Subj Book THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW taxpayers, free libraries, schools, clubs, granges or other recorded organizations in New York State. New York State Trav. Libs. Ei8-Agi8-io,ooo (7-19627) M SYSTEMATIC SERIES EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOLUME I SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY BY JOHN W. BURGESS, PH.D., LL.D., J.U.D. PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEAN OF THE FACULTIES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, PURE SCIENCE, AND FINE ARTS IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY BAKER AND TAYLOR COMPANY NEW YORK ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL. COPYRIGHT, 1890, BY JOHN W. BURGESS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 216.9 T \(OT, sia Cof ^ TO the memory of my former friend and teacher, J3r, 3ojjann 575, 1828. 152 Organization of the State. body after the spirit has departed. When, in a democratic political society, the well-matured, long and deliberately formed will of the undoubted majority can be persistently and suc- cessfully thwarted, in the amendment of its organic law, by the will of the minority, there is just as much danger to the state from revolution and violence as there is from the caprice of the majority, where the sovereignty of the bare majority is acknowledged. The safeguards against too radical change must not be exaggerated to the point of dethroning the real sovereign. There is another way, a better way and a natural way of securing deliberation, maturity and clear consciousness of purpose without antagonizing the actual source of power in the democratic state, viz ; by repetition of vote. If, for exam- ple, the Congress should, in joint session and by simple majority, resolve upon a proposition of amendment, and give notice of the same to the people in time for the voters to take the matter into consideration in the election of the members of the House of Representatives for the next suc- ceeding Congress ; and if the succeeding Congress should then repass the proposition in joint session and by like majority ; and if then it should be sent to the legislatures of the commonwealths for ratification by the houses thereof, act- ing in joint assembly and resolving by simple majority vote ; and if then the vote of each legislature should have the same weight in the count as that of the respective commonwealth in the election of the President of the United States, and an absolute majority of all the votes to which all of the com- monwealths were entitled should be made necessary and suffi- cient for ratification, why would not this be an organization of the sovereign, of the state within the constitution, which would be truthful to the conditions of our national demo- cratic society and our federal system of government ; which would secure all needful deliberation in procedure and matur- ity in resolution ; which would permit changes when the nat- The Sovereignty in the Constitution of the U. S. 153 ural conditions and relations of our state and society demanded them ; and which would give us an organization of the state convenient in practice and, at the same time, sufficiently dis- tinct from the organization of the government to prevent confusion of thought in reference to the spheres and powers of the two organizations ? To reach such an organization of the state within the con- stitution legally would, of course, require th amendment of the provision of the constitution for amendment. This may be done legally in the manner prescribed for making any amendment, since no part of the constitution is withdrawn by the constitution from the process, except the equality of the commonwealths in the senatorial representation. The only question would be as to whether this exception must be con- nected with the new law of amendment. It seems to me that the letter of the constitution and the intentions of the framers would require this, unless the new law should be rati- fied by the legislature of every commonwealth. If this be not true, then a commonwealth might be deprived indirectly of its equal representation in the Senate without its own con- sent, while by the existing law it cannot in any manner be so deprived. From the standpoint of political science, on the other hand, I regard this legal power of the legislature of a single commonwealth to resist successfully the will of the sovereign as unnatural and erroneous. It furnishes the temptation for the powers back of the constitution to re- appear in revolutionary organization and solve the question by power, which bids defiance to a solution according to law. There is a growing feeling among our jurists and publicists that, in the interpretation of the constitution, we are not to be strictly held by the intentions of the framers, especially since the whole fabric of our state has been so changed by the results of rebellion and civil war. They are beginning to feel, and rightly too, that present conditions, relations and requirements should be the chief consideration, and that 154 Organization of the State. when the language of the constitution will bear it, these should determine the interpretation. From this point of view all the great reasons of political science and of juris- prudence would justify the adoption of a new law of amend- ment by the general course of amendment now existing, without the attachment of the exception ; and in dealing with the great questions of public law, we ' must not, as Mirabeau finely expressed it, lose the grande morale in the petite morale. Sovereignty in the German Imperial Constitution. 155 CHAPTER III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE WITHIN THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION. THE seventy-eighth article of the imperial constitution reads as follows : " Changes of the constitution shall be effected by legislation. Propositions therefor are to be regarded as defeated when fourteen voices in the Federal Council declare against them. Those provisions of the imperial constitution, through which specific rights are secured to an individual commonwealth of the Union in its relation to the Union, can be changed only with the con- sent of the commonwealth so privileged." 1 This language requires much explanation before any criticism will be intelligible. i. What is meant by the provision that changes in the constitution shall follow the usual course of legislation ? The first element of the answer is, of course, that the legislative department of the imperial government makes constitutional law. No distinction, then, as to personnel or organization, exists between the body which makes constitutional law and the body which makes ordinary law. The second element of the answer requires a description of the usual course of legislation. The two houses of the legislature are the Fed- eral Council (BundesratK) and the Diet (Reichstag)? Bills may be originated in either house. 3 They become law when passed by both houses by simple majority vote of those voting, a quorum being present. 4 A quorum in the Diet is 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 78. 2 Ibid. Art. 5. Ibid. Arts. 7 and 23. 4 Ibid. Art. 5. 156 Organization of the State. the majority of the whole number. 1 In the Federal Council it consists of those present at a meeting regularly called, the chancellor or his representative being among those present. 2 The constitution does not require the Emperor's approval to bills which may become law through the general course of legislation, and therefore amendments to the constitution are not subject to his veto, since they, by provision of the constitution, follow this course. 2. But when this general provision of the constitution in reference to legislation is made applicable to the work of changing the constitution, it is placed under one general and one special limitation. The first limitation requires an extraordinary majority in the Federal Council to effect any constitutional changes. Less than fourteen voices in that body must oppose the proposition in order that its passage may be effected. 3 The Federal Council (Btindesrath) is composed of members appointed by the executives of the twenty-five common- wealths of the German Empire, to the number of fifty-eight voices. 4 The representation therein is distributed as follows : Prussia has seventeen voices ; Bavaria, six ; Saxony and Wiirttemberg have four each ; Baden and Hesse have three each ; Brunswick and Mecklenburg-Schwerin have two each ; the rest have one each. The vote of each commonwealth is cast solid and according to instructions from the executive of the commonwealth. 6 The Diet (Reichstag), on the other hand, is composed of members elected by the universal suffrage of all male Germans twenty-five years of age and in full possession of their civil rights, and the representation is according to population. 7 Each member thereof- represents 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 28. 2 Von Ronne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. II, Erste Ab- theilung S. 12. 8 Reichsverfassung, Art. 78. 4 By an amendment to the constitution in 191 1, Alsace-Lorraine was granted three voices in the Federal Council, making sixty-one voices in all. Ibid. Art. 6. 6 Ibid. Arts. 6 and 7. 7 Ibid. Art. 20. Sovereignty in the German Imperial Constitution. 157 the whole Empire and votes uninstructed. 1 Fully three- fourths of the members are from Prussia. The vote in this body upon changes of the constitution is by simple majority of those voting thereon, a quorum being present. It will be seen from an examination of the representation in these two bodies, that while the King of Prussia or the representatives in the Diet from Prussia may prevent any change in the constitution, both of them together cannot effect a change in the constitution. It will also be seen that the Kings of Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Saxony can together prevent any change in the constitution, but that all the executives, without the King of Prussia, and the unanimous voice of the Diet taken together cannot force a change of the constitution upon the King of Prussia. Finally, it will be seen that the executives of at least twelve of the largest commonwealths must unite with the majority of the Diet in order to effect a change in the constitution. The second limitation upon the general course of legisla- tion in making constitutional changes is special, and ordains that those provisions of the constitution, through which specific rights are guaranteed to the individual commonwealths in their relation to the Union, cannot be changed except with the consent of the commonwealths so privileged. 2 Limitations upon and exceptions to general provisions are of course to be strictly construed. Under this exception to the general course of constitutional amendment, therefore, nothing can be claimed as a specific right requiring, as the condition of its change, the consent of the commonwealth affected, unless it shall be expressly guaranteed in the consti tution, and unless it shall affect the relation of the particular commonwealth to the Union. For example, the general rights and powers of local self-government not withdrawn from the commonwealths by the imperial constitution, but 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 29. 2 Ibid. Art. 78. 158 Organization of the State. not expressly secured to the commonwealths by that consti- tution, are not protected by this exception from the general course of constitutional amendment. These specific rights, guaranteed in the constitution, are quite numerous. They are either in the form of specific pow- ers conferred upon particular commonwealths, or specific exemptions of particular commonwealths from the general powers of the imperial government. In the first class belong the right of Prussia to the presidency of the Union ; 1 the right of Bavaria to the chairmanship of the 'standing com- mittee of the Federal Council for Foreign Affairs, 2 and to a permanent seat in the standing committee of the Federal Council for the Army and Fortifications ; 3 the right of Wiirt- temberg to a permanent seat in the standing committees for Foreign Affairs * and for the Army and Fortifications ; 5 and the right of Saxony to a permanent seat in the standing com- mittee of the Federal Council for Foreign Affairs. 6 These are clearly all specific powers touching the relation of the particular commonwealth to the Union, and guaranteed by the express provisions of the constitution to the particular com- monwealth, and there is no difference of opinion among the commentators in regard to their falling under the class of rights which may be dealt with only by consent of the com- monwealth so privileged. The commentators, however, gen- erally go further, and bring under this class also powers not guaranteed to a particular commonwealth by the constitution, but by the treaty made between the North German Union and Bavaria, connecting Bavaria with the North German Union in the present German Union or Empire. 7 The powers guar- 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. II. 2 Ibid, Art. 8. Ibid. Art. 8. * Ibid. Art. 8. 6 Ibid. Schlussbestimmung zum XI. Abschnitt, Art. 15. 6 Reichsverfassung, Art. 8.. 7 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts, Zweites Buch, S. 14; von Ronne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. II, Erste Abtheilung S. 46, 47. Sovereignty in the German Imperial Constitution. 159 anteed to Bavaria in this treaty are : that in case Prussia shall be prevented from exercising the presidency of the Federal Council, Bavaria shall have that right, 1 and that in case the imperial ambassadors shall be prevented from representing the Empire at courts to which Bavarian ambas- sadors are accredited, these latter shall have that right. 2 These provisions of that treaty are mentioned in the law passed by the imperial legislature on April 16, 1871, empow- ering the Emperor to proclaim the revised constitution in force, and are declared in that law to be unchanged by the constitution ; i.e. they are declared to retain their character as treaties between the Empire, in place of the North German Union, and Bavaria ; i.e. they cannot be changed by the pro- cess of constitutional amendment without the consent of Bavaria. This is undoubtedly regarded as law by the Ger- man jurists, statesmen and publicists, but it certainly is very bad political science. It is bad enough to acknowledge that the sovereign is not sovereign upon subjects expressly and specifically excepted in the constitution. When, however, we go beyond this, we are certainly on the road to Warsaw. Some of the commentators go still further and construct specific rights for certain commonwealths out of the general principles of the constitution, and then assign such implied rights to the class of rights requiring the consent of the com- monwealth affected to any change therein. They claim, for example, that the existing distribution of the voices in the Federal Council belongs to this class. 3 Those who do not hold this view in general place, nevertheless, the right of Bavaria to six voices instead of four the number to which Bavaria would have been entitled if the same principle of distribution had been applied to Bavaria as was applied to 1 Bayerisches Schlussprotokoll, IX. a Ibid. VII. 8 Von Ronne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. II, Erste A.btheilung S.47- 160 Organization of the State. the other commonwealths under this class. 1 Laband goes so far as to claim legal equality of the commonwealths in rights and duties as a right of each commonwealth, which cannot be changed without the consent of the commonwealth unfavor- ably affected. 2 This is utterly indefensible from the stand- point of political science, and I think also from that of the constitutional law of the Empire. The constitution only declares "that those provisions of the constitution through which specific rights are guaranteed to a particular common- wealth " are subject to this particularistic method of change. It therefore excludes everything else from this category. If we depart from the strict construction of this exception to the sovereignty of the Empire, there will be no firm ground at all under our feet. The whole organization of. the state will become a matter of conflicting opinion instead of objec- tive reality. Such honeycombing of the constitution is not dictated either by the needs of science or the condition of the Empire. It springs from the blindness of particularism. The other class of specific rights guaranteed by the con- stitution to particular commonwealths consists of exemptions of the particular commonwealths from the general powers of the imperial government. These are far more numerous than those of the first class. Bavaria is the most richly privileged. The constitution provides that Bavaria shall be exempt from the legislation and supervision of the imperial government in regard to the law of residence and settlement; 3 in regard to the taxation of domestic liquors and beer ; 4 in regard to the regulation of the railway system, except in so far as the general defence of the Empire shall require uniformity; 5 in regard to the regulation of the internal postal and telegraphic system, and 1 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts, Zweites Buch, S. 14; Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, S. 113. * Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, S. 109. 8 Reichsverfassung, Art. 4, sec. I. * Ibid. Art. 35. 5 Ibid. Art. 46 Sovereignty in the German Imperial Constitution. 161 also the postal and telegraphic intercourse with her imme- diate foreign neighbors ; x and in regard to the regulation of the military system, except in so far as imperial control is permitted by the treaty between Bavaria and the North German Union, providing for the union of these two states in the Empire. 2 To these exemptions expressly mentioned in the constitu- tion the commentators add those contained in the treaty above mentioned, viz ; the control of marriage relations and insurance of realty. 3 Laband even adds exemptions in regard to the fixing of the normal standard of weights and measures, and in regard to the issue of bank notes created by imperial legislation. 4 This seems to be altogether strained and exag- gerated. As I have said above, I can go no farther than the treaties made between the North German Union and the several South German states providing for their entrance into the Union, and mentioned, as to certain of their pro- visions, in the law putting the revised constitution of the Empire into force, as still binding. That makes confusion enough. Anything more stands upon no ground either in science or law. Next in the order of extent of exemption comes Wurttem- berg. The constitution provides that Wiirttemberg shall be exempt from the legislation and supervision of thrf imperial government in regard to the taxation of domestic liquors and beer ; 6 in regard to the regulation of the internal postal and telegraphic system, and the postal and telegraphic intercourse with her immediate foreign neighbors ; 6 and in regard to the regulation of the military system, except so far as imperial control is permitted by the treaty of the 21-25 of November, 1870, between Wiirttemberg and the North 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 52. 2 Ibid. Schlussbestimmung zum XL Abschnitt. 8 Bayerisches Schlussprotokoll, I, IV. 4 Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, S. 112. Reichsverfassung, Art. 35. 6 Ibid. Art. 52. _ 1 62 Organization of the State. German Union. The commentators add to these the exemp- tion, contained in this same treaty, of Wiirttemberg from the power of the imperial government to introduce the one pfennig freight charge upon the railways of Wiirttemberg. 1 This treaty is mentioned in the law empowering the Emperor to proclaim the revised constitution in force, and this exemp- tion is declared therein to be unchanged by the constitution. Lastly, Baden is exempted by the constitution from the legislation and supervision of the imperial government in regard to the taxation of domestic liquors and beer. 2 The commentators Hanel and von Ronne speak of an ex- emption of Oldenburg from the power and duty of the impe- rial government to maintain the chaussee-tolls throughout the Empire at the Prussian rates of i828. 3 They find this duty imposed upon the imperial government, and this exemption of Oldenburg from its operation, in the 22d article of the customs-union treaty of the 8th of July, 1867, which they claim to be a part of the present constitution. Article 40 of the constitution declares that the provisions of the cus- toms-union treaty of the 8th of July, 1867, shall remain in force in so far as they shall not be changed by law or consti- tutional amendment as the particular case may require.* If, therefore, this treaty guarantees a special exemption to a par- ticular commonwealth, they argue, that it can be now with- drawn only by constitutional amendment in its exceptional form, i.e. only by consent of the commonwealth so privileged. There are two other points to be explained before I leave this most confusing subject. The first is in regard to the organ through which the privileged commonwealth shall ex- press its assent or dissent in reference to a change of its specifically guaranteed right. I think it is now the universal view that its representation in the Federal Council is the 1 Wiirttembergischer Schlussprotokoll, 2. 2 Reichsverfassung, Art. 35. 8 Von Ronne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. II, Erste Abtheilung S. 46. * Reichsverfassung, Art. 40. Sovereignty in the German Imperial Constitution. 163 proper constitutional organ for this purpose, and that the commonwealth is bound by the acts of that organ in this respect. If that organ should act contrary to the instruc- tions of the executive which appoints it, or if the legislature of the particular commonwealth should disapprove the in- structions of the executive, the questions which would arise therefrom are internal to the particular commonwealth. The imperial government will not inquire into any of these matters, but will treat the word and act of the representatives in the Federal Council as final and irrevocable. 1 The second point is, that the consent of the privileged commonwealth to a change of its specific constitutional right does not do away with the power of the fourteen voices to veto the change. The condition that less than fourteen voices must be found in the negative must be fulfilled, as well as that the voice of the privileged commonwealth must not be found in the negative. 2 My criticism of this organization of the state within the constitution is based upon three considerations. The first is the lack of correspondence between it and the real power back of the constitution, the second is the fact that it is not wholly sovereign, and the third is the confusion in organiza- tion of the state with the government. First. The real power back of the constitution is, as we have seen, the German people under the lead of the Prussian organization. The power of the Prussian arms established the German Empire. The many and in some respects petty and misleading legal forms employed in the formal part of the work must never blind us as to where the real power was and is. As the Germans would say, " Preussen ist Deutschland im werden begriffen;" which Mr. Emerson would have trans- lated, " Prussia is Germany in the making." Now, there- 1 Von Ronne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. II, Erste Abtheilung S. 36 ff.; Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes, Zweites Buch, S. 19. 8 Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, SS. 114, 115 . 164 Organization of the State. fore, any organization of the sovereignty within the constitu- tion which would prevent the whole German people and the Prussian organization from amending the constitution is more or less artificial. It prevents the natural development of the German state. It sets law in opposition to fact, the result of which, in the long run, will be a period of stagnation fol- lowed by a period of violent changes. The constitutional provision which gives to a majority of the representatives of the whole German people, or to the Prussian executive, the power to prevent an amendment to the constitution is certainly a truthful legalization of the facts ; but that is only one side of this transcendent question. The mere power to prevent is not the test of sovereignty : the sovereign must also have the power to overcome the attempt of any other force to prevent. When, therefore, we reflect that, according to the organization of the sovereignty within the imperial constitution, the whole German people together with the executives of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirttemberg, Baden, Hesse, Brunswick, Mecklenburg- Schwerin, Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg could not legally change the constitution upon a single point, in case the fourteen petty princes of Waldeck, Reuss, Lippe, etc. should object, we cannot fail to see that upon this side of the question the organization of the sovereignty within the con- stitution departs very far from the real conditions of power back of the constitution. And when, in the second place, we come to the provision which recognizes to a single prince the power to prevent con- stitutional development by legal means upon many subjects which naturally concern the entire German state, thus really dethroning the sovereign by making the will of its subject superior to its own will, then must every healthy mind come to the conclusion that there is not only incompleteness, but positive error, in such an organization of the state. It does not require a great deal of scientific reflection to detect the Sovereignty in the German Imperial Constitution. 165 root of the error. It lies in the doctrine of the federal state. I contend that there is no such thing in political science as a federal state ; that this political adjective is applicable only to government ; and that the attempt to make a federal state in law is caused by confounding the conceptions of state and government. This political phenomenon always appears in that period of the history of a state when, through the expan- sion of the state, the organization of the sovereignty suffers natural changes which do not express themselves immediately in new forms of law. The dull mind of the average legis- lator cannot at once be made conscious of such changes. It takes them in only piecemeal, and formulates them only piecemeal, and is always deceived by the tempting conceit that the whole thing is a matter of legislative will. The third great difficulty with the organization of the state in the German constitution is its confusion with the govern- ment. The sovereign acts through the ordinary organs of legislation and according to the ordinary forms of legislation ; and its acts are distinguished from the ordinary acts of the legislature only by the extraordinary majority required in the Federal Council for their validity. The first consideration, therefore, as to any project which is presented in either house of the imperial legislature is whether it be a project of ordinary law or of constitutional amendment and, if the latter, whether it touches a specifically guaranteed right of a particular commonwealth. Who shall decide these questions ? The constitution makes no express provision in regard to such a power. If it makes any provision, it must be by implication. Some of the commentators hold that this is a question of constitutional interpretation, to be determined preliminary to the passage of the bill, and that the constitution impliedly vests this power in the legislature, since the legislature must exercise the same whenever it passes any act ; and that the power is to be exercised in the manner of ordinary legisla- tion, i.e. by vote of the simple majority in the Federal Coun- 1 66 Organization of the State. cil and in the Diet. 1 But if this be true, then what becomes of that most vital power of the King of Prussia to veto any proposition for constitutional change through his more than fourteen voices in the Federal Council ? The simple majority in the Federal Council and in the Diet would only find it necessary to declare a project for changing the constitution to be a project of ordinary law, and the Prussian government would be helpless. Moreover, of what value would be the constitutional reservation of specific rights to particular com- monwealths, and the requirements that these rights shall not be changed without the consent of the particular common- wealths, if the simple majority in the Federal Council and in the Diet could legally avoid this requirement through this power of preliminary interpretation ? Other commentators have been so impressed by this con- sideration that they have found in the Emperor's prerogative of promulgating the laws the power to examine their contents and determine therefrom their character and leave them unpromulgated if, in the Emperor's opinion, they have not been passed in the manner and with the legislative majority prescribed by the constitution. 2 But what a tremendous power this would place in the hands of the Emperor. He would only find it necessary to declare any project distasteful to him a constitutional amendment in order to be able to veto it in the Federal Council by the Prussian votes. More- over, this power of the Emperor would not legally protect the other commonwealths against an attempt of the imperial legislature to deprive them of their specifically guaranteed rights by the power of interpretation. It would protect Prussia only. It may be said, of course, that the simple majority of the Federal Council and of the Diet on the one side, or the Emperor on the other, would not so abuse the 1 Von Ronne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. II, Erste Abtheilung, S-35- 2 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes, Zweites Buch, 8.119; La- band, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, S. 549 ff. Sovereignty in the German Imperial Constitution. 167 power of interpretation as to achieve the results above indi- cated ; but we are treating of law now, not of personal dispo- sition ; not of what probably would be, but of what might be. This close connection, almost identification, of the organi- zation of the state with the government, has already led to some indistinctness as to what is constitutional law and what merely ordinary law. For example : a project of law, which could be passed by the imperial legislature only after an amendment to the constitution had been made empowering the legislature thereto, has been considered valid without such formal preliminary change of the constitution, provided it shall have been passed by a majority sufficient to have made the constitutional change. 1 Now is this law a part of the constitution ? It has been held by precedent that it is not as to form, only as to matter, and that it may be changed subsequently as a piece of ordinary legislation, even though the change would involve further modifications of the original constitutional provision. 2 All this is most unscientific and confusing. The question of amendment should be considered and decided separately, apart from and antecedent to the passage of any law authorized by such amendment. If the organization of the state, the constitution-making power, were distinct from the government, this source of confusion would not exist. Of course the German state may reorganize itself in the constitution ; but it can do so, legally, only through the forms of procedure prescribed therein for its present organization. The likelihood of its being able to do so in fact is not, there- fore, great. It is more probable that the reappearance of the actual, though unorganized, power back of the constitution will precede any further advance in the development of the fundamental principles of the constitution. If so, however, the organization of the state within the constitution will have, so far, failed of its purpose. 1 Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Bd. I, S. 547 ff. 2 Ibid., S. 549. 1 68 Organization of the State. CHAPTER IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE IN THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION. THE eighth article of that part of the constitution passed in February of 1875 reads as follows: "The chambers shall have the power, upon their own motion, or upon the motion of the President of the Republic, to determine, separately and by absolute majority in each, whether a revision of the con- stitution shall be undertaken. After each of the two cham- bers shall have passed this resolution in the affirmative they shall unite in National Assembly and proceed to the revision. 1 The propositions of revision shall be valid parts of the con- stitution when voted by an absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly." 2 These provisions are quite clear and very simple. They require but little explanation and not a great deal of criticism. 1. As to the principles of the composition of the two chambers, we may say here, generally, that they both pro- ceed from universal suffrage, and that the one is chosen by direct and the other by indirect election. Their power to initiate and ordain the revision of the constitution is thus popular sovereignty, pure and simple. 2. As to the procedure in the chambers when acting sep- arately, we may say that the constitution leaves all questions regarding the inception of the motion for revision to be set- tled by each chamber for itself, and only requires that in the 1 Loi relative a 1'organisation des pouvoirs publics, 25-28 fevrier, 1875, Art & Ibid. The Sovereignty in the French Constitution. 1 69 passage of the resolution the necessary majority shall be the absolute majority, i.e. the majority of all the seats in the chamber. The constitution furthermore leaves it to the two cham- bers to determine the exact time of meeting in joint assem- bly. There is, therefore, no power in any body outside of the chambers to hasten, delay or frustrate the meeting of the National Assembly. Lastly, the constitution leaves everything to the National Assembly in regard to the making of the revision, except the official organization of the Assembly and the principle of the majority necessary to vote the revision. It makes the bureau of the National Assembly to consist of the President, Vice- Presidents and Secretaries of the Senate ; and fixes the majority for voting the revision at the absolute majority, i.e. the majority of all the seats in the Assembly. 3. The first element of uncertainty in these provisions at- taches to the question whether the National Assembly may proceed to a revision of the constitution in regard to subjects which the two chambers have not, in separate preliminary session, resolved to consider. If the separate resolutions shall have been general and unlimited, then, of course, any subject whatsoever may be considered and decided in the National Assembly. If, on the other hand, the chambers shall have specified the subjects in regard to which they deem revis- ion necessary, and in regard to which alone therefore they agree to go into joint, i.e. National, Assembly, then the ques- tion becomes pertinent and important. Lebon contends that the importance of this question is chiefly theoretic. 1 His argument is, that since the personnel of the two chambers and of the National Assembly is the same, therefore the majorities in the two chambers form the majority in the joint assembly, and that, therefore, if the National Assembly 1 Das Staatsrecht der franzosischen Republik, S. 74. 170 Organization of the State. resolves to consider subjects not specified in the acts of the separate chambers, it must be presumed that each chamber then and thereby consents to the same. This seems to me to be superficial. In the first place, it ignores the fact that the number of members of the separate chambers is not the same. There are but three hundred senators to five hundred and seventy-three deputies. 1 This difference alone would enable the deputies to overpower the senators in National Assembly and force upon them constitu- tional revision in regard to subjects which they, in separate assembly, would never have consented to bring before the joint assembly. The fact is, that when the Constituent Con- vention ordained the constitution of 1875-76, the Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists made up together the majority in that body. They constructed the Senate so as to make it the representative of royalty as against republicanism, and they meant to furnish the Senate with the power to prevent the deputies from revising the constitution at their will. It is true that the republicans are now in majority in the Sen- ate, but the Senate is still far more conservative in its repub- licanism than the Chamber of Deputies, and, therefore, a con- flict may still arise between the two bodies concerning the fundamental principles of the organic law. In the second place, it is conceivable that if the two chambers were com- posed of the same number of members, still the majority in the National Assembly might not represent the majorities in the two chambers taken separately. Yea, it is even con- ceivable that a practically solid Senate, if supported by a respectable minority of the deputies, might overcome the majority of the deputies in National Assembly and force revision of the constitution in regard to subjects which the deputies, in separate session, would never have agreed to bring before the joint assembly. It seems to me manifest, 1 Almanach de Gotha, 1890, p. 696. The Sovereignty in the French Constitution. 171 therefore, that this question is not merely or chiefly theoretic, but may at any moment become intensely practical. We shall do well, therefore, to examine the constitution narrowly to see if, perchance, we may find any means for its solution. I am not able to discover any, unless they be in the power of the President, with the consent of the Senate, to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. Lebon considers that the ordinary legislative session of the two chambers is to be regarded as continuing during National Assembly. The two chambers may therefore continue to act separately, as well as jointly, during such a period. If the deputies should under- take to overpower the senators in National Assembly (and this would be the event most likely to occur), the Senate might meet in separate session and call upon the President to dis- solve the Chamber of Deputies ; and if the President should respond affirmatively, the session of the National Assembly might thus be closed by the legal termination of the man- dates of a majority of its members. 1 I doubt very much if the President has any such power over the National Assembly. I think the National Assembly is entirely exempt from the powers of the President, whether exercised directly or indirectly. The National Assembly is the organization of the state. The President is only a part of the government. Unless, therefore, we mean to make a branch of the government sovereign over the state, we must dismiss this idea as untenable. Moreover, there are means provided by the constitution and developed through practice whereby any move of the kind above indicated might be prac- tically frustrated by the deputies. For example, the consti- tution provides that every act of the President shall be signed by a minister, 2 and that the ministers are responsible collec- tively and individually to the chambers for their political acts. 3 1 Das Staatsrecht der franzosischen Republik, S. 75. 2 Loi relative a 1'organisation des pouvoirs publics, 25-28 fevrier, 1875, Art. 3, 6. 8 Ibid., Art. 6, I. 172 Organization of the State. By the exercise of its power over the budget the Chamber of Deputies has now made the ministry practically responsible to itself alone. No minister therefore would now sign a decree of the President dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, unless it were practically certain that the new election would return a different political majority to that chamber from the existing one. Practically no minister would now take any such desperate chances. We must conclude, therefore, that the constitution provides no method whereby limitations sought to be placed upon the powers of the National Assembly by either of the chambers in separate session can be realized against the will of the majority in the National Assembly, and that practice has not yet worked out any. This result accords with sound theory. The National Assembly is the organization of the state. No branch of the government could, therefore, exercise compulsion over it without commit- ting coup d'etat ; i.e. without dethroning the sovereign. Curiously enough, the National Assembly has undertaken to tie its own hands upon a single subject. It enacted a constitutional amendment in August of the year 1884 which declares that the republican form of government shall never be subject to revision. 1 There is no power, however, outside of the Assembly to hold it to this pledge. It is, therefore, only a self-limitation, which the Assembly may, at any moment, remove through the exercise of the same power by which it was imposed. It is simply a bit of useless verbiage. It must be conceded, finally, that when compared with the three preceding systems which I have treated, the French constitution has gone farther in the development of an inde- pendent organization of the state, distinct from the organiza- tion of the government and possessing more completely all the elements of sovereignty, both in theory and practice, 1 Loi Constitutionnelle du 13-14 Aofit, 1884, Art. 2, 2. The Sovereignty in the French Constitution. 173 than any of the others. The identity of personnel in the National Assembly and in the legislative chambers is the one point in which the constitution fails in logical perfection. There are indeed practical advantages in this, viz ; it does away with the cost and exertion attendant upon a special election, and it creates a National Assembly in quasi-perma- nence ; but on the other hand it is the source of some diffi- culties, as I have already demonstrated. The political scientists and the statesmen have yet to solve, in logical and practical completeness, this question of the permanent organization of the state distinct from the organ- ization of the government and in possession of complete sovereignty over both the individual and the government. This is the most important question of political science and constitutional law. The failure to deal with it clearly and intelligently has produced inexpressible confusion in the con- ceptions both of liberty and of government. Its correct elucidation can alone light our way along the labyrinths of liberty, law and government. BOOK II. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. CHAPTER I. THE IDEA, THE SOURCE, THE CONTENT AND THE GUARANTY OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. The idea. Individual liberty has a front and a reverse, a positive and a negative side. Regarded upon the negative side, it contains immunities, upon the positive, rights ; i.e. viewed from the side of public law, it contains immunities, from the side of private law, rights. The whole idea is that of a domain in which the individual is referred to his own will and upon which government shall neither encroach itself, nor permit encroachments from any other quarter. Let the latter part of the definition be carefully remarked. I said it is a domain into which government shall not penetrate. It is not, however, shielded from the power of the state. This will be easily understood by those who have carefully perused the previous pages, and will be further explained when we come to consider the source of this liberty. There is no point in regard to which the modern state presents so marked a contrast to the antique and the mediae- val as in the recognition of a province within whose limits government shall neither intrude itself nor permit intrusion from any other quarter. This is entirely comprehensible from the standpoint of the reflection that the theocracy crushes the individual will at every point by the divine will ; that the despotism confounds the state with the government, and 174 General Principles. 1 75 vests the whole power of the state in the government ; and that the feudal state confounds property in the soil with dominion over the inhabitants thereof, substituting thus the petty despotism for the grand. Not until the rise of the modern monarchic governments upon the ruins of feudalism do we become aware of the fact that a new constitutional principle had found lodgment in the consciousness of the age. To this period individual liberty had existed only in so far as the government allowed. It had no defence against the government itself. Now the understanding tacitly reached between the King and the people was : that while the people would lend their strength to the King in subjecting the nobles to the royal law, the King would deliver the people from the feudal oppression ; i.e. while all governmental power should be consolidated in the King's hands, the people should have a sphere of autonomy, not only against the nobles, but against the King's government itself. The weak point in the system was that there existed no organization back of the King's government to define and defend this sphere against that government. Legally the conscience of the King was the ultimate resort. The organization of the state back of the King was then the indispensable necessity. This is the chief point in what is termed by the political histo- rians the constitutionalization of monarchy. In the so-called constitutional state, i.e. in the state, which is organized back of the government, which limits the powers of the gov- ernment, and which creates the means for restraining the government from violating these limitations, individual liberty finds its first real definer and its defender. The source. Therefore we affirm that the state is the source of individual liberty. The revolutionists of the eighteenth century said that individual liberty was natural right ; that it belonged to the individual as a human being, without regard to the state or society in which, or the government under which, he lived. But it is easy to see that this view is 176 Civil Liberty. utterly impracticable and barren ; for, if neither the state, nor the society nor the government defines the sphere of individual autonomy and constructs its boundaries, then the individual himself will be left to do these things, and that is anarchy pure and simple. The experiences of the French rev- olution, where this theory of natural rights was carried into practice, showed the necessity of this result. These expe- riences drove the more pious minds of this period to formulate the proposition that God is the source of individual liberty. " Dieu etmon droit" was the mediaeval motto made new again. But who shall interpret the will of God in regard to individual liberty ? If the individual interprets it for himself, then the same anarchic result as before will follow. If the state, or the church, or the government interprets it, then the individual practically gives up the divine source of his liberty ; for the question of the interpretation and legal formulation of indi- vidual rights and immunities is the only part of the question which has any practical value. These two theories embodied a natural and necessary revulsion of sentiment against the prac- tical system of the pre-revolutionary period, which accorded to the individual only such liberty as the government might, at the moment, permit. -But they overshot the mark ; and a reaction of view as well as practice naturally resulted. The present moment is much more favorable to an exact and scientific statement of these relations. We may express the most modern principle as follows: The individual, both for his own highest development and the highest welfare of the society and state in which he lives, should act freely within a certain sphere ; the impulse to such action is a universal quality of human nature ; but the state, the ultimate sovereign, is alone able to define the elements of individual liberty, limit its scope and protect its enjoyment. The indi- vidual is thus defended in this sphere against the government, by the power that makes and maintains and can destroy the government ; and by the same power, through the government, General Principles. 177 against encroachments from every other quarter. Against that power itself, however, he has no defence. It can give and it can take away. The individual may ask for liberties which it has not granted, and even prove to the satisfaction of the general consciousness that he ought to have them ; but until it grants them he certainly has them not. The ulti- mate sovereignty, the state, cannot be limited either by individual liberty or governmental powers ; and this it would be if individual liberty had its source outside of the state. This is the only view which can reconcile liberty with law, and preserve both in proper balance. Every other view sac- rifices the one to the other. The content. The elements of individual liberty cannot be generally stated for all states and for all times. All mankind is not to be found, or has not yet been found, upon the same stage of civilization. The individual liberty of the Russian would not suffice for the Englishman, nor that of the English- man at the time of the Tudors for the Englishman of to-day. As man develops the latent elements of his own civilization he becomes conscious of the need of an ever-widening sphere of free action, and the state finds its security and well-being in granting it. It must be remarked, on the other hand, how- ever, that the elements of individual or civil liberty are much more generally and uniformly recognized than the elements of political rights. The brotherhood of man is much more dis- tinctly expressed through the former than through the latter. We can, therefore, approach nearer, at the present time, to a universal system of individual liberty than of political liberty. In fact, in the modern states the realm of individual liberty is almost identical, no matter whether the governmental executive holds by election or hereditary right. In the four states, whose constitutions it is the purpose of this work to compare, the disagreement as to the essence of the rights and immunities which constitute individual liberty is really but slight. The divergence is chiefly in the character of the 178 Civil Liberty. organs which guarantee the enjoyment of these rights and immunities. We may say, generally, that in all these states individual liberty consists in freedom of the person, equality before the courts, security of private property, freedom of opinion and its expression, and freedom of conscience. The rights of the individual in respect thereto are the powers conferred upon him by the state to exercise certain prerogatives, and to call upon the government, or some branch thereof, for the employ- ment of sufficient force to realize these prerogatives, to the full extent as defined by the state. The immunities of the indi- vidual in respect thereto are his exemptions from the power of the government itself, or any branch thereof, to enter or encroach upon this sphere, except in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the state. The guaranties. The means for protecting individual lib- erty, on the contrary, as I have already indicated, differ radically in the four states whose constitutional law we are examining. This difference appears most prominently on that side of individual liberty which I term immunities. In the system of the United States, it is the sovereignty back of the government which defines and defends individual liberty, not only against all forces extra-governmental, but also against the arbitrary encroachments of the government itself. The sovereignty back of the government vests the courts of the central government with the power to interpret the prescripts of the constitution in behalf of individual rights and immunities, and to defend the same against the arbitrary acts of the legislature or executive. 1 It is the constitutional duty of the executive to obey these final decisions of the United States judiciary in regard to private rights and immunities, and to execute the laws in accordance therewith. Should he refuse, however, and insist upon exercising, in 1 Constitution of the United States, Art. Ill, sec. 2, L General Principles. 179 this sphere, powers denied him by judicial decision, or upon exercising his rightful powers in a manner forbidden by such decision, there is no remedy provided in the constitution unless it be impeachment. 1 Should the legislative and execu- tive powers conspire against the judiciary, or the legislature fail to hold the executive to his duty by impeachment, the sovereignty within the constitution may be appealed to, so to amend the constitution as to prevent the nullification of its intent by its governmental servants. It is difficult to see how the guaranty of individual liberty against the govern- ment itself could be made more complete. Its fundamental principles are written by the state in the constitution ; the power to put the final and authoritative interpretation upon them is vested by the state in a body of jurists, holding their offices independently of the political departments of the government and during their own good behavior ; while finally, recourse to the sovereign itself is open if all other defenses fail. This is the special point in which the constitutional law of the United States is far in advance of that of the Euro- pean states. Of the three European constitutions which we are examining, only that of Germany contains, in any degree, the guaranties of individual liberty which the constitution of the United States so richly affords. The German impe- rial constitution has made a beginning in this direction, but only a beginning. A few of the rights and immunities be- longing in this domain are written in the constitution itself , by the act of the sovereign, the state. 2 No department of the imperial government, therefore, can legally violate them. But the ultimate power of interpreting these rights and im- munities is not vested by the constitution in the imperial judiciary. 3 In fact, the imperial judiciary is not created by 1 Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 4. 2 Reichsverfassung, Art. 3. * Laband, Das Staatsrecht das deutschen Reiches, I. Band, S. 55 1 ff. 180 Civil Liberty. the constitution at all. It owes its existence to a statute of the imperial legislature. 1 It is therefore unable to stand between the legislature and the individual in the interpreta- tion of the constitution. The legislative interpretation is the more ultimate. It is not certain that it can stand between the executive and the individual in the interpretation of the constitution. The most reliable commentator upon the German constitution ascribes to the Emperor the power of final interpretation of the constitutionality of the laws. 2 Neither, again, has the imperial legislature the power to impeach the executive for encroaching upon the sphere of individual liberty guaranteed by the constitution. Lastly, there is no way provided in the constitution for the initiation of an amendment to the constitution, save through the agency of the imperial legislature itself. 3 Constitutionally, then, the immunities of the individual as against the powers of the imperial legislature and executive taken together are nothing ; as against the acts of the legislature and executive they are what these bodies resolve to allow them to be. This does not mean that the individual has no liberty in the German state. The legislature and executive have created for him a sphere of freedom, and have made it very nearly coextensive with the same domain in the United States. It simply means that the guaranties to the individual against the government itself are still wanting. It means that he is still exposed to the possible caprice and tyranny of the legislative and executive powers. It means that almost the whole power of the state over against the individual is still vested in the government. It means that the distinction between state and government is still in its infancy in this system. In the French system there is not the slightest trace of a 1 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, 1877. 3 Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, I. Band, S. 549 ff. 8 Reichsverfassung, Art. 78. General Principles. 181 constitutional guaranty of individual liberty. 1 The legislative power is the ultimate interpreter of the constitution; 2 and the machinery for amending the constitution can be set in motion only by the legislature. 3 Moreover, the executive power appoints and removes at pleasure those quasi-judicial persons who decide controversies which arise between the individual and the government in the course of the admin- istration of the law. 4 The regular judicial power in France is created by the legislature, and the judges hold by a tenure and for a term designated by the legislature. The legislature may, therefore, abolish the judicial department or modify the tenure and term of the judges in any manner which it may choose or fancy. Moreover, the ordinary judi- ciary has, as above indicated, no general jurisdiction over con- troversies in which the administration is a party. The indi- vidual has thus generally but one recourse in case of a denial of his liberty by the administration, and that is to the legisla- ture. The legislature cannot impeach the President in defense of the individual immunity, unless the act of the administra- tion in violating the same amounts to high treason in the President ; 5 but it may cause a change of ministry at its will, and it may impeach the ministers in case their acts in violation of the said immunities amount to crimes. Against the legislature itself, however, the individual has no defense. This does not mean that the individual has no liberty in France. In fact, the individual enjoys very nearly the same liberty there as here. It means simply that the guaranties of individual liberty against the powers of the government itself are entirely wanting. It means that in regard to this 1 Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der franzosischen Republik, S. 27. 2 Ibid. S. 23. 8 Loi relative k 1'organisation des pouvoirs publics, 25-28 fevrier, Art. 8. 4 Lebon, Das Staatsrecht der franzosischen Republik, S. 78. 5 Loi relative a 1'organisation des pouvoirs publics, 25-28 fevrier, 1875, Art. 6^ I and 2; Loi constitutionelle sur les rapports des pouvoirs publics, 16-18 juillet, 1875, Art. 12, 2. 1 82 Civil Liberty. subject the whole power of the state is vested in the govern- ment. It means that the distinction between state and government is, in this respect, wholly wanting. In the English system, while there are no constitutional guaranties of individual liberty against the Parliament, either when it acts as constituent assembly or when it acts simply as legislature, the individual has the defense of the regular courts, i.e. of the independent judiciary, against executive encroachments upon his liberty. The Parliament is the source both of individual liberty and of the courts, and cannot be limited or restrained by either. The Parliament has by statutes marked out a large domain of liberty for the individual ; and has made the judiciary the special guardian of this domain, by freeing the judicial tenure from the execu- tive power. But the Parliament may by statute sweep away every vestige of this liberty, if it will, and abolish the judiciary ; and it may, furthermore, cause the removal of any judge either by impeachment or by address to the Crown. It is true, as I have demonstrated, that the Parliament, when acting as the state, is somewhat differently organized than when acting simply as legislature ; i.e. that the Commons have a supremacy over the Lords and the King in the former case, while in the latter there is parity of powers between them ; but this difference does not furnish the individual with an independent way of appeal to the state against the legislature. The appeal must be made through the body against which it is made. The trouble here again is that the whole power of the state is vested in the govern- ment, and that no sufficient distinction is made between the state and the government. It will thus be seen that individual liberty is really a part of constitutional law in the system of the United States only. In all the other systems it is substantially statutory, Germany alone having made any progress, in this respect, out of the old system of governmental absolutism. I dwell General Principles. 183 upon this point, for it is the point in which the great advance of the American idea over the European, in the development of constitutional law, is most distinctly manifested. I dwell upon it, furthermore, because I desire to explain, at the outset, why in the discussion of this topic I shall devote myself almost exclusively to the consideration of the consti- tution of the United States. 184 Civil Liberty CHAPTER II. THE SYSTEM OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY PROVIDED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. WHEN the constitution of the United States issued from the convention of 1787, it contained several provisions touch- ing the domain of individual liberty, and when this instru- ment was submitted for adoption, much was said in the legislatures of the commonwealths, in the ratifying conven- tions and by the press of the day concerning a bill of rights, as it was then called, which should make the domain of indi- vidual liberty more complete. The idea was not that the United States government should be made by the constitu- tion the positive defender of this sphere of individualism, but that that government should itself be more expressly restrained from trenching upon this sphere. What was pro- posed was, therefore, rather a bill of immunities than of rights. I think it cannot be doubted that the view of that day was that the so-called "States " were in the main the proper de- finers and defenders of individual rights. The opposition to the adoption of the "bill of rights," by way of amendment to the original draft of the constitution, did not attempt to stand upon any principle worth naming. The argument of the opposition was, in brief : that the United States government being one of limited powers, the principle of constitutional interpretation in reference to its powers must be that what is not granted, expressly or im- pliedly, is denied ; and that, therefore, the " bill of rights " excepting anything was not necessary. But the answer to this : that the powers granted might, if pressed to the utmost In the Constitution of the United States. 185 in all directions, conflict at some point or other with indi- vidual liberty, proved the more convincing. The first ten amendments, in the nature of such a bill, were framed and passed by the first Congress and subsequently ratified by the legislatures of the commonwealths in sufficient number to make them parts of the constitution. But if the political history of the United States from 1790 to 1860 taught anything, it was this: That the so-called States were not sufficient guarantors, to say the least, of indi- vidual liberty, and that the United States government must be authorized to change its position from a passive non- infringer of individual liberty to an active defender of the same against the tyranny of the commonwealths themselves. The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments express this change in the organic law. We may now proceed to the analysis in detail of the immu* nities guaranteed to the individual by the constitution of the United States. A. The Immunities against the Central Government. An immunity is, as I have above indicated, a defense estab- lished by the constitution in behalf of the individual against the powers of the government. The chief means of encroach- ing upon the domain of individual liberty which necessarily lay within the hands of government are the powers of criminal legislation, of taxation and of eminent domain. The restric tions placed by the constitution upon the exercise of these powers by the government are, when regarded from the stand- point of the individual thus protected, immunities. I. The Personal Immunities. The central government has no general power of crimi- nal legislation in those parts of the United States which enjoy the dual or federal system of government ; i.e. in the commonwealths. Its powers in this regard, in and for these parts, extend to only three species of crime, viz ; treason, 1 1 United States Constitution, Art. Ill, sec. 3. 1 86 Civil Liberty counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, and offences against the Law of Nations. 1 The judi- cial department of the central government has criminal juris- diction only so far as it is conferred by the constitution and the statutes of Congress made in accordance therewith. 2 The executive power is, of course, confined within the same bound- aries. On the other hand, upon the high seas, 3 and in those parts of the United States not enjoying the dual system of government, general powers of legislation and administration in respect to crime are conferred upon the central government by the constitution. 4 But the powers of the central govern- ment in regard both to crimes committed within the common- wealths and those committed upon the high seas and within those parts of the United States not yet erected into common- wealths are placed under many important limitations, all of which are of the character of individual immunities, as follows : 1. The Congress can pass no bill of attainder or ex post facto law; 6 i.e. the legislative department shall not act as a court and convict any one of common crime by its reso- lutions ; nor pass a law making an act, innocent at the time of its committal, criminal ; or, if the act be already a crime, a law increasing the penalty or lessening the evidence neces- sary to conviction or altering in any manner the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. 6 2. The government cannot issue or authorize general war- rants of search or arrest ; but all warrants must rest upon 1 United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, 6 and 10. 2 Ex parte Bollman, U. S. Reports, 4 Cranch, 75; United States v. Hud- son, U S. Reports, 7 Cranch, 32; United States v. Coolidge, U. S. Reports, I Wheaton, 415; United States v. Bevans, U. S. Reports, 3 Wheaton, 336. 8 United States Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, 10. 4 Ibid. Art. IV, sec. 3, 2. 5 Ibid. Art. I, sec. 9, 3. 6 Calder v. Bull, U. S. Reports, 3 Dallas, 386; Ex parte Garland, U. S. Re- ports, 4 Wallace, 333; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. Reports, 221. A law simply enlarging the class of persons who may testify in a given case is not, however, ex post facto in its application to offenses committed previous to its enactment. Hopt v. Utah, no U. S. Reports, 574. In the Constitution of the United States. 187 probable cause ; must be supported by an oath or an affirma- tion on the part of some reliable person ; must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized ; must contain the name of the person ; and must state with reasonable certainty the time, place and nature of the offense. 1 3. The government cannot, except in time of war, suspend the writ of habeas corpus ; i.e. it cannot prevent a person, under arrest and detention, from having his body brought immediately before a judge, in order that judicial determi- nation of the question of his further detention may be had. 2 4. The government cannot require a bail so excessive in amount as to be practically a denial of the privilege of bail. 3 5. The government cannot authorize any unreasonable delay in the trial of an individual legally held. 4 6. The government cannot authorize prosecution for any crime, the punishment of which is so grievous as the depri- vation of personal liberty, except by way of grand jury pre- sentment or indictment ; i.e. except upon accusation by at least twelve men of the country, who, it is presumed from their being men of the country or citizens, have no govern- mental interest in the oppression of their fellow-citizens, and will not seek to make criminal accusation a pretext for dis- posing of political opponents. 5 Military persons do not enjoy this immunity. 7. The government cannot authorize the trial of any person for a crime or for a misdemeanor, the punishment of which is 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. IV; Ex parte Burford, U. S. Reports, 3 Cranch, 448. 2 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 9, 2. 8 Constitution, Amendments, Art. VIII. 4 Ibid. Art. VI. 5 Ibid. Art. V; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. Reports, 417; Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. Reports, 348. 1 88 Civil Liberty so grievous as the deprivation of personal liberty, except by way of the jury process ; i.e. except by the participation of the community, whose peace shall have been violated, in the trial ; and except the rendering of the verdict be by the unan- imous agreement of the representatives of the community. 1 8. The government cannot authorize any arbitrary procedure in the trial. It cannot deport the accused for trial from the commonwealth and district in which the crime charged shall have been committed, or from the place already assigned by the legislation of Congress for the trial, in case the crime charged shall have been committed outside of the common- wealths. 2 It cannot authorize a secret trial. 3 It cannot de- prive the accused of the right to have counsel. 4 It cannot deny to the accused information of the nature and cause of his arraignment. 5 It cannot prevent him from confronting the witnesses against him. 6 It cannot refuse him compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 7 It cannot com- pel him to give testimony against himself, either by word of mouth or by the production of his private papers. 8 It cannot prosecute him a second time for the same offense, after a verdict either of conviction or acquittal shall have been pro- nounced upon him by a lawful jury proceeding upon a good indictment. 9 And it cannot deprive him of his life or liberty without fulfilling all of the requirements of a due process of law ; 10 i.e. without a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles definitely contained in these very provisions of the constitution which we have just been con- sidering, and upon points not covered by these, if any, accord- ing to those rules and principles " existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ances- 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. VI; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. Reports, 540. 3 Constitution, Art. Ill, sec. 2, 3; Amendments, Art. VI. 8 Constitution, Amendments, Art. VI. * Ibid. 6 Ibid. 6 Ibid. > Ibid. 8 Ibid. Art. V; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. Reports, 616. 9 Constitution, Amendments, Art. V. 10 Ibid. In the Constitution of the United States. 189 tors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country." 9. The criminal concept most liable to abuse, viz ; that of treason, cannot be fixed by the government. The constitu- tion itself defines it as the "levying of war against the United States, or adhering to the enemies of the United States, giv- ing them aid and comfort." Nor can the government so fashion the rules of evidence in a trial for treason as to secure an easy conviction nor attach a penalty to the crime which may fall upon innocent persons. The constitution requires the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or con- fession in open court in order to conviction, and ordains that no attainder of treason shall prevent inheritance of property from or through the attainted person, or work the forfeiture of the real estate belonging to the attainted person longer than during his or her life. 1 10. The government cannot authorize the imposition of excessive fines or the infliction of cruel or unusual punish- ments; 2 i.e. the criminal legislation of Congress upon the subjects assigned to it by the constitution must, in the fixing of penalties, follow the precedents of the common law. 11. If the constitution had created no express immunity of the individual against governmental power in respect to the liberty of opinion and its expression, it must certainly have been inferred as existing within those parts of the United States enjoying the federal system of government, i.e. within the commonwealths, from the fact that the consti- tution confers no power upon the government to make the free exercise of opinion and its expression by the individual either a crime, or a misdemeanor, or a tort. The constitu- 1 Constitution, Art. Ill, sec. 3, i, 2; Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, U. S Reports, 4 Cranch, 75 ; Bigelow v. Forrest, U. S. Reports, 9 Wallace, 339. 2 Constitution, Amendments, Art. VIII. i go Civil Liberty tion, however, makes the principle doubly sure by giving expression to the immunity. It ordains that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti- tion the government for redress of grievances ; or respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 1 These restrictions require a little more minute treatment, since they, in some respects, go beyond the well- understood principles of the common law. First. The freedom of speech and of the press. Since the constitution confers, neither expressly nor impliedly, any power upon the general government to control these subjects, except in the provisions authorizing the making of all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, it must be concluded that this immunity is complete, within the com- monwealths, as against the general government ; i.e. the general government can infringe it neither by way of censor- ship or prevention nor by way of punishment for its use or abuse. Nevertheless the Congress did, in the year 1798, pass an act for the whole United States, making the writing, printing, uttering or publishing of any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment; 2 and several persons were tried and convicted under this act. 8 This was one of the most unpopular statutes which the Con- gress ever enacted. Its constitutionality was doubted by a very large proportion of the citizens of the country. It evoked the noted Kentucky and Virginia resolutions. 4 It was allowed to expire in 1801, without any attempt to renew it. It certainly cannot be defended except from the stand- 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. I. * United States Statutes at Large, vol. i, chap. Ixxiv, sec. 2, pp. 596-7. 8 Cooper's Case, Wharton's State Trials, 659; Haswell's Case, Ibid., 684; Cal- lender's Case, Ibid., 688. 4 Elliot's Debates, vol. iv, pp. 528 ff. In the Constitution of the United States. 191 point of the extraordinary or war powers of the govern- ment. It is true that war with France threatened, but it was hardly so imminent as to justify the assumption of war powers ; still, the Congress is the body in our system which has the power of ultimately determining that question. 1 In the district of Columbia, in the territories, and in places within a commonwealth the jurisdiction over which shall have been ceded by the commonwealth to the general government, this immunity is far less extensive than in those parts of the United States enjoying the dual system of govern- ment. The general government is vested by the constitu- tion with general as distinguished from enumerated powers in the above-mentioned district, territories and places. 2 The rule of interpretation as regards such powers is, that what is not denied is granted. The general government may, therefore, control the expression of opinion within these places, in so far as the government is not restrained there- from by some provision of the constitution. The restriction contained in article first of the amendments is expressed in general language. It is not limited to the common- wealths, as to the scope of its action. This restriction upon the power of the government extends therefore to the district, the territories and other places subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the general government. The ques- tion then is : whether in such parts the immunity is, as in the commonwealths, total or, for the reasons just cited, less than total. In seeking the reply to this question we must certainly be allowed to assume as point of departure that this restriction was not intended to prevent the government of the United States from introducing and administering the law of slander and libel for the protection of individual reputa- tion in these parts. The common law never held the freedom of speech and of the press to be in any measure infringed by 1 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, n. 2 Ibid., Art. IV, sec. 3, 2. 192 Civil Liberty this law ; and the common law is the great source from which we draw the principles of interpretation of all provisions of our constitutions relating to private rights and immunities. If such power be not conceded to the general government, then these parts and places would be without any law of slander and libel, which would be an unendurable condition in a society professing to exist under the reign of law. It would inevitably lead to the re-establishment in practice of the duel self-help for the maintenance of personal honor and character. I hold, therefore, that the restriction can only mean that the general government shall create no un- ttsual law of slander and libel in those parts of the United States subject to its exclusive jurisdiction, but must follow, in respect to these subjects, the general principles of our jurisprudence as derived from the common law ; i.e. for example, the government shall not make criticisms upon itself or upon the public character of its officials slander or libel, nor undertake by way of censorship and prevention to prohibit the utterance or publication of anything. This I take to be the extent of the immunity guaranteed by the constitution to the individual against the government in those parts of the United States subject to the exclusive jurisdic- tion of the general government. The immunity is in such parts, therefore, not total, as in the commonwealths, for the simple reason that in the commonwealths the law of slander and libel is fixed and administered by the commonwealths, while in these other places, where the dual system of govern- ment does not prevail, the general government must fix and administer that law. Second. The freedom of assembly and of petitioning the government for the redress of grievances. Here again the distinction must be made between those parts of the United States enjoying the dual system of government, viz ; the commonwealths, and those parts subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of the general government. In the Constitution of the United States. 193 Within the commonwealths this immunity is almost total. The general government can exercise no powers whatsoever in regard to the assembling of persons within a common- wealth, unless the assembling be for a treasonable purpose, simply because the constitution does not confer upon the government any such powers ; and the principle of inter- pretation which must be applied in determining the extent of powers possessed by the general government within the commonwealths is that what is not granted by the constitu- tion is denied, is reserved either to the commonwealths or to the people. 1 On the other hand, the grant of general powers, as dis- tinguished from enumerated powers, in the government of those parts of the United States not under the dual or federal form, must be interpreted, as I have above maintained, upon the principle that what is not denied is accorded. This principle of interpretation would allow the general govern- ment to limit the immunity in question, as to such parts, by laws distinguishing between a peaceable and a riotous assem- bly, forbidding the latter and permitting only the former. In such parts the immunity against the general government is therefore not so complete as in the commonwealths. The reason for this is obviously the same as in the case of the freedom of speech and of the press. From whatever place the petition may come, however, the duty of the govern- ment to receive, and hear the prayer of the petition is the same. Third, The freedom of religion and worship. Here again the same distinction is to be made between those parts of the United States in which the federal system of government prevails, and those parts subject to the exclusive authority of the general government. In the former this immunity is total against the general 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. X; The Collector v. Day, U. S. Reports, II Wallace, 113. 194 Civil Liberty government. In the commonwealths the general government has no power whatsoever to touch this subject. The control of the same is assigned, in our system, exclusively to the commonwealths. This is, therefore, a sphere upon which the general government has no authority to intrude. On the other hand, in those parts in which the dual system does not prevail, the central government has general powers in regard to this subject as to all other subjects, except where these powers are denied to it by the constitution.- The sole restriction upon the power of the general government, as to this subject, is contained in the first two lines of the first amendment and reads : " Congress shall make no law respect- ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer- cise thereof." x The existence, in parts of the United States subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the general govern- ment, of a system of worship calling itself religion and asserting the practice of polygamy to be one of its exercises, has put this restriction upon the power of that government in reference to this subject to the actual test, and has given us an authoritative interpretation of the restriction. In the great case of Reynolds v. United States, the constitutional immunity of the individual in respect to the freedom of religion and worship was fixed and defined. 2 The court declared that by this constitutional restriction Congress is deprived of legislative power over opinion merely, but is left free to reach actions which it may regard as violations of social duties or as subversive of good order. The free exercise of religion secured by the constitution to the indi- vidual against the power of the government is, therefore, confined to the realm of purely spiritual worship ; i.e. to rela- tions between the individual and an extra-mundane being. 1 The principle of the constitution which denies to the government of the United States the power to make a religious test a qualification for holding office or public trust (Art. VI, sec. 3) creates a political immunity rather than one coming under the category of individual or civil liberty. For this reason I do not treat of it in this connection. a 98 U. S. Reports, 145. In the Constitution of the United States. 195 So soon as religion seeks to regulate relations between two or more individuals, it becomes subject to the powers of the government and to the supremacy of the law ; i.e. the indi- vidual has in this case no constitutional immunity against governmental interference. II. The Immtmities in respect to Private Property. The other principal avenue of approach to the sphere of individ- ual autonomy is through the powers of taxation and of emi- nent domain necessarily possessed by the government. Let us now examine the defenses of private property erected by the constitution in behalf of the individual against the government. So far as the constitution of the United States is concerned, private property may extend to everything but man. Man alone cannot be made the subject of property. 1 The general government cannot, therefore, as the constitution now stands, narrow the sphere of private property within those parts of the United States enjoying the federal system of government, i.e. within the commonwealths, by declaring anything, except only man, not a proper subject of private property. In the parts under its exclusive jurisdiction, the case is different, as I have already repeatedly explained. In these parts it may determine freely in what private property shall consist, within the single limitation that it cannot make man a subject of property. In these parts the constitution creates no other immunity for the individual upon this point. But, both in the commonwealths and in the districts and places subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the general gov- ernment, the defenses of the individual created by the consti- tution against the governmental powers of taxation and emi- nent domain are the same. i. The constitution requires that all bills for the raising of revenue shall originate in the lower house of the Congress ; f 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. XIII. 