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 1395
 
 Retrospect and Prospect
 
 WORKS BY 
 
 CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN 
 
 The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
 1660-1783. 
 
 The Influence of Sea Power upon the French 
 Revolution and Empire. Two volumes. 
 
 The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the 
 Sea Power of Great Britain. Two volumes. 
 
 The Life of Nelson. Popular edition. One 
 volume. 
 
 The Interest of America in Sea Power, 
 Present and Future. 
 
 Lessons of the War with Spain, and other 
 Articles. 
 
 The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon 
 International Policies. 
 
 Types of Naval Officers, with Some Re- 
 marks ON THE Development of Naval 
 Warfare during the Eighteenth Century. 
 
 Retrospect and Prospect. Studies in Inter- 
 national Relations, Naval and Politi- 
 cal.
 
 Retrospect ^ Prospect 
 
 Studies in International Relations 
 Naval and Political 
 
 i By 
 
 AT. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D. 
 
 Captain, United States Nwvy 
 
 Author of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
 
 1660-1783," " The Influence of Sea Power 
 
 upon the French Revolution and 
 
 Empire," etc. 
 
 Boston 
 
 Little, Brown, and Company 
 1902
 
 Copyright, ipof, 
 By Doubleday, Page, & Co. 
 
 Copyright, igo2, 
 By Judge Co. 
 
 Copyright, igo2. 
 By The S. S. McClure Co. 
 
 Copyright, igo2. 
 By Frederick A. Richardson. 
 
 Copyright, igo2. 
 By a. T. Mahan. 
 
 All rights reser'ved. 
 Published October, 1902. 
 
 UNIVERSITY PRESS • JOHN WILSON 
 AND SON • CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 IN their main features, the following essays 
 are in direct sequence to those of the 
 author's previous volumes, " The Interest of 
 America in Sea Power," and " The Problem 
 of Asia." The title article, Retrospect and 
 Prospect, in its scope serves as a connecting 
 link between the present and their prede- 
 cessors ; indicating the continuity of interest 
 and gradual development of the several sub- 
 jects dealt with. As the future has passed 
 into the present, it has brought with it the 
 unfolding of inevitable policy, evolving fresh 
 problems, that are in essence only new phases 
 of a steady progression, which in its course is 
 making history. 
 
 As has hitherto usually been the case, the 
 articles in this book for the most part have 
 been written, not of the author's own initiative, 
 but in response to the request of editors. Such 
 significance as may attach to this is due to the 
 fact that the work consequently indicates, not
 
 vi Preface 
 
 the trend of a single mind, but the outlook of 
 those whose business is to study the current 
 of events, to watch the tide of popular interest 
 and feeling, and thus to provide for readers 
 information or discussion upon matters toward 
 which general curiosity is seen to be turning. 
 It is perfectly consistent with the general tend- 
 ency thus avouched, and even illustrative of it, 
 that the series, if it may be called such in vir- 
 tue of a consecutiveness rather essential than 
 formal, has led out from considerations nar- 
 rowly American, with which the papers began, 
 into the broad field of world policies ; for 
 thither our nation also is indisputably and 
 irresistibly moving. 
 
 Herein lies whatever of lastino: value or 
 interest may attach to the subjects treated, or 
 the treatment given. In retrospect, and from 
 this point of view, it now seems a kind of happy 
 forecast that the first of the long succession, 
 written over twelve years ago, began with the 
 words, " Indications are not wanting of an 
 approaching change in the thoughts and policy 
 of Americans as to their relations with the 
 world outside their own borders." ^ The pres- 
 age has been fulfilled, far beyond any con- 
 sciousness then possible to the writer. 
 
 ^ Interest of America in Sea Power, p. 3.
 
 Preface vii 
 
 I desire to return my cordial thanks, for the 
 permission here to reprint, to the several pro- 
 prietors and editors of the periodicals in which 
 the articles first appeared. I owe to them not 
 only the recognition of their courtesy in this 
 respect, but the further acknowledgment that, 
 save for their intervention, probably no single 
 one would have been undertaken. The name 
 of each magazine, with the date of publication, 
 is attached to the title in the Table of Contents. 
 The dates at the head of the articles show the 
 time of writing. 
 
 A. T. MAHAN. 
 
 September, 1902.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 * 
 
 I 
 
 Page 
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 3 
 
 By Courtesy of The World's Work, February, 1902 
 
 II 
 
 Conditions Determining the Naval Expansion of 
 
 the United States 39 
 
 By Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly, October, 2, 1902 
 
 III 
 
 The Influence of the South African War upon 
 
 the Prestige of the British Empire ... 57 
 
 By Courtesy of The National Review, December, 1901 
 
 IV 
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 89 
 
 By Courtesy of The National Review and the International 
 Monthly, May, 1902 
 
 V 
 
 Considerations Governing the Disposition of 
 
 Navies 139 
 
 By Courtesy of The National Review, July, 1902
 
 Contents 
 
 VI 
 
 Page 
 
 The Persian Gulf and International Relations . 209 
 By Courtesy of The National Review, September, 1902 
 
 VII 
 The Military Rule of Obedience ...... 255 
 
 By Courtesy of The National Review and International 
 Monthly, March, 1902 
 
 VIII 
 
 Admiral Sampson 287 
 
 By Courtesy of McClure's Magazine, July, 1902, and the 
 Fortnightly Review, August, 1902
 
 RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
 
 RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
 
 December, 1901 
 
 IT has often been remarked, as a curious 
 coincidence, that momentous events, direc- 
 tive of the fortunes of nations and of the 
 world, are found to cluster about the end of 
 our conventional centuries. The final decade 
 of the fifteenth saw both the discovery of 
 America and its complement in maritime 
 achievement, the reaching of India by the 
 passage round the Cape of Good Hope. It 
 witnessed the consummation of the Spanish 
 monarchy by the fall of the last of the Moorish 
 kingdoms, at the very instant that the new 
 possessions in America constituted the com- 
 mencements of the Spanish Empire. During 
 it occurred also, in 1494, the first of the 
 organized French invasions of Italy, concern- 
 ing which a master of history has observed 
 that it marked the end of the middle ages, — 
 and so the beginnings of modern history, — 
 because it put forth a scheme of aggrandize-
 
 4 Retrospect and Prospect ^ 
 
 ment foreign to medioeval conceptions. France 
 and Spain, in rivalry, the scope of which was 
 not yet realized by either, were preparing to 
 attemj^t the extension of their power over the 
 rest of Europe. 
 
 In this effort Spain first succeeded ; but, as 
 the sixteenth century drew to its close, the 
 annihilation of the Armada, in 1588, gave re- 
 sounding proof of her inefficiency as a maritime 
 nation. This defect had for its near result the 
 success of the Dutch in their struggle for 
 independence ; but in it was necessarily in- 
 volved the ultimate downfall of the primacy 
 of SjDain among nations, and of her colonial 
 Empire, then apparently untouched. The 
 years remaining to 1600 were spent by her in 
 continued strife with the seamen of England 
 and Holland, the predestined destroyers of her 
 international predominance. To this position 
 France succeeded, reaching the height of her 
 power in the latter half of the seventeenth 
 century; but in 16S8 the English Revolution, 
 which decided finally the conflict between 
 King and Parliament, thus shaping the future 
 of another Empire, imparted also the impulse 
 for the descent of France from the eminence
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 she had attained. The coming of William of 
 Orange to the throne entailed as a necessary 
 consequence the accession of England to the 
 two general wars of the Continent against 
 Louis XIV. These, by their drain upon his 
 resources, and the miseries undergone by his 
 kingdom, sapped the foundations of the abso- 
 lutism upon which the greatness of France had 
 been erected, and precipitated the nation upon 
 the path to decay and revolution. 
 
 Great Britain at the same epoch, and through 
 the same causes, was urged further along the 
 way that led her at the end of the war of the 
 Spanish Succession, in 1 713, to the unques- 
 tioned and unapproached naval supremacy in 
 which lay the germ of her expansion that was 
 to be. Her progress in territorial and com- 
 mercial aesrrandizement was the dominant 
 feature of the eighteenth century, which, though 
 one of chequered strife, was marked upon the 
 whole by the ascent of Great Britain, and still 
 more by the decisive decline of France. As 
 it drew to its close, Louis XVI., in 1788, by 
 summoning the States General to meet after 
 an intermission of many generations, gave the 
 signal for the French Revolution. This, like
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 its English predecessor, brought France and 
 Great Britain into a prolonged warfare which 
 divides into two periods, the Republic and the 
 Empire, corresponding to the last two wars 
 of Louis XIV. At the peace of 1815 Great 
 Britain stood in influence at the head of' the 
 states of European civilization, with a secured 
 colonial empire, which, in the final decade* of 
 the century, has involved her in a war the most 
 momentous she has known since Waterloo, 
 and probably productive of permanent results 
 to her imperial constitution. 
 
 More striking outwardly, even if not more 
 actually decisive, were other events that oc- 
 curred between 1890 and 1900. The disap- 
 pearance of the colonial empire of Spain after 
 four hundred years of continuous life, although 
 but the close of a long process of decline, had 
 singular dramatic effect. The once colossal 
 structure that so long was crumbling had yet 
 retained a phantom grandeur, a relic of real 
 greatness, which enhanced the majesty of the 
 final fall; for in the days of her supremacy 
 Spain had over England an ascendency which 
 France never attained, and the vastness of her 
 power made upon the imagination of English-
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 men of that day an impression, traces of which 
 long, remained and have been transmitted to 
 their descendants in the United States. In 
 history, too, few events have been told us with 
 as great narrative force as the conquest of 
 Granada, and the early contact of Spain with 
 America. Upon them the genius of American 
 writers has dwelt with peculiar sympathy, both 
 from their intrinsic romantic interest and their 
 close connection with' the beginnings of our 
 own country. In her past, thus told, Spain 
 has an immortality resembling that of Rome ; 
 and like her she survives and ever will survive 
 in the tales of her heroic prime, and in the 
 enduring impress of her speech and national 
 characteristics left upon great part of the 
 peoples of the new world. 
 
 The loss of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Phil- 
 ippines, the last remnants of a former vast do- 
 minion. Is an event which, so far as Spain is 
 involved, concerns the past only. At most, 
 if it has for her a future, it is one as yet not 
 even vaguely indicated. As a matter of world 
 interests, its effect upon her is part of the 
 retrospect. From the same point of view the 
 future of that catastrophe lies in the influence
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 it is to exert upon the prospective course of 
 the United States, upon her internal consti- 
 tutional development and her external policy. 
 Not only in the lost possessions of Spain has 
 the old order yielded, giving place to the new. 
 To the former mother country, forced back 
 upon herself, to seek in the organization of 
 her abundant internal resources the spring of 
 a new life, it may yet prove a cause of national 
 regeneration, the precursor of re-entrance at 
 some future day upon international power rest- 
 ing on more solid foundations. Upon the 
 United States it has imposed the necessity of 
 reconsidering some of the postulates that were 
 supposed fundamental and irreversible in the 
 scheme of her national existence, and of her 
 international relations. The Bible of Ameri- 
 can political tradition has had new light thrown 
 upon it, and has had to submit to new criti- 
 cism, based upon truths newly apprehended 
 under the pressure of unforeseen conditions. 
 It would not be unprecedented that popular 
 conception of the meaning of ideas and phrases, 
 formulated and transmitted by our ancestors, 
 should be found imperfect or exaggerated under 
 the clearer appreciation of a later day. The
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 authority hitherto attaching to the popular 
 understanding may in such case have to be 
 transferred to the correcter signification which 
 advancing experience shall have revealed ; and 
 obligation, true obedience, will then be seen 
 due to the spirit not to the letter. This would 
 be but the repetition of a very old story in the 
 political as in the religious history of mankind. 
 Whenever it happens, however, the transition 
 of thought and action consequent upon such 
 riper views affects both inner principle and 
 outward action. It must therefore bring shock 
 to those who are too old to change ; and when 
 compressed within a very few years, as our 
 recent experience has been, the blow is not 
 broken by the slow reconcilement which suc- 
 cessive steps effect. It is not surprising that 
 the recoil on the part of those thus dismayed 
 has been intense, and, it must be added, marked 
 less by reasonableness of argument than by 
 extravagance of expression ; by tenacious insist- 
 ence upon the traditional letter and stubborn 
 rejection of evident modifying circumstance. 
 
 Yet, although in point of duration of time 
 the change has been too sudden, or at least 
 too rapid, to allow the process of gradual
 
 lo Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 mental adjustment which obviates moral dis- 
 tress, it has not been without its marked suc- 
 cessive stages which might have prepared an 
 attentive onlooker for the final outcome. I 
 have been told that at the time of the regener- 
 ation of the material of the navy, and the lay- 
 ing down of modern ships, some fifteen years 
 ago, a sagacious political student remarked 
 that the measure would be followed by expan- 
 sive results resembling those we have recently 
 witnessed. There was here, I think, the error 
 of takins: one link in a chain of events for a 
 final cause ; but nevertheless the observer 
 showed that having a clue in his hand he 
 could, as they say at sea, " underrun " it, till 
 it led him to the unseen point at which it for 
 the moment terminated. That mysterious 
 thread of purpose which runs through the 
 progression of history comes to the surface 
 from time to time in some marks of evident 
 preparation. These may be construed, accord- 
 ing to individual bias, either as providential, 
 or merely as symptomatic of a tendency already 
 formed, and which unconsciously manifests 
 itself in particular actions conducive to its 
 general end. Whichever view be adopted, the
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 1 1 
 
 opportune renewal of the navy is to my appre- 
 hension not a cause, but one in a series of 
 events which has constituted the general un- 
 witting advance of the nation towards wider 
 influence. It was the more notable because 
 without visible immediate urgency, save that 
 of repairing a cumulative neglect which had 
 resulted in atrophy. No cloud on the political 
 horizon commanded it ; but when the cloud 
 afterwards arose the navy was there. 
 
 The foregoing remarks are prefatory to the 
 following brief survey of incidents in our own 
 history, which have impressed upon the final 
 decade of the nineteenth century a significance 
 for us, resembling those noted in its prede- 
 cessors, prophetic of issues not yet fully to be 
 foreseen. It was undertaken at the request of 
 the editor of the World's Work, — not by my 
 own initiative. Thus much is said in explana- 
 tion of an attempt which of my proper motion 
 would scarcely have been made; for the hasty 
 glance which it caused over my occasional 
 magazine papers, during the ten years in ques- 
 tion, gave me an unexpected start as I realized 
 from them the singularly different points of 
 view necessarily occupied by an American, at
 
 1 2 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 their beginning and at their end, because of 
 changes only partly foreshadowed at the earlier 
 day when I began to write. 
 
 It was in August, 1890, that the editor of 
 the Atlantic Moiithly, Mr. Horace E. Scudder, 
 wrote to ask from me what proved to be the 
 first magazine article I ever published. He 
 referred to a very brief and casual remark in 
 my book then recently out — "The Influence 
 of Sea Power upon History" — touching the 
 exposed condition of our Pacific Coast in the 
 event of an isthmian canal being made. I 
 had quoted in that connection the expression 
 of a French admiral to me, during a cruise 
 then recent, that in our "little corner" of the 
 world we did not need the military and naval 
 preparation incumbent upon the nations of 
 Europe. To this I added, " Yet should that 
 little corner be invaded by a new commercial 
 route through the isthmus, the United States 
 in her turn may have the rude awakening of 
 those who have abandoned their share in the 
 common birthright of all people — the sea." 
 
 This reflection, which followed upon a sum- 
 mary of the consequences to Spain — and, it 
 may be added, to France — of a like neglect,
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 1 3 
 
 had caught Mr. Scudder's attention, and he 
 wrote to know whether I could give the 
 Atlantic a paper upon the following general 
 argument. " The centre of maritime opera- 
 tions has shifted once from the Mediterranean 
 to the Atlantic, It may pass in the distant 
 future (my italics) to the Pacific. Meanwhile, 
 would not the completion of a canal, taken 
 with the British movements at the terminal 
 of the Canadian Pacific, the occidentalizing of 
 Japan, and the growth of Australasia, im- 
 mensely quicken the process.-^ and, if so, will 
 not the Pacific Coast of our country become 
 a far more important factor in our historical 
 development than it has been } " It will be 
 observed that Mr. Scudder's suggestion, con- 
 sciously or unconsciously to himself, tran- 
 scended the bounds of United States' interests, 
 and embraced in its scope the politics of the 
 world. 
 
 The canal as yet is not, though it has 
 very measurably advanced through the tedious 
 stages that precede undertakings the impor- 
 tance of which is rather national than corporate, 
 and which therefore do not find their support 
 in private enterprise ; but how much of what
 
 1 4 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 is here outlined has passed from the realm of 
 speculation to that of action ? and how little 
 distant docs that future now appear as com- 
 pared to the anticipations of 1890? In writing 
 on these themes in those days one felt that, 
 while the chain of reasoning was eminently 
 logical, yet there was a lack of solid foundation; 
 that though argumentation were sound, premise 
 was perhaps mistaken ; and that when indulg- 
 ing in such forecasts one was in the fantastic 
 sphere familiarized to us by Mr. Edward 
 Bellamy and others. But what events have 
 since happened, bringing the abstract con- 
 ceptions of theorists and extremists, as they 
 then seemed, down to earth in very concrete 
 realization ! What once were visions are now 
 accepted as solid present matters of course by 
 our very practical nation. They have almost 
 ceased to excite vivid interest, because of a 
 familiarity which eliminates surprise. The 
 condition, however, if no longer novel, is one 
 so substantial that it can never again in our 
 day pass out of sight, or out of national con- 
 sideration. 
 
 Since Mr. Scuddcr wrote, the occidentaliza- 
 tion of Japan, in methods although not in
 
 Retrospect ajid Prospect 1 5 
 
 national spirit, — which changes much more 
 slowly, — has been fully demonstrated to an 
 astonished world by the war of 1894 with 
 China. It is one of the incidents of the clos- 
 ing nineteenth century. To this achievement 
 in the military sphere, in the practice of war 
 which Napoleon called the science of barba- 
 rians, must be added the development of civil 
 institutions that has resulted in the concession 
 to Japan of all international dignity and privi- 
 lege; and consequently of a control over the 
 administration of justice among foreigners 
 within her borders, not heretofore obtained by 
 any other Oriental State. It has thus become 
 evident that the weight of Japan in the inter- 
 national balances depends not upon the quality 
 of her achievement, which has been shown to 
 be excellent, but upon the gross amount of 
 her power. Moreover, while in wealth and 
 population, with the resources dependent upon 
 them, she may be deficient, — though rapidly 
 growing, — her geographical position relatively 
 to the Eastern centre of interest, and her ad- 
 vantage of insularity, go far to compensate such 
 defect. These confer upon her as a factor in 
 the Eastern problem an influence resembling
 
 1 6 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 in kind, if not equalling in degree, that which 
 Great Britain has held and still holds in the 
 international relations centring around Europe, 
 the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. 
 
 Yet the change in Japan, significant as it 
 is and influential upon the great problem of 
 the Pacific and Asia, is less remarkable and 
 less important than that which has occurred 
 in the United States. If in the Orient a 
 nation may be said to have been born in a day, 
 even so the event is less sudden and less revo- 
 lutionary than the conversion of spirit and of 
 ideals — the new birth — which has come over 
 our own country. In this are evident a rapid- 
 ity and a thoroughness which bespeak impulse 
 from an external source, rather than any con- 
 scious set process of deliberation, of self-deter- 
 mination within, such as has been that of Japan 
 in her recognition and adoption of material 
 improvements forced upon her attention in 
 other peoples. No man or group of men can 
 pretend to have guided and governed our 
 people in the adoption of a new policy, the 
 acceptance of which has been rather instinc- 
 tive — I would prefer to say inspired — than 
 reasoned. There is just this difference be-
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 1 7 
 
 tween Japan and ourselves, the two most 
 changed of peoples within the last half-century. 
 She has adopted other methods; we have re- 
 ceived another purpose. The one conversion 
 is material, the other spiritual. When we 
 talk about expansion we are in the realm of 
 ideas. The material addition of expansion — 
 the acreage, if I may so say — is trivial com- 
 pared with our previous possessions, or with 
 the annexations by European states within a 
 few years. The material profit otherwise, the 
 national gain to us, is at best doubtful. What 
 the nation has gained in expansion is a regen- 
 erating idea, an uplifting of the heart, a seed 
 of future beneficent activity, a going out of 
 self into the world to communicate the gift it 
 has so bountifully received. 
 
 In this connection, and in emphatic contrast 
 of past with present, how very apt is the ex- 
 pression of the French admiral, our " little 
 corner," — the Jack Horner of nations. How 
 accurately did the phrase then represent our 
 own estimate, and that of the outer world, 
 concerning our political and international ex- 
 posure, responsibilities, and duties, in days 
 when the ideas, imperialism and anti-imperial-
 
 1 8 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 ism, had scarcely received formulation. I re- 
 member that imperialism had not long before 
 been associated in my mind with certain vague 
 impressions of Mr. Blaine and his supposed 
 projects. As far as my own views went, I 
 might say I was up to 1885 traditionally an 
 anti-imperialist; but by 1890 the study of the 
 influence of sea power and its kindred expan- 
 sive activities upon the destiny of nations had 
 converted me, and my new faiths, thus origi- 
 nated, colored the first of my writings, as they 
 have continued to do the rest. 
 
 The natural tendency of the line of thought 
 which leads up to the appreciation of sea 
 power and to the vision of expansion of 
 national influences — rather than of national 
 possessions — when acting upon a person in- 
 heriting Anglo-Saxon political traditions, is in 
 commercial matters towards freedom of trade. 
 Mr. Blaine, a protectionist by antecedents and 
 by party aflfiliation, as his mind expanded to 
 embrace the idea of an American system, in- 
 evitably moved on to modify the idea of pro- 
 tection to that of reciprocity. Reciprocity is 
 far from being free trade ; but in principle it 
 is nearer to that than to protection. Reci-
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 19 
 
 procity has abandoned the view-point of exclu- 
 sive interest, which is the citadel of protection, 
 to embrace that of mutual benefit, the corner- 
 stone upon which the advocates of freedom of 
 trade rest their argument. 
 
 The beneficiaries of protection see this 
 clearly enough, as is shown by their recent 
 capture of the Reciprocity Convention and 
 renewed proclamation of their favorite dogma. 
 The fate of the measures proposed for Cuban 
 relief, in the session that has passed since this 
 article was first written, is probably an indica- 
 tion in the same direction. But protection is 
 essentially a defensive measure, and in all 
 struggles, in commerce as in war, it is not de- 
 fensive action but offensive — conquest, expan- 
 sion — which ultimately wins. It is in truth 
 this factor of offence, show^n in the activity of 
 the American mind, in the energy with which 
 it carries ideas into practice and in the flexibility 
 which readily embraces improvement, that has 
 won the superiority which enables us latterly 
 to invade the markets of the world. The 
 credit is claimed for protection, and is too 
 easily yielded because the coincidence of our 
 advance with the protective system confuses
 
 20 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 thought; but it is easy to see that, left to itself 
 alone, the assurance of an adequate market — 
 the secured home market — removes that ne- 
 cessity which is the mother of invention, the 
 necessity which competition imposes. Ameri- 
 can inventive aptitude and American energy 
 have triumphed over the enervating influence 
 of the protection that would and long did 
 restrain them from efificient action without their 
 own borders, and in so doing hindered that de- 
 velopment of sea power, commercial and naval, 
 which expansion, material and moral, requires. 
 Reciprocity, increased freedom of movement, is 
 the logical corollary of expansion, which itself 
 is but increase of scope and power to act. 
 
 It is, therefore, not a disconnected feature 
 of the situation that reciprocity is no longer 
 the idea of the few, but has assumed a con- 
 spicuous place in the thought of a party and of 
 a leader — President McKinley — whose very 
 names have been synonymous with protection. 
 It is but another aspect of that mysterious, 
 subtle influence, already vaguely felt in the 
 early years of the last decade of the nineteenth 
 century, and then, before its end, bursting 
 suddenly into life and taking definite form in
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 2 1 
 
 the acceptance of national expansion — terri- 
 torial, political, naval, commercial. In every 
 one of these aspects we find not merely develop- 
 ment, but extension ; not merely growth from 
 what has been, but the grafting on of that 
 which before found no place in our national 
 conceptions. It resembles the breach of con- 
 tinuity between the middle ages and modern 
 times. Our development on former lines has 
 reached into maturity and, unless renewed by 
 fresh influence, would pass into decadence ; 
 that which now succeeds it is new life, not new 
 growth. In the Philippines, Porto Rico, and 
 Hawaii, we have territorial expansion. They, 
 as well as Cuba, require us to constitute and 
 establish political relations of a kind not here- 
 tofore admitted as compatible with our scheme 
 of existence, — in short, expansion of political 
 thought. These changed conditions have ne- 
 cessarily entailed naval expansion; and there 
 can be little doubt that they will also imper- 
 ceptibly — perhaps the protectionist may say 
 " insidiously " — promote reciprocity of trade, 
 expansion of commercial thought, with the 
 logical consequences that follow the admission 
 of a new principle.
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 Mr. Scudder named my first article, " The 
 United States Looking Outward." It was 
 particularly apt, for it exactly described the 
 national attitude then. We were looking, but 
 we had not got beyond that point where a baby 
 vaguely follows with its eyes something which 
 has cauHit its attention but not entered its 
 understanding. Yet I have felt it significant, 
 then and now, that in casting round for a start- 
 ing point I, with all my professional preposses- 
 sions naturally maritime and military, should 
 have opened my theme, not by a discussion of 
 the naval or strategic situation, but by indicat- 
 ing the essential feebleness of a commercial 
 policy which was primarily — nay wholly — de- 
 fensive, and in which aggression, expansion, 
 found no place. I quoted joyfully Mr. Blaine's 
 words, " It is not an ambitious destiny for so 
 great a country to manufacture only what we 
 can consume, or produce only what we can 
 eat;" and I had pleasure in likening the ex- 
 travagances of the then recent tariff legislation 
 to Napoleon's Continental system, — a proph- 
 ecy by implication which it must be admitted 
 has not yet received fulfilment. 
 
 There has, however, been realized so much of
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 2 3 
 
 the other indications of the future in that article, 
 so much beyond what I dared to expect in my 
 time, that I am not without hope that herein 
 also I may live to see beneficial results. This 
 paper some half-dozen years later was gath- 
 ered into a book with a series of seven others 
 on kindred topics, all falling under the general 
 head of arguments for expansion ; not, indeed, 
 specific in detail, but I think not without clear- 
 ness in the enunciation of principles governing 
 its general direction and character. The very 
 enumeration of the successive titles has par- 
 ticular suggestion to those interested in the 
 general subject, as bearing upon the gradual 
 expansion of the nation's thought, the gradual, 
 though very rapid, development of policy; be- 
 cause in none save one, and that the last of 
 all, was the article prompted by myself. In 
 each case, as in the first, it was elicited by 
 the request of the editors, whose perceptions 
 were quickened by their need to watch the 
 trend of events and provide the public with 
 matter concerning which its interest was 
 stirring. 
 
 Of course, naval officers, moving round the 
 world, talking with its inhabitants in various
 
 24 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 localities and afterward bringing the various 
 ideas to the common exchange of the mess- 
 table and of other professional intercourse, 
 imbibe a good deal of information particularly 
 pertinent to the question of expansion, needing 
 only digestion and arrangement to have a use- 
 fulness quite peculiar to itself. I was there- 
 fore pretty full of matter, and to this day 
 remember the delightful ease of production 
 due to that fact, as contrasted with some heart- 
 breaking work done since. Nevertheless, for 
 the reasons noted, the record of articles traces 
 not my development, but the progress of na- 
 tional awakening from 1890 to 1897; to the 
 eve, that is, of the great year when old things 
 passed away, and all things became new in the 
 birth of a new national resolve, quickened into 
 life by the crash of a falling empire and the 
 devolution of its responsibilities upon our con- 
 science. In some measure through the cir- 
 cumstances of my profession, but chiefly 
 through the solicitation of others, it fell to me, 
 though by no means to me alone, to chronicle 
 from time to time the stages of the antecedent 
 process of preparation ; to note the advance of 
 ideas, as step by step the editorial watchers saw
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 25 
 
 that advance had been made, but needed defi- 
 nition and formulation. 
 
 As far as known to me, " The United States 
 Looking Outward " attracted no special atten- 
 tion in any quarter. The only comment I can 
 now recall was by, I think, a Protectionist sheet, 
 to the effect that it seemed to be an argument 
 for free trade. This critic apparently had not 
 got beyond the first two pages. Yet the other 
 topics, incidentally touched or more fully de- 
 veloped, need only to be named in order to 
 show the most casual reader of to-day the im- 
 portant possibilities involved in the external 
 objects which demanded the consideration of 
 the United States in 1890. Samoa; Hawaii; 
 German commercial and colonial push in the 
 Caroline and other islands near the Philippines, 
 which the empire has since acquired by pur- 
 chase ; the progress of German influence in 
 Central and South America, notably in the 
 southern province of Brazil ; the increasing 
 importance of the Pacific and the effects upon 
 it of an isthmian canal ; the political wisdom 
 of maintaininof with Great Britain a cordial un- 
 derstanding, approaching cooperation, though 
 distinctly rejecting the idea of alliance; the
 
 26 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 question of purchase by European powers of 
 stations in the West Indies, such as the Danish 
 St. Thomas and the Dutch Cura9ao; the 
 strategic features of the Gulf of Mexico and 
 the Caribbean Sea, with the transcendent miH- 
 tary vakie of Cuba and Jamaica in that connec- 
 tion. As regards these external points the 
 United States was perhaps looking outward, 
 but she evidently was not, as a nation, taking 
 notice ; and my remarks that " whether they 
 will or no, Americans must now begin to look 
 outwards," rested upon the necessities of the 
 case as set forth, not upon any certain evidence 
 of such watchfulness begun. 
 
 The first really arousing event occurred 
 where naval officers had long recognized the 
 most critical of our external interests; the one 
 where political change of condition detrimen- 
 tal to our military security was most likely to 
 occur, and to be allowed by default. The 
 islands and mainland of America were fairly 
 covered from serious aggression by national 
 susceptibility, pointed in the phrase " the 
 Monroe Doctrine." What the doctrine was, 
 was perhaps not very clearly understood, but it 
 was a good war-cry and might be depended on
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 2 7 
 
 to serve its turn, although the experience 
 of generations had shown it impotent to insure 
 naval expansion adequate to enforce its asser- 
 tion. Hawaii, however, could not be construed 
 to fall under the Monroe Doctrine; and, al- 
 though many men in the country appreciated 
 its consequence to us, it was not certain that 
 the people generally would sustain an active 
 policy based upon the need of our predominance 
 there. 
 
 It is not necessary to recall in detail the 
 occurrences in Hawaii at the end of 1892, 
 which led to the treaty of annexation sent to 
 the Senate by President Harrison, and with- 
 drawn upon the change of administration by 
 President Cleveland. What then occurred was 
 the outcome of conditions which had led me in 
 my first article to say, "At this moment inter- 
 nal troubles are imminent in the Sandwich 
 Islands, where it should be our fixed determi- 
 nation to allow no foreign influence to equal 
 our own," The submittal and withdrawal of 
 the treaty in rapid succession demonstrated the 
 doubtful attitude of national opinion in 1893, 
 just as the annexation of five years later showed, 
 not growth, but conversion. Nevertheless I
 
 28 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 have always felt the first abortive movement to 
 have been the more conspicuous landmark. 
 Though without result, it was the awakening ; 
 too late to seize the current opportunity, but not 
 so late as to be unprepared for the events which 
 the near future was to bring. 
 
 It may profitably be noted that the contrary 
 decisions of the two administrations in this 
 matter were prophetic of party fortunes. In 
 the face of an emergency such as in 1893 arose 
 in Hawaii, with its extravagantly mixed popu- 
 lation, foreign not only in extraction, but in 
 sentiment and allegiance, a political party which 
 held that our action was to be controlled by a 
 count of heads among them was evidently un- 
 able to deal with impending questions. I do 
 not pretend to have foreseen the events that 
 ensued between 1893 and 1898; but it was 
 clear enough in 1892 that we had to look out 
 into the Pacific and toward China. We could 
 never act there efficiently with our intellects 
 manacled by a traditionalism which saw in 
 the population of Hawaii a capacity for self- 
 determination like that of the Pilgrims, and 
 which failed to comprehend that Hawaii was an 
 outpost of the utmost value in the Pacific, for
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 29 
 
 the tenure of which, in the rapid decay of the 
 aboriginal population, East and West were 
 already striving. 
 
 This Hawaiian business drew from me, by 
 request from the Foruiii, of which Mr. Walter 
 H. Page was then editor, my second article, 
 " Hawaii and Our Sea Power; " to which suc- 
 ceeded almost immediately an invitation from 
 the Atlantic to treat the question of the isthmus 
 and its canal from the same point of view. The 
 latter of itself, coming so quickly, indicates how 
 the former affair had waked the people up, not 
 to Hawaii alone, but to the broader issues of 
 which Hawaii only happened by special circum- 
 stances to become the exponent. I do not think 
 I erred then in saying, in the first of these 
 articles, with reference to Mr. Harrison's treaty, 
 " The United States now finds herself com- 
 pelled to answer a question — to make a deci- 
 sion — not unlike and not less momentous 
 than that required of the Roman Senate when 
 the Mamertine garrison invited it to occupy 
 Messina, and so to abandon the hitherto tra- 
 ditional poHcy which had confined the ex- 
 pansion of Rome to the Italian peninsula." 
 " What is here involved is not so much a
 
 30 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 particular action as a principle pregnant of 
 great consequences." 
 
 A reasonable regard for the patience of 
 readers, and for the proprieties, limits me to 
 mentioning simply the titles of the articles 
 asked from me in the successive years 1894, 
 1895, 1896, 1897; indicative not only in their 
 particular subject, but in the very order of the 
 series, of the awakening consciousness of the 
 people, reflected in the attentive minds of 
 editors. They were, " The Possibilities of 
 Anglo-American Reunion," " The Future in 
 Relation to American Naval Power," " Pre- 
 paredness for Naval War," and " A Twentieth 
 Century Outlook." 
 
 The last decade of the century carried the 
 outward look on from the Isthmus and Hawaii, 
 and from the naval preparations essential to 
 maintaining the nation's requirements, as form- 
 ulated in the Monroe Doctrine and evident in 
 the conditions of the Pacific, to consider the 
 general outward movement of the European 
 world, evinced in the new era of colonization 
 and the search for naval stations which had 
 recently begun. This impulse, I believ^e, will 
 hereafter be recoo^nized as the chief amons:
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 3 1 
 
 those transmitted by the nineteenth century 
 to its successor. Viewed with the new and 
 significant restlessness among the Oriental 
 peoples, aroused at length, by intimate contact 
 with Europeans, from the torpor and change- 
 lessness of ages — an awakening of w^hich the 
 occidentalizing of Japan is merely the most 
 conspicuous incident — this is the significant 
 feature of the opening century, that should 
 direct the attention of our people in external 
 policy. This European movement has three 
 principal fields: the Levant, — in which Egypt 
 may for convenience be included, — Africa, and 
 Asia. Though locally Asiatic, the Levant is a 
 European interest, pure and simple ; and Africa, 
 in relation to world politics, is but an annex of 
 Europe, geographically as well as, now, by pre- 
 emption. Eastern Asia, however, and China 
 especially, with all its immense possibilities, 
 stands over against us, demanding our most 
 careful and constant thought ; all the more 
 because there would appear to be a disposition 
 in some quarters to question our right of inter- 
 est. In a Parliamentary blue book published 
 some eighteen months ago with reference to 
 the incipient troubles in China which after-
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 ward became so acute, the Russian ambassador 
 at Peking is mentioned as saying to his British 
 colleague that only Russia and Great Britain 
 had serious interests in China. We shall not 
 err greatly, I imagine, in believing that Great 
 Britain does not share this sentiment. 
 
 As a matter of national decision Hawaii is 
 already past history, and the Monroe Doctrine 
 seems even now to be approaching a condition 
 of general silent acquiescence, which, if realized, 
 will give to it also the quality of permanence that 
 distinguishes the past from the present. The 
 living external issue of the present and the 
 future, the field for us alive with multifold possi- 
 bilities and uncertainties, is Eastern Asia; so 
 far in 1901 have we travelled, in the eight years 
 that began by seeing even Hawaii rejected and 
 have ended with the Philippines possessed. The 
 elements of the situation in China, as determi- 
 native of national watchfulness, may be stated 
 as follows. The great stream and valley of 
 the Yangtse Kiang is the natural focus of trade 
 for the greater and richer part of the empire, 
 which it divides roughly into two halves. It is 
 navigable continuously by steamers for a thous- 
 and miles, and for a great part of that distance
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 33 
 
 by sea-going vessels, including large ships of 
 war. Here, therefore, is the great command- 
 ing interest of commercial nations and of mari- 
 time Powers. Here, and here only, apart from 
 the seaboard itself, can they effectually assert 
 their force to control infringement upon China's 
 right of self-direction, and to support the 
 Chinese themselves in their resistance which, 
 unaided, has not been able to retain Manchuria. 
 The maritime Powers are several ; but of them 
 France has seen fit to identify her policy with 
 Russia and cannot be depended upon, even if 
 her irritable national sensitiveness permitted 
 other peoples to count upon the reasonableness 
 of her action in any particular case. Regard 
 for the interests of China, of the commercial 
 world at large, and of our own people, there- 
 fore impel us to cooperation with Great Brit- 
 ain, the greatest of naval states ; for her aim, as 
 a free-trade nation with large carrying trade, 
 must necessarily be to increase the volume of 
 commerce in a country like China, and to sup- 
 port her against the encroachments of another 
 people, of whose policy exclusive trade is a 
 dominant factor. For the same reasons, though 
 to a less degree, we find ourselves impelled to 
 
 3
 
 34 Retrospect and Prospect 
 
 act in this matter in unison with Germany and 
 Japan. As the world is now balanced, the 
 British Empire is in external matters our 
 natural though not our formal ally. 
 
 The canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines are 
 valuable to us as positions even more than as 
 possessions. In the problem of Eastern Asia, 
 still in an early stage of its solution and of 
 doubtful issue, they are important as facilita- 
 ting]: our access to the seas of China and to the 
 valley of the Yangtse, and as furnishing terri- 
 torial support to our action there. Intrinsically, 
 their future now presents but few elements of 
 anxiety. In the grave uncertainties surround- 
 ing China, it is along the great river, of which 
 Shanghai is the chief port, that the interest of 
 the western world centres. From it our eyes 
 should never wander. There rests the centre 
 of Chinese power as susceptible of future 
 development, and there it should receive firm 
 support from us, disregardful of the place 
 where the Chinese Court may see fit to estab- 
 lish its abode. Peking, as has been clearly 
 shown, is too easily controlled from the land 
 side. Partition is one thing which we may 
 well reject ; but it would be very different
 
 Retrospect and Prospect 35 
 
 to see established along the course of the 
 Yangtse a native Power strong enough to 
 resist dictation from the capital, and, if need 
 be, strong enough also to resist those by whom 
 the capital may be oppressed.
 
