CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 A HISTOKY OF 
 
 AND THEIR 
 
 BEARING UPON AMERICAN POLITICS 
 
 BY DORMAN B. EATON 
 
 "7 think every one, according to the way Providence lias placed him 
 in, is bound to labor for the public good as far as he is able ' ' 
 
 JOHN LOCKE 
 
 NEW YORK 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS 
 
 FRANKLIN SQUARE 
 1880
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1879, by 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
 
 E -JO&tf 
 
 12 HOHTH WASHINGTON SQL 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 IN submitting these pages to the public, it seems proper I should state 
 that the views they express concerning administration in Great Britain 
 are not based solely upon the authorities cited. During a sojourn of 
 more than a year in that country, I had given special attention to the 
 subject. The general studies then made have been recently verified by 
 special inquiries conducted in her principal Executive Departments;* 
 and it is but just to add that these later investigations were undertaken 
 pursuant to the request conveyed to me in the following communication : 
 
 DEPARTMENT OP STATE, 
 WASHINGTON, June 25, 1877. 
 Honorable DOBMAN B. EATON, Chairman Civil Service Commission: 
 
 SIR, The Act of March 3, 1871 (R. S., 1753), having, in terms, con- 
 ferred certain authority upon the President for the regulation of the Civil 
 Service, the proper exercise of which may make it desirable that he should 
 possess fuller information concerning the methods of such regulation in 
 countries where that service sustains relations most analogous to those of 
 the Civil Service of the United States, I have been requested by the Presi- 
 dent to say to you that he hopes you may find it practicable to inves- 
 tigate and make a report to him conceiving the action of the English 
 Government in relation to its Civil Service, and the effects of such action 
 since 1850. 
 
 But I must add that, there not appearing to be any appropriation available 
 for such purpose, you will not be authorized to incur any expense for which 
 the United States is to be held responsible. 
 
 I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant, 
 
 W. M. EVARTS. 
 
 In bringing the substance of the report submitted to the President 
 before the public in this volume, I may be mistaken in the value of the 
 facts it presents as a contribution to the literature of reform ; but I cannot 
 be in my painful sense of the many defects in the execution of the work. 
 
 D. B. E. 
 
 * I am much indebted to various British officers and to several other gentlemen for their 
 polite and valuable assistance in aid of my inquiries ; and, without mentioning other 
 names, I desire to return my special thanks to Sir Charles Trevelyan, the venerable re- 
 former and statesman, and to Horace Maun, Esq., the efficient and accomplished Secretary 
 of the British Civil Service Commission.
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS. 
 
 THE author of this book, Mr. Dorinan B. Eaton, is the chair- 
 man of the commission for devising rules and regulations for 
 the purpose of reforming the Civil Service, which was author- 
 ized by the Act of Congress approved by President Grant 
 March 4th, 1871. Soon after President Hayes entered upon 
 the duties of his office, he requested Mr. Eaton personally to 
 investigate the operation of the reformed system in England, 
 and to prepare a report upon the results of his observation. 
 Mr. Eaton accepted the invitation of the President, and de- 
 voted several months, with characteristic zeal and thorough- 
 ness, to an exhaustive inquiry upon the spot into the reasons, 
 methods, and results of the reform. His studies soon showed 
 him that the new system of appointment and the new tenure 
 of place in the Civil Service were but logical steps of progress 
 in the political development of England. The unreformed 
 Civil Service in Great Britain, as in the United States, was 
 founded upon the theory of feudal times, that public offices are 
 the property of the ruler. Upon this theory they were filled 
 for his benefit, and without regard to the fitness of the officer 
 or to the public welfare, and Mr. Eaton well calls the Forty- 
 fifth Article of Maama Charta the first Civil Service Rule.
 
 IV INTRODUCTION. 
 
 By that article the king engaged not to "make any justices, 
 constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs but of such as know the law of 
 the realm." This was a declaration that administrative offices 
 should be filled by those who were competent, and not merely 
 by royal favor. 
 
 Pursuing his interesting researches from epoch to epoch, Mr. 
 Eaton's report has taken, naturally and fortunately, the form 
 of a history of the development of the Civil Service in Eng- 
 land, from the earliest day down to its present efficient and 
 excellent condition. It is a comprehensive manual of informa- 
 tion upon the subject, and there is no other work of the kind. 
 It answers the historical, theoretical, and practical questions 
 which are asked by every inquirer, the answers to which have 
 been hitherto very difficult to find. The work, indeed, is a 
 timely and valuable contribution to the literature of the re- 
 form, as well as an exceedingly interesting study in a neg- 
 lected branch of historical and political inquiry. The history 
 of the movement for reform in the United States does not fall 
 within the scope of Mr. Eaton's work, nor could he properly, 
 in this report, express at length his views of the results that 
 have been accomplished under the present administration. Yet 
 he treats fully of those principles of a sound service which are 
 common to both countries, and he presents a complete and well- 
 reasoned argument for their enforcement in the United States. 
 There are few points which any serious thinker upon the sub- 
 ject will find to have escaped Mr. Eaton's attention, while the 
 evidence of care in the preparation of the work is sure to com- 
 mand sympathy and confidence. 
 
 The reform movement which ended in the appointment of 
 the commission of which Mr. Eaton is chairman, was begun by 
 Mr. Thomas Allen Jenckes, a representative in Congress from 
 Rhode Island from 1863 until 1871. Ilis attention, and that 
 of many others, had been turned to the subject at the close
 
 INTRODUCTION. V 
 
 of the war by the enormous increase of the number of places 
 within the patronage of the Government, and by the new and 
 extraordinary doctrines and practices in regard to their distri- 
 bution. These doctrines and practices threatened popular gov- 
 ernment itself. The "spoils" system introduced by President 
 Jackson, which is now stigmatized as the "American system," 
 imperils not only the purity, economy, and efficiency of the ad- 
 ministration of the Government, but it destroys confidence in 
 the method of popular government by party. It creates a mer- 
 cenary political class, an oligarchy of stipendiaries, a bureau- 
 cracy of the worst kind, which controls parties with relentless 
 despotism, imposing upon them at the elections issues which 
 are prescribed not by the actual feeling and interest of the 
 country but solely by the necessities and profit of the oligar- 
 chy, while, to secure this advantage, party-spirit, the constant 
 and mortal peril of republics, is inflamed to the utmost. It is 
 a system which, by requiring complete servility to the will of 
 the oligarchy, both as the tenure of minor place and as the con- 
 
 O !/ * J. 
 
 dition of political promotion, destroys the individual political 
 independence which is the last defence of liberty. An elec- 
 tion thus becomes merely the registry of the decree of a cabal. 
 Government by the people, four-fifths of whom simply vote 
 for the ticket or the measures prepared by the oligarchy, sinks 
 practically into the empire of a corrupt ring. In a country 
 where every citizen ought to take an active part in practical 
 politics, this system disgusts with politics, and repels from them 
 good citizens who cannot compete with the professional politi- 
 cal class which gives all its time to a pursuit by which it prof- 
 its. The system necessarily excludes able men from public 
 life, and makes a great many of the conspicuous names in poli- 
 tics little illustrative of the real leadership of American abili- 
 ty, enterprise, and progress. The name of politician and office- 
 holder becomes a byword, and casts ridicule upon the very
 
 VI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 name of reform. How complete was the subjugation of pub- 
 lic sentiment in this country within a few years, and how au- 
 dacious the effrontery of the spoils system, may be inferred 
 from, the deliberate argument of one of Tweed's political attor- 
 neys, that such " rings " are inevitable and indispensable in a 
 free country ; and from the contemptuous bitterness with which 
 a leader of the party opposed to Tweed echoed the same senti- 
 ment, by sneering that when Dr. Johnson described patriotism 
 as the last refuge of a scoundrel, he did not know the infinite 
 possibilities of the word reform. There is no more startling 
 sign of political demoralization than the craft which turns the 
 follies of reformers into blows at reform. This situation has 
 been plainly seen by the most intelligent observers of our poli- 
 tics. In the second volume of his Constitutional Ilistwy of 
 the United States, Yon Hoist quotes Senator Marcy's notorious 
 declaration that" the politicians of New York * * * see noth- 
 ing wrong in the rule that to the victor belong the spoils of 
 the enemy ;" and adds, " From that hour this maxim has re- 
 mained an inviolable principle of American politicians, and it 
 is owing only to the astonishing vitality of the people of the 
 United States, and to the altogether unsurpassed and unsur- 
 passable favor of their natural conditions, that the State has 
 not succumbed under the onerous burden of the curse." 
 
 Mr. Jenckes began the general discussion of the subject in 
 a report of the Joint Select Committee on Retrenchment, of 
 which he was chairman. It was presented to the House of 
 Representatives on the 25th of May, 1868, and, with its appen- 
 dix, contains a mass of information which shows how deep was 
 his interest and how careful his investigation. The question 
 of reform had been very fully considered in England for sev- 
 eral years when Mr. Jenckes began his inquiries, and lie en- 
 tered into correspondence with Sir Stafford II. Northcote and 
 Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, who wrote the masterly report upon
 
 &D n ... v-vi'^., 
 12 NORTH WASHINGTON SQ8. 
 INTRODUCTION. vii 
 
 the organization of the Permanent Civil Service in Great Brit- 
 ain, dated November 23d, 1853. This report, with the Blue 
 Book called "Papers relating to the Reorganization of the 
 Civil Service," had opened the whole question in England. The 
 Blue Book contained the elaborate opinions of leading Eng- 
 lishmen in every department of private and public life, and 
 presents completely the argument, the objections, and the refu- 
 tations. No objection has been suggested in this country which 
 is not satisfactorily answered in this Blue Book. The instruct- 
 ive reports and speeches of Mr. Jenckes, although treated in 
 Congress with little consideration, aroused great interest in the 
 public mind, and led to some discussion in the press. The law 
 of 1871, authorizing the inquiry under which President Grant 
 appointed the commission of which Mr. Eaton is now chair- 
 man, was the last public service of Mr. Jenckes ; but during 
 the short remainder of his life his interest in the question was 
 unabated. His valuable counsel was sought by the commission 
 in the early days of their labors, and it was most willingly 
 given. 
 
 The rules recommended to President Grant, and adopted by 
 him, were never effectively carried into practice at any point 
 of the service. The reasons for this failure were many, and it 
 is not necessary to consider them here. They all served, how- 
 ever, to show more clearly the extent and the power of the 
 evils of the system of patronage in the Civil Service, and the 
 necessity of reform. The subject having attracted public at- 
 tention, was cautiously mentioned in the platforms of all politi- 
 cal parties, but the allusions were evasive, and were evidently 
 intended only to propitiate a desire for reform which the party 
 managers did not believe to be strong or general enough to 
 compel its gratification. The subject, however, is one that nec- 
 essarily interests intelligent citizens, and, although derided by 
 politicians, it is not surprising that Mr. Hayes, in his letter ac-
 
 Vlll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 cepting the nomination for the Presidency, spoke of reform in 
 the Civil Service as one of the questions so important as to 
 demand an expression of his convictions in regard to it. He 
 declared that the resolution upon the subject, in the platform 
 of the Convention that nominated him, was of "paramount 
 interest ;" and, after a vigorous expression of his views, he con- 
 cluded by saying, " The reform should be thorough, radical, 
 and complete. We should return to the principles and practice 
 of the founders of the Government, supplying by legislation, 
 when needed, that which was formerly the established cus- 
 tom. They neither expected nor desired from the public 
 officers any partisan service. They meant that public officers 
 should give their whole service to the Government and to the 
 people. They meant that the officer should be secure in his 
 tenure so long as his personal character remained untarnished 
 and the performance of his duties satisfactory. If elected, I 
 shall conduct the administration of the Government upon 
 these principles, and all constitutional powers vested in the 
 Executive will be employed to establish this reform." 
 
 Notwithstanding the strong declarations of the Republican 
 platform and of the candidate upon this subject, the managers 
 of both parties carefully gave the chief prominence during 
 the canvass of 1876 to other questions, and there was no gen- 
 eral popular discussion of reform. But in his inaugural ad- 
 dress President Hayes unequivocally reaffirmed the views of 
 liis letter of acceptance. He said, " I ask the attention of the 
 public to the paramount necessity of reform in the Civil Ser- 
 vice a reform not merely as to certain abuses and practices of 
 so-called official patronage which have come to have the sanc- 
 tion of usage in the several departments of our Government, 
 but a change in the system of appointment itself a reform 
 that shall be thorough, radical, and complete a return to the 
 principles and practices of the founders of the Government."
 
 INTRODUCTION. IX 
 
 The President gave the most conspicuous proof of his sincer- 
 ity in selecting for the Secretaryship of the Interior Mr. Carl 
 Schurz, who is known as a faithful friend of reform. 
 
 During the administration of President Hayes, although its 
 conduct upon this subject has been inexplicably inconsistent, 
 and although no general and uniform system of determining 
 minor appointments has been adopted, yet very much more 
 reform has been accomplished than under any previous ad- 
 ministration. The abuse of Congressional dictation of nomi- ! . 
 nations has been in a great degree remedied. The usurpation 
 of executive power, called the courtesy of the Senate, by which 
 the Senator or Senators from a State control the confirmation 
 of all appointments in it, has been in a conspicuous instance 
 overthrown. The interference, in caucuses and conventions, of / 
 office-holders, with all their patronage to buy votes, has been ; 
 prohibited, and had the prohibition been vigorously enforced, 
 the results would have been very much more favorable to the ' 
 rapid progress of reform. The robbery known as political as- 
 sessments, a tax levied by party committees upon office-holders 
 as the price of their places a tax which puts up the public 
 service at auction, and illustrates the degrading tenure of office 
 under a system of patronage has been strictly forbidden; 
 and so far as the President can defend the incumbents by the 
 frankest expression of his views, and of his determination that 
 they shall not suffer for refusing to be robbed, the abuse has 
 been corrected. There is no donbt that the evil has been very 
 much lessened, but there is no doubt, also, that there is still 
 connivance at the practice on the part of many superior of- 
 ficers, and the only really effective remedy lies in the appoint- 
 ment of superior officers who are sincerely resolved to stop it. 
 Reform thrives upon moral confidence, and nothing would de- 
 velop faith in it so fully as the knowledge that the offices of 
 great patronage were filled by men thoroughly persuaded of
 
 X INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the necessity of reform, and courageous enough resolutely to 
 enforce it. 
 
 The great measure of reform, however, which has been ac- 
 complished under the administration of Mr. Hayes, is the sub- 
 stitution of what Mr. Eaton justly calls the merit system for 
 favoritism in appointment at the New York Custom-house and 
 Post-office, the two chief offices in these departments in the 
 country. The faithful enforcement at these offices of the rule 
 that minor appointments shall be made only upon the proved 
 merit of applicants, in a competitive examination, has shown 
 conclusively the practicability of the system. All applicants 
 have been submitted, without fear or favor, to equal tests, and 
 the selections for appointment have been made in the same 
 way from those who have proved their superiority. The char- 
 acter of the persons so appointed, and the value of their ser- 
 vices as compared with those appointed under the old system 
 of political and personal favoritism, are but additional proofs 
 of the excellence of the system. In both of these offices, how- 
 ever, the reform has been applied only to original appointments 
 in certain grades, and to certain promotions. The service in 
 both is full of those who were appointed under the old system 
 of favor and reward, and who naturally cherish its traditions. 
 This does not produce an atmosphere of reform, and it makes 
 abuse easier; but it is incontestable that the simplicity of the 
 method and the great value of the result have been demon- 
 strated at these two chief points. If practicable there, reform 
 is practicable everywhere. 
 
 These are results which are due wholly to the sincere con- 
 viction and purpose of the President, and, however imperfect 
 and incomplete, they are of great importance and significance. 
 It was in pursuance of his general purpose that he asked Mr. 
 Eaton, as chairman of the Civil Service Commission, personally 
 to conduct the inquiry of which this work is the fruit. Mr.
 
 INTRODUCTION. XI 
 
 Eaton's report shows conclusively from the experience of Great 
 Britain how the radical vice of our system of appointment in 
 the Civil Service can be corrected. The modern party patron- 
 age system in England began in 1693, and continued until the 
 beginning of the reform in 1853. Instead of the " clean sweep," 
 upon every party success, which is the disgrace of our repub- 
 lic, only certain high officers now go out in England when 
 their party is defeated. " We limit," says Mr. Gladstone, " to 
 a few scores of persons the removals and appointments on these 
 occasions, although our ministers seem to us not infrequently 
 to be more sharply severed from one another in principle 
 and tendency than are the successive Presidents of the Great 
 Union." The legitimate sphere of personal political ambition 
 in a free country is that of competition before the public for 
 posts of legislation and of political administration. But the 
 details of the Civil Service belong to a business, not to a politi- 
 cal administration, and the line between proper political and 
 non- political places is perfectly well defined. When King 
 James II. insisted that nobody should have an ale or beer li- 
 cense who did not favor his policy, he was only asserting the 
 modern principle that nobody shall be an inspector in the 
 Custom-house, or shall deliver letters at the Post-office, unless 
 he is a supporter of the dominant party. We denounce, as in- 
 tolerable tyranny, Cromwell's test of Presbyterian ism, and the 
 Test Acts of Charles II., which made religious profession of 
 another kind an essential qualification for holding minor office. 
 But they were no more tyrannical, or intolerable, or absurd 
 than our party tests. Sir Robert Wai pole's use of the Secret 
 Service money to buy votes in Parliament was no worse than 
 buying votes with patronage in a Convention. I have known 
 an officer of the customs who intended, as a delegate in a party 
 Convention, to vote against the candidate favored by the col- 
 lector, who was also a delegate. The collector, learning the
 
 X 1 1 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 intention of his subordinate, gave him the choice of voting as 
 the collector wished, or losing his place. The subordinate had 
 a wife and family dependent upon him, and he yielded. This 
 was Sir Robert Walpole'fi method, but his bribery was manlier 
 than the collector's. 
 
 Reform of the system which necessarily produces such 
 abuses is no more an experiment than the reform of any 
 other evil. The system of civil appointment for the public 
 service by patronage and favoritism, like the Corporation and 
 Test Acts like all other forms of injustice and abuse when 
 it is challenged by advancing civilization and greater intelli- 
 gence, must show why it should not be abolished. The abuses 
 which it is said cannot be reformed are merely surviving 
 forms of old venality and wrong, which have been univer- 
 sally condemned as monstrous and intolerable, and whose 
 gradual disappearance marks the progress of society. The 
 readers of this book w r ill decide whether the abuses of the 
 worst days of English party politics abuses which the good 
 sense of England lias entirely removed are necessary either 
 for the maintenance of party government or for the promo- 
 tion of political morality in the United States.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 I. Introductory 1 
 
 II. The Feudal Spoils System 12 
 
 III. Influence of Despotism on Administration 39 
 
 IV. Administration under the Tudors and until Cromwell 44 
 
 V. Cromwell's Administrative System 53 
 
 VI. Public Service under Charles II. and James II 60 
 
 VII. The New System of Administration under William III 69 
 
 VIII. Party Government from Anne to George III 82 
 
 IX. Administration under George III 102 
 
 X. The Reform Period after the Fall of Lord Bute 1 20 
 
 XI. The Improved Condition after the Fall of Lord North 128 
 
 XII. Administration under George IV 144 
 
 XIII. Partisan System waning and Examinations introduced 155 
 
 XIV. Final Contest between Patronage and Open Competition 169 
 
 XV. Open Competition introduced into British India 177 
 
 XVI. Government Inquiry and Report leading to the Introduction of the 
 
 New System in 1853 181 
 
 XVII. How the New System was received 195 
 
 XVIII. The First Order for a Civil Service Commission and Competitive 
 
 Examinations May, 1855 203 
 
 XIX. The first Five Years under the New System 208 
 
 XX. Parliamentary Investigation of the New System in 1860 216 
 
 XXI. Development of the New System from 1860 to 1870 223 
 
 XXII. The Order for Open Competition in 1870 228 
 
 XXIII. First Experience of Open Competition 234 
 
 XXIV. Parliamentary Inquiry into the Civil Service in 1873 238 
 
 XXV. The Executive Investigation of 1874 244 
 
 XXVI. The Results of the Merit System based on Open Competition in 
 
 British India 248 
 
 XXVII. The Practical Operation of the Merit System since 1875 259 
 
 XXVIII. Concerning Parts of the old Spoils System excluded by the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States 266 
 
 XXIX. Some Practical Tendencies and Relations of the Reformed Method. . 288 
 
 XXX. The Merit System in the Great Departments 297 
 
 XXXI. Social, Moral, and International Bearings of the New System 317 
 
 XXXII. A Summary, and the Significance of the Reform Movement 342 
 
 XXXIII. The Bearing of British Experience upon Civil Service Reform in the 
 
 United States 3G1 
 
 APPENDIX A 429 
 
 APPENDIX B 438 
 
 APPENDIX C. . 445
 
 CIVIL SEEYIOE 
 
 IN 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 The character of our early politics. The sources of our Constitution. Ad- 
 ministrative abuses little anticipated. The forecast of Washington. 
 
 ' The changes of a century. Present views as to reform in this country. 
 First study of administrative questions in Great Britain. Reasons why 
 we should consider British precedents. Attention to Civil Service Re- 
 form on the part of the principal nations. Our neglect of the subject. 
 Extent of reforms in the leading European States. The situation in Can- 
 ada. Causes of our neglect of administrative questions. Party despot- 
 ism. Different theories as to a reform policy. The value to us of British 
 experience. Some of the main questions to be considered, and their bear- 
 ing on our politics. No mere imitation of British precedents desirable. 
 Why we must go back in our inquiry to first principles and to the origin 
 of abuses. The great variety and extent of British administration. Ad- 
 ministration in India. Our evils all dealt with in the experience of Great 
 Britain. The policy on which the leading nations have acted in making 
 reforms. The exposure of abuses a patriotic duty. 
 
 AN English historian declares that " no nation ever started 
 on its career with a larger proportion of strong character or a 
 higher sense of moral conviction than the English colonies in 
 America. They almost entirely escaped the corruption that 
 so deeply tainted the government at home." ' 
 
 It is universally admitted that our early leaders in politics 
 embodied, in a remarkable degree, the ability and the high 
 moral tone of their generation. There is, perhaps, no more 
 
 Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. ii., p. 2, 
 herein elsewhere cited as 1 or 2 Lecky. 
 1
 
 2 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 striking proof of their statesmanship than the fact that, when 
 heated from recent battle-fields and filled with righteous in- 
 dignation at the injustice of the mother country, they yet 
 brought to the great work of forming a constitution judg- 
 ments so calm and unprejudiced that they were able to con- 
 sider her precedents in the same judicial spirit in which they 
 considered those of other nations. Men of narrower minds 
 might have rejected all the political wisdom of their race. 
 They might have given us a constitution as original and as 
 disastrous as the constitutions which fell to the lot of France. 
 "We can better appreciate the enlightened spirit which ani- 
 mated our early statesmen, if we consider the narrow preju- 
 dices which even now stand in the way of improved methods 
 which are denounced as of foreign origin. 
 
 The authors of our constitution accepted good material 
 wherever they found it ; but from no quarter did they gather 
 so much as from the experience of England. The theory of 
 executive power ; the great divisions of government into 
 three departments, with well-defined jurisdictions ; two houses 
 of legislation with the whole body of parliamentary law ; trial 
 by jury ; the habeas corpus ; the common law, with its vast 
 stores of wisdom, extending to all business and all personal re- 
 lations ; the long series of statutes so far as not repugnant to 
 the new system ; criminal definitions and procedure in all 
 their larger parts ; the theory of military as subordinate to civil 
 authority ; the political conception of domestic and individual 
 rights and duties all these they drew from the same paternal 
 source from which had flowed their blood, their language, 
 and their civilization. 
 
 With wise adjustments, they incorporated all these political 
 elements into their new system of government. That govern- 
 ment, however, was not to be a mere imitation, but an origi- 
 nal and true Republic. They, therefore, rejected royalty and 
 primogeniture, the entire feudal theory, all class distinctions, 
 and all mingling of religion with politics. In their place, 
 they proclaimed common rights, equality before the law, and 
 freedom of speech and of worship. The new government, for 
 the very reason that it discards and rises above mere selfish 
 interests, more than any that has existed in modern times,
 
 BZ 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRir'Sy! MSH '*'GrOfl s<?,3 
 
 both appeals to and requires general intelligence and public 
 virtue. " In proportion as the structure of a government 
 gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion 
 should be enlightened." ' 
 
 At its creation the greatest dangers, the absorbing questions 
 affecting the new government, concerned rights, liberty, and 
 independence. Corruption bred in the daily work of adminis- 
 tration, partisan tyranny and debasement growing out of con- 
 tentions for patronage, office, and power, were almost un- 
 known, and they were but feebly imagined, in the first genera- 
 tion. It was natural that no very definite provisions should be 
 made against such sources of danger. "Washington, apparent- 
 ly, looked upon parties as an evil, and perhaps thought they 
 might be avoided. The great power of removal from office 
 was left to mere inference, and it is, therefore, without ex- 
 pressed limitation or safeguard. But. that generation must 
 be counted wise and patriotic which provides a remedy for 
 the evils which it knows. Certainly, statesmen who nobly 
 performed the duties of their own trying times, are not to be 
 complained of because they did not take precautions against 
 abuses which were only to afflict the country in future genera- 
 tions. No nation had, at that time, protected itself against 
 the evils of cojTUj3t_j)atronage and favoritism in bestowing 
 office. In no nation but England was there even freedom 
 enough to enable great parties to exist. 
 
 A century has passed, and it has produced great changes 
 in the old country and in the new. In Great Britain, these 
 changes have struck deeper both into social life and into the 
 political system than with us. But in the United States they 
 have long since made administrative abuses a source of solici- 
 tude and humiliation. They are now recognized as a grave 
 problem in our public affairs. Recently, and for the first 
 time, these abuses have been brought into the foreground of 
 a presidential contest. The promise of their removal has been 
 made the subject of party pledges before the people. Civil 
 service reform has become an issue in national politics. 
 
 Administrative abuses are of a kind that will naturally grow 
 
 1 Washington's Farewell Address.
 
 4: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 as wealth accumulates, population becomes more dense, and 
 public affairs increase in volume and complexity. They raise 
 issues in their nature as permanent as the selfishness and par- 
 tisanship from which they are born, and the government 
 which they threaten. Few thoughtful persons are so blind as 
 not to see that a great reform is essential to avert a great 
 calamity. How to bring it about is the question. There is a 
 profound sense of need to purify public administration, to ar- 
 rest partisan tryanny, and to bestow office upon men of worth 
 and capacity. But the public mind gropes and hesitates and 
 doubts ; having no clear conception as to what is possible, and 
 no definite method upon which it inclines to act. A few 
 statesmen very early comprehended, and the popular mind 
 is now beginning to comprehend, that, though the form- 
 ing of a wise and just government is the greatest achievement 
 of a people, its honest and vigorous administration involves 
 perils and difficulties little anticipated in the youth of nations. 1 
 With astonishment, and a sort of despair, the people of t^ie 
 United States now find as every older nation has found 
 that the question of good methods, of honest ways, and of 
 faithful servants, in administration, must take its place among 
 the grave and the permanent problems of statesmanship. 
 
 There is nothing more remarkable in the experience of 
 Great Britain, during the past century, than the measures she 
 has taken to reform administrative abuses. "What we have 
 most neglected in politics, she has most studied the science 
 of administration. Chatham and Burke set the example of 
 giving that subject a foremost place in the politics of their 
 country ; and during the last fifty years it has commanded the 
 earnest attention of her greatest statesmen. She has brought 
 about changes which have elevated the moral tone of her 
 
 1 Washington's experience in war strongly convinced him of the need of 
 competent officers in the military service. The Academy at West Point has 
 been the result. Simple and easy as civil administration was in his day, 
 seven years in the executive chair caused him to advise even the extreme 
 measure of a national university, " a primary object of which should be the 
 education of our youth in the science of government." (Washington's Eighth 
 Annual Message.) In his sixth annual message, President Jefferson sug- 
 gested an amendment to the Constitution to enable " a national establish- 
 ment for education" to be created and endowed.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 5 
 
 official life reforms which really constitute an era in her his- 
 tory. They are as a silver edge upon the dark cloud which 
 hangs over British administration in former centuries. While 
 this great work has been going on in the mother country, we 
 have fallen away from the better methods of our early his- 
 tory. We have come upon a period when we mourn over the 
 absence of the political virtues recognized in the past when 
 not a few good citizens despair of again seeing that purity of 
 official life which prevailed during our first generations. The 
 more thoughtful are asking whether the abuses which have 
 been so rapidly developed are due to our neglects as citizens, or 
 are inevitable under republican institutions. The republican 
 theory is arraigned at the bar of public opinion on charges ap- 
 parently never imagined by its authors. Seeing how much 
 better and more quietly administration is carried on in Great 
 Britain than in the United States, some gloomy and some 
 aristocratic spirits are ready to despair of the republic. They 
 attribute the obvious superiority to causes original and in- 
 evitable in the institutions of their own country. If faith 
 in the republican system has not been impaired, respect for 
 official life has been seriously undermined. Obviously, fun- 
 damental principles, not less than grave interests, are involved. 
 Nothing would seem, therefore, to be more appropriate or 
 more in the spirit of the great work of our fathers than to in- 
 quire whether, in the later experience of Great Britain 
 which is only a prolongation of that from which they made 
 such large selections there may not be something adapted to 
 our system and worthy of our consideration. Are her reforms 
 based on principles of which only a monarchy can take advan- 
 tage, or are they equally available under republican institu- 
 tions ? Can we remove our abuses without changing the form 
 of our government ? 
 
 But, were there no suggestions from the highest precedents 
 in our history, it would seem to be but the statesmanship of 
 national interest at a time when the leading states of the 
 world have made it a national policy to bring into comparison 
 even the works of mechanical industry to make ourselves ac- 
 quainted with the measures through which the freest and most 
 enlightened of the great nations of Europo has elevated the
 
 C CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 character of her public administration. No nation can afford 
 to be ill-informed as to the methods by which other nations 
 advance their strength and prosperity. More and more, in 
 later years, the leading governments have comprehended, and 
 have acted upon the theory, that their peace and prosperity 
 are greatly dependent, not merely on officers in very high 
 positions, but upon the fidelity and ability of those in the public 
 service down to the very lowest places. All the leading na- 
 tions, except the United States, have recently, and as a matter 
 of policy, made searching investigations not only into their 
 own administrative methods but into the methods of other gov- 
 ernments. These inquiries have extended to civil and military 
 administration alike ; and neither prejudice nor partisan inter- 
 ests have been allowed to stand in the way of improvements. 
 Prussia set the example, after her humiliation by Bonaparte 
 in 1815, and her position is the fruit of her policy. The pres- 
 ent Emperor of Russia acted in the same spirit when he en- 
 tered upon the reform policy which has done so much to raise 
 his country from the degradation it had reached under the 
 corrupt civil and military service of former reigns. Great 
 Britain had investigated the excellent methods of France and 
 Prussia, before 1854. In later years, Great Britain has steadily 
 acted upon the principle that her prosperity and safety depend 
 on the character of her administration, and that the surest way 
 to correct its abuses is to investigate and expose them. The 
 United States, on the contrary, have, until very lately, given 
 but little attention to the growing abuses of administration at 
 home ; and they have utterly neglected the methods through 
 which rival nations have brought about great reforms. 
 
 This neglect has been the result of no general indifference to 
 foreign matters on the part of the American people. They 
 have rather been conspicuous for the zeal and success with 
 which, in every quarter of the globe, they have sought informa- 
 tion concerning productions, business, and every process of 
 science and industry. They are far better informed concern- 
 ing all the ways of raising crops and all the breeds of cattle, 
 horses, sheep, and swine in Great Britain, than they are con- 
 cerning the means by which her official life has been raised 
 and her politics purified. Our statesmen are familiar enough
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. T 
 
 with the history of Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus, the Bill 
 of Eights, the Act of Settlement, and all the great events 
 which preceded our revolution. But what study have they 
 given to the principles and the carefully matured methods of 
 administration upon which the greatest British statesmen of 
 this century have bent their minds ? The history and devel- 
 opment of literature, science and art, in every leading Euro- 
 pean State, have been carefully studied by American scholars, 
 and they are a part of the cherished instruction of our edu- 
 cated classes. But what attention has been bestowed upon 
 those profound and salutary systems of administration which 
 have, during the present century, transformed the politics of 
 Europe and made learning and character the handmaids and 
 strength of governments ? 
 
 " All the governments of Europe have, in our time, singu- 
 larly improved the science of administration they do more 
 things, and do every thing with more order, more celerity, and 
 at less expense. 1 
 
 "During the last three quarters of a century a complete 
 revolution has taken place in the civil service of the principle 
 European States. Rigorous and impartial tests of qualification 
 have been applied ; and, where formerly were incompetency, 
 routine, and peculation, are now efficiency and fidelity. The 
 prosperity of these States is owing, in a great degree, to the 
 character of their civil service ; for it has been instrumental 
 to the development of their resources and to public economy. " 2 
 
 These great changes this moral regeneration of official life 
 in the Old World have all the more significance for us be- 
 cause they have taken place during the period within which, 
 by common consent, we have fallen away from the higher 
 standards of our earlier politics. These reforms are not less 
 worthy our attention for the reason that nowhere have they 
 been more complete and more salutary than in Great Britain 
 (and in her colonies and dependencies), where laws and insti- 
 tutions most analogous to our own prevail. 
 
 The spirit of improvement has at last come from abroad 
 
 1 "Democracy in America." By De Tocquevillc, vol. ii. p. 378. 
 
 2 Mr. Andrews, late Minister to Sweden, to Mr. Fish, Foreign Relations 
 of the United States, 1876, p. 553.
 
 8 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 upon our own borders. A Governor-General of Canada is able 
 to refer to the prospects of that country in language which 
 we can hardly read without interest, if without self-reproach. 
 "It is necessary that the civil service should be given a 
 status regulated by their acquirements, their personal qualifi- 
 cations, their capacity for rendering the country efficient ser- 
 vice ; and that neither their original appointments nor their 
 subsequent advancement should, in any way, have to depend 
 upon their political connections or opinions. If you will take 
 my advice, you will never allow the civil service to be degraded 
 into an instrument to subserve, the ends of any political party. 
 Happily both the great political parties in this coun- 
 try have given in their adherence to this principle. 
 And I have no doubt that the anxiety manifested by our 
 friends across the line to purge their own civil service of its 
 political complexion will confirm every true Canadian in the 
 convictions I have sought to impress upon you." 
 
 How are we to explain these contrasts, and this strange 
 neglect of what so gravely concerns our honor and our pros- 
 perity ? Has it been because, in our days of inexperience 
 and sparse population, we adopted the theory that public ad- 
 ministration was an inferior matter, hardly worthy the thoughts 
 of statesmen, which might be handed over to the management 
 of great parties ? Have we acted under that delusion so 
 long that it requires a greater effort than we have made to see 
 the subject in its true relations ? Whatever the cause, it is 
 plain we have allowed abuses to grow almost without a serious 
 effort to remove them. We have neither traced them to their 
 causes nor comprehended their perils. We have endured 
 them with a sort of fatalistic resignation equally suggestive of 
 indifference and despair. We have been supinely floating on 
 the partisan currents of our politics in whatever direction they 
 have flowed. The caprice of the majority has been accepted 
 as the rule of duty. That majority, until the present de- 
 cade, at least, has tended more and more to become despotic." 
 
 1 Farewell speech of Lord Dufferin, Governor-General of Canada, Novem- 
 ber, 1878. 
 
 2 " I had remarked during my stay in the United States, that a demo- 
 cratic state of society might offer singular tacilities for the establishment of 
 despotism." " Democracy in America," vol. ii. p. 389.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 9 
 
 Manly independence in politics has naturally decayed. Ab- 
 sorbed by the current questions of party contests, our great 
 officers and political leaders have, decade after decade, re- 
 mained inactive in the presence of injustice and corruption in 
 the daily affairs of administration such as have not, for nearly 
 half a century, existed in the government of any other leading 
 nation, except Russia. With many politicians, it has come to 
 be treated as unpatriotic to suggest that our methods of deal- 
 ing with offices and parties can be improved. To such an 
 extent has the prevalence of a partisan spoils system blinded 
 and perverted the public judgment that we need to go back 
 to the time of Walpole, or at least to the time of George III., 
 to find precedents for the scorn and arrogance with which! 
 partisan managers and the dominant majority, in this country, 
 have insulted and defied the higher sentiments of the people. 
 
 The more sober and introspective mood which has lately 
 come over the public mind is highly favorable to a reform in 
 our administration, and we may reasonably expect that the in- 
 fluence of the reform sentiment will continue to gain strength. 
 But well defined and consistent views and common methods 
 of action on the part of those who support reform are es- 
 sential. Such views by no means exist. Some of its friends 
 expect to see a reform brought about by a grand popular 
 effort, which shall at once drive all unworthy men from office 
 and open a new era in our politics. Others look upon re-j 
 form as a work of enlightenment and purification, to be j 
 gradually carried forward, and mainly through methods of I 
 its own which, by their salutary effects, will win the support 
 needed to hasten its completion. While a third class believe ; 
 that no reform is possible which is not carried out through 
 party action alone, and by the ordinary processes of partisan 
 politics. We need to decide which of these theories is cor- 
 rect. 
 
 Civil service reform in its true scope includes not merely 
 practical methods in administration, under which worth and 
 capacity may gain what is their due, despite corrupt and par- 
 tisan influence, but it also embodies great principles which 
 concern the duties of office and the very foundations of par- 
 ties and government. An essential condition of its support is
 
 10 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 a belief that our partisan activity is excessive, and that great 
 parties would be more salutary if they trusted more to prin- 
 ciples and to patriotism, and less to mere interest, patronage, and 
 spoils. But, on the other hand, there are many who believe 
 that all such base elements are essential to the vigor, if not 
 to the existence, of great parties. Ordinary human nature 
 man as he is and will be in this country they hold to be in- 
 capable of any thing more patriotic or disinterested. They 
 maintain that our partisan system of dealing with office and 
 administration is a natural and original growth under our in- 
 stitutions. They assert that every attempt to change it is a 
 sort of rebellion against the theory of the government and 
 the conditions of its success. They declare that the British 
 Government is so different in theory and structure, and that 
 the relations of parties under it are so diverse from party re- 
 lations in the United States, that all reasoning from one to 
 the other is unwarranted and misleading. From these views, 
 it follows that those who seek a reform in our civil service 
 and especially those who hope to aid the work by a study of 
 British precedents are commending principles which it is 
 dangerous to act upon. They are urging standards of duty 
 and methods of action at once chimerical and impracticable 
 the dreams of doctrinaires the ideals of amiable enthusiasts 
 knowing little of politics or of human nature. It is plain that 
 the merits of these conflicting views cannot be tested without 
 an inquiry into the history of civil corruption in Great Britain 
 and a consideration of the relations which parties there hold to 
 government and to society. It will certainly not be an un- 
 profitable inquiry, if we shall find that the abuses, (for which 
 our corrupt partisans apologize by declaring them to be origi- 
 nal and inseparable from party government in a republic,) 
 were in full vigor under despotic kings two centuries before 
 this continent was discovered, and four centuries before party 
 government existed. How can we better determine the com- 
 parative relations of parties in the two countries than by show- 
 ing their origin and growth in Great Britain, their attitude 
 toward the partisan spoils system which prevailed there for 
 generations, and the manner in which British parties have 
 been compelled to accept a reform by which that system
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 11 
 
 has been exterminated and their own salutary vigor has been 
 strengthened ? 
 
 AVhen we see something like despair over the evils produced 
 by Congressmen interfering with the appointing power, will it 
 not be useful to consider a grand procession of reform meas- 
 ures, in which the origin, the damaging effects, and the re- 
 moval of those very evils, are but links in the great chain of 
 events ? At a time when demagogues proclaim, and faint- 
 hearted, good men fear that it requires an official virtue far 
 beyond any we should expect in this world, to have appoint- 
 ments made on the basis of merit fairly disclosed by non-par- 
 tisan tests, will it not be profitable to present the history of 
 the accomplishment of precisely that reform by another gov- 
 ernment acting upon methods quite available to us ? 
 
 In tracing the history 1 of abuses and reforms in Great 
 Britain, we shall find ourselves considering no unimportant 
 part of those great influences which have shaped the progress 
 of her civilization. The purposes of this volume, fortunately, 
 do not require any profound treatment of the subject. But I 
 am persuaded that its adequate presentation would show that 
 important events, commonly represented as carried forward by 
 influences much more general and external, have really had their 
 foundation in the interests of officials and the prostitution of 
 the public service. For example, the attitude of Great 
 Britain toward this country during our revolutionary war can- 
 not be fully appreciated without a better understanding, than 
 is usually illustrated by historians, of the influence of a des- 
 potic and corrupt civil and military administration in that 
 country, by which that war was at least aggravated and pro- 
 longed. It is not easy to estimate the extent to which the 
 morality and the policy of a great nation is moulded by the 
 character and the interests of those who fill its offices, apply 
 its resources, and use its name and authority. 
 
 In considering the methods by which the most liberal and 
 commercial nation of the Old World has elevated the charac- 
 
 1 " To give a full history of civil service reform in England would require 
 a bulky volume." Pamphlet by E. F. Waters, 1878. This interesting pam- 
 phlet, which, unfortunately for me, is of very limited range, is the only writ- 
 ing I have been able to find especially devoted to the subject.
 
 lla CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ter of its official life, \ve need not have any purpose of inere__ 
 imitation. The question for us, like the question for our 
 early statesmen, is whether, from that quarter, we may gather 
 any thing adapted to our needs, and in harmony with our po- 
 litical and social system. And it is because the subject is so 
 general that it will be necessary to consider it quite beyond its 
 direct bearings upon public administration. How does it stand 
 related to liberty, to equality, to popular education, to equal 
 rights and common justice ? Is the spirit which has reformed 
 the civil service of Great Britain a monarchical, aristocratic 
 spirit, or is it a republican, democratic, and liberal spirit ? 
 
 On reflection, it will excite no surprise that British experience 
 is presented as richer, riper, and more varied, as well as vastly 
 more extensive, than that of the United States. It is such, not 
 merely because England had gathered the administrative wis- 
 dom of many centuries before the American nation was born. 
 Eliot and Vane, Chatham and Burke, had so lived and spoken 
 that the greatest reformers may even yet gather inspiration and 
 wisdom from their examples. Statutes had been enacted, in 
 the interest of pure and vigorous administration, to the moral 
 level of which none of our own enactments have yet risen, and 
 without which our courts could not sustain their most salutary 
 rulings. We nmst also remember that Great Britain has ruled 
 over so many millions of people, over countries so diverse and 
 races so different, and that she has held such supremacy in 
 commerce in all quarters of the globe, that every kind of 
 official authority has been exercised upon a scale with which, 
 in many particulars, nothing analogous in our affairs is com- 
 parable. To rule British India alone, with its vast public 
 works, its great army of more than 250,000 men, its 200,000 
 policemen, its revenues of $250,000,000 a year, its population 
 of more than 190,000,000, of many races and creeds at once 
 difficult to govern and dangerous to neglect even for a single 
 year requires more officials, more responsibility, more efficient 
 methods of administration, and I may almost add more care 
 and capacity, than would have sufficed for good administration 
 in all our territories and Indian affairs during this generation. 
 When to India we add the Australian colonies Tasmania and 
 South Africa, Canada and Jamaica, Ceylon and the many
 
 . 
 
 12 NORTH WASHINGTON g* 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 11 J 
 
 islands and stations under the British flag all round the globe 
 there is presented a variety of official life and opportunities 
 for corruption under a bad system, such as never before, in 
 ancient or modern times, taxed the administrative wisdom of 
 a nation. 
 
 As we have to deal with the claim that some of our princi- 
 pal evils are inevitable accompaniments of the blessings of 
 republican government, we shall need to trace them to their 
 true source in the feudal system. Therein we shall find the 
 origin of the spoils system ; and the partisan theory of official 
 irresponsibility in the use of the appointing power in full 
 practice. From thence, we shall trace the gradual develop- 
 ment of the idea of official responsibility up to and through a 
 partisan system of appointments and removals, beyond which 
 we have not yet advanced. 1 It is the need of refuting the 
 false theories referred to which makes a historical treatment 
 of the subject indispensable. The course of history and the 
 results of experience through centuries will be the argument 
 and the refutation. The world takes notice that never before 
 has any nation ruled with such success dependencies so broad 
 or profited by a commerce so extensive as now belong to 
 Great Britain. Is that success more due to the form of her 
 government or to the system of her administration ? AVe are 
 of the same Anglo-Saxon race as the British people. We have 
 a form of government to which we are devoted, and which 
 we do not intend to abandon. If we are compelled to believe 
 that, under our administrative system, we could not manage 
 the dependencies of Great Britain or even British India 
 
 1 Exceptions must be made of the civil service reform experiment success- 
 fully entered upon and needlessly abandoned under President Grant (see 
 Appendix C) ; and of the reform policy and measures of President Hayes, 
 the admirable spirit, and the effects of which limited in range as these 
 measures have thus far been are full of encouragement. The administra- 
 tion of the Department of the Interior and of the New York Post Office has 
 been made to approach closely to the British standards ; and the Custom 
 House, at New York City, is being raised out of the quagmire of partisan 
 politics. Political assessments, official interference with the freedom of 
 elections, and the despotic sway of partisan manipulators, have already re- 
 ceived a considerable check from the present administration, which shows 
 how easily a more comprehensive and systematic reform may be carried 
 forward.
 
 11(? CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 alone for a single decade, are we prepared to assign as the 
 cause either the inherent weakness of our form of government 
 or our own incompetency as administrators ? If not, what is 
 the cause ? 
 
 With so much depending on the fidelity and wisdom of 
 officials, it is no matter of surprise that administrative ques- 
 tions have engaged the serious attention of British statesmen. 
 Public administration, in Great Britain, has, in fact, been re- 
 duced to something like a science. It has taken rank with 
 legislation ; having its fixed principles, its carefully nurtured 
 methods, its theory of parties, its well-considered tests of ca- 
 pacity and character, its limits of work, recreation, age, and 
 responsibility of which the British people take notice and 
 from which high officers dare not depart. It is all the more 
 worthy our attention, because it is the experience of a people 
 than whom none are more severely practical and utilitarian 
 of an empire whose institutions are most free and analogous to 
 our own. It will appear that, either in the home government 
 or in India, substantially all the abuses we have endured, and 
 all the specious arguments by which their contimiance has been 
 excused, were familiar to English statesmen long before we 
 began to talk about political corruption. Even our late at- 
 tempts at the limitation of these abuses are but the reproduc- 
 tions of modes of relief quite familiar in British experience. 
 
 If we believe that the great care given to public admin- 
 istration, in the older countries, is by reason of any thing 
 peculiar to monarchies, or is a mere attempt to reconcile them 
 to the more liberal ideas of modern times, I venture to think 
 that our mistake is very great. It is only a counterpart of 
 that we make in supposing that a real reform in the civil ser- 
 vice of a great nation can be brought about either in a sweep- 
 ing and sudden way, or by any partisan method, or without 
 a comprehensive and patriotic policy steadily pursued by the 
 government and intelligently supported by the people. We 
 shall, on the contrary, find reason to believe that the work of 
 administrative reform, in the older countries, has been guided 
 by a sagacious and comprehensive statesmanship, aiming at a 
 greater strength and a larger commerce a statesmanship by 
 no means untouched by national pride and ambition. It has
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 11(1 
 
 aimed to increase the power of the nation and the patriotism 
 of the people by bringing superior character and capacity into 
 official places of every grade. 
 
 I am not unmindful that there are people who will be 
 ready to denounce as unpatriotic any comparison unfavorable 
 to ourselves. But I can feel no patriotism to be higher than 
 that which arraigns our national vices only in the hope of ar- 
 resting them. u The most important lessons a nation can 
 learn from its own history are to be found in the exposure of 
 its own errors." 1 In the religious and moral sentiments, 
 broadly developed in the homes of our people, and in general 
 education more and more cherished among them, we may 
 surely find a basis as solid and a potency as great for high 
 national effort as ever existed in the citizenship of any coun- 
 try. But such capacity will be of little avail if a sort of 
 Turkish or Mexican conceit that our methods are perfect, and 
 a false patriotism fatal to self-inspection, shall keep us blind 
 to the peril of a decline in the moral tone of official life, while 
 making ns half unconscious of its disgrace. Kor will our 
 virtues much more avail if the voice of truth and patriotism 
 is to be silenced by the domineering spirit of the political ma- 
 jority and the partisan leaders. We need to see ourselves 
 distinctly as we appear in the light of administrative wisdom 
 reflected from the foremost nations of the Old World. 
 
 1 " A History of our Own Times," by McCarthy, vol. i., chap. 8.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Origin and growth of the idea of official responsibility. Corrupt use of 
 public authority held no wrong long after such use of public money ad- 
 mitted to be indefensible. The spoils system originated in the feudal sys- 
 tem and is an outgrowth of despotism. All offices for sale, all officials venal, 
 all administration corrupt, in feudal times. Sale of offices tended to make 
 them hereditary and prevented frequent removals. Civil Service Rules 
 in Magna Carta. Our abuses shown to have monarchical precedents. 
 Reform measures and the " Good Parliament. " Rebellion against the 
 spoils system under Richard II., in 1378. Remarkable Civil Service 
 reform law of that reign. A second rebellion, of the same kind, in the 
 next century. Its results. 
 
 AT whatever period, short of going back to feudal times, 
 we investigate British administration with the purpose of em- 
 bracing in its later history all that is material to our own con- 
 dition, we find not a little to invite us still further into the 
 past, unless we are willing to overlook the old forms of modern 
 abuses. 
 
 But for that reason, it would suffice to state its condition 
 when our constitution was adopted, and from thence to trace 
 its progress to our time. Earlier than that date, however, 
 we shall find that there is much especially worthy our attention. 
 
 As we go back over its course, we are struck with the evi- 
 dence, everywhere presented, that the progress made in civil 
 administration, though having many irregularities and oscilla- 
 tions, has really been a sort of evolution from a narrower to a 
 broader wisdom, from ignorance to intelligence, from injustice 
 to justice, from a lower to a higher public morality, from the 
 lawlessness of official caprice to the sternness of official respons- 
 ibility in dealing not only with official duties in the strict 
 sense, but with public affairs altogether ; the ascent, though 
 much affected by the character of the king, generally keeping 
 pace with the rising public intelligence and liberty.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 13 
 
 It is not necessary to consider whether it has more frequently 
 happened that government has originated in democratic 
 equality and degenerated into despotism, or in despotism of 
 some sort, and been improved up to free institutions. For it is 
 familiar history, but not less instructive to keep in mind, that we 
 may readily go back upon the course of the British, or indeed of 
 any European government, to that period when power over 
 the civil service (I should rather say the king's service) was ar- 
 bitrary ; when neither character, nor capacity, nor economy, nor 
 justice, nor duty or responsibility of any sort, was recognized 
 by the ruler, if demanded by the subject, in connection with offi- 
 cial appointments or removals. K~ot only the appointing power, 
 but control in every way, on the part of the king or chieftain, 
 over his subordinates, was arbitrary, universal, and unchal- 
 lenged the merest perquisite and appendage of paramount 
 authority. 
 
 For a long period after there was regular government, it is 
 familiar knowledge that the three great departments legisla- 
 tive, executive, and judicial did not exist ; but the king, or 
 the king with his council, made up of his favorites, was 
 supreme over the whole field of government, and exercised 
 every kind of authority. Government of course had none 
 of the modern limitations in favor of religion or right, 
 humanity or conscience, liberty or justice. It was a long 
 period, also, after there were regular officers and departments, 
 in rudimental form, with duties quite analogous to those now 
 assigned them in all the greatest states of the world, before 
 there was any evidence that rulers or officers, having the power 
 of appointment or supervision for the execution of the laws, 
 recognized any obligation to regard merit, or to consult the 
 interests or comfort of the people. Such a sense of obligation 
 is of later origin and of very slow growth. Long after the 
 time when, to use public money for the private purposes of the 
 king or the great officers of state or of any powerful faction in 
 politics (for parties were a later development) was generally re- 
 garded as a crime, and was punished as such, there was no public 
 opinion and much less any law that condemned the use of 
 the appointing power, or of any kind of official influence, for 
 such reprehensible purposes. The theory of the notorious 
 2
 
 14: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Judge Barnard, 1 that, when, he gained an office, he acquired 
 the right to use its patronage and influence to suit himself 
 and his friends, was the unchallenged creed of every king 
 and high officer (with the exception of here and there an 
 official far in advance of his age), from William the Norman 
 toWilliam Prince of Orange, except we shall find that Crom- 
 well rose to about the partisan level of General Jackson in 
 the use of the appointing power. 
 
 It needs no reasoning to make it plain that a long period 
 must have elapsed, after some enlightened spirits first 
 affirmed the true rule of official duty, before there was any 
 public opinion in its behalf, that materially checked the haughty 
 pleasure of the kings, lords, or great officers of an arbitrary 
 age. 
 
 The first instance I have met with of the coercive power of 
 such a public opinion, was early in the thirteenth century, 
 when the historian says " the opinion of the nation was strongly 
 expressed in favor of reform, and the king was compelled to 
 choose his subordinate ministers with some reference to their 
 capacity for business. ' ' 8 
 
 In view of the facts that, even in these enlightened times, 
 it is thought a crime for an officer to apply public money for 
 the use of himself or his party, but is very generally recognized 
 as no wrong to use his official influence (to say nothing of his 
 time needed in the public service, just as selfishly), for the 
 same purpose, we need not express much surprise that the 
 coarse and obtuse morality of a rude and uneducated people 
 passed no condemnation upon bribery or upon the open pur 
 chase and sale of office. They long remained too blunt and 
 reckless to take any notice that there is really the same duty 
 to use public authority that there is to use public property, only 
 for public purposes. Such arbitrary and corrupt ways of deal- 
 ing with office, in the ruder ages of British history, were 
 
 1 When Judge Barnard was asked on his trial to explain his system of ap- 
 pointment, this was his answer : 
 
 " Here, counsellor, this is my court ; I have won this office ; this 
 patronage is mine." George G. Barnard Impeachment, trial, vol. iii., p. 
 1641. 
 . "Stubbs' Constitutional History of England, vol. i., p. 355.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 15 
 
 nothing exceptional in the affairs of government ; for they 
 are but an example of the manner in which all its powers were 
 prostituted ; to extort the earnings and hold down in poverty 
 and ignorance the masses of the people ; to fill the treasuries, 
 to minister to the vices and luxuries, and to fight the battles, 
 of kings, lords, and bishops. The pleasure, ambition, and 
 power of the kings, nobles, and great officers were everything ; 
 justice and equality, duty and economy, the personal worth of 
 the citizen, and the effect of administration upon the people at 
 large, were nothing with those who controlled the nation ; ex- 
 cept in the rare instances when a long-outraged people would, 
 in wrath and despair, follow a Jack Cade or a Wat Tyler in 
 bloody assault upon their oppressors. 
 
 The reigns of the Plantagenets and the Tudors may be re- 
 garded as the palmy days of the despotic-spoils system of office ; 
 for everything in government and society was in the same spirit 
 that crushing spirit of feudal subordination and dependence 
 under which all the public offices and places, and nearly all 
 the land of the kingdom, not in the hands of the Crown, the 
 nobles, or the Church, were held subject to a solemn oath and 
 condition to king or lord " to be a liegeman for life . . . and 
 to keep loyalty to him . . . for life and death." Charters 
 and monopolies, in a fit of good-nature, were tossed by a king 
 to some borough, great officer or favorite that had pleased him ; 
 and, in a fit of anger or drunkenness, they were as arbitrarily 
 revoked. When a king could "confer two hundred manors 
 upon a brother," and reward every great baron and favorite 
 with rich estates at his will ; when every successful warrior 
 was given not only the spoils of his enemy, but lands and 
 houses arbitrarily taken from citizens at home ; when vast 
 spaces could be appropriated to forests and pleasure-grounds 
 by kings and dukes without consent if not without compensa- 
 tion ; when from amidst the armed followers who attended 
 their journeys, or from the lofty turrets of their castles and 
 palaces, so many of which have survived the spoils system, of 
 which they were the citadels, the great lords and ecclesiastics 
 could look down in haughty defiance upon a half -enslaved 
 common people then indeed there is no ground for surprise 
 that offices and places, salaries and sinecures, removals and
 
 1C CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 promotions, were the mere perquisites and playthings of the 
 great and the highborn. But we may well wonder, not merely 
 that the system, but that the smallest example of it, should 
 have survived to these times. 
 
 It is an interesting fact that the absence of any controlling 
 sense of duty to bestow office, either with reference to the 
 merit of the officer or the interests of the people, tended to 
 make, and to a large extent did make, offices hereditary. It 
 was natural that ministers and noblemen, having offices for 
 sale, should seek to enhance the market price by strengthening 
 all the guarantees of permanence in tenure. There _being 
 no standard of right, except power and influence, for holding 
 an office, those in offices naturally and openly used their 
 authority to extend and transmit their tenure. A statute, 
 enacted in 1452, declares that no officer of the customs shall 
 have any " estate certain in his office ;" but, significantly 
 enough, it further provides that this prohibition shall not 
 ' ' prejudice our sovereign lady the Queen, the Prince, or the 
 Duke of Buckingham," or several others named, who of 
 course might continue to demand and receive the full market 
 price for offices and places sold in perpetuity. Hence sprung 
 the spirit which supported a hereditary crown and nobility, as 
 well as some other hereditary offices which still survive, and 
 many that do not. In these facts, we may find the reason 
 why frequent removals from office, even in the worst times, 
 were not so serious abuses in England as they have been with 
 us. By its very magnitude, one great evil put some limits to 
 another. 
 
 The offices or dignities that early became hereditary and 
 long continued so were very numerous. Nor was this all ; for 
 the right to appoint to office and to sell the appointment openly 
 for money became also and long remained hereditary ; some- 
 times in great families and sometimes in the holder for the 
 time being of the offices themselves. 
 
 Mr. Stubbs 1 speaks of hereditary offices being numerous in 
 the thirteenth century. I believe some of these dignitaries 
 (besides the king and nobility), which I think we should call 
 officers, are yet hereditary. 
 
 1 Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 355.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 17 
 
 In 1552, in the reign of Edward YI., 1 a law was enacted pro- 
 hibiting the sale of offices, but it contained this curious ex- 
 ception, that it shall not apply to the Justices of the Court of 
 King's Bench or Common Pleas, or to the Justices of the 
 Assize ; and therefore those officials were expressly left at 
 liberty to exercise freely the hereditary right of making sale, 
 for their own profit, of offices and places in their own courts. 
 And the act further declares that the " prohibition shall not 
 extend to any sale or bargain, gift, promise, nomination, bond, 
 or covenant for office" to be made before March then next ; 
 a proviso equally remarkable as illustrating a well developed 
 machinery for contracting for offices and nominations to be 
 made binding by ''bonds and covenants," and as suggesting 
 that not a few votes were probably secured for the act by 
 leaving a free market for official corruption during nine 
 months after its passage ! And the illustration will be the 
 more adequate if I add that, so late as 1825,* an act was passed 
 for the purchase by the government, from the hereditary 
 owner, of two public offices, one in the Court of King's Bench, 
 and the other in the Common Pleas, and under this law an 
 appraisement of the money value of each office was actually 
 made, and the government paid the value fixed, and became 
 again the owner and possessor of its own functions which had 
 been merchandise in the market for centuries. 
 
 These are but specimens of very many instances of the 
 purchase of civil offices ; to say nothing here of the scandalous 
 and open purchase of offices or places in the army, and in the 
 State Church, a practice only arrested in the army in 1871, 
 but which continues in the State Church to the present time, 
 as I shall more fully explain. 
 
 It is hardly worth while even to take a glance back of the 
 Korman Conquest ; and from that date to Cromwell the atti- 
 tude of the government toward public offices and places was 
 much the same. If not bestowed in the mere wantonness of 
 irresponsible and unlimited power, for the gratification of 
 pride, ambition, and passion, or sold for money, they were 
 used to strengthen the power of the Crown, the nobles, the 
 
 1 G Edward VI., chap. 15. 6 George IV., chap. 89.
 
 18 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Church, or the court favorites, who held them as perquisites 
 or spoils. "Not offices and places merely, but salaries without 
 labor or responsibility ; charters, grants, and monopolies ; 
 sentences, pardons, exemption from taxation, and from 
 services by land and sea were each and all given, sold, with- 
 held, or exchanged, in the same venal and arbitrary spirit, and 
 | with like impunity. : The common, jpsqple were substantially 
 unrepresented when this old spoils system was matured, and a 
 great proportion of them were in a condition of ignorance and 
 dependence little above slavery ; and power was so concen- 
 trated in a ruling class that public opinion, even had it been 
 far more enlightened, could have put only slight check upon 
 the arbitrary use of official authority. 
 
 I give a few examples, by way of illustrating the original 
 spoils system as it was applied in practice in the twelfth, thir- 
 teenth, and fourteenth centuries. 
 
 " Among the great officers of the Household which appear from the 
 pipe-roll to have been saleable are those of Dapifer, Marshal and Chan- 
 cellor. The last mentioned officer, in A.D. 1130, owes 3006 13s. 4d. 
 for the great seal. The office of Treasurer was bought by Bishop 
 Nigel for his son, for 400. ... In Norfolk, Benjamin pays 
 4 5s. to be allowed to keep the pleas of the crown. . . . John 
 Marshall pays forty marks for a mastership in the King's Court. 
 Richard Fitz Alured pays fifteen marks that he may sit with 
 Ralph Bassctt on the King's pleas in Buckinghamshire. At the 
 same time the officers of the ancient courts are found purchasing relief 
 from their responsibilities . . . anxious, no doubt, to avoid 
 heavy fine . . . for neglect of duty." 
 
 These examples of that refinement of royal and official infa- 
 my, under which not only was the highest of human function 
 
 1 For example : " In 1245, Henry III. ordered all shops in London to be 
 closed for fifteen days for the benefit of fairs proclaimed by him at West- 
 minster. Henry the VI. having bought some alum for 4000, sold it for 
 8000, granting in the sale an exclusive privilege of dealing in alum for a 
 term of years. Henry the VI. conferred upon a Tuscan merchant the priv- 
 ilege of importing a quantity of merchandise and prohibited its importation 
 by any one else until he had sold it off. America was only suffered to be 
 colonized under the permission of trading monopolists. Princeton Review, 
 March, 1878.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 19 
 
 that of administering justice thus openly sold for money, 
 but by which also another price was taken in advance for 
 impurity in the merciless and corrupt abuse of this purchased 
 authority, lend a deeper significance to that celebrated clause 
 of the great charter, extorted from King John, which declares 
 that "no man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or outlawed, or 
 exiled, or anywise destroyed ; nor will we go upon him, nor 
 send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by 
 the law of the land. To none will we sell, to none will we 
 deny or delay right or justice. ' ' To this charter, some of the 
 great principles of our constitutions are to be traced. 
 
 If in some appropriate form we had incorporated into them 
 the principle of the forty-fifth article, which makes the King 
 promise that " we will not make any justices, constables, 
 sheriffs, or bailiffs, but of such as know the law of the realm 
 and mean to truly observe it," is there any reason to doubt 
 that primary justice in this country would have been far better 
 administered ? This clause of Magna Carta may be justly said 
 to be the First Civil Service Rule the first authoritative pro- 
 vision for securing due qualifications for an office to be found 
 in English history ; and I have not noticed that the constitution 
 of any State of the Union has yet come up to its spirit. The 
 majority is hardly yet convinced that a justice needs to know 
 the law provided he is only zealous for the party. As a con- 
 sequence there are thousands of justices in this country, as 
 ignorant of law as they are efficient in politics, and tens of 
 thousands of the victims of their ignorance and their prejudices 
 help to swell the volume of public discouragement and discon- 
 tent by reason of our bad administration. It cannot be matter 
 of surprise that, in an age when the conception of such princi- 
 ples was possible only during the uprising of a high national 
 sentiment, they were neglected and scorned as soon as those in 
 rebellion had laid aside their arms. The old abuses were 
 renewed. " So intimate is the connection of judicature with 
 finance under the Xorman kings, that we scarcely need the 
 comments of the historian to guide to the conclusion that it 
 was mainly for the sake of the profit that justice was adminis- 
 tered at all. . . . The Treasurer, the Chancellor, the 
 Justiciar, pays a sum of money for his office, or even renders
 
 20 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 an annual rent. This practice runs on to the thirteenth cen- 
 tury, when so many of the dignities became hereditary." 
 " A great court and council was held at Nottingham, attended 
 by ... archbishops, bishops, and earls. On the first 
 day the King removed the Sheriffs of Lincolnshire and York- 
 shire and put up the offices for sale. Yorkshire fell to Arch- 
 bishop Geoffrey, whose bid of an immediate payment of 3000 
 marks and 100 marks of increment was accepted in preference 
 to the lower bid of the Chancellor, who proposed 1500 marks 
 for Yorkshire, etc. . . . The sheriffs, as we learn from 
 the rolls, were nearly all displaced. " " He (the King) brought 
 together a great council at Pipewell, . . . where he gave 
 away the vacant bishoprics, appointed a new ministry, and 
 raised a large sum of money by the sale of charters of con- 
 firmation^^ " The Bishop of Durham had paid heavily for 
 his honors ; he had bought the justiciarship and the earldom 
 of Northumberland." "Beneath a thin veil of names and 
 fictions, the great ministerial officers, and the royal interfer- 
 ence l>y writ in private quarrels, were alike matters of pur- 
 chase." 1 
 
 A statute 2 of this period so forcibly illustrates its spirit and 
 is so ingenious a contrivance for giving impunity to all kinds 
 of official corruption and tyranny, that I cannot forbear quoting 
 from it. 
 
 " Whereas it is contained in the statute of the second year of our 
 lord the King that none be so hardy to invent, say, or tell any false 
 news, lies, or such other false things, of the prelates, Dukes, Earls, 
 Barons, and other nobles and great men of the realm ; and also of 
 the Chancellor, Clerk of the Privy Seal, Steward of the King's House, 
 Justice of the one bench or of the other, and other great officers of the 
 realm ; and he that doth shall be taken and imprisoned until he hath 
 found him of whom the speech shall be moved. ' ' 
 
 The magistrates were the mere dependents of the higher 
 officers. Official records and doings were official secrets. 
 No man could prove a charge from that quarter. It was only 
 needed to treat what was disagreeable as being ' ' false, ' ' to 
 
 1 See Stubbs' Const. History, vol. i., pp. 317-502, 496, 497, 384, 387, and 355. 
 * 2 Richard II., chap. 11.
 
 CIVIL SEEVICE IN GREAT BRITADT. 21 
 
 make this law a terror to every man who thought to expose 
 corruption. In condemning this device of tyranny, let us not 
 .forget how generally a rule prevails with us, within the public 
 service, as demoralizing as this statute was without the service. 
 So long as our subordinate officers can be dismissed without 
 cause and without explanation, they are no more likely, than 
 was a subject of Hichard II. , to expose official delinquency in 
 high quarters. Year after year it may continue with no ex- 
 posure from subordinates who are silenced by the fear of an 
 arbitrary dismissal. 
 
 While considering the condition of civil administration at 
 that interesting period when the English people, as the first 
 instance in modern history, arose in their might to arrest its 
 abuses, I wish to present some further facts which show the 
 identity of such abuses in ages and under forms of govern- 
 ment remotely separated. It is generally believed that such 
 frauds as often come to light in our large cities in connection 
 with the offices of coroners, sheriffs, justices, marshals, and 
 clerks of courts, are original with us, and that they are the 
 inevitable evils or drawbacks of universal suffrage and free 
 institutions ; and this belief unquestionably discourages efforts 
 for their prevention. Nothing can be more unwarranted than 
 such opinions. A statute enacted more than six centuries 
 ago, 1 having recited "that forasmuch as mean persons, and 
 indiscreet, now of late are commonly chosen to the office of 
 coroners, when it is requisite that honest persons should 
 occupy such offices," proceeds to enact " that no coroner shall 
 demand or take anything to do his office, upon pain of great 
 forfeiture to the king." Another clause of the same law 
 enacts " that no sheriff or other King's officer shall take any 
 reward to do his office, . . . and if he do he shall be 
 punished at the King's pleasure ;" and still another provides, 
 in substance, that no clerk shall take anything but his fees for 
 doing his duty, and if he does he shall pay twice as much as 
 he has taken and also lose his place for a year ; and still 
 another forbids any " marshall, or cryer, or other officer of 
 justice," taking money wrongfully, and declares "that there 
 
 1 In 1275, 3 Edward I., chap. 10.
 
 22 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 is a greater number of them than there ought to he, whereby 
 the people are sore aggrieved, ' ' and forbids such abuses in the 
 future, which are to be followed by a forfeiture of the office 
 and " grievous punishment at the King's pleasure." 
 
 In recognizing these familiar offences of our day, flourishing 
 under a royal and feudal government, it is worthy of notice 
 that the punishment denounced especially the forfeiture of 
 office is more drastic and effective in its nature than we have 
 generally provided. The twenty-ninth chapter of the same 
 law reaches another abuse not less familiar to us. It provides 
 that ' ' if any pleader ... or other do any manner of 
 deceit or collusion in the King's Court, or beguile the court or 
 the party, ... he shall be imprisoned for a year and a 
 day ; and if the trespass require greater pum'sliment, it shall 
 be a-t the King's pleasure." 
 
 In 1344, a statute prohibits justices from taking gifts or 
 rewards ; but a later statute 1 breathes a less stern morality, 
 for it makes this exception, " unless it be meat or drink, and 
 that of small value. ' ' 
 
 The practice of extorting extra fees or arbitrary payments on 
 the part of officers of the treasury, is not an abuse of republican 
 origin, but was well developed under royalty before this con- 
 tinent was discovered. A statute of 1455 3 recites that 
 " whereas officers in the King's Exchequer do take fees, . 
 and also do take gifts and rewards for the execution of their 
 offices ... by extortion, . . . " and then denounces 
 penalties. So also the vexatious wrongs practiced by baggage 
 searchers and other officers of customs are not original here, 
 but were well developed in the old country four centuries ago. 
 In a statute of about the same date as that last referred 
 
 1 12 Edward III. 
 
 a This easy kind of morality seems indigenous in despotic states. Speak- 
 ing of Russian administration, a late author says : " The officials, quite puz- 
 zled by the severe punishments as to how to mask their corrupt cupidity, at 
 last invented a curious trick. They placed in their houses a great number 
 of religious pictures. Those who desired to win the ear of the judge, or of 
 any other official, suspended their presents as a sort of religious homage ! 
 An ukase was thereupon published, that only seven or eight roubles' worth 
 could be suspended to the pictures. 
 
 3 Henry VI., chap. 3.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 23 
 
 to, 1 it is recited that " whereas divers water-bailiffs, searchers, 
 comptrollers of the search, and others, their deputies and 
 servants, within the ports of this realm, . . . do, by color 
 of their office, wrongfully take, by constraint ... of 
 goods and merchandise, . . . and cause great charges 
 and impositions, . . . and by such wrongful impositions, 
 they do discourage said merchants and do great damage, . 
 contrary to law and conscience . . . " ; and the act then 
 goes on to provide a remedy. This law is well adapted to 
 arrest the old abuses in the !New York Custom House, which 
 so many think are quite original in that office. 
 
 " As early as 1377 we find interference with the freedom of 
 elections of members of Parliament by the executive officers 
 made a ground of serious complaint by the people. ' ' 2 Even 
 the great offence of false counts, certificates and returns 
 of votes by inspectors of election and returning officers (gen- 
 erally deemed to be emphatically republican offences, if not 
 incurable), were fully developed and ingeniously dealt with in 
 England near two centuries before even a town meeting had 
 been held on this continent. A law of Henry VI. contains an 
 elaborate provision on that subject. It recites that ' ' sheriffs 
 for lucre" have not made due " elections of knights" (members 
 of Parliament), and ' ( no return of knights lawfully chosen, ' ' 
 but ' ' knights . . . haver been returned which were 
 never duly chosen ; and sometimes the sheriffs have not re- 
 turned the writs which they had to make elections ; but the 
 said writs have been embezzled ; and made no precept." 
 
 The congeries of frauds of omission and commission, referred 
 to in this statute, would seem to indicate a royal original for 
 all the devices of rascality, for which the politicians of Lou- 
 isiana and Florida are thought to have shown unrivalled powers 
 of invention. 
 
 " Under an absolute king, whose will is law, that which he 
 chooses to sell passes for justice ;" and there can be no doubt 
 that the long practice of making merchandise of public 
 authority had vitiated and benumbed the moral sense of the 
 English nation on the subject, so that reform had become 
 
 I., chap. 5. 
 8 Green's History of the English People, p. 250.
 
 24 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tenfold more difficult ; just as the moral sense of this nation 
 has, from like causes, become blunted to the immorality of 
 levying assessments and bestowing office for mere partisan pur- 
 poses. It was not, it is well to repeat, mere offices and places 
 that were bought and sold that great officers in Church and 
 State haughtily treated as their perquisites, which they might 
 hand over to the highest bidder or give to please a favorite or 
 conciliate an enemy but every possible exercise of official 
 authority, by every grade of officials, from the lowest to the 
 highest, was in the market as merchandise, at the time when 
 Civil Service Reform may be said to have commenced in Eng- 
 land. It was not merely such universal and long-continued 
 precedents of venality that were to be encountered by any 
 reform, but there was also a false and pernicious public opinion, 
 developed through centuries, to the effect that such abuses were 
 inevitable ; because neither in England nor in any part of the 
 world were there any examples to the contrary. In France, 
 for example, ' ' the purchase of office was legalized. A bureau 
 was opened for their sale. . . . The kings of France, 
 in order to raise money, made the judicial offices in Parlia- 
 ment saleable." ' In every European country, in a certain 
 stage of its civilization, offices have been bought and sold. 
 And besides all this ground of discouragement, there was 
 the great fact that those who sanctioned and practised such 
 corruption, and who gained money, authority, and influence 
 thereby, were the ruling, the high-born, the educated classes 
 the royal family and the nobles the bishops and the priests 
 the ministers and the generals great lawyers who had become 
 judges all persons in places of authority or social influence. 
 
 Then, as now and ever, from its very nature, the cause of 
 administrative reform was the cause of the common people 
 the cause of justice and equal rights among them, the cause of 
 personal merit against every one having special privileges and 
 perquisites against the whole official or partisan body. But the 
 great body of the people were utterly ignorant and were hardly 
 represented at all. The public press, and other great modern 
 agencies for awakening and combining a public protest, did 
 
 1 Young's Sketches of the French Bar.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 25 
 
 not exist. Freedom of speech did not exist ; the right of 
 petition was not recognized. In such a time, it might well 
 have been said that a reform of such abuses seemed impossible. 
 To attack them was, indeed, hardly less than a rebellion ; and 
 the question raised by a reformer was a constitutional question 
 of disturbing the balance of power in the state, by an elevation 
 of the masses. 
 
 ' ' The nobility, and the knights and members of knightly families, 
 made up a warrior caste, who termed themselves gentle by birth, and 
 who looked down upon the great mass of the lay community as be- 
 ings of almost inferior nature. . . . The peasantry and the 
 little allodialists were ground down with servitude and forced to till 
 the soil as abject dependents of the barons." 
 
 In those times the spoils system was neither an anachronism 
 nor an importation, but a congenial growth in keeping with 
 general despotism, injustice, and violence. To assail that 
 system required not simply the little courage which suffices to 
 dissent from one's party platform, or the small patriotism need- 
 ed to forbear a nomination to a little office, but the forecast of 
 a statesman in advance of his times, the courage of a patriot 
 ready to defy a domineering class and a merciless king, or per- 
 haps the resignation of a martyr ready to go to prison if not 
 to the block. It is plain that to interfere with such a sys- 
 tem was nothing less than an assault upon the power of the 
 king. But in those times the king luled, in popular estima- 
 tion, by the favor of Heaven. His government was a divine 
 institution. 
 
 This added vastly to the awe it inspired and the power it 
 wielded. In the language of Mr. Lecky, ' ' It placed the sove- 
 reign entirely apart from the category of mere human institu- 
 tions ;" and (I may add) it therefore made a civil service 
 reformer a rebel against Divine Providence as well as a traitor 
 against the king. He is with us only a visionary and an enemy 
 of the party. This divine attribute, in those old times, was 
 thought to extend to the physical person of the king, and to give 
 him power over the ills of men a power the exercise of which 
 
 1 Creasy's History English Constitution, p. 82.
 
 26 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 was for centuries used, with great political effect, in the cure of 
 diseases ; every instance of which was accepted as a fresh proof 
 of the king's right to rule and of the smile of Heaven upon 
 him. This perverse veneration even surviving the cruelty of 
 Mary and the treachery of Charles I. and James I. was ex- 
 tended to the contemptible voluptuary who succeeded Crom- 
 well. In a single year Charles II. touched for the king's evil 
 8500 times, and nearly 100,000 persons fell on their knees 
 before him for that healing touch during his reign. Nor was 
 it the humble and ignorant alone who were deluded ; for in 
 1687 the King touched more than TOO sick in the centre of 
 learned society at Oxford. 
 
 The delusion did not end with the seventeenth century. A 
 solemn service for touching by the Queen was printed in the 
 Common Prayer-book of the State Church during the reign of 
 Queen Anne. Her Privy Council issued a proclamation stating 
 where the Queen would perform the miracle. Dean Swift 
 made an application to her in 1711 to cure a sick boy. In a 
 single day, in 1712, two hundred persons were touched by her, 
 and among them was the celebrated Samuel Johnston, then a 
 scrofulous child. Even so late as 1838, a minister of the Shet- 
 land Islands asserts that no cure for scrofulous diseases was at 
 that time there believed to be so efficacious as the royal touch. 
 Nor could the democratic spirit of this land at once dissipate 
 the madness. Mr. Lecky says that " a petition has been 
 preserved in the records of the town of Portsmouth in New 
 Hampshire, asking the assembly of that province in 1687 to 
 grant assistance to one of the inhabitants who desired to make 
 the journey to England in order to obtain the benefit of the 
 royal touch. ' ' How brave and audacious must a reformer be 
 to challenge any use of a prerogative in the hands of mortals 
 thus favored by the powers above. 
 
 Returning again to the progress of the spoils system, we find 
 two great popular uprisings against it during the arbitrary 
 times we have been considering ; the one in the fourteenth 
 and the other in the fifteenth century ; the first three hundred 
 years before party government or even great parties existed in 
 England. These uprisings were really the first distinct 
 attempts to bring about civil service reform in England, though
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 27 
 
 the rebellion under King John had in part the same end in 
 view. And perhaps the violence and blood these rebellious 
 reforms involved were the unavoidable means of gaining a 
 hearing for civil abuses in those feudal ages. 
 
 It certainly cannot be said that, in the rebellion of 1377, in 
 which Wat Tyler was the military leader, he had the spirit or 
 acted the part of a civil service reformer. lie only appeared 
 when the popular protest had passed the limits of law and 
 order. But it is as certain that, in that rebellion, the people of / 
 England, for the first time, made the abuses of their civil 
 administration a great national issue and battle cry for reform, 
 as it is that the same issue became national with us, for the \ 
 first time, in the last Presidential election. Nor was Jack 
 Cade any more such a reformer in his own person, in the 
 rebellion of the next century, in which he was the military 
 chieftain ; but the continuance of the spoils system, only a 
 little curtailed, and still leading to outrageous corruption and 
 oppression, was one of the greatest causes, if not the main 
 cause, which drove the people a second time to revolt. It is 
 worthy of notice that these two rebellions of our ancestors are 
 the only instances of their taking up arms on their own account 
 in the whole period from the Norman Conquest to Charles I. 
 
 There are facts connected with the earlier rebellion which 
 have a practical bearing upon civil service reform, even in 
 this enlightened age. 
 
 The open sale and prostitution of official power in manifold 
 forms ; the granting of monopolies ; the extortion of money for 
 the forbearance of injustice ; the exaction of illegal fees ; the 
 invasion of private right by official favorites, male and female ; 
 gross injustice in the courts ; oppressive taxes to maintain a 
 great army of sinecurists and supernumeraries in offices and 
 public places ; domineering and insulting conduct on the part 
 of high officials all these abuses, to which I have referred as 
 existing at an earlier date, had continued to grow and poison 
 and exasperate until they led to the outbreak early in the reign 
 of Richard II., in 1377. The very vices and luxuries which 
 such debasement of official power fostered, indirectly con- 
 tributed to raising the condition of those most oppressed. This 
 result was brought about by a process which in itself is one
 
 28 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of the best illustrations that can be given of the degradation of 
 all official and social influence. " The luxury of the time 
 and the pomp of chivalry . . . drained the purses of 
 knights and barons, and the sale of freedom to the serf . 
 afforded an easy and tempting mode of filling them. In this 
 process Edward III. himself led the way. Commissioners 
 were sent to the royal estates for the special purpose of manu- 
 missions. ' ' 1 The very lowest placeman at an office door, as 
 well as the highest near the King, were equally venal and 
 unscrupulous. Even the King, " with a jest took a bribe" 
 for the exercise of the pardoning power. 2 
 
 In the mean time the people had become bolder, as they had 
 gained in liberty and in the knowledge o f the cause of their 
 grievances. It was the generation of Wyckliffe, and great 
 ideas were beginning to stir the heart of England. In the 
 domain of politics, as of religion, we find at this era the be- 
 ginnings of those brave and true utterances which, in later 
 generations, shook the Church and the State to their founda- 
 tions. They are the first predecessors of the pamphlets of 
 Milton and of Burke. 
 
 Foreign wars, made more disastrous by incompetent officers, 
 had led to crushing taxation ; and a poll tax brought a vivid 
 sense of their cost to the people. If this obnoxious tax most 
 directly aroused the masses, which Wat Tyler led, we yet find 
 the real cause further back. " The poll tax interpreted to the 
 individual far more intelligently than any political propagan- 
 da the misdoings of the rulers. ' ' To add to the public exas- 
 peration, the royal and lordly officials interfered with the 
 freedom of elections in 1377 ; and this, Mr. Stubbs declares, 
 " is the first occasion on which any definite signs are traceable 
 of an attempt to influence an election for a political purpose. ' ' 
 And in view of the bloody resistance to which it then con- 
 tributed, as compared with the tame submission with which 
 
 1 Green's History of the English People, p. 262. 
 
 8 "There was no check (Stubbs 1 History, vol. ii., p. 434) on dishonesty 
 and extortion among public servants, noF^njrdetermination to enforce the 
 constitutional law ; and some of the highest officers of the court, the closest 
 friends and associates of the King, were among the chief offenders. " 
 j 3 Stubbs' History, vol. ii., p. 452.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 29 
 
 we endure the same abuse, it is certainly a striking illustration 
 of the demoralizing effect of long familiarity with vice. 
 
 The haughty statesmen of the day did not mistake the real 
 cause of the threatened outbreak, and as they saw its angry 
 spirit and vast proportions, they took measures to avert it. 
 These measures failed. A Parliament was called (after the 
 war), which entered upon the detailed work of refonning the 
 administration ; and it accomplished so much that it has always 
 been known in history as the "Good Parliament." A hun- 
 dred and forty petitions for the redress of grievances (a most 
 unprecedented number in that age, when so few could write, 
 and when even to petition involved the perils of imprisonment) 
 were considered by that " Good Parliament." An examina- 
 tion of public accounts was demanded and granted. Some of 
 the results read like a modern report about Washington or 
 ]^ew York City. Latimer, the King's Chamberlain, was 
 found " guilty of every sort of malversation. " Hi chard Lyons, 
 " the King's agent, had been a partner in some gigantic 
 financial frauds." The great offenders were impeached and 
 removed from office. Women as well as men were found 
 guilty. Among those banished for corruption (and for a 
 violation of an ordinance against women practising law) was 
 Alice Perrers ; but Alice got into her old place again years , 
 later. A council was elected by Parliament to act as a check- j 
 onjpatronage. One of the petitions called for the reform in 
 theconduct of justices, another of marshals, another of 
 sheriffs, and another prays ' ' that officers convicted of default 
 or deceit may be permanently incapacitated from acting. ' ' 
 
 In the hope of allaying popular indignation, at this period, 
 the aristocratic leaders in Parliament proposed a grand inquest 
 of abuses, which was ordered, through a high commission. 1 
 It was the first great inquiry ever ordered in England into the 
 abuses of public administration ; and few in that country have 
 been more sweeping and comprehensive. In this country none 
 so thorough has ever been provided for. Every grade of office 
 and every branch of administration and expenditure high and 
 low, civil and military, ecclesiastical and judicial, national and 
 
 1 12 Richard II., chap. 1.
 
 30 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 municipal, domestic and foreign, including all forms of the 
 exercise of official functions were included. The concise 
 enumeration of abuses to be investigated fills over four pages 
 of this ancient statute. The act opens with a solemn recital of 
 the pervading abuses of administration, saying " that whereas 
 by the grievous complaints ... it appears that the rents 
 and revenues of the realm ... by insufficient counsel 
 and evil government of ... great officers and other per- 
 sons, be so wasted and destroyed, . . . and there is so 
 great and outrageous oppressions, . . . and the laws are 
 not executed, nor justice nor right done, to the people, . . . 
 and great mischief and damage has happened." Parts of 
 this recital are as flattering to the dear people as any modern 
 platform made to catch votes in a canvass, and it was as basely 
 disregarded by its authors. The work of the commission was 
 entered upon and some abuses were exposed by it, but its great 
 undertaking was never completed. The powerful nobles at 
 its head, like the venal, partisan managers of our day, never 
 intended to have their income, their authority, or their patron- 
 age much curtailed. The battle had gone in favor of the 
 king's legions, and against the undisciplined people. In 
 the language of the historian of the times, " What the poli- 
 ticians wanted was not so much reform of abuses as the pos- 
 session of power. ' ' What they did was the equivalent in our 
 day of a series of sonorous resolutions for economy and reform 
 adopted by a national convention and trampled upon by the 
 party that adopted them. 
 
 Here, therefore, in the first struggle for civil service reform, 
 we find the unscrupulous politicians the legitimate predeces- 
 sors of those of our time uniting with the great nobles under 
 an arbitrary prince, and intriguing and working together to 
 hold down the people under abuses in the civil administration 
 so great that they were ready to fly to arms for their redress. 
 
 While the question whether the people would take up arms 
 hung in fearful suspense, " the Parliament of 1377 resumed its 
 work of reform and boldly assumed the control of the expend- 
 iture by means of a standing committee of two burgesses of 
 London ; and that of 1378 demanded and obtained an account 
 of the mode in which the subsidies had been spent. ' ' ' Official
 
 ' 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 corniption lias so weakened the executive department and so 
 aroused the anger of the people, that Parliament having up 
 to this time but little if any patronage is able to stand 
 boldly forth for reform, with all the prestige of disinterested- 
 ness and popular indignation in its support. But it is worthy 
 of notice that it so exerted its new authority from the outset 
 as to secure substantial patronage at the expense of the 
 Executive. Various new officers were for the first time 
 appointed by its own vote. It exerted a controlling influence 
 over other appointments. And we shall find as we proceed 
 that, with the steady increase of the power in the legislature, 
 there was also a continued usurpation of executive func- 
 tions and a growing abuse of patronage by members of 
 Parliament, until that body finally became more corrupt 
 than even the Executive. As a consequence, Parliament at 
 last became the great obstacle encountered by the people 
 in that final contest for reform, which, in this generation, 
 has established the Merit System in Great Britain. At every 
 stage, corruption has prevailed, in either department, in the 
 proportion that it has had control of patronage or, in other 
 words, the management of a spoils system of office. 
 
 The' rebellion, I have said, had not been arrested. Partly 
 because the reforms came too late, partly because* they were 
 believed to be deceptive, and largely because when popular 
 indignation has been awakened it readily passes all bounds of 
 reason, the people took up arms, by hundreds of thousands, 
 demanding vengeance on official plunderers. It is not for 
 me to describe the bloody scenes that followed, nor even 
 to recount how a hundred thousand men from the country, 
 headed by Wat Tyler, marched on London, when its common 
 people opened its gates and Tyler and his followers did execu- 
 tion upon officers, whom they believed had grown rich on the 
 spoils of office ; nor even to narrate how, all over the land, 
 officials were stoned or slaughtered, licenses for extortion and 
 grants of monopoly were seized and destroyed, or, in some 
 quarters, how lawyers who had justified exactions and defended 
 corruption were savagely put to death. While taking merciless 
 
 1 Green's History of the English People, p. 263.
 
 32 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 vengeance on the spoilsmen, liigli or low, who had ravaged the 
 State, they not less mercilessly flung to the flam.es the men 
 from their own ranks who were guilty of pillage. The soldiers 
 proved too strong for the undisciplined people, and peace was 
 soon restored. The spoils system, with its poison and its cor- 
 rupting methods, was left essentially unchanged ; though, for 
 a considerable period, its greater abuses were arrested. 
 
 It would take me too far from the main subject were I to 
 attempt to describe the many ways in which this terrific 
 demonstration of the might and wrath of the common people 
 contributed to the wholesome prestige of public opinion. It 
 put some limits to the intolerable insolence and insatiable 
 extortion of those in office. From that date, perhaps, the 
 officials began to be in some small measure a_^^c_s_ejrvice, 
 and hence in the same degree ceased to be a mere official 
 tyranny. The direct gain of political influence, however, was 
 rather on the part of the middle than of the lower class. What 
 the latter gained was personal freedom and not political rights, 
 which came later. From this date, there began in a small way 
 to be a public opinion demanding that offices be bestowed with 
 some_regard for merit an opinion which has grown stronger 
 and stronger until tEe final victory it has achieved during this 
 generation* 
 
 But there is one authentic expression of the reform spirit of 
 this period so unique and remarkable that it must not be over- 
 looked. I refer to the provisions of an act passed in 1388. ' 
 
 Nothing uttered by Wyckliife was more original, more in 
 advance of the age, or evinced a deeper conception of the 
 evils of the times and of the conditions of their improvement. 
 It was no more to the taste of Richard II. or his court than 
 was the Great Charter to that of King John, or the Habeas 
 Corpus to that of Charles II., or the Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence to that of George III. ; but, like those memorable 
 acts, it utters the high and just demands of an indignant 
 people, when oppressive taxation and corrupt officials have 
 aroused them to a great effort of patriotism and self-preserva- 
 tion. I give the laiiguage of the statute : 
 
 '12 Richard II., chap. 2.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 " None shall obtain office by suit or for reward but upon desert. 
 
 " Item : (1) It is accorded that the Chancellor, Treasurer, Keeper of 
 the Privy Seal, Steward of the King's House, the King's Chamberlain, 
 Clerk of the Rolls, the Justices of the one Bench and of the other, 
 Barons of the Exchequer, and all others that shall be called to ordain, 
 name, or make justices of the peace, sheriffs, escheators, customers, l 
 comptrollers, or any other officer or minister of the King, shall be 
 firmly sworn. 
 
 " (2) That they shall not ordain, name, or make justices of the 
 peace, sheriffs, escheators, customers, comptrollers, nor other officers 
 of the King, for any gift or brokerage, favor or affection.* 
 
 ' ' (3) Nor that none that pursueth by himself or by others, pri- 
 vately or openly, to be in any manner of office, shall be put in the 
 same office or any other. 
 
 " (4) But that they make all such officers and ministers of the 
 best and most lawful men, and sufficient to their estimation and 
 knowledge." 
 
 When we consider the spirit of the age, the fact that Parlia- 
 ment was in great measure the reflection of those who shared 
 the profits of the despotic spoils system that that system 
 was the bulwark of authority in the hands of the titled and 
 privileged classes, which were supreme in the government I 
 might say, when we consider that no State of this Union has 
 (so far as I am aware, except in a single instance 3 within 
 this decade) yet come even nearly up to the moral stand- 
 
 1 That is, Custom House officers. 
 
 "Even the celebrated rule of Jefferson which our public men have gener- 
 ally accepted as the supreme standard of ideal duty, falls far short of the re- 
 quirement of this statute of Richard II. in passing no censure either upon 
 professional office seeking, or upon bestowing office for "gift, favor, or 
 affection." 
 
 3 In 1877, the Legislature of New York, for the purpose of arresting the 
 gross extravagance and corruption that had long prevailed, under the parti- 
 san spoils system of managing its prisons, enacted the following section 
 (Laws 1877, chap. 24), in a law regulating the future government of the 
 prisons, in conformity with the amended State Constitution : 3. " Xo ap- 
 pointment shall be made, in any of the prisons of this State, on grounds of 
 political partisanship ; but honesty, capacity, and adaptation shiill constitute 
 the rule for appointments ; and any violation of this rule shall be sufficient 
 cause for removal from office of the superintendent." 
 
 Already under the new system, discipline has become much more cffi /^ 
 cient, expenses have teen materially reduced, and earnings largely increased. '
 
 \ 
 
 34 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ard of this statute, in dealing with public office we may 
 well be astonished at its provisions ; which doubtless are to be 
 accounted for only by considering how high public aspiration 
 will rise, when aroused by flagrant wrongs, and how great was 
 the dread of a repetition of the bloody scenes of the war then 
 just ended. It may be justly regarded as the second series of 
 civil service rules ever promulgated in England. It plainly 
 affirms the great and fundamental principles of all reform in 
 the public service viz., that the appointing power is not a per- 
 quisite and must not be exercised as matter of favor ; but is 
 a public trust, requiring those clothed w T ith it to withstand all 
 the pretensions of birth, wealth, and social prestige, and to 
 make all appointments out of regard for personal merit and 
 the public welfare. Such a view (while of course exactly 
 in the spirit of our institutions) was so utterly repugnant 
 to the feudal tyranny of the fourteenth century, that it 
 requires no ordinary effort of the imagination to conceive 
 a force or fear strong enough to extort its recognition 
 from a despotic king and a parliament of armed knights and 
 haughty lords and bishops, whose lofty castles looked down 
 upon every part of the land where their dependents humbly 
 toiled. This unique statute must forever shine out conspic- 
 uously upon the dark horizon of a rude and ignorant age. 
 And may we not well believe that it will be the ultimate 
 judgment that the principles it affirms were as well worthy of 
 adoption into our system, and that they are as essential to our 
 well-being as a nation, as the Habeas Corpus or the trial by 
 jury ; for these latter safeguards, perhaps, become less impor- 
 tant as civilization advances ; while the need of worth and ca- 
 pacity in office increases all the more with wealth and numbers 
 and the magnitude of public affairs ? 
 
 As might well have been expected of a law so much in ad- 
 vance of the age, when the grave danger was passed, and the 
 old system had had time to regather its strength, this beneficent 
 statute and those who defended it were disregarded or defied. 
 In a milder and more secret form, the spoils system became 
 again supreme, and continued wars, both foreign and domestic, 
 aided its growth. Indeed, so bold did the spoilsmen become 
 that they undertook to vindicate their favorite system by deny-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 35 
 
 ing that it had been the cause of the war ; but Parliament 
 formally resolved to the contrary. 
 
 " It laid before the King a scheme for tlie reform of his Household 
 and administration, the abuses of which they declared to have been the 
 causes of the revolt, and earnestly prayed for a general pardon for the 
 severities committed in putting down the rebellion. ... A 
 commission for the reform of the Household, to begin with the person 
 of the King himself, was elected. ' ' 
 
 I have said that the uprising under Tyler failed to secure 
 the political rights (though it advanced the personal freedom) 
 of the lower class ; but it did greatly strengthen the power of 
 the middle classes for the future work of reform. It is a strik- 
 ing fact that the lords of the spoils system, while forced to such 
 concessions to personal merit, did yet, in the true spirit of that 1 
 system, still exert their power mercilessly to keep down the 
 lower classes. The very Parliament by which that statute was ' 
 enacted, for example, passed other acts, with the following 
 significant titles : 
 
 "CHAP. 3. No servant shall depart from one hundred to another 
 without a testimonial under the King's seal, on pain of being set in 
 the stocks. 
 
 " CHAP. 4. The several penalties for taking more wages than are 
 limited by statute. 
 
 " CHAP. 5. Whosoever serveth in husbandry until twelve years old 
 shall so continue. 
 
 ' ' CHAP. 1 1 . The punishment of him who tells lies of the peers or 
 great officers of the realm. 
 
 " CHAP. 13. No manner of artificer or laborer who hath not lands 
 shall keep any dog or ferret, ... or net, for to take 
 any deer, hare ... or other gentleman's game, upon pain of 
 one year's imprisonment." 
 
 Another act of 1389 is entitled that, " Xo shoemaker shall be a 
 tanner, nor tanner a shoemaker." 
 
 Among the petitions of this period is one of great landed 
 lords, praying that " no bondman or bondwoman shall place 
 their children at school, as has been done, so as to advance 
 their children." 
 
 1 Stubbs' Constitutional History, vol. ii., p. 462.
 
 36 CIVIL SERVICE IN' GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 What I have stated concerning the origin and methods 
 of our inherited spoils system, in connection with this first 
 great effort of the English people to arrest it, enables me to 
 dismiss, with a few words, the subsequent rebellion against 
 it to which I have alluded. It occurred in 1450. "When it 
 had passed its peaceful stages of petition, protests and par- 
 liamentary efforts to bring about a redress of abuses, and 
 had culminated in a fearful uprising, especially of the middle 
 classes, and when the populace was ready to join in the 
 work of death, the soldier, Jack Cade, became its military 
 leader. He, like "Wat Tyler, led an armed multitude to 
 London, and again corrupt ministers were made victims of 
 the wrath of the people. The great popular demand was set 
 forth in a formal and well considered "complaint," framed 
 by the " Commons of Kent," where the people first flew 
 to arms. Its scope and the whole aim of the revolt are 
 clearly stated by the latest historian of the period in a single 
 sentence. 
 
 " With the exception of tlio demand for the repeal of the statute 
 of laborers, the programme of the Commons was now not social but 
 political. The complaint calls for administration and economical re- 
 form, for a change of ministry, a more careful expenditure of rev- 
 enues, . . . for the restoration of the freedom of elections, which 
 had been broken in upon by the interference both of the Crown and 
 the great landowners. ' ' 1 
 
 I have already recited a statute of this date, which illustrates 
 these election abuses ; and other laws passed about the same 
 date give a clear idea of the frightful oppression and corrup- 
 tion which finally forced the people a second time to take up 
 arms. An act of 1444 limits the term of sheriffs to a single 
 year, for the significant reason that, so demoralizing was 
 their official life, that a longer term tended " to the uphold- 
 ing of manslaughter, perjury, and great oppression of many 
 of the King's liege people." Another act 3 contains this 
 recital : " Considering the great perjury and oppression 
 
 1 Green's History of the English People, p. 295. 
 8 2 Henry VI., chap. 9.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 37 
 
 which be and have been in this realm by sheriffs, . . . 
 clerks, coroners, stewards, bailiffs, keepers of prisons, and 
 others officers," a recital which, in view of the fact that the 
 government, in all its brandies, was in the hands of the high- 
 born classes, and that Parliament was a body of placemen, 
 we may well believe, does but scanty justice to the shameful 
 official degradation which this old spoils system had a second 
 time produced. This second rebellion, like the first, arrested 
 the grosser abuses ; but the sources and the methods of the 
 old system itself were but little disturbed. They were not 
 long in reproducing in milder form the same old evils in the 
 administration. 
 
 Public opinion, however, acquired a greater power ; officials 
 were taught a wholesome lesson of caution and forbearance ; 
 and all the lower grades of society were raised in the same 
 degree that feudalism and despotism lost their strength and 
 their terrors. But however mitigated, the spoils system itself 
 survived. It was never really much broken in upon until the 
 time of Cromwell. In fact, it was not possible to remove that 
 system without removing much of the very framework of the 
 old British constitution, or without repudiating the great 
 theory of government upon which it reposed. 
 
 The insulted and pillaged merchants, artisans, and tenants 
 of those times could see clearly enough that royal purveyors 
 and revenue collectors, who bought their offices for a round 
 sum of money that sheriffs and bailiffs, who were the tools 
 if not the stewards of the great lords of the country, pledged 
 to make their own salary and fill their masters' treasury from 
 the profits of their offices that beadles and priors, who 
 brought home to the family fireside the arbitrary power and 
 exacting demands of the Church were generally men without 
 any sense of honor or justice to which they could appeal. 
 But never having been accustomed to question the great 
 power belonging to those officials, or much to consider 
 ultimate causes in politics they naturally thought that such 
 a civil service law as I have cited, requiring that only men 
 o " desert " should be appointed, and that professional 
 office-seekers should be disqualified, would of its own virtue
 
 38 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 give adequate relief. They did not inquire what power there 
 was to enforce such a law. 
 
 I find no evidence that the authors of the reform statute of 
 Richard II. had any conception of the entire repugnance of 
 its principles to the theory and organization of the government 
 to which they had sworn allegiance. Much less did they 
 foresee that such principles could be carried into practice only 
 after centuries of conflict had changed the base of power in the 
 State a struggle for authority and monopoly on one side, and 
 liberty and justice on the other to be marked by blood and 
 martyrdom, by conflicts between Crown and Parliament, and 
 between Parliament and the people during all which liberty 
 was to increase and education to be extended ; until, w T hen 
 the people should finally win the battle, they would stand, if 
 nominally under the old monarchy of orders and privileges, 
 yet in reality with something near the political equality of a 
 republic, and with almost every right and protection which a 
 republican freeman could expect. 
 
 We ought not to judge very severely the failures of the men 
 of the fourteenth century. In our own times, we find many 
 who fail to see that the parts of the spoils system which w r e 
 have revived are in their very nature hostile to the whole 
 spirit of liberty, justice, and equality in which our government 
 is founded. They hardly take notice that the system is as 
 destructive to public morality and economy as it is injurioiis 
 to the great cause of education and to the salutary activity of 
 political parties. Nor are the numbers still small among us 
 who do not seem to comprehend much better than the subjects 
 of Richard II., that no such statute can be made effective, 
 except when re-enforced by a system of executive regulations 
 providing proper tests of fitness, upon compliance with which 
 persons of merit may secure the opportunity of appointment 
 independent of mere official or partisan favoritism.
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF DESPOTISM ON ADMINISTRATION 
 
 An Aristocratic Monarchy hostile to the just claims of merit. It tends to ven- 
 ality in bestowing office. To require every little officer to defend the doings 
 of the President, Senators and party leaders a Republican imitation of a 
 feudal tyranny. The old spoils system more courageous and consistent 
 than the modern. How the sale of offices prevented assessments and 
 frequent removals. 
 
 ISToT the spirit of the government alone, but its very organ- 
 ization and modes of action, under the Plantagenets and Tu- 
 dors, tended to produce a spoils system of favoritism^ influence, 
 nepotism, and venalitv, which frowned on personal merit and 
 
 A _*L_Z. ,. JT 
 
 scorned the idea of official responsibility. 
 
 In an arbitrary monarchy, a primary necessity of its exist- 
 ence is absolute subordination and obedience to those in power ; 
 and hence official authority must be so exerted as to preserve 
 the monopoly and exalt the influence of the official class, to the 
 end that they may overawe the common people. All authority 
 comes from above from the King. The ruling force is fear. 
 Such a government, in its very theory and administration, says 
 to the people that office should be obtained without regard to 
 personal merit. The king, the source of all office, on that theory 
 acquires his great place. The hereditary lords, who make laws 
 and hold social and political precedence, gain and hold their 
 offices irrespective of personal merit. They and the councils 
 they form fill nearly every subordinate office in their discretion, 
 and they are intended to do this not in a way that will promote 
 merit or do justice, but in such way as will exalt the king, 
 preserve their own rank, and secure obedience in all ranks 
 below them. From giving an office at pleasure, on the con- 
 dition of servility from taking office by right of birth, how- 
 ever unworthy the heir to selling it for money, is only a step. 
 When once it is admitted that office is to be given, not to ben-
 
 40 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 efit the people, or reward merit among them, but to pre- 
 serve a crown and nobility, to enforce gradation of rank, to 
 put down aspirations for freedom, the spoils system becomes 
 inevitable, or rather it is already in vigorous growth. If a 
 rough royalist may be made a sheriff because he w T ill coerce an 
 election, or enforce the payment of an arbitrary tax in the in- 
 terest of the Crown, then the office upon the same principle 
 may be sold to him for such a purpose. If the office belongs 
 to the king, duke or bishop to give to whom he will, in prin- 
 ciple it belongs to him to sell to whom he will. If he may fix- 
 the terms on which he will give it, he may fix the terms on 
 which he will sell it. To say that a man is entitled to an office 
 simply because he is a man of worth and capacity and not 
 otherwise, is in principle to say that he is entitled to be a 
 knight, a baron, a duke, or a king for the same reason 
 obviously a principle as utterly repugnant to the theory of all 
 arbitrary governments as it is essential to the prosperity of a 
 republic. Therefore the spoils system w r as the natural out- 
 growth of despotism and aristocracy. It is in its very nature 
 a royal and aristocratic and not a republican agency of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 
 
 "When Blackstone says that the king is the fountain of "jus- 
 tice, honor, office and privilege ;" that "it is impossible that 
 government can be maintained without a due subordination of 
 rank ;" that the king may make war and peace, that he may 
 create corporations, that he " has the prerogative of conferring 
 privileges upon private persons ;" when he declares that for 
 ' ' the maintenance of his dignity and the exertion of his pre- 
 rogative," the king has three councils to advise with the 
 Parliament, the law courts, and his " privy council," named at 
 his pleasure, which last council, by way of eminence, is the 
 principal ; that " the person of the king is sacred even though 
 the measures pursued in his reign be completely tyrannical and 
 arbitrary" we have presented before us in these outlines a 
 form of government and a theory of executive power and 
 responsibility in which the individual character and capacity of 
 the officers and the welfare of the citizens are everywhere made 
 subordinate to the interests of the class in power and the policy 
 of the king and his great officers.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 41 
 
 In the very nature of such a government, the number of 
 officers, the salaries, the tenure of office must obviously be 
 secondary to such essential conditions of its existence. When, 
 therefore, our Declaration of Independence justly denounced 
 George III. because " he made judges dependent on his will 
 alone for the tenure of their offices and the amount and payment 
 of their salaries," and because he created new offices and sent 
 over officers to harass our people, we really assailed the theory 
 of the government and complained of abuses which every gen- 
 eration of Englishmen before the expulsion of James II. had 
 suffered, and against which they had struggled with small 
 success. But, the strength and pernicious influence of this 
 royal and aristocratic spoils system will be greatly underrated, 
 if we do not bear in mind that the kin^ became the head of the 
 
 O 
 
 Church as well as of the State, and that the system extended 
 to social order and consideration which it regulated, and to 
 the Church which it dominated ; pursuing a policy in the 
 spheres of religion and society, quite as unjust and demoral- 
 izing as any that prevailed in politics. 
 
 It would perhaps require some apology for these few words 
 in support of propositions so nearly self-evident, were it not 
 that the difficulties in making any reform in our civil service, 
 and the faith of the people in its practicability, are unfavorably 
 affected by a loose theory, held by many persons, that such re- 
 forms are easier in a monarchy than under our form of govern- 
 ment. They regard the spoils system as so original and con- 
 genial in our institutions that they incline to tolerate it as 
 quite inevitable ; when, in fact, our spoils system is only a 
 faint reproduction, in an uncongenial age and government, of 
 vicious methods, of which the coarse and more corrupt originals 
 are to be found in the most despotic periods of British history. 
 It is in fact that part of medieval despotism, inherited by us, 
 which we have allowed to survive even slavery. 
 
 The theory that a president may require that every petty 
 executive officer shall hold his views of politics, and may com- 
 pel him to exert himself to promote exe3utive policy, is a 
 feeble reproduction of the theory and practice of the worst of 
 the Tudor ancf the Stuart princes, which were that everywhere 
 the officer must be a believer in the divine right and per-
 
 42 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 fection of the king, and an active advocate and champion of 
 royal prerogative. The theory that a State Senator may 
 selfishly use his patronage, and that all his appointees must 
 assent to his faith and promise to use their official influence, 
 to promote his prestige and his re-election, are but tame and 
 puny imitations of that arrogant, old, feudal prerogative by 
 reason of which every noble was the local ruler of his vici- 
 nage and all political action and all social life were obedient 
 to his will, as a perpetual representative in a feudal Senate. 
 The theory that a party may prostitute its authority and pat- 
 ronage in order to gain offices and levy assessments, and must 
 do so to keep itself in power, is the cunning, cowardly, modern 
 form of the old despotism, under which the king, the nobles, the 
 knights, the squires, and the gentlemen being the party for- 
 ever dominant perpetuated their supremacy by using official 
 authority in every form of injustice for keeping the great body of 
 the people in subjection. The only parts of our system, I am 
 compelled to believe, which Henry VIII., or Elizabeth, or 
 James II. , or George III. , would like, would be those theories 
 of bestowing office under which personal merit may be over- 
 , looked in the pretended interest of keeping a party in power, 
 and of causing executive policy or partisan opinions to be ad- 
 vocated by the carrier of every mail-bag and the keeper of every 
 office-door. But more consistently they would also require that 
 every priest and beadle of the Church, and every general and 
 corporal of the army, as well as all the members of the legis- 
 lature, should exhibit the same evidence of true faith and alle- 
 giance. 
 
 In fact, one of the marked distinctions between the original 
 despotic-spoils system and the modern partisan-spoils system 
 is this : that the old system was bold, consistent, and out- 
 spoken not pretending to make selections for office out of 
 regard for personal merit or economy, or the general wel- 
 fare. It plainly asserted that those in power had a right and 
 duty to keep themselves in power and preserve their monopoly 
 in any way which their judgment should approve, and that the 
 people were bound to submit ; while the modern system, at all 
 times carrying the spirit of the original as far as it dares, falsely 
 pretends to be guided by personal worth and the public interest.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 43 
 
 If it shall be noticed that in the examples given in illustra- 
 tion of the original spoils system, it does not appear that the 
 modern abuse of frequent removals and of levying assessments 
 upon officers and placemen, or even the common forms of 
 bribery, are very prominent, the explanation is easy. In the 
 practice of the original system, the theory that the appointing 
 power and all official authority are mere perquisites was carried 
 to its legitimate results. Offices and places, royal prerogatives 
 of every grade, and great and little official favors, were, as we 
 have seen, openly sold, or were used as bribes and threats in 
 whatever way found most available. In order that the market 
 rate should be high, it was necessary that the purchaser should 
 be assured that he could retain the commodity bought, and that 
 it would not be made valueless by the further exercise of official 
 authority in levying taxes. A nobleman or minister could 
 sell an office or a monopoly for but a poor price, if any body 
 of ministers and lords, or even the king 3 could thereafter tax 
 that office or monopoly at pleasure, or remove the owner. In 
 other words, the greater corruption of open sale and barter of 
 offices in great measure excluded those peculiar and numr 
 
 ou=r.^_^____ _ f- _ iSSSBsil; ~' 
 
 abuses of removals and assessments. So strongly, indeed, did 
 this influence of general venality tend to permanence of tenure 
 in the subordinate offices, and to cause them to be farmed out 
 to non-resident agents, after the Turkish fashion, that non- 
 resident officers were forbidden in 1402. And in 1519 ' an act 
 was passed with this title : " Customers, 2 controllers, searchers, 
 etc., shall be removable at the pleasure of the king and shall 
 be resident upon their office." 
 
 For similar reasons bribery of electors or members of Parlia- 
 ment which, in later years, became one of the most serious 
 abuses in Great Britain was as yet but little known. Electors 
 felt small interest in officers sure to be servilely obedient to the 
 king and the nobles ; and members of Parliament were almost 
 without patronage and wielded only a small portion of the 
 legislative power which, in later centuries, growing to be 
 almost supreme, made the vote of a member and even of an 
 elector of value in the great market of politics. 
 
 1 1 Henry IV., chap. 13. a Custom -Ho use officers.
 
 CHAPTER IY. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION ILSLDEK THE TUDORS AND UNTIL CROMWELL. 
 
 Venality under Henry VII. Boroughs created to control Parliament. Its 
 independence assailed. Elections interfered with. Dock-yard influence. 
 Spoils system extended to the Church and its effect. Leads to royal as- 
 sumptions of absolute power. James' interference with the judges* Great 
 corruption under James. Lord Coke and Lord Bacon. Parliament grows 
 bolder. The Petition of Right. Our party assessments repugnant to that 
 memorable statute. 
 
 HAA-ING, I trust, sufficiently explained the origin and spirit 
 of the spoils system, which we have so largely reproduced, it is 
 unnecessary, and it would be tedious, to follow the details of its 
 application, or even to note all the ways in which, from time to 
 time, its worst features were removed. While there were various 
 modifications sometimes toward what was worse, and some- 
 times toward what was better there was no essential change 
 of the system after the opening of the fifteenth century until 
 the time of Cromwell. In the reign of Henry VIII., the 
 crown itself was treated as a mere personal perquisite of him 
 who wore it, which he was authorized by statute to dispose of 
 by last will and testament, and Henry did so dispose of it. 
 The great and exciting religious questions and the frequent 
 wars by which the politics of the period were embroiled and 
 the higher thought of the nation was absorbed, were in every 
 way unfavorable to good administration. I need not recall 
 the political history of the reigns of Henry VIII. , Edward VI. , 
 Mary, Elizabeth, or James I., as it is familiar knowledge that 
 they cover a period in which men seem to have been almost 
 willing to forego civil liberty and official morality, if they 
 could have plenty of angry contentions and bloody scenes over 
 church dogma and ecclesiastical forms. The leading minds 
 \vere given the great subjects of church reformation. There
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 45 
 
 can be little doubt that the long continuance of political cor- 
 ruption greatly debased official morality, and, as a natural con- 
 sequence, private morality ; and it is even a question whether, 
 on the whole, both the morals of politics and methods of gov- 
 ernment did not degenerate during this period. 
 
 A few illustrations of the abiding spirit of the old system, 
 which have an important bearing upoif later changes, are all the 
 notice I shall need to take of those times. So irresistible 
 was the spoils system, and so little fearless public opinion was 
 there under the first two Tudor princes (1485 to 1547), that 
 almost the only resistance made to the government was directed 
 against arbitrary taxes levied by the Crown. Speaking of the 
 first of them (Henry "VII.), Hallam says that " even the King's 
 clemency seems to have sprung from the sordid motive of sell- 
 ing pardons ; and it has been shown that he made a profit of 
 every office in his court, and received money for conferring 
 bishoprics." Early in the next reign, we begin to find the 
 strong manifestation of that pernicious appliance of the spoils 
 system, through which, frequently, in the succeeding centuries, 
 Parliament became little more than a body of servile placemen, 
 named by the king and the great nobles, to endorse their 
 policy and pay their henchmen and relatives in office. Refer- 
 ring to the reign of Henry VIII., Mr. Hallam says that " a 
 considerable part of the Commons appears to have consisted 
 of the King's Household officers." 
 
 In order to secure compliankmembers, as Parliament increas- 
 ed in importance, Edward YI. created twenty new boroughs, 
 Mary fourteen, and Elizabeth as many as sixty-two ; nor did the 
 government " scruple a direct and avowed interference with 
 elections." It was the habit of the Tudor kings to cause 
 letters to be sent to the electors stating ' ' our pleasure and 
 commandment," as to who should be elected to Parliament. 
 One of Mary's letters, written in 1554, " admonishes the elect- 
 ors to choose Catholics." Speaking of Elizabeth's reign, Mr. 
 Hallam says : " The ministry took much pains with elections. 
 
 . . . The House accordingly was filled with placemen, 
 civilians, and common lawyers grasping at preferment." Re- 
 
 1 Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 27. 
 4
 
 46 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 f erring to about the same date, Mr. Froude Bays : " Either a 
 circular was addressed to the sheriffs of counties or mayors of 
 towns, simply naming the persons who were to be chosen, or 
 the electors were instructed to accept their directions from some 
 members of the privy council. In some instances the orders 
 of the Crown were direct to the candidate himself. " Here we 
 find the original of our modern interference with the freedom 
 of local elections by the national administration and the party 
 managers. And when Mr. Froude says that, ' ' in Portsmouth 
 and Southampton the government influence was naturally para- 
 mount, through the dockyards and establishments maintained 
 in them, ' ' I think we may naturally infer that the venal and 
 corrupt use of dockyard sinecurists and custom-house-patron- 
 age coercion for carrying elections are not of republican 
 origin, but are at least three and a quarter centuries old. The 
 early leaders of the spoils system did not, however, stop with 
 dictating as to who should go to parliaments ; but, with in- 
 flexible consistency, they endeavored to control, arbitrarily, the 
 tongues as well as elections of their members. Blackstone 
 tells us that " the glorious Queen Elizabeth made no scruple 
 to direct her parliaments to abstain from discoursing of mat- 
 ters of state." Mr. Ilallam says the Queen used to send 
 messages to Parliament ' ' to spend little time in motions and 
 make no long speeches. ' ' With us it is only the tyranny of 
 the party majority that suppresses debate on disagreeable sub- 
 jects. ' ' It became the common whisper that no one must 
 speak against licenses lest the Queen and council should be 
 angry." And at the close of the session, " the Lord Keeper 
 severely reprimanded those audacious, arrogant, and presump- 
 tuous members who had called her Majesty's grants and 
 prerogatives in question." The modern partisan managers 
 only send a few thousands of assessment collections to the 
 district of an independent member and defeat his re-election. 
 "We have not, to be sure, admitted that the practice of in- 
 terfering with the freedom of elections, in aid of the party, as 
 it is called, would justify a like interference with the freedom 
 of debate ; but is it quite certain that, under our more partisan 
 
 1 History, vol. v., p. 428.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. .47 
 
 ^^) fa&^i^uAAstlu^^l<rtt^ **Wo fiftf^ 
 application of tlie spoils system, tlie freedom of debate is not 
 as much hampered, or that it does not require as much courage 
 and as much imperil a re-election, to oppose the commands of 
 the party, as it did to oppose those of Henry VIII. or of Eliz- 
 abeth ? The same system which accorded to noblemen a sort 
 of monopoly of all offices not directly filled by the king or his 
 ministers, also gave them formal patents for " the privilege of 
 importing wine free of duty for the consumption of their house- 
 holds" patents which we know have hardly been needed by 
 the lords of our patronage system, to secure them a still more 
 extensive exemption from the payment of duties. 
 