'Art. I, sec. 7, I. 196 Civil Liberty that all appropriations of money shall be made by law ; J that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation ; 2 and that no one shall be deprived of property without due process of law. 3 I have brought here together the general restrictions upon the powers of the government, and after briefly explaining them, I will proceed to the more specific limitations. First. The vesting of the power to originate tax levies exclusively in the more popular branch of the legislative department of the government is not a defense against the whole government, and therefore is not, strictly speaking, an immunity. Its advantage to the security of private property springs from the fact that the people, i.e. the suffrage-holders, have a more direct influence over this branch of the gov- ernment than any other, rather than from any restriction imposed by the constitution upon the government as to the extent of its power of taxation. The real immunity is to be found in the negative side of this provision, viz ; that the power of taxation shall not be exercised at all in any other way than as thus prescribed. The House of Representa- tives itself has not the power, either by separate resolution or by joining with the Senate and the President in a law to that effect, to permit the Senate, or any other branch of the government, to originate a bill for the raising of revenue; and I think it is at least a question whether, should the Senate or the President undertake to assume this power and the House acquiesce in the usurpation, the individual may not defend himself in the courts of the United States against the collection from him of any tax so levied, on the ground of its unconstitutionality. It does not seem to me that the judicial power could excuse itself from taking jurisdiction under the plea that this is a political question. As a general principle, the distribution of powers by the constitu- 1 Art. I, sec. 9, 7. 3 Amendments, Art. V 8 Ibid. In the Constitution of the United States. 197 tion between the different departments of the government is a political question ; but in this particular instance private property would be directly involved, and the United States courts have never declined jurisdiction where private property was immediately affected, on the ground that the question was political. Second. The constitutional restriction upon the power of the government in the appropriation of money, viz ; that it can be done only by law, i.e. not by order of the executive, creates no immediate immunity for the individual, but by preventing waste of money it keeps down the requirements of the treasury. If, however, the President should make appropriations of money, and the treasurers of the govern- ment funds should honor his orders, there is no way provided by the constitution whereby an individual could prevent the same. The only remedy is a political one, viz ; impeachment of the President and the treasurers by the Congress. If, again, the government should make wasteful appropriations by law, there is no way provided by the constitution whereby an individual could prevent the same. This is wholly a ques- tion of policy, and in our system the Congress is the final determiner of such questions. 1 This provision of the consti- tution creates, then, a probable defense of private property, but no actual immunity ; and I have referred to it at this point simply for the sake of giving a complete rhumt of all the defenses of private property, both actual and possible, under the same division. Third. The constitutional restriction upon the govern- ment's power of eminent domain is, however, a real immu- nity. The government may not take any property from the individual for public use without rendering just compensation therefor, and the government must always follow due process of law in depriving the individual of any property. 1 Georgia v. Stanton, U. S. Reports, 6 Wallace, p. 51. 198 Civil Liberty Due process of law in exercising the right of eminent domain means that the expropriation shall be for a public pur- pose, and shall be made by an act of the legislative depart- ment of the government ; that this act shall provide a fair and just means of determining the value of the property to be taken, giving opportunity for the owner to present evi- dence and be heard as to the value, and shall provide a just compensation to the expropriated owner. 1 The due process of law for the taking of private property by the government in any other manner than by the exercise of the power of eminent domain must be determined by look- ing, first, to "the constitution itself," and second, to "those settled usages and modes of proceeding" for the taking of private property by the government "existing in the com- mon and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country." 2 The individual is protected by the constitution against gov- ernmental encroachments upon his private property through any other forms of procedure than those above described. 2. The constitution more particularly describes the due process which the government must follow in the exercise of the power of taxation. First. The government cannot levy any tax upon things exported from any commonwealth ; i.e. from those parts of the United States in which the federal system of government exists. 3 The court has defined exports to be articles "actu- ally in course of transportation to the state of their destina- tion, or delivered to a common carrier for transportation." 4 1 United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. Reports, 513. 2 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., U. S. Reports, 18 Howard, 272. & Constitution, Art. I, sec. 9, 5. *Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. Reports, 517; Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. Re- ports, 504. In the Constitution of the United States. 1 99 On the other hand, the constitution does not forbid the government to tax exports from those parts of the United States which are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the general government. In such parts, therefore, this immunity does not exist for the individual. Second. The constitution provides that no direct tax shall be levied except in proportion to the population. 1 The consti- tution declares a capitation or poll-tax to be a direct tax, 2 and the Court has declared that a tax on any kind of property or on the income from property is a direct tax. 3 Third. The constitution provides that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ; i.e. looked at from the side of the individual immunity, none can be levied with partiality or lack of uniformity. The Court has defined uniformity in taxation to be its operation " with the same force and effect in every place where the sub- ject of it is found"; 4 i.e. the same rate of taxation upon the same article wherever found. Fourth. Judicial interpretation of the general spirit and principles of the constitution has declared that the general government cannot tax any of the necessary means and instrumentalities for the legitimate governmental acts and operations of the commonwealths. 5 I suppose, therefore, that the property of individuals in any such necessary means and instrumentalities, such, for example, as bonds of the com- monwealths, is shielded from the tax-power of the general government. 6 3 . I have said that the chief means possessed by the govern- ment for encroaching upon the constitutional domain of pri- vate property are the powers of taxation and eminent domain ; but these are not the exclusive means. The government might 1 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 9, 4. 2 Ibid. 8 Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 and 158 U. S. Reports, pp. 429, 601. * Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. Reports, 580. 6 The Collector v. Day, U. S. Reports, n Wallace, 113. 6 This is now so held in Pollock v. The Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 1 57 and 158 U. S. Reports, pp. 429, 60 1. 2OO Civil Liberty construct by legislation a system of judicial procedure, which would greatly expose the property of the individual. The constitution creates some immunities for the individual against the powers of the government in this respect. First. It prohibits the use of general search-warrants in the seizure of property by the officers of the government, in that it requires that all warrants shall rest upon oath or affirmation and shall describe particularly the place to be searched and the things to be seized ; 1 i.e. the individual has a constitu- tional immunity against the use of any other form of warrant by the government in the searching of his premises and the seizure of his papers and effects. Second. The constitution secures to the individual, in suits prosecuted in the courts of the general government where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, an immunity against any other form of trial than the trial by jury. 2 Third. The constitution secures to the individual an im- munity against the quartering of any soldier in his house in time of peace and also, except in a manner to be prescribed by law, in time of war. 3 This is, in outline, the domain of immunity against the powers of the general government expressly marked out for the individual by the constitution and expressly guaranteed to him by the constitution. It must be added, however, that the individual is impliedly exempted from the powers of that government in regard to all subjects not brought by the constitution within the realm of its authority. The domain of immunity is thus increased against the general govern- ment so as to correspond with the whole field of powers left by the constitution exclusively to the commonwealths. Within this field the general government has no authority to intrude at all, nor to bring the individual under its jurisdiction in respect to subjects contained therein. The United States 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. IV. a Ibid., Art. VII. 8 Ibid., Art. III. In the Constitution of the United States. 201 judiciary is obligated to defend the individual against any at- tack made by the general government upon this sphere of autonomy, a sphere created by direct implication from the general principles of the constitution. B. The Immunities against the Commonwealths. The sphere of individual liberty is, in a federal system of government, threatened from two quarters, viz ; from the central government and from the commonwealths. In some respects and under some circumstances the danger from the latter quarter is more to be dreaded than from the former, and therefore more to be guarded against by the constitution. Following the same order as before, I will treat first of personal immunities, and then of immunities in respect to property. I. Personal Immunities. i. The constitution prescribes that "no State" (common- wealth) "shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law." 1 The word "State" evidently means here both the people res- ident in, and the legislature of, a commonwealth. The lan- guage of the constitution is apparently preventive, but the constitution furnishes the general government with no means of anticipating any such acts upon the part of the common- wealths. These bodies may therefore, in spite of this prohi- bition, pass such acts, and the general government cannot deal with them until some person has been aggrieved by them and calls upon the judicial department of the govern- ment for defense. 2 The court will then nullify them in the particular case before it ; but the commonwealths are deterred from continuing to execute such measures in other cases only by the knowledge that if any person has the courage and the means to resist them, he will be sustained by the judicial department of the general government. When the constitu- tional convention of 1787 began its work of framing the 1 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, I. 2 Cummings v. Missouri, U. S. Reports, 4 Wallace, 277. 202 Civil Liberty present constitution of the United States, and before it had been compelled to compromise its first conviction and judg- ment with the views of the upholders of the old system, it provided efficient means for the execution of this prohibition. The Randolph resolutions, 1 the Pinckney draft 2 and the report from the committee of the whole house presented by Mr. Gorham 8 contain the provision that the laws enacted by the States, i.e. the commonwealths, shall be subject to veto by the legislature of the United States, when, in the opinion of the latter, they contravene the constitution and laws of the United States. Through the determined opposition of the particularists, this practical, though rather radical, solu- tion of this knotty question was stricken out, and in place of it we have the plan which first allows the mischief to happen, and then undertakes to cure it in each separate case by a long and expensive process. I have already explained the meaning of these terms, bill of attainder and ex post facto law, and will not here repeat the explanation. 2. The constitution provides that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction." 4 The language is not "in anyplace subject to their" exclusive "jurisdiction," but simply "their jurisdiction." The constitution then empowers Congress to enforce, by appropriate legislation, this provision in behalf of personal freedom everywhere within the United States, and especially therefore, from the nature of the case, against attempts to infringe it by the commonwealths, or by persons or combina- tions of persons resident within the commonwealths. It is, therefore, a constitutional right of the individual to call upon the government of the United States to defend him against 1 Elliot's Debates, vol. I, p. 144. a Ibid., p. 149. *Ibid., pp. 181, 182. 4 Constitution, Amendments, Art. XIII. In the Constitution of the United States. 203 any attempt, from any quarter, to enslave him or to subject him to any of the legal incidents of slavery. And in this case he may be protected by other means than the judicial. The government is not obliged to let the injury happen to the individual and then apply a remedy. The ninth section of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, which provides the means and measures for the execution of this mandate of the constitution, declares, "that it shall be lawful for the Presi- dent of the United States, or such person as he may empower for this purpose, to employ such part of the land and naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce the due execu- tion of this act." J I do not find either in the constitution, the laws or the judicial decisions any direct and formal definition of slavery or of involuntary servitude. The language of the constitu- tion would, I think, imply that they are not intended as co-extensive terms simply, but rather as cumulative terms. I infer from the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and of the decision in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, that the meaning of these two terms is : that no involuntary per- sonal servitude, either for life or for any period of time, nor any of the civil incidents or private law incidents of the same, shall be allowed to exist in any part of the United States, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 2 It will be noticed that I employ the expression "civil inci- dents." I do this in order to distinguish such incidents from political incidents, on the one side, and from social incidents, on the other. This provision of the constitution does not directly confer political rights upon anybody, though it is conceivable that it might do so indirectly ; as, for example, if some other clause in the constitution of the United States, 1 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 14, p. 29. 2 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 14, p. 27; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S Reports, 3. 2O4 Civil Liberty or some provision in the constitution or laws of a common- wealth, should declare that all free men shall have the right to vote, then the secondary effect of the execution of the thirteenth amendment would be to confer suffrage. On the other hand, the social incidents of involuntary servitude can- not be regarded as legally abolished by this provision, either directly or indirectly. They may gradually die out in conse- quence of the abolition of the civil incidents, but this process is one which must accomplish itself outside of the realm of law and in the domain of social disposition. It is indeed con- ceivable that law may be so expanded as to dominate the whole intercourse of society ; but this provision of the consti- tution does not authorize the legislature of the United States so to expand the laws of the United States in regard to this subject, and we trust that the legislatures of the common- wealths will not enter upon any such tyrannic course. In the Civil Rights Cases above cited, the Supreme Court of the United States, the ultimate interpreter of the constitu- tion in our system in regard to private rights, plainly declares that the thirteenth amendment has not abolished what may be termed the social incidents of slavery. These cases decide that acts of discrimination made by innkeepers, theatre- managers, and carriers of passengers, as regards the accom- modations furnished by them to different individuals, do not impose upon the persons, against whom such discriminations may be made, any incident of slavery or involuntary servitude within the meaning of the provision of the constitution abol- ishing slavery and involuntary servitude ; and that the act of Congress of March i, 1875, which undertook to secure to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and other places of public amusements, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, In the Constitution of the United States. 205 regardless of any previous condition of servitude," * is not warranted by the constitution, and is, therefore, null and void. 2 Of course, then, all relations more distinctly social than these mentioned stand still more completely, if possible, outside of the pale of the legal operation of this constitutional provision. The Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1 866, indicates, I think, correctly the incidents of involuntary servitude, which this thirteenth article of the amendments to the constitution abol- ishes. They are inequality of rights in the making and enforcing of contracts ; in suing ; in being parties and giving evidence in a suit ; in inheriting, purchasing, leasing, selling, holding, and conveying real and personal property ; in the benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per- son and property, as enjoyed by white citizens ; and, finally, the suffering of more grievous pains, penalties, and punish- ments than those inflicted upon white persons for the same offenses. 3 The Supreme Court evidently approves of this view. 4 It is undoubtedly the true view. Two avenues of approach to this immunity, as thus defined, are still open to the commonwealths ; two means of infring- ing upon the same still exist, which may be easily abused by the commonwealths. The first is the law of apprenticeship, which, in our system of federal government, is a subject that comes under the control of the commonwealths. The general incidents of apprenticeship are, that only a minor may be apprenticed ; that the apprenticeship shall not run beyond the date of the attainment of majority ; that the consent of the father, mother or guardian of the minor shall be given to the apprenticeship ; that the minor shall enter voluntarily into the same or, if the minor be a pauper, that the officers of the poor 1 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 18, part 3, sec. i, p. 336. a Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. Reports, 3. 8 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 14, p. 27. 4 109 U. S. Reports, 22. 206 Civil Liberty shall execute the indenture at their own discretion for the minor ; that the apprenticeship shall be made by way of an unassignable indenture ; and that the master shall be held to provide the apprentice with reasonable support, proper in- struction and proper care in case of sickness. 1 This law may, however, be modified at will by the legislature of each com- monwealth in our system. It is easy to see how a species of slavery could thus be introduced under its cloak by the legis- lature of any commonwealth which might be so disposed. If, for example, the consent of the person to be bound should not be required, or if the indenture should be made generally as- signable, or if no instruction should be made necessary, so that the apprentice should grow up in utter ignorance of his or her rights, there would certainly result an involuntary servitude. This question came to a practical test very soon after the passage of the Civil Rights Act. A law of Maryland, distin- guishing between white and colored apprentices, by allowing the assignment of indentures of the latter to any one within the county and by making no provision for the education of colored apprentices, was reviewed by Chief Justice Chase in the case of Turner. 2 The Chief Justice pronounced this law to be one creating an involuntary servitude, and declared it null and void, as contravening the thirteenth amendment to the constitution and the Civil Rights Act of the Congress made in accordance therewith. The second means still in the hands of the commonwealths which may be so abused as to produce involuntary servitude is reserved in the constitutional provision itself. The plain inference to be drawn from the words " except as a punish- ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con- victed" is : that the commonwealths may still establish slavery and involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, and that the individual suffering such punishment will not be accorded 1 Kent's Commentaries, vol. II, p. 262 ff. 2 United States Circuit Court Reports, I Abbott, 84. In the Constitution of the United States. 207 the aid of the general government to deliver him from the same. Now, in our federal system of government, the legis- latures of the commonwealths, unless prevented or limited by the constitutions of the commonwealths respectively, have plenary power to define crime and fix the penalties of crime. They may define petty offenses as grievous crime, and punish the same with life-servitude. According to the terms of this exception in the constitutional provision under consideration it is only necessary that the person shall have been duly con- victed ; i.e. shall have been convicted by due process of law. If that shall have been followed, the general government has no further power of intervention. The commonwealths may thus first fill their prisons with convicts sentenced with griev- ous punishments for the commission of petty offenses, and then deliver these convicts over to individuals to be held in involuntary personal servitude for years or for life, by assign- able indentures, or in any other way they may determine. This is not mere speculation. Actual procedures in certain commonwealths have come very nearly up to what I have indicated as possibilities. The difficulty lies in regarding criminal law as local law. The administration of the criminal law should be local, but the fundamental principles of the law, the definitions, the punishments, and the fundamental rules of procedure in trial and conviction, should be national. They are, in their nature, national. 3. When the readmission to the Congress of the United States of members from the reconstructed commonwealths became desirable and necessary, the party which had secured the abolition of slavery was obliged to consider the possibility of its opponents regaining a majority in both houses of the Congress and also the presidency. As yet the constitution expressed the gain of the great civil war only in the two lines abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude. The Civil Rights Act of April Qth, 1866, might be abolished by the vote simply of a hostile majority in the Congress with the 208 Civil Liberty consent of a hostile President. It appeared wise, therefore, to elaborate the principles of the thirteenth amendment a little further in the constitution itself, and give the newly emancipated the status of citizenship by the constitution. Two advantages would thus be gained. First, the Congress could not by legislation abolish the constitutional provisions ; and, second, if the Congress should fail to enact the proper measures for executing them, they would be so nearly com- plete and self-executing that the judiciary might be able to apply them to each individual case. These were the reasons which led to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, so far, at least, as the question of individual or civil liberty is concerned. Subsequent events have shown the wisdom of the precaution, and have also demonstrated, in large degree, the shortsightedness of the wisest. The first section of the fourteenth amendment contains all that there is upon the subject of civil liberty in the entire article. It defines, first, the qualifications of citizenship ; second, it declares certain rights of citizenship ; and third, it declares certain rights of persons. As the last concept is the wider, I will deal with it first. First. The amendment ordains that no "State" (common- wealth) " shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 1 If any com- monwealth should undertake to do any of these things, the injured individual may call the government of the United States to his defense by means of judicial decision and its execution. It is true that had Congress passed no laws to enforce this provision, (as it is empowered to do by the fifth section of the amendment,) there might be room for argument that the provision is only declaratory of the moral duty of the commonwealth, 2 and if this view had prevailed the most 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. XIV, sec. I. a Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. Reports, 339. In the Constitution of the United States. 209 that the Court could have done would have been to free the individual from the force of the commonwealth, it could not have forced the commonwealth in his behalf. It is also true that the Congress might provide other instrumen- talities than the courts for the vindication of the individual immunities here established. We have seen that the Con- gress did do so in regard to the execution of the thirteenth amendment. The Congress has enacted laws in enforcement of this pro- vision ; 1 but it is extremely doubtful whether it has created any other means of meeting the hostile acts of the common- wealths than the judicial. In section thirteenth of the first of these acts, viz ; that of May 31, 1870, it is provided "that it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States or of the militia as shall be necessary to aid in the execution of judicial process issued under this act." This is certainly only declaratory of the constitutional power of the President in such a case, and does not create any new power for the President. The same act also re-enacts the Civil Rights Act of April 9th, 1 866, (which, as I have pointed out, does contain other means of enforcement than the judicial,) and in the re-enacting clause the act of 1870 provides that its sixteenth and seventeenth sections shall be enforced according to the provisions of the measure of i866. 2 These sections of the act of 1870 are but little more than a repetition of the first and second sections of the act of 1866. The act of 1875 provides no other means than the judicial for its enforcement. The supreme judicial power has interpreted the meaning of those terms employed in this clause of the constitutional pro- vision upon which all the important issues under the same 1 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 16, 140; United States Statutes at Large, vol. 18, part 3, 336. 3 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 16, 144, sec. 18. 2io Civil Liberty turn. In the case of Ex parte Virginia, 1 the Court held that the word "state" (commonwealth) signifies any of the offi- cers or agents by whom the powers of the commonwealth are exerted. The exact language of the Court is " that whoever, by virtue of public position under a State " (commonwealth) "government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name of and for the State " (common- wealth), "and is clothed with the State's" (commonwealth's) " power, his act is that of the State " (commonwealth). " This must be so or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the State " (commonwealth) " has clothed one of its agents with the power to annul or to evade it." That is to say, a commonwealth cannot avoid the interference of the general government in behalf of an individual, whose immunity under this provision of the constitution shall have been infringed by some agent or officer of the commonwealth, upon the plea that that agent or officer has acted ultra vires. The Court will not go into that question. It is enough that the common- wealth has clothed its agent with official power, and that he, by means of it, has infringed the immunity of the in- dividual established by this constitutional provision. The later case of Arrowsmith v. Harmoning 2 seems to modify this doctrine somewhat, in that it declares a commonwealth guiltless of a violation of "due process of law" when one of its courts renders an erroneous decision under a common- wealth statute, which statute, if correctly interpreted, would furnish the parties with the necessary constitutional protec- tion. The rule would thus seem to be that when a common- wealth clothes an officer with discretionary power, and he, in the exercise of such power, violates due process of law, then the commonwealth itself is guilty. Of course it is guilty if 1 100 U. S. Reports, 339. a Il8 U. S. Reports, 194. In the Constitution of the United States. 211 a legislative enactment violates due process. I shall treat of this point a little more fully further on. In the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1 the Court defines the word "person" to be any human being, whether citizen or alien, without regard to race, color or nationality ; and in the case of the Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 2 it places under the term persons also private corporations legally exist- ing within the commonwealth. It is the widest possible term of private law for designating parties who may be affected by any governmental act or the act of any governmental agent or official. The words "life," and "liberty," refer to physical freedom from violence and restraint, inflicted or imposed by govern- ment or the agents or officials thereof. The first of these words is self-defining, and the second has been defined in the discussion of the terms slavery and involuntary servitude. The meaning of the word "property" will be considered under division II. The phrase, " due process of law," which we here, for the first time, find directed against the commonwealths occurs, as we know, in another part of the constitution as descriptive of an immunity of the individual against the general govern- ment. In that case we know from the constitution itself exactly what it means : viz; the special warrant for arrest ; the privilege of habeas corpus and of bail ; indictment by grand jury ; trial by petty jury in open court ; full knowledge of the subject of the accusation ; opportunity to confront witnesses supporting the accusation ; power to compel the attendance of witnesses rebutting the accusation, etc. The question here is : does the phrase have the same significance when directed against the commonwealths ? The first general definition given to it by the Supreme Court when aimed at the commonwealths is to be found in the case of Pennoyer v. 1 118 U. S. Reports, 356. 2 125 TJ. S. Reports, 181. 212 Civil Liberty Neff. 1 The exact words of the Court are that due process of law, as required by the fourteenth amendment, means, when applied to judicial proceedings, "a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights." We should not be able to determine from this definition whether all the specifica- tions of due process contained in the immunity against the general government were also requisite in the proceedings of the commonwealth courts ; but the Supreme Court of the United States has at last cleared up this question definitely in the case of Hurtado v. California, 2 by deciding that due process of law, as required of the commonwealths by the constitution does not prevent a commonwealth from author- izing its courts to prosecute for crime by information ; i.e. to prosecute without the intervention of the grand jury. Due process of law as directed against the commonwealths is, then, not to be considered as defined at all in the con- stitution of the United States or in the laws of the United States made in accordance therewith, but as defined in the constitution, laws and customs of the commonwealths, sub- ject, however, to review in each case by the courts of the United States. It will be, therefore, as defensive of individ- ual liberty as the disposition of those courts, acting with full discretion, may choose to make it. This is an immense power, and the hands into which it i entrusted should be selected with the most scrupulous care. No narrow spirit can be endured in such a position. Civil liberty is in its nature, at the narrowest, national, and manifests, with the widening of political organization, the tendency to become human. The local control of this subject must be placed under strongest limitations if we would hold our public law up to the demands of our political science, i.e. of our true political conditions. 1 95 U. S. Reports, 714. 2 no U. S. Reports, 516. In the Constitution of the United States. 213 Again, the supreme judicial power has decided, in the case of Barbier v. Connolly, 1 that the fourteenth amendment was not designed to interfere with the police power of the com- monwealths. This opens a very wide field of discussion. What is the police power ? Who is authorized to fix its final limita- tions? Who is to decide how far it shall be permitted to infringe individual rights before the defense of " due process of law" can be successfully invoked against it ? I can find no satisfactory definition of this phrase, "police power," in the decisions of the Supreme Court itself. The earlier decisions make it identical with the whole internal government of the commonwealth. In the case of the City of New York v. Miln 2 the Court declared, "we should say that every law came within this description which concerned the welfare of the whole people of a State" (commonwealth), "or any indi- vidual within it, whether it related to their rights or their duties ; whether it respected them as men, or as citizens of the State" (commonwealth); "whether in their public or private relations ; whether it related to the rights of persons, or of property, of the whole people of a State " (common- wealth) "or of any individual within it, and whose operation was within the territorial limits of the State" (common- wealth), "and upon the persons and things within its jurisdic- tion." The recent case of Barbier v. Connolly, cited above, does not evince very great advance in the analysis of this sub- ject. The Court, in this case, defines the police power of the commonwealth to be its power " to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State" (commonwealth), "develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." The distinction between the two definitions consists in this : that while the former identifies the police- power with the whole power of internal 1 113 U. S. Reports, 27. 2 U. S. Reports, 1 1 Peters, IO2. 214 Civil Liberty government, the latter excepts from its domain the power to fix and administer the law of private rights. The latter dis- tinguishes the whole power of internal government into two parts, viz ; the jural and the police. Under the jural power it would place the development and administration of the common law, or, better, of private law. Under the police power it would place everything else. This is certainly some advance in thought upon the subject. It is the conclusion to which one of Europe's greatest publicists has arrived. 1 The scientific thought of the day has, however, gone much beyond this. It makes many further distinctions, which, however, cannot be clearly understood except by following briefly the historical development of the conception of the police power. The etymology of the word is Greek, TroTureta. In its Greek home it was the term which designated the whole internal government of the state as distinguished from its foreign relations. It came into the political science of mod- ern Europe at the epoch when the absolute monarchy was slowly developing its powers out of the regalia of the feudal monarchy. The revival of Greek and Latin learning was one of the chief forces contributing to this development, in that it furnished the contrast of a brilliant and powerful civiliza- tion, produced largely by the consolidation of governmental power, over against the dissolution, anarchy and poverty of the middle ages and the feudal system. The royal power began to expand its authority and activity beyond the limits of the royal regalia, or prerogatives recognized in the feudal compacts, and to interfere in the local affairs of the manors, bishoprics, abbeys and free cities in behalf of the individual subject. The struggle was long and bitter, but the crown was in favor with the masses, who, as tenants of manors and religious corporations, or as servants of city guilds, had had enough of petty tyranny. The result was the 1 Robert v. Mohl, Die Polizei-Wissenschaft, I. Bd. SS. 5, 6. Dritte Auflage. In the Constitution of the United States. 215 assumption by the crown of all governmental powers within the localities, and the administration of them through its own appointed agents. Under the conditions of the age, viz ; hatred of the petty lord by the common man, and yet no capacity in the mass of the people to assume sovereignty and organize government, the principle was rapidly devel- oped by the civilians about the throne that the King knew best what would promote the security and welfare of the peo- ple, and that to him belonged the duty and the power to invent and apply, at his discretion, the means for the attain- ment of the same ; i.e. the police power of the crown became absolute and identical with what we now term the sphere of internal government. Among the states of western Europe, this development was most thorough-going in France and Germany, especially in France, under whose Grand Monarch it reached a degree of absoluteness, which sacrificed the indi- vidual to the government ; i.e. the King's government became despotic. This result of the development produced the Revo- lution, the main purpose of which was to win for the individual man the constitutional power of seeking, in some degree, his own welfare in his own way ; and to secure the constitutional recognition to him of the domain of free action necessary for the attainment of the same. With this new thought and purpose, the political science of the present century has resurveyed the field of the police power, and has brought out four very fundamental distinc- tions in regard to it. The first is, that the police power is, in its nature, administrative, not legislative nor judicial; the second 'is, that it is not co-extensive with the whole scope of internal administration, as distinguished from external, but is only a branch of internal administration ; the third is, that, in the exercise of the police functions, the executive discretion should move within the lines of general principles prescribed either by the constitution or the legislature ; and the fourth is, that the community in its most local organize 216 Civil Liberty tion should participate, so far as possible, in the exercise of the police power. The purpose of these distinctions is to secure the individual against the tyranny of the government and, at the same time, to secure the public welfare against the selfishness of the individual ; and the function which they assign to the police power, in so far as it is directed against the actions of men as distinguished from the processes of nature, is that of restraining the individual in the exercise of his rights when exaggerated by him to the point of becom- ing a danger to the community. Every right acknowledged to the individual by the state may be abused by him to the detriment of the state. The state must therefore confer upon the government the power to watch for and prevent such abuse. This is the police power. Its realm is, therefore, the counterpart of the realm of individual liberty. It is the guard which the state sets upon the abuse of individual liberty. It does not prescribe the method according to which that liberty may be enjoyed, but it fixes the point past which it may not be pursued, and contains summary governmental authority for preventing its abuse. 1 The narrowing of the sphere of the police power is thus seen to be the general trend of the history of the theory of that power. I do not see how it can now be further narrowed without danger to public security. But the Supreme Court has not yet brought its definitions to the standard of the lat- est formulation of the theory. It gives, in its practice, a much wider range to the police power of the commonwealths than the latest thought upon the subject warrants. Its theory of the extent of the police power is, in the political science of to-day, obsolete. The practice of the Court, however, war- rants us in holding it to be the doctrine of our public law that the constitutions and laws of the commonwealths fix, in first instance, the domain of the police power of the respec- * L. von Stein, Verwaltungslehre, S. 1 86 ff. In the Constitution of the United States. 217 tive commonwealths ; but that these constitutions and laws are subject to revision, in any case of their application, by the United States judiciary, upon appeal made thereto by any individual under the plea that " due process of law " has not been observed in the deprivation inflicted upon him by the act of the commonwealth. This is again an immense power in the hands of the general judiciary. It is proper that it should be so placed ; but in its exercise, again, no narrow spirit can be endured. The largest wisdom, the broadest patriotism and the most exalted humanity are the qualities of character absolutely necessary to the personnel of a body vested with such a power. Lastly, the phrase " equal protection " of the laws has been defined by the Court to mean exemption from legal discrimi- nations on account of race or color. 