable as to be void."^** This is the well-established doctrine of the cases in """ Ex parte Lorenzen, 128 Cal. 431; =^« People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428, s. c. 61 Pac. 68. s. c. 64 N. W. 333. =•>' Jones V. Foster, 59 N. Y. S. 738; =" Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412; s. c. 43 App. Dlv. (N. Y.) 33. s. c. 44 Pac. 725. ^""Village of St. Marys v. Lake -^^^ Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal. 326; Erie &c. R. Co., 60 Ohio St. 136; s. c. s. c. 41 Pac. 411. 53 N. E. 795. =^» City of Chicago v. Stratton, 58 -'"City Council &c. v. Parker, 114 III. App. 539. Ala. 118; s. c. 21 So. 452. --"City of Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 ="City of Emporia v. Wagoner, 6 N. Y. 591; Mayor &c. v. Thorne, 7 Kan. App. 659; s. c. 49 Pac. 701. Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 261; Dunham v. ='Mn re Gribben, 5 Okla. 379; s. c. Trustees &c., 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462: 47 Pac. 1074. Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 2'^ Washington &c. R. Co. v. Lacey, Wend. (N. Y.) 100; Austin v. Mur- 94 Va. 460; s. c. 26 S. E. 834. ray, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 121; City of =" State V. Canal &c. R. Co., 50 La. Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met. (Mass.) 130; An. 1189; s. c. 24 So. 265. Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. '''City of Laddonia v. Poor, 73 Mo, (Mass.) 462; In re Vandine, 6 Pick. App. 465. (Mass.) 187; Commonwealth v. Stod- § 528 PUBLIC CORrORATlONS. 506 England as well as in America, but the contrary view has been as- serted in a Wisconsin case where the validity of an ordinance in- tended to protect the city from inundation was called into question. The court held that testimony relating to the reasonableness of the ordinance could properly be presented to the jury.^^^ This decision is anomalous, however, and is probably entitled to but little weight. While the question of the reasonableness of an ordinance is a ques- tion of law for the court, yet the facts which may or may not make an ordinance reasonable, if controverted, must be determined by the jury.--- The motives of members of the council in the passage of an ordinance, in the absence of fraud will not be inquired into if the ordinance is lawful on its face, passed in due form, and is within the scope of the powers vested in the council; nor are the motives of the beneficiaries important.--^ § 528. (j) Vagueness of the ordinance. — It is manifest that an or- dinance must be certain and definite in order to be reasonable. Accord- ingly the courts have often held ordinances void as being vague and indefinite.^^* An ordinance providing that for certain offenses the der, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562; Commis- sioners V. Nortliern Liberties Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; Kneedler v. Bo- rougli of Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368; Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 291; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606; State v. East Orange, 41 N. J. L. 127; State v. Mayor &c., 37 N. J. L. 348; Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N. J. L. 196. --'■ Clason V. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316. ^-- City of Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Ass'n (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 1023. '''Wood V. City of Seattle, 23 Wash. 1; s. c. 62 Pac. 135; Dreyfus V. Lonergan, 73 Mo. App. 336; Moore V. Commissioners &c., 62 N. J. L. 386, 792; s. c. 41 Atl. 946; Kittinger V. Buffalo &c. Co., 160 N. Y. 377; s. c. 54 N. E. 1081. It would seem to be a pertinent inquiry whether the doc- trine laid down in the text should be applied where the action of the coun- cil is contractual in its nature, rather than purely legislative. And even where the action is of a mixed nature, as in the granting of fran- chises, the strict application of the rule is, to say the least, of doubtful propriety. "^Tappan v. Young, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 357; San Francisco &c. Factory V. Brickwedel, 60 Cal. 166; Becker v. City of Washington, 94 Mo. 375, 380; s. c. 7 S. W. 291; Commonwealth v. Roy, 140 Mass. 432; s. c. 4 N. E. 814; Town of State Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa 249; s. c. 23 N. W. 652; Bills V. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221; s. c. 20 N. E. 115; City of Helena v. Gray, 7 Mont. 486; s. c. 17 Pac. 564. A penal ordinance which fails to cast on any particular person or persons the duty of making repairs on leaky vaults is too vague and uncertain: State V. Forman, 50 La. An. 1022; s. c. 24 So. 603. An ordinance impos- ing a fine of not more than $50 for a violation is void for uncertainty: State V. Irvin, 126 N. C. 989; s. c. 35 S. E. 430. An ordinance may be void for uncertainty, as where it pre- scribes that an awning may be upon a suitable frame: State v. Clarke, 69 Conn. 371; s. c. 37 Atl. 975. 507 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 529 offender should pay not more than fifty dollars or suffer imprisonment not to exceed one month was held in North Carolina to be void for vagueness and uncertainty.^-^ And in the same state an ordinance providing that for certain disorderly conduct the offender might be fined by the mayor not more than five dollars was also considered void for uncertainty.^-" But in an Alabama case an ordinance which imposed a penalty not exceeding a fixed sum was upheld as sufficiently certain. ^^^ In accordance with these principles the weight of author- ity is that the amount of the fine imposed by the ordinance must be fixed thereby and can not be left to the discretion of an officer.^^^ An ordinance providing that no occupant of land abutting on a pri- vate way shall suffer any filth to remain on that part of the way ad- joining his land is not open to the objection of indefiniteness because it does not fix a time beyond which it shall not be allowed to remain. The words "suffer to remain" imply an opportunity to remove and a failure to do so.^^^ § 529. (k) Ordinances void for want of notice. — As we have al- ready seen all ordinances are not strictly legislative in their nature, and frequently they affect the individual and property rights of per- sons, in which case it is essential that the persons whose rights are affected by the ordinance shall have notice. Thus, an ordinance which practically adjudicates property-rights is invalid unless all persons who are interested in the subject-matter have notice, actual or constructive. ^'^^ An ordinance establishing a building-line which encroaches on private property, passed without notice, can not be en- forced. ^^^ The charter, or general statute, frequently requires that ordinances of certain character, such as granting permission to a "^ State V. Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877. fine of not more than five pounds, an ^-*' State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883. ordinance fixing a fine "not exceed- And a town ordinance which pro- ing 51." was sustained: Piper v. vided that "any person whose duty Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624. it shall be to make such alterations, --•* State v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L. 262, and who shall refuse to do so after 269; Commissioners v. Harris, 7 due notice thereof, shall be fined a Jones L. (N. C.) 281; State v. Cren- sum not exceeding five dollars, and shaw, 94 N. C. 877; State v. Cainan, one dollar for each and every day 94 N. C. 883; State v. Treasurer &c., he may neglect to make such re- 53 N. J. L. 329; s. c. 21 Atl. 304. pairs," was thought to leave the fine '--" Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 and penalty uncertain in amount and Mass. 52; s. c. 29 N. E. 1146. to be void: State v. Rice, 97 N. C, -™City of Cape May v. Cape May 421; s. c. 2 S. E. 180. &c. R. Co., 60 N. J. L. 224; s. c. 37 --' Mayor &c. v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55. Atl. 892. So also, under the English statute -^^ Byrnes v. Mayor &c., 64 N. J. L. authorizing an ordinance imposing a 210; s. c. 44 Atl. 857. § 530 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 508 railway to occupy the streets, and other franchises of a similar nature, shall be based on the consent of a specified number of the property-owners on the line of street affected, or that before an ordi- nance of a certain nature shall be passed notice thereof shall be given in advance, or that a certain period shall elapse after the introduction of an ordinance and its publication before it shall be put upon its final passage. An ordinance declaring that a street-railway might locate its line on certain streets without petition or publication of notice thereof is a nullity.^^- In the very nature of things it would be manifestly unjust, outside of constitutional guaranties, that indi- vidual rights of persons should be injuriously affected without an opportunity to be heard. § 530. (1) Ordinances granting arbitrary power. — Ordinances which invest a city council, or a board of trustees, or officers, with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid.^^^ But it is only where the municipal authorities are invested with a power that is purely arbitrary, and which they may exercise or not, as their will may dictate, and the beneficiary appears to be entitled to personal favors, that the rule applies. Ordinances, however, must be general, and officers charged with the duty of enforcing them must be vested with more or less discretion. Many things detrimental to the public peace and enjoyment, in one locality, may not be so in another, and so as to time and environments. Hence an ordinance prohibiting awnings without the consent of certain officers is valid.-^* And so as to orations and harangues in a public park, or common, or other public grounds ;^^^ or the beating of a drum or tambourine on a street =^3=' Harvey v. Aurora &c. R. Co., 186 72; City of Plymouth v. Schultheis, 111. 283; s. c. 57 N. E. 857. Notice 135 Ind. 701; s. c. 35 N. E. 14; Town of the passage of an ordinance for of State Center v. Barenstein, 66 the costs of an improvement, or es- Iowa 249; s. c. 23 N. W. 652; Com- tablishing a district sewer, held not missioners v. Northern Liberties Gas required in Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; Austin v. Mur- 534; s. c. 57 S. W. 559. As to what ray, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 121, 126; State is sufficient notice of the introduc- v. Mahner, 43 La. An. 496; s. c. 9 So. tion of an ordinance granting a f ran- 480; State v. Dulaney, 43 La. An. chise, see Wood v. City of Seattle, 23 500; s. c. 9 So. 481; Yick Wo v. Hop- Wash. 1; s. c. 62 Pac. 135. kins, 118 U. S. 356; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1064; -■'^ Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of City of Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. Cicero, 176 111. 9; s. c. 51 N. E. 758; 598; s. c. 10 N. E. 464; Mayor &c. v. City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 111. Radecke, 49 Md. 217. 430; s. c. 26 N. E. 359; Rich v. City "'* Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray of Naperville, 42 111. App. 222; In re (Mass.) 161. Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; s. c. 30 N. W. ='' Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156 509 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS, § -'531 or sidewalk ;^^*' or prohibiting the erection and repair of a wooden building, or an}' building ;-^^ or forbidding the occupancy of a place on the street;-^" or forbidding the keeping of swine ;^^^ or forbidding any one remaining in a public market more than twenty minutes;^**' or prohibiting the carrying-on of a laundry ;~^^ or retailing liquor.^*^ An ordinance is not void for uncertainty in that it gives the mayor the discretion to impose a penalty of either fine or imprisonment.^*^ § 531. (m) Ordinances delegating power. — Wliere the law has placed in the city council the power of legislation, in so far as its local affairs are concerned, or in other words has, by special grant, permitted a part of its sovereign power of legislation to be exercised by the local legislative body, prescribed as to territory and scope, this power so delegated can not be redelegated to some other body, committee, board, bureau, or officer. Besides, it is not possible for an executive or judicial officer to exercise legislative functions. Hence the council can not delegate general power to the mayor to grant a license, or fix the fees;^** and so an order for an assessment for an improvement "where necessary" is void;-*^ and so is an ordinance for an improvement, excepting such portions as have already been done in a suitable manner ;^*^ or for improving such portions of a sidewalk as the city engineer may direct ;^*'^ or in such manner as the city superintendent shall direct.^*® The power of assessment is ref- erable to the power of taxation, and is itself a legislative power which must not only find express authority for its exercise, but which can be neither exercised by an executive officer, nor delegated to such Mass. 57; s. c. 30 N. E. 79; Common- v. Bering, 84 Wis. 585; s. c. 54 N. W. wealth V. Davis, 140 Mass. 485; s. c. 1104; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; s. 4 N. E. 577. c. 30 N. W. 72. ^^« Vance v. Hadfield, 22 N. Y. St. "'State v. Higgs, 126 N. C. 1014; 858. s. c. 35 S. E. 473. ^"Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 125; s. c. -" Naegle v. City of Centralia, 81 13 Pac. 310; Hine v. City of New 111. App. 334. Haven, 40 Conn. 478; Commissioners -"Richardson v. Heydenfeldt, 46 &c. v. Covey, 74 Md. 2G2; s. c. 22 Atl. Cal. 68. 266. ^^''Foss V. City of Chicago, 56 111. 23S Nightingale, Petitioner, 11 Pick. 354. (Mass.) 168. =^"Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush (Ky.) '"'^ Inhabitants &c. v. Kennard, 151 464. Mass. 563 ; s. c. 24 N. E. 860. =** Thompson v. Schermerhorn, G -'"Commonwealth v. Brooks, 109 N. Y. 92; Phelps v. Mayor &c., 112 N. Mass. 355. Y. 216, 221; s. c. 19 N. E. 408; City =" Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. of Kankakee v. Potter, 119 111. 324; 27; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 357. s. c. 10 N. E. 212; McCrowell v. City ■■^=Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. of Bristol, 89 Va. 652; s. c. 16 S. E. 208; s. c. 24 Pac. 747. But see State 867. § 532 PUBLIC COUrOKATlONS. 510 officer, by the legislative body of the municipality.^*^ An attempt to delegate such power to an executive officer is such covert, irresponsi- ble, discretionary power as is wholly inconsistent with a proper exer- cise of the high and sovereign power of taxation or eminent domain. It might be used, and it does not affect the principle whether it was so used or not, as a cover to an unfair assessment. It might be used as an instrument of favoritism in letting contracts for work.-^° A provi- sion in specifications for extra work, such as the superintendent of streets and the city engineer may require, and to be paid for pro rata, renders the proceedings void.^^^ § 532. (n) Ordinances which are contracts. — Where rights and privileges have been lawfully granted to and accepted by either a pri- vate or public corporation, and valuable improvements have been made on the faith of the grant, a contract is thereby entered into, and it can not be impaired by a law of the state, or by a municipality, where the right of repeal or alteration has not been reserved. ^^^ The passing of a resolution by the council letting a contract for light- ing is a ministerial act in the nature of a business transaction.^^* Where an ordinance grants a franchise to a water company and per- mits the company to charge a fixed price for water and there is no power of repeal reserved, it becomes a contract, or at least the council has no right to reduce the price one half.^"* An ordinance passed under power given by the legislature which grants to a railroad com- pany the right to construct its road upon a public landing and which prohibits the use of the track during specified hours is not only con- ^^ Bolton V. Gilleran, 105 Cal. 244, leans &c. Co. v. Louisiana &c. Co., 248; s. c. 38 Pac. 881. 115 U. S. 650; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 252; New ^'""Foss V. City of Chicago, 56 111. Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 354. 115 U. S. 674; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 273; Sioux =" Ferine &c. Co. v. City of Pasa- City &c. R. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U. dena, 116 Cal. 6; s. c. 47 Pac. 777; S. 98; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 226; St. Louis Bolton V. Gilleran, 105 Cal. 244; s. c. v. Western U. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92; 38 Pac. 881. s. c. 13 S. Ct. 485; Saginaw Gas &c. ''^^ Baltimore Trust &c. Co. v. Mayor Co. v. City of Saginaw, 28 Fed. 529; &c., 64 Fed. 153; Dartmouth College Coastline R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 30 V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Chicago Fed. 646; Citizens' St. R. Co. v. City v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50; Shields v Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; New Jersey v Yord, 95 U. S. 104; Railroad Co. v Richmond, 96 U. S. 521; Wright v Nagle, 101 U. S. 791; Greenwood v Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; New Or leans &c. R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U S. 501; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 1009; New Or of Memphis, 53 Fed. 715; State v. Corrigan Con. St. R. Co., 85 Mo. 263; City of Burlington v. Burlington St. R. Co., 49 Iowa 144. "'"'■^ Seitzinger v. Borough of Tama- qua, 187 Pa. St. 539; s. c. 41 Atl. 454. -^^City of Ashland v. Wheeler, 88 Wis. 607; s. c. 60 N. W. 818. 511 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 533 tractual but is also an exercise of police power for the protection of the public.'^^ § 533. (o) Ordinances as to improvements — Valid. — Where an or- dinance describes the nature, character, locality and description of a proposed improvement, with reasonable certainty, it is sufficient and is valid. ^"*^ An ordinance for an assessment for a street-improve- ment is sufficient as to the nature, character, and locality of an im- provement, if it refers to the ordinance ordering the same, where the description therein is sufficient.^^'^ An ordinance specifying the ma- terial to be used, but not the character of the material to be used, is a sufficient compliance with the charter.^ ^® An ordinance for a street- extension will not be held invalid for failure to designate the grade of the street, and whether it is to be paved or not, where the amount apportioned on the property is not left in doubt.'^" ^^^ Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Hood, 94 Fed. 618; s. c. 36 C. C. A. 423. ^•^ Hynes v. City of Chicago, 175 111. 56; s. c. 51 N. E. 705; Delamater v. City of Cliicago, 158 III. 575; s. c. 42 N. E. 444; Vane v. City of Evans- ton, 150 111. 616; s. c. 37 N. E. 901; City of Kankakee v. Potter, 119 111. 324; s. c. 10 N. E. 212; Adams Co. v. City of Quincy, 130 111. 566; s. c. 22 N. E. 624; Woods v. City of Chicago, 135 111. 582; s. c. 26 N. E. 608; Kim- ble V. City of Peoria, 140 111. 157; s. c. 29 N. B. 723; Otis v. City of Chi- cago, 161 111. 199; s. c. 43 N. E. 715; Cass V. People, 166 111. 126; s. c. 46 N. E. 729; Pearce v. Village of Hyde Park, 126 111. 287; s. c. 18 N. E. 824; Cramer v. City of Charleston, 176 111. 507; s. c. 52 N. E. 73. =^'McManus v. People, 183 111. 391; s. c. 55 N. E. 886. ^« Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. He- zel, 155 Mo. 391; s. c. 56 S. W. 449. '^^ Pearson v. City of Chicago, 162 111. 383; s. c. 44 N. E. 739. An ordi- nance providing for the construction of a sewer from its outfall at the north branch of the Chicago river is not ambiguous where the city had by a former ordinance located the channel of the river, the river be- ing a well-defined and well-known stream with a natural bed and chan- nel: Bickerdike v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 280; s. c. 56 N. E. 1096. The description of a street improvement as extending on a specified street from the south line of a street-rail- way right of way to the north line of another street-railway right of way on another named street, is not void for indefiniteness: Rawson v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 87; s. c. 57 N. E. 35. The grade of a street is suflSciently described in an ordinance whereby it is fixed on certain heights above low-water mark, by means of which it can be definitely deter- mined: Mead v. City of Chicago, 186 111. 54; s. c. 57 N. E. 824. An ordi- nance giving the height of a curb at the back and inside of the gutter at certain points and providing for a uniform slope, is valid: Mead v. City of Chicago, 186 111. 54; s. c. 57 N. E. 824. An ordinance providing for an assessment to pay for an im- provement made under an ordinance subsequently declared void is not void for a failure to describe the na- ture and character of the improve- ment: Hull V. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 185 111. 150; s. c. 57 N. E. 1. An ordinance is sufficiently certain in the description of a sewer where 534 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 512 § 534. (p) Ordinances as to improvements — Invalid. — An ordi- naucc prescribing that curbstones shall be imbedded on flat stones without stating what kinds is not sufficient and is void;^^" and it must also describe the height of the curb.-®^ There should be no variance between the ordinance and the estimates on which it is based. ^''- A municipal corporation can not under guise of paying for a street- improvement collect a fund in advance to be used at some indefinite it places the beginning at the inter- ordinances were held sufficient as to section of the center lines of two streets and extends along the center lines of streets named to a point of connection with another sewer, giv- ing its depth at the point of begin- ning and at its intersections with cross streets: Ryder's Estate v. City of Alton, 175 111. 94; s. c. 51 N. E. 821. An ordinance describing the size, material and manner of con- struction of a catch-basin, specifying that it shall be built on a bottom of two-inch pine plank spiked to im- bedded stringers, is sufficient with- out describing the stringers: Village of Hinsdale v. Shannon, 182 111. 312; s. c. 55 N. E. 327. An ordinance de- scribing a grade measured from a plane of low-water mark in Lake Michigan in 1847 as established by a certain board, was held sufficient, as it was not necessary that the object from which the survey was to be made should have been es- tablished by ordinance: Chicago &c. R. Co. V. City of Chicago, 184 111. 154; s. c. 56 N. E. 410. A caption to an ordinance entitled "An ordinance for the construc- tion of a pipe sewer .... with manholes and catch-basins com- plete," is sufficient: Village of Hins- dale V. Shannon, 182 111. 312; s. c. 55 N. E. 327. An ordinance pro- viding for sewers in several streets is not void as providing for a double improvement: Beach v. People, 157 111. 659; s. c. 41 N. E. 1117; City of Springfield v. Green, 120 111. 269; s. c. 11 N. E. 261; Village of Hinsdale V. Shannon, 182 111. 312; s. c. 55 N. E. 327. In the following cases the the description of the improve- ment: Sawyer v. City of Chicago, 183 111. 57; s. c. 55 N. E. 645; In re Beech wood Ave., 194 Pa. St. 86; s. c. 45 Atl. 127; People v. Delaware &c. R. Co., 159 N. Y. 545; s. c. 54 N. E. 1093; City of Louisville v. Western Bank, 21 Ky. L. 1075; s. c. 54 S. W. 15; Bickerdike v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 280; s. c. 56 N. E. 1096. That the outlet of a sewer will be insuffi- cient does not render the ordinance or the assessment invalid: Bicker- dike V. City of Chicago, 185 111. 280; s. c. 56 N. E. 1096. That the com- missioners may at any time before final report enlarge or reduce the taxing-district, see City of St. Louis V. Brown, 155 Mo. 545; s. c. 56 S. W. 298. Ordinance for public improve- ment under Ky. Stat, § 2834,— see City of Louisville v. Selvage, 21 Ky. L. 349; s. c. 51 S. W. 447. =""> Lusk V. City of Chicago, 176 111. 207; s. c. 52 N. E. 54; Otis v. City of Chicago, 161 111. 199; s. c. 43 N. E. 715; City of Kankakee v. Potter, 119 111. 324; s. c. 10 N. E. 212; Levy v. City of Chicago, 113 111. 650; City of Sterling v. Gait, 117 111. 11; s. c. 7 N. E. 471; Cass v. People, 166 111. 126; s. c. 46 N. B. 729. ^" Essroger v. City of Chicago, 185 111. 420; s. c. 56 N. E. 1086; Jarrett V. City of Chicago, 181 111. 242; s. c. 54 N. E. 946; Mills v. City of Chi- cago, 182 111. 249; s. c. 54 N. E. 987; Cruickshank v. City of Chicago, 181 111. 415; s. c. 54 N. E. 997. ^''- Mead v. City of Chicago, 186 111. 54; s. c. 57 N. E. 824. 513 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 535 time.^^^ Where a resolution is adopted declaring a necessity for certain improvements, and an ordinance is passed providing for the improvements and a contract is made and subsequently the grade is established and a substantial change made the proceedings prior thereto are void.-*^* § 535. (q) Miscellaneous ordinances — Valid and invalid. — An or- dinance giving a gas company the right to lay pipes in the streets is not void because it fails to reserve the right in the city to determine what streets shall be used.^**^ An ordinance denying the right of re- newing a license is not illegal.^*'*^ The granting by ordinance of power to a street-railway company to acquire by purchase or other- wise, any existing railway, or part thereof, does not create a monopoly and trust.^^'^ The following ordinances have been held invalid : An ordinance regulating fares to be charged by a street-railway outside the city limits ;^®^ an ordinance providing for the payment of inter- est on warrants for public work to be returned to the city on final payment, under a constitutional provision prohibiting the city from loaning its money on credit ;^'^^ an ordinance taxing vehicles kept for public use where not taxed by the state ;^'^*' an ordinance providing for imprisonment under a fine without giving an opportunity to pay the fine as provided by the charter ;^^^ an ordinance providing for a license and an illegal method of enforcement;^"^ an ordinance for the sale of impounded stock, where no method is provided for a judicial hearing and judgment.-'^® An illegal ordinance is wholly inoperative, and can not be rendered valid by an ordinance continuing in force all existing ordinances until altered or repealed.-^* ='«" State V. District Court &c., 80 ^"^ City of South Pasadena v. Los Minn. 293; s. c. 83 N. W. 183. Angeles &c. R. Co., 109 Cal. 315; s. c. -°* Whittaker v. City of Deadwood, 41 Pac. 1093. 12 S. D. 608; s. c. 82 N. W. 202. ^''^ Moran v. Thompson, 20 Wash. -"' City of Kalamazoo v. Kalamazoo 525; s. c. 56 Pac. 29. &c. Co., 124 Mich. 74; s. c. 82 N. W. "'"Ex parte Terrell, 40 Tex. Cr, 811. App. 28; s. c. 48 S. W. 504. 266 pfg^fgrling v. Mayor &c., 88 Md. =" Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336; 475; s. c. 41 Atl. 778. s. c. 32 S. E. 86. See Papworth v. '"Wood V. City of Seattle, 23 City of Fitzgerald, 106 Ga. 378; s. c. Wash. 1; s. c. 62 Pac. 135. As to 32 S. E. 363. validity of ordinances under Ky. "''- German &c. Ins. Co. v. City of Stat, §§ 2834, 2783, see Louisville Minden, 51 Neb. 870; s. c. 71 N. W. Steam Forge Co. v. Anderson, 22 Ky. 995. L. 397; s. c. 57 S. W. 617. Require- "'^ Armstrong v. Brown, 20 Ky. L. ments as to validity under N. J. Gen. 1766; s. c. 50 S. W. 17. St., p. 575, — see Flood v. Atlantic ""* City of Omaha v. Harmon, 58 City, 63 N. J. L. 530; s. c. 42 Atl. 829. Neb. 339; s. c. 78 N. W. 623. 1 Smith — 33 § 536 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 514 § 536. (r) Jurisdictional matters in relation to ordinances. — A court can not enjoin the passage of an ordinance for non-compliance with the rules, as such non-compliance merely relates to the valid- ity.-^® Neither will a court of equity enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance on the ground of its invalidity, as in such case there is an adequate and complete remedy at law.^'^^ As a general rule, it may be stated that a court of equity will not determine as a matter of law whether an ordinance is valid or invalid. ^^''' Where an ordinance is, in effect, a contract entered into between the municipality and a third party, and no fraud or palpable abuse of discretion appears, the only question for judicial cognizance is whether there has been a violation of legal principles, or neglect of prescribed legal formalities in enter- ing into the contract. ^'^® On an appeal from a fine for violation of a city ordinance the supreme court can not inquire into the legality of the proceeding, or correctness of the judgment, when the legality or constitutionality of the ordinance is not raised.^'^^ Courts will not review the proceedings of a city council by preventing the carry- ing-out of an ordinance for public improvement unless it is so unrea- sonable as to be void.^^" A resolution of a common council, modify- ing a contract procured by means of fraud and corruption, may be declared by the courts to be void ; and such defense is available by the city when sued by the contractor upon the contract. In such case the resolution is part of the administrative duties of the council and not legislative.^®^ A member of the city council who has voted for the passage of an ordinance may assert its invalidity as a taxpayer and citizen. ^®^ An ordinance though passed in excess of power in the council can not be collaterally attacked by the city.^®^ § 537. (s) Curative ordinances. — It sometimes happens that an ordinance is within the scope of power, express or implied, granted to the council, but by reason of some informality in the passage, or of some other preliminary step prescribed by the charter not being taken, "^ State v. Superior Court &c., 105 "^ State v. Hohn, 50 La. An. 432; Wis. 651; s. c. 81 N. W. 1046. s. c. 23 So. 966. '"'= Mayor &c. v. Patterson, 109 Ga. -'" Field v. Village of Western 370; s. c. 34 S. E. 600. Springs, 181 111. 186; s. c. 54 N. E. "-" Coykendall v. Hood, 55 N. Y. S. 929. 718; s. c. 36 App. Div. (N. Y.) 558. -"Weston v. City of Syracuse. 158 ^'« Oakley v. City of Atlantic City, N. Y. 274; s. c. 53 N. E. 12; Talcott 63 N. J. L. 127; s. c. 44 Atl. 651. Cf. V. City of Buffalo, 125 N. Y. 280; s. State V. Inhabitants &c., 60 N. J. L. c. 26 N. E. 263. 402; s. c. 38 Atl. 636; State v. Board =" Stadler v. Fahey, 87 111. App. &c., 57 N. J. L. 588; s. c. 31 Atl. 454; 411. State V. Mayor &c., 58 N. J. L. 262; -'"Vicksburg &c. R. Co. v. Mayor s. c. 33 Atl. 740. &c., 48 La. An. 1102; s. c. 20 So. 664. 515 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 538 its validity as a binding contract is open to attack. In such case the ordinance may be rendered valid by a curative ordinance, subject, of course, to intervening rights. Where the city has authority to con- tract but does not expressly do so, it may ratify it after the work has been done.^^* An ordinance is necessary to ratify an unauthorized act of a council committee. ^^^ The charter, or statute, frequently provides in matters of public improvements and special assessments, that if, for any reason, the ordinance shall be found invalid on which .the improvement is based, it may be rendered valid by a subsequent curative act. And in the absence of a constitutional limitation the curative act may be by the legislature.^®*^ A curative statute may be so construed although it does not use the words "ratify," "confirm" or "validate."^'^'^ § 538. (t) Scope, force, effect, etc., of ordinances. — An ordinance may combine contractual as well as police regulations,^®^ and may be passed to take effect in the event of a contingency.^^" Within the corporate limits the police provisions of an ordinance have the force of a legislative enactment.^ ^^ An ordinance, adopted under author- ity given by statute, giving a railroad the right to construct its track along certain streets subject to restrictions and limitations, when accepted becomes as binding as a statute and is a limitation on the power of the road.^^^ The legislature may provide that on the annexation of one corporation to another any ordinance in force shall continue in force.^®^ An ordinance is not retrospective.^^* To make an ordinance applicable to a street-railway, or railway operating on the city streets, it must appear that the company was existing at the time the ordinance was passed and was one of the railroads desig- nated. ^^^ A railroad accepting the benefits of an ordinance is subject to burdens imposed by it.^***^ A town ordinance declaring a particular thing a nuisance does not make it so.-"'^ ="* City of Chester v. Eyre, 181 Pa. -'- Tudor v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 154 St. 642; s. c. 37 Atl. 837. III. 129; s. c. 39 N. E. 136. """Maudlin v. City of Trenton, 67 =*' Swift v. Klein, 163 111. 269; s. Mo. App. 452. c. 45 N. E. 219. ""*" Nottage v. City of Portland, 35 ^* City of Willow Springs v. Wit- Or. 539; s. c. 58 Pac. 883. haupt, 61 Mo. App. 275; s. c. 1 Mo. ~^' Nottage V. City of Portland, App. Repr. 388. supra. ="' Thompson v. Citizens' St. R. -"' Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Hood, 94 Co.. 152 Ind. 461; s. c. 53 N. B. 462. Fed. 618; s. c. 36 C. C. A. 423. =»" Chicago &c. R. Co. v. People, 79 =»« Heman Constr. Co. v. Loevy, 64 111. App. 529. Mo. App. 430; s. c. 2 Mo. App. Repr. ""' Board &c. v. Norman, 51 La. 1123. An. 736; s. c. 25 So. 401; Walker v. =^^ Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Hood, Jameson, 140 Ind. 591; s. c. 37 N. E. 94 Fed. 618; s. c. 36 C. C. A. 423. § 539 PUBLIC CORrORATIOXS. 516 § 539. Motives of council not to be impeached. — A city council being "a miniature general assembly and its authorized ordinances having the force of laws passed by the legislature of the state/'^°* it follows that when a municipal corporation passes an ordinance legis- lative in its character importing no private contract or rights, the meml)ers of the corporation enjoy the same prerogatives as members of a state legislature, and their conduct- or motives in passing the ordinance can not be questioned by way of impeaching the validity of the ordinance.^'''' But in Ohio it has been held that this immunity from impeachment for fraudulent motives or abuse of power does not attach to all of the acts of a city council which may assume the form of an ordinance; and that wdiere the city council was empowered to regulate the price of gas, and under the colorable exercise of such power for a fraudulent purpose passed an ordinance fixing the price of gas at a rate at which they well knew that it could not be manu- factured and sold without loss, the motives of the council could be properly inquired into.^*^'' The officers of a municipal corporation are of course exempt from personal liability for the passage of any ordinance within their authority; nor are they personally liable for any ordinance not within their authority, for such an ordinance is absolutely void.^*'^ § 540. Construction of ordinances. — The canons of construction that are employed in the interpretation of statutes are also used to determine the meaning of ordinances. ^"^ Provisions that are essen- tially penal are strictly construed,^"^ but ordinary police regulations, 402; 39 N. E. 869; 49 Am. St. 222; adds the great weight of his opin- 28 L. R. A. 679; City of Evansville ion to the effect that the acts of mu- V. Miller, 146 Ind. 613; s. c. 45 N. E. nicipal bodies, whether in the form 1054. of resolutions or ordinances, may be 2tis Taylor v. City of Carondelet, 22 impeached for fraud at the instance Mo. 105. of persons injured thereby: 1 Dillon =»=• Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La. An. Munic. Corp., § 311. 247, 258; s. c. 1 So. 599; Borough of ""' 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 313. Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253; '"^ In re Yick Wo, 16 Cal. 294; s, c. Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa 282. 9 Pac. 139; 58 Am. R. 12; State v. =°« State V. Cincinnati Gas &c. Co., Kirkley, 29 Md. 85; Zorger v. City 18 Ohio St. 262. 300; citing Davis v. of Greensburgh, 60 Ind. 1; Quin- Mayor &c.. 1 Duer (N. Y.) 451. But ette v. City of St. Louis, 76 Mo. 402. in the opinion in the Ohio case there Construction is a question of law: is a dictum that inquiry into the mo- Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 13 111. tives of the council in passing an or- App. 91 ; Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. dinance for purposes of police regu- App. 708; s. c. 59 Pac. 1092; 61 Pac. lation or municipal government 803. would perhaps be incompetent; as ^°^ Town of Pacific v. Seifert, 79 the courts would have no jurisdic- Mo. 210; Krickle v. Commonwealth, tion to impeach such an ordinance 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 361; City of St. for such a reason. Judge Dillon Louis v. Goebel, 32 Mo. 295. So, 517 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 540 even though a penalty be attached, are not subjected to so close a scrutiny.^"* It is proper to consider the title of the ordinance^"^ and the mischief which it was designed to remedy/"*' and also in doubtful eases a contemporaneous construction by the parties interested.^"''' General words and sweeping clauses are controlled by particular de- scriptions preceding them.^°^ If an ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, that one must prevail which will preserve its validity in preference to a construction that will render it invalid; and this must be done although the construction adopted may not be the most obvious or natural or the literal one.^°'' Thus, an ordinance making it unlawful to ride a bicycle across a public bridge is limited to the footways of the bridge ; otherwise it would be void as against common right. ^^"^ And an ordinance providing that "no person shall drive or lead any horse or cart or wheel-carriage on the footway or sidewalk of any street" does not prohibit the carting of earth from excavations across the sidewalk.^ ^^ An ordinance is to be resolved against the city where it is doubtful as to its validity as conflicting with individ- ual rights.^^^ Where an ordinance is clear and explicit, previous statutes imposing power to license must be construed strictly: Ex parte Sims, 40 Fla. 432; s. c. 25 So. 280. ^•^ A reasonable construction is the rule: First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154; Commonwealth v. Rob- ertson, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 438; Merri- am V. City of New Orleans, 14 La. An. 318; Master of Vintners' Co. v. Passey, 1 Burr. 235; Poulters' Co. V. Phillips, 6 Bing. N. C. 314. Lib- eral rules are applied to town by- laws: Whitlock V. West, 26 Conn. 406. ="'' Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411. ^°® Ho Ah Kow V. Nunan, 5 Saw. 552. ^^ Wright V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 7 111. App. 438; State v. Severance, 49 Mo. 401. ^"'^Schultz V. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St. 659; Snyder v. City of North Lawrence, 8 Kan. 82; Keokuk &c. Co. V. City of Quincy, 81 111. 422. Cf. Illinois &c. R. Co. v. City of Galena, 40 111. 344; City of St. Louis v. Herthel, 88 Mo. 128. ""^ Commonwealth v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.) 382; Mayor &c. v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J. (Md.) 480; Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 376; Iowa &c. Co. v. Webster Co., 21 Iowa 221; Johnson V. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 445; Roosevelt v. Godard, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 533; Colwell v. May's Landing Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 245; Bigelow v. West Wis. R. Co., 27 Wis. 478; Dow V. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Inkster v. Carver, 16 Mich. 484; Cooley Const. Lim. 184. ^'^^ Swift v. City of Topeka, 43 Kan. 671; s. c. 23 Pac. 1075. ^" "If so construed," said the court, "it would prevent a party from building upon his own lot and would deny the right of an ^abutting owner of driving his carriage from a stable: In re O'Keefe, 19 N. Y. S. 676; s. c. 46 N. Y. St. 557. See also, Gilluly V. City of Madison, 63 Wis. 518; s. c. 24 N. W. 137; Ex parte Ah Lit, 26 Fed. 512; Mayor &c. v. Georgia R. Co., 72 Ga. 800. Cf. Com- monwealth V. Curtis, 9 Allen (Mass.) 266, 268. ='= Slaughter v. O'Berry, 126 N. C 181; s. c. 35 S. B. 241. § 541 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 518 action of the council will not be permitted to affect the construc- tion.^ ^^ g 541. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous. — After a con- tract has been forfeited an ordinance extending the time for the com- pletion of the work thereunder does not give life to the forfeited con- tract and render valid an assessment.^^* An ordinance granting the mayor power to determine whether a person applying for a license to sell cigarettes has good character and reputation, and is a suitable per- son to be entrusted with their sale, and requiring him to license every one complying with these conditions, vests in him no arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license. ^^^ An ordinance which directs a city clerk to issue a license if an applicant has complied with the law, and shall not be in arrears for previous years, does not confer judicial power. ^^"^ Where, as a condition of allowing an electric company to occupy the streets, all city buildings occupied as police or fire stations are to be wired and lighted, it applies to all police and fire stations whether erected before or after the ordinance»was passed.^ ^'^ An or- dinance providing that "the vault of every privy which may be con- structed," etc., applies only to those constructed after its passage.^^® An ordinance which provided that it should not go into effect until after receiving a majority of the votes of the legal voters at an election held as therein provided, goes into effect, so far as the election is con- cerned, when it receives the approval of the mayor.^^" An ordinance requiring persons riding or driving to check up or halt for pedestrians on approaching an alley or street crossing, does not apply to street- cars.^^*^ Power to a mayor to release a person from imprisonment does not give power to release a judgment under which the imprison- ment was made.^-^ A statute requiring the yeas and nays to be called on the passage of ordinances does not apply to cities under special charters.^^- Where a resolution is ambiguous the construction placed upon it by the council which passed it, and the acquiescence of the in- cumbent of the office affected by it, are competent evidence of the in- "^Stadler v. Fahey, 87 111. App. ="' Forbes v. Mayor &c., 1 Marv. 411. (Del.) 186. ^"Neill V. Gates, 152 Mo. 585; s. c. ''^=' Parker v. Zeisler, 73 Mo. App. 54 S. W. 460. 537. ^^^ Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. '"■" Citizens' R. Co. v. Ford, 93 Tex. 183; s. c. 20 S. Ct. 633. 110; s. c. 53 S. W. 575. •■'"' Baker v. City of Lexington, 21 ^-' City of Newton v. Bergbower, Ky. L. 809; s. c. 53 S. W. 16. 63 111. App. 201. ^" Kensington Electric Co. v. City ^" Preston v. City of Cedar Rapids, of Philadelphia, 187 Pa. St. 446; s. 95 Iowa 71; s. c. 63 N. W. 577. c. 41 Atl. 309. 519 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 542 tention of the coimcil.^-^ An ordinance prohibiting the placing of merchandise upon sidewalks beyond the front line of the lot applies to pedlers as well as storekeepers.^^* In an ordinance prohibiting the erection of wooden or frame buildings, "wooden" and "frame" mean the same thing.^-^ § 542. Ordinances void in part. — It is well settled that invalid provisions in an ordinance do not necessarily render the ordinance totally void. The rule to be applied is that if part of a law is void other essential and connected parts are also void,^-® but where that part which is void is independent and not essentially connected with the remainder the law will stand. ^^^ Thus, it was held that where a ^'^ Saunders v. Nashua, 69 N. H. 492; s. c. 43 Atl. 620. ^■* State V. Messolongitis, 74 Minn. 165; s. c. 77 N. W. 29. =^Ward V. City of Murphysboro, 77 111. App. 549. Construction of ordinances under Kan. Gen. St. 1889, in relation to desecration of the Sabbath, — see City of Kansas City V. Grubel, 57 Kan. 436; s. c. 46 Pac. 714. Under city and village act of Illinois the provision permit- ting an owner to make a sidewalk in front of his property and thus relieve it from assessment applies to improvements by special taxation as well as special assessment: Vil- lage of Western Springs v. Hill, 177 111. 634; s. c. 52 N. E. 959. Construc- tion of Burns Rev. Stat. Ind. 1901, § 1709, in reference to riding on sidewalks, — see Town of Whiting v. Doob, 152 Ind. 157; s. c. 52 N. E. 759. Construction of Ky. St., § 3304, in relation to ordinances, — see Rob- erts & Co. V. City of Paducah, 95 Fed. 62. Construction and require- ments of Iowa code 1873, § 493, as amended, — see German Ins. Co. v. City of Manning, 95 Fed. 597. Con- struction of N. Y. code as to boundary of district under ordi- nance, — see Farrington v. City of Mt. Vernon, 64 N. Y. S. 863; s. c. 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 250. -' In re Ah Toy. 45 Fed. 795; Town of Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa 32; s. c. 17 N. W. 148; Town of Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa 26; s. c. 12 N. W. 753; State v. Treasurer &c., 45 N. J. L. 288; Trowbridge v. Mayor &c., 46 N. J, L. 140; State v. Mayor &c., 38 N. J. L. 110; Common- wealth V. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562; Commonwealth v. Dow, 10 Met. (Mass.) 382; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray (Mass.) 1; Amesbury v. Bow- ditch &c. Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 596; Warren v. Mayor &c., 2 Gray (Mass.) 84; Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208; s. c. 24 Pac. 747; State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883; City of St. Louis V. St. Louis R. Co., 14 Mo. App. 221; City of St. Louis v. St. Louis R. Co., 89 Mo. 44; s. c. 1 S. W. 305; City of Pi qua v. Zimmerlin, 35 Ohio St. 507; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 237; Rau v. Little Rock, 34 Ark. 303; Baker v. Town of Normal, 81 111. 108; City of Quin- cy V. Bull, 106 111. 337; Harbaugh v. City of Monmouth, 74 111. 367; State v.'Chamberlin, 37 N. J. L. 388. ^=' State V. Inhabitants &c., 45 N. J. L. 318, 325; s. c. 46 N. J. L. 209; Wilcox V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144; s. c. 15 N. W. 435; 46 Am. R. 625; State V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 286; State V. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377; State v. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69; s. c. 21 N. W. 856; State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1; s. c. 24 N. W. 458; Cooper v. Dis- trict of Columbia, MacArth. & M. 250; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17. When 543 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 520 statute authorized the mayor to impose a fine of not more than $20 "in his discretion" for certain offenses, an ordinance imposing a fine of not less than three nor more than ten dollars being void as to the fine, the whole enactment was void and could not be treated as ordaining an offense.^-*' But where the charter gave express power to prohibit the sale of certain articles except at a public market, an ordinance in pursuance thereof was valid, although it covered some articles not included in the enumeration.^-^ § 543. Amendment and repeal — By subsequent ordinance. — The power of a municipal corporation to enact ordinances includes by implication the power to amend or repeal them.^^" The general rules it prohibits disjunctively two or more acts, the invalidity of one part does not affect the validity of the others: Kettering v. City of Jack- sonville, 50 111. 39. But the parts must be entire and distinct from each other: Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. An. Ill, 116; Rex v. Faver- sham Fishermen's Co., 8 T. R. 352; Willcock Mimic. Corp. 160, pi. 384; City of Eureka v. Jackson, 8 Kan. App. 49; s. c. 54 Pac. 5; City of Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App. 365; s. c. 1 Mo. App. Repr. 84; Eure- ka City V. Wilson, 15 Utah 67; s, c. 48 Pac. 150; In re Mansfield, 106 Cal. 400; s. c. 39 Pac. 775; City of Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 507; City of Belleville v. Citizens' Horse R. Co., 152 111. 171; s. c. 38 N. E. 584; City of Seattle v. Pearson, 15 Wash. 575; s. c. 46 Pac. 1053; State V. Newman, 96 Wis. 258; s. c. 71 N. W. 438. If the valid part can not stand alone or be separated it is wholly void: City of Tampa v. Salo- monson, 35 Fla. 446; s. c. 17 So. 581. Where an ordinance creates two or more offenses that are severable, those which are valid may be en- forced and those that are invalid may not: Ex parte Bizzell, 112 Ala. 210; s. c. 21 So. 371; Canova v. Wil- liams, 41 Fla. 509; s. c. 27 So. 30. Cf. Baker v. City of Lexington, 21 Ky. L. 809; s. c. 53 S. W. 16. ^''^Landis v. Borough of Vineland, 54 N. J. L. 75; s. c. 25 Atl. 409. The argument was that the maximum limit of ten dollars was opposed to an inference that it was intended to create an offense which might be punishable by a twenty-dollar fine. One section of an ordinance making it an offense to continue or allow the continuance of a house of ill fame for two days after it shall have been so adjudged under a prior void section, the two are so connected that they must fall together: State V. Webber, 107 N. C. 962; s. c. 12 S. E. 598. ^^Shelton v. Mayor &c., 30 Ala. 540. See also, Eureka Springs v. O'Neal, 56 Ark. 350; s. c. 19 S. W. 969. =>=» Welch V. Bowen, 103 Ind. 252; s c. 2 N. E. 722; Bank of Chenango V. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343, 347; Rex v. Bird, 13 East 367; Rex v. Ashwell, 12 East 22; In re Great Western R. Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 28; Greeley v. City of Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean 158; Rice V. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 479; Santo V. State, 2 Iowa 165; s. c. 63 Am. D. 487; In re Hall, 10 Neb. 537; s. c. 7 N. W. 287; City Council v. Wentworth &c. Church, 4 Strobh. (S. C.) 306. But where the record showed that a motion changing cer- tain provisions was adopted and that "the maj^or was instructed to pre- 521 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 543 governing the amendment and repeal of statutes are applied to the legislation of municipal corporations. An amendment of a void or- dinance is ineffectual to create a valid and enforceable ordinance,^^^ l)ut if only a part of the original ordinance is invalid an amendment of that part will stand.^^^ A repealing ordinance may contain a clause excepting from its operation offenses committed and forfeitures in- curred previous to the repeal,^^^ but if there be no reservation all vio- lations of the former ordinance are blotted out, as it were, and the courts are also powerless to proceed further in pending prosecu- tions.^^VxWhere a repealing ordinance is itself repealed the original ordinance is restored to full force and efficacy.^^^ The power to amend and repeal is subject to the qualification that it can not be exercised in such a way as to impair private rights which have been acquired under a lawful ordinance. ^^"^ An ordinance can be amended pare an ordinance covering said changes," it was held not to be in itself a complete legislative act: Jones V. McAlpine, 64 Ala. 511. ^"^ Cowley V. Town of Rushville, 60 Ind. 327; Board &c. v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194; Ford v. Booker, 53 Ind. 395; State V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69, 77; s. c. 21 N. W. 856. «'= State V. Kantler, 33 Minn. 69; s. c. 21 N. W. 856. An amending ordinance which does not attempt to amend the old by adding to or tak- ing from one of its sections, but con- tains in full the section as it was de- signed to be when amended, suffi- ciently complies with a statutory requirement that an amending ordi- nance shall contain the ordinance or part thereof which it at- tempts to review or amend: Larkin V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 85 Iowa 492; s. c. 52 N. W. 480; Town of De- corah V. Dunstan, 38 Iowa 96. ^'* City of Kansas v. White, 69 Mo. 26. See also, Pardridge v. Village of Hyde Park, 131 111. 537; s. c. 23 N. E. 345. ^*Day V. City of Clinton, 6 111. App. 476; Barton v. Incorporation &c. of Gadsden, 69 Ala. 495. And no subsequent ordinance or statute can revive the offense by attempting to limit the effect of the repeal: City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588. The rule is not confined to penal ordi- nances: Kaime v. Harty, 4 Mo. App. 357. A statute abrogating the com- mon-law rule in relation to the re- peal of laws does not apply to mu- nicipal ordinances: Naylor v. City of Galesburg, 56 111. 285. ^^^ Mayor &c. v. Broadway &c. R. Co., 97 N. Y. 275; citing People v. Davis, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 456; Van Denburgh v. President &c., 66 N. Y. 1. Day V. City of Clinton, 6 111. App. 476, cited in one text-book to sup- port the contrary proposition, mere- ly decides that the guilt of one whose offense has been wholly ex- pui'gated by the repeal of the law creating it can not be revived by a repeal of the repealing act. ^'"Rex V. Bird, 13 East 367; Rex v. Ashwell, 12 East 22; Bigelow v. Hill- man, 37 Maine 52; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; s. c. 18 N. E. 692; Nel- son V. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716; Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230; s. c. 3 Am. D. 131; Cunningham v. Cor- poration &c. of Almonte, 21 Up. Can. C. P. 459; In re Great Western R. Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 28; Louisiana V. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Minnesota &c. R. Co., 14 Fed. 525; City of Terre Haute v. § 544 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 523 only by an ordinance and not by resolution; thus, wards must be changed by ordinance/'' ^^ An ordinance can only be amended by an act of the same grade. Orders passed upon motion before the council changing the material provided for in the ordinance are nullities.^^® But not all ordinances are repealable at the mere will of the council. Thus where an ordinance is, in fact, a contract and has been accepted, it is not repealable without the consent of the other party thereto.^^^ And so after a tax has been levied by a council in aid of a railroad and the road has been built the ordinance can not be repealed.^*" But where legislative authority has been given to a council to grant to a street-railroad company the right to occupy a street on condi- tion of its paving the street, the ordinance may be repealed if the legislative act left the paving regulation in the discretion of the coun- cil.^*^ An ordinance for improvements of streets, and street inter- sections, may be repealed in part without impairing its validity in other respects.^"*^ § 544. Eepeal by act of the legislature. — "The legislature can not by express intendment repeal ordinances, though a repeal may be effected by the passage of a general law that is inconsistent with the ordinance."^^^ When a city of the second class having lawful authority passed an ordinance to suppress houses of prostitution, and while it was in full force a new law for the government of cities of that class Lake, 43 Ind. 480; State v. Graves, ^" Cascaden v. City of Waterloo, 19 Md. 351; Baldwin v. Smith, 82 106 Iowa 673; s. c. 77 N. W. 333. 111. 162; People v. Chicago &c. R. '^' Gait v. City of Chicago, 174 111. Co., 18 111. App. '125; Gormley v. 605; s. c. 51 N. E. 653; Davis v. City Day, 114 111. 185; s. c. 28 N. E. 693; of Litchfield, 155 111. 390; s. c. 40 N. City of Quincy v. Bull, 106 111. 337; E. 354. Cape May &c. R. Co. v. City of Cape ^ Baltimore Trust &c. Co. v. May, 35 N. J. Eq. 419; Reiff v. Con- Mayor &c., 64 Fed. 153. ner, 10 Ark. 241; State v. Pinto, 7 ''"Missouri &c. Trust Co. v. Smart, Ohio St. 355; Road in Augusta Tp., 51 La. An. 416; s. c. 25 So. 443. 17 Pa. St. 71, 75; City of Des Moines ''"City of Philadelphia v. Bow- V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 41 Iowa 569; man, 175 Pa. St. 91; s. c. 34 Atl. 353. City of Burlington v. Burlington St. ^" Noonan v. People, 183 111. 52; s. R. Co., 49 Iowa 144; s. c. 31 Am. R. c. 55 N. E. 679. 145; City Council &c. v. Wentworth ^*''' Horr & Bemis Munic. Police &c. Church, 4 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 306; Ord., §§ 60, 61. A statute regulating Mayor &c. v. Lumpkin, 5 Ga. 447. the taking-up of stray animals, and But "no person can claim immunitj' providing that nothing in any mu- from proper police regulation of his nicipal charter shall be construed to vested interests because they were authorize an ordinance dealing with based upon the privileges or under the subject in any other manner, re- the protection of a municipal ordi- peals an existing valid ordinance of nance:" Horr & Bemis Munic. Ord., that description: Town ot Marietta § 67, and cases cited. v. Fearing. 4 Ohio 427. 523 ORDINANCES AXD BY-LAWS. § 545 was passed containing authority to the city council to "restrain, pro- hibit and suppress" houses of prostitution, and the former act was repealed without a saving clause, it was held that the new act did not repeal existing ordinances.^** And as a general rule an ordinance will not be deemed to be repealed by a statute unless they are irrecon- cilably inconsistent with each other.^*^ But where it is the evident design of the legislature to assume the exclusive regulation of a sub- ject which had been before permitted to be regulated by municipal ordinances, the latter must yield, and such legislative intent will more readily be inferred if the ordinance in question would otherwise be unreasonable and oppressive. ^*^ § 545. Repeals by implication. — It has been laid down as law that a general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former statute unless the two are plainly inconsist- ent.^*^ It is also a doctrine that a subsequent statute revising the whole subject-matter of a former one will operate as a repeal of it, though it contains no express words of repeal.^*® Both these rules are without doubt as applicable to ordinances as to statutes.^*® Where 344 "There has been no attempt on the part of the legislature to repeal the law creating cities of the second class and destroy the organization of the same. It is true that a new act has taken the place of the for- mer and continues the organization of such cities with new and modified powers. But this is very different from an entire repeal. The doc- trine is well settled that a change in the form of government of a com- munity does not ipso facto abrogate pre-existing laws:" In re Hall, 10 Neb. 537; s. c. 7 N. W. 287; citing Trustees v. Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515-517. See also, Waring v. Mayor &c., 24 Ala. 701. '''Mayor &c. v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 156, holding that a statute by which a violation of the ordinances of New York was de- clared a misdemeanor and punish- able by fine or imprisonment did not operate as a repeal of the penalty given by those ordinances nor take away the right of the corporation to prosecute a civil action for the pen- alty. See also, March v. Common- wealth, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25; State V. Labatut, 39 La. An. 513; s. c. 2 So. 550; Baldwin v. Murphy, 82 111. 485; Quinette v. City of St. Louis, 76 Mo. 402; Franklin v. Westfall, 27 Kan. 614; Chamberlain v. City of Evansville, 77 Ind. 542. "'" Southport V. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128. ^"Conley v. Supervisors &c., 2 W. Va. 4]?6; Brown v. County Com'rs, 21 Pa. St. 37; Bank of Louisiana v. Farrar, 1 La. An. 49, 54; Lenz v. Sherrott, 26 Mich. 139; CroU v. Vil- lage of Franklin, 40 Ohio St. 340; Barker v. Smith, 10 S. C. 226. ''* Inhabitants &c. v. Estlow, 43 N. J. L. 13; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 537; Town of Decorah v. Dunstan, 38 Iowa 96; Goodenow v. Buttrick, 7 Mass. 140; Booth v. Town of Car- thage, 67 111. 102; Commonwealth v. Cooley, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 37; Ellis V. Page, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43, 45; Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295; Farr v. Brackett, 30 Vt. 344. '^''City of Providence v. Union R. 545 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 524 the final chapter of a revising ordinance recited a long list of ordi- nances which were expressly repealed, the omission of certain ordi- nances from the list was held to preserve them in full force, although the title of the ordinance imported to comprise all former enact- ments.^?*' The general ordinances of a city were revised and consoli- dated for publication and were thus adopted and re-enacted. An ordi- nance under which a prosecution had been begun was re-enacted in substantially the same language without any words of repeal or any clause saving pending prosecutions. The effect of the re-enactment was declared to be to continue in force the provisions of the original ordinance and not to abate or affect the prosecution. ^'^^ The rule is that where two ordinances are inconsistent with each other and there is no express language repealing the earlier ordinance and both relate to the same subject-matter the later repeals the former.^^^ But an ordinance will not be construed as repealing by implication a prior ordinance unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between the two, or it clearly appears that the new ordinance was intended to su- Co., 12 R. I. 473; Booth v. Town of Carthage, 67 111. 102. ^"City of Providence v. Union R. Co., 12 R. I. 473. The case did not, however, turn upon this circum- stance alone. =^1 City of Junction City v. Webb, 44 Kan. 71; s. c. 23 Pac. 1073; citing State V. Cumber, 37 Wis. 298; State V. Wish, 15 Neb. 448; s. c. 19 N. W. 686; Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154; Fullerton v. Spring, 3 Wis. 667; Scheftels v. Tabert, 46 Wis. 439; s. c. 1 N. W. 156; Cheezen v. State, 2 Ind. 149; Martindale v. Martindale, 10 Ind. 566; Cordell v. State, 22 Ind. 1; State V. Baldwin, 45 Conn. 134; Mid- dleton V. Railroad Co., 26 N. J. Eq. 269; United Hebrew Ass'n v. Benshi- mol, 130 Mass. 325; Lisbon v. Clark, 18 N. H. 234. ="" Button V. City of Aurora, 114 111. 138; s. c. 28 N, E. 461; Union Trust Co. V. Trumbull, 137 111. 146; s. c. 27 N. E. 24; Korah v. City of Ottawa, 32 111. 121; Culver v. Third Nat. Bank, 64 111. 528; Von Der Leith V. State, 60 N. J. L. 46; s. c. 37 Atl. 436; Von Der Leith v. State, 60 N. J. L. 590; s. c. 40 Atl. 1132; Smyrk V. Sharp, 82 Md. 97; s. c. 35 Atl. 411; City of Grand Rapids v. Nor- man, 110 Mich. 544; s. c. 68 N. W. 269; Knight v. Town of West Union, 45 W. Va. 194; s. c. 32 S. E. 163. A later ordinance relating to the same subject-matter as a former one and being identical in language except as to the number of feet repeals the former, although the later ordinance is called a "building ordinance and the prior one a fire ordinance, the purpose of each being the same: Cook V. Sanitary Dist. &c., 177 111. 599; s. c. 52 N. E. 870. An amended ordinance purporting to amend "as follows" (giving schedule of li- censes) and not referring to other sections does not by implication re- peal the original ordinance: Gold- smith V. Mayor &c., 120 Ala. 182; s. c. 24 So. 509. An ordinance provid- ing for an improvement may repeal a former ordinance relating to the manner of letting contracts: Barber &c. Co. V. Ullman, 137 Mo. 543; s. c. 38 S. W. 458. 525 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 545 persedo all others, and embrace the entire regulation on the siibject.^^^ An ordinance providing for the issuance of licenses to sell liquors, restrictions in regard thereto, requiring bonds conditioned for the payment of license at such rate as might from time to time be estab- lished, and repealing all ordinances in relation to the subject-matter or inconsistent therewith, does not repeal a prior ordinance in rela- tion to the amount of the license fee.^^* The provision of a charter authorizing a council to punish persons who knowingly sell food which is unwholesome is a repeal, in effect, of an existing ordinance provid- ing punishment for such, offense but not requiring it to be done know- ingly.^^^ The reasons which induced the repealing of an ordinance are not a proper matter for investigation by thecourts.^^^ The sav- ing clause of a statute providing that a repeal shall not affect any right accrued, or duty imposed, or penalty incurred thereunder is not to be applied to ordinances which are mere by-laws of the city.^^^ The repeal of an ordinance without a saving clause is not retrospective and does not render valid an act which was illegal when done.^^^ A mere resolution not passed or published as an ordinance will not repeal a valid ordinance duly enacted. The principle involved is that an ordinance can only be repealed by an ordinance.^^" An ordi- nance can only be amended, repealed or suspended by action of the same dignity as the ordinance itself.^ ^° And so, as a rule, an ordinance that can be adopted only by a certain vote must be repealed by a similar vote.^**^ The effect of a repeal of an ordinance imposing a penalty has the effect of and operates as a pardon of the offense as to any suit pending.^''^ '=^ People V. Harrison, 185 111. 307; ^^9 p^opig y Mount, 87 111. App. s. c. 56 N. E. 1120. 194; Backhaus v. People, 87 111. App. ^'•^ People v. Mount, 87 111. App. 173; Swindell v. State, 143 Ind. 153; 194; s. c. affirmed 186 111. 560; 58 N. s. c. 42 N. E. 528. E. 360. Ky St. § 3350 repeals ordi- =™ Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of Chi- nances of city of Owensboro in rela- cago, 174 111. 439; s. c. 51 N. E. 596. tion to payment of fees of city mar- ^""^ Naegely v. City of Saginaw, 101 shal: Wethington v. City of Owens- Mich. 532; s. c. 60 N. W. 46. An boro, 21 Ky. L. 960; s. c. 53 S. W. ordinance fixing a fiscal year is re- 644. pealable: First Nat. Bank v. Keith, ''^^ People v. Brill, 120 Mich. 42; s. 84 111. App. 103. A second ordinance c. 78 N. W. 1013. held to not repeal a prior ordinance, -""Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. in Thomson v. People, 184 111. 17; City of Richmond, 98 Fed. 671. s. c. 56 N. E. 383. ^" Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. App. ^"- Rutherford v. Swink, 96 Tenu. 708; s. c. 61 Pac. 803. 564; s. c. 35 S. W. 554. s^s Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. App. 708; s. c. 61 Pac. 803. § 546 ruBLic couroHATiONS. 526 § 546. Power to impose penalties. — Since an ordinance without a penalty would be nugatory, a corporation that has the power to pass the ordinance has an implied power to provide for its enforcement by proper and reasonable fines against those who break it.^"-' Thus, a power to "open, widen, * * * and keep in repair streets," etc., and to pass ordinances necessary to carry into effect the power granted, confers authority to punish by fine any person who may obstruct a public street.^*'* And under a power to suppress bawdy- houses the corporation has by implication and of necessity the power to adopt proper means to accomplish it.^^^ So, also, the power to "restrain and prohibit" an act implies power to punish its commis- sion. ^'^'^ But the right to impose fines can not exist in conflict with a reasonable interpretation of the charter; and although authority to "prevent" will support an ordinance prohibiting under proper penal- ties,^®^ the general rule that all doubtful grants must be resolved against the corporation has been held to forbid the extension of the power "to abate" nuisances to the enactment of ordinances pre- scribing a punishment for the maintenance of a nuisance. ^•'^ And where the charter specifically enumerates various powers which the council may render effectual by means of penal prosecutions, it is an implied exclusion of the right to impose penalties in other cases.^*"* ^®' Village of Winooski V. Gokey, 49 wise: People v. Sacramento, 6 Cal. Vt. 282; Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich. 422. In the absence of statutory 476; Mason v. City of Shawneetown, power a municipality can not create 77 111. 533; Korah v. City of Ottawa, offenses by ordinance of a penal na- 32 111. 121; s. c. 83 Am. D. 255; Eyer- ture: City of ' Owensboro v. Sparks, man v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145; City of 18 Ky. L. 269; s. c. 36 S. W. 4. Independence v. Moore, 32 Mo. 392; "i" Toledo &c. R. Co. v. President Town of Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. &c., 43 111. 209. 380; Hooksett v. Amoskeag &c. Co.. ™^ Which included the imposition 44 N. H. 105; Mayor &c. v. Yuille, 3 of a fine: City of Shreveport v. Ala. 137; Trigally v. Mayor &c., 6 Roos, 35 La. An. 1010. See also, Cor- Coldw. (Tenn.) 382; City of Shreve- poration of Amite City v. Clements, port V. Roos, 35 La. An. 1010; State 24 La. An. 27. V. Boneil, 42 La. An. 1110; s. c. 8 '""'State v. Grimes, 49 Minn. 443; So. 298; Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 s. c. 52 N. W. 42. P. & W. (Pa.) 253; Fisher v. Harris- =" City of Centerville v. Miller, 57 burg, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 291; Mount Iowa 56; s. c. 10 N. W. 293; Respub- Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa 399; lica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 493. Reinhard v. Mayor &c., 2 Daly (N. ■"* City of Knoxville .v. Chicago &c. Y.) 243; Horr & Bemis Munic. Po- R. Co., 83 Iowa 636; s. c. 50 N. \Y. 61. lice Ord., § 147. Contra, Farnsworth ^^ City of Grand Rapids v. Hughes, v. Pawtucket, 13 R. I. 83. Such fines 15 Mich. 54, per Cooley, J.; citing must as a general rule be paid into Child v. Hudson's Bay Co., 2 P. the treasury of the city, town or Wms. 207; State v. Ferguson, 33 N. other municipal corporation, unless H. 424. the law specifically directs other- 527 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 547 In order that an ordinance, penal in its natnre, may be valid there must be an appropriate and legal penalty.^'" Where the section of an ordinance providing a penalty is void the entire ordinance is a nullity.^'' ^ Where a council is authorized to impose a penalty it must fix the penalty to be imposed and not leave it to the discretion of the trial court. ^'^^ Where the constitution prohibits a penalty fixed by ordinance less than that fixed by the statute the penalty may be fixed greater than the minimum fixed by the statute.^'^^ Where the statute provides for a penalty, in the discretion of the magistrate, not to ex- ceed a certain sum an ordinance fixing a uniform penalty at that sum is void,^"'' and where the statute requires the ordaining of fixed penal- ties an ordinance fixing the penalty at not less than ten dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars is unauthorized.^''^ Where an ordinance is passed mitigating a penalty pending a prosecution under the origi- nal ordinance the defendant can not be heard to complain that the penalty under the original ordinance is exorbitant.^ ''^ An ordinance can not create a civil liability for a violation.^''' § 547. Mode of enforcement of ordinances — By a purely civil ac- tion. — If the manner of enforcing ordinances is prescribed by statute or charter it is a cardinal rule that no other method can be resorted to.^'^^ In the absence of statutory provisions, at common law the ^'OTomlin v. City of Cape May, 63 Co., 134 Mo. 641; s. c. 36 S. W. 659. N. J. L. 429 ; s. c. 44 Atl. 209. Cf . '" Ewbanks v. President &c., 36 111. State v. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L. 262; 177; King v. President &c., 3 111. 305; State v. Treasurer &c., 53 N. J. L. Israel v. President &c., 2 111: 290; 329; s. c. 21 Atl. 304; State v. Cleve- "Weeks v. Porman, 16 N. J. L. 237; land, 3 R. I. 117; State v. Gouldy, Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B. 58 N. J. L. 562; s. c. 34 Atl. 748; Men. (Ky.) 146; State v. Zeigler, 32 Massinger v. City of Millville, 63 N. N. J. L. 262; Hart v. Mayor &c., 9 J. L. 123; s. c. 43 Atl. 443. Wend. (N. Y.) 571; Mayor &c. v. ^'^ Massinger v. City of Millville, Murphy, 40 N. J. L. 145. So, too, 63 N. J. L. 123; s. c. 43 Atl. 443. where a city council invested by ^'- Young &c. Amuse. Co. v. At- statute with authority to require lantic City, 60 N. J. L. 125; s. c. 37 payment of license fees, and to pass Atl. 444. such ordinances as are necessary for =" City of Owensboro v. Sparks, 18 that purpose, enacts an ordinance Ky. L. 269; s. c. 36 S. W. 4. prescribing a penalty for failure to ^^* Massinger v. City of Millville, pay a license, it is confined to that 63 N. J. L. 123; s. c. 43 Atl. 443. mode of enforcement and can not ^"^ City of Poughkeepsie v. King, 57 maintain a suit to recover license N. Y. S. 116; s. c. 38 App. Div. (N. fees: City Council &c. v. Ashley &c. Y.) 610. Co., 34 S. C. 541; s. c. 13 S. E. 845. ='« Baker v. City of Lexington, 21 See also, City of Santa Cruz v. Santa Ky. L. 809; s. c. 53 S. W. 16. Cruz R. Co.. 56 Cal. 143. Upon the =*" Moran v. Pullman Palace Car question, which has not been ex- 547 PUBLIC CORPORATIOXS. 528 recovery of fines and penalties is by an action of debt or assumpsit, and where these forms have been abolished the remedy is by a civil action of the same nature ;^^*^ and it is competent for the corporation to provide by ordinance for a recovery by an action of debt.^^^ The suit should be brought in the name conferred upon the corporation by its charter. Thus, if the "mayor and council of the town/' etc., constitute the corporate body, the names of the individual officers should not be set out in the declaration.^**- Several penalties may be included in the declaration and recovered in one suit;^^^ but it has been held that when ordinances, though relating to the same subject, are entirely different in the specification of offenses and the amounts of the penalties, each presents a distinct cause of action, and for the enforcement of each a separate suit must be brought.^^* It is not necessary, as in actions on contract, to join all the defendants in pressly decided, whether the remedy provided by the English municipal corporations act of 1835, by distress and imprisonment for non-payment of fines, precludes the common-law action of debt or assumpsit, see Grant Corp. 364; Rawlison Corp. (5th ed.) 167; Bodwie v. Fennell, 1 Wils. 233; Adley v. Reeves, 2 Mau. & S. 53, 61. ='° Ewbanks v. President &c., 36 111. 177; State v. Treasurer &c., 53 N. J. L. 329; s. c. 21 Atl. 304; State v. Pas- saic, 42 N. J. L. 429; Israel v. Presi- dent &c., 2 III. 290; Coates v. Mayor &c., 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 585; Corporation of Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Treadw. Const. (S. C.) 213, 215; Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456; Town of Brookville v. Gagle, 73 Ind. 177; City of Monett v. Beatty, 79 Mo. App. 315; City of Lead v. Klatt, 13 S. D. 140; s. e. 82 N. W. 391; City of Cassville V. Jimerson, 75 Mo. App. 426; Wal- ton V. City of Canon City, 13 Colo. App. 77; s. c. 56 Pac. 671. Where the charter prescribes that it shall be sufficient to declare generally in debt, it is not necessary to file a written declaration in the common- law form: Deitz v. City of Central, 1 Colo. 323, holding also, that in such an action a verdict of guilty is sub- stantially responsive to the issue. ^^ Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 P. & W. (Pa.) 253; Hesketh v. Brad- dock, 3 Burr. 1847, 1858. See also, State V. Inhabitants &c., 45 N. J. L. 318. But not by distress and sale of goods: Willcock Munic. Corp. 164- 181; Adley v. Reeves, 2 Mau. & S. 53, 60; 2 Wheat. Selw. Nisi Prius 1178. ^- Powers V. Mayor &c., 54 Ala. 214. See also, Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47; Williamson v. Common- wealth, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 146; State V. Treasurer &c., 45 N. J. L. 288; Graves v. Colby, 9 Ad. & El. 356; Master of Vintner's Co. v. Passey, 1 Burr. 235. The suit for the violation of an ordinance should be in the name of the city and not the state: State V. Faber, 50 La. An. 952; s. c. 24 So. 662. Suits for violation of ordinances in Washington are brought in name of the state under the constitution: State v. Fountain, 14 Wash. 236; s. c. 44 Pac. 270. ^^ City of Brooklyn v. Cleves, 1 Hill & D. (N. Y.) 231. But that it is not necessary to join them, see Whitehall v. Meaux, 8 111. App. 182. "'* Kensington v. Glenat, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 393. 529 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 548 interest. The cause of action is assimilated to a case of tort, in which one or more of the offending parties vaay be sued.^^^ § 548. Jurisdiction of proceedings. — If a special tribunal is pro- vided by law for the trial of proceedings based upon municipal ordi- nances, as is usually the case in this country, that tribunal has ex- clusive jurisdiction unless the legislature has plainly indicated an intention to the contrary,^*^*^ and the corporation can not by ordinance create a court or confer upon it a jurisdiction not expressly authorized by statute or charter.^'^^ Of course, the charter itself can not give power to a judicial officer not recognized by the organic law; but where the latter vested all judicial authority in certain courts, in- cluding justices of the peace, and a charter provided for the election of a justice of the peace, "to be denominated police judge," and de- fined his jurisdiction, it was held that although the title was unwar- ranted he was lawfully possessed of the powers of a justice of the peace. ^^^ The invalidity of an ordinance is not an objection that goes to the jurisdiction of the court. ^^'^ And it is also well settled that a magistrate's personal interest in a fine from the fact that he is a citizen of the municipality to which it is payable is too remote to disqualify him to try the action.^''" An objection to the jurisdiction on account of defects in the process should be made at the earliest moment; it comes too late if made for the first time on appeal. ^^^ § 549. Imprisonment in default of payment of fine. — We have seen that the power to impose pecuniary penalties is deemed a necessary adjunct to the power to enact ordinances unless restrained expressly =«^ President &c. v. Holland, 19 111. =^'^ Deitz v. City of Central, 1 Colo. 271. 323. ''« Horr & Bemis Munic. Police ^« Woodruff v. Stewart, 63 Ala. 206, Ord., § 166. In the same section it 208. is said that "remedies under ordi- '"'" Deitz v. City of Central, 1 Colo, nances will, however, never be al- 323; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 lowed to fail for want of a tribunal. Pick. (Mass.) 462; Mayor &c. v. Mc- and if no special tribunal is pro- Kee, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 167; Thomas v. vided, actions to enforce penalties Town of Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio 290; may be brought in the established City Council v. Pepper, 1 Rich. L. courts of the state;" citing Corpo- (S. C.) 364; Queen v. Milledge, L. R. ration of Columbia v. Harrison, 2 4 Q. B. D. 332; Queen v. Justices, L. Treadw. Const. (S. C.) 213. R. 4 Q. B. D. 522. It was formerly ^'^' State V. Inhabitants &c., 45 N. held otherwise in England: Hesketh J. L. 318; Deel v. City of Pittsburgh, v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1847. 3 Watts (Pa.) 363; Barter v. Com- ^^'^ Tisdale v. President &c., 46 111. monwealth, 3 P. & W. (Pa.) 253. 9. See also, Wiggins v. City of Chi- cago, 68 111. 372. 1 Smith — 34 § 549 PUBLIC CORPORATIOXS. 530 cr by fair implication, and that their collection may be enforced by an action of debt or assumpsit or an equivalent civil remedy. But as this sanction would be futile against impecunious offenders, it is generally provided that imprisonment may be inflicted in default of payment of the fine and the costs of prosecution.^^^ Only express and precise authority will justify such imprisonment.^®^ Payment of fines can not be coerced in that manner under a power to fine or imprison ;^^* but where a charter conferred the power to enact ordi- nances with penalties, and provided that upon conviction for a breach thereof and failure to pay the fine the offender might be placed at labor for the city, it was held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license tax on certain occupations might lawfully annex a fine for violation of its provisions, which might be enforced in the same manner as any other ordinance. ^^^ In all cases the terms of the judgment must be in exact conformity with the language of the stat- ute or charter relating to the penalty. Under authority to commit to the county jail a commitment to any other prison is void.^^® So, where the statute provided that imprisonments should not exceed six months, a judgment that the defendant should be confined in jail until such time as would at a certain rate per day make the amount of the fine and costs was pronounced invalid.^'^^ ^^- The costs are no part of the pen- Sachs, 64 Ind. 155. Cf. Ex parte alty and are not computed in deter- Reed, 4 Cranch C. C. 582; City of mining whether the jurisdictional Philadelphia v. Duncan, 4 Phila. amount has been exceeded: State v. (Pa.) 145; Hall v. Corporation of Herdt, 40 N. J. L. 264. And the au- Washington, 4 Cranch 722. thority to imprison for non-payment ■'"■' Brieswick v. Mayor &c., 51 Ga. of fine includes the costs: Horr & 639; City of Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Bemis Munic. Police Ord., § 203. Iowa 59; City of London's Case, 8 Contra, State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. Coke 241; Clark's Case, 5 Coke 319. 1 ; s. c. 24 N. W. 458. A penalty ac- ='^ Brieswick v. Mayor &c., 51 Ga. cruing from a breach of an ordi- 639. Cf. Ex parte Green, 94 Cal. 387; nance of a municipal corporation is s. c: 29 Pac. 783, where it was held not a debt within the meaning of a by a divided court that under a constitutional provision which for- power to impose a fine or imprison- bids imprisonment for debt: Harden- ment, or both, a fine and imprison- brook v. Town of Ligonier, 95 Ind. ment, and imprisonment in default 70; citing McCool v. State, 23 Ind. of payment of the fine, might be im- 127; Lower v. Wallick, 25 Ind. 68; posed in one sentence. Turner v. Wilson, 49 Ind. 581; Mcll- ='' Ex parte City Council of Mont- vain V. State, 87 Ind. 602; Lane Co. gomery, 64 Ala. 463. V. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; Dunlop v. '"'"Merkee v. City of Rochester, 13 Keith, 1 Leigh (Va.) 430; Caldwell Hun (N. Y.) 157. V. State, 55 Ala. 133; Hibbard v. =" Kanouse v. Town of Lexington, Clark, 56 N. H. 155; City of Camden 12 111. App. 318. The court said: — V. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Flora v. "It does not appear from the record 531 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 550 § 550. Imprisonment as a penalty. — The right to inflict imprison- ment as a penalty for a violation of an ordinance mnst be given by charter or statute, otherwise no such penalty can be legally annexed or enforced. The rule is that they can only be enforced by a pecuni- ary penalty unless there is some express act giving power to inflict other punishment.^®® The power to imprison must be strictly con- strued. In a Colorado case it appeared that a city charter gave the council power to enforce ordinances "by a proper fine, impris- onment, or other penalties." The question at issue was whether this provision would sanction a fine and imprisonment. The con- clusion that it would not was based on the following argument : "If the words 'other penalties' were omitted, a single offense could be punished by either fine or imprisonment, but not by both fine and imprisonment. Therefore, if the council had power to provide for 'fine or imprisonment,' such power must be conferred by the words 'other penalties.' But this language was in our judgment employed in contradistinction to 'fines and imprisonments.' The expression is, 'or other penalties,' — that is, penalties other than fines or imprison- ments. To say that the phrase 'other penalties' may in a given case include 'fine and imprisonment,' together, whereas it could not in- clude either fine or imprisonment separately, would be at least para- doxical. * * * rpj^g "^other penalties' referred to are penalties that do not include either of the two previously designated, such as revocation of licenses, forfeitures, distress and sale, and the like."^®® Before the power to imprison can be exercised there must be an appropriate by-law and a trial and judicial ascertainment that such by-law has been violated.**'" § 551. Forfeitures. — A municipal corporation can not impose a for- feiture of property without express authority. Such an extraordinary what amount of costs was taxed in would have discharged the prisoner this case, but it is argued by counsel at once." See also, In re Greystock, that when the fine and costs are 12 Up. Can. Q. B. 458; Queen v. Gil- added together they could not be bert, 2 Pug. & B. 619; Ex parte discharged in six months at the rate Trask, 1 Pug. & B. 277. [prescribed by law]. It is enough to ''^^ City of Burlington v. Kellar, 18 say that such might be the effect, Iowa 59; City of Kinmundy v. Ma- and if so the defendant at the end of ban, 72 111. 462; State v. Ruff, 30 La. six months would be driven to an- An. 497. See also. Clerk v. Tucket, other proceeding in order to obtain 3 Lev. 281; s. c. 2 Vent. 182; Adley his discharge. We are of opinion v. Reeves, 2 Mau. & S. 53, 60; Lee v. the judgment should have limited Wallis, 1 Kenyon 292, 295. the imprisonment to six months, so ^"^ Mclnerney v. City of Denver, 17 that when that period should have Colo. 302; s. c. 29 Pac. 516, 521. arrived the keeper of the prison *"" Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461. 551 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 532 power can not be exercised under the general power to make by-laws.*"^ Where the only penalties which a town council was authorized to impose for violation of ordinances were fines not exceeding $50, an ordinance declaring that any retailer who should sell or give any spirituous liquors to a slave without a written permit should forfeit his license was held to be void. A distinction was urged by counsel between the forfeiture of a license and the forfeiture of goods and chattels, but the court replied that the oppression and hardship of a forfeiture does not depend on the nature but the value of the thing forfeited. "It may be better for the retailer," said Frost, J., "to have his stock in trade forfeited than his license to retail. * * * If the town council can forfeit it for the offense of selling spirits to a slave, they may declare it forfeited for any other offense ; and thus convert a license to retail into a recognizance of the retailer for the observance of all their by-laws."*°' ^" Taylor v. City of Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105. In Kirk v. Nowill, 1 T. R. 118, 124, Lord Mansfield held that such a power must be expressly given, as otherwise it was against Magna Charta; and Mr. Justice Buller also held the ordinance cre- ating a forfeiture to be bad for the additional reason that the act of par- liament had prescribed in what man- ner by-laws should be enforced, namely, by fine or amercement, and that therefore the corporation was precluded from inflicting any other punishm.ent. This case has been cited by subsequent elementary writers as establishing both these positions: 2 Kyd Corp. 110; Will- cock Munic. Corp. 180, pi. 449; An- gell & Ames Corp., § 360. See also. Hart v. Mayor &c., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 571; Clerk v. Tucket, 3 Lev. 281; s. c. 2 Vent. 182; Lee v. Wallis, 1 Ken- yon 292, 295; Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481; State v. Town Council, 6 Rich. L. (S. C.) 404; Rosebaugh v. Saffin, 10 Ohio 31; Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio 394; Kneedler v. Borough of Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368; White V. Tallman, 26 N. J. L. 67; Bergen v. Clarkson, 6 N. J. L. 428; Slessman V. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487; Town of New Hampton v. Conroy, 56 Iowa 498; s. c. 9 N. W. 417; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378; s. c. 7 N. W. 623; Varden V. Mount, 78 Ky. 86; Mayor &c. v. Odrenan, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 122; Dunham v. Trustees &c., 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 462; Mayor &c. v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; City of Cincinnati v. Bucking- ham, 10 Ohio 257; Wilcox v. Hem- ming, 58 Wis. 144; s. c. 15 N. W. 435; Donovan v. Mayor &c., 29 Miss. 247. But an ordinance imposing a pecuniary penalty and also a for- feiture may be good as to the pen- alty and void as to the forfeiture: Kneedler v. Borough of Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368. '"- State V. Town Council, 6 Rich. L. (S. C.) 404, 415, 417. See also, Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371; State V. Inhabitants &c., 44 N. J. L. 610. An ordinance providing that upon a second conviction for violation of a Sunday closing of tippling-houses law the defendant's license and the money paid therefor shall be for- feited and remain forfeited, though upon appeal and trial de novo he is acquitted, is void for unreasonable- ness: Mclnerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302; s. c. 29 Pac. 516. 533 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 552 § 552. The same subject continued. — When the power to denounce a forfeiture of property is clear it must not be exercised in contraven- tion of constitutional provisions looking to the security of property from condemnation without "due process of law." Most of the cases in which the validity of ordinances in this particular has been dis- cussed were those enacted for the impounding and sale of animals running at large. "The cases agree," said Judge Dillon, "that when the power to denounce the forfeiture against such animals is given there should be notice either actual or constructive, or prior legal pro- ceedings."*"^ But this alternative requirement has afforded ground for much contention among the courts. The law was laid down by the supreme ' court of Kansas as follows : "Where the law or an ordinance provides that the owner of the cattle shall, in addition to the cost of taking them up, impounding and keeping them, pay for the damages that they may do to private individuals while unlaw- fully running at large, the question of damages and the amount thereof can be determined only by judicial investigation, and generally in a suit between the parties interested.*"* And it will also be ad- mitted that where fines or forfeitures, or anything of a penal or criminal nature or character, is imposed, the question of whether the owner of the stock is liable for the same can only be determined by judicial investigation.*"^ But when nothing is attempted to be im- posed upon the owner of the stock as damages or penalty, but only the reasonable cost of taking up, impounding and keeping the same, and sufficient notice is provided for, and the ordinance is authorized by the city charter, it is believed that no court has ever held the law, or the ordinance founded thereon, to be unconstitutional or invalid, although there may be no provision for a judicial investigation, ex- cept the general remedies to determine whether the law or the ordi- nance has been complied with, and although the notice provided for "" may not be a personal notice, but only a notice by publication or by posting."*"® But the court of appeals of Kentucky declare that a judicial investigation is essential to the validity of such proceedings. "The constitution provides that the citizen shall not be deprived of ^"■"l Dillon Munic. Corp., § 348. Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa 296T *•" Bullock V. Geomble, 45 111. 218. McKibbin v. Port Scott, 35 Ark. 352; ^"^Poppen V. Holmes, 44 111. 360; Hellen v. Noe, 3 Ired. L. (N. C.) 493; Willis V. Legris, 45 111. 289. McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) *»« Gilchrist v. Schmidling, 12 Kan. 433; Shaw v. Kennedy, N. C. Term 263, 272; quoted and approved in R. 158; Davies v. Morgan, 1 C. & J. Fort Smith v. Dodson, 46 Ark. 296. 587; Grover v. Huckins, 26 Mich. See also, Whitfield v. Longest, 6 476; Campau v. Langley, 39 Mich. Ired. L. (N. C.) 268; Wilcox v. Hem- 451; Moore v. State, 11 Lea (Tenn.) ming, 58 Wis. 144; s. c. 15 N. W. 435; 35; Mayor &c. v. Lanham, 67 Ga. 753. § 553 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 534 liis property except by ilie law of tlie land. The meaning of the pro- vision has generally been construed a law that hears before condemn- ing and arrives at a judgment for the divestiture of the rights of property through what is ordinarily understood to be judicial process — general rules that govern society in reference to the rights of prop- erty. This is the general rule, and it is only in extreme cases, when the preservation and repose of society or the protection of the property rights of a large class of the community absolutely require a departure, that the courts recognize any exception. When, for instance, it be- comes necessary to destroy private property to prevent the spread of fire or pestilence in a city or the advance of an army, the rule is silent, bending to an overwhelming necessity." The court insists that the right to proceed without citation and without hearing should not be extended beyond the impounding of the animals. "When that is done the necessity for summary and precipitate action ceases and judicial proceedings looking to a forfeiture may then properly begin."**'^ § 553. Cumulative fines and fines for continuous and repeated oifenses. — A municipal corporation having power to enforce ordi- nances by fines may distinguish between a first and second offense, and mark that distinction by a graduation of the penalty, provided the penalty in no case exceeds that authorized to be imposed. '^'^^ Where the acts are distinct repetitions of an offense and not merely a con- tinuation of a misconduct which may be treated as an entirety the full penalty may be inflicted in each case. Unlawful sales of liquor on the same day may, for instance, be punishable separately.^*"' But where a person was charged in one complaint with one hundred violations of an ordinance "prohibiting any person from cutting down and making use of cedar and other trees," it was held to set forth only a single offense.*^ ° It was also held that an ordinance imposing a fine of $125 on each hundred pounds of gunpowder kept in store, the limit of power to punish being $250, could not be enforced beyond the limit.*^^ So, too, an ordinance prescribing a penalty "of not less «'Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86, and 215; State v. Town Council &c., 6 cases there cited. See also, in favor Rich. (S. C.) 404. oE this view, Lanfear v. Mayor, 4 *'" State v. Town Council &c., Rice La. 97 (cf. Guillotte v. City of New (S. C.) 158. Orleans, 12 La. An. 432) ; Cincinnati "^ Mayor &c. v. Odrenan, 12 Johns. V. Buckingham, 10 Ohio 257. (N. Y.) 122. The court remarked ^•^ State V. Inhabitants &c., 45 N. that if a contrary construction were J. L. 318; citing Master of Butchers' to prevail a penalty to the full Co. v. Bullock, 3 Bos. & Pul. 434. amount might be repeated, not upon *°* Corporation of Columbia v. Har- the offense itself but upon the quan- rison, 2 Treadw. Const. (S. C.) 213, tity of the offense, and that with 535 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. 554 than one dollar nor more than five dollars for every hour" that a pei'son shall keep his wagon within the limits of a market without the authority of the clerk of the market is in violation of a statute conferring power to pass reasonable by-laws with penalties not ex- ceeding $20 for one offense.*^^ g 554. Enforcement by complaint — Nature of the proceeding. — There is great confusion among the authorities as to the rules of pro- cedure and evidence applicable to the prosecution of offenders against municipal ordinances by complaint. The decisions are influenced in a great measure, but not wholly, by local statutory or constitutional provisions.^^^ By the code of Wyoming civil procedure in all such, actions is expressly enjoined."*^* Substantially the same rule has been judicially adopted in some other states, while in many jurisdic- tions they are deemed to possess in whole or in part the character- istics of criminal prosecutions. A summary of the doctrine in various states is given in a recent and much-quoted treatise, and the authori- ties there cited will be found in the note.*^^ equal propriety the penalty might be imposed on every pound or on every grain. See also, City of Chicago v. Quimby, 38 111. 274; Hart v. Mayor &c., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 571; Stokes v. Corporation of New York, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 87; Marshall v. Smith, L. R. 8 C. P. 416; Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.) 382; Crepps V. Burden, Cowp. 640. 412 "Tjig offense thus punished is a single continuous offense, and the ordinance affixing a penalty which, computed according to its terms, may exceed $20 for a single offense upon one and the same day is void:" Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 121 Mass. 356. Cf. Horr & Bemis Munic. Police Ord., § 152. *" These must be strictly followed so far as they go: People v. Presi- dent &c., 32 Hun (N. Y.) 508. And generally the case is controlled by the procedure which obtains in sim- ilar cases before the same tribunal: People V. Cox, 76 N. Y. 47; State v. City of Passaic, 42 N. J. L. 87. ^" Jenkins v. City of Cheyenne, 1 Wyom. Ter. 287. "^Horr & Bemis Munic. Police Ord., § 170. Alabama: — Stricter rules than in civil cases: Mayor &c. V. Jones, 42 Ala. 630; Fuhrman v. Mayor &c., 54 Ala. 263. California: — Criminal: City of Santa Barbara v. Sherman, 61 Cal. 57 ; People v. John- son, 30 Cal. 98. Colorado : —For the rule in Colorado, see the succeeding section. Georgia: — Not criminal: Williams v. City Council &c., 4 Ga. 509; Floyd v. Commissioners &c., 14 Ga. 354. Illinois: — Not criminal: City of Quincy v. Ballance, 30 111. 185; President &c. v. Holland, 19 III. 271; Town of Lewiston v. Proctor, 23 111. 483. Indiana: — Not criminal: Town of Brookville v. Gagle, 73 Ind. 177; Quigley v. City of Aurora, 50 Ind. 28; City of Greensburgh v. Cor- win, 58 Ind. 518; City of Goshen v. Croxton, 34 Ind. 239; Board &c. v. Chissom, 7 Ind. 688: Miller v. O'Reil- ly, 84 Ind. 168. Iowa: — Not crimi- nal: City of Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa 524. Kansas: — In some cases civil, in others criminal: Neitzel v. City of Concordia, 14 Kan. 446. Cf. City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 555 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 536 § 555. The complaint — General requisites. — At common law no trial for any offense except contempts could ever be had without a writ- ten complaint.*^* It is a part of the technical meaning of the term "complaint" that it is verified by the oath or affirmation of the person who informs.*^^ The' complaint ought regularly to be entitled in behalf of the proper party, which in most cases is the corporation ;*^* but mere irregularities not affecting any substantial right of the de- fendant, and where the record of the proceedings is sufficiently full and specific to protect him against another prosecution for the same offense, will be disregarded.*^ ** There must be a distinct allegation 622. Massachusetts: — Criminal: Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 462; In re Goddard, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504. Michigan: — Not crim- inal: Cooper V. People, 41 Mich. 403; s. c. 2 N. W. 51; People v. Controller &c., 18 Mich. 445. Minnesota: — Not criminal: State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445; s. c. 13 N. W. 913. Missouri:— Not criminal: City of St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo. 204; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395; Ex parte Kilburg, 10 Mo. App. 442. Nebraska: — Criminal: City of Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101. New Hampshire: — Criminal: State v. Stearns, 31 N. H. 106. New Jersey: — Not criminal: Brophy v. City of Perth Amboy, 44 N. J. L. 217; Kip V. Mayor &c., 26 N. J. L. 298; Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. L. 142. New York: — Not criminal: Wood V. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 425, 431. See also. City of Buffalo V. Schliefer, 25 Hun (N. Y.) 275. Ohio: — In some cases civil, in others criminal: City of Cincinnati V. Gwynne, 10 Ohio 192; Markle v. Town Council &c., 14 Ohio 586. See also, Larney v. City of Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 599. Wisconsin: — The rule is now nearly or quite the same as that in Colorado (see the following section) : President &c. v. McKernan, 54 Wis. 487; s. c. 11 N. W. 798; Pres- ident &c. V. Bell, 43 Wis. 488; Fink V. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26; City of Oshkosh v. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483; s. c. 13 N. W. 533; Sutton v. McConnell, 46 Wis. 269; s. c. 50 N. W. 414; Chafin v. Waukesha Co., 62 Wis. 463; s. c. 24 N. W. 732. "" 4 Bl. Com. 280; Barbour Cr. Law 614; 1 Bishop Crim. Proc, § 894: Chitty Cr. Law 34; Archbold Cr. Prac. & PI. 31, n. 1; Allen v. Gray, 11 Conn. 95, 102; Tracy v. Williams, 4 Conn. 107; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Campbell v. Thompson, 16 Me. 117. On appeal, city ordinances will not be presumed to require a written complaint: City of Alton v. Kirsch, 68 111. 261. "^ Campbell v. Thompson, 16 Maine 117, 120. A slight error in the jurat will not vitiate the affidavit: City of Cherokee v. Pox, 34 Kan. 16; s. c. 7 Pac. 625. If the charter requires an information by the city attorney, a complaint made by a deputy, though afterwards adopted by him, is not sufficient: City of Kansas v. Flanagan, 69 Mo. 22. "3 Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 146; Smith v. Mar- ston, 5 Tex. 426; Webster v. City of Lansing, 47 Mich. 192; s. c. 10 N. E. 196. Any form of complaint in this respect which is prescribed by stat- ute must be strictly obeyed: State V. Zeigler, 32 N. J. L. 262; State v. Bartlett, 35 Wis. 287; Exeter v. Starre, 2 Show. 158; Harris v. Wake- man, Say. 254; Commonwealth v. Fahey, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 408. "=• State V. Graffmuller, 26 Minn. 6; s. c. 46 N. W. 445; Farrel v. Mayor &c., 12 Up. Can. Q. B. 343; State v. Treasurer &c., 45 N. J. L. 288; City 537 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 556 of the offense,*^** a reference to the ordinance violated, and a conclu- sion.*-"^ § 556. The same subject continued — Pleading. — The precision re- quired in common-law informations or indictments is not required in affidavits for violation of municipal ordinances. "It is sufficient if they set out with clearness the offense charged, and the substance of that part of the ordinance which has been violated, with a reference to the title, the date and the section."*^^ It is generally held suffi- cient to set out the substance of the ordinance or the section of it which is alleged to have been violated.'*^ ^ But a simple charge of of Alton v. Kirsch, 68 111. 261; State v. King, 37 Iowa 462. ""Roberson v. Lambertville, 38 N. J. L. 69; Horr & Bemis Munlc. Police Ord., § 173. ^"a See the following two sections. ^^^Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. L. 142, 145. Continuing, the court said: — "This much, however, it ought to contain, for the office of the complaint is not only to give the magistrate jurisdiction, but event- ually to apprise the party of what offense he is charged with, and it answers neither of these purposes with certainty unless it contains these particulars. I am inclined to think this complaint is defective, inasmuch as it does not give the date and the section of the ordinance alleged to have been violated; but as it refers to the ordinance relating to markets, and gives the literal words of the section, and as there is no pretense that the defendant was surprised, I should have some hesitation in reversing for this cause alone." See also. Inhabitants &c. v. O'Connor, 53 Mo. 468; Common- wealth V. Rowe, 141 Mass. 79; s. c. 6 N. E. 645; State v. Dunbar, 43 La. An. 836; s. c. 9 So. 492; State v. Baker, 44 La. An. 79; s. c. 10 So. 405; City. Council &c. v. Ashley Phosphate Co., 34 S. C. 541; s. c. 13 S. E. 845. ^^Kip v. Mayor &c., 26 N. J. L. 298; Goldthwaite v. City Council &c., 50 Ala. 486; Case v. Mayor &c., 30 Ala. 538; City Council &c. v. Chur, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 164; Clevenger v. Town of Rushville, 90 Ind. 258; City Council &c. V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 7 Wis. 484; People v. Justices, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 65; City Council v. Seeba, 4 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 319; O'Malia v. Wentworth, 65 Maine 129. In Ex parte Lane, 76 Cal. 587; s. c. 18 Pac. 677, a description of the offense, and a reference to the sec- tion of the ordinance, were held in- sufficient. See also, to the same point. City of Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 254; s. c. 25 N. W. 449; Town of Auburn v. Eldridge, 77 Ind. 126; City of Huntington v. Pease, 56 Ind. 305; City of Goshen v. Kern, 63 Ind. 468; Whitson v. City of Franklin, 34 Ind. 392; West v. City of Columbus, 20 Kan. 633; State v. Merritt, 83 N. C. 677; State v. Cai- nan, 94 N. C. 880. In some cases it has been held unnecessary to refer to the ordinance: City of Rochester V. Upman, 19 Minn. 108; State v. Reckards, 21 Minn. 47; City of Osh- kosh V. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483; s. c. 13 N. W. 552. See also. Information of Oliver, 21 S. C. 318; and contra. City of Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254; Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants &c., 47 Maine 481. But the prevail- ing rule is that the courts will take judicial notice of the charter, and the power to make by-laws, but not of the by-laws themselves: Case v. Mayor &c., 30 Ala. 538; Goodrich v. 55^ PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 538 violating an ordinance by a more recital of the number of the section is insufficient.*^^ The complaint should state briefly but clearly the acts done or omitted to be done which constitute a violation of the ordinance, together with the time when and place where the offense was committed.*^* The general rule undoubtedly is that it is suffi- cient to describe the offense in the language of the ordinance ;*^^ but Avhere the words of the ordinance by their generality embrace within their literal terms cases which are not within their equity and spirit or the obvious intention of the framers, the rules of good pleading require all the circumstances and ingredients of the ofEense to be set out.*'*^ § 557. Pleading further considered. — While some latitude must be allowed in the construction of complaints charging violations of ordi- nances, all the common safeguards and requirements of criminal pleading ought not to be disregarded. A complaint for wilfully re- fusing, as the agent of a water company, to supply the complainant with water, a tender being made in actual money for that purpose, Brown, 30 Iowa 291; Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa 286 (cf. Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa 90); Trustees &c. v. Lefler, 23 111. 88, 90; Harker v. Mayor, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 199; People v. Mayor &c., 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 81; Mooney V. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551; Cox v. City of St. Louis, 11 Mo. 431; City of Aus- tin V. Walton, 68 Tex. 507; s. c. 5 S. W. 70; City of New Orleans v. Boudro, 14 La. An. 303; City of Miles City V. Kern, 12 Mont. 119; s. c. 29 Pac. 720; People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho 681; Green v. City of Indian- apolis, 22 Ind. 192; Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266; Garland v. City of Denver, 11 Colo. 534; s. c. 19 Pac. 460. In Town of Mounds- ville V. Velton, 35 W. Va. 217; s. c. 13 S. E. 373, it is said to be "well settled" that the courts of the mu- nicipality will take judicial notice of its ordinances without pleading or proof, — citing Dillon Munic. Corp., § 413, and Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266. But cf. Horr & Bemis Mu- nic. Police Ord., § 174, and Bishop Stat. Crimes (2d ed.), § 106, and cases cited; Downing v. City of Mil- tonvale, 36 Kan. 740; s. c. 14 Pac. 281. ^' City of Huntington v. Pease, 56 Ind. 305; City of Huntington v. Cheesbro, 57 Ind. 74. '-' City of Huntington v. Pease, 56 Ind. 305; Inhabitants &c. v. O'Con- nor, 53 Mo. 468; Lippman v. City of South Bend, 84 Ind. 276; City of St. Louis V. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582. *-'' City of St. Louis v. Knox, 74 Mo. 79; State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97; Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 52; s. c. 29 N. E. 1146. ^^^ State V. Goulding, 44 N. H. 284; State V. Beirce, 27 Conn. 319; Com- monwealth V. Stark, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 556; Rex v. Home, 2 Cowp. 672, 682; State V. Follet, 6 N. H. 53; 2 Hawk. P. C, ch. 25, §§ 111, 115; 3 Bac. Abr. 113; State v. Robinson, 29 N. H. 274; Rex V. Mason, 2 T. R. 581; Davey v. Baker, 4 Burr. 2471; Rex v. Spar- ling, 1 Str. 497; Anthony v. State, 29 Ala. 27: State v. Fleetwood, 16 Mo. 448; Horr & Bemis Munic. Police Ord., § 173. "A complaint properly concludes against the form of the statute:" State v. Cruickshank, 71 Vt. 94; s. c. 42 Atl. 983. 539 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 558 which does not state that the water company was nnder a legal ohli- gation by ordinance to supply such water, and does not in express words or by fair implication allege that the tender was sufficient or was the amount of the legal or contract price of the water supply desired, is bad and should be quashed on motion. *^'^ But a general allegation that an ordinance has been duly passed is sufficient without alleging that every antecedent act requisite to its legal passage has been done ;*-■'' or that the officers were duly elected and authorized to pass the ordinance. '^^^ As a general rule exceptions need not be negatived/^" If an offense be cumulative with respect to the acts done, although any one of the acts be sufficient to constitute the offense, the cumulative offense may be charged without making the pleading bad for duplicity. ^^^ A complaint for allowing swine to go upon the sidewalk is not objectionable in describing a continuous street by the names of its different parts. *^- Where the complaint is brought in the name of the corporation, it is proper to conclude "contrary to the form of the ordinance," etc;^^^ but when it is required to be prose- cuted in the name of the state, it ought to conclude "contrary to the statute," or to both statute and ordinance. *•''* § 558. Proof of ordinances. — The method of proving ordinances is frequently provided for by statute ;*^^ but where the matter is not thus regulated, the common-law rule requires the production of the *"'' Johnson v. City of Winfield, 48 * - Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Al- Kan. 129; s. c. 29 Pac. 559. len (Mass.) 266, 268. ^^* Becker v. City of Washington, *'^ Village of Winooski v. Gokey, 94 Mo. 375; s. c. 7 S. W. 291. See 49 Vt. 282. also. Board &c. v. Henzler (N. J.), ^^* Horr & Bemis Munic. Police 41 Atl. 228; Town of Flora v. Lee, Ord., § 176. In a prosecution for vi- 5 111. App. 629. olation of an ordinance under a stat- ^^ Hardenbrook v. Town of Ligo- iite providing that "it shall be suffi- nier, 95 Ind. 70. See also. Village of cient to set forth the offense fully, Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282; City plainly, substantially and formally, of Janesville v. Milwaukee &c. R. and no part of such ordinance need Co., 7 Wis. 484. Cf. Commissioners be set forth," a conclusion "against &c. V. Frank, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 436. the revised ordinances of said city *^" McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. L. in such case made and provided," 213; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 472; is sufficient to embrace an amend- Town of Martinsville v. Frieze, 33 ment to a section included in a vol- Ind. 507. ume entitled "Revised Ordinances:" ^■■^ Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Al- Commonwealth v. Odenweller, 156 len (Mass.) 266, 268; State v. Mass. 234; s. c. 30 N. E. 1022. Haney, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 390, 403. ^==* Napman v. People, 19 Mich. 352; See also, Reg. v. Bowen, 1 Denison City of St. Louis v. St. Louis R. Co., 23; Stevens v. Commonwealth. 6 89 Mo. 44; s. c. 1 S. W. 305. See Met. (Mass.) 241; State v. Morton, also, Downing v. City of Miltonvale, 27 Vt. 310; Hinkle v. Common- 36 Kan. 740; s. c. 14 Pac. 281. wealth, 4 Dana (Ky.) 518. § 558 rUBLIO COUPOKATIONS. 640 originals or the books in which they are reeorded.^^® If the regular enactment of the ordinance is not questioned, it is not necessary to show that fact in addition to its production to sustain a conviction.*^'' But where it becomes necessary to prove a compliance with all formali- ties, none must be omitted which are requisite to its validity/^^ A «6 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Engle, 76 111. 317; City Council v. Dunn, 1 McC. (S. C.) 333; Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 111. 69; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; State v. King, 37 Iowa 462; Barr v. Village of Auburn, 89 111. 361; Lindsay v. City of Chicago, 115 111. 120; s. c. 3 N. E. 443; City of In- dependence v. Trouvalle, 15 Kan. 70. As to attestation and identifica- tion of the book, see Town of Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. 380; City of Ot- tumwa v. Schaub, 52 Iowa 515; s. c. 3 N. W. 529. Where there is no rec- ord the original or a certified copy is admissible: Pugh v. City of Little Rock, 35 Ark. 75; Bailey v. State, 30 Neb. 855; s. c. 47 N. W. 208; King- horn V. Corporation &c. of Kingston, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 130; Block v. Presi- dent &c., 36 111. 301. An ordinance purporting to have been passed by the city council and coming from the city secretary, who is the cus- todian, is admissible, although there is an interlineation therein: Hutchi- son V. Storrie (Tex. Civ. App.), 48 S. W. 785. The clerk's certificate re- citing that the document was a true and correct copy of an ordinance passed by the council and deposited in his office is prima facie proof of its passage: McChesney v. City of Chicago, 159 111. 223; s. c. 42 N. E. 894. Where the charter provides that the ordinances published in book form shall be received in evi- dence without further proof, an or- dinance so published will be pre- sumed to have been signed by the mayor: Allen v. City of Davenport, 107 Iowa 90; s. c. 77 N. W. 532. A book of ordinances published by authority of the city council, though not precisely as prescribed, is com- petent evidence: Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Winters, 65 111. App. 435. But not so if not published by authority of the council: Louisville &c. R. Co. V. Patchen, 167 111. 204; s. c. 47 N. E. 368. It is prima facie proof of an ordinance to introduce the ordi- nance-book with the vote thereon and the proper authentication thei"e- of with evidence of due publication: Merced Co. v. Fleming, 111 Cal. 46; s. c. 43 Pac. 392. An ordinance of a city providing protection from blasting is admissible in evidence in an action for injury caused by loose fragments of rock thrown upon plaintiff's house from blasting: Ma- honey V. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321; s. c. 79 N. W. 134; Ex parte Davis, 115 Cal. 445; s. c. 47 Pac. 258. *^^ Town of Flora v. Lee, 5 111. App. 629. See also, Becker v. City of Washington, 94 Mo. 375; s. c. 7 S. W. 291; Board &c. v. Henzler (N. J.), 41 Atl. 228. ^^"'Willard v. Warden &c., 8 Conn. 247; Trustees &c. v. Lefler, 23 111. 88; Schott v. People, 89 111. 195. The record-book is the best evidence of the ordinance and can not be con- tradicted by parol: People v. Mur- ray, 57 Mich. 396; s. c. 24 N. W. 118; City of Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan. 211; City of Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush (Ky.) 508; Ball v. Fagg, 67 Mo. 481; City of Covington v. Lud- low, 1 Met. (Ky.) 295; City of St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513. Cf. Knight V. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 70 Mo. 231; Barton v. City of Pitts- burgh, 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 373; City of Troy V. Atchison &c. R. Co., 11 Kan. 519. But it is generally held that parol proof of publication is compe- tent: Horr & Bemis Munic. Police 541 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 559 town or city court takes judicial notice of the ordinances of such town or city.'*''"' But courts other than municipal courts will not take judicial notice that there is an ordinance on a given subject, and such ordinance must be pleaded and proved.**" § 559. Right to trial by jury. — Constitutional provisions relating to trial by jury, being twice put in jeopardy, proceedings by indict- ment or information and the like, in criminal cases, are generally held to have been adopted with reference to the procedure previously exist- ing. If in a given class of offenses trials without a jury were formerly the prevailing rule, this rule is not abrogated by the constitution.**^ Both in this country and in England the trangressions of municipal regulations enacted under the police power for the purpose of pre- serving the health, peace and good order, and otherwise promoting the general welfare within cities and towns, have for considerably more than a century been generally prosecuted without a jury.**^ It is certainly true that where the judgment against the defendant entails a fine, even if its collection may by virtue of the statute and ordinance be enforced by imprisonment, the proceeding remains a Ord., § 187, and cases there cited; Town of Eldora v. Burlingame, 62 Iowa 32; s. c. 17 N. W. 148; Newlan v. President &c., 14 111. 364; Teft v. Size, 10 111. 432. See also. Raker v. Village of Maquon, 9 111. App. 155; Schwartz v. City of Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 490; s. c. 13 N. W. 450; Village of Betholto v. Conley, 9 111. App. 339. *^^ Incorporated Town of Scranton v. Danenbaum, 109 Iowa 95; s. c. 80 N. W. 221. ^"'Munson v. Fenno, 87 111. App. 655; Watt v. Jones, 60 Kan. 201; s. c. 56 Pac. 16; Field v. Malster, 88 Md. 691; s. c. 41 Atl. 1087; City of St. Louis V. Roche. 128 Mo. 541; s. c. 31 S. W. 915; Shanfelter v. Mayor &c., 80 Md. 483; s. c. 31 Atl. 439; Weaver v. Snow, 60 111. App. 624; People V. Casegeanda, 37 N. Y. S. 768; s. c. 73 N. Y. St. 445. *"Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 390, n. 3; Sedgwick Stat. & Const. Law 487, n., 491, n., 497; State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572; Shafer v. Mum- ma, 17 Md. 331; Williams v. City Council &c., 4 Ga. 509; Hill v. Mayor &c., 72 Ga. 314, 319; Ward v. Far- well, 97 111. 593; Floyd v. Commis- sioners, 14 Ga. 354, 356; McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. L. 213, 215; Howe V. Treasurer, 37 N. J. L. 145; State v. City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; s. c. 12 Pac. 310; Inwood v. State, 42 Ohio St. 186; People v. McCarthy, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 97; Ex parte Kiburg. 10 Mo. App. 442, 447; Mclnerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302; s. c. 29 Pac. 516. "= State V. Lee, 29 Minn. 445; s. c. 13 N. W. 913; City of Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94; s. c. 12 Pac. 1; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395, 400; State V. Sly, 4 Or. 277; State v. Con- lin, 27 Vt. 318; Wong v. City of As- toria, 13 Or. 538; s. c. 11 Pac. 295; State v. Noble, 20 La. An. 325; By- ers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. St. 89; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Peo- ple V. Van Houten, 35 N. Y. S. 186; s. c. 69 N. Y. St. 265; Board of Po- lice &c. V. Giron, 46 La. An. 1364; s. c. 16 So. 190; Hunt v. City of Jack- sonville, 34 Fla. 504; s. c. 16 So. 398; and cases cited in the preceding note. But see State v. Larkins, 44 S. C. 362; s. c. 22 S. E. 409. § 560 PUBLIC COKPOKATIONS. 542 civil action so far as a jury trial is concerned name of the state or not."**^ And in a number cisions the same rule is held to apply where the imprisonment in the first instance and not mere There is excellent authority for the i)roposition viding for summary proceedings without a jury if the offense be also a statutory misdemeanor ment and jury trial.^*^ , whether it be in the of well-considered de- judgment may include ly as an alternative.*** that an ordinance pro- is in that respect void punishable by indict- § 560, The same subject continued. — It is believed that no court has gone further in supporting summary convictions than the supreme court of Colorado, in a case where the defendant was prosecuted for violating an ordinance regulating dram-shops. By general statute the act was made a misdemeanor punishable by indictment or informa- tion, trial by jury, etc., and it was strenuously insisted by counsel for "^ Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 636; City of Osh- kosh v. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 483, 487; s. c. 13 N. W. 552; President &c. v. Bell, 43 Wis. 488; State v. Smith, 52 Wis. 134; s. c. 8 N. W. 870; Chafin v. Waukesha Co., 62 Wis. 463; s. c. 22 N. W. 732; Baldwin v. City of Chi- cago, 68 111. 418; Ex parte Hollwe- dell, 74 Mo. 395; Horr & Bemis Munic. Police Ord., § 181. «^ McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. L. 213, 215. In Hill v. Mayor, 72 Ga. 314, the court said: — "If no man could be fined or imprisoned for vio- lation of city police ordinances ex- cept by a jury trial on indictment, away would go all power in our mu- nicipal authorities to preserve peace and good order within their corpo- rate limits." In affirming the same doctrine the supreme court of Colo- rado used the following vigorous language: — "The public welfai'e de- mands summary and speedy prose- cution of offenders against munici- pal ordinances. To hold that unless there be presentation by indictment, trial by jury, and unless all the oth- er constitutional rights and priv- ileges accorded to defendants in criminal cases be extended to each and every person charged with these petty offenses, and imprisonment could not follow conviction, would be disastrous beyond measure to the welfare of those living within cities and towns, and would largely de- stroy the usefulness of such corpora- tions:" Per Justice Helm, in City of Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94; s. c. 12 Pac. 1. . **^ Some of these cases declare, however, that if the defendant is en- titled on appeal to a trial by jury and there be no unreasonable limita- tion connected with the appeal, the constitutional provisions are satis- fied. See In re Dana, 7 Ben. 1, 4; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1301, confining this qualifi- cation to petty offenses. Where the defendant was required, as a condi- tion precedent to the right of appeal, to execute a bond with approved sureties, not merely for his appear- ance in the police court, but also for the payment of any judgment ren- dered on the appeal, and likewise as a further condition to pay all costs accrued in the police court, the act would be unconstitutional in cases where the right of trial by jury ex- ists: Mclnerney v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 302; s. c. 29 Pac. 516. 543 ORDINANCES AND BY-LAWS. § 561 the defense that it does not follow, because an act might be punishable under each of two different laws, that the procedure might be differ- ent — that the defendant was at least entitled to trial by jury. The court decided that a summary proceeding for violation of a munici- pal by-law is not necessarily unconstitutional, though it be a statutory misdemeanor. "The inquiry," said the court, "is not. Was the act complained of a public misdemeanor by statute or at the common law ? but, Does the offense charged belong to a class of offenses that were usually proceeded against summarily ?"**^ § 561. Certiorari and habeas corpus. — Where no appeal is given by statute or charter from the decision of the municipal authorities, certiorari will issue for the purpose of a judicial review of their action.'**'^ In the United States the office of this writ has been ex- tended beyond the practice in England, and it is used not only to review the decisions of courts, properly so called, but also the pro- ceedings of special tribunals, commissioners, magistrates and officers of municipal corporations exercising judicial powers, affecting the rights of property of the citizen, when they act in a summary way, or in a new course different from that of the common law. The authori- ties are almost uniform in holding that mere legislative or ministerial acts, as such, can not be reviewed on certiorari.**^ There is no ground for the remedy unless it be made to appear that the plaintiff may suffer injury in case of non-intervention.**^ And it must also appear ^ Mclnerney v. City of Denver, 17 trial is not de novo, and conclusions Colo. 302; s. c. 29 Pac. 516. The of fact can not be revised: Town of court also recognized the converse of Camden v. Bloch, 65 Ala. 236. If the proposition; that is to say, that there is a statutory remedy it is ex- though a particular offense may elusive: City Council &c. v. Belser, have been unknown to the common 53 Ala. 379; Intendant v. Chandler, 6 or statutory law before the adoption Ala. 899; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich, of the constitution, yet if it clearly 111; Taylor v. Mayor &c., 39 Ga. 59; belongs to a class of offenses there- State v. Bill, 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) 373. tofore triable by jury the constitu- Where the time for appeal has been tional guaranty applies. This is the allowed to expire, there is no relief doctrine of the United States su- unless in special circumstances: preme court, where, however, it was Beasley v. Town of Beckley, 28 W. held that a person charged with con- Va. 81; Poe v. Machine Works, 24 spiracy to prevent another from pur- W. Va. 517. suing a lawful vocation was en- "^ In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145; s. titled to a jury trial: Callan v. Wil- c. 19 N. W. 723. Contra in New son, 127 U. S. 540; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1301. Jersey: Treasurer &c. v. Mulford, 26 So, too, on a charge of libel: In re N. J. L. 49; State v. Mayor &c., 29 Dana, 7 Ben. 1. N. J. I^. 