 CONDITIONS DETERMINING THE 
 
 NAVAL EXPANSION OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES
 
 CONDITIONS DETERMINING THE 
 
 NAVAL EXPANSION OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES 
 
 January, 1902. 
 
 AT this time, while naval manoeuvres are 
 attracting attention among the people of 
 the United States, it is pertinent to point out 
 that it is commonly, but mistakenly, supposed 
 that the present necessity for naval enlarge- 
 ment rests upon the acquisition of oversea 
 territories, as a consequence of the war with 
 Spain. The error is natural, for undoubtedly 
 the war convinced the Am.erican people of the 
 advantage — nay, the necessity — of a great 
 navy, and so led to the increase we are wit- 
 nessing; but the necessity was approaching 
 unobserved, and would have come upon the 
 nation unawares and unprepared, but for the 
 fortunate intervention of the war, and its dem- 
 onstration of the usefulness of navies. 
 
 We have the highest military authority for 
 saying that the best and only sure form of de-
 
 40 Conditions Determiimig the Naval 
 
 fence is to take the offensive, or at least to be 
 evidently ready so to do at brief notice. The 
 navy is essentially and pre-eminently a force 
 that thus acts, in virtue of the mobility which 
 is its prime quality ; and it is scarcely neces- 
 sary to argue that the more wide-spread the 
 interests open to attack, the more valuable in 
 this sense the navy is, and the more numerous 
 and powerful must it be. So long as the 
 United States had no external possessions, it 
 was comparatively easy to blind people to the 
 usefulness of a navy, or to the necessity for it. 
 A navy for coast defence only was then a plaus- 
 ible, though deceitful, cry ; and it was a very 
 easy further step to say that fortifications, sta- 
 tionary land defences, were cheaper and more 
 effective. On the narrow ground of passive 
 defence, that is true ; therefore, ignorance of 
 military principles being characteristic of man- 
 kind generally, and of Americans perhaps par- 
 ticularly, the need of a mobile force to act 
 offensively could not obtain recognition. 
 
 It is not the least of the advantages derived 
 from the new possessions that this condition of 
 the public mind can exist no longer. It was
 
 Expansion of the United States 4 1 
 
 very soundly argued, by the American oppo- 
 nents of the expansion which has been realized 
 in the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
 that transmarine acquisitions would be so 
 many new exposed points, to be supported by 
 sea only, not by land, as the continental terri- 
 tory can. They were very right, and this is 
 very true ; the flaw in their argument, as well 
 as the beam in the eye of the American public, 
 which prevented it from seeing clearly, was the 
 failure to note that, even when not possessing 
 a square foot of territory without its borders, 
 there were manifold interests abroad, assailable 
 by a superior navy, and only to be protected 
 by such display of force as should make it not 
 worth while to arouse the nation to action. 
 
 The argument of the opponents of territorial 
 expansion, even within moderate limits, and 
 with due regard to locality and consequent 
 utility in the positions acquired, was thus 
 plausible, and was deplorably successful ; but 
 it was fallacious. It adduced a sound military 
 reason, — the increased exposure, — but wholly 
 ignored qualifying considerations of the most 
 serious character, reversive of conclusions. It 
 may with much more certainty be now alleged,
 
 42 Conditions Determining the Naval 
 
 and the assertion can be supported to the point 
 of demonstration, that the acquisitions of re- 
 cent years, despite the additional requirement 
 of their defence imposed upon the United 
 States, have not necessitated any increase of 
 naval force beyond that which would have been 
 imperatively demanded at the present time, 
 had they never passed into American hands. 
 More still, they have lessened the burden of 
 purely naval increase, which but for them 
 would have been necessary ; for by the tenure 
 of them, and due development of their re- 
 sources, the navy itself receives an accession 
 of strength, an augmented facility of move- 
 ment, by resting upon strong positions for 
 equipment and repair, — upon bases, to use the 
 military term, — in several parts of the world 
 where national interests demand naval pro- 
 tection of the kind already mentioned ; namely, 
 readiness to take the offensive instantly. 
 
 Facilities of this character add a percentage 
 of value to a given mobile force, military or 
 naval, for they by so much increase its power 
 and its mobility. This percentage may be 
 difhcult of precise definition as to amount,
 
 Expansion of the United States 43 
 
 but it none the less exists. That coal can be 
 obtained near at hand, plentifully, and with 
 certainty ; that ships can remain in readiness, 
 and in security, near the possible scene of op- 
 erations ; that they can be repaired there, in- 
 stead of returning to the United States ; all 
 these conditions, which the new possessions 
 will afford, enable the work on the spot to be 
 done by fewer ships. Furthermore, by their 
 storage facilities, by their accumulated and 
 natural resources, they diminish the immediate 
 dependence upon home by a long chain of 
 communications, which is the great drain on 
 all military operations. 
 
 Thus, according to the particular conditions, 
 one ship may do the work of two, or three ships 
 of five, or perhaps nine of ten ; but, be the pro- 
 portion more or less, the gain in efficiency 
 means, as such gain always does, smaller num- 
 bers and therefore less expense. When a 
 battleship in war time runs upon an un- 
 charted rock, as the Oregon did a year ago 
 in the China Seas, it makes an immense differ- 
 ence to an admiral, and to the operations in 
 hand, whether she can be repaired at a dis- 
 tance of five hundred miles, or of five thou-
 
 44 Condi iioits Determining the Naval 
 
 sand. The case is the same with minor repairs, 
 and with the renewal of coal, one of the great- 
 est of naval anxieties. For instance, it would 
 be difficult to exaggerate the value of Guanta- 
 namo, only fifty miles from Santiago de Cuba, 
 to the American fleet off the latter port, which 
 otherwise had to coal in the open, or depend 
 upon a base many hundred miles away. 
 
 It may be advisable here to notice passingly 
 an argument at times maintained, and often 
 advanced during recent discussions concerning 
 the annexation of the Philippines, that, while 
 such bases of naval action are intrinsically 
 advantageous, there attaches to them no ex- 
 pediency of holding adjacent territory in polit- 
 ical tenure. The United States therefore, so 
 it was urged, for the security of her naval situa- 
 tion in eastern waters would require in the 
 Philippines no more than a navy yard. From 
 the military point of view this is w^holly in- 
 accurate. Any military permanent station, 
 land fortress or naval arsenal, gains immeasur- 
 ably in strength from the support of a friendly 
 region in which it is situated, because of the 
 contribution to its resources and the distance 
 at which attack is held. The impressiveness
 
 Expansion of the United States 45 
 
 of the word " isolation," which we all instinc- 
 tively feel, testifies to this condition. Nor is it 
 conclusive against the military argument that 
 the friendliness be of a passive or reluctant 
 character, as of a population subjected to mili- 
 tary control. This consideration is indeed 
 material to the general conduct of a war, for 
 the force thus engaged in insuring submission 
 is withdrawn from that available for other 
 operations ; but so long as it is effective in 
 compelling or inducing the co-operation of the 
 inhabitants, either as peaceful workmen and 
 agriculturists, or more positively in the field, 
 the particular fortress, land or sea, is far 
 stronger than it could be if surrounded by 
 territory under alien government, even though 
 neutral. 
 
 Extent of territory is a real factor in military 
 strength, and for this reason a small island is 
 decisively less valuable than a large one. It 
 is a distinct weakness to Gibraltar that it is 
 backed by a country wholly foreign, though 
 probably not belligerent ; and Malta, if severed 
 from a predominant navy, would find its in- 
 trinsic power inadequate to prolonged endur- 
 ance. On the other hand, places on the coast
 
 46 Conditions Determining the Naval 
 
 of the United States, or of Australia, or New 
 Zealand, though individually weak from a 
 purely military standpoint, derive great in- 
 crease of resistant force, and still more of pro- 
 ductive energy, — a large element in military 
 offensive efficiency, — because in the midst of 
 a friendly and industrious community. The 
 questions of resources and of support, both 
 very important factors in military vigor, turn 
 largely upon this one consideration. 
 
 This is not, in itself, an argument for large 
 annexations, or indefinite territorial expansion. 
 These, if desirable, rest upon reasons other 
 than military. We are dealing here with a 
 purely military consideration, and supporting it 
 by military argument, which, however, cannot 
 be pressed to the extent of supporting an action 
 political in origin. The military argument 
 amounts simply to this : that a moderate num- 
 ber of such bases, suitably chosen in view of 
 their position and resources, strengthen a mili- 
 tary or naval situation, and thereby enable 
 fewer men or fewer ships to do the necessary 
 work ; but it must be at once qualified by the 
 other perfectly familiar military maxim, that 
 the multiplication of such bases, as soon as you
 
 Expansion of the U^iited States 47 
 
 pass the limits of reasonable necessity, becomes 
 a source of weakness, multiplying exposed 
 points, and entailing division of force. It is 
 not even a matter of indifference that you have 
 too many ; it is a positive injury. Conse- 
 quently, the necessity of naval bases to efificient 
 naval action cannot by itself be made into an 
 argument for indefinite expansion. 
 
 Such oversea expansion as the United States 
 has so far made has not been primarily for 
 military purposes. Incidentally, it has contrib- 
 uted to naval power, and it has not as yet 
 transcended the limit of utility to that end. 
 What has been already gained is useful, either 
 directly or indirectly ; the increase of exposure, 
 as yet, does not equal the increase in strength. 
 It is, of course, very possible that considerations 
 of political or commercial expediency, or even 
 necessity, might lead to acquisitions, the 
 exposure and burden of which would find no 
 compensation in increase of naval strength, or 
 of general national military security. The 
 justification of such measures, if taken, must 
 rest on other than military or naval rea- 
 sons, and would not concern this argument ;
 
 48 Conditions Determining the Naval 
 
 but in fact no such undue expansion has yet 
 occurred. 
 
 The march of events, not in the United 
 States only, but over the world at large, not of 
 military or naval events chiefly, but of political 
 events, events economical and commercial, has 
 brought about a necessity for large navies; 
 for navies much increased over the standard of 
 twenty years ago. This is now universally 
 recognized. Of this course of events in those 
 two decades, and their result to-day, the war 
 with Spain, which led directly or indirectly to 
 the acquisition of every foot of insular territory 
 possessed by the United States, is simply one 
 incident; and that an incident rather discon- 
 nected, something of a side issue, though one 
 most timely for the welfare of the nation. 
 
 Had that war not occurred, there is no 
 reason to believe that the mighty events which 
 have transpired in Africa, Egypt, the Levant, 
 and China, would not have happened ; still less 
 that there would not have been the immense 
 commercial developments, which, if less strik- 
 insf, are even more momentous, and more 
 influential at this moment upon the policy of 
 nations. Issues and conditions which are mov-
 
 Expansion of the United States 49 
 
 ing the world would have been as they are had 
 the distress of Cuba never compelled interven- 
 tion. The difference now would have been that 
 the United States would be without Porto Rico, 
 Hawaii, and the Philippines ; without reserved 
 rights in Cuba, the key of the West Indies and 
 Gulf of Mexico ; and that she would not have 
 received the impulse, which the war and its 
 consequent acquisitions most timely gave, to the 
 building of the navy towards a point necessary 
 to meet the demands of a political and com- 
 mercial future, which in any case would have 
 arrived, and, but for that war, have found the 
 nation unprepared. 
 
 The general strenuous impulse of the great 
 civilized states of the world, to find and to estab- 
 lish markets and commercial relations outside 
 their own borders and their own people, has 
 led to multifold annexations, and to commer- 
 cial and naval afjQrressions. In these the United 
 States has had no part, but they have consti- 
 tuted a political situation that immensely in- 
 creases her political and commercial anxieties, 
 and consequently her naval responsibilities ; 
 for, as interests of this kind are outside the 
 North American continent, it is upon the navy 
 
 4
 
 50 Conditions Determining the Naval 
 
 that their support rests. This external impulse 
 of the commercial nations is of two-fold char- 
 acter. First, there is the perfectly legitimate 
 and unobjectionable form of commercial com- 
 petition, in open field and without favor ; but 
 there is, besides, the effort to extend and sustain 
 commercial advantage by the extension of politi- 
 cal power, either by controlling influence or by 
 actual annexation, under cover of either of 
 which the commercial system of the particular 
 country obtains favored conditions, injurious to 
 others, from special privilege all the way up to 
 a practically exclusive market. The history of 
 the past twenty or thirty years abounds in such 
 instances, reversive of the course of trade, even 
 to the destruction at times of a well-established 
 commerce. 
 
 Much of this politico-commercial movement 
 has occurred in regions where the United 
 States has been compelled, by her recognized 
 traditional policy, to abstain from intervention, 
 or even remonstrance. The politics are none 
 of our business, and the resultant commercial 
 inconvenience, if it touch us, has to be ac- 
 cepted. This applies to Europe generally ; to 
 Africa, which, both by position and now by
 
 Expansion of the United States 5 1 
 
 annexation, is an appendage of Europe ; and 
 probably also to those parts of Asia commonly 
 known as the Levant, which by juxtaposition 
 are European in interest. The case is very 
 different in South America, in Eastern Asia, 
 and in the Pacific. From interest in none of 
 these is the United States excluded by the 
 Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, by which 
 she simply defines her policy to be hands- 
 off in matters of purely European concern; 
 while by express declaration political interfer- 
 ence in South America, of a character to 
 intrude European political control, will be 
 resented as directly injurious to American 
 security. 
 
 As regards the Pacific and China, the move- 
 ment there, and especially in the latter, has 
 been lately so much before the public that it 
 is unnecessary to recall details. It is obvious, 
 however, that where the commercial interests 
 at stake are so great, and political conditions 
 so uncertain, the desire to secure commercial 
 opportunity will lead countries that possess 
 force into a dangerous temptation to use it for 
 the extension of their influence. Therefore, 
 unless prepared to maintain the national rights,
 
 52 Conditions Determining the Naval 
 
 either singly or in combination with others, 
 backed by force at hand, the United States 
 may find her people excluded, more or less, 
 by the encroachment of rivals. 
 
 The case in South America is even more 
 serious; for political interference there not only 
 may injure the nation commercially, but would 
 certainly dishonor it, in face of its clearly 
 avowed policy. It must be remembered that 
 this extension of commerce by political pres- 
 sure is a leading element in the spirit of the 
 times ; and, when such a spirit is looking watch- 
 fully for a field in which to act, one so fruitful 
 and so promising as South America can secure 
 exemption only by a display of power to resist, 
 which South America itself does not possess, 
 and which the United States alone can supply. 
 
 These are among the leading conditions 
 which necessitate the creation of a powerful 
 navy by the United States, and they are quite 
 independent of her relatively small external 
 possessions, most valuable though these are 
 from the naval point of view. She is con- 
 fronted, in short, by a general m.ovement of 
 the nations, resting upon a spirit spread among
 
 Expansio7i of the United States 5 3 
 
 their peoples, which seeks to secure commer- 
 cial advantages in all quarters of the world ; 
 peaceably, if may be, but, if not, by pressure. 
 In this collision of interests, force will have a 
 determining part, as it has in all periods of 
 the world's history ; and force, in such remote 
 localities, means necessarily naval force. It is 
 upon the spread of this spirit and the action 
 ensuing from it, that the necessity for a great 
 navy rests, and not upon the fact of having 
 assumed oversea charges. Porto Rico, Hawaii, 
 the Philippines, and if there be any other 
 acquisition at present, have not created the 
 necessity ; on the contrary, they have reduced 
 the weight of the burden, by contributing to 
 support it.
 
 THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOUTH 
 AFRICAN WAR UPON THE PRES- 
 TIGE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
 
 THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOUTH 
 AFRICAN WAR UPON THE PRES- 
 TIGE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
 
 November, 1901. 
 
 WITHOUT seeking excessive refinement 
 in definition, it may profitably be re- 
 called that the common colloquial use of the 
 word " prestige " overlooks its primary significa- 
 tion, which involves the idea of illusion, or 
 even of delusion. When employing it in ordi- 
 nary speech we do not think of a veil conceal- 
 ing truth, but of a solid basis of achievement 
 or power which underlies present acknowl- 
 edged reputation. Thus the word is practically 
 affirmative, not negative ; it suggests actuality, 
 not a mask. But for the very reason that 
 prestige is popular impression, resting upon 
 surface appearance assumed to be substantial 
 fact, it is among the most uncertain of posses- 
 sions ; upon a pedestal to-day, in the dust to- 
 morrow, with the facile fickleness noted in
 
 58 The Influence of the South African War 
 
 populaces. When to this source of error in 
 the adoption of opinion is added the misguid- 
 ing influence of strong prejudices, when mis- 
 understandino: of conditions combines with bias 
 of judgment, mutabilities of prestige may be 
 both sudden and extreme. " Presto ! Change ! " 
 and prestidigitator, are prominent and charac- 
 teristic members of the volatile family to which 
 prestige owes its birth. The decline of prestige 
 may involve as much illusion as its growth ; 
 therefore its value, while not to be denied, may 
 easily be exaggerated. 
 
 Prestige then does not necessarily corre- 
 spond with fact, even moderately ; on the 
 contrary, it is apt to be much in excess or 
 much in defect. Nevertheless, it is a valuable 
 possession ; an asset which counts for a good 
 deal in the reckoning of international balances. 
 Accepted at its face value, and repeated in the 
 street from man to man, it constitutes a mass of 
 impression which finally affects even the more 
 judicious and better-informed, and may become 
 of weight in diplomatic action. Consequently, 
 when impaired, it is worth the effort to restore 
 it, and to bring it into conformity with material 
 facts. These do not change either with the
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Em-pire 59 
 
 suddenness, or in the degree, to which mere 
 moral effect is specially liable. 
 
 Qualifying the word and its idea with the 
 remarks so far made, the prestige of the British 
 Empire has assuredly suffered diminution from 
 the South African war. Men in the street, 
 and the hurried writers of the press, have re- 
 ceived an impression of bafflement, or even of 
 failure, in holding which they support one 
 another. From the very outset prepossession 
 stood ready upon the Continent, and among 
 many of the American people, not only to re- 
 joice over British reverses, but to draw from 
 them quick, disparaging conclusions, affecting 
 prestige, by the easy process of forgetting fun- 
 damental conditions and dwelling upon surface 
 events. Precisely the same disposition was 
 entertained towards the United States a year 
 before, at the beginning of our war with Spain, 
 as I had opportunity to observe by the experi- 
 ence of dining in company with several diplo- 
 mats in a European capital at the moment of 
 the outbreak of hostilities. That the gratifica- 
 tion of gloating over our defeats was confi- 
 dently anticipated also is a matter of common 
 notoriety. We were out of favor, and our
 
 6o The Influence of the South African War 
 
 prestige was naturally low. The fortunate 
 event of our war having at least not lowered 
 it further, there is no necessity to inquire how 
 far the original estimate corresponded with the 
 facts. Of one thing, however, we may be sure ; 
 that had temporary unsuccess attended us, the 
 difHculties of our undertaking, which formed the 
 basis of unfavorable prediction and were by no 
 means small to a dispassionate judgment, would 
 not in the least have qualified unfavorable criti- 
 cism. Prejudice is a two-edged sword, and 
 cuts both ways. So it has been in South 
 Africa. The evident military diiificulties gave 
 hostile sentiment the basis on which to build 
 prophecies of disaster ; but having served that 
 purpose, when it comes to comment and infer- 
 ence, the difficulties no longer find place for 
 consideration. 
 
 The military conditions before and during 
 the war, and now existing in South Africa, are 
 so much matters of present remembrance that 
 it is unnecessary to enumerate them at large. 
 What can profitably be done is to select from 
 them those which constitute the distinctive 
 characteristics, differentiating this from other 
 struggles, and yet at the same time enabling it
 
 upon tJie Prestige of the British Empire 6 1 
 
 to be in some measure classified ; for such 
 features suggest resemblances as well as differ- 
 ences. The prominent facts, thus separated 
 from less noteworthy surroundings, can then 
 be brought to the test of criticism as to their 
 positive influence in the present case, and also 
 to comparison with other historical experiences. 
 Whatever may be the prestige, in the strict 
 sense of the word, of the British Empire, at 
 home or abroad, its real meed of praise or 
 blame depends upon the way it has met, and is 
 meeting, these distinctive conditions. 
 
 The characteristic elements of this war re- 
 sulting fronl the permanent conditions, irre- 
 spective of the conduct of the present hostilities, 
 and anterior to their beginning, are (i) The 
 remoteness of the British base of operations 
 from the scene of fighting, contrasted with the 
 nearness of the Boers; in other words, the 
 length of the British lines of communication. 
 (2) The nature and extent of the country over 
 which operations had to be conducted. ( 3 ) The 
 character of the hostile people ; including there- 
 in the advantage which familiarity with a region 
 and its conditions, especially when sparsely 
 settled, undeveloped, and consequently imper-
 
 62 The Injhience of the SoiitJi African War 
 
 fcctly known, always gives to inhabitants over 
 invaders. All three particulars, indeed, fall 
 under the general head of communications, 
 which, on the strategic side at least, dominate 
 war. The nature and extent of the country 
 affect materially the maintenance of commu- 
 nications, their security and their rapidity. So 
 also the native and acquired characteristics of 
 the enemy act and react upon communications. 
 If of extremely simple wants, capable of rapid 
 movement, familiar with the country, surrounded 
 by sympathizers, their own communications are 
 relatively invulnerable, and to the same degree 
 they are facilitated in attacking those of the 
 invader. Roles are, in a measure, reversed; 
 the offence is constantly on the defence for his 
 communications, the defence on the offensive 
 against them. 
 
 These factors, onerously adverse to Great 
 Britain, were and are permanent. To them 
 must be added a present consideration, which 
 existed from the beginning, but which it was 
 then perhaps impossible to anticipate ; namely, 
 the difficulty under which the British Govern- 
 ment would be placed in dealing with partially 
 organized forces maintaining insurrection rather
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 6 
 
 o 
 
 than war ; with no organic social system be- 
 hind them, and, from that very lack, without 
 vital centres, or social articulations, at which 
 to strike ; capable of indefinite subdivision and 
 consequent elusiveness, due to the very low 
 type of social and political cohesion which has 
 been characteristic of the Boer peoples from 
 their beginnings. When highly organized and 
 complex, national vitality may be paralyzed 
 without killing men ; but where organization 
 is defective, the same end cannot be quickly 
 reached without a slaughter of individuals from 
 which modern humanity rightfully revolts. 
 
 Here has been the difficulty confronting the 
 Empire since the end of the war proper. From 
 the delay in solving it proceeds the present 
 impairment of prestige, which, granting the 
 idea of illusion inseparable from the word, is 
 natural and to be expected. For many obvious 
 reasons, the individual Boer, when caught, can- 
 not be killed. Great Britain is limited to cap- 
 ture and exportation ; processes indefinitely 
 tedious, owing to the nature of the country 
 and other causes before noticed, and further 
 protracted by the necessity of diverting a huge 
 fraction of the large available forces to the
 
 64 The ht/liicnce of the South African War 
 
 protection of the communications. These 
 stretch a thousand miles from the sea-board to 
 the seat of war, and thence ramify throughout 
 the extensive regions over which desultory and 
 elusive fighting may spread. This burden is 
 even greater than during regular hostilities, 
 both because the lines are more disseminated, 
 and because the evasive action of the small 
 bands now in the field is harder to counteract 
 than the efforts of large masses, compelled by 
 their very size to consider their own com- 
 munications. 
 
 The military operations of the war in South 
 Africa may be divided into two principal and 
 easily recognized stages. There is, first, that 
 of regular hostilities, which terminated not long 
 after the fall of Pretoria; to which succeeded 
 the existing conditions of what is commonly 
 called guerilla warfare. In the former, the 
 British were confronted by large numbers, 
 more or less organized, acting in masses, and 
 representing a regular Government which had 
 its staff of officials and local habitat. In the 
 present embarrassing situation, the permanent 
 natural factors (the nature of the country, and 
 the racial characteristics of the opponents, with
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 65 
 
 their consequent individual tendencies of ac- 
 tion) remain much the same ; but the accidental 
 temporary elements are changed. The Boer 
 forces are no longer organized, in the sense of 
 having a common centre of action, or a regular 
 gradation of even military authority. They no 
 longer act in masses, but are scattered in small 
 bodies, much of whose immunity depends upon 
 their faculty of melting away and subsequently 
 reuniting ; and there is behind them no recog- 
 nized and efificient civil government. On the 
 civil side the Boer bands represent a past, not 
 a present; the organic society and government 
 no longer exist. 
 
 The conduct of the earlier stasre of the war 
 by the British, with its effect upon prestige, is 
 first to be considered. Bearing in mind the 
 respective distances of the antagonists from the 
 seat of war, the outbreak of hostilities gave to 
 the Boers the advantage, to the British the dis- 
 advantage, of a surprise. That this is so is 
 seen by considering how the case would have 
 stood had the British Islands been where Cape 
 Colony is. That larger organized forces were 
 not assembled in South Africa at an early date 
 will be differently criticised even by impartial 
 
 5
 
 66 The Infltience of the South African War 
 
 observers. It may at least be observed that, if 
 injurious to the prestige of the Government on 
 the score of unwise delay, it cannot at the 
 same time be attributed to eagerness for war. 
 Also, however viewed, this is chargeable to 
 political calculation, not to military ineffi- 
 ciency. But when war was at last resolved, it 
 cannot, I think, be considered as less than ad- 
 mirable that over 165,000 men, with the vast 
 mass of warlike equipment, were transferred 
 six thousand miles from the British Islands to 
 South Africa in six months. Nor yet that, 
 from the sea-coast, the same huge numbers 
 and equipment were carried by single track 
 railroads a thousand miles inland, there main- 
 tained, and within eight months, not of their 
 arrival in Africa, but of their earliest departure 
 from England, had possession of the capitals 
 of both their opponents, having driven them 
 from position to position in a notoriously diffi- 
 cult country, devoid alike of natural and of 
 artificial resources. The numbers of the Brit- 
 ish, doubtless, were fully adequate to this work. 
 They were greatly superior to the Boers, but 
 not, I think, to a degree much exceeding that 
 which any prudent military man would esti-
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 67 
 
 mate as absolutely necessary for such a task ; 
 considering, that is, the character and extent 
 of the countr)^ the length of the communica- 
 tions, and the general difficulties inherent in 
 all invasions. 
 
 I fail, therefore, to see that the ultimate 
 results up to the fall of Pretoria, and during 
 the subsequent disintegration of the Boer 
 forces under continued pressure, are so unsatis- 
 factory as in any way to constitute a reason for 
 that diminution of credit which we call loss of 
 prestige. During the operations which thus 
 terminated, that is, during the process that pro- 
 duced the results, there occurred numerous in- 
 cidents; some attended by success, some by 
 grave disaster. The latter chiefly require 
 notice, for they are the food for criticism. 
 The advance towards Kimberley was brought 
 sharply to a standstill ; the fact being marked 
 by the slaughter at Magersfontein, which we 
 may say ought not to have been. It was not, 
 however, the particular repulse that constituted 
 the check, but the want of numbers, which 
 showed that the advance had been premature. 
 Almost simultaneously came the defeat at 
 Colenso, which postponed the relief of Lady-
 
 68 TJie Influence of the South African War 
 
 smith ; and upon these two rebuffs followed 
 the strain of national endurance, through the 
 two months of painful uncertainty as to 
 whether the isolated British garrisons could 
 hold out. 
 
 Now, I hold no brief to defend the advance 
 on either line at the moment chosen. But I 
 do feel very strongly that it is unreasonable to 
 judge military operations carried on by repre- 
 sentative governments on merely military 
 grounds, leaving out of account the absolute 
 necessity of convincing the people represented. 
 The American General Grant certainly did 
 not lack self-dependence or firmness, nor did 
 his subordinate, Sherman, lack eminent military 
 characteristics and acquirements ; yet when 
 Sherman remonstrated against the movement 
 round Vicksburg, in 1863, on very sound mili- 
 tary grounds of communications. Grant replied 
 that to fall back to a new base for a secure line 
 of communications would so dishearten the 
 nation " that bases of supplies would be of no 
 use ; neither men to hold diem nor supplies to 
 be put in them would be furnished." The con- 
 clusion was perhaps extreme, but the remark 
 has value. In countries where the voice of
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empijx 69 
 
 the people is mighty it cannot be disregarded, 
 nor can the soldier so separate his military 
 convictions from the popular sentiment as to 
 neglect it wholly. To the utmost possible ex- 
 tent he doubtless should act on strict military 
 reason. Disastrous as the determination ap- 
 peared to be for a time, I have always ap- 
 plauded White's holding on to Ladysmith, nor 
 have I been able greatly to condemn the risk 
 taken in remaining at Dundee until the neces- 
 sity of evacuation was not only seen but dem- 
 onstrated. For the same reason I hesitate to 
 criticise Methuen's advance to the Modder, 
 though it was shown to be premature by the 
 long delay necessary after Magersfontein. 
 
 In brief, therefore, while the attempts at ad- 
 vance may have been premature, militarily con- 
 sidered, they were almost unavoidable under 
 the imperfectly understood difficulties of re- 
 lieving Kimberley and Ladysmith. To hold 
 advanced positions, and to push advance, were 
 inevitable, if only to demonstrate the difficulties 
 and the need of more men ; yet to see the 
 effort of a great empire blocked by two small 
 republics inevitably affected prestige. Failure, 
 until redeemed, cannot but do so; but, in fact,
 
 JO The Injlzicnce of the South African War 
 
 there was no occasion for disheartenment had 
 the circumstances been intelligently appre- 
 ciated. I am not aware that in these main 
 operations, up to the standstill in December, 
 there was anything that impeached the general 
 military character of the army. Mistakes in 
 generalship I think there were. These affect the 
 reputation of the general, but they should not 
 that of the nation. Experience is universal 
 that a very large percentage, probably a ma- 
 jority, of able men, men of high promise both 
 in character and acquirement, break down in 
 chief command. The South African war is 
 not in this respect different from others. I 
 know that in our Civil War we had bitter disap- 
 pointments; and I believe that Dupont, who 
 surrendered somewhat ignominiously at Baylen, 
 in 1808, had stood very high in the esteem of 
 Napoleon himself. Nevertheless, for lack of 
 this correct appreciation, a merely personal 
 defect is carried to the losing balance of na- 
 tional prestige. 
 
 There were, however, in both advances inci- 
 dents of a character which have since too often 
 recurred not to reflect upon the reputation of 
 the army. Passing over questions involving
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 
 
 the Commander-in-Chief, as being too essen- 
 tiall}^ personal to warrant general conclusions, 
 the inference prompted by the battle of Co- 
 lenso, by the deadly surprise at Magersfontein, 
 and by many subsequent episodes, is unques- 
 tionably that of inadequacy, or of remissness 
 in subordinate duties, which cannot be recon- 
 ciled with reasonable requirements of efficiency. 
 Taken singly, any one incident may be due to 
 unexpected causes, or to some one person ; 
 but the impression produced — and in speak- 
 ing of prestige I necessarily deal with impres- 
 sions — by the numerous surprises, and some 
 surrenders, is that of a proportion of incom- 
 petency in the grades of subordinate officers 
 too large to be creditably accounted for. I 
 have even heard surrenders attributed to decay 
 in the fighting quality of the race ; than which 
 imputation none can be more injurious to 
 military prestige. This has appeared to me 
 nothing short of absurd, in view of the abun- 
 dance of good fighting that has been done ; 
 and we Americans, as a nation courageous and 
 warlike, but not military, have had experience 
 enough of panic in troops badly officered to 
 dismiss peremptorily any such suggestion. For
 
 72 The Influence of the South African War 
 
 such discreditable episodes, however, the only 
 one alternative solution is incompetent leader- 
 ship; and when it is remembered that the 
 leaders in these small affairs are the subordi- 
 nates, and sometimes the principal subordi- 
 nates, in large operations, the impression of 
 dangerous unsoundness in the main body is 
 deepened. In contemplating the question of 
 their own acquirements, ofificers should re- 
 member that failure on their part must thus 
 react upon their troops at times, even to the 
 accusation of cowardice. I confess that while 
 I think the prevalent impression of incompe- 
 tency among officers exaggerated, it does not 
 seem to me unfounded. It errs by neglect to 
 take due account of the mass of good work 
 done ; but that is always the case with such 
 criticism, and the loss of prestige which it 
 asserts is not without reason in fact, though 
 immoderate in terms. 
 
 If this be so, the defect is precisely one that 
 would be conspicuously felt when the war 
 passed into its second stage, and on both sides 
 took the form of wide dissemination in small 
 bodies, which, however united in some general 
 scheme, were locally self-dependent. This
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire ']i 
 
 multiplication of small commands necessarily 
 multiplies the chance of inefficiency betraying 
 itself, and not improbably accounts for some 
 mischances. On the other hand, a constant 
 sifting process goes on, and dearly bought 
 experience will remedy this evil. I have no 
 doubt that the efficiency of the force under 
 Lord Kitchener is double now what it was a 
 year ago, both by such process of elimination 
 and by the increase of facility which constant 
 practice bestows even upon those previously 
 well-equipped. There can scarcely be a cor- 
 responding gain to the Boers, who already 
 possessed the particular local aptitudes which 
 the British have had to acquire. Of this the 
 makers of prestige have probably taken too 
 little account. 
 
 Equally do they fail to take account of the 
 grave difficulties which should qualify the sur- 
 face impressions produced by the mere pro- 
 longation of the trouble. The British Army 
 in South Africa during eighteen months, practi- 
 cally since the fall of Pretoria, has been engaged 
 in a task analogous to that of which the United 
 States Army during the past century has had 
 large experience. Setting aside the savagery
 
 74 The Influence of the South African War 
 
 in the practices of North American Indians, 
 the Boers have much in common with them, as 
 combatants. To the adaptation of methods to 
 environment which distinguishes both, as it 
 docs natives usually, they have further brought 
 the brain capacity of the white man ; and instead 
 of the tribal tradition of the Indian, they have 
 that of a known common history and of a 
 national existence, which, although excessively 
 loose and unorganized, furnishes a certain bond 
 of cohesion. Concert of action and persistence 
 are thereby attainable to a degree impossible to 
 the Indians, ever prone to disintegration, and 
 fickle with the fickleness of the savage. In 
 scope of design and intelligence of direction 
 there is also no comparison. Let it be added 
 that in both cases the methods of fighting are 
 not external habits, assumed like a change of 
 garments, or superinduced as training upon 
 a recruit, but the outgrowth of surrounding 
 circumstances and everyday life ; an evolution 
 rather than a system, and marked therefore with 
 a spontaneity, a facility, and a readiness, not to 
 be attained offhand by imitators. As well might 
 a coat be expected to rival the skin in adapting 
 itself to the form and movements of the body.
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 7 5 
 
 Forces of this character, acting within their 
 usual environment, and unimpeded by consider- 
 ations common to men of complex civilization, 
 possess a power of injury and an elusivcness 
 which are enormous ; to be matched only by 
 their powerlessness for good, and for self- 
 initiated progress in the civil order. To meet 
 the conditions in South Africa — which, though 
 not unparalleled in kind are perhaps unpre- 
 cedented in degree, because the brains of white 
 men are utilizing the capacities and immunities 
 of the savage — are needed both adequate 
 methods, probably somewhat original in char- 
 acter, and also familiarity with the particular 
 circumstances which practice alone confers. 
 In this also, and for this reason. Kitchener's 
 command must be much more competent now 
 than it possibly could be a twelvemonth ago. 
 
 Some very bad blunders are doubtless charge- 
 able against the management of British detach- 
 ments in the early and more regular part of the 
 war — blunders against which the training of 
 the of^cers should have been sufificient preven- 
 tion ; but I cannot see so much discredit, as 
 the apparent loss of prestige would imply, in 
 the mere fact that a final blow has not yet been
 
 76 The Influence of the South African War 
 
 dealt to the novel and Irregular resistance now 
 encountered. The task is one historically and 
 proverbially difficult. I am not an expert in 
 knowledge of our Indian wars; but I have 
 greatly misunderstood what has been said and 
 written, if the most successful methods there 
 applied have not been the joint product of prac- 
 tice and of that species of mental effort which 
 corresponds to invention in industrial life, — a 
 happy thought occurring to an individual whose 
 mind is absorbed in overcoming difficulties 
 with which he has made a thorough experi- 
 mental acquaintance.^ The history of our 
 Indian hostilities is not without its record of 
 grave perplexities, of bafflement, or of occasional 
 appalling disaster; and in the present case, 
 upon a fair balancing of achievement against 
 
 ^To Lord Kitchener, thus pondering, and driven by experiment 
 from one expedient to another, there came the solution of the block- 
 house system. The problem before him, and the underlying prin- 
 ciple of the plan adopted, have been thus described since the peace. 
 " An army largely immobile," partly from natural characteristics and 
 partly from the absolute necessity of hovering near railway lines, to 
 the protection of which it was tied, " had to cope with one entirely 
 mobile. He used his immobile troops to form artificial frontiers " 
 (the blockhouse lines) "against which the enemy could be driven. 
 It was a heavy task, but he had found the solution, and the Boers 
 were quick to recognize the fact. They saw in the blockhouse line 
 and the drive the end of their struggle, which depended all through 
 upon unlimited power of evasion." — LottJofi Times, July 12, 1902.
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 7 7 
 
 difficulty, I should find ground for increase of 
 hope rather than for diminution of prestige. 
 The man in the street, I fear, judges differently, 
 and his judgment is prestige. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, while I can see 
 abundant room for criticism of detail, I do not 
 in the military record find cause to warrant 
 loss of prestige. The main defect of the aver- 
 agre British officer — that he is not what the 
 
 o 
 
 French call instruit, nor even disposed to be- 
 come so — has been his trouble historically and 
 always ; and it is emphasized now by an enforce- 
 ment of systematic training in continental 
 armies, and by the United States in their mili- 
 tary academy, with which the British authorities 
 are not inclined to comply, either in army or 
 navy. The successes of Great Britain in other 
 times have been attained under this disadvan- 
 tage. To meet difficulties as they arise, instead 
 of by foresight, to learn by hard experience 
 rather than by reflection or premeditation, are 
 national traits ; just as is contempt for consti- 
 tutions which are made instead of evolved. 
 Personally, if I must choose, I prefer the knowl- 
 edge given by experience, the acquirements of 
 growth to those of formulated instruction ;
 
 78 The Influence of the South African War 
 
 but I see no reason wh}'^ one should exclude 
 the other, to the injury of both. The British 
 officer might possess more knowledge, more 
 reading, more grasp of precedent and principle, 
 without injuring his adaptability. The stu- 
 dent's lamp has its part as well as the football 
 field or the cricket ground in equipping an 
 officer. 
 