 During this period, as in the earlier periods to which I have 
 referred, the spoils system was not kept within the sphere 
 of politics, but was boldly extended to that of religion as 
 well ; and with results equally demoralizing. " In the 
 country ' the patron of a benefice no longer made dis- 
 tinction between a clergyman and a layman. . . . He 
 presented his steward, his huntsman, or his gamekeeper. 
 Clergy, even bishops who called themelves Gospellers would 
 hold three or four or more livings, doing service in none ; or 
 if, as a condescension, they appointed curates, they looked out 
 for starving monks who would do the duty for the lowest pay 
 men who would take service indifferently under God or the 
 devil, to keep life in their famished bodies. . . . The 
 cathedrals and churches of London became the chosen scenes 
 of riot and profanity. St. Paul's was the Stock Exchange of 
 the day, where the merchants of the city met for business and 
 the lounge where the young gallants gambled, fought and 
 killed each other. They rode their horses through the aisles 
 and stabled them among the monuments." 
 
 How naturally such a spoils system, prevailing through 
 so many centuries, and forever saying to kings and nobles, 
 " Your right it is to rule through officers and favorites 
 selected at your caprice, without regard to merit, economy, or 
 the general welfare," led on to the Star Chamber, to Charles 
 I. and James II., to Laud and to Jeffreys is too obvious for 
 comment. Nothing but the influence of such a system, in spirit 
 
 1 Froude's History, vol. v., p. 255-257.
 
 48 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 asserting omnipotent and irresponsible power in the ruler, 
 makes it conceivable that even James I. could ever have used 
 those words of sublime audacity : " As it is atheism and blas- 
 phemy in a creature to dispute what the Deity may do, so it is 
 presumption and sedition in a subject to dispute what a king 
 may do in the height of his power. ' ' And I am persuaded 
 that the feeling so general even to this day, that it is a less 
 offence to use the appointing power _for a corrupt or selfish 
 
 I purpose than it is to use the public money for the same purpose, 
 has its source far back in those arbitrary centuries during which 
 all example, all law, all teaching, impressed upon our ancestors 
 the doctrine that the use of official authority was absolute and 
 irresponsible in him who possessed it, even if that possession 
 was not a divine favor too sacred and awful to be questioned 
 by ordinary mortals. We may find the root of this pernicious 
 distinction in the theory of King James himself, for even his 
 doctrine of the divine right of kings did not mean that he 
 might use the public money or the public stores at his pleasure 
 or corruptly, but that he might so use his "prerogative 
 royal" the power to appoint and remove officers and place- 
 men and herein he agreed exactly with partisan managers of 
 modern times. The King and Laud scrutinized the religious 
 opinions of office-seekers as carefully as they did their political 
 opinions ; and orthodoxy in the former, not less than in the 
 latter, was an indispensable condition of royal favor. 
 
 It was as much a part of this old spoils system l that every 
 officer should obey every direction of his superior, as it was 
 that an appointment might be made or sold at pleasure ; and 
 this they extended to military and judicial offices as well. 
 The unflinching champions of that system at this period re- 
 fused to see any distinction between claiming an arbitrary 
 
 I right to make a judge or a justice out of a compliant, incom- 
 petent favorite (with the intent that he should be obedient), 
 
 1 There was another old method of strengthening the opinion and policy 
 of the government, quite remarkable for its arbitrary forecast. " The rapid 
 increase of London [says Mr. Hallam] " continued to disquiet the court. It 
 was the stronghold of political and religious disaffection, hence the prohibi- 
 tions of erecting new houses, which had begun under Elizabeth, were con- 
 tinually repeated."
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 49 
 
 and the right to command him if disobedient ; or between a 
 political test for office and a religious test for office. And 
 although we may all the more for this reason admire the 
 heroic sense of justice which caused Lord Coke to refuse to 
 give judgment as King James ordered, we can hardly deny 
 that the king's commands were very much, if not more than 
 the refusal of Coke, in harmony with the constitution of that 
 day and with the practice under it. ' 
 
 When James prohibited the judges from " wounding his 
 prerogative under pretext of the interest of private persons, ' ' 
 and Coke was first suspended and then dismissed from his 
 office because he answered, ' ' that when the case should arise 
 he would do what should be fit for a judge to do," he was 
 naturally thought in official circles to be disobedient and 
 erratic a view of the matter not so strange when we reflect 
 that he assrted a principle of official independence which, in 
 our generation even, has cost many a manly officer his place 
 when he attempted to protect " the interest of private per- 
 sons" against the tyranny of partisan dictation. Sinecurists 
 and placemen sw T armecT7n all the offices, and extravagance and 
 inefficiency prevailed everywhere in Church and State, in the 
 army and the navy. The peace expenditures of James I. 
 exceeded the war expenditures of Elizabeth. According to 
 Mr. Hallam, the terrific powers of the Star Chamber (a natural 
 growth of the spoils system) were resorted to by James I. as 
 much " to eke out a scanty revenue by penalties and for- 
 feitures" as for any other purpose. Lord Bacon's official 
 corruption was punished, not so much because it was of a 
 kind uncommon as because it was that of the Lord Chancellor, 
 the keeper of the king's conscience, and the highest subject 
 of the realm. Mr. Hallam says that " shameless corruption 
 characterizes the reign of James beyond every other in our his- 
 tory. " Mr. Green 2 says, " Payment of bribes to him (the 
 Duke of Buckingham), or marriage witli his greedy relatives, 
 became the only road to political preferment. ' ' James not 
 
 1 Under the Tudors " the Judges in the application and exposition of the 
 criminal law were servile tools of the sovereign." Creasy on the English 
 Constitution. 
 
 8 History English People, p. 480.
 
 50 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 only had offices sold and shared the proceeds with his favorite 
 ministers, but he sold his prerogative of making corporations 
 and granting monopolies ; getting, for example, a large sum 
 for a starch-making monopoly and 10,000 for a soap-making 
 charter. ~Nor was this the worst, for, more merciless than any 
 modern tyrant of patronage, he revoked this soap-charter and 
 exacted a large sum for a new one ; and out of ' ' political 
 resentment " he even extorted large fines from those who did 
 not come forward and receive knighthood at his hands. 
 
 These administrative abuses, and the extravagant claims of 
 prerogative to which they led on, were, as all the world 
 knows, in great part at least the causes which drove the people 
 to arms (for the third time in self-defence) during the next 
 reign. "While thus all official life, both lay and clerical, was 
 becoming more and more a festering source of corruption and 
 a vast agency of tyranny, the control of which tended to those 
 extravagant claims of prerogative made by Gardiner and Laud, 
 and Charles and James, there was on the other hand an increase 
 of wealth and intelligence and a growing courage among the 
 common people, whom the poison of the spoils system least 
 touched. Parliament became more active and aggressive. Its 
 members secured more influence over appointments ; and with 
 this tendency there came a greater desire for seats in that body. 
 In such a state of public morality as then existed, bribery 
 was an inevitable consequence. In the session of 1571, a fine 
 had been imposed for bribery in a parliamentary election. 
 This is the first instance on record of the punishment of that 
 offence in England ; an offence which for a long time grew 
 more frequent, and which in some form, for more than two 
 centuries, continued to be one of the greatest scandals of Eng- 
 lish politics. 
 
 Popular intelligence had become too great, and the virtues 
 of private life too robust, to longer tolerate supinely the huge 
 vices bred in official circles. The spirit of resistance was 
 aroused. The demand for reform first made itself greatly 
 felt in the election of 1614, which brought such men as John 
 Pym and John Eliot into Parliament. Puritanism, and the 
 great law called the " Petition of Right," were the well-known 
 expression of that reform spirit. x\nd as we read the princi-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE EST GREAT BRITAIN. 51 
 
 pal demand of that celebrated law, " that no man hereafter 
 be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, or 
 tax, or such like charge, without common consent by act of 
 Parliament," and reflect upon the noble spirit by which it was 
 extorted, it is well to remember that, although that high de- 
 mand has long since been complied with in England, yet in this 
 republican country (to which even Cromwell and Hampden 
 sought to flee from the tyranny of Charles), tens of thousands 
 of public officers and employees national, state, and munici- 
 pal have long been compelled to annually make "gifts and 
 benevolences," under the name of political^ assessments, at the 
 peril of dismissal or with the hope of promotion a threat and 
 a bribe as great and as debasing as any that King Charles could 
 have inflicted upon the meanest in his civil service. 
 
 The story is too familiar to warrant any repetition here, 
 how the English people, when once aroused, carried on their 
 contest against the spoils system of James I. and Charles I. But 
 I cannot dismiss this period without a word of observation as to 
 the debasing effect upon the public conscience of familiarity 
 with flagrant public wrong. The readiness with which we 
 supinely endure such exactions upon the members of our civil 
 service and upon those who work for the public such legalized 
 pillaga of the people's money (for that partisan tyranny which 
 coerces^ the assessment also keeps up salaries and wages need- 
 lessly high in order that the assessment may be paid), at the 
 same moment that we abhor and prohibit monopolies and the 
 sale of offices is certainly a remarkable instance of that effect. 
 "We seem to think it a wholly different wrong to sell an office 
 or a franchise outright from that involved in handing it arbi- 
 trarily over to a servile dependent, on the condition that his 
 master may exact from him an annual rent, to be fixed at his 
 will, on the peril of ejection. The chances, I venture to 
 think, are that he who holds by purchase will cherish the more 
 wholesome and manly feeling of independence. That noble 
 man, Sir Samuel Romilley, found a more honorable independ- 
 ence in a seat in Parliament he purchased than a partisan sys- 
 tem would allow him to secure by an ordinary election. And 
 perhaps John Hampden himself would not think Charles I. a 
 greater tyrant, because he arbitrarily required a tax from all
 
 52 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of his subjects alike for tlie purposes of the public treasury 
 than he would consider that American President or Secretary 
 to be who should, as arbitrarily, require a tax from those 
 whom he has the power to dismiss, to be used, not in aid of the 
 public treasury, but for the baser purposes of keeping himself 
 and his friends in office, and his opponents out of office. But 
 it is plain enough that such a President might be a far greater 
 coward than the King ; since real courage is required to prac- 
 tice extortion upon a whole nation, while any vulgar tyrant 
 may enforce depredations upon a few thousand of his official 
 subordinates. The justification made by James and Laud for 
 levying the tax was in principle precisely that made by mod- 
 ern partisans in defence of party assessments, that it was 
 necessary to uphold their principles and to keep their party in 
 power.
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 CROMWELL'S ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. 
 
 He rejected the worst abuses of the old system, but relied on patronage. 
 His situation similar to that of a party leader A sort of partisan system 
 introduced. He applied a joint test of religion and politics at the gates of 
 office. Made important reforms. The test applied to members of Parlia- 
 ment and army officers. A better system hardly possible in his day. 
 Marvel, Eliot, and Vane as reformers. 
 
 CROMWELL gave the first blow to the despotic spoils system 
 which was heavy enough to break in its framework. He was 
 no mere administrative reformer, but a mighty impersonation 
 of a new spirit in religion and politics, of better methods in 
 government and of grander conceptions of the duties and 
 responsibilities both of rulers and of citizens. It was principles 
 and ideas a well-defined creed in religion, and large views in 
 politics and not class interests or traditional favoritism, that 
 were to bear sway while he lived. There were neither party 
 platforms nor parties in the modern sense, but (excepting a 
 few gathered separately) there were two great, hostile bodies in 
 the state the one standing together for the divine right of 
 kings, for rank, privilege, and the old^s_poils_system generally, 
 and the other for Cromwell and the principles and spirit of the 
 great revolution of which he was the leader. Cromwell and 
 his fellow-oificers recognized themselves as representing at least 
 that portion of the people who believed as they did ; and 
 hence they regarded themselves as responsible to them for 
 economy and efficiency in the administration. This placed 
 them much in the attitude of party leaders ; having imposed 
 upon them the obligation of justifying their use of official 
 authority to so many of the people as constitute the ruling 
 majority. This sort of responsibility, directly to at least a 
 great portion of the people, rather than to a privileged and
 
 54 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 official class alone, marks the great advance of party over 
 despotic government in the exercise of official power. Such 
 a power may be used as corruptly by a party as by a despot 
 (as I shall have occasion to point out), but not so despotically ; 
 and hence a partisan use of such authority seems to be naturally 
 an intermediate stage of progress between the arbitrary use of 
 that power by a despot and its use by officers who, regarding 
 their authority as a public trust, make appointments on the 
 basis of personal merit. 
 
 It is plain that Cromwell must have men of capacity in the 
 public service, or his rule would be short ; and neither his 
 temper nor the spirit of the times tended to make him any 
 more scrupulous about slaughtering the innocents and driving 
 out those who did not accept his creed in the public service 
 than he was of cutting down his enemies on the lield of battle. 
 It was a time of bloody antagonism and desperate measures. 
 He had no leisure for perfecting methods of administration, 
 and the violent sentiment of the times demanded retaliation 
 and proscription. He made some reforms of great import- 
 ance, with a wise regard to the interest of the people ; and, 
 in his own interest and that of his favorites and followers, 
 he applied the partisan system with a vigor and a logical 
 consistency from which its modern votaries would shrink. 
 Himself a member of Parliament, he was, perhaps, the first 
 to advocate the salutary doctrine that legislators ought not to 
 hold executive office or interfere with its proper duties, but he 
 fell from the great principles of his speech by remaining a 
 member while he held the most influential executive office in 
 the army. He struck from the pay rolls many drones and 
 sinecurists. He dealt heavy blows upon court favoritism and 
 extravagance generally. He infused vigor into every part of 
 the administration, and character and economy were more 
 regarded in his appointments than ever before. He gave 
 members of Parliament a voice in the appointment of minis 
 ters, and, for a time at least, he allowed them full legislative 
 authority ; but he also dispersed one Parliament at the point 
 of the sword, and he locked the members of another out of 
 their hall until they promised to approve his policy. He 
 made a creed and a policy of his religion and his politics
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 55 
 
 united ; and lie enforced it in selecting the members of his 
 regiment as well as the members of his civil service. He was 
 too manly and statesmanlike to allow predatory levies or 
 assessments by anybody upon his officials ; but he used 
 intrigue and coercion, if he escaped venality, in the exercise 
 of the appointing power. He caused rotten boroughs to be 
 swept away, and members to be sent from unrepresented 
 towns ; but he disfranchised Catholics and Royalists. 
 
 In his own way he gave the partisan system a most vigorous 
 trial. For Cromwell not only gave office and titles, confiscated 
 lands, and brijbes of other sorts to his favorites and to those he 
 wished to conciliate, but he added a religious to a political test 
 for office. And to induce others to think as he did, he placed 
 the creed of Congregationalism at the door of his conventions 
 and parliaments, as we place the creed of our party at the doors 
 of the post-offices and custom-houses. He not only nominated 
 those who were to be voted for as members of a Parliament, 
 but he also required them to get a certificate of orthodoxy 
 from his council before they were allowed to pass the doors 
 of the House. Being substantially in the position of a great 
 party leader, he did not see any reason why executive and 
 partisan coercion and tests of opinion might not be applied 
 to legislative officers, and to those in the army, as well as to 
 officials in the civil service proper. And can we deny the 
 logical consistency of his reasoning ? Those of opposing 
 faiths and factions were as prescriptive and as vigorously 
 demanded that political spoils should be made the reward of 
 victory as has ever been the case in the most violent partisan 
 contests of our times. Xo partisan manager ever used patron- 
 age more skilfully or more boldly than Cromwell. And he 
 evidently believed it would strengthen his hold upon power 
 and perpetuate his dynasty. Of one of his Parliaments it is 
 said that u It was calculated that of the members returned, one 
 half were bound to the government by ties of profit or place." 
 The system does not seem to have been any more effective than 
 in our day in securing model men for the customs service. 
 For example, one of his statutes recites that " Carmen, por- 
 
 1 Green's History of the English People, p. 576.
 
 56 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ters, watermen, and others employed on the quays, . . . 
 and also on the River Thames, are very ordinarily drunk, and 
 do also profane and blaspheme the holy name of God by curs- 
 ing and swearing." lie punished such offenders, however, 
 with a vigor that we have never reached ; for he gave his 
 customs officers the powers of justices of the peace, with 
 liberty to appoint deputies, each of whom, without special 
 warrant, might arrest any of these drunkards and blas- 
 phemers. 
 
 Neither Robert Walpole nor General Jackson could deny 
 that this first trial of the partisan system was in able hands. 
 But not even the mighty genius of Cromwell was able through 
 that system to secure for himself or his party any abiding 
 position or official gratitude. As he went on under it, his 
 power steadily declined. Upon his decease, his followers 
 melted away. Almost without a struggle, England resumed 
 allegiance to the heir to her throne, utterly base and unworthy 
 as he was. The greatest genius for government England ever 
 produced was not able, through the most skilful use of pa- 
 tronage, to leave gratitude enough behind him to save his 
 own bones from being dragged from the grave and exposed on 
 a gibbet to the jeers of the royalists. It is quite probable 
 that in the intolerant period in which he lived when un- 
 popular opinions took men to the block when men fought 
 about religious dogmas when even slavery stood unchallenged 
 by the popular judgment when the noblest man of his time 
 was executed for treason in violation of the pledge of a king 
 any less mercenary and partisan system than his would 
 have failed of support ; just as in such times it would have 
 been impossible to have manned fleets or filled up armies, or 
 to have led either successfully, without the hope and the en- 
 joyment of sacks, pillages, and spoils which were so long 
 believed to be equally justiable and inevitable in warfare and 
 from the terrible reality of which the designation of ' ' spoils 
 system," in politics, has been derived. 
 
 It cannot therefore be said that Cromwell really broke up 
 the spoils system as a whole, but only in part ; but his admin- 
 istration caused some salutary changes in public opinion upon 
 the subject, as well as in the modes of carrying on public
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 57 
 
 business. The number of those who thought and acted boldly 
 upon political questions was permanently increased, and the 
 old system lost much of its prestige, which it never regained. 
 It was made easier for Parliament to become a great power 
 at the expense of the Crown and the nobility. The Star 
 Chamber, the Court of High Commission, and the arbitrary 
 levy of taxes were at an end. In the minds of a great portion, 
 and that the more intelligent portion, of the middle classes, the 
 awe and majesty which had hedged about a king, and made a 
 manly scrutiny of his doings almost impossible, was to be no 
 more. 
 
 The great political contests in the times of Charles I. and of 
 Cromwell had turned upon the fundamental principle of civil 
 and religious liberty, and the time had not arrived when patriots 
 and statesmen could in quiet sit down to the study of the prob- 
 lem of honest and economical administration. But an age that 
 could produce Ilampden and Pym, Eliot and Marvel, Milton 
 and Vane, and could place them in Parliament or in high 
 offices of state, gives reason to expect that the solid virtues and 
 statesmanship nourished in the private life of the people will 
 in due time make themselves felt in the execution of the laws. 
 In the writings of Marvel, we find perhaps the first systematic 
 attack upon administrative abuses recorded in English history ; 
 sinecurists, placemen, and corrupt and subservient court fa- 
 vorites being so roughly handled by him that he was in dan- 
 ger of assassination. His acts were in the spirit of his words ; 
 and at a time when he was so poor as to need to borrow a 
 guinea, Charles II. tried in vain to bribe him with a 1000. 
 He is said to have been the last member of Parliament who 
 was paid for his services. But he served his constitutents with 
 wonderful ability and fidelity, sending them a daily account 
 of the proceedings of Parliament in letters which were 
 thought worthy of publication even after the elapsing of a 
 century. The abolition of all compensation to members was 
 admirably calculated and was probably designed to keep out 
 of Parliament poor men like Marvel, who were genuine 
 representatives of a free and pure sentiment steadily growing 
 among the people. Reformers were becoming troublesome in 
 that age.
 
 58 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 In a noble speech of Sir John Eliot, made in the House of 
 Commons in support of the " Petition of Right " in 1628, he 
 used this courageous and prophetic language : " For the next, 
 the ignorance and corruption of our ministers, where can you 
 miss of instances. If you survey the court, if you survey the 
 country ; if the Church, if the city be examined ; if you 
 observe the bar, if the bench, if the ports, if the shipping, if 
 the land, if the seas all these will give you variety of proofs ; 
 and that, in such measure and proportion as shows the great- 
 ness of the disease to be such that, if there be not some speedy 
 appliance of remedy, our case is almost desperate. ' ' And he 
 demanded that a great inquisition " should be speedily made 
 into these alarming abuses. ' ' In that age a reformer had not (as 
 in England a century later, or now in this country) merely to 
 encounter small sarcasm or the coarse misrepresentation of 
 those whom he might scorn, but to withstand the despotic 
 power and the vindictive passions of those who could put his 
 liberty and life in peril, as Eliot well knew and soon experi- 
 enced. He must be such a man as Mr. Gladstone says he 
 found in Zachary Macauley, who " expected little comfort in 
 this world, and looked for his reward only beyond the grave." 
 The inquisition which Eliot demanded was not made ; and 
 his bold arraignment of the government caused this great 
 patriot and reformer, whom Hallam declares to be " the most 
 illustrious confessor in the cause of liberty whom the times pro- 
 duced," to be speedily thrown into the Tower by the King's 
 order, where his health giving way, after great suffering, he 
 died in 1632. These facts are very familiar history ; but it 
 is not so generally noticed, I think, how greatly the adminis- 
 trative corruption and incompetency which, if not removed 
 by " speedy appliance of remedy," Eliot declared would 
 make the condition of the kingdom ' ' desperate, ' ' had to do 
 with driving the people to arms and bringing Charles himself 
 to the block only seventeen years later. 
 
 It is, however, in the life and character of the noble Puri- 
 tan statesman, Sir Henry Vane whom Cromwell and Charles 
 both feared and in the fact that he was long a member of 
 Parliament and in various other high offices, that we may find 
 the best evidence of the great strength which the liberal and
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 59 
 
 reforming spirit in that age had attained. He had the dis- 
 interestedness, the courage, and the constructive capacity 
 essential to a great administrative reformer. He gave up to 
 the government the fees of his office as Treasurer of the 
 Navy, which amounted to 30,000 a year ; and, as chairman 
 of a committee, he reported a bill for parliamentary reform. 
 But he was too far in advance of his age to achieve the 
 important reforms he desired. It was on account of his great 
 liberality in religion and politics that in early life he was 
 opposed by Winthrop and was defeated as a candidate for 
 governor in the Puritan colony of Massachusetts. As a leader 
 of the Independents, he rendered great service in behalf of 
 New England ; and, befriending Roger "Williams after he fled 
 from official tyranny at Salem, it was the vast influence of 
 Yane's character that procured that liberal charter for the 
 Rhode Island colony, which was as much in advance of the 
 general spirit of the New World as it was of that of 
 the Old. The King feared his virtues. Parliament and the 
 great leaders were too base to save him ; and thirty years 
 after the death of Eliot, Yane was beheaded. So great in 
 those days was the peril of being a patriot and a reformer.
 
 CHAPTER YI. 
 
 PUBLIC SERVICE UNDER CHARLES II. AND JAMES II. 
 
 Corruption gross and universal. Bribery of members of Parliament be- 
 comes systematic. Prostitution of the appointing power. Parliament 
 crowded with placemen. Officials make great fortunes. The King him- 
 self bribed. Religious tests for office. Administration as imbecile as it is 
 venal. Gerrymandering boroughs and packing Parliaments. Removals, 
 and revocation of licenses, on account of opinions. The spoils system ex- 
 tended to the army. Noble examples of courage and self-respect on the pait 
 of officers and candidates. Favoritism and corruption unsuccessful. The 
 judiciary invaded by the spoils system. How far that system contributed 
 to the fall of James II. 
 
 IT is not in the reign of an idler and a sensualist like Charles 
 II. , nor in that of a corrupt tyrant and bigot like James II. , that 
 we are to look for reform in public affairs. But these reigns 
 are full of admonition ; and they afford striking illustrations of 
 the extent to which administrative abuses are independent of 
 forms of government. 
 
 The surprise expressed by some historians that no conditions 
 in favor of good administration were exacted on the restoration 
 \ of Charles II. would perhaps be less if they had reflected that 
 I the privileged classes were opposed to such conditions, and 
 that a vast army, in great part old officers and placemen, 
 expected to become officials again, and to enjoy .the spoils of 
 ' the old system revived. Cromwell had established no method 
 except the arbitrary exercise of his will and that of his offi- 
 cers for official selections. That method, in the hands of a 
 monarch like Charles II., in an age of reaction against Puri- 
 tanism as well as all morality and religion, was precisely what 
 the most corrupt and desperate villains in politics, and all the 
 dependents of the privileged classes, most desired. It in- 
 cluded all the essential conditions of a saturnalia of official cor-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 6L 
 
 ruption, and therefore facilitated the loss of no small portion 
 of what had been gained for good government by the revolu- 
 tion. Quite as unscrupulously as at any other period, public 
 authority in the hands of the King, his favorites, and the priv- 
 ileged classes was now used in every grade of official life as a 
 prerogative for gain, a bribery fund, and a terror ; to the de- 
 basing demands of which every one seeking to enter the public 
 service must prostrate himself, and every one in it must con- 
 form. Ko man of high capacity could act the part of a patriot 
 or a reformer who had not the stalwart virtue that could with- 
 stand offers the most tempting and threats the most formid- 
 able. It was in this reign that the systematic buying of votes 
 in Parliament began, and the abuse spread with great rapidity. 
 We shall never realize how vast have been the reforms in 
 Great Britain, without looking into the profound depths of 
 the corruption and villainy which followed the Restoration. 
 
 On two points Charles was in earnest : (1) " he would not 
 have a company of fellows ' looking into his actions and exam- 
 ining his ministers and accounts ;" and (2) he would have titles 
 and estates for his mistresses, and would use the appointing 
 power freely to gratify his passions, please his court, reward 
 his favorites, punish his enemies caring as little as the most 
 mercenary partisan demagogue of later days for the cost of 
 the service or the rights, honor, or morals of the people. 
 
 " The public service was starved that courtiers might be pam- 
 pered." . . . " The personal favorites of the sovereign, his 
 ministers and the creatures of those ministers were gorged with public 
 money." . . . " The regular salary was, however, the smallest 
 part of the gains of an official man of that age. From the nobleman 
 who held the white staff and the great seal down to the humblest tide 
 waiter and ganger, what would now be called gross corruption was 
 practiced without disguise and without reproach. Titles, places, com- 
 missions, pardons were daily sold in market overt by the great dignita- 
 ries of the realm ; and every clerk in every department imitated, to 
 the best of his power, the evil example. Whitehall, when he dwelt 
 there, was a focus of political intrigue and fashionable gayety." 
 
 ' He meant by " fellows" members of Parliament, and it must be borne in 
 mind that members of Parliament had not yet got so much patronage as to 
 be involved in the corruption of the tunes. 
 5
 
 62 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 " Whoever could make himself agreeable to the prince or could 
 secure the good offices of the ministers, might hope to rise in the 
 world without rendering any service to the government, without even 
 being known by sight to any Minister of State. This courtier got a 
 frigate, and that a company ; the third the pardon of a rich offender; 
 a fourth a lease of Crown land on easy terms. ' ' 
 
 ' ' If the King notified his pleasure that a briefless favorite should 
 be made a judge or that a libertine favorite should be made a peer, 
 the gravest counsellors, after a little murmuring, submitted. ' ' 
 
 " The immense gain of official men moved envy and indignation. 
 Here a gentleman was paid to do nothing. There many gentlemen 
 were paid to do what would be better done by one. " . . . " The 
 house swarmed with placemen of all kinds Lords of the Treasury, 
 Lords of the Admiralty, Commissioners of Customs, Commissioners 
 of Excise, Commissioners of Prizes, Tellers, Auditors, Receivers, 
 Paymasters, Officers of the Mint, Officers of the Household, Colonels 
 of Regiments, Captains of Men-of-war, Governors of Forts. ' ' 
 
 Parliament made no serious attempt to reform in this 
 reign. 
 
 " There was great servility and no small amount of corruption 
 among its members. A minister of Charles II. declared that to pocket 
 the bribes, members flocked around him like so many jackdaws for 
 cheese." 2 
 
 The King and the court actually became pensionaries of great cor- 
 porations, and franchises and titles were bartered for money. Childs, 
 the Chairman of the India Company, bribed Charles II. with a pres- 
 ent of 10,000 guineas from its funds, and James II. with the same 
 amount. 
 
 " All who could help or hurt at court, ministers, mistresses, priests, 
 were kept in good humor by presents of shawls and silks, bird's-nests 
 and attar of roses, bulses of diamonds and bags of guineas. 
 James ordered his seal to be set to a new charter." 
 
 Imitating Cromwell, Parliament in this reign applied a theo- 
 logical as well as a political test to office. The Test Act re- 
 quired, in addition to the oath of allegiance and supremacy, 
 
 1 Macauley's History, vol. i. , p. 303 and 359. 
 
 8 Palgrave's Lectures on House of Commons, 1877. 
 
 3 History, vol. vi., p. 249.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 63 
 
 that every one in the civil and military employment of the 
 State should make a declaration against transubstantiation and 
 also partake of the sacrament according to the rites of the 
 Church of England. This theory of strengthening a creed in 
 religion may seem very absurd at first blush ; but are we cer- 
 tain that it cannot be defended upon every ground upon which 
 parties have, in our times, justified a test of political faith for 
 every petty office ? Not having practised the political art of 
 propagating religion in that way, we call it oppression and 
 have little faith in its success. 
 
 From Charles II. to James II. the short step is downward 
 from one corrupt administration that was graceful and cautious 
 to another that was brutal and reckless. 
 
 James II. cannot be said to have brought any new system 
 into the public service ; but he combined together the worst 
 elements of the despotic spoils system and the partisan spoils 
 system, to both of which he added a taint of his own character. 
 Far more arbitrary than Charles I., and quite as corrupt as 
 Charles II., he imitated Cromwell, without his respect for 
 merit, in the enforcement of a theological test in politics, and 
 made a sort of political party out of Catholic sympathizers. 
 He had no higher conception of the appointing power than to 
 make it the instrument of his vengeance, his vanity, his lust, 
 and his bigoted ambition. In the true spirit of the spoils sys- 
 tem, of which he was the head, he became a pensionary of the 
 King of France, pocketing the gold of that country as a con- 
 dition of betraying his own. 
 
 Jeffreys, his favorite judge, ordered hanging and judicially 
 levied blackmail as boldly as ever Barnard, under his view of 
 the spoils system, granted illegal injunctions, or any of his 
 associates plundered the public treasury. The Queen and the 
 King's favorites collected commissions on fines and forfeitures 
 imposed by the King as freely as ever the wife of a republican 
 secretary made a levy upon army posts, or the partisan leaders 
 in a republic ever levied percentages on salaries fixed by Con- 
 gress. 
 
 " The naval administration moved the contempt of men acquainted 
 with the dock-yards of France and Holland. "... In the navy
 
 64: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 alone James seems to have made some reforms. ' ' The military ad- 
 ministration was worse. The courtiers took bribes from the colonels, 
 the colonels cheated the soldiers ; the commissaries sent in long bills 
 for what they had never furnished. Keepers of arsenals sold the 
 stores and pocketed the price. From the time of the Restoration to 
 the time of the Revolution, neglect and fraud had been almost con- 
 stantly impairing the efficiency of every department of the govern- 
 ment. Honors and public trusts, peerages, baronetcies, regiments, 
 frigates, embassies, governments, commissionerships, leases of Crown 
 lands, contracts for clothing, for provisions, for ammunition, pardons 
 for murder, for robbery, for arson, were sold at Whitehall, scarcely 
 less openly than asparagus at Covent Garden, or herrings at Billings- 
 gate. Brokers had been incessantly plying for customers in the pur- 
 lieus of the court ; and of these brokers the most successful had been, 
 in the days of Charles, the harlots, and in the days of James, the 
 priests. From the palace, which was the chief seat of this pesti- 
 lence, the taint had diffused itself through every office and every rank 
 in every office, and had everywhere produced feebleness and disor- 
 ganization." 1 
 
 It is worthy of notice in what small measure the contempora- 
 ries of these events comprehended how perilous administrative 
 corruption is to a nation's peace and strength. At that time 
 little importance was attached to the modes of appointing 
 officers, the methods of doing the public business, or to charac- 
 ter in public places. It is only since administration has been 
 made a sort of science by English statesmen, that they have 
 looked back and got a clear view of the fearful perils and costs 
 in which official incapacity and dishonesty had involved the 
 nation. 
 
 There is nothing new in the partisan (and generally supposed 
 to be modern) theory of manipulating election districts, pack- 
 ing legislatures, or supporting the party right or wrong. 
 
 " Returning officers [says Macaulay] were appointed who would 
 avail themselves of the slightest pretences to declare the King's friends 
 duly elected. Every placeman, from the highest to the lowest, must 
 be made to understand, if he wished to retain his office, that he must 
 at this juncture support the Throne by his vote and interest. The 
 
 1 History, vol. iv., p. 61 and 62.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE LIST GREAT BRITAIN". 65 
 
 high commission in the meanwhile would keep its eye upon the clergy. 
 The boroughs, which had just been remodelled to serve one turn, might 
 be modelled to serve another turn. By such means the King hoped to 
 obtain a majority in the House of Commons." 
 
 Here is Gerrymandering, complete, from the brain of a 
 royal bigot and despot, put in actual practice, three quarters 
 of a century before Elbridge Gerry or this republic was born ; 
 and it is but another instance of old abuses which so many 
 suppose to be original in a republic, and not a few palliate as 
 inevitable in our politics, if, indeed, they are not held to be a 
 very justifiable means of partisan success. 
 
 Under James II. also, the champions of the spoils and pat- 
 ronage system as vigorously denied the right of a member of 
 Parliament, a judge, a magistrate, a bishop, or even a colonel, 
 to hold political opinions different from those of his chief, as 
 the advocates of that system now dispute the right of a 
 ganger, a book-keeper, a collector, or a rural postmaster, to 
 such liberty of opinion. King James wanted a parliament to 
 suit himself ; and, like Cromwell, seeing no reason why 
 members of Parliament, as well as those holding office in the 
 executive departments, should not be required to be of his 
 way of thinking, he acted accordingly. The same author 
 says : " King James also determined to revise the Commis- 
 sions of Peace and Lieutenancy, and to keep in power and to 
 retain in public employment only such gentlemen as should be 
 disposed to support his policy. ' ' Here also Jackson has small 
 claims to originality, and was greatly outdone in his own line of 
 fame by James II. The King pursued a similar course in regard 
 to municipal corporations ; threatening the revocation of 
 charters if the support of his policy was not pledged. In case 
 of the attempted coercion of the Lieutenants, we find perhaps 
 the first plain utterance and, if not the first, certainly one of 
 the most striking examples of that manly, self-respecting 
 feeling in the official life of England, which, contrary to the 
 common belief, I fear that even the independent spirit of 
 republican officials does not always surpass. For the histo- 
 rian adds that " half the Lieutenants of England peremptorily 
 refused to stoop to the odious service which was required of 
 them." . . . " They were immediately dismissed. "
 
 66 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 Similar attempts on magistrates and candidates for Parliament 
 met with a resistance equally honorable and equally success- 
 ful. " Arguments, promises, threats were tried in vain. . . 
 The candidates and magistrates of four counties unanimously 
 refused to fetter themselves by the pledge which the King de- 
 manded of them." In parts of the kingdom, where the King 
 had great hopes, out of sixty only seven made so much as a 
 qualified promise to support the royal policy. The candidates 
 for Parliament in 1687 framed and signed a paper, and sent it 
 to the King, which is so just and manly that legislators of the 
 present day, from whom mercenary caucuses or the great 
 chiefs of politics attempt to extort pledges, could hardly do 
 better than to adopt it, if indeed they have the courage. 
 These are the material parts : " As a member of the House of 
 Commons, should I have the honor of a seat there, I shall 
 think it my duty carefully to weigh such reasons as may be 
 adduced in debate for and against a bill, . . . and then 
 to vote according to my conscientious convictions." 
 ' l As an elector, I shall give my support to candidates whose 
 notions of the duty of a representative agree with my own." 
 Perhaps clerks in the departments, when coerced as to his vote 
 by members of Congress, could not do better than refer their 
 persecutors to this dignified language of their political ances- 
 tors, addressed to King James II. For the progress made in 
 civil liberty since his reign is well illustrated in the fact that a 
 large portion of the members of Parliament then sustained 
 relations to the Crown quite as dependent as those our ordinary 
 clerks now sustain to members of Congress. The elections 
 went against the King and in favor of those who thus stood on 
 principle and duty, but had no patronage. A motion having 
 been made to inquire into the abuses in the elections, King 
 James answered it in the same way that General Jackson 
 answered those who opposed his election : " The members who 
 had voted against the court were dismissed from the public 
 service." Charles Fox quitted the pay office ; the Bishop of 
 London ceased to be Dean of the Royal Chapel, and so on down 
 the official list. In one particular the King proposed to carry 
 the theory of the spoils system and the doctrine of passive 
 obedience to those in authority further, perhaps, than any of 
 its advocates have proposed to carry it in our days, however
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 67 
 
 much they may have in secret practice followed King James' 
 precedent. He insisted that none but those who approved his 
 policy should have a license for selling wine, beer, or coffee ; 
 not seeing any good reason, I suppose, why the faithful con- 
 stable or magistrate, who might be called on to deal with an 
 offending coffee-stand or beer-cellar, should, any more than 
 the voter (who had got the favor of a license he had broken) 
 be placed under a pledge to support those who gave him his 
 privileges. 
 
 "Every battered old cavalier (says Macaulay) who, in re- 
 turn for blood and lands lost in the royal cause, had obtained 
 some small place under the Keeper of the Wardrobe or the 
 Master of the Harriers, was called up to choose between the 
 King and the Church. The Commissioners of Customs and 
 Excise were ordered to attend his Majesty at the Treasury. 
 There he demanded from them a promise to support his poli- 
 cy, and directed them to require a similar promise from all 
 their subordinates. One custom-house officer notified his sub- 
 mission to the royal will in a way which excited both merri- 
 ment and compassion. 'I have,' he said, 'fourteen reasons 
 for obeying his Majesty's command : a wife and thirteen 
 young children. ' ' 
 
 That system was all the more terrible in the King's hands, 
 because it was carried to its logical results of allowing him to 
 remove, and he did remove, judges and justices at will, as he 
 did all other officers. " The packed judges of the Court of 
 King's Bench gave, as a matter of course, judgment in favor 
 of the Crown." ' Wielding this all-pervading power, he used 
 it everywhere, as an unscrupulous party majority might use it, 
 and his strong hand was felt in every local election. " Its 
 effect was to place in the hands of the Crown the nomination 
 of a large portion of the members of the House of Commons, 
 and also to give its adherents the power of domineering in all 
 the daily detail of local municipal politics. The court put in 
 force every artifice and used injustice and violence of the 
 gravest kind throughout England to manage the elections. 
 . . . An eminently servile House of Commons was the 
 result." 2 ' 
 
 I Creasy on the English Const. , p. 308. 
 
 II Creasy on the English Const., pp. 308 and 310.
 
 68 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 I hardly need say that all this use of patronage and spoils^ 
 of threats and solicitation, alike failed to increase the power 
 of King James. The feeling of independence and the sense 
 of public duty, the patriotism and the manhood, among the 
 people from whom we sprung, were, under an arbitrary mon- 
 arch near two centuries ago, too great and fearless to submit 
 to such abuses. They saw that one of two results must soon 
 happen either that all the justice and liberty enjoyed by Eng- 
 lishmen must be lost in an intolerable despotism, or that the 
 prostitution of official authority must be arrested. The world 
 knows how England decided that issue what angry cries hur- 
 ried Jeffreys to the Tower how a nation, indignant, drove 
 its King from its soil and called a foreign prince to the throne. 
 James, his tyranny and his civil service system fell together, 
 never more to be tolerated in England. 
 
 It may be difficult to decide in what measure the direct 
 causes of these great events had their origin in any positive 
 usurpation on the part of Charles II. and James II., or in 
 what measure they may be traced back to the extravagance 
 and corruption, the annoyance, humiliation, and oppression, 
 the royal necessities and presumption, the pride of birth and 
 the tyranny of official station These were the natural out- 
 growth of that false and vicious system of public administra- 
 tion which, while repudiating all moral standards and all 
 official responsibility, had for centuries flouted and scorned 
 high character and capacity in the common life of the 
 nation. That system treated the bestowal of the highest 
 offices, and the management of what is grandest in the 
 executive affairs of a nation, as royal and aristocratic per- 
 quisites and monopolies to be dispensed as a favor or bar- 
 gained for money and influence. But without attempting 
 any estimate on the subject, no one can fail now to see, as 
 Marvel, Eliot and Vane and other great statesmen had fore- 
 seen, that it was necessary that this system should be arrested, 
 or liberty, intelligence, and public virtue, in England, would 
 be dwarfed forever.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE NEW SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION UNDER WILLIAM III. 
 
 Low character and capacity of those he found in office. The Bill of 
 Rights. Executive officers excluded from Parliament. Tenure of judges 
 to be during good behavior. Third series of Civil Service Rules. Experi- 
 ment of opposing leaders for executive advisers and its failure. Factions 
 lead politics. Origin of British Cabinet. Party government originated in 
 1893. Its significance. Partisan system of office developed. Its meaning. 
 Power of Parliament increased. The British Cabinet compared with that 
 of the United States. Power of appointment and removal and conditions 
 of administration similar in the two countries. William as a reformer. 
 Bribery increases with the increased authority of Parliament. Relation of 
 party government to the partisan system of appointments. 
 
 THE vicious methods of selecting officers, and the corrup- 
 tions which had existed in adminstration, during the last two 
 reigns, naturally debased the character of those in official life. 
 When "William, Prince of Orange, came to the throne in 
 1688, the official life of England was at the lowest stage of 
 degradation it had ever reached. With rare exception, all 
 those in office and all those connected with the court or pol- 
 itics were seething sources of corruption. The very fact of a 
 man being a public officer or a politician brought a suspicion 
 upon his integrity and his manhood. 
 
 The same causes which had kept men of purity and capacity 
 from official places had also filled them to overflowing with 
 venal minions of the court, decayed stewards of lords and 
 bishops, and the servile henchmen of the privileged classes 
 generally. Self-respecting manhood had no chances, and sin- 
 ecurists drained the public treasury. William could never be 
 certain that any of those he found in office would be either faith- 
 ful or competent in an emergency. " The standard of honor 
 and virtue among our public men was, during his reign, at the
 
 70 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 very lowest point. His predecessors had bequeathed to him a 
 court foul with all the vices of the Restoration, a court swarm- 
 ing with sycophants, who were ready, on the first turn of 
 fortune, to abandon him, as they had abandoned his uncle. 
 Here and there, lost in the ignoble crowd, was to be found a 
 man of true integrity and public spirit. ' ' ' 
 
 It is at this time, and at such profound depths of official 
 degradation, that we may begin to trace the motions of those 
 purer currents that led slowly on to great improvements. 
 From the beginning, the movement for reform was republican 
 in its spirit a struggle in which the privileged classes con- 
 tended for their old monopoly, and the unprivileged classes for 
 equal chances to enter the service of their country. 
 
 " The politicians of the Upper House were deeply tainted with the 
 treachery and duplicity common to most English statesmen between 
 the Restoration and the American Revolution. Most of the bills for 
 preventing corrupt influence in the Commons . . . were crushed 
 by the influence of ministers in the House of Lords. The country 
 was long seriously burdened, and some of the professions were system- 
 atically degraded, in order to furnish lucrative posts for the younger 
 members of the aristocratic families ; and the representative character 
 of the Lower House was so utterly prevented by the multiplication of 
 nomination boroughs, in the hands of the peers, that a storm of in- 
 dignation was at last raised, which shook the very pillars of the con- 
 stitution." 2 
 
 In his own person, the King brought a purer moral tone as 
 well as habits of business to his high station. The English 
 people had gained wisdom since they called Charles II. to the 
 throne without guaranties for good administration. They 
 therefore, at the accession of William, imposed some con- 
 ditions upon the crown ; but the low state of morals in polit- 
 ical circles allowed these conditions to be far less stringent 
 than the public safety required. Still some of them have a 
 vital bearing upon our system. They clearly show the in- 
 creased power of the higher sentiments. It was a part of the 
 
 1 Macaulay's History, vol. iv., p. 60. 
 
 2 Lecky's England in the Nineteenth Century, vol. i., pp. 198 and 199.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 71 
 
 great results of this revolution to limit tlie power of the Crown 
 and to increase that of Parliament and of the higher public 
 opinion. In order to prevent the King and the army of civil 
 officers from everywhere controlling elections, as they had 
 formerly done, the Bill of Rights of 1688 declared that " elec- 
 tions of members of Parliament ought to be free." In the 
 same spirit it was provided, in the Act of Settlement of the 
 next year, ' ' that no person who has an office and place of 
 profit under the King, or receives a pension from the Crown, 
 shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of 
 Commons;"* and also, "that judges' commissions shall be 
 made quamdieu se l>ene gessarint, and their salaries ascertained 
 and established ; but upon the address of both Houses of 
 Parliament it may be lawful to remove them. ' ' And I may 
 anticipate a little by adding that in the first year of the reign 
 of George III. (1760)" it was enacted that the judges should 
 continue to hold their offices notwithstanding the demise of 
 the King, and that they should continue to enjoy their salaries 
 during their terms, which shall be ' ' during good behavior. ' ' 
 
 Taken together, these provision? may be designated as 
 another (a third) series of "Civil Service Hules." They 
 broadly break into the old spoils system in various ways, but 
 more especially by raising the judiciary above executive 
 interference. The former rules (I have referred to) related 
 mainly to qualifications for appointment ; here, however, for 
 the first time, we find independence secured in the proper dis- 
 charge of duty while in office. These precedents (so far as 
 they relate to the judiciary) we have followed ; for they are 
 the well-known originals of our constitutional provisions that 
 judges "shall hold their offices during good behavior," and 
 shall not have their compensation diminished during their con- 
 tinuance in office. But the difference in the two countries has 
 been that, M'hiie in England the same tenure has been grad- 
 ually extended to nearly the whole civil service, we have, more 
 
 1 Such a law would of course have excluded members of the Cabinet 
 from membership of either House of Parliament, and thus have disastrously 
 changed the whole balance of the executive system of Great Britain. 
 
 4 Statutes George III., chap. 23.
 
 72 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 especially in later years, confined it to judges alone. 1 This 
 provision of the Act of Settlement, however, was too much 
 for the disinterestedness of the members of the then existing 
 Parliament, but was not beyond that which they were willing 
 to demand of their successors ; and so they speedily changed 
 the provision to the effect that it should only apply to mem- 
 bers elected after 1705 ; but even that provision was modified. 
 In the mean time, however, an act passed in 1694, for a new 
 revenue board for stamp duties, provided that its members 
 should not have seats in Parliament ; and this, Mr. Hallam 
 says, is the first exclusion from membership of that body on 
 account of employment. A law of 1699 extended the exclu- 
 sion to various other excise officers. It will be perceived that 
 these are material limitations of the opportunities of official 
 tyranny under the old spoils system ; and it is a good illustra- 
 tion of the survival of parts of that system that we now often 
 see our State legislatures protecting themselves against execu- 
 tive officers, as the British Parliament did near two centuries 
 ago, by excluding them from membership. 
 
 But we have never yet, in our federal legislation at least, 
 acted upon the salutary precedent of the Bill of Rights, by 
 preventing such officers interfering with the freedom of elec- 
 tions. We have, on the contrary, so tamely surrendered our- 
 selves to official dictation, that a late mild attempt of the Pres- 
 ident to vindicate such freedom at elections was denounced by 
 partisan leaders as an interference with the just liberty of 
 officials as if the exertion of official authority over elections, 
 rather than freedom on the part of the private citizen in tak- 
 ing part in them, was the right to be protected. 
 
 During the first five years of William's reign his position 
 was peculiar. Strictly speaking, there were no parties, but 
 factions ; and yet the power of the King was not despotic. 
 Despotism was at an end, but neither parliamentary nor party 
 
 1 We have not, in the States, as is well known, generally maintained that 
 tenure even for judges, but have elected them for short terms. The tend- 
 ency now is toward a longer tenure ; New York, for example, has lately 
 changed her judicial tenure from eight to fourteen years. Our federal stat- 
 utes go the full length of the Bill of Rights in excluding executive officers 
 from the legislature.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 73 
 
 government had begun. 1 The condition was that of rival no- 
 blemeri and unscrupulous factions among the higher classes 
 contending for the favor of the King and the control of pa- 
 tronage. Parliament had become stronger and more ambitious 
 than ever before, but it had then secured but little patronage. 
 The King, seeking to harmonize contending factions, took 
 opposing elements into his council. Being a sovereign of 
 commanding ability and great experience in administration, he 
 seems to have thought that he could bend rival factions to his 
 policy ; or at least that he could make a strong administration 
 by pursuing a middle course. He gave the experiment a thor- 
 ough trial during five years. So far as royal authority had, 
 under the Stuarts, not been absolute, it had been shared by 
 the Privy Council, a large body, of which the kings had really 
 consulted only a small number, and those of course royal fa- 
 vorites. William seems to have become convinced, after five 
 years' experience, that neither any large body, nor any body 
 though not large, which contained antagonistic elements, could 
 successfully exercise executive power. 
 
 " It would cause infinite delay and embarrassment in governing the 
 kingdom." " Want of harmony caused want of vigor. " 2 "Some 
 of the most serious difficulties of his situation were caused by the 
 conduct of the ministers on whom he was forced to rely. There 
 was indeed no want of ability among his chief councillors, but one 
 half of their ability was employed in counteracting the other half. 
 "The two Secretaries of State were constantly laboring to 
 draw their masters in diametrically opposite directions. ' ' 
 
 Such a state of things could not be long endured. Unity of 
 policy was found to be as essential as unity of action. In 
 short, the King's experiment of reconciliation and harmony 
 had failed utterly. A remedy for the difficulty was proposed 
 by Sunderland and approved by William, in 1693 ; which was 
 this : that a small number, since called the " Cabinet," or the 
 
 1 Hallam says that political factions were so violent in the early part of 
 William's reign, that they were " regardless of all the decencies of political 
 lying." 
 
 8 Creasy on the English Constitution, p. 332. 
 
 8 Macaulay's History, vol. iv., pp. 63-70 ; and vol. vii., pp. 216-256.
 
 74 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 " Cabinet Council," should be selected from the party in ma- 
 jority in Parliament, under whose advice the King should carry 
 on the government, leaving to the ancient Privy Council only 
 a small portion of its original authority. The Cabinet soon 
 discontinued the practice it first adopted of consulting the 
 Privy Council at all. The members of the Cabinet were called 
 "Cabinet Ministers." Yet this "Cabinet," which keeps no 
 records, yet controls the highest affairs of a vast empire, which 
 is the original upon which our Cabinet is modelled and the 
 embodiment of what all the world has come to designate as 
 parliamentary government, is not, nor are its members, named 
 in any law or known to the English Constitution. l 
 
 This important change in the method of exercising execu- 
 tive authority marks or perhaps, I might say, was in itself 
 the origin of political parties in the modern sense, and of 
 party government in England, and, indeed, in the world. 
 This change, so pregnant of vast consequences in every way, 
 enormously increased the power of Parliament over the civil 
 service ; since from its majority the members of the Cabinet 
 were to be taken, and upon their failure to receive the support 
 of that majority they were, according to the new theory, to 
 resign. It tended greatly to secure harmony and vigor in the 
 administration, which at all times (apparently at least) repre- 
 sented the majority of the nation. It hardly need be added 
 that it also developed two great parties, each of which strug- 
 gled for that majority which would give the victor the control 
 not only of all legislation, but of all administration. There 
 being no separate States to share the power and dignity of 
 government, the central party majority was really made (in a 
 more absolute sense than has ever been the fact in this country) 
 supreme throughout the domain of politics. Such vast power, 
 as well as all patronage (which Parliament could grasp), and 
 the direction of every officer (save the judges), the enactment 
 of all laws and the interpretation of the constitution itself, 
 constituted the grand objects for which party warfare was 
 
 1 By making the Lord Chancellor a member of the Cabinet, and not giv- 
 ing to the V ice-Chancellors a tenure during good behavior, the English 
 equity system was left far more dependent than is our own upon political 
 favor.
 
 & net WASH,NGTM. s <!- 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 75 
 
 thereafter to be waged. This great change was what naturally 
 and speedily led to the development in England of the partisan 
 system of appointment to office. Under this system the sharing 
 of the opinions of the party in power and the unhesitating sup- 
 port of the policy of its administration, are conditions para- 
 mount to personal merit, of receiving or retaining each and 
 every office, however humble ; and the prescriptive use of 
 patronage in that sense is one of the great agencies relied on 
 for party strength. In a strict sense, this system was new in 
 English politics, though Cromwell and some of the kings had ; 
 ruled in its spirit. Never elsewhere has that system offered 
 so splendid and so tempting a prize to party victory. And 
 never elsewhere had the government of a country held its 
 power by a tenure so precarious ; for on no day could a prime 
 minister be sure that to-morrow he and his cabinet would not 
 fall. 1 
 
 I have thought it important to recall those events, because 
 at this date commences the long trial, in Great Britain, of the 
 efficiency of a partisan system of administration of the same 
 kind, in general theory and practice, as that known by the 
 same designation in our politics. It went into effect (as far as 
 the situation would allow) in 1693, and was continued, though 
 somewhat modified in detail, without fundamental change, for 
 one hundred and sixty years, or until 1853, when the first ele- 
 ments of the Merit System were formally introduced. While 
 there have been dissimilar conditions in the two countries, 
 effecting to some extent the bearing of the experience of the one 
 upon the other, I think it will appear that there is hardly a 
 phase of administration in the United States upon which that 
 of Great Britain, under the partisan system, will not be found 
 to throw a valuable light. For some years after 1693, the 
 power of the great nobles and families unquestionably caused 
 the administration to be as much aristocratic as partisan ; but 
 there was a steady growth of parliamentary influence, aiid 
 hence of the influence of the great parties, at the expense of the 
 Crown and privileged classes. As the power of Parliament and 
 
 1 There have been in fact, I believe, three cabinets in the same month in 
 England, though the average duration of each has been about three and a 
 half years.
 
 76 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of popular opinion increased, the House of Commons more and 
 more encroached upon the old prerogatives of the executive, 
 and, in similar measure, of course upon its patronage. Mem- 
 bers seeking patronage naturally conditioned their support of 
 aspirants for seats in the Cabinet upon pledges of such patron- 
 age ; and here we have the origin of members of the legislature 
 dictating local appointments. Much in the same ratio that 
 members of Parliament grasped patronage, parliamentary elec- 
 tions became corrupt and the votes of members became venal. 
 As a consequence, bribery of voters and of members so in- 
 creased that we shall soon find the greater corruption in the 
 administration standing, for the first time in English history, 
 in connection with Parliament rather than with the executive. 
 
 Before proceeding to the practical effects of the partisan sys- 
 tem, it will be useful to consider how close is the similarity in 
 the two countries between the methods of exercising executive 
 authority. Between an hereditary king and nobility on one 
 side, and an elective president and senators on the other, the 
 difference of course is vast ; but practically authority over 
 administration in Great Britain is now neither with the Crown 
 nor the Lords, but, as here, is with the Cabinet and the heads 
 of departments. I have said that our Cabinet is modelled upon 
 this original Cabinet of 1693. The imitation is one of both 
 substance and form. We borrowed the English name. Like 
 the Cabinet of England, our own keeps no records. Ours, 
 like hers, is unknown to the constitution and the laws. The 
 authority of either is nowhere defined nor is the action of either 
 anywhere legally subject to review. In each country alike, the 
 Cabinet, in a large way, has the care of its great affairs in peace 
 and war ; the one with a king, the other with a president, in 
 whose name everything is done ; and in the president is united 
 nearly all the powers of the king, with perhaps all those of 
 the prime minister. The modal difference is this : that in 
 England the king names a prime minister from the party 
 majority of members elected by the people to Parliament, and 
 the member so named selects the other members of the Cab- 
 inet from the same party majority, subject to the assent of 
 the king, which he is almost certain to give ; while, with us, 
 the president (himself elected by the party majority) selects
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 77 
 
 the members of his Cabinet from that same majority, sub- 
 ject to the assent of the Senate, which it is almost certain to 
 give. The one grand difference in the two governments, 
 touching the civil service, is the power of the United States 
 Senate in the matter of confirmation, to which no executive 
 authority possessed by Parliament corresponds ; but, as a sort 
 of offset, the president freely uses the veto power, which for 
 more than a century no British sovereign has used, and which 
 may therefore be regarded as obsolete. 1 
 
 Both methods alike bring into the control of the administra- 
 tion men who stand for the principles and policy of the party 
 majority of the nation, and it is their duty to interpret those prin- 
 ciples and to carry that policy into action. "With us the same 
 policy may be pursued for four years, unless arrested by sup- 
 ply bills, even though the party majority has changed. But, 
 in England, a change of the popular majority will be at once 
 followed by a change of the Cabinet, unless Parliament is 
 prorogued, and a new election ordered. In England the per- 
 manence of the Crown and the House of Lords, and in the 
 United States the fixed term of the President and the con- 
 servative influence of the Senate, put some check upon the 
 sudden and dangerous oscillations in policy which the too rapid 
 changes in the popular majority might otherwise produce. 
 The constitutions of both countries give the appointing 
 power, and by implication the power of promotion, removal, 
 and control of subordinates, to the executive (which in Great 
 Britain, for nearly all administrative purposes, means to the 
 Cabinet and departments), but in neither constitution has it 
 been defined how that power should be exercised, nor are 
 there any adequate safeguards against its use for selfish or par- 
 tisan ends. "Whether it be a trust for the public benefit or 
 an official perquisite, each constitution leaves to inference. : 
 Hence it may be said, with equal truth of both govern- 
 ments, that in principle those who administer them may give 
 
 1 There is this further difference in practice, that in Great Britain the sove- 
 reign does not preside at or attend Cabinet meetings, while with us the 
 President always presides. Originally the practice was the same in Great 
 Britain, but is said to have been discontinued because George I. could not 
 speak the English language. 
 6
 
 78 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ' ' to the party in power those places where harmony and vigor 
 of administration require its policy to be represented, ' ' and 
 that both alike " permit all others to be filled by persons 
 selected with sole reference to the efficiency of the public 
 service and the right of all citizens to share in the honor 
 of rendering faithful service to their country." Neither gov- 
 ernment, more than the other, seems to require that all sub- 
 ordinate officials should be active politicians or hold the same 
 political opinions as the high officers who control its policy. 
 The divisions into departments State and Foreign Affairs, 
 the Treasury, AVar, Naval Affairs, Public Justice, the Post 
 Office Department, with subdivisions into bureaus and offices 
 having various grades of official and clerical duty are, with 
 formal difference, in the main the same in the two countries, 
 except that this great difference grows out of the very nature 
 of the two governments viz. , that ours most encourages 
 supreme regard for personal merit and accords the least im- 
 portance to wealth, birth, and official and social prestige. 
 With these elements of similarity in mind, we may consider 
 the great trial of the partisan system and its results in Great 
 Britain. 
 
 A few more words will suffice as to the reign of William. 
 
 The greatest statesman of his age and the ablest man that 
 had sat on the English throne in modern times, he was the 
 first of her kings who had any sense of the vital importance 
 of good administration ; an importance all the greater in the 
 fearful stress of arms and of civil discontent in which so much 
 of his reign was involved. Finding so few officials worthy of 
 confidence, he became a practical reformer himself ; taking 
 time, in the midst of the most exacting duties, to make inves- 
 tigations into the depaitments ; for example, going in person 
 day after day to the Navy Department and to the Treasury, 
 and overhauling records and accounts which disclosed the most 
 flagrant incompetency, neglect, and corruption. He removed 
 many sinecurists, enforced economy in various ways, and 
 brought able men into the public service. He was his own 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and reformed that branch of 
 the service. He vetoed several bills, and (except in a single 
 instance) he was the last English sovereign who has thought it
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 79 
 
 prudent to use that high authority. He did not allow members 
 of Parliament to acquire much control over patronage, but he 
 used it in the hope of strengthening the Whig party. Still in 
 his reign there began to be a strong indication of patronage 
 falling into the hands of members. His influence was in favor 
 of retaining efficient officers as long as they were honest, and 
 this much strengthened the example of the permanent tenure 
 of judges. But he resorted to pensions, sinecures, and venal 
 patronage to influence Parliament. Though in advance of 
 his age, he did not wholly keep clear of its corruptions. His 
 high example, however, in favoring some reforms and in giving 
 reformers exemption from the courtly annoyance and the lordly 
 scorn and sarcasm, to say nothing of the injustice and perse- 
 cution, they had before encountered, so emboldened the re- 
 form spirit that even Parliament itself was driven by public 
 opinion, for the first time since Cromwell's death, into mak- 
 ing a real investigation into the abuses of the public service. 
 Mr. Macaulay says, " The House fully determined to make a 
 real reform, and in truth nothing could have averted such a 
 reform except the folly and violence of the reformers." The 
 common fault of underrating the power of those organized 
 about abuses of long standing, and of believing the attempt 
 should be made to remove all evils by one drastic operation, 
 was fatal for the time. The House even had the rashness and 
 folly to vote that no person employed in the civil service 
 (save the Speaker, judges and ambassadors) should receive 
 more than five hundred pounds a year. All the higher 
 officials combined for self-defence, and the cause of reform 
 was arrested by causes that may be traced back to the incompe- 
 tency and impetuosity of its own friends. 
 
 While the partisan system in its early stages tended greatly to 
 increase the influence of members of Parliament and of pub- 
 lic opinion, and hence in many ways was productive of good, 
 it early showed its inability to much raise the moral standard 
 of official life. Even before the close of William's reign it 
 greatly increased the practice of bribery. " Burnet assures us 
 that, at the election of 1701, when William was still on the 
 throne, a most scandalous practice was brought in of buying 
 votes, with so little decency that the electors engaged them-
 
 80 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 selves by subscription to choose a blank person before they 
 were trusted with the name of the candidate. " . . . In 
 a pamphlet (published by Defoe) in 1701, he tells us that 
 there was a regular set of stock-jobbers in the city who made a 
 business to buy and sell seats in Parliament, that the market 
 price was 1000 guineas, and that Parliament was in a fair way 
 of coming under the management of a few individuals." ' 
 
 The stronger and most corrupt interest in these elections was 
 the new influence over appointments which members of 
 Parliament had unfortunately acquired with their enlarged 
 legislative authority. 
 
 In considering the effects of party government, and the par- 
 tisan system for appointments and removals, now on trial, it is 
 important to have clear views of their relations to each other. 
 It by no means follows that party government must enforce a 
 partisan system in carrying on the administration. Patriotic 
 motives may prevail and personal worth may be prized higher 
 than party zeal. It is unquestionably essential to such gov- 
 ernment that a few of the higher executive officers at the 
 head of affairs, who are to carry into effect the policy, both 
 domestic and foreign, of the dominant party, should share the 
 opinions of that party and have faith in its policy. Such 
 higher officers guide all executive affairs, give instructions to 
 all below them, and enforce official obedience everywhere. 2 
 The political opinions of the vast body of subordinate officials, 
 including the whole clerical force, in a properly regulated 
 civil service, are not material to the success of such policy ; 
 nor would such subordinates be active politicians if not com- 
 
 1 Lecky's English History in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i., p. 397. 
 
 * In British administration there are from thirty-four to fifty of these 
 higher officers, who are regarded as political, and who go out when their 
 party suffers defeat. They include, of course, all the members of the Cab- 
 inet, and certain of the heads of departments. Various of the departments 
 the Treasury, Admiralty, War, Customs, Inland Revenue, for example 
 have Boards at their head, a part of the members of which (except of the 
 two latter) are regarded as political. But there are permanent members of 
 these Boards who are specially charged with the care of the administrative 
 work. Foreign ministers are not generally displaced by a new administra- 
 tion, but may be, if important questions of policy are involved ; though 
 transfers are more frequent than removals.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 81 
 
 pelled to be in order to prevent their own removal. It is 
 quite open to a party in power, therefore, either to enforce a 
 prescriptive, partisan system in the civil service, or to select 
 those to till the subordinate places with paramount reference 
 to personal merit, and to leave them undisturbed so long as 
 their duties are well performed. Whether party government 
 will insist on having a partisan civil service will, of course, de- 
 pend on the relative strength of its moral and patriotic elements 
 as compared with its corrupt and prescriptive elements. In 
 Great Britain the latter elements were for a long time con- 
 trolling, and they can hardly be said to have been subordinated 
 by the other until 1853, when, as I have said, the Merit System, 
 in a qualified form, was introduced, without any change in the 
 essential features of party government.
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT FROM ANNE TO GEORGE HI. 
 
 Attempted union of opposing elements in her Cabinet. Advantages of par- 
 ty government. Parliament takes power from the Crown. Uses patron- 
 age corruptly. Officers in postal services prohibited from interfering with 
 elections. Gross injustice in contested election cases. Turning out officers 
 to make places a high Tory device. Increase of bribery. Office-holders 
 excluded from Parliament. The partisan system degrades official life and 
 becomes a spoils system. Religious tests for office and their consequence. 
 Partisan censorship of the press. Bales of boroughs. Parliament grows 
 more corrupt. Robert Walpole, his theory, and gross corruption of his rule. 
 Public despair. Duke of Newcastle. Growth of higher public opinion 
 outside official life. John Wesley. William Pitt. Drunkenness and 
 gambling, crime and violence, have increased. Fearful condition of pris- 
 ons. 
 
 COMING to the throne in 1702, Queen Anne brought to it 
 no personal qualities likely to affect the administration, except 
 purity of character and decided Tory sympathies. Looking at 
 the party conflict from the Tory side, as William had from the 
 Whig side, she also sought peace and a good execution of the 
 laws through an administration of which the leaders of both 
 parties were members. ' ' Her ideal was a government in which 
 neither Whig nor Tories possessed a complete ascendency. ' ' : 
 Until near the end of her reign she persevered with such a 
 Cabinet ; but, like King William's experiment of the same 
 kind, it was essentially a failure, and she finally yielded to 
 the advice of the stronger party. This part of the policy of 
 the two sovereigns lias, I believe, never been tried by any of 
 their successors. Referring to the contemplated adoption of 
 the same policy in the next reign, Mr. Hallam 2 says : " But 
 the mischief of a disunited, hybrid ministry had been 
 
 1 1 Lccky, p. 46. 2 Constitutional History, vol. ii. , p. 759.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 83 
 
 sufficiently manifest in the two last reigns ; nor could George, 
 a stranger to his people and their constitution, have under- 
 taken without ruin that most difficult task of balancing parties 
 and persons, to which the great mipd of William had proved 
 unequal." When this theory of balancing party influence in 
 the Cabinet was at an end, party government had its first great 
 opportunity. 
 
 Party government as such (that is, as distinct from a parti- 
 san and corrupt system of administration) was an immense 
 advance in political justice and civilization. In spirit, it 
 declared the majority of the people, instead of the King, the 
 privileged classes and court favorites, to be the ruling power. 
 It affirmed that great political principles, and not royal and 
 aristocratic pleasure and interests, were the true standards of 
 public duty. It widened the circle of those who enjoyed the 
 monopoly of office, transferring it from the King, the nobles, 
 and their favorites, to the King, the dominant party (or at 
 least the managers of that party), and their favorites. It thus 
 tended strongly to a larger liberty and equality, at the same 
 time that it stimulated public thought and gave to personal 
 worth and capacity larger opportunity of influence. It tended 
 also to inspire a higher conception of the dignity and power of 
 government, as having all its action conformable to great polit- 
 ical principles ; and it aroused a loftier feeling of self-respect 
 in the citizen, since through his party he could make his 
 influence felt, and was himself recognized as a part of the 
 nation. Party government, in its larger spirit, had also this 
 salutary effect upon the administration that it tended to make 
 it harmonious, public and national. In earlier times each min- 
 ister, head of department or great office was independently 
 appointed, governed, and removed by the King ; each acted 
 as an independent chieftain within his own autocratic sphere 
 of duty ; and the administration therein was as diverse as it was 
 secret, capricious, and arbitrary. The subordinate officers or 
 agents were mere hirelings of the heads of departments. 
 When party government was established, the Cabinet became 
 in theory one body standing for a policy, and administering 
 the national affairs as a whole. It is also one of the good 
 results of the partisan system itself (as compared with the
 
 84 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 despotic system), to be set off against its manifest evils, 
 that it introduced third persons the dominant party and its 
 leaders whom it recognized as having a right to be heard in 
 the disposal of office. In earlier times the giver and receiver 
 were the only parties to the contract. The introduction of 
 this third party tended to greater publicity, since in a measure 
 it opened the secrets of patronage and of the spoils system to 
 public criticism. If it only conceded a right to share office 
 to those of the dominant party, and not to the people at large, 
 it was at least a great and essential step toward recognizing the 
 just claims of merit. 
 
 The appointing power and the control of administration passed 
 as largely from the Crown to Parliament, in the reign of 
 Queen Anne, as it did in this country from the President to 
 Congress in the twenty years following the close of General 
 Jackson's second term. It was something like a revolution, 
 which threatened the counterpoise of legislative and executive 
 power, under each government. The newly acquired appoint- 
 ing power was more and more, under Queen Anne, used by 
 the dominant party for corrupt and merely partisan purposes ; 
 foreboding a reproduction of the spoils system in another form. 
 
 Party government was thus put to a severe test in its very 
 outset. It became more and more clear, as its trial went on, 
 that there was no virtue in it adequate for the reform of the 
 great abuses which it had inherited ; and, on the other hand, 
 the new order of things soon developed serious evils of its own. 
 Parliament having ceased to be subservient to the Crown, 
 turned around and made its appointees subservient to itself. 
 Indeed, it soon became itself tyrannical. 
 
 It was early perceived that the only hope of reform was 
 in a coercive influence, from a higher public opinion, to be 
 developed outside official circles. The time was favorable 
 for the formation of that opinion ; as never before had there 
 been such eminent men who gave their talents to political 
 literature ; for example, Swift, Bolingbroke, Atterbury, and 
 Prior on the side of the Tories ; Addison, Steele, and Defoe 
 on the side of the Whigs. The Tatler, the Spectator, the 
 Guardian, and the Englishman, and many less celebrated 
 journals, show the tendency toward popular discussion. To a
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 85 
 
 better public opinion thus aroused, we may attribute legislation 
 (during some years later) that helped to arrest those new evils. 
 The independent, reforming sentiment to which these times 
 gave an ineffective utterance acquired a vast power when pro- 
 claimed by Burke and Chatham in the next generation. A law 
 enacted early in the reign of Queen Anne ' is an example of the 
 demand of this public opinion. Referring to the various post- 
 office officials, it declares that if any of them " shall by word, 
 message, or writing, or in any manner whatsoever, endeavor to 
 persuade any elector to give or dissuade any elector from giv- 
 ing his vote for the choice of any person ... to serve in 
 Parliament," he shall be liable to a fine of $500, and on con- 
 viction " shall become disabled and incapable of ever bearing 
 or executing any office" under the Crown. That law is still 
 in force, and is printed in the standing instructions before the 
 eyes of every postmaster in the United Kingdom. To its 
 salutary influence we may doubtless attribute the exemption 
 from partisanship and in no small measure the unrivalled effi- 
 ciency of the British postal service ; while the absence of such 
 a law in our service has allowed so many of our postmasters 
 to be politicians and their offices to be electioneering agencies. 
 
 The proof that patronage newly acquired by members of 
 Parliament, and used in a partisan spirit, was rather a source 
 of corruption than of purification, is decisive. The appetite 
 for patronage was as insatiable as it was demoralizing on the 
 part of members of Parliament. Ilallam 2 says of this period : 
 " Xo check was put on the number or quality of placemen in 
 the lower House. New offices were continually created and 
 at unreasonable salaries. Those who desired to see a regard 
 to virtue and liberty in the Parliament of England could not 
 be insensible to the enormous mischief of their influence ;" 
 nor, I fear, can we be insensible to the fact that, to this day, 
 similar causes continue "to produce similar effects in our own 
 legislatures. 
 
 Mr. Leeky s says that the old corruption, within Parlia- 
 ment, " increased rather than diminished after the revolu- 
 tion." In 1694, for example, Sir John Trevor, the Speaker 
 
 1 9 Anne, ch. 10, 44. * Const. History, vol. ii., p. 733. 
 
 * England in Eighteenth Century, vol. i., p. 396.
 
 86 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 (a cousin and warm friend of the infamous Jeffreys), was con- 
 victed of receiving a bribe of 1000 guineas from the City of 
 London for his services in carrying a bill through the House of 
 Commons. 1 
 
 Mr. Hallam 2 shows how early there was a dishonest use of 
 power in contested election cases; " there was the grossest 
 partiality . . . and contrary determinations for the sole 
 purpose of serving rival factions, " by reason of which a statute 3 
 was passed by the House to check its own corruption, which 
 renders the last determination of the House of Commons con- 
 clusive as to the right involved. The modern prescriptive 
 policy of turning out all the lower officers to make room for 
 friendly partisans was adopted by the very generation that 
 originated party government. That policy began with the 
 high born Tories. Bolingbroke, their great leader, says Hal- 
 lam, exposes " their intention to fill the employments of the 
 Kingdom, down to the meanest, with Tories ;" at the same 
 time declaring the Tory belief to be that such a use of patron- 
 age and the great property of the Tories would keep them 
 in power during the whole of the reign of Queen Anne. But 
 greatly to the surprise of the Tory leader, what happened was 
 that the Whigs, though without control of patronage, actually 
 got control of the administration before the end of her reign. 
 
 Bribery became so bold that, after outside public opinion 
 had forced Parliament to enact laws against it (between 1703 
 and 1708), they seem to have been disregarded even by those 
 who enacted them. Mr. Lecky 4 (citing Defoe) says : 
 
 ' ' Never was treating, bribery, buying of voices ... so open 
 and barefaced. . . . In 1716 we find bitter complaints in Par- 
 liament of the rapidly-increasing expenses of election, . . . and 
 a great number of persons have no other livelihood than being em- 
 ployed in bribing corporations." 
 
 1 As Speaker, Sir John was forced to the ignominious duty of putting the 
 vote in the House that adjudged his own infamy ; hut he did it with a sub- 
 lime effrontery perhaps without example in a legislative body, until William 
 M. Tweed rose in the Senate of his State to vindicate the purity of partisan 
 rule in the city of New York. Trevor's corruption and expulsion did not 
 prevent him continuing to hold the office of Master of the Rolls for twenty- 
 two years thereafter ! 2 Vol. ii., p. G40. 
 
 3 2 George II., chap. 2. * Vol. i., pp. 397 and 398.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 In a short passage, Mr. Lecky, 1 places in very clear light 
 not only the fact that the new partisan system was powerless to 
 elevate the public service, but the further fact that the party 
 majority, in Parliament, had no disposition to reform the gross 
 abuses in that body : 
 
 " The question in home politics, however, which created most in- 
 terest in the nation, was of a different kind, and it was one which for 
 very obvious reasons Parliament desired as much as possible to avoid. 
 It was the extreme corruption of Parliament itself, its subserviency 
 to the influence of the executive, and the danger of its becoming in 
 time rather the oppressor than the representative of the people. This 
 danger had been steadily growing since the Revolution, and it had 
 reached such a point that there were many who imagined that they 
 had certainly gained little by exchanging an arbitrary King for a cor- 
 rupt and often tyrannical Parliament. ' ' 
 
 Though members of Parliament exercised without scruple 
 their new patronage, 2 they had spirit enough to enact laws for 
 limiting the influence of the executive in their own body. By 
 one act 3 all persons holding pensions from the Crown were 
 rendered incapable of sitting in the House ; and by another 4 
 this prohibition was extended to those who held them for a 
 term of years but a bill of the House requiring an oath by 
 each member that he was not pensioned, was defeated in the 
 House of Lords ; a further fact showing that the greater cor- 
 ruption was in the old ruling class. 
 
 But the inherent incapacity of party government to raise 
 the moral tone of official life, except as coerced by an indepen- 
 dent public sentiment, is shown in the steady growth of cor- 
 rupt favoritism, until its most profound depths were reached 
 under the administrations of Walpole, Pelham, and Newcastle, 
 during the reigns of George I. and George II. Xor shall we 
 find that justice and liberty, except as protected by that senti- 
 
 1 England in Eighteenth Century, vol. i. , p. 470. 
 
 4 " Patronage," in British politics, seems to include not merely the legal 
 right to appoint, but controlling influence in respect to an appointment. 
 When a member of Parliament could influence an appointment effectively, 
 he was said to have the patronage of that appointment. 
 
 ' G Anne, chap. 7. 4 1 George I., chap. 56.
 
 88 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ment, were much more cared for by an arbitrary party major- 
 ity than they had been by an arbitrary King and nobility. 1 
 
 Following the worst examples of the reigns of James and 
 Charles, the party majority, led by men of no religious prin- 
 ciples, enforced a religious test in Queen Anne's reign, not 
 only for all officers under the national government, but for 
 officers in corporations ; and this (in the language of Mr. 
 Lecky, and also, I may add, in the language of modern par- 
 tisans) ' ' on the ground that it was necessary for the party in- 
 terests." These tests required the reception of the eucharist, 
 according to the rites of the Church of England ; and so shame- 
 lessly was one of the most solemn sacraments of Christianity 
 trailed in the mire of official corruption, and so repugnant was 
 the spectacle to the better sentiment outside of partisan poli- 
 tics, that ' ' it became the general custom for the minister, before 
 celebrating the communion, to desire the legal communicants 
 to separate themselves from those who were come there purely 
 for the sake of devotion. 2 
 
 In the ninth year of the reign of William III., a law was 
 enacted for political effect which required that any Catholic 
 priest who should perform a marriage between a Catholic and 
 a Protestant should be hung ; there were other laws in the 
 same spirit ; and in 1729, in the reign of George II. , a Fran- 
 ciscan friar died in Hurst Castle, in the seventy -fourth year of 
 his age, and the thirtieth of his imprisonment, under one of 
 these savages laws. When, in 1701, the party majority had, 
 in pursuit of its factious policy, delayed the public supplies 
 (just as we have seen them delayed in our time), and a respect- 
 ful and constitutional petition from the people was presented, 
 
 1 Party government, in these earliest years of its trial, adopted one per- 
 nicious practice which we have seen despotic partisans continue in this gen- 
 eration. " The mode adopted by the Commons of tacking, as it was called, 
 the provisions for this purpose to a money bill, so as to render it impossible 
 for the Lords even to modify them without depriving the King of his supply, 
 tended to subvert the constitution and annihilate the rights of a coequal 
 House of Parliament." Hallam's Constitutional History, vol. ii., p. 703. 
 
 2 In one of the states of Germany this prescriptive practice is said to have 
 been, in its application to licenses, carried so far that the courtesans were 
 required to partake of the Communion as a qualification for opening a 
 bawdy house.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 89 
 
 justly reflecting on such conduct, the House voted the petition- 
 ers seditious, had them arrested, and held them in prison for 
 two months. 
 
 Members of Parliament claimed that the proceedings of 
 their own body (in the same spirit that arbitrary kings had 
 claimed that the causes and records of their appointments and 
 removals) were a part of their own secrets, as to which it was 
 an impertinence for the people to seek any information. If 
 the right of nominating to office was an official perquisite, with 
 which the people had nothing to do, why was not knowledge 
 of the doings of the Commons also an official privilege ? It is 
 well known that it was only after a long and dangerous struggle 
 (during which Parliament sent many a reporter to prison), ter- 
 minating in the reign of George III. , that the right of printing 
 debates in Parliament was won by the English people. 
 
 It was not until 1836 four years after the passage of the 
 great reform bill that the votes in Parliament were published 
 by its own authority. The party majority also carried on a 
 censorship of the public press, on the theory that its control 
 was as rightful and as essential as was the partisan use of the 
 appointing power, in order to maintain the dominant party in 
 position and to keep down its adversaries. And, on this 
 theory, Steele and others were expelled, Defoe was prosecuted, 
 and Tutchin and several besides were whipped by the hang- 
 man, by order of the House of Commons ; and several writers 
 were compelled to apologize on their knees at the bar of the 
 House all for the offence of having written in opposition to 
 the party majority of the hour. 2s or was any check put to 
 this tyranny until Parliament was prorogued by reason of a 
 crisis produced by its order in committing to Kewgate four 
 officers of the Court of King's Bench engaged in carrying out 
 judgments of that court for maintaining the rights and liberties 
 of the people. 
 
 The injustice and corruption in the matter of contested elec- 
 tions, which Hallam mentions as existing in the reign of Wil- 
 liam, grew to be far worse under the two first Georges. Mr. 
 Lecky ' says : " They threatened to subvert the whole theory 
 
 J Vol. i., pp. 477 to 479.
 
 90 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of representation ; the evil liad already become 
 
 apparent in the latter days of William, but some regard for 
 appearance seems then to have been observed ; soon, 
 
 however, all shame was cast aside. In the Tory Parliament, in 
 1702, the controverted elections, in the words of Burnett, were 
 adjudged in favor of the Tories with such barefaced partiality 
 that it showed that the party was resolved on everything that 
 might serve their ends. When the Whigs triumphed in 1705, 
 they exhibited the same spirit. In the Parliament which met 
 in 1728 there were nearly seventy election petitions to be tried, 
 and Lord Harvey has- left an account of how the House dis- 
 charged its functions. ' I believe, ' he says, ' the manifest in- 
 justice and glaring violation of all truth in the decisions of this 
 Parliament surpass even the most flagrant and infamous in- 
 stances of injustice of any of their predecessors. 
 People grew ashamed of pretending to talk of right and wrong, 
 and laughed at that for which they ought to have blushed, and 
 declared that in elections they never considered the cause, 
 but the men, nor even voted according to justice and right, 
 but from solicitation and favor.' ; 
 
 This reference to "solicitation and favor " as a rule for a 
 decision that ought to have been impartial and non-partisan, 
 shows how readily the corrupt standard of bestowing office by 
 favor perverts all political action ; that rule being in this case 
 carried even into the sphere of judicial procedure. The cele- 
 brated Speaker Onslow says the rule ' ' that the right is in 
 the friend, and not in the cause, is almost avowed, and he is 
 laughed at by the leaders of parties who scruples upon it ; 
 and yet we should not bear this a month in any other judica- 
 ture of the Kingdom." Here we see that an independent 
 tenure, so lately conferred, had already developed a higher 
 standard of duty in the courts. 
 
 The utter demoralization, on the part of those engaged in 
 political functions, which these facts disclose, and the tone of 
 despair and desperation (not unknown in our time) with which 
 all. honorable standards of political conduct were referred to, is 
 also strikingly illustrated in Mr. Macanlay's essay on Lord 
 Chatham, where he says :
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 91 
 
 " These men wished to transfer the disposal of employments and 
 the command of the army from the Crown to the Parliament, and* 
 this on the very ground that the Parliament had long been a grossly 
 corrupt body. The security against malpractice was to be that the 
 members, instead of having a portion of the public plunder doled out 
 to them by a minister, were to help themselves." 
 
 There have been several bills presented in our Congress 
 within the last ten years which have proposed the equally rev- 
 olutionary measures of substantially giving to members of 
 Congress all the patronage which they have not already appro- 
 priated. And some of their advocates, for want of a better 
 reason, have justified themselves in the same way as the men 
 referred to by Macaulay. The baneful results of the new 
 spoils system, in the control of the dominant party, were not, 
 however, more conspicuous within Parliament than they were 
 in the election of its members. 
 
 Mr. Lecky, quoting the writers of these times, says : 
 
 ' ' Boroughs are rated at the Royal Exchange like stocks and tallies ; 
 the price of a vote is as well known as of an acre of land, and it is no 
 secret who are the moneyed men, and consequently the best custom- 
 ers." 
 
 The Lord Chancellor (Macclesfield) during Walpole's ad- 
 ministration was impeached for official corruption in selling 
 masterships in his own court. Robert Walpole, an able man, 
 but utterly unscrupulous, who had himself been in the Tower 
 for official corruption, naturally became the great impersona- 
 tion of the partisan spoils system of this age. For the larger 
 part of the time from 1708 to 1742 he was Prime Minister 
 or in the Cabinet. It was as much a part of his theory and 
 that of his coadjutors that it is necessary for a party, in order 
 to keep itself in power, to break open the letters of its oppo- 
 nents in the post-office, as it is of partisan leaders to-day that 
 they must fill all offices with their minions ; and therefore he 
 freely ransacked his opponents' letters for their secrets, and 
 even literary authors, like Pope, were victims of his pillage. 
 According to Mr. Macaulay, he established a regular practice of 
 giving places on condition that a part of the salary or perqui- 
 sites should be paid over to some third person, and this prac-
 
 t'2 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tice seems to have continued long after his day. This is the 
 nearest approach in British administration to our abuse of 
 levying party assessments, and is really the same in principle 
 and its equivalent in mischief. 1 
 
 "He governed," says Mr. Lecky, 2 "by means of an as- 
 sembly, which was saturated with corruption, and he fully 
 acquiesced in its conditions and resisted every attempt to im- 
 prove it. lie appears to have cordially accepted the maxim 
 that government must be carried on by corruption or by force, 
 and he deliberately made the former the basis of his rule. He 
 bribed George II. by obtaining for him a civil list exceeding by 
 more than 100,000 a year that of his father. He bribed the 
 Queen by securing for her a jointure of 100,000 a year. . . 
 He employed the vast patronage of the Crown, uniformly and 
 steadily, with the single view of securing his political position, 
 and there can be no doubt that a large proportion of the im- 
 mense expenditure of the secret service money, during his 
 administration, was devoted to the direct purchase of members 
 of Parliament. The government, ... by the votes of 
 its numerous excise or revenue officers, by direct purchase, or 
 by bestowing places or peerages on the proprietors, exercised 
 an absolute authority over many seats ; and its means of in- 
 fluencing the assembled Parliament were so great that it is 
 difficult to understand how, in the corrupt moral atmosphere 
 that was prevalent, it was possible to resist it. Great sums of 
 secret service money were usually expended in direct bribery, 
 and places and pensions were multiplied to such an extent that 
 it is on record that, out of 550 members, there were in the first 
 Parliament of George I. no less than 271, and in the first 
 Parliament of George II. no less than 257, holding offices, 
 pensions, or sinecures." "Almost every man of weight in 
 the House of Commons," says Mr. Macaulay in his essay on 
 Walpole, "was officially connected with the government." 
 Macaulay says that in 1742 the Solicitor and Secretary of the 
 Treasury received 1,147,211 of secret service money, and 
 
 1 I have before explained the reasons why the identical abuse seems never 
 to have prevailed in England, and it is, perhaps, the only one in our service 
 without a complete and generally a more extreme English precedent. 
 
 2 Vol. i., pp. 395, 471, and 472.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN" GREAT BRITAIN". 93 
 
 avoided giving any account of it, Walpole's agent evading the 
 answering of questions as to the use of the money, on the 
 ground that his answers would tend to criminate himself. 
 
 Walpole and his party were true to the spirit of the spoils 
 system to the last. In the course of his ministry he had 
 bestowed upon his sons permanent offices, chiefly sinecures, 
 amounting in all to about 15,000 a year, and had obtained 
 the title of Baron for his eldest son, and the Orders of the 
 Bath and of the Garter for himself. He also procured for 
 himself the title of the Earl of Orford and a pension of 4000 
 a year, and for his illegitimate daughter the rank and prece- 
 dence of an earl's daughter. In view of such vast agencies of 
 power and influence, concentrated in the hands of an able 
 leader of a ruling party, having an overwhelming majority 
 in Parliament and in all official circles, it would seem almost 
 impossible that a minister like Walpole could ever be over- 
 thrown. But such was not a true view of the situation ; and, 
 while his unrivalled sagacity was wholly unimpaired and the 
 devotion of his party was without abatement, he was hurled 
 from office in 1742 by the irresistible power of public opinion. 
 He did not make a fortune in public life. But he had no 
 faith that there could be any disinterestedness in public affairs, 
 and he distrusted all appeal to patriotism or duty. His only 
 reliance was self-interest and adroit management. His 
 shrewdness and good judgment in estimating the strength of 
 all the more selfish forces of politics were proverbial and were 
 probably never surpassed by any party leader. But, like 
 most of the partisans of later days who have acted on his sys- 
 tem, he was by nature incapable of measuring the force, or 
 even of appreciating the spirit, of that more unselfish, patriotic 
 public opinion outside official and partisan circles, born and 
 cherished in the common life of every enlightened people ; 
 and which, when mere party managers least expect it, may 
 come mightily forth, sweeping all their plans and favorites 
 before its irresistible advance. "Walpole and his confederates 
 did not comprehend that, during the period in which their 
 corrupt use of official authority had been degrading the moral 
 tone of official life, and of all men and women ' within the in- 
 
 1 In this early stage of the spoils system, bright intriguing women acted 
 
 7
 
 94: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 fluence of politics, there had been developing in the virtuous 
 houses of England a high-toned and patriotic demand for 
 purer methods in politics, which the elder Pitt was soon to 
 lead to victory and glory. Nor did Walpole any more com- 
 prehend that, in this same period, a stern and fervent spirit 
 of religious revival was growing strong and active, by reason 
 of the apathy and formalism of the State Church, which, 
 under the lead of "Wesley and Whitefield, was soon to shake 
 the whole ecclesiastical system at the same time it would elevate 
 the moral tone of the nation. Walpole, therefore, with the 
 fatuity of a blind man rather than with the sagacity of a 
 statesman, tried to suppress William Pitt (the future Lord 
 Chatham) by depriving him of his commission in the army. 
 He met those who protested against abuses, and who com- 
 plained of his contempt for moral duty, " in a strain of coarse 
 and cynical banter, . . . and sneeringly called them 
 patriots, 1 saints, Spartans, and boys." But the sentiment he 
 had scorned, and the power he could not comprehend, were 
 what laid him low. 
 
 "Above all," says Mr. Lecky, "there was the public 
 opinion of England, which was doubly scandalized by the ex- 
 tent to which parliamentary corruption had arisen, and by the 
 cynicism with which it was avowed, and on this point, though 
 on this alone, Walpole never respected it. Like many men 
 of low morals and of coarse and prosaic natures, he was 
 altogether incapable of appreciating, as an element of political 
 calculation, the force which moral sentiment exercises upon 
 mankind ; and this incapacity was one of the great causes of 
 his fall." 
 
 Had the saturnalia of corruption, of which he was the chief, 
 occurred a century or two earlier, there might have been an 
 
 a vicious part. The Duchess of Kendall, the Countess of Platen, the 
 Duchess of Yarmouth, and Mrs. Howard made and unmade officials, and 
 were generally quite as successful in partisan politics as Mrs. Jencks, or any 
 female office-broker of our day. Even the mother of Lord Chatham tried 
 the virtue of a bribe of a thousand guineas to procure a position for her 
 brother. 
 
 1 " A patriot, sir. Why, patriots spring up like mushrooms. I could 
 raise fifty of them within four-and-twenty hours. I have raised many of 
 them in one night." Walpole's Speech in reply to Sandys.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 95 
 
 opportunity for another Wat Tyler or Jack Cade ; for " the 
 cry of the people for his blood was fierce and general, and 
 politicians of most parties had pledged themselves to impeach 
 him. ' ' But the English people were now seeking reform by 
 peaceable methods. 
 
 Yet at this crisis again we find that the public understand- 
 ing of the real causes of corrupt administration was no deeper 
 than this : they were believed to have been brought about by 
 a corrupt minister, or they were the result of combinations of 
 bad men in official places. It was not yet generally per- 
 ceived that there could be no permanent relief until the parti- 
 san spoils system itself was uprooted, and a different system 
 put in its place. Indeed, the time had not arrived when public 
 investigations had disclosed to the people the secrets of adminis- 
 tration. Hence the same historian tells us that " to the mass 
 of the nation the fall of Walpole was the signal for the wildest 
 rejoicing. It was believed that the reign of corruption had 
 at last ended ; . . . that all pensioners would be excluded 
 from Parliament ; that the number of placemen would be 
 strictly limited," 2 just as in our day the people have so gen- 
 erally believed that corruption is to end with the fall of each 
 official villain, which that system has produced as regularly as 
 any seed produces its kind. The partisan spoils system itself 
 was hardly challenged, and it survived Walpole unchanged in 
 its modes of action, and only modified in practice. 
 
 It would not shed much additional light on the subject to 
 enter into any detail concerning the ministry of Pelham or of 
 the Duke of Newcastle, which carry us down to 1TCO, when 
 George III. came to the throne. But in the mean time 
 
 o 
 William Pitt, representing the purer and more non-partisan 
 
 sentiment, had become, just at the end of the reign of George 
 II., one of his ministers. His influence, in a general way, 
 raised the moral tone of the administration, but he was com- 
 pelled to leave the disposition of patronage almost wholly to 
 the Duke of Newcastle. And under Newcastle, as under 
 Pelham for the most part, Parliament was managed, officers 
 and places were disposed of, sinecure salaries were paid, 
 honors and titles were granted, on the basis of favoritism, bar- 
 1 Lecky, vol. i., p. 431. * Ibid., p. 428.
 
 96 CIVIL SERVICE IN GEEAT BRITAIN. 
 
 gains, and influence, to strengthen the ruling party and fill 
 the pockets and gratify the ambition of its favorites. 
 
 How the system had been gradually extended, so as to estab- 
 lish a general tyranny and arrest the advance of every person 
 who did not accept the creed of the dominant party and con- 
 form to the discipline of its leaders, is well illustrated in the 
 case of the great commentator, Sir "William Blackstone. He 
 was recommended by Mr. Murray (afterwards Lord Mans- 
 field) to the Duke of Newcastle for the Professorship of Civil 
 Law at Oxford. The Duke said to him : 
 
 ' ' ' Sir, I can rely upon your friend Mr. Murray as to your giving 
 law lectures in a style beneficial to the students ; and I dare say I 
 may safely rely on you, whenever anything in the political hemi- 
 sphere is agitated in the university, that you will exert yourself in our 
 behalf. ' ' Your grace may be assured that I will discharge my duty 
 in giving the law lectures to the best of my poor ability,' was the 
 response. ' Ay,' replied his grace, ' and your duty in the other 
 branch, too ? ' Blackstone coolly bowed : and a few days after Dr. 
 Jenner was appointed professor." 1 
 
 At the conclusion of the reign of (reorge II. party govern- 
 ment had been on trial for more than sixty years ; and, at 
 least after the death of William in 1702, it had not been 
 greatly influenced by the Crown. Ministers especially under 
 the two Georges had with little interruption controlled all 
 officers and patronage, and had exercised every kind of authori- 
 ty at will. If, during nearly the whole period, the dominant 
 party had been dragged down by the spoils system, the union 
 with corruption was voluntary, and the party in power was at 
 all times free to select its officers with supreme reference to 
 personal merit. 
 
 It undoubtedly cannot be justly said that all abuses that 
 existed are to be attributed to the spoils system itself ; since 
 some of them may have been the inevitable consequences of 
 the moral tone of the age. The decisive question on that 
 point is whether party government, in union with the sys- 
 tem adopted, kept the public service on the moral plane of pub- 
 lic opinion, or whether the service fell below that plane. And 
 
 1 Memoir of Sir William Blackstone.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 97 
 
 it is clear that the latter was the case, and that corruption 
 flowed over from every office and place in politics into the 
 great plane of private life. The causes of Walpole's fall, the 
 exultation of non-partisan people upon it, the spirit that Pitt 
 brought into office, the fact that when he came into public life 
 poor he refused the old perquisites of the paymaster's office, 
 also prove this fact. " For the corruption about him he had 
 nothing but disdain ; . . . his real strength was not in 
 Parliament, but in the people at large. His significant title 
 of the Great Commoner marks a political revolution." 
 " During his struggle with Newcastle, the greater towns 
 backed him with gifts of their freedom and addresses of confi- 
 dence." ' 
 
 " History owes to him this attestation, that at a time when every- 
 thing short of direct embezzlement of the public money was consid- 
 ered as quite fair in public men, lie showed the most scrupulous disin- 
 terestedness ; that at a time when it seemed generally taken for 
 granted that government could be upheld only by the basest and 
 most immoral acts, be appealed to the better and nobler parts of hu- 
 man nature. ' ' a 
 
 And he not only did this, in the same noble spirit that he 
 justified the heroic patriotism of our fathers, but, overawing 
 not only dukes and bishops, but all the confederated hosts 
 of partisans and corruptionists, he advanced higher than 
 any man but Cromwell had done the character and martial 
 glory of his country, at the same time that, in the name of 
 honor, duty, and justice, he acquired a respect, affection, and 
 power, wherever the English language was spoken, such as no 
 other English statesman has ever commanded. And now 
 when only infamy covers the memory of "Walpole, Pelham, 
 Newcastle, Bolingbroke, and the whole corrupt and parti- 
 san generation, who sneered at public virtue and religion, and 
 scoffed at the possibility of honest ways in government the 
 name of Chatham is a part of the glory of his country, and 
 every American recalls it with pride and gratitude. 
 
 Mr. Lecky* quotes contemporary authority, which speaks 
 
 1 Green's History, p. 718. * Macaulay's Essay on Lord Chatham, p. 11. 
 * History, vol. i., p. 509.
 
 98 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of "the administration of justice as generally pure" (from 
 which the partisan spoils system, as we have seen, had been for 
 some years excluded), but beyond that he points out " the ever 
 widening circle of corruption which had now spread from the 
 Parliament to the constituencies, and tainted all the approaches 
 of political life. ' ' 
 
 After referring to the fact that, at an earlier period in the 
 century, worthy scholars had been aided by government, he 
 says 1 that " in the reign of the first two Georges all this 
 changed. The government, if it helped any authors, helped 
 only those who would employ their talents in the lowest forms 
 of party libel. ' ' 
 
 In respect to religion the tendency of the partisan system 
 was equally downward, until it was arrested by the accession 
 of Pitt to the Cabinet in 1757. " There has seldom been a 
 time in which the religious tone was lower than in the age of 
 the first two Georges. 2 On the death of the Queen (Anne), 
 church patronage, like all other patronage, degenerated into a 
 mere matter of party or personal interest. It was distributed, 
 for the most part, among members or adherents of the great 
 families, subject to the condition that the candidates were 
 moderate in their views and were not inclined to any descrip- 
 tion of reform. ' ' 
 
 In 1745, "good judges spoke with great despondency of 
 the decline of public spirit, as if the energy of the people had 
 been fatally impaired. ' ' 
 
 It is, then, abundantly clear that party government, when 
 upholding the partisan system of appointment, had failed 
 as signally as any despotic or aristocratic administration ever 
 tolerated in England had failed, to raise or even prevent 
 the degradation of the moral tone of politics. But the im- 
 portant question remains, "What was the effect upon the actual 
 execution of the laws ? The answer is very clear. The minor 
 officials and the standard of duty were such as the system 
 would naturally produce. They were degraded. Owing to the 
 
 1 History, vol. i., p. 505. 
 
 2 It is said that not more than five members of the House of Commons 
 were at this period regular attendants upon any place of worship. 
 
 3 Lecky's History, vol. i., pp. 505, 506.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 99 
 
 party in power courting the support of the liquor interest, and 
 to the subserviency of venal officials to that interest, intoxica- 
 tion and drunken brawls fearfully increased in the time from 
 Anne to George III. " In 1749 more than 4000 persons were 
 convicted of selling spirituous liquors without a license, and 
 the number of private ginshops within the bills of mortality 
 was estimated at more than 17,000. At the same time, crime 
 and immorality of every description vjere rapidly increasing. 
 The City of London urgently petitioned for new measures of 
 restriction. ... In 1750 and 1751 more than 11,000,000 
 of gallons of spirits were annually consumed, and the increase of 
 population, especially in London, appears to have been percep- 
 tibly checked. . . . There is not only no safety of living 
 in the town but scarcely any in the country now, robbery and 
 murder are grown so frequent. . . . The watchmen and 
 constables, utterly inefficient, are as a rule to be found more 
 frequently in the beer shops than in the streets, and were often 
 themselves a serious danger to the community. . . . One 
 is forced to travel, wrote Horace "Walpole, even at noon, as if 
 one were going to battle. . . . The weakness of the 
 law was also shown in the great number of serious riots which 
 took place in every part of the Kingdom. . . . Outrages 
 connected with smuggling were in many parts of the Kingdom 
 singularly daring and ferocious, and they were often counte- 
 nanced by a large amount of popular sympathy." 
 
 This was the generation of the famous burglar, John Shep- 
 herd, of the famous thief, Jonathan Wild, and of the famous 
 highwayman, Dick Turpin all of whom were hung in the 
 period between 1724 and 1739. Fielding says of the justices at 
 this time that they were " never indifferent in a cause, but 
 when they could get nothing on either side. " Smollett, speak- 
 ing of 1740, declares that thieves and robbers were now become 
 " more desperate and savage than they had ever appeared since 
 mankind was civilized." An address to the King from the 
 May or and Aldermen of London, in 17-44, complains that " per- 
 sons armed with bludgeons and pistols . . . now infest 
 the streets and places ... at such times as were hereto- 
 fore deemed hours of safety. ' ' ' 
 
 1 Lecky's History, vol. i., pp. 518-590.
 
 100 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 The prisons were loosely and inhumanly managed. The 
 wardenship of the Fleet Prison, bought for 5000 in the time 
 of Lord Clarendon, was publicly sold for the same sum in 1728. 
 In 1730 the judge and several members of the Bar lost their 
 lives from jail fever caught while trying prisoners in London ; 
 and in 1750 the disease raged to such an extent in Newgate 
 Prison that the Lord Mayor of London, an alderman and many 
 of inferior rank were its victims while an assize was being 
 held. In 1759, Dr. Johnson computed the number of impris- 
 oned debtors at not less than 20,000, and asserted that one in 
 four died every year from the treatment they underwent. 
 Often the criminals staggered to the gallows, and some of the 
 most noted were exhibited for money by the turnkeys before 
 their execution. Dr. Dodd, a clergyman convicted of forgery, 
 was exhibited for two hours for a shilling a head. All the 
 high officials, even Addison, took shares in public lotteries, 
 which were not suppressed in England until 1823. 
 
 Demoralization extended even to the stage (as it did in New 
 York City in the time of Barnard and Tweed), and " the English 
 stage," says Mr. Lecky, " was far inferior to that of France 
 in decorum, modesty, and morality." MissPelham, daughter 
 of the Prime Minister under George I. , was one of the most 
 notorious gamblers of her time, and in the palmy days of the 
 partisan spoils system under "Walpole gambling in England 
 reached its climax. An illustration of the higher moral senti- 
 ment, outside the sources of corruption, may be found in the 
 fact that, at this period, there were many active societies " for 
 the reformation of manners" (or rather morals) ; and theirj 
 members became a sort of voluntary police. In 1735 their 
 aggregate prosecutions in London and Westminster alone had 
 reached the enormous number of 99,380. 
 
 No one at all acquainted with the influence of the liquor in- 
 terest over official appointments under onr spoils system no 
 one who knows the extent to which gambling and lottery 
 ticket selling are encouraged and protected by the associations 
 and the corrupting influences which grow out of a venal and 
 partisan bestowal of office no one, especially, who has wit- 
 nessed prison life degradation in some parts of New York, or 
 in any prison given over to corrupt partisan control, whether
 
 
 tt MMTH WASHINGTON Itfft, 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE 1ST GREAT BRITAIN. 101 
 
 in village or country in this generation will fail to see tlie 
 significance of the facts 1 have cited, as illustrations of the char- 
 acter and effects of early partisan administration in England. 
 I have thought it all the more desirable to bring out pretty 
 fully the character and methods of such administration in its 
 early stages, especially because they bring us close upon the 
 time of our Revolution ; and altogether they show the system 
 inherited by George III., who used all its vicious resources 
 (against the influence of Chatham, Rockingham, and Burke, 
 and all the true friends of administrative reform) to reduce our 
 fathers to political slavery. In view of such abuses, it seems all 
 the more strange that so few safeguards were provided against 
 them in our constitution and early Federal laws ; an omission 
 only to be accounted for, I venture to think, by the fact that 
 in this country they were hardly known at our Revolution, and 
 that, even in England, they had in but small measure become 
 a part of general information.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION UNDER GEORGE III. 
 
 Its condition and public opinion in 1760. His theory of governing. Tries 
 to break up party government and to govern through ' ' The King's friends. ' ' 
 Meddlesome and arbitrary. Lord Bute. Favoritism and venality.' Bri- 
 bery. The King urges on war against America. Corrupt lotteries to 
 pay its expenses. King interferes with Parliament. Guilty of bribery. 
 Religious tests. Great obstacles in way of reform. Spoils system in the 
 State, Church and the Army. Boroug'i abuses in England, in Scotland, 
 in Ireland. Municipal corruption and intolerance. Power of impress- 
 ment used politically. Dominant party opens letters and employs 
 spies. Debates state secrets. Liberty of the press not allowed. General 
 warrants issued by ministers. Spoils system extended to America. First 
 reform administration. 
 
 Sucn was the condition of administration and the temper 
 of the public mind in 1Y60 when George 111. came to the 
 throne. 
 
 Corruption, extravagance, inefficiency everywhere in the 
 domain of politics, except where the influence of William Pitt 
 and his followers was felt. A high-toned, rapidly growing 
 public opinion abroad among the people the strength of 
 Pitt and Burke in politics, and of Wesley and Whitefield in 
 religion indignant at the pervading abuses, crying aloud for 
 reform, but ill instructed as to their deeper causes, and without 
 experience in the ways of their removal. Party government, 
 having been on trial for sixty-seven years, was in full vigor. 
 As an agency for expressing the opinions and interests of a 
 nation, for embodying them in national policy, and for carry- 
 ing that policy into effect, there was no great protest against 
 it ; and it may be added there has not been any such pro- 
 test to the present time. The party method of governing, 
 which originated under William III. , stands, in its essential
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 103 
 
 features, unchanged and unchallenged by the British nation 
 to this hour. 
 
 The sentiment which was to separate that method, first, 
 from the partisan spoils system of appointment, and, next, 
 from the partisan system itself, was, when George III. came 
 to the throne, only a great unorganized mass of public 
 opinion, not knowing either its own power or how to attack 
 the corruption which it was its high mission to overthrow. 
 That traditionary loyalty which was universal, and that ser- 
 vile spirit of obedience which was general, forgetting the 
 past, hopefully and blindly trusted the future to the pleasure 
 of a fresh young king even at the moment that he adopted 
 the spoils system, as being altogether as much a part of his 
 heritage as the crown itself ; just as at our elections we have 
 trusted that reform was certain as successive presidents have 
 made a fresh application of the same old spoils system. 
 
 Great changes took place in public administration during 
 the sixty years George III. was on the throne. For about 
 twenty years after his accession he had, for the most part, 
 his own way. At the close of that period the reform spirit 
 had become too bold and strong for the King. An ascending 
 plane of administration was then entered upon, which has ever 
 since been held. During the first period, he pushed the spoils 
 system generally to extremes of tyranny and corruption almost 
 as great as it had ever reached ; and, in some particulars, he 
 was the worst administrative tyrant (except James II.) ever on 
 the English throne. Narrow, proud, obstinate, and relentless, 
 yet highly patriotic and sincere, he was a sort of Andrew Jack- 
 son, crowned. He was unfaithful to party government itself ; 
 not that, like "William and Anne, he tried to amalgamate par- 
 ties or to rule by compromise councils ; for his aim was to 
 build up a party of his own, called " The King's Friends," 
 based on patronage and prerogative, and to subordinate every- 
 thing in the government to his own arbitrary will. And, for 
 a time, he had apparently great success. But, in fact, this 
 specious success contributed to that bold sentiment among 
 the people, demanding liberty and reform, which, within 
 twenty years, gave the death-blow to the worst parts of the 
 spoils system itself, arrested the arbitrary power of the Crown,
 
 104 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 reinstated party government in its true position, and so humil- 
 iated the King that he ordered his royal yacht to be made 
 ready for his retirement to Hanover. 
 
 There never has been in times of peace a more desperate 
 struggle between official coercion and mercenary influence on 
 the one side, and a few noble men, standing for public hon- 
 or and duty, and leading the higher sentiments of a nation, 
 on the other, than the earlier period of this reign presented. 
 It is especially interesting as showing how a king may apply a 
 spoils system to break down the very parties which had ma- 
 tured it for their own selfish purposes. 
 
 " The King desired to undertake, personally, the chief administra- 
 tion of public affairs, to direct the policy of his ministers, and him- 
 self to distribute the patronage of the Crown. He was ambitious not 
 only to reign but to govern. ... It was the King's object, not 
 merely to supplant one party and establish another in its place, but to 
 create a new party, faithful to himself, regarding his personal wishes, 
 carrying out his policy, and dependent on his will. This party was soon 
 distinguished as ' The King's Men ' or ' The King's Friends.' " 1 
 
 1 ' Day by day George himself scrutinized the voting list of the two 
 houses, and distributed rewards and punishments as members voted 
 according to his will or not. Promotion in the civil service, prefer- 
 ment in the church, or rank in the army was reserved for the ' King's 
 friends. ' Pensions and court places were used to influence debates. 
 Bribery was employed on a scale never known before. Under Bute's 
 ministry, an office was opened at the Treasury for the bribery of mem- 
 bers, and twenty-five thousand pounds are said to have been spent in 
 a single day. 
 
 . . . ' ' Not only did he direct the minister in all important matters 
 of foreign and domestic policy, but he instructed him as to the man- 
 agement of debates in Parliament, suggested what motions should be 
 made or opposed and how measures should be carried. He reserved 
 for himself all the patronage, he arranged the whole cast of the ad- 
 ministration, settled the relative plan and pretensions of Ministers of 
 State, law officers, and members of the household, nominated and 
 promoted the English and Scotch judges, appointed and translated 
 bishops and deans, and dispensed other preferments in the Church. 
 He disposed of military governments, regiments, and commissions, 
 
 1 May's Constitutional Hfttory of England, vol. i., pp. 23, 24, and 60.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 105 
 
 and himself ordered the marching of troops. He gave and refused 
 titles, honors, and pensions. All this immense patronage was steadily 
 used for the creation and maintenance of a party in both Houses of 
 Parliament attached to the King himself, and its weight was seen 
 in the dependence to which the new ministry was reduced." 1 
 
 Macaulay, in his essay upon Lord Chatham, after stating 
 that all ranks from the highest to the lowest were to be taught 
 that the King would be obeyed, and that lords-lieutenants of 
 several counties were dismissed, adds (in language as applica- 
 ble in spirit to this generation and in this country as to the 
 royal despot whom our fathers fought) : 
 
 " But as nothing was too high for tke revenge of the court, so' also 
 was nothing too low. A prosecution, such as had never been known 
 before and has never been known since, raged in every public de- 
 partment. Great numbers of humble and laborious clerks were de- 
 prived of their bread, not because they had taken an active part 
 against the ministry, but merely because they owed their situations to 
 the recommendation of some nobleman or gentleman who was against 
 the peace. The proscription extended to tide-waiters, to gangers, to 
 door-keepers. One poor man, to whom a pension had been given 
 for his gallantly in a fight with smugglers, was deprived of it because 
 he had been befriended by the Duke of Grafton. An aged widow, 
 who, on account of her husband's services in the navy, had many 
 years before been made housekeeper in a public office, was dismissed 
 from her situation because it was imagined that he was distantly con- 
 nected by marriage with the Cavendish family. The public clamor, 
 as may well be supposed, grew daily louder and louder." 
 
 The corrupt intrigues and the fierce contentions about col- 
 lectorships and postmasterships, and all places in the customs 
 and the excise service, were not carried on by bodies corre- 
 sponding to our primary organizations, for the mass of the 
 people were not allowed to vote ; nor did members of the two 
 houses of Parliament bestow so much of their time and thought, 
 as have our Senators and Representatives, in planning and 
 scheming in connection with such offices ; for members of Par- 
 liament had not then secured that complete control over pat- 
 
 1 Green's History of the English People, pp. 732 and 737.
 
 106 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ronage which they were able to usuq:) during the next genera- 
 tion ; but these straggles were carried on between borough- 
 mongers and the agents of great officers and nobles, or between 
 ministers, bishops, royal favorites, and the nobility in per- 
 son. There is nothing new, however, in our constant and 
 unseemly contentions about petty offices and small local pat- 
 ronage except the station in life and the official designation of 
 those who most engage in them. 
 
 Everywhere the freedom of elections was invaded and the 
 whole power of the Crown and of the ministry was used to in- 
 timidate, bribe, or cajole the voters. 
 
 " In a letter to Lord North, in 1772, the King says : 'I expect 
 every nerve to be strained to carry the bill. ... I have a right 
 to expect a hearty support from every man in my service, and I shall 
 remember defaulters.'' And in a letter a few days after he says: 
 ' I wish a list could be prepared of those that went away and of those 
 that deserted to the minority (on the division in the committee). 
 That would be a rule for my conduct in the drawing-room to-morrow. ' ' 
 
 Here we see that it was not merely royal and official power, 
 but social opportunity and ostracism as well, that were to be 
 coercively used. It is not easy to say whether James II. or 
 President Jackson would have most admired this theory of 
 George III., but both of them would have felt at home with 
 him. It is certain that President Jackson has by no means 
 such claims to originality as are generally conceded to him. 
 
 Such a policy naturally called for an unscrupulous man like 
 Lord Bute ' to lead in its execution. He was a facile agent in 
 using money, offices, sinecures, increased salaries and pensions, 
 titles and every form of intimidation, flattery and bribery in 
 support of the government. The following letter illustrates 
 the relation between ministers and their supporters in Parlia- 
 ment in those times : 
 
 1 He rested under a charge of betraying his country for money in a treaty, 
 and of illicit intercourse with the widow of the Prince of Wales. His ideas 
 of literature and of office were quite in keeping, for he expended $50,000 of 
 his dishonest fortune in a great work on botany, but had the plates de- 
 stroyed when twelve copies were struck off, in order that the work might 
 be exclusive.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 107 
 
 Nov. 26, 1763. 
 
 Honored Sir : I am very much obliged to you for that freedom of 
 converse you this morning indulged me in, which I prize more than 
 the lucrative advantage I then received. To show the sincerity of my 
 words (pardon, sir, the perhaps over-niceness of my disposition), I 
 return, enclosed, the bill for 300 you favored me with, as good 
 manners would not permit my refusal of it when tendered by you. 
 Your most obliged and obedient servant, 
 
 SAVE & SELE. 
 
 But all these venal influences, so long effective in British 
 administration, and all the power of the Crown united with 
 them, were now unable to keep Lord Bute in power for more 
 than ten months. He had not preserved the proper secrecy, 
 and the honest public opinion of a nation of which the letters 
 of Junius and the unprecedented boldness of the public press 
 were an utterance began at this time to be more than ever 
 before a power in the State. Mr. May ' says, ' ' The govern- 
 ment was soon at issue with the press. Lord Bute was the first 
 to illustrate its power. Overwhelmed by a storm of obloquy 
 and ridicule, he bowed down before it and fled. . 
 Vainly did his own hired writers endeavor to shelter him. 
 Vainly did the King uphold his favorite. ' ' This was the first 
 great triumph of the higher sentiment at this period. And it 
 powerfully contributed to the civil service reform policy 
 which, as we shall see, was a few years later inaugurated. 
 
 But the King and his favorites adhered to the spoils system 
 as long as possible. Vast sums of money were raised for the 
 public use by lotteries as well as by loans. Officials made large 
 sums dishonestly, in 1763, out of these loans. In 1767, there 
 were huge stock-jobbing transactions, in which as many as sixty 
 members of Parliament, including the Chancellor of the Ex- 
 chequer himself, were involved. In 1769, it appeared that 
 20,000 lottery tickets, on the raising of a public loan, had been 
 disposed of to members of Parliament, which sold at a pre- 
 mium of 2 each. A motion in that virtuous "body, in the 
 same year, to prohibit members receiving more than twenty 
 tickets each (and backed by charges that as many as fifty mem- 
 
 1 Constitutional History, vol. ii., p. 110.
 
 
 .*** * 
 108 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 bers had subscribed for as many as five hundred tickets each) 
 was voted down. But what may perhaps enable us to more 
 fully appreciate the influence and resources of the spoils sys- 
 tem at that time is the fact; that, in 1781, Lord North, in 
 order to raise 12,000,000 with which to carry on the war 
 against this country, resorted to a sale of lottery tickets, and 
 so disposed of a great part to members ' of Parliament as to 
 make them corruptly interested in the success of the loan. 
 Lord Rockingham declared the loan was made " for the pur- 
 pose of corrupting Parliament to support a wicked, impolitic, 
 and ruinous war. ' ' The King persisted in the more corrupt 
 parts of the spoils system, even after an indignant public 
 opinion had begun to overawe his minions. As late as March, 
 1781, he used this language in a letter to Lord North : " Mr. 
 Robinson sent me the list of the speakers last evening, and 
 of the very good majority. I have this morning sent him 
 6000 to be placed to the same purpose as the sum transmitted 
 on the 21st of August. ' ' The King was as lavish of titles of 
 nobility as he was of money ; and Mr. May says there were 
 three hundred and eighty-eight conferred during his reign. 
 
 But the facts now presented by no means convey an adequate 
 conception of the strength, the oppression, or the manifold 
 resources of the British spoils system of a century ago, and 
 therefore fall far short of presenting the hostile influences which 
 later reforms have had to overcome. Some further illustra- 
 tions will be useful. They will show how much more diffi- 
 cult reform was in England than it would be with us. 
 
 1. The King, having all executive power, and the House 
 of Lords, with half the legislative power, united with a vast 
 preponderating social and moneyed influence, have their 
 foundation in a political theory and custom utterly hostile to 
 the just claims of personal merit and common right before 
 the law. Indeed they represent in large measure only birth- 
 right, favoritisms, property, and privilege or, in a word, 
 feudalism. Every nobleman (and I might add every bishop) 
 had a strong personal interest to say nothing of the safety 
 of his class in maintaining the old system under which, for 
 
 1 Seven members subscribed 70,000 each, others 50,000, and one 
 100,000.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 centuries, the sons, the decayed stewards, and the favorites of 
 his ancestors had monopolized the offices and places, both in 
 Church and State. Whoever advocated a reform that based 
 selections for the public service on personal worth was com- 
 pelled to challenge the privileges of the nobility. 
 
 2. The administrative system, in an old country, carries 
 with it the immense influence of usage, which is indeed a 
 vital part of the English constitution itself. It was a part of 
 that ancient usage in fact, it was and is now a part of the 
 system of government itself to bestow titles, orders, and 
 decorations always conferring social rank and often political 
 power as a mere matter of favor ; and with the common 
 understanding that they imposed an obligation of grateful 
 allegiance and friendly service ; a practice, in spirit and influ- 
 ence, utterly hostile to the paramount claims of personal 
 merit and common right, to which all true civil service 
 reform must respond. 
 
