JB>X) 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
 B M bDl Eb7 
 
LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 University of California. 
 
 RECEIVED BY EXCHANGE 
 
 Class 
 
\p 
 
 \^ 
 
 INTRODUCTION to the GENETIC 
 TREATMENT of the FAITH- 
 CONSCIOUSNESS in the 
 INDIVIDUAL 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM WILBERFORCE COSTIN 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns Hopkins 
 
 University in conformity with the requirements for the 
 
 Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY 
 
 BALTIMORE 
 
 1909 
 
INTRODUCTION to the GENETIC 
 TREATMENT of the FAITH- 
 CONSCIOUSNESS in the 
 INDIVIDUAL 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM WILBERFORCE COSTIN 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns Hopkins 
 
 University in conformity with the requirements for the 
 
 Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 ERSlTV 
 
 or 
 
 WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY 
 
 BALTIMORE 
 
 1909 
 
Oj 
 
 Copyright, 1909 
 
 BY 
 
 William Wilberforce Costin 
 
PART I 
 NON-RELIGIOUS FAITH 
 
 Prefatory Note. 
 
 The object of this dissertation is to carry into a new field, 
 that of the reUgious; the method of approach known as the 
 "Genetic Method," which has become so fruitful in the hands of 
 contemporary psychologists and logicians. 
 
 w. w. c. 
 
 18e^-^B 
 
CONTENTS. 
 Part I. 
 
 NON-RELIGIOUS FAITH. 
 
 Chapter I Genesis of the Faith Consciousness or Pre- 
 
 Logical Faith: Presumption 7-13 
 
 Chapter II Practical or Quasi-Logical Faith: Assump- 
 tion 14-18 
 
 Chapter III Rational or Logical Faith: Presupposition 
 
 and Belief 19-21 
 
 Chapter IV Ideal Faith: Postulation 22-31 
 
 Chapter V Mystic and Hyper-Logical Faith. I Mys- 
 tic Faith: Contemplation. II Hyper- 
 Logical Faith: The Hyper - Logical 
 Experience as Union of Faith and 
 Knowledge 32-43 
 
 Part II. 
 
 religious faith. 
 
 Appendix I (presenting a brief abstract of Part II.) . .. 44-45 
 
 Part III. 
 
 the faith principle in modern philosophy. 
 
 (Omitted.) 
 
 Life 46-47 
 
V OF 
 
 Part I 
 
 NON-RELIGIOUS FAITH 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 GENESIS OF THE FAITH-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 OR 
 
 PRE-LOGICAL FAITH! PRESUMPTION 
 
 By the faith-consciousness* is meant the conscious act and con- 
 tent of faith. The act of faith is consciousness functioning 
 according to the demand of the faith-stimulus. Faith as act is 
 that condition in which mental objects possess the interest and 
 significance that make them worthy of acknowledgment, con- 
 sideration and trust. Faith as content from the psychological 
 point of view comprises those activities and mental states result- 
 ing from the above condition over against which consciousness 
 sets itself. 
 
 Our first interest is not so much in the functioning of the faith- 
 consciousness as in the consideration of what constitutes the 
 content and genesis of the same. We pass to that considera- 
 tion. 
 
 There can be no adequate psychological study of the faith 
 principle without raising the question of its genesis. Where in 
 the psychic movement does there appear anything resembling 
 that which in mature consciousness we call faith? In attempt- 
 ing to answer this question we shall seek by comparative analysis 
 of the various functions of the primary consciousness to set in 
 bold relief a psychic process or principle which would seem funda- 
 mentally to resemble the psychological principle of mature faith. 
 In making this analysis we begin with the cognitive function. 
 
 ' For a study of the natxire of consciousness, see Baldwin, Handbook of 
 Psy. Senses and Intellect, pp. 43-45. 
 
8 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 Mere reaction against external action is not an adequate de- 
 scription of the cognitive process. A mere hitting-back move- 
 ment could never produce meaning. A reaction, to have cog- 
 nitive value, must be that of an inner movement or control which 
 gives it direction, and for which the result is meaning. Such a 
 control would indicate a cognitive consciousness. Cognition, 
 then, is that activity in the psychic process which accepts and 
 unifies the impression made by stimulation, and constructs it 
 into meaning, thereby constituting it knowledge for the reacting 
 consciousness. Thus we are able to distinguish between cog- 
 nitive process and cognitive content or knowledge.^ 
 
 Feeling: The bombardment of consciousness by external 
 action is something first of all felt. The feeling produced by such 
 an attack is instantly followed by reaction. And the reaction 
 process itself again stimulates feeling. This is true also of the 
 presence of cognitive content or knowledge in consciousness. 
 It produces an affection of the self,^ an affection which in turn is 
 the index or sign of at least an emotional valuation given by 
 consciousness to the constructs of all conscious activity. 
 
 Will: Every state of consciousness is the embodiment of a 
 mental process.^ Even reflex action is the expression of activity. 
 There could be no such action without a psychic process. This 
 and the other activities of mind necessary for attention, feeling 
 and knowing, together with the power of conscious control 
 within limits,* characterize will. 
 
 The process, the genesis of which we are seeking, will gradually 
 emerge, as we analyze and compare it with the aspects of con- 
 sciousness sketched above. But first let us compare these activ- 
 ities with each other as to their genesis. 
 
 Prof. Dewey says, ''that, first, feeling is necessary, for unless 
 the mind were affected in some way by the object or the truth, 
 
 *Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 9. "Thought may- 
 signify the mental activity, and it may signify the contents grasped through 
 that activity. " 
 
 ^ See Dewey, Psy., p. 16. 
 
 * Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 38. 
 
 * Bowne, Psy., p. 222. 
 
Pre-Logical Faith: Presumption 9 
 
 unless it had some interest in them, it would never direct itself 
 to them, would not pay attention to them, and they would not 
 come within its sphere of knowledge at all."* 
 
 To apprehend feeling is a cognitive act as seen in the unifying 
 process which sets it up, and recognizes it as such. Besides, feel- 
 ing for, or interest in, a thing, or the truth, carries the attention 
 and results in its cognition. But the attention involved a proc- 
 ess of conation; so that the relative position in which these 
 three aspects of consciousness stand as respects dependence 
 would be feeling, will, cognition. That is, taking the construc- 
 tive act of setting up feeling as cognition. 
 
 We come now to the genesis of the faith principle. Faith has 
 no meaning without an object, so that will and feeling must pre- 
 cede the process. In order better to understand these conditions 
 and the resulting significance of the faith principle, let us take 
 for illustration, some object of cognition, say the child and its 
 bottle. The nurse, with the bottle, appears and disappears. 
 The child sees the bottle for a moment but is soon disappointed. 
 What is the psychic state of the child's consciousness until it 
 appears again? 
 
 Many elements enter in to complicate the situation. Cogni- 
 tion has done its work in constructing the object. As knowl- 
 edge it is accompanied by a state of feeling, an affection of self; 
 it comes to have value, worth, significance for consciousness. 
 Interest is aroused.^ But the object has disappeared. What 
 does the child do? After a moment of restless disappointment, 
 it gives itself up to the situation, in the spirit of blind surrender 
 to the object, to watch and wait for its return. The psychic sig- 
 nificance of the attitude thus assumed involves the problem 
 of the faith principle. We pass to the consideration of that 
 significance. 
 
 In the pre-logical mode consciousness may be characterized as 
 respects its attitude in its control of a given content as a ''pre- 
 sumption of existence, control, or reality;"^ and over against 
 
 * Dewey, Psy., p. 18. 
 
 ' Baldwin, Handbook of Psy. Feeling and Will, p. 139, on Nature of Interest. 
 
 3 Baldwin, Thought and Things, Vol. II, p. 11. 
 
10 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 this, "assumption" — the contrasted attitude towards what is 
 not presumed, but is made "schematic for further determina- 
 tion."^ The psychic significance of the attitude of conscious- 
 ness while waiting and watching for the return of the absent object 
 involves the principle of "presumption," i.e., consciousness 
 " presumes its existence and availability in the world of its prac- 
 tical interests. "2 The attitude thus characterized may be called 
 "presumptive faith." 
 
 We have seen that cognition, feeling and will, construct, attend 
 and give conscious value to the object. These activities spring 
 up the moment the stimulating conditions are present. It is not 
 even necessary, in order to arouse these activities, that the object 
 be familiar. A stimulus flashed into consciousness for the first 
 time, will stimulate reaction, arouse interest, and result in cog- 
 nition. The attitude of consciousness toward an unfamiliar 
 and persisting object, has in it at least two elements of the faith 
 principle, namely. Interest and Surrender. 
 
 Interest once aroused in the object persists so long as the object 
 persists, that is, if the object has any significance for conscious- 
 ness. But in addition to, and along with, persisting interest 
 in a persisting object, we have the attitude of consideration or 
 sustained interest — the unrefiective attitude of primary contem- 
 plation or first immediacy. The considering consciousness has in 
 it the element of knomng. It persists in seeing progressive, 
 enriching, enlarging, and changing meaning in the object. This 
 attitude of concentrated interest in the object is an attitude in 
 which consciousness goes out, in a process of grasping and indi- 
 viduating the object as a unit. 
 
 Interest as acceptance is akin to logical acknowledgment. It 
 is an element in presumption (or reality-feeling). In the pre- 
 logical consciousness it is what "belief" is in the logical. 
 
 The second element of the faith principle is surrender. The 
 object, in yielding up its meaning, must arouse sufficient interest 
 to make it worth while for consciousness to concentrate upon it. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 11. 
 'Ibid., p. 12. 
 