 So much for contemplating the reasonable in- 
 fluence upon military prestige of what has so far 
 occurred and now exists in South African condi- 
 tions. Upon the broader question of present 
 prestige of the Empire I cannot enlarge, and 
 will limit myself to a brief enumeration of exist- 
 ing factors as they appear to me, with an esti- 
 mate of the consequent real status of the Empire 
 among the Powers of the world. 
 
 First among symptoms is one which, to my 
 mind, sfives immeasurable assurance of national 
 power — the sure guarantee of prestige — and 
 that is the progress towards unanimity in the 
 nation, centring round the idea of Imperialism, 
 and finding an immediate impetus in the South 
 African problem. Whatever the faults of a 
 Government, or the failures of an army, a unan- 
 imous and sustained national spirit is the vital
 
 upon the Preslige of the Bi^itish Empire 79 
 
 force, of which prestige is at best but the out- 
 ward sign and faint reflection. The increase 
 of unanimity throughout the Empire is wit- 
 nessed both by the movement of the Colonies, 
 and by the rejection of the disintegrating ten- 
 dency in the Liberal party by its younger and 
 abler members, to whom the future belongs. 
 Imperialism has shown itself an idea capable of 
 quickening national self-consciousness, of be- 
 stowing strength of purpose, and of receiving- 
 indefinite expansion. 
 
 Again, the sea-power of the Empire still 
 stands pre-eminent. I do not here consider 
 the accuracy of the many allegations made, of 
 failure on the part of the Government to main- 
 tain necessary progress. Even if these be true, 
 no irreparable harm has yet been done. The 
 Imperial movement of the Colonies, in con- 
 tributing to the war, is greatly contributive to 
 sea-power. By strengthening the Imperial 
 tie, it gives assurance of local support in many 
 seas — the bases — which sea-power requires; 
 while the military effort, and the experience 
 gained by the colonial troops engaged, render 
 the defence and security of these local bases 
 much more solid than ever before, because
 
 8o The Influence of the South African War 
 
 dependent upon men experienced in warfare. 
 The foundations are surer. 
 
 Again, closely connected with this last con- 
 sideration is the inevitable superior efficiency of 
 the army at large, Imperial as well as colonial, 
 consequent on this protracted experience of war. 
 I made this remark twenty months ago to an 
 American audience, which I believed to be 
 impressed with the idea of lost prestige, and 
 forgetful of this prolonged warlike practice, 
 obvious as its effect upon efficiency should be. 
 The comment rests now on an even wider 
 and firmer basis than when first uttered. The 
 British army, including colonial contingents, 
 is to-day, to the number of over 200,000 men, a 
 vastly more useful instrument than it could 
 have been two years ago ; and this gain will 
 last for at least a decade, as a matter of inter- 
 national calculation, just as the disbanded but 
 tempered forces of the United States remained 
 after the Civil War. 
 
 The Confederation of the Empire, whatever 
 shape that may ultimately, if ever, attain, has 
 doubtless been furthered, not hindered, by the 
 war. Community of sentiment and community 
 of action have both been fostered. I would
 
 up 071 the Prestige of the British Empi^'e 8 1 
 
 not speak with exaggeration, nor overlook the 
 immense difficulties in maintaining community 
 of interest and of aim between political entities 
 so widely scattered as the component parts of 
 the Empire. The work is one of time, of tact, 
 and labor. I say only that the war has furth- 
 ered it, and most justly; for from the point 
 of view of the British Islands alone — the 
 Imperial idea apart — the war, so far from be- 
 ing selfish, has been self-sacrificing. It is the 
 Empire, not the Mother Country, that is most 
 interested in this comparatively ex-centric and 
 remote dependency. 
 
 In development of power, both local and 
 general, therefore, I believe the war to have 
 strengthened materially the British Empire, 
 and I believe it has likewise given renewed and 
 increased force to the spirit of union, of con- 
 centration upon great ideals, without which 
 material strength runs to waste. As an im- 
 mediate result, I look for the establishment 
 of a group of South African communities, in 
 which the English tradition of law and liberty 
 will henceforth prevail, partly by force of con- 
 quest, partly because of its inherent fitness to 
 
 survive. Of this eminent inherent fitness the 
 
 6
 
 82 The Influence of the South African War 
 
 United States of America gives the most signal 
 illustration, because, though so heterogeneous 
 in the composition of its jDopulation, the Eng- 
 lish tongue and the Ensrlish tradition overbear 
 all competitors, reconcile in themselves all 
 rivalries, and sustain themselves in directive 
 control; modified doubtless, but not weakened, 
 by the variety of foreign influences to which 
 they are subjected. 
 
 With these obvious gains — development of 
 Imperial purpose, strengthening of Imperial 
 ties, broadening and confirming the bases of 
 sea-power, increase of military efficiency, dem- 
 onstrated capacity to send and to sustain 
 200,000 men on active service, for two years, 
 6000 miles from home— I do not believe the 
 international prestige of Great Britain has 
 sunk in foreign Cabinets, however it may be 
 reckoned in the streets and cafes of foreio;n 
 cities. Against this, in order to support a 
 charge of loss of prestige, is set the weary pro- 
 longation of the war. Men need not deceive 
 themselves ; there is here no even balance. 
 The gain outweighs the loss. I unfeignedly 
 wish that the war, with its sorrows and sus- 
 pense, might end; but it remains true, sad
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 83 
 
 though the argument is, that the more com- 
 pletely the Boer exhausts himself now, the 
 more convinced and the more final will his 
 submission necessarily be. 
 
 I have not thought it incumbent upon me, 
 or even becoming, to enter into discussion of 
 the vexed question concerning the manage- 
 ment of the later stage of the war by the 
 Home Government. The conduct of a par- 
 ticular government, like that of a particular 
 general, gives no assured indication of national 
 worth, unless its ei^ciency or inefficiency pro- 
 ceeds, clearly and inevitably, from causes in- 
 trinsically national ; as from a close division 
 in national sentiment, or failure in material 
 resources. There is no sign of such division 
 or such failure at the present time; rather the 
 contrary. Whatever the fault or merit of the 
 present Government, challenged as I know it 
 to be by many of its own followers as well as 
 by the Opposition, the point considered in this 
 paper is not the deserts of a group of individ- 
 uals, but the real power of the nation, on which 
 its prestige should depend. It will be retorted 
 that this begs the question, that the nation 
 cannot put forth its power without the neces-
 
 84 The Influence of the South African War 
 
 sary and adequate instrument which a Govern- 
 ment is intended to supply, and which, it is 
 urged, this Government does not. The argu- 
 ment, I think, is exaggerated. Governments 
 may do more or less ; they may impede or 
 facilitate ; but they cannot prevent the exertion 
 of the national will. That they have not done 
 so in this instance is assured — to me — by 
 the very recent assertion, resting on the ven- 
 erated authority of Lord Roberts, that " Lord 
 Kitchener, in whom we all have implicit con- 
 fidence, has never made one single demand for 
 men, for horses, or for stores, that has not been 
 immediately complied with." This result is 
 quite compatible with much error, delay, and 
 extravagance ; but nevertheless it is the main 
 point secured. The nation does well to be 
 watchful and exacting, for in the wretched 
 plight to which the regular party Opposition 
 is reduced, voluntary organization or individual 
 criticism must supply the corrective of super- 
 vision, without which ofificials never, and private 
 individuals rarely, do their best; but when Lord 
 Roberts can say what he has it is clear that 
 much has been done, even thouQ^h the most 
 may not have been. Loss of prestige, worth
 
 upon the Prestige of the British Empire 85 
 
 considering, will come when the nation loses 
 heart. 
 
 This article, as first penned in November, 
 1 90 1, ended here. As it opened with comment 
 upon the fundamental primary definition of the 
 word " prestige," let us now, nearly a year later, 
 recur to the secondary accepted meaning, as 
 given by authorities. " Prestige is the moral 
 influence which past successes, as the pledge 
 and promise of future ones, breed." The 
 British war in South Africa, esteemed by many 
 to be of doubtful outcome when I first wrote, 
 has since been carried to a victorious issue. It 
 is now a past success ; can it be considered to 
 carry pledge and promise for the future.'* A 
 correct answer must depend upon due con- 
 sideration of conditions. A year ago belief in 
 the final result, now realized, rested upon an 
 intellectual appreciation of the decisive facts 
 then attainable, reinforced by a reference to the 
 historical teaching: of British warfare in the 
 past. Putting aside the particular merit of 
 individuals, as foreign to the general estimate, 
 success in the present instance, as on former 
 occasions, has been due to national tenacity.
 
 86 The Injliicncc of the South African War 
 
 and ultimate aptitude to meet conditions as 
 they arise, combined with the essential justice 
 of the national contention. It has been gained 
 despite a certain degree of unreadiness and 
 inadequacy at the outset, which cannot be pro- 
 nounced wholly excusable. Great Britain has 
 won, as she has before, by national endurance, 
 supported by superior resources, and strength- 
 ened by the felt goodness of her cause around 
 which determination could harden. In these 
 substantial strong qualities of national charac- 
 ter, the foundations of her prestige are seen to 
 be the same that they were a year ago, and 
 have commonly been in the past. Another 
 demonstration has been added ; but her people 
 may hope that she will not further tempt for- 
 tune by failing to correct practical deficiencies 
 which have been revealed.
 
 MOTIVES TO IMPERIAL 
 FEDERATION
 
 MOTIVES TO IMPERIAL 
 FEDERATION 
 
 March, 1902. 
 
 WITHIN the last twenty years Great 
 Britain has passed through two crises 
 which should appeal strongly to the attention 
 and intelligence — if not also to the practical 
 sympathy — of Americans. Not only have 
 they an analogy to problems we ourselves have 
 met and solved in the course of our national 
 existence, but the result to which they 
 tend, by confirming the power of the British 
 Empire, will probably strengthen likewise the 
 external policy of the United States during the 
 next generation. Interest, due in any case, 
 is emphasized by the fact that the issue at 
 stake has been the same in both these momen- 
 tous instances. Under all superficial divergen- 
 ces and misleading appearances, the real ques- 
 tion about Ireland and about South Africa has 
 been, " Shall Great Britain exist as an Empire,
 
 90 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 or shall it fall to pieces by a series of willing 
 or tolerated secessions ? " As Joseph said to 
 Pharaoh concerning the two visions of the lean 
 kine and the blasted ears, — the dream is one. 
 The impetus given to Imperial Federation by 
 the South African war, the striking root 
 downward and bearing fruit upward of the 
 imperial idea, has doubtless been immense ; 
 but the moment really decisive of the Em- 
 pire's future — as an Empire — is to be 
 sought in the period when Mr. Parnell's effort 
 at disruption obtained the support of Mr. 
 Gladstone. That was the critical instant, 
 which determined both that the conception 
 should come to the birth, and that, being born, 
 it should not be strangled in its cradle. 
 
 An impressive article published in 1885, on 
 the eve of the general election which resulted 
 in that disastrous stroke of policy, Mr. Glad- 
 stone's Irish Bill, both foretold its coming and, 
 in a spirit of prophecy, perhaps not fully con- 
 scious of the scope of its utterance, predicted 
 likewise the inevitable revulsion of the nation 
 from a foreign policy marked by constant 
 feebleness and repeated disgrace, as well as 
 from an economical propaganda which, what-
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 9 1 
 
 ever its possible fitness to a future yet distant, 
 had too far outrun the general sentiment of the 
 people to be practicable. The foreign policy 
 — summed up in the words of Candahar, 
 Majuba, Suakim, Khartoum, and Gordon — 
 was identified by the writer with the name of 
 Mr. Gladstone ; the economical programme 
 with that of Mr. Chamberlain. Neither the 
 one nor the other was longer acceptable. The 
 issue indicated, and since fulfilled, was the 
 abatement of interest in internal changes and 
 the concentration of national sentiment upon 
 external policy. 
 
 It needed only the announcement of Mr. 
 Gladstone's Irish Bill of 1886 to precipitate the 
 conclusion, for which men's minds were already 
 prepared. The Irish measure, in form a matter 
 of arrangement internal to the United King- 
 dom, was in essence one of which the gravest 
 bearing was upon external policy; for in prin- 
 ciple it involved the dissolution of the Empire. 
 It is to the undying honor and distinction of 
 Mr. Chamberlain that he quickly recognized 
 the issue, and decided without hesitation that 
 the existence of the nation and of the Empire, 
 in undiminished power, involved the interests
 
 92 Alotives to Imperial Federation 
 
 of every class of the community, and therefore 
 utterly exceeded in immediate importance all 
 projects of social readjustment. Subordinating 
 to the general welfare the objects with which 
 he had been most closely associated, he sep- 
 arated himself from the party of his lifelong 
 allegiance, wherein lay the best hope of accom- 
 plishing his social programme, and thenceforth 
 has given pre-eminence to the imperial interests 
 which he saw threatened. This postponement 
 of political objects involved a sacrifice of per- 
 sonal ambition, to be appreciated only by recall- 
 ing the conditions of that time. The same 
 astute observer, writing but a year later, when 
 the momentous step had been taken, derided its 
 finality. " Mr. Chamberlain is the obvious suc- 
 cessor of Mr. Gladstone in leadership of the 
 democracy. It is idle to suppose he would 
 sacrifice this prospect for the sake of taking 
 a subordinate position in a Conservative or 
 even a Coalition Ministry. Sooner or later the 
 logic of facts must separate him from his present 
 associates. . . . His assistance to Unionists 
 is welcome as long as it lasts. Of its essence, 
 however, it is transitory. Mr. Chamberlain 
 will return to the Liberal fold, probably at no
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 93 
 
 remote date." The logic of one great thought, 
 Imperial Unity, the exclusive leading of the 
 single eye, has falsified these predictions ; but 
 it is only fair to accept their measurement 
 of what Mr. Chamberlain surrendered by his 
 act. 
 
 It is to be apprehended that the recent 
 striking outburst of blended national and impe- 
 rial sentiments in Great Britain and her colonies, 
 the display of unified enthusiasm sweeping over 
 the various quarters of the Empire, has been an 
 unpleasant surprise to the world at large. In 
 it has been recognized the strong bond of 
 national feeling, oneness of origin and blood, 
 joined to and inspiring the imperial conviction 
 which involves a fundamental unity of policy. 
 If, in the union of the two, deed answered to 
 word, if success followed upon attempt, a power 
 nothing short of new had arisen in the world. 
 The fluttering conception of twenty years ago 
 had become a reality ; incipient, perhaps, but 
 with what a possible future ! To this, doubt- 
 less, lias been due in great part the correspond- 
 ing unanimity of denunciation on the Continent. 
 An unexpected manifestation of power and reso- 
 lution has elicited an echoing outcry from disap-
 
 94 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 pointed anticipation. It is not quite thirty 
 years (1874) since a foreign naval captain 
 remarked to me that in his belief England was 
 a " colosse a pieds d'argile." This impression 
 was general. The phrase voiced a wish as 
 well as a thought ; and it may be said that 
 then there was much to justify the implied 
 prophecy, whether it took the shape of a hope or 
 a fear, prompted by dislike or by affection. The 
 tendency of the great money-getting era of 
 trade and material prosperity, of exclusive 
 devotion to purely commercial ideas, of the 
 prevalence of strictly national, internal, domes- 
 tic interests over colonial sympathies and impe- 
 rial ambitions, was then culminating to its 
 decline ; and one looked in vain for the appear- 
 ance of higher aspirations and broader views, 
 bearing promise of a fresh spring to national 
 life. A down grade seemed at hand. 
 
 After the long supremacy of the doUars- 
 and-cents standards of policy, which arose and 
 flourished in the middle of the nineteenth 
 century, to languish and droop with its clos- 
 ing decades, experience is refreshed, and hope 
 stimulated, by the sight of two great peoples, 
 who speak the same tongue and inherit the
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 95 
 
 same tradition, casting aside considerations of 
 mere monetary cost and abandoning them- 
 selves to the domination of a lofty ideal. 
 This the United States did in 1861 under the 
 tremendous impetus exerted by the simple 
 words " The Union," which, cherished almost 
 to idolatry by the boyhood of the North dur- 
 ing preceding generations, — as the writer well 
 remembers, — lifted the nation to its feet as one 
 man when disruption threatened. The Union 
 was to us a personification, devotion to which 
 probably afforded the nearest approach to per- 
 sonal loyalty that the spirit of our institutions 
 warrants. Again, although to a less degree, 
 in the Philippines matter, where no such com- 
 manding motive or long tradition exists to 
 inspire, there is nevertheless to be found, 
 surely disengaging itself from the confused 
 tumult of impressions inevitable upon deci- 
 sions taken in the heat of pressing action, the 
 deep conviction, widespread among the people, 
 that here is no mere question of gain or loss, 
 of land or money, but one of moral responsi- 
 bility. Upon us has devolved, by an inevitable 
 sequence of causes, responsibility to our con- 
 science for an assemblage of peoples in moral
 
 96 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 and political childhood ; and responsibility 
 further to the world at large, and to history, 
 
 — the supreme earthly judge of men's actions, 
 
 — for our course in the emergency thrust upon 
 us. As such, the United States has accepted 
 the burden. Its duties are not to be dis- 
 charged by throwing them overboard, or by 
 wrapping our political talent in a napkin for 
 our own national security and ease. 
 
 The noble record of Great Britain in Egypt 
 during the past twenty years, justly considered, 
 gives inspiration and direction to our purposes 
 for the Philippines. External conditions are 
 doubtless most diverse ; but, if the informing 
 spirit be the same, it will adapt itself to the 
 circumstances, and the good-will find the way 
 to manifest itself in the damp lowlands and 
 mountains of the islands as surely as in the 
 dry Nile Valley. Here the example has been 
 set us for encouragement ; and to cavilers at 
 the integrity of our purpose, or at the advantage 
 of our efforts to a subject people, we have but 
 to cite Egypt, which, like the Philippines, and 
 but a few years before them, is emerging from 
 along period of oppression, to advance through 
 national childhood to such measure of self-
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 97 
 
 administration as its people may prove fit 
 for. 
 
 As regards the question of federal union, the 
 priority of experience is reversed. However 
 great the difference of conditions here pre- 
 sented to the British Empire and to America, — 
 and it is at least greater than the diversity be- 
 tween the Philippines and Egypt, — the United 
 States has been first to find a solution. The 
 American colonies began their attempt under 
 the difficulty of mutual alienation, due to long 
 standing tradition, and with interests differing 
 probably more radically than those which now 
 exist between the several English-speaking 
 parts of the British Empire. Despite this 
 serious initial obstacle, the thirteen original 
 States, aided later by those afterwards consti- 
 tuted, worked out the problem of union through 
 a prolonged period of perplexity, anxiety, re- 
 pulsion, and dissension. The final achievement 
 has been so complete that the men of to-day 
 have almost lost the very memory of the ante- 
 cedent traVail, and of the narrow margin by 
 which ruin was more than once escaped. Here, 
 as in Egypt, but with more vital issues, there is 
 the cheering example of success; wrung in this 
 
 7
 
 98 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 instance out of the jaws of imminent failure. 
 Hence, while the difference of circumstances 
 surrounding the problem of Imperial Federa- 
 tion precludes in great measure any advantage 
 of precedents to be found in the historic path 
 by which the American communities made 
 their way to union, it may safely be argued 
 that, if the informing spirit of desire be present, 
 the adequate motives to a closer imperial bond 
 recognized, the questions of form and method 
 will be solved in the one case as they have 
 been in the other. In both, the purpose and 
 end is the same : to assure unified, or imperial, 
 external action, by the means of an adequate 
 organ, common to all, while preserving the in- 
 dependence of the several parts in their in- 
 ternal affairs. Whatever the particular solution 
 appropriate to either, both present the diflfi- 
 culty of reconciling in practical working two 
 principles, which in terms appear contradictory, 
 whereas in fact they may prove complementary. 
 Questions of such difficult character do not 
 recommend themselves to practical mankind 
 as political conundrums, in answering which 
 the satisfaction of the intellect is its own sufifi- 
 cient reward. They are not accepted by men
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 99 
 
 as recreations, but are forced upon them by 
 urgency. They must supply their own ade- 
 quate motive, and propose their own reasonable 
 end, or they receive no attention. Only by 
 motives most grave, by danger most pressing, 
 by inconveniences serious in the present and 
 threatening to be intolerable in the future, 
 were the American States first driven into a 
 combination, imperfect and often grudging. 
 From this, still under the pressure of renewed 
 urgency, they advanced into a union more per- 
 fect in form but still sadly lacking in unity, 
 either of understanding or sentiment, until, 
 finally, to avert dismemberment, physical force 
 itself had to be exerted by those who had come 
 not only to believe in the Union, but by long 
 unquestioning devotion to love it supremely. 
 Mutual jealousy, quite as much as mutual 
 love, characterized the first efforts of the States 
 at association. As feeling grew kinder and 
 warmer, divergence of interest and of political 
 ideals still tended to preserve and to promote 
 the elements of repulsion, as was shown in the 
 debates on the acceptance of the present Con- 
 stitution, and in many incidents of checkered 
 national life through two generations. Ulti-
 
 lOO Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 mately, translated into broader action, from 
 individual States to groups of States, the last 
 manifestation of the disruptive tendency took on 
 a sectional form, upon a scale so large that the 
 ensuins: war was in character rather international 
 than "civil," as it has been commonly styled. 
 
 With one exception, there does not exist 
 among the different bodies which should com- 
 pose a federal Empire of Great Britain the 
 traditional alienation which hampered the 
 movement of the American States in their first 
 efforts towards union. The exception, of 
 course, is Ireland. Practically regarded, it is 
 impossible for a military man, or a statesman 
 with appreciation of military conditions, to 
 look at the map and not perceive that the am- 
 bition of Irish separatists, if realized, would be 
 even more threatening to the national life of 
 Great Britain than the secession of the South 
 was to that of the American Union. It would 
 be deadlier, also, to imperial aspirations ; for 
 Ireland, by geographical position, lies across 
 and controls the communications of Great 
 Britain with all the outside world, save only 
 that considerable, but far from preponderant, 
 portion which borders the North Sea and the
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation loi 
 
 Baltic. Independent and hostile, it would 
 manacle Great Britain, which at present is, and 
 for years to come must remain, by long odds 
 the most powerful member of the federation, if 
 that take form. The Irish question, therefore, 
 is vitally important, not to Great Britain only, 
 but to the colonies. The considerations that 
 swayed the mind of the Union in the Civil 
 War apply with peculiar force to the connec- 
 tion between Great Britain and Ireland. And 
 let it be distinctly noted that the geographical 
 relation of Ireland to Great Britain imposes as 
 indispensable a political relation which would 
 be fatal to any scheme of federation between 
 the mother country and the remote great col- 
 onies. The legislative supremacy of the British 
 parliament, against the assertion of which the 
 American colonists revolted, and which to-day 
 would be found intolerable in exercise in Can- 
 ada and Australia, cannot be yielded in the 
 case of an island where independent action 
 might very well be attended with fatal conse- 
 quences to its partner. The instrument for 
 such action, in the shape of an independent 
 parliament, could not safely be trusted even to 
 avowed friends.
 
 I02 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 The constant lightening of control by the 
 mother country, and the concession of substan- 
 tial self-government, have removed from the 
 problem before Great Britain and her colonics 
 the initial disadvantage under which the Amer- 
 ican States drew together ; but, on the other 
 hand, the idea of Imperial Federation long 
 awaited the impulse which they received, first 
 from a common extreme danger, and afterwards 
 from their close contact with one another, 
 which emphasized the general injury that 
 mutual independence and inconsiderate action 
 were daily causing. It is not fanciful to say 
 that, as the common dangers to the American 
 colonies from the power of Great Britain, which 
 was to them irresistible unless they combined, 
 supplied the first motive to effectual association ; 
 so the needed impulse, urgent if not imperative, 
 was found by the members of the British Em- 
 pire in the danger and threatened oppression 
 of one of their number by alien blood. The 
 feeling of nationality, the sentiment of one 
 blood and one political tradition, wrought pow- 
 erfully in support of imperial action in South 
 Africa ; and it is a commonplace that action 
 intensifies sentiment.
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 103 
 
 When the American colonists united in form, 
 however defective, they had made a large prac- 
 tical step towards the sentiment of union, which 
 as a constraining force is even stronger than 
 interest. In that which has been well named 
 " the critical period " of American history, be- 
 tween the War of Independence and the adop- 
 tion of the Constitution, the love of the Union 
 showed itself forcibly in the utterances even of 
 those who dreaded union on the terms proposed. 
 When we consider the narrow majorities by 
 which these were accepted, it is easy to believe 
 that only the realization in act of the first union, 
 that of the Confederacy, made possible the 
 second, — the federal Union. When the British 
 colonies and the mother country, three years 
 ago, rose together in defence of a threatened 
 brother and child, translating into action an 
 idea nascent but as yet weak in its grasp of 
 men's affections, they also advanced a first 
 stage, the most important stage, in the direc- 
 tion of a further unity, under such ultimate 
 form as their particular relations may de- 
 mand. The analogy of the two cases is per- 
 fectly real. The idea of union was not new 
 to Americans before their Revolution. On
 
 I04 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 the contrary, its advantages were obvious ; 
 but all attempts prompted by manifest in- 
 terest fell abortive, until pressure was sup- 
 plied by the Stamp Act and its train of 
 incidents. The legislation of the Transvaal, 
 supplemented by the Afrikander Bond, has 
 fulfilled the same ofBce in the history of Impe- 
 rial Federation ; unless, indeed, a prior claim 
 to that honor be established for Mr. Parnell. 
 Not the conception nor yet tentative theories 
 were wanting ; but languid inclination had to 
 be quickened into stirring life by contact with 
 pressing occasion- 
 Two successive dangers, Ireland and South 
 Africa, have thus contributed to the onward 
 movement of imperialism in Great Britain. 
 They have indicated a need and furnished a 
 motive. The first gave birth to aspiration, con- 
 scious and definite, towards a higher form of 
 imperial development; corresponding in anal- 
 ogy, though by no means necessarily in outward 
 resemblance, to the "more perfect union " of 
 the once loosely combined American States. 
 The second emphasized the wisdom of such a 
 policy by a concrete example of its advantages. 
 Aspiration, having found its opportunity, was
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 1 05 
 
 translated into action ; and action in turn rein- 
 forces and stimulates aspiration by demonstra- 
 tion, and by its powerful effect upon sentiment, 
 the great motive force of humanity. Happily, 
 too, for the general impulse, the illustration of 
 advantage has been afforded in one of die great 
 colonies, where national self-existence, entire 
 independence of outside control, and exemption 
 from the exposure attendant upon an imperial 
 war, might have a preponderant hold upon 
 men's minds. The specific utility of the impe- 
 rial connection to the large secondary members 
 was shown ; for the menace to one of them 
 came from a State which, though in form in- 
 ternal to the Empire, was in fact and power 
 external as well as alien. 
 
 Similar conditions may well arise elsewhere, 
 with extreme increase of danger to one of the 
 great colonies, if severed by independence from 
 the support of the British navy. Canada, 
 doubtless, whatever she might lose otherwise, 
 would find territorial immunity in the policy of 
 the United States, avowed in the Monroe 
 Doctrine, — as applicable to her as to South 
 America; but to South Africa, Australia, and 
 New Zealand, local difficulties, — such as those
 
 1 06 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 of the Transvaal, and of New Guinea twenty 
 years ago, — would, in the absence of the impe- 
 rial bond, assume a very different aspect if 
 incurred with a powerful European naval State. 
 These instances also bring into conspicuous 
 evidence the general truth that sea power, the 
 material strength and bond of an Empire the 
 component parts of which are separated by 
 thousands of miles of ocean, is equally essen- 
 tial to the individual security of the several 
 members. Imperial Federation, in action, will 
 manifest itself pre-eminently along ocean and 
 naval lines. 
 
 At present the large colonies, while retain- 
 ing their hold upon the support of the Empire, 
 to the power of which they in turn can con- 
 tribute much, substantially control all that 
 relates to their internal affairs. Taxation, 
 regulation of commerce, the purse and the 
 sword, are in their own hands. Were they to 
 become immediately independent, no jar would 
 be felt in the continuance of the local adminis- 
 tration. The appointment of the governors 
 by the Crown, may, if choice be judicious, 
 materially help to maintain the reality, as it 
 does the form, of political attachment to the
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 107 
 
 mother country ; but the actual government 
 is parliamentary, and assumption of independ- 
 ence would not necessarily involve any serious 
 modification of institutions. Further, in two 
 out of the three large aggregations of colonial 
 communities, in Canada and in Australia, there 
 exists now a federal compact, by which bodies 
 but a few years ago politically separate, linked 
 only by common allegiance to Great Britain, 
 are united into one State. British South 
 Africa still remains an assemblage of colonies, 
 with particular local and domestic difficulties 
 of their own, on which it is inopportune here 
 to enlarge. 
 
 These are the present political conditions of 
 the principal factors of which an Imperial 
 Federation, if realized, will be composed. It 
 seems inevitable, however, that, when the re- 
 sistance of the Boers shall have ended, some 
 form of union will be requisite to insure the 
 dominance of British political ideas and tradi- 
 tions throughout the mass of South African 
 colonists; for in such community of sentiment 
 a federal union of the Empire must find the 
 homo2:eneousness without which it will be but 
 a vain word. The term nation, it is said,
 
 I oS Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 applies primarily to community of blood ; but 
 I question whether a closer bond is not to be 
 found in inherited acceptance, inborn and in- 
 bred, of the same political ideas, fundamental 
 laws, and habits of thought, which regulate the 
 relations and intercourse between man and 
 man, and constitute congeniality. If to these 
 a common tongue be added, environment will 
 have done more to promote unity than it is in 
 the power of mere blood to effect. 
 
 It may fairly be questioned whether the 
 phrase Imperial Federation is not something 
 of a misnomer, altogether too broad in its im- 
 plication. It has obtained currency ; and in 
 a general way is understood with as much pre- 
 cision as is perhaps attainable in the present 
 inchoate stage of the idea involved. Are all 
 parts of the present Empire to be admitted as 
 component States in the Federation } Take 
 India as the crucial instance, on account of 
 its extent and population, extremely important 
 elements in state existence; is its constitution, 
 racial, social, and political, such that it could 
 be admitted at the present time as one of 
 several self-governing communities, under the 
 federation of which the affairs of the Federal
 
 Motives to Lnpcrial Federation 1 09 
 
 State, the interests common to all, and the 
 external policy of the whole, could be adminis- 
 tered? Can India be properly described as a 
 State? Without statehood a community can 
 be a member of an Empire, as a dependency, 
 but it can scarcely be a member of a federation. 
 Logomachies, when nothing more, are un- 
 profitable ; but in attempting the solution of 
 such a problem, difficult both on the intellectual 
 and the practical sides, accuracy of expression 
 demands closeness of thought, and is rewarded 
 by increased clearness of vision as to the exact 
 nature of the object desired. I do not propose 
 myself to pursue the interrogatory I have sug- 
 gested; but apparently the aim of those who 
 desire federation, the importance of which is 
 to me undeniable, should not be so much a 
 federated Empire — is not that a contradiction 
 in terms? — as a federal State, or kingdom, 
 composed of some half-dozen principal mem- 
 bers, substantially homogeneous in their prin- 
 ciples of government. To this system would 
 remain attached a huge dominion of subordi- 
 nate communities, differing much between 
 themselves in size and importance, as well as 
 in blood, institutions, and social development.
 
 1 1 o Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 and linked together only by the common rule 
 of the Federal State, as they now are by that 
 of the United Kingdom. The Federal King- 
 dom and the dependencies, taken together, and 
 in their respective relations of governing and 
 governed, would compose the Empire. 
 
 It is such rule and control over peoples not 
 yet fully fitted to go alone that in strictness 
 of phrase constitute Empire. Empire is not 
 a particular form of government. It is a fact, 
 independent of particular methods. The Re- 
 public of the United States, already a federal 
 State, has found itself by the impulse and 
 sequence of events in just this position of 
 Empire ; charged with the responsibility of 
 subordinate communities which it would be 
 impossible now to admit to statehood in the 
 federation. Against this condition of empire 
 — actual and inevitable — from which there 
 has been, and is, no escape at once honorable 
 and safe, a small minority of Americans have 
 revolted violently. They regard it as destruc- 
 tive of cherished formulas, political maxims, 
 which are identified with and accurately ex- 
 press the principles of our own national exist- 
 ence and growth, and therefore are assumed,
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 1 1 1 
 
 inconsequently, to apply equally to races en- 
 tirely different in antecedents and in present 
 development. Words and phrases, however, 
 war hopelessly against facts with which they 
 are inconsistent; nor is there any more curious 
 instance than this of veritable and futile I02:- 
 omachy. To more practical Americans, thus 
 committed despite themselves to imperialism 
 after federation, it is impressive to watch a 
 converse process ; to see a consolidated king- 
 dom, a unified State, possessed of an already 
 existing Empire, feeling its way to perpetuation 
 and intension of power by means of federation 
 with those members of its present empire which 
 are homogeneous to itself. 
 
 Imperialism, the extension of national au- 
 thority over alien communities, is a dominant 
 note in the world-politics of to-day. Compara- 
 tively a newcomer, it already contends for pre- 
 eminence with commercial ambition, to which 
 also it ministers. This out-reaching of an 
 imperialistic arm by all the greater nations, 
 whether voluntary or compelled by circum- 
 stances, constitutes and summarizes the motive 
 to a closer union than that which now exists 
 between the members of the British Empire.
 
 1 1 2 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 In the past, Ireland and the Transvaal have 
 given impulsion ; the joresent and the future 
 have further reason, no less imperious. The 
 conditions have ceased under which inde- 
 pendence might conceivably be more advan- 
 tageous to the larger colonies. If ever true, it 
 is no longer so that the colonial tie brings 
 them no compensative advantage for exposure 
 in war. They are now surrounded by ambitions 
 and confronted by navies which till recently 
 did not exist. Once war meant to them only 
 incidental injury; now it may well mean per- 
 manent mutilation to a colony thrown by in- 
 dependence upon its own resources. Not 
 now, if ever, much less now than ever before, 
 can colonial interests be viewed as separate 
 from the politics of Europe and America. In 
 peace as in war, in peace to avert war, or to 
 stay trespass which armed power alone can 
 restrain, each colony now needs the strong arm 
 of the mother country's fleet to sustain its local 
 strength. According to the circumstances, 
 such support may be given either immediately 
 in colonial waters, or by diversion, in Europe 
 or elsewhere, keeping the enemy's battleships 
 remote. In one way or the other it is indis-
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 113 
 
 pensable. With it the colony will be — not 
 invulnerable, perhaps, but — invincible; with- 
 out it, immunity can be insured only by the 
 maintenance of a local navy approaching equal- 
 ity with those of Europe. 
 
 The greater European powers are now colo- 
 nially present in several quarters of the globe, 
 and there renew through their colonies the 
 contact and collision of interests which have 
 marked European history. The histories of 
 Australasia and South Africa, possibly of Can- 
 ada also, are yet to make. Colonial jealousies 
 in turn are transmitted back to the mother 
 countries, and there give rise to diplomatic 
 friction perhaps more dangerous, certainly 
 more frequent, than do questions purely Euro- 
 pean. In the latter, rulers meet facts of terri- 
 torial tenure so founded in popular acceptance 
 and mutual jealousies as to give little expec- 
 tation of facile modification by resort to war. 
 In newer countries, as the history of North 
 America witnesses, the undetermined condi- 
 tions which exist, and the resultant unrest in 
 men's minds, predispose colonists to jealousies 
 which readily find or give provocation ; and 
 strife is promoted by the comparative ease with
 
 1 1 4 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 which great territories may change masters 
 through the fortune of war, as Canada and 
 India, for instance, passed from France to 
 Great Britain in the eighteenth century. In 
 our own day, the political future of the vast 
 tract known as British South Africa is being 
 decided by a war that has found its origin in 
 colonial friction, but to the successful issue of 
 which imperial intervention and sea power 
 were essential. The consequences to Great 
 Britain and her colonies of failure in this case, 
 and the possibilities inherent in the proximity 
 of German East and Southwest Africa, illus- 
 trate further the contingencies with which the 
 present and the future of the British Empire 
 will have to deal. 
 
 This reliance of the colonies upon the 
 mother nation finds its correlative in the fact 
 that European States in turn rest upon their 
 colonies for maintenance in necessary activities. 
 They can no longer extend freely within their 
 own continent, nor there find adequate markets 
 for their ever increasing production ; yet, in 
 order that they may securely expand elsewhere, 
 they must have local support in the several 
 quarters whither their energies reach. This
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 1 1 5 
 
 interaction of mother countries and colonies, 
 their reciprocal dependence and importance, 
 are decisive facts, to which development and 
 organization should be s^iven. For local se- 
 curity, or for the assertion of external rights or 
 interests, the colonies cannot as yet dispense 
 with the material force of the home govern- 
 ment. Without it they are unequal to a con- 
 flict, necessarily in the main naval, with any 
 one of three or four foreign nations whose 
 colonial possessions are near them. A Euro- 
 pean fleet, on the other hand, must rely upon 
 local bases of action far more than in the days 
 when coal renewal was not a question. For 
 this, isolated fortified stations, like Bermuda 
 and Gibraltar, may be most useful from unique 
 geographical situation ; but in intrinsic value 
 they do not compare with positions which have 
 behind them a loyal continent, with extensive 
 social and commercial organization, such as 
 Canada, Australia, and South Africa afford. 
 
 This reciprocal service and utility constitute 
 the chief general and common interest in which 
 the motive to Imperial Federation at present 
 lies. It is not alone, but it is paramount, and 
 will, I think, be found to embrace all the many
 
 1 1 6 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 minor interests which now, and in peace, tend 
 to union; for it defends them, and in defending 
 perpetuates. It is essentially an interest of 
 general defence imposed by novel and growing 
 world-conditions. It must be recognized as 
 covering, not only the local welfare of each and 
 all the parts, but also the communications be- 
 tween them, chiefly by sea, which may, and in 
 large measure do, lie remote from any one of 
 the federation. The several members, and the 
 highways between them, together make one 
 whole, to the maintenance of which each even 
 now contributes. The object of federation is 
 to promote the security of this imperial system 
 and its development on firmer lines. To the 
 general acceptance of this fact of a supreme 
 common interest must be added on all hands a 
 hearty disposition to subordinate local interests 
 to the general welfare, when they clash. Just 
 here, of course, arises the difficulty of realizing 
 any federation, especially in its early stages ; 
 later, like everything possessed of inherent 
 usefulness, federation gains strength by its hold 
 upon men's affections. The difficulty is very 
 real, for not only does each member naturally 
 exaggerate its own claims, but it also tends to
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 1 1 7 
 
 disregard the needs of others, of which it has 
 not immediate experience. Out of touch, out 
 of mind, is the evil genius of all federative 
 efforts, to be expelled only by the superior 
 influence of a dominating affection for the tie 
 of union, through experience of its benefits. 
 