 3. The partisan system, in the time of George III., was as 
 paramount in the State Church as in politics. According to 
 its methods, bishops, deans, and vicars secured their places. 
 
 " The piety of a churchman brought him no preferment, unless his 
 political orthodoxy was well attested. All who aspired to be preben- 
 daries, deans, and bishops sought Tory patrons and professed the 
 Tory creed." 1 
 
 Advowsons," presentations to livings, and clerkships in the 
 Church were as unscrupulously conferred by favor as were 
 the meanest civil offices, and they were as openly advertised 
 and sold as calves and cabbages. The Sacrament of that 
 Church was a legal test at the gates of nearly every office, 
 national, municipal, and corporate. 
 
 " The incapacity of dissenters extended not only to government 
 employments but to the direction of the Bank of England, the East 
 India Company, and other chartered companies. The City of Lon- 
 don had perverted the corporation act into an instrument of extortion 
 by electing dissenters to the office of sheriff, and exacting fines when 
 
 1 2 May's History, 48. 
 
 * And they are openly sold at this day, as I shall more fully point out. 
 8
 
 110 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 they refused to qualify. ' ' (That is by taking the Sacrament after the 
 manner of the Church of England.) No less than 15,000 had thus 
 been levied. 1 
 
 The creed of that Church was practically a condition of 
 entrance to the great universities and professions. Its bishops 
 had seats in the House of Lords ; and throughout the nation 
 its monopoly of official station, its vast wealth and social 
 prestige, its friends everywhere controlling the local magis- 
 tracy, and in manifold ways influencing the private life of the 
 people, made it a vast power opposed to reform in the civil 
 service. Its sympathies were therefore strongly with the 
 King and the nobility ; and the King and his ministers had 
 no more scruples about using Church patronage 2 than about 
 using political patronage. 
 
 4. That system also extended to the army and navy. I 
 shall have occasion to point out that the English regular 
 army remained under a sort of spoils system commissions 
 being openly bought and sold as well as secured by influence 
 and favor long after we had made provision, at the national 
 cost, for high personal qualifications for office in our regular 
 army. By orders of the King, worthy military officers like 
 General Conway and Colonel Barre (who sympathized with 
 this country) were, on account of votes in Parliament, de- 
 prived of 'their commands. Political proscription extended to 
 all grades of office in the army. 
 
 Having fortunately (yet with far less consistency than the 
 original English system) taken our army offices out of parti- 
 san politics, but leaving our civil officials embroiled in them, 
 we look with surprise at the old English practice ; while, on 
 the other hand, modern Englishmen, who, (until within this 
 decade saw offices in their army bought and sold,) finding 
 their civil offices now conferred upon merit, look upon our 
 favoritism and partisanship in civil administration with aston- 
 ishment and disgust. Mr. May quotes Mr. Grenville, while 
 
 1 2 May, pp. 315-324. 
 
 2 The king, after keeping the Bishopric of Osnaburgh open for near three 
 years, contrary to the custom which allows but six months, bestowed it 
 upon his son, a new-born child, before it was christened. The revenue was 
 about 25,000 a year. Walpole's Memoirs of George III., vol. i., p. 320.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. Ill 
 
 minister to George III., to the effect that " he never would 
 admit the distinction between civil and military appoint- 
 ments." The King maintained that position until Mr. Pitt 
 became minister, when he was forced, by public opinion, to 
 forbear enforcing political proscription against army officers ; 
 and the practice has never since prevailed. ' 
 
 5. The elections and the methods of appointment in the 
 boroughs, (from which members of Parliament were sent,) 
 were even more corrupt and exclusive than any other part of 
 the administration. The outrageous monopoly of the fran- 
 chise, in a few hands, defeating the fair expression of the 
 better public sentiment at the elections, made the franchise 
 venal beyond all example in history. Parliament was prac- 
 tically controlled by a few great families. Out of a population 
 of about 8,000,000 there were scarcely 160,000 legal voters. 
 I can give space for only slight illustration of borough politics. 
 In the boroughs of Buckingham and Bewdley the right of 
 election was confined to thirteen persons ; at Bath to thirty- 
 five ; at Salisbury to fifty-six ; at Gatton to seven ; at Tavi- 
 stock to ten ; at St. Michael to seven. It would seem that 
 ninety members of Parliament were returned by forty-six 
 places, with less than fifty electors each ; thirty-seven members 
 by nineteen places, having less than one hundred electors 
 each ; while Leeds, Birmingham, and Manchester had no rep- 
 resentation whatsoever. Eleven members owed their places 
 to the Duke of Norfolk, nine to Lord Lonsdale, eleven to 
 Lord Darlington ; several lords had six members each ; and 
 members were actually holding their seats in the Commons 
 under claim of hereditary right. 
 
 " Boroughs had been publicly advertised for sale in the 
 newspapers ; and there was a set of attorneys who rode the 
 country and negotiated seats in the most indecent manner. ' ' 
 
 The borough of Sudbury "publicly advertised itself for 
 
 1 Our laws of 1862 and 1866 (12 stat. p. 596 and 14 stat. p. 92) afford a 
 curious commentary upon official tenure in the army and navy. The first 
 gave free scope for the practice of the very abuses of which Geo. III. was 
 guilty, and the second brought us back to the rule which that king was 
 compelled to submit to. 
 
 a Walpole's Memoirs, George III., vol. i., p. 157.
 
 112 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 sale. ' ' In the borough of New Shoreham, the majority of 
 electors^ calling itself the " Christian Club," under the guise 
 of charity, were in the habit of selling the borough to the high- 
 est bidder and dividing the spoils among its members. The 
 prices generally paid are nt>t given, but Mr. May says there 
 are instances of a person spending 70,000 in contesting a 
 borough. The practice of buying and selling boroughs gave 
 a new word to the language and a new calling in life ' ' bor- 
 ough-mongers' ' " borough-mongering. ' ' Boroughs were not 
 only sold, but they were rented for annual sums when the 
 member was unable to buy. Some of the noblest men of the 
 times, like Sir Samuel Romilly, were compelled to buy a bor- 
 ough as the only means of getting into Parliament with any 
 independence. 
 
 In 1762, an act was passed imposing, for the first time, 
 pecuniary penalties on the offense of bribery. But it was far 
 from being adequate for its purpose. The mayor and ten of 
 the aldermen of Oxford were imprisoned in 1768 for receiving 
 bribes for the borough vote. But Mr. May says that " while 
 in Newgate they completed a bargain which they had already 
 commenced, and sold the representation of this city to the 
 Duke of Marlborough, . . . and the town clerk carried 
 off the books of the corporation which contained the evidence 
 of the bargain ; and the business was laughed at and for- 
 gotten." 
 
 The state of things in the boroughs and local districts of 
 Scotland, was no better. There property, revenues, franchises, 
 and patronage were vested in small self -elected bodies. The 
 public property and revenues were corruptly alienated and de- 
 spoiled sold to nobles and other favored persons at inadequate 
 prices. Incompetent men and even boys were appointed to 
 offices of trust. At Forfar an idiot for twenty years filled 
 the place of town clerk. ' ' Lucrative offices were sold by the 
 councils. Judicature was exercised without fitness or respon- 
 sibility." ' 
 
 In Ireland, if possible, it was worse. While the corrupt 
 proscription of the dominant party and the Sacrament of the 
 State Church were in the name of the majority supreme in 
 
 1 2 May's History, 470, 471.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 113 
 
 the politics of England, in Ireland a despotism not less corrupt 
 and far more galling was enforced in the interest of a small 
 minority of the population. A sectarian creed excluded from 
 the franchise five sixths of the Irish people. In her Parliament 
 not a single representative of this vast Catholic majority was 
 allowed a seat. Peerages were given almost exclusively to 
 large borough-owners, and it would seem that fifty-three peers 
 controlled the election of one hundred and twenty-three mem- 
 bers of the Commons. ' 
 
 " Two thirds of the House of Commons, on whom the government 
 generally relied, were attached to its interests, by offices, pensions, or 
 promises of preferments. . . . Places and pensions, the price of 
 Parliamentary sendees, were publicly bought and sold in the market. 
 Every judge, every magistrate, every officer civil, military, and cor- 
 porate was a Churchman. No Catholic could practice law or serve 
 on a jury. . . . Protestant Nonconformists, scarcely inferior in 
 numbers to Churchmen, fared no better than Catholics, . . . be- 
 ing excluded from every civil office, from the army and from corpora- 
 tions." 8 
 
 The King was himself a participant in borough corruption. 
 In one of his letters to Lord North, in 1779, he says : "If the 
 Duke of Northumberland requires some gold bills for the 
 election, it would be wrong not to satisfy him. ' ' Besides this 
 kind of corruption at the polls, there were other forms of elec- 
 tion abuses with which we are familiar. The use of the minor 
 government officers, clerks, and placemen as a band of polit- 
 ical regulars, bound to support their superiors, right or wrong, 
 was in full operation. Speaking of such officers and serv- 
 ants, Mr. May * uses language which this generation of Ameri- 
 cans can understand : "It was quite understood to be part of 
 their duty to vote for any candidate who hoisted the colors of 
 the minister of the day. Wherever they were most needed by 
 the government their number was the greatest. The smaller 
 boroughs were secured by purchase or overwhelming local in- 
 terests ; but the cities and ports had some pretension to inde- 
 pendence. Here, however, troops of petty officers of customs 
 
 1 2 Lecky, 247. 8 2 May's History, pp. 479-482. 
 
 * 1 History, 277, 278.
 
 114: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 and excise were driven to the polls, and, supported by venal 
 freemen, overpowered the independent electors." 
 
 It hardly need be added that the dominant party of that day 
 was as exacting in local appointments as it has ever been in our 
 own times. Referring to city appointments, Mr. May says : 
 ' ' None but jealous adherents of the government could hope 
 for the least share of the patronage of the Crown." ' And 
 with still another phase of municipal abuses then prevalent we 
 are equally familiar, except that we are a little shy about the 
 political use of religion, or what passes for it. 
 
 " Generally of one political party, the borough electors 
 exluded men of different opinions, whether in politics or 
 religion. . . . Neglecting their proper functions the 
 superintendence of the police, the management of the jails, the 
 paving and lighting of the streets, and the supply of water 
 they thought only of the personal interests attached to office. 
 They grasped all patronage, lay and ecclesiastical, for their 
 relatives, friends and political partisans, and wasted the cor- 
 poration funds in greasy feasts and vulgar ribaldry. Many 
 were absolutely insolvent. Charities were despoiled. . . . 
 Jobbery and corruption in every form were practised. . . . 
 Even the administration of justice was tainted by suspicion of 
 political partiality. Borough magistrates were at once incom- 
 petent and exclusively of one party. . . . But the worst 
 abuse of these corrupt bodies was that which too long secured 
 them impunity. They were the strongholds of parliamentary 
 interests and corruption. ' ' 2 
 
 6. But the spoils system of that age had yet other powers of 
 seduction and terror unknown in our day. The same arbitrary 
 authority which, in order to strengthen the government or the 
 party, might give places or make removals anywhere in the 
 army, the navy, the Church, and the civil administral ion at its 
 pleasure, might also, in the plenitude of its authority, impress 
 soldiers for the regiments and sailors for the ships "nay, we 
 even find soldiers employed to assist the press gangs ; villages 
 invested by a regular force ; sentries standing with fixed bayo- 
 nets ; and churches surrounded during divine service, to seize 
 
 1 History, vol. ii., p. 48. a 2 May's History, 464-466.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 115 
 
 seamen for the fleets." ' And this formidable power was ef- 
 fectively used to influence elections and overawe the spirit of 
 independence and reform. 
 
 It was a part of the same system that government could no 
 more get along without paid spies everywhere than it could 
 get along without servile henchmen at every government 
 desk. " Throughout that period," says Mr. May, "society 
 was everywhere infested with espionage." In 1764, " we see 
 spies following Wilkes, dogging his steps like shadows, and 
 reporting every movement of himself and his friends to the 
 Secretaries of State." 
 
 In the same spirit, the high officials of George III. claimed 
 the right, for the protection of the party in power, to break 
 open and read the letters of their opponents, while in the mails 
 or public oftices ; and they did so without shame or hesitation. 
 They thought no administration safe without the exercise of 
 this power. And perhaps no abuse of public authority did so 
 much to arrest independent utterance and embarrass that 
 organization and co-operation essential to crush so fearful a 
 tyranny. Mr. Pitt complains that even his correspondence with 
 his family was constantly ransacked in the post office. Nothing 
 written by a political opponent of the government was safe from 
 the pillage of the post office official and government spies. 
 And while the Parliamentary majority claimed such powers, it 
 refused to allow its own proceedings to be reported. It prose- 
 cuted or imprisoned those who attempted to furnish the people 
 with adequate reports. 
 
 7. The partisan tyrants of these times also sought to make 
 the public press, then threatening to become a dangerous ene- 
 my of the spoils system, either its servant or its victim. The 
 law of libel of that day under which any servile justice of 
 the peace (holding office by appointment made by a member 
 of the Cabinet) could arrest any person charged on oath with 
 a seditious libel, and according to which juries were not judges 
 of the fact of libel greatly favored such results. 
 
 Besides all this, Secretaries of State as the law was inter- 
 preted might issue general warrants to search for authors, 
 printers, and publishers and their papers throughout the King- 
 1 2 May's History, pp. 231, 262.
 
 116 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 dom. This power, unscrupulously exercised, was sufficient to 
 overawe any ordinary reformer, and it caused the imprisonment 
 and financial ruin of not a few. Even John Wilkes had his 
 house ransacked, and was brought a prisoner before the minis- 
 ters on such a warrant. Years later, so fearless a writer as 
 William Cobbett was driven from England to this country by 
 the mere fear of its exercise. 
 
 It needs no argument to prove how naturally the spirit of 
 such a system, and the exercise at will of a power so vast and 
 irresponsible, developed in the King and his ministers an exag- 
 gerated idea of prerogative and official authority. It com- 
 pletely blinded them to the state of public opinion, at the same 
 time that it gave them the means of carrying forward what- 
 ever arbitrary undertaking they might decide to enter upon. 
 " What a king and ministry habitually do, soon comes to be 
 regarded as involving their rights and their honor. ' ' 
 
 If in the application of such a system all merit and all jus- 
 tice among the people might be disregarded ; if municipal cor- 
 porations might be converted into partisan entrenchments ; if 
 money coming from taxation and from the endowments of 
 charity at home could be used in the interest of the party 
 and the ministry upon what theory could little colonial set- 
 tlements along the borders of the ocean and the forests of a 
 remote continent expect any higher consideration for their 
 property or their rights ? Indeed, the very extravagance and 
 the insatiable demand for offices and places w T hich such a sys- 
 tem developed only made those colonies the more certain to 
 become its victims. They could be outraged and pillaged 
 without offending any Parliamentary voter, except such rare 
 men as Burke and Chatham, who felt indignant when in any 
 quarter of the world a British subject was wronged. 
 
 In this view the familiar fact that George III. personally 
 insisted on taxing, coercing, and fighting the American colo- 
 nies, (when he might have known that the higher, if not the 
 larger, public opinion of England condemned that policy,) is 
 no evidence of malice in the King or his ministers, but only 
 shows the consequences to which the spoils system of admin- 
 istration, with its false standard of official "right and honor," 
 had carried them.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 117 
 
 " The King continued, personally, to direct the measures 
 of the ministers, more particularly in the disputes with the 
 American colonies, which, in his opinion, involved the rights 
 and honors of his crown. . . . The persecution of 
 "Wilkes, the straining of Parliamentary privilege, and the 
 coercion of America were the disastrous fruits of the court 
 policy." " The colonies offered a wide field of employment 
 for the friends, connections, and political partisans of the 
 home government. The offices in England available for secur- 
 ing Parliamentary support fell short of the demand, and ap- 
 pointments were accordingly multiplied abroad. . . . In- 
 fants in the cradle were endowed with colonial appointments 
 to be executed through life by convenient deputies." 2 
 
 Mr. May quotes a letter of a British general, written in 
 1758, which says : "As for civil officers appointed for 
 America, most of the places in the gift of the Crown have 
 been filled with broken-down members of Parliament, of bad 
 if any principles ; valets de chambre, electioneering scoundrels, 
 and even livery servants. In one word, America has been 
 for many years made the hospital of England.^ Measures 
 of oppression against the colonies were so ingeniously contrived 
 as to take away their liberties at the same time that they made 
 more places to be filled under this voracious spoils system : 
 for example, in 1774 3 the Elective Council of Massachussetts 
 was made appointable by the Crown, and the selection of 
 judges, magistrates, and sheriffs was also added to the royal 
 patronage. 
 
 It is a not less interesting fact to us that, if this country was 
 the place of the most unprovoked and unscrupulous applica- 
 tion of the spoils system, it also affords about the last illustra- 
 tion of its extreme enforcement. 4 The failure of the King's 
 policy against us dealt the King, his party, and the spoils sys- 
 tem a blow from which they never fully recovered. 
 
 Lord North's administration fell in 1782, four months after 
 
 1 1 May's History, pp. 43, 49. ! 2 May, 529. 
 
 '14 George III., chap. 45. 
 
 4 From Horace Walpole's Memoirs it appears to have required about 
 $6,700,000 in 1788 to satisfy promises made under that system to American 
 traitors, mildly called Royalists.
 
 118 CIVIL SEEVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the fall of Yorktown. It was succeeded by that of Lord 
 Rockingham, the first ministry distinctly pledged to admin- 
 istrative reform, or faithful to its duties, which England had 
 ever seen. The leading friends of reform were the leading 
 friends of America : Buckingham, who had declared the war 
 "wicked, impolitic, and ruinous;" Burke and Chatham, 
 whose noble defence of our cause all the world knows ; Con- 
 way, Barre, and others less distinguished. 
 
 If the horrors of the French Revolution, late in the reign 
 of George III., arrested for a time the cause of reform, we 
 shall, with that exception, find that it made a steady advance 
 after our independence was recognized. Such, then, was the 
 theory of the appointing power the system of administration 
 the moral tone of party politics in England during the 
 generation of Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and all the 
 founders of our system, and even within the lifetime of per- 
 sons now living. It seems not improbable that but for the 
 corrupt and prescriptive system of administration which pre- 
 vailed, our Revolutionary War might have been a far less pro- 
 tracted and costly struggle. 
 
 Our fathers framed a system repugnant to that of England 
 in some of the principles of equality and justice upon which it 
 rests, yet substantially identical in the arrangements, methods, 
 and official character required for good administration. Birth- 
 right, privileges, class distinctions, religion, Church Establish- 
 ments, property, and every element of feudalism they discard- 
 ed, as foundations of government or qualifications for ofiicial 
 service. By the strongest of all conceivable implications, 
 they declared competency for office to be character and capa- 
 city. Yet, in face of such an experience in the mother coun- 
 try, they directly said, or provided for, almost nothing on a 
 subject so vital, beyond declaring that the President should 
 be a native ; that judges should have a fixed tenure and salary 
 (provisions copied from English statutes) ; and that Senators 
 and Representatives in Congress should be of a certain age. 
 The States generally fell short of even such meagre pro- 
 visions. The nation and the States alike left the great and dan- 
 gerous power of removal to the merest implication. This is 
 not to be mentioned against them as a reproach ; for their
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 119 
 
 thoughts were absorbed in the vital questions of personal liberty 
 and national independence. The subject of good public ad- 
 ministration, as one of the vital and permanent conditions of 
 national peace, morality, and prosperity, was only a mooted 
 question even among the older nations which had centuries of 
 misrule before their eyes. Indeed, it could hardly be said to be 
 before their eyes, for the procedure and the corruption in the 
 great offices, like the debates in Parliament, had been treated 
 as party or official secrets. There was but little in print, 
 and perhaps nothing on this side of the Atlantic, from which 
 they could be learned. It cost the greatest efforts and long 
 litigation to bring to light abuses in the departments and the 
 municipalities, and the veil of secrecy is not yet torn from some 
 parts of the administration of the City of London. ' 
 
 The subject of administration had hardly been considered at 
 all on this side of the ocean. And in sparsely settled colonies, 
 without great cities or great fortunes, or any experience in 
 large public affairs, it is not strange that no provision ' should 
 be made for the character, capacity, or discipline of that great 
 army of officers, and those vast and complex affairs which 
 were only to exist in a future generation. Keed we doubt 
 that adequate safeguards would have been provided in the 
 constitution, had its framers foreseen the abuses of the last 
 forty years ? 
 
 1 At this time (Jan. 16, 1870) a proceeding is being taken before the 
 courts, in the City of New York, in order to get at the facts of habitual ex- 
 tortion and other .corruption in the municipal offices, which are charged, 
 and generally believed, to be, in character, quite analogous to those pre- 
 vailing in English cities a century ago.
 
 CHAPTEK X. 
 
 THE REFORM PERIOD AFTER THE FALL OF LORD BUTE. 
 
 Parliament first limits the King's civil list. Rockingham Ministry in 
 1765. Its reforming policy. Public opinion growing bold and exacting. 
 Junius Letters. Burke's reform bill. Wilkes. The King caricatured. 
 The public press. Lord Chatham and William Pitt as reformers. 
 Later progress of reform sentiment. Monster meetings and petitions. 
 Reform societies. Relation of American independence to administrative 
 reform. Test acts. Rights of Catholics to hold office. Of Jews. Gene- 
 ral results of partisan and religious tests for office. 
 
 ON the accession of George III., Parliament had, for the 
 first time, assumed control over the personal expenditures (the 
 " civil list") of the Crown ; but that servile body allowed the 
 law to remain a dead letter. In less than nine years the king 
 had exceeded the allowance by more than 500,000. The cli- 
 max of the last phase of the spoils system in English politics 
 was reached under Lord Bute ;' and with his fall the era of 
 practical reform opened. The public opinion demanding it 
 had become bold and threatening. The theory of making a 
 party of mere office-holders and favorites was at an end, and 
 that of ruling through party leaders was restored. 
 
 In 1765, the king was forced to accept, as Prime Minister, 
 the Marquis of Itockingham, the leader of the opposition, 
 whom he had just dismissed from his lieutenancy, and, as a 
 
 1 The Union with Ireland, effected in 1799, was, in a pecuniary sense, one 
 of the most corrupt of all the official transactions of that generation. Gov- 
 ernment bought out the borough interests, openly treatingpatronage as prop- 
 erty. The patrons of boroughs received 7500 for each seat. The total 
 compensation for boroughs amounted to 1,260,000. It appears that the 
 original estimates of expenses were as follows : Boroughs, 756,000 ; 
 county interests, 224,000 ; barristers, 200,000 ; purchases of seats, 75,- 
 000 ; Dublin, 200,000. Besides all which, there were peerages conferred, 
 places multiplied, and pensions increased. Lord Cornwallis, the Lord Lieu- 
 tenant, most bitterly complained of the " dirty business," and " longed to 
 kick those whom his public duty obliged him to court."
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 121 
 
 Secretary of State, General Conway, whom he had just de- 
 prived of his regiment. It was a condition, made by this ad- 
 ministration, that military officers should not be disturbed for 
 political reasons. It also compelled the king to disclaim the 
 old practice ' of influencing members of Parliament by bribes, 
 patronage or prerogative. These were" two great victories, 
 poorly as the king kept his promise. The king 2 was intensely 
 hostile to the independent reforming spirit of his new cabi- 
 net ; and, aided by divisions among the Whigs, was before 
 long able to overthrow it. For ten more years, there was 
 little apparent progress, but a public opinion was growing, 
 more enlightened, more exacting and more audacious than had 
 ever been known. For the first time, the character and the 
 practical methods of the administration became a great issue 
 before the people. The public was angry over abuses. 
 
 The first of the letters of Junius appeared in January, 1769, 
 and that to the king, the boldest and most defiant ever written 
 by a subject, before the end of the year. So audacious did the 
 popular protest against the royal spoils system become, that 
 Mr. R"ast, in our day, has not dealt more boldly with high 
 officials. One caricature sold upon the streets represented a 
 high official wheeling the king on a barrow with his crown, 
 with the legend " what a man buys he may sell ;" and, in 
 another, the king was exhibited on his knees, with his mouth 
 open, into which Warren Hastings was pitching diamonds. 
 In the law courts, Wilkes recovered 4000 against the Secre- 
 tary of State, who had caused his house to be ransacked under 
 a general search warrant. It would require far too much 
 space to trace, historically, the many reform measures by 
 which abuses existing in the early part of this reign have been 
 removed or reduced. A brief outline must therefore suffice. 
 The days for sneering at reform and for scorning the higher 
 sentiment of the nation pretty much expired with Walpole 
 and his generation. But the details of public abuses had not 
 
 1 The celebrated Lord Mansfield defended the king. 
 
 2 The king treated reformers as rebels against the laws, just as modern 
 partisan tyrants treat them as rebels against the party ; and, in a proc- 
 lamation, he warned the people " against rebellious insurrection" to resist or 
 reform the laws.
 
 122 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 even yet become much known to the people. They had no 
 definite theories about the best way of reforming the exercise 
 of the appointing power. They knew that fearful abuses 
 existed, and they had three distinct convictions on the sub- 
 ject : that the corruption and favoritism in the administration 
 were serious matters ; that their rulers ought to give their atten- 
 tion to them ; and that they might be reformed. The greatest 
 and most practical statesmen of the age held the same views. 
 From that day to this, administrative measures in England 
 have been recognized as among the most vital questions in 
 her affairs ; and 'the reputation of nearly every eminent 
 statesman since the time of Lord North has largely rested 
 upon his efforts in connection with administrative reform. 
 Administration has been converted into a sort of science, 
 which all the leading statesmen have studied. The bold and 
 brilliant speeches and writings of Mr. Burke called attention 
 to the details of official abuses. The struggle for reform was 
 opened in Parliament by Lord Chatham in 1766, the same year 
 in which he spoke against the Stamp act, and openly " rejoiced 
 that America had resisted." Seeing the angry mood of the 
 nation, he declared that " before the end of the century, Par- 
 liament will reform itself from within, or be reformed, with 
 a vengeance, from withou t. ' ' 
 
 The press, by reason of Parliament, being too corrupt to 
 represent the higher sentiment, had suddenly become a 
 political power ; and, repeating the thoughts of the great 
 statesmen, and giving voice to the popular indignation, it 
 awed both the Parliament and the king. In 1780, "nu- 
 merous public meetings were held, associations formed, 
 and petitions presented, in favor of economical reforms, 
 complaining of the undue influence of the Crown, and of 
 the patronage and corruption by which it was maintained. ' ' l 
 It was this aroused feeling among the people which encouraged 
 Mr. Burke " to bring forward his celebrated reform bill, the 
 
 1 1 May's History, p. 54. 
 
 2 Lord Talbot, about the same time, had tried to carry through a bill for 
 reducing the officers, sinecurists and various expenses ia the king's house- 
 hold ; but Mr. Burke said he failed, " because the king's turnspit was a 
 member of Parliament."
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 123 
 
 next year, which was supported in a speech by the younger 
 Pitt. It provided both for a reduction of officers and a 
 diminution of expenses in many .ways. 
 
 "I bent the whole force of my mind (Mr. Burke says) to the 
 reduction of that corrupt influence which is, in itself, the perennial 
 spring of all prodigality and of all disorder ; which loads us with 
 . . . debt, takes vigor from our army, wisdom from our council 
 and authority and credit from the more venerable parts of our con- 
 stitution." 
 
 Mr. Pitt (the younger) brought forward a reform bill of 
 his own, in 1783, and twice pressed it upon Parliament. 
 When coming to office himself in the same year, he was (in 
 his own person) true to his principles ; for though so poor 
 that he had an income of only 300 a year, he declined the 
 sinecure perquisites, amounting to 3000 a year, which the old 
 spoils system tendered him. 1 
 
 About the same time the Duke of Richmond also brought 
 in a reform bill, and the people began, for the first time at 
 this period, to petition on a large scale for the removal of 
 abuses ; earnestly calling for " parliamentary and economical 
 reform." One of these petitions from Yorkshire was signed 
 by eight thousand freeholders, and one from "Westminster by 
 five thousand electors. It required some boldness, under the 
 law of libel of those days, to sign an outspoken petition. 
 
 Instead of fearing to promote any reform, lest the party 
 majority should be offended (as has so generally and so unfor- 
 tunately been the case with our party managers), 2 the great 
 party leaders of that day (1780) formed a society " to instruct 
 the people in their political rights and to forward the cause of 
 
 1 But William Pitt, as Prime Minister, made a partisan, though, strictly 
 speaking, not a corrupt, use of titles, decorations and patronage, to an ex- 
 tent that has not been equalled by any of his successors. 
 
 * English writers of the most liberal views, and who are ready to do jus- 
 tice to our public virtues, cannot forbear noticing this habitual cowering to 
 the party majority. Speaking of English public opinion, in this decade, 
 Mr. May says (2 History, p. 215): "Opinion free in the press, free in 
 every form of public discussion has become not less free in society. It is 
 never coerced into silence or conformity, as in, America, by the tyrannous force 
 of a majority."
 
 124 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 parliamentary reform. ' ' Among its early members were the 
 Duke of Richmond, Mr. Fox, Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Sheridan. 
 
 " Political societies and clubs took part in the creation of 
 public opinion, and . . . proved that Parliament would soon 
 have to reckon with the sentiments of the people at large. " l 
 
 But it was the fall of Lord North in 1782, and the coming in 
 of the Marquis of Buckingham, a second time, as Prime Min- 
 ister (under whom Burke held office), which dealt the heaviest 
 blow the spoils system had ever received ; a blow from which 
 it has never recovered. "It must be added, to the lasting 
 honor of Lord Rockingham, that his administration was the 
 first which during a long course of years Lad the courage and 
 the virtue to refrain from bribing members of Parliament. 
 . . None of his friends had asked or obtained any pen- 
 sion or any sinecure, either in possession or in reversion. " 2 It 
 was then that the proud king felt so humiliated, that lie or- 
 dered his yacht ready with a view of leaving the country. 
 Parliament was overawed by the stern tone of public opinion. 
 Mr. May thinks that bribery of its members, with money, 
 "did not long survive the ministry of Lord North," and 
 Mr. Green says it then ceased altogether. The new adminis- 
 tration declared, as part of its policy, " independence to 
 America, abolition of offices, the exclusion of contractors 
 from Parliament, and the disfranchisement of revenue offi- 
 cers ;" and this policy was carried out. " Many useless offices 
 were abolished, restraints were imposed on the issue of secret- 
 service money, the pension list was diminished, and guaran- 
 tees were provided for a more effectual supervision of the 
 royal expenditures." 3 And thus was our independence a twin 
 birth with administrative reform in the mother country. 
 
 The effect of such measures and of such a public senti- 
 ment upon Parliament had been great. In the time of 
 George II. , there had been two hundred and fifty-seven place- 
 men in that body, exclusive of army and navy officers, but at 
 this time they had fallen to less than ninety. That venal but 
 tyrannical body which, as late as 1771, had issued a proc- 
 
 1 Green's History, p. 738. 
 
 * Macaulay's " Essay on Lord Chatham," pp. 172 and 178. 
 
 1 May's History, vol. i., pp. 61 and 199.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 125 
 
 lamation forbidding the publication of its debates had 
 brought printers to its bar, on their knees had sent the Lord 
 Mayor of London to the Tower was now compliant in the 
 presence of that indignant sentiment of the nation which 
 fiercely demanded publicity and reform. " The public ex- 
 penses were reduced and commission after commission was 
 appointed to introduce economy into every department of the 
 public service . . . Credit was restored. The smuggling 
 trade was greatly reduced." ' 
 
 The demand for reform continued to spread more and 
 more widely among the people. And, had it not been for the 
 reaction caused by the excesses of the French Revolution, 
 results attained only in this decade might, perhaps, have been 
 reached a half a century ago. As early as 1795, political 
 meetings were held at which 150,000 persons are said to have 
 been present, and at which universal suffrage and parliamen- 
 tary reform were demanded. In 1797, a reform of the bor- 
 ough system was urged in Parliament by Lord Gray, but it 
 was not carried until 1832, when he was Prime Minister. 
 
 The corporation and test acts making the Sacrament of 
 the Church of England a qualification 2 for office lingered oh 
 the statute books until 1828, and Lord Eldon opposed the 
 repeal to the last. Because the partisan tyranny of our day 
 has only had the courage to deprive those in the public service 
 of reasonable liberty of speech, we must not forget that, in 
 these earlier times, the same tyranny was extended both to 
 the public press and to the assemblies of the people. It was 
 the theory and for a long period the fact that there was 
 little more liberty to criticise the acts of government on the 
 part of those beyond the public service, than on the part of 
 those within it. It was against what remained of this official 
 oppression, that the fierce and trenchant invective of Junius, 
 the boldness and adroitness of Wilkes, the patriotic eloquence 
 of Erskine, and the majestic justice of Camden were so effective. 
 They seriously crippled an overshadowing despotism ; which, 
 however, was not wholly renuved until the present century. 
 
 1 Green's History, pp. 756 and 757. 
 4 " To make the symbols of atoning grace, 
 An office key and pick-lock to a place." 
 9
 
 ^v ,.-- :, . 
 
 126 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 For, when neither courts nor juries would longer sustain 
 it, and high officials dared not act under restrictive stat- 
 utes still in force (which they were too partisan to have re- 
 pealed), the old spirit, just as hostile to popular intelligence as 
 to popular action, found utterance in the form of taxation. 
 And it was not until 1853 and 1855 that the advertisement 
 duty and the newspaper stamp were taken away. The duty 
 on paper did not fall until six years later. 
 
 It was not until 1829 that belief in the Catholic creed 
 ceased to disqualify a man, generally, for office. In that year, 
 Sir Robert Peel carried a reform bill, which removed that 
 test, opening Parliament and all political and judicial offices, 
 national and municipal, to the Catholics, except that of Re- 
 gent, Lord Chancellor, and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. But 
 that precious piece of property, the patronage of the State 
 Church, was sacredly reserved. Here again the venerable 
 Lord Eldon led the opposition, but he was compelled in that 
 year to see Catholic peers take seats which had been vacant for 
 generations. The Jews were now the only persons, unable by 
 reason of their opinions, to hold office, civil, military or cor- 
 porate. An effort to emancipate them failed in 1830. In 1845 
 they were allowed to hold corporate offices ; and finally, in 
 1860, a roundabout way was provided for Jews to come into 
 the House of Commons. Only in so late times did England 
 remove the official test of opinion and grant such limited meas- 
 ure of justice and liberty ; while we proclaimed them, without 
 limitation, at our national birth. Yet it is one of the anom- 
 alies of national development that, in this decade, opinions are, 
 practically, a pervading test for subordinate office with us, 
 \vhile in England not opinion, but personal merit alone, is that 
 test. IS'ever have efforts been made on a scale so large, 
 in forms so varied, or with a perseverance so great, to keep 
 administrations in power by patronage, to enforce opinions by 
 official influence, or to strengthen creeds by a monopoly of 
 office. In these records, we see their futility and their fate. 
 
 For what but these have been the results ? Administrations 
 struck down, by the popular verdict against the very favorit- 
 ism and corruption on which, they leaned ; Ireland, to-day, 
 more overwhelmingly Catholic .than ever ; the Jews more
 
 * *TH WASHINGTON SQ, 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 127 
 
 than ever numerous, respected and prosperous ; Dissenters 
 grown to be more than half of the people of England ; the old 
 official system detested and abandoned, and the memory of its 
 champions held in execration ; the government of England it- 
 self, under the forms of a monarchy, closely approximated to a 
 republic, toward which it is slowly drifting.
 
 CHAPTEE XI. 
 
 THE IMPROVED CONDITION AFTER THE FALL OF LORD NORTH. 
 
 The Partisan system in last part of reign of George III. Members of Parlia- 
 ment secure patronage. The higher public opinion asserts itself. Vari- 
 ous reforms. Clerks no longer mere department employes. Freedom 
 of elections protected. Those in the public service disfranchised. Office 
 brokerage prohibited. Legislation against it stringent and comprehen- 
 sive. Drastic bribery laws. British legislation compared with American. 
 Severe laws against official abuses in India. Superannuation allowances 
 and their effect. 
 
 WE have seen that the fall of Lord North and the inde- 
 pendence of America mark the period when the power of the 
 higher public opinion began to be felt in the departments and 
 feared by the executive and by Parliament. With some in- 
 terruption by George III. , party government prevailed during 
 the residue of his reign. Pecuniary corruption and aristo- 
 cratic supremacy were steadily decreasing, and patronage was 
 dispensed with a more and more strict regard to partisan in- 
 terests. The mental derangement of the king and the grow- 
 ing political activity and enlightenment of the times facili- 
 tated the transfer of power and patronage from the executive ; 
 and Parliament was able to appropriate what the executive 
 lost. " Members of Parliament eagerly sought the patronage of 
 the Crown. ' ' The party leaders in that body promised patron- 
 age to their friends in the House, as well as out, in return 
 for support. And when these leaders were called into the cabinet, 
 (as one party or the other became dominant), they performed 
 their part of the bargain, and the elections in boroughs and muni- 
 cipalities felt the consequences. In that age, the basis of a call to 
 the cabinet was party influence in Parliament and in the bor 
 oughs, and such influence was generally measured by the num- 
 1 1 May's History, p. 18.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. l!>9 
 
 her of pensions and titles promised to fellow members and 
 constituents. It is plain that this practical working of party 
 government tended to make the administration intensely parti- 
 san and to concentrate all patronage in the hands of members 
 of Parliament. That tendency continued almost unchecked 
 during the residue of this reign. The people, generally, did 
 not at that time see that the great contest in which, after a 
 struggle for centuries, they had destroyed monopoly and 
 tyranny in the civil service on the part of the king and his 
 ministers, was about to be succeeded by a contest, hardly less 
 formidable, with the same monopoly, which was then being 
 usurped by members of Parliament. In the public eye, Par- 
 liament, rather than the executive, was the popular body and 
 stood for liberty and justice ; and therefore its silent and 
 steady usurpation was less noticed. We shall find that this 
 new parliamentary monopoly of the appointing power gained 
 strength for about half a century, when it had become an 
 oppressive and demoralizing tyranny, against which the higher 
 prfblic opinion then began to make open war. It is in this pe- 
 riod between 1800 and 1853 that the administrative situation in 
 Great Britain was, in its general features, most analogous to 
 what our own has been during the last fifty years, except that 
 there a steady improvement was taking place. There the plane 
 of advance was slowly rising (but not so rapidly as public intel- 
 ligence and virtue), while with us it was slowly falling. To 
 make the nearest accordance, the order of time must be reversed 
 ill one country. Among the greater obstacles to reform, in 
 both countries was a monopoly of patronage in the hands of 
 members of the legislature. In Great Britain, as with us, 
 the contest was really between the people, standing for free- 
 dom and equality, as to sharing public service and emoluments, 
 on the one side, and the members of the legislature with some 
 high officials, claiming and enjoying a monopoly of both, on 
 the other side ; while the executive, sometimes favoring one 
 side and sometimes the other, failed to gain much popular sup- 
 port, because so rarely rising to a standard above that of the 
 monopolists of whose encroachments it justly complained. I 
 can give but a brief outline of the reforms made in this 
 period.
 
 130 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 1. It would seem that, in the first half of the reign of 
 George III., or perhaps earlier, a practice had grown up in 
 certain of the larger offices, without the aid of any act of Par- 
 liament, of providing, (mainly by collections from the salaries 
 of those in the public service,) a fund out of which those who 
 might be disabled in the discharge of duty, or who might re- 
 tire after long service, should receive an allowance for their 
 support. This voluntary action appears to have been the basis 
 of that pervading system of superannuation allowances in the 
 English service, to which I shall more fully refer. 
 
 2. /Subordinates in departments elevated in rank. Until 
 1810, ' those employed in any department appear to have been 
 little more than private clerks or employes of the head of that 
 department. They were not, in law, recognized as public 
 officials at all. They were paid out of a fund made up of the 
 fees collected in the department or office ; and the balance of 
 the fund, like the appointing power itself , was treated as a part of 
 the perquisites of the minister or head of the office. It was a 
 part of the old spoils system which had prevailed, under 
 which offices and places in the civil service were official 
 property to be sold. This statute seems to indicate that the 
 balance of the fund above expenses is to be paid into the 
 public treasury, and it requires that any deficiency of the 
 fund to pay salaries should be made up from the treasury, 
 thus making those employed in the departments public ser- 
 vants. It regulated pensions and allowances and required 
 annual statements of those employed and of their com- 
 pensation to be laid before Parliament. This statute, with 
 an act of 1816, a and some later amendments, made all those 
 engaged in the established service public officials with fixed 
 salaries. Their dignity and self-respect were thereby much 
 increased, and the tyranny and profit of high officers were in 
 the same degree diminished. 
 
 3. Official interference with freedom of elections. The cor- 
 ruption and partisan activity in the civil service, (caused by the 
 whole body of inferior officers, except officers in the postal ser- 
 vice, whom we have seen a statute of Anne had prohibited tak- 
 
 1 Statute of 50 George III., chap. 117. a 56 George III., ch. 46.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 131 
 
 ing any part in elections, being in confederacy with members 
 of Parliament and other high officials, by whom they were in 
 great measure appointed), and the coercion of elections which 
 was a natural consequence, were too great to be longer en- 
 dured. All milder remedies having failed, the disenfranchise- 
 ment of these in minor offices seemed to be the only effective 
 remedy. An act passed in 1782 l is entitled " An act for bet- 
 ter securing the freedom of elections, ... by disabling 
 certain officers from giving their votes," etc. It provides 
 that " no commissioner, collector, supervisor, gauger, or other 
 officer or person, whatsoever, concerned or employed in the 
 charging, collecting, levying, or managing the duties of excise, 
 . or concerned or employed in the charging, collect- 
 ing, levying, or managing the customs, ... or any of 
 the duties on stamped . . . parchment and paper, 
 or of the duties on salt, . . . windows or houses, nor any 
 postmaster, postmaster-general, or his deputy or deputies, nor 
 any person employed under him or them, . . . shall vote 
 for members of Parliament. . . . " The number of per- 
 sons thus disfranchised, and the great check put upon official 
 dictation, at elections, may be inferred from the fact that one 
 of the four schedules of duties attached to a customs revenue 
 law, of 1809, defining the articles to be taxed, 2 fills one hun- 
 dred and twenty-five closely printed pages of the act, making 
 the bewildering number of more than two thousand separate 
 classes of customs duties to be collected. All officers required 
 for such a vast service are of course in addition to those in the 
 inland revenue and post office service, which were also dis- 
 franchised. Such was the result in England, before the adop- 
 tion of our constitution, of the indignation of her people 
 aroused by the same abuse against which we now more and more 
 protest, under the name of interference with local elections, by 
 custom-house and other officials. And thus members of Par- 
 liament, having neither the disinterestedness nor the patriotism 
 required to refrain from making use of the unworthy subordi- 
 nates, whose appointment they had procured, for the purpose 
 of coercing their own election, and not being able to withstand 
 
 1 22 George III., chap. 41. * 49 George III., chap. 93.
 
 132 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 a non -partisan public opinion which demanded the removal of 
 that abuse, instead of attempting to justify it, as has too often 
 been the case in our day, boldly disfranchised the whole body 
 of subordinates in the executive department. They greatly 
 limit the abuse on the side of the minor officials, while cun- 
 ningly preserving their usurped patronage and retaining the 
 full measure of the evil on their own side. Whether the rem- 
 edy was the best practicable or not, it shows a stern determina- 
 tion to have an end of a great public evil ; and the act is fur- 
 ther worthy of notice as being, perhaps, the first (since the cel- 
 ebrated statute of Richard II.) which aims directly at raising 
 the character of the civil service. And I may add that both 
 the great parties in England found it necessary to maintain this 
 restriction until July, 1868, when the salutary effects of intro- 
 ducing the merit system (that is, examinations and competi- 
 tions) made it safe to restore the franchise to all those officers. 2 
 In that year it was restored ; and public officers, clerks, and 
 employes in Great Britain can now, as freely as any other per- 
 sons, vote at all elections. Having come into the public ser- 
 vice on their own merits, and holding their places by no tenure 
 of servility to any high official or domineering party leader, 
 they, like other citizens, vote or decline to vote, with entire 
 freedom, of which no one complains. 
 
 4. Sale and brokerage of offices. But even when deprived 
 of the right of voting, those in the public service might in- 
 trigue and bargain for promotions and for increase of salaries. 
 Those not in the public service might promise votes and elec- 
 tioneering work for appointments in the gift of members of 
 Parliament. An act of 1809 1 is entitled " An act for the 
 further prevention of the sale and brokerage of offices." 
 It re-enacts the prohibitions of the law of Edward VI. 
 (already referred to), and such prohibitions are extended 
 to nearly all officers. How thoroughly it deals with the 
 subject may be inferred from the following provisions : Any 
 one is made guilty of a misdemeanor who shall give or assist 
 to give any money or thing of value, ... or prom- 
 
 49 George III., chap. 120, and chap. 218, 3. 
 9 31 and 32 Viet., chap. 73, and ace 37 and 88 Viet., chap. 22.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 133 
 
 ise to give any, . . . "for any office, commission, place, 
 or employment," or ... "for any appointment or 
 nomination or resignation thereof, or for the consent or con- 
 sents or voice or voices of any person or persons to any such 
 appointment, nomination, or resignation. . . ." And 
 the same punishment is incurred by "any person who shall 
 receive, have, or take any money, reward, directly or indi- 
 rectly, for any promise, . . . assurance ; or ly any way, 
 means or device, contract . . . for any interest, solicita- 
 tion, petition, request, recommendation, negotiation, 
 under pretence of . . . or in or about or anywise touch- 
 ing, concerning, or relating to any nomination, appointment, 
 deputation, or resignation of any such office, commission, 
 place, or employment." The keeping of any office, place, 
 or agency for procuring or selling offices, employments, or 
 places, " or for negotiating in any manner whatever any bus- 
 iness relating to vacancies, or in or to the sale or purchase of 
 any appointments, nominations, or deputation to, resig- 
 nation, transfer or exchange of any offices, places, or employ- 
 ments, in or under any public department," ... is also 
 made a misdemeanor. The purchase and sale of commissions 
 in the army upon the conditions and at regular rates fixed by 
 authority are excepted. It hardly need be mentioned that such 
 a searching law is equally remarkable as illustrating the grave 
 and varied abuses to which a bad system inevitably leads, and 
 as declaring the stern, practical demand of the English people 
 that these abuses shall come to an end. How much further 
 this act goes than any of the laws \ve have, in making criminal 
 not only barter and trade concerning salaries and officers, but 
 all negotiations relating to vacancies, exchanges, nominations, 
 resignations, removals, and transfers in short, every form of 
 corrupt use of the power of appointment and confirmation, 
 and every pernicious kind of solicitation and bargaining 
 hardly need be pointed out. 
 
 But it should be particularly noticed that, it is not merely 
 the giving, promising, or accepting of money or a valuable 
 consideration, which is made penal, but the " making or taking 
 of any promise or agreement whatever" of a corrupt nature as 
 a consideration ; and that not for office or place merely, but
 
 134 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 for any " appointment, nomination, resignation, voice, or con- 
 sent to any appointment, nomination, or resignation, or for 
 any " negotiation concerning an office or appointment ;" and 
 ' ' every such person, and also every person who shall wilfully 
 and knowingly aid such person, shall be deemed guilty of a 
 misdemeanor. " It would seem that such a statute would reach 
 every form of corrupt bargaining and promising, in connection 
 with nominations and confirmations, whether or not any money 
 or thing of value was promised ; and therefore presents a sig- 
 nificant instance of the more exacting demands of English leg- 
 islation aimed at securing official fidelity. 
 
 Indeed, on several of the important points covered by this 
 law, I believe our laws are silent. And it is, to say the least, 
 very doubtful whether our courts would feel authorized to fol- 
 low the English decisions. Perhaps this statute is compre- 
 hensive enough to make penal the habitual bartering and trad- 
 ing which takes place in regard to nominations, appointments, 
 and elections between public officers, party managers, and pat- 
 ronage brokers in our municipalities, and sometimes in our leg- 
 islatures, if not in higher quarters. It places the exacting de- 
 mands of the times in which it was enacted in curious contrast 
 with the loose morality which had before prevailed ; for it de- 
 clares that, if any one has an office, which he took " on an 
 agreement to pay a charge or part of the profits to a former 
 holder," he is still left liable to make such payments / and it 
 further recites that ' 5 whereas ... it has always been 
 customary in the appointment of the masters and six clerks 
 and . . . the examiners of the Court of Chancery of 
 Ireland to allow the having or receiving of money or other val- 
 uable consideration for such appointments f and though it 
 is a practice fit to be discontinued, etc., " yet it is reasonable 
 that the persons . . . who now hold the said offices 
 should be permitted to dispose of them in the same manner y" 
 and it permits them so to do. If we wonder at such indul- 
 gence, we cannot wonder less at the rapid rise in public senti- 
 ment, as shown in the general provisions of the law. 
 
 5. Bribery. An act of 1809 ' shows how the English Gov- 
 
 1 49 George III., chap. 118.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 135 
 
 eminent struck at the partisan spoils system through her laws 
 against bribery. It is declared to be " An act to secure inde- 
 pendence in Parliament and prevent the attaining of seats by 
 corrupt practices," and is a part of the laws against bribery. 
 One of its recitals is worthy of special notice. The Bill of 
 Rights had declared that " the election of members of Parlia- 
 ment ought to be free." Now this act, after reciting that 
 money . . . and ' ' offices, places, and employment are 
 promised and given to secure elections," declares that not only 
 are such gifts but " such promises are contrary to the freedom 
 of elections." 
 
 It was a great step in the reform of the civil service to lay 
 down the rule of law that a promise of an office, place, or em- 
 ployment, or of official influence in securing either under the 
 government, in consideration of votes and work for candidates, 
 was as real and dangerous an invasion of the freedom of 
 elections and as fit a cause of punishment as to promise money 
 or anything of direct pecuniary value for doing the same 
 thing. But this statute carries the principle even further in 
 the same direction. For, after declaring in the first section that 
 it is a penal offence to " promise any sum of money, gift, or 
 thing of value" as a consideration for procuring or endeavoring 
 to procure the return of any person to Parliament, it declares 
 in the next section that if " any person shall by himself or other 
 person give or procure to be given, or promise to give or pro- 
 cure to be given, any office, place, or employment, to any per- 
 son or persons whatsoever, upon any express contract or agree- 
 ment that such person . . . shall by himself, or by any 
 other person or persons, . . . their solicitation, request, 
 or command, procure or endeavor to procure the return of any 
 person to Parliament," . . . the candidate knowing and 
 consenting to such agreement, is " declared to be disabled and 
 incapacitated to serve in Parliament /" and the person prom- 
 ised the said office, place, or employment is declared incapable 
 of holding the same, and is made liable to pay a fine of 500. 
 And in addition, ' ' any person holding any office under the Crown 
 who shall give any office, place, or employment under a contract 
 for procuring or endeavoring to procure the return of a per- 
 son to Parliament," is made liable by the same section to a tine
 
 136 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of 1000. The bearing of this provision upon such habitual ar- 
 rangements as are made in connection with our elections, for giv 
 ing offices and places as a consideration for votes, resignations, 
 and influence, must be apparent. Is there any way of avoiding 
 the admission that in this statute, English political legislation 
 had thus early reached a level ours has not yet attained ? If 
 I am not laboring under some misapprehension, the pas- 
 sage of such a law by Congress would not only produce a 
 great sensation in the lower circles of our politics, but would 
 be a great and salutary reform in our official life. And have 
 we any right to be surprised at the higher' moral tone and 
 greater efficiency now claimed for the British civil service, 
 when, for more than half a century, it has been guarded and 
 protected by such salutary statutes ? 
 
 A law of 1827 ' is in the same spirit. That is also a law to 
 prevent corrupt practices in elections, and for diminishing 
 election expenses. It provides that " If any person shall, 
 either during any election of members of Parliament or within 
 six calendar months before or fourteen days after 
 be employed as counsel, agent, or attorney, . . . or in 
 any other capacity for the purposes of such election, and shall 
 . . accept from any such candidate, or from any person 
 whatsoever, for, in consideration of, or with reference to such 
 employment, any sum of money, retaining fee, office, place, 
 or employment, or any promise or security for any such 
 money, . . . office, place, or employment, . . 
 such person shall be deemed incapable of voting at such 
 election." These laws were consolidated and extended by 
 a law of 1854, 2 which declares that "every person who 
 shall directly or indirectly . . . give or procure, or 
 agree to give or procure, . . . or endeavor to procure 
 any office, place, or employment to or for any voter, or to or 
 for any person in behalf of any voter, or to or for any other 
 person, ... in order to induce him to vote or refrain 
 from voting,' 1 '' . . . is guilty of bribery. " Every person 
 who shall, in consequence of any such promises, ... en- 
 deavor to procure any such . . . return or vote, . , 
 
 1 7 and 8 George IV., chap. 37. a 17 and 18 Viet., chap. 102.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIX. 137 
 
 is also guilty of bribery." It is further provided that every 
 voter who shall, before or during the election, . . . agree 
 or contract for any money, etc. , "or any office, place ; or em- 
 ployment for himself or any other person for voting, agreeing 
 to vote, or refraining from voting at any election" is also 
 guilty of bribery. This act also places salutary restrictions of 
 various kinds upon election abuses too numerous to be detailed 
 here. They show that far more consideration has been given 
 to the subject in all its bearings than it has ever commanded 
 in this country. Some of the prohibitions were doubtless 
 made more necessary for the reason that the ballot was not in 
 use ; but most of them are hardly less efficacious since it has 
 been introduced. The more important of them relate to mak- 
 ing merchandise of the appointing power independently of elec- 
 tions. Among other important precautions of the act are those 
 providing for a public " auditor of election expenses," before 
 whom all such expenses must be publicly stated and proved, 
 and without whose approval of them they are neither binding, 
 nor is it lawful for the candidate to pay them. I think there 
 can be no doubt but these provisions as to expenses have been 
 most salutary in England, arid could be adopted here with good 
 effect in checking the secret and corrupt use of money and 
 other bribes to effect elections. 
 
 There are strong reasons for thinking that these British 
 statutes have contributed largely to the formation of that 
 salutary public opinion in Great Britain sure to attract the 
 attention of a candid foreigner which now condemns the 
 use of authority over the public service for promoting the in- 
 terests of ambition and partisanship, almost as strongly as it does 
 the direct use of public money for the same purpose. That 
 opinion and these statutes plainly regard the honest exercise of 
 the power of appointment, promotion, removal, and employ- 
 ment in the public service as being a duty as absolute as that 
 of accounting for the taxes or guarding the treasury. 
 
 It is worthy of serious reflection that our Federal statutes, 
 on the subject of bribery, though sometimes framed in language 
 which suggests a knowledge of the English precedents, have 
 stopped short of prohibiting the corrupt use or the promise of 
 the use of influence or official authority to procure offices, places,
 
 138 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 or employments in the public service as a consideration for votes 
 or support. And, so far as I have been able to learn, our State 
 statutes on these subjects go little further than the Federal 
 statutes or are silent. 
 
 The United States Revised Statutes, 8 5449, relating to 
 
 / (J 7 O 
 
 bribing judges ; 5450 and 5500, relating to bribing mem- 
 bers of Congress ; 5501, relating to other officers generally, 
 are meagre and narrow compared with the British statutes ; 
 only prohibiting the use of " money or any promise, contract, 
 etc. , for payment of money, or for the delivery or conveyance 
 of anything of value." Were these words " delivery or con- 
 veyance" put in connection with " thing of value," to make 
 it certain that the statute should extend to nothing but a bribe 
 in material property of some kind ? 
 
 And such important provisions as those contained in 
 1781 to 1784, inclusive, seem to be framed in the same re- 
 strictive spirit ; almost suggesting that, while it is a grave 
 offence to receive a sum of money for prostituting a public 
 function, it is no offence at all to promise or give an office or a 
 promotion for doing the same thing. Indeed, the British 
 crime of " office brokerage" that is, the making of merchan- 
 dise of the use of official authority and influence, in the guise 
 of promising offices and places the criminality of which has 
 long been a salutary force for civil service reform in Great 
 Britain appears to be unknown in our Federal legislation. I 
 know of no fact more significant of the demoralizing effects of 
 the partisan spoils system in our politics than these defects in 
 our laws ; unless it be that public opinion, which so generally 
 fails to perceive that a public officer has no more right to use 
 the authority than he has the money, with which the people have 
 entrusted him, to advance private or partisan interests at their 
 expense. 
 
 A thoughtful writer has declared it to be important " that 
 the national institutions should place all things that are con- 
 nected with themselves before the mind of the citizen, in the 
 light in which it is for his good that he should regard them. ' ' 
 Is there not reason to fear that these false teachings of the laws 
 
 laws which in their very phraseology reflect the domineering 
 
 > 
 1 Mill on Representation, p. 173.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 139 
 
 supremacy of the partisan theory of politics are in a large 
 measure responsible for the idea so generally accepted, that 
 there is no right to inquire into the abuse of official discretion, 
 provided it falls short of actual peculation that its use, in the 
 selfish interests of a party, is almost if not quite commendable, 
 if not a sheer necessity ? The simple facts are that we now 
 tolerate the corrupt iise the virtual bargain and sale of 
 power and influence connected with office, precisely as I have 
 shown that the English so long tolerated the bargaining and 
 sale of the offices themselves. 
 
 The extent of the differences I have pointed out, between the 
 English and American statutes, as to using public functions 
 and offices for selfish and partisan purposes, is emphasized by 
 the decisions of our courts. Though popular elections of 
 judges for short terms have brought our judiciary (in most of 
 the States) sadly under the influence of party politics, the 
 judges have stiil tried to go beyond the language of our stat- 
 utes in arresting official corruption ; and their reliance has been 
 the English statutes and decisions. Thus, where one public 
 officer paid money to another for a resignation in his favor, 
 the courts of Rhode Island could find no law of the State or of 
 Congress forbidding the abuse, but held the transaction illegal 
 under English precedents. 1 The same in substance was the 
 fact when the United States Supreme Court declared void a 
 promise to pay a percentage to one who lobbied a claim 
 through Congress. 2 So when, in New York, one of t\vo can- 
 didates for an inspectorship agreed to withdraw, to support the 
 other and to share fees, the agreement was held void, not 
 because the meagre New York bribery law or any American 
 law was against it, but because English statutes and precedents 
 were against it. 3 It was decided by Lord Thurlow that a suit 
 on an agreement to pay for recommending one to an office 
 should be enjoined. 4 
 
 6. India Civil Service. The world knows the fearful abuses 
 that once pervaded it. A law of 1784 5 affords a further illus- 
 
 1 Eddy r. Capron, 4 Rhode Island Rep., 394. 
 Trist t>. Child, 21 Wallace, chap. 450. 
 
 3 Gray P. Hook, 4 Comstock R., 449. 
 
 4 Harrington v. Chatel, 1 Bro. cases, 124 ; Grcame r. Wrotichton, 1 Eng. 
 L. and E. Rep. " 24 George III., chap. 25.
 
 140 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tration of the painstaking manner in which English statesmen 
 at this period attempted to bring purity and vigor into that 
 branch of administration. No law upon our statute book will 
 bear any comparison with this for the thoroughness of its deal- 
 ing with the principal elements essential to a good civil ser- 
 vice remote from central supervision. I have no space for de- 
 tails. Promotions by favor and patronage, having resulted 
 in disgraceful corruption, inefficiency, and injustice, a trial 
 was ordered of a system of promotion mainly based on 
 seniority, and to prevent abuses, it is declared that the India 
 authorities shall keep and transmit a report to the direc- 
 tors which shall contain ' ' a full and perfect entry to be made 
 upon their minutes, specifying all the circumstances of the 
 case, and their reasons and inducements at large," whenever 
 in making promotions, they shall depart from the general rules 
 laid down in the law. 
 
 And I may say that similar rules had prevailed in some 
 of the home offices of England, in regard to promotions, and 
 that such records have been the efficient means of taking pro- 
 motions to a considerable extent out of party politics and per- 
 sonal favoritism. But seniority had its own evils. Another 
 section of this law is perhaps more stringent and comprehen- 
 sive than any we now have against public officers receiving pay- 
 ments or bribes ; and the same remark may be extended to the 
 following provision from the 50th section : ' ' The making or en- 
 tering into, by any officer, "of any corrupt contract for the giving 
 up or obtaining or in any manner touching or concerning the 
 trust and duty of any office or employment under the said 
 company in the East Indies, . . . shall be deemed and 
 taken to be a misdemeanor." 
 
 But the 55th section of this act is the most remarkable, and is 
 certainly a very unique and probably effective remedy. Its re- 
 enactment by Congress would give a shock to our territorial 
 officials, and it would be so well adapted to the cases of some 
 of our Indian agents that I give the material part of it in a 
 
 1 55. And for the better preventing or more easily punishing the mis- 
 conduct of the servants in the . . . affairs of ... India, be it fur- 
 ther enacted, That every person now being, or who shall hereafter be, in 
 the service ... in India, shall, within the space of two calendar
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 141 
 
 note. ' Xot only is the complete inventory in that section re- 
 quired to be made under oath, but, at any time within three 
 years, it may be shown to be false by any one and in that 
 case, or in case of any misrepresentation in it, or in the public 
 examinations under oath concerning its contents, to which the 
 maker may be subjected, he is not only made guilty of per- 
 jury, but he also forfeits his entire fortune. By such laws, the 
 English people illustrated their resolve to have brought to an 
 end that robbery and corruption in India with which the elo- 
 quence of Burke has made the world familiar. It was by such 
 laws, giving authority and permanency to the higher moods of 
 the people, that great encouragement and strength were impart- 
 ed, three-quarters of a century ago, to that reforming spirit, in 
 which were laid the deep foundations of those methods in the 
 civil service which have so much raised its standard in the 
 present generation over that of the past. Without citing such 
 laws, I have feared I shall be thought guilty of exaggeration 
 when I come to state how high that standard now is. 
 
 7. Superannuation allowances. The next class of the leg- 
 islation of this period, to which I shall refer, aims at making 
 
 months after his returning to Great Britain, deliver in upon oath, before 
 the Lord Chief Baron of his Majesty's Court of Exchequer in England, or 
 any two of the other barons of the said court for the tini3 being respectively 
 (which oath the said Lord Chief Baron, and other Larws, are hereby 
 respectively authorized to administer), duplicates of an exact particular or 
 inventory of all and singular the lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, 
 chattels, debts, moneys, securities for money, and other real and personal 
 estate and property whatsoever, as well in Europe as in Asia, or elsewhere, 
 which such person was seized or possessed of or entitled unto, at the time 
 of his arrival in Great Britain, in his own right, or which anj r person or 
 persons yas or were seized or possessed of in trust for him, or to or for his 
 use or benefit, at the time of his said arrival in Great Britain, or at any time 
 after ; specifying what part thereof was not acquired, or purchased by 
 property acquired, in consequence of his residence in the East Indies ; and 
 if any of the real or personal estate or property of any such person shall 
 have been conveyed, alienated, transferred, or otherwise disposed of, after 
 his said arrival in Great Britain, then such person shall also, in and by 
 said particular or inventory, set forth an accurate description and specifica- 
 tion of all such parts of his said real or personal estate and property as 
 shall have been so conveyed, transferred, or disposed of, and how and in 
 what manner, and to whom, and at what time, and for what price consid- 
 eration, the same shall have been so conveyed, alienated, transferred, or 
 disposed of respectively. 
 10
 
 142 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the public service more attractive through, provisions for dis- 
 ability and declining years ; whereby also it was believed that, 
 at least equal capacity and more fidelity might be obtained, at 
 a smaller expense to the public treasury. A law of 1809 ' 
 provides for superannuation allowances to persons in the excise 
 service. It clearly defines the policy on which it proceeds in 
 this preamble: "Whereas no provision is made by law for 
 persons employed in the revenue of excise to the great discour- 
 agement of such officers and other persons, and to the 'manifest 
 injury of the revenue" and it then authorizes certain pay- 
 ments out of the public revenue to those disabled by age or 
 infirmity after ten years' service ; the allowance being propor- 
 tional to salary. Allowances are also to be made to those who 
 shall meet with accidents in the discharge of official duty. A 
 law of 1810 3 shows a fact already suggested, that the voluntary 
 contributions of those in certain branches of the service had 
 provided a sort of retiring allowance from a fund in the nature 
 of an insurance fund. This law provides, for the first time, 
 that statements shall be annually laid before Parliament of all 
 persons in the public service, giving their salaries, pensions, 
 and allowances, and of all increase and diminution of either ; 
 the act being the equivalent and precedent of our statements 
 annually laid before Congress. The act also established a sys- 
 tem of superannuation allowances. The next year, 8 the old 
 system was abolished in the customs service, and the payment 
 of the allowances, so far as the old fund was inadequate, was 
 regularly charged upon the public treasury. The new system 
 having been found to contribute to efficiency as well as econ- 
 omy, after long trial, has never been very materially changed, 
 though modified from time to time. The final revision of 
 these laws was made in 1859. 4 Under this act, it is the rule 
 that, if there has been no more than ten years' service, there 
 can be no allowance. The retiring allowance, after ten years 
 and before eleven years of service, is at the rate of ten-sixtieths 
 of the current salary being paid at that time. At eleven years 
 of service, the allowance is at the rate of eleven-sixtieths of the 
 salary, and so on, increasing at the rate of one-sixtieth for every 
 
 1 49 George III., chap. 98. * 50 George III., chap. 117. 
 
 3 51 George III., chap. 55. 4 22 Viet., chap. 26.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 143 
 
 year of service, after ten years, until forty years of service, after 
 which there is no increase. It is also a part of this method 
 for securing faithful and efficient officers that most of the 
 salaries are regularly graded, so that there are regular ad- 
 ditions, dependent upon length and efficiency of service. 
 There are also carefully guarded provisions for the granting of 
 discretionary allowances up to a fixed limit, in cases of excep- 
 tional merit, severe bodily injury, disability in the service, 
 abolition of offices, and also in cases of special service of great 
 value to the public ; the same being, in principle, analogous to 
 pensions in military life. On the other hand, a deduction may 
 be made from such allowances against any person when " his 
 defaults or demerits in relation to the public service . . 
 appear to justify such diminution. ' ' The act f urrtier provides 
 that thereafter no person (save a few especially excepted) shall 
 be deemed to be in the civil service, in such a sense as to en- 
 title him to any superannuation or retiring allowance, " unless 
 he has been admitted to the civil service with a certificate from 
 the Civil Service Commissioners /" or, in other words, he must 
 have got into the service, not by favor or influence, but through 
 a public examination and open competition with his fellows 
 who sought the same place. 
 
 I have departed from chronological order, for the purpose of 
 bringing together all I have to say upon this important subject. 
 It seems to be demonstrated, by the experience of England 
 during three-quarters of a century, under such a method (which 
 we have adopted, by applying it in a very limited way to the 
 judges of the Supreme Court, and in spirit in our army and 
 navy pension system), 1 that the provision it makes for old age 
 and misfortunes, besides promoting a better feeling in the ser- 
 vice towards the State, and making effective discipline easier, 
 actually enables the State to purchase the services of its offi- 
 cers at a less cost to the public treasury. The allowances for 
 special merit and the deductions for bad conduct are based on 
 records kept in the departments, and they are considered to 
 have a salutary influence, (analogous to promotions, prize 
 money, and brevet rank in the naval and military service,) in 
 stimulating honorable exertions in the public interest. 
 
 1 It has lately been applied to the police force of New York City.
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION UNDER GEOEGE IV. 
 
 The better public opinion a growing power in politics. Condition of the 
 public service from 1820 to 1830. Partisan system supreme, but pecu- 
 niary corruption has nearly ceased in appointments. Bribery of members 
 of Parliament at an end, but not of electors. Few removals for political 
 reasons. Members of Parliament cling to patronage. Inefficiency and 
 supernumeraries in the service. Members foist incompetent favorites 
 upon the public Treasury. Theory of promotion. The Treasury and its 
 authority. The existing abuses explained. Great Reform Bill of 1832. 
 Failed to breakup the partisan system. The "Patronage Secretary" 
 of the Treasury and his functions. 
 
 GEORGE IV. came to the throne in 1820. In the laws to 
 which I have referred, it abundantly appears that the higher 
 public opinion had already achieved considerable victories over 
 official tyranny and all the corrupt elements of politics. Of 
 that tyranny Mr. May says : ' ' Henceforward we shall find its 
 supremacy gradually declining and yielding to the advancing 
 power and intelligence of the people. . . . From this 
 time public opinion became a power which ministers were un- 
 able to subdue, and to which statesmen of all parties learned 
 more and more to defer. . . . From the accession of 
 George IY. it gathered strength until it was able, as we shall 
 see, to dominate over ministers and Parliaments." The 
 establishment of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowl- 
 edge in 1826, and of the Society for the Promotion of Christian 
 Knowledge soon after, mark the spirit of the period. Since 
 that time, the utmost latitude of criticism and invective has 
 been permitted. Prosecutions for libel, like the censorship of 
 the press, fell out of the system of government. The time of 
 George IY. (1820 to 1830) has a peculiar interest, because, 
 
 1 History, vol. ii., pp. 201-213.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 14:5 
 
 during that period, the element of " spoils" (in its true defini- 
 tion) in the partisan system of appointment almost wholly disap- 
 peared from English administration, while, by a strange con- 
 trast, the way was, at that time, opened for the spoils and pro- 
 scriptive elements to come more readily into our politics. For 
 the act of 1820, limiting the term of numerous officers to four 
 years, tended to make the election of the President decisive of 
 their tenure, and hence to involve all those officials in that 
 contest, as in a struggle for life. The administrative system of 
 the two centuries then passed each other, one on an ascending 
 and the other on a descending plane. It will be useful to note 
 the character of British, administration at that period. 
 
 1. Bribery of members of Parliament was past ; though 
 bribery of electors continued a very serious evil until after the 
 great Reform Bill of 1832 ; and it was considerable until the 
 introduction of the ballot in 1871, since which the situation in 
 that regard has been, I think, much the same as our own. 
 
 2. Party government becoming more absolute as the power 
 of the Crown and nobility declined, a proscriptive application 
 of the partisan system, everywhere setting up political opinions 
 as a test, prevailed in making all appointments and promo- 
 tions. 
 
 3. Patronage that is, the right of selections for official 
 places below heads of departments was substantially in the 
 hands of members of Parliament ; and it was freely used for 
 the purpose of gaining influence for themselves and making 
 places for their favorites. 
 
 4. Grave abuses, inevitable from a partisan system in the 
 control of members of legislature, existed. It caused a vicious 
 activity and rewarded demoralizing intrigues in Parliamentary 
 and even in municipal elections. The election involved the 
 awarding of patronage ; and hence other issues than those of 
 principle and the merits of the candidate were often controlling. 
 
 The practice was also fatal to economy and disastrous to the 
 character and efficiency of the public service. Legislation was 
 often controlled by patronage, and the departments were crowd- 
 ed with incompetents and supernumeraries. 
 
 5. It had, by the force of public opinion, without any law 
 on the subject, come to be the rule, almost universally acted
 
 146 CIVIL SEEVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 upon, that those in the civil service below cabinet ministers and 
 a few political assistants (less than fifty in all, besides foreign 
 ministers and certain consuls) should not be removed except 
 for causes other than political opinions. To the number thus 
 liable to be removed for political reasons, postmasters must be 
 added ; though they were not removed witli the frequency of 
 such removals in our service. There was no practice of re- 
 moving one subordinate merely to make place for another. 
 These facts are of some importance as bearing upon the extent 
 of the implied power of removal declared by the Senate, in 
 1T89, to belong to our Executive ; the question being whether 
 in principle it is a power of removal for cause, or upon caprice 
 merely. 
 
 6. As those in the subordinate civil service were no longer 
 allowed to vote, they were little inclined to activity in party 
 politics. Not being liable to arbitrary removal, they were not 
 forced to fight at every election in self-defence. 
 
 7. ISTo abuse corresponding to what we call " political assess- 
 ments" existed; and I have pointed out the reasons why it 
 never existed in the English service. It was, in more corrupt 
 times, merged in the greater evil of selling offices, the pur- 
 chaser insisting on getting a title free of annual taxation. Be- 
 sides, for a long time after members of Parliament had become 
 the dominant power in politics, all those in the service below 
 heads of bureaus, being regarded as the servants of high 
 officers, were paid from fees, the balance of which belonged to 
 the head of the office. This system did not allow party assess- 
 ments. Perhaps the great officers contributed to election ex- 
 penses from the balance of the fee fund. 
 
 8. No examinations of any sort stood between the appointing 
 power on the one side, and the favorites urged upon it by mem- 
 bers of Parliament and party leaders on the other side. As a 
 rule, those exercising that power were forced to accept whoever 
 was most strongly backed. 
 
 9. There was not at this time, nor has there been since, any 
 legislative authority in England, participating in executive 
 functions, which is the equivalent of the power of confirmation 
 in our Senate. Still, in other ways, the party majority in the 
 legislature was made perhaps almost as influential as with us.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 14:7 
 
 The members of the Cabinet were members of the Parliamen- 
 tary majority. What was called The Treasury had (subject to 
 the influence of members of Parliament) something like a con- 
 trol over the greater number of the appointments and promo- 
 tions. There was a permanent Secretary of the Treasury ; and 
 in addition there were the following (political) officers who 
 went out with each administration viz. , the- first Lord of the 
 Treasury (generally the Prime Minister), the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, and several junior lords, which together consti- 
 tute " The Treasury." 
 
 Such, in substance, appears to have been the condition of 
 the English civil service in the period from 1820 to 1830 ; 
 the relative power of the Crown, the Cabinet, The Treasury, 
 and the members of Parliament over appointments and pro- 
 motions being very inadequately defined, and by far the 
 greater evil being patronage in the control of members of 
 Parliament. The system of administration, in short, was at 
 this date the partisan system, in its most characteristic and ex- 
 treme form, but without the spoils element in the mercenary 
 or more corrupt sense. 
 
 The evidence illustrating the abuses of patronage in the 
 hands of members of Parliament, to which I might refer, is 
 so great in variety and volume that I have no space to do jus- 
 tice to it. It is to be found throughout the many thousands 
 of pages of evidence and reports which have been printed, as 
 the results of the numerous investigations into the working 
 of the civil service. I submit a few illustrations. Mr. Lowe, 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer under Mr. Gladstone, said, on 
 his examination before a committee in 1873 (referring to the 
 partisan system after the introduction of the merit system) : 
 that " Under the former system, I suppose there was never such 
 a thing known as a man being appointed to a clerkship in a 
 public office because he was supposed to befit for the place." 
 Mr. Baxter, the Financial Secretary of the Treasury, describes 
 that system in his examination : " Question 4672. Is much 
 pressure brought upon the Treasury with respect to public 
 establishments outside ? Answer. The most unpleasant part, 
 as I find it, of the duty of the Financial Secretary of the 
 1 Report Parliamentary Committee, 1873, p. 231.
 
 148 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Treasury is to resist the constant pressure brought day by day, 
 and almost hour by hour, l>y members of Parliament in order 
 to increase expenditure by increasing the pay of the classes, 
 and granting larger compensations to individuals or to 
 classes / . . . and that pressure, which is little known to 
 the public, as I said before, is the most unpleasant part of my 
 duties, and it occupies a very great deal of time which prob- 
 ably might be better spent. Question 4682. You spoke of 
 the constant parliamentary pressure. . . . Do you allude 
 to proceedings in Parliament as well as private communica- 
 tions, or only to the latter ? Answer. I did. . . . But 
 of course my answers might be extended to those motions in 
 the House which are resisted without effect by the govern- 
 ment, and which entail great expenditure upon the country. ' ' l 
 In another report, the head of a large office makes this state- 
 ment : 
 
 " I have made out a return of 55 persons . . . who were 
 nominated by the Treasury between 1836 and 1854. . . . Seve- 
 ral of them were incompetent from their ages. ... I found 
 some perfectly unqualified. ... I also found persons there of 
 very bad character ; one person in that list had been imprisoned by 
 the sentence of the court as a fraudulent debtor. . . . Then 
 with regard to health, there was one man whom I was forced to keep 
 in a room by himself, as he was in such a state of health that he could 
 not associate with the other clerks. . . . There was a case in 
 our offices (Board of Audit), in which a gentleman was appointed 
 who really could neither read nor write, he was almost an idiot, and 
 there was the greatest possible difficulty in getting him out of the 
 office." 2 
 
 The report of the committee last referred to declares that, 
 " where the spirit of patronage rules, the appointments are 
 given, to a great extent, as a reward for political services, 
 without the least reference to the ability, knowledge, or fitness 
 of the persons appointed. ' ' a 
 
 In 1855 a large volume 4 was printed by the British Govern- 
 
 1 Parliamentary Report of 1873, p. 248. 
 
 2 Parliamentary Report on Civil Service, 1810, p. 176 and p. x. 
 8 Report on Civil Service, I860, p. 287. 
 
 4 That volume will be hereafter cited as Civil Service Papers.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 140 
 
 ment, made up of valuable papers, containing the opinions of 
 many persons of great experience in administration upon its 
 previous condition, and setting forth the causes of existing 
 abuses. The following extracts are from that volume : * 
 
 " I have known many instances of individuals boldly stating they 
 were not put into the service by their patrons to work. . . . The . . . 
 majority of the members of the Colonial Department in my time 
 possessed only in a low degree, and some of them in a degree almost 
 incredible, either the talents or the habits of men of business, or the 
 industry, the zeal, or the knowledge required for the effective perfor- 
 mance of their appropriate functions. . . . The existing defect of the 
 civil service is, in my opinion, its want of that high moral tone 
 which is so essential in conducting the common affairs of life. . . . 
 The most feeble sons in families which have been so fortunate as to 
 obtain an appointment, yes, and others too, either mentally or physi- 
 cally incapacitated, enter the service. The more able and ambitious 
 sons seek the open professions. . . . The fault of the present system 
 lies principally in the fact that almost every branch of the Permanent 
 Civil Service is connected more or less with politics throughxthe heads 
 of the respective departments . . . and that the selection of officers 
 generally proceeds on political grounds, and for political purposes. . . 
 The needless and very inconvenient increase of the numbers borne on 
 the clerical list the frequent transfer of many of their appropriate 
 duties to ill-educated and ill-paid supernumeraries and the not infre- 
 quent occurrence of mistakes and oversights are so serious as occasion- 
 ally to imperil interests of high national importance. . . . Every 
 person who has had experience in conducting a large office will admit, 
 that if all were really efficient ... it could be probably executed 
 by two-thirds of tJie number of clerks at present employed. Let any one 
 who has had experience reflect on the operation of patronage on 
 Elections, Parliament, and the Government. Over each it exercises an 
 evil influence. In the Elections, it interferes with the honest exercise of 
 the franchise ; in Parliament it encourages subservience to the adminis- 
 tration ; it impedes the free action of a Government desirous of pursuing 
 an honest or an economical course, and it occasions the employment 
 of persons without regard to their peculiar fitness. It is a more per- 
 nicious system than the mere giving of money to Electors or mem- 
 bers of Parliament to secure their votes. It is bribery in its worst 
 form. . . Notwithstanding the constant interference of the House 
 
 1 Pages 52, 53, 54, 73, 80, 81, 74-236, 302, 271, 272.
 
 150 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of Commons in matters relating to the civil service, the reform of the 
 civil service remains just where it was. Their single panacea for all 
 the evils they supposed to exist in it is, was, and ever will be, 
 retrenchment, the abolition and consolidation of offices, and the dim- 
 inution of salaries. The mode of making the service efficient seems 
 never to have entered their minds ; and the real reform of the civil 
 service is still left for the civil service itself to accomplish. ' ' 
 
 The point made by the last writer was that members of 
 Parliament, wishing to preserve their patronage and to use it 
 in their own interest to reward their favorites and supporters 
 would never consent to any tests of character and capacity that 
 would limit their own arbitrary authority by keeping out the 
 unworthy. This was the greatest obstacle in the later stages 
 of reform in Great Britain. The disinterestedness required 
 for a surrender of that patronage was too great for Par- 
 liamentary patriotism. No candid person, I think, can read 
 these statements of the condition of the British civil service in 
 the last generation without being impressed with its great 
 similarity to that of our own in this generation. And that the 
 causes which produced both were substantially the same per- 
 haps hardly admits of a doubt. Great as had been the re- 
 forms already achieved, it is not strange that when public at- 
 tention became concentrated upon this new phase of abuses, 
 the demand for their removal was expressed with great vigor. 
 Neither parties nor members of Parliament, however, at that 
 time, showed any inclination to surrender their patronage. 
 The statesmen of that day may have thought that a reform 
 of the Parliamentary representation itself would be the best 
 means of mitigating if not of removing such abuses. How- 
 ever the fact may have been, they bent themselves upon 
 that reform. How long and stormy the struggle that secured 
 a great victory for liberal government in the reform law of 
 1832, is well known. I have already referred to the monstrous 
 injustice and corruption at which it was aimed. Lord John 
 Russell took the lead in the struggle in which it was carried. 
 It was the greatest and most desperate civil contest in modern 
 history. On one side of the issue hung the rights of the 
 people to be better represented and protected, and on the 
 other the waning supremacy of the aristocracy and the cor-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 151 
 
 rupt borough system. All England was for several years in a 
 ferment of agitation. It required the most formidable dis- 
 play of the police and military to keep the peace, and even 
 that failed. Monster meetings, fired with anger and indigna- 
 tion, were held in all the great cities. One at Birmingham, 
 in 1831, was attended by 150,000 people, and it voted " to 
 refuse to pay taxes as Hampden had refused to pay ship 
 money," if reform was not granted ; and it petitioned Par- 
 liament to withhold supplies. Great bodies of people paraded 
 the streets of the larger cities in an angry mood, and assaulted 
 distinguished noblemen. During two days, the city of Bristol 
 was in the hands of a riotous mob. Custom houses, excise 
 offices, and bishops' palaces were carried by storm. The ex- 
 tinction of the peerage was threatened, and the throne itself 
 was in danger. In 1831, the second reading of the bill was 
 carried in the Commons by a majority of one, in a vote of 
 608, the largest number that ever voted in Parliament. 
 Another year of fearful agitation followed. There were mon- 
 ster meeting assuming attitudes of intimidation, and filling the 
 air with threats of violence. It was not until the danger of a 
 general collision between the government and the people was 
 imminent, and the perils of the nation could be read in smok- 
 ing harvests and burning castles and mansions, that the bill was 
 passed. The close monopolies at elections were set aside, and 
 a 10 household franchise was established. Fifty-six boroughs, 
 having less than 2000 inhabitants, and returning one hundred 
 and eleven members, were swept away. The disfranchisement 
 extended to one hundred and forty -three members. Twenty- 
 two large towns and districts were allowed two members each, 
 and twenty more one each. These changes secured a fairer re- 
 presentation of the better public opinion, and greatly limited 
 but by no means prevented bribery. 1 A large body of intelli- 
 gent and worthy persons of small means were, for the first 
 time, enabled to vote. Royalty and aristocracy lost a great 
 deal of power which that class of voters gained. The cause 
 
 1 Soon after, the laws against bribery were made more effective by allow- 
 ing general proof of bribery to precede the proof of agency of the members' 
 supposed bribing agent ; and still later by a law authorizing the personal 
 examination of sitting members and candidates. (4 and 5 Viet., chap. 57 ; 
 14 and 15 Viet., chap. 99.)
 
 152 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of good administration was thus strongly reinforced. But it 
 soon appeared that even this vast extension of suffrage had 
 left the cause of reform too weak to take nominations from 
 members of Parliament, or to install merit in the place of 
 favoritism at the gates of the public service. The partisan 
 system was too strongly entrenched, and its managers too skil- 
 ful, to be captured in that way. They resisted to the utmost. 
 With more votes to win and more vigorous political criticism 
 to withstand, the partisan managers of the reformed Parliament 
 only saw the greater need of using every fragment of patron- 
 age to perpetuate their monopoly. Though the higher leader- 
 ships and better public sentiment which prevailed, after 1832, 
 were able (in 1833) to abolish slavery in the British Colonies ; 
 to terminate the monopoly in the East India trade ; to reform 
 the poor laws and the tithe laws ; to provide an admirable 
 municipal system in the two years next following ; to inau- 
 gurate popular education in 1834, and greatly extend it in 
 1839 ; to overthrow the corn laws monopoly in 1846 after a 
 contest only less desperate than that which earned the Reform 
 Bill ; and to improve the administration in many ways which 
 I need not mention in detail yet moral forces equal to such 
 high achievements were altogether too weak to take a young 
 man of merit and put him into the public service without the 
 formal consent of some member of Parliament, or of the 
 official heads of the party in power ; a consent which was 
 almost sure to turn upon personal or partisan reasons. 
 
 It was not till long after 1832 that the inherent mischief of 
 the partisan system became manifest to the great body of 
 thinking people. When that result was attained, the final 
 struggle with patronage in the hands of members of Parlia- 
 ment began on a larger scale. It seems to have been, even 
 then, foreseen by the best informed that it could not be re- 
 moved by any partisan agency. They began to see the need 
 of some method by which fitness for the public service could 
 be tested otherwise than by the fiat of a member of Parlia- 
 ment or the vote of the Cabinet or the Treasury. What 
 that method should be was one of the great problems of 
 the future. No government had then solved it. That there 
 must be tests of fitness independent of any political action, or
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 153 
 
 mere official influence, became more and more plain to think- 
 ing men. 
 
 The leaders of the great parties soon began to see that a 
 public opinion in favor of such tests was being rapidly de- 
 veloped, which seriously threatened their power, unless the 
 party system itself could be made more acceptable to the 
 people. Parliament (after a fashion with which we are 
 familiar) held long debates and ordered frequent investigations 
 into the details of the public service, but always passing by the 
 great evil for which its members were responsible. They 
 could see and were ready to attack any abuse except their own 
 prostitution of patronage. Talk of economy was as long, 
 loud, and frequent as it has been in our Congress. The party 
 in power commended itself to the people from time to time by 
 exposing the extravagance of its opponents, by having the 
 salaries of officers cut down, by lopping off a few of the 
 many supernumeraries, by removing some of the many com- 
 plications. And above all, there was #n abundance of fine 
 promises made. But no member gave up his patronage no 
 way was opened by which a person of merit could get into an 
 office or a place except by the favor of the party or the conde- 
 scension of a member. The partisan blockade of every port 
 of entry to the public service, which made it tenfold easier for 
 a decayed butler or an incompetent cousin of a member or a 
 minister, than for the promising son of a poor widow, to 
 pass the barrier, was, after the Reform Bill as before, rigidly 
 maintained. Fealty to the party and work in its ranks sub- 
 serviency to members and to ministers and electioneering on 
 their behalf these were the virtues before which the ways to 
 office and the doors of the Treasury were opened. Year by 
 year, the public discontent with the whole system increased. 
 Certain parts of it had already been found so degrading and 
 intolerable that an ingenious mitigation had been contrived. 
 In Walpole's time, a Parliamentary bribery agent had been 
 employed, with plenary authority to make contracts with 
 members and to comply with their terms in the distribution 
 of the corruption fund. After this analogy, there had been 
 provided, -for the present exigency, a broken general in pat- 
 ronage called " The Patronage Secretary of the Treasury,"
 
 154: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 whose duty it was to stand between members and partisan 
 managers appealing for places for their favorites, on the one 
 side, and the heads of offices who needed to have these places 
 filled with competent persons, on the other side. This Sec- 
 retary measured the force of threats and took the weight of 
 influence ; he computed the political value of a member's sup- 
 port and deducted from it the official appraisement of patron- 
 age before awarded to him. It is said that actual accounts, 
 Dr. and Cr. were kept with members by this Patronage 
 Secretary. Degrading as such an arrangement was, it was 
 far better than to have members of Parliament going from 
 department to department and from office to office, now sug- 
 gesting favors and then assaults in Parliament here using 
 threats and there persuasion in aid of his purpose of foisting 
 a dependent or an electioneering agent upon the public treas- 
 ury. This comptroller-general of patronage continued in full 
 sway until competitive examinations, upon the introduction of 
 the merit system, had made an end of patronage. He still 
 feebly survives, but only as the withered skeleton of the great 
 political potentate which he once was in whose presence 
 members took off their hats and their dependents fell to their 
 knees.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PARTISAN SYSTEM WANING AND EXAMINATIONS INTRODUCED. 
 
 The patronage monopoly challenged. Peel as a reformer. Statesmen see 
 that the partisan system is failing. Promotions for merit introduced in 
 1820. Examinations between 1834 and 1841. Their beneficial effect. 
 Imitated in the United States in 1853. Examinations opposed in Great 
 Britain because democratic. The merit system defined. Various kinds 
 of examinations explained. 'Pass," "Limited Competition," and 
 " Open Competition The principle and tendency of the latter. 
 
 THE demand for administrative reform lias now become con- 
 centrated against the great monopoly of designating all persons 
 for the civil service, which is held potentially by members of 
 Parliament. How to break up that monopoly and to open the 
 public service to merit without influence, has become a great 
 question. The people do not challenge party government it- 
 self, but thoughtful men are concerned at its prostitution. 
 They concede that the party majority should elect all legisla- 
 tors and enact all laws ; that it should make up the Cabinet and 
 select all those higher officers who shall stand for and carry 
 into effect the policy, both foreign and domestic, which the 
 majority of the people have approved at the polls. But the 
 rest the sixty thousand or more subordinates who are bound 
 to obey the instructions of those superiors and whose politics, 
 to say the least, are not so important as their capacity and their 
 character these they insist should be selected with reference 
 to personal merit and not partisan convictions. What should 
 be the test and how applied ? This, after the Reform Bill, 
 became a much mooted question. 
 
 I have said that, since the time of Mr. Pitt, the fame of 
 nearly every leading English statesman has in large measure 
 rested upon his reform policy. We now find new illustrations 
 of this fact. That of Lord John Russell stands on the Reform
 
 156 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Bill of 1832. Sir Robert Peel was, perhaps, the most prac- 
 tical statesman England had produced, and as little as any 
 nattered by the seductions which an aristocracy can offer ; for 
 he refused a peerage and the highest Order of distinction the 
 Queen could tender him. In 1816, he brought about a great 
 reform by the passage of the Irish Constabulary Act ; in 1822, 
 he carried a measure for reforming the criminal laws ; and a few 
 years later he caused the Metropolitan Police law for London to 
 be enacted, with its stringent provisions for excluding politics. 
 
 " To check the introduction of patronage into the Metropolitan 
 Police force, Sir Robert Peel provided that no one should be admit- 
 ted as qualified for the office of inspector or superintendent who had 
 not been trained by actual service in each subordinate rank. ' ' l 
 
 To these measures of administrative reform, he brought the 
 whole force of his character. It is after these models that the 
 police system of New York city, and all the best police laws 
 we have, are framed. These police laws were the first laws (since 
 the act of Richard II.) that, in principle, made personal quali- 
 fication in an officer paramount to political opinions or the favor 
 of some great lord or politician. Despite the pressure of mem- 
 bers of Parliament, who demanded every scrap of patronage, 
 those administering the government had, at an earlier date, 
 been forced by sheer necessity to resort to other than political 
 methods for securing adequate ability. Lord Liverpool set the 
 example in 1820, and his example was followed by Mr. Canning. 
 " Before that time, all the higher appointments in the customs 
 service, the collectors and comptrollers of the outposts, were 
 filled by members (of Parliament) from the posts, 
 and from certain boroughs which regularly returned govern- 
 ment members. . . . There was a commission of inquiry 
 into the customs service which reported in that year and made 
 a strong presentation of the abuses that existed. 
 Upon the recommendation of this commission, Lord Liverpool 
 sacrificed all that patronage, and laid down the principle that 
 all superior officers in the customs should be supplied by pro- 
 motion from the inferior ranks. . . . Lord Grey, in 1830 . . . 
 gave up all exercise of patronage, in matters relating to pro- 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, p. 149.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 157 
 
 motion, and it has so continued ever since." ' To comprehend 
 the statesmanship and disinterestedness and the moral tone in 
 party leaders required for such a change, we must imagine an 
 American Secretary of the Treasury as abandoning all idea of ad- 
 vancing partisan interests by selecting political managers for the 
 collectorships or the other high places in the customs service, and 
 as filling its offices (with the consent of those leaders) by the 
 promotion of the most worthy subordinates in that service. If 
 the relief from lamentable controversy and demoralizing in- 
 trigue, which such a change would produce, are indescribable, 
 we can at least in that way get a better idea of the reform thus 
 made in England nearly sixty years ago. 
 
 During the Melbourne administration, between 1831 and 
 1841, a demand for examinations, as a condition for admission 
 to the service, came from two very different quarters. One 
 was the higher officials, who declared that they could not do the 
 public work with such poor servants as the partisan system 
 supplied." The other was the more independent, thoughtful 
 portion of the people, who held it to be as unjust as it was de- 
 moralizing for members of Parliament and other officers to 
 monopolize the privilege of saying who might enter the public 
 service. Lord Melbourne then yielded so far as to allow pass 
 examinations to be instituted in some of the larger offices ; and 
 he was inclined to favor competitive examinations, but it was 
 thought to be too great an innovation to attempt at once. 
 These examinations several of them being competitive in- 
 troduced by public officers in self- defence many years previous 
 to 1853, had before that time produced striking results. In 
 the Poor Law Commission, for example, they had brought 
 about a reform that arrested public attention. Under the 
 Committee on Education, they had caused the selection of 
 
 1 Report on Civil Service, etc., 1860, p. 69. 
 
 a " It used to be by no means uncommon to have a fine, fashionably 
 dressed young man introduced as the junior clerk. On trial he turns out tit 
 for nothing. The head of the department knows from old experience that 
 a representation of this fact to higher quarters would merely draw down ill 
 will upon himself. . . . Besides there is the imbecile, who is below 
 work. . . . The public offices have been a resource for many an idle, 
 dissipated youth, with whom other occupations have been tried in vain." 
 (Civil Service Papers, p. 181.) 
 11
 
 158 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 teachers so much superior "that higher salaries were bidden 
 for them for private service, . . . and they were taken 
 away to a seriously inconvenient extent." In the General 
 Board for Public Works, both superior servants and greater 
 economy had been the result of examinations in so marked a 
 degree that " the local authorities of twenty-five cities and 
 towns . . . have practically abandoned the principle of 
 patronage by requesting the General Board to name an 
 engineer for . . . taking responsible superintendence. 
 In all sixty-nine towns have . . . abandoned the principle 
 of appointment by patronage. . . . The result has been 
 improved local administration, local party agitation has been 
 checked, . . . fewer persons are put on the lists to carry 
 appointments or contracts, and the attendance of persons of 
 higher qualifications on the local boards ; and business has 
 been better transacted. " 1 If I had space for the facts, it could 
 be shown. that the reform in municipal administration in Great 
 Britain has hardly been less than in its national affairs ; and 
 that the same methods of improving the character of the official 
 force and of advancing economy have been found equally ap- 
 plicable in both. 
 
 Such were the first distinct encroachments made by the 
 Executive upon the partisan system by a partial introduction of 
 the merit system through examinations. These examinations 
 were steadily extended from office to office down to the radical 
 change made in 1853. It is worthy of notice that these ex- 
 aminations the theory of placing personal merit above politics 
 in selections for office originated not in Parliament not by 
 that body -showing any willingness to surrender patronage 
 which it had usurped but in the executive department, where 
 the evils were most felt and the responsibility for good admin- 
 istration rested. The aim and tendency of the examinations 
 were not to aggrandize the Executive, but rather to limit its 
 discretion, by opening the public service in some measure 
 to the whole people. \Ve shall find that, in all stages of the 
 later reforms, the Executive has held this position, and that 
 the people, and not the Crown, have gained influence and 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 142-150.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 159 
 
 opportunity. Parliament did not aid, but was compelled by 
 the people to acquiesce, in this reform. 
 
 The higher public opinion had been making rapid progress, 1 
 and it now overawed Parliament and gave direction to State 
 policy. The leading statesmen were too clear-sighted not to 
 see that the time had come when a great party, which should 
 attempt to confront such an opinion, and to rule through pat- 
 ronage, must go to the wall. A strictly partisan system of 
 administration was no longer practicable. Both parties seem 
 to have reached this condition about the same time. Mel- 
 bourne, Peel, Russell, Aberdeen, Palrnerston, and Derby, the 
 leaders of both parties who certainly were neither theorists 
 nor doctrinaires and whose administrations together cover the 
 whole period from 1834 to 1868 acted upon this view of the 
 situation. They clearly considered the partisan system as 
 doomed, from the moment it should be found practicable to 
 substitute a better system, and that any party was also doomed 
 that should refuse to make a practical test of examinations as 
 a basis for a better system. This was not because there was 
 little party spirit ; on the contrary, party spirit was as vigorous 
 and exacting as it ever has been in this country. For example. 
 Sir Robert Peel (between 1836 and 1841) refused to form a 
 ministry because Queen Victoria would not dismiss certain 
 ladies of her household who had Whig connections. This 
 state of public opinion naturally prevented the question of 
 civil-service reform ever being made a direct issue between the 
 great parties in England ; but caused it, as naturally, to be 
 made for a long time an issue in each party between its more 
 unselfish, patriotic elements on one side, and its more partisan 
 and corrupt elements on the other side. " The question of 
 reforming the administration did not so much divide the two 
 parties as it did each party within itself, according to the moral 
 level of its members." Each party claimed as we have 
 seen opposing parties claim, and with no more sincerity to be 
 
 - ' In 1821, such men as Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Huskisson, and Lord Pal- 
 merston ridiculed Mr. Joseph Hume for firmly supporting reform ; but 
 thirty years later Mr. Hume was still in Parliament, and was regarded " with 
 unfeigned and cordial respect by leading members of all sorts of politics." 
 (Miss Martineau's Biographical Sketches, p. 305.) 
 a Civil Service Report, 1860.
 
 160 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the special friend of reform, and appealed to the people for 
 support on that basis. There can be nothing original in this 
 country in that line of policy. The state of public opinion in 
 England at that time, upon the subject of admissions to the 
 public service, was similar to what is with us now, though 
 somewhat more advanced. Neither party dared defy the re- 
 form sentiment, and both, while courting it, were too ready to 
 depart from its principles. From the time that the beneficial 
 results of examinations had become known to the people, it 
 was seen to be impossible ever to suppress them, unless upon 
 the substitution of examinations of a better kind. Before 
 1853, at which time they had been in practice for about twenty 
 years, they had done much to improve the public service, 
 though they were very defective, and had been applied in only 
 a part of the offices. 
 
 These examinations attracted attention in this country, and 
 they led to the enactment of the law of 1853, ' which divided 
 our clerks in the Treasury, "War, Navy, Interior, and Post 
 Office departments into four classes, and provided that " no 
 clerk shall be appointed . . . until after he has been ex- 
 amined and found qualified by a board to consist of three ex- 
 aminers." In 1855, 2 similar provisions were extended to the 
 State .Department. 3 
 
 The great difference in the action of the two countries, at 
 that time so nearly in harmony, has been that we fell away 
 from the policy on which the laws of 1853 and 1855 are based, 
 while England has continued to advance steadily in the same 
 direction, and thereby has more and more elevated her civil 
 service. But the continuing encroachment upon the partisan 
 system which such examinations threatened were not to be 
 allowed without a struggle. It was clearly seen that they 
 were democratic in tendency, and that they challenged, not 
 merely the partisan monopoly of the members of the House, but 
 the vested interests and the prestige of the aristocracy as well. 
 
 1 Ch. 97, 3. a Laws 1855, chap. 175, 4. 
 
 3 In sonie sort of fashion, pass examinations have been since made under 
 these laws, except during the time the civil service rules were enforced 
 pursuant to the statute of 3d March, 1871 (now Revised Statutes, 1753), 
 under which President Grant, through the Civil Service Commission, pro- 
 vided for uniform competitive examinations.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 161 
 
 Pointing out the tendency of the new method, one writer says 
 it will increase " until at last the aristocracy will be altogether 
 dissociated from the permanent civil service of the country." 
 . Another says, " The encouragement given to educa- 
 tion would no doubt be great, . . . but it will be all in 
 favor of the lower classes of society and not of the higher. ? ' 
 Another says, ... " The principal objection which I have 
 heard ... is, that appointments now conferred on young 
 men of aristocratic connexion will fall into the hands of per- 
 sons in a much lower grade in society." 
 
 The strength of a custom of a hundred and fifty years, in a 
 conservative old country like England, in favor of any system, 
 thus united with the interests of the privileged classes in its 
 preservation, were indeed a formidable power. Those who 
 stood for patronage and those who stood for class distinctions 
 naturally joined hands to break down these examinations, and 
 to change the public judgment which sustained them. Their 
 sarcasms, their ridicule, and their cunning policy (of which I 
 shall give examples), as they stand recorded, leave little chance 
 for doing or saying anything original by those who oppose re- 
 form in this country. The friends of reform met those attacks 
 not only by argument, but by demanding open competi- 
 tive examinations, common for all the departments and free 
 to all the people, and the merit system* of appointments and 
 promotions. They also insisted that it was an injustice, a 
 usuqjation, and a source of manifold evils for members 
 of Parliament and other high officers to hold a monopoly of 
 patronage, so that none could go into the public service 
 without their consent. Before proceeding further, it will be 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 44 and 289. 
 
 9 By the merit system I mean that theory of government (and the proper 
 method of examinations and promotions through which it is applied, and 
 the proper regulations for attaining economy and efficiency) which treats 
 personal qualificat ons, rather than the political opinions or the partisan 
 services of applicants for office, as the true and paramount basis for appoint- 
 ments ; which regards office, including the appointing power, as a public 
 trust and not as an official perquisite or a partisan agency for propagating 
 political opinions or keeping a party in power. From the despotic system, 
 under the Norman kings, through various spoils systems under arbitrary 
 kings through a sort of partisan system under Cromwell through fearful 
 corruption under James and Charles through a sort of aristocratic spoils
 
 162 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 useful to give some particulars concerning these examinations, 
 as they will not only render more clear what is to follow, but 
 have a direct bearing upon difficulties in our civil service. 
 
 Kinds of examinations. There are three distinct kinds of 
 examinations : the pass examination, the limited competitive 
 examination, and the open competitive examination. The two 
 last are in England usually designated as " limited competi- 
 tion" and "open competition." These examinations are 
 very different in principle, and in their adequacy to bring about 
 the best results. I shall not now enter upon the question of 
 their utility. It was never any part of the theory upon which 
 either is based, that it should extend to judges, to any legisla- 
 tive, or other officer elected by the people, or to any member 
 of the Cabinet, or to foreign ministers (as such), or to any 
 high officer of the executive department (in England there 
 being not exceeding fifty excluded officers, besides those 
 elected) who can properly be regarded as the representative 
 of the principles or policy of the party in power. Officers 
 who are properly regarded as political must, of course, be 
 selected in reference to their political opinions and ideas of 
 policy, and it is they who are clothed with authority, to compel 
 the subordinate members of the civil service (from collectors and 
 postmasters to doorkeepers, to whom the examinations apply) 
 to obey all proper instructions. They thus carry out the great 
 .policy, foreign and domestic, which the popular majority 
 has approved. Obedience to them and to the laws is the duty 
 of all their subordinates. It is because these subordinates 
 have no more legal right or ability to carry into practice their 
 political opinions, than they have to carry out their personal 
 theories (contrary to the instructions of their superiors), that 
 such opinions should not control in their selection. 
 
 Examination may be made through examiners named and 
 acting separately in each department office ; or there may be one 
 
 system under William and Anne through a partisan spoils system under 
 George I. and II. and a part of the reign of George III. through the par- 
 tisan system in its best estate in later years we have traced the unsteady 
 but generally ascending progress of British administration ; and, in 1870, 
 we shall find it to have reached a level at which office is treated as a trust 
 and personal merit is the recognized criterion for selection for office. That 
 was the inauguration of the merit system.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 1G3 
 
 examining board for all departments. Uniformity of require- 
 ment for admission to the service could hardly be brought about 
 by independent examiners. The mutual jealousy of departments 
 and examiners, and disparity in practice, would be sure to be 
 damaging to such a method. It is otherwise inherently weak. 
 No examiner would represent the power or policy of the 
 Executive, but only that of a particular secretary or the head 
 of a bureau. And further ; each examiner, so separately ap- 
 pointed, being exposed to the whole pressure of all those who 
 wish to force unworthy persons upon the service, and not being 
 directly supported by the Executive, has no such power of 
 resistance as is possessed by a central board of examiners, di- 
 rectly appointed by the Executive, which acts uniformly in his 
 name in every department and office. 1 
 
 It hardly need be added that partisans and patronage-holders 
 favored these isolated examinations and learned how to make 
 their influence most effective with detached examiners. It 
 was natural too for secretaries to favor great party leaders by 
 making their special examinations vary to suit them. It has 
 been found, after great experience in England, that it was 
 highly important that all examinations of whatever kind should 
 be conducted by one central examining board backed by the 
 whole power of the government. Xor is any other method 
 one of common justice to all those in the public service. 
 
 1. The pass examination is one under which each person 
 allowed to present himself is separately examined as to whether 
 he comes up to some prescribed standards. lie is put in com- 
 parison with nobody. No one need be or is usually pres- 
 ent with him except the examiner, and very likely the patron 
 by whom he has been presented. In the case of a nominee 
 of a member of Parliament who wishes to get in with inade- 
 quate qualification, it is easy to see that it would not be one 
 of the members only, but many having similar interests, who 
 would join to push him past the examiner. If the nominee 
 was the favorite of a minister, a bishop, or a great nobleman, 
 or a partisan clique, and not utterly a knave or a dunce, the 
 
 1 " I agree with you in thinking that the examination cannot be con- 
 ducted in an efficient manner throughout the service if it is left to each de. 
 partment to examine the candidates." (Civil Service Papers, p. 132.)
 
 164: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 pressure would be still more nearly irresistible. If the qual- 
 ifications presented came nearly up to the prescribed standard, 
 it is easy to see how solicitation and threats would cause their 
 acceptance by an isolated examiner, perhaps in peril of his 
 place. The standard once thus depressed, the next effort 
 would be to go in at a still lower level ; and hence a tendency 
 to constant depression. Still, with all its inherent tendency 
 to feebleness, even this method of examination raised the civil 
 service of England. Mr. Mill said that, at their worst, pass 
 examinations only kept dunces out, but as many dunces were 
 presented, even that effect was no small blessing. It was im- 
 possible to preserve the standard. " It became so much a 
 matter of form that we used to have an examination paper 
 which was generally known about the office. When a young 
 man came into the office, he had to pass the examination by a 
 superior clerk, who perhaps was the friend of his father or 
 his uncle. There was a feeling that it was not right to reject. 
 It was a leaping-bar-test, and if the clerk did not come up to the 
 bar, it was somewhat lowered." ' " These unknown men of 
 talent witness daily their inferiors advancing before them, who 
 may have been put into the service through interest, and who 
 probably passed what is termed an examination, but such as a 
 charity boy would smile at. " 2 Another defect of pass ex- 
 aminations was that they allowed the party managers and the 
 holders of patronage to designate all the persons to be ex- 
 amined ; so that it was no check upon the parliamentary and. 
 partisan monopoly of nomination, but only a limitation upon 
 the incapacity which they could foist upon the public service. 
 It gave the people, outside official favoritism, no opportunities. 
 It is plain, therefore, that the most inefficient and objectionable 
 of all methods of examinations, and hence those most accept- 
 able to spoilsmen, are pass examinations, conducted by separate 
 examiners, named by and acting for each department or office 
 separately. And only such examinations were made in this 
 country before 1872, and, with very limited exceptions, only 
 such were made in England before 1854. They showed the 
 same defects with us that they did in Great Britain. 
 
 1 Report Civil Service, etc., I860, p. 221. 
 
 2 Civil Service Papers, p. 53.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 165 
 
 2. Limited competitive examinations are those in which a 
 certain number of selected persons are examined in competi- 
 tion with each other, with a view to give appointments only to 
 those who show the highest qualifications. The selections for 
 examinations were of course made by those having patronage or 
 controlling influence. This kind of examination was therefore 
 entirely consistent with the claim made by members of Parlia- 
 ment to designate those outside of whom the executive depart- 
 ment should not go in making its appointments. It was also 
 no less compatible with the partisan theory that none but 
 those who adopt the party creed shall go into the public ser- 
 vice. It allows the partisan toll gate to stand, where all who 
 enter must accept the creed and swear allegiance. But going 
 through that gate does not bring one into the service, but 
 only into competition with all the others who have passed it. 
 Nevertheless, it was found to be a great improvement upon 
 mere pass examinations ; for, unless the competition was, by 
 reason of the vicious and exclusive mode of selections for it, 
 confined (as, in fact, it occasionally was) to a dead level of 
 dunces and imbeciles, superannuated coachmen, valets, and 
 stewards, sickly sons and shiftless cousins, the competition would 
 infallibly throw down the good-for-nothings, and give the ap- 
 pointments to those who were most competent. 
 
 3. Open competitive examinations are founded on broad prin- 
 ciples of justice, liberty, and equality. The meaning attached 
 to their being " open" is, that every citizen is permitted upon 
 the same conditions to join in the competition, and that the 
 right of no one to be examined is dependent either on any 
 official or any party. Each is to come publicly and fairly to 
 the examination with the others who present themselves ; and 
 those who show the highest measure of the qualifications which 
 the government requires in its service, as laid down in fixed 
 regulations, will win the chances of going into that service. 
 All that fall below a fixed standard are excluded by their in- 
 competency thus demonstrated. In their very nature, com- 
 petitive examinations affirm these principles : (1) That every 
 citizen whether high-born or low-born, whether with great 
 influence or wealth or without any influence or wealth stands 
 on an equality before the laws and in the right to enjoy an
 
 166 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 open and manly contest with his fellows for the honor of enter- 
 ing the service of his country ; (2) That the government needs 
 in its service, and seeks most to honor and reward, those who 
 represent capacity and worth, and not those w r ho represent 
 partisan or official influence, political opinions, or intrigue ; 
 (3) That the right and propriety of members of Parliament or 
 any other high officers taking to themselves the monopoly and 
 the profit of opening and shutting, at their pleasure, the gates 
 of the public service to all those who do not accept their poli- 
 tics and pay court and swear fealty to them is utterly denied 
 and intended to be made impossible in practice ; and (4) That 
 the affairs of the nation being the greatest of all human affairs, 
 and its interest to have the people educated and of good char- 
 acter being a paramount interest, therefore a just test of rela- 
 tive character, attainments, and capacity is enforced in the 
 common cause of good morals, good government, and general 
 education. It is clear that open, competitive examinations 
 must be everywhere destructive of a monopoly of the right of 
 saying who may be examined. The poorest and humblest 
 may apply without the consent of any officer or any politician. 
 No member of Parliament, or other official, when they apply, 
 could look over his constituents and say, " This relative of 
 mine, these old worn-out servants of mine, those who elec- 
 tioneered for me at the last election, those who will promise 
 to work for me at the next election or for my schemes of 
 profit and those alone may be examined. You are not 
 among them. ' ' The introduction of open competition is the 
 death sentence of the last phase of official feudalism. 
 
 All members of Parliament, who cared more for patronage 
 than for good government, were as hostile to open competition 
 as that is fatal to their patronage. It was of course opposed 
 by corrupt party managers. It is one of the salutary condi- 
 tions of open competition that it has that publicity under 
 which fraud or favoritism is hardly possible. Every one w T ho 
 competes is interested in the marks and in the character of 
 every other who competes. He looks to see that others are 
 not marked more liberally than himself. He makes inquiries 
 whether his fellow-competitors are persons of good character. 
 The competitions arrest public interest and curiosity, and are
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 167 
 
 reported in the public press. The young man or woman, with 
 a vulnerable reputation, must be very bold indeed, who would 
 dare offer himself or herself in such a contest. Any one below 
 may strike a person of frail repute from the list above, and 
 thus advance his own chances by exposing the bad character of 
 his competitors. The value of the places to be won are in the 
 nature of prices to the worthy for their worth, and they are 
 hardly less prices offered for the exposure of the bad character 
 of any scoundrel who may have the impudence to join in the 
 competition. Such competition tends continually to raise its 
 own standard ; for in every contest the best are preferred, no 
 matter how high it rises. The victor wins by a test which 
 commands his own self-respect as it does the respect of his 
 competitors, of the community which watches the contest, and 
 of the government which gives the prize to merit. 
 
 " The simple nomination system gives to the candidate ex- 
 pectations on which he relies, ... so that if he is neg- 
 lected on the pass examination, he is discredited and disap- 
 pointed. The disappointment is shared by his friends and 
 his patron, and leads to dissatisfaction with the examining 
 authorities and with the system generally ; whilst under the 
 system of open competition, each candidate is well aware that 
 he has only a chance of success, and that if he fails the failure 
 may be ascribed to the merits of others and not to defects on 
 his own part." ' 
 
 The method of reaching the public service through open 
 competition would seem to be republican in spirit, because 
 based on common justice and absolute equality before the laws. 
 The child of a chimney sweep or the orphan from a ragged 
 school, if worthy, may, under this method in the most aristo- 
 cratic nation of the world without the consent of any officer 
 or politician whatever go and win a place in the service of 
 his country over the favorite of a cabinet or the son of a duke. 
 The examination papers of each, with their marks and grad- 
 ings of relative merit in the competition, are preserved ; and 
 years hence, as well as at the moment, the justice of the de- 
 cision can be verified. The same Civil Service Commission 
 applies the same rules of competition and the same tests of 
 1 Report on Civil Service, 1870, p. 300.
 
 168 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 merit in every department and in the several localities where 
 examinations are held. Thus the government, everywhere the 
 same in its system, and everywhere through a process un- 
 touched by any suspicions that influence and favoritism have 
 prevailed, gains the most worthy and the most capable of those 
 who wish to enter its service. I have not intended in this 
 outline to state everything that is material to be known about 
 open competition ; but only to set forth its principle and so 
 much of the method as is essential to an understanding of the 
 final struggle in which it won the victory over Parliamentary 
 patronage and official favoritism. If I have implied an opin- 
 ion of its merits, before presenting the evidence, I can only 
 say now that such evidence will not be wanting. 
 
 Probation. But it should be added that it has been at all 
 times a part of the competitive system that those who won in 
 competition should serve at least six months on moderate pay, 
 under probation, during which their ability and fidelity in 
 business affairs could be tested before they receive any actual 
 appointment. Probation had also been, in form, applied 
 under pass and limited examinations, though when influence 
 pushed a man into and through the examination, it generally 
 pushed him beyond probation as well. But it was easy to 
 apply the probative test effectually against the competitor 
 who came alone and had no influence to back him. The fact 
 that it will be applied generally keeps away those young men 
 who know, or whose friends know, they have no practical 
 qualities for business.
 
 CHAPTER XIY. 
 
 FINAL CONTEST BETWEEN PATRONAGE AND OPEN COMPETITION. 
 
 The principles involved. Arguments for and against Parliamentary patron- 
 age. Is a partisan system essential to party government ? The evils that 
 result from nominations in the hands of members of Parliament. 
 
 THE decisive part of the contest between patronage and 
 open competition was between 1845 and 1855, though the 
 victors did not take possession of the whole field until 
 1870. No two systems could be more antagonistic in princi- 
 ple than one based on open competition and one based on 
 patronage, favoritism, and spoils. The difference was one 
 which involved the nature of office, the duties of public serv- 
 ants, the theory of party government, the authority and func- 
 tions of Parliament, the common ^rights^ of the people to hold 
 office, and the relative claims of character and capacity as 
 compared with those of partisanship and subservience upon 
 the respect and honors of a great nation. Are offices public 
 trusts for the common good, or are they partisan outposts for 
 the special benefit of those who can capture them ? "Were 
 officers in the subordinate service to be first of all electioneer- 
 ing agents and obedient representatives of high officials, or 
 were they to be the common servants and guardians of the 
 community ? Should parties seek their strength in sound 
 principles and a wise policy, carried into effect in a pure, vig- 
 orous, and economical administration, or should they seek it in 
 the adroit use of patronage and the skilful manipulation of 
 elections ? Ought members of Parliament to confine them- 
 selves to a courageous and thorough scrutiny of the acts of the 
 Executive, and to preserve that independence of patronage 
 which would enable them to do so, or was it better that they 
 should grasp and use all the patronage possible, each being in
 
 170 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the line of his duty alike, while searching through the offices 
 for as much as he can gather, and while using it to suit his 
 official caprice or to discharge his election pledges ? Did or 
 did not an election to Parliament, as matter of law or of prin- 
 ciple, confer the right to a fractional part of all the ap- 
 pointments in Great Britain, as personal perquisite, or partisan 
 spoils ? Were her people for ever to allow all chances of en- 
 tering the public service to depend upon the will of a member 
 of Parliament and a few high officials, or, in the name of com- 
 xj mon justice and equality, should it be demanded that free and 
 open access to office should be opened to the most_worthy ? 
 Should education and character be encouraged by conferring 
 office upon merit, or should partisan tyranny and political in- 
 trigue be encouraged by bestowing it as the reward of influ- 
 ence and servility ? These were the issues involved in the 
 struggle. There was nothing in the form or the history of 
 the government to make such a struggle less severe than it 
 would be with us ; but quite the contrary. Members of Par- 
 liament loved executive power and knew how to use specious 
 arguments to defend its usurpation. There was no purer era 
 of public administration in the country, before that authority 
 was usurped, to which reference could be made as a reason for 
 its surrender. If it must be conceded that the power of selec- 
 tion, in the hands of members, was a clear usurpation of ex- 
 ecutive authority, it could not be denied that it was acquired 
 at the time when Parliament began to stand more bravely for 
 liberty and common rights. 
 
 During the one hundred and fifty years in which that pat- 
 \| ronage had increased, and party government in England had 
 acquired its solid frame, it could not be denied that liberty, 
 education and political power had vastly increased among the, 
 people. In no country is usage so formidable or so generally 
 accepted as evidence of right as in England. By far the 
 greater part of the aristocratic influence of the country was 
 against an innovation so democratic in spirit and so hostile to that 
 regard for wealth and conservativism which are the strength 
 of an aristocracy. All available arguments were used for and 
 against Parliamentary patronage, and a slight outline of them 
 may be useful :
 
 * 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 171 
 
 1. To the argument that England had prospered under 
 favoritism, it was replied that she had also prospered while 
 sharing the slave trade, neglecting to educate her people, and 
 denying them the right to vote ; but that since she had eman- 
 cipated her slaves, widened her suffrage, and founded a better 
 system of education, she had prospered all the more. As the 
 body of her people had become more intelligent, and class 
 divisions and aristocratic privileges had decayed, the protest 
 against official patronage and favoritism had gained strength. 
 
