il».jHg STREET AND CHARING CROSS. /^/9^ TO ESTHEE LAWEENCE, A DILIGENT READER OF EPICTETUS, TO WHOM THE TRANSLATOR OWES MANY USEFUL REMARKS. T, T B R A R Y OF ('\ l.ii'OUNIA. J 151^ U CONTENTS. BOOK I. CHAP. PAGE I. Of the Things which are in our Power, and not IN our Power ....... 3 II. How a Man on every occasion can maintain his Proper Character ...... 8 III. How A Man should proceed from the principle of God being the Father of all Men to the rest 12 IV. Of Progress or Improvement ^ . . . . 13 V. Against the Academics . . . . .17 VI. Of Providence ....... 19 VII. Op the use op Sophisiical Arguments and Hypo- thetical, AND THE LIKE . •> . . .23 VIII. That the Faculties are not safe to the Un- INSTRUCTED ........ 28 IX. How FROM THE FaCT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A Man may proceed to the Consequences . . 30 X. Against those who eagerly seek Preferment at Rome ......... 35 \y XI. Of Natural Affection , 37 XII. Of Contentment ....... 41 XIII. How Everything may be done acceptably to the Gods ......... 45 XIV, That the Deity oversees All Things . . .40 V.XV. What Philosophy promises 49 XVI. Of Providence .- . 50 XVII. That the Logical Art is necessary . . .52 XVni. That we ought not to be Angry with the Errors (Faults) of others ...... 55 XIX. How WE should behave to Tyrants . . .60 XX. About Reason and how it contemplates itself . 63 XXI. Against those who wish to be Admired . . ^Q XXII. Of Praecognitions ^% XXIII. Against Epicurus ....... 69 Ylil CONTENTS. <'HAP. tAGT. "^ XXIV. How WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES . 70 XXV. On the SA31E '«o - XXVI. What is the Law of Life . . . . . 77 XXVII. In how many ways Appearances exist, and what Aids we should provide against them . .80 XXVIII. That we ought not to be Angry with Men ; and WHAT ARE the SmALL AND THE GrEAT ThiNGS AMONG Men ....... 83 XXIX. On Constancy (or Firmness) . . . .87 XXX. What we ought to have ready in Difficult Circumstances . 06 .r^ BOOK IL I. That Confidence (Courage) is not inconsistent WITH Caution ....... 97 II. Of Tranquillity (Freedom from Perturbation) . 103 III. To THOSE WHO recommend PERSONS TO PHILOSOPHERS 106 IV. Against a Person who had once been detected IN Adultery . . . . . . . 107 V. How Magnanimity is consistent with Care . .108 VI. Of Indifference . . . . . . .112 VII. How WE ought to use Divination . . . IIG VIII. What is the Nature (r] ovaia) of the Good . 118 IX. That when we cannot fulfil that which the Character of a Man promises, we assume the Character of a Philosopher .... 123 X. How WE MAY discover THE DUTIES OF LiFE FROM Names . . . . . . . . 127 y— XI. What the Beginning of Philosophy is . . .130 XII. Of Disputation or Discussion .... 133 XIII. Of Anxiety (Solicitude) 136 XIV. To Naso 140 XV. To OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN what THEY HAVE DETEUMINED . . . . Ii4 XVI. That we do not strive to use our Opinions ABOUT Good A^D Evil ..... 147 xvii. how we must adapt preconceptions to particular Cases 153 xviii. how ave should struggle against appearances . 158 XTX. Against those who embrace Philosopiikjal Opinions only in Words JG2 ^IX. Against the Epicureans and Academics . .167 CONTENTS. iX (MAP. PAGE XXI. Of Inconsistency ....... 173 XXII. Of Feiendship ...,,.. 176 XXIII. On the Power of Speaking ..... 182 XXIV. To (or against) a Person who was one of those WHO WERE NOT VALUED (eSTEEMED) BY HIM . . 188 XXV. ThaV Logic is necessary . . . . .192 XXVI. What is the Property of Eriiok . • • . 192 BOOK III. 1. Of Finery in Dress 195 II. In WHAT a Man ought to be exercised who has BiADE Proficiency; and that we neglect the Chief Things 201 III. What is the Matter on which a Good Man should BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT WE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO EMPLOY OURSEI-VES ...... 204 IV. Against a Person aviio showed his Paktizanship in AN UNSEEMLY WAY IN A ThEATRE . . . 207 V. Against those who on account of Sickness go AWAY Home 209 VI. Miscellaneous . . . . . . .211 VII. To the Administrator of the Free Cities who WAS AN Epicurean . . . , . .213 VIII. How WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEAR- ANCES ( X. EPICTETUS. Very little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a native of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and a branch of the Maeander named the Lyons. Hierapolis is mentioned in the epistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv. 13); from which it has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis in the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is unknown. The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a slave in Eome, and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the emperor Nero. There is a story that the master broke his slave's leg by torturing him ; but it is better to trust to the evidence of Simplicius, the commentator on the Enchei- ridion or Manual, who says that Epictetus was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not said how he became a slave ; but it has been asserted in modern times that the parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any authority for this statement. It may be supposed that the 3'oung slave showed intel- ligence, for his master sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius Rufus, an eminent Stoic philoso- pher. It