The Effects to "he Expected the T -;-!3t Tn ] , Tf pon ;he Constitution of Great Brit lin 1f Passed Into a Law. - UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE EFFECTS TO BE EXPECTED FROM THE EAST INDIA BILL, U r O N THE CONSTITUTION ' OF GREAT BRITAIN, if t L A B Y WILLIAM PULTENEY, Es.o,. FOURTH EDITION, CORRECTED. P O S T S t R I P T. V LONDON: PRINTED FOR J. STOCKDALE, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY. MDCCLXXXIV. {PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIXPENCE.) The Sub fiance of what is contained in the following Tages, was intended to have been delivered in ^Parliament , if other Gentlemen, better entitled to be heardy had not beenfrft in the Eye of the Speaker, when I fever al times, offered my f elf 'for that purpoje ; but f think it a Tublic Duty, to declare my Opinion on a matter fo deeply inter eft** ing to the State. n T H EFFECTS TO BE EXPECTED FROM THE EAST INDIA BILL. N the Queftion which has fo much occupied the Attention N i of the Public, concerning the Eaft India Bill, Gentlemen of known in-* tegrity and love for their Country, have taken different fides; and there- si fore, the Queftion muft either be jL doubtful in itfelf, or the true grounds A 2 Of 354679 ( 4 ) of it have not hitherto been clearly ex- plained. This laft I take to be in fome degree the faft; and as it is allowed on all hands to be a bufL nefs of great magnitude, I have little doubt that, every one who wifhes to aG an honourable part, will willing-* ly Men to any thing which is fairly offered, with a view to throw light * upon the matter. The arguments drawn from Vio- lation of Charters are fuch, as un- doubtedry admit of differ ent opi- nions: One fet of men may fairly ? perhaps, think, that there is a fufficient degree of Neceflhy in this aife, to juflify juflify fo (bong an interference of Parliament, both on account of the State of the Company's Affairs, and on account of the Mifcondufl of the Company's Servants in India; and alfo, becaufe the great (lake which the Na-, tion has in thefe Concerns, demands ' a ftrongand effectual remedy; whilft others may as fairly think, that the Neceflity is not in this cafe fufficiently urgent: That theCompany's Affairs are in no defperate condition ; that their temporary diftrefs has arifen from the general calamity of the National War; that the Mifconduft of their Servants abroad, has been exag- gerated, whether from defign, or enthufiafm, is immaterial: That by no pofllble means, can fuch diftant Dominions enjoy a perfect fyftem of Government; and that by proper Parliamentary Regulations, they may enjoy as confiderable a degree of happiness and profperity, under the Old Syftem a little corrected, as they are likely to enjoy under the New; which will moft probably fend out a great number of new hungry Perfons, with much the fame fort of principles with thofe who have hi- therto vifited that unfortunate coun- try ; and that at any rate, it has not been the Trading Concerns of the Company, which have produced inal verfat ions ( 7 ) malverfations in India, but their Power and Authority over the Na- tives; which it is ridiculous to fay, cannot inftantly be put into other hancL, leaving the Trade upon the fame footing as before any Territo- rial Power was acquired. Upon thefe points, the moft up- right men may certainly differ in opinion ; but there is another quef- tion, of much greater magnitude, upon which I am apt to think they could not differ, if the argument were fully ftated and rightly underftood ; I mean, with regard to the Effects of the prefent Bill upon the Conflitij- tion of this Country. It It has been faid on this head 5 that the -New Arrangement will increafe the Influence of the Qx>^i> f v ; which has been explained in ;thb 'rhanner - That it will increafe the Power of the prefent Mmifters, dtiri%^he four years /hat this At is to be in force ; and that if the Nomination is afterwards given to the Crown, it will increafe iu a very enormous degree the In- fluence of the Crown hfelf, : It has alfo been fa-id, that it will tlimmilli the Influence of the Crown ; becaufe the prefentNomiriation being made by hisMajefty'sprefentMiniRers, and the New Directorsbeing irremove- abte a ( 9 ) tiMe by the Crown for four years, it will throw fuch a weight of power into the hands of the prefent Minifters, independent of the Crown, that they too will be irremoveable by his Ma~ jefty ; and if the New Parliament, \vhich muft be chofen before the four years expire, ftiall make a fimilar New Nomination for the fame, or a longer term, inftead of permitting the Crown to name, the prefent Mi- nifters will become independent of the Crown for a new period, which may be renewed again and again, without any limitation of time. In (. 