 2. To the argument that the old-fashioned patronage sys- 
 tem was necessary to the stability and good effects of parties, 
 it was replied that they had never been more vital, vigorous, or 
 honest than in that period during which examinations had been 
 encroaching upon patronage. On an average, under the parti- 
 san spoils system, a party had not been able to keep an admin- 
 istration in power more than three and one half years ; and in 
 1834-5, it failed to keep Sir Robert Peel in power even one 
 year. For every person or faction that was conciliated by an 
 appointment, there were many offended who had sought the 
 same appointment. It was very likely that changes of admin- 
 istration would be less frequent if there were no appointments 
 whatever to be made. If appointments, on the other hand, 
 were increased a hundredfold, was it not clear that party 
 struggles would be more bitter and politics far more corrupt ? 
 Patronage and spoils were as disastrous to the moral tone and 
 discipline of a party as the right of sack and pillage had been 
 to armies and fleets. The theory that a party can be kept to- 
 gether only by the hope and reality of spoils, is in fact but the 
 survivorship, in a milder form, of the once universal theory 
 that an army could only be raised and kept in efficiency by 
 the prospects of pillage. " When the measures were first 
 proposed for the abolition of patronage, . . . the old 
 political officers treated it with the like incredulity that the 
 old Mahratta chieftains treated the notion of European armies 
 in India being moved or maintained in the field without 
 regular plunder." ' This theory is wholly false alike, in war 
 and peace, in politics and in military service. The more 
 largely a party relies upon patronage and spoils, and the less 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, p. 144.
 
 172 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 it appeals to the public, on the basis of principle and good 
 administration, the more certain that party is to suffer de- 
 feat. The simple fact that year by year the popular protest 
 against favoritism and the demand for open competition 
 had increased, despite all the efforts of party leaders to arrest 
 it, was conclusive of the intrinsic weakness and failure of the 
 partisan system. As the result of his broad survey of British 
 politics, Mr. Hallain declares, " There is no real cause to 
 apprehend that a virtuous and enlightened government would 
 find difficulty in resting upon the reputation justly due to it." 
 3. It was asserted that members of Parliament lived among 
 the people, knew the local needs of the public service, and 
 many persons well qualified to supply them. Members, like 
 other officers, were patriotic, and were to be trusted to look to 
 the general welfare. To a certain extent, this argument was 
 admitted to be well founded. The best evidence, however, of 
 the controlling aim of members in holding on to patronage, 
 was the use they had made of it and the effects of their action 
 upon the administration. That use was being year by year 
 more and more emphatically condemned by the people. It 
 was notorious that dependents and electioneering agents of 
 members abounded in the public service. Salaries and super- 
 numeraries were not reduced, merely because such legislation 
 would be damaging to the favorites of members. Persons not 
 connected with the executive department were not good 
 judges of its needs, or of those most fit to serve it. Members 
 of Parliament were so dependent upon votes at elections as 
 to be in the worst possible situation for forming an impartial 
 judgment. If it was worthy, competent persons that mem- 
 bers knew in their localities, and whom they wished to get 
 into the public service, why do such persons fear the test of 
 open competition ? However disinterested the motives of 
 many members, the system of patronage subjected them to 
 dangerous temptations, and was far too seductive for the patriot- 
 ism of not a few. They knew best and thought best of those who 
 worked most for them in their political contests. They could 
 not, without the greatest self-denial, refuse to promise nomi- 
 nations to their henchmen. The scandalous suggestion at- 
 1 Const. Hist., vol. ii., p. 782.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 173 
 
 taclied to the very name of patronage, and the avowed pur- 
 pose of so many of the noblest men in Parliament to be rid of 
 its exacting and humiliating demands, left no room for doubt 
 on these points. It is as indefensible in principle for members 
 to select executive officers as it would be for the Executive to 
 select subjects upon which Parliament should legislate, or 
 names for the committees it should appoint. What would be 
 said if the Executive should claim a right to nominate the offi- 
 cers of either House of Parliament ? 
 
 The duty of a member of Parliament is, in its very nature, 
 such as to require him to have a constant and supreme regard 
 to the effects of the old laws, and to the need of new laws, in 
 their relation to the common welfare of the people. And this 
 duty is inconsistent with his use of an appointing power (with- 
 out executive responsibility) through which he becomes inter- 
 ested in keeping certain persons in office, in bringing other 
 persons into office. 1 Under the present state of things, bills 
 are supported or opposed in reference to their probable effect 
 upon the patronage of members. 4 
 
 It is inconsistent with that independence, dignity, and dis- 
 interestedness which the people require in a legislator, as well 
 as a bad use of valuable time and talents, for a member of 
 Parliament to act as an office or patronage broker, and to go 
 about from department to department and office to office, 
 begging or bullying, to-day this, and to-morrow that officer, 
 in order to make a place for perhaps a needy dependent, or 
 perhaps an unscrupulous and unrewarded supporter at an 
 election. 
 
 " Considering the pressure that is put on the treasury by 
 men having powerful Parliamentary interest, and that which 
 is put on the heads of departments, both by Parliamentary in- 
 terest and by the claims of private friendship (and the object 
 
 1 As to the vicious effects of Parliamentary patronage, see cl.ap. xii. 
 
 " How interest in office may influence the conduct of a legislator and may 
 ca.se even a great and pure man to make, perhaps unconsciously, a dam- 
 aging record against himself, is shown in the letters of Macaulay while a 
 member of Parliament. " There were points in the bill of which I did not 
 approve, and I only refrained from stating these points because an office of 
 my own was at stake." (Life and Letters of Macaulay, by Trevelyan, voL 
 L, p. 165.) 
 
 12
 
 374 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 \ of the persons possessing this influence is generally to palm 
 off on the public service such of their sons or nephews as are 
 
 ' fit for nothing else), it is impossible to estimate too highly the 
 importance of a preliminary examination, conducted by an 
 independent and competent Board of Examiners. ' ' ' 
 
 The fact that a member has such a power tempts him to 
 promise places for votes, subjects him to suspicions, and 
 brings upon him solicitations in a thousand ways as pernicious 
 as they are troublesome. They degrade the morals of official 
 life, at the same time that they dissuade the best men from 
 standing for Parliament. Members of Parliament were worn 
 out with the annoyance patronage gave them. 2 The possession 
 of patronage by members introduces a corrupt element, and 
 especially the damaging belief that there must be corruption, 
 in elections, because the ability of a member to control places 
 under the government causes the more active and unscrupulous 
 managers of local politics to give their support to the candidate 
 who will promise most places and is likely to work most per- 
 sistently to obtain them. Thereby the chances of the most 
 partisan and unscrupulous candidate are increased, and the 
 better sort are disgusted and discouraged. 
 
 5. Patronage in members also tends to bring the public ser- 
 vice into disrepute, and to convert public officers into active 
 politicians. For no officer can have great self-respect, or much 
 respect for his fellows, when he gets his office, and they theirs, 
 through official favor, if not through demoralizing subservi- 
 ency ; nor are the public likely to have a better opinion 
 of the public service than its members have of themselves. A 
 mistaken duty of gratitude is held to require that one who is 
 receiving a salary obtained for him by a member of Parlia- 
 ment should serve that member whenever the opportunity 
 presents. Thus a great portion of the public service is 
 brought into subserviency to members of Parliament. 
 
 6. And looking beyond any particulars that can be speci- 
 fied, it is plainly discreditable to a great and free country, and 
 unbecoming the exalted position of those who make its laws 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, p. 132. 
 
 2 " As I know from experience that it would relieve members of Parlia- 
 ment and official men from a most disagreeable portion of their labors." 
 (Civil Service Papers, p. 231.)
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 175 
 
 and interpret its constitution, that they should desire to pos- 
 sess an authority to barter and bargain in nominations, or should 
 be willing to use their official influence to enforce a partisan 
 test upon the conscience and manhood of the nation. A mem- 
 ber of Parliament should scorn a system which thus inevitably 
 degrades his high office, subjects him to suspicion, and de- 
 moralizes the politics of his country. The final decision on 
 these issues was early foreshadowed. For some years before 
 1853, it seems to have been tacitly conceded by the leaders of 
 both parties that Parliamentary patronage, if not the whole 
 partisan system, must be very soon abandoned. The great 
 question was, "What should be put in its place ? It was not 
 regarded as a mere question of administrative details or as 
 having its greater interest in its probable effects upon a general 
 election, but as a vital issue of principle and national policy, 
 of which the influence would be felt to the very foundation of 
 government and of social order. The eminent men consulted 
 by the administration whether hostile or friendly to a com- 
 petitive system equally recognized its grave importance, and its 
 sure encouragement of education and of liberty. " Why add 
 yet another to the many recent sacrifices of the royal preroga- 
 tive ? ... I ... call your attention to the almost 
 incalculable magnitude of the political changes which the pro- 
 posed abdication of all the patronage of the Crown in the pub- 
 lic offices must invoke. . . . The proposal to select can- 
 didates for the civil service of government by a competitive 
 examination appears to me to be one of those great public im- 
 provements, the adoption of which would form an era in his- 
 tory. ... It still seems to me that the ultimate result of 
 open competition will be a democratic civil service, side by side 
 with an aristocratic legislature. Open competition must neces- 
 sarily be in favor of the more numerous class. The natural 
 ability of that more numerous class i.e., of the lower or less 
 rich class is not inferior to those of the higher or richer 
 class." l 
 
 Such were the divergent views expressed. Neither party 
 dared defend the old system any longer, or maintain that noth- 
 ing better was possible. Lords Derby and Aberdeen, the min- 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 79, 80, 62, and 288.
 
 176 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 isters and party leaders of the period, were not theorists, but 
 practical statesmen of great experience. Both appear to have 
 reached the conclusion that a reform must be undertaken. It 
 fell to Lord Aberdeen's administration to begin it. But be- 
 fore considering the measures for introducing open competition 
 into the civil service at home, it will be useful to refer to what 
 was done, in the same direction and about the same time, to 
 improve the administration of British India.
 
 CHAPTER XY. 
 
 OPEN COMPETITION INTRODUCED INTO BRITISH INDIA. 
 
 Patronage a failure there. Pass examinations and a college course found 
 inadequate. The public service in a threatening condition. Open com- 
 petition provided for in 1853. Report of Mr. Macaulay and Lord Ash- 
 burton. Nature of the competition. 
 
 ATTENTION lias already been called to several statutes of the 
 reign of George III., which showed that, thus early, careful 
 study had been made into the conditions of good administra- 
 tion for India, and that official corruption was even then more 
 stringently dealt with than it has yet been in analogous cases 
 in this country. It would be easy, but it can hardly be useful, 
 to refer to later statutes, framed in the same spirit, under 
 which several experiments were made, in the hope of increas- 
 ing the purity and vigor of the civil service of India. It is 
 enough to say that patronage, in the hands of the Board of 
 Directors having control of its administration, was found to 
 be as intolerable as such patronage was at home in the hands 
 of members of Parliament. For this reason, it had been pro- 
 vided, long before 1853, that those designed for the civil ser- 
 vice of India should not only be subjected to a pass exami- 
 nation, but should, before entering the service, be subjected 
 to a course of special instruction at Haileybury College, 
 a sort of civil West Point. This college was abolished in 
 1854:, but equivalent instruction was elsewhere provided for. 
 The directors had the patronage of nomination for such in- 
 struction, much as our members of Congress have (or rather 
 take) the patronage of nomination for our military school. 
 If it seems strange that a severe course of study, for two years 
 in such a college, was not sufficient to weed out the incompe- 
 tents which patronage forced into it, we must bear in mind
 
 178 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 that the same influence which sent them there was used to 
 keep them there, and that it has required a high standard of 
 proficiency and the sternness of military discipline, which force 
 out a very great portion of those who enter, to prevent in- 
 competent favorites from graduating at "West Point. The 
 ablest administrators England could supply had been sent to 
 India for the purpose of raising its civil administration to a 
 condition compatible with the public safety. Every prom- 
 ising method, consistent with such patronage, or short of a rad- 
 ical change of system, had been tried. The evils which the 
 India administration disclosed grew not so much out of mere 
 partisan zeal and recklessness as out of the general demorali- 
 zation sure to result from every system which allows an ap- 
 pointing power, without executive responsibility, as a mere 
 appendage to a public office, or permits that power to be ex- 
 ercised with no enforced regard to the worth and capacity of 
 those nominated. Both the Derby and the Aberdeen admin- 
 istrations, in 1852 and 1853, took notice that the civil service 
 was in a condition of peril to British India ; and, without dis- 
 tinction of party, it was agreed that radical reforms must be 
 promptly made. There was corruption, there was inefficiency, 
 there was disgraceful ignorance, there was a humiliating fail- 
 ure in the government to command the respect of the more 
 intelligent portion of the people of India, and there was a 
 still more alarming failure to overawe the unruly classes. It 
 was as bad in the army as in the civil offices. " In the years 
 1851 to 1854, both inclusive, 437 gentlemen were examined 
 for direct commissions in the Indian army ; of this number 132 
 failed in English, and 234 in arithmetic. The return requires 
 no comment." 1 There was, in short, a hotbed of abuses 
 prolific of those influences which caused the fearful outbreak 
 of 1857. It was too late, when reform was decided upon, to 
 prevent the outbreak, but not too late to save British suprem- 
 acy in India. 
 
 A change of system was entered upon in 1853. The 36th 
 
 and 37th clauses of the India act of that year provided " that 
 
 all powers, rights, and privileges of the court of directors of 
 
 the said India Company to nominate or appoint persons to be 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 876, 377.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN*. 179 
 
 admitted as students . . . shall cease ; and that, subject 
 to sucli regulations as might be made, any person, being a nat- 
 ural l)orn subject of her Majesty, who might be desirous of 
 presenting himself, should be admitted to be examined as a 
 candidate." 
 
 Thus, it will be seen, Indian patronage received its death- 
 blow, and the same blow opened the door of study for the 
 civil service of India to every British citizen ; allowing him 
 to come and prove himself, if he could, to be the better man 
 to serve his country, without having to ask the consent of any 
 director, minister, member of Parliament, caucus, or party 
 manager whatever. It was the clearing of the way for the 
 introduction of the merit system, pure and simple, into civil 
 administration in the home government. It was the first ex- 
 ample of the kind the first time that a nation had declared 
 in its statutes that its officers should not have either a pa- 
 tronage, a privilege, a profit, or a monopoly, in the autho- 
 rity of saying, irrespective of merit, 2 which of its citizens shall 
 be allowed to present his claims for a place in its service. It 
 was the intent of the statute that open competition should 
 take the place made vacant by the death of patronage. Mr. 
 Macaulay, as is well known, had held office in India ; and 
 he and Lord Ashburton were the leading men on the com- 
 mittee which the administration selected to draw up the regu- 
 lations to which the statute referred. Their report was made 
 in 1854, and provided for open competition, in which the best 
 qualified would win the right of admission to the proper col- 
 lege, where two years of special study would complete their 
 preparation for entering the civil service of India. The report 
 was approved, and thereupon the merit system, based on open 
 competition, was for the first time put into actual practice on 
 a large scale. It was a bold and radical experiment full of 
 peril ; and it may be said to have been, like our government, 
 founded almost upon theory alone, since it was the first of its 
 kind ever adopted by a nation. The rules for the competition 
 provided for extended to such subjects as were deemed im- 
 portant to be understood by those engaged in the Indian ser- 
 
 1 Report on India Civil Service, London, 1870, p. 13. 
 a Except the law of Richard II.
 
 180 CIVIL SERVICE IN GEEAT BRITAIN. 
 
 vice. In order to determine the relative standing of each com- 
 petitor, lie was to be marked in each subject, and the average 
 of his aggregate marks, in all the subjects, would determine 
 how he stood as compared with the others in the competition. 
 There is no doubt that aristocratic influence was used to 
 set up a standard most favorable to the classes from which 
 that influence came ; but the authors declare in their report 
 that they have adopted a standard which is not calculated to fa- 
 vor any class, school, or other institution of learning. When we 
 consider the vast population and revenue of India, and how 
 vitally the honor and credit of Great Britain are involved in 
 her fate, we can more readily comprehend the magnitude of 
 this experiment and the gravity of the abuses that must have 
 forced a proud and practical nation to enter upon it. For to 
 it were committed, not the hopes of a party merely, but the 
 safety of an empire. At the proper time, the results of this 
 unique experiment will be presented.
 
 CHAPTER XYI. 
 
 GOVERNMENT INQUIRY AND REPORT LEADING TO THE INTRODUC- 
 TION OF THE NEW SYSTEM IN 1853. 
 
 General condition of the service in 1853. How it compared with that of the 
 United States. Should reform be instituted by statute or by executive 
 action ? Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyau directed to 
 make a report. Their report. They recommend open competition. 
 Declared to be founded in justice and favorable to the education of the 
 people. How report received at first. Parliament hostile. Government 
 decided not to ask special legislation. 
 
 IN 1853, the British Government had reached a final decision 
 that the partisan system of appointments could not be longer 
 tolerated. Substantial control ( of nominations by members 
 of Parliament, however guarded by restrictions and improved 
 by mere pass examinations, had continued to be demoralizing 
 in its effect upon elections, vicious in its influence upon legisla- 
 tion, and fatal to economy and efficiency in the departments. 
 The higher public opinion demanded the extension of those 
 better modes of examination for admission to the public ser- 
 vice, which, in their limited use, had been so manifestly ben- 
 eficial. Those responsible for good administration had a deep 
 sense of the need of relief from that pervading solicitation and 
 intrigue which everywhere stood in the way of the fit dis- 
 charge of their official duties. It is plain, from what has 
 already been said, that the abuses from which relief was to be 
 sought were by no means of that gross and alarming kind which 
 had existed in earlier times. The laws and the policy, to which 
 I have referred, had greatly advanced the work of reform. 
 But public opinion, in the same spirit, had made not less ad- 
 vance ; and it now insisted on a standard of efficiency and 
 purity in official life which only the most advanced re- 
 formers had, half a century before, thought to be practi- 
 cable in public affairs. Both the importance which govern-
 
 182 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ment accorded to administrative methods and the sound prin- 
 ciples embodied in the statutes, I have cited had, doubt- 
 less, contributed to elevate the public standard of official duty. 
 A brief outline will enable us to compare that standard and the 
 character of administration in Great Britain in 1853 with our 
 own at this time. 
 
 1. Neither political assessments nor any other form of ex- 
 tortion, by the higher officers from the lower, or by partisan 
 leaders from any grade of officials or government employes, 
 existed. 
 
 2. Officers were not removed for the purpose of making 
 places for others ; and, so long as official duty was properly 
 performed, no one was proscribed by reason of his political 
 opinions. 
 
 3. In the great departments of customs and internal revenue 
 (and in a large way, as a general rule, in other departments also), 
 the higher places were filled by promotions from the lower ; 
 and therefore such contests as we have over these higher places 
 were unknown. 
 
 4. As a general rule, to which the exceptions were rare, 
 those in office held their places during efficiency and good be- 
 havior (always excepting the members of the Cabinet and the 
 few high political officers to which I have before referred), 
 and therefore nothing analogous to the fear of removal and 
 the vicious, partisan activity of officials in connection with 
 elections (which that fear produces under our system) was 
 known in Great Britain. 
 
 5. The law of Queen Anne (already cited), which prohibits 
 post office officials trying to influence elections, and the laws 
 of George III. , which prevented them and nearly all others in 
 the civil service from voting, were still in force, and they 
 effectually protected the freedom of elections from invasion 
 by executive officers. But they were not adequate to prevent 
 members of Parliament and other high officers from giving 
 places to those who had worked for them in the canvass. The 
 grosser forms of bargaining, however, these laws had sup- 
 pressed. 
 
 6. Members of Parliament monopolized patronage, but they 
 must recommend their favorites through the Patronage Sec-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 183 
 
 retary of the Treasury ; and to that officer the heads of de- 
 partments and offices must apply for clerks. " The names 
 are sent by the Secretary of the Treasury, who, in selecting 
 them, is mainly influenced by political considerations. They 
 are persons of whom he can scarcely ever have any personal 
 knowledge, and who are recommended to him by the political 
 supporters of the government." The Secretary parcelled 
 out places and salaries with as much exactness as a prize master 
 ever apportioned the proceeds of a capture. Secret bargain- 
 ing and intrigue was greatly limited by this open way of mak- 
 ing merchandise of public functions. The reduction of favor- I 
 itism and nepotism to a system was also a most salutary check ' 
 upon the old habits of members of Parliament going whining : 
 and palavering, or bullying and blustering (according to their 
 temper, or that of the official whose ante-room they besieged), 
 from department to department, and from office to office, seek- 
 ing places for their favorites. 
 
 7. There were pass examinations quite as effective (to say 
 the least) as any we have applied, between nominations and 
 admissions ; and, very generally, a six-months probation fol- 
 lowed before an actual appointment was made. In addition, 
 competitive examinations were being enforced (in mere self- 
 protection) by the heads of some of the offices ; and, 
 altogether, these safeguards were no inconsiderable check upon 
 the selfishness and wantonness of official favoritism. 
 
 8. Wliat might be called a spoils system (in the more cor- 
 rupt sense of the term) had ceased to exist. Personal corrup- 
 tion in office had, for a considerable period, been of very rare oc- 
 currence. The public service, as a whole, was regarded as need- 
 lessly costly and inefficient ; but public opinion did not dis- 
 trust official honesty, however much it might suspect political 
 partiality and prejudice. In public, as in private life, there 
 were of course criminals, but on moral grounds the public ser- 
 vice, as a whole, was respectable. 
 
 9. A strictly partisan system of appointments (and to some 
 extent of promotions) prevailed. The right of nomination 
 was treated as an official perquisite. Political opinions were 
 recognized as paramount qualifications for office. Govern- 
 
 1 Letter Sir George Cornwall Lewes, July 20th, 1854, Civil Service Papers, 
 p. 108.
 
 181 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 ment stood before the people as a grand agency (or, in the 
 language of our politics, as " a machine") that might be used 
 to keep in the offices those who at any time held them, and to 
 perpetuate the rule of the dominant party. The system 
 afforded the means of rewarding those intriguers and manip- 
 ulators who supply the corrupt elements of elections, and beset 
 and seduce every officer having patronage. The gates of the 
 public service, being opened by influence rather than by 
 merit, those within naturally held a low place in public esteem, 
 and generally deserved nothing more. In all the elections, 
 which were as vigorously contested as they are in our politics, 
 the corrupting elements of patronage and partisan coercion 
 '-were present and exhaled an atmosphere of suspicion over 
 ! ^every issue of principle and of character. If the facts that 
 'there were no removals and but few promotions, except for 
 ' cause, made this vicious element far weaker than in our poli- 
 tics, it was yet an ever-active source of debasement and dis- 
 trust. In short, the bestowal of office w r as made upon the 
 theory of official and partisan favoritism, rather than upon 
 that of duty, justice, or the public interests, as the supreme 
 ends of government. So long as that theory prevailed, gov- 
 ernment and those who served it could never hold their just 
 place in the honor and respect of the people. 
 
 10. Stated in general terms, the great and primary source 
 of the evils in the British civil service, in 1853, w r as executive 
 patronage in the hands of members of Parliament, and the 
 obstruction it naturally caused in the way of bringing in and 
 promoting merit and of carrying on the administration 
 economically and efficiently. Questions upon the enactment 
 of laws were continually complicated by questions of Parlia- 
 mentary patronage. Members were indisposed to cut down 
 salaries, or reduce numbers, or abolish offices, or repeal laws, 
 when their own favorites might be those prejudiced by the 
 change. The men it was for their interest to foist upon the 
 service were not unfrequently persons very unfit to discharge 
 its duties. 1 There were many more persons whom members 
 wished to oblige than there were vacant places in the Treasury. 
 Such were the evils which the British Government set 
 
 1 See ante, p. 147 to 149.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 185 
 
 about removing in 1853. How they compare with those in 
 our service is too obvious for remark. In one particular that 
 of patronage in the hands of members of the legislature the 
 analogy is very close, though in consequence of our short 
 terms for so many officers and of our making promotions and 
 removals for political reasons, that evil in our service is vastly 
 greater. Should it be suggested that, if our service were in 
 the condition of that of Great Britain in 1853, there would be 
 slight fault found with it, the fact would be only further 
 evidence of an exacting public opinion there, which is due to 
 the greater attention which statesmen have for a long time 
 given to the subject of good administration. 
 
 Ingenious attempts had been made, especially since 1832, to 
 remove the evils of the partisan system, and, to make it satis- 
 factory to the higher public opinion. In several ways, the 
 abuses of the system had been curtailed. The more it was re- 
 stricted, the purer and more vigorous party government had 
 become. The results of all experience pointed to yet more 
 salutary effects, as sure to result from an utter severance of 
 party government itself from a mere partisan system of ap- 
 pointments. The last twenty years had been, beyond any in 
 English history, distinguished by liberal measures ; and the time 
 was fortunate in enlightened statesmen Grey, Aberdeen, 
 Peel, Russell, Cobden, Granville, Derby, Palmerston, Bright, 
 Gladstone among them whose names recall the great tri- 
 umphs of justice, liberty, education, humanity, and national 
 vigor with which they will stand forever associated. Fortu- 
 nately, these men had no faith in a partisan system, nor was 
 there one of them, whichever side he took in politics, who was 
 willing to apologize for that system, or failed to see that it was 
 hostile alike to the true life of a party and to the highest inter- 
 ests of a nation. It was at this period that those enlightened 
 health laws were enacted, and that vigorous sanitary adminis- 
 tration began, which have been an inestimable blessing to the 
 British people and especially to the poor and which are also 
 the basis of our best laws and regulations for the protection of 
 the public health. 
 
 The administration, with Lord Aberdeen at its head, prompt- 
 ly decided to undertake a radical and systematic reform.
 
 186 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 There was no little doubt as to the best plan to pursue. It 
 was at first proposed to begin by offering a bill in Parliament, 
 it being thought that nothing short of joint action by the leg- 
 islative and the executive would either be at once effective, or 
 binding upon succeeding administrations. But unanswerable 
 objections arose. It was least promising of success. Mem- 
 bers of Parliament were much more likely to acquiesce in 
 reforms proposed by the executive than to initiate them by 
 statute. They were not well informed as to existing methods 
 or real needs in the executive department, and could never 
 devise a good system, even if such an undertaking did not 
 too directly concern both their future patronage and their 
 favorites in office. 
 
 It would be shirking responsibility, and would raise sus- 
 picions of want of faith, for the executive not to take the 
 initiative in a reform within its own sphere of duty. None 
 so well as those in the executive department knew the abuses 
 or the true remedy. Upon none did the duty so clearly rest 
 to remove them. Nowhere else was there so much existing 
 authority unused for that purpose. With what consistency 
 could the executive call upon Parliament to reform adminis- 
 tration, so long as executive authority remained unexercised, 
 which, if not wholly adequate, was yet sufficient to accom- 
 plish much in that direction ? Any lack of courage any want 
 of faith in the higher sentiments of the people any attempt 
 to shift responsibility, any resort to the tactics of its opponents, 
 on the part of the Executive, it was perceived, must be fatal 
 to such a reform. 
 
 " It has been too much the habit of the House of Commons to 
 interfere in matters for which not they but the executive are respon- 
 sible. It is the duty of the executive to provide for the efficient and 
 harmonious working of the civil service, and they cannot transfer 
 that duty to any other body far less competent to the task than 
 themselves, without infringing a great and important constitutional 
 principle, already too often infringed, to the great detriment of the 
 public service." 1 
 
 A new method must be very cautiously, if not gradually, 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 271, 272.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 187 
 
 introduced, and it would be fatal to give a new and experi- 
 mental system the rigidity of law at the outset. A statute may 
 safely declare a principle of action, but not the details of that 
 action. There must be tentative measures gradually adopted 
 by the executive to the public needs. 
 
 " I may as well say that there was a considerable amount of vacil- 
 lation and of tentative action, proceedings being afterwards recalled 
 and alterations made in the conduct of the Treasury, according as we 
 got fresh light and information ; there were different rules 
 
 in almost every department . . . we took a step in that year 
 which we saw fit to retract the next year." 1 
 
 Why should the administration be encumbered by reg- 
 ulations, theoretically devised, which might soon be found 
 impracticable, but wliich could only be changed by the 
 joint act of the executive and the legislature ? Whether 
 regard be had to the usurpation of executive power by 
 members of Parliament, or to the plain duty of the ex- 
 ecutive, independent of that encroachment, it was felt to be 
 too clear for dispute that the most natural and the most effec- 
 tive opening of a reform policy would be for the executive to 
 set an example of the discharge of official duty, in the spirit of 
 the reform proposed, and to follow it up by the fearless ex- 
 ercise of all executive authority in that direction. Such an 
 example would, in the public mind, silence all suspicion of 
 lack of courage or lack of sincerity ; and, in Parliament, it 
 would make the executive invulnerable, at the same time that 
 it would turn public criticism upon members and other 
 officers who should continue to justify abuses in order that 
 they might enjoy patronage. Consistency, disinterestedness, 
 fidelity to the principles on wliich the reform was to be based, 
 at whatever cost, were felt to be indispensable to its success. 
 Strong opposition was to be expected, but it must be boldly 
 met on the basis of the reform policy alone. 
 
 But there were other reasons not less decisive. The greater 
 effort was to make it certain, first, that the executive should 
 be at liberty to select the best persons, as the constitution 
 contemplated ; and, next, that its authority should be faith- 
 
 1 Evidence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Report of Parliamentary 
 Commission, 1873, p. 227.
 
 188 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 fully exercised. Tho main reform sought is in the use of the 
 executive power of appointment. If Parliament would sur- 
 render its usurpations and not again interfere, all that was 
 needed was that the executive should perform a plain duty 
 within its constitutional power. The authority of selecting 
 officers covers the whole subject of their character, qualifica- 
 tions, age, promotions and removals ; and that of executing 
 the laws embraces all matters pertaining to the regulation and 
 discipline of public servants. If left free to do so, and sup- 
 plied with the necessary funds, the executive could bring 
 about such reform. Why then should the executive begin the 
 work of reform in its own department with a request that Par- 
 liament should further transcend its sphere ? "I am firmly 
 persuaded that if governments were more courageous in ef- 
 fecting reforms tending to the benefit of the community, we 
 should hear fewer complaints of the difficulties arising out of 
 the conflict of party interests." "After a few quiverings 
 in the balance, the scale would sink down on the side of those 
 whose wisdom and energy were steadily toward the promotion 
 of the common weal. " 1 Why assume that members of Parlia- 
 ment are as well acquainted with business in the departments 
 as the experienced officers at their head ? Why might not 
 the executive as properly take part in making the business 
 rules of the House of Commons as the House interfere with 
 the business ru'les of the departments ? It could not of course ' 
 be denied that Parliament had a large and undefined legisla- 
 tive authority, that in many ways reached within tho depart- 
 ments ; and it unquestionably extended to salaries and to all 
 matters involving expenditures. But, at most, Parliament 
 should be only called upon to approve regulations for the gov- 
 ernment of executive officers, and that approval was implied 
 in voting an appropriation. The course that members of 
 Parliament would pursue was predicted with remarkable fore- 
 sight, and the prediction has been almost as applicable to what 
 we have seen in this country, as to what took place in the Brit- 
 ish Parliament ; though, when once the members of that body 
 had committed themselves to the reform before the nation, 
 they did not arrest it by withholding money to pay its cost. 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 31, 33.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 189 
 
 " I think th3 members of the House of Commons would in 
 general support this scheme. Many of them would gladly be relieved 
 from the importunities to which they are now exposed. Many more 
 would advocate the new arrangement from a sincere conviction of its 
 advantages. Of those who were inclined to oppose it, some would 
 dissemble their aversion, through unwillingness to come forward at 
 all as the champions of a system which they knew to be corrupt ; and 
 other would be unable to offer more than a feeble resistance, being 
 obliged to rest their arguments upon grounds different from those on 
 which their views were really founded. They would raise objec- 
 tions on small points of detail, or would assert in a sweeping way 
 that the plan was complicated, expensive, impracticable, and so 
 forth." 1 
 
 Such views prevailed, and the original plan was changed. 
 It was decided that, in the outset, no application should be 
 made to Parliament. The reform should be undertaken by 
 the English Executive (that is, the Queen, and ministers, or 
 administration) for the time being. The first step decided 
 upon was an inquiry into the exact condition of the public 
 service. Sir Stafford Korthcote (the present Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer) and Sir Charles Trevelyan were appointed in 
 1853 to make such inquiry and a report, They submitted their 
 report in November of the same year. 
 
 I have no space to do justice to this abLe document, but a 
 few sentences will indicate its spirit and some of the abuses of 
 patronage for which it proposed a remedy. 
 
 " Admission into the civil service is indeed eagerly sought after, 
 but it is for the unambitious and the indolent or incapable that it is 
 chiefly desired. Those whose abilities do not warrant the expecta- 
 tion that they will succeed in the open professions, where they must 
 encounter the competition of their cotemporaries, and those whose 
 indolence of temperament or physical infirmities unfit them for 
 active exertions, are placed in the civil service. . . . Parents and 
 friends of sickly youths endeavor to attain for them employment in 
 the service of the government. . . . The character of the indi- 
 viduals influences the mass, and it is thus that we often hear com- 
 plaints of official delays, official evasions of difficulty, and official in- 
 disposition to improvement." 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 21, 22. 
 13
 
 190 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 A system of competitive examinations is recommended 
 which will test personal fitness for the public service. 
 
 " In the examinations which we have recommended, we con- 
 sider that the right of competing should be open to all persons 
 of a given age, ' ' subject to satisfactory proof of good health 
 and good moral character. 
 
 These examinations " cannot be conducted in an effective 
 and consistent manner throughout the service while it is left 
 to each department to determine the nature of the examina- 
 tion and to examine the candidates. ' ' 
 
 The report was accompanied with a scheme for carrying the 
 examinations into effect, from which I quote the following 
 passages, as seeming to show that, from the very outset, the re- 
 form was neither royal nor aristocratic, but was advocated in 
 the interest of common justice and population education : 
 " Such a measure will exercise the happiest influence in the 
 education of the lower classes throughout England, acting by 
 the surest of all motives the desire a man has of bettering 
 himself in life. . . . They will have attained their situa- 
 tions in an independent manner through their own merits. 
 The sense of this conduct cannot but induce self-respect and 
 diffuse a wholesome respect among the lower no less than the 
 higher classes of official men. . . . The effect of it in 
 giving a stimulus to the education of the lower classes can 
 hardly he overestimated. ' ' ' Such was the spirit of the re- 
 port. This was the theory of the merit system, then first ap- 
 proved by an English administration for the home government. 
 I hardly need repeat that the examinations referred to as ex- 
 isting were (with small exception) mere pass examinations, and 
 that the new examinations proposed were open, competitive 
 examinations, being such as I have before explained. The 
 examinations were to be general, so as to reach those qualifica- 
 tions which every person in the public service ought to 
 possess, and also special to the extent requisite in the various 
 parts and grades of the service, to ascertain the peculiar qual- 
 ifications there needed. 
 
 A central board of examiners, with common duties, in all 
 the departments and offices, is recommended as essential to 
 1 Civil Service Papers, Appendix, pp. 4-31.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 191 
 
 uniformity and independence in enforcing the rules of admis- 
 sion and probation. Such a body, for conducting them, would, 
 we may readily see, impart the greatest vigor, uniformity, and 
 justice to open competition. The proposal that merit should 
 be the basis of promotion was of course quite hostile to the 
 spirit of royalty and conservatism. It is worthy of notice that 
 the report does not advise that any officers should be dismissed 
 because they came in under the old system and were imbued 
 with its spirit. If they should not act in good faith under 
 the new system, they could be dismissed^forjcause. English 
 statesmen have always regarded the government itself, and not 
 its subordinates, as responsible for low qualifications and ex- 
 cessive numbers in the public service ; and poor clerks have 
 never, as with us, been suddenly and ruthlessly dismissed into 
 the streets without notice or other employment. The report 
 proceeds upon the theory that a complete removal of all abuses 
 at once is impossible. But if merit, and not favoritism, should 
 hereafter secure places in the public service, its whole spirit 
 would be, at once, changed and its reasonable independence of 
 politics would be in a short period established. Promotion 
 from the places to the higher would inspire and reward honor- 
 able ambition, and in a few years the whole service would be- 
 come as distinguished for administrative capacity as it had been 
 for incapacity and servility. We shall see to what extent these 
 hopes have been realized. 
 
 But the great feature of the report, which made it really a 
 proposal for the introduction of a new system, was its advo- 
 cacy of open competition. Except the experiment just put 
 on trial in India, no nation had adopted that system. It was 
 as theoretical as it was radical. While it seemed sound in 
 principle, and had worked well in a small way, when it had 
 been tried in isolated places in England and France, no one 
 could be certain what might be its general consequences. 
 Caution, candor, and a fair field were needed for its trial. It 
 was of course particularly exposed to ridicule and misrepre- 
 sentation. 
 
 It soon appeared that such a trial was too much to expect. 
 Speculators in patronage, partisan leaders, high officers having 
 some fragments of the appointing power, and, especially, all
 
 192 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the scheming members of Parliament who had appropriated 
 the bulk of that power, at once took alarm and combined for 
 common attack and self-defence. They saw that their usurpa- 
 tion was threatened, not so much by the executive regaining 
 what they had pillaged as by the people having the public 
 service so freely opened to them that the most meritorious 
 could enter it without their consent without any other pass- 
 port than superior merit. Such freedom and justice would 
 be fatal to all official monopoly and all Parliamentary dictation. 
 If the cabman's son John and the farmer's boy Peter, and the 
 orphan at the head of his class in the public schools, could 
 boldly go before the Civil Service Commission, in open com- 
 j petition, and prove themselves to be better qualified to enter 
 ; the public service than the bisliops's blockhead boy, the 
 squire's or the earl's favorite, the member's electioneering 
 ! clerk or decayed butler, or the party manager's most serviceable 
 henchman, then, indeed, it would be pretty plain that a new 
 system had come in and that patronage and favoritism must 
 go out. This was too much for official and average Parlia- 
 mentary patriotism, too much for conservative old England 
 too dangerous for any country without a precedent to bring 
 about all at once. A chorus of ridicule, indignation, lamenta- 
 tion, and wrath arose from all the official and partisan places 
 of politics. The government saw that a further struggle was 
 at hand. It appeared more clear than ever that Parliament 
 was not a very hopeful place in which to trust the tender 
 years of such a reform. Its true friends were the intelligent 
 classes outside official life. 
 
 In England, as with us, the most active opponents of the 
 reform were those who had promised places and those who 
 hoped soon to gain them through official favoritism and parti- 
 san coercion. The appeal, therefore, it was seen, must be made 
 to the people themselves. They that is, such of them as are 
 neither in office nor seeking it were the true and almost the 
 only disinterested friends of the new system. With this view, 
 the executive caused the report to be spread broadcast among 
 the people, and also requested the written opinions of a large 
 number of persons of worth and distinction both in and out of 
 office. The report was sent to Parliament, but no action upon
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 193 
 
 it was requested. The situation will be recognized as resem- 
 bling our own when, under General Grant's administration, a 
 similar report was prepared ; but the final executive action in 
 the two countries was widely different. 
 
 The responses made in 185-4 are printed in an interesting 
 volume, to which I have already referred as " Civil Service 
 Papers." The hostility manifested in Parliamentary and 
 partisan circles soon appeared to be very formidable. But 
 there were not wanting able, disinterested members who were 
 ready to support the reform with patriotic zeal. At the 
 other end of the scale of membership, there were partisan in- 
 triguers and noisy demagogues horrified at such an attack 
 upon Parliamentary perquisites which had been enjoyed for 
 more than a hundred years, and without which, they declared, 
 no party could live, if indeed the constitution could survive. 
 They were as ready to defend their monopoly as they were to 
 defend their dcg kennels, their inherited acres, or their seats 
 at the horse races. Between these extremes were many good- 
 ish members, some of whom would faintly support reform in 
 order to get rid of the annoyance and the dirty work imposed 
 by patronage, and others of whom had just faith and princi- 
 ple enough to vote on what they might think would be the 
 winning side. The result of an early appeal to Parliament 
 would therefore be very doubtful, to say the least ; nor was 
 the first response of the people (perhaps to be made before 
 they had fully comprehended the issue) by any means certain. 
 "When we consider that an English administration has no other 
 tenure than the support of a majority in Parliament, so that an 
 adverse majority, for a single day, might compel the resigna- 
 tion of a ministry, we can appreciate that such an appeal to 
 the people required faith and courage of a high order. ' Those 
 high qualifications were not wanting in the ministry in power. 
 The government, faithful to its pledges and its sense of duty, 
 resolved to persist in the reform at all hazards. The only 
 
 1 " Those early supporters of it might be counted upon the fingers, and if 
 the matter had been put to the vote in London society or the clubs, or even 
 in Parliament itself by secret voting, it would have been rejected by an over- 
 whelming majority." Letter, Sir Charles Trevelyan to the Author. See 
 Appendix.
 
 194 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 alternatives were success or repudiation and disgrace. It de- 
 cided to notify its purpose to Parliament, but not to ask any 
 assistance at that time. Accordingly, tlie Queen's Speech, on 
 the opening of Parliament, in 1854, contained the following 
 language : 
 
 ' ' The establishment required for the conduct of the civil 
 service, and the arrangements bearing upon its conditions, 
 have recently been under review ; and I shall direct a plan to 
 be laid before you which will have for its object to improve 
 the system of admission, and thereby to increase the efficiency 
 of the service." ' 
 
 No such plan, however, was laid before Parliament at the 
 time first contemplated. That body showed itself too selfish, 
 unpatriotic, and hostile. But before considering the next step 
 taken by the administration, I ought to notice the response 
 made to the report by those of whom the government re- 
 quested opinions. 
 
 J See Report on Civil Service Appointments, I860, p. v.
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 HOW THE NEW SYSTEM WAS RECEIVED. 
 
 Politicians and many officers oppose. Xon-partisans generally approve. 
 Great disparity of views. It is Chinese. It is sound and salutary. It is 
 Utopian. It is wise and just. It shoots above human virtue. It responds 
 to public morality and intelligence. It is ridiculous. It is statesmanlike. 
 It is the dream of doctrinaires. It has the marks of practical states- 
 manship. The present service is the best the world ever saw. The pres- 
 ent service is disgracefully incompetent and costly. The new system 
 endangers the aristocracy The spoils system defended. Ridicule. The 
 new plan a bureaucracy. It is the opposite of a bureaucracy. 
 
 THE volume of replies to which I have referred ' discusses 
 the report of 1853 from every point of view. The prejudices 
 of aged officers wedded to routine, the natural hostility and 
 jealousy of partisan managers, the indignation and anger of a 
 certain class of members of Parliament,* the zeal of great re- 
 formers like John Stuart Mill, the honorable ambition of 
 young men wishing to rise by merit and scorning the degrad- 
 ing ways of subserviency, the alarm of old croakers and pessi- 
 mists, and the sober thought of good citizens in many callings 
 each and all found expression. There was no small differ- 
 ence of opinion as to what would come of an experiment so 
 novel and so radical. The journals and reviews of England 
 resounded with the tierce debate. I might fill pages with in- 
 teresting illustrations. Sarcasm, ridicule, denunciation, gloomy 
 prognostications of evil, high faith in the better sentiments, the 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers published in 1855. 
 
 ' The public press did not spare the selfish and partisan members of 
 Parliament. " Had not a long course of elective corruption blinded the 
 constituencies to its true import, and given members an instinctive antipathy 
 to any method for curtailing the means of corruption, such a measure 
 would have been hailed with applause." Times, August 11, 1854, Civil 
 Service Papers, p. 250.
 
 196 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 cunning sophisms of demagogues, and the calm reasoning of 
 statesmen, were heard by turns. Those whose patronage and 
 whose mercenary prospects of rising were threatened were 
 especially exasperated, and insisted that their rights were 
 being invaded. No bellicose woman at Billingsgate ever de- 
 fended her herring-stand with greater iierceness, or greater 
 apparent faith in the righteousness of her cause, than some of 
 the monopolists of patronage brought to the support of their 
 claim that justice, good policy, and the stability of the Eng- 
 lish constitution itself required that they should each keep 
 a toll-gate to the public service ever open to favor and shut 
 to merit. So complete was the discussion that subsequent 
 originality has not been possible ; and those who now employ 
 stale sarcasm and ridicule, better uttered at that time, must be 
 pardoned. Some denounced it as a Chinese system, because 
 the Chinese were said to have originated examinations ; not 
 remembering that the same reasoning would deprive English- 
 men of gunpowder, the compass, and the art of printing. 
 Some sneered at the new system as "a perfect novelty, never 
 hitherto enforced in any commonwealth except that of 
 Utopia ;" 1 not of course bearing in mind that free speech, 
 which they so much enjoyed, was also original in that re- 
 nowned commonwealth. One high officer, a Ilight Honorable, 
 a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath, and a Secre- 
 tary of a great department, commends his objections by using 
 the familiar argument (sound enough when fairly applied) 
 that rulers must not attempt what is not practicable in their 
 day and generation. He says : " The law-giver may keep 
 ahead of public opinion, but he cannot shoot out of sight of 
 the moral standard of his age and country. The world we 
 live in is not, I think, half moralized enough for the accept- 
 ance of a scheme of such stern morality as this." He was re- 
 minded that public officers are very liable to mistake official 
 opinion for the public opinion, and hence often shoot far be- 
 low the moral tone of the people. He showed before he got 
 through that it was fears about prerogative and not about 
 morality that really troubled him. "Why add another," he 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, p. 77.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 197 
 
 exclaims, " to the many recent sacrifices of the royal prerog- 
 ative ?" ' 
 
 Just as with us, there were those who thought the old sys- 
 tem a piece of perfection. "I reply that I do not consider 
 that system capable of improvement, but think it better than 
 any other that has been suggested, or that I am able to sug- 
 gest." 2 
 
 Even distinguished officers (a Eight Honorable Secretary of 
 State and the Secretary of the National Council for Education) 
 had the hardihood to defend the worst features of the old par- 
 tisan spoils system itself, in language that would have brought 
 a blush of shame even to the face of the author of the declara- 
 tion that " to the victor belongs the spoils." 
 
 " The principal ministers of the Crown (he said) are themselves 
 so ill remunerated, that those high trusts are practically confined to 
 persons born to ;:mple fortunes. . . . But the range of choice 
 will become still more narrow, . . . if the remuneration of these 
 great offices be further reduced, by depriving the holders of them of 
 all their most valuable patronage. . . . Considering the long 
 habituation of the people to political contests, in which the 
 share of office, not merely for its emoluments, but also for the sake 
 of influencing administration, reckons among the legitimate prizes of 
 war, . . . and that rank and wealth . . . hold the keys 
 of many things, ... I should hesitate long before I advised 
 such a revolution of the civil service." 
 
 The argument, so familiar with us, that the corruption we 
 have is an inevitable evil that comes " with the best civil ser- 
 vice the world has ever seen," is by no means original here, 
 but is a stale falsehood born of English fatalism and con- 
 ceit. 4 " Jobbing is a part, though an ugly part, of the price 
 which a free people pay for their constitutional liberty. So 
 long as there are Parliamentary constitutents, they will ask 
 favors of members of Parliament, and members of Parliament 
 of ministers. ." * 
 
 Civil Sen-ice Papers, pp. 78, 79. * Ibid., p. S93. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 104 and 105. * Ibid., p. CT3. 
 
 Ibid.
 
 198 CIVIL SERVICE IJST GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Polite sarcasm was ingeniously applied by high officials in 
 language of which this is a specimen : 
 
 " I should be extremely happy if any scheme occurred to me by 
 which pure, simple, unadulterated merit, without the slightest mix- 
 ture of other ingredients, could be made the sole criterion of advance- 
 ment. If such a discovery should ever be made, it would probably be 
 founded upon some new view of human nature, and would certainly 
 not be confined in its operation to the civil service, but would extend 
 its benign influence over all services, trades and professions." 1 
 
 Some arguments are noticeable as not having been yet re- 
 produced in our discussions ; for example, in one, it is urged 
 that if patronage is taken from members of Parliament, they 
 will utterly neglect the civil service, whereby it will go to de- 
 cay ; and, in another, that the real sufferers by existing abuses 
 are, not the public service or the people, but " the members 
 of Parliament and heads of departments, . . . who need 
 sheltering from the irresistible attacks of their constituents and 
 supporters, with which they often unwillingly and from neces- 
 sity comply. ' ' a 
 
 The specious and familiar, old argument the argument that 
 no part of an abuse should be remedied unless the whole can 
 be removed at once that no thief should be punished unless 
 all gamblers are sent to prison at the same time was put with 
 much adroitness, with a view of arousing the fears and hostility 
 of the Established Church and of the owners of its patronage. 
 Why should patronage and favoritism, in bestowing offices, be 
 stopped (the writer asks), unless the sale of livings (that is, the 
 sale of the right to be a minister in the State Church) shall also 
 be forbidden? " If the government will absolutely proclaim 
 the abstract principle that nepotism is not to be endured, what 
 will they say of nepotism in the Church ? There it is not an 
 accident, but a system. It is an abuse, not furtively perpet- 
 uated, but ostentatiously avowed." 3 
 
 By some the new system was opposed on the ground that 
 the standard of examinations would be fixed so high that none 
 
 I Civil Service Papers, p. 394. 
 
 II Ibid., p. 357. Civil Service Report, 1860, p. 224. 
 8 Civil Service Papers, p. 78.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 199 
 
 but learned pedants and college-bred aristocrats could gain ad- 
 mission ; and, by others, it was opposed for exactly the oppo- 
 site, that it would be fixed so low that gentlemen would be 
 overslaughed by a band of conceited, impracticable school- 
 masters and book- worms, together with crowds of bright, vul- 
 gar fellows from the lower classes ; so that the high flavor of 
 honor and gentility, if not the moral tone of the service, would 
 be lost. ' ' Another objection to your system of competing 
 examinations is to be found in the stimulus that would be 
 given by it to over-education. There can be little doubt that 
 great numbers of youths who are now content to seek to earn 
 their subsistence in the lower ranks . . . would be at- 
 tracted by the more captivating prospect of these government 
 offices." l In reply, Mr. Mill and others commended the new 
 system because it gave the poor and the humble an equal 
 chance upon their merits, and they declared that if the sons of 
 the rich and the high-born could not, on that basis, hold their 
 own, the quicker they were driven from the public service the 
 better. There were also attacks upon the new system on the 
 ground that it would so largely draw young persons of ability 
 and attainments into the public service, that private business, 
 the pulpit, and the bar would suffer for want of them. To 
 which it was replied that no affairs were so great and impor- 
 tant as those of the nation, and that they demanded the ser- 
 vice of the best of her children, in which their example and 
 their influence would be most beneficent in all the ranges of 
 private life. At the worst, it would be easy to lower the stand- 
 ard, if the nation should ever be found to be too ably and 
 worthily served. It was claimed by some that the new sys- 
 tem would tend to a bureaucracy, and thus become dangerous 
 to liberty. The reply was that no system was so repugnant 
 and fatal to a bureaucracy as that proposed. It opened the 
 public service to every one upon equal terms, and those who 
 came in entered it under the least possible commitment or 
 obligations that would compromise their independence. The 
 essential conditions of a bureaucracy, in a public service, were, 
 first, that those in office should command the gate of that ser- 
 vice, thus selecting those who should enter it ; and second, 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 133 and 134.
 
 200 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 that the higher officers should domineer over the lower. 
 These were the very conditions of the old system which the 
 new was intended and was especially adapted to remove. 
 How could a bureaucracy arise under a system where all the 
 old officers in the service united could not prevent a young 
 man of worth from coming in, and under which they must 
 promote him for merit, and could turn him out only for cause, 
 to be publicly stated ? 
 
 The old argument, that parties could not prosper without at 
 least as much patronage as they then enjoyed, was renewed. 
 But, as it had been made by the party managers and overruled 
 by the English people, at every stage of the progress of re- 
 form, and parties had continued to prosper all the more, it did 
 not seem to have so much weight in England as it has with 
 us ; for the present generation of Americans has seen partisan 
 patronage and coercion steadily increase, whereas the present 
 generation of Englishmen has seen them as steadily fall away. 
 
 Another objection, which has been also urged with us, was 
 that a general examining board would be too expensive, and 
 that its duties would be found impracticable in their discharge. 
 To which it was replied that experience f would be the best 
 answer ; though there had been enough already to make it 
 probable that the objections were without weight ; that the 
 intrigues, the consumption of the time of officers by rival ap- 
 plicants for office, the interruptions of public business by 
 members of Parliament soliciting places, and the excessive 
 numbers and salaries foisted upon the treasury, which, were 
 the inevitable results of the old system, were ten times more 
 costly than any examining board could be. Still another ob- 
 jection, lately made familiar to us, was that the examining 
 board would itself succeed to the patronage which its old pos- 
 sessors would lose, and thereby a sort of Patronage Star 
 Chamber would be created ; in answer to which it was ex- 
 plained that the board would not have the least authority over 
 or participation in appointments, its duty being confined to 
 making up a record from data, always open to inspection and 
 review, and upon the face of which any unfairness would at 
 all times be patent. 
 
 But the attack upon the new system most confidently urged 
 was this : that, while an examination might test mere mem-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BWtt WASHING TO 
 
 ory, brightness and quickness of parts, it could not test moral 
 character, soundness of discretion, executive ability, or 
 capacity to command. This was the consideration which 
 caused not a few good citizens to hesitate, and which partisans 
 urged with much force and effect. It could be urged in much 
 fewer words than it could be answered, and it looked plausible 
 at the first statement. ~No nation had then tried examinations 
 on a large scale. Still, there had been considerable miscel- 
 laneous experience in England, and some in France, and that 
 was fully set forth. The argument from experience, to which 
 I shall call attention, is now, at the end of nearly a quarter of 
 a century of actual trial, so full and decisive that it will hardly 
 be useful to refer to what then existed or to dwell upon theory 
 or probability. It was pointed out that a public competition is 
 almost sure to expose and exclude bad characters. Examina- 
 tions were not to be merely literary, but were to cover the 
 practical duties of officers. They were not claimed to be 
 infallible ; but it was believed that a public competition, be- 
 tween attainments and capacity, for such duties was far prefer- 
 able to a private competition of influence, solicitation, favor, 
 and coercion, which generally prevailed under the old system. 
 Besides, the six-month probation would further test executive 
 ability. 
 
 The reform was distinctly presented to the people as one in 
 the interest of popular education, and of the common, equal 
 rights of the people of every class and condition to share in 
 the public service ; and it was as distinctly opposed, because 
 it was regarded as hostile to privilege and favorable to repub- 
 lican or democratic ideas. " A public opinion favorable to 
 the elementary schools would spring up in the humbler classes 
 of society, from this public recognition and sanction of it, as 
 the means of qualifying men for responsible stations in life. 
 . . In the first place, we may expect to see it operate 
 widely and deeply in the education of the country. Parents, 
 even down to those of the lowest class, will be more solicitous 
 than they are to secure the benefits of instruction for their 
 children, when they see its direct bearing upon their prospects 
 of advancement in life." 
 
 1 Civil Service Papw, pp. 24, 41, and 42.
 
 202 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 To this language of its friends its enemies replied in this 
 strain : 
 
 "I am free to confess that I can see no reason why the Crown 
 should be depriveJ. of the grace and influence which belongs to the 
 nominations. . . . One obvious effect of the competition which 
 is proposed by you would be to fill the offices with the picked, clever, 
 young men of the lower ranks of society, to whom such offices would 
 be a great object of ambition, which they would not in general be to 
 men of the higher ranks. ' ' 1 
 
 And yet, it would not be just to say that the aristocracy were 
 all on one side and the common people (as they are called) 
 all on the other. To the credit of English statesmen of the 
 most aristocratic birth and associations, it should be said that 
 several of them have set examples of the surrender of pat- 
 ronage and of the support of measures clearly in the interest 
 of common justice and humble life, which it would be an 
 honor to high officers in a republic to imitate. Lord Derby, 
 Lord Russell, and Lord Palmerston, for example, supported 
 the reform, as prime ministers, at the head of their respective 
 parties, though assured by their subordinates (and I think by 
 their own experience compelled to believe) that the inevitable 
 consequence would be an advance of the influence and educa- 
 tion of the people at large, by reason of which the privileged 
 classes would suffer a loss of power in public affairs. The line 
 between those who supported and those who opposed the re- 
 form was not a party line, nor was it the boundary between 
 the privileged and the unprivileged classes ; but it was a strata 
 in the moral tone of all parties and all ranks, below which 
 were the men whose faith was in management and the selfish 
 forces of politics, and, above which, were those who trusted 
 the higher sentiments and the nobler impulses of the people. 
 On the one side was all that survived in sympathy with "VVal- 
 pole and Newcastle, on the other, all that had grown in the 
 spirit of Chatham and of Burke. 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, pp. 133 and 330.
 
 CHAPTEE XVIII. 
 
 THE FIRST ORDER FOR A CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND COM- 
 PETITIVE EXAMINATIONS, MAY, 1855. 
 
 Lord Palmerston decides to go to Parliament only for an appropriation. 
 Executive order appointing a Civil Service Commission. Applicants for 
 office to be examined by the commission. Only limited competition at 
 first introduced. Part of their patronage retained by members of Parlia- 
 ment. No removals made. Moderate changes thought most prudent. 
 Vote of Commons in 1855 adverse to new system. The administration 
 stands firm, and relies on the people. 
 
 ABOUT the time that English public opinion had pronounced 
 its first judgment upon the official report, and before any final 
 action had been taken upon it, the Aberdeen administration 
 went out. The cause the disastrous management of the 
 Crimean war was independent of the new system, except in so 
 far as the lack of official capacity, both in the military and 
 civil administration, for which the old system was responsible, 
 contributed to that result. Lord Palmerston came into 
 power early in 1855, than whom, this most practical of nations 
 never produced a more hard-headed, practical statesman, nor 
 one who had a poorer opinion of mere theorists, sentimental- 
 ists, and doctrinaires. Upon his administration fell the duty 
 of deciding the fate of the new system advocated in the report. 
 
 Fortunately, he was no more inclined to shirk a plain duty 
 than he was to follow an empty theory. He had had long 
 experience in administration, and knew intimately the hope- 
 less incompetency of the partisan system. He too held that 
 the executive should discharge its own duty before going to 
 Parliament. He had faith in his party, and believed it would 
 gain more by removing grave abuses than by any partisan use 
 of patronage. It was beyond question, however, that a 
 majority of those most active in either party, and probably a
 
 204: CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 majority of members of Parliament, were opposed to the re- 
 form. But lie knew its strength with the people. Making 
 no direct appeal to Parliament, and trusting to the higher 
 public opinion, Lord Palmerston's administration advised that, 
 an order should be made by the Queen in Council for carrying 
 the reform into effect ; and such an order was made on the 
 21st of May, 1855. 
 
 It recites that "it is expedient to make provision for test- 
 ing, according to fixed rules, the qualifications of the young 
 men who may from time to time be proposed to be appointed 
 to the junior situations," ... in the civil service. There 
 were no women in the service at that time, and no provision 
 was made for them. It also appoints three General Commis- 
 sioners, with power to select assistants, under whom the ex- 
 aminations for all the departments are provided to be made. 
 It directs that an estimate for their remuneration be laid before 
 Parliament ; for it was believed that even members of Parlia- 
 ment would not refuse to allow a trial of the experiment, hos- 
 tile as the majority was believed to be. The order requires 
 that all young men proposed to be appointed to junior situ- 
 ations shall, before they shall be admitted to probation, be 
 examined under the commissioners and receive a certificate of 
 qualification from them ; but there is a carefully guarded excep- 
 tion allowing persons of mature age to be admitted to certain 
 places where special qualifications may be required. Appoint- 
 ments are not to be made until after a six months' probation, 
 which probation must have given satisfactory evidence of 
 fitness. There are also proper directions for determining age, 
 good character, and freedom from disqualifying physical 
 defects. 
 
 Thus far the order was as broad as the report ; but the need 
 of going to Parliament for an appropriation, the doubts of so 
 many thoughtful men over so radical a novelty, the fierce 
 opposition in official and partisan circles, and the angry mood 
 of the public mind over the" Crimean war, seem to have 
 caused the administration to think it most prudent to modify 
 the recommendation of the report upon the three following 
 points, until some experience should be acquired : (1) the rules 
 were to be accommodated in each department to the views of
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 205 
 
 its head ; (2) the power of nominating and appointing, as then 
 existing (but subject to examinations), was not to be taken 
 away by the rules ; (3) the examinations were not expressly 
 required to be competitive ; but it seems to have been under- 
 stood they would be competitive, and in fact competitive ex- 
 aminations were held by the Board of Commissioners from the 
 beginning of its duties. 
 
 This first order, therefore, did not really provide for uni- 
 form rules throughout the departments, but we shall find it 
 hurried on and really produced that result. It did not in terms 
 take away Parliamentary and official patronage, but, by sub- 
 mitting its favorites to competitive examination, under one 
 central board, it gave patronage its death-blow. It was really 
 limited and not open competition that was at first introduced, 
 and mainly a competition, perhaps, between those of the same 
 party. It was much as if all the nominations made by mem- 
 bers of Congress for West Point, or for civil offices, were sub- 
 jected to competition, and only a fit number of those marked 
 highest, regardless of residence, were allowed to enter or have 
 places. No one, I presume, will doubt that such a competi- 
 tion would greatly raise the average capacity and character of 
 the students and clerks. The English service was therefore 
 not really opened to the people, or made free to merit, but 
 the old monopoly of office-holders and members of Parliament 
 was made more odious by being made more conspicuous. As 
 competition and the other tests would head off favorite dunces 
 and rascals, the holders of patronage at once began to regard 
 their perquisites as of much less importance. It was therefore 
 a substantial triumph for the new system, which was very soon 
 put in practice. If members of Parliament still nominally sat 
 in authority at the gates of the public service, it was only to 
 make their selfishness more conspicuous, by showing them- 
 selves ready to contend for the shadow of a monopoly, after 
 its substance had been lost, to maintain the forms of usurpa- 
 tion, after the fruits had been wrested from their hands. 
 
 Before proceeding to the effects of the new system, it will 
 
 be useful to consider for a moment its theory and scope. The 
 
 aim of the practical statesmen who promoted it was to take 
 
 the whole body of the civil service of Great Britain out of 
 
 14
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 official favoritism and partisan control, and to raise official, life 
 to a higher plane. They knew there were many officers in 
 the service, for a long time trained under the old system, who 
 were opposed to the new, and who would not fail to disparage 
 and obstruct it. But they left every such case to be treated 
 upon its own merits, irrespective of the changes adopted. 
 No removals were made, by reason of the introduction of the 
 new system. The members of Lord Palmerston's cabinet and 
 the unofficial friends of reform foresaw that the change they 
 proposed would be only slowly brought about by the new 
 method they established. Their long experience had convinced 
 them that all expectations of suddenly changing the character 
 and tone of the sixty or more thousand persons who make 
 up the civil service of Great Britain a character and tone 
 which were the growth of generations are utterly chimerical. 
 They felt that even the attempt, to accomplish at one sweep 
 the full reform that was desired, would recoil upon them with 
 disastrous effect. Their reliance was upon the introduction 
 of superior elements into the service and almost wholly into 
 itsjowerjrrade from which promotions would be made on 
 the basis of merit ; and thus, in a few years, higher character 
 and a better spirit would permeate and in no long time would 
 control the entire service. Neither the ministry nor the Eng- 
 lish people fell into the error of regarding that reform as 
 trifling which, though not at once very much affecting the 
 higher offices, really controlled the doors of patronage and 
 favoritism, and determined who, a few years hence, would fill 
 nearly every high office except that of cabinet ministers. 
 They seem to have comprehended that the adoption, even in 
 a limited sphere, of a principle by which partisan tyranny was 
 condemned, was in itself no inconsiderable victory, which 
 would not fail to lead on to far greater triumphs in the same 
 direction. I have found nothing in the progress of this re- 
 form which has seemed to me a better evidence of a sound 
 public opinion on the subject than this popular judgment. 
 "Wise methods steadily and faithfully applied, which educate 
 public opinion at the same time that they close the fountains 
 of mischief, and not sweeping, revolutionary proceedings, 
 which assume that the moral tone of a nation's politics can be
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 207 
 
 changed by an assault or an exhortation, were, in the opinion 
 of the British public, the essential conditions of all adminis- 
 trative reform. 
 
 The evidence is decisive that the reform would have been 
 defeated had the original plan of going to Parliament in the 
 first instance been adhered to. For, after it had been strength- 
 ened by all the power of the administration, it failed of a 
 majority when first brought before that body. Members saw 
 that it was in principle fatal to patronage. The order in Coun- 
 cil of May, 1855, came before Parliament in July of that year, 
 and it was approved by only 125 votes to 140 which condemned 
 it. It will be notied that a very large majority of members did 
 not vote. How many of those who dodged the issue really 
 detested the mean work which patronage imposed upon them, 
 yet wanted the courage to vote, I have no means of knowing. 
 The administration neither informed Parliament beforehand 
 that it would surrender to an adverse vote, nor abandoned its 
 duty or its pledges when that vote was announced. The 
 struggle had been recognized as one in which the people, con- 
 tending for common rights and pure government, were on one 
 side, and selfish officials, endeavoring to maintain a corrupt 
 monopoly of patronage, and all the partisan manipulators were 
 on the other side. The ministers had set an example of sub- 
 mitting their patronage to the test of competition, and that ex- 
 ample members of Parliament had refused to follow. It was for 
 the people to decide between them. To the people therefore 
 the appeal was made, whether they would approve the selfish- 
 ness and the monopoly of their representatives or the patriot- 
 ism and disinterestedness of the administration.
 
 CHAPTEK XIX. 
 
 THE FIRST FIVE YEARS UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM. 
 
 The system gains strength. Subjects as to which examinations were made. 
 Many incompetent persons applied. Examinations extended to Ireland 
 and Scotland. Competition shown to be practicable and popular. Better 
 men secured than by pass examinations. The Commons, in 1856, change 
 their vote, and approve the commission and open competition. In 1857, 
 the House, by vote, calls for an extension of competition. It is steadily 
 extended from office to office. Examinations favorable to practical capac- 
 ity and to the public schools. In 1859, Parliament refuses the benefit of 
 the superannuation allowances to those not examined before the Civil Ser- 
 vice Commission. 
 
 THE members of the Civil Service Commission promptly 
 entered upon the discharge of their duties. The administra- 
 tion was faithful to the spirit of the order in Council, and ex- 
 hibited the self-denial and firmness which were essential to 
 success in the great work. The commissioners' first report 
 was made, March 4th, 1856, covering only a period of about 
 nine months. Though not expressly required by the order, a 
 great portion of the examinations were competitive from the 
 outset. The first examination was held in June, 1855. 
 Thirteen competitive examinations are mentioned in the first 
 report. This able document broadly circulated very much 
 strengthened that favoring public opinion which the frequent 
 discussions of the action of the commission in the public press 
 had tended to develop. The principal subjects of examination 
 were writing, arithmetic, geography, composition, history, 
 and book-keeping ; but some of the examinations included one 
 or more languages ; to which were added such practical sub- 
 jects as the clerk most needed to understand in entering a par- 
 ticular office. A just system of marking and grading was 
 adopted, according to which the relative standing of those ex- 
 amined, as between themselves, was so made up that both the
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 209 
 
 degree of excellence in each subject and the relative practical 
 importance of that subject, were embraced as factors. Those 
 who stood the highest in qualifications got the appointments. 
 It has struck me that the standard for admission was at first 
 fixed needlessly high, probably on some grounds of expediency 
 having reference to English opinion at that time ; and it is 
 very certain that it would exclude not a few of those who 
 enter our service. But it gave high capacity and character to 
 English official life ; and nothing is easier than to lower the 
 standard to any extent desirable. Indeed, it has been some- r~~ 
 what lowered in later years. In the outset the old aristocratic 
 element was powerful, and it could not be wholly disregarded. 
 The commission seems to have discharged its duties with 
 ability and firmness. The rules were extended to only a por- 
 tion of the offices at the beginning. But in the few months 
 covered by the first report, 1078 persons were examined, of 
 whom almost one third that is, 309 were regarded as not 
 competent. The 309 would seem to have been the class of 
 blockheads and incompetents of partisan henchmen and 
 superannuated butlers of which the report of 1853 had given 
 an account as swarming in the service. Of course, not a few 
 members of Parliament had such favorites thrown back upon 
 their hands and were angry. But the people were glad to see 
 them spurned from the public service, and praised the com- 
 mission. Great pressure was brought upon the board, by mem- 
 bers and high officers, to allow favorite dunces to pass, but in 
 vain. An important incident tested the character of the 
 board the first year. Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, 
 had the mortification of being informed that one of his own 
 nominees had failed in the examination. lie sent to the 
 board for the papers, which would show why his favorite had 
 been rejected ; and he was probably never more astonished than 
 when told they could not be sent from the office, but were 
 open to his inspection there, as they were to the inspection of 
 all other persons. He graciously yielded to his own system, 
 and allowed the papers to remain and his nominee to go about 
 other business. This event was a sort of proclamation that 
 personal fitness would avail more for getting into the public 
 service than all the power of a Prime Minister. This first
 
 210 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 report declared that the duties of the board were in their 
 nature judicial, and that a recognition of its independence 
 was essential to justice. And I may add that, from that 
 day to this, the Civil Service Commission, created in 1855, 
 has gone on in the discharge of its ever increasing duties, 
 with a justice that has hardly been challenged, and with a 
 good faith that has never been questioned. The order con- 
 templated that examinations should be extended from office 
 to office, and even beyond London, as experience and con- 
 venience might suggest. The first report shows examinations 
 held in Ireland and in Scotland ; and that Lord Clarendon, the 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had required that, both 
 his clerks and all persons entering the diplomatic service as 
 attaches or consuls, should be examined by the commission. 
 Perhaps the most striking illustration of the extent to which 
 these examinations, from the beginning, arrested incompe- 
 tency, is found in the fact that, at a single examination, held 
 in November, 1855, for clerkships in the Council for Educa- 
 tion, and confined to ' ' subjects deemed of indispensable neces- 
 sity" 21 of the 31 candidates examined were rejected as dis- 
 qualified. 
 
 If the people did not, in those first examinations, find all 
 their sons at liberty, without official endorsement, to compete 
 for a place in the public service, they did, for the first time, 
 see such of them as members and ministers might choose to 
 favor, compelled to submit to manly competitions between 
 themselves, in which those of the best character and the highest 
 capacity won the prizes. They did, from the first, see the na- 
 tion thus openly declare its preference for young men of merit 
 rather than for beggars for places and sycophants in politics ; 
 they did see education honored and its victory, in honorable 
 competition, send official favorites and fawners to the wall. 
 This was a great advance in the right direction ; and neither 
 the people nor the monopolists failed to see that the success of 
 this limited form of contest would inevitably bring in free, 
 open, competition at no distant day. 
 
 The first experience of competitive examinations dissipated 
 the old objections that it would be found impracticable to con- 
 duct them, and that they would fail to arrest bright rascals.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 211 
 
 In such, an open contest, it was found that the public and the 
 competitors alike took notice of the character and history as 
 well as of the capacity of those competing. Young men of 
 tarnished reputations dared not present themselves for a public 
 ordeal of that kind, in which every one engaged searched the 
 record of those who contended against him. 
 
 Even ridicule was soon turned against those who had laughed 
 and sneered at examinations. The ten who had won the 
 prizes, in the case last referred to, were cheered by the people 
 and praised by the press, while the twenty-one incompetents 
 were ridiculed, and with them the patronage system they rep- 
 resented ; for it thus appeared that the system would, but for 
 the examinations, have foisted two imbeciles upon the service 
 for each competent person it produced. It was declared that 
 if competition was made free to all, far better men would offer 
 themselves, who would be greatly superior to the favorites 
 recommended by members of Parliament. These favorites, 
 like some of our students recommended to West Point, were 
 not seldom found to be poor material for public officers ; and 
 their competition was compared to a Derby horse-race at which 
 none but "sprained and sickly colts, ringboned, old racers, 
 and heavy, wheezy coach-horses should be allowed to run." 
 The reformers had their time to laugh when highly-recom- 
 mended noodles walked out crestfallen from the examinations. 
 The effects upon the public mind of these examinations, and 
 of the discussions they called forth, were at once considerable. 
 It was seen that patronage and favoritism were the losers by 
 competition, and that what they lost was gained by good char- 
 acter and capacity. Still, pass examinations, by the commis- ! 
 sioners, were not wholly discontinued ; but they were far more 
 efficient than pass examinations by mere department boards. 
 Members of Parliament soon appreciated the change which had 
 thus come over public opinion, and comprehended that their old 
 monopoly was no longer defensible. On the 24th of April, 
 1856, Parliament resolved, by a vote of 108 to 87 (from which 
 it would appear that dodgers were still very numerous), that 
 " the House has observed, with great satisfaction, the zeal and 
 prudence with which the Commission has proceeded in apply- 
 ing a remedy to evils of a serious character, the previous ex-
 
 212 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 istence of which has now been placed beyond dispute 1 and 
 also the degree of progress that has been made, with the sanc- 
 tion of various departments of the State, toward the establish- 
 ment of a system of competition among the candidates for ad- 
 mission to the civil service, . . . and makes known to 
 her Majesty that, if she shall think fit further to extend them 
 and to make trial in the service of the method of open compe- 
 tition as a condition of entrance, this House will cheerfully 
 provide for any charges which the adoption of that system 
 may entail. ' ' 
 
 This certainly was a great victory for the new system ; and 
 it was won by the executive and the people. A right of nom- 
 ination had become of little value as a perquisite, the moment 
 that even limited competition was placed between the favorites 
 and the offices. Recommendation no longer gave an office, 
 but only a chance to compete for one. The great majority 
 that failed to vote, however, shows that not all the defeated 
 monopolists were willing to meet their fate in a patriotic and 
 manly spirit. Still, the British Parliament, as a whole, must 
 be given the credit of having promptly accepted the public 
 judgment, and of having tendered the executive its promise 
 to sustain a trial of open competition, which, if successful, 
 would take from each member from all officials of the empire 
 from party managers every particle of that coveted patron- 
 age which had belonged to them and their predecessors for a 
 hundred and fifty years. This is the highest elevation of self- 
 denial and patriotic statesmanship that legislative action on 
 the subject, in any country, has ever reached. And it can 
 never flatter our pride to compare this record with that of our 
 Congress, when, without a debate or a division, it refused to 
 vote a dollar to carry on a similar reform to which an American 
 Executive and a great party were equally committed. Thus, 
 within three years from the time the merit systein was pre- 
 
 1 The evidence which had " placed such evils beyond dispute " was the 
 exposure and rejection, on the examinations, of incompetent nominees which 
 before had been pushed into the service. The public had begun to take 
 notice of abuses which before had escaped censure, and members of Par- 
 liament could no longer deny an evil they had before considered it infidelity 
 to the party and scandalous to even suggest.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 213 
 
 sented, in an official report, which was, at first, received by 
 hostile parties and an indignant Parliament, it had won both 
 the people and the legislature. 
 
 I must pass rapidly over the next four years, in which the 
 reform rapidly gained strength ; so rapidly indeed that, in 
 1857, the House resolved, unanimously, " that the experience 
 gained since the issuing of the order in Council of May 21st, 
 1855, is in favor of the adoption of the principle of competi- 
 tion as a condition of entrance to the civil service, and that the 
 application of that principle ought to be extended, in conform- 
 ity with the resolution of the House agreed to on the 24th of 
 April, 1856." 
 
 The facts were that members of Parliament and officials gen- 
 erally experienced a great relief in being even partially pro- 
 tected from solicitation. Troublesome office-seekers could be 
 sent to competition, where the poorer sort were sure to be laid 
 out. When legislation and party action began to turn on 
 principle and not on patronage, official duty was found to be 
 as much less wearisome as it was more honorable. The 
 moment favoritism ceased to be powerful, it became contempt- 
 ible. Each year, to this time, the Civil Service Commission has 
 laid its methods and proceedings fully before the public in an 
 annual report. The second report showed that competition 
 had been steadily extended, and with results equally satisfac- 
 tory. The number of noodles and ignoramuses sent by mem- 
 bers for examination were less than the first year ; but some 
 appeared who declared Germany to be on the Caspian Sea, the 
 Isle of Wight to be a part of Scotland, who had never heard 
 anything about the Alps, Mount Sinai, Athens, the Red Sea, 
 or the St. Lawrence ; nor could some of them tell where tea, 
 tobacco, or cotton came from. Such examples of ignorance of 
 course more and more turned the laugh upon the opponents of 
 the new system. From the report of 1857, it appears that 509 
 persons had been examined as letter-carriers before 1850 ; a 
 method which Postmaster James of Xew York city lias lately 
 found greatly conducive to the rare efficiency of his administra- 
 tion. During the year, 34 competitive examinations were held. 
 Of all those examined over 38 per cent were rejected, and 1906 ^ 
 certificates of competency- were granted. The third report
 
 214: CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 shows that the Directors of the East India Company had applied 
 to the commission to examine the clerks for the home service 
 of that company, and I shall soon have occasion to show how 
 the system had been extended to its foreign service. The cor- 
 poration of London, in the same year, took measures in the 
 same direction. Examinations were about the same time insti- 
 tuted in Malta and were provided for in Canada. This report 
 shows that 5682 persons in all had been examined. The ratio 
 of rejections had fallen to about 28 per cent, apparently for 
 the reason that dunces had come to understand that it was of 
 no use to compete. The post office authorities, which had 
 always been most hostile to the new system, this year notified 
 their assent to competition. In this report, the general bearings 
 and results of the competitions, which had turned in part upon 
 literary attainments and in part upon practical capacity, are 
 fully discussed ; and it is shown that attainments and business 
 ability are so closely allied in young men, that on the basis of 
 76 competitions, it appears that out of 115 candidates the 
 result would have been different as to nine only, had the ex- 
 aminations been limited to subjects wholly practical. The 
 stimulating and salutary effects of these public competitions 
 of the spirit that brought them into existence speedily made 
 themselves felt in places beyond the public service, proper ; 
 and early produced striking results. For example, there is a 
 central society a sort of semi-official body known as the 
 Society of Arts, which has contributed largely to the improve- 
 ment of scientific and artistic education. As early as 1856, I 
 find this society conducting competitive 1 examinations, in "a 
 large number of institutions of different kinds, . . . people's 
 -colleges, evening schools, and all sorts of bodies." From its 
 centre in London, the examinations of the Society, in 1858, 
 had extended to 36 places, and in 1859 to 63 places, in Eng- 
 land, Ireland, and Scotland, everywhere superseding favorit- 
 ism and solicitation, and giving new vigor to that growth of 
 
 1 As illustrating the liberal spirit in which British noblemen have dealt 
 with patronage (to which I have already referred), I may mention that 
 Lord Granville declined the patronage of these appointments belonging to 
 his office, and gave them to competition "to make them available for the 
 purpose of encouraging education." Report of I860 on Civil Service Ap- 
 pointments, p. 286. May we hope that Republican officers will do as much ?
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 215 
 
 education of every kind which has been so remarkable in 
 Great Britain during the last twenty years. 1 
 
 The report for 1858 further illustrates the fact that the ex- 
 aminations gave results far more favorable to the common 
 people (to use an English phrase) and to the public schools than 
 to the aristocracy or to higher scholarship, and that the want 
 of practical knowledge, and not the want of mere book learn- 
 ing, determined the rejections ; though of course whatever 
 stimulated learning in its lower planes strengthened it in all its 
 higher grades. For example, certificates were granted to 958 
 of the persons nominated ; and in 292 cases they were re- 
 fused. Kow, of these 292 rejections, 286 were made by rea- 
 son of incapacity in such elementary subjects as arithmetic and 
 spelling, and only six for incompetency in higher attainments. 
 A careful inquiry into the education and the occupation of 
 the parents of 391 of those who passed by competition, showed 
 that but 12 were sons of lawyers, that but 27 were sons of gentle- 
 men, and that but 22 were sons of ministers of the Established 
 Church ; while 29 were sons of public officers, 1-i were sons of 
 private clerks, and 174 were sons of tradesmen, artificers, 
 farmers, and manufacturers. Of the 391, only eight were 
 college graduates, while 335 were educated in the different 
 grades of British schools. Here we have the predictions, made 
 by the friends of the new system, that it would promote 
 school education, fully verified. Such facts show us why this 
 reform has commended itself so much more to the great body 
 of the worthy English people, not high in the social scale, than 
 it has to the aristocracy, and why it has so greatly advanced 
 popular education. In 1859, the new system came again be- 
 fore Parliament, in connection with a revision of_the superan- 
 nuation acts ; and so firmly had it and the Civil Service Com- 
 mission been established in public favor, that it was enacted 
 (22 Victoria, ch. 26) that (with some slight exceptions) " no 
 person appointed after its date shall, for its purposes, be con- 
 sidered as serving in the permanent civil service of the State 
 unless admitted with a certificate from the Civil Service Com- 
 missioners ;" and, without being in that service, no one could 
 share in the superannuation allowances. 
 
 1 Report of 1860 on Civil Service Appointments, p. 283.
 
 CHAPTEE XX. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM IN 1860. 
 
 Able men on the committee. Lord Derby and John Bright among them. 
 Over 4500 questions answered. "Numbers in the British service. Heads of 
 departments. Causes of rejections stated. Appointments in the Postal 
 Service. Some officers hostile. Aims of the committee. Approve the 
 Civil Service Commission. Advise a steady advance towards open com- 
 petition. Pass examinations should be discontinued. Preliminary exam- 
 ination to weed out inferior persons nomiuated. 
 
 AT tliis date, the new system had been on trial only five 
 years. It should be borne in mind that the greater part of 
 those competitions had been limited that is, confined to per- 
 sons selected by members of Parliament and other officers. 
 Though Parliament had, as we have seen, expressed its readi- 
 ness to make appropriations for the trial of open competition, 
 the government had, with that caution which has marked the 
 whole progress of administrative reform, preferred to have 
 fuller evidence of the effects of what they had already done. 
 Some had complained that the standard of admission was too 
 high, some that it was too low. Conservatives had expressed 
 fears that the new system endangered the constitution ; and 
 partisans had got angry over the loss of patronage and spoils. 
 In 1860, therefore, a Parliamentary committee of fifteen was 
 appointed ' ' to inquire into the present mode of nominating 
 and examining candidates for junior appointments in the civil 
 service, with a view of ascertaining whether greater facility 
 may not be afforded for the admission of properly qualified 
 persons." 
 
 It is worth noticing, as an illustration of the high importance 
 which the English Parliament and nation have long attached 
 to the character of those who enter even its junior civil service, 
 that this inquiry was not treated as matter of clerical detail,
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 217 
 
 nor intrusted to inferior members, but was placed in charge of 
 some of the foremost statesmen of both parties ; and the 
 thorough investigation made is beyond comparison with any 
 similar inquiry ever conducted by our Congress. The six first 
 names on the committee are the following : 
 
 Sir Stafford Northcote (now Chancellor of the Exchequer). 
 
 John Bright, ) both . n Mr Gladstone s Cabinet. 1 
 
 Kobert Lowe, ) j 
 
 Monckton Mimes. 
 
 Lord Stanley (now Lord Derby). 
 
 Mr. Roebuck. 
 
 Lord Stanley was made chairman. The interest felt in the 
 subject is shown by the facts that he did not fail to preside at 
 a single one of the numerous meetings, and that, though five 
 was a quorum, there was not a meeting at which less than 
 eight were present. I call attention to such details, not as 
 being important in themselves, but to contrast them with the 
 neglect and indifference, with which, in this country, a subject 
 vital to its safety has generally been treated by legislators. It 
 would require far more space than I can give to do justice to 
 the elaborate report of this committee, presented in July, 
 1860. More than 4500 comprehensive questions are answered. 
 There are exhaustive explanations in the appendix on special 
 points. Those in every grade of the service, from heads of 
 departments to. messengers and copyists, were fully examined. 
 
 The action of Parliament that led to the inquiry, as well as 
 the opening proceedings of the committee, showed that there 
 was no thought of taking any back steps, but only of per- 
 fecting and extending the new system, and of removing col- 
 lateral abuses that interfered with its good effects. The com- 
 mittee give the whole number officially employed in the civil 
 service of Great Britain in 1860 (not however including 
 those serving in the colonies or in India, as I understand 
 
 it), as 58,504 
 
 To those are to be added artisans and laborers 29,613 
 
 Persons not wholly employed, women, etc 14,941 
 
 In all 103,058 ' 
 
 1 I think this includes none of the postmasters, but there is an indefinite- 
 ness of language on the subject. Report, 1860, p. viii., and 247 and 062.
 
 218 CIVIL SEE VICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 There were, of those designated as heads of departments, in 
 all 190. Of these 190 only from thirty -four to fifty are classed 
 as " political " that is, as being the officers (exclusive of 
 some of the foreign ministers) who go out and come in with 
 an administration. Beyond those, a change of administration 
 in England does not change its civil service. 1 
 
 The committee say that, since the creation of the Civil Ser- 
 vice Commission, and, before the end of 1859, there had been 
 10,860 nominations to which the order of 1854 applied ; of which 
 2479 had been rejected ; and that "it is worthy of notice 
 that of these latter all except 106 were rejected as deficient in 
 arithmetic or spelling, a fact which your committee thinks 
 ought to be borne in mind when complaints are made of the 
 needlessly high educational requirements imposed on candi- 
 dates for the civil service. . . . The examiners emphatic- 
 ally deny that candidates have ever been rejected, as is fre- 
 quently rumored, for failing to answer questions of a recondite 
 or difficult character. ... It does not appear that an ex- 
 amination paper has ever come unfairly into the hands of a 
 candidate or his tutor. . . . " 
 
 It would seem from this report that about 500 new admis- 
 sions are anually made into the 58,504 which make up the reg- 
 ular official civil service ; but these 500 vacancies are exclusive 
 of those in the post office service. That department remained 
 longer under political influence than any other. Yet even 
 its average yearly appointments, for five years previous to 
 1859, was 111 clerks, 14 mail guards, and 535 sorters, letter 
 carriers, and laborers. But in regard to the lower grade of 
 postmasters, it would seem that there was still a considerable 
 response to political influence in making appointments, but there 
 were no removals without cause. The average appointments for 
 
 Report, 1860, pp. 047 and 362. 
 It may be stated as explaining the large number of 190 heads of de- 
 partments, that several offices are called departments, that would not be so 
 called with us. The inland and customs revenue, for example, is each 
 under a separate department, each being in charge of several commissioners 
 or heads, all in a limited way subordinate to the Treasury. So there are 
 several Lords or Heads of the Admiralty and of the Treasury. But of these 
 heads, I repeat, only about 34 to 50 are political, or go out with a change of 
 administration.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 219 
 
 five years of postmasters, sub-postmasters, and letter receivers 
 had been 1264 annually. 
 
 The report brings out, in a striking way, the well-known 
 fact that heads of bureaus and officers who have served under 
 the patronage-favorite system are generally opposed to selec- 
 tion or promotion according to merit. They are also opposed 
 to competition, for it not only takes away their arbitrary 
 authority, but it may bring in or promote men brighter than 
 themselves. Such officers had generally deprecated if not 
 openly opposed reform ; but the report shows that a majority of 
 them had outgrown their prejudices. By some of these officers, 
 opposition was unquestionably made for disinterested reasons. j 
 Mr. Helps and Mr. Trollope were distinguished for their hos- 
 tility to the new system, and they stand almost alone among 
 men of distinction who have conscientiously opposed it. The 
 opposition of Mr. Trollope was so conspicuous that it is re- 
 ferred to in the report ; and, as his peculiar views have been 
 frequently quoted in this country, I give a question and answer 
 from his examination before the committe, which will show 
 the evil the new system was in his view bringing upon the 
 country : 
 
 " Are you of the opinion that there is a serious evil to be appre- 
 hended in getting men who are, too good for their situation ? I think 
 so." 1 
 
 1 Mr. Trollope's view seems to have been that it was possible to get men 
 who were above their business, an evil perhaps ; but he did not say that this 
 would be an effect of the new system, if found to exist at all, which could 
 be easily prevented by lowering the examination. His fears, however, 
 have not been realized. The views of Mr. Arthur Helps have also been 
 often quoted in this country. Mr. Helps was the secretary of the 
 Queen's privy council (one of the most aristocratic of the institutions 
 that survive from early times), and Mr. Helps and such members of 
 Parliament as Mr. Neate the representative, of State Church doctrines 
 and aristocratic philosophy, for the University of Oxford condemn, 
 competitive examinations " as bringing a lower class of society into the 
 civil service." Mr. Helps, in his " Thoughts on Government," page 6, 
 says, " I rather partake of the opinion of George III. (not altogether an 
 unprejudiced observer) that the British Constitution is the best that has 
 yet been devised by man." At page 82, we are told, " The conferring of 
 honors is a most important function of government ;" and at page 84 we
 
 220 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Having disposed of the objections, the report, in the lan- 
 guage next quoted, states the ends sought by the wide range of 
 the investigation the committee had made : 
 
 1. "To provide, by a proper system of examination, for 
 the supply of the public service with a thoroughly efficient 
 class of men." 
 
 2. "To encourage industry and foster merit by teaching all 
 public servants to look forward to promotion according to their 
 deserts, and to expect the highest prizes in the service if they 
 can qualify themselves for them." 
 
 3. " To mitigate the evils which result from the fragmen- 
 tary character of the service, and to introduce into it some 
 elements of unity, by placing the first appointments upon a 
 uniform footing, opening the way. to the promotion of public 
 officers to staff appointments in other departments than their 
 own, and introducing into the lower ranks a body of men (the 
 supplementary clerks) whose services may be made available 
 at any time in any office whatever. ' ' 
 
 Such was the undertaking which, in 1860, the eminent, 
 practical statesmen of both the great parties seemed to have 
 thought to be more worthy of their attention than the manip- 
 ulation of elections or the parcelling of patronage plain as it 
 is that only about a generation had passed since their prede- 
 cessors were accustomed to give to these latter subjects the 
 paramount importance with which we are so painfully familiar. 
 And, I cannot forbear the remark that, so far as I recol- 
 lect, such subjects have not yet commanded the attention of 
 our leading statesmen, and that until they do there is great 
 reason to fear that the abuses of our civil administration will 
 continue to be a subject of grave solicitude. I must pass 
 over all the evidence relating to salaries, promotions, hours 
 
 are informed that the wisdom of a maxim of Napoleon, that " Religion 
 and honors were the two things by which mankind may be governed," 
 is so clear that it " will not be disputed by those who have had converse 
 with their fellow-men." The value placed upon the eccentric judgment of 
 this worthy and accomplished atfthor may be inferred from the fact that the 
 statesmen of the Privy Council, of which he was secretary, introduced 
 competition for the selection of its clerks, in 1837, and that this method is 
 still enforced in that office.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 221 
 
 of service, classification, grading, discipline, superannuation, 
 seniority, removals_ior_cause, health, proper age for entering 
 and leaving the service ; not because they are not full of in- 
 terest and instruction, but because we shall never deal wisely 
 with such matters, if even attention can be gained for them, 
 until we have applied some salutary first principles to our ser- 
 vice. In the present state of public opinion, they would only 
 encumber the higher interests of the subject. I will therefore 
 close my references to the report, with the leading conclusions 
 of the committee. 
 
 1. Though the pass examinations, conducted by the Civil 
 Service Commission, are far more effective than pass examina- 
 tions, as before conducted in separate offices, they are yet 
 greatly inferior to limited competition. 
 
 2. Limited competition would be much improved if more 
 persons competed, and more should therefore be nominated 
 for each competition. If they are to continue, there must also 
 be preliminary examinations of those nominated by members 
 to compete, so that there shall not, in the future, be compe- 
 titions between mere dunces, blockheads, and ignoramuses. 
 
 3. The committee (whose report is unanimous) are convinced 
 that open competition free alike to every British subject, 
 and an end, utterly, of the monopoly of patronage, now re- 
 duced to mere selections for examination are what the public 
 interest and the better public opinion demand, and that these 
 results must very soon be reached. In not advising open com- 
 petition at once, as the only entrance to the public service, they 
 are influenced by prudential reasons. They fear a recoil of 
 public opinion, if too great changes are made hastily. In the 
 interest of open competition itself, they advise a cautious ad- 
 vance towards its complete introduction. 
 
 4. While such further experience is being acquired, the 
 committee recommend that pass examinations be wholly su- 
 perseded, that no place in the public service be filled save 
 through a competition of five or at least three nominated per- 
 sons, except that open competitions, wherever it be practicable, 
 should be introduced after the plan of those which had lately 
 been shown to be satisfactory in the East Indian service. The 
 
 15
 
 222 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 salutary system of probation, according to which no one was 
 to be appointed until after a trial of six months, was, I hardly 
 need say, retained. Such were the conclusions reached in 
 1860. If it was a bold experiment to introduce the new sys- 
 tem, it was certainly applied with prudence and watched with 
 care.
 
 CHAPTEE XXI. 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW SYSTEM FROM 1860 TO 1870. 
 
 Government acts on report of 1860. Examinations to weed out those unfit to 
 compete. Competition extended to various offices. Two out of five nom- 
 inated shown to be unfit even to compete. Competition for the service of 
 India. Those educated in the public schools win in competition. Have 
 been 66,519 persons examined. The new system becomes rapidly popular 
 with the people. Every one claimed to have an equal right to compete. 
 The official monopoly of nomination must be broken up. 
 
 IF the Parliamentary report of 1860 did not advance the 
 merit system so rapidly as its more radical friends desired, it 
 seems to have convinced its enemies that there was small 
 chance of arresting it. It had taken a strong hold of the pub- 
 lic mind. Its opponents were shown to be, with few excep- 
 tions, officers, partisans, and aristocrats, with the addition of a 
 few excellent persons with peculiar views. Lord Palmerston's 
 administration approved the report of the committee of 1860, 
 and ordered its recommendations to be carried into effect. I 
 must pass rapidly over the period of ten years of steady growth 
 in the reform sentiment of waning patronage and victorious 
 competition which brought in the great changes of 18 TO ; - 
 making only slightest references to the annual reports of the 
 Civil Service Commission, by which the public mind was 
 being educated. 
 
 The report of 1861 shows that The Treasury, the great 
 centre of patronage, promptly acted upon the suggestion of 
 the Parliamentary committee of 1860 viz., that those nom- 
 inated for competition should first undergo a preliminary test 
 examination, in order to avoid the scandal of a competition 
 between inferior persons alone. The need of such precaution 
 was expressly shown by the facts that, during 1860, there were 
 66 nominated candidates examined for the admiralty service,
 
 224 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 out of which only 24 were competent, and that on a compe- 
 tition for clerks in the customs service, at Hull, not a compe- 
 tent person was found among the nominated champions sent 
 there to compete. 
 
 The report says that " the desire is natural to provide for 
 faithful and long tried servants, which has often led to the ap- 
 pointment of persons advanced in life" in plainer phrase, it is 
 natural for members of Parliament and other officers having 
 the right of nomination to make the public service a hospital 
 for the superannuated. Such facts more and more aroused 
 the -people to a sense of the imposition which members of 
 Parliament and other high officials had long practiced upon 
 the public service, under the pretense of selecting good officers 
 from among their acquaintances. This same report shows 
 that, hostile as the post-office department had been to the new 
 system, even Mr. Trollope was ready for a competition for 
 letter-carriers, based mainly on physical qualifications, which 
 was also favored by the Postmaster- General, the Duke of 
 Argyle. Competition is also shown to have been applied with 
 success to apprentices in the dockyards and for the position of 
 naval engineers, and also to the selection of young men to be 
 sent to China and Japan to master the languages of those 
 countries. The report for 1862 shows that competitions for 
 engineer, dockyard and admiralty factory boys were successful, 
 and that open competition was being extended elsewhere. 
 The report for 1865 shows that of 364 persons nominated 
 for competition, and subjected to a preliminary examination 
 before being allowed to compete, 160, or in a ratio greater 
 than two out of every five, were rejected as unworthy even to 
 compete. ~No one can fail to see how natural it is that a sys- 
 tem which arrests so many incompetent, official favorites should 
 have bitter enemies, especially in official circles. This report 
 also explains the successful progress of competition for the 
 civil service of India, to which I shall soon call attention, 
 showing that the natives of that country were winning official 
 places in the contests. 
 
 It is shown, by the report for 1866, that 196 out of 411, and 
 in 1867 that 244 out of 540, officially nominated for compe- 
 tition, were thrown out by the preliminary examination, as too
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 225 
 
 stupid or ignorant to have a chance on a competitive trial, to 
 say nothing of those who were superannuated. Those thus 
 rejected doubtless corresponded to the troublesome fellows 
 Whom our members of Congress are said to sometimes send 
 with an approving letter to a secretary, which letter is met by 
 another declaring them to be blockheads or nuisances. There 
 had, however, been some improvement in the class nominated ; 
 for, in 1859, out of 1107 nominated to fill 258 situations, only 
 397 were found qualified, and 710 were utterly rejected as 
 incompetents. ' It is also shown that of the whole number of 
 marks gained in competition, in 1866, "eighty-two per cent 
 were due to subjects included in the ordinary curriculum 
 (studies) of a public school y" and as further showing in what 
 small ratio merely literary (or not directly practical) knowl- 
 edge excludes those rejected, I may add that the report for 
 1867 shows that of 818 rejections in that year (from the 3038 
 examined) 805 were made by reason of deficiency in knowl- 
 edge of " subjects connected with the practical work of the 
 oflice," or of ignorance in the matters of " reading, spelling, 
 arithmetic, and handwriting," and that only 13 were rejected 
 by reason of a want of higher knowledge ! 
 
 From the report for 1868, it appears that the whole number 
 nominated for examination under the commission, during the 
 thirteen years of its existence, had been (unless a few may 
 have been twice nominated) 59,658. Some of them seem 
 not to have had the courage to appear, for only 46,528 had 
 been actually examined. Of these 9461 had been rejected ; of 
 whom 480 were rejected for being physically disqualified, and 
 616 by reason of unsatisfactory character.* 
 
 This report also shows that competition had been extended 
 to the public service at Ceylon and Mauritius, to the Irish 
 constabulary force, to dockyard artificers, and to the public 
 inspectors of schools throughout Great Britain. 
 
 The report for 1869 shows that the whole number of candi- 
 dates for examinations whose names appeared on the books in 
 
 1 Report on Civil Service, 1860. 
 
 2 But (as I understand) the two last classes of rejections are independ- 
 ent of those who were rejected for the same causes for want of proper cer- 
 tificates before any examination took place.
 
 226 CIVIL SERVICE IX GKEAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the office of the commission that office having become the 
 great centre of information relating to official life had reached 
 66,519. In addition to those who had failed to appear, 10,558 
 had been rejected as disqualified for various causes ; and, in- 
 cluded in this number, were 2283 who had been preliminarily 
 rejected, as not even fit to be allowed to go into competi- 
 tions. These figures mark the extent of the prostitution of 
 Parliamentary nominations. If by reason of so numerous re- 
 jections, many enemies of the new system were made among 
 officials, party leaders and their dependents, yet, on the 
 other hand, its keeping of incompetency out of the public ser- 
 vice, and the honor it conferred on education and good char- 
 acter, had gained for it fiftyfold more friends among the 
 people at large. The report for 1869 shows that during the 
 fourteen years of examinations under the Commission, 8169 
 persons had been rejected as deficient in mental ability and 
 literary attainments. How few of these failures were due to 
 anything but stupidity or disgraceful ignorance may be inferred 
 from this extract : "If the subjects of examination be divided 
 into two classes, one including reading, spelling, handwriting, 
 arithmetic, and (in the case of each department),, the subjects 
 connected with the practical work of that office ; the other 
 comprising those which are prescribed as tests of general in- 
 telligence and cultivation ; the number of rejections caused 
 by failures in the latter class of subjects has been only 271, as 
 against T899 cases of failure in the former class." In face of 
 such facts, it was, of course, impossible longer to pretend that 
 ornamental attainments won the day or that essential and prac- 
 tical knowledge were not decisive. The old Parliamentary 
 monopoly of nominations had become not only untenable, but 
 ridiculous. The change in public opinion, since 1850, had 
 been as great as that which had taken place, in this country on 
 the slave question, between 1840 and 1860. The popular sup- 
 port of the merit system had become so overwhelming indeed 
 so nearly universal that opposition by any one cast something 
 like suspicion upon his motives. The thought even of mak- 
 ing it a party or Parliamentary issue had ceased to exist. The 
 cause of civil service reform had become identified with that 
 of common justice, popular education, and official integrity ;
 
 CIVIL SERVICE 1ST GREAT BRITAIN. 227 
 
 all of which it had greatly strengthened. The people of Eng- 
 land had finally decided that it was a public disgrace and a 
 gross injustice to allow a monopoly of selections for appoint- 
 ment in the public service, on the part of members of Parlia- 
 ment or any other officials, to longer continue. They de- 
 manded, as the right of every citizen, that he should be at 
 liberty, without any official interference or consent, to present 
 himself, in conformity to just regulations, for examination by 
 the Civil Service Commission, for a place in the public ser- 
 vice. " I think that all persons have, primd facie, an equal 
 right to be candidates, if they are fit ; and if you do not con- 
 cede that right and make it accessible, you do injustice, first, 
 to the public service, and then to her Majesty's subjects gen- 
 erally who are excluded.'' ' Here is a principle of democratic 
 equality and common justice maintained in a monarchy, but 
 yet unrecognized in this republic. We shall next see how this 
 principle was reduced to practice in 1870. 
 
 J Report on Civil Service, 1860, p. 286.
 
 CHAPTEK XXII. 
 
 THE OEDEE FOE OPEN COMPETITION IN 1870. 
 
 Right of nomination lost its value. Officers not willing to defend their mo- 
 nopoly of nominations. Order for open competition. Its provisions. 
 Probation retained. Exceptions to open competition. Nature of the op- 
 position made. General principle of the new method provided for. 
 
 THE demand for the suppression of the official monopoly of 
 patronage had become too strong for the administration to 
 withstand, had it been so disposed. Even the more partisan 
 members of Parliament had ceased to care much for a right to 
 nominate ; because the inevitable result had been that a great 
 portion of those whom they most wished should secure places 
 were thrown out in disgrace by the preliminary examination, 
 and not a few of the residue had been distanced in the com- 
 petition. To enable their proteges to succeed, they must 
 nominate the most worthy young men, but that necessity de- 
 prived their perquisite of most of its value in their eyes ; since 
 it would neither aid an election nor make a place for an old 
 servant. None but the most brazen-faced and unscrupulous 
 were willing to appear longer as sponsors of the prostitution 
 of the executive power they had usurped, now that the people 
 comprehended that it was prized by its possessors in the exact 
 ratio that it was costly and demoralizing to the public service. 
 A monopoly which had prevailed for more than a hundred and 
 fifty years was almost without a claimant or a defender. 
 
 On the 4th of July, 1870, the administration, through an 
 executive order in Council, and without any action by Parlia- 
 ment, gave effect to the wishes of the people by abolishing 
 official patronage and favoritism (and limited competition as 
 an incident), and substituting open competition in their place. 1 
 
 1 " Our object was to introduce competition. I think that everything we 
 did, so far as I know, was rigidly subordinated to that. " Testimony of the 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Report of Committee, 1873, p. 226.
 
 CIVIL SEKVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 229 
 
 The order declares " that the qualifications of all such per- 
 sons as may be proposed to be appointed, either permanently 
 or temporarily, to any station or employment, in any de- 
 partment in the civil service, shall, before they are employed, 
 be tested by or under the directions of said Commissioners ; 
 and no person shall be employed in any department of the 
 civil service until he shall have been reported by the said Com- 
 missioners to be qualified to be admitted on probation to such 
 situation or employment. ' ' 
 
 " All appointments which it maybe necessary to make after 
 the 31st of August next (1870), . . . shall be ^made by 
 reasons of competitive examinations according to regulations, 
 . . . open to all persons (of requisite age, health, char- 
 acter, and other qualifications prescribed in the said regula- 
 tions), who may be desirous of attending the same." 1 
 
 These provisions do not extend to mere day laborers or to 
 wholly unskilled labor, but they do extend to skilled laborers in 
 continuous public employment. And there are exceptions of 
 three classes of official persons (very few in all), whom I shall 
 more particularly describe. The order then provides that the 
 Civil Service Commissioners, the Commissioners of the Treas- 
 ury, and the chiefs of the departments shall frame proper 
 rules or regulations for putting open competition into prac- 
 tice. The regulations or rules provided methods of ascertain- 
 ing the age, character, and physical health as well as the 41 
 attainments and practical capacity for the public business of 
 those who offer themselves for competition. The appoint- 
 ments were to be given to those shown by the competition to 
 have the highest qualifications for the service ; and it will be 
 noticed that it is not mere ornamental or literary attainments 
 which are to be made the subject of the examinations, ' ' but 
 knowledge and ability to enter on the discharge of his official 
 duties." And to secure a still higher guaranty of practical, 
 executive capacity, the long-tried rule of probation was re- 
 tained and made more stringent. No actual appointment was 
 to be made except at the end of a six-months' trial of official 
 
 1 Subject to the payment of small fees which were intended to cover the 
 expenses of the examinations, but they have been made so light as to pay 
 only about one third of such expense.
 
 230 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 
 work, during which time ' ' a formal record of the particulars 
 of the result of such probation ' ' (of course covering deport- 
 ment as well as capacity) was to be kept, " and the chief of 
 the department " (as used here nearly the equivalent of a chief 
 of bureau with us) must sign and declare satisfactory this 
 record, and send it to the Civil Service Commission for pres- 
 ervation. 
 
 So far from such provisions being an inadequate test of 
 practical capacity, as some mistaken people have supposed, 
 they have been found to be highly effective. They have been 
 objected to as being much too severe, since young men might 
 lose their places by reason of an unsatisfactory probation. 
 The answer was that applicants, or their friends, must, at 
 their own peril, form a correct judgment of their ability for 
 practical work. ' 
 
 Before considering the practical effects of the great changes 
 which this order introduced, we may well reflect a moment 
 
 1 A few words of explanation may make the exceptions to competition 
 more intelligible. There are three classes of them. The first embraces the 
 34 to 50 political officers who go out with an administration, and to which I 
 have before made reference. 
 
 There are some provisions as to the second class in this order of 1870 ; 
 and the clauses of the Superannuation act before referred to are to nearly 
 the same effect. The two provisions together cover cases (always very few 
 in number) where persons of maturer years may be needed in the public ser- 
 vice, who shall possess professional or peculiar attainments of a high order 
 not acquired in the usual course of public instruction or of experience in 
 the service. In such cases, the Lords of the Treasury, together with the 
 head of department where such an appointment is needed, may make a 
 selection, and thereupon there is to be a special examination and certificate 
 of qualification by the Civil Service Commissioners, upon which, the same 
 being satisfactory, the appointment may be made, but not before. 
 
 The third class of exceptions from open competition covers promotions. 
 They are, in the main, based on merit, either tested by limited competition 
 among those within the departments, or otherwise tested, as I shall have 
 ^ occasion to explain. In some offices meritorious seniority is given weight. 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that the entire exceptions to open competition, 
 as the rule for admissions under the order of 1870, can hardly exceed one 
 per cent of the whole number in the public service. The lower grades of 
 post-offices, however, are not included in that order. 
 
 But in order to guard against any unforeseen embarrassments from a 
 ^change so sweeping, provision was made for taking particular officers out 
 of competition as public exigency might require.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 231 
 
 upon its nature and the convictions which enforced its adop- 
 tion. "We should take notice that the order not merely arrested 
 all interference by the members of the legislature with ex- 
 ecutive appointments, but it also involved, and in substance 
 proclaimed, a surender, by the members of the Cabinet and 
 by every other high officer (with the small exceptions just 
 pointed out), of all opportunity to make any selfish or partisan 
 use of the appointing power. Recognizing the inherent duty 
 of always using that power so as to secure the persons best 
 qualified to serve the people, the order declared that the open 
 competition provided for was the most reliable means of ascer- 
 taining such persons ; and that, upon their being ascertained, 
 the duty of appointment was imperative. The usurped au- 
 thority thus reclaimed from the members of the legislature 
 was not an increase of executive power in any arbitrary sense, 
 or even in any sense whatever ; for the freedom of open com- 
 petition was at the same time extended to the whole body of 
 the British people ; and hence it was not the Executive, but 
 the people themselves common justice, general liberty, per- 
 sonal character and capacity which had really won the victory 
 and made the gain. If the executive had, in one sense, a 
 larger discretion than before, it was only a discretion to dis- 
 charge a public duty, by recognizing and rewarding merit, as 
 tested by fair public standards which all right-minded men 
 approved. It was no discretion to grant favors or to encroach 
 on liberty. The order was, in short, a grand triumph of pa- 
 triotism, character, education, and capacity over selfishness, 
 official favoritism, partisan intrigue, and whatever else had 
 been corrupt, immoral, or unjust in the action of parties or the 
 bestowal of office. It marked the highest elevation of justice 
 and official self-denial that governmental action, in any coun- 
 try, had ever reached ; for though examinations and com- 
 petitions had been used in a qualified form in France, Ger- . 
 many, Sweden, and several other European countries, they 
 were not wholly without official dictation nor were they free 
 to all citizens alike. Open competition, thus established in 
 Great Britain, said, in substance, to every British subject : 
 The administration confers no favors by appointments, the 
 great parties aro not allowed to coerce you, the high officers
 
 232 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 are forbidden to use the appointing power capriciously ; and, 
 subject to the just regulations prescribed, each of you is at 
 liberty to compete for, and, if you are the most worthy, you 
 will win a place in the public service of your country, there to 
 remain as long as you serve her honorably and efficiently and 
 her interests require you. The able and experienced statesmen 
 who, after the partisan system had been tried for more than 
 five generations, thus brought in the merit system in its com- 
 pletest form, with no protest from either party, must, I 
 think, be regarded as condemning, more emphatically by 
 their action than they could by any language, the entire 
 theory of securing power for parties, stability for adminis- 
 trations, or economy, purity, or safety for nations, by a 
 partisan use of the appointing power. They did not con- 
 demn party government in its true form, or when acting 
 by just methods ; but only its prostitution to the purposes 
 of a partisan system of appointments. Thus, the British peo- 
 ple with whom party government originated, and by whom 
 it has been given the most absolute sway have, after a long 
 and earnest discussion of the subject such as has taken place 
 in no other nation demanded and applauded that great change 
 and, by their acts, have expressed their profound convic- 
 tion that all that is salutary in political parties will survive 
 the loss of all that is corrupt or venal, and their determination 
 that, thereafter, those in power shall seek support, not through 
 intrigue and manipulation, or through influence secured by 
 the prostitution of the appointing power, but upon their 
 record of good administration. In approving this order, they 
 practically said to the Crown, to the administration, and to 
 the great parties : Hereafter, as before, the party majorities 
 may carry all elections, name all members of the Cabinet, make 
 all laws, and guide all national action, whether domestic or 
 foreign. In those high spheres, the principles of parties, 
 the worth and ability of their leaders, the wisdom of their 
 policy must gain public favor or fail in the attempt. With 
 such prizes to win, elections can never lose their wholesome 
 interest, nor citizens be indifferent to their results. The ex- 
 aminations will cause the most worthy to be selected as sub- 
 ordinates to carry into effect the instruction of their superiors.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 233 
 
 But we neither wish, nor will we allow, any action by parties, 
 or anything to be done by postmasters, collectors, or other sub- 
 ordinate officers, or any processes of electing members of Par- 
 liament, which depend upon making merchandise of the ap- 
 pointing power or upon treating public places as perquisites or 
 spoils. After the partisan system in its long trial under its 
 favorite forms had failed, we allowed party managers and pub- 
 lic officials to decide, during the period from 1855 to 1870, 
 who ' should be examined for admission to the public service. 
 The records show that inferior and unworthy persons were gen- 
 erally nominated. Members of Parliament did not nominate 
 the most worthy among their acquaintances, but they used 
 their monopoly in a selfish and partisan spirit. We now there- 
 fore suppress the monopoly. We order the trial whether 
 parties cannot make their issues upon sound principles and 
 good works ; whether better men will not apply for admis- 
 sion to the public service, now that official and partisan tyranny 
 has been dislodged at its gates ; whether the moral tone of 
 politics will not rise, now that patronage and favoritism have 
 been expelled from the departments.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 FIRST EXPERIENCE OF OPEN COMPETITION. ' 
 
 Competitions extended to the military schools. Competition in India. An 
 aristocratic division into classes. Numbers competing. Extended to vari- 
 ous offices, civil, military, and naval. Better men secured by open com- 
 petition. Obstructions by officers. 
 
 THE report of the Civil Service Commission for 1S70 shows 
 that the whole number of those who had been before the com- 
 mission during the period of limited competition had been 
 71,971 ; a number considerably greater than the whole body 
 of those in the British Civil Service, who are properly des- 
 ignated as officers or clerks. ' It also shows that examinations 
 for admissions to the Military College at Sandhurst, for the 
 Military Academy at Woolwich, and for direct commissions in 
 the army, were thereafter to be conducted under the Civil Ser- 
 vice Commission ; and that one open competition had just been 
 held for such admission. It is an interesting fact that, though 
 we instituted examinations for admissions to our naval and 
 military schools before such examinations were introduced 
 in England, the English Government, encouraged by the suc- 
 cess of their tests of merit for civil appointment, has rapidly 
 made her selection of cadets for the army and navy far more 
 independent than ours, both of official favoritism and of parti- 
 san dictation. I need not enter into the details concerning the 
 new rules, the general principles of which I have already ex- 
 plained. I may say, however, that they not only provide for 
 examinations in elementary subjects (essential for all or nearly 
 all candidates to understand), but for examinations extending to 
 that special information and skill necessary in particular officers 
 or kinds of service ; or, in other words, they range, in their prac- 
 
 1 Exclusive of postmasters.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tical bearing, from reading, writing, and the elementary j 
 arithmetic, to knowledge of materials and skill and attai 
 adequate for applying the patent, customs, and inland revenue 
 laws, so that fraud may be detected and the money due to the 
 government may be more efficiently collected. I might quote 
 pages, if it was worth while, in answer to the popular and 
 superficial criticism so often made, to the effect that exami- 
 nations and probation cannot test the attainments or capacity 
 needed for the real work of the offices. But if the fact that 
 the most practical nation in the world the nation having the 
 most complex and difficult civil administration that has ever 
 existed has, as the result of varied and long continued trial, 
 demonstrated to its satisfaction that such theoretical criticism 
 is unfounded, shall not be regarded as decisive, surely a more 
 extended discussion of the subject would be useless. 
 
 In the report for 1872, the first results of open competition 
 on a grand scale are set forth at length. 1 So democratic or 
 republican an innovation as that of opening the whole civil 
 service to the free competition of all classes, very naturally, 
 not a little alarmed the more aristocratic officials ; and they 
 were strong enough in 18 TO to enforce a division of the new 
 clerks into two classes, known as Class I. and Class II., the 
 attainments and work of the former to be of a higher order. 
 If this division was not in the liberal spirit of the order of 
 1870, it was quite in the spirit of the division of the legal 
 profession into barristers and attorneys, and of the legislature 
 into Lords and Commons. We shall find that this aristocratic 
 distinction has been disapproved and substantially abolished by 
 that same just and liberal sentiment which demanded open 
 competition, though not before it had produced both jeal- 
 ousies and expensive complications. The belief was so gen- 
 eral that open competition would introduce a better class of 
 
 1 This report, very inexpressive in form, with the examination papers 
 and correspondence appended (covering both the domestic and Indian 
 service), fills more than 800 large pages ; and the annual reports that follow 
 are not much less voluminous ; the whole action of the Civil Service Com- 
 mission being set forth at length, in order to give the utmost publicity to 
 proceedings peculiarly liable to be prejudiced by charges of unfairness, if 
 any part of them should be involved in mystery or confusion.
 
 236 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 public servants, and thereby enable a reduction to be made 
 of the number, and hence of expense in the service, that 
 preparation for that result was made in the outset ; and it 
 was fully realized. The report for 1872 shows that since 
 open competition, under the order of 1870, had commenced, 
 2684 persons had competed for 355 places (exclusive of 
 those in the Post Office Department), and those 355 places 
 had been assigned to the most meritorious. Besides these 
 competitions, there was open competition for selecting boys 
 to fill the junior clerkships in the Post Office Department, for 
 newspaper sorters and for telegraph messengers ; 1095 such 
 situations having been filled between July, 1870, and June, 
 1872, by the most worthy as indicated by competition between 
 10,065 persons. Postmaster James, of the .New York City 
 Post Office, now keeps his "sorters" up to their rare con- 
 dition of efficiency by the same kind of examinations. Nor 
 do these include all ; for there were also the competitors for 
 the admiralty and military service, and for the Irish con- 
 stabulary, raising the total candidates to 14,123. And even 
 this immense number is exclusive of the examinations for the 
 entire public service of British India. In these competitions, 
 we have the means of making the first practical comparison, 
 on a large scale, between those who presented themselves for 
 examination, directly and freely from the people, and those 
 who had been sent in by the nomination-monopolists ; and the 
 language of the report on this vital point is as follows : " But 
 it is more important to observe that the standard of pro- 
 ficiency exhibited by the successful competitors, and even by 
 many of the unsuccessful, has been very satisfactory, and far 
 in advance of that which we found it possible to enforce under 
 the previous system of nomination. Nor can we refrain from 
 expressing a confident hope that, while an important branch 
 of the service will thus gain by the appointment of officers of 
 superior intelligence, a further and wider benefit will result to 
 the public generally from the stimulus which these large com- 
 petitions for valuable privileges must impart to elementary 
 education in each of the numerous districts in which they are 
 held." They were held from time to time in various parts 
 of England, Ireland, and Scotland ; and weekly in London.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 237 
 
 Instructive examples ure next given of the successful use of 
 open competition for the selection of persons required to 
 possess technical, scientific, and even mechanical proficiency, 
 but 1 cannot spare space for them. J The report further shows 
 that such competition had been applied for the selection of 
 clerks in the House of Lords ; and also by Earl Granville, the 
 Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for the selection of student in- 
 terpreters in the consular service. 2 
 
 The eighteenth report of the commission brings the new 
 system down to January 1st, 187-t. It shows that under vari- 
 ous pretences causing delay in applying open competition, 
 and through the facilities afforded by the complication of 
 offices in an old country and the natural desire of officials to 
 retain unlimited authority, 3 a considerable number of places 
 had still been filled through nominations and limited compe- 
 tition. Yet open competition had rapidly advanced. It had 
 been for the first time extended to appointments to cavalry and 
 infantry regiments, and to applicants for places in the commis- 
 sary department of the army. Besides those examined for the 
 military service, and for service in British India, it appears 
 that 23,261 had come before the commission since the order 
 of 1870. 
 