may seem strange that such a master should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher ; but Garnier, the author of a Memoire sur les ouvrages d'Epictete, explains this matter very well in a communica- tion to Schweighaeuser. Garnier says : " Epictetus, born XU EPICTETtJS. at Hierapolis of Phrj^gia of poor parents, was indebted apparently for tlie advantages of a good education to the whim, which was common at the end of the Republic and under the fir^t emperors, among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous slaves Grammarians, Poets, Rhetoricians, and Philosophers, in the same way as rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a great cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only one which can explain to us, how a wretched child, born as poor as Iras, had received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of Epaphroditus, one of the officers of the Imperial guard. For we cannot sus- pect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine and for his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the debaucheries of Nero would have desired to possess such a slave." Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master ; but I can find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nero when he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable tyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton. Domit. 14) afterwards put Epaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude that Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to teach at Rome ; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by Domitian A.o. 89, fie retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by Augustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epic- tetus opened a school or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old man. The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as we learn from Ijucian (Depaonax, c. 55, Tom. ii. ed. Hemsterh. p. 393).^ When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax aud advising him to take a wife aind beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, was a philosopher's duty, to * Lucian's ' Life of the Philosopher Denioiiax/ EPICTETUS. Xm leave in j)lace of himself another in the Universe, Denionax refuted the doctrine by answering, Give me then, Epic- tetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Com- ment, c. 46, p. 432, ed. Schweigh.) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last he took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of Epictetus' friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, but Epictetus took the child and brought it up. Epictetus wrote nothing; and all that we have under his name was written by an affectionate pupil, Arrian, afterwards the historian of Alexander the Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing the philosopher's dis- courses (the Epistle of Arrian to Lucius Gellius, p. 1). These discourses formed eight books, but only four are extant under the title of ^Ettlkt'^ov SiaTpt/SaL Simplicius in his commentary on the 'Eyxct/atStov or Manual, states that this work also was put together by Arrian, who selected from the discourses of Epictetus what he considered to be most useful, and most necessary, and most adapted to move men's minds. Simplicius also says that the contents of the Encheiridion are found nearly altogether and in the same words in various parts of the Discourses. Arrian also wrote a work on the life and death of Epictetus. The events of the philosopher's studious life were probably not many nor remarkable ; but we should have been glad if this work had been preserved, which told, as Simplicius says, what kind of man Epictetus was. Photius (Biblioth. 58) mentions among Arrian's works Conversations with Epictetus, 'OfjLtXtat ^Ettlkt-^ov in twelve books, Upton thinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that Photius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a different work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight books of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations, Rohweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these XIV EPICTETUS. works of Arrian on Epictetus, for so he concludes from the "brief notice of these works by Photius. The fact is that Photins does not say that he had read these books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books, which he enumerates in his Bibliotheca. The conclusion is that we are not certain that there Avas a work of Arrian, entitled the Conversations of Epictetus. The Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion and Fragments were translated into English by the learned lady Mrs. Elizabeth Carter ; who is said to have lived to the age of eighty-nine. The fourth edition (1807) contains the translator's last additions and alterations. There is an Introduction to this translation which contains a summary view of the Stoic philosophy for the purpose of explaining Epictetus ; and also there are notes to the translation. The editor of this fourth edition says that *' the Introduction and notes of the Christian translator of Epictetus are, in the estimation of most readers, not the least valuable parts of the work " : and he adds " this was also the opinion of the late Archbishop Seeker, who though he thought very highly of the