Pre-Logical Faith: Presumption 11 
 
 But this attitude when once assumed, involving the considering 
 consciousness, includes in its activities the process of surrender. 
 
 Surrender, as here used, is an act of the will, but it is something 
 more. It is will not only in the sense that all conscious process 
 is will or activity, but it is a definite act of will. It is an act, 
 however, which rests upon meaning as its stimulus. It is the 
 process involved in consideration; not the process that wills to 
 consider, but the process which gives itself over under the pres- 
 sure of meaning,* value, significance, in the thing considered. 
 It is a resting of the entire self upon the object. The thing be- 
 comes fulfillment or end-state. Meaning becomes so trustworthy 
 and significant, and seems to guarantee so much, that conscious- 
 ness falls upon it, and confidently rests and reposes in it as 
 something having value and worth while. But all this is in the 
 presence of a persisting object. This is the second element of 
 presumption. 
 
 Take now the case where the object does not persist, as that 
 of the disappearance of the nurse and the bottle. A new situa- 
 tion confronts us, and new elements manifest themselves. With 
 a persisting object the function of memory is unnecessary, unless 
 we say that continuous recognition involves memory. But with 
 a passing and shifting object, memory is indispensable. There 
 could be no recognition of the object, when it reappears, without 
 memory. And there could be no image formed of the object 
 without it. So that when the object disappears, consciousness 
 is able to reproduce it in memory. It is this image object for 
 the original of which consciousness with great interest waits and 
 watches. 
 
 The element of "absence" entering into the situation, pro- 
 duces a different state of consciousness from that of the persist- 
 ing object. If the meaning has sufficient significance to guaran- 
 tee "absent treatment," consciousness, remembering and imag- 
 ing the object and feeling its worth, makes, as in the case of the 
 persisting object, a surrender of itself to it as imaged, and waits 
 
 ' On rise of psychic meanings; Baldwin, Thought and Things or Genetic 
 Logic, Vol. I, p. 130; a work upon which many of the psychological posi- 
 tions of this paper are based. 
 
12 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 patiently and intently for its reappearance. The act of sur- 
 render to an object, with all that that involves as compared with 
 the similar process when the object persists, is the further ele- 
 ment of the faith principle. The process here is more than sim- 
 ply will. The absence of the object gives rise to the "trustful" 
 state of consciousness. Trust is produced. Confidence or 
 "trust" in the unseen object, impelling consciousness to take 
 the attitude of surrender, of waiting and watching for its return, 
 along with the interest necessary to stimulate the process, is the 
 first mode of faith characterized by "presumption." 
 
 In "trust" there are two elements (1) trust in the conversion 
 value of the image, corresponding to the "interest" element in 
 faith, and (2) trust in the satisfying or worthful character of con- 
 tent, corresponding to surrender; so that "trust" shows the same 
 two factors in the image mode. It requires on the cognitive side 
 what Prof. Baldwin has described as the "remote sameness" 
 meaning.^ 
 
 The faith principle takes its rise in the lowest levels of con- 
 sciousness, as seen in the fact that certain of its elements appear 
 in advance of the memory function. This is true even on the 
 theory that memory is involved in continuous recognition. For 
 before recognition is possible, interest must be aroused, while 
 it in turn is followed by reaction. But the element of faith which 
 appears as the result of embarrassment on the part of conscious- 
 ness in its endeavor to relate itself to the absent object, takes its 
 rise in consciousness, after the image has been lifted from the 
 material object, and, by memory, recognized as in some sense the 
 copy of the same. The reposeful, trustful state of consciousness, 
 involving confidence in the absent and unseen, is not possible 
 until consciousness has passed into the higher mode of memory. 
 But even this is placing the genesis of faith at a very low level 
 in the development of consciousness. 
 
 Faith at this level attaches to "foreign" control.^ The mind 
 under the pressure of meaning goes direct to the object, or, rather, 
 
 » Baldwin, Thought and Things, Vol. I, p. 156. 
 2 On the Notion of Control, Ibid., p. 57. 
 
V 
 
 CAUfO^^'^ 
 
 Pre-Logical Faith: Presumption 13 
 
 to where it is expected to reappear. Everything in consciousness 
 at this stage is becoming external. If left to itself, conscious- 
 ness instantly seeks its object, in order to entwine itself about it, 
 and find satisfaction in the enfoldment. Consciousness is under 
 its control. The power to constitute the object something for 
 consciousness in the sense of setting it up at will, for thought and 
 consideration, is not yet developed. Faith at this stage is ration- 
 ally blind — it "presumes." 
 
 It is to be noted, therefore, that there is a difference between 
 this simple or first consciousness, which is mere apprehension, 
 and the consciousness of contemplation or the higher mode of 
 immediacy. The contemplative consciousness at this stage is, 
 not conscious that it is contemplating. It lacks the power to set 
 up, as an object of thought, this fact or process and also the com- 
 plex content of the logical mode for contemplation. There is no 
 consciousness either of a distinction between the self which con- 
 templates and the object contemplated. The dualism of sub- 
 ject-object has not yet sprung up. There is lacking also the 
 power of judgment, and the capacity for rational determination 
 within the content of consciousness. It may be said that con- 
 sciousness at this level is in the pre-logical mode, lacking all the 
 powers that go to make up the logical function. The principle, 
 therefore, the genesis of which we are seeking, may be called 
 pre-logical faith or Presumption. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 PRACTICAL OR QUASI-LOGICAL FAITH: ASSUMPTION 
 
 The expression ''quasi-logical faith" may be better understood 
 as we consider the general movement of consciousness through- 
 out this section of its progressions, and note the larger charac- 
 teristics of other phases. Consciousness viewed from the genetic 
 standpoint is seen to be not something static and fixed, but an 
 organized vital psychic process of action and reaction against 
 stimulus to its own internal advantage developmentally and 
 experimentally. Consciousness thought of as thus growing, 
 expanding and enriching itself takes to itself direction, and 
 makes for itself a history. The study of consciousness through- 
 out the highway of its procession, and byway of its history is the 
 work of Genetic Logic and Psychology. Throughout this ever 
 expanding movement may be traced the vital strands of its 
 being which taken together constitute longitudinally at least its 
 inner fiber and structure. A study of the genesis of conscious 
 elements is first of all an investigation as to the source, rooting 
 and rise of the fibers constituting the strandlike structure of 
 consciousness. 
 
 In order to clearness it is necessary to explain that what we 
 are calling the "strands of consciounsess " are in turn for pur- 
 poses of analysis thought of as each constituting a separate mode 
 of consciousness. Thus we may speak of the moral, aesthetic, 
 cognitive, religious, emotional, volitional or faith-consciousness. 
 That is to say when we find consciousness functioning habitually 
 in a particular way — in such a way as can be definitely charac- 
 terized and studied throughout the histoiy of that process we 
 call it a consciousness of this or that particular kind or mode. 
 Thus we find justification for the use of the term " faith-conscious- 
 ness. " It is the study of a mode of consciousness theoretically 
 
Quasi-Logical Faith: Assumption 15 
 
 within the whole of consciousness and yet not actually separable 
 from the whole; for after all consciousness functions as a unit;^ it 
 is the one and the same consciousness functioning now as moral, 
 now as aesthetic, now as religious, etc. The identity is not in the 
 process but in the quality characteristic of each process. For 
 example when consciousness in its functioning has the quality 
 or character of faith we call it a faith-consciousness; when it has 
 the quality of cognition we call it a cognitive consciousness. 
 
 When the particular consciousness which we are analyzing 
 out has made a beginning and a history for itself through growth, 
 we call with Baldwin the distance covered in its development a 
 progression; and this taken together with its beginning as a gen- 
 esis may be designated in its entirety as a genetic progression. 
 Still further by way of definition it may be said that when in any 
 progression we come to a point where a new character appears 
 and thereafter a new and distinctive quality is given to conscious- 
 ness that the section of the progression thus formed is a mode and 
 that the transition made from what went before into the new 
 character is a modal transition or genesis.^ In the genetic treat- 
 ment of the strands of consciousness it is usually found that the 
 conscious fibers of one mode have their roots in the preceding 
 mode, or even run back through all preceding modes into the 
 foundation soil of consciousness itself. Minor growths or enlarge- 
 ments within the mode may be called ''progressions." 
 
 Above we suggested that a glance at some other phase of con- 
 sciousness might be of help in understanding the meaning of the 
 mode into which the faith-consciousness has now passed. Take 
 for example the cognitive consciousness considered from the side 
 of logical meaning. There would first of all be the pre-logical 
 mode; that phase of the cognitive consciousness apparently 
 destitute of logical meaning although the roots of the logical 
 might be present. The objects cognized by consciousness in this 
 state could only be those of sense and memory. From the pre- 
 
 ' See Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 22. 
 
 ^ See Baldwin, Development and Evolution, Chap. XIX, "The Theory 
 of Genetic Modes;" also Thought and Things, Vol. I, for the positions 
 immediately following. 
 
16 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 logical the passage is made into the quasi-logical mode. Here 
 the objects cognized are those of fancy, make-believe, and sub- 
 stantive objects. In order to clearness as to what is meant by 
 the quasi-logical mode of the cognitive consciousness let us take 
 one of these objects of determination and analyze it in its rela- 
 tions both from beneath and from above, from the logical as well 
 as from the pre-logical point of view. Take for example the 
 make-believe determination as set forth in play. Here we have 
 a construction of the imagination aided by memory of a situation 
 which in part is suggested by real life — herein imitative — but 
 at the same time is consciously unreal. 
 