 1 See Report 1872, pp. X. and XI. 
 
 8 It would seem that great influence had been used to take certain places 
 out of competition under the order ; and a moderate number had, for appar- 
 ently good reasons, been excepted. 
 
 3 My theory is, that all persons in authority are the natural enemies of 
 competition, and that if they have an opportunity of evading it, they "will 
 use it. Investigation, 1874, vol. i., p. 125, Evidence of Mr. Lowe. 
 16
 
 CHAPTEE XXIY. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIVIL SERVICE IN 1873. 
 
 A thorough investigation ordered. Economy the object. Patronage being 
 at an end, members are ready to reduce numbers and salaries. Spirit and 
 scope of the inquiry. Sinecures brought to light. How open competition 
 tends to economy. Officers allowed to vote. No official fraud or corrup- 
 tion found. Open competition approved. 
 
 THE investigation of 1873 is mainly instructive for reasons 
 peculiar to itself. The committee consisted of seventeen mem- 
 bers of the House of Commons ; and its membership shows 
 that the importance of the subject had not fallen in the 
 estimation of that body. Sir Stafford Northcote, the pres- 
 ent Chancellor of the Exchequer, was chairman ; Mr. Child- 
 ers (of Mr. Gladstone's cabinet), Mr. Smith (now of Mr. Dis- 
 raeli's cabinet), Mr. McLaren (a brother-in-law of John 
 Bright), and Mr. Yernon Harcourt were upon the committee. 
 The report, in three volumes, was, if possible, even more 
 thorough and searching than those already referred to. I 
 should think it safe to say that, if all the investigations 
 made by us since the formation of our government, with a 
 view to economy in our civil administration, were united 
 into one, such united reports would fail to bring together 
 so complete and important a mass of facts and explanations. 
 The third volume of the report alone would fill nearly a 
 thousand pages of our documentary size ; and it contains 
 answers to more than five thousand questions, besides many 
 subordinate reports and special statements. Every class of 
 officials and employes, from the Lord Chancellor and the 
 head of the Treasury down to messengers and post boys, 
 were examined, and nothing was allowed to screen scandalous 
 secrets. The special I may say the only object of this 
 investigation was to "inquire whether any and what reduc-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 239 
 
 tions can be effected in the expenditures for the civil ser- 
 vice." The prior investigations had been directed to the 
 best means of selecting and promoting officers, to the dis- 
 cipline, duties, and methods best adapted to secure honest 
 and efficient administration. This had for its object retrench- 
 ment and economy, in harmony with the new system. Noth- 
 ing is more significant, in connection with this inquiry, than 
 the facts that it could be ordered with such breadth and car- 
 ried forward with such completeness and severity. "When 
 members could see that retrenchment might abolish places 
 they wished to fill, send back to them their poor dependents, 
 or cut down the salaries of the partisan henchmen to whom 
 they owed a debt of gratitude to say nothing of the scandals 
 of which such results might provoke a disclosure how could 
 they be expected to have courage for economy ? But limited 
 competition, from 1855 to 1870, having excluded most of 
 the unworthy, and open competition, since 1870, having closed 
 the doors of patronage and favoritism, members of Parliament 
 had no longer the same interest to resist retrenchment. The 
 investigation of 1873 was, therefore, a natural outcome of the 
 new system of selections. I cannot take the space required 
 to do justice to this great inquest of economy ; and I fear 
 we are not likely to appreciate its value until we shall have 
 taken patronage away from our officials and freely opened 
 our public service to the personal worth of the nation. 
 Some general explanations must suffice. The inquiry was not 
 confined to questions about the lowest salaries that would 
 secure clerks and the fewest clerks that could be made to do 
 the work at the period of the reports. It extended to the 
 whole subject of organization, official authority, subordination, 
 discipline, hours of labor, mechanical appliances, holy days, 
 health and sickness, ventilation of offices, pride in the service, 
 honesty efficiency in making collections, satisfaction in per- 
 forming public duty, promotions, increase of pay with length 
 of service, retiring allowances, proper age for coming into and 
 going out of the public service in all the aspects in which 
 these matters bear upon economy and efficiency of administra- 
 tion in its long range. I say, in its long range ; for while a 
 purpose of promoting direct economy is everywhere apparent,
 
 240 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 it is not less apparent that it was regarded as one of the surest 
 means of inducing young men of worth to enter and remain in 
 the service, at a low salary, that they should feel that their 
 compensation and tenure were not utterly precarious, and 
 that their official relations would not be needlessly degrading 
 or disagreeable. The authors of the report evidently believe 
 that if the surroundings of a man, in the minor civil service, 
 are not inconsistent with a' manly self-respect, and if he- is not 
 liable, every hour, to be dismissed upon the spite of an official 
 or the greedy claim of a party manager, he is not only more 
 likely to be honest and efficient, but certain to be willing to ac- 
 cept a lower salary. The purpose of making the public service 
 honorable and manly, and hence attractive and economical, 
 everywhere finds expression. I am 'strongly impressed with 
 the fact, so often shown in these reports, that, in this aristo- 
 cratic, old country, those in the public service are treated with 
 more consideration and justice than are those in our public ser- 
 vice. Their freedom of opinion is as much greater as their 
 tenure of office is more secure. Under the partisan system, 
 they had been disfranchised by the statutes of George III. , as 
 the only means of securing freedom of elections ; but the merit 
 system had made it practicable to remove that disability, and 
 since 1868 * they had been as free to vote as any other citizen ; 
 and, having a tenure during good conduct and capacity, they 
 were no longer driven into election contests to make sure of 
 their own places. Arid here I will, repeat a fact, emphasized in 
 the inquiry of 1873 that where excessive numbers have been 
 employed, it is treated as the fault of the government or of 
 its higher officers, for which the nation is responsible ; and the 
 supernumeraries are not arbitrarily dismissed, but are given 
 the first vacancies for which they are qualified. Our practice 
 in that regard would be looked upon as cruel in England. 
 Even when an office is abolished, some provision as a general 
 rule is made for him who filled it. And I hardly need add 
 that, as a natural consequence, British officials, in the lower 
 grade such as doorkeepers and boatmen not less than the 
 highest, cherish, as I am compelled to believe, much kinder 
 
 Act 81 and 32 Viet. ch. 78, as amended, in 1874, by 37 and 38 Viet. ch. 22.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 241 
 
 and more respectful feelings than are found among our officials 
 towards their superiors and towards the public service gen- 
 erally. Nor can I doubt that such provisions, by awakening 
 gratitude and a sense of duty, advance economy and fidelity 
 alike. But I have departed too much from my general plan, 
 which is to reserve the practical results of the new system for 
 the last topic. Before dismissing this inquiry of 1873, I will 
 refer to a few illustrative facts which this new courage for re- 
 trenchment brought to light. They show what sums members of 
 Parliament had been willing to vote, if only their favorites were 
 retained in the public service. There was an old office desig- 
 nated as " Patentee of Bankrupts," which had many years ago 
 ceased to have more than the merest nominal existence ; yet the 
 persons holding or pensioned for it, and doing nothing what- 
 ever, appear to have received altogether nearly $2,500,000, 
 and there was being expended, on account of it, the sum of 
 $60,000 a year of the public money. 
 
 Clerks of assize were shown to be drawing salaries at the rate 
 of $2500 annually, and yet not serving the public more than 
 twenty-five days in the year. There were cases brought to 
 light of the same person holding several offices, and very sus- 
 picious examples of nepotism and extravagance on the part 
 of high officials. The Treasury had been compelled, during 
 the last year, to rebuke the Master of the Kolls by letter for 
 giving clerkships to his son and his^ nephew, and it was done 
 in strong and plain terms. Even the Lord Chancellor had to 
 make an explanation in writing ; his secretary having been 
 receiving a salary of $6000 a year, and the clerk of the secre- 
 tary a salary of $2000 a year ! The committee were also very 
 free in their raillery and scrutiny in regard to purse bearers, 
 porters of the great seal, court-keepers, ceremonial ushers and 
 other needless or overpaid officials, which the vicious patronage 
 system had allowed to survive from the royal times of old. 
 The overhauling of patronage, in the hands of judges of the 
 higher courts, was as severe as it was needful. It was shown 
 that certain registrars, being part of the old patronage of the 
 Chief Justices of the King's Bench and Common Pleas, had 
 no duties whatever, the whole work being done by deputy 
 registrars ; yet it would appear that the registrars for the
 
 242 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 county of Middlesex alone had been collecting fees at the rate 
 of from $10,000 to $15,000 a year. But the bankrupt court 
 was the great headquarters of sinecurists. The annual cost of 
 the court was shown to be $710,000 ; of which $280,000 was 
 being paid for the services of officers no longer performing 
 any duty whatever ! 
 
 I can spare no more space for such examples. But the fol- 
 lowing, from the evidence of the permanent Secretary of the 
 Treasury, is worthy of quotation : " Under competition, you 
 have no patronage, and there is therefore no motive to increase 
 establishments beyond the strength which is required for the 
 work which they have to do ; on the contrary, there is a very 
 strong motive in the departments themselves to keep the es- 
 tablishment down, so as to have the credit of economical esti- 
 mates." Of which I may add this practical illustration from 
 the same report viz., that, in 1853 (before competition was in- 
 troduced), the customs service cost $5,250,000, in 1868 it cost 
 only $4,950,000, and in 1872 only $4-,600,000. There is one 
 more important consideration connected with this report to 
 which I must refer. The thorough and fearless scrutiny of 
 the committee extended over several months and into every 
 office, without respect of station, high or low a scrutiny that 
 brought the head of the Treasury and the Lord Chancellor to 
 their bar, not less than the humblest clerks and doorkeepers 
 a scrutiny which invited and received the complaints of 
 every discharged or discontented official who chose to appear 
 or to write and yet such a scrutiny did not, so far as I can 
 discover, disclose a single instance of peculation or fraud, nor 
 was there any evidence or charge that illicit gains or corruption 
 (except in the survival of the abuses of the old system as illus- 
 trated in the examples I have given) anywhere existed or 
 were by anybody believed to exist in the public service. And 
 I am unable to find any other explanation of a condition of 
 things so striking, except selections and promotions based on 
 merit, a tenure not disturbed for political reasons, retiring 
 allowances, and the various methods to which I have adverted 
 for promoting self-respect and respect for the government on 
 
 1 Third Report 1873. Answer 3176.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the part of those in its service. It is only when we contem- 
 plate the full significance of such freedom from even the sus- 
 picion of corruption or dishonesty, and compare it with the per- 
 vading venality and malversation which had prevailed jn earlier 
 generations, that we are able to comprehend the scope and the 
 blessing of administrative reform in Great Britain. "We then 
 feel the force of the reasons which have called her greatest 
 statesmen to the work and made it the pride and the safety of 
 her people.
 
 CHAPTER XXY. 
 
 THE EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATION OF 1874:. 
 
 Relates to department details. Better organization. No change in the prin- 
 ciples of the new system. Restrictions removed. Aristocratic division 
 into two classes disapproved. Open competition approved and ex- 
 tended. 
 
 THE reasons which gave Parliament the courage and inde- 
 pendence needed to probe abuses in 1873 had a similar effect 
 upon executive officers. Most of those who had secured places 
 by their favor had received promotion before 1874, and such 
 officers had no personal interest in screening those who had 
 obtained places by open competition. ~No one, I think, can 
 peruse the series of stern and searching examinations into the 
 English Civil Service, made between 1860 and 1874, without 
 feeling that a new and fearless spirit in harmony with the 
 higher sentiment of the nation has come over official life. 
 The inquiries made by the commission of 1874, unlike those 
 before considered, were not ordered by Parliament, but by the 
 executive. The commission consisted of nine persons (two 
 being members of Parliament), of whom the Right Honorable 
 Lyon Playfair (Postmaster-General in Mr. Gladstone's last cab- 
 inet) was chairman. The main aims of the investigation seemed 
 to have been to review the method of selecting civil servants, 
 especially in reference to its operation within the departments ; 
 to grade the service so as to make compensation and labor more 
 equable ; to provide a method of transfer of officers from one 
 office to another, and to arrange for doing the lower grade of 
 public work through less expensive clerks. The inquiry 
 ranged over almost the whole field of civil service, and three 
 elaborate reports were made. Even a summary of the topics 
 and recommendations would carry me far beyond reasonable 
 limits. It affords a still more striking illustration than any I
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 245 
 
 have referred to of the extent to which the British Government 
 has sought to secure efficiency and economy in the public ser- 
 vice by introducing just and scientific methods. 
 
 It was not proposed to interfere with the principle of open 
 competition or with any of the essential features of the merit 
 system / and in fact they were not only strengthened and ex- 
 tended, but were relieved of the encumbering debris of the old 
 system as well as of some needless restrictions. Nor, in the 
 immense mass of testimony taken in 1874 and 1875, any more 
 than in that taken in 1873, can I find anything tending to 
 show personal corruption on the part of any officer, or any 
 feeling that such corruption existed in the public service. 
 There is no lack of complaint about inadequate salaries, too 
 hard work, too exacting regulations, slow promotion, and unfair 
 distribution of labor and of honors ; but everywhere faith in offi- 
 cial integrity and pride in being connected with the public ser- 
 vice. From the numerous topics that will be likely to command 
 our attention, wherever we shall make a thorough study of the 
 condition of good civil administration, I select but two as 
 especially calling for notice here. The public opinion that 
 broke through patronage and favoritism had been too radical 
 and exacting, in its hour of victory, to impose wise condi- 
 tions upon its great demand that all places should be won by 
 merit tested in open competition. It was consequently insisted 
 that he who should stand highest in the competition should 
 have the first vacancy, if indeed the competition was not di- 
 rectly for a single vacancy. And such had been substantially 
 the practice ; a practice that gave but the smallest discretion 
 to the appointing power, and hence afforded less opportunity 
 than was desirable for giving to those having a high average, 
 yet varying qualifications, the particular places for which they, 
 were best fitted. This was an inconvenient restriction need- 
 lessly imposed, and was not involved in the principle of com- 
 petition. In some cases it too much curtailed a salutary official 
 liberty of choice. Through the commission of 1874, this un- 
 due restriction was removed ; and provision was made that the 
 appointments (always as heretofore to be made to the lowest 
 grade) should be made from among several of those highest in 
 the competition ; the liberty of choice, as to the several officers,
 
 246 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 always being large enough to allow the most appropriate talent 
 and attainments being chosen for the particular place to be 
 filled, but not so large as to give room for official favoritism. 
 It is plain that the fit range of choice, in this regard, may well 
 be greater for some places than for others, according to the 
 peculiarity of capacity needed, and that the subject is one for 
 detailed provision in the rules. The other leading subject 
 dealt with by the committee was that of the aristocratic di- 
 vision of those in the public service into two classes. The 
 principle of free, open competition is repugnant to that distinc- 
 tion. The division was also as objectionable by reason of its 
 effect upon economy, convenience, and good feeling, in the 
 public service, as it was on the score of justice ani principle. 
 Those of the first class had higher salaries, performed higher 
 work, and they claimed social precedence ; though they might 
 be morally and intellectually inferior to those of the second 
 class. Jealousy and antagonism, and a sense of injustice on 
 the part of the lower class, were the natural results. Haughty, 
 aristocratic officials favored Class 1., and used their influence 
 to crowd the service with that class, and to depress Class II. , 
 whereby needless expense for salaries was incurred. It was 
 made .very difficult to get from the lower class to the higher. 
 When humble young men of worth had won their way to the 
 service, they found, to their disgust, that they Vere admitted 
 to hardly half of it, and that the lower half, on which a higher 
 grade looked down frowningly. They were in the relation of 
 English attorneys to barristers, of Commons to Lords. In 
 accordance with the scheme of the report of 1874, the line of 
 demarcation between the two classes has been substantially 
 opened to merit, and the division itee2f_must_soon, I think, 
 cease to exist. But the idea of classes is too deep in the Eng- 
 lish mind to allow its speedy suppression in official circles, 
 and it will doubtless survive its application to practice. 
 
 There is another view of this series of investigations, from 
 1853 to 1876, well worthy of notice ; as it indicates a continued 
 growth of the reforming sentiment. With departments of 
 government as with individuals, it is far easier to criticise 
 others than to institute self -reform. An officer who thoroughly 
 inquires into and exposes the defects allowed by himself has
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 24:7 
 
 taken one of the most difficult steps in public duty. The in- 
 quiry of 1853 was, in substance, an inquiry by the ,executive 
 into usurpations and shortcomings of members of Parliament ; 
 taking care to say only the least about the real object. The 
 intermediate investigations were made by Parliament into 
 executive administration ; while those ordered in 1874 were 
 made by the executive into the detailed abuses in its own ad- 
 ministration. And by this time the independent sentiment of 
 the country had become so strong that I find no evidence that 
 the leaders of either party ventured to interpose any objections 
 to the most complete exposure of abuses, or to the large re- 
 duction of expenses effected. Indeed, the time seemed to be 
 past when either party could hope to gain as much through 
 the influence of its friends in subordinate stations as through a 
 reputation for favoring an honest and economical execution of 
 the laws.
 
 CHAPTER XXYI. 
 
 THE RESULTS OF THE MERIT SYSTEM BASED ON OPEN COMPE- 
 TITION IN BRITISH INDIA. 
 
 Official opinions between 1853 and 1875. Law of 1860 requiring examina- 
 tions before Civil Service Commission. Full investigation ordered in 1875. 
 The investigation made. The new system approved. Better men ob- 
 tained. Better administration. Great difficulties overcome. Open com- 
 petition free to all British subjects, now the door of entrance to the Indian 
 service. 
 
 IT lias already been shown that, after many experiments, 
 with a view to render favoritism and patronage tolerable in 
 India, it had been found necessary to abolish both in 1853 and 
 to substitute the Merit System founded on open competition. 
 The changes being novel, were of course regarded as wholly 
 tentative, and they were carefully watched by both the friends 
 and enemies of the new system. The first official inquiry as to 
 its effects was made in 1863, with these results officially pro- 
 mulgated : " It is enough to observe that the general results 
 of the inquiry were in favor of the system, so far as it had 
 been then developed ; and that this favorable judgment was 
 adopted and confirmed, somewhat later, by the Government 
 of India, in a dispatch dated May 5th, 1866.". . . The 
 results of the inquiry instituted by the Government of India 
 were thus summarized by the Govern or- General, Lord Law- 
 rence, one of the ablest administrators ever at the head of 
 Indian affairs, in a dispatch dated May 5th, 1866 : ' ' We would 
 observe that, as the civil servants who were at first appointed 
 under the system of competitive examinations have not as yet 
 been ten years in India, and as consequently the great majority 
 of the servants so appointed are still holding very subordinate 
 positions in the service, it would, in our opinion, be prema- 
 ture to pronounce, conclusively, whether or not the civil ser-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 219 
 
 vice has, on the whole, been improved by the present system. 
 We are inclined, however, to believe that it has, and it may 
 at least, we think, be confidently affirmed that the present sys- 
 tem is effective to exclude great inefficiency, which undoubt- 
 edly was not excluded under the old system ; and also that the 
 young men who enter the service under the present system 
 are, as a rule, more highly educated than those who found 
 admittance under the former system. ' ' As these reports only 
 relate to the practical effects of the new system in India, 
 nothing is said in them of the check it put to the intrigue, 
 and favoritism in connection with nominations which it ar- 
 rested, in England. I need not enter into details on that sub- 
 ject ; for it is enough to say that the advantages of the new 
 system were so early appreciated in England that in 1859-60 
 it was provided by statute " ' ' that no candidate shall be ad- 
 mitted to the service in India . . . without a certificate from 
 the Civil Service Commissioners of examination by them." 
 . . . These examinations were competitive. It is declared 
 in the before cited, Parliamentary Report made in I860, 3 
 that the competitive examinations for the India service are 
 entirely open and free. 'No one nominates those to be exam- 
 ined, but they propose themselves. The chairman of the Civil 
 Service Commission uses this language : " The Minister for 
 India has no knowledge .with regard to these candidates until 
 we return to him the list of those who have passed us, nor 
 does he in any way interfere in regard to that competition." 4 
 The new system, therefore, completely excluded all patronage, 
 favoritism, threats, and solicitation; success in competition alone 
 giving a chance for a place in the service. He who wished to test 
 his merits by competition could do so without asking permission 
 from anybody. And this was not only true of all British sub- 
 jects proper, but of the natives of India as well, of whatever 
 race, caste, or religion they might be. All are allowed to com- 
 pete alike. Among the 754 who first won places by competi- 
 
 1 Report of Commission of Inquiry of 1874, as to selections, etc. , for 
 Civil Sen-ice of India, pp. 12, 19, and 20. 
 8 21st and 22d Viet., chap. 106, 32. 
 * Report of 1860, p. 328. 
 4 Ibid., p. 328.
 
 250 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tion, there were natives of France, Canada, Brazil, and of the 
 United States. How little the contest favored mere college 
 
 O 
 
 learning was shown by the fact that of the forty who won the 
 highest places, in the competition of 1874, thirty had gained 
 their education in the public schools. And in practice 
 open competition was made as republican and democratic as 
 it is in theory. It has been one of the significant results that- 
 intelligent and docile Hindoos and Parse.es have, to a great ex- 
 tent, crowded the stolid and domineering Moslems out of the 
 public service of India. Thus the experiment was continued 
 on trial until 1875, when it was thought that, as more than 
 twenty years had elapsed since it was commenced, it was time 
 for a thorough investigation of its general effects. It had en- 
 countered opposition not only from officers who had long been 
 accustomed to the old system, but also from those who have a 
 great love of unlimited, official authority. I have cited Mr. 
 Robert Lowe's testimony that such officials always oppose com- 
 petition. It was also opposed by a few very cautious and con- 
 scientious persons, who feared the results of a change so 
 radical and unexampled. In 1875, the Secretary for India 
 ordered a thorough investigation of the Indian Civil Service. 
 Lord Northbrook (the late Yiceroy) and Lord Napier were 
 among the eight eminent persons by whom it was conducted. 
 Their report was unanimous in its favor, and, with the evidence 
 taken, is contained in ParliamentaryjBlue Book, issued in 1876, 
 from which I shall quote. The Yiceroy begins his opinion by 
 declaring that ' ' there are few subjects, connected with the 
 Government of India, of more importance than the manner in 
 which candidates for the civil service should be selected and 
 the selected candidates should be trained for service in India." 
 In 1855, Lord Ellenborough declared, as President of the 
 India Board, " that the prosperity and peace of India depend 
 upon the characters of those who govern." This Blue Book 
 contains the elaborate opinions of one hundred and one of the 
 most experienced administrators in India, ranging from the dis- 
 tinguished Sir II. Maine down to those most worthy to be con- 
 sulted in the lowest class of the service ; and those from officers 
 of position are marked by an ability and elevation of tone 
 which goes far to enable one to understand how it is possible
 
 fc WORTH WASHiNu,.. 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 2ol 
 
 for so few, of a foreign race, to hold the millions of India in 
 peaceful subjection and to carry on such vast public works 
 with so much vigor and so little corruption. I should have to 
 go beyond all reasonable limits, if I should attempt more than 
 to state the conclusions reached upon the few decisive points 
 of the great experiment. All that relates to such questions as 
 the proper age for entering and leaving public service, to the 
 best subjects and methods of education, to retiring allowances, 
 to transfers and promotions in the service, to the best measure 
 of official discretion, to the peculiar duties of judges, fiscal 
 officers and governors, to the best plan of dealing with ques- 
 tions of caste, nationality, and others of similar kind, I must 
 therefore pass over without further notice, much as the study of 
 such details has improved the Indian service, and sadly as we 
 have neglected such matters. What then was the judgment 
 passed upon the merit system as a whole ? Was the method 
 of selection by open competition and of promotion with refer- 
 ence to merit, which were the decisive issues, approved or 
 condemned ? The report of the Commission of 1875 gives a 
 clear and decisive answer to these questions. The Commission- 
 ers not only had before them those one hundred and one elabo- 
 rate written opinions coming from every division and grade of 
 the service presidents, governors, judges, fiscal officers, en- 
 gineers, school and college officers, from Bangal, Madras, 
 Bombay, and every part of India, as well as from Assam, 
 Berar, and Ceylon, but they inspected records, conferred 
 with leading officers, and examined into the practical work- 
 ing of the administration. Their final and unanimous re- 
 port, made in September, 1875, uses this language : " We 
 desire to call your lordship's particular attention to the ability 
 and good sense of the replies which we have received, and 
 which form the enclosures of this despatch. . . . With regard 
 to the general result of free competition for the Indian Civil 
 Service, we consider that the experience which has been 
 gained since the Government of India expressed their opinion, 
 in despatch No 25 (public), of the 5th of May, 1866 that the 
 result was satisfactory amply confirms the favorable judg- 
 ment then expressed. In our opinion the civil service is filled by 
 officers of merit and ability, and we are confident that they will
 
 252 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 be found fully competent to discharge the duties which they 
 have to perform, and to supply statesmen and administrators 
 of high distinction in the different branches of the administra- 
 tion. . . ." l In an official communication subsequently made 
 to the Secretary for India, the Viceroy says : " As regards the 
 maintenance of free competition, I do not perceive that it has 
 been challenged by any high authority, and I do not think it 
 necssary to discuss the subject. . . . " " 
 
 And as an illustration of the spirit in which open compe- 
 tition had been adopted, and as some evidence of the justness of 
 the opinion I have expressed, that it is liberal and republican 
 rather than royal or aristocratic in tendency, I may quote this 
 further passage from the Viceroy's instructions : 
 
 " In the first place, I should regret that any man should be de- 
 barred from entrance to the Indian Civil Service who possessed such 
 energy and ability as to enable him in a humble position of life to 
 succeed at the competitive examination. Such a man it would be to 
 the advantage of India that he should form one of the Civil Ser- 
 vice. . .." s 
 
 It is certainly significant of the great changes wrought in 
 public opinion, that the head of the Government in India, 
 the Viceroy of the most aristocratic monarchy in the world, 
 should thus especially commend that effect of the new system 
 which so favors the opportunities of humble life ; 4 nor does 
 it take from this significance when Lord Salisbury, the head 
 of Indian affairs in England, and among the most aristocratic 
 of British noblemen, approves both the communication and 
 the report. The explanation of course is that British states- 
 men have long since found that common justice and the ex- 
 clusion of partisan tests, in selecting civil servants, are essential 
 for securing those most useful, and they have had patriotism 
 and independence enough to act upon their convictions of duty, 
 even in a foreign province. These declarations appear not 
 to have been mere professions, for in the final order, made in 
 
 1 Report, p. 53. * Ibid., p. 224. s Ibid., p. 230. 
 
 4 In the same spirit the late changes in the army have abolished the old 
 custom of enlisting only high-caste Hindoos, and those of the Imcest caste 
 are rather preferred.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 253 
 
 1876, for the permanent establishment of open competition, as 
 the sole means of entry to the Indian Civil Service, it is pro- 
 vided that during the two years of special study, which are// - 
 to follow success in the competition, the sum of $750 a yearij/i 
 is to be paid to each successful competitor, thereby enabling 
 the children of the poor to go on with their preparation for the 
 public service. ' 
 
 Lord Salisbury gave his opinion in his final instructions to 
 the Viceroy and Council of India, in this language : 3 
 
 " With respect to the principle of competition itself, the evidence 
 you have collected sufficiently shows that it cannot be disturbed 
 without injury to the public service. The expressions of opinion 
 which I have received from competent judges in England led me to 
 the same conclusion. Of its success, as a mode of selecting persons 
 fit to serve in the Indian Civil Service, there seems to be no reason- 
 able doubt." 
 
 Not only was the Commission of Inquiry unanimous, and 
 those responsible for administration convinced that the merit 
 system based on open competition was the best ever tried, but 
 its avowed enemies become converted. A member of the 
 Government of India, who had been hostile to competition, 
 uses this language in his official opinion : 
 
 " It is needless to state views in regard to the competitive system, 
 as compared with that of nomination, because it is clear, in the 
 present state of public feeling, it is out of all probability that compe- 
 tition could be abandoned ; and, moreover, / confess, after careful 
 perusal of these papers, I arrive at the conclusion that, on the whole, 
 it has been more sucessful than I for one ever expected it to be. . . . " 
 
 The conclusion of the whole matter was that in 1876, open 
 competition, in which those of every race, religion, caste, 
 color, or party could freely participate, on the same terms, 
 became the established and sole means of entering the Civil 
 Service of India. To this there is, of course, the exception of 
 the Viceroy, and of any other officers who may be sent to guide 
 the general policy of the Indian Government. Original ad- 
 mission is to the lower grade of the service, and the higher 
 
 1 Lord Salisbury's Order, Report, p. 323. 
 
 2 Report, p. 333. Ibid., p. 3ia 
 
 17
 
 254 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 places (save the very few exceptions just noted) are filled by 
 promotions based on merit and experience in the subordinate 
 service. Special study for two years after selection by com- 
 petition, and before entering upon practical duties, is made 
 necessary by reason of the considerable knowledge of local 
 laws, languages, and institutions which are indispensable in 
 the public service of India. The same rule, in that respect, 
 had existed when selections were made under the old system. 
 
 The world knows full well what oppression and extortion 
 marked the early years of British rule in India. The original 
 system was one of pillage and spoils. I have now given the 
 merest outline of the failure of the partisan system (which 
 succeeded the spoils system) and of the method of patronage 
 in the hands of members of the Indian Board, supplemented 
 by a college course, which stand between the old order of 
 things and the new. We have reached the point where it is 
 demonstrated, by the most ample experience, that the pros- 
 perity and safety of England and India alike require that places 
 in the public service of the latter shall depend neither upon 
 the favor of any party, any cabinet, any great officer, any 
 board of control, nor upon anything other than the personal 
 merit of the applicant, tested by a standard, public, uniform, 
 and just. If I could afford the space, I might call attention 
 to particular facts showing that competition had given not 
 merely more bright men of learning, but men with physical 
 systems as strong, with characters quite as high, with practical, 
 administrative capacity not less, to say the least, than had 
 come into the service under any other system. But no evi- 
 dence I could present would perhaps be BO satisfactory or con- 
 clusive as the official opinions already quoted. 
 
 Another aspect of the subject, however, may well arrest our 
 attention for a moment. History, perhaps, affords no example 
 so remarkable as that of British India of the efficiency and 
 power of able and upright officers and good methods in admin- 
 istration to lead on a people in order and prosperity and to 
 hold them in subjection while raising their civilization. ' The 
 
 1 "No thoughtful person can read what General Upton says of the firm 
 but beneficent rule of England in India, without earnestly wishing to see 
 that rule extended over all of Southern Asia. " International Review, July, 
 1878, p. 57.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 255 
 
 civil servants of Great Britain in India are but a little band 
 of a few thousands, scattered over a vast empire, holding in 
 obedience nearly one hundred and ninety millions of people 
 of different races, castes, and religions. These races are not 
 wanting in ability or learning, and they are proud, bigoted, 
 and warlike. They have many languages, and laws and cus- 
 toms older and more numerous and complicated than any 
 other people. Nowhere is the peril or the responsibility of 
 government greater. All the officers are remote from the seat 
 of ultimate responsibility, and many of them are widely sepa- 
 rated from each other ; so that discretion, firmness, practical 
 resources, and high administrative ability are more than any- 
 where else indispensable and invaluable. It had been thought 
 by many that even if competition would secure bright men and 
 perhaps good theorists, it would fail to secure practical men, 
 sagacious administrators, competent to command and to lead. 
 It is worthy of notice, therefore, that its first great trial and 
 success seems to demonstrate the incorrectness of that view. 
 It is not any longer ability to lead an army and a body of civil 
 tyrants, in enforcing measures of oppression and exaction, that 
 is needed in India, but ability to collect and expend a revenue 
 as large as that of any but a few of the greatest nations of the 
 world ; ability to take supervision of the construction and 
 management of railways, roads, public drainage, irrigation, 
 hospitals, and other works of internal improvement of great 
 magnitude ; ability to sustain a judicial administration demand- 
 ing more learning, patience, and high sense of justice than any 
 that ever existed in any other country. Nor should it be for- 
 gotten that whatever places the merit system has thus opened 
 to worth and capacity have been taken from the perquisites 
 and the spoils of office and politics. Where, before, governors, 
 judges, directors, members of Parliament, heads of offices or 
 great noblemen or party leaders, could, at their arbitrary will, 
 say to one, you can enter, and to another, you cannot enter, 
 the public service of India, they must now accept some one 
 from among the most meritorious in the competition, even if 
 he be the child of a Hindoo of the lowest caste, or the orphan 
 of a British sailor. "We may well believe, I think, that haughty 
 Indian officers long accustomed to patronage and arbitrary
 
 256 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 power, that the leaders of politics and the great aristocratic 
 families, who, for more than a century, had found the Indian 
 service a convenient field for rewarding their relations and de- 
 pendents, did not submit to such sacrifices as the new system 
 called for, until the defence of the old was no longer possible 
 and the safety of the empire was seen to be in peril. The 
 first advocates of the new system were, in the eyes of such 
 officials, not only theorists but meddlers. No five Senators or 
 Territorial Governors, with us, have ever, altogether, had a 
 patronage at all comparable with that formerly enjoyed by the 
 Queen's chief officer in Madras, Bengal, or other great pres- 
 idency, to say nothing of that of the Yiceroy himself. There 
 is one of the many of dependent princes even who has a yearly 
 revenue of $3,300,000. The official service and the public 
 affairs of all our territories united are but small compared with 
 those of a single presidency in India. In any view, the late 
 changes there must be regarded as a remarkable and noble 
 triumph of justice and patriotism over all that was selfish, 
 venal, and partisan in official life. Like our late constitutional 
 amendments, they established equality, justice, and liberty, ir- 
 respective of race, color, religion, or nativity. They gave to 
 the humblest Hindoo and Parsee the same right, that they al- 
 lowed to the favorite of the greatest family or of the strongest 
 party, to enter the public service, both civil and military l 
 upon the basis of their character and capacity as men, what- 
 ever views of politics or religion they might hold a right not 
 practically enjoyed in this generation in this boasted land of 
 freedom. The contrast of the mild and fair spirit of this 
 system, with the rapacity and injustice which marked the pol- 
 icy of Olive and Hastings, presents a significant illustration 
 of the vast political changes of a century. If we are to look 
 beyond patriotism for any part of the general support the 
 reform has received in the high official circles of India, we 
 might, perhaps, find it in the exemption it has brought from 
 the wearisome solicitation of office seekers, from the vexatious 
 adjustments of the rival claims of patronage, from unjust 
 
 1 Native officers of low caste have often been promoted, who were yet 
 forced, when off duty, to give precedence to common soldiers of the Brah- 
 min class.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 257 
 
 charges of partiality, from the enmity of a hundred persons dis- 
 appointed for every one gratified with an office to all which 
 the records bear evidence. 
 
 "When we consider the many thousands of miles of railroads 
 under government charge, the extensive public works for 
 irrigation, for drainage, for land and water transportation, for 
 sanitary improvement, 1 and for varied forms of utility or 
 benevolence, on the security of which Englishmen have be- 
 come the holders of bonds in the amount of more than $900,- 
 000,000 ; when we take into account the educational system 
 with its peculiar difficulties and the delicate and responsible re- 
 lations of government to many religions ; when we consider the 
 chances innumerable for fraud and peculation (if our army 
 and Indian affairs are the units of comparison) that must 
 exist in the equipment and supply, and in connection with 
 hundreds of stations and posts, of an army of more than 250,- 
 000 men distributed over a vast country of 190,000,000 of 
 people ; as we calculate the opportunities of cheating and mal- 
 versation (if tested by our experience) among the great army 
 of officials required to collect and disburse an annual revenue 
 (in great part internal) of $250,000,000, in a remote country 
 and among an alien and notoriously cunning and deceptive 
 race ; and when we find that both the most careful researches of 
 British commissions and the common understanding of man- 
 kind agree in considering this stupendous administration not 
 merely unsurpassed in justice and purity among all instances of 
 foreign domination, but in itself in a high degree economical 
 and honest, and generally just a (even as compared with the do- 
 mestic administration of the leading States), we must, at least, 
 
 1 The once filthy and pestilential city of Bombay, with all its nat- 
 ural disadvantages of people and situation, has, through good sanitary con- 
 trol, come to have a death-rate lower than that of Baltimore, Richmond, 
 or New Orleans. 
 
 2 That there is frequent injustice and sometimes corruption and oppres- 
 sion among those innumerable small officials, especially among the lowest 
 classes of justices, mostly native, and whose sphere of duty is beyond 
 the possibility of direct supervision by the better class of officers, can- 
 not, I think, be doubted. Only education and Christianity can remove 
 such evils. There are over 190,000,000 of. natives directly under British 
 rule, to which over 48,000,000, living in feudatory States, with an army of 
 nearly 800,039 men, are to be added. India has only 121,147 persons of
 
 258 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 I think, reach the conclusion that a great deal depends on the 
 mode of appointment and discipline of those in the public ser- 
 vice, and that Great Britain has not bestowed so much care 
 upon the affairs of India without abundant reward. Xor can 
 we feel surprise at the just pride of British statesmen, in the 
 presence of so noble an example of successful administration, 
 or dispute them when they assert that " in the history of the 
 world, no other State has shown how to govern territories so 
 extended and remote, and races of men so diverse ; giving to 
 her own kindred colonies the widest liberty, and ruling with 
 enlightened equity dependencies unqualified for freedom." ' 
 
 I am glad to be able to cite the opinions of a competent 
 and impartial observer ; 2 and he has found that the merit 
 system, enforced in the military service, has been as salutary 
 as in the civil service. "In no country," he says, "is the 
 subordination of the military to the civil authority more 
 clearly defined. . . . All the officers we met at Delhi 
 and elsewhere, in India, showed a capacity and confidence 
 above their rank. . . . The results attained in India are 
 worthy our closest study. . . . J$o stranger free, from 
 national prejudice can visit . . . India without rejoicing 
 that England controls the destiny of 200,000,000 of people ; 
 neither can he observe the great institutions which she has 
 founded for their moral and physical amelioration, without 
 hoping that, in the interests of humanity, she may continue 
 her sway until she has made them worthy to become a free 
 and enlightened nation." 
 
 non- Asiatic origin ; of which only 75,734 (besides 63,000 British soldiers) 
 are of British origin ; while there arc 190,000 native policemen alone in 
 the public service, besides a native army also consisting of about 190,000 
 men. Westminster Review, January, 1879. 
 
 1 May's History, p. 546. 
 
 3 General Upton, of the United States Army, lately sent by the Govern- 
 ment to make observations from the military, as I have made them from the 
 civil side of administration. Armies of Asia and of Europe, 1879, p. 51, 67, 
 81 and 87.
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE MERIT SYSTEM SESCE 1875. 
 
 Great numbers who compete. The new system in the British colonies. 
 Promotions. The census. Comparison of old and new systems. Fur- 
 ther extensions of the new system. Probation made more efficient. 
 Publicity of appointments and promotions. The new system becomes 
 more popular and salutary. The Civil Service Commission likely to be 
 permanent. 
 
 are now to consider the operations of the new system, 
 in that more perfect form into which the various investigations 
 and improvements we have traced have finally brought it. 
 
 The report for 1875 shows that the whole number of per- 
 sons who had been before the commission since its creation (in 
 1855) had been 142,423, of which 70,452 (and among them were 
 1622 for the military service) presented themselves within the 
 four and a half years of open competition since July, 1870. 
 In other words, during the fifteen years of limited competition, 
 the official monopolists who selected the candidates only allowed 
 an average of about 5000 persons a year to come forward for 
 examination ; ' but under open competition more than 15,000 
 each year had freely presented themselves before the commis- 
 sion ; from which it would seem to follow that members of Par- 
 liament and other officials must have deprived about 10,000 per- 
 sons every year of their equal right to have their claims tested 
 for a place in the public service. And there is the most decisive 
 evidence that the 5000, which the official monopolists ticketed 
 for examination, were by no means the more worthy portion of 
 the 15,000 who wished to be examined. These excluded 10,000 
 
 1 During several years, immediately preceding 1870, the number of per- 
 sons presenting themselves for examination had exceeded 5000 annually ; 
 for open competition was to some extent allowed, the partisan system was 
 rapidly decaying, and the official blockade was less rigid.
 
 260 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 were generally, I think we may believe, either too humble to 
 command influence or too manly and independent to ask 
 favors. It is this official tyranny of exclusion which still ex- 
 ists in this country, but which, 1 am persuaded, could not be 
 resumed in Great Britain without the utter overthrow of the 
 party proposing it, if it could be without serious agitation. 1 
 This report also traces the progress, I have before noticed, 
 which is being made in the British colonies and dependencies 
 for taking their public service out of party politics and giving 
 public honors to persons of merit. In August, 1874, examina- 
 tions for admission to the civil ssrvice were introduced by 
 the legislature of South Australia. They had been introduced 
 into New Zealand in 1866 ; and the reports for 1873 and 1874 
 seem to show that such examinations had already been made 
 more efficient and had been raised to a higher standard than 
 ever has been the case in our own service, save in a limited 
 sphere and for a short time under President Grant. Reference 
 has before been made to reforms in the Canadian civil service. 2 
 From all which, we are, I think, at liberty to infer that the 
 time is not remote when, if we do not very soon improve our 
 system, the most partisan and the most illiterate civil service in 
 any part of the world where the English language is spoken 
 1 will be that of the United States. That part of the Anglo- 
 Saxon race under republican government will then stand alone 
 in its open toleration of the official coercion, intrigue, and cor- 
 rupt bargaining in public honors and places which had their 
 origin in the most despotic experience of the mother coun- 
 try. Of all those speaking our language, republicans alone 
 would proclaim that partisan and official influence should be 
 paramount in public affairs over all considerations of personal 
 worth and capacity ; a distinction, perhaps, not less likely to 
 arrest the world's attention than the conspicuous position we 
 so long occupied as a slave-holding republic. 
 
 The report of 1876 records the death of Sir Edward Ryan^ 
 who had presided over the Civil Service Commission during 
 the whole twenty years of its existence. During the year 
 
 : See the letters of John Bright and Sir Charles Trevelyan in the Appen- 
 dix, and also ch. 80. 
 a See last paragraph, chap. I.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 261 
 
 (1875), 15,342 persons had appeared for examination ; and 
 some idea of the activity of the commission and of the public 
 interest felt in its work may be gathered from the fact that 
 the number of letters received and written during the year 
 had been 147,350. This report contains an order for certain 
 adaptations to be made in conformity with the recommenda- 
 tions already mentioned as resulting from the executi v T e inquiry 
 of 1874. Among other things, it provides for boy clerks, who 
 are to secure their places through open competition. It fur- 
 ther increases the authority of the Civil Service Commission, 
 by providing that no promotions shall be made from a lower to 
 a higher division in the service without a special certificate of 
 qualification from that body ; and it is further ordered that all 
 appointments, promotions, and transfers from one office to 
 another shall be notified to the commissioners for record in 
 their office, and that they shall be, by them, published in the 
 London Gazette. By such means, the publicity so much needed 
 to prevent suspicion_will be secured, and the office of the com- 
 mission will contain a sort of official record of every person in 
 the public service a great convenience in making promotions 
 for merit as well as a powerful stimulant of good conduct. 
 This report also shows that, for some unexplained reason, tlie 
 General Registrar's office (which has charge of taking the 
 census) had not, in 1871, been brought under the provisions 
 for open competition ; although the official nominees for clerks 
 (or census agents) were directed to go through a sort of pass 
 examination before the Civil Service Commission. 
 
 The evidence taken on this subject in 1874 facilitates a sig- 
 nificant comparison of the new system with the old. The 
 head of the office gives a sad account of the motley imbeciles 
 put upon him by members of Parliament for taking the census 
 (they seem fully as bad, I think, as any similarly imposed upon 
 Mr. Walker for taking our census) ; for example, ' ' two were 
 suffering from such offensive complaints that others could not 
 associate with them, and I was forced to put them into sepa- 
 rate rooms, . . . they were a heterogeneous mass from 14 
 to 60 years of age . . . who had tried many occupations 
 and failed in all." When the Registrar was ordered to take 
 the census in 1871, he says he supposed he was to be allowed
 
 262 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 to have better clerks, obtained through open competition, 
 under the order of 1870, but he was deprived of them. " The 
 Lords of the Treasury decided against me, . . . and their 
 Lordships took to themselves the patronage, . . ." and di- 
 vided it among members. " Their Lordships acting on the old 
 system, and following the recommendation of influential adher- 
 ents, nominated no fewer than 261 census clerks." He found 
 that inquiry into their character and history ' ' was productive of 
 pain and confusion," and he gave it up. But he forced this 
 miscellaneous herd of official favorites into a pass examination, 
 before the commission, which rejected fifty-seven per cent of 
 them, and with the residue the Registrar succeeded in taking 
 the census of 1871, and wonders that he could do it. He 
 says : ' ' Nothing could be worse than the system of nomination 
 of clerks by the Treasury ; their Lordships know 
 
 only their names, and that they were recommended by influ- 
 ential peers or member? of Parliament, supporters of the gov- 
 ernment of the day, . , . no inquiry being made as to 
 their character and qualifications." This is only one of the 
 many examples (which together w r ould cover nearly the whole 
 field of administration) that might be presented, as showing 
 how closely analogous if I may not say how exactly alike 
 have been the abuses of official power and the opposition to re- 
 form in England and in this country. On certain points 
 connected with the aristocratic element in the social life of 
 England, and with the administrative subdivisions, there is a 
 material difference ; but beyond those matters, the analogy is 
 so close that you may read for hours in the British documents 
 almost without a reflection that you are not going over abuses 
 in the service of the United States. Had open competition 
 been applied to the census clerks, those wishing to compete 
 would have quietly joined in a public and manly contest, in 
 the several places where the examinations would have been 
 held, and the most competent would have been speedily ascer- 
 tained and selected without the least political significance. 
 But, by the method pursued, great noblemen and members of 
 Parliament, political bodies and aspiring demagogues, the 
 
 1 Report Investigation, 1874, vol. i., p. D88, etc.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 263 
 
 Lords of the Treasury and the leaders of parties, were drawn 
 into a demoralizing and ignominious scramble for patronage, 
 reaching to hundreds of cities and villages, and affecting no one 
 can tell how many elections, which finally resulted in 261 nom- 
 inees so disgracefully incompetent that, in mere self-defence, 
 the census officer was forced to subject the motley throng to a 
 non-partisan examination before the Civil Service Com- 
 mission, which excluded 57 out of each 100 as utterly incom- 
 petent. And it may well be doubted if ten per cent of them 
 would have been left if he could have put them into open com- 
 petition with such young men as would, if permitted, have 
 voluntarily presented themselves for examination. This illus- 
 tration is not the less interesting because the taking of a census 
 is before us, in which our general rule is quite sure to work 
 like this British exception. 
 
 In 1877, there were 14,362 persons before the commission, 
 of which 1723 were for the military service, and 472 for India. 
 Besides those rejected as too young or because of insufficient 
 health or bad character, there were 3840 denied certificates as 
 unqualified for the public work. It will be seen that the ratio of 
 incompetents is far less, and hence the capacity of those apply- 
 ing is much higher, than when officials designated those to be 
 examined. Examinations had already been so extended in the 
 home, military service as to regulate admissions to the Royal 
 Military College, the Royal Military Academy, the Royal 
 Marine Artillery, and the Royal Marine Light Infantry. 
 Promotion in the military is made to turn mainly upon attain- 
 ments tested by examination. These several military institu- 
 tions, I believe (owing to the fact that there is no military ser- 
 vice in Great Britain corresponding to that of the States of our 
 U nion), are more than the equivalent, in our army and navy 
 system, of the schools of West Point and Annapolis. When 
 we consider how short has been the period since admission to 
 those English military schools was as much dependent, as ad- 
 mission either to the school at West Point or at Annapolis now 
 is, upon political influence or official favor, and especially 
 when we recall the fact that up to 1871 commissions and pro- 
 motions in the British, military service were matters of open 
 sale and purchase, we can better appreciate the strength of
 
 264 CIVIL SERVICE IIST GREAT BRITAIX. 
 
 conviction, in favor of the new system, which has so rapidly 
 extended it in all directions. 1 Only the English State Church 
 has withstood its advance. Her official places are still made 
 merchandise or bestowed by official favor. 
 
 It is provided (concerning new appointments) that ' ' no clerk 
 shall remain more than one year in any department, unless, at 
 the end of that time, the head of the department shall certify 
 in writing to the Civil Service Commissioners that the clerk is 
 accepted by the department. If he is not accepted, the de- 
 partment shall report to said commissioners the reasons for not 
 accepting him. ' ' On this rule probation now stands. Promo- 
 tions from lower to higher divisions 2 of the service are not to 
 be made without a certificate from the Civil Service Commis- 
 sion, nor until after ten years of service. All appointments, 
 promotions, and transfers are to be recorded by the commission 
 and published in the London Gazette. This is a part of the 
 procedure through which the records of the commission are 
 made to contain a brief history of every one in the public 
 service, and the secrecy that facilitates corruption and injus- 
 tice are thus avoided. The public is treated as having a right 
 to be informed as to what is being done in the public service 
 and of the reasons for it. The same rule, it will be seen, that 
 throws out an inefficient clerk after a year's trial also puts a 
 
 1 The executive (adopting some of the suggestions of the report of the 
 last Parliamentary Commission already considered), by an order in Council, 
 made in FebruarVj^lOTG, provided for the selection, through open compe- 
 tition, of a less expensive class of men and boy clerks in the public service, 
 the members of which are made liable to do work in any office, and to go 
 from department to department, as convenience may require. By reason 
 of this provision, there will no longer be a need that every department and 
 office shall have a force equal to the greatest demand that may be made 
 upon it ; but this movable, clerical force of all work can be shifted from 
 places where there is relatively least to be done, to places wlure there is 
 most. Men with such experience must soon become far more valuable in 
 their sphere of duty than mere routine clerks, who often know little about 
 administration beyond that small part that takes place at their own desks. 
 This supplementary order rather increases the stringency of the new system, 
 and with the further orders of June and December, 1876, appears to extend 
 it and to enlarge the authority of the Civil Service Commission. 
 
 2 Division is not synonymous with our word grade or class. There may 
 be grades in a division.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 265 
 
 check upon arbitrary rejections, by requiring the written rea- 
 sons for non-approval to be presarved of record. Prior to 
 August, 1877, the whole number who had sought to enter 
 the public service through examinations had readied the vast 
 aggregate of 172,127. Coming from, perhaps, as many 
 homes, and from nearly every district, borough, village, and 
 hamlet of the kingdom, where the fate of those examined has 
 arrested attention, it is easy to see how naturally the public 
 examinations have stimulated study, how broadly and usefully 
 they have advertised the fact that character and attainments, 
 and not influence or partisan activity, are honored by the 
 government. 
 
 It is worthy of notice that not a charge of favoritism, of in- 
 tentional injustice, or (^interference in party politics, has ever 
 been brought against the commission, nor has an instance of 
 actual injustice, as the accepted result of an examination, been 
 substantiated. The commission has steadily advanced in pub- 
 lic estimation ; and now, in the twenty-fifth year of its grow- 
 ing work, with duties more extended than ever before, and 
 unchallenged by any party or by any class of the people, it 
 stands entrenched in public confidence, with guarantees of 
 enduring usefulness hardly inferior to those which support the 
 strongest agency of British government.
 
 CHAPTER XXYIII. 
 
 CONCERNING PAETS OF THE OLD SPOILS SYSTEM EXCLUDED BY 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 What is so excluded. Mr. Helps's theory of governing by religion and 
 honors. How titles and knighthood have been conferred. For what they 
 are now conferred. The great " Orders" and their influence. Enormous 
 abuses in former times in granting pensions. How they are now granted. 
 Relations of religion to politics. Powers of the crown over church 
 appointments. Corruption in the official life of the church. Use of the 
 appointing power by archbishops. Right to be a minister a matter of 
 merchandise centuries ago and to this day. Advowsons and presentations 
 still openly advertised as for sale. How far old checks on abuse of patron- 
 age worthy our adoption. Patronage and proscription have failed to sus- 
 tain the English Church. They are now its opprobrium and its weak- 
 ness. Patronage in the Church of Scotland has dismembered it, and given 
 birth to "the Free Church of Scotland." How Englishmen and Ameri- 
 cans regard each other's abuses. Purchase in the British military system. 
 Its abolition. Examinations for admission to the British military schools. 
 Favoritism abolished in the British army during the time it has grown 
 in the army of the United States. Illustrations from the laws applicable 
 to the schools at Annapolis and West Point. 
 
 THE repugnancy of a spoils system of office to the Govern- 
 ment of the United States is illustrated by the fact that some 
 of the most pernicious and characteristic elements of the orig- 
 inal system are made impossible by the constitution itself. 
 The granting of titles of nobility, the requirement of religious 
 tests, and laws respecting an establishment of religion, therein 
 prohibited, were not only great bulwarks of that system, but 
 they have shown themselves to be prolific sources of injustice 
 and corruption, endowed with a vitality so tenacious that they 
 have outlived almost every other part of the ancient abuses ; 
 and, at this moment, a demoralizing method of church patron- 
 age and favoritism, in the spirit of mediaeval times, stands out
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 267 
 
 conspicuously alongside tlie ruins of the old system in the 
 domain of politics. 
 
 When Mr. Arthur Helps, whose attacks on competitive 
 examinations the apologists of a republican spoils system are so 
 much in the habit of quoting, in his " Thoughts on Govern- 
 ment," 1 approved the maxim of Buonaparte, which declares 
 that ' ' religion and honors are the two things by which man- 
 kind may be governed," and declared " that the British Con- 
 stitution is the best that has yet been devised by man," he 
 knew very well what he meant ; for, from his central place as 
 the Secretary of the Privy Council, he had during many years 
 looked down through the ranks of social life and all the grades 
 of state-church officials, and knew how they were moved ; but 
 he had no more sympathy with the Constitution of the United 
 States than he had with the partisan manipulations and in- 
 trigue of those who so absurdly invoke and misconceive his 
 words and the system he approved. 
 
 In a general way, the exercise of the powers of the govern- 
 ment in matters of religion, and of those of the crown in confer- 
 ring rank, pensions, and social distinction, in a prescriptive 
 and corrupt spirit, have been already pointed out ; but some 
 further explanations may both illustrate the great difficulties 
 of overcoming the British spoils system and place in a clearer 
 light the true character and tendencies of our own. 
 
 It is familiar knowledge that the power of conferring 
 titles, orders, knighthoods, and social distinction in many 
 ways, has been in past centuries an important source of 
 strength on the part of the crown, and in later years on the 
 part both of the crown and the ministry. The exercise of 
 such a power concerns elements of hope and ambition, active 
 and powerful under every form of government, but especially 
 so in an old monarchy, where standards set up by itself have 
 acquired something like the respect accorded to the dictates of 
 natural justice. A true history of its exercise would be found 
 to run parallel with that of the use of the appointing power, 
 to which it has, in corrupt times, been little more than an 
 adjunct in creating and dividing the spoils of politics. When 
 
 1 Published in 1872.
 
 268 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 James IT. or Charles II. or Walpole used offices and places 
 as merchandise and bribes, they gave titles and decora- 
 tions to vile women and corrupt men. In the reign of 
 Queen Anne twelve peers were created at one time in order 
 to secure a court majority. William Pitt caused peerages to 
 be freely created one hundred and forty being created during 
 his administration and he used them to reward his political 
 followers. The passage of the great Heform bill of 1832 hung 
 in doubt until the administration turned the scale by a threat 
 to create a large number of peers who would vote for it. 
 The scramble for peerages appears to have been as fierce and 
 troublesome as the scramble for office has ever been in a 
 republic. Mr. May says that every minister is obliged to re- 
 sist the solicitation of not less than ten earnest claimants for 
 jgvery peerage which he can bestow, and that recently a minister 
 found that in a single year upwards of thirty of his supporters 
 were ambitious of a peerage, as an acknowledgment of their 
 friendship toward himself and of their devotion to his party. 
 As a natural result, aided by the increase of population and 
 wealth, the House of Lords, which at the accession of George 
 III. consisted of one hundred and seventy-four members, had 
 by 1860 increased to four hundred and sixty members. George 
 III. abused the power of creating knights and baronets, as he 
 did all his other powers, for political and personal purposes. 
 During his reign four hundred and ninety-four baronetcies 
 were created ; and he responded to congratulations on his 
 escaping assassination by conferring so many knighthoods that 
 the degradation of that order was long recognized, even if 
 it has ever regained its old distinction. If, in these times, 
 many men, with real claims to social eminence, in a republican 
 spirit decline royal aid to that end, it is yet true, I think, that 
 rank and social distinctions thus conferred by the crown are a 
 powerful influence for royalty. In 1860 there were eight 
 hundred and sixty baronets, as against about five hundred on 
 the accession of George III. Without attempting to trace the 
 history of the power of conferring titles, it must suffice to say 
 that it survives in great though in waning vigor ; a royal and 
 aristocratic agency in government still holding its place in the 
 liberal currents of British politics by which it is being slowly
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 2G9 
 
 abraded. 1 The same causes which have compelled the use of 
 the appointing power in the common interests of the people 
 have enforced the exercise of nearly all kindred authority in the 
 same spirit ; and at this time titles and decorations are rarely 
 conferred in a mere partisan spirit, nor does any suspicion of 
 corruption appear to attach to their bestowal. 
 
 While the true republican theory in regard to this agency of 
 government seems to be gaining strength, no one can look 
 over the list of those honored by the favor of the crown, 
 or listen to the prevailing views of Englishmen on the subject, 
 without being deeply impressed with a sense of the vast in- 
 fluence thus exerted, and of the utter incompatibility in prin- 
 ciple of this medieval prerogative with the new methods in 
 British politics. The variety and prestige of the great orders 
 "Knights of the Garter," "Knights of the Thistle," 
 "Knights of the Order of St. Patrick," " Knights of the 
 Bath," with its many classes; "Order of St. Michael and 
 St. George," "Order of the Star of India," with their 
 numerous and distinguished membership, extending to foreign 
 statesmen and princes and drawing within their seductive 
 influence so many men of the highest capacity and station at 
 home present another forcible illustration of the adverse in- 
 terests and the traditional privileges by which the reform of 
 the civil service has been confronted and delayed in Great 
 Britain. 
 
 Perhaps no part of this old authority of the crown is now 
 exercised in closer analogy to the partisan use of the appoint- 
 ing power than that of conferring knighthood and baronetcies. 
 " In acknowledgment of the zeal displayed by the city of 
 London, on the occasion of the thanksgiving, a Baronetcy is to 
 be conferred on the Lord Mayor ; and Sheriffs Truscott and 
 Bennett will obtain the honor of Knighthood," a is a journal- 
 
 " It is of the nature of the curious influence of rank to work much more 
 on men singly than on men collectively ;" it is an influence which most men 
 at least, most Englishmen feel very much, but of which most English- 
 men are somewhat ashamed. Each man is a little afraid (hat " his sneaking 
 kindness for a lord," as Mr. Gladstone put it, be found out. Bagehot on 
 The English Constitution, pp. 24 and 25. 
 * London Daily Telegraph, March 1, 1872. 
 18
 
 270 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 istic illustration of the use of this power, of which frequent 
 examples are to be met with in the leading newspapers ; and 
 yet, while non-partisan zeal for the Queen may be thus rewarded 
 by royal favor, no administration, I think, would venture to 
 advise its exercise on mere partisan grounds ; and it is but just 
 to say that it is generally exercised for the purpose of reward- 
 ing exceptional capacity or devotion in the interest of science, 
 literature, or philanthropy. Let the citizens of a republic, if 
 they will, condemn the tame compliance with official wishes 
 which such notices may be thought to prove, and find in the 
 reward of mere zeal for royalty an unworthy use of executive 
 power, but let them at the same time remember the pervading 
 subserviency, of minor officials among themselves, to officers 
 having the appointing power, and the fact that they have seen 
 not individuals only, but conventions and legislatures obse- 
 quious before, not the head of an ancient line of princes, but 
 the temporary officers of their own creation. If it is bad in a 
 monarchy to give social precedence to those who are zealous 
 for the crown and the nobility, for which the constitution pro- 
 vides, is it better in a republic to give offices and salaries as 
 rewards for zeal for parties for which the constitution does not 
 provide ? 
 
 Closely connected with the governmental agency just con- 
 sidered is another affording a similar illustration and equally 
 repugnant to our system that of pensions granted by the 
 crown (formerly) or the administration in (the practice of) 
 recent years. This authority, once as vast as it was pernicious, 
 has in later times been reduced to small if not to harmless 
 proportions. It is important that this power of pensioning 
 should be apprehended as distinct from the authority of grant- 
 ing superannuating or retiring allowances in the public service, 
 which I have already explained. 1 Those allowances are really 
 a part of the compensation of the officer- of the conditions on 
 w r hich he entered the public service and are not, therefore, 
 given on any theory of a gratuity or of favor. Looked at 
 from the side of the government, they are regarded as present- 
 ing an ingenious and just method of securing a good quality of 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 141-144.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 271 
 
 service at the most reasonable rates ; and from the side of the 
 officer, as an inducement to greater economy, at the opening 
 of official life, in order to secure, by reason of what he then 
 forbears to receive, a certain provision for his declining years. 
 
 The pension proper (in civil life) is a different matter alto- 
 gether ; being the bribe of the crown or administration for 
 political effect, or its favor bestowed upon some person deemed 
 fit for its charity or deserving of its honor, and often irre- 
 spective of such person being or having been in the public 
 service. The history of giving pensions, like that of confer- 
 ring offices and titles,' may be easily traced back to the dark 
 ages of corruption, and if possible the authority to grant 
 them has been used more disgracefully and craftily than any 
 other power of the government. I cannot spare the space 
 needed to give anything like a history of this branch of execu- 
 tive authority, but a brief notice of it may be useful. It is 
 well known that vast sums were squandered as pensions upon 
 royal and court favorites male and female in the times of 
 the Stuarts. In the earlier years of the House of Hanover, 
 the extravagance was hardly less, if the moral tone was a little 
 improved; and in later days, amounts not much smaller, though 
 not technically called pensions, have been used in a respectable 
 way to support the households of the members of the royal 
 family. Now " the crown," says Mr. May, 1 " repudiates the 
 indirect influences exercised in former reigns, and is free from 
 imputations of corruption." That the crown is neither cor- 
 rupt nor thought to be capable of corruption is, I believe, 
 beyond question ; but in view of its broad bestowal of titles, 
 and of the lavish votes of money to keep up the prestige and 
 influence of the several members of the royal family, I fail to 
 see how it can be said that " indirect influence" is repudiated. 
 
 It had been the practice and the conceded right of the crown, 
 before the reign of Queen Anne, to charge pensions and an- 
 nuities in perpetuity upon its hereditary revenues ; but on her 
 accession, the right of making such charges was limited to the 
 lifetime of the reigning king, but this restriction did not 
 extend to Scotch or Irish revenues, nor did it cover all other 
 
 1 Const. Hist. , vol. i. , p. 203.
 
 272 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 revenues within the power of the crown. " From the period 
 of the revolution, places and pensions have been regarded as 
 the price of political dependence," and in 1705, persons enjoy- 
 ing a pension during the pleasure of the crown were by law 
 excluded from Parliament. 1 Even after the accession of 
 George III., when a fixed civil list was provided, there was 
 authority to charge pensions upon that list. Vast sums as 
 pensions and annuities were charged upon it or other property, 
 by that prince and his successors ; and corruption and servility, 
 as a consequence, were serious evils. Mr. Burke made a great 
 effort for the reduction of the pension list to $3,000,000 ; and 
 under the Rockingham administration it was provided that 
 until it should be reduced to $-i,500,000, no pension above 
 $1500 a year should be granted, and that the aggregate pen- 
 sions granted in one year should not exceed $3000. It was 
 further provided that pensions should be given only "as a 
 royal bounty to persons in distress or as a reward for desert. ' ' 
 Put, notwithstanding these great reforms, large amounts of 
 revenue from Ireland and Scotland were available, and were 
 used for the purposes of political corruption and royal coer- 
 cion. The Irish pension list of George III. was in 1793 
 $620,000, when important restrictions were imposed. In 
 Scotland the free use of pensions by the crown w r as tolerated 
 until 1810, when the pension list had reached $195,000. 
 There was an available pension fund apparently in the discre- 
 tion of the crown for political purposes until 1830, when all 
 the pension lists were consolidated. And on the accession of 
 Queen Victoria to the throne, in 1837, the right of the crown 
 to grant pensions was limited to $6000 a year, and they can 
 only be granted in that amount " to such persons as have just 
 claims on the royal beneficence, or who, by their personal 
 services to the crown, by their performance of duties to the 
 public, or by their useful discoveries in science and attain- 
 ments in literature and the arts, have merited the gracious 
 consideration of their sovereign and the gratitude of their 
 country." * It will thus be seen that this vast power of cor- 
 
 1 1 May Const. Hist., p. 294. 4 Anne, chap. viii. 
 " 1 Viet., chap. ii.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 273 
 
 mption, under the form of pensions, has departed with the 
 prostitution of the appointing power, and that the reasons for 
 the use of $6000 a year in pensions are if the principle of 
 granting pensions at all is conceded of a kind as fit to be 
 approved by a republic as by a monarchy ; except in so far 
 as the right of pensioning on political grounds may be covered 
 by the phrase " personal services to the crown ;" and we may 
 accept the declaration of Mr. May that " the names of those 
 who receive the royal bounty are generally such as to com- 
 mand respect and sympathy." 
 
 But of all the authority conferred by the British Constitu- 
 tion, in excess of what is allowed under the Constitution of 
 the United States, that which has been the most grossly per- 
 verted for the purposes of coercion and injustice in adminis- 
 tration is the authority over religion and a state church. It 
 would require a volume to set forth the disastrous conse- 
 quences which have flowed from the forced relation between 
 religion and politics, as disclosed in British history. " In 
 the sixteenth century the history of the church is the history 
 of England. In the seventeenth century the relations of the 
 church to the state and society contributed, with political 
 causes, to convulse the kingdom with civil wars and revolu- 
 tions." Having already given adequate illustration of the 
 great fact that authority in ecclesiastical affairs has been as 
 unscrupulously prostituted as authority in civil affairs, there 
 are only a few important considerations to be added in this con- 
 nection. The British king, as the supreme head on earth of 
 the Church of England, has been held to have not only the 
 right to convene, prorogue, and regulate all ecclesiastical syn- 
 ods and conventions, but also the right of nomination to 
 all vacant bishoprics ; and through that supreme power he 
 has had a similar facility, for interference, intimidation, and 
 control in regard to all subordinate nominations and all official 
 action in the lower spheres of ecclesiastical life, to that pos- 
 sessed by a President of the United States, or by Senators and 
 Governors in their own States, to meddle, without constitu- 
 tional warrant, with every subordinate nomination down to that 
 
 1 1 Const. Hist., p. 214. 2 May's Constitutional History, p. 291.
 
 274: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of doorkeeper in a warehouse or a clerk in a convention ; and 
 I hardly need add, that this royal prerogative was formerly 
 used to its full measure. When we consider the superstitious 
 awe inspired by the head of the church, added to the pervad- 
 ing fear of the head of the state, in earlier ages, we can more 
 readily comprehend how crushing was the weight .of a despotic, 
 spoils system which was supreme alike in the sphere of relig- 
 ion and in the sphere of politics. It should also be borne in 
 mind that several of these church officers had authority affect- 
 ing property and persons in their secular relations united with 
 their spiritual and ecclesiastical powers, and that, for the sup- 
 port of the state church and the use of its officials, the tithes 
 of all lands and stock were set apart. Offices and places of 
 every grade from that of the archbishop to that of the 
 beadle and the churchwarden were given as bribes or sold 
 for money just as openly and as unscrupulously as were offices 
 and places in the state. Those miscellaneous kinds of venality 
 and corruption for which our statutes have no aggregate 
 name, but which in English statutes are designated as " office 
 brokerage" were early developed in connection with the offices 
 and patronage of the church. More than three centuries ago, it 
 had become an established custom, for example, that an arch- 
 bishop, upon consecrating a bishop, might name a favorite of 
 his own to be called a clerk or chaplain, who was " to be pro- 
 vided for' ' l by the bishop ; just as republican officers, who now 
 have the power of appointment or confirmation, require those 
 toward whom they discharge a public duty " to provide for " 
 some of their dependants ; but, more openly and boldly, the old, 
 church spoils system allowed this venal imposition to be con- 
 firmed, by deed in due form of law, running to the arch- 
 bishop, his executors and assigns. With such an example on 
 the part of the archbishop, we may well believe that the 
 bishops, the deans, the archdeacons, the deacons, and 
 every church official having any right of nomination or con- 
 firmation, had their favorites "to be provided for. " This 
 right to be provided for was treated as a fit subject of trade 
 
 1 This phrase, generally supposed to have been first used to mark a peculiar 
 form of cormption in our politics, is to be found applied in the modern sense, 
 in Blackstone's Com., vol. i. ch. ii., to high church officials.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 275 
 
 and barter, arid was known and protected in law under the 
 name of the archbishop's " option." ' In times which toler- 
 ated such dealings with the sacred offices of the church, it was 
 natural that the rights of selection of rectors, parsons, curates 
 and vicars that is, the right to live in the parsonage house 
 and to officiate as a minister of a parish should become venal, 
 mere matters of bargain, barter, and sale ; and under the 
 names of " advowsons" and "presentations" they early be- 
 came as much articles of merchandise, and as such were as 
 openly a subject of negotiation and trade, and were as fully 
 recognized by law, as land titles or cattle. Ownership of 
 these rights of naming the next minister could be held by the 
 crown, by individuals, by corporations, or even by military 
 orders. It is no part of my purpose to here describe the scan- 
 dals, dilapidation of church edifices, corruption in the care of 
 church property, decay of spiritual life, or contempt for relig- 
 ious and sacred things, which flowed from such abuses. 2 This 
 right of property in advowsons and presentations was as care- 
 fully protected by the law and the courts, and is by British law- 
 writers made the subject of as elaborate description, as any other 
 kind of property whatever ; Blackstone, saying that ' ' an advow- 
 son" (which he declares to be " synonymous with patronage, " 
 that is, it expresses the same relation to an office 3 of the church 
 that "patronage" does to an office in the state) will more 
 completely illustrate a particular kind of property than any 
 example he can give. When church patronage had thus come 
 
 1 I am not aware that any analogous right has ever been recognized under 
 American law, much as we have acted on the same theory in politics. In 
 morality and legal theory it is most suggestive of a stock-jobber's " put." 
 
 3 See, on these points, ante, p. 47. 
 
 8 Despite this high authority, I must think there is considerable difference 
 between patronage as applied to the choice of a minister and patronage as 
 applied to civil offices generally ; yet they have these most important ele- 
 ments in common : they make merchandise of places of trust, and they re- 
 fuse to allow worth and capacity to determine the selections for office. But, 
 beyond the special kind of church patronage here referred to, patronage, 
 essentially the same as that which prevailed in politics, also extended to the 
 selection and promotion of church officials ; and perhaps that form of it, 
 known as nepotism, was even worse in the church than in the state. The 
 making of his infant son Bishop of Osnaburgh, by George III., is an ex- 
 ample.
 
 276 CIVIL SEKVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 to be valuable property, the monastic orders (among others) 
 " begged and bought " as many advowsons as possible ; and 
 having in that way got control of the income of a vast num- 
 ber of benefices or parishes said to have been one third of 
 thos'e in England they devoted it to their own establishments, 
 to the great prejudice of the poor and of religion among the 
 people. But on the breaking up of these orders under Henry 
 YIII. their advowsons were seized by the Crown, and were 
 afterwards in large part given as favors or bribes in the 
 ordinary course of the corrupt administration of the times ; 
 thus making the circuit of venality, from one private owner, 
 through both ecclesiastical and civil officers, to another pri- 
 vate owner. ' ' Lay patronage placed the greater part of the 
 benefices at the disposal of the Crown, the barons, and the 
 land-owners ;" * and hence we see a whole hemisphere of pat- 
 ronage, beyond any ever known in this country, in the con- 
 trol of the privileged classes and their friends "the party 
 forever in power under a despotic government. This owner- 
 ship of patronage, both on the part of the crown and of indi- 
 viduals, seems to have continued, doubtless with great changes, 
 until the present time. The same causes which thus largely 
 tended to make the sacred domain of the church a great arena 
 for bargaining and pecuniary greed ; which developed a 
 system of corruption which in many ways greatly increased the 
 difficulty of reform in civil affairs ; which caused those who 
 officiated in Christian pulpits to be looked upon and to be re- 
 ferred to in the laws, not so much as being unworldly guides 
 and teachers in spiritual matters, but as purchasers and holders 
 of " livings" for their own enjoyment also caused holders of 
 church offices to be treated as having a pecuniary right to their 
 offices ; " So that even parish clerks and sextons are also re- 
 garded, by the common law, as persons who have freeholds in 
 their offices. ' ' " 
 
 The holder of an advowson in theory had no absolute right 
 to have his man called " a clerk " made a minister, rector, 
 pastor, or vicar, any more than a member of Parliament or 
 of Congress, in the use of his patronage has, in theory, a 
 
 1 2 May's Const. Hist., p. 297. 2 Blackstone's Com., vol. i. ch. ii.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 277 
 
 right to have his man made a collector, bookkeeper, weigher, 
 or inspector ; but ancient bishops found resistance to be as 
 difficult as secretaries and heads of offices have ever found it 
 to be in later times. I have already explained the device of a 
 "Patronage Secretary of the Treasury," and his duty of 
 weighing and apportioning patronage as an indispensable re- 
 straint upon parliamentary importunity ; and, for similar 
 reasons, perhaps, barriers were set up between the pushing 
 holders of patronage and the bishop, some of which would 
 be very embarrassing if applied to our patronage holders in 
 politics; for the bishop might reject a clerk if "an alien," 
 in "want of learning," or when "under age"; but there 
 were other conditions which modern partisans would not object 
 to, for the bishop could not reject the clerk "for haunting 
 taverns or playing unlawful games." His vice must be malum 
 in se, or the clerk was held good enough for a minister. And 
 may it not be true that the regularity, justice, and publicity 
 which such provisions secured that the open recognition of the 
 rights of patronage and of the real influences which controlled 
 appointments, however venal are preferable to the secret in- 
 trigue, corruption, and uncertainty which disguise the iniquity 
 of the transaction itself in our politics, without exposing either 
 the obsequiousness of the official, or the unpatriotic importunity 
 of the patronage-monger ? If we are to endure much longer 
 the evils of a civil, patronage system, borrowed from Great 
 Britain, why should we not also borrow the methods by 
 which she mitigated its evils, and, like her, openly avow our 
 venality and boldly practise in the light a corruption which, 
 perhaps, to be arrested needs only to be seen ? Until we can 
 prevent legislators and party leaders foisting their unworthy 
 dependants and henchmen upon the executive departments, 
 why not have "a patronage secretary" and patronage itself 
 apportioned and entered of record on the books of the Treasury 
 like salaries, and the reasons for which a secretary may reject 
 a nominee as distinctly stated as were the reasons for which a 
 bishop might reject a clerk ? "We should then know, at least 
 as between those who urged and those who accepted a bad 
 nomination, where the responsibility rests, and how to direct 
 the public censure.
 
 278 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 If under any circumstances it be possible for a church any 
 more than for a party to maintain its prestige and author- 
 ity by favoritism and proscription, it would seem it should 
 have been the case of the Church of England the church 
 of the king, the nobility, the rich and high-born classes thus 
 privileged and fortified in her vast patronage and her all-per- 
 vading ministrations. And she had yet other and not less 
 powerful means of domination. For the Corporation Act 
 of 1661 shut the gates of office against the Protestant non- 
 conformists, and the Test Act, 1663, made the papists incom- 
 petent to hold any official position, high or low, national or 
 municipal, civil or ecclesiastical ; and these laws, under which 
 both the creed and the sacrament of the state church were 
 made conditions of holding office even though her highest 
 dignitaries admitted a fear that they " had led, in too many 
 instances, to the profanation of the most sacred offices of 
 religion' ' remained unrepealed for more than one hundred 
 and fifty years until 1828. It is hardly worth while to stop 
 to inquire which, in point of justice, is the most indefeasible, 
 or which in practice is most disastrous : this old despotic 
 system, under which, by permanent provision of law, mere opin- 
 ions about religion were made grounds of exclusion from all 
 offices ; or the modern, partisan system, which, going beyond 
 law, and without the courage to declare mere opinions a 
 ground of exclusion, yet accomplishes an equal amount of pro- 
 scription by giving each party in turn the opportunity to ex- 
 pel and exclude its adversaries from office, for mere opinions 
 about politics. But it may perhaps be useful for us to reflect 
 upon the facts that, besides all the strength which a state 
 church or a state church party could gain from all this 
 patronage and proscription in its behalf, there was the still 
 further advantage of having its creed taught in all the great 
 institutions of learning, where it excluded those professing 
 any other faith ; ' of its having a monopoly of entrance at the 
 
 1 It was not until 1871 that all religious tests -were abolished for admis- 
 sion to offices and degrees in the Universities. The nonconformists had to 
 pay rates for the benefit of the state church until 1868 ; and though some- 
 thing like justice is thus secured to the living, the dead are still made the 
 subjects of state church restrictions before they can be laid for their final 
 rest in the cemeteries.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 279 
 
 gates of the great professions ; of its being proclaimed in the 
 courts of law, in the halls of legislation, at the head of regi- 
 ments, in the cabins of ships, in every office and in every place 
 of honor, from the smallest fort or consulate to the palace and 
 the throne ; but with what results ? Catholicism, toward which 
 the state church itself has an ominous leaning, is growing 
 more formidable in Great Britain. Among the dissenters are 
 to be counted, probably, one half of the people and of the 
 piety of England. Patronage and favoritism upheld, doubt- 
 less, by their connection with the creed and the sacraments, in 
 the sphere of religion after they have been crushed in the do- 
 main of politics are at once the opprobrium of the Church of 
 England ' and the weakest point in her battlement, through 
 which her enemies are making their most dangerous assaults ; 
 while on this continent the old, state church faith, transplanted 
 without its patronage and venality, has grown with an earnest- 
 ness of spirit and a material prosperity which are the best of 
 all refutations of the theory that a party based on religion, 
 any more than a party based on politics, can prosper on the 
 prostitution of its offices or the degradation of its principles. 
 
 1 Speaking of these abuses, the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol says : 
 "In regard to the sale of benefices, and especially of next presentations, it 
 must be admitted -we are in the greatest possible difficulty. . . ." Nine- 
 teenth Century, March, 1877, p. 58. 
 
 The dissenters of course stop with no such moderate language. "A more 
 mournful and painful book (" Purchase in the Church, etc.") can scarcely be 
 imagined. ... It is impossible to question the accuracy of these instances, 
 the aggregate of which 1400 is one tenth of the entire livings of the Church 
 in the market for sale or barter at the same time. . . . The living of Tra- 
 haverock, in Cornwall, worth 180 a year, is advertised for sale. The ad- 
 vertisement states " there is no cure of souls to perform, and no residence is re- 
 quired." British Quarterly Review, Oct. 8, 1878. 
 
 The following are advertisements (similar to those to be found in any of 
 the journals) cut from the London Times in September, 1870 : 
 
 " Advowson for Sale (a Rectory), situate close to a good town in an eastern 
 county. Situation most healthy and pleasant. Good society. Income is 
 about 250 a year, and there is a prospect of a very early possession, excel- 
 lent vicarage house, grounds, etc. Address, J. B., 51 Hollywood Road, West 
 Brompton." 
 
 "140 Preferments for Sale. Tlie Church Preferment Register, for Se'p- 
 tember (32 pages), contains all details of advowsons, presentations, Episco- 
 pal chapels, for sale by private treaty," etc., etc.
 
 280 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Advertisements and transactions of the kind mentioned in 
 the note last referred to, which with us would undoubt- 
 edly be deemed in the last degree scandalous, have so long 
 been common in Great Britain, that they attract little more 
 attention there than the habitual bestowal of offices for mere 
 partisan services, in disregard of personal iitness, attracts in 
 the United States. Indeed, it is not easy to say which is the 
 more astonished an American when he first learns that a 
 young clerk, the merest stranger from the other end of the 
 empire, may, against the common wishes of the parish, buy 
 his way into a pulpit of the English state church, or the 
 Englishman when for the first time he learns that a mere 
 politician, an inexperienced stranger from the hills, may be 
 pushed by a clique of partisans into a collectorship over the 
 heads of all those in the custom house, who alone are quali- 
 fied for the office. If the British example of venality and 
 injustice seem more disgraceful because in the sphere of sacred 
 things, we must bear in mind that, before the clerk can enter 
 his pulpit, he must have been approved by a bishop ; while 
 no moral standard can be applied to the politician partisan 
 services and prospects of services, by whatever means, being 
 the grounds of his claim. And it would be unjust not to men- 
 tion that the bishop's standard of acceptance has been raised 
 higher and higher, that mercenary influence has been limited 
 in various w T ays, so that, aided by the better public opinion 
 which banished patronage from politics, and sustained, in later 
 years, by a higher sentiment within the church itself, 1 a great 
 part of the evils are now prevented which originally attended 
 the church patronage system. But the system, with its in- 
 herent tendency toward venality and corruption, survives ; and, 
 much as its abuses have been mitigated, it has been a great 
 obstruction to the reform of the civil service, of which the 
 enemies of that reform have not scrupled to avail themselves. 2 
 This system of purchase and sale of places in the Church of 
 
 I " While loyalty to the crown has survived all the advances of democ- 
 racy, the church has awakened from a long period of inaction, and by her 
 zeal and good works have recovered much of her former influence." May'* 
 Democracy in Europe, vol. ii. p. 501. 
 
 II Sec, for example, ante, p. 198.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 2S1 
 
 " lay patronage," as it is called by the Scotch has not been 
 confined to the Church of England, but has demoralized and 
 embroiled both the Episcopal and the Presbyterian churches in 
 Scotland as well. John Knox opposed it from the beginning, 
 but not successfully. It led even to scandalous acts of vio- 
 lence. But patronage was recognized by statute, and its spirit 
 and example for centuries contributed to the venality, favor- 
 itism, and corruption of all official life in Scotland. Growing 
 more obnoxious as the moral tone and independence of the 
 nation rose, and largely drawing into the controversy about 
 patronage the broader question of state interference in affairs 
 of religion, it became in the first quarter of this century a 
 cause of contentions in the Presbyterian Church so serious 
 as to lead at last to its dismemberment. The party which 
 resisted lay patronage, and claimed the right of the congrega- 
 tion to deckle what minister it would have, led by Dr. Chal- 
 mers, finally, in 1834, secured a majority in General Assem- 
 bly ; a result followed by long-continued litigation about 
 the rights of patrons, in which both the Scotch and the 
 English courts affirmed a right of private property in church 
 patronage in Scotland (analogous to that existing in the English 
 Church), which no congregation was allowed to defeat by 
 rejecting the minister who had been tendered them by the 
 patronage-owner. This was too much for the honesty and 
 manhood of a great portion of the members of the (state) 
 Church of Scotland, and they formally seceded and withdrew 
 in 1843, Dr. Chalmers being still a leader. "The secession 
 embraced more than a third of the clergy of the Church of 
 Scotland, and afterwards received considerable accessions of 
 strength. . . . Their once crowded churches were surrendered 
 to others, while they went forth to preach on the hillsides, in 
 tents, barns, and stables. But they relied, with just con- 
 fidence, upon the sympathies and liberality of their flocks, 
 and in a few years the spires of their free kirks were to be 
 seen in most of the parishes of Scotland." ' In eighteen years, 
 more than $26,000,000 were contributed for the purposes of 
 the new organization, and the devotion and earnestness of its 
 
 1 2 May's Const. Hist., p. 443.
 
 282 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 members have not been less than its material prosperity ; re- 
 sults which the vigorous growth of the same faith in the 
 United States, without State aid, patronage, or proscription, 
 must have led all thoughtful minds to anticipate. Here, there- 
 fore, in a rebellion against the ecclesiastical part of the old 
 spoils system, we have the origin of ' ' The Free Church of 
 Scotland," as well as an illustration of the cost and the diffi- 
 culties of removing some portions of that system which the 
 principles of the Constitution practically made impossible in 
 the United States. The fate of so much of that despotic, old 
 system as still lingers in the more worldly divisions of the 
 Scotch Church and in the Church of England whether any 
 thing less than disfranchisement can make an end of that sys- 
 tem in Great Britain whether it be destined to survive the 
 longest among the state church Tories of the Old World in the 
 domain of religion, or among the republican freemen of the 
 New World in the domain of politics these must remain in- 
 teresting questions of the future. Certainly, few things are 
 more anomalous, in the public affairs of the English-speaking 
 people, than the facts that the champions, of the mediaeval and 
 despotic spirit on one side of the Atlantic should be defending 
 whatever there remains of the old system of patronage, favor- 
 itism, and proscription in the avowed interests of royalty and 
 a state church ; at the same time that the self-proclaimed 
 champions of republican institutions, on the other side of the 
 Atlantic, are defending whatever of the same old system there 
 survives, in the pretended interest of democracy, liberty, and 
 justice. Nor is this contrast less significant when considered as 
 illustrating the extent to which provision may be made against 
 evils of the same kind, in one direction, while, with some- 
 thing like unconsciousness, the people allow them to flourish 
 in full view in another direction ; for the people of Great 
 Britain went on removing abuses in the civil administration 
 without their sense of the enormity of such abuses in the 
 affairs of the state church being very much increased ; and the 
 people of the United States, on the other hand, look upon the 
 provisions of the Constitution, which have protected them from 
 these latter abuses, without much reflecting that its authors 
 could never have imagined that like abuses would grow in the
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 283 
 
 civil administration. Standing in the presence of church 
 patronage, which, if allowed, would speedily sink any religious 
 organization in the United States, Englishmen are filled with 
 horror at our political abuses, and grow loyal and patriotic 
 over the virtues of the civil administration of their country ; 
 while, standing amidst civil abuses that have been impossible, 
 for nearly half a century in Great Britain, Americans are 
 amazed that the offices of religion should there be in the mar- 
 ket as merchandise, and that men should be able to buy their 
 places as ministers in the temples of divine worship. 
 
 There is another branch of public service in Great Britain 
 which, though not literally within the scope of this chapter, 
 or perhaps of the present work, yet affords striking illustra- 
 tions of the spirit of the new system and of the obstacles it has 
 overcome ; nor is it without importance as showing the decay 
 of patronage and favoritism in Great Britain during the period 
 in which they have been growing in the United States. We 
 have seen that under the despotic kings there was no distinc- 
 tion between civil and military officers as to the conditions of 
 their appointment, government, or removal ; that James IT. 
 as unhesitatingly turned out colonels and generals as he did 
 collectors or heads of bureaus, for mere political or household 
 reasons ; that "Walpole denied all grounds of distinction be- 
 tween civil and military officers as to removal ; that George 
 III. deprived General Con way, Colonel Barre, and other mili- 
 tary officers of their commands for favoring the patriotic cause 
 in America, and that it was with great difficulty that the king 
 was induced to promise that military men should in the future 
 be treated as beyond removal for mere political reasons. But 
 while the king forebore any extreme application of his pre- 
 scriptive theory to military affairs, appointments in the army 
 and navy became a part of the patronage monopoly of mem- 
 bers of Parliament. There had also been growing up a system 
 under which the war offices of the nation, just like the minis- 
 terial places in the Church, were the subjects of open barter 
 and of bargain and sale for money. This system spread until 
 under the name of "purchase" it appears to have embraced 
 almost the whole military (and no small part of the naval) ser- 
 vice of the Empire. Army purchase, like Church patronage,
 
 284 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 was recognized and protected by law ; and when it was finally 
 brought to an end (since the order for open competition in 
 1870), it was on the basis of an allowance or compensation in 
 money for all commissions then held by purchase. While 
 there was much in the spirit and exigencies of military life 
 and in the high demands of national sentiment that put some 
 check upon the grosser abuses to which so demoralizing a system 
 tended, it is easy to see that it could hardly fail to bring many 
 unworthy persons into military office, to be a serious obstacle 
 to the introduction of the merit system into civil service, or to 
 add greatly to all that was venal and suspicious in official life. 
 No examinations were provided and no effective standard of 
 qualifications applied as against the purchaser of the office. 
 Everywhere there was only a gross competition of money and 
 influence, in which personal worth had little favor and no aid in 
 the methods of government. It was this military system 
 which we had before us when our Constitution was formed : 
 but we also had before us the experience of the revolutionary 
 war. Our statesmen had seen what caused them to feel the 
 necessity of having military officers adequately instructed for 
 the practical duties of their calling. It was this conviction 
 which resulted in the establishment of the Military Academy 
 at "West Point in 1802, and in fixing a literary qualification 
 for admission to it in 1812. In foresight and in patriotic disin- 
 terestedness, the American Congress was then far in advance of 
 the British Parliament. The law creating this school provided 
 for no patronage in nominating cadets on the part of mem- 
 bers of Congress, for they were to be selected by the Presi- 
 dent ; and its whole spirit was hostile to making merchandise 
 of military commissions. England had then no such school, 
 and her military system was, during the first quarter of the 
 century, on a low moral plane as compared with that of the 
 United States. But a change was soon to appear in both 
 countries, which has resulted in contrasts full of significance. 
 It was not long before military instruction was provided for in 
 Great Britain, and the claims of personal merit began to rise 
 over Parliamentary patronage and the opportunities of wealth. 
 The greater abuses of the purchase system were one after 
 another remedied. Rigid examinations were provided for
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 285 
 
 admission to the military schools ; and at last Parliamentary 
 patronage has been compelled to yield to open competition as 
 the key that opens the gates of those institutions from whose 
 graduates generally the army officers are selected. I need not 
 here recount any of the facts to which I have already referred 
 (or shall refer), showing that, in India and in the home ser- 
 vice, members of Parliament have lost their patronage of nom- 
 inating cadets for either the naval or the military schools, and 
 that a fair public contest 9f merit open competition before 
 the Civil Service Commission wins the cadetships and gives 
 a better class of candidates for the regular army and navy. It 
 would seem that the same method guards the official places in 
 what we should call the militia service. Parliamentary pat- 
 ronage and purchase in the war service of the nation have 
 thus died and been buried together. In the United States, 
 however, the tendency has been in the other direction. The 
 partisan spirit that created the spoils system was equally favor- 
 able to the disastrous growth of Congressional patronage. The 
 first step toward Congressional control over cadet appoint- 
 ments was made in 1843, when it was provided that one cadet 
 should be taken from each Congressional district. In viola- 
 tion of the provisions of the law which vested the nomination 
 of cadets in the President, members of Congress took their 
 selection to themselves, and they have since maintained that 
 usurpation, though the statutes still provide that ' ' they shall 
 be appointed by the President. ' ' 
 
 In the law providing for cadet appointments in the Kaval 
 School, enacted in 1862, 3 we find the claims of this growing 
 Congressional patronage system more significantly expressed. 
 The " number allowed at the Academy shall be two for every 
 member" (of Congress), says the statute, and the President 
 shall select two from the District of Columbia and ten at 
 large, and "the President shall also be allowed three yearly 
 appointments of midshipmen ... to be selected from boys 
 enlisted in the Xavy. The Revised Statutes of 1875 3 require 
 the Secretary of the Xavy to notify the member of any vacancy 
 
 1 See Revised Statutes U. S., 1315. * Laws 1862, chap. 183, 11. 
 3 1514. 
 
 19
 
 286 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 in his district, and declare that ' ' the nomination shall be made 
 on the recommendation of the member," and permits the 
 President to appoint one cadet from the District of Columbia 
 and ten at large. 
 
 Here we see the advance of a system of legislative patronage 
 unknown to our politics in the beginning of the century, and 
 which was abandoned in Great Britain after long experience of 
 its disastrous consequences ; and a new spirit with a new claim 
 has grown into such domineering tones and assumptions, that 
 the small portion of the constitutional authority left to the 
 President the selection of eleven out of near four hundred 
 cadets is mentioned as being what is ' ' allowed ' ' to him, and 
 the nomination by members is spoken of as if it were a per- 
 quisite and right as legitimate and as absolute as any claim of 
 Parliamentary or State Church patronage ever set up by a 
 member of Parliament in the most corrupt and prescriptive 
 periods of British history. These and other encroachments of 
 the Legislature upon the Executive have attracted the attention 
 of thoughtful, foreign writers., "A legislative chamber is 
 greedy and covetous ; it acquires as much, it concedes as 
 little as possible ; . . . the law-making faculty, the most 
 comprehensive of the imperial faculties, is its instrument ; 
 it will take the Administration if it can take it. Tried by 
 their own aims, the founders of the United States Constitu- 
 tion were wise in excluding the Ministers from Congress." 1 
 In the facts recited, we see, not merely how law-makers can 
 ' ' take ' ' patronage, in flagrant violation of the fundamental 
 principle of the government, which requires that the legisla- 
 tive and executive functions shall be kept distinct, but we 
 also see regulations for apportionment, division, and enjoy- 
 ment laid down as formally and with as little disguise as in 
 any rules of a prize court for sharing the spoils of war, or in 
 any customs of Newcastle's or Walpole's "Patronage Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury " for sharing the spoils of peace. 
 
 It is interesting to note that here, as in Great Britain before 
 
 1 Bagehot's " English Constitution," pp. 92 and 93. It is Mr. Bagehot's 
 view that Secretaries coming into Congress would increase the power of that 
 body over the Executive ; and he feels the necessity of not increasing that 
 peril, much as, in the abstract, he favors their presence.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 287 
 
 the new system became general, public opinion tends more and 
 more to compel members to hand their cadetships over to open 
 competition; and here as there it seems clear that such compe- 
 tition secures a superior class of students ; l but it would carry 
 me too far from my subject to present the proofs on these 
 points, and they would but add another to the many exam- 
 ples of our repeating continually, for good or for evil, the ex- 
 perience of the older country. 
 
 1 Twenty-two years ago, upon the first experiment of competition for the 
 selection of military cadets, we find Mr. Mill (Representative Government, 
 p. 110, edition 1857) saying : "I am credibly informed that in the military 
 academy at Woolwich the competition-cadets are as superior to those ad- 
 mitted on the old system of nominations in these respects (bodily activity) as 
 in all others." And the report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, made 
 in April, 1874, uses this language on the same subject : "So unsatisfactory 
 had been all olher methods of nomination that the official circulars from the 
 Secretary of War, under which this courtesy is regularly extended, recog- 
 nizing the precedents of disinterested members of Congress, now contain a 
 notice that 'competitive examinations,' etc., have been introduced, 'with 
 results satisfactory,' as the basis of these nominations ; and in the Naval 
 School, also, the advantages of competitive examinations, induced by the ex- 
 ample of such examinations under the civil service rules, have still further 
 supplanted the old methods. The facts, which we find confirmed by the 
 highest authority, are stated by the editor of a Washington journal as follows : 
 
 " ' The position of cadet -engineer being open to any youth of proper age 
 and proficiency, the Secretary of the Navy received last summer a very 
 large number of applications, and in order to secure the most efficient he 
 made the examination competitive. The wisdom of this course has fully 
 proved itself in the second class of cadet-engineers, now at the Academy, 
 which has been declared both mentally and physically superior to any that pre- 
 ceded it.' "The Chronicle, February 14, 1874.
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 SOME PRACTICAL TENDENCIES AND RELATIONS OF THE REFORMED 
 
 METHOD. 
 
 Popular education advanced with administrative reform. The public 
 schools. Examinations for women. Interest in politics unabated. The 
 franchise extended. Crime decreased: Sanitary administration. Salaries 
 and economical results. Relation of the new system to tenure of office, to 
 official fidelity, and to efficiency. 
 
 THE history of the growth of the reform sentiment and of 
 the new methods to which it has given birth has to a large ex- 
 tent explained their practical effect. That they have been a 
 victory of public virtue and intelligence over corruption and 
 incompetency, of common justice over special privileges and 
 feudal customs, of equal rights and opportunities over official 
 favoritism and partisan tyranny, and especially of the great 
 cause of elementary education over the exclusiveness and the 
 selfish hostility of the aristocratic classes, are results almost 
 too plain for further comment. In one aspect, the reform in 
 its later stages may be looked upon as an illustration of a 
 great movement in the public conscience and thought, which 
 marks an epoch in British history ; finding kindred expression 
 in laws, of rare beneficence and wisdom, for the protection of 
 the poor and humble in mines, shops, and factories ; for the 
 suppression of vice and crime ; for the security of life, health, 
 and virtue ; for the acquisition of land, education, and com- 
 mon rights ; for the extension of suffrage, and the purity and 
 responsibility of public life in various ways. In another as- 
 pect, it presents itself as a remarkable concentration of public 
 intelligence and scrutiny upon a method for elevating the 
 standard of official duty and capacity, above what might be ex- 
 pected from the general condition of the people ; and, where- 
 by political contests, no longer mere scrambles for office,
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 289 
 
 are made to turn upon great principles and good administra- 
 tion ; so that the very processes of governing are made foun- 
 tains of strength to the conservative forces of society. The 
 early reformers naturally expected that popular instruction 
 would be stimulated by their work, and this opinion was, we 
 find, soon shared by practical statesmen at the head of the 
 government. " I hope we shall give a great stimulus to 
 primary education by holding out this large number of re- 
 wards . . . for those who excel in competition. "' That 
 hope was not disappointed. I have space for only the most 
 meagre illustration of the marvellous strides 2 which have been 
 made during the past few years in common-school education, 
 so long shamefully neglected by the ruling class in Great 
 Britain. It was in the same year (18 TO) when open competi- 
 tion was introduced, that school boards, sustained by local 
 rates (which had been long resisted by the State Church and 
 the privileged classes), were for the first time provided for in 
 all the districts of the country. 
 
 Competent observers think the new school system to be in 
 some respects unsurpassed, and no well informed person will 
 deny that parts of its administration deserve our serious study. * 
 The vigor with which popular education has advanced, since 
 1870, makes its own suggestion as to its being aided by some 
 new and powerful cause not so much, perhaps, by com- 
 petition for the public service as the ultimate force, as 
 by the new spirit which demanded both competition and 
 schools and which now stands behind and stimulates edu- 
 cation. The election for the London School Board in the 
 autumn of 1870 is said to have aroused more interest than 
 
 1 Evidence of the Chancellor of Exchequer, Parl. Rep. 1873, p. 231, 
 Vol. 3. 
 
 " " In your elementary schools you are in advance of us. . . . Ten years 
 ago we were a long way behind, but we are improving rapidly, and if you 
 intend to keep before us, you will have to work hard. " Impressions of Amer- 
 ica, by Hep. R. W. Dak, 1878, p. 163. 
 
 3 Several able women have been elected members of the London School 
 Roard, and their services have been found invaluable a kind of member- 
 ship not so compatible with our partisan system. The new system of 
 cumulative voting for school officers excludes the absolute domination of 
 either party in school management.
 
 290 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 any municipal election ever held in the metropolis. Be- 
 tween 1870 and 1875, that Board alone completed 53 school 
 houses, at a cost of nearly $3,500,000 ; and in 1875 it had 80 
 others in the course of construction, on which more than 
 $2,800,000 had been expended. Attendance in the schools is 
 compulsory. In 1874, there were 77,985 official notices served 
 to attend ; 4681 persons were convicted for neglect in that 
 regard, and 41,697 parents were required to appear and show 
 cause why their children were absent from school. A part of 
 the expenses of destitute children attending school are paid 
 from the public funds, so that their poverty may not prevent 
 their education. 1 The popular support of education advanced 
 so rapidly that, in 1876, compulsory attendance was made 
 general by act of Parliament. It appears 2 that the rapid 
 spread of elementary instruction among the people continues un- 
 abated. In England, the attendance upon the public schools 
 has increased sixty per cent in five years, and in Scotland forty- 
 two per cent in three years. In the city of Birmingham, it in- 
 creased one hundred and thirty-eight per cent between 1871 and 
 1876. The success of the higher institutions of learning, in 
 testing capacity by examinations, would seem to have originally 
 suggested the practicability of such tests for the public service. 
 There can be no doubt, however, but the debt has been many 
 times repaid by the greater honor and profit which the action 
 of the government has conferred upon learning in every grade. 
 What elevates and widens the base of course raises and 
 strengthens the whole pyramid of knowledge. It has not 
 therefore been in the lower range of learning alone that exam- 
 inations for the public service have given new vitality to pop- 
 ular education. The example helped to stimulate the higher 
 schools and even the universities to a more active life. Much 
 higher qualifications have also been required, within the last few 
 years, than formerly, for admission to the bar or to practice as 
 an attorney or solicitor. The right to practice as a doctor 
 or surgeon, or to carry on the business of an apothecary or 
 medical chemist, has, in the same period, been condition- 
 ed on higher attainments. In 1865, Oxford and Cambridge 
 
 1 Firth's Municipal London, p. 442-457. 
 
 "Report U. S. Commissioner of Education, 1878, p. CLXIV.-CLXIX.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 291 
 
 (which had before conducted local examinations for young 
 men engaged in literary and scientific studies) extended them 
 to young women, not with a view of admitting them as stu- 
 dents, but of stimulating and rewarding home studies by public 
 encouragement. Other institutions have followed these exam- 
 ples. In 1865, only 126 young women were candidates, but 
 in 1875 examinations were held at fifty-six different places, 
 and there were 1552 female candidates ' examined. The grow- 
 ing spirit of justice and liberty, within the same period, has 
 opened the public museums, libraries, and galleries freely to 
 the people, and made the Kensington Museum the centre of a 
 vast system of instruction in the practical arts now being given 
 in numerous places throughout the British Islands. 
 
 It is a matter of common observation that the taking of the 
 corrupt elements and the venal prizes out of party contests in 
 Great Britain has in no sense weakened the wholesome public 
 interest in elections. Parties have never stood more firmly by 
 their principles or maintained more vigorous contests at the 
 polls than since these contests have ceased to control nomina- 
 tions, appointments, promotions, or removals. Indeed, it has 
 been during the same period, in which that service has been 
 gradually raised above corruption and partisanship, that the 
 English people have most vigorously and successfully con- 
 tended for an enlarged suffrage and for the ballot. The same re- 
 forming spirit which abolished compulsory church rates in 1868, 
 disestablished the Irish Church in 1869, opened the public 
 service freely to merit in 1870, swept away religious tests for 
 admissions to offices and degrees in the universities, and sup- 
 pressed the sale of army commissions in 1871, finally, in the 
 last-named year, secured to the people the invaluable privilege 
 of voting by ballot. So far from there being indifference to 
 elections, the right of voting is now held and exercised by a 
 larger proportion of the people of Great Britain than at any 
 other period of her history. 
 
 It is a point of interest to know what effect the new methods 
 for selecting executive officers have had upon the amount of 
 
 1 Harvard University, among our own institutions, five years ago offered 
 American women the benefit of such examinations upon the English prin- 
 ciple, and they are being continued with increasing success.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GKEAT BRITAIN. 
 
 crime and the administration of justice ; but I cannot spare 
 space for more than the briefest illustration. The fact has 
 been that crime and criminal arrests have been steadily de- 
 creasing in Great Britain, as corruption has disappeared from 
 her politics. London is, perhaps, a fair example of the whole 
 country ; and there a recent English writer asserts :/ "It is 
 satisfactory to notice that crime in the metropolis is on the de- 
 crease, not merely proportionally, but actually ;" but it is not 
 satisfactory to us to be compelled also to notice that the num- 
 ber of crimes and criminal arrests in London are less in each 
 year than they are in the city of New York, which has only 
 about one-third the population of London. 2 
 
 It would require too much space to give the facts necessary 
 to illustrate in any general way the efiiciency with which the 
 laws are now executed in Great Britain. It must suffice to 
 make a simple reference to sanitary administration, which, as 
 much as any other, measures the ability and fidelity of 
 officials. New York city has a health administration of unsur- 
 passed efficiency in this country (considering the partisan 
 abuses which cripple it and which demoralize the whole city 
 government on which it depends) ; but the more favorable 
 political conditions of London have, in later years, enabled its 
 health officers despite its slums of fearful vice and ignorance 
 which have come down from generations that knew neither 
 cleanliness nor schools to reduce its ratio of disease and death 
 below that of the city of New York ; and, by reason of able 
 health officers, the death rate of Bombay that ancient haunt 
 and breeding-place of plagues, leprosies, and choleras with 
 its population of 650,000 of all races and religions under the 
 sun seems to have been reduced below that of Baltimore, 
 Richmond, New Orleans, and other American cities. Per- 
 haps the greatest sanitary reforms ever yet undertaken in the 
 world are those which have been carried forward in Glasgow 
 
 1 Firth's Municipal London, 1876, p. 431. 
 
 2 The number of arrests in London in 1869 was 72,951. In 1870 it was 
 71,269, and has since decreased. In 1870 the number arrested in New York 
 city was 75,692. In 1871 it was 84,514, and in 1875 it was 84,399. I have 
 not the exact figures to make the comparison since, but the ratio has not 
 materially varied.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 293 
 
 and Edinburgh within the last twelve years. The artisans' 
 and laborers' dwellings improvement acts of 1875 are being 
 carried into effect with an official ability and fidelity worthy 
 the spirit they embody ; and the tenement house law (and all 
 the other most efficient sanitary) statutes of New York city 
 are in large part based on British precedents. 1 
 
 It would require a whole chapter to do justice to the 
 economical results of the new system. It is by no means 
 easy to make due allowance for the different rates of wages in 
 the two countries so as to show with exactness the relative 
 cost of the merit and partisan systems. Besides, as the Brit- 
 ish officers have a graded salary, which increases with years 
 of service, and is followed (after ten years of service) by a re- 
 tiring allowance, the relative cost is not shown by a mere 
 comparison of salaries. ~No argument, however, is needed to 
 prove that, as the respectability and honor of the public service 
 is raised, it becomes more attractive. Men will work for less 
 compensation, when their tenure is secure during good be- 
 havior and their position commands public respect. It has 
 already been shown that, by reason of securing a better class 
 of officers, a much smaller number has been found adequate. 
 Facts might be cited, could I give space for them, which 
 would show a great saving in the cost of administration. 4 It 
 must suffice, as illustrations, to state that the government 
 clerks clerks corresponding to those to whom we pay $900 a 
 year, begin on a salary of from $400 to $450 a year, and that 
 the police of London are paid salaries that are not much 
 
 1 38 and 39 Viet. , chaps. 36 and 49. These are most comprehensive stat 
 utes, and in their elaborate provisions for securing sanitary protection to the 
 homes of the poor, they go far beyond anything attempted in this country. 
 And another act of the same year (38 and 39 Viet. , chap. 55), which fills 152 
 pages of the statute being a general public health law in the variety, benev- 
 olence, and breadth of its provisions, probably transcends the united body of 
 all our State and Congressional legislation on sanitary subjects. So wise 
 and just provisions, in the special interest of the humble and the feeble, 
 would not seem to be most fit to be monopolized by a monarchy ; and 
 at a time when our legislators, State and national, are so anxiously debating 
 sanitary subjects, in aspects that have long since entered into British admin- 
 istration, I venture to depart a little from my subject to draw attention to 
 these matters of supreme importance. 
 
 * For some illustrations, see Chap. XII. , pp. 147-150.
 
 294: CIVIL- SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 more than one half those paid policemen in the city of New 
 York. 
 
 The method of coming into the service upon the basis of 
 merit has not necessarily anything to do with the tenure of 
 office, though its spirit is of course utterly hostile to removals 
 except for good cause, and for such removals the British sys- 
 tem gives ample authority. The moment that open compe- 
 tition is made the door of entrance to the service, there is 
 little pressure to put men out in order to get others in. It is 
 far too uncertain who will win the place made vacant, to make 
 the attack attractive to office-brokers or place-hunters. So 
 long as every executive officer having the right of nomination 
 is exposed to the menace of congressional influence, and all the 
 gates of the public service stand wide open to the siege of 
 partisan organizations, it will, I am persuaded, hardly be 
 possible to establish any wise tenure of office ; but as soon as 
 an effective test of merit can be placed at these gates, the vast 
 army of interested politicians now so obstructive will no longer 
 be able to foist their favorites upon the Treasury, and they will 
 therefore no longer take the trouble to oppose a just and 
 economical official tenure. It will be only after corrupt and 
 partisan ways of getting into public places have been closed, 
 that we shall be able to consider the subject disinterestedly and 
 calmly, and thus be in a fair condition to decide for how long 
 a time, or until what age, in the several branches of the ser- 
 vice, it is for the public interest to retain an official. There 
 does not seem, in view of British experience, to be any great 
 promise of usefulness in giving much attention to that subject 
 at present ; though if we could return to our original system, 
 by repealing the laws which limit the term of collectors, post- 
 masters, surveyors, and various other subordinates, to four 
 years, we should get rid of many demoralizing contests, and 
 should soon gain that experience that would enable us to decide 
 upon some tenure more inviting to worthy persons, and hence 
 more economical for the government upon some tenure that 
 would not bring on a new contest for existence, by the time 
 an officer has gained experience enough to know his duties. 
 
 No one can go over the British investigations on the sub- 
 ject, or come in contact with British officials, without being
 
 CIVIL SEEVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 295 
 
 impressed with the need and the importance of some fixed 
 rules as to the age most fit and advantageous for entering and 
 leaving the public service and hence, as to the proper tenure 
 of a subordinate, executive officer. The question is one which 
 equally concerns public economy and official morality. So 
 long as the absurd theory of " rotation in office" a change 
 for the sake of a change a theory that could not bring about 
 the justice to which it appeals, even if official tenure was for 
 only a single day or the partisan theory of appointment and 
 removals move the majority, it is in vain to expect any prac- 
 tical result from inquiring what a proper regard for efficiency, 
 economy, or official fidelity demand. I have no space to ade- 
 quately present the reasoning on the subject to be found in 
 British documents, and yet I am not willing to dismiss them in 
 silence. What can be plainer than this that when an officer or 
 clerk has no assurance that great capacity or industry in his place 
 will either prevent his removal, ensure his promotion, or even 
 protect him from assessments, he is deprived of the strongest 
 motives to usefulness, and is naturally filled with a sense of the 
 injustice of his government ? To be most efficient he needs to 
 study the duties of his position ; but why should he labor be- 
 yond the needs of to-day, when to-morrow he may be sent 
 home in disgrace, without cause and without trial, or be 
 humiliated by seeing an official or partisan favorite, every 
 way inferior to himself, put over his head ? lie has not even 
 the motives to good conduct which the government of all the 
 more enlightened States throw around the inmates of their 
 prisons, who are allowed by good conduct to reduce their term 
 of confinement. This precariousness the constant sense of 
 uncertainty and peril which it produces is, I am persuaded, 
 in two ways the cause of great pecuniary expense to the gov- 
 ernment ; first, by compelling it to pay liigher salaries, as an 
 inducement to competent persons to enter so uninviting a ser- 
 vice, and next, by compelling it to employ a greater number 
 of officials, because those it has are without the higher in- 
 ducements to exertion, and are distracted by efforts to protect 
 themselves against dismissals, and to secure promotions by 
 influence. It hardly need be added that such utter uncer- 
 tainty of tenure the general conviction it produces that when
 
 296 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 a place in the service is forfeited nothing stable or reliable is 
 lost tend to weaken the inducements to honesty and fidelity. 
 "When a public officer or clerk feels that, if he be faithful, he 
 can hold his place, with an increasing salary, so long as he is 
 competent, and that if he is especially efficient, he will be 
 promoted, it is almost too plain for observation that he is 
 bound to honesty and fidelity by ties far stronger than the man 
 can feel who has before him nothing but a dreary, dead level 
 of uncertainty a hold of his place utterly frail and precarious 
 liable on any day to be broken by an order which arrests his 
 income, and if it does not suggest his incompetency or 
 infidelity for that very reason must proclaim the arbitrary 
 injustice of his country. No one, I think, can become ac- 
 quainted with the very different feelings cherished by those in 
 the civil service, toward the government, under these con- 
 trasted systems, without a strong conviction that the pride of 
 place and the sense of justice and gratitude which the one de- 
 velops and the other destroys, are subjects well worthy the 
 attention of statesmen ; and I shall take occasion to more ade- 
 quately present the significant fact that, in Great Britain, those 
 in the subordinate service hold their places and serve the gov- 
 ernment with pride, always certain that a knowledge of their 
 employment by the government will advance rather than pre- 
 judice their standing in public estimation. 
 
 It should be mentioned that, under British laws, no limit 
 but incompetency and hence no tenure expressed in terms of 
 years applies to those in the civil service ; but the superan- 
 nuation laws cease to make additional allowances after forty 
 years ' of service ; and perhaps the great question for us, on 
 this subject, is not that of fixing any tenure of office, but that 
 of deciding upon some age or period of service before which an 
 officer may feel safe if worthy, and after which, if his capacity 
 is impaired, he may feel it is wise to retire lest he be requested 
 to do so. 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 143-3.
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 THE MERIT SYSTEM IN THE GREAT DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 Internal revenue administration. Examinations. Promotions. Disci- 
 pline. Exclusion of politics. Removals. Extent of delinquency. Cus- 
 toms service. Examinations. Removals. Neither patronage nor poli- 
 tics. Stringent regulations. Extent of delinquency. Method of appoint- 
 ments and promotions compared with that of United States. The Treas- 
 ury. - Open competition for clerks. Promotions. Statement of Mr. 
 Gladstone. Post Office Department. Classes of postmasters. How 
 clerks are examined and appointed. Appointment of postmasters. 
 Open competition in large offices. Severe rules of discipline. No elec- 
 tioneering in offices or interference with elections. Mr. Mundella's state- 
 ment. State Department and Consular and Diplomatic Service. How far 
 politics excluded. Examinations for clerks and consuls. Regulations. 
 Members of Parliament without patronage. Clerks of the two Houses of 
 Parliament. Not removed for political reasons. Members relieved from 
 solicitation. 
 
 The Inland Revenue Department is in charge of a board 
 of five commissioners, appointed by the Crown, and they con- 
 tinue in office during good behavior. More than two thirds of 
 the income of the British Government comes from its inland 
 revenue. The amount thus collected in 1876 was $225,730,- 
 180. The number of officials in the service was 7093, be- 
 sides employes. Of the revenue collected, more than $75,- 
 000,000 comes from spirits, and more than $38,000,000 from 
 malt. In addition to what is covered by our internal revenue 
 collections, the system of land taxation, of income taxes, of 
 house duties, and of game and dog licenses, are administered 
 by this board. It hardly need be said that in the number of 
 agents, in the magnitude and complexity of the business trans- 
 acted, and in the opportunities of cheating which a lax disci- 
 pline would afford, British internal revenue administration 
 greatly transcends that of the United States. The taxation 
 it controls, in variety and difficulty, approximates what would
 
 298 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 be the condition with us if State taxation were added to the 
 internal revenue administration of the Federal Government. 
 By reason of the stability of its tenure, the long experience it 
 secures, and its independence of elections and politics, the 
 board is able to pursue a firm and consistent policy and to en- 
 force a rigid discipline. 1 
 
 With very slight exceptions, all entrance to the service is 
 to the lowest grade, and by the way of open competition, be- 
 fore the Civil Service Board. Corrupt or partisan influence 
 and official favoritism are thus effectually excluded. The ex- 
 ceptions referred to are in the lowest grade of the service, 
 being mere messengers in some of the local offices, as to which 
 the right of nomination seems to have survived. But even 
 these nominated messengers are examined under the board. 
 And from messengers and porters up to the heads of bureaus, 
 no one can be removed, except for cause, and no one is re- 
 moved without being given a proper hearing or opportunity 
 for explanation in his own defense. Appointments for po- 
 litical reasons are, I hardly need add, excluded by competition. 
 
 The board has the right of promotion and authority for dis- 
 cipline without interference from any other quarter, but can- 
 not increase salaries or expenses. Promotions are for merit. 
 In certain parts of the service, they are based on examinations, 
 and in other parts on official records kept in the offices, and, 
 almost without exception, all the higher places are filled from 
 those below. Personal records of the conduct of all officers are 
 kept by the board. The right of discipline, in its application, 
 ranges from a mere caution to a dismissal, and includes the 
 right to reduce both rank and pay. It would seem plain that 
 there can be little or no opportunity for politics in this branch 
 of the service. Neither the dominant party nor those control- 
 ling local elections are allowed chances for patronage or co- 
 ercion anywhere in the vast network of official places through 
 which, in all parts of the empire, such enormous internal rev- 
 enues are collected. Year after year, through elections follow - 
 
 1 For example, each clerk has to sign, eveiy morning and evening, his 
 name in a book which shows the hour and minute of his arrival and depart- 
 ure, and this record must be daily signed by a supervising officer. Fines 
 are rigidlj r imposed for tardiness.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. i>99 
 
 ing elections, during one administration and then into the 
 next, without change of method or members, the work of the 
 department advances steadily upon business principles ; not a 
 clerk with a fear of losing, not a politician with a chance of 
 gaining, an office by any result in the field of politics. The 
 best information I could get as to the character l of the admin- 
 istration is to this effect : It is universally believed to be 
 efficient and without corruption or political bias. 1 could hear 
 of no reports that revenues were not properly collected or 
 accounted for. There is no public rumor or belief (so far as I 
 have been able to learn) that in any way corresponds to the 
 current views in this country in regard to whiskey frauds and 
 official delinquency in connection with internal revenue admin- 
 istration. Such seems to be the conclusion of an American 
 gentleman, than whom, probably, no one is better informed 
 on the subject; "Great Britain," he says, "has for many 
 years had an iniernal, income tax which, . . . with her trained 
 officials, is assessed and collected with as much of accuracy as 
 any such tax probably can be. " a I have high authority 3 for 
 stating that " peculation amounts to nothing. . . . I do not 
 think there is an average of three cases a year. . . . The 
 revenue seldom loses anything from such cases." Referring 
 to collecting officers, it is said, " I think there have not been 
 more than half a dozen defaults in twenty-four years . . . in 
 no case has the revenue lost anything. The estimated losses 
 by .fraud and default for the year 18TT-8 amount to 400 
 out of a collection of 46,000,000 . . . amongst the collectors 
 of land tax and inhabited house duty . . . five defaults have 
 occurred since 1874." It would require far more space than 
 I can spare to set forth the carefully matured methods of 
 supervision and precaution by which such fidelity has been 
 secured. !N"ext after the exclusion of politics and favoritism, 
 in the selections of those who enter the service, the stability, 
 vigor, and sense of responsibility, which a permanent Board 
 is able to impart, are the most important elements. 
 