philosophy of Epictetus, considered the Introduction and notes as admirably calculated to prevent any mistake concerning it, as well as to amend and instruct the world." The Introduftion is certainly useful, though it is not free from errors. I do not think that the notes are valuable. I have used some of them without any remarks ; and I have used others and made some remarks on them where I thought that Mrs. Carter was mistaken in her opinion of the original text, or on other matters. The translation of Mrs. Carter is good ; and perhaps no Englishman at that time would have made a better trans- lation. I intended at first to revise Mrs. Carter's transla- tion, and to correct any errors that I might discover. I had revised about half of it, when I found that I was not satisfied with my work ; and I was advised by a learned EPICTETUS. XV friend to translate the whole myself. This was rather a great undertaking for an old man, who is now past seventy- six. I liave however done the work with great care, and as well as I could. I have always compared my transla- tion with the Latin version and with Mrs. Carter's ; and I think that this is the best way of avoiding errors such as any translator may make. A man who has not attempted to translate a Greek or Latin author does not know the difficulty of the undertaking. That which may appear plain when he reads, often becomes very difficult when he tries to express it in another language. It is true that Epictetus is generally intelligible ; but the style or manner ^) of the author, or we may say of Arrian, who attempted to ' produce what he heard, is sometimes made obscure by the continual use of questions and answers to them, and fur other reasons. Upton remarks in a note on iii. 23 (p. 184 Trans.), that " there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes." The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken ex- tempore, and so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker (Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii. 336 of his edition) that the con- nexion of the discourse is sometimes obscure through the omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connexion of the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot always understand Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passages more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he will miss the meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble. Every man must judge for himself. But I should not have translated the book, if I had not thought it worth XVI EPICTETUS. study ; and I think that all books of this kind require careful reading, if they are worth reading at all. The text of Epictetus is sometimes corrupted, and this corruption causes a few difficulties. However, these diffi- culties are not numerous enough to cause or to admit much variety or diversity in the translations of the text. This remark will explain why many parts of my translation are the same or nearly the same as Mrs. Carter's. When this happened, I did not think it necessary to alter my trans- lation in order that it might not be the same as hers. I made my translation first, and then compared it with Mrs. Carter*s and the Latin version. I hope that I have not made many blunders. I do not suppose that I have made none. The last and best edition of the Discourses, the Enchei- ridion, and the fragments is by J. Schweighaeuser in 6 vols. 8vo. This edition contains the commentary of Simplicius on the Encheiridion, and two volumes of useful notes on the Discourses. These notes are selected from those of Wolf, Upton, and a few from other commentators ; but a large part are by Schweighaeuser himself, who was an excellent scholar and a very sensible man. I have read all these notes, and I have used them. Many of the notes to the translation are my own. ( xvii ) THE PHILOSOPHY OP EPICTETUS. I HAVE made a large Index to tins book; and any person > who has the necessary industry, may find in it almost every passage in the Discourses in which the opinions of the philosopher are stated ; and thtis he may acquire a general notion of the philosophical system of Epictetus. But few readers will have the time and the inclination for this labour, and therefore I shall attempt to do the work for them. I have found two expositions of the system of Epictetus. One is by Dr. Heinrich Eitter in his Geschichte der Philo- Sophie alter Zeit, Vierter Theil, 1839. The other is by Professor Christian A. Brandis.^ Both of these exposi* tions are useful ; and I have used them. I do not think that either of them is complete, nor will mine be. I shall not make my exposition exactly in the same form as either of tliem ; nor shall I begin it in the same way. Eitter has prefixed a short sketch of C. Musonius Eutiis, a Eoman Stoic, to his exposition of the system of Epic- tetus. Eufus taught at Eome under the emperor Nero, who drove him from Eome ; but Eufus returned after the tyrant's death, and lived to the times of Vespasian and his son Titus. He acquired great reputation as a teacher, but there is no evidence that he wrote anything, and all tbat we know of his doctrines is from a work of Pollio in ^ Article Epictetus in the ' Dictionary . of Greek and Eoman Biography,' etc, edited by Doctor William Smith. h • •* XVin THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETIJS. Greek, whicli was written after the model of Xenoplion's Memorabilia of Socrates. Of this work there are many fragments.