 In the order of logical sequence, federation 
 finds its orisjin and motive force in a common 
 interest, which is the first impulse in the direc- 
 tion of the desired object. The next step is to 
 recognize clearly what is this object, this goal 
 of attainment, by reaching which the admitted 
 interest shall be subserved. The object, I sup- 
 pose, is to provide the several members with 
 an organism, an instrument common to all, 
 which shall be specifically efficient in the main- 
 tenance of the common interests, and inopera- 
 tive towards strictly individual concerns. This 
 object is loosely styled Imperial Federation, 
 but its particular form and the method of 
 attainment are yet indeterminate. The form 
 of an instrument, and the method of its fabri- 
 cation, though dictated by the use for which it 
 is designed, are in process distinct from it. 
 The States of the American Union, for example, 
 having recognized certain common interests,
 
 ii8 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 formed the common object of making a special 
 provision for the care of those specific interests 
 and of none others. The particular method, 
 — adapted subsequently to the recognition of 
 interest and object, — was a central govern- 
 ment fully equipped with executive, legislative, 
 and judicial functions. This form suited them, 
 but most probably may not suit the conditions 
 of the British Empire, the members of which 
 at present seem in the position of having rec- 
 ognized, somewhat imperfectly, a community 
 of interest. Thence has arisen a desire, vague 
 and somewhat feeble, for an object, an instru- 
 ment, they see not yet just what, to which 
 the common interest may be solely intrusted. 
 When minds are definitely settled on these two 
 points, that they have the interest and need 
 the instrument, thinking men will sooner or 
 later evolve methods. In a recent excursion 
 into that realm of unfulfilled prophecy, the 
 magazines of twenty years ago, I found affirmed 
 the hopelessness of Australian federation. Fol- 
 lowing by a few numbers, perhaps elicited by 
 this, Sir Henry Parkes stated that all the more 
 thoughtful men in Australia had thought out 
 in one form or another the question of federa-
 
 Motives to Imperiat Federation 1 1 9 
 
 tion. The result in Australia is now before us. 
 Imperial Federation is doubtless a problem 
 very different in kind, but not necessarily more 
 hopeless. The need being recognized, individ- 
 uals will frame methods, from the discussion 
 of which feasible measures will result. Interest 
 is the foundation of the whole; the object is 
 the building to be raised thereon, the plan of 
 which depends upon the needs of those who 
 shall use it. The interest, again, is self- 
 existent; whether men like it or not, there it 
 is; the object — union in some form — is a 
 matter of voluntary acceptance and purposeful 
 effort on the part of those interested. The 
 method by which the object is to be attained is 
 the last in the mental processes. 
 
 The contrivance of methods requires close 
 detailed knowledge of the political conditions 
 of the several parts, to be attained only by 
 prolonged personal contact. A foreigner of 
 reasonable modesty will here forbear sug- 
 gestion, but may with less presumption con- 
 sider some of the obvious circumstances which 
 make the object more or less desirable, and 
 the methods of its attainment more or less 
 intricate.
 
 1 20 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 From the wide dispersion of the principal 
 members it is evident that each one, by acqui- 
 escing in any federal bond, enters into such 
 new relations with its fellows as involve a 
 policy external to itself, additional to that 
 already existing towards distinctly foreign na- 
 tions. Internal affairs remain in the hands of 
 each one; foreign relations continue unaltered; 
 but superimposed upon both come relations to 
 one another on the part of communities geo- 
 graphically far apart, and heretofore practically 
 severed, save for the loose tie now uniting 
 them to the mother country. These relations 
 are new and are external ; their maintenance 
 involves an established politic action — policy 
 — distinctly external. Moreover, whatever the 
 nature of the federal bond, there is conceded 
 to it a certain amount of the virtually entire 
 independence previously enjoyed. This will 
 be true of Great Britain as well as of the 
 colonies. At the present writing, in the ab- 
 sence of any federal union, the mother country 
 has entire management of the foreign policy 
 of the Empire. Concern for the interests of 
 the colonies, regard to their possible action in 
 case of serious discontent with particular meas-
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 1 2 1 
 
 ures, certainly and necessarily modify the de- 
 cisions of the British Cabinet. In this way the 
 colonies possess influence; but influence is 
 different from power, less assured in exercise, 
 and less dignified in recognition. Colonial in- 
 terests, as affected by foreign relations, not only 
 are not in the hands of the colonists, but they 
 have no constitutional voice in determining 
 them. In this chiefly their dependency now 
 consists ; and Sir Henry Parkes, whose ideal 
 of Australian independence was not severance 
 from the Empire, but entrance upon a due 
 share in the government of a united Empire, 
 avowed his conviction that there was no pos- 
 sibility of permanent contentment with the 
 status of dependency. Deprecating separate 
 independence, he defined the only alternative 
 to be " sharing on equal terms in all the glory 
 of the Empire." The precision of this phrase 
 is in one respect noteworthy. It does not 
 demand an equal share, but a share " on equal 
 terms." This not only admits, but prescribes, 
 that the power constitutionally exercised by 
 each member shall bear some proportion to 
 the strength contributed by it to the whole. 
 Otherwise there is no equality.
 
 122 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 Here, apparently, whatever the method 
 adopted, there will have to be concession on 
 the part of Great Britain. Constitutional re- 
 straint upon her present unlimited control of 
 the foreign policy of the Empire, by some clear 
 voting power on the part of the other mem- 
 bers, would seem an inevitable concomitant of 
 federation. In return, evidently, the colonies 
 by acquiring a voice in the determination of 
 foreign policy would incur a proportionate ob- 
 ligation to bear the burdens necessary to its 
 enforcement. In place of the purely volun- 
 tary and unregulated assistance now given, 
 there must be accepted a compulsory and de- 
 terminate contribution to the general defence. 
 The amounts may be fixed at the first by an 
 agreement to which all the parties may be 
 voluntary participants ; but, unless the federa- 
 tion is to be periodically renewable at choice, 
 — a most unsatisfactory arrangement, — its 
 terms must provide the means for readjust- 
 ment of obligations, as the several parties ad- 
 vance in strength, at rates probably unequal. 
 This is, in effect, entrusting the power of taxa- 
 tion to a central organ established by the federal 
 Constitution. Unless acceptance of this reap-
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation i 2 3 
 
 portionment of burdens, as provided for by the 
 terms of federation, is obligatory upon every 
 member, the federation carries in its constitu- 
 tion the seeds of decay. It is doomed from 
 its birth ; for not only is each member at lib- 
 erty to withdraw, but the sense of that liberty 
 will continually sap the sentiment for union 
 which supplies the spirit of federation, as mu- 
 tual interest does its body. 
 
 We meet here clearly an initial diflRculty in 
 the inequality of population and resources 
 among the members of the supposed federa- 
 tion. I assume that these would be the United 
 Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, the Aus- 
 tralian Commonwealth, New Zealand, and the 
 group of South African colonies, as yet un- 
 combined. These, at least, would be the prin- 
 cipal pillars of the federated Empire. Among 
 them the United Kingdom is now so greatly 
 preponderant, upon any ordinary basis of com- 
 parison, as to outweigh all the others put 
 together. As in the case of the province of 
 Holland amono; the seven United Netherlands, 
 this is in effect a cohesive force now, but it 
 evidently introduces a grave difficulty in the 
 way of formal federation. Shall the colonies
 
 1 24 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 put themselves under bonds to any central 
 body, in which their total voice is outweighed 
 by the vote of the home country ? Could 
 Great Britain accept an arrangement like that 
 of the first American confederacy, where each 
 State, large and small, had one vote ? Is there 
 any feasible combination of these two alterna- 
 tives, such as is to-day presented by the national 
 le2:islature of the United States ? 
 
 It is needless to insist upon the practical 
 dififtculty as to method. Evidently, to over- 
 come it, motive must be strong. We must 
 fall back upon the common interest which 
 points the way to the common object, leaving 
 to the ingenuity of those directly concerned, 
 or to evolution, — perhaps to both, — the de- 
 termination of means. The common interest 
 demands increased mutual support throughout 
 the Empire, in view of the new conditions of 
 the world which have transferred the rivalries 
 and the needs of Europe to colonial and other 
 foreign regions. The object is to reach some 
 working arrangement, by which the several 
 contributions of the various parts of the Em- 
 pire to the general support and defence may 
 be not only determined but enforced. In
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 125 
 
 peace things may drift along as they are ; 
 but Imperial Federation is needed for prob- 
 able emergencies, to combine military prep- 
 aration, to avert war by evident readiness, or 
 to meet it if it come. It requires, therefore, 
 the power of the sword and the purse, guar- 
 anteed by something more binding than the 
 voluntary action from time to time of the in- 
 dividual communities composing it. For sus- 
 tained effort Imperial Federation will be 
 impotent, unless at the very least the several 
 members are willing to accept a fixed burden, 
 periodically determined by some competent 
 body, external to all, but in the constitution 
 of which each, of course, has a voice. The 
 experience of the United States goes farther. 
 They found it not sufficient to determine in a 
 lump amount the proportion due from each 
 member; effective union, efHciency for the 
 defence of the whole, was not obtained until 
 power was given to the central government, — 
 not merely to fix the quotas in men and money 
 of the several States, — but to lay and to exact 
 taxes upon the citizens of all the States, pass- 
 ing over the State governments directly to in- 
 dividual men. The power refused by them to
 
 126 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 the British ParHament was dehberately, for the 
 sake of union, granted to the Congress of the 
 United States, in which the States and their 
 citizens were severally represented. 
 
 This it will be seen was a question of 
 method. Its adoption resulted from long, 
 bitter experience. Only so, and hardly so, was 
 it conceded. It was the final step in the prog- 
 ress to union. Like its predecessors, it was ex- 
 torted by dire emergency. This imparted the 
 motive; bringing men to desire, as a political 
 object, the organism, the scheme, which out 
 of the States framed the Nation and started it 
 on the road to success. To the American mo- 
 tive geographical nearness contributed much ; 
 for the different communities could not help 
 seeing the injury all were receiving from their 
 mutual indifference or antagonism. The mem- 
 bers of the British Empire are in this less 
 fortunate. Their remoteness makes less evi- 
 dent the interaction of conditions and events. 
 That the suffering of one member involves 
 injury to each, because of its effect upon the 
 whole, becomes less easy to realize. Motive 
 thereby becomes less clear and less imperative. 
 The impulse to form an object, and to grapple
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 127 
 
 with the difficulties of method which impede 
 its accomplishment, is weakened. 
 
 Still, the motives are there. Let each mem- 
 ber of the Empire consider, for instance, what 
 it would mean to the general welfare to have 
 an independent and hostile Ireland lying across 
 the access of Great Britain to the outer world. 
 What would the weakening of the chief mem- 
 ber of the Empire be to every other .? What 
 would a conquered and hostile South Africa 
 have meant to Australia? and beyond Aus- 
 tralia, to British influence in the Far East } 
 Can decay of British influence in China be 
 seen with equanimity by Canada, with its Pa- 
 cific seaboard } For the same reason it cannot 
 be indifferent to Canada whether the British 
 navy and commerce, in war, find their way to 
 the Farther East through the Mediterranean, 
 or be forced to the long Cape route. It is, 
 therefore, matter of interest to her, and to 
 Australia, if a hostile naval power be firmly 
 based on the Persian Gulf. In a way, these 
 are internal questions. They are so imme- 
 diately, with reference to the Empire at large ; 
 but it is easy to see that their determination 
 affects powerfully, possibly even vitally, the
 
 128 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 external and foreign relations of the whole and 
 of each part. One member has just been 
 saved from destruction by the com.bined effort 
 of all, supported by the supreme sea power of 
 the mother country. This result, too, is in- 
 ternal to the Empire ; but is it not also of vast 
 importance to its external security and foreign 
 policy ? What has made the Transvaal so 
 formidable to the adjoining colonies and to the 
 Empire ? It is because not only was the pop- 
 ulation hostile, but the hostility was organized, 
 armed, and equipped, under the shield of com- 
 plete self-government. Had Ireland been con- 
 ceded the substance of Mr. Gladstone's bill, or 
 should she hereafter attain it, would not her 
 power of mischief, in case of foreign war, 
 make such demands upon the presence of the 
 British navy as seriously to lessen its ability to 
 protect commercial routes and colonies } She 
 is to the United Kingdom what the Transvaal 
 has been to South Africa. The consideration 
 shows both how important the status of Ire- 
 land is to the colonies, and how much, by the 
 development of their own forces, relieving the 
 navy of the United Kingdom, they can con- 
 tribute to its security, and thereby to that of
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 129 
 
 the commercial routes, which is the common 
 interest of all. 
 
 In the question of foreign relations are con- 
 spicuously to be seen the advantages of federa- 
 tion, which on the internal side is not without 
 its drawbacks. Its look is distinctively out- 
 ward, recognizing that there conditions have 
 undergone decisive change. It faces the world, 
 ai\d sees that to do so with success it must 
 show a united body. For that purpose it seeks 
 to find a means, an organ, in which and by 
 which union may be established and main- 
 tained. For that purpose it must be willing to 
 endure the internal sacrifices, the inevitable 
 concessions of individual independence, and 
 the burdens of additional expense. For these 
 concessions on either hand there will be com- 
 pensation. The colonies by entering upon 
 a share in determining the foreign policy of 
 the whole, gain wider scope of action, elevation 
 of idea, increased dignity of existence, and state 
 equality with the United Kingdom, actual in 
 kind, partial in degree ; an equality resembling, 
 doubtless, in principle that of the lower house 
 of the United States, where the representation 
 for all the States is the same in character, but 
 
 9
 
 1 30 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 in voting power proportioned to the respective 
 populations. Individual colonists would claim 
 and find imperial careers, as the interests and 
 obligations of their native land gained ever 
 increasing expansion in the general growth 
 and interaction of the Empire. To Sir Henry 
 Parkes this seemed, for Australia, a higher 
 destiny than independence ; he called it " a 
 rightful share in what may be a more glorious 
 rule than mankind has ever yet seen." 
 
 It is not to be denied that superficially, 
 perhaps by force of tradition, the benefit of 
 federation seems chiefly to inure to the mother 
 country. This impression probably derives 
 from the old idea of state property, underlying 
 the colonial relation. Under such a concep- 
 tion, the benefit of the owner of this estate, 
 the mother country, was naturally the primary 
 object in administration. The subordination 
 of the colony was not merely in political con- 
 nection, but , in economical treatment. This 
 was admitted by the American colonists, who, 
 though they rebelled promptly at commercial 
 regulation by tariff, for the raising of imperial 
 revenue, as being indirect taxation, acquiesced 
 in regulation which alleged the benefit of
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 131 
 
 imperial trade as a whole, though they suffered 
 by it. 
 
 Such conditions, however, have passed away; 
 and after the temporary domination of the 
 contrary belief, that colonies are of little or no 
 advantage, it is now recognized that in the 
 mutual relation there is reciprocity of benefit, 
 even though there be not equality. Colonies 
 trade more readily with the mother country 
 than with others ; and the capital of the latter, 
 other things being equal, seeks investment more 
 readily, with greater feeling of security, in com- 
 munities kindred in political and legal tradition, 
 and of a common allegiance. The question of 
 military and naval reciprocity of usefulness has 
 been touched on. To this is to be added 
 the wider and grander sphere open to the 
 colonies, as communities and as individuals, 
 when closer relations gain them increasing 
 entry, and opportunity for activity, in the inter- 
 nal administration and foreign policy of a great 
 established State like the United Kingdom. In 
 the present threatening and doubtful question 
 of the future of China are the elements of a 
 world-conflict, in which the British navy is one 
 of the largest among several determinative
 
 132 Motives to Imperial Federation 
 
 factors. Its strength can be supported and 
 enlarged by tlie conditions attendant upon 
 federation, and the colonies can thus share in 
 both the benefits and the distinction of influence 
 upon great political issues ; but what of weight 
 or of prestige can they there display, if severally 
 independent ? They may receive the benefit of 
 the open door, but not the self-contentment of 
 self-help. Self-dependence, as distinct from 
 nominal independence, is to be found in federa- 
 tion, not in separation. As time passes, it can 
 hardly fail that the premier and government of 
 the Australian federation will be greater in 
 position and wider in activities than the cor- 
 responding officials of the several states; and 
 in like manner a man will be larger in his own 
 eye and that of the world as a citizen of 
 Australia, than as belonging to a particular 
 division of the Commonwealth. The federation 
 of the United States exalted irresistibly the 
 name American far bevond all local desio^na- 
 tions. So Imperial Federation will dignify and 
 enlarge each State and each citizen that enters 
 its fold. 
 
 Imperial Federation proposes a partnership 
 in which a number of younger and poorer
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 133 
 
 members are admitted into a lono: standino^ 
 wealthy firm. This simile is doubtless not an 
 exhaustive statement; but there can be little 
 doubt that it is sufficiently just to show where 
 the preponderance of benefit will for the time 
 fall. The expenditure of the United Kingdom 
 on the South African war offers a concrete 
 example of this truth, doubly impressive to 
 those who, like the writer, see in this instance 
 great imperial obligation but little material 
 interest, save the greatest of all, — the preser- 
 vation of the Empire. On the other hand, in 
 view of the spreading collision of interests 
 throughout the world, it is hard to over-value 
 the advantage of healthy, attached, self-govern- 
 ing colonies to a European country of to-day. 
 Blessed is the State that has its quiver full of 
 them. Under such conditions, and with the 
 motives to union that have been presented, it is 
 petty to fasten attention on comparative benefit 
 to the exclusion of mutual benefit. Not by 
 such grudging spirit are great ideas realized, 
 or great ends compassed. Sentiment, imagina- 
 tion, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational 
 and moral faculties in some object better than 
 bread alone, — all must find a part in a worthy
 
 1 34 Motives to I'}nperial Federation 
 
 motive ; not to the exclusion of reasonable 
 interests, but to their ennoblement by marriage 
 to loftier aims, seeking gratification in wider 
 activities. Like individuals, nations and em- 
 pires have souls as well as bodies. Great and 
 beneficent achievement ministers to worthier 
 contentment than the filling of the pocket. 
 
 Finally, the broadening and strengthening of 
 British power by the progress of Imperial 
 Federation is necessarily an object of profound 
 interest to Americans. In many quarters it 
 will find deep sympathy ; in others, perhaps, 
 jealousy may be manifested. For this there is 
 no good cause. The American Commonwealth 
 and the British Empire have had many jars in 
 the past, the memory of which has not wholly 
 disappeared ; but more and more clearly are 
 coming into view the permanent conditions 
 that from the first have existed, but until now 
 have been overlaid and buried by the wreckage 
 of past collisions and disputes. In language, 
 law, and political traditions there is fundamen- 
 tal identity ; and in blood also, though to some 
 extent differentiated in each by foreign admix- 
 ture. Coincidently with these, there is a clearly 
 defined and wide belt of geographical separa-
 
 Motives to Imperial Federation 1 35 
 
 tion between their several spheres, — save the 
 one common boundary between Canada and 
 the United States. These constitute perma- 
 nent factors, tending on the one hand to pro- 
 mote understanding, and on the other to avert 
 misunderstandings. To reinforce these, there 
 is rapidly arising a community of commercial 
 interests and of righteous ideals in the Far 
 East. In proportion to the hold which abiding 
 factors such as these have upon the mind of 
 the statesman, will be the light he finds to 
 thread his way through the passing perplexities 
 of revolving years. The tactical changes of 
 front and redistribution of arrangements, which 
 the incidental progress of events necessitates 
 from time to time, will lack intelligence, cohe- 
 rence, and firmness, unless governed by con- 
 stant reference to the things which cannot be 
 shaken, and which bear to policy the same 
 relation that the eternal principles of strategy 
 do to the conduct of war.
 
 CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING 
 THE DISPOSITION OF NAVIES
 
 CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING 
 THE DISPOSITION OF NAVIES 
 
 May, 1902. 
 
 WE have the highest military authority for 
 saying that " War is a business of posi- 
 tions " ; a definition which includes necessarily 
 not only the selection of positions to be taken, 
 with the reasonings, or necessities, which dic- 
 tate the choice, but further also the assignment 
 of proportionate force to the several points 
 occupied. All this is embraced in the easy 
 phrase, " The distribution of the fleet." In 
 these words, therefore, ought to be involved, by 
 necessary implication, an antecedent apprecia- 
 tion of the political, commercial, and military 
 exigencies of the State in the event of possible 
 wars ; for the dispositions of peace should bear 
 a close relation to the contingency of war. All 
 three elements form a part of the subject-matter 
 for consideration, for each is an essential factor 
 in national life. Logically separable, in prac-
 
 140 Considerations Governing 
 
 tice the political, commercial, and military 
 needs are so intertwined that their mutual 
 interaction constitutes one problem. The fre- 
 quent statement that generals in the field have 
 no account to take of political considerations, 
 conveys, along with a partial truth, a most mis- 
 leading inference. Applied even to military 
 and naval leaders, it errs by lack of qualifica- 
 tion ; but for the statesman, under whom the 
 soldier or seaman acts, the political as well as 
 the military conditions must influence, must at 
 times control, and even reverse, decision. 
 
 The choice of situations, localities, to be held 
 as bases of operations, is governed by considera- 
 tions of geographical position, military strength, 
 and natural resources, which endure from age 
 to age; a permanence which justifies the ex- 
 pense of adequate fortification. The distribu- 
 tion of mobile force, military or naval, is 
 subject to greater variation, owing to changes 
 of circumstances. Nevertheless, at any one 
 historical moment, of peace or war, this ques- 
 tion also admits of an appropriate fixed deter- 
 mination, general in outline, but not therefore 
 necessarily vague. This conclusion should be 
 the outcome of weighing the possible dangers
 
 The Disposition of Navies 141 
 
 of the State, and all the various factors — po- 
 litical, commercial, and military — which affect 
 national welfare. The disposition thence 
 adopted should be the one which will best 
 expedite the several readjustments and combi- 
 nations that may be necessitated by the out- 
 break of various particular wars, which may 
 happen with this or that possible enemy. Such 
 modification of arrangements can be predicated 
 with reasonable certainty for a measurable 
 period in advance. The decision thus reached 
 may be called the " strategic " solution, because 
 dependent upon ascertainable factors, relatively 
 permanent, of all which it takes account ; and 
 because also it is accepted, consciously and of 
 purpose, as preliminary to the probable great 
 movements of war, present or prospective. 
 
 In the particular cases that afterwards arise 
 from time to time, and of which the outbreak of 
 war may itself be one, the unforeseen, the unex- 
 pected, begins to come into operation. This is 
 one of the inevitable accompaniments of war- 
 fare. The meeting of these new conditions, 
 by suitable changes of plan, is temporary in 
 character, varying possibly from day to day ; 
 but it will generally be found that the more
 
 142 Co7isiderations Governing 
 
 comprehensive has been the previous strategic 
 study, and the more its just forecasts have con- 
 trolled the primary disposition, — the distribu- 
 tion of force, — the more certainly and readily 
 will this lend itself to the shifting incidents of 
 hostilities. These movements bear to the fun- 
 damental general dispositions the relations 
 which tactics have to strategy. In them, on 
 occasions, one or two of the leading considera- 
 tions which have each had their full weight in 
 the original dispositions, may have to be momen- 
 tarily subordinated to the more pressing demand 
 of a third. In war, generally and naturally, 
 military exigencies have preponderant weight ; 
 but even in war the safety of a great convoy, 
 or of a commercial strategic centre, may at a 
 given instant be of more consequence than a 
 particular military gain. So political condi- 
 tions may rightly be allowed at times to over- 
 weigh military prudence, or to control military 
 activity. This is eminently true, for, after all, 
 war is political action. The old phrase, " The 
 cannon is the last argument of kings," may now 
 be paraphrased, " War is the last argument of 
 diplomacy." Its purpose is to compass political 
 results, where peaceful methods have failed ;
 
 The Disposition of Navies 
 
 14: 
 
 and while undoubtedly, as war, the game should 
 be played in accordance with the well-estab- 
 lished principles of the art, yet, as a means to 
 an end, it must consent to momentary modifi- 
 cations, in accepting which a well-balanced 
 mind admits that the means are less than the 
 end, and must be subjected to it. 
 
 The question between military and political 
 considerations is therefore one of proportion, 
 varying from time to time as attendant circum- 
 stances change. As regards the commercial 
 factor, never before in the history of the world 
 has it been so inextricably commingled with 
 politics. The interdependence of nations for 
 the necessities and luxuries of life have been 
 marvellously increased by the growth of pop- 
 ulation and the habits of comfort contracted 
 by the peoples of Europe and America through 
 a century of comparative peace, broken only by 
 wars which, though gigantic in scale, have been 
 too short in duration to affect seriously com- 
 mercial relations. The unmolested course of 
 commerce, reactinf^ upon itself, has contributed 
 also to its own rapid development, a result fur- 
 thered by the prevalence of a purely economi- 
 cal conception of national greatness during the
 
 144 Considerations Governing 
 
 larger part of the century. This, with the vast 
 increase in rapidity of communication, has mul- 
 tipHed and strengthened the bonds knitting the 
 interests of nations to one another, till the 
 whole now forms an articulated system, not 
 only of prodigious size and activity, but of an 
 excessive sensitiveness, unequalled in former 
 ages. National nerves are exasperated by the 
 delicacy of financial situations, and national 
 resistance to hardship is sapped by generations 
 that have known war only by the battlefield, 
 not in the prolonged endurance of privation and 
 straitness extending through years and reach- 
 ing every class of the community. The preser- 
 vation of commercial and financial interests 
 constitutes now a political consideration of the 
 first importance, making for peace and deter- 
 ring from war; a fact well worthy of observa- 
 tion by those who would exempt maritime com- 
 mercial intercourse from the operations of naval 
 war, under the illusory plea of protecting pri- 
 vate property at sea. Ships and cargoes in 
 transit upon the sea are private property in 
 only one point of view, and that the narrowest. 
 Internationally considered, they are national 
 wealth engaged in reproducing and multiplying
 
 The Disposition of Navies 145 
 
 itself, to the intensification of the national 
 power, and that by the most effective process ; 
 for it relieves the nation from feeding upon itself, 
 and makes the whole outer world contribute to 
 its support. It is therefore a most proper 
 object of attack ; more humane, and more con- 
 ducive to the objects of war, than the slaughter 
 of men. A great check on war would be re- 
 moved by assuring immunity to a nation's sea- 
 borne trade, the life-blood of its power, the 
 assurer of its credit, the purveyor of its comfort. 
 This is the more necessary to observe, be- 
 cause, while commerce thus on the one hand 
 deters from war, on the other hand it engenders 
 conflict, fostering ambitions and strifes which 
 tend towards armed collision. Thus it has 
 continuously been from the beginning of sea 
 power. A conspicuous instance was afforded 
 by the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth 
 century. There were other causes of dissatis- 
 faction between the two nations, but commer- 
 cial jealousies, rivalry for the opening markets 
 of the newly discovered hemispheres, and for 
 the carrying trade of the world, was the under- 
 lying national, as distinguished from the purely 
 governmental motive, which inspired the fierce
 
 146 Considerations Governiiig 
 
 struggle. Blood was indeed shed, in profusion ; 
 but it was the suppression of maritime com- 
 merce that caused the grass to grow in the 
 streets of Amsterdam, and brought the Dutch 
 Republic to its knees. This too, it was, that 
 sapped the vital force of Napoleon's Empire, 
 despite the huge tributes exacted by him from 
 the conquered states of Europe, external to his 
 own dominions. The commerce of our day 
 has brought up children, nourished popula- 
 tions, which now turn upon the mother, cry- 
 ing for bread. " The place is too strait for 
 us ; give place where we can sell more." The 
 provision of markets for the production of an 
 ever-increasing number of inhabitants is a lead- 
 ing political problem of the day, the solution 
 of which is sought by methods commercial and 
 methods political, so essentially combative, so 
 offensive and defensive in character, that direct 
 military action would be only a development 
 of them, a direct consequent ; not a breach of 
 continuity in spirit, however it might be in 
 form. As the interaction of commerce and 
 finance shows a unity in the modern civilized 
 world, so does the struggle for new markets, 
 and for predominance in old, reveal the unsub-
 
 The Disposition of Navies i/^y 
 
 dued diversity. Here every state is for itself ; 
 and in every great state the look for the desired 
 object is outward, just as it was in the days 
 when England and Holland fought over the 
 Spice Islands and the other worlds newly 
 opening before them. Beyond the seas, now 
 as then, are to be found regions scantily pop- 
 ulated where can be built up communities with 
 wants to be supplied ; while elsewhere are teem- 
 ing populations who may be led or manipulated 
 to recognize necessities of which they have be- 
 fore been ignorant, and stimulated to provide 
 for them through a higher development of their 
 resources, either by themselves, or, preferably, 
 through the exploitation of foreigners. 
 
 We are yet but at the beginning of this 
 marked movement, much as has been done 
 in the way of partition and appropriation 
 within the last twenty years. The regions — 
 chiefly in Africa — which the Powers of Europe 
 have divided by mutual consent, if not to mut- 
 ual satisfaction, await the gradual process of 
 utilization of their natural resources and con- 
 sequent increase of inhabitants, the producers 
 and consumers of a commerce yet to be in the 
 distant future. The degree and rate of this
 
 148 Considerations Governing 
 
 development must depend upon the special 
 aptitudes of the self-constituted owners, whose 
 needs meantime are immediate. Their eyes 
 therefore turn necessarily for the moment to 
 quarters where the presence of a population 
 already abundant provides at once, not only 
 numerous buyers and sellers, but the raw ma- 
 terial of labor, by which, under suitable 
 direction and with foreign capital, the present 
 production may be multiplied. It is not too 
 much to say that, in order further to promote 
 this commercial action, existing political tenure 
 is being assailed ; that the endeavor is to 
 supplant it, as hindering the commercial, or 
 possibly the purely military or political ambi- 
 tions of the intruder. Commercial enterprise 
 is never so secure, nor so untrammelled, as 
 under its own flag; and when the present 
 owner is obstructive by temperament, as China 
 is, the impulse to overbear its political action 
 by display of force tends to become ungovern- 
 able. At all events the fact is notorious ; nor 
 can it be seriously doubted that in several other 
 parts of the globe aggression is only deterred 
 by the avowed or understood policy of a power- 
 ful opponent, not by the strength of the present
 
 The Disposition af Navies 149 
 
 possessor. This is the significance of the new 
 Anglo-Japanese agreement, and also of the 
 more venerable Monroe Doctrine of the United 
 States, though that is applicable in another 
 quarter. The parties to either of these poli- 
 cies is interested in the success of the other. 
 
 It seems demonstrable, therefore, that as 
 commerce is the engrossing and predominant 
 interest of the world to-day, so, in consequence 
 of its acquired expansion, oversea commerce, 
 over-sea political acquisition, and maritime 
 commercial routes are now the primary ob- 
 jects of external policy among nations. The 
 instrument for the maintenance of policy di- 
 rected upon these objects is the Navy of the 
 several States; for, whatever influence we at- 
 tribute to moral ideas, which I have no wish 
 to undervalue, it is certain that, while right 
 rests upon them for its sanction, it depends 
 upon force for adequate assertion against the 
 too numerous, individuals or communities, who 
 either disregard moral sanctions, or reason 
 amiss concerning them. 
 
 Further, it is evident that for the moment 
 neither South America nor Africa is an imme- 
 diate object of far-reaching commercial ambi-
 
 150 Considerations Governing 
 
 tion, to be compassed by political action. 
 Whatever the future may have in store for 
 them, a variety of incidents have relegated 
 them for the time to a position of secondary 
 interest. Attention has centred upon the 
 Pacific generally, and upon the future of China 
 particularly. The present distribution of navies 
 indicates this ; for while largely a matter of 
 tradition and routine, nevertheless the assign- 
 ment of force follows the changes of political 
 circumstances, and undergoes gradual modi- 
 fications, which reflect the conscious or un- 
 conscious sense of the nation that things are 
 different. It is not insignificant that the pre- 
 ponderant French fleet is now in the Mediter- 
 ranean, whereas it once was in the Atlantic 
 ports; and memories which stretch a genera- 
 tion back can appreciate the fact and the 
 meaning of the diminution of British force on 
 the east and west coasts of America, as also 
 of the increase of Russian battleship force in 
 China seas. Interests have shifted. 
 
 Directly connected with these new centres 
 of interest in the Far East, inseparable from 
 them in fact or in policy, are the commercial 
 routes which lead to them. For the commerce
 
 The Disposition of Navies 151 
 
 and navies of Europe this route is by the Med- 
 iterranean and the Suez Canal. This is the 
 line of communication to the objective of in- 
 terest. The base of all operation, political or 
 military, — so far as the two are separable, — is 
 in the mother countries. These — the base, 
 the objective, and the communications — are 
 the conditions of the problem by which the 
 distribution of naval force is ultimately to be 
 determined. It is to be remarked, however, 
 that while the dominant factor of the three is 
 the line of communication between base and ob- 
 jective, the precise point or section of this upon 
 which control rests, and on which mobile force 
 must be directed, is not necessarily always the 
 same. The distribution of force must have 
 regard to possible changes of dispositions, as 
 the conditions of a war vary. 
 
 Every war has two aspects, the defensive 
 and the offensive, to each of which there is 
 a corresponding factor of activity. There is 
 something to gain, the offensive ; there is some- 
 thing to lose, the defensive. The ears of men, 
 especially of the uninstructed, are more readily 
 and sympathetically open to the demands of 
 the latter. It appeals to the conservatism
 
 152 Considerations Governing 
 
 which is dominant in the well-to-do, and to the 
 widespread timidity which hesitates to take any 
 risk for the sake of a probable though uncertain 
 gain. The sentiment is entirely respectable in 
 itself, and more than respectable when its power 
 is exercised against breach of the peace for other 
 than the gravest motives — for any mere lucre 
 of o-ain. But its limitations must be under- 
 stood. A sound defensive scheme, sustaining 
 the bases of the national force, is the founda- 
 tion upon which war rests ; but who lays a 
 foundation without intending a superstructure? 
 The offensive element in warfare is the super- 
 structure, the end and aim for which the de- 
 fensive exists, and apart from which it is to all 
 purposes of war worse than useless. When 
 war has been accepted as necessary, success 
 means nothing short of victory; and victory 
 must be sought by offensive measures, and by 
 them only can be insured. " Being in, bear 
 it, that the opposer may be ware of thee." No 
 mere defensive attitude or action avails to such 
 end. Whatever the particular mode of offen- 
 sive action adopted, whether it be direct mili- 
 tary attack, or the national exhaustion of the 
 opponent by cutting off the sources of national
 
 The Disposition of Navies 1 5 3 
 
 well-being, whatsoever method may be chosen, 
 offence, injury, weakening of the foe, to anni- 
 hilation if need be, must be the guiding pur- 
 pose of the belligerent. Success will certainly 
 attend him who drives his adversary into the 
 position of the defensive and keeps him there. 
 Offence therefore dominates, but it does not 
 exclude. The necessity for defence remains 
 obligatory, though subordinate. The two are 
 complementary. It is only in the reversal of 
 roles, by which priority of importance is as- 
 signed to the defensive, that ultimate defeat is 
 involved. Nor is this all. Though opposed 
 in idea and separable in method of action, cir- 
 cumstances not infrequently have permitted 
 the union of the two in a single general plan 
 of campaign, which protects at the same time 
 that it attacks. " Fitz James's blade was sword 
 and shield." Of this the system of blockades by 
 the British Navy during the Napoleonic wars 
 was a marked example. Thrust up against the 
 ports of France, and lining her coasts, they 
 covered — shielded — the operations of their 
 own commerce and cruisers in every sea; 
 while at the same time, crossing swords, as 
 it were, with the fleets within, ever on guard.
 
 154 Consideratio7is Govenmtg 
 
 ready to attack, should the enemy give an 
 opening by quitting the shelter of his ports, 
 they frustrated his efforts at a combination of 
 his squadrons by which alone he could hope 
 to reverse conditions. All this was defensive ; 
 but the same operation cut the sinews of the 
 enemy's power by depriving him of sea-borne 
 commerce, and promoted the reduction of his 
 colonies. Both these were measures of offence ; 
 and both, it may be added, were directed upon 
 the national communications, the sources of 
 national well-being. The means was one, the 
 effect two-fold. 
 
 It is evident also that offensive action de- 
 pends for energy upon the security of the 
 several places whence its resources are drawn. 
 These are appropriately called " bases," for 
 they are the foundations — more exactly, per- 
 haps, the roots — severed from which vigor 
 yields to paralysis. Still more immediately 
 disastrous would be the destruction or capture 
 of the base itself. Therefore, whether it be 
 the home country in general, the centre of 
 the national power, or the narrower localities 
 where are concentrated the materials of war- 
 fare in a particular region, the base, by its
 
 The Disposition of Navies 1 5 5 
 
 need of protection, represents distinctively the 
 defensive element in any campaign. It must 
 be secured at all hazards ; though, at the same 
 time, be it clearly said, by recourse to means 
 which shall least fetter the movements of the 
 offensive factor — the mobile force, army or 
 navy. On the other hand, the objective repre- 
 sents with at least equal exclusiveness the 
 offensive element; there, put it at the least, 
 preponderance over the enemy, not yet exist- 
 ent, is to be established by force. The mere 
 effort to get from the base to the objective is 
 an offensive movement ; but the ground inter- 
 vening between the two is of more complex 
 character. Here, on the line of communica- 
 tions, offence and defence blend. Here the 
 belligerent whose precautions secure suitable 
 permanent positions, the defensive element, 
 and to them assign proportionate mobile force, 
 the offensive factor, sufficient by superiority to 
 overpower his opponent, maintains, by so far 
 and insomuch, his freedom and power of action 
 at the distant final objective ; for he controls 
 for his own use the indispensable artery 
 throuQ^h which the national life-blood courses 
 to the distant fleet, and by the same act he
 
 156 Considerations Gover7ting 
 
 closes it to his enemy. Thus again offence 
 and defence meet, each contributing its due 
 share of effect, unified in method and result by 
 an accurate choice of the field of exertion, of 
 that section of the line of communications 
 where power needs to be mainly exerted. 
 