 While the play situation is consciously recognized as unreal 
 it may be said to be under psychic control, and to be psychically 
 or inwardly determined. But so soon as the play is fairly under 
 way and consciousness looses itself in the spirit of the game the 
 situation for the time seems real and all psychic control is with- 
 drawn. But now and then in the midst of the excitement the 
 player realizes that after all it is only play, and yields to it as a 
 "conscious self-illusion." In this we see what is called in the 
 cognitive consciousness the quasi-logical mode. Here is the 
 element of the pre-logical, where all logical determination is 
 withdrawn, and at the same time the logical, where conscious 
 content is more or less under the control peculiar to the self. 
 With this process in mind we are better able to understand the 
 meaning of the quasi-logical mode of the faith-consciousness. 
 We pass to the further consideration of that mode. 
 
 The tendency of consciousness, observed from the beginning 
 to go direct to its object is maintained throughout the life of the 
 individual. It is only after persistent endeavor and laborious 
 lifting of thought from its object that consciousness comes to 
 realize its right and power to push and hold off from itself for 
 purposes of thought and consideration its various mental con- 
 structs. These two roads indicating the direction and move- 
 ment of consciousness in its development branch from a com- 
 mon point located in the lower levels of psychic progression. 
 Within these overlapping spheres of conscious content are to be 
 found certain forms of the faith principle. The first of which 
 
Quasi-Logical Faith: Assumption 17 
 
 may be considered under the head of "practical faith." By 
 this we mean that principle which enables the individual to so 
 relate himself to things and persons and to the constituted order 
 of his environment as to guarantee the ongoing of his life with as 
 little friction and embarrassment as possible. In order to fix 
 with any degree of certainty the content and setting of this prin- 
 ciple other related topics should have due consideration. We 
 pass to the determination of these considerations and principles 
 in their relation to faith. 
 
 Impulse:^ An impulse is the onward pressure of ideas, feelings 
 or perceptions as states of consciousness showing itself in activ- 
 ity, as in producing some external physical change. An instinc- 
 tive impulse is the feeling on the part of consciousness of being 
 impelled to act without knowing the end to be realized yet with 
 the power to select the proper means for its accomplishment.' 
 While impulse is not faith it is so closely related to it in this mode 
 as to supply the dynamic of the principle in its practical use. 
 It often compels the exercise of faith as when one trusts another 
 or some situation on no other ground than that of instinctive 
 impulse. Much of the world's work is done through the dynamic 
 of these combined principles. It leads to the "assumption" of 
 the persistence and satisfying quality of the object. In the pre- 
 logical mode we found the attitude of assumption "to be the use 
 of a meaning in a control and with a reference that is not yet estab- 
 lished, not yet a 'presumption.'" In this mode — the quasi- 
 logical — there is not only present "pre-logical assumption," but 
 logical as well, as existence or "reality" meaning.^ 
 
 Sympathy: In sympathy consciousness identifies with itself 
 the experiences of others, The mere fact of living in the psy- 
 chical atmosphere of social intercourse will produce sympathy. 
 Consciousness apprehends the feelings of others and reproduces 
 them in itself, at the same time forgetting self and remembering 
 that they are the feelings of others.* Sympathy is not faith, 
 
 > See Hoffding, Outlines of Psy., pp. 235-256. 
 
 ^ See Dewey, Psy., 353. 
 
 ^See Baldwin, Thought and Things, Vol. II, pp. 11-12. 
 
 •Ibid., pp. 329-330. 
 
18 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 but as between men it is a strong bond of union and readily 
 becomes the occasion for the exercise of it. Often men have faith 
 in each other and in their schemes and inventions purely out of 
 personal sympathy for each other. The faith of sympathy is a 
 practical force of far-reaching influence. 
 
 Desire : While desire is not impulse it is often a development 
 from it. Impulse has no presentation of the end to which it goes 
 straight and blindly. But desire has.^ An impulsive act repeat- 
 edly performed resulting in a pleasurable state of consciousness 
 creates a desire for the repetition of the same or similar experience. 
 This implies a consciousness that is able to project itself into the 
 future and to apprehend the difference between a future or pos- 
 sible state of consciousness and its actual experience. It is a 
 consciousness that knows it has impulses, and as a form of pleas- 
 urable action sets before itself the satisfaction of them. The 
 tendency to realize desires often results in the taking of great 
 risks and in pressing into service the function of faith for no other 
 reason than that of personal gratification. The faith of impulse, 
 sympathy, desire, implies a consciousness the content of which 
 involves a play back and forth as between rational determination 
 on the one hand, and a blind undiscriminating outgoing of spirit 
 on the other. This quality of consciousness may be character- 
 ized as quasi-logical, i.e., partly deliberate and rational, but at 
 the same time undetermined in part and rationally blind in its 
 ongoing and purpose. Such a principle may be called quasi- 
 logical faith or assumption. It "assumes" beyond what it is 
 entitled either to ''presume" or "believe." 
 
 ' See Dewey, Psy., p. 360. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 RATIONAL OR LOGICAL FAITH : PRESUPPOSITION AND BELIEF. 
 
 Another form of the faith principle found in the over-lapping 
 spheres of conscious content is rational faith. Faith may be said 
 to be rational when it rests upon the deductions of reason or 
 involves a process of judgment. We have seen that there is a 
 faith that trusts everything and everyone, taking on an attitude 
 of presumption. In this consciousness loses itself in its object. 
 All logical considerations are either not present or are set aside 
 under the stress of a passion which finds satisfaction only in 
 burying itself in the object of its pursuit. This kind of faith is 
 found not only in the pre-logical state of consciousness where the 
 logical function has not yet appeared, but often also in mature 
 consciousness where the capacity for reflection is possible but is 
 not exercised or controlled. We have seen pre-logical faith pass 
 into that state of conscious progression where consciousness in 
 the process of becoming comes to be more and more capable of 
 self-determination, with view to ends, but not altogether so. 
 This we call the quasi-logical state of the faith-consciousness. 
 It "assumes" what it cannot "presume." From this the pas- 
 sage is made more or less laboriously into the logical mode. We 
 say "laboriously" because the popular and easy road is that of 
 the quasi-logical mode, although the way is open for the use of 
 the judgment. Consciousness in passing from the pre-logical 
 to the quasi-logical mode undergoes a change not merely in 
 expansion but in the germination of a new function, namely, 
 the judgment; whereas the passage from the quasi-logical to the 
 logical state of consciousness involves the addition of nothing 
 wholly new but rather the development of what already is germi- 
 nally there. So that the difference between quasi-logical and 
 logical faith resolves itself into the question of the quantity of 
 rational determination absent or present in any one conscious- 
 
20 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 ness. In approaching the question of rational faith certain funda- 
 mental considerations are involved. 
 
 There is a faith the ground of which is not rationally deter- 
 mined and yet is probably possessed only by a rational conscious- 
 ness. It is the faith, consciousness has in itself. No reasoning 
 is necessary to induce consciousness to have faith in itself and 
 yet only a reflecting consciousness is capable of selecting out and 
 setting up that fact as part of its content or meaning. There is a 
 faith also in self-consciousness that needs not the support of 
 rational determination. Self-consciousness is self-knowledge 
 not indeed without reflection, but as the presupposition of the 
 mode of reflection. Self-knowledge is a kind of knowledge of the 
 self that simply wells up within one without having to pass 
 through the categories of thought. It is the consciousness of the 
 inner control and direction of thought. Another kind of knowl- 
 edge of the self is that which comes through reflection.^ It 
 objectifies the self and makes it content of judgment. The faith 
 or presupposition here involved is of the type of presumption as 
 it is developed in the mode of reflection. It requires, however, 
 a reflective consciousness to see that an act of faith is involved. 
 This shows that the subject-self is presupposed just by the act 
 of judgment that aflSrms the object-self. The same is true of 
 our knowledge of persons and the world. Reflection shows clearly 
 that our knowledge of a person is purely and only a mental con- 
 struct.^ How then do we know that the subject-person and the 
 mental construct or object-person correspond? And yet we do 
 not hesitate a moment, but act at once on the faith that they 
 do seeing that one is the function that constitutes the other. 
 The same holds true when the principle is applied to the world. 
 Every mind constructs for itself its own world. The world that 
 is phenomenally real, to us is a mental construct. But we believe 
 that there is also an actually real world and that there is some 
 kind of correspondence between the two.^ The real world is 
 presupposed by judgment as a control sphere just as the subject 
 
 ' See Baldwin, Handbook, Senses and Intellect, p. 144. 
 
 ' See Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, pp. 309-310. 
 
 ' See Bowne, Metaphysics, pp. 16-17. 
 
Logical Faith: Presupposition and Belief 21 
 
 is. We never think, however, of making this distinction in 
 practical hfe, and, therefore, the faith-process involved is never 
 recognized. Consciousness must be reflective in order to see 
 the process while the faith involved is spontaneous. 
 
 What is "presumed" in the pre-logical and "assumed" in the 
 quasi-logical is presupposed in the logical. The case is some- 
 thing different, however, when we come to contemplate the Abso- 
 lute. The difference is in this: The mind is compelled to con- 
 struct the world because it lives in it, on the basis of fact and 
 truth but the Absolute we are not compelled to construct under 
 like limitations. It is an ideal construction making "postula- 
 tion" beyond experience. It requires an act of faith to believe 
 that there is a correspondence between the Infinite and the men- 
 tal concept. It is evident again that this is the same kind of 
 faith as that called "trust" above. 
 