 1 In the appendix will be found several letters bearing upon this point. 
 a David A. Wells, in International Recifw, April, 1878. 
 3 Letter from one of the Internal Revenue Commissioners to the author 
 Nov. 17, 1877.
 
 300 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 The Customs Service. The foreign (or customs) duties 
 of Great Britain in 18Y6 amounted to $96,446,000, and 
 hence fall below our own in a ratio approximating that in 
 which her inland duties exceed ours. The whole number of 
 established clerks in the customs service in 1S76 was 4626, 
 but these do not include messengers, porters, or mere em- 
 ployes. This branch of her fiscal affairs is administered by 
 a board of four commissioners, the members of which are 
 appointed by the Crown, and they continue in office during 
 good behavior. There has been such a board for over a hun- 
 dred years. To them and their subordinates, what I have just 
 said (in connection with internal revenue administration) as to 
 the exclusion of politics and favoritism, and as to authority 
 and discipline, also applies. As illustrating the discipline 
 and system that prevails, I may mention that the board makes 
 an annual report, which not only sets forth every fact neces- 
 sary to disclose the character of the administration, in the 
 ordinary sense, but states, in apt medical phrase, the several 
 diseases which have caused sickness, and for how long a time, 
 and to how many persons, among those in the customs service, 
 at the larger ports. 1 
 
 The hours of duty of the indoor branch of the service are 
 from ten to four, and of the outdoor branch from nine to 
 four. Every ordinary clerk has, each day, to sign a record 
 when he reaches and again when he leaves his office, which 
 fixes his daily service even to the minute. The head of .the 
 office must put his initials daily at the foot of the page. Fines 
 are regularly imposed for tardiness or absence, and no salary 
 can be paid when any fine is in arrears. These signed " ap- 
 pearance sheets" are laid before the board weekly, and if fines 
 often occur, other consequences beside their payment follow. 
 There is a system of supervision of official conduct by officers 
 having that duty (and the same in other departments), which 
 is analogous to the duty imposed on roundsmen in a police 
 force, and the instructions declare that "the board rely on 
 their zeal and discretion in taking every necessary means for 
 ascertaining, not merely the official conduct and character, 
 
 1 The names are not given.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 301 
 
 but tho habits and pursuits of every individual under their 
 control. ' ' Full records are kept in every office of the official 
 conduct of those who serve there ; and it is on such evidence, 
 on the official opinions of the leading officers formally taken, and 
 and on appropriate examinations, and not on politics or influ- 
 ence, that promotions are based. It would seem plain there 
 can be but small opportunity for neglecting public business 
 in order to attend to politics, and I have thought such details 
 not unimportant, in view of the notorious laxity which has 
 prevailed in so many of our custom houses. 
 
 There are one hundred and forty ports of entry in the United 
 Kingdom, and they are all under the jurisdiction of the same 
 board. Like the Inland Revenue Board, it has a full au- 
 thority of appointment, promotion, and removal as well as of 
 discipline. I hardly need to point out that a permanent Board, 
 having charge of all the custom houses, has great facilities for 
 securing uniformity of administration and for bringing the 
 expenses of each into comparison with the others, in a way 
 which largely contributes to responsibility and economy ; but 
 I have no space for details. If I should merely say that this 
 authority is really independent of both general and local poli- 
 tics that a custom house is no more a party or a political 
 agency in Great Britain than a college is with us, and that a 
 collector is no more a political manager than is one of our col- 
 lege presidents I fear I should hardly be believed in thus 
 declaring the simple truth. I must, therefore, give some fur- 
 ther facts. The clerks, at all these ports, and in all the offices, 
 are appointed according to well-known rules, from among 
 those who were first in the competitive examinations before the 
 Civil Service Commission. Xo influence can secure a clerk- 
 ship, 1 and no officer or politician can decide who shall com- 
 pete for one. The clerks are, therefore, neither politicians 
 by trade nor insolvents for want of ability to trade, but 
 young men whose character and capacity have stood a severe 
 
 1 There are a few messengers, boatmen, and porters below the grade of 
 clerks, who, through a curious survivorship of a fragment of the old system, 
 are yet nominated by the Treasury for only a pass examination. But that 
 examination is exacting, and when once in service, they are only removed i 
 for cause after an opportunity of explanation. 
 20
 
 302 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 public test, and whose pkces have been gained by their 
 own merits. They must serve jit_Jeast six months on 
 probation, and then if approved they are appointed ; and 
 they can only be removed for cause, and after a hear-_ 
 ing before the board. They may be fined or reduced in rank 
 for bad conduct. Such public servants as housekeepers, door- 
 keepers, watchmen, etc., have in addition to place on file 
 evidence both of character and of ' ' the course of life they 
 have led." The rules are of many years' standing which re- 
 quire such officers as searchers, landing waiters, and gangers 
 "to go under a course of instruction three months without 
 pay. ' ' The higher places, including collectorships, are filled 
 by promotions, which are based on merit ; and full and care- 
 ful records are kept in order that a just judgment may be 
 formed. The board annually inspects the administration 
 at each port, and a careful record of the cost and char- 
 acter of the administration of each is made. In the 
 outdoor service, where the board has less personal acquaint- 
 ance with the officers, ^one half of the promotions are 
 secured by competition among the clerks. The office of col- 
 lector at Liverpool, London, or other large ports is only 
 filled by a person who has been collector at some port where 
 he has supervised every branch of port service. Our practice 
 of placing inexperienced men at the head of even a small port 
 is as utterly unknown as is the practice of considering party 
 politics in making such appointments. Nothing can be in 
 wider contrast than our toleration of miscellaneous influence 
 for effecting appointments and promotions and the British sys- 
 tem which excludes them. 
 
 " It has long been the practice in the Customs to require the chief 
 officers of each branch to make a report in writing to the Board of 
 Commissioners as to the character and qualifications of the officers 
 coming forward for promotion, and to name the persons whom they 
 consider most competent and deserving. It is usual in tlie more 
 important cases to summon the surveyors general and inspectors 
 general to the board room, and take their opinions separately on the 
 subject. And, as a further security against improper selections, the 
 board is required to transmit a formal report to the Lords of the 
 Treasury, stating all the circumstances, and requesting their Lordships'
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 303 
 
 confirmation of the appointment. . . The circumstances of all pro- 
 motions stand recorded in the official books, and may be referred 
 to in the event of any complaint or inquiry being made into the 
 matter." 1 
 
 Regulations long in force contain these provisions : 
 
 " In any case in which an officer would be entitled to promotion 
 on his own merits, application made in his favor . . . affords 
 grounds for suspicion that the selection of the officer has been influ- 
 enced in some degree by private considerations . . . and private 
 applications from officers themselves, or from others, on their behalf, 
 addressed to individual members of the board, are interdicted ; and 
 the same will not only have the effect of retarding the promotion of 
 the parties, but subject them to the board's severe displeasure. The 
 board . . . will consider any private application for promotion 
 to have emanated from the party in whose behalf the same shall be 
 made . . . unless he shall satisfy the board that he had no 
 knowledge thereof, directly or indirectly. Beyond recording your 
 vote, if you shall be so entitled, you are not in any way to interfere 
 in the elections for members of Parliament." 
 
 These facts must be sufficient to show how radically different 
 are the systems prevailing in the customs service of the two 
 countries. Promotions constantly tendered on such conditions 
 would seem to be a powerful stimulant to good conduct, and 
 such, I am convinced, is the fact. They^ also cause those in 
 the service to give earnest attention to the relative merits of 
 each other and to the manner in which the members of the 
 board apply the principle of advancement to which they are 
 thus publicly pledged. A few facts bearing upon the disci- 
 pline, honesty, and efficiency of this branch of the service will 
 be found interesting. There has been an average number of 
 fifteen a year, during the past five years, dismissed from the 
 service for bad conduct. 2 During those five years there has 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, p. 337, printed in 1855. 
 
 "The Board being independent of party politics, the rules as to dismissals 
 are rigid, and are, I think, fearlessly applied. As an illustration of the precau- 
 tions against abuses and perhaps of their infrequency as well, I may men- 
 tion that the standing instructions require that even an " anonymous com- 
 plaint" shall be publicly investigated on public notice, the complainant 
 being called on in such notice to appear ; but if he does not appear, " a sec- 
 ond notice is to be published," and the charge investigated, pursuant thereto.
 
 304 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 been only a single case of defalcation in the customs service 
 proper, and that was for only 3 5s. But, even in this case, 
 a jury failed to find the officer guilty, though the board dis- 
 missed him. " There have been eleven cases in five years of 
 pilfering small quantities of goods. The government, how- 
 ever, finally lost nothing. During those years, there were 
 also two cases of defalcation in collection of money belonging 
 to the corporation of Trinity House, but which is collected 
 by the Customs Department," the amount being 4225 6s. 
 5d. , a part of which was lost. ' 
 
 It is not for me to attempt to describe the different effects upon 
 public business, public morality, and political affairs a differ- 
 ence almost indescribable, and not easy to imagine even be- 
 tween such a customs system, based on personal character and 
 capacity, and independent of partisan politics and corrupt influ- 
 ence, and a system under which coercions and favor make and 
 unmake officers, and every custom house on the borders is the 
 centre of a feverish, costly and useless partisan activity, if of 
 nothing more pernicious. What can be more widely con- 
 trasted or more significant than the different methods pur- 
 sued, in the two countries, for the common object of selecting 
 that mere business officer called a collector of a port ? In the 
 one, he is quietly taken by the administrative board, through 
 a well-known process, based on merit, and without political 
 significance, from some lower place of duty where his public 
 record of efficiency and economy has brought his capacity to 
 the notice of his superiors. Once in office, he remains, like a 
 judge, during good behavior. In the other, the selection 
 raises an exciting contest of partisan strategy and influence, 
 certainly in the district, and very likely in the State, if not in 
 Congress and the whole nation ; with intrigues and embroil- 
 ments which bring all the vicious machinery of political man- 
 agement into action, convert every custom house clerk into a 
 factionist compelled to fight for his salary and his place, 
 absorb the activity of every grade of officials from doorkeepers 
 and porters to Senators and Cabinet Secretaries, disgust the 
 merchants and all the best citizens with the very name of 
 
 1 Letter Secretary Customs Board to the author, Dec. 11, 18T7.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 305 
 
 politics and office ; and all with the result, perhaps, of a col- 
 lector utterly unacquainted with his duties, but bound fast in 
 demoralizing pledges to remove a third of his best subordi- 
 nates in order to meet the promises which are likely to compel 
 him to be an active partisan leader, but a poor collector of a 
 port, during the four years or less which may intervene before 
 another battle of the same kind must be fought. By one 
 method, the selection is so made that it stimulates and honors 
 capacity and integrity in every grade of the service ; by the 
 other, such qualifications are spurned, and the nation is made 
 to declare its preference for political intrigue and manage- 
 ment to practically say to every clerk, No matter how devoted 
 and capable you may be, you have no chance of becoming a 
 collector no chance of escaping dependence upon a politician 
 put over you unless you become a politician yourself. 
 
 In general terms, I ought to say that public confidence in 
 the customs service in Great Britain in its honesty, its free- 
 dom from political partiality, its economy and efficiency 
 appears to be very nearly if not quite universal. l 
 
 The Treasury. The two great revenue divisions already 
 described include the bulk of the administration in the Brit- 
 ish Treasury Department. And this fact illustrates a very im- 
 portant difference between the revenue system of Great Brit- 
 ain and that of the United States. There, as with us, the 
 Treasury is, to a certain extent, a political office ; and those 
 at its head are expected to carry out the financial policy of the 
 dominant party. This duty requires a right of giving general 
 instructions to those legally at the head of the revenue depart- 
 ments, to the extent that such policy is involved ; but it is not 
 concerned with the discipline or the political opinions of sub- 
 ordinates, or with the miscellaneous details of the public work, 
 which needs to be the same whatever party is in power. And 
 on this theory, the two great Kevenue Boards I have described, 
 the heads of which remain unaffected by political changes in 
 the cabinet or in Parliament, have charge of all the offices, 
 officials, and the work connected with revenue collection, sub- 
 ject only to such instructions and to certain rights of appeal 
 
 1 Here again I refer to the letters in the appendix.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 in connection with the higher grades of promotions and a few 
 other issues of paramount importance. The Treasury does 
 not interfere with revenue officers or affairs directly, but only 
 by general instructions communicated through the proper rev- 
 enue boards. It is apparent that such an arrangement must 
 largely contribute to make revenue administration independent 
 of both local and general politics. The British system as- 
 sumes that it does not follow, because the head of the Treasury 
 is a statesman, competent to guide a national policy, that he 
 is at once endued with the local and personal information 
 needed to pass upon innumerable appeals for office and multi- 
 farious claims for promotion ; or that he has suddenly mas- 
 tered the manifold questions of skill, science, routine, and 
 method which it is the labor of an ordinary official life to 
 understand ; nor, on the other hand, does that system suggest 
 that it is wise to have the head of the Treasury daily besieged 
 by office-seekers and schemers pushing for advantage under a 
 vast body of complicated laws and regulations, with which he 
 is perhaps little familiar, and which questions of national in- 
 terest give him no time to study. 
 
 I have before stated that the head of the Treasury itself 
 is a board, which now has seven members, of which the 
 First Lord (or member) is Prime Minister, and the Chancel- 
 lor of the Exchequer is also a member, and he is generally 
 the leader of the ruling party in the House of Commons. 
 These seven members are political officers, and go out with 
 each administration. But there is also a permanent Sec- 
 retary of the Treasury who has charge of the administrative 
 work, and is unaffected by political changes. The clerks in 
 the Treasury gain their places by open, competitive examina- 
 tions before the Civil Service Commission. They enter at the 
 lowest grade ; and the higher places (except membership of 
 the board) are filled by promotion from below. Neither 
 partisan politics nor official favoritism can secure appointments 
 in the Treasury Department of Great Britain. And, therefore, 
 when Mr. Gladstone said ' that, "as to the clerkships in my 
 office the office of the Treasury every one of you has just as 
 
 1 In his speech to the electors of Greenwich in 1871.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 307 
 
 much power over their disposal as I have. ... In order that 
 the public service might be, indeed, the public service ; in 
 order that we might not have among the civil officers of the 
 State that which we had complained of in the army, namely, 
 that the service was not the property of the nation, but of 
 the officers, we have now been enabled to remove the barriers 
 of nomination, patronage, jobbery, favoritism, in whatever 
 form ; and every man belonging to the people of England, if 
 he so please to fit his children for competing for places in the j 
 public service, may do it entirely irrespective of the question, 
 what is his condition in life. . . ." when Mr. Gladstone 
 proclaimed this noble triumph of common justice and common 
 honesty over all that had been aristocratic, venal, and partisan 
 in British administration, I am convinced he not only said 
 what was literally true of himself, but what, in principle, was 
 true of every member of the Cabinet and of Parliament. 
 
 The Postal Service. It is not necessary, after what I have 
 said of the revenue service, to enter much into detail as to the 
 application of the merit system to the postal service. Its rep- 
 utation is familiar to all well-informed Americans. Though 
 legally under the control of the Postmaster-General, (who is 
 a member of the Cabinet, and hence a political officer,) the 
 postal service is practically managed by a permanent, non- 
 political secretary. All subordinate officers serve during 
 good behavior, and they can be removed only for cause. The 
 reason for any removal of a clerk must be stated in the rec- 
 ords. With reference to the appointment of postmasters and 
 the clerical force, the department may be considered as in four 
 divisions : 
 
 1. There are the very small offices in which an aggregate 
 sum is paid for carrying on each office, and not much scrutiny 
 is extended to the clerical force, if indeed there is any, pro- 
 vided the business is well cared for. 
 
 2. In offices larger than the last named, but with an income 
 not above 120 in England and 100 in Ireland and Scotland, 
 the clerks are nominated by the postmasters and are examined 
 upon a uniform method by the Civil Service Commission. 1 
 
 J I find myself unable to state that such examinations extend to all offices 
 of this grade, but I believe such to be the fact.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 The clerks being few in so small offices, each may be well 
 known to the postmaster, and the form of competition is 
 hardly necessary, and has not been applied. The postmas- 
 ters, in this class of offices, are selected by the Treasury, but 
 are only to be removed for cause. 
 
 3. In offices where the income is larger than the amount 
 last named, the postmasters are selected from the entire ser- 
 vice as a recognition of their efficiency. They are 'appointed 
 by the Postmaster-General, and are removable only for cause. 
 How effectually these appointments are severed from legisla- 
 tive dictation, is illustrated by the fact that the official notices 
 of the vacancy declare that applications through ' ' members of 
 Parliament are calculated to defeat rather than promote the 
 object in view," and no candidate is allowed to apply save 
 through his superior officer. 1 The clerks are examined as last 
 mentioned. 
 
 4. In the great offices of London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, 
 the clerks all secure their places by open, competitive exami- 
 nations before the Civil Service Commission. 
 
 Removals are nowhere made for political reasons, but only 
 for causes connected with their efficiency or character. The 
 Postmaster of Liverpool has held his place since 1841, and the 
 Q Postmaster of London his place since 1834. Careful exami- 
 nations are held for sorters, earners, distributors, and telegraph 
 operators, etc. , in the postal service. 
 
 It would require too much detail to make any adequate 
 comparison between British and American postal administra- 
 tion. But by way of illustration, I may mention that in the 
 city of Kew York the long experience and rare executive abil- 
 ity of the postmaster, 2 aided by a clerical force improved (so 
 far as our system would permit) by examinations and competi- 
 tions like those thus practised in Great Britain, have brought 
 the postal service to a degree of efficiency I think never 
 before reached in this country ; yet, as compared with that of 
 London, it stands as follows : London, 12 daily deliveries in a 
 portion of the city, 11 in other portions, and 6 in the sub- 
 urban districts ; New York, 7 daily deliveries in a portion of 
 the city, 5 in other portions, and 3 in the rest of the city ; and 
 
 1 3 Report Com. Iiiq. 1873, App. F, p. 78. a Thomas L. James, Esq.
 
 WASHINGTON ty* 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. \ 309 
 
 the superior efficiency of the British service is, I think^ 
 hardly more marked in London than in the other cities and in 
 the villages and rural districts. 1 
 
 It is well known that the money order system prevailed in 
 the postal service of Great Britain for a considerable time be- 
 fore we applied it. The telegraph system and the issuing of 
 revenue licenses are now a part of her postal service, and there 
 are also attached to it between 5000 and 6000 post-office savings 
 banks, which cause a complexity and responsibility in the postal 
 administration unknown in the United States. Over 25,000 
 separate deposits of money have been made in the postal banks 
 in a single day, and open accounts are kept with more than 
 1,700,000 depositors. Postal savings banks (which have 
 been adopted in France and Belgium, on a large scale) are 
 regarded as a great aid to economy and saving on the part of 
 the poor ; but the duties they impose, and the sending of 
 more than 2^,000,000 of telegraph messages and the issuing 
 of nearly a million of revenue licenses each year, I hardly 
 need say, call for rare capacity and discipline in the officers of 
 the postal service, and for an amount of experience and trained 
 skill to which our partisan system of appointments and remov- 
 als is fatal. I may say, generally, that the discipline is as 
 strict in the Post- Office Department in every particular as in 
 the others to which I have referred. For example, " An offi- 
 cer who borrows money of his subordinate or lends money to 
 his superior is liable to dismissal ;" and it is also a cause for 
 dismissal " for any letter-carrier or rural messenger to borrow 
 money from any person residing on his walks. ' ' In many of 
 the larger offices, the clerks are organized and trained as fire 
 brigades ; and general efficiency and discipline have been in- 
 creased by the supervision of medical officers in the postal 
 service, who report on the cause and kind of sickness, and take 
 care that absences for alleged ill health are not too easily ob- 
 tained. But it is more important to mention that every post- 
 
 1 Mr. James' competitive tests have, perhaps, raised the ability of his 
 force nearly or quite to that of the same number in London, but the higher 
 public stand xrd of administration in that city would not be satisfied with 
 what it is possible to do with a force of sorters and carriers so inadequate as 
 that allowed in New York. Mr. James is about extending open competition 
 to the selection of all the clerks in his office.
 
 310 CIVIL SEEVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 / master and deputy, and " every person employed by or under 
 him or them," are. prohibited l from exerting their influence 
 either for or against any particular candidates" (except they 
 may vote themselves), and from by " word, message, or writ- 
 ing, or .in any manner whatever, endeavoring to persuade any 
 elector to give or dissuade any elector from giving his vote. 
 Canvassing within a post office is not permitted," 
 and postmasters are instructed, when permission to canvas is 
 requested, " to refuse it absolutely." 
 
 It is, I presume, quite .impossible to imagine the astonish- 
 ment with which an officer in charge of a British post-office 
 would receive a proposition from a partisan assessment collec- 
 tor to go among his clerks and make a levy of political black- 
 mail. There are no politics in a British post office, no parti- 
 san contentions over its officials, no political management 
 within its walls, no reliance by any party on the vote of its 
 clerks, or on exactions from their salaries. In the light of such 
 facts, we can see the significance of the words of Mr. Mun- 
 della, 3 when he said : "I stand before you the representative 
 of the largest constituency in England, and yet have not the 
 power to control the appointment of the lowest excise offi- 
 cer ;" for what he states is not only true as to excise offices, 
 but as to all other offices in whatever department ; and the 
 broad fact he meant to illustrate was not that technically he 
 could not appoint, but that, as a member of Parliament, he 
 had no opportunity to control, and that the public opinion and 
 administrative methods of his country would not permit him 
 to control any official appointment in her service. 
 
 Department of State and Consular and Diplomatic Service. 
 There is no other part of the public service so difficult to 
 bring under rigid rules, none in which so peculiar information 
 is required, none wherein partisan and personal favoritism is 
 more disgraceful and disastrous. It would, however, require 
 too much space to enter fully into the particulars ; but I can, 
 in a general way, state the methods through which the Gov- 
 
 I This part of the regulation is based on the statute Anne, chap. 10, 44, 
 already referred to. 
 
 II Instructions to Head Postmasters, 1873, pp. 24, 31, and 32. 
 1 Speech in New York city.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 311 
 
 eminent of Great Britain has pretty effectually taken these 
 branches of administration out of patronage and politics. The 
 mere exigencies of her supremacy and safety in so many 
 quarters of the globe where she rules, together with the 
 demonstrated conditions of success in that vast foreign com- 
 merce which is vital to her prosperity as a nation, have long 
 since impressed upon her statesmen, merchants, and manufac- 
 turers a deep sense of the paramount importance of honesty 
 and capacity in her consular and diplomatic service. 1 This con- 
 viction alone has become a powerful influence (far stronger, I 
 must think, than any existing in this country) in restraint of 
 solicitation and political pressure brought to bear on the for- 
 eign service. The conviction is not less general and decided 
 that essential efficiency in either branch cannot be attained 
 without much experience in the service. With such support 
 from public opinion, official duty is not so difficult, and de- 
 mands for removals are more easily resisted. 
 
 While there is a right of exception, not often applied in 
 practice, it is the rule and course of administration that the , 
 higher places are filled from the lower 2 (perhaps with consider- 
 able reference to seniority of service, but) mainly with a view 
 of rewarding and securing merit. This is beyond question a 
 great stimulus to fidelity and learning in the line of duty. 
 Competition lias been resorted to in making selections for pro- 
 motions. The clerical places in the Foreign Office (corre- 
 sponding to that of our Secretary of State) are filled from the 
 best qualified on a list of persons sent by the Secretary to com- 
 pete together in an examination before the Civil Service Com- 
 missioners. It is quite easy for the Secretary to have personal 
 information concerning each of the small body of clerks in his 
 office, and the- fact that state secrets are so open to them is 
 
 1 We may note its strength, in the fact that the present, Conservative ad- 
 ministration has just appointed Lord Dufferin(a Liberal, and lately Governor- 
 General of Canada) to be Ambassador at St. Petersburg. 
 
 3 Perhaps there is sometimes too much regard for seniority, which may 
 have been allowed to exclude larger ability from the more important posts ; 
 but the Secretary is always at liberty to take the best. This is a deep and 
 many-sided question, I will not assume to express any opinion about, and 
 is not to be decided by instances, but by the general effect upon the whole 
 service.
 
 312 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 hardly consistent with allowing any person not known to him 
 to come into that branch of the service by competition or 
 otherwise than on his personal information. Persons seeking 
 clerical places under the foreign legations, or elsewhere in the 
 diplomatic service, are examined in the same way, and their 
 examinations appear to be thorough and exacting. 1 
 
 The rules require attaches to serve in the Foreign Office six 
 months before going on foreign duty, and they are under pro- 
 bation for two years. Applicants for consular appointments 
 must also be examined before the Civil Service Commission ; 
 but the nature of the service hardly allows competition. 2 
 
 The spirit of the rules for the examination of those who 
 apply for consulates may be inferred from the following : 
 They must be able to speak French as well as English ; ' ; and 
 they must have a sufficient knowledge of the current lan- 
 guage, so far as commerce is concerned, of the port at which 
 they are appointed to reside, to enable them to communi- 
 cate directly with the authorities ;" or, in other words, 
 ,they are not allowed to depart in a condition of ignorance that 
 leaves them utterly unable even to communicate understand- 
 ingly in regard to duties which are sent to perform. They 
 must " also have a sufficient knowledge of the British mercan- 
 tile and commercial law to enable them to deal with questions 
 arising between British shipowners, shipmasters, and seamen. ' ' 
 It does not seem to be thought wise to send persons destitute 
 of all knowledge of the legal principles, or of the intricate 
 commercial codes they are to administer, to be the protectors 
 of the commerce and subjects of a great nation in a foreign 
 country. And, in addition, where it is not impracticable, 
 those going for the first time to a foreign consulate are re- 
 quired to attend three months at the Foreign Office, in order 
 that they may become more competent for their duties. 
 
 It does not fall within my plan to consider the great differ- 
 ence in the consular systems of the two countries in regard to 
 
 1 The examinations would seem to show that the knowledge required of 
 the history of the United States even is greater than has, sometimes at least, 
 been found to suffice for getting into our own service. 
 
 a In cases where the appointees are abroad or the exigency of the service 
 requires it, examinations may be deferred, or even dispensed with. "Where 
 foreign merchants are made consuls the rules of examination do not apply.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 313 
 
 fees and the payment of expenses. The English system 
 makes the character and capacity of its official representatives, 
 the great interests of its commerce, the certain protection of 
 its citizens, and the preservation of the national prestige and 
 honor, paramount objects. All the world knows the character 
 and capacity of the British Consular Service. And, I hardly 
 need add, in view of the explanations given, that political pres- 
 sure and personal solicitation for appointments, in the foreign 
 service of Great Britain, appear to be as much less than they 
 are in our own as the standards of her qualifications for such 
 service are higher than those we enforce. 
 
 Parliament. After the explanations already made, it is 
 hardly necessary to say that members of Parliament have, 
 practically, ceased to possess patronage. They must, in their 
 election contests, make their appeal for support on the princi- 
 ples of their party and their own worth as men. Officers, 
 places, or promotions in the public service can no more be 
 bartered for votes or peddled for influence. Parliamentary 
 patronage that prolific and degrading element, for a hundred 
 and fifty years one of the great curses of British politics is 
 substantially no more, and no one mourns its loss or denies 
 its corruption. 
 
 The same influences which have raised executive appoint- 
 ments above the corruption of Parliamentary traffic have, in 
 the same spirit, made themselves felt within the doors of the 
 two Houses. We might easily go back to the time when the 
 appointment of the subordinate officers and clerks of Parlia- 
 ment was attended with personal contests as desperate, with 
 management as lamentable, with a subordination of worth and 
 experience to partisan interests and ambition as much to be 
 deplored, as any which have ever been witnessed in our legis- 
 lative bodies. Only a faint remnant of such abuses has sur- 
 vived the later reforms in Great Britain. As a rule, these 
 clerks and officers of Parliament go on from session to session 
 in the orderly and satisfactory discharge of their functions, 
 which are in no proper sense political. They are required to 
 pass an examination before the Civil Service Commission, 
 which is sufficiently stringent to secure an order of capacity 
 quite beyond what a mere partisan struggle is competent to
 
 314: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 supply, to say nothing of the saving of time, temper, and 
 dignity. 1 
 
 In the House of Lords, an officer (the Clerk of Parliaments) 
 with a tenure, which in practice continues during good beha- 
 vior, selects the persons to be examined for clerkships, and in 
 the House of Commons the selection is made by the Libra- 
 rian, who holds his place by the same tenure. These clerk- 
 ships, I am assured by high authority, are looked upon by 
 members as without political significance, and the discharge of 
 their duties is not regarded as affected by partisan considera- 
 tions. The dignity of legislative functions is no longer de- 
 graded either by petty wrangles about readers, engrossers, and 
 messengers, or by general contests in the interest of local 
 patronage, rival factions, or ambitious leaders. 
 
 I have already so fully called attention to the demoralizing 
 influences which an interest, on the part of the members of 
 the legislature, in appointments, promotions, removals, and 
 salaries in executive departments, has been found to exert 
 upon their independence and their disposition toward reforms, 
 that nothing need be added in this connection. 2 If any 
 changes from the old system could be greater, in the relations 
 of members of Parliament, than those which I have already 
 pointed out, it would be their present, happy exemption from 
 the harassing and exasperating importunities of office-seekers 
 and demagogues, by which their predecessors had been tor- 
 mented during more than a century and a half. I ought to 
 add, as a part of the reform brought about in Parliament, 
 that contested election cases have been practically removed 
 from the forum of the party majority to the decision of the 
 judicial tribunals, which would seem to have caused great 
 relief to Parliament and great gains to justice. 
 
 It must not be understood, because my illustrations extend 
 no further, that the new method is confined to the great depart- 
 
 1 I may mention, by way of illustration, that the present Clerk of the 
 House of Commons is Sir Thomas Erskine May, the accomplished author of 
 the " Constitutional History of England," so often quoted in these pages ; 
 and also of " Democracy in Europe," with which he evidently has liberal 
 sympathies. 
 
 9 Questions upon the enactment of laws were continually complicated by 
 questions of Parliamentary patronage. Report on Civil Service, 1860.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 315 
 
 ments. On the contrary, it is in force in nearly all the execu- 
 tive offices. Legislative officers are the representatives of polit- 
 ical opinions and private interests, of whose qualifications the 
 people judge for themselves ; and, from the very nature of 
 their duties, such officers must be guided by views of politics 
 and theories of policy. To their selection, therefore, the 
 popular judgment must put the only conditions. The judges 
 are so few in number that it is quite practicable that every 
 appointment should be made upon the personal knowledge of 
 the executive ; and public observation, in every case of their 
 selection, is too great and discriminating to allow that secrecy 
 which elsewhere, under the old system, so facilitated the vic- 
 tory of favoritism and partisanship. It has been no more 
 needful than it is practicable, therefore, to extend the new 
 methods, in the legislative and judicial departments, beyond 
 their clerical force. 
 
 I need not enter into details, which would be tedious, con- 
 cerning the selections and promotions in the many subordi- 
 nate offices. But it should be borne in mind that national 
 offices and affairs are by no means as restricted in Great 
 Britain as in the United States. They include nearly all those 
 parts of civil administration which with us fall to the several 
 States, and a great deal which with us falls to municipalities. 
 The officers of some of the prisons, of the national asylums, of 
 the Board of Public Works (carrying on a large part of the 
 municipal work in London), of the Poor Law administration, 
 of a great part of the sanitary administration (being all that car- 
 ried on by the nation), of the British Museum, of the Ken- 
 sington Museum, of the national galleries, of the University 
 of London, of the Charity Commission, of the Education 
 Office, of the Public Record Office, of <iie Emigration 
 Office, of the Stationery Office, of the Board of Trade, and of 
 the Lighthouse and of the Life-Saving Stations, are among 
 those appointed, promoted, and removed under the national 
 civil service regulations, and on the basis of examinations and 
 competitions. ' 
 
 It is to be noticed, however, that neither these rules nor any 
 
 1 There are a very few of these officers to whom competition, for special 
 reasons, does not apply.
 
 316 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 modern reforms have in any respect centralized administration 
 or made it national ; but, the principles of the reform having 
 been found salutary in the great departments, have, for that 
 reason, been extended to the places mentioned, which were 
 before a part of the national jurisdiction. I must also add 
 that (although it seems a contradiction in terms to include 
 officers of the army and navy as a part of the " civil service") 
 when those in the civil service are spoken of as descriptive 
 of the extent of the application of examinations and compe- 
 tition, they must be understood as extending to admissions to 
 the military and naval schools (which stand at the gates of office 
 in the army and navy), and also as extending, with, 1 think, 
 some exceptions, to the officers of that part of the military 
 force which most nearly corresponds to our militia. From 
 these explanations, it must be apparent how w r ide and varied, 
 in Great Britain and India, is the field of official life, political 
 activity, and personal ambition and jealousy, which is now 
 dominated by the reform methods. They extend to all but a 
 very few of the highest places for the exercise of the appoint- 
 ing power of the Crown. They are supreme through almost 
 the whole vast range of what was, for generations, the patron- 
 age of the Treasury and of members of Parliament ; a patron- 
 age which was as much greater than that of our heads of 
 departments and members of Congress, as their authority 
 would be greater if the entire legislative and executive power 
 of the States was made a part of the Federal jurisdiction. 
 The merit system, therefore, with its tests of character and 
 capacity, and its claims of justice and principle against favor- 
 itism and partisanship, has achieved a victory over patronage 
 as seductive and universal has suppressed opportunities of 
 intrigue and c<|fruption as varied and numerous has over- 
 thrown a tyranny of partisan and official influence as pervading 
 and powerful, as would be involved in this country in a strug- 
 gle which should draw to itself every selfish and partisan 
 element all the offices and gains all the intrigue and influ- 
 ence all the hopes and fears of a Presidential campaign, of 
 Senatorial contests, and of elections for governors, united into 
 one grand issue dependent upon a single national vote at the 
 polls.
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 SOCIAL, MORAL, AND INTERNATIONAL BEARINGS OF THE 
 NEW SYSTEM. 
 
 Women brought into the public service. The social position of the Civil 
 Service raised. Service of the public regarded as evidence of fitness for 
 private service. Examinations and competitions applied by banks, cor- 
 porations, and business houses. How the public opinion of ^government is 
 affected by good administration. The character of the persons brought 
 into office by the old system, and by the new. What the people see 
 honored and rewarded in the practical working of the new system. 
 Its moral and educational influence. Effect on patriotism, national 
 prestige and prosperity. Relations of revolutionary tendencies, from 
 1830 to 1848, to Civil Service reform. Influence of the United States then 
 at its maximum. British statesmen seeking to strengthen monarchy and 
 exclude republicanism by good administration. Their success. The Euro- 
 pean view of our system. Tendency to republicanism has declined. 
 Character of republicanism in France. The Holy Alliance and the posi- 
 tion of the United States in 1815. Civil Service reform in Sweden. In 
 Prussia. Americans humiliated in Europe. Monarchists declare our 
 partisan system inherent in republicanism. Our system really favorable 
 to rewarding merit. 
 
 I. THERE are other effects of the new system, or at least of the 
 influences sustaining it, which ought not to be overlooked. 
 They are social and moral as well as political, and some of 
 them are in a sense international. 
 
 The principle that appointments should be made on the 
 basis of character and capacity as tested by examinations, was 
 utterly inconsistent with the further exclusion of women 
 from the public service merely by reason of their sex. And, 
 as a consequence in a country where women had been de- 
 pressed by legal restrictions and by a popular sentiment, 1 far 
 
 1 This spirit found expression as late as 1873, in a regulation of the Re- 
 turned Letter Office, which forbade women being entrusted to open any let- 
 ters with valuables. They were to be opened and the valuables taken out by 
 male clerks, on the presumption, apparently, that women are not by naturg 
 
 21
 
 318 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 more unjust than have ever prevailed in the United States, 
 the new system gave them, on principle, that opportunity 
 to take part in the public work which has been in great 
 measure allowed them here, rather on the score of gallantry, 
 or by reason of calamities in the war from which they had 
 suffered. The number of women employed in public posi- 
 tions in Great Britain is steadily increasing. They may now 
 be seen in the exclusive charge of offices in the postal and 
 telegraph service, which they have won by open competition 
 and manage with success ; and these new opportunities of 
 usefulness must, I think, be counted as among the principal 
 causes which have helped on the great improvement in the 
 education and in the intellectual and benevolent activity of 
 women (especially of the middle classes) in Great Britain dur- 
 ing the last few years. 1 The marked executive ability, the 
 
 as honest as men. And the head of the office expresses great surprise that 
 the experiment of employing women had been " a perfect success" which 
 ' ' completely surpassed my expectation. ' ' But the women have steadily 
 won their way, vindicating their honesty and showing there is no need of 
 matrons. So great was the distrust and hostility on the first employment of 
 women, that the men were " jealous" of the innovation, and it was thought 
 necessary to employ " a matron" to take special charge of the female clerks. 
 Report C. S. Inq. Com., 1873-5, Vol. I., p. 146. 
 
 1 In view of the great and manifest advantages to women of having a 
 means of access to such kinds of public employment as are appropriate for 
 them, far removed from the dirty highway of partisan politics, and in all par- 
 ticulars compatible with their modesty and self-respect, it seems almost in- 
 credible that any sane women, however eccentric, should be found justify- 
 ing the spoils system on principle, after men, who by reason of some knowl- 
 edge of politics are more discreet, have prudently abandoned all attempts at 
 such justification. But it is a curious fact that an abnormal class of women 
 seem to have been the last to practise the abuses of a system which they 
 may as consistently, perhaps, be the last to defend. History has preserved 
 the name of Miss Alice Ferrers as among the foremost in political corrup- 
 tion in the thirteenth century, and she seems to have been as bold and suc- 
 cessful as Mrs. Jenks. The shameful part acted in court politics by a class 
 of women under the Stuart princes is familiar history. "Walpole," says 
 Mr. Bagehot, " declared he would pay no attention to the Queen's daugh- 
 ters" (those "girls," as he called them), " but would rely exclusively on 
 Madame de Walmoden, the King's mistress." The Duchess of Kendall 
 under George I., Mrs. Clark and Mrs. Gary under George III., the Marchio- 
 ness of Conyngham under George IV., appear to have been among the last to 
 practise the forms of political corruption for which they were notorious. 
 Mr. Bagehot quotes a writer under George IV. as saying, " The King is in
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN'. 319 
 
 the fidelity and decorum illustrated in the official conduct of 
 women, not merely in the local offices and central depart- 
 ments, but in the London School Board and in many posi- 
 tions of high responsibility, have done much to change an 
 unjust public opinion and to utilize, for the benefit of society, 
 the capacity and moral worth of the female sex, which that opin- 
 ion had before so largely excluded from opportunities of use- 
 fulness. The memorable work of Florence Nightingale in the 
 Crimea was as much a duty of public administration as of 
 Christianity as much in the interest of economy as of hu- 
 manity and, in the schools, in the poor law boards, in the- 
 prisons, in the public asylums and hospitals, in sanitary admin- 
 istration, and in many other ways, the beneficent results of 
 the new opportunities opened to women have been felt. 
 
 While, for reasons sufficiently indicated, we may well fear 
 that the honor and dignity of office in the abstract, and the 
 respect in which the people hold their public servants, have 
 been falling during the last forty years in the United States, 
 it would seem to have been quite otherwise in Great Britain. ' 
 We have seen that it has been little more than a century since 
 
 our favor, and, what is more to the purpose, the Marchioness of Conyngham 
 is so too. " But such instances, 1 am persuaded, only show the extravagances 
 of exceptional characters wheu out of their sphere, and are in wide contrast 
 with the almost universal feeling and recognized interest of the sex on the 
 subject of civil service reform. I cannot think that the many gifted and 
 well-instructed women who, to the great advantage of society and of them- 
 selves, are more and more turning their attention to the moral and social prob- 
 lems of the day, will long omit to bring their powerful influence to bear in 
 behalf of a system which stimulates and rewards virtue and education on 
 the part of their children, and opens to women a respectable and honor- 
 able way of reaching the public service ; while it repudiates those coarse and 
 corrupt methods in politics from which so many worthy women suffer, and 
 which every true woman abhors. But even exceptional and unfortunate 
 women ought to welcome the new system, which has opened to them a new 
 way of hope and consolation. For, of the first trial of examinations and 
 competitions for school teachers, it is said "that the females have been so 
 far advanced in mental power and influence as to have been lost to the ser- 
 vice by matrimonial engagements obtained with exceeding rapidity. To 
 avoid these losses, plainer candidates were selected for training, but they 
 too have attained preferences as wives to a perplexing extent." Civil Ser- 
 vice Papers, p. 139. 
 1 For facts bearing on these points, see Appendices A and B.
 
 320 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the subordinates in her civil service were without legal recog- 
 nition the mere hirelings of superior officers and, until a 
 very recent period, they appear to have had comparatively little 
 social consideration or self-respect. And how could it be other- 
 wise, when the consciousness of servility and dependence, and 
 the scandalous repute of patronage and favoritism, through 
 which places in the public service were gained, were at once a 
 humiliation and a taint ? But as soon as those places became 
 the rewards of personal merit, so that an official position was, 
 in itself, evidence of good reputation and good capacity of 
 , attainments that had not been surpassed in an open compe- 
 tition of a character that could not be impeached by a rival 
 in a public contest it was natural that the estimation of the 
 civil service should rise with its real worth. There was no 
 longer any reason why its members should not take rank 
 with the officers of the army and navy in sharing the social 
 honors of the people. And such appears to be now the fact 
 in Great Britain. 1 With a manly pride, an officer in that 
 service, whether at home or abroad, sends his card, with 
 the words, " Of Tier Majesty's Civil Service," upon its face, 
 with a certainty that, everywhere among his own countrymen, 
 and in every quarter of the globe where the reputation of that 
 service is known, it will be at once accepted as a certificate of 
 character and an aid to social attention. The same thins:, 
 
 O ' 
 
 and for like reasons, may be said of our officers of the 
 army and navy ; and I know of no single fact that so strik- 
 ingly and so painfully marks that silent but severe, popular 
 judgment, according to which the methods of gaining the 
 official places of peace and industry consign those who fill them 
 to an inferior rank in the scale of social life. How long 
 would officers of our army or navy hold their social prestige 
 or retain their claims upon public confidence, if they reached 
 their positions through methods as partisan and as regardless 
 of capacity and attainments as those which have secured most 
 of the places in our civil service ? To give to the civil officers 
 of the nation, of corresponding grade, a social rank equal to 
 that of officers in the army or the navy a rank which, if 
 
 1 See, on these points, the letter of Sir Charles Trevelyan, in Appendix A.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 321 
 
 selected by means considered equally pure and honorable, 
 they would surely take involves the whole problem of civil 
 service reform ; and in the discrimination now made we may 
 see both the proof and the measure of the public estimate of 
 corruption in our politics. 
 
 In 1854, an English officer of great experience used this 
 language : " I am assured that the fact of previous service in the 
 government offices has, in reality, operated as a powerful objec- 
 tion to candidates for employment in commercial houses. . . . 
 It would be practicable to re verse the present general condition 
 of the civil service, and to make the fact of service in a public 
 office a recommendation not only for any social standing, . . . 
 but for efficiency." ' And after six years' experience of com- 
 petition, another officer made this prediction : "I have no 
 doubt that private persons will find it for their interest by and 
 by to institute competitions of this kind in order that they may 
 get the best clerks ; indeed, very large numbers of public and 
 private persons, merchants, bankers, directors of railroads, and 
 managers of public companies, have signed a declaration ap- 
 proving of the scheme of examination. . . ," a 
 
 These anticipations have already been fully realized. 
 Not only has the government been much troubled by reason 
 of private persons and corporations endeavoring to get 
 away the superior men and women which the new system 
 has brought into the public service, but the Civil Service 
 Commission has been compelled to refuse the applications 
 of persons who for private ends have sought the honor and 
 advantage of an examination before it. Nor is this all ; for 
 large corporations, whose employes are too numerous for in- 
 telligent, personal selection, have adopted the methods of ex- 
 amination and competition, which the success of the govern- 
 ment has commended to their attention. 
 
 For example, the great London printing house of Spottis- 
 woode instituted examinations 3 for its clerks as early as 1854. 
 The Bank of England has not only established a system of ex- 
 aminations for clerkships, but it has found its advantage in a 
 
 '- Civil Service Papers, 1854, p. 138. 
 
 s Report on Civil Service Appointment, 1839, p. 288. 
 
 1 Civil Service Papers, p. 14.
 
 322 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 gradual increase of salary and in a superannuation allowance 
 on retirement, according to fixed regulations, in close analogy 
 to those which prevail in the public service. The Railway 
 Clearing House, employing nearly fifteen hundred clerks, has 
 examinations for their admission (so rigid that sometimes 
 fourteen out of fifteen applicants have been rejected at a sin- 
 gle trial) and a system of competition for promotion to the higher 
 grades ; and to these it has added a superannuation fund and 
 a savings bank, in aid of both economy and efficiency in its 
 clerical force. The London and Westminster Bank, employ- 
 ing about four hundred and fifty clerks, has adopted competi- 
 tion for admission to its employment ; and, abandoning favorit- 
 ism, it has also established a regular system of promotion 
 for merit ; and, like many other great establishments, it has 
 found its profit in graded salaries and retiring allowances. l 
 
 II. The silent effect of administration, everywhere carried 
 on before the eyes of the people, by officers who have secured 
 their positions by reason of personal worth, tested by open 
 and honorable means, is, I am persuaded, both great and 
 salutary. Into whatever offices you may enter, whether 
 they be those of the light-house or life-saving stations along 
 the shores, of the custom-house service in the commercial 
 cities, of the postal or inland revenue administration anywhere 
 in the interior, of the vast departments of London or of India 
 you do not find servile officers and clerks who have gained 
 their places either by the influence of members of Parliament 
 or by the importunity of great politicians, but men of self- 
 reliance, who have succeeded, through public competitions, in 
 which they established the highest capacity and character. 
 And for these reasons they are no man's men no party's 
 agents no officer's dependents but self-respecting, competent 
 public servants, standing on their, own worth, taking an honest 
 pride in their record, and commanding the respect of their fel- 
 lows and of the community. It is only necessary to compare the 
 social and political elements thus brought into the public service, 
 with those which find representation there under a system of 
 spoils and favoritism, in order to get a clear view of the 
 
 1 See First Rep. of Civil Service Inq. Com., 1875, pp. 179 to 181, 204 
 and 205, and 230 to 232.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 323 
 
 very different effects which the two methods exert upon 
 political action and public morality. Even under that vicious 
 system, there are unquestionably many worthy persons appoint- 
 ed, and they are, of course, indispensable ; but how great a por- 
 tion of all to be met, in passing through public offices, filled 
 under that system, have reached their places for reasons or by 
 means that would not bear publicity ? Here are those whose pres- 
 ence marks the corrupt victory of a local faction or the vicious 
 influence of unscrupulous party managers ; there are the men 
 whose appointments prevented an exposure by a great officer or 
 hushed the just complaints about a local office ; at these desks are 
 the men who did immoral work in the last election, and at those 
 the men who are expected to do such work in the next election ; 
 this man's fraud gave one member his seat, and the appoint- 
 ment of that incompetent clerk secured from another mem- 
 ber his vote ; in this bureau is the bankrupt cousin of a 
 governor, and in that the unworthy dependent of a sec- 
 retary. The natural influences from such examples in the 
 great departments pervade every part of the country, and 
 are felt in every political meeting and at every family fireside, 
 moulding the common opinion of politics, tainting the air in 
 official places, lowering the popular estimate of public life, 
 degrading government in the eyes of the people. The old 
 spoils system, which Great Britain has destroyed, said to young 
 men seeking office : " Politics is a game of intrigue and 
 influence ; court the great politicians who can force your 
 nomination ; be submissive to corrupt officials and excuse 
 their sins ; attack no popular abuse which may deprive you of 
 influence." The new system says to him: " Official life is 
 a place of duty and responsibility ; preserve a character so 
 pure that no rival can 'attack it if you compete with him ; 
 make yourself so well informed that you cannot be defeated 
 in the examinations ; stand manfully for principles and fear not 
 to expose abuses ; condemn all intrigue and manipulation for 
 deceiving or coercing the people. ' ' 
 
 I am convinced that the salutary effect of the new system 
 has been felt not only in every part of the empire, but in 
 every grade of life. Mr. !May declares that the authority of the 
 crown, formerly wielded haughtily as a power, is now " held
 
 324 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 in trust as it were for the benefit of the people. " Every place 
 
 which the son of a farmer or sailor has been able to win 
 
 . 
 
 through competition, has been lost both to the arbitrary dis- 
 cretion of the crown and to the class interest of the no- 
 bility ; and it has not the less been taken from the vicious 
 capital of the demagogues and the pawnbrokers of politics 
 from the prizes to be won by manipulation, intrigue, and cor- 
 ruption. " I am not indifferent" (says a distinguished leader 
 of the British Parliament) " to the consideration that these 
 offices have become the patrimony of the poorer part of the 
 middle class, or even perhaps of the working class. " ' "I 
 consider that public office is a solemn trust, and that one of 
 the most important conditions is to choose the best possible 
 men for the different places. ' ' a 
 
 Such is the spirit of the new power in British politics, 
 and the tendency of the reform, which the people support 
 with a genuine enthusiasm. The consequences have been not 
 merely that royal and aristocratic authority, as well as in- 
 trigue and venal influence, have been limited ; that educa- 
 tion has been encouraged ; that common justice has been pro- 
 moted ; that partisan tyranny has been arrested ; that cor- 
 \ rupt elements have been taken out of elections ; 3 but govern- 
 ment itself has been presented to the people as having a purer 
 character and nobler ends as based on principles and recog- 
 nizing duties, and not merely as a merciless and selfish power 
 always yielding to the greater influence, however vicious, and 
 forever ready to turn to advantage the services' of agents, 
 however corrupt. The people are enabled to see the govern- 
 ment everywhere seeking and honoring the best capacity and 
 character among them, everywhere repudiating servility and 
 manipulation, everywhere defeating * partisan intrigue and 
 official prostitution, everywhere affirming that fidelity to prin- 
 ciples and to public interests is an obligation paramount to all 
 the selfish claims of individuals and of parties. They take 
 notice that skilful methods have been elaborated, and that they 
 are carefully applied, for the purpose of separating the worthy 
 
 1 Evicl. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Parlia. Report, 1873-4, p. 231. 
 
 - Report Investigation Committee, 1874-5, Vol. II., p. 103. 
 
 3 See Letters of John Bright and Sir Charles Trevelyan, Appendix A.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 325 
 
 from the unworthy, among the thousands who press for places 
 under the government. They find that if their sons or their 
 daughters would gain public places, what is most essential is not 
 that they should be servile to great officials, or great lords, or 
 great partisan managers, but that their pri7ate lives should be so 
 unspotted that they cannot be assailed by rivals, and that their 
 attainments should be so respectable that they cannot be 
 thrown out in competition. They see in the great army of 
 sixty thousand civil servants, not a body of men and women, 
 the greater portion of whom high officials and political cliques 
 have pushed into their places for ends of their own, and 
 whose stay there depends more on their servility than on their 
 merits, but they see a body, each member of which secured 
 his place through personal qualities which are as honorable 
 to their possessor as they are useful to the nation. They 
 take notice that the new system which, by making elections 
 turn on principles and not on patronage, invites worthy men 
 not seeking office to take part in politics has, at the same 
 time, removed the larger part of these elements which most 
 attract the vicious and the corrupt, and most disgust the pure 
 and the patriotic. In short, they see the vast machinery of 
 government itself the most potent of all human influences 
 for raising or lowering the character and prosperity of a na- 
 tion no longer, as formerly, a prolific source of fraud and 
 immorality no longer in alliance with the most venal ele- 
 ments of politics ; but a mighty force in the interest of edu- 
 cation, justice, and public virtue a discriminating power 
 that embodies and appeals to the higher intelligence and the 
 nobler sentiments of the nation. Such an influence and ex- 
 ample, when continued for a considerable period in Great 
 Britain, will, 1 am persuaded, disclose beneficent conse- 
 quences of which the whole civilized world will take yet more 
 emphatic notice. The rapid growth of her prestige and com- 
 merce, and the great capacity for government displayed by 
 her within recent years in so many parts of the world, are, 
 I am compelled to believe, closely connected with the charac- 
 ter of her consular l and diplomatic service, and are by no 
 
 1 For a comparison between American and British consular service, see 
 Appendices A and B.
 
 326 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 means independent of the worth and capacity that pervade 
 every part, and not in the least degree the higher part, of her 
 domestic administration. Ability and experience in the lower 
 official grades invite and can be controlled only by ability and 
 experience in the higher grades. The public service, instead 
 of being longer a source of corruption, which flows out upon 
 private life, has become a sphere of manly and conservative 
 virtues which are a strength to the State and an inspiration 
 to patriotism. And, how else can we explain the anomaly 
 that, through all these later years, in which views and methods, 
 thus wholly democratic and republican in their tendency, 
 have been rapidly growing before the eyes of the British 
 people, the old spirit of loyalty to the crown fervent devo- 
 tion to the constitution an honest and pervading belief that 
 no system of administration is so pure, so efficient, or so abid- 
 ing as the British system and a sturdy purpose to maintain 
 and defend them all have survived with a vigor and a uni- 
 versality unsurpassed in the national sentiment of modern 
 times ? How else, but upon the merits of her administrative 
 methods, and the capacity and integrity of her officials, of all 
 grades, in her many dependencies, and under such diverse 
 conditions, can we explain the unrivalled growth of the power 
 and influence of Great Britain ? And can any one doubt, if 
 the old system of George III. or any system of partisan spoils 
 and official favoritism had been continued, that British patriot- 
 ism and loyalty would have decayed, that India would have 
 been lost, that the Constitution would have fallen into uni- 
 versal weakness and decay, or that despotism would have 
 triumphed over liberty and law ? 
 
 III. It is worthy of notice that the broader effects of the 
 reform, which, transcending all mere questions of economy and 
 internal method, have deepened the fountains of patriotism 
 and made monarchy itself dearer to the British people, were 
 not wholly unanticipated at the opening of the great work in 
 1853 ; nor was that work began merely to remove adminis- 
 trative abuses ; but it was expected to strengthen the very bul- 
 warks of the government and to aid in averting the grave 
 perils which, between 1830 and 1848, had threatened the 
 thrones of all the leading nations of Europe. Sir Charles
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 327 
 
 Trevelyan (who with the present Chancellor of the Exchequer 1 
 first set forth the merit system in their celebrated report of 
 1853) puts the sense of peril very clearly when he says, " the 
 revoluntionary period of 1848 gave us a shake and created a 
 disposition to put our house in order^ and one of the conse- 
 quences was a remarkable series of investigations into public 
 offices which lasted for five years, culminating in the . 
 report. ' ' Speaking for a different class of society, at about 
 the same date, Matthew Arnold says : " The growing power 
 in Europe is democracy. . . . Our society is destined to be- 
 come much more democratic. . . . The time has arrived when 
 it is becoming impossible for the aristocracy of England to 
 conduct and wield the English nation any longer." 
 
 Before 1848, the constitutional system of the United States 
 and its administration had probably reached the maximum of 
 their effect in Europe in favor of republican institutions. Until 
 near that date, our administration had generally been worthy 
 of our principles ; and the savage partisanship and official 
 corruption with which we were then first becoming familiar 
 and which marked the extent of our fall from that high 
 standard which European statesmen had recognized in our 
 public affairs were little known in Europe ; so that our polit- 
 ical system had no drawbacks, and stood commended in for- 
 eign countries by the great attractions of equality, liberty, and 
 justice upon which it rests. That influence was then pervad- 
 ing and considerable in every enlightened community on the 
 continent ; and in the profession of republican principles at the 
 great centers of thought, and in revolution or in tendencies to 
 revolution in many quarters, was to be seen the measure of its 
 peril to feudal institutions and arbitrary government. If the 
 "shake" which such fears of disturbance gave in England 
 was less violent, it was not less significant, than on the conti- 
 nent. Between 1840 and 1848 many monster meetings were 
 held in Great Britain, by which the public peace was threat- 
 ened and serious anxiety was caused. Responding to anned 
 revolution on the continent for popular rights in 1848, the 
 
 1 Sir Stafford Northcote. * Civil Service Inq., 1873., Vol. II., p. 100. 
 3 Mixed Essays, pp. 7, 14 aud 27.
 
 c 
 
 328 CIVIL SEKVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 " Chartists" organizations and other republican sympathizers, 
 with their demand of "universal suffrage, the ballot and 
 annual parliaments," alarmed all England by their lawless 
 and revolutionary action. A petition, said to bear the signa- 
 tures of five millions of people, was backed by such a host, 
 resolved to attend its presentation to Parliament, that 170,000 
 special constables, to aid an army with artillery, were sworn 
 in for keeping the peace of London. It was under such a 
 state of affairs that British statesmen, sustained by the better 
 public sentiment, carried forward five years of investigations 
 into the methods of government, with a view of " putting 
 their house in order." A peril was upon the nation, and 
 thoughtful men felt its gravity. " On what action may we 
 rely to prevent the English people from becoming American- 
 ized ? . . . I answer on the action of the state. ' . . . They 
 could not radically change the British constitution. But 
 they could make reforms that would ensure pure, eco- 
 nomical, and efficient administration. They could suggest 
 to the crown, and they could compel the members of Par- 
 liament, to surrender their power of making partisan and 
 selfish nominations. They could by honest and equitable 
 methods open the public service to the whole body of the 
 people, so that the most deserving should get the offices. 
 They could, perhaps, thus, under the forms of a monarchy, 
 secure to the people nearly all the practical blessings which a 
 real republic could promise. In this way they could, per- 
 chance, be more republican than the great republic itself ; 
 and through such means present monarchy to the people as 
 enforcing the highest possible standard of official duty as 
 having more regard for equality, liberty of opinion, and re- 
 spectability of private character, than a republic had ever ex- 
 hibited. What, therefore, was, in form, only a salutary 
 method of administration, was in intention, and in broad effect, 
 a conservative force in government a barrier against republic- 
 anism by actually conferring blessings which republics had 
 given only in theory an antidote against revolutions by put- 
 ting in practice the equality and justice which revolutions 
 
 1 Bagehot's English Constitution, p. 23.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 320 
 
 demanded. " The salutary reforms of this active period 
 averted revolution. 1 
 
 It is interesting to note how soon after 1848 the sad effects 
 of our then recently developed, partisan system were present- 
 ed before Europe. In a volume published by the British 
 Government in 1855 (which quotes continental authority for 
 its statements), the very worst abuses of British administration 
 are said to have " the prominent features of the general as well 
 as local administration of the United States. These features 
 are : absence of any special qualifications for any administra- 
 tive service unless it be that of subserviency ... re- 
 movability . . . upon every change of party, . . . 
 an increasing distaste to public office, and the consequent ex- 
 clusion from it of the most accomplished persons in society ; 
 the lowering of the efficiency and the respectability of public 
 administration ; the retardation of its progress relatively to the 
 general progress of society ; and a tendency to increasing cor- 
 ruption concurrently with increased party feeling. " "The 
 whole issue is based on a single election on the choice of a 
 president. . . . The managers of the contest have the greatest 
 possible facility for using what I may call patronage bribery, 
 . . . and the efficiency of promised offices as a means of cor- 
 ruption, is augmented, because the victor can give what he 
 likes to whom he likes." 3 
 
 Such is the character of our administrative methods as they 
 have been understood by the reading people of Europe for a 
 quarter of a century. While Great Britain (accompanied by 
 all the leading European States, as I shall more fully explain) 
 has been carrying forward administrative reform, in a truly 
 republican spirit, and we have fallen from the better prece- 
 dents of our history down upon the partisan spoils system of 
 her less civilized times, can it be any matter of surprise that 
 this country that republican institutions as we represent 
 them among the nations have lost a great part of their in- 
 fluence as an example ? Is it strange that republicanism has, on 
 the other side of the water, become, to a sad degree, iden- 
 
 1 Democracy in Europe, by May, vol. ii. p. 495. 
 
 9 Civil Service Papers, p. 150-2. 
 
 3 Bagehot's English Constitution, 1873, p. 264.
 
 330 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 tified with extreme partisanship, a low standard of official 
 capacity and integrity, perpetual agitation about petty offices, 
 and management and manipulation, where statesmanship is 
 essential V It is Mr. May's judgment that there is far less 
 republicanism and democracy in England (and such, I believe, 
 is the general opinion among the best informed) than there 
 was thirty-five years ago. 2 " Freedom and good government, 
 a generous policy, and the devotion of rulers to the welfare of 
 the people have been met with general confidence, loyalty, 
 and contentment. . . . The constitution . . . has' 
 gained on democracy. ' ' The United States is judged as a 
 nation not so much by the noble principles of its constitution 
 as by the measure of purity, economy, and capacity to be 
 found in its official life, and by the style of men who fill those 
 high places where experienced statesmen and unselfish patriots 
 are needed. 
 
 ' ' Outside of Switzerland or France 4 there can hardly be 
 
 1 See Appendix B for considerations bearing on these points. 
 
 2 The advance of democracy referred to relates rather to its tendency to 
 attack the monarchical form of government, than to the spirit and principles 
 of democracy itself ; for they have advanced continually, and in no way 
 more strikingly, than in the reformed methods in the civil service, which 
 have been explained in this volume. 
 
 8 2 May's Const. Hist., p. 576. 
 
 4 The great republican principles of equality, liberty and justice have not, 
 of course, lost their attraction ; and in establishing them, France has not 
 .adopted our partisan system, but retains the admirable administrative meth- 
 ods which, based on examinations and not allowing arbitrary removals, have 
 aided her in so many fearful crises. In the profound changes lately brought 
 about, but few removals have been made, and those only in cases where 
 vital principles were involved less in all, probably, than the number 
 we should make upon a change in the party majority, upon the election 
 of a mayor in a city of 50,000 people. Had the republican leaders of France 
 understood that a change to a republic would involve the substitution of our 
 partisan-spoils system for her merit system, I venture to think France would 
 not have become even in form a republic. And it is not without signifi- 
 cance that the relation of her cabinet to parties, to Parliament, and to the 
 civil service, is more analogous to that of Great Britain than to that of the 
 United States. Indeed, English writers seem to claim the new French 
 regime as a reflection of the British system : " The Premier, as we should 
 call him," is nominated and removed by the vote of the National Assembly ; 
 the experiment of government in France, the position of M. Thiers, is " sin- 
 gularly illustrative of the English Constitution." (Bagehot's English Con- 
 stitution, p. 45.) The example of France, in becoming a republic, is all
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 331 
 
 said to be, in any country of Europe, a strong popular move- 
 ment towards a republic, . . . and, unhappily, the 
 United States have utterly lost, in Europe, that influence for 
 republican institutions which was so potent in the first half of 
 the century." ' And while partisan and corrupt administration 
 has so damaged us abroad, are we sure it has been less destruc- 
 tive of patriotism and confidence at home ? 2 What, but the 
 too frequent elections and the corrupt administration which a 
 partisan system produces and requires, has raised the ominous 
 question " Whether popular suffrage is a failure ?" What, if 
 not the perpetual struggle for patronage and the absorption of 
 the valuable time of Congress and of legislatures required by 
 the great affairs of the States and the nation in demoralizing 
 wrangles over clerkships, postmasterships, collectorships, and 
 the many petty offices, has done so much to impair the just and 
 ancient prestige of our legislative bodies ? What is it, forever 
 before our eyes as most humiliating and disastrous in our 
 public life, but those bargains, intrigues, prostitutions and 
 frauds in connection with getting office and holding office, 
 which we have seen that a merit system is able to correct ? 
 Is it because liberty and equality are less prized by the people 
 as their intelligence rises because the great principles of our 
 constitution are distrusted the more they are known that 
 republicanism as we practise it has lost ground in Europe ? 
 Or is it by reason of a bad system of administration, which, 
 in perfect harmony with those principles, we are at liberty 
 to reform ? 
 
 IV. In 1815, when the leading sovereigns of Europe, in 
 
 the more instructive and encouraging, because she has become such 
 through a conviction of the beneficence of republican principles, and 
 not through the seductions of a partisan-spoils system of office ; and, 
 perhaps, it is a part of her mission to teach the United States, from 
 which those principles were borrowed, how they may be applied in prac- 
 tical affairs, without being soiled and enfeebled by the corruptions of that 
 base system which France has spurned. For some facts bearing on the 
 Merit System, as enforced in France, especially in her consular service, see 
 Appendix B. 
 
 1 Prin&ton Review, May, 1878, p. 737. 
 
 3 For facts bearing on these points, see Appendix B, and John Bright's 
 letter in Appendix A.
 
 332 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIX. 
 
 the "Holy Alliance," declared themselves " delegated by 
 Providence to govern," and that they "looked upon them- 
 selves, with regard to their subjects and their armies, as 
 fathers of a family, ' ' Great Britain which alone declined to 
 join was the only leading monarchy in which the people had 
 an effective voice in the government ; and of the secondary 
 class of monarchies, Sweden in which for more than a cen- 
 tury ability to read and write had been a condition of the fall 
 privileges of citizenship was the only one in which there was 
 a constitutional government, giving a representation of popu- 
 lar interests. Since that date, the old theory of a divine right 
 to rule absolutism and clerical domination the supremacy of 
 class interests and the monopoly of official places by those of 
 noble birth have yielded to the claim of equal rights, and to 
 the paramount need of capacity and moral worth in the ser- 
 vice of the government ; but in this advance of justice and 
 liberty, Great Britain and, in some degree, Sweden have 
 maintained their old precedence. And it is interesting to 
 find that in Sweden the reform of the civil service though 
 not sufficiently excluding opportunities of bureaucratic 
 and aristocratic influence, perhaps has been attended by 
 results closely analogous to those of which we have taken 
 notice in Great Britain. I have already alluded to the fact 
 that the principal continental states, including Sweden, have 
 greatly reformed their civil service in later years, 1 but some 
 further facts more especially relating to Sweden (and Norway 
 being under the same king) will not be without interest. 2 
 That government, many years ago, provided for the examina- 
 tion of candidates for office. The standard of attainment, 
 which (like that first fixed in the British service) somewhat 
 reflects the influence of an aristocratic class, appears to be 
 higher than in Great Britain, and may perhaps be fairly 
 objected to as tending to give a needless monopoly to highly 
 educated persons. As the democratic spirit shall gain 
 strength, the standard will doubtless be lowered, in the 
 
 1 See ante p. 10. 
 
 3 The facts are to be found in a letter of Mr. Andrews, our Minister to 
 Sweden, dated October 11, 1876, and in " Foreign Relations United States, 
 1876," p. 553-563.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN'. 333 
 
 interest of humble life, so as to include only the qualifications 
 essential to the public service. The king has patriotically sur- 
 rendered his arbitrary right of appointment, for the sake of 
 obtaining the worthiest men for the service of the state. And, 
 without interference from the members of the legislature, he 
 uses the appointing power for selecting the best from among 
 those examined. The severe tests of character and capac- 
 ity for admissions gives the service a social rank which makes 
 it attractive and honorable. The tenure of ofiice is much the 
 same as in Great Britain, and there is an analogous system 
 providing for an increase of pay based on length of service and 
 for retiring allowances. And Mr. Andrews says : " There is 
 no doubt but the high respectability and rank of the civil 
 service in Sweden tend much to induce people to enter it." 
 He thinks this has been sometimes allowed to draw in super- 
 numeraries ; and it, of course, causes places to be accepted at 
 a lower grade of salary than would attract young men into a 
 disreputable service. " For a member of the legislative 
 branch of the government, as such, to recommned or urge the 
 appointment of persons in the civil service would be consid- 
 ered intrusive, and would have no weight, certainly, in ex- 
 cluding a more 'meritorious officer. Anything like patronage 
 does not obtain. . . . While the subordinates have the free 
 enjoyment of their political convictions and can express their 
 opinions and vote against the government, it is never their 
 practice to seek to propagate the political views of the gov- 
 ernment among the people. . . . Such attempt, whether for 
 or against the government, would probably excite the same 
 feeling that would be excited in our country if an officer of 
 the regular army or of the navy should undertake to play the 
 party politician. It is, therefore, considered, here, rather of 
 slight importance to the government whether civil service men 
 are included among its political supporters or not." And 
 here, therefore, as in Great Britain, we are shown that, if the 
 government will not compel its officers to fight, in every cam- 
 paign, for their places, they will not interfere with the free- 
 dom of elections or waste their time on partisan politics. The 
 abuses we suffer in those regards are the legitimate outcome of 
 our partisan and demoralizing methods. Coming to the effects 
 22
 
 33-i CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 of this system upon the moral tone of official life and the 
 safety of the public moneys, Mr. Andrews shows that defalca- 
 tions are extremely rare ; " only about four cases of defalca- 
 tion a year on an average ;" and that the government almost 
 never lose any money. "It is very seldom that a subordinate 
 officer is ... even charged with lesser misdemeanors, notwith- 
 standing the Rigsdag appoints and pays its own special Attor- 
 ney-General (under the constitution) to see that persons in the 
 public service fulfil their duties, and to accuse them before 
 the courts of justice if they fail to do so." It hardly need be 
 pointed out how widely different is the attitude of the mem- 
 bers of the Swedish, from that of the members of the American 
 Congress toward efficiency and integrity in official life. In 
 the one case, their power and influence are used to push per- 
 sonal and partisan favorites into the public service, and to keep 
 them there ; in the other, no such selfish and demoralizing 
 use of authority stands in the way of justice to the public 
 interests ; but, on the contrary, a special officer of the legislature 
 has a duty to prosecute in its behalf every unfaithful servant ; 
 and there is neither any party nor patron pledged or spe- 
 cially interested to screen the guilty. With such a system, 
 we see how natural it is that defaults should so rarely occur, 
 and are prepared for the stern dealing with official delin- 
 quents of which Mr. Andrews gives examples. One of the 
 latest is that of a whole board of directors of a charity institu- 
 tion at Stockholm " all prominent citizens" sentenced to 
 pay thirty thousand crowns, the amount lost " for lack of 
 proper watchfulness" in the custody of a key ; each of two 
 directors having, "without wrong intention," left his key 
 with the same third officer, during an absence from the city, 
 who by the use of the three keys was able to embezzle that 
 amount of money. 
 
 It would take me too far from my subject to separately 
 point out how, in all the more enlightened European states, 
 since 1815, and more especially during the last generation, the 
 old claims of royalty and aristocracy, of church and class inter- 
 ests, of favoritism and patronage, the social prestige of cen- 
 turies, and the old theory of government itself, have yielded 
 to the paramount need of high character and capacity in the 
 public service, and to the just and equal right of each citizen,
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 335 
 
 according to his fitness, and irrespective of his birth or party 
 affiliations, to tender his claim upon that service and have its 
 merits impartially considered. And it is worthy of notice 
 that on the continent, as in Great Britain, improvements in 
 the civil service have everywhere been attended with a great 
 advance in popular education, and in legislation for the pro- 
 tection of humble life ; so that several of the more enlightened 
 monarchies now enforce a more general attendance and pro- 
 vide for and secure a more thorough instruction in the public 
 schools than has yet been attained in the United States. The 
 statistics are too familiar to be repeated ; but the concrete 
 significance of the main fact cannot be too much insisted on 
 the great fact that the leading monarchies have, in this gen- 
 eration, made the common education of the people, ir. the 
 interest of patriotism, justice, and general prosperity, more 
 beneficent and universal than it has ever yet been in any 
 republic except Switzerland. 
 
 Y. I can refer to only a single other example of improved 
 civil administration on the continent that of Prussia. Ref- 
 erence has been made to the civil service system of France, as 
 embodying the better methods ; but the capacity of her mili - 
 tary officers in later years had not been properly attended to. 
 The opinion has been general that the superior capacity of 
 the military officers of their enemy caused the defeat of Austria 
 and France in the late wars with Prussia ; but careful ob- 
 servers also tell us that " Prussia, whose soil and physical 
 resources are third rate in quality as compared with those of 
 the United States, while in magnitude they bear but slight 
 comparison with ours, owes it very much to the high order of 
 efficiency which has been introduced into her civil service, 
 that she has risen to be one of the first powers in the world." 
 
 Another competent observer says, " Our civil service should 
 be above temptation and beyond suspicion. Prussia has such 
 a service. The pay is, indeed, not large ; but it is graduated 
 on the economical habits of the people. The service is hon- 
 orable, and brings certain social consideration ; it admits of 
 promotion as the reward of merit, and it ensures a pension for 
 the decline of life." 2 
 
 1 " Foreign Relations of the United States, 1876," p. 553. 
 
 8 " The United States as a Nation," by Rev. J. P. Thompson, 1877. p. 261.
 
 336 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 In a government in which so strong elements of aristocracy 
 and royalty survive as in Prussia, we are not surprised to ob- 
 serve that a phase of bureaucracy and a tendency to favor high, 
 literary attainments find expression in the examinations and 
 perhaps in the selections for the civil service ; but despite this 
 lingering of the old spirit, which may yet do some injustice 
 tojhumble life, the service is lifted high above the corruptions 
 and intrigues of partisan politics, and men of capacity and 
 moral worth everywhere stand in the official places of the 
 nation, and were the leaders in the great events which have 
 given Germany the first place on the continent. 
 
 If considered in the light of the past, the example of Prussia, 
 as an illustration of the effects of educating the people and of 
 bringing the most meritorious of them rather than mere 
 partisans and schemers into official leadership, is all the more 
 significant. The United States were conspicuous among the 
 nations, not only for the general intelligence of their citizens, but 
 for a pure and able civil service, and for a common-school system 
 in the interest of all their children, when, in 1815, Prussia, far 
 behind in the education of her people with a great part of 
 them in a condition hardly above serfdom was a blind and arro- 
 gant champion of the ' ' Holy Alliance, ' ' of the divine right of 
 kings and despotic administration, with as little regard for the 
 education as for the equal rights of her subjects. But the 
 sober reflections caused by her humiliation by Kapoleon de- 
 veloped in the minds of her rulers a new political philosophy ; 
 and her king, or the great statesman Stein, who spoke 
 through the king, avowed his purpose to " rehabilitate the 
 nation by devoting the most earnest attention to the education 
 of the masses of my people." That work was promptly 
 undertaken and has been firmly pursued ; and the great 
 results are well known : perhaps the best educated people in 
 the world a foremost place in science, art, and letters the 
 military leadership of the continent a civil administration 
 of unsurpassed purity and ability. 1 Stein, like William III. 
 
 1 It is not my purpose to commend the Prussian Government as a model 
 of justice or wisdom, and in various particulars it exhibits not a little of the 
 old spirit. But it has been the beneficent methods referred to which have 
 produced so great results, despite all drawbacks that have existed.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 337 
 
 (of England), was the first, under the government he had in 
 charge, to appreciate the vital importance of good methods in 
 administration ; and each of them gave the subject a promi- 
 nence which in later years it has never lost. The German states- 
 man secured the gratitude, and, in large measure, the great- 
 ness, of his country by three great measures of administrative 
 reform the reorganization of the army, improved municipal 
 government, and the " constitution of the Supreme adminis- 
 trative departments" and by his emancipation of the serfs. 
 It has been by such means by surrendering the monopoly of 
 office, which had been supposed to be essential to the exist- 
 ence of a crown and a privileged class by educating the com- 
 mon people, which had been claimed to be the peculiar virtue 
 of a republic by freely bringing into the official places of the 
 nation capacity and moral worth wherever found among the 
 people by legislating kindly for their protection that royal 
 and aristocratic governments have in large measure averted 
 the hostility that threatened them, and, at the end of two 
 generations of great advance in liberty and justice, find them- 
 selves, perhaps, stronger in the confidence and patriotism of 
 their subjects than they were in the beginning. In 1833 we 
 find Mr. Macaulay saying, " I see nothing before us but a 
 frantic conflict between extreme opinions, ... a tremendous 
 crash of the funds, the church, the peerage, and the throne. 
 It is enough to make the most strenuous royalist lean a little 
 to republicanism to think that the whole question between 
 safety and general destruction may probably . . . depend on 
 a single man, whom the accident of his birth has placed in a 
 situation to which certainly his own virtues or abilities would 
 never have raised him ;" and he even predicted that the 
 House of Peers Would soon have to give place to an elective 
 chamber. 1 I think it may be safely said that no Englishman of 
 Macaulay's character at this time leans even " a little toward 
 republicanism ;" but, on the contrary, there are Americans 
 who, disgusted by the magnitude and frequency of our admin- 
 istrative abuses, and not comprehending that they are only a 
 neglected excrescence upon the abiding virtues of republican 
 
 1 " Life and Letters of Macaulay," chaps, v. and viii.
 
 338 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 institutions, incline to lean a little to monarchy. Of that 
 class of thoughtless or unpatristic sympathizers with the 
 showy and exclusive features of aristocratic governments, I 
 have nothing to say ; but not a few sensible and patriotic 
 republicans some from their experience at home, others from 
 their observations and discussions abroad have had, if not 
 their faith and patriotism, at least their pride, not a little 
 disturbed. 1 
 
 Having detected the point at which republicans may be put 
 to a disadvantage, the active supporters of monarchy have been 
 so successful in giving prominence to the evils of our civil 
 service as to attract the attention of our foreign ministers, 
 who have brought the fact to the notice of the President. 2 
 Prudent monarchists no longer deny the justice and beauty of 
 republican principles, theoretically considered. But when a 
 government is established, they say that all the good that can 
 be got out of it is to be found in the effects of its administra- 
 tion. Administration is the only thing practical or of current 
 interest. All else is theory and sentiment. What is the 
 advantage, they ask, of proclaiming universal liberty and 
 equality in the constitution, if a monarchy really provides the 
 best education for the children, the best and cheapest courts of 
 justice for the parents, the best poor-law and sanitary admin- 
 
 J The humiliation which patriotic Americans have suffered abroad, by 
 reason of administrative abuses at home (which I can all the better appreci- 
 ate from having spent three of the last eight years in Europe), is well 
 illustrated in a volume already cited, " The United States as a Nation," 
 Preface, p. vii.) : " When I announced a course of lectures" (in 1876, at 
 the time of the Whiskey Ring and District of Columbia frauds), . . . 
 " to be given in the hearing of Europeans, some of my countrymen were of 
 the opinion that, in the painful aspect of public affairs at home, it were 
 better that Americans should do nothing to call attention to their country, 
 already the subject of so much adverse criticism." I ought to add that Dr. 
 Thompson did not follow their advice, but that he stood manfully and patri : 
 otically in vindication of the sound principles of his government ; and he 
 would seem to believe, as I believe, that when our people come to adequately 
 understand the causes of the abuses wbich exist, they will be found to pos- 
 sess the wisdom and virtue needed for their removal. 
 
 9 " Believing most sincerely that the United States have much to gain in 
 prosperity at home and in reputation abroad by a reform of their civil service, 
 and as the subject now occupies much attention tfiere," etc. " Foreign Rela- 
 tions U. S.,' 1876, "p. 553.
 
 Cl 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 339 
 
 istration for the sick and the destitute. "What, they inquire, 
 is the advantage of a republican senator who corruptly worked 
 his way to an election through a partisan caucus, over an aris- 
 tocratic lord who reached his seat through the birthright of 
 an ancient family, especially, if in the first case the government 
 permits the promises made to be discharged by the prostitu- 
 tion of offices, and in the last, no such prostitution is allowed ? 
 If a monarchy, having educated the children, then opens alike 
 all the offices and places, high and low, domestic and foreign, 
 freely to public and manly competition by any and every citi- 
 zen, so that character and capacity have an unobstructed way 
 to reach the positions where they can be most useful and hon- 
 orable to the nation what more, the monarchist demands, can 
 a republic offer what more can a republican patriot ask ? l 
 
 But the enemies of our institutions do not stop with these 
 questions. They challenge a comparison between our govern- 
 ment and theirs. " The practical choice of first-rate nations is 
 between the presidential government and the parliamentary, 
 . . . and nothing, therefore, can be more important than to 
 compare the two, and to decide upon the testimony of experi- 
 ence, and by facts, which of them is the better. ' ' a They point 
 to the debasing, partisan intrigues through which so many 
 
 1 Of course, there are the exceptions of the king or emperor and of the 
 hereditary members of the legislature. And I may add that I am not com- 
 paring the general merits of the two kinds of government, but only account- 
 ing for the state of European opinion, and for the loss in later years of re- 
 publican prestige and of influence on the part of th United States. If it were 
 any part of my purpose to make such comparison, or to set forth the unjust 
 and depressing effects of an hereditary class upon humble life, many other 
 facts would of course need be slated. I am not unmindful that I may be 
 denounced as unpatriotic in bringing forward facts, not creditable to iny 
 own country ; but it is enough for me, that these facts ought to be under- 
 stood by the American people, and that they cannot, without dishonor, 
 follow those pseudo-patriots, who, like Turks and Mexicans, having substi- 
 tuted conceit for patriotism and vanity for virtue, remain blind, and reck- 
 less of the world about them, while claiming for their countrymen all wis- 
 dom and perfection, at the very moment that other nations are gaining in 
 the race of civilization and liberty. The facts presented, I have hoped, may 
 help to recall the true friends of the republic to their duty and to encourage 
 the work of reform which shall make our administration worthy of our 
 principles. 
 
 * Bagehot's English Constitution, pp. 6G and C7.
 
 340 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 unworthy persons gain office ; to the many removals made for 
 political reason, which are fatal to the stability and experience 
 essential in the public service ; to the constant and acri- 
 monious contests about places, which exert a demoralizing 
 influence upon elections ; to the frequent condemnations of 
 our whole partisan system, and the exposure of its scandals, to 
 be found in our literature, in the debates in Congress, in 
 the resolutions of national conventions ; and with these in 
 hand, and in presence of the fact that the evils, which the 
 better public opinion so fully condemns, yet go on unchanged 
 from decade to decade they argue that the people are bet- 
 ter than their government, and that the continued existence of 
 the evils is proof of the inherent imbecility and peril of 
 republican government, and that they should be accepted as 
 a good cause for a return to monarchical institutions. They 
 declare, as a fact, that better administration in Europe than in 
 America has arrested the progress of republicanism, and main- 
 tained the prestige of royalty. " All evidence, therefore, con- 
 tradicts the assertion that loyalty has declined in England. It 
 is well known that republican speculations have occasionally 
 been ventured upon, but they have found no favor with any 
 considerable class of society ; they have not been addressed to 
 a single constituency ; they have not even been whispered in 
 Parliament ; and they are repelled by the general sentiment' ' 
 of the country. 1 
 
 These facts and arguments have not been reproduced, I 
 hardly need say, because they are agreeable to me or because 
 I am indifferent to the patriotic feelings of the reader, which 
 they may tend to disturb. But republican institutions their 
 honor, their prospects, their hope and glory in the world are 
 under our patronage, as the leading republican State ; and it 
 is not only our duty to make them most beneficent at home, 
 but to take care that they be not needlessly distrusted or 
 placed at a disadvantage abroad. To these ends, we need to 
 look the facts, however disagreeable, fully in the face, and we 
 must not allow any misapprehension or false pride to bias our 
 judgment. For the very reason that a republic rests, less than 
 
 1 Democracy in Europe, by May, vol. ii. p. 501.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 any other form of government, npon birthright, selfish inter- 
 ests, or class distinctions for the very reason of its disinterest- 
 edness, which proclaims liberty, equality, and justice for all alike 
 it needs, more than any other kind of government, to exclude 
 every form of monopoly and proscription in bestowing office, 
 and to strengthen and adorn itself, by bringing into its ser- 
 vice the highest worth and capacity to be found among its 
 citizens. A failure to bring about such results is both infidel- 
 ity to the principles of a republic and a peril to its safety ; 
 while, on the contrary, their accomplishment by a monarchy 
 is really to rise above its essential principles to elevate the 
 masses at the expense of the nobility and the crown ; a conse- 
 quence which we have seen the enemies of reform advance 
 as good reasons for opposing the merit system. 1 I am pro- 
 foundly convinced that a republic, being without hereditary 
 officers, without a privileged class, without a state church, 
 without feudal traditions, without any form of authorized 
 restraint upon equality, liberty, and common justice, is, of all 
 forms of government, in principle and opportunity, the most 
 favorable for bringing its best citizenship into its places of 
 public duty, and that our failure, in that regard, is largely to 
 be explained by the fact that no sense of peril until within a 
 few years has prevented our being blinded by our marvellous 
 growth and prosperity, or disturbed our neglect of growing 
 abuses in the administration ; so that the subject, not in any 
 other way much pressed upon public attention, has never yet 
 taken its appropriate place in the reflections of the citizen or 
 the action of the government. When, at no remote day, such 
 shall be the case, it need not, I think, be doubted that the 
 honor and the safety of the people will alike be seen to demand, 
 or that their unmistakable voice will require that, in the 
 advancing stages of civilization, the official places in the 
 republic shall be filled, and its honor, dignity, and rights 
 shall be upheld, at home and abroad, by men in experience, 
 education, and moral worth, not inferior to those who may hold 
 corresponding places in the foremost monarchy in the world. 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 196-197, and 202.
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 A SUMMARY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EEFOKM MOVEMENT. 
 
 The original spoils system. The first appearance of partisan methods. 
 The origin of parties. The beginning of the partisan system. 
 Source of parliamentary patronage. A partisan spoils system devel- 
 oped. Checks upon that system by legislation and public opinion. The 
 system of George III. Reforms after the American Revolution. A 
 higher and bolder public opinion. When examination first introduced. 
 Limited competition. Fear of revolution. Civil Service commission 
 created in 1853. Only limited competition required. Unpopularity and 
 decay of parliamentary patronage. The leaders of both parties find the 
 partisan system a failure. Open competition in India. Open competi- 
 tion made general in 1870. The significance of Civil Service reform. It is 
 not a mere method or process. It involves great principles, and the 
 morality and the stability of government. TL>3 general results reached 
 in Great Britain. 
 
 THE decisive influences, and the more important measures, 
 in civil administration during the long course of history which 
 we have followed, can now be presented within narrow limits. 
 
 I. In the feudal times, upon which we first entered, gov- 
 ernment represented neither the wishes nor interests of the 
 people, nor were its objects the protection of common rights 
 or the promotion of common justice. A hereditary king, 
 the source of all office, the nobility, forever in office, and their 
 subordinates, true to the feudal spirit, recognized neither equal- 
 ity nor liberty nor responsibility, but claimed a divine right to 
 rule and insisted on an absolute duty of the people to obey. 
 The modern rule of duty, that laws should be framed and ex- 
 ecuted in the common interests and on the basis of the equal 
 rights of the people, and the theory that the power to appoint 
 and remove public officers is one of trust and strict responsi- 
 bility, to be exercised only for the general welfare, were not 
 recognized, and they were repugnant alike to the theory 
 of the government and the spirit of the age. Power was the
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 343 
 
 only limit of official action, and fear the only reliance of the 
 government. The mass of the people were in gross ignorance, 
 and many of them were in- slavery. The authority to make 
 laws and to appoint and remove officers, like the power to con- 
 fer titles, to give pensions, to grant pardons, to extort taxes, to 
 enforce service in the army, to excuse compliance with statutes 
 and judgments, were alike used to advance the interests of the 
 king, the officers, and the privileged classes, who made up the 
 one party forever in power. In no other sense was there any 
 party ; nor had the people the necessary intelligence or liberty 
 to form a party, in the modern sense, until centuries later. 
 A spoils system of office was wrought into the very struc- 
 ture of government and society. Nearly all kinds of official 
 abuses known in modern times from the open sale of offices 
 by the head of a nation down to petty pillage by a baggage- 
 searcher at the docks, from bribery on the highest seats of 
 justice to extortion by constables and robbery by collectors 
 were developed in all their manifold forms. They were not 
 confined to politics, but extended to the church, to the army, and 
 to the conditions of privilege and precedence in social life. If 
 the salaries of petty officers were not pillaged by great officials 
 under the pretence of party assessments, it was because there 
 was no party but the members of the privileged class, some of 
 whom had sold the offices and got a larger price by reason of 
 their being delivered free of taxation ; if there was no invasion 
 of the appointing power by members of Parliament, and al- 
 most no bribery at their election, it was because that body had 
 but little power and its members were as dependent upon the 
 king and the great lords as clerks now are upon members of 
 Congress. We need only to read the history of these times, 
 to expose the unpatriotic slanders by which modern partisans 
 and demagogues have sought their own justification, in repre- 
 senting that the abuses they practise are the peculiar and in- 
 evitable drawbacks of republican institutions. Our spoils sys- 
 tem is only that portion of these old, royal abuses which we 
 have foisted upon our republican institutions. 
 
 II. A despotic spoils system was an essential part of the power 
 of the crown and of the bulwarks of the nobility and the church ; 
 and there was neither the sense of duty, the justice, the
 
 344: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 liberty, nor the intelligence, that made even its fit discussion 
 possible ; nor could there be until centuries of a rising civil- 
 ization had not only raised the -conscience, the education, 
 and the freedom of the people, but modified the very structure 
 of government and society. If, as in the age of "Wyckliffe, 
 a great uprising of the manhood and the moral sense of 
 the nation gave birth to a civil-service reform statute, as 
 much in advance of the age as any thing he said or did, it 
 was yet true that, in religion and politics alike, such glimpses 
 of better things were but lights on the dark way of progress, 
 and that real reform was far in the future. As it had been 
 under the Plantagenets, so, substantially, it continued under 
 the Tudors and the Stuarts, until the time of Cromwell. There 
 was no public opinion sufficiently enlightened to grasp the 
 idea that there is no more right to use the appointing power 
 than there is to use the public money for selfish and corrupt 
 purposes if indeed there could be said to be any that com- 
 prehended the idea of official responsibility to the people in any 
 sense. It would have required a bold man, ready to peril his 
 life, to assert such principles before the king. To question the 
 selfish use of the appointing power which now only subjects a 
 reformer to the ostracism of a party, was then treason against a 
 king, if not rebellion against the divine order in the state. 
 Until near the time of Cromwell, the idea of true political 
 reform as a right or a duty, in the sense of modem times, 
 hardly existed in England. There had, indeed, begun to be a 
 public opinion that, in a general way, claimed rights and re- 
 sponsibility in connection with government, and there was 
 some co-operation to secure them ; but public thought rested 
 on principles without reaching the definite conception of 
 methods in administration results only to be reached in the 
 next century. Parliament still remained too feeble to usurp 
 any part of the appointing power, and the clerks in the de- 
 partments were not public servants at all, but were the mere 
 hirelings of the great officers at their head. 
 
 III. In the time of Cromwell, there were combinations in 
 the nature of parties, and that which supported him had a 
 well-defined policy, and principles as much religious as po- 
 litical which in many ways raised the administration above
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN". 345 
 
 the selfish interests of persons and classes. He recognized a 
 sort of responsibility to his party for the use of the appointing 
 power, and in that regard made the first great advance toward 
 administering the government in the interest of common jus- 
 tice. At this period, we find the character of the administra- 
 tion beginning to attract the attention of statesmen ; and 
 Marvel, Eliot, and Yane may be regarded as the first of the 
 illustrious patriots who began to comprehend the great work 
 of administrative reform ; and the republican, Algernon Sid- 
 ney, declared the new doctrine, ' ' that magistrates are set up 
 for the good of the nation, not nations for the honor or glory 
 of magistrates." 
 
 IY. Cromwell had done nothing toward the establishment 
 of a better method than mere official favor for making 
 selections for the public service, if indeed the times were 
 not too violent and ignorant for a reform based on character 
 and justice. Under Charles II., therefore, the old spoils 
 system was restored with the crown ; and in the form of pen- 
 sions, titles, and bribes he increased all the former elements of 
 corruption in ways which his profligacy and recklessness sug- 
 gested. The appointing power was as much an article of 
 merchandise as the crops on the royal estates. Parliamentary 
 corruption increased with the power of Parliament, and nearly 
 every officer was open to bribes, from the king, who set the 
 example to the keeper of the dog-kennels, who followed it. 
 Under James II. it was not better, but worse. Religious as 
 much as political opinions continued to be tests for office in 
 the army and in civil life, as well as in the church. Districts 
 were gerrymandered, Parliament was packed with placemen, 
 members followed the precedent of the king in accepting 
 bribes and in bribing others. Proscription extended to the 
 judiciary, and Jeffreys expressed the savage spirit it breathed. 
 Officers were removed by reason of their opinions, as ruthlessly 
 as they have ever been by any republican president, governor, 
 or mayor in later times. Official life became a source of cor- 
 ruption, which poisoned and debased every thing in connection 
 with government, and helped to arouse tl^e wrath of the people, 
 which drove James from the country. But outside of official 
 life, and despite the demoralizing influence of politics, a better
 
 346 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 public opinion, a larger and bolder sense of right and duty, were 
 growing among the people, and taking more and more notice 
 of public administration. 
 
 V. William III. was the first English king who brought a 
 reforming spirit to the throne, and the first who appreciated 
 the importance of good administration ; and he soon dis- 
 covered that without reforms he could not carry forward 
 his great enterprises, if indeed he could retain the throne. 
 He did little for better methods, but much for a better 
 spirit, and more efficiency and responsibility. He became 
 his own Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and day after day 
 he personally investigated abuses in the other departments. 
 Laws were passed for the protection of the freedom of elec- 
 tions, judges were made secure in their offices during good 
 behavior, placemen were excluded from seats in Parliament. 
 But a desperate spirit of faction prevailed. The nation was 
 unaccustomed to the responsibilities of freedom and without 
 experience in the management of parties. The power of 
 Parliament had greatly increased, but with more power had 
 come more bribery and more factious activity. The king 
 created a select cabinet of advisers, the beginning of the 
 present British Cabinet, and the model on which that of 
 the United States is closely framed. The members were 
 all taken from the dominant party in Parliament, and 
 they were to go out (unless the Parliament should be pro- 
 rogued) whenever, on any important measure, they should 
 fail of carrying a majority in that body. This system gave 
 to the Parliamentary majority the great prize of guiding the 
 administration and of controlling all appointments ; and very 
 soon and very naturally drew its members and their constitu- 
 ents into two great parties. Here was the origin of parties 
 and of party government, as understpod in British history. 
 The majority could before make all laws ; but now, through 
 the cabinet, it could also control all national policy, name all 
 officers, direct all subordinate officials in the line of their 
 duty. It was the greatest prize ever offered to the victors in 
 a party contest. Party government, thus introduced under 
 William III., has continued, with no fundamental change, to 
 this day. It made no provision as to the mode of the appoint-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 347 
 
 ment or removal of subordinate officials ; and it was quite 
 consistent with its theory that their selection should be based 
 on their personal qualifications, irrespective of poh'tical opin- 
 ions. In that particular, the condition was the same as it is 
 under the Constitution of the United States. So great a regard 
 for character and so non-partisan a spirit were, however, too 
 much for the political virtue and general intelligence of the 
 times of William III. Despite the failure of party gov- 
 ernment to rise above a partisan, spoils system, and its con- 
 tinued inability to make reforms that kept administration up 
 to the level of the rising plane of public intelligence and mo- 
 rality, its introduction was in itself no small improvement. 
 To a great extent, it took administration out of the secret in- 
 trigues of the court, and opened it to the members of a party 
 or at least to its leaders. If it did not give the offices to the peo- 
 ple, it in principle gave them to such of the people as belonged 
 to the ruling party though in practice it only gave them to 
 official favorites and partisan manipulators. The leaders of 
 the dominant party insisted on proscription, and made opinions 
 the test of nominations. Members of Parliament demanded 
 patronage, and very soon began their long-continued encroach- 
 ment on the appointing power of the executive. They de- 
 manded places as a condition of helping fellow-members to 
 seats in the cabinet ; and here was one great source of their 
 control of appointments. There were not at this time (nor has 
 there since been, except for very brief periods) any general 
 practice of removals without cause ; but the dominant party 
 continued to grasp larger and larger patronage, and more and 
 more, it came under the control of members of Parliament. 
 And party politics strongly tended to venality. Here we 
 have the introduction of the partisan system of appointments 
 of the practice of parties looking to their patronage, rather 
 than to their principles and their good administration, for the 
 sources of their strength among the people. This usurpation 
 of the appointing power by members of Parliament and the 
 introduction of a partisan system of appointments, at the very 
 beginning of party government, made indispensable that long 
 contest, in which members were finally compelled to surrender 
 their spoils.
 
 348 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 VI. From Anne to George III. was the period of the first 
 great trial of party government. It did not fail, nor has it 
 since failed, within its true sphere. But having descended 
 to partisan methods, it proved that by such methods public 
 administration cannot be raised, or the just demands of an 
 intelligent nation be satisfied. The partisan system of ap- 
 pointments and promotions aggravated the evils of Parlia- 
 mentary patronage, made administration costly and feeble, 
 spread corruption from the department to cities, boroughs, 
 and elections, while it disgusted the better class of citizens, 
 alarmed statesmen, and exasperated and debased all politi- 
 cal contests. At the same time that every thing within the 
 domain of administration and politics was becoming more 
 and more demoralized, until the lowest depths of corruption 
 were reached under "Walpole, Newcastle, and Pelham while 
 statesmanship tended to sink into the mere management and 
 manipulation of parties and elections, and those at the head of 
 public affairs became the leaders of a servile class seeking 
 places, pensions, and titles a higher and bolder public 
 opinion was being developed outside political circles, which 
 demanded more purity and patriotism in politics, and more 
 zeal and spirituality in religion an opinion which found no- 
 ble utterance by Chatham and Burke in Parliament and by 
 Wesley and Whitefield in the pulpit. Political writers became 
 more bold, and the reforming spirit found a more enlightened 
 and vigorous expression. Still reformers were ridiculed as 
 doctrinaires and sentimentalists, were denounced as canting 
 hypocrites, seeking office, were branded as enemies of the 
 party who threatened its safety. Nevertheless the reforming 
 spirit steadily gained strength, and more and more the inherent 
 evils of Parliamentary patronage and the partisan system 
 were demonstrated. Even in Queen Anne's time, the inter- 
 ference of officials with the freedom of elections became intol- 
 erable ; and in that ninth year of her reign those in the postal 
 service were by statute prohibited using their influence to affect 
 the vote of any elector. This statute is, I think, the first of 
 that series of enactments which enforce a more just and whole- 
 some restraint than we have yet imposed on official interfer- 
 ence with the freedom of elections.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 349 
 
 Still members of Parliament insisted on their patronage and 
 used it basely. Inexorable partisan tests in the departments 
 were reinforced by proscriptive appointments and promo- 
 tions in the church, by corrupt pensions, by titles that re- 
 warded venality, by promotions that insulted merit, by a cor- 
 rupt borough-system, and by fearful bribery at the elections. 
 The abuse of partisan removals was not as great as it has been 
 with us, though the Tories attempted to introduce universal 
 proscription. 
 
 VII. George III. added new elements of debasement to 
 the evils of the partisan system which he inherited. He arbi- 
 trarily interfered with the details of administration and rivalled 
 members of Farliament in bribery and coercion. His policy, 
 especially, during the administration of Lord Bute,' was as 
 proscriptive as that of our most partisan Presidents, and 
 immeasurably more corrupt. Pensions, titles, decorations, 
 court favors, social influence, espionage, open bribes at elec- 
 tions, bribes of members, threats, were used to carry the 
 projects of the king and to punish his enemies. Members of 
 Parliament, high officials and party leaders, generally, were lit- 
 tle above the morality of the court. The king tried to rule 
 through a party based on patronage, official influence, and cor- 
 ruption ; and he failed as sadly as any party has ever failed in 
 the use of the same means. Lord Bute ignominiously surren- 
 dered on the failure of that system. The higher sentiments 
 and the nobler minds of the nation exhibited a growing power. 
 But the war with America to the support of which the king 
 brought all the corrupt resources of the spoils system, and 
 which that system unquestionably protracted silenced for a 
 time the voice of reform. At the conclusion of the war, an 
 administration distinctly pledged to reform came, for the first 
 time in English history, into the possession of the govern- 
 ment. ' 
 
 Independence for America, administrative reform, freedom 
 of elections, exclusion of placemen from Parliament these 
 were its pledges, to vvhich it was faithful. The triumph of the 
 spirit of Burke and Chatham victory for those who had stood 
 
 The first Rockingham Ministry was certainly friendly to reform. 
 
 23
 
 350 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 for America and for reform gave significance to the change 
 of ministry. If there was delay and occasional reaction, the 
 higher sentiments, whose victory these events record, never 
 again surrendered to patronage or partisanship. We very 
 soon come upon the time when British legislation, in a long 
 series of statutes against bribery and office brokerage, passed 
 during the reign of George III. and since perfected, was made 
 far more effective against the prostitution of the appointing 
 power and the abuse of official authority generally, than our 
 laws have ever been. If there was not enough public virtue 
 or wisdom to remove the causes which induced subordinate 
 officials to interfere with elections, there was at least a patriotic 
 public opinion bold enough, in the last half of the reign of 
 George III. to crush out that evil by disfranchising those 
 officers ; a disability that continued until 1868, when the merit 
 system had removed the cause of the great evil at which dis- 
 franchisement had been aimed. And before his reign came 
 to an end, the system of superannuation allowances, ever since 
 enforce'd, had been well developed, and there were several 
 other laws intended to advance the self-respect and social po- 
 sition of those in the public service. 
 
 These statutes, by making official prostitution more peril- 
 ous, by holding up a higher standard of public duty before 
 the people, by encouraging the criticism of the better public 
 opinion, have largely contributed to the purification of politi- 
 cal life and to the upbuilding of that more exacting popular 
 demand which has imposed a wholesome sense of responsibility 
 upon British officers of every grade and in every part of the 
 empire. 
 
 VIII. Before 1820, when George IV. became king, the 
 better public sentiment had nearly driven corruption out of the 
 partisan system, while the system remained ; but its inherent 
 viciousness had only become the more conspicuous in the 
 light of a higher civilization. Bribery of members of Parlia- 
 ment was at an end, and removals for mere political reasons 
 were very rarely made. But members of Parliament were by 
 their patronage disarmed for some of the higher duties of 
 legislation ; they forced incompetent favorites into the ser- 
 vice ; the departments were crowded with supernumeraries ;
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 351 
 
 elections were debased, and the whole atmosphere of politics 
 was poisoned by the evils of patronage and favoritism. These 
 evils had become known to the more intelligent part of the 
 people, and there was a far more discriminating condemnation 
 of parliamentary interference with appointments than ever 
 before ; but for a time the great reform measure of 1832 
 absorbed public attention. 
 
 As early as 1834, however, pass examinations for admission 
 to the service were begun in a small way, and before 1850 
 they had been greatly extended. In 1854 they were adopted 
 in the United States. But in their very nature, they were 
 inadequate, and more efficient examinations were called for. 
 Patronage in all its forms, by reason of the good effects of 
 examinations, encountered more and more powerful oppo- 
 sition. Statesmen clearly perceived, that a partisan system 
 is as unnecessary to the vigorous life of a party as it is 
 disastrous to the higher interest of a nation. Under the 
 influence of such convictions, patronage and proscription 
 were put under more effective limitations, and examinations 
 were extended and made more efficient by limited competi- 
 tion in some of the offices. The great party leaders on both 
 sides comprehended that neither parliamentary patronage 
 nor the partisan system itself could long survive. Even as 
 early as 1820, the patronage of promotion in the customs ser- 
 vice had been surrendered by the head of the treasury in favor 
 of promotions for merit ; and the results not a little aided 
 the cause of reform by increasing the efficiency of that branch 
 of the service. To the other influences, which led to the 
 radical movement of 1853, must be added the fact that pass 
 examinations inherently defective as they are everywhere, 
 in a perceptible measure, both limited the abuses of parlia- 
 mentary patronage and brought better men into the public 
 service. It was no longer possible for politicians to prevent 
 the question of better administrative methods coming into 
 the foreground as a great measure of executive policy ; and 
 it became distinctly such before 1853. It was not, in form, 
 ever a party issue ; for, in its nature, it divided not party 
 from party, but what was higher from what was lower in each 
 party ; and not even the more partisan managers of either party
 
 352 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 thought it safe any more than they have in the United 
 States in later years to avow hostility to the duty or prin- 
 ciple of reform, however much they might sneer and secretly 
 oppose. 
 
 IX. This brings us to the radical reform measures of 1853. 
 In large part by reason of the statutes I have referred to, 
 the general character of official life had so risen, between 1780 
 and 1853, that, at the latter date, it was, I think, decidedly less 
 partisan and less venal in Great Britain than in the United 
 States ; though patronage in the hands of members of Parlia- 
 ment the main source of the abuses in the civil service was 
 still as arbitrary and pernicious as it has at any time been in 
 the hands of members of Congress. The moral planes of 
 official life in the two countries the one ascending and the 
 other descending had crossed each other in the period be- 
 tween those dates. The nearest correspondence between the 
 use of the appointing power by an English king and an Amer- 
 ican president was the practice in the earlier part of the reign 
 of George III. and that which began under President Jackson ; 
 though George III. added to merciless partisanship, pecuniary 
 bribery, an offence of which President Jackson was never 
 guilty. 
 
 If the character of administration had, in a degree, risen 
 with the intelligence and moral tone of society since party 
 government began, it had neither risen as rapidly as the 
 demand for reform, nor reached the efficiency and purity 
 which the statesmen of both parties felt that the exigency of 
 the empire demanded. They saw that the waning partisan 
 system was capable of nothing better than what it had given, 
 that the reform sentiment was steadily gaining strength, that 
 parliamentary patronage must from its very nature be fruitful 
 of evil continually, and was incapable of defense on any sound 
 principles. 1 And they felt that the revolutionary tendencies in 
 England and throughout Europe, since 1830, and especially 
 since 1848, were a warning not only against any elements of 
 feebleness, but against every abuse that might impair the 
 
 1 "Some years have now elapsed since Lord Althorp declared in the 
 House of Commons that the time for a system of government by patronage 
 was gone by." Speech of Earl Granville in House of Lords, 1854.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 353 
 
 patriotism of the people. Though we have high authority for 
 saying that on a secret vote a reform policy would have been 
 suppressed by overwhelming numbers, the great party leaders 
 dared not longer oppose it on principle. ' ' If the clubs had 
 been polled, there would have been ninety-nine out of a 
 hundred against us." 
 
 The strength of the minority was not in numbers, but in the 
 influence of high character and capacity, and of deep, moral 
 earnestness a force in public affairs which politicians are very 
 apt to underestimate. It was then, as it had been long before, 
 and has continually since been, a part of the conviction of all 
 English statesmen that the good administration of the laws 
 is a matter of serious concern, to which they ought to give 
 their best efforts. " Every eminent statesman has since a shown 
 that the true policy of a government was in appealing to 
 the good sense and intelligence of the large classes of the 
 community." Such was the condition, in 1853, when the 
 government ordered Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Staf- 
 ford Northcote to make their celebrated investigation and 
 report. It was not a movement by members of Parliament 
 toward the surrender of their usurped patronage, nor did that 
 body, at first, co-operate beyond voting money to pay ex- 
 penses ; but it was an exercise of the long-dormant authority 
 of the executive, in its own sphere of duty, to see that the 
 laws are faithfully executed sustained by the better public 
 opinion. Members of Parliament, with few exceptions each 
 grasping firmly his little parcel persistently claimed as a right 
 that portion of the appointing power which they had originally 
 gained as a usurpation ; nor can they ever be credited with 
 surrendering it until a frowning public opinion enforced that 
 duty. 8 
 
 X. The investigation made by those gentlemen showed that 
 pass examinations had been useful ; that limited competition 
 between those nominated by members of Parliament and the 
 Treasury though applied only within very narrow limits 
 
 1 Evid. Sir Charles Trevelyan, C. S. Inquiry, 1873, vol. ii., p. 102. 
 9 The date referred to is 1854, and this language is from Earl Granville's 
 speech cited in the last note. 
 * See Appendix A, Letter Sir Charles Trevelyan.
 
 35i CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 had been still more useful. It also developed good reasons for 
 believing that open competition, under which any one apply- 
 ing could be examined without permission of any official, 
 would be far more salutary ; and it hardly need be added that 
 it would exclude the evil of parliamentary patronage. Open 
 competition was therefore recommended ; and also a general 
 Civil Service Commission for supervising and giving harmony 
 to examinations throughout all the departments and offices. 
 Open competition was the application of a new and higher 
 standard in official life ; for, it was a proclamation that worth 
 and capacity have higher claims upon office than official favor 
 or partisan services. Partisans and official monopolists were 
 naturally enough alarmed, and became hostile. Denunciation, 
 sarcasm, ridicule, gross exaggerations of the probable expenses 
 and of the difficulties in enforcing the new system, bold pro- 
 phecies of its futility, and of its pretended centralizing tend- 
 encies, were urged with a skill and persistency which were not 
 surpassed when a similar measure of reform was initiated in 
 the United States. But Lord Palmerston remarkable alike 
 for courage and practical experience and his cabinet sup- 
 ported the report and had the commission promptly appointed. 
 It was thought prudent, while allowing open competition, to 
 only require limited competition, as a first experiment which 
 did not prevent a monopoly of nominations by members of 
 Parliament lest a too sudden change from the long-prevail- 
 ing system should arouse a dangerous opposition. Open com- 
 petition was about the same time applied to the administration 
 of British India, under the immediate supervision of Mr. Ma- 
 caulay. The practical effect, in both countries, was to exclude 
 the worst nominees, to give places to the best men nomi- 
 nated, to improve the moral tone and the capacity of the pub- 
 lic service, to speedily make parliamentary patronage ridicu- 
 lous and odious, by publicly exposing and rejecting the class 
 of incompetent favorites and disreputable henchmen which 
 members had been, for more than a century, in the habit of 
 foisting upon the public treasury in the interest of their purses 
 and their elections. It was soon plainly seen that open compe- 
 tition, which would alike promote common justice and general 
 education, was all that was needed to exterminate vicious
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 355 
 
 patronage, to destroy the old official monopoly, and to give 
 to the intelligence and manhood of the nation free access to 
 present their paramount claims upon places under the gov- 
 ernment. Public opinion rapidly grew stronger for the 
 reform. Parliament, which in 1855 had condemned the 
 new merit system (as our Congress condemned it under 
 President Grant), had in 1856 grown wiser, and by a small 
 majority commended it ; and, rising with public opinion, it 
 unanimously, in 1857, not only approved what had been done, 
 but suggested that open competition be established as the sole 
 test for entering the public service. Patronage so rapidly lost 
 its attractions and its respectability, and the Civil Service 
 Commission so early demonstrated its usefulness, that in 1859 | 
 Parliament refused all retiring allowances to those who should ! 
 get into the service without an examination before the com- 
 mission. The machinery of the new system had worked so 
 easily, its expenses were so small', and the certainty of obtaining 
 the best men by examinations was so overwhelmingly demon- 
 strated, that criticism was silenced and the enemies of reform 
 were confounded. The charge of centralization was seen to 
 be absurd ; for the unconstitutional share of the appointing 
 power (before centralized in members of Parliament) did not, 
 practically, revert to the executive, but was in practice dis- 
 tributed to the persons, of character and capacity among the 
 people, who should win their way into the public service by 
 an open competition, which left the executive nothing like 
 the arbitrary caprice of appointment which had belonged to 
 every English king from the origin of the monarchy. The 
 reform, therefore, was as democratic and republican in its 
 operation, as it was moral and educational in its origin and 
 influence. The same method which broke up that centraliza- 
 tion of power in the hands of the members of the legislature 
 which impaired the counterpoise of the Constitution, also 
 enlarged the liberties of the people by giving to personal worth 
 an open way to office. 
 
 The victory of the merit system was thus complete, and the 
 disposition to oppose or argue was over, in five years from the 
 time it was first officially proposed. The nation was proud of 
 guarantees for a better official life ; the cause of education and
 
 356 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 common justice was advanced ; members of Parliament were 
 glad to be relieved of the degrading and exasperating solicita- 
 tion for office ; elections began to turn more on character and 
 capacity, and not so much on hopes of patronage and salaries ; 
 parties were found to be not less vigorous and wholesome 
 when the main issues were those of policy and principles 
 without embroilment with questions about all sorts of offices 
 and places. The time had come when hopes of personal gain, 
 adroit management, and official manipulation were seen to be 
 forces in politics far inferior to honest and open appeals to the 
 judgment, honor, and patriotism of the people. Those seek- 
 ing office turned for support from the place-brokers and 
 partisan speculators of politics, whose business was broken up, 
 to the independent and honest citizenship of the country, 
 whose influence was increased. 
 
 X. In the presence of such effects, it was only natural that 
 the series of thorough investigations, already explained, 
 should be made into all the old abuses of the departments 
 that open competition, free to every British subject, with no 
 possibility of limitation or obstruction by any member or any 
 executive officer, should be introduced in 1870, and since con- 
 tinued with a satisfaction that has never diminished ; that 
 popular education should receive a marked impetus ; that 
 the general efficiency of the administration and the character 
 and social standing of those who execute the laws should 
 be elevated with the standard for admission to the public 
 service. Open competition, which had, much longer and 
 in a more extensive way, been on trial in India, had given 
 results not less salutary ; and these examples caused the new 
 system to be extended to the army and navy, to the jurisdic- 
 tions of the royal governors, to Australia, Tasmania, and, to 
 some extent, to Canada ; so that, in every quarter of the world 
 where the English language is spoken (except in the United 
 States) the wholesome influence of the new system was early 
 felt, and the foundation was laid for a public service based on 
 personal worth and capacity. Thus, we see an ancient govern- 
 ment, of imperial proportions, with all its dependencies a 
 monarchy in form and historical development which has been 
 generally supposed to iind its strength in royal and official
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 357 
 
 favoritism and in selfish and class interests, going forward with 
 a reform, in principle founded on equal rights and common 
 opportunity for sharing its honors and salaries a reform which 
 in practice (with a few exceptions) takes from parties all 
 chances of trading in public franchises, surrenders the gracious 
 privileges of the crown to a stern rule of justice, deprives every 
 officer of the power of granting favors, and holds officials to a 
 responsibility more democratic and republican in spirit, and 
 to a moral standard of duty more severely exacting and sternly 
 in the common interests of the people, than any ever yet 
 been enforced in a republic. 
 
 The whole advance the result of the efforts of patriots 
 and statesmen for good administration during six centuries 
 is expressed in this simple fact : In the beginning, a man 
 was in the public service because a corrupt and arbitrary 
 king wished him there ; at the end, he was in that service 
 because a fair test of his worth gave him the place, as the best 
 man to fill it. 
 
 But consider what an immense advance in justice and lib- 
 erty, in the standard cf official duty and the rights of simple 
 manhood, this change illustrates ! In the beginning, and for 
 centuries, all offices, salaries, and places, all authority exerted 
 in ways innumerable in every grade of official influence, all the 
 prestige, profits, and spoils of carrying on the vast affairs of 
 government from the hamlet to the throne, were the perqui- 
 sites, the privileges, the monopoly, or the spoils of kings, no- 
 bles, or bishops and their favorites ; into a participation of which 
 no man as a man, or because the ablest and best of men, 
 could come, except upon conditions almost certain to be a 
 compromise of manhood or a prostitution of public interests. 
 But at the end the great principle has become established, 
 that the personal character and capacity which fit a man for 
 public duty are in themselves the highest claim upon office ; 
 and to ascertain, select, and appoint the men thus fitted for the 
 public service are affirmed to be duties paramount to all royal 
 policy, to all aristocratic interests, to all state church ambi- 
 tion, to all partisan exigencies ; and thus, high exalted over 
 every other reason of preference and every other interest, 
 stand the simple claims of personal worth, and the interest and
 
 358 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 right of the people to leave them regarded in making selec- 
 tions for office. It is plain, then, that the reform of the civil 
 service in Great Britain has not been, and that nowhere 
 should it be looked upon as being a mere device in procedure, 
 a mere method in public business, or a mere collection of 
 rules in the departments : but that it involves all this besides 
 a test and expression of the justice and moral tone of a 
 nation's politics ; a decision between the relative claims of 
 worth and manhood, as weighed against official favoritism, 
 and selfish interests, upon public confidence and respect ; a 
 theory of the true sphere of parties and of their best means of 
 gaining the support of a free and intelligent people ; a princi- 
 ple of duty and responsibility in official life ; the character 
 of political leadership whether it should be by statesmen 
 making their appeal upon principles and good administration, 
 or by manipulators relying on patronage and management ; 
 the question whether it be better to encourage selfish and par- 
 tisan activity by selecting officers on the bid of cliques and 
 caucuses, or to encourage education and manliness by selecting 
 them through examinations and competitions ; the relations of 
 the legislature to the executive departments, and therefore 
 the construction of the constitution and the counterpoise and 
 stability of government itself. It was because civil service 
 reform or, what is the same thing, administrative reform, as 
 embracing the essential conditions of good administration 
 was apprehended in this higher spirit and broader range as 
 being a great and permanent question of principle and duty as 
 presenting a perpetual issue between the higher and lower ele- 
 ments in politics, that, more than a century ago, it began to 
 receive, and has ever since received, the attention of the fore- 
 most of British statesmen. The first germs of it are in the 
 declaration of Algernon Sidney, that magistrates are created 
 for the benefit of the state, and not the state for magistrates. 
 Eliot and Yane comprehended it in that spirit when they 
 staked their lives upon a reform policy. It was understood, 
 in that spirit, by Lord Chatham when he refused the spoils of 
 office, and declared of a Parliament steeped in patronage 
 and corruption that if it was not speedily reformed from 
 within, it would be reformed with a vengeance from with-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 359 
 
 out ; by "William Pitt when lie brought in reform bills and, 
 while living on a narrow income, renounced the great sine- 
 cure salary which the partisan system tendered him ; by Ed- 
 mund Burke, when he " bent the whole force of his mind " 
 upon those great measures- of reform with which his name will 
 be forever associated ; by Lord Grey and Sir Robert Peel 
 when, giving their best efforts to reform in various ways ; by 
 Lord Liverpool, '\vhen, a generation ago, he surrendered the 
 patronage of promotion in favor of merit in the Customs ser- 
 vice ; by Lord Palmerston, when as Prime Minister he con- 
 fronted the selfishness of members of Parliament who opposed 
 the great reform of 1853 ; by Lord Granville when, as we 
 have seen, he declined the patronage of various appointments 
 " in order to make them available for the purpose of encourag- 
 ing education ;" by Mr. Gladstone, in the steady and vigorous 
 support he has given to administrative reform during his 
 whole official life ; by John Bright * and Lord Derby, when, 
 representing the opposite parties, they devoted so much labor 
 to the great civil-service investigations to which I have re- 
 ferred ; by the eminent statesmen examined on those investiga- 
 tions, whose convictions find expression in such words as these : 
 * all persons have an equal right to be candidates if they are 
 fit," 2 " this is the critical part of our national institutions, 
 namely, the selection of candidates for the public service ; " 
 by the honest, intelligent people generally, of every class, by 
 ministers representing all parties, and, finally, even by mem- 
 bers of Parliament themselves, who have co-operated in ad- 
 vancing the new system at home, in India, and every depend- 
 ency of the British Empire. And can we believe it to have been 
 understood in any narrower sense by the leading nations of 
 Europe, which, in the common interest of good administration 
 and national safety, have one after another destroyed the 
 official, patronage system, and the class monopoly of offices, 
 upon which monarchies were originally based, and opened 
 them, with but few exceptions, to the intelligence and worth 
 of the people irrespective of their birth or their political opin- 
 ions ? 
 