1 This provision would probably, therefore, not be held to cover discriminations in legal standing made for other reasons ; as, for example, on account of age or sex, or mental, or even property, qualifi- cations. The Court distinctly affirms that the history of the provision shows it to have been made to meet only the unnatural discriminations springing from race and color. If a discrimination should arise from any previous condition of servitude, I think the Court would regard this as falling under the inhibition. The language of the decision implies this certainly, if it does not exactly express it. The Court has been generous in the application of the principle of its definition to the details of practice. It has declared, under the direct issue, that where the custom exists of a participation of the community in the administration of justice, i.e. where the custom of trial by jury exists, the exclu- sion of persons from the jury service on account of race or color or previous condition of servitude falls within the con- stitutional inhibition. 2 It seems to me that the reasoning 1 Strauder v. West Virginia, loo U. S. Reports, 303. 3 Ibid. 218 Civil Liberty of this case would prohibit a commonwealth from making race, color or previous condition of servitude a disqualifica- tion for holding judicial office. The decision of the Court seems to me to cover all discriminations in legal status or in the administration of justice arising from race, color or previous condition of servitude, and to interpret the consti- tutional provision as conferring upon the individual the power to invoke the interference of the judicial department of the general government against any attempts made upon his lib- erty by the commonwealths with this purpose. Second. The constitutional provision under consideration or- dains that "no State " (commonwealth) "shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 1 It will be observed at the outset that the language of this part of the provision differs somewhat from that employed in the part which we have just reviewed. It does not read, "no State" (commonwealth) "shall abridge the privileges and immunities," etc., as it would if it followed the language of the clause just referred to, but "no State " (commonwealth) " shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge," etc. ; and it does not read, "no State" (common- wealth) " shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of any person, as established by the constitution and laws of the United States," but, "the privileges and immunities of any citizen of the United States," What do these differences of expression signify? Who are citizens of the United States as distinguished from per- sons within the jurisdiction of the United States ? Against what organization or power or procedure of the common- wealths is the right of the citizen of the United States protected ? And what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States ? The constitution itself declares that " all persons born or 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. XIV, sec. I. In the Constitution of the United States. 219 naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic- tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State " (commonwealth) "wherein they reside." * Before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment the constitution con- tained no definition of citizenship, either of the United States or of a commonwealth. It referred to a citizenship of the United States as a qualification for membership in the two houses of Congress and for the presidential office, but it did not declare what should constitute such citizenship. Before the adoption of this amendment the leaders of the states- rights party held that citizenship of the United States was but the consequence of citizenship in some State (common- wealth). 2 Finally, before the adoption of this amendment, the Supreme Court itself indicated that it was inclining to the same view in the famous decision which declared that a man of African descent could not be a citizen of a State (commonwealth) or of the United States ; i.e. that the United States government had not the power to make him so. 3 This amendment, therefore, reverses the previously estab- lished principle. According to it, citizenship is primarily of the United States ; and secondarily and consequently, of the locality in which the citizen of the United States may reside. Citizenship, both of the United States and of the common- wealths, is thus conferred by the constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress made in accordance there- with. The commonwealths can neither confer nor withhold citizenship. 4 A citizen of the United States is now, ipso jure, a citizen of the commonwealth in which he may fix his residence ; and if any commonwealth should under- take to defeat the spirit of this provision by the enact- ment of hostile laws in regard to the gaining of residence within its limits, any individual suffering injury from 1 Constitution, Amendments, Art. XIV, sec. i. 2 Calhoun's Works, vol. II, p. 242. 8 Dred Scott v. Sanford, U. S. Reports, 19 Howard, 393. * Minneapolis v. Raum, U. S. C. C. of Appeals XII, 448. 2 2O Civil L iberty the same may invoke the interpretation of the term residence by the United States judiciary, and the aid of the general government in the protection of his liberty under that in- terpretation. There is nothing in this provision, indeed, which would prevent a commonwealth from permitting an alien to exercise the privileges of a citizen within the com- monwealth so far as that particular commonwealth is con- cerned. The provision was meant to enlarge the enjoyment of these privileges, not to contract them. It is easy to see, however, that a commonwealth may abuse this power to the detriment of the whole people of the United States. For example, a commonwealth might permit aliens to hold real estate in such quantities and under such tenures as to intro- duce a very disturbing element into our general system of ownership of land. I will say nothing at this point concern- ing the possible, nay, actual, abuse of this power by the com- monwealths in permitting aliens to exercise the suffrage, since the suffrage cannot be classed among the civil or pri- vate rights. I think a great deal of the confusion of thought which prevails in reference to this subject, wherever a federal sys- tem of government exists, is occasioned by the failure to dis- tinguish between the state and the two governments. The individual is not a citizen of either government, but of the state back of both. He derives his citizenship, with all its immunities and rights, from the state ; and the two govern- ments have only the duty and the power of observing and protecting those immunities and rights, each in the sphere assigned to it by the state. I will endeavor to expand this view still further when I come to inquire what are " the privi- leges and immunities of a citizen of the United States." Before leaving the subject of citizenship, however, I must call attention to the fact that this provision of the fourteenth amendment does not cover every possible case. Children born in foreign countries, of parents who are citizens of the Uni- In the Constitution of the United States. 221 ted States, and becoming, afterwards, subject to the jurisdic- tion of the United States without being naturalized, do not have their status expressly determined by this clause. Neither do persons born or naturalized in the United States and temporarily out of the jurisdiction of the United States. Neither do alien women married to citizens of the United States. Two of these cases had been already provided for by a statute of Congress before the adoption of the four- teenth amendment, viz ; the first and the third. The statute confers citizenship in the first case, provided the father has resided in the United States, and, in the third case, provided the woman is capable of naturalization. 1 As to the second case, our custom regards citizenship as continuing through any temporary absence, i.e. any absence which contemplates a resumption of permanent residence in the United States ; although the person, unless enjoying diplomatic extra-territori- ality, becomes temporarily subject to the civil, police and criminal jurisdiction of the foreign power, and any protection which our government may exercise over him, at such time, must be through the forms of diplomacy. 2 1 must also call attention to the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States, in its first interpretation of this clause, excludes children born in the United States, of parents who are citizens or subjects of foreign states, from United States citizenship. 3 The language of Mr. Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion of the Court, is as follows : "The phrase 'subject to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign states born within the United States." Now, consuls and the citizens and subjects of for- eign states, unless they are of the family or suite of an * United States Statutes at Large, vol. 10, 604. 2 Wheaton, International Law, Boyd's edition, Chap. II; Bluntschli, Das Mo derne Volkerecht, 338. 8 Slaughter House Cases, U. S. Reports, 16 Wallace, 36. 222 Civil Liberty ambassador or minister, are themselves subject, while in the United States, to the jurisdiction of the United States and of the commonwealths wherein they sojourn. Certainly, then, their children are. The learned justice seems to have had some other meaning in his mind for the phrase "subject to its jurisdiction " than that commonly held. The general understanding in regard to this phrase is that it signifies being within the territorial limits of the state concerned, and not enjoying the extra-territoriality of international custom. Certainly under such a definition the children born within the United States, of parents who are foreign consuls or sub- jects of foreign states, but who do not belong to the family or suite of an ambassador or minister or of the diplomatic head of a foreign state, are not, by the words of the four- teenth amendment, excluded from the citizenship of the United States, but are included among those enjoying the same. The Civil Rights Act of April gth, 1866, declared, "all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed," to be citizens of the United States. 1 If Mr. Justice Miller's interpretation of the law rested upon the language of this act, no fault could be found with it ; but, of course, the constitutional provision overrides the act wherever they differ, and it is the con- stitutional provision upon which he rests his explanation. I think the dictum of the Court is wiser law than the consti- tution, but I do not think it is the law as expressed in the constitution. In a later case Mr. Justice Gray, expressing the opinion of the Court, upholds the view of this subject advanced by Mr. Justice Miller, and gives a definition to the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." He says : "The evident mean- ing of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but com- 1 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 14, p. 27. In the Constitution of the United States. 223 pletely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance." l According to this defini- tion the constitutional provision should read : All persons born or naturalized within the United States, and owing the United States direct and immediate allegiance, are citizens of the United States, etc. But to whom does a person born in a given state owe direct and immediate allegiance ? This is a question as yet for each state to determine for itself. The juristic world has found two principal answers to it. They are called in legal language the jus soli and the jus sanguinis. The English common law contained the jus soli at the time of our separation from the motherland ; it is therefore the law of the United States, unless changed by constitutional or statutory provision. This has not happened. Now, what is the doctrine of the jus soli upon this point ? It is that any per- son born within the territory of a given state, and over which the state has established government, owes direct and im- mediate, or better, primary and natural, allegiance to that state, no matter whether his parents be citizens or subjects of, or aliens in, the said state. 2 There is one case only of exception to this rule, viz ; children born of parents who are extra-territorial persons ; i.e. who are the diplomatic heads or the diplomatic agents of foreign states. I do not think that the dictum of Mr. Justice Gray logically sustains the doc- trine of Mr. Justice Miller. The point actually decided in the case of Elk v. Wilkins was that an Indian, belonging to an organized tribe recognized by the government of the United States, could become a citizen of the United States under the fourteenth amendment only by way of naturalization. This is doubtless a sound interpretation of that provision, but it does not rest at all for its validity upon the dictum that children born in the United States, of parents who are sub- 1 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. Reports, 94. 2 Munroe Smith, Nationality, in Cyclopaedia of Political Science &c. (Ed. Lalor^ vol. 2, p. 941 ff. 224 Civil Liberty jects of foreign states, are not citizens of the United States. The dictum is therefore in both cases obiter, and the meaning of the constitutional provision has not been settled by the supreme interpreting organ in a case directly in point. What now are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States for the abridgment of which no common- wealth may make or enforce any law ? Two principal views may be taken of this subject. The first is, that they cover the whole civil liberty of the individual, as recognized in our constitutional system ; the whole domain of individual auton- omy, as protected by constitutional law against governmental encroachment proceeding from either the general government or the commonwealths. The second is, that they cover only a part of this liberty, a section of this domain ; the other part or division being determined wholly by the commonwealths and protected only by the commonwealths. There is no doubt that the latter was the legal view of our system down to the time of the incorporation of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments in the constitution. There is no doubt that, from the adoption of the constitution of 1781 to the civil war of 1861, the commonwealths held the position, in our system, of chief definers and protectors of individual liberty ; and that the general government, while forbidden to invade this sphere itself, was intrusted with the defense of it against the com- monwealths at but few points. It is just as true, on the other hand, that the history of those eighty years demonstrated the error and the danger of this distribution of power. If history ever taught anything, it is that civil liberty is national in origin, content and sanction. Not all mankind, indeed, are capable of enjoying the same degree of civil liberty ; and when the state is composed of different nationalities, occupy- ing distinct portions of its territory, it may be a sound public policy to make the degree of civil liberty accorded corre- spond with the degree of general civilization which each may have attained ; but this again is only saying that civil liberty In the Constitution of the United States. 225 is national where the state is a conglomerate of different nations. On the other hand, where the population of the state is substantially national, i.e. where the population of the state speaks a common language and has attained a sub- stantial consensus of opinion in regard to the fundamental principles of rights and wrongs, there the nationalization of civil liberty has become complete in fact, and, if it has not already become so in law, the impulse to adjust the form to the reality will never rest until it forces the public law of the state, upon this subject, into correspondence with its political science. I say that if history has taught anything in political sci- ence, it is that civil liberty is national in its origin, content and sanction. I now go further, and I affirm that if there is but a single lesson to be learned from the specific history of the United States, it is this. Seventy years of debate and four years of terrible war turn substantially upon this issue, in some part or other ; and when the Nation triumphed in the great appeal to arms, and addressed itself to the work of readjusting the forms of law to the now undoubted condi- tions of fact, it gave its first attention to the nationalization in constitutional law of the domain of civil liberty. There is no doubt that those who framed the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments intended to occupy the whole ground and thought they had done so. The opposition charged that these amend- ments would nationalize the whole sphere of civil liberty ; "* the majority accepted the view; 2 and the legislation of the Congress for their elaboration and enforcement proceeded upon that view. 3 In the face of all of these well-known facts, it was hardly to be doubted that, when a case involving this question should be presented to the Supreme Court of the 1 Congressional Globe, ist session, 39th Congress, part 3, pp. 2530-38. 8 Ibid., p. 2542. 9 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 14, p. 27 ff. ; voL 16, p. 140 ff.; vol. 18 part 3, p. 336 ff. 226 Civil Liberty United States, the final interpreting organ of the constitution upon all issues touching directly individual liberty, this great body would unanimously declare the whole domain of civil liberty to be under its protection against both the general government and the commonwealths. Great, therefore, was the surprise felt by the scientific students of our political his- tory when, in the December term of 1872, the decision in the Slaughter House Cases 1 was announced, taking the other ground, viz ; that still only a part of civil liberty has been nationalized, and that by far the larger and more important part is still subject, without appeal, to the power of the com- monwealths. This opinion was concurred in by only a bare majority of the court. Both the chief justice, who had been one of the principal actors in the great conflict through which it was supposed that the thorough-going settlement of this question had been reached, and Mr. Justice Field, who was regarded as the sturdy defender of the powers of the commonwealths against centralization, dissented. Mr. Justice Field wrote the dissenting opinion, which was concurred in by Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley. He held, to quote his own language, that the fourteenth amendment "does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State " (com- monwealth) "legislation. If this inhibition has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but only refers, as held by the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adop- tion specially designated in the constitution, or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and 1 U. S. Reports, 16 Wallace, 36. In the Constitution of the United States. 227 most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage. With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State " (commonwealth) " could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit such interference. The supremacy of the constitution and the laws of the United States always controlled any State " (commonwealth) " legislation of that character. . . . What, then, are the privileges and immu- nities which are secured against abridgment by State " (commonwealth) "legislation? In the first section of the Civil Rights Act Congress has given its interpretation to these terms, or at least has stated some of the rights which, in its judgment, these terms include ; it has there declared that they include the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property. That act, it is true, was passed before the fourteenth amendment was adopted, but the amendment was adopted, as I have already said, to obvi- ate objections to the act, or, speaking more accurately, I should say, to obviate objections to legislation of a similar character, extending the protection of the national govern- ment over the common rights of all citizens of the United States. Accordingly, after its ratification, Congress re- enacted the act, under the belief that whatever doubts may have previously existed of its validity, they were removed by the amendment. . . . The privileges and immunities desig- nated are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments" Expressed in the nomenclature which I have adopted in this treatise, Mr. Justice Field and his three learned col- leagues held that the fourteenth amendment had nationalized the common law in regard to civil liberty, and had placed its protection and development under the power and guardian- 228 Civil Liberty ship of the United States judiciary. Mr. Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion of the majority, should have no ob- jection to that view. Upon what other principle can his own opinion and that of the majority of the Court stand in the case of Watson v. Jones ? 1 In that case, decided before the Slaughter House Cases, he affirmed a decision and decree of the Circuit Court of the United States, which overturned a decision of the highest court of law of the commonwealth of Kentucky, upon a question which, according to all pre- vious canons of interpretation and practice, could come before the courts of the United States only because of the fact that the parties to the controversy were residents of dif- ferent commonwealths, and which, therefore, should have been decided by the United States courts in accordance with the law as determined by the highest court of law of the commonwealth. There is only one other possible principle upon which it can stand, viz ; that the common law in refer- ence to the fundamental principles of individual liberty was always national, both before as well as after the enactment of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. But this Mr. Justice Miller would doubtless deny even more strenuously than that it was made so by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. From whatever point of view I regard the opinion of the Court in the Slaughter House Cases, from the historical, political, or juristic, it appears to me entirely erroneous. It appears to me to have thrown away the great gain in the domain of civil liberty won by the terrible exertions of the nation in the appeal to arms. I have perfect confidence that the day will come when it will be seen to be intensely reactionary and will be overturned. But until then it is the law of the land, and as such I must state it in detail. The opinion declares that "there is a citizenship of the 1 U. S. Reports, 13 Wallace, 679. In the Constitution of the United States. 229 United States and a citizenship of a State" (commonwealth), "which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics and circumstances in the individual" ; that " there is a difference between the privileges and immu- nities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizen of the State " (commonwealth) " as such " ; that " the latter must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested," and the former only " are placed under the protection of the Federal Constitution" ; that the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States are free access to the seat of govern- ment of the United States in order " to assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in its administrative functions ; free access to the seaports, the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States " (commonwealths) ; protection over " life, liberty, and property, when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government " ; the " right to assemble peaceably and petition for redress of grievances ; the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ; the right to use the navigable waters of the United States ; all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations ; the right to become a citizen of any State " (commonwealth) " of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State" (commonwealth). "To these may be added the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment and by the other clauses of the fourteenth." I do not find in this enumeration the privilege of United States citizenship, created by article IV, section 2, paragraph i of the constitution, that "citi- zens of each State " (commonwealth) "shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States V (commonwealths). Of course this is mere over- sight, since the court has relieved a citizen of one common- 230 Civil Liberty wealth going into another from any discriminations which the latter may have sought to make against him. 1 I shall not enter upon any further criticism of this most ominously important decision. I will only add that, coming at the time when the reaction had begun to set in against the pronounced nationalism of the preceding decade, it partook of the same, and set the direction towards the restoration of that particularism in the domain of civil liberty, from which we suffered so severely before 1861, and from which we are again suffering now. Lastly, against what power is the inhibition in this clause of the constitutional provision directed ? The language upon this point is a little different from that employed in the clause which I have considered on pages 209 and 210. In the case which I am now discussing it is declared that "no State" (commonwealth) "shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge," etc. ; in the other case the provision reads: "nor shall any State" (commonwealth) "deny," etc. The two expressions, however, have one and the same signifi- cation. The commonwealth can act only through the making and enforcing of laws ; in fact, it can act upon the individual only by the process of enforcing the laws. The phrase "no State" (commonwealth) "shall make or enforce any law" means, therefore, practically, that no commonwealth shall, through any of the instrumentalities employed by it in the administration of government, do anything or omit anything which will abridge the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States. 2 The inhibition is therefore directed against any of the agents or officers of the commonwealth authorized to exercise its governmental powers. I have already pointed out the fact that a late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States has modified this sound rule somewhat, and, as I think, injuriously. 8 The commonwealth may escape 1 Ward v. Maryland, U. S. Reports, 12 Wallace, 163. 2 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. Reports, 339. 8 p. 210. In the Constitution of the United States. 231 the charge of a violation of " due process " and, by parity of reasoning, of abridging " the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States," if the injury to the individual should occur through an erroneous decision made by one of the courts of the commonwealth under a commonwealth statute which, if properly interpreted, would not inflict the injury. 1 By parity of reasoning, again, I do not see why the commonwealth may not escape responsibility for the erro- neous interpretation of such a statute by one of its executive officers in the course of its enforcement. In fact, this would not be at all so dangerous to the liberty of the individual, since he might apply to the commonwealth courts for protec- tion against the same ; while, in case the erroneous interpre- tation should be made by the highest court of the common- wealth, he can find no relief, should the United States courts be shut against him, except, perchance, through an appeal to the commonwealth legislature itself. Should he go there, however, he would meet another difficulty, viz ; the principle in our system that the judicial interpretations of law stand, in the order of supremacy, above the legislative. If the court should adhere to its interpretation, the legislature can defeat it only through impeachment of the judges. In short, it is practically impossible for the individual to secure the protection of his immunities and privileges as a citizen of the United States against such erroneous interpretation of a commonwealth statute by the highest court of the common- wealth unless he can take his case to the bar of the United States courts. Such, however, is the law upon the subject ; and, reiterated briefly, it is that the inhibition in this clause of the constitu- tional provision is directed against the law-making power of the commonwealths, those governmental agents of the com- monwealths executing its laws under correct interpretation 1 Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. Reports, 194. 232 Civil Liberty thereof, and those officials and agents whom the law-making power of the commonwealth clothes with discretionary pow- ers, and who, in the exercise of these powers, abridge any of the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States. These are the commonwealth organs which are com- prehended in the term " State " as employed in this provision, and whose acts are to be regarded as the acts of the " State." The acts of any other organs, when coming into conflict with the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States, are ultra vires, and the commonwealth is not respon- sible for them ; i.e. their correction cannot be assumed by the courts of the United States, but must be left with the com- monwealth. 4. Finally, the Court has decided that the constitutional provision vesting in the Congress of the United States the power " to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States " (commonwealths), " and with the Indian tribes," 1 is an inhibition upon the commonwealths in behalf of the individual, and renders any attempt of the com- monwealths to restrict the ingress and egress of persons, or in any manner to regulate the same beyond police necessities, null and void. 2 What the police necessities of the common- wealths in this respect are, the Court, as in other cases, reserves to itself to determine in detail. I have treated of the general character of the police power and will make ref- erence to what I have already said rather than indulge in repetition. 3 II. The Immunities in respect to Private Property. The individual is authorized by the constitution to invoke the aid of the United States government, in certain cases against the general power of controlling property, attributed in our system to the commonwealths. 1 Art. I, sec. 8, 3. 2 Henderson et al. v. Mayor of N. Y. ei a!., 92 U. S. Reports, 259; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Reports, 275; Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. Reports, 557. 8 p. 213 ff. In the Constitution of the United States. 233 I. The commonwealths are inhibited, without the consent of the legislature of the United States, from levying and col- lecting any imposts or duties upon any article in the hands of the person who sends it directly to, or receives it directly from, a foreign country, except in so far as this shall be necessary to defray the expenses incurred by the commonwealth in ex- amining the article and making certification as to its quality or fitness for use ; l from levying and collecting any charge upon any vessel according to its tonnage, as an instrument of com- merce, for entering or leaving a port or navigating the public waters of the country ; 2 and from levying and collecting any tax upon the property and -lawful agencies and instrumental- ities of the general government, no matter in whose hands they may be found, 3 or upon franchises conferred by Con- gress, 4 or upon receipts of a telegraph company from inter- commonwealth business, 5 or upon receipts from any inter- commonwealth business carried on by anybody. 6 Finally, the legislatures of the commonwealths are inhibited from exercising their general powers of legislation in regard to taxation or eminent domain in such a manner as to take, or to authorize anybody to take, private property, without the owner's consent, for any but a public object. 7 It is not said that the legislature of a commonwealth is thus inhibited, should it be specifically authorized thereto by a provision of the constitution of the commonwealth. 1 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, 2; Brown v. Maryland, U. S. Reports, 12 Wheaton, 419; Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. Reports, 38. 2 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, 3; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. Reports, 543. 8 McCulloch v. Maryland, U. S. Reports, 4 Wheaton, 316; Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, Ibid. 16 Peters, 435; Bank Tax Cases, Ibid. 2 Wallace, 200; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 Ibid. 151. * California v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 127 U. S. Reports, I. 5 Rotterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S. Reports, 411. 6 Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. Reports, 557; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 Ibid. 489. 7 Loan Association v. Topeka, U. S. Reports, 20 Wallace, 655 ; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. Reports, 487; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. Reports, I. 234 Civil Liberty 2. The commonwealths are inhibited from depreciating the property of their creditors, or aiding individual debtors to depreciate the property of their creditors, by making anything a legal tender in the payment of debts except the gold and silver coin of the United States. 1 3. The commonwealths are inhibited from restricting or regulating the transmission of property or messages by per- sons in the United States to persons in foreign states, or by persons in one commonwealth to persons in another. 2 4. The commonwealths are inhibited from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 3 This provision demands a more minute examination and explanation. First. The power against which the inhibition is directed is not exactly the same as that comprehended under the word " State " (commonwealth), as employed in the foregoing clauses and as explained at the close of subdivision I, of this subject. The language of the constitution, in this clause, is that "no State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing," etc. ; and the Court has decided that " the prohibition is aimed at the legislative power of the State " (commonwealth), " and not at the decisions of its courts or the acts of administrative or executive boards or officers." 4 The impairing of the obli- gation must be made by a provision of the constitution of the commonwealth, or by some act passed by the legislature of the commonwealth, 5 in order to warrant the intervention of the United States judiciary in behalf of the individual against the same. 6 1 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, I. 2 Henderson et al. v. Mayor of N. Y. et al., 92 U. S. Reports, 259; Welton v. Missouri, 91 Ibid. 275; Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 Ibid. 557. 8 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, I. * New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. Reports, 18. 5 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. Reports, 650. 6 It does not matter, however, whether the act or provision be original or adopted. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. Reports, 176. In the Constitution of the United States. 235 Second. The term "contract" has, in this connection, been made subject to exhaustive definition by the courts. It is held to mean a legally binding agreement in respect to property, either expressed or implied, executory or executed, between private parties, or between a commonwealth and a private party or private parties ; or a grant from one party to another ; or a grant, charter, or franchise from a common- wealth to a private party or private parties. 1 Third. The term " obligation " has received an equally exact and exhaustive definition. It is held to mean the exist- ing body of law, defining, regulating, securing and giving sanction to the contract. 2 In fact, we may say that the chief element in the obligation is the existing remedy provided by law for its enforcement. 3 Any distinction, therefore, between the obligation and the remedy, in this connection, is unsound. 4 Fourth. The most important term of the clause is the word " impair." Any alteration of the substance of the con- tract, or of the law governing the contract at the time it was entered into, would be, in popular definition, an impairment. There are, however, some grave difficulties in the way of accepting this as the legal definition of the term. Shall, for example, a commonwealth be regarded as impairing the obli- gation of a contract by simply changing its judicial proced- ure for the enforcement of the same, or by defending the public health or morals against any baleful influence or 1 Fletcher v. Peck, U. S. Reports, 6 Cranch, 87; Vanhorne v. Dorrance, Ibid. 2 Dallas, 304; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Ibid. 4 Wheaton, 518; The Binghampton Bridge, Ibid. 3 Wallace, 51; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. Reports, 5; New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 Ibid. 674; St. Tammany Water Works v. New Orleans Water Works, 120 Ibid. 64. 2 Bronson and Kinzie, U.S. Reports, I Howard, 311; McCracken v. Hayward, Ibid. 2 Howard, 608. 8 Walker v. Whitehead, U. S. Reports, 16 Wallace, 314; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. Reports, 69; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 Ibid. 595; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 Ibid. 203. * Nelson v, St. Martin's Parish, in U. S. Reports, 716. 236 Civil Liberty effect, which might arise by a strict adherence to the same ? In other words, is the power of the commonwealth to control its public policy in matters pertaining to judicial and police regulations limited by the body of contracts existing at any particular moment ? The first part of this question was answered in an early case, and to the position then taken the Court has substan- tially adhered ever since. The Court held that the common- wealth may change its judicial procedure without making any distinction between past and future contracts in the application of the new forms ; but must not, under the cloak of the same, so change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights and interests of any of the parties. 1 In re-affirming this opinion, twenty years later, the Court said : " It is difficult, perhaps, to draw a line that would be applicable in all cases between legitimate alterations of the remedy " under the power to regulate the modes of procedure, "and provisions . . . which impair the right " ; but the Court entirely concurred in the rule of the former case. 2 The Court has pointed out the chief things which may not be done by a commonwealth, under its power to regulate its judicial procedure. It may not pass an insolvent law which shall apply to past contracts. 3 It may not suspend the remedy as to past contracts. 4 It may not so shorten the period of a statute of limitations as not to leave a reasonable time for the commencement of a suit. 5 It may not substitute any other means of payment than that ex- pressed or implied in the contract, 6 or any other measure 1 Green v. Biddle, U. S. Reports, 8 Wheaton, I. a Bronson v. Kinzie, U. S. Reports, I Howard, 311. 8 Sturgis v. Crowningshield, U. S. Reports, 4 Wheaton, 122. 4 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 357, fourth edition. 6 Hawkins v, Barney, U. S. Reports, 5 Peters, 457; Sohn v. Waterson, Ibid. 17 Wallace, 596; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. Reports, 628. 8 McCracken v. Hayward, U. S. Reports, 2 Howard, 608. In the Constitution of the United States. 237 of values. 1 It may not make such subsequent exceptions of property from sale in execution of judgment for satisfaction of debt upon contract as shall substantially weaken the gen- eral security upon which the contract rested when it was made. 2 It may not withdraw from the lien of the judgment property which, when judgment was obtained, was bound thereby. 3 It may not subsequently prohibit the sale of prop- erty, on execution for debt upon contract, for less than an appraised value or percentage of an appraised value. 4 It may not subsequently authorize a redemption of property, after sale, by a mortgagor or his creditors, nor extend the period for redemption, if any, which was legal at the time the con- tract was made, 5 etc. The Court has given a very distinct, though more recent, answer to the second part of our question. It holds that not only is the police power of a commonwealth unlimited by the body of contracts existing at any given moment of time, but that a commonwealth cannot by any contract divest itself of the police power or limit the exercise of the same according to its own discretion. 6 What the boundaries and content of the police power of a commonwealth are the Court has not clearly denned, as I have elsewhere explained. As I have shown, the Court has given it an excessively wide range. 7 It has treated it as nearly identical with the whole internal government of the commonwealth, less the jural power. I believe this to be extravagant, as I have elsewhere said. 8 The Court has, however, excluded in detail from the police 1 Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. Reports, 566. 3 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. Reports, 595. 8 Gunn v. Barry, U. S. Reports, 15 Wallace, 610. 4 McCracken v. Hayward, U. S. Reports, 2 Howard, 608. 6 Bronson v. Kinzie, U. S. Reports, i Howard, 310; Howard v. Bugbee, Ibid. 24 Howard, 461. 8 Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. Reports, 645; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 Ibid. 25. 7 p. 212. 8 p. 213 ff. 238 Civil Liberty power, when brought into conflict with existing contracts, some things which, according to its general definition, would appear to be included in it. It has decided, for example, that a commonwealth cannot rescind an agreement, made by itself, not to exercise the power of taxation, or to exercise it only within certain limits. 