 By rational faith is meant that whenever faith is used we always 
 have an adequate reason for its use. The reason for faith may 
 not always be in consciousness when faith is employed. A mem- 
 ory of the same may suffice many times, but rational faith must 
 have somewhere in consciousness a basis in judgment. Illus- 
 trations of rationally determined faith are all about us in life. 
 A person has faith in another because he "knows" him. We 
 have faith in the system because we have tested it and "know" 
 it. The man of science has faith that his theory will hold even 
 where he cannot experiment, because it seems reasonable, and 
 held good where experimentation was possible. The chief motive 
 of philosophy is its absolute faith in the unity of the whole, and 
 that somewhere in the universe there is light, and that at the 
 center everything is transparently clear to reason. From the 
 first philosophy has been looking for plan and purpose in things 
 with the faith that the universe is not destitute of them, and for 
 good reasons. 
 
 Another term for rationally determined faith is belief. An 
 interesting study is that of the distinction between knowledge 
 and belief. But this we pass over at this time. Our aim here 
 is simply to show that there is what we are calling the rational 
 or logical mode of the faith-consciousness in which the whole 
 believed implicates our "presuppositions" of belief. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 IDEAL faith: postulation. 
 
 The ideal element in perception and memory attaches to the 
 meaning of the perceived or remembered thing. It is tied down 
 to some particular existence and cannot be freed until the mode 
 of construction known as creative imagination lifts the ideal 
 element from its connection and treats it with reference to its 
 own significance and value, disregarding the concrete existence 
 of the thing. Creative imagination liberates the idea from its 
 accidental connections and as a universalizing activity reveals 
 it in its nature as independent of varying concomitants. 
 
 While the idealizing activity of imagination is involved in con- 
 scious construction ideals as such are not constructions, as they 
 are not describable. Ideal productions, as vague ends set up 
 for pursuit, are elements of meaning attaching to present images. 
 They are of the nature of interest. They have the distinguish- 
 ing characters of the good, the beautiful and the true; to the 
 religious ideal there attaches, in addition, the moral or ethical 
 determinations inducing the sense of obligation and dependence. 
 The psychic disposition to pursue identities through the con- 
 nections of new determinations results in the setting up of the 
 abstraction by which conception proceeds. The realization of 
 the pursuit of identities involved, gives rise to a feeling of appre- 
 ciation whenever desperate elements of experience " fall together 
 in a unity of common meaning."^ The unifying process accom- 
 panied by appreciation or gratification is necessary in order to 
 abstraction. One of the elements of conceptual feeling, therefore, 
 attaching to abstraction "may be best characterized as the feel- 
 ing of unity in a whole. "^ 
 
 > Baldwin, Handbook of Psy., Feeling and WiU, p. 200. 
 » Ibid. 
 
Ideal Faith: Postulation 23 
 
 Through the process of abstraction the concept is set up as a 
 positive construction, at the expense and neglect, however, of 
 all experience ineligible for illustration. In generalization we 
 have an opposite but equally important aspect of conception. 
 Consciousness modifies conceptual content in extending its 
 application to cover its accepted conscious experience. General- 
 ization is a psychic process toward variety tending away from 
 identity. The gratification of these tendencies from identity to 
 variety results in a conceptual feeling which may be characterized 
 as that of the harmony of parts. 
 
 The conscious value of a concept in experience yields an aspect 
 of feeling begotten of intension, as over against extension, "which 
 excites only a feeling of its present accidental application."^ 
 The emotion aroused by the process of intension is the "feeling 
 formeaning. " 
 
 Ideals have attached to them a kind of objectivity which may 
 be called presentative as present in imagination; and also the 
 same reality-coefficient attaching to every one, as not present 
 in imagination. These aspects of conceptional emotion may be 
 characterized as the feeling of universality. 
 
 Taking the four ingredients of conceptual feeling sketched 
 above. Ideals may be defined, "as the forms which we feel our 
 conceptions would take if we were able to realize in them a satis- 
 fying degree of unity, harmony, significance and universality."^ 
 
 The conceptual feeling involved in ideal construction carries 
 with it a determination which has the force of belief — a deter- 
 mination which may be characterized as Ideal Faith. 
 
 Consciousness in the ideal-faith mode goes beyond the content 
 of reflection in an acceptance, on the basis of "trust," of the 
 remote, when it is not fully guaranteed by thought. This out- 
 come results from the growth of ideal and universal meaning. 
 The attitude of consciousness involved is postulation ; it is related 
 to presupposition as assumption is to presumption. In assump- 
 
 1 Ibid. 
 
 2 Baldwin, Handbook of Psy., pp. 201-202, also Thought and Things, Vol. 
 I, pp. 234-238 on Ideal Meaning, and Vol. II, on Postulation, etc., as 
 presented below. 
 
24 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 tion consciousness determines a construction of which the main 
 element of meaning is that it has not been found real but is set 
 up, accepted and acted upon as though it were real. Meaning 
 is ejected into a control sphere in which there is little or no reality- 
 correspondence ; it is made to attach to the construction — by the 
 ipse dixit of consciousness — when in fact it is out of its proper 
 realm. Relations of coordination and interconnection as attach- 
 ing to the meaning are forced into the situation to satisfy the 
 conscious impulse of the moment. The principle of assumption 
 may be illustrated by the child and his toy-dog: "When the 
 child goes through the process of feeding his toy-dog, he ' assumes' 
 a sphere that he does not regularly ' presume.' " In presumption 
 consciousness acts upon the principle that reality is what the 
 meaning indicates, and reads into reality only such meaning as 
 the pre-determined meaning of reality will justify. "That 
 attitude whereby the meaning is recognized as determined for 
 what it is, gives what we may call a 'presumption' of existence, 
 control, or reality. The meaning is depended upon or expected 
 to have its own appropriate coefficients, its own 'real' value; 
 but the aspect that constitutes it thus 'real' is not isolated or 
 asserted, as a separate element of meaning. When a child, for 
 example, cries for an object in the next room, he 'presumes' its 
 existence and availability in the world of his practical interests. " 
 
 W^e have said that postulation is related to presupposition in 
 the logical mode as assumption is to presumption in the pre- 
 logical. Postulation is a schematic meaning in the logical mode. 
 Reality treated in a schematic way may be said to be postulated ; 
 the postulated meaning thus set up is a logical assumption. Pre- 
 supposition on the other hand is an attitude of logical presump- 
 tion or acceptance. " It is that determinate sphere of reference 
 and control which attaches to the whole disjunctive meaning. 
 It is the sphere which is accepted and acknowledged as that in 
 which the disjunction stated in the subject-matter is finally to 
 be resolved." 
 
 In determining the content of ideal faith the material is sub- 
 sumed under the form of postulation. The various ideals — 
 truth, goodness, "ideas of reason" — are thought as developments 
 
V OF THE 
 
 Ideal Faith: Postulation 25 
 
 in the form of postulation of assumptive or schematic meaning. 
 We shall see in the schematic rendering necessary for the pro- 
 duction of the "agreement of relations" we call truth that the 
 principle of postulation performs an important role. The deter- 
 mination of truth as an element in the content of ideal faith 
 necessitates the consideration of other principles. 
 
 The fundamental question of speculation is : What is reality? 
 Psychologically considered the question would be: What is 
 meant by the ''sense" of reality? Ideas to which reality is 
 attributed and those to which it is not, have the effect in conscious- 
 ness of producing respectively the feeling of reality, and the 
 feeling of unreality. Reality-feeling at the earliest stage of 
 conscious development is simply ''feeling" — feehng without 
 meaning of any kind. "Consciousness is filled with affective 
 sensational happenings." Reality-feeling, however, is not be- 
 lief. There is a distinction between the feeling of reality and 
 belief. "The phrase reality-feeling denotes the fundamental 
 modification of consciousness which attaches to the presentative 
 side of sensational states — ^the feeling which means, as the child 
 afterwards learns, that an object is really there. By the word 
 belief, on the other hand, we may denote the feeling which 
 attaches to what may be a secondary or representative state of 
 mind, and indicates the amount of assurance we have at the time 
 that an object is there. The idea which has the reality-feeling 
 may be said to have its own guarantee of its reality; it is a given, 
 and my feeling of it is direct acquaintance with it. But the idea 
 to which belief attaches is guaranteed by some other mental 
 state, by what I know about it, or by its connection with ideas 
 already guaranteed."^ 
 
 Unreality-feeling takes its rise in an experience quite different 
 from the feeling of reality. Impulse and appetite rise in conscious- 
 ness as simply feeling but make sharp demands upon the sensi- 
 bility. Presence-feeling — as in taste and touch — is readily con- 
 nected with the feeling of absence, as when the stimulus is with- 
 drawn. The mere feeling of the absence of that which is neces- 
 
 ^ Baldwin, Handbook, Feeling and Will, p. 149. 
 