 In purely land warfare the relative strength 
 of the opponents manifests itself in the length 
 of the line of communications each permits itself; 
 the distance, that is, which it ventures to ad- 
 vance from its base towards the enemy. The 
 necessary aim of both is superiority at the point 
 of contact, to be maintained either by actual 
 preponderance of numbers, or else by a combi- 
 nation of inferior numbers v/ith advantageous 
 position. The original strength of each evi- 
 dently affects the distance that he can thus 
 advance, for the line of communication behind 
 him must be secured by part of his forces, 
 because upon it he depends for almost daily 
 supplies. The weaker therefore can go least 
 distance, and may even be compelled to remain 
 behind the home frontier, — a bare defensive, 
 — yielding the other the moral and material 
 advantage of the offensive. But commonly, in 
 land war, each adversary has his own line of
 
 The Disposition of Navies 1 5 7 
 
 communication, which is behind him with re- 
 spect to his opponent; each being in a some- 
 what literal sense opposite, as well as opposed, 
 to the other, and the common objective, to be 
 held by the one or carried by the other, lying 
 between them. The strategic aim of both is to 
 menace, or even to sever permanently, the 
 other's communications ; for if they are imme- 
 diately threatened he must retreat, and if sun- 
 dered he must surrender. Either result is 
 better obtained by this means than by the 
 resort to fighting, for it saves bloodshed, and 
 therefore economizes power for the purpose of 
 further progress. 
 
 Maritime war has its analogy to these con- 
 ditions, but it ordinarily reproduces them with 
 a modification peculiar to itself. In it the bel- 
 ligerents are not usually on opposite sides of 
 the common objective — though they may be so 
 — but proceed towards it by lines that in gen- 
 eral direction are parallel, or convergent, and 
 may even be identical. England and France 
 lie side by side, and have waged many mari- 
 time wars ; but while there have been excep- 
 tions, as Gibraltar and Minorca, or when the 
 command of the Channel was in dispute, the
 
 158 Considerations Governing 
 
 general rule has been that the scene of opera- 
 tions was far distant from both, and that both 
 have approached it by substantially the same 
 route. When the prospective theatre of war is 
 reached, the fleet there depends partly upon 
 secondary local bases of supplies, but ultimately 
 upon the home country, which has continually 
 to renew the local deposits, sending stores for- 
 ward from time to time over the same paths 
 that the fleets themselves travelled. The secu- 
 rity of those sea-roads is therefore essential 
 and the dependence of the fleets upon them 
 for supplies of every kind^ — pre-eminently of 
 coal — reproduces the land problem of commu- 
 nications in a specialized form. The two have 
 to contest the one line of communications vital 
 to both. It becomes therefore itself an objec- 
 tive, and all the more important because the 
 security of military communications entails in 
 equal measure that of the nation's commerce. 
 In broad generalization, the maritime line of 
 communications is the ocean itself, an open 
 plain, limited by no necessary highways, such 
 as the land has to redeem from the obstacles 
 which encumber it, and largely devoid of the 
 advantages of position that the conformation
 
 The Disposition of Navies 159 
 
 of ground may afford in a shore battlefield. 
 In so far control depends upon superior num- 
 bers only, and the give and take which history 
 records, where disparity has not been great, has 
 gone far to falsify the frequent assertion that 
 the ocean acknowledges but one mistress; but 
 as the sea-road draws near a coast, the armed 
 vessels that assail or protect are facilitated in 
 their task if the shore affords them harbors 
 of refuge and supply. A ship that has to go 
 but fifty miles to reach her field of operation 
 will do in the course of a year the work of 
 several ships that have to go five hundred. 
 Fortified naval depots at suitable points there- 
 fore increase numerical force by multiplying it, 
 quite as the possession of strategic points, or 
 the lay of the ground of a battlefield, supply 
 numerical deficiencies. 
 
 Hence appears the singular strategic — and, 
 because strategic, commercial — interest of a 
 narrow or landlocked sea, which is multiplied 
 manifold when it forms an essential link in an 
 important maritime route. Many widely diver- 
 gent tracks may be traced on the ocean's un- 
 wrinkled brow; but specifically the one military 
 line of communications between any two points
 
 i6o Considerations Governing 
 
 of Its surface is that which is decisively the 
 shortest. The measure of force between op- 
 ponents in such a case depends therefore not 
 only upon superiority at the objective point, 
 but upon control of that particular line of 
 communications; for so only can superiority 
 be maintained. The belligerent who, for any 
 disadvantage of numbers, or from inferiority 
 of strength as contrasted with the combined 
 numbers and position of his opponent, cannot 
 sustain his dominant hold there is already 
 worsted. 
 
 To this consideration is due the supreme 
 importance of the Mediterranean in the present 
 conditions of the communications and policies 
 of the world. From the commercial point of 
 view it is much the shortest, and therefore the 
 principal, sea route between Europe and the 
 Farther East. At the present time very nearly 
 one-third of the home trade, the exports and 
 imports, of Great Britain originates in or passes 
 through the Mediterranean ; and the single port 
 of Marseilles handles a similar proportion of 
 all the sea-borne commerce of France. From 
 the military standpoint, the same fact of short- 
 ness, combined with the number and rivalry
 
 Tlie Disposition of Navies i6i 
 
 of national tenures established throughout its 
 area, constitutes it the most vital and critical 
 link in an interior line between two regions of 
 the gravest international concern. In one of 
 these, in Europe, are situated the bases, the 
 home dominions, of the European Powers con- 
 cerned, and in the other the present chief 
 objective of external interest to all nations of 
 to-day — that Farther East and western Pacific 
 upon which so many events have conspired 
 recently to fasten the anxious attention of the 
 world. 
 
 The Mediterranean therefore becomes neces- 
 sarily the centre around which must revolve 
 the strategic distribution of European navies. 
 It does not follow, indeed, that the distribution 
 of peace reproduces the dispositions for war; but 
 it must look to them, and rest upon the com- 
 prehension of them. The decisive point of 
 action in case of war must be recognized and 
 preparation made accordingly ; not only by the 
 establishment of suitable positions, which is the 
 naval strategy of peace, but by a distinct rela- 
 tion settled between the numbers and distri- 
 bution of vessels needed in war and those 
 maintained in peace. The Mediterranean will
 
 1 62 Considerations Governing 
 
 be either the seat of one dominant control, 
 reaching thence in all directions, owning a sin- 
 gle mistress, or it will be the scene of continual 
 struggle. Here offence and defence will meet 
 and blend in their general manifestation of 
 mobile force and fortified stations. Elsewhere 
 the one or the other will have its distinct 
 sphere of predominance. The home waters 
 and their approaches will be the scene of 
 national defence in the strictest and most 
 exclusive sense ; but it will be defence that 
 exists for the foundation, upon which reposes 
 the struggle for, or the control of, the Mediter- 
 ranean. The distant East, in whatever spot 
 there hostilities may rage, will represent, will 
 be, the offensive sphere ; but the determination 
 of the result, in case of prolongation of war, 
 will depend upon control of the Mediterranean. 
 In the degree to which that is insured defence 
 will find the test of its adequacy, and offence 
 the measure of its efficiency. 
 
 In this combination of the offensive and 
 defensive factors the Mediterranean presents 
 an analogy to the military conditions of insu- 
 lar states, such as Great Britain and Japan, 
 in which the problem of national defence
 
 The Disposition of Navies 163 
 
 becomes closely identified with offensive action. 
 Security, which is simply defence in its com- 
 pleted result, depends for them upon control 
 of the sea, which can be assured only by the 
 offensive action of the national fleet. Its pre- 
 dominance over that of the enemy is sword 
 and shield. It is a singular advantage to have 
 the national policy in the matter of military 
 development and dispositions so far simplified 
 and unified as it is by this consideration. It 
 much more than compensates for the double 
 line of communications open to a continental 
 state, the two strings to its bow, by its double 
 frontiers of sea and land ; for with the two 
 frontiers there is double exposure as well as 
 double utility. They require two-fold protective 
 action, dissipating the energies of the nation by 
 dividing them between two distinct objects, to 
 the injury of both. 
 
 An insular state, which alone can be purely 
 maritime, therefore contemplates war from a 
 position of antecedent probable superiority 
 from the two-fold concentration of its policy ; 
 defence and offence being closely identified, 
 and energy, if exerted judiciously, being fixed 
 upon the increase of naval force to the clear
 
 164 Considerations Governing 
 
 subordination of that more narrowly styled 
 military. The conditions tend to minimize 
 the division of effort between offensive and 
 defensive purpose, and, by greater comparative 
 development of the fleet, to supply a larger 
 margin of disposable numbers in order to con- 
 stitute a mobile superiority at a particular 
 point of the general field. Such a decisive 
 local superiority at the critical point of action 
 is the chief end of the military art, alike in 
 tactics and strategy. Hence it is clear that an 
 insular state, if attentive to the conditions that 
 should dictate its policy, is inevitably led to 
 possess a superiority in that particular kind of 
 force, the mobility of which enables it most 
 readily to project its power to the more distant 
 quarters of the earth, and also to change its 
 point of application at will with unequalled 
 rapidity. 
 
 The general considerations that have been 
 advanced concern all the great European na- 
 tions, in so far as they look outside their own 
 continent, and to maritime expansion, for the 
 extension of national influence and power ; but 
 the effect upon the action of each differs neces- 
 sarily according to their several conditions.
 
 The Disposition of Navies 165 
 
 The problem of sea-defence, for instance, relates 
 primarily to the protection of the national com- 
 merce everywhere, and specifically as it draws 
 near the home ports ; serious attack upon the 
 coast, or upon the ports themselves, being a 
 secondary consideration, because little likely to 
 befall a nation able to extend its power far 
 enough to sea to protect its merchant ships. 
 From this point of view the position of Ger- 
 many is embarrassed at once by the fact that 
 she has, as regards the w^orld at large, but one 
 coast-line. To and from this all her sea com- 
 merce must go; either passing the English 
 Channel, flanked for three hundred miles by 
 France on the one side and England on the 
 other, or else going north about by the Orkneys, 
 a most inconvenient circuit, and obtaining but 
 imperfect shelter from recourse to this deflected 
 route. Holland, in her ancient w^ars with Eng- 
 land, when the two were fairly matched in 
 point of numbers, had dire experience of this 
 false position, though her navy was little inferior 
 in numbers to that of her opponent. This is 
 another exemplification of the truth that dis- 
 tance is a factor equivalent to a certain number 
 of ships. Sea-defence for Germany, in case of
 
 1 66 Considerations Governing 
 
 war with France or England, means established 
 naval predominance at least in the North Sea ; 
 nor can it be considered complete unless ex- 
 tended through the Channel and as far as 
 Great Britain will have to project hers into 
 the Atlantic. This is Germany's initial dis- 
 advantage of position, to be overcome only 
 by adequate superiority of numbers; and it 
 receives little compensation from the security of 
 her Baltic trade, and the facility for closing that 
 sea to her enemies. In fact. Great Britain, 
 whose North Sea trade is but one-fourth of her 
 total, lies to Germany as Ireland does to Great 
 Britain, flanking both routes to the Atlantic ; 
 but the great development of the British sea- 
 coast, its numerous ports and ample internal 
 communications, strengthen that element of 
 sea-defence which consists in abundant access 
 to harbors of refuge. 
 
 For the Baltic Powers, which comprise all 
 the maritime States east of Germany, the com- 
 mercial drawback of the Orkney route is a little 
 less than for Hamburg and Bremen, in that the 
 exit from the Baltic is nearly equidistant from 
 the north and south extremities of England ; 
 nevertheless the excess in distance over the Chan-
 
 The Disposition of Navies 167 
 
 nel route remains very considerable. The initial 
 naval disadvantas^e is in no wise diminished. 
 For all the communities east of the Straits of 
 Dover it remains true that in war commerce is 
 paralyzed, and all the resultant consequences 
 of impaired national strength entailed, unless 
 decisive control of the North Sea is established. 
 That effected, there is security for commerce by 
 the northern passage ; but this alone is mere 
 defence. Offence, exerted anywhere on the 
 globe, requires a surplusage of force, over that 
 required to hold the North Sea, sufficient to 
 extend and maintain itself west of the British 
 Islands. In case of war with either of the 
 Channel Powers, this means, as between the 
 two opponents, that the eastern belligerent has 
 to guard a long line of communications, and 
 maintain distant positions, against an antagonist 
 resting on a central position, with interior lines, 
 able to strike at choice at either wing of 
 the enemy's extended front. The relation 
 which the English Channel, with its branch 
 the Irish Sea, bears to the North Sea and tlie 
 Atlantic — that of an interior position — is the 
 same which the Mediterranean bears to the 
 Atlantic and the Indian Sea ; nor is it merely
 
 1 68 Considerations Governing 
 
 fanciful to trace in the passage round the north 
 of Scotland an analogy to that by the Cape of 
 Good Hope. It is a reproduction in miniature. 
 The conditions are similar, the scale different. 
 What the one is to a war whose scene is the 
 north of Europe, the other is to operations by 
 European Powers in Eastern Asia. 
 
 To protract such a situation is intolerable to 
 the purse and morale of the belligerent who has 
 the disadvantage of position. This of course 
 leads us straight back to the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of all naval war, namely, that defence is 
 insured only by offence, and that the one de- 
 cisive objective of the offensive is the enemy's 
 organized force, his battle-fleet. Therefore, in 
 the event of a war between one of the Chan- 
 nel Powers, and one or more of those to the 
 eastward, the control of the North Sea must be 
 at once decided. For the eastern State it is a 
 matter of obvious immediate necessity, of com- 
 mercial self-preservation. For the western 
 State the offensive motive is equally impera- 
 tive ; but for Great Britain there is defensive 
 need as well. Her Empire imposes such a 
 development of naval force as makes it eco- 
 nomically impracticable to maintain an army
 
 The Disposition of Navies 169 
 
 as large as those of the Continent. Security 
 against invasion depends therefore upon the 
 fleet. Postponing more distant interests, she 
 must here concentrate an indisputable supe- 
 riority. It is, however, inconceivable that 
 against any one Power Great Britain should 
 not be able here to exert from the first a pre- 
 ponderance which would effectually cover all 
 her remoter possessions. Only an economical 
 decadence, which would of itself destroy her 
 position among nations, could bring her so to 
 foreg-Q the initial advantage she has, in the 
 fact that for her offence and defence meet and 
 are fulfilled in one factor, the command of the 
 sea. History has conclusively demonstrated 
 the inability of a state with even a single con- 
 tinental frontier to compete in naval develop- 
 ment with one that is insular, although of 
 smaller population and resources. A coalition 
 of Powers may indeed affect the balance. As 
 a rule, however, a single state against a coali- 
 tion holds the interior position, the concen- 
 trated force ; and while calculation should 
 rightly take account of possibilities, it should 
 beware of permitting imagination too free sway 
 in presenting its pictures. Were the eastern
 
 170 Considerations Governing 
 
 Powers to combine they might prevent Great 
 Britain's use of the North Sea for the safe 
 passage of her merchant shipping ; but even 
 so she would but lose commercially the whole 
 of a trade, the greater part of which disappears 
 by the mere fact of war. Invasion is not pos- 
 sible, unless her fleet can be wholly disabled 
 from appearing in that sea. From her geo- 
 graphical position, she still holds her gates 
 open to the outer world, which maintains three- 
 fourths of her commerce in peace. 
 
 As Great Britain, however, turns her eyes 
 from the North and Baltic Seas, which in 
 respect to her relations to the world at large 
 may justly be called her rear, she finds con- 
 ditions confronting her similar to those which 
 position entails upon her eastern neighbors. 
 Here, however, a comparison is to be made. 
 The North Sea is small, its coast-line con- 
 tracted, the entrance to the Baltic a mere 
 strait. Naval preponderance once established, 
 the lines of transit, especially where they draw 
 near the land, are easily watched. Doubtless, 
 access to the British Islands from the Atlantic, 
 if less confined by geographical surroundings, 
 is constricted by the very necessity of approach-
 
 The Disposition of Navies 
 
 ing at all ; but a preponderant fleet maintained 
 by Great Britain to the south-west, in the pro- 
 longation of the Channel, will not only secure 
 merchant shipping within its own cruising- 
 ground, but can extend its support by outlying 
 cruisers over a great area in every direction. 
 A fleet thus in local superiority imposes upon 
 cruisers from the nearest possible enemy — 
 France — a long circuit to reach the northern 
 approaches of the islands, where they will 
 arrive more or less depleted of coal, and in 
 danger from ships of their own class resting on 
 the nearer ports of Scotland or Ireland. Su- 
 periority in numbers is here again counterbal- 
 anced by advantage of position. Vessels of 
 any other country, south or east, are evidently 
 under still greater drawbacks. 
 
 As all the Atlantic routes and Mediterranean 
 trade converge upon the Channel, this must 
 be, as it always has been, among the most im- 
 portant stations of the British Navy. In the 
 general scheme its office is essentially defence. 
 It protects the economical processes which 
 sustain national endurance, and thus secures 
 the foundation on which the vigor of war 
 rests. But its scope must be sanely conceived.
 
 172 Considerations Governing 
 
 Imaginative expectation and imaginative alarms 
 must equally be avoided ; for both tend to 
 exaggerate the development of defensive dispo- 
 sitions at the expense of offensive power. En- 
 tire immunity for commerce must not be 
 anticipated, nor should an occasional severe 
 blow be allowed to force from panic concessions 
 which calm reason rejects. Inconvenience and 
 injury are to be expected, and must be borne 
 in order that the grasp upon the determining 
 points of war may not be relaxed. It will be 
 the natural policy of an enemy to intensify 
 anxiety about the Channel, to retain or divert 
 thither force which were better placed elsewhere. 
 By the size of her navy and by her geographical 
 situation France is the most formidable mari- 
 time enemy of Great Britain, and therefore sup- 
 plies the test to which British dispositions must 
 be brought; but it is probable that in war, as 
 now in peace, France must keep the larger part 
 of her fleet in the Mediterranean. Since the 
 days of Napoleon she has given hostages to for- 
 tune in the acquisition of her possessions on the 
 African continent and beyond Suez. Her po- 
 sition in the Mediterranean has become to her 
 not only a matter of national sentiment, w^iich
 
 The Disposition of Navies 1 7 3 
 
 it long has been, but a question of military 
 importance much greater than when Corsica 
 was all she owned there. It is most unlikely 
 that Brest and Cherbourg combined will in 
 our day regain the relative importance of the 
 former alone, a century ago. 
 
 In view of this, and barring the case of a 
 coalition, I conceive that the battle-ships of the 
 British Channel Fleet would not need to out- 
 number those of France in the near waters by 
 more than enough to keep actually at sea a 
 force equal to hers. A surplus for reliefs would 
 constitute a reserve for superiority; that is all. 
 The great preponderance required is in the 
 cruisers, who are covered in their operations 
 by the battle-fleet ; the mere presence of the 
 latter with an adequate scouting system se- 
 cures them from molestation. Two classes 
 of cruisers are needed, with distinct functions; 
 those which protect commerce by the strong 
 hand and constant movement, and those that 
 keep the battle-fleet informed of the enemy's 
 actions. It is clear that the close watchins: of 
 hostile ports, an operation strictly tactical, has 
 underojone marked chanQ-cs of conditions since 
 the old days. The abiHty to go to sea and
 
 174 Considerations Governing 
 
 steer any course under any conditions of wind, 
 and the possibilities of the torpedo-boat, exag- 
 gerated though these probably have been in 
 anticipation, are the two most decisive new 
 factors. To them are to be added the range 
 of coast guns, which keeps scouts at a much 
 greater distance than formerly, and the impos- 
 sibility now of detecting intentions which once 
 might be inferred from the conditions of masts 
 and sails. 
 
 On the other hand the sphere of effec- 
 tiveness has been immensely increased for 
 the scout by the power to move at will, and 
 latterly by the wireless telegraphy. With high 
 speed and large numbers, it should be possible 
 to sweep the surroundings of any port so thor- 
 oughly as to make the chance of undetected 
 escape very small, while the transmission of 
 the essential facts — the enemy's force and 
 the direction taken — is even more certain 
 than detection. A lookout ship to-day will 
 not see an enemy going off south with a fresh 
 fair breeze, which is for herself a head wind to 
 reach her own fleet a hundred miles to the 
 northward. She may not need even to steam 
 to the main body ; but, telephoning the news,
 
 The Disposition of Navies 175 
 
 she will seek to keep the enemy in sight, gath- 
 ering round her for the same work all of her 
 own class within reach of her electric voice. 
 True, an enemy may double on his track, or 
 otherwise ultimately elude ; but the test so 
 imposed on military sagacity and inference is 
 no greater than it formerly was. The data 
 are different ; the problem of the same class. 
 Where can he go fruitfully.'' A raid.'' Well, 
 a raid, above all a maritime raid, is only a raid ; 
 a black eye, if you will, but not a bullet in the 
 heart, nor yet a broken leg. To join another 
 fleet.? That is sound, and demands action; 
 but the British battle-fleet having immediate 
 notice, and a fair probability of more informa- 
 tion, should not be long behind. There is at 
 all events no perplexity exceeding that with 
 which men of former times dealt successfully. 
 In the same way, and by the same methods, it 
 should be possible to cover an extensive cir- 
 cumference to seaward so effectively that a 
 merchant vessel reaching any point thereof 
 would be substantially secure up to the home 
 port. 
 
 The battle-fleet would be the tactical centre 
 upon which both systems of scouts would rest.
 
 176 Co7isiderations Governing 
 
 To close-watch a port to-day requires vessels 
 swifter than the battle-ships within, and 
 stronger in the as^o-resfate than their cruiser 
 force. The former then cannot overtake to 
 capture, nor outrun to elude; and the latter, 
 which may overtake, cannot drive off their 
 post, nor successfully fight, because inferior 
 in strength. Add to the qualities thus de- 
 fined sufificient numbers to watch by night 
 tiie arc of a circle of five miles radius, of which 
 the port is the centre, and you have disposi- 
 tions extremely effective against an enemy's 
 getting away unperceived. The vessels nearest 
 in are individually so small that the loss 
 of one by torpedo is militarily immaterial ; 
 moreover, the chances will by no means all 
 be with the torpedo-boat. The battle-fleet, a 
 hundred or two miles distant it may be, and 
 in a different position every night, is as safe 
 from torpedo attack as ingenuity can place it. 
 Between it and the inside scouts are the 
 armored cruisers, faster than the hostile bat- 
 tle-fleet, stronger than the hostile cruisers. 
 These are tactical dispositions fit for to-day; 
 and in essence they reproduce those of St. 
 Vincent before Brest, and his placing of
 
 The Disposition of Navies 177 
 
 Nelson at Cadiz with an inshore squadron, a 
 century ago. " A squadron of frigates and cut- 
 ters plying day and night in the opening of the 
 Goulet ; five ships-of-the-line anchored about 
 ten miles outside ; and outside of them again 
 three of-the-line under sail." The main body, 
 the battle-fleet of that time, was from twenty- 
 five to forty miles distant, — the equivalent in 
 time of not less than a hundred miles to-day. 
 Keeping in consideration these same waters, 
 the office and function of the Channel Fleet 
 may be better realized by regarding the battle- 
 ships as the centre, from which depart the dis- 
 positions for watching, not only the enemy's 
 port, but also the huge area to seaward which 
 it is desired to patrol efHciently for the security 
 of the national commerce. Take a radius of 
 two hundred miles; to it corresponds a semi- 
 circle of six hundred, all within Marconi 
 ransre of the centre. The battle-fleet never 
 separates. On the far circumference move the 
 lighter and swifter cruisers ; those least able to 
 resist, if surprised by an enemy, but also the 
 best able to escape, and the loss of one of which 
 is inconsiderable, as of the inner cruisers off" 
 the port. Between them and the fleet are the
 
 178 Co7isiderations Gover^iing 
 
 heavier cruisers, somewhat dispersed, in very 
 open order, but in mutual touch, with a squad- 
 ron organization and a plan of concentration, 
 if by mischance an enemy's division come upon 
 one of them unawares. Let us suppose, under 
 such a danger, they are one hundred miles from 
 the central body. It moves out at twelve miles 
 an hour, they in at fifteen. Within four hours 
 the force is united, save the light cruisers. 
 These, as in all ages, must in large measure look 
 out for themselves, and can do so very well. 
 
 Granting, as required by the hypothesis, 
 equality in battle-ships and a large prepon- 
 derance in cruisers, — not an unreasonable de- 
 mand upon an insular state, — it seems to me 
 that for an essentially defensive function there 
 is here a fairly reliable, systematized, working 
 disposition. It provides a semi-circumference 
 of six hundred miles, upon reaching any point 
 of which a merchant ship is secure for the rest 
 of her homeward journey. While maintained, 
 the national frontier is by so much advanced, 
 and the area of greatest exposure for the mer- 
 chant fleet equally reduced. Outside this, 
 cruising as formerly practised can extend very 
 far a protection, which, if less in degree, is still
 
 The Disposition of Navies 1 79 
 
 considerable. For this purpose, in my own 
 judgment, and I think by the verdict of his- 
 tory, dissociated single ships are less efficient 
 than cruiser-squadrons, such as were illustrated 
 by the deeds of Jean Bart and Pellew. One 
 such, a half-dozen strong, west of Finisterre, 
 and another west of Scotland, each under a 
 competent chief authorized to move at discre- 
 tion over a fairly wide area, beyond the baili- 
 wick of the commander-in-chief, would keep 
 enemies at a respectful distance from much 
 more ground than he actually occupies; for 
 it is to be remembered that the opponent's 
 imagination of danger is as fruitful as one's 
 own. 
 
 In conception, this scheme is purely defen- 
 sive. Incidentally, if opportunity offer to in- 
 jure the enemy it will of course be embraced, 
 but the controlling object is to remove the 
 danger to home commerce by neutralizing the 
 enemy's fleet. To this end numbers and force 
 are calculated. This done, the next step is to 
 consider the Mediterranean from the obvious 
 and inevitable military point of view that it is 
 the one and only central position, the assured 
 control of which gives an interior line of opera-
 
 I So Considerations Goverfii^tg 
 
 tions from the western coast of Europe to the 
 eastern waters of Asia. To have assured safety 
 to the home seas and seaboard is little, except 
 as a means to further action ; for, if to build 
 without a foundation is disastrous, to lay 
 foundations and not to be able to build 
 is impotent, and that is the case where dis- 
 proportioned care is given to mere defensive 
 arrangements. The power secured and stored 
 at home must be continually transmitted to 
 the distant scene of operations, here assumed, 
 on account of the known conditions of world 
 politics, to be the western Pacific, which, under 
 varying local designations, washes the shores 
 of the Farther East. 
 
 It has been said that in the Mediterranean, 
 as the principal link in the long chain of 
 communications, defence and offence blend. 
 Moreover, since control here means assured 
 quickest transmission of reinforcements and 
 supplies in either direction, it follows that, 
 while preponderance in battle-ship force is 
 essential in the Far East, where if war occurs 
 the operations will be offensive, such predom- 
 inance in the Mediterranean, equally essential 
 in kind, must be much greater in degree. In
 
 The Disposition of Navies i8i 
 
 fact, the offensive fleet in the Eastern Seas and 
 the defensive fleet in the Channel are the two 
 wings, or flanks, of a long front of operations, 
 the due security of both of which depends upon 
 the assured tenure of the central position. 
 Naturally, therefore, the Mediterranean fleet, 
 having to support both, possibly even to de- 
 tach hurriedly to one or the other, has in it- 
 self that combination of defensive and offen- 
 sive character which ordinarily inheres in sea 
 communications as such. 
 
 If this assertion be accepted in general state- 
 ment, it will be fortified by a brief considera- 
 tion of permanent conditions ; with which it 
 is further essential to associate as present tem- 
 porary factors the existing alliances between 
 France and Russia, Great Britain and Japan. 
 The Triple Alliance, of the renewal of which 
 we are assured, does not contemplate among 
 its objects any one that is directly affected by 
 the control of the Mediterranean. Should an 
 individual member engage in war having its 
 scene there, it would be as a power untram- 
 melled by this previous engagement. 
 
 History and physical conformation have 
 constituted unique strategic conditions in the
 
 iS2 Considerations Govcr7iing 
 
 Mediterranean. To history is due the exist- 
 ing tenure of positions, the bases, of varying 
 intrinsic value, and held with varying degrees 
 of power and firmness by several nations in 
 several quarters. To examine these minutely 
 and w^eigh their respective values as an ele- 
 ment of strategic effect would be indeed essen- 
 tial to the particular jilanning of a naval cam- 
 paign, or to the proper determination of the 
 distribution of naval force, with a view to the 
 combinations open to one's self or the enemy; 
 but a paper dealing with general conditions 
 may leave such detailed considerations to those 
 immediately concerned. It must be sufficient 
 to note the eminently central position of Malta, 
 the uni(]ue position of Ciibraltar, and the ex- 
 ccntric situation of Toulon relatively to the 
 great trade route. By conformation the Med- 
 iterranean has, besides the artificial canal, — 
 the frailest and most doubtful j^art of the chain, 
 — at least three straits of the utmost decisive 
 importance, because there is to them no alter- 
 native ])assage by which vessels can leave the 
 sea, or move from one part of it to another. 
 In the Caribbean Sea, which is a kind of Med- 
 iterranean, the multiplicity of islands and pas-
 
 The Disposition of Navies i8 
 
 o 
 
 sages reduces many of them to inconsequence, 
 and qualifies markedly the effect of even the 
 most important; but, in the Mediterranean, 
 the Dardanelles, Gibraltar, and the belt of 
 water separating the toe of Italy from Cape 
 Bon in Africa, constitute three points of transit 
 which cannot be evaded. It is true that in the 
 last the situation of the island of Sicily allows 
 vessels to go on its either side ; but the sur- 
 rounding conditions arc such that it is scarcely 
 possible for a fleet to pass undetected by an 
 adversary making due use of his scouts. 
 These physical peculiarities, conjointly with 
 the positions specified, are the permanent fea- 
 tures, which must underlie and control all 
 strategic plans of Mediterranean Powers, among 
 whom Russia must be inferentially included. 
 Geographically, Great Britain is an intruder 
 in the Mediterranean. Her presence there at 
 all, in territorial tenure, is distinctively military. 
 This is witnessed also by the character of her 
 particular possessions. Nowhere docs the vital 
 energy of sea power appear more conspicu- 
 ously, as self-expansive and self-dependent. 
 To its historical manifestation is due the acqui- 
 sitions which make the strength of her present
 
 184 Consider atio7ts Governing' 
 
 position; but, as in history, so now, sea power 
 itself must continue to sustain that which it 
 begat. The habitual distribution of the war- 
 ships of the United Kingdom must provide for 
 a decisive predominance here, upon occasion 
 arising, over any probable combination of 
 enemies. Such provision has \.o take account 
 not only of the total force of hostile divisions 
 within and without the Mediterranean, but of 
 movements intended to transfer one or more 
 from or to that sea from other scenes of opera- 
 tions. Prevention of these attempts is a ques- 
 tion, not of numbers chiefly, but of position, 
 of stations assigned, of distribution. Predom- 
 inance, to be militarily effectual, means not 
 only an aggregate superiority to the enemy 
 united, but ability to frustrate, before accom- 
 plishment, concentrations which might give 
 him a local superiority anywhere. This is a 
 question of positions more even than of num- 
 bers. In the Mediterranean, as the great 
 centre, these two factors must receive such 
 mutual adjustment as shall outweigh the com- 
 bination of them on the part of the adversary. 
 Where one is defective the other must be in- 
 creased. The need is the more emphatic when
 
 The Disposition of Navies 1S5 
 
 the nation itself is external and distant from 
 the sea, while possible antagonists, as Russia 
 and France, are territorially contiguous ; for 
 it can scarcely be expected that the Russian 
 Black Sea fleet would not force its way through 
 the Dardanelles upon urgent occasion. 
 
 Evidently, too, Japan cannot in the near 
 future contribute directly to maintain Great 
 Britain in the Mediterranean. On the con- 
 trary, the declarations of Russia and France 
 make plain that, if war arise, Japan must be 
 supported in the Far East by her ally against 
 a coalition, the uncertain element of which is 
 the force that France will feel able to spare 
 from her scattered, exposed interests. Russia 
 labors under no such distraction ; her single- 
 ness of eye is shown by the fact that the more 
 efficient, and by far the larger part, of her so- 
 called Baltic fleet is now in the waters of China. 
 In numbers and force she has there a sub- 
 stantial naval equality with Japan, but under 
 a disadvantage of position like that of Great 
 Britain in the Mediterranean, in being remote 
 from the centre of her power, imperfectly based, 
 as yet, upon local resources, and with home 
 communications by the shortest route gravely
 
 1 86 Considerations Governing 
 
 uncertain. Under these circumstances the 
 decided step she has taken in the reinforcement 
 of her Eastern Navy, carries the political in- 
 ference that she for the present means to seek 
 her desired access to unfrozen waters in East- 
 ern Asia, preferably to the Mediterranean or the 
 Persian Gulf. Having in view local difHculties 
 and antagonistic interests elsewhere, this con- 
 clusion was probably inevitable ; but its evident 
 acceptance is notable. 
 
 For Great Britain it is also most opportune ; 
 and this raises a further question, attractive to 
 speculative minds, viz.: whether the Anglo- 
 Japanese agreement has had upon Russia a 
 stimulating or a deterrent effect .f* If it has in- 
 creased her determination to utilize her present 
 advantages, as represented in Port Arthur and 
 its railroad, it would be in the direct line of 
 a sound British policy ; for it fixes the rea- 
 sonable satisfaction of Russia's indisputable 
 needs in a region remote from the greater in- 
 terests of Great Britain, yet where attempts 
 at undue predominance will elicit the active 
 resistance of many competitors, intent upon 
 their own equally indisputable rights. The 
 gathering of the eagles on the coasts of China
 
 The Disposition of Navies 187 
 
 is manifest to the dullest eye. But should the 
 alliance have the contrary effect of checking 
 Russian development in that direction, her 
 irrepressible tendency to the sea is necessarily 
 thrown upon a quarter — the Levant or Persia 
 — more distinctly ominous, and where, in the 
 last named at least, Great Britain would find 
 no natural supporter, enlisted by similarity of 
 interest. The concentration of Russian ships 
 in the East, taken in connection with the gen- 
 eral trend of events there, is, however, as clear 
 an indication of policy as can well be given. 
 
 In connection with the substantial numerical 
 equality of Japan and Russia is to be taken, 
 as one of the ascertained existing conditions, 
 instituted so recently as to have a possi- 
 ble political significance, the reorganization 
 of the French divisions beyond Suez into a 
 single command, and the numbers thereto 
 assigned. It is not to be supposed that this 
 new disposition has been adopted without con- 
 sideration of the new combinations indicated 
 by the Anglo-Japanese treaty. It may even be 
 in direct consequence. The relative strengths 
 of this extensive eastern command and of the 
 French Mediterranean fleet should in close
 
 1 88 Consideraiicms Govciniing 
 
 measure reflect the official consciousness of the 
 general naval situation, and of the power of 
 France to give support to her recognized ally ; 
 directly in the East, and indirectly by military 
 influence exerted upon the Mediterranean. 
 Supposing Great Britain, on the other hand, 
 to have made provision for the defensive con- 
 trol of the approaches to her home ports, how 
 will she, and how can she, assure the joint 
 ascendency of herself and her ally in the Farther 
 East, the scene of the offensive, and her own 
 single preponderance in the Mediterranean, 
 the main link in the communications? These 
 are the two intricate factors for consideration, 
 calling for plans and movements not primarily 
 defensive but offensive in scope. For France 
 and for Great Britain, as a party to an alliance, 
 the question is urgent, " How far can I go, 
 how much spare from the Mediterranean to 
 the East? In assisting my ally there, unless 
 I bring him predominance, or at least nearly 
 an equality, I waste my substance, little help- 
 ing him. If paralyzed in the Mediterranean, 
 thrown on a mere defensive, my force in the 
 East is practically cut off. Like a besieged 
 garrison, it may endure till relieved ; but the
 
 The Disposition of Navies 189 
 
 situation is critical while it lasts, and carries 
 imminent possibilities of disaster." 
 
 In approaching a military subject of this 
 character it is necessary first and for all to 
 disabuse the mind of the idea that a scheme 
 can be devised, a disposition imagined, by 
 which all risk is eliminated. Such an attrac- 
 tive condition of absolute security, if realized, 
 would eliminate all war along with its risks. A 
 British distribution, most proper for the Medi- 
 terranean alone, may entail the danger that a 
 hostile body may escape into the Atlantic, may 
 unite with the Brest and Cherbourg divisions 
 against the Channel Fleet, and overwhelm the 
 latter. True ; but imagination must work both 
 ways. It may also be that the escape cannot 
 but be known at Gibraltar, telegraphed to 
 England, and the fleet warned betimes so that 
 the reserve ships, which give it a superiority to 
 either detachment of the enemy, might join, 
 and that its scouts, stationed as previously 
 suggested, would gain for it the two hours of 
 time needed to deal decisively with one division 
 before the other turns up. These probabilities, 
 known to the enemy, affect his actions just as 
 one's own risks move one's self. Listen to Nel-
 
 190 Considerations Governing 
 
 son contemplating just this contingency. " If 
 the Ferrol squadron joins the Toulon, they will 
 much outnumber us, but in that case I shall 
 never lose sight of them, and Pellew " (from 
 before Ferrol) " will soon be after them." But 
 he adds, confirmatory of the need of numerous 
 scouts, then as now, " I at this moment want 
 ten frigates or sloops, when I believe neither 
 the Ferrol or Toulon squadron could escape 
 me." By this, I understand, is clearly inti- 
 mated that he could look out both ways, in- 
 tercept the first comer, frustrate the junction, 
 and beat them in detail. If not before the 
 action, Pellew would arrive in time to repair 
 Nelson's losses and restore equality. The 
 change in modern conditions would favor the 
 modern Pellew more than the adversary. 
 
 So again disturbing political possibilities 
 must be reasonably viewed. It may be that 
 the whole Continent not only dislikes Great 
 Britain, but would willingly combine for her 
 military destruction ; and that, if war begin, 
 such a combination may come to pass. It may 
 be; but this at least is certain, that interest, 
 not liking, will decide so grave a matter. 
 In the calculation of final issues, of national
 
 TJie Disposition of Navies 191 
 
 expenditure, of profit and loss, of relative na- 
 tional predominance resulting from a supposed 
 success, I incline to think that Imperial Feder- 
 ation will be a far less difficult achievement than 
 framing such a coalition. If the two dual alli- 
 ances, the mutual opposition of which is appar- 
 ent, come to blows, Germany may see it to her 
 interest to strike hands with Russia and France; 
 but it seems to me it would be so much more 
 her interest to let them exhaust themselves, to 
 the relief of her two flanks, that I find it diffi- 
 cult to believe she would not herself so view 
 the question. There is one qualifying consid- 
 eration. Germany cannot but wish a modifica- 
 tion in the effect exerted upon her maritime 
 routes by the position of Great Britain, already 
 noted. As geographical situation cannot be 
 changed, the only modification possible is the 
 decrease of Great Britain's power by the les- 
 sening of her fleet. But, grant that object 
 gained by such coalition, what remains.-^ A 
 Channel dominated by the French Navy no 
 longer checked by the British ; whereas with 
 the latter as an ally the Channel would be 
 almost as safe as the Kiel canal. If this re- 
 mark is sound, it is but an illustration of the
 
 192 Considerations Governing 
 
 choice of difficulties presented by attempts to 
 change permanent conditions by artificial com- 
 binations. As a matter of fact, no single power 
 in Europe, save possibly Russia, is individually 
 so weighty as to see without apprehension the 
 effective elimination of any one factor in the 
 present balance of power. The combined posi- 
 tion and numbers of Russia do give her a great 
 defensive security in her present tenures. 
 