^ Enfus taught a practical philosophy, one that was useful for the purposes of life, and for the life of a philosopher who was not hindered by following the common occupa- tions of mankind from philosophizing and aiding others to philosophize.^ He urged young men especially to the study of philosophy, and even women, because without philosophy no person can be virtuous and do his duty. He asks, what hinders the scholar from working with his teacher and at the same time learning from him something about moderation (o-co^/Door'n;) and justice and endurance? His belief in the power of philosophy over men's minds was strong, and he was convinced that it was a perfect cure for the corruption of mankind. He showed the firm- ness of this conviction on an occasion which is recorded by Tacitus (Hist. iii. 81). He endeavoured to mediate between the partizans of Yitellius who were in Kome, and the army of Vespasian, which was l)efore the gates : but he failed in his attempt. His behaviour was like that of a modern Christian, who should attempt to enforce the Christian doctrines of peace on men who are arrayed against one another with arms in their hands. Such - Christian would be called a fanatic now; and TacitUb, who was himself a philosopher, gives to the behaviour of Eufus the mild term of "in tempest ivam" or "nnseasonable." The judgment of Tacitus was right: the behaviour of - See the * Fragments from Stobaeus,' cited by Eitter in his notes (Vierter Theil^ p. 204:). The notice of UaXiofy, as he is named, in Suida?, is not satisfactory. It speaks of the ^A-rofiyrifioyivfiara of :Musonin3 by Polio or Pollio ; and yet it states that Pollio tanght at Rome in the time of Pompeius ^Magnus, See Clinton, Fasti, iii. p. 5nO. * " It wonld be a strange thing indeed if the cultivation of the eanh hindered a man from philosophizing or aiding others to philosophize.'' Stobaeus, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETTJS. XIX lliifns was unseasonable, as the result proved: but the attempt of Eufns was the act of a good man. Eufns did not value Dialectic or Logic so highly as the old Stoics ; but he did not nnderralue it, and he taught that a man should leam how to deal with sophistical argu- ments, as we leam from Epictetus (I. c. 7 at the end). In his teaching about the Gods he follows the general Stoic practice of maintaining the popular religion. He taught that nothing was unknown to the Gods : as Socrates (Xenophon, Mem. i. c. 1) taught that the Gods knew every- thing, what was said, what was done, and what men thouscht. He considered the souls of men to be akin to the Gods ; but as they were mingled with the body, the soul must partake of the impurities of the body. The intelligent principle (StaFoia) is free from all necessity (compulsion) and self sufficient (avreiovato^). We can only conjectnre that Rufus did not busy himself about either Dialectic or Physic ; for he said that philosophizing was nothing else than an inquiry about what is becoming and conformable to duty ; an inquiry which is conducted by reason, and the result is exhibited in practice. The old Stoics considered virtue to be the property only of the wise man ;- and they even doubted whether such a man could be found. But Eufus said that it was nbt impossible for such a man to exist, for we cannot conceive such virtues as a wise man possesses otherwise than from the examples of human nature itseK and by meeting with men such as those who are named divine and godlike. The Stoical doctrine that man should live according^ to naturejs not pressed so hard by Eufus as by some Stoics, and he looks on a life which is conformable to nature as not very difficult ; but he admits that those who attemj)t philosophy have been trained from youth in great corrup- 'on and filled with wickedness, and so when they seek after virtue they require more discipline or practice. Ac- h 2 XX THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETU^. cji'diijgiy lie views pliilosopliy as a spiritual medicine, and gives more weight to the practice or exercise of virtue than the older Stoics did. The knowledge and the teach- ing of what is good, he saj^s, should come first ; but Eufus did not believe that the knowledge of the Good was strong enough without practice (discipline) to lead to moral con- duct, and consequently he believed that practice has greater efficacy than teaching.* He makes two kinds of exercise, first, the exercise of the soul in thinking, in reflecting and in stamping on the mind sound rules of life ; and second, in the enduring of bodily labours or pains, in which act of endurance the soul and the body act togethei-. '' The sum of his several rules of life," says Eitter, may be thus briefly expressed : in his opinion a life according to Nature results in a social, philanthropic and contented state of mind, joined to the most simple satisfaction of our /accessary wants. We see his social and philanthropic dis- position in this that he opposes all selfishness (selbstsucht), * I have followed the exposition of Ritter here. Perhaps a literal translation of the Greek is still better: "Reason which teaches how we should act co-operates with practice, and reason (or teaching) comes in order before custom (habit) or practice : for it is not possible to become habituated to any thing good if a person is not habituated by reason (by teaching) ; in power indeed the luibit (pr.ictice) has the advantage over teaching, for habit (practice) iivmore efficacious • leading a man to act (properly) than reason is." I have given the meaning of the Greek as accurately as I can. In our modern education we begin with teaching general rules, or piinciples or beliefs ; and there we stop. The result is what might be expected. Practice or the habit of doing what we ought to do is neglected. The teachers are teachers of words and no more. They are the men whom Epictetus (iii. 21. note 6) describes : " You have committed to memory the words onl5% ai I you say, Sacred are the woids by themselves." See p. 245, note 3. It is one of the greatest merits of Rufus that he laid dovin the principle which is expounded above ; and it is the greatest deme »t of our system of teaching that the principle is generally neglected : iu... most particularly by those teachers who proclaim ostentatiously tliat tlioy give a religious education. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPIOTETUS. Xxi that lie views marriage not only as the sole right and natural satisfaction of the sexual feelings, but also as the foiindation of family, of a state, and of the continuation of the human race; and accordingly he declares himself jagainst the exposu^-e of children as an unnatural practice ; and he often recommends beneficence." Epictetus was a pupil of this noble Eoman teacher, whose name occurs several times in the Discourses. Eitter con- jectures that Epictetus also heard Euphrates, whom he highly commends. It has been justly said that, though Epictetus is named a Stoic, and that his principles are Stoical, he is not purely a Stoic. He learned from other teachers as well as the Stoic. He quotes the teaching and example of Socrates continually, and the example of Dio- genes the Cynic, both of whom he mentions more frequently than Zeno the founder of the Stoic philosophy. He also valued Plato, who accepted from Socrates many of his principles, and developed and expanded them. So Epictetus learned that the beginning of philosophy is man's knowledge of himself (yvwOt o-eavroV), and the ac- Imowledgment of his o^wn ignorance and weakness. He teaches (i. c. 17 ; ii. c. 14; ii. c. 10) that the examination of names, the understanding of the notion, of the concep- tion of a thing, is the beginning of education : he con- sistently teaches that we ought to pity those who do wrong, for they err in ignorance (i. c. 18; IT a 22, p. 181) ; and, as Plato says, every mind is deprived of truth unwillingly. < Epictetus strongly opposes the doctrines of Itlpicurus, of the newer Academics, and of Pyrrho, the great leader of the Sceptical school (i. c. 5, c. 23 ; ii. c. 20). y He has no taste for the subtle discussions of these men. He'^says (p. 81), "Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defence of common consent (opinion)." XXll THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. " How indeed perception is effected, whether throngh the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain; for both opinions perplex me. But that yon and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. How do you know it ? When I intend to swallow anything, I never* carry it to your mouth, but to my own. And you your- selves (the Pyrrhonists), who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise ? AVho among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill ? " He also says (ii. c. 20) that " the propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used even by those who con- tradict them ; and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that anything is universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory negation, that nothing is universally true." Epictetus did not undervalue Dialectic or Logic, and the solution of what are called Sophistical and Hypothetical arguments (i. c. 7) ; but he considered the handling of all such arguments as a thing relating to the duties of life, and as a means towards Ethic, or the practice of morals. Kufus said, *' for a man to use the appearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, and not to understand argument nor demonstration nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not con- sistent : is there no error in this " ? Accordingly Dialectic is not the object of our life, but it is a means for dis- tinguishing between true and false appearances, and for ascertaining the validity of evidence, and it gives us security in our judgments. It is the application of these things to the purposes of life which is the first and neces- sary part of philosophy. So he says in the Encheiridion THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. xxiii (LI.) ; *' The first and most necessary place in pliilosophy is the use of theorems (precepts), for instance, That wo must not lie : the second is that of demonstration, for instance, How is it proved that we ought not to lie : the third is that which is confirmatory of these two and ex- planatory, for example, How is this a demonstration"? The^ jihilosophyi of Epictetus is in . fact only the way jif liring as_a_man_OTight to live, according to his nature. Epictetus accordingly views that part of the Stoic teach- ing, named Physic