170. "' Errors of law apparent on the "" Davison v. Otis, 24 Mich. 23. record may be reviewed, but the § 561 PUBLIC CORl'OKATIONS. 544 that he has some substantial interest in the subject-matter, on which the judgment of the court can act effectively and work advantage to him.*°° Where the plaintiff was convicted on his plea of not guilty and satisfied the judgment by paying the fine, he was not entitled to a review of the proceedings/"^^ It is not the province of the writ of habeas corpus to retry any questions of fact upon which the findings of the court of original jurisdiction must be presumed to have been based. Unless it appears as a matter of law that an ordinance is void, the remedy of review must be had by other appropriate proceedings.^ ^^ '^^ Golden v. Botts, 12 Wend. (N. erty, and if the change of grade is Y.) 234. justified only as part of an entire *" People V. Leavitt, 41 Mich. 470; scheme he may question the legality s. c. 2 N. W. 812. The writ does not of the scheme: Read v. City of Cam- lie in favor of the corporation after den, 54 N. J. L. 347; s. c. 24 Atl. 549. trial and acquittal: Cranston v. Au- *^- Question of reasonableness de- gusta, 61 Ga. 572. An abutting own- pending on facts will not be thus re- er may maintain certiorari to re- tried: In re Wright, 29 Hun (N. Y.) view an ordinance changing the 357. See also. Madden v. Smeltz, 2 grade of a street in front of his prop- Ohio C. C. 168. CHAPTEE XV. EXPRESS CORPOEATE POWERS. Section 562. Powers of a municipal corpora- tion generally. 563. Delegation of powers. 564. Delegation of power by the municipality. 565. Power which may be delegated. 566. The same subject continued. 567. Exercise of powers. 568. Mode of exercise. 569. Proceedings not reviewable. 570. The same subject continued. 571. Constitutionality of acts grant- ing powers. 572. The same subject continued. 573. "Validity of acts granting pow- ers. 574. Power to "trade" should not be granted. 575. Power of towns as to villages within them. 576. Power as to issue of commer- cial paper. 577. As to trusts. 578. Purchase at tax sales. 579. Granting exclusive franchises. 580. The same subject continued. 581. Contracts not exclusive. 582. Improvements generally. 583. Costs of improvements. 584. Gas and water supply. 585. Natural-gas companies. 586. Establishment of electric plant. 587. Public property. 588. The same subject continued. 589. Parks. 590. Wharves. 591. The same subject continued. 592. Markets. 593. The same subject continued. 594. Streets generally. 1 Smith— 35 Section 595. Construction of statutory pro- visions. 596. Protection of streets. 597. Obstructions in streets. 598. Use of streets by street-rail- ways. 599. Telegraph- and telephone-poles in streets — Removal. 600. Vacation of streets. 601. Grading of streets. 602. Allowing the use of streets by railroads. 603. The same subject continued. 604. Regulations as to railroads us- ing streets. 605. The same subject continued. 606. Crossings of railways. 607. Miscellaneous matters relating to streets, 608. Sewers. 609. Fire-limits— Public health. 610. Directions as to buildings. 611. Police power. 612. The same subject continued. 613. Regulation of liquor traffic. 614. To promote health. 615. General welfare, etc. 616. To license. 617. Occupations. 618. The same subject continued. •619. Public offenses. 620. The same subject continued. 621., Nuisances. 622. Holidays, etc. 623. Power to purchase, lease and convey real estate. 624. Power to subscribe for stock. 625. Power over watercourses. 626. Power to aid private charities. 627. Miscellaneous. (545) § 563 PUBLIC CORPOIJATIONS. 546 § 562. Powers of a municipal corporation generally. — The powers of a municipal corporation are those granted in express words by its charter or the general statutes under which it is incorporated; the powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers thus expressly granted; and the powers essential to the declared purposes of the corporation, not only convenient but indispensable.^ These corporations being mere instrumentalities of the state for the more convenient administration of local government, their powers are such as the legislature may confer, and these may be enlarged, abridged or entirely withdrawn at its pleasure.^ Only such powers and rights can be exercised under municipal charters as are clearly comprehended within their words, or derived therefrom by necessary implication, regard being had to the object of the grant. Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the words used by the charter must be resolved in favor of the public.^ Grants of power to supply water or gas have been ^Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 89; Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491; s. c. 4 S. E. 774; Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435; s. c. 4 S. B. 650; Kelly v. Town of Milan, 21 Fed. 842; Cook Co. v. McCrea, 93 111. 236; City of Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Or. 17; s. c. 6 Pac. 221; City of Somerville v. Dickerman, 127 Mass. 272; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378; s. c. 7 N. W. 623; City of Richmond V. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192; Oilman v. City of Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 588; s. c. 21 N. W. 640; Town of Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325; Smith v. City of Newbern, 70 N. C. 14; Blake v. Walker, 23 S. C. 517; City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623; s. c. 10 S. W. 197; City of Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Parish of Ouachita v. City of Monroe, 42 La. An. 782; s. c. 7 So. 717; City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; s. c. 4 S. W. 143; State v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128. The court in Los Angeles &c. Co. V. City of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720, state the doctrine of the text as follows: — "The general prop- osition is that a municipal corpora- tion possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: (1) those granted in express words; (2) those necessarily or fairly im- plied in or incident to the powers ex- pressly granted; (3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply con- venient, but indispensable. And therefore it follows that any fair reasonable doubt concerning the ex- istence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation and the power denied." To the same effect are Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151, 157; s. c. 38 Pac. 682; City of Joplin v. Leckie, 78 Mo. App. 8. - Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540. ^ Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435, holding that the legislature may grant exclusive control over ferries to a municipality, but that the char- ter of Oakland did not confer such exclusive privileges upon the city. In case of reasonable doubt as to the power of a municipal corporation under a charter the power is re- solved against the corporation: City of Joplin V. Leckie, 78 Mo. App. 8. Power to reprint and publish a mu- nicipal charter does not include power to publish in connection therewith the ordinances: Quint v. City of Merrill, 105 Wis. 406; s. c. 81 547 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. 563 upheld upon the ground that the power is a business or proprietary power, as distinguislied from a governmental or legislative power.* And so is the power to construct sewers.""^ In their business transac- tions municipal and quasi-municipal corporations are governed by the same rules that govern private individuals and corporations.^ § 563. Delegation of powers. — The legislature having delegated some portion of its power to a municipal corporation, the latter must hold those powers in subordination to the general power. »Such powers given for local purposes are regarded as trusts confided to the hands in which they are placed, and are not subject to be delegated by the departments in the control of which they are placed,'' The subject of delegation of power may be properly treated from two standpoints: (a) delegation of power by the legislature to the municipality, and (b) delegation of power by the municipality to its municipal departments and officers. The municipal government es- tablished by the legislature, through the instrumentality of the char- ter, is, in effect, a transfer by the state of the functions of the state in so far as they are general and for the public welfare, and vests in N. W. 664. The power of the city does not extend to the protection of subcontractors under contracts made with it: City of Philadelphia v. Mad- den, 8 Pa. Dist. R. 532. * Los Angeles &c. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720; Illinois Trust &c. Bank v. City of Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271; s. c. 22 C. C. A. 171; 40 U. S. App. 257; City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336; Safety In- sulated Wire &c. Co. v. Mayor &c., 66 Fed. 140; s. c. 13 C. C. A. 375; State v. Mayor &c., 19 Mont. 518; s. c. 49 Pac. 15. ^ City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336. "Speer v. Board &c., 88 Fed. 749; s. c. 32 C. C. A. 101; Illinois Trust &c. Bank v. City of Arkansas City, 40 U. S. App. 257; s. c. 22 C. C. A. 171; 76 Fed. 271. ' Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73; s. c. 29 Am. R. 105; City of Brook- lyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 485; s. c. 37 Am. D. 271; Bibel v. People, 67 111. 172, 175; City of Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72 111. 462; State v. Fiske, 9 R. I. 94; State v. City of Trenton, 42 N. J. L. 72, 74; State v. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 117; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 62; State v. Bell, 34 Ohio St. 194; Whyte v. Mayor &c., 2 Swan (Tenn.) 364; Smith V. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Cooley Const. Lim. 204; Sedgwick Stat. & Const. Law 164; City of Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540 (declaring an ordinance giving the exclusive priv- ilege of laying out, constructing, etc., wharves within the city for thirty-seven years, void as being a transfer of the corporate powers of the board) ; City of East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111. 28 (holding that prosecution could not be maintained for a violation of an ordinance which attempted to delegate the power of the city council to the city treasurer by authorizing him to grant licenses to retail liquor and to fix the amount to be paid for it). See also, § 286 et seq., ante. , § 563 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 548 local officers the exercise of the general powers of the state, and in addition to this the municipality is made the depository of a twofold power of local legislation, and a proprietary power not unlike, in many respects, the power of a private corporation. The scope of the legislative functions of the municipality relate (1) to those subjects which are general in their nature but circumscribed as to territory, and which would otherwise be exercised by the legislature, (2) to those matters which are purely of a local nature, not common to the state at large and are the embodiment of the idea of pure local self- government, and (3) those things which are incidental to the corpo- rate entity, as such, and have been appropriately styled proprietary or of a corporate business nature. The first naturally fall under the head of delegated powers while the latter are grants pure and simple. All power vested in the municipality which relates to the exercise of what is generally termed the police power is delegated; that which relates to the local self-government of the corporation, and the inci- dental matters relating thereto are not. A grant of legislative power to do a certain thing carries with it power to use all necessary and proper means to accomplish the end ; and the legislature may author- ize others to do things which it might properly, but can not con- veniently or advantageously do itself.^ Where powers are delegated to a municipal body which are beyond the scope of usual and ordinary powers and which may result in a public burden, they must be strictly pursued.^ The legislature can delegate to municipal corpora- tions the power to tax for public purposes only. Beyond this it would be public plunder.^" A municipal corporation can not be authorized to tax its citizens for the support of a school, hospital or library, . although its doors are open to the public, and a great number are accommodated, unless it is a public agency, and controlled by the state or county.^^ It is inherent in the idea of taxation that it should be for public good, and a law taxing one class of citizens for the benefit of another, or in furtherance of an industrial enterprise, is confiscation in all civilized countries. Almshouses and hospitals may be for public or private uses according to circumstances. Wlien con- *City of Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Wis. 616; Hasbrouck v. City of Mil- Ill. 494, 503; s. c. 44 N. E. 853; Chi- waukee, 13 Wis. 37; Brodhead v. cago &c. R. Co. V. Jones, 149 111. 361; City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624; s. c. 37 N. E. 247. Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; »Ex parte Sims, 40 Pla. 432; s. c. Whiting v. Sheboygan &c. R. Co., 25 25 So. 280. Wis. 167. ^^ Knowlton v. Board &c., 9 Wis. " Wisconsin Keeley Institute Co. 410; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 v. Milwaukee Co., 95 Wis. 153; s. c. Wis. 271; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 70 N. W. 68; 36 L. R. A. 55. 282; Foster v. City of Kenosha, 12 549 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 564 trolled by the commonwealth and open to all who need such aid, they are for public uses, and may be sustained by taxation. But any institu- tion, however admirable or useful, which is in the hands of private persons not accountable to the government is not for public use.^^ The legislature has power without express constitutional grant to confer upon a city power to enact and enforce an ordinance against carrying concealed weapons. ^^ The legislature has the power to take from the municipality a power previously vested in it and vest such power in a board created by it for such purpose. ^^^ A state may dele- gate power to license a calling or business when it may fairly be deemed detrimental to the public welfare or against public policy and might be prohibited entirely, and the exercise of such power is not tax- ation but a legitimate exercise of police power and not subject to ju- dicial control.^* The legislature can not delegate power to try offenses against the state to courts created for municipal offenses. ^^ Power of control over streets in a city may be delegated by the legislature,^*' and so may the power to regulate weights and measures. ^^ The legislature having power to impose terms and conditions on foreign corporations before they can do business in this state, may delegate this power to cities. ^^ § 564. Delegation of power by the municipality. — The rule is that power delegated to a municipality can not be delegated by it to some other body, officer or set of officers. The reason for this rule is illus- trated by analogy in the law of agency, but rests mainly in the idea that power vested in one department of government can not be trans- ferred to, assumed or exercised by another department. The public powers or trusts devolved by law, or charter, upon the council or gov- erning body to be exercised by it when and in such manner as it shall judge best, can not be delegated to others. ^^ Where the charter em- powers the council to pass ordinances and prescribe penalties for a "Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U. S. "Humes v. City of Ft. Smith, 93 655; Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Fed. 857. Mass. 454; St. Mary's Industrial ^^ Grant v. Camp, 105 Ga. 428; s. c. School V. Brown, 45 Md. 310; Phila- 31 S. E. 429. delphia Assn. &c. v. Wood, 39 Pa. ^^ City Council &c. v. Parker, 114 St. 73; Hitchcock v. City of St. Ala. 118; s. c. 21 So. 452. Louis, 49 Mo. 484; State v. Osawkee "Ford v. New York &c. R. Co., 53 Tp., 14 Kan. 418. N. Y. S. 764; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. ^^ Town of Ocean Springs v. Green, Y.) 474. 77 Miss. 472; s. c. 27 So. 743. '" Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. City of ^'•aSee ch. 41, vol. 2. But it can Peoria, 156 111.420; s. c. 40 N. E. 967; not take from a municipality the Walker v. City of Springfield, 94 111. control of its fire-department: State 364. V. Fox (Ind.), 63 N. E. 19. ^» City of Chicago v. Stratton, 162 111. 494, 500; s. c. 44 N. E. 853. § 564 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 550 violation not exceeding a certain sum, or imprisonment not exceeding a certain period, the specific fine and imprisonment must be fixed in the ordinance. This power can not be delegated to the court before whom proceedings are had.^° The city council can not delegate power to a board of health so as to make the regulations of the latter ordi- nances the violation of which will be a misdemeanor,^^ nor delegate power to another to make a rule which will prohibit the slaughter of animals within the city limits,^^ nor can power to grade a street be delegated to the city engineer.-^ But an ordinance giving a city engi- neer supervision of an improvement in order to secure compliance with the ordinance as to work done and material used, is not a delega- tion of power vested in a council.^* If the ordinance, however, directs that the engineer shall designate where inlets and catch-basin covers shall be placed at street corners, and that cross-walks be built in form as designated by him, it is invalid. And so, also, as to changes authorized which will increase or diminish the costs. ^^ The power to determine what articles of merchandise are injurious to public health or a fraud on the public can not be delegated f^ and where the entire control of finances is vested in a city council it can not delegate the power to the mayor to sell its bonds and give him discretion as to the price ;^'^ and so where the council has power to regulate the com- pensation of officers, etc., it can not delegate to the mayor power to con- tract for the collection of taxes.^® But delegation of power to sell water and fix rates to the department of public works for use outside the city is not void for the reason that the city is not obliged to sell for that purpose.^** Power lodged in a common council can not be delegated to a committee;^" nor can power to prescribe penalties be delegated to a justice of the peace before whom a prosecution is had.=*^ ^oTomlin v. City of Cape May, 63 354; Rich v. City of Chicago, 152 N. J. L. 429; s. c. 44 Atl. 209. 111. 18; s. c. 38 N. E. 255. " State V. Beacham, 125 N. C. 652; ==« City of Cairo v. Coleman, 53 111. s. c. 34 S. B. 447. App. 680. " Cocker v. Du Coteau Landing '" Blair v. City of Waco, 75 Fed. Co., 16 Rap. Jud. Que. S. C. 72. 800; s. e. 21 C. C. A. 517. -^ City of Westport v. Martin, 62 =^ Brand v. City of San Antonio Mo. App. 647. (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 340. "* Bradford v. City of Pontiac, 165 ^ Cooper v. City of Brooklyn, 42 111. 612; s. c. 46 N. E. 794; Jackson- N. Y. S. 762; s. c. 11 App. Div. (N. ville R. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, Y.) 71. 114 111. 562; s. c. 2 N. B. 478. ""Foster v. City of Cape May, 60 '=* Bradford v. City of Pontiac, N. J. L. 78; s. c. 36 Atl. 1089. supra; Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. City ^^ State v. Ocean Grove Camp of Chicago, 144 111. 391; s. c. 33 N. E. Meeting, 59 N. J. L. 110; s. c. 35 Atl. 602; Foss v. City of Chicago, 56 111. 794. Construction of Kansas City 551 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 565 § 565. Power which may be delegated. — There are many powers which may be legally and judiciously delegated by the municipality. Thus power to perform a ministerial act may be delegated, but when delegated can not be again delegated by that body to another. ^^ It is not a delegation of power to prohibit the maintenance of a livery- stable in certain blocks unless a majority of the lot-owners consent in writing to the location there. ^^ And so it is not a delegation of 130wer to provide that an ordinance shall not go into effect unless petitioners shall pay into the treasury a specified sum.^* Power given to a contractor to construct a sidewalk of pine, white or burr oak, is not a delegation of power. ^^ Submitting the question of whether a proposed irrigation district shall be organized under a statute to a vote of the citizens of the district is not a delegation by the legislature of power to create a public corporation.^^ A town may delegate to the mayor and clerk the duty of taking up warrants, and issuing new ones in their stead. ^''' Leaving the execution of work to a street com- mittee is not a delegation of power belonging to the council, where the council has ordered the work to be done.^^ Power to contract for the construction of water-works is not delegated to the commissioners of the water department by a resolution authorizing them to prepare plans and to advertise for bids.^^ § 566. The same subject continued. — The legislature had the con- stitutional right to authorize the council of a city to empower the board of police to make rules and regulations respecting the use of the streets of Boston.^" The court said: "The several towns and cities charter in reference to delegation of N. W. 115; In re North Terrace power: Kansas City v. Duncan, 135 Park, 147 Mo. 259; s. c. 48 S. W. 860; Mo. 571; s. c. 37 S. W. 513. Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259; ^- City of Tampa v. Salomonson, s. c. 48 S. W. 860. 35 Fla. 446; s. c. 17 So. 581. =" Continental Const. Co. v. City of =*^City of Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Altoona, 92 Fed. 822; s. c. 35 C. C. A. 111. 494; s. c. 44 N. E. 853; revers- 27. What is not delegation of pow- ing s. c. 58 111. App. 539. er, — see In re House, 23 Colo. 87; ^^ Heman Const. Co. v. Loevy, 64 s. c. 46 Pac. 117. Mo. App. 430. « Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 ^=Gallaher v. Smith, 55 Mo. App. Mass. 375, 383; s. c. 19 N. E. 224. 116. where it was held that under this ^^ Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Brodley, power, delegated to the police board 164 U. S. 112; s. c. 17 S. Ct. 56. by the council, the board was em- ^' State V. Winter, 15 Wash. 407; powered to require an itinerant mu- s. c. 46 Pac. 644. sician to take out a license and pay ^ Town of Harrisonburg v. Roller, a small fee therefor. See also, as to 97 Va. 582; s. c. 34 S. E. 523. Cf . In re reasonableness of ordinance, Com- Taxes Delinquent &c., 75 Minn. 456; monv/ealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. s. c. 78 N. W. 115; State v. West Du- (Mass.) 462; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 luth Land Co., 75 Minn. 456; s. c. 78 Gray (Mass.) 161; Vandine, Peti- § 567 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 55^^ are agencies of government largely under the control of the legisla- ture. The powers and duties of all the towns and cities, except so far as they are specifically provided for in the constitution, are created and defined by the legislature, and we have no doubt that it has the right in its discretion to change the powers and duties created by itself and to vest such powers and duties in officers appointed by the gov- ernor, if in its judgment the public good requires this, instead of leaving such officers to be elected by the people or appointed by the municipal authorities."*^ County officers authorized by law to con- tract for the building of a court-house can not delegate such authority to a private individual. •*- § 567. Exercise of powers. — Where a city council has power to act in a given case and the mode of action is not prescribed by charter, it may proceed either by resolution or by ordinance.*^ Where it is intended to pay for an electric plant by the issuance and sale of city bonds, and the statute empowers the city to erect such a plant upon the approval of a majority of the voters of the city, it is proper to submit to vote the entire matter of erecting the plant and issuing the bonds in one proposition.** Under that provision of the same act which provides that the city council may order the submission of the question of electric lighting to a vote, or that the mayor may do so upon petition of a certain number of taxpayers, the adoption of an ordinance providing for the erection of an electric plant is not a con- dition precedent to the submission of the question. Though the issu- ance of the bonds at the time they were authorized by vote would have been in violation of the constitutional limitation as to the amount of municipal indebtedness allowed, yet, if when they were issued they tioner, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 187; Com- powers to the police board or other monwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray (Mass.) boards, see Heland v. City of Lowell, 52; Commonwealth V. Curtis, 9 Allen 3 Allen (Mass.) 407; City of Taun- (Mass.) 266; Commonwealth v. Mc- ton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254, 260; Cafferty, 145 Mass. 384; s. c. 14 N. Sawyer v. State Board &c., 125 Mass. E. 451. As to requiring a license, 182, 196; Commonwealth v. Young, see Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 135 Mass. 526; City of Brooklyn v. Cush. (Mass.) 562, 573; Nightingale, Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; Birdsall v. Petitioner, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 168; Clark, 73 N. Y. 73; State v. Mayor Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray (Mass.) &c., 34 N. J. L. 163. 161; Commonwealth v. Brooks, 109 ''^Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 355. As to the fee, see Com- Mass. 375; s. c. 19 N. E. 224. monwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. "Russell v. Cage, 66 Tex. 428; s. c. (Mass.) 562; Welch v. Hotchkiss, 39 1 S. W. 270. Conn. 140; Cooley Const. Lim. (5th " City of Crawfordsville v. Braden, ed.) 242, n.; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. 130 Ind. 149; s. c. 28 N. E. 849. (4th ed.), § 357. As to the legality ** Thompson-Houston Electric Co. and propriety of delegating such v. City of Newton, 42 Fed. 723. 553 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 568 ■were not in excess, they are not void, no debt being created until the bonds are issued. That such bonds were sold and delivered before the ordinance providing for issuing them took effect was no ground for enjoining their payment at the suit of a taxpayer. A city, by grant- ing the privilege to a private corporation to erect an electric plant for the purpose of lighting the city without any grant of exclusive rights is not estopped from erecting such a plant itself when power has been granted it by statute to do so.*^ A natural-gas company entering into business under an ordinance of a city having power to regulate its prices, but silent on the subject of rates, is not exempted from the provisions of a subsequent ordinance with reference thereto.*® The provisions of an ordinance denying gas companies the right to carry on their business unless they execute a bond, and declaring the execu- tion of the bond of itself a full acceptance of the ordinance with all its requirements, is invalid as to a company already in business under an ordinance requiring no such bond.*^ The power to erect water- works under a statute which provides for the approval of the voters of the city by a majority vote may be exercised by the council passing an ordinance, in advance of an election, prescribing the character of the water-works and the tax to be levied to meet its cost, and afterwards submitting the question to the electors.*^ If a charter of a city re- quires any sale or lease of its real estate to be made at public auction to the highest bidder, an ordinance of its council making a lease of any of such property to a corporation upon the payment of a rent reserved has been held to be void and to pass no title to the corpora- tion.*^ § 568. Mode of exercise. — The powers of a municipal corporation, whether regarded as political or governmental, or those of a mere private corporation, can be exercised only in conformity with the provisions of its charter. The legislature can impose such restrictions as it thinks proper, as in the case cited it saw fit to require the for- malities of legislation for the disposition of the city property, for the imposition of taxes, the regulation of the fire-department and matters connected with the general welfare of the city.^'' All contracts made *'^ Thompson-Houston Electric Co. ment of this void ordinance by pros- V. City of Newton, 42 Fed. 723, for edition of the company's employes this and preceding propositions. was properly enjoined. " City of Rushville v. Rushville ^' Taylor v. McPadden, 84 Iowa &c. Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575; s. c. 28 N. 262; s. c. 50 N. W. 1070. E. 853. ^^ San Francisco &c. R. Co. v. City " City of Rushville v. Rushville of Oakland, 43 Cal. 502. &c. Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575; s. c. 28 N. "° McCracken v. City of San Fran- E. 853, holding that the enforce- cisco, 16 Cal. 591. § 569 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 554 by a municipal corporation must conform to the mode prescribed in its charter for making contracts.'^^ The provisions of a statute authorizing an act by a municipal corporation must be strictly fol- lowed. ''- Where no method is prescribed by law in which a mu- nicipality shall exercise its powers, but it is left free to determine the method for itself, it may act either by resolution or ordinance.^^ Bonds issued by a corporation under the corporate seal, but without the passage of a resolution authorizing the issue, have been held void where the legislature authorized the issue "at such time or times as the board of trustees may by resolution direct."^* Where the power to perform an act is in a municipal corporation, and in the execution thereof the prescribed form is not followed, the corporation has the power to subsequently ratify and confirm the informal act, so as to make it as binding as if originally done in the proper manner.^^ Property of a municipal corporation can only be conveyed in the mode of conveying its property particularly pointed out in its char- ter. ^*^ § 569. Proceedings not reviewable. — The action of a county board of supervisors in borrowing money, and issuing county bonds therefor, for the purpose of improving highways in a town, is legislative and not judicial, and can not be reviewed on certiorari.^^ There need be no failure of justice if the power is wrongly used. Any aggrieved taxpayer could arrest all proceedings. ^^^ Though the proceedings of county commissioners in establishing highways may be irregular, as the boards are usually composed of men unskilled in the law, such irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the parties affected will be disregarded.^^ The New York statute providing for the dis- "Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Morris Square, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 14; Cal. 96, 98. People v. Board of Health, 33 Barb. ■s^ Glass V. Ashbury, 49 Cal. 571; (N. Y.) 344; People v. Board &c., 43 McCoy V. Briant, 53 Cal. 247. Barb. (N. Y.) 232; s. c. affirmed 34 =>=Halsey v. Rapid Transit St. R. N. Y. 516; People v. Walter, 68 N. Y. Co., 47 N. J. L. 380; s. c. 20 Atl. 859. 403; People v. Jones, 112 N. Y. 597; '' McCoy V. Briant, 53 Cal. 247. s. c. 20 N. E. 577. ^^ Lucas V. City of San Francisco, "^^ People v. Board &c., 131 N. Y. 7 Cal. 463. 468; s. c. 30 N. E. 488. See also, Bar- ^ Holland v. City of San Francisco, ker v. Town of Oswegatchie, 16 N. 7 Cal. 361. See § 258 et seq., ante. Y. S. 727; s. c. 62 Hun (N. Y.) 208. "People v. Board &c., 131 N. Y. Remedies are provided in Code of 468; s. c. 30 N. E. 488; rev'g s. New York, §§ 1925, 1968 et seq.. Laws c. 16 N. Y. S. 705; 62 Hun (N. Y.) N. Y. 1881, ch. 521, as amended by 620 (mem.) ; construing Laws N. Y. Laws N. Y. 1887, ch. 673. 1869, ch. 855, § 1. See also. People v. ™ Fulton v. Cummings, 132 Ind. Mayor, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 9; In re Mount 453; s. c. 30 N. E. 949. Proceedings 555 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 570 continuance of proceedings to open a street on objection of abutting owners"" has been construed not to apply to the opening of streets of the first class, which by provision of the act is to be whenever the board of street opening shall think the public interest requires it, but only to the opening of streets of the second and third classes, which the act provides shall be on request of a certain proportion of the owners of the frontage. It was held that the power to discontinue was express and complete, and that the decision was final and con- clusive, not subject to review.^^ In determining what property would be benefited by an improvement, and hence should be assessed, the action of the common council of a city is conclusive.''^ Under the provision of the constitution of Michigan*'^ the legislature may confer upon boards of supervisors the power to determine when there exist the prerequisite facts authorizing a special election of the people of the municipal corporation upon any question.^* Where a board of commissioners is required by statute to erect a court-house where the same has not been done, and to keep the county building in repair, and authorized to provide the means to construct, complete or repair the court-house or other public buildings whenever it shall be neces- sary to do so, it is for them alone to determine whether an old court- house should be replaced by a new one ; and in the absence of an abuse of discretion amounting to fraud, they will not be enjoined from carrying out their plans, though it may seem to taxpayers that the old building is suificient.*'^ § 570. The same subject continued. — The jurisdiction of boards of supervisors in the exercise of their powers under the provisions of the Iowa code*"* has been held to be exclusive, and an injunction will for establishing highways are pro- 91 Mich. 504; s. c. 52 N. W. 18, where vided for in Burns R. S. Ind. 1901, it was held that a board of county § 6859. supervisors having examined a peti- "" Consolidation Act, Laws of New lion for a special election on local York, ch. 410, § 990. option and declared that the election "^ In re Alexander Avenue, 133 N. had been prayed for by the requisite Y. 436; s. c. 31 N. E. 316; dismissing number of electors, such declaration appeal from 17 N. Y. S. 933. by them was final, and that it was "- Teegai'den v. City of Racine, 56 not competent afterwards to show Wis. 545; s. c. 14 N. W. 614. that a certain number of the peti- "' Constitution of Michigan, art. 4, tioners were not qualified voters. § 38, authorizes the conferring upon '^'^ Kitchel v. Board &c., 123 Ind. boards of supervisors of such powers 540; s. c. 24 N. E. 366. of a local legislative and adminis- ""^ Code Iowa, §§ 281, 287, regulates trative character as the legislature elections for the relocation of county may deem proper. sites and vests in the board of su- •"Friesner v. Common Council &c., pervisors of counties full power to 571 PUBLIC CORPOKATIONS. 55G not lie to restrict the board in the exercise of its power, even though the petition is an attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the board (it con- taining in the case cited thousands of names of persons who were not "legal voters"). The board has no power to investigate the alleged fraud, being bound by the facts as they appear on the face of the pro- cedings.®^ The court distinguished and held not applicable to this case several cases cited in favor of the complainant.^^ In Mississippi the power of a board of supervisors over court-houses and sites for court-houses is exclusive, and no court can interfere with the exercise of this power so long as it is exercised only unwisely and without dis- cretion ; and the purchase of a site for a court-house, the county having already a court-house site, is not such a usurpation of power as will warrant the interference of courts.*''^ Where the question of the neces- sity of taking land for a road was settled by a board of supervisors it is not a question for the court to pass upon.'^" § 571. Constitutionality of acts granting powers. — An Ohio stat- ute providing that in any village in any county containing a city of the first grade of the first class, in which no sidewalks have already determine the sufficiency of the peti- tion, and to authorize the submis- sion of the question of relocation to a vote. "Luce V. Fensler, 85 Iowa 596; s. c. 52 N. W. 517, the court denying the right to review a decision of the board upon such matter. See also, Herrick v. Carpenter, 54 Iowa 340; s. c. 6 N. W. 574 (as to the power of the legislature to provide for reloca- tion of county sites by a general law and giving exclusive authority to a special tribunal in such matters) ; 4 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. Law 403; Alexander v. People, 7 Colo. 155; s. c. 2 Pac. 894; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Heiser v. Mayor &c., 104 N. Y. 68, 72; s. c. 9 N. E. 866; Phillips V. Ash's Heirs, 63 Ala. 414, 418; Chandler v. Hanna, 73 Ala. 390; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa. St 332; Sedgwick Stat. & Const. Law 94; Baker v. Board, 40 Iowa 226, 228. As to courts of equity interposing to control, see 1 High Injunctions, § 50; 2 High Injunctions. § 1311; Hyatt v. Bates, 40 N. Y. 164. ««"Rice V. Smith, 9 Iowa 570, [where] a vote to relocate the coun- ty seat had been taken, and the question involved was the right of the county judge to erect an ex- pensive public building which was required to be at the county seat, while the matter of location was in controversy. The question involved in Sweatt v. Faville, 23 Iowa 321, 326, was whether the county seat had been relocated, and arose un- der the revision of 1860 and not un- der the present law. The question involved in this case was not con- sidered in that. The case of Sinnett V. Moles, 38 Iowa 25, arose under a statute which provided for the vot- ing of a tax in aid of the construc- tion of a railway. The statute, the facts and the principles involved [in that case] were in many respects so unlike those [here that they need no consideration]." "'■' Rotenberry v. Board &c., 67 Miss. 470; s. c. 7 So. 211. ™ Butte Co. V. Boydstun, 68 Cal. 189; s. c. 8 Pac. 835; 11 Pac. 781. 557 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS, § 573 been constructed, etc., the council of sucli village may construct, etc./^ was held not to be a sufficient classification to satisfy the constitu- tional requirement that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state. '^^ Upon this subject, Beasley, C. J., of New Jersey, said that a law may be general in its provisions, and may apply to the whole of a group of objects having characteristics sufficiently manifest and important to make them a class by them- selves, and yet the marks of distinction on which the classification is founded may be such that the law may be in contravention of a consti- tutional provision prohibiting the enactment of special laws which regulate the internal affairs of towns and cities.'^^ The Minnesota court said: "The true practical limitation of the legislative power to classify is that the classification shall be upon some apparent natural reason — some reason suggested by necessity, by such a difference in the situation and circumstances of the subjects placed in different classes as suggests the necessity or propriety of different legislation with respect to them."'^* The New Jersey chief justice said: "The marks of distinction, on which the classification is founded, must be such in the nature of things as will, in some reasonable degree at least, account for or justify the restriction of the legislation."" The classification must be just and reasonable, and not arbitrary."^ § 572. The same subject continued. — It was held in Wisconsin that where a city charter gave to every lot-owner a right to compensa- tion for injury resulting from change of grade of a street, a legisla- tive act which undertook to suspend and declare that provision^ ^ in- applicable to certain streets was repugnant to the constitution of Wis- consin, which entitles every person to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries he may receive in his person, property or character ;'^^ also " "An act to authorize villages to '" Bronson v. Oberlln, 41 Ohio St. levy special assessments for the con- 476. struction and improvement of side- " Laws of Wisconsin of 1891, ch. walks and to be s^upplementary to 254, entitled "An act to authorize the § 2328 of the revised statutes and city of Milwaukee to change the known as § 2328a:" 88 Ohio L. 311. grade of streets," which amended a '-Const. Ohio, art. 2, § 26; Costello law providing that the owner of any V. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St. 202; s. c. 30 lot affected or injured thereby N. E. 613. should be "entitled to compensation" " State V. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. by authorizing the common council 435, 440. of that city to change the grade of '* Nichols V. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, certain streets in designated wards 272; s. c. 33 N. W. 800, 802. "without paying for any injury or " State V. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. damage thereby occasioned." 435, 440. ^'^ Anderton v. City of Milwaukee, 82 Wis. 279; s. c. 52 N. W. 95. The § 573 PUBLIC COJJl'OKATIONS. 658 to the constitution of the United States, amendment 14, section 1, which declares that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws;"'^" also to the state con- stitution, on the ground that it was a local act and related to a sub- ject not expressed in its title.'**' § 573. Validity of acts granting powers. — In exercising the power to levy assessments upon property-owners for improvements the tax proceedings required by the charter must be regarded, when taken together, as "due process of law," within the principles sanctioned by the supreme court of the United States. ^^ § 574. Power to "trade" should not be granted. — The justices of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts have given an opinion to the general court that the legislature can not authorize a city to buy coal and wood as fuel and sell them to its inhabitants. Parker, J., modified his assent to this so far as to say it might if the necessities of society as now organized could be met only by the adoption of such measures. Holmes, J., dissented upon the ground that the purpose was no less public when the article (proposed to be furnished the pub- lic) is wood or coal than when it is water or gas or electricity or edu- cation, to say nothing of cases like the support of paupers or the taking court considered this act special United States constitution amend- class legislation, and that such dis- ment. Cf. Scott v. City of Toledo, criminate exercise of arbitrary legis- 36 Fed. 385. lative power was void. See also, ^"Anderton v. City of Milwaukee, Bull V. Conroe, 13 Wis. 233; Durkee 82 Wis. 279; s. c. 52 N. W. 95. See V. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464; also, Durkee v. City of Janesville, 26 Hincks V. City of Milwaukee, 46 Wis. Wis. 697; Yellow River &c. Co. v. 559; s. c. 1 N. W. 230; Culbertson v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214; s. c. 49 N. W. Coleman, 47 Wis. 193; s. c. 2 N. W. 971. 124; Hughes v. City of Fond du Lac, *' Meggett v. City of Eau Claire, 81 73 Wis. 380, 382; s. c. 41 N. W. 407; Wis. 326; s. c. 51 N. W. 566, holding City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 the charter not repugnant to Amend. Wis. 288; s. c. 46 N. W. 128; Wilder Const. U. S., art. 14, § 1. See also, V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 70 Mich. 382; as to power of legislature to author- s. c. 38 N. W. 289; State v. Sheriff ize, Warner v. Knox, 50 Wis. 429; s. &c., 48 Minn. 236; s. c. 51 N. W. 112. c. 7 N. W. 372; Weeks v. City of Mil- ™Anderton v. City of Milwaukee, waukee, 10 Wis. 242; Soens v. Ra- 82 Wis. 279; s. c. 52 N. W. 95. The cine, 10 Wis. 271; Lumsden v. Cross, court said: — "It [this act] attempts 10 Wis. 282; State v. City of Portage, to make an arbitrary classification 12 Wis. 562; Bond v. City of Keno- and distinction in regard to such an sha, 17 Wis. 284; Blount v. City of established grade between lots simi- Janesville, 31 Wis. 648; May v. Hold- larly situated and subject to the ridge, 23 Wis. 93; Mills v. Charleton, same or substantially the same con- 29 Wis. 400; Evans v. Sharp, 29 Wis. ditions," and therefore violates the 564; Dill v. Roberts, 30 Wis. 178; 559 EXPRESS CORrORATE ROWERS. 574 of land for railroads or public markets.**- The principle which con- trolled the majority of the court was that if this bill was passed it would authorize a carrying on of business which must be with money raised by taxation, and the legislature could authorize a city or town to tax its inhabitants only for public purposes.®^ The court Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236, 247; Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315. As to "due process of law," see Hagar v. Reclamation Dist, 111 U. S. 701; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 663; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 57; Spen- cer V. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 921; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660; s. c. 10 S. Ct. 324; Lent V. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 825; Fass v. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525; s. c. 19 N. W. 533; Bald- win V. Ely, 66 Wis. 171, 188, 191; s. c. 28 N. W. 392; Murphy v. Hall, 68 Wis. 202; s. c. 31 N. W. 754; David- son V. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104. In Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 825, the court said: — "But errors in the mere administra- tion of the statute [granting the power to widen a street], not involv- ing jurisdiction of the subject and of the parties, could not justify this court, in its re-examination of the judgment of the state court upon writ of error, to hold that the state had deprived or was about to de- prive the plaintiffs of their property without 'due process of law.' " ^- Opinion of Justices, 155 Mass. 598; s. c. 30 N. E. 1142. *^ Kingman v. City of Brockton, 153 Mass. 255; s. c. 26 N. E. 998; Opinion of Justices, 150 Mass. 592; s. c. 24 N. E. 1084; Mead v. Inhabit- ants &c., 139 Mass. 341; s. c. 1 N. E. 413; Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454; State v. Osawkee Tp., 14 Kan. 418; Mather v. City of Ottawa, 114 111. 659; s. c. 3 N. E. 216; Loan Ass'n V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Cole V. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 416; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 361; Attorney-Gen- eral v. City of Eau Claire, -37 Wis. 400; State v. City of Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533; Allen v. Inhabitants &c., 60 Maine 124; Opinion of Judges, 58 Maine 590. The court said: — "Up to the present time, however, none of the purposes for which cities and towns have been authorized to raise money has included anything in the nature of what is commonly called "trade" or "commercial business." Instances can be found of some very curious legislation by towns in the colonial and provincial times, some of which would certainly now be thought to be beyond the powers of towns under the constitution. What- ever the theory was, towns, in fact, under the colony charter, and for some time under the province char- ter, often acted as if their powers were limited only by the opinion of the inhabitants as to what was best to be done. This was the result of their peculiar situation and condi- tion, and the powers of towns or of the general court were not much considered. The exercise of these extraordinary powers, however, gradually died out." The only in- stance referred to of a town pur- chasing articles for its inhabitants is that of Boston, in March, 1713-14, voting to lay in a stock of grain to the amount of five thousand bushels of corn, and to store it in some con- venient place, and it was left to the selectmen to dispose of it as they saw fit. This followed the prohibi- tion by the general court of the ex- portation of grain on account of its scarcity in the fall of 1713. Of t^is the court said:— -"It is apparent that the •riginal purpose was to provide against a famine, and that it was § 575 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 560 sanction the rule as expressed in another opinion, that "it must often be a question of kind and degree whether the promotion of the interests of many individuals in the same community constitutes a public service or not."«* § 575. Power of towns as to villages within them. — A Wisconsin statute provided that "all powers relating to villages and conferred upon village boards by the provisions of chapter 40 of the revised statutes and all acts amendatory thereof, excepting those the exercise of which would conflict with the provisions of law relative to towns and town boards, are hereby conferred upon towns and town boards of towns containing one or more unincorporated villages having each a population of not less than one thousand inhabitants, and are made applicable to such unincorporated village or villages, and may be exercised therein when directed by resolution of the qualified electors of the town at the last preceding annual town meeting."^ ^ This act was held not void for uncertainty, as the powers granted to the town boards are defined by the act therein referred to as governing villages. Nor was it void for attempting to incorporate a village or villages by a special act. It did not incorporate a village as a separate munici- pality; it simply enlarged the powers of town boards. Nor did it violate the constitution, article 11, section 3. Even though the legis- lature may in its discretion enforce the incorporation of communi- ties as cities or villages, under proper limitations, this power does not deprive the legislature of the power to legislate for the control and government of such communities before it is deemed wise to incorpo- rate them.®*' Nor did it violate the section of the constitution provid- ing that "the legislature shall establish but one system of town and county government."*" It was held that the exercise of the power not the intention of the town to as- and during the revolution, or not sume the business of buying and long after it, it was discontinued." selling all the grain which the in- ^* Opinion of Justices, 150 Mass. habitants needed, but of keeping 592; s. c. 24 N. E. 1084. such an amount in store as was nee- *^ Laws Wis. 1883, ch. 292. essary in order that small quantities ™ Land &c. Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. might be obtained, particularly by 294; s. c. 40 N. W. 482. the poorer inhabitants, at what the " Land &c. Co. v. Brown, supra, selectmen, or a committee of the The court said: — "[This law] is an town, or the town itself, deemed amendment of the laws concerning reasonable prices. On May 25, 1795, towns and the government thereof, the town voted to sell the granary. Like many other laws of the state, This action of the town of Boston it provides for the exercise of differ- was an exception to the usages of ent powers by the boards of differ- towns, and it appears from the re- ent towns, when there is anything in ports of committees that before the a town which calls for the exercise revolution it had come to be con- of such different or additional pow- sidered as of doubtful expediency, ers. The act is as general as any 561 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. 57G under this act by the town board in providing for water-works, pro- tection against fire and making police regulations for a village within the limits of the town was proper and fully authorized. An objection was made to thife that the law should be declared void under some supposed rule of public policy forl)idding taxation of persons for pur- poses of expenditure which would not benefit their property. The court overruled this objection.^® § 576. Power as to issue of commercial paper. — Charter power to borrow money "for general purposes" "on the credit" of a city only includes authority to borrow money for ordinary governmental pur- poses, such as are generally carried out with revenues derived from taxation ; and the presumption is that the power was intended to con- fer the right to borrow money in anticipation of the receipt of taxes. ^"^ Neither does this charter power include the power to issue and sell negotiable bonds, nor can such power be inferred from the provision that "bonds of the city shall not be subject to tax under this act."*"* The court relies mainly for the correctness of its conclusion upon a case in which it was held that the implied power of a municipal corpo- other general act. It provides for the exercise of the additional powers in all towns in which villages are situated having a given number of inhabitants. It is not subject to the criticism that though general in form it is special in fact, as it is a matter of public notoriety that there are and have been sevei'al towns in the state to which the act can be ap- plied. . . . Such act is not a violation of the system of town government, but a part of the sys- tem, in order to adapt the system to the peculiar wants of certain towns in the state." As to the constitu- tionality of laws applying to cities and towns on the basis of popula- tion, situation, etc., as being local and special laws, see State v. Circuit Court (N. J.), 15 Atl. 272 and note; Atlantic City &c. Co. v. Atlantic City &c. Co. (N. J.), 15 Atl. 581; Cross V. Cherry, 122 Pa. St. 417; s. c. 15 Atl. 782. «»Land &c. Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. 294; s. c. 40 N. W. 482. These prin- 1 Smith — 36 ciples controlled the ruling. The village was not by the act made a separate village, but remained a part of the town. The town constituted the taxing-district, and the legisla- ture had full power to establish tax- ing-districts, and the courts can not question the justice or injustice of the limits thereof when fixed by the legislature. See also, Teegarden v. City of Racine, 56 Wis. 545; s. c. 14 N. W. 614; Dickson v. City of Ra- cine, 61 Wis. 545, 549; s. c. 21 N. W. 620; T. B. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida Co., 72 Wis. 158; s. c. 39 N. W. 343; State v. Board &c., 70 Wis. 485; s. c. 36 N. W. 396. *" Brenham v. German-American Bank, 144 U. S. 173; s. c. 12 S. Ct. 559; rev'g s. c. 35 Fed. 185. "» St. Laws Tex. 1873, ch. 2, art. 3, § 2; Brenham v. German-American Bank, 144 U. S. 173; s. c. 12 S. Ct. 559; overruling Rogers v. Burling- ton, 3 Wall. 654, and Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. § 576 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 56^ ration to borrow money to enable it to execute the power expressly conferred upon it by law, if existing at all, did not authorize it to create and issue negotiable securities to be sold in the market and to be taken by the purchaser freed from the equities that might be set up by the maker. ^^ The provision in the charter of Chattanooga, Tenn., that the corporation "shall have full power to borrow money on its bonds," etc., did not authorize it to issue warrants on the treas- urer or city scrip for the purpose of raising money for the ordinary expenses of the corporation. **- "Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 441. The court further said; — "It is admitted that the power to borrow money, or to in- cur indebtedness, carries with it the power to issue the usual evidences of indebtedness by the corporation to the lender or other creditor. Such evidences may be in the form of promissory notes, warrants, and perhaps, most generally, in that of a bond. But there is a marked legal difference between the power to give a note to a lender for the amount of money borrowed, or to a creditor for the amount due, and the power to issue for sale, in open mar- ket, a bond, as a commercial secur- ity, with immunity in the hands of a bona fide holder for value from equitable defenses." The court cited and approved Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 489; Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1101; Young v. Claren- don Tp., 132 U. S. 340; s. c. 10 S. Ct. 107; Hill V. Memphis, 134 U. S. 198, 203; s. c. 10 S. Ct. 562. In this last case the court said: — "The inability of municipal corporations to issue negotiable paper for their indebted- ness, however incurred, unless au- thority for that purpose is expressly given or necessarily implied for the execution of other express powers, has been affirmed in repeated deci- sions of this court." See also. Con- cord V. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 937; Norton v. Dyersburg, 127U. S. 160; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1111. The case of Dwyer v. Hackworth, 57 Tex. 245, was distinguished by the court's referring to the fact that the supreme court of Texas, while re- versing the court below, said that it could not enjoin the collection of the taxes on the ground of the invalid- ity of these same bonds without making the holders of those bonds parties to the suit, and citing Board V. Texas &c. R. Co., 46 Tex. 316; and then the United States supreme court say: — "There was, therefore, no adjudication in that case as to the validity of the bonds, and the re- mark of the court that the city bor- rowed money by selling its bonds to the amount of $15,000 is of no force on the question of the validity of the bonds," and cite Lewis v. City of Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 634. Cities have no power to in- cur debts and issue negotiable in- struments unless specially author- ized to do so by their charters, or by statute, or the power to do so is clearly implied from some power ex- pressly given, which can not fairly be exercised without it: Watson v. City of Huron, 97 Fed. 449; s. c. 38 C. C. A. 264. The city may execute a note for a just and legal indebted- ness: City of Mineral Wells v. Darby (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. 351. "^Colburn v. Mayor &c. (Tenn.), 17 Am. L. Reg. 191, the court order- ing perpetual injunction against the officers issuing such paper. The court said: — "If there be not money 563 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. 577 § 577. As to trusts. — In the absence of an express grant of power, a municipal corporation can not accept and hold property upon a purely private trust. ^^ Under its charter power to "receive in trust and control for the purpose of such trust all money or other property * * * bestowed upon such corporation * * * f^j. ^]^g general purposes of education/' it has been held that the city of Baltimore could take in trust property given it by will "to establish a chair in the McDonogh Educational Fund and Institute, * * * to promulgate such a course of instruction in said institute as will aid in the prac- tical application of the mechanical arts, * * * to give boys in that institution such useful and practical mechanical education as will enable them to gain a livelihood by skilful manual labor."®^ Aside from this provision in its latest charter, the court declared that accord- ing to the great weight of authority the corporation would seem to be entirely capable of taking property in trust for purposes germane to the objects of the corporation or which would promote, aid or assist in carrying out or perfecting those objects.®^ There is no statute law in the treasury, then the corpora- tion should borrow, as provided in the charter or by existing law, or they should levy and collect such tax as is necessary to raise what- ever sum is needed, and if they can neither borrow nor raise the money by taxation to meet their expendi- tures, then they should cease their expenditures until they can thus realize according to law." ^^ In re Franklin's Estate, Appeal of Gillespie, 150 Pa. St. 437; s. c. 24 Atl. 626. The court said:— "In- stances are not wanting in which municipal corporations have exe- cuted trusts committed to them by private persons, germane to the ob- jects of the corporation, and they have been upheld for that reason." See also, Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169 (commept of Sharswood, J., on Corporation &c. of Gloucester v. Osborn, 1 H. L. Gas. 272, in which it was said that a municipality may take and hold for purposes altogeth- er private) ; Mayor v. Elliott, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 170. A town may act as a trustee of a charitable bequest and execute the trust: Higginson v. Turner, 171 Mass. 586; s. c. 51 N. E. 172. A city may take a devise in trust for religious societies without regard to denomination: Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa 92; s. c. 61 N. W. 434. A devise of land to a city was legal in South Carolina after 1872; Mcintosh V. City of Charleston, 45 S. C. 584; s. c. 23 S. E. 943. In Pennsylvania a municipal corpora- tion is capable of taking and hold- ing property under a will and ca- pable of acting as trustee for public purposes germane to the purposes of its creation: Handley v. Palmer, 91 Fed. 948. "'Barnum v. Mayor &c., 62 Md. 275. '=2 Kent Com. 280; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 716. See also, Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 422; Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. Sr. 462; Trustees &c. v. King, 12 Mass. 546; Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Barr (Pa.) 23, 27; Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Execu- tors &c. V. Murdoch, 15 How. 367; State V. Executors &c., 8 La. An. 171; Girard v. City of New Orleans, 2 La. An. 898; Vidal v. Mayor &c., 2 § 578 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 564 of New York which can be construed to give a municipal corporation the right to hold lands in trust for pious uses or for religious purposes.**® A municipal corporation can not, in the absence of statute, accept a testamentary trust to establish and maintain a poor- house for the support of the poor of the county. ^^ § 578. Purchase at tax sales. — A city having power under its char- ter to purchase property within or without its borders can purchase land for non-payment of taxes levied by the city.^* Where a statute gives the power to make such purchase, a municipality must strictly pursue its statutory authority. It is confined to the express provision of the statute conferring the power ; and where there is no authority for it to purchase jointly with another person, a tax deed, from which it appears that land was sold to the municipality and a private indi- vidual, has been held void.**® So, where a city charter limits to fifty years the terms for which lands should be sold to the city for taxes and the city took such lands for nine hundred years, the title was held to be void; but if the tax was lawful, the landowner must pay the tax with interest as the condition of a decree in his favor in a pro- ceeding to set aside or annul the deed.^*"* Per contra: It has been said by the supreme court of Illinois that since municipal corporations can only exercise such powers as are expressly conferred, or as arise by implication from general powers granted, the charter power of a How. 127; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 sonal property to such as may be Wall. 1; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. necessary to the exercise of corpo- 465; Bell Co. v. Alexander, 22 Tex. rate or administrative powers. 350; Columbia Bridge Co. v. Kline, "City Council v. Walton, 77 Ga. Bright. (Pa.) 320; Miller v. Lerch, 1 517. Wall. Jr. 210; Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen ■'" Keller v. Wilson, 90 Ky. 350; s. (Mass.) 575; Oxford &c. Society v. c. 14 S. W. 332. The court said: — West &c. Society, 55 N. H. 463; Sar- "This [the provision in the charter] gent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18; Cres- should be construed to mean for gov- son's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 437. ernmental purposes; but in purchas- "" Village of Corning v. Rector &c., ing it for its taxes it was executing 33 N. Y. St. 766; s. c. 11 N. Y. S. such a purpose, and, in our opinion, 762. In In re Underbill's Will, 3 N. no valid distinction can be drawn Y. S. 205; s. c. 6 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) between a purchase by the city at a 466, it was held that a town can not sale for taxes under a levy by its col- receive a bequest to be devoted un- lecting officer and under a decretal der certain conditions to the erec- sale for a like purpose." tion of a town hall, inasmuch as § 2 "" Sprague v. Coenen, 30 Wis. 209. of revised statutes of New York, p. "" Baldwin v. City of Elizabeth, 42 337, provides that no town shall pos- N. J. Eq. 11 ; s. c. 6 Atl. 275. See sess or exercise any corporate pow- also. In re Report of Commissioners ers except as enumerated, and § 1 &c., 49 N. J. L. 488; s. c. 10 Atl. 363; limits the power of towns in pur- 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 484. chasing and holding lands or per- 565 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS, 579 corporation to buy and hold real property should be understood to include purchases made in the ordinary way, and not a tax sale.^"^ In Indiana it has also been held that there could be no purchase at a sale for taxes due by the corporation without express power conferred by statute, and that it could not bind itself by an agreement to warrant the title of a purchaser at such sale.^^^ Such a sale to a corporation had before been held void in Wisconsin. ^^^ A power to sell lands for taxes imposed upon such lands does not authorize selling of lands for taxes imposed upon the owners or occupants merely, and not upon their lands.^°* § 579. Granting exclusive franchises. — A village has no power to grant an exclusive franchise so as to disable itself for the period of thirty years from establishing for itself a system of water-works, under a power to provide for and control the erection of water-works, and to grant the right to one or more private companies to erect water- works to supply such village and the inhabitants with water, etc.^**^ "^ City of Champaign v. Harmon, 98 111. 491. "^ City of Logansport v. Humph- rey, 84 Ind. 467. ^"^Knox v. Peterson, 21 Wis. 247. In Bruck v. Broesigks, 18 Iowa 393, Lowe, J., has given the following reason for denying such powers to counties and municipal corporations generally: — "The relations which counties or municipal corporations sustain to the state and their own in- habitants is of a fiduciary nature. The duties required and the respon- sibilities imposed in the matter of assessing and collecting taxes are such as to render it inexpedient, not to say unwise, and against the pur- pose and the policy of the revenue law of the code of 1851 (under which the land in controversy was sold for taxes), to allow counties to traffic in the purchase and sale of tax titles in the absence of an ex- press statute authorizing the same. They are intermediate agencies be- tween the state and the people, cre- ated for civil and political purposes; and whilst it would be competent for counties to buy and hold real estate as a means to an end in effecting or carrying out the objects of their cre- ation, it would not be within the scope of their powers to buy and sell delinquent lands at tax sales as a mere pecuniary operation." ^'^ Sharp V. Speir, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 76. '»" Long V. City of Duluth, 49 Minn. 280; s. c. 51 N. W. 913. The court said: — "If there is any ambiguity or reasonable doubt, arising from the terms used by the legislative or granting body, as to whether an ex- clusive franchise has been conferred or authorized to be conferred, the doubt is to be resolved against the corporation or individual claiming such a grant. Public policy does not permit an unnecessary inference of authority to make a contract in- consistent with the continuance of the sovereign power and duty to make such laws as the public wel- fare may require." On this point see also, Nash v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261, 263; s. c. 33 N. W. 787; Proprie- tors &c. V. Proprietors &c., 11 Pet. 420, 443, 444; Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435; Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 796; Panning v. Gregoire. 16 How. 524 (where it was held that 579 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 566 The fact tliat the law in another section provides that every grant to a private company of the right to erect water-works shall provide for the sale of such works to the village after fifteen years does not affect this construction of the law, as it merely requires that the right the earlier grant of a ferry fran- chise was not exclusive, and, al- though "no court or board of county commissioners" [they having been prohibited by the act granting the first] could subsequently grant an- other franchise, the legislature could do it, or empower the city of Dubuque to do so, thus sustaining a subsequent ferry franchise granted by the city under its charter pow- ers) ; Richmond Co. &c. Co. v. Town of Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228 (holding that a legislative act authorizing a town to cause its streets to be lighted with gas and to enter into a contract with the gas company for that purpose did not confer power to make an absolute contract for a term of years; that the legislature could not thus be deprived of its power to subsequently legislate upon the subject, and its repeal of the authority to light with gas was effectual to terminate the contract so made) ; Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167; s. c. 22 N. E. 381. The state in its sov- ereign capacity may grant an ex- clusive franchise which amounts to a monopoly which will be protected against a subsequent conflicting grant: Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. City of Saginaw, 28 Fed. 529; New Or- leans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana &c. Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 252; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gaslight Co., 115 U. S. 683; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 265. But in the absence of legislative power vested in the mu- nicipality, so to do, it can not grant a monopoly: Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. City of Saginaw, supra; State v. Cincinnati Gas &c. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262, 293. A grant of an exclusive franchise is a monopoly and can be exercised only by the sovereign pow- er of the state. A city council has no authority to grant to any one a monopoly, even where no express prohibition is found in the charter, or other legislative act: Los Angeles Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720; Illinois Trust &c. Bank v. City of Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 279; s. c. 22 C. C. A. 171. The grant of an exclusive franchise is not an indispensable, or even an appropri- ate means to the procurement of water, and, besides, creates a monop- oly, and upon this ground many courts hold such grants to be void: Los Angeles Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720. The state may delegate to a municipality the power to grant a street-railway franchise and the granting of such franchise by the council is the act of the state: City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 166 U. S. 557; s. c. 17 S. Ct. 653. The common council has no right to authorize a railroad com- pany to erect a building upon the batture in front of riparian prop- erty on a public river within the city limits for 99 years: Louisiana Const. &c. Co. V. Illinois &c. R. Co., 49 La. An. 527; s. c. 21 So. 891. An ordinance granting greater rights than authorized may be valid to the extent authorized: City of St. Paul V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330; s. c. 68 N. W. 458. The city has no power to grant to certain drivers of vehicles the exclusive use of the streets: Pennsylvania Co. v. City of Chicago, 181 111. 289; s. c. 54 N. E. 825. The grant of a franchise is oiot exclusive unless so specified: Jack- son Co. &c. R. Co. V. Interstate &c. R. Co., 24 Fed. 306. See Citizens' Gas &c. Co. V. Town of Elwood, 114 Ind. 332; s. c. 16 N. E. 624. 567 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 580 to purchase shall be a condition of the grant, but imposes no require- ment or dut}^ to purchase, and does not justify the inference that the village could only provide itself with water-works by purchasing from the company.^"® A water company was incorporated in 1860 to supply the borough of Easton with water. In 1867 the borough was author- ized to construct water-works and to purchase the works of any exist- ing company. This authority became effectual in 1881, being ap- proved by a popular vote. The water company in the meanwhile had accepted the benefits of an act of 1874 which declared that "the right to have and enjoy the franchises and privileges of such incorporation within the district or locality covered by its charter shall be an exclu- sive one, and no other company shall be incorporated for that pur- pose" until the corporation should have realized profits to a specified amount. It was held that the franchise was exclusive only as respects other companies, and that the borough was not prohibited from sup- plying water by works constructed by itself, even though that might impair the value of the franchise of the water company. ^"'^ § 580. The same subject continued. — It was held that the granting of the exclusive privilege of supplying a city with water "from the Three-mile Creelr" did not prevent a subsequent grant of a right to supply water from another source. ^"^ Under authority to a municipal corporation to cause its streets to be lighted and to make reasonable regulations with reference thereto, it is empowered to enter into a con- tract to accomplish that end, but it has no authority to thus confer an exclusive right to furnish gas for a period of thirty years. ^"^ A city was empowered by its charter to provide itself with water, and was deemed to be authorized to do so by contract. A water company was expressly authorized to contract with the city for that purpose, and a contract was entered into which the court deemed to have been intended to confer an exclusive right upon the company for a period of twenty-five years. It was held that the city had no such power. ^^^ The facts that a water company is required, when requested, to furnish water to a city for the extinguishment of fires, etc., and that such request has been made, and contracts entered into for that purpose between the company and the city, do not constitute a contract bind- ing the city perpetually while the company retains its charter and "" Long V. City of Duluth, 49 '"" Stein v. Bienville Water &c. Co., Minn. 280; s. c. 51 N. W. 913. See 34 Fed. 145. also, Syracuse Water Co. v. City of '"* Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 187; s. c. 22 Saginaw, 28 Fed. 529. N. E. 381. ""City of Brenham v. Brenham '"'Lehigh Water Company's Ap- Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; s. c. 4 S. W. peal, 102 Pa. St. 515. 143. § 581 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 568 preventing the city from making contracts with others. The city could bind itself by such contracts only as it was authorized by statute to make. It has no power to grant exclusive privileges to put mains, pipes and hydrants in its streets, nor can it lawfully, by contract, deny to itself the right to exercise the legislative powers vested in its common council.^^^ § 581. Contracts not exclusive. — A city has power to contract for a supply of gas or water for a stated period of time extending beyond the tenure of office of the individual members of the common council making such contract."^ A contract by ordinance to pay for twenty- five years for the gas furnished by the lamps provided for therein and by those afterwards directed was upheld. The ordinance was con- strued to be a grant so far as it conferred upon the gas company the right to lay its mains and pipes in the public streets. But it was held that in that far it was in the nature of a license and not exclusive.^ ^^ "^ Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167; s. c. 22 N. E. 381, sustaining ttie power of the city to authorize another water com- pany to construct, maintain and operate water-works in the city, but not denying the right of the com- pany first receiving the contract con- tinuing to furnish. See also, Le- high Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 391; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 916; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica &c. R. Co., 6 Paige (N. Y.) 554; Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. Fish, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 547; Thompson v. New York &c. R. Co., 3 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 625; Au- burn &c. Plank Road Co. v. Doug- lass, 9 N. Y. 444, 452; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44, 61; Power V. Village of Athens, 99 N. Y. 592; s. c. 2 N. E. 609; Dermott v. State, 99 N. Y. 101; s. c. 1 N. E. 242; Milhau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; Mayor &c. v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261; Gale v. Village of Kala- mazoo, 23 Mich. 344; s. c. 9 Am. R, 80; Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa 524; s. c. 22 Am. R. 261; Des Moines Gas Co. V. City of Des Moines, 44 Iowa 505; s. c. 24 Am. R. 756; Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; State v. Cincin- nati Gas &c. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435; s. c. 4 S. E. 650; Birmingham &c. St. R. Co. V. Birmington St. R. Co., 79 Ala. 465 (where it was held that neither the charter of the city of Birmingham nor the general stat- utes conferred on that corporation the power to grant, by ordinance in the nature of a contract, the exclu- sive franchise in perpetuity of run- ning a street-railway through cer- tain designated streets and avenues; and further, that if such power were granted to the corporation by its charter or public statute, it would be violative of the constitutional pro- vision (Const. Ala., art. 1, § 23) against the passage of any law "making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities") ; City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111. 90; Davis V. Mayor &c., 14 N. Y. 506. "' City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 132 Ind. 114; s. c. 31 N. E. 573. See also, City of Indian- apolis V. Indianapolis &c. Co., 66 Ind. 396; City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; s. c. 49 Am. R. 416. "'^ City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 132 Ind. 114; s. c. 31 N. E. 573. See also, Crowder v. 569 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 582 Nor was a monopoly of supplying the city with gas for street-light- ing given by such contract, there being nothing in the ordinance preventing the city from taking gas from others.^^* Had the ordi- nance contained a provision by which the city agreed to take gas from no other company, or prohibiting any other company from engaging in the business of making and selling gas, the cases mentioned in the note would be in point.^^^ The arrangement provided by the ordi- nance being purely a business matter there was no surrender by the council of any legislative power."® The statute which authorized the common councils of cities to contract for light for its streets and alleys for a period not exceeding ten years did not affect this contract. By the same act existing contracts, except such as conferred exclusive privileges, were declared valid. This one was held not to be ex- clusive.^^^ § 582. Improvements generally. — The charter of a city provided that, if sidewalks are not built Avithin the prescribed period of time after notice, the city council may order the same to be done "at the expense of the lots adjoining." It has been held that a resolution of the council, after the expiration of the time fixed by the notice, di- recting the city recorder to advertise for bids to furnish the material and construct the walk, was a sufficient compliance with the charter provision. It was not necessary that they should have directed that the walks be built "at the expense of the lots" adjoining.^^^ A pro- vision in a city charter that the expense of constructing sidewalks in a certain contingency should be assessed against the "lots and par- cels of land adjoining said sidewalks" was held to conform to the state constitution, which authorized and provided that such assess- ments might be made "upon the property fronting upon such improve- ments."^^'' Under the code of North Carolina, relative to towns Town of Sullivan, 128 Ind. 486; s. c. 31 N. E. 573, as to its being purely 28 N. E. 94; City of Rushville v. a business power. See also, in addi- Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. tion to cases supra, Dillon Munic. 575; s. c. 28 N. E. 853. Corp. (4th ed.), §§ 608, 609; New "* City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Orleans &c. Co. v. City of New Or- Gas Light Co., 132 Ind. 114; s. leans, 42 La. An. 188; s. c. 7 So. 559. c. 31 N. E. 573. Cf. Citizens' "^ City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas &c. Co. V. Town of Blwood, 114 Gas Light Co., 132 Ind. 114; s. c. 31 Ind. 332; s. c. 16 N. E. 624. N. E. 573. See also, cases supra; "^ Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' &c. Mont. 502; s. c. 13 Pac. 249; and Co., 115 U. S. 683; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 265. cases collected in In re Union Perry "^ Scott Co. v. Hinds, 50 Minn. Co., 98 N. Y. 139, 150. 204; s. c. 52 N. W. 523. "" City of Vincennes v. Citizens' "'^ Scott Co. v. Hinds, 50 Minn. Gas Light Co., 132 Ind. 114; s. c. 204; s. c. 52 N. W. 523. § 583 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 570 and cities, providing that the commissioners or aldermen may cause necessary improvements to be made, and '^apportion them equally among the inhabitants by assessments," a city authorized by its charter to charge abutting owners with the cost of improvements may apportion them according to the front-foot rule, though the charter is silent as to the method of apportionment.^^*' An amend- ment to the charter of a city providing that the common council should not take stock "in any public improvement, or effect a loan for any purpose, without first obtaining the consent of the people at an election held for that purpose," can not be extended to improve- ments other than municipal in their character. The legislature did not intend to invest the city with authority to embark in speculative enterprises of improvement. ^^^ For like reasons a city charter was construed not to authorize the levying and collection of a tax for making a survey of a railroad-route from that city to another.^^^ It has been held that although an act empowering a county to improve the navigation of a navigable stream, and to issue bonds, the proceeds of which were to be applied for such purpose, might not provide any means or method for paying the principal and interest on the bonds, such fact was not a good objection to the validity of the act or to the issue of the bonds thereunder, nor was the fact that such provision might not be otherwise made.^^^ § 583. Cost of improvements. — When municipal corporations seek to impose upon property-owners the burden of the cost of street-im- provements, and to hold the property of abutting owners liable there- for, the statute or charter authorizing such improvements to be made must be strictly pursued. ^^* Under the Dakota statute, which grants the powers in this respect to cities, the resolution adopted and pub- lished must specifically designate the work declared necessary to be ""City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. "^Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1; s. C. 32; s. c. 14 S. E. 521. c. 10 So. 688. ^^1 Low v. Mayor &c., 5 Cal. 214, ^"* Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 where it was held the city under S. D. 640; s. c. 51 N. W. 770; 2 that provision had no power to sub- Desty Taxation 1241; 2 Dillon scribe to stock in a steam naviga- Munic. Corp., § 769; 1 Blackwell Ta'x tion company. Titles, § 612; Merritt v. Village of ^"Douglas v. Mayor &c., 18 Cal. Port Chester, 71 N. Y. 309; Hewes v. 643. That a railroad extending Reis, 40 Cal. 255; McLauren v. City from the city was as much of a of Grand Forks, 6 Dak. 397; s. c. 43 means of municipal benefit as a N. W. 710; White v. City of Sagi- street in the city, gas- or water- naw, 67 Mich. 33; s. c. 34 N. W. 255; works, does not meet the require- Hoyt v. City of East Saginaw, 19 ments of this case. It was not a Mich. 39; Pound v. Supervisors &c., work which the charter authorized. 43 Wis. 63. 571 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 584 done, and propert3^-owners and the property will only be liable for the cost of snch improvements as are specifically designated in the resolution and published in the official paper.^-^ But owners of prop- erty abutting upon a street that has been used by the public as a street for a number of years can not defeat the city in enforcing the collec- tion of street-assessments for the cost of improving such street on the ground that the title to such street or some part of it is not in the city.^-° § 584. Gas and water supply. — A charter of an electric-light com- pany authorizing it to "furnish any city * * * with gas, * * * etc.," and the charter of a city giving it power to control and its board of councilmen power "to construct, maintain and operate gas- and water-works, and to pass all ordinances necessary to regulate the same, "have been held to authorize a contract between the two as to lighting the city by gas, electricity, or any other mode.^^'^ Under the power to make all needful police regulations for the welfare, con- venience and safety of its citizens, the power to light the streets of a city may be lawfully exercised and the council may purchase and operate an electric-light plant for that purpose. ^^® Authority in a city to make a permanent and exclusive contract with a water company to build water-works and supply it with water can not be implied from the general power conferred by its charter to contract for the needs of the municipality.^"" The city of New Orleans was held to have the power to contract for a water supply under the provisions of its charter : and having this power to contract, it was held that the price, '^ Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 White's Lessees, 6 Pet. 431; Jarvis S. D. 640; s. c. 51 N. W. 770. v. Dean, 3 Bing. 447; Case v. Favier, >='■• Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 12 Minn. 89; Hobbs v. Inhabitants S. D. 640; s. c. 51 N. W. 770, laying &c., 19 Pick. (Mass.) 405; City of down this rule as to evidence re- Chicago v. Wright, 69 111. 318; Ceme- quired on the part of the city: — "It tery Ass'h v. Meninger, 14 Kan. 312; is sufficient for the city to show that 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 638 and the street, avenue or alley sought to cases cited; 2 Greenleaf Evidence, be improved is one that has, for a § 662. As to estoppel of owner of considerable length of time, been land, see Holmes v. Village of Hyde used as a public street and is such Park, 121 111. 128; s. c. 13 N. E. 540; property as can be appropriated by Village of Hyde Park v. Borden, 94 the city, and is, in the language of 111. 26. Chief Justice Shaw in Hobbs v. In- ^"^ City of Newport v. Newport habitants &c., 19 Pick. (Mass.) 405, Light Co., 89 Ky. 454; s. c. 12 S. W. a street de facto." See also, as to 1040. uses of the street by the city, and "* Mauldin v. City Council &c., 33 what amounts to a dedication. El- S. C. 1; s. c. 11 S. E. 434. liott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), ^-^ Greenville Water Works Co. v. §§ 123, 162, 163; President &c. v. City of Greenville (Miss.). 7 So. 409. § 584 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 572 the kind of water, and the amount, were matters of legislative dis- cretion vested in the city council; and that when the city confined itself within the limits of its power to contract, this legal discretion exercised by the city council would not l)e inquired into by the courts in the absence of fraud and corrupt and extravagant legishition.^^* Under the general statutes of Kansas, cities of the second class have the right to provide for supplying themselves and their inhabitants Avith water by granting the privilege of furnishing water to a person, natural or artificial/ ^^ A charter which enumerates among the powers of a city one "to provide the city with water by water-works" authorizes the corporation to furnish the inhabitants of the city with water.^'^- Power conferred by the legislature upon a common council to prescribe regulations for the laying of gas-pipes through the streets can not be delegated; and a resolution authorizing all companies to lay pipes upon such conditions as may be prescribed by the mayor, comptroller and commissioner of public works confers no authority on the latter and their permits are void.^^^ Under a general power to contract a city may incur indebtedness for the construction of water-works and issue bonds therefor. ^^* And it has even been held that a city has inherent power to build water-works. ^^^ A charter which authorizes bonds for water and light may issue bonds for a water plant alone."*' The question of necessity for water-works will not be inquired into by courts."^ The legislature may regulate ""Conery v. New Orleans Water also, as to liability for taxes, Town Works Co., 41 La. An. 910; s. c. 7 of West Hartford v. Board &c., 44 So. 8. See also. Mayor &c. v. Cabot, Conn. 361 ; City of Rochester v. 28 Ga. 50; Wells v. Mayor &c., 43 Town of Rush, 80 N. Y. 302; City of Ga. 67; Watson v. Turnbnll, 34 La. Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. An. 856; Pickles v. Dry Dock Co., 38 (Ky.) 295; In the Matter of the Ap- La. An. 412. peal of Des Moines Water Company, "'Burlington Water Works Co. v. 48 Iowa 324. City of Burlington, 43 Kan. 725; s. '-'' Anderson v. Equitable Gas c. 23 Pac. 1068. See also, Wood v. Light Co., 12 Daly (N. Y.) 462. See National Water Works Co., 33 Kan. also, Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 590, 597; s. c. 7 Pac. 233. N. Y. 92; Tappan v. Young, 9 Daly "= Smith v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. (N. Y.) 357; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 464; s. c. 12 S. W. 924. The court N. Y. 73; Index, tit. Delegation of said: — [In exercising its authority Powers. the city could not be held to be] "' Heilbron v. Mayor &c., 96 Ga. "engaging in a private enterprise or 312; s. c. 23 S. E. 206. performing a municipal function for "'' Gas &c. Co. v. Borough of Dow- a private end. It is the use of cor- ringtown, 175 Pa. St. 341; s. c. 34 porate property for corporate pur- Atl. 799. poses in the sense of the revenue ""Janeway v. City of Duluth, 65 law of 1887," and, therefore, it may Minn. 292; s. c. 68 N. W. 24. not be liable for a privilege tax. See "' Janeway v. City of Duluth, 65 573 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. 585 the rates at which water shall be supplied by a private corporation.^^* Power to provide for lighting streets implies power to maintain an electric-lighting system.^ ^^ The power given to a municipality to make and vend gas carries with it the right to fix the price.^*" And so where the grant is to supply the city with water it includes the power to fix the price. Power to light by gas, or in any other man- ner, is authority for an electric-light plant,^*^ but it does not convey power to furnish electric lights to private houses.^*^ A city has no power to compel an assignee to furnish gas at less than the rate fixed in its consent to the assignment of the franchise, the latter providing that the assignee shall furnish at a price not to exceed a specified rate.^*^ § 585. Natural-gas companies. — "An act empowering cities and towns within the state * * * to regulate the supply, consump- tion and distribution of natural gas therein, and declaring an emer- gency," has been held to authorize, not merely such regulations as conduce to safety, but to confer full power to regulate the supply, dis- tribution and consumption of natural gas, including the power to fix reasonable maximum rates that may be charged to consumers.^'** Minn. 292; s. c. 68 N. W. 24. A house of correction under Detroit city charter not entitled to supply of water fi'ee of expense: City of De- troit v. Board &c., 108 Mich. 494; s. c. 66 N. W. 377. Power of commis- sioner of public works to cut elec- tric wires under N. Y. laws of 1884, ch. 534; Laws 1885, ch. 499; Laws of 1887, ch. 716, — see Electric Power Co. V. Mayor &c., 60 N. Y. S. 590; s. c. 29 Misc. (N. Y.) 48. ^■■* City of Danville v. Danville Water Co., 180 111. 235; s. c. 54 N. E. 224. '^^ Christensen v. City of Fremont, 45 Neb. 160; s. c. 63 N. W. 364. "" State v. Laclede Gas-Light Co., 102 Mo. 472, 485; s. c. 14 S. W. 974; 15 S. W. 383. "^ Jacksonville Elec. Light Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 36 Pla. 229; s. c. 18 So. 677. "2 Village of Ladd v. Jones, 61 111. App. 584. "^ In re Pi-yor, 55 Kan. 724 ; s. c. 41 Pac. 958. Under Wash. Act 1890 the city can not regulate the price of gas: Tacoma Gas &c. Co. v. City of Tacoma, 14 Wash. 288; s. c. 44 Pac. 655. Municipalities have pow- er to make contracts for street lighting: State v. Board &c., 57 N. J. L. 588; s. c. 31 Atl. 454. "*City of Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575; s. c. 28 N. E. 853. This construction was based upon the title and the inten- tion of the legislature. The court said: — "We can not think that it was the purpose of the legislature to leave municipal corporations abso- lutely without power of control or regulation over the holders of such franchises [using the streets for the supply of natural gas], except as they may be able to reach and con- trol them in the exercise of their im- plied police powers. To give to the statute such construction would be to say that after such franchises have been acquired, no matter what conduct their holders may be guilty of tending to the discomfort or in- § 586 PUBLIC COKI'OU/TIONS. 574 Where an owner of property devotes it lo a use in which the public have an interest, he musi: to the extent of the interest thus acquired by the public submit to the control of such property by the public for the common good."'^ The supreme court of Ohio, applying the doctrine just stated on the subject of regulating prices, said: "Be- cause prior to any legislation on the subject it [a gaslight com- pany] may have possessed the common-law right of fixing its own prices, it does not place it beyond the reach of any legislative control on the subject whenever in the interest of the public good it becomes necessary that such control should be had.""" The only restriction upon the right to fix maximum prices which follows the right to con- trol, and which is delegated by statute to the municipality, is some provision in the charter or grant of the license which amounts to a contract."'^ Where a corporation fails to have a stipulation from the municipality reserving to itself the right to regulate its charges, or otherwise to contract for a restraint pf the powers of the city, it acts in full view of the power of the city to regulate its prices by fixing a maximum and is bound by an ordinance on the subject.^^^ A provi- sion in an ordinance that natural-gas companies shall supply all individuals along their lines requiring it, on payment or reasonable security, is valid, and within the power of a city to impose by ordi- nance.^*^ § 586. Establishment of electric plant. — Under a general authority to establish electric-light plants a city may erect an electric plant for the purpose of furnishing light to its inhabitants in their stores and houses as well as for lighting the streets and public places of the city.^^*^ In upholding a similar power in a city under a statute,^^**^ convenience of the citizen, and no Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575; s. c. matter how extortionate they may 28 N. E. 853. be, unless their acts tend to endan- "" City of Rushville v. Rushville ger the safety, or otherwise come Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575; s. c. within the purview of the inherent 28 N. E. 853. police powers of the municipality, "" So held in Thompson-Houston there is no remedy, as the legisla- Electric Co. v. City of Newton, 42 ture has left them independent of Fed. 723. The court said: — "It has municipal supervision." been the uniform rule that a city "^ Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; in erecting gas-works or water-works Hockett V. State, 105 Ind. 250; s. c. is not limited to furnishing gas or 5 N. B. 178. water for use only upon the streets "^Zanesville v. Gas Light Co., 47 and other public places of the city, Ohio St. 1 ; s. c. 23 N. B. 55. but may furnish the same for pri- "'Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; ' vate use; and the statutes of Iowa Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. now place electric-light plants in the 155; Peik v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 94 same category." U. S. 164. '•■% Elliott's Supp. Ind. 1889, § 794 "'"City of Rushville v. Rushville et seq. (Burns R. S. Ind. 1901, 575 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. 586 the supreme court of Indiana said: "There can be little or no doubt that the power to light the streets and public places of a city is one of its implied and inherent powers, as being necessary to properly protect the lives and property of its inhabitants, and as a check on immor- ality."^^^ Incidental to the ordinary powers of a municipal corpo- ration, and necessary to a proper exercise of its functions, is the power of enacting sanitary regulations for the preservation of the lives and health of those residing within its corporate limits.^^^ "It follows [from this principle]," continued the court in the Indiana case, "that to concede to municipal corporations the possession of such powers does not involve any extension, either by intendment or implication, of the powers expressly conferred by statute; but that by the act authorizing the organization of the corporation, the legislature ex- pressly delegates to the municipality the power to take such steps as are necessary to preserve the health and safety (and we will add the property) of its inhabitants. The inference of the delegation of such §§ 4301-4305). Section 4301 provides tliat the common council of a city shall have power to light its streets and public places with electric light and may contract with individuals or corporations for supplying such light. Section 4302 provides for the erection in the streets of necessary poles and appliances for supplying electric light to the inhabitants of the city. Section 4305 provides for the appropriation of lands and rights of way by corporations engaged in lighting the city or the public and private places for the inhabitants with electric light. Of such power the court, in City of Crawfordsville V. Braden, 130 Ind. 149; s. c. 28 N. E. 849, said: "The so-called inferred or inherent police powers of such corporations are as much delegated power as are those conferred in ex- press terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the corporation, and the additional fact that the cor- poration can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exer- cising such power. Special charters as well as general statutes for the incorporation of cities and towns usually contain a specific enumera- tion of powers granted to and which may be exercised by such corpora- tions. In many cases the powers thus enumerated are such as would be implied by the mere fact of the incorporation. Where powers are thus enumerated in a statute which would belong to the corporation without specific enumeration, the specific statute is to be regarded, not as the source of the power, but as merely declaratory of a pre-ex- isting power, or rather of a power which is inherent in the very nature of a municipal corporation, and which is essential to enable it to ac- complish the end for which it was created. And the enumeration of powers, including a portion of those usually implied, does not necessarily operate as a limitation of corporate powers, excluding those not enumer- ated." See also, Clark v. City of South Bend, 85 Ind 276; s. c. 44 Am. R. 13; First Nat. Bank v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201; s. c. 28 N. E. 434. "^ City of Crawfordsville v. Bra- den, 130 Ind. 149; s. c. 28 N. E. 849. "=City of St. Paul v. Laidler, 2 Minn. 190. S 587 PUBLIC CORPORATIOXS. 576 o powers follows inevitably and irresistibly, because their exericse is necessary to the accomplishment of the objects of the incorpora- tion/'i'3 .^ 587. Public property. — A patent was issued by the state of Illi- nois to the county commissioners conveying all the lots in a certain block known as the ''Public Square" at Ottawa, on which a statute had directed the public buildings should be erected, "to aid in the erection of public buildings.'' It was held that the county commis- sioners, after using as much of such block for public buildings as they deemed necessary, might sell and convey the rest of it for the purpose of raising money to pay for such buildings.^ ^^ Under an act authorizing a county to issue bonds for a building for a court-house. It has no authority to issue bonds for the erection of a jail and court- house combined which is to be permanently used as a jail and is to be used as a court-house only until a separate court-house should be built.^^^ A statute authori2dng the supervisor of a cotmty to cause the commons to be surveyed and platted, and to lease the same for ninety-nine years, was held to apply to leases in possession only, and not in reversion or future ; and a subsequent act giving to the person entitled to any portion of such title by an existing lease the right to acquire the fee by paying a certain sum, vested in the lessee a property- right which could not be disturbed or abridged by any future lease to another.^^® Under authority "to prevent and extinguish fires," a town may erect a fire-engine house, and, under its general authority to provide a suitable place for town business, may provide for a public hall over said house.^'" "^ City of Crawfordsvllle v. Bra- the municipal corporation should be den, 130 Ind. 149: s. c. 28 X. E. S49. relieved from a condition to erect This court referred to the Iowa stat- structures of certain kinds upon ute involved in Thompson-Houston realty conveyed to it. and thus avoid Electric Co. v. City of Newton, 42 a restoration of the property to the Fed. 723, supra, and said: — "'It will grantor on the ground of lack of be observed that this [that] statute power to perform the condition. See does not in terms confer any power also, as to the power to erect the not, in our opinion, as above stated, hall. State v. Haynes. 72 Mo. 377; included among the implied powers Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. of municipal corporations." 356: Allen v. Inhabitants &c., 19 ^" Lyman v. Gedney, 114 111. 3SS; Pick. (Mass.) 4S5: Hardy v. Inhab- s. c. 29 N. E. 2S2. itants &c., 3 Met. (Mass.) 163; Rich- "' Nolan Co. v. State, S3 Tex. 1S2; ardson v. Boston, 24 How. 188; s. c. 17 S. W. 823. Board &c. v. Woods. 77 Mo. 197. '^Rutz V. Kehn, 143 111. 558; s. v. Where by charter a city council has 29 N. E. 553. power to erect necessary buildings ^'Clarke v. Inhabitants &c.. 81 Mo. it has authority to erect a city hall: 503, where it was contended that Wright v. City of San Antonio 577 EXPKESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 588 § 588. The same subject continued. — The code of Iowa authorizes cities and towns to acquire lands for various municipal purposes, and provides that they shall have power "to dispose of and convey such lands if deemed unsuitable for the purposes for which they were purchased;" and also authorizes the purchase by a city of lands sold under execution, when the city has any interest in the proceeding, and empowers the corporation "to dispose of the property," or of any real estate or any interest therein, "in such manner and upon such terms as the city council shall deem just and proper." The provi- sions have been held not to confer upon a city the authority to donate land and buildings to the county in which they are situate in order to induce a relocation of the county seat in such city. Such authority could only exist by legislative grant.^^^ So a statute declaring that when a piece or parcel of land held for public use shall not be needed for public use the land may be sold by the city, has been construed to refer to such property as is held by a city in full use and owner- ship, as the commons, in this instance, acquired by confirmation under various acts of congress, and not to apply to property which has been dedicated by the owner to the public use.^^^ A deed of a home- stead to a county is not invalid because the land was not acquired for any public purpose, such as a site for a court-house, jail, etc. This holding was in Texas, where the statutes^ ^° recognize the rights of counties to take title to and enjoy real estate without any limitation as to the purpose for which it shall be used.^®^ The legislature may regulate the use of any property dedicated to a public use in a city, or promote its improvement, but can not divert or subject it to any use clearly inconsistent with the contract of dedication. The property or easement which a city has in its streets or public places is not private property in the sense that it can not be taken for a public use except upon just compensation ; but it is public, and the power of regulating the use thereof, as such, resides in the legislature. The power is not, however, absolute, but is limited as above stated."^ The authority of (Tex.), 50 S. W. 406. Property held absolute: Potter v. Collis, 46 N. Y. by a municipality for the purpose S. 471; s. c. 19 App. Div. (N. Y.) of furnishing its inhabitants with 392. water is not held as a private corpo- ^=^ Brockman v. City of Creston, ration and the legislature may su- 79 Iowa 587; s. c. 44 N. W. 822. pervise the management at will. ''" Cummings v. City of St. Louis, Coyle V. Gray, 7 Houst. (Del.) 44; 90 Mo. 259; s. c. 2 S. W. 130. s. c. 30 Atl. 728. Except for constitu- '<''> Rev. Stat. Tex., arts. 680-682. tional restrictions, legislative con- ^" Scalf v. Collins Co., 80 Tex. 514; trol over the property of municipal s. c. 16 S. W. 314. corporations held for public use is '^= Portland &c. R. Co. v. City of 1 Smith— 37 § 589 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 578 a municipality as such to donate the right of way for a railroad com- pany other than through its streets, and appropriate money to pay for such right of way, does not exist under the constitution of Texas."3 § 589. Parks. — An act providing that cities acting under special charters may provide for the election of park commissioners who shall have exclusive power over public parks, and authorizing the councils of such cities to submit to a vote the question whether there shall be levied a tax for the purpose of purchasing real estate for parks and their improvement, has been held in Iowa not to divest the common council of the cities of power under the code, when such commissioners have not been elected, to "purchase or condemn and pay for out of the general fund lands for the use of public squares, streets and parks,'' and the necessity therefor is to be determined solely by the city.^®* A Minnesota statute providing for a system of public parks and park- ways in Minneapolis was construed not to authorize the board created by it to vacate or close or exclude any class of vehicles from any street except such as might run through any tract of lands taken for a park, and it could not acquire that power over a street by merely widening it by acquiring title to a strip on each side.^^^ But authority *'to make rules for the use and government" of a park will sustain a rule forbidding all persons "to make orations, harangues or loud outcries" therein. ^^® Wliere park commissioners have power to con- trol and lay out parks it must be done in the manner prescribed by the charter and they have no power to close a street by resolution.^® ^ A lease of a building on park premises is not illegal where the lease is subject to such regulations as are or may be afterwards prescribed.^*'^ Portland, 14 Or. 188; s. c. 12 Pac. ^"^ Holtz v. Diehl, 56 N. Y. S. 841. 265, where a license by the legisla- ^'^ Gushee v. City of New York, 58 ture to a railroad company to use a N. Y. S. 967; s. c. 42 App. Div. (N. levee or public landing for certain Y.) 37. Park commissioners of Buf- property was sustained as being in falo are not precluded from using aid of the use to which this property money granted for repairs for the had been dedicated by the grantor construction of a speedway where to the city. they have power to improve and '"^ Const, of Texas, 1875, art. 10, make repairs: Holtz v. Diehl, 56 N. § 9, and art. 11, § 3. So held in City Y. S. 841. Under laws of 1893 and of Cleburne v. Gulf &c. R. Co., 66 the charter of Greater New York Tex. 457; s. c. 1 S. W. 342. the department of public parks have "* In re City of Cedar Rapids, 85 no right to prohibit the use of speed- Iowa 39; s. c. 51 N. W. 1142. ways by equestrians nor the use of ^■"^ State V. Waddell, 49 Minn. 500; driveways by carriages in the ab- s. c. 52 N. W. 213. sence of evidence that the latter ^''"'^ Commonwealth v. Abrahams, would injure the driveway or render 156 Mass. 57; s. c. 30 N. E. 79. it unfit or inconvenient for the pur- 579 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 590 § 590. Wharves. — A municipal corporation may, unless restricted by positive law, dedicate property irrevocably to public uses.^^^ It may, under its power to regulate wharves, authorize the erection of a public grain-elevator upon a wharf so dedicated to public uses.^'^** But it can not, without express authority from the legislature, by ordinance surrender to a private corporation its control of a public wharf for a fixed term, nor the right to regulate prices chargeable for such use.^'^^' A power to regulate them does not include the power to surrender con- trol of them.^'^^ Authority conferred by charter upon a city "to pur- chase and hold real, personal and mixed property, and to dispose of the same for the benefit of the city," is limited to the purchase of such property as may be necessary for the purposes of the corporation, such as the house for the public offices and furniture to fit them up. It doe's not embrace power to subscribe for railway-stocks or to any other work of internal improvement. To do this, special authority from the legislature is required.^'^^ § 591. The same subject continued. — A municipal corporation hav- ing, by its charter, an exclusive right to make wharves on the banks of a navigable river upon which it is situated, collect wharfage and regulate wharfage rates, can, consistently with the constitution of the United States, charge and collect from the owner of enrolled and licensed steamboats, which move and land at a wharf constructed by it, wharfage proportioned to their tonnage. ^'^* pose for which it was created: Doll ^^* Packet Company v. Keokuk, 95 V. Devery, 57 N. Y. S. 767. U. S. 80. The court said:— "It is a ^'^^ Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. City of tax or duty that is prohibited [by St. Louis, 2 Dill. 70; Board &c. v. the constitution]; something im- Risley, 40 Mo. 356; Schools v. Risley, posed by virtue of sovereignty, not 10 Wall. 91. claimed in right of proprietorship. ^'^ Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. City of Wharfage is of the latter character. St. Loiiis^ 2 Dill. 70. Providing a wharf to which vessels "* Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. City of may make fast, or at which they St. Louis, 2 Dill. 70. may conveniently load or unload, is "' Illinois &c. Canal Co. v. City of rendering them a service. The char- St. Louis, 2 Dill. 70. See also, Davis acter of the service is the same V. Mayor &c., 14 N. Y. 506, 532; Mil- whether the wharf is built and of- hau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; Goszler fered for use by a state, a municipal V. Corporation of Georgetown, 6 corporation or a private individual; Wheat. 593, 597, where, in the Ian- and when compensation is demanded guage of Chief Justice Marshall, it for the use of the wharf, the demand is held that a mvinicipal "corpora- is an assertion, not of sovereignty, tion can not abridge its own legisla- but of a right of property." Cf. five power." Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577, "=■ City of Wheeling v. Mayor &c., where the court carefully guarded 1 Hughes 90. the right to exact wharfage. Any 593 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 580 § 592. Markets. — An oi'dinancc pi'oliibiting the keeping of a pri- vate market within six blocks of a public market is a valid exercise of the power to "regulate" private markets."^ The authority of a city to provide for the inspection and to regulate the sale of meats and other things does not give power to tax for revenue the occupation of selling them, but justifies such fees and charges as will cover the expense of inspection and police supervision.^'^'' And under such authority a city may prohibit the sale of such articles except at markets duly established under its power to establish and regulate markets."^ law or ordinance savoring of a tax on tonnage, though ostensibly passed to collect wharfage, has been held prohibited. See also. Northwestern Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dill. 454 (where an ordinance imposing a wharfage tax each trip upon every boat and vessel loading or anchor- ing, etc., was held in conflict with the constitution and void. Nelson, J., said: — "It is not a charge for the use of a wharf, but for the privilege of arriving at and departing from the port"); Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31 (where the stat- ute imposing a tax upon every ship entering the port was held to be void, as "a regulation of commerce and a duty of tonnage," — "a sover- eign exaction, not a charge for com- pensation"); Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581 (holding a tax of the same character void); Northwestern &c. Packet Co. v. City of Louisiana, 4 Dill. 17, n.; Kennedy v. Corporation of Washington, 3 Cr. C. C. 595 (where it was held that the making of rules for the regulation of private wharves was discretionary, and that the commissioners could not be com- pelled to exercise the power). "= Natal V. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 636; affirming s. c. 42 La. An. 612; 1 So. 923. The court said: — "By the law of Louisi- ana, as in states where the common law prevails, the regulation and con- trol of markets for the sale of pro- visions, including the places and the distances from each other at which they may be kept, are matters of municipal police, and may be in trusted by the legislature to a city council to be exercised as in its dis- cretion the public health and con- venience may require." Morano v. Mayor, 2 La. 217; First Municipality V. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335; City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 La. An. 417; Bush V. Seabury, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 419; Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 99; Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 168; Com- monwealth V. Rice, 9 Met. (Mass.) 253. Where a city has power to es- tablish markets, it has power to pro- hibit the sale at, or near, such mar- kets of articles for sale in such markets: City of New Orleans v. Kientz, 52 La. An. 950; s. c. 27 So. 344. The action of a city council in establishing a market is not sub- ject to question on the ground of necessity: Miller v. Webster City, 94 Iowa 162; s. c. 62 N. W. 648. Power granted to regulate markets authorizes the prohibiting under a penalty the sale of fresh meat by retail during market hours at other places than those set apart for such purpose: Keck v. City of Cincinnati, 6 Ohio Dec. 97. ^''' City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Pla. 163; s. c. 7 So. 885. "^ City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163; s. c. 7 So. 885. 581 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 593 § 593. The same subject continued. — A municipal corporation has the power to contract with an individual, to authorize him to build a market-house, rent stalls and collect dues during a specified period, with the consideration that the land, which is his property, and the improvements upon it, shall be conveyed to the city, and that the same at the expiration of the term, shall be turned over absolutely in good order to the corporation.^^^ An act which gives to cities power "to provide for and regulate the inspection of meats, poultry," etc., and "to do all acts and make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease," does not confer power to establish a public slaughter-house for the purpose of securing proper inspection of fresh meats,^^" although under the special provisions of the statute, incorporated towns have power to prohibit slaughter-houses or any unwholesome business or establishment within the incorporation, and the common council by appropriate ordinance may regulate the location of any unwholesome business, and may cleanse, abate or remove the same.^®" The estab- lishment and regulation of markets is the exercise of the police .power of a city for the preservation of the health of its citizens.^^^ But the legislature has not given to the city of New Orleans power to establish a market-bazaar as distinguishable from a market.^*- Under a char- ter which confers authority upon a city "to regulate the erection, use and continuance of market-houses," the city has power to pass an ordinance prohibiting the sale of fresh meats outside the market- house.^®^ The exclusive police power over the whole subject of slaughtering animals within its corporate limits is delegated by the constitution of Louisiana^®* to the city of New Orleans, subject to ™ State V. Natal, 41 La. An. 887; by the special provisions of the stat- s. c. 6 So. 722 (the court based this ute which followed it, and the spe- decision on the city's charter giving cial powers conferred alone should it all the power necessary for a be exercised) ; State v. Fergeson, 33 proper administration of a munici- N. H. 424; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. (2d pal government, and its recognized ed.), § 250; City of Cairo v. Bross, rights of establishing public mar- 101 111. 475. kets); Moran v. Mayor, 2 La. 217; ""Huesing v. City of Rock Island, Cougot V. City of New Orleans, 16 128 111. 465; s. c. 21 N. E. 558. La. An. 21; Weymouth v. City of ^"^^ City of New Orleans v. Morris, New Orleans, 40 La. An. 344; s. c. 4 3 Woods 103. So. 218. ^*'- City of New Orleans v. Morris, "" Huesing v. City of Rock Island, 3 Woods 103. 128 111. 465; s. c. 21 N. E. 558; re- '^'^ Ex parte Canto, 21 Tex. App. versing s. c. 25 111. App. 600 (the 61; s. c. 17 S. W. 155. court holding that the general pro- '^^ Const. La., art. 248, relates to vision as to the promotion of health regulating the slaughter of live ani- did not enlarge the power conferred mals. 594 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 582 no limitation except that imposed by the article of the constitution itself.^«^ § 594. Streets generally. — Lands used as a private cemetery may be seized by a city under authority to enter on and condemn "any and all lands."^^*^ It would not have been authorized to take lands pre- viously taken and devoted to a public purpose.^^^ The cemetery land was devoted to a private and not a public use.^^*^ The construc- tion of a sewer in a public street, if done in a lawful manner, is authorized ; sewerage being one of the legitimate uses to which public streets may be devoted. ^^^ The word "building," used in a statute authorizing cities to improve streets by "macadamizing, building," etc., includes "paving," and such cities are not thereby restricted to macadamizing their streets, but may pave them with asphalt.^^" The provisions of a city charter as to the removal of obstructions from its streets gave comprehensive powers of quasi-legislative character to the common council, and extended to the cutting down and removal of shade trees which had been growing on the sidewalks. ^®^ A city has inherent power to construct or reconstruct sewers of all kinds and to pay therefor out of the general revenue of the city.^''^ ^'^ Darcantel v. People's Slaughter House &c. Co., 44 La. An. 632; s. c. 11 So. 239. "^n re St. John's Cemetery, 133 N. Y. 329; s. c. 31 N. E. 102; affirm- ing s. c. 16 N. Y. S. 894. ^"In re New York &c. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 12; s. c. 1 N. E. 27; Suburban &c. Transit Co. v. Mayor, 128 N. Y. 510; s. c. 28 N. E. 525. ^^* In re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n, 66 N. Y. 569. i^^Elster V. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82; s. c. 30 N. E. 274. "» Morse v. City of West Port, 110 Mo. 502; s. c. 19 S. W. 831. "1 Chase v. City of Oshkosh, 81 Wis. 313; s. c. 51 N. V/. 560. The court said: — "A permanent obstruc- tion, such as trees standing within a sidewalk or traveled street, or stone columns which may interfere with public travel, constitutes per se a public nuisance, and may be sum- marily removed by direction of the common council." See also. State v. Leaver, 62 Wis. 387, 392; s. c. 22 N. W. 576. ^^- Commonwealth v. George, 148 Pa. St. 463; s. c. 24 Atl. 59. This act was not repealed by act of May 16, 1891 (P. L. Pa. 1891, p. 75), as there is nothing inconsistent with the former act in its provisions. In In re Private Road in Borough of Huntingdon, Appeal of Huntingdon &c. R. Co., 149 Pa. St. 133; s. c. 24 Atl. 189, it was held that the act of April 3, 1851 (Brightly Purd. Dig. Pa. 202 et seq. ), giving boroughs power "to survey, lay out, enact and ordain such roads, streets, lanes, alleys, etc.," "as they may deem nec- essary," and all "needful jurisdic- tion over the same," has been held not to repeal, as to boroughs, the act of June, 1836 (Brightly Purd. Dig. Pa. 1499), which authorizes courts of quarter sessions to lay out, upon the petition of one or more persons, "a road from their respective dwell- ings or plantations to a highway or 583 • EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 595 § 595. Construction of statutory provisions. — A recent Pennsylva- nia statute relative to laying out and opening streets^ ''^ has been con- strued to be an affirmative act, conferring additional and cumulative powers on municipalities of all grades, but repealing no prior .statute expressly, nor any portion thereof by implication, "unless the system provided by it is so inconsistent with that previously existing as to make it impracticable for them to stand together."^^* In the case cited it was held that the power exercised in passing the ordinance under the former statute remained, but the proceedings to carry out the improvement might be under the later statute, ^^^ Where a city charter requires the board of public works to prepare a general plan of laying out into streets and alleys all of the city not already laid out, a provision that "no private plan shall be allowed * * * which does not conform thereto, and no plat shall hereafter be recorded, or be of any validity, unless before such record the approval of such board shall be duly indorsed thereon," does not empower the board to refuse to approve a plat without a dedication by the owner of the land platted of a portion of his land for the extension of certain streets. ^'^'^ And where the plat does not interfere with the general plan established for streets, a writ of mandamus will be granted on petition of such owner, compelling the board to indorse its ap^ place of necessary public resort, or wishes of the multitude of munici- to any private way leading to a high- pal organizations in the state. In way." the effort some well-intended acts ^"^ May 16, 1891, P. L. Pa. 75, in re- had come to naught, and others had lation to laying out, opening, etc., been shorn of sections that left in- of streets, etc., in the several munic- convenient gaps here and there in ipalities of the commonwealth. the whole system. It was to fill ^"^ Borough of Hanover's Appeal, these gaps, to support the casus 150 Pa. St. 202; s. c. 24 Atl. 669, omissi, and to supplement powers holding the act of April 3, 1851 (P. doubtful or defective, that the act L. 320), which authorizes borough of 1891 was passed. It took away councils of their own motion to pass no power in any municipality that ordinances for widening streets, to existed before nor interfered with be unrepealed; following Hand v. any mode of its exercise, except Fellows, 148 Pa. St. 456; s. c. 23 Atl. where there is an irreconcilable re- 1126; McCall v. Coates, 148 Pa. St. pugnancy." 