 Admitting the Mediterranean to be distinc- 
 tively and pre-eminently the crucial feature in 
 any strategic scheme that contemplates Europe 
 and the Farther East as the chief factors of 
 interest, the positions before enumerated, in 
 conjunction with the relative forces of the fleets, 
 constitute the initial strategic situation. As- 
 suming, as is very possible, that the decisive 
 predominance, local or general, desired by either 
 party, does not yet exist, the attempt of each 
 must be to reach some preponderance by play- 
 ing the game of war ; by such applied pressure 
 or strategic movements as shall procure a deci- 
 sive momentary preponderance in some quarter, 
 the due use of which, by the injury done the 
 enemy, shall establish a permanent and decisive 
 superiority. This is the one object of war sci-
 
 The Disposition of Navies 193 
 
 entifically — or better, artistically — ■ considered. 
 The nation that begins with the stronger fleet 
 should initiate some offensive action, with the 
 object of compelling the enemy to fight. This 
 the latter cannot do, unless already in adequate 
 strength at some one point, except by under- 
 takinor to combine his divided forces so as to 
 effect a concentration in some quarter. The 
 movements necessary to accomplish this are 
 the opportunity of the offensive, to strike the 
 converging divisions before their junction gives 
 the desired local superiority. Herein is the 
 skill ; herein also the chance, the unexpected, 
 the risk, which the best authorities tell us are 
 inseparable from war, and constitute much of 
 its opportunity as of its danger. 
 
 How shall the superior fleet exercise the 
 needed compulsion ? Ships cannot invade ter- 
 ritory, unless there be unprotected navigable 
 rivers. The stronger navy therefore cannot 
 carry war beyond the sea-coast, home to the 
 heart of the enemy, unless indeed its nation in 
 addition to controlling the sea, can transport 
 an overpowering force of troops. Of this the 
 Transvaal war offers an illustration. Possibly, 
 a disabling blow to the British fleet by the 
 
 13
 
 194 Considerations Governing 
 
 navy of one of the great continental armies 
 might present a somewhat similar instance ; but 
 when the British fleet is thus enfeebled, Great 
 Britain will be exposed to the conditions which 
 it must be her own first effort, with her supreme 
 navy, to impose on an opponent. Under such 
 circumstances, there will be no need for an 
 enemy to land an invading host on British soil. 
 The interception of commerce at a half-dozen 
 of the principal ports will do the work as surely, 
 if less directly. Similarly, while the British 
 Navy is what it is, the destruction of an enemy's 
 commerce, not only by scattered cruisers at 
 sea, but by a systematized, coherent effort 
 directed against his ports and coasts, both 
 home and colonial, must be the means of in- 
 flicting such distress and loss as shall compel 
 his fleet to fight; or, if it still refuse, shall sap 
 endurance by suffering and extenuation. 
 
 To effect this requires a battle-fleet superior 
 in the aggregate to the one immediately op- 
 posed to it by at least so many ships as shall 
 suffice to allow a constant system of reliefs. 
 The battle-fleet is the solid nucleus of power. 
 From it radiates the system of cruisers by 
 which the trade blockade is maintained in
 
 The Disposition of Navies 195 
 
 technical, and as far as may be, in actual, effi- 
 ciency. In case of hostilities with France, for 
 example, the blockade of a principal commer- 
 cial port, like Havre or Marseille, may be sus- 
 tained in local efficiency by cruisers ; but the 
 security of these, and consequently the main- 
 tenance of the blockade, will depend upon such 
 proximity of the battle-fleet as will prevent the 
 French divisions at Cherbourg, Brest, or Toulon, 
 from attacking them, except at great risk of 
 being compelled to an engagement which it is 
 presumably the specific aim of the British fleet 
 to force. " Not blockade but battle is my aim," 
 said Nelson : " on the sea alone we hope to 
 realize the hopes and expectations of our coun- 
 try." A successful battle in any one quarter 
 clears up the whole situation ; that is, in pro- 
 portion to the results obtained. This qualifi- 
 cation is always to be borne in mind by a 
 victorious admiral; for the general relief to his 
 nation will correspond to the use made by him 
 of the particular advantage gained. More or 
 fewer of his ships will be liberated from their 
 previous tasks, and can reinforce the station 
 where the most assured predominance is desired. 
 This by our analysis is the Mediterranean.
 
 196 Considerations Governing 
 
 History has more than once shown how 
 severe a compulsion may be exerted over an 
 extensive coast by proper dispositions. Where 
 a formidable, though inferior, navy lies in the 
 ports of the blockaded state, the position and 
 management of the battle-fleet, on either side, 
 is the critical military problem. The task of the 
 cruisers is simple, if arduous ; to keep near the 
 port assigned them, to hold their ground against 
 equals, to escape capture by superior force. The 
 battle-fleet must be so placed as effectually to 
 cover the cruisers from the enemy's fleet, with- 
 out unduly exposing itself ; above all to torpedo 
 attack. It must be on hand, not only to fight, 
 but to chase to advantage, to make strategic 
 movements, perhaps extensive in range, at short 
 notice. War is a business of positions. Its posi- 
 tion, suitably chosen, by supporting the cruiser 
 force, covers the approaches of the national com- 
 merce, and also maintains both the commercial 
 blockade and the close watch of the military 
 ports. It may be noted that the commer- 
 cial blockade is offensive in design, to injure 
 the enemy and compel him to fight, while 
 the other specified functions of the vessels 
 are defensive. We therefore have here again
 
 The Dispositio7i of Navies 197 
 
 a combination of the two purposes in a single 
 disposition. 
 
 For some time to come nations distinctively 
 European must depend upon the Mediterra- 
 nean as their principal military route to the 
 Far East. In the present condition of the 
 Siberian railroad, Russia shares this common 
 lot. While the other States have no land route 
 whatever, hers is still so imperfect as not to 
 constitute a valid substitute. Moreover, what- 
 ever resources of moderate bulk may be locally 
 accumulated, — coal, provisions, ammunition, 
 and stores of various kinds, — reinforcements 
 of vessels, or reliefs to ships disabled by service 
 or in battle can go only by sea. Guns beyond 
 a certain calibre are in like case. Every con- 
 sideration emphasizes the importance of the 
 Mediterranean. To it the Red Sea is simply 
 an annex, the military status of which will be 
 determined by that of its greater neighbor, 
 qualified in some measure by the tenure of 
 Egypt and Aden. 
 
 On the farther side of the isthmus, the naval 
 operations throughout Eastern seas will depend 
 for sustained vigor upon contact militarily 
 maintained with the Mediterranean, and
 
 1 98 Considerations Governing 
 
 through that with home. In these days of 
 cables, the decisive importance of Malta to 
 India, recognized by Nelson and his contem- 
 poraries, is affirmed with quadruple force of 
 the sea in which Malta is perhaps the most 
 conspicuously important naval position. Rein- 
 forcements sent by the Cape, whether west or 
 east, can always be anticipated at either end of 
 the road by the Power which holds the interior 
 line. 
 
 As regards special dispositions for the East- 
 ern seas, embracing under that name all from 
 Suez to Japan, the same factors — numbers and 
 position — dictate distribution. To a central 
 position, if such there be, must be assigned 
 numbers adequate to immediate superiority, in 
 order to control commercial routes, and to 
 operate against the enemy whose approximate 
 force and position are known. Such assign- 
 ment keeps in view, necessarily, the possibilities 
 of receiving reinforcements from the Mediter- 
 ranean, or having to send them to China. Cey- 
 lon, for example, if otherwise suitable, is nearly 
 midway between Suez and Hong-Kong; in 
 round numbers, 3000 miles from each. Such 
 a position favors a force of battle-ships as
 
 The Disposition of Navies 199 
 
 an advanced squadron from the Mediterranean, 
 and would be a provision against a mishap at 
 the canal interrupting reinforcements eastward. 
 Position, with its two functions of distance and 
 resources; there is nothing more prominent 
 than these in Napoleon's analysis of a military 
 situation. Numbers go, as it were, without 
 saying. Where the power was his he multiplied 
 them ; but he always remembered that position 
 multiplies spontaneously. He who has but 
 half-way to go does double work. This is the 
 privilege of central position. 
 
 The question of the Eastern seas introduces 
 naturally the consideration of what the great 
 self-governing colonies can do, not only for 
 their own immediate security, and that of their 
 trade, but for the general fabric of Imperial 
 naval action, in the coherence of which they 
 will find far greater assurance than in merely 
 local effort. The prime naval considerations 
 for them are that the British Channel Fleet 
 should adequately protect the commerce and 
 shores of the British Islands, and that the 
 Mediterranean Fleet should insure uninter- 
 rupted transit for trade and for reinforcements. 
 These effected and maintained, there will be
 
 200 Considerations Governing 
 
 no danger to their territory; and little to their 
 trade except from single cruisers, which will 
 have a precarious subsistence as compared 
 with their own, based upon large self-support- 
 ing political communities. Australasia, how- 
 ever, can undoubtedly supply a very important 
 factor, that will go far to fortify the whole 
 British position in the Far East. A continent 
 in itself, with a thriving population, and willing, 
 apparently, to contribute to the general naval 
 welfare, let it frame its schemes and base its 
 estimates on sound lines, both naval and im- 
 perial; naval, by allowing due weight to battle 
 force; imperial, by contemplating the whole, 
 and recognizing that local safety is not always 
 best found in local precaution. There is a 
 military sense, in which it is true that he who 
 loses his life shall save it. 
 
 In the Eastern seas, Australia and China 
 mark the extremities of two long lines, the 
 junction of which is near India ; let us say, for 
 sake of specificness, Ceylon. They are off- 
 shoots, each, of one branch, the root of which 
 under present conditions, is the English Chan- 
 nel, and the trunk the Mediterranean. Now it 
 is the nature of extremities to be exposed. To
 
 The Disposition of Navies 201 
 
 this our feet, hands, and ears bear witness, as 
 does the military aphorism about salients ; but 
 while local protection has its value in these 
 several cases, the general vigor and sustenance 
 of the oro-anism as a whole is the truer de- 
 pendence. To apply this simile: it appears 
 to me that the waters from Suez eastward 
 should be regarded as a military whole, vitally 
 connected with the system to the westward, 
 but liable to temporary interruption at the 
 Canal, against which precaution must be had. 
 This recognizes at once the usual dependence 
 upon the Channel and the Mediterranean, and 
 the coincident necessity of providing for inde- 
 pendent existence on emergency. In the na- 
 ture of things there must be a big detachment 
 east of Suez ; the chance of its being momen- 
 tarily cut off there is not so bad as its being 
 stalled on the other side, dependent on the 
 Cape route to reach the scene. But for the 
 same reason that the Mediterranean and Malta 
 are strategically eminent, because central, (as is 
 likewise the Channel with reference to the 
 North Sea and Atlantic), the permanent stra- 
 tegic centre of the Eastern seas is not by 
 position in, China, nor yet in Australia. It is
 
 202 Considerations Governing 
 
 to be found rather at a point which, approxi- 
 mately equidistant from both, is also equi- 
 distant from the Mediterranean and the East. 
 Permanent, I say; not as ignoring that the 
 force which there finds its centre may have 
 to remove, and long to remain, at one extrem- 
 ity or another of the many radii thence issu- 
 ing, but because there it is best placed to 
 move in the shortest time in any one of the 
 several directions. That from the same centre 
 it best protects the general commercial inter- 
 ests is evident from an examination of the 
 maps and of commercial returns. 
 
 Whether the essential unity of scope in naval 
 action east of Suez should receive recognition 
 by embracing Australia, China, and India, 
 under one general command, with local sub- 
 ordinates, is a question administrative as well 
 as strategic. As military policy it has a good 
 side; for commanders previously independent 
 do not always accept ungrudgingly the intrusion 
 of a superior because of emergency of war. 
 Military sensitiveness cannot prudently be left 
 out of calculations. There would be benefit 
 also in emphasizing in public consciousness the 
 essential unity of militar}' considerations, which
 
 The Disposition of Navies 203 
 
 should dominate the dispositions of the fleet. 
 Non-professional — and even military — minds 
 need the habit of regarding local and general 
 interests in their true relations and proportions. 
 Unless such correct appreciation exist, it is 
 hard to silence the clamor for a simple local 
 security, which is apparent but not real, because 
 founded on a subdivision and dissemination of 
 force essentially contrary to sound military 
 principle. What Australasia needs is not her 
 petty fraction of the Imperial navy, a squadron 
 assigned to her in perpetual presence, but an 
 organization of naval force which constitutes a 
 firm grasp of the universal naval situation. 
 Thus danger is kept remote ; but, if it should 
 approach, there is insured within reaching dis- 
 tance an adequate force to repel it betimes. 
 There may, however, be fairly demanded the 
 guarantee for the fleet's action, in a develop- 
 ment of local dock-yard facilities and other 
 resources which shall insure its maintenance in 
 full efficiency if it have to come. 
 
 In this essential principle other colonies 
 should acquiesce. The essence of the matter 
 is that local security does not necessarily, nor 
 usually, depend upon the constant local presence
 
 204 Considerations Governing 
 
 of a protector, ship or squadron, but upon gen- 
 eral dispositions. As was said to and of Rod- 
 ney, " Unless men take the great line, as you 
 do, and consider the King's whole dominions 
 as under their care, the enemy must find us 
 unprepared somewhere. It is impossible to 
 have a superior fleet in every part." 
 
 It is impossible ; and it is unnecessary, grant- 
 ing the aggregate superiority at which Great 
 Britain now aims. In the question of the dis- 
 position of force three principal elements are 
 distinguishable in the permanent factors which 
 we classify under the general head of " posi- 
 tion." These are, the recognition of central 
 positions, of interior lines — which means, 
 briefly, shorter lines — and provision of abun- 
 dant local dock-yard equipment in its widest 
 sense. These furnish the broad outline, the 
 skeleton of the arrangement. They consti- 
 tute, so to say, the qualitative result of the 
 analysis which underlies the whole calcula- 
 tion. Add to it the quantitative estimate of 
 the interests at stake, the dangers at hand, 
 the advantages of position, in the several 
 quarters, and you reach the assignment of 
 numbers, which shall make the dry bones
 
 The Disposition of Navies 205 
 
 live with all the energy of flesh and blood in a 
 healthy body ; where each member is supported, 
 not by a local congestion of vitality, but by the 
 vigor of the central organs which circulate 
 nourishment to each in proportion to its 
 needs.
 
 THE PERSIAN GULF AND 
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 
 THE PERSIAN GULF AND 
 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 Jmie, 1903. 
 
 THE American whom above all others 
 his countrymen delight to honor, more 
 even to-day than a century ago, as his sober 
 wisdom and unselfish patriotism stand in 
 stronger relief on the clear horizon of the past, 
 when he took leave of public life, cautioned 
 his fellow-citizens of that day against " perma- 
 nent inveterate antipathies against particular 
 nations." In uttering this warning, to which 
 he added certain obvious corollaries as to the 
 effect of prejudice, sympathetic as well as anti- 
 pathetic, upon action, Washington had vividly 
 in mind American conditions, both present 
 and past, of which he had had bitter official 
 experience. His own people had then divided, 
 and was still farther dividing:, in sentiment and 
 utterance, upon lines of sympathy for and 
 against Great Britain and France. Impas- 
 
 14
 
 2IO The Persian Gulf and 
 
 sioned feeling and fervent speech were doing 
 the deadly work he deplored, in setting man 
 against man, and to some extent section 
 against section, upon issues which were at 
 least not purely of American interest. Harm- 
 ful at any time, such an opposition of mis- 
 placed emotions was peculiarly dangerous then, 
 when the still recent union under the Consti- 
 tution of 1 789 had not yet had time to obliter- 
 ate the colonial habits of thought, to which the 
 common term " American " loomed far less 
 large, and was far less dear, than the local 
 appellations of the several States. This in- 
 spired Washington's further very serious and, 
 to use his own word, " affectionate " counsels 
 against the spirit of faction and disunion, 
 which, though not confined to our political 
 communit}^ presented special perils to one but 
 lately organized. 
 
 Nor was it only against immediate instances 
 of inveterate national antipathies that Wash- 
 ington uttered his warning. These served 
 him merely as pointed illustrations. He based 
 his counsels, as advice to be sound must ever 
 be based, upon permanent general principles. 
 International relations, he said, were not de-
 
 International Relations 211 
 
 termined, and should not be determined, by 
 sympathy, but by justice and by interest. Jus- 
 tice of course first. However onerous and 
 unsatisfactory, ''let existing engagements be 
 observed in their genuine sense." Beyond this, 
 " keep constantly in view that 't is folly in one 
 nation to look for disinterested favors from 
 another; that it must pay with a portion of 
 its independence for whatever it may accept 
 under that character; that by acceptance it 
 may place itself in the condition of having 
 given equivalent for nominal favors, and yet 
 of being reproached with ingratitude for not 
 giving more." 
 
 Here again, in this slightly veiled allusion 
 to the French alliance, was indicated the in- 
 trusion of bias into international relations. 
 The help extended by France to the American 
 struggle for independence was indeed real ; 
 but as a favor, though given that coloring, it 
 was purely nominal. Yet upon it, so regarded, 
 were based extravagant claims, not only for 
 American sympathy, but for American active 
 support in the early days of the French Revo- 
 lution. Sight was lost of the notorious fact, 
 that, however disinterested the action of indi-
 
 2 1 2 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 vidual Frenchmen, the French government, 
 with proper regard to the interests of its own 
 nation, had simply utihzed the revolt of the 
 colonies to renew its old struggle with Great 
 Britain under favorable conditions, A large 
 number of Americans, treasuring the then 
 recent occasions of bitter hostility to Great 
 Britain, responded vehemently; another numer- 
 ous party, alienated by republican excesses in 
 France, and seeing a truer ideal of liberty in 
 British institutions, recoiled with equal vigor. 
 At a moment when everv consideration of ex- 
 pediency dictated political detachment, to the 
 intensification of national life, by pruning 
 superfluous activitives and concentrating vital 
 force upon internal consolidation and develop- 
 ment, a vast motive power of passion and 
 prejudice was aroused, misdirecting national 
 energy into channels where it not merely ran 
 to waste but corroded the foundations of the 
 Union, On one side and the other, the ideals 
 of national duty and policy became confused 
 with the names of foreign peoples, leading to 
 a bitterness of antagonism that prolonged 
 through a generation the immaturity of the 
 affection uniting the States; maintaining an
 
 International Relations 2 1 3 
 
 internal weakness which manifested itself re- 
 currently with each fresh cause of variance, 
 and entailed continued feebleness of external 
 influence until it disappeared forever in the 
 asfonies of civil war. 
 
 It will doubtless be argued that there is now 
 general recognition that reasoned interest, 
 controlled by justice, is the true regulator of 
 state policy. Possibly ; but does practice 
 coincide? Is national calmness or harmony 
 undisturbed, national force unweakened, by 
 sympathies and antipathies which, however 
 otherwise justified, have no proper place in 
 perturbing international conduct 1 The foster- 
 ing of an internal spirit of faction is not the 
 only evil effect on national judgment that may 
 arise from extra-national repulsions or attrac- 
 tions. The immediate evil of disruption, wliich 
 then threatened the United States, is indeed 
 not imminent for political communities of long- 
 standing consolidation ; but even into them 
 prepossession indulged for or against other 
 peoples, as such, introduces a motive which 
 is to national efficiency what a morbid growth 
 is to the health of the body. The functions 
 are vitiated, vision impaired, and movement
 
 2 14 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 undecided or misdirected ; perhaps both. A 
 tendency arises to seek the solution of diffi- 
 culties in artificial and sometimes complicated 
 international arrangements, contemplating an 
 indefinite future, instead of in simple national 
 procedure meeting each new situation as it 
 develops, governed by a settled general national 
 policy. The latter course may at times incur 
 the reproach of inconsistency through the in- 
 evitable necessity of conforming particular 
 measures to unforeseen emergencies ; but it 
 may none the less remain most truly consistent 
 in its fixed regard to a few evident leading 
 conditions for v.hich permanency may be pre- 
 dicated. Washington, a man wise with the 
 wisdom that comes of observation in practical 
 life, phrased this for his countrymen, in the 
 connection already quoted, in the words, " Con- 
 sulting the natural course of things, forcing 
 nothing;" or, as an American experienced in 
 political campaigning once said to me, " Never 
 contrive an opportunity." 
 
 Nothing is more fruitful of that frequent 
 charge of bad faith among nations than the 
 attempt to substitute the artificial for the 
 natural. When subsequent experience shows
 
 International Relations 215 
 
 that interest has been elaborately sacrificed 
 because imperfectly comprehended or wholly 
 misunderstood, popular revulsion ultimately 
 exerts over rulers an influence that is compul- 
 sive in proportion to the urgency of the situa- 
 tion. It does not follow from this that a 
 nation, as such, has premeditated bad faith, or 
 wilfully accepts it. Nations are not cynical, 
 though individual statesmen have been. There 
 need be no attempt to justify breach of en- 
 gagement ; but it is a very partial view of facts 
 not to reco2:nize that the oreater fault lies with 
 those who made a situation which could not 
 be perpetuated, because contrary to the nature 
 of things. Such action should be accepted as 
 a warning that international arrangements can 
 be regarded as sound only when they conform 
 to substantial conditions, relatively at least 
 permanent. If this caution be observed, na- 
 tional policy may through long periods be as 
 enduring as national characteristics admit- 
 tedly are. National character abides, though 
 nations under impulse are often inconstant. 
 So may national policy, though on occasion 
 fluctuating, or even vacillating, be really con- 
 stant ; but to be so it must conform to the
 
 2 1 6 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 nature of things, consulting — not resisting — 
 their course. 
 
 If this be so as regards general policy, it fol- 
 lows that successive questions, as they arise, 
 should be viewed in their relation to that gen- 
 eral policy, which it must be assumed is con- 
 sciously realized in its broad outlines by the 
 governments of the day. Of such questions 
 the prospective status of Persia and the Per- 
 sian Gulf now forms one, in the consideration 
 of two or three of the great world powers. In 
 their regard to it, and to the various interests 
 or enterprises centring around it, how far are 
 they guided by the natural tendency of things? 
 How far are they seeking to interject artificial 
 arrangements, forced ambitions ? What is to 
 be said, from this point of view, of the pro- 
 posed activities, the various theories of action, 
 suggested political compromises, that here find 
 their origin ? As the phrase " world politics " 
 more and more expresses a reality of these lat- 
 ter days, the more necessary does it become to 
 consider each of the several centres of interest 
 as not separate, but having relations to the 
 whole ; as contributory to a general balance 
 of constitution, to the health of which it is
 
 International Relations 2 1 7 
 
 essential to work according to nature, not 
 contrary to it. 
 
 In the general economy of the world, irre- 
 spective of political tenures, present or pos- 
 sible, the Persian Gulf is one terminus of a 
 prospective interoceanic railroad. The track 
 of this, as determined by typographical con- 
 siderations, will take in great part a course 
 over which, at one period and another of his- 
 tory, commerce between the East and West has 
 travelled. Though itself artificial, it will follow 
 a road so far conforming to the nature of things 
 that it has earned in the past the name of the 
 Highway of Nations. The railroad will be one 
 link, as the Persian Gulf is another, in a chain 
 of communication between East and West, 
 alternative to the all-water route by the Suez 
 Canal and the Red Sea. This new line will 
 have over the one now existing the advantage, 
 which rail travel always has over that by water, 
 of greater specific rapidity. It will therefore 
 serve particularly for the transport of passen- 
 gers, mails, and lighter freights. On the other 
 hand, for bulk of transport, meaning thereby 
 not merely articles singly of great weight or 
 size, but the aggregate amounts of freight that
 
 2i8 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 can be carried in a given time, water will al- 
 ways possess an immense and irreversible ad- 
 vantage over land transport for equal distances. 
 This follows directly from the fact that a rail- 
 road is essentially narrow. Even with four 
 tracks, it admits of but two trains proceeding 
 abreast in the same direction ; whereas natural 
 water ways as a rule permit ships, individually 
 of greater capacity than any single train, to go 
 forward in numbers practically unlimited. A 
 water route is, as it were, a road with number- 
 less tracks. For these reasons, and on account 
 of the first cost of construction, water trans- 
 port has a lasting comparative cheapness, 
 which so far as can be foreseen will secure to 
 it forever a commercial superiority over that 
 by land. It is also, for large quantities, much 
 more rapid ; for, though a train can carry its 
 proper load faster than a vessel can, the closely 
 restricted number of trains that can proceed 
 at once, as compared to the numerous vessels, 
 enables the latter in a given time, practically 
 simultaneously, to deliver a bulk of material 
 utterly beyond the power of the road. 
 
 Commercially, therefore, the railroad system, 
 or systems, and their branches, which shall find
 
 International Relations 2 1 9 
 
 their terminus at the Persian Gulf, begin at a 
 great disadvantage towards the Suez route, con- 
 sidered as a hne of commercial communication 
 between two seas, or between the two conti- 
 nents, Asia and Europe. This, the broad 
 general result, is, however, only one aspect of 
 the relations to world politics. A railroad, as 
 all know, develops the country through which 
 it passes. This means that it there increases 
 existing interests, and creates new ones. Of 
 these it, and through it its owners, become the 
 fostering and controlling centre. Because of 
 this effect, railroads possess a marked local 
 commercial influence; and commercial influ- 
 ence, especially in these days, and in regions 
 where government is weak or remiss, readily 
 becomes political. It is in measure compelled 
 to political action, to protect its varied interests. 
 Furthermore, railroads serve to expedite not 
 only the movement of commerce but the move- 
 ment of troops. They have therefore military 
 significance, as well as commercial and politi- 
 cal. This is a commonplace, upon which it is 
 needless to insist beyond recalling that it in- 
 heres in all railroads as such, and therefore in 
 the one under consideration. Finally, while
 
 2 20 The Persian Gtilf and 
 
 all parts of a commercial route, by land or by 
 sea, have a certain value, supreme importance 
 is accumulated at the termini, the points of 
 arrival or of departure. The operations of 
 commerce, — receipt, distribution, or transship- 
 ment, — are there multiplied many fold. This 
 concentration makes them singularly the ob- 
 jects of forcible interference, and consequently 
 attributes to them an importance which is 
 military or naval, according to the locality. 
 This at present is the particular bearing of 
 the Persian Gulf upon world politics. It is 
 closely analogous to that of Port Arthur, which 
 has preceded it so shortly as not yet to be 
 fairly out of sight, as a matter of international 
 heartburnings. Upon the control of it will 
 rest the functioning of the prospective rail- 
 road itself, regarded either as a through line 
 of communication, or as a maintainer of local 
 industries by the access it affords them to 
 wider markets. Not only the prosperity of 
 the railroad itself is at stake. The commer- 
 cial interests that depend upon it, those of the 
 country through which it runs and to which it 
 immediately ministers, and those of many other 
 regions, as producers or consumers, are in-
 
 International Relations 221 
 
 volved in the political and military status of 
 the Persian Gulf. 
 
 Whose affair then is this, intrinsically so im- 
 portant? Not that of all the world, for though 
 all the world may be interested, more or less, 
 directly or indirectly, it by no means follows 
 that it is everybody's particular responsibility. 
 By established rule and justice, the determina- 
 tion belongs primarily to those immediately on 
 the spot, in actual possession. Unhappily, the 
 powers that border the Persian Gulf, Persia 
 itself, Turkey, and some minor Arabian com- 
 munities, are unable to give either the commer- 
 cial or the military security that the situation 
 will require. Under their tutelage alone, with- 
 out stronger foundations underlying, stability 
 cannot be maintained, either by equilibrium or 
 by predominance. In such circumstances, and 
 when occasion arises, the responsibility natu- 
 rally devolves, as for other derelicts of fortune, 
 upon the next of kin, the nearest in place or 
 interest. If they, too, fail, then the more re- 
 motely concerned derive both claim and duty. 
 The general welfare of the world, as that of 
 particular communities, will be most surely 
 advanced by each one doing that which he
 
 2 22 The Persian Gnlf and 
 
 finds to his hand to do, whether by direct 
 charge received from due authority, or by in- 
 heritance, or from the mere fact of neighbor- 
 hood, which has given to the word " neighbor " 
 that consecrated association, with the sound of 
 which we are all familiar, though we too nar- 
 rowly conceive the range of its privilege and 
 its duty. 
 
 From the fact of propinquity, of geographi- 
 cal nearness, or of direct political interest, it is 
 easy to see that Great Britain and Russia are 
 the two States which from existing circum- 
 stances are most immediately and deeply con- 
 cerned ; nor, when the several circumstances 
 are closely analyzed and duly weighed, does 
 there to my mind seem room to doubt that to 
 the former falls first to say whether she will 
 discharge the duty, or let it go to another. 
 Let there be here interposed, however, the 
 word of caution, before quoted, concerning the 
 natural course of things, lest I should seem 
 fairly chargeable with the disposition, unwise 
 as well as unjust, to favor needless or prema- 
 ture intervention. It may well to-day be a 
 duty not to do that which to-morrow will find 
 incumbent. Opportunity is not to be created,
 
 International Relations 223 
 
 but to be awaited till it appear in the form of 
 necessity, or at the least of clear and justifiable 
 expediency. Consulting the natural order of 
 things, forcing nothing, means at least invin- 
 cible patience as well as sleepless vigilance; 
 and vigilance includes necessarily readiness, 
 for he only is truly awake who is careful to 
 prepare. 
 
 I have said that an analysis of the circum- 
 stances shows that Great Britain, in the evi- 
 dent failure of Turkey and Persia, is the 
 nation first — that is, most — concerned. She 
 is so not only in her own right and that of her 
 own people, but in the yet more binding one 
 of imperial obligation to a great and politically 
 helpless ward of the Empire ; to India and its 
 teeming population. In her own right and 
 duty she is, as regards the establishment and 
 maintenance of order, in actual possession, hav- 
 ing discharged this office to the Gulf for several 
 generations. Doubtless, here as in Egypt, now 
 that the constructive work has been done, she 
 might find others who would willingly relieve 
 her of the burden of maintenance; but as re- 
 gards such transfer, the decision of acceptance 
 would rest, by general custom, with the present
 
 224 ^'^^ Persiaji Gtilf and 
 
 possessor. To her the question is one not 
 merely of convenience, but of duty, arising 
 from and closely involved with existing con- 
 ditions, which are the more imperative because 
 they are plants of mature growth, with roots 
 deep struck and closely intertwined in the soil 
 of a past history. 
 
 These conditions are doubtless manifold, but 
 in last analysis they are substantially three. 
 First, her security in India, which would be 
 materially affected by an adverse change in 
 political control of the Gulf; secondly, the 
 safety of the great sea route, commercial and 
 military, to India and the farther East, on which 
 British shipping is still actually the chief trav- 
 eller, though with a notable comparative dim- 
 inution that demands national attention; and, 
 thirdly, the economic and commercial welfare 
 of India, which can act politically only through 
 the Empire, a dependence which greatly en- 
 hances obligation. The control of the Persian 
 Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval 
 potentiality, a "fleet in being" there, based upon 
 a strong military port, would reproduce the re- 
 lations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the 
 Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes
 
 International Relations 225 
 
 to the farther East, to India, and to Australia, 
 the last two actually internal to the Empire, 
 regarded as a political system ; and although 
 at present Great Britain unquestionably could 
 check such a fleet, so placed, by a division of 
 her own, it might well require a detachment 
 large enough to affect seriously the general 
 strength of her naval position. On the other 
 hand, India, considered in regard to her par- 
 ticular necessities, apart from the general in- 
 terests of the Empire, may justly demand that 
 there be secured to her untrammelled inter- 
 course with Mesopotamia and Persia. She 
 has a fair claim also to any incidental ad- 
 vantage attendant upon the through land 
 communication that can be assured by polit- 
 ical foresight, obtaining a position favorable 
 to the negotiations of the future. It is noto- 
 rious, for instance, that most nations, and 
 Russia pre-eminently, adopt a highly protec- 
 tive or exclusive policy towards foreign in- 
 dustries. Applied to what is now Persia, this 
 would be a direct injury to India, which, even 
 under the present backward conditions of the 
 inhabitants and of communications, carries on 
 a large part of the Persian trade, as might 
 
 IS
 
 2 26 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 naturally be expected from the nearness of the 
 two countries. The same is doubtless true of 
 her relations with Mesopotamia, though the 
 absence of reliable customs returns prevents 
 positive statements. For securing these nat- 
 ural rights of India, British naval predomi- 
 nance in the Gulf, unfettered by bases there 
 belonging to possibly hostile foreign powers, 
 would be a political factor of considerable in- 
 fluence ; but it is incompatible with the estab- 
 lishment of foreign arsenals. 
 
 Further, purely naval control is for this 
 purpose a very imperfect instrument, unless 
 supported and reinforced by the shores on 
 which it acts. It is necessary therefore to 
 attach the inhabitants to the same interests 
 by the extension and consolidation of com- 
 mercial relations, the promotion of which con- 
 sequently should be the aim of the government. 
 The acquisition of territory is one thing, which 
 may properly be rejected as probably inexpe- 
 dient; and certainly unjust when not impera- 
 tive. It is quite another matter to secure 
 popular confidence and support by mutual use- 
 fulness. Whatever the merits of free trade as 
 a system, suited to these or those national
 
 International Relations 227 
 
 circumstances, it probably carries with it a 
 defect of its qualities in inducing too great 
 apathy towards the exertion of governmental 
 action in trade matters. Non-interference, 
 laissez-faire, may easily degenerate from a con- 
 servative principle to an indolent attitude of 
 mind, and then it is politically vicious. The 
 universal existence and the nature of a consular 
 service testify to the close relationship between 
 trade and government, a relationship that is 
 in some measure at least one of mutual de- 
 pendence. A certain forecast of the future, 
 a preparation of the way by smoothing of ob- 
 stacles, a discernment of opportunity, — which 
 is quite different from creating it, — a recog- 
 nition of the natural course of things at the 
 instant when it may be taken at the flood, 
 these are natural functions of a competent 
 consular body. To it belongs also the estab- 
 lishment of international relations through the 
 medium of personal intercourse, so strongly 
 operative in public matters even in states of 
 European civilization, among statesmen whose 
 business is to look below the surface, and 
 beyond the individual, to the substantial and 
 permanent issues at stake. Much more is it
 
 2 28 The Persian Gulf aiid 
 
 influential among peoples where statesmanship 
 is chiefly a matter of personal interest or bias, 
 consequently short sighted and unstable, and 
 where local confidence and prestige are domi- 
 nant factors in sustaining policy. There the 
 flag, if illustrated in a well-organized consular 
 service, may well be the forerunner of trade 
 as well as its necessary complement. 
 
 At the present time the trade of Persia is 
 divided chiefly between Great Britain and India 
 on the one hand, and Russia on the other. 
 As would be expected from their relative posi- 
 tions, the northern part falls to Russia, the 
 southern to her principal rival in Asia. The 
 one therefore is essentially a land trade, the 
 other maritime. From these respective char- 
 acteristics, the one naturally induces govern- 
 mental intervention, to promote the facility of 
 communications, to which the land by its varied 
 and refractory surface presents continual ob- 
 stacles. The other finds its royal highway of 
 the sea ever clear and open, a condition which 
 ministers to the natural conservatism and ac- 
 quired principle of non-interference which dis- 
 tinguish Great Britain. By the disposition 
 of all living things to grow, the spheres of the
 
 International Relations 229 
 
 two tend continually to approach. The mo- 
 ment of contact may well be indefinitely dis- 
 tant, but the circumstances which shall attend 
 its arrival are already forming ; and when it 
 comes it may be, as now in China, the signal of 
 an antagonism, the result of which will depend 
 upon the facts of political position on the one 
 side or the other. Russia not unnaturally 
 looks to her continuous territory and popula- 
 tion, behind the scene of possible contest, as 
 the assurance of her own permanent predom- 
 inance and eventual exclusive influence. It 
 may be so; but not necessarily until a future 
 so far distant as to be utterly beyond the range 
 of. our possible vision, and between which and 
 us lie many chapters of unknowable changes. 
 If confronted by a solid political organism, 
 resting immediately upon commercial interests, 
 and ultimately upon naval control of the Gulf 
 and the armed forces of Great Britain, backed 
 by her colonies and India, it must be long 
 before the northern impulse can overcome the 
 resistance. The physical difficulties of the 
 land route contrasted with the level path of 
 the sea, the narrowness of rail carriage as com- 
 pared with the broad highway of the ocean,
 
 230 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 more than compensate for the apparent shorter 
 distance and delusive continuity of the land. 
 The enercries of Russia also must Ions: be 
 absorbed by other necessary pre-occupations, 
 notably the far superior importance of de- 
 veloped and consolidated access, by Siberia 
 and Manchuria, to North China seas and the 
 Pacific, the great immediate centres of world 
 interest. There is therefore no need to hasten 
 things in their natural course, but equally there 
 is no justification for neglecting to note and 
 improve them ; to quote Washington again, 
 " diffusing and diversifying by gentle means 
 the streams of commerce," which will gradually 
 nurse the future into vigorous life. 
 