26 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 sary to satisfy makes the impression upon consciousness of 
 unreality. Unreality-feeling, however, is not the "negation of 
 belief;" it does not rise as the contradiction of reality. It is not 
 the result of conflict, but takes its rise in natural impulse. There 
 are degrees of unreality — as well of reality-feeling. The reality 
 feeling attaching to food is more intense in time of hunger than 
 of complete satisfaction. Every consciousness postulates for 
 itself realities of varying degree. The postulation of the true as 
 the real and eternal as over against that which is unreal and 
 temporal has an abiding significance for consciousness. Such 
 a reality — ideal reahty — readily becomes the object of faith. A 
 reality corresponding to truth may be thought in the schematic 
 meaning of this mode as an assumptive postulate of the faith- 
 consciousness. Not to go into the various processes by which 
 truth thus considered is finally determined, it will suffice to pre- 
 sent the outcome, by way of definition, of the development of the 
 principle. "Truth is a relative conversion of the contents of 
 social acceptance into the facts of a system of external controls. 
 Socially considered truth has an existential reference that is not 
 removed by the statements of social desiderata."^ Again, "the 
 true is simply the body of knowledge, acknowledged as belonging 
 where it does in a consistently controlled context. The char- 
 acters of truth are those attaching to the content of judgment as 
 being under mediate control. The meaning of truth is its intent 
 to mediate the original sphere of existence meaning in which it 
 arose. "^ "Truth is a system of objective contents set up and 
 acknowledged as under a variety of coefficients of control; this 
 system is socially derived and socially valid, though rendered by 
 acts of individual judgment; the whole movement issues in a 
 dualism of self-acknowledging and objects-acknowledged, a 
 dualism from which thought as such cannot free itself."' 
 Truth as thus defined when once set up and acknowledged as 
 such readilypasses into an abiding postulate of a reality accepted 
 by faith. 
 
 1 Baldwin, On Truth, Psy. Rev., July, 1907, p. 283. 
 
 ^Ibid., p. 287. 
 
 ' Ibid., Note 2, p. 287. 
 
Ideal Faith: Postulation 27 
 
 Goodness as an ideal construction gets its determination also 
 through the postulation of the faith-consciousness. The ideal 
 of consciousness, that, somehow, at the heart of things there 
 must be, not only truth, but goodness as well, is a postulate of 
 faith upon which consciousness acts with a high degree of cer- 
 tainty. There is no rest in the thought that everything is bad; 
 so that consciousness in lieu of discovering the good, postulates, 
 as a working ideal, goodness at the center of things, and has the 
 faith that all things rest upon goodness as ultimate ground. 
 
 Other ideal constructions which may be thought as postulates 
 of the faith-consciousness are what Kant calls the "ideas of rea- 
 son" — "the ego, considered merely as a thinking nature or soul; 
 the conception of the Universe; and the one and all-sufficient 
 cause of all cosmological series, in other words, the idea of God."^ 
 
 "The notion of self, hke all other notions, is a gradual growth."^ 
 We defer, however, the consideration of the development of the 
 self as content, but enquire concerning the status of the control- 
 self as an assumptive postulate of the faith-consciousness. The 
 notion of the self as content is constructed upon the basis of 
 empirical data, while that of the control-self is an ideal construc- 
 tion existentially postulated as the "subject-agent" or "inner 
 control" of consciousness giving direction and organization to 
 experience. Kant says concerning the control-self that it is, 
 "the rational conception or idea of a simple substance which is 
 in itself unchangeable, possessing personal identity, and in con- 
 nection with other real things external to it." "But, "he says, 
 "the real aim of reason in this procedure is the attainment of 
 principles of systematic unity for the explanation of the phenom- 
 ena of the soul. That is, reason desires to be able to represent all 
 the determinations of the internal sense, as existing in one sub- 
 ject, all powers as deduced from one fundamental power, all 
 changes as mere varieties in the condition of a being which is 
 permanent and always the same, and all phenomena in space 
 as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of 
 
 ' Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 417-420. 
 
 ' Baldwin, Handbook, Senses and Intellect, p. 143. 
 
28 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 thought."* And he would have us understand that the best 
 way to meet this demand of reason is by " means of such a schema, 
 which requires to regard this ideal thing (control-self) as an actual 
 existence." But, "the psychological idea is meaningless and in- 
 applicable, " he says, "except as the schema of a regulative con- 
 ception. "^ That is, the control-self, whatever else it may be, is 
 an ideal postulate of consciousness determined in the interest of 
 unity as a regulative principle of reason — schematic, therefore — 
 yet a principle in which consciousness may have practical faith. 
 
 Another idea of reason is the conception of the Universe. 
 For Kant, ''nature is properly the only object presented to us, 
 in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. "^ But 
 nature is two-fold — ''thinking and corporeal nature." This 
 two-foldness of nature compels consciousness to postulate 
 "nature in general. " "The absolute totality of the series of these 
 conditions is an idea, which can never be fully realized in the em- 
 pirical exercise of reason, while it is serviceable as a rule for the 
 procedure of reason in relation to that totality. "* But the notion 
 is an ideal construction, regulative, schematic, not constructive 
 but postulated as a practical necessity in the interests of ration- 
 ality and unity, and worthy of the trust and confidence of the 
 faith-consciousness. 
 
 The last idea of reason that need be mentioned is "the all- 
 sufficient cause of all cosmological series, the idea of God." 
 Consciousness in its contemplation of nature and the universe 
 constructs an ideal to satisfy the demand for an all-sufficient 
 cause of things. Kant recognizing the urgency for such a con- 
 struction says, "The highest formal unity, which is based upon 
 ideas alone, is the unity of all things — a unity in accordance 
 with an aim or purpose; and the speculative interest of reason 
 renders it necessary to regard all order in the world, as if it origi- 
 nated from the intention and design of a supreme reason. This 
 principle unfolds to the view of reason, in the sphere of experi- 
 
 * Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 418. 
 =^Ibid., p. 418. 
 3 Ibid., p. 419. 
 Mbid., p. 419. 
 
Ideal Faith: Postulation 29 
 
 ence, new and enlarged prospects, and invites it to connect the 
 phenomena of the world according to teleological laws, and in this 
 way to attain to the highest possible degree of systematic unity. 
 The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of the 
 universe — an intelligence which has for us no more than an ideal 
 existence, is accordingly always of the greatest service to reason."* 
 
 The ideal thus constructed, however, is a postulate of faith 
 both schematic and regulative. The progressive meaning ejected 
 into the ideal of the Absolute on the part of consciousness in its 
 effort to adequately satisfy the demand of its developing need 
 is considered under the second determination of the faith-con- 
 sciousness, namely. Religious Faith. 
 
 Other elements of the content of ideal faith have yet to be 
 recognized, namely, the postulation of the absolute as the ideal 
 of both truth and appreciation ; the postulation of absolute experi- 
 ence and its justification; and the postulation of the absolute- 
 self or God. 
 
 Consciousness is never content to rest in a dualism. The 
 dualistic notion, for example, of an eternal universe as over against 
 an eternal God presents an embarrassment to consciousness; 
 consciousness seeks to bridge the dualism in a fundamental 
 unity. The history of conscious development is that of a pro- 
 gression by way of dualistic stages toward the absoluteness of 
 conscious experience. In connection with the postulation of the 
 absolute as the ideal of truth and appreciation certain dualistic 
 experiences demand consideration. 
 
 Consciousness in the logical mode sets up as a dualistic con- 
 struction to be acknowledged and judged the control-self as over 
 against the empirical-self. The embarrassment of conscious- 
 ness thus formed by the presence of a dualism is soon disolved 
 in the transition of experience from the logical to the feeling or 
 appreciative consciousness. So soon as consciousness takes up 
 the terms of the dualism in an experience of feeling and apprecia- 
 tion the dualism disolves, and a unity of selfhood is formed. 
 That is, for the purposes of thought, the control-self and the 
 
 * Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 420. 
 
30 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 empirical-self may be set over against each other; but all the 
 while — or whenever it attends to it — consciousness has the feel- 
 ing that these selves are nothing more than itself functioning now 
 in this way and now in that. It is, however, in feeling only that 
 the duahsm is transcended; as soon as the logical consciousness 
 is invoked the dualistic embarrassment reappears. 
 
 Another form of dualistic experience is the situation necessi- 
 tated by consciousness in getting knowledge of the world of 
 objects. The world of objects appears in consciousness as con- 
 tent over against which consciousness sets itself as control giving 
 direction and organization to it as experience. The organization 
 thus formed in experience is truth; and the dualistic experi- 
 ence set up is that of the logical determination of conscious- 
 ness over against the world of truth. That is, a dualism is formed 
 within the logical consciousness. To rest here would bring 
 thought to a standstill. All progression of consciousness would 
 stop. Somehow the higher dualism thus formed must be trans- 
 cended. Again the solution of the difficulty must be found in an 
 appeal to appreciation — the aesthetic and feeling consciousness. 
 Consciousness in this mode in addition to getting the meaning 
 of the object, becomes so overwhelmingly absorbed in that 
 meaning — the absorption taking the form of appreciation — as 
 to loose itself in it and to neglect altogether the fact of its exist- 
 ence as object as over against consciousness as subject. In other 
 words, the dualism is transcended by a supreme abandonment 
 of consciousness to the meaning of its content in an all absorb- 
 ing act of appreciation. Everything that would tend to distract, 
 all relativity and determinations of every kind are neglected 
 absolutely in the interest and the moment of conscious aesthetic 
 appreciation. That is a great triumph for consciousness. No 
 longer is it the victim of dualistic embarrassment. It has worked 
 its way through the dualism of all preceding modes and now is 
 able to gather up in the unity of appreciation all present as well 
 as past experiences. 
 
 Consciousness in constructing for itself the meaning of the 
 absolute ejects into it the meaning of its own experience; so 
 that both truth and appreciation are thought as attaching to 
 
Ideal Faith: Postulation 31 
 
 the meaning of the absolute as the ideal of worship. The abso- 
 lute is able to set up and think as object the truth — herein logical 
 — as over against itself; but unconditioned by it, it is able also to 
 transcend the dualism formed by itself and the truth in an abso- 
 lute experience of aesthetic appreciation. So that consciousness 
 is not only itself able to transcend all dualisms in this experience 
 but postulates the absolute as having the power to unite all 
 things in a supreme act of absolute appreciation. The construc- 
 tion thus postulated we shall find in the determination of religious 
 faith to be the absolute-self or God, and as such the preeminent 
 postulate of ideal faith. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 MYSTIC AND HYPER-LOGICAL FAITH. 
 