462; s. c. 23 Atl. 1127. The court "^Borough of Hanover's Appeal, said: —"In the task of steering 150 Pa. St. 202; s. c. 24 Atl. 669. through constitutional restrictions, ^°° Van Husan v. Heames, 91 Mich, well meant, but destructive of nee- 519; s. c. 52 N. W. 18. The court essary governmental powers, the said: — "The power conferred goes no legislature had found it difficult to further than to prevent landowners construct statutes conferring powers from laying out streets contrary to and modes of procedure suitable to the general plan." all the diverse needs, situations and § 596 PUBLIC CORPOEATIONS. • 584 proval.^^^ An act providing for the consent of the municipal au- thorities as a condition precedent to the incorporation of a company to supply the city with water was construed to require a consent to the formation of a company by the very persons and in the manner proposed. The consent could be given by ordinance and might be wholly refused, but would be defective if given in general terms/®* and permission might be granted to more than one company. ^'^^ § 596. Protection of streets. — The council of the city of Kingston had the authority, under the provisions of its charter giving the council powers of commissioners of highways, "to lay out, make and open streets * * * and cause the same to be repaired; * * * to cause any street * * * to be graded, paved or repaired;" to prescribe "of what materials" the same shall consist, and its power to pass ordinances for the purpose of executing the foregoing and other powers conferred upon it, authorized an ordinance prohibiting any person from drawing a load weighing from two and one-half to five tons over any paved street of a city.^°^ Under a power to make ordinances to prevent encroachments on and obstructions to the city streets and to regulate the use of streets and sidewalks for signs, awnings and other purposes, the council may by ordinance authorize the erection and maintenance of awnings over the sidewalks.^"^ An ordinance which purports to grant permission to erect poles and stretch wires in a public street as a part of a system of electrical railroading is illegal. ^°^ The laying out of drives, etc., along any beach within a city's limits, which is flowed by ocean tides, whether a beach of the ocean proper or of an outlet, is authorized by a statute jDro- viding that cities located on "or" near the ocean, and embracing within their limits any "beach" or ocean front, to lay out streets, drives or walks "along the beach or ocean front."^°^ A common council has no "'Van Husan v. Heames, 91 Mich. ="1 Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132; 519; s. c. 52 N. W. 18. s. c. 29 N. E. 85, reversing s. c. 14 ^"^ State V. City of Plainfleld, 54 N. N. Y. Supp. 159. It is not authorized J. L. 526; s. c. 24 Atl. 493. by Supp. Rev. N. J. 369. § 30, which '°^ State V. Consumers' Water Co., empowers street-railways, with the 51 N. J. L. 420; s. c. 17 Atl. 824. See consent of municipal authorities, to also, Proprietors &c. v. Proprietors use electric or chemical motors or &c., 11 Pet. 420; Mohawk Bridge Co. grip cables as the propelling power v. Utica &c. Bridge Co., 6 Paige (N. of its cars instead of horses. Y.) 554; Proprietors &c. v. Hoboken -"-State v. Inhabitants &c., 54 N. Land &c. Co., 2 Beas. (N. J.) 81; J. L. 92; s. c. 23 Atl. 281; State v. Delaware &c. Canal Co. v. Camden Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. 102; s. c. 23 &c. R. Co., 1 C. E. Green (N. J.) 321. Atl. 284. ^""People v. Wilson, 16 N. Y. S. ="' State v. Wright, 54 N. J. L. 130; 583; s. c. 41 N. Y. St. 765. s. c. 23 Atl. 116. 585 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 597 power or authority to authorize the permanent possession of a public highway, street or alley for private purposes.^''* The court said: "The erection of a structure of the character and permanency de- scribed in the complaint, for purely private purposes, upon or across the public streets, alleys, highways or wharves of a city, is unlawful, and such as the common council can not authorize and should not tol- erate. Where a street or other public way is used for public purposes, such as for street-railways or other improved methods of travel, the common councils have authority to permit permanent structures to be placed on the streets, but they have no such power when the purpose is strictly private and the public in no manner served."-"^ § 597. Obstructions in streets. — A city has no power in the ab- sence of legislation by contract or ordinance to confer the right to obstruct its streets, or to grant franchises or privileges in the same which will tend to impair the public uses in the same.^"*' Where the city is charged with the duty of removing all nuisances from the streets it may file a bill to remove obstructions down to a wharf-line, although the legislature may have placed the wharves in the hands of a trustee for the benefit of certain bondholders. ^°^ In the absence of statutory power a city has no power to license the erection and maintenance of stock-weighing scales, in a public street, for the personal profits of the licensee.^"^ A city has power to summarily abate obstructions in its streets which are dangerous to the public without an ordinance.*"" Where a state has power to attach condi- tions to a charter beneficial to the public, the city may do so as part of its delegated authority in granting a permit for the use of its streets by a corporation. -^° § 598. Use of streets by street-railways. — Where by its charter a street-railway company has power to construct its road in the streets -« Adams v. Ohio Palls Car Co., Louisville &c. R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 131 Ind. 375; s. c. 31 N. E. 57. Cf. 121; s. c. 4 So. 106; Costello v. State, State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185; Sims 108 Ala. 45, 49; s. c. 18 So. 820; V. City of Frankfort, 79 Ind. 446; Grand Lodge v. Waddill, 36 Ala. 313, Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), 318; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Canal § 653; Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139. Com'rs, 21 Pa. St. 9; Richmond &c. ="' Adams v. Ohio Falls Car Co., R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co., 13 How. 81. 131 Ind. 375; s. c. 31 N. E. 57. For -°^ City of Mobile v. Louisville &c. illustration of this distinction, see R. Co., 124 Ala. 132; s. c. 26 So. 902. Mikesell v. Durkee, 34 Kan. 509; s. =<** State v. Stroud (Tenn. Ch.), 52 c. 9 Pac. 278. S. W. 697. ^'^ City of Mobile v. Louisville &c. -"^ Bitzer v. Leverton, 9 Kan. App. R. Co., 124 Ala. 132; s. c. 26 So. 902. 76; s. c. 57 Pac. 1045. Cf. Birmingham &c. R. Co.'s Cases, -" People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 79 Ala. 465, 472; Port of Mobile v. 111. 594; s. c. 53 N. E. 349. § 599 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 586 of a city, consent may be given by the city authorities to the use of its streets without express authority in the charter.^" Where a city pursuant to a statute on petition of the property-owners grants permission to a railroad company to lay its tracks it has no power to extend the privilege beyond the time fixed in the petition. ^^- § 599. Telegraph- and telephone-poles in streets — Removal. — A statute providing that no poles shall be erected in the streets without the consent of the landowners, does not apply to the public lighting of the streets by a city or town.-^'^ Where a city is vested with power of supervision and control of its streets, all grants and privileges granted by it are subject to its right to enact such legislation from time to time as the public may require, and so when a telephone company has been granted the right to use a street in the maintenance of its line, and subsequently such use becomes dangerous and inconvenient to the jjublic, the city may require the removal of the line to another street which is a reasonable substitute."^* Under the Kentucky constitution, § 163, telephone-wires are not permitted to be erected in the streets without a city's consent, and if erected after the adoption of the con- stitution without such consent the city may compel the removal. ^^^ § 600. Vacation of streets. — Where a city by its charter has power to vacate its streets it may vacate a portion of a street where it has title and convey the same to abutting owners for .the purpose of having a factory erected thereon by a private corporation.-^^ If a city has made an ineffectual attempt to vacate a street it is not estopped from claiming that the street is a public highway.-^^ "^Almand v. Atlanta &c. St. R. St. R. Co. v. City of Covington, 9 Co., 108 Ga. 417; s. c. 34 S. E. 6. Cf. Bush (Ky.) 127. City Council &c. v. Port Royal &c. ''"City of Chester v. Wabash &c. R. Co., 74 Ga. 658; Kavanagh v. Mo- R. Co., 182 111. 382; s. c. 55 N. B. 524. bile &c. R. Co., 78 Ga. 271; s. c. 2 S. ='= Meyers v. Hudson Co. Elec. Co., E. 636; Augusta &c. R. Co. v. City 63 N. J. L. 573; s. c. 44 Atl. 713. Council &c., 100 Ga. 701; s. c. 28 S. ^^ Michigan Tel. Co. v. City of E. 126; Daly v. Georgia &c. R. Co., Charlotte, 93 Fed. 11. 80 Ga. 793; s. c. 7 S. E. 146; Davis ="> East Tenn. Tel. Co. v. City of v. East Tennessee &c. R. Co., 87 Ga. Russellville, 21 Ky. L. 305; s. c. 51 605; s. c. 13 S. E. 567; Beekman v. S. W. 308. Third Ave. R. Co., 153 N. Y. 144; =''' Knapp, Stout & Co. v. St. Louis, s. c. 47 N. E. 277; Milhau v. Sharp, 153 Mo. 560; s. c. 55 S. W. 104. Cf. 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 435; Attorney-Gen- Clough v. Holden, 115 Mo. 336; s. c. eral v. Lombard &c. R. Co., 10 Phila. 21 S. W. 1071; Hoester v. Sammel- (Pa.) 352; Eichels v. Evansville St. raann, 101 Mo. 619; s. c. 14 S. W. R. Co., 78 Ind. 261; s. c. 41 Am. R. 728; Nichols v. Stevens, 123 Mo. 96, 561; City of Boston v. Richardson, 117; s. c. 25 S. W. 578; 27 S. W. 613. 13 Allen (Mass.) 146; Davis v. ="City of Ashland v. Chicago &c. Mayor &c., 14 N. Y. 506; Covington R. Co., 105 Wis. 398; s. c. 80 N. W. 587 EXPRESS COErORATE POWERS. § 601 § 601. Grading of streets. — An act authorizing a city council to fix the district benefited by a local improvement and to apportion and assess the benefits is not open to the objection that it confers an arbi- trary power on the council.^ ^^ This form of taxation has been re- peatedly held valid and the discretionary power is properly lodged in the council.-^** Where in the exercise of its power a city has changed the grade in a street to the damage of the property upon which it abuts, on a trial of an appeal by the owner from the assessment of damages the city should not be allowed ,to plead irregularities in its proceedings to defeat the owner's claim for fair damages. ^^" A city council having general authority to establish the grades of streets may, under peculiar circumstances, fix the grade for one side of a street on a materially different level or plane from that of the other side; and if this renders it incidentally necessary to construct a re- taining-wall along the center of the street, to support the earth on the higher grade, that may be done. Such an exercise of public rights is not an infringement of the rights of an adjacent proprietor whose property may be injured thereby.^^^ A right to lay pipes in the streets of a city is subordinate to the power of the city to establish grades and grade the streets. ^-^ A statute conferring upon cities the power to change grades of streets, whereby railroads entering said cities may relocate, change or elevate their railroads, has been held not to be limited to railroads in existence at the time of the passage of the act.^^^ But under that act a change of grade must be confined to such limits as are necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose.--* Where the power to grade a street is in the city council a court of equity has no power to fix the grade.^-^ 1101. Cf. Trester v. City of Sheboy- Minn. 331, 334; Henderson v. City of gan, 87 Wis. 496; s. c. 58 N. W. 747; Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 319; s. c. 20 James v. City of Darlington, 71 Wis. N. W. 322. 173; s. c. 36 N. W. 834. ---Stillwater Water Co. v. City of ^i^Beecher v. City of Detroit, 92 Stillwater, 50 Minn. 498; s. c. 52 N. Mich. 268; s. c. 52 N. W. 731. W. 893. ^i^Beecher v. City of Detroit, 92 -^ State v. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. Mich. 268; s. c. 52 N. W. 731. See 293; s. c. 23 Atl. 648. also. City of Detroit v. Daly, 68 Mich. ^-* State v. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. 503, 509; s. c. 37 N. W. 11. 293; s. c. 23 Atl. 648. --" Second Cong. Church Soc. &c. v. -^ Town of Harrisonburg v. Roller, City of Omaha, 35 Neb. 103; s. c. 52 97 Va. 582; s. c. 34 S. E. 523; Gosz- N. W. 829. ler v. Corporation of Georgetown, 6 ^^^Yanish v. City of St. Paul, 50 Wheat. 593; Roanoke Gas Co. v. City Minn. 518; s. c. 52 N. W. 925. See of Roanoke, 88 Va. 810; s. c. 14 S. B. also, O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 25 665. § 603 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 588 § 602. Allowing the use of streets by railroads. — A city council has no power to condemn hind for a street for the express purpose of giving a railroad company the use of a street in such manner as to exclude all other travel therefrom.^-" The power conferred on the common council by the charter of Buffalo--^ "to permit the track of a railroad to be laid in, along or across any street or public ground" is subject to the qualification that no property-rights of abutting owners are thereby invaded, even in cases where the city has acquired the fee of the street in which it authorizes such track to be laid.^^^ The laws of Kentucky allow municipal corporations to grant rights of way over the public streets and alleys only on condition that the use of the easement shall not obstruct or "unreasonably" impede the pas- sage of persons or vehicles. It has been held that the fact that while cars are passing along a railroad laid in a public alley, four hundred feet long and sixteen feet wide, the passage of vehicles drawn by horses is totally prevented, though for only a few minutes at a time, renders the use of the alley by the railroad company an "unreason- able" obstruction.--" § 603. The same subject continued. — A statute^^" authorizing the common council to discontinue and close a portion of Liberty street in the city of Schenectady for the purposes of a railroad-depot "to the passage of vehicles, horses and cattle" has been held sufficient authority for an ordinance of the council authorizing the railroad company to construct and maintain an iron foot-bridge for pedestrians over the railroad-track on the discontinued portion of the street and to close the surface of the street to pedestrians by the erection of a fence.^^^ An order of the board of public works requiring a railroad company which, under legislative permission, laid its tracks in a city and continuously used them for eighteen years, to remove its tracks on twenty-five days' notice, has been held beyond its authority, though a statute, passed after the construction of the tracks, empowered the -2" Ligare v. City of Chicago, 139 *"' Reining v. New Yorlv &c. R. Co., 111. 46; s. c. 28 N. E. 934. See also, 128 N. Y. 157; s. c. 28 N. E. 640; af- Moses V. Pittsburg &c. R. Co., 21 111. firming s. c. 13 N. Y. S. 238. 515; Stack v. City of East St. Louis, ' ""Commonwealth v. City of Frank- 85 111. 377; Canal Co. v. Garrity, 115 fort, 92 Ky. 149; s. c. 17 S. W. 287, 111. 155; s. c. 3 N. E. 448; City of holding that the city had no author- Olney v. Wharf, 115 111. 523; s. c. ity to grant the right to a railroad 5 N. E. 366; Dubach v. Railroad Co., company to use such an alley for a 89 Mo. 483; s. c. 1 S. W. 86; Railway branch railroad. Co. V. City of Louisville, 8 Bush ="" Laws of New York, 1884, ch. 187. (Ky.) 415. -^^ Weinckie v. New York &c. R. ^" Laws N. Y. 1870, ch. 519, tit. 3, Co., 15 N. Y. S. 689; s. c. 39 N. Y. St. § 19. 584. 589 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS, § 604 city council to "direct and control railroad-tracks" within the city.^^^ It is competent for the legislature to give a board of trustees of an incorporated town power to grant the use of its streets to a railroad for a side-track. And when once granted it is not revocable at the mere pleasure of the board, but there must be failure on part of the road to comply with the terms of the grant before the privilege can be recalled. ^^^ Cities and villages incorporated under the general incorporation law of Illinois are made the representatives of the state with respect to the control of streets and highways and bridges within their limits, and are invested with power to lay out, alter or vacate streets, regulate the use of the same, and to construct and keep in re- pair bridges, viaducts, etc., and regulate the use thereof. And where the city has the right to bridge a river it may empower a railroad company to do so.*^* § 604. Regulations as to railroads using streets. — A municipal corporation may regulate within its limits the running and stopping of cars propelled by steam by virtue of its power over the streets and to protect the safety of citizens and their property.^^^ But it has been held that in the absence of a legislative grant of power to that end the police juries of Louisiana have no authority to prohibit by ordinance the running of railroad-trains through the villages of their parish at a greater speed than six miles an hour.^^*^ A charter which gives the mayor and council authority to lay out streets and pass all ordi- nances respecting them, and to make any other regulation that shall appear to them necessary and proper for the security, welfare and interest of the city, confers no authority to make a contract to obtain the right of way through the city for a railway. -^^ The power to grade and improve streets is a legislative power and a continuing one unless there is some special restraint imposed in the charter of the corpora- tion. ^^^ The power granted to a city to "regulate the use of streets" has been held to extend to public uses only, and not to authorize an ordinance permitting a private corporation to build a railroad- track and run trains across streets of the city for the transaction of ^'^Sinnott v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 81 ='« State v. Miller, 41 La. An. 53; Wis. 95; s. c. 50 N. W. 1097. s. c. 7 So. 672. These police juries 233 Town of Areata v. Areata &c. R. have no general grant of police Co., 92 Cal. 639; s. c. 28 Pac. 676. power. =^* McCartney v. Chicago &c. R. Co.. '" Covington &c. R. Co. v. City of 112 111. 611. Athens, 85 Ga. 367; s. c. 11 S. E. 663. ^^^Merz V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 88 ==' Estes v. Owen, 90 Mo. 113; s. c. Mo. 672; s. c. 1 S. W. 382. 2 S. W. 133. § 605 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 590 its business.^^® The charter of a city authorizing the adoption of ordinances to prevent the incumbering of streets with carriages au- thorizes an ordinance to prevent the obstruction of streets by railroad- cars.^*'' An ordinance requiring a railroad company to light its line by electricity within twenty days after notice of the passage of the ordinance is not necessarily unreasonable.^*^ Where an ordinance grants a right of way to a railroad company through a city the ac- ceptance of the benefits and privileges by the corporation makes it also subject to the burdens.^*^ § 605. The same subject continued. — A statute which gave au- thority to the mayor and council of a city to permit and sanction encroachments upon its streets for a fair and reasonable compensa- tion paid in money into the city treasury was held not to empower the city authorities to grant a railroad company a block of land eighty feet wide and four hundred and eighty feet long in one of the city streets.^*^ Nor did they have the power to make a donation of ten acres of land of the city commons to a railroad corporation, and after- wards grant to such corporation large encroachments upon a street of the city^ the consideration therefor being the return of this ten acres of land to the city.^** Nor did the general clause in the charter of the city, giving it power to control its streets, authorize the grant to a railroad company of the privilege of laying its tracks along its streets.^*^ ^^ Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch out." This was an obstruction, a Brewing Ass'n, 100 Mo. 508; s. c. 13 nuisance, not an encroachment. S. W. 707. -'' Daly v. Georgia &c. R. Co., 80 ^'''City of Duluth v. Mallet, 43 Ga. 793; s. c. 7 S. E. 146. The legis- Minn. 204; s. c. 45 N. W. 154. lative intention could not be thus *" Village of St. Marys v. Lake circumvented. Erie &c. R. Co., 60 Ohio St. 136; s. c. =^' Daly v. Georgia &c. R. Co., 80 53 N. E. 795. Ga. 793; s. c. 7 S. E. 146; 2 Dillon -'^ Chicago &c. R. Co. v. People, 79 Munic. Corp., § 724. See also. State 111. App. 529. V. Corrigan &c. R. Co., 85 Mo. 263; -*^ Daly V. Georgia &c. R. Co., 80 Hinchman v. Paterson Horse R. Co., Ga. 793; s. c. 7 S. E. 146. The court 17 N. J. Eq. 75; Jersey City &c. R. construed the act to allow the gi-ant Co. v. Jersey City &c. R. Co., 20 N. of "small encroachments to property J. Eq. 61; 2 Wood Ry. Law, § 273; holders along the whole length of Kavanagh v. Mobile &c. R. Co., 78 the street and on both sides thereof Ga. 271; s. c. 2 S. E. 636; Eichels v. in order to narrow the street. Evansville St. R. Co., 78 Ind. 261; . . . Such a grant as this was not s. c. 41 Am. R. 561; Davis v. East an encroachment, but a dedication Tennessee &c. R. Co., 87 Ga. 605; s. of the major part of the street for c. 13 S. E. 567; Cooley Const. Lim. purposes entirely foreign to the ob- 556; Elliott v. Fair Haven &c. R. ject for which the street was laid Co., 32 Conn. 579; Cincinnati &c. St. 591 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. 606 § 606. Crossings of railways. — An act declaring that "the city council shall have power by condemnation or otherwise to extend any street over or across any railroad-track, right of way, or land of any railroad company," gives the power to extend streets across a rail- road-track, even though such extension would subject the railroad company to great inconvenience and hindrance in the operation of its road ; also to extend a street across a railroad "yard" consisting merely of a collection of tracks.^* ^ And a court of equity will not compel the city to extend the street across the track by means of a viaduct for the convenience of the railroad company, since under the statute the city council has the option, in its discretion, of creating a crossing at grade or above grade, and its discretion should not be interfered with by the courts. ^*'^ The rule in such cases is that in the exercise R. Co. V. Incorporated Village of Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Ho- bart V. Milwaukee City R. Co., 27 Wis. 194; s. c. 9 Am. R. 461; Attor- ney-General V. Metropolitan R. Co., 125 Mass. 515; s. c. 28 Am. R. 264; Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. An. 842; Savannah &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 45 Ga. 602; Peddicord v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 34 Md. 463; Hiss v. Balti- more &c. R. Co., 52 Md. 242; s. c. 36 Am. R. 371; Stanley v. City of Davenport, 54 Iowa 463; s. c. 6 N. W. 706; 37 Am. R. 216. ^'' Illinois &c. R. Co. v. City of Chi- cago, 141 111. 586; s. c. 30 N. E. 1044. See also, Illinois &c. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 138 111. 453; s. c. 28 N. E. 740; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 140 111. 309; s. c. 29 N. E. 1109. As to the "yard," see Dela- ware &c. Canal Co. v. Village of Whitehall, 90 N. Y. 21. In the exer- cise of its governmental power the city has a right to open and use a disused crossing over a railroad, and the statute of limitations has no ap- plication: Chicago &c. R. Co. v. City of Council Bluffs, 109 Iowa 425; s. c. 80 N. W. 564. ^" Illinois &c. R. Co. v. City of Chi- cago, 141 111. 586; s. c. 30 N. E. 1044. See also. Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 97 111. 506; Curry V. President &c., 15 111. 320; Railroad Co. V. Town of Lake, 71 111. 333; Durham v. Hyde Park, 75 111. 371; Brush V. City of Carbondale, 78 111. 74; Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 111. 237; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 95; Lewis Eminent Domain, § 238; Boom Co. V. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Wiltse, 116 111. 449; s. c. 6 N. E. 49; People v. New York &c. R. Co., 74 N. Y. 302; Mil- waukee &c. R. Co. V. City of Fari- bault, 23 Minn. 167; National &c. R. Co. V. Central R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755; National &c. R. Co. v. State, 53 N. J. L. 217; s. c. 21 Atl. 570; Struth- ers V. Railway Co., 87 Pa. St. 282; Central R. Co. v. State, 32 N. J. L. 220; 2 Wood Ry. Law 981; Elliott Roads and Streets (2d ed.), §§ 778, 779; Railroad Co. v. Bentley, 64 111. 438; People v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 67 111. 118; Railroad Co. v. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 510; Town Coun- cil &c. V. Railroad Co., 10 R. I. 365; People V. Boston &c. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569; Drexel v. Town of Lake, 127 111. 54; s. c. 20 N. E. 38, where the question to be determined by the trustees of the town was, which one of two modes of carrying off the sew- age of a district should be adopted as the best and most expedient mode, and the court said: — "The choice of expedients is within the legislative discretion of the trustees of the town — a discretion with which the § 607 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 592 of tlie power of the municipal corporation in this respect there should be no unreasonable impairment of the usefulness of the railroad right of way.^** The governing authorities of a municipal corporation may, in furtherance of the object of a statute empowering them to alter streets which were to be crossed by railroads looking generally to the safety of life of citizens, vacate any street or any part of the street, and change the grade upon any street or part of a street without the consent of abutting owners. They may also construct bridges as parts of streets to carry the public way above intersecting railroads.^*^ The council of a borough organized under an act conferring powers to be exercised by ordinance has no right, by a mere resolution, to enter into a contract by which the public moneys are to be expended, and borough bonds are to be issued, to pay for grading and tilling a street. ^^"^ A resolution by the common council of a city authorizing a person to grade a portion of a street and build a bridge thereon across a* private canal has been held invalid. Such authorization should have been by ordinance.^ ^^ § 607. Miscellaneous matters relating to streets. — An ordinance prohibiting the cutting, trimming, or breaking of any tree-limb or twig without permission and providing a penalty for so doing, is a valid exercise of police power.^^^ The mere declaration by the com- mon council that a street exists does not give the city a right of entry as against the private rights based on ownership and actual posses- sion.^^^ Ejectment by the city is the proper remedy againt one unlaw- fully encroaching on the public highway under its control. ^^* Power courts will not interfere unless clear- -^° State v. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. ly abused." 476; s. c. 24 Atl. 481. "» Wood Ry. Law. § 271, p. 975, n. ''^' State v. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. 3, and cases; Commonwealth v. Erie 474; s. c. 24 Atl. 448. See also, Pack- &c. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; People v. ard v. Railroad Co., 48 N. J. Bq. 281; Dutchess &c. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 152; s. c. 22 Atl. 227; State v. Common Town Council &c. v. Railroad Co., Council &c., 45 N. J. L. 279, 282. 10 R. I. 365; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. =^* Consolidated Traction Co. v. Moffitt, 75 111. 524; City of Bridge- East Orange Tp., 63 N. J. L. 669; s. port V. New York &c. R. Co., 36 c. 44 Atl. 1099. Under provisions of Conn. 255; 2 Wood Ry. Law, § 271, charter the council of Cape May by p. 981, n. 1; People v. Boston &c. ordinance regulate the use of streets, R. Co., 70 N. Y. 569; State v. St. Paul or portions thereof, by hucksters &c. R. Co., 35 Minn. 131; s. c. 28 N. and other vendors: Tomlin v. City W. 3. of Cape May, 63 N. J. L. 429; s. c. =^»Read v. City of Camden, 54 N. 44 Atl. 209. J. L. 347; s. c. 24 Atl. 549. See also, ^'^^ State v. Judge &c., 51 La. An. State v. City of Elizabeth, 54 N. J. 1768; s. c. 26 So. 374. L. 462; s. c. 24 Atl. 495. "*City of Cleveland v. Cleveland 593 EXPKESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 608 may be conferred on a city by the legislature to use streams within the state as outlets for public sewers.^^^ § 608. Sewers. — A complaint in an action to set aside a special assesment to pay for the construction of a sewer and a pavement on the street in front of plaintilf's land was held insufficient, as it alleged facts which only showed mere irregularities and failures to comply with some minor statutory requirements and did not allege an offer to pay the amount of such assessments justly chargeable to plaintiff's property.-^" In Pennsylvania it has been held that a lot- owner can not defend against an assessment under the front-foot rule, for the construction of a sewer in front of his lot, on the ground that such sewer was neither a private benefit to him or his property nor a matter of necessity to the public. ^^^ It is not enough for the complaint to allege in direct terms the inequality and injustice of such assess- ment; it must also allege facts showing such inequality and injustice or going to the groundwork of the assessment.^^^ Nor could the plain- tiff limit his liability to the improvement of that portion of the street immediately in front of his property, and then only to the extent it was benefited. The city was empowered by its charter to apportion the entire cost of the sewer and pavement respectively upon that street among the several lots fronting thereon, under the front-foot rule.^^* &c. R. Co., 93 Fed. 113; Ocean Grove Pa. St. 255; Lipps v. City of Phila- &c. Assn. v. Berthall, 63 N. J. L. 312; delphia, 38 Pa. St. 503; City of Phil- s. c. 43 Atl. 887. adelphia v. Tryon, 35 Pa. St. 401; ==^ Sayre v. Mayor &c., 60 N. J. Eq. Brientnall v. City of Philadelphia, 361; s. c. 45 Atl. 985. 103 Pa. St. 156. ='«Meggett v. City of Eau Claire, ^''^ Pratt v. Lincoln Co., 61 Wis. 62; 81 Wis. 326; s. c. 51 N. W. 566. s. c. 20 N. W. 726; Fifield v. Mari- '"Michener v. City of Philadel- nette Co., 62 Wis. 532; s. c. 22 N. W. phia, 118 Pa. St. 535; s. c. 12 Atl. 705; Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Ashland 174; City of Harrisburg v. McCor- Co., 81 Wis. 1; s. c. 50 N. W. 937, mick, 129 Pa. St. 213; s. c. 18 Atl. 939, 940. See also, Wisconsin &c. R. 126; City of Chester v. Black, 132 Co. v. Lincoln Co., 67 Wis. 478; s. c. Pa. St. 568; s. c. 19 Atl. 276. See 30 N. W. 619; Canfield v. Bayfield also, as to power to construct sewers, ^o., 74 Wis. 60, 64; s. c. 41 N. W. etc., Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 437; 42 N. W. 100; Green Bay &c. Pa. St. 146; Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Co. v. Outagamie Co., 76 Wis. 588; Rawle (Pa.) 291; Northern Liber- s. c. 45 N. W. 536,— this last ap- ties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa. St. proved and sanctioned in Farrington 104; City of Philadelphia v. Wistar, v. New England &c. Co., 1 N. D. 102; 35 Pa. St. 427; Commonwealth v. s. c. 45 N. W. 191, 194; Avant v. Woods, 44 Pa. St. 113; Magee v. Flynn, 2 S. D. 153; s. c. 49 N. W. 15. Commonwealth. 46 Pa. St. 358; ==^» Pratt v. Lincoln Co., 61 Wis. 62; Wray v. Mayor &c., 46 Pa. St. 365; s. c. 20 N. W. 726. See also. State Stroud V. City of Philadelphia, 61 v. City of Portage, 12 Wis. 562. 1 Smith — 38 § GOO PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 594 § 609. Fire-limits — Public health. — A provision in a charter to prevent the reconstruction in wood of old buildings within certain limits does not include the power to prevent the repairing with shingles the roof of buildings originally covered with similar ma- terials.-*^" An ordinance establishing fire-limits is not inconsistent with the general laws of Georgia.-"^ Power by charter to pass or- dinances necessary for the preservation of the health, good order, etc., of the town, authorizes an ordinance limiting the maximum quantity of land lawful to be cultivated within the corporate limits.-'^- And an ordinance imposing a proper and reasonable restriction upon the enjoyment of property to prevent its becoming injurious to public health is a legal exercise of the police power of the state which it is competent for the legislature to delegate by charter to the municipal authorities;'"^ also to compel a railway company to water its tracks so as to lay the dust.""'* A municipal corporation can not control the owners of property in the mode or manner of constructing their build- ings, within certain designated limits, in the absence of express legisla- tive authority.^"" The grant to a municipal corporation of power to provide for the prevention and extinguishment of fires necessarily implies the right to establish fire-limits and prohibit the erection of wooden buildings therein.^"''' A statute giving power to commissioners of a town to pass "such ordinances as they may deem necessary and '"" State v. Schuchardt, 42 La. An. ^"^ Town Council &c. v. Pressley, 33 49; s. c. 7 So. 67. S. C. 56; s. c. 11 S. E. 545. See also, 281 pord v. Thralkill, 84 Ga. 169; as to the power to regulate, restrain s. c. 10 S. E. 600, as Ga. Code, § 786, and suppress particular kinds of expressly authorizes mayors and business, 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. (3d councils of towns and villages "to ed.), § 144; Harrison v. Mayor &c., make regulations for guarding 1 Gill (Md.) 264; City Council v. against danger or damage by fire." Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 See also, 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., Strob. (S. C.) 306; State v. Mayor §§ 145, 405, n.; Horr & Bemis Munic. &c., 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 491. Police Ord., §§ 222, 223; Wadleigh =^^ Town Council &c. v. Pressley, 33 v. Gilman, 12 Maine 403; Mayor &c. S. C. 56; s. c. 11 S. E. 545. See also, V. Hoffman, 29 La. An. 651; Baum- 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 146; Com- gartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575; s. c. monwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 50 Am. R. 830; dictum of Shaw, C. 53. J., in Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, ""■' City &c. R. Co. v. Mayor &c., 77 11 Met. (Mass.) 55, 58; City of Ga. 731. Charleston v. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681; =''■• State v. Schuchardt, 42 La. An. Williams v. City Council &c., 4 Ga. 49; s. c. 7 So. 67. 509 ; Kneedler v. Borough of Norris- '"" Hubbard v. Town of Medford, town, 100 Pa. St. 368; City of Troy 20 Or. 315; s. c. 25 Pac. 640. See v. Winters, 2 Hun (N. Y.) 63; Pye v. also. City of Olympia v. Mann, 1 Peterson, 45 Tex. 312; s. c. 23 Am. Wash. 389; s. c. 25 Pac. 337. R. 608. 595 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 610 beneficial for said town" confers on them authority to prohibit by ordinance any person erecting any building within the limits of the town without a permit from them.-^'^ § 610. Directions as to buildings. — Ordinances relating to fire- limits, enacted without authority, may be expressly validated by a subsequent revision of the charter.-"^ An ordinance of a city impos- ing a penalty on persons erecting a certain class of buildings made of combustible materials within certain fire-limits, declaring such buildings nuisances, and giving the council power to tear them down, has been held not void where the city charter empowered the city to prohibit such buildings and to provide for their removal.-"" The charter of a city authorizing the making of ordinances "to prescribe the limits within which wooden buildings shall not be erected" per- tains to the future, and an ordinance made thereunder prohibiting, without the council's permission, the erection of "any building con- structed in whole or in part of wood" within certain limits, refers to buildings to be erected in the future, and not to buildings in ex- istence and erected by such permission.^''*' A city has power to pass an ordinance prohibiting the blasting of rock with explosive comjDounds under a statute providing that towns may make by-laws to protect persons from dangers incident to the maintenance, occupa- tion or use of buildings on streets.^'^ A city is not justified in de- stroying a building because it is used for illegal and unlawful purposes and thereby becomes an annoyance to other residents of the neighbor- hood. The wrongful use can be stopped. ^^^ When the statute au- thorizes the city council to prescribe the manner of constructing "°^ Commissioners &c. v. Covey, 74 s. c. 7 N. Y. S. 501. See also, Peiople Md. 262; s. c. 22 Atl. 266. And it is v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1-62; s. c. 18 within their discretion to refuse a N. E. 692; In re Union El. R. Co. permit. &c., 112 N. Y. 61, 75; s. c. 19 N. E. ='*«Brunner v. Downs, 17 N. Y. S. 664; People v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48, 52; 633; s. c. 43 N. Y. St. 824. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; City '"^Baxter v. City of Seattle, 3 of Detroit v. Detroit &c. Plank R. Wash. 352; s. c. 28 Pac. 537. Co., 43 Mich. 140; s. c. 5 N. W. 275. "° City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, -"' Commonwealth v. Parks, 155 134 N. Y. 163; s. c. 31 N. E. 443, hold- Mass. 531; s. c. 30 N. E. 174. The ing that the defendant, who had a court said: — "Such prohibition is permit from the city council to erect not such a taking of property as to frame buildings within the fire-lim- be beyond the police power," under its, and had made contracts and in- Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 647; curred liabilities thereon before a s. c. 26 N. E. 100. rescission of such permit, acquired a -'- Bristol &c. Co. v. City of Bris- private property-right of which he tol, 97 Va. 304; s. c. 33 S. E. 588. was entitled to pi'otection; affirming § 611 PUBLIC COKrOILVTIONS. 596 stone, brick and other buildings, and fix the limits in which wooden buildings may be erected, the council is not authorized to prohibit the erection of buildings within certain limits unless the buildings, or the outside walls, shall be composed of stone or brick.-" A city has power to cause to be erected a roofed passageway in front of a building, on the sidewalk, during process of construction.-^* The city is not liable for revoking a building-permit where an express pro- vision of the permit has been violated.-^ ° An ordinance empowering a building commissioner to grant or refuse permits for buildings from which no appeal is provided is void."'^*' A permit which unjustly discriminates between citizens is void.-'^^ Before the city, or any one representing it can remove a building in process of erection in the fire- limits, it must give the owner notice to remove it himself, and if this is not done the owner may recover damages.- '^'^ § 611. Police power. — Under a city charter giving the council power to pass all ordinances necessary for the due administration of justice and the better government thereof, and "to cause the removal or abatement of any nuisance," the passage of an ordinance requiring a street-car company to put "a driver and conductor" on each car is a proper exercise of the city's police power, and not an impairment of the company's rights, not being unreasonable or oppressive.^'^^ And a provision in such an ordinance, requiring the police to cause every car not provided with a "driver and conductor" to be returned to the stable, is not an attempt at enforcement without trial, but merely a means of preventing a nuisance by blockading travel.^^** Acts of a territorial legislature empowering county commissioners to grant ferry licenses and regulate the ferries have been upheld as containing a valid exercise of police power.^^^ An ordinance of 2" City of Marion v. Robertson, 84 "^» South Covington &c. R. Co. v. 111. App. 113. Berry, 13 Ky. L. 943; s. c. 18 S. W. -'* Smith v. Milwaukee Builders' 1026. See also. Railroad Co. v. Rich- fee. Exch., 91 Wis. 360; s. c. 64 N. W. mond, 96 U. S. 521, where it was 1041. said an ordinance as to running cars -"Harper v. Mayor &c., 94 Ga. 801; in the streets "was a mere regula- s. c. 22 S. E. 139. tion of the use of its [the railroad °™ City of Sioux Falls v. Kirby, 6 company's] property in the city, and S. D. 62; s. c. 60 N. W. 156. not a 'taking' within the meaning of "' City of Brooklyn v. Furey, 30 the constitutional prohibition." N. Y. S. 349; s. c. 61 N. Y. St. 287. "'Evans v. Hughes Co., 6 Dak. 2'* Ward V. City of Murphysboro, 102; s. c. 50 N. W. 720. Nor are 77 111. App. 549. such acts repugnant to the revised -'" South Covington &c. R. Co. v. statutes of the United States, § 1889, Berry, 13 Ky. L. 943; s. c. 18 S. W. which provides that the legislative 1026. assemblies of the several territories 597 EXPRESS CORrORATE POWERS. 613 a town to prohibit peddling within the corporate limits without a license is within the police power, and is not void as discriminating in favor of citizens of the town, since it applies to all persons alike, whether they reside in the town or elsewhere.^^^ § 612. The same subject continued. — Applying the provision of the constitution of California, which authorizes the city and county of San Francisco to make and enforce within its limits such police regu- lations as are not in conflict with general laws, the supreme court of California has held an ordinance of the city prohibiting the sale of pools, etc., on horse races, "except within the inclosure of a race- track where such trial or contest is to take place," to be valid; for though its incidental efl'ect may be to confer special privileges on the owners of race-tracks, its purpose is to restrain gambling of the character mentioned, which is a proper subject of police regulation. -^^ shall not grant private charters or special privileges. In Common- wealth V. Page, 155 Mass. 227; s. c. 29 N. E. 512, a rule of the board of police of Boston, providing that no person shall use "any hackney-car- riage unless he is licensed thereto by the board," and that every ve- hicle "used for the conveyance of persons for hire from place to place within the city, except a horse-car, shall be deemed a hackney-car- riage," has been held to be a reason- able exercise of the authority con- ferred on the board, under various acts which placed the power in their hands, to act under Pub. St., ch. 28, § 25, empowering the mayor and aldermen of a city to regulate all vehicles used therein. This rule was also held to apply to all vehicles used in the city for the conveyance of persons for hire, whether the vehicles stood in public places or in the stables of their own- ers. Authority to a town on a navi- gable stream to operate a ferry de- pends wholly upon special grants: Hoggard v. Mayor &c., 51 La. An. 683; s. c. 25 So. 349. ^= Martin v. Town of Rosedale, 130 Tnd. 109; s. c. 29 N. E. 410. See Elliott's Supp. Ind., § 826 (Burns' R. S. Ind. 1901, § 4357) pursuant to which it was passed. In Common- wealth V. Cutter, 156 Mass. 52; s. c. 29 N. E. 1146, an ordinance by the city of Boston, providing that "no owner or occupant of land abutting on a private way, and having the right to use such way, shall suffer any filth," etc., to remain on that part of the way adjoining such land, was held to be authorized as a proper exercise of police power, un- der Pub. St., ch. 27, § 15, which pro- vides that towns may make by-laws for preserving peace and good or- der within their limits, and St. 1854, ch. 448, § 35, which gives the city council of Boston "power to make all such needful and salutary by-laws and ordinances ... as towns . . . have power to make and es- tablish." See also, as to the power of cities and towns to adopt ordi- nances and by-laws for the preserva- tion and promotion of the health of their inhabitants, as an exercise of police power, Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221; Commonwealth V. Curtis, 9 Allen (Mass.) 266; Van- dine, Petitioner, 6 Pick. .(Mass.) 187; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. (3d ed.) 369. =''Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589; s. § 612 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 598 Nothing passes by a grant of power to a municipal corporation to establish and regulate ferries across a navigable stream but what is granted in clear and explicit terms. Power conferred on a munici- pality "to lay out, make, open, widen, regulate and keep in repair all * * * ferries," etc., does not include the power to con- fer upon any individual the exclusive right to keep and operate a ferry. If by such a grant power to establish ferries is conferred at all, such power is held by the trustees of the city as a public trust, to be exercised as the public good may require.^^* Where the only legislative authority conferred by the charter of a city with reference to billiard-saloons and pool-rooms is to license such places by or- dinance, the power to license is to be construed as a power to regulate, and the city council may impose such reasonable terms and con- ditions as may be necessary to make the license issued efficacious as a police regulation ; but in the absence of further authority to regulate or control such places, the council would not be authorized, as against existing licenses at least, to impose new or additional conditions not required or contemplated under the original ordinance, or to provide and enforce penalties for the violation thereof.-^ ^ WTiere a corporation is authorized to enact ordinances to prohibit practices which are against good morals, or contrary to public decency, and its legislative body determines that any particular practice, such as the uttering of profane language, is against good morals, and prohibits it, its decision is final and will not be reviewed.^^'' An ordinance enacting that it shall not be lawful for any horse-railroad company to run any car without having an agent, in addition to the driver, to assist in the control of the car and passengers, and to pre- vent accidents and disturbances of the good order and security of the streets, is a reasonable regulation and a valid exercise of the general police power vested in a city by its charter.^^^ The subject of police power is treated generally in another chapter and is only briefly no- ticed in this connection. The power of taxation is the exercise of one of the sovereign powers of the state, and is not permitted as an exercise of police power.^^® Under general power to preserve peace, good order, health and safety, a city may prohibit domestic c 27 Pac. 933. A business carried People v. Meyers, 95 N. Y. 223; on to enable persons to bet on horse- Schwuchow v. City of Chicago, 68 races is against public policy and 111. 444; Gilham v. Wells, 64 Ga. 192. may be prohibited, though not crimi- "*'*' Ex parte Delaney, 43 Cal. 478. nal, by statute: Odell v. City of At- ="' State v. Inhabitants &c., 53 N. lanta, 97 Ga. 670; s. c. 25 S. E. 173. J. L. 132; s. c. 20 Atl. 1076. See '■* Minturn v. Larue, 1 McAl. 370. also, § 611, ante. ="' State V. Pamperin, 42 Minn. ="" Pitts v. City of Vicksburg, 72 320; s. c. 44 N. W. 251. See also, Miss. 181; s. c. 16 So. 418. 599 EXPEESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 613 animals from rimning at large,^^^ and may regulate the storage of petroleum,-'"' and the power to regulate burials of human bodies includes the power to prohibit burials in certain localities within the corporate limits,-^^ and may prohibit boisterous assemblies,^ ®^ and power to preserve the public peace and morals includes power to prescribe penalties for non-observance of Sunday,'^^ but power to provide ordinances for the general welfare does not authorize an or- dinance contrary to the express provisions of the charter.^"'* Police power does not justify an ordinance in restraint of trade,^^^ nor is authority to prohibit gambling-houses authority to prohibit all gam- jjjg_296 rpi^g g-^y |-^.^g power to establish hack-stands in front of public buildings such as a railway-station.-^^ § 613. Regulation of liquor traffic. — Where by charter a city is authorized to adopt such ordinances as may be necessary to secure order and quiet in the city, and protect the morals thereof, it may by ordi- nance prohibit the keeping for sale, bartering or exchange of vinous, spirituous or malt liquors within its limits.^^® But it has been held that a charter conferring power to pass ordinances to preserve the peace and good order, or for the more effectual suppression of immorality, does not justify the licensing of the sale of intoxicating liquors, or the imposition of penalties for sale without license.-"" There is no doubt, however, that the legislature may grant control over the sale of liquors.^"" Under power to regulate health a city has power to ^* Cochrane v. Mayor &c., 81 Md. tomers with certificates of weight at 54; s. c. 31 Atl. 703; Chamberlain v. the expense of dealers: Sylvester City of Litchfield, 56 111. App. 652. Coal Co. v. City of St. Louis, 130 =^ Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Mayor Mo. 323; s. c. 32 S. W. 649. There &c., 47 La. An. 863; s. c. 17 So. 343. is, in absence of statute, no power to ^^ City of Austin v. Austin City prohibit the use of profane Ian- Cemetery Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330; s. c. 28 guage: State v. Home, 115 N. C, S. W. 528. 739; s. c. 20 S. E. 443. ^^ Village of Vicksburg v. Briggs, ^^ Cunningham v. City of GriflSn, 102 Mich. 551; s. c. 61 N. W. 1. 107 Ga. 690; s. c. 33 S. E. 664. =*^ Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. =™ Schlachter v. Stokes, 63 N. J. L. 440; s. c. 16 So. 321. 138; s. c. 43 Atl. 571. =^City of Brooklyn v. Furey, 30 N. ">" State v. Haines, 35 Or. 379; s. c. Y. S. 349; s. c. 61 N. Y. St 287. 58 Pac. 39. See Cunningham v. City =^' Borough of Warren v. Lewis, 16 of Griffin, 107 Ga. 690; s. c. 33 S. E. Pa. Co. R. 176. 664. But see Schlachter v. Stokes, ='"' City of Owensboro V. Sparks, 18 63 N. J. L. 138; s. c. 43 Atl. 571. Ky. L. 269 ; s. c. 36 S. W. 4. Under power to protect health, prop- ^'^ Pennsylvania Co. v. City of Chi- erty and person of citizens and to cago, 181 111. 289; s. c. 54 N. E. 825. preserve peace and good order a mu- The city of St. Louis has power to nicipal ordinance may prohibit the require coal-dealers to furnish cus- keeping of a "blind tiger" or the § 614 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 600 disinfect second-hand clothing at specified prices. ^"^ If not infring- ing vipon constitutional rights, the question of reasonableness of pro- hibiting slaughter-houses within the city limits will not be considered by the courts.^*^- An order to remove and destroy animal and vegeta- ble matter is within the express power to protect health and main- tain cleanliness/"^ and so is an ordinance to prevent the sale of impure milk, and direct its destruction.^"* A statute which gives a munici- pality power over the safety, health and comfort of its inhabitants, empowers it to create the office of city scavenger and prohibit others than the city scavenger from doing scavenger-work.^"^ An ordinance requiring the immediate removal of dead animals without giving the owner opportunity to dispose of them, is void.^"^ § 614. To promote health. — Under the general police power the legislature may delegate to a municipality the authority to pass ordinances for the preservation of the health or the promotion of the comfort, convenience, good order and general welfare of its citizens, provided, always, that they are not in conflict with the provisions of the federal and state constitutions, framed for the protection of the citizens in the enjoyment of equal rights, privileges and immuni- ties.^"'^ A municipality authorized by the legislature to pass any ordinance in the nature of a police regulation that is consistent with the laws of the land may prohibit the exposing of any produce, mer- chandise, cooked provisions, poultry, fruit, vegetables or other com- modities on the space between stores and the sidewalk, as well as upon the sidewalk.^"^ • sale of vinous, spirituous or malt c. 10 S. E. 143; State v. Pendergrass, liquors: Bagwell v. Town of Law- 106 N. C. 664; s. c. 10 S. E. 1002. renceville, 94 Ga. 654; s. c. 21 S. E. ^°* State v. Summerfield, 107 N. C. 903. 895; s. c. 12 S. E. 114. The court ="^ Rosenbaum v. City of Newbern, said: — "The fact that produce, mer- 118 N. C. 83; s. c. 24 S. E. 1. chandise, meats, etc., exposed in ^"-Rund V. Town of Fowler, 142 front of stores might, in the opinion Ind. 214; s. c. 41 N. E. 456; Belling of the commissioners, based on rea- V. City of Evansville, 144 Ind. 644; sonable grounds, endanger the s. c. 42 N. E. 621. health of the citizens of the town or ^"^ State V. Payssan, 47 La. An. incommode them in passing by a 1029; s. c. 17 So. 481. way left open for them by the own- "'" Deems v. Mayor &c., 80 Md. 164; er, or might frighten horses at- s. c. 30 Atl. 648. tached to vehicles driven along the '•^ City of Ouray v. Corson, 14 streets, would be sufficient to war- Colo. App. 345; s. c. 59 Pac. 876. rant the enactment under the gen- ^'"' State V. Morris, 47 La. An. 1660; eral authority to prohibit nuisances, s. c. 18 So. 710. protect health and prevent individu- ^•^ State V. Moore, 104 N. C. 714; s. als from so using their own prop- 601 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 615 § 615. General welfare, etc. — A general statute empowering city councils "to enact and make all such ordinances, by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be expedient for maintaining the peace, good government and welfare of the city and its trade and commerce" authorizes the enactment of an ordinance regulating the sale of cider by prohibiting such sales in less quantities than a gallon, and forbidding it to be drunk on the premises. ^"^ Neither was such ordinance unconstitutional as vio- lating private rights or unreasonably or improperly restraining trade. ^^^ The general-welfare clause has been held to confer power upon a city council to prohibit the keeping open of stores, shops and other places of business on Sunday.^ ^^ Under it an ordinance to pre- vent the keeping of a bawdy-house has been held valid ;^^^ also an or- dinance prohibiting saloons, restaurants and other places of public entertainment being kept open after ten o'clock at night.^^^ So under it a municipality may fix the time or places of holding public markets for the sale of food.^^* The establishment of a by-law imposing a penalty for mutilating any ornamental tree planted in any of the streets or public places of a city has been held within the authority to pass such ordinances as "shall be needful to the good order of tJie city.'^^^^ Under the power to make regulations which may be neces- sary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease an incorporated city has the right to require sellers of meats to take out licenses.^ ^^ erty as to subject others to serious S. 678; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 992, 1257; Stokes and unnecessary inconvenience or v. Corporation &c. of New York, 14 danger." See also, State v. Stovall, Wend. (N. Y.) 88; Mayor &c. v. 103 N. C. 416; s. c. 8 S. E. 900; In- Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; State v. Campbell, tendant &c. v. Sorrell, 1 Jones L. (N. 64 N. H. 402; s. c. 13 Atl. 585 and C.) 49; Cooley Const. Lim. *58. note. ^'^ Monroe v. City of Lawrence, 44 ^^^ City of St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Kan. 607; s. c. 24 Pac. 1113. The Mo. 94. court said: — "Instead of specifically ^'^ State v. Williams, 11 S. C. 288. defining every regulation which ^"'^ State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426. might be necessary to the health, ^" Wartman v. City of Philadel- safety, peace and convenience of the phia, 33 Pa. St. 202. public, the legislature enacted the ^'= State v. Merrill, 37 Maine 329. general welfare clause; and it seems ""Kinsley v. City of Chicago, 124 to us that it furnishes sufficient au- 111. 359; s. c. 16 N. E. 260. See also, thority for the council to pass an Williams v. City Council &c., 4 Ga. ordinance so clearly in the interest 509; Matter of Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294; of peace, good order and health as s. c. 9 Pac. 139; City of St. Louis v. the one in question." Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618; s. c. 8 S. ""Monroe v. City of Lawrence, 44 W. 791; Mayor v. Williams, 15 N. Kan. 607; s. c. 24 Pac. 1113. See Y. 502; State v. Welch, 36 Conn, also, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. 215; Commonwealth v. McCafferty, § 616 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 602 § 616. To license. — A contract between a council and a corporation for the extension of pipes into the municipal territory from a neighbor- ing city, which leaves for an indefinite period to other parties the regulation of the price to be paid or the quantity or quality of gas to be furnished, and which confers exclusive rights, has bc^n held to be ujiauthorized, under a statute which prohibits the granting of exclusive privileges. ^^^ The general legislation of 1887 in Minnesota, regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, although applicable to cities, has been held not to have had the effect of repealing by impli- cation existing municipal ordinances upon the subject, or the charter power to enact ordinances not inconsistent with the general law.^^* An act giving a city power to assess a license tax upon all persons carrying on "any business, trade or profession" within the city au- thorizes the assessment of a tax for retailing cigars, although the cigars are sold in connection with a grocery business and the grocer has taken out a general license for such business. ^^^ A city ordinance declaring it a misdemeanor punishable by fine to keep stallions, etc., within the city limits for service has been held invalid.^-" The board of county supervisors has authority to appoint a license-col- lector under a valid ordinance referring to the selling of liquor at retail.^ ^^ § 617. Occupations. — A power to license and regulate hack-owners and drivers, and to prohibit unlicensed persons and vehicles from engaging in such capacities warrants the imposition of a reasonable pecuniary penalty for a violation of an ordinance requiring such a license.^- ^ A similar power in a charter extending to public grounds 145 Mass. 384; s. c. 14 N. E. 451; See also, Moore v. City of Minne- Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass. apolis, 43 Minn. 418; s. c. 45 N. W. 485; s. c. 4 N. E. 577; Dillon Mimic. 719. Corp. (4th ed.), §§ 396-407. '"City of Mobile v. Craft, 94 Ala. ''"Cincinnati Gas Light &c. Co. v. 156; s. c. 10 So. 534. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257; s. c. 1 N. ^^^Ex parte Robinson (Tex.), 17 E. 527. S. W. 1057, as such keeping was ™ State V. Harris, 50 Minn. 128; not a nuisance per se and its prohi- s. c. 52 N. W. 387. The court said, bition not authorized either by re- in addition to "repeals by implica- vised statutes of Texas, arts. 403, tion" not being "favored": — "This 408, empowering cities to abate nui- principle has peculiav force from the sances, or by art. 383, empowering fact that the laws, the implied re- cities to "regulate" occupations and peal of which is in question, were callings. principally special laws, enacted to ''"' Amador Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Cal. meet the needs of particular locali- 458; s. c. 11 Pac. 758. ties, while the repealing act was '" Haynes v. City of Cape May, 52 general, and not thus particular." N. J. L. 180; s. c. 19 Atl. 176; City G03 EXPRESS CORrOEATE POWERS. § 618 and spaces has been held to authorize the enactment of an ordinance forbidding farmers, huclcsters, pedlers, etc., from standing with their vehicles and carts on the streets adjacent to the city market, within five hundred feet of such market. ^-^ But provisions conferring pow- ers to license persons in such lines of business have been held to apply only to those who are engaged in business as carriers of persons or property for hire, and not to those who, not being engaged in such business, merely hire out teams and vehicles to those who have prop- erty to transport, the hirer himself using and controlling the team and vehicle.^-* Under a power granted to a city to regulate hack- men, porters, etc., a city may by ordinance prohibit their soliciting custom at the depot or on the .platform of any railroad within its corporate limits. ^^^ An ordinance prohibiting a transfer company from soliciting business in a depot does not impair the obligation of a contract between the transfer company and the depot company, whereby the former was given the exclusive privilege of soliciting patronage in the trains and depots so far as lawful.^-*' § 618. The same subject continued. — An ordinance requiring pawn- brokers to take out licenses is not authorized by a statute empowering the council to pass ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of the state and necessary to carry out the objects of the corporation. ^^^ of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; 724. But power to license drays is s. c. 31 S. W. 1045. Ttiere is no not power to tax milk-wagons: power to require a license from an Reading City v. Bitting, 167 Pa. St. expressman carrying parcels from a 21; s. c. 31 Atl. 359. place within to a place without the ^"People v. Keir, 78 Mich. 98; s. c. city or vice versa: City of Cairo v. 43 N. W. 1039. Adams Exp. Co., 54 111. App. 87. It =*** State v. Robinson, 42 Minn. 107; is a legitimate exercise of police s. c. 43 N. W. 833. power to require all persons, dairy- «^ City of Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 men or herdsmen, supplying cities, Mo. App. 609. towns and villages with milk, to reg- "" Lindsay v. Mayor &c., 104 Ala. ister their herds or cattle with a 257; s. c. 16 So. 545. live-stock sanitary board whose duty ^" Shuman v. City of Fort Wayne, it shall be to inspect at least annu- 127 Ind. 109; s. c. 26 N. E. 560, the ally, without notice, the premises court putting the ruling upon the wherein cows are kept, and if found principle that the right to exact in an unsanitary condition to pro- that they should take out a license hibit the sale of milk or its ship- must be expressly conferred by stat- ment until such time as the prem- ute; it not being unlawful to con- ises shall conform to sanitary condi- duct such business, and there being tions prescribed: State v. Broodbelt, no power to prohibit it in the coun- 89 Md. 565; s. c. 43 Atl. 771. A 11- cil, they could not require of him a cense of $10 per annum for the sale license as a condition precedent to of milk is reasonable: Littlefield v. carrying on the business. State, 42 Neb. 223; s. c. 60 N. W. § 618 PUBLIC CORPOKATIONS. 604 But all the authorities agree that the business of the pawnbroker is a proper matter for regulation by the police power,^^^ Under the police power a city council may forbid the keeping or storing of petroleum, naphtha, benzine, gasoline, or any inflammable or explosive oils, within the corporate limits in quantities greater than five barrels at a time. Licensing the sale of an article is a legitimate means of regulating its sale,^-'' and -the power to regulate the inspection of an article includes power to license.^^° To render a license valid there must be no discrimination between persons engaged in the same line of business. An ordinance attempting to discriminate between those having license for a dramshop and a druggist's permit is invalid. ^^^ There is no power to impose a license on non-residents which is not applicable to residents.^^- A license must be uniform and equal as to time. Hence a tax of $150 from the date of application to the following January is void.^^^ A council may require a license of $3 on telegraph-poles under power to regulate streets,^ ^* but not so if the license fee is unreasonable and disproportionate.^^^ A license must not only bear equally upon all affected thereby, but it must also be reasonable, but reasonableness depends on the nature of the busi- ness and other circumstances. A license of $50 per annum on pawn- brokers and $25 on junk-dealers has been held reasonable.^^® A =>=** Shuman V. City of Port Wayne, and sale-stable: Carson v. Mayor 127 Ind. 109; s. c. 26 N. E. 560. See &c., 94 Ga. 617; s. c. 20 S. E. 116. also, Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich. "' Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 258; Launder v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 340; s. c. 52 N. E. 44; Farwell v. 111. 291. It is not unreasonable to City of Chicago, 71 111. 269; Chicago require pawnbrokers, junk-dealers. Packing Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 etc., to keep a record of purchases 111. 221; Kinsley v. City of Chicago, and sales and furnish statement to 124 111. 359; s. c. 16 N. E. 260. police-department: City of Grand ==° City of Cairo v. Coleman, 53 111. Rapids v. Brandy, 105 Mich. 670; s. App. 680; Farwell v. City of Chi- c. 64 N. W. 29. Nor is it unreason- cago, 71 111. 269; Kinsley v. City of able to require the application to be Chicago, 124 111. 359, 362; s. c. 16 N. signed by twelve freeholders certi- E. 260. fying to the good character and rep- "' Popel v. City of Monmouth, 81 utation of the applicants: Ibid. And 111. App. 512. see City of St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 ^'- City of Saginaw v. Saginaw Mo. 588; s. c. 31 S. W. 101. A city Circuit Judge, 106 Mich. 32; s. c. 63 may require dealers in fresh meats N. W. 985. and dressed poultry to take out a li- ''' Moore v. City of St. Paul, 61 cense and prohibit the sale thereof Minn. 427; s. c. 63 N. W. 1087. except in a public market: State v. ^='* Postal Tel. &c. Co. v. Mayor &c., McMahon, 62 Minn. 110; s. c. 64 N. 79 Md. 502; s. c. 29 Atl. 819. W. 92. The city of Forsyth, Ga., '■"* City of St. Louis v. Western U. has power to require tax on livery- Tel. Co., 63 Fed. 68. ^™ City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 605 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS, § 618 license may provide for revocation at the will of the council,^^^ except by permission as in the ordinance provided. ^^^ A statute empowering city councils to regulate the use of the public streets does not authorize an ordinance that no processions shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the superin- tendent of police, leaving the issuance of such permits to his discre- tion, since the power conferred upon the council can not be delegated by them.^^^ Nor was such an ordinance authorized by the grant of power in the general incorporation act "to regulate and prohil)it the exhibition or carrying of banners; * * * to declare what shall be a nuisance and abate the same; * * * to prevent and suppress riots, routs, affrays, noises, disturbance, disorderly assemblies in any public or private place."^*"' An incorporated town has power, under a statute authorizing it "to provide for the measuring or weighing of hay, coal," etc.,. to grant to individual dealers the right to set scales in the public streets in front of their places of business in such a way as not to be an obstruction to travel.^* ^ In Iowa the board of super- visors may employ counsel to institute an action in behalf of the county, and their right to do so is not dependent on the consent of the county attorney.^*- County supervisors in Michigan have no authority, by resolution, to vote the sheriff a salary in lieu of all 105 Mich. 670; s. c. 64 N. W. 29. And ties within the limits of a city is so see, as to millt-dealers, Littlefield v. great as to invite legislative control State, 42 Neb. 223; s. c. 60 N. W. of the same by the city govern- 724. ment." =•" City of Grand Rapids v. Brandy, 339 cj^y ^f Chicago v. Trotter, 136 105 Mich. 670; s. c. 64 N. W. 29. And m. 430; s. c. 26 N. E. 359. See also, see Economides v. Hinricks, 48 La. Bills v. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221; An. 370; s. c. 19 So. 124. May re- s. c. 20 N. E. 115; Mayor v. Radecke, quire license-plate on vehicle: City 49 Md. 217; Barthet v. City of New of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; Orleans, 24 Fed. 563; State v. Mah- s. c. 31 S. W. 1045. A charter au- ner, 43 La. An. 496; s. c. 9 So. 480; thorizing a city to levy a license tax City of Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. on railroads is not in violation of 598; s. c. 10 N. E. 464. Alabama constitution: Alabama &c. ^"Trotter v. City of Chicago, 33 R Co. V. City of Bessemer, 113 Ala. 111. App. 206; s. c. sub nom. City of 668; s. c. 21 So. 64. N. J. act of Chicago v. Trotter affirmed in 136 March 28, 1892, does not authorize 111. 430; 26 N. E. 359. See also, tax on groceries: Guerin v. Borough Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; s. c. of Asbury Park, 57 N. J. L. 292; s. c. 30 N. W. 72; Anderson v. City of 30 Atl. 472. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173; s. c. 19 ^^ City of Richmond v. Dudley, Pac. 719. 129 Ind. 112; s. c. 26 N. E. 184. The ^" Incorporated Town of Spencer court said: — "The danger to be ap- v. Andrew, 82 Iowa 14; s. c. 47 N. prehended to life and property from W. 1007. the storing of inflammable or ex- ^" Taylor Co. v. Standley, 79 Iowa plosive substances in large quanti- 666; s. c. 44 N. W. 911. § G19 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 606 statutory fees for services rendered the county, and include sucli sal- ary in the yearly tax levy.^''^ § 619. Public offenses. — An ordinance imposing a fine of $25 for the use of "any abusive or indecent language, cursing, swearing, or any loud or boisterous talking, holloaing, or any other disorderly conduct," is reasonable and authorized under a statutory power to abate nuisances.^** But the same provision would not authorize an ordinance making it an offense for the occupant or owner of any room to suffer or allow prostitution therein, or males and females to cohabit therein without being lawfully married. ^*^ Authority to sup- press bawdy-houses does not include power to provide by ordinance that "circumstances from which it may reasonably be inferred that any house is frequented by disorderly persons or persons of notoriously bad character shall be sufficient to establish that such house is a dis- orderly house or house of ill fame.^*® An ordinance making a mere private trespass on land penal is not authorized by a statute which confers on the common council authority to "declare what shall be considered nuisances in the * * * }Q^g a,nd places in said borough and remove all obstructions," etc.^*" § 620. The same subject continued. — Ordinances prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, disturbing the peace and selling liquor on Sunday are not "inconsistent with the laws of the state," although the prohibited acts are made offenses by general statute.^*^ Author- ^'^ Hewitt v. White, 78 Mich. 117; =>*" Mansf . Dig. Arlc., § 764, which s. c. 43 N. W. 1043. authorizes the passage of ordinances ^^ State v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. by cities not inconsistent with the 789; s. c. 12 S. E. 426. See also, laws of the state, to suppress disor- State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883; State derly conduct, provide for the v. McNinch, 87 N. C. 567; State v. safety, preserve the health, promote Merritt, 83 N. C. 677. the prosperity, and improve the ^" State V. Webber, 107 N. C. 962; morals, order, comfort and conveni- s. c. 12 S. E. 598. ence of the corporation and its in- ^^^ State V. Webber, 107 N. C. 962; habitants: Van Buren v. Wells, 53 s. c. 12 S. E. 598. The court said Ark. 368; s. c. 14 S. W. 38. The this would be prescribing new rules court said: — "The only limitation of evidence. See also. City of Char- upon this power is that the by-laws iton V. Barber, 54 Iowa 360; s. c. 6 and ordinances must 'not be incon- N. W. 528; Darst v. People, 51 111. sistent with the laws of the state.' 286; City of Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, The ordinances in question do not 11 Iowa 399; Wood Nuisances, fall within the limitation, and are §§ 740, 741; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., wholesome provisions for the prose- §§ 309, 310. cution [promotion?] and improve- =" Bregguglia v. Borough of Vine- ment of the order and morals of land, 53 N. J. L. 168; s. c. 20 Atl. the inhabitants for whose benefit 1082, they were designed, and a proper ex- 607 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 621 ity given to a city "to prevent and restrain disturbances" does not include the right to take jurisdiction and punish for the crime of an assault with a dangerous weapon.^'*® The power given a city council to restrain and prohibit all descriptions of gambling and fraudulent devices and practices authorizes an ordinance prohibiting the keeping or setting up of any gambling device designed to be used in gambling, and imposing a penalty for its violation.^ ^"^ § 621. Nuisances. — Under a power in a. charter to define and abate nuisances a city was held authorized to declare by ordinance the running at large of domestic animals a nuisance ;^^^ and this power was not abrogated by a statute providing that it should be lawful for stock to run at large where the inliabitants of the county adopted the stock law, which was done in the county where the city was situated. Under authority to maintain the public health and to suppress all nuisances the city of New Orleans has been held empowered to pass an ordinance prohibiting smoking in street-cars under penalty of ercise of the power conferred." See also, Mayor &c. v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400; Town of Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa 399; s. c. 6 N. W. 586; 37 Am. R. 212; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; State v. Williams, 11 S. C. 288; Hamilton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 643; McLaughlin v. Stephens, 2 Cr. C. C. 148; United States v. Wells, 2 Cr. C. C. 45; City of St. Louis v. Schoenbush, 95 Mo. 618; s. c. 8 S. W. 791; State v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App. 131; Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101. The court further approved the doc- trine laid down by Judge Cooley that "an act may be a penal offense under the laws of the state, and further penalties, under proper leg- islative authority, be imposed for its commission by municipal by-laws, and the enforcement of the one would not preclude the enforcement of the other," of which the author says: — "Such is the clear weight of authority, though the decisions are not uniform:" Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 239; Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536; s. c. 9 Pac. 50; Wragg v. Penn Tp., 94 111. 11; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351; Williams v. City of Warsaw, 60 Ind. 547; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Wayne Co. v. City of Detroit, 17 Mich. 390; State V. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507; s. c. 5 N. W. 959; State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445; s. c. 13 N. AV. 913 ; City of Linneus v. Duskey, 19 Mo. App. 20; City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395; City of St. Louis V. Vert, 84 Mo. 204; Howe V. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N. J. L. 145; State v. Bergman, 6 Or. 341; Greenwood v. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 567; State v. Taxing District &c., 16 Lea (Tenn.) 240; United States v. Holly, 3 Cr. C. C. 656. On similar principle. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; Briz- zolari v. State, 37 Ark. 364; Bishop Stat. Crimes (1st ed.), § 23. ^^^ Walsh V. City of Union, 13 Or. 589; s. c. 11 Pac. 312. '=" State V. Grimes, 50 Minn. 123; s. c. 52 N. W. 42, holding a "stock clock" under the evidence to be a gambling device. ^^^ City of Quincy v. O'Brien, 24 111. App. 591. See also, Roberts v. Ogle, 30 111. 459; Seeley v. Peters, 5 Gilm. (111.) 130. § 623 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 608 fine and imprisonment.^''''- A provision in the charter of a city em- powering the mayor and council to abate nuisances public and private, and to pass all ordinances they may deem necessary for preserving the good order and good government of the city, confers on them by necessary implication authority to establish fire-limits.^'^^ But a city has no authority to pass an ordinance imposing a tine for the maintenance of a nuisance under a statute providing that incorpoTated towns shall have power to prevent injury or annoyance from anything dangerous, offensive or unhealthy, and to cause any nuisance to be abated. 3^^ § 622. Holidays, etc. — It was held that a statute authorizing a "town" to raise money by taxation "for the purpose of celebrating any centennial anniversary of its incorporation" referred to the act which was the beginning of its corporate existence, whether as a dis- trict or as a town.^^^ A city council may appropriate money for public concerts by a band under a statute authorizing the city council of the city in a manner specified to appropriate money, not exceeding a certain amount, for armories, for the celebration of holidays, "and for other purposes."^^*' § 623. Power to purchase, lease and convey real estate. — A city may lawfully purchase and hold all real estate necessary for corporate "^^ State V. Heidenhain, 42 La. An. passage of needful ordinances and 483; s. c. 7 So. 621. The court said: — prescriptions of fines and penalties "The city council of New Orleans is to carry the first grant of power into to a limited extent clothed with leg- effect, the council could provide for islative authority and it is vested the taking up and impounding of with that discretion within its pow- cattle found running at large in the ers common to all legislative bodies, public streets, and for selling them Within the exercise of this legisla- to pay charges. tive discretion it has the authority ^'-^ Hill v. Selectmen &c., 140 Mass. to determine what is a nuisance and 381; s. c. 4 N. E. 811. to enact the necessary ordinances to ^'•'^ Hubbard v. City of Taunton, 140 suppress it." See also, Kennedy v. Mass. 467; s. c. 5 N. E. 157. The Phelps, 10 La. An. 227; Mayor &c. court said: — "The word 'other' im- V. Gerspach, 33 La. An. 1011. plies that the celebration of holidays 353 pord V. Thralkill, 84 Ga. 169; is a public purpose within the mean- s. c. 10 S. E. 600. Under "such gen- ing of the act, and indicates that eral welfare" clauses, said the court, purposes which are public only in ^** City of Knoxville v. Chicago &c. that sense are included within its R. Co., 83 Iowa 636; s. c. 50 N. W. scope; although they look rather 61. In Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va. more obviously to increasing the 347; s. c. 13 S. E. 1012, it was held picturesqueness and interest of life that under W. Va. code, ch. 47, § 28, than to the satisfaction of rudimen- empowering the council of a city to tary wants, which alone we gener- prevent cattle from going at large ally recognize as necessary." in the city, and § 29, empowering the 609 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § 624 purposes.^^^ Where the city has power to purchase land for public buildings, and does so, and having no power to sell, it can not pur- chase other lands not adjoining for the same purpose.^^^ It may, like an individual, acquire land by adverse possession.^^^ Where the constitution prohibits the state from becoming interested in any in- ternal improvement, it is prohibitive of a city purchasing, leasing or otherwise acquiring by conveyance a street-railway.^^'' Property held in trust, as water-works property, can not be sold by a city without legislative authority. ^"^^ Where a city has power to lease land for city purposes it may lease land for a public park.^*^^ The right to lease to a steamship company a small portion of its water front has been recognized. ^"^^ § 624. Power to subscribe for stock. — Without authority given in the statute or charter a municipality has no power to subscribe for stock in a private corporation, and with such power there must be found some constitutional warrant. A statute authorizing cities to take stock in a mineral corporation, organized to develop mineral resources, is unconstitutional and void;^®* but it has been held that an act which authorizes a municipality to subscribe for stock in a canal company and levy taxes to pay therefor is not unconstitutional in that it takes property without due process of law.^®^ Power in the charter to take stock in chartered companies for making roads author- izes taking stock in a railroad,^"" but there must be charter power to do so.^*^^ ^■'' Richmond &c. Co. v. Town of ^^° Attorney-General v. Pingree, 120 West Point, 94 Va. 668; s. c. 27 S. E. Mich. 550; s. c. 79 N. W. 814. 460. '"' Huron Water Works Co. v. City ="^McGuire v. Atlantic City, 63 N. of Huron, 7 S. D. 9; s. c. 62 N. W. J. L. 91; s. c. 42 Atl. 781. 975. ==*" Stephens v. Murray, 132 Mo. ■"'= Holder v. City of Yonkers, 56 468; s. c. 34 S. W. 56. Commissioners N. Y. S. 912; s. c. 39 App. Div. (N. having power by statute to buy land Y. ) 1. may do so under Mass. St. 1886, ch. ="3 Pacific Coast S. S. Co. v. Kim- 240, § 10: Inhabitants &c. v. Paul, ball, 114 Cal. 414; s. c. 46 Pac. 275. 173 Mass. 148; s. c. 53 N. E. 272. ^'^^ City of Geneseo v. Geneseo &c. Construction of N. Y, laws of 1892, Co., 55 Kan. 358; s. c. 40 Pac. 655. ch. 466, §§ 1, 2, 8, in relation to pur- And see, as to Kansas, ^tna L. Ins. chase of land: Choate v. City of Co. v. City of Burrton, 75 Fed. 962. Buffalo, 57 N. Y. S. 383; s. c. 39 App. ^"^ Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh (Va.) Div. (N. Y.) 379. Water commis- 120. sioners have power under Mass. ^"^ Evansville v. Dennett, 161 U. S. laws of 1886, ch. 240, §§ 2, 10 & 15, 434; s. c. 16 S. Ct. 613. to purchase land which will bind ^^' Higgins v. City of San Diego, the town: Inhabitants &c. v. Paul, 115 Cal. 170; s. c. 45 Pac. 824. In 173 Mass. 148; s. c. 53 N. E. 272. South Carolina municipalities may 1 Smith— -39 § 625 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 610 I § 625. Power over watercourses. — A law giving a city exclusive power to control watercourses leading to a city, and to regulate and control them within the city, where persons prior thereto had acquired paramount title, would deprive such jDcrson of property without due process of law, and is therefore void.^**^ A city may lawfully use from a river within its limits such an amount of water as may be necessary to supply the wants of its citizens and of the city.^^^ A town has no power to divert water from private streams to the detriment of lower riparian owners.^^" A municipality may change the flow of water and cause it to empty in the same watercourse at a different point if, in its judgment, for the benefit of the municipality, and if such change does not create a nuisance to those injured, will not be enjoined.^'' ^ § 626. Power to aid private charities. — The law will not permit a municipality to invoke the power of taxation, or contribute its funds, in support of charities under private control, no matter how laudable their object. A law which provides for the treatment of habitual drunkards at the expense of the counties is for the benefit of private individuals, or a corporation, not the legitimate objects of public charity, and void.^''^ It is clearly beyond corporate power to appropriate public funds in aid of private educational institutions over which the corporation has no control.^ ^^ take stock in railroads: Town of ^""^ City of Los Angeles v. Los An- Darlington v. Atlantic Tr. Co., 68 geles Water Co., 124 Cal. 368; s. c. Fed. 849. S. Car. laws of 1896, legal- 57 Pac. 571. izing elections, held void in Cudd v. ''" Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of Calvert, 54 S. C. 457; s. c. 32 S. E. Newton (N. J.), 45 Atl. 596. 503. There is no power to become "■'■ Commissioners &c. v. Village of stockholder in a corporation except East Peoria, 75 111. App. 450. on vote of three-fourths of voters ^'- Wisconsin Keeley Inst. Co. v. participating, in Tennessee, since Milwaukee Co., 95 Wis. 153; s. c. 70 adoption of constitution of 1870: N. W. 68; 36 L. R. A. 55. Fidelity &c. Co. v. Lawrence Co., '" Whiting v. Sheboygan &c. R. 92 Fed. 576; s. c. 34 C. C. A. 553. W. Co., 25 Wis. 167, 187; State v. Tap- Va. code 1891, ch. 39, construed with pan, 29 Wis. 664; Attorney-General reference to aid to railroads: Neale v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400, v. County Court &c., 43 W. Va. 90; s. 436. See Curtis v. Whipple. 24 Wis. c. 27 S. E. 370. An act of Kan. 1887, 350. Under N. Y. Const. 1877, a mu- ch. 114, authorizing counties and in- nicipality can not pay money to corporated cities to subscribe for charitable institutions wholly or stock, develop coal, natural gas, etc., partly under private control for the unconstitutional : Vail v. City of At- benefit of any inmate not therein tica, 8 Kan. App. 668; s. c. 57 Pac. pursuant to the rules of the state 137. board of charities: People v. Comp- ''« Fisher v. Bountiful City, 21 troller &c., 42 N. Y. S. 657; s. c. 11 Utah 29; s. c. 59 Pac. 520. App. Div. (N. Y.) 114. 611 EXPRESS CORPORATE POWERS. § G27 § 627. Miscellaneous. — Under the power to "regulate" a city coun- cil ma}^ prohibit "the burial of the dead" within the city limits.^''* A city charter authorizing the city "to erect, repair and regulate public wharves and docks, and fix the rates of wharfage thereat," has been held not to give the city power to create a harbor or to im- prove one by obtaining an increased supply of water.^^^ The power to fill up slips is not given to cities by an act authorizing cities to con- struct and keep in repair canals and slips for the accommodation of commerce. ^^^ County commissioners are not empowered to order the payment of attorneys' fees for services rendered to the petitioners for gravel roads under a statute which provided that "the cost and expense of the preliminary survey, proceedings and report of the improvement shall be paid out of the county treasury, and be refunded, as well as all other amounts advanced by the county for the prelimi- nary expense of such improvement. ^^^ Although the statute pro- vides for the election of a city attorney, the mayor and council of a municipal corporation may employ counsel to commence and prose- cute suits for violations of city ordinances in case of vacancy in the office of city attorney.^"^ Where the corporate existence is at stake the municipality has power to employ counsel to defend.^^^ Where the constitution prohibits the legislature from passing any special acts conferring corporate powers, an act providing for the govern- ment management and control of fire- and police-departments in cities having a population of over forty thousand is a special act and void.^^° An agreement by which an ordinance is permitted to be violated at pleasure, made by a city council and giving assur- ance against prosecution by future councils, is a nullity.^*^ The board of aldermen can not validate a claim which arises under a void con- tract. ^^^ A person can not by lapse of time acquire a vested right under an illegal permit.^^^ Where there is no lien to contractors 5'* People V. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68; ='' Board «S:c. v. Cole, 2 Ind. App. s. c. 29 N. E. 7. See also, Cronin v. 475; s. c. 28 N. E. 772. People, 82 N. Y. 318; Corporation ^'* City of Roodhouse v. Jennings, &c. V. Mayor &c., 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 538; 29 111. App. 50. Coates V. Mayor &c., 7 Cow. (N. Y.) ^^' Village of Harvey v. Wilson, 78 585; In re Ryers, 72 N. Y. 1. 111. App. 544. ""Spengler V. Trowbridge, 62 Miss. ='" State v. Downs, 60 Kan. 788; s. 46, where it was held that the pay- c. 57 Pac. 962. ment from the city treasury of mon- '''' City of Marshall v. Cleveland ey for expenses of persons to go to &c. R. Co., 80 111. App. 531. Washington City to influence con- ^'- Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. gressional action to that end should 119; s. c. 57 Pac. 777. have been enjoined. '*' City of Brooklyn v. Furey, 30 ^«Ligare v. City of Chicago, 139 N. Y. S. 349; s. c. 61 N. Y. St. 287. 111. 46; s. c. 28 N. E. 934. § 627 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 613 or subcontractors given on public buildings and no right of attachment of money in the hands of the city, the city can not provide a new rem- edy by attachment or trust in favor of subcontractors on money due from the city to the contractor. ^'^^ Where the city council is sole judge of the election returns and qualification of its members, and after investigation it seats a member, a subsequent council can not review its action.^ ^^ An ordinance providing for the sale of im- pounded animals is invalid if it does not provide for a judicial de- termination of the question of violation,^ -'^ The city has no power to compel a citizen to buy material from it for connecting with its sewer- age or pay for the work of making such connection.^^^ From the fact that a municipality has power to levy taxes, acquire sites and construct such levees as are required by the public, it does not follow that it must exercise that authority in protecting low lands from overflow by natural watercourses.^*^ Statutory power to establish, alter, widen, extend and vacate public parks and grounds does not authorize the construction of a county court-house in one of its parks.^^^ The legislature may confirm and ratify corporate acts which are void by reason of the law being unconstitutional.^"*' A city may require insurance companies to pay two per cent, of their premiums to it for the use of the fire-department. It is not a license tax, as it does not grant permission to do business.^"^ It is an invasion of personal lib- erty to make it a penal offense to knowingly and unlawfully associate with persons having the reputation of thieves. ^"^ ^'^^ Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. St. 268; ="«" Mclntyre v. B6ard &c., 15 Colo. s. c. 43 Atl. 959. App. 78; s. c. 61 Pac. 237. =>'= State V. City of Camden, 63 N. «'" State v. Winter, 15 Wash. 407; J. L. 186; s. c. 42 Atl. 848. s. c. 46 Pac. 644. ^^ Armstrong v. Brown, 20 Ky. L. ^^ Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. City of 1766; s. c. 50 S. W. 17. Peoria, 156 111. 420; s. c. 40 N. E. =^^ Slaughter v. O'Berry, 126 N. C. 967. 181; s. c. 35 S. B. 241. ='^- City of St. Louis v. Roche, 128 ='«»City of Hamilton v. Ashbrook, Mo. 541; s. c. 31 S. W. 915. 62 Ohio St. 511; s. c. 57 N. E. 239. CHAPTER XVI. ULTRA VIRES. Section 628. General statement of the rule. 629. Purchase of land for use of a railroad. 630. Illustrations of the general rule. 631. Grant of power to regulate highways construed. 632. Contracts for exclusive privi- leges in highways. 633. Strictly official duties not to be confided to non-official per- sons. 634. Police ordinances — Wooden buildings. 635. The same subject continued — Railroad crossings. 636. The same subject continued — Markets, etc. 637. Donations. 638. The same subject continued. 639. Subscribing to stock of rail- roads. 640. City council as judge of elec- tions. 641. Governing authorities of school districts. The same subject continued. Purchase of real estate for school purposes — Texas rul- ing. Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits. Diversion of lands dedicated to public uses. 646. Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls. Appropriations for highways and school-buildings. 642. 643. 644. 645. 647. Section 648. Power to purchase realty does not authorize giving notes. 649. Work on public buildings, etc. 650. Issuing of bonds. 651. The same subject continued — Municipal aid. 652. The same subject continued — Public improvements. 653. Contracts abrogating control of streets. 654. General legislation — Offers of rewards. 655. Contracts for water supply. 656. The same subject continued. 657. Contracts for lighting streets. 658. Grant of exclusive privileges. 659. Curative legislation. 660. Ratification. 661. Estoppel. 662. Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notice. 663. Corporations may contest ultra- vires contracts. 664. Liability upon ultra-vires con- tracts. 665. The same subject continued. 666. Ultra vires, when not a defense to actions by the corporation. 667. Taxpay^ers' resistance. 668. Taxpayers' suits. 669. The same subject continued. 670. Suits to restrain the enforce- ment of contracts. 671. Injunction the proper remedy. 672. The same subject continued. § 628. General statement of the rule. — Acts of municipal corpora- tions which are clone without power expressly granted, or fairly to be (613) § 628 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 614 iniplicd from the powers granted or incident to the purposes of their creation, are ultra vires. So, also, are acts of the otticers of such cor- porations which are done without the prescribed preliminaries to ac- tion, which are conditions precedent to their being authorized. So, also, are the acts which are specially prohibited to them by statute, or where for special reasons the power to do such acts in general is withdrawn from them in particular instances. It was held that there was no power in a city council to authorize one whose term as mayor had expired to sign bonds as of a date during his term of office.^ ^Coler V. Cleburne, 131 U. S. 162; s. c. 9 S. Ct. 720. The statute pro- vided that the bonds should be signed by the mayor. "This clearly means that they shall be signed by the person who is mayor of the city when they are signe^, and not by any other person," said Justice Blatchford. In State v. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. 437; s. c. 24 Atl. 571, it was held that a resolution of the board of aldermen to publish, under a statute requiring it, the names, residences and places of business of persons applying for licenses to sell liquors, in a German newspaper, was void. The presumptions in such a case, where there is no express inti- mation in the statute as to the lan- guage in which the notice is to be given or the newspaper is to be printed, are that the legislature de- signed the notice to be published in the same language as the newspaper itself (see State v. Mayor &c., 54 N. J. L. Ill; s. c. 22 Atl. 1004), and that the notice was to be given in the ordinary language of the state (see Road in Upper Hanover, 44 Pa. St. 277), and requires the notice to be given in English, in a newspaper printed in the same tongue. The court also sustained a taxpayer's right to intervene by certiorari to prevent this as an illegal expendi- ture of municipal funds, deficiencies in which must be made up by gen- eral taxation. In Citizens' Gas &c. Co. V. Town of Elwood, 114 Ind. 332; s. c. 16 N. E. 624, it was held that the Indiana act of 1887, p. 36 (Burns R. S. Ind. 1901, § 4306), with ref- erence to natural-gas companies, forbade the grant of special privi- leges by special contract or license to any company; and that under the rules of common law as well as un- der the provisions of the statute, the subject of supplying towns and cities with natural gas must be regulated by a general ordinance, and that the ordinance must not unfairly dis- criminate between competing com- panies. The ordinance must be gen- eral in its nature and impartial in its operation. See also, Graffty v. City of Rushville, 107 Ind. 502; s. c. 8 N. E. 109; Whyte v. Mayor, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 364; City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111. 90; Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 111. 405; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. 322. In State v. Baxter, 50 Ark. 447; s. c. 8 S. W. 188, it was held that under Mansfield's Digest of Arkansas, § 1407, allowing county courts to dispose of real and per- sonal property belonging to the county and appropriate the proceeds to the county's use, such courts are trustees of the county; and where it appears that land donated by con- gress to a county for public build- ings was leased by such court for ninety-nine years, without regard to the statute requiring that sales of county lands should be by a com- missioner appointed by the county court, and without advertising that the land was to be leased to persons 615 ULTRA VIRES. 629 § 629. Purchase of land for use of a railroad. — The purchase of land by a town for the use of a railroad for a right of way, though ostensibly for a public street, is ultra vires,^^ and the purchase price can not be collected by one having knowledge of the facts and aiding in the transaction.- paying an inadequate consideration therefor, such lease may be set aside by the county on the ground of fraud. See also, Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309; United States v. Arre- dondo, 6 Pet. 691; § 743, post. ^a Strahan v. Town of Malvern, 77 Iowa 454; s. c. 42 N. W. 369. In Huesing v. City of Rock Island, 128 111. 465; s. c. 21 N. E. 558, it was held that while under paragraphs 83 and 84 of § 1, art. 5, of the general incor- poration law of Illinois, there is con- ferred upon cities and villages power to prohibit slaughter-houses or any unwholesome business or establish- ments within the incorporation, and the common council may regulate by appropriate ordinance the loca- tion of unwholesome business, and may cleanse, abate or remove the same, this power does not authorize appropriating public funds for the erection and maintenance of a pub- lic slaughter-house. In City of St. Louis V. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623; s. c. 10 S. W. 197, it was held that the power to regulate charges for telephone service was neither in- cluded in nor incidental to the power to regulate the uses of the streets; and that while the city, under that provision of its charter which gave the mayor and assembly power to license, tax and regulate "telegraph companies as corporations, etc., . . . and all other business, trades, avocations or professions whatever," had the power to make police regula- tions as to the mode in which the business of telephone companies shall be exercised, it did not derive therefrom any power to pass the or- dinance regulating charges for the service; nor could it do the same under the general-welfare clause of its charter as to maintaining peace, good government, health or welfare of the city. See also. City of St. Louis V. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559; City of St. Louis V. Herthel, 88 Mo. 128. In Tilyou v. Town of Gravesend, 104 N. Y. 356; s. c. 10 N. E. 542, 543. it was shown that a resolution was passed at a town meeting providing that the common lands of the town should be let only at public auction after notice, and that no lot should be let at a time more than one year prior to th-e expiration of any exist- ing lease thereon, and providing for compensation to be made by incom- ing to outgoing tenants in case a lot previously under lease should be let to another than the former lessee. A later resolution amended the for- mer one by adding thereto that the commissioners were "also authorized to renew any existing lease . . . upon terms as they may deem most advantageous for said town." It was held that the amendment did not au- thorize the renewal of a lease before the last year of the unexpired lease. In Millsaps v. Mayor &c., 37 La. An. 641, it was held that in the absence of special authority given in its charter or by statute a municipal corporation had no power to lease a ferry. Municipal corporations can not legally contract debts for imag- inary necessities or real conveni- ences. They are not permitted to exercise powers not specially dele- gated to them in their charters un- less such powers are incident to those granted or flow from them by necessary implication. See also, Lisso V. Parish of Red River, 29 La. An. 590. = Mt. Adams &c. R. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 25 Wkly. Law Bull. 91. § C30 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. G16 ^ 630. Illustrations of the general rule. — In Ohio a municipal corporation has no power to borrow money except in conformity with the statute which provides that "all bonds issued under authority of this chapter shall express upon their face the purpose for which they were issued and under what ordinance," and that such bonds shall be advertised and sold at auction to the highest bidder. There- fore a contract by a city to levy an assessment to repay money ad- vanced by an individual has been held to be void.^^ A municipal cor- poration organized under the general statutes of Alabama has been held not liable in an action against it for services rendered as cap- tain of a quarantine guard under a contract made with the intendant.^ A municipal corporation can not any more than any other corporation or private person escape the taxes due on its property, whether ac- quired legally or illegally, and it can not make its want of legal authority to engage in a particular transaction or business a shelter from the taxation imposed by the government on such business or transaction by whomsoever conducted.* In New Hampshire it has been held that as a town has possession of the volumes of New Hamp- shire reports, statutes, pamphlet laws, and other books and docu- ments by law distributed to the several towns for the use of its inhabitants, and to enable them and its officers to become informed of the laws and official business of the state, it has no power nor can its selectmen lawfully make any disposition or use of the books incon- sistent with that object.^ ^a Mt. Adams &c. R. Co. v. City of count of liquors distilled by the city; Cincinnati, 25 Wkly. L. Bui. (Ohio) the city basing its right to recover 91. upon the claim that as it had no ^ New Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala. power to engage in this business it 432; s. c. 7 So. 838. These general was not legally bound to pay the statutes neither gave the town au- taxes. See also, McCready v. Guard- thorities expressly the power to ians &c., 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 94. make quarantine regulations, nor ^ Litchfield v. Parker, 64 N. H. 443; could such power be implied; neither s. c. 14 Atl. 725— an action to test was it incident to the power granted the right of an attorney in another or the objects and purposes of the town to retain those books for his corporation. Therefore, the contract own use by au arrangement he had of employment of a guard was an made with the selectmen. In City act ultra vires, and not binding upon of Fort Wayne v. Shoaff, 106 Ind. the town; and an attempt to ratify 66; s. c. 5 N. B. 403, it was held that the contract of the intendant was the common council of the city had also futile. no jurisdiction to assess the cost of * Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 improving property owned by the U. S. 256; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1055 — an ac- city for market purposes upon ad- tion instituted by the city to recover joining property-owners, the juris- taxes which it claimed to have paid diction in such matters extending under protest to a collector of United only to streets and alleys, and not to States internal-revenue taxes on ac- property owned by the city for other 617 ULTRA VIRES. 631 § 631. Grant of power to regulate highways construed. — A city has no power through its city council to prohibit circulating, distrib- uting or giving away circulars, hand-bills or advertising-cards of any description in or upon any of its public streets or alleys, as it is neither expressly conferred nor to be fairly implied from a charter providing for cleaning the highways, for the prevention of obstruc- tions thereon, and conferring power to regulate their use.® municipal purposes. Therefore the proceedings here were void, and in- junction was the appropriate rem- edy. See also, Goring v. McTaggart, 92 Ind. 200; Wilson v. Poole, 33 Ind. 443. The provisions of a contract- or's bond that he shall pay for all labor and material for city work, and comply with a certain ordinance for the protection of subcontractors, is not ultra vires on the part of the city: Philadelphia v. Stewart, 195 Pa. St. 309; s. c. 45 Atl. 1056. Appro- priations to charitable institutions are not based on a contract express or implied and are ultra vires: State V. City of New Orleans, 50 La. An. 880; s. c. 24 So. 666. '^ People V. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288; s. c. 41 N. W. 275. In State v. Johnson, 41 Minn. Ill; s. c. 42 N. W. 786, it was held that a charter which authorized the city council by the proper ordinance to restrain the run- ning at large of cattle and other domestic animals within the city limits did not authorize an ordi- nance providing a penalty for tres- passes committed by herdsmen and stock-owners in herding their cattle upon the lands of private owners. In State v. Hammond, 40 Minn. 43; s. c. 41 N. W. 243, an ordinance of a city imposing a penalty upon "any person who commits any act of lewd- ness or indecency within the limits of said city" was held to be void as in excess of the power vested in the city council by the city charter. The power to enact this ordinance, it was claimed, was conferred by the section which authorized the passage of ordinances "for the government and good order of the city, for the suppression of vice and intemper- ance, and for the prevention of crime;" and "to prevent open or no- torious drunkenness and obscenity in the streets or public places of this city." The court said: — "[These sections of the charter refer] only to such [acts] as may affect the pub- lic peace, decency and good order; and do not authorize punishment for private conduct, however reprehen- sible it may be in the matter of morals." In State v. Mayor &c., 52 N. J. L. 65; s. c. 18 Atl. 586, 696, it was held that the common council of that city, under its power to pass ordinances to regulate or prevent the use of streets for any other pur- poses than public travel, had no power by ordinance to confer upon a railroad company a right to occupy exclusively twelve feet of a street by the erection thereon of a freight- platform and roof. This was an ap- propriation of the public highway to private interests, of which Justice Van Syckle, in State v. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. J. L. 79, thus speaks: — "An appropriation of [streets] to private individual uses, from which the public derived no convenience, benefit or accommodation, is not a regulation but a perversion of them from their lawful purposes, and can not be regarded as an execution of the trust imposed in the city author- ities." So in Metropolitan &c. Co. V. Newton. 4 N. Y. S. 593; s. c. 51 Hun (N. Y.) 639, it was held that the common council had no power § 632 PUBLIC COKPOUATIONS. 618 § 632. Contracts for exclusive privileges in highways. — A mu- nicipal corporation can bind itself only by such contracts as it is by statute authorized to make. It has no power to grant exclusive privileges to put mains, pipes and hydrants in its streets, nor can it lawfully by contract deny to itself the right to exercise the legisla- tive powers vested in its common council.'^ Public policy will not permit the inference of authority to make a contract inconsistent with the continuously operative duty to make such by-laws, rules and regu- lations as the public interest or welfare of a city may require. '^^ to appropriate any portion of any street to private use to the exclusion of the public, and a license from the council to use and occupy a street for amusement purposes was void. ' Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167; s. c. 22 N. E. 381; 5 L. R. A. 546; 26 N. Y. St. 364; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 307. •aMilhau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; Mayor &c. v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261; Richmond Co. &c. Co. v. Town of Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228; Gale V. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; s. c. 9 Am. R. 80; Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa 524; s. c. 22 Am. R. 261; Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 44 Iowa 505; s. c. 24 Am. R. 756; Norwich &c. Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19. In School Dist. v. Sullivan, 48 Kan. 624; s. c. 29 Pac. 1141, it was held that a con- tract for building a schoolhouse, void because made by only one mem- ber of the school board, may be rati- fied and made binding by the action of the school district in completing the building left unfinished by an absconding contractor, by the fur- nishing the same with seats, desks and other necessary schoolhouse furniture, by occupying the same for school purposes and by insuring the same. In Widner v. State, 49 Ark. 172; s. c. 4 S. W. 657, it was held that the school directors have no power to authorize the cutting of timber from school lands. In Fluty V. School Dist, 49 Ark. 94; s. c. 4 S. W. 278, a contract made with the directors of the school district for building a schoolhouse under au- thority conferred at a special meet- ing of the electors of the district held in June was held to be void, and no recovery could be had upon it because they had no power to build a schoolhouse under the statutes unless authorized to do so by the annual meeting on the third Saturday in May: Mansf. Dig. Ark., §§ 6197, 6199, 6210, 6213, 6223. See also, Argenti v. City of San Fran- cisco, 16 Cal. 255; s. c. Field Ultra Vires 352. In Everts v. District Tp. &c., 77 Iowa 37; s. c. 41 N. W. 478, it was held that if a school board exceeded its powers in making a contract the action of the electors in authorizing a settlement of the con- troversy growing out of it was a ratification of their act, and the di- rection of a verdict against the dis- trict for the amount agreed to be paid by the compromise settlement was sustained. In Buchanan v. School District, 25 Mo. App. 85, the court held that the directors of a- school district of a town, incorpo- rated under the school law, should be enjoined from changing the site of a schoolhouse or from building a new schoolhouse on a new site without having first obtained the sanction of the voters at an election held therefor under the law, that being the sole mode in which it could be done. See also, Newmeyer V. Missouri &c. R. Co., 52 Mo. 81; Ranney v. Bader, 67 Mo. 476, 479; Ruby V. Shain, 54 Mo. 207. 619 ULTRA VIKES. 633 § 633. Strictly official duties not to be confided to non-official per- sons. — A contract made by a municipal corporation with one of its officers for the collection of taxes in arrears during an indefinite period, under terms which are onerous to the corporation, is ultra vires when the corporation relieves one of its officers from the duty of collection, which is one of his functions without additional pay.* A city charter authorized the council to make ordinances for certain purposes, and to "make any other by-laws and regulations which may seem for the well-being of said city," with "power to provide for the appointment or election of all necessary officers for the good govern- ment of the city not otherwise provided for," etc. It was held that a city council could not deprive a board of supervisors of the power of determining when they would choose one of themselves clerk of the board. ^ § 634. Police ordinances — Wooden buildings. — An ordinance of a city prohibiting the owners of a wooden building within the fire-limits from repairing the roof with the same materials with which it was covered at the date of the passage of the ordinance has been held void, as being ultra vires, and not enforceable. ^'^ * Gurley v. City of New Orleans, 41 La. An. 75; s. c. 5 So. 659. » Weeks v. Dennett, 62 N. H. 2. This incidental power was left to the discretion of the board of assessors by the legislature and can not be controlled by the city. In Dickinson Hardware Co. v. Pulaski Co., 55 Ark. 437; s. c. 18 S. W. 462, it was held that the county was not liable on an order of the county judge guaran- teeing payment for goods to be sold a person who had a contract for the ..construction of a turnpike for the county. He had no power to give such a guaranty. In Sexton v. Cook Co., 114 111. 174; s. c. 28 N. E. 608, it was held that where a county board, in the exercise of the power which it has to clothe its officers, or agents, or committees, by resolution X)r vote, with power to act for it, by resolution directed a party to build so much of the dome of a court- house in process of erection as was necessary to inclose the building, under the architect's supervision and subject to his valuation of the same, the architect under this resolution had authority only to supervise the work directed to be done and make a schedule of prices for the same, and that any order of the architect for work outside of the terms of the resolution was not binding on the county: Dillon Munic. Corp., § 450; Rice V. Plymouth Co., 43 Iowa 136; Bouton V. Board &c., 84 111. 384. '"State V. Schuchardt, 42 La. An. 4,9; s. c. 7 So. 67. The court said: — "Now the power in a municipal cor- poration to control the owners of property within its limits in using or building their property in the manner different from their inclina- tion, desire or convenience, can not be ranked among the implied and incidental powers which such corpo- rations may exercise in the absence of express legislative mandate. It if a useful power, presumably neces- sary to provide for the greatest good of the greatest number; but it is at the same time a power in derogation G35 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, G20 § 635. The same subject continued — Railroad crossings. — A mu- nicipal corporation has not the power by ordinance to compel a rail- road company to maintain at a street crossing within the corporate of common right, and unless it be expressly conferred it will never be presumed to exist." See also, Suc- cession of Irwin, 33 La. An. 63. In Coonley v. City of Albany, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 327; s. c. 32 N. Y. St. 411; 10 N. Y. S. 512, it was held that an ordinance of the city council with leference to boats sunken at the dock, wharf, slip or anywhere in the Hudson river opposite the city of Albany, so far as it authorized a sale of the boat in a certain contin- gency was ultra vires, as the city was only authorized to enforce its ordinances by ordinary penalties for their violation. See also. Hart V. Mayor &c., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 571. In Hoey v. Gilroy, 37 N. Y. St. 754; s. c. 14 N. Y. S. 159, an iron awning one hundred and ten feet long, sup- ported by Iron pillars placed along the inside of the curbstone, the roof being ten feet above the sidewalk, was held to be essentially a perma- nent structure, and an unlawful en- croachment upon the highway, as the common council of the city of New York had no power under the consolidation act to authorize the erection or maintenance of such a structure. In Trenor v. Jackson, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 115, Mon- ell, J., said: — "It is claimed that the power given by the charter to pass ordinances for the regulation of the use of the sidewalks for awnings, etc., necessarily implies a power to allow or permit the continuance of awnings by individuals for private purposes. The difficulty in the posi- tion is that, even if it was competent for the legislature to give such pow- er, it is not given in express terms, and being subversive of clear public right it can not and should not be Implied. It is, I think, very clear that a trust, created by law for a strictly public purpose, can not be diverted from such purpose and con- verted into a private use. But, even if it can be at all, it must be done by express enactment and never can be inferred from or as being incidental to other powers." See also, People V. Mallory, 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 281; Kingsland v. Mayor &c., 110 N. Y. 569; s. c. 18 N. E. 435; 18 N. Y. St. 701; People v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 150; s. c. 22 N. E. 1026; 27 N. Y. St. 153; Farrell v. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. St. 12; s. c. 5 N. Y. S. 672; s. c. affirmed in 22 N. Y. St. 469; 5 N. Y. S. 580; People v. Mayor, 18 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 123; Ely v. Camp- bell, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 333; People V. Mayor, 59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 277; Story V. New York &c. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Lahr v. Metropolitan &c. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 268; s. e. 10 N. E. 528. In Turner v. Mayor &c., 78 Ga. 683; s. c. 3 S. E. 649, it was held that after the passage of an act prohibit- ing the sale of spirituous or malt liquors in the county in which the city was situate, a section of which provided "that the provisions of this act shall not prevent practicing phy- sicians furnishing liquors them- selves as medicines to the patients under treatment by them," the mayor and council of the town had no authority to pass an ordinance directing that all physicians prac- ticing medicine therein should make monthly returns to the council, giv- ing a monthly statement of their business, and for whom they fur- nished liquor, and providing a pen- alty for failing to comply with such ordinances. All power under the charter of the town as to regulating the liquor traffic was taken from it by the general law prohibiting its 621 ULTRA VIRES. 635 limits a watchman for the purpose of giving warning to passers-by of the approach of trains.^^ sale. Besides, its power under the charter to regulate barrooms and saloons did not include the power to regulate physicians and require returns from them as to their prac- tice and to whom they furnished liquors. At the same time the court held there was no error in refusing the writ of prohibition, as there was a remedy by a defense before the mayor and council, and if adverse to the petitioners a writ of certiorari was their right to review the case. " Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118; s. c. 12 N. E. 445, this not being a power which may be im- plied as essential to carry into ef- fect those expressly granted, and not being expressly granted to the cor- poration. In Grand Rapids &c. Co. V. Grand Rapids &c. Co., 33 Fed. 659, it was held that an ordinance grant- ing exclusive vise of the streets for wires and poles for electric lights for fifteen years was ultra vires and void. The city charter which gave the council power to make, amend and repeal any ordinance deemed desirable for lighting the streets and taking charge of them did not confer in express terms exclusive power over them, and it did not give the city, by implication, control of the streets to the exclusion of the sov- ereign power of the state. In James V. City of Darlington, 71 Wis. 173; s. c. 36 N. W. 834, an ordinance va- cating a street at a certain point without first having a petition of the lot-owners at that point in favor of it, and posting notice as required by the statute conferring the power to vacate streets, was held to be invalid and ineffectual; that without those preliminary steps there was no ju- risdiction or power in the council to vacate the street. In City of Bur- lington V. Dankwardt, 73 Iowa 170; s. c. 34 N. W. 801, it was held that the passage of an ordinance to pre- vent the pedling of meats in the streets of the city was beyond the powers of the city authorities — they not being entitled to go beyond the power given by statute to estal;)lish and regulate markets. In City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298; s. c. 31 N. W. 49, it was held that an ordinance passed by the city council, declaring the emission of dense smoke from smokestacks and chim- neys a public nuisance, was unau- thorized and void, as the charter of the city conferred no power upon the city council to declare what acts or omissions should constitute a nui- sance; distinguishing Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 111. 400, 411. In City of Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 598; s. c. 10 N. E. 464, it was held that in passing an ordinance as fol- lows: "No person shall erect, alter or rebuild, or essentially change any building or any part thereof, for any purpose other than a dwelling-house, without first obtaining in writing a permit from the board of aldermen. The application for such permit shall specify the location and size of the building, the material of which it is to be constructed, and the use for which it is intended," — the gov- erning authorities exceeded the pow- ers conferred upon the city by the legislature and imposed unauthor- ized restrictions upon the right of the citizen to the use of his prop- erty. The ordinance was broader in its scope than the statute providing that any city or town except Boston "may, for the prevention of fire and the preservation of life, by ordi- nances or by-laws not repugnant to law and applicable throughout the whole or any defined part of its ter- ritory, regulate the inspection, ma- § 636 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 632 § 636. The same subject continued — Markets, etc. — Under a stat- ute granting to the mayor and council tlio ''power to erect and regu- late markets," and providing that "the mayor and city council may lease, sell or dispose of the stalls and stands in any market in any manner and for any term they may think proper," the governing power of a city can not set apart by ordinance a certain portion of the market for the sale of any class of products — as various kinds of fish — and require a license fee to be paid by every one before engaging in that business in the market. ^^ An ordinance of a city to compel a bridge company to sell one hundred tickets for $1, according to its contract with the corporation, was held void as not relating to the morals, health or safety of the people. ^^ A provision in an act of a legislature conferring the power on a city council to "license, tax and regulate grocers, merchants, retailers," etc., confers no power to prohibit the sale of liquors.^^ § 637. Donations. — A county has no power to donate its lands to a railroad company in consideration of its constructing a railroad through the county. And the legislature having no power to au- thorize such a donation in the first instance can not by a subsequent statute validate a conveyance of lands in pursuance of such a dona- tion. ^^ A town council has no power to appropriate funds of the terials, construction, alteration and the power to regulate the markets use of buildings and other struc- was held to intend to give reason- tures within its limits," under able police powers with reference which statute it was claimed the thereto. The taxing power belongs city had such power. to the legislature, and it will not be '^ State v. Rowe, 72 Md. 548; s. c. held as conferred on a municipal 20 Atl. 179. This was an effort to corporation unless it be by express raise revenue under the guise of ex- and unequivocal language, or by ercising the police power, and the necessary implication, ordinance was, therefore, void. Un- " City of Newport v. Newport &c. der the rule in Van Sant v. Harlem Co., 90 Ky. 193; s. c. 13 S. W. 720; Stage Co., 59 Md. 330, which was that 12 Ky. L. 39; 8 L. R. A. 484; 29 Am. "if under the guise of licensing and & Eng. Corp. Cas. 491. Passing the regulating, the municipal corpora- ordinance was not an exercise of tlon should attempt to raise revenue police power but related merely to or clearly violate the rule requiring a contract in respect to a financial a reasonable exercise of its powers, matter. the courts will declare such ordi- "Ex parte Reynolds, 87 Ala. 138; nances unlawful and void," the court s. c. 6 So. 335; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. in State v. Rowe, supra, construed Cas. 1. See also, Miller v. Jones, 80 the statutes to give to the city an- Ala. 89. thorities as the owners of the mar- ^= Ellis v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 77 ket-houses the power only of selling Wis. 114; s. c. 45 N. W. 811. See and leasing the stalls in their build- also, Whiting v. Sheboygan &c. R. ings as they may judge best; and Co., 25 Wis. 167, holding that the 633 ULTRA VIRES. 638 town to aid in building a county court-house therein. ^^* A town can not ratify and validate what it lias previously done without authority, and what is absolutely void for that reason.^" It is not within the power of a city to^ bind itself by contract either to forbear to impose taxes or to impose them under certain given limitations or on certain conditions.^*'^ § 638. The same subject continued. — A city has no power to con- vey its real estate to the county in which it is located, in consideration power of taxation could not be ex- erted to raise money for the pur- pose of donating it to a railroad company, even when the legislature authorized it. Approved in Phillips V. Town of Albany, 28 Wis. 340; Ro- gan V. City of Watertown, 30 Wis. 259; Bound v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 45 Wis. 543. The court in Ellis V. Northern Pac. R. Co., supra, re- ferring to the Whiting case, supra, said:— "In that case the county au- thorities were restrained from issu- ing negotiable securities, which cre- ated a county debt to be paid by tax- ation, though the court had, upon the strength of adjudications elsewhere, sustained the validity of municipal subscriptions to the stock of railroad corporations. But such subscrip- tions were sustained solely on the ground that their validity had been affirmed by many of the highest and most respectable courts in the land, and such vast pecuniary interests had become involved and were de- pendent upon these decisions that the court felt bound to follow them while regarding as unsound the principle which they laid down. And while the distinction between a stock subscription and the donation or other appropriation of public money or corporate property to a railroad corporation is not very dis- tinct and obvious, yet we are un- willing to extend a bad rule of law a particle beyond where the courts had carried it, and shall, therefore, adhere to the doctrine of the Whit- ing case." ^=a Russell V. Tate, 52 Ark. 541; s. c. 13 S. W. 130; 7 L. R. A. 180. '" Dullanty v. Town of Vaughn, 77 Wis. 38; s. c. 45 N. W. 1128. '"a Augusta Factory v. City Coun- cil &c., 83 Ga. 734; s. c. 10 S. E. 359. See also, State v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 208; Mack v. Jones, 21 N. H. 393; Cooley Taxation 200; Desty Taxation 466. In Gray v. Baynard, 5 Del. Ch. 499, it was held that while the legislature had con- ferred upon the city council of Wil- mington very full powers touching its public streets, it was not compe- tent for the city council to author- ize the erection of a private building in such a manner as to create a pub- lic nuisance. In Snyder Tp. v. Bovaird, 122 Pa. St. 442; s. c. 15 Atl. 910; 22 W. N. C. (Pa.) 563, it was held that the supervisors of a town- ship have no power to give to the assignee of a township order a new order in his own name as a substi- tute for the old one. In State v. Harris, 96 Mo. 29; s. c. 8 S. W. 794, it was held that a subscription to stock of a railroad company by a county court for the county, where it appeared that two-thirds of the qualified voters of the county, at a regular or special election, had not assented to such subscription, which was required by general statutes of Missouri, 1865, p. 338, § 17, to au- thorize such subscription, was with- out authority and void. County courts in this state are only the agents of the counties. S G39 PUBLIC CORrOEATIONS. 