or the Nature of things, also as sub- ordinate to his philosophy, which is purely Ethical. We ought to live according to Nature, and therefore we must inquire what the Law of Nature is. The contemplation of the order of things is the duty of man, and to observe this wonderful system of which man is a part ; but the pur- pose of the contemplation and the observation is that we may live a life such as we ought to live. He says (Frag, CLXXV., " What do I care whether all things are com- posed of atoms or of similar parts, or of fire and earth ? for is it not enough to knoAv the nature of the good and the evil, and the measures of the desires and aversions, and ako the movements towards things and from them ; and using these as rules to administer the affairs of life, but not to trouble ourselves about the -things above us ? For these things are perhaps incomprehensible to the human mind : and if any man should even suppose them to be in the highest degree comprehensible, what then is the profit of them, if they are comprehended? And must we not say that those men have needless trouble who assign these things as necessary to a philosopher's discourse?" Epictetus then did not value the inquiries of the Physical j)hilosophers, or he had no taste for them. His Philosophy was Ethical, and his inquiry was. What is the rule of life? " With respect to gods," says Epictetus (i. c. 12), "there ore some who say that a divine being does not exist: others XXIV THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPIOTETUB. say tliat it exists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no foretlioiTglit about anything ; a third class say such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth ; a fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say, ' I move not without thy know- ledge,'" (Iliad, X. 278). After a few remarks Epictetus concludes : " The wise and good man then after consider- ing all these things, submits his own mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state." The foundation of the Ethic of Epictetus is the doctrine which the Stoic Cleanthes proclaimed in his h^^mn to Zeus (God), '* From thee our race comes." EjDictetus speaks of Gods, whom we must venerate and make offerings to ; and of God, from whom we all are sprung in an especial manner. " God is the father both of men and of Gods." This great descent ought to teach us to have no ignoble or mean thoughts about ourselves. He says, '* Since these two things are mingled in the generation of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intel- ligence in common with the Gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and mortal ; and some few to that which is divine and happy " (i. c. 3). In a chapter of Providence (i. c. 6) he attempts to prove the existence of God and his government of the world by everything which is or happens ; but in order to understand these proofs, a man, he says, must have the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to "all persons and things, and a grateful disposition " (also, i. c. 16). He argues from the very struc- ture of things which have attained their completion, that we are accustomed to show that a work is certainly the act THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. XXV of some artificer, and that it lias not been conbtructed without a pur^Dose. *' Does then each of these things de- monstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate him " ? He then considers the constitution of man's understanding and its operations ; and he asks, if this is not sufficient to convince us, let people ** explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion " ? It is enough for animals to do what their nature leads them to do without understanding why they do it. But it is not enough for us to whom God has given also the intel- lectual faculty ; for unless we act conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. God has introduced man into the world to be a spectator of God and his works ; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason, he says, ''it is shameftd for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do ; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us ; and nature ends in contemplation and undei standing, and in a way of life con- formable to nature" (p. 21). He examines in another chapter (i. c. 9), How from the fact that we are akin to God, a man may proceed to the consequences. Here he shows that a man who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God came all beings which are j)ro- duced on the earth, and particularly rational beings who are by reason conjoined with him, — " why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which | happens among men ? — when 3'ou have God for your maker, |; and father, and guardian, shall not this release us from? Borrows and f(^ars?" XXVI THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. In this chapter aljiO is a supposed address of Epictetns to those people who on account of the bonds of the body and the troubles of this life intend to throw them off, " ar to depart to their kinsmen." Epictetus says, " Friend, wait for God : when He shall give the signal and release you from this service, then go to Him ; but for the present endure to dwell in this place where He has put you — wai^ then, do not depart without a reason." He gives the