 Both Persia and China are being swept irre- 
 sistibly into the general movement of the world, 
 from which they have so long stood apart. 
 Both have a momentous future of uncertain 
 issue, but that of China is evidently more 
 immediately imminent. This is the natural 
 course which things are at present following. 
 Persia has still a time of waiting. The indi- 
 cations also are that Russia, consciously or 
 intuitively, thus reads the conditions. By far- 
 sighted sagacity, or through continued yield-
 
 Interiiatio7tal Relations 231 
 
 ings to the successive leadings of the moment, 
 she has now extended her great effort towards 
 sustained communication with ever-open water 
 to the farther East The Siberian railroad, by 
 which she hopes to assure it, passes through 
 territory that is wholly her own by ancient 
 tenure; while through recent generations 
 she has prepared its security by her steady 
 progress southward in Central Asia and Tur- 
 kestan. The establishment of orderly gov- 
 ernment in those regions relieves the flank 
 of the route from predatory dangers, which 
 under the feeble adminstration of Turkey will 
 constitute one of the elements of difficulty for 
 the projected railroad in the Euphrates valley. 
 The Siberian road throughout its whole course 
 is unassailable by any external power, until 
 within a very short distance of the coast ter- 
 minus. Its military safety being thus absolute, 
 its maintenance, and the development of its 
 carrying power, essential to the Russian posi- 
 tion in the farther East, are questions simply 
 of money. Money, however, will be needed in 
 such quantities that the imperative require- 
 ments must postpone further effective move- 
 ment to the southward or westward ; for effec-
 
 232 The Persian Gulf a7id 
 
 tive movement means developed communica- 
 tions, consolidated and sustained. These are 
 expensive, and in sound policy should not be 
 attempted on a grand scale in two directions 
 at the same time ; unless indeed the resources 
 in money and labor are so great as to justify 
 their dissemination. That this is not the case 
 the notorious condition of the Siberian road 
 sives reason to believe. 
 
 Water communication with the external 
 world, through an unimpeded seaboard of her 
 own, is Russia's greatest present want. For 
 this object, to what extent would slie benefit 
 commercially by access to the Persian Gulf, 
 as compared with the China seas? Putting 
 out of consideration China itself, with the 
 nearer shores of the Pacific, as to which the 
 better situation of Manchuria cannot be ques- 
 tioned, Russia is there much closer also to the 
 Americas and to the entire Pacific. Australia 
 is substantially equidistant from the Persian 
 Gulf and from Port Arthur; the balance 
 favoring the latter. Only Southern Asia and 
 Africa can be said to be nearer to the Gulf. 
 Europe and Atlantic America are now reached, 
 and ever must be reached, commercially, by
 
 International Relations 233 
 
 Russia, from the Black Sea or the Baltic. 
 From the standpoint of military advantage, a 
 Russian naval division in the Persian Gulf, 
 although unquestionably a menace to the trade 
 route from Suez to the East, would be most 
 ex-centrically placed as regards all Russia's 
 greatest interests. It is for these reasons that 
 I have elsewhere said that the good of Russia 
 presents no motive for Great Britain to con- 
 cede a position so extremely injurious to her- 
 self and her dependencies. 
 
 The question of the Persian Gulf, and of 
 South Persia in connection with it, though not 
 yet immediately urgent, is clearly visible upon 
 the horizon of the distant future. It becomes, 
 therefore, and in so far, a matter for present 
 reflection, the guiding principle of which should 
 be its relation to India, and to the farther East. 
 This again is governed by the strategic con- 
 sideration already presented in the remark that 
 movement, advance, to be effective and sus- 
 tained, requires communications to be coherent 
 and consolidated. The Russian communica- 
 tion by land, though still inadequately devel- 
 oped, is thus secure, militarily. Throughout 
 its length there exists no near-by point held
 
 2 34 ^^^ Persian Gulf and 
 
 by an enemy able to interrupt it by a serious 
 blow. The significance of such a condition 
 will be realized forcibly by contrasting it with 
 the military exposure of another great trans- 
 continental line, the Canadian Pacific. In the 
 farther East Great Britain, like Russia, holds 
 an advanced position, chiefly commercial, but 
 consequently military also, the communications 
 of which are by water. These have not, and 
 probably never can have, any military security 
 comparable to that of the Siberian railway. 
 Their safety must depend upon sustained ex- 
 ertion of mobile force, resting upon secure 
 bases, ready for instant and constant action. 
 It is needless to insist upon the difficulty of 
 such a situation ; it has been made the subject 
 of recent and abundant comment. But if thus 
 onerous now, all the more reason that the 
 burden should not be increased by the gratu- 
 itous step of consenting, upon any terms of 
 treaty, any forced infringement of the natural 
 condition of things, to the establishment of 
 a new source of danger analogous to those 
 already existing in Cadiz, Toulon, the Darda- 
 nelles, and so on. Concession in the Persian 
 Gulf, whether by positive formal arrangement,
 
 International Relations 235 
 
 or by simple neglect of the local commercial 
 interests which now underlie political and mili- 
 tary control, will imperil Great Britain's naval 
 situation in the farther East, her political posi- 
 tion in India, her commercial interests in both, 
 and the imperial tie between herself and 
 Australasia. 
 
 So far from yielding here, it appears to me 
 that the signs of the times, as outlined above, 
 point seriously to the advisability of concentrat- 
 ing attention, preparation of the understanding 
 at least, upon that portion of the Suez route 
 to the farther East which lies between Aden 
 and Singapore. In this the Persian Gulf is a 
 very prominent consideration. It is not neces- 
 sary that material preparation should far fore- 
 stall imminent necessity ; but the preparation of 
 thought which we call recognition, and appre- 
 ciation, costs the Treasury nothing, and saves 
 it much by the quiet anticipation of contin- 
 gencies, and provision against them. It tends 
 to prevent inopportune concessions, and the 
 negligences which arise from ignorance of 
 facts, or failure to comprehend their relations 
 to one another. The South African War and 
 the twenty preceding years give recent warn-
 
 236 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 ing. Foreign affairs, as well as military, need 
 their general staff. Besides its bearing upon 
 the Suez route, the Gulf has a very special 
 relation to the Euphrates valley, and any road 
 passing through it from the Levant ; and this 
 relation is shared by South Persia, because of 
 the political effect of its tenure upon the con- 
 trol of the Gulf. There is here concentrated 
 therefore commercial and political influence 
 upon both of the two routes, that by land and 
 that by water, from the Mediterranean to India 
 and to the East beyond. There is no occasion 
 in the nature of things that Great Britain, either 
 by concession or compulsion, should share with 
 another State the control which she now has 
 here ; but in order to retain it she needs not 
 only to keep the particular protective relations 
 already established with minor local rulers, but 
 further to develop and fortify her commercial 
 interests and political prestige in South Persia 
 and adjacent Mesopotamia. This means not 
 only, nor chiefly, increase of exchange of pro- 
 ducts. It means also partnership, public or 
 private, in the system of communications, anal- 
 ogous in idea, and if need be even in extent, 
 to Disraeli's purchase of the Suez canal shares.
 
 International Relations 237 
 
 The attitude of the United States Government 
 towards the projected Panama Canal affords a 
 further su^sestive illustration. As towards 
 the farther East, South Persia is in fact the 
 logical next step beyond Egypt ; though it 
 does not follow that the connection therewith 
 is to be the same. Correlative to this com- 
 mercial and political progress, goes the neces- 
 sity of local provision for naval activity when 
 required. The middle East, if I may adopt 
 a term which I have not seen, will some day 
 need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar; it 
 does not follow that either will be in the Gulf. 
 Naval force has the quality of mobility which 
 carries with it the privilege of temporary ab- 
 sences ; but it needs to find on every scene of 
 operation established bases of refit, of supply, 
 and, in case of disaster, of security. The 
 British Navy should have the facility to con- 
 centrate in force, if occasion arise, about Aden, 
 India, and the Gulf. 
 
 In summary : Relatively to Europe the far- 
 ther East is an advanced post of international 
 activities, of very great and immediate impor- 
 tance ; but from the military point of view, to 
 which as yet commercial security has to be re-
 
 238 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 ferred, the question of communications, of the 
 routes of travel, underlies all others and must 
 be kept carefully and predominantly in mind. 
 Russia has her own road, by land, unshared 
 with any other. To the rest of Europe, and 
 to Russia when she chooses, there exists now 
 the sea route by Suez, which is, and probably 
 must remain, supreme to all others. Alterna- 
 tive to it, in part of the way, the future will 
 doubtless bring railways. These, however, on 
 account of the greater cheapness of water car- 
 riage, will pretty surely do their principal 
 through business in expediting special transit 
 between the two seas — the Mediterranean and 
 the Indian Ocean. They will in this respect 
 maintain merely an express and fast freight 
 traffic. Between them and the Suez route 
 there will be the perennial conflict between 
 land and water transport, between natural and 
 artificial conditions, in which the victory is 
 likely to rest, as heretofore, with nature's own 
 highway, the sea. But, however that prove, the 
 beginning and the end, the termini, of both 
 routes, land and sea, so far as they compete, 
 will be substantially the same: the Levant Sea, 
 the Straits of Bab-el- Mandeb and the Persian
 
 International Relations 239 
 
 Gulf. It is too much to ask of international 
 compliancy that Europe should accept the 
 single control of both terminal regions by the 
 same State, especially where no defined claim 
 now exists, as is the case in Levantine Turkey; 
 but equally, where a single government can 
 show a long prescription of useful action, of 
 predominant influence, and of political primacy 
 locally recognized in important quarters, as 
 Great Britain can, there is no reason why she 
 should be expected to abandon these advan- 
 tages, except as the result of war, if a rival 
 think that result will repay the cost. 
 
 There is not to be seen in the nature of 
 things any evidence, or any tendency, which 
 indicates the probability that Great Britain 
 may be forced to yield to compulsion, actual 
 or threatened, concessions of present right 
 which it is inexpedient that she should grant 
 voluntarily. It is upon such probability, con- 
 ceived to be imminent, that are based pro- 
 posals of arrangement, or compromise, that I 
 cannot but think excessively artificial, and 
 disregardful of permanent conditions. They 
 surmise, as a necessary postulate, hostile com- 
 binations of two or more States, against which,
 
 240 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 by a curious intellectual prepossession, no prob- 
 able counterpoise is discernible. As a matter 
 of fact, founded upon present territorial posi- 
 tions, there is in the nature of things no real, 
 no enduring, antagonism concerning the Per- 
 sian Gulf, except between Great Britain and 
 Russia. It is not to the interest of any third 
 State to interfere between these two, or to dis- 
 turb — much less to destroy — the local bal- 
 ance of power which now exists between them 
 and can probably be maintained. As regards 
 its particular interests, the hands of any third 
 State will be not more, but less, free, should 
 that balance yield to the decisive predominance 
 of one of the two throughout the regions in- 
 volved. Nor can a third State expect to re- 
 store equilibrium, if lost, by itself taking the 
 place of the one that has gone under. It is 
 only necessary to consider the solidity, extent, 
 and Ions: standing:, of the local control now 
 wielded by Russia and Great Britain, together 
 with the land power of the one and the sea 
 power of the other, to see the hopelessness of 
 any substitute for either in its own sphere. 
 The two systems are not dead, but living ; not 
 machines, but organisms; not merely founded,
 
 International Relations 24 1 
 
 but rooted, in past history and present condi- 
 tions. What the rest of the world needs, what 
 world politics requires, is that here, as in Asia 
 immediately to the eastward, there should be 
 political and military equipoise, not predomi- 
 nance. The interests of other States are eco- 
 nomical ; freedom of transit and of trafific, the 
 open door. The very problem now troubling 
 nations in the Levant and China is how to 
 establish, — and only afterwards to maintain, 
 — conditions which are already established 
 and have now only to be maintained about 
 the land approaches to the Persian Gulf. 
 
 There is therefore, no sound inducement for 
 another State to waste strength here. It can 
 be used better elsewhere. When substantial 
 equilibrium thus exists, a slight effort will 
 suffice to obtain from either party a considera- 
 tion which in the case of distinct predomi- 
 nance, or exclusive tenure, might require a 
 full display of national power. Doubtless, 
 many in Great Britain, and also in America, 
 are convinced that one third State, the German 
 Empire, is restlessly intent, not only upon 
 economical and maritime development, which 
 
 is not to be contested by other than econom- 
 
 16
 
 242 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 ical weapons, but also upon self-assertive ag- 
 gression with a view to territorial aggrandize- 
 ment in more than one part of the world ; and 
 notably in this particular quarter. A conces- 
 sion has been granted to German capitalists to 
 extend the railway, which now ends at Konieh, 
 to Bagdad, passing through the Euphrates val- 
 ley. The necessary outlet to this is the Persian 
 Gulf. Such concession, when realized in con- 
 struction, carries with it a national investment, 
 an economical interest, which, though in private 
 ownership, inevitably entails political interest. 
 It justifies public backing by its own govern- 
 ment, in countries where, as in Turkey, private 
 right is secure only when it has national force 
 behind it. It is for this very reason that Great 
 Britain, having already political interest in the 
 Persian Gulf, should encourage British capital 
 to develop communications thence with the in- 
 terior in Persia and in Mesopotamia, as strength- 
 ening her political claim to consideration, and 
 excluding that of possible antagonists. The 
 German road would thus find its terminus in 
 a British system; a not unusual international 
 relation. German enterprise has in anticipation 
 established German political hold upon Asia
 
 Inter7iational Relations 243 
 
 Minor and Mesopotamia. As expectation 
 passes into realization Germany will acquire 
 local political importance and influence ; a 
 right, sanctioned by the rules of intercourse 
 with Oriental nations, to have her voice heard 
 in many local matters, as affecting the interests 
 of her subjects who are thus engaged in devel- 
 oping the country. 
 
 What effect will this have upon Germany's 
 political and military position, relatively to 
 Russia and Great Britain, which, from near- 
 ness or from the commercial ubiquity of their 
 citizens, are also politically interested? Under 
 present conditions Germany, whose nearest port 
 is in the North Sea, has assumed a political 
 burden at a point from which she is far more 
 remote than Russia, and her sea approach to 
 which is before the face of the much greater 
 navy of Great Britain. There is in this nothing 
 to prevent the just assertion of her right, no 
 necessary cause of quarrel, — far from it ; but 
 also there is nothing menacing. Germany has 
 simply introduced another factor into a problem 
 as yet unsolved, that of the ultimate political 
 status of several provinces of the Turkish Em- 
 pire, — Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia.
 
 244 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 As I have elsewhere said, I believe that her 
 appearance there is a step towards a right 
 final solution; that from the necessary com- 
 mon interest of Germany and Great Britain 
 in the Suez route to the farther East, be- 
 cause the commerce of both depends upon 
 its security, the two cannot but work together 
 to secure here a political development which 
 will consolidate their respective naval posi- 
 tions in the Levant. 
 
 This seems to me an absolute permanent 
 condition, consistent with a certain amount of 
 mutual jealousy and political wrangling, and 
 with unlimited commercial rivalry, but never- 
 theless determinative of substantial co-opera- 
 tion. The mass of Russia is so vast, her 
 ambitions so pronounced, and she is so near 
 at hand, that the Suez route needs precisely 
 that kind of protection against her which 
 Russia herself has given to the Siberian road 
 by the regularization of the provinces south of 
 it. Whatever the particular form local admin- 
 istration may ultimately assume, it is impera- 
 tive upon the Teutonic States to see that their 
 water route to the East is not imperilled by 
 naval stations flanking it, whether in the Le-
 
 International Relations 245 
 
 vant or in the Persian Gulf. Being them- 
 selves far distant, dependent upon naval power 
 simply, it is essential that they constitute a polit- 
 ical pre-occupation favorable to themselves in 
 the Asian provinces of Turkey and in Southern 
 Persia. In Egypt and in Aden Great Britain 
 has already done much. Germany, in building 
 a Mesopotamian railway, the continuation of 
 that already working in Asia Minor, contrib- 
 utes to the same end. That Russia looks upon 
 the enterprise with disfavor is a testimony, 
 conscious or unconscious, to its tendency. 
 
 These also seem to me permanent consid- 
 erations. Not less so, having reference to the 
 anxiety felt by some in Great Britain as to 
 the intentions of Germany, is the general situ- 
 ation of the latter in European politics. There 
 is certainly an impression in America, which 
 I share, that Great Britain for various reasons 
 has been tending to lose ground in economical 
 and commercial matters. Whether this be a 
 passing phase, or a symptom of more serious 
 trouble, time must show. Should it prove per- 
 manent, and Germany at the same time gain 
 upon her continuously, as for some years past 
 she has been doing, the relative positions of
 
 246 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 the two as sea powers may be seriously modi- 
 fied. The danger appears to exist; and if so 
 the watchmen of the British press should cry 
 aloud and spare not until all classes of their 
 community realize it in its fundamental signifi- 
 cance. Military precautions, and the condi- 
 tions upon which they rest, have been the main 
 motive of this paper; but these, while they 
 have their own great and peremptory impor- 
 tance, cannot in our day, from the point of 
 view of instructed statesmanship, office-holding 
 or other, be considered as primary. War has 
 ceased to be the natural, or even normal, con- 
 dition of nations, and military considerations 
 are simply accessory and subordinate to the 
 other greater interests, economical and com- 
 mercial, which they assure and so subserve. 
 In this article itself, turning as it does on mili- 
 tary discussion, the starting point and founda- 
 tion is the necessity to secure commerce, by 
 political measures conducive to military, or 
 naval, strength. This order is that of actual 
 relative importance to the nation of the three 
 elements — commercial, political, military. 
 
 It is evident, however, that these primary 
 matters, although they underlie this argument,
 
 International Relations 247 
 
 are otherwise outside it. For the rest, as 
 regards the general military strength, and in 
 particular the sea power, of the two countries, 
 nothing can overthrow the one permanent 
 advantage that Great Britain enjoys in being 
 insular. Germany, should she realize her ut- 
 most ambitions, even expanding to the Med- 
 iterranean, must remain a continental State, 
 in immediate contact with powerful rivals. 
 Historically, no nation hitherto has been able 
 under such conditions to establish a supreme 
 sea power. Of this France is the historical 
 example. On the other hand, regarded in her- 
 self alone, apart from rivals, Germany cannot, 
 as the United States could not, exert the in- 
 tense internal effort now required for political 
 consolidation and economical development co- 
 incidently with an equal expansive effort. The 
 one may succeed the other, as in our case and 
 in that of Great Britain, where the expansion 
 of the eighteenth century followed and de- 
 pended on the unifying action of the seven- 
 teenth; but, until internal coherence is secured, 
 external expansion cannot adequately progress. 
 One weakens the other. Though correlative, 
 they are not co-operative.
 
 248 The Persian Gulf and 
 
 The ambition of Germany so to develop her 
 fleet as to secure commercial transit of the 
 North Sea, which washes her entire maritime 
 frontier, is a national aspiration in itself de- 
 serving of entire sympathy. Towards all other 
 States except Great Britain it is within the 
 compass of reasonable expectation. As towards 
 Great Britain it is, under present economical 
 conditions, impossible ; for Great Britain, being 
 insular, must maintain continuously supreme 
 the navy upon which her all depends, and 
 moreover, as I pointed out in a recent paper, 
 by geographical position she lies across and 
 flanks every sea route by which Germany 
 reaches the outer world. This condition is 
 permanent, removable only by the friendship 
 or destruction of the British power. Of the 
 two the friendship will be the cheaper and more 
 efflcacious; for it is needed not in home waters 
 only but in those distant regions which we have 
 been considering. The naval power of Great 
 Britain is just as real a factor in the future of 
 Germany in the distant East as every thinking 
 American must recognize it to be in our own 
 external policy. That such a force should be 
 paid for, and must necessarily be maintained,
 
 International Relations 249 
 
 by another people, whose every interest will 
 prompt them to use it in the general lines of 
 our own advantage, is a political consideration 
 as valuable as it is essentially permanent. In 
 the matter of exertion of force it accords abso- 
 lutely with the nature of things. As for eco- 
 nomical rivalry, let it be confined to its own 
 methods, eschewing force. 
 
 In saying these things I may seem to ignore 
 the bitter temper, openly and even outra- 
 geously shown by the German people towards 
 Great Britain in these last three years. I do 
 not forget it. Human nature being what it 
 is, the dangerous effect of such conditions 
 upon international relations is undeniable. It 
 is ever present to my reflections upon the 
 political future. The exhibition is utterly de- 
 plorable, for it can serve no good end, and if 
 it continue will prevent a co-operation among 
 the three Teutonic States which all need, but 
 Germany most of all ; for the respective ex- 
 ternal interests of the United States and Great 
 Britain — together with Japan — have so much 
 in common, and so little that is antagonistic, 
 that substantial, though informal, co-operation 
 is inevitable.
 
 250 The Persian Gnlf a7id 
 
 This hostility constitutes an element in the 
 political situation which should be taken into 
 account, and carefully watched. Nevertheless, 
 the permanent conditions, above summarized, 
 will through a future beyond our possible pres- 
 ent foresight retain Germany in a position of 
 naval numerical inferiority to Great Britain, 
 as regards both mobile force and the essential 
 naval stations which the latter has acquired 
 during two centuries of maritime activity. 
 These conditions, by their inevitable logic, 
 ought ultimately to overcome a sentiment which 
 has no good ground for existence, and which 
 betrays the national interest. Should it, how- 
 ever, endure, the permanent facts are too strong 
 for it to do more than dash harmlessly against 
 them. Awaiting either event, may not the 
 people of Great Britain on their part, without 
 relaxing vigilance or ignoring truths, accept 
 Washington's warning, which we Americans 
 at least have by no means outgrown, against 
 " permanent inveterate antipathies against par- 
 ticular nations." They have cause for anger ; 
 but anger disturbs the judgment, and I think 
 in some measure is doing so in this instance. 
 This particular antipathy is yet young, let it
 
 International Relations 251 
 
 not harden into maturity. In the great politi- 
 cal questions which for some time to come will 
 concentrate the external regard of nations and 
 statesmen, the natural desires of Russia, rea- 
 sonable and unreasonable, are contrary to those 
 of Germany as well as of Great Britain. It is 
 to her clear interest that they remain alienated. 
 Such conditions should on the one hand prompt 
 an earnest effort for a balanced and concilia- 
 tory adjustment on all sides; but on the other, 
 their essential permanence, if it be as I think, 
 demands a recognition which would show itself 
 in the extrusion of everything resembling pas- 
 sion, and in the settlement of national purpose 
 on the firm ground of essential facts, instead 
 of the uncertain foundation of any artificial 
 agreement which contravenes them.
 
 THE MILITARY RULE OF 
 OBEDIENCE
 
 THE MILITARY RULE OF 
 OBEDIENCE 
 
 January, 1902. 
 
 THE military duty of obedience may be re- 
 garded either as a rule or a principle, for 
 it is both. The rule derives from the principle. 
 It is the principle defined in precise and man- 
 datory terms, as a law is the expression of the 
 general will of the community, formulated by 
 the Legislature for the governance and control 
 of individuals. The difificulty of such formula- 
 tion, however, as that of definition generally, is 
 well known, and has found proverbial recogni- 
 tion in phrases indicating that statutes, even 
 when framed with great care by experienced 
 hands, are very liable to offer loop-holes through 
 which the observance of them may be escaped. 
 It is no less difficult to define the military rule of 
 obedience, without on the one hand constitut- 
 ing fetters, which would neutralize intelligence 
 and palsy individuality in a sphere and at in-
 
 256 The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 stants where both are pre-eminently needed, or, 
 on the other hand, permitting a Hcense which 
 in practice would degenerate into anarchy. It 
 is not a sufficient solution to so knotty and 
 dangerous a question to damn obedience to 
 orders, as a rugged veteran will occasionally be 
 heard to suggest ; while, on the other extreme, 
 the saying of that eminent disciplinarian. Lord 
 St. Vincent, " The whole of discipline is con- 
 tained in the word 'obedience,'" though safer in 
 practice, is perhaps too absolute in its assertion. 
 The matter at stake is too intricate for such 
 Gordian solutions. It is also too important at 
 once to the individual officer and to the nation, 
 the conduct of whose armed forces may at crit- 
 ical moments depend upon a correct under- 
 standing. In many instances, perhaps in the 
 large majority, the propriety of literal obediencf; 
 is plainly evident; in a few the inexpediency, 
 folly, or impossibility of such compliance is for 
 obvious reasons equally clear; but there never- 
 theless remain a number of cases, not merely 
 possible, but copiously exemplified by history, 
 which present serious difficulty. In these an 
 officer finds himself confronted with condi- 
 tions that make a large demand upon his moral
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 257 
 
 courage as well as upon his judgment. His 
 judgment then can be safely guided, and his 
 resolution supported, only by a mastery of prin- 
 ciples. No mere rule will here suffice. Mili- 
 tary obedience when in subordinate post, and 
 military initiative when in independent com- 
 mand, untrammelled by orders and free to fol- 
 low the guidance of one's own judgment, are 
 both governed by principles, the appreciation 
 of which is the only sure light to one's foot- 
 steps. To them recurrence must be had in 
 doubtful positions, where precise precedent and 
 formal definition are wanting; in short, when 
 rules, however good in general use, fail to apply. 
 It does not hence follow that rules, terse and 
 positive embodiments of principles, such as 
 that of obedience, are mostly useless because 
 essentially narrow and unelastic. That all 
 rules have exceptions is proverbial ; and mili- 
 tary rules are probably more liable to exceptions 
 than most others, because of the emergency 
 that characterizes war and the vast variety of 
 situations to which a rule has to be adapted. 
 No one proposes on these accounts to disre- 
 gard rules utterly. It is evident, hovv^ever, 
 that an officer who undertakes to violate the 
 
 17
 
 258 The Military Rtile of Obedience 
 
 fundamental rule of obedience, upon the strict 
 observance of which depends in general the 
 success of combined operations, and who sub- 
 stitutes his own initiative for the directions of 
 his superior, assumes a risk which urgently 
 imposes a comprehension of the principles, 
 upon which respectively rest both the rule of 
 obedience and the rules of war. 
 
 It may be asserted, as perhaps the most ten- 
 able general definition of the principle upon 
 which the rule of obedience rests, that the 
 spirit of obedience, as distinguished from its 
 letter, consists in faithfully forwarding the 
 general object to which the ofl[icer's particular 
 command is contributing. This finds expres- 
 sion in the well-known directive maxim, " March 
 to the sound of the guns." In doubtful cases, 
 however, — and by doubtful I mean cases where 
 action other than that prescribed in the orders 
 seems expedient, — liberty of judgment is con- 
 ditioned by the officer's acquaintance with the 
 plans of his superior. If his knowledge is im- 
 perfect, or altogether lacking, the doing that 
 which at the moment seems wise to himself 
 may be to defeat a much more important ob- 
 ject, or to dissolve the bonds of a combined
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 259 
 
 movement to which his co-operation is essen- 
 tial. If, under such circumstances of igno- 
 rance, resting only upon his own sagacity or 
 surmises, he errs either in his reading of his 
 commander's general purpose, or in his de- 
 cision as to his own action, and through such 
 error disobeys, he cannot complain if he re- 
 ceive censure or punishment. He has violated 
 a recognized rule without adequate reason. 
 The rectitude of his intentions may clear him 
 of moral blame, though not necessarily even so; 
 for the duty of obedience is not merely military, 
 but moral. It is not an arbitrary rule, but one 
 essential and fundamental ; the expression of a 
 principle without which military organization 
 would go to pieces, and military success be impos- 
 sible. Consequently, even where the individual 
 purpose may be demonstrably honest, not wil- 
 ful, blame adheres and punishment may follow, 
 according to the measure of the delinquency, 
 though that be due to nothing worse than per- 
 sonal incompetency. Does this seem hard 
 measure 1 It may be replied, in what pursuit 
 is this not so? What is the profession, physi- 
 cian, lawyer, or Wall Street, in which a trans- 
 gression of instructions by an inferior, or a
 
 2 6o The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 departure from recognized methods, when not 
 justified by the conditions, escapes punishment, 
 either at the hand of events or of his employer? 
 Is " I thought so," or " I did my best," accepted 
 there as an excuse for disobedience ? 
 
 In the question of miHtary obedience there 
 is therefore involved both a rule and a prin- 
 ciple. In dealing with the matter I shall have 
 to consider both, but I have advisedly chosen 
 the rule for the heading of this article; for, as 
 I have said before, the rule has the force of a 
 law, a law positive in existing enactment, and 
 a law traditional in the settled practice of the 
 military professions, as well as in numerous 
 precedents established by competent author- 
 ities. To go behind a law to the principle 
 underlying it, to recognize a higher law than 
 the law explicit, is a very delicate matter for a 
 man in any position ; and it is therefore the 
 rule of obedience, rather than the general prin- 
 ciple upon which it rests, that most closely 
 touches an officer in military responsibility. 
 Under what conditions is it permissible to dis- 
 regard orders, or, even more positively, to act 
 contrary to them.f* What is the real test of 
 propriety, which differentiates one act of dis-
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 261 
 
 obedience from another of the same apparent 
 character ? Is one's own sense of right, one's 
 own good intention, the justifying factor? 
 What judge, however, in such a case is com- 
 petent to penetrate through the faulty act, if 
 such it be, to the hidden good purpose of the 
 heart? What claim have military men to ex- 
 emption from the general rule of law, that in- 
 tention, which cannot be seen, must be inferred 
 from attendant circumstances, which can ? If 
 conduct, upon an impartial review of the con- 
 ditions at the moment of action, is shown to 
 be palpably wrong, by what right can alleged 
 intention, "error of judgment " as it is styled, 
 be invoked to justify an offender ? Is there no 
 such thing as malpractice, professionally guilty, 
 though possibly morally innocent ? Is profes- 
 sional incompetence, translated into action and 
 injurious to others, never worse than an error 
 of judgment ? Mistakes, doubtless, all men are 
 liable to; the fact is proverbial; but the justi- 
 fication of a decision proved by the event to be 
 mistaken rests not upon the intention of the per- 
 son making it, but upon a judicial review of the 
 circumstances surrounding the decision, which 
 shall prove that, under the conditions known
 
 262 The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 at the moment, it was correct, or at least the 
 most favored by probabilities. If this be 
 true, as I hold it is, in the case even of a man 
 in independent command, much more is the 
 responsibility weighty when action, intrinsi- 
 cally faulty, is taken in disobedience of orders. 
 The mere enunciation of the queries in the 
 last paragraph will suggest to most that we 
 have here before us no simple question of yea 
 and nay. In fact, no clear-cut absolute reply, 
 no vade mecum for pocket use, can be furnished 
 defining just when and how, in all cases, a man 
 is justified in disobedience, nor even when he 
 is justified by blind obedience ; although the 
 balance of professional judgment must always 
 incline in favor of the latter alternative. 
 When a doubt arises, as it frequently does, 
 between strict compliance with an order and 
 the disregard of it, in whole or in part, the 
 officer is called upon to decide a question of pro- 
 fessional conduct. Personal judgment neces- 
 sarily enters as a factor, but only one of many; 
 and, to be trusted, it needs to be judgment 
 illuminated by professional knowledge and for- 
 tified by reflection. Short of that, it is not a 
 safe counsellor, and has no claim to consider-
 
 The Military Rtik of Obedience 26 
 
 a 
 
 ation if cited before a court of final appeal. 
 The officer at the moment should consider 
 himself, as he in fact is, a judge deciding upon 
 a case liable to be called up to a superior court, 
 before which his conclusion has no claim to 
 respect because it is his personal opinion, but 
 only so far as it is supported by the evidence 
 before him. There is, of course, the necessary 
 reservation that the final judgment upon him- 
 self, for his professional conduct as involved in 
 his decision, will be rendered upon the facts 
 accessible to him, and not upon those not then 
 to be known, though afterwards apparent. 
 
 Unless qualified by these grave consider- 
 ations, the phrase "error of judgment," so 
 facilely used, is misleading to popular under- 
 standing. Not only so ; it is pregnant of 
 serious consequences to the issues of war and 
 to individuals influenced by it. It is necessary 
 to realize that some errors of judgment are 
 inexcusable, because inconsistent with recog- 
 nized standards ; and that disobedience of 
 orders is on its face a fault, a disregard of a 
 settled standard, of an established rule, of such 
 general application that upon the person who 
 commits it rests the burden of proving that
 
 264 The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 the circumstances commanded his action. The 
 presumption, in the case of disobedience, is not 
 innocence, but guilt. Mere rule though it be, 
 in its narrow construction and rigid framework, 
 the rule of implicit and entire obedience rests 
 upon reasons so sound that its infringement 
 in action can rarely be condoned, when not 
 thoroughly approved. Nothing can be more 
 disastrous than to trifle with the corner stone, 
 upon which rests the structure of coherent, 
 unified action. The admission into the mili- 
 tary mind of anything approaching irreverence 
 for the spirit of military obedience, or levity 
 as regards the letter of the rule in which it 
 is embodied, is the begetter of confusion, and 
 that, in turn, is the forerunner of defeat. To 
 sit loose to this oblis^ation weakens the sense 
 of responsibility, upon the due realization of 
 which rests not merely literal obedience, but 
 intelligent and deserving disobedience in the 
 occasional circumstances which call for that. 
 The recognition of responsibility by the indi- 
 vidual, the consciousness that serious regard to 
 it is governing his determinations, is the best 
 mxOral equipment that a man can have to en- 
 able him to sustain the burden of violating
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 265 
 
 instructions, deliberately undertaken upon his 
 own judgment. It is the mens conscia recti 
 in a serious problem of action. 
 
 The mental equipment is another matter, 
 but it, as well as the moral, are necessary to 
 full professional competency for such occasions. 
 Upon the hypothesis now before us, the rule, 
 absolute in general, seems not to apply. To 
 meet the difficulty with sound discretion, on 
 which to base the defence of his action what- 
 ever its issue may prove, the officer will need 
 an adequate realization of all the conditions 
 before him, and a power of appreciating the 
 military situation as thus constituted. This 
 power depends in part upon native aptitude; 
 but it requires also a knowledge of the practice 
 of war, a broad and ripened acquaintance with 
 the principles and precedents controlling the 
 conduct of military operations, which is by no 
 means so widely diffused as may, perhaps, be 
 thought. Without this, disobedience is a haz- 
 ardous undertaking; but, when so equipped, 
 an officer may with considerable confidence 
 permit himself to depart from the letter of his 
 instructions in order to fulfil their spirit. Con- 
 fidence, I say deliberately; for in the majority
 
 266 The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 of such instances he will receive intelligent 
 and generous consideration. 
 
 In such instances it is not just that the pro- 
 priety of the act should be judged by the 
 event; and it is not true that it will be, as a 
 cheap sneer would have it. Success undoubt- 
 edly often covers mistakes ; for human nature 
 is on the whole generous, or at least good- 
 tempered. It is willing to forgive faults which 
 it can afford to forget; but failure does not 
 with any equal certainty entail condemna- 
 tion, for again mankind is generous, and no- 
 where more so than in dealing with military 
 men. Even though mishap ensue, where an 
 officer can show preponderant military reasons 
 for departure from orders, he can anticipate 
 from his superiors intelligent comprehension 
 and acquittal, which the public will confirm 
 on their finding ; but, while this is so, let none 
 be rash enough to anticipate immunity on the 
 score of error of judgment, when it can be 
 demonstrated that with the data before him a 
 man who knew his business would have de- 
 cided otherwise. 
 
 Actions that fly in the face of ascertainable 
 fact, or of well-settled military principles, are
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 267 
 
 not to be excused as merely errors of judg- 
 ment. They are something more, and worse. 
 A man is just as much responsible for an error 
 of judgment which results from his own neglect 
 to inform himself, or his lack of professional 
 knowledge, as he is for any other misdoing. 
 What is amiss here is not judgment, but con- 
 duct. Such errors when they take shape in 
 action, whether of commission or omission, are 
 misconduct. They have a standing, as acts, 
 external to and independent of the person com- 
 mitting them, just as murder has a standing as 
 a crime quite independent of its association 
 with the individual criminal. As killing is not 
 
 O 
 
 always murder, but depends for its character 
 upon the attendant circumstances, so a par- 
 ticular unfortunate military movement is not 
 always misconduct. Circumstances may be 
 proved to justify it. In neither case, however, 
 is it the judgment of the person concerned that 
 determines conduct to have been good or bad. 
 It is the circumstances, passed upon by judges 
 other than himself, and referred to recognized 
 standards. Personal defects may be considered 
 in extenuation, or they may not; their title to 
 indulgence is small where they are due to per-
 
 268 The Military Riile of Obedience 
 
 sonal fault or neglect, present or in the past, 
 or to professional incompetency. 
 
 If so much as is here claimed be allowed to 
 the military duty of obedience, it is desirable 
 to pass in review the considerations from which 
 such weighty obligations are supposed to de- 
 rive. Tradition and acceptance, in most men 
 irreflective, have built up an imposing fabric 
 of power, cemented by the habit of rigid, and 
 in the last resort of even blind, submission to 
 superior authority, which, in exhibition and ex- 
 ercise, is directly and immediately personal, 
 though legal in derivation. It will be useful 
 to test the foundations upon which this struc- 
 ture rests, and the necessity, in order to main- 
 tain it, of a moral code so foreign to the 
 customary personal independence of the gen- 
 eral citizen. Or, if a more vital simile be 
 desired for an organization so instinct with 
 life and regulated movement as a well-consti- 
 tuted military body, let us seek the root, the 
 energizing power of which has evolved, de- 
 veloped, and continues to quicken, military 
 efficiency in all its ramifications, whether in 
 administrative methods or in the principles 
 governing the conduct of war in open cam-
 
 The Military Rzile of Obedience 269 
 
 paign. What we here possess we have through 
 tradition. Can it give an account of itself? 
 
 The value of tradition to the social body is 
 immense. The veneration for practices, or for 
 authority, consecrated by long acceptance, has 
 a reserve of strength which cannot be speedily 
 obtained by any novel device. Respect for the 
 old customs is planted deep in the hearts, as 
 well as in the intelligence, of all inheritors of 
 English-speaking polity. From the very rea- 
 son of this profound influence over men, tra- 
 ditions need from time to time to be brouo:ht 
 to the touchstone, by reference to principle, in 
 order to know whether they are still accordant 
 with the ideas in which their origin is found ; 
 or whether, the ideas themselves being already 
 outgrown, the tradition no longer represents a 
 living present, but only a dead past. Is the 
 duty of military obedience in either of these 
 cases.? Does the tradition, set forth by the 
 rule, still embody the essential spirit of the 
 principle once involved } Is the principle it- 
 self still alive and applicable as of old ? 
 
 The question is far from needless, for the 
 contest between the letter and the spirit is 
 constant here, as in many spheres of action.
 