621 of the location of the county-seat in such city.^'^ A municipal cor- poration can not incur a liability and levy and collect taxes on the property of a citizen to aid in the development of mere private en- terprises.^^ § 639. Subscribing to stock of railroads. — Acts authorizing appro- priations l)y towns and cities as aid to railroad corporations in con- sideration of their constructing the roads through their limits if approved by a majority of the electors of the town or city, but also requiring the authorities of the corporation "to levy and collect a tax and make such provisions as may be necessary and proper for the prompt payment of the appropriation," neither expressly nor by impli- cation invest such corporations with the power to issue commercial " Brockman v. City of Creston, 79 Iowa 587; s. c. 44 N. W. 822; 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 69. The rule is thus stated by the Iowa court: — "[Cities] have power to dispose of their real property for purposes au- thorized by law and for no other purpose. The purpose of the dispo- sition of lands deterniines the ques- tion of authority. A city may sell its lands when its interests require that they be sold; but it possesses no authority to give away, or to convey without consideration, or for a purpose which it has no authority to advance, any of its property." See also. District Tp. v. Thomas, 59 Iowa 50; s. c. 12 N. W. 767. ^"Maher v. City of Ottawa, 114 111. 659; s. c. 3 N. E. 216; 2 West. R. 46, holding that the city had no pow- er to incur a debt and issue bonds, and levy and collect taxes for the payment of bonds issued to raise money to build a dam across a river within its limits, for the purpose of introducing the water of such river into the city, with the view of de- veloping the natural advantages of the city for manufacturing pur- poses. See also, as to such power being confined to corporate pur- poses, Johnson v. Campbell, 49 111. 316; Harward v. St, Clair &c. Co., 51 111. 130; County Court v. People, 58 111. 456; People v. Du Puyt, 71 111. 651, 653; Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 111. 75 (where the court said: — "All will perceive that the building of our court-houses, jails, poor- houses, the opening and keeping in repair of common highways, and the erection and maintenance of bridges, by which they are rendered useful to the people, are 'county purposes' for which the people of the county may be taxed; and that the erection of hotels, mercantile, manufactur- ing, trading and banking houses, al- though of great importance to the prosperity of the community, are not such purposes as were contem- plated by the constitution. These are properly regarded as matters of in- dividual enterprise and can not, in any reasonable or just sense, be re- garded as public or county pur- poses"); Bissell V. City of Kanka- kee, 64 111. 249 (holding city bonds issued to aid a company so as to en- able it to embark in the manufac- ture of linen fabrics in the city to be void); English v. People, 96 111. 566 (holding that a city tax levied to pay bonds issued in aid of a man- ufacturing company could not be enforced); Ohio Val. I. Works v. Moundsville, 11 W. Va. 1; Loan Ass'n V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. In Ottawa V. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 361; 27 L. ed. 669, the bonds were held to be void. 625 ULTRA VIRES. 640 paper in payment of an appropriation so voted.^^ The adoption of the constitution of 1870 in Illinois, which provides that "no county, city, township or other municipality shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donations to or loan its credit in aid of such corporations," withdrew from municipal corporations all power to subscribe to stock or make donations except in cases where they had before its adoption, as the law then existed, been authorized to do so by a vote of the people of such municipalities. In that case they could complete the mat- ter.^" § 640. City council as judge of elections. — A statute describing the duties and powers of a city council, declaring that it shall "be the judge of the election and qualification of its own members," does not confer upon such council the power to hear and determine a contest of an election for the city marshalship ; nor does it include the power to enact ordinances for such purpose. ^^ 1^ Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 937, holding bonds issued by the town invalid. See also, Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 406; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 489; Wells V. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 625, 631, 632; Ogden v. Daviess Co., 102 U. S. 634, 639. '"Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 937. See also, Town of Middleport v. ^tna Life Ins. Co., 82 111. 562, 568; Aspinwall v. Daviess Co., 22 How. 364; Wads- worth V. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 534. In Hardin Co. v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 92 Ky. 412; s. c. 14 Ky. L. 401; 17 S. W. 860, it was held that the presence of one of the sinking-fund commissioners of the county at a meeting of the stockholders of the railroad corporation, when a resolu- tion was passed declaring a stock dividend for the purpose of stopping interest on payment of stock sub- scriptions, and his action in voting for the resolution being unauthor- ized either by statute, by the county court or by the county commission- ers, did not estop the county from demanding interest on a stock sub- 1 Smith — 40 scription it had made up to the time when a cash dividend was declared. "^ Vosburg V. McCrary, 77 Tex. 568; s. c. 14 S. W. 195. This last was claimed under revised statutes of Texas, 342, that municipal corpo- rations "may ordain and establish such acts, laws, regulations and or- dinances not Inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this state as may be needful for the govern- ment, interest, welfare and good or- der of said body politic;" and § 418, that "the city council shall have power to pass, publish, amend or re- peal all ordinances, rules and police regulations not contrary to the con- stitution of this state for the good government, peace and order of the city and the trade and commerce thereof, that may be necessary or proper to carry into effect the pow- ers vested by this title in the corpo- ration, the city government or in any department or officer thereof."' To this the court said: — "The power of a municipal corporation or of a city council can not exceed that con- ferred by the charter and all ordi- nances must be in subordination § 641 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 626 § 641. Governing authorities of school districts. — Town trustees having authority to "build or otherwise provide suitaljle houses, furni- ture, apparatus and other articles and educational appliances neces- sary for the thorough organization and efficient management" of schools, can not purchase, at the expense of the township, text-l)ooks for the use of the pupils attending the public schools of the town- ship. ^^ thereto. Ordinances when author- ized by the charter are but munici- pal laws intended to regulate and provide for the orderly exercise of powers conferred by the charter." In Gregory v. Mayor &c., 113 N. Y. 416; s. c. 21 N. E. 119; 22 N. Y. St. 703, it was held that the power of a board of commissioners to remove employes did not include the power to suspend indefinitely and without .pay. The position of the court was, that there is nothing in the power to remove or expel which necessari- ly and in all cases includes the pow- er to suspend, and the latter power may not be implied from the mere grant of the former. Shannon v. Portsmouth, 54 N. H. 183, distin- guished. See also, State v. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496; State v. Chamber of Commerce &c., 20 Wis. 63; State v. Common Council &c., 25 N. J. L. 536. "Honey Creek School Tp. v. Barnes, 119 Ind. 213; s. c. 21 N. E. 747, in which Jackson School Tp. v. Hadley, 59 Ind. 534, where the in- debtedness was for Webster's Dic- tionaries, is distinguished. In State V. Mayor &c., 49 N. J. L. 308; s. c. 8 Atl. 114, it was held that school- houses were not included in the ex- pression "public buildings" in § 79 of the charter of Bayonne, which au- thorizes the mayor and council to purchase sites, markets, public buildings and wharves, and to erect suitable buildings or wharves, or other structures or improvements on said sites and for said purposes, or for the purpose of purchasing sites for schoolhouses, to issue bonds; therefore, a resolution to is- sue bonds to enlarge a schoolhouse was illegal. In Roseboom v. Jeffer- son School Tp., 122 Ind. 377; s. c. 23 N. E. 796, it was held that a con- tract made by a township trustee for building a schoolhouse beyond the fund in hand, and that to be de- rived from the tax levy for the year, without an order from the board of county commissioners, was without authority. See also, Middleton v. Greeson, 106 Ind. 18; s. c. 5 N. E. 755. In Briggs v. Borden, 71 Mich. 87; s. c. 38 N. W. 712, the action of school inspectors in the destruction by division of a school district and attaching the parts to other dis- tricts, without having obtained the consent of a majority of the resident taxpayers of the district, which was required by Howell's statutes of Michigan, § 5041, before such divi- sion could be made, was decreed to be null and void for lack of author- ity. See also, Doxey v. Board &c., 67 Mich. 601, 604; s. c. 35 N. W. 170. 172. In Dartmouth Sav. Bank v. School Districts, 6 Dak 332; s. c. 43 N. W. 822, it was held that a petition by a majority of the districts af- fected being a condition precedent to the establishment of a new dis- trict, the formation of a new dis- trict by the county superintendent, under Dakota police code of 1877, ch. 40, relating to the division of school districts and rearrangement of their boundaries, without such a petition, would be beyond his au- thority. Also, that districts which are its successors would not be €27 ULTRA VIRES. 642 § 642. The same subject continued. — Under an act conferring power on school trustees to lay out roads, streets and alleys, the power of school trustees was confined to cases where they laid out school lands into town or village lots. In other eases they had no power to lay out roads or to appropriate or dedicate any part of such land for public highways. ^^ estopped to deny the incorporation of their predecessor by showing a failure to present such a petition in an action upon a bond of this prede- cessor. In Farmers' &c. Bank v. School Dist., 6 Dak. 255; s. c. 42 N. W. 767, the court held that the pow- er to select a site for a schoolhouse belonged alone to the legal voters of the district, under the Dakota stat- utes, and until they have selected it ty vote the district board has no au- thority whatever to acquire the site or erect a schoolhouse. And in this case the school district was held not to be liable on warrants issued with- out authority by the board of direc- tors for the purchase of a school site. ''"Seeger v. Mueller, 133 111. 86; s. c. 24 N. E. 513; affirming s. c. 28 111. App. 28, holding that any attempt of the school trustees to lay out a road was ultra vires and void. The court said: — "The power granted by [these] sections [of the act] to trus- tees of schools will not be extended by implication, but in determining their extent and scope a strict in- terpretation will be adopted. The thirtieth section of [the] act de- clares trustees of schools bodies cor- porate and politic, thus constituting them municipal or quasi-municipal corporations, and the same rule of interpretation should apply to the statute from which they derive their powers which obtains in case of other municipal corporations. Such bodies act wholly under a delegated authority, and can exercise no pow- ers which are not in express terms or by fair implication conferred upon them." See also, Buchanan v. School Dist., 25 Mo. App. 85; Thomp- son V. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327; Minturn V. Larue, 23 How. 435. Revised statutes of Maine, ch. 11, § 1, for- bid the alteration of school dis- tricts except upon the recommenda- tion of municipal and school offi- cers. In Parker v. Titcomb, 82 Maine 180; s. c. 19 Atl. 162, it was held that an attempt, in the absence of such recommendation, to alter by uniting or disuniting, was ultra vires. In State v. Compton, 28 Neb. 485; s. c. 44 N. W. 660, it was held that the presentation of a petition in writing duly signed to a county superintendent of schools being necessary to give him jurisdiction to detach a part of the territory of a school district and attach the same to an adjoining district, a change of the boundaries of districts in that respect without such petition was without authority. The court said: — "The duties of superintendents are alone those prescribed in the statute." See also, State v. County Board &c., 20 Neb. 595; s. c. 31 N. W. 117 (where it was held that the board of equalization of taxes of a county possessed no powers save those conferred by statute, and that the filing of a complaint was neces- sary to give it jurisdiction to in- crease the valuation of a taxpayer's property, and unless this appeared upon the face of the proceedings there was no authority to act) ; Peo- ple V. Flint, 39 Cal. 670; People v. Goldtree, 44 Cal. 323; Black v. Cor- nell, 30 Mo. App. 641 (where it was held that no power exists in a board 643 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 628 § 643. Purchase of real estate for school purposes — Texas ruling.— - An incorporated town in Texas exceeds its powers by contracting to issue its bonds in tlie purcbasc of grounds for public free school pur- poses. Should such a town afterwards, by adopting the provisions of the statutes, become under general law a city, the purchase of such grounds would not be ratified by this act of adoption of the permission of the statute and becoming a city.^^ § 644. Condemnation of land outside of territorial limits. — Pro- ceedings by a village to condemn land outside of its jurisdiction are unlawful unless the village charter expressly gives the power to do so. A power can not be implied where by the proceedings it is pro- posed to take land against the will of the owners.^^ of public-school directors, without authority from the voters of the dis- trict, to rent buildings or rooms separate from the district school- house, and to employ teachers for a supplemental school therein) ; Sei- bert V. Botts, 57 Mo. 430; Board of Education v. Roehr, 23 111. App. 629 (where it was held that a school dis- trict having become organized un- der revised statutes of Illinois, ch. 122, § 80, the board of education had no power to enter into a con- tract for the erection of a school- house without a petition of a ma- jority of the voters of a district). ^* City of Waxahachie v. Brown, 67 Tex. 519; s. c. 4 S. W. 207. See also, Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex. 316, where it was held that commission- ers' courts, though charged with the duty of providing court-houses, could not issue bonds for that pur- pose in absence of an express legis- lative grant. In City of Waxa- hachie V. Brown, supra, the court said: — "The power to borrow money or to create debt is not a necessary incident of the power to buy grounds and build schoolhouses, and hence should not be implied against the spirit and policy so clearly manifested by contempo- raneous legislation as well as by the organic law in force at the time this legislation was enacted." It was also held that the city had no power to ratify a purchase involving the is- suance of bonds in contravention of the authority of the town when the contract was made, and which, if ratified, would involve the issuance of bonds in excess of the amount the city could lawfully issue. ^ Common Council &c. v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 57 Mich. 547; s. c. 24 N. W. 820. See also, Dillon Munic. Corp., § 469; Cooley Const. Lim. 528-541; Kroop v. Forman, 31 Mich. 144; Detroit &c. Ass'n v. High- way Com'rs, 34 Mich. 36; Powers' Appeal, 29 Mich. 504; Specht v. City of Detroit, 20 Mich. 168; Wright v. Town of Victoria, 4 Tex. 375 (where it was held that citizens who had purchased of the corporation lots upon the faith of an ordinance pur- porting to make a dedication of the timbered lands to the free and com- mon use of the citizens were not en- titled to an injunction to restrain the sale of such timbered lands, which the corporation by act of the legislature had been empowered to sell, and use the proceeds for erec- tion of public buildings, school- houses, etc., for the reason that the corporation had no power to dedi- cate these timbered lands so as to restrain a future sale under the pow- 629 ULTRA VIRES. 645 § 645. Diversion of lands dedicated to public uses. — The authori- ties of a municipal corporation can not lawfull}^ appropriate to otlier uses land which has been dedicated by the owner as a street; nor can they divert it to uses and purposes foreign to those for which it was dedicated ; nor is it within the power of the legislature to authorize such a disposal or diversion of it."'' ers given in the statute) ; Kings Co. &c. Ins. Co. V. Stevens, 101 N. Y. 411; s. c. 5 N. E. 353; Roper v. Mc- Whorter, 77 Va. 214. In Town of Searcy v. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269; s. c. 1 S. W. 319, where a contract of sale had been executed, the corporation was held estopped from setting up the plea of ultra vires. As to dis- posal of property dedicated to public uses in violation of trusts upon which it is held, or without legisla- tive authority, see Reynolds v. Com- missioners &c., 5 Ohio 204; Meri- wether V. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Trustees &c. v. Perkins, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 437; Alves v. Town of Hen- derson, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 131, 168; Bowlin V. Furman, 28 Mo. 427; Ken- nedy V. Trustees &c., 8 Dana (Ky.) 50; Town Council &c. v. Elliott, 5 Ohio St. 113; Ransom v. Boal, 29 Iowa 68; Still v. Trustees &c., 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 107; Commissioners &c. v. McCombs, 19 Ohio St. 320; City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 58 Pa. St. 253; Holladay V. Frisbie, 15 Cal. 630; Shannon v. O'Boyle, 51 Ind. 565; Matthews v. City of Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Lord V. City of Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; s. c. 2 N. W. 785; Board &c. v. Patter- son, 56 111. 111. — ^'^ Packet Co. v. Sorrels, 50 Ark. 466; s. c. 8 S. W. 683; In re John and Cherry Streets, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 659; Warren v. Mayor &c., 22 Iowa 351; Le Clerq v. Trustees &c., 7 Ohio 217; Trustees &c. v. Mayor &c., 33 N. J. L. 13; Trustees &c. v. Perkins, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 437; Buck- ner v. Trustees &c., 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 9; Alves v. Town of Hen- derson, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 131, 168; Police Jury v. McCoi-mack, 32 La. An. 624; Matthews v. City of Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Kennedy v. Trustees &c., 8 Dana (Ky.) 50; Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315; Price V. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361, 363; City of Alton v. Illinois Transp. Co., 12 111. 38; San Antonio v. Lewis, 15 Tex. 388; Mayor &c. v. United States, 10 Pet. 662; Ransom v. Boal, 29 Iowa 68; Branham v. Mayor &c., 24 Cal. 585; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Arm- strong, 45 N. Y. 234; City of Jack- sonville V. Jacksonville R. Co., 67 111. 450; Town of Cromwell v. Connecti- cut &c. Quarry Co., 50 Conn. 470; West Carroll Parish v. Gaddis, 34 La. An. 928; Cummings v. City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259; s. c. 2 S. W. 130; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; City of San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541; Pickett v. Hastings, 47 Cal. 269; Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Pa. St. 186; Commonwealth v. Al- burger, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 469; Board &c. V. Inhabitants &c., 18 Ohio St. 221; Seebold v. Shitler, 34 Pa. St. 133; President &c. v. City of Indian- apolis, 12 Ind. 620; Mayor &c. v. Stockton, 44 N. J. Eq. 179; s. c. 14 Atl. 630; New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 26 La. An. 478; s. c. 26 La. An. 517; Franklin Co. Com'rs V. Lathrop, 9 Kan. 453; Woodruff V. Neal, 28 Conn. 165. As to power of municipal corporation to alien public places with the con- sent of the legislature, see Herbert V. Lavalle, 27 111. 448; Bell v. Ohio &c. R. Co.. 25 Pa. St. 161; s. c. 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 105: In re Philadel- phia &c. R. Co., 6 Whart. (Pa.) 25; § 646 rUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 630 § 646. Sale of real estate — Prescribed mode controls. — The cases in California which involved the sale of real estate of the city under an invalid ordinance necessitated rulings upon various points perti- nent to the subject we are now considering. The legislature had re- stricted the governing authorities in the charter to a sale of such property by ordinance or resolution authorizing it, the only mode of city legislation, and prescribed how many votes should be required to pass such ordinance. The power of the legislature to prescribe a mode M^as sustained by the court, and the ordinance was held void be- cause it was not adopted by a proper vote ; in short, there was no power to sell because the necessary steps to give such power had not been taken. It was therefore held that the sales were never properly made and that no title to the purchasers passed from the city. The court held the city, inasmuch as it had through its officers received the money of these purchasers paid upon their contracts of purchase, and used the same for corporate municipal purposes, liable in actions for its re- covery to return it. Field, C. J., said: "[The facts] show an appro- priation of the proceeds, and the liability of the city arises from the use of the moneys or her refusal to refund them after their receipt. The city is not exempted from the common obligation to do justice which binds individuals. Such obligation rests upon all persons whether natural or artificial. If the city obtain the money of another by mistake, or without authority of law, it is her duty to refund it, from this general obligation. If she obtain other property which does not belong to her, it is her duty to restore it, or if used, to render an equivalent therefor, from the like obligation.-' The legal liability springs from the moral duty to make restitution. And we do not appreciate the morality which denies in such cases any rights to the individual whose money or other property has been thus appropriated. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; Payne be conveyed to private persons, and V. Tread well, 16 Cal. 220 (distin- is effectually withdrawn from com- guished in Grogan v. City of San merce; and the city having no au- Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, 614); City thority to convey the title, private and County of San Francisco v. It- persons are virtually precluded from sell, 80 Cal. 57; s. c. 22 Pac. 74 acquiring it"); approved and fol- ( where it was held that the city held lowed in Sawyer v. City of San Fran- its public squares in trust for the cisco, 50 Cal. 370, and in Hoadley v. public, and the municipal authori- City of San Francisco, 70 Cal. 320; ties had no authority to dispose of s. c. 12 Pac. 125, which was affirmed them by way of compromise or oth- on writ of error in Hoadley v. City erwise); Hoadley v. San Francisco, of San Francisco, 124 U. S. 639, 646; 50 Cal. 265 (where the court said of s. c. 8 S. Ct. 659. this same square: — "It was granted "' Argenti v. City of San Francis- to the city for public use and is held co, 16 Cal. 255. for that purpose only. It can not 631 ULTRA VIRES. § 647 The law countenances no such wretched ethics: its command always is to do justice.'"-^ It was held that where an authority to do any particular act on the part of the corporation could only be conferred by ordinance, a ratification of such an act could only be by ordinance. And further, that even if the city would be estopped from denying the sale and from asserting title to the property sold, it did not follow that the purchasers would be estopped from claiming a return of the money they paid. The general doctrine of estoppel in pais is not applicable to these purchasers, they not being wrong-doers. The sale of the city's property here being without authority and void, these purchasers were not required to surrender possession before they could maintain an action to recover back the purchase-money. The rule as to rescission does not apply. The contract being void, there was nothing to rescind; no rights were acquired, and there were in consequence no rights to restore. ^^ § 647. Appropriations for highways and school-buildings. — Town supervisors have no authority to appropriate or expend in the construction or repair of highways any funds raised for ordinary town charges.^" Nor have the electors of a town power to appropriate any sum for such construction or repair of highways, except when they have voted to raise the sum by taxation. The power to appropriate is limited to the sum voted to be raised. They have no control over any other fund for that purpose. '^^, ^ Pimental v. City of San Francis- their annual town meeting to keep CO, 21 Cal. 351, 361, 362. all the funds of the town in one gen- ^ McCracken v. City of San Fran- eral fund was without authority of Cisco, 16 Cal. 591; Grogan v. City of law and void. In Brown v. School San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Satterlee Dist, 64 N. H. 303; s. c. 10 Atl. 119, V. City of San Francisco, 23 Cal. a vote of a school district to raise 314; Herzo v. City of San Francisco, money for the erection of a school- 33 Cal. 134; Zottman v. City of San house upon a lot other than the one Francisco, 20 Cal. 96; People v. designated by the county commis- Swift, 31 Cal. 26, 28. sioners, upon a proper appeal from ^^ Aldrich v. Collins, 3 S. D. 154; s. the action of the district was held s. c. 52 N. W. 854. As the constitution, to be unauthorized and void. The art. 10, § 2, provides that funds court said: — "If the school district raised "by taxation, loan or assess- were permitted to abrogate or dis- ment for one purpose shall not be continue a location made by the diverted to any other," the acts of commissioners, which would be a re- the board in this case making such fusal to procure the land designated, appropriations were held to be il- and to build a schoolhouse upon it, legal and void. they could nullify the statutes de- " Aldrich v. Collins, 3 S. D. 154; signed to compel the purchase of the . s. c. 52 N. W. 854, holding that a land located for a lot by the commis- resolution adopted by the electors at sioners and the building upon it of § G48 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 632 § 648. Power to purchase realty does not authorize giving notes. — While a county in Nebraska is empowered by statute to purchase realty for a poor-farm, it is beyond the power of the governing au- thorities of the corporation to give promissory notes and mortgages of the land to secure their payment.'"'^ The United States supreme court accepted this as a correct ruling upon the statute as to the pur- chase of a poor-farm for a county, but held that parties who had sold such to a county for a cash payment and notes with mortgages for the deferred payments, upon the failure of the county to meet these notes were entitled to have the contract of purchase rescinded and the property reconveyed to them.^^ a schoolhouse." See also, Holbrook V. Faulkner, 55 N. H. 311, 315, 316; Blake v. Orford, 64 N. H. 299; s. c. 10 Atl. 117, where it was held that such a tax would be abated on peti- tion of the taxpayers of the district. In Andrews v. School Dist., 37 Minn. 96; s. c. 33 N. W. 217, it was held that where goods were • received un- der a contract made by the trustees in a manner unauthorized and which would not bind the district, and used for the benefit of the dis- trict under such circumstances and for such length of time as to raise the presumption that it was with the common consent of the district, the law would impose on the district the obligation to pay for them. In Town of Winamac v. Huddleston, 132 Ind. 217; s. c. 31 N. E. 561, it was held that a town could not issue bonds to procure funds with which to rebuild a schoolhouse, where the bonds, if issued, would create an in- debtedness In excess of two per cent, of the taxable value of the property within the town limits, to which limit of taxation it is restricted by the constitution of Indiana, art. 13, § 1. The court said: — "The debt created by a bond executed by a pub- lic corporation is not an obligation payable out of a specific fund, but is a contract to pay money generally." This case is not within the doctrine of Quill V. City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292; s. c. 23 N. B. 788; Strieb v. Cox, 111 Ind. 299; s. c. 12 N. E. 481; Board &c. v. Hill, 115 Ind. 316; s. c. 16 N. E. 156. These bonds would create a debt, this case radically dif- fering from City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; s. c. 49 Am. R. 416. That there was a provision or promise to levy taxes to pay these bonds was no reason why the con- stitutional resriction would not apply. "' Stewart v. Otoe Co., 2 Neb. 177. The court said: — "The statutes pro- vide the only security that can be given. The public faith is pledged, and a tax not exceeding one per cent, may be levied upon all the tax- able property of the county annu- ally, and when collected paid to the person entitled thereto by an order upon the treasurer of the county, payable out of that special fund." ^^ Chapman v. Douglass Co., 107 U. S. 348; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 62. The court said: — "The agreement, ... so far as it relates to the time and mode of payment, is void; but the contract for the sale itself has been executed on the part of the vendor by delivery of the deed, and his title at law has actually passed to the county. As the agreement between the parties has failed by reason of the legal disability of the county to perform its part, according to its conditions, the right of the vendor to rescind the contract and to a res- titution of his title would seem to be 633 ULTRA VIRES. 649 § 649. Work on public buildings, etc. — The people of a county voted seventy-five thousand dollars to build a court-house, and a con- tract was entered into by a contractor to build it by tlie plans and specifications for that sum. Changes were made in the plans by which the cost was much increased in some respects, but no corre- sponding changes were made to decrease the cost in other respects. It was held in such a case that all the agreements whereby the total cost of the work was to exceed the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars were in excess of the authority of the supervisors, and therefore void, and there could be no recovery upon them ; and that the case was not altered by the fact that the people afterwards voted an additional sum to complete the building which the contractor failed to finish under his contract.^* Boards of supervisors have no power to con- struct bridges over navigable lakes, no such power having been con- ferred upon them by statute. ^^ as clear as it would be just, unless some valid reason to the contrary can be shown." (See also, Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676, 684; Louisi- ana V. Wood, 102 U. S. 294; Milten- berger v. Cooke, 18 Wall. 421.) Fur- ther on the court said: — "The pur- chase itself . . . was expressly authorized. The agreement for defi- nite times of payment and for se- curity alone was not authorized. It was not illegal in the sense of being prohibited as an offense; the power in that form was simply withheld. The policy of the law extends no further than merely to defeat what it does not permit and imposes upon the parties no penalty. It thus falls within the rule stated in Pollock on Contracts 264." See also, as to the application of this principle, Mor- ville V. American Tract Society, 123 Mass. 129, 137; Hitchcock v. Galves- ton, 96 U. S. 341, 350, which allowed a recovery for the value of the bene- fit conferred upon the municipal cor- poration, notwithstanding the con- tract to pay in bonds was held to be illegal and void. The court said: — "It matters not that the promise was to pay in a manner not authorized by law. If payment can not be made in bonds because their issue is ultra vires, it would be sanctioning rank injustice to hold that payment may not be made at all. Such is not the law." ^^King V. Mahaska Co., 75 Iowa 329; s. c. 39 N. W. 636; Lancaster Co. V. Fulton, 128 Pa. St. 48; s. c. 18 Atl. 384; 24 W. N. C. (Pa.) 401 (a contract made by the commissioners of a county, to give to the county solicitor, whose salary is fixed by law, an additional compensation for services to be rendered by him lying within the sphere of his official au- ties as prescribed by statute, was held to be ultra vires; and that being in its effect evasive and sub- versive of law, and contrary to pub- lic policy, it was void, irrespective of intent, and was, therefore, in- capable of being ratified after the expiration of the solicitor's term) ; Hunter v. Nolf, 71 Pa. St. 282; Ches- ter Co. V. Barber, 97 Pa. St. 455. ^^ Snyder v. Foster, 77 Iowa 638; s. c. 42 N. W. 506. The court said: — "It is true that boards of super- visors have power to provide for the erection of all bridges 'which may be necessary and which the public convenience may require, within their respective counties,' but they can provide for the erection of such 650 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 634 § 650. Issuing of bonds. — Where there is a total want of power un- der tlie law in the ollicers or board who issue bonds of a municipal cor- poration, the bonds will be void in the hands of innocent holders. There is a distinction between irregularities in the exercise of the power conferred and the total want of power to do the act, the distinc- tion being between questions of fact and questions of law. If it is a question of fact and the board of officers are authorized by law to de- termine the fact, then their determination is final and conclusive. And although it may be contrary to the fact, yet if recited in the bond that the necessary and proper steps required by law to be taken had been taken, then the municipality is estopped from denying that they were taken.^*' But all persons are presumed to know the law, and if the law creates conditions precedent upon which the right to act at all depended, and these conditions were not complied with, and the law appointed no board or officer to determine that fact, then there can not be an innocent holder of such bonds. ^'^ Where a bond upon its face does not show authority on the part of the township to issue it, the doctrine of bona-fide holder does not apply, but the holder takes it subject to the defense of entire illegality.^^ bridges only in public high- ways. They may establish high- ways only 'as provided by law.' But the law does not authorize the establishment of a highway until the right to use the land over which it is to pass for that purpose has been obtained. In this case the state holds the title to the bed of the lake for the use and benefit of its citizens. It has not, by express stat- ute, authorized any obstruction of such use." See also, as to how far powers conferred may be extended by implication, Hickok v. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 523; Inhabitants &c. v. County Com'rs, 3 Met. (Mass.) 202; Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 489; Inhabitants &c. v. Railway Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 63; Attorney-Gen- eral V. Stevens, 1 Saxt. Ch. (N. J.) 369; s. c. 22 Am. D. 526. ^^ Spitzer v. Village of Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234; s. c. 46 N. W. 400; Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 U. S. 83; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 315. ^'' Bernards Tp. v. Morrison, 133 U. S. 523; s. c. 10 S. Ct. 333. =" Bogart V. La Motte Tp., 79 Mich. 294; s. c. 44 N. W. 612. And a mu- nicipal corporation can not ratify or be estopped by an act void in its in- ception and wholly ultra vires: Highway Com'rs v. Van Dusan, 40 Mich. 429. In Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, the court held that when the power was shown in the municipal corporation to issue the bond, but there were irregularities in its execution, the corporation might be estopped to deny that the power was properly executed. In Town of Hackettstown v. Swack- hamer, 37 N. J. L. 191, it was held that municipal corporations in the absence of a specific grant of power do not in general possess the ca- pacity to borrow money; and a note given by such corporation for an unauthorized loan can not be en- forced, even though the money bor- rowed has been expended for mu- nicipal purposes. In Portsmouth Sav. Bank v. Village of Ashley, 91 Mich. 670; s. c. 52 N. W. 74, it was held that the village was not bound 635 ULTRA VIRES. 651 § 651. The same subject continued — Municipal aid. — A municipal corporation can not create a debt and issue negotiable bonds repre- senting it in order to pay for a subscription to a railway corporation under a power conferred by the legislature upon it to subscribe for stock in that corporation.^^ Seven-year bonds issued by a township board, bearing interest, in lieu of township orders which, were payable on presentation, have been held void.*" The power of township boards in Michigan to audit and allow claims and issue obligations ends wath issuing orders for what they allow to be signed by the clerk and countersigned by the chairman.''^ to pay water-works bonds, the sign- ing of which by the president and clerk had been authorized by resolu- tion of the village council, but which were delivered by the presi- dent without any authority con- ferred by resolution. - - - The pub- lic can act only through authorized agents, and it is not bound until all who are required to participate in what is to be done have performed their respective duties: Brown v. Bon Homme Co., 1 S. D. 216; s. c. 46 N. W. 173. The Michigan court also said: — "The statute of this state in reference to the issuing of the water-works bonds vests that power in the village council, and until that body has met at a legal meeting and voted to issue the bonds or authorized their issue, one of the essential requirements of the statute has not been complied with; and these bonds being issued with- out such direction are not binding against the village." ^''Hill V. Memphis, 134 U. S. 198; s. c. 33 L. ed. 887; 10 S. Ct. 562; 7 R. R. & Corp. L. J. 470: 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 135. All grants of power of this kind must be con- strued strictly. Under a grant like this the corporation might give written evidence of the subscrip- tions, but that only. The rule for municipal corporations differs from that of private corporations. Pri- vate corporations created for pri- vate purposes may contract debts in connection ■^vith their business, and issue evidences of them in such form as may best suit their con- venience. But municipal corpora- tions, being established for purposes of local government, in the absence of specific delegation of power can not engage in undertakings not di- rected immediately to the accom- plishment of those purposes. The provisions in the general railroad law of Missouri which went into effect January 1, 1866, respecting the loan of municipal credit to a railroad company, and the act of the state of March 24, 1868, respect- ing the funding of the debts of mu- nicipalities, are to be construed in subordination to the provisions of the constitution of the state then in force, prohibiting the legislature authorizing any town to loan its credit to any corporation except with the assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters at a regular or spe- cial election: Hill v. Memphis, su- pra. '" Bogart V. La Motte Tp., 79 Mich. 294; s. c. 44 N. W. 612; for neither townships of this state nor their of- ficers have any power to borrow money or to issue bonds unless that power is conferred upon them by act of the legislature. " Comp. L. Mich., § 708. As to the rule of strictly construing acts granting corporate powers involv- ing the imposing of public burdens, see 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., §§ 507- 509; Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 653 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 636 § 652. The same subject continued — Public improvements. — While police juries may contract for improvements which they are authorized to make to be paid out of the taxes which they are author- ized to levy for parochial expenses, and which are set apart for this special improvement, they can not issue any promissory note, draft or warrant in advance to cover this amount which may go into the treasury. It must be there before the warrant issues, unless by legis- lative authority they are authorized to issue the same in advance.*^ A town in Indiana had issued its negotiable bonds to a certain amount, the proceeds of which were to be used in the construction of a sehoolhouse, and sold them in open market. When they matured there was a new issue of similar bonds and they were also sold in open market. The supreme court of the United States held the new issue to be void for want of authority, and that the municipality was not estopped from setting up that defense.*^ Wall. 566; Gause v. City of Clarks- ville, 5 Dill. 165. In City of New- port V. Newport &c. Co., 84 Ky. 166, it was held that when a municipat corporation has the power, express or implied, to contract with others to furnish its inhabitants with the means of obtaining gas at their own expense, it has the power to make a contract granting to a corporation the exclusive rights to the use of its streets for that purpose for a term of years. This opinion rested upon this, among other grounds, — that the power given the municipal- ity to provide for lighting the city included the power to grant that ex- clusive right. *- Snelling v. Joffrion, 42 La. An. 886; s. c. 8 So. 609, in which the court sustained the rights of tax- payers to maintain the action to an- nul the contract so far as to prevent the issuing of evidences of indebted- ness against a fund not yet in the parish treasury, this being prohibit- ed by express legislative enactment: La. acts 1877, No. 30, § 5; Breaux v. Parish of Iberville, 23 La. An. 232; Sterling v. Parish of West Felici- ana, 26 La. An. 59. See also, New- gass V. City of New Orleans, 42 La. An. 163; s. c. 7 So. 565 (the court would not interfere with the discre- tion of a police jury so as to dictate what particular contract should or should not be made) ; State v. City of New Orleans, 41 La. An. 91; s. c. 5 So. 262; Conery v. New Orleans Water- Works Co., 41 La. An. 910; s. c. 7 So. 8. "Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 441. The im- plied power of a municipal corpora- tion to borrow money to enable it to execute the powers expressly conferred upon it by law, if it ex- ists at all, does not authorize it to create and issue negotiable securi- ties to be sold in the market and to be taken by a purchaser freed from equities that might be set up by the maker. To borrow money and to give a bond or obligation therefor which may circulate in the market as a negotiable security freed from any equities that may be set up by the maker of it are essentially dif- ferent tran-sactions ■ in their nature and legal effect. See also. Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676; East Oak- land Tp. V. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278; Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 U. S. 83; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 315; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 637 ULTRA VIRES. 653 § 653. Contracts abrogating control of streets. — The laying out' and opening streets by the common council of a city being the exercise of its legitimate functions, any contract made by the city with an individual or corporation, by which it agrees that it will not in the future open or extend a street in any particular place or part of the city, is an abrogation of its legislative powers and ultra vires.*'* A contract by a city to straighten the course of a large stream running in a zigzag direction through it has been held not to be ultra vires.* ^ 785; Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 897; Gause v. City of Clarksville, 5 Dill. 165; Hop- per V. Covington, 118 U. S. 148, 151; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 1025; McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, 619; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566; Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Clai- borne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 406; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 489 (wtiere it was held that the statutes of Tennessee which conferred upon counties in that state power to erect a court- house, jail and other necessary county buildings did not authoi'ize the issue of commercial paper as evidence of or security for a debt contracted for the construction of such a building) ; Young v. Claren- don Tp., 132 U. S. 340, 347; s. c. 10 S. Ct. 107; Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1101; Hill v. Memphis, 134 U. S. 198, 203; s. c. 10 S. Ct. 562. " Matter of Opening of First Street, 66 Mich. 42; s. c. sub nom. In re City of Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co., 33 N. W. 15. See also. Gale v. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Detroit &c. R. Co., 62 Mich. 564; s. 0. 29 N. W. 500; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; Coleman v. Second Ave. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 201; Hood v. Mayor &c., 1 Allen (Mass.) 103; Backus v. Lebanon. 11 N. H. 19; State v. Hud- son &c. R. Co., 38 N. J. L. 548; New- castle &c. R. Co. V. Peru &c. R. Co., 3 Ind. 464; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19; Trustees &c. v. Salmond, 11 Maine 109; West River Bridge Co. V. Dix, 6 How. 507; Dillon Munic. Corp., § 567; Davis v. Mayor, 14 N. Y. 506, 532; People's R. Co. v. Memphis R. Co., 10 Wall. 38. ^^ McGuire v. City of Rapid City, 6 Dak. 346; s. c. 43 N. W. 706; the court holding such power in the city to arise from its power to drain, improve, keep in repair and prevent obstructions in its streets. In Ben- ton V. Hamilton, 110 Ind. 294; s. c. 11 N. E. 238, a contract between a town treasurer and the town for the improvement by the former of a public street was void under the revised statutes of Indiana ■ 1881, § 2049 (Burns' R. S. Ind. 1901, § 2136), which prohibited it; and it was further held that contracts by a municipal corporation with one of its own officers, by which a burden is imposed on property-owners, are opposed to tlie policy of the law. In Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218; s. c. 10 N. E. 155, a con- tract with an attorney made with the authorities of a city for profes- sional services was void, as the amended charter of the city (N. Y. laws 1871, ch. 461) placed the com- mon council under an absolute dis- ability to cre&,te any debt or liabil- ity on the part of the city for legal services; also, that, having no au- thority to create a liability against the city by express contract, it could not legalize such a claim by ac- knowledgment, ratification or other- wise. Power of village trustees in relation to vacation of streets and acts declared ultra vires, in New § 654 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 638 § 654. General legislation — Offers of rewards. — The contracts of niuuicipalities obtain validity only by force of the law authorizing their making. There is no authority for contracts that the law does not empower the governing hoards to enter into.*" In holding that a county court in Oregon had no power to order the offer of a reward for information leading to a conviction of bribery at a coming elec- tion, the court said: "The county courts, in the management of county affairs, have no power except that which is expressly given them by statute, or which is necessary to carry out those so given them. They have no authority to legislate. Their province is to administer the law as the legislature has directed."*^ An incorpo- rated village has power to offer a reward for the conviction of incen- diaries for offenses committed within its limits where it is author- ized to provide for the preservation of public property and for the safety and general welfare of the inhabitants.*^ It has been held that under power to preserve order and protect the city from fire, and the danger from the same, the city council has no power to offer rewards for the detection of incendiaries.*" In the absence of express charter or statutoT}^ power a municipal corporation has no power to offer and pay a reward for the apprehension and conviction of a criminal.^ ** In the absence of a statute a town has not power to grant bounties. ^^ York &c. R. Co. v. Village of New Loker v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Pick. Rochelle, 60 N. Y. S. 904; s. c. 29 (Mass.) 343; City of Philadelphia v. Misc. (N. Y.) 195. Flanigan, 47 Pa. St. 21; Johnson v. '" Therefore a contract let by a Santa Clara Co., 28 Cal. 545. board of commissioners of a county, " Mountain v. Multnomah Co., 16 for the care of the "poor," at a cer- Or. 279; s. c. 18 Pac. 464. They tain price per capita, and for the have no powers except those granted care of the "sick and infirm" at an- and defined by law, and like other other price per capita, was held to agents must pursue their authority be void in Lebcher v. Board &c., 9 and act within the scope of their Mont. 315; s. c. 23 Pac. 713, as the power. See also, Wolcott v. Law- law only authorized a contract for rence Co., 26 Mo. 272; Book v. Earl, the care of such persons as were 87 Mo. 246; Sturgeon v. Hampton, poor and therewith sick and infirm. 88 Mo. 203; State v. Brossfield, 67 See also, Parr v. President &c., 72 N. Mo. 331; Webb v. La Payette Co., 67 Y. 463; Head v. Providence Ins. Co., Mo. 353; Ranney v. Bader, 67 Mo. 2 Cranch 127; Bonestell v. Mayor, 22 476; State v. Walker, 85 Mo. 41. N. Y. 162; Poster v. Coleman, 10 "People v. Village of Holly, 119 Cal. 278; Zottman v. City of San Mich. 637; s. c. 78 N. W. 665. Francisco, 20 Cal. 96; s. c. 81 Am. '" Crofut v. City of Danbury, 65 D. 96; Argenti v. City of San Fran- Conn. 294; s. c. 32 Atl. 365. Cisco, 16 Cal. 255; City of Alton v. '"City of Winchester v. Redmond, Madison Co., 21 111. 115; Dillon 93 Va. 711; s. c. 25 S. B. 1001. Munic. Corp., § 381; Thomas v. City "O'Connor v. Town of Waterbury, of Richmond, 12 Wall. 349; Clark v. 69 Conn. 206; s. c. 37 Atl. 499. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199; 639 ULTRA VIRES. 8 655 § 655. Contracts for water supply. — An act, the material parts of which are quoted in the note,^" for the annexation of a town to a city, was held to give to the city a power to purchase the property and franchises of the water-works company, but by the terms of the act that right expired with the expiration of the two years. ^^ Any con- tract by a city council with a private corporation, impairing the exercise of its power and duty to keep the streets in repair, safe and convenient for public use, is void as against public policy.^* Upon a contention that a contract by a city with a water company, in extend- ing through a period of twenty-one years and depriving subsequent city councils of legislative control over the matter embraced in it, was ultra vires, it was held that the objection did not require that the contract should be held void, but only voidable so far as it was execu- tory.^*^ § 656. The same subject continued. — Authority to make a perma- nent and exclusive contract with a water company to build water- works and supply a city with water can not be implied from the 52 Laws of New York 1886, ch. 335, § 5, read: "The mayor, comp- troller and auditor of the city , . . are hereby authorized . . . to purchase the reservoir, . . . and all other property, of [a water- works company] . . . when and at such price as may be agreed upon, . . . and in case said par- ties shall be unable to agree upon a price for the purchase, . . . then in that case the power to acquire said property and franchises by the right of eminent domain is hereby expressly delegated to said city, . . . and the said officers in the name of and for said city within two years thereafter may proceed to acquire . . ." ^^Zeigler v. Chapin, 126 N. Y. 342; s. c. 27 N. E. 471; affirming s. c. 59 Hun (N. Y.) 214; 13 N. Y. S. 783, in which case the court held the action of a taxpayer to annul a con- tract which had been entered into by the city authorities for the pur- chase of this property, on the ground that the contract having been made after the two years had expired was illegal and void, there being no power in the city authori- ties to make it, was maintainable, and that the injunction restraining the officials from carrying out the contract pending the litigation was properly granted. "City Council &c. v. Capital City Water Co., 92 Ala. 361; s. c. 9 So. 339. The court said: — "If conceded that the city council has authority to contract for a supply of water for fire and sanitary purposes, yet the city council has no power, in the absence of legislative authority, to make contracts or pass ordinances relinquishing or abandoning the leg- islative or governmental powers or divesting the corporation of its leg- islative discretion, or disabling it to perform its public duties: 1 Dil- lon Munic. Corp., § 97." "a Carlyle Water &c. Co. v. City of Carlyle, 31 111. App. 325; City of East St. Louis v. East St. Louis Gas &c. Co., 98 111. 415; Decatur Gas &c. Co. V. City of Decatur, 24 111. App. 544. 657 PUBLIC . COKPOEATIONS. 640 general power conferred by its charter to contract for the needs of a municipality.^^ § 657. Contracts for lighting streets. — Cities and towns in Massa- chusetts have been held to have no authority under the statutes to erect and maintain works for the manufacture and distribution of electric light for lighting the public streets or for this and the addi- tional purpose of furnishing light to their inhabitants.^® A city has °= Greenville Water-Works Co. v. City of Greenville (Miss.), 7 So. 409. In City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; s. c. 4 S. W. 143, it was iield that the city had no power to grant to this water com- pany an exclusive privilege of sup- plying it with water for twenty-five years, such power not being express- ly granted to it, and for the further reason that the power of a city gov- ernment to make such a contract as would disable it from controlling in future, as it might deem best, municipal affairs to which it refers, can not be implied from the express delegation of power to contract re- garding the particular subject-mat- ter. The ruling was based upon the general principle that powers are conferred on municipal corpora- tions for public purposes, and they can neither be delegated nor bar- tered away. Such corporations have no power either to cede away or embarrass their legislative or governmental powers, either through the agency of by-laws or contracts with others, so as to disable them from the performance of their pub- lic duties. Applying these princi- ples, the contract here would have the effect not only to embarrass the city government in the exercise of the power conferred on it but to withdraw from it the right to pro- vide water in any other authorized way for public purposes and for the inhabitants of the city, which was the sole purpose for which the pow- er to erect, maintain and regulate water-works was given to it. This would result from the exclusive right which, from the terms of the ordinance, it intended to confer. In Waterbury v. City of Laredo, 68 Tex. 565; s. c. 5 S. W. 81, it was held that a contract between the city and an attorney, which gave to him an- nually for twenty years one-third of the rents of the ferry privileges and ferries or of any bridge or bridges built across the Rio Grande river at that point, the contract being de- clared to be irrevocable, and which mutually bound the contracting parties to do no act and to enter into no engagement or contract that would interfere with its terms, in connection with certain suits he had conducted pertinent to this ferry, for which he had been reasonably compensated, was in contravention of public policy and not enforce- able. It would, if enforced, place it beyond the power of the city to es- tablish a free ferry or to charge such tolls only as would defray the expenses of operating the franchise if it so desired. In City of Cle- burne V. Brown, 73 Tex. 443; s. c. 11 S. W. 404, it was held that a con- tract between the city and a water and ice company, which, if carried out, would have amounted to a loan by the city of its credit to a pri- vate corporation, was ultra vires. It had not the power to do it under the constitution of Texas, art. 11, §3. "^ Spaulding v. Inhabitants &c., 153 Mass. 129; s. c. 26 N. B. 421; 10 L. R. A. 397; 33 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 638. Such a power can not be 641 ULTRA VIRES. 658 no power to loan the moneys arising from a sale of bonds issued to construct water-works.'*'^ The treasurer being by law the proper cus- todian of such moneys, his bondsmen, in such a case, could maintain a suit to restrain his carrying out the order of the city council, as it would be a misappropriation of the fund.^^ § 658. Grant of exclusive privileges. — The powers of municipal corporations are limited to the express terms of the grant and will not be extended by inference. A municipal corporation can confer exclusive privileges for the prosecution of business only under an express grant of power from the legislature. Monopolies being preju- dicial to the public welfare, the courts will not infer grants thereof, but will refuse to presume the existence of legislative intention in conflict with public policy.^" implied as an incident to power ex- pressly granted them to erect and maintain street lamps — at least where it has been the custom of the legislature to specifically define from time to time the purposes for which towns may raise money by taxation of their inhabitants. See also, as to construing strictly all such statutes, Minot v. Inhabitants &c., 112 Mass. 1; Coolidge v. Inhabi- tants &c., 114 Mass. 592; Connolly v. Inhabitants &c., 151 Mass. 437; s. c. 24 N. E. 404; Anthony v. Inhabitants &c., 1 Met. (Mass.) 284. The legis- lature of Massachusetts has, since this decision, enacted "an act to enable cities and towns to manufac- ture and distribute gas and elec- tricity:" Mass. St. 1891, ch. 370, ap- proved June 4, 1891. "City of Bonham v. Taylor, 81 Tex. 59; s. c. 16 S. W. 555; 33 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 647. The court said: — "Municipal corporations ex- isting under the general law have power to raise funds for special pur- poses, enumerated in the statute, and to use such funds for the pur- poses for which they were raised, but we know of no power conferred on them to become money-lenders except of a sinking-fund raised to 1 Smith — 41 meet the payment of a debt." It was contended that the revised statutes of Texas, art. 370, which declares that "the city council shall have the management and control of the finances and other property, real, personal and mixed, belonging to the corporation," conferred on the city the power to lend the spe- cial fund raised for constructing the water-works. This contention was overruled, the court holding that the statute meant a control in accordance with law and not in vio- lation of law, and as to art. 420, which gave to the city power to ap- propriate money raised to enumer- ated purposes, this was not one of them. Nor would art. 424, which relates to the investment of a sink- ing fund, apply. The money ,in question was not the sinking fund, which the city would have power to lend, for the entire fund was money borrowed, and not money raised by taxation for a sinking fund. °* City of Bonham v. Taylor, 81 Tex. 59; s. c. 16 S. W. 555; 33 Am. & . Eng. Corp. Cas. 647. '^^ Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa 524; s. c. 22 Am. R. 261. In City of Brenham V. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; s. c. 4 S. W. 143, the court consid- 650 PUBLIC CORPOKATIOXS. 642 § 659. Curative legislation. — The United States supreme court h'ave lield and adhered to it that wlicre municipal corporations have issued evidences of indebtedness, which at the time of issue were un- authorized, it is in the power of the legislature to validate their issue by curative legislation."" ered a grant to a water company of the right and privilege, for the term of twenty-five years, of furnisliing the city with water, and thus summed up their conclusion: — "We do not wish to be understood to hold that a municipal corporation has no power in any event to contract for such things as are consumed in their daily use, for a period longer than the official term of the officers who make the contract; but we do intend to be understood to hold that such corporations have no power to make contracts continuous in char- acter in reference to such things or any others, by which they will be, in effect, precluded from exercising, from time to time, any power, legis- lative in character, conferred upon them by law." In Gale v. Village of Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; s. c. 9 Am. R. 80, in which a contract to build and control a market-house for the period of ten years was held to be void because it created a monopoly. Judge Cooley said: — "It is impossi- "ble to predicate reasonableness of any contract by which the govern- ing authority abdicates any of its legislative powers, and precludes itself from meeting in the proper way the emergencies that may arise. Those powers are conferred in order to be exercised again and again, as may be found needful or politic; and those who hold them in trust to-day are vested with no discretion to circumscribe their limits or di- minish their efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to their successors. This is one of the fun- damental maxims of government, and it is impossible that free gov- ernment with restrictions for the protection of individual or munici- pal rights could long exist without its recognition." In Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502; s. c. 13 Pac. 249, it was held that a city council has no authority to grant to any person a monopoly even where no express prohibition is found in the charter or other acts of the leg- islature. In Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435, Justice Nelson gives this rule of construction of grants by the legislature to corporations: — "That only such powers and rights can be exercised under them as are clearly comprehended within the words of the act, or derived there- from by necessary implication, re- gard being had to the objects of the grant. Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the terms used by the legislature must be resolved in favor of the public." In Richmond Co. Gas-Light Co. v. Town of Middle- town, 59 N. Y. 228, the New York court of appeals held that there was no power conferred upon the town auditors to contract with a gas com- pany to light the streets of the town for five years. In City of Chicago V. Rumpff, 45 111. 90, a right to do all slaughtering of animals in Chi- cago for a specified period was held to be void, because creating a mon- opoly. "^Bolles V. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 736; Grenada Co. Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 262; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 125 (the court saying in this case: — "Since what was done in this case by the consti- tutional majority of qualified elec- tors and by the board of supervisors of the county would have been legal and binding upon the county had it 643 ULTRA VIRES. § 660 § 660. Ratification. — Corporate ratification, without authority from the legislature, can not make a municipal bond valid which was void when issued for want of legislative power to make it.^^ An been done under legislative author- ity previously conferred, it is not perceived why subsequent legisla- tive ratification is not, in the ab- sence of constitutional restrictions upon such legislation, equivalent to original authority"); Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 806, 815; Ritchie V. Franklin Co., 22 Wall. 67; Thom- son V. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327, 330; City V. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 485; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Otoe Co. v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1, 15; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 265; St. Joseph Tp. V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 663; Anderson v. Santa Anna Tp., 116 U. S. 356; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 413; United States Mort. Co. v. Gross, 93 111. 483, 494, where the court said: — "Unless there be a constitutional in- hibition, a legislature has power, when it interferes with no vested right, to enact retrospective stat- utes to validate invalid contracts or to ratify and confirm any act it might lawfully have authorized in the first instance." In Katzenber- ger V. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 947, it was held that when, by reason of a change in the consti- tution of a state, its legislature had no constitutional authority to au- thorize a municipal corporation to issue negotiable bonds, it could not validate an issue of bonds by such a corporation made before the change in the constitution, and when the legislature had such power. The court was controlled by Sykes v. Mayor £c., 55 Miss. 115, where Chief Justice Simrall said about this at- tempted curative act: — "The act of 1872 is not relied on to waive mere irregularities in the execution of the power, but as conferring power by retrospective operation. If the bonds are obligatory on the city of Columbus, they became so for the first time by virtue of this statute. The legislature of 1872 could not, by relation, put itself back to 1869 and exercise power not denied or re- stricted by the constitution of 1832. The measure of its power was the constitution of December, 1869, and it could not ratify an act previously done if, at the date it professed to do so, it could not confer power in the first instance. It could author- ize a municipal loan conditionally. In order to ratify and legalize a loan previously made, it was bound by the constitutional limitation of its power." This doctrine was as- sented to in Grenada Co. Supervis- ors V. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 125. '1 Lewis V. City of Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 634 (which held bonds of the city issued to grant pecuniary aid to a railroad without legislative authority void as beyond the power of the city to issue, and, as they bore evidence on their face of the purpose for which they were issued, void in the hands of bona-fide holders. The holder of the bonds insisted that as the city had employed agents to sell these bonds, and its law officer had given an opinion in favor of their validity, and as they had been recognized in official statements as binding obli- gations, and as taxes had been levied to pay principal or interest, this amounted to a ratification. The court held that it mattered not that such things had been done) ; Otta- wa V. Gary, 108 U. S. 110; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 361. See also, as to the inability of subsequent acts of a corporation to make an ultra-vires contract ef- fective, Highway Com'rs &c. v. Van Dusen, 40 Mich. 429; Board &c. v. § GGl PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 644 act performed by a public corporation in violation of the terms of a statute can not be validated by a subsequent ratification by the corpo- ration.'"'- An act of a municipal corporation, void for want of author- ity to do it, can not be validated by an estoppel incurred by the corpo- ration; otherwise all limitations on the power of such corporation imposed by the legislature for the public good might be evaded at the mere volition of the corporation/^^ A municipal corporation has no vested right of property in a defense of ultra vires to a contract it has entered into, and hence a retroactive statute conferring upon a corporation power it lacked in making the contract, and thus legaliz- ing the contract, does not deprive the corporation of its property with- out due process of law.*'* There is a marked distinction between the incidental powers that are implied in favor of the acts of a business corporation and those of a municipal corporation. The inability of a business corporation to avoid its obligations upon the plea of ultra vires when it has received and retained the consideration for its obli- gation has no application to a municipal corporation.^^ § 661. Estoppel. — In general, a municipal corporation is not es- topped from denying the validity of a contract with its officers, when Arrighi, 54 Miss. 668; Nash v. City 32 N. H. 118; Kingman v. Inhabit- of St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174; Hague v. City of Philadelpliia, 48 Pa. St. 527; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y. 312; City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; Pe- terson V. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449; Cow- en V. Village of West Troy, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; Brown v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 239; Hodges v. City of Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; Smith v. City of Newburgh, 77 N. Y. 130; Green v. City of Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45; Taymouth Tp. v. Koehler, 35 Mich. 22; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Horton v. Town of Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513; Scott v. City of Shreve- port, 20 Fed. 714; San Diego Water Co. V. City of San Diego, 59 Cal. 517; Bank v. Town of Statesville, 84 N. C. 169; City of Laredo v. Mac- donell, 52 Tex. 511. As to effect of use of a schoolhouse which has been constructed at an expense beyond the authority reposed in the build- ing committee by the vote of the district, or similar cases as a ratifi- cation, see Wilson v. School Dist., ants &c., 2 Cush. (Mass.) 426; Da- vis V. School Dist, 24 Maine 349; Lane v. Inhabitants &c., 10 Met. (Mass.) 462; Chaplin v. Hill, 24 Vt. 528; Fisher v. Inhabitants &c., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 494; Taft v. Inhabit- ants &c., 14 Mass. 282; Keyser v. School Dist, 35 N. H. 477; Pratt v. Town of Swanton, 15 Vt. 147. "Platter v. Board &c., 103 Ind. 360; s. c. 2 N. E. 544; 1 West Rep. 235. "' Hoey V. Gilroy, 37 N. Y. St 754; s. c. 14 N. Y. S. 159; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449, 454 (holding that no sort of a ratification can make good an act without corporate authority) ; New York &c. R. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473 (holding that a statute can not be evaded by estoppel) ; Northern Bank &c. v. Porter Tp. Trustees, 110 U. S. 608, 619; s. c. 4 S. Ct 254. "Steele County v. Ersklne, 98 Fed. 215. «^ Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151, 157; s. c. 38 Pac. 682. G45 ULTRA VIRES. Gfil there has been no authority for making such a contract. The doctrine of ultra vires is applied with greater strictness to municipal bodies than to private corporations.''*' The supreme court of Minnesota, with reference to this doctrine, said': "A different rule of law would, in effect, vastly enlarge the power of public agents to bind a munici- pality by contracts, not only unauthorized but prohibited by the law. It would tend to nullify the limitations and restrictions imposed with respect to the powers of such agents ; and to a dangerous extent expose the public to the very evils and abuses which such limitations are designed to prevent.""^ ''"Newbery v. Fox, 37 Minn. 141; s. c. 33 N. W. 333, which held a con- tract for making certain street-im- provements made by the municipal officers in the first instance without having called upon the adjacent pro- prietor to make them, and a default upon his part, which the charter required, to have been unauthor- ized ; also that the contracting party could not recover after he per- formed the contract, he not having been misled as to any fact. He was legally chargeable with notice of the restricted power of the municipal authorities under the charter. See also, as to being chargeable with no- tice, McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143. As to applying the doc- trine of ultra vires, see Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Brady v. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. 312; Hague v. City of Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 527; 1 Dil- lon Munic. Corp., § 457; Nash v. City of St. Paul, 8 Minn. 172; Con- cord V. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165, 170; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 937; Crow v. Oxford, 119 U. S. 215; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 180; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218; s. c. 10 N. B. 155; Donovan V. Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. 291, 293. " Nash V. City of St. Paul, 8 Minn. 172. In State v. Atlantic City, 49 N. J. L. 558; s. c. 9 Atl. 759, where the city had entered into a contract with a water-works company for a supply of water, and after some de- lay an action was brought by the company to enforce its contract, it was held that neither the city nor a taxpayer was estopped from con- testing the authority of the city to enter into such contract, and that the writ of certiorari was properly allowed, it having been applied for within a reasonable time after it had become apparent that by the proceedings a burden might be im- posed on the taxpayers. See also. State V. Mayor &c., 30 N. J. L. 303; State V. City of Hudson, 29 N. J. L. 475; State v. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. 115; State v. Water Com'rs, 30 N. J. L. 247; State v. Mayor &c., 36 N. J. L. 159; State v. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. J. L. 499; State v. City of Perth Amboy, 38 N. J. L. 425; Haines v. Campion, 18 N. J. L. 49; State v. Blake, 35 N. J. L. 208; State v. Logan, 43 N. J. L. 421. When, however, a municipal corpo- ration had power to borrow money if certain facts existed, and the leg- islature had manifested an inten- tion to invest certain officials or agents with authority to detertnine the existence of such facts, and they have solemnly asserted their exist- ence, the corporation has been held to be estopped from contesting its obligations when in the hands of those who loaned thereon in good faith and without knowledge of the lack of power on the ground that the facts did not exist: Mutual &c. Ins. Co. V. City of Elizabeth, 42 N. J. L. 235. 063 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 646 v^ 662. Purchasers of bonds are bound to take notice. — The power of a municipal corporation to issue coupon bonds is derived from the legislative authority of the state, and the laws conferring such power form a part of the bonds themselves. Accordingly, every person dealing with such corporation must, at his peril, take notice of the existence and terms of the law by which it is claimed the power to issue such bonds is conferred.*^- Parties dealing with a municipal corporation are bound to know the extent of the powers lawfully confided to the officers with whom they are dealing in behalf of such corporation and they must guide their conduct accordingly.*'^ § 663. Corporations may contest ultra-vires contracts. — Where contracts are not authorized by the charter or by other legislative act, and are clearly without the scope of the power of the corporation, and therefore void, in actions thereon the corporation may interpose the plea of ultra vires, setting up as a defense its own want of power to enter into the contract. ''° The acts of officers can not bind the local •'^ National Bank &c. v. City of St. Josepli, 31 Fed. 216. In this case it was a condition of tliese bonds that interest should cease upon a tender of the principal by the governing au- thorities of the city at any time. And the court held that it was be- yond the power of the mayor and councilmen to curtail or impair the effect of this condition by issuing bonds of a different tenor. See also, Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S. 693, 697; Ogden v. Daviess Co., 102 U. S. 634; Northern Bank v. Porter Tp. Trustees, 110 U. S. 608, 618; s. c. 4 S. Ct. 254. In Duke v. Brown, 96 N. C. 127; s. c. 1 S. B. 873, it was held that where there is an inherent constitutional defect in the statute authorizing the issue of municipal bonds, a purchaser of the bonds takes them with notice of their ille- gal origin, for purchasers must in- quire into the authority by which the bonds are issued, and are held to notice of any defect therein. See also, as to the duty of persons to take notice of the scope of power of officers in contracting for municipal- ities, Mayor &c. v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1; State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85; Horn V. Mayor &c., 30 Md. 218; Mayor &c. V. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272; City of Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357; City of Wyandotte v. Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649; City of Bridgeport v. Housa- tonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493; Haynes v. Covington, 21 Miss. 408; Taft V. Town of Pittsford, 28 Vt. 286; City Council &c. v. Montgom- ery &c. R. Co., 31 Ala. 76; Hodges v. City of Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; Dill V. Inhabitants &c., 7 Met. (Mass.) 438; Branham v. Mayor &c., 24 Cal. 585, 602; McCoy v. Braint, 53 Cal. 247; Wallace v. Mayor &c.. 29 Cal. 180; State v. Mayor, 29 Md. 85, 111; State v. Haskell, 20 Iowa. 276; People v. Treasurer &c., 39 Mich. 554; Neely v. Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141; Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.) 696; Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. 236; s. c. 46 N. W. 464; Laycock v. City of Baton Rouge, 35 La. An. 475; Keating v. City of Kansas, 84 Mo. 415. "^ Stone V. Bank of Commerce, 174 U. S. 412; s. c. 19 S. Ct. 747; Murphy V. City of Louisville. 72 Ky. 189. To the same effect is Village of Marys- ville V. Schoonover, 78 111. App. 189. "■1 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 457; 647 ULTRA VIRES. 664 public by estoppel where the officers performing these acts can not bind them by a direct contract.'^ A municipal corporation incurs no liability for work done under a void contract, and where there is no guaranty on its part that the forms of law have been complied with, and its officers, without authority, attempt to contract, those dealing with it must see to it that its agents have power to act.'^^ § 664, Liability upon ultra-vires contracts. — Where a contract is void because of the express declaration of a statute, or because prohib- ited in terms, the retention by a municipality of the fruits of such a contract will not subject it to liability, either under the contract or upon a quantum meruit.'^^ No estoppel can ordinarily arise from the Cheeney v. Inhabitants &c., 60 Mo. 53; Burrill v. City of Boston, 2 Cliff. 590; Martin v. Mayor &c., 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545; Overseers &c. v. Overseers &c., 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 382; Seibrecht V. City of New Orleans, 12 La. An. 496; Loker v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Pick. (Mass.) 343, 348; City of Phil- adelphia V. Planigen, 47 Pa. St. 21; Cuyler v. Trustees &c., 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 165; Mayor &c. v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165; Halstead v. Mayor &c.. 3 N. Y. 430; Boom v. City of Utica, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 104; Cornell v. Town of Guilford, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 510; Boyland v. Mayor &c., 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 27; Vincent v. Inhabitants &c., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 103, 105; Stetson V. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Parsons v. Inhabitants &c., 11 Pick. (Mass.) 396; Hood v. Mayor &c., 1 Allen (Mass.) 103; Spalding v. City of Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 71; Mitchell v. City of Rockland, 45 Maine 496; Board &c. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Inhab- itants &c. V. Weir, 9 Ind. 224; Ap- pleby V. Mayor &c., 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 428; Brady v. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. 312; Estep v. Keokuk Co., 18 Iowa 199; Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 327; Lincoln v. Inhabitants &c., 75 Maine 141. If the city accept the benefit under a contract for street lighting it will not be heard to plead ultra vires: City of Kansas City v. Wyandotte Gas Co., 9 Kan. App. 325: s. c. 61 Pac. 317. '" Platter v. Board &c., 103 Ind. 360; s. c. 2 N. E. 544; 1 West. Rep. 235. A public corporation, such as a county or a city, is composed of the inhabitants of a locality, and the officers are not agents in the strict sense of the term, but are per- sons acting in an official capacity. See also, Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575; s. c. 50 Am. R. 830; Stros- ser V. City of Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; s. c. 49 Am. R. 416. '- Daly V. City of San Francisco, 72 Cal. 154; s. c. 13 Pac. 321. The supreme court of the United States have thus stated the rule: — "Indi- viduals as well as courts must take notice of the extent of authority con- ferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity:" Hawkins V. United States, 96 U. S. 689; s. c. 24 L. ed. 607; Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 247; s. c. 23 L. ed. 882. See also. Union School Tp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 Ind. 464; s. c. 2 N. E. 194; 1 West. Rep. 107; Reeve School Tp. V. Dodson, 98 Ind. 497; Axt V. Johnson School Tp., 90 Ind. 101; Pine Civil Tp. v. Huber Mfg. Co., 83 Ind. 121; Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind, 491; Driftwood &c. Co. V. Board &c., 72 Ind. 226; Mur- phy V. City of Louisville, 9 Bush (Ky.) 189. " Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake School Tp., 1 N. D. 26; s. c. 44 N. W. 1002; Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65; McBrian 665 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 648 act of a municipal corporation or officer done in violation of or without authority of law. Every person is presumed to know the nature and extent of the powers of municipal officers and therefore can not be deemed to have been deceived or misled by acts done without legal authority.'^' § 665. The same subject continued. — In a case where the United States supreme court held that under the charter power of a city it was vested with power to cause sidewalks to be erected, and could delegate its power to the mayor and chairman of the committee on streets and alleys, to make, in its behalf and pursuant to its directions, a contract for doing the work, there was an objection that it had V. City of Grand Rapids, 56 Mich. 95; s. c. 22 N. W. 206; National Tube-Works Co. v. City of Chamber- lain, 5 Dak. 54; s. c. 37 N. W. 761. Ejectment will not lie against a city on a sale by it of a street, the sale being ultra vires, even where the consideration is retained by it: Beebe v. Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39; s. c. 56 S. W. 791. '^Seeger v. Mueller, 133 111. 86; s. c. 24 N. B. 513, where the rule was applied in a case in which pur- chasers of school lands claimed an easement of a right of way over roads laid out by school trustees, which laying out of roads was held to be ultra vires and void. In King v. Mahaska Co., 75 Iowa 329; s. c. 39 N. W. 636, it was held that, where the work done under additional and void contracts in the erection of a court-house had been paid for in the periodical estimates of an architect, and afterwards the contractor brought an action against the county for a large sum of money, involving all the transactions between the par- ties, based on the several contracts, the county was not concluded, by such payments, from insisting that the additional contracts were illegal and that all the money paid should be regarded as paid on the amount named in the original contract; dis- tinguishing Long V. Boone Co., 36 Iowa 60. In Trustees &c. v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1, an action to recover for work done on streets under a con- tract in which the contractor bound himself not to look to the city for payment, but to the property-owners whose lots abutted upon the street, it was held that the corporation could not be held liable upon implied promises by reason of benefits re- ceived. The court said: — "This re- fusal to hold corporations liable is done for the protection of the inhab- itants of the corporation and be- cause the only power the corpora- tion has is from the law creating it, and instead of recognizing a more liberal rule the courts are inclined to hold corporations and their agents within the letter of their grant." But in Scofield v. City of Council Bluffs, 68 Iowa 695; s. c. 28 N. W. 20, it was held that where a city, pursuant to a contract, in payment for work in grading streets issued certificates of assessment upon the owners of abut- ting lots, it impliedly agreed that they were valid, and upon it being shown that they were not valid, be- cause the city had no power to as- sess the cost of such grading upon the abutting lot-owners, the contract could not be set aside, and the city was held liable for the contract price of the work, and not only for the reasonable value thereof; following Bucroft V. City of Council Bluffs, 63 Iowa 646; s. c. 19 N. W. 807. 649 ULTRA VIRES. 666 not the power to pay for the work done under this contract in bonds and that there should be no recovery against the city for that reason. The court, as the issue of bonds was not prohibited by any statute, said: "At most the issue was unauthorized. At most there was a defect of power. The promise to give bonds to the plaintiffs in pay- ment of what they undertook to do was therefore, at farthest, only ultra vires; and in such a case, though the specific performance of an engagement to do a thing transgressive of its corporate power may not be enforced, the corporation can be held liable on its contract. Having received benefits at the expense of the other contracting party, it can not object that it was not empowered to perform what it promised in return, in the matter in which it promised to per- form."" § 666. Ultra vires, when not a defense to actions by the corpora- tion. — One who has made a contract with a city which is ultra vires on its part, — as, for instance, for the working of the city's convicts sen- tenced to the workhouse, — and reaped the benefits of such contract, can not defend in an action for their work rendered for him under the contract on the ground that the contract was against public policy or that it was not within the power of the city to enter into if^" ■^ Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341. The court referred with ap- proval to State Board &c. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 47 Ind. 407, holding that "although there may be a defect of power in a corporation to make a "contract, yet if a contract made by it is not in violation of its charter, or of any statute prohibiting it, and the corporation has by its promise induced a party relying on the prom- ise and in execution of the contract to expend money and perform his part thereof, the corporation is lia- ble on the contract." See also, sub- stantially to the same effect, Alle- gheny City V. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St. 81; and more or less in point, Maher V. Chicago, 38 111. 266; Oneida Bank V. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490; Ar- genti V. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 370. The court. In Hitchcock v. Galveston, supra, held that the contract remained in force so far as it was in other re- spects lawful, and that the action for damages for breach of the same was maintainable. City of East St. Louis V. East St. Louis Gas &c. Co., 98 111. 415; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415; 2 Parsons Contracts 790; Field Corp., § 273, par. 8; Bridge Co. v. City of Frankfort, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 41; San Francisco Gas Co. v. City of San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453. '" City of St. Louis v. Davidson, 102 Mo. 149; s. c. 14 S. W. 825. The city could successfully interpose the plea of ultra vires if sued upon such a contract, but the other party can not plead its disability. The charter of this city, while not permitting such a contract, does not prohibit it; therefore the contract though ultra vires was not unlawful. This dis- tinction is sanctioned by the author- ities: 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 936; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; Bigelow Estoppel (5th ed.) 465, 685; Oregonian R. Co. v. Oregon &c. R. Co., 10 Saw. 464. See also, 667 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 650 Where a municipal corporation lias made a contract with an individ- ual and it has been executed, and nothing remains to be done except for him to pay the last instalment of the price agreed upon for the privilege accorded him, and he has reaped all the benefits he had pro- posed to himself in making the contract, the doctrine of ultra vires does not apply. '^^ Although a city has no power to loan its funds and take a mortgage as security, yet when its officers have done so a pur- chaser of the property mortgaged with notice of the lien will not be permitted to urge as a defense to the foreclosure the ultra-vires act of the cityJ^ § 667. Taxpayers' resistance. — The courts generally now recognize the rights of property-holders or taxable inhabitants to resort to judi- cial authority to restrain municipal corporations and their officers from transcending their lawful powers or violating their legal duties in any unauthorized mode which will increase the burden of taxation, or otherwise injuriously affect taxpayers and their property; such as an unwarranted appropriation and squandering of corporate funds or unjustifiable disposition of corporate property; an illegal levy and collection of taxes not due or exigible, etc.^'' Mayor v. Harrison, 30 N. J. L. 73, where a collector of assessments for street-improvements and his sureties sought to defend an action on his bond upon the ground that the act of the council of the municipality in creating the office and his appoint- ment to it were ultra vires and void; it was held that there was no power in the common council to create the office, but that the appointee was estopped from denying the validity of the ordinance. Middleton v. State, 120 Ind. 166; s. c. 22 N. E. 123, was decided on the same principle; also Town of Hendersonville v. Price, 96 N. C. 423; s. c. 2 S. E. 155; City of Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 Iowa 356; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415; Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.) 230; Mayor &c. v. Sonneborn, 113 N. Y. 423; s. c. 21 N. E. 121; Common- wealth V. Wolbert, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 292; Postmaster-General v. Rice, Gil- pin 554; Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C. 464. "Town of Monticello v. Cohn, 48 Ark. 254; s. c. 3 S. W. 30 (an action on a bond given by defendant to the corporation for a privilege, and it was held he could not plead the want of corporate power to make the con- tract) ; National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621; Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494; Whitney Arms Co. v. Bar- low, 63 N. Y. 62; Poock v. Lafayette Bld'g Ass'n, 71 Ind. 357; Weber v. Scott Co. &c. Soc, 44 Iowa 239; City of Helena v. Turner, 36 Ark. 577. " City of Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Hotel Co., 80 Minn. 165; s. c. 83 N. W. 54. ■"* Handy v. City of New Orleans. 39 La. An. 107; s. c. 1 So. 593, sus- taining an action based upon charges that the city had in excess of its powers and in violation of prohib- itory provisions in its charter passed an ordinance under which a contract of lease of public wharves was en- tered into. Followed and approved in Conery v. New Orleans Water- Works Co., 39 La. An. 770; s. c. 2 So. 555. As to the subject-matter 651 ULTRA VIRES. 668 § 668. Taxpayers' suits. — Taxpayers may maintain suits against towns and their officers to prevent or remedy misapplication of town funds, their relations to the municipality being analogous to those of stockholders to a private corporation.*^" And chancery has power in such cases to grant affirmative as well as injunctive relief.^^ Where and amount involved in giving juris- diction to the court the taxpayer stands in judgment for the whole community, irrespective of the dis- tributive interest he may have in the matter at issue. Pro hac vice, he is considered as the payer of all taxes. See also, Crampton v. Za- briskie, 101 U. S. 601; Gifford v. New Jersey &c. R. Co., 10 N. J. Eq. 171; Mayor &c. v. Gill, 31 Md. 375; Wade v. City of Richmond, 18 Graft. (Va.) 583; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338; City of New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; Harney v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 32 Ind. 244; Barr v. Den- iston, 19 N. H. 170; Stevens v. Rut- land &c. R. Co., 29 Vt. 546; Webster V. Town of Harwington, 32 Conn. 131; Terrett v. Town of Sharon, 34 Conn. 105; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126; Normand v. Board &c., 8 Neb. 18; Oliver v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 514; Drake v. Phillips, 40 111. 388; Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa 396; Douglas v. Mayor &c., 18 Cal. 643; Smith v. Magourich, 44 Ga. 163; Newmeyer v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 52 Mo. 81; Wright v. Bishop, 88 111. 302; Rice v. Smith, 9 Iowa 570; Place V. City of Providence, 12 R. I. 1; Allison v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 9 Bush (Ky.) 247; Bound v. Wiscon- sin &c. R. Co., 45 Wis. 543; Blyton Land Co. v. Ayres, 62 Ala. 413; Boyle V. City of New Orleans, 23 Fed. 843; s. c. 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 329; White v. County Com'rs, 13 Or. 317; s. c. 10 Pac. 484; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 485; Whelen's Case, 108 Pa. St. 162; s. c. 1 Atl. 88; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 174; City of Delphi V. Startzman, 104 Ind. 343; s. c. 3 N. E. 937; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 37; City of Valparaiso v. Gard- ner, 97 Ind. 1; s. c. 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 626; 49 Am. R. 416; Roper V. McWhorter, 77 Va. 214; s. c. 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 359; Sack- ett V. City of New Albany, 88 Ind. 473; s. c. 45 Am. R. 467; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 85; Ayer v. Law- rence, 59 N. Y. 192; Plagg v. Parish of St. Charles, 27 La. An. 319; Bab- ington V. Parish of St. Charles, 27 La. An. 321; Stevenson v. Weber, 29 La. An. 105; New Orleans Tax-Pay- ers' Ass'n V. City of New Orleans, 33 La. An. 567; Saloy v. City of New Orleans, 33 La. An. 79; Rivet v. City of New Orleans, 35 La. An. 134. ""Russell V. Tate, 52 Ark. 541; s. c. 13 S. W. 130; 7 L. R. A. 180; Town of Jacksonport v. Watson, 33 Ark. 704; Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. 914, 915; Blakie v. Staples, 13 Grant (Can.) 67, cited in note on p. 1102, 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. "2 Story Eq. Jur. 1252; Frost v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Allen (Mass.) 152; Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Lyon, 29 N. J. Eq. 110; Attorney-General v. Wilson, 1 Craig & Ph. 1; People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491; Attorney-Gen- eral V. City of Boston, 123 Mass. 460; Attorney-General v. Mayor &c., 1 Bligh 312; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. 909-912. In Appeal of Tarbell, 129 Pa. St. 146; s. c. 18 Atl. 758, the court held it proper to restrain by injunction a board of school direc- tors from appropriating money to the erection of a school building upon lands conveyed to a county in trust "to be appropriated to the use of the public buildings of the county, an academy and church or churches," § GG9 rUBLIC COliPORATIONS. 652 nothing has been done furtlier than the adoption hy the common council of a city of a resolution that the mayor and city clerk take immediate steps to let a contract for the construction of water-works for the city, a court of equity will not interfere at the suit of tax- payers to enjoin the threatened enforcement of such resolution, even though its adoption by the council was ultra vires and therefore un- authorized.^^ Where an electric-light company has made large ex- penditures in carrying out a contract a taxpayer by long delay is not entitled to equitable relief and it is not material that the contract may have been ultra vires. ^^ § 669. The same subject continued. — Where a city is attempting to dispose of public property without authority of law, one who has property liable to taxation in the city may maintain an action to re- strain such disposition, though he be not a resident of the city.^* until the title to the ground on which the buildings might lawfully be erected should have been acquired. " Pedrick v. City of Ripon, 73 Wis. 622; s. c. 41 N. W. 705. See also, Judd V. Town of Fox Lake, 28 Wis. 583; West v. Ballard, 32 Wis. 168; Nevil V. Clifford, 55 Wis. 161; s. c. 12 N. W. 419; Roe v. Lincoln Co., 56 Wis. 66; s. c. 13 N. W. 887; Gilkey V. City of Merrill, 67 Wis. 459; s. c. 30 N. W. 733; Sage v. Town of Fi- field, 68 Wis. 546; s. c. 32 N. W. 629; Snyder v. Foster, 77 Iowa 638; s. c. 42 N. W. 506 (where it was held that a taxpayer could maintain an action to prevent the county officers paying out money on a contract for the erection of a bridge v/^hich the county had no legal authority to erect); 2 High Injunctions, § 1560; Hospers v. Wyatt, 63 Iowa 264; s. c. 19 N. W. 204; Cornell College v. Iowa Co., 32 Iowa 520; Carthan v. Lang, 69 Iowa 384; s. c. 28 N. W. 650. In Briggs v. Borden, 71 Mich. 87; s. c. 38 N. W. 712, the right of a resident taxpayer of a school dis- trict which the township board of school inspectors, acting without jurisdiction, had attempted to divide and parcel out, to other districts, to file a bill to restrain the sale of the schoolhouse and other property of the original district, was sustained. The court said: — "If the school in- spectors are permitted to take this last step in the destruction of the district, the mischief and damage to him may be irreparable." "'Pugh V. Edison &c. Co., 19 Ohio C. C. 594; Carter v. City of Portland, 4 Or. 339; Packard v. Board, 2 Colo. 338, 350; Whitsett v. Union Depot & R. Co., 10 Colo. 243; s. c. 15 Pac. 339; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Foley, 19 Colo. 280; s. c. 35 Pac. 542; City of Denver v. Girard, 21 Colo. 447, 450; s. c. 42 Pac. 662. ^* Brockman v. City of Creston, 79 Iowa 587; s. c. 44 N. W. 822. As to residence or citizenship of a person whose interests were about to be prejudiced by action of municipal corporation, not being essential to authorize an action to restrain, see also, Brandirff v. Harrison Co., 50 Iowa 164; Olmstead v. Board, 24 Iowa 33; Litchfield v. Polk Co., 18 Iowa 70. In Brockman v. City of Creston, supra, the court explain their ruling thus: — "It must be re- membered that the doctrine we rec- ognize is not based upon the right of the property-owner or tax-payer, resident or non-resident, to dictate 653 ULTRA VIRES. § 670 And the court can not inquire into the motives of the prosecutor of such a suit, nor deny him relief because his interest as a taxpayer is inconsiderable. Nor need he defer his action until a tax has actually been levied upon his property by reason of the wrongful disposition of the property of the city. He may have the preventive remedy by injunction as soon as damage is threatened by the unlawful act.^^ § 670. Suits to restrain the enforcement of contracts. — The su- preme court of New Jersey having decided that the resolution of a board of freeholders for the purchase of and payment for land on which to erect a court-house by the issue of bonds was illegal for the lack of authority in them, and the vendor having brought suit on. the bonds, the United States supreme court sustained an action of taxpayers for restraining the prosecution of the action, and to enjoin the board from paying the bonds, and to direct a reconveyance of the land and a surrender of the void bonds, holding they were entitled to the relief prayed for.*" A taxpayer of a city has sufficient interest in the subject-matter to sue to, enjoin the consummation of an illegal contract by the city with a bank, by which it is proposed to take the public moneys out of the hands of the legal custodian of them, and deposit them in a bank as a loan at interest.*'^ But it has been held that a person suing under a statute which provided that any taxpayer might institute a suit for an injunction to restrain the execution of a contract by a municipal corporation in contravention of its powers in case of the failure of the public prosecutor to institute such suit could not complain that the owners of a majority of the frontage of lots on the proposed line of a street-railroad, the franchise of which, granted by the city, plaintiff attacked as illegal, had not given their and control the administration of having been acquired through taxa- the city government and to nullify tion, its disposition would be in ef- by proceedings in the court the law- feet a misappropriation of taxes, ful acts of the city officers, legisla- which may occasion levies to take tive or executive, done in the ad- the place of the misapplied tax." ministration of the city's affairs, for ^^ Brockman v. City of Creston, 79 the reason that the proposed acts of Iowa 587; s. c. 44 N. W. 822. the city do not promote its interest **" Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. or are against public policy. The 601; Clark v. Board &c., 9 Neb. 516; foundation of the doctrine is the in- s. c. 4 N. W. 246; Pimental v. City terference with the rights of the tax- of San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; Ar- payer in the increase of the burden genti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; of taxation, or the liability thereto, Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. by misappropriating the property of 487; s. c. 1 S. Ct. 442. the city, which may demand the " Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles, levy of taxes to acquire other prop- 87 Cal. 603; s. c. 25 Pac. 767. erty in its place; or the property. 671 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 654 written consent thereto, he not being an owner of any such lots/*^ A contract for paving a street awarded to contractors for a "vulcanite asphalt pavement," a kind neither called for in the ordinance of the city council nor even hinted at in the advertisement inviting bids, and where the parties proposing to bid were instructed to prepare their own specifications and submit them with their respective bids, has been held illegal, null and void as beyond the power of the council to make, as they did not comply with the statutes for letting such con- tracts to the lowest bidder. ^^ § 671. Injunction the proper remedy. — A contract made in the name of a city not in the mode and manner and upon the conditions prescribed by the ordinance is void, as a compliance with those con- ditions by the governing power of the city is essential to the exercise of the power conferred.^" Where city authorities undertake to make a contract without the lawful power to make it, and the contract, if made, will increase the burden of taxation, taxpayers constitute a special class, having a special interest in the subject-matter distinct from that of the general public. In all such cases injunction is, upon obvious principles, the most convenient and appropriate remedy.^^ •*** Simmons v. City of Toledo, 5 Ohio C. C. 124. *" Mazet V. City of Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. St. 548; s. c. 20 Atl. 693; 27 W. N. C. (Pa.) 73. And a property- owner on the street which was to be paved had a right to maintain a suit to enjoin the doing of the work, though it might be conceded that the bill was filed by him as a cover for an unsuccessful bidder for such contract. '■>" Mayor &c. v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106; s. c. 19 Atl. 706. The court said: — "They had no power to make a con- tract without advertising for pro- posals filed within the time desig- nated, nor had they any power to make a contract without opening all the proposals filed within the time designated; nor had they any power to award the contract to any one other than the lowest responsible bidder." "^ Mayor &c. v. Gill, 31 Md. 375. In a later case, St. Mary's Industrial School V. Brown, 45 Md. 310, 326, an injunction was held to be the proper remedy whenever it appears that municipal corporations and their officers are "acting ultra vires or are assuming or exercising a power over the property of the citi- zen, or over corporate property or funds, which the law does not confer upon them, and where such unau- thorized act may affect injuriously the rights and property of the par- ties complaining." The cases were approved and followed in Mayor &c. V. Keyser, 72 Md. 106; s. c. 19 Atl. 706, where, after holding that the mayor and aldermen had no power to make a contract for lighting a portion of the city except in the mode and manner prescribed by law, and sustaining the taxpayers* right to an injunction, the court said that the complainants "have a right to require that the money they have contributed for the public benefit shall be spent only for the purposes and in the manner authorized by law, and that every security de- 655 ULTRA VIRES. 672 § 672. The same subject continued, — But a taxpayer can not have a contract of purchase of property for the county set aside as being ultra vires, and the treasurer enjoined from paying warrants issued for the residue of the purchase-money, his action being against the county treasurer, and the supervisors and the county not a party, for the reason that such a decree would be inequitable while the county is allowed to retain the property, and its title could not be disturbed in such an action.®' Where the consideration received by a corporation under an ultra-vires contract can be restored, a court of equity will not relieve the corporation as against the contract, without providing for a restoration of the consideration.*^^ signed to protect its proper expendi- ture shall be faithfully observed. This right is a vital one to them, and they are required to allege no other injury than that it is about to be violated. They will be injured if the violation is permitted by the act of violation alone." See also, Talcott V. City of Buffalo, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 43; s. c. 10 N. Y. S. 370. '''Turner v. Cruzen, 70 Iowa 202; s. c. 30 N. W. 483. "=' Turner v. Cruzen, 70 Iowa 202; s. c. 30 N. W. 483, in which case the court held that the county should not be relieved from its contract for the purchase of a poor-farm, which purchase was ultra vires, without a reconveyance to the vendor. The court thus distinguished a class of cases: — "We are aware that there is a class of cases where courts of equi- ty declare a contract ultra vires, and grant relief in favor of a corpora- tion, without any decree for the res- toration of the consideration re- ceived by the corporation. This is so where municipal funds have been issued in excess of the constitutional limit of indebtedness, and the money obtained thereon has been expended. Courts of equity decree the cancel- ation of such bond, or enjoin pay- ment without decreeing repayment to the bondholders of the money re- ceived by the corporation on the bond. But this results from the ne- cessity of the case. If the courts should decree repayment, the very object of the constitutional provision would be defeated." See also, Pratt V. Short, 53 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 506; Leonard v. City of Canton, 35 Miss. 189; Moore v. Mayor &c., 73 N. Y. 238; County Com'rs &c. v. Hunt, 5 Ohio St. 488. In Nance v. Johnson, 84 Tex. 401; s. c. 19 S. W. 559, it was held that taxpayers could not maintain a suit to enjoin the pay- ment of the school-fund to a teacher under a contract made with him by the school trustees, on the ground that the trustees had no authority to make such a contract with him, as his school was a sectarian one, unless they had exhausted the rem- edies allowed them under the law of appeal from the school trustees to the superintendent of public instruc- tion, and from him to the state board of education, under Sayles' civil statutes of Texas, art. 3715. In Town of Winamac v. Huddleston, 132 Ind. 217; s. c. 31 N. E. 561, a taxpayer's action for injunction to restrain the issue of bonds of a school district which were about to be issued without authority was sus- tained, as there was no other remedy of equal power and efficiency, the case coming within the rule in Wat- son V. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; Denny v. Denny, 113 Ind. 22; s. c. 14 N. E. 593; Bishop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1; § 672 PUBLIC coRroRxi-TiONS. 656 s. c. 49 Am. R. 731; English v. R. Co., 44 Ind. 248; Thatcher v. Smock, 34 Ind. 115, 124; s. c. 7 Am. Humble, 67 Ind. 444; Spicer v. Hoop, R. 215; Elson v. O'Dowd, 40 Ind. 51 Ind. 365, 370; Bonnell v. Allen, 53 300, 302; Clark v. Jeffersonville &c. Ind. 130, CHAPTER XVII. IMPLIED POWERS AND EMINENT DOMAIN". 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. (a) Implied Powees. Section 673. General statement of the rule. Compromise of claims. The same subject continued — Application of the rule in Iowa. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case. Compromise of ultra-vires claims. Submission to arbitration. 679. Employment of attorneys. 680. Power to hold property in trust. 681. Acquisition of property for other than municipal pur- poses. 682. The same subject continued — Discretion in erecting public buildings. Power to indemnify officers. The same subject continued. Offers of rewards. The same subject continued — The power generally denied. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule qualified. Expenditures in obtaining or opposing legislation. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. (b) Eminent Domain. 689. Nature and definition. 690. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitations. 691. What property may be taken. 692. Quantity of estate. 693. What constitutes a taking. 694. The same subject continued — The leading case. 695. The same subject continued — Constitutional amendments. Section 696. Property already appropriated to public use. 697. The same subject continued. 698. Change of grade. 699. Change of use — Additional use. 700. The same subject continued — Electric railways. 701. Grant of power to municipal corporations. 702. Public use and necessity of ap- propriation, by whom deter- mined. 703. Legislative declaration conclu- sive. Public use as respects munici- palities — Parks and streets. The same subject continued — Water, gas, etc. The same subject continued — Cemeteries, sewers, etc. 707. The same subject continued — Leasing for public use. The same subject continued — Ornamental purposes. Notice of proceeding — Necessi- ty for. Parties entitled to notice. Service of notice. Treaty with the owner. The application or petition. The tribunal. 715. Right to jury trial. 716. Right to abandon proceedings. 717. Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings. 718. Compensation. 719. Elements in estimating compen- sation. 720. The same subject continued. 721. Benefits. 704. 705. 706. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 1 Smith — 42 (657) g 673 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 658 Section Section 722. Payment. 724. The same subject continued — 723. Review of proceedings — Certi- Appeal. orari. (a) Implied Powers. § 673. General statement of the rule. — The powers of public cor- porations arc either express or implied. "The former are those which the legislative act under which they exist confers in express terms; the latter are such as are necessary to carry into effect those which are expressly granted and which must therefore be presumed to have been within the intention of the legislative grant. * * * g^^ without being expressly empowered so to do they may sue and be sued;^ may have a common seal ; may purchase and hold lands and other property for corporate purposes and convey the same ; may make by-laws when- ever necessary to accomplish the design of the incorporation and en- force the same by penalties ; may enter into contracts to effectuate the corporate purposes. Except as to these incidental powers, which need not be though they usually are mentioned in the charter, the charter itself, or the general law under which they exist, is the measure of the authority to be exercised. And the general disposition of the courts of this country has been to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict construction of the grants of powers in their char- ters will assign to them ; thus applying substantially the same rule that is applied to charters of private incorporations."- Implied power of a municipal corporation is a power necessarily incident to the exer- cise of those powers expressly granted and directly and immediately appropriate to their exercise.^ ^ "I tiave no doubt of the right of "A municipal corporation possesses the school district as a body corpo- not only the powers specifically con- rate to interfere and ask the aid of ferred upon it by its charter, but equity to prevent the consummation also such as are necessarily incident of an illegal and void apportionment to or may fairly be implied from and creation of a debt against it by those powers, including all that are the collection of the same out of the essential to the declared object of its taxable property within its limits:" existence:" Village of Carthage v. Morse, J., in School Dist. &c. v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 271; s. c. School Dist. &c., 63 Mich. 51, 58; s. 25 N. E. 480; citing Le Couteulx v. c. 29 N. W. 489. Courts take judicial City of Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333; Ketch- notice of the powers and capacities um v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356; of public corporations, and in ac- Buffalo &c. R. Co. v. City of Buffalo, tions by them it is not necessary to 5 Hill (N. Y.) 209; 1 Dillon Munic. allege a legal capacity to sue: City Corp. (4th ed.), § 89; Angell & Ames of Janesville v. Milwaukee &c. R. Corp. 346, 364 ; 2 Kyd Corp. 149. See Co., 7 Wis. 484. also, 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law 1040. ''Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 231. ^ Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 €59 IMPLIED POWERS. § 674 § 674. Compromise of claims. — It is well settled that municipal corporations have the power to effect the compromise of claims in favor of or against them. This is a corollary to the right to sue and be sued.* They may compromise doubtful controversies in which the corporation is a party either as plaintiff or defendant. A judgment in favor of a city is not to be regarded as final while the right of ap- peal exists; and at any time before the period in which to appeal ex- pires, the city council may lawfully compromise the case and settle the claim by the acceptance of a less sum than that of the judgment.^ A fortiori the proper authorities may settle a suit in which judgment has been rendered in favor of the plaintiff corporation, but from which the defendant has appealed.^ § 675. The same subject continued — Application of the rule in Iowa. — A more radical doctrine in favor of the power to compromise is declared by the supreme court of Iowa. By statute in that state county supervisors are "to represent their respective counties and to have the care and management of the property and business of the county." Upon an application for a writ of certiorari to test the power of the supervisors to settle a judgment in its favor for less than the amount recovered it was alleged and admitted by demurrer that the judgment debtor was perfectly solvent. The court sustained 111. 340; s. c. 52 N. B. 44; People v. to discharge a debt without payment €hicago Gas Trust Co., 130 111. 268; which may be held against parties s. c. 22 N. E. 798; Chicago &c. R. Co. who are solvent and responsible V. City of Chicago, 148 111. 141; s. c. where no controversy exists in re- 35 N. E. 881; Mather v. City of Ot- gard to the validity and binding ef- tawa, 114 111. 659; s. c. 3 N. E. 216. feet of the indebtedness. This point ^People V. Board &c., 27 Cal. 655; is discussed in the following two People V. Coon, 25 Cal. 635; Inhab- sections. itants &c. v. Lowell, 20 Maine 178; ^ Town of Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 Inhabitants &c. v. Leadbetter, 16 111. 193; s. c. 56 Am. D. 501, where Maine 45; State v. Martin, 27 Neb. the town accepted payment of the 441; s. c. 43 N. W. 244; Grimes v. costs in full settlement of the judg- Hamilton Co., 37 Iowa 290; Mills ment. Here also, the court said that Co. V. Burlington &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa public officers could not, under the 66; Hall v. Baker, 74 Wis. 118; s. c. pretense of satisfaction, discharge a 42 N. W. 104; 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. debt due the corporation without Cas. 208; Artz v. Chicago &c. R. Co., payment. "The law vests them 34 Iowa 153, with a discretion in such matters ^ Agnew V. Brail, 124 111. 312 ; s. c. which they are to exercise for the 16 N. E. 230; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. best interests of the corporation. Cas. 134. But the court said that Settlement of an existing contro- the council had no power to sell or versy, if made in good faith, binds in any manner to dispose of the the corporation, but if collusively property of the corporation without made it is not obligatory:" Ibid., consideration; and probably no right p. 195. § 676 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 660 the action of the board. Premising that the power to compromise a claim before it has been reduced to a judgment is unquestionable and after judgment when the debtor's solvency is doubtful, Adams, C. J., continued : "It is true that in the case at bar the plaintiff avers that the judgment debtor was solvent. But that averment is immaterial. We can not go into any such question of fact in this action. The question before us is one of jurisdiction. If the board can make a compromise with an insolvent judgment debtor it must be allowed to judge for itself in any given case as to whether the debtor is insolvent or not, and an error made in this respect, however great, would not affect its jurisdiction."^ § 676. The dissenting opinion in the Iowa case. — But in a dissent- ing opinion. Beck, J., uses the following vigorous language: "My brethren insist that the defendants satisfied the judgment in the exer- cise of their power to compromise an action to which the county is a party. * * * But an insuperable objection to this position is that the defendants did not compromise the action for the very best of reasons — no action in fact was pending. There had been an action, but a judgment had been rendered therein. If there was a ^compro- mise' it was not of an action, but of a valid undisputed claim upon a judgment. In the case which is cited^ there was an action against the county which it resisted and litigation was pending. There could well be a compromise in that case ; in this case there was no pending litigation and no dispute as to the validity of the county's claim on the judgment. In my judgment the canceling of the judgment upon the payment of a part only can not be called a compromise. * * * It would be just as improper to apply the word to such a transaction as to say that in a distribution of alms a compromise is made with the mendicant." Further on in combating the position of the majority ' Collins V. Welch, 58 Iowa 72, 73; such that the board is unable to dis- s. c. 12 N. W. 121; 43 Am. R. 111. cover any way of collecting any part The opinion proceeds as follows: — of the judgment. The board should "It is true that where a claim has have the power to accept a part in been reduced to judgment all ques- satisfaction of the whole if in its tions pertaining to the rightfulness judgment the best interests of the of the claim have been adjudicated, county would thereby be promoted. But questions may arise subsequent All rules of business conduct by to the rendition of the judgment, and which the prudent person is gov- where they are of such a character erned are applicable to a county in as to render a compromise expedient the management of its affairs under it is manifest that the board ought similar circumstances." to have the power to make it. Sup- ^ Grimes v. Hamilton Co., 37 Iowa pose, for instance, that the financial 290. condition of the judgment debtor is 661 IMPLIED POWERS. § 677 of the court that if the board had jurisdiction their action could not be reviewed on questions of fact, he continued: "I have heard much that has been written upon the subject of the jurisdiction of courts, but this doctrine is new to me. I have always understood the rule to be that the jurisdiction of courts (I have never understood that the board of supervisors is higher than the courts) may always be in- quired into whenever their judgments are brought in question. It is true that their decisions upon questions of process whereby they ob- tained jurisdiction can not be collaterally assailed. But if upon the face of the record of a judgment it appears that jurisdiction is want- ing the judgment is void and will be so regarded, both collaterally and on direct attacks."^ In the author's view the dissenting opinion is the sounder and safer. § 677. Compromise of ultra-vires claims. — The right to compro- mise disputed claims came into conflict with the doctrine of ultra vires in a case in Massachusetts in such a way as to afford ground for a vigorous contest. The defendant, a quasi-corporation called a fire district, was created by the legislature and invested with certain express and ample powers for the extinguishment of fires within its limits. The district established an electric fire-alarm sys- tem, one of the wires of which ran into the house where the plaintiff lived, and during a thunder-storm she was injured by electricity con- ducted into the house by means of the wire. It was not controverted that the establishment of the fire-alarm system was within the defend- ant's authority. The plaintiff sued the defendant and obtained a verdict with substantial damages in the superior court under instruc- tions from the presiding justice authorizing it to be rendered. Ex- ceptions were taken, and before they were argued in the appellate court the defendant passed a vote approjoriating a sum less than the verdict to be paid in compromise of the action and claim, which the plaintiff accepted and afterward brought suit to recover. The defend- ant contended that it was not liable in the first instance for any negli- gence of the fire-department or of its members, and that it was wholly beyond its power to assume liability therefor by a compromise of the plaintiff's claim. "This latter objection," said the court, "is clearly imtenable, and ive have therefore no occasion to consider the former." The court also declared that whether the result of a litigation depends chiefly upon the ascertainment of the facts by the verdict of a jury, or upon the determination of the rules of law found applicable by the => Collins V. "Welch, 58 Iowa 72; s. c. 12 N. W. 121; 43 Am. R. 111. § 678 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 663 court, in either case the uncertainty is one upon which compromises rest and are uphold by the law.^" § 678. Submission to arbitration. — The authorities fully sustain the proposition that a municipal corporation may, unless restricted by its charter, submit a disputed claim against it to arbitration.