1 ) In this mode of viewing the Queflion, fome of the mod virtuous Patriots may poflibly entertain very different fentiments ; fome may wifli fuccefs to the Bill, becaufe they may think it will increafe the Influence of the Crown, which may appear to them to have been lately too much diminiflied ; others may oppofe the Bill, for that very reafon, as believ~ ing, that it will increafe that Influ- ; ence, which they may think has not been too much, or not fufficiently di- miniflied. Some again may approve the Bill, becaufe it may appear to them to diminifh the Influence of the Crown, and 'becaufe it may throw a con- a confiderable degree of power, irn dependent of the Crown, into the hands of a fet of Gentlemen, who, though at prefent Minifters, they may think well difpofed to the Country, and fafe to be trufted. Others, on the contrary, may diflike the Bill, becaufe they may think that we ought to fee fully the confequences of the late de- munitions of the Influence of the Crown, before we proceed to di- minifti it farther ; and becaufe they may not think the prefent Minifters can be fafely trufted with fo great an Independent Power even for four years, much lefs for ever: And many peo^ pie may think the arguments incon- B 2 fiftentj fiftent, which contend that the Bill will both increafe and diminifh the Influence of the Crown ; and that therefore, neither of the aflertions^ can be relied on ; but that the only point to be attended to is, whether the Bill promifes a better Adminn ftration of our Affairs in India than formerly; and that as the Bill is only to endure for four years, we may truft that Parliament will not renew it, if any dangerous confe- quences are found to have arifen during that fliort period. But in order to judge fairly of this Bill, it is fit to ftate clearly what ( '5 ) what appears to be the intention of thofe who bring it in; and then to confider the Effe&s which that will f produce upon the Conftitution of this Government. The intention of the Bill is, to vefl the whole Powers of the Eaft India Company in Seven Direc- tors, whofe names were moved by the prefent Secretary of State, and adopted by the Houfe of Com-* mons* They are to hold their offices for four years, removable, like the Twelve Judges, by an Ad- drefs of either Houfe of Parliament, not by any other power : And for for managing the Commercial Affairs of the Company, Nine Gentlemen, moved for and adopted in the fame manner, are to affift them, fubjcft to their controul,andremovable by them. The effect of this is, to veil in thefe . Seven Directors the whole Influence of the Offices of every kind in India, and at home, belonging to the Com- pany; and the whole Influence arifing from the tranfations of their Trade here, in the purchafe of goods for exportation, furnifhing {hipping, (tores, and recruits ; the Influence arifmg from the method of felling their goods, by bringing forward or keeping back goods ( '5 ) goods at thefales, or giving indulgcn^ cies as to payments, fo as to accommo- date thofe who are meant to be fa- voured; the Influence arifing from the favour they may fliew to thofe who are now in England, and haye left debts or effects in India, as to the mode of bringing home and recover- ing their fortunes; the Influence of contracts of all kinds in India; of pro- motions, from (lep to ftep; of favour in the Inland and Export Trade; of intimi- dation with refpeft to every perfon now there, who may come home with a fortune; both with regard to recover- ing his debts, and the means of re- mittance, and with regard to enqui- ries ries into his conduft; the Influence upon foreign Companies, or foreign States, who have eftablifhments in that Country, who, in return, may have the means of afting upon In- dividuals in this Country ; the Influ- ence upon the native Princes of In- dia, fome of whom have already found the way of procuring the Elec- tions of Members of Parliament ; and many other means of Influenc e, which it is impoflible to forefee, or to trace. The amount of the whole cannot