 2 70 The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 I am inclined to believe that on shore, among 
 soldiers, the letter has tended to have the up- 
 per hand, and with seamen the spirit, due prob- 
 ably to the more frequent removal of the latter 
 from the presence of an immediate superior, 
 throwing them thus upon their own initiative. 
 Naval biography and history, and military his- 
 tory as far as my limited reading goes, seem to 
 support this opinion. No man wrestled with 
 the question more vigorously than Nelson ; 
 none found greater exasperation than he did 
 in the too often successful opposition of the 
 letter to the demands of his impetuous spirit 
 for co-operation, addressed to men over whom' 
 he had not immediate control ; none was more 
 generous in his attitude to subordinates who 
 overrode or overpassed his own orders, pro- 
 vided he saw in their acts the intelligent and 
 honest will to forward his purposes. Obedi- 
 ence he certainly required ; but he recognized 
 that, given a capable and zealous man, better 
 work would usually be had by permitting a 
 certain elasticity of initiative, provided it was 
 accompanied by accurate knowledge of his 
 general wishes. These he was always most 
 careful to impart; in nothing was he more
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 271 
 
 precise or particular. If he allowed large lib- 
 erty in the letter, he expected close observance 
 of, nay, rather, participation in, the spirit of his 
 ideas. He was not tolerant of incapacity, nor 
 would he for a moment bear wilful disregard of 
 his plans. When considerations of high policy 
 entertained by himself were crossed by Sidney 
 Smith, his language became peremptory. " As 
 this is in strict opposition to my opinion^ which 
 is 7iever to suffer any one individual Frenchman 
 to quit Egypt, I strictly charge and command 
 you never to give any French ship or man leave 
 to quit Egypt." The italics are his own ; and 
 he adds again, as though distrustful still : " You 
 are to put my orders in force, not on any pre- 
 tence to permit a single Frenchman to leave 
 Egypt." The seventy of the tone sufificiently 
 proves his disposition to enforce the strictest 
 rule, where necessary to control individuals ; 
 but a more liberal reliance upon principle, in 
 preference to rule, was his habit. None, it 
 may be added, illustrated more copiously than 
 he, when a junior, the obedience of the spirit 
 and the disobedience of the letter. His prac- 
 tice was in this consistent in all stages of his 
 career. Unfortunately, the example may tempt
 
 272 The Military Rule of Obedie7ice 
 
 smaller men to follow where their heads are 
 not steady enough to keep their feet. 
 
 Of course, thinking and feeling thus, he gave 
 frequent expression to his views, and these, 
 coming from a man of his military genius, are 
 often very illuminative. There is one such 
 that is singularly applicable to our present 
 purpose, of searching for the underlying prin- 
 ciple which governs the duty and observance 
 of obedience, and determines its absolute neces- 
 sity to all military action. " I find few think 
 as I do, but to obey orders is all perfection. 
 What would my superiors direct, did they 
 know what is passing under my nose.? To 
 serve my King and to destroy the French I 
 consider as the great order of all, from which 
 little ones spring, and if one of these little ones 
 militate against it, I go back to obey the great 
 order." 
 
 Carefully analyzed, there is much that is 
 instructive in these words. First of all, it will 
 be observed that the obedience commended is 
 that of the spirit, compliant with general known 
 views. Again, justification of local disobedi- 
 ence also rests upon this compliance with the 
 spirit, applied to the attendant circumstances.
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 273 
 
 This tacitly admits, of course, that the circum- 
 stances must be adequate in order to justify 
 disobedience. It is, however, deeply significant 
 and monitory that the particular sentences 
 quoted were elicited by censure from the Ad- 
 miralty for disobedience, in the only instance, 
 among many similar liberties of action, in 
 which Nelson failed to establish that circum- 
 stances did warrant, or rather did require, him 
 to traverse his instructions. Even he, in the 
 very height of his glory, with reputation, capa- 
 city, and zeal, all established beyond question, 
 could not trifle with literal obedience, on the 
 strength of his own judgment, where, upon 
 a calm review of all the facts, the circumstances 
 failed to justify him. He himself, in the ex- 
 asperation of self-vindication, fell into the facile 
 perversion of thought, concerning error of 
 judgment. " I am so confident of the upright- 
 ness of '}ny intention, that, with all respect, I 
 submit myself to the judgment of my supe- 
 riors." " Although a military tribunal may 
 think me criminal, the world will approve my 
 conduct." 
 
 What Nelson here meant by "the world" 
 
 may be doubtful ; but it is impossible that the 
 
 18
 
 274 "^^^^ Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 verdict of history to-day will not affirm the 
 propriety of the Admiralty's rebuke a century 
 ago. The facts, briefly stated, were these. 
 The Commander-in-Chief of the whole Medi- 
 terranean had sent orders to Nelson, his subor- 
 dinate, to detach a certain part of his force 
 from Naples to Minorca, which he considered 
 endangered. Nelson, anticipating the case, 
 had argued, to quote his own words, " Should 
 such an order come, it would be a cause for 
 some consideration whether Minorca is to be 
 risked, or the two kingdoms of Naples and 
 Sicily. I rather think my decision would be 
 to risk the former;" and he deliberately dis- 
 obeyed, resting on this opinion of his own. 
 His error, however induced, is clear enough. 
 The Commander-in-Chief was charged with 
 the safety of the whole field, Naples as well as 
 Minorca, with many other cases needless to 
 specify. It was his business, and his responsi- 
 bility, to co-ordinate all in a general plan of 
 offence and defence; in order to carry out 
 which he had need to count upon the certain 
 movement of all parts of his command in obedi- 
 ence to his directions. Refusal in any one 
 part might throw all out of gear. Nelson's
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 275 
 
 particular district, was, simply and broadly, Na- 
 ples and the Eastern Mediterranean. Within 
 these limits he had full discretion, subject to 
 the general orders of his superior, and his 
 information as to his policy; but when he 
 undertook to act upon his own estimate of the 
 relative value of Minorca and Naples, he went 
 outside the trust and the powers committed 
 to him, and invaded the province which be- 
 longed to the Commander-in-Chief alone. His 
 erroneous judgment, or as he styles it, " The 
 uprightness of my intentions," being translated 
 into overt act, became misconduct, and as such 
 was censured by the Admiralty. " Their Lord- 
 ships do not see sufficient reason to justify 
 your having disobeyed the orders you had re- 
 ceived from your commanding officer, or hav- 
 ing left Minorca exposed to the risk of being 
 attacked without having any naval force to 
 protect it." 
 
 It is perhaps expedient to observe, as tend- 
 ing to confirm a general truth which cannot be 
 too seriously insisted upon, that this unwar- 
 rantable action was something more than a 
 breach of necessary discipline, by a man of too 
 assured position and importance to be sum-
 
 276 The Military Rtile of Obedience 
 
 marily treated, and who therefore should have 
 been doubly careful of the strict propriety of 
 his course. It was also most unfair to the 
 Commander-in-Chief, in its possible conse- 
 quences. In case of mishap, the public, less 
 clear-sighted ordinarily than the administration, 
 because more easily moved by appearances, 
 would have sought the first victim of its dis- 
 pleasure in the superior, who had not the same 
 support of past brilliant achievement to fall 
 back on that Nelson had. Nor can it, I think, 
 upon a more detailed examination of the cir- 
 cumstances than is here expedient, be doubted 
 that very serious national disaster was possible, 
 though actually no harm resulted from this 
 breach of discipline. 
 
 A previous instance of disobedience on the 
 part of a junior admiral, less than three years 
 before, met with very different measure. Lord 
 St. Vincent, then Sir John Jervis, commanded 
 the British fleet in the Mediterranean in 1796. 
 Scarcity of provisions compelled him to order 
 one of his lieutenants, Rear- Admiral Mann, to 
 take half a dozen ships-of-the-line to Gibraltar, 
 there to fill up, and to rejoin him in Corsica 
 as soon as possible. On his way down, about
 
 The Military Riile of Obcdie^ice 277 
 
 October i, Mann met and was chased by a 
 Spanish fleet of nineteen sail, on their way to 
 Toulon to join the French navy there; Spain 
 having very lately declared war. He escaped, 
 and reached Gibraltar; but on arrival there 
 called a council of war, and upon its advice 
 determined not to carry out his orders to re- 
 join Jervis. Instead, dominated by the fear 
 of possible consequences, which governed his 
 judgment, he took his division to England. 
 An error of judgment.'* Yes, according to 
 the common phrase, which the present writer 
 accepted from unchallenged tradition, until 
 forced by reflection to recognize that " error 
 of judgment" was being invoked to cover 
 many acts, very different in their military 
 character. 
 
 Mark the result. Because the junction of 
 the Spanish navy to the French gravely im- 
 perilled Jervis with fifteen ships in Corsica, 
 Mann judged expedient to leave him in the 
 lurch, instead of obeying his orders and taking 
 back the seven he had with him. Jervis, in 
 perplexed uncertainty, hung on till the last 
 moment, diminishing the rations of his men 
 to one-third of the daily allowance, doubting
 
 278 The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 and wondering, unwilling to depart lest he 
 should expose Mann's seven, as Mann was ex- 
 posing his fifteen. He was, besides, confident 
 that, if the junction were effected in Corsica, 
 twenty-two ships, such as he would then have, 
 would " make their way " through the out- 
 numbering Spaniards " in every direction ; " 
 that is, " would cut them to pieces." So much 
 for the opportunity lost, as Jervis judged it; 
 in which agreed the opinion of Nelson, who 
 was with him. We have also the sober meas- 
 ured judgment of Colling wood on the same 
 occasion. " We waited with the utmost im- 
 patience for Admiral Mann, whose junction 
 at one time seemed absolutely necessary to our 
 safety." As for Mann, the Admiralty showed 
 their appreciation of his judgment by steps 
 which proved that they considered his conduct 
 at fault. A cutting rebuke was administered. 
 " Their lordships feel the greatest regret that 
 you should have been induced to return to 
 England with the squadron under your orders, 
 under the circumstances in which you were 
 placed." " The circumstances " which gov- 
 erned his judgment did not justify his conduct. 
 He was deprived at once of his command, and
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 279 
 
 appears never to have been employed afloat 
 again. 
 
 Occurring in so high quarters, and being on 
 so large a scale, these instances show more 
 forcibly than usual what the necessity is, what 
 the root, whence spring the principle, the rule, 
 and the duty — all three — of military obedi- 
 ence. Where many wills have to act to one 
 end, unity of effort, effective co-operation, 
 needs not only to exist, but to be guaranteed 
 by the strongest possible sanctions. The many 
 wills need to become one will ; the many 
 persons, in many quarters, simply the rep- 
 resentatives, in the best sense, of the one 
 person, in whom the united action of the whole 
 finds source and energy. Lord St. Vincent's 
 maxim, " The whole of discipline is contained 
 in the one word ' obedience, ' " may be correctly 
 paraphrased, " The whole of military action is 
 contained in the one word 'unity.'" Obedience 
 and unity are only different manifestations of 
 the same principle. The one is the principle 
 in will, the other in act. The one characterizes 
 the conduct of persons, the other the conduct 
 of operations. Obedience ensures that the 
 members of the military body, often far apart,
 
 28o The Military Rule of Obedience 
 
 will obey the one commander with the accuracy 
 and vieor with which the muscles of an athlete 
 obey his will. 
 
 In the conduct of war, what is concentration, 
 the necessity of which is universally granted, 
 but essential unity? When, for purposes of 
 the war, concentration yields momentarily to 
 expansion, then all the movements and dis- 
 positions of the forces must be governed by 
 reference to easy concentration, to unity of 
 action. The moment this consideration is 
 violated, unity is sacrificed, and conduct has 
 become misconduct; nor does it matter, in 
 justification of a plain violation of principle, 
 that the misconduct is due to an error of judg- 
 ment. If circumstances knowable at the time 
 justify, judgment has not been at fault; if they 
 do not, the man should have known better. 
 This necessity to keep unity in view is ex- 
 pressed by one of Napoleon's pithy phrases : 
 " The art of war consists in proper distribu- 
 tions, to disseminate in order to exist, and to 
 concentrate in order to fight." Again he says, 
 " War is a business of positions," and he illus- 
 trates the maxim by an example of positions 
 of dissemination, so taken that the scattered
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 281 
 
 bodies can with certainty and in the briefest 
 period unite at a common centre, in case of 
 threatened attack, or for an intended move- 
 ment of offence. 
 
 In all this there is, of course, much that 
 finds close analogies in civil life, and no doubt 
 much light might be thrown on the rule of 
 military obedience by a comparative examina- 
 tion of other callings. But the peculiarity of 
 war, for which alone the military professions 
 exist, to meet or to avert it, is that men are in 
 the constant presence of power actively and 
 malevolently intent upon injuring them, by any 
 means of surprise or superiority of force that 
 can be contrived. Therefore the need to have 
 every moment in hand, and upon occasion 
 to exert, all the means at one's command, to 
 counteract the enemy, to overthrow his de- 
 signs, to crush himself, to do so with the ut- 
 most speed and certainty, weighs heavier in 
 war than in more tranquil pursuits. War is 
 face to face continually, not with misfortune 
 only but with catastrophe; and that not of 
 gradual approach or partial, but sudden and 
 irremediable. 
 
 For these weighty reasons, all available re-
 
 282 The Military Rtcle of Obedience 
 
 sources to forestall such result, and to destroy 
 the enemy upon whom it depends, need to be 
 utilized and put forth in the most effective and 
 promptest manner. This means that exertions 
 in all parts must be instant upon the word of 
 command, and in unison; united in movement 
 and united in weight. Velocity and weight 
 are the factors of momentum in armed colli- 
 sion as in any other, and both the rapidity and 
 the force of an intended blow depend upon 
 unity of impulse and simultaneous impact, in 
 bodies of men as well as in projectiles. What 
 else is the conceded value of movement in 
 mass than concentrated movement, the weight 
 of several bodies effectively joined into one } 
 To frame the plan, to initiate and control the 
 movement, to give to it direction, combination, 
 and impulse, to sustain its energy, is the duty 
 of one man, upon whom in the last analysis 
 depends the unity of thought and act which 
 inspires and vivifies the whole ; but the trans- 
 mission of the impulse and energy throughout 
 the mass, so that the oneness of the head is 
 realized in the unity of the whole, is ensured 
 by the military rule of obedience, and by that 
 only. Obedience is the cement of the struc-
 
 The Military Rule of Obedience 28 
 
 a 
 
 ture; or, more worthily understood in the spirit, 
 apart from which a word is but dead, it is the 
 life-blood of the organism. In short, the rule 
 of obedience is simply the expression of that 
 one among the military virtues upon which all 
 the others depend, in order that the exertion of 
 their powers may not breed confusion, which is 
 the precursor of disaster, but may accomplish 
 decisive results, approaching perfection in pro- 
 portion as co-operation has been exact.
 
 ADMIRAL SAMPSON
 
 ADMIRAL SAMPSON 
 
 May, 1902. 
 
 AS a matter of mere retrospect, there can 
 be few officers now in the navy whose 
 recollections of the late Admiral Sampson go 
 back as far as my own. Although a few 
 months his junior in age, I belonged to the 
 class at the Naval Academy which was two 
 years ahead of his ; and consequently, at the 
 time of his entrance, I was able to regard new- 
 comers with something of that feeling of de- 
 tached superiority which is apt to characterize 
 the attitude of older collegians toward fresh- 
 men. Whatever of distinction between the 
 two exists in the nature of things is, of course, 
 emphasized at a military school, where the 
 want of uniform and difference of carriage 
 betray at a glance any affectation of com- 
 posure, with which a stranger may try to con- 
 ceal the fact that he is in an unaccustomed 
 position and knows it. At that date — 1857 
 — the body of midshipmen, as they were then
 
 288 Admiral Sampson 
 
 styled, were organized for purposes of drill 
 and messing on the same basis as the ship's 
 company of a naval vessel of the day, in small 
 groups of sixteen to twenty in number, called 
 gun's crews. To each of these was assigned, 
 in the battery which figured as a ship's deck, 
 a gun of the type then common in the navy, a 
 thirty-two pounder; and at the head of each 
 were two captains, called first and second, 
 taken from the two older classes. I was 
 second captain of the gun to which Sampson 
 was assigned, and my earliest sight of him was 
 toward the end of September, when the whole 
 Academy assembled for the first muster of the 
 year, the conspicuous incident of the all-round 
 shakedown with which the annual course began. 
 It is, perhaps, characteristic of the person- 
 ality of the man, that even then, under all the 
 awkward disadvantage of a novice, he made 
 such an impression upon me that I can at 
 this moment see his face as I did then, and 
 as vividly. Memory plays strange tricks ; and 
 her methods of selecting what she is pleased 
 to retain defy systematization, or unqualified 
 approval. The trivial sticks, the important 
 escapes ; at least we often so estimate its ac-
 
 Admiral Sampson 289 
 
 tion. In this case I do not mean in the least 
 to convey the idea that I then recognized, con- 
 sciously, that the person before me was one of 
 superior intellect or character, marked though 
 Sampson afterward proved to be in both those 
 respects. Nevertheless, I do find it noticeable, 
 in the light of his subsequent career, that he, 
 and he alone, of all the youths then about me, 
 has left an abiding remembrance. I had a 
 hard wrestle with my recollections a few days 
 ago to recall who was the first captain of that 
 crew. I got him at last; but memory is ob- 
 stinate in refusing me the names or faces of 
 the men who sat on my right and left hand at 
 mess during the eight following months which 
 made the academic year of study. Sampson 
 alone of the whole group has stuck. 
 
 Although I did not then, nor for long after- 
 ward, analyze the reason for this arrest of atten- 
 tion, which forced memory to take hold and 
 pigeon-hole a portrait for future reference, I 
 incline to think that it was due to the unusual 
 inquisitive interest he showed in all that was 
 going on. This trait was carried into his sub- 
 sequent professional life as a whole. It was 
 the necessary complement to his very excep- 
 
 19
 
 290 Admiral Sampson 
 
 tional intellectual capacity, without which his 
 natural abilities might have been wasted, as 
 have been those of so many other gifted men 
 in all callings. The average raw boy, in his 
 then position of entrance to the Academy, 
 yields passively, and with a certain sense of 
 subjection, to the impulse of those above him. 
 He does what he is told, asks no questions, and 
 gradually learns by familiarity what he has to 
 know and to do. Commonly, too, he acts thus 
 through life. He goes through his round, do- 
 ing his duty; for, if he learns nothing else, that 
 at least the navy drives thoroughly home, and 
 from that lesson the personnel of the service 
 becomes the thoroughly reliable instrument it 
 always has proved on demand. For average 
 results the motive is sufficient. But the desire 
 for personal advancement is stifled by the rule 
 of promotion by seniority; and consequently 
 the only stimulus in peace, to exertion beyond 
 the simple line of duty, is the influence of a 
 lively interest in matters professional for their 
 own sake. This creates initiative and sustains 
 energy, thus becoming a productive force for 
 personal improvement, as well as for naval prog- 
 ress. This Sampson had, and to it he owed
 
 Admiral Sampson 291 
 
 the advance and eminence which constitute 
 the self-made man. Yet he was entirely with- 
 out the aggressive self-assertion which is often 
 the unpleasant accompaniment of those who 
 realize that they owe their fortunes to them- 
 selves. There was in him an inherent mod- 
 esty and simplicity, through which there 
 transpired no evidence of consciousness that 
 he had made himself more than others. In 
 all my intercourse with him he never gave any 
 indication of knowing that he was a man of 
 mark ; and as he rested contentedly in the 
 sense of duty done, for its own sake and its 
 own interest, so he never sought other ap- 
 proval than his own. He had none of the 
 tricks of the popularity hunter, and he suffered 
 for it. 
 
 In the very small beginnings of his introduc- 
 tion to naval life, at our first meeting, Samp- 
 son began as he afterwards continued ; putting 
 me through a searching series of questions 
 concerning the matters around him. He 
 clearly, if unconsciously, intended not to wait 
 till knowledge came to him of itself, if he could 
 compel it to hasten. I should not call him 
 handsome, as I remember him then, though
 
 292 Admiral Sampson 
 
 the elements of the singular good looks that 
 he possessed in early manhood were all there 
 
 — an unusually fine complexion, delicate, reg- 
 ular features, and brown eyes remarkable both 
 in shape and color. The .smooth, round face 
 struck me as over small, and the beauty which 
 in his prime was thoroughly masculine, seemed 
 then wanting in strength — a singular misread- 
 ing. He had just about as much — or as little 
 
 — carriage and bearing as the ordinary country 
 lad of his age, emphasized by a loose mixed 
 suit, ready-made and ill-fitting. He owed, 
 therefore, nothing to adventitious external cir- 
 cumstances. The figure, which soon after 
 broadened and gathered erectness and firm- 
 ness, gave then an impression of slightness 
 amounting to fragility, which was pathetically 
 recalled to me by the shrunken aspect notice- 
 able after the Spanish War, when prolonged 
 frail health and incipient decay had wasted 
 the vigorous frame I had once known, and 
 set on him the mark of death's approach. I 
 remember also that his manner in questioning 
 was not only interested, but eager, affecting the 
 play of the face ; in this differing from the im- 
 pression usually conveyed by him in mature
 
 Admiral Sampson 293 
 
 life, which was one of too great quiescence. 
 This was really an evidence of temperamental 
 calmness, of self-composure, not of indifference, 
 for he was susceptible of strong feeling, and at 
 times exhibited it ; but commonly his features, 
 though little open to criticism otherwise, were 
 too statuesque and unemotional. 
 
 To one with a prophet's eye, the conjunction 
 of the raw country lad who was questioning me 
 with the scene surrounding him would have 
 constituted an artistic epitome of our naval 
 history, past and future. The material of naval 
 war was then on the eve of an epoch of transi- 
 tion, in which he was to play a part so promi- 
 nent as to associate him continuously with its 
 entire progress. The guns and carriages among 
 which we stood, and the implements with 
 which they were served, differed little in size 
 and nothing in method from those with which 
 the War of 181 2 had been fought. There was 
 then being introduced a new class of cannon, 
 resembling the old in type, but exaggerated in 
 size and improved in manufacture, with some 
 scientifically calculated modifications in form, 
 and with new methods of handling. The partic- 
 ular effective feature of these, however, was the
 
 294 Admiral Sampson 
 
 throwing of explosive shells instead of solid shot. 
 With them mainly the Civil War was to be 
 fought; but their designer, the most prominent 
 ordnance officer then in the navy, still rejected 
 the project of rifling great guns, as being need- 
 less for sea warfare. " Those who mean fight- 
 ing," he was reported to have said, " will come 
 within smooth-bore range ; " an unconscious 
 plagiarism upon Nelson, who was indifferent 
 to improvements in sighting, on the avowed 
 ground that it was better to go so near the 
 enemy that you could not miss. The other 
 considerations which compelled the accept- 
 ance of the rifle, — notably sustained velocity 
 and penetrative force, — were then little ac- 
 counted of ; for the armoring of ships was 
 in an uncertain infancy. The turret system, 
 soon to play so great a part, was yet a germ 
 in the thought of its inventor, unknown to the 
 professional world. 
 
 It will easily be understood that after our 
 first interview the difference of classes be- 
 tween us prevented any growth of intimacy, 
 beyond the occasional and entirely routine 
 association of the drill ground ; and there, as 
 silence was the rule for all except necessary
 
 Admiral Sampson 295 
 
 orders, acquaintance could scarcely make fur- 
 ther way. We saw little or nothing of each 
 other, save in the most casual manner, up to 
 the time of my graduation in 1859. He re- 
 mained until 186 1, the outbreak of the Civil 
 War, when he graduated in due course; the 
 war not having the effect upon his class, which 
 it did on some that followed, of shortening 
 their time at the Academy in response to the 
 urgent demand of the service for more young 
 officers. His career throuohout was in scholar- 
 ship most distinguished ; giving, withal, that 
 assurance of force of character as well as in- 
 tellectual capacity which led to his long iden- 
 tification with the Academy in after years. 
 First as an assistant, afterwards as the head 
 of one of the scientific departments, ultimately 
 as superintendent, no naval officer has been 
 more broadly associated with it, or made a 
 more marked impression. He declined de- 
 cisively, however, to entertain a proposal made 
 to him, to remain as permanent head of the 
 department which he successfully administered 
 from time to time. There was much that was 
 tempting in an offer, which would substitute, 
 for the family partings incidental to a naval
 
 296 Admiral Sampson 
 
 career, a comfortable fixed home and steady 
 congenial employment ; but in speaking of it 
 to me he alleQ:ed his unwillingrness to be sev- 
 ered from immediate association with the pro- 
 fession of his education and friendships. As 
 it was, his constant returns to the same sphere 
 of duty were, like his other conspicuous em- 
 ployments, one part of the unexpressed tribute, 
 the tribute in act rather than word, which the 
 service paid to his merits. Not that words 
 were wanting; but men spoke them among 
 themselves, rather than to him or to the pub- 
 lic. The professional recognition which fol- 
 lowed him, and still follows, was largely 
 silent ; but I believe it was, and is, as com- 
 petent and instructed as it is positive and even 
 enthusiastic. 
 
 Of this I am, perhaps, the better judge, in 
 that my own personal knowledge of him is 
 chiefly at second hand, not direct. I am rather 
 a witness to general reputation than an eye- 
 witness of conduct or character. Thoug^h I 
 knew him well, and met him often, and so had 
 occasion by experience to corroborate the gen- 
 eral estimate, we were rarely associated, and 
 never closely. Intimacy never existed between
 
 A dmiral Sampson 297 
 
 us, and there was no chance for me thus to 
 form that prepossession of esteem which I had 
 ample occasion to note among those who had 
 seen him in active service. Officers who 
 had been under his command afloat spoke of 
 him with a warmth of admiration and confi- 
 dence, the sincerity of which was too obvious 
 for doubt. To those wlio, like myself, learned in 
 this way how he was regarded by the men who 
 had been best situated to observe him, there 
 was little surprise at the eminent character- 
 istics shown by him during the late war; nor 
 had there been antecedently any fear whether 
 the Navy Department was exercising sound 
 judgment and discretion in selecting him for 
 the position he held. His very remarkable 
 fitness for particular duties, which had to be 
 discharged on shore, had kept him decidedly 
 below the average in the amount of what is 
 technically rated as " sea-service ; " but that 
 which he did left no apprehension among those 
 who saw him that the habit of the student or 
 administrator had swamped the faculties of the 
 sea officer. He was to add another example 
 to the list of those who have proved by their 
 deeds, that the professional capacity of the sea-
 
 298 Admiral Sampson 
 
 man is at least as much a matter of intelligence 
 as of uninterrupted practice, and that, once 
 acquired, it is very like other habits, easily 
 resumed after intermission, and quickly re- 
 stored when a little rusty. 
 
 Prominent among the aptitudes of the com- 
 petent commander, however, are certain moral 
 faculties which are not acquired by practice, 
 though they may by it be improved and en- 
 larged ; gifts from Nature, who in such matters 
 knows nothing of impartiality. It was upon 
 these traits in Sampson that men seemed in- 
 stinctively to dwell, and by them chiefly to be 
 impressed. Their estimates were not reached 
 as a matter of analysis, but were received by 
 incidental familiarity and daily observation of 
 the man. As I met his reputation from time 
 to time in conversation with men, in their opin- 
 ions and anecdotes, as I knew him by what 
 they thought and quoted about him, there 
 formed gradually in my mind a conception of 
 his professional character which the event has 
 proved to be substantially correct. The more 
 naval history and biography are read, the more 
 do they confirm to us the assurance that in 
 successful leaders there are certain essential
 
 Admiral Sampson 299 
 
 qualities, the absence of which in a particular 
 man may remain long undetected, like a flaw 
 beneath the surface of metal, but under strain 
 is suddenly revealed, to the disappointment 
 and dismay of those who had hopes of him. 
 No one has phrased this experience better than 
 Lord St. Vincent, in the words, " Responsibility 
 is the test of a man's courage." Not that 
 many men who here fail are not brave enough 
 physically; but that, for those who emerge 
 unbroken from this trial, there remains none 
 severer. It is the extreme proof of endurance, 
 active and passive. A frequent and familiar 
 indication of succumbing under it is the ina- 
 bility to sleep, which has been the prelude of 
 many failures. 
 
 It was upon this characteristic, and upon 
 the qualities accessory to it, that there was 
 consensus of opinion in Sampson's case. How- 
 ever differing otherwise in details, all agreed in 
 the conclusion that upon him responsibility sat 
 easily ; that anxiety did not overrun the due 
 bounds of reasonable, though watchful, pre- 
 caution ; that he could rest with quiet mind 
 in the certainty that all had been done which 
 reason could prescribe, untroubled by fears of
 
 300 Admiral Sampson 
 
 improbable, though not impossible, eventuali- 
 ties. To this is closely allied the very essen- 
 tial power to take necessary risk for adequate 
 ends, a thing almost impossible to a man upon 
 whom responsibility weighs unduly. This was 
 finely, though unconsciously, illustrated in his 
 orders for the blockade of Santiago. " The 
 end to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo 
 attack, and that risk must be taken. The 
 escape of the Spanish squadron at this junc- 
 ture would be a serious blow to our prestige, 
 and to a speedy end of the war." To one who 
 has listened, as I have, to one of his gallant 
 captains telling, in laughing earnest, the num- 
 ber of torpedo-boats imagination discovered in 
 one of the early nights of the Havana blockade, 
 these words mean more than they will, perhaps, 
 convey to a layman. It is in this danger, in 
 its anxiety even more than in its actuality, — in 
 its moral effect, — that the naval profession 
 recognizes one of the greatest difficulties of a 
 modern blockade. A distinguished British 
 admiral has said that he believed but a small 
 proportion of captains could long endure the 
 nightly strain. Sampson assumed it without 
 hesitation, though not without assiduous pre-
 
 Admiral Sampson 301 
 
 caution, as is shown by the numerous orders 
 issued by him to perfect the methods. The 
 danger was shared by many ; the responsibility 
 of the means, which effectually prevented the 
 enemy from coming out by night, and so con- 
 fusing the movements of our squadron, was his 
 alone. 
 
 It is evident that this professional faculty 
 was part of his natural equipment, and it mani- 
 fested itself in his personal daily life. In con- 
 versation, ordinarily, there was nothing more 
 noticeable than a certain impassivity of manner 
 that was readily mistaken for indifference or 
 lack of response. This at times gave offence, 
 particularly in his later years, when bodily 
 weakness imparted lassitude to his speech. 
 But when consulting him on a matter of inter- 
 est to another, one found that he had carefully 
 followed what was said, giving both thought 
 and sympathy to the discussion; while in mat- 
 ters that primarily concerned himself he was 
 in all outward semblance, and I believe inter- 
 nally, just as quiet and untroubled as about 
 the most trivial external detail. I remember 
 meeting him the day after the monitor " Pa- 
 tapsco " was sunk by a submarine mine off
 
 302 Admiral Sampson 
 
 Charleston, a personal experience which would 
 have made many men nervous as well as care- 
 ful about torpedoes in after life. With her 
 small reserve of buoyancy, a torpedoed monitor 
 went from under the men on deck with some- 
 thing of the suddenness of the drop of a gallows, 
 and Sampson, who was keeping watch on the 
 turret roof, described his experience as step- 
 ping from it into the water. Nevertheless, 
 when I saw him, he was as unaffectedly and 
 without effort imperturbed as though nothing 
 remarkable had occurred. Quite consistent 
 with this observation of my own is the account 
 given of him off Santiago by his flag-captain, 
 Chadwick, in an admirably sympathetic sketch 
 contributed after the admiral's death to the 
 New York Evening Post. " He usually had 
 a chair upon the quarter-deck until about ten 
 in the evening, when he turned in and slept 
 soundly, unless called for something important, 
 until six in the morning. His calm, equable 
 temperament carried him through the night 
 without any of the sleeplessness usually asso- 
 ciated with the mental strain of great respon- 
 sibilities." 
 
 In his conduct of a war command, however,
 
 Admiral Sampson 303 
 
 there was not to be found any of the lethargy 
 or sluggishness which might, perhaps, be in- 
 ferred from this unmoved exterior. Mental 
 activity and enterprise suffered nothing, but 
 rather gained, from a composure of spirit which 
 preserved all his other faculties from derange- 
 ment, insuring the full utilization of the 
 abundant intelligence, extensive professional 
 knowledge, and vivid interest in his work, by 
 which he was characterized. It is true that 
 apathy is the defect of this quality of compos- 
 ure, and in military biography has often been 
 found to accompany it. During the Civil War 
 there was an amusing anecdote of a certain 
 commanding officer in a particular incident. 
 " Was he composed } " it was asked. " Oh, yes ! 
 he was perfectly composed," was the reply ; 
 " but he had n't the faintest idea of what ought 
 to be done." Sampson's professional character 
 was here well balanced. It was only in the 
 matter of personal ambition, of self-assertion, 
 or self-vindication, that his reticent calmness 
 entailed an inaction, which, though dignified, 
 and preservative of his own self-respect as of 
 the esteem of his comrades, did not save him 
 from suffering keenly when he thought himself
 
 304 Admiral Sampson 
 
 unworthily treated. He consulted me on one 
 occasion as to how far it would become him to 
 take action that had been suggested for his 
 benefit. I told him that while I heartily wished 
 him all the good that was at stake, I believed 
 the particular step would be injurious to the 
 navy. He expressed no decision to me then 
 or afterwards ; but I thought I read assent in 
 his eyes, and I know that he went no farther 
 in the matter. 
 
 The opening acts of a war drama, especially 
 after a long period of peace, are necessarily 
 characterized by a considerable tension of 
 feeling among the actors, which seeks natural 
 relief in immediate action. So big a deed as 
 war calls clamorously for something to be done, 
 and speedily. Probably few appreciate in this 
 light how great was Dewey's privilege in the 
 opportunity, so consonant to his personal qual- 
 ities, and of which he so admirably availed 
 himself, overriding all consideration of hazards, 
 to strike at once at the enemy's fleet at its 
 anchorage. Upon Sampson fell the more 
 arduous trial of prolonged expectancy, in un- 
 avoidable attendance upon the enemy's move- 
 ments, which he could only by indirection force
 
 Admiral Sampson 305 
 
 or control ; submitting to the necessity of not 
 attempting to enter a harbor like Santiago, or 
 risking on mine fields the armored ships which 
 were the nation's most important diplomatic 
 asset at that moment. In this he had no 
 choice. The orders of the Government were 
 positive, though his own opinion coincided 
 with them. No man was more fitted by tem- 
 perament than he to bear this strain, without 
 disturbance of judgment or inconsiderateness 
 of act. The tension which he felt in common 
 with others manifested itself in sustained 
 energy, rising indeed on necessary occasion to 
 impetuosity, but characterized rather by the con- 
 tinuous and increasing stringency of methods 
 adopted to meet a sortie by the enemy. In 
 the strong professional admiration I have felt 
 for his conduct of operations in every respect, 
 as soon as the appearance of the enemy's fleet 
 had really defined the situation, it has been to 
 me a matter of satisfaction that my judgment 
 differed decisively from his own in two pre- 
 liminary matters: his wish to attack the sea 
 defences of Havana, and the expediency of his 
 movement against Porto Rico, undertaken in 
 the hope that on arrival he would find Cervera
 
 3o6 Admiral Sampson 
 
 there. Soon after the war I criticised the latter 
 step in the pages of McClurcs Magazhie, draw- 
 ing from him a warm remonstrance on what he 
 considered an inadequate appreciation of his 
 reasons. Whether he or I was right in this 
 is to me immaterial, compared with the fact 
 that it gives me assurance of my own impar- 
 tiality in the profound admiration I have felt 
 for all his dispositions and actions, without ex- 
 ception that I can recall, from the time he 
 knew the enemy to be on this side. 
 
 The methods of the Santiago blockade are 
 now commonly understood, but their precise 
 military merit has scarcely been adequately 
 appreciated. By them, as appears from the 
 Spanish telegrams published since the war, 
 Sampson compelled the enemy to accept battle 
 on the terms they considered most disadvan- 
 tageous. Many may remember the classical 
 story of the leader who cried to his opponent, 
 " If you be the great commander men sa}^ why 
 don't you come down and fight me ? " and re- 
 ceived the pertinent reply, " If you be the gen- 
 eral you claim to be, why don't you m-ake me 
 come down and fight you } " This summarizes 
 in effect the credit due to Sampson. On June
 
 Admiral Sampson 307 
 
 26, just a week before the battle, the Spanish 
 authorities at Madrid and Havana had decided 
 that the surrender of the squadron in Santiago, 
 or its destruction there by its own officers, 
 would be more injurious to their cause than its 
 destruction in battle, and they held that, by 
 "choosing a dark night and favorable oppor- 
 tunity while part of the enemy's ships are with- 
 drawn," there was a fair chance of eluding the 
 United States fleet. Cervera replied that to 
 go out " at night was more perilous than in 
 daytime, on account of the hostile ships being 
 closer inshore." After the war, he explained 
 at length, in a letter dated October 7, 1898: 
 " At night the enemy remained in the imme- 
 diate vicinity of the harbor entrance. They 
 always had one ship less than a mile distant, 
 constantly illuminating the entrance; and as 
 though this were not enough, they had other 
 smaller vessels still nearer, and steamboats 
 (launches) close to the headlands of the en- 
 trance. Once in a while the latter would ex- 
 change musketry fire with our forces. Under 
 these circumstances it was absolutely impossi- 
 ble to go out at night, because in this narrow 
 channel, illuminated by a dazzling light, we
 
 J 
 
 08 Admiral Sampson 
 
 could not have followed the channel. But 
 even supposing we had succeeded in going out, 
 before the first ship was outside we should 
 have been seen and covered from the very first 
 with the concentrated fire of the whole squad- 
 ron." These details will be found to corres- 
 pond with Sampson's published orders. 
 
 The thoroufjhness of the blockade after 
 Sampson's arrival determined the detention of 
 Cervera in Santiago till our army arrived. To 
 use an expression of one of the American cap- 
 tains, it " put the lid on Cervera's coffin." After 
 the army came, the same measure determined 
 the destruction of the squadron if it attempted 
 to escape ; for it decided the time and condi- 
 tions under which the battle would be fought, 
 when on July i, the further land defence be- 
 ing considered practically hopeless, a peremp- 
 tory order to sail was given to Cervera. The 
 forcing of the enemy to action under these dis- 
 advantageous conditions was the great decisive 
 feature of the campaign from start to finish. 
 
 The skill with which advantage was taken 
 of all the possibilities of the situation was char- 
 acteristic of Sampson's deliberate painstaking 
 energy. No less characteristic, indicative of
 
 y 
 
 _r 
 
 i 
 
 f \'
 
 10 20 JO 40 SO 60 70 80 
 
 90 1°° '1° 120 130 140 150 160 170 igT
 
 Admiral Sampson 309 
 
 the sustained purpose which rises of its own 
 force to impetuosity, when impetuosity is 
 needed, was his urgent repeated telegram to 
 the Department for its sanction to go to San- 
 tiago with only two ships, dropping the slower 
 but powerful battle-ship " Indiana," when news 
 was received that Commodore Schley felt it 
 necessary to bring back his squadron to 
 Key West for coal. For once he betrayed 
 impatience at the apparent delay of the De- 
 partment, although it replied the same day. 
 It was a flash of the fire that burned within 
 him unremittingly, but with regulated fervor ; 
 a token of the entire absorption in his duties 
 which was the groundwork of his professional 
 character. Disregardful of all but the necessity 
 of success, he was heedless of personal danger, 
 and daring in professional risk. The mastery 
 which the service had over his interest and 
 affections, united to entire self-mastery in 
 temper and under responsibility, insured his 
 eminence as an officer, which history will 
 unquestionably recognize and afiirm.
 
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