^^ The governing body of the corporation is the proper agent to exercise this power, and it may intrust the city attorney with the selection of the arbitrators.^^ It will be assumed that the attorney of the corpora- tion may in virtue of his retainer consent to a reference of a cause, though he had no authority under seal to appear or to consent to a reference, and after award made it will not be set aside on the sup- posed want of authority in the attorney to consent to a submission.^^ If a statute should direct an ascertained sum of money to be paid to an ascertained person by the authorities of a township or other political "Prout V. Inhabitants &c., 154 Mass. 450; s. c. 28 N. E. 679; citing to the proposition that the power to sue is inherent, Inhabitants &c. v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193; Stebbens v. Jen- nings, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 172, 188; Linehan v. City of Cambridge, 109 Mass. 212; 2 Kent. Com. 277, 278, 283, 284 and notes; Angell & Ames Corp., §§ 23, 24, 78; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., §§ 21, 22. And that the power of compromise is incident to the lia- bility to be sued, Cushing v. Inhab- itants &c., 6 Cush. (Mass.) 389; Drake v. Inhabitants &c., 6 Cush. (Mass.) 393; Matthews v. Inhabit- ants &c., 131 Mass. 521; s. c. 134 Mass. 555; Inhabitants &c. v. inhab- itants &c.. 21 Pick. (Mass.) 349, 359; Bean v. Inhabitants &c., 23 Maine 117; President &c. v. Mappin, 14 111. 193; Agnew v. Brail, 124 111. 312; s. c. 16 N. E. 230; Board &c. v. Bowen, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 24, 30, 31; Supervisors &c. v. Birdsall, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 453; Dillon Munic. Corp., §§ 30, 477, 478. "Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N. J. L. 559; Kane v. City of Fond du Lac, 40 Wis. 495; Brady v. Mayor &c., 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 584; City of Shawnee- town v. Baker, 85 111. 563; Inhabit- ants &c. V. Inhabitants &c., 16 Mass. 396; Inhabitants &c. v. Brazer, 11 Mass. 447; Dix v. Town of Dummers- town, 19 Vt. 262; Remington v. Har- rison Co. Court, 12 Bush (Ky.) 148; In re Arbitration between Eldon and Ferguson Townships, 6 Up. Can. L. J. 207; District Tp. of Walnut v. Rankin, 70 Iowa 65; s. c. 29 N. W. 806 (which was a case of a claim in favor of a town against its treasurer, and where the court said that an arbitration of differences is just as legitimate a mode of settlement as by action. "All persons" in a stat- ute relating to arbitration includes municipal corporations) ; Spring- field V. Walker, 42 Ohio St. 543. See also. Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 177. ^- Kane v. City of Fond du Lac, 40 Wis. 495. It was held in that case that an alderman who had been act- ive in the council in endeavoring to procure payment of plaintiff's claim against the city was not thereby ren- dered incompetent to act as an ar- bitrator. At any rate the city, hav- ing notice of his conduct, could not object after award made. "Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N. J. L. 559; Faviell v. Eastern &c. R. Co., 2 Exch. 344; Alexandria Coal Co. v. Swann, 5 How. 83. 663 IMPLIED TOWERS. § 679 precinct, mandanms might be used to coerce sucli payment in case of default; but the report of a statutor.y referee, confirmed by the court, is in no better legal position than an award made by arbitrators, and the remedy must be an ordinary action.^'' § 679, Employment of attorneys. — A municipal corporation may without express authority, unless especially restricted, employ an at- torney to attend to the corporate interests and to prosecute and defend actions brought by or against the municipality.^^ But it can not make a valid contract for the employment of an attorney to file a bill in which it seeks to destroy its corporate existence.^" And there is no implied power to employ attorneys to conduct or assist in con- ducting criminal prosecutions.^^ And where the law has provided an officer whose duty it is to attend to all the legal business of a "State V. Board &c., 41 N. J. L. 135. '= Lewis V. Mayor &c., 9 C. B. (N. S.) 401; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431; Smith v. Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 531; Hornblower v. Duden, 35 Cal. 664; Thatcher v. Commissioners, 13 Kan. 182; Ellis v. Washoe Co., 7 Nev. 291; Clarke v. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181; Wil- helm V. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa 254; Town of Mt. Vernon v. Patton, 94 111. 65; Roper v. Town of Laurien- burg, 90 N. C. 427; s. c. 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 130; CuUen v. Town of Carthage, 103 Ind. 196; s. c. 2 N. E. 571; 14 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 256; 53 Am. R. 504; Town of Bruce v. Dickey, 116 111. 527; s. c. 6 N. E. 435; State v. Heath, 20 La. An. 172; s. c. 96 Am. D. 390. County commis- sioners acting in behalf of the coun- ty possess this power: Ellis v. Washoe Co., 7 Nev. 291; Jack v. Moore, 66 Ala. 184; Huffman v. Board &c., 23 Kan. 281. But their action must be taken at a legal ses- sion of the board: McCabe v. Board &c., 46 Ind. 380; Board &c. v. Ross, 46 Ind. 404; Butler v. City of Charlestown, 7 Gray (Mass.) 12; Thatcher v. Commissioners, 13 Kan. 182. See also. City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; s. c. 32 Am. R. 637; Car- roll V. City of St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444. And they can not contract for serv- ices for a period beyond the time when by operation of law the board will be reorganized: Board &c. v. Taylor, 123 Ind. 148; s. c. 23 N. E. 752; 30 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 294. Nor for an unreasonably large con- tingent fee: Chester Co. ,v. Barber, 97 Pa. St. 455. Counsel may be em- ployed to attend to corporate inter- ests outside of the territorial limits of the corporation or in another state: City of Memphis v. Adams, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518; s. c. 24 Am. R. 331. Employment by a mayor alone was sustained in an extreme case: City of Louisville v. Murphy, 86 Ky. 53; s. c. 5 S. W. 194; 9 Ky. L. 310; 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 421. ^^ Daniel v. Mayor &c., 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 582. " Hight V. Board &c., 68 Ind. 575. Not even against an official indicted for embezzling corporate funds: Board &c. v. Ward, 69 Ind. 441; Montgomery v. Board &c., 22 Wis. 69; State v. Commissioners &c., 21 Ohio St. 648. But where a town has an interest in the fines it may em- ploy an attorney to assist the state's attorney: People v. Warren, 14 III. App. 296. § 680 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 664 county it has been held that the county can not employ counsel.^^ Counsel may be employed not only in suits in which the corporation is a party on the record, but in those in which it may be a party in interest. ^^ § 680. Power to hold property in trust. — Municipal corporations may not only take and hold property in their own right by direct gift, conveyance or devise,-" but they are capable, unless specially re- strained, of taking property, real and personal, in trust for purposes not foreign to their institution, and not incompatible with the objects of their organization.^^ Its capacity to take and execute trusts of this kind is not limited to objects technically denominated charities or pious uses, or to religious or educational purposes, and is circum- scribed by no other limitations than such as should exclude inconsist- 1' Brome v. Cuming Co., 31 Neb. 362; s. c. 47 N. W. 1050; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 481. See also, Platte Co. V. Gerrard, 12 Neb. 244; s. c. 11 N. W. 298; Board &c. v. Tate, 10 Neb. 193; s. c. 4 N. W. 1044; Ramson V. Mayor &c., 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 226; Clough V. Hart, 8 Kan. 487; State V. Mayor &c., 40 N. J. L. 186. Cf. Hugg V. City Council &c., 29 N. J. Eq. 6. ^' Ellis V. Washoe Co., 7 Nev. 291; Thatcher v. Commissioners, 13 Kan. 182; Smith v. Mayor &c., 13 Cal. 531; Hornblower v. Duden, 35 Cal. 664; Jack V. Moore, 66 Ala. 184; Curtis V. Gowan, 34 111. App. 516; Doster v. Howe, 28 Kan. 353; Gushing v. In- habitants &c., 6 Gush. (Mass.) 389. As to what does not constitute a sufficient interest, see Halstead v. Mayor &c., 3 N. Y. 430; Smith v. Mayor &c., 4 Lea (Tenn.) 69. A town has power to employ counsel to defend an action for false impris- onment brought against the town marshal by a person arrested by him for violating a town ordinance: Cul- len V. Town of Carthage, 103 Ind. 196; s. c. 2 N. E. 571; 53 Am. R. 504; 14 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 256. See also, Roper v. Town of Laurienburg, 90 N. C. 427; s. c, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 130. =° Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18; McDonogh v. Murdoch, 15 How. 367; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 566, and cases there cited; 15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law 1060, and cases cited. -^Vidal V. Mayor &c., 2 How. 127; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465; Trus- tees V. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317; Chapin V. School Dist, 35 N. H. 445; The Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 459. Educa- tion is not an Incongruous element in municipal affairs, and bequests for that purpose are valid so far as the capacity to hold is concerned: Maynard v. Woodward, 36 Mich. 423; Hathaway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97; Yates V. Yates, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 324; Bell Co. V. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350; Common Council &c. v. State, 5 Ind. 334; Inhabitants &c. v. Cole, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 232; Christy v. Commis- sioners &c., 41 Ohio St. 711; Barnum V. Mayor &c., 62 Md. 275. Bequest for the relief of the poor: Board &c. V. Rogers, 55 Ind. 297; Craig v. Secrist, 54 Ind. 419. For a hospital: Mayor &c. v. Elliott, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 170. For highways and bridges: Town of Hamden v. Rice, 24 Conn. 350. For a town building: Cogge- shall V. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 292. For purchase of fire-engines: Wright V. Linn, 9 Pa. St. 433. C65 IMPLIED POWERS. § G81 ent, incompatible and improper objects. Thus, it has been held that a town is capable of holding in trust a sum of money, the income to be invested yearly in the purchase and use for display of United States flags.^^ § 681. Acquisition of property for other than municipal purposes. — In an action of ejectment by a town it adduced evidence of posses- sion for more than twenty years in proof of title. It appeared, how- ever, that the premises were not used for municipal purposes, but were part of a larger tract which was for most of the time in the occu- pation of tenants of the town. The defendants contended that the town could not acquire title by possession for any other than munici- pal purposes and requested the court so to charge, and the court re- fusing to do so they excepted. "The cases cited in support of these exceptions," said Durfee, C. J., "do not go to the point that a town can not acquire land by possession for other than municipal purposes, but only to the point that it is ultra vires for a town to purchase land for other than such purposes. We think this quite a different thing; for a town can not purchase land without expending its moneys, and it has no right to expend its moneys, raised by taxation or otherwise for municipal purposes, for other purposes. The acquirement of land by possession does not involve an expenditure any more than does the acquirement of land by deed of gift or by devise ; and it has been decided that a gift or devise of land to a town is good even though the land be given or devised in general terms, and be accepted without any intent to use it strictly for municipal purposes."^^ § 682. The same subject continued — Discretion in erecting puhlic huildings. — The validity of appropriations for the purpose of erect- ing or repairing public buildings is sometimes contested in the courts on the ground that the contemplated accommodations exceed the ac- tual needs of the corporation and are to be rented in part to private individuals. The distinction drawn in the authorities is this : If the -- Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18. tion of misuser by declaring void The court tliere said ttiat it seems to conveyances made in good faith: be impossible to prescribe in definite Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 terms the almost innumerable ob- Mo. 543. See also, Inhabitants &c. v. jects of a liberal bounty with which Eaton, 13 Mass. 371; Holten v. Board a town might be advantageously and &c., 55 Ind. 194. happily endowed, directly or in -^ Town of New Shoreham v. Ball, trust. In this case it was held that 14 R. I. 566; citing Inhabitants &c. if a city violates or abuses its power v. Baton, 13 Mass. 371; Sargent v. to purchase property it is a matter Cornish, 54 N. H. 18; Dillon Munic. solely between it and the state. Corp., § 437. Courts will not determine the ques- 683 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 666 primary object of a public expenrlitnre is to subserve a public munici- pal purpose, the expenditure is legal notwithstanding it also involves as an incident an expense which, standing alone, would not be lawful. But if the primary object is to promote some private end, the ex- penditure is illegal even though it may incidentally serve some public purpose.^* It is proper in constructing buildings to make suitable provision for prospective wants.^^ Proceedings in raising and ex- pending money within the limits of the corporate powers in these particulars will not be collaterally impeached and held void because in the opinion of a court and jury a less sum would have answered the immediate necessities of the corporation or the money might have been more judiciously and economically expended.^*' § 683, Power to indemnify officers. — A municipal corporation may legally indemnify an officer acting in good faith for a loss incurred in the discharge of his official duties. Thus, the court refused to enjoin a town from indemnifying one of its officers for his expenses in successfully resisting a suit for damages for malicious prosecution in procuring, by the direction of the town council, the arrest of the plaintiff on a charge of obtaining public moneys by false pretenses. '* Bates v. Bassett, 60 Vt. 530; s. c. 15 Atl. 200. "This is the test," said the court in that case, "where good faith is exercised in making the ex- penditure. If a public purpose is set up as a mere pretense to conceal a private purpose, of course the ex- penditure is illegal and fraudulent." A town hall was fitted up with the- atrical apparatus and part of the building was rented as a post-office. The court sustained a tax to defray the expense. See also, Worden v. Inhabitants &c., 131 Mass. 23; Inhab- itants &c. V. Camden Village Corp., 77 Maine 530; s. c. 1 Atl. 689; City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163; s. c. 7 So. 885; Bell v. City of Platteville, 71 Wis. 139; s. c. "36 N. W. 831; Konrad v. Rogers, 70 Wis. 492; s. c. 36 N. W. 261; Ely v. City of Rochester, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 133; Reynolds v. Mayor &c., 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 597; Poillon v. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 132; s. c. 4 N. B. 191; At- torney-General V. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (where it was held that the legislature could not authorize the erection of a dam across the river at the expense of the city "for the purpose of leasing water-power for private purposes" merely; yet, upon subsequent amendment of the act, it was in effect held that as the city had lawful authority to erect the dam "for the purpose of water- works for the city," it might as inci- dent thereto lease for private pur- poses any excess of water-power not required); State v. City of Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533; Green Bay &c. Co. v. Kaukauna &c. Co., 70 Wis. 635; s. c. 35 N. W. 529; 36 N. W. 828. "^ Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207; French v. Inhabitants &c., 3 Allen (Mass.) 9. -"Eddy V. Wilson, 43 Vt. 362; Greenley v. People, 60 111. 19; Spaulding v. City of Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 71; Torrent v. Common Council &c., 47 Mich. 115; s. c. 10 N. W. 132. 66: IMPLIED POWERS. 684 the plaintiff having been acquitted upon the trial.-'' So, also, where the mayor of a city, in the execution of a law conferring certain pow- ers upon him, and in good faith but in excess of his authority, tres- passed upon the rights of a citizen, who sued for false imprisonment and recovered a verdict, it was pronounced to be a "legitimate duty" and a "usual and ordinary expense" for the city to reimburse him.^® § 684. The same subject continued. — But in order to justify an expenditure of money in indemnifying an ofiticer three things must appear : first, the officer must have been acting in a matter in which the corporation had an interest; second, he must have been acting in the discharge of a duty imposed or authorized by law; and third, he must have acted in good faith. ^^ In two Connecticut cases the en- forcement of this rule resulted in a denial of the right to indemnify. The common council of the city of Bridgeport, under authority of the city charter, enacted a by-law with regard to wharves, and the anchoring, moving and mooring of vessels in the harbor, and ap- " This was within the power con- ferred by the statute to raise money for "town purposes": State v. Coun- cil &c., 38 N. J. L. 430; s. c. 20 Am. R. 404; citing King v. Inhabitants &c., 4 T. R. 591; Attorney-General v. Mayor, 2 Mylne & Cr. 406; Reg. v. Town Council &c., 4 Q. B. 893; Reg. V. Town Council &c., 4 Q. B. 900, n. a; Lewis v. Mayor &c., 9 C. B. (N. S.) 401; Reg. v. Mayor &c., 10 Ad. & El. 281; Reg. v. Paramore, 10 Ad. 6 El. 286; Nelson v. Inhabitants &c., 7 Pick. (Mass.) 18; Bancroft v. In- habitants &c., 18 Pick. (Mass.) 566; Fuller V. Inhabitants &c., 11 Gray (Mass.) 340 (where the members of a school committee were sued for libel because of some statements made in their official report to the town. For their expenses in suc- cessfully defending themselves the town voted an indemnity and the court held that it had a right to do so); Hadsel v. Inhabitants &c., 3 Gray (Mass.) 526; State v. Board &c., 37 N. J. L. 254. Cf. Hotchkiss V. Plunkett, 60 Conn. 230; s. c. 22 Atl. 535, cited in the following sec- tion. =" Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431. The court said that the opposite rule would tend to make an officer too cautious if not too timid in the exer- cise of his powers — "powers which must be frequently exercised for the protection of society before and not after a thorough investigation of the case in which he is called upon to act;" and that, although it may be urged that if the officer has the right to fall back on the city treasury there is danger that he will become reckless and overbearing, still it would seem to be the wisest course to leave the matter of indemnifica- tion to the discretion of those who represent the interests of the city. "We know of no case," continued the court, "in which, while the offi- cer continues to act in behalf of the community and not in his own be- half, it is held that the community can not indemnify him:" Ibid., p. 434. See also, Nelson v. Inhabitants &c., 7 Pick. (Mass.) 18; quoted at length in Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 258. ^'^ Hotchkiss V. Plunkett, 60 Conn. 230; s. c. 22 Atl. 535. § 684 PUBLIC CORI'ORATIONS. 668 pointed an officer called a superintendent of wharves to discharge the duty provided for in the by-law. The performance of his duties was not enforced by a penalty, and he acted only upon application of par- ties interested and at their expense. While acting in good faith he ordered a vessel lying at a wharf to be hauled astern to make more room for another at an adjoining wharf, and was sued for damages by the owner of the wharf. It was decided that the city had no suffi- cient interest in the matter to sustain a vote of indemnity for his expenses in defending the suit. "He is not the agent or servant of the city," said the court, "nor subject to its control, and it is not responsi- ble for his official negligence, misconduct or delinquency, nor bene- fited by his official fidelity. With respect to his official character and obligation the city has no duty to perform, no rights to defend, no interest to protect, and no pecuniary or corporate concern in the sub- ject-matter connected with his official duty. Want of interest involves the want of power and is necessarily fatal to the claims of the city."^"' And where the members of a board of education of a school district were sued for an injury to the business reputation of the plaintiffs by their refusal to entertain a bid offered by the plaintiffs for fur- nishing stationery for the district on the ground that they had some- time before dealt dishonestly with the district, the money of the dis- trict could not be used for the defense of the suit.^^ =° Gregory v. City of Bridgeport, Hazard, 7 R. I. 438; City of New 41 Conn. 76; s. c. 19 Am. R. 485; cit- London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; ing Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. Webster v. Town of Harwinton, 32 126; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H. 539; Conn. 131. Halstead v. Mayor &c., 3 Comst. (N. ^' Hotchkiss v. Plunkett, 60 Conn. Y.) 430; Martin v. Mayor &c., 1 Hill 230; s. c. 22 Atl. 535. Andrews, C. (N. Y.) 545; Hodges v. City of Buf- J., pointedly remarked that there falo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; Vincent v. was no duty authorized or imposed Inhabitants &c., 12 Cush. (Mass.) to make charges of dishonesty and 103; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. cheating. See also, Fuller v. In- 272; Nelson v. Inhabitants &c.. 7 habitants &c., 11 Gray (Mass.) 340. Pick. (Mass.) 18; Fuller v. Inhabit- A corporation can not appropriate ants &c., 11 Gray (Mass.) 340; Bab- money to pay the costs of an official bitt V. Selectmen &c., 3 Cush. who has been prosecuted for official (Mass.) 530; Bancroft v. Inhabit- misconduct, although he be ac- ants &c., 18 Pick. (Mass.) 566; quitted: People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill Tash V. Adams, 10 Cush. (Mass.) (N. Y.) 244; Merrill v. Plainfield, 252; Claflin v. Inhabitants &c., 4 45 N. H. 126; Butler v. City of Mil- Gray (Mass.) 502; Hood v. Mayor waukee, 15 Wis. 493; Smith v. May- fee, 1 Allen (Mass.) 103; Briggs v. or &c., 4 Lea (Tenn.) 69, 72. See Whipple, 6 Vt. 95; Baker v. Inhabit- also, Halstead v. Mayor &c., 3 N, Y. ants &c., 13 Maine 74; Fisk v. 430. 669 IMPLIED POWEHS. § 685 § 685. Offers of rewards. — The question wliether towns, cities or counties have the implied power to bind themselves by offers of reward for the arrest and conviction of criminals has been considered in several cases, and the conclusion supported by the weight of author- ity is adverse to the existence of such a power. One of the earliest cases involving this point arose in Massachusetts, and Chief Justice Shaw there held that a statute limiting the power of the mayor and aldermen in offering rewards to a certain amount did not operate to restrain the citi/ cowicil, as the representatives of the whole body of the people, from offering a greater amount for the apprehension and conviction of any person who should set fire to a building with felo- nious intent.^^ The courts wherein this power has been denied to municipalities do not attempt to cope with this case as a direct oppos- ing authority, nor does it seem to the author that they parry the force of it satisfactorily. Some of them take no notice of it whatever, while it has been said not to be applicable because the Massachusetts statute conferred the power to offer rewards.^^ And again, that as the re- ward was for the detection of persons who should thereafter be guilty of the crime of arson within the limits of the city, it was "a simple police measure, as legitimate as the employment of police to guard the inhabitants and their property against violators of the law."^* But the learned chief justice did not rest his decision upon either of these grounds or refer to them in any manner. In Pennsylvania it was held to be within the legitimate province of the burgesses of a town to offer rewards for the detection of offenders against the gen- eral safety of its inhabitants (incendiaries in that case). The court said : "The burgesses * * * are a part of the public police. It is therefore the state by one of its departments that offers a reward for the detection and conviction of an unknown offender against its laws."^^ § 686. The same subject continued — The power generally denied. — But, with the exceptions noted in the preceding section, the deci- sions are unanimous, and the purely implied power to tax the inhabit- ants for the apprehension of criminals is not only denied,^® but charter ^" Crawshaw v. City of Roxbury, 7 equally within the province of the Gray (Mass.) 374. state in administering its criminal ^^ Hawk v. Marion Co., 48 Iowa laws. 472, 474. ^Borough of York v. Forscht, 23 ^* Patton V. Stephens, 14 Bush Pa. St. 391, 393. (Ky.) 324. But it is evident that, ^"Gale v. Inhabitants &c., 51 whether the offer is antecedent or Maine 174. "We have been unable subsequent to the commission of the to find any case overturning the offense, the service to be paid for is case of Gale v. [Inhabitants of] § 687 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 670 provisions are strictly construed so as to exclude it. Thus, an article in the charter of the city of Covington providing that "the council shall have power to pass any needful by-laws and ordinances for the due and effectual administration of right and justice. * * * They may legislate upon all subjects wdiich the good government of said city shall require, unless restrained by the terms of the charter or constitution of the state, notwithstanding the legislature may have enacted laws relating to the same," confers no authority to offer a reward for the arrest of the city treasurer, who had been indicted for forgery and for the embezzlement of the funds of the city.^'^ "It is not a matter in which the local public have an exclusive or peculiar interest," said the court, "as distinguished from the general public. The offender when arrested must be tried under the laws of the state by the judiciary of the state. * * * No power can be implied in favor of a corporation which does not pertain to matters of a local character, matters which peculiarly concern the local public, and with- out which those local affairs committed by the state to the corporation can not be properly attended to."^^ § 687. The same subject continued — The foregoing rule qualified. — Where it was provided by statute that counties "may acquire and hold property and make all contracts necessary or expedient for the management, control and improvement of the same," it was con- ceded that the county had no power to offer a reward for the arrest of persons charged with the commission of crime, but held that the board of supervisors might offer a reward for the recovery of money which had been stolen from the county. "Of necessity it seems to us that this power must exist," said the court; "otherwise, when a county treasury is robbed, the county authorities must fold their hands and remain passive until the thief repents and voluntarily returns the South Berwick:" Baker v. City of 1105; 35 Am. R. 266 (the charter Washington, 7 D. C. 134, 140; Hawk gave the common council power by V. Marion Co., 48 Iowa 472; Board a two-thirds vote to offer rewards. &c. V. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455; s. c. It was held that even assuming that 37 Am. R. 174; Hight v. Board &c., there was an implied power, it could 68 Ind. 575; Board &c. v. Ward, 69 not be exercised except in the man- Ind. 441. See also, Lee v. Trustees ner pointed out) ; Loveland v. City &c., 7 Dana (Ky.) 28. of Detroit, 41 Mich. 367; s. c. 1 N. =' Patton V. Stephens, 14 Bush W. 952. See also. Stamp v. Cass (Ky.) 324. Co., 47 Mich. 330; s. c. 11 N. W. 183. "^ Patton V. Stephens, 14 Bush Whether a reward might not be (Ky.) 324, 328. If the power be binding if it related merely to of- doubtful the court should decide fenses against municipal ordi- against it: Hanger v. City of Des nances, qu«re: Murphy v. City of Moines, 52 Iowa 193; s. c. 2 N. W. Jacksonville, 18 Pla. 318. 671 IMPLIED POWERS. § 688 money, or rely on the exertions of the individual citizen to work and labor for the recovery of the money without hope of pay or pecuniary reward. If the latter discovered the money under such circumstances, the temptation to divide with the thief instead of the county would be great."^^ § 688. Expenditures in obtaining or opposing legislation. — The su- preme court of Connecticut decided that a town has the power to employ and pay counsel to oppose before the general assembly a petition to divide its territory, made by certain individuals seek- ing to promote their own interests, and not by the state from mo- tives of policy. The chief justice dissented, and the majority opinion concedes that the conclusion of the court is in conflict with the views expressed in Maine and Massachusetts.*" In the latter state it was held that a town has no implied authority to incur ex- pense in opposing before the legislature a proposition to annex it to another town.*^ The same court had previously denied the validity ^° Hawk v. Marion Co., 48 Iowa 472, 475, holding also that if only a part of the stolen money is recov- ered the party through whose agen- cy the recovery has been effected is entitled to a pro-rata share of the reward. Under the revised stat- utes of Illinois, ch. 60, § 15, provid- ing that county boards may offer re- wards for the arrest and conviction of any person guilty of stealing "any horse, mare." etc., "or any other property exceeding $50 in value," the limitation as to value ap- plies only to property other than that specified: Butler v. McLean Co., 32 111. App. 397. When the of- fer of a reward is authorized, an of- ficer can not recover it if his services are only in the line of his duty: Pool V. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 219; Stamper v. Temple, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 113; Kick v. Mer- ry, 23 Mo. 72; Day v. Putnam Ins. Co., 16 Minn. 408; Warner v. Grace, 14 Minn. 487; Gillmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio 281; Means v. Hendershott, 24 Iowa 78; Thornton v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 42 Mo. App. 58. See also, Morris v. Kasling, 79 Tex. 141; s. c. 15 S. W. 226. '" Parrel v. Town of Derby, 58 Conn. 234; s. c. 20 Atl. 460; 34 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 391. "Had the state of its own motion, by reasons of public policy, taken steps to change the boundaries of the town or abolish it altogether, the case presented would have been a very different one; but the attack was not made by the state from motives of policy, and in the interest of good government, but was made by cer- tain parties who sought thereby to promote their own interests. The attack was not directed alone against other individuals who dif- fered from them but against the town as well. The end sought in- volved not only a dismemberment of the town in respect to territory and population, but also a division of its corporate property, a reduction of its grand list, an apportionment of its debts, liabilities and burdens as to highways, bridges, paupers and the like." " Coolidge V. Inhabitants &c., 114 Mass. 592; Minot v. Inhabitants &c., 112 Mass. 1; s. c. 17 Am. R. 52 (where it was held that a town could not legally appropriate money § 689 PUBLIC conroRATiONS. 672 of a contract to pay for services of "lob])y members" in procuring' the passage of a charter of incorporation.'*" In Maine, also, a town can not legally raise and expend money either for services of members of the "third house" in opposing a division of the town,*^ or of at- torneys who appear before a committee for the same purpose.** A city has no authority to appropriate money to obtain legislative per- mission to build a bridge across a navigable river,* ^ or to procure the passage of an unconstitutional act.*^ The power granted in a charter "to provide for supplying the city with water," by implication gives the city power to agree upon water rates.*''' Power to light streets includes power to buy or build a plant for that purpose.*^ There is no implied power to provide for a pyrotechnic display on the Fourth of July.*9 (b) Eminent Domain. § 689. Nature and definition. — The right of eminent domain has been defined to be "that superior right of property pertaining to the sovereignty by which the private property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or its use controlled for the public benefit without regard to the wishes of its owners. More accurately it is the rightful authority which exists in every sovereignty to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citi- zens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience or to pay for the expenses of a commit- ** Henderson &c. v. City of Coving- tee directed by vote to petition the ton, 14 Bush (Ky.) 312. legislature for annexation to anoth- " Mead v. Inhabitants &c., 139 er town). But under a statute au- Mass. 341; s. c. 1 N. E. 413; 8 Am. & thorizing the employment of coun- Eng. Corp. Cas. 545. In Bachelder sel by "any town interested in a pe- v. Epping, 28 N. H. 354, the plaintiff tition to the legislature" to repre- recovered for services as a member sent it at hearings thereon, a town of a committee appointed to apply may employ and pay counsel to op- to the legislature to have a term of pose its division before a committee court holden annually in the de- of the legislature: Connolly v. In- fendant town. habitants &c., 151 Mass. 437; s. c. 24 ^' Los Angeles &c. Co. v. City of N. E. 404. Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720; Santa "Frost V. Inhabitants &c., 6 Allen Ana Water Co. v. Town of San (Mass.) 152, on the ground that se- Buenaventura, 56 Fed. 339; Illinois cret attempts to secure votes, etc., Trust &c. Bank v. City of Arkansas are not a legal consideration. City, 76 Fed. 271; s. c. 22 C. C. A. ^= Frankfort v. Inhabitants &c., 54 171. Maine 250. «Hay v. City of Springfield, 64 ^ Inhabitants &c. v. Inhabitants 111. App. 671. &c., 63 Maine 231. '" Love v. City of Raleigh, 116 N. C. 296; s. c. 21 S. E. 503. 673 EMIXEXT DOMAIN". § 090 welfare may demand.""'' It is a necessary and inherent attribute of sovereignty in the state, which does not depend njjon constitutional provisions for its existence."^ All grants of property by the state are subject to the imjdied condition that it may be resumed by an exer- cise of the right of eminent domain, and a contract renouncing this power is not covered by the constitution of the United States prohibit- ing legislation that impairs the obligation of contracts.^- § 690. The same subject continued — Constitutional limitations. — The provision in the constitution of the United States that private property shall not be taken for public u,se without just compensation is a restriction only upon the power of the federal government and not a limitation of the power of the states.^^ But this provision is '" Cooley Const. Lim. 640; citing Vattel, ell. 20, § 34; Bynliershoek, lib. 2, ch. 15; Angell Watercourses, § 457; 2 Kent Com. 338-340; Red- field Railways, ch. 11, § 1; Waples Proceedings in Rem, § 242; Pol- lard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Beelvman v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 45. " Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts (Pa.) 63; Noll v. Dubuque &c. R. Co., 32 Iowa 66; Raleigh &c. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. L. (N. C.) 451; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 346; Peo- ple V. Mayor &c., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 102; Lewis Eminent Do- main, ch. 1. The right which is denominated the eminent domain is distinguished from the police power, in that the former is a taking of property and the latter a regulation of the use of it: Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. St. 80; King v. Daven- port, 98 111. 305; Bass v. State, 34 La. An. 494; Hine v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 478; Inhabitants &c. v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315; People V. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Vanderbilt v. Adams. 7 Cowen (N. Y.) 349. It is also distinct from the common- law right to destroy property to pre- vent a public calamity, such as the 1 Smith — 43 spread of fire or ravages of pesti- lence: Russell V. Mayor &c., 2 Denio (N. Y.) 461; American Print Works V. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 248; Field V. City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575. And from taxation: People v. Mayor &c., 4 N. Y. 419, where the two rights are contrasted. And from assess- ments for local improvements: Nich- ols V. City of Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; State v. Blake. 36 N. J. L. 442; Chambers v. Saterlee, 40 Cal. 497; Matter of Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230. And from the war power: Lewis Eminent Domain, § 8 and cases there cited. '- Cooley Const. Lim. 339, where the author says that if such an agreement were held to be valid the only effect would be to require that compensation be made for its viola- tion. ^^ Barron v. Mayor &c., 7 Peters 243; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; Cairo &c. R. Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494; Johnson v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; Young V. McKenzie. 3 Ga. 31. But to constitute "due process of law" within the meaning of the four- teenth amendment it is believed that the decided cases "require compen- sation, notice and procedure con- § 691 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 674 now a part of the organic law of every state except North Caro- lina.^* § 691. What property may be taken. — "Every species of property which the public need may require and which government can not lawfully appropriate under any other right is subject to be seized and appropriated under the right of eminent domain."^^ Land, timber, stone and gravel with which to make or improve the public highways,^" streams of water,^^ a prescriptive right to pollute a watercourse/® a right to use the water of a stream for irrigation/* and all corporate property and corporate franchises.''" formable to law:" Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 183; Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 Fed. 385. As to the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, see § 715, post. " The constitutional provisions in the different states are given in ex- tenso in Lewis Eminent Domain, 27, n. Previous to the adoption of these limitations it was held in many ju- risdictions that the property of the citizen was secured from seizure without compensation by funda- mental principles of natural justice which were supposed to inhere in the constitution: Harness v. Chesa- peake &c. Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 248; Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 103. But this opinion was not universal and is opposed to the later cases and the views of standard au- thors: Winona &c. R. Co. v. Wald- ron, 11 Minn. 515; Harvey v. Thom- as, 10 Watts (Pa.) 63; Lewis Emi- nent Domain, § 10; Cooley Const. Lim. 81. ^^ Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 646; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), §§ 213 et seq., 223; Lewis Emi- nent Domain, § 262. ^•^ Wheelock v. Young, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 647; Bliss v. Hosmer, 15 Ohio 44; Watkins v. Walker Co., 18 Tex. 585; Arnold v. Hudson River R. Co., 55 N. Y. 661; Lyon v. Jerome, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 569; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 315. Buildings may be removed or destroyed to make way for public improvements, and a dwelling-house is no more ex- empt than any other species of prop- erty: Wells V. Somerset &c. R. Co., 47 Maine 345. Nor a pier: Matter of Union Ferry, 98 N. Y. 139. Toll- bridges, turnpikes and ferries may be taken : Northampton Bridge Case, 116 Mass. 442; In re Towanda Bridge Co., 91 Pa. St. 216; Arming- ton V. Town of Barnett, 15 Vt. 745; Sullivan v. Board &c., 58 Miss. 790. " Gardner v. Trustees &c., 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 162; Reusch v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 57 Iowa 687; s. c. 11 N. W. 647. ^^ And this without taking the land along it: Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183; s. c. 29 N. E. 664. ^^ And this may be separated from the land in connection with which it ripened: Strickler v. City of Colo- rado Springs, 16 Colo. 61; s. c. 26 Pac. 313. °°West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Central Bridge Corp. v. City of Lowell, 4 Gray (Mass.) 474; In re Twenty-second street, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 409; Proprietors &c. v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Com- monwealth V. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Pa. St. 41; s. c. 5 Am. R. 329. Cf. Central City Horse R. Co. v. Fort Clark Horse R. Co., 81 111. 523. 675 EMINENT ])()>[AIN. 692 § 692. Quantity of estate. — It is competent for the legislature to determine the extent of the estate which shall be taken for public use.^^ It may authorize the condemnation of the absolute fee- simple^- and if the public necessity for which authority to appropriate land is given be of a permanent nature, the legislative intent to seize the fee may be implied."^ But ordinarily express authority is re- quired to deprive the owner of the fee/* and statutes will be strictly construed so as to limit the estate taken to an easement if possible.^^ " It is the exclusive judge: Brook- lyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; Wyoming Coal Co. v. Price, 81 Pa. St. 156; United States v. Har- ris, 1 Sumner 21. Cf. Jackson v. Rutland &c. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150; Bar- clay V. Howell's Lessees, 6 Peters 498. But the power to decide may be delegated: Powers' Appeal, 29 Mich. 504; Rensselaer &c. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; Embury v. Con- ner, 3 N. Y. 511; In re Commission- ers of Public Works, 10 N. Y. S. 705. °^ Haldeman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 50 Pa. St. 425; Ferree v. School Dist, 76 Pa. St. 376; Bachler's Ap- peal, 90 Pa. St. 207; Hey wood v. Mayor &c., 7 N. Y. 314; Washington Cemetery v. Prospect Park &c. R. Co., 68 N. Y. 591; In re City of Buf- falo, 64 N. Y. 547; Water-Works Co. V. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Canal &c. Co. V. Commissioners &c., 26 La. An. 740; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 224. In such a case the weight of authority is that there is no reverter upon a cessation of pub- lic use: Malone v. City of Toledo, 28 Ohio St. 643; Heard v. City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 242; Heath v. Barmore, 50 N. Y. 302; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 589. An act author- izing the taking, on the express ground of expediency, of more land than was necessary for the purpose specified, was held unconstitutional in Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. "^Holt V. City Council &c., 127 Mass. 408 (case of a public park) ; De Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatchf. 95 (an almshouse). See also, Brook- lyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N, Y. 234; Tifft v. City of Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204. A statute entitled "to enable" a city "to abate a nuisance and for the preservation of the pub- lic health" authorized the city "to purchase or otherwise take the lands" within a large district, pro- vide for payment to the owners for damages, and directed the city "to raise the grade of the territory so taken or purchased with reference to a complete drainage thereof so as to abate the present nuisance and to preserve the health of the city." It was held that the fee of lands taken under this act vested in the city as absolute owner, and that the statute was not unconstitutional either as an attempt to exercise judicial pow- er or as authorizing the taking of a greater interest than was necessary; Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544. ^ Clark V. Worcester, 125 Mass. 226; Board v. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603. "= Kellogg V. Malin, 50 Mo. 496; United States v. Harris, 1 Sumner 21; In re Commissioners of Public Works, 10 N. Y. S. 705; Quimby v. Vermont &c. R. Co., 23 Vt. 387; Washington Cemetery v. Prospect Park &c. R. Co., 68 N. Y. 591. Cf. Page v. O'Toole, 144 Mass. 303; s. c. 10 N. E. 851; Edgerton v. Huff, 2& Ind. 35; City of Logansport v. Shirk, 88 Ind. 563. Where an easement only is taken the owner retains the right to enjoy the property so far as it is susceptible of use without G93 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 676 § 693. What constitutes a taking. — It was formerly held in sub- stance that to constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitu- tion there must be an actual physical appropriation of the property, or a divesting of title.^*' But the later authorities, by adopting a more liberal construction of the term "property,'"^^ include all tlie rights which pertain to the ownership of things real and personal."^ ' § 694. The same subject continued — The leading case. — The lead- ing case wherein the later doctrine is expounded is Eaton v. Boston &c. E. Co.,''^ decided by the supreme court of New Hampshire in 1873. A railroad corporation constructed its road across Eaton's farm. Damages were assessed under the statute and paid to Eaton, who re- leased the corporation from damages on account of the laying out of the road over his land. Northerly of the farm there was a ridge of land completely protecting the farm from the effect of floods and freshets in a neighboring river. Through this ridge the corporation, in constructing its road, made a deep cut, and the waters of the river in times of flood carried sand, gravel and stones upon Eaton's land. interfering with the paramount right of the public: Village of Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 111. 429; Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 133; El- liott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 230, and cases cited. ™ Sedgwick Const. Law (2d ed.) 456-458; Lewis Eminent Domain, § 57. 07 "The earlier cases as to what constitutes a taking were based upon a radically defective interpre- tation of the constitution, which not only denied the right to compensa- tion in many cases where it ought to be given, but greatly embarrassed the property-owner in obtaining it in those cases in which it was con- ceded to be due. These early cases attacked the question wrong end, first, so to speak, through the word 'taken' instead of through the word 'property.' It is only by having a clear and correct conception of the idea of property that a uniform, consistent and just application of the constitution can be made to the many complicated and varied cases which come up for adjudication:" Preface to Lewis Eminent Do- main, p. 1. •"^ Arnold v. Hudson River R. Co., 55 N. Y. 661; Eaton v. Boston &c. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Thompson v. An- droscoggin River Imp. Co., 54 N. H. 545; Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463; Matter of Hamilton Ave- nue, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 405. But the damage must be of such a nature as to give a cause of action on com- mon-law principles. A jail may be obnoxious to those who live or do business near it, but the special damage in such case is incidental to what the general interest of the community requires and becomes damnum absque injuria: Burwell v. Board &c., 93 N. C. 73; Wehn v. Commissioners &c., 5 Neb. 494. Dis- turbing the right to lateral support of land is a taking: O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331; Buskirk V. Strickland, 47 Mich. 389; s. c. 11 N. W. 210; Richardson v. Vermont &c. R. Co., 25 Vt. 465. So, too, de- priving the owner of the use of a non-navigable stream: Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463; Yates v. Milwaukee. 10 Wall. 497. «" 51 N. H. 504; s. c. 12 Am. R. 147. 677 EMINENT DOMAIN, § 694 It was held that, even if the corporation had constructed the road with due care and prudence, Eaton could recover the damage caused him by cutting away the ridge. The court said: "The constitutional prohibition (which exists in most, or all, of the states) has received in some quarters a construction which renders it of comparatively little worth, being interpreted much as if it read: ^No person shall be divested of the formal title to property without compensation, but he may, without compensation, be deprived of all that makes the title valuable.' * * * In a strict sense, land is not 'property,' but the subject of property. The term 'property,' although in common par- lance frequently applied to a tract of land or a chattel, in its legal signification 'means only the right * * * over a determinate thing.' 'Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing.'^° If property m land consists in certain essential rights, and a physical interference with the land substantially sub- verts one of those rights, such interference 'takes' pro tanto the owner's 'property.' The right of indefinite user (of using indefi- nitely) is an essential quality or attribute of absolute property, with- out which absolute property can have no legal existence. This right of user necessarily includes the right and power of excluding others from using the land. From the very nature of these rights of user and of exclusion, it is evident that they can not be materially abridged without ipso facto taking the owner's 'property.' If the right of in- definite user is an essential element of absolute property or complete ownership, whatever physical 'interference annuls this right takes 'property' — although the owner may still have left to him valuable rights (in the article) of a more limited and circumscribed nature. He has not the same property that he formerly had. His absolute ownership has been reduced to a qualified ownership. * * * j^ the claim set up by the defendants in this case is well founded, an easement is already vested in them. An easement is property, and is Avithin the protection of the constitutional prohibition now under consideration. If the defendants have acquired this easement, it can not be taken from them, even for public use, without compensa- tion. But the right acquired by the defendants is subtracted from the plaintiff's ownership of the land. Whatever interest the defendants have acquired in this respect the plaintiff has lost. If what they have gained is property, then what he has lost is property."^ ^ '"Citing Selden, J., in Wynehamer H. 504, 511, 515; s. c. 12 Am. R. 147. v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 433; 1 Bl. This case was approved in Thomp- Com. 138; 2 Austin Jurisprudence son v. Androscoggin River Imp. Co., (3d ed.) 817, 818. 54 N. H. 545. See also. Grand Rap- " Eaton V. Boston &c. R. Co., 51 N. ids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. § 695 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. crs § 695. The same subject continued — Constitutional amendments. — The narrow constructiou placed by some of the courts upon the words "property" and "taken" caused the amendment of the constitutions of many of the states so that damage to private property taken for public use should be compensated.'^- Judge Dillon sums up the effect of these amendments as follows: "It may perhaps be premature to affirm that the meaning of the word 'damaged,' as used in the recent con- stitutional amendments, is absolutely confined to cases where the common law would have given a remedy for injuries to property or property-rights, if the legislative authority to do the act which caused the damage had not, aside from such constitutional amendment, de- prived, or been previously construed to deprive, the owner of his right to compensation therefor ; and yet such is, in our judgment, its main, if not exclusive, purpose and effect."" § 696. Property already appropriated to public use. — It is a well- established rule that property already appropriated in the proper ex- ercise of the power of eminent domain can not be taken for another public use which will wholly defeat or supersede the former use, unless the power to make such second appropriation be given expressly or by necessary implication.''* A further exposition of the rule was 308; Lewis Eminent Domain, ch. 3; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), ch. 8; Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 666 et seq.; Dillon Munic. Corp., § 587b. "- Such amendments have been adopted in the following states and construed in the cases cited: — Ala- bama: City Council &c. v. Town- send, 84 Ala. 478; s. c. 40 So. 780. Arkansas: Hot Springs R. Co. v. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429. Califor- nia: Reardon v. City of San Fran- cisco, 66 Cal. 492; s. c. 6 Pac. 317. Colorado: Mollandin v. Union Pac. R. Co., 14 Fed. 394. Georgia: City of Atlanta v. Green, 67 Ga. 386. Illi- nois: Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 111. 64; Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U. S. 161; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 820; City of Chi- cago V. Union Bldg. Ass'n, 102 111. 379; s. c. 40 Am. R. 598; City of 01- ney v. Wharf, 115 111. 519; s. c. 5 N. E. 366. Missouri: McElroy v. Kan- sas City, 21 Fed. 257; Sheehy v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 94 Mo. 574; s. c. 7 S. W. 579. Nebraska: Schal- ler v. City of Omaha, 23 Neb. 325; s. c. 36 N. W. 533. Pennsylvania: Hendrick's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 358; Chester Co. v. Brower, 117 Pa. St. 647; s. c. 12 Atl. 577; O'Brien v. Pennsylvania &c. R. Co., 119 Pa. St. 184; s. c. 13 Atl. 74; Pennsylvania R. Co. V. Marchant, 119 Pa. St. 541; s. c. 13 Atl. 690. Texas: Bounds v. Kirven, 63 Tex. 159. West Vir- ginia: Hutchinson v. City of Park- ersburg, 25 W. Va. 226. '=* Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th. ed.), § 587. "* Little Miami &c. R. Co. v. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 510; Railroad Co. V. Village of Belle Centre, 48 Ohio St. 273; s. c. 27 N. E. 464. "It is settled beyond controversy that land already appropriated to a pub- lic use can not be appropriated to another public use unless the stat- ute clearly confers authority to make a second seizure:" City of Sey- mour V. Jeffersonville &c. R. Co., 126 Ind. 466; s. c. 26 N. E. 188; cit- 679 EMINENT DOMAIN. § 007 given by Folgor, J., of the court of appeals of Xcw York, as follows: "An implication is an inference of something not directly declared, but arising from what is admitted or expressed. * * * in deter- mining whether a power generally given is meant to have operation upon lands already devoted by legislative authority to a public purpose, it is proper to consider the nature of the prior public work, the public use to which it is applied, the extent to which that use would be im- paired or diminished by the taking of such part of the land as may be demanded for the subsequent public use. If both uses may not stand together, with some tolerable interference which may be com- pensated for by damages paid ; if the latter use, when exercised, must supersede the former, — it is not to be implied from a general power given, without having in view a then existing and particular need therefor, that the legislature meant to subject lands devoted to a public use already in exercise to one which might thereafter arise. A legis- lative intent that there should be such an effect will not be inferred from a gift of power made in general terms. To defeat the attain- ment of an important public purpose to which lands have already been subjected the legislative intent must unequivocally appear. If an implication is to be relied upon, it must appear from the face of the enactment, or from the application of it to the particular subject- matter of it, so that by reasonable intendment some especial object sought to be attained by the exercise of the power granted could not be reached in any other place or manner."''^ § 697. The same subject continued. — Ordinarily a highway or rail- road can not be laid out longitudinally over a previously established railroad or highway by virtue of general statutory powers or without special authority from the legislature.^^ On the other hand, in the absence of special regulations and by virtue of a general authority to lay out such roads, necessary crossings can be made.'^^ It was held ing Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Cincin- turn-outs and switches. See also, nati &c. R. Co., 116 Ind. 578; s. c. 19 In re Boston &c. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 574. N. E. 440; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. "''West Boston Bridge Co. v. Coun- North, 103 Ind. 486; s. c. 3 N. E. ty Com'rs. 10 Pick. (Mass.) 270,272; 144; McDonald v. Payne, 114 Ind. Inhabitants &c. v. Connecticut River 359; s. c. 16 N. E. 795; Elliott Roads R. Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 63, 71; Bos- & Streets (1st ed.) 167, notes 2 and ton &c. R. Co. v. Lowell &c. R. Co., 4 (see 2d ed., §§ 218, 219). 124 Mass. 368, 371. "In re City of Buffalo, 68 N. Y. "St. Paul &c. R. Co. v. City of 167. It was held in that case that Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 141; s. c. 27 under a general power a city could N. W. 500; State v. Easton R. Co.. 36 not excavate a canal across several N. J. L. 181; Tuckahoe Canal v. railroad-tracks and a railroad-yai'd Tuckahoe &c. R. Co.. 11 Leigh (Va.) where there were numerous tracks, 42. Express authority to cross rail- G98 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 680 that under a general authority county commissioners might take a strip of land from a schoolhouse lot for a needed town way, where the use of the lot for school purposes, though considerably impaired, would not be wholly prevented." There are cases in which it would seem that lands used for a burying-ground have been taken by the municipal authorities for highway purposes, but whether they were taken under a general or special authority does not appear,''^ In Connecticut it was held that land already in use as a cemetery could not be taken for a highway without clear legislative authority.*** § 698. Change of grade. — At common law a municipal corporation is not liable for injuries resulting from changing the grade of a high- way.^^ But a recovery may be had for injuries which result from the negligent manner in which the work is performed.*^ And in many states there are statutory or constitutional provisions giving a right of action for a substantial injury without regard to negligence.*^ road-tracks does not extend to land used for depot purposes: Prospect Park &c. R. Co. v. Williamson, 91 N. Y. 552; Albany &c. R. Co. v. Brown- ell, 24 N. Y. 345. '" Inhabitants &c. v. County Com'rs, 154 Mass. 424; s. c. 28 N. E. 298. Authority to take land for an- other public use may rest on neces- sary implication: In re Application of Mayor &c., 135 N. Y. 253; s. c. 31 N. E. 1043; N. Y. Law Jour., Oct. 27, 1892. " In the matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 149; In the mat- ter of Beekman Street, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 269. **" Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. City of New Haven, 43 Conn. 234. "' Simmons v. City of Camden, 26 Ark. 276; s. c. 7 Am. R. 620; Burr v. Inhabitants &c., 121 Mass. 241; Snow V. Inhabitants &c., 109 Mass. 123 ; Brown v. City of Lowell, 8 Met. (Mass.) 172; Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 418; Alden v. City of Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 254, 257; Lee V. City of Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 13; Shaw V. Crocker, 42 Cal. 435; Fel- lowes V. City of New Haven, 44 Conn. 240; s. c. 26 Am. R. 447; Dor- man v. City of Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538; Fuller v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 80; Thomson v. Mayor &c., 61 Mo. 282; Nebraska City v. Lampkin, 6 Neb. 27; Hendershott v. City of Ottumwa, 46 Iowa 658; Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 111. 502; City of Terre Haute v. Turner, 36 Ind. 522; Keasy v. City of Louisville, 4 Dana (Ky.) 154; Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Maine 322; Tyson v. City of Mil- waukee, 50 Wis. 78; s. c. 5 N. W. 914; Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635; People v. Green, 64 N. Y. 606; Pusey v. City of Allegheny, 98 Pa. St. 522; Humes v. Mayor &c., 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 403. In Ohio the rule is different: Keating v. Cincin- nati, 38 Ohio St. 141; Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159; Dod- son V. City of Cincinnati, 34 Ohio St. 276. " Dorman v. City of Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538; City of Aurora v. Reed, 57 111. 29; Cotes v. City of Daven- port, 9 Iowa 227; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), §§ 463, 483. '^^ Dalzell V. City of Davenport, 12 Iowa 437; City of Columbus v. Hy- draulic Woollen Mills Co., 33 Ind. 435; Burr v. Inhabitants &c., 121 Mass. 241; Hurford v. City of Oma- ha, 4 Neb. 336; Crossett v. City of 681 EMINENT DOMAIN. § 699 § 699. Change of use — Additional use. — It is clear that where the owner of the property condemned retains the fee, he is entitled to additional compensation in a new proceeding, if an additional burden is cast upon the land.'*'* "It is difficult to determine what shall be considered an additional burden, entitling the owner of the fee to the protection of the constitutional provision limiting the right of emi- nent domain. If the new use is radically distinct and different from the former, tliere must be a new assessment of compensation ; and the decided weight of authority is that constructing an ordinary com- mercial railroad on a street or road is a change of use entitling the owner of the soil to compensation."®^ But where the use is not Janesville, 28 Wis. 420. "A case of this character does not stand upon the common law, and, therefore, is not within the rule that an action will lie where there is an invasion of a right, although no substantial injury is shown; for it is of the es- sence of the statutory right that it should affirmatively appear that the complaining property-owner has sustained substantial damages:" Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 487, and cases cited. " "The soil can not be devoted to a different use, whether more or less onerous, without a new condemna- tion and compensation paid:" Lewis Eminent Domain, § 140. '''^Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 207, where the authorities on both sides are collected, and the prevail- ing rule vindicated by the authors. Part of a highway can not be used for a market-house without compen- sation to the owner of the fee. "Land taken and applied for the or- dinary purposes of a street would often be an improvement of the ad- jacent property; an appropriation of it to the uses of a market would, perhaps, as often be destructive of one-half of the value of such prop- erty:" State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. L. 201, 205. See also, Lutterloh v. Mayor &c., 15 Fla. 306; State v. • Mayor &c., 5 Port. (Ala.) 279; Mayor &c. V. Wilson, 49 Ga. 476. So with a ferry-landing upon a highway: Pros- ser V. Davis, 18 Iowa 367; Chambers V. Furry, 1 Yeates (Pa.) 167; Haight V. Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199; Chess v. Ma- nown, 3 Watts (Pa.) 219. Cf. Hud- son v. Cuero Land &c. Co., 47 Tex. 56. And generally where telegraph- or telephone-lines are put up on the highway. But the question of dam- age is one of fact: Lewis Eminent Domain, § 131. In Julia Bldg. Ass'n V. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, and Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75 (two judges dissenting), it is held that the erection of telegraph- and tele- phone-poles is not an additional servitude. And in Consumers' Gas &c. Co. V. Congress Spring Co., 15 N. Y. S. 624, it is held that poles and wires for electric lights are merely ancillary to the original use, but that special and peculiar circumstances might give a right to compensation. For cases holding that the use of a highway for a telegraph-line will en- title the abutting owner to ad- ditional compensation, see Dusen- bury V. Mutual Tel. Co., 11 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 440; Atlantic &c. Tel. Co. V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 6 Biss. 158; Board &c. v. Barnett, 107 111. 507; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), §§ 705, 706. As to elevated rail- roads, it was held by a majority of the justices of the New York court of appeals that an abutting owner, even if he does not own the ?^ i 00 PUBLIC CORPOIUTIONS. 682 essentially changed there is no new taking in the constitutional sense.®® § 700. The same subject continued — Electric railways. — The ques- tion whether electric railways shall be placed in the same category as horse-railroads or in that of steam-railroads has been earnestly debated in several cases. So far as the bare weight of authority can silence contention, it must be declared that a change in the motive power from horses to electricity, applied by means of the overhead- wire system, is not a radical and substantial departure in the occupancy of the highway and does not constitute a new and additional burden. This is the law in Pennsylvania,®'^ New Jersey,® ® Michigan,**'' and fee of any part of the street, has such a property as to be entitled to additional compensation: Story v. New York &c. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122. That the city can not authorize the use of a street for a hack-stand as against an abutting owner, see Mc- Caffrey v. Smith, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 117. In Attorney-General v. Metro- politan R. Co., 125 Mass. 515, and Lockhart v. Craig &c. R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 419, 422; s. c. 21 Atl. 26, a horse- railroad was held not to be a new servitude if the use of the highway be reasonable. To the same point, 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 722; Cincin- nati &c. R. Co. v. Incorporated Vil- lage of Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Detroit City R. Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 654; s. c. 48 N. W. 1007, and cases there cited; Taggart v. Newport St. R. Co., 16 R. I. 668; s. c. 19 Atl. 326. While it is recognized that the proper and contemplated use of a highway is not to be deemed limited to such vehicles as are in use at the time, it is considered to be too great an extension to hold that it embraces its use for a steam- railway. At this point the line has been drawn by a great weight of judicial decision: "Williams v. New York &c. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Wager V. Troy Union R. Co., 25 N. Y. 526; Imlay v. Union Branch R. Co., 26 Conn. 249, 255; Sherman v. Milwau- kee &c. R. Co., 40 Wis. 645; Kuche- man v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 46 Iowa 366; Kaiser v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 22 Minn. 149; Southern Pac. R. Co. V. Reed, 41 Cal. 256. *" Changing a highway into a turn- pike: Benedict v. Goit, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 459; Carter v. Clark, 89 Ind. 238; Wright v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 76, Contra, Cape Girardeau Road v. Ren- froe, 58 Mo. 265. Use of city or vil- lage streets for sewers and drains, water-pipes, gas-pipes, steam and electricity: Lewis Eminent Domain, § 127 et seq. The same writer points out (§ 140) a distinction between cases where the public holds a qual- ified fee in lands and those were the fee is absolute. In the latter case a change of use gives no claim to compensation. "Thus lands taken for an asylum, jail or schoolhouse are usually held by a fee-simple ab- solute, while lands acquired for streets and public grounds, though held in fee, are nevertheless held in trust for the' use specified." " Lockhart v. Craig St. R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 419; s. c. 21 Atl. 26. ^'^ Halsey v. Rapid Transit St. R. Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 380; s. c. 20 Atl. 859. 8" Detroit City R. Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634; s. c. 48 N. W. 1007. The same doctrine was announced by the Cuyahoga county, Ohio, court of common pleas in Pelton v. Railroad Co., 22 Week. Law Bui. 67. 683 ElMINENT DO:\rAIN, § 700 Eliodc Island."" In llie Pennsylvania case the eonrt said: "The pro- posed construction here is no more illegal by reason of its effects upon the owners of property, so far as actual interference with their rights to use the streets is concerned, than so many lamp-posts, and if com- pensation could not be compelled for the ground taken by them, neither should it be for the posts supporting the wires in this case."®^ And Grant, J., delivering the opinion in the Michigan case, said: ^'These poles used by the complainant [the railway company] are a necessary part of its system. When they do not interfere with the owner's access to and the use of his land, we see no reason why they should be held to constitute an additional servitude. Certainly they constitute no injury to his reversionary interest. To constitute an additional servitude, therefore, they must be an injury to the present use and enjoyment of his land. But they do not obstruct his light or his vision as do the structures of an elevated railroad. Neither they nor the cars they assist in moving cause the noise, steam, smoke and dirt which are produced by steam-cars. They do not interfere with his going and coming at his pleasure when placed as they can and must be so as to give him free access. Wherein then is he injured ? If it be said that they are unsightly and therefore offend his taste, it can well be replied that they are no more so than the lamp-post or the electric tower. It is as necessary that rapid transit be furnished to a crowded city as it is that light should be furnished to its streets. Public convenience and necessity must control in all such cases."®^ ^ Taggart v. Newport Street R. Co., elusion of others from the use of the 16 R. I. 668; s. c. 19 Atl. 326. street. A railway so constructed and "^ Lockhart v. Craig St. R. Co., 139 operated would be a public nuisance Pa. St. 419, 425; s. c. 21 Atl. 26. and the^ courts should abate it. 3. ^= Detroit City R. Co. v. Mills, 85 The complainant's road-bed and Mich. 634, 657; s. c. 48 N. W. 1007. track must be built substantially But the scope of the decision was with the level of the street so as to limited by the enunciation of the permit vehicles to cross without dif- following general principles: — "1. ficulty. 4. The poles must be so The complainant can not lawfully placed as not to interfere with the construct and operate its road in a rights of ingress and egress to abut- street too narrow to admit the pas- ting property." And the doctrine sage of its cars and other vehicles at seems also, to be confined to the use the same time, nor so construct it of city streets as distinguished from as to interfere with the rights of country roads. See s. c, pp. 653, 654, the general public in the street: and Lockhart v. Craig St. R. Co., 139 Grand Rapids St. R. Co. v. West Side Pa. St. 419, 424; s. c. 21 Atl. 26. In St. R. Co., 48 Mich. 433; s. c. 12 N. the opinion delivered in the Michi- W. 643. 2. Nor in a street, though of gan case, Long, J., concurred, and sufficient width, if its condition be Champlin, C. J., gave a qualified as- such that the operation of the rail- sent, but McGrath and Morse, JJ.. way will result in the practical ex- entered an emphatic protest. § 701 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 684 § 701. Grant of power to municipal corporations. — The right of eminent domain is one which lies dormant in tlie state until legislative action is had pointing out the occasion, mode, conditions and agencies for its exercise.®^ The legislature may delegate authority to private or to municipal corporations to take property by eminent domain,"* but the power must be given in express terms or by necessary implica- tion."" Statutes conferring the right are to be strictly construed."^ A provision that the common council may enforce ordinances "to construct and regulate sewers," etc., "and provide for the payment of the cost of constructing the same," does not confer the power to con- demn property by eminent domain."^ And power to open, extend or straighten streets and alleys does not authorize the condemnation of land for the purpose of widening a street."^ It has been held, how- ever, that power "to build and keep in repair county buildings, * * * and in case there are no public buildings, to provide suitable rooms for county purposes," gives the right to acquire land by eminent domain."" When the power is clear and the contem- plated use in a particular case is public, the courts will not inquire into the necessity or propriety of the exercise of the right, or investi- gate the motives of the municipal authorities.^"** "^Dyckman v. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. 434; Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 648; Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 438; Chi- cago &c. R. Co. V. Town of Lake, 71 111. 333. A strict compliance must be had with all the provisions of the law or the proceeding will be inef- fectual: Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 649 and cases cited; Weckler v. City of Chicago, 61 111. 142; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 605. ■■'^People V. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Commonwealth v. Inhabitants &c., 1 Pick. (Mass.) 180; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th ed.), § 602. "^ Harwinton v. Catlin, 19 Conn. 520; Baldwin v. City of Bangor, 36 Maine 518; State v. Bishop, 39 N. J. L. 226; Gallup v. Woodstock, 29 Vt. 347. When the statute makes no provision for compensation the pro- cedure can not be sustained: 'Chaf- fee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 244; s. c. 22 N. W. 871; In re Widening of Bur- nish St., 140 Pa. St. 531; s. c. 21 Atl. 500. ""Alexandria &c. R. Co. v. Alexan- dria &c. R. Co., 75 Va. 780; Washing- ton Cemetery v. Prospect Park &c. R. Co., 68 N. Y. 591; Chamberlain v. Elizabethport Steam Cordage Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43; s. c. 2 Atl. 775; Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. 372; s. c. 1 N. E. 711. "Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 438, 442. ''"Chaffee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 244; s. c. 22 N. W. 871. See also. People v. Common Council fee, 50 N. Y. 525; City of East St. Louis v. St. John, 47 111. 463. '-'^ Board &c. v. Gorrell, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 484. "" Dunham v. Village of Hyde Park, 75 111. 371 (unless, as the court intimated, tiie case shows manifest injustice, oppression and gross abuse of powers) ; Townsend v. Hoyle, 20 Conn. 1, 9; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 410; Stout v. Chosen Free- holders, 25 N. J. L. 202. GS5 EMlMOXr DOMAI \. 702 § 702. Public use and necessity of appropriation, by whom deter- mined. — "The question, Wliat is a public use? is always one of law. Dt'l'creiice will be paid to the legislative jiulgment as expressed in euactnieiils for an appropriation of property, but it will not be conclusive. "^"^ But the necessity and expediency of the exercise of the right of eminent domain is a political question, which is to be determined exclusively by the legislature.^"^ '"Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 660; Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Lake, 71 111. 333; Water-Works Co. v. Burk- hart, 41 Ind. 364; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540; Scudder v. Trenton &c. Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694; s. c. 23 Am. U. 756; Beekman v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 45; s. c. 22 Am. D. 679 and note; In re Deans- ville Cemetery Ass'n, 66 N. Y. 569; s. c. 23 Am. R. 86; In re Union Ferry Co., 98 N. Y. 139; In re Niagara Falls &c. R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375; s. c. 15 N. B. 429; Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333; s. c. 24 Am. R. 564; In re St. Paul &c. R. Co., 34 Minn. 227; s. c. 25 N. W. 345; City of Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54; s. c. 3 S. W. 215; McQuillen v. Hatton, 42 Ohio St. 202; Harding v. Goodlet, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 40; s. c. 24 Am. D. 546; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648. '"- United States v. Harris, 1 Sumn. 21, 42; De Varaigne v. Pox, 2 Blatch. 95; Dingley v. City ol; Boston, 100 Mass. 544, 558; Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v. County Com'rs, 103 Mass. 120; s. c. 4 Am. R. 518; Hing- ham &c. Co. v. Norfolk Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 353; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray (Mass.) 417; In re Wellington, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 87; s. c. 26 Am. D. 631; Iji re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n. 66 N. Y. 569, 572; s. c. 23 Am. R. 86; Harris v. Thompson, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 350; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; Hey ward V. Mayor &c., 7 N. Y. 314, 325; Varick V. Smith, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 137; s. c. 28 Am. D. 417; Coster v. Tidewater Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 54, 67; Scudder v. Trenton &c. Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694; s. c. 23 Am. D. 756; Concord R. Co. V. Greeley, 17 N. H. 47; Smedley v. Irwin, 51 Pa. St. 445; Mayor &c. v. Scott, 1 Pa. St. 309; Sadler v. Lang- ham, 34 Ala. 311, 327; Aldridge v. Tuscumbia R. Co., 2 St. & P. (Ala.) 199; s. c. 23 Am. D. 307; New Cen- tral Coal Co. V. George's Creek Coal &c. Co.. 37 Md. 537; Anderson v. Tuberville, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 150; Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor &c., 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 419; Challis v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 16 Kan. 117; Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341; Ford V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 14 Wis. 609; Tait's Ex'r v. Central Lunatic Asylum, 84 Va. 271; s. c. 4 S. E. 697; Sholl V. German Coal Co., 118 111. 427; s. c. 10 N. E. 199; In re Union Ferry Co., 98 N. Y. 139; Stockton &c. R. Co. v. Common Council &c., 41 Cal. 147; Napa &c. R. Co. V. Board &c., 30 Cal. 435, 437; County Court &c. v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; Lewis Eminent Domain 162, 238. But it is competent for the state to delegate the authority to adjudicate upon the question to the tribunal which has cognizance of the proceeding for appropriation: Coo- ley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 663; citing (among other cases) In re- New York &c. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 407; In re St. Paul &c. R. Co.. 34 Minn. 227; s. c. 25 N. W. 345; State v. Proprie- tors &c., 46 N. J. L. 495; Tracy v. Elizabethtown &c. R. Co.. 80 Ky. 259; Spring Valley Water Works v. San Mateo Water Works, 64 Cal. 123; s. § 703 PUBLIC COUrOKATlOiNS. 686 § 703. Legislative declaration conclusive. — Conceding that the de- termination by the legislative authority that a certain appropriation of property is for a public use may be supervised, and in cases of gross error or extreme wrong controlled by the judgment of the courts, the rule- is qualified, in a very important particular by a decision of the court of appeals ofNew York. The legislature made an appropria- tion for the purpose of extending a public canal by dredging a private mill-race which drew its supply of water from one side of the canal.^"^ The plaintiff, who was tlie owner of a race on the other side, com- plained, that the volume of water to which he was entitled would, be diminished, and he successfully assailed the validity of the act in the trial court by showing upon the testimony of witnesses that the improvement could not benefit the canal, but would benefit the prop- erty of the owner of the race which was to be enlarged. But the court of appeals sustained the act, reversing the judgment of the court below. O'Brien, J., premising that the purpose of the work, so far as it appeared on the face of the statute, was public and not private, continued as follows: "The expenditure may in fact be improvi- dent and the work may prove to be useless to the public, but the legis- lature, as the depositary of the sovereign powers of the people, must necessarily be the judge of the propriety and utility of making it. If it were otherwise, every appropriation of money by the legislature could be assailed in the courts, at the suit of private individuals, on the ground that they are useless and intended for a purpose other than is plainly expressed, in order to evade some provision of the or- ganic law. The judicial department can not institute an inquiry concerning the motives and purposes of the legislature, in order to attribute to it a design contrary to that clearly expressed or fairly implied in the bill, without disturbing or impairing in some measure the powers and functions assigned by the constitution to each de- partment of the govermneiit. The courts can not determine, upon the testimony of witnesses, that the purpose of the legislature was to appropriate public money for the benefit of an individual, when it has expressed its purpose in the bill itself to be the enlargement or im- provement of the canal. They must assume that the legislature acted in good faith and meant just what it said, though it may be possible to show, outside of the language and terms of the bill, that in fact c. 28 Pac. 447; Cape Girardeau &c. Lecoul v. Police Jury, 20 La. An. Road V. Dennis, 67 Mo. 438. See 308. also, Rensselaer &c. R. Co. v. Davis, '"' The ostensible purpose of the 43 N. Y. 137; Milwaukee &c. R. Co. improvement was to permit naviga- V. City of Faribault, 23 Minn. 167; tion by boats from the canal to a public street. 687 EMINENT DOMAIN. 704 all, or the larger part, of the benefits following the expenditure may or will be reaped by a few individuals. ■•= * * Eeason and au- thority as well as the fitness of things demand that when an act of the legislature appropriating money is assailed upon the ground that the purpose of such appropriation is local or private and not public, the question shall be determined by the language and general scope of the act."i°* § 704. Public uses as respects municipalities — Parks and streets. — Municipalities may be authorized to condemn private property for public roads and streets,^''^ public parks,"^ and public '"Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345, 358; s. c, 28 N. E. 358. The language of the court, as quoted in the text, had di- rect reference to the contention that the purpose of the bill was local and private, requiring the assent of two- thirds of the members of each house, which it did not receive, and in an- other part of the opinion it was shown that the plaintiff, under the facts proved in the case„ had no right to the water which would be divert- ed from him. But the doctrine would seem to be necessarily applicable to a bill for the appropriation of pri- vate property, and the court evident- ly so regarded the matter. ^"^ Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241; Rey- nolds v. Reynolds, 15 Conn. 83; O'Reiley v. Kankakee Val. &c. Co., 32 Ind. 169; Dorgan v. City of Bos- ton, 94 Mass. 223; Watson v. Town Council &c., 5 R. I. 562; Seaman v. Hicks, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 655; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), §§ 190, 195; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 54; City of Savannah v. Han- cock, 91 Mo. 54; s. c. 3 S. W. 215; United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean 317. Land can not be ap- propriated for private ways: Sadler V. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Roberts v. Williams, 15 Ark. 43; Nesbit v. Trumbo, 39 111. 110; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540; Dickey v. Ten- nison, 27 Mo. 373; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 140; s. c. 40 Am. D. 274. Cf. Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37; Robinson V. Swope, 12 Bush (Ky.) 21. "It is not the amount of travel, the extent of the use of a highway by the public that distin- guishes it from a private way or road. It is the right to so use or travel upon it, not its exercise:" Wild V. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 461; s. c. 13 Am. R. 399. But it may be a pub- lic road though maintained at pri- vate expense: Denham v. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 202; Davis v. Smith, 130 Mass. 113; Shaver v. Starrett, 4 Ohio St. 494; Perrine v. Farr, 22 N. J. L. 356; Procter v. An- dover, 42 N. H. 348. See also, Cope- land V. Packard, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 217; Crockett v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 182; Parks v. Mayor &c., 8 Pick. (Mass.) 218. Power to narrow a street may be given, but the easement of the abutting owners in the street as it exists must be paid for: Town of Rensselaer v. Leopold, 106 Ind. 29; s. c. 5 N. E. 761. Highways may be laid out for pleasure driving: Higginson v. In- habitants &c., 11 Allen (Mass.) 530; Petition of Mount Washington Road Co.. 35 N. H. 134; Lewis Eminent Domain, § 175. ""People V. Williams, 51 111. 57; In re Central Park Extension. 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 56; City of Phila- 705 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 688 squares.^*''' But land can not be taken for private roads. Dillon, C. J., de- livering the opinion of the supreme court of Iowa, said: "Wherever, by any well-considered decision, private roads have been sustained, it was because they were regarded as public in their character; and if prop- erly so regarded, laws authorizing their establishment would doubt- less_ be valid."^°^ In Vermont it was held that pent roads are not necessarily and essentially private.^"" And where land is condemned for a public square it is immaterial whether it is intended to be trav- eled upon or not, and it is no objection that damages are to be as- sessed upon the owners of adjoining property, be they few or many.^^** § 705. The same subject continued — Water, gas, etc. — So, also, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain private property may be taken for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants with water^^^ delphia v. Germantown Pass. R. Co., 10 Pliila. (Pa.) 165. Land for a park may be condemned outside the city limits and conveniently near there- to: Matter of Mayor of New York, 99 N. Y. 569; s. c. 2 N. E. 642; Thompson v. Moran, 44 Mich. 602; s. c. 7 N. W. 180. In St. Louis Co. Court V. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175, it was held that a county might be empow- ered to take land for a park near to but outside of the limits of the city of St. Louis, and create a county debt therefor. Nor was the act void for uncertainty because the title to the land was to vest in "the people of the county." As to the rights of a landowner whose premises front on a public park to enjoin its use for other than public purposes, see Morris v. Sea Girt Land Imp. Co., 38 N. J. Bq. 304 and note. "'Owners &c. v. Mayor &c., 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 374. 1°* Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540, 549. 109 Warren v. Bunnell, 11 Vt. 600. "" Owners &c. v. Mayor &c., 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 374. "1 Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104, 116; Cummings v. Peters, 56 Cal.593; Lake Pleasanton W. Co. v. Contra Costa W. Co., 67 Cal. 659; s. c. 8 Pac. 501; St. Helena W. Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182; Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 60; Ham v. City of Salem, 100 Mass. 350; Inhabitants &c. V. County Com'rs, 4 Gray (Mass.) 500; Bailey v. Inhabitants &c., 126 Mass. 416; Tyler v. Inhabitants &c., 147 Mass. 609; s. c. 18 N. E. 582; Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183; s. c. 29 N. E. 664; Matter of New Ro- chelle Water Co., 46 Hun (N. Y.) 525; Gardner v. Trustees &c., 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 162; Stamford Water Co. v. Stanley, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 424; In re Middletown Village, 82 N. Y. 196; In re Rochester Water Com'rs, 66 N. Y. 413; Reddell v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Kane v. Mayor &c., 15 Md. 240; Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 75 Maine 91; Thorn v. Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251; State v. City of Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533. For this purpose also, authority may be given to condemn property situated at a distance from the city: Mayor &c. V. Bailey. 2 Denio (N. Y.) 433, 446. Compensation must be made to those who own the right to use the water: City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588; s. c. 37 Am. R. 265. 689 EMINENT DOMAIN. 700 and gas^^- for public school buildings/ *■'* markets,"* and alms- houses."^ § 706. The same subject continued — Cemeteries, sewers, etc. — Lands may also be condemned for the purpose of a public cemetery. ^^'^ In this instance the land is deemed to be taken for public use, if all the public have a right of burial there, even though the privilege must be paid for and thus operate practically to exclude some per- sons.^^' But it is otherwise if the public have not and can not acquire the right of sepulture."** The construction of drains and sewers and levees is a public purpose."** But drainage laws which permit the taking of property for the chief object of promoting private interests are unconstitutional.^-'' "^ Bloomfield &c. Co. v. Richard- son, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 437. See also, In re Deering, 93 N. Y. 361; Provi- dence Gas Co. V. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15; Johnston v. People's Natural Gas Co. (Pa.), 5 Cent. R. 564. "^ Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. St. 168; Long v. Fuller, 68 Pa. St. 170; Township Board &c. v. Hack- man, 48 Mo. 243; Williams v. School Dist, 33 Vt. 271. "* Matter of Application of Cooper, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 515. "^ Hayward v. Mayor &c., 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 486. And public buildings of all kinds: Lewis Eminent Do- main, § 174. 110 Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551; s. c. 5 Atl. 353; Balch v. County Com'rs, 103 Mass. 106; Edgecumbe v. City of Burlington, 46 Vt. 218. ^" Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551; s. c. 5 Atl. 353. lis Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551; s. c. 5 Atl. 353; Matter of Deansville Cemetery Ass'n, 66 N. Y. 569. "" Patterson v. Baumer, 43 Iowa 477; Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 Ohio St. 349; Zimmerman v. Canfield, 42 Ohio St. 463; s. c. 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 382; Hildreth v. City of Lowell, 1 Smith — 44 11 Gray (Mass.) 345; People v. Near- ing, 27 N. Y. 306; Norfleet v. Crom- well, 70 N. C. 634; s. c. 16 Am. R. 787; Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 166; Burk v. Ayers, 19 Hua (N. Y.) 17; Matter of Ryers, 72 N. Y. 1; Dingley v. City of Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Bancroft v. City of Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438. ^-° Jenal v. Green Island Draining Co., 12 Neb. 163; s. c. 10 N. W. 547; Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hoo- per, 2 Met. (Ky.) 350; Reeves v. Treasurer &c., 8 Ohio St. 333; Pat- terson V. Baumer, 43 Iowa 477. Cf. Seely v. Sebastian, 4 Or. 25; Ander- son V. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199; s. c. 77 Am. D. 273; Pool v. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297. In discussing a drainage act the court of appeals of New York (Folger, J.) said: — "Drainage acts of the legislature not having in view the public health solely have been recognized and ac- quiesced in by the courts. But we wish to be distinctly understood that we sustain this- act as constitutional solely for that it plainly has for its purpose the preservation and promo- tion of the public health. . . . That the public purpose may be sought and attained, and private benefit also found, is not improbable. So it is when private property is § 707 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 690 § 707. The same subject continued — Leasing for public use. — In a case decided by the New York court of appeals/-^ it was urged that the provisions of the New York statute^-- authorizing the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York to ac- quire water-front property, including piers and bulkheads, were un- constitutional, upon the ground that they contemplated an appropria- tion to the sole use of special kinds of commerce or of steamboats, and also a lease of certain piers and rights of wharfage to a particular steamship-line to the exclusion of all others, thus constituting what was contended to be a private and not a public use. Peckham, J., de- livering the oj)inion of the court, conceding that an interest may be of a public nature when the use may tend incidentally to benefit the pub- lic in some collateral way, in which case the right to take property in invitum does not exist, proceeded to show that property may right- fully, under certain circumstances, be devoted to a special and particu- lar public use, and yet the entire public be permitted to use it or have access to it only in a very restricted manner. Applying these well-recognized principles to the case in hand, he continued: "We must consider the nature of the property which is to be so used or leased, and the object and purpose of such use must be viewed in connection with the whole of the property of like nature under the control and ownership of the city. * * * The circumstances sur- rounding the ease must be viewed in all aspects. The act plainly con- templates, through all its provisions, the fact that there will always remain under the direct control and possession of the city sufficient piers and docks for the accommodation of all the commerce which may seek our port, and which has no special pier or dock leased to the owner of the vessel desiring dock facilities.'* The act was unani- mously pronounced constitutional.^-^ taken for the public use of a rail- 99 N. Y. 569; s. c. 2 N. E. 642; Law road, and in quite as great degree; Jour., October 27, 1892. but in such case the private interest ^-- Ch. 574, laws of 1871. promoted is said to be incidental. ^-^ The opinion continues: — "Con- And though the works authorized to sidering the large extent of the prop- effect this public purpose are in any erty of this description owned and to case not extended beyond a particu- be owned by the city, together with lar, and it may be a small, district, the fact that there is no absolute di- the purpose is the same and is pub- rection to the city to lease the small- lie:" Matter of Ryers, 72 N. Y. 1, 8. est portion thereof to any one, we The constitutionality of these acts is became at once convinced that the treated at length, and the authorities leasing which will be actually car- collated by states, in Lewis Eminent ried on under this mere permission Domain, § 188 et seq. will amount to no more than a spe- "^ In re Application of Mayor &c., cial regulation of the manner in 691 EMINENT do:maix. § 708 § 708. The same subject continued — Ornamental purposes. — Byn- kcrslioek iv^ quoted by Chancellor Kent^-'* as insisting "that private property can not he taken on any terms without consent of the owner for purposes of public ornament or pleasure." And Judge Dillon says that "if it be admitted or shown in any given ease that the orna- mental purpose is not associated with any useful purpose, it would seem to be true that it is inconsistent with the respect in which all enlightened governments hold private property to say that it can be compulsorily taken from the owner."^^^ No case seems to have been adjudicated in which the contemplated purpose was wholly disso- ciated from any recognized "useful" purpose. But the doctrine to be applied has been distinctly declared by the supreme court in Ver- mont. The commissioners in a proceeding to lay out a highway adjacent to a court-house and town hall reported that they established the road upon the ground of a general public necessity and convenience which they considered almost indispensable for the use of the court- house and town hall, etc., taking into account in part "the looks" as well as the convenience and necessity; but that "for the purpose of embellishment alone or mainly" they should uot have established the road. The decision of the county court rejecting this report was reversed upon appeal. Eedfield, C. J., said: "If it appeared upon the face of the report that the prevailing ground with the commis- sioners in establishing the highway was that of ornament and improve- ment of the court-house .grounds, we should regard it as an insuffi- cient basis upon which to lay the highway, and as equivalent to a re- port against its being laid. But in the present case we understand the prevailing motive in laying out the road was the public convenience and private necessity, and the matter of ornament merely incidental and accessory. In that view * * * jt does not seem to us objec- tionable."^2« which a comparatively small portion be properly or effectually performed, of the whole property of this nature And in filling the necessity for such owned by the city shall be used for accommodations the city or state is the legitimate ends of commerce, only performing its public duty." . . . When used by lessees under ^-* Gardner v. Trustees &c., 2 Johns, the facts already stated, the use is Ch. (N. Y.) 161, 165. a public one. The use is public while '^ 2 Dillon Munic. Corp., § 599, the property is thus leased, because where the author also remarks that it fills an undisputed necessity ex- "it would be an extreme case where isting in regard to these common a purpose was wholly ornamental carriers by water, who are them- and not at all useful." selves engaged in fulfilling their ob- '=" Town of Woodstock v. Gallup, ligations to the general public; obli- 28 Vt. 587, 590. See also. West River gations which could not otherwise Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507. In 709 PUBLIC COriPOltATlONS. 692 § 709. Notice of proceeding — Necessity for. — The phrase "due process of law," in the fourteenth auieudnieut of the federal constitu- tion,* is held to require notice to the owners of land which it is sought to appropriate hy condemnation proceedings. "Due process of law," said the court of appeals of New York, "requires an orderly proceed- ing adapted to the nature of the case, in which the citizen has an op- portunity to.be heard, and to defend, enforce and protect his rights. A hearing or an opportunity to be heard is absolutely essential. We can not conceive of due process of law without this."^-^ But it is not needful that the statute should provide for personal and individual notice, as distinguished from public and general notice given by ad- vertisements in newspapers.^ ^^ And the propriety of taking private property for a public use is not strictly a judicial question, and the parties interested have no constitutional right to notice of proceedings to determine whether it shall be taken or not.^-^ Higginson v. Inhabitants &c., 11 Al- len (Mass.) 530, it was held that where there is a sufficient amount of travel to warrant the laying out of a highway, the reasons which may induce people to travel on it are im- material, and that pleasure travel may be accommodated as well as business travel. "Streets may be widened and court-yards left which are for ornament and not open to public travel:" Mills Eminent Do- main, § 18; citing In re Bushwick Ave., 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 9. 1" Stuart V. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183 ; Campbell v. Dwiggins, 83 Ind. 473; Harbeck v. City of Toledo, 11 Ohio St. 219; Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 116 Ind. 578; s. c. 19 N. E. 440; Molett v. Keenan, 22 Ala. 484; Nichols v. City of Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Matter of Village of Middletown, 82 N. Y. 196; Langford v. Commissioners, 16 Minn. 375; Darlington v. Common- wealth, 41 Pa. St. 68; Mayor &c. V. Bouldin, 23 Md. 328; Kidder v. City of Peoria, 29 111. 77. The case of Swan V. Williams, 2 Mich. 427, holding that no notice is required, is pronounced by Messrs. Elliott to be absolutely unsound: Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 197, n. In § 197 the learned and discrimi- nating authors maintain that some provision for notice is absolutely essential to the constitutionality of a law conferring the power to con- demn, and must be so declared •though the property-owner actually appears before the appraisers; and they hold to the dissenting opinion in Kramer v. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140. 1^ Matter of Petition of De Peyster, 80 N. Y. 565; United States Trust Co. V. United States Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. 199; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 148; s. c. 21 Am. D. 172; Davies v. City of Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37; s. c. 24 Pac. 771; Polly v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 449; Owners &c. v. Mayor &c., 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 374; Wilson v. Hath- away, 42 Iowa 173 (followed in State V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 80 Iowa 586; s. c. 46 N. W. 741); Mason v. Mes- senger, 17 Iowa 261; Cupp v. Board &c., 19 Ohio St. 173; Wilkin v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 16 Minn. 271; In- habitants &c. V. Morton. 25 Mo. 593; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195. ^^^ People V. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595. distinguishing such cases from the 693 EMINENT DOMAIN. 710 § 710. Parties entitled to notice. — In proceedings to condemn land the statute generally provides that notice shall he given to the "owners," which is construed to include those who have vested estates appearing of record/^" but not those whose interest consists of a mere lien, or contingent or inchoate estate. Under this rule a judgment creditor^^^ and the holder of a contingent dower interest have no such substantial right as to be entitled to notice.^^^ § 711. Service of notice. — The notice, if so directed, must be to the owner by name."^ But it need not be personally served on him,^^* although if sent by mail, and by reason of improper addressing it never reaches the person for whom it is intended, the proceeding as to him is of no effect. ^^^ Where several commissioners published a process for arriving at the amount of compensation; George's Creek Coal Co. v. New Central &c. Co., 40 Md. 425; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 200. "" Gerrard v. Omaha &c. R. Co., 14 Neb. 270; s. c. 15 N. W. 231; Parks v. City of Boston, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 198; Shelton v. Town of Derby,, 27 Conn. 414; Borough of Harrisburg v. Crangle, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 460; New Orleans R. Co. v. Frederic, 46 Miss. 1; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Will- iams, 54 Pa. St. 103; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 323, and cases there cited. Mortgagees are neces- sary parties: Wilson v. European &c. R. Co., 67 Maine 358; Sherwood v. City of Lafayette, 109 Ind. 411; s. c. 10 N. E. 89; Severin v. Cole, 38 Iowa 463; Hagar v. Brainard, 44 Vt. 294; Cool v. Crommet, 13 Mayie 250; Parker's Case, 36 N. H. 84; Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 603; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Eastern &c. R. Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 132. And tenants in com- mon: Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Alley, 34 Mich. 16. Cf. Bowman v. Venice &c. R. Co., 102 111. 459. And both landlord and tenant: Voegtly V. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 243; 6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 609. The trustee represents his cestui que trust: Hawkins v. County Com'rs, 2 Allen (Mass.) 254; State V. Mayor fee, 32 N. J. L. 49. As to waiver of insufficiency in the notice by appearance without objections, see Harrington v. Wofford, 46 Miss. 31; Morrow v. Weed, 4 Iowa 77; People V, Hagar, 52 Cal, 171; Delany V. Gault, 30 Pa. St. 63; Muncey v. Joest, 74 Ind. 409; Headrick v. Whittemore, 105 Mass. 23. In Will- iams v. Hartford &c. R. Co., 13 Conn. 397, a notice was sent on the day previous to the appraisal to the owner, who lived in close proximity to the place. He sent a written pro- test but not asking for delay. The notice was held sufficient. "If the facts are such as to impart notice that the person in possession has a proprietary claim to the land or color of title, then he should be made a party:" Elliott on Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 324 and cases cited. "'Gimbel v. Stolte, 59 Ind. 446; Watson V. New York &c. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157. 1S2 Moore v. Mayor. 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 456; Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 386; City of Indianapolis V. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200; s. c. 51 Am. R. 749 ; Duncan v. City of Terre Haute, 85 Ind. 104. See also, Simar V. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298. "'Birge v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 65 Iowa 440; s. c. 21 N. W. 767. "* Harper v. Lexington &c. R. Co., 2 Dana (Ky.) 227. 135 Morgan v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 36 § 712 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 694 notice that lands were al)out to be taken for a railroad and that they would meet on a day named to lay out the route and assess damages, and the notice was directed, "To all persons owning land on the line of the railroad, as the same is now or may be located through section 23, township 11, range 25, in the county of Wyandotte and state of Kansas," the United States supreme court held it to be sufficient no- tice to any one owning a quarter-section in section 23 that some of his land might be taken. ^^^ It was further held that a non-resident owner was concluded by such publication as well as a resident owner.^^^ Where the form of the notice is matter of detail in the enabling act, the provisions must be carefully carried out. Thus if the law says the notice must state the time when the commissioners will begin con- demnation proceedings and it fails to show the time, the proceedings will be held void;^^' or if the law directs the notice to be served, in case of a corporation, on its president, or some other named officer, service on any other official is not legal service.^^'' § 712. Treaty with the owner. — The owner of property has no con- stitutional right to an opportunity to sell and a failure to agree as a preliminary to proceedings to condemn.^*" But it has been held that if the statute authorizes a seizure only in case no agreement can be made with him, the proceedings are fatally defective if the}^ fail to show that this condition has been fulfilled.^*^ According to some Mich. 428. The substance of the no- man, 41 Kan. 300, 304; s. c. 21 Pac. tice must be such as the statute re- 284. quires and must be given in the "'' In re St. Paul &c. R. Co., 36 mode prescribed, and if proceedings Minn. 85; s. c. 30 N. W. 432; Acker- are not begun at the time designated man v. Huff, 71 Tex. 317; s. c. 9 S. a new notice must be issued. These W. 236. See also, Cory v. Chicago and all other matters relating to the &c. R. Co., 100 Mo. 282; s. c. 13 S. W. condemnation of land for roads and 346. Any local rule, statutory or ju- streets are carefully and thoroughly dicial, that notice is ineffectual un- treated in Elliott Roads & Streets less personally served on all resident (2d ed.), chs. 13-15. owners, must be strictly followed: i^^Huling V. Kaw Val. R. &c. Co., Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 206; State 130 U. S. 559; s. c. 9 S. Ct. 603. v. Common Council &c., 42 Wis. 287; "^ See also, Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Kundinger v. City of Saginaw, 59 Wall. 328; Secombe v. Railroad Co., Mich. 355; s. c. 26 N. W. 634. 23 Wall. 108; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 ""Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids U. S. 714; McMillan v. Anderson, 95 &c. R. Co., 58 Mich. 641; s. c. 26 N. U. S. 37; Davidson v. New Orleans, W. 159. 96 U. S. 97, 105 ; Hagar v. Reclama- "^ Graf v. City of St. Louis, 8 Mo. tion Dist., Ill U. S. 701; s. c. 4 S. App. 562; citing Kansas City &c. R. Ct. 663; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 Co. v. Campbell. 62 Mo. 585; Moses U. S. 403, 406. V. St. Louis Sectional Dock Co., 84 ^'^ Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. House- Mo. 242; reversing s. c. 9 Mo. App. 695 EMINENT DOMAIN. i: authorities proof of tlie fact is deemed to l)c waived by proceeding to trial without objection,^ ■"^ while others declare that the objection may be taken at any stage of the case, even after award. ^*^ There must be a genuine effort to effect an agreement/*^ but "the attempt need not be prosecuted further than to develop the fact that an agreement is impossible/"''*'* and if the owner is under a legal disability to con- tract, the statute has no application.^'*^ If the petition states the in- ability to agree, it need not recite the circumstances,^ *° unless the statute so requires. ^*^ § 713. The application or petition. — The statute sometimes grants power to the municipal authorities to initiate proceedings to condemn land of their own motion, but more generally it is provided that this shall be done upon application or petition. In the latter case a sufficient application is absolutely essential to confer jurisdiction.^*^ The petition should be in substantial conformity with the statute, but technical accuracy is not requisite. ^"*^ If, however, it is provided that 571. See also, to the same point, State V. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. J. L. 499; Matter of Opening House Ave., 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 350; Matter of Marsh, 71 N. Y. 315; Powers v. Ha- zelton &c. R. Co., 33 Ohio St. 429; Arnold v. Village of Decatur, 29 Mich. 77; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47; Morseman v. City of Ionia, 32 Mich. 283. Cf. ^tna Mills v. In- habitants &c., 126 Mass. 422; Ney v. Swinney, 36 Ind. 454. In Hall v. People, 57 111. 307, such a provision was held directory in a collateral proceeding. i"a Taylor v. Clemson, 11 CI. & F. 610; President &c. v. Diffebach, 1 Yeates (Pa.) 367. "- Lewis Eminent Domain, § 301 and cases there cited. '" Laue v. City of Saginaw, 53 Mich. 442; s. c. 19 N. W. 137. ^" Lewis Eminent Domain, § 302; citing Matter of the Village of Mid- dleton, 82 N. Y. 196. "^Laue v. City of Saginaw, 53 Mich. 442; s. c. 19 N. W. 137. See also. President &c. v. Diffebach, 1 Yeates (Pa.) 367. "" Bowman v. Venice &c. R. Co., 102 111. 459; Matter of Lockport &c. R. Co., 77 N. Y. 557. "'See Matter of Marsh, 71 N. Y. 315. "^ State V. Morse, 50 N. H. 9 (hold- ing, however, that although the rec- ord of the laying out of a highway disclosed no application, yet the rec- ord being ancient, such an applica- tion might be presumed by the jury, in connection with user even for less than twenty years) ; Oliphant v. Commissioners &c., 18 Kan. 3S6; Commonwealth v. Peters, 3 Mass. 229; State v. County Com'rs, 6 Neb. 129; People v. Judge &c., 40 Mich. 64; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa 58. The municipal authorities can not dele- gate the power confided to them: Oliphant v. Commissioners &c., su- pra. But they may appoint a com- mittee to report on expediency: Dor- man V. City Council &c., 81 Maine 411; s. c. 17 Atl. 316. ""The use of the word "road" in- stead of "highway" is not fatal: In- habitants &c. V. Commissioners, 26 Maine 406. See also. Board &c. v. Hogan, 39 Kan. 606: s. c. 18 Pac. 611; Dorman v. City Council &c., 81 713 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 696 the petition must be signed by a certain number of persons with j)rescribed qualifications, this is a jurisdictional requirement, and if the record fails to show affirmatively the existence of the fact, the proceedings will, when attacked directly, as by petition in error, be held void.^^° If attacked collaterally, it may be proved by evidence aliunde that the petitioners are duly qualified.^^^ There is no juris- diction to act unless the petition contains substantially all that the statute declares shall be inserted in it. Thus a statement that in the opinion of the petitioners the improvement asked for should be made is not an averment that in their opinion public interests require it.^^^ But the law looks to the substance rather than to the form, and if there is a substantial compliance with every essential condition it is sufficient.^^^ In the case of a proposed highway it is the practice to state at least the termini with reasonable and approximate definite- ness,^^* and it should appear affirmatively that it is within the terri- torial jurisdiction of the tribunal ;^^^ and an averment of necessity for the taking is generally deemed jurisdictional.^^® Maine 411; s. c. 17 Atl. 316. Nor is it necessary that those authorized to judge of the necessity and conve- nience of ways shall use technical terms in their adjudication and loca- tion, provided their intention is manifest, and they have jurisdiction of the subject: Inhabitants &c. v. Commissioners, 26 Maine 406. "Pub- lic convenience and necessities of the city" is equivalent to the statu- tory phrase, "common convenience and necessity:" Dorman v. City Council &c., 81 Maine 411; s. c. 17 Atl. 316. ^^'' Oliphant v. Commissioners &c., 18 Kan. 386; Early v. Hamilton, 75 Ind. 376; Board &c. v. Muhlenbacker, 18 Kan. 129; Conoway v. Ascherman, 94 Ind. 187. ^^^ Oliphant v. Commissioners &c., 18 Kan. 386; Willis v. Sproule, 13 Kan. 257; Robinson v. Rippey, 111 Ind. 112; s. c. 12 N. E. 141; Austin V. Allen, 6 Wis. 134. ''- In re Grove Street, 61 Cal. 438. "' Matter of Commissioners of Washington Park, 52 N. Y. 131, where an annexed schedule, referred to in the petition, was deemed a part of it. "* Hayford v. County Com'rs &c., 78 Maine 153; s. c. 3 Atl. 51; Inhab- itants &c. V. County Com'rs, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 351, in both of which cases the petition was fatally defective on this point. See also, generally, on sufficiency of description. Inhabit- ants &c. V. Norfolk, 117 Mass. 416; Smith V. Weldon, 73 Ind. 454; Jack- son V. Rankin, 67 Wis. 285; s. c. 30 N. W. 301; Clement v. Burns, 43 N. H. 609; Inhabitants &c. v. Field, 1 Conn. 279; Henline v. People, 81 111. 269; Inhabitants &c. v. County Com'rs, 37 Maine 112; Mossman v. Forest, 27 Ind. 233; Toledo &c. R. Co. V. Munson, 57 Mich. 42; s. c. 23 N. W. 455; West v. West &c. R. Co., 61 Miss. 536; Watson v. Crowsore, 93 Ind. 220. ""'> Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 296. '^"Colville V. Judy, 73 Mo. 651; In re Road in Sterrett Tp., 114 Pa. St. 627: s. c. 7 Atl. 765; Brown v. Rome &c. R. Co., 86 Ala. 206; s. c. 5 So. 195; City of Helena v. Harvey, 6 Mont. 114; s. c. 9 Pac. 903; Leath v. Summers, 3 Ired. L. (N. C.) 108. Formal objections should be specific and promptly made: Meranda v. 697 EMINENT DOMAIN. 14 § 714. The tribunal. — No appropriation of land can l)c made un- less the statute provides a tribunal for the assessment of damages.^''^ But while the legislature must provide an impartial tribunal to as- certain the amount of compensation/^** and give the parties interested an opportunity to be heard before such tribunal, it may determine what the tribunal shall be — whether a jury, a court without a jury, or commissioners selected by the court. ^^^ The tribunal must, how- ever, be one of a judicial nature, though not necessarily a court or a body exercising judicial functions only;^*'" and the weight of au- Spurlin, 100 Ind. 380; City of Worcester v. Keith, 5 Allen (Mass.) 17; Carr v. State, 103 Ind. 548; s. c. 3 N. E. 375; Bachelor v. New Hamp- ton. 60 N. H. 207; Wells v. Rhodes, 114 Ind. 467; s. c. 16 N. E. 830. As to allowance of amendment, see Young V. Laconia, 59 N. H. 534; Rus- sell V. Turner, 62 Maine 496; Cool- man V. Fleming, 82 Ind. 117; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 341 and cases cited. "^ Ames V. Lake Superior &c. Co., 21 Minn. 241; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Heister, 8 Barr (Pa.) 445. I's What shall be a "just compensa- tion" can be determined only by some impartial agency. The parties who take the land can not be allowed to determine it: Hessler v. Drainage Com'rs, 53 111. 105; Powers v. Bears, 12 Wis. 214; Lumsden v. City of Mil- waukee, 8 Wis. 485. Cf. Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169; McMicken v. City of Cincinnati. 4 Ohio St. 394, where the rule is re- laxed in cases where an appeal is allowed. The legislature can not prescribe a schedule of prices: Cun- ningham V. Campbell, 33 Ga. 625. A person ought not to be appointed to review damages in laying out a road who has formed or expressed an opinion upon the subject with a knowledge of the facts, and the as- sessment made under such appoint- ment will be set aside on certiorari; no person, however, who knew of such objection at the time of the ap- pointment and did not make it then will be allowed to take advantage of it upon certiorari: Inhabitants &c. V. Dilley, 24 N. J. L. 209. ^^"Ames V. Lake Superior &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 241. The legislature may confer upon the board of super- visors of one county the power to lay out a road in another county: People v. Board &c., 33 Cal. 487; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 346. The tribunal should be composed of disinterested persons. As to disqualification by relationship to parties, see Clifford v. Commissioners, 59 Maine 262. The interest of a general taxpayer may be disregarded : State v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. 394; Bradley v. City of Frankfort, 99 Ind. 417; Chase v. Town of Rutland, 47 Vt. 393. But the disqualification by direct inter- est has its origin in the fundamental nature of law: State v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. 394; Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), §§ 273, 281, 282. Cf. Mayor &c. V. Long, 31 Mo. 369; Foot v. Stiles, 57 N. Y. 399. Selection by lot is not an appointment by the court: Menges v. City of Albany, 56 N. Y. 374. ^"^ State V. Macdonald, 26 Minn. 445; s. c. sub nom. State v. District Court. 4 N. W. 1107; Doctor v. Hart- man, 74 Ind. 221; White v. Conover, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 462: State v. Rich- mond. 6 Fost. (N. H.) 232; Shue v. Highway Com'rs, 41 Mich. 638; s. c. 2 N. W. 808. § 715 PUBLIC COHPOKATIONS. 698 thority is that jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the rec- ord.^ «^ § 715. Right to jury trial. — The constitutional provision which declares that the right of trial by Jury shall remain inviolate has no relation to proceedings for the condemnation of private property by eminent domain. ^''- But some of the constitutions secure the right in this class of cases ia express terms. ^^^ And vi^here the word "jury'* is used it is construed to denote ex vi termini a body of twelve men acting substantially through the accustomed forms by which the pow- ers of a jury are exercised.^"* It is generally held in interpreting these provisions that if a jury trial may be had in an appellate court. '^' Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), §§ 295, 296, where the authorities are examined. ic2rpj^g reason is that the right in such cases did not exist at common law: Beekman v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 45; s. c. 22 Am. D. 679; Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 Ohio (pt. 2) 111; s. c. 30 Am. D. 195; Montgomery St. R. Co. v. Sayre, 72 Ala. 443; People v. Blake, 19 Cal. 579; Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 Saxt. Ch. (N. J.) 694; s. c. 23 Am. D. 756; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19; s. c. 35 Am. D. 466; Brug- german v. True, 25 Minn. 123; Copp V. Henniker, 55 N. H. 179; Hymes v. Aydelott, 26 Ind. 431; Dronberger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420; Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503; s. c. 1 N. E. 871; 4 N. E. 160; City of Kansas v. Hill, 80 Mo. 523; Kendall v. Post. 8 Or. 141; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; s. c. 5 S. Ct. 1086; Missouri Pac. R. Co. V. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 110; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Hood v. Pinch, 8 Wis. 381; Liigat V. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 456; Virginia &c. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358; Anderson v. Caldwell, 91 Ind. 451; s. c. 46 Am. R. 613; Kim- ball v. Board &c.. 46 Cal. 19. Contra, Kramer v. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140; Rhine v. City of Mc- Kinney, 53 Tex. 354; Henderson &c. R. Co. V. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 173. See also, Lewis Eminent Domain, § 311. "The proceeding for the ascertainment of the value of the property and consequent compensa- tion to be made is merely an inquisi- tion to establish a particular fact as a preliminary to the actual taking; and it may be prosecuted before commissioners or special boards, or the courts, with or without the in- tervention of a jury, as the legisla- tive power may designate. All that is required is that it shall be con- ducted in some fair and just manner, with opportunity to the owners of the property to present evidence as to its value, and to be heard there- on:" Justice Field in United States V. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 346. "^Williams v. City of Pittsburg, 83 Pa. St. 71; Mitchell v. Illinois &c. R. Co.. 68 111. 286; Weber v. Board &c., 59 Cal. 265; Louisville &c. R. Co. V. Dryden, 39 Ind. 393; Paul v. City of Detroit, 32 Mich. 108; Ipsom v. Mississippi &c. R. Co., 36 Miss. 300. ^«* Clark V. City of Utica, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 451. Unanimity is necessary to a legal verdict: Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167; Whitehead v. Arkan- sas &c. R. Co., 28 Ark. 460; City of Des Moines v. Layman, 21 Iowa 153; Mitchell V. Illinois &c. R. Co., 68 111. 286; Cooley Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 394. Cf. Cruger v. Hudson River R. Co., 12 N. Y. 190; McManus v. Mc- Donough, 107 111. 95. 699 !•: M 1 N i: N r domaix. § "10 it is no objection (linl the pivliniiiiai y licariii" Steuart v. Mayor &c., 7 Md. 500; Hapgood v. Doherty, 8 Gray (Mass.) 373; Tharp v. Witham, 6.5 Iowa 566; s. c. 22 N. W. 677; Maxwell v. Board &c., 119 Ind. 20, 23; s. e. 19 N. E. 617; 21 N. E. 453; Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167; Reckner v. Warner, 22 Ohio St. 275; Mayor &c. v. Central R. Co., 53 Ga. 120. A bond may be required by statute on appeal: Lewis Eminent Domain, § 312 and cases cited. ^«« Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Hock, 118 111. 587; s. c. 9 N. E. 205. '«' City of Elkhart v. Simonton, 71 Ind. 7: Brokaw v. City of Terra Haute, 97 Ind. 451; Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. V. Swinney, 97 Ind. 586; Hunting v. Curtis, 10 Iowa 152; Cor- bin v. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co., 66 Iowa 73 ; s. c. 23 N. W. 270 ; Graff v. Mayor &c., 10 Md. 544; Black v. Mayor &c., 50 Md. 235; Clarke v. Manchester, 56 N. H. 502; Whyte v. City of Kansas, 22 Mo. App. 409; City of St. .Joseph v. Hamilton, 43 Mo. 282; Stiles v. Town of Middle- sex, 8 Vt. 436; Hullin v. Second Mu- nicipality, 11 Rob. (La.) 97; Appli- cation &c. for Widening of Roffig- nac St., 4 Rob. (La.) 357: Stevens v. Borough of Danbury. 53 Conn. 9: O'Neil v. Board &c.. 41 N. J. L. 161; Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. Brad- ford, 6 W. Va. 220. In New York it was held that the court may impose conditions: Matter of Waverly Wa- ter-Works, 85 N. Y. 478. See also, Beekman Street, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 269; Lewis Eminent Domain, § 655. It would seem to be reasonable to require a party to make his election within the time allowed for filing objections to the report: Crume v. Wilson, 104 Ind. 583; s. c. 4 N. E. 169; People v. Common Council &c., 78 N. Y. 56. In England, after no- tice of intention to take, even be- fore the price is ascertained, the proprietor acquires the right to in- sist upon fulfilment of the award when made: Birmingham &c. R. Co. V. Reg., 6 Ry. Cas. 628; s. c. 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 276; King v. Market St. Com'rs, 4 B. & Ad. 333; Stone v. Commercial R. Co., 4 M. & C. 122; Walker v. Eastern Counties R. Co.. 6 Hare 594; Tawney v. Lynn &c. R. Co., 16 L. J. (N. S.) Eq. 282. "' Matter of Rhinebeck &c. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 242. See also, Drath v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 15 Neb. 367; s. c. 18 N. W. 717. '<■■'• O'Neil V. Board &c., 41 N. .J. L. 161; State v. Halsted. 39 N. J. L. 640; Merrick v. Mayor &c., 43 Md. 219; Mayor &c. v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272; City of St. Joseph v. Hamilton, 17 PUBLIC CORrOHATIONS. 