be computed. It has been called ( '7 ) fequal to two or three millions a yearj for the fum paid in cam to the Civil and Military Officers, is alone faid to amount to more than one million a year; but there can be no doubt that its magnitude is very great and exten- five indeed, and that it may produce very remarkable confequences* This power is not, indeed, taken from the Crown ; but it is placed in new hands, who are independent during four years, equally of the Crown and of the People. Before this Bill, it was placed in twenty-four Directors, cho- fen by the Proprietors at large. The Election was at firft annual ; but, by an Act pafled feveral years ago, fix C Pirec., Directors were to go out by rotation* every year, and fix new Directors to- be chofen : So that each Director was elected for four years; after which he was to go out, and could not be re-* elected for a certain interval. By this meanr, the Patronage of the Company was, in the lirfi: place, divided amongft twenty-four, inftead of feven ; and thefe twenty-four coivHiled of very different defcripticns of men, with different, and often uppofrte, connections, not named by one man, or one party, but chofen by the Proprietors of India Stock - to whom alone they felt themfelves indebted for their fituations. It ( '9 ) ,/as, fecondly, employed not to -effect an Influence in Government? to which none of that defcrip- tion of men afpired, but was ap-< plied to fliew gratitude to thofe who had affifted in their Election, or from whom they might expect a f.milar fupport hereafter, and amongft their private friends and connections. Government, no doubt, mud have .had a mare of the favours bellowed by the Directors ; but it was not of a very important nature, nor very ex- .tenfive. It was not a {hare inde- pendent of the Crown, but paffed to the Minifter of the Day. The Di- re&ors, having no joint object of ob- taining the power of governing the C 2 State, State, could never unite in directing the Patronage of the Company to ac- quire that power ; and their favours were diffufed very generally over the kingdom, with little or no regard to the diftinctions of. State Parties. The whole of this Patronage will be diverted into a different channel; and being put into the hands of per- fons named by one of the State Par* ties, it may be fuppofed that it wilj in future be chiefly employed as a State Engine ; and that it muft pro- duce very important and ferious Ef* feels upon the future Government of thL Country. The The Secretary of State, in the jcourfe of the progrefs of the Bill in the Houfe of Commons, took occafion to declare, that he had never faid, that at the end of the four years the No- mination of the feven Directors would be given to the Crown ; but added, that he feared it might. The ob- ject of which declaration might pof- fibly be, to quiet, in fome degree, the fears of thofe who dreaded an in- creafe of Influence in the Crown ; but the latter part of the declaration, was at the fame time well adapted to keep up the hopes of thofe who favoured the Bill, from an honed or an ( 22 ) an interefted wifli to increafe, by this mean?, the Influence of the Crown. But men, accuftomed to affairs, are apt to look more to the charac- ters and principles of thofe who fpeak, than to what they fay in the mo- Trient : They are apt to look to the nature of the human mind, in order .to judge how men will aSt on great and important occafions. It is not any part of the principles of the Party to whom the Secretary of State has at- tached himfelf, to increafe the Influ- ence of the Crown; but they, like men of talent?, in 'all age~, cannot be fuppofed averfe to an inde- . pendent pendent power in themfelves, which they may think it impoffible they fhould ever abufe. To that Party, this Country owed, in a great meafure, the Revolution ; and the gratitude of the Nation can never overpay them, unlefs by Surrendering both King and People into their hands: JBut the fame Party, when in Power, undoubtedly extended the Influence of the Crown by Corruption, beyond the example of any former period ; and they ex- tended that Influence to fuch a degree 5 y that the Crown found itfelf ftrong enough to difpenfe with their fer- vices. They have again been inftru- mental in reducing that Influence very very confiderably, and they have beeri once more placed in Office. No- body will believe, that it is now their