 1 Sec Letter of Mr. Bright in Appendix A. * See ante, p. 227. 
 
 3 Report Com., 1873. vol. i., p. 133.
 
 360 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 What is the lesson, of such a history and of such results, for 
 the United States ? How far are such reforms compatible 
 with our constitution and social life ? What, if any thing, 
 may we wisely do to improve our administration, in the light 
 of such an experience ? Are not these questions vital enough 
 for the reflections of an intelligent people, large enough for 
 the action of statesmen in a great republic 2
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIII. 
 
 THE BEARING OF BRITISH EXPERIENCE UPON CIVIL SERVICE 
 REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Caution in accepting foreign experience. The theory of the framers of our 
 constitution on the subject. A summary of the principles and conclusions 
 reached in British administration. The question of a long term of office 
 and its relations to the merit system. Who are certain to oppose the new 
 system. Reasons for more confidence in its support. The world's ex- 
 perience on its side. Who are the theorists and the doctrinaires f 
 Who the statesmen ? Examinations and competitions supported by an 
 irresistible public opinion in Great Britain. Lord Beaconsfield rebuked by 
 it. Various principles and methods of the new system considered in refer- 
 ence to our institutions. The right to claim and the duty to bestow 
 office. The xtent to which patronage has been surrendered by the 
 Crown, by noblemen, and officials in Great Britain. Have our officers 
 equal patriotism ? Our subordinate officials made feudal dependents. 
 Whether patronage is essential to the utility and prosperity of parties. 
 Do republics awaken less patriotism than monarchies ? Parties would 
 gain more than they would lose by abandoning the spoils system. Prac- 
 tical effects of adopting the merit system. It would destroy a vicious 
 monopoly over office-getting. Effects on the Presidential elections. 
 Promotes self-reliance, good character, and education. How members of 
 Congress would be affected. Effects on custom-houses and other local 
 offices. Consequences of bringing persons of worth and capacity into sub- 
 ordinate positions. Promotions for merit. The merit system would 
 give new dignity to office and government. Means by which the reform 
 may be advanced. How far and what kinds of legislation useful or prac- 
 ticable. Political assessments. The reform a question for the people, 
 and its need in State and municipal offices as well as in Federal offices. 
 Whether we have the public virtue to carry it forward and are as unsel- 
 fish and patriotic as the people of Great Britain. Competition a general 
 law of progress. The permanent nature of the reform issue. 
 
 THE undertaking to point out the bearing of the reform 
 measures of Great Britain upon administrative questions in 
 the United States has, the author trusts, been in large part per- 
 formed as the work has proceeded ; and perhaps few sugges-
 
 362 CIVIL SERVICE IN GKEAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tions can now be made which have not already occurred to the 
 reader. 
 
 The mere fact that any given principles or methods of politi- 
 cal action have been found salutary in one country, is by no 
 means a sufficient reason for introducing them into another ; 
 nor is it often that corresponding relations among officers, or 
 between the officials and the people, will be found practicable 
 in any two countries. But the probability that they may 
 be naturally increases with all that is in common in race, 
 language and religion, in laws, institutions, and civilization. 
 And, therefore, notwithstanding the people of Great Britain 
 have so much more than any other people in common with 
 ourselves, the mere success of her reform measures within her 
 own borders has not been accepted as a reason why we should 
 find them equally salutary ; and hence their influence has 
 been considered in its bearings upon liberty, common justice, 
 general education, public morality, and the complicated and 
 essential relations of great parties in a free State. In the 
 opening chapter, attention was called to the extent to which our 
 fathers incorporated into their new structure the principles of 
 the British constitution. It is worthy of our notice that 
 the question now presented is not so much a question about 
 adopting processes and methods as it is about approving cer- 
 tain great principles which embody a theory of political mo- 
 rality, of official obligation, of equal rights and common jus- 
 tice in government. It was the principle, rather than the 
 mere methods, of the division of government into three great 
 departments, of the independence of the judiciary, of free, 
 parliamentary debate, of representative institutions, of trial 
 by jury, of the habeas corpus, of the common law, of 
 personal rights, of the subordination of the military to the 
 civil power, which we adopted in our original constitution. 
 The question now before us is, whether the nation which has 
 maintained, as faithfully as we have, all these great foundations 
 of liberty, still equally fundamental in the two countries, may 
 not now be able to tender us other principles worthy of our 
 adoption, which she has developed in perfecting the vast and 
 complicated operations in her civil affairs during the period 
 in which absorbed by the interests of new States and terri-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 363 
 
 tories and by the many matters peculiar to a young nation 
 we have given little thought to the practical working of gov- 
 ernment ? Our fathers did not borrow so much from the 
 mother country because the two peoples had kindred blood, 
 spoke the same language and gathered inspiration from the 
 same literature, but because England, being at that time the 
 freest and most enlightened of the old nations, and her higher 
 precedents having been forged in the furnace fires of lib- 
 erty and sanctioned by its saints and martyrs, were best adapt- 
 ed to our needs and most naturally commanded the confidence 
 of our early statesmen. Xow, as then, the two great English- 
 speaking nations maintain their original precedence in free- 
 dom and justice. For what great nation, besides Great Britain 
 and the United States, even yet allows a true freedom of de- 
 bate and of the press makes the military really subordi- 
 nate to the civil power affords a safe asylum for the victims 
 of despotism or secures an efficient protection to every citizen 
 without the aid cf bayonets or the menace of policemen bear- 
 ing deadly weapons ? Still, after all such general reflections 
 have had there true weight, there remain the direct ques- 
 tions : Has the new system been adequately tested ? Is it 
 adapted to our constitutions and social life ? Is it republican 
 in spirit and consistent with the practical administration of 
 government under our institutions ? Have we the public in- 
 telligence and virtue which warrant the attempt to carry for- 
 ward such a reform ? 
 
 Some of these questions, I must think, have been sufficiently 
 answered, if indeed it were possible to hesitate as to the 
 answer to be given ; and the others can be more intelligently 
 considered if we have distinctly before our minds the princi- 
 ples and conclusions which have become accepted in the later 
 experience of Great Britain. They may be briefly stated as 
 follows : 
 
 1. Public office creates a relation of trust and duty of a 
 kind which requires all authority and influence partaining to it 
 to be exercised with the same absolute conformity to moral 
 standards, to the spirit of the constitution and the laws, and 
 to the common interests of the people, which may be insisted 
 upon in the use of public money or any other common prop-
 
 364 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 erty of the people ; and, therefore, whatever difficulty may 
 attend the practical application of the rule of duty, it is iden- 
 tically the same whether it be applied to property or to official 
 discretion. There can in principle be no official discretion to 
 disregard common interests or to grant official favors to per- 
 sons or to parties. 
 
 2. So far as any right is involved, in filling offices, it is the 
 right of the people to have the worthiest citizens in the public 
 service for the general welfare ; and the privilege of sharing 
 the honors and profits of holding office appertains equally to 
 every citizen, in proportion to his measure of character and 
 capacity which qualify him for such service. 1 
 
 4. The ability, attainments, and character requisite for the 
 fit discharge of official duties of any kind, in other words, the 
 personal merits of the candidate are in themselves the highest 
 claim upon an office. 3 
 
 5. Party government and the salutary activity of parties are 
 not superseded, but they are made purer and more efficient, 
 by the merit system of office, 3 which brings larger capacity 
 and higher character to their support. 
 
 6. Government by parties is enfeebled and debased by 
 reliance upon a partisan system of appointments and rc- 
 
 1 I do not here refer to cases of offices conferred, or other rewards 
 given as compensation for patriotic efforts or sacrifices, by the act of the 
 people, who, in voting, are a law unto themselves ; or to elections by the 
 people ; but to the exercise of power by an officer, whether in respect to 
 the nomination, confirmation, or removal of some other officer, or otherwise 
 in his discretion. Patronage and favoritism, in connection with the exercise 
 of official power, are therefore in their very nature abuses repugnant to the 
 nature of the official trust actual violations of the duty which the officer 
 owes to the people just as reprehensible as it would be to use official au- 
 thority to deprive a citizen of his equal right to send his children to the 
 public schools, or to prevent his vote being cast for the candidate he prefers 
 wrongs upon every ground upon which it would be wrong to give a part 
 of the public money or of the public lands to a person not having a good 
 claim to it. 
 
 * Subject of course to the limitations mentioned in the last note ; and 
 therefore to ascertain such merits and to decide upon competing claims 
 arising thereunder are important parts of the duties of a government, and 
 are equally essential for doing justice and for obtaining good officers. 
 
 * For the meaning of the phrases, the "partisan system" and the " merit 
 system," as here used, see ante pages, 77 to 81 and 161, note.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 3G5 
 
 movals ; and, for its most vigorous life and salutary influ- 
 ence, it is only needful for the party majority to select, as the 
 representative of its views and the executors of its policy, the 
 few high officers with whom rests the power to direct the na- 
 tional affairs, and to instruct and keep in the line of their duty 
 the whole body of their subordinates 1 through whose adminis- 
 trative work that policy is to be carried into effect. 
 
 7. Patronage in the hands of members of the legislature, 
 which originated in a usurpation of executive functions, in- 
 creases the expenses of administration, is degrading and de- 
 moralizing to those who possess it, is disastrous to legislation, 
 tends to impair the counterpoise and stability of the govern- 
 ment ; and it cannot withstand the criticism of an intelligent 
 people when they fairly comprehend its character and con- 
 sequences. 2 
 
 8. Examinations (in connection with investigations of char- 
 acter) may be so conducted as to ascertain, with far greater cer- 
 tainty than by any other means, .the persons who are the most 
 fit for the public service ; and the worthiest thus disclosed may 
 be selected for the public service by a just and non-partisan 
 method, which the most enlightened public opinion will 
 heartily approve. 
 
 9. Open competition presents at once the most just and prac- 
 ticable means of supplying fit persons for appointment. It is 
 proved to have given the best public servants ; it makes an 
 end of patronage ; and, besides being based on equal rights 
 and common justice, it has been found to be the surest safe- 
 guard against both partisan coercion and official favoritism. 
 
 10. Such methods, which leave to parties and party govern- 
 ment their true functions in unimpaired vigor, tend to reduce 
 manipulation, intrigue, and every form of corruption in poli- 
 
 1 Where the line between the two classes of officers should be drawn 
 in the United States between those political officers who command all the 
 others and who should go out with each administration, and those adminis- 
 trative officers whose duty it is to obey their superiors it is not my purpose 
 to attempt to point out. The first class, in Great Britain, we have seen, 
 includes only from 34 to 50 officials. "We cannot draw the line in the 
 United States until after we have adopted the principle by which it is to be 
 guided. See ante, pp. 80 to 83 and 161. 
 
 * See chap. 14.
 
 366 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tics to their smallest proportions. They also reward learning, 
 give more importance to character and principles and make 
 political life more attractive to all worthy citizens. 
 
 11. Regarded as a whole, the new system has raised the 
 ambition and advanced both the self-respect and the popular 
 estimation of those in the public service, while it has encour- 
 aged general education, arrested demoralizing solicitation for 
 office, and promoted economy, efficiency, and fidelity in public 
 affairs. J 
 
 12. A system is entirely practicable under which official sal- 
 aries shall increase during the more active years of life, and 
 through which a retiring allowance is retained to be paid upon 
 the officer leaving the public service ; and such a system ap- 
 pears to contribute to economy and fidelity in administration. 
 
 13. Open competition is as fatal to all the conditions of a 
 beaurocracy, as it is to patronage, nepotism and every form of 
 favoritism, in the public service. 
 
 14. The merit system, by raising the character and capacity 
 of the subordinate service, and by accustoming the people to 
 consider personal worth and sound principles, rather than sel- 
 fish interest and adroit management, as the controlling elements 
 of success iri politics, has also invigorated national patriotism, 
 raised the standard of statesmanship, and caused political 
 leaders to look more to the better sentiments and the higher 
 intelligence for support. 
 
 II. Such are the principles and conclusions which have ob- 
 tained almost universal acceptance in British administration 
 and .perhaps, I may add, in the administration of every nation 
 of the old world, to the extent that its government has been lib- 
 eral enough to tolerate them. Objections are most likely to arise 
 against whatever like graded salaries and retiring or super- 
 annuation allowances may be thought to favor a long tenure 
 of office. It is certainly desirable to have clear views upon 
 these points. They have before come under our notice in 
 some of their aspects ; and I must leave the less important 
 questions of the effects of graded salaries and retiring allow - 
 
 1 See Letter Sir Charles Trevelyan, Appemlix A ; and in Appendix C 
 will be found the results of a short trial, within narrow limits, of the merit 
 system in the United States.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 3GT 
 
 ances to tlie observations already submitted. 1 But the bearing 
 of the merit system upon the tenure of office perhaps re- 
 quires some further notice. That system and the partisan- 
 spoils system, considered in relation to their influence within 
 the service, might be treated under three separate heads : 
 
 (1) what relates to bringing persons into the public service, 
 
 (2) what relates to their government and duty while there ; 
 
 (3) what relates to the determination of service. It would be 
 seen that the question of duration of tenure would fall wholly 
 under the last head. But, under the partisan-spoils system, 
 the question of removals stands in close relations with the 
 question of appointments ; for by far the greater number of 
 removals arc urged, not because there is a good reason for put- 
 ting the officer out, but because there is a purpose to put 
 some other person in his place. All serious abuse from re- 
 movals without good cause will disappear the moment it be- 
 comes necessary to fill the vacancy by open competition. In 
 deciding, therefore, how long an officer should be allowed to re- 
 main in his place or, in other words, for what reason he 
 should be removed we must look beyond the effects upon 
 himself or upon the office he fills, to the general influence upon 
 the whole question of proscription and of partisan intermed- 
 dling in administration. But as all these collateral influences 
 make in favor of an extended term of office, which would di- 
 minish the number of opportunities for corrupt appointments, 
 we may dismiss them, and confine our attention to the more 
 direct relations between tenure of office and the new system. 
 It needs but a moment of reflection to make it plain that 
 neither the qualifications demanded for entering an office, nor 
 the influences or conditions that control the nomination or 
 confirmation, have, intrinsically anything to do with the time 
 during which the office is to be held. Nor need the authorized 
 causes of removal have any intrinsic relation to the length of 
 tenure, unless the fact of having been in office a designated 
 number of years or up to a certain age be made in itself a 
 ground of removal. Every other part of the merit system 
 could be put in practice, and no small share of its salutary 
 influences might be secured, though the present tenure of 
 
 1 See ante pp. 141 to 143 and pp. 291 to 297.
 
 363 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 office should be left unchanged ; however repugnant to the 
 spirit of that system removals without good cause may be. The 
 most rigid competitions may be set up at the door of every office 
 in the republic, civil, military, and naval years of careful study 
 may be exacted to lit applicants for their special duties and yet 
 the tenure of office be left utterly indefinite and precarious, 
 if such we think to be the part of statesmanship or justice. 
 Like officers in the old Italian republics, our civil servants 
 may be allowed a tenure of only one, three, or six months, 
 and, like the Athenian generals, our military and naval officers 
 may be allowed to command for only a single day, if we think 
 that the part of wisdom. IV hat does the public interest 
 require in that regard ? is the decisive question. Neither 
 nominations nor competitions have changed the tenure of office 
 in Great Britain or in India. It must be clear, I think, that 
 the question of the proper tenure of office may be treated sep- 
 arately and upon its own merits, though the spirit and sug- 
 gestion of the new system are utterly hostile to removals for 
 political reasons. And if the principle should be accepted that 
 the best qualified person has the strongest claims to office, and 
 that no incompetent person should be appointed, no matter 
 what the influence in his favor, there is little ground for 
 doubt that experienced and worthy officers will be retained as 
 long as they shall properly discharge their duties and the pub- 
 He shall have need of their services. 
 
 There is really no question presented, as to having a perma- 
 nent body of officers, but only the questions as to each class of 
 officers or more accurately, as to each officer : What tenure 
 does the public interest require ? How long a tenure should 
 the laws and the administrative rules therefore encourage ? 
 Should officers be exposed to arbitrary and capricious removals ? 
 These are the only questions. With these questions, Great 
 Britain has dealt by laying down certain general principles, 
 but not by actually fixing any tenure of office, in the civil ser- 
 vice. Much less has she made the fact of having been in 
 office a certain number of years in itself a cause for removal or 
 for resignation. If we think that having been in the service 
 one year or ten years is a good cause for going out if we 
 feel that we have too much trained skill and experience
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 369 
 
 in our administration we can place those reasons among the 
 grounds of removal " for cause. " It is not my purpose to 
 consider the general question of the proper tenure of office in 
 the civil service. We have only to go back to our early 
 laws and usages to find a system far more in harmony, than 
 the spoils system, with our constitution and the general wel- 
 fare. The tenure of these properly constituting the civil 
 service at least as the constitution was understood in the 
 earlier and less partisan period of our history was, in theory 
 and practice, like the tenure of our judiciary, the same as 
 the British Civil Service tenure, as I have defined it. The 
 laws limiting the official terms of collectors, naval officers, 
 post-masters, or other subordinates, to four years or other 
 fixed periods, are, like the practice of making removals to 
 satisfy the greed of parties and the clamors of favorites 
 and henchmen, the fruits of the proscriptive spirit which 
 began to be so powerful and reckless in the last generation. 
 They were opposed by our greatest statesmen, and they re- 
 spond to partisan greed rather than to public interests. What 
 we need in this regard is not what is new, but a return to 
 the rule and the practice of the fathers of the constitution. 
 These laws, I venture to think, and the question of the most 
 salutary tenure of office in all its forms, national, state, and 
 municipal as to which the discordant and fluctuating official 
 terms indicate a lamentable absence of a matured public opin- 
 ion will not long hence be recognized as worthy the most 
 serious consideration because they concern the morality of poli- 
 tics and the economy and integrity of official life. 
 
 It is not, of course, to be expected that methods of adminis- 
 tration which tend to diminish the spoils of party managers 
 and the arbitrary patronage of officials, in the same ratio that 
 they increase the just opportunities for office of every man 
 and woman of worth and capacity, will in this country, any 
 more than they did in Great Britain, escape the persistent and 
 unscrupulous hostility of those whose occupation and profits 
 they threaten. With many of this latter class, reason is of lit- 
 tle avail, and they may be left to repeat the sneers and the 
 sarcasms, the falsehoods and the fallacies, long so familiar, 
 but for a quarter of a century abandoned as stale and una-
 
 370 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 vailing, in British polities. We have doubtless a class of ex- 
 treme partisans ready to listen and to laugh at their reiteration ; 
 ignorant enough, perhaps, even to believe they have rea- 
 son and experience on their side ; prejudiced enough to reject 
 whatever is denounced as of foreign origin. It will only be 
 another example of the repetition of English history, if we shall 
 find aspiring party -leaders and a certain stamp of officials be- 
 coming more and more widely separated from the most un- 
 selfish and patriotic portion of the people, and more and more 
 making their appeal to a highly organized body of servile fol- 
 lowers, who substitute manipulation for statesmanship and 
 convert politics into a trade. So long as faith in patronage 
 retains its influence, and the spoils of victory attract and re- 
 ward the politicians, why, in the light of reason any more 
 than in the light of, history, should we be surprised at those 
 later and ominous phases of our politics, wherein we see par- 
 tisan contests losing none of their fierceness, when all real 
 differences of avowed principles have ceased to exist, and both 
 parties, in theory, joining in reprobation of the identical abuses 
 which both alike practise ? It is further worthy of notice that 
 the increasing divergence and repugnance, in recent years, be- 
 tween the independent voters and the partisan politicians, are 
 quite as much due to the more vigorous reforming spirit of 
 the former as to any growing servility and intrigue of the 
 latter. Here, as was the case in Great Britain, that diver- 
 gence and repugnance must go on increasing until the reform 
 ing elements shall obtain the mastery, unless, indeed, we are 
 to fall under the hopeless bondage of the spoils system. 
 
 III. But has not the time arrived when the friends of reform 
 are justified in using a more decided and confident language 
 when they ought to make prominent the great fact that the system 
 of administration which they commend is as well founded in ex- 
 perience as it is in sound and just principles ? The merit system 
 now presents itself, not merely as a fine theory or as a high, 
 ideal conception of purity and justice in politics, but as an em- 
 bodiment of principles and methods matured during a century, 
 in which the foremost statesmen have bent their minds upon 
 good administration as never before as a system of practical 
 arrangements and safeguards which at every stage of develop-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 371 
 
 ment have gone on from victory to victory, under the eyes of 
 the most practical of administrators, in the most practical and 
 utilitarian of nations as conclusions and results reached not 
 on the British Islands alone, but in colonies and provinces 
 variously governed, and in all quarters of the globe (except in 
 the United States), where the English language is spoken 
 as principles and methods tested and confirmed, so far as 
 the form of government has been liberal enough for such con- 
 firmation, by the administrative experience of all the nations 
 which lead the world in commerce, arms, and industry, in educa- 
 tion, morality, and religion. Nor can the better or even the 
 longer part of the experience of the United States be cited 
 against it. Our first generations sustained administrative 
 methods quite in the spirit of these later reforms. And 
 for every candid person who really approves our partisan-spoils 
 system of later years, there are scores of worthier men (hav- 
 ing views of a remedy, perhaps rather obscure) with whom 
 that system is an abhorrence and a despair. Outside of the 
 American Union, that spoils system has not the support of a 
 single State above the moral level of Mexico, Turkey, and 
 the factious Spanish- American republics which our backsliding 
 example has helped to demoralize. It is not, therefore, the 
 friends of the merit system not the reformers who are theo- 
 rists, and who insist on measures not yet justified by good re- 
 sults in practice. It is rather the partisans, the party leaders 
 claiming to be statesmen all those who insist on applying the 
 partisan spoils theory, after all the higher public opinion of 
 their own country and the judgment of all enlightened man- 
 kind beyond their own country have condemned it who are 
 the theorists. It is they who have got a favorite method un- 
 known to our fathers, novel in our history of managing par- 
 ties and of getting into and holding office, which they enforce 
 with the passion of enthuiasists and the recklessness of theorists. 
 In another sense, indeed, they are not theorists, but plant 
 their feet on ancient usage, inviting us to go back on the 
 road of civilization and again put in force the methods of 
 James II., of Walpole, Newcastle, and George III. ; claim- 
 ing, as they did, that an administration cannot be kept in 
 power without proscription, that patronage is a fit perquisite
 
 372 IVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of members of legislature, that offices and places are the just 
 and essential spoils of party victory. If he be not a theorist or 
 an enthusiast, how shall we describe the man who calls upon 
 us to shut our eyes, both to the degradation of our spoils sys- 
 tem and to the beneficent experience of all the rest of the 
 world under the merit system, to allow our officers to appro- 
 priate the perquisites and employ language of feudal lords of 
 the middle ages, to deny ourselves the right and opportunity 
 of gaining office by reason of our own merits, or otherwise 
 than upon the consent of patronage monopolists and partisan 
 manipulators? "What is a doctrinaire but one "who rigidly 
 applies to political or practical concerns the absolute principles 
 of his own system," without due regard to past experience 
 and practical consequences ? And who are such doctrinaires ? 
 The men who urge the partisan spoils system upon the people 
 of the United States, without being able to show that there, 
 or in any quarter of the world, it has produced any good results, 
 or the men who urge the merit system, because they find it in 
 practice in every other enlightened nation, and are able to show 
 that, in every instance where, in any degree, it lias superseded 
 the spoils system, it has in that degree checked abuses and 
 raised political life to a higher plane ? And who is the states- 
 man, the man who scorns the higher sentiments, who defies 
 the broader experience, who bends his energies upon manip- 
 ulating his party, who puts his faith in the selfish instincts, in 
 patronage and in spoils, who lives on the adulation of servile 
 politicians and forfeits the respect of nobler minds ; or the 
 man who has faith in the virtue and intelligence of the peo- 
 ple, who considers the great questions of his country in the 
 light of its permanent interests, who recognizes moral forces 
 and obligations in politics, who, rising above narrow preju- 
 dices and selfish interests, gives due weight, in all his judg- 
 ments, to the experience and wisdom of the great nations who 
 share in the leadership of human affairs '{ 1 
 
 The merit system comes before us not only sanctioned by 
 this long, this diversified, this almost universal experience, but 
 
 1 " A belief in the perfection of their own systems could only exist among 
 a people who knew nothing of any other systems." A History of Our 
 Own Times, 1879, by McCarthy, vol. i., chap. 8.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 373 
 
 supported by a matured and enlightened public opinion, 
 which seems to secure for it the same elements of permanency 
 which are the safeguards of our dearest constitutional pro- 
 visions. A pervading sense of its justice and the intelligent 
 conviction of the British people that it is essential to their 
 well-being entrench it in the popular judgment. There can 
 be no doubt that they have deliberately accepted these three 
 principles as axioms in their politics : (1) that the true and 
 highest claims upon office are the character and capacity that 
 best qualify a person to discharge its duties ; (2) that common 
 justice requires the application of a fair public test for ascer- 
 taining these qualifications ; and (3) that he who thus presents 
 the highest evidence of fitness has morally, and should have 
 legally, a right to receive the office. They ceased to reason 
 upon these maxims years ago. The public conviction has become 
 so decided and outspoken that no law seemed necessary to in- 
 sure obedience to them, and none has ever been enacted 1 
 which requires it, or even examinations and competitions for 
 the civil service ; these latter resting, so far as any coercive 
 element is concerned, on the orders in Council, the demands of 
 public opinion, and the conditions of retiring allowances. 
 From the very outset, proceedings under the new system 
 have been regarded by British statesmen as an agency of higher 
 education in public affairs. It has been treated as but an act 
 of justice to the people that they should be kept informed of the 
 manner in which the appointing power is exercised. " The 
 examinations should not only be rightly conducted, but they 
 should be shown to the whole country to be rightly conducted ; 
 and every amount of publicity should be given to them." 
 " I think it would be very advantageous that every thing in the 
 matter of appointment and promotion or transfers should be 
 known to the public." That publicity has been attained ; 
 and clear and ample reports and the records of the Civil 
 Service Commission leave no use of the appointing power, 
 
 1 Except for British India. 
 
 " 2 Report Committee 18T3 and '4, pp. 103 and 100. Evidence Sir Charles 
 Trevelyan. 
 
 3 Report 1873 and '4, vol. i. p. 133. Evidence Chancellor of the Ex- 
 chequer.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 and no reasons upon which it has proceeded, concealed 
 from the knowledge or the criticism of the people. Those 
 exercises of official authority are treated as no more party 
 or official secrets than the use made of the seats in the 
 public schools or of the moneys in the national treas- 
 ury. This opening of the public mind to a knowledge of 
 the morals and the logic of administration, while overawing 
 official favoritism within the departments, has educated the 
 people up to a higher sense of their rights and their duties. 
 And may we not well ask ourselves whether this salutary 
 publicity this new educational and purifying influence in 
 politics is possible only where the executive wears a crown, 
 where the senate is hereditary, where privileged classes and a 
 state church are tolerated ? In a republic, must all such affairs 
 be shrouded in mystery, in order that they may the more easily 
 be made subservient to partisan interests ? Must they be 
 planned in secrecy, and be carried into effect with defiance, as 
 a part of the irresponsible discretion and privileges of republi- 
 can officials ? However that may be, I repeat that this pub- 
 licity in Great Britain has developed a public opinion so dis- 
 criminating and stern that examinations and competitions 
 stand unchallenged and impregnable within the rampants of its 
 high sanction alone. No minister or party would now dare 
 affront that opinion. Indeed, a party might almost as safely 
 discriminate on political grounds in levying taxes, or a minis- 
 try in collecting them, awarding contracts, or allowing suffrage, 
 as to make nominations or removals in the civil service for 
 partisan reasons or in violation of reform principles or methods. 
 There have been striking examples of the power of that 
 opinion to bring ministers and cabinets to obedience, in which 
 members of Parliament, once so hostile, appear to have made 
 haste to speak for the new and popular system. When, for 
 example, a few years since, Mr. Layard was thought to have 
 been appointed Minister to Spain in violation of the civil ser- 
 vice system, the cabinet was speedily forced to vindicate the 
 regularity of its action before Parliament. In the late pro- 
 motion of a Mr. Pigott to a very subordinate place, Lord 
 Beaconsfield was believed to have departed from the spirit of the 
 civil service rules. So vigorous was the protest, so fierce
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITALST. 375 
 
 was the assault of the press, so many of liis own party re- 
 fused to sustain him, that his administration suffered its first 
 defeat. A vote of censure was carried against him upon the 
 question raised, in a House in which his party had a majority 
 of from sixty to a hundred totes. So intense was the feeling 
 that " the House of Commons was deserted, and the members 
 flocked to hear what their former colleague could say in the 
 House of Lords." It was only by a frank and elaborate speech, 
 in self vindication, showing that the charge was unwarranted, 
 that the prime minister saved himself from the necessity of 
 resignation. A well-informed American, long resident in 
 England, referring to this event, says that " the point for us is 
 that civil service reform is so much a reality in this country that 
 one of the strongest governments that England has ever seen 
 suffered a defeat in the house, because it was supposed, in a 
 single instance, to have 'overriden the settled principle which 
 now controls appointments to office the principle that fitness 
 for office, and not need of office nor party service, shall be con- 
 sidered in the nomination of public servants." 1 In these facts 
 we may not only see how soon, by proper means of education, a 
 debauched public opinion may be elevated into a conservative 
 moral power, but we may be reminded that, in our own country 
 also, the time has been when offices could not be used as par- 
 tisan spoils, without an equal shock to the public sense of duty 
 and justice. For " when the Democratic party came into 
 power with Mr. Jefferson, the removals were few so few that 
 single cases excited a sense of wrong through a whole State." a 
 tl Then, the dismissal of a few inconsiderable officers, on party 
 grounds as was supposed, was followed by a general burst of 
 indignation ; but now the dismissal of thousands, when it is 
 openly avowed that the public offices are the spoils of the 
 victors, produces scarcely a sensation." 3 These facts show us 
 that the moral tone of politics, to which the British people 
 have risen, is only that of our last generation, from which we 
 have fallen. 
 
 The evidence of the permanency of the new system ap- 
 peal's to be not less decisive than that of its popularity. Sir 
 
 1 Letter of Mr. Smallcy, New York Tribune, August 4, 1877. 
 * Woolsey's Political Science, vol. ii., p. 561. 
 3 Speech J. C. Calhoun in U. S. Senate in 183o.
 
 S76 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Charles Trevelyan, 1 now enjoying public respect in liis retire- 
 ment, and who, I believe, is justly thought to have exhibited 
 more practical statesmanship than the whole body of parlia- 
 mentary monopolists and partisan manipulators who sneered at 
 and obstructed the new system in its earlier stages says, 
 " You cannot lay too much stress upon the fact that the mak- 
 ing of public appointments by open competition has been ac- 
 cepted by all our political parties, and there is no sign of any 
 movement against it from any quarter." 2 In the fact of his 
 holding the high positions of head of the British Treasury 
 and leader of the Conservatives in the House of Commons, 
 (where he faithfully carries into effect his own reform methods), 
 Sir Stafford Northcote illustrates not less the abiding nature of 
 
 O 
 
 the reform toward which he has so much contributed than he 
 does the feeling of the people toward its authors. The decla- 
 ration of John Bright, who may speak for the Liberals, to the 
 effect that ' ' it would be impossible to go back to the old 
 system,'-' 3 has already been quoted. But there are assur- 
 ances of the stability of the reform methods far beyond 
 what can be shown by examples or on the authority of 
 great names. They are to be found in the sentiment, now 
 pervading every class of respectable society, that patronage- 
 mongering by members of Parliament is ignominious and 
 disgraceful ; that bartering in nominations and prostituting the 
 appointing power for selfish or partisan purposes is a repre- 
 hensible breach of official trust ; that it is not less an act of jus- 
 tice than of wisdom to give the offices to those shown in a fair 
 contest to be best qualified to hold them. While parties havei 
 ceased to look to patronage or spoils as sources of strength, 
 and no man or woman of respectability can be found to defend 
 the old system, all the young men and women who have so 
 much as a common-school education all honest persons of 
 the rising generation who have the capacity and attainments 
 which justify a hope of reaching even the lowest appoint- 
 ments recognizing no party issue in the subject, stand to- 
 
 1 Already mentioned as having, with Sir Stafford Northcotc, first pre- 
 sented the merit system in a formal report in 1854. 
 
 2 See his second letter in Appendix A. 
 
 3 See his letter in Appendix A.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 377 
 
 gether for a system which has conferred new honors upon 
 learning and a higher dignity upon simple manhood. They 
 now comprehend that every office, which has been bestowed as 
 patronage or spoils, was so much pillaged from the just inher- 
 itance of good citizens and so much capital added to the cor- 
 ruption fund of partisan politics. These facts are not without 
 an important bearing upon our affairs. Those worthy citi- 
 zens who have so little faith in public virtue and intelligence 
 that they fear a reform can never gain strength enough to with- 
 stand its natural enemies, unless it be first made a part of the 
 constitution itself who excuse themselves and their party for 
 not beginning it from a fear that the other party coming 
 into power would overthrow it 1 may perhaps find encourage- 
 ment in such results, and be able to see that justice and wis- 
 dom are not without power even in politics. They may be- 
 gin to comprehend that the great principles involved in ad- 
 ministrative reform, when fairly presented, take a strong hold 
 of the public mind (without the support of laws or. of con- 
 stitutions), because they have inherent powers of vitality 
 which appeal alike to the general sense of justice and to 
 every individual's conception of his own personal rights. 
 Efficiently, therefore, as a party might support these principles, 
 the conditions of their success are in no small degree inde- 
 pendent of the action of parties or the sympathy of legislators. 
 Indeed, that is one of the most significant and encouraging 
 
 1 What measure is there at issue between the parties against the adoption 
 of which such a reason would [not with equal force apply? Each party is 
 ready to reverse any measures of its adversary if the public will sustain it 
 in doing so. But here again the experience of Gr^nt Britain is instructive ; 
 and in the triumph of the merit system there, over both parties, "we find evi- 
 dence that such want of faith in the intelligence and virtue of the people is 
 without warrant ; unless indeed wo believe that those qualities are higher 
 in Great Britain than in the United States. In the light of that experience, 
 is there much reason to doubt that when, in 1874 members of Congress 
 betrayed the reform policy to which they and the party in power were com- 
 mitted if the President had stood firmly for it, and had withstood the 
 patronage-mongers and partisans who beset him as stubbornly as he with- 
 stood his enemies on the battle-field, he would have prevented its temporary 
 abandonment; and might, by adhering to its principles, have averted a great 
 loss of support by the dominant party, and have established additional 
 claims to the gratitude of his country ?
 
 378 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 lessons of British experience which shows the power of these 
 principles, when once in the mind of the intelligent and inde- 
 pendent voters, to arrest the arrogance of politicians and to bring 
 members of Parliament to their duty. " Large as were the 
 numbers who profited by the former system, . . . those 
 left out . . . were still larger and included some of the 
 best classes of our population ; . professional persons of 
 
 every kind, lawyers, ministers of religion of every persuasion, 
 schoolmasters, farmers, shopkeepers, etc., . . . who 
 rapidly took the idea of the new institution . . . as a val- 
 uable privilege. . . . Whatever may have been the indi- 
 vidual sentiments of members of the House of Commons, they 
 received such pressing letters from their constituents as obliged 
 them to vote straight. ' ' 1 Patronage became odious from the 
 moment it was exposed, and fell mortally wounded by its first 
 defeat. 
 
 IV. If, from these considerations relating to the stability and 
 trustworthiness of the new system, we turn to the principles 
 and methods upon which it proceeds, interesting questions at 
 once present themselves as to their adaptation to our social con- 
 dition and form of government. It would be little less than 
 an insult to the intelligence of the reader to gravely argue that 
 a policy, which would bring into places of public trust the 
 moral character and the intelligence needed for the proper dis- 
 charge of their duties, is at least as appropriate and needful in 
 a republic as in a monarchy. Is a monarchy w r ith a state 
 church creed at the door of every office, with an hereditary 
 executive which is the source of all office, with its Upper 
 House of Parliament whose members take their seats as an 
 inheritance, with birthright and property as the basis of politi- 
 cal and social privileges, with its vast and imposing system of 
 ranks, honors, and decorations the natural friend and sup- 
 porter of such a policy ? And is a republic which proclaims 
 justice, personal equality, and common rights as its cardinal 
 principles, which, discarding property and birthright, makes 
 virtue, liberty, and intelligence its chief reliance a sort of 
 natural enemy which should look upon that policy with dis- 
 
 1 Letter Sir Charles Trevelyan, Appendix A.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 379 
 
 trust, if not with dread ? If any among ourselves are so par- 
 tisan or so prejudiced as not to be able to see that every step 
 which monarchies have taken in the way of that policy is re- 
 pugnant to the main principles of their original form of govern- 
 ment, while it is, on the other hand, in complete harmony with 
 our institutions, English statesmen at least are not so blind. 
 They comprehend the fitness of the merit system for the refor- 
 mation of our abuses. ' ' I have long been struck by the singular 
 suitableness of our new but well-tried institution, of making 
 public appointments by open competition, for the correction of 
 some of the worst results of the United States political sys- 
 tem. " * We have already seen that the merit system, as estab- 
 lished in Great Britain, has been built upon the fundamental 
 principles of common right, individual worth, and universal 
 justice. " All persons have an equal right to be candidates if 
 they are fit ; ... we consider the right of competing 
 should be open to all persons of a given age ; ... if you 
 do not concede that right, and make it accessible, you do in- 
 justice, first to the public service and then to Her Majesty's 
 subjects generally," a is the language of the British statesmen 
 who devised and put that system in practice, and the view 
 of the people who sustain it. Are these principles are 
 such ideas of right and justice safe and appropriate to be 
 carried into practice in a monarchy, but repugnant and danger- 
 ous in a republic ? After they have achieved a victory in the 
 mother country over so many centuries of oflicial despotism and 
 aristocratic monopoly while they are now being applied in 
 every quarter of the globe where English-speaking people are 
 under a royal flag is it fit and natural that they should be 
 distrusted and denied that, in the true feudal spirit, patronage 
 and spoils should still be allowed as the perquisites of officials 
 in the leading republic of the world ? The standard of official 
 duty, in the light of which these ideas of justice and right 
 are to be carried into effect, is, according to these statesmen, 
 this : " Public office is a solemn trust, and one of its most im- 
 portant conditions is to choose the best possible men for the 
 different places." Shall we look upon this as an obligation of 
 
 1 Letter Sir Charles Trcvclyan, Appendix A. 
 a See ante, pp. 190 and 227.
 
 380 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 official life fit to be observed in a monarchy, but which officers 
 in a republic should be at liberty to disregard as inconsistent 
 with the constitution of their country or too high for the 
 spirit of its politics and the morals of its administration. 1 
 Looking to the ultimate aims of the new system, we find 
 them not to rest in mere economy or efficiency or in anything 
 within the circles of administration, but to comprehend the pros- 
 perity and the elevation of the people at large. " I am not 
 indifferent to the consideration that offices have become the 
 patrimony of the poorer part of the middle class, or even, per- 
 haps, of the working class," says a British statesman at the 
 head of his party in Parliament. 3 " I should regret that any 
 man should be debarred . . . who possessed energy and 
 ability enough to enable him, in a Jiumble position of life, to 
 succeed at the competitive examinations," says the Viceroy of 
 India, 3 while commending the new system in that dominion. 
 Are these national aims and sympathies appropriate to be en- 
 couraged in the theories and the very processes of royal ad- 
 ministration, but such as a republic may wisely discard for the 
 greater blessings of favoritism, patronage, and spoils for a 
 system which thrusts back or crushes every poor and humble 
 applicant for an office or a place under the government, how- 
 ever high his character or ample his capacity, unless he prom- 
 ises servility, has voters at his back or influence at his bidding ? 
 We have seen members of the British Cabinet refusing 
 
 O 
 
 patronage *in order that the places which they would be en- 
 abled to hand over to competition might become the prizes of 
 popular education. Eminent statesmen have sustained the new 
 system the more heartily because it was seen to be favorable to 
 the general instruction of the people, " to which it has given 
 a marvellous stimulus." 4 It would be an affront to the 
 reader's intelligence to ask the question whether the encour- 
 
 1 Whatever answer politicians may give, the Supreme Court of the United 
 States has declared that " the theory of our government is that all public 
 stations are trusts, and that those clothed with them are to be animated in. 
 the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and 
 the public good." Trist v. Child, 21 Wallace R. 450. 
 
 9 Ante, p. 324. 3 Ante, p. 252. 
 
 4 See pp. 190, 201, 214, note, and see Sir Charles Trerelyan's letter, Ap 
 pcndix A.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 381 
 
 agement of popular education is in the spirit of republican 
 institutions. But may we not well pause and consider in 
 presence of the fact that Great Britain is gaining upon us, and 
 that several monarchies have already surpassed us, in the 
 education of the people, and of the further fact that the 
 ratio of well-educated persons in official life has been growing 
 less in the United States under our partisan spoils system 
 whether we can longer afford to hand over the offices, as the 
 prizes of partisan contests and the perquisites of officials? 
 And especially can we do this at a time when foreign States, 
 giving new vigor to the means by which they have distanced 
 us in the race, are, through superior officers and a growing com- 
 merce, more and more placing us at a disadvantage, and en- 
 hancing the distinction and the dignity of the kind of govern- 
 ment which they represent, in every quarter of the globe ? 
 
 To execute that "solemn trust" of official life, to select 
 the best men for public places in the light of the highest tests 
 of fitness, to secure humble citizenship its equal right to office 
 according to its capacity, to thus make the orderly processes 
 of administration in themselves a daily example before the 
 eyes of the people of the justice and integrity of the govern- 
 ment and a powerful force in aid of education and morality, 
 it was first necessary that the king should surrender, or at 
 least forbear, the exercise of that haughty and absolute pre- 
 rogative of selecting officers at his pleasure which every Eng- 
 lish sovereign had wielded from the foundation of the mon- 
 archy ; that dukes, and noblemen of every class, should waive 
 that vast influence over minor appointments which for ages 
 had been in great part the patrimony of their children and 
 the strength and prestige of their order in the State ; that 
 members of Parliament should surrender a patronage, won 
 in contests not wholly foreign to the progress of liberty, which 
 for more than a century had been held as the unchallenged per- 
 quisite of their predecessors. And now that all this has been 
 done that the old feudal and class barriers have been 
 broken down, so that simple manhood and womanhood, un- 
 obstructed by monopolists, stand with all the liberty and 
 equality of their just and natural relations before the law in 
 the mother country and in all her provinces now that her 
 25
 
 382 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 politics have risen practically to the principles upon which 
 our fathers framed our constitution is it for us, upon a new 
 construction of that instrument and a degrading theory foisted 
 into our administration, to take the lead in presenting republi- 
 canism before the world as the only kind of government, ac- 
 cepted by a leading nation, whose administration is held 
 together by spoils, and whose officers require patronage as a 
 condition of serving their country ? I am unable to find any 
 reason, in the sentiment of our people or the nature of our 
 government, why the members of the American Congress, any 
 more than the members of the British Parliament, need pat- 
 ronage and spoils, or can justify the use of them, to bring 
 about their elections, to inspire their patriotism, or to reward 
 their fidelity. But if it be too much to hope that, congress- 
 men will ever lead in a reform, the fundamental conditions 
 of which are that they surrender the patronage they have 
 usurped and no longer violate the Constitution by leaving 
 their own sphere to invade the Executive may we not at 
 least believe that they will not again refuse appropriations ? 
 May we not expect that, not less patriotic than members of 
 the British Parliament, they will give a free field, and vote 
 the necessary moneys for that systematic reform in administra- 
 tion which seems in this country to be, as plainly as in Great 
 Britain, within the province of the Executive to inaugurate ? 
 Another of the great and* salutary principles of the new 
 system, which, if in any way dependent upon the form of 
 government, would seem to be peculiarly congenial to the 
 more liberal institutions, is that which it applies to promo- 
 tions in. the public service. It requires that they shall not 
 be regardless of capacity and well tested fidelity. They must 
 not depend on partisan services, or the ambition of high 
 officials, or the interests of patronage monopolists or of poli- 
 ticians of any sort. When, in the great report of 1860, a 
 distinguished parliamentary committee (of which such men 
 as the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Lowe, 
 John Bright, Lord Houghton, and Lord Derby were mem- 
 bers) declared it to be one of the great purposes of their 
 appointment " to encourage industry and foster merit by 
 teaching all public servants to look forward to promotion ac-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. . 383 
 
 cording to their desert, and to expect the highest prizes in 
 the service if they can qualify themselves for them," 1 they 
 touched upon a subject of profound importance, which vitally 
 affects fidelity, efficiency, and economy in the public service. 
 I have no space for pointing out the salutary effects which 
 such a rule faithfully executed in our service would be 
 sure to produce. What industry, and consequently what 
 economy, would it not encourage ? What worthy ambition 
 would it not inspire and crown with honor ? What imbecility 
 and indolence would it not rebuke ? What injustice and 
 favoritism, in superiors, would it not arrest ? What new life 
 and aspiration would it not breathe into the dreary, servile at- 
 mosphere which pervades offices and departments, precisely in 
 the ratio that merit is without recognized claims to a re- 
 ward, that the reasons for advancement are shrouded in mys- 
 tery, that official favoritism and partisan interests are be- 
 lieved to determine the position and consequently the 
 salaries of every officer in the service. More than fifty years 
 have elapsed since the head of the British Treasury set 
 the example, 3 still followed, of surrendering patronage in 
 the interest of merit, in the matter of promotions, in that 
 vast department. It has been a little longer, perhaps, since 
 an American Secretary of the Treasury for the first time 
 violated the rights of merit, in the interest of patronage 
 and spoils, in his great office. It is a part of the issue 
 for the people to decide, whether we are to continue 
 the downward, or resume the upward road, in the future ? 
 Whether those holding official places under a republic are to 
 have their manhood respected and their merits rewarded as 
 justly and surely as they would be under every enlightened 
 monarchy in the world, or are to be exposed every moment to 
 the perils of caprice and the humiliations of unregulated and 
 irresponsible authority ? Whether every hour they are to be lia- 
 able to be taxed without limit, and removed without hearing and 
 without cause ? Whether, in short, those in our public service 
 are to enjoy the rights due to merit and the liberty of speech due 
 to freemen, or their relations are to have more of the character 
 
 1 See ante, p. 220. See p. 156.
 
 384: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 which belonged to feudal dependents centuries ago than of 
 that which befits the representatives of the justice and intelli- 
 gence of the foremost republic of the globe ? I cannot think 
 that any principle or interest of our government stands in the 
 way of promotions being so regulated that, in our service, as in 
 the British service and in that of all the leading States, they 
 shall be the encouragement and the reward of the highest vir- 
 tues of official life. 1 
 
 There is but one other great principle involved in the re- 
 form methods to which reference need be made. It is that 
 which declares the patronage and spoils, which a partisan sys- 
 tem places at the disposal of parties, are not essential to their 
 greatest usefulness, but rather tend to degrade and enfeeble 
 them. It should be no matter of surprise if, in a generation 
 reared under that system and little accustomed to consider 
 the attitude and influence of great parties when acting 
 independently of spoils, there should be found not a few 
 candid persons who hesitate over that principle, and do not 
 see their way to its adoption. An adequate presentation 
 of the subject would require a whole chapter, and it is not 
 within the scope of this work to comment upon our own 
 party history. Let it be borne in mind that the merit sys- 
 tem does not interfere with the freedom of choice on party 
 ground in any popular election ; that it leaves unimpaired 
 the power of the party majority to control the enactment 
 of all laws ; that the officers its majorities have elected will 
 have the right of instruction and control according to 
 law, and for the purpose of executing its policy of the 
 great body of civil servants by whom the laws are carried 
 into effect. The system thus gives to parties the broadest 
 field of discretion and responsibility. It enables the will of 
 the people to be carried into effect everywhere from the high- 
 est centres of political action from the Cabinet and Con- 
 
 1 If it be said that quite as many of those in our public service violate 
 official propriety and diginity, by excessive partisan speech and action, as 
 by servility and hypocrisy, the answer is that both forms of abuse, are the 
 result of the same enslaving system, producing opposite effects upon differ, 
 ent natures. A tenure dependent upou merit would equally remedy both 
 forms of the evil.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN". 385 
 
 gress, through every grade of office and every form of juris- 
 diction to the humblest public servant and the remotest terri- 
 tory. Whatever parties can now do to uphold and carry 
 into effect a sound national policy, to develop and express 
 the sentiments of the people upon any question of politics, 
 to invite or honorably reward patriotic service in the interest 
 of good government, to secure true and honest suffrage, to elect 
 worthy men to office, to rebuke treachery or to reform abuses 
 all these things they can do as freely and far more certainly 
 under the merit system of administration. But the prostitu- 
 tion of the functions and honors of the State for partisan ends, 
 bribery by the promise of offices, the huckstering of em- 
 ployment on the public works for votes, feudal tyranny and 
 pillage in the form of arbitrary taxation of official salaries, 
 despotic patronage in the hands of legislators, all the forms 
 of partisan interference with the internal affairs of depart- 
 ments by which discipline is impaired, economy made impo- 
 sible, promotions are degraded into favoritism, and unworthy 
 henchmen are foisted upon the public treasury these abuses, 
 one and all that system, faithfully enforced, would in great 
 measure bring to an end. The good effects of this theory 
 of parties and of such principles in the execution of the laws, 
 not only within the departments, but upon the people and 
 upon parties themselves, have been demonstrated in Great 
 Britain by an amount of evidence which has there placed the 
 subject beyond discussion. The question is, whether there is 
 any reason why similar effects would not flow from the same 
 principles applied to our politics ? In other words, is it not 
 practicable for great parties in a republic to express the will 
 of the people in regard to public affairs and to serve the na- 
 tion, as justly and efficiently as in a monarchy, without any 
 more reliance upon corruption, patronage, and spoils ? The 
 same history which has shown us that rulers and parties, in 
 an old monarchy, long ago devised and put in practice, in 
 forms more aggravated than we have ever allowed, the varied 
 kinds of proscriptions, frauds, and prostitution known in our 
 politics, and others yet more flagitious which lias shown us 
 how parties and the partisan system began and the uses to 
 which every variety of spoils and patronage may be put has
 
 386 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 also shown the inherent inability of these devices of corruption 
 to sustain a party or to meet the requirements of the higher 
 sentiment in a free State. It has further shown us how such 
 abuses fell before the rising intelligence of an enlightened 
 people. Upon a broad, historical review of the course of 
 British affairs, Hallam declares that * ' government may saf el v 
 rely on the reputation justly due to it ;" and from the 
 deepest experience of practical politics, Lord Granville de- 
 clared in Parliament, in 1854, " that the time for a system of 
 government by patronage was gone by, ' ' lie also laid down 
 the rule ' ' that the true policy of a government was in appeal- 
 ing to the good sense and intelligence of the large classes of 
 the community. ' ' ' The appeal here meant was an appeal to 
 the people to come forward and show themselves qualified for 
 office without resorting to partisan coercions to compel its 
 bestowal. Is not this appeal based on a faith and a policy 
 upon which a republic as consistently and safely as a mon- 
 archy may act ? Were not these the theories of our early 
 statesmen, and are they not in the spirit of our constitution 
 and our social life ? "When, in royal old England, feudalism 
 and patronage and privilege have been laid so low, by the 
 people's demand of common justice at the gates of office, that 
 no man without the prescribed qualifications can pass those 
 gates, though having in his veins the blood of all the How- 
 ards and at his back the influence of the whole bench of 
 bishops and all the coronets that glitter on the heads of noble- 
 men, is that the time for this young nation of republican 
 freemen to make a privileged class of its politicians, and feu- 
 dal lords of its officials and partisan leaders, without whose 
 consent, no man, however meritorious, can enter the public 
 service of his country ? Are we not as competent to make a 
 reform, in the spirit of our institutions and according to the 
 better precedents of our history, as the English people were 
 
 "The recent utterances of leading statesmen and thinkers in England 
 regarding the submission of questions of fundamental policy to a fairly 
 educated people, as compared with the submissions of such questions 
 simply to the most highly educated classes, are very striking." Address of 
 Hon. Andrew D. White on Education and Political Science. February, 
 1879.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 387 
 
 to make the same reform, which took away privileges as old 
 as civilization in Great Britain and undermined theories and 
 classes which every former generation had cherished ? Con- 
 sider further what is involved in the assumption that it is 
 easier under a monarchy than under a republic more 'in 
 harmony with the political relations of the subjects of a 
 king for a party to forbear the use of proscription and 
 corruption in carrying forward its policy. These may be 
 accepted as the principal reasons why men act together in 
 parties : 1. Patriotic devotion to the form of government 
 or to the general welfare, which the party is believed to 
 promote. 2. Interest in the success of a particular measure 
 or policy. 3. Personal ambition for office or power. 4. Sub- 
 serviency to the dominant public opinion. 5. Love of con- 
 tention, excitement, and mere pride of victory. .6. Selfish 
 expectation of direct personal gains. It is plain that it 
 is only the latter and lower class of motives for acting 
 with a party which would be weakened by the diminution 
 of the bribes which it can hold out and the spoils which it 
 can distribute. If it be true, therefore, that the application 
 of the principle we are considering would impair the support 
 given to parties in a republic more than it would in a mon- 
 archy, it must be because the corrupt elements are relatively 
 stronger and the patriotic elements relatively weaker in the 
 former than in the latter. Royalty, class distinction, aristo- 
 cratic privileges must, consequently, be greater inspirations to 
 patriotism and self-sacrifice than liberty, equality, common 
 rights, or any thing upon which republican institutions are 
 founded. If w.e hold such views, we may, with some con- 
 sistency, fear that our parties will fall to pieces, and that 
 citizens of a republic will refuse to serve their country, 
 unless party managers are at liberty to pillage the officials in 
 order to supply their treasuries, and to practice proscription 
 and make merchandise of office in order to reward their hench- 
 men. But, in that event, let us cease our grandiloquent talk 
 about " the oppressed and downtrodden masses in the effete 
 monarchies of the Old "World," and about the people's glo- 
 rious love of freedom and equality on our happy shores. Let 
 us frankly admit that monarchy is the government most loved
 
 388 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 and best served by the people the government which alone 
 develops a truly self-sacrificing patriotism while a republic 
 can command the services of its citizens only to the extent 
 that they are bribed and paid by offices and spoils. If such 
 views are well founded, let us also be prepared for the gradual 
 decadence of republican. States. For, what is more certain, in 
 the great international rivalry of governments and institutions, 
 than that those will triumph which most attract to their sup- 
 port the virtues and higher sentiments of the people. It can 
 only be in a world surrendered to chance, or under a civiliza- 
 tion hastening to decay, that a political system which makes 
 its appeal to the baser motives of men can win the foremost 
 places in the competition of nations. 
 
 I have no space for more than an allusion to the fact that, 
 if the taking of the bribery and corruption fund out of party 
 politics should result in the more venal and rowdyish voters 
 keeping away from the polls if a class of mercenary manipu- 
 lators should not be so much busied in caucusses and conven- 
 tions British experience shows us that worthier citizens, which 
 a corrupt system repels, will more than fill any places left 
 vacant. It also shows us that such citizens, for which a con- 
 test of principles has attractions, will give more virtue and 
 ability to political leadership than can ever be secured under 
 the system we tolerate. 
 
 V. Dismissing the questions of principle involved in the 
 new system, we come to the practical effects which would be 
 likely to attend its adoption. It not being within the scope of 
 this work to set forth the abuses in our administration, no at- 
 . tempt will be made to do more than indicate, in broad outline, 
 the changes the new system would bring about. They have 
 been largely suggested already, and most of them are so plainly 
 deducible from the explanations made concerning the British 
 departments, 1 that not much need be added. Civil service 
 reform, though in its indirect effects a powerful aid to. educa- 
 tion, has for its more direct object the utilization, more effec- 
 tively for the public good, of the virtue and intelligence 
 already existing. But, with whatever success this may be 
 
 / 
 1 See especially Chap. 30.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 389 
 
 done, we may well believe that need will always exist in 
 our politics for giving the utmost efficiency to all influences 
 which directly mould character for higher ends. If faith in 
 the better sentiments is an element in all true statesmanship, 
 anticipations of any sudden or absolute purification of politics 
 are evidences of weakness and inexperience. Great reforms 
 are the slow growth of years. 
 
 The most important change which the merit system would at 
 once bring about would be the breaking up of a perva.ding and 
 pernicious monopoly, now held by party managers, by jobbers 
 in politics, and by office-holders possessing (or usurping) the ap- 
 pointing power, which everywhere obtrudes itself between the 
 people and all nominations for office and all public employment. 
 This monopoly everywhere, in the departments and offices of 
 the cities, of the States, and of the nation alike, imposes condi- 
 tions in the interests of personal gain or partisan supremacy 
 and largely irrespective of personal worth upon nearly every 
 applicant for a public position. All the ways to offices and 
 places, under the partisan spoils system, are through the 
 narrow gates held by this vast monopoly, at which there is a 
 degrading, secret, and corrupt competition of influence, to 
 which these gates are opened. The surrender of indepen- 
 dence and of liberty to serve the people faithfully are the 
 toll. Free, public examinations, directed to subjects of essen- 
 tial knowledge for the public work, and open competitions of 
 merit, to which no officer, party, or monopolist could prescribe 
 the conditions of entry, would break up both this monopoly and 
 the great trade in patronage and spoils. They would allow 
 citizens a real freedom and equality in presenting their claims 
 for office. They would deprive intrigue and partisan influence 
 of their controlling power in politics. Better still, they would 
 exhibit the methods of exercising the appointing power before 
 the minds of the people in an aspect of justice and purity 
 which would command their confidence and respect. Is o longer 
 affiliated with intrigue, manipulation, and mere influence, 
 that power would stand in alliance with industry, education 
 and personal worth. It would be exercised without conceal- 
 ment. It would appear to the people as based on principle, as 
 intended to reward capacity and character, as making ability to
 
 390 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 discharge the duties of an office an essential condition of secur- 
 ing it. Where now there is secrecy, intrigue, uncertainty, and 
 consequently suspicion, distrust and ignorance, pervading and 
 darkening all the approaches and purlieus of office, and a dis- 
 orderly contention, in large measure only between the venal and 
 unscrupulous forces of politics, there would be openness of pro- 
 cedure and complete publicity of method. In place of the 
 secret contests of influence, there would be a public competi- 
 tion and a rivalry in presenting in the highest degree those 
 qualifications needed in official places character that could not 
 be impeached attainments that are in themselves evidence of 
 virtuous industry. The final decision of the appointing offi- 
 cers which under the spoils system is based, so generally, on 
 the secret preponderance of menace and persuasion in the 
 interest of a motley throng of applicants would, under the 
 new system, be required to be made as between only a few of 
 the more worthy persons to whom competition had reduced 
 the many applicants. And that decision would necessarily 
 have to stand upon public records, in writing, concerning the 
 character and capacity of each successful competitor, which 
 would remain as abiding evidence of the justice or injustice 
 of the final selection. 1 
 
 As a natural consequence of arresting partisan control of 
 nominations and of subordinate administration generally, the 
 main causes would cease to exist which now hold together so 
 many active and mercenary cliques and ' ' rings ' ' in our poli- 
 tics. Without the power and the profit of such nominations 
 and control, and without the ability to collect party assess- 
 ments any longer, their business and means of support would 
 come to an end together. They do not exist by reason of any 
 patriotic interest in public affairs, nor do they contribute to 
 any healthy activity or to the public enlightenment. It is 
 these combinations, managed by men of low moral tone and 
 mercenary aims, and their domineering influence upon elec- 
 tions which have driven worthy men from the polls and 
 
 1 For example, the record of eacli of the hundreds of thousands of appli- 
 cants who have been examined under the British Civil Service Commission, 
 has been preserved ; and the justice of every appointment made from among 
 them could be verified to-day as well as at the date of the examination.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 391 
 
 brought politics into disgrace. When they are broken up, we 
 shall have left only that legitimate popular action which 
 directly concerns officers elected by the people and the princi- 
 ples by which the great parties may be divided. 
 
 In presidential elections, the introduction of the merit sys- 
 tem would bring about changes too manifold and profound for 
 description here. These elections would become true national 
 contests, in which little beyond the personal worth of candi- 
 dates and the principles and the policies of the rival parties 
 would be involved. The filling of a very few high places 
 would depend on the result ; but the innumerable side issues of 
 self-seeking and partisanship could no longer be made to trail 
 the whole canvass in corruption. Those within the departments 
 and offices would have the full liberty of citizens to express 
 their opinions and to vote. They would not be forced, by 
 fears of arbitrary removal, to prostitute their authority, or 
 waste time needed in the public service, upon the servile 
 work of partisan politics. They would no longer be com- 
 pelled to invade the freedom of elections as a condition 
 of holding their own places. Among the people at large, 
 every question of principle, the devotion inspired by patriot- 
 ism, the earnestness prompted by a cause believed to be 
 righteous, whatever zeal comes from a true party spirit, 
 and every honest interest that can be involved in political con- 
 tests, would have a fair and open field. Such motives of 
 action would be all the more effective in giving vigor to speech 
 and drawing honest voters to the polls, because innumerable 
 issues of corruption would have disappeared. They would be 
 all the more powerful for good, because the expectations and 
 intrigues of a million of claimants for a hundred thousand 
 offices and places would not be involved, and the people 
 would feel that the great question to be settled was not which 
 party should capture the offices, but what policy should guide 
 the nation. 
 
 The same causes which, by giving official places to merit, 
 would deprive officers and party leaders of their irresponsible 
 control of selections and appointments, would also make polit- 
 ical leadership and official life less attractive to self-seeking 
 and corrupt men. Those causes would also make public affairs
 
 392 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 far more attractive to all patriotic and high-minded citizens. 
 It has been one of the most lamentable tendencies of our spoils 
 system to hand over political leadership and office to a class of 
 persons quite inferior to the men who held such positions in 
 the earlier years of the government. As a natural result, we 
 have seen a class of politicians become powerful in high 
 places, who have not taken (and who by nature are not 
 qualified to take) any large part in the social and educational 
 life of the people. Politics have tended more and more to 
 become a trade, or separate occupation. High character and 
 capacity have become disassociated from public life in the 
 popular mind. We see small bands of trained partisans, who, 
 while servile to officials, yet domineer over the great parties. 
 British experience warrants the belief that rigid tests of merit, 
 enforced against every applicant for office, will aid powerfully 
 in restoring the old sympathy and union between the politics 
 and the ability and worth of the nation. How can we expect 
 political morality to improve under a system which makes the 
 higher officers the most interested in preserving existing 
 abuses at the same time that it surrenders to them ample 
 power for continuing these abuses at their pleasure ? 
 
 It requires some effort of the imagination to get a clear idea 
 of the manifold effects in detail of the profound influences 
 upon the relations of citizens to parties and to office of the 
 stimulus to education and to independent, manly thought, 
 speech, and action which such an exchange of systems would 
 cause. Where now we see all thought, all hope, all influence, 
 all effort, concentrated upon partisan cliques, upon jobbers in 
 influence, upon official and unofficial patronage-mongers, upon 
 what good-natured citizens may be unduly persuaded to rec- 
 ommend in aid of an unworthy office-seeker, henchman, or 
 dependent we should see exertions to educate one's self up 
 to the standards needed for official duty, concern to keep one's 
 character above danger of attack at a public competition, en- 
 couragement to independence in politics, study of whatever 
 would contribute to the acquirement of a just distinction for 
 ability and efficiency in the discharge of official duty, upon 
 which all promotion would depend. With the greater ability 
 and higher character which such improved methods would
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 393 
 
 bring into the public service, its self-respect and its public es- 
 timation could not fail to be enhanced. ' Our politics would 
 t tend to rise from the degradation in which vicious and corrupt 
 methods have involved them, and to take the position befit- 
 ting a science which deals with the greatest affairs of a nation 
 and the profoundest human interest of a people. 
 
 Some brief explanations will give definiteness to these gen- 
 eral statements and to the practical methods of the new 
 system. The secretaries, the foreign ministers, the judges, 
 and some other high officers will, it may be assumed, always 
 be appointed without examination or competition. In deal- 
 ing with this limited number of conspicuous places, it 
 would be practicable for the President to become well in- 
 formed of the qualifications of the candidates, and for the 
 people to take notice of his action in each case. And therefore 
 examinations would be no more necessary than they would be 
 appropriate for such selections. At the other end of the 
 official scale, there would be the small postmasters, numer- 
 ous isolated officials, and the clerks in various small offices, as 
 to which there would probably be no examinations, or only 
 those of a general character, conducted in a less formal man- 
 ner and without competition. 11 Between these extremes, there 
 would be the great body of the subordinate officers, from^O^- 
 000 to 60,000, perhaps, in all, to whom examinations and (gen- 
 erally) competition would extend. It is the persons who fill 
 these offices who would be brought within the range of ap- 
 propriate tests of qualification and rules of procedure. It is 
 in connection with efforts to obtain these offices that the 
 greater part of the deception, the official and partisan intrigue, 
 the fraud and corruption of our politics take place. The hopes 
 and the profits of success are sufficient to keep in a state of 
 feverish and mercenary activity innumerable bodies of politi- 
 cians who render no real service to the people, and who, but 
 
 1 See Letter of Sir Charles Trevelyan on this point, Appendix A. 
 
 2 It is very plain that the need of competition in any office or department 
 depends, in large measure, upon the number of clerks being too great for 
 the head of the office to know the merits of each applicant for appointment 
 and promotion, and upon the amount of partisan and other corrupt pres- 
 sure applied for foisting unworthy persons into its official places.
 
 394: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 for chances of corrupt gain, would never take any active part 
 in public affairs. 
 
 A general Civil Service Board would supervise the examina- 
 tions, to be conducted in convenient parts of the Union upon a 
 uniform plan. Those competitors found worthy would be 
 certified to local officers and to the great departments at 
 Washington, so as at all times to enable selections to be made 
 for appointments with due reference both to the just claims 
 of every section and to the needs of every office. 1 From the 
 persons thus shown to be qualified, the President and the 
 heads of departments at "Washington, as well as officers having 
 the right of nomination in local offices, would readily make their 
 selections without interference from politicians, without agita- 
 tion of the community, and without disturbance of the business 
 of congress or of legislatures. The whole duty and responsibility 
 would in practice, as they do in the theory of the constitution, 
 rest with the executive department to which they relate. That 
 department would therefore be relieved of the demoralizing 
 necessity of surrendering to, or of deciding between, any 
 of the rival claims of factions or of favorites ; and it would no 
 longer be besieged by an army of importunate office-seekers, 
 backed by high officials and influential politicians of every 
 sort. The executive would be, for the first time in this gener- 
 ation, at liberty to give the attention needed for the proper 
 working of the departments. It would also be possible to 
 separate executive affairs from those legislative questions with 
 which congressional patronage has so disastrously embroiled 
 them. 
 
 Examinations and competitions would not only supply wor- 
 thy persons from whom appointments could at all times be 
 readily and safely made, but would be a part of a system which 
 would exclude appointments from persons not thus shown to 
 be competent. It would therefore have as salutary an effect 
 upon the legislative department as upon the executive. Those 
 candidates for Congress who might be capable of such a pros- 
 
 1 The practicability of this method was being tested with success, when 
 Congress deserted the reform policy under President Grant ; and it has been 
 found satisfactory, after a trial of more than twenty-five years, in Great 
 Britain.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN". 
 
 titution, having no longer power to give places in custom- 
 houses or other public offices, could no more pledge and barter 
 them with effect for votes, speeches, or influence, in aid of 
 their elections. They would have to go before the people on 
 the policy of their party and their own worth as men. Many 
 great fountains of corruption would thus be closed. The most 
 unscrupulous candidates would no longer be able to gain ad- 
 vantages over the best, in the ratio of the numbers they bribed 
 or deceived by corrupt promises of offices and places. Nor 
 would the effects be less salutary after members of congress 
 had reached Washington. For there, also, they would be 
 without power to barter in patronage, and without opportu- 
 nity for fawning or threatening successfully in the depart- 
 ments, in aid of their supporters or themselves. But they 
 would be left free, in the dignity of their high stations, and 
 able, in a manly and independent manner, to discharge their 
 only function the high function of making laws for a great 
 nation. They might find time for acting upon the thousands 
 of bills that year after year remain upon their tables, and for 
 dealing thoughtfully with the great interests of the nation 
 which are now neglected. No longer liable to be charged, 
 however unjustly, with prostituting duty to patronage, they 
 would be exalted in the respect and confidence of the people 
 and of each other. 
 
 It ought, however, to be clearly perceived that it does not 
 follow (because the members of the legislature are to give up 
 their usurped patronage and lose their corrupt influence), that 
 the executive would be aggrandized under the new system. Such 
 would not be the fact. Good citizens would be the only gain- 
 ers. The executive would be rather limited in its arbitrary 
 discretion curtailed in opportunities to act selfishly. For it 
 would be required to appoint only from the most worthy 
 among the people, as shown by the examinations. It would, 
 therefore, be only justice and the sanctions of official fidelity, 
 which would be made stronger, and only a selfish and capricious 
 favoritism which would be made weaker. Justice would ad- 
 vance upon official discretion to do wrong and limit its range. 
 The President, not less than members of Congress and other 
 high officials, would be compelled to surrender his secret and
 
 396 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 unpatriotic favoritism. The new system is decentralizing. 
 It is democratic and discriminating to the last degree. It not. 
 only says to every official, it is your duty to appoint the fittest 
 man, but, in a measure, it compels him to do so. It not only 
 takes away the opportunity of selecting the unworthy, but it 
 enables the people, by their own acts, to determine the condi- 
 tions of a proper choice from among those most competent. 
 In other words, the examinations, by showing who are the most 
 worthy, put limits to the arbitrary discretion of nominating 
 the unworthy. To that extent, the people themselves would 
 aid the executive in doing its duty. 
 
 British statesmen speak of the position 'of members of 
 Parliament under the old system as "a double bondage 
 from which they were at once liberated when the junior 
 appointments were opened to competition ;'" and there 
 is abundant evidence that such a relief would not be less 
 welcome to all high-toned members of Congress than it was 
 to all high-toned members of Parliament. 2 It is but justice 
 to believe that most members of Congress, who consent to per- 
 form the ignominious and demoralizing work of office brokers 
 and patronage-mongers, do so only because, not having 
 studied the methods by which the legislators of other great 
 nations have risen above such servility, they have accepted an 
 inherited usage as a public necessity. They would, undoubt- 
 
 1 See Appendix A, Letter Sir Charles Trevelyan. 
 
 4 In a debate in the House, in 1869, a Representative declared that " it is no 
 more a part of a Representative's duty to seek and dispose of executive offi- 
 ces than to solicit pardons for traitors or condemned criminals. 
 If, as a matter of personal or political favor, he goes to the State Depart- 
 ment to beg a consulate, or perhaps something higher, . . . he is made 
 to feel . . . that he surrenders his independence when he accepts the 
 gift ;" and in a debate in 1870, another member used this language : " I ap- 
 peal to the members of the House, if it is not one of the greatest curses of 
 the position of a member of Congress that there are continual demands made 
 on his time and patience by persons whom it is utterly impossible for him 
 to satisfy, who demand that he shall secure office for them. The enemies 
 we make are dissappointed office-seekers almost exclusively." Report U. S. 
 Civil Service Commission, April, 1874, pp. 17 and 18. Still, the people will, 
 doubtless, be more impressed with the injustice of burdens thus cruelly put 
 upon members of Congress, if they shall more generally manifest their 
 courage and patriotism by speaking out plainly against them, and by vigor- 
 ous efforts to throw them off.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 397 
 
 edly, welcome a reform wliicli would as much enlarge their 
 own freedom as it would their ability to serve the people with 
 advantage. And if there shall be members deaf to the calls of 
 duty and patriotism, they have only to act on the lessons of 
 partisan selfishness. In 1871, Vice-President Wilson declared 
 in the Senate (having reference to the patronage of represen- 
 tatives), that ' ' looking over the country this year, and 1 have 
 taken some little pains to learn the facts, I believe that a large 
 majority of the districts lost to the administration party in the 
 House of Representatives, were lost on account of bad appoint- 
 ments made in the districts, and by the disappointment of men 
 who w r ere turned out of office or wanted to get into office. ' ' 1 
 
 We may also see in these facts how such changes would con- 
 tribute not less to keeping the great departments within their 
 constitutional spheres of duty and therefore to the counterpoise 
 and stability of the government itself than they would to 
 the dignity and manhood of official life and to the chances 
 of men of a scrupulous sense of honor at the elections. 
 
 I have no space to explain if it be not too clear for explana- 
 tion that the same methods and principles are as appli- 
 cable to governors and members of the legislature, and 
 to mayors and aldermen of cities, in the exercise of the 
 appointing power, as they are to the President and to mem- 
 bers of Congress. It needs but little reflection to comprehend 
 what a mass of corruption and intrigue would be suppressed, 
 and what superior officers, State and municipal, might be 
 secured, by enforcing examinations for fitness and by selecting, 
 for the subordinate officials of the States and the cities, only 
 those who should win in competition. And what encourage- 
 ment would not be given to fidelity and efficiency by providing 
 that all but the very highest positions should be filled by pro- 
 motions from the lower places ? The first city that shall put in 
 practice rigid and honest examinations and competitions of 
 character and qualifications for admission to its clerkships, 
 and require the higher places (below that of mayor and 
 perhaps two or three other officers) to be filled by competitive 
 promotions from among the -subordinates, will make an era in 
 
 1 Report U. S. Civil Service Commission, April, 1874, p. 74. 
 26
 
 398 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 city affairs. It will be equally salutary in reducing expenses, 
 in suppressing a demoralizing and partisan intermeddling, 
 and in giving respectability and efficiency to municipal admin- 
 istration. "Who can estimate the advantage of suppressing the 
 useless and pernicious partisan machinery now operated in our 
 municipalities, for the purpose of controlling local nomina- 
 tions and officials in the interest of patronage and spoils ? And 
 can it be doubted that open competition would cause that sup- 
 pression ? That municipal government in Great Britain is 
 more efficient and less affected by official corruption than in 
 the United States, is well known. We have only to refer to 
 facts already cited to learn the salutary effect of such methods 
 of reform in her cities. 1 
 
 In the light of these explanations, it is hardly necessary to 
 point out how naturally and inevitably the administration of 
 our custom-houses and post-offices would rise above servility to 
 partisan interests, upon the enforcement of a merit system 
 of office. The bands of manipulators, who so generally domi- 
 nate them, would lose their control of nominations, removals, 
 and promotions, and with it the power to levy party assessment. 
 Their occupation and their income would be gone. Appoint- 
 ments, promotions, and removals would cease to be mere ap- 
 pendages to popular elections, and would go on as a part of an 
 orderly procedure, managed within the offices and not in the 
 partisan caucuses or cliques. Neither senators nor represen- 
 tatives, neither governors nor other State officers, would be 
 disturbed by the ordinary administrative duties, or be able to 
 meddle effectively with their due performance. Unless the 
 experience of all other nations should be belied, better admin- 
 istration and economy would soon give the new system a strong 
 hold upon the confidence of the people. 2 I am convinced 
 there is no need that the places in our revenue or postal 
 administration should be the prizes of partisan politics, or 
 that the public buildings should be the fortresses of the 
 dominant party. For a whole generation, there has been 
 little more politics in a British custom-house, or in the cus- 
 
 1 Sec ante, pp. 157 and 158. 
 
 2 See Letter Sir Charles Trevelyan. Appendix A.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 399 
 
 torn-houses of any leading nation in Europe, than in courts 
 or colleges. And it is very plain that no political principles 
 and no conditions appropriate for the interference of parties 
 are involved in the ministerial business of collecting the reve- 
 nues according to law and the instructions of the Secretary. 
 The duty and the discretion are the same, to whatever party 
 the collector belongs. He has, in the view of the constitution, 
 and should have in fact, no control over the policy of the ad- 
 ministration. It is only our partisan spoils system, the like of 
 which has not been tolerated by any other great nation for a 
 century, which has prostituted the revenue and postal services 
 and made them the sources of scandals which are the shame and 
 the peril of our people at home and their opprobrium in for- 
 eign countries. It is that system which, in a single year, has 
 brought more partisan and mercenary intrigue, more incom- 
 petency, more extravagance, scandal, and corruption into the 
 New York Custom House alone, than have existed, in a whole 
 decade, in both the Customs and Inland Revenue Services 
 of Great Britain united. 
 
 Another evil from which the adoption of the merit system 
 would indirectly, but not less surely, bring great relief, is that 
 of too numerpus_elections and too short terms on the part of 
 elected officers, especially of an inferior grade. Nothing has 
 more significantly illustrated the growth and predominance of 
 partisan theories and habits in this country, during this gener- 
 ation, than the many officers originally appointable which are 
 now elective. It was natural that the people should think 
 their direct choice would secure better officers than the spoils 
 system of appointment. It was natural that when political 
 management became a sort of trade, of which offices, places, 
 and promotions were the capital stock, and the elections 
 supplied the profits, there should arise a class of politicians 
 directly interested in increasing the number of those elections. 
 Laws and constitutions were changed in the interest of fre- 
 quent elections until most of the , judicial and administrative 
 places in the States and municipalities, and not a few mere 
 clerkships, were not only made elective, but the terms were 
 made so short that adequate experience was impossible. It 
 has even been seriously proposed to throw the choice of the
 
 400 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIX. 
 
 many thousands of postmasters into the turmoil of elections 
 which now burden and disgust the people. The many evils 
 which have been the consequences of these measures, I need not 
 stop to point out. The confusion, the vast expense, the corrupt 
 partisan activity, the inability to judge of the merits of candi- 
 dates, the refusals to vote, the disgust and despair (especially 
 in cities) which have been thus caused are well known. No 
 nation not tolerating a partisan spoils system has been thus tor- 
 mented or has thus departed from all sound principles. It 
 cannot, I think, be doubted that the people would never have 
 made such radical changes, had it not been for the prostitution 
 of the appointing pow'er. 1 Nor need we doubt that the proper 
 measures of relief would speedily follow the elevation of that 
 power. It was not more elections which the people wanted, 
 but more certainty that worthy men would be made officers. 
 So rash and expensive a proceeding bringing into play the 
 whole machinery of caucus nominations as that of calling 
 upon a community to ballot for town, village, and city post- 
 masters, w T ould probably never be proposed to any people not 
 made desperate by a corrupt and partisan system of appoint- 
 ments. 
 
 One other effect of the merit system is too important not 
 to be noticed the indirect effect of bringing able and self-re- 
 liant young men and women, who have stood highest in com- 
 petitions, into the departments and local offices. They would 
 soon create an atmosphere of intelligence, thoughtfulness, 
 and independence, which, in itself, would make it very difficult 
 to treat such offices as the asylums, or the citadels of partisan 
 politics. They would come in on their own merits, and would 
 owe fealty and incline to be servile to no one. They would 
 be more ready to expose abuses, and more inclined to assert and 
 defend the rights and manhood of those who serve the public, 
 than the dependent appointees of patronage monopolists ever 
 
 1 Allusion has already been made to the fact tffat the people are becoming 
 ^i tired of these short terms of office. New York has lately extended the 
 term of her governor to three years, that of some of her police justices to 
 eight years, and that of her judges from eight to fourteen years. Several 
 States have not only extended the tenure of various officers, but have made 
 the sessions of their legislatures biennial.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 401 
 
 can be. The people would rejoice to see their government be- 
 friending education and honoring worth and capacity in the 
 selection of its agents. Their pride and patriotism would be all 
 the greater, when in every official place they beheld a man or a 
 woman whose very presence proclaimed, not the success of 
 official or partisan influence in secret ways, but the victory of 
 personal merit, won by its own strength in open and manly 
 contest with all who chose to compete. Office would rise in 
 public respect ; and government itself would have a higher 
 dignity in the eyes of those who saw it spurning servility, 
 while seeking the service of the ablest and worthiest among 
 its citizens. With better and abler men in the subordinate 
 places, mere politicians mere strangers to its business, of any 
 sort would have a hard time indeed, when foisted over such 
 subordinates to the head of a great office. They would be 
 contemptible even in their own estimation. The bare fact 
 that there were many able men in the lower grades would 
 make it certain that the higher places would soon be filled 
 from the lower. No people can withhold their respect from a 
 body of men who have gained their places by demonstrating 
 their superior fitness to perform the duties which such places 
 impose. Every successful competitor would begin to share 
 that respect the moment he won a place by his own merits. 
 If no self-seeking patron could claim a right to disturb his ca- 
 reer, the friendly sympathy of the circle or the village where 
 his honors were won would attend his progress. Feebly de- 
 veloped as the public feeling now is on such points, I venture 
 to think that an officer would call down upon himself no 
 slight criticism who, after a competition under civil service 
 rules, should reject the victor, in order to give an office to a 
 favorite dunce at the foot of the list, or to an office-seeking 
 partisan so ignorant that he dared not enter the contest. 
 
 YI. We can hardly take leave of our subject without some 
 reflections as to the best policy to be pursued by the friends 
 of reform, and the lines along which they can act most 
 effectively. 
 
 1. The demand for better administration and the spirit 
 that supports reform are extending, and have been rapidly 
 gaining strength. But how the spoils system may be most
 
 402 CIVIL SEEVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 effectually attacked, and what should be substituted in its 
 place are points by no means clear in the public mind. 
 Many of the friends of reform are only in the stage of dis- 
 gust, denunciation, and general discontent with our adminis- 
 tration. They have not those definite views needed for devising 
 or even for giving effective support to better methods. While 
 there are bad methods that must be done away with, the main 
 work is constructive the framing and putting into practice of 
 a new system which will open a free field to merit a system 
 strong enough to withstand the assaults of the old monopolist 
 and the constant pressure of hostile interests. We need clear 
 views and a wise and generally accepted theory of action, as a 
 prerequisite to the thorough performance of that work. The 
 natural enemies of reform whether they be the baser spirits 
 in parties acting in the party name, or selfish individuals, each 
 seeking his own gain stand together. They will make 
 a common attack and defence. They have on their side the 
 familiar usages, and the distrust of non-partisan methods, 
 which have grown up during more than a generation of parti- 
 san supremacy. Many worthy people will, probably, even 
 against the weight of reason, for a time allow their influence 
 to go with these enemies at least they will adhere to the 
 partisan theory from mere w T ant of knowledge of better 
 methods, and consequently from lack of faith in their suffi- 
 ciency. These facts show the need of a dissemination of 
 clearer views concerning the merit system and the improve- 
 ments it would bring about. That system is not yet clearly in 
 the public mind. To understand it is the first, if not the only 
 argument needed to make a supporter. To bring its just 
 principles and its simple, practical methods distinctly before the 
 intelligent classes, is therefore a patriotic and paramount duty. 
 Perhaps nothing would contribute more to this end than its 
 application, before the eyes of the paople, in any public office 
 national, State, or municipal. The examples of the New 
 York City Post Office and of the Department of the Interior 
 have been educating the people on the subject. But we need 
 a didactic literature which shall show what can be done to im- 
 prove administration, and how to do it. A literature of com- 
 plaint and denunciation will not suffice. It is only barren and
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 403 
 
 disintegrating. The people are in a mood to listen to those who 
 will properly present the issue between the two systems the 
 question whether the merit system or the partisan spoils sys- 
 tem is the better, the most in harmony with our institutions, 
 the safest with which to trust the fate of this great country. 
 The subject has a direct bearing upon every man of property, 
 upon every pupil in the schools, upon every man and woman 
 in office or who seek office, upon every parent whose children 
 hope for public employment, upon the action of parties and 
 the prospective gains of partisans, as well as upon all the more 
 unselfish interests which find their support in the higher senti- 
 ments of the nation. 
 
 We cannot expect to change the moral tone or the political 
 theories of a generation at once. The new system, therefore, 
 must be gradually introduced and allowed to aid its own prog- 
 ress through its good effects, and its educational influence, 
 as was the case in Great Britain. Its enemies will contest not 
 only the theory and principles of reform, but will resist its 
 application to every department, every city, every office, every 
 nomination and promotion. Hence, its friends must regard 
 every separate contest as having some importance and as worthy 
 their attention. There is no greater delusion than the theory 
 held by some worthy but inexperienced and sanguine reform- 
 ers who, scorning deliberate and educational processes, ex- 
 pect the removal of all our abuses to be brought about, sud- 
 denly, in a grand reform campaign, which shall drive all bad men 
 from office and inaugurate an era of purity and patriotism. A 
 great and salutary victory of reform principles at the polls 
 may doubtless be expected very soon. The great parties 
 should be forced to take well-defined positions upon the re- 
 form issue. But the bases of a permanent reform are to be 
 sought only in public enlightenment, and in those practical 
 methods of administration, which, by steadily vindicating their 
 own utility and disproving the need of partisan officials, will 
 educate the people up to a higher standard of official life and a 
 clearer conception of their own rights and duties. ' Our spoils 
 system is the natural result of the combined and perennial forces 
 
 1 Sec on this point, ante, p. 205 to 207.
 
 4:04: <nv'iL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of individual selfishness and partisan zeal, left free to work their 
 ends in political life. And however stayed for a time by 
 spasmodic efforts, they can be permanently arrested only by 
 salutary methods in daily administration, which the public 
 intelligence can accept as founded in natural justice and as 
 conducive to the general welfare. The friends of reform must 
 not despise the day of small things. It must be seen that the 
 issue, the opportunity, and the duty are at their own doors. 
 They are, in a degree, involved in every local appointment or 
 promotion, as well as in the great departments at Washington 
 and in the presidential elections. The man, who signs an 
 undeserved recommendation, or goes before a mayor or an 
 alderman, to get his relatives or his dependents into office, 
 through favoritism, is in spirit as much an enemy of good 
 administration as the great manipulator who brings the whole 
 power of his party to bear in the interest of partisan appoint- 
 ments, or the high official who prostitutes his authority by the 
 use of patronage for his own ends. Faithful citizens all over 
 the country, in every narrow as well as every broad sphere, 
 must stand up for the right and interest of the people to have 
 worthy men and women in office. It is not enough to make a 
 loud complaint because the President and Congress do not 
 bring a great reform complete to our doors. We need a defi- 
 nite, resolute, public opinion that will cause both the President 
 and Congress to do their duty whenever they neglect it, and 
 not merely miscellaneous protests and indefinite indignation. 
 A cause, which is that of the patriotic and disinterested classes 
 against all partisan monopolists and schemers against all cor- 
 rupt officials and all jobbers in politics against all the im- 
 moral interests of society, necessarily demands effort, self- 
 sacrifice, and public enlightenment. A free people, in the 
 long range, have as good administration as they deserve. If 
 we fold our hands while other nations advance, we must suffer 
 the loss and the disgrace. Whatever can be done to bring 
 home to the people a more vivid sense of the true dignity and 
 duty of office, and to make them comprehend how taxes are 
 made higher, how immorality and crime are increased, how 
 the country is dishonored and law and politics are brought 
 into contempt, by incompetent and corrupt officials, are among
 
 SDWABD COGPSB, 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRlMW 
 
 the most efficient means of advancing the cause of civil ser- 
 vice reform. Here, I think, is a field but little cultivated. 
 And are not the people in the towns, villages, cities, and coun- 
 ties prepared to listen with interest to a candid and courage- 
 ous statement of the facts on these points which affect their 
 local affairs ? Wherever there is a corrupt officer, wherever 
 public money is lost or administration is inefficient, by reason 
 of official incompetency or partisan dictation, there is a need 
 for civil service reform, and a place where good citizens have 
 a duty. 
 
 2. But public opinion, as already developed, demands that 
 more vigorous and extended reform measures be carried for- 
 ward, especially by the national government. There is, however, 
 a question whether their more direct support should be sought 
 in a law of Congress or in the action of the executive under 
 existing laws. A similar question arose in Great Britain, and, 
 in considering it, the reasons have been given 1 which clearly 
 show that the duty of initiating and guiding a reform policy 
 belongs to the executive. These reasons suggest that, inas- 
 much as the first effect would be to deprive members of 
 their patronage, Congress is little likely to take the lead in 
 devising regulations for a reform ; but they further show 
 how that adverse interest and the hostility it produces 
 may be overcome. 2 These reasons also present grave ob- 
 jections to encouraging legislative interference with ex- 
 ecutive functions. They show how very inconvenient, if 
 not disastrous, it would be, were rigid provisions laid 
 down by statute for conducting the detailed work of 
 administration in the tentative stages of reform. So far 
 as the executive might be without adequate authority under 
 the Constitution, the co-operation of Congress would, of 
 course, Be essential. But that lack of authority has been, in 
 the main, supplied by the act of March 3d, 1871 (now Re- 
 vised Statutes, 1753), which is as follows : " The President 
 is authorized to prescribe such regulations for the admission 
 of persons into the Civil Service of the United States as may 
 best promote efficiency, and ascertain the fitness of each can- 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 185 to 189, and also pp. 211 and 212. 
 9 See ante, pp. 211 to 213.
 
 406 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 didate, in respect to age, health, character, knowledge, and 
 ability, for the branch of the service he seeks to enter ; and 
 for this purpose he may employ suitable persons to conduct 
 such inquiries and may prescribe their duties ; and establish 
 regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive ap- 
 pointments in the Civil Service." 
 
 It will be perceived that this is a very comprehensive en- 
 actment, covering three important points : (1) Regulations 
 fixing the conditions of admission to the service ; (2) The em- 
 ployment of suitable persons to conduct the examinations ; and 
 (3) Regulations for the conduct of those in the service. 1 
 
 The authority given by this law is ample to enable the ex- 
 ecutive to do much, directly, in behalf of good administration; 2 
 and also to go forward with the work of reform on a large 
 scale, whenever Congress can be induced to vote a moderate 
 appropriation of, say, $25,000 each year. That amount is 
 needed to meet the necessary expenses attending examinations 
 in various quarters of the Union and to provide for the proper 
 supervision of the new system as a whole. Upon these points, 
 it is important that the full force of public opinion should be 
 brought to bear. 
 
 It is desirable to so amend this statute as to provide that the 
 chief examiners (who should constitute a civil service commis- 
 sion) shall hold their places by a tenure similar to that of 
 judges. Their duties would seem to be essentially judicial in 
 their nature. It is important that their appointment and ten- 
 ure .should be as far removed as possible from any peril or sus- 
 picion of partisan influence. 3 !No argument is needed to make it 
 plain that the examinations and the regulations, as well as 
 their interpretation and enforcement, should proceed upon a 
 
 1 It would be more satisfactory perhaps if the law had provided that 
 those who have charge of the examinations should have a general duty of 
 supervising the execution of the regulations ; but the regulations themselves 
 and the inherent authority of the executive may be made to cover that duty, 
 and thus the necessary vigor and uniformity may be given to the whole 
 system. 
 
 2 The executive order of June 22d, 1877, against federal officers taking 
 part in the management of local politics is only an example of what may 
 be done under this authority without the co-operation of Congress. 
 
 3 See ante, p. 235.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 407 
 
 uniform principle and method in all the departments and 
 in every quarter of the Union. Diverse and independent 
 rules and Boards of Examiners in each separate department or 
 great office, applying one standard in one department or in 
 one local office, and a very different one in another allowing 
 regulations to be enforced now as understood hy one board 
 and then as understood by some other board would only lead 
 to confusion, feebleness, and injustice. 1 The result would be 
 suspicion and hostility, highly prejudicial to the public inter- 
 ests, and perhaps, for the time, fatal to the new system. 
 
 3. There is another class of legislation, practicable both on 
 the part of Congress and of the State legislatures, which 
 might be made to reinforce the cause of reform. The instruc- 
 tive British precedents have been already pointed out, 2 and 
 they cannot be too carefully studied. It cannot, I think, 
 be doubted that, to clearly lay down the rules of official 
 duty in the exercise of the appointing power, to give them 
 the prestige of law, and to enable their violation to be made 
 the basis of investigation and punishment, would as greatly 
 strengthen the reform sentiment in this country as it did 
 in England. The alleged violation of the New York Statute of 
 1877, referred to in the last note, has already been made the 
 subject of a legislative investigation. Upon what theory, which 
 does not also embrace the exercise of the appointing power, 
 can partiality, favoritism, or any form of corruption in a judge 
 or a collector be made a ground for inquiry and punishment ? 
 Is it less a crime against morality or public safety to wilfully 
 bestow the office of collector, judge, or commissioner upon a 
 person known to be unfit who may do injustice and cause 
 loss in a hundred instances than it is to give a single corrupt 
 decision or appropriate a few dollars of the public money, for 
 which we promptly send officers to prison ? Can there be any 
 good cause why the reasons upon which public officers act in 
 making appointments should not be investigated whenever 
 
 1 Harmony of action could be secured by providing that one member of 
 the general Board of Examiners should act as a member of the several local 
 Boards for Examinations. 
 
 3 Chap, xi., pp. 85, 130 to 143. and p. 33, note 3.
 
 408 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 there is prima facie evidence that they have used their au- 
 thority for indefensible purposes ? ' 
 
 Has a collector, a postmaster, or a mayor any more right, with 
 the intention of serving his party or his friends, to foist upon 
 the public treasury sinecurists, or clerks known to be incompe- 
 tent to earn their salaries (when efficient persons are applicants), 
 whereby the Government suffers a loss of money, than he has 
 to use as much of the public money for personal or par- 
 tisan purposes ? In morals or in reason, how much worse is 
 it for a member of Congress to secretly sell a nomination to the 
 military or naval academy or to a civil department, than it is to 
 gain the votes and the commendation of many families and 
 cliques, on the deceptive promise of the same nomination, 
 which after the election he gives to a cousin or a favorite ? 
 Yet, for one class of these offences, the wrong-doer is subject 
 to criminal indictment, while for the other the law leaves him 
 untouched. A half developed public opinion hesitates and 
 doubts, and perhaps hints a judgment by calling him a poli- 
 tician. 2 But still we fail to see either our own inconsistency 
 
 1 There is a late New York statute providing for summary investigations 
 which is in principle perhaps a precedent, even in this country, for such an 
 inquiry. See Laws of New York, 1873, p. 514, Chap. 335, Sec. 109. 
 
 2 If it be asked whether the suggestion be that every exercise of the ap- 
 pointing power should be liable to be inquired into perhaps by a hostile 
 member of an opposing party the answer is, that whenever there may be 
 adequate proof of a corrupt or otherwise indefensible use of that power, it is 
 as fit a subject of investigation and punishment as would be a case of the cor- 
 rupt or indefensible use of public property appearing upon like proof. There 
 would be no more danger of too frequent or unreasonable investigations of 
 one kind than of the other. It is only because we have been accustomed to 
 allow the appointing power to be exercised in a feudal and partisan spirit, and 
 to look upon it as an irresponsible power, that it seems strange to us to have 
 it brought within the same rules of duty and responsibility which we enforce 
 in cases analogous. In the same inconsiderate manner, it may, very likely, 
 be said that it would be hardly possible to decide whether the officer made 
 an appointment either for a personal or a partisan purpose, or only for an 
 honest public purpose. But the least reflection will ehow that question to 
 be far less difficult than those which are presented in every criminal and 
 most civil cases, viz. : whether there be " premeditated malice," " felonious 
 purpose," "disregard of human life," " an intent to appropriate to one's 
 own use," " gross negligence," " ability to distinguish right and wrong ;" 
 questions which, though much more metaphysical and much further remov- 
 ed from the outward sphere of facts, arc every day made decisive, not
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 409 
 
 or the force of those British precedents to which our partisan 
 theories have so nearly blinded us. 
 
 Need it be doubted that here, as in Great Britain, the brand- 
 ing of a prostitution of the appointing power as a criminal 
 offence would not only greatly limit the abuse itself, but 
 would arouse a strong public opinion against it ? Duelling, 
 gambling, and lottery selling soon become infamous under the 
 condemnation of the statutes. 
 
 The theory, that the reasons for an appointment are the 
 secrets of the officers or the party leaders, is only a part of 
 the system which treats the appointments themselves as the 
 perquisites of the officer, and the gains to be made of them as 
 the spoils of his party. It is not enough that we denounce 
 this system and pass resolutions condemning it. We must do 
 as the English did a century ago make official action, in its 
 spirit, criminal in the view of the statutes and the courts. 
 
 4. In close connection with the British statutes restraining 
 the corrupt use of the appointing power, are the laws forbid- 
 ding public officers interfering with the freedom of elections 
 and the political equality of the people in private life. The 
 most characteristic of them is the statute of Anne, 1 to which 
 special reference has already been made. The salutary effects 
 of laws like this cannot be questioned. They are not less 
 effective in keeping officers to the discharge of their duties 
 than they are in protecting the people against official coer- 
 cion and in preventing pernicious combinations, between 
 public servants and partisan managers, for the purposes 
 of political intrigue and dishonest gains. I cannot doubt 
 that a comprehensive law, in the spirit of that last referred 
 to, which should cover the whole field of official life, 
 would be of great public utility. It must be regarded 
 as one of the greatest anomalies of our politics (especial- 
 ly in view of the fact that Great Britain has not only 
 enforced that statute, but from the same cause for several 
 generations utterly disfranchised her subordinate officials) that 
 we have had no pervading public opinion which has fixed 
 
 simply of a continuance of public favor, but cf property, character, and 
 life itself. 
 1 See ante, p. 85 and 309 to 310.
 
 410 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 any well-defined limits to the use of official authority for 
 political or even for partisan ends. Nothing more strik- 
 ingly illustrates the demoralizing influence of a partisan-spoil- 
 system, administered by the omnipotent party majority, in 
 degrading the sense of individual rights and official responsi- 
 bility, than the fact that, in this republic, we tolerate an official 
 intermeddling with the political freedom of the citizen, which 
 has been unknown in the mother country for three genera- 
 tions, and which is only surpassed by the more despotic of 
 the continental governments. 
 
 5. Another much needed law is one which shall be ade- 
 quate to suppress the demoralizing and despotic practice of 
 levying political assessment upon the subordinates in the civil 
 service. Had we not grown up in familiarity with this abuse, 
 elsewhere unknown among the enlightened* nations, we should 
 probably look with something like contempt upon a govern- 
 ment without the ability, the sense of justice or of its own 
 dignity, required to protect the salaries of its faithful servants 
 from public pillage under orders of confiscation from the camps 
 of politics. I have no space for setting forth the manifold 
 evils which flow from this abuse. How can we expect zeal in 
 the public service, or a high sense of honor, or a manly in- 
 dependence of thought or action, on the part of a body of 
 men and women every moment exposed to unlimited extor- 
 tion at the hands of those whose favor gave them their places 
 and whose frown threatens their removal ? We have no 
 reason to expect a clerk to be honest to whom the nation 
 is not just. Until we are ready to protect an officer in what he 
 has earned and to give him a tenure fairly reliable, we have 
 no right to complain if he takes time for his own defence and 
 makes leagues with robbers to whose mercy we leave him. 
 How can we hope to reduce the excessive and mercenary 
 activity in our politics within reasonable limits, so long as we 
 permit the partisan treasuries to be filled by freely intercepting 
 the public money between the pay offices of the people and 
 the pockets of the officials ? How can we expect to reduce 
 salaries to reasonable amounts, so long as their excessive rates 
 not only increase the chances of gain, on the part of every 
 corrupt politician and every partisan clique, but are in them-
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 411 
 
 selves a sort of justification of the levies by which the ex- 
 penses of the great parties are paid ? 
 
 It has been explained how it happened that this kind of ex- 
 tortion is almost the only abuse in our politics which did not, 
 at an early day, exist in a more aggravated form in the mother 
 country. 1 But it has also been shown that more than two and 
 a half centuries ago there were legal prohibitions in Great 
 Britain incompatible with introduction of that abuse." Pub- 
 lic ofiicers, like other citizens, should of course be allowed to 
 freely make contributions in aid of their own views of politics 
 or religion. But all solicitation, whether by agents or by cir- 
 culars, in any department or office, should be prevented by 
 law. Every officer should be forbidden to take any part in 
 reference to such collections. Every person in the public 
 service whether officer or workman should be made to 
 clearly comprehend that he is under no more constraint to part 
 with the fruits of his toil for political purposes, and is in no 
 more danger of losing his place if he refuses to do so, than any 
 laborer upon a farm or any clerk in a private workshop. Such 
 legal protection is essential to true liberty, manhood, or justice 
 in public life. These views are gaining strength, even beyond 
 the more non-partisan 3 circles. But they will never be vindi- 
 cated in practice until the people give strong expression to their 
 will on the subject. The principle of such a law is covered 
 by existing statutes. One act prohibits officers, clerks and 
 employes soliciting contributions for gifts, or making gifts to 
 their official superiors, and such superiors are forbidden to re- 
 ceive gifts from their subordinates. 4 These provisions, how- 
 ever, are utterly inadequate in scope to put much restraint 
 upon the great evil which they recognize. Relating only 
 to officers in a line of subordination, they leave unchecked 
 both the despotic use of the appointing power and the 
 prescriptive influence of parties, by which payments are 
 exacted under threats of removal and bribes of promo- 
 
 1 See ante, p. 43. * See ante, p. 43, 50 to 52, and 310. 
 
 " No official or officeholder should be subject to political or partisan 
 assessments, , . . and plain laws should punish all attempts . . . 
 to enforce such assessments . . . or to abridge absolute freedom in 
 political action." Resolutions of Republican Convention of New York, 
 of September, 1877. 4 U. S. Revised Statutes, 1784.
 
 412 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 tion. 1 Another statute 2 affirms the same principle somewhat 
 more broadly, by prohibiting all executive officers and employes 
 of the United States from requesting, giving to, or receiving 
 from any other officer or employe of the government, any 
 money, property, or other thing of value 3 for political purposes ; 
 but with the exception that the prohibition shall not apply to 
 officers ' ' appointed by the President with the advice and con- 
 sent of the Senate /" If that lamentable and significant excep- 
 tion came from the Senate itself, it would make the difference 
 between its disinterestedness and that of the House of Lords 
 still more conspicuous. It would certainly go far to confirm 
 the popular belief that patronage and partisan interests are no- 
 where so strongly entrenched and so unblushingly defended as 
 in the highest legislative body of the nation. In any event, 
 the import and suggestion of this exception are of painful sig- 
 nificance. The officers confirmed by the Senate are of the 
 higher class, of whom many have an authority of nomination 
 or a right to recommend promotions and removals. Their 
 power and influence overawe the tens of thousands of officers 
 who fill the grades below. Upon what principle of justice or 
 policy can official tyranny and partisan coercion be prohibited, 
 as between officers of nearly equal grade, and yet be allowed 
 (if not by plain suggestion invited) on the part of those high 
 officials whose caprice can be enforced and whose bad example 
 is most demoralizing ? This statute is also sadly defective in 
 affording clerks and employees no protection against partisan 
 tax-gatherers who are not in the public service. An officer, 
 simply because he has been confirmed by the Senate, is at lib- 
 erty, under this statute, to use his influence for the removal of 
 any poor, worthy clerk, if he refuses to pay the contributions 
 which such tax-gatherers may choose to demand. 4 In the 
 
 1 They do not even seem to have prevented a member of the Cabinet 
 being himself the head of a political bureau of extortion. 
 
 4 U. 8. Laws, 1876, chap. 287, 6. 
 
 3 Is an office " a thing of value " within the meaning of this law ? Why 
 not use the comprehensive prohibitions of British statutes, if the true intent 
 be to stop bribery by promises of office and promotion ? 
 
 A bill is now pending (46th Cong., 1st Session, H. R. 226) which pro- 
 hibits, in very general terms, the demanding or paying of money for politi- 
 cal purposes, by officers, clerks, or employees of the government. The 
 prohibitions extend to superior officers permitting the collection of such
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 413 
 
 whole range of British and American legislation, during the 
 last quarter of a century, I am aware of no contrast so strik- 
 ing, or to an American so painful, as that afforded by these 
 statutes when compared with the action of the British Parlia- 
 ment in sustaining open competition over twenty years ago. 1 
 Is it too much to hope that this exception, in the interest of 
 servility and proscription, will not long be allowed to dishonor 
 the national laws ? If but a single senator would present it 
 in its true light before the people, he would arouse a senti- 
 ment which would make its early repeal inevitable. 
 
 6. On one other point there is a necessity of appealing to 
 Congress. It is in regard to the laws, already referred to, lim- 
 iting the tenure of collectors, postmasters, naval officers, and 
 various other officials to four years. We have seen that these 
 statutes came in with the causes of the spoils system, which 
 they greatly strengthen ; if indeed they may not be said to 
 have paved the way for that system. They ought to be re- 
 pealed. They suggest that such officers should come in and 
 go out with each administration, and they cause many changes 
 just when officers have been long enough in their places to 
 become efficient. They cause uncertainty and perpetual agi- 
 tation in ail the lower circles of official life. They are utterly 
 destructive of that experience, consistency, and steadiness of 
 policy without which no good administration is possible. So 
 short a term dissuades the worthier men from taking these 
 
 o 
 
 offices. It forces those who hold them into constant efforts 
 of a pernicious kind to strengthen their influence in aid of a 
 reappointment. These short terms also add greatly to the 
 disastrous effects which the present method of senatorial con- 
 firmations exerts upon the public service, and to the facil- 
 ity with which partisan manipulators can make their demoral- 
 izing influence felt within the departments. The mischievous 
 tendency of these short terms of office, unknown under our 
 original system, which the law of 1820 introduced, was so 
 manifest even without trial, as to arouse the gravest fears of 
 the great statesmen of that day. 4 In the humiliating abuses 
 which we suffer, in connection with so frequent appointments 
 
 moneys, and, on certain conditions, to government contractors. The bill 
 embodies very salutary principles. 
 
 1 See ante, p. 213. * Webster, Benton and Calhoun, especially. 
 
 27
 
 414: CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 and confirmations, we may see the fulfilment of their gloomy 
 predictions/ which I regret want of space docs not permit me 
 to cite. 
 
 These may perhaps be accepted as the more important, 
 practical issues to be made, and upon which public opinion 
 may with advantage be concentrated. But there is another 
 serious obstacle to a thorough reform, upon which British ex- 
 perience sheds no light. I mean the manner in which the 
 Senate exercises the power of confirmation. To discuss that 
 subject is quite beyond the scope of this work. It is well 
 known this power is not used, as the Constitution contem- 
 plated it would be, merely as a check upon bad nominations 
 by the executive. It has been so magnified as in great 
 measure to supersede executive authority, and to confer upon 
 the Senators from each State (or the Senator of the dominant 
 party) a sort of feudal lordship over nominations for officers 
 who are to serve within the State. The interference of the 
 Senate, with executive functions, has not been limited to the 
 matter of appointments. Since 1867, it has even been carried 
 to the extent of assuming to restrain and regulate the discharge 
 of the executive duty of removal for cause. This has been 
 done by making the consent of the Senate essential to the 
 removal, during his term of office, of an officer confirmed by 
 that body. In this way the influence of the Senate has been 
 greatly increased and the constitutional functions of the execu- 
 tive have been in a corresponding degree impaired. 2 The de- 
 moralizing influence of this system upon legislation, upon State 
 politics, upon discipline, economy, and fidelity in the depart- 
 ments, and upon the dignity and usefulness of the Senate itself, 
 is notorious and hardly disputed. 3 The very counterpoise of the 
 
 1 Speaking of the proscription to which the Law of 1820 so greatly con- 
 tributed, Mr. Webster used this language in a speech delivered in Worces- 
 ter, in 1832 : " Mr. President, so far as I know, there is no civilized coun- 
 try on earth in which, on a change of rulers, there is such an inquisition 
 for spoils as we have witnessed in this free republic. When, Sir, did any 
 British minister, Whig or Tory, ever make such an inquest ? When did he 
 ever take away the daily bread of weighers and gaugers and measurers ? 
 Sir, a British Minister who should do this, and should afterwards show his 
 head in the British House of Commons, would be received by a universal 
 hiss." 2 U. S. Rev. Stat., 1767 to 1771. 
 
 3 It was declared in debate in the Senate, in December, 1889, that " nomi- 
 nally, appointments are so made [in the constitutional mode], but in reality
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 415 
 
 government has been disturbed by an invasion of the executive 
 from the legislative department. This is no place for considering 
 a remedy. But it is plain that whatever shall tend to weaken the 
 spoils system in other quarters, whatever shall tend to fill the de- 
 partments with young men and women of worth and capacity, 
 whatever shall tend to restore to the executive its true and 
 constitutional functions in other particulars, whatever shall 
 bring the aggression and monopoly of the Senate more promi- 
 nently before the people, will also tend to make such usurpa- 
 tion obnoxious and intolerable. It is only an aroused public 
 sentiment that can open the way for bringing the exercise of 
 the power of confirmation into harmony with the interests and 
 rights of the people. That power extends to but a moderate 
 portion of the officers. The Senate could not long resist a 
 powerfully expressed, public censure, concentrated upon the 
 narrow field of its monopoly. And it is only just to expect 
 that Senators of the United States will be ready to yield to 
 changes that may be shown to be essential for the public wel- 
 fare. l They will not venture to defend an usurpation through 
 which they have taken to themselves feudal prerogatives. 
 They will never try to justify a monopoly of the appointing 
 power which the public opinion of Great Britain more than 
 a generation since took from members of the House of 
 Lords. They now act upon precedents, the inherent evils of 
 which long practice lias deprived of half their hatefulness. If 
 it be too much (and I do not think it is too much) to expect 
 that the Senators of a republic will be found to have the pat- 
 
 they are dictated and controlled, in a vast majority of cases, by an influence 
 unknown to the Constitution or laws. Every Senator, and every Represen- 
 tative in the other House, knows that appointments in most cases are dic- 
 tated by them ;" and in a debate in the House in 1870, that " under the pres- 
 ent custom in the Senate, it is almost impossible for a united House-delega- 
 tion to get a good man confirmed if the Senators from the State prefer a bad 
 one : in other words. Senators secure the rejection of those that the Presi- 
 dent has constitutionally nominated, not because they are not ft for the place 
 in question, but because they do not themselves recommend them." Report 
 U. S. Civil Service Commission, April, 1874, p. 18. 
 
 1 In his message of December 5th, 1870, President Grant says : There is 
 no duty which so much embarrasses the executive and heads of departments 
 as that of appointments, nor is there any such arduous and thankless labor 
 imposed on Senators and Representatives as that of finding places for con- 
 stituents."
 
 4:16 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIX. 
 
 riotism needed to follow the examples of British noblemen 
 of Chatham, Liverpool, and Granville many years ago in vol- 
 untarily surrendering patronage, surely it is not too much to 
 expect that (like the majority of the members of both houses 
 of the British Parliament in the last decade), the members of 
 the Senate will make a virtue of necessity, by yielding grace- 
 full}' to a frowning public opinion, without driving the people 
 to a constitutional amendment for the suppression of official 
 feudalism under the most democratic government of the 
 world. Politics certainly exhibit many inconsistencies ; but 
 thoughtful Senators are not likely to believe, because for a 
 time they have been allowed through usurpation to become 
 feudal lords of patronage, that the people will very long toler- 
 ate so anomalous and degrading a despotism. 1 
 
 Y. In a late case before the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, in which that tribunal made a salutary application of 
 British law to some of our abuses, it is declared that " no peo- 
 ple can have a higher public interest, except the preservation 
 of their liberties, than integrity in the administration of their 
 government in all its branches. ' ' If this volume proves that 
 vital truth not to have been so fully comprehended by the 
 American people as by the people of some other countries, 
 there has certainly been much to excuse their failure ; and the 
 future promises a better appreciation. The American consti- 
 tutional system was by far the most original and the grandest 
 political achievement ever yet made by one generation. 
 Our early administration was placed. upon a basis of jus- 
 tice and purity far in advance of any which elsewhere ex- 
 isted. It was but natural that the brilliant success of the great 
 experiment should dazzle the public mind. It led the way 
 to a general conviction that a government founded in sound 
 principles held within itself preserving virtues so efficient that 
 it might be safely handed over to such voluntary combina- 
 tions among the people as should be pleased to take an interest 
 in carrying it on. The many questions incident to the creation 
 
 1 "The democratic nations which have introduced freedom into their po- 
 litical constitutions, at the very time that they were augmenting the despotism 
 of their administrative constitutions have been led into strange paradoxes." 
 Democracy in America, by De Tocqueville, vol. 2, p. 393. 
 
 2 Trist r. Child, 21 Wallace R., 450.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IK GREAT BRITAIN. 417 
 
 of a new government, to the developing industries of a new 
 continent, and to their relation to foreign States, absorbed 
 public attention. Exciting and novel theories, which natu- 
 rally developed the most intense political activity, in connec- 
 tion with the interpretation and enforcement of the new con- 
 stitution and laws, strongly tended to withdraw thought from 
 administrative methods and from all the internal relations of 
 the government. No state of facts, among a people in the 
 condition of our fathers, could be more favorable to the steady 
 growth of intensely partisan and vicious methods in adminis- 
 tration or more effectually tend to blind the people to their bad 
 effects. A few sagacious statesmen comprehended the nature 
 and magnitude of the evil from the outset. But before any con- 
 siderable portion of the people understood the situation, the 
 spoils system was not only developed but entrenched. In the 
 meantime, we had gone so far and were so shaken on the 
 stormy seas which carried us into the great civil conflict, 
 that little thoughtful attention could be secured for any ques- 
 tions relating to the more internal operations of the govern- 
 ment. It hardly need be pointed out that the period which 
 immediately followed the civil war was in every way unfavor- 
 able to introspection, candid deliberation, or reform of any 
 kind. But, in the later years, a change has been coming over 
 the public mind. " The era of buoyant youth is coming to a 
 close ; ripe and sober manhood is to take its place." 1 Fourth- 
 of-July orations are no longer given to political boasting. 
 There is a feeling of soberness for giving some thought 
 to the fact that it is not enough to have a government 
 based on just principles. It must be administered by pure 
 and able men, or the people cannot prosper. Attention 
 rests more than ever before upon the facts that, though 
 the original questions which divided parties have nearly 
 disappeared, though tiie supreme, national peril which appalled 
 a whole generation has been taken out of our politics, though 
 principles less than ever before divide the great parties, yet 
 party struggles are not less intense. The vicious and exces- 
 sive activity of partisans has rather increased than dimin- 
 ished. The people are more than ever before taking notice 
 
 1 Preface, Von Hoist's Const. History United States, p. i.
 
 418 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 that the party issues tend to gather about the means of getting 
 into power and the possession and division of patronage, 
 offices, and spoils. They begin to see that the questions which 
 are permanently absorbing and important are administrative 
 questions. They are as never before alive to the facts how 
 seriously these questions concern economy and taxation, the 
 efficiency with which the laws arc executed, the safety of life 
 and property, the morals of politics, the purity and freedom of 
 elections in short, the prosperity and safety not only of the 
 nation as a whole, but of every State, county, city, town, and 
 citizen which it contains. They are alarmed at the many 
 cases of official infidelity. They begin to comprehend that to 
 get good men into office is one of the paramount needs of all 
 government one of the supreme conditions of all prosperity. 
 This riper and sounder temper of the national mind has, in the 
 last decade, several times forced partisan organization to de- 
 nounce the spoils system, and to make pledges of administrative 
 reform ; but w r ith what sincerity, in some cases, need not be 
 here considered. And it has finally, for the first time in our 
 history, made the question of such reform a distinct and leading 
 issue in a national canvass. The experience of Great Britain 
 shows us that when that question has been once raised in the 
 forum of politics, it is sure to more and more arrest public 
 attention. The reform elements, there, rapidly gained strength 
 until their final triumph. Is there any reason to doubt that 
 our experience will be the same ? 
 
 The question whether the partisan-spoils system or the merit 
 system shall prevail in our politics is really the question 
 whether the self-respecting, intelligent manhood and woman- 
 hood of the whole nation may compete for the honor of hold- 
 ing official places, or a profession of dominant opinions and 
 servility to the partisan majority of the hour shall fix the class 
 and the boundary beyond which no selection shall be made 
 Avhether the caucus, the ' ' rings, ' ' and the secret arts of the 
 politicians, or the studious and industrious homes and work- 
 shops, the schools, the seminaries and the colleges, shall mould 
 the character which is to serve and guide the nation ? Is it 
 possible that a method of selection based on equal opportunities 
 and common rights for all can be overborne, in a great re- 
 public, by a system of proscription and privilege of feudal
 
 CIVIL SEEVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 419 
 
 and official favoritism ? Are the United States to perma- 
 nently stand before the world as the only great nation which 
 foregoes the best methods of bringing into its high service the 
 worthiest of its citizens as the only nation which allows its 
 officials to be plundered by its parties, and its parties to make 
 merchandise of its offices ? 
 
 Free public competition in the selection of nominees for the 
 public service is the most essential feature of the merit sys- 
 
 i/ 
 
 tern. It is at once the most democratic and the most just and 
 salutary agency of good government which has been developed 
 in the political experience of modern times. It is, in fact, no 
 mere method in administration or politics. It embodies a 
 great principle of jutice and progress, which finds illustration 
 alike in the rivalry of nations, in the competition of races, in 
 the providential order of the universe itself. Wherever there 
 is life and growth, there is a competition, in which the de- 
 velopment and the survival of the fittest are the conditions of 
 superiority and progress, if not of continued existence. For 
 the improvement of every species and every breed, the best of 
 the kind must be selected and cared for ; nor does the rule 
 fail when we come to the growth of communities, and the 
 prosperity of nations. To secure the best men for officers and 
 leaders is, next to the creation of government itself, the most 
 difficult problem of statesmanship the greatest achievement 
 which political wisdom can make. The conditions of prosper- 
 ity with every people are involved in the extent to which they 
 bring their purest and wisest minds into positions of honor and 
 control. 1 Donation however strong, no race however vigorous, 
 could long preserve its relative prestige and prosperity in the 
 world, if it should disregard these conditions. The need, in 
 
 1 I am not unmindful that the officers directly selected through com- 
 petition cannot be said lo be " leaders," and are not at once given control. 
 But I repeat that, as soon as non-partisan, self-reliant men of worth and 
 capacity shall have filled the lower grades, the higher places (except a few 
 of the very highest) will certainly be filled by promotions from those be- 
 low ; and upon that being the case, not only will it be seen to be incon- 
 gruous and really impracticable to put into those controlling positions mere 
 politicians or inferior men of any kind, but the theories and the morals of 
 politics will be so improved that incompetent, self-seeking men will no more 
 be accepted as leaders in civil administration than they now are in arms or 
 in education.
 