700 § 717. Damages upon discontinuance of proceedings. — Upon a dis- continuance the landowner is entitled to recover his legal costs, at any rate, and probably other legitimate expenses/'^'* which in one case were held not to include counsel fees.^^^ "If, pending proceed- ings, possession has been taken of the property sought to be con- demned, the abandonment of such proceedings renders such possession wrongful from the beginning, and a suit will lie for any damages occasioned by the entry and possession. "^^^ In many cases the owner is kept in suspense for a considerable period before the election to dis- continue is made, during which time he is unable to dispose of his property, deems it injudicious to improve it, or is otherwise deprived of the beneficial use of it. The supreme court of Louisiana declared that the fact of great delay and abandonment of the suit was prima facie evidence that it was unnecessary and gave judgment for dam- ages.^'^^ The same doctrine was laid down by the court of appeals of Maryland,^ ^* and subsequently affirmed with the qualification that the 43 Mo. 282; People v. Village of Hyde Park, 117 111. 462; s. c. 6 N. E. 33; Wilkinson v. Bixler, 88 Ind. 574; Carson v. City of Hartford, 48 Conn. 68; State v. Mills, 29 Wis. 322. There should be no unreasonable de- lay: Baltimore &c. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395. See also, Williams v. New Orleans R. Co., 60 Miss. 689. But, in favor of the property owner, an unreasonable delay may consti- tute an abandonment by implica- tion: Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306. For other cases of constructive abandonment, see State v. Halsted, 39 N. J. L. 640; Breese v. Poole, 16 111. App. 551. Costs of discontinuance: North Missouri R. Co. v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515. The right to abandon pro- ceedings is frequently regulated by statute, and many cases construing these provisions are cited in Lewis Eminent Domain, § 356. ^■"Carson v. City of Hartford, 48 Conn. 68; Graff v. Mayor &c., 10 Md. 544; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Gear v. Dubuque &c. R. Co., 20 Iowa 523; McLaughlin v. Municipal- ity, 5 La. An. 504. See also, Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545; Feiten v. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494; s. c. 2 N. W. 1148; Leisse v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 72 Mo. 561; North Mis- souri &c. R. Co. V. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515; State v. Waldron, 17 N. J. L. 369. >'i Bergman v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 533. '"-Lewis Eminent Domain, § 658; citing Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Swin- ney, 97 Ind. 586; Hullin v. Second Municipality, 11 Rob. (La.) 97; Van Valkenburg v. City of Milwaukee, 43 Wis. 574. "^ McLaughlin v. Municipality, 5 La. An. 504. Where the proceed- ings are rightfully discontinued, after award made, the landowner's remedy, if he has any, is by special action for damages and not by man- damus or other action to collect the amount: State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Milliard v. City of Lafayette, 5 La. An. 112; In re Canal St., 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 155. "^ Norris v. Mayor &c., 44 Md. 598, holding that the measure of damages is interest upon the mar- ket value of the property for the time the delay was without justifi- able excuse. 701 EMINENT DO]N[ATN'. 718 delay must be culpable or unreasonable, which is a question of fact for the jury/'^^' Further than tliis the courts are not disposed to § 718. Compensation. — Pecuniary compensation must be paid to the person wlioso property is taken, the amount of which is fixed by inquest before a jury or before commissioners. The compensation must be the full reasonable value of the interest appropriated, and tJie measure of damages is the market value. ^"^ In estimating the market value speculative considerations do not have weight unless, in excep- tional cases, the probable increase in value from whatever cause can be very clearly proven. But improvements on the property taken may not be disregarded."® The market value is usually calculated "= Black v. Mayor &c., 50 Md. 235. To the same effect see Leisse v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 2 Mo. App. Repr. 105; s. c. 5 Mo. App. 585; s. c. af- firmed in 72 Mo, 561. See also, Whyte v. City of Kansas, 22 Mo. App. 409. "" Carson v. City of Hartford, 48 Conn. 68; Bergman v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 533; Van Vallien- burg v. City of Milwaulvee, 43 Wis. 574; Feiten v. City of Milwaulvee, 47 Wis. 494; s. c. 2 N. W. 1148. Mar- tin v. Mayor &c., 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545, decides that there is no action even for unreasonable delay. Where the proceedings are abandoned after award made and subsequently recom- menced, it has been held that the first award is binding and a bar to the new proceedings: Rogers v. City of St. Charles, 3 Mo. App. 41. See also, Hupert v. Anderson, 35 Iowa 578. Many statutes now give a right to recover damages upon abandonment. The expression "trouble and expense" is construed in Whitney v. City of Lynn, 122 Mass. 338. See also, Stafford v. Mayor &c., 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 541. '"Hill v. Mohawk &c. R. Co., 5 Denio (N. Y.) 206; In re Purman St., 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 649; Lawrence V. City of Boston, 119 Mass. 126; Burt V. Brigham, 117 Mass. 307; Cobb V. City of Boston, 112 Mass. 181; Fall River Works v. City of Fall River, 110 Mass. 428; Edmunds V. City of Boston, 108 Mass. 535; King V. Minneapolis Union R. Co., 32 Minn. 224; s. c. 20 N. W. 135; Jones V. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227; Cohen v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 34 Kan. 158; s. c. 8 Pac. 138; St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ja- cobs, 110 111. 414; Jacksonville' &c. R. Co. V. Walsh, 106 111. 253; Sidener V. Essex, 22 Ind. 201; Cummins v. Des Moines &c. R. Co., 63 Iowa 397; s. c. 19 N. W. 268; Bangor &c. R. Co. V. McComb, 60 Maine 290; Fremont &c. R. Co. V. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585; s. c. 10 N. W. 491; Virginia &c. R. Co. V. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358; Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Rose, 74 Pa. St. 362; How- ard V. City of Providence, 6 R. I. 514; Chapman v. Oshkosh &c. R. Co., 33 Wis. 629; City of Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 508; On- tario &c. R. Co. V. Taylor, 6 Ont. Rep. Q. B. D. 338; Penny v. Penny, 37 L. J. Ch. 340. Witnesses ac- quainted witlj the market value may testify to their opinion, though it is said to be the prevailing rule that a witness can not be asked how much damages a party has suffei'ed: Elli- ott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 258, and cases cited. "* Jacksonville &c. R. Co. v. Walsh, 106 111. 253; Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. Winslow, 66 111. 219. § 719 PUBLIC COKI'OKATIOXS. 703 at what the property woiikl "bring in the hnnds of a prudent seller at liberty to fix the time and the conditions of the sale."^^^ And con- siderations of association or affection are not admitted. In Massa- chusetts the court held that it was not competent to take into account what the owner would give rather than be turned out of his prop- erty.^^° Nor can the fact that the particular lot is absolutely indis- pensable to the project of the corporation be made an element in its value.^^^ But of course the purpose to which property has been put and in view of which improvements have been made is very justly a factor in the case.^^^ § 719. Elements in estimating compensation. — The statement that the indispensability of the property to the taker's purposes is not to affect the amount of compensation must be taken with the qualifica- tion that where property is found in every way suitable and he seeks to condemn it, although other property could be obtained not quite so conveniently situated, the owner is entitled to the benefit of the suitability in estimating its value. In the case of Boom Co. v. Patterson,^®^ the plaintiff, a boom construction company, entitled by law to enter upon and occupy lands necessary properly to conduct its business, sought to acquire a chain of islands in the Mississippi river, very well fitted to form, by connecting their shore line, a boom of great dimensions. The result of the original proceed- ings was an award of $3,000, from which both parties appealed. Upon a second appraisement the jury assessed the value of the prop- erty at $300, but in view of its adaptability for boom purposes they found a further and additional value of $9,058.33. The company contended that the $300 appraisal was all it could be made to pay. Mr. Justice Field, for the court, said: "In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be, Wliat is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is ""6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law Nev. 358; Penny v. Penny, 37 L. J. 568; citing among other cases, Law- Ch. 340. rence v. City of Boston, 119 Mass. ^^^ Michigan &c. R. Co. v. Barnes, 126; City of Memphis v. Bolton, 9 44 Mich. 222; s. c. 6 N. W. 651; Price Heisk. (Tenn.) 508; Tufts v. City of v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 27 Wis. 98; Charlestown, 4 Gray (Mass.) 537; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 110 111. Cobb V. City of Boston, 112 Mass. 414; Robb v. Maysville &c. Tpk. Co., 181. 3 Met. (Ky.) 117; King v. Minne- ''" Tufts V. City of Charlestown, 4 apolis Union R. Co., 32 Minn. 224; s. Gray (Mass.) 537. c. 20 N. W. 135. ''' Virginia &c. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 ^'' 98 U. S. 403. 703 EMINENT DOMAIN, § 720 at the time applied, but witli reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted; that is to say, what is its worth from its availability for valuable uses ? Property is not to be deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go to waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to use it, and make it subserve the necessities or conveniences of life. Its capability of being made thus available gives it a market value which can be readily estimated. * * *" The learned justice goes on to show the adaptability of the islands to the company's purposes, and adds: "Their adaptability for boom purposes was a circumstance, there- fore, which the owner had a right to insist upon as an element in estimating the value of his lands."^** § 720. The same subject continued. — Some cases go even further and hold that the owner is entitled to the highest price the property will bring for the use to which it may most advantageously be ap- plied.^^^ Judge Cooley expresses himself on the subject of compensa- tion as follows: "The principle upon which the damages are to be assessed is always an important consideration in these cases, and the circumstances of different appropriations are sometimes so peculiar that it has been found somewhat difficult to establish a rule that shall always be just and equitable. If the whole of a man's estate is taken there can generally be little difficulty in fixing upon the measure of compensation ; for it is apparent that in such a case he ought to have the whole market value of his premises, and he can not reasonably demand more. The question is reduced to one of market value, to be determined upon the testimony of those who have knowledge upon that subject or whose business or experience entitles their opinion to weight. It may be that, in such a case, the market value may not seem to the owner an adequate compensation, for he may have reasons peculiar to himself, springing from asociation or other cause, w^iich make him unwilling to part with the property on the estimate of his neighbors ; hut such reasons are incapable of being iahen- into account in legal proceedings where the question is one of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is manifestly impossible to measure them by any standard for estimating values which is applied in other cases and ^^ See also. In re Furman St., 17 "^ In re Furman Street, 17 Wend. Wend. (N. Y.) 649; Goodwin v. Gin- (N. Y.) 649, 650; King v. Minneap- cinnati &c. Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. olis Union R. Co., 32 Minn. 224; s. c. 169; Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30. 20 N. W. 135. See also, as to recov- That no allowance is to be made for ery for incidental injuries to re- the good will of a business, see Ed- maining land, Elliott Roads & munds v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535. Streets (2d ed.), § 253. § 721 PUBLIC conroRATioxs, 704 wliieli necessarily measures the worth of property by its value as an article of sale, or as a means of producing pecuniary returns."^^" § 721. Benefits. — There is a wide difference of opinion among the courts upon tlie question whether the damages for tlie land taken may be offset either wholly or partly by the benefits that accrue to the residue. It is said in a standard treatise that the authorities range themselves under these heads: "1st. Those holding that benefits can not in any case be set off against the injury sustained by the land- owner.^*^ 2d. Those holding that special benefits may not be set off against the value of the land actually seized, but may be set off against incidental injuries sustained by the landowner.^** 3d. Those hold- ing that special benefits may be set off against the value of the land as well as against incidental injuries."^**" In all cases the benefits claimed must be special to the particular parcel affected^ ^° and of a kind not common to the public at large. ^^^ In several states there are statutory or constitutional provisions forbidding a deduction on account of benefits. In declaring the construction of such an inhibi- tion the court of appeals of New York said : "Whatever land is taken must be paid for by the railroad company at its full market value, and from such value no deduction can be made, although the re- mainder of the landowner's property may be largely enhanced in value as a result of the operation of the railroad. But in considering tlie question of damages to the remainder of the land not taken, the commissioners must consider the effect of the road upon the whole of that remainder, its advantages and disadvantages, benefits and in- juries, and if the result is beneficial there is no damage and nothing can be awarded."^^" ^""Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) Putnam v. Douglas Co., 6 Or. 328; s. 646, 647. c. 25 Am. R. 527; Root's Case, 77 1" Elliott Roads & Streets (2d Pa. St. 276; Nichols v. City of ed.), § 245; citing among other Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189. See also, cases, New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. 6 Am. & Bng. Encyc. of Law 581. Moye, 39 Miss. 374; City of Memphis '""Mayor &c. v. Long, 31 Mo. 369; V. Bolton, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 508; Paducah &c. Co. v. Stovall, 12 Heisk. Israel V. Jewett, 29 Iowa 475; Mayor (Tenn.) 1; Selma &c. R. Co. v. &c, V. Hartridge, 37 Ga. 115. Camp, 45 Ga. 180; Koestenbader v. ^^ Citing among other cases, Rob- Price, 41 Iowa 204. bins V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 6 Wis. '"' Commissioners &c. v. Johnston, 636; Shipley V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 71 N. C. 398; Meacham v. Fitch- 34 Md. 336; City Council &c. v. burg R. Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 291; Marks, 50 Ga. 612; City of Shawnee- City of Springfield v. Schmook, 68 town V. Mason, 82 111. 337; Sutton V. Mo. 394; Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. City of Louisville, 5 Dana (Ky.) 28. 503; s. c. 1 N. E. 871; 4 N. E. 160; "" Citing with other cases, Mcln- Penrice v. Wallis, 37 Miss. 172. tire V. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 384; "= Newman v. Metropolitan &c. R. 705 EMINENT DOMAIN, ' § 723 § 722, Payment. — Where the constitution does not provide that payment must be made before the property is taken, it need not be given in all cases concurrently in point of time with the actual exer- cise of the right of eminent domain. It is enough if an adequate and certain remedy is provided whereby the owner of such property may compel payment of his damages.^"^ A remedy contingent upon the realization of a fund from taxation for benefits within a limited-as- sessment district does not meet the requirements of the law.^^* And it is a gross violation of constitutional right to compel the owner of property to resort to a lawsuit in order to recover. ^^^ Judge Cooley says : "The land should either be his or he should be paid for it. Whenever, therefore, the necessary steps have been taken on the part of the public to select the property to be taken, locate the public work, and declare the appropriation, the owner becomes absolutely entitled to the compensation, whether the public proceed at once to occupy the property or not. If a street is legally established over the land of an individual, he is entitled to demand payment of his damages without waiting for the street to be opened."^ ''^ But where a town was authorized to borrow money by the issue of its bonds, to meet any deficiency in local assessments, and enable payment to be more readily made, the court of appeals of New York held that the provision fur- Co., 118 N. Y. 618; s. c. 23 N. E. 901. Wallace v. Karlenoweski, 19 Barb. See also, Shipley v. Baltimore &c. (N. Y.) 118. R. Co., 34 Md. 336; Wilson v. Rock- ^^^ Cooley Const. Lim. (6th ed.) ford &c. R. Co., 59 111. 273. 696; citing City of Philadelphia v. 1"^ Matter of Petition of United Dickson, 38 Pa. St. 247; City of States, 96 N. Y. 227; Bloodgood v. Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Pa. St. 463; Mohawk &c. R. Co., 18 Wend. (N. Hallock v. Inhabitants &c., 2 Met. Y.) 9; Lyon V.Jerome, 26 Wend. (N. (Mass.) 558; Blake v. City of Du- Y.) 485; People v. Hayden, 6 Hill buque, 13 Iowa 66; Higgins v. City (N. Y.) 359; Rexford v. Knight, 11 of Chicago, 18 111. 276; Town of N. Y. 308. Cf. 2 Kent Com. 339, n. Hampton v. Coffin, 4 N. H. 517; Har- ^'■^ Sage V. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. rington v. County Com'rs, 22 Pick. Y. 189; Chapman v. Gates, 54 N. Y. (Mass.) 263. See also. City of Chi- 132; City of Lafayette v. Shultz, 44 cago v. Barbian, 80 111. 482; Elliott Ind. 97; Commissioners &c. v. Dur- Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 269. ham, 43 111. 86. Title does not vest until payment: 195 Even though it be mandamus to New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Lagarde, compel the appointment of commis- 10 La. An. 150; Gillan v. Hutchin- sioners of appraisal: Shepardson v. son, 16 Cal. 153. Preliminary sur- Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 6 Wis. 605; veys are not a taking: Cushman v. Norton v. Peck, 3 Wis. 714. See Smith, 34 Maine 247; Orr v. Quim- also, Walther V. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; by, 54 N. H. 590; Steuart v. Mayor Henry v. Dubuque, 10 Iowa 540; &c., 7 Md. 500. 1 Smith — 45 723 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 706 nished adequate seeurity.^"^ Where the statute provides a remedy not obnoxious to the objections, suggested, it is only by that means that payment may be enforced.^'''* If there be no statutory provision the owner may of course have an action for his moncy.^^" § 723. Review of proceedings — Certiorari. — Where the proceedings are merely erroneous the remedy is usually by certiorari or appeal.^*''* A writ of certiorari (when not auxiliary to any other process) is in the nature of a writ of error, addressed to an inferior court or tribunal whose procedure is not according to the course of the common law, After the writ has been issued and the record certified in obedience to it, the court is bound to determine upon an inspection of the whole record whether the proceedings are legal or erroneous ; but the grant- ing of the writ in the first instance is not a matter of right and rests in the discretion of the court, and the writ will not be granted unless the petitioner satisfies the court that substantial justice requires it.^°^ "^ In the Matter of Church, 92 N. Y. 1. The Messrs. Elliott, whose opinion is always entitled to weight, do not think this doctrine ought to prevail: Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 237. ^"^ Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 667; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Dodge v. Essex Co. Com'rs, 3 Met. (Mass.) 380; Lafay- ette &c. R. Co. V. Smith, 6 Ind. 249; New Albany &c. R. Co. v. Connelly, 7 Ind. 32; Indiana &c. R. Co. v. Oakes, 20 Ind. 9; Mills Eminent Domain, §§ 87, 88; Lewis Eminent Domain, § 608. "° Jamison v. City of Springfield, 53 Mo. 224. If the property be tak- en without payment he may main- tain ejectment in Iowa and Missis- sippi: Daniels v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 35 Iowa 129; Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700. Contra in Arkansas: Cairo &c. R. Co. v. Tur- ner, 31 Ark. 494. '""' Farmington River &c. Co. v. County Com'rs, 112 Mass. 206. In- junction is not the appropriate rem- edy: State V. Hanna, 97 Ind. 469; Buckley v. Drake, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 384; Tharp v. Witham, 65 Iowa 566; s. c. 22 N. W. 677. Nor mandamus to compel appointment of new com- missioners: State V. Longstreet, 38 N. J. L. 312. -'■'- Farmington River &c. Co. v. County Com'rs, 112 Mass. 206; Com- monwealth V. Sheldon, 3 Mass. 188; Ex parte Weston, 11 Mass. 417; Lees V. Child, 17 Mass. 351; Freetown v. County Com'rs, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 46; Inhabitants &c. v. County Com'rs, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 71; Gleason v. Sloper, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 181; In- habitants &c. V. County Com'rs, 5 Gray (Mass.) 451, 453; Ex parte Hitz, 111 U. S. 766; s. c 4 S. Ct. 698; Pickford v. Mayor &c., 98 Mass. 491; City of Charlestown v. Commission- ers, 109 Mass. 270; Petition of Landaff, 34 N. H. 163; Tiedt v. Car- stensen, 61 Iowa 334; s. c. 16 N. W. 214; Keys v. Marin Co., 42 Cal. 252; Boston &c. R. Co. v. Folsom, 46 N. H. 64. Requisites of petition for certiorari: Chambers v. Lewis, 9 Iowa 583; Vanderstolph v. Highway Com'rs, 50 Mich. 330; s. c. 15 N. W. 495; Richardson v. Smith, 59 N. H. 517; Stokes v. Early, 45 N. J. L. 478. Petitioner must show a special inter- est: Parnell v. Commissioners, 34 Ala. 278. 707 EMINENT DOMAIN. § 724 The writ lies only to correct errors in law and not to revise a decision of a question of fact upon the evidence introduced at the hearing in the inferior court, or to examine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding, unless objection was taken to the evidence for incompetency so as to raise a legal question. ^°^ Whenever the case was within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, the petitioner for a writ of certiorari can not be permitted to introduce evidence or to* contradict or vary its statement, in its record or return, of its proceed- ings or decision.^"^ It is only where extrinsic evidence has been in- troduced, at the hearing upon the petition, in support of the decision below, and by way of showing that substantial justice does not require the proceedings to be quashed, that like evidence may be introduced by the party petitioning for the writ, and then upon the same point only.^"* The writ must be addressed to the court having the custody and control of the record of the proceedings sought to be quashed.^*' ^ It can only be granted after notice and opportunity to show cause against it, and if granted without such notice will be quashed as im- providently issued.-*'® When the proceedings are before county com- missioners, notice of the petition should be given to them,, the answer or return to the petition must be the joint act of the whole present board and the separate answer of one commissioner can not be re- ceived.^"'^ § 724. The same subject continued — Appeal. — The right of appeal is purely statutory. ^^^ The legislature has authority to deny an appeal and to make the decision of the inferior tribunal final and conclusive, or, if appeal is allowed, to declare what questions shall be and what questions shall not be tried on appeal.^"" Ordinarily only parties to ^^ Hayward's Case, 10 Pick. ^"^ Commonwealth v. Winthrop, 10 (Mass.) 358; Nightingale's Case, 11 Mass. 177. Pick. (Mass.) 168; Stratton v. Com- -"''Commonwealth v. Downing, 6 mon wealth, 10 Met. (Mass.) 217; Mass. 72. Cobb V. Lucas, 1.5 Pick. (Mass.) 1. ""'Inhabitants &c. v. County ^"^Pond V. Medway, Quincy (Mass.) Com'rs, 16 Gray (Mass.) 341. 193; City of Charlestown v. County ^" Sims v. Hines, 121 Ind. 534; s. Com'rs, 109 Mass. 270; Inhabitants c. 23 N. E. 515. &c. v. County Com'rs, 5 Allen =»=> Matter of State Reservation, 102 (Mass.) 13. N. Y. 734; s. c. 7 N. E. 916; Appeal '"* Inhabitants &c., Petitioner, 6 of Houghton, 42 Cal. 35; Sims v. Pick. (Mass.) 470; Stone v. City of Hines, 121 Ind. 534; s. c. 23 N. E. Boston, 2 Met. (Mass.) 220, 228. See 515; State v. Mayor &c., 29 N. J. L. further, as to practice upon hearing 441; Ricketts v. Village of Hyde of petition for certiorari. Farming- Park, 85 111. 110; Norfolk &c. R. ton River &c. Co. v. County Com'rs, Co. v. Ely, 95 N. C. 77; Murray v. 112 Mass. 206, 215. Tucker, 10 Bush (Ky.) 240; Dough- 724 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 708 the proceedings have the right of appeal.'^ "^ Notice must be given and served as the statute provides.^^^ The practice in the appellate court is generally regulated by statute, but in respect of matters not included in the statutory provisions, the general rules of practice in similar cases are adopted.^ ^^ The appeal operates to vacate the deci- sion appealed from,^^^ and the case is usually tried de novo in the appellate court.^^* erty v. Miller, 36 Cal. 83; Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 75; Fass v. See- hawer, 60 Wis. 525; s. c. 19 N. W. 533. Statutes giving appeals are liberally construed so as to embrace condemnation proceedings if possi- ble: Howard v. Drainage Com'rs, 126 111. 53; s. c. sub nom. Howard v. Shaw, 18 N. E. 313; Yelton v. Addi- son, 101 Ind. 58. "" Canyonville &c. Road Co. v. Douglass Co., 5 Or. 280; Barr v. Stevens, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 292; Spauld- ing V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 57 Wis. 304; s. c. 14 N. W. 368; 15 N. W. 482. "Persons" includes corpora- tions: People V. May, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 238. -" People V. Lawrence, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 589; Commissioners &c. v. Claw, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 537; Klein V. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 30 Minn. 451; s. c. 16 N. W. 265; Waltmeyer v. Wisconsin &c. R. Co., 64 Iowa 688; s. c. 21 N. W, 139. Appearance for the purpose of moving to dismiss is not a waiver of notice: Spurrier v. Wirtner, 48 Iowa 486. See also, People V. Osborn, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 186. "'- Elliott Roads & Streets (2d ed.), § 362, and cases there cited; Lewis Eminent Domain, § 540. "^ Minneapolis &c. R. Co. v. Wood- worth, 32 Minn. 452; s. c. 21 N. W. 476. '" Hardy v. McKinney, 107 Ind. 364; s. c. 8 N. E. 232; Blize v. Cast- lio, 8 Mo. App. 290. See also. Raw- lings V. Biggs, 85 Ky. 251; s. c. 8 Ky. L. 919; 3 S. W. 147; Kirkpat- rick V. Taylor, 118 Ind. 329; s. c. 21 N. E. 20; Davis v. Mayor, 1 Duer (N. Y.) 451. CHAPTEE XVIII. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. Section Section 725. Municipal contracts — General. 737. Validity of contracts — General. 726. Contracts — By whom made. 738. Contracts which have been held 727. What is municipal contract. valid. 728. Implied contracts. 739. Invalidity of contracts. 729. Ratification of contracts. 740. Construction of contracts. 730. Rescission of contracts. 741. Extras. 731. Modification or alteration of 742. Exclusive franchises and priv- contracts. ileges. 732. Acceptance of work under con- 743. Contracts ultra vires. tract. 744. Liability of municipality on 733. Performance of contract. contracts. 734. Waiver of performance. 745. Estoppel. 735. Breach of contract — Remedy. 746. Letting of municipal contracts. 736. Payments on contract. § 725. Municipal contracts — General. — While it is not intended, in this connection, to enter into the general subject of the law of con- tracts, yet it is believed that the subject-matter of municipal contracts is of vital interest, and deserves more than a mere casual treatment such as was given to the subject in the first edition of this work. We have, therefore, rewritten the chapter and endeavored to cover the field of municipal contracts, though in a very condensed form, as de- veloped principally by the decisions rendered since the first edition of this work was published. The general features of the municipal contract are not unlike those of the ordinary contract, and hence will not be considered herein. There are, however, certain matters per- taining to contracts of municipalities, which are unique, and are of special significance and importance to all who have a general, or special, interest in the contractual relationship of this class of corpo- rations. § 726. Contracts — By whom made. — As a general rule all munici- pal contracts are made by the common council, board of trustees, or other body, by whatever name designated, in whom is vested, by char- ter or statute, the law-making power of the corporation. By custom, and by reason of the greater facility in the matter of execution, the ministerial and formal execution of contracts is vested in some bureau (709) § 72G PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 710 or departmont of tlic nuinicipality, or in the mayor, or other officer, but their power to act is special and must be found in some formal au- thority conferred by the council, unless, indeed, the statute or charter confers such authority, which is sometimes done. The legislature has seen proper in some cases to confer upon special boards or bureaus the power of corporate agents to make contracts in relation to cer- tain subjects wholly independent of the council, or authority from it, but such legislation, and contracts thereunder, are contrary to the general rule.^ Concerning the power of corporate agents to make con- tracts in behalf of the municipality, it may be stated that their power is special and limited and usually prescribed by the statute or charter. Outside of this scope of authority they have no power to act, and being special agents the general law of agency applies and all persons dealing with them, in the matter of contracts, must do so charged with knowl- edge of their authority to act, and the scope of their power to bind the corporation.^^ In addition to this there is also the limitation upon the corporation itself that all its corporate contracts must relate to strictly corporate matters. Where the limitation on the power of the city council to contract appears in the statute or charter knowledge of such limitation will be presumed by the court.- Where an agent is em- 1 Paul V. City of New York, 61 N. tion the cost between the city and Y. S. 570; s. c. 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) company providing that such agree- 69; Gushee v. City of New York, 56 ment when approved by the board N. Y. S. 1002; s. c. 26 Misc. (N. Y.) of railroad commissioners shall be 287. Neither the commissioner of -final and conclusive on the parties, water supply nor the board of public a contract so made is binding on improvements has power under N. the parties, though not authorized Y. laws of 1897, ch. 378, to contract by the city or ratified by the coun- for a supply of water and for fur- cil: New York &c. R. Co. v. Wheeler, nishing it to the inhabitants with- 72 Conn. 481; s. c. 45 Atl. 14. The out authority conferred by previous ^a Condran v. City of New Orleans, legislation by the municipality: 43 La. An. 1202 (mem.); s. c. 9 So. Press Pub. Co. v. Holahan, 62 N. Y. 31; Burchfield v. City of New Or- S. 872; s. c. 29 Misc. (N. Y.) 684. leans, 42 La. An. 235; s. c. 7 So. 448; Cf. Woodruff V. Catlin, 54 Conn. 277; Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. An. 11; Ross v. s. c. 6 Atl. 849; New York &c. R. Co. City of Philadelphia, 115 Pa. St. 222; V. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556; s. c. 14 S. s. c. 8 Atl. 398. Ct. 437; Mooney v. Clark, 69 Conn. -Black v. Common Council &c., 241; s. c. 37 Atl. 506, 1080. 119 Mich. 571; s. c. 78 N. W. 660. In Where a special act empowers a all cases where authority is con- special commission to act for a city ferred by statute upon an agent a in making an agreement with a rail- person dealing with such agent is road company in reference to abol- bound to ascertain the nature and ishing grade crossings and appor- 711 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. '26 ployed by a municipality to make a contract, as is frequently necessary to do, it is necessary that his authority to contract shall appear of rec- ord, and thereby appear as part of the council proceedings.^ Some- times in the administration of municipal affairs the council finds it necessary to delegate to a committee power to make a contract, but such power must be embodied in an ordinance and the details as to scope, etc., fixed as far as possible.* Where the contract is made by a com- mittee, and reported to the council, the action of the committee should be ratified by the council, and thus become the act of the council itself. In such case the power of the committee being delegated power it follows that the committee can not delegate its power to a subcom- mittee.^ A contract may also be made by a board and be ratified by the council in a case where the council originally had power to make such contract.*^ But where a board is authorized by statute, as in cases of public improvements, to advertise for bids, open and approve extent of his authority: Town of Madison v. Newsome, 39 Fla. 149; s. c. 22 So. 270. And in dealing with a city treasurer parties are charged with notice that he has no power to issue city warrants: Bardsley v. Sternberg, 17 Wash. 243; s. c. 49 Pac. 499. A contractor entering into a contract with a municipality does so with knowledge of the limi- tations upon the power of the mu- nicipality: Santa Cruz Rock Pave- ment Co. V. Broderick, 113 Cal. 628; s. c. 45 Pac. 863; McAleer v. Angell, 19 R. I. 688; s. c. 36 Atl. 588; Osgood V. City of Boston, 165 Mass. 281; s. c. 43 N. E. 108. The rule is univer- sal and general that persons con- tracting with a municipal corpora- tion must inquire into the power of the corporation or its officers to make the contract: State v. Minne- sota &c. R. Co., 80 Minn. 108; s. c. 83 N. W. 32. Cf. City of Chicago v. Williams, 182 111. 135; s. c. 55 N. E. 123; Kerr v. City of Bellefontaine, 59 Ohio St. 446; s. c. 52 N. E. 1024. ^ Where an agent is employed to make a contract on behalf of a mu- nicipality for a street improvement his authority must appear of record: Barker v. Southern Const. Co., 20 Ky. L. 796; s. c. 47 S. W. 608. ^ A committee of the council may, by ordinance, be authorized to make a contract for street improvement: Reuting v. City of Titusville, 175 Pa. St. 512; s. c. 34 Atl. 916. ^ A part of the members of a com- mittee by their separate action, not at a meeting of the committee, can not set aside the formal action of the committee as a whole: Mur- dough V. Inhabitants &c., 165 Mass. 109; s. c. 42 N. E. 502; Shea v. Mil- ford, 145 Mass. 528; s. c. 14 N. E. 764. '^ The test as to the power of a mu- nicipal corporation to make a con- tract is to be determined by the fact as to whether it is for the general good of all the inhabitants: Sun Printing &c. Ass'n v. Mayor &c., 40 N. Y. S. 607; s. c. 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 230; Hill v. City of Indianapo- lis. 92 Fed. 467. Where an act cre- ating a city board is held to be un- constitutional the contracts of such. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 712 the same, and let contracts, the council has no power to interfere in any manner with the making of the contract, the discretion of the board, or any of the details, although the improvement is beneficial to the city and the duty of paying therefor devolves upon it.'^ The power to make contracts in behalf of and binding on the municipality by other than the city council is exceptional and special, the general rule being that a contract must be made either by the council, or under its authority and direction, and in the latter case the act is min- isterial.® A contract may be based upon a petition of taxpayers, or even upon a vote of tire electors ; nevertheless, it is the contract of the municipality.^ The contract, and particularly so if in regard to public improvements, involving large deferred payments, should be by ordinance duly enacted, in which all formalities are complied with.^*^ And the minutes of the council are the best proof of the con- tract, but not the only proof." § 727. What is a municipal contract. — A franchise to a railroad company by a municipality based on valuable privileges given the latter which are lived up to by the former constitutes a contract which can not be violated by the city.^- Where a specification for a board are not binding on the city: City of Findlay v. Pendleton, 62 Ohio St. 80; s. c. 56 N. E. 649. ' Moran v. Thompson, 20 Wash. 525; s. c. 56 Pac. 29. Where the charter gives the mayor and council ample power and control over the streets and general power to con- struct, pave and keep them in re- pair, they may exercise discretion in matters of detail: Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woesten, 147 Mo. 467; s. c. 48 S. W. 939. A statute providing for the incorporation of water com- panies and prohibiting municipali- ties from making contracts depriv- ing themselves of the right to regu- late the rates does not apply to con- tracts with individuals: Los Ange- les City Water-Works Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720. ^ Neither the commissioner of pub- lic works nor the mayor, or both, can make a contract without authority from the council: City of Chicago v. Frazer, 60 III. App. 404; People v. Town, 37 N. Y. S. 864; s. c. 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 127. Additional water supply can only be procured in the city of New York from action of the municipal assembly: Keator v. Dal- ton, 62 N. Y. S. 878; s. c. 29 Misc. (N. Y.) 692. A contract signed by the mayor, under seal of the city, which recites that the name of the city is thereto subscribed, binds the city: Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380; s. c. 35 S. W. 1125; 18 Ky. L. 238. " Board &c. v. National Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. 228. ^"Noel V. City of San Antonio, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 580; s. c. 33 S. W. 2G3. '^ In the absence of minutes, parol proof is admissible: City of Belton V. Sterling (Tex.), 50 S. W. 1027. Utah Rev. St. 1898, ch. 13, §§ 283, 286, repeals Rev. St. 1898, § 206, subsecs. 36, 76, in reference to the power to make contracts: Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382; s. c. 59 Pac. 524. '= Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of Syracuse, 53 N. Y. S. 690; s. c. 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 338. 713 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 728 public improvement fully describes the work to be done, and a bid is made thereon for such work in writing and it is accepted and entered of record it constitutes between the city and the contractor a valid con- tract. ^^ But it is not absolutely essential, however desirable, that the contract shall be in writing, although the charter so requires. Thus where the contract was verbal and was fully performed on the part of the contractor he was permitted to recover.^* Neither the municipal charter, nor a statute purporting to regulate the use of property held by a public corporation for governmental or public purposes, is a con- tract. ^^ A resolution by the city council passed pending an injunc- tion proceeding in which it is provided that a proposed draft of the contract be approved, and its execution agreed upon, to be performed as soon as the council shall be free to act, is not a contract.^® A reso- lution of the council that the mayor be instructed to purchase certain property for a certain sum and on certain conditions is not on its face a contract of purchase. ^'^ § 728. Implied contracts. — A municipality may be bound by an implied contract, concerning a matter about which it would be author- ized to contract, to the same extent as an individual.^^ In other words, where a municipality is authorized to contract it may be made liable under an implied contract. ^^ But a contract will not be im- plied where goods have been ordered by one employe, and accepted by another, without authority, and used by him.^" Where a person is compelled by municipal officers to perform labor for the municipality under a judgment which is void he may recover the value of his services.^^ A city is not liable to a person who volunteers services.^^ Nor is it liable on an implied contract for the temporary use of a hose which belongs to an individual but was used under the suppo- sition that it belonged to the city.^^ "City of Fort Madison v. Moore, Council &c., 114 Ala. 433; s. c. 21 109 Iowa 476; s. c. 80 N. W. 527. So. 960. " North River Electric &c. Co. v. ^' Buck v. City of Eureka, 124 Cal. City of New York, 62 N. Y. S. 726; 61; s. c. 56 Pac. 612. s. c. 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 14. -"New Jersey Car Spring &c. Co. v. « Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. City of Jersey City (N. J.), 46 Atl. S. 231; s. c. 19 S. Ct. 383. 649. '" State V. Noyes, 25 Nev. 31; s, c. ^^ Fox v. City of Richmond, 19 Ky. 56 Pac. 946. L. 326; s. c. 40 S. W. 251. " Carskaddon v. City of South " Lydecker v. Village of Nyack, 39 Bend, 141 Ind. 596; s. c. 39 N. E. N. Y. S. 509; s. c. 6 App. Div. (N. 667; 41 N. E. 1. Y.) 90. 1^ Brush Electric &c. Co. v. City " Dolloff v. Inhabitants &c., 162 Mass. 569; s. c. 39 N. E. 191. § 729 PUBLIC CORPOHATIONS. 714 § 729. Ratification of contracts. — A contract that is within the scope of the city's power, but irregular in that it was made by resolu- tion instead of ordinance, may be ratified by a subsequent ordinance without a new consideration.-* An so where officers of a corporation execute a contract in behalf of the city which they were not author- ized to execute but which should have been executed by another officer the city council by an ordinance duly passed may ratify the contract.^^ Likewise a contract which has been improperly executed may be rati- fied by the departments which have general powers over such matters, where the city has had the benefit of the contract performed in good faith. ^^ Where a contract is invalid by reason of some irregularity, that does not go to the subject-matter, it may be the subject of ratifi- cation in so far as it has been executed,-'^ but if it is void for non- compliance with statutory requirements it can not be ratified, the requirements being mandatory,^'* nor can a contract which is ultra vires be ratified.-'' Neither does the attempted ratification of a void contract work an estoppel against the city. Thus where the board of supervisors of a city and county authorize the payment of a demand under a void contract, in such case the board having no power to make the contract it can have no power to order payment.^** Where a contract made by a water board is outside of the scope of its powers it may be rendered valid by a ratification of the council,^^ for a city like an individual may ratify the acts of its agent provided the con- tract is not itself unlawful,^ ^ and where original power existed a city council may ratify the unauthorized act of another.^^ So where ^ State V. Cowgill &c. Mill Co., 156 works must receive the ratification Mo. 620; s. c. 57 S. W. 1008. of the council the board has no pow- ■'^ City of Chicago v. Galpin, 183 er to provide in the contract that 111. 399; s. c. 55 N. E. 731. alterations in the work shall be ^ North River Electric &c. Co. v. added to or deducted from the origi- City of New York, 62 N. Y. S. 726 ; s. nal contract price: Chittendsn v. c. 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 14. Cf. Port City of Lansing, 120 Mich. 539; s. c. Jervis Water-Works Co. v. Village of 79 N. W. 797. Port Jervis, 151 N. Y. Ill; s. c. 45 ^'Roberts v. City of Cambridge, N. E. 388. 164 Mass. 176; s. c. 41 N. E. 230. '' Frederick v. People, 83 111. App. == City of Findlay v. Pertz, 66 Fed. 89. 427; s. c. 13 C. C. A. 559. -*City of Indianapolis v. Mann, ^^Kcch v. City of Milwaukee, 89 144 Ind. 175; s. c. 42 N. E. 901. Wis. 220; s. c. 62 N. W. 918; Davis v. -» Ellis V. City of Cleburne (Tex. Mayor &c., 61 Mich. 530; s. c. 28 N. Civ. App.), 35 S. W. 495. W. 526; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp., =" Santa Cruz Rock Pavement Co. § 463; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. 26; v. Broderick, 113 Cal. 628; s. c. 45 Blen v. Bear River Co., 20 Cal. 602; Pac. 863. Where the charter pro- San Francisco Gas Co. v. City of vides that all contracts recom- San Francisco, 9 Cal. 45S; Hoyt v. mended by the board of public Thompson, 19 N. Y. 207, 218; Clarke 715 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS, § 729 tlie cit}^ has undertaken to delegate power to an agent but the delega- tion was unauthorized, the acts themselves may be ratified.^* A con- tract may be ratified by a statute conferring on a municipality power to enter into a contract previously made without such authority, and the ratification is of the date of the approval,^ ^ but a ratification by the legislature does not ratify a fraud inherent in the contract and not disclosed to the legislature,^*' nor does it ratify a contract made in violation of an existing statute.^^ Where a corporation is empow- ered to contract for the purchase of goods, it may bind itself by an original contract, or the purchase may be ratified by an acceptance and use, or directing payment.^* It is not necessary that there shall be a formal ratification ; as, where services were rendered at the request of the president of the board of trustees, which the corpora- tion subsequently accepted and agreed to pay for.^** An action of a city to enforce an assessment is a ratification of the contract on which it is based.*** A ratification, by a vote of the electors, does not validate V. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181; Howe v. Keeler, 27 Conn. 538; Emerson v. In- habitants &c., 13 Pick. (Mass.) 377; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; People v. Plagg, 17 N. Y. 584; s. c. 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 36; Brady V. Mayor &c., 20 N. Y. 312; Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 159, 176; s. c. 8 Paige (N. Y.) 527; 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 192; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470; s. c. 8 Am. Law. Reg. 693; Dubuque Female College v. District Tp. &c., 13 Iowa 555; Merrick v. Burlington &c. Road Co., 11 Iowa 74; Mayor &c. v. Jackson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 106; Crawshaw v. City of Roxbury, 7 Gray (Mass.) 374; Bur- rill v. City of Boston, 2 Cliff. 590; Albany Nat'l Bank v. City of Albany, 92 N. Y. 363; City of Galveston v. Morton, 58 Tex. 409; Strong v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 1 Mackey 265; Town of Durango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257; s. c. 7 Pac. 14; Town of Bruce v. Dickey, 116 111. 527; s. c. 6 N. E. 435; Board &c. v. Hinchman, 31 Kan. 729; s. c. 3 Pac. 504; Lin- coln v. Inhabitants &c., 75 Maine 141; Schmidt v. Stearns Co., 34 Minn. 112; s. c. 24 N. W. 358; Kings- ley V. Norris, 60 N. H. 131. ^* Naegely v. City of Saginaw, 101 Mich. 532; s. c. 60 N. W. 46. ^^ Chesapeake &c. Tel. Co. v. Mayor &c., 89 Md. 689; s. c. 43 Atl. 784; 44 Atl. 1033. ^^ Santa Ana Water Co. v. Town of Buenaventura, 65 Fed. 323. " Board &c. v. Mayor &c., 57 N. J. L. 452; s. c. 31 Atl. 625. A law may legalize a contract between a city and a railroad company since the legislature may confer such power by retrospective action: Weed v. Common Council &c., 56 N. Y. S. 105; s. c. 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 208. The defects in the preliminary proceed- ings incident to the making of the contract may be remedied by a cur- ative act, but this does not neces- sarily render the contract itself valid: Windsor v. City of Des Moines, 110 Iowa 175; s. c. 81 N. W. 476. ^^ New Jersey Car Spring &c. Co. V. City of Jersey City (N. J.), 46 Atl. 649. ^^ Kents V. Village of North Tarry- town, 64 N. Y. S. 178; s. c. 50 App. Div. (N. Y.) 502. " City of Harrisburg v. Shepler, 190 Pa. St. 374; s. c. 42 Atl. 893. § 730 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 716- a contract as of the time it was made, but only from the time o£ ratification.*^ § 730. Rescission of contracts. — Contracis by a municipality are in the exercise of proprietary or business powers and are governed by the rules applicable to other contracts, and when without fraud and fairly made on the part of the contractor and without bad faith or misconduct on the part of the city officials, and not unreasonable, can not be repudiated by the city after performance or part performance by the contractor.*^ A court will not cancel a municipal contract upon the ground that the city made a bad bargain, paid more than the property was worth, and that the council's action was dictated by im- proper motives.*^ A contract entered into by a city can not be re- scinded by verbal instructions given by members of the council. The corporation alone can discontinue a contract, and such discontinu- ance is proved by the M^ritten minutes and records of the council;** and in such case the entry in the minutes of the council that a claim was disallowed and the mayor instructed to inform the claimant that the claim would not be paid for the reason that the company had not performed its contract is not a discontinuance of the contract, as to future accruing claims under the contract.*^ After a contract has become binding it can not be rescinded by one without the consent of the other party.*'' A municipal corporation can not avoid a contract that has been ratified by the electors after it has been accepted and performed by the company and has been complied with by the city for a number of years, on the ground of irregularity in the election.*^ A right of revocation in the city if the other party fails to fulfill the contract may be exercised by the city when sufficient grounds exist therefor, and a prima facie presumption may be indulged that the revocation is on good grounds.*^ The use of water by the city under a rescinded contract will render the city liable for the Where a committee was authorized " City of Greenville v. Greenville to make a particular contract it Water Works Co., 125 Ala. 625; s. c. may, by a subsequent vote, ratify a 27 So. 764. contract made by its chairman and ^'^ City of Greenville v. Greenville the engineer: May v. City of Water Works Co., 125 Ala. 625; s. c. Gloucester, 174 Mass. 583; s. c. 55 27 So. 764. N. E. 465. "" Hudson Electric L. Co. v. In- *' Squire v. Preston, 31 N. Y. S. habitants &c., 163 Mass. 346; s. c. 40 174; s. c. 82 Hun (N. Y.) 83. N. E. 109. " Little Falls Electric &c. Co. v. " Cribs v. City of Lebanon, 98 Fed. City of Little Falls. 102 Fed. 663. 549. *^ New Orleans v. Warner, 175 U. *'* City of Newport v. Phillips, 19 S. 120; s. c. 20 S. Ct. 44. Ky. L. 352; s. c. 40 S. W. 378. 717 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 731 water so furnished.*^ The trustees of a corporation are not re- quired to exercise diligence to obtain information concerning the nature or cost of work for the benefit of bidders, and where no fraud is imputed to the trustees a contractor is not entitled to a rescission because the work is^ more difficult than he was expecting from the profile and data in the engineer's office, or because some of the trus- tees knew, or should have known, of the existence of information they did not communicate to the contractor.^'' The abandonment of a con- tract induced by the fraud of the deputy comptroller does not render the city liable to an assignee of the contractor.^ ^ An action against the city can not be maintained to recover money on the contract after its revocation. The action is for a breach of the contract. ^^ A bridge erected as part of a street-improvement under an authorized contract can not be removed by the contractor unless it can be done without injuring the foundation and unless he refunds what has been paid to him.°^ § 731. Modification or alteration of contracts. — Where two munici- palities are authorized to contract with each other, and there is no limitation placed on that power, they may make any reasonable modifi- cation of such contract, or substitute a new contract in place of the old one.^* Generally speaking, it is within the power of the city to provide in the contract for changes or modifications thereof if they are made in good faith, honestly, and for the benefit of the city.^^ The general rule is that the motives of the council are not the subject of review by the courts, but a resolution of a council waiving a re- quirement in a contract for a public improvement is administrative in its character and hence the motives which induced its passage are proper subjects of judicial investigation.^® A contract can only be modified by the body which was authorized to make it. Thus a con- *» United States Water Works Co. '"City of Newport v. Phillips, 19 V. Borough of Du Bois, 176 Pa. St. Ky. L. 352; s. c. 40 S. W. 378. 439; s. c. 35 Atl. 251. "" Berlin Iron-Bridge Co. v. City of '° Sanitary Dist. &c. v. Ricker, 91 San Antonio, 92 Tex. 388; s. c. 50 Fed. 833. S. W. 408. " Jones v. Savage, 53 N. Y. S. 308; =* Arnold v. Mayor &c., 21 R. I. 15; s. c. 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 158. A con- s. c. 41 Atl. 576. tract will not be canceled for fraud ^^ Filbert v. City of Philadelphia, on the part of municipal officers at 181 Pa. St. 530; s. c. 37 Atl. 545; the suit of a taxpayer where the con- Weston v. City of Syracuse, 31 N. Y. tractor did not participate in the S. 186; s. c. 82 Hun (N. Y.) 67. fraud and where the contract was ^° Weston v. City of Syracuse, 158 let in accordance with the charter: N. Y. 274; s. c. 53 N. E. 12. Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woesten, 147 Mo. 467; s. c. 48 S. W. 939. § 733 PUBLIC COUi'OltATlONS. 718 tract subject to the approval of the council can not be altered witliQut its consent and approval." Where it is necessary that an ordinance shall be ratified by a popular vote in order to the creation of an in- debtedness, the proposition, as ratified, will control a schedule made by the company and city officials.^*^ A contract having been made granting rights and franchises can not be modified by subsequent ordinances limiting the rights theretofore granted, where it is not a valid exercise of police power.'^'' § 732. Acceptance of work under contract. — The acceptance of work under a contract within a specified time is immaterial, where the city permits expenditures under the contract and performance under it for several years.^" In other words the acceptance may be implied. Thus where the contract requires the work when completed to be accepted by the city, actual use of the improvement after com- pletion will operate as an estoppel on the city from urging as a defense the non-acceptance.*'^ Fraud on the part of the contractor in the performance of the work, and failure on the part of the proper city officials to discover, and have rectified, the fraudulent work, vitiates the acceptance of such part of the work and renders an assessment void on abutting property.®^ But in the absence of fraud, the accept- ance of work when property-owners have had an opportunity to be heard, is conclusive.''^ The employment by a contractor of members of the city council to superintend the improvement, and by such em-' ployment procuring the acceptance of work not in compliance with the contract, is a fraud upon the property-owners and ground for resisting an assessment.**'* Where material used has passed inspection and is equal to samples furnished, but the work, as a whole, has not been accepted, the contractor is liable for the loss occasioned by the use of " Campau v. City of Detroit, 106 "= Mason v. City of Des Moines, 108 Mich. 414; s. c. 64 N. W. 336. Iowa 658; s. c. 79 N. W. 389. =* Tacoma Light &c. Co. v. City of "' Green v. Shanklin, 24 Ind. App. Tacoma, 13 Wash. 115; s. c. 42 Pac. 608; s. c. 57 N. B. 269. Nor is the 533. assessment in such case void for del- ^^ City of Indianapolis v. Consum- egating to the contractor power to ers' Gas &c. Co., 140 Ind. 107; s. c. determine where good walks exist 39 N. E. 433. and where the sidewalk should be "» State V. Mayor &c., 19 Mont. 518; built. s. c. 49 Pac. 15. ^ Green v. Shanklin, 24 Ind. App. "1 Neosho City Water Co. v. City 608; s. c. 57 N. E. 269. of Neosho, 136 Mo. 498;, s. c. 38 S. W. 89. 719 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. 733 material not in compliance with the contract.*'^ The city has no right to accept part performance of a contract for an entire improvement."* § 733. Performance of contract. — Where the statute requires a street-improvement contract shall fix a time when the work shall be commenced and when completed, and the contract specifies that work shall be commenced within ten days and completed within two hun- dred and forty days thereafter it is a sufficient compliance.*^'^ The city and not the individual property-owner is the judge whether the contract is complied with, and unless there is a fraudulent abuse of the power the property-owner is concluded. In case of fraud equity is the proper remedy."^ Where the certificate of the city engineer is made final and tonclusive by the contract as to the amount of work done and materials furnished, such certificate, in the absence of bad faith, or misconstruction by the engineer, will be binding. "'' A guaranty «= Goswell V. City of Louisville (Ky.), 57 S. W. 476. ™Berwind v. Galveston &c. Ins. Co., 20 Tex. Civ. App. 426; s. c. 50 S. W. 413. "^ Rannsh v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443. Where an ordinance designated a sidewalk 20 feet wide, and that con- structed was 19 feet and 7 inches, the stone curbing being 5 inches wide, it is a sufficient compliance where the pavement is paid for by the square foot: Middlesborough Town &c. Co. V. Knoll, 21 Ky. L. 1399; s. c. 55 S. W. 205. A slight variance in the performance of a contract from its requirements resulting in no injury to the improvement and no in- creased cost is not ground for re- straining the payment of the con- tract price at the suit of an abutting property owner: McCartan v. Inhab- itants &c., 57 N. J. Bq. 571; s. c. 41 Atl. 830. °« People V. McWhethy, 177 111. 334; s. c. 52 N. E. 479; Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 111. 110; Haley v. City of Alton, 152 111. 113; s. c. 38 N. E. 750. Where the means of payment under a contract, guar- anteed by the city, have failed, as in case of a paving contract, where part was payable by property owners, and the failure can not be attributed to the city contractor, the city is lia- ble: Cole V. City of Shreveport, 41 La. An. 839; s. c. 6 So. 688, affirming a judgment in favor of the contract- ors for a balance due on a paving contract which was made with the understanding that the owners of land fronting on the street were bound for a portion of the cost, and the city guaranteeing the payment of the same by appropriation of wharfage dues which by legislation afterwards it could not use in that way. The court approved and fol- lowed Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341. A contract to furnish electric lighting but not specifying any par- ticular source may be enforced al- though the contractor has sold and removed his own plant and fur- nishes light from the plant of an- other: Town of Colorado City v. Townsend, 9 Colo. App. 249; s. c. 47 Pac. 665. Where an ordinance and specifications called for a specified material, and the contract referred to the ordinance and specifications, both of them were held to be bind- ing on the contractor: Dunn v. Mc- Neely, 75 Mo. App. 217. "^ Smith V. Mayor &c., 42 N. Y. S. 522; s. c. 12 App. Div. (N. Y.) 391. But see Quinn v. Mayor &c., 45 N. Y. S. 7; s. c. 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 408. § 734 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 720 of performance may be special and not general, as where a contractor guarantees to make all repairs which may become necessary from any imperfection in the work or material within a specified period. Such guaranty is not to be construed as a guaranty to repair irrespective of the causes. ^"^ And so where a guaranty was for a period of five years against all defects due to proper use it was not held a guaranty for all future repairs but a guaranty of substantial compliance with the terms of the contract.^^ The performance of a contract by a con- tractor does not entitle him to his money where as a condition pre- cedent to the making of the contract a certificate of the auditor that the money required is in the treasury to the credit of the fund has not been filed and recorded, and the city is not liable.^ ^ Where the city receives the benefit of a part performance of a contract with knowledge of the non-performance of the remainder it is liable for the part performed.'^^ § 734. Waiver of performance. — Where the details of the con- struction of a public work are left to the council by the charter it is within the power of the council to waive performance of the contract, in so far as work done has not been in compliance with the contract, where the consent of property-owners is not based on the contract as made.'^'* A waiver of compliance with a contract may be implied, as where a contract called for water of good quality to be furnished and the city continued to audit the bills and use the water.'^^ But "° City of Kansas City v. Hanson, tract providing for delays includes 60 Kan. 833; s. c. 58 Pac. 474. delays occasioned by injunction: " Allen V. City of Portland, 35 Or. Whittemore v. Sills, 76 Mo. App. 248. 420; s. c. 58 Pac. 509. There is no right to abrogate a con- •= Comstock V. Incorporated Village tract on the ground of unnecessary of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288; s. c. delay in completion of work by a 56 N. E. 15. contractor where the city has been " Sykes v. City of St. Cloud, 60 remiss in complying with the re- Minn. 442; s. c. 62 N. W. 613. Under quirements of the contract where the an agreement by which the city cov- contract is highly penal: Mayor &c. enanted that it had not done, and v. Reilly, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 501; s. c. would not do, anything to delay the 13 N. Y. S. 521. contractor, and there was discov- '* Weston v. City of Syracuse, 158 ered, as the work progressed, an ob- N. Y. 274; s. c. 53 N. E. 12; Meech v. struction which existed by permis- City of Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198; Moore sion of the city and not removable v. City of Albany, 98 N. Y. 396; by the contractor, it was the duty of Voght v. City of Buffalo, 133 N. Y. the city to remove it after notice 463; s. c. 31 N. E. 340. from the contractor or provide for '^ Creston Waterworks Co. v. City the protection of the contractor: of Creston, 101 Iowa 687; s. c. 70 N. Mairs v. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. S. 351; W. 739. s. c. 30 Misc. (N. Y.) 384. A con- 721 MUNICIPxVL CONTRACTS. § 735 payments on account on certiticates of the engineer do not waive the terms of a written contract in the al)sence of evidence that such was the intention on the part of the council.'^*' § 735. Breach of contract — Remedy. — Although the contract pro- vides that no payment shall he made upon it until the cash has been collected by assessment, yet where the municipality formally declares that the contract has been abandoned and refuses to levy an assessment to pay the contract price the contractor may sue for a breach of such contract.'''^ A contract will not be enjoined in its ex- ecution because of irregularities in advertising for proposals ; as where the advertisement is by the board of public safety instead of the de- partment of public works.'^^ A refusal on the part of a city comptrol- ler and deputy to pay instalments, and a denial by them of the city's liability, is a breach of the contract.'^^ Proof of the ordinance, the contract, performance, acceptance of work, issuance of warrant and failure for four years to provide a fund from which to pay constitutes a prima facie case against the city, and the burden is then upon the city to show as a defense that a failure to provide the necessary funds was not owing to its neglect in complying with the charter or in exer- cising reasonable diligence.^ ° The waiver of liquidated damages based on delay in the work, is not to be construed as an admission by the city of its responsibility for the delay.^^ § 736. Payments on contract. — Where the method of payment is prescribed by contract or by statute that method must be strictly pur- sued. And so where, by the contract, no payment is to be made until ™ Dougherty v. Borough of Nor- ^^ Mairs v. City of New York, 65 wood, 196 Pa. St. 92; s. c. 46 Atl. 384. N. Y. S. 160; s. c. 52 App. Div. (N. Cf. St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. City of Y.) 343. The non-enforcement of a St. Paul, 78 Minn. 39; s. c. 80 N. W. penalty in a contract by the city 774, 877. A vote by a town to pay council is not a defense to an assess- a judgment rendered on a contract, ment, such penalty having no rela- when not a waiver of the town's tion to the assessment and not being rights, — see Town of Grand Isle v. provided by law: Cass Farm Co. v. Kinney, 70 Vt. 381; s. c. 41 Atl. 130. City of Detroit, 124 Mich. 433; s. c. " Weston v. City of Syracuse, 158 83 N. W. 108. La. act No. 133 of 1888 N. Y. 274; s. c. 53 N. E. 12. for the specific enforcement of con- '* Potts V. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. St. tracts furnishes cities a more sum- 619; s. c. 46 Atl. 195. mary remedy against private corpo- '^ Jones V. City of New York, 62 rations for the enforcement of con- N. Y. S. 284; s. c. 47 App. Div. (N. tracts than previously existing: Y.) 39. State v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 52 ^o Jones V. City of Portland, 35 Or. La. An. 1570; s. c. 28 So. 111. 512; s. c. 58 Pac. 657. 1 Smith— 46 ^ 736 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 722 the cost of the work has been ascertained, and assessed upon, and col- lected from the taxpayers this is a condition precedent to an action to recover payment. The remedy is mandamns.*" A contract by a city with a water company that is fair and reasonable, in the matter of j)ay- ment or compensation may be made to depend upon the amount of tax assessed against the water company for municipal purposes.^ ^ A con- tractor may enforce payment from a fund derived from the sale of bonds issued for the construction of the work although the ordinance provides for the payment out of funds derived from general taxa- tion.®* Under a statute giving cities and villages power to make local improvements by special assessment or by special taxation, or both, of contiguous property, or by general taxation or otherwise as they shall prescribe by ordinance, and the improvement is one properly chargeable against abutting property, the decision of the city council is iinal, and a contractor is not entitled to be paid from the general taxation.®^ Where a contract provides that payment under the eon- tract shall not be made until the work is completed according to agreement and the completion certified by specified officers the certifi- cate does not estop the city from showing the correct amount and character of the work and the incorrectness of the certificate.^" An improvement made and guaranteed for five years on which certifi- cates are issued whenever two blocks are completed and certified to is to be paid for in cash when the city makes appropriations, and not at the end of five years. ^'^ A contract by which the city agrees to pay ninety per cent, of the estimated amount of work done for the preced- ing month means for all materials furnished in the preceding month though not put in place.®® Where there are constitutional limita- tions as to the amount of municipal indebtedness a contract may be made payable in annual instalments if such instalments are within the constitutional limits.®^ ^= Weston V. City of Syracuse, 158 '* First Nat'l Bank v. Keith, 183 N. Y. 274; s. c. 53 N. E. 12; People v. 111. 475; s. c. 56 N. E. 179. Mayor &c., 144 N. Y. 63; s. c. 38 N. «^ City of Pontiac v. Talbot Pav. E. 1006; Howell v. City of Buffalo, Co., 94 Fed. 65; s. c. 36 C. C. A. 88. 15 N. Y. 512; Baldwin v. City of Os- ""^ Dean v. City of New York, 61 wego, 1 Abb. Ch. App. Dec. (N. Y.) N. Y. S. 374; s. c. 45 App. Div. (N. 62; Beard v. City of Brooklyn, 31 Y.) 605. Barb. (N. Y.) 142; Dannot v. Mayor, "State v. City of New Orleans, 51 66 N. Y. 585; Hunt v. City of Utica, La. An. 699; s. c. 25 So. 421. 18 N. Y. 442. , "' Delafield v. Village of Westfeld, *' Maine Water Co. v. City of 58 N. Y. S. 277; s. c. 41 App. Div. Waterville, 93 Maine 586; s. c. 45 (N. Y.) 24. Atl. 830. '" McBean v. City of Fresno, 112 Cal. 159; s. c. 44 Pac. 358. 723 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 737 § 737. Validty of contracts — General. — The validity of ordi- nances, when contracts, has been treated in Chapter XIV, '^'^^ and will not be repeated in this connection. It may be stated generally that the contract must relate to a subject-matter within the scope of the con- tractual powers of the municipality. It must not be in contravention of the constitution, the general statutes or the municipal charter, and not contrary to public policy. Where the charter, or other law gov- erning the subject, has prescribed certain preliminary steps, in rela- tion to the making of contracts, which are mandatory, these condi- tions precedent are to be carefully observed. Where the charter makes an ordinance effective unless vetoed in a given number of days, and prior to the expiration of this period a contract is entered into under the ordinance, it is not void, and on the expiration of the time allowed for veto, and no disapproval, it becomes valid and binding from its date, and a subsequent attempt to repeal the ordinance is ineffective.^* Where a contract provides that it shall be voidable by the city upon the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction whenever there shall be a substantial failure in performance, until so avoided it is valid and binding on the city.**^ In determining by a court whether a contract is void, as where it relates to furnishing the city with water, the court can only take cognizance of a violation of legal principles in the making or scope of the contract, and whether there has been a neglect of prescribed formalities or fraud.''^ It should be noticed fur- ther in this connection that most contracts by a municipality are in the exercise of the proprietary powers belonging to it, rather than legisla- tive, and in such cases the jurisdiction of courts is not hampered by the strict rules applicable to the exercise of legislative functions.''^ If the contract is incomplete, as where it relates to a public improvement, and provides that the work shall be in accordance with specifications annexed to and made a part of it, and there are no specifications, no valid contract exists.^* There must be likewise, as with contracts in general, the element of mutuality. '^^ Where the charter provides that *'a § 532, ante. »^ Where a contract provides that ^"Harris v. City of St. Joseph, 99 a lighting company shall furnish Fed. 246. such lights as the city may desig- "^ Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla nate, which the city does not do but Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; s. c. 19 S. repudiates the contract and notifies Ct. 77. the company, there is a want of mu- "- State v. Mayor &e., 58 N. J. L. tuality and no contract exists: El 262; s. c. 33 Atl. 740. Paso Gas &c. Co. v. City of El Paso, "== State v. Mayor &c., 19 Mont. 518; 22 Tex. Civ. App. 309; s, c. 54 S. W. s. c. 49 Pac. 15. 798. "' Gray v. Richardson, 124 Cal. 460; s. c. 57 Pac. 385. § 737 PUBLIC CORPOKATIONS. 734 in contracts by the board of public works certain powers shall be re- served to the board the contract must enumerate the powers reserved, and a general reference to the charter for an enumeration is not suffi- cient.''*^ A contract may be valid in part and void in part, but in order that the unobjectionable part may be held valid it must be a complete contract of itself and enforceable. A contract otherwise valid and legal is not rendered invalid by the city attempting to confer an ex- clusive right, and therefore exceeding its powers, if the provisions of the contract otherwise are not dependent upon the illegal provision. A contract need not be rendered void in toto because of an illegal provision therein. "'^ Where a city has power to make a contract for supplying the city with water, a portion of the contract relating to the exclusive and continuing features of the franchise granted may be void and not enforceable and the remaining features of the contract relating to the rentals for hydrants valid and enforceable.^** A contract that is otherwise complete will be rendered invalid by a provision re- quiring all materials furnished thereunder to be shipped over a cer- tain railroad.^'' As seen in the chapter relating to ordinances a con- tract must be reasonable and not oppressive. °"^ But there are no rules of general application by which the reasonableness or unreasonable- ness may be determined. Each case must be determined by the facts and circumstances surrounding it. A contract leasing water-works to a company for thirty years at an annual rental of fifteen hundred dollars and the cancelation of large claims of the lessees against the city has been held to be reasonable. ^**° And so a contract for lighting the city for five years with the privilege of terminating the contract on three months' notice by the city if not satisfied is reasonable. ^°^ One claiming compensation under a contract must show that his claim was to be paid out of the current revenues, or from some fund within the immediate control of the city, or that the constitutional provision has been complied with.^°- ^"Ricketson v. City of Milwaukee, '''City of Greenville v. Greenville 105 Wis. 591; s. c. 81 N. W. 864. Water Works Co., 125 Ala. 625; s. c. Where the mayor was authorized by 27 So. 764. the council to contract for offices, '*" Cason v. City of Lebanon, 153 the rental not to exceed a fixed Ind. 567 ; s. c. 55 N. E. 768. amount, a lease for ten years to '"a § 525, ante. cease if the city should sooner erect ""Los Angeles Water Co. v. City a building of its own was held to be of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720. legal: City of Michigan City v. "^ City of Hartford v. Hartford Leeds, 24 Ind. App. 271; s. c. 55 N. Electric L. Co., 65 Conn. 324; s. c. E. 799. 32 Atl. 925. »' Kimball v. City of Cedar Rapids, "= McNeal v. City of Waco, 89 Tex. 100 Fed. 802. 83; s. c. 33 S. W. 322. 725 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 738 § 738. Contracts which have been held valid. — Without being able to classify or generalize the following contracts have been held valid on various grounds: (a) A'ot in restraint of succeeding council: A contract of a municipality for a lease of a water-works system for a period of twenty years is not necessarily void as being in restraint of succeeding councils. ^°^ (b) When not contravening cotistitutional limitations: A contract payable annually for water and light fur- nished, does not create a present indebtedness for the aggregate amount, and is therefore valid under constitutional limitations as to amount of indebtedness.^"* (c) Maintaining and Tceeping roads in repair: An agreement to build and maintain certain roads, and re- pair the same, so far as damaged from flooding from a dam owned by the promisor, is not void for non-compliance with the statute in rela- tion to keeping in repair roads generally.^"^ (d) Paving and keeping a street in repair: A contract to pave a street and make repairs ren- dered necessary by indifferent work or the use of defective material is not invalid in the absence of proof that the agreement to repair increased the amount of the bid and imposed upon the abutting prop- erty-owners a burden properly resting on the general public. ^°® (e) Guaranty to keep street in repair: A guaranty to keep a street in repair for five years does not render the contract void, but the con- tractor can not recover for the excess of the assessment caused by the guaranty which is presumed to be ten per cent, retained by the city to secure the repairs. ^"^ (f ) Repairs for a term of years: A charter prohibiting contracts for public improvements unless recommended "^ Higgins V. San Diego Water Co., plant for supplying a city or village 118 Cal. 524; s. c. 45 Pac. 824; 50 with water thirty years is not an un- Pac. 670. reasonable time for the duration of ^"^Foland v. Town of Frankton, the contract: Little Falls E. & W. 142 Ind. 546; s. c. 41 N. E. 1031. A Co. v. City of Little Falls, 102 Fed. contract for a term of 10 years pay- 663. able in equal annual payments for "^ Town of Levis v. Black River paving and resurfacing a street is Imp. Co., 105 Wis. 391; s. c. 81 N. W. not, by reason of the term, objec- 669. tionable if the current revenues are "'' City of Kansas City v. Hanson, sufficient to meet the payments: 60 Kan. 833; s. c. 58 Pac. 474; Rob- Morris V. Barber Asphalt P. Co., 5 ertson v. City of Omaha, 55 Neb. Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 129. Wh.eve a 718; s. c. 76 N. W. 442; Barber &c. contract is made in good faith and Pav. Co. v. Ullman, 137 Mo. 543 ; s. c, is not unreasonable or unfair it may 38 S. W. 458; Allen v. City of Daven- extend over a considerable term of port, 107 Iowa 90; s. c. 77 N. W. 532; years and not be void on the ground State v. Inhabitants &c., 60 N. J. L. of public policy: Maine Water Co. v. 394; s. c. 38 Atl. 635; Cole v. People, City of Waterville, 93 Maine 586; s. 161 111. 16; s. c. 43 N. E. 607. c. 45 Atl. 830. Where a contract in- ^''" City of Louisville v. Selvage, 21 volves the erection of an expensive Ky. L. 349; s. c. 51 S. W. 447. § 738 ruBLic coiiPORATiONS. 726 by the board of pnl)lic works does not prevent the council from con- tracting for repairs for a term of years in a paving contract which contract is made in accordance with the charter/°*^ (g) Removal of garbage: Where an ordinance required all garbage to be removed by a licensed person it is not objectionable in that it was for a longer term than was permissible.^"'' (h) Agreement based on invalid as- sessment: After a voluntary agreement to pay a sum to a municipal corporation as a proportionate share of an assessment for an improve- ment one is not permitted afterwards to say that the assessment was illegal and invalid in the absence of an allegation of fraud, accident or mistake in the execution of the contract. It is competent for a person to make a valid agreement to pay an invalid assessment where his property is benefited.^" (i) When not founded on an appropria- tion: It is not material in a municipal contract that it does not ap- pear that it is founded on an appropriation of money." ^ (j) Subse- quent restriction of debt limits: A contract is valid notwithstanding the legislature may subsequently restrict the debt limits under which it would be invalid.^^^ (k) Sale of gas plant: A contract of sale of a gas plant by a city in consideration that the purchaser would light the streets and the city pay the taxes against such purchaser is en- forceable.^^^ (1) Not oppressive and against public policy: A con- tract which has been executed and in force for ten years will not be held unreasonably oppressive and against public policy.^ ^* (m) Not indefinite: A contract for water supply is not void for not stating 1"^ Barber &c. Pav. Co. v. Hezel, 76 pany to keep it so: State v. New Or- Mo. App. 135. Where the contractor leans &c. R. Co., 52 La. An. 1570; s. lias agreed to make repairs on notice c. 28 So. 111. such notice must be given, although '"" City of Grand Rapids v. De lie has become insolvent and has as- Vries, 123 Mich. 570; s. c. 82 N. W. signed his interest in the balance of 269. A contract for the disposition the contract price: Southern Pav. of sewage for five years has been Co. v. City of Chattanooga (Tenn.), held valid: McBean v. City of Fres- 48 S. W. 92. A city council is no, 112 Cal. 159; s. c. 44 Pac. 358. not authorized to make provision ""Floyd v. Atlanta Banking Co., for repairs before the necessity 109 Ga. 778; s. c. 35 S. E. 172. But exists therefor: City of Kansas see Union Pav. &c. Co. v. McGovern, City v. Hanson, 8 Kan. App. 290; 127 Cal. 638; s. c. 60 Pac. 169. s. c. 55 Pac. 513. Where a railroad "^ City of Harrisburg v. Shepler, company has obligated itself to keep 190 Pa. St. 374; s. c. 42 Atl. 893. a street in good order, and by inac- "= Ludington Water Supply Co. v. tion on the part of the city the street City of Ludington, 119 Mich, 480; becomes in ^ such state of repair as s. c. 78 N. W. 558. to require an unusual expenditure, "•■ Board &c. v. Capital Gas &c. Co., the proper construction requires the 16 Ky. L. 780; s. c. 29 S. W. 855. city to restore the street to good or- "* Fergus Falls Water Co. v. City der and require the railroad com- of Fergus Falls, 65 Fed. 586. 737 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 738 the source of supply.^^^ (n) Discretion permissihh : A contract for lighting may be within the discretion of the municipality.^^*' (o) To keep turnpike in repair: A contract with a turnpike company to re- move its gate and keep its road in repair within the city limits is valid.^^^ (p) Constructing bridge over a railroad: A city has power to bind itself to pay part of the expense of constructing a bridge over a railroad.^ ^** (q) Construction of seiver: Under a statute authorizing a town to construct a town hall, necessary outbuildings and convenient accommodations for the same it is authorized to construct a sewer for the service of the town hall.^^'' (r) Water-supply as fire protection: Where the statute authorizes the city to provide for the health and welfare of the city it has power to contract for a water-supply as a pro- tection against fires.^^° (s) Construction of crematories: Where a city is authorized to contract or otherwise for the disposal of its garbage and to purchase or lease land within its territory for the purpose of erecting crematories, it does not prevent it from contract- ing with a rendering establishment outside its limits to dispose of dead animals in a sanitary and inoffensive manner.^- ^ (t) To fix water rates: A charter granting power to provide for supplying a city with water gives power to fix the rates to be charged to consum- ers.^^^ (u) Heating and lighting court-house: A joint committee created by law and which has control of the court-house has authority to contract for heating and lighting the same.^^^ (v) No appropria- tion to pay made: Irregularity in the payment for land by a munici- pality, as where no formal appropriation had been made as required by the charter, will not affect the title to the land of the municipality, in a suit by a citizen to rescind.^-'* (w) License not a contract: A li- cense for a whole year is not a contract for that time within the pro- vision of the constitution. ^^^ (x) Franchise for term of years: Where a charter authorizes the city to provide for lighting the streets ^'^ Brady v. City of Bayonne, 57 N. 422. Cf. Chesapeake &c. Tel. Co. v. J. L. 379; s. c. 30 Atl. 968. Mayor &c., 89 Md. 689; s. c. 43 Atl. "8 Wade v. Borough of Oakmont, 784; 44 Atl. 1033. 165 Pa. St. 479; s. c. 30 Atl. 959. "^ Tiede v. Schneidt, 105 Wis. 470; "^Providence &c. Plank R. Co. v. s. c. 81 N. W. 826. City of Scranton, 1 Lack. Leg. N, ^--Los Angeles Water Co. v. City (Pa.) 183. of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720. "^City of Argentine v. Atchison "^ State v. McCardy, 62 Minn. 509; &c. R. Co., 55 Kan. 730; s. c. 41 Pac. s. c. 64 N. W. 1133. 946. i=*Ecroyd v. Coggeshall, 21 R. L "=* Watson v. Town of New Milford, 1; s. c. 41 Atl. 260. 72 Conn. 561; s. c. 45 Atl. 167. ^''^ St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo. '=°Webb City &c. Waterworks Co. 634; s. c. 34 S. W. 878. v. City of Webb City, 78 Mo. App. § 739 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 728 and for a water-supply, by contract or otherwise, and to grant fran- chises for a term of years for such purposes, a franchise may be grant- ed or contract entered into binding the city for the term of the fran- chise or contract.^^" (y) Contract for term of years in Ohio: The Ohio act of May 4, 1885, as amended by act of May 13, 1886, super- sedes, in certain cities, the act of January 29, 1885, and a twenty-year contract is legal, without submission to a vote of the electors. ^^'^ (z) Time for commencement and completion of contract: A statute which requires the superintendent of streets to fix the time for the commencement and completion of the work is not complied with by an agreement to commence work in fifteen days and complete same in one hundred and eighty days thereafter. ^^® § 739, Invalidity of contracts. — (a) In violation of statute: Where the statute provides that no contract, or other obligation in- volving an expenditure of money, shall be made, or ordinance or res- olution for an appropriation or expenditure of money shall be passed, unless the auditor shall first certify that the money required is in the treasury to the credit of the fund to be drawn upon, it applies only to street-improvements to be paid from the general taxes and not to those to be paid by taxes on abutting property-owners.^^^ And where the charter provides that, except as therein otherwise provided, any public work or improvement that may be the subject of a contract must first be authorized by the board of public improvements, and by the municipal assembly, it has no reference to the public lighting of the city.^^° Where by statute personal property can not be con- tracted for at one time to exceed five hundred dollars unless author- ized by a majority of the electors, a purchase of fire-apparatus exceed- ing five hundred dollars is invalid ;^^^ and in such case the contract is not rendered valid by splitting the price into parts of less than five Hundred dollars.^^^ (b) In violation of constitutional limitations: ""Cunningham v. City of Cleve- lage of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288; land, 98 Fed. 657; s. c. 39 C. C. A. s. c. 56 N. B. 15. 211. ' "" Blank v. Kearny, 61 N. Y. S. 79; ^"^ Defiance Water Co. v. City of s. c. 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 592. Defiance, 90 Fed. 753. "' Fire Extinguisher Mfg. Co. v. 1=^ Palmer v. Burnham (Cal.), 47 City of Perry, 8 Okla. 429; s. c. 58 Pac. 599. The mere fact that one of Pac. 635. the parties to a contract executes it "- Fire Extinguisher Mfg. Co. v. for the benefit of an undisclosed City of Perry, 8 Okla. 429; s. c. 58 third person does not render it in- Pac. 635. Cf. Raton Waterworks valid: Herman v. City of Oconto, Co. v. Town of Raton, 9 N. M. 70; 100 Wis. 391; s. c. 76 N. W. 364. s. c. 49 Pac. 898. Contract held in- ^" Comstock V. Incorporated Vil- valid without being countersigned 729 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. 739 Where the constitution limits the expenditures to the revenue pro- vided for such year, and the revenue has been expended for the year, the city, no matter how pressing its needs may be, can not incur lia- bilities to be paid from the revenues of the succeeding year.^^^ Where the constitution provides that no indebtedness shall be incurred un- less at the time provision is made for the payment of interest and to create a sinking-fund therefor, a contract without such provision is void.^^* Where a city grants the right to erect telegraph-poles in a street on condition that the city be permitted to use them free of charge, and the grant is accepted and the poles used by the city, it can not subsequently impose a tax on such poles.^^^ (c) In violation of precedent preliminaries : Frequently the statute requires certain preliminaries to be taken, which are made conditions precedent to the making of valid contracts involving the expenditure of money, and in such case these provisions are generally construed as manda- tory. Where the statute requires as a precedent to entering into a contract that the auditor, or clerk, shall certify that the money re- quired is in the treasury to the credit of the particular fund, this is an essential to making a valid contract. ^^^ Where the statute provides by the comptroller under provisions of charter: City of Superior v. Nor- ton, 63 Fed. 357; s. c. 12 C. C. A. 469. 1'^ Bradford v. City &c. of Sau Francisco, 112 Cal. 537; s. c. 44 Pac. 912. A contract in excess of the constitutional limit without a vote of the people is void: City of Cov- ington V. McKenna, 99 Ky. 508; s. c. 36 S. W. 518; 18 Ky. L. 288. A con- stitutional limit of twenty years in the grant of a franchise or privilege will prohibit the making of a con- tract granting a franchise of twenty years from a future date: City of Somerset v. Smith, 20 Ky. L. 1488; s. c. 49 S. W. 456. ^=* Noel V. City of San Antonio, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 580; s. c. 33 S. W. 263. "^ City of St. Louis v. Western U. Tel. Co., 63 Fed. 68. ^=« City of Findlay v. Pendleton, 62 Ohio St. 80; s. c. 56 N. E. 649; Sulli- van V. City of Leadville, 11 Colo. 483; s. c. 18 Pac. 736; Town of Du- rango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257, 260; s. c. 7 Pac. 14 (where the set- tled law was announced that "a party dealing with a municipal body is bound to see to it that all manda- tory provisions of the law are com- plied with, and if he neglects such precaution he becomes a mere volun- teer and must suffer the conse- quences") ; Tracey v. People, 6 Colo. 151. Where there is fraud between the contractor and the city officers by which the letting of a contract is secured but not to the lowest bidder, as required by the mandatory provis- ion of the charter, the city may prop- erly defend on this ground: Nelson V. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. S. 688; s. c. 23 N. Y. St. 518. Daniels, J., said: — "Where parties in this manner join together to evade and disregard the obligations and duties of public offi- cers and the plain mandates of stat- utory provisions, the contract result- ing from their acts and combination is not only fraudulent, but it is un- lawful, and upon such an unlawful agreement no action can be main- tained for indemnity by either of the parties." See also, People v. Ste- phens, 71 N. Y. 527, 558. § 739 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 730 that no contract involving the appropriation of money shall take ef- fect until the controller sliall certify thereon that the estimated cost of the work has been charged against the appropriation on which it is founded, it can not be dispensed with.^-"*^ This requirement applies to a contract made by a city with a contractor for paving in front of the city's property.^^® A contract made without complying with the statutory requirements as to interest and sinking-fund is void."** Where by constitutional provision a municipal corporation is prohib- ited from creating an indebtedness unless a provision is made at the time for levying and collecting a sufficient tax to pay interest thereon, and for the creation of a sinking-fund for the final payment, a con- tract in violation of such provision is void.^*** In such case it makes no difference that the city had twelve months in which to pay the debt, or had a sufficient amount to pay the debt in another fund, (d) Interest of officers in contract: It is a universal rule, unyielding in its application and founded on public policy, that no municipal officer shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in municipal con- tracts. An alderman has no right to enter into a contract with the council. Public policy forbids such transactions.^'*^ The city has no right to contract with a corporation in which a member of the council is interested (see statute). ^"'^ A stockholder and officer of a corpora- tion who is also a member of the council, may be disqualified from "'Continental C. Co. v. City of Al- Water Works Co., 56 Neb. 403; s. c. toona, 92 Fed. 822. 76 N. W. 906. Where the law re- "' City of Harrisburg v. Shepler, quires the publication of a notice of 190 Pa. St. 374; s. c. 42 Atl. 893. a public improvement, as to what is "^ Berlin I. B. Co. v. City of San sufficient notice see Arnold v. City Antonio, 62 Fed. 882. And see Kuhls of Ft. Dodge, 111 Iowa 152; s. c. 82 v. City of Laredo (Tex. Civ. App.), N. W. 495. Where the making of a 27 S. W. 791. contract is within the corporate "" Mineralized Rubber Co. v. City powers, and it is regular on its face of Cleburne, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 621; and has been performed by the con- s. c. 56 S. W. 220. A contract for tractor, mere irregularities in pre- lighting the streets for five years is liminary steps are not a defense: void in Minneapolis unless the funds State v. Long Branch Police &c. are on hand and taxes actually lev- Com., 59 N. J. L. 371; s. c. 35 Atl. ied at the time the contract is made 1070. are sufficient to cover the liability: "^Snipes v. City of Winston, 126 Kiichli V. Minnesota &c. Elec. Co., N. C. 374; s. c. 35 S. E. 610; Santa 58 Minn. 418; s. c. 59 N. W. 1088. Ana Water Co. v. Town of Buena- An ordinance making a contract for ventura, 65 Fed. 323. water-works under Neb. Comp. St., ^" Goodrich v. City of Waterville, eh. 14, art. 1, § 69, is valid though 88 Maine 39; s. c 33 Atl. 659; Nune- not preceded by an appropriation to macher v. City of Louisville, 98 Ky. meet payments for water rentals: 334; s. c. 32 S. W. 1091; 17 Ky. L. City of North Platte v. North Platte 933. 731 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 739 voting on an ordinance providing for a supply of water to the munici- pality by the corporation, yet the ordinance itself is not rendered invalid by such vote if it appears that the contract is legitimate and a majority of the memljers of the council voted for tlie ordinance without counting the invalid vote. This is not the rule, however, where the contract is prohibited.^*^ In a suit on a contract with a board of education a conspiracy between the plaintiff and a member of the board whereby the latter was to have the benefit of the contract and the bid of the former was in fact for the latter will prevent a recovery thereon where the charter prohibits its members from being interested directly or indirectly in its contracts.^** Where the charter prohibits an officer being interested directly or indirectly in any contract in which the corporation is concerned he can not charge for services rendered as attorney in court for it whether the contract is express or implied ;^*^ but the rule does not apply where the mayor after the making of a contract and its acceptance takes stock in a cor- poration which succeeds to the rights of the original contracting par- ties.^'*'' And so a poundmaster can not recover for premises furnished by him under an implied contract.^* '^ It has been held that where an alderman liolds as collateral security a share of stock in an electric- light company, he is not permitted to vote authorizing a contract with such company though the stock has small value.^*^ And so a secretary and stockholder of a corporation which has a contract with a city for lighting can not be councilman although the contract was made prior to his election. ^*^ The mere fact that the mayor and a member of the council may at some time become liable as stock- holders in a corporation should it become insolvent and other con- tingencies happen will not render invalid a contract between the municipality and the corporation, it appearing that they were no longer stockholders.^ ^° Eelationship between the city engineer and the contractor who has a contract with the city does not render the contract void, and particularly so where it appears that the engineer has no interest in the contract directly or indirectly.^ ^^ A contract is "^ Marshall v. Borough of Ellwood "' Macy v. City of Duluth, 68 Minn. City, 189 Pa. St. 348; s. c. 41 Atl. 452; s. c. 71 N. W. 687. 994. ""Foster v. City of Cape May, 60 "*Heughes v. Board of Education N. J. L. 78; s. c. 36 Atl. 1089. &c., 55 N. Y. S. 799; s. c. 37 App. Div. '''■' Commonwealth v. De Camp, 177 (N. Y.) 180. Pa. St. 112; s. c. 35 Atl. 601. "' West V. Berry, 98 Ga. 402 ; s. c. ^"^ City of Broken Bow v. Broken 25 S. E. 508. Bow Waterworks Co., 57 Neb. 548; "" State V. Mayor &c.. 19 Mont. s. c. 77 N. W. 1078. 518; s. c. 49 Pac. 15. '^^ Cason v. City of Lebanon, 153 Ind. 567; s. c. 55 N. E. 768. § 739 PUBLIC COIirOKATIONS. 732 not rendered invalid by reason of the contractor being a partner, of a member of the board letting the contract,^"'- nor will the mere fact that a member of the council is interested in a contract for public improvement invalidate the tax for such improvements.^^^ Where a city has been furnished with gas by a gas company it is lia- ble for the reasonable value thereof although the mayor is a stock- holder and is the president of the company.^^* Where the council proceedings were irregular and a purchase was made from a council- man and the council has ratified the payment and used the material and can not return it, the town can not recover the money paid.^^^ (e) Interest of municipality in subject-matter: It is at all times a question of prime importance that the city shall be interested in the subject-matter of the contract. It is not sufficient that some of its citizens may be benefited thereby, or even a considerable number of them, nor its ofiicers or employes be parties. A contract by a corpo- ration council for services of a stenographer in a suit to which the city is not a party and in no way interested is invalid. ^^'^ (f ) Must he in good faith: A contract entered into prior to consolidation and not to take effect until after and to run for ten years is not in good faith, is against public policy and void.^^'^ (g) In restraint of future legislation : The authorities of a city can not by present agreement bind themselves to exercise their legislative powers in a particular manner at some future time.^^® (h) Delegation of powers: The reservation in a contract of power in the city engineer to annul the contract is but an attempt to delegate legislative power, and, there- fore, void.^^** (i) Contracts at special meetings: A contract entered into at a special meeting of the council of which several mem.bers had no notice and in which they did not participate is invalid.^®" ^=*= State V. City of Passaic, 63 N. 680; 56 N. Y. S. 580; 38 App. Div. J. L. 208; s. c. 42 Atl. 1058. (N. Y.) 480. '^^ Roberts v. First Nat'l Bank, 8 ^'^^ New York &c. R. Co. v. Village N. D. 504; s. c. 79 N. W. 1049. of New Rochelle, 60 N. Y. S. 904; s. ^=* Capital Gas Co. v. Young, 109 c. 29 Misc. (N. Y.) 195. Cal. 140; s. c. 41 Pac. 869. The lia- ^'^'^ Neill v. Gates, 152 Mo. 585; s. c. bility in this case grew out of the 54 S. W. 460. obligation of the company to furnish ^™ London &c. Land Co. v. City of gas under the code and not by con- Jellico, 103 Tenn. 320; s. c. 52 S. W. tract. 995; Lord v. City of Anoka, 36 Minn. '^^Frick v. Brinkley, 61 Ark. 397; 176; s. c. 30 N. W. 550; Township s. c. 33 S. W. 527. Board &c. v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528; ''"City of Chicago v. Williams, 80 s. c. 18 N. W. 250; Supervisors &c. v. 111. App. 33. Horton, 75 Iowa 271; s. c. 39 N. W. "' Hendrickson v. City of New 394; Paola &c. R. Co. v. Commis- York, 160 N. Y. 144; s. c. 54 N. E. sioners &c., 16 Kan. 302; People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128; Harding v. 733 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 730 (j) Conlract increasing interest: A contract by sinkin<]^-fuii(l trustees for tlie sale of bonds resulting in adding interest to tbe funded public debt is invalid.^"^ (k) Failure to attack specifications: Tbe failure to annex specifications to a contract referred to a ])art tbereof renders the contract invalid and tbe assessment based tbercon void.^"- (1) Purchase of smallpox Jiospital: Power to make police, sanitary, and other regulations, not in conflict with general law, does not authorize the purchase of a site for a smallpox hospital.^"* (m) Fixing price of water for thirty years: Where by statute cities arc authorized to con- tract for a water-supply for a period not exceeding thirty years, they may not fix a price for that period.^*''* (n) Ik violation of popular vote: Where the electors, at an election called for the purpose, have expressed themselves, in relation to street lighting, in favor of con- struction or purchase of an electric-light plant, a subsequent contract with a corporation for street lighting for ten years is void.^"° (o) Di- version of puhlic funds : A contract unlawfully diverting public funds is void.^*'° (p) Contracts procured by bribery: The rule is universal that fraud in procuring the maldng of a contract vitiates the contract. Hence bribery in obtaining a contract will render it void, although it is with the lowest bidder.^"^ (q) Must be a corporation: A contract by what is neither a de facto nor de jure corporation is a nullity.^"^ (r) Change in improvement : An act changing the line of an improve- ment after a contract had been made so as to lessen the amount and cost of work renders the contract inoperative and the assessment Vandewater, 40 Cal. 77; Stow v. ing to allow no grade crossings at Wyse, 7 Conn. 214. such point: State v. Minnesota &c. "^ City of Cincinnati V. Guckenber- R. Co., 80 Minn. 108; s. c. 83 N. ger, 60 Ohio St. 353; s. c. 54 N. E. W. 32. 376. ^"^ George v. Wyandotte &c. Light "-Gray v. Richardson, 124 Cal. Co., 105 Mich. 1; s. c. 62 N. W. 985. 460; s. c. 57 Pac. 385. '"^ Village of Kent v. Dethridge &c. '°^ Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. Glass Co., 10 Ohio C. C. 629. 151; 38 Pac. 682. "^Herman v. City of Oconto, 100 "^City of Carlysle v. Carlysle Wis. 391; s. c. 76 N. W. 364. An alle- Water &c. Co., 52 111. App. 577; s. c. gation in an answer that the con- affirmed on other grounds, 140 111. tract sued on was obtained by bri- 445; 29 N. E. 556. It is beyond the bery of the officers charged with its power of a city to enter into a con- execution, the ones bribed and the tract with a railroad company bind- amount paid being unknown, is suffi- ing itself to maintain and keep in cient where no application for a repair for all future time a bridge more specific statement is made: which is the joint work of the city Herman v. City of Oconto, 100 Wis. and railroad company, on a public 391; s. c. 76 N. W. 364. highway and over tracks belonging '"^City of Guthrie v. Wylie, 6 Okla. to the railroad company, and agree- 61; s. c. 55 Pac. 103. § 739 PUBLIC COIM'OUATIONS. 734 void.^"" (s) Compromise of an illegal claim: A compromise of an illegal claim against the city is not legal, and creates no liability,^'"* and so as to a contract in connection with an invalid franchisc/^^ and a contract based on a void ordinance.^'- (t) Must he reasonable: A contract with a water company to furnish the city with water for thirty years is unreasonable and beyond the power of the city to make.^^^ And so is an exclusive privilege for lighting for ninety-nine years.^'^* (u) Exclusive employment of union labor: A stipulation in a contract by a board of education that none but union labor shall be employed by the contractor is void. It is a discrimination against dif- ferent classes of citizens and of such a nature as to restrict competi- tion and to increase the cost of work, and is an infringement of the constitutional rights of citizens.^ '° (v) To aid construction of rail- road: An agreement to- pay a stipulated monthly rental for a water- works plant on condition that the lessor would construct a railroad be- tween certain points, where the city has no right to expend funds to aid railroads, is void.^'^*^ While a contract with specified persons may be void as granting an unauthorized exclusive franchise, yet so long as the city accepts services under the contract it must pay the stipulated price,^^'^ (w) Invalid contract — How abrogated: Where a contract is objectionable in itself on the ground of infringing on the police power of the state, or if it becomes so in its execution, the municipality may, in the exercise of its police power, regulate the manner in which 109 Warren v. Chandos, 115 Cal. Live Stock Excli., 170 111. 556; s. c. 382; s. c. 47 Pac. 132. 48 N. E. 1062; Pishburn v. City of ""Village of Port Edward v. Fish, Chicago, 171 111. 338; s. c. 49 N. E. 33 N. Y. S. 784; s. c. 86 Hun (N. Y.) 532. 548. ^'° Higgins v. San Diego Water "1 Nicholasville W. Co. v. Board Co., 118 Cal. 524; s. c. 50 Pac. 670. &c. (Ky.), 64 S. W. 1133. A city without special authority can "-Ellis V. City of Cleburne (Tex. not extend its aid to an association: Civ. App.), 35 S. W. 495. Park v. Modern Woodmen, 181 111. "•'Plynn v. Little Palls &c. Co., 74 214; s. c. 54 N. E. 932. The subscrip- Minn. 180; s. c. 77 N. W. 38; 78 N. tion for corporate stock by a city W. 106. being unauthorized the acceptance "*City of Wellston v. Morgan, 59 of bonds by it does not make it a Ohio St. 147; s. c. 52 N. B. 127. stockholder: City of Genesee v. Gen- "^ Adams v. Brenan, 177 111. 194; eseo &c. Co., 55 Kan. 358; s. c. 40 s. c. 52 N. E. 314; Millett v. People, Pac. 655. But if there was a general 117 111. 294; s. c. 7 N. E. 631; Prorer power to contract for a water supply V. People, 141 111. 171; s. c. 31 N. E. the city will be liable on a quantum 395; Bruceville Coal Co. v. People, valebat for the reasonable value of 147 111. 66; s. c. 35 N. E. 62; Ramsey the use of the plant. V. People, 142 111. 380; s. c. 32 N. E. "Mllinois Trust &c. Bank v. Ar- 364; Ritchie v. People, 155 111. 98; kansas City W. Co., 67 Ped. 196. s. c. 40 N. E. 454 ; People v. Chicago 735 MUNicir.VL contracts. § T30 it may ])e carried out, or may al)ro_tiat(> it ciitiroly upon tlic principle that it can not bind itself to any course of action which shall prove deleterious to the health or morals of its inhabitants."'' An illegal contract might be canceled at the suit of a lot-owner in a suit brought before much work had been done, and before the bonds had been sold, and an assessment made, and the fact that at the time of the trial the work had been completed and the bonds issued and sold would not cure the illegality."" (x) Recovery under void contract: A con- tractor can not recover from the city the value of a bridge built under a void contract. ^^" The city may recover the proceeds of bonds issued by it to a corporation under a void subscription to the capital stock. ^^^ (y) Mahing of long lease: Where the city holds land for the benefit of the public it has no right to make a long lease of such land for private purposes.^**- (z) Release of railway from duty: Where a duty rests upon a railway company to restore a public highway to its former condition the city can not make a valid contract relieving the com- pany from such performance and waiving its power to enforce per- formance.^^^ (aa) Remedy in equity: A contract with a city to furnish it for municipal use a fire-alarm telegraph system which is void for contravening constitutional limitations can not be changed by a court of equity so as to give an implied franchise to the contract- "' Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla of Corpus Christ! v. Central W. & Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; s. c. 19 S. W. Co., 8 Tex. Civ. App. 94; s. c. 27 Ct. 77. S. W. 803. A lease of franchises by ^■* Allen V. City of Davenport, 107 a city after the repeal of an act Iowa 90; s. c. 77 N. W. 532. granting them to the city is void: ^^« Berlin I. B. Co. v. City of San Central W. & W. Co. v. City of Cor- Antonio, 62 Fed. 882. A town is re- pus Christi, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 390; lieved from liability on a contract s. c. 57 S. W. 982. A city, as les- assigned without its consent, though sor, is governed by the same obliga not annulled until after receiving tions of law as are imposed upon the benefits, where the law prohibits other lessors, and if part of the the assignment of such contracts leased premises are taken for public without the written consent of the improvement there must be a dimi- town, and authorizes its revocation nution of rent: Hinrichs v. City of on the ground of an assignment New Orleans, 50 La. An. 1214; s. c. without consent: Suburban Blec. 24 So. 224. Light Co. V. Town of Hempstead, 38 ^'^ State v. Minnesota Trans. R. App. Div. (N. Y.) 355; s. c. 56 N. Y. Co., 80 Minn. 108; s. c. 83 N. W. 32. S. 443. Cf. Plynn v. Little Falls &c. Co., 74 "'City of Geneseo v. Geneseo &c. Minn. 180, 186; s. c. 77 N. W. 38; 78 Co., 55 Kan. 358; s. c. 40 Pac. 655. N. W. 106; State v. St. Paul City R. '"Weeks v. City of Galveston, 21 Co.. 78 Minn. 331; s. c. 81 N. W. 200; Tex. Civ. App. 102; s. c. 51 S. W. 544. Nash v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261; s. c. A city can not lease to one person all 33 N. W. 787. its wharf and water privileges: City § 740 ri'HLic coiu'OHATioNS. 736 ing company to operate the system for its own benefit and use, nor can the court authorize tJie delivery of possession of the plant as an entirety where part of the apparatus and poles belong to the city.^®* Where the charter requires all contracts to be signed by the mayor, or some other person authorized thereto, a contract for a sewer signed only by the parties who agree to do the work is invalid and no action can be maintained thereon for damages for preventing its perform- ance by the city, nor will equity grant relief, where no work has been done and there is no detriment except prospective profits."^ § 740. Construction of contracts. — ]\Iunicipal contracts are gov- erned by the same general rules of construction as are applied to other contracts with but few minor exceptions. The construction of a mu- nicipal contract is to be governed by the surroundings existing at the time, and not in the light of subsequent developments and newly arising conditions.^^'^ A few judicial constructions under municipal contracts are given though no general rules are to be derived there- from, (a) As to losses — By ivliom home: Where a contract provided that all losses arising from the nature of the work and from unseen obstructions should be borne by the contractor the city is not li- able.^®^ (b) To improve a street: A contract binding a railroad company to regrade and gravel a street used by it, place it in a good condition and keep it in good repair is not to be construed as a contract to improve the street by a brick pavement, but it does not prevent the city from improving the street by special assessment.^ ^^ (c) What estimates include: Estimates for grading a street properly include the filling in and the adjustment of sewers, catch-basins and manholes.^^® (d) When plans and specifications govern: Where a contract pro- vides that the work is to be done according to certain plans and speci- fications which form part of it, and nothing is said as to the proposal and acceptance which are attached to the contract, the plans and specifications will govern without reference to the proposal and ac- ceptance.^^** (e) Bent of hydrants: A contract by which the city ^** Gamewell &c. Tel. Co. v. City of ^*° Los Angeles Water Co. v. City Laporte, 102 Fed. 417; s. c. 42 C. C. of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720. A. 405; 96 Fed. 664. ^" Mairs v. Mayor &c., 65 N. Y. S. "■^Frick V. City of Los Angeles, 351; s. c. 52 App. Div. (N. Y.) 343. 115 Cal. 512; s. c. 47 Pac. 250. A ^"^ Cason v. City of Lebanon, 153 judgment rendered by consent Ind. 567; s. c. 55 N. E. 768. against town commissioners will not ^*"' Sawyer v. City of Chicago, 183 estop the town from setting up want 111. 57; s. c. 55 N. E. 645. of power to make such contract: ""Murphy v. City of Yonkers, 60 Union Bank &c. v. Commissioners N. Y. S. 940; s. c. 45 App. Div. (N. &c., 119 N. C. 214; s. c. 25 S. E. 966; Y.) 621. 34 L. R. A. 487. 737 MUNICITAL CONTRACTS. § 740 rents a specified rmmber of hydrants for a specific sum per annum for the period of ten years with the privilege of taking any additional hydrants at a specified annual rental means that if additional hydrants are rented it shall be for the remaining portion of the ten years and not until the order may be rescinded,^"^ (f) Not retrospective: The limitation of a tax to seven mills on the dollar for water supply does not apply to existing contracts.^®- (g) Ohligation to purchase water- works: A grant of the right to erect water- works providing that at the expiration of twenty years, if the grant should not be renewed, the city should purchase the works, makes it obligatory on the city to pur- chase if the grant is not renewed.^"^ (h) When ohligation of contract impaired: A statute so construed as to require a vote of the taxpayers on the reincorporation of a city or town, in favor of assuming the debts of the old corporation, before the new corporation is held there- for, impairs the obligation of a contract and is void.^^* (i) "Street" — Meaning of: In the absence of limiting words "street" means the whole area from the line of lots on one side to the line of lots on the other, and includes the sidewalk areas.^"^ (j) Guaranty for repairs, when: A contract including maintenance will be regarded as a guaranty in a contract for repaving, where it does not appear that the bid was higher than if the maintenance had been 'omitted.^*"^ "'State v. City of Phillipsburg, 23 rates: Arnold v. Mayor &c., 21 R. I. Mont. 16; s. c. 57 Pac. 405. 15; s. c. 41 Atl. 576. Construction '■'- State V. City of Kearney, 49 Neb. of Ohio Rev. St., § 2486, as to power 337; s. c. 70 N. W. 255. of trustees in relation to contracts: "=* National Water Works Co. v. Kerr v. City of Bellefontaine, 59 Kansas City, 62 Fed. 853; s. c. 10 C. Ohio St. 446; s. c. 52 N. E. 1024. Con- C. A. 653. struction of Seattle charter with ref- '" Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. erence to the validity of contracts S. 646; s. c. 17 S. Ct. 957. thereunder: Moran v. Thompson, 20 "^ Board of Public Works &c. v. Wash. 525; s. c. 56 Pac. 29. Con- Hayden, 13 Colo. App. 36; s. c. 56 struction of St. Louis charter with Pac. 201. reference to the validity of contracts ""Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woes- thereunder: Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. ten, 147 Mo. 467; s. c. 48 S. W. 939. Woesten, 147 Mo. 467; s. c. 48 S. W. A contract for construction of tunnel 939. Construction of charter of Bay partly through rock and partly City, Mich., and contract thereun- through earth construed: City of der: Fox v. City of Bay City, 122 Chicago V. Duffy, 179 111. 447; s. c. Mich. 499; s. c. 81 N. W. 352. Con- 53 N. E. 982. As to when rentals are struction of contract under St. Paul due in advance for water supplies, city charter: St. Paul Gaslight Co. see City of Greenville v. Greenville v. City of St. Paul, 78 Minn. 39;- s. c. Water Works Co., 125 Ala. 625; s. c. 80 N. W. 774, 877. Construction of 27 So. 764. Construction of contract contracts generally, — see Barry v. under R. I. act of June 13, 1878, §§ 9, City of New York, 56 N. Y. S. 1049; 10, in relation to regulation of water s. c. 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 632. 1 Smith — 47 § 741 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 738 § 741. Extras. — There are many unforeseen contingencies that arise in the performance of municipal contracts that by no reasonable probability could have been anticipated, in the inception of the con- tract, and afford grounds for well-founded claims for extra com- pensation. While this is true no reason exists why the contract itself should not contain provisions, equitable and just to all concerned, for adjusting all claims for extra compensation. There is probably no matter, in the management of municipal affairs, requiring greater acumen, judgment, and legal ability than the preparation of munici- pal contracts, involving, as they frequently do, complicated interests, vast expenditures of money and extending over considerable periods of time. Claims for extras, or extra compensation over and beyond the contract price, may be, and often are, equitable and just, but the casual observer of the trend of municipal litigation must observe that they are often made, either as an evasion of the law requiring con- tracts to be let to the lowest responsible bidder, or as a means of extor- tion. There are two adequate remedies for this evil which are easily attainable; that is, judicious legislation, such as has been adopted in a few states, and ample provisions touching all claims for extras under municipal contracts, embodied in the contract itself. There are many safeguards thrown around the execution of municipal contracts, for the protection of the public, all of which are rendered nugatory by laxness in legislation, or want of care in the drafting of the contract in the matter of extras. The provision of a contract that no extras were to be allowed except in case of a change of the route, or appliances, and then only when agreed upon and endorsed on the con- tract, or, in case of a disagreement, the engineer should fix a valua- tion, and endorse the same on the contract, will prevent a recovery for extras furnished at the request of the engineer, but of which the council had no knowledge, and no endorsement on the contract was made. The engineer had no power to contract for the city.^"^ A municipality is not liable for work done outside of the contract al- though done by order of the engineer of the municipality and with the knowledge of some of the municipal officers. ^''^ The contract may provide that no extra work shall be performed or material furnished except on the written order of the contractor, signed or countersigned by the city engineer, and approved by the city council, and unless this is done the city is not liable.^^" It, no doubt, would be equally effi- cacious, in many cases, to provide also that the municipal contract '^' J. M. Griffith Co. v. City of Los '="' City of Huntington v. Force, 152 Angeles (Cal.), 54 Pac. 383. Ind. 368; s. c. 53 N. E. 443. "'West Chicago Park Com'rs v. Kincade, 64 111. App. 113. 739 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 742 shall in no case be modified, clinngcd or in any manner extended to include extra work or material except by order of tbc city council by ordinance duly enacted. The contract may also provide that no claim for extras shall be binding on the municipality unless presented in writing to the city council for allowance within a specified period, and no suit or proceeding shall be based thereon without such presen- tation, the presentation to include a minute statement of the nature, items, etc. No recovery can be had for work done outside of specifi- cations designated by the engineer.^'^'' The acceptance and use of a building does not bind the city to pay for extra work done thereon which was unauthorized.-'*^ The furnishing of extra lights in excess of the number required by the contract for four years without demand- ing payment, receiving payment monthly for those furnished under the contract, is not conclusive that the extra lights were furnished gratuitously.^"^ Extra work rendered necessary by a mistake of the city engineer makes the city liable therefor.^''^ Whether additional work was extra work was left for the future, and a provision vesting in the engineer the final decision as to construction and meaning of the specifications has no application and his decision is not bind- ing.^"* A contractor doing work made necessary by unforeseen ex- igencies is entitled to extra compensation therefor.^''^ § 742. Exclusive franchises and privileges. — The law does not look with favor upon municipal contracts granting exclusive privileges and has at all times condemned monopolies. There may be, and sometimes are, extenuating circumstances involved, particularly in the matter of time or the duration of the contract, but there are no general rules pertaining to the subject and each case is governed by its own facts and circumstances. A grant of especial and exclusive privileges is void.-"® And so is a contract granting an exclusive right and fran- chise for twenty-one years.-°^ A contract with a water-supply com- pany which contains no privileges, and no contract is made for fur- ^'"'McEwen v. City of Nashville ^"^ Abells v. City of Syracuse, 40 (Tenn. Ch. App.), 36 S. W. 968. N. Y. S. 233; s. c. 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) ^" Boston Elec. Co. v. City of Cam- 501. General construction of con- bridge, 163 Mass. 64; s. c. 39 N. E. tract as to extras, — see Braney v. In- 787. habitants &c., 167 Mass. 16; s. c. 44 ^o^* Brush Elec. &c. Co. v. City Coun- N. E. 1060; City of Chicago v. Weir, cil &c., 114 Ala. 433; s. c. 21 So. 960. 165 111. 582; s. c. 46 N. E. 725. ^o^McCann v. City of Albany, 42 =«« Parfitt v. Ferguson, 38 N. Y. S. N. Y. S. 94; s. c. 11 App. Div. (N. 466; s. c. 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 176. Y.) 378. "" Illinois Trust &c. Bank v. Ar- ""^ Murphy v. City of Yonkers, 60 kansas City W. Co., 67 Fed. 196. N. Y. S. 940; s. c. 45 App. Div. (N. Y.) 621. § 743 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 740 iiishing the inhabitants with water, does not preclude the city from erecting or purchasing water-works to supply its inhabitants and for its own use and is not ground for injunction. ^°® A contract between a city and an electrical subway company of the right to construct subways, to lease space therein without prejudice to the city to enter into further and different contracts, and that nothing shall be con- strued as granting exclusive privileges, reserves to the city the right to grant other privileges as to subways. ^"'^ A contract to be a mo- nopoly must be with reference to franchises and agreements in re- striction of trade, and not mere police regulations in the interest of public health.^^" Where no exclusive rights are given it is not a monopoly.^" Where a board of health is authorized to provide for the collection and disposal of its garbage it can contract with a single person for such work and not create an illegal monopoly.^^^ The grant of a franchise for water and light plants for a term of years is not the grant of an exclusive privilege.^^^ § 743. Contracts ultra vires. — The general subject of ultra-vires acts of municipal corporations is treated in a special chapter, and the subject will only be incidentally considered in this connection. There are many municipal contracts that are illegal and therefore void that are not to be classified with ultra-vires contracts. An ultra-vires con- tract is one made concerning a subject-matter that is beyond the gen- eral scope of power of the corporation to contract. A municipality would have no power to contract concerning a mining interest, a dry- goods business, or a grain speculation, and if it did so the contract would be ultra vires and void. A contract in violation of the statute or contrary to public policy may be equally void but not ultra vires,^^* =»" Bienville Water &c. Co. v. City '" State v. Orr, 68 Conn. 101 ; s. c. of Mobile, 95 Fed. 539. 35 Atl. 770; 34 L. R. A. 279. *" Empire City Subway Co. v. ""' Cunningham v. City of Cleve- Broadway &c. R. Co., 159 N. Y. 555, land, 98 Fed. 657. What not a s. c. 54 N. E. 1092. monopoly, — see Waco Water &c. Co. ""Coombs v. MacDonald, 43 Neb. v. City of Waco (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 632; s. c. 62 N. W. 41. Cf. Walker v. S. W. 675. Ordinance of the city of Jameson, 140 Ind. 591; s. c. 37 N. E. Walla Walla held not to grant an 402; 39 N. E. 869; 28 L. R. A. 679; exclusive franchise to water com- Smiley v. MacDonald, 42 Neb. 5; s. pany: City of Walla Walla v. Walla c. 60 N. W. 355; 27 L. R. A. 540. n. Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; s. c. But see In re Lowe, 54 Kan. 757; s. 19 S. Ct. 77. c. 39 Pac. 710; 27 L. R. A. 545. "* Field v. City of Shawnee, 7 ="Ludington Water-Supply Co. v. Okla. 73; s. c. 54 Pac. 318; and see City of Ludington, 119 Mich. 480; s. ch. 16, ante, c. 78 N. W. 558. 741 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 744 and being void is not susceptible of ratification.^^^ The following contracts were held to be ultra vires : The offering of a reward ;^^" borrowing money to pay expenses of a contested election in regard to the removal of the county seat;^^'^ to make loans and donations to colleges ;^^^ the giving away, or exchange of the city streets for other property.'^^® Where a municipality has power to provide for a water supply it may employ an engineer to supply plans and specifications, and the contract is not ultra vires, although the building of the water- works is subsequently enjoined on other grounds than the municipal functions of the municipality.^^** The defense of ultra vires must be raised by pleading.-^^ A city is not authorized to bind itself by a con- tract to furnish Avater for a number of years, at a fixed rate. But this is not on the ground of ultra vires.- ^- § 744. Liability of municipality on contracts. — (a) For failure to collect assessment : A contract for a sewer, part of which is to be paid for out of the general sewer fund and the remainder to be assessed against the property benefited, makes the city liable for the whole sum though it is able to collect but part of the assessment. ^^^ Where a contract is based on a special assessment with a provision waiving all claims or lien against the city except from the collection of the special assessment, the contractor can not recover a general judgment against the city on the ground that its officers failed,' or refused, to levy a second assessment after the first had been held invalid.--* Delay in the collection of an assessment growing out of a mistake in the law rendering it necessary to make a reassessment renders the city liable for the damages caused by such delay.