object, by this Bill, to give, after four years, or at any future pe- riod, a new Influence to the Crown, which would not only far furpafs what the Crown has lately loft, but more than double what it ever at any time enjoyed ; for if they did give it, the weight of that Party in the fcale of Government, would na longer be felt* No perfon can therefore ferioufly" doubt, that it is the intention of the prefent Minifters to renew this Bill in fuch a manner, as to preferve the full ( 25 ) full power of Indian Patronage in their own hands; and I have no doubt that- the utmoft pains will be taken, during thefe four years, to reconcile the Nation to the meafure : I am per- fuaded mod fully, that great exer* tions will at firft be made, to reform all glaring abufes in India ; but when once the power here is fully fixt, and ap- plied to Political Influence, we may be fare, that nocomplaints will come home from India to this country againfl Fa- vourites ; for who will dare to make a complaint ? and every circumftance in the conduct of this Bill convinces me, that the prefent plan decidedly is, to veft the whole Power and Pa- tronage of India in the Members of P the ( z6 ) the prefent Adminiftration, not only during four years, but as long as India fliall belong to this kingdom. If it is faid, that Parliament, at the end of four years, may interpofe ; it is to be confidered, that an Adminiftra- tion pofTeffed of the Power of India, is not removeable in time of Peace, either by the Crown or by the voice of the People ; and as a General Elec- tion muft come on in four years, and may come on muchfooner, they mud know very little of the (late of Elec-^ tions in this Ifland, who think that, with the whole power of Govern- ment, and the whole power of India y fo powerful a Party in this kingdom, will will not be able to take their meafures 4"o ? as to have nothing to fear from a future Parliament. The only queftion therefore to be confidered is, What will be the Effefts of this change in the Conftitution ? And it is upon this queftion, when more fully explained, that I think honourable men cannot poflibly differ, whatever predileftion they may natu- rally have for particular men, or par- ticular defcriptions of men, or parti- cular parties. It is poflible, that all perfons may not have particularly turned their at- D 2 tention, tention to what it is that conllitutes the very eflence of this Conftitution; We all know that it is the very bed Conftitution upon the face of the globe, becaufe we all feel its benign influence ; we all know that its out- ward form, confifts of King, Lords, and Commons: But many are not ap- prifed of the particular caufe, that our Government has notbeen hitherto fab- jeft to thofe fatal difaften, which have attended all former fyftems, where the People have enjoyed a great (hare in thcGovernmentoftheir Country, [will fhortly ftate my idea of it, but I do not claim the merit of the difcovery ; I take .it from, a molt ingenious Author, to to whom the Republic of Letters, and ^Mankind in general, are greatly in-* debted. In Republican Governments, thofe who were intruded by the People, were thereby conftantly placed in a Situation which gave them a perfonal intereft, feparate and diftinfl: from the People at large, which necefiarily excited views and confederations by J no means in unifon with the fecurity arid freedom of the general mafs. The confequence always was, that the People were betrayed by every new Fa v ourite, and the power and confe- cuence of a few perfons was fuccef- fively lively eftabliflied, which in time became fo grievous, that the People were pre- pared for accepting of the defpotifm of one perfon, as preferable to the ar- bitrary Government of a few of their fellow citizens. Whereas in our Go- vernment, the perfons intruded by the People to exercife their powers, as Reprefentatives, have no permanent feparate intereft, nor any executive authority whatfoever ; their only power is to propofe and confent to Laws, and to controul the exercife of the Executive, which is placed in the Prince : Their intereft and that of the People is the fame ; they cannot betray the People with- out out at the fame time betraying tbcmfelves : And, as no individual can obtain the exercife of Executive Powers, except at the will of the Prince, by whom he may be deprived of it at pleafure, it is the intereft of everyone, to unite