 MYSTIC faith: contemplation. 
 
 Jacobi's theory of the rational intuitions of God, and all such 
 determinations, are highly mystic and contemplative. The 
 truly mystic consciousness as "religious fact" consists in "a. 
 tendency to arrive at the consciousness of the Absolute by means 
 of symbols under the influence of love."^ Bouchette affirms, 
 as something less than the religious fact, that, "mysticism con- 
 sists in according to spontaneity a larger place in the intelligence 
 than is granted to the other faculties. "^ Victor Cousin without 
 a true appreciation of the religious fact speaks of mysticism as 
 "the claim of knowing God without intermediary, and, as it were 
 face to face; in mysticism, everything that comes between God 
 and ourselves hides him from us. "^ But Rec^jac emphasizing the 
 religious fact of mysticism considers this the best definition: 
 "Mysticism is the tendency to draw near to the Absolute in moral 
 union by symbolic means."* 
 
 The method of mysticism is symbolism, mysticism in its con- 
 templation of the Absolute is highly symbolic. The mystic 
 consciousness constructs its objects as symbols. The relation 
 between symbolic representation and the things represented is 
 that of analogy. Analogy is the "unique force which renders 
 fertile the vast field of mysticism."^ Science and philosophy are 
 
 * R^c^jac, The Basis of the Mystic Knowledge, p. 62. 
 ^ Bouchette, Diet, des sciences philosophiques, p. 189. 
 ' Hist, de la philos moderne, t, ii, IX, le, con. 
 
 * R^c^jac, The Basis of the Mystic Knowledge, p. 64. 
 •'Ibid., p. 120. 
 
Mystic Faith: Contemplation 33 
 
 much concerned with symboHc representation through analogy. 
 SymboHsm is the only expression proper to mysticism. The 
 function of the symbolic object is not so much to image or rep- 
 resent as to suggest. The symbolic object has about itself a halo 
 of sentiment which stimulates consciousness as suggestion to an 
 emotional outbreak — joyful, sympathetic or otherwise. R6c6jac 
 says, "symbolic signs have the same effect as direct perceptions; 
 as soon as they have been 'seen' within, their psychic action 
 takes hold of the feehng and fills consciousness with a crowd of 
 images and emotions which are attracted by the force of 
 Analogy."^ 
 
 Mystic representation is purely subjective as indicated by the 
 nature of mystic phenomena — voices, prophetic dreams, ecstasy, 
 etc. The "inner voice" of the mystic consciousness results 
 from the unity of God and spirit in a relation shut in from all 
 sense-reaction or objective determination. In dreams, the 
 external perceptions of the waking state are absent and memory 
 and imagination must reproduce them in order to give to con- 
 sciousness the sense of at least apparent externality. In ecstasy, 
 empirical determinations cease to influence consciousness; the 
 sense of externality entirely disappears and consciousness be- 
 comes wholly absorbed in the divine presence. In all these 
 phenomena the moral element is present in varying degree and 
 attaches to the sense of freedom as the constant quality of con- 
 sciousness. The elements thus described are the dominant deter- 
 minations of the mystic faith-consciousness. The principle of 
 surrender as in all preceding modes is here the functioning 
 process of mystic faith, and contemplation is a form of the 
 content of the mystic consciousness. 
 
 Other elements of the mystic-faith content need to be con- 
 sidered: for instance, the faith of feeling only, in opposition to 
 knowledge ; faith as will — the will to believe — without knowledge ; 
 faith as the faculty of the intuition of the ideal; and faith as union 
 of all in the content of a new immediateness; — the aesthetic 
 consciousness. 
 
 1 Ibid., p. 134. 
 
34 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 Faith as feeling takes the form, first of all, of desire. This is 
 a state in which aspiration plays an important role. Conscious- 
 ness aspires toward an object, a good, such as the heart requires, 
 but the mind does not construct. Desire though vague in its 
 object becomes a deep passion of the heart which finds satisfac- 
 tion only in the grasp of faith upon the infinite, eternal, the per- 
 fect. In ecstasy also we have a form of faith as feeling. The 
 consciousness of ecstasy is the consciousness of unity with the 
 object of faith; there is no intermediary; consciousness sees, 
 touches, possesses, is merged in its object. This is not simply 
 the faith that believes without seeing, it is the faith that believes 
 by touching, possessing, feeling. Consciousness in ecstasy does 
 not hold its object through idea — i.e., through knowledge — but 
 through feehng; through a perfect unity of consciousness and 
 object in feeling; and that feeling is faith. Faith unites without 
 absorbing; it merges consciousness in its object, and at the 
 same time increases the self-consciousness of each. 
 
 Mystic experience is not knowledge but results from the faith 
 of feeling which has in it the mystic element. Mysticism is 
 not an expedient to satisfy the demands of the rational conscious- 
 ness in its reach after the unknowable. All that it takes from 
 the empirical consciousness is the form of its expression — the 
 symbolic method or elements. Science as knowledge — that which 
 grasps its objects through ideas — and mysticism never meet. 
 While mysticism seeks a synthesis of the self and the world, it 
 does it through the grasp of consciousness functioning in the 
 act of faith characterized by feeling, and not through the under- 
 standing. Knowledge as that which synthesizes through ideas can 
 never truly grasp first principles; it must be left to the ''heart" 
 alone to do this, and that through feeling. The mystic con- 
 sciousness does not need, however, to disregard knowledge 
 through ideas; the fact is that by virtue of its free and naive 
 feeling of the absolute, it is the better able when occasion offers 
 to synthesize experience through the understanding. 
 
 IWe come now to the determination of another element in the 
 , content of mystic faith, namely, faith as will — the will to believe — 
 V without knowledge. There is a sense in which it is not true that 
 
Mystic Faith: Contemplation 35 
 
 we can believe what we will, and there is a sense in which it is 
 true, that we can will to believe. When belief is defined "as the 
 consciousness of the personal indorsement of reality — reality being 
 found to be a general term for that kind of experience which 
 satisfies one or more of the needs of the individual — it is evident 
 that belief is not the feeling of volition or effort. " " It is a feeling 
 of willingness or consent, but not of will. We often consent to 
 reality against our wills. The effect of will upon belief is really 
 the effect of voluntary attention upon one or more of the coeffi- 
 cients already mentioned. Attention may intensify an image and 
 so give greater sensational or emotional reality. It may also 
 dwell upon and bring out certain relational connections of an 
 image and so throw the logical coefficient on the side of those 
 connections ; it may refuse to dwell upon those relations which are 
 distasteful. But it is not true that we can believe what we will. 
 To say we believe what we need, is not to say we believe what we 
 want."* 
 
 On the other hand belief used in the sense of mystic faith — 
 i.e., knowledge without recourse to ideas — maybe said to be willed 
 when by an act of determination consciousness seeks to merge 
 itself in the absolute ; the result of such an act being the grasp of 
 consciousness in its effort to touch and possess the absolute 
 in the synthesis of feeling. Mystic faith, that is, the conscious- 
 ness that seeks to merge itself thus does what it does as deter- 
 mined by the will. So that in a very general sense, in this mode 
 we may say that the dynamic of consciousness is the will to 
 believe — i.e., the will to exercise mystic faith, the will that deter- 
 mines the mystic faith consciousness to do what it does. While 
 the mystic consciousness can hardly be said to decide an option 
 between propositions in its effort to possess the absolute yet it 
 is true that the same dynamic of volition determines its action as 
 when consciousness is required to decide an option. In both 
 cases it is the will to believe. Where the option is present the 
 principle may be set forth as follows: "Our passional nature 
 not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between prop- 
 
 * Baldwin, Handbook, Feeling and Will, pp. 170-171. 
 
36 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 ositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its 
 nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such 
 circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open,' is 
 itself a passional decision — just like deciding yes or no — and is 
 attended with the same risk of losing the truth."* The thesis 
 thus stated involves the will to believe as in mystic faith. 
 
 Another element of the content of mystic faith is faith con- 
 sidered as the faculty of intuition of the ideal. "Mystic intui- 
 tion enables us to perceive the facts of freedom through and 
 above the empirical consciousness, in a manner the inverse of 
 abstraction. "2 Imagination serves the mystic consciousness in 
 its production of symbols and reason exercises the intuition suited 
 to it. Before rational determination of any kind can take place 
 there must be the presentation to consciousness of mental images 
 — images formed under the pressure of moral influence — which 
 constitute the symbols of the meaning underlying the analogical 
 representations. Reason exercises intuition proper to the sym- 
 bols thus presented. Reason in abstracting from the symbols, 
 however, produces that which must not be thought as in any 
 way corresponding to objective, empirical knowledge. The 
 product is that of the nature of analogy. The mystic purpose of 
 reason in analogy is to merge the Absolute in consciousness and 
 consciousness in the Absolute. The culmination of symbolic 
 representation is the Absolute in consciousness as an abiding 
 moral presence. That presence together with the efforts of the 
 mystic consciousness in realizing its purpose stimulates inward 
 action, strengthens the will, quickens the moral sense and rein- 
 forces the natural powers in the making of character. 
 