1 In other words, it is law in our system that a commonwealth legislature may bargain away the tax power of the common- wealth, unless prohibited therefrom by the commonwealth constitution, and that, if it does do so, the United States gov- ernment will protect the rights of individuals established un- der the contract. In still other words, it is law in our system that a commonwealth may create a property right in an indi- vidual to an exemption from the operation of a governmental power. What is this but the negative side of the feudal system ? It seems to me that a sound interpretation of the constitution of the United States would not accord to the commonwealths the power to divest themselves by contract of the power of taxation ; and this for two reasons. The first is that, according to the true history and spirit of our system, the commonwealths are simply local governments, entrusted by the sovereign behind both the local and the general governments with governmental powers only, and that their discretion in the exercise of these powers cannot extend to the point of conferring upon any person or body of persons a right to an exemption from their exercise. The power to do this is not a governmental power merely. It is a power to change the system of government. It is a sov- ereign power. The commonwealth may of course exempt certain persons or property from taxation, but that is alto- gether another thing from an irrevocable exemption from its power of taxation. A temporary or a permanent suspension of the employment of a power is not at all the same thing as 1 The Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, U. S. Reports, I Black, 436; Univer- sity v. People, 99 U. S. Reports, 309. In the Constitution of the United States. 2 39 the creation of a disability to employ the power. This, I say, the sovereign alone can do, and the sovereign in our system is not the commonwealth. The second reason is that the constitution expressly provides that the United States shall guarantee to every commonwealth a republican form of gov- ernment. 1 It is not easy to define the republican form ; but it seems to me that one of its prominent characteristics is the preservation of all governmental powers by the government and their divestment only by the act of the sovereign. The most direct antithesis to republican government is the feudal form, because republican government is above all things representative government ; 2 because it regards government as public business purely and condemns in toto any property rights in governmental powers or in exemptions from their operation. The absolute monarchy stands in far less blunt contradiction to the republican form. The most truly abso- lute monarch of modern times declared himself to be but the "first servant of the state," i.e. the first representative of the state ; but the feudal form, upon both its negative and posi- tive sides, is thoroughly unrepresentative, and deals with public powers as with private rights. On the other hand, the Court has decided that a common- wealth cannot so grant away its power of eminent domain that the constitution of the United States will vest in an individual a right against the future exercise of that power upon the same property. 3 I must say that I do not compre- hend the reasoning which, upon general principles, concedes the power to a commonwealth to create a right to an exemp- tion from one of its governmental powers and not from another ; nor is there any such distinction between the powers in question as to justify such discrimination. Governmental powers are, in all cases, public trusts ; and the exemption of 1 Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 4. 2 The Federalist, No. XXXVIII, University edition, p. 259* 8 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. Reports, 403. 240 Civil Liberty an individual from the operation thereof, as well as the invest- ment of an individual with the exercise thereof, should always be subject to withdrawal at the pleasure of the government which exempts or which invests. This is, at least, the dictum of sound political science, though our public law does not yet fully correspond thereto. Our public law exaggerates private rights upon this point. The power of the United States government to defend the domain of contractual obligation against impairment by com- monwealth law might, however, be made nugatory in many cases, if the principle that the United States has no common law, within the commonwealths, should be adhered to. That principle, strictly applied, would require that, when the con- tract relates to a matter subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the commonwealth, the United States courts should follow the decisions of the highest courts of the commonwealth in interpreting the question both of the obligation and the impairment. This, however, the Supreme Court has abso- lutely and expressly refused to do. 1 It has asserted its inde- pendent power to interpret for itself the law of the common- wealth in reference to contracts and to determine for itself the question of impairment. This is certainly sound juris- prudence. Let it only be so expanded in application as to break down the old and, now certainly erroneous, principle that the United States has no common law within the com- monwealths. 2 The constitution itself, however, interposes a technical dif- ficulty in the way of an individual attempting to hold a com- monwealth by the obligation of its contract with him. The well-known eleventh article of the amendments provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be con- strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States " (commonwealths) 1 The Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, U. S. Reports, i Black, 406. 2 Political Science Quarterly, vol. 3, no. i, p. 136 ff. In the Constitution of the United States. 241 " by citizens of another State " (commonwealth) " or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." This provision has been interpreted as applying also to the case of a suit against a commonwealth by a citizen thereof. 1 The Supreme Court of the United States has, however, shown a most wise and commendable spirit in the interpre- tation of this limitation upon individual rights. It has assumed jurisdiction in behalf of the individual, wherever this could be accomplished without making the common- wealth the original and direct defendant in the suit. For example, it has decided that, if the commonwealth begins the suit, the individual may always appeal to the United States courts without being regarded as the prosecutor; 2 that where property of the commonwealth, or property in which the commonwealth has an interest, comes before the Court and under its control, in the regular course of judicial administration, without being forcibly taken from the possession of the commonwealth, the Court will pro- ceed to discharge its duty, in behalf of the individual party, in regard to that property ; 3 that an individual may bring an action in tort against an officer of the commonwealth, and that said officer cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Court by merely proving himself to be an officer and asserting his offi- cial authority to do the act complained of, but must prove that his authority is sufficient in law to protect him ; 4 that an individual may bring suit against an officer of a commonwealth to compel him to perform a well-defined duty, imposed upon him by law, in regard to a specific matter, in the performance of which the individual may have a distinct interest capable of enforcement by judicial process; 5 and that an individual 1 Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, p. 118. 2 Cohens v. Virginia, U. S. Reports, 6 Wheaton, 264. 8 Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. Reports, 436. * U. States v. Lee, 106 U. S. Reports, 196. 6 U. States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. Reports, 378. 242 Civil Liberty may bring suit against an official of a commonwealth to pre- vent him from violating his official duty to the injury of the plaintiff, when "adequate compensation for the injury cannot be had at law." 1 In the recent case of Poindexter v. Green- how, 2 the Court introduced distinctions in behalf of individual rights so refined as to be almost fanciful. This was an action in detinue brought by an individual against an officer of the commonwealth of Virginia to recover possession of property seized by the officer in payment of taxes. The individual had tendered to the officer coupons of Virginia bonds made receiv- able by an act of the commonwealth for taxes. The com- monwealth had by a subsequent act ordered the collection of all taxes in gold, silver, United States treasury notes, national bank currency, and nothing else. The officer made defend- ant in this suit sought, therefore, to oust the jurisdiction of the Court by making the suit appear to be directed against the commonwealth itself, but the Court said that the com- monwealth " is a political, corporate body, can act only through agents, and can command only by laws. It is necessary, there- fore, for such a defendant, in order to complete his defense, to produce a law of the State" (commonwealth) "which con- stitutes his commission as its agent, and a warrant for his act. This the defendant, in the present case, undertook to do. He relied on the act of January 26, 1882, requiring him to collect taxes in gold, silver, United States treasury notes, national bank currency, and nothing else, and thus forbidding his receipt of coupons in lieu of money. That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it is not a law of the State" (commonwealth) "of Virginia. The State" (commonwealth) " has passed no such law, for it cannot ; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law, has not done. The constitution of the United States, and its 1 Davis v. Gray, U. S. Reports, 16 Wallace, 203. Board of Liquidation v, McComb, 92 U. S. Reports, 531. 2 1 14 U. S. Reports, 270. In the Constitution of the United States. 243 own contract, both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia ; and that law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter taken, to be without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands, then, stripped of his official character ; and confessing a per- sonal violation of the plaintiff's rights for which he must per- sonally answer, he is without defense." This reasoning seems sophistical in several respects. For example, the distinction between the commonwealth as state and the commonwealth as government is impossible, since the commonwealth is not sttrte, i.e. sovereignty, at all, but only government. Again, the dictum that an act of the commonwealth legislature, not repugnant to the constitution of the commonwealth, is not law of the commonwealth, if it conflicts with a provision of the constitution of the United States, but that the latter is the law of the commonwealth, seems to me an extraordinary confu- sion of prepositions and an absurd statement of propositions. The constitution of the United States is the law of the United States within the commonwealth, not the law of the commonwealth, and an officer of the commonwealth is bound to obey and execute the law 0/"the commonwealth until it has been decided by the courts to be abrogated by the law of the United States within the commonwealth. The officer of the commonwealth cannot, therefore, in such a case, be personally responsible as a wrong doer. His act is the act of the com- monwealth. Notwithstanding the fact that I consider this reasoning to be erroneous, I approve the spirit of the Court which prompts it to the invention of such fictions in order to uphold the property rights of individuals against the too often manifested dishonesty of the commonwealths. I should prefer to see the eleventh amendment abolished ; but if this cannot be, I shall not regret to see it perforated by legal fictions. 5. The commonwealths are inhibited from depriving any 244 Civil Liberty person of property without due process of law, and from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privi- leges or immunities of citizens of the United States as to property. 1 That is, in all the acts of a commonwealth, when dealing with the property of individuals through the exercise of the powers of taxation and of eminent domain and through the procedures of its courts, due process must be followed, and none of the property privileges and immunities of United States citizenship may be encroached upon at all. I have explained these terms and phrases under the division of personal immunities ; and I have there also pointed out the means for vindicating all immunities guaranteed by the constitution of the United States against the possible at- tempts of the commonwealths to violate them. I will there- fore not occupy space with repetition of the same in this connection. 6. Lastly, the commonwealths are of course inhibited from exercising their powers over individuals in regard to mat- ters placed by the constitution under the exclusive control of the general government, such as the waging of offensive war, the making of treaties and alliances, the conducting of diplomatic relations, the regulation of commerce with foreign states and between the commonwealths, the fixing of the monetary system, the military system, the patent and copy- right systems, and the system of naturalization. The indi- vidual is exempted by the constitution from the powers of the commonwealths in this entire domain of the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government, and may always call upon the United States judiciary to relieve him from injuries resulting from any attempts of the commonwealths to intrude upon this domain. Such is the sphere, the content and the guaranty of civil liberty in our constitutional law. It must be confessed that 1 Constitution, Amendment XIV, sec. I. In the Constitution of the United States. 245 its boundaries are ragged and that its protection is, in many respects, incomplete, but it is the best which the world has yet devised, and it contains in it the principle and the process for a far more perfect development. C. The Suspension of the Immunities. In the foregoing pages I have endeavored to present the system of individual liberty, both as to content and sanction, as clearly and distinctly as the existing status permits. There is, however, another most important question to be consid- ered before we can dismiss this great subject. It is the inquiry as to whether there is any contingency under which the central government may temporarily suspend the consti- tutional guaranties of individual liberty and rule absolutely ; i.e. assume the whole power of the state, the sovereignty. From the standpoint of political science we should be obliged to answer this inquiry in the affirmative. In time of war and public danger, when the life of the state is threat- ened, the government must have command of every element of power for its defense. This has been the experience of all states. I will not cite the example of the great Roman state, because the objection may be made that it is anti- Teutonic. Neither will I rely wholly upon the experience of the Teutonic states, formed out of the amalgamation of Teutonic and Roman ideas, lest it may again be said that this element of their constitutions was drawn from a Roman source. I will take the pure Germanic state, as described by Caesar. 1 He tells us that in time of war a dux was chosen, and invested with power over life and death. Tacitus does not put it so strongly. He says the dukes led rather by their influence and example than by their power. 2 However that may be, the fact is well established that, in time of war and migration, the ancient liberty-loving Germans followed the custom of suspending government by the assemblies of 1 De bello Gallico, VI, 23. a Germania, c. 7. 246 Civil Liberty the freemen, and of living under the more or less complete dictatorship of the duke. From the earliest period of Ger- manic history to the 'formation of the constitution of the United States, the system of every Teutonic state has admit- ted the temporary dictatorship, when the necessities of war and public danger require its existence and activity. Does now the constitution of the United States contain any such provision ? or were our forefathers able to invent any other means, less dangerous to individual liberty, for the preserva- tion of the life of the state in periods of mortal peril ? The clauses of the constitution bearing upon this question are contained in sections 8 and 9, of Article I, and in sec- tion 2, of Article II. They read : "The Congress shall have power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States ; to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions ; to raise and support armies ; to provide and maintain a navy ; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States " (commonwealths), " when called into the actual service of the United States." It is very evident that Congress has the power to ordain universal military duty in the United States, and provide for calling the entire population into the service of the United States, after which the entire population would be made sub- ject to the rules and regulations governing the army and navy, which Congress may fashion at pleasure, without regard to the system of civil liberty. This would indeed be an extraordinary procedure, but its constitutionality could not In the Constitution of the United States. 247 be doubted. The constitution places no limitation upon the power of the Congress in the construction and the govern- ment of the military system. The whole power of the state is certainly vested in the government upon this point. But the question which we have propounded is a more diffi- cult one than this. It is whether, in the absence of any acts of Congress bringing the whole population of the United States into its military service, there is any exigency under which the government may suspend the guaranties of civil liberty as to persons not within that service. This question has received both a practical and a judicial answer in our history, and the one contradicts in some respects the other. I will not go farther back in our experience than the great civil war, since the precedents set before that period are incom- plete and indistinct. Neither will I, at this point, undertake to make any distinction between the different departments of the government in respect to the extraordinary powers of war. The question at this juncture is as to the powers of the whole government over against individual liberty. I. The practical answer. On the igth of April, 1861, the President of the United States issued a proclamation, declar- ing the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas in a state of blockade. 1 That is, the President declared that civil war existed. There is no question that the government of the United States may declare war or the existence of war. The only question is whether the Congress or the President is vested with the power, and, as I have said, that question is not at issue under this topic of our treatise. On the loth of May, 1861, the President of the United States issued a proclamation suspending the writ of habeas corpus in certain islands upon the coast of Florida. 2 In his message of July 4, 1861, the President informed the 1 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 12, p. 1258. a Ibid. vol. 12, p. 1260. 248 Civil Liberty Congress that he had authorized the commanding general to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, without limitation as to place. 1 There is no question that the central government may suspend the writ of habeas corpus, when it deems the act necessary to the public safety. The only questions in regard to the subject are whether the Congress or the President is vested with this power, and whether the suspension intro- duces the reign of martial law, or simply authorizes detention without remedy. The first question is not at issue under this topic. I will simply say at this point that the Congress fully indemnified the President by the law of March 3, 1863, de- claring the President authorized "to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof." z As to the second question, I will only say that the govern- ment, though inclined to interpret the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus as the introduction of martial law, i.e. as the suspension of all the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty, 3 rested also upon its power to make war and regulate the results thereof, in proclaiming the reign of martial law. 4 The fact is, then, that the government did assert and exercise the power to introduce martial law throughout the whole United States, both upon the imme- diate theatre of the conflict, and at points territorially far removed from it. 6 2. The judicial answer. This was finally reached, for the first time, after the close of the civil war, in the famous Milligan case. 6 The Court decided, in the first place, that " the suspension of the writ does not authorize the arrest of any one, but simply denies to one arrested the privilege of 1 McPherson, History of the Rebellion, p. 126. 3 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 12, p. 755. 8 Ibid. vol. 12, p. 1260. 4 Dunning, Political Science Quarterly, vol. I, no. 2, p. 187. 6 Ibid. p. 191. 6 U. S. Reports, 4 Wallace, 2. In the Constitution of the United States. 249 this writ in order to obtain his liberty." That is, the Court held that the suspension of the writ does not work the introduction of martial law generally, does not suspend all the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty, but sim- ply authorizes detention of the person once legally arrested, simply prevents the arrested person from being brought be- fore a regular judge for the purpose of having the question of his further detention determined by the judge. The constitutional forms of arrest and trial are still preserved. The Court decided in the second place, however, that there are occasions upon which the government can establish mar- tial law, i.e. suspend all the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. It holds that "if, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war really pre- vails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society ; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration ; for if this government is continued after the courts are re-instated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial law can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war. Because during the late Rebellion it could have been enforced in Virginia, where the national authority was overturned and the courts driven out, it does not follow that it sho'uld obtain in Indiana, where that authority was never disputed, and justice was always administered. And so, in the case of a foreign invasion, martial rule may become a necessity in one State" (commonwealth), "when in another it would be mere lawless violence." In fewer words, the Court holds that the government has 250 Civil Liberty the power, in time of war, to introduce martial law as conse- quence of its power to make war, but that the government cannot extend the reign of martial law to places "where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction," and cannot protract the reign of mar- tial law, once rightfully established, beyond the moment when the courts shall have been re-instated. It seems to me that this is a claim on the part of the Court that the judiciary shall determine when and where war exists. It is even more than this. It is a claim, not that the judiciary as a single body, not that the Supreme Court alone, but that each judge or, at least, each United States judge, has this power. I cannot find the warrant for this proposition anywhere in the constitution, and it is certainly very bad political science. It would place in the hands of a relatively insignificant and irresponsible official the power of life and death over the state, in times of its greatest peril. War is the solution of a question by force ; and this proposition would introduce into the process, at its most critical point, the pettiest kind of legalism. Scientifically, the view is weak and narrow ; practically, it cannot be realized. The commander has only to close the court-room, and place a guard at the door, and this criterion of war or peace will be made to conform to the determinations of power. Political science would confer, and, as it appears to me, the constitution does confer, the power of determining when and where war exists upon those bodies who represent the whole United States, who wield the power of the United States, and upon whom the constitution casts the responsibility of the public defence against both the foreign and the domestic foe. The opinion of the Court, which has fixed the other view as the law of our system, was delivered by Mr. Justice Davis, and concurred in by but a bare majority. Chief Justice Chase, on the other hand, delivered a vigorous dis- sent from the opinion, and was sustained therein by Justices In the Constitution of the United States. 251 Wayne, Swayne and Miller. The Chief Justice said : "When the nation is involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress to determine in what States " (commonwealths) "or districts such great and imminent pub- lic danger exists, as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the dis- cipline or security of the army, or against the public safety." * Again : martial law may be " called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and private rights." And again: "The fact that the Federal Courts were open could not deprive Congress of the right to exer- cise" martial law. "These courts might be open and undis- turbed in the exercise of their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to avert threatened danger, or to punish with adequate promptitude and certainty the guilty conspirators. ... In times of rebellion and civil war it may often happen, indeed, that judges and marshals will be in active sympathy with the rebels, and courts their most efficient allies. . . . We are unwilling to give our assent by silence to expressions of opinion which seem to us calculated, though not intended, to cripple the constitutional powers of the government, and to augment the public dangers in times of invasion and rebellion." This is undoubtedly the sound view. It is the only view which can reconcile jurisprudence with political science, law with policy, upon this subject. It is devoutly to be hoped that the decision of the Court may never be subjected to the strain of actual war. If, how- ever, it should be, we may safely predict that it will necessarily be disregarded. In time of war and public danger the whole 252 Civil Liberty power of the state must be vested in the general government, and the constitutional liberty of the individual must be sacri- ficed so far as the government finds it necessary for the pre- servation of the life and security of the state. This is the experience of political history and the principle of political science. In the German Imperial Constitution. 253 CHAPTER III. CIVIL LIBERTY AS PROVIDED IN THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION. A. The Immunities of the Individual against the Powers of the General Government. There are no express exemptions contained in this consti- tution in behalf of the individual against the powers of the general government. The principle, however, that the gen- eral government is a government of enumerated powers, leads us to the conclusion that the individual is exempt from the exercise of any powers over him by that government impli- edly denied to it by not being conferred upon it in the consti- tution, or expressly or impliedly reserved by the constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of the commonwealths. For example, in the realm of civil liberty : 1. The fact that the constitution fixes the period of active military service and vests no power in the government to change the same must be construed to create an exemption from the power of the government to demand, under ordi- nary circumstances, any longer period of service from the individual. 1 2. The fact that the constitution confers upon the general government the power of taxing imports and exports and the home production of salt, tobacco, distilled liquors, beer, sugar, and syrup, and makes mention of no other subjects of taxa- tion, must be construed as exempting the individual from the power of this government to tax any other species of property in his hands. In Bavaria, Wurttemberg and Baden the im- 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 59. 254 Civil Liberty munity is still wider. Distilled liquors and beer are not sub- ject to the tax power of the general government in these commonwealths. 1 The fact also that the power to levy these taxes is conferred upon the legislative department of the government, implies an immunity of the individual from the power of the government to tax him in any other manner than by legislation. 2 3. The fact that the constitution confers no power upon the general government to restrict the freedom of conscience must be construed as creating an immunity for the individual in this domain against that government. These three examples constitute in substance the extent of the immunity against the central government. It may, if it will, intrude at about every other point by legislation and administration. Neither has the constitution created any judicial body to defend this narrow domain against the impe- rial legislature and executive. The constitution regards the imperial legislature as the chief creator and supporter of civil liberty, and casts upon it the most wide-reaching powers and responsibilities in this sphere ; but, after all, this can produce only a statutory liberty which can, at any moment, be modified or destroyed by a legislative act, while we are seeking a con- stitutional liberty, and a constitutional guarantor of its main- tenance which is not swayed by popular passion nor by a despotic will. In the imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine there exists no constitutional immunity, either express or implied, for the individual against the powers of the general government. 3 B. The Immunities of the Individual against the Common- wealths. Upon this side the constitution is somewhat more gener- ous in the exemption of the individual from the powers of government. 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 35. 2 Ibid. Art. 4, sec. 2, and Art. 69. 8 Schulze, Lehrbuch cles deutschen Staatsrechtes, Zweites Buch, S. 365. In the German Imperial Constitution. 255 i. The constitution creates a common citizenship, in the sense that a citizen or subject of any commonwealth of the Empire shall be dealt with as a citizen or subject in every other ; i.e. he shall have the equal protection of the laws, shall be equal before the courts in the seeking of justice and the suffering of prosecution, shall have the equal right to acquire a residence, pursue any business, purchase and sell real estate, attain to citizenship and to the enjoyment of all civil rights with the citizens or subjects of the commonwealth into which he may go, and shall be in nowise restricted in the exercise of these rights and privileges either by the com- monwealth in which he resides or any other, except in so far as reasonable regulations in respect to communal member- ship may require. 1 This is not to be understood as the creation of an imperial citizenship antecedent to and separate from citizenship in a commonwealth. Whether there be any such imperial citizen- ship is doubtful. The commentators rather pronounce against it. 2 I think myself that there is ; but it cannot be derived from this article of the constitution. It is to be drawn from the whole spirit and nature of the constitution. This article only requires that no discrimination shall be made as to civil rights and privileges by a commonwealth of the Empire be- tween its own citizens or subjects and those of another com- monwealth. 3 This provision abolishes all existing discrimi- nations of this nature, and makes the creation of any such discriminations in the future unconstitutional. It establishes equality in the domain of civil liberty in each commonwealth for every citizen and subject of the Empire; but it does not imperialize, nationalize, this domain. So far as this article is concerned, the commonwealth might refuse to recognize any 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 3. 2 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes, Zweites Buch, SS. 24, 26; Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs, S. 29; Marquardsen's Handbuch, 8 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes, Zweites Buch, S. 25. 256 Civil Liberty civil liberty, provided only it were as tyrannic over its own citizens as over those of other commonwealths. This is simply the old provision of article fourth, section second, of the constitution of the United States, that " the citizens of each State " (commonwealth) " shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States " (commonwealths). It was fashioned from this provision. 1 It was discovered and demonstrated in the constitutional assembly of 1867 that this provision would not secure the civil liberty throughout the German state which that body intended to establish. 2 The difficulty was solved not by fixing the immunities and privileges of citizenship in the consti- tution, but by vesting the legislature of the general govern- ment with the power to deal with all these subjects by statutory provisions. Sections 1-6, 13, 15 and 16 of the fourth article of the constitution vest in the legislature of the Empire the power to nationalize civil liberty at about every point. The legislature has already made very large use of this power, 3 the result of which is to make the prin- ciple of the third article, in great degree, unnecessary. The citizenship of the Empire as thus established, with its immunities and privileges, is statutory, while, as I have ex- plained before, we are seeking a constitutional civil liberty and have in this treatise nothing to do with that which is merely statutory. So long as the individual is at the mercy of any part of the government, we are still, as to principle, within the system of absolutism, although the government may be never so liberal and benevolent. 2. The constitution expressly exempts the individual from the power of the commonwealths to impose upon him any tax on account of commerce and trade between the common- wealths. 4 1 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts, Zweites Buch, S. 24, Anmer- kung, I. 2 fl,i& * Von Ronne, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs, Bd. I, S. 1 06 ff. * Reichsverfassung, Art. 33. In the German Imperial Constitution. 257 3. The constitution creates an implied immunity against the powers of the commonwealths in respect to all matters which are made subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the general government. The commonwealths are excluded from this domain whether the general government occupies it or not. This makes the immunity constitutional instead of stat- utory : the immunity would be simply statutory if the com- monwealths were authorized to act in case of the inaction of the general government. I find but one article of the con- stitution in which the exclusive jurisdiction of the general government is expressly declared, viz ; the thirty-fifth. In this article it is ordained that "legislation in regard to the customs system," i.e. in regard to foreign commerce, "in regard to the taxation of domestic salt, tobacco, distilled liquors, beer, sugar and syrup, in regard to securing just col- lections and returns of these excises to the imperial treasury by the respective commonwealths, and in regard to the meas- ures necessary to secure the customs boundary of the Em- pire, shall be exclusively imperial." By implication, however, the exclusive jurisdiction of the general government reaches somewhat further. The commonwealths cannot deal, in any case, with the imperial constitution, or with the imperial official organization or relations, or the army, or with the navy, or the foreign merchant marine. 1 Consequently when the exercise of such powers would touch the civil auton- omy of the individual, we may regard the individual as possessing a constitutional immunity against the powers of the commonwealths to impose any restriction or regulation upon him in respect to these subjects. The general govern- ment might refrain from occupying this ground by any action of its own, and yet the commonwealths would have no authority whatsoever to intrude upon it, under the otherwise valid plea of supplementing the governmental acts of the general govern- ment, or under any other plea. 1 Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs, S. 93; Marquardsen's Hand- buch. 258 Civil Liberty 4. The immunities of the individual against the common- wealths are better secured than those against the general gov- ernment. The constitution creates no independent judicial power vested with the authority to interpret the constitution in the domain of civil liberty against the legislature and exec- utive of the general government itself. The judicial power in the German constitution is itself created by the legislature. It is a statutory body, not a constitutional body. It interprets the acts of the legislature, but cannot- pronounce upon the constitutionality of its acts. There is no legal defense for the constitutional immunities of the individual against the general government, should the legislature of that govern- ment choose to disregard them. Their violation by the executive power might possibly be checked. The constitu- tion creates a responsibility of the chancellor for every act of the Emperor. 1 It does not declare indeed to whom he is responsible, and it does not provide any means of enforcing his responsibility. Against the commonwealths, on the other hand, every department of the general government may be appealed to by the individual. This is, of course, to be inferred from the fact that the violation by a commonwealth of the immuni- ties of the individual against the commonwealth involves the violation of the imperial constitution and laws, which the gen- eral government must uphold. We are not, however, left wholly to inference in the establishment of this proposition. The constitution expressly provides, that "when justice is denied to any individual within or by a commonwealth, and no relief can be secured by ordinary legal process, the individual so injured may appeal to the Federal Council ; and it shall be the duty of the Federal Council to receive the appeal and, if it be well grounded, to force the recusant commonwealth to the performance of its duty." 2 Thus, when the constitu- tional immunities of the individual against the common- 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 17. Ibid. Art. 77 & ig. In the German Imperial Constitution. 259 wealths cannot be preserved through the ordinary legal supervision which the imperial judiciary exercises over the commonwealth judiciaries, this extraordinary remedy exists, which is intended and calculated to cover every possible case not otherwise provided for. 1 C. The Suspension of Civil Liberty. I have sufficiently explained in the previous chapter the necessity, under certain exigencies, for the temporary sus- pension of civil liberty by the general government, and for the assumption of the whole power of the state by the gov- ernment. No constitution can claim completeness which does not make provision for such exigencies, and which does not regulate, so far as the nature of the case permits, the manner and the results of the suspension, and the conditions of its termination. The German constitution vests the power to declare war in the Emperor, with the consent of the Federal Council ; 2 the power to defend the Empire against attack in the Emperor ; 3 the power to wage war in the Emperor ; 4 the power to make peace in the Emperor ; 5 the power to supervise the execution of the laws of the Empire in the Emperor ; 6 and the power to coerce a commonwealth in the Emperor, with the consent of the Federal Council. 7 We should be amply warranted in concluding generally, from these provisions, that the imperial government has the constitutional authority to assume a temporary military dic- tatorship in time of war or great public danger, and to deter- mine when the exigency, justifying the exercise of dictatorial powers, arises, and when it ceases to exist. We should conclude specifically also from these provisions that the Emperor, with the consent of the Federal Council, determines when this exigency arises in the cases of offensive war and in 1 Schulze, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechtes, Zweites Buch, S. 28. 2 Reichsverfassung, Art. II, 2. 8 Ibid. * Ibid. Art. 63. 5 Ibid. Art. II, I. 6 Ibid. Art. 17. 7 Ibid. Art. 19. 260 Civil Liberty the coercion of a commonwealth ; that the Emperor alone determines when it arises in defensive war, or in the employ- ment of the military power in the execution of the laws ; and that the Emperor alone, in all cases, determines when the exigency requiring martial law ceases to exist. The consti- tution does not, however, leave us to inferential conclusions. It makes explicit declaration. It ordains that the Emperor may declare the state of siege to exist in any part of the Empire when the public security is threatened. 1 The Em- peror may thus introduce the reign of martial law, and he alone can determine exactly when it shall terminate. This is distinct, exact and strong. It places the dictatorship just where a sound science of government would advise. It places it just where the logic of events will always finally fix it. These last remarks, however, are a little aside from my purpose at this point. Here I am dealing only with the rela- tion of the whole government to civil liberty. Tf the whole government may introduce martial law, then is my proposi- tion established that there are exigencies, upon the happen- ing of which the government may suspend the whole liberty of the individual, and assume to itself the whole powers of the state ; and that the government is the sole determiner of the question as to when these exigencies arise and when they cease to exist. From the provisions of the constitution which I have cited, there can be no doubt that the imperial government has this power. 2 The sixty-eighth article, which expressly confers this power upon the Emperor, ordains that, until an imperial law shall be passed, designating the conditions and prescrib- ing the form and the effect of the declaration of a state of siege by the Emperor, the Prussian law of June 4, 1851, shall be regarded as the imperial law. This Prussian law is still 1 Reichsverfassung, Art. 68. 8 Lahand, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reichs, S. 164; Marquardsen's Handbuch. In the German Imperial Constitution. 