in preventing the power of the Prince from rifmg to an improper height; becaufe he may himfelf be the firft to feel the effecls of it. Not that particular men may not fometimes be weak enough to fancy themfelves fo perfectly fecure in the favour of the Prince, as to wifli to increafe the power of the Sovereign beyond due limits ; but the general feelings of all being very ftrongly directed to withftand the extension of the the Sovereign Power, the ReprefefU tatives of the People have in general been faithful to their truft, with re-, fpeft to that effential point, of refift- ing the encroachments of Power ; not: from any fuperior virtue in the inha* bitants of this ifland, but from the form of the Conilitution, which gave 1 the Reprefentatives of the People no feparae and diftinft intei eft from the People at large. This happy circumftance, peculiar to our form of Government, arifes front our having, as a part of it, a King in whom is vefted the whole Execu-< tive Power, but who has not the power of ( 53 ) of making Laws, nor the power of .controlling Judges and Juries, nor the power of levying Money. He has* however, fufficient power for every good and ufeful pur-pofe; and the exift- ence of fuch a branch in our Go~ vernment, has this important" effet, that as no Favourite of the People can, with us, afpire at the Sceptre, nor can -ever hold more than a precarious power at the will of the Crown, all who are aftuated by ambition, imme~ -diately perceive the neceffity of main- taining equal laws and of fupportino; the general freedom, in which their own fecurity is neceflarily involved. Tfeey and the whole People are E therefore .( 54 ) therefore united to guard againft the Executive Power, which poffeffes alone a permanent pre-eminence, and which, by being equally form!-* dable to all, produces a general mo* tive of intereft to refift it. But if the bajance were turned the other way, and it were in the power of Popular Leaders to matter tli Crown, that necefTary branch of the Conflitution would be annihilated as to every ufeful purpofe, and the amr bition of every man would take a .new direction ; the Leaders would from that moment come to have a Separate perfonal intereft, diftiiit from, ( 55 ) from that of the People ; equal laws would be no longer an object to them, but only laws which might fa- vour their indiviJinl power and pre*- eminence. The Liberty of the Prefs, fo eflential to General Liber- ty, would loon be at an end ; for it does not exift in any State, where the power is in the hands of a few, any more than it exifls in abfolute Governments ": It exifts not in Hol- land, nor in Venice ; nor did it exift at Rome. We would experience, in a ftiort time, all the mifchiefs of an Ariftocratical form of Govern-, ment, and would probably at laft be driven, like the people of Sweden, E 2 to to feek a miferable relief by throwing: ourfelves into the arms of an abfolute Mofi of the Governments in Europe were formerly limited Monarchies^ but many of them have been de~ ftroyed by meafures of this very fort, by putting into other hands part of the Executive Power of the State, with a view to controul more pletely the power of the Prince; and the People have at laft been willing to render the King abfolute, in order to be relieved of what they thought a more grievous yoke* I would ( 57 ) I would earneftly recommend to all who have doubts upon this fub- jeft, that they would perufe the four following fliort chapters of Mr. De Lolme's excellent Treatife on the Conftitution of England, viz. Book 2d, Cap. ^th, loth, i 7th, and i(?th, of the Englifh Edition, i 7 8 i . In the ^th chapter the Author fhews, that in Republican Govern- ments the People are necefTarily be- trayed by thofe in whom they truft ; but in the i oth chapter he explains, by what happy mechanifm in our State we are relieved and fecured from that fatal difadvantage ;. and that 354679 ( 38 ) that with us " the People can give " their confidence, without giving " power over themfelves ; they can " appoint Truflees, and yet not give ^ themfelves matters." In the i 7th chapter he points out, by what circum-* fiances in our form of Government, the Crown has been enabled, with- out a dependent mercenary army, to maintain its neceffary authority, al-< though that authority is the object of jealoufy to every part of the People * And in the x^th chapter he fets in a ftrong and clear light, the very great and fatal- danger of transferring any part of the power which ought to be veiled in the Crown, to any other order ( 39 ) order of. men in the State ; for this is a very different queftion from that of aboliihing altogether, any power in the Crown, which may be thought too great or too dangerous. I can- not help tranfcribing a fhort para- graph from this chapter : If through the unforfeen operation of forme t< new regulation, made to reftrain the Royal Prerogative, or through *< fome fudden public revolution, any " particular bodies, or claffes of in.