 The faculty of mystic intuition by which the Absolute is posited 
 in consciousness is conditioned by the moral qualities of the sub- 
 ject. Only a quickened moral consciousness would seek to merge 
 itself in the Absolute; and the Absolute could only be posited 
 where such moral qualities exist. Desire also as an internal driv- 
 ing passion may be said to condition mystic intuition. Where 
 
 ' James, The Will to Believe, p. 11. 
 
 ^ R6c6jac, The Basis of the Mystic Knowledge, p. 137. 
 
Mystic Faith: Contemplation 37 
 
 there is little desire for the Absolute, little effort will be put forth 
 in the realization of that desire. But desire intensified into a 
 passion will have a decided conditioning and directing influence 
 upon intuition. An all-absorbing desire stimulates mystic intui- 
 tion to a transcendental reach in the two-fold effort to merge 
 consciousness in the Absolute and to posit the Absolute in con- 
 sciousness. Mystic intuition is instrumental as the faculty of 
 faith in the realization of the Absolute as its Ideal. 
 
 Faith as the union of all in the content of a new immediateness 
 — the aesthetic — is a further determination of the experience which 
 is hyper-logical rather than mystic. The process by which the 
 aesthetic object is taken out of its relations and set up for contem- 
 plation is called "detachment." There are two methods of 
 detachment; one where the object is, as we say, taken up out of 
 its setting and treated or individuated as in itself worthy of 
 aesthetic appreciation; the other is where consciousness deliber- 
 ately detaches the object from it relations and connections — 
 often in an abrupt and broken way — and sets it up for idealiza- 
 tion and contemplation without further reference to its contex- 
 tual setting. Consciousness in its attitude toward the aesthetic 
 object may be treated from two points of view; (1) that of the 
 spectator, and (2) that of the artist himself. The consciousness 
 of the spectator may be characterized in two ways: (1) there is 
 the sense of reading into (einfiihlung) the object elements of 
 personification — consciousness gives to the object life, thought, 
 feeling, consciousness itself or whatever is necessary to animate 
 it; and (2) the sense of oneness (absorption in) with the object — 
 consciousness feels itself as one with the object — as actually 
 doing the things which before it personified the object as doing; 
 consciousness is absorbed, merged in the object — is at one with 
 it. In this we see the bridging of the dualism of the self and its 
 object, and a perfect unity established. The consciousness of the 
 artist may be said to have these elements of aesthetic experience 
 in common with that of the spectator, but in addition, something 
 more, namely, the feeling of appreciation which comes from the 
 sense of ha\nng actually produced that which gives so much real 
 aesthetic pleasure. In mystic contemplation consciousness pro- 
 
38 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 ceeds in a quasi-aesthetic wa}'' and merges itself by faith into unity 
 with its object of love and worship. 
 
 II 
 
 HYPER-LOGICAL FAITH: THE HYPER-LOGICAL EXPERIENCE AS 
 UNION OF FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 The early type of conscious experience may be characterized 
 as an immediacy of feeling; consciousness at this stage is in the 
 pre-logical mode; the power of logical or rational determination 
 has not yet developed. Memory, imagination, the conscious- 
 ness of self, the power to construct objects of thought, to objec- 
 tify and apprehend the world, the dualisms of "inner-outer," 
 "mind and body," "self and not-self," the power of rationality, 
 of contemplation, — none of these have yet arisen, and conscious- 
 ness knows not itself or its environment; it simply is, and lives 
 in an immediacy of mere feeling. Prof. James has character- 
 ized this earliest stage of consciousness as "pure experience," 
 "Pure experience," he says, "is the name which I give to the 
 original flux of life before reflection has categorized it. Only 
 new-born babes, and persons in semicoma from sleep, drugs, 
 illness or blows can have an experience pure in the literal sense 
 of a that which is not yet any definite what, though ready to be 
 all sorts of whats; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in 
 respects that don't appear; changing throughout, yet so con- 
 fusedly that its phases interpenetrate, and no points, either of 
 distinction or of identity, can be caught. True experience in 
 this state is but another name for feeling or sensation. But the 
 flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, 
 and these to become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that 
 experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and 
 names and prepositions and conjunctions. Its purity is only a 
 relative term, meaning the proportional amount of sensation 
 which it still embodies. 
 
 " Far back as we go, the flux, both as a whole and in its parts, 
 is that of things conjunct and separated. The great continua 
 
Hyper-Logical Faith: Faith and Knowledge 39 
 
 of time, space and the self envelopes everything betwixt them and 
 flow together without interfering. The things that they envel- 
 ope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in other. 
 Some sensations coalesce with some ideas, and others are irrecon- 
 cilable. Qualities compenetrate one space, or exclude each other 
 from it. They cling together persistently in groups that move 
 as units, or else they separate. Their changes are abrupt or 
 discontinuous; and their kinds resemble or differ; and, as they 
 do so, fall into either even or irregular series. 
 
 "In all this the continuities and the discontinuities are abso- 
 lutely coordinate matters of immediate feeling. The conjunc- 
 tions are as primordial elements of 'fact' as are the distinctions 
 and disjunctions. In the same act by which I feel that this 
 passing minute is a new pulse of my life, I feel that the old life 
 continues into it, and the feeling of continuance in no wise jars 
 upon the simultaneous feeling of a novelty. They, too, com- 
 penetrate harmoniously. Prepositions, copulas, and conjunc- 
 tions, 'is', 'isn't,' 'then,' 'before,' 'in,' 'on,' 'beside,' 'between,' 
 'next,' 'hke, ' 'unlike,' 'as,' 'but,' flower out of the stream of 
 pure existence, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream, 
 as naturally as nouns and adjectives do, and they melt into it 
 again as fluidly when we apply them to the new portion of the 
 stream."* Thus we see that consciousness begins its life with, 
 and in, an immediacy of feeling. 
 
 But with the development of consciousness in experience there 
 soon spring up the various powers mentioned above — memory, 
 imagination, the "inner-outer" and "mind and body" dualisms, 
 consciousness of self, objectivity, knowledge, rationality — so that 
 we are able to track out with some degree of certainty the vari- 
 ous progressions or strands of consciousness, as well as the modes 
 through which consciousness must pass in its developing move- 
 ment. It is to be noted that consciousness through experience 
 very soon gets out of its first immediacy of mere feeling and passes 
 into the world of "dualisms," which, as development continues 
 
 ' James, Journal of Phil., etc., Jan. 19, 1905, p. 29. See Baldwin, Thought 
 and Things, I, p. 45. 
 
40 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 become more and more hardened into constructions of greater 
 and greater practical utility. The history of the ''dualisms," 
 and consequent embarrassments of consciousness in its various 
 progressions, and the study of the development of consciousness 
 in its manifoldness is the work of Genetic Logic/ this, however, we 
 shall not attempt here; we wish merely to point out the fact that 
 consciousness begins with an immediacy of feeling but soon 
 passes out of it into the ''mediateness" of thought, in which 
 sphere it meets \\dth the embarrassment of dualisms. Now the 
 question is. Does consciousness ever come to the place in its 
 development where the possibility of dissolving or bridging all 
 dualisms is reached? The answer is that we beUeve it does, and 
 that that stage is the mode we are calling the "hyper-logical" — 
 an experience constituted by the union of faith and knowledge. 
 
 Very early in consciousness there begins to appear in a quite 
 germinal way a strand or progression which has in it the promise 
 of a higher and richer immediacy; we refer to that which appears 
 first as mere play, uninformed, impulsive and uninfected by 
 thought or rationality. Later this progression takes the form 
 of "semblance" and we see the beginning of art; with this the 
 idealistic and aesthetic-consciousness emerge. In the aesthetic 
 experience the dualisms through which consciousness has passed 
 and in which it may at the time find itself are bridged.^ 
 
 The full aesthetic experience is not possible in the pre-logical 
 modes; this becomes the more evident as we seek to determine 
 the marks or criteria of the logical consciousness. "It is plain 
 that the criterion of the logical as such is found not alone in the 
 matter thought about, but in the way we think about it ; not alone 
 in the factors determining the "what" of which the object is 
 made, but in the factors of control which give answer to the 
 question "how" it is made. Looked at broadly, the mode is one 
 of a dualism of self and the objects of its experience; logical 
 objects, are therefore, only those objects which are meanings to 
 a subject of experience. Again, logical objects are those which 
 
 ' See Prof. Baldwin's work, Thought and Things, which the following 
 exposition follows. Use also is made of his unpublished lectures on Aesthetics. 
 - For the aesthetic experience see Section I, this chapter. 
 
Hyper-Logical Faith: Faith and Knowledge 41 
 
 issue from the redistribution and organization of all simpler 
 meanings in a whole context of experience. They are individ- 
 uated as in this organization; as related, in meanings of general, 
 universal, particular and singular force. Here, evidently, the 
 the characteristic mark is the elevation of relationship — actual 
 presence of contemporaneous, like, different and otherwise re- 
 lated wholes — into a single whole exhibiting these relations. 
 Relation is individuated as a meaning or object of thought, one 
 whose abstraction from the body of the former objective con- 
 tinuum or complication, it is the special interest of this mode 
 to achieve. Finally, the logical function is that in which these 
 two specifications are given — a subject of experience, and a 
 related objective whole which is experience to such a subject. 
 This function is that to which we have given the name judgment. 
 Judgment is the psychic control, issuing from what is now a self, 
 exercised upon those meanings of relation which constitute 
 ideas about things."^ 
 
 It would seem from what is necessary in order to constitute an 
 object, an object for the logical consciousness, that the aesthetic 
 experience is impossible to the pre-logical consciousness. In 
 fact we have just seen that the immediacy of consciousness in 
 the beginning — in the pre-logical mode — is the immediacy of 
 mere feeling, and is not aesthetic. The aesthetic experience would 
 seem to be a provision for immediacy at the top rather than at 
 the bottom. Consciousness must first develop its dualisms and 
 pass through them before the parallel lines of progression and 
 development, as object or meaning on the one hand and con- 
 sciousness on the other, can be brought together in a higher and 
 richer immediacy — "higher" because it rests upon the founda- 
 tion of dualistic and logical experience, and ''richer" because out 
 of this same experience it is highly informed. 
 