261 the law of the Empire. It designates both war and insurrec- tion as the conditions warranting the declaration. It pro- vides that, in the first case, the commander-in-chief, or the commanding officer on the scene of war, may make the dec- laration ; while in the second case, the ministry must make it. It further provides that the first effect of the declara- tion shall be the suspension of the constitutional liberties of the individual. 1 The only modification which this law requires, to make it fit the machinery of the general govern- ment, is the substitution of the chancellor for the ministry, since there is no imperial ministry, and no minister except the chancellor. The Emperor, then, as commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces, may immediately, or through any of his military subordinates, declare the reign of martial law in any part of the Empire, when a war exists which in his opinion threatens the public security; and, as chief of the civil administration, he may make the like declaration through the chancellor, when an insurrection exists which in his opinion threatens the public security. 2 From what- ever point of view the subject may be regarded, there is no question that the constitution vests in the general govern- ment full power to suspend temporarily the whole consti- tutional liberty of the individual and assume the whole power of the state, and to determine itself the existence of the exi- gencies which will warrant the assumption, and the moment of their cessation. The law of 1851, which the constitution adopts, provides, indeed, that the suspension can only be made in time of war and insurrection ; but when the imperial government declares that there is war, then there is war legally, and when it declares that there is insurrection, then there is insurrection legally ; and therewith the power of the government becomes constitutionally unlimited. 1 Preussische Gesetz-Sammlung fur 1851, S. 451 ff. 2 Von Holtzendorff, Rechtslexicon, Bd. I, I, S. 262. Dritte Auflage. 262 Civil Liberty. CHAPTER IV. THE SCIENTIFIC POSITION AND THE TRUE RELATIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE CONSTITUTION. I PASS over the subject of civil liberty in the constitutional law of England and France, for the simple and entirely con- vincing reason that there is none in either. It may be said that, as to the English constitution, this fact results from its unwritten character; but the constitution of France is a written instrument, and yet it contains not a trace of what we call civil liberty. Every particle of civil liberty in both systems is at all times at the mercy of the government. There is a large domain of civil liberty in both of these states. In fact, that domain is nearly identical in both, and corresponds very nearly with the same sphere in the systems of the United States and of Germany ; but it was not created by the state as distinct from the government, and it is not defended by the state against the government. When the English barons first constituted the Parliament as the state, and enacted Magna Charta, and established a committee to protect its provisions against the King, i.e. the government, there was then in England a constitutional civil liberty ; i.e. a civil liberty created by the state and defended against the government. But when this baronial Parliament, this organ- ization of the aristocratic state, became, half a century later, a part of the government, then the sovereign, the state, be- came merged in the government, so far as civil liberty was concerned, and civil liberty lost its supra-governmental source and support. In France, also, the first work of the revolution of '89 was, The True Position of Civil Liberty. 263 as we have seen, the organization of the state back of the King, i.e. back of the government, and then the creation of the constitution, in which civil liberty was denned and secured against the government. The constitutional character of civil liberty was preserved in all the changes of the French system, down to the present, except in the Napoleonic instruments. The fact that civil liberty has no place in the present demo- cratic constitution is striking. It is to be explained largely, but not wholly, upon the ground of the fragmentary and incomplete character of the constitution. There is no doubt that the French Republic needs a revision of its constitu- tional law. It needs a constitutional civil liberty and a more independent executive power. It is to be confessed and .regretted, however, that these are not the subjects which seem uppermost and most important in the minds of the revisionists. There is another reason, as I have indicated, for the omission of the charter of liberties from the constitu- tion. It is the psychology of the Gallic mind, which con- fuses civil liberty with political equality, and which, therefore, is ready to confide everything to a government proceeding from universal suffrage. This is altogether unscientific in theory and unsatisfactory in practice. I said, at the beginning of this chapter, that I would pass over the topic of civil liberty in the English and French sys- tems, because it is no part of their constitutional law. I might, indeed, present its principles, as worked out in these systems by legislative enactments, or by custom subject to legislative action, or both ; but that would tend to obscure the great fact which I wish to keep in mind : That upon this side of the Atlantic constitutional law has made advances far beyond anything which has been accomplished upon the other side. A true and perfect political science will require, as I have already pointed out, first, the organization of the state, i.e. the sovereignty back of the constitution ; second, the continued organization of the sovereignty within the con- 264 Civil Liberty. stitution ; third, the tracing out of the domain of civil liberty within the constitution, by the sovereignty, the state ; fourth, the guaranty of civil liberty ordinarily against every power, except the sovereignty organized within the constitution ; fifth, provisions for the temporary suspension of civil liberty by the government in time of war and public danger ; sixth, the organization of government within the constitution, by the sovereignty, the state ; and seventh, the security of the government against all changes, except by the sovereignty organized within the constitution. Of the constitutions which we have examined, only that of the United States contains all of these categories with any degree of completeness. And while it must be confessed that we can learn much from the European constitutions in the organization of government, and in the details of administration, yet for a clearly defined and well secured civil liberty, one which can defy govern- ment, and still be subject to the state, one which can do far more for civilization upon many sides, and upon many of its finer sides, than the best ordered government which the world has ever produced, Europe must come to us, and take lessons in the school of our experience. We have not yet by any means perfected our system. Our conceptions in reference to civil liberty are still clouded by crude notions about the federal system, and its requirements as to citizen- ship, and the immunities of citizenship ; but we have done by far the best in this direction which mankind has as yet ac- complished ; and while we feel the pressure upon all sides to expand the powers of government, in accordance with Euro- pean practice, let us never forget that constitutional civil liberty is the peculiar product of our own political genius ; and let us sacrifice no part of it, until the evidence becomes indisputable that, as to that part, individual autonomy has become either dangerous to the public security or detri- mental to the general welfare. APPENDIX I. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. APPENDIX I. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE the People of the United States, in order to form a more per- fect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America. ARTICLE I. SECTION i. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. SECTION 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legis- lature. No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths oC all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at 267 268 Appendix. least one Representative ; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massa- chusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Con- necticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three. When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers ; and shall have the sole power of impeachment. SECTION 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years ; and each Senator shall have one vote. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class, at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class, at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year ; and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise,- during the recess of the Legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legisla- ture, which shall then fill such vacancies. No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief- Justice shall preside : and no person shall be convicted without the con- currence of two-thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Constitution of the United States. 269 office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indict- ment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law. SECTION 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the -Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at anytime by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. SECTION 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business ; but a smaller num- ber may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties, as each house may provide. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. Each house shall keep- a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. SECTION 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a com- pensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same ; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time ; and no person 270 Appendix. holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office. SECTION 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States ; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States ; and before the same shall take effect, shall be ap- proved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. SECTION 8. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the com- mon defence and general welfare of the United States ; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ; To borrow money on the credit of the United States ; To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes ; To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States ; To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures ; Constitution of the United States. 271 To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States ; To establish post-offices and post-roads ; To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court ; To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations ; To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years ; To provide and maintain a navy ; To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces ; To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions ; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appoint- ment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress ; To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of par- ticular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings ; And To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. SECTION 9. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hun- dred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importa- tion, not exceeding ten dollars for each person. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, 272 Appendix. unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. No bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be passed. No capitation, or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another : nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law ; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be pub- lished from time to time. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States : And no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state. SECTION 10. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or con- federation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; coin money ; emit bills of credit ; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts ; pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any im- posts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws : and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States ; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships-of-war, in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. ARTICLE II. SECTION i. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows Constitution of the United States. 273 Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress : but no Senator or Representative, or person holding any office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. [The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabi- tant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each ; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed ; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President ; and if no person have a major- ity, then from the five highest on the list the said house shall, in like manner, choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote ; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a mem- ber or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice-President] The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes ; which day shall be the same throughout the United States. No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President ; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the 274 Appendix. said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resigna- tion or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a com- pensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the fol- lowing oath or affirmation : " I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." SECTION 2. The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States ; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur ; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and con- sent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise pro- vided for, and which shall be established by law : but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. SECTION 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress infor- mation of the state of the Union, and recommend to their considera- tion such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient ; he Constitution of the United States. 275 may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper ; he shall receive ambassadors and other public minis- ters ; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States. SECTION 4. The President, Vice-President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and mis- demeanors. ARTICLE III. SECTION i . The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compen- sation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. SECTION 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority ; to all cases aifecting ambassadors, other public ministers and con- suls ; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; to con- troversies to which the United States shall be a party ; to contro- versies between two or more States ; between a State and citizens of another State ; between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and con- suls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before men- tioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury ; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed ; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. 276 Appendix. SECTION 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of trea- son, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. ARTICLE IV. SECTION i . Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. SECTION 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privi- leges and immunities of citizens in the several States. A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. SECTION 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union ; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the juris- diction of any other State ; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property be- longing to the United States ; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State. SECTION 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of Constitution of the United States. 277 mem against invasion ; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. ARTICLE V. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two- thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Consti- tution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the sev- eral States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress ; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article ; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. ARTICLE VI. All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every State shall be bound there- by, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the mem- bers of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. f ARTICLE VII. The ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so rati- fying the same. 278 Appendix. Done in convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven and of the independence of the United States of America the twelfth In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names NEW HAMPSHIRE. JOHN LANGDON NICHOLAS OILMAN MASSACHUSETTS. NATHANIEL GORHAM RUFUS KING CONNECTICUT. WM. SAML. JOHNSON ROGER SHERMAN NEW YORK. ALEXANDER HAMILTON NEW JERSEY. WIL: LIVINGSTON DAVID BREARLEY WM. PATERSON. JONA : DAYTON PENNSYLVANIA. B FRANKLIN THOMAS MIFFLIN ROBT. MORRIS. GEO. CLYMER THOS. FITZSIMONS JARED INGERSOLL JAMES WILSON Gouv MORRIS Attest Go: WASHINGTON Presid. and deputy from Virginia. DELAWARE. GEO : READ GUNNING BEDFORD JUN JOHN DICKINSON RICHARD BASSETT JACO: BROOM MARYLAND. JAMES MCHENRY DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER DAN CARROLL VIRGINIA. JOHN BLAIR JAMES MADISON JR. NORTH CAROLINA. WM. BLOUNT RICHD DOBBS SPAIGHT Hu WILLIAMSON SOUTH CAROLINA. J. RUTLEDGE CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY CHARLES PINCKNEY PIERCE BUTLER. GEORGIA. WILLIAM FEW ABR BALDWIN WILLIAM JACKSON, Secretary Constitution of the United States. 279 ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATIFIED BY THE LEGIS- LATURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION. ARTICLE i. Congress shall make no law respecting an establish- ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg- ing the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. ARTICLE II. A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. ARTICLE III. No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. ARTICLE IV. The right of the people to be secure in their per- sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ARTICLE V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, lib- erty, or property, without due process of law ; nor shall private prop- erty be taken for public use, without just compensation. ARTICLE VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him ; to have compulsory process for 280 Appendix. obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. ARTICLE VII. In suits at common law, where the value in con- troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-ex- amined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. ARTICLE VIII. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces- sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. ARTICLE IX. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. ARTICLE X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. ARTICLE XI. The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. ARTICLE XII. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice- President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves ; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the Presi- dent of the Senate ; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted ; the person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole 'number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as Presi- dent, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal- lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote ; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be Constitution of the United States. 281 necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice- President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi- dent, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed and if no person have a majority, then from the two high- est numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President ; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be nec- essary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. ARTICLE XIII. Section i. Neither slavery nor involuntary servi- tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ARTICLE XIV. Section i. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu- nities of citizens of the United States ; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizeivs twenty-one years of age in such State. 282 Appendix. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con- gress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legis- lature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec- tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each house, remove such disability. Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave ; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro- priate legislation, the provisions of this article. ARTICLE XV. Section i. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. APPENDIX II. VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS APPENDIX II. I. GESETZ, BETREFFEND DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS. VOM 1 6. APRIL 1871. (RGB. 1871. Nr. 16. S. 63.) Wir WILHELM, von Gottes Gnaden Deutscher Kaiser, Konig von Preussen &c. verordnen hiermit im Namen des Deutschen Reichs, nach erfolgter Zustimmung des Bundesrathes und des Reichstages, was folgt : i. An die Stelle der zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und den Grossherzogthiimern Baden und Hessen vereinbarten Verfassung des Deutschen Bundes (RGB. vom J. 1870. S. 627 ff.), sowie der mit den Konigreichen Bayern und Wiirttemberg iiber den Beitritt zu dieser Verfassung geschlossenen Vertrage v. 23. und 25. Nov. 1870 (RGB. vom J. 1871 S. 9. ff. und vom J. 1870 S. 654 ff.) tritt die beigefiigte Verfassungs-Urkunde fur das Deutsche Reich. 2. Die Bestimmungen in Art. 80 der in i gedachten Verfassung des Deutschen Bundes (RGB. vom J. 1870 S. 647), unter III. 8 des Vertrages mit Bayern v. 23. Nov. 1870 (RGB. vom J. 1871 S. 21. ff.), in Art. 2 Nr. 6 des Vertrages mit Wiirttemberg v. 25. Nov. 1870 (RGB. vom J. 1870 S. 656), iiber die Einfiihrung der im Norddeut- schen Bunde ergangenen Gesetze in diesen Staaten bleiben in Kraft. Die dort bezeichneten Gesetze sind Reichsgesetze. Wo in den- selben von dem Norddeutschen Bunde, dessen Verfassung, Gebiet, Mitgliedern oder Staaten, Indigenat, verfassungsmassigen Organen, Angehorigen, Beamten, Flagge u. s. w. die Rede ist, sind das Deutsche Reich und dessen entsprechende Beziehungen zu verstehen. Dasselbe gilt von denjenigen im Norddeutschen Bunde ergangenen 285 286 Appendix. Gesetzen, welche in der Folge in einem der genannten Staaten ein- gefuhrt warden. 3. Die Vereinbarungen in dem zu Versailles am 15. Nov. 1870 aufgenommenen Protokolle (RGB. vom J. 1870 S. 650 ff.), in der Verhandlung zu Berlin vom 25. Nov. 1870 (RGB. vom J. 1870 S. 657), dem Schlussprotokolle v. 23. Nov. 1870 (RGB. vom J. 1871 S. 23 ff.), sowie unter IV. des Vertrages mit Bayern v. 23. Nov. 1870 (a. a. O. S. 21 ff.) werden durch dieses Gesetz nicht beriihrt. Urkundlich unter Unserer Hochsteigenhandigen Unterschrift und beigedrucktem Kaiserl. Insiegel. Gegeben Berlin, d. 16. AprU 1871. (L.S.) WlLHELM. Ftirst v. Bismarck. II. VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS. Seine Majestat der Konig von Preussen im Namen des Nord- deutschen Bundes, Seine Majestat der Konig von Bayern, Seine Majestat der Konig von Wiirttemberg, Seine Konigliche Hoheit der Grossherzog von Baden und Seine Konigliche Hoheit der Gross- herzog von Hessen und bei Rhein fur die siidlich vom Main bele- genen Theile des Grossherzogthums Hessen, schliessen einen ewigen Bund zum Schutze des Bundesgebietes und des innerhalb desselben giiltigen Rechtes, sowie zur Pflege der Wohlfahrt des Deutschen Volkes. Dieser Bund wird den Namen Deutsches Reich fiihren und wird nachstehende VERFASSUNG haben. I. BUNDESGEBIET. Art. i. Das Bundesgebiet besteht aus den Staaten Preussen mit Lauenburg, Bayern, Sachsen, Wiirttemberg, Baden, Hessen, Meck- lenburg-Schwerin, Sachsen- Weimar, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Braunschweig, Sachsen-Meiningen, Sachsen-Altenburg, Sachsen- Koburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Son- dershausen, Waldeck, Reuss alterer Linie, Reuss j lingerer Linie, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, Liibeck, Bremen und Hamburg. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 287 II. REICHSGESETZGEBUNG. Art. 2. Innerhalb dieses Bundesgebietes iibt das Reich das Recht der Gesetzgebung nach Massgabe des Inhalts dieser Verfassung und mit der Wirkung aus, dass die Reichsgesetze den Landesgesetzen vorgehen. Die Reichsgesetze erhalten ihre verbindliche Kraft durch ihre Verkiindigung von Reichswegen, welche vermittelst eines Reichs- gesetzblattes geschieht. Sofern nicht in dem publicirten Gesetze ein anderer Anfangstermin seiner verbindlichen Kraft bestimmt ist, be- gin nt die letztere mit dem vierzehnten Tage nach dem Ablauf des- jenigen Tages, an welchem das betreffende Stuck des Reichsgesetz- blattes in Berlin ausgegeben worden ist. Art. 3. Fiir ganz Deutschland besteht ein gemeinsames Indigenat mit der Wirkung, dass der Angehorige (Unterthan, Staatsbiirger) eines jeden Bundesstaates in jedem anderen Bundesstaate als In- lander zu behandeln und demgemass zum festen Wohnsitz, zum Gewerbebetriebe, zu offentlichen Aemtern, zur Erwerbung von Grund- stiicken, zur Erlangung des Staatsbiirgerrechtes und zum Genusse aller sonstigen biirgerlichen Rechte unter denselben Voraussetzungen wie der Einheimische zuzulassen, auch in Betreff der Rechtsverfolgung und des Rechtsschutzes demselben gleich zu behandeln ist. Kein Deutscher darf in der Ausiibung dieser Vefugniss durch die Obrigkeit seiner Heimath, oder durch die Obrigkeit eines anderen Bundesstaates beschrankt werden. Diejenigen Bestimmungen, welche die Armenversorgung und die Aufnahme in den lokalen Gemeindeverband betreffen, werden durch den im ersten Absatz ausgesprochenen Grundsatz nicht beriihrt. Ebenso bleiben bis auf Weiteres die Vertrage in Kraft, welche zwischen den einzelnen Bundesstaaten in Beziehung auf die Ueber- nahme von Auszuweisenden, die Verpflegung erkrankter und die Beerdigung verstorbener Staatsangehorigen bestehen. Hinsichtlich der Erfiillung der Militairpflicht im Verhaltniss zu dem Heimathslande wird im Wege der Reichsgesetzgebung das Nothige geordnet werden. Dem Auslande gegeniiber haben alle Deutschen gleichmassig Ans- pruch auf den Schutz des Reichs. Art. 4. Der Beaufsichtigung Seitens des Reichs und der Gesetz- gebung desselben unterliegen die nachstehenden Angelegenheiten : i) die Bestimmungen iiber Freiziigigkeit, Heimaths- und Niederlas- sungsverhaltnisse, Staatsbiirgerrecht, Passwesen und Fremdenpolizei 288 Appendix. und iiber den Gewerbebetrieb, einschliesslich des Versicherungs- wesens, soweit diese Gegenstande nicht schon durch den Art. 3 dieser Verfassung erledigt sind, in Bayern jedoch mit Ausschluss der Hei- maths- und Niederlassungsverhaltnisse, desgleichen iiber die Koloni- sation und die Auswanderung nach ausserdeutschen Landern ; 2) die Zoll- und Handelsgesetzgebung und die fur die Zwecke des Reichs zu verwendenden Steuern ; 3) die Ordnung des Maass-, Miinz- und Ge- wichtssystems, nebst Feststellung der Grundsatze iiber die Emission von fundirtem und unfundirtem Papiergelde ; 4) die allgemeinen Be- stimmungen iiber das Bank wesen ; 5) die Erfindungspatente ; 6) der Schutz des geistigen Eigenthums ; 7) Organisation eines gemeinsa- men Schutzes des Deutschen Handels im Auslande, der Deutschen Schifffahrt und ihrer Flagge zur See und Anordnung gemeinsamer konsularischer Vertretung, welche vom Reiche ausgestattet wird ; 8) das Eisenbahnwesen, in Bayern vorbehaltlich der Bestimmung im Art. 46, und die Herstellung von Land- und Wasserstrassen im In- teresse der Landesvertheidigung und des allgemeinen Verkehrs ; 9) der Flosserei- und Schifffahrtsbetrieb auf den mehreren Staaten gemeinsamen Wasserstrassen und der Zustand der letzteren, sowie die Fluss- und sonstigen Wasserzolle ; I. RG. v. 3. Marz 1873, betr. einen Zusatz zu dem Art. 4 Nr. 9 der Reichs- Verfassung. (RGB. 1873 S. 47). Wir Wilhelm von Gottes Gnaden Deutscher Kaiser, Konig von Preussen &c. verordnen im Namen des Deutschen Reichs, nach erfolgter Zustimm- ung des Bundesrathes und des Reichstages, was folgt: EINZIGER PARAGRAPH. Im Artikel 4 der Reichsverfassung ist der Nr. 9 hinzuzufugen : desgleichen die Seeschifffahrtszeichen (Leuchtfeuer, Tonnen, Bar- ken und sonstige Tagesmarken). Urkundlich unter Unserer Hochsteigenhandigen Unterschrift und beige- drucktem Kaiserl. Insiegel. (L. S.) WILHELM. Gegeben Berlin, d. 3. Marz 1873. ,,.. . , Furst v. Bismarck. 10) das Post- und Telegraphenwesen, jedoch in Bayern und Wiirt- temberg nur nach Massgabe der Bestimmung im Art. 52; 1 1 ) Bes- timmungen tiber die wechselseitige Vollstreckung von Erkenntnis- sen in Civilsachen und Erledigung von Requisitionen iiberhaupt; 12) sowie iiber die Beglaubigung von offentlichen Urkunden ; 13) die gemeinsame Gesetzgebung iiber das Obligationenrecht, Strafrecht, Handels- und Wechselrecht und das gerichtliche Verfahren ; Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 289 I. RG. v. 20. Dec. 1873, betr. die Abanderung der Nr. 13 des Art. 4 der Ver- fassung des Deutschen Reichs. (RGB. 1873 S. 379). Wir Wilhelm von Gottes Gnaden Deutscher Kaiser, Konig von Preussen &c. verordnen im Namen des Deutschen Reichs, nach erfolgter Zustimmung des Bundesraths und des Reichstags, was folgt : EINZIGER PARAGRAPH. An Stelle der Nr. 13 des Art. 4 der Verf. des Deutschen Reichs tritt die nachfolgende Bestimmung : Die gemeinsame Gesetzgebung tiber das gesammte biirgerliche Recht, das Strafrecht und das gerichtliche Verfahren. Urkundlich unter Unserer Hochsteigenhandigen Unterschrift und beige- drucktem Kaiserl. Insiegel. (L. S.) WILHELM. Gegeben Berlin, d. 20. Dec. 1873. .. _. , Furst v. Bismarck. 14) das Militairwesen des Reichs und die Kriegsmarine; 15) Mass- regeln der Medicinal- und Veterinarpolizei ; 16) Die Bestimmungen fiber die Presse und das Vereinswesen. Art. 5. Die Reichsgesetzgebung wird ausgeiibt durch den Bun- desrath und den Reichstag. Die Uebereinstimmung der Mehrheits- beschliisse beider Versammlungen ist zu einem Reichsgesetze erfor- derlich und ausreichend. Bei Gesetzesvorschlagen tiber das Militairwesen, die Kriegsmarine und die im Art. 35 bezeichneten Abgaben giebt, wenn im Bundes- rathe eine Meinungsverschiedenheit stattfindet, die Stimme des Pra- sidiums den Ausschlag, wenn sie sich fur die Aufrechthaltung der bestehenden Einrichtungen ausspricht. III. BUNDESRATH. Art. 6. Der Bundesrath besteht aus den Vertretern der Mitglieder des Bundes, unter welchen die Stimmfiihrung sich in der Weise ver- theilt, dass Preussen mit den ehemaligen Stimmen von Hannover, Kurhessen, Holstein, Nassau und Frankfurt . . 17 Stimmen fuhrt, Bayern 6 Sachsen 4 Wiirttemberg 4 Baden 3 Hessen 3 Mecklenburg-Schwerin 2 Sachsen- Weimar . i Appendix. Mecklenburg-Strelitz Stimmen. Oldenburg Braunschweig Sachsen-Meiningen Sachsen-Altenburg Sachsen-Koburg-Gotha Anhalt Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt Schwarzburg-Sondershausen Waldeck Reuss alterer Linie Reuss j lingerer Linie Schaumburg-Lippe Lippe Liibeck Bremen Hamburg zusammen 58 Stimmen. Jedes Mitglied des Bundes kann so viel Bevollmachtigte zum Bun- desrathe ernennen, wie es Stimmen hat, doch kann die Gesammtheit der zustandigen Stimmen nur einheitlich abgegeben werden. Art. 7. Der Bundesrath beschleisst : i) fiber die dem Reichstage zu machenden Vorlagen und die von demselben gefassten Besch- liisse ; 2) iiber die zur Ausfuhrung der Reichsgesetze erforderlichen allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschriften und Einrichtungen, sofern nicht durch Reichsgesetz etwas Anderes bestimmt ist; 3) tiber Mangel, welche bei der Ausfuhrung der Reichsgesetze oder der vorstehend erwahnten Vorschriften oder Einrichtungen hervortreten. Jedes Bundesglied ist befugt, Vorschlage zu machen und in Vor- trag zu bringen, und das Presidium ist verpflichtet, dieselben der Berathung zu iibergeben. Die Beschlussfassung erfolgt, vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen in den Art. 5, 37 und 78, mit einfacher Mehrheit. Nicht vertretene oder nicht instruirte Stimmen werden nicht gezahlt. Bei Stimmen- gleichheit giebt die Prasidialstimme den Ausschlag. Bei der Beschlussfassung tiber eine Angelegenheit, welche nach den Bestimmungen dieser Verfassung nicht dem ganzen Reiche gemeinschaftlich ist, werden die Stimmen nur derjenigen Bundes- staaten gezahlt, welchen die Angelegenheit gemeinschaftlich ist Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 291 Art. 8. Der Bundesrath bildet aus seiner Mitte dauernde Aus- schiisse i ) fiir das Landheer und die Festungen ; 2) fur das See- wesen ; 3) fur Zoll- und Steuerwesen ; 4) fiir Handel und Verkehr ; 5) fur Eisenbahnen, Post und Telegraphen; 6) fur Justizwesen; 7) fur Rechnungswesen. In jedem dieser Ausschiisse werden ausser dem Presidium mindes- tens vier Bundesstaaten vertreten sein, und fiihrt innerhalb derselben jeder Staat nur Eine Stimme. In dem Ausschuss fur das Landheer und die Festungen hat Bayern einen standigen Sitz, die tibrigen Mit- glieder desselben, sowie die Mitglieder des Ausschusses fur das See- wesen werden vom Kaiser ernannt ; die Mitglieder der anderen Aus- schiisse werden von dem Bundesrathe gewahlt. Die Zusammensetzung dieser Ausschiisse 1st fur jede Session des Bundesrathes resp. mit jedem Jahre zu erneuern, wobei die ausscheidenden Mitglieder wieder wahlbar sind. Ausserdem wird im Bundesrathe aus den Bevollmachtigten der Konigreiche Bayern, Sachsen und Wiirttemberg und zwei, vom Bundesrathe alljahrlich zu wahlenden Bevollmachtigten anderer Bundesstaaten ein Ausschuss fiir die auswartigen Angelegenheiten gebildet, in welchem Bayern den Vorsitz fiihrt. Den Ausschtissen werden die zu ihren Arbeiten nothigen Beamten zur Verfugung gestellt. Art. 9. Jedes Mitglied des Bundesrathes hat das Recht, im Reich- stage zu erscheinen und muss daselbst auf Verlangen jederzeit gehort werden, um die Ansichten seiner Regierung zu vertreten, auch dann, wenn dieselben von der Majoritat des Bundesrathes nicht adoptirt worden sind. Niemand kann gleichzeitig Mitglied des Bundesrathes und des Reichstages sein. Art. 10. Dem Kaiser liegt es ob, den Mitgliedern des Bundes- rathes den tiblichen diplomatischen Schutz zu gewahren. IV. PRAsroiUM. Art. ii. Das Presidium des Bundes steht dem Konige von Preussen zu, welcher den Namen Deutscher Kaiser fiihrt. Der Kaiser hat das Reich volkerrechtlich zu vertreten, im Namen des Reichs Krieg zu erklaren und Frieden zu schliessen, Biindnisse und andere Vertrage mit fremden Staaten einzugehen, Gesandte zu beglaubigen und zu empfangen. Appendix. Zur Erklarung des Krieges im Namen des Reichs ist die Zustim- mung des Bundesrathes erforderlich, es sei denn, dass ein Angriff auf das Bundesgebiet oder dessen Kiisten erfolgt. Insoweit die Vertrage mit fremden Staaten sich auf solche Gegen- stande beziehen, welche nach Art. 4 in den Bereich der Reichsge- setzgebung gehoren, ist iu ihrem Abschluss die Zustimmung des Bundesrathes und zu ihrer Giiltigkeit die Genehmigung des Reich- stages erforderlich. Art. 12. Dem Kaiser steht es zu, den Bundesrath und den Reich- stag zu berufen, zu eroffnen, zu vertagen und zu schliessen. Art. 13. Die Berufung des Bundesrathes und des Reichstages findet alljahrlich statt und kann der Bundesrath zur Vorbereitung der Arbeiten ohne den Reichstag, letzterer aber nicht ohne den Bundes- rath berufen werden. Art. 14. Die Berufung des Bundesrathes muss erfolgen, sobald sie von einem Drittel der Stimmenzahl verlangt wird. Art. 15. Der Vorsitz im Bundesrathe und die Leitung der Ge- schafte steht dem Reichskanzler zu, welcher vom Kaiser zu ernen- nen ist. Der Reichskanzler kann sich durch jedes andere Mitglied des Bundesrathes vermoge schriftlicher Substitution vertreten lassen. Art. 1 6. Die erforderlichen Vorlagen werden nach Massgabe der Beschliisse des Bundesrathes im Namen des Kaisers an den Reich- stag gebracht, wo sie durch Mitglieder des Bundesrathes oder durch besondere von letzterem zu ernennende Kommissarien vertreten werden. Art. 17. Dem Kaiser steht die Ausfertigung und Verkiindigung der Reichsgesetze und die Ueberwachung der Ausfiihrung derselben zu. Die Anordnungen und Verfugungen des Kaisers werden im Namen des Reichs erlassen und bediirfen zu ihrer Giiltigkeit der Gegenzeichnung des Reichskanzlers, welcher dadurch die Verant- wortlichkeit ubernimmt. Art. 1 8. Der Kaiser ernennt die Reichsbeamten, la'sst dieselben ftir das Reich vereidigen und verfiigt erforderlichen Falles deren Entlassung. Den zu einem Reichsamte berufenen Beamten eines Bundes- staates stehen, sofern nicht vor ihrem Eintritt in den Reichsdienst im Wege der Reichsgesetzgebung etwas Anderes bestimmt ist, dem Reiche gegeniiber diejenigen Rechte zu, welche ihnen in ihrem Heimathslande aus ihrer dienstlichen Stellung zugestanden hatten. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 293 Art. 19. Wenn Bundesglieder ihre verfassungsmassigen Bundes- pflichten nicht erfullen, konnen sie dazu im Wege der Exekution angehalten warden. Diese Exekution ist vom Bundesrathe zu be- schliessen und vom Kaiser zu vollstrecken. V. REICHSTAG. Art. 20. Der Reichstag geht aus allgemeinen und direkten Wah- len mit geheimer Abstimmung hervor. Bis zu der gesetzlichen Regelung, welche im 5 des Wahlgesetzes v. 31. Mai 1869 (BGB. 1869 S. 145) vorbehalten ist, werden in Bayern 48, in Wurttemberg 17, in Baden 14, in Hessen siidlich des Main 6 Abgeordnete gewahlt, und betragt demnach die Gesammtzahl der Abgeordneten 382. Art. 21. Beamte bediirfen keines Urlaubs zum Eintritt in den Reichstag. Wenn ein Mitglied des Reichstages ein besoldetes Reichsamt oder in einem Bundesstaate ein besoldetes Staatsamt annimmt oder im Reichs- oder Staatsdienste in ein Amt eintritt, mit welchem ein hoherer Rang oder ein hoheres Gehalt verbunden ist, so verliert es Sitz und Stimme in dem Reichstag und kann seine Stelle in dem- selben nur durch neue Wahl wieder erlangen. Art. 22. Die Verhandlungen des Reichstages sind offentlich. Wahrheitsgetreue Berichte iiber Verhandlungen in den offentlichen Sitzungen des Reichstages bleiben von jeder Verantwortlichkeit frei. Art. 23. Der Reichstag hat das Recht, innerhalb der Kompetenz des Reichs Gesetze vorzuschlagen und an ihn gerichtete Petitionen dem Bundesrathe resp. Reichskanzler zu iiberweisen. Art. 24. Die Legislaturperiode des Reichstages dauert funf 1 Jahre. Zur Auflosung des Reichstages wahrend derselben ist ein Beschluss des Bundesrathes unter Zustimmung des Kaisers erforderlich. Art. 25. Im Falle der Auflosung des Reichstages miissen inner- halb eines Zeitraumes von 60 Tagen nach derselben die Wahler und innerhalb eines Zeitraumes von 90 Tagen nach der Auflosung der Reichstag versammelt werden. Art. 26. Ohne Zustimmung des Reichstages darf die Vertagung desselben die Frist von 30 Tagen nicht ubersteigen und wahrend derselben Session nicht wiederholt werden. 1 Reichsgesetzblatt. 1888. S. no. 294 Appendix. Art. 27. Der Reichstag priift die Legitimation seiner Mitglieder und entscheidet daruber. Er regelt seinen Geschaftsgang und seine DiszipHn durch eine Geschafts-Ordnung und erwahlt seinen Prasi- denten, seine Vizeprasidenten und Schriftfiihrer. Art. 28. Der Reichstag beschliesst nach absoluter Stimmenmehr- heit. Zur Giiltigkeit der Beschlussfassung ist die Anwesenheit der Mehrheit der gesetzlichen Anzahl der Mitglieder erforderlich. Bei der Beschlussfassung tiber eine Angelegenheit, welche nach den Bestimmungen dieser Verfassung nicht dem ganzen Reiche ge- meinschaftlich ist, werden die Stimmen nur derjenigen Mitglieder gezahlt, die in Bundesstaaten gewahlt sind, welchen die Angelegen- heit gemeinschaftlich ist. EINZIGER ARTIKEL. Der Absatz 2 des Art. 28 der Reichsverfassung ist aufgehoben. _ Urkundlich unter Unserer Hochsteigenhandigen Unterschrift und beigedruck- tern Kaiserl. Insiegel. (L. S.) WlLHELM. Gegeben Berlin, den 24, Febr. 1873. _.. _. . Furst v. Bismarck. Art. 29. Die Mitglieder des Reichstages sind Vertreter des ge- sammten Volkes und an Auftrage und Instruktionen nicht gebunden. Art. 30. Kein Mitglied des Reichstages darf zu irgend einer Zeit wegen seiner Abstimmung oder wegen der in Ausubung seines Be- rufes gethanen Aeusserungen gerichtlich oder disziplinarisch verfolgt oder sonst ausserhalb der Versammlung zur Verantwortung gezogen werden. Art. 31. Ohne Genehmigung des Reichstages kann kein Mitglied desselben wahrend der Sitzungsperiode wegen einer m;t Strafe be- drohten Handlung zur Untersuchung gezogen oder verhaftet werden, ausser wenn es bei Ausiibung der That oder im Laufe des nachstfol- genden Tages ergriffen wird. Gleiche Genehmigung ist bei einer Verhaftung wegen Schulden erforderlich. Auf Verlangen des Reichstages wird jedes Strafverfahren gegen ein Mitglied desselben und jede Untersuchungs- oder Civilhaft fur die Dauer der Sitzungsperiode aufgehoben. Art. 32. Die Mitglieder des Reichstages diirfen als solche keine Besoldung oder Entschadigung beziehen. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 295 VI. ZOLL- UND HANDELSWESEN. Art. 33. Deutschland bildet ein Zoll- und Handelsgebiet, umge- ben von gemeinschaftlicher Zollgrenze. Ausgeschlossen bleiben die wegen ihrer Lage zur Einschliessung in die Zollgrenze nicht geeig- neten einzelnen Gebietstheile. Alle Gegenstande, welche im freien Verkehr eines Bundesstaates befindlich sind, konnen in jeden anderen Bundesstaat eingefiihrt und diirfen in letzterem einer Abgabe nur insoweit unterworfen werden, als daselbst gleichartige inlandische Erzeugnisse einer inneren Steuer unterliegen. Art. 34. Die Hansestadte Bremen und Hamburg mit einem dem Zweck entsprechenden Bezirke ihres oder des umliegenden Gebietes bleiben als Freihafen ausserhalb der gemeinschaftlichen Zollgrenze, bis sie ihren Einschluss in dieselbe beantragen. Art. 35. Das Reich ausschliesslich hat die Gesetzgebung liber das gesammte Zollwesen, iiber die Besteuerung des im Bundesgebiete gewonnenen Salzes und Tabaks, bereiteten Branntweins und Bieres und aus Ruben oder anderen inlandischen Erzeugnissen dargestellten Zuckers und Syrups, iiber den gegenseitigen Schutz der in den ein- zelnen Bundesstaaten erhobenen Verbrauchsabgaben gegen Hinter- ziehungen, sowie iiber die Massregeln, welche in den Zollausschliissen zur Sicherung der gemeinsamen Zollgrenze erforderlich sind. In Bayern, Wiirttemberg und Baden bleibt die Besteuerung des inlandischen Branntweins und Bieres der Landesgesetzgebung vor- behalten. Die Bundesstaaten werden jedoch ihr Bestreben darauf richten, eine Uebereinstimmung der Gesetzgebung iiber die Besteu- erung auch dieser Gegenstande herbeizufiihren. Art. 36. Die Erhebung und Verwaltung der Zolle und Verbrauchs- steuern (Art. 35) bleibt jedem Bundesstaate, soweit derselbe sie bisher ausgeiibt hat, innerhalb seines Gebietes iiberlassen. Der Kaiser iiberwacht die Einhaltung des gesetzlichen Verfahrens durch Reichsbeamte, welche er den Zoll- oder Steueramtern und den Direktivbehorden der einzelnen Staaten, nach Vernehmung des Ausschusses des Bundesrathes fur Zoll- und Steuerwesen, beiordnet. Die von diesen Beamten iiber Mangel bei der Ausfiihrung der gemeinschaftlichen Gesetzgebung (Art. 35) gemachten Anzeigen werden dem Bundesrathe zur Beschlussnahme vorgelegt. Art. 37. Bei der Beschlussnahme iiber die zur Ausfiihrung der gemeinschaftlichen Gesetzgebung (Art. 35) dienenden Verwaltungs- 296 Appendix. vorschriften und Einrichtungen giebt die Stimme des Presidiums als- dann den Ausschlag, wenn sie sich fur Aufrechthaltung der bestehen- den Vorschrift oder Einrichtung ausspricht. Art. 38. Der Ertrag der Zolle und der anderen in Art. 35 bezeich- neten Abgaben, letzterer, soweit sie der Reichsgesetzgebung unter- liegen, fliesst in die Reichskasse. Dieser Ertrag besteht aus der gesammten von den Zollen und den iibrigen Abgaben aufgekommenen Einnahme nach Abzug : 1) der auf Gesetzen oder Allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschriften beruhenden Steuervergiitungen und Ermassigungen, 2) der Riickerstattungen fiir unrichtige Erhebungen, 3) der Erhebungs- und Verwaltungskosten, und zwar : a. bei den Zollen der Kosten, welche an den gegen das Ausland gelegenen Grenzen und in dem Grenzbezirke fiir den Schutz und die Erhebuug der Zolle erforderlich sind ; b. bei der Salzsteuer der Kosten, welche zur Besoldung der mit Erhebung und Kontrolirung dieser Steuer auf den Salzwerken beauftragten Beamten aufgewendet werden, c. bei der Riibenzuckersteuer und Tabakssteuer der Ver- giitung, welche nach den jeweiligen Beschliissen des Bundesrathes den einzelnen Bundesregierungen fiir die Kosten der Verwaltung dieser Steuern zu gewahren ist, d. bei den iibrigen Steuern mit fiinfzehn Prozent der Ge- sammteinnahme. Die ausserhalb der gemeinschaftlichen Zollgrenze liegenden Ge- biete tragen zu den Ausgaben des Reichs durch Zahlung eines Aver- sums bei. Bayern, Wiirttemberg und Baden haben an dem in die Reichs- kasse fliessenden Ertrage der Steuern von Branntwein und Bier und an dem diesem Ertrage entsprechenden Theile des vorstehend erwahnten Aversums keinen Theil. Art. 39. Die von den Erhebungsbehorden der Bundesstaaten nach Ablauf eines jeden Vierteljahres aufzustellenden Quartal-Extrakte und die nach dem Jahres- und Biicherschlusse aufzustellenden FinaK abschliisse iiber die im Laufe des Vierteljahres beziehungsweise wah- rend des Rechnungsjahres fallig gewordenen Einnahmen an Zollen und nach Art. 38 zur Reichskasse fliessenden Verbrauchsabgaben werden von den Direktivbehorden der Bundesstaaten, nach vorange- gangener Priifung, in Hauptiibersichten zusammengestellt, in welchen jede Abgabe gesondert nachzuweisen ist, und es werden diese Ueber- Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 297 sichten an den Ausschuss des Bundesrathes fur das Rechnungswesen eingesandt. Der letztere stellt aus Grund dieser Uebersichten von drei zu drei Monaten den von der Kasse jedes Bundesstaates der Reichskasse schuldigen Betrag vorlaufig fest und setzt von dieser Feststellung den Bundesrath und die Bundesstaaten in Kenntniss, legt auch alljahrlich die schliessliche Feststellung jener Betrage mit seinen Bemerkungen dem Bundesrathe vor. Der Bundesrath beschliesst liber diese Fests- stellung. Art. 40. Die Bestimmungen in dem Zollvereinigungsvertrage vom 8. Juli 1867 bleiben in Kraft, soweit sie nicht durch die Vorschriften dieser Verfassung abgeandert sind und so lange sie nicht auf dem im Art. 7, beziehungsweise 78 bezeichneten Wege abgeandert werden. Art. 41. Eisenbahnen, welche im Interesse der Vertheidigung Deutschlands oder im Interesse des gemeinsamen Verkehrs fur noth- wendig erachtet werden, konnen kraft eines Reichsgesetzes auch gegen den Widerspruch der Bundesglieder, deren Gebiet die Eisen- bahnen durchschneiden, unbeschadet der Landeshoheitsrechte, fur Rechnung des Reichs angelegt oder an Privatunternehmer zur Aus- fiihrung koncessionirt und mit dem Expropriationsrechte ausgestattet werden. Jede bestehende Eisenbahnverwaltung ist verpflichtet, sich den An- schluss neu angelegter Eisenbahnen auf Kosten der letzteren gefallen zu lassen. Die gesetzlichen Bestimmungen, welche bestehenden Eisenbahn- Unternehmungen ein Widerspruchsrecht gegen die Anlegung von Parallel- oder Konkurrenzbahnen einraumen, werden, unbeschadet bereits erworbener Rechte, fur das ganze Reich hierdurch aufgeho- ben. Ein solches Widerspruchsrecht kann auch in den kiinftig zu ertheilenden Koncessionen nicht weiter verliehen werden. Art. 42. Die Bundesregierungen verpflichten sich, die Deutschen. Eisenbahnen im Interesse des allgemeinen Verkehrs wie ein einheit- liches Netz verwalten und zu diesem Behuf auch die neu herzustel- lenden Bahnen nach einheitlichen Normen anlegen und ausriisten zu lassen. Art. 43. Es sollen demgemass in thunlichster Beschleunigung tiber- einstimmende Betriebseinrichtungen getroffen, insbesondere gleiche Bahnpolizei-Reglements eingefuhrt werden. Das Reich hat dafiir Sorge zu tragen, dass die Eisenbahnverwaltungen die Bahnen jeder- zeit in einem die nothige Sicherheit gewahrenden baulichen Zustande 298 Appendix. erhalten und dieselben mit Betriebsmaterial so ausrtisten, wie das Verkehrsbedurfhiss es erheischt. Art. 44. Die Eisenbahnverwaltungen sind verpflichtet, die fur den durchgehenden Verkehr und zur Herstellung ineinander greifender Fahrplane nothigen Personenziige mit entsprechender Fahrgeschwin- digkeit, desgleichen die zur Bewaltigung des Giiterverkehrs nothigen Guterziige einzufuhren, auch direkte Expedition im Personen- und Giiterverkehr, unter Gestattung des Ueberganges der Transportmit- tel von einer Bahn auf die andere, gegen die ubliche Vergtitung ein- zurichten. Art. 45. Dem Reiche steht die Kontrole iiber das Tarifwesen zu. Dasselbe wird namentlich dahin wirken : i) dass baldigst auf alien Deutschen Eisenbahnen iibereinstimmende Betriebsreglements ein- gefiihrt werden ; 2) dass die moglichste Gleichmassigkeit und Herab- setzung der Tarife erzielt, insbesondere, dass bei grosseren Entfer- nungen fiir den Transport von Kohlen, Koaks, Holz, Erzen, Stein en, Salz, Roheisen, Diingungsmitteln und ahnlichen Gegenstanden ein dem Bedlirfniss der Landwirthschaft und Industrie entsprechender ermassigter Tarif, und zwar zunachst thunlichst der Einpfennig- Tarif eingefuhrt werde. Art. 46. Bei eintretenden Nothstanden, insbesondere bei unge- wohnlicher Theuerung der Lebensmittel, sind die Eisenbahnverwal- tungen verpflichtet, fur den Transport, namentlich von Getreide, Mehl, Hiilsenfruchten und Kartoffeln, zeitweise einen dem Bedurf- riss entsprechenden, von dem Kaiser auf Vorschlag des betreffenden Bundesraths-Ausschusses festzustellenden, niedrigen Spezialtarif ein- zufuhren, welcher jedoch nicht unter den niedriesten auf der betreff- enden Bahn fur Rohprodukte geltenden Satz herabgehen darf. Die vorstehend, sowie die in den Art. 42 bis 45 getroffenen Be- stimmungen sind auf Bayern nicht anwendbar. Dem Reiche steht jedoch auch Bayern gegeniiber das Recht zu, im Wege der Gesetzgebung einheitliche Normen fur die Konstruk- tion und Ausrlistung der fur die Landesvertheidigung wichtigen Eisenbahnen aufzustellen. Art. 47. Den Anforderungen der Behorden des Reichs in Betreff der Benutzung der Eisenbahnen zum Zweck der Vertheidigung Deutschlands haben sammtliche Eisenbahnverwaltungen unweigerlich Folge zu leisten. Insbesondere ist das Militair und alles Kriegs- material zu gleichen ermassigten Satzen zu befbrdern. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 299 VIII. POST- UND TELEGRAPHENWESEN. Art. 48. Das Postwesen und das Telegraphenwesen warden fur das gesammte Gebiet des Deutschen Reichs als einheitliche Staats- verkehrs-Anstalten eingerichtet und verwaltet. Die im Art. 4 vorgesehene Gesetzgebung des Reichs in Post- und Telegraphen-Angelenheiten erstreckt sich nicht auf diejenigen Gegen- stande, deren Regelung nach den in der Norddeutschen Post- und Telegraphen-Vervvaltung massgebend gewesenen Grundsatzen der reglementarischen Festsetzung oder administrativen Anordnung tiber- lassen 1st. Art. 49. Die Einnahmen des Post- und Telegraphenwesens sind fur das ganze Reich gemeinschaftlich. Die Ausgaben werden aus den gemeinschaftlichen Einnahmen bestritten. Die Ueberschiisse fliessen in die Reichskasse ( Abschnitt XII.) . Art. 50. Dem Kaiser gehort die obere Leitung der Post-und Tele- graphenverwaltung an. Die von ihm bestellten Behorden haben die Pflicht und das Recht, dafiir zu sorgen, dass Einheit in der Organi- sation der Verwaltung und im Betriebe des Dienstes, sowie in der Qualification der Beamten hergestellt und erhalten wird. Dem Kaisersteht der Erlass der reglementarischen Festsetzungen und allgemeinen administrativen Anordnungen, sowie die ausschliess- liche Wahrnehmung der Beziehungen zu anderen Post- und Tele- graphenverwaltungen zu. Sammtliche Beamte der Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung sind verpflichtet, den Kaiserlichen Anordnungen Folge zu leisten. Diese Verpflichtung ist in den Diensteid aufzunehmen. , Die Anstellung der bei den Verwaltungsbehorden der Post und Telegraphic in den verschiedenen Bezirken erforderlichen oberen Beamten (z. B. der Direktoren, Rathe, Ober-Inspektoren) ferner die Anstellung der zur Wahrnehmung des Aufsichts- u. s. w. Dienstes in den einzelnen Bezirken als Organe der erwahnten Behorden fungiren- den Post- und Telegraph enbeam ten (z. B. Inspektoren, Kontroleure) geht flir das ganze Gebiet des Deutschen Reichs vom Kaiser aus, welchem diese Beamten den Diensteid leisten. Den einzelnen Lan- desregierungen wird von den in Rede stehenden Ernennungen, so- weit dieselben ihre Gebiete betreffen, Behufs der landesherrlichen Bestatigung und Publikation rechtzeitig Mittheilung gemacht werden. Die anderen bei den Verwaltungsbehorden der Post und Tele- graphic erforderlichen Beamten, sowie alle fur den lokalen und tech 300 Appendix. nischen Betrieb bestimmten, mithin bei den eigentlichen Betrieb- stellen fungirenden Beamten u. s. w. werden von den betreffenden Landesregierungen angestellt. Wo eine selbststandige Landespost- resp. Telegraphenverwaltung nicht besteht, entscheiden die Bestimmungen der besonderrn Vertrage. Art. 51. Bei Ueberweisung des Ueberschusses der Postverwaltung fiir allgemeine Reichszwecke (Art. 49) soil, in Betracht der bisheri- gen Verschiedenheit der von den Landes-Postverwaltungen der ein- zelnen Gebiete erzielten Reineinnahmen, zum Zwecke einer ent- sprechenden Ausgleichung wahrend der unten festgesetzten Ueber- gangszeit folgendes Verfahren beobachtet werden. Aus den Postiiberschiissen, welche in den einzelnen Postbezirken wahrend der fiinf Jahre 1861 bis 1865 aufgekommen sind, wird ein durchschnittlicher Jahresiiberschuss berechnet, und der Antheil, welchen jeder einzelne Postbezirk an dem fur das gesammte Gebiet des Reichs sich darnach herausstellenden Postiiberschusse gehabt hat, nach Prozenten festgestellt. Nach Massgabe des auf diese Weise festgestellten Verhaltnisses werden den einzelnen Staaten wahrend der auf ihren Eintritt in die Reichs-Postverwaltung folgenden acht Jahre die sich fiir sie aus den im Reiche aufkommenden Postiiberschussen ergebenden Quoten auf ihre sonstigen Beitrage zu Reichszwecken zu Gute gerechnet. Nach Ablauf der acht Jahre hort jene Unterscheidung auf, und fliessen die Postiiberschiisse in ungetheilter Aufrechnung nach dem im Art. 49 enthaltenen Grundsatz der Reichskasse zu. Von der wahrend der vorgedachten acht Jahre fur die Hansestadte sich herausstellenden Quote des Postiiberschusses wird alljahrlich vor- weg die Halfte dem Kaiser zur Disposition gestellt zu dem Zwecke, daraus zunachst die Kosten fiir die Herstellung normaler Postein- richtungen in den Hansestadten zu bestreiten. Art. 52. Die Bestimmungen in den vorstehenden Art. 48 bis 51 finden auf Bayern und Wurttemberg keine Anwendung. An ihrer Stelle gelten fiir beide Bundesstaaten folgende Bestimmungen. Dem Reiche ausschliesslich steht die Gesetzgebung tiber die Vor- rechte der Post und Telegraphic, tiber die rechtlichen Verhaltnisse beider Anstalten zum Publikum, iiber die Portofreiheiten und das Posttaxwesen, jedoch ausschliesslich der reglementarischen und Tarif- bestimmungen fiir den internen Verkehr innerhalb Bayerns, bezie- hungsweise Wiirttembergs, sowie, unter gleicher Beschrankung, die Feststellung der Gebiihren fiir die telegraphische Korrespondenz zu. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 301 Ebenso steht dem Reiche die Regelung des Post- und Telegraph- enverkehrs mit dem Auslande zu, ausgenommen den eigenen unmit- telbaren Verkehr Bayerns, beziehungsweise Wiirttembergs mit seinen dem Reiche nicht angehorenden Nachbarstaaten, wegen dessen Regelung es bei der Bestimmung im Art. 49 des Postvertrages v. 23. Nov. 1867 bewendet. An den zur Reichskasse fliessenden Einnahmen des Post- und Telegraphenwesens haben Bayern und Wiirttemberg keinen Theil. IX. MARINE UND SCHIFFFAHRT. Art. 53. Die Kriegsmarine des Reichs ist eine einheitliche unter dem Oberbefehl des Kaisers. Die Organisation und Zusammen- setzung derselben liegt dem Kaiser ob, welcher die Offiziere und Beamten der Marine ernennt, und fur welchen dieselben nebst den Mannschaften eidlich in Pflicht zu nehmen sind. Der Kieler Hafen und der Jadehafen sind Reichskriegshafen. Der zur Griindung und Erhaltung der Kriegsflotte und der damit zusammenhangenden Anstalten erforderliche Aufwand wird aus der Reichskasse bestritten. Die gesammte seemannische Bevolkerung des Reichs, einschliess- lich des Maschinenpersonals und der Schiffshandwerker, ist vom Dienste im Landheere befreit, dagegen zum Dienste in der Kaiser- lichen Marine verpflichtet. Die Vertheilung des Ersatzbedarfes findet nach Massgabe der vor- handenen seemannischen Bevolkerung statt, und die hiernach von jedem Staate gestellte Quote kommt auf die Gestellung zum Land- heere in Abrechnung. Art. 54. Die Kauffahrteischiffe aller Bundesstaaten bilden eine einheitliche Handelsmarine. Das Reich hat das Verfahren zur Ermittelung der Ladungsfahigkeit der Seeschiffe zu bestimmen, die Ausstellung der Messbriefe, sowie der Schiffscertifikate zu regeln und die Bedingungen festzustellen, von welchen die Erlaubniss zur Ftihrung eines Seeschiffes abhangig ist. In den Seehafen und auf alien natiirlichen und kiinstlichen Was- serstrassen der einzelnen Bundesstaaten werden die Kauffahrtei- schiffe sammtlicher Bundesstaaten gleichmassig zugelassen und be- handelt. Die Abgaben, welche in den Seehafen von den Seeschiffen oder deren Ladungen fur die Benutzung der Schifffahrtsanstalten er- 302 Appendix. hoben werden, dlirfen die zur Unterhaltung und gewohnlichen Her- stellung dieser Anstalten erforderlichen Kosten nicht ubersteigen. Auf alien natiirlichen Wasserstrassen diirfen Abgaben nur fur die Benutzung besonderer Anstalten, die zur Erleichterung des Verkehrs bestimmt sind, erhoben werden. Diese Abgaben, sowie die Abgaben fur die Befahrung solcher kiinstlichen Wasserstrassen, welche Staats- eigenthum sind, diirfen die zur Unterhaltung und gewohnlichen Her- stellung der Anstalten und Anlagen erforderlichen Kosten nicht uber- steigen. Auf die Flosserei finden diese Bestimmungen insoweit An- wendung, als dieselbe auf schiff baren Wasserstrassen betrieben wird. Auf fremde Schiffe oder deren Ladungen andere oder hohere Ab- gaben zu legen, als von den Schiffen der Bundesstaaten oder deren Ladungen zu entrichten sind, steht keinem Einzelstaate, sondern nur dem Reiche zu. 'Art. 55. Die Flagge der Kriegs- und Handelsmarine ist schwarz- weiss-roth. X. KONSULATWESEN. Art. 56. Das gesammte Konsulatwesen des Deutschen Reichs steht unter der Aufsicht das Kaisers, welcher die Konsuln, nach Vernehmung des Ausschusses des Bundesrathes fur Handel und Verkehr, anstellt. In dem Amtsbezirk der Deutschen Konsuln dtirfen neue Landes- konsulate nicht errichtet werden. Die Deutschen Konsuln iiben fur die in ihrem Bezirk nicht vertretenen Bundesstaaten die Funktionen eines Landeskonsuls aus. Die sammtlichen bestehenden Landeskon- sulate werden aufgehoben, sobald die Organisation der Deutschen Konsulate dergestalt vollendet ist, dass die Vertretung der Einzel- interessen aller Bundesstaaten als durch die Deutschen Konsulate gesichert von dem Bundesrathe annerkannt wird. XI. REICHSKRIEGSWESEN. Art. 57. Jeder Deutsche ist wehrpflichtig und kann sich in Austi- bung dieser Pflicht nicht vertreten lassen. Art. 58. Die Kosten und Lasten des gesammten Kriegswesens des Reichs sind von alien Bundesstaaten und ihren Angehorigen gleich- ma'ssig zu tragen, so dass weder Bevorzugungen, noch Pragravationen einzelner Staaten oder Klassen grundsatzlich zulassig sind. Wo die gleiche Vertheilung der Lasten sich in natura nicht herstellen lasst, Verfassung. des Deutschen Reichs. 303 ohne die offentliche Wohlfahrt zu schadigen, ist die Ausgleichung nach den CJrundsatzen der Gerechtigkeit im Wege der Gesetzgebung festzustellen. Art. 59. Jeder wehrfahige Deutsche gehort sieben Jahre lang, in der Regel vom vollendeten 20. bis zum beginnenden 28. Lebens- jahre, dem stehenden Heere und zwar die ersten drei Jahre bei den Fahnen, die letzten vier Jahre in der Reserve die folgenden fiinf Lebensjahre der Landwehr ersten aufgebots und sodann bis zum 31. Marz desjenigen Kalenderjahres, in welchem das neununddrei- sigste Lebensjahr vollendet wird, der Landwehr zweiten Aufgebots an. 1 Art. 60. Die Friedensprasenzstarke des Deutschen Heeres wird bis zum 31. Dez. 1871 auf Ein Prozent der Bevolkerung von 1867 normirt, und wird pro rata derselben von den einzelnen Bundes- staaten gestellt. Fur die spatere Zeit wird die Friedens-Prasenz- starke des Heeres im Wege der Reichsgesetzgebung festgestellt. Art. 6 1. Nach Publikation dieser Verfassung ist in dem ganzen Reiche die gesammte Preussische Militairgesetzgebung ungesaumt einzuftihren, sowohl die Gesetze selbst, als die zu ihrer Ausfiihrung, Erlauterung oder Erganzung erlassenen Reglements, Instrucktionen und Reskripte, namentlich also das Militair-Strafgesetzbuch v. 3. April 1845, die Militair-Strafgerichts-Ordnung v. 3. April 1845, die Vercrdnung iiber die Ehrengerichte v. 20. Juli 1843, die Bestimmun- gen iiber Aushebung, Dienstzeit, Sends- und Verpflegungswesen, Ein- quartierung, Ersatz von Flurbeschadigungen, Mobilmachung u. s. w. fur Krieg und Frieden. Die Militair- Kirchenordnung ist jedoch aus- geschlossen. Nach gleichmassiger Durchfuhrung der Kriegsorganisation des Deutschen Heeres wird ein umfassendes Reichs-Militairgesetz dem Reichstage und dem Bundesrathe zur verfassungsmassigen Beschluss- fassung vorgelegt werden. Art. 62- Zur Bestreitung des Aufwandes fur das gesammte Deutsche Heer und die zu demselben gehorigen Einrichtungen sind bis zum 31. Dec. 1871 dem Kaiser jahrlich sovielmal 225 Thaler, in Worten zweihundert fiinf und zwanzig Thaler, als die Kopfzahl der Friedens- starke des Heeres nach Art. 60 betragt, zur Verfiigung zu stellen. Vergl. Abschnitt XII. Nach dem 31. Dec. 1871 miissen diese Beitrage von den einzelnen Staaten des Bundes zur Reichskasse fortgezahlt werden. Zur Berech- 1 Reichsgesetzblatt. 1888. S. n. 304 Appendix. nung derselben wird die im Art. 60 interimistisch festgestellte Fried- ens- Prasenzstarke so lange festgehalten, bis sie durch ein Reichs- gesetz abgeandert ist. Die Verausgabung dieser Summe fur das gesammte Reichsheer und dessen Einrichtungen wird durch das Etatsgesetz festgestellt. Bei der Feststellung des Militair-Ausgabe-Etats wird die auf Grundlage dieser Verfassung gesetzlich feststehende Organisation des Reichsheeres zu Grande gelegt. Art. 63. Die gesammte Landmacht des Reichs wird ein einheit- liches Heer bilden, welches in Krieg und Frieden unter dem Befehle des Kaisers steht. Die Regimenter &c. fiihren fortlaufende Nummern durch das ganze Deutsche Heer. Fur die Bekleidung sind die Grundfarben und der Schnitt der Koniglich Preussischen Armee massgebend. Dem betreffenden Kontingentsherrn bleibt es tiberlassen. die aus- seren Abzeichen (Kokarden &c.) zu bestimmen. Der Kaiser hat die Pflicht und das Recht, dafiir Sorge zu tragen, dass innerhalb des Deutschen Heeres alle Truppentheile vollzahlig und kriegstiichtig vorhanden sind und dass Einheit in der Organisa- tion und Formation, in Bewaffnung und Kommando, in der Ausbil- dung der Mannschaften, sowie in der Qualifikation der Offiziere hergestellt und erhalten wird. Zu diesem Behufe ist der Kaiser be- rechtigt, sich jederzeit durch Inspectionen von der Verfassung der einzelnen Kontingente zu tiberzugen und die Abstellung der dabei vorgefundenen Mangel anzuordnen. Der Kaiser bestimmt den Prasenszstand, die Gliederung und Ein- theilung der Kontingente des Reichsheeres, sowie die Organisation der Landwehr, und hat das Recht, innerhalb des Bundesgebietes die Garnisonen zu bestimmen, sowie die kriegsbereite Aufstellung eines jeden Theils des Reichsheeres anzuordnen. Behufs Erhaltung der unentbehrlichen Einheit in der Administra- tion, Verpflegung, Bewaffnung und Ausriistung aller Truppentheile des Deutschen Heeres sind die beziiglichen kiinftig ergehenden Anordnungen fur die Preussische Armee den Kommandeuren der tibrigen Kontingente, durch den Art. 8 Nr. i bezeichneten Ausschuss fur das Landheer und die Festungen, zur Nachachtung in geeigneter Weise mitzutheilen. Art. 64. Alle Deutsche Truppen sind verpflichtet, den Befehlen des Kaisers unbedingte Folge zu leisten. Diese Verpflichtung ist in den Fahneneid aufzunehmen. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 305 Der Hochstkommandirende eines Kontingents, sowie alle Offiziere, welche Truppen mehr als eines Kontingents befehligen, und alle Festungskommandanten werden von dem Kaiser ernannt. Die von Demselben ernannten Offiziere leisten Ihm den Fahneneld. Bei Generalen und den Generalstellungen versehenden Offizieren inner- halb des Kontingents ist die Ernennung von der jedesmaligen Zustim- mung des Kaisers abhangig zu machen. Der Kaiser ist berechtigt, Behufs Versetzung mit oder ohne Be- forderung fur die von Ihm im Reichsdienste, sei es im Preussischen Heere, oder in anderen Kontingenten zu besetzenden Stellen aus den Offizieren aller Kontingente des Reichsheeres zu wahlen. Art. 65. Das Recht, Festungen innerhalb des Bundesgebietes anzulegen, steht dem Kaiser zu, welcher die Bewilligung der dazu erforderlichen Mittel, soweit das Ordinarium sie nicht gewahrt, nach Abschnitt XII. beantragt. Art. 66. Wo nicht besondere Konventionen ein Anderes bestimmen, ernennen die Bundesfursten, beziehentlich die Senate die Offiziere ihrer Kontingente, mit der Einschrankung des Art. 64. Sie sind Chefs aller ihren Gebieten angehorenden Truppentheile und geniessen die damit verbundenen Ehren. Sie haben namentlich das Recht der Inspizirung zu jeder Zeit und erhalten, ausser den regelmassigen Rapporten und Meldungen liber vorkommende Veranderungen, Be- hufs der nothigen landesherrlichen Publikation, rechtzeitige Mit- theilung von den die betreffenden Truppentheile beriihrenden Avancements und Ernennungen. Auch steht ihnen das Recht zu, zu polizeilichen Zwecken nicht bios ihre eigenen Truppen zu verwenden, sondern auch alle anderen Truppentheile des Reichsheeres, welche in ihren Landergebieten dislocirt sind, zu requiriren. Art. 67. Ersparnisse an dem Militair-Etat fallen unter keinen Um- standen einer einzelnen Regierung, sondern jederzeit der Reichs- kasse zu. Art. 68. Der Kaiser kann, wenn die offentliche Sicherheit in dem Bundesgebiete bedroht ist, einen jeden Theil desselben in Kriegs- zustand erklaren. Bis zum Erlass eines die Voraussetzungen, die Form der Verkiindigung und die Wirkungen einer solchen Erklarung regelnden Reichsgesetzes gelten dafiir die Vorschriften des Preuss. Gesetzes v. 4. Juni 1851 (G.-S. fiir 1851 S. 451 ff.). 306 Appendix. SCHLUSSBESTIMMUNG ZUM XI. ABSCHNTTT. Die in diesem Abschnitt enthaltenen Vorschriften kommen in Bayern nach naherer Bestimmung des Biindnissvertrages v. 23. Nov. 1870 (B. G. B. 1871 S. 9) unter III. 5, in Wiirttemberg nach naherer Bestimmung der Militairkonvention v. 21. 725. Nov. 1870 (B. G. B. 1870 S. 658) zur Anwendung. I. Biindniss-Vertrag mit Bayern v. 23. Nov. 1870 (BGB. 1871 S. 9 fL) unter III. 5- Anlangend die Art. 57 bis 68 von dem Bundes-Kriegswesen, so findet Art. 57 Anwendung auf das Konigreich Bayern. Art. 58 ist gleichfalls fur das Konig- reich Bayern giiltig. Dieser Art. erhalt jedoch fur Bayern folgenden Zusatz : Der in diesem Art. bezeichneten Verpflichtung wird von Bayern in der Art ent- sprochen, dass es die Kosten und Lasten seines Kriegswesens und den Unterhalt der auf seinem Gebiete belegenen festen Platze und sonstigen Fortifikationen einbegriffen, ausschliesslich und allein tragt. Art. 59 hat gleichwie der Art. 60 fur Bayern gesetzliche Geltung. Die Art. 61 bis 68 finden auf Bayern keine Anwendung. An deren Stelle treten folgende Bestimmungen : I. Bayern behalt zunachst seine Militairgesetzgebung nebst den dazu gehorigen Vollzugs-Instruktionen, Verordnungen, Erlauterungen u. s. w. bis zur verfassungs- massigen Beschlussfassung fiber die der Bundesgesetzgebung anheimfallenden Materien, desgl. bis zur freien Verstandigung beziiglich der Einfiihrung der bereits vor dem Eintritte Bayerns in den Bund in dieser Hinsicht erlassenen Gesetze und sonstigen Bestimmungen. II. Bayern verpflichtet sich, fur sein Kontingent und die zu demselben gehorigen Einrichtungen einen gleichen Geldbetrag zu verwenden, wie nach Verhaltniss der Kopfstarke durch den Militair-Etat des Deutschen Bundes fur die iibrigen Theile des Bundesheeres ausgesetzt wird. Dieser Geldbetrag wird im Bundes-Budget fur das Koniglich Bayerische Kontingent in einer Summe ausgeworfen. Seine Verausgabung wird durch Special-Etat geregelt, deren Aufstellung Bayern iiber- lassen bleibt. Hierfiir werden im Allgemeinen diejenigen Etatsansatze nach Verhaltniss zur Richtschnur dienen, welche fur das iibrige Bundesheer in den einzelnen Titeln ausgeworfen sind. III. Das Bayerische Heer bildet einen in sich geschlossenen Bestandtheil des Deutschen Bundesheeres mit selbststandiger Verwaltung, unter der Militairhoheit S. Maj. des Konigs von Bayern, im Kriege und zwar mit Beginn der Mobili- sirung unter dem Befehle des Bundes-Feldherrn. In Bezug auf Organisation, Formation, Ausbildung und Gebiihren, dann hinsichtlich der Mobilmachung wird Bayern voile Uebereinstimmung mit den fur das Bundesheer bestehenden Normen herstellen. Beziiglich der Bewaffnung und Ausriistung, sowie der Gradabzeichen behalt sich die Koniglich Bayerische Regierung die Herstellung der vollen Uebe- reinstimung mit dem Bundesheere vor. Der Bundes-Feldherr hat die Pflicht und das Recht, sich durch Inspektionen von der Uebereinstimmung in Organisation, Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 307 Formation und Ausbildung, sowie von der Vollzahligkeit und Kriegstuchtigkeit des Bayerischen Kontingents Ueberzeugung zu verschaffen und wird sich fiber die Modalitaten der jeweiligen Vornahme und fiber das Ergebnfss dieser Inspek- tionem mit Sr. Maj. dem Konige von Bayern ins Vernehmen zu setzen. Die Anordnung der Kriegsbereitschaft (Mobilisirung) des Bayerischen Kontingents oder eines Theils desselben erfolgt auf Veranlassung des Bundes-Feldherrn durch Se. Maj. den'Konig von Bayern. Zur steten gegenseitigen Information in den durch diese Vereinbarung geschaffenen militairischen Beziehungen erhalten die Militair-Bevollmachtigten in Berlin und Mfinehen fiber die einschlagigen Anordnungen entsprechende Mittheilung durch die resp. Kriegs-Ministerien. IV. Im Kriege sind die Bayerischen Truppen verpflichtet, den Befehlen des Bundes-Feldherrn unbedingt Folge zu leisten. Diese Verpflichtung wird in den Fahneneid aufgenommen. V. Die Anlage von neuen Befestigungen auf Bayerischem Gebiete im Interesse der gesammtdeutschen Vertheidigung wird Bayern im Wege jeweiliger specieller Vereinbarung zugestehen. An den Kosten fur den Bau und die Ausrustung solcher Befestigungsanlagen auf seinem Gebiete betheiligt sich Bayern in dem seiner Bevolkerungszahl entsprechenden Verhaltnisse gleichmassig mit den ande- ren Staaten des Deutschen Bundes; ebenso an den ffir sonstige Festungsanlagen etwa Seitens des Bundes zu bewilligenden Extraordinarien. VI. Die Voraussetzungen, unter welchen wegen Bedrohung der offentlichen Sicherheit das Bundesgebiet oder ein Theil desselben durch den Bundes-Feldherrn in Kriegszustand erklart werden kann, die Form der Verkfindigung und die Wir- kungen einer solchen Erklarung werden durch ein Bundesgesetz geregelt. VII. Vorstehende Bestimmungen treten mit dem I. Jan. 1872 in Wirksamkeit. 2. Die Bestimmungen der Militair-Konvention mit Wurttemberg v. 21. und 25. Nov. 1870 (BGB. 1870 S. 658 ff.) sind folgende: Art. I. Die Konigl. Wfirttembergischen Truppen als Theil des Deutschen Bun- desheeres bilden ein in sich geschlossenes Armee-Korps nach _der vereinbarten Formation nebst der entsprechenden Anzahl von Ersatz- und Befatzungs-Truppen- nach Preussischen Normen im Falle der Mobilmachung oder Kriegsbereitschaft. Art. 2. Die hierdurch bedingte neue Organisation der Konigl. Wfirttembergis- chen Truppen soil in drei Jahren nach erfolgter Anordnung zur Rfickkehr von dem gegenwartigen Kriegsstand auf den Friedensfuss vollendet sein. Art. 3. Von dieser Rfickkehr an bilden, beginnend mit einem noch na'her zu bestimmenden Tage, die Konigl. Wfirttembergischen Truppen das vierzehnte Deutsche Bundes-Armee-Korps mit ihren eigenen Fahnen und Feldzeichen und erhalten die Divisionen, Brigaden, Regimenter und selbststandigen Bataillone des Armee-Korps die entsprechende laufende Nummer in dem Deutschen Bundes- heere neben der Numerirung im Koniglich Wfirttembergischen Verbande. Art. 4. Die Unterstellung der Konigl. Wfirttembergischen Truppen unter den Oberbefehl Sr. Maj. des Konigs von Preussen als Bundes-Feldherrn beginnt eben- falls an einem noch naher zu bestimmenden Tage und wird in den bisherigen Fah- neneid in der Weise aufgenommen, dass es an der betr. Stelle heisst : " dass ich Sr. Maj. dem Konige wahrend meiner Dienstzeit als Soldat treu dienen, dem Bundes-Feldherrn und den Kriegsgesetzen Gehorsam leisten, und mich stets als tapferer und ehrliebender Sodat verhalten will. So wahr mir Gott helfe." 308 Appendix. Art. 5. Die Ernennung, Beforderung, Versetzung u. s. w. der Officiere und Beamten des Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Armee-Korps erfolgt durch Se. Maj. den Konig von Wiirttemberg, diejenige des Hochstcommandirenden fur das Armee-Korps nach vorgangiger Zustimmung Sr. Maj. des Konigs von Preussen als Bundes-Feldherr. Se. Maj. der Konig von Wiirttemberg geniesst als Chef seiner Truppen die Ihm Allerhochst zustehenden Ehren und Rechte und iibt die entsprechenden gerichtsherrlichen Befugnisse sammt dem Bestatigungs- und Begnadigungsrecht bei Erkenntnissen gegen Angehorige des Armee-Korps aus, welche iiber die Befugnisse des Armee-Korps-Kommandanten, beziehungsweise des Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Kriegsministeriums hinausgehen. Art. 6. Unbeschadet der dem Bundes-Feldherrn gema'ss der Bundes-Verfassung zustehenden Rechte der Disponirung iiber alle Bundestruppen und ihrer Dislocir- ung soil fiir die Dauer friedlicher Verhaltnisse das Wiirttembergische Armee- Korps in seinem Verband und in seiner Gliederung erhalten bleiben und im eigenen Lande dislocirt sein; eine hiervon abweichende Anordnung des Bundes- Feldherrn, sowie die Dislocirung anderer Deutscher Truppentheile in das Konig- reich Wiirttemberg soil in friedlichen Zeiten nur mit Zustimmung Sr. Maj. des Konigs von Wiirttemberg erfolgen, sofern es sich nicht um Besetzung Siid- deutscher oder Westdeutscher Festungen handelt. Art. 7. Ueber die Ernennung der Kommandanten fiir die im Konigreiche Wiirt- temberg gelegenem festen Pla'tze, welche nach Art. 64 der Bundes Verf. dem Bundes-Feldherrn zusteht, sowie iiber die Demselben gleichermassen zustehende Berechtigung, neue Befestigungen innerhalb des Konigreichs anzulegen, wird sich der Bundes-Feldherr eintretenden Falls mit dem Konige von Wiirttemberg vorher in Vernehmen setzen; ebenso wenn der Bundes-Feldherr einen von Ihm zu ernennenden Officier aus dem Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Armee-Korps wahlen will. Um der Beurtheilung dieser Ernennungen eine Grundlage zu gewahren, werden iiber die Officiere des Konigl. Wiirttembergishen Armee- Korps vom Stabsofficier aufwarts alljahrlich Personal- und Qualificationsberichte nach Preussischem Schema aufgestellt und Sr. Maj. dem Bundes-Feldherrn vor- gelegt. Art. 8. Zur Beforderung der Gleichmassigkeit in der Ausbildung und dem inneren Dienst der Truppen werden nach gegenseitiger Verabredung einige Konigl. Wiirttembergische Officiere je auf 1-2 Jahre in die Konigl. Preussische Armee, und Konigl. Preussische Officiere in das Konigl. Wiirttembergische Armee-Korps kommandirt. Hinsichtlich etwa wiinschenswerther Versetzung ein- zelner Officiere aus Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Diensten in die Konigl. Preuss- ische Armee oder umgekehrt haben in jedem Specialfalle besondere Verabre- dungen stattzufinden. Art. 9. Der Bundes-Feldherr, welchem nach Art. 63 das Recht zusteht, sich jederzeit durch Inspektionen von der Verfassung der einzelnen Kontingente zu iiberzeugen, wird die Konigl. Worttembergischen Truppen alljahrlich mindestens einmal entweder selbst inspiciren, oder durch zu ernennende Inspekteure, deren Personen vorher Sr. Maj. dem Konige von Wiirttemberg bezeichnet werden sollen, in den Garnisonen oder bei den Uebungen inspiciren lassen. Die in Folge solcher Inspicirungen bemerkten sachlichen und personlichen Missstande wird der Bun- des-Feldherr dem Konige von Wurttenberg mittheilen, welcher seinerseits diesel- Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 309 ben abstellen und von dem Geschehenen alsdann dem Bundes-Feldherrn Anzeige machen lasst Art. 10. Fiir die Organisation des Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Armee-Korps sind so lange und insoweit nicht auf dem Wege der Bundes-Gesetzgebung anders bestimmt wird die derzeitigen Preussischen Normen massgebend. Es kommen demgemass in dem Konigreiche Wiirttemberg, ausser dem G. iiber die Verpflichtung zum Kriegsdienste v. 9. Nov. 1867 nebst der dazu gehorigen Militair- Ersatz- Instr. v 26. Marz 1868, insbesondere alle Preuss. Exercier- und sonstigen Reglements, Instruktionen und Reskripte zur Ausfiihrung, namentlich die V. uber die Ehrengerichte v. 20 Juli 1843, die fur Krieg und Frieden gegebenen Bestimmungen iiber Aushebung, Dienstzeit, Servis-, Verpflegungs- und Invaliden- wesen, Mobilmachung u. s. w., uber den Ersatz des Officier-Korps und iiber das Militair-Erziehungs-Bildungswesen. Ausgenommen sind von der Gemeinsamkeit in den Einrichtungen des Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Armee-Korps mit denjeni- gen der Preuss. Armee : die Militair-Kirchenordnug, das Militairstrafgesetzbuch und die Militair-Strafgerichtsordnung, sowie die Bestimmungen iiber Einquar- tierung und Ersatz von Flurbeschadigungen, woriiber in dem Konigreiche Wiirt- temberg die derzeit bestehenden Gesetze und Einrichtungen vorerst und bis zur Regelung im Wege der Bundes-Gesetzgebung in Geltung verbleiben. Die Grad- abzeichen, sowie die Benennungen und der Modus der Verwaltung sind in dem Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Armee-Korps dieselben wie in der Konigl. Preuss. Armee. Die Bestimmungen Uber die Bekleidung fur das Konigl. Wiirttem- bergische Armee-Korps werden von Sr. Maj. dem Konige von Wiirttemberg gege- ben und es soil dabei den Verhaltnissen der Bundes-Armee die moglichste Rechnung getragen werden. Art. n. Im Falle eines Krieges steht von dessen Ausbruch bis zu dessen Beendigung die obere Leitung des Telegraphenwesens, soweit solches fur die Kriegswecke eingerichtet ist, dem Bundes-Feldherrn zu. Die Konigl. Wiirttem- bergische Regierung wird bereits wahrend des Friedens die beziiglichen Einrich- tungen in Uebereinstimmung mit denjenigen des Nordd. Bundes treffen, und insbesondere bei dem Ausbau des Telegraphennetzes darauf Bedacht nehmen, auch eine der Kriegsstarke ihres Armee-Korps entsprechende Feldtelegraphie zu organisiren. Art. 1 2. Aus der von Wiirttemberg nach Art. 62 der Bundes-Verf. zur Verf- iigung zu stellenden Summe bestreitet die Konigl. Wurttembergische Regierung, nach Massgabe des Bundes-Haushalts-Etats, den Aufwand fur die Unterhaltung des Konigl. Wiirttembergischen Armee-Korps, einschliesslich Neuanschaffungen, Bauten, Einrichtungen u. s. w. in selbststandiger Verwaltung, sowie den Antheil Wurttembergs an den Kosten fur die gemeinschaftlichen Einrichtungen des Gesammtheeres Central- Administration, Festungen, Unterhaltung der Militair- Bildungs-Anstalten, einschliesslich der Kriegsschulen und militairarztlichen Bil- dungs-Anstalten, der Examinations-Kommissionen, der.militairwissenschaftlichen und technischen Institute, des Lehrbataillons, der Militair- und Artillerie-Schiess- schule, der Militair-Reitschule, der Central-Turnanstalt und des grossen Gene- ralstabs. Ersparnisse, welche unter voller Erfiillung der Bundespflichten als Ergebnisse der obwaltenden besonderen Verhaltnisse moglich werden, verbleiben zu Verfugung Wurttembergs. Das Konigl. Wurttembergische Armee-Korps par- 3 1 o Appendix. ticipirt an den gemeinschaftlichen Einrichtungen und wird im grpssen General- stabe verhaltnissmassig vertreten sein. Art. 13. Die Zahlung der von Wurttemberg nach Art. 62 der Bundes-Verf. aufzubringenden Summe beginnt mit dem ersten Tage des Monats, welcher auf die Anordnung zur Riickkehr der Konigl. Wurttembergischen Truppen von dem Kriegszustande auf den Friedensfuss folgt. In den Etat und die Abrechnung des Bundes-Heeres. tritt das Konigl. Wiirttembergische Armee-Korps jedoch erst mit dem i. Jan. 1872 ein. Wahrend der im Art. 2 verabredeten dreijahrigen Ueber- gangszeit wird fur den Etat des Konigl. Wiirttemburgischen Armee-Korps die Riicksicht auf die, in dieser Periode zu vollziehende neue Organisation massgebend sein, und zwar sowohl in Beziehung auf die in Ansatz zu bringenden Betrage, als auch in Beziehung auf die Zulassigkeit der gegenseitigen Uebertragung ein- zelner Titel und der Uebertragung gleichnamiger Titel aus einem Jahre ins andere. Art. 14. Verstarkungen der Konigl. Wurttembergischen Truppen durch Einzie- hung der Beurlaubten, sowie die Kriegsformationen derselben und endlich deren Mobilmachung hangen von den Anordnungen des Bundes-Feldherrn ab. Solchen Anordnungen ist allezeit und im ganzen Umfange Folge zu leisten. Die hier- durch erwachsenden Kosten tragt die Bundeskasse, jedoch sind die Wiirttemberg- ischen Kassen verpflichtet, insoweit ihre vorhandenen Fonds ausreichen, die nothwendigen Gelder vorzuschiessen. Art. 15. Zur Vermittelung der dienstlichen Beziehungen des Konigl. Wurttem- bergischen Armee-Korps zu dem Deutschen Bundesheer findet ein direkter Schriftwechsel zwischen dem Konigl. Preuss. und dem Konigl. Wurttembergischen Kriegsministerium statt und erhalt letzteres auf diese Weise alle betreffenden zur Zeit giiltigen oder spater zu erlassenden Reglements, Bestimmungen u. s. w. zur entsprechenden Ausfiihrung. Nebendem wird die Konigl. Wiirttembergische Regierung jederzeit in dem Bundesausschuss fur das Landheer und die Festungen vertreten sein. XII. REICHSFINANZEN. Art. 69. Alle Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Reichs miissen fur jedes Jahr veranschlagt und auf den Reichshaushalts-Etat gebracht werden. Letzterer wird vor Beginn des Etatsjahres nach folgenden Grundsatzen durch ein Gesetz festgestellt. Art. 70. Zur Bestreitung aller gemeinschaftlichen Ausgaben dienen zunachst die etwaigen Ueberschiisse der Vorjahre, sowie die aus den Zollen, den gemeinschaftlichen Verbrauchssteuern und aus dem Post- und Telegraphenwesen fliessenden gemeinschaftlichen Einnahmen. Insoweit dieselben durch diese Einnahmen nicht gedeckt werden, sind sie, so lange Reichssteuern nicht eingefiihrt sind, durch Beitrage der einzelnen Bundesstaaten nach Massgabe ihrer Bevolkerung auf- zubringen, welche bis zur Hohe des budgetmassigen Betrages durch den Reichskanzler ausgeschrieben werden. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs. 311 Art. 71. Die gemeinschaftlichen Ausgaberi warden in der Regel fur ein Jahr bewilligt, konnen jedoch in besonderen Fallen auch fur eine langere Dauer bewilligt werden. Wahrend der im Art. 60 normirten Uebergangszeit ist der nach Titel geordnete Etat iiber die Ausgaben fiir das Heer dem Bundes- rathe und dem Reichstage nur zur Kenntnissnahme und zur Erin- nerung vorzulegen. Art. 72. Ueber die Verwendung aller Einnahmen des Reichs ist durch den Reichskanzler dem Bundesrathe und dem Reichstage zur Entlastung jahrlich Rechnung zu legen. Art. 73. In Fallen eines ausserordentlichen Bediirfnisses kann im Wege der Reichsgesetzgebung die Aufnahme einer Anleihe, sowie die Uebernahme einer Garantie zu Lasten des Reichs erfolgen. SCHLUSSBESTIMMUNG ZUM XII. ABSCHNITT. Auf die Ausgaben fiir das Bayerische Heer finden die Art. 69 und 71 nur nach Massgabe der in der Schlussbestimmung zum XI. Ab- schnitt erwahnten Bestimmungen des Vertr. v. 23. Nov. 1870 und der Art. 72 nur insoweit Anwendung, als dem Bundesrathe und dem Reichstage die Ueberweisung der fiir das Bayerische Heer erforder- lichen Summe an Bayern nachzuweisen ist. XIII. SCHLICHTUNG VON STREITIGKEITEN UND STRAFBESTIMMUNGEN. Art. 74. Jedes Unternehmen gegen die Existenz, die Integritat, die Sicherheit oder die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, endlich die Beleidigung des Bundesrathes, des Reichstages, eines Mitgliedes des Bundesrathes oder des Reichstages, einer Behorde oder eines offent- lichen Beamten des Reichs, wahrend dieselben in der Ausiibung ihres Berufes begriffen sind oder in Beziehung auf ihren Beruf, durch Wort, Schrift, Druck, Zeichen, bildliche oder andere Darstellung, werden in den einzelnen Bundesstaaten beurtheilt und bestrasft nach Massgabe der in den letzteren bestehenden oder kiinftig in Wirksam- keit tretenden Gesetze, nach welchen eine gleiche gegen den einzel- nen Bundesstaat, seine Verfassung, seine Kammern oder Stande, seine Kammer- oder Standemitglieder, seine Behorden und Beamten begangene Handlung zu richten ware. Art. 75. Fiir diejenigen in Art. 74 bezeichneten Unternehmungen gegen das Deutsche Reich, welche, wenn gegen einen der einzelnen Bundesstaaten gerichtet, als Hochverrath oder Landesverrath zu 312 Appendix. qualificiren waren, 1st das gemeinschaftliche Ober-Appellations- gericht der drei freien und Hansestadte in Liibeck die zustandige Spruchbehorde in erster und letzter Instanz. Die naheren Bestimmungen liber die Zustandigkeit und das Ver- fahren des Ober-Appellationsgerichts erfolgen im Wege der Reichs- gesetzgebung. Bis zum Erlasse eines Reichsgesetzes bewendet es bei der seitherigen Zustandigkeit der Gerichte in den einselnen Bun- desstaaten und den auf das Verfahren dieser Gerichte sich beziehen- den Bestimmungen. Art. 76. Streitigkeiten zwischen verschiedenen Bundesstaaten, so- fern dieselben nicht privatrechtlicher Natur und daher von den kom- petenten Gerichtsbehorden zu entscheiden sind, werden auf Anrufen des einen Theils von dem Bundesrathe erledigt. Verfassungsstreitigkeiten in solchen Bundesttaaten, in deren Ver- fassung nicht eine Behorde zur Entscheidung solcher Streitigkeiten bestimmt ist, hat auf Anrufen eines Theiles der Bundesrath gtitlich auszugleichen oder, wenn das nicht gelingt, im Wege der Reichsge- setzgebung zur Erledigung zu bringen. Art. 77. Wenn in einem Bundesstaate der Fall einer Justizver- weigerung eintritt, und auf gesetzlichen Wegen ausreichende Hlilfe nicht erlangt werden kann, so Hegt dem Bundesrathe ob, erwiesene nach der Verfassung und den bestehenden Gesetzen des betreffen- den Bundesstaates zu beurtheilende Beschwerden fiber verweigerte oder gehemmte Rechstpflege anzunehmen, und darauf die gericht- liche Hiilfe bei der Bundesregierung, die zur Beschwerde Anlass gegeben hat, zu bewirken. XIV. ALLGEMEINE BESTIMMUNGEN. Art. 78. Veranderungen der Verfassung erfolgen im Wege der Gesetzgebung. Sie gelten als abgelehnt, wenn sie im Bundesrathe 14 Stimmen gegen sich haben. Diejenigen Vorschriften der Reichsverfassung, durch welche be- stimmte Rechte einzelner Bundesstaaten in deren Verhaltniss zur Gesammtheit festgestellt sind, konnen nur mit Zustimmung des berechtigten Bundesstaates abgeandert werden. APPENDIX III. VERFASSUNGS-URKUNDE FUR DEN PREUSSISCHEN STAAT. APPENDIX III. VERFASSUNGS-URKUNDE FUR DEN PREUSSISCHEN STAAT VOM 31. JANUAR 1850. Wir Friedrich Wilhelm, von Gottes Gnaden, Konig von Preussen &c. &c. thun kund und fiigen zu wissen, dass Wir, nachdem die von Uns unterm 5. Dezember 1848 vorbehaltlich der Revision im ordent- licnen Wege der Gesezgebung verkundigte und von beiden Kam- mern Unseres Konigreichs anerkannte Verfassung des Preussischen Staats der darin angeordneten Revision unterworfen ist, die Verfas- sung in Uebereinstimmung mit beiden Kammern endgiiltig festges- tellt haben. Wir verkiinden demnach dieselbe als Staats-Grundgesetz, wie folgt : TITEL I. VOM STAATSGEBIETE. Art. i. Alle Landestheile der Monarchie in ihrem gegenwartigen Umfange bilden das Preussische Staatsgebiet. Art. 2. Die Granzen dieses Staatsgebiets konnen nur durch ein Gesetz verandert werden. TITEL II. VON DEN RECHTEN DER PREUSSEN. Art. 3. Die Verfassung und das Gesetz bestimmen, unter welchen Bedingungen die Eigenschaft eines Preussen und die staatsbiirger- lichen Rechte erworben, ausgeiibt und verlojren werden. Art. 4. Alle Preussen sind vor dem Gesetze gleich. Standes- vorrechte finden nicht statt. Die offentlichen Aemter sind, unter Einhaltung der von den Gesetzen festgestellten Bedingungen, fiir alle dazu Befahigten gleich zuganglich. Art. 5. Die personliche Freiheit ist gewahrleistet. Die Bedin- gungen und Formen, unter welchen eine Beschrankung derselben, 3 1 6 Appendix. insbesondere eine Verhaftung zulassig 1st, werden durch das Gesetz bestimmt. Art. 6. Die Wohnung ist unverletzlich. Das Eindringen in dieselbe und Haussuchungen, sowie die Beschlagnahme von Briefen und Papieren, sind nur in den gesetzlich bestimmten Fallen und Formen gestattet. Art. 7. Niemand darf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden. Ausnahmegerichte und ausserordentliche Kommissionen sind un- statthaft. Art. 8. Strafen konnen nur in Gemassheit des Gesetzes angedroht oder verhangt werden. Art. 9. Das Eigenthum ist unverletzlich. Es kann nur aus Grtinden des offentlichen Wohles gegen vorgangige, in dringenden Fallen wenigstens vorlaufig festzustellende Entschadigung nach Massgabe des Gesetzes entzogen oder beschrankt werden. Art. 10. Der biirgerliche Tod und die Strafe der Vermogensein- ziehung finden nicht statt. Art. ii. Die Freiheit der Auswanderung kann von Staatswegen nur in Bezug auf die Wehrpflicht beschrankt werden. Abzugsgelder diirfen nicht erhoben werden. Art. 12. Die Freiheit des religiosen Bekenntnisses, der Vereini- gung zu Religionsgesellschaften (Art. 30 und 31) und der gemein- samen hauslichen und offentlichen Religionsjtibung wird gewahrleistet. Der Genuss der burgerlichen und staatsbiirgerlichen Rechte ist unab- hangig von dem religiosen Bekenntnisse. Den burgerlichen und staatsbiirgerlichen Pflichten darf durch die Ausiibung der Religions- freiheit kein Abbruch geschehen. Art. 13. Die Religionsgesellschaften, so wie die geistlichen Gesell- schaften, welche keine Korporationsrechte haben, konnen diese Rechte nur durch besondere Gesetze erlangen. Art. 14. Die christliche Religion wird bei denjenigen Einrichtun- gen des Staats, welche mit der Religionslibung im Zusammenhange stehen, unbeschadet der im Art. 1 2 gewahrleisteten Religionsfreiheit, zum Grunde gelegt. Art. 15. Vacat. Art. 1 6. Vacat. Art. 17. Ueber das Kirchenpatronat und die Bedingungen, unter welchen dasselbe aufgehoben werden kann, wird ein besonderes Gesetz ergehen. Art. 1 8. Vacat. Verfassungs- Urkunde fur den Preussischen Staat. 317 Art. 19. Die Einfuhrung der Civilehe erfolgt nach Massgabe eines besonderen Gesetzes, was auch die Ftihrung der Civilstandsregister regelt. Art. 20. Die Wissenschaft und ihre Lehre ist frei. Art. 2 1 . Fur die Bildung der Jugend soil durch offentliche Schulen gentigend gesorgt werden. Aeltern und deren Stellvertreter dtirfen ihre Kinder oder Pflege- befohlenen nicht ohne den Unterricht lassen, welcher fur die offent- lichen Volksschulen vorgeschrieben ist. Art. 22. Unterricht zu ertheilen und Unterrichtsanstalten zu griinden und zu leiten, steht Jedem frei, wenn er seine sittliche, wis- senschaftliche und technische Befahigung den betreffenden Staatsbe- horden nachgewiesen hat (s. Erlass des Minist. der geistlichen &c. Angelegenheiten, betr. die Ertheilung von Privat-Unterricht gegen Bezahlung durch offentliche Lehrer, insbesondere an Schiller der eigenen Klasse. Oeffentliche Lehrer bediirfen zur Ertheilung von Privat-Unterricht eines fur Privatlehrer erforderlichen Erlaubniss- scheines der Ortsschulbehorde nicht, v. 6. Octob. 1882 [Central- blatt fur die Unterrichts-Verwalt. S. 716]). Art. 23. Alle offentlichen und Privat-Unterrichts- und Erziehungs- anstalten stehen unter der Aufsicht vom Staate ernannter Behorden. Die offentlichen Lehrer haben die Rechte und Pflichten der Staats- diener. Art. 24. Bei der Einrichtung der offentlichen Volksschulen sind die konfessionellen Verhaltnisse moglichst zu beriicksichtigen. Den religiosen Unterricht in der Volksschule leiten die betreffenden Religionsgesellschaften. Die Leitung der ausseren Angelegenheiten der Volksschule steht der Gemeinde zu. Der Staat stellt, unter gesetzlich geordneter Betheiligung der Gemeinden, aus der Zahl der Befahigten die Lehrer der offentlichen Volksschulen an. Art 25. Die Mittel zur Errichtung, Unterhaltung und Erweiterung der offentlichen Volksschule werden von den Gemeinden und, im Falle des nachgewiesenen Unvermogens, erganzungsweise vom Staate aufgebracht. Die auf besonderen Rechtstiteln beruhenden Ver- pflichtungen Dritter bleiben bestehen. Der Staat gewahrleistet demnach den Volksschullehrern ein festes, den Lokalverhaltnissen angemessenes Einkommen. In der offentlichen Volksschule wird der Unterricht unentgeltlich ertheilt. ' 3 1 8 Appendix. Art. 26. Ein besonderes Gesetz regelt dasganze Unterrichtswesen. Art. 27. Jeder Preusse hat das Recht, durch Wort, Schrift, Druck und bildliche Darstellung seine Meinung frei zu aussern. Die Censur darf nicht eingefiihrt werden ; jede andere Beschran- kung der Pressfreiheit nur im Wege der Gesetzgebung. Art. 28. Vergehen, welche durch Wort, Schrift, Druck oder bild- liche Darstellung begangen werden, sind nach den allgemeinen Strafgesetzen zu bestrafen. Art. 29. Alle Preussen sind berechtigt, sich ohne vorgangige ob- rigkeitliche Erlaubniss friedlich und ohne Waffen in geschlossenen Raumen zu versammeln. Diese Bestimmung bezieht sich nicht auf Versammlungen unter freiem Himmel, welche auch in Bezug auf vorgangige obrigkeitliche Erlaubniss der Verfiigung des Gesetzes unterworfen sind. Art. 30. Alle Preussen haben das Recht, sich zu solchen Zwecken, welche den Strafgesetzen nicht zuwiderlaufen, in Gesellschaften zu vereinigen. Das Gesetz regelt, insbesondere zur Aufrechthaltung der offent- lichen Sicherheit, die Ausiibung des in diesem und in dem vorstehen- den Artikel (29) gewahrleisteten Rechts. Politische Vereine konnen Beschrankungen und voriibergehenden Verboten im Wege der Geseztgebung unterworfen werden. Art. 31. Die Bedingungen, unter welchen Korporationsrechte ertheilt oder verweigert werden, bestimmt das Gesetz. Art. 32. Das Petitionsrecht steht alien Preussen zu. Petitionen unter einem Gesammtnamen sind nur Behorden und Korporationen gestattet. Art. 33. Das Briefgeheimniss ist unverletzlich. Die bei strafgericht- lichen Untersuchungen und in Kriegsfallen nothwendigen Beschran- kungen sind durch die Gesetzgebung festzustellen. Art. 34. Alle Preussen sind wehrpflichtig. Den Urafang und die Art dieser Pflicht bestimmt das Gesetz. Art. 35. Das Heer begreift alle Abtheilungen des stehenden Heeres und der Landwehr. Im Falle des Krieges kann der Konig nach Massgabe des Gesetzes den Landsturm aufbieten. Art. 36. Die bewaffnete Macht kann zur Unterdriickung innerer Unruhen und zur Ausflihrung der Gesetze nur in den vom Gesetze bestimmten Fallen und Formen und auf Requisition der Civilbehorde Verfassungs-Urkunde fur den Preussischen Staat. 319 verwendet werden. In lezterer Beziehung hat das Gesetz die Aus- nahmen zu bestimmen. Art. 37. Der Militairgerichtsstand des Heeres beschrankt sich auf Strafsachen und wird durch das Gesetz geregelt. Die Bestim- mungen iiber die Militairdisziplin im Heere bleiben Gegenstand besonderer Verordnungen. Art. 38. Die bewaffnete Macht darf weder in, noch ausser dem Dienste berathschlagen oder sich anders, als auf Befehl, versammeln. Versammlungen und Vereine der Landwehr zur Berathung militair- ischer Einrichtungen, Befehle und Anordnungen sind auch dann, wenn dieselbe nicht zusammenberufen ist, untersagt. Art. 39. Auf das Heer finden die in den Artikeln 5.-6.-29.-3O. und 32. enthaltenen Bestimmungen nur insoweit Anwendung, als die mili- tairischen Gesetze und Dissiplinarvorschriften nicht entgegenstehen. Art. 40. Die Errichtung von Lehen ist untersagt. Der in Bezug auf die vorhandenen Lehen noch bestehende Lehns- verband soil durch gesetzliche Anordnung aufgelost werden. Art. 41. Die Bestimmungen des Art. 40 finden auf Thronlehen und auf die ausserhalb des Staats liegenden Lehen keine Anwendung. Art. 42. Ohne Entschadigung bleiben aufgehoben, nach Massgabe der ergangenen besonderen Gesetze : i ) das mit dem Besitze gewisser Grundstiicke verbundene Recht der Austibung oder Uebertragung der richterlichen Gewalt (Tit. VI.) und die aus diesem Rechte fliessenden Exemtionen und Abgaben ; 2) die aus dem gerichts- und schutzherr- lichen Verbande, der friiheren Erbunterthanigkeit, der friiheren Steuer- und Gewerbe-Verfassung herstammenden Verpflichtungen. Mit den aufgehobenen Rechten fallen auch die Gegenleistungen und Lasten weg, welche den bisher Berechtigten dafiir oblagen. TlTEL III. VOM KONIGE. Art. 43. Die Person des Konigs ist unverletzlich. Art. 44. Die Minister des Konigs sind verantwortlich. Alle Regi- erungsakte des Konigs bediirfen zu ihrer Giiltigkeit der Gegenzeich- nung eines Ministers, welcher dadurch die Verantwortlichkeit iiber- nimmt. Art. 45. Dem Konige allein steht die vollziehende Gewalt zi . El ernennt und entlasst die Minister. Er befiehlt die Verktindigung del Gesetze und erlasst die zu deren Ausfiihrung nothigen Verordnungen Art. 46. Der Konig fiihrt den Oberbefehl tiber das Heer. 3 2 o Appendix. Art. 47. Der Konig besetzt alle Stellen im Heere, so wie in den (ibrigen Zweigen des Staatsdienstes, in sofern nicht das Gesetz ein Anderes verordnet. Art. 48. Der Konig hat das Recht, Krieg zu erklaren und Frieden zu schliessen, auch andere Vertrage mit fremden Regierungen zu errichten. Letztere bediirfen zu ihrer Gtiltigkeit der Zustimmung der Kammern, sofern es Handelsvertrage sind, oder wenn dadurch dem Staate Lasten oder einzelnen Staatsbiirgern Verpflichtungen auferlegt werden. Art. 49. Der Konig hat das Recht der Begnadigung und Straf- milderung. Zu Gunsten eines wegen seiner Amtshandlungen verurtheilten Ministers kann dieses Recht nur auf Antrag derjenigen Kammer ausgeiibt werden, von welcher die Anklage ausgegangen ist. Der Konig kann bereits eingeleitete Untersuchungen nur auf Grund eines besonderen Gesetzes niederschlagen. Art. 50. Dem Konige steht die Verleihung von Orden und anderen mit Vorrechten nicht verbundenen Auszeichnungen zu. Er iibt das Munzrecht nach Massgabe des Gesetzes. Art. 51. Der Konig beruft die Kammern und schliesst ihre Sitzun- gen. Er kann sie entweder beide zugleich oder nur eine auflosen. Es miissen aber in einem solchen Falle innerhalb eines Zeitraums von sechszig Tagen nach der Auflosung die Wahler, und innerhalb eines Zeitraums von neunzig Tagen nach der Auflosung die Kammern versammelt werden. Art. 52. Der Konig kann die Kammern vertagen. Ohne deren Zustimmung darf diese Vertagung die Frist von 30 Tagen nicht iiber- steigen und wahrend derselben Session nicht wiederholt werden. Art. 53. Die Krone ist, den Koniglicheh Hausgesetzen gemass, erblich in dem Mannsstamme des Koniglichen Hauses nach dem Rechte der Erstgeburt und der agnatischen Linealfolge. Art. 54. Der Konig wird mit Vollendung des achtzehnten Lebens- jahres volljahrig. Er leistet in Gegenwart der vereinigten Kammern das eidliche Gelobniss, die Verfassung des Konigreichs fest und unverbriichlich zu halten, und in Uebereinstimmung mit derselben und den Gesetzen zu regieren. Art. 55. Ohne Einwilligung beider Kammern kann der Konig nicht zugleich Herrscher fremder Reiche sein. Art. 56. Wenn der Konig minderjahrig oder sonst dauernd ver- Verfassungs- Urkunde fur den Preussischen Staat. 321 hindert ist, selbst zu regieren, so ubernimmt derjenige volljahrige Agnat (Art. 53.)* welcher der Krone am nachsten steht, die Regent- schaft. Er hat sofort die Kammern zu berufen, die in vereinigter Sitzung iiber die Nothwendigkeit der Regentschaft beschliessen. Art. 57. Ist kein volljahriger Agnat vorhanden und nicht bereits vorher gesetzliche Fiirsorge fur diesen Fall getroffen, so hat das Staatsministerium die Kammern zu berufen, welche in vereinigter Sitzung einen Regenten erwahlen. Bis zum Antritt der Regentschaft von Seiten desselben fiihrt das Staatsministerium die Regierung. Art. 58. Der Regent iibt die dem Konige zustehende Gewalt in dessen Namen aus. Derselbe schwort nach Einrichtung der Regent- schaft vor den vereinigten Kammern einen Eid, die Verfassung des Konigreichs fest und unverbruchlich zu halten, und in Ueberein- stimmung mit derselben und den Gesetzen zu regieren. Bis zu dieser Eidesleistung bleibt in jedem Falle das bestehende gesammte Staatsministerium fur alle Regierungshandlungen verant- wortlich. Art. 59. Dem Kron-Fideikommisz-Fonds verbleibt die durch das Gesetz vom 17. Januar 1820, auf die Einkunfte der Domainen und Forsten angewiesene Rente. TlTEL IV. VON DEN MlNISTERN. Art. 60. Die Minister, so wie die zu ihrer Vertretung abgeord- neten Staatsbeamten haben Zutritt zu jeder Kammer und miissen auf ihr Verlangen zu jeder Zeit gehort werden. Jede Kammer kann die Gegenwart der Minister verlangen. Die Minister haben in einer oder der anderen Kammer nur dann Stimmrecht, wenn sie Mitglieder derselben sind. Art. 6 1. Die Minister konnen durch Beschluss einer Kammer wegen des Verbrechens der Verfassungsverletzung, der Bestechung und des Verrathes angeklagt werden. Ueber solche Anklage ent- scheidet der oberste Gerichtshof der Monarchic in vereinigten Sena- ten. So lange noch zwei oberste Gerichtshofe bestehen, treten die- selben zu obigem Zwecke zusammen. Die naheren Bestimmungen tiber die Falle der Verantwortlichkeit, tiber das Verfahren und tiber die Strafen werden einem besonderen Gesetze vorbehalten. 322 Appendix. TITEL V. VON DEN KAMMERN. Art. 62. Die gesetzgebende Gewalt wird gemeinschaftlich durch den Konig und durch zwei Kammern ausgeiibt. Die Uebereinstimmung des Konigs und beider Kammern ist zu jedem Gesetze erforderlich. Finanzgesetz-Entwurfe und Staatshaushalts-Etats werden zuerst der Zweiten Kammer vorgelegt ; leztere werden von der Ersten Kammer im Ganzen angenommen oder abgelehnt. Art. 63. Nur in dem Falle, wenn die Aufrechthaltung der offent- lichen Sicherheit, oder die Beseitigung eines ungewohnlichen Noth- standes es dringend erfordert, konnen, insofern die Kammern nicht versammelt sind, unter Verantwortlichkeit des gesammten Staats- ministeriums, Verordnungen, die der Verfassung nicht zuwiderlaufen mit Gesetzeskraft erlassen werden. Dieselben sind aber den Kam- mern bei ihrem nachsten Zusammentritt zur Genehmigung sofort vorzulegen. Art. 64. Dem Konige, so wie jeder Kammer steht das Recht zu, Gesetze vorzuschlagen. Gesetzesvorschlage, welche durch eine der Kammern oder den Konig verworfen worden sind, konnen in derselben Sitzungsperiode nicht wieder vorgebracht werden. Art. 65-68. Die Erste Kammer wird durch Konigliche Anord- nung gebildet, welche nur durch ein mit Zustimmung der Kammern zu erlassendes Gesetz abgeandert werden kann. Die Erste Kammer wird zusammengesetzt aus Mitgliedern, welche der Konig mit erblicher Berechtigung oder auf Lebenszeit beruft. Art. 69. Die Zweite Kammer besteht aus dreihundert zwei und funfzig Mitgliedern. Die Wahlbezirke werden durch das Gesetz fest- gestellt. Sie konnen aus einem oder mehreren Kreisen oder aus einer oder mehreren der grosseren Stadte bestehen. Art. 70. Jeder Preusse, welcher das fiinf und zwanzigste Lebens- jahr vollendet hat und in der Gemeinde, in welcher er seinen Wohn- sitz hat, die Befahigung zu den Gemeindewahlen besitzt, ist stimm berechtigter Urwahler. Wer in mehreren Gemeinden an den Gemeindewahlen Theil zu nehmen berechtigt ist, darf das Recht als Urwahler nur in einer Gemeinde ausiiben. Art. 71. Auf jede Vollzahl von zwei hundert und funfzig Seelen der Bevolkerung ist ein Wahlmann zu Wahlen. Die Urwahler wer- Verfassungs-Urkunde fur den Preussischen Staat. 323 den nach Massgabe der von ihnen zu entrichtenden direkten Staats- steuern in drei Abtheilungen getheilt, und zwar in der Art, dass auf jede Abtheilung ein Dritttheil der Gesammtsumme der Steuerbetrage aller Urwahler fallt. Die Gesammtsumme wird berechnet : a) gemeindeweise, falls die Gemeinde einen Urwahlbezirk fiir sich bildet ; b) bezirksweise, falls der Urwahlbezirk aus mehreren Gemeinden zusammengesezt ist. Die erste Abtheilung besteht aus denjenigen Urwahlern, auf welche die hochsten Steuerbetrage bis zum Belaufe eines Dritttheils der Gesammtsteuer fallen. Die zweite Abtheilung besteht aus denjenigen Urwahlern, auf welche die nachst niedrigeren Steuerbetrage bis zur Granze des zweiten Dritt- theils fallen. Die dritte Abtheilung besteht aus den am niedrigsten besteuerten Urwahlern, auf welche das dritte Dritttheil fallt. Jede Abtheilung wahlt besonders, und zwar ein Dritttheil der zu wahlenden Wahlmanner. Die Abtheilungen konnen in mehrere Wahlverbande eingetheilt werden, deren keiner mehr als funfhundert Urwahler in sich schliessen darf. Die Wahlmanner werden in jeder Abtheilung aus der Zahl der stimmberechtigten Urwahler des Urwahlbezirks ohne Rticksicht auf die Abtheilungen gewahlt. Art. 72. Die Abgeordneten werden durch die Wahlmanner gewahlt. Das Nahere xiber die Ausfuhrung der Wahlen bestimmt das Wahl- gesetz, welches auch die Anordnung fur diejenigen Sta'dte zu treffen hat, in denen an Stelle eines Theils der direkten Steuern die Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer erhoben wird. Art. 73. Die Legislate- Periode der Zweiten Kammer wird auf fiinf Jahre festgesetzt. Art. 74. Zum Abgeordneten der Zweiten Kammer ist jeder Preusse wahlbar, der das dreissigste Lebensjahr vollendet, den Vollbesitz der biirgerlichen Rechte in Folge rechtskraftigen richterlichen Erkennt- nisses nicht verloren und bereits drei Jahre dem Preussischen Staats- verbande angehort hat. Der President und die Mitglieder der Ober- Rechnungskammer konnen nicht Mitglieder eines der beiden Ha'user des Landtages sein. Art. 75. Die Kammern werden nach Ablauf ihrer Legislatur-Periode neu gewahlt. Ein Gleiches geschieht im Falle der Auflosung. In beiden Fallen sind die bisherigen Mitglieder wahlbar. 324 Appendix. Art. 76. Die beiden Hauser des Landtages der Monarchic (die Kammern) werden durch den Konig regelmassig in dem Zeitraum von dem Anfange des Monats November jeden Jahres bis zur Mitte des folgenden Januar und ausserdem, so oft es die Umstande erhei- schen, einberufen. Art. 77. Die Eroffnung und die Schliessung der Kammern ge- schieht durch den Konig in Person oder durch einen dazu von Ihm beauftragten Minister in einer Sitzung der vereinigten Kammern. Beide Kammern werden gleichzeitig berufen, eroffnet, vertagt und geschlossen. Wird eine Kammer aufgelost, so wird die andere gleichzeitig vertagt. Art. 78. Jede Kammer priift die Legitimation ihrer Mitglieder und entscheidet dariiber. Sie regelt ihren Geschaftsgang und ihre Disziplin durch eine Geschaftsordnung und ervvahlt ihren Prasi- denten, ihre Viceprasidenten und Schriftfiihrer. Beamte bedurfen keines Urlaubs zum Eintritt in die Kammer. Wenn ein Kammer-Mitglied ein besoldetes Staatsamt annimmt oder im Staatsdienste in ein Amt eintritt, mit welchem ein hoherer Rang oder ein hoheres Gehalt verbunden ist, so verliert es Sitz und Stimme in der Kammer und kann seine Stelle in derselben nur durch neue Wahl wieder erlangen. Niemand kann Mitglied beider Kammern sein. Art. 79. Die Sitzungen beider Kammern sind offentlich. Jede Kammer tritt auf den Antrag ihres Prasidenten oder von zehn Mit- gliedern zu einer geheimen Sitzung zusammen, in welcher dann zunachst iiber diesen Antrag zu beschliessen ist. Art. 80. Keine der beiden Kammern kann einen Beschluss fassen, wenn nicht die Mehrheit der gesetzlichen Anzahl ihrer Mitglieder anwesend ist. Jede Kammer fasst ihre Beschliisse nach obsoluter Stimmenmehrheit, vorbehaltlich der durch die Geschaftsordnung fur Wahlen etwa zu bestimmenden Ausnahmen. Art. 81. Jede Kammer hat fur sich das Recht, Adressen an den Konig zu richten. Niemand darf den Kammern oder einer derselben in Person eine Bittschrift oder Adresse iiberreichen. Jede Kammer kann die an sie gerichteten Schriften an die Min- ister tiberweisen und von denselben Auskunft iiber eingehende Beschwerden verlangen. Verfassungs-Urkunde fur den Preussischen Staat. 325 Art. 82. Eine jede Kammer hat die Befugniss, Behufs ihrer Infor- mation Kommissionen zur Untersuchung von Thatsachen zu ernennen. Art. 83. Die Mitglieder beider Kammern sind Vertreter des gan- zen Volkes. Sie stimmen nach ihrer freien Ueberzeugung und sind an Auftrage und Instruktionen nicht gebunden. Art. 84. Sie konnen fur ihre Abstimmungen in der Kammer nie- mals, flir ihre darin ausgesprochenen Meinungen nur innerhalb der Kammer auf den Grund der Geschaftsordnung (Art. 78.) zur Rechen- schaft gezogen werden. Kein Mitglied einer Kammer kann ohne deren Genehmigung wahrend der Sizungsperiode wegen einer mit Strafe bedrohten Hand- lung zur Untersuchung gezogen oder verhaftet werden, ausser wenn es bei Ausiibung der That oder im Laufe des nachstfolgenden Tages nach derselben ergriffen wird. Gleiche Genehmigung ist bei einer Verhaftung wegen Schulden nothwendig. Jedes Strafverfahren gegen ein Mitglied der Kammer und eine jede Untersuchungs- oder Civilhaft wird fur die Dauer der Sitzungs- periode aufgehoben, wenn die betreffende Kammer es verlangt. Art. 85. Die Mitglieder der Zweiten Kammer erhalten aus der Staatskasse Reisekosten und Diaten nach Massgabe des Gesetzes. Ein Verzicht hierauf ist unstatthaft. TlTEL VI. VON DER RICHTERLICHEN GEWALT. Art. 86. Die richterliche Gewalt wird im Namen des Kom'gs durch unabhangige, keiner anderen Autoritat als der des Gesetzes unter- worfene Gerichte ausgeiibt. Die Urtheile werden im Namen des Konigs ausgefertigt und vollstreckt. Art. 87. Die Richter werden vom Konige oder in dessen Namen auf ihre Lebenszeit ernannt. Sie Konnen nur durch Richterspruch aus Griinden, welche die Gesetze vorgesehen haben, ihres Amtes entsetzt oder zeitweise entho- ben werden. Die vorlaufige Amtssuspension, welche nicht kraft des Gesetzes eintritt, und die unfreiwillige Versetzung an eine andere Stelle oder in den Ruhestand konnen nur aus den Ursachen und unter den Formen, welche im Gesetze angegeben sind, und nur auf Grund eines richterlichen Beschlusses erfolgen. Auf die Versetzungen, welche durch Veranderungen in der Organ- 326 Appendix. isation der Gerichte oder ihrer Bezirke nothig werden, finden diese Bestimmungen keine Anwendung. Art. 870. Bei der Bildung gemeinschaftlicher Gerichte fiir preus- sische Gebietstheile und Gebiete anderer Bundesstaaten sind Ab- weichungen von den Bestimmungen des Artikels 86 und des ersten Absatzes im Artikel 87 zulassig. Ges. vom 19. Februar 1879 (Ges.-S. S. 18). Art. 88. Aufgehoben. Art. 89. Die Organisation der Gerichte wird durch das Gesetz bestimmt. Art. 90. Zu einem Richteramte darf nur der berufen werden, welcher sich zu demselben nach Vorschrift der Gesetze befahigt hat. Art. 91. Gerichte fur besondere Klassen von Angelegenheiten, insbesondere Handels- und Gewerbegerichte, sollen im Wege der Gesetzgebung an den Orten errichtet werden, wo das Bedtirfniss solche erfordert. Die Organisation und Zustandigkeit. solcher Gerichte, das Ver- fahren bei denselben, die Ernennung ihrer Mitglieder, die besonderen Verhaltnisse der lezteren und die Dauer ihres Amtes werden durch das Gesetz festgestellt. Art. 92. Es soil in Preussen nur Ein oberster Gerichtshof be- stehen. Art. 93. Die Verhandlungen vor dem erkennenden Gerichte in Civil- und Strafsachen sollen offentlich sein. Die Oeffentlichkeit kann jedoch durch einen offentlich zu verktindenden Beschluss des Ge- richts ausgeschlossen werden, wenn sie der Ordnung oder den guten Sitten Gefahr droht. In anderen Fallen kann die Oeffentlichkeit nur durch Gesetze beschrankt werden. Art. 94. Bei Verbrechen erfolgt die Entscheidung iiber die Schuld des Angeklagten durch Geschworene, insoweit ein mit vorheriger Zustimmung der Kammern erlassenes Gesetz nicht Ausnahmen be- stimmt. Die Bildung des Geschworenengerichts regelt das Gesetz. Art. 95. Es kann durch ein mit vorheriger Zustimmung der Kammern zu erlassendes Gesetz ein besonderer Gerichtshof errichtet werden, dessen Zustandigkeit die Verbrechen des Hochverraths und diejenigen Verbrechen gegen die innere und aussere Sicherheit des Staats, welche ihm durch das Gesetz iiberwiesen werden, begreift. Art. 96. Die Kompetenz der Gerichte und Verwaltungsbehorden wird durch das Gesetz bestimmt. Ueber Kompetenz-Konflikte zwi Verfassungs- Urkunde fur den Preussischen Staat. 327 schen den Verwaltungs- und Gerichtsbehorden entscheidet ein durch das Gesetz bezeichneter Gerichtshof. Art. 97. Die Bedingungen, unter welchen offentliche Civil- und Militairbeamte wegen durch Ueberschreitung ihrer Amtsbefugnisse veriibter Rechtsverletzungen gerichtlich in Anspruch genommen wer- den konnen, bestimmt das Gesetz. Eine vorgangige Genehmigung der vorgesetzten Dienstbehorde darf jedoch nicht verlangt werden. TITEL VII. VON DEN NICHT ZUM RICHTERSTANDE GEHORIGEN STAATSBEAMTEN. Art. 98. Die besonderen Rechtsverhaltnisse der nicht zum Richter- stande gehorigen Staatsbeamten, einschliesslich der Staats-Anwalte, sollen durch ein Gesetz geregelt werden, welches, ohne die Regierung in der Wahl der ausfuhrenden Organe zweckwidrig zu beschranken, den Staatsbeamten gegen willkiirliche Entziehung von Amt und Ein- kommen angemessenen Schutz gewahrt. TITEL VIII. VON DEN FINANZEN. Art. 99. Alle Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Staats miissen fUr jedes Jahr im Voraus veranschlagt und auf den Staatshaushalts-Etat gebracht werden Lezterer wird jabrlich durch ein Gesetz festgestellt. Art. 100. Steuern und Abgaben fur die Staatskasse dtirfen nur, so weit sie in den Staatshaushalts-Etat aufgenommen oder durch besondere Gesetze angeordnet sind, erhoben werden. Art. 101. In Betreff der Steuern konnen Bevorzugungen nicht ein- gefiihrt werden. Die bestehende Steuergesetzgebung wird einer Revision unter- worfen und dabei jede Bevorzugung abgeschafft. Art. 102. Gebiihren konnen Staats- oder Kommunalbeamte nur auf Grand des Gesetzes erheben. Art. 103. Die Aufnahme von Anleihen fur die Staatskasse findet nur auf Grand eines Gesetzes statt. Dasselbe gilt von der Ueber- nahme von Garantien zu Lasten des Staats. Art. 104. Zu Etats-Ueberschreitungen ist die nachtragliche Geneh- migung der Kammern erforderlich. Die Rechnungen iiber den Staatshaushalts-Etat werden von der Ober-Rechnungskammer gepruft und festgestellt. Die allgemeine 328 Appendix. Rechnung iiber den Staatshaushalt jeden Jahres, einschliesslich einet Uebersicht der Staatsschulden, wird mit den Bemerkungen der Ober- Rechnungskammer zur Entlastung der Staatsregierung den Kammern vorgelegt. Ein besonderes Gesetz wird die Einrichtung und die Befugnisse der Ober-Rechnungskammer bestimmen. TITEL IX. VON DEN GEMEINDEN, KREIS-, BEZTRKS- UND PROVINZIAL-VERBANDEN. Art. 105. Die Vertretung und Verwaltung der Gemeinden, Kreise und Provinzen des Preusisschen Staats wird durch besondere Gesezte naher bestimmt. ALLGEMEINE BESTIMMUNGEN. Art. 1 06. Gesetze und Verordnungen sind verbindlich, wenn sie in der vom Gesetze vorgeschriebenen Form bekannt gemacht worden sind. Die Pruning der Rechtsgiiltigkeit gehorig verkundeter Konig- licher Verordnungen steht nicht den Behorden, sondern nur den Kammern zu. Art. 107. Die Verfassung kann auf dem ordentlichen Wege der Gesetzgebung abgeandert werden, wobei in jeder Kammer die gewohnliche absolute Stimmenmehrheit, bei zwei Abstimmungen, zwischen welchen ein Zeitraum von wenigstens ein und zwanzig Tagen liegen muss, geniigt. Art. 1 08. Die Mitglieder der beiden Kammern und alle Staats- beamten leisten dem Konige den Eid der Treue und des Gehor- sams, und beschworen die gewissenhafte Beobachtung der Verfassung. Eine Vereidigung des Heeres auf die Verfassung findet nicht statt. Art. 109. Die bestehenden Steuern und Abgaben werden forter- hoben und alle Bestimmungen der bestehenden Gesetzbiicher, einzel- nen Gesetze und Verordnungen, welche der gegenwartigen Verfassung nicht zuwiderlaufen, bleiben in Kraft, bis sie durch ein Gesetz abgean- dert werden. Art. no. Alle durch die bestehenden Gesetze angeordneten Behor den bleiben bis zur Ausfuhrung der sie betreffenden organischen Gesetze in Thatigkeit. Art. in. Fur ben Fall eines Krieges oder Aufruhrs konnen bei Verfassungs- Urkundefur den Preussischen Staat. 329 dringender Gefahr fiir die offentliche Sicherheit die Artikel 5. 6. 7. 27. 28. 29. 30. und 34. der Verfassungs-Urkunde zeit- und distrikts- weise ausser Kraft gesetzt warden. Das Nahere bestimmt das Gesetz. UEBERGANGSBESTIMMUNGEN. Art. 112. Bis zum Erlass des im Artikel 26. vorgesehenen Gesetzes bewendet es hinsichtlich des Schul-und Unterrichtswesens bei den jetzt geltenden gesetzlichen Bestimmungen. Art. 113. Vor der erfolgten Revision des Strafrechts wird liber Vergehen, welche durch Wort, Schrift, Druck oder bildliche Dar- stellung begangen werden, ein besonderes Gesetz ergehen. Art. 114. Vacat. Art. 115. Bis zum Erlasse des im Artikel 72. vorgesehenen Wahl- gesetzes bleibt die Verordnung vom 30., Mai 1849., die Wahl der Ab- geordneten zur Zweiten Kammer betreffend, in Kraft. Art. 1 1 6. Die noch bestehenden beiden obersten Gerichtshofe sollen zu einem Einzigen vereinigt werden. Die Organisation erfolgt durch em besonderes Gesetz. Art. 117. Auf die Anspruche der vor Verkiindigung der Verfas- sungs-Urkunde etatsmassig angestellten Staatsbeamten soil im Staats- dienergesetz besondere Riicksicht genommen werden. Art. 1 1 8. Sollten durch die fur den Deutschen Bundesstaat auf Grund des Entwurfs vom 26. Mai 1849. festzustellende Verfassung Abanderungen der gegenwartigen Verfassung nothig werden, so wird der Konig dieselben anordnen und diese Anordnungen den Kamm- ern bei ihrer nachsten Versammlung mittheilen. Die Kammern werden dann Beschluss dariiber fassen, ob die vor- laufig angeordneten Abanderungen mit der Verfassung des Deut- schen Bundesstaats in Uebereinstimmung stehen. Art. 119. Das im Artikel 54. erwahnte eidliche Gelobniss des Konigs, so wie die vorgeschriebene Vereidigung der beiden Kamm- ern und aller Staatsbeamten, erfolgen sogleich nach der auf dem Wege der Gesetzgebung vollendeten gegenwartigen Revision dieser Verfassung. (Art. 62. und 108.). Urkundlich unter Unserer Hochsteigenhandigen Unterschrift und beigedrucktem Koniglichen Insiegel. Gegeben Charlottenburg, den 31. Januar 1850. (L. S.) FRIEDRICH WILHELM. Graf von Brandenburg, von Ladenberg. von Manteuffel. von Strotha. von der Heydt. von Rabe. Simons, von Schleinitz. APPENDIX IV. JLOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES APPENDIX IV. LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES. Loi RELATIVE A L'ORGANISATION DES POUVOIRS PUBLICS. 25-28 fevrier 1875. Art. i. Le pouvoir le"gislatif s'exerce par deux Assemblies: la Chambre des de'pute's et le Se"nat. La Chambre des de'pute's est nomme'e par le suffrage universel, dans les conditions de'termine'es par la loi electorate. La composition, le mode de nomination et les attributions du Se"nat seront re'gle's par une loi spe"ciale. Art. 2. Le President de la Re"publique est 61u a la majorite" abso- lue des suffrages par le Snat et par la Chambre des de'pute's re"unis en Assemble nationale. II est nomme' pour sept ans. II est re'e'ligible. Art. 3. Le President de la Re"publique a 1'initiative des lois, con- curremment avec les membres des deux Chambres. II promulgue les lois lorsqu'elles ont t vetoes par les deux Chambres ; il en sur- veille et en assure 1'exe'cution. II a le droit de faire grace ; les amnisties ne peuvent etre accorde'es que par une loi. II dispose de la force arme'e. II nomme a tous les emplois civils et militaires. II preside aux solennite's nationales ; les envoy^s et les ambassa- deurs des puissances trangeres sont accr^dit^s aupres de lui. Chacun des actes du President de la R^publique doit etre contre- sign^ par un ministre. Art. 4. Au fur et a mesure des vacances qui se produiront a partir de la promulgation de la pre"sente loi, le President de la Re"publique nomine, en conseil des ministres, les conseillers d'Etat en service ordinaire. Art. 5. Le President de la Re"publique peut, sur 1'avis conforme du Se"nat, dissoudre la Chambre des d6pute"s avant 1'expiration tegale de son mandat. 333 334 Appendix. En ce cas, les colleges eiectoraux sont reunis pour de nouvelles Elections dans le delai de deux mois, et la Chambre dans les dix jours qui suivront la cloture des operations electorates. 1 Art. 6. Les ministres sont solidairement responsables devant les Chambres de la politique ge'ne'rale du gouvernement, et individuelle- ment de leurs actes personnels. Le President de la Republique n'est responsable que dans le cas de haute trahison. Art. 7. En cas de vacance par dces ou pour toute autre cause, les deux chambres re"unies precedent immediatement a rejection d'un nouveau President. Dans 1'intervalle, le conseil des ministres est investi du pouvoir exe'cutif. Art. 8. Les Chambres auront le droit, par deliberations se"par6es, prises dans chacune a la majorite" absolue des voix, soit spontane"ment, soit sur la demande du President de la Republique, de declarer qu'il y a lieu de reviser les lois constitutionnelles. Apres que chacune des deux Chambres aura pris cette resolution, elles se reuniront en Assemble nationale pour proceder a la revision. Les deliberations portant revision des lois constitutionnelles, en tout en partie, devront etres prises a la majorite absolue des mem- bres composant 1'Assembiee nationale. La form republicaine du Gouvernement ne peut faire 1'objet d'une proposition de revision. 2 Les membres des families ayant regne sur la France sont ineligible la Presidence de la Republique. 3 Loi RELATIVE A L'ORGANIZATION DU SENAT. 24-28 fevrier, 1875. Arts. 1-7 abroges. Art. 8. Le Senat a, concurremment avec la Chambre des deputes, 1'initiative et la confection des lois. Toutefois, les lois de finances doivent etre, en premier lieu, presentees a la Chambre des deputes et votees par elle. Art. 9. Le Senat peut etre constitue en cour de justice pour juger, soit le President de la Republique, soit les ministres, et pour connaitre des attentats commis centre la surete de 1'Etat. 1 Loi constitutionnelle des 13-14 aoflt 1884, art. I. 2 Ibid. art. 2. 8 Ibid. art. 2. Lois Constitutionnelles. 335 LOI CONSTITUTIONNELLE SUR LES RAPPORTS DBS POUVOIRS PUBLICS. l6-l8juillet 1875. Art. i. Le Senat et la Chambre des dputs se runissent chaque ann6e le second mardi de Janvier, a moins d'une convocation ante- rieure faite par le President de la R^publique. Les deux Chambres doivent etre runies en session cinq mois au moins chaque annee. La session de Tune commence et finit en meme temps que celle de 1'autre. Art. 2. Le President de la Rpublique prononce la cloture de la session. II a le droit de convoquer extraordinairement les Chambres. II devra les convoquer si la demande en est faite, dans 1'intervalle des sessions, par la majorite absolue des membres composant chaque Chambre. Le President peut ajourner les Chambres. Toutefois, 1'ajourne- ment ne peut exc6der le terme d'un mois ni avoir lieu plus de deux fois dans la meme session. Art. 3. Un mois au moins avant le terme lgal des pouvoirs du President de la Republique, les Chambres devront etre reunies en Assembled nationale pour proceder a Election du nouveau President. A deTaut de convocation, cette reunion aurait lieu de plein droit le quinzieme jour avant 1'expiration de ces pouvoirs. En cas de dces ou de demission du President de la Republique, les deux Chambres se runissent immdiatement et de plein droit. Dans le cas ou, par application de 1'article 5 de la loi du 25 feVrier, 1875, ^ a Chambre des dputs se trouverait dissoute au moment ou la Pr^sidence de la Rpublique deviendrait vacante, les colleges electoraux seraient aussitot convoqu^s, et le Senat se runi- rait de plein droit. Art. 4. Toute assemble de Tune des deux Chambres qui serait tenue hors du temps de la session commune est illicite et nulle de plein droit, sauf le cas prvu par Particle prcdent et celui ou le Senat est runi comme Cour de justice ; et, dans ce dernier cas, il ne peut exercer que des fonctions judiciaires. Art. 5. Les stances du S6nat et celles de la Chambre des deputes sont publiques. N^anmoins, chaque Chambre peut se former en comite 1 secret, sur la demande d'un certain nombre de ses membres, fix6 par le reglement. Elle decide ensuite, a la majority absolue, si la stance doit etre reprise en public sur le meme sujet. 336 Appendix. Art. 6. Le President de la Republique communique avec les Chambres par des messages qui sont lus a la tribune par un ministre. Les ministres ont leur entree dans les deux Chambres et doivent etre entendus quand ils le demandent. Us peuvent se faire assister par des commissaires designes, pour la discussion d'un projet de loi determine, par decret du President de >a Republique. Art. 7. Le President de la Republique promulgue les lois dans le mois qui suit la transmission au gouvernement de la loi definitive- ment adoptee. II doit promulguer dans les trois jours les lois dont la promulgation, par un vote expres dans 1'une et 1'autre Chambre, aura et6 declaree urgente. Dans le delai fix pour la promulgation, le President de la Repu- blique peut, par un message motive, demander aux deux Chambres une nouvelle deliberation qui ne peut etre refusee. Art. 8. Le President de la Republique negocie et ratifie les traites. II en donne connaissance aux Chambres aussitot que 1'interet et la suret^ de 1'Etat le permettent. Les traites de paix, de commerce, les traites qui engagent les finances de 1'Etat, ceux qui sont relatifs a 1'etat des personnes et au droit de propriety des Francais a 1'etranger, ne sont definitifs qu'apres avoir et votes par les deux Chambres. Nulle cession, nul echange, nulle adjonction de territoire, ne peut avoir lieu qu'en vertu d'une loi. Art. 9. Le President de la Republique ne peut declarer la guerre sans 1'assentiment prealable des deux Chambres. Art. 10. Chacune des Chambres est juge de Peligibilit de ses membres et de la regularity de leur election ; elle peut seule rece- voir leur demission. Art. ii. Le bureau de chacune des deux Chambres est elu chaque annee pour la duree de la session et pour toute session extraordinaire qui aurait lieu avant la session ordinaire de 1'annee suivante. Lorsque les deux Chambres se reunissent en Assemblee nationale, leur bureau se compose des president, vice-presidents et secretaires du Senat. Art. 12. Le President de la Republique ne peut etre mis en accusa- tion que par la Chambre des deputes et ne peut etre jug6 que par le Senat. Les ministres peuvent etre mis en accusation par la Chambre des deputes pour crimes commis dans 1'exercice de leurs fonctions. En ce cas, il sont juges par le Senat. Lois Constitutionnelles. 337 Le Snat peut etre constitu6 en cour de justice par un de"cret du President de la Republique, rendu en conseil des ministres, pour juger toute personne preVenue d'attentat commis centre la suret6 de 1'Etat. Si 1'instruction est commenced par la justice ordinaire, le dcret de convocation du Senat peut etre rendu jusqu'a 1'arret de renvoi. Une loi de'terminera le mode de proc6der pour 1'accusation, 1'in- struction et le jugement. Art. 13. Aucun membre de 1'une ou de 1'autre Chambre ne peut etre poursuivi ou recherch a 1'occasion des opinions ou votes mis par lui dans 1'exercice de ses fonctions. Art. 14. Aucun membre de 1'une ou de 1'autre Chambre ne peut, pendant la dure de la session, etre poursuivi ou arret6 en matiere criminelle ou correctionnelle qu'avec Pautorisation de la Chambre dont il fait partie, sauf le cas de flagrant delit. la detention ou la poursuite d'un membre de 1'une ou de 1'autre Chambre est suspendue pendant la session, et pour toute sa duree si la Chambre le requiert. University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388 Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. RECD YPi. JAN 2 9 '01