* dividuals, were ever to acquire a perfonal independent {hare in the exercife of the governing authority, we fliould behold the virtue and << patrictifm of the Legiflators, and great ( 40 ) & great men, immediately ceafe with <<' its caufe, and Ariflocracy, as it " were watchful of the opportunity, burft out at once, and fpread itfelf " over the kingdom." Thefe chapters were not wrote with a view to theprefent Queftion; Jmt they are applicable to it in fb if will be a call upon every man of every rank, v \vho is not embarked as an accefTary to the meafure* to unite in a fyfte- iTuitic body to bring about its Repeal. The queftion of General Warrants, the queftion of the Middlcfex E!ec-< tion, and all the Confdtutional Topics which liave agitated mens' minds in modern time?, are as nothing, when put ( 47 ) put in companion with it. The fate of the Kingdom, the freedom* of Britons, will ultimately depend upon the Ciic3: cf their united efforts, to reftore the breach that will thus be made in the bed Conftitution which the admiring \Yorld has ever beheld. POSTSCRIPT. POSTSCRIPT, OlNCE the firft Edition was printed, it has occured to me, that I ought to have obferved, when I flated the objection, that no lefs objeo tional Plan for India had been pro* pofed, and that fomething muft be " done," that this is not a fort of anfwer which Minifters are entitled to make ufe of in Parliament ; becaufe it is their bufmefs, as poiTeiTed of Of-* ficial Information, to bring forward Plans ; and it is the bufinefs of other Members to make objeftions. If Minifters cannot anfwer thcfe objec- tions. ( 49 ) tions, nor introduce Claufes to remove them, it is their bufinefs to profit by the cbje&ions, and bring forward a better Plan. Not that any Member ought to refufe to give every aflift- ance, and every light in his power ; but I hope it will never be a reafon for accepting a bad Plan, becaufe thofe who have not fituations of Re- iponfibility are not ready to produce a tetter Plan for the Minifter to adopt. When I fuggefted the idea of tak- ing away from the General Couit of Proprietors, the power of ap~ pointing and recalling Officers, I did it merely to remove the argu- G ment ( 50 ) ment ufed by the Secretary of State, for naming in Parliament the Seven Neiv Directors; namely, that the prefent Direfton, becaufe controuled by the Proprietors, are difabled from all Authority over their S ervant ab , oa d : That controul of the Proprietors can only weaken the Authority of the Directors over their Servants abroad, when it interferes as to the naming, recalling, and punching Officers ; and it is a full anfwer to fay, that Parlia- ment may take away that controul of the Proprietors, and give the Direc- tors full power, as to the naming and recalling; but it does not fol loWjthattheEleclionofDireftorsmould bealfo taken from the Proprietors. My My prefent opinion, however, is, that it would be hazardous to leave iio controul in the Proprietors, upon thofe who are appointed by the Di- reftors ; and that though it would be right to give the Directors the exclusive power of naming to all Of-* fices (fubjeft, as to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Council, and of all Governors or Preil dents, to the Negative of the Crown) yet that the Proprietors, as well as the Directors, mould have the power of recalling every perfon in office abroad, leaving it folely to the Dire&drs to . name others; and that both the Proprietors and Directors fhould have G 2, the ( 52 ) the power of ordering Profecutions y and of infli&ing Punimments ; fo that theRefolutionsof either of thefe Bodies, as to recalling, profecuting, and punrfhing, fliould be carried into execution without controul of the other Body. In fhort, that nei- ther fliould have the power of fcreen- ing Offenders ; but that the