 420 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 every nation, of being served by its ablest and best men in the 
 great contests of arms and diplomacy, and even in the higher 
 places in its internal affairs, was not, of course, left for modern 
 times to discover. It was, however, left to these times to com- 
 prehend, or if not to comprehend, at least to act upon, the 
 theory that it is of essential importance to have all the subordi- 
 nate (as well as the higher) official places, both at home and 
 abroad, filled with persons of sufficient ability and character. 
 The leading nations have treated this question of official com- 
 petency as so vital as to require not only persistent national 
 efforts to that end, but the surrender of the privileges of 
 royalty and class, the theories of birthright and aristocracy, 
 upon which all the older governments had been founded. 
 The practice of sending mere favorites or influential par- 
 tisans after the fashion of the old colonial period even to 
 the humblest offices in colonies or foreign ports, has ceased 
 on the part of every European nation. That vicious old 
 practice survives only in the unnatural form in which it has 
 been grafted upon our institutions. Not only have the older 
 governments placed better men in office, but they have 
 brought them under sterner rules of discipline and duty. 
 They "hold their subordinate officers under stricter control, 
 and invent new methods for guiding them more closely, and 
 for inspecting them with less trouble. " . . . " They do every- 
 thing with more order, more celerity, and at less expense." 1 
 It is only in the light of such considerations that we can 
 take in the full significance of the efforts and methods 
 through which, in later years, the older nations have 
 invigorated and armed themselves for the grand international 
 competition of races and States for the commerce and domi- 
 nation of the world. Some of the practical effects of this new 
 policy have been pointed out, and I cannot enlarge upon 
 them. It is for us to consider whether we can maintain our 
 prestige and the honor of republican institutions by contin- 
 uing to draw our official force only from the hotbeds of par- 
 tisan influence, and only by the selfish and secret methods 
 of patronage and favoritism ; while every other leading nation 
 plants itself upon common justice and invites, by its competi- 
 tions, and rewards by selections for its service, the highest 
 
 1 " Democracy in America," by Do Tocquevillc, vol. ii., pp. 378, 379.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 421 
 
 capacity and character in its citizenship. The facilities of 
 modern communications are so great that the competitions of 
 nations living on different continents are almost as direct and 
 rapid, in all the inland towns and along every shore of the 
 ocean, as they were in earlier times between rival villages 
 of the same district. Who can doubt that the question of 
 better ministers, consuls, and commercial agents has become 
 as decisive of the industries as it certainly has of the prestige 
 and the honor of rival nations ? l 
 
 But however great the need of reform, our attempts must 
 be proportioned to the virtue and intelligence which we have for 
 their support. To attempt too much may be for a time as 
 unfortunate as to attempt too little. The moral tone of the 
 American people, as compared with that of the British people, 
 and their relative patriotism, intelligence, and readiness to 
 make efforts for the general welfare, are not only intrin- 
 sically very interesting, but they have a direct bearing upon 
 the applicability of British precedents in the United States. 
 I have no space for their discussion. While it is unques- 
 tionable that public opinion demands higher qualifications 
 for office and has secured greater purity of administration 
 in Great Britain than in this country, I am by no means con- 
 vinced that the moral standard or intelligence, averaged over 
 the whole field of life, is higher there than here. The expla- 
 nation of this apparent contradiction seems to be this : More 
 attention to the subject of administration and the enforce- 
 ment of better methods for a series of years, in Great Britain, 
 have made public opinion more exacting and critical and raised 
 all official life to a relatively higher plane. Whereas in this 
 country, the neglect of administration by our Statesmen, and 
 the use of corrupting methods by the partisan class which 
 has controlled the government, have caused the charac- 
 ter of official life to fall below the general average of 
 morality in other matters. In other words, in Great Brit- 
 ain the public service and official life generally are so pure 
 as to be more in danger from without than from any 
 source of corruption within themselves ; while with us cor- 
 ruption is most developed in official circles and tends to flow 
 out from politics and official life upon private life. That the 
 1 See Appendix B.
 
 422 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 partisan and office-holding class is generally the more de- 
 moralized and distrusted class of our people, of corresponding 
 intelligence, will, I think, hardly be questioned. That the 
 facts are quite otherwise in Great Britain could be made very 
 clear, but I can do no more than allude to a few facts bearing 
 on the subject. 
 
 The purchase of commissions in the British army, as it 
 prevailed until 1871, spoke as significantly from one plane 
 of life as the buying and selling of Church "livings" still 
 speak from another plane of life. ' It has been shown that 
 fewer crimes are committed in Great Britain than in this 
 country. But the fact of a lower rate of criminality among 
 a people may perhaps be equally explainable on the theory 
 of less disposition to break the laws or of more certainty 
 and a prompter justice in the imposition of punishment. 
 Now, nothing in British administration is more admirable than 
 the purity, dignity, and ability to be found in her courts of jus- 
 tice of every grade ; and her most thoughtful writers have 
 borne testimony to the law-abiding spirit of the American 
 people. ' ' Even in America, the most law-loving of countries, " 
 . . . there is " a regard for law, such as no great people have 
 yet evinced, and infinitely surpassing ours." 2 And what 
 higher evidence can there be of the relative moral tone of two 
 peoples than their comparative disposition to obey the laws 
 which their own representatives have made ? It would seem, 
 therefore, that good administration has reduced criminality to 
 a ratio below that of the United States, even among a people 
 more inclined than Americans to set the laws at defiance. 
 These conclusions, and more especially the inference that good 
 methods of administration in Great Britain have raised the 
 morality of public life above that of private life, may, how- 
 ever, be directly supported by British writers. ' ' As we have 
 seen, it (private corruption) has worn its slimy way from the 
 Butler to the Broker class. Almost every man who has 
 patronage has also his price. . . . Shall we now at- 
 tempt by legislative enactment to stamp it out and brand the 
 briber and bribed with infamy, or shall we wait yet longer, until 
 physicians, the bar, our Judges, our civil servants at home, in 
 
 1 See ante, p 278 to 281. 
 
 2 Bagehot on the English Constitution, pp. 52 and 289.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 423 
 
 India, and the Colonies, government inspectors of mines and 
 factories, our very ministers of State, are tampered with f " 
 
 I cannot think it would occur to an American writer to thus 
 represent the stream of corruption, in his own country, as 
 having its springs in the regions of private business, and as 
 flowing thence to taint pervading virtues in official life and 
 poison a pure domain in politics. He would regard the 
 stream as flowing the other way. If in these facts we may 
 find consoling evidence of the elevating influence of our insti- 
 tutions and social life, in their aggregate effect, ought we to 
 be the less rebuked by the consideration that, with at least 
 equally good material out of which to construct a pure and 
 vigorous administration, and with far less obstacles to be 
 overcome, our neglect has been so great that we have 
 fallen far short of the achievements of the older country ? 
 The comparison will not have its true significance, if we 
 fail to remember that, by going back about the space of a sin- 
 gle human life, we come upon a condition the very reverse in 
 the administrative affairs of the two countries upon a time 
 when, in this country, respected and capable men filled all the 
 public places, and distrust of officers was little known upon a 
 time when, in Great Britain, there was official corruption and 
 a prostitution of authority such as our demagogues now hardly 
 venture even to suggest against their partisan opponents. 
 
 To the other considerations which give importance to ad- 
 ministrative abuses this must be added : that they are the 
 most permanent known to politics. Having their ultimate 
 source in the selfishness of human nature, they grow wherever 
 ambition, the love of gain, or partisan zeal are not effectively 
 restrained. Favored by the imperfections of all human gov- 
 ernments and incidents of their daily operation, they are, in 
 their causes, as abiding as government itself. It is in the 
 struggles for office, and the opportunities for gain in the exer- 
 cise of official power, that selfishness, deception, and partisan 
 zeal have their everlasting contest with virtue, patriotism, and 
 duty. It is in that contest that statesmen and demagogues, 
 patriots and intriguers, the good citizen and the venal office 
 seeker, all the high and all the low influences of political life, 
 meet face to face, and by the balance of power, for good 
 1 Westminster Revieic, article on Illicit Commissions, July, 1877.
 
 421 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 or for evil, give character to politics and determine the 
 morality of nations. The questions raised by that contest, 
 and the methods by which politicians seek their solution, 
 are much the same and are equally vital under every form 
 of representative government. From generation to gen- 
 eration, from century to century, partisans and self-seek- 
 ing and corrupt men of all sorts employ much the same 
 means to make office-getting and administration serve their 
 ends. If we go back over the administration of a century, 
 in any enlightened State, we find the abuses with which 
 statesmen and patriots have struggled, if a little different 
 in form, yet in substance much the same. AVhether a pres- 
 ident or a king be at the head of the government, whether 
 the higher branch of the legislature be elective or hereditary, 
 make little difference in the administrative abuses or in their 
 perilous tendency. Our civil service abuses, as I have already 
 explained, are in substance but a repetition of those of the 
 other enlightened nations. As a people, we have cherished no 
 more complete and disastrous delusion than that which has led 
 us to think that the just principles of our constitution and 
 social life have relieved us from dangers growing out of 
 corrupt administration. Human nature has not been changed 
 by republican institutions. Good government does not come 
 from neglect, from conceit, or from party zeal, even in a re- 
 public. 
 
 If, from the inveterate permanency and peril of administra- 
 tive abuses, we turn to the other great questions of politics, we 
 see that every generation, every decade, almost every year, 
 has had its peculiar policy, its temporary interests, its absorb- 
 ing issues, domestic or foreign. The highway of progress is 
 marked by the ever changing procession of subjects each 
 thought to be paramount in its day. Even from our short his- 
 tory, a long list of forgotten questions, each most absorbing 
 for a time, could be gathered. But at all times and every- 
 where, the questions How to bring honest and capable men 
 into office, high and low ? How to secure economy and 
 fidelity in administration ? How to prevent official authority 
 from being prostituted to partisan and selfish ends ? have 
 been subjects of serious and increasing difficulty. Whether 
 considered in that light or not, they have really been problems
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 42 J 
 
 tlian which none have at once so constantly and so vitally 
 concerned the prosperity and the morality of the nation. 
 "What other questions, among all those which have arisen in 
 our politics, have so steadily grown in importance '( What 
 question to-day presents issues more difficult of solution, or 
 which are the source of more anxiety to patriotic and 
 thoughtful citizens, than this ? How can we so administer the 
 government that its daily operations shall not develop infidelity 
 and corruption, fatal alike to all the virtues of official and pri- 
 vate life ? 
 
 However the past may be excused, we can hardly find in 
 the future a justification for a continued neglect of the sci- 
 ence of administration which, as we have seen, the states- 
 men of every other enlightened nation have made one of the 
 the paramount studies of politics. For surely it is not the in- 
 crease of wealth, the growth of great cities, or the advance of 
 population that will purify the fountains of virtue or make 
 the problems of government easier. When, perhaps in the 
 lifetime of persons now living, the residents of Washington 
 holding places in the public service shall exceed her present 
 population ; when the country shall contain three hundred 
 millions of people, of which the names of half a million 
 shall be upon the national pay-rolls ; when the commerce and 
 population of San Francisco shall far exceed the present pop- 
 ulation and commerce of New York ; when the national 
 revenues shall be tenfold their present amount, and consuls 
 and commercial agents shall discharge their duties in Central 
 Africa and in cities upon the upper waters of the Amazon 
 can we expect, if our neglect shall continue, that the perils 
 of a spoils system of office will be less, or that the difficulties 
 of its removal will be diminished ? 
 
 But it is not merely such natural increase and expansion 
 which will continue to make that science more profound and 
 its neglect more disastrous. It is in the order of a growing 
 civilization that the functions of official life must become 
 more and more various, delicate, and difficult. " The 
 authority of government has not only spread throughout the 
 sphere of all existing powers, . . . but it goes further 
 and invades the domain heretofore reserved to private inde- 
 pendence. A multitude of actions, which were fonnerly be-
 
 426 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 yond tlie control of public administration, have been sub- 
 jected to that control in our time, and the number of them is 
 constantly increasing. " ' A larger and still larger number of 
 officers are required, and their neglect and incompetency more 
 and more tend to become evils of serious magnitude. The 
 railroad, the steamship, and the telegraph ; the system of 
 national banks and the new departments of agriculture, edu- 
 cation, and public health ; the life-saving and the Marine Hos- 
 pital service ; the money order system, and the light-house, the 
 internal revenue and the postal administration, greatly extended 
 are but illustrations of the growth of administrative func- 
 tions created or enlarged during the present generation. In 
 the cities 2 and in the States, this growth has hardly been less 
 than under the Federal Government ; nor has it been less in 
 other countries than in our own. 3 Year by year, the prosperity 
 and morality of every enlightened people become, in a still 
 greater degree, dependent upon the character and capacity of 
 those who fill their places of public trust. In no country is 
 this more true than in the United States, where the very 
 structure of the government frequently produces a complica- 
 tion of official duties, by reason of the division of authority 
 over great subjects between the nation and the States. 4 
 
 With so great evils upon us from the neglect of administra- 
 tion in the past, and still greater evils thus threatening us if that 
 neglect shall continue in the future, it would hardly seem pos- 
 sible that the subject should long fail to take its proper place 
 in the serious reflections cf American statesmen. How, in- 
 deed, can a man be called a statesman who is not well versed 
 in the world's wisdom as to the best means of carrying for- 
 
 1 " Democracy in America," vol. 2, p. 370. 
 
 y Popular education and sanitary laws vastly extended ; parks, gas-works, 
 and water-works ; the more complete supervision of prisons, of charity 
 and workshops in the interests of health and safety, are familiar examples. 
 
 3 " I assert that there is no country in Europe in which the public admin- 
 istration has not become . . . more inquisitive and minute ; . . it 
 regulates more undertakings and gains a firmer footing every day about, 
 above, and around all persons, to assist, to advise, and, to coerce them. 
 " Democracy in America," vol. 2, p. 377. 
 
 4 At this moment, the embarrassments connected with the subjects of the 
 public health and elections present significant examples. In no country is 
 there so great a need of a superior class of officers to deal with these subjects.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 427 
 
 ward with steadiness and fidelity the vast administration of 
 his country, upon which the happiness and prosperity of its 
 people so greatly depend ? For self-seeking politicians for 
 men with whom statesmanship means the manipulation of 
 parties for any citizen without faith in public virtue and the 
 courage needed to stand for duty and the general welfare 
 against the ignorance and the blind majority of the hour, the 
 subject can have few attractions. But those thoughtful citizens 
 whose hearts are warmed by a true love of their country, 
 who are humiliated as they see that country failing to rise to 
 its true dignity before the world, who comprehend that, 
 under better methods, worth and ability of a higher order 
 could be made to elevate politics and official life will be 
 drawn to the subject by all the strength of interest, patriotic 
 duty, and national pride. They feel that the United States 
 stand before the world as the original and the noblest embodi- 
 ment of the republican ideal in government. As the oldest 
 and the most powerful republican nation as the example to 
 which young republics turn for wisdom and experience the 
 character of public administration in the United States does 
 not concern merely the growing millions of her own people, 
 but the republican cause and the fate of free institutions in 
 every quarter of the globe now and for ages to come. 
 !Need we fear that this generation of Americans will supply 
 patriots who will worthily lead in the reform of the civil ser- 
 vice of their country ? Are not great masses of the people 
 ready to turn away from the politicians and to follow such 
 leaders ? Can it be doubted that, if the true methods of 
 reform were once brought clearly before the American people, 
 they would give those methods a support as vigorous and 
 enlightened as that extended to them by the people of Great 
 Britain ? Surely we are not to be permanently known as 
 " the people who boast most over their form of government, 
 and groan most over the abuses of their administration." 1 . 
 We are not degenerate sons without the patriotism or the 
 courage of our fathers. This generation, which has made the 
 greatest sacrifices for liberty and justice recorded in human 
 annals, must surely have the moral elevation needed for the 
 removal of any abuses that can be developed in administering 
 1 The Saturday Review.
 
 423 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 the government whose righteousness , and honor it has greatly 
 exalted. We are justly proud of the stability of a govern- 
 ment, which has been less changed in the past century, and 
 bids fair to be less changed in the next century, than any gov- 
 ernment in Europe. Its safety now depends upon the virtue 
 and wisdom of its daily administration. "While nearly every 
 European country is agitated by hopes and fears, threatening 
 the very framework of the State, no expectation of a change 
 of structure colors our estimate of the future. Our fate must 
 turn upon our capacity to administer institutions which we do 
 not wish to abandon, and which we cannot expect, by any 
 radical change, to improve. We are for those reasons all the 
 more free, and we have resting upon us a duty all the more 
 serious, to speedily solve our great problem that of making 
 our administration worthy of our constitution and our social 
 life. If the present generation is too poorly instructed in the 
 true methods of government to act upon the higher experi- 
 ence of the leading European States, then it is the duty of all 
 who teach in whatever grade, from the school to the univer- 
 sity to take care that the next generation be wiser in the 
 knowledge of what so deeply concerns the character and sta- 
 bility of the nation to make it appear that republics are not 
 hostile to statesmanship, to education, or to official virtue. No 
 other knowledge will compensate for ignorance as to the best 
 means of securing capacity and fidelity in public administra- 
 tion. Xo amount of scholarship will cover the disgrace to 
 republican institutions of allowing the world to believe that 
 republics must fall below monarchies in bringing high character 
 and ability into places of public trust. In no other way can 
 the prestige and influence of such institutions be so much ad- 
 vanced in the world as by the United States making it mani- 
 fest to the nations that a great republic seeks and secures, quite 
 as surely as the most enlightened monarchy, tjie full measure 
 of official worth and ability which good administration re- 
 quires. To attain such results is, 1 repeat, the great problem 
 of American politics the paramount duty of American 
 patriots. And I trust I may be pardoned for adding that 
 the hope of contributing, in some small measure, to their accom- 
 plishment, has given me the courage to submit this volume to 
 the public judgment.
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 OPINIONS CONCERNING THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE. 
 
 I. LETTEK, SIR CHARLES TREVELYAN. 
 
 Open competition adapted to United States. Few supported reform 
 at first. How it gained in Parliament. Members relieved from 
 importunity. Better men secured under new system. Corrup- 
 tion arrested. Efficiency of service increased. Promotion for 
 merit brought about. Popular estimate and self-respect of the 
 service advanced. Education promoted. The new system per- 
 manent. 
 
 II. LETTER, JOHN BRIGHT. 
 
 New system approved. Return to ol 1 system impossible. Corrup- 
 tion prevented. Reform in the United States desired by its 
 friends abroad. 
 
 III. LETTER, UNITED STATES CONSUL AT LIVERPOOL. 
 
 IV. LETTER, UNITED STATES CONSUL-GENERAL. 
 
 V. LETTER, MR. MORAN, FORMERLY SECRETARY LEGATION, LONDON. 
 
 VI. LETTER, MR. HOPPIN, NOW SECRETARY LEGATION, LONDON. 
 VII. LETTER, EDWARDS PIERREPONT, MINISTER TO GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 VIII. LETTER, J. S. MORGAN, Esq., OF LONDON. 
 
 LETTER, HON. HUGH MCCULLOCH, OF LONDON. 
 
 I HAVE not wished that any important conclusion reached in 
 this volume should, to any needless extent, rest upon my own 
 opinion alone, and some of the points involved are of such 
 a nature that the opinions of competent observers are, per- 
 haps, the highest authority that can be offered. Both these 
 considerations have induced me to present in this form the 
 views of several gentlemen some of them Englishmen and 
 some of them Americans some representing official life in 
 various grades and some of them only distinguished in private 
 life ; but each of them has had exceptional opportunities of 
 forming correct conclusions, and their views will probably be 
 thought entitled to weight. The portion of any letter which 
 28
 
 430 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 has been here omitted is immaterial to the purpose of this 
 Appendix, and neither in such portion nor in any other letter 
 received, but not here referred to, were any views expressed 
 contrary to those herein set forth. I give at length the letter 
 of Sir Charles Trevelyan (formerly " The Permanent Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, ' ' and one of the two persons selected by 
 the British Government in 1853 to report upon the best 
 method of reform), because of its great historical interest. 
 
 I. Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan : 
 
 BRAEMORE, August 20, 1877. 
 
 DEAR SIR : Your letter of the 14th has reached me at this remote 
 place, and I much regret that I cannot at present personally confer 
 with you, for I have long been struck by the singular suitableness of 
 our new but well-tried institution of making public appointments by 
 open competition, for the correction of some of the worst results of 
 the United States political system, and would gladly help to place 
 you in possession of the mature fruit of our experience. . . . 
 
 Considering the practical nature of the English character, which 
 abhors theoretical innovations based upon a priori reasoning, and 
 reluctantly accepts even those changes which have been proved by 
 experience to be desirable, a remarkable proof of the success of 
 the system is to be found in the fact that all real opposition to it has 
 long since died away, and, step by step, it has been extended to 
 almost every branch of the service in its most advanced and only 
 efficient form of perfectly open competition. 
 
 It may be useful to the President to know one feature of its early 
 history : the change was made by persons conversant with public 
 affairs from a practical perception of its necessity, but these early 
 supporters of it miyht be counted upon the fingers, and if the matter 
 had been put to the vote in London society, or the clubs, or even in 
 Parliament itself by secret votiny, the new system would have been 
 rejected by an overwhelming majority. Nevertheless, whenever 
 adverse motions were made in the House of Commons we always had 
 a majority in favor of the plan. This at first caused us some sur- 
 prise ; but on investigation the case turned out to be thus : Large as 
 the number of persons who profited by the former system of patron- 
 age were, those who were left out in the cold were still larger, and 
 these included some of the best classes of our population busy pro- 
 fessional persons of every kind, lawyers, ministers of religion of every
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 431 
 
 persuasion, schoolmasters, farmers, shopkeepers, etc. These rapidly 
 took in the idea of the new institution, and they gladly accepted it 
 as a valuable additional privilege. We were especially interested and 
 amused at the sudden popularity which the system acquired in Ire- 
 land, where " the competition," as they called it, was regarded as a 
 very preferable alternative to the old jobbery. You will now under- 
 stand that, whatever may have been the individual sentiments of 
 members of the House of Commons, they received such pressing 
 letters from their constituents as obliged them to vote straight. 
 
 But all the best members soon felt that, by the abolition of 
 patronage, they had been relieved from a degrading yoke. While it 
 was customary to place situations in the revenue and other depart- 
 ments at their disposal for distribution among their constituents, they 
 were obliged, in self-defence, to dance attendance on the Patronage 
 Secretary of the Treasury, besides having to carry on a large and 
 annoying correspondence with their constituents. From this double 
 bondage they were at once liberated when the junior appointments 
 were opened to competition ; and as all members were placed on the 
 same footing, they were under no disadvantage in their elections in 
 consequence of the change. 
 
 The most searching and vital improvement arising from the aboli- 
 tion of patronage is that it has purified the constituencies and in- 
 creased the independence and public feeling of members of Parlia- 
 ment. %ery borough and county, except a few of the largest, had 
 its local manager on either side a banker, brewer, or solicitor who 
 purchased the vote and support of the leading men by a judicious 
 application of the loaves and fishes. The corruption so engendered 
 was more constant and general than the bribery carried on by means 
 of money, and it was also more influential, in the degree in which a 
 provision for life for a son or some other person in whom a voter was 
 interested was more valuable than the customary five-pound note. 
 Both constituents and members now have to look, not to what they 
 can get, but to what it is their duty to do. At any rate, they must 
 now seek to promote their interests in some larger and more public 
 way than by obtaining appointments for themselves or their friends. 
 
 As regards the effect of the change upon the efficiency of the 
 administrative service, the ordinary practice was to place the fool of 
 the family in the civil, and the wild, idle, unmanageable youth in the 
 military, service, for the plain reason that while this was a provision 
 for life for them, they were not so fit as their brothers to compete 
 with others in the open professions. The promotion within the civil
 
 432 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 service was, for the most part, conducted on the same principle of 
 patronage, and in the military service on a mixed principle of pur- 
 chase and patronage. The civil service also was held in low estima- 
 tion by the public, who regarded it as a corpus vile for political job- 
 bers ; and this reacted in an injurious manner upon the esprit de 
 corps of- the civil servants. Now both civil and military officers are 
 appointed on the ground of superior ability and attainment, with an 
 indirect guarantee for good moral qualities (inasmuch as superior 
 cultivation and attainments is to be acquired only by industry, self- 
 denial, and a preference of the future for the present), besides direct 
 evidence to moral character from the persons best able to testify to 
 it. As the persons appointed have no party connections, and are 
 generally unknown to the political chiefs, there is now nothing to 
 prevent their being promoted according to qualification and merit, 
 wh:ch is the key to administrative efficiency. Lastly, the reproach 
 of a corrupt origin has been removed from the civil service, 'and the 
 members of it have been elevated in the estimation of themselves and 
 others. 
 
 The same change which has increased the efficiency of the civil and 
 military services has given a marvellous stimulus to education. For- 
 merly boys intended for any branch of the public service had no 
 motive to exert themselves, because, however idle they might be, 
 they were certain to get an appointment. Now, from their earliest 
 years, boys know that their future depends upon themselves, and a 
 new spirit of activity has supervened. The opening of the civil and 
 military services, in its influence upon national education, is equiva- 
 lent to a hundred thousand scholarships and exhibitions of the most 
 valuable kind because, unlike such rewards in general, they are for 
 life offered for the encouragement of youthful learning and good 
 conduct in every class of the community. 
 
 All this luis led to a great improvement in the efficiency of the 
 administrative service. That such is the case is proved by the 
 general acceptance of the new national institution, so that no sane 
 person has any idea of abrogating it and reviving the former state of 
 things, but, on the contrary, there is a constant movement towards 
 extending it in its entirety to the few remaining branches of the 
 service to which it has not yet been fully applied. . . . 
 
 You ask as to the effect of the change upon " official morality." 
 Official corruption was not one of the faults of the old system. 1 
 
 1 The " old system," as here referred to, is not the " old system" as the 
 phrase is generally used in this volume, where it refers to the state of things
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 433 
 
 Trust worthiness mainly depends upon a secure tenure of office, and 
 that has long been abundantly provided for. The rule that the first 
 appearance of official delinquency should be thoroughly investigated 
 and adequately dealt with, has been and still is fully enforced. The 
 plan now acted upon is to have fewer of the higher class of civil 
 servants, and to pay them better from the first, getting the copying, 
 care of papers, and other less intellectual work done by a cheaper 
 and more ordinarily educated class, which has a tendency both to I 
 promote economy and to encourage fidelity and exertion on the part/ 
 of the most trusted servants by making their appointments more 
 valuable to them. . . . 
 
 Believe me, very truly yours, CH. TREVELYAN. 
 
 D. B. EATON, E>q., etc., etc. 
 
 In a subsequent letter to the author Sir Charles Trevelyan 
 says : 
 
 " You cannot lay too much stress upon the fact that the making of 
 public appointments by open competition has been accepted by all 
 our political parties, and that there is no sign of any movement 
 against it from any quarter." 
 
 II. Letter from John Bright : 
 
 LONDON, April 29, 1874. 
 
 DEAR SIR : I am sorry I have be^n so long in replying to your 
 letter, and now I do not feel that I can say much that will be of use 
 to you. 
 
 The opening of our civil service has met with general approval, and 
 after the experience of some years it would be impossible to go back 
 to the old system. The present plan is one which is felt to be more 
 just to all classes, and it is calculated to supply more capable men for 
 the various departments of the public service. 
 
 You are doubtless aware that appointments with us are to a large 
 extent of a permanent character. No changes in persons employed 
 in government offices, in the customs, -excise, post-office, and tele- 
 graph departments, take place -on a change of government, and thus 
 we avoid a vast source of disturbance and corruption which would be 
 opened if the contrary plan were- adopted. 
 
 prior to 1800 or 1820. Sir Charles Trcvelyan means by the old system only 
 that which immediately preceded 1853, which -was in large part removed 
 at that time, and which was abolished in 1870.
 
 434 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 In these days, when so much is done by governments, and so many 
 persons are employed by them, it seems absolutely necessary to take 
 precautions against the selection of incompetent men, and against the 
 corruption which under the purest administration is always a menac- 
 ing evil. 
 
 Your proposed reform is a great undertaking. I hope the good 
 sense of your people will enable you to complete it. All the friends 
 of your country in other nations will congratulate you in your success. 
 I have directed to be forwarded to you some of our Parliamentary 
 publications, that you may know the latest facts connected with what 
 is doing here in the matter of our civil service. 
 
 I am, with great respect, yours very sincerely, 
 
 JOHN BRIGHT. 
 D. B. EATON, Esq., etc., etc. 
 
 III. Mr. Faircliild, then United States Consul at Liverpool, 
 wrote the author, under date of October 8th, 1877, as follows : 
 
 "I do not hesitate to say that the civil service of this country is held 
 in very high estimation by the people here. . . . There is a pervad- 
 ing feeling of confidence in and satisfaction with the civil service as a 
 whole, and I am decidedly of the opinion that such confidence and 
 satisfaction are well founded. . . . Not that it is considered by all 
 as an entirely perfect system and incapable of improvement, but that 
 it is held to be so perfect in its workings and results as to give great 
 satisfaction to the people. During my residence here I do not now 
 remember to have heard of but three cases where men in the service 
 have been found guilty of financial dishonesty. . . . The service 
 being non-partisan, they were treated just exactly the same as any 
 other criminal would have been, . . . and the crimes of the individ- 
 uals were not charged to either of the great political parties. . . ." 
 
 IV. General Badeau, the United States Consul-General in 
 Great Britain, under date of November 1st, 1877, \vrote the 
 author as follows : 
 
 "... That the general opinion in England and I believe the facts 
 carry out such belief is that the inland revenue service, the customs 
 service, and post-office department are efficient, and that every con- 
 fidence is placed in Ihc administration of those services ; and in very
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 435 
 
 few instances is that confidence ever abused. If an abuse of the con- 
 fidence of the Government has sometimes occurred, it has been and is 
 among the inferior officers of the postal departments, such as letter- 
 carriers and sorters ; but in the very large number of these offices the 
 percentage of crime is very small. I know of no scandals in these 
 departments that are spoken of at all, and I am decidedly of opinion 
 that one of the greatest causes of the absence of scandals and of the 
 honesty of officials is the fact that after a short series of years each 
 officer becomes entitled to a pension which continues for life and 
 increases in proportion to the number of years of service and the 
 efficiency of the officer. ..." 
 
 Y. Mr. Moran, now United States Minister at Lislxm, but 
 for many years the Secretary of Legation in Great Britain, uses 
 th^s language, in a letter to the author dated January 26th, 
 1878: "I fully share your views of the efficiency of the 
 revenue and postal services of Great Britain arid their freedom 
 from corruption. These views of mine are based upon the 
 observation of years. The causes are not far to seek. Men 
 are selected for these services because of their fitness, are fairly 
 jgaid^are onl^removable for cause, and can always look for- 
 ward to a pension when incapacitated by labor or old age. 1 
 Both services are thoroughly efficient, and there have been no 
 great scandals attached to either service in my time. Delin- 
 quencies occasionally occur among the post-office officials of 
 minor grades, but these are invariably punished. On the 
 whole, the civil service of Great Britain is, in iny opinion, the 
 best in the world, and worthy of imitation." 
 
 VI. Mr. Hoppin, who succeeded Mr. Moran as Secretary of 
 Legation in Great Britain, says, in a letter to the author, that 
 " During the whole period of my stay here I do not remem- 
 ber to have seen in the papers any charge of peculation or 
 improprieties of any sort against any permanent official. I 
 presume the more closely I should inquire, the more unani- 
 mous I should find the sentiment in favor of the rules of the 
 civil service as they exist here at present." 
 
 1 The pensions here referred to are the superannuation allowances already 
 explained, which are little more than another name for a part of the salary 
 reserved for declining years.
 
 436 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 VIT. Letter from Edwards Plerrepont : 
 
 LEGATION OF THK UNITED STATES, ) 
 LONDON, October 14, 1877. J 
 
 MY DEAR SIR Yours of September 18th is received. You 
 rightly state that you understood me to say that I had very often 
 asked men of different grades of life in England their views about 
 the honesty of the administration of their imperial and their muni- 
 cipal governments, and that I invariably found that they believed, or 
 professed to believe, in the purity of such administration. 
 
 Since my interview with you last summer, I have had increased 
 opportunities to make further and more minute inquiries upon this 
 subject, of which I have carefully availed myself, both in England 
 and Scotland ; and I have never found a person who did not profess 
 to believe in the strict honesty of the administration in all depart- 
 ments, so far as relates to the expenditure of money. What the 
 facts may he I have no means of knowing, but the belief, or ex- 
 pressed belief, among all classes is universal, that serious corruption 
 does not exist either in the imperial or municipal administration, and 
 I have no reason to question the correctness of this general opinion. 
 I am, very truly yours, EDWARDS PIERREPONT. ' 
 
 Hon. D. B. EATON. 
 
 YIII. The two following letters present the subject from 
 the standpoint of private citizens of the United States, who 
 also liave had rare opportunities of forming a correct judgment : 
 
 NEW YORK, November 7, 1877. 
 
 DEAR SIR : I have received" your favor of the 19th, asking me 
 whether, in my opinion, it was the general belief of the English 
 people, if not their almost universal conviction, that the civil-service 
 administration of England, at least in the customs service, in the 
 inland revenue service, and the post-office department, is efficient, 
 and, as a rule, free from corruption. 
 
 To this inquiry I do not hesitate to give an. affirmative answer. 
 Not that there is no scandal and no abuse. These evils, no doubt, 
 exist in every country to a greater or less extent ; but that there is in 
 England, generally speaking, a pervading fidelity and efficiency, with 
 a corresponding feeling of confidence and satisfaction on the part 
 of the people generally, there can, I think r .bc no question ; and, so 
 far as my observation extends, that confidence is, as a rule, well 
 
 1 At that time Mr. Pierrepont was United States Minister.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 437 
 
 deserved. If I were to particularize any service it would be that of 
 the post-office, for the working of that branch comes more nearly 
 under my observation ; and I do not hesitate to say that it is man- 
 aged with singular efficiency and regard for public convenience, and, 
 so far as I have known, with that freedom from public scandal which 
 is proverbial in the English service. 
 
 Yours faithfully, J. S. MORGAN.' 
 
 D. B. EATON, Esq. 
 
 NEW YORK, Octooer 2o, 1877. 
 
 DEAR SIR : In reply to your letter of the 19th ult. addressed to 
 me in London, I do not hesitate to say that the opinion I have 
 formed of the administration of the civil service of Great Britain is 
 a very favorable one. I consider it vastly superior in all important 
 respects to that of the United States. It could hardly fail to be so, 
 inasmuch as, while in that country the party in power may, and doubt- 
 less does, in getting offices give a preference 2 to its friends, no removals 
 are made on political grounds. With a change of ministry changes 
 take place in a few high offices, but minor offices in all departments 
 of the government are held by their incumbents as long as the duties 
 thereof are properly performed. On what grounds public offices in 
 the United States are filled and vacated is understood by all who 
 have paid any attention to the administration of our civil service. 
 I have spent the most of the time since November, 1870, in London, 
 and I do not think that I have ever heard charges of corruption or 
 complaints of inefficiency against the service in Great Britain. There 
 is undoubtedly, in some departments, too much of routine and of 
 adherence to ancient modes of transacting business ; but I am quite 
 sure that the general administration of the civil services in Great 
 Britain is approved by the intelligent and fair-minded men of both 
 parties, Liberals and Conservatives. 
 
 Very truly yours, II. McCuLLOCH. 3 
 
 D. B. EATON, Esq. 
 
 1 The well-known American banker, formerly member of the house of 
 George .Peabody & Co., and now the 'head of the banking house of J. S. 
 Morgan^ Co!', of London. 
 
 4 This preference, of course, can only take place within those very narrow 
 limits whfcfe;Open;compeUtion has not wholly excluded favoritism prob- 
 ably not extending to five per cent of the clerkships, and only in a qualified 
 form even to those. 
 
 s Late United States Secretary of the Treasury, but for some years past 
 the head of the London banking house of McCuIloch & Co.
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 SOME CONFIRMATION OF VIEWS EXPRESSED. 
 
 American opinions of British administration. Mr. Hewitt on consular 
 systems. American and British consuls in China. Our territorial govern- 
 ments contrasted with the British. Examples of the infidelity of both the 
 great parties to reform. How patriotism and public spirit are impaired. 
 
 PERHAPS the views most likely to be challenged of any ex- 
 pressed in this volume are those to the following effect : 
 
 (1) That the superiority of British administration is so 
 manifest as to be readily seen and admitted by competent and 
 candid observers. 
 
 (2) That our partisan spoils system, no longer a mere de- 
 fect in administration, has really undermined patriotism at 
 home and arrested the growth of republicanism abroad. 
 
 (3) That civil service reform is not merely a mode of pro- 
 cedure and an economy, but has become a vital question of 
 principle and public morality, involving the counterpoise and 
 in no small degree the stability of the government itself. 
 
 Upon the first point, perhaps, any thing beyondwhich is con- 
 tained in Appendix A. is superfluous. A whole chapter might 
 easily be filled with citations in support of the second and 
 third propositions. 
 
 From the mass of evidence, I cite a few opinions from per- 
 sons representing all parties, which seem to go quite beyond 
 any statements in this volume. 
 
 I. ' ' The thorough reform of our civil service would sweep 
 away nearly the whole brood of evils which have so dishonored 
 the government at home and abroad within the last genera- 
 tion ; and our party leaders, and not the masses, have made 
 that service a disgusting system of political prostitution. " 
 International Review, Jan., 1879.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 439 
 
 II. " In the British service, candidates (for consulships) 
 must be examined for admission, and in all cases must under- 
 stand French and the language of the country to which they 
 are assigned for duty. . . Promotions are made for merit and 
 length of service. . . They are never removed for political 
 causes ; nor is it ever intimated, on a change of administration, 
 that they are expected to make room for hungry politicians. 
 They devote themselves for life to the promotion of British 
 trade and commerce. They seek out new avenues for enter- 
 prise. . . If time permitted, I could furnish volumes of evi- 
 dence of the zeal and energy of these missionaries in the cause 
 of British trade. Their reports and the reports of the attaches 
 of the. British legations are models of patient labor and treas- 
 uries of valuable commercial knowledge. . . I need not waste 
 any time in describing how our consuls are appointed, and, 
 with some creditable exceptions, what manner of men they 
 are apt to be. Appointed as a rule for subordinate and often 
 discreditable political services, they usually have no qualifica- 
 tions for the position. They have no permanence of tenure, 
 and hence are often removed just as they have acquired the 
 experience to be useful. The result is that it may almost be 
 affirmed that our consular system as now organized and admin- 
 istered, with its code, offers an impediment rather than an 
 aid to commerce.'''' 1 
 
 Mr. Hewitt also sketches a plan for reform almost iden- 
 tical with the consular system of Great Britain, France, and 
 Germany that system which France, in becoming a republic, 
 shows no disposition to abandon. Of the French system Mr. 
 Hewitt says : 
 
 " A most elaborate scheme of examination is laid down for ad- 
 mission to the permanent consular and diplomatic service. . . " 
 " They must understand two modern languages besides their 
 own." " The examinations include . . international law, di- 
 plomatic history, statistics, political economy, geography, and 
 the languages." "Promotion is made from the lower grades 
 of the entire foreign service." This system he declares has 
 been found so efficient that it has remained unchanged for 
 nearly half a century. 
 
 1 Speech Hon. A. S. Hewitt, H. Rep., llth March, 1878.
 
 440 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIX. 
 
 III. Speaking of the dissatisfaction of American merchants 
 in China with our consular system, a writer who is personally 
 familiar with the facts says : "They contrast, for instance, 
 that of Great Britain, which makes the service so honorable 
 and attractive that entrance thereto is eagerly sought by an 
 excellent class of specially fitted men. . . This system they 
 contrast with one which makes it possible to send a man to per- 
 form commercial, judicial, and almost diplomatic functions 
 among an ancient, formal, oriental people, because he has been 
 an efficient ' worker ' in the primaries of Oshkosh or Yuba 
 Dam. . . Yet our system does not save us money ; for satis- 
 factory establishments at the leading ports, where alone they 
 are needed, would cost less than the present aggregate. . . Our 
 consular system is something 'to make the very gods of 
 solemnity laugh. ' ' 
 
 Surely it is not a matter for argument or doubt, whether the 
 contrast of our political, ill-instructed, shifting consuls, with 
 the experienced and highly-educated officials of the leading 
 monarchical states, in all the commercial ports of the world 
 whether their relative influence upon national commerce, 
 reputation, and honor are or not favorable to our trade, to re- 
 publican institutions, or to American patriotism ? Or, looking 
 to the contrasts presented in the State Departments at home 
 the one system tendering high standards of capacity and attain- 
 ments, the other balancing the pressure of factions and the in- 
 terests of partisan politics is the suggestion and the influence 
 any more favorable to American pride or patriotism ? If 
 our foreign relations whether the part pertaining to com- 
 merce or the part pertaining to the other great subjects of 
 national jealousy and ambition upon either of the continents 
 presented anything like the complications and difficulties with 
 which the British Foreign Office has to deal, our Secretary of 
 Sta{;e would, I venture to think, find it absolutely impossible 
 to:giye the amount of time and thought now wasted upon the 
 miserable negotiations, bargainings, and balancings that attend 
 the selections and appointments of a great portion of the con- 
 suls and not a few of the lower, grade of diplomatic repre- 
 
 1 International Review, April, 1879, pp. 357-359.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN". 441 
 
 sentatives. lie is compelled to listen to importunity, to 
 weigh partisan influence, and to calculate and provide for po- 
 litical consequences every year in connection with the candi- 
 dacy of hundreds of persons for these places, nearly every one 
 of whom would be excluded by the non-partisan tests which 
 are applied by Great Britain, and by every other great and 
 enlightened nation of the world tests of capacity and fitness 
 which are as essential to advance the commerce as they are to 
 maintain the honor of the country and the prestige of repub- 
 lican institutions. 
 
 IV. It would carry me too far and it is quite superfluous 
 to cite authority as to administration at our own doors ; but, 
 by way of bringing into comparison the British and American 
 systems, as applied to dependencies or territories, as to which 
 the facts are perhaps not so familiar to the reader, I cite the 
 following statement from a late article written by the Chief- 
 Justice of the Territory of Montana, 1 who certainly must be 
 familiar with our Territorial system ; and, as a high judicial 
 official, he may be assumed to be candid : 
 
 " Good men are often removed without cause or prov- 
 ocation, to make room for others whose claims are thought 
 to be superior by reason of their services to the party 
 in power, or whose importunity becomes unendurable. . . 
 A swarm of office-seekers besiege the ' White House,' sup- 
 ported by a thousand and one pretended claims and in- 
 fluences ; charges arc made against the distant officer, and 
 he is removed without notice or warning ; the result is that 
 Federal officials are constantly arriving in the Territories and 
 departing from them, until the terms ' pilgrim ' and ' car- 
 pet-bagger,' by which names they are generally known and 
 designated among the people, become natural and appropriate. 
 . . An officer, by the purity of his life and official conduct, be- 
 comes popular with the people. The embryo Senators and 
 members of Congress see danger in the distance. Their rival 
 must be humbled, and the word of one man upon an ex-parte 
 hearing can cause his removal and degradation. This feeling 
 is the parent of many an unjust charge and accusation, where- 
 by the Territories may be kept in a constant broil." 
 1 International Review, March, 1879, p. 003.
 
 442 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIX. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to say that abuses of this character, from 
 the very nature of the British system, cannot happen anywhere 
 in the vast chain of her dependencies, from imperial India down 
 to the smallest island under her flag. And how long do we 
 think her rule could be maintained how many years could we 
 hold India, the Dominion of Canada, the great Australian col- 
 onies, Tasmania, or even such second-class dependencies as 
 Jamaica, New Zealand, Cape Colony, or Ceylon under such a 
 system as we tolerate ? Even the smallest of these secondary 
 dependencies has a population greater, I believe, than the 
 entire white population of all the Territories of the United 
 States combined. 1 
 
 Y. As bearing upon the last of the three points, I cite from 
 a report lately submitted to Congress by a committee, 2 repre- 
 senting one of the great parties, which has just been making 
 extensive investigations : 
 
 1 ' At the end of each four years the entire Federal patronage 
 (amounting to one hundred and ten thousand offices) is col- 
 lected in one lot, and the people divide themselves into two 
 parties, struggling in name to choose a President, but in fact 
 to control this enormous patronage, which the President, when 
 elected, is compelled to distribute to his party because he was 
 elected to so distribute it. The temptation to fraud, to usur- 
 pation, and to corruption, thus created, is beyond calculation. 
 A prize so great, an influence so powerful, thus centralized 
 and put up at short periods, would jeopard the peace and 
 safety of any nation. . . No nation can withstand a strife 
 among its own people, so general, so intense, and so demoral- 
 izing. No contrivance so effectual to embarrass government, 
 to disturb the public peace, to destroy political honesty, and 
 to endanger the common security, was ever before invented. ' ' 
 
 And yet, since that report was adopted, a deliberate removal 
 has been made by that party of officers of the national Senate 
 for political reasons alone one of the most extreme, inde- 
 fensible, and unprecedented acts of partisan proscription to be 
 
 1 Their population is about as follows : Ceylon, 2,500,000; Jamaica, 
 506,000 ; Cape Colony, 700,000 ; New Zealand, 800,000. 
 
 2 Report made by Mr. Potter from the Committee on Alleged Frauds in 
 the late Presidential Election, p. G4, March 3, 1879.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 443 
 
 found in the whole history of the government. 1 In presence 
 of such declarations and such acts, does patriotism, and faith in 
 official life, remain unimpaired ? 
 
 ver against these acts of one party, impartial history must 
 set acts of the other party hardly less discreditable and disas- 
 trous. * 
 
 Acting upon a reform policy recommended in 1870 by a 
 President of its choice, that party in the most formal manner 
 pledged itself to reform the civil service, and holding up 
 that pledge before the people, it carried a national election. 
 The work of reform was entered upon, but while it was going 
 forward, with the good effects set forth in Appendix C., it 
 was suppressed by the party which had started it through a 
 refusal to vote money to carry it forward, although an appro- 
 priation was requested by a special message of the President, 
 April 18th, 1ST4. Such examples might well be discouraging 
 if the reform sentiment had not, after eveiy betrayal, risen 
 yet more powerful to rebuke the folly of those who insulted 
 it, and to thrust aside those who attempted to trample upon it. 
 
 If I have cited these instances of infidelity to pledges and 
 professions, in support of views before expressed, they are not 
 less instructive as showing that here, as has been the fact in 
 England, there is more hope of reform from the Executive than 
 from Congress, and perhaps from the joint influence of the 
 best men of both parties than from either party acting alone. 
 
 In Appendix A. we can learn how little an Englishman 
 finds to place the administration of his country in a repulsive 
 or humiliating attitude before his eyes. But how different is 
 it with us ! What I have cited is but here and there a line 
 from the vast volume of indignation, complaint, lamentation, 
 and disgust, in connection with our administrative methods, 
 
 1 If only the claim of the principal officer removed were involved, I should 
 think that the extreme partisan work in which ha so unbecomingly engaged 
 fully justified his removal. 
 
 2 Having no party ends to save by this volume, and believing that civil 
 service reform is a great cause and interest of the people, which they must 
 carry forward against what is most selfish, corrupt, and partisan in offi- 
 cial life and in each of the great parties, it is no part of my purpose to screen 
 either party, or to point out which party has rendered most service to that 
 cause, or from which it has most to hope in the future.
 
 444 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 which comes from every quarter of the Union, from every 
 grade of life, from every sphere of political action. The vil- 
 lages, the cities, the army posts, the special agencies, the cus- 
 tom-houses, the mayors, the governors, the consulates, the 
 revenue officers, the president in short, public affairs of 
 every nature and officers of every class are involved in dis- 
 trust and are degraded in popular estimation, by reason of the 
 opportunities afforded by a partisan -spoils system of office and 
 the use that is made, or is believed to be made, of these op- 
 portunities. In the formal papers of the President, in the 
 resolutions of conventions, State and National, in debates in 
 the Senate and the House, in reports of committees and of 
 subordinate officers, in our periodical literature, in the speeches 
 and sermons of our thoughtful men, in the press and in com- 
 mon speech of the people, in forms and at times innumerable, 
 we see our administrative system, for such reasons, denounced, 
 and the character, and motives of those who administer it ar- 
 raigned and brought under suspicion. This goes cm from 
 month to month, from year to year, from administration to 
 administration. Can any one undertake to estimate how much 
 it has done to impair confidence in our institutions, to cast 
 suspicion over all official life, to disgust the people with the 
 very name of politics, to drive good men from the polls, to 
 bring republicanism into disrepute both at home and abroad ? 
 And it is because these abuses are known, bringing joy to our 
 enemies and sorrow to our friends in other countries, that we 
 find John Bright using this language in 18T4, at the very 
 moment the then dominant was strangling its oicn reform: 
 "Your proposed reform is a great undertaking. I hope the 
 good sense of your people will enable you to complete it. 
 All the friends of your country in other nations will congratu- 
 late you on your success." Thus far, only the politicians 
 and not the people have dealt with the reform. When the 
 people shall have it fairly before them, need we doubt that 
 Mr. Bright's hopes will be realized ? 
 
 1 See his letter of April, 1874, in Appendix A.
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 CIVIL SERVICE REFORM TJXDER PRESIDENT GRANT. 
 
 The practical results of that experiment. The good effects of the merit sys- 
 tem established. Its defeat caused by patronage monopolists in Congress. 
 Analogous to the first experience in Great Britain. 
 
 IT is a matter of general information, that under President 
 Grant a trial, beginning January 1st, 1872, was made of the 
 merit system in a limited way ; the regulations, competitions 
 and examinations being closely analogous to those so long in 
 practice in Great Britain. 1 hardly need recall the well- 
 known facts that, by reason of the imperfect support given 
 the reform,' of open hostility in various official quarters, and 
 of the damaging examples of official infidelity on the part of 
 some of those connected with the Administration, the new 
 system was placed at a great disadvantage ; but it is important 
 not to forget that, despite all these drawbacks, its good effects 
 clearly appeared, and that they are established by authority so 
 high and direct as not to be open to question. From the re- 
 port of the Civil Service Commission, submitted to President 
 Grant in April, 18T4, 1 it appears that, upon the basis of their 
 own experience and of the reports of their subordinates, the 
 heads of departments the members of the Cabinet ap- 
 proved the language of the report, which stated the following 
 as the results of the trial of the new system that is, of the 
 rules then in force : 
 
 (1) " They have, on an average, where examinations apply, 
 given persons of superior capacity and character to the ser- 
 vice of the government, and have tended to exclude unworthy 
 applicants. 
 
 (2) " They have developed more energy in the discharge 
 
 1 Report, p. 42. 
 29
 
 446 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 of duty, and more ambition to acquire information connected 
 with official functions, on the part of those in the service. 
 
 (3) " They have diminished the unreasonable solicitation 
 and pressure which numerous applicants and their friends, 
 competing for appointments, have before brought to bear 
 upon the departments in the direction of favoritism. 
 
 (4) " They have, especially where competition applies, 
 relieved the heads of departments and of bureaus, to a large 
 extent, of the necessity of devoting, to persons soliciting places 
 for themselves or for others, time which was needed for official 
 duties. 
 
 (5) " They have made it more practicable to dismiss from 
 the service those who came in under the civil service examin- 
 ations, when not found worthy, than it was, or is, to dismiss 
 the like unworthy persons who had been introduced into the 
 service through favor or dictation. 
 
 (6) " They have diminished the intrigue and pressure, be- 
 fore too frequent, for causing the removal of worthy persons 
 for the mere purpose of bringing other, perhaps inferior, per- 
 sons into the service." 
 
 And the Commissioners, at the close of the report, make 
 these statements as to the practical working of the new 
 methods : 
 
 1. " The practicability of fairly conducting examinations 
 as to the qualities to be tested, and of fairly rating the re- 
 sults of competition, and of preserving reliable evidence of 
 the same, has been established. 
 
 2. "It has been demonstrated that competitive examina- 
 tions for entrance to the public service will, besides diminish- 
 ing evil influences in our politics generally, bring a better 
 class of persons into that service and insure more efficiency in 
 administration. 
 
 3. " In regard to promotions, it has been shown that the 
 method of competition may be so united with the exercise of 
 the proper authority of heads of offices or bureaus as to pre- 
 vent the favoritism and discouragements too frequent under 
 the old method of making promotions, and secure more fidel- 
 ity and intelligence in the service.
 
 CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. 447 
 
 6. " To carry on the reform for another year, there is 
 needed an appropriation of $25,000. ..." 
 
 There is no need, nor can the space be spared, to present here 
 even an outline of the decisive evidence by -which the utility 
 of the new system was demonstrated in that report. It is 
 enough to say that on the 18th April, 1874, President Grant 
 sent the report to Congress with a special message in which 
 he says : 
 
 " Herewith I transmit the report of the Civil Service Com- 
 mission. If sustained by Congress, I have no doubt the rules 
 can, after experience gained, be so improved and enforced as 
 to still more materially benefit the public service and relieve 
 the Executive, members of Congress, and the heads of depart- 
 ments from influences prejudicial to good administration. The 
 rules, as they have hitherto been enforced, have resulted bene- 
 ficially, as is shown by the opinions of the members of the 
 Cabinet and their subordinates in the Departments, and in 
 that opinion 1 concur" 
 
 The message concluded by asking for the same appro- 
 priation for the next year that had been made for the pre- 
 vious year. President Grant repeated these views in his 
 annual message of December 7th, 1874, in which he again 
 appealed to Congress for an appropriation. Not even such 
 unquestioned evidence, reinforced by the request of the 
 President, could avail in that Congress. Its members lacked 
 faith in the higher sentiments of the people as much as they 
 desired patronage in their own hands. Party managers clam- 
 ored for spoils. There was a lamentable absence of foresight 
 and statesmanship. The pledges of the past and the promise 
 of the future were sacrificed by a refusal to make the least ap- 
 propriation, and by treating with contempt an experiment for 
 which the party and administrative power were responsible. 
 For a time this refusal in a large measure suppressed the re- 
 form methods. 1 That it did not arrest the reform sentiment, 
 is very clearly shown by the fact that it was an element which 
 
 1 1 say for a time and in large measure, because, though the rules appear to 
 have been formally suspended in some departments, they have hardly any- 
 where lost their influence, and various public officers have since shown so 
 much respect tor the public interests notably Secretary Schurz and Postmas-
 
 448 CIVIL SERVICE IX GREAT BRITAIX. 
 
 exerted a greater influence in the next Presidential election 
 than it had ever exerted upon any previous national canvass. 
 
 "With the members of that Congress directly, but not 
 solely, must rest the responsibility of deserting and arresting 
 a reform to which they were pledged, and of losing, without 
 the least gain, a powerful hold upon the confidence of the na- 
 tion. In noticing this lamentable triumph of personal and 
 partisan selfishness over statesmanship and public faith, we 
 cannot fail to recall the fact that, at near the same time after 
 the first introduction of the merit system into Great Britain, 
 Parliament condemned it by an adverse vote, but its members 
 never (like the members of this Congress ') refused an appro- 
 priation requested by the Executive to carry it on. 
 
 From these facts, we can see that the merit system is just as 
 practicable, and that it bids fair to be as salutary, in this coun- 
 try, as it has been found to be in Great Britain and the other 
 leading nations ; and that its strongest enemies are patronage 
 monopolists in Congress. It is, perhaps, vain to expect that 
 these monopolists or that partisan managers will voluntarily 
 surrender their spoils, or in any way begin a reform ; but is 
 it unreasonable to expect that the people will not much longer 
 tolerate abuses the removal of which is thus proved to be 
 entirely practicable, and which it only needs a firm and clear 
 expression of their wishes to bring about ? 
 
 ter James of New York that they have again put them in force, with the 
 sanction of President Hayes ; and within the last few days they have been, in 
 the same spirit, applied in the Custom-House and in the Naval Office at the 
 City of New York. 
 
 1 It was stated in the public journals at the time, that fifty-one of them, 
 soon after the 4th of March, urged their personal claims for office upon the 
 President, to say nothing of claims innumerable made on behalf of their 
 favorites and henchmen.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Aberdeen, Lord, as a reformer 
 
 175, 185 
 
 Abuses, not original with us 
 
 lie, 21, 23 
 
 not well guarded against in 
 
 Constitution of the United 
 
 States 2, 3 
 
 first, general inquiry into. ... 29 
 early reforms of, in Great 
 
 Britain 4, 5, G 
 
 under feudal system, Clis. II. 
 
 and III., 11 to 43 
 
 under Charles II., and James 
 
 II GO-G8 
 
 under Walpole 91-101 
 
 under George III 102-118 
 
 under George IV 145 
 
 how neglected in United 
 
 States 8,9 
 
 of patronage by members of 
 
 Parliament, 147-149 (sec Pat- 
 ronage). 
 
 as they existed in 1&53. . .183-189 
 brought out by investigation 
 
 of I860 216-222 
 
 of power of nomination. .224, 
 
 225, 231-233, 236 
 
 examples of, in 1873 241, 242 
 
 but corruption not found 
 
 212,245 
 
 in the State Church 267-282 
 
 compared with those of the 
 
 United States 352 
 
 chargeable against both our 
 
 parties 442-441 
 
 See Patronage, Spoils System, 
 
 Bribery, Parliament, Offices, 
 
 Officers, Church. 
 Administration, its importance 
 
 PAGE 
 slow of being understood 
 
 53, 68, 78, 118, 119 
 
 Administration, now a science 
 
 in Great Britain. . .4, 7, 11 c, 123 
 effect of, a change of, upon 
 
 officers 217, 218, note. 
 
 See Merit System, Removals, 
 
 Officers, 
 permanent nature of questions 
 
 as to 4, 11, 424, 425 
 
 danger of neglecting . .4, 426, 427 
 
 in France 330, 439 
 
 grows more difficult and com- 
 plicated 426, 427 
 
 how benefited by new system 
 
 "...7,432 
 
 state of British in 1820. .145-147 
 state of British in 1853. .181-185 
 neglected in the United States 
 and studied in older coun- 
 tries. . . .6, 7, 8, 9, 118, 149, 
 
 175, 416, 417, 418, 422 
 
 and bttter there 420 
 
 British and American systems 
 
 compared 77, 78, 128, 
 
 129, 133-139, 150, 278, 280, 
 
 303, 304 
 American opinions of British 
 
 282,434-444 
 
 its character in 1853 182 
 
 See Chap. XXX., Merit Sys- 
 tem, Spoils System. Parti- 
 san System, Party Govern- 
 ment, Abuses, Patronage, 
 Parliament, Customs Ser- 
 vice, Postal Service, Bribe- 
 ry, Offices, Officers, Sales, 
 Competition, and Examina- 
 tions. 
 Administrative reform. See
 
 450 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Reform and Merit Sys- 
 tem. 
 
 Advowsons, sale of (see Re- 
 ligion and Church). ... 109, 
 
 275, 279 
 
 Allowances, See Superannua- 
 tion. 
 
 Annapolis. See Naval Offices. 
 America, early the victim of 
 the- partisan spoils system 
 
 116-118 
 
 reform and her independence, 
 
 a twin birth 124 
 
 Anne, Queen, her reign 82-88 
 
 touching by for sickness 26 
 
 law of, forbidding officers in- 
 terfering with elections . 85, 
 
 309, 310 
 Appointing power, treated as a 
 
 mere perquisite 39-43 
 
 origin of the theory of its ir- 
 responsibility 47, 48 
 
 slow developement of sound 
 
 views concerning 64 
 
 gained by members of Parlia- 
 ment 84 
 
 the questions presented as 
 
 to 11 
 
 abuses of, prohibited by law 
 
 in Great Britain 132-139 
 
 abuse of, in the Church. .274-277 
 abuse of, in United States 
 
 407-409 
 
 none in members of Parlia- 
 ment 306, 307, 310,313 
 
 responsibility in use of. ..231, 
 
 232, 408, 409 
 
 See Patronage, Removals, 
 Spoils System, Senate, Par- 
 liament, Officers, Competi- 
 tion. 
 Appointments. See Officers and 
 
 Appointing Power. 
 Appropriations. See Supplies. 
 Aristocracy, reform early seen 
 
 to be hostile to 160, 161, 
 
 175, 180, 201, 202, 235, 246 
 
 Assessments, why none in early 
 
 times in Great Britain 43 
 
 practically excluded by Peti- 
 tion of Right 51 
 
 none under Cromwell 5 
 
 nearest approximation to.. 91, 
 
 92, 146 
 
 the injustice of.. . .50, 51, 411-413 
 political, in United States. 410-412 
 
 relation of Senate to 412 
 
 Army offices, venal 48 
 
 proscription in, under James 
 
 II 63, 64,67 
 
 under George III.. . .104, 110, 
 
 111, 121 
 
 purchase of offices in 283-285 
 
 ours follows English prece- 
 dent Ill, note. 
 
 favoritism in our army .... 284-287 
 Australia. See Competition and 
 Examinations. 
 
 B 
 
 Bacon, his corruption 49 
 
 Badeau, General, his opinion.. 434 
 
 Bank of England conducts ex- 
 aminations 321 
 
 Ballot, when secured 291 
 
 Baronets and Titles (see Titles). 
 
 268-270 
 
 Beaconsfield, Lord, overawed by 
 
 reform sentiment 374-375 
 
 Bill of Rights. See Rights. 
 
 Blackstone, Sir William 40, 96 
 
 the theory ot government he 
 describes 40 
 
 Bolingbroke, Lord, originated 
 
 partisan removals. . . .84, 86, 97 
 
 Boy clerks 264, note. 
 
 See Civil Service. 
 
 Borough corruption. 45, 91, 111, 
 
 113, 114 
 
 Boroughs created for political 
 purposes 45 
 
 Bribery under James 1 49 
 
 under Charles II 5, 7
 
 INDEX. 
 
 451 
 
 Bribery under James II 64, 67 
 
 under Queen Aime 86 
 
 under Geo. Ill 106-115, 120 
 
 limited by public opinion 121 
 
 when it began in elections. . 50 
 increased with power of Par- 
 liament 76, 79, 80 
 
 under Walpole 91, 92 
 
 in borough elections Ill, etc. 
 
 See Boroughs. 
 
 prohibited by stringent stat- 
 utes 132-139, 151, note. 
 
 its decline 124 
 
 our laws against, less strin- 
 gent than the British. ..137-139 
 of members,but not of electors, 
 
 ; . . ceased under George IV. .. 145 
 See Patronage, Offices, and 
 Spoils System. 
 
 Bombay, how its health has 
 been improved 292 
 
 Brokerage of Office, see Office 
 and Office Brokerage 132-139 
 
 Bright, John 217 
 
 letter from 433 
 
 his opinions 376, 433, 434 
 
 Bureaucracy, bearing of merit 
 
 system, as to. 199, 200, 214, 215 
 excluded by competition 366 
 
 Burke as a reformer 4, 101, 
 
 118, 122, 272 
 
 Bute, Lord 106, 107 
 
 Cade, Jack 27, 36 
 
 Cadets, selection of, in United 
 
 States 284, 285 
 
 See Army, Military School?, 
 Purchase, Competition, Ex- 
 aminations. 
 
 Cabinet Council, or " The Cabi- 
 net," origin of 74 
 
 original of our Cabinet 76 
 
 how elevated by party gov- 
 ernment 83, 84 
 
 Composition of 73 
 
 Canada, reform in 8, 11 a 
 
 Caricature in times of George 
 
 III 121 
 
 Catholics, disabilities of. 88, 112, 
 
 113, 126 
 See Church, Sacrament, and 
 
 Tests. 
 
 Character, as tested by compe- 
 tition. See Competition, 
 an essential qualification for 
 
 office in U. S . .2, 118 
 
 Ceylon, examinations extended 
 
 to 225 
 
 Charles II. and his system 60-69 
 
 Charters sold and used as spoils 
 
 18,20 
 
 See Spoils System and Abuses. 
 Chatham. See Pitt. 
 Chinese, the reform declared to 
 
 be 196 
 
 Church, the, early abuses in. 41- 
 
 47,48 
 See Church. 
 
 opposed to reform 110 
 
 patronage in 274-279 
 
 its creed a test for office. . 109, 
 
 277, 291 
 
 influence in universities. .110, 125 
 as a political influence. . .267-282 
 See Tests, Religion and Sac- 
 raments. 
 
 Cities, old corruption in. 21, 112-114 
 merit system applicable to 
 
 157, 158, 397 
 
 Civil service, what it embraces 
 in Great Britain. ..143, 315, 
 
 316, 358-360 
 
 what members of regard- 
 ed as political. See Offi- 
 cers. 
 
 publicity as to doings in 264 
 
 See Publicity. 
 
 members of, kindly treated. 
 See Officers. 
 
 boy clerks in 264 
 
 its reform an executive duty 
 
 186-189,405, 406 
 
 See Executive.
 
 45:3 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Civil service, numbers in Brit- 
 ish 217,218 
 
 British and American com- 
 pared. See Administra- 
 tion, 
 importance attached to, in 
 
 Great Britain 216, 217 
 
 numbers admitted to, each 
 
 , year 218 
 
 formerly two classes in.. 235, 246 
 how those in first, elevated in 
 
 condition 130, 320-324 
 
 when those in, disfranchised. 131 
 
 when franchise restored 131 
 
 Bee Abuses, Officers, Adminis- 
 tration, Merit System. 
 Civil service commission, origin 
 
 of, in Great Britain. 203, 204, 208 
 in United States. 405, 406, 446-448 
 report of, in United States. . . 447 
 how duty of, discharged 
 
 209, 215, 265 
 
 speedily become popular.. 209, 431 
 
 judicial character of 210, 265 
 
 general reputation of . . . .210, 265 
 praised by Parliament. . ..211, 215 
 
 annual reports of 213, 235 
 
 authority of, extended. . .229, 261 
 
 examinations for India 249 
 
 refuses private examinations. 321 
 
 general duties of. 264, 265, 394 
 
 full records kept by.. 264, 265, 390 
 its proper sphere in United 
 
 States 393 
 
 Civil service rules, clauses of 
 
 Magua Garta, the first 19 
 
 statute of Richard II. the 
 
 next rules 33, 34 
 
 the third series 71 
 
 the formal rules of 1855.. .204-206 
 
 in the United States 445-448 
 
 President Grant's view of . . . 447 
 Civil service reform. See Re- 
 form, Merit System, Civil 
 Service Commission, Civil 
 Service, Officers, Promotion, 
 Appointments, Parliament, 
 
 Treasury, Postal Service, 
 Examinations, and Customs 
 Service. 
 
 Civil list, first parliamentary in- 
 terference with 120 
 
 under House of Brunswick.. . 272 
 
 that of Queen Victoria 272, 273 
 
 Classes. See Civil Service. 
 Clerks, early extortions of, how 
 
 punished 21 
 
 Commerce, as affected by the 
 
 reform 325, 420, 421, 439-441 
 
 Commission. See Civil Service 
 
 Commission. 
 Competition, various kinds of, 
 
 explained 165-167 
 
 contest for establishing it. 169-1 78 
 limited, ordered in 1855 
 
 204-206, 210 
 
 found practicable at once. . . . 210 
 
 fatal to patronage 242 
 
 first five years of 208-216 
 
 blockheads thrown out by 
 
 209, 210 
 
 elementary and practical edu- 
 cation encouraged by. . 214, 
 
 215, 218, 225, 226, 229, 230 
 open, recommended by in- 
 quiry of 1860 221 
 
 examples of its utility. . .224, 225 
 why preliminary examina- 
 tions required for , . . . 224 
 
 order for open, in 1870. . . 228- 
 
 233, 419, 420 
 principle of open, stated.. 231, 
 
 232, 233 
 
 regulations as to 229 
 
 for clerks in House of Lords.. 236 
 for Clerks of Privy Council 
 
 219,220 
 
 those in authority its natural 
 
 enemies 237, note. 
 
 as affected by inquiry of 1874 
 
 245 
 
 as a test of character 166, 
 
 167, 264, 265 
 in Australia and New Zealand. 260
 
 INDEX. 
 
 453 
 
 Competition for military service. 263 
 See Army and Examinations, 
 how it stimulates education 
 
 204, 205 
 
 See Education. 
 
 first condemned and then 
 approved by. Parliament 
 
 207,211,213 
 
 results of, in India 248, 258 
 
 number who have joined in 
 
 261,205 
 
 in subordinate offices. .. .315, 316 
 its general effects. . .324-326, 
 
 354, 356-358, 365, 416 
 required by great corpora- 
 tions 321, 322 
 
 to what it may be extend- 
 ed 393 
 
 the justice and importance 
 
 of 165-168, 418, 419 
 
 always opposed by officials 
 
 237, note. 
 
 in revenue service 298-301 
 
 in the Treasury 303 
 
 in postal service 308-310 
 
 in State Department 311-312 
 
 results of trial of, in United 
 
 States 446-448 
 
 See X. Y. Post-office, James, 
 Mr., and Examinations. 
 
 Coke, Lord 49 
 
 Collectors, how appointed. .302, 
 
 303, 304 
 
 of London 302 
 
 objectionable tenure of, in 
 
 U. S 413-415 
 
 See Customs Service. 
 Constitution, sources of Ameri- 
 can 2,118 
 
 did not anticipate abuses 2, 3 
 
 Commons, clerks of House of, 
 
 how appointed 314 
 
 See Parliament. 
 Congress, Laws o^, relating to 
 
 Civil Service.'. 138. 405 
 
 what action of useful 
 185-180, 211, 212, 405-414 
 
 Congressmen, how affected by 
 
 the merit system 377, 
 
 378, 394-397 
 
 Confirmation, British Parlia- 
 ment no authority for 77 
 
 closest analogy to Senatorial 
 
 power of 42, 146, 147 
 
 abuses of power of, in the 
 
 United States 42, 413-416 
 
 See Senate and Offices. 
 
 Consuls 237, 312, 421, 439 
 
 in China 440 
 
 See State Department, Cus- 
 toms Service. 
 Coroners, corruptions of, in 
 
 early times 21, 37 
 
 Corporations required to sup- 
 port king's policy , 65 
 
 charters sold for money. . . .49, 50 
 they examine their clerks. 321, 322 
 
 Corporation test acts 125 
 
 See Church, Religion and 
 
 Tests. 
 
 Corruption, the result of patron- 
 age 31 
 
 when greatest in House of 
 
 Lords 70 
 
 disappeared before 1873. .242, 245 
 See Abuses, Parliament, Bri- 
 bery, and Spoils System. 
 Crime, under the spoils system.. 99 
 under the merit system. .291, 
 
 292, 422, 423 
 
 Cromwell's administration. . . .54-59 
 Custom-House Officers, how re- 
 moved by James II 67 
 
 character of British 301 
 
 compared with American. 303, 304 
 See Customs Service. 
 Customs Service under Crom- 
 well 55 
 
 under Geo. Ill 105, 106, 113 
 
 how taken out of politics. 156, 
 
 300-305, 398, 399 
 English and American com- 
 pared 300-305, 383 
 
 in Xew York 448, note
 
 454 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Customs service under partisan 
 
 system 223, 224 
 
 effect of reform upon 389-399 
 
 See Revenue, Collectors, Ex- 
 aminations, Competitions. 
 
 D 
 
 Defalcation. See Peculation, 
 Corruption, Sweden Cus- 
 toms Service, Revenue. 
 
 Democracy. See Republicanism. 
 
 Derby as a ref orm<* . . . 1 75, 202, 217 
 
 Dissenters excluded from office 
 
 109, 113 
 
 See Tests and Church. 
 
 Dismissals. See Removals. 
 
 Disfranchisement. See Civil Ser- 
 vice, Officers, Elections. 
 
 Doctrinaires, early reformers de- 
 nounced as being 10, 196-198 
 
 who really are 203, 371, 372 
 
 Dockyard influence 46 
 
 apprentices now examined. . . 224 
 
 Drunkenness under partisan 
 system 99 
 
 DufFerin, Lord 8, 311, note. 
 
 E 
 
 Economy, bearing of New 
 
 system upon 147, 148, 
 
 149, 158, 238, 239, 240, 242, 293 
 Education encouraged and ad- 
 vanced by merit system 
 161, 190, 196, 201, 202, 214, 
 215, 218, 225, 226, 229, 
 236, 264, 265, 289-291, 
 
 335, 336, 373-376, 432 
 of women. See Women, Ex- 
 aminations and Competition. 
 Effects, general, of the intro- 
 duction of the merit system 
 
 289-340,318-341 
 
 See Merit System. 
 Efficiency of British Service 
 303-305, 298, 299, 308, 402 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Efficiency. See Tenure, Merit 
 
 System, and Promotion. 
 Eldon, Lord, hostile to reform 
 
 125, 126 
 
 Elections, first attacks upon 
 freedom of 23, 28, 45, 46 
 
 freedom of, demanded by 
 Cade's rebellion 36 
 
 corruption of, contested. 86, 89, 90 
 
 freedom invaded by James II. 
 64, 67 
 
 and by Geo. Ill 106 
 
 bill of rights declares their 
 freedom 71, 72 
 
 corruption in boroughs Ill 
 
 See Boroughs. 
 
 false counts and certificates 
 23,64,67 
 
 coerced by press-gangs 114 
 
 districts manipulated and 
 
 gerrymandered 64, 65 
 
 Elections, how freedom of, 
 
 secured.... 85, 130, 131, 309, 310 
 
 not now disturbed by revenue 
 officers 298 
 
 nor by postmasters 85, 309, 310 
 
 voting at, denied officers.. 131, 132 
 
 privilege of voting restored 
 under merit system 131, 132 
 
 same result as to voting in 
 Sweden. See Sweden. 
 
 British and American senti- 
 ment and laws as to free- 
 dom of, compared.. 136, 137-139 
 
 late protection of. in United 
 States 11 c, note. 
 
 effect of merit system upon 
 
 391,409,410 
 
 Elective officers, cause of their 
 increase in United States 
 
 399, 400 
 
 Eliot, Sir John, as a reformer. 
 
 50,58 
 
 Examinations, fisst introduced 
 
 146, 157, 158, 351, 446 
 
 their early effect 158 
 
 imitated in United States. 160, 164
 
 INDEX. 
 
 455 
 
 Examinations aroused great op- 
 position 160, 161 
 
 various kinds pass, limited 
 and open competition ex- 
 plained 162-167 
 
 denounced as cbimerical 196 
 
 of women. See Women. 
 
 elementary and practical sub- 
 jects of .. .208, 214, 215, 218, 
 
 225, 226 
 of letter-carriers and sorters 
 
 213, 224,236, 308 
 
 pass, not wholly superseded 
 
 in 1855 211 
 
 early extended to Ireland, 
 
 Scotland and Malta 210, 214 
 
 numbers rejected on 213 
 
 favor schools. . .214, 215, 218, 
 
 225, 226, 236 
 See Education, 
 great numbers examined. 21 8, 
 
 226, 265 
 recommendations as to, in 
 
 1860 221 
 
 in Australia and New Zea- 
 land 260 
 
 introduced for Ceylon and 
 
 Mauritius 225 
 
 not claimed to be infallible. . 201 
 those introduced in 1855. .204, 205 
 
 subjects of 208 
 
 marking and grading of at- 
 tainments 208, 209 
 
 stimulated education. See Ed- 
 ucation. 
 
 for private purposes refused.. 321 
 to what places to be extend- 
 ed !.. 339 
 
 on the part of great corpora- 
 tions 321,322 
 
 need of being uniform 406 
 
 for India 177-180, 249-254 
 
 preliminary, introduced. ...174 
 
 223, 224 
 
 for military schools 234, 263 
 
 better men secured by 263 
 
 See Competition. 
 
 Executive, authority and duty 
 to make reforms.. ..186-189, 
 
 203, 394, 405, 406, 446, 447 
 not aggrandized by merit sys- 
 tem. .158, 230, 231, 395, 396, 405 
 Expense, urged against reform 
 
 in Great Britain 200 
 
 Extortion, examples of... 22, 28, note. 
 See Spoils System. 
 
 Favoritism first limited by 
 
 Cromwell 54 
 
 in the army 283-287 
 
 made disgraceful by public 
 
 sentiment.211, 213, 226, 261, 263 
 See Patronage. 
 Fees. See Extortion. 
 Feudal administration. See Ch. 
 II. and Chap. III. pp. 12 
 and 39. 
 
 Feudal system, origin of spoils 
 system in. Chap. III. p. 39. 
 
 Fox, as a reformer 124 
 
 France, offices salable in 24 
 
 her administrative system.339, 439 
 Freedom, early sale of, to serfs.. 28 
 See Elections. 
 
 G 
 
 Gambling, under old spoils sys- 
 tem ICO 
 
 Gaugers, formerly arbitrarily 
 
 removed 105 
 
 now specially instructed 302 
 
 Geo. III., his system 102, 349 
 
 George IV., administration un- 
 der. Chap. XII., pp. 144- 
 154. 
 
 Gerrymandering, origin of. .... 65 
 
 Gladstone, W. E., his declara- 
 tion as to patronage. ...303, 304 
 as a reformer 359 
 
 Good behavior made the tenure 
 
 of judges 71, 72 
 
 See Tenure and Removals.
 
 456 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Good Parliament 29 
 
 Grant, Ex-Pres., reform under 
 
 445-448 
 
 commends the civil service 
 rules 447 
 
 Great Britain. See Civil Ser- 
 vice, Commerce, Republi- 
 canism, Patriotism, Merit 
 System, Offices, Examina- 
 tions, Parliament, Competi- 
 tion. 
 
 Granville, Lord, as a reformer 
 214, note, 352, 353, 859 
 
 Grey, Lord, surrenders patron- 
 age. ..> 153 
 
 H 
 
 Hampden 51 
 
 Heads of departments... . . .218, note. 
 
 See Officers. 
 
 Helps, Arthur, his theory. . .219, 267 
 Hereditary, offices tended to be- 
 come 10,17,43 
 
 See Offices. 
 
 Hewitt, Hon. A. S., liis views. . 439 
 Honors. See Titles. 
 Honesty. See Abuses, Pecula- 
 tion, and Corruption. 
 
 Hoppin, Mr., his opinion 435 
 
 Holy alliance 332 
 
 Hume, Joseph, as a reformer 
 159, note. 
 
 India, laws to elevate her civil 
 
 service 139-141 
 
 specimen of their remarkable 
 
 stringency 141-143 
 
 magnitude of her administra- 
 tion 10,254-257 
 
 examinations for. 177-1 80, 249-254 
 competitions for service in. 177-180 
 
 and its results 248-258,292 
 
 Influence not relied on. .271, 301, 303 
 See Promotions, Competition, 
 
 Merit System, Appointing 
 Power and Patronage. 
 Inquiry, the first commission of, 
 
 into abuses 29 
 
 See Investigations. 
 International effects of merit 
 
 system, 317, etc. 
 Internal Revenue administra- 
 tion 296-300 
 
 See Revenue. 
 Investigations, the first made. .. 29 
 
 demanded by Eliot 58 
 
 those made about 1848 326, 327 
 
 several within few years last 
 
 past 181, 214, 216, 238, 244 
 
 their thoroughness 238 
 
 they show growth of reform 
 
 sentiment 243 
 
 Ireland, corruption in :112, 113 
 
 bribes on union with 120 
 
 sale of offices in 134 
 
 religion made an official test 
 in.. ,. 113 
 
 James I., his system 47,50 
 
 II., his system CO-69 
 
 James, Th. L., his action as 
 postmaster... 236, 308, 309, 
 
 447, 448 
 Jackson, Ex-Pres., his theory 
 
 like Cromwell's 55, 56 
 
 his theory really that of feu- 
 dal lords .'..41,42 
 
 Jeffreys 47-63, 68 
 
 Jews, their disability 126 
 
 Judiciary, British, character of 
 
 292, 422 
 
 Judges formerly bought their 
 
 offices 18 
 
 allowed to sell clerkships. ... 17 
 
 arbitrary removals of 67 
 
 tenure during good behavior.. 71 
 
 Junius 121 
 
 Justice, feudal administration 
 of 19,20,48,49
 
 INDEX. 
 
 457 
 
 Justice, Low improved in later 
 
 years 292,422 
 
 how promoted by reform 
 
 379, 380,395 
 
 Juptices. taking gifts by 22 
 
 required to know the law. ... 19 
 
 K 
 
 King, liis power in feudal times.. 25 
 liealing the sick by, a political 
 power 25, 26 
 
 Knighthood as a political influ- 
 ence. . . .267-270 
 
 Lawyers, deceptions by, early 
 
 punished 22 
 
 Laws, what new ones desirable 
 to promote reform.. 186-189, 
 
 211, 212, 405-414 
 English more comprehensive 
 and stringent than Ameri- 
 can 132-141 
 
 Lay patronage. See Patronage. 
 Letters opened by partisan offi- 
 cials 115 
 
 of various persons, appendix 
 
 429, etc. 
 
 carriers of. See Postal Ser- 
 vice, London, New York, 
 and Examinations. 
 Licenses, brought under spoils 
 
 system 67 
 
 Limited competition. Sf.e Com- 
 petition and Examinations. 
 
 Liverpool, collector of 302 
 
 Lords, several, surrender their 
 
 patronage 156, 414 
 
 London, postal service in 308 
 
 School-Board 3J9 
 
 crime in, formerly and now 
 
 98, 100, 289, 290, 292 
 Lords, House of, mcst corrupt, 
 inlG88.. 70 
 
 Lords, House of, clerks selected 
 
 by competition 237-314 
 
 several, surrender patronage 
 and engage in reform. See 
 Liverpool, Qranville, Pitt, 
 Kockingham, Grey, Derby, 
 Richmond, Aberdeen, and 
 Palmerston. 
 
 Lotteries, part of spoils system 
 
 100, 107 
 
 Lower classes favored by re- 
 form 161, 190, 214, 215, 218 
 
 See Poor and Education. 
 
 M 
 
 Macclesfield, Lord 91 
 
 Magna Carta, significance of 
 
 clauses of 19 
 
 contains earliest Civil Service 
 
 Rules 19 
 
 Mann, Horace. See Prelimi- 
 nary note. ' 
 
 Markings, of qualification, 208, 209 
 See Examinations. 
 
 Marshalls, corruption of 21 
 
 Marvel as a reformer 57 
 
 McCulloch, letter of 437 
 
 Members. See Patronage, Con- 
 gress, and Parliament. 
 Merit begins to be better test 
 
 than opinions 33, 126, 147 
 
 See Merit System, Promo- 
 tion, Examinations, Compe- 
 tition. 
 
 Merit System, meaning of 161 
 
 as applied by statute of Rich- 
 ard II 33, 34 
 
 enabled officers to be re- en- 
 franchised 131, 132 
 
 the first introduction of some 
 
 elements of 150-158 
 
 founded in justice.. .226, 227, 
 
 363, 372, 373, 379, S80 
 investigation for its introduc- 
 tion in 1853. . ..181-194
 
 458 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Merit System, a triumph over 
 aristocratic as well as base 
 
 elements 174-176 
 
 opposition made to 192, 220 
 
 Low received, on its first in- 
 troduction 193-203 
 
 form it took in 1855 204-206 
 
 first five years' experience of 
 
 208-215 
 
 why it became popular. ..209, 
 
 210, 211, 215 
 
 first condemned and then sup- 
 ported by Parliament.. 207, 
 
 211, 213 
 
 favorable to popular educa- 
 tion and justice 190-194, 
 
 196, 201, 202, 214, 215, 218, 
 
 225, 226, 227, 322, 324, 432 
 two classes of officers at first 
 
 235, 246 
 
 results of, in India 248-258 
 
 its practical operation since 
 
 1875 259-265, 324, 432 
 
 in New Zealand and Australia 260 
 its effects in the great depart- 
 ments 296-316 
 
 its economical effects 147, 
 
 148, 149 
 See Economy. 
 its application to minor offices 
 
 315, 316 
 
 social, moral, and internation- 
 al effects of 317, etc. 
 
 brought in better class of 
 
 men 322-324 
 
 its final triumph 355-358 
 
 effect on parties.. 364, 365, 366, 432 
 opposition to be expected. .236, 370 
 
 experience in its favor 370-373 
 
 See Sweden, Prussia, and 
 France. 
 
 is firmly established 374-378 
 
 ail opposition has ceased in 
 
 Great Britain 430 
 
 adapted to our institutions.378, 379 
 its probable effect in United 
 States 385,388-401 
 
 Merit System, how and to what 
 to be applied in United 
 
 States 393-395 
 
 effect on promotions. ..400, 401, 432 
 See Education, Schools, and 
 Promotions. 
 
 permanence of 374, 375 
 
 opinions of Trevelyan and 
 
 Bright 430-433 
 
 general effects of, as already 
 applied in U. S. Appendix A. 
 
 429-437, 445-448 
 
 partial application of, in New 
 
 York 33, note. 
 
 under President Grant. . . 445-448 
 
 Mill, J. S. , hia views 199, 287 
 
 Military offices, venal 48 
 
 See Spoils System, Removals, 
 
 Army. 
 
 schools. See Sandhurst, 
 Woolwich, Examinations, 
 Army. 
 
 Money Orders. Sue Postal Ser- 
 vice. 
 Monarchy made stronger by 
 
 reform 328, 332, 337 
 
 See Republicanism. 
 
 Monopolies sold 18, 49, 50 
 
 Monopoly of patronage by mem- 
 bers of Parliament 155 
 
 See Patronage and Parliament, 
 of nominations, how defeated 
 
 by competition 165, 166 
 
 See Competition. 
 Moral sense impaired by corrup- 
 tion in early times 23 
 
 in time of Walpole. .85, 93, 97, 99 
 effects of merit system upon 
 
 317, etc.. 357, 359 
 
 Morality, public, in Great Brit- 
 ain as compared with United 
 States. . .357-359, 375, 422, 423 
 in politics impaired in the 
 United States . 375-377, 413, 
 
 414, note. 
 
 See Peculation, Corruption, 
 Abuses, Spoils System.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 459 
 
 Moran, Mr., his views 435 
 
 Morgan, J. S., letter from 436 
 
 Muudella, Mr., Lis statement.. . 310 
 
 N 
 
 Naval officers 263, 285, 287, note. 
 
 engineers examined 224 
 
 Nepotism, examples of 93, 
 
 110, note, 275, note. 
 Newcastle, the Duke of . ..87, 95, 97 
 
 New York Custom-House 448 
 
 tee Custom Service. 
 New York Postal Service. . .308, 309 
 See James. 
 
 North, Lord 108, 117, 122 
 
 New Zealand. See Competitions 
 
 and Examinations 
 
 Nominations, bad ones made by 
 members of Parliament. 224- 
 
 227, 231-233, 261, 262 
 monopoly of, defeated by com- 
 petition 165, 166, 228 
 
 right to make became val ue- 
 
 less 228 
 
 See Appointing Power, Parlia- 
 ment, and Competition. 
 New System, meaning Merit 
 
 System, which see. 
 Northcote, Sir Stafford, his re- 
 port of 1853 181, 217, 238 
 
 Officers, the subordinate, meni- 
 als in feudal times 83 
 
 first exclusion from Parlia- 
 ment 72 
 
 interesting statute of Richard 
 
 II. as to 33 
 
 proscription on account of 
 opinions under Georpe III. 
 
 105,113, 114 
 
 disfranchised 130, 131 
 
 reinfranchised in 1868 131 
 
 excessive numbers 146-149 
 
 -Sec Placemen. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Officers begin to be paid sala- 
 ries 130 
 
 are recognized by law 130 
 
 tenure of, and its effects.. 294- 
 
 296, 367, 369 
 
 what officers are political and 
 liable to go out with a par- 
 ty .80, note, 81, 145-146, 147, 
 155, 218, 303, 306, 365, 393, 394 
 
 their pride and self-respect in 
 Great Britain. 240, 241, 294-296 
 
 their social influence improved 
 by the reform. 146, 240, 319-324 
 
 two classes of, at first 235, 246 
 
 importance of their character 
 419-4H 
 
 increase of elective, in U. S., 
 under spoils system 399, 400 
 
 numbers of, in the public ser- 
 vice 
 
 their salaries. See Salaries 
 and Economy. 
 
 now better treated in Great 
 Britain than in United 
 States.. 142, 143 240, 294- 
 
 296, 383, 384 
 
 opinions as tests for, yield to 
 merit 126 
 
 See Tests, Army, Appointing 
 Power, Removals, Exami- 
 nations, Competition, Merit 
 System. 
 Offices, a feudal perquisite. .13, 
 
 14-17, 39-43 
 
 early made merchandise 15 
 
 sale of. See Sale. 
 
 tend to become hereditary 
 16,17,43 
 
 why not arbitrary removals 
 from, in feudal times 16, 48 
 
 bought back by government. . .17 
 
 rented 19, 20 
 
 sale and brokerage of, prohib- 
 ited 132 
 
 sale of recommendations, con- 
 firmations, or appointments 
 for, prohibited by law. .132-136
 
 460 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Offices, dignity of, advanced by 
 
 the reform. . . .320, 322, 401, 402 
 
 are trusts 324, 379, 381 
 
 proper conception of 363, 
 
 364, 379, 381 
 
 the right of, or the basis of 
 claim to hold.. 357-359, 363, 
 
 364, 372, 373, 379, 380 
 tenure of. . .366-369, 413, 432, 433 
 See Tenure, 
 chances of the poor to gain 
 
 improved 190, 192, 324, 
 
 379, 380 
 See Poor, 
 too many elective, and why 
 
 399, 400 
 
 responsibility of 357-359, 408 
 
 right of removal from, given 
 
 by statute 43 
 
 See Removals, Officers, Tests, 
 Appointing Power.Confirm- 
 ations, Merit System, Sale, 
 Competition. 
 
 Office Brokerage 132-139 
 
 See Office. 
 
 Official records formerly secrets 20 
 now their publicity a right 
 
 264, 373, 375,390 
 
 life at lowest stage in 1688. . 69 
 life has risen in later years. 
 See Moral Sense, Public Opin- 
 ion, and Officers. 
 Opinion. See Public Opinion. 
 Open competition. See Compe- 
 tition. 
 
 Orders 269 
 
 See Titles. 
 Order in council for competition 
 
 in 1855 204 
 
 in 1870... ..228-233 
 
 Palmerston, Lord, sustained re- 
 form policy. ..... .202, 203, 223 
 
 had to yield to his commis- 
 sion. .' . 209 
 
 Pardons sold and used as 
 
 spoils 18,28,45, 61 
 
 Parliament without patronage 
 
 in early times 31 
 
 and then engages in reforms.. 30 
 
 first appoints officers 31, 50 
 
 placemen early in 45 
 
 See Placemen. 
 
 boroughs created to make 
 
 members 45 
 
 members formerly as depen- 
 dent as clerks now are. .45, 
 
 46, 61, 66, 67 
 
 noble protest 66 
 
 in time of Charles II 62 
 
 in time of James II 66-68 
 
 applies theological tests 62 
 
 how its power over civil ser- 
 vice and patronage in- 
 creased 74, 75, 79, 80, 
 
 128, 129, 145, 347 
 
 placemen excluded from.. . .71, 72 
 failed to arrest corruption. ... 87 
 proceedings of, kept secret 
 
 89, 115 
 
 grasps authority and patron- 
 age 50, 84, 90, 114-120 
 
 placemen increase in. 104, 113, 124 
 See Placemen. 
 
 its members protected corrup- 
 tion in boroughs 114 
 
 became in itself a source of 
 
 corruption 87, 96, 97, 98 
 
 Parliament humbled by the 
 
 higher public opinion, ..124, 125 
 effect of losing patronage. . . . 431 
 
 pensioners excluded 71 
 
 how members abused their 
 
 patronage 85, 147-149 
 
 See Patronage. 
 
 its monopoly of patronage be- 
 coming obnoxious 155 
 
 how members opposed compe- 
 tition 166 
 
 contest of members for pat- 
 ronage against competition 
 
 . .169-176
 
 INDEX. 
 
 461 
 
 Parliament, reasons why patrcn- 
 age is injurious to members 
 and to the nation 169-176 
 
 patronage of members in 18-13 
 182-184 
 
 members hostile to merit sys- 
 tem, and the reason for 
 it 190-193, 224, 353 
 
 condemned the new system in 
 1855 207 
 
 approved new system in 1856 
 and 1857 211, 212,213 
 
 and in 1859 215 
 
 investigation by, in 1860. .216-222 
 
 bad nominations made by 
 
 members of 224-227, 
 
 231, 233, 201 
 
 no part in introducing the 
 merit system in 1870. . .203, 
 
 204, 228 
 
 nominations by members con- 
 demned and taken away 
 231-233,298-313 
 
 how its officers and clerks are 
 now appointed 313-316 
 
 members now no patronage 
 
 298-313 
 
 Parliamentary government, or- 
 igin and meaning of. .74, 80, 83 
 
 See Party Government. 
 Pass-Examinations 157, 138, 183 
 
 See Examinations. 
 Parties, origin of 74, 346 
 
 See Party Government, Par- 
 tisan System, Patronage. 
 
 an advance in government 
 and liberty 83, 84 i 
 
 something like under Crom- 
 well 53,56 
 
 attempt to govern without 
 73, 82, 104 
 
 their relation to reform. . .207, 
 
 211-213, 215, 441-444 
 
 See Party Government. 
 Party government, meaning of. 74, 80 
 
 not the same as the partisan 
 
 system 74, 75, 83 
 
 30 
 
 Party government, its origin 
 
 71-74, 346 
 
 its good features 74, 83, 84 
 
 failed to elevate politics. .87, 347 
 
 analogy to, under Cromwell 
 53,56 
 
 its oppressive measures 89 
 
 attempts to dispense with. 
 82,104 
 
 early years of its trial. 93, 98-101 
 
 in Wai pole's time 92 
 
 its condition when George III. 
 began his reign 102 
 
 became less corrupt but 
 more prescriptive under 
 George IV 145 
 
 the bearing of open compe- 
 tition and the merit sys- 
 tem upon 231, 232 
 
 its true sphere 231, 232 
 
 Party government has gained 
 by new system. . .291, 364, 3C5 
 
 patronage thought to be es- 
 sential to 192, 193 
 
 patronage found not essential 
 to. . .'..33, 169-176, 232, 384-386 
 
 See Patronage. 
 
 Partisan system in spirit first 
 applied by Cromwell 53, 50 
 
 its origin and meaning. . .75, 
 
 347, 348 
 
 its merits 83, 84 
 
 its early effects 79-81 
 
 in full force in Parliament 
 128,129 
 
 failed to raise administra- 
 tion 87, 352 
 
 of removals began with Bo- 
 lingbroke 86 
 
 degrades religion and moral- 
 ity 98-101 
 
 is a perversion of party gov- 
 ernment 74, 75, 83 
 
 employed spies and press- 
 gangs 113, 114 
 
 how it grew out of party 
 government 74, 75, 128
 
 462 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Partisan system, not much cor- 
 ruption in, after George IV. 145 
 its evils becoming under- 
 stood 152-154 
 
 being undermined by pub- 
 lic opinion 153 
 
 desperate efforts to save it 
 
 151-154 
 
 begins to give way and to 
 
 be deserted 155, 158, 159 
 
 generally prevailed in 1853. . . 183 
 vain attempts to make it ac- 
 ceptable 185 
 
 how superseded in 1870 by 
 
 open competition 231, 232 
 
 ceased to prevail. . . .246, 247, 
 
 358-388 
 
 some benefits from 347 
 
 final results of, injurious... 364, 365 
 Patriotism, as affected by abuses 
 
 and reforms 325- 
 
 331, 338, 340, 343 
 See Republicanism. 
 Patronage, meaning of, 87, note, 
 
 and 275, note. 
 when Parliament bad little. .. 31 
 
 under William III 79 
 
 origin of theory that parties 
 
 prosper by 42, 84, 86, 97 
 
 origin of the senatorial theory 
 
 by senators 42 
 
 early tended to corruption. ... 85 
 
 as used by Cromwell 55, 56 
 
 used to keep party in power... 85 
 becomes more partisan under 
 
 George III 128 
 
 secresy of 153 
 
 when and how secured by 
 members of Parliament. .31, 
 74, 75, 79, 80, 128, 129, 145, 
 
 233, 347 
 how abused by members of 
 
 Parliament 85, 114, 147-150 
 
 held tenaciously against a 
 
 frowning public opinion. 152-154 
 increased by party government 74 
 "Patronage Secretary". . .153, 183 
 
 Patronage, accounts kept of. ... 154 
 surrendered by eminent states- 
 men 156, 157,202, 380, 383 
 
 See Lords. 
 
 abandoned in cities 158 
 
 its great contest with compe- 
 tition 169-176 
 
 its condition in 1853 182, 184 
 
 destroyed by competition. .228, 
 
 242, 259-265, 313 
 
 in the State Church 275-283 
 
 See Church. 
 
 as applied in the army. . . .283-287 
 
 its growth in the United 
 
 States 284-287 
 
 in the American army 284-287 
 
 how excluded from the de- 
 partments in Great Britain 
 
 296-316 
 
 its failure as a power. 228, 352, 
 
 353, 364 
 indefensible on principle 
 
 364, 365 
 See Right. 
 
 injurious to members of legis- 
 lature 364, 397, 431 
 
 members ashamed of it.. .228, 431 
 not essential to parties, and its 
 
 decay 384-388, 397 
 
 none now possessed by mem- 
 bers 231-233, 298-313 
 
 members glad to be rid of 
 
 228,431 
 
 abolition of, beneficial 431, 432 
 
 injurious to a party.. .384-388, 
 
 396, 397 
 
 ended by order of 1870 228 
 
 See Parliament, Spoils Sys- 
 tem, Merit System. 
 Peculation, present extent of 
 
 299,303,304 
 
 See Sweden. 
 Peel, Sir Robert, as a reformer 
 
 126, 156 
 
 Pelham 95 
 
 Pensions, used to bribe 113 
 
 as a political influence. . ..270-273
 
 INDEX. 
 
 463 
 
 Pensioners excluded from Par- 
 liament 71 
 
 See Placemen and Parliament. 
 Perquisites, office and the ap- 
 pointing power treated as 
 
 13, 16, 17, 44 
 
 See Sale, Patronage, Spoils 
 
 System. 
 Pierrepont, Hon. Edwards, his 
 
 views and letters 436 
 
 Petition of right, its demand ... 50 
 Pitts, the, as reformers. . . .4, 94, 
 
 95, 97, 101, 102, 122, 123 
 
 letters of, opened 115, 122 
 
 Pigott, case of 374 
 
 Placemen early in Parliament.. 45 
 
 under Cromwell k 55 
 
 under Charles 62 
 
 under Walpole 92 
 
 under Geo. Ill 124 
 
 excluded from Parliament. .71, 72 
 See Parliament. 
 
 Plantagenets, their reign 15, 39 
 
 Playfair, Sir Lyon 244 
 
 Poor, the, gainers by the merit 
 system... 16 1, 167, 190, 192, 
 214, 215, 334, 334, 335, 379, 380 
 See Education, Merit System, 
 Examinations, Competition. 
 Politics, extent of, in public ser- 
 vice 289,299, 300, 301, 
 
 305-308, 310, 311 
 See Competition, Customs Ser- 
 vice, Postal Service, Exam- 
 inations, Promotions, and 
 Merit System. 
 Political officers, who are, and 
 
 meaning of 218, note. 
 
 See Officers. 
 
 Political Assessments. Sse As- 
 sessments. 
 Postal service, when used for 
 
 partisan purposes 115 
 
 those in, forbidden to engage 
 
 in elections 85, 310 
 
 its present condition 307- 
 
 310, 398 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Postal service, postmasters 
 
 306,307, 398 
 
 competition in 308, 310 
 
 no politics in 309, 310 
 
 that of London and New 
 
 York compared 308, 402 
 
 letter-carriers and sorters ex- 
 amined 213, 224, 236, 308 
 
 those in, the last protected 
 from arbitrary removals 
 
 146,218 
 
 money order system and sav- 
 ings banks 3C9 
 
 See James. 
 
 Postmasters. See Postal Ser- 
 vice. 
 
 Potter, Hon. C. N., his report. . 442 
 Practical qualifications secured. 
 See Competition and Ex- 
 aminations. 
 
 Preliminary examinations. See 
 Examinations. 
 
 Presentations, sale of. 275, 279 
 
 See Religion and Church. 
 President. See Executive. 
 Press, the, censure and coercion 
 
 of 89, 115,116 
 
 becomes a great power 107, 
 
 116, 122, 195, note. 
 
 becomes free 144 
 
 Press-gangs used as a politi- 
 cal force 114 
 
 Prisons, conditions under spoils 
 
 system 100 
 
 Privy Council, its ancient power 73 
 largely superseded by the 
 
 Cabinet 74 
 
 order of, in 1855 and 1870 
 
 203,228 
 
 competition for appointing its 
 
 clerks 219, 220 
 
 Probation, meaning of 168, 183 
 
 part of merit system 229, 
 
 230, 264 
 
 in its latest form 264 
 
 Promotions, surrender of pat- 
 ronage as to. See Patron-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 age, Granville, and Liver- 
 pool. 
 
 Promotions, general practice as 
 to, under merit system 
 26i, 2J8, 801, 806, 882, 883, 
 
 400, 401, 432, 439, 446 
 
 to fill collectorahips 302, 303 
 
 effects of promotion for merit 
 303, 320, 322, 382, 383, 432, 
 
 439, 446 
 
 careful regulations to secure 
 justice and reward merit 
 
 220,264, 302, 303 
 
 Proscription by James II 65-68 
 
 noble protest against 65, 66 
 
 general, started by high 
 
 Tories 86 
 
 by reason of opinions 113, 114 
 
 See Removals, Tests, Religion, 
 
 Spoils System, Army. 
 Prosecution of authority. See 
 Sale, Offices, Perquisites, 
 Spoils System, Patronage, 
 Tests. 
 Public opinion, none in early 
 
 times 14,32,45 
 
 when it first showed itself 
 14, 32, 37 
 
 its increasing power 84, 85 
 
 overthrows an administration 107 
 under George III., overawed 
 
 him 103, 121-125 
 
 overthrows Parliament. . .124, 125 
 threatens the partisan system 153 
 becomes a controlling power 
 
 143, 152-154, 159, 160, 
 
 226, 246, 355 
 
 rapid changes in 331, 374, 375 
 
 now supports the merit sys- 
 tem 321, 374, 375, 377 
 
 comparative moral standard 
 of, in Great Britain and 
 
 United States 373-375, 
 
 421, 424 
 
 overawes the Disraeli minis- 
 try 374,375 
 
 how partisan system has low- 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ered our standard in politics 
 
 374-377, 413, 414, note. 
 
 Publicity required as to appoint- 
 ments, etc., 264, 373-375, 
 
 389, 390, note. 
 See Civil Service. 
 Public service. See Civil Ser- 
 vice, Postal Service, Rev- 
 enue Service, Army Ad- 
 ministration. 
 Prussia, her reforms and reform 
 
 policy 6,335-337 
 
 Purchase, in the State Church. 
 See Church and Religion, 
 in the Army and Church 
 
 283-285 
 
 See Army, Church and Pat- 
 ronage. 
 
 Pym represents the reform sen- 
 timent 50 
 
 Q. 
 
 Quarrels, private, settled for 
 
 money 20 
 
 Queen Anne. See Anne. 
 
 R. 
 
 Rebellion, to bring about re- 
 form 26, 27,31, 35,36 
 
 Recommendation for office. See 
 
 Offices and Sale, 
 merit system excludes them. 
 See Merit System, Patronage, 
 Examinations. 
 
 Reform, aim of 205, 206 
 
 first great effort for 30 
 
 demanded by Cade's and Ty- 
 ler's rebellions 35, 36 
 
 the cause of the common peo- 
 ple 24,25, 35 
 
 spirit and aim of.. 11 c, 14, 16, 
 
 50, 266, 358-360 
 condition when it began in 
 
 England 24 
 
 its first great representatives. 50
 
 INDEX. 
 
 465 
 
 Reform under Cromwell 54 
 
 defeated by rashness 79 
 
 reasons for confidence in.. .370-3 74 
 extent to which it lias been 
 
 carried 315, 310 
 
 See Merit System and Civil 
 
 Service. 
 
 in India. See India, 
 its friends the friends of 
 
 America 118 
 
 victory over George III., 121, 
 
 and over Parliament 125 
 
 See Parliament. 
 
 patronage the great obstacle 
 
 to 128,129 
 
 See Patronage. 
 
 bill of 1832, and the effort it 
 
 cost 150,152, 2G8 
 
 why more difficult in Great 
 
 Britain than in U. S 23, 
 
 24-27, 31-41, 57-59, 114- 
 
 119, 101, 193, 340, 341, 
 
 378, 381 
 demand for, concentrated 
 
 against the monopoly of 
 
 members of Parliament... 155 
 a question for the people... 30, 
 
 37, 38, 151, 165, 160, 169, 
 
 207, 231, 315, 316, 358-360, 431 
 not so much a party as a moral 
 
 question 159, 160, 202, 
 
 203, 441-444 
 
 its scope and meaning 315, 
 
 316, 358-360 
 limits aristocratic monopoly 
 
 190, 196, 200, 201 
 
 See Education. 
 
 denounced as Utopian and 
 
 Chinese 196 
 
 order for in 1855 204 
 
 radical measures to be avoided 
 
 at first 205, 206, 370, 374 
 
 effects of, set forth 289-340 
 
 has elevated government.322- 
 
 326, 358-360 
 conclusion reached as to, in 
 
 Great Britain 363-367 
 
 Reform, how far it already ex- 
 tended. See Merit System 
 and Civil Service, 
 how much to be attempted at 
 
 first 421 
 
 few friends of, at first 193, 430 
 
 relation of parties to 159, 
 
 160, 441-444 
 
 under President Grant 445-448 
 
 opposed as too expensive. . . . 200 
 executive authority and duty 
 
 to make 186-189, 394 
 
 405, 406, 446, 447 
 See Executive, 
 our ignorance and neglect of, 
 
 in other countries 4, 6 
 
 very great, made in Europe. 6, 7 
 Sea France, Prussia, and Swe- 
 den, 
 how to be carried on. .10, lie, 203 
 
 in Canada 8 
 
 scope and spirit of civil ser- 
 vice 9, 359, 360, 
 
 378-388 
 
 See Merit System, Republi- 
 canism, Competition, Offi- 
 ces, Civil Service Commis- 
 sion. 
 Reformers, their perils in early 
 
 times. . .24-27, 57-59, 121, note. 
 See Vane, Eliot, Marvel, 
 William III., Pitt, Burke, 
 Rockingham, Russell, Gran- 
 ville, Hume, Peel, Bright, 
 Derby, Gladstone, Trevel- 
 yan, Palmerston. 
 Religion early brought under 
 
 spoils system 41, 47, 273 
 
 later and present relations of 
 
 273-2S3 
 
 governing by aid of 220, 
 
 267, 273-283 
 
 as a political power 267, 
 
 273-283 
 made a test by Cromwell. ... 55 
 
 and by later rulers 62, 88, 
 
 109, 111, 112, 113, 125, 278
 
 466 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Religion degraded by the parti- 
 san system 98, 109 
 
 in the universities 278,291 
 
 See Test, Sacrament, Church. 
 Removals, right of, under the 
 
 British Constitution 77 
 
 not guarded in American sys- 
 tem 118 
 
 early causes that prevented 
 
 arbitrary ...1G, 19, 20, 43 
 
 given by statute, in feudal 
 
 times 43 
 
 partisan, began with Boling- 
 
 broke 86 
 
 arbitrary, under the Stuarts 
 
 105,113 
 
 arbitrary, ceased by time 
 
 George IV 148 
 
 none made on introducing 
 
 merit system 206 
 
 only made for cause 80, 
 
 308, 309 
 See Officers, 
 relation of, to tenure of office 
 
 366, 367 
 See Tenure, 
 abuse of, in our Territories. . 441 
 
 abuses of power of. 414, 415 
 
 effect of, on official fidelity 
 
 295, 296, 304, 307, 308, 375 
 
 See Tenure, Spoils Sys- 
 tem, Merit System, Parti- 
 san System, Appointing 
 Power. 
 
 Rent paid for offices 19, 20 
 
 Report on civil service in 
 
 1853-4 181 
 
 See Investigations and Civil 
 
 Service Commission. 
 Republicanism, decline of its 
 influence in Europe.327-331, 
 
 337, 338-341 
 
 the argument against it. .. 338-340 
 Responsibility, official slow 
 
 growth of feeling of. ..12-17, 39 
 Retiring allowances. See Super- 
 annuation. 
 
 Revenue, internal administra- 
 tion 296-300, 305, 306 
 
 customs administration.. ..300-305 
 See Customs Service. 
 Revolution averted by reform 
 
 327-331 
 
 Revolutionary war, affected by 
 
 spoils system 116, 117, 
 
 118, 124, 349, 352 
 Richard II., remarkable civil 
 
 service statute of 33 
 
 Richmond, Duke of, as a reform- 
 er 123, 124 
 
 Ridicule and sarcasm used 
 against reform. . . .121, 122, 
 
 192, 196-202, 210, 211, 213 
 turned in favor of new sys- 
 teni..209,210, 211, 213, 226, 
 
 227, 261 
 
 Right to hold office a common 
 
 and equal right.. 226, 227, 
 
 357-359, 363, 372, 373, 
 
 379,880 
 
 See Office and Merit Sys- 
 tem. 
 
 the petition of. 50, 51 
 
 Bill of 71,72 
 
 Rockingham, Lord, as a re- 
 former, his reform policy 
 
 118, 120, 124 
 
 Romilly, purchased seat in Par- 
 liament 51 
 
 Rules. See Civil Service Rules. 
 
 S 
 
 Sacrament of Lord's Supper a 
 test for office.. ..63, 88, 125, 
 
 126, 273-276 
 See Tests, Church, Religion. 
 
 Sale of offices in France 24 
 
 becomes general in England 
 
 16, 17, 18,134 
 
 in Ireland, under Qeo. Ill 113 
 
 of, prohibited 17, 132 
 
 of recommendations, etc., pro- 
 hibited. . ..132-136
 
 INDEX. 
 
 467 
 
 Bale of charters 20 
 
 of boroughs 91 
 
 of offices, excluded political 
 
 assessments 16, 43 
 
 of places in the State Church 
 
 279-283 
 
 carious limitations of 17, 134 
 
 how much worse than our sys- 
 tem 51 
 
 See Officers and Spoils Sys- 
 tem. 
 Salaries, when fees gave place 
 
 to 130, 141-143, 293, 294 
 
 Sandhurst Military School 234 
 
 See Army and Examinations. 
 
 Sanitary administration 292, 293 
 
 Sarcasm. See Ridicule. 
 Savings Bank. See Postal Ser- 
 vice. 
 
 Schools. See Education. 
 Searchers, former extortion by . 23 
 
 but now instructed 302 
 
 Schurz, Carl, his official action 
 
 447,448 
 
 Scotland, corruption in 112 
 
 church abuses in 281-283 
 
 Free Church of 282 
 
 Secret service money 92, 93 
 
 Seniority 311 
 
 See Superannuation and Tenure. 
 
 Serfs buy their freedom 28 
 
 Settlement, act of 71 
 
 Sinecurists in early times 27-29 
 
 under Charles II 62 
 
 swarmed in 1688 69 
 
 example of their late survival 
 
 241,242 
 
 Senate, its relation to appoint- 
 ments 412-416 
 
 See Confirmation and Bribery. 
 Senators, the theory of partisan, 
 
 that of feudal lords 41, 42 
 
 Sheriffs, corruptions of, in early 
 
 times 21,36 
 
 false returns by 23 
 
 required to know law 19 
 
 Sidney, Algernon 345 
 
 Social effects of the merit sys- 
 tem 317, etc. 
 
 See Merit System. 
 Sorters. See Postal Service. 
 
 Spies, to aid partisans 115 
 
 Spoils system, originated in feu- 
 dalism. 12, 21,25, 37, 39,341-344 
 
 causes two rebellions 26, 35, 36 
 
 not destroyed by rebellions.. 32, 34 
 
 people oppressed by 33-36 
 
 in the church.. 41, 47, 48, 110, 
 
 125, 267-282 
 
 See Church. 
 
 in the army. .48, 64, 101, 110, 
 
 111, 283-285 
 
 See Army. 
 
 extended to licenses 67 
 
 See Corporations. 
 
 first limited by Cromwell... .53-56 
 
 as applied by George III 104 
 
 as applied by Charles II. ..... 61 
 
 as applied by James II 63-68 
 
 its various corrupt resources 
 108-116 
 
 tended to tyranny toward Am- 
 erica 116,118 
 
 yielded to a strictly partisan 
 system under Geo IV.. ..145, 183 
 
 come into our politics about 
 the game date. . . .144, 145, ICO 
 
 its struggle to retain patron- 
 age 169-176 
 
 how justified by British par- 
 tisans 197 
 
 when it ceased in Great Brit- 
 ain 183 
 
 driven out of British India 
 248-259 
 
 how far excluded by Consti- 
 tution of United States.. 266-287 
 
 how effectually excluded from 
 the British departments .245, 
 
 296-810 
 
 some surviving fragments 
 291, note. 
 
 effect on our independence 
 
 ...116, 117,118, 124, 349
 
 468 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Spoils system riot essential to 
 
 party government 384 
 
 See Party Government. 
 
 effects of its removal 383-401 
 
 how far now tolerated in 
 
 United States 440, 441, 443 
 
 ancient compared with, mod- 
 ern. 41-45 
 
 Star chamber 47, 49, 57 
 
 State department, merit system 
 
 in 310-313 
 
 competition in 311, 312 
 
 theory as to consuls 311, 312 
 
 theory as to ministers 311 
 
 ours compared with British 
 .. .10, 254-258, 310-313, 438-441 
 
 Statesmen, our early 1,2 
 
 who are 372 
 
 condemn patronage.. .155, 156, 
 
 159, 216, 217, 220 
 the leading have been reform, 
 ers. See Vane, Eliot, Mar 
 vel, Burke, Pitt, Grey, Gran- 
 ville, Liverpool, Peel, Rus- 
 sell, Derby, Palinerston, 
 Gladstone, Bright. 
 Stock jobbing under George III. 
 
 107, 108 
 
 Superannuation allowances, ori- 
 gin of 130 
 
 laws and regulations in re- 
 gard to 141, 142,215 
 
 See Pensions. 
 
 Summary of whole course of 
 the history, p. 342, Chap. 
 XXXII. 
 
 Supernumeraries 149 
 
 See Patronage, Sinecurists, 
 
 Placemen. 
 Supplies to carry on government 
 
 refused by partisans 88, 89 
 
 Stein as a reformer 236 
 
 Sweden, reform in 332-334 
 
 System. See Spoils System, 
 Partisan System, Merit Sys- 
 tem, Feudal System. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Tacking. See Supplies. 
 
 Talbot, Lord, as reformer. .122, note. 
 
 Tasmania, reform in 356 
 
 Tenure of office, tendency to in- 
 crease 71, 72, 400, 413, 414 
 
 nature of British 294-296, 
 
 367-369 
 
 need of its being more definite 
 in United States. ..294-296, 340 
 
 in the army Ill 
 
 See Army, Office, Good Behav- 
 ior, and Removal. 
 Term. See Tenure. 
 Theorists. See Doctrinaire. 
 
 Test acts 55, 61, 62, 88, 109, 
 
 125, 126, 278 
 
 in universities 278, note, 291 
 
 their repeal 125, 126 
 
 See Corporation, Office, Reli- 
 gion, Church, Jews, Catho- 
 lics, Sacrament. 
 
 Titles openly sold 61 
 
 See Sale. 
 
 as a political influence... .108, 
 
 267-270 
 
 Treasury, the, meaning of 147 
 
 Patronage, Secretary of. .153, 183 
 the, its relation to the revenue 
 
 305, 306 
 
 permanent Secretary of 306 
 
 political offices in 306 
 
 competition in 303 
 
 Trevelyan, Sir Charles, his re- 
 port of 1853 189 
 
 letters from 430-433 
 
 his views established 376 
 
 See Preliminary Note. 
 Trevor, Sir John, his corruption 
 
 85, 86, note. 
 
 Trust, office treated as 231- 
 
 233, 324-326, 379 
 
 Tudors, their reign 15, 39 
 
 Tyler, Wat 27, 28, 34 
 
 Tyranny, official, declines from 
 
 time of George IV 144 
 
 United States. See Republican-
 
 IXDEX. 
 
 469 
 
 ism, Administration, Cus- 
 toms Service, New York, 
 Spoils System. 
 
 University, a national 4 
 
 Utopian argument against re- 
 form 196 
 
 Upton, General, views of admin- 
 istration in India 254, 258 
 
 Vane as a reformer 58 
 
 Voting. See Officers, and Ballot. 
 Veto power no longer used 77, 78 
 
 W 
 
 Walpole and Lis administra- 
 tion 91-97 
 
 See Spoils System. 
 
 Warrants, general, used for par- 
 tisan coercion 115, 116 
 
 Washington, Lis forecast 3, 4 
 
 Webster, his views 414, note. 
 
 Wesley 94 
 
 West Point 4, note, 205, 263, 284 
 
 Wilkes 115, 116, 125 
 
 William III. as a leforiner. .70, 
 
 78,346 
 
 bis system 69-81 
 
 Wilson, VicePrest., condemns 
 
 patronage 397 
 
 Women, early in politics and 
 practising la w .... 29, 93, 94, 100 
 Low benefited by tlie reform 
 
 298, note, 291, 317-319, note. 
 
 WoolwicL military scLool 2S4 
 
 See Army and Examinations. 
 Wyckliffe 28, 32 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 11, line 5 from bottom, for "is," read "are." 
 " 42, line 2 from top, omit " State." 
 " 237, Note 3 should be marked as a quotation. 
 " 305, line 15 from bottom, for "system," read " administration." 
 
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