^^^ Where improvements are =^' State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548; ==^ Addyston Pipe &c. Co. v. City of s. c. 31 S. W. 784; 34 S. W. 51; 35 Corry, 197 Pa. St. 41; s. c. 46 Atl. S. W. 1132. 1035. "" City of "Winchester v. Redmond, "^ City of Pontiac v. Talbot Pav. 93 Va. 711; s. c. 25 S. E. 1001. Co., 94 Fed. 65; s. c. 36 C. C. A. 88. ^^" Myers v. City of Jeffersonville, -^ Denny v. City of Spokane, 79 145 Ind. 431; s. c. 44 N. E. 452. Fed. 719. Cf. Reilly v. City of Al- "I'City of Fulton v. Northern 111. bany, 112 N. Y. 30; s. c. 19 N. E. Coll., 158 111. 333; s. c. 42 N. E. 138. 508; City of Leavenworth v. Mills, ^^'Beebe v. Little Rock, 68 Ark. 6 Kan. 288; City of Leavenworth v. 39; s. c. 56 S. W. 791. Stille, 13 Kan. 539; Commercial ""Harlow v. Borough of Beaver Nat'l Bank v. City of Portland, 24 Palls, 188 Pa. St. 263; s. c. 41 Atl. Or. 188; s. c. 33 Pac. 532; Cum- 533. ming v. Mayor &c., 11 Paige (N. "'Brown v. Board &c., 103 Cal. Y.) 596; City of Memphis v. Brown, 531; s. c. 37 Pac. 503. 20 Wall. 289, 311; McEwan v. City of "-Trustees &c. v. City of Jackson- Spokane, 16 Wash. 212; s. c. 47 Pac. ville, 61 111. App. 199. 433. § 744 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 742 made under the assessment plan against property specially benefited, and not at the expense of the city generally, the city is not liable gen- erally for failure duly and without neglect to collect the special as- sessments.--*^ Warrants payable out of a street-grade fund can not be collected from the city generally. And this though the remedy against the special fund be lost.--'' (b) When officers may hind mu- nicipality : Where street lighting was furnished at the request of cer- tain officials, who had administrative authority under the charter, and the street lighting was absolutely necessary for the city, the court will grant relief.^^® A municipal corporation is liable for the acts of an authorized officer although such officer expended more money than he was authorized to expend. ^^^ Where the charter intrusts the care of schools to a board of education and its trustees the city is liable for a violation of a contract by them.-^° (c) Officers not liable when: Where a person making a contract with village officers knows their official position and of the invalidity of the contract without ratifica- tion of the board, and there is absence of proof of an intention to make themselves personally liable, they can not be held personally. -^^ (d) Liability on void contracts: Where a contract for water supply for more than a year is illegal by reason of not having been submitted to a vote of the people, but the contractor has expended a large amount for a plant, the city is liable for the water actually supplied under such contract in each year.-^^ While an executory contract between a city and an alderman will not be enforced, yet, if it has been per- formed by the alderman, in good faith, and the benefits received by the city, a recovery may be had on the quantum meruit.-^^ Although a contract may be invalid the city is bound to pay for the benefits received,-^* as where water is furnished to and used by it,^^^ or where 226 Northwestern L. Co. v. City of sub nom. Sanitary Dist. &c. v. Geo. Aberdeen, 20 Wash. 102; s. c. 54 F. Blake Mfg. Co., affirmed in 179 Pac. 935. 111. 167; 53 N. E. 627. "^ Rhode Island Mortgage &c. Co. ■^'' Purcell v. Long Island City, 36 V. City of Spokane, 19 Wash. 616; N. Y. S. 290; s. c. 91 Hun (N. Y.; s. c. 53 Pac. 1104. Under Tex. Rev. 271. St., art. 544-547, the city is primarily =" Miller v. Board &c., 37 N. Y. S. liable for the entire improvement or- 766; s. c. 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 322. dered, although by the statute the -^=City Council &c. v. Dawson city is made liable for one-third and Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696; s. c. abutting owners two-thirds: City of 32 S. B. 907. Belton V. Sterling (Tex.), 50 S. W. ^^^ City of Concordia v. Hagaman, 1027. 1 Kan. App. 35; s. c. 41 Pac. 133. ^'^^ North River Elec. &c. Co. v. City "^* Nicholasville Water Co. v. Board of New York, 62 N. Y. 726; s. c. 48 &c., 18 Ky. L. 592; s. c. 36 S. W. 549. App. Div. (N. Y.) 14. ='' Nicholasville W. Co. v. Board "''Geo. F. Blake Mfg. Co. v. Sani- &c. (Ky.), 38 S. W. 430. tary Dist. &c., 77 Til. App. 287; s. c. 743 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § '^44 services have been rendered l)y an attorney.-^" But a city is not liable on a contract made in violation of the constitution.^^'' (e) Where work and material not in accordance with contract: Where fraud is not shown in the certificate of performance, or that the work called for was not performed, or that it was not of the general character re- quired, it is not ground for resisting payment that the material and work were not in accordance with the contract.-^'* (f) Work per- formed under contract: Where a contractor is in performance of work in grading a street, and the city takes possession for the purpo.se of laying a sewer and subsequently turns the street over to another to be macadamized, the city is liable for the grading done.^^® (g) On quan- tum meruit and valebat: Where a corporation has power to make a contract but it is executed irregularly and therefore void, recovery may Le had on a quantum meruit without showing a ratification if the corporation receives and retains the benefits.^'*** Under a continuous contract the acceptance of a portion does not render the city liable on a quantum valebat.^''^ (h) On negotiable bonds: The city can not escape the payment of an obligation on the ground that negotiable securities were issued therefor instead of non-negotiable.^'*- (i) Lia- bility of city for damages: Under a contract with the city for grad- ing a street, where no provision is made for the payment of daMiages ^" Brand v. City of San Antonio (Tex.i, 37 S. W. 340. Where irregu- larity in the making of a contract malves it impossible to sue upon to enforce the contract there may exist a right of action upon a quantum meruit: Condran v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. An. 1202; s. c. 9 So. 31; Hill v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 11 La. An. 292; City of Ellsworth v. Rossiter, 46 Kan. 237; s. c. 26 Pac, 674. See also, Butler v. Board &c., 15 Kan. 178; Brown v. City of Atchison, 39 Kan. 37; s. c. 17 Pac. 465; Salomon v. United States, 19 Wall. 17; Commissioners &c. v. Brewer, 9 Kan. 307; Huffman v. Board &c., 23 Kan. 281. "' Noel V. City of San Antonio, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 580; s. c. 33 S. W. 263. =5' People V. Coler, 57 N. Y. S. 461; s. c. 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 509. ='"City of Dunkirk v. Wallace, 19 Ind. App. 298; s. c. 45 N. E. 614. -'° Lincoln Land Co. v. Village of Grant, 57 Neb. 70; s. c. 77 N. W. 349. -" Berwind v. Galveston &c. Inv. Co., 20 Tex. Civ. App. 426; s. c. 50 S. W. 413. Where a corporation has received the benefits of a contract it is not a defense to show the passage of resolutions limiting expenses, the contractor having no knowledge of such action: Sanitary Dist. &c. v. Geo. F. Blake Mfg. Co., 179 111. 167; s. c. 53 N. E. 627. "*- Pacific Imp. Co. v. City of Clarksdale, 74 Fed. 528. The taking of a bond of indemnity from a rail- road company to protect the city from a failure of the railroad com- pany to construct a tunnel under the street in accordance with the ordi- nance and to indemnify persons against the company's negligence and wrongful acts does not make the city liable to such persons: Terry v. City of Richmond, 94 Va. 537; s. c. 27 S. E. 429. § 744 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 744 and the assessment of benefits, and for that reason the performance of the contract is enjoined, the city will be liable to the contractor for damages in the absence of an express provision in the contract or charter exempting the city from liability.^** Where the city is lim- ited to a maximum expenditure for a specified purpose, not being within the general municipal powers, it is not liable in excess of this sum even to a bona-fide contractor who has performed the contract.^** (j) Defenses of municipality: "Where the city granted electric-light and water franchises to certain persons, who proceeded to form a corporation to construct and operate plants, to which was assigned the franchises, and the company thereupon mortgaged its plants, property, and contracts, it was held, in an action to foreclose, which was subse- quently made a creditor's bill, and in which case an ancillary bill was filed by the receiver against the city to reach rentals due from it, that it was no defense that the company was not a corporation de jure or de facto.^*^ The defense that the city had paid out all the contract price on other claims and had none to pay plaintiff, requires the city to establish that the claims for which the money was paid were legally filed.^'*® (k) Equitable remedies: Where a city entered into a con- tract for a fire and police telegraph system, at a time when the city was already indebted beyond the constitutional limit, which was known to both parties, and recovery was refused by the court for the contract price, the contractor is not entitled to file a bill in equity to charge the city with rentals, or to compel it to transfer the sjstem to the contractor as a whole.^'*'' Facts alleged may not bo sufficient to authorize a recovery at law but may be sufficient for equitable re- lief."*® (1) Remedies of contractor: Where plaintiff had two con- tracts, one to excavate one street and one to fill another street, the dirt from the former to be used in filling the latter, and he was permitted to perform but a portion of the first contract, his measure of damages is the contract price for the work done and the difference between the cost of excavation and the contract price on the work not done, and in addition the value of the earth that would have been excavated had the contract been completed.^*^ Where a street-paving ^*Ash v. City of Independence, 79 N. Y. S. 794; s. c. 31 Misc. (N. Y.) Mo. App. 70. 102. "" Black V. Common Council &c., ^" Gamewell &c. Tel. Co. v. City 119 Mich. 571; s. c. 78 N. W. 660. of Laporte, 96 Fed. 664; s. c. 102 Fed. =« Cunningham v. City of Cleve- 417; 42 C, C. A. 405. land, 98 Fed. 657. ^' Kerr v. City of Bellefontaine, 59 =^«Iowa Brick Co. v. City of Des Ohio St. 446; s. e. 52 N. E. 1024. Moines, 111 Iowa 272; s. c. 82 N. W. =^»McManus v. City of Philadel- 922; Dixon v. City of New York, 63 phia, 195 Pa. St. 304; s. c. 45 Atl. 745 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 745 contractor suffers damages by reason of the settling of a trench im- properly filled by a water board, the board is not liable to the con- tractor therefor, where the trench was in existence before the paving was done, and the contract was entered into with knowledge of the trench.-'"^" (m) Liability for expenses — Medical services: Where a city charter contains a mandatory provision that certain medical ser- vices rendered at the request of the police department shall be paid for at a certain rate, and requires a specified sum to be appropriated therefor, the city is liable, notwithstanding the charter also provides that no expenses shall be incurred by any department or officers with- out an appropriation previously made,^^^ but the city is not liable where its appropriation has been exhausted before the services were rendered, (n) Liability in case of an independent contractor: Where plaintiff was injured by dynamite used in excavating a sewer and the evidence showed that the sewer was being constructed by con- tractors under the supervision of a foreman ; that all employes, includ- ing plaintiff, were hired and paid by the contractors ; and it further appeared that the city exercised no control over the work or the serv- ants, and reserved the right only to see that the work was in accord- ance with the contract, the city is not liable.^^^* § 745. Estoppel. — Estoppel of municipal corporations generally is elsewhere treated fully and need not be considered here extensively. Where a contract is void because in conflict with the constitution, laws, and public policy, the city may plead the illegality of the contract although fully performed by the contractor;-^- and there is no es- toppel when the contract is ultra vires.^^^ The fact that a city has 1053; Gamewell &c. Tel. Co. v. City St. 399; Creed v. Hartmann, 29 N. of Laporte, 42 C. C. A. 405; s. c. Y. 591; Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. 102 Fed. 417; Comstock v. Incorpo- Y. 104; Congreve v. Morgan, 5 Duer rated Village of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio (N. Y.) 495; Water Co. v. Ware, 16 St. 288; 56 N. E. 15. Wall. 566; Mayor &c. v. Furze, 3 ='" Grant v. Board of Water Com'rs Hill (N. Y.) 616; Dygert v. Schenck, &c., 122 Mich. 694; s. c. 81 N. W. 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 446; Vanderpool v. 969. Husson, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 196; ==^1 Dixon v. City of New York, 63 Matheny v. Wolffs, 2 Duv. (Ky.) N. Y. S. 794; s. c. 31 Misc. (N. Y.) 137; Inhabitants &c. v. Holbrook, 9 102. Allen (Mass.) 17; Bower v. Peate, L. ^'aStaldter v. City of Huntington, R. 1 Q. B. D. 321; Ellis v. Sheffield 153 Ind. 354; s. c. 55 N. E. 88. Cf. Gas &c. Co., 23 L. J. Q. B. 42. Vincennes Water-Supply Co. v. -^- City Council &c. v. Dawson White, 124 Ind. 376; s. c. 24 N. E. Water Works Co., 106 Ga. 696; s. c. 747; Wabash &c. R. Co. v. Farver, 32 S. E. 907. Ill Ind. 195; s. c. 12 N. B. 296; =^'McAleer v. Angell, 19 R. I. 688; Clark V. Fry. 8 Ohio St. 358; Car- s. c. 36 Atl. 588. man v. Steubenville R. Co., 4 Ohio § 745 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 746 received benefits under a contract will not estop it from avoiding the contract if it was made without authority. ^^^ Where a contract was the result of a compromise between the city and a railroad company, and a bridge, provided for therein, was built by both parties and kept in repair by the city, it does not estop the city from alleging the invalidity of the contract as being ultra vires. "^^ And so where an ordinance is necessary to the validity of an improvement, the city is not estopped to assert its invalidity by reason of the work having been done and the benefits having been received.^'^" A contract, invalid because made at a special meeting of which certain members had no notice, but which is legitimate and proper and within the scope of the council's power, will be enforced against the city where it has received the benefit of the contract, and the contractor has expended money on the improvements.-^'' Where a lessee from the city made permanent im- provements on the leased premises under an agreement that the city would refund the value at the termination of the lease, the city will be estopped to claim the contract was ultra vires.^^^ Failure on the part of the city to enforce a disputed provision of a contract for a period of five years will work an estoppel on the part of the city to enforce such provision.^ °^ ^ McTwiggan v. Hunter, 19 R. I. 265; s. c. 33 Atl. 5. ^^^ State V. Minnesota Trans. R. Co., 80 Minn. 108; s. c. 83 N. W. 32. ^^ Wheeler v. City of Poplar Bluff, 149 Mo. 36; s. c. 49 S. W. 1088. 23' London &c. Co. v. Jellico, 103 Tenn. 320; s. c. 52 S. W. 995; Hitch- cock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; San Francisco Gas Co. v. City of San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453; Columbus Waterworks Co. v. City of Colum- bus, 48 Kan. 99; s. c. 28 Pac. 1097; Moore v. Mayor &c., 73 N. Y. 238; Schipper v. City of Aurora, 121 Ind. 154; s. c. 22 N. E. 878; Gas L. Co. v. Memphis, 93 Tenn. 612; s. c. 30 S. W. 25; Dowell v. City of Portland, 13 Or. 248; s. c. 10 Pac. 308. -3^ Wilkins v. Mayor &c., 30 N. Y. S. 424; s. c. 9 Misc. (N. Y.) 610. ^"'City of St. Louis v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 155 Mo. 1; s. c. 55 S. W. 1003. One who has had the full benefit of property of a corporation under a contract is estopped to ques- tion the validity of such contract: Mayor &c. v. Sonneborn, 113 N. Y. 423; s. c. 21 N. E. 121, an action by the city to recover rent for lease of a pier, in which the lessee at- tempted to defend on the ground that the lease was not made in terms of the statute relating to such mat- ters, which provides that all "leases other than for districts appropriated by said board to special commercial interests shall be made at public auction to the highest bidder." See also, Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62; Rider Life Raft Co. v. Roach, 97 N. Y. 378. A city is not estopped by a resolution of the coun- cil reciting a compliance with the contract when in fact there had not been in an action to rescind the contract: City of Galesburg v. Gales- burg Water Co., 34 Fed. 675; af- firmed in Farmers' Loan &c. Co. v. Galesburg, 133 U. S. 156; s. c. 10 S. Ct. 316. 747 MUNICirAL rOXTRACTS. § 74G § 746. Letting of municipal contracts. — There is no subject con- nected with nmnieipiil contracts that has been more fruitful of liti- gation than tlie matter of letting such contracts under the statutory provisions usually found regulating the subject. There is great dis- similarity in the statutes, and much confusion in the decisions and but few general principles to be derived therefrom. It seems to be generally admitted, however, that the provisions of the statute pre- scribing the mode and time of advertising for bids are mandatory, and a condition precedent to the making of a valid contract.-"** (a) Sufficiency of notice on advertisement: Where the law requires the advertisement for bids for at least ten days, one insertion ten days before letting is sufficient.'"^ Where the statute, or charter, fixes the length of time and method of advertising there can be no radical departure from such requirements. It has been held, however, that although the charter requires advertisement for bids before letting contracts, the design of which being to insure economy and prevent favoritism and corruption, yet in case of emergency, where a delay would result in irreparable injury, a valid contract may be made without such preliminary advertisement if the price is reasonable.^" - "WHiere the assignees of a contractor sue on a contract that has been completed by the board of pulilic works, after abandonment by the contractor, it is of no avail to the plaintiffs that no advertisement for bids was made for the completion of the work as required by law.-""^ The New Jersey act of ]\Iay 22, 1894, authorizing the lighting of public streets and places in cities, towns, townships, boroughs and villages, and to erect and maintain proper appliances, does not re- quire advertisements for proposals nor that the contract be awarded to the lowest bidder. The contract may be awarded with or without proposals, and so long as the contract is bona fide and is made with reasonable discretion and judgment it will not be interfered with.-"* (b) Letting of contract on bids, not required when: The statutes, as a rule, do not require all contracts to be let on bids submitted ; in fact, where the amount involved is small or the number necessarily ="*' McLoud v. City of Columbus, Schefbauer v. Board &c., .57 N. J. L. 54 Ohio St. 439; s. c. 44 N. E. 95. 588; s. c. 31 All. 454; Howell v. City ="' Woodward v. Collett, 20 Ky. L. of Millville, 60 N. J. L. 95, 98; s. c. 1066; s. c. 48 S. W. 164. 36 Atl. 691; Foster v. City of Cape ="= North River Elec. &c. Co. v. May, 60 N. J. L. 78; s. c. 36 Atl. City of New York, 62 N. Y. S. 726; s. 1089; State v. Inhabitants &c., 52 N. c. 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 14. J. L. 483; s. c. 19 Atl. 966. Notice ='■•' Jones V. Savage, 53 N. Y. S. 308; of the improvement for which bids s. c. 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 158. are invited held insufficient in Wind- -"* Oaltley v. City of Atlantic City, sor v. City qf Des Moines, 101 Iowa 63 N. J. L. 127; s. c. 44 Atl. 651. Cf. 343; s. c. 70 N. W. 214. § 746 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 748 large, it would be necessarily inconvenient so to do. It has been held that a statute which provides that all contracts exceeding $500 shall be let to the lowest bidder does not apply to a contract for hiring pumps at $42.50 per day which may be terminated at any time.^''^ Evidently this would not be the case if there was a manifest evasion of the law. It has been held under a city charter that a city council may let contracts for street-improvements without advertising for bids, where the law requiring bids is applicable only to the mayor and a committee, and not applicable to the letting of bids by the coun- cil.^®® (c) Opening of bids: Where bids were to be received by a cer- tain day and the bids were opened two days later, but the record was silent as to when the bids were handed in, it will be presumed the bid was in apt time.^*^'^ Where the law requires all bids to be publicly opened by the officer in charge of the advertising, and such officer is absent at the time, the bids can not be opened by his secretary,^"* and bids opened in the absence of the officer authorized to open, may be disregarded by him.-^^ Where an ordinance provides that advertise- ments for bids for public improvements shall specify a time and place when and where bids shall be opened by the board of public works in the presence of such persons as shall choose to attend, and the adver- tisement merely recited that sealed proposals would be received at the office of the board of public works till a certain hour, at which time they were in fact opened in public in the presence of bidders, the assessment was legal.-"" Where the statute requires each bid to con- tain the full name of every one interested in it, it is mandatory, and this for the reason that it is material to know who are to be held re- sponsible for the faithful performance of the contraet.-^^ (d) Accept- ance of bid: After the acceptance of a bid such acceptance can not be reconsidered and revoked, for the reason that it has then become a con- ="= Sanitary Dist. &c. v. Geo. F. ^"^People v. Coler, 54 N. Y. S. 785; Blake Mfg. Co., 179 111. 167; s. c. 53 s. c. 35 App. Div. (N. Y.) 401. N. E. 627. Where the charter pro- ="" People v. Coler, 54 N. Y. S. 785; hibits the making of a contract s. c. 35 App. Div. (N. Y.) 401. where the expense will exceed $500 ""Cass Farm Co. v. City of De- without letting it to the lowest troit, 124 Mich. 433; s. c. 83 N. W. bidder it has no application to the 108. The minutes of a board must hiring of pumps to be used by the show that bids were opened and de- engineer of the corporation in doing clared publicly as required by law work he was required to do: Geo. F. or it is prima facie proof that it Blake Mfg. Co. v. Sanitary Dist. &c., was not done: Edwards v. Berlin, 77 111. App. 287. 123 Cal. 544; s. c. 56 Pac. 432. ^^^ City of Waco v. Chamberlain, "' Strack v. Ratterman, 18 Ohio C. 92 Tex. 207; s. c. 47 S. W. 527. C. 36. =<" Williams v. Bergin, 129 Cal. 461; s. c. 62 Pac. 59. 749 MUNICIPAL CONTRxVCTS. § 74G tract. -'^- It has been held, however, that after bids on plans and specifications have been received it is competent for the city to make an agreement with one of the bidders modifying the plans and speci- fications to the advantage of the city.^^^ It will be readily seen that the acceptance of a bid may be fraudulently procured, or under a mistake as to the real parties in interest, and may be rescinded if done promptly, (e) Competition the design: The design of such statutes is to secure competition and thereby secure a contract on as favorable terms as possible. The general rule is, therefore, that every- thing which tends to prevent competition renders the bid invalid. And so a contract for a public improvement which reserves to an officer the power to require a greater or less amount of certain material in the work, thereby affecting the profits on the work, is invalid as calculated to discourage competition.^^* Where the law requires contracts to be let to the lowest bidder it must be done, and it is no excuse that the council has determined by ordinance and agreement to let contracts to no person employing non-union labor. ^^^ It has been held, however, that an ordinance in relation to the paving of a street, which provides that a particular kind of asphalt shall be used in which there is a monopoly, does not render the ordinance void.^^*' And so a city in advertising for bids, if acting in good faith, may contract for the use of such materials as are for the city's interest, although such material is the product of an exclusive manufacture.-^'^ (f) Bids based on plans and specifications: An advertisement for bids which refers to plans and specifications is sufficient,-'^ but such specifications ^^ Safety Insulated Wire &c. Co. v. turer is not void in the absence of City of Baltimore, 74 Fed. 363; s. c. proof that they were patented and 42 U. S. App. 64; 20 C. C. A. 453. not generally on sale in the market: ^^'Reno W. &c. Co. v. Osburn, 25 Smith v. City of Syracuse, 44 N. Y. Nev. 53; s. c. 56 Pac. 945. As to a S. 852; s. c. 17 App. Div. (N. Y.) 63. state of facts under which an ac- But they are void if it is provided ceptance of a bid will not be bind- that the materials shall be pur- ing, see Wilson v. Gabler, 11 S. D. chased of a certain manufacturer: 206; s. c. 76 N. W. 924. Larned v. City of Syracuse, 44 N. Y. =^' California Imp. Co. v. Reynolds, S. 857; s. c. 17 App. Div. (N. Y.) 19. 123 Cal. 88; s. c. 55 Pac. 802. An agreement between competitors -^^ Holden v. City of Alton, 179 111. in business that one shall make a 318; s. c. 53 N. E. 556. bid for both, the work to be divided ="* Verdin v. City of St. Louis, 131 between them, is not a fraudulent Mo. 26; s. c. 33 S. W. 480. combination such as will render the -'" Mayor &c. v. Bonnell, 57 N. J. L. contract void : Woodward v. Collett, 424; s. c. 31 Atl. 408. The petition 20 Ky. L. 1066; s. c. 48 S. W. 164. to and proceedings of a council ="- Bozarth v. McGillicuddy, 19 Ind. called for an improvement with App. 26; s. c. 47 N. E. 397; 48 N. E. bricks made by a certain manufac- 1042. § 746 PUBLIC COUPORATIONS. 750 must be on file a reasonable time before the bids are to be received.-^* A material conflict to the disadvantage of the city between a detailed specification furnished with a proposal, and the plans and specifica- tions on which proposals were invited, renders the proposal invalid.^®** Where the charter requires advertisement for proposals for a public work on plans and specifications, or other sufficient description, filed, a mere general specification is not a compliance and does not authorize the acceptance of a bid."^^ The fact that advertisement for bids was made before specifications were prepared and could be seen does not invalidate the proceedings, where a readvertisement for thirty days was made after the specifications were prepared.-®^ Where a contract is abandoned and proposals are advertised for the completion of the work according to plans and specifications, it means the specifications of the old contract.^^^ (g) Materials as affecting a hid: Where the charter requires contracts to be let to the lowest bidder, the city in its advertisement for bids has no right to restrict the use of material to that manufactured by ^ certain specified firm, as that would prevent free competition, and a fortiori if other firms manufactured as good material as that specified.^^* An advertisement for proposals which fails to state that the successful bidder will be entitled to use certain material, already belonging to the city, will not vitiate the contract made with the lowest bidder by which he is permitted to use such material. ^^^ The letting of a contract will not be restrained on the ground that there was no competition in the bidding by reason of a monopoly in the sale of some of the material required by the specifi- cations.-**^ Where new material is advertised for, second-hand ma- terial can not be accepted, without notice to the other bidders.^^'^ (h) Award of contract to bidder: The provisions of the statute relative to the letting of contracts upon bids for public improvements must be strictly followed, and the letting of a contract on terms more favorable than the requirement for bids destroys the benefit of competition and renders the contract illegal and subject to being enjoined.-*® 2™ Smith v. City of Syracuse, 44 -'"'' Oakley v. City of Atlantic City, N. Y. S. 852; s. c. 17 App. Div. (N. 63 N. J. L. 127; s. c. 44 Atl. 651. Y.) 63. - ^'"Holmes v. Common Council &c., '^ State v. City of Passaic, 63 N. J. 120 Mich. 226; s. c. 79 N. W. 200. A L. 208; s. c. 42 Atl. 1058. contract requiring bids may limit =^^ Ricketson v. City of Milwaukee, the bids to two designated brands if 105 Wis. 591; s. c. 81 N. W. 864. done in good faith: Beazley v. Ken- -■^^ Johnson v. City of Rock Hill, 57 nedy (Tenn.), 52 S. W. 791. S. C. 371; s. c. 35 S. E. 568. ""Lake Shore Foundry v. City of '^' State V. City of Passaic, 63 N. J. Cleveland, 8 Ohio C. C. 671. L. 208; s. c. 42 Atl. 1058. -'^^ Wickwire v. City of Elkhart, ^-^'Smith v. Syracuse Imp. Co., 161 144 Ind. 305; s. c. 43 N. E. 216. N. Y. 484; s. c. 55 N. E. 1077. 751 MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 746 The awarding of a contract for lighting the streets is a minis- terial act and not legislative/"*® an administrative act and not judicial. -°° Where a contract shows that it was let on bids had for that purpose, in the absence of evidence to the contrary it sufficiently shows that it was by competitive bidding,-"^ and where it must be let to the lowest bidder, a presumption will be raised that the trustees did their duty where the record discloses such facts as to warrant such pre- sumption.-®- Where the facts are not sufficient to establish fraud on the part of the council in awarding a contract, the contract will be re- garded as valid. ^®^ Where the city has a right to pay for street lighting out of the current funds or revenues as the services are ren- dered, and monthly statements were rendered, and payments made, pursuant to a proposition of the light company, but no contract was ever signed by the mayor, or prepared and approved by the city at- torney, the contract can not be avoided at the suit of a taxpayer.^"* An assessment for an improvement will not be set aside on the grounds of fraud of the council where the bid is not so high as to warrant a finding of improvidence of the council, the council being aware of no collusion between bidders, although it appears that the bid is forty to fifty per cent, above the fair cash price for the work, but the war- rants for the work were at twenty-five to thirty per cent, discount.^®^ The award of a contract to one who is slightly in excess of the lowest bid will not in the absence of fraud or bad faith invalidate the con- tract.-^*' Where discretion is vested in an officer he has a right to restrict bidders for supplies to animals killed and dressed in the state. -^'^ A contract awarded on condition that a bond be furnished by a certain time, or it would be reawardcd, followed by default, does not require notice of a reaward to the defaulting bidder.^®^ A grant of a franchise to a water-works company without receiving bids as required by the constitution is void.-'"' A contract in excess of $500, without advertising for bids as required, is not void where there is ^^ Seitzinger v. Borough of Tama- Y. S. 1000; s. c. 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 258. qua, 187 Pa. St. 539; s. c. 41 Atl. =»* Dallas Elec. Co. v. City of Dal- 454. las, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 323; s. c. 58 ^Adleman v. Pierce (Idaho), 55 S. W. 153. Pac. 658. -'" Shannon v. Portland, 38 Or. 382, ='' City of Marshall v. Rainey, 78 s. c. 62 Pac. 50. Mo. App. 416. -"" Kingsley v. Bowman, 53 N. Y. ^'-Neff v. Covington Stone &c. Co., S. 426; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1. 21 Ky. L. 1454; s. c. 55 S. W. 697. =»^ In re Rooney, 56 N. Y. S. 483; -^^ Potts v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. s. c. 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 73. St. 619; s. c. 46 Atl. 195. The letting =°" Barrett v. Ocean City, 62 N. J. of a contract to one not the lowest L. 588; s. c. 41 Atl. 946. bidder does not establish fraud, or -'"' Nicholasville Water Co. v. Board illegality: Terrell v. Strong, 35 N. &c., 18 Ky. L. 592; s. c. 36 S. W. 549. § 746 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 753 but one bidder that can perform the contract.^"'' The power to award bidders the contract for a public work is lost by a delay of several months,^"^ (i) Lettmg to lowest bidder: Where the contract is re- quired to be let to the lowest bidder, whom the council, in its discre- tion, may deem best, this does not make it mandatory to let to the low- est bidder.^*'- Where the contract must be let to the lowest bidder there is no objection in saying that bids in excess of a certain amount for a particular street will not be considered.^*'^ Where the lowest bid is rejected the bidder has no right of action against the city to recover what would have been his profits had his bid been accepted,^°* Where the law requires a contract to be let to the lowest bidder, and it is let without such bidding, the contractor can not recover. Where it must be let to the lowest bidder, the city may divide the improvement in several parts and let the different parts to different bidders, where the whole improvement will thereby be made at less cost than by a single letting.^°^ In the absence of fravid or an abuse of discretion a city need not let a contract to the lowest bidder where the charter does not so prescribe.^*'*^ (j) Letting to lowest responsible bidder: Where by charter a contract is to be let to the lowest responsible bidder the word "responsible" does not apply to ability to pay money only, but means ability to respond to the requirements of the contract, regard being had to the subject-matter thereof.^ °^ "Eesponsible" may also have ^""'City of Hartford v. Hartford 518; s. c. 37 Pac. 695; Kerr v. Cen- Elec. L. Co., 65 Conn. 324; s. c. 32 tral Board &c., 25 Pitts. Leg. J. (N. Atl. 925. S.) 54. If the requirements as to '■""■ Pennell v. City of New York, 45 the proposals for bids are reasona- N. Y. S. 229; s. c. 17 App. Div. (N. ble an injunction will not issue at Y.) 455. Under Cal. St. 1891 the the suit of a taxpayer to restrain awarding of a contract may be ap- the letting of a contract to a higher proved by the mayor, or three- bidder where the lowest bidder had fourths of the city council: Green- not complied with such reasonable wood V. Morrison, 128 Cal. 350; s. c. requirements: Berghoffen v. City of 60 Pac. 971. New York, 64 N. Y. S. 1082; s. c. 31 '»= Brown v. City of Houston (Tex. Misc. (N. Y.) 205. Civ. App.), 48 S. W. 760. ="'^ Jones v. City of Seattle, 19 ^°^ Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woes- AVash. 669; s. c. 53 Pac. 1105. ten, 147 Mo. 467; s. c. 48 S. W. 939. '""Elliot v. City of Minneapolis, 59 ^" Talbot Pav. Co. v. City of De- Minn. Ill ; s. c. 60 N. W. 1081. There troit, 109 Mich. 657; s. c. 67 N. W. are some contracts of a municipality 979; City Imp. Co. v. Broderick, 125 required to be let to the highest bid- Cal. 139; s. c. 57 Pac. 776. The letting der, and where this is so the same to one who is not the lowest bidder rules apply: State v. Payssan, 47 La. may be enjoined at the instance of An. 1029; s. c. 17 So. 481. a taxpayer, but not at the instance , ^"People v. Kent, 160 111. 655; s. c. of an unsuccessful bidder: Times 43 N. E. 760. Pub. Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 753 MUNICIPAL COXTHACTS. § 74G reference to the jiulo-mont and skill of llic bidder/''"^ Where a bidder is required to give satisfactory proof of his ability properly to perforin the work the board of public works can not exercise an arbitrary dis- cretion in tlie matter.^**'* Fixing the niininunn price to be paid for labor and awarding a contract on that basis renders the contract void where the contract must be to the lowest responsible bidder.^^" Where by law a contract is to be let to the lowest responsible bidder the city can not impose a condition that each bidder shall agree to employ, or allow the employment of, only such labor as a certain trades council shall designate, or forfeit the contract.^^^ (k) Rejection of bids is judicial: Where a board in passing ujDon bids is authorized to require bidders to furnish evidence of ability and financial resources to com- plete a proposed contract, and to pass upon the sufficiency of such evi- dence and award the contract, it acts judicially, and its discretion will not be interfered with by the courts, in the absence of fraud, by either mandamus or mandatory injunction. ^^- (1) Where officer is vested ivith discretion: Where an officer in the letting of a contract to a bid- der is vested with the exercise of official judgment and discretion, as where the contract is to be let to the lowest responsible bidder, courts have no right, in the absence of fraud, to interfere with the exercise of that judgment and discretion. The officers' duty is not merely minis- terial and can not be controlled by mandamus.^ ^^ (m) Giving of bonds, or security: Where a bond is required but there is no provision as to the amount, or its form, or the time to be given, the officers have power to regulate.^^^ It has been held that such provision required =«^ Renting v. City of Titusville, 1101; State v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386; 175 Pa. St. 512; s. c. 34 Atl. 916. The s. c. 3 S. W. 846; State v. Commis- word "responsible" in the matter of sioners &c., 36 Ohio St. 526; Douglas letting bids has reference to pecu- v. Commonwealth, 108 Pa. St. 559; niary ability, judgment and skill: Hoole v. Kinkaid, 16 Nev. 217. Interstate Vitrified Brick &c. Co. v. ^^^ In re McCain, 9 S. D. 57; s. c. Philadelphia, 164 Pa. St. 477; s. c. 68 N. W. 163; People v. Kent, 160 111. 30 Atl. 383. 655; s. c. 43 N. E. 760; Kelly v. City '•» McGovern V. Board &c., 57 N. J. of Chicago, 62 111. 279; People v. L. 580; s. c. 31 Atl. 613. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 680; ''"Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. St. 47; People v. Common Council &c., 78 s. c. 31 Atl. 375. N. Y. 33. '"Elliott V. City of Pittsburg, 6 '» Selpho v. City of Brooklyn, 39 Pa. Dist. R. 455. N. Y. S. 520; s. c. 5 App. Div. (N. ''^Johnson v. Sanitary Dist., 163 Y.) 529. A statute requiring a bond 111. 285; s. c. 45 N. E. 213; East River from a bidder whose bid is accepted Gaslight Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. is mandatory: Barker v. Southern 557; People v. Gleason, 121 N. Y. Const. Co., 20 Ky. L. 796; s. c. 47 S. 631; s. c. 25 N. E. 4; Erving v. W. 608. Mayor, 131 N. Y. 133; s. c. 29 N. E. 1 Smith — 48 § 746 PUBLIC CORPOnATIONS. 754 security with every bid and that the security is to be a guaranty on the bid as well as the performance of the contract.^ ^^ It has been held not to be unreasonable to require a deposit of $100,000 on an ex- penditure of $7,999,000.^^^ Where a bidder was unable to furnish the required deposit when bids were asked for, but is subsequently able to do so, it is no ground for rescinding the contract and re- opening bids.^^^ A certified check required to be deposited with a bid may be forfeited only where the contract is based on legal pro- ceedings by the authorities.^^^ And a contractor refusing to sign a contract because more burdensome than the specifications, is entitled to his deposit.^^^ (n) Municipality not liable for facts not com- mwiicated : The sanitary district of Chicago being represented by trustees is not responsible for the individual knowledge of individual trustees as to materials to be encountered in the process of excavation, and which was not embodied in the profile given for the benefit of bidders and not communicated to the bidder.^-" (o) Not liable for representations wlien: A chief engineer of a sanitary district, whose duty it is to let contracts, is not authorized to make representations and bind the district in regard to the subject-matter for which bids are asked.^^^ '^'Selpho v. City of Brooklyn, 39 N. Y. S. 520; s. c. 5 App. Div. (N. Y.) 529. A chai'ter providing that all contractors shall give bond condi- tioned for the payment of all claims for materials is a legitimate exercise of legislative power: Wilson v. Web- ber, 157 N. Y. 693; s. c. 51 N. B. 1094. A person furnishing terra cotta manufactured by him accord- ing to plans and specifications which is placed in the building by a con- tractor is a sub-contractor and re- quired to give bond: People v. Cot- teral, 119 Mich. 27; s. c. 77 N. W. 312. A bond given by a contractor to se- cure the performance of a contract is in effect a bond to secure the per- formance of the work: City of Fort Madison v. Moore, 109 Iowa 476; s. 0. 80 N. W. 527. When suit may be brought on contractor's bond by ma- terial men, — see Wilson v. Webber, 157 N. Y. 693; s. c. 51 N. E. 1094. When not, — see Buffalo Cement Co. V. McNaughton, 156 N. Y. 702; s. c. 51 N. E. 1089. And see Baum v. What- com Co. &c., 19 Wash. 626; s. c. 54 Pac. 29. Under Kansas City charter the sureties of a contractor are not liable to a sub-contractor for the building of a sewer: Kansas City V. McDonald, 80 Mo. App. 444. '^« State v. City of Jersey City (N. J.), 42 Atl. 845. '"State V. City of Jersey City (N. J.), 42 Atl. 845. 3^'N. P. Perine Contr. &c. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 116 Cal. 6; s. c. 47 Pac. 777. ■™ Colter V. Casteel (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 791. Where a suc- cessful bidder makes a deposit as a guaranty of good faith on his part and wilfully fails to perform the contract the deposit is forfeited: Mutchler v. Easton City, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 613; Ex parte Barrell, L. R. 10 Ch. 512; Village of Morgan Park v. Gahan, 35 111. App. 646. ''"Sanitary Dist. &c. v. Ricker, 91 Fed. 833. '" Sanitary Dist. &c. v. Ricker, 91 Fed. 833. CHAPTER XIX. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. Section Section 747. Legislative control subject to 756. The same subject continued — limitations. Public interest paramount to 748. Powers that the state can not private right. relinquish. 757. Application of revenues. 749. Impairment of legislative 758. The same subject continued. grants. 759. Impairment of obligations to 750. The same subject continued. individuals. 751. Remission of forfeitures. 760. The same subject continued. 752. Property held for public uses. 761. Impairment of remedies 753. Tenure of office of municipal against the corporation. officers. 762. The same subject continued — 754. Agencies of municipal adminis- Control of taxing power lim- tration. ited. 755. Diversion of funds. 763. Vacating assessments of dam- ages. 764. The rule summarized. § 747. Legislative control subject to limitations. — The subject of legislative control, so far as the latter operates upon and through the charter, has been discussed in another chapter,^ and the general rule affirming the supremacy of the legislature over its instrumentalities of government finds application in numerous instances throughout this work. As regards matters of general concern and duties which the people of cities or other municipal corporations owe to the state at large, the control of the state is complete, and no discretionary author- ity is vested in such corporations. But these corporations, though made use of in state government and in that character subject to state control, have other objects and purposes peculiarly local, in which the state at large, except in conferring the power and regulating its exercise, is legally no more concerned than it is in the individual and private concerns of its several citizens. And as regards property- rights and matters of exclusively local concern, the state has no right to interfere and control by compulsory legislation the action of municipal corporations." * Amendment, Repeal and Forfeit- ^ People v. Common Council &c., ure of Charter, ch. 4, ante. 28 Mich. 228; s. c. 15 Am. R. 202, a (755) S 748 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 75G § 748, Powers that the state can not relinquish. — Justice Swayne, speaking upon this subject for the United States supreme court, said : "The legislative power of a state, except so far as restrained by its own constitution, is at all times absolute with respect to all offices within its reach. It may at pleasure create or abolish them or modify their duties. It may also shorten or lengthen the term of service. And it may increase or diminish the salary or change the mode of compensa- tion.^ The police power of the states, and that with respect to munic- ipal corporations, and the many other things that might be named, are of the same absolute character.* In all these cases there can be no contract and no irrepealable law, because they are 'governmental subjects,' and hence within the category before stated. They involve public interests, and legislative acts concerning them are necessarily public laws. Every succeeding legislature possesses the same juris- diction and power with respect to them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of enactment — neither more nor less. All occupy in this respect a footing of public equality. This must necessarily be so in the nature of things. It is vital to the public welfare that each one should be ahle at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and well-considered case refusing a man- damus to compel the common coun- cil of the city to order the issuing of bonds to purchase lands for a park contracted for by a board of park commissioners under an act of the legislature supposed to have en- larged the powers of this board so far as to authorize them to make a purchase of lands for the city; in other words, to give them a power of taxation; the court holding that while it was within the legislative power to take away as it did from a citizens' meeting, where it was for- merly located under a prior act, the right to decide for the city upon the purchase of a public park, and to lodge it with some other proper agent or representative of the local community, the state had no author- ity to confer such functions upon its own agents, nor by legislative amendment to enlarge their powers upon these park commissioners, who were originally state appointees and had become representatives of the city only to the extent that their authority was recognized under the original statute by the representa- tives of the city, which conferred upon them no such power. See "Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations," by W. P. Wade, Esq., 8 Cent. L. J. 3; and as to compul- sory legislation, People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; People v. State Treas- urer, 23 Mich. 499. As to the pri- vate rights of corporations as distin- guished from public, see Small v. Inhabitants &c., 51 Maine 359; Phil- adelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Western College v. City of Cleve- land, 12 Ohio St. 375; San Fran- cisco Gas Co. v. City of San Fran- cisco, 9 Cal. 453; Oliver v. Worces- ter, 102 Mass. 489. '■" See Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. 'See Cooley Const. Lim. 232, 342; Regents v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365. 757 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. § 749 present exigencies touching the subject involved may require. A different result would be fraught with evil. All those considerations apply with full force to the times and places of holding courts. They are both purely public things, and the laws concerning them must necessarily b€ of the same character. If one may be bargained about so may the other. In this respect there is no difference in principle between them."^ § 749. Impairment of legislative grants. — A legislative grant is an executed contract, and as such is within the clause of the constitution of the United States which prohibits the states from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. It can not, therefore, be de- stroyed and the estate be divested by any subsequent legislative enact- ment.® "And though a municipal corporation is the creature of the legislature, yet when the state enters into a contract with it, the subordinate relation ceases, and that equality arises which exists between all contracting parties. And however great the control of the legislature over the corporation, it can be exercised only in subor- dination to the principle which secures the inviolability of contracts."'^ ^ Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, an action to restrain the re- moval of a county seat, in which case the court applied the principles of the text and held that a law es- tablishing a county seat of a county in a town upon condition that the citizens of the town should give a bond in a fixed sum for building a court-house, the condition precedent having been complied with, was not a contract which would disable the legislature subsequently to legislate for its removal to another town. See also, Armstrong v. Board &c., 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 208; Elwell v. Tuck- er, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 285 (in which the Indiana court said: — "The es- tablishment of the time and place of holding courts is a matter of gen- eral legislation, respecting which the act of one session of the general assembly can not be binding on an- other") ; Adams v. Logan Co., 11 111. 336; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698. •^ Grogan v. City of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, holding it not in the power of the legislature to divest property which is not held in trust for public municipal purposes. See also, Benson v. Mayor &c., 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 223. ^ Field, C. J., in Grogan v. City of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, 613. In Spaulding v. Andover, 54 N. H. 38, an act which declared a portion of a fund which had been assigned to a town "to belong to and be the prop- erty of" certain individuals was held to be invalid as violating a contract between the state and the town which was the effect of a statute under which the state issued bonds and assigned to the town its portion "to be devoted exclusively toward the reimbursement of the expendi- tures incurred by the town for war purposes during the rebellion." The court said: — "[The assignment of these bonds] was an unqualified and unincumbered grant [of the same to the town], possessing all the inci- dents of an executed and irrevoc- able contract." § "^'"^O PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 758 § 750. The same subject continued. — The supreme court of the United States sustained a statute of Connecticut which discontinued a ferry in which a town had a half -interest on the ground that there was no contract between the state and the town by which the latter could claim a permanent right to the ferry, the nature of the subject- matter of the grant and the character of the parties to it both show- ing that it was not such a contract as was beyond the interference of the legislature.** § 751. Remission of forfeitures. — A county does not, nor do any of its citizens or its governing authorities, acquire a right of property or any separate or private interest in a forfeiture named in an act of the legislature authorizing a subscription by the state to the stock of a private corporation, if the corporation fails to do a certain thing, *Town of East Hartford v. Hart- ford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511. Woodbury, Justice, said: — "The do- ings of the legislature must be con- sidered rather as public laws than as contracts. They related to public interests. They changed as those interests demanded. The grantees likewise, the towns being mere or- ganizations for public purposes, were liable to have their public pow- ers, rights and duties modified or abolished at any moment by the leg- islature. They are incorporated for public and not private objects. They are allowed to hold privileges or property only for public purposes. The members are not shareholders nor joint partners in any corporate estate which they can sell or devise to others, or which can be attached and levied on for their debts. Hence, generally, the doings between them and the legislature are in the nature of legislation rather than compact, and subject to all the leg- islative conditions just named, and therefore to be considered as not violated by subsequent legislative changes. It is hardly possible to conceive the grounds on which a dif- ferent result could be vindicated without destroying all legislative sovereignty and checking most leg- islative improvements and amend- ments, as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies. Thus to go a little into details, one of the highest attributes of a legislature is to regulate public matters with all public bodies, no less than the com- munity, from time to time, in the manner which the public welfare may appear to demand. It can neither devolve these duties perma- nently on other public bodies, nor permanently suspend or abandon them itself, without being usually regarded as unfaithful, and, indeed, attempting what is wholly beyond its constitutional competency. It is bound, also, to continue to regulate such public matters and bodies, as much as to organize them at first. Where not restrained by mere con- stitutional provision, this power is inherent in its nature, design and attitude, and the community possess as deep and permanent interest in such power remaining in and being exercised by the legislature when the public progress and welfare de- mand it, as individuals or corpora- tions can in any instance possess in restraining it." See also, remarks of Taney, C. J., in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peter . 420, 547, 548. 759 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. 752 though the act declares it for the use of the county. A proviso of that kind in an act of the legislature is a measure of state policy which the state has a right to change if the policy is, afterwards dis- covered to be erroneous.** § 752. Property held for public uses. — It is within the power of the legislature to relieve a city or other municipal corporation from the trust to hold real property condemned or purchased for a public use only, and to authorize it to sell and convey the same.^° So, also, the legislature may sanction a sale of such property, a change in its char- acter from realty to personalty, and the devotion of the avails of such a sale to general or special purposes.^^ The legislature having declared in a prior act authorizing the purchase of lands for a public use by a municipality that the holders of the bonds issued and sold by it to pay for such lands should have a lien upon the lands to secure the pay- ment of the bonds, it can not by a subsequent act empower the munic- ipality to sell such lands and make a title freed from the lien of such ^ Maryland v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 3 How. 534, in which it was urged that the county had acquired a bene- ficial right to the $1,000,000 named in the act by reason of the failure of the railroad company to construct their road through the county; that its right was a vested right; in short, that it was a contract, and that the legislature had no power by a subsequent act to release the cor- poration from its payment and or- der a discontinuance of the suit which the county had instituted for the amount. The supreme court of the United States held that it was a penalty inflicted upon the corpora- tion as a punishment for disobeying the law, and the assent of the com- pany to it, as a supplemental char- ter, was not sufficient to deprive it of the character of a penalty. A clause of forfeiture in a law is to be construed differently from a similar clause in an engagement between individuals. A legislature can im- pose it as a punishment, but indi- viduals can only make it a matter of contract. The legislature has a right to remit a penalty imposed by law. In Holliday v. People, 10 111. 214, it was held that the legislature might, after verdict, release a pen- alty in a popular action brought for the benefit of a county, a county be- ing a public corporation subject completely to the control of the leg- islature, and the acts of the execu- tive pursuant to the provisions of the constitution. See also. Coles v. Madison Co., Breese (111.) 154; Con- ner V. Bent, 1 Mo. 235. In the lat- ter case it was held that the legisla- ture was competent to relieve from a forfeiture, even where the money was going to a county, and that after judgment; also, that where money accrues to a county (this was an action for money collected as district taxes claimed not to have been paid over), it can not be said to be so vested as to prevent the control of the legislature, as the leg- islature has power over the counties and all things that belong to them in that capacity simply as such. ^" Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Arm- strong, 45 N. Y. 234; s. c. 6 Am. R. 70. See also, Nicoll v. New York &c. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121. " De Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatchf . 95. 753 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 700 bondholders. The security can not be taken away without impairing the ol)ligation of the contract, which is not one between the corpora- tion and the state, but between the creditor of the one part, and the corporation and the state of the other part.^^ § 753. Tenure of office of municipal officials. — It has been held in Kentucky that the provisions of the state constitution as to courts of cities and the election of judges were never intended to take from the legislature the power to enlarge the boundaries of towns in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution, or to alter or abolish the courts therein, when the lawmaking power should deem it for the benefit of the inhabitants.^^ § 754. Agencies of municipal administration. — Although the power, under its charter and subsequent legislation, has been placed in the governing authorities of a municipal corporation to appoint ^- Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Arm- strong, 45 N. Y. 234; s. c. 6 Am. R. 70. See also, Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304-314; McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143; Wabash &c. Co. v. Beers, 2 Black 448. " Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140, in which the right to the oiRce of a city judge elected in accordance with the terms of a new charter of a city re- incorporated was sustained over the claims of one elected when the pro- visions of the constitution governed in the matter. The court of appeals said: — "Cities and towns are mere creatures of the legislature, and the power exists in that department of the state government not only to abolish the courts, but to destroy the existence of the corporation by a repeal of its charter. These in- ferior courts not being the creatures of the constitution, it was never in- tended to deprive the legislature of the power to regulate and control by proper legislation all the machinery necessary to the existence of such municipalities." Again they said: — "And when its [the city's] charter has been repealed and a new and distinct act of incorporation ob- tained [which was done here], it is the creation of a new city govern- ment, with its civil and police juris- diction as well as the manner of electing all its officers controlled by its charter, when not in violation of the constitution." In Rutgers v. Mayor &c., 42 N. J. L. 51, it was held to be in the power of the legislature of New Jersey to enact a law which was supplemental to an act which had established a district court in cities having fifteen thousand in- habitants. The supplemental act changed the former by substituting twenty thousand inhabitants. The ground of the ruling was that dis- trict courts are inferior courts, which the legislature could estab- lish, alter or abolish at its discre- tion, as the public good might re- quire; and if in its discretion the court was abolished, the term of service of its officers was thereby terminated. The effect of the sup- plemental act, as the city did not have twenty thousand inhabitants, was to abolish the court and termi- nate the term of office of the re- lator, who applied for mandamus to compel the payment of his salary as district judge after the passage of the supplemental act. 761 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. § 755 the officers of any department of its government, there remains in the legislature the power, to be exercised whenever it deems that the public welfare requires it, to create by legislative enactment a board for the government of that particular department, to appoint the mem- bers of the board, and to define its duties and delegate to it the powers necessary to the administration of that department,^* That the constitution of a state mentions and recognizes any particular municipal corporation does not make the charter oi that corporation a constitutional charter so as to place it beyond the reach of legislative power.^^ The doctrine that there is a fundamental principle of right and justice, inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact, that rises above and restrains the power of legislation, can not be ap- plied to the legislature when exercising its sovereignty over public charters, granted for the purpose of government.^^ § 755. Diversion of funds. — It was urged in an Illinois case that money appropriated by an act to establish and maintain a general sys- tem of internal improvements to the different counties through which no railroad or canal was provided to be made, when received by the county, became its property for the use of the inhabitants thereof and was beyond legislative control. The supreme court held that this money was subject to legislative control, and until definitely appro- priated it might be resumed or diverted at the will of the legislature.^''^ " Mayor &c. v. State, 15 Md. 376. rected. That the state may make a " Mayor &c. v. State, 15 Md. 376. contract with or a grant to a public This ruling was based upon the doc- municipal corporation, which it trine that the power to govern be- could net subsequently impair or re- longs to the people, and it is their sume, is not denied; but in such duty to exercise it for the common case the corporation is to be re- good, and being under that obliga- garded as a private company. A tion, it is not to be assumed that grant may be made to a public cor- they have impaired the means ef poration for purposes of private ad- performing the duty by parting vantage, and although the public with the power to any division of may also derive a common benefit the body politic. therefrom, yet the corporation ^■^ Mayor &c. v. State, 15 Md. 376. stands on the same footing as re- " Richland Co, v. Lawrence Co., spects such grants as would any 12 111. 1. The court said: — "There body of persons upon whom like was no contract here between the privileges were conferred. Public state and Lawrence county, either or municipal corporations, however, at the time the appropriation was which exist only for public purposes made or when the county received and possess no power except such as the money. The county was the are bestowed upon them for pub- mere agent of the state for the dis- lie political purposes, are subject at bursement of a certain amount of all times to the control of the legis- the money of the state as she di- lature, which may alter, modify or § 756 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 762 § 756. The same subject continued— Public interest paramount to private right. — A municipal ollicer has no vested right of property in any portion of a fund of the corporation which is set apart as a fund for the relief of disabled or retiring officers of the class to which he belongs, which results from an authority given to the treasurer of the corporation by a statute fixing the compensation of such officers, to re- tain a certain amount from their compensation for this purpose. The effect of the provisions of such a statute is an appropriation by the state each month to the creation of the fund for the purposes desig- nated in the statute, and until used for these purposes it can be transferred to other parties and applied to different purposes by the legislature.^^ § 757. Application of revenues. — The revenues of a county are not the property of the county in the sense in which the revenue of a pri- vate corporation is regarded ; and the power of the legislature to direct their application is plenary. A county being a public corporation, which exists only for public purposes, connected with the administra- tion of the state government, it follows that such a corporation, and of course its revenue, are subject to the control of the legislature, and when the legislature directs the application of its revenue to a par- ticular purpose, or its payment to any party, a duty is imposed and an obligation created upon the county." abolish tliem at pleasure: 2 Kent '^ Board &c. v. City of Springfield, Com. 305; Bailey v. M!iyor &c., 3 63 111. 66. In People v. Power, 25 Hill CN. Y.) 531." 111. 187, the supreme court of Illi- ^* Pennie v. Reis, 132 U. S. 464; s. nois sustained the validity of an act c. 10 S. Ct. 149. Field, Justice, said: of the legislature which provided — "The direction of the state, that that the county in which a city was the fund should be one for the bene- situated, out of taxes collected as fit of the police officer or his repre- ordered by the act, should pay over sentative under certain conditions, to the city certain portions of the was subject to change or revocation revenue realized from the taxes. It at any time at the will of the legis- was especially urged before the lature. There was no contract on court that the legislature could not the part of the state that its disposi- control the revenue of a county, such tion should always continue as origi- revenue being the property of the nally provided. Until the particu- counties, not to be taken from them lar event should happen upon which without their consent, and to be the money or a part of it was to be used and appropriated in such man- paid, there was no vested right in ner only as the county courts of the the officer to such payment. His in- respective counties might direct; terest in the fund was, until then, a that to do so would violate the con- mere expectancy created by the law stitutional provisions as to laws im- and liable to be revoked or de- pairing the obligation of contracts, stroyed by the same authority." Upon this point the court said: — 7G3 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. § 758. The same subject continued. — The power of appropriation which a legislature can exercise over the revenues of the state for any purpose, which it may regard as calculated to promote the public good, it can exercise over the revenues of a county, city or town, for any purpose connected with the present or past condition, except as such revenues may by the law creating them be devoted to special pur- poses.-*' § 759. Impairment of obligations to individuals. — The implied contract which is deemed to arise out of the acceptance of a charter by a municipal corporation is a contract between the city and the state, and not between the city and individuals, and is not "impaired" by a statute exempting the corporation from liability for torts.^^ An act "The whole state has an interest in the revenue of a county, and for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its applica- tion. The power conferred upon a county to raise a revenue by taxa- tion is a political power, and its ap- plication, when collected, must nec- essarily be within the control of the legislature for political purposes." ^ This rule was declared by Field. J., in People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343, 351. See also, Town of Guilford v. Board &c., 13 N. Y. 143; People v. Mayor &c., 4 Comst. (N. Y.) 419; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 65; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. (111.) 405; City of Bridgeport v. Housa- tonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 492; In- habitants &c. V. County Com'rs &c., 13 Pick. (Mass.) 60; truchelut v. City Council &c., 1 N. & Mc. (S. C.) 227; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters 627, 661, 662; Morris v. People, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 381; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 232; Benson v. Mayor &c., 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 248; Clark v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 446; Sharpless v. Mayor &c., 21 Pa. St. 147; Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. St. 188; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; Cincinnati &c. R. Co. V. Commissioners &c., 1 Ohio St. 77; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; People v. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 680; People v. Draper, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 344; State v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 399; Creighton v. Board &c., 42 Cal. 446 (in which it was held that the power of the legislature to appropriate the moneys of the mu- nicipal corporations in payment of claims, ascertained by it to be equi- tably due to individuals, though such claims be not enforceable in the courts, depends largely upon the legislative conscience and will not be interfered with by the judicial department, Ui,■^- '-n exceptional cases); People v. Board &c., 11 Cal. 206; People v. Haws, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 440; Stillwell v. Mayor &c., 19 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 376; Hobart v. Su- pervisors, 17 Cal. 24; People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175, 209; People v. Stewart, 28 Cal. 395; Beals v. Board &c., 35 Cal. 624; Davidson v. Mayor &c., 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 342. -^ Gray v. City of Brooklyn, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 186. The section of the act, amendatory of the charter of the city, under consid- eration, which exempted the city from liability for non-feasance, etc., of city ofBcers, was held constitu- tional; and the court further said the section was intended, not to di- vest persons affected thereby of their rights, but to change and limit their remedies. § 760 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 764 of the legislature establishing a board of public works for a city can not be held invalid on the ground that it divests old boards, or the city corporation, or the common council, of the title to property, and transfers it to and vests it in such a board of public works.^^ § 760. The same subject continued. — If a contract when made is valid under the constitution and laws of a state, as they have been previously expounded by its judicial tribunals, and as they were un- derstood at the time, no subsequent action by the legislature or the judiciary will be regarded by the United States supreme court as es- tablishing its invalidity.-^ "People V. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 73, Christiancy, J., saying: — "All those previous boards and the city corporation itself held whatever property they did hold in the right, and for the public benefit, of the city, as a public trust for municipal purposes; and it was clearly compe- tent for the legislature to transfer it to another public board, to be held in the same manner, for the same public use and benefits." In West- ern Sav. &c. Society v. City of Phila- delphia, 31 Pa. St. 185, the supreme court of the state of Pennsylvania aflirmed the granting of an injunc- tion on complaint of the society to restrain the city from an election of a number of trustees of a loan fund in accordance with an act passed by the legislature, which the court held not to be in the power of the legisla- ture, as it impaired a contract made by the city with reference to the organization of a gas-works com- pany, on the principle that when- ever a municipal corporation en- gages in things not public in their nature it acts as a private individu- al, — no longer legislates, but con- tracts, — and is as much bound by its engagements as a private person. -''Olcott V. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, in which the court applied the principles stated in the text, and held an act of the legislature of Illi- nois, authorizing a vote of the peo- ple of a particular county upon the question whether they would aid the building of a certain railroad, and, if they voted in favor of aiding, au- thorizing the issue of county orders for money to aid in the building, to have been a proper exercise of legis- lative authority, and the county charged on such orders issued by it and given to the road by way of do- nation. See also, Chicago v. Shel- aon, 9 Wall. 50; Louisiana v. Pils- bury, 105 U. S. 278; Livingston Co. V. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407; Have- meyer v. Iowa Co., 3 Wall. 294; Thomson v. Lee, 3 Wall. 327; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Butz V. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. In Burton v. Town of Koshkonong, 4 Fed. 373, it was held that if a statute which provided against interest upon interest was intended and did operate, so as to affect the rate of interest upon cou- pons of the bonds of this town, — a contract made before its passage, it would be such a change in the rem- edy as practically to cut off a por- tion of the cause of action or render the contract of less available worth, and was as much within the consti- tutional provision inhibiting laws impairing the obligation of con- tracts as if it affected the contract directly, and judgment was given for the plaintiff. In United States V. Lincoln Co., 5 Dill. 184, it was held that an act of the legislature. 765 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. § 761 § 761. Impairment of remedies against the corporation. — If a municipality enters into a contract under a supposed power to pay for improvements by an assessment upon property-owners presumably benefited by such improvements, and upon its afterwards appearing that there was no such power in the corporation, the legislature passes a statute empowering the municipality to levy a tax to pay for such improvements, a contractor who has reduced his claim for such work to judgment against the corporation has a vested right under that statute to a remedy to compel the corporation to levy such a tax that the legislature can not take away by subsequent legislation, under the constitutional provision prohibiting legislation which will impair contracts.-* § 762. The same subject continued — Control of taxing power lim- ited. — The supreme court of the United States upon this subject has said: "The argument in support of the act [a statute of Louisiana authorizing the "premium bond" plan for settling the bonded and floating debts of the city of New Orleans] is substantially this : That the taxing power belongs exclusively to the legislative department of the government, and when delegated to a municipal corporation may, equally with other powers of the corporation, be revoked or restricted at the pleasure of the legislature. It is true that the power of taxa- if it applies to county bonds issued of Watertown, 6 Biss. 79, a Wiscon- before its passage, and takes away sin statute of limitations so far as the power from the county court to it affected municipal bonds issued levy taxes to pay these bonds, and before its passage was held to be as a result the right of the holder unconstitutional and void. Hop- of a judgment based upon such kins, J., held that in passing a stat- bonds to compel a levy of a tax by ute of limitations the legislature mandamus to the county court, was must allow a reasonable time with- in conflict with the constitution in which to prosecute existing as to impairing the obligation of causes of action; and as to what contracts. constitutes such reasonable time the -* Memphis v. United States, 97 U. legislature was not the exclusive au- S. 293. See also. Von Hoffman v. thority. The period fixed by the City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. In legislature is subject to review by Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 Dill, the court, and if they deem it un- 522, a statute of Iowa which dis- reasonable they will disregard it as criminated specially against taxes impairing the obligation of con- levied to pay judgments on bonds is- tracts. A limitation to one year in sued by municipal corporations in municipal bonds issued for negotia- aid of railroads was, in view of the tion in a foreign market the judge laws in force when the bonds were regarded as clearly unreasonable issued, held to be unconstitutional and unconstitutional. It amounted and void as impairing the obliga- to a destruction of the contract, tion of contracts. In Pereles v. City § 763 PUBLIC COIJPORATIONS. 76fi tion belongs exclusively to the legislative department, and that the legislature may at any time restrict or revoke at its pleasure any of the powers of a municipal corporation, including among others that of taxation, subject, however, to this qualification, which attends all state legislation, that its action in that respect shall not conflict with the prohibitions of the constitution of the United States, and, among other things, shall not operate directly upon contracts of the corpora- tion, so as to impair their obligation by abrogating or lessening the means of their enforcement. Legislation producing this latter result, not indirectly as a consequence of legitimate measures taken, as will sometimes happen, but directly by operating upon those means, is prohibited by the constitution, and must bo disregarded — treated as if never enacted — ])y all courts recognizing the constitution as the par- amount law of the land. This doctrine has been repeatedly asserted by this court when attempts have been made to limit the power of taxation of a municipal body, upon the faith of which contracts have been made, and by means of which alone they could be performed. So long as the corporation continues in existence the court has said that the control of the legislature over the power of taxation dele- gated to it is restrained to cases where such control does not impair the obligation of contracts made upon a pledge, expressly or im- pliedly given, that the power should be exercised for their fulfil- ment. However great the control of the legislature over the corpora-' tion while it is in existence, it must be exercised in subordination to the principles which secure the inviolability of contracts."-^ § 763. Vacating assessments of damages. — The effect of a law which empowers a municipality to condemn property in the broaden- ^ Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, as to what 358. See also. Von Hoffman v. City constitutes the obligation of a con- of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. In National tract, as follows: — "The obligation Bank v. Sebastian Co., 5 Dill. 414, of a contract includes everything an action by the bank upon county within its obligatory scope. Among warrants issued by the county in a these elements nothing is more im- regular manner, it was held that a portant than the means of enforce- statute of Arkansas which was ment. This is the breath of its vital passed by the legislature after the existence. Without it the contract, institution of this suit in the federal as such, in the view of the law, court, declaring counties no longer ceases to be, and falls into the class bodies corporate and suable upon of 'those imperfect obligations,' as their contracts, being evidently in- they are termed, which depend for tended to deprive parties of the their fulfilment upon the will and right to sue counties in the federal conscience of those upon whom they court, impaired the obligation of a rest. The ideas of right and remedy contract; and Parker, Judge, ex- are inseparable." tracted from the case of Edwards v. 767 LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. 764 ing of its streets, upon that being done, and a commission appointed under the hiw assessing and fixing the compensation to the landowner, is not to divest the owner at once of his property and to vest in him a right to the amount fixed as his compensation, such that the legis- lature may not provide for a vacating of an order of confirmation of the report of the commission in the matter, and submit to the court whether or not there had been error, mistake, irregularity and illegal acts in the proceedings."® § 764. The rule summarized. — A municipal corporation, being a mere agent of the state, stands in its governmental or public charac- ter in no contract relation with its sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may be amended, changed or revoked without the impairment of any constitutional obligation ; but such a corporation in respect of its private or proprietary rights and interests may be entitled to constitutional protection. -'' It was held by the supreme court of the "•^ Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. 196, in which it was held that in the proceeding to condemn prop- erty for public use there is nothing in the nature of a contract between the owner and the state or corpora- tion which the state in virtue of her right of eminent domain authorizes to take the property; all that the constitution of the state or of the United States or justice requires in such cases being that a just compen- sation shall be made to the owner; his property can then be taken with- out his assent. The court said: — "The proceeding to ascertain the benefits or losses which will accrue to the owner of the property when taken for public use, and thus the compensation to be made to him, is in the nature of an inquest on the part of the state, and is necessarily under her control. It is her duty to see that the estimates made are just, not merely to the individual whose property is taken but to the public who is to pay for it. And she can to that end vacate or authorize the vacation of any inquest taken by her direction to ascertain the particular facts for her guidance, where the proceeding has been irregularly or fraudulently conducted or in which error has intervened and order a new inquest, provided such methods of procedure be observed as will se- cure a fair hearing from the parties interested in the property." See also, Matter of Broadway, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 483; s. c. 49 N. Y. 150. ^ This doctrine, first declared in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 660, 661, restated in East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Company, 10 How. 511, 533, 534, has been reiterated in New Orleans v. New Orleans Water-Works Co. and Conery v. New Orleans Water- Works Co., 142 U. S. 79; s. c. 12 S. Ct. 142; in which case the city had under an act of the legislature made a contract for a supply of water with the water- works company, and it was urged by the city that a subsequent act of the legislature which required the city to make a proper compensation to the company for water furnished, or the company should not be com- pelled to deliver the water to the city, impaired the first contract. In Commissioners &c. v. Commission- ers &c., 92 U. S. 307, 311, it was held that the legislature had power to di- § 764 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 768 United States that a municipal corporation could not claim that a contract between it and a private corporation had been impaired by a subsequent act of the legislature, where this contract, which was in reality one between the state and the private corporation, had been adjudged in the state courts to be ultra vires; also, that as the city had repudiated its contract by bringing suit against the private cor- poration for its taxes, it was estopped from the claim of impairment of the contract by subsequent legislation when such legislation was rendered necessary by or at least was the natural outgrowth of its own repudiation of the contract.^^ minish or enlarge the area of a county whenever the public conveni- ence or necessity required it. In Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189, 199; s. c. 9 S. Ct. 453, it was held that the power of taxation on the part of a municipal corporation is not private property or a vested right of property in its hands, but the conferring of such power is an exercise by the legislature of a pub- lic and governmental power which can not be imparted in perpetuity, and is always subject to revocation, modification and control, and is not the subject of contract. In Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334; s. c. 11 S. Ct. 790, it was held that an executive agency cre- ated by a state for the purpose of improving public highways, and em- powered to assess the cost of their improvement upon adjoining lands and to purchase such lands as were delinquent in the payment of the as- sessment, did not by such purchase acquire a contract right in the land so bought which the state could not modify without violating the pro- visions of the constitution of the United States. '* New Orleans v. New Orleans Water-Works Co. and Conery v. New Orleans Water-Works Co., 142 U. S. 79; s. c. 12 S. Ct. 142. CHAPTER XX. TORTS AND CRIMES. Section 765. Torts by the sovereign power. 766. The state not liable for officers' torts — No respondeat supe- rior. 767. Suits against United States — Court of claims. 768. Suits against New York — Board of claims. 769. Counties, etc., as divisions of the state. 770. The same subject continued. 771. Non-liability of New England towns. 772. Liability of New York towns. 773. Liability of towns, etc., as to special duties. 774. Non-liability of school districts and drainage districts. 775. Non - liability for separate boards and bodies. 776. Non-liability for torts of inde- pendent officers. 777. The same subject continued — Who are independent officers. 778. The same subject continued — Applied in New York city, etc. 779. Liability of municipal corpora- tions in tort — General princi- ples. 780. Liability in performance of pub- lic or governmental functions. 781. Duties which are mandatory and discretionary. 782. Duties legislative or judicial. 783. Liability for torts of public oflB- cers. 784. Liability for torts of officers not public. 785. Liability in making improve- ments, etc. Section 786. Torts in diverting watercourses, surface water, etc. 787. Respondeat superior not appli- cable to public oflScers. 788. Negligence as an element of tort. 789. Liability for collision of ves- sels. 790. Torts of independent contract- or. 791. Miscellaneous matters in rela- tion to torts. 792. Non-liability for firemen. 793. Non-liability for police. 794. Liability for acts of mobs. 795. Private interests must yield to public. 796. The same subject continued — Destroying buildings to check fire. 797. Non-liability for negligence in public service. 798. Liability in matters of arrest. 799. Non-liability as to jails. 800. Non-liability as to hospitals. 801. Non-liability as to fire-works. 802. Liability as to city wells and water. 803. Non-liability to trespassers. 804. Liability for nuisances. 805. Municipal liability in general. 806. Chartered cities, etc., distin- guished from counties, etc. — The conflict. 807. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers. 808. Liability commensurate with duty. 809. Municipal liability as to water front. 1 Smith — 49 (769) S 765 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 770 Section 810. Liability for fright of horses. 811. Municipal liability for acts of officers and agents. 812. Not liable for ultra vires acts of officers. 813. Non-liability in the exercise of discretionary powers. 814. The same subject continued — New York and Georgia rule. 815. The same subject continued — Drainage. 816. Non-liability for errors of judg- ment. Section 817. Liability for trespass. 818. Liability for waste. 819. Liability after notice — Implied notice. 820. The same subject continued — Statutory notice. 821. The same subject continued — New York decisions. 822. Impeaching municipal legisla- tive acts for fraud. 823. Indictment for torts. 824. Not indictable for felony. § 765. Torts by the sovereign power. — While the maxim that the king can do no wrong is deemed not to apply to the United States or the several states^ in their character of public corporations,^ it is ob- vious enough on general principles that they should not be subject to prosecution in the courts of their own creation for such wrongs as they may commit,^ without their consent to such prosecution duly expressed by statute.^ The liabilities of the state, being created only by its legis- lature, may be revoked by the same body whenever the public interest requires.^ The legislature of a state may keep within the letter of the constitution and bill of rights to which it is subject, and yet with impunity pass laws which are unjust and oppressive to individuals.^ 1 Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341. - United States v. Hillegas, 3 Wash. C. C. 70. While generally the word "corporation" as used in statutes does not include a state, yet in its more extensive meaning, both the United States and the several states may be termed corporations: Geor- gia V. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315. ^ "We consider it to be a funda- mental principle that the govern- ment can not be sued except by its own consent, and certainly no state can pass a law which would have any validity for making the govern- ment suable in its courts:" Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433; United States V. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. 204; s. c. 1 S. Ct. 240; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; The Davis. 10 Wall. 15. "The state is not liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its agents unless such liability has been voluntarily assumed by it by legislative enact- ment:" Lewis V. State, 96 N. Y. 71; People V. Dennison, 84 N. Y. 272. ^Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433, 437. ^Ex parte State, 52 Ala. 231; Van- dyke V. State, 24 Ala. 81; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. (U. S.) 527. See also. Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 Dallas 419; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dallas 378; Platenius v. State, 17 Ark. 518. " In Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509. the civil damages act of 1873 was upheld as constitutional in spite of its "sweeping character;" and An- drews. J., said: — "We come back to the proposition that no law can be pronounced invalid for the reason simply that it violates our notions of 771 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 7GG In some European countries an innocent man who is punished for crime through judicial errors may have reparation therefor from the state, but not in this country. This seems to be a penalty which one has to pay for belonging to civilized society.'^ § 766. The state not liable for officers' torts — No respondeat su- perior. — In respect to its contracts the state is equally liable with individuals;^ and is restrained by the constitution from making laws to impair the obligation of its contracts.^ But governments, federal or state, do not hold themselves liable to individuals for their officers' misfeasance, laches, or imauthorized exercise of power,^** for such lia- bility would involve them in endless embarrassments.^^ The state is not liable for the tortious acts of its agents except by force of statute. ^^ A state acts in a sovereign capacity and does not submit its action to the judgment of courts and is not liable for torts or negligence of its agents, and a corporation created by the state as a mere agency of the state for the more efficient exercise of governmental functions is likewise exempted from the obligation to respond in damages, as master, for negligent acts of its servants to the same extent as the state itself, unless such liability is expressly provided by the statute creating such agency:^^ justice, is oppressive and unfair in its operation, or because in ttie opin- ion of some or all of the citizens of the state, it is not justified by public necessity." See also, Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 704. ^ This apparent injustice is consid- ered in 26 Am. L. Rev. 555, and the N. Y. Law Jour, of Sept. 21, 1892. ^Danolds v. State, 89 N. Y. 36, 44; People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527, 549. " Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 137; New Jersey v. Wil- son, 7 Cranch 164. " Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269. " Story Agency, § 319. In United States V. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, 735, Story, J., said: — "The general principle is that laches is not im- putable to the government; and this maxim is founded not in the notion of extraordinary prerogative, but upon a great public policy. The gov- ernment can transact its business only through its agents; and its fis- cal operations are so various, and its agencies so numerous and scattered, that the utmost vigilance would not save the public from the most se- rious losses, if the doctrine of laches can be applied to its transactions." See also. United States v. Vanzandt, 11 Wheat. 186; United States v. Nicholl, 12 Wheat. 505; People v. Russell, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 570; Sey- mour V. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. (N. Y. ) 403; overruling People v. Jansen, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 332. ^- Lewis V. State, 96 N. Y. 71; Clod- felter v. State, 86 N. C. 51, where the court said: — "That the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable to the relation of principal and agent does not prevail against the sover- eign in the necessary employment of public agents is too well settled upon authority and practice to ad- mit of controversy." ^^Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 § 7G7 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 77^ § 767. Suits against United States — Court of claims. — The United States has not generally consented to be sued in the federal court of claims in cases sounding in tort or for war claims/* and is not liable for the tort of its officers in forcibly taking private land for public use.^'^ That court is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction in con- gressional cases^*' if tlie claim be for destruction of or damage to property by the army, or if it be barred by the acts of 1873 or 1879.^'^ When congress by special legislation refers a claim of which the court has not jurisdiction it must be held that the first purpose of congress is to confer jurisdiction, and, also, that the court is to render sub- stantial justice if upon ordinary principles of law the claimant is entitled to it;^* but where a private act of congress submits the ques- tion whether the government is liable for certain alleged acts of its officers, the liability must be deemed to be the legal liability which an ordinary body corporate, such as a municipal corporation, would be subject to for similar acts of its agents.^ ^ That congress has by several special acts provided for payment of several claims on which claimants could not have recovered in the court of claims in the exer- cise of its general jurisdiction is no reason why the United States should be held liable in that court on a like claim which congress has not provided for.^" A statute authorizing the court of claims to render judgment on claims for property taken in 1857 for the United States by Colonel Johnson, while in command of the Utah expedition, was held not to authorize that court to give judgment for losses caused by the refusal of the colonel to permit claimants' trains to proceed without delay.^^ Though the United States be not responsi- ble for the trespass of officers who illegally seize the property of a 111. 332; s. c. 49 N. E. 536; Town of ^'Langford v. United States, 101 Waltham t. Kemper, 55 111. 346; El- U. S. 341. See United States v. Great more v. Drainage Com'rs, 135 111. Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645; s. c. 269; s. c. 25 N. E. 1010; Symonds v. 5 S. Ct. 306. Clay Co., 71 111. 355; Town of Odell ^«Act of March 3, 1883. v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353; Wilcox v. "Burke v. United States, 21 Ct. CI. City of Chicago, 107 111. 334; Nagle 317; Myers v. United States, 22 Ct. V. Wakey, 161 111. 387; s. c. 43 N. E. CI. 80; Nelson v. United States, 22 1079. Ct. CI. 159. See Beasley v. United "Act of 1887, 24 U. S. Stat, at States, 21 Ct. CI. 225. Large, ch. 359. In United States v. '" Gumming v. United States, 22 Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 205; s. c. 1 S. Ct. Ct. CI. 344. 240, Miller, J., says: — "Congress has '" Cumming v. United States, 22 created a court in which it has au- Ct. CI. 344. thorized suits to be brought against -" United States v. McDougall, 121 the United States, but has limited U. S. 89; s. c. 7 S. Ct. 850. such suits to those arising on con- " United States v. Irwin, 127 U. S. tracts, with a few unimportant ex- 125; s. c. 8 S. Ct. 1033. ceptions." '73 TORTS AND CRIMES. 768 citizen, yet if the proceeds pass into the treasury the government will be liable on implied contract to account to the owner therefor, and the court of claims will have jurisdiction.^^ In congressional cases the claimant in the cgurt of claims must prove his loyalty, and it is not always clear whether it is the personal representative, or the heir, or the creditor of a deceased whose loyalty must be proved.^^ A claim must be dismissed if the claimant "sustained the late rebellion/'-* § 768. Suits against New York — ^Board of claims. — In New York a board of claims has been established to hear and determine "all pri- vate claims against the state of New York";-^ and the state may be- come liable for an authorized trespass by its agents and officers on pri- vate lands ;^^ but under the statute establishing the board of claims and the statute of 187G creating the board of audit,^'^ the state is not gen- erally liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its agents, because the state has not by its legislature assumed such a liability.-^ In North Carolina, too, it is held that the state is not rendered liable for the torts of its officers while administering the functions of government by the constitutional provision which confers jurisdiction on the state supreme court "to hear claims against the state.""" A similar rule prevails in Alabama.^'^ "Thayer v. United States, 20 Ct. CI. 137. -^ Compare Newman v. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 205, with Randolph V. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 282. '* Hart V. United States, 118 U. S. 62; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 961. 2^ Laws 1884, ch. 85, § 1; Laws 1883, ch. 205; Laws 1888, ch. 435. ^"Coleman v. State, 47 N. Y. St. 609, where on appeal from the board of claims it was decided by the court of appeals that "for the injury caused by entering upon this strip of land by the state it was liable and the board erred in refusing the claimant any relief. The entry of the state upon the land and its di- rection to the contractor to excavate and remove the stone therefrom be- ing wrongful, a trespass, it became liable for all trespasses committed by the contractor with the knowl- edge and acquiescence of the agents of the state in executing the con- tract." "Laws 1876, ch. 444. =** Lewis V. State, 96 N. Y. 71, where, a prisoner in the state re- formatory having been injured by a defective ladle which the overseer compelled him to use, Danforth, J., said: — "The claimant must fail un- less the doctrine of respondeat su- perior can be applied to the state and the state made liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its agents in like manner as a natural person is responsible for the acts of his servants. We are aware of no principle of law or of any adjudged case which makes that application except where the state by its legis- lature has voluntarily assumed it." =^ Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51. ^" State V. Hill, 54 Ala. 67, where it was held that § 2534 of the re- vised code was only intended to af- ford to persons who had claims against the state a mode of ascer- taining whether or not they were well founded, and if they were what S 769 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 774 § 769. Counties, etc., as divisions of the state. — Counties, towns, and, in some states, eities, in the uxercisL' of the governmental func- tions delegated to them by the state, are not liable for the misfeasance or negligence of their officers ; thus a county is not liable for the neg- ligence of commissioners in selecting an incompetent physician for the care of the poor.^^ In Alabama a county, being deemed an agency of the state, and as exercising a quasi-legislative authority over high- ways, is not liable at common law in damages for any negligence in respect to them,^^ but such liability must be specially defined by statute.^^ In Virginia a county as a political subdivision of the state is not subject to suit, except as permitted by statute, and such per- mission may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the legislature;^* and the same rule exists in Georgia, though the code makes every county a corporation with the right to sue and be sued. In a particular case, however, the code provides that a county may be sued for neglect to sum was due to them; but not to create a liability on the part of the state where it did not exist already under the laws. '•'^ In Summers v. Board &c., 103 Ind. 262; s. c. 2 N. E. 725; 53 Am. R. 512, the court said: — "There is no more reason for holding counties liable for the negligence of the com- missioners in the exercise of the governmental functions delegated to them than there is for holding cities liable for the acts of their firemen or police officers, or for holding counties and townships liable for the torts of sheriffs and constables. In providing for the care of the poor, a police power which resides primarily in the sovereignty is exer- cised, and neither the sovereign nor the local governing body to whom such a power is delegated is respon- sible for the misfeasance of its offi- cers." See also. City of Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330; Faulkner V. City of Aurora, 85 Ind. 130; Rob- inson V. City of Evansville, 87 Ind. 334; Brinkmeyer v. City of Evans- ville, 29 Ind. 187. And in Bryant v. City of St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289; s. c. 23 N. E. 220; 53 Am. R. 31; 21 Cent. L. J. 33, it was held that the city was not liable for the misfeasance of the board of health selected by the city. ^= Askew V. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; Mitchell V. Tallapoosa Co., 30 Ala. 130; Van Eppes v. Board &c., 25 Ala. 460. ''^ Barbour Co. v. Horn, 48 Ala. 649. Under the Alabama Code (§ 1203) an action lies against a county to recover damages sustained from the fall of a bridge, after the expiration of the period covered by the build- er's guaranty, though no toll was charged: Barbour Co. v. Brunson, 36 Ala. 362. ^' Fry V. Albemarle Co., 86 Va. 195; s. c. 9 S. E. 1004; Hunsaker v. Bor- den, 5 Cal. 288; Sharp v. Contra Costa Co., 34 Cal. 284. Plaintiff, the employe of an independent contract- or, engaged in building a bridge on a county road, was injured by the negligent explosion of a charge of dynamite by the agents of defendant county while blasting and building an approach to the bridge. It was held, in an action for damages, that counties are not liable for the torts of their officers acting within the line of their authority, unless made so by statute: Smith v. Board &c., 46 Fed. 340. 775 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 770 keep bridges in repair, where the required bond is not taken from the bridge contractor.^^ In Connecticut counties have no organization and can not be sued.^*^ The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to counties, because there is no relation of master and serv- ant between them and their officers, whose office and duties are created by the legislature.^^ § 770. The same subject continued. — In Illinois a county is not liable, in damages, for loss of life caused by not keeping a bridge in repair,^ ^ or for personal injury caused by the negligent construction of a court-house.^" In Iowa it is held that no claim is a "just claim" against a county, within the meaning of the code provision, unless the law somewhere either requires or authorizes its payment by the county.'"' In Iowa a county is under the same obligation of reasonable Scales v. Ordinary &c., 41 Ga. 225. 36 Ward V. Hartford Co., 12 Conn. 404. " Fry V. Albemarle Co., 86 Va. 195; s. c. 9 S. E. 1004, where the court said: — "No suit can be maintained against the county upon the princi- ples of respondeat superior because the relation of master and servant did not exist; such officers are quasi- public officers of the state. For al- though the officer in charge was ap- pointed by the county, yet the office and duties incident to it were cre- ated by an act of the legislature for the general public welfare, the pub- lic roads of Albemarle county being highways of the commonwealth for the common benefit of all the people of the state." See the application of respondeat superior to municipal corporations in Maxmilian v. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. 160. ^ White V. Bond Co., 58 111. 297. See also, Town of Waltham v. Kem- per, 55 111. 346; Russell v. Town of Steuben, 57 111. 35; Hedges v. Madi- son Co., 1 Gilm. (111.) 567; overrul- ing Town of South Ottawa v. Foster, 20 111. 296. ^^Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95 111. 148, 151, where the court said: — "No reason is perceived why a coun- ty should be held to respond in dam- ages for the negligence of its officers while acting in the discharge of pub- lic corporate duties enjoined upon them by the laws of the state. Coun- ties are but local subdivisions of the state clothed with but few corpo- rate powers and these not of a pri- vate character. ... In fact the powers and duties of counties bear such a due analogy to the govern- mental functions of the state, that as well might the state be held respon- sible for the negligent acts of its officers as counties. But it is said that the alleged negligence was af- firmative in character, imputed to the county itself. The authorities, however, do not seem to make a dis- tinction between the negligence of a town or county in failing to observe a duty and the performance of that duty in a negligent manner." *" Turner v. Woodbury Co., 57 Iowa 440; s. c. 10 N. W. 827; Foster v. Clinton Co., 51 Iowa 541; s. c. 2 N. W. 207. A county is not liable in damages for personal injury caused by the defective construction of its court-house, or the failure properly to light it at night: Kincaid v. Har- din Co., 53 Iowa 430; s. c. 5 N. W. 589. But a county is liable for a defective county bridge, because in 771 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 776 care and diligence to keep its bridges safe as a municipal corporation is to keep its streets safe.'*^ In Missouri a county created by the legis- lature for purposes of public policy is not responsible for the neglect of prescribed duties, unless made so by statute.*^ § 771. Non-liability of New England towns. — New England towns, as involuntary political divisions of the state established for purposes of government, have the same exemption as counties, and are not liable to individuals for neglect of the public duties enjoined upon them, unless made subject to action by statute.*^ It is to be ob- respect to it a special authority is conferred at the county's request: Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa 430; s. c. 5 N. W. 589; Wilson v. Jefferson Co., 13 Iowa 181; Huston v. Iowa Co., 43 Iowa 456. "Weirs v. Jones Co., 80 Iowa 351; s. c. 45 N. W. 883, where the rule was applied to barricading danger- ous places. Compare Soper v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa 264, 269, with Cook v. City of Anamosa, 66 Iowa 427; s. c. 23 N. W. 907; Koester v. City of Ot- tumwa, 34 Iowa 41; Klatt v. City of Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 196, 200; s. c. 10 N. W. 162. *" Reardon v. St. Louis Co., 36 Mo. 555; Ray Co. v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236. '^ Hill V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332. In the lead- ing case of Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; s. c. 72 Am. D. 302, the town-house was so imperfectly constructed that the flooring gave way at the annual town meet- ing, but it was held that a voter injured thereby could not recover damages against the town because, as Perley, C. J., said, "Towns are in- voluntary territorial and political di- visions of the state, like counties, established for purposes of govern- ment and municipal regulation. It is chiefly through this organization of towns that the people exercise the sovereign power of government; and the plaintiff's claim is for damages which he has suffered from neglect of the town to provide him a safe place for the exercise of his public lights as a citizen of the town and state. . . . There is a great weight of authority to show that towns in New England are not liable to a civil action in a case like this. In Riddle v. Proprietors &c., 7 Mass. 169, 187, the case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, is cited as an authority applicable to towns and counties in Massachusetts; and in Mower v. In- habitants &c., 9 Mass. 250, it was held that towns are not liable to a civil action for neglect to perform public duties imposed on them, un- less the action were given by some statute, and Russell v. Men of Devon was again recognized as applicable to the case of towns. President &c. V. Cook, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 405; Tisdale V. Inhabitants &c., 8 Met. (Mass.) 388; Holman v. Inhabitants &c., 13 Met. (Mass.) 297; and Brady v. City of Lowell, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 124, are to the same point. In Adams v. President &c., 1 Greenl. (Maine) 361, Mellen, C. J., cites from Riddle V. Proprietors &c., supra, the re- marks of Parsons, C. J., on this sub- ject, and adds: 'No private action, unless given by statute, lies against quasi-corporations for breach of a corporate duty.' And other cases in Maine would seem to show that the rule as above stated is well estab- lished in that state: Hooper v. Em- ery, 14 Maine 375, 377; Reed v. In- habitants &c., 20 Maine 246, 248; Sanford v. Inhabitants &c., 32 Maine 777 TOETS AND CRIMES. 772 served, however, that from a very early period Massachusetts towns have been made liable by statute for defects in their highways and hridges.** § 772. Liability of New York towns. — In New York, prior to 1881, in distinction from chartered cities and villages, no corporate duty rested upon towns, either at common law or by statute, in re- spect to the care or regulation of highways, and there was therefore no liability upon towns to respond in damages for neglect to keep highways in repair.*^ By the act of 1881 the liability of towns was 536. We understand the same rule to prevail in Vermont. In Baxter v. Winoonski Tpk. Co., 22 Vt. 114, Ben- net, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says, 'I take it to be well settled that if the statute had not given the action, no individual who had sustained a special damage through neglect of the town to re- pair their roads could maintain a suit. It may be said that where an individual sustains an injury by the neglect or default of another, the law gives a remedy; but that principle does not apply where the public are concerned.' And the same general doctrine is affirmed in Hyde v. Town of Jamaica, 27 "Vt. 443. In Connect- icut it is held that no action will lie for injuries caused by defects in a highway, unless given by statute: Chidsey v. Town of Canton, 17 Conn. 475. In Farnum v. Town of Con- cord, 2 N. H. 392, Richardson, C. J., says: 'No action lies at common law against towns for damages sus- tained through defects in highways.' He cites, as authorities for his posi- tion. Mower v. Inhabitants &c., 9 Mass. 250, and Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667; and after quot- ing the provision of our statute which gives an action for special damages caused by insufficiency of highways, he adds: 'And the ques- tion is, whether any damage has happened to the plaintiff in this case by means of the insufficiency or •want of repairs of the highway in question, within the intent and meaning of this statute.' The right to recover against the town is thus placed entirely on the statute. There is certainly no such exact resem- blance between counties in England and our towns as will make all the reasons upon which the court in Russell V. Men of Devon placed their decision applicable to towns in this state. Counties in England are, how- ever, territorial and political divis- ions of the country, as counties and towns are here; and they are quasi- corporations so far as to be liable to public prosecution for neglect to perform their public duties. . . . And the doctrine of that case has been adopted and applied to towns in numerous instances by judges who must certainly be reckoned among the most eminent jurists that New England has produced: by Parsons and Shaw in Massachusetts, by Mellen and Shepley in Maine, and by our own learned Chief Justice Richardson in this state; and no men in the country have been more familiarly acquainted with the whole legal history of towns in New Eng- land, and all the traditions of the law in relation to them." "Mass. Colonial Stats. (1648); Gen. Stats., ch. 44, §§ 1, 22. See Hill V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332. ^'^Monk V. Town of New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. 552; s. c. 11 N. E. 268; People V. Board &c., 74 N. Y. 310. 773 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 778 made coextensive with that of highway commissioners of towns, and the liability of these officers is only a limited responsibility — arising out of their negligence and to the extent that they are possessed of or have the power to obtain means to make necessary repairs.**' While under the act of 1881 the duty of repair still rests on the highway commissioners, the civil liability for injury resulting from the neg- lect of that duty is transferred to the town.*^ And that statute is not unconstitutional because it makes a town liable for the neglect of its highway commissioners.*^ § 773. Liability of towns, etc., as to special duties. — This rule of exemption from liability applies to counties and towns only when act- ing in their public character and in respect to their public and invol- untary duties in distinction from their special and voluntary duties.** ^'^ Clapper v. Town of Waterford, 131 N. Y. 382; s. c. 30 N. E. 240. In Monk V. Town of New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. 552; s. c. 11 N. E. 268, Ruger, C. J., said: — "Neither at common law nor by the statute were towns under any legal liability to respond in damages even to persons injured by defects in the highways, until after the enactment of ch. 700 of the laws of 1881. ... By this act of 1881 it was provided that towns should thereafter be liable for such injuries in cases where the commis- sioners of highways of said towns are now by law liable therefor. It is seen that the liability of the towns is thus made co-extensive with that of commissioners of highways in towns. No absolute liability for such injuries was ever imposed by law upon such officers, but only a limited responsibility arising out of their negligence to the extent only that they were possessed of or had power to obtain means to make necessary repairs: Hines v. City of Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113." " Bryant v. Town of Randolph, 133 N. Y. 70; s. c. 30 N. E. 657. *' Taylor v. Town of Constable, 15 N. Y. S. 795; s. c. 131 N. Y. 597; 30 N. B. 63. ^^ Thus in Hannon v. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313, where the county made a contract for laying water pipe to the county asylum, the work being done under the supervision of the county engineer, and while a trench, was being dug it caved in and killed one of the workmen, it was held that the duty in which the county was engaged was not one imposed by general law on all counties, but a self-imposed one; that quoad hoc the county was a private corporation engaged in a private enterprise, and governed by the same rules as to its liability. And Metcalf, J., in Big- elow V. Inhabitants &c., 14 Gray (Mass.) 541, speaking of the rule established in Mower v. Inhabitants &c., 9 Mass. 247, that a private ac- tion can not be maintained against a quasi-corporation for neglect of corporate duty unless the action be given by the statute, adds: — "This rule of law, however, is of limited application. It is implied in the case of towns only to the neglect or omission of a town to perform those duties which are imposed on all towns without their corporate assent, and not to the neglect of those ob- ligations which a town incurs when a special duty is imposed on it with its consent express or implied, or a 779 TORTS AND CRIMES. 774: i.'he distinction has been often observed between the liability of towns and cities for neglect to perform public duties growing out of the powers which they exercise under the general law, and this liability ahen the duty arises from some special power conferred on a particu- lar town or city;''" in the exercise of these special powers a city is a corporate legal individual and liable for injuries to third persons resulting from the neglect of corporate officers and agents.^^ In Ken- tucky a county, being held to be a corporation as well as a political division of the state, may be sued for the infringement of a patent ;^^ but a county is not liable where the county authorities are not privy to the infringement.^^ § 774. Non-liability of school districts and drainage districts. — The management of the public schools is a branch of the state govern- ment, and school districts, as part of the state educational system, are special authority is conferred on it at its request. In the latter case a town is subject to the same liabili- ties for the neglect of those special duties to which private corporations would be if the same duties were im- posed or the same authority con- ferred on them, including their lia- bility for the wrongful neglect as well as the wrongful acts of their officers and agents." A township is not liable for torts committed by its officers for filling up a ditch without proper authority: Chase v. Middle- ton, 123 Mich. 647; s. c. 82 N. W. 612. =>" Mayor &c. v. Furze, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 612; Bailey v. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531. =1 Lloyd v. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. 369. "May V. Logan Co., 30 Fed. 250; May V. Mercer Co., 30 Fed. 246. In the latter case Barr, J., said: — "There are many cases which hold that counties can not be sued at all, — this will of course depend upon the nature and character of the sub- divisions called counties, in the re- spective states, — and some that they can not be sued for torts; but as- suming that a county is a corpora- tion and may sue and be sued for its contracts made within the scope of the authority given them, there is only one case known to me which holds that a county is not liable for the infringement of a patent right by its use, and that is Jacobs v. Hamilton Co., 1 Bond 500. . . . This case has, however, not been fol- lowed." A city is liable in its cor- porate capacity for the infringement of a patent (Munson v. Mayor &c., 3 Fed. 338), though it was by the separately incorporated fire depart- ment (Brickill v. Mayor &c., 7 Fed. 479), on the ground that any gains from such infringement must be in the general treasury of the city. ^^ A contract for building a county jail provided for a patent lock de- vice, which was put in by the con- tractor without authority from the owner of the patent. In less than two years after the county took pos- session of the jail the patent ex- pired, and in the meantime the lock device was not used. The county authorities knew nothing of the con- tractor having put in the lock with- ovit authority from the patentee. It was held that the county was not liable in tort for infringement of the patent: May v. Juneau Co., 30 Fed. 241. 775 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 780 on the same footing as counties and towns in respect to liability to individuals for the breach of official duty by their officers.^* In Ohio it has been held that a corporate board of education is not liable to a pupil at a common school injured through the board's negligence. ^^ In Illinois a drainage district formed under the statute of 1879 is not a private but a public corporation, and is not liable for the negli- gent or tortious acts of its commissioners.^" § 775. Non-liability for separate boards and bodies. — A city is not liable for the torts or negligence of a board of health in the discharge of its duties, where such board is constituted a separate body by the city charter, and it is not material whether its members are appointed directly by the state or by the city government in pursuance of the charter.^^ The board of revision and correction of assessments in ^* Bank v. Brainerd School Dist., 49 Minn. 106; s. c. 51 N. W. 814, where the court said: — "The board of education is a corporation which holds and manages the property in its control as trustee for the district for a public purpose. It is made its duty to keep and take care of the property of the district, but this is a duty it owes to the district and not to individuals, and is a duty im- posed for the public benefit, with no consideration or emolument to the corporation; and it is given a corpo- rate existence solely for the exercise of this public function. It is organ- ized for educational purposes, not for the benefit or protection of prop- erty or business interests." See also. Board v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412. Nor is a right of action against a school district for such negligence given by § 117, ch. 36, general statutes of 1878, which authorizes actions to be brought against trustees in their of- ficial capacity for an injury to the rights of plaintiff arising from some act or omission of the officers or of the district: Bank v. Brainerd School Dist., supra. ^^ Finch V. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St. 37, where it was said: — ■ "Whether we consider the language of the statutes affecting this ques- tion of defendant's liability, apply- ing to them the rules of construc- tion indicated by the very narrow range of objects and purposes in the organization of defendant as a cor- poration, or looking to the general policy of our state common-school system, we are of opinion no action sounding in tort was ever contem- plated." And in Bigelow v. Inhab- itants &c., 14 Gray (Mass.) 541, it was held that a "town which has as- sumed the duties of school districts is not liable for an injury sustained by a scholar attending the public school from a dangerous excavation in the school yard owing to the neg- ligence of the town officers." '^"^ Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs, 135 111. 269; s. c. 25 N. E. 1010, where the court said: — "The non-liability of the public quasi-corporation, un less liability is expressly declared, is usually placed on these grounds: that the corporators are made such nolens volens; that their powers are limited and specific, and that no corporate funds are provided which can without express provision of law be appropriated to private indemni- fication." "Bryant v. City of St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289; s. c. 23 N. W. 220, where the court said: — "The duty is im- 781 TOKTS AND CRIMES. 776 New York city being independent public officers acting not for the peculiar benefit of the city, but for the public good, the city is not liable for their negligent discharge of duty;^^ and the city is simi- larly exempt as to the negligence of its commissioners of public in- struction,^^ and as to the negligence of its commissioners of charities* and correction.*'" § 776. Non-liability for torts of independent officers. — A municipal corporation is not liable for the torts or negligence of an officer whom it is required by law to appoint for the performance of a public duty laid upon the officer, and from which it derives no special benefit.*'^ A village is not liable for the negligence of its trustees and commis- sioners if under the village charter they are independent public offi- cers."" posed by the legislature upon the board of health, under the police power, to be exercised for the bene- fit of the public generally. It is one in which the city corporation has no particular interest, and from which it derives no special benefit in its corporate capacity. And we think it clear that, as respects an agency thus created for the public service, the city should not be held liable for the manner in which such serv- ice is performed by the board. . . . The duties of such officers are not of that class of municipal or corporate duties with which the corporation is charged in considera- tion of charter privileges, but are police or governmental functions, which could be discharged equally well through agents appointed by the state, though usually associated with and appointed by the munici- pal body." See also. New York &c. Co. V. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580; Jones V. Mayor &c., 9 N. Y. St. 247. '^"Tone V. Mayor &c., 70 N. Y. 157; followed in Heiser v. Mayor &c., 104 N. Y. 68; s. c. 9 N. E. 866. =" Ham V. Mayor &c., 70 N. Y. 459. '^^ "Where, as in New York, the state courts hold that a city is not liable for injuries arising from the negli- gence of the employes of a munici- pal board, a libel against a steam- boat owned by the city and negli- gently responsible for a collision must be dismissed without costs: Haight V. New York, 24 Fed. 93. ®^ New York &c. Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580, where both the dock commissioners and common covmcil were to be regarded as agents of the state, not of the city, and therefore the city not liable for their torts or omissions. - - - The duties imposed on the commissioners of public charities and corrections for the city of New York by the stat- utes of 1860 and 1870 are public in their character and from them no special benefit to the city is derived; and such officers, though appointed by the city, are not its agents or servants; and therefore the city was held not liable where the commis- sioners' employe caused death by the negligent driving of an ambu- lance belonging to the city: Max- milian v. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. 160. Where the driver of a city wagon employed by the board of public works to cart refuse and ashes to a public dumping place by his negli- gence killed a man while making a dump, it was held that the city was not liable: Condict v. Mayor &c., 46 N. J. L. 157. See also, Wallace v. City of Menasha, 48 Wis. 79, 85; s. c. 4 N. W. 101; Hayes v. City of Osh- kosh, 33 Wis. 314. ®^ Where the charter of a village PUBLIC COllPORATIOXS. 782 § 777. The same subject continued — Who are independent officers. — It has been held upon high authority that whether an ollieer or board existing under a municipal charter is to be deemed independent or not does not much depend upon the means by which such officers are placed in their position, — whether they are elected by the people of the municipality or appointed by the governor of the state or the presi- dent of the United States, as the people are the recognized sonrce of all authority, state and municipal; it rather depends upon the nature of the powers conferred upon these officers and boards."^ A makes it a highway district of a neighboring town, and provides that the highway taxes shall be paid to the treasurer to be expended in maintaining the streets, which shall be under the charge of a commis- sioner appointed by the trustees, such trustees and commissioner are not the agents of the village in the premises, but are public officers, and the village is not liable for their negligence: Bates v. Village of Rut- land, 62 Vt. 178; s. c. 20 Atl. 278, where the court said: — "The defend- ant was engaged in the public work of repairing its streets. The officers by whom the work was being per- formed were for this purpose public officers, and for their negligent acts an action does not lie against the defendant." See also, Wilkins v. Village of Rutland, 61 Vt. 336; s. c. 17 Atl. 735; Walsh v. Village of Rut- land, 56 Vt. 228; Weller v. City of Burlington, 60 Vt. 28; s. c. 12 Atl. 215. Where the trustees of a New York village are made by its charter highway commissioners they are to be regarded, in respect to that func- tion, not as independent officers but as corporate agents, so as to make the village civilly responsible for their acts or omissions according to the law of master and servant: Con- rad V. Trustees &c., 16 N. Y. 158. ^The act of congress of 1871 (16 U. S. Stat, at Large 419) created a municipal corporation called the District of Columbia; it provided for the appointment of a governor and for a legislative assembly for the district; it created a board of public works to consist of the governor and four others to be appointed by the president by and with the consent of the senate; such board to have entire con- trol of the streets, and to disburse all moneys therefor, and to make re- ports to the legislative assembly of the district and to the governor, who was directed to lay the same before the president to be by him ti'ansmitted to congress. It was held in Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, that the board of public works was not an independent body acting for itself but a part of the corporation, and that the district was responsible to an individual in- jured through the defective condi- tion of the streets of Washington. Hunt, J., speaking for the majority of the court, said: — "We have al- ready endeavored to show that it is quite immaterial, on the question whether this board is a municipal agency, from what source the power comes to those officers, whether by appointment of the president or by the legislative assembly, or by elec- tion. This board is invested with the entire control and regulation of the repair of the streets and all other works which may be intrusted to their charge by the legislative as- sembly or congress. It is to be no- ticed here that the municipal cor- poration as represented by the leg- islative assembly may impose upon 783 TORTS AND CRIMES. 778 state officer must derive his powers from and execute them in obedi- ence to a state hiw.*^* § 778. The same subject continued — Applied in New York city, etc. — The park commissioners of New York city are not independent public officers, but act for the city, and the city is liable for their negligence within the rule as to municipal liability for an. officer's neglect;®" and this is also true of the street-cleaning commissioners this board such other duties as they think proper. . . . The board is required to make a report of their transactions during the preceding year to each branch of the legisla- tive assembly and also to the pres- ident to be placed before congress by him. This duty is also an indication of their subordination equally to congress and to the legislative as- sembly. The powers given to this board are not of a character belong- ing to independent officers, but rather those which indicate that it is the representative of the munici- pal corporation. ... In the case before us we think that congress in- tended to make the board a portion of t,he municipal corporation. . . . Names are not things. Perhaps there is no restriction on the power of congress to create a state within the limits of the District of Colum- bia; but it does not make an organi- zation a state to call its mayor a governor, or its common council a legislative assembly, or its superin- tendent of streets a board of public works, especially when the statute by which they are created opens with a declaration of its intention to create a municipal corporation. We take the body thus organized to be a municipal corporation and that its parts are composed of the mem- bers referred to; and we hold, there- fore, that the proceedings by that body, in the repair and improvement of the street out of which the acci- dent arose, are the proceedings of the municipal corporation." In the foregoing decision, Bailey v. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531; s. c. affirmed 2 Denio (N. Y.) 433, was relied on as a leading authority. But see Hill V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332. "* State V. Vallei, 41 Mo. 29. «^Ehrgott V. Mayor &c., 96 N. Y. 264, where Earl, J., said: — "To de- termine whether there is municipal responsibility the inquiry must be whether the department whose mis- feasance or nonfeasance is com- plained of is a part of the machinery for carrying on the municipal gov- ernment, and whether it was at the time engaged in the discharge of a duty, or charged with a duty prima- rily resting upon the municipality. For these views the cases of Bailey V. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531, 538; s. c. affirmed 2 Denio (N. Y.) 433, and Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, are ample authority; and the case of Richards v. Mayor &c., 16 J. & Sp. (N. Y.) 315, is a precise authority." Detroit park commissioners selected by the legis- lature are not city officers: People V. Common Council &c., 28 Mich. 228. When park commissioners are agents of the city the city is liable for their acts: Mahon v. Mayor &c., 31 N. Y. S. 676; s. c. 10 Misc. (N. Y.) 664. Where the statutes of Massa- chusetts gave a remedy for damages for the acts of park commissioners in diverting surface water, and there was no evidence that they had ex- ceeded their authority, it was held that an action of tort would not be sustained, but the remedy if any was under the statute: Holleran v. § 779 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 784: under the city-consolidation act of 1882 in the performance of the duty of removing refuse from the streets/*' and probably also as to the aqueduct commissioners appointed under the act of 1883 for sup- plying the city of '^cw York with additional water.®^ g 779. Liability of municipal corporations in tort — General prin- ciples. — It may be well in this connection to state as briefly and as concisely as possible, a few of the fundamental principles relating to the functions and duties of municipal corporations, in order more clearly to understand and more readily apply the principles of laws re- lating to the subject-matter of torts, (a) As already seen the mu- nicipal corporation performs a two-fold function in the affairs of the state. In its nature it is dual. It is charged by the state with the performance of certain duties that are governmental and relate to the public health, general welfare, public peace, etc. These duties are sometimes designated in state legislation, and sometimes in muni- cipal legislation enacted under powers delegated by the state. On the other hand the municipality, although chartered as an entity by the state, is invested with certain powers of local self-government, and concerning matters of purely local concern, in which the corpo- ration alone is interested, and in this respect it partakes largely of the nature of a private corporation. In the performance of these func- tions it exercises legislative powers similar to the state, optional in their nature, and coextensive w^ith municipal interests. It also, of necessity, is invested with the power of administration, not unlike the executive power of the state, and has certain limited judicial powers, chiefly, as a rule, relating to the violation of its ordinances. The scope of municipal powers, duties and corporate functions is regulated and defined in its charter. Being essentially a private cor- poration it is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, and its rights, powers and duties are therein interpreted the same as those of individuals or private corporations, (b) Whether a munic- ipality will legislate or adopt an ordinance is wholly discretionary. City of Boston, 176 Mass. 75; s. c. bureau are city employes and the 57 N. E. 220. City not liable for city is liable for injury caused by acts of road commissioners in the the negligence of such employes in construction of a drain: Bryant v. driving through the city streets: Inhabitants &c., 86 Maine 450; s. c. Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. St. 29 Atl. 1109. Where an electric bu- 492; s. c. 31 Atl. 728. reau derives large revenues from ""Engle v. New York, 40 Fed. 51; grants to private persons, which Barney Dumping Boat Co. v. Mayor grants are regulated by ordinance, &c., 40 Fed. 50. and the revenues are paid into the " People v. Civil Service Boards, city treasury, the employes of such 17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 64. 785 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 780 (c) Where a municipal officer is charged with the performance of pub- lic duties he is, so far as those duties are concerned, a state officer, (d) The statute or charter may give to a municipal officer discretion in the performance of the duties of his office, (e) The statute or charter may make the performance of certain duties of a municipality manda- tory and imperative, (f) The option to perform, the manner of performing, and the result of the performance of public duties create no liabilities, (g) The performance of purely municipal functions is administrative and the usual liability applying to such duties ap- plies, (h) Some acts of a municipality are judicial in their nature and no liability ensues, as in the plan, size and material of a sewer, (i) Other aists are ministerial, to which liability attaches, as in the construction of a sewer. § 780. Liability in performance of public or governmental func- tions. — When power conferred has relation to public purposes and for the public good it is to be classified as governmental in its nature and appertains to the corporation in its political capacity. But when it relates to the accomplishment of private purposes in which the public is only indirectly concerned, it is private in its nature and the municipality in respect to its exercise is regarded as a legal indi- vidual. In the former case the corporation is exempt from all lia- bility, whether for non-user or misuser ; while in the latter case it may be held to that degree of responsibility which would attach to an ordinary corporation.*'^ "^ Springfield &c. Ins. Co. V. Village function: Miller v. City of Minne- of Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46; s. c. 42 apolis, 75 Minn. 131; s. c. 77 N. W. N. E. 405. Where by statute it is 788. A city is not liable for a fire made the duty of the commissioner through negligence or inefficiency of of street cleaning to remove or dis- its fire department: Irvine v. City of pose of ashes, garbage, etc., as often Chattanooga, 101 Tenn. 291; s. c. 47 as the public health may require, S. W. 419. Nor in the performance the performance of such duty is a of public duties generally: Bartlett governmental function and the city v. Town of Clarksburg, 45 W. Va. it not liable for an injury caused by 393; s. c. 31 S. E. 918; Snyder v. City the driver in the street cleaning de- of Lexington, 20 Ky. L. 1562; s. c. partment: Davidson v. Mayor &c., 49 S. W. 765. Where the charter im- 54 N. Y. S. 51; s. c. 24 Misc. (N. Y.) poses a duty on the board of health 560. But not so if it is a quasi-pri- of keeping its streets free from filth vate duty: Quill v. Mayor &c., 55 N. the duty is governmental in its na- Y. S. 889; s. c. 36 App. Div. (N. Y.) ture and not administrative, in 476. A city is not liable for permit- which case the city is not liable for ting its hydrants to become clogged an act of negligence by one engaged since the neglect is in the perform- in the performance of this duty: ance of a public or governmental Love v. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129; 1 Smith — 50 781 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 786 § 781. Duties which are mandatory and discretionary. — The legis- lature may confer powers and enjoin their performance as a duty; or it may create new powers to be exercised as governmental adjuncts and make their assumption optional with the corporation. Where a duty specifically enjoined upon the corporation as such has been wholly neglected by its agents and an injury to an individual arises in consequence of the neglect, the corporation will be responsible.^* So when a ministerial duty is imposed by law a negligent omission to perform that duty creates a liability for damages.^" But such lia- bility will not attach to a coi^oration where it voluntarily assumes powers authorized by the legislature under a general provision respect- ing municipalities throughout the state and permissive in their na- ture." As a part of the governmental machinery of the state, munic- ipal corporations legislate and provide for the customary local con- venience of the people, and in exercising these discretionary functions the corporations are not called upon to respond in damages to indi- s. c. 22 S. E. 29. Where a person is convicted by a municipal court and sentenced to work on the streets, and while so engaged is killed through negligence of the foreman, an employe of the city, who, after the injury, fails to secure proper medical attention and treatment, the city is not liable: Nisbet v. City of Atlanta, 97 Ga. 650; s. c. 25 S. E. 173. The city is not liable for the failure of a private water company, with which it has a contract to supply water, to meet its obligations: Plant- ers' Oil Mill V. Monroe Waterworks &c. Co., 52 La. An. 1243; s. c. 27 So. 684. Cf. City of New Orleans v. Kerr, 50 La. An. 413; s. c. 23 So. 384. But is liable for property destroyed on account of an insufficient water supply: Springfield &c. Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 29 N. Y. S. 1130; s. c. 80 Hun (N. Y.) 162. The power of a city to supply water is legislative in its nature and the city is not liable for loss occasioned by fires growing out of insufficient fire protection: Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe Water-works &c. Co., 52 La. An. 1243; s. c. 27 So. 684. Cf. Yule v. City of New Orleans, 25 La. An. 394; Springfield &c. Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46; s. c. 42 N. E. 405; Akin v. Akin, 78 Ga. 24; s. c. 1 S. E. -267; Heller v. Mayor &c., 53 Mo. 159; Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19; s. c. 2 Am. R. 368; Van- horn V. City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 447; s. c. 19 N. W. 293; Brinkmeyer V. City of Evansville, 29 Ind. 187; Grant v. City of Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420; s. c. 8 Am. R. 272; Mendel v. City of Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233; Foster v. Lookout Water Co. &c., 3 Lea (Tenn.) 42; Tainter v. City of Worcester, 123 Mass. 311; Witheril V. Mosher, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 412. City not liable for failure to enforce ordi- nance: Moran v. Pullman &c. Co., 134 Mo. 641; s. c. 36 S. W. 659. "^ Springfield &c. Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46; s. c. 42 N. E. 405. '"Springfield &c. Ins. Co. v. Vil- lage of Keeseville, supra. "Springfield &c. Ins. Co. v. Vil- lage of Keeseville, supra. Cf. Edg- erly v. Concord, 62 N. H. 8; Tainter V. City of Worcester, 123 Mass. 311; Maxmilian v. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. 160; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Hughes v. Monroe Co., 147 N. Y. 49; s. c. 41 N. E. 407. 787 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 783 viduals either for omissions to act or in the mode of exercising the powers conferred on them for public purposes and to be exercised at discretion for the public good. For injuries arising from the corpo- ration's failure to exercise its public, legislative and police powers, and for the manner of exercising those powers, there is no remedy against the municipality, nor can an action be maintained for damages resulting from the failure of its officers properly and efficiently to discharge their official duties.''^ § 782. Duties legislative or judicial. — In general a municipality is not liable for negligence in the performance of any duty which is legislative or judicial, or for a failure to perform such duty, but is liable for neglect to perform a ministerial duty, or for negligence in the exercise of privileges granted.''^ Municipal corporations are not liable for the manner in which they exercise in good faith their dis- cretionary powers of a public, or legislative, or quasi-judicial char- acter. Official action is judicial when it is the result of judgment or discretion, and ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set work, and when the laws which impose it prescribe the time, mode, and occasion of its per- formance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion.'^* And so a corporation acts judicially, or exercises dis- cretion, when it selects and adopts a plan in the making of public improvements such as the construction of sewers and drains, but as soon as it begins carrying out that plan, it acts ministerially, and is bound to see that the work is done in a reasonably safe and skilful manner. '^^ § 783. Liability for torts of public officers. — In regard to the lia- bility of the municipality for torts the general rule is that where the officers or department are in the performance of duties pertaining to the state or which are governmental the corporation is not liable ; thus " Edgerly v. Concord, 62 N. H. 8. Seifert v. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. "Vaughtman v. Town of Water- Y. 136; s. c. 4 N. E. 321. The city loo, 14 Ind. App. 649; s. c. 43 N. E. is not liable for a failure to pass an 476. ordinance prohibiting the riding of ^* City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 111. bicycles on the sidewalk to a pedes- 371, 378; s. c. 46 N. E. 244; People v. trian injured by a bicycle: Tarbut- Bartels, 138 111. 322; s. c. 27 N. E. ton v. Town of Tennille, 110 Ga. 90; 1091. s. c. 35 S. E. 282. The improper and ''^ City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 negligent exercise of police power 111. 371; s. c. 46 N. E. 244; City of does not render a city liable: Beth- Springfield V. Le Claire, 49 111. 476, am v. City of Philadelphia, 196 Pa. 478; Johnston v. District of Colum- St. 302; s. c. 46 Atl. 448. "bia, 118 U. S. 19; s. c. 6 S. Ct. 923; § 784 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 788 as to the departments of charity in charge of the poor, the criminal and insane, or the department of police, or the board of education. ^*' On the other hand where the duties are essentially local, in which the municipality has a special interest as distinguished from the public at large, or where the corporation derives an emolument, profit or advan- tage, the corporation is liable ; thus as to the street department, sewer department and fire-department.'^'^ § 784. Liability for torts of officers not public. — Where a contract is let to grade a street to the official grade and by an error of a city officer the grade of a street was made eight feet above the official grade, by means of which extra grade damages ensue, the city is not liable. The rule is that when an officer has no other authority en- trusted to him than that of the law and he acts beyond that authority and a tort ensues, and a citizen is injured in person or property, it is the act of the officer only and the city is not liable.'^* An act by munic- ipal officers done outside of their actual and apparent scope of au- thority, does not render the city liable. '^^ A board of education is not liable for an act of an officer done outside of the scope of his au- thority.^** But where he acts under the direction of the city, or with '" Maxmilian v. Mayor &c., 62 N. Y. 160; Swift v. Mayor &c., 83 N. Y. 528, 535; Ham v. Mayor &c., 70 N. Y. 459. "Ehrgott V. Mayor &c., 96 N. Y. 264, 271; Barney Dumping Boat Co. V. Mayor &c., 40 Fed. 50; Philadel- phia &c. R. Co. V. Mayor &c., 38 Fed. 159; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; New York &c. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580; Bieling v. City of Brooklyn, 120 N. Y. 98, 105; s. c. 24 N. E. 389. A board of education is not liable for misuser by an officer who is in per- formance of his duties under the compulsory education act: Reynolds V. Board of Education &c., 53 N. Y. S. 75; s. c. 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 88. '^ Sievers v. City &c. of San Fran- cisco, 115 Cal. 648; s. c. 47 Pac. 687; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497, 529; Goddard v. Inhabitants &c., 84 Maine 499; s. c. 24 Atl. 958; 30 Am. St. 373. (See this case for valuable collection of cases and analysis.) Cf. Huffman v. San Joaquin Co., 21 Cal. 426; Barnett v. Contra Costa Co., 67 Cal. 77; s. c. 7 Pac. 177 Lloyd V. Mayor &c., 5 N. Y. 364 Crowell V. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313 Winbigler v. Mayor &c., 45 Cal. 36 Chope V. City of Eureka, 78 Cal. 588; s. c. 21 Pac. 364. '"Wabaska Elec. Co. v. City of Wymore, 60 Neb. 199; s. c. 82 N, W. 626. City is not liable for the malicious acts of an officer: Moss v. City Council &c., 93 Ga. 797; s. c. 20 S. E. 653. But it has been held that the city is liable for such acts if done within the scope of author- ity, whether the acts are ratified or not: City of Ysleta v. Babbitt, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 432; s. c. 28 S. W. 702. The law is well settled that a municipality is not liable for the tortious acts of its officers or agents, when they are ultra vires or beyond the scope of corporate authority in reference to the subject-matter: Boye V. City of Albert Lea, 74 Minn. 230; s. c. 76 N. W. 1131. ''"Reynolds v. Board ef Education 789 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 785 its sanction, the law is otherwise and the city liahle,*^ and so where the act of the mayor in committing a trespass is ratified by the city, liabil- ity attaches,^^ or where it is done under the direction of the city coun- cil.**^ The statute may also change the rule and make the city liable.^* A city is not liable for negligence of an assistant street superintend- ■ent not under the control of a city council, though elected by it.*^ The reason for this rule is in the fact where a city is in the exercise of its police power it is not liable for the acts of its officers in viola- tion of the laws of the state and in excess of the legal powers of the city.*^ Where a city has power to change the grade of its streets only by ordinance, it is not liable for the acts of its agents in making a change in the grade without such ordinance.®'^ Where a city made a contract for improving a street and deducted a certain price per yard for the use of its steam-roller, and the roller was used by the city €mployes without suggestions from the contractor and a fire was communicated by the roller, the city is liable f^ and so in the opera- tion of an acequia for irrigation purposes. ^'^ § 785. Liability in making improvements, etc. — If the city in making an improvement uses ordinary care and skill, so that when the work is completed it will be reasonably safe, the city will not be liable.^" Where personal injuries are received as a result of negli- gence of the city in building a sewer for the use of which property- owners pay a rental to the city, it is liable therefor.''^ But the city is not liable for acts in maintenance of water-works which by statute is vested in an independent commission,®^ nor is it liable for a loss oc- &c., 53 N. Y. S. 75; s. c. 33 App. Div. 111. 353; City of Chicago v. Turner, (N. Y.) 88. 80 111. 419, 422; Wilcox v. City of "Johnson City v. Wolfe, 103 Chicago, 107 111. 334; Blake v. City Tenn. 277; s. c. 52 S. W. 991. of Pontiac, 49 111. App. 543. "= Commercial Elec. &c. Co. v. City "' Beatty v. City of St. Joseph, 57 of Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288; s. c. 55 Mo. App. 251. Pac. 219. ""^ McMahon v. City of Dubuque, •^^Hallman v. City of Platteville, 107 Iowa 62; s. c. 77 N. W. 517. 101 Wis. 94; s. c. 76 N. W. 1119. ''^ City of Ysleta v. Babbitt, 8 Tex. ^ Parks V. Greenville, 44 S. C. 168; Civ. App. 432; s. c. 28 S. W. 702. As s. c. 21 S. E. 540. to when an officer is not an agent of ^^ McCann v. City of Waltham, 163 the city, see Gilpatrick v. City of Mass. 344; s. c. 40 N. E. 20. It was Biddeford, 86 Maine 534; s. c. 30 urged in a unique case that a police- Atl. 99. man was a nuisance and the city ""McQueen v. City of Elkhart, 14 therefore liable for his acts, but the Ind. App. 671; s. c. 43 N. E. 460. contention was not sustained: Craig '' Coan v. City of Marlborough, 164 V. City of Charleston. 78 111. App. Mass. 206; s. c. 41 N. E. 238. 312; s. c. affirmed 180 111. 154; 54 "= Gross v. City of Portsmouth, 68 N. E. 184. N. H. 266; s. c. 33 Atl. 256. ^'Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 § 786 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 790 casioned by fire growing out of the defective condition of its water- worlvs.''^ But where water-gates are maintained by a city for pecu- niary gain it is immaterial by whom, or for what purpose, they were originally erected, in an action for damages.^* In such case the main- tenance or removal of the gates is not a governmental function.®^ A city hiring a train and crew and operating the same on a temporary track laid on its own property is liable to its employes as other cor- porations operating a railroad.^'' The liability of a city for injury growing out of ownership and operation of a gravel-bank which is dangerous, where no notice is given to laborers, is the same as that of a natural person.''^ The city is liable for injury to an employe by reason of mismanagement of a steam-roller engaged in repairing the streets.^^ Where a city is the owner of a toll-bridge over a river it is liable for injury resulting from defects in the approach to the bridge though in another state.®'' And it is liable for an injury grow- ing out of negligence in not providing barriers or lights on a draw- bridge.^**" Where a statute provides that it shall not be lawful to lo- cate a pest-house within one mile of the boundary-line of the city and a person is injured by the acts of the municipal officers, the city is liable for their acts though the statute provides a remedy against the olScers only.^"^ § 786. Torts in diverting watercourses, surface-water, etc. — Where the city in grading its streets diverted the natural drainage' of the surface-water and threw larger quantities of water, dirt and filth than formerly on plaintiff's ground and caused large quantities of water, dirt and filth to acumulate on the street in front of plaintiff's lot, to such an extent as to become a nuisance, it is unnecessary to allege that the work was negligently and unskilfully done.^°^ Nor «^ Springfield &c. Ins. Co. v. Vil- 58 S. C. 413; s. c. 36 S. E. 661. See lage of Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46; s. c. Rev. Stats. S. C, § 1582. 42 N. E. 405. ""City Council &c. v. Hudson, 94 "'City Council &c. v. Lombard, 99 Ga. 135; s. c. 21 S. E. 289. Ga. 282; s. c. 25 S. E. 772. "° Stephani v. City of Manitowoc, "^City Council &c. v. Lombard, 89 Wis. 467; s. c. 62 N. W. 176. supra. "' City of Henderson v. Clayton ""Coughlan v. City of Cambridge, (Ky.), 57 S. W. 1. 166 Mass. 268; s. c. 44 N. E. 218. For "-Guest v. Commissioners &c., 90 negligent construction of doors of Md. 689; s. c. 45 Atl. 882. Cf. Sei- an engine house, see Kies v. City of fert v. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. Erie, 169 Pa. St. 598; s. c. 32 Atl. 136; s. c. 4 N. E. 321; Byrnes v. 621. City of Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 204; Noon- ^'City of Winfield v. Peeden, 8 an v. City of Albany, 79 N. Y. 470, Kan. App. 671; s. c. 57 Pac. 131. 475; Field v. Inhabitants &c., 36 N. "'Barksdale v. City of Laurens, J. Eq. 118; O'Brien v. City of St. 791 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 787 in such case is it necessary to allege knowledge or notice on the part of the cit}^, since, it being an original wrong-doer, it is not entitled to notice before suit.^°^ A municipality is liable for damages caused by tearing away a gutter wall by which the water from the street was turned upon plaintiff's premises and building.^"* It has been held that damages are not recoverable for water caused to flow in a dooryard by reason of necessary changes in the surface and grade of a street, under the general statutes, section 2683, laws of Connecticut, although it might have been graded so as to prevent such flow.^°^ The city may be liable for diverting a watercourse for supplying a reservoir.^"'' In the grading of streets it is the duty of the city to take care of the surface-water accumulated by reason of the grading and prevent in- jury to property where it can be done practically and at a reasonable expense.^'*' AVhere the city collects the water in a body and by artificial means throws it upon adjacent land it is liable.^**^ And where by a permanent public improvement it narrows the channel of a natural waterway and throws the current on the opposite side so as to injure property then it is liable.^"'' A citizen is liable in^ damages for negli- gence in diverting a stream by means of an artificial canal by means of which the canal overflowed and damaged plaintiff's land. Where the city is beneficially interested it is not a governmental function."** In a suit for polluting a stream with sewage, evidence of a town vote authorizing the construction of the sewers and making appropriation therefor is admissible, whether the town was or was not authorized to build sewers.^^^ § 787. Respondeat superior not applicable to public officers. — Where the city assumes a duty public in its nature, such as the erec- tion of a schoolhouse, and an injury results, it is not liable. It is per- formed in obedience to a statute which was enacted because it was Paul, 25 Minn. 331; Ashley v. City N. Y. S. 579; s. c. 31 Misc. (N. Y.) of Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Patoka 375. Tp. V. Hopkins, 131 Ind. 142; s. c. "" Schuett v. City of Stillwater, 80 30 N. E. 896; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Minn. 287; s. c. 83 N. W. 180. &c. Co., 13 Wall. 136; Hitchins v. ^"^ Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 Mayor &c., 68 Md. 100, 113; s. c. 11 W. Va. 312; s. c. 26 S. B. 266; 36 L. Atl. 826; Mayor &c. v. Merryman, 86 R. A. 519; Bedell v. Village of Sea Md. 584, 592; s. c. 39 Atl. 98. Cliff, 46 N. Y. S. 226; s. c. 18 App. ^''^ Guest V. Commissioners &c., 90 Div. (N. Y.) 261; Cannon v. City of Md. 689; s. c. 45 Atl. 882. St. Joseph, 67 Mo. App. 367. ^"* Morley v. Village of Buchanan, "" Parker v. City of Atchison, 58 124 Mich. 128; s. c. 82 N. W. 802. Kan. 29; s. c. 48 Pac. 631. "^ Downs v. City of Ansonia, 73 ""Willson v. Boise City (Idaho), Conn. 33; s. c. 46 Atl. 243. 55 Pac. 887. '"'Rider v. City of Amsterdam, 65 "'Watson v. Town of New Mil- ford, 72 Conn. 561; s. c. 45 Atl. 167. § 787 PUBLIC COIU'ORATIONS. 793 deemed expedient by the legislature, in the distribution of the powers of government, to require the city, nolens volens, to perform a public service in which it, as a corporation, had no interest. In such case the employes are the servants and agents of the state, and not the city, and it is for this reason the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.^^^ Negligence of a public officer engaged in the performance of a public duty which results in a personal injury to an emplo^^e, does not render the municipality liable,^ ^^ and so the city is not liable for the acts of a liquor-licensing board, such board not being agents but public officers of the city.^^'* Where a person is arrested without cause, is confined in the city jail and injured by reason of its improper con- struction and unwholesome condition, the city is not liable for such in- juries, for the reason that the city is not responsible for an illegal ar- rest by a police officer, and respondeat superior does not apply.^^^ Where a tort was committed by a chain-gang superintendent by im- prisoning a person and compelling him to work, although it was done under instructions from county authorities, there is no liability. ^^^ The city is not liable for the acts of an officer in requiring a prisoner to break stone when he was not sentenced to hard labor,^^^ nor generally for the negligence of any officer who is in the performance of duties imposed by law,^^^ nor in the exercise of police powers, even under a void ordinance,^ ^^ nor for endeavoring to enforce a void judgment for a fine where the offense was against the general law.^^** Although police officers are appointed by the municipality under authority of a statute, the city is not liable for their acts under the rule respon- deat superior.^ ^^ A city is not liable for negligent and wilful acts of city physicians,^^" nor for the acts of an officer which are unofficial, but the duties are imposed by resolution of the council. ^-^ Respond- "2 Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 "" Royce v. Salt Lake City, 15 111. 332; s. c. 49 N. E. 536. Utah 401; s. c. 49 Pac. 290. "^ Murphy v. Inhabitants &c., 176 ""* Sievers v. City &c. of San Fran- Mass. 422; s. c. 57 N. B. 689. And cisco, 115 Cal. 648; s. c. 47 Pac. 687. so as to the torts of a general officer ^^^ Easterly v. Town of Irwin, 99 over whom the council exercises no Iowa 694; s. c. 68 N. W. 919; City of control except of general orders or Caldwell v. Prunelle, 57 Kan. 511; s. ordinances: Jensen v. City of Wal- c. 46 Pac. 949. tham, 166 Mass. 344; s. c. 44 N. E. "" Fox v. City of Richmond, 19 339. Ky. L. 326; s. c. 40 S. W. 251. "* McGinnis v. Inhabitants &c., "^ Woodhull v. City of New York, 176 Mass. 67; s. c. 57 N. E. 210. 150 N. Y. 450; s. c. 44 N. E. 1038. "^ Gray V. Mayor &c., Ill Ga. 361; ^-- Bates v. City of Houston, 14 s. c. 36 S. E. 792; Bean v. City of Tex. Civ. App. 287; s. c. 37 S. W. Middlesboro (Ky.), 57 S. W. 478. 383. ""Bailey v. Fulton Co., Ill Ga. ^^^Gray v. City of Detroit, 113 313; s. c. 36 S. E. 596. Mich, 657; s. c. 71 N. W. 1107. 793 TORTS AND CRIMES, § 788 cat superior does apply where an act is within the general scope of the corporate powers, and is in the execution of such powers, but is done in such negligent and unlawful manner as to injure others.^-'* The fact that a department is created by law for the performance of a public duty does not relieve the city from liability growing out of negligence in the performance of duties voluntarily assumed.^^^ § 788. Negligence as an element in tort. — The propriety of con- sidering negligence as an element in the subject of torts may be ■doubted. Negligence in municipal affairs usually arises in connection with streets, alleys and sidewalks, and is fully treated in that connec- tion and will be only briefly considered here. Negligence as applied to the management of municipal affairs is not susceptible of defini- iion, and is only made plain by illustration. The application of the doctrine of negligence can only be considered with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case and there are no well-defined rules governing the subject. The existence of negligence in any case is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.^-^^ In order that the city may be held liable for negligence it is essential that it shall have knowledge of the negligent act, or notice thereof. Notice, however, is not required where the negligent act is the act of the servants of the •city.^^'' Again, what is sufficient notice of the negligent act is a ques- tion of fact for the jury.^-'^ Knowledge of the defect is not conclusive evidence of negligence. ^^^ Officers of a city are chargeable with knowl- edge which it is their duty to possess, as such officers.^-^ Notice should be given to such officers as are chargeable with the duty of care, as in case of streets, sidewalks, etc., although it has been held that notice to the mayor is notice to the city of a trespass by its offi- cers.^^° As to negligence in the case of children receiving injury «*Boye V. City of Albert Lea, 74 ^=° City of Dallas v. Cooper (Tex. Minn. 230; s. c. 76 N. W. 1131. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 321. 125 Twist V. City of Rochester, 55 "' Sproul v. City of Seattle, 17 N. Y. S. 850; s. c. 37 App. Div. (N. Wash. 256; s. c. 49 Pac. 489; Smith Y.) 307. v. Mayor &c., 45 N. Y. S. 239; s. c. ^==aCity of Ft. Scott v. Peck, 5 17 App. Div. (N. Y.) 438. Kan. App. 593; s. c. 49 Pac. Ill; '-"Nichols v. Incorporated Town Sheridan v. Mayor &c., 33 N. Y. S. of Laurens, 96 Iowa 388; s. c. 65 N. 71; s. c. 12 Misc. (N. Y.) 47; Roach W. 335; Mayor &c. v. Starr, 112 Ala. V. City of Ogdensburg, 36 N. Y. S. 98; s. c. 20 So. 424. 112; s. c. 91 Hun (N. Y.) 9; Rumsey '=« Carstesen v. Town of Stratford, V. City of Philadelphia, 171 Pa. St. 67 Conn. 428; s. c. 35 Atl. 276. 63; s. c. 32 Atl. 1133; Fuchs v. City '''"City of San Antonio v. Mackey's of St. Louis, 133 Mo. 168; s. c. 31 Estate, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 145; s. c. S. W. 115; 34 S. W. 508. 54 S. W. 33. Where the question of § 788 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 794: through fault of the city the Law is somewhat different, in some respects, from that applicable to persons of mature age. It has been held that the city is liable for death of a child falling from a section of the sidewalk it was using as a raft on a pond of water accumulated by the city's negligence in grading for a sewer,^^^ and for leaving a sand-pit in close proximity to a street open and unprotected, whereby a child enters the pit and is injured. ^^^ And so where there is a half- block of ground in a populous city bounded on two sides by public streets and on a third by a public alley, on which is a dangerous pond or pit, in which the water is from five to fourteen feet deep, with logs floating upon it on which children were in the habit of playing, and the city had been notified of the attractiveness to children and the dan- gerous character thereof, and an injury ensues to a child seven years old, the city is liable. ^^^ Undoubtedly the general rule of law is that an owner of premises is not required to keep his premises in a safe condition for the benefit of trespassers who come upon them without invitation, express or implied, for their own pleasure or to gratify their own curiosity.^^* But an exception to this general rule exists in its application to children. Thus where the owner of premises leaves them open and unguarded and they are of such nature and char- acter as to be an attraction to children, appealing to their childish curiosity, the owner becomes liable for an injury. In such case the owner should reasonably anticipate the injury. ^^^ If the property is negligence is one for the jury and pra. The cases which sustain this the evidence is conflicting and the doctrine, usually known as the verdict of the jury in the trial court Turn-table Cases, are: Keffe v. Mil- is approved by that court it will not waukee &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207; be disturbed by the appellate court: Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Fitzsim- City of Ft. Scott V. Peck. 5 Kan. App. mons, 22 Kan. 686; Koons v. St. 593; s. c. 49 Pac. 111. A finding Louis &c. R. Co., 65 Mo. 592; Union that the village had notice is suf- Pac. R. Co. v. Dunden, 37 Kan. 1; s. ficient where a village trustee nailed c. 14 Pac. 501; Evanisch v. G. C. & down the loose board which caused S. F. R. Co., 57 Tex. 123; Ferguson the injury, but the stringers being v. Columbus &c. R. Co., 75 Ga. 637; decayed were insufficient to hold: s. c. 77 Ga. 102; St. Louis &c. R. Co. Village of Sorento v. Johnson, 52 111. v. Bell, 81 111. 76. Other cases of a App. 659. similar nature are: Mackey v. City "^City of Omaha v. Richards, 49 of Vicksburg. 64 Miss. 777; s. c. 2 Neb. 244; s. c. 68 N. W. 528. So. 178; Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. ^"^Hawley v. City of Atlantic, 92 507; Daley v. Norwich &c. R. Co., Iowa 172; s, c. 60 N. W. 519. 26 Conn. 591; Powers v. Harlow, 53 "^'City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Mich. 507; s. c. 19 N. W. 257; Hy- 111. 141; s. c. 39 N. E. 484. draulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. St. "^City of Pekin v. McMahon, su- 332; Whirley v. Whiteman, 1 Head pra. (Tenn.) 610. For an exhaustive ^^^ City of Pekin v. McMahon, su- note on the liability for dangerous 795 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 789 not immediately on the highway it has been held there was no lia- bility."" And so where the agency of the injury was not attractive to children there would be no negligence. '•"''^ § 789. Liability for collision of vessels. — Where a city under power in its charter enters into the business of towing vessels for profit and by negligence causes injury to another vessel by collision, it is liable. ^^* The reason for the liability in this class of cases is based upon the fact that when a city voluntarily assumes the exercise of powers which are private in their nature, and for profit, it is liable to suit and the measure of actual damage that an individual or private corporation would vsubject itself to under similar circumstances. ^^'^ The city is liable for the collision of its fire-boat with another vessel through the negligence of the former. In such case the fire-department does not act as an instrumentality of the state, but rather of the munici- pality.^*" A city is liable for a collision of its ice-boat with another vessel moored at a dock while the ice-boat is engaged in private service for the owners of the dock, gratuitously or for compensation.^*^ § 790. Torts of independent contractor. — The city is liable for an injury although it may have employed an independent contractor to do the work, where the work is done under specifications by the city, and is in conformity therewith, and the injury is the proximate and necessary result of the work contracted for.^*^ The city is liable for condition of private grounds lying W. 417; Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271; open beside a highway or fre- s. c. 32 N. W. 223. quented paths, see note to Lepnick v. "* City of Philadelphia v. Gavag- Gaddis, 72 Miss. 200; s. c. 16 So. 213, nin, 62 Fed. 617; s. c. 10 C. C. A. in 26 L. R. A. 686. But upon this 552. subject the authorities are not en- ^^^ City of Philadelphia v. Gavag- tirely harmonious: Gillespie v. Mc- nin, supra; The Giovanni v. City of Gowan, 100 Pa. St. 144; Hargreaves Philadelphia, 59 Fed. 303. V. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1; Klix v. Nie- ""Workman v. City of New York, man, 68 Wis. 271; s. c. 32 N. W. 223; 63 Fed. 298. A city is liable for a Schmidt v. Kansas City Dist. Co., 90 collision of a fire-tug with another Mo. 284; s. c. 1 S. W. 865; 2 S. W. vessel. This is contrary to the com- 417; City of Indianapolis v. Emmel- mon law and grows out of the prin- man, 108 Ind. 530; s. c. 9 N. E. 155; ciples of maritime law. Inasmuch Clark V. City of Richmond, 83 Va. as public policy forbids a seizure of 355; s. c. 5 S. E. 369; Clark v. Man- the vessel as in other maritime cases Chester, 62 N. H. 577; Trost v. East- the judgment is in personam: ern R. Co., 64 N. H. 220; s. c. 9 Atl. Thompson N. W. Co. v. City of Chi- 790. cago, 79 Fed. 984. i^« Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. '» Guthrie v. City of Philadelphia, St. 144. 73 Fed. 688. "'^ Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. "= City of Louisville v. Shanna- 1; Schmidt v. Kansas City Dist. Co., ban, 22 Ky. L. 163; s. c. 56 S. W. 90 Mo. 284; s. c. 1 S. W. 865; 2 S. 808. § 791 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 796 improper materials and work by a contractor where all materials were subject to the approval of a commissioner of public improvements, and the location of a wall was designated by a city engineer and was built under the supervision of the engineer or his assistants.^''^ The city is liable for failure to require the contractor to use care to pre- vent injury.^** It is probable that where city authorities employ a contractor to do what they arc empowered by statute to do, which is dangerous in its nature, the city is liable for injuries. ^*^ § 791. Miscellaneous matters in relation te torts. — \\Tiere the city gave authority to al)utting owners to make excavations dangerous to the public and has notice thereof, it is liable,^*® but not so if it has given no permission. ^^'^ Where there is a valid ordinance and grading is done without provision for and the payment of damages to an abutting owner, the city is liable.^*^ A city in the exercise of a gov- ernmental power in granting a railroad company the right to construct a tunnel under a street is not liable for damages occasioned by the company. ^*^ It is not a defense in an action for negligence that a lawful act was performed in an unlawful manner, as where an improvement was required to be made under contract and was in fact done by or under the direction of the superintendent of streets.^^" Where the city is prosecuting work through its officials and at its expense, it will not be heard to say that through irregularity in the proceedings the work was without authority of law.^^^ A municipal corporation is not liable in tort when the alleged tort consists in a breach of a contract which is void by being prohibited by the consti- tution. ^^^ A county, occupying a leased building, is liable for its loss by fire if occasioned by the negligence of officers charged with its care.^^^ Though an ordinance shows an abuse of discretionary power vested in the municipality, it is not liable for damages caused by the "^ Goldschmid v. Mayor &c., 43 N. ^^'' Donahew v. City of Kansas Y. S. 447; s. c. 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) City, 136 Mo. 657; s. c. 38 S. W. 571. 135. To the same effect is Collenswortli "* White V. Mayor &c., 44 N. Y. S. v. City of New Whatcom, 16 Wash. 454; s. c. 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 440. 224; s. c. 47 Pac. 439. "' Hardaker v. Idle Dist. Council, "^ Norton v. City of New Bedford, 1 Q. B. D. 335. 166 Mass. 48; s. c. 43 N. E. 1034. ""Sproul V. City of Seattle, 17 ''= Schiilenberg &c. Co. v. City of Wash. 256; s. c. 49 Pac. 489. East St. Louis, 63 111. App. 214; s. c. '"Jones V. City of Clinton, 100 166 111. 232; 46 N. E. 728; Prince v. Iowa 333; s. c. 69 N. W. 418. City of Quincy, 28 111. App. 490. '"Rives V. City of Columbia, 80 ''' Williams v. Board &c., 61 Kan. Mo. App. 173. 708; s. c. 60 Pac. 1046. Ill) Terry v. City of Richmond, 94 Va. 537; s. c. 27 S. E. 429. 797 TORTS AND CRIMES. enactment and enforcement of such ordinance.^^* The city is nor ble for an injury growing out of the use of impure vaccine under a^ ordinance requiring all citizens and residents to be vaccinated. !^^ A city is not liable for an injury to property on a wharf-boat which grows out of the negligence of one to whom the city had leased the wharf and privileges. ^^^ Where a public work by reason of its nature and location injures a person, and which could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable prudence as to plan and location, the city and contractor are liable. ^^^ § 792. Non-liability for firemen. — Members of a fire-department, as ofhcers charged with a public service, are not the agents or servants of the city which appoints them, and the city is therefore not liable for their negligent discharge of official duty,^^^ nor is it liable for neg- ^^* Rosenbaum v. City of Newbern, 118 N. C. 83; s. c. 24 S. E. 1. ^^ Wyatt v. City of Rome, 105 Ga. 312; s. c. 31 S. E. 188; 42 L. R. A. 180; Sberbourne v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Summers v. Board &c., 103 Ind. 262; s. c. 2 N. E. 725; Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495; Love v. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129; s. c. 22 S. E. 29. ^^^ Carrollton &c. Mfg. Co. v. City of Carrollton, 20 Ky. L. 818; s. c. 47 S. W. 439, 885. "'De Baker v. Southern &c. R. Co., 106 Cal. 257; s. c. 39 Pac. 610; Carstesen v. Town of Stratford, 67 Conn. 428; s. c. 35 Atl. 276. "" Smith v. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506. A city is not responsible for the torts of its firemen: Kies v. City of Erie, 135 Pa. St. 144; s. c. 19 Atl. 942; Knight v. City of Phila- delphia, 15 W. N. C. (Pa.) 307; Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. St. 624; s. c. 15 Atl. 553. A city is not liable for the negligent driving of a mem- ber of its fire-department in going to a fire, though the department be un- der its direct control, management and operation, and the members of it be employed and paid by the city: Alexander v. City of Vicksburg, 68 Miss. 564; s. c. 10 So. 62. In Hayes V. City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, Dixon, C. J., said: — "The grounds of exemption from liability are that the corporation is engaged in a pub- lic service in which it has no partic- ular interest, . . . but which it is bound to see performed in pursu- ance of a duty imposed by law for the general welfare; that the mem- bers of the fire-department, though appointed by the city corporation, are not, when acting in the dis- charge of their duties, servants or agents of the city, but they act rather as public officers charged with a public service for whose negli- gence or misconduct in the discharge of official duty no action will lie against the city unless expressly given." In Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87, Gray, J., said: — "Nor is it material that in Boston a fire-de- partment has been established and is regulated under a special statute accepted by the city council: Stat. 1850, ch. 262. The engineers and members of that department are no less public officers and no more agents of the city than fire-wards and similar officers under the gen- eral statutes. In the leading case of Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 297, the fire-depart- ment, for the negligence of whose members the city was held not to be 793 PUBLIC CORPOIUTIONS. 798 ligence in the performance of a public duty imposed by law, to a mem- ber of its fire-department injured by reason of a defective brake on an engine.^'"''' The fire commissioners of the city of New York being public officers and not its agents, it is not liable for their wrongful dismissal of a fireman. ^®° § 793. Non-liability for police. — Municipal corporations are not liable for the torts or negligence of policemen because the duties of those officers are of a public nature and their appointment is devolved by the legislature on cities, towns and boroughs as a convenient mode of exercising a public function ;^^^ thus a borough was held not liable where a policeman stood by and made no effort to stop the firing of cannon on a public street.^**^ And a city is not liable for an illegal arrest and imprisonment by the police, ^®^ or for their unnecessary violence,^*^* or for their accidental shooting of a liable to an action, was established and regulated and its officers and members appointed under a similar special statute. . . . However ap- pointed or elected such persons are public officers who perform duties imposed by law for the benefit of all the citizens, the performance of which the city or town has no con- trol over and derives no benefit from in its corporate capacity. The acts of such officers are their own official acts and not the acts of the munici- pal corporation or its agents." And see Mayor &c. v. Workman, 67 Fed. 347; s. c. 14 C. C. A. 530; Shanewerk V. City of Port Worth, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 271; s. c. 32 S. W. 918. 159 Wild V. Mayor &c., 47 N. J. L. 406; s. c. 1 Atl. 490. And it makes no difference that the injury oc- curred while a fire-tower was being tested preparatory to its purchase by the city: Thompson v. Mayor &c., 52 N. Y. Super. 427. i°»Terhune v. Mayor &c., 88 N. Y. 247, 251. "^ Perkins v. City of New Haven, 53 Conn. 214; s. c. 1 Atl. 825. In Iowa it has been repeatedly decided that as the police regulations of a city are not made and enforced in the interest of the city in its cor- porate capacity, but in the interest of the public, it is not liable for the acts of its officers in enforcing such regulations: Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495; Calwell v. City of Boone, 51 Iowa 687; s. c. 2 N. W. 614. ''"'- Borough of Norristown v. Fitz- patrick, 94 Pa. St. 121. See also, Elliott V. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. St. 347, where a horse in the custody of a policeman was killed through his negligence. Policemen do not derive their powers and duties from the city or town which appoints them, but from the law: Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen (Mass.) 172; and are not the city's servants: Kimball v. City of Boston, 1 Allen (Mass.) 417; People v. Shep- ard. 36 N. Y. 285; Burch v. Hard- wicke, 30 Graft. (Va.) 24. "■' Harris v. City of Atlanta, 62 Ga. 290; Cook v. Mayor &c., 54 Ga. 468. '"* Calwell V. City of Boone, 51 Iowa 687; s. c. 2 N. W. 614. See also, McElroy v. City Council &c., 65 Ga. 387. A complaint in a suit against a city which alleges that a policeman of the city arrested plaintiff for a supposed violation of a city ordi- nance, without a warrant, and with- out affidavit made as required by law; that plaintiff had not violated 799 TORTS AND CRIMES. 794 citizen.^''' A city is not liable to one who is injured while aiding, at their request, its police to make an arrest.^^" § 794. Liability for acts of mobs. — Municipal liability for injury to person or property caused by a mob does not exist at common lj^^^i66a gjj(j (JQgg j-^Q^ j.gg^ upon contract between the city and the suf- ferer, but is wholly statutory. ^"'^ It is well settled that a statute cre- ating such a liability is not unconstitutional.^"® Under the Pennsyl- vania mob laws of 1841 and 1849 it is held that the fact that the au- thorities are unable to quell a riot, and that the property injured is in transitu and belongs to non-residents, does not limit the county's liability for damages.^"^ Under the New York mob laws a city is liable for goods carried away by a mob as well as for those destroyed on the premises; and it is not a good defense for the city that the the ordinance; and that the police- man was incompetent, to the knowl- edge of the city, — states no cause of action: Rusher v. City of Dallas, 83 Tex. 151; s. c. 18 S. W. 333. ^•^^ Culver V. City of Streator, 130 111. 238; s. c. 22 N. E. 810. I'^'^Cobb V. City of Portland, 55 Maine 381, where the court said: — "But the plaintiff was not the serv- ant of the city nor was the police- man whom he assisted. Both were acting under the authority of the state as the conservators of the pub- lic peace — the peace of the state, not the peace of the city of Portland alone. It is true they derived their authority from the city, but that was done by act of the legislature as a matter of convenience. . . . The obligation devolved by statute upon the city to appoint police offi- cers . . . confers no particular interest, benefit or advantage upon it in its corporate capacity and cre- ates no liability on its part for the acts of those officers." See also. Western College v. City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375; Borough of Norris- town V. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St. 121; Campbell v. City Council &c., 53 Ala. 527. i««a Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625, where Okey, J., said: — "Thus, with respect to the power to suppress riots and assemblages of disorderly persons, it has been uni- formly held that the corporation is a mere agency of the state, and not liable for negligence in the perform- ance of such duties. Upon this prin- ciple it has been held that there is no corporate liability for the acts of a mob although the charter contains this provision as to the duties of council, — that it shall be their duty to regulate the police of the city, preserve the peace, prevent riots, disturbances and disorderly assem- blages." '"Louisiana v. Mayor &c., 109 U. S. 285; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 211. So, a city which has failed to prohibit the firing of cannon in its public parks, or given its legislative sanction to such firing on certain conditions, is not liable for injuries to individuals caused by such firing if there is no statute giving an action therefor: Lincoln v. City of Boston, 148 Mass. 578; s. c. 20 N. E. 329. ^•^ Louisiana v. Mayor &c., 109 U. S. 285; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 211; Darlington V. Mayor &c., 31 N. Y. 164. '"'Allegheny Co. v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397. § 795 • rUBLIC CORI'OUATIONS. 80O crowd at first collected to see a fire, if it afterwards united in unlawful conduct."" And the fact that plaintiff keeps a disorderly house is not a good defense."^ If a building is not a nuisance per se, the town may be liable for its destruction by a mob, though under conditions its erection be prohibited."^ The city is liable for property destroyed by a mob or riot in the absence of the owner's consent or contributory negligence on his part where the general municipal law declares that the city shall be lial^le in damages for the destruction of property by mobs or riots. "^ The Illinois statute (1887) makes a city liable for property other than property in transit destroyed by a mob or riot composed of twelve or more persons.^'^* The Illinois statute (1895) providing that when any property, except property in transit, shall be destroyed or injured by a mob or riot of twelve or more persons, the city or county shall be liable for the injury to the extent of three- fourths the damages, is constitutional.^''^ That the mob was composed mainly of employes of plaintiff is not a defense.^'** It is not the duty of the owner of property destroyed by a mob to employ an armed force of men to defend his property. "'' Under the Kansas statute making cities and towns liable for injury by mobs, evidence was admitted that a person killed by a mob was guilty of misconduct or crime within a reasonable time prior to the killing which may have influenced the mob, or which might affect his value to next of kin.^'^^ A city is not liable for the loss of life by a mob.^'^® § 795. Private interests must yield to public. — As public accommo- dation must prevail over private interests, a city is not liable for a private injury which is incidental to an authorized public improve- ment; for example, for raising or lowering the grade of a street under authority of law, though an abutting ownei*'s house may thereby be left standing high above the grade or in a hollow below it. The indi- vidual can have no compensation for the inconveniences which fairly ""Solomon v. City of Kingston, 24 lington v. Mayor &c., 31 N. Y. 164; Hun (N. Y.) 562; Sarles v. Mayor Allegheny Co. v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. &c., 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 447. 337. And see Louisiana v. Mayor "^Bly V. Board &c., 36 N. Y. 297. &c., 109 U. S. 285; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 211. 17= Brightman v. Inhabitants &c., 65 ^"^ Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City Maine 426. of Spring Valley, 65 111. App. 571. "^ Marshall v. City of Buffalo, 64 "" Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City N. Y. S. 411; s. c. 50 App. Div. (N. of Spring Valley, 65 111. App. 571. Y.) 149. ""Adams v. City of Salina, 58 Kan. "* Spring Valley Coal Co. v. City 246; s. c. 48 Pac. 918. of Spring Valley, 65 111. App. 571. ™ City of New Orleans v. Abbag- "^ Pennsylvania Co. v. City of Chi- nato, 62 Fed. 240; s. c. 10 C. C. A. cago, 81 Fed. 317; Underbill v. City 361. of Manchester, 45 N. H. 214; Dar- 801 TORTS AXD CRIMES. 795 result from the making of needed public improvements, as he is supposed to be recompensed by the enhancement of the general wel- fare.^'"' The rule Just laid down is well illustrated in the case of the Brooklyn bridge. The Brooklyn bridge over the East river, being erected by the two cities under authority derived from congress and the New York legislature, can not be abated as a public nuisance, and the public benefit from it far outweighs any inconvenience to indi- viduals by interfering with navigation.^^^ Acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers and not directly encroaching upon private property, though impairing its use, are held not to be a talcing within the constitutional provision.^*"- And a lot-owner who has peti- tioned for a public improvement and has had his day in court on a review of the assessment therefor, and has failed to exercise his right I'^Vidalat v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. An. 1121; s. c. 10 So. 175; Hembling v. City of Big Rapids, 89 Mich. 1; s. c. 50 N. W. 741; City of Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Micli. 164. In Governor &c. v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794, Lord Kenyon thus states the reasons which preclude a private remedy in such cases: — "If this ac- tion could be maintained every turn- pike, paving and navigation act would give rise to an infinity of ac- tions. If the legislature think it necessary, as they do in many cases, they enable the commissioners to award satisfaction to the indivduals who happen to suffer. But if there be no such power the parties are without remedy, provided the com- missioners do not exceed their ju- risdiction. Some individuals suffer an inconvenience under all these acts of parliament, but the interests of individuals must give way to the accommodation of the public." See also, Boulton v. Crowther, 2 B. & C. 703; King v. Commissioners. 8 B. & C. 355; Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 418; Smith v. Corporation &c. of Washington, 20 How. 135. In Glasgow V. St. Louis, 107 Mo. 198; s. c. 17 S. W. 743, it was held that an owner had no redress by injunc- tion or damages for the vacating of 1 Smith — 51 a street upon which he did not abut; as there was no physical interfer- ence with his property or any ease- ment thereof, the inconvenience he suffered with others did not entitle him to relief under the clause of the constitution "that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensa- tion." See § 662, ante. ^"Miller v. Mayor &c., 109 U. S. 385; s. c. 3 S. Ct. 228. See also, Es- canaba &c. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U. S. 678; s. c. 2 S. Ct. 185; Gil- man v. City of Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. ''-Atwater v. Trustees &c., 124 N. Y. 602; s. c. 27 N. E. 385; Transpor- tation Co. V. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 641. A city is not liable unless made so by statute or charter for conse- quential injuries to property adja- cent to a public street caused by a change lawfully made of the grade of a street: Henderson v. City of Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 319; s. c. 20 N. W. 322; Lee v. City of Minneapo- lis, 22 Minn. 13. But is liable if in so changing a grade it removes the lateral support of an abutting lot: Dyer v. City of St. Paul, 27 Minn. 457; s. c. 8 N. W. 272; Nichols v. City of Duluth, 40 Minn. 389; s. c. 42 N. W. 84. § 796 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. , 802 to appear before the city council to claim damages therefor, is thereby estopped to recover damages in an independent action. ^''^ Mere non- resistance to a projected improvement or the joining in a petition for it does not estop a lot-owner from claiming compensation for an injury caused by it;^^* but the active promotion and superintendence of the improvement may amount to such estoppel.^* ^ The remedy of a person claiming to be unfairly assessed for a local improvement is to apply to the statutory tribunal vested with the power of review; and where no constitutional objection is raised or fraud charged, the inquiry in such a case will be limited to the question whether the mu- nicipal authorities have acted within their powers.^"*^ ^ 796. The same subject continued — Destroying buildings to check fire. — Unless made so by statute a city is not liable to individuals for the necessary destruction of buildings in order to prevent a conflagra- tion.^'*^ Such a destruction of private property is not a taking for public use entitling the owner to compensation.^"*^ In Pennsylvania the mayor of a city is by virtue of his official position justified in demolishing a wooden building which is dangerous to the public safety.^*"* § 797. Non-liability for negligence in public service. — Where a city, under the authority of a general law, undertakes a work for the sole use and benefit of the public, it is not liable for an injury caused by the negligent or defective performance of such work by its agents or servants, unless some statute either directly or by implication gives ^''Hembling V. City of Big Rapids, '"In Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. 89 Mich. 1; s. c. 50 N. W. 741; Brown S. IG, Swayne, J., said: — "In order v. City of Grand Rapids, 83 Mich, to charge the city, the remedy being 101; s. c. 47 N. W. 117; Peninsula given by statute only, the case must Iron &c. Co. v. Crystal Falls Tp., 60 be clearly within the statute. The Mich. 510; s. c. 27 N. W. 666; city is responsible by force of the Comstock V. City of Grand Rapids, statute only, and such responsibility 54 Mich. 641; s. c. 20 N. W. 623; is limited to the cases specially con- Williams V. City of Saginaw, 51 templated." See also, Taylor v. In- Mich. 120; s. c. 16 N. W. 260. habitants &c., 8 Met. (Mass.) 462, '** Jones v. Borough of Bangor, 144 465; Field v. City of Des Moines, 39 Pa. St. 638; s. c. 23 Atl. 252. Iowa 575. As to the statutory liabil- '^^Bidwell V. City of Pittsburgh, ity of the city of New York in such 85 Pa. St. 412. And see Dewhurst v. a case, see Mayor &c. v. Lord, 18 City of Allegheny, 95 Pa. St. 437; Wend. (N. Y.) 126; Russell v. Mayor McKnight v. City of Pittsburgh, 91 &c., 2 Denio (N. Y.) 461. Pa. St. 273. ''^ Stone v. Mayor &c., 25 Wend. i^" Kansas City Grading Co. v. (N. Y.) 157, 174; Russell v. Mayor Holden, 107 Mo. 305; s. c. 17 S. W. &c., 2 Denio (N. Y.) 461. 798, "» Fields v. Stokley, 99 Pa. St. 306. 803 TORTS AND CRIMES. 797 a private remedy for such injury."" This rule has been applied against a traveler injured by negligent blasting while excavating the foundation of a public schoolhouse;"^ and against a child injured by reason of an unsafe staircase of a schoolhouse and a dangerous ex- cavation in a schoolhouse yard."- The same rule has been applied in favor of cities in respect to town-houses and court-houses ;^^^ and in respect to public grounds like Boston Common."* And it makes no material difference in the application of the rule whether the injury is caused by a negligent act done in the direct performance of the pub- lic work or is received after the completion of the work.^^^ As an ap- parent exception to the foregoing general rule, cities and towns have been held liable for injuries caused by the negligent construction of roads and bridges."** In Texas where a city established a place for the burial of carcasses and garbage in order to improve its sanitary condition, it was held not to be liable to an individual for sickness produced thereby, as the intended improvement was in the interest of ""Howard v. City of Worcester, 153 Mass. 426; s. c. 27 N. E. 11. "In the absence of a statute creating the liability, no action can be maintained against a municipal corporation for an injury arising from the neglect of a public corporate duty from the performance of which the corpora- tion receives no special benefit, pe- cuniary or otherwise:" Allen, J., in Clark V. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577. See also, Edgerly v. Concord, 62 N. H. 8. "^ Howard v. City of Worcester, 153 Mass. 426; s. c. 27 N. E. 11. "^ Hill V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332; Bigelow v. Inhabitants &c., 14 Gray (Mass.) 541; Sullivan v. City of Boston, 126 Mass. 540. See also, Wixon v. City of Newport, 13 R. I. 454. "^Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Board &c. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109. A county is not liable for injuries caused by its neglect to pro- vide a railing around a veranda on the second floor of the court-house, where no liability is imposed by stat- ute: Sheppard v. Pulaski Co., 13 Ky. L,. 672; s. c. 18 S. W. 15. ^»* Steele v. City of Boston, 128 Mass. 583; Oliver v. City of Worces- ter, 102 Mass. 489; Clark v. Inhab- itants &c., 128 Mass. 567; Veale v. City of Boston, 135 Mass. 187. ^'^ Howard v. City of Worcester, 153 Mass. 426; s. c. 27 N. E. 11; Tindley v. City of Salem, 137 Mass. 171; Lincoln v. City of Boston, 148 Mass. 578; s. c. 20 N. E. 329; Fisher V. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Haf- ford V. City of New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 297. '"'' See Lawrence v. Inhabitants &c., 5 Gray (Mass.) 110; Deane v. Inhab- itants &c., 132 Mass. 475; Waldron V. City of Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582; s. c. 10 N. E. 481. "These cases, how- ever, rest on grounds which take them out of the general rule, and in the last resort it must be properly considered that, taking all the stat- utes together which relate to the construction of roads and bridges, it is to be inferred that the legislature intended to recognize the existence of a liability for the consequences of negligence in the performance of the work:" Allen, J., in Howard v. City of Worcester, 153 Mass. 426; s. c. 27 N. E. 11. § 798 rUBLIC COKPOEATIOXS. 804 the public and the execution of it was not attended with negligence; but the court added that if the acts done had teen for the city's private advantage it would have been liable for the injury irrespective of the question of negligence. ^"'^ Though a, municipal work be made and maintained for a time for a public purpose, yet if such purpose be abandoned and it be used for a private purpose, the city becomes liable for negligence in such case as any other private corporation would be.^^® § 798. Liability in matters of arrest. — The municipality is not li- able for the acts of a police otficer in making an arrest for a violation or an ordinance/"^ but is liable for imprisonment for default in pay- ment of a fine under an ordinance which is unconstitutional. -°° A city is not liable for the mayor causing a person charged with a viola- tion of an ordinance to give a larger bond for appearance than tlie law authorized, thus causing confinement through inability to give bond.^°^ Although the ordinance be void, the city is not liable in damages for an arrest thereunder in the absence of malice, and where the city acts in good faith, ^*^^ nor for making an arrest for a breach of the peace under a void ordinance. ^"^ Where the mayor, police force and city physician commit a trespass in detaining yellow-fever sus- pects and confining them in plaintiff's hotel for six days without authority or ratification of the council, the city is not liable.^"* A municipality is not liable for an injury resulting from exposure of a violator of an ordinance from which he contracted a disease and died. The placing the prisoner in a dilapidated prison is in the exercise of a governmental function from which no liability results.^°^ § 799. Non-liability as to jails. — A county is not liable to a pris- oner for injur}^ to his health caused by failure of the supervisors to ^" Fort Worth v. Crawford, 64 Tex. Ky. 271; s. c. 32 S. W. 948. The city 202; s. c. 53 Am. R. 753. is not liable for an unlawful arrest "* Clark V. Manchester, 62 N. H. and imprisonment of police officers: 577. Kelley v. Cook, 21 R. I. 29; s. c. 41 "»Vaughlman v. Town of Water- Atl. 571. loo, 14 Ind. App. 649; s. c. 43 N. E. ="* City of San Antonio v. White 476. See Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 (Tex. Civ. App.), 57 S. W. 858. Minn. 278; s. c. 64 N. W. 812. =«^ Eddy v. Village of Ellicottville, ^'"'McGraw v. Town of Marion, 98 54 N. Y. S. 800; s. c. 35 App. Div. Ky. 673; s. c. 34 S. W. 18. (N. Y.) 256. For acts of officer in ^"1 Gray v. Mayor &c.. Ill Ga. 361; confining a person in his own house, s. c. 36 S. E. 792. as a quarantine measure, see Tilford '"= Masters v. Village of Bowling v. Mayor &c., 37 N. Y. S. 185; s. c. Green, 101 Fed. 101. 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 199. 103 Taylor v. City of Owensboro, 98 805 TORTS AND CRIMES. 799 keep the county jail in a sanitary condition ;^''* nor for assaults npon him by violent and intoxicated fellow prisoners wath whom the police had negligently confined him.^'''^ In Kentucky such liability is im- posed upon members of the county court instead of upon the county.^''^ In Georgia a county is not responsible for the tort of one of the guards in unlawfully beating a convict, nor for the negligence of the other guards in not protecting him from such beating ;^°'* nor is a city liable for a tort committed by one of its convicts on the person of another.^^'' In Virginia chartered towns and cities are not deemed political divi- ^"^ A person confined for nearly four months in a county jail under an indictment for forgery, which was then dismissed, can not recover from the county for injuries to his health, caused by the negligent fail- ure of the board of supervisors to keep the jail in a healthy condition: Lindley v. Polk Co., 84 Iowa 308; s. c. 50 N. W. 975. The care and con- trol of prisons being within the po- lice power, a county is not liable for the failure of its officers to keep the county jail in a healthy condi- tion: White V. Board &c., 129 Ind. 396; s. c. 28 N. E. 846; followed in Board &c. v. Boswell, 4 Ind. App. 133; s. c. 30 N. E. 534. A convict in the Albany penitentiary alleged that he lost his hand through the negli- gence of the county in compelling him to approach a circular-saw; a demurrer that the complaint did not state sufficient facts was sustained on the ground that the county while engaged in the public duty of build- ing and managing the penitentiary was not a corporation but a mere in- strumentality selected by the state: Alamango v. Albany Co., 25 Hun (N. Y.) 551. The city is not liable for negligence in caring for a person in the police-station: Kelley v. Cook, 21 R. I. 29; s. c. 41 Atl. 571. Nor for negligently maintaining its lockup: Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278; s. c. 64 N. W. 812. But see Shields v. Town of Durham, 118 N. C. 450; s. c. 24 S. E. 794. ='"' A city is not liable for personal injuries sustained by one prisoner at the hands of another confined in the same cell of the city prison, though the police officer who arrested the injured prisoner, and put him in prison, may have been guilty of neg- ligence in confining him with an in- toxicated fellow prisoner, who was on that account violent and danger- ous: Wilson V. Mayor &c., 88 Ga. 455; s. c. 14 S. B. 710. Where one is confined in a city jail on a crim- inal charge, and is assaulted by other prisoners confined in the same room, he can not hold the city liable for such assault, on the ground of the negligence of its officers in not taking proper measures to protect him: Davis v. City of Knoxville, 90 Tenn. 599; s. c. 18 S. W. 254. -"* General statutes Kentucky, ch. 28, art. 17, § 4, which provide that the county court shall cause a secure county jail to be erected and kept in repair, and that upon a failure so to do each member of the court whose name does not appear recorded in favor thereof shall be liable to a fine, and shall be liable in a civil action for all damage sustained by any per- son by reason thereof, does not au- thorize an action against the county for injuries caused by a defective jail: Hite v. Whitley Co. Court, 91 Ky. 168; s. c. 15 S. W. 57. 2°^ Hammonds v. Richmond Co., 72 Ga. 188. "« Doster v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. 233. § 800 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 80(; sions of the state, as counties are, and their liability for unhealthy jails is the same in principle as for defective streets and sewers. ^^'^ In Kansas a city is not liable for the bad condition of its prison in the absence of some statutory requirement to keep it in a proper condi- tion.2^2 § 800. Non-liability as to hospitals. — Where a city is, under its charter, a municipal government as well as corporation, and receives legislative powers in respect to the public health, it is not liable for the negligence or misconduct of the superintendent, nurses or attendants of its hospitals. ^^^ A corporation established for the maintenance of a public charitable hospital, which has exercised due care in the selec- tion of its agents, is not liable for injury to a patient caused by their negligence, nor for the unauthorized assumption of one of the attend- ants to act as a surgeon, even though the patients be required to pay board.^^* ^"Code Virginia, 1887, § 927, pro- vides that every town having no jail of its own may use the county jail. Sections 928-930, applicable only to counties and cities, provide that the jailer shall keep the jail always clean, that jails shall be inspected under direction of the county court, and that the jailer may be summari- ly punished for failure in his duty. It was held that a town which used a jail of its own was liable for in- juries to the health of a prisoner caused by its filthy condition; since, under § 927 and a special provision of its charter, it might have used a county jail, subject to inspection and control: Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. 268. '^^- Though the general statutes of Kansas, 1889, paragraph 1013, pro- vide that, in a city of the third class, the chief of police shall have power "to keep all persons arrested in the city in the city prison, county jail, or other proper place," and par- agraph 3552, that "all prisoners shall be treated with humanity," the city is not liable for injuries resulting from the confinement of a prisoner without bedding in a filthy and un- inhabitable city prison : City of New Kiowa V. Craven, 46 Kan. 114; s. c. 26 Pac. 426. ^'^ Benton v. Trustees &c., 140 Mass. 13; s. c. 1 N. E. 836. In City of Richmond v. Long, 17 Graft. (Va. ) 375, the city was held not to be liable for the death of a slave who, after being admitted to the city hospital, was negligently allowed to escape therefrom and die from exposure. After a thorough review of the facts and authorities Rives, J., said: — "If this recovery could be made I do not perceive why by parity of reason the state should not be held liable through its public functionaries in civil actions at the suit of individ- uals for losses or torts occurring in the management of its departments and public institutions under its im- mediate control and supervision. It can not be denied that in the munic- ipal government of this city the council occupies towards its hospital relations quite similar to those of the general assembly towards its asylums for the insane, the blind, and deaf mutes." -" McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen'l Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, where De- vens, J., said: — "Where actions have been brought against commissioners 807 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 801 § 801. Non-liability as to fireworks. — The Massachusetts rule that cities or towns are not liable for negligence in matters of public ser- vice, whether the statutes require such service or only permit it, is deemed to exempt a city from lialiility to persons injured through the negligent discharge of authorized fireworks.^^^ In states like New Jer- sey and Kew York, where the discharge of fireworks in the streets is deemed a public nuisance,^^*' the licensing of such a nuisance by the city without the authority of a statute renders it liable for a conse- quent injury to individuals f^"^ though merely negatively permitting it does not render it so liable, as a city is not responsible for the action or of public works, serving gratuitous- ly, for negligence in carrying on the work, by which injury has occurred, it has been held that they were not liable if proper care had been used by them in selecting those who were actually to perform the work: Hol- liday v. St. Leonards, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 192." See also, Gooch v. Asso- ciation &c., 109 Mass. 558; Heriot's Hospital V. Ross, 12 CI. & F. 507. "^Tindley v. City of Salem, 137 Mass. 171, where it was held that a city which undertakes the celebra- tion of a holiday (July 4), under the authority of the public statutes, ch. 28, § 13 (which provides that the city council may appropriate money for such a purpose), exclusively for the gratuitous amusement of the public, is not liable to an action by one who sustains personal injuries through the negligence of city serv- ants in discharging fireworks for the purposes of the celebration. After specifying a great number of differ- ent cases in some of which cities were required by statute, and in others of which they were only au- thorized to do certain things, Allen, J., said: — "In all of these cases the duty is imposed or the authority conferred for the general benefit. The motive and the object are the same, though in some instances the legis- lature determines finally the neces- sity or expediency, and in others it leaves the necessity or expediency to be determined by the towns them- selves. But when determined, and when the service has been entei-ed upon, there is no good reason why a liability to a private action should be Imposed when a town voluntarily enters upon such a beneficial work, and withheld when it performs the service under the requirement of an imperative law. ... It is well known that many towns in Massa- chusetts, not bound to do so, volun- tarily maintain high schools. It is not to be supposed that the legisla- ture have intended to make such towns liable to private actions when towns required to maintain high schools would be exempt. On the other hand, it has been recognized in numerous cases in this state and elsewhere that the question of the liability of towns does not rest upon this distinction: Clark v. Inhabit- ants &c., 128 Mass. 567; Fisher v. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Hafford V. City of New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 297; Bigelow v. Inhabitants &c., 14 Gray (Mass.) 541; Eastman V. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Wixon v. City of Newport, 13 R. I. 454." See also. Beach Contr. Neg. (2d ed.), §§ 259, 413. =1" Jenne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. L. 257; Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 218. =" Speir V. City of Brooklyn, 18 N. Y. S. 170, and cases cited. § 802 PUBLIC CORrORATIONS. 808 non-aetion of its police, as shown elsewhere.^^^ Where a city has no power to provide for a display of fireworks it is not liable for in- juries,-^" and is not liable for injury from erecting a scaffold for the display of fireworks where the contractor agreed to be responsible for all personal injuries.^^" A municipality is not liable for an injury caused by the firing of fireworks and firearms on the street by a crowd of citizens, although done with the knowledge and consent of the of- ficers.^-^ § 802. Liability as to city wells and water. — A municipal cor- poration is bound to use reasonable diligence to keep its wells for the gratuitous use of the public in repair,^^^ and, on notice that their water is unwholesome, to protect the public health by closing or puri- fying them ; but it is not an insurer of the quality of their water, or liable to a person injured by using it without proof of wilful mis- conduct or culpable neglect. The city is not bound from time to time to test the purity of such water by a chemical examination.^-^ As the powers granted by the acts for supplying New York city with pure "^ Danaher v. City of Brooklyn, 119 N. Y. 241; s. c. 23 N. E. 745, where Earl, J., said: — "The city has its public water-supply by running water in addition to these wells. The wells are furnished and kept for public use by the city. It was un- doubtedly the duty of the city to keep the wells and pumps in good order and to keep the wells properly cleaned out so that they would not become contaminated by anything that might be thrown into them. . . . The burden upon the city is sufficient if it be held to the respon- sibility of keeping the wells and pumps in order and clean, and if it be made liable for any injury result- ing from the use of impure waters from the wells after it has had no- tice of their dangerous qualities and an opportunity to remove the dan- ger. The higher degree of diligence (that is. testing by chemical exami- nation) as to water apparently pure and wholesome, agreeable to the taste and in common use by the pub- lic without complaint, would be un- reasonable." =^«Ante, § 793; Hill v. Board &c., 72 N. C. 55; Borough of Norristown V. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St. 121; Ball v. Town of Woodbine, 61 Iowa 83; s. c. 15 N. W. 846; 47 Am. R. 805; Robin- son V. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625. In Little v. City of Madison, 49 Wis. 605; s. c. 6 N. W. 249, it was held that a city license to exhibit wild animals, specifying no place for such exhibition, is a license to ex- hibit in some suitable place, and the fact that the licensee makes the ex- hibition in a public street, and- is permitted to do so by the negligence of city officers, does not render the city liable for injuries resulting therefrom. =" Love V. City of Raleigh, 116 N. C. 296; s. c. 21 S. E. 503. 2^° Heidenway v. City of Philadel- phia, 168 Pa. St. 72; s. c. 31 Atl. 1063. "" Bartlett v. Town of Clarksburg, 45 W. Va. 393; s. c. 31 S. E. 918. It has been held, however, that a cijty may conduct the display of fire- works: Heidenway v. City of Phil- adelphia, 168 Pa. St. 72; s. c. 31 Atl. 1063. ^-^ McCarthy v. City of Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194. 809 TORTS AND CRIMES. 803 water were intended for the private advantage of the city, the city was lield liable for the unskilful construction of a Croton river dam by the employes of the water commissioners, who, though appointed by the state, were agents of the city.^^* Doubtless a city may be liable for causing or negligently permitting its sewage and filth to percolate into its wells or other water supply.--^ A city is not liable in damages for so negligently constructing a sewer as to cut off water from the spring of an abutting land-owner, which otherwise Avould supply the spring by percolation through the soil of the street, because the owner has no absolute right to such percolating water,^-*^ unless such right has been conferred or damages for interference with it awarded by statute.^-^ § 803. Non-liability to trespassers. — A municipal corporation is not liable to a trespasser who goes, without license or invitation, upon its land, though unmolested, for mere pleasure or to gratify curiosity, and there meets with an injury through the corporation's negligent management of its property; and no distinction is made in favor of ^^ Bailey v. Mayor &c., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531. The village of Rutland maintains a water-system for tlie double purpose of furnishing the in- habitants with a supply for private purposes and providing against fire. It was held that as to that portion of the system supplying individuals for hire, the village was liable for any negligence in its construction or maintenance: Wilkins v. Village of Rutland, 61 Vt. 336; s. c. 17 Atl. 735. "5 Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. D. 115; Rex v. Medley, 6 Car. & P. 292; Charles v. Finchley Local Board, 52 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 554; Brown v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84. In Gold- smid V. Tunbridge Wells Com'rs, L. R. 1 Eq. 161, an injunction was granted to restrain commissioners for draining a town from causing the sewage to be discharged into a stream passing through the plain- tiff's land, and feeding a lake there, as the pollution of the water per- ceptibly increased as new houses contributed their sewage to the stream. --" Elster V. City of Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82; s. c. 30 N. B. 274. "• Trowbridge v. Inhabitants &c., 144 Mass. 139; s. c. 10 N. E. 796, where the court said: — "In exercis- ing its rights the town acts, not un- der the title of the owner, but by virtue of the authority given by the statute, and under the obligation im- posed by the statute to pay all dam- ages occasioned thereby. The peti- tioner had a right to collect and keep the water in her well, and de- priving her of it so as to injure her land was a damage to her. It is no answer that other landowners had the same right in respect to their lands, and that, if the petitioner's damages had been in consequence of the exercise of those rights in his land by a landowner, she could not have recovered damages from him. The respondent's rights in the land, and its authority to do the act which caused the damage, are given by the same statute which gives a remedy to the petitioner to recover dam- ages." See also, Watuppa Reservoir v. City of Fall River, 134 Mass. 267. 804 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 810 an infant child so receiving an injury.^^^ In such a case the munici- pality owes no special duty to a child straying from its parents, and the duty of protecting it is not shifted from its parents to the mu- nicipality because it chances to escape from their care.--'' This is the general rule applicable to those who trespass on private lands, and there is no reason why municipal corporations should not have the benefit of it;-^" but of course it has no application to public highways, where all have a right to be, nor can it be invoked by a city which is itself either directly or indirectly a trespasser upon such highways.^^^ § 804. Liability for nuisances. — A municipal -corporation must not use its property in such a manner as to injure the property of others, and, unless authorized by statute, can not justify a trespass or nuisance on the ground that it is acting for the public benefit,^'^^ for in general "« Clark v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577, where the court said that "the owner of land, for whatever purpose it may be used, is under no obliga- tion to keep his premises in a safe condition for the prevention of in- jury to trespassers and persons intruding without license or invita- tion express or implied." See also, Severy v. Nickerson Co., 120 Mass. 306; Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1; Beach Contr. Neg. (2d ed.), § 50. -^ Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. St. 144. ^'''Beck V. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283; Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127. See also, Barrett v. Black, 56 Maine 498; Carleton v. Franconia &c. Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216. -=' Tobin V. Portland &c. R. Co., 59 Maine 183, 188. See also. Beach Contr. Neg. (2d ed.), § 256. 233 Tiius in Miles v. City of Worces- ter, 154 Mass. 511; s. c. 28 N. E. 676, which was an action in tort for dam- ages occasioned by the encroach- ment on plaintiff's land of a wall built by the city in adapting a lot of land to schoolhouse purposes. The continuance of the wall on plaintiff's land was held to be a nuisance for which the city was responsible. Allen, J., said: — "The defendant suggests that it is not liable because the wall was built and maintained solely for the public use and under the requirement of general laws; and that the case can not be distin- guished in principle from the line of cases beginning with Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344; s. c. 23 Am. R. 332, and ending with How- ard V. City of Worcester, 153 Mass. 426; s. c. 27 N. E. 11. We are not aware, however, that a private nui- sance to property can be justified or excused on that ground. The ver- dict shows a continuous occupation of the plaintiff's land by the en- croachment of defendant's wall. The question of negligence in the building of the wall is not material. The erection was completed and was accepted by the defendant, and is now in the defendant's sole charge, and if it is a nuisance the defendant is responsible. . . . The public use and the general benefit will not justify such a nuisance to the prop- erty of another." The rule of lia- bility for nuisances and for the in- vasion of property was thus laid down in Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, 295:— "Towns and other municipal corporations, including counties in this state, have power, for certain purposes, to hold and manage property, real and personal; 811 TORTS AND CRIMES. 804 it has no more right than a natural person to create or maintain a nuisance.-^* A city which acquires land on which a nuisance exists becomes liable to others injured by its continuance if it suffers the nuisance to continue after notice of its existence and a request to re- move it.-^^ Generally the city is liable for creating and maintaining a nuisance.^^" The city is not liable for destruction or loss of prop- erty occasioned by abating a nuisance, since the exercise of such power is governmental and discretionary.-^'^ A person appointed by the mayor as special policeman to keep a street free of obstructions and for private injuries caused by the improper management of their property, as such, they have been held to the general liability of pri- vate corporations and natural per- sons that own and manage the same kind of property: Bailey v. Mayor &c.,3Hill (N.Y.) 531, 541. ... So if a town or city maintain an erec- tion or structure which is a private nuisance, and causes a special dam- age, or in the performance of an au- thorized act invade any right of property, the corporation has been held liable to a civil action: Thayer V. City of Boston, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 511; Town Council v. McComb, 18 Ohio 229; Rhodes v. City of Cleve- land, 10 Ohio 159." ^" Harper v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365; Young v. Leedom, 67 Pa. St. 351; Pittsburg City v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Delmonico v. New York, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 222. A city which lets for hire a building erected for municipal purposes is liable for an injury caused by a defect or want of repair in the building or for negli- gence of its agents in the manage- ment of the building in the same manner as a private owner would be: Worden v. City of New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23. In Noonan v. City of Albany, 79 N, Y. 470, Andrews, J., said: — "A municipal corporation has no greater right than an indi- vidual to collect the surface-water from its lands or streets into an artificial channel and discharge it upon the lands of another, nor has it any immunity from legal respon- sibility for erecting or maintaining nuisances." See also, Byrnes v. City of Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 204. The negligent construction of a gutter by a municipality, or its negligent failure to keep the same in repair, caused surface water to flood a lot upon which it would not otherwise have flowed. It was held that the municipality was liable for the con- sequent damages, although such lot was below the grade of the street: Gilluly V. City of Madison, 63 Wis. 518; s. c. 24 N. W. 137; 53 Am. R. 299. "= Nichols V. City of Boston, 98 Mass. 39; McDonough v. Oilman, 3 Allen (Mass.) 264. And after ac- ceptance of an unsafe party wall built by another, a city would prob- ably be liable to the adjoining own- er for an injury caused by its fall: Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232. And see Khron v. Brock, 144 Mass. 516; s. c. 11 N. E. 748; Bryant v. Town of Randolph, 14 N. Y. S. 844. A city empowered, for sewerage pur- poses, to change, widen and deepen the channel of a brook, may be li- able for so performing the work as to create an unnecessary nuisance: Morse v. City of Worcester, 139 Mass. 389; s. c. 2 N. E. 694. -■"^ Bolton V. Village of New Rochelle, 32 N. Y. S. 442; s. c. 84 Hun (N. Y.) 281. -=^Wood V. City of Hinton, 47 W. Va. 645; s. c. 35 S. E. 824. 80^ PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 81^ does not himself become a nuisance and an obstruction to the street which will render the city liable.-^^ A city is liable for a nuisance for the time it continued, even though abated by the eity.^^® Animals running at large in a city are a nuisance, which it is the duty of the city to suppress. ^•'^ § 805. Municipal liability in general. — Corporations in general are liable to actions for torts as individuals are,-*^ and this rule is ap- plicable to municipal corporations for torts committed under their authority.-^^ A municipal corporation is liable for injuries to indi- viduals resulting from any neglect or omission of duty in keeping its streets in reasonably safe condition for use in the usual mode. And this is the rule in England, even where the duty is not expressly im- posed by statute.-*^ § 806. Chartered cities, etc., distinguished from counties, etc. — The conflict. — In many of the states a distinction is made between the ^^'^ Craig V. City of Charleston, 78 111. App. 312; s. c. affirmed 180 111. 154; s. c. 54 N. B. 184. -"■'City of New Albany v. Slider, 21 Ind. App. 392; s. c. 52 N. E. 626. =^"Coclirane v. City of Frostburg, 81 Md. 54; s. c. 31 Atl. 703. =" In Reed v. Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443, the court said: — "It is too late to discuss the question whether a corporation can commit a trespass or is liable to an action on the case or subject generally to ac- tions for torts as individuals are. The reports for a quarter of a cen- tury show that a large proportion of actions of this nature both for nonfeasance and misfeasance are against corporations. By the great weight of modern authority a cor- poration may be liable, even where a fraudulent or malicious intent is necessary to be proved, the fraud or malice of its authorized agents be- ing imputable to the corporation, as in actions for fraudulent represen- tations, for libel or for malicious prosecution." =" Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 TJ. S. 256; s. c, 6 S. Ct. 1055. **^ Clemence v. City of Auburn, 66 N. Y. 334; Diveny v. City of Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506; Hines v. City of Lock- port, 50 N. Y. 236; Barton v. City of Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Conrad v. Trustees &c., 16 N. Y. 159; Hutson v. Mayor &c., 9 N. Y. 163. See § 806, post. In Borough &c. of Bathurst V. MacPherson, 4 App. Cas. 256, de- fendants were held liable for neg- lect to repair a barrel drain which they had made, and the sole control and management of which had been vested in them by statute; following Hartnall v. Ryde Com'rs, 4 B. & S. 361. "In their lordships' opinion no substantial distinction can be taken between that case and the present, in which the duty for the reasons above stated had been found to exist though not expressly imposed by statute." In Blackmore v. Vestry &c., 9 Q. B. D. 451, the defend- ants as the body authorized by stat- ute to water the streets were held liable for the slippery condition of an iron flap which they had placed in the street, though they might not have been liable as highway survey- ors. See also, White v. Hindley Local Board &c., L. R. 10 Q. B. 219. 8i; TORTS AXD CRIMES. 806 liability of such purely municipal corporations as chartered towns, cities and villages, and the non-liability of counties and towns as political divisions of the state, and the former are held quite strictly to the performance of their duties and responsible in damages for neglecting them.-'*' If the charter granted to a city or town at its request enables it to derive benefit in its corporate capacity in the way of rent or tolls from the public works it is required to construct, it is deemed reasonable it should be liable as other corporations are for any injury caused by its negligence.^^^ But in Arkansas and -" Thus in Board &c. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, the court says: — "A municipal corporation proper is cre- ated mainly for the interest, advan- tage and convenience of the locality and its people; a county organiza- tion is created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large." In Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas, 47 Fed. 268, the court says: — "The distinction between the liability of a municipal corporation called into existence either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons composing it for the promotion of their own local and private advan- tage and convenience, and that of counties or other political divisions of a state, established by general laws, for the negligent conduct of their officers and agents, is clearly defined. The principle upon which the distinction rests is that counties are arbitrary political divisions of a state, and the governmental powers they exercise are imposed upon them by general laws, while municipal corporations act voluntarily in their assumption of a part of the sover- eignty of the state in their exercise of self-government," — citing also, Cooley Const. Lim. (3d ed.) 247, 248. See also, Oliver v. City of Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, and cases cited. In Barnes v. District of Co- lumbia, 91 U. S. 540, the district was held to be liable to an individu- al who fell into an excavation caused by a change of grade in the city of Washington, which the district per- mitted a certain railroad to make. The district as a chartered munici- pal corporation had acted by a board of public works appointed under the charter or act of congress by the president and confirmed by the sen- ate. Hunt, J., speaking for the ma- jority of the court, said: — "The powers given to this board are not of a character belonging to inde- pendent officers, but rather those which indicate that it is the repre- sentative of the municipal corpora- tion. Notwithstanding these feat- ures, and that we find this power given by the act which creates the municipality, and that this is one of the powers ordinarily belonging to a municipal government, and though the manner of its bestowal and the selection of the agents who exercise it are similar to that of the other ap- pointees and agents of the municipal corporation, it is still contended that no liability exists on the part of the corporation to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries. . . . The authorities establishing the contrary doctrine that a city is re- sponsible for its mere negligence are so numei'ous and so well considered that the law must be deemed to be settled in accordance with them." "= Oliver v. City of Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 500; Weet v. Trustees &c., 16 N. Y. 161, n.; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black 590; Weightman V. Washington, 1 Black 39. § 80^ PUBLIC COIll'ORATIONS. 814 California this distinction is not observed, and incorporated cities are held to no stricter liability than counties, unless such liability is im- posed by statute.^*" Nor is the distinction before adverted to recog- nized in South Carolina,-*^ nor in Michigan,^*^ nor in New Jersey,^*" nor in Massachusetts, Maine ajid Connecticut, in respect to high- ways.^^° § 807. Municipal liability in exercise of private powers. — In the exercise of its private powers a municipality is liable for torts to the same extent as a private corporation.^^ ^ These private powers relate. "^ Thus in Arkadelphia v. Wind- ham, 49 Ark. 139; s. c. 4 S. W. 450, the court said: — "We think the streets of a town or city like all other roads are public highways; that the duty of keeping them in repair is to the public, not to private individuals; and no civil action arises from an injury resulting from a neglect to keep them in repair. In the absence of a statute there is no difference between the liability of an incorporated town or city and a county in such cases. Such a distinction would be con- trary to every principle of fairness, reason and justice." In California cities are deemed like counties mere instruments of the government and not liable for injuries sustained by individuals through neglect of city officers to keep the streets in repair: Winbigler v. Mayor " Rehberg v. Mayor &c., 91 N. Y. 137. "^ Goodfellow V. City of New York, 100 N. Y. 15; s. c. 2 N. E. 462. A city is liable for an injury caused by a hydrant which its officers have allowed to stand within the limits of a sidewalk after notice of its ex- 827 TORTS AND CRIMES. 820 No notice is necessary to render a city liable for an injury caused by the act of itself, or of an authorized officer or agent.^^*' This sub- ject of notice is treated at length in the chapter on Streets, etc.^^^ § 820. The same subject continued — Statutory notice. — In many of the states it is provided by statute that actions for torts and negli- gence shall not be maintainable against municipal corporations unless a required notice of the injury and of the claim for damages be given within a time specified. ^^^ Under the charter of St. Paul, in Min- nesota, a person "bereft of reason," by an injury received, is excused from giving such notice ;^^'* and the time limited for commencing actions against that city for injuries caused by its negligence is not applicable to statutory actions by the personal representatives of a deceased person for negligence causing his death.^'° The charter provisions in respect to notice to cities in cases of torts, and to other requisites preliminary to actions against them, are quite varied and require careful attention.^-^ Under the charter of Appleton city the istence and time to remove it: King V. City of Oshkosh, 75 Wis. 517; s. c. 44 N. W. 745. "" If a defect in a street be caused by accident or by the wrongful and unauthorized act of a third person the liability of the corporation does not begin until it has notice of the defect, or until the defect has ex- isted for such a length of time that ignorance of its existence is inex- cusable; but if it be occasioned by the act of the corporation itself or by the act of a person authorized by the corporation to make any use of the street which results in pro- ducing the defect, the corporation will be liable without notice: Rus- sell V. Inhabitants &c., 74 Mo. 480. A village, though not liable for the defective construction of a drain by its trustees, acting as public officers, is liable for suffering the drain to continue in a defective condition after notice: Whipple v. Village of Fair Haven. 63 Vt. 221; s. c. 21 Atl. 533. See Weller v. City of Burling- ton, 60 Vt. 28; s. c. 12 Atl. 215, where the city was not liable for the negligence of the trustees act- ing as public officers. And to the same effect, Bates v. Village of Rut- land, 62 Vt. 178; s. c. 20 Atl. 278. ^" In vol. 2, ch. 29. ^'* The provision of the special Minnesota law of 1881 incorporating the city of Minneapolis, that no action shall be maintained against the city "on account of any injuries received by means of any defect in the condition of any bridge, street, etc., unless notice is given within thirty days stating the place and time of its occurrence, and that the person so injured will claim dam- ages from the city for such injury," applies to injuries to property as well as to person: Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, 30 Minn. 545; s. c. 16 N. W. 410. See also. Powers v. City of St. Paul, 36 Minn. 87; s. c. 30 N. W. 433; Pye v. City of Mankato, 38 Minn. 536; s. c. 38 N. W. 621. ^^« Ray V. City of St. Paul, 44 Minn. 340; s. c. 46 N. W. 675. '="Maylone v. City of St. Paul, 40 Minn. 406; s. c. 42 N. W. 88. And see Clark v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577. *-' In Wisconsin it is provided by 820 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 828 determination of the council is a bar to an action but not to an ap- peal^ and the objection that the chiim has not been presented to the common council must be taken by demurrer or answer or it is waived. ^-^ It is enough that such notice be in substantial compliance, as to form and service, with the statutory requirement.^-^ The Ver- mont statute requires notice of "the place" where the injury was received; and where there was no controversy or dispute upon the trial as to the place or as to the prominent surrounding objects, or any of the facts bearing upon the question, it was held to be a question of law for the court and not a proper subject for the jury whether the notice contained a sufficiently accurate description.^^* Ample the Antigo city charter that no ac- tion in tort shall lie against the city unless a statement of the wrong shall be presented to the common council within sixty days; and it is lield that under this and- connected provisions of the charter there is a right of action after presenting the statement to the council, but no right of appeal from the council's determination: Vogel v. City of An- tigo, 81 Wis. 642; s. c. 51 N. W. 1008. ^-^ Sheel V. City of Appleton, 49 Wis. 125; s. c. 5 N. W. 27. The charter provision of Madison city that no action shall be maintained against it "upon any claim or de- mand" until it shall first have been presented to the common council for allowance does not include actions for personal torts: Kelley v. City of Madison, 43 Wis. 638. === Harder v. City of Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446; s. c. 42 N. W. 350; Clark v. City of Austin, 38 Minn. 487; s. c. 38 N. W. 615. In McDon- ald v. City of Troy, 36 N. Y. St. 704; s. c. 13 N. Y. S. 385, plaintiff's at- torney prepared the claim, presented a copy to the comptroller, said he had the original with him, and asked If that was all he wanted, and was answered "Yes." It was held a substantial compliance with the de- fendant's charter, as the comptroller had obtained the notice the law contemplated. The statement re- quired by the New Hampshire Gen- eral Laws, ch. 75, § 7, of the exact place where damage to a traveler on a highway is received, is suffi- cient if upon the information con- tained in it and by the exercise of reasonable diligence the officers of the town can find the place: Carr v. Ashland, 62 N. H. 665. ^" Holcomb V. Town of Danby, 51 Vt. 428. It was said, however, that although the trial court erred in submitting the question to the jury the judgment would not have been reversed if the jury had decided correctly. The degree of certainty which satisfies the statute was ex- pounded to the jury in the trial court to be a description "with as much particularity and minuteness as a person of common business capacity, in the exercise of such care and prudence as such persons generally vise in their own affairs, would ordinarily use to inform an- other person of like capacity of the place where the accident happened." This was held to be erroneous be- cause it "leaves out of sight the fact that the party is legally bound to give notice of the place where the accident happened; that the party to whom the notice is given has an interest and an object in knowing the place; that he has a legal right to the information, and that the ob- ject of the notice is to enable the 829 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 831 opportunity to acquire notice is not actual notice.''-^ A charter pro- vision that a city shall not be liable for the defective condition of a street unless it be sho\vn that the ward alderman knew of it does not apply to an obstruction placed in the street by a city servant while repairing it.^"*^ § 821. The same subject continued — New York decisions. — The New York statute of 1886 prohibiting actions against municipal cor- porations, for personal injuries, unless the notice therein prescribed shall have been filed with the corporation counsel within six months after the cause of action accrued, and requiring such actions to be brought within one year, is constitutional and valid.^^^ The provision of the Buffalo charter, requiring the claim to have been made forty days before action brought, is a condition precedent, and in an action against the city for a tort the complaint must allege the presentation of the claim to the common council and the expiration of forty days thereafter before the commencement of the action.^^^ Under the statute of 1881 (ch. 183), the city of Cohoes is not liable for personal injuries from unsafe sidewalks, etc., unless actual notice of the danger has been given to the common council or street superintendent at least twenty-four hours before the injury, and therefore opportunity to acquire notice of the danger is not enough to create such liability.^-** § 822. Impeaching municipal legislative acts for fraud. — The rule that courts will not inquire into the motives of the legislature in enacting a law even where fraud and corruption are charged is re- laxed in respect to municipal bodies, and the legislative acts of mu- nicipal councils or assemblies may be impeached for fraud at the instance of persons thereby injured.^^° Starting, however, with the presumption that municipal legislative acts have been adopted under good motives and on sufficient information,^^ ^ a city is not liable party to whom it is given, readily Y. St. 577; s. c. 11 N. Y. S. 778; s. c. to find the place." See also, on affirmed 128 N. Y. 617; 28 N. E. 253. sufficiency of notice under this stat- See also, Reining v. City of Buffalo, ute. Read v. Town of Calais, 48 Vt. 102 N. Y. 308; s. c. 6 N. E. 792; 7; Purrington v. Town of Warren, Wheeler v. Jackson, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 49 Vt. 19; Boyd v. Town of Reads- 410; Gray v. Brooklyn, 10 Abb. Pr. boro, 52 Vt. 522; Perry v. Town of N. S. (N. Y.) 186. Putney, 52 Vt. 533; Law v. Town of '"'Reining v. City of Buffalo, 102 Fairfield, 46 Vt. 425; Bean v. Town N. Y. 308; s. c. 6 N. E. 792. of Concord, 48 Vt. 30. ''' McNally v. City of Cohoes, 53 '^^McNally v. City of Cohoes, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 202; s. c. 6 N. Y. S. Hun (N. Y.) 202; s. c. 6 N. Y. S. 842. 842. ^ Glasgow v. St. Louis, 107 Mo, ^2" Adams v. City of Oshkosh, 71 198; s. c. 17 S. W. 743; Cooley Const, Wis. 49; s. c. 36 N. W. 614. Lim. (5th ed.) 225. =" Merz v. City of Brooklyn, 33 N. =='i New York &c. R. Co. v. Mayor S 823 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 830 for its neglect to pass just and reasonable ordinances in respect to matters left to the discretion of its council f^^ nor for its neglect to enforce them if no statutory liability has been imposed. ^^^ Where a subject-matter is intrusted to a town or city for legislative or judicial action, the duty is essentially discretionary, and no person can claim damages for its non-performance.^^'* § 823. Indictment for torts. — A municipal corporation is indicta- ble at common law for creating a public nuisance,^^^ but perhaps not &c., 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 562; Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 193; Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa 282. '^- In McDade v. City of Chester, 117 Pa. St. 414; s. c. 12 Atl. 421, the city council had legislative author- ity to limit or prohibit wholly the making and sale of fireworks with- in the corporate limits; but in an action for damages by one who was injured while aiding to extinguish a fire in a fireworks factory, it was held that the power to prohibit im- posed no absolute duty to prohibit fireworks, and that the city was not liable for the failure of the council to exercise its power. See also, Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324; Hill v. Board &c., 72 N. C. 55; Rivers v. City Council &c., 65 Ga. 376. ™Hines v. City of Charlotte, 72 Mich. 278; s. c. 40 N. W. 333, where the city having by ordinance estab- lished fire limits was held not re- sponsible for loss by fire starting in a wooden building within such lim- its and in violation of the ordi- nance, though the city had notice that the building was about to be erected and took no steps to pre- vent it. The court said: — "The rule is well established, however, not only in this state but in most of the states, that simply as municipal corporations, apart from any con- tract theory, no public bodies can he made responsible for oflScial neg- lect involving no active misfeas- ance. It is only where corporations have been guilty of some positive mischief produced by active mis- conduct that they have been held li- able, and not from mere non-feas- ance, or for errors of judgment. Municipal corporations, under their charters and ordinances, do not be- come insurers of the property with- in their corporate limits from de- struction by reason of the neglect or refusal of their officers to enforce their ordinances: Village of St. John V. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 72." See also, Stillwell v. Mayor &c., 17 J. & Sp. (N. Y.) 360; s. c. affirmed 96 N. Y. 649; Griflan v. Mayor &c., 9 N. Y. 456; Lorillard v. Town of Mon- roe, 11 N. Y. 392; Wheeler v. City of Plymouth, 116 Ind. 158; s. c. 18 N. E. 532. It is also sometimes pro- vided, as in the Albany charter (laws 1883, ch. 298, tit. 3, § 44), that a city shall not be liable in damages for an omission to pass or enforce ordi- nances: See Coonley v. City of Al- bany, 132 N. Y. 145, 153; s. c. 30 N. E. 382. '=•* Lehigh Co. v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. St. 119; s. c. 9 Atl. 177. ^^^ Brayton v. City of Fall River, 113 Mass. 218, 227, where the court said: — "If the sewers are so built or managed as to create a public nui- sance, the defendants are indict- able." See also, Eastman v. Mere- dith, 36 N. H. 284, 289; People v. Adsit, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 619. In People V. Corporation &c. of Albany, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 539, the mayor, alder- men, etc., of the city were indicted for not cleaning a foul barn con- nected with the river and a verdict 831 TORTS AND CRIMES. § 823 for not abating a nuisance created by another.^ ^* In some states a municipal corporation is indictable at common law for neglecting the public health and public streets/^'' and for misfeasance as well as non-feasance.^^ ^ Where the duty of keeping in repair the highways and bridges is imposed by statute upon the towns in which they are located, an information will lie against a town for failing to repair a bridge either built or adopted by it.^^^ In England the rule has repeatedly been laid down that where an indictment can be maintained against a corporation for a public injury an action on the case can be maintained for a special damage thereby done to an individual;^*" and the ground both of the indictment and of the private action is deemed to be the breach of a covenant entered into by the corporation upon a consideration received from the sovereign power.^*^ In New obtained at general sessions. On appeal to the supreme court, Nelson, J., said: — "It is well settled that when a corporation are bound to re- pair a highway or navigable river they are liable to indictment for neglect of their duty. An indict- ment and information are the only remedies to which the public can re- sort for a redress of their griev- ances in this respect." ^='« State V. Town of Burlington, 36 Vt. 521. ^" Hamar v. Covington, 3 Met. (Ky.) 494; Hill v. State, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 443; McCrowell v. Mayor &c., 5 Lea (Tenn.) 685; State v. Corporation of Shelbyville, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 176; State v. Town of Wit- tingham, 7 Vt. 390. ^^^ In Commonwealth v. Proprie- tors &c., 2 Gray (Mass.) 339, it was held that a corporation could be in- dicted for a misfeasance as well as a non-feasance, and Bigelow, J., said: — "Corporations can not be in- dicted for offenses which derive their criminality from evil intention, or which consist in a violation of those social duties which appertain to men and subjects. But beyond this there is no good reason for their exemption from the conse- quences of unlawful and wrongful acts committed by their agents in pursuance of authority derived from them." =^'Town of Saukville v. State, 69 Wis. 178; s. c. 33 N. W. 88; Town of Byron v. State, 35 Wis, 313 ; State v. Town of Campton, 2 N. H. 513; State V. Inhabitants &c., 37 Maine 451; Davis v. City of Bangor, 42 Maine 522; State v. City of Port- land, 74 Maine 268. ^'"McKinnon v. Penson, 8 Ex. 319, 327; Hartnall v. Ryde Com'rs, 4 B. & S. 361. Referring to the last case in Borough of Bathurst v. MacPher- son, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 256, the court said: — "It was there held that the statute creating the commissioners having expressly imposed upon them the obligation of repairing the roads, they are liable not only to be indicted for a breach of that duty, but to be sued by anybody who can show that by reason of such breach of duty he has sustained particular and special damage." ^'"In Weet v. Trustees &c., 16 N. Y. 161, 163, n., Selden, J., said: — "The principle which really lies at the basis of the case of Henly v. Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91, and of the series of English cases upon the authority of which that case was de- cided, is this: — That whenever an individual or corporation, for a con- sideration received from the sover- § 824 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. 832. Jersey when the neglect of a public duty results in a public injury an individual can not bring an action for his particular loss, the only remedy being indictment for the public wrong.^*^ For an of- fense which is statutory only, the indictment is defective if it omits the words "against the form of the statute."^*^ Under the New York penal code a public officer "upon whom any duty is enjoined by law who wilfully neglects to perform that duty is guilty of a misde- meanor" and indictable therefor. ^^"^ The Maine rule, and probably the general rule, is that the same proof is required to sustain an indict- ment against a city for neglect of its streets as to obtain a recovery of damages.^** '^ § 824. Not indictable for felony. — The state, counties, towns, cities and villages can not be indicted for a felony,^'*" but their officers are often declared by statute to be guilty of felony for false audits, falsify- ing accounts, embezzlements, etc.^*'^ In New York a corporation may be fined for contempt of court in an amount to cover the complain- ant's costs and expenses and also his damages for loss or injury, thereby caused in cases where he has no action therefor. ^*^ In the state of New York a common carrier corporation is guilty of a mis- demeanor in employing intemperate persons after notice that they are such,^*^ and is guilty of a misdemeanor for the unlicensed selling of intoxicants to its passengers.^^" eign power, has become bound by it is applicable to a case like the covenant or agreement, either ex- present, where a criminal neglect of press or implied, to do certain duty is charged upon a corporation things, such individual or corpora- who in the absence of a statute tion is liable in case of neglect to would not be liable to be indicted perform such covenant, not only to for the non-repair of a highway." a public prosecution by indictment, ^" So held as to an excise com- but to a private action at the suit missioner: People v. Meakim, 133 N. of any person injured by such neg- Y. 214; s. c. 30 N. E. 828. lect." ^" Davis v. City of Bangor, 42 ^" Mayor &c. v. Kiernan, 50 N. J. Maine 522. L. 246; s. c. 13 Atl. 170; Livermore '^^^^ Commonwealth v. Proprietors V. Board &c., 31 N. J. L. 507; Cooley &c., 2 Gray (Mass.) 339, where Bige- V. Chosen Freeholders &c., 27 N. J. low, J., said: — "Corporations can L. 415; Board &c. v. Strader, 18 N. not be indicted for offenses which J. L. 108. derive their criminality from evil ^*' In Queen v. Mayor &c., L. R. 19 intention. They can not be guilty Q. B. D. 602, an indictment against of treason or felony, of perjury or a municipal corporation for non-re- offenses against the person." pair of a highway was held bad for ^" N. Y. Pen. Code, §§ 164-167, 470. this omission. Lord Coleridge said: ''*^ Code of Procedure, § 2284. — "This appears to have been de- ^*'' Laws 1892, ch. 401, § 39. cided in several cases; and we think =^° Laws 1892, ch. 401; § 30. 6<^ '/ LAW LIBRARY IBJIVERSITY OF CALIFORNU LOS ANGELES UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 000 838 217 8