perma- nent Body alone, viz. the fliould have the Executive Power. By this means, the Government of India would in fome degree refemble the Government of Britain. The King can name the Officers ;, but Parliament can addrefs his Majefty to remove, and can, as well as the ( 55 ) the. King, order Prolecutions for all Offences. There is little danger in trufling a numerous AfTembly with the power of demanding punimment> becaufe, except in a moment of fuddcn heat, they are always too mild ; but there is great danger in trufting them with the appointment to Offices of Emo^ lament, or with the power of fcrecniiig Delinquency. There is alfo great danger, on the other hand, in leaving the Nominees of the Directors free of all controul, except from thofe who appoint them. The ( 54 ) The Proprietors, I think, nlaf alfo be fafely trufted with a con- trol, as to all Expenditure of Mo-*- toey ; hut I fhould not think it fafe to give them the power of making Grants of Money to any individual* FINIS. Tkis Day is pnblijhcd$ for Jj STOCKDALI, offqftte llurtington-Houfe, PiW cuJ:/ty, in Three Volumes Ofhivo, Price Fourteen Shillings and Sixpence, A FULL and Authentic Account of the feyeral DEBATES on Mr. J\ FOX's EAST INDIA BILL, in the HOUSE of COMMONS, on Ihurlclay the zyth November, and on Monday the ift. and Monday the 8th December : Arid in the HOUSE of LORDS, on Tuefday the gth* Monday the 1 5th, Tuefday the i6th, and Wednelday the iyth of Dectm- ber, 17^3. Including the feveral Papers containing a true Statement of the Company 's Affairs: Lifts of the Diviiions ; of the Abfcntces ; and qf thofc who retired before the Diviiions commenced. Together with Authentic Copies of Mr. Fox's Two EAST INDIA BILLS, the Argu- ments of the Counfel agajnft one of them, in behalf of the Court of Di tectors and Court of Proprietors, at the Bar of both Houfes of Parliament, ALSO, The DEBATES in the HOUSE of COMMONS from Tuefday, Pet. iSth, to Wednefday Decembi-r 241)1, on the STATE of the NATION { on the various Motions. Relohnions, and Addieffes, during that period f v,iih his Majefty's Anfwers to the Addreffes. The DEBATES in the HOUSE of COMMONS, from Monday the Jzth, to Friday the i6th of January, 1784; containing the very intereft- ing Debates on Mr. PITT's EAST INDIA BILL, with a CORRECT COPY of the BILL. 'I lie whole compiled and revifed in the beft manner poffble; forming one of the mofl; complete and intercfHng Parliamentary Woiks ever offered to the Public ; and may be had le ; afate or together. BEAUTIES BEAUTIES O F FOX, NORTH, AND BURKE. Th s Day is pabliflied, Price 35. 6d. nibelliflied with a beautiful Frontifpiece of thofe remarkable Characters, lakeu from the Life by an eminent Artul ; Together with an ADDRESS to the PUBLIC; and a Series of i 10 the i riends of the Coalition ; And a o , ious Index to the whole, in the courfe of which, the r')U<>..in.^ Marges, amongil many others, appear to be brought a^' unit Lord North, by Air. Fox or Mr. Burke : LOKD NORTH chargt-J with a want of PJHU nd conscience i acculed of treachery and talfh'iod 3 charged vw.h negligence and incapacity - ib. accuied of railmefs - 4 leads the Houie of Com- mons blindfold ib. described as a blundering pilot - 5 charged with the lofs of a whole continent ib. pronounced a Tory, and hence an enemy to free- dom - - ib. charged with breach of promife - 7, 32 never twice of the lame temper or of the fame opinion - - 7 fufpecledof being bri- bed - - ib. LORD NO RT-H his conduct pronounced infolent and contemp- tuous - - ib. acculed of the uefign of ipreading arbitrary power throughout the empire - 9 charged with inlolencc and temerity - 10 being credulous - ib. compared to Sir Rob.\t Wai pole for corruption, and laid to have loll halt" tiie empire by it - n charged with ignorance 21 charged in the moil direct terms with the lei's of America - -. ib. acculed of avarice and ambition - 24 charged with partiality ib. his views pronounced dif- honeft and corrupt 2i> BEAUTIES OF FOX, NORTH, AND BURKE. L O R. D NORTH charged with indignity and vilenefs - 1 2 accufed of puhllanimitv il). cent IT red for fufpending the Habeas Corpus A6t - - ib. compared to Sancho Pan- z;j's phyfician - 13 secured of impotence, ob- ftinacy, incapacity, and inattention - 16 'icprefented as fufpected, F CALIFORNIA DS 463 Pulteney - A2P2 The Effects to b 1784 Expected from the V^ East India Bill,. DS 463 A2P2 1784 v.8