 While the aesthetic experience is above the logical — is hyper- 
 logical — at the same time consciousness profits by having passed 
 through the logical; and the gain is manifest in the enriching of 
 the aesthetic experience. At every stage in conscious progres- 
 
 » Baldwin, Thought and Things, Vol. I, p. 271. 
 
42 The Faith Consciousness 
 
 sion the aesthetic experience partakes by way of enrichment of 
 the aggregate of past experience up to that point. A meagerly 
 developed and uninformed consciousness will not have as rich 
 an aesthetic experience as the highly developed and well informed 
 consciousness will have. Thus we see the justification for calling 
 this the ^'hyper-logical experience;" it is not an experience for 
 the logical consciousness as such, but is an experience for a con- 
 sciousness which has been greatly enriched by the logical. 
 
 In the hyper-logical experience so described we have a union 
 of faith and knowledge — meaning by faith a certain dispositional 
 attitude of consciousness, an openness of consciousness toward 
 experience ; and by knowledge experience itself. In the aesthetic 
 experience the object — already experienced and, therefore, 
 knowledge — and the open consciousness — faith, dispositional 
 and volitional — are brought together and merged into one. So 
 that the mode of consciousness in which the aesthetic experience 
 arises may be called from the point of view of this thesis. Hyper- 
 logical Faith. 
 
 In concluding the constructive portion of Part I, Non-Religious 
 Faith, let us notice a few points by way of summing up. We have 
 found throughout the progressions of the faith-consciousness that 
 the faith principle consists fundamentally in surrender to an 
 absent object, postulated in the higher modes as ideal. Faith 
 we have defined as "trust," confidence — trust that reaches 
 beyond rational grounds in its effort to grasp its object. Belief 
 as a "personal endorsement of reality," or "as the consciousness 
 of the presence of a thing as fitted to satisfy a need," does not 
 involve the faith principle. The need for faith may disappear 
 and belief take its place, but faith cannot be said prior to this to 
 be belief. The faith-consciousness does not begin with reality 
 or give it a " personal endorsement " as present, but rather postu- 
 lates an ideal which it hopes is real but has no way of proving; but 
 in the absence of proof it "trusts" in it as real and "surrenders" 
 to it. Later the ideal of faith comes to be thought and believed 
 in as real. Faith then may be said to give it a kind of imagina- 
 tive reality. Conviction as to such a reality would involve the 
 elements of the belief-consciousness. The faith-consciousness 
 
Hyper-Logical Faith: Faith and Knowledge 43 
 
 in constructing its ideal sets before itself an end for the will and 
 thus influences it in surrender. In this faith embodies the will; 
 on the other hand it may be said that will is directed by faith, 
 as when it becomes the dynamic of consciousness in its effort to 
 merge itself in its object. Farther it may be said that faith 
 involves the emotional and dispositional attitudes of the self. 
 
Part II 
 RELIGIOUS FA.ITH 
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 AN ABSTRACT OF PART II 
 
 Part II of the Dissertation^ is a treatment of Religious Faith; 
 while Part III deals with the Use of the Faith Principle in Modern 
 Philosophy, with special reference to Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, Paul- 
 sen, James and Royce, closing with a chapter on Criticism and 
 Conclusion. 
 
 Part II is an attempt to sketch in a genetic way the movement 
 of the religious faith-consciousness through its various modes or 
 progressions. Chapter I is a study of the Genesis of the Religious 
 Faith-Consciousness in The Sensuous-Self Mode. Chapter II is a 
 treatment of The Supersensuous-Self Mode as Rational or Deistic. 
 Chapter III is a study of the Immanence-Self Mode; and Chapter 
 IV of The Spiritual-Self Mode. 
 
 By way of summing up, the following concluding passage of 
 Part II, may be taken as briefly setting forth the determinations 
 of religious faith throughout the four stages of conscious develop- 
 ment: In the Sensuous-Self Mode consciousness may be thought of 
 as having the attitude of presumption of nature — the sense of 
 mere reality-feeling in nature's presence. The meaning of this 
 mode is largely sensational and anthropomorphic. In the Super- 
 sensuous-Self Mode consciousness has the power of detachment 
 or subjectivity, it rests its determinations upon rational proof; 
 in this we have a return to acceptance or belief without trust; 
 faith is grounded in dogma. In the Immanence-Self Mode con- 
 sciousness constitutes its constructions by postulating ideal worth 
 
 ' A bound manuscript copy of the entire Dissertation is on file at the 
 Johns Hopkins University. It is hoped that a full treatment of Religious 
 Paith may be published in the near future. 
 
Appendix 45 
 
 beyond logical proof. It assumes an Ideal-Self for worship, and 
 trusts that which it cannot guarantee by belief. In the Spiritual- 
 Self Mode the Ideal-Self construction is highly universalized and 
 personalized as within immediate reach of consciousness. The 
 process of its construction is that of postulation beyond the 
 guarantee of proof. Throughout the entire movement of conscious 
 progression we find the dominant quality or attitude of the faith- 
 consciousness to be that of " surrender. " In the higher religious 
 modes we find the surrender of faith to involve the postulation 
 of meaning by trust beyond that guaranteed by belief. In the 
 postulate of spiritual or mystic faith which is contemplative and 
 aesthetic we have the unity of both trust and belief. The result- 
 ing character of consciousness is that of immediateness, oneness 
 of appreciation and feeling with the Spirit-Self. The Spirit — or 
 Absolute — Self is thought or postulated as Absolute Ideal-Self, 
 as Absolute-Consciousness merged in the object of its creation — 
 including finite selves — through the unifying principles of love, 
 feeling, appreciation. The Absolute Experience, by which all 
 dualisms are bridged, is primarily aesthetic. 
 
 In our study of the faith-consciousness throughout its progres- 
 sion, it has been gratifying to find such a rich and important field 
 for thought and investigation. In our genetic treatment of the 
 subject we have been dealing — though only in an introductory way 
 — with a very vital phase of conscious function and content. We 
 shall find in a large treatment of "Genetic Faith" that all philoso- 
 phy may be subsumed under the head of the "function and 
 content of the faith-consciousness;" at least we shall find that all 
 philosophy must be more or less mystic, and that every philosophy 
 should have a place in its system for faith. 
 
LIFE. 
 
 William Wilberforce Costin was born in Bale Verte, N. B., 
 Canada, December 19, 1871. His preliminary education was 
 received in the public schools of his county, and the Collegiate 
 School of Fredericton, N. B. After spending two years at Mount 
 Allison Male Academy he matriculated at Mount Allison College, 
 Sackville, N. B., in 1891, where he was graduated with the degree 
 of B. A. in 1895. 
 
 The years 1895-06 and 1897-08, he spent in study at Boston 
 University School of Theology. The year 1896-07, he was pastor 
 of the Methodist Episcopal Church in County Line, N. Y. In 
 the spring of 1898 he began his ministry in Maryland, and in 
 1900 was received on trial in the Baltimore Annual Conference 
 of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In 1902 he was ordained a 
 Deacon, and in 1904, an Elder. 
 
 In the fall of 1900 while pastor of the Woodside Methodist 
 Episcopal Church, Md., he began graduate study in the Colum- 
 bian (now George Washington) University, Washington, D. C, 
 where he was graduated with the degree of M.A. in 1901. Dur- 
 ing the year 1902-03 he pursued graduate study at the same 
 University. The year 1903-04, he spent doing special work in 
 the Oriental Seminary of Johns Hopkins University. 
 
 In the fall of 1904, he began graduate study at the Johns Hop- 
 kins University, chosing Philosophy as his principal and Experi- 
 mental Psychology and History of the Ancient East as his sub- 
 ordinate subjects. 
 
 His ministry in Maryland has comprised the following pastor- 
 ates: Patapsco Circuit 1898-99, Leonardtown 1899-1900, 
 Woodside, 1900-01, Boundary Ave. 1901-02, Hunt's 1902-05 
 City Station: Firsi Church, Assistant Pastor, 1905-06, Oxford 
 1906-08, and Chester Street 1908. 
 
 He has attended the lectures of Professor Paul Haupt and Dr. 
 Foote, in special studies, and of Professors J.M.Baldwin, Stratton, 
 
Life 47 
 
 Johnston, Griffin, and Doctors Ladd-Franklin, Farrar, Baird 
 and Riley, in graduate work, to all of whom he would express 
 grateful appreciation, especially to Professor James Mark Bald- 
 win for the inspiration of his instruction, personality, advice and 
 encouragement. 
 
 
 CALIFQ 
 
 ^^ 
 
RETURN TO the circulation desk of any 
 
 University of California Library 
 
 or to the 
 
 NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 BIdg. 400, Richmond Field Station 
 University of California 
 Richmond, CA 94804-4698 
 
 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS 
 2-month loans may be renewed by calling 
 
 (510)642-6753 
 1-year loans may be recharged by bringing books 
 
 to NRLF 
 Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days 
 
 prior to due date 
 
 DUE AS STAMPED BELOW 
 
 SEP 6 mh 
 
*j r>