ex- ample of Socrates, who said that if God has put us in a^^v place, we ought not to desert it. I think that Epictetus did not recommend suicide in any case, though he admitted that there were cases in which he would not condemn xi, ; but a man ought to have good reasons for leaving his post. The teaching of Epictetus, briefly exj)ressed, is, that man ought to be thankful to God for all things, and always content with that which happens, for what God chooses is better than what man can choose (iv. c. 7). This is what Bishop Butler sa^^s, " Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect when our will is lost and resolved up into his ; when we rest in his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good." (Sermon on the Love of God.) I have not discovered any passage in which Epictetus gives any opinion of the mode of God's existence. He dis- tinguishes God the maker and governor of the universe from the universe itself. His belief in the existence of this great power is as strong as any Christian's could be; and very much stronger than the belief of many who call themselves Christians, and who solemnly and publicly declare " I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." Epictetus teaches us what our duty is towards God ; and there is no doubt that he practised what he taught, as a sincere and honest man should do, or at least try to do with all his might, V that a man of his temper of mind, and his giea THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. XXVH did what be recommends (Fragments, cxviii., cxix.) : " Let your talk of God be renewed every day ratber than your food"; and *' Tbiiik of God more frequently than you oreatbe." I see no otber conclusion tbat such a man could come to tban tbis, tbat God exists witbout doubt, and tbat He is incomprebensible to sucb feeble creatures as man .wbo lives in so feeble a body. See p. 21, note 5. We must now see wbat means God bas given to His children for doing tbeir duty. Epictetus begins by sbow- ing wbat tbings God bas put in our power, and wbat tbin^^^ be bas not (i. c. 1 ; Encbeir. 1). " Tbat wbicb is 1^ ;u of all and supreme over all is tbe only thing which the gods have placed in our power, tbe right use of appear- ances ; but all other things they have not placed in our power " ; and the reason of this limitation of man's power is, " that as we exist on the earth and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals?" He says again (Encheirid. 1) : " Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion, movement towards a thing, desire, ayersion (turning from a thing) ; and in a word, whatever are our own acts : not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to lestraint nor hindrance : but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in tbe power of others." This is his notion of man's freedom. On this notion all his system rests. He says (i. c. 17): "if God had made that part of himself, which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then 1)0 God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought." Ho says (i. c. 1 ; iii. o. 3 ; and elsewhere) that the right XXviii THE PHlLOSOniY OF EPICTETUS. use of appearances is the only thing that the gods have placed in our power ; and " that it is the business of the wise and good man to use appearances conformably to nature." For this purpose a man has what Epictetus names a ruling faculty (to yyejxoviKov), of which he gives a defini- tion or description (iv. c. 7). It is that faculty " which uses all other faculties and tries them, and selects and rejects;" a faculty by which we reflect and judge and determine, a faculty which no other animal has, a faculty which, as Bishop Butler says, '^ plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direc- tion of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification" (Preface to the Sermons). These appearances are named ^avracrtat by Epictetus ; and the word is translated *' Visa animi " by Gellius (Frag, clxxx.). This Phantasy (<^ai/Tao-ta) is not only the thing which is perceived by the eyes, but the impression which is made on the eyes, and generally it means any impression received by the senses; and also it is the power of the mind to represent things as if they were present, though they are only present in the mind and are really absent. This power of Phantasy exists also in animals in various degrees according to their several capacities : animals make use of appearances, but man only understands the use of appearances (i. c. G).^ If a man cannot or does not make a right use of appearances, he approaches the nature of an irrational animal; and he is not what God made him capable of being. The nature of the Good is in the use of appearances, 5 I suppose that this will be generally allowed to be true. Whatever an animal can do, we shall hardly admit that he understands the us 3 of appearances, and uses them as a man can. However the powers of some animals, such as ants for example, are very wonderful ; and it may be contended that they are not ii-rational in many of tlieir act.s, but quite rational. THE PBILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. :^X1X and tlie nature of evil lilvewise; and things independent of the will do not admit either the nature of evil or of good (ii. c. 1). The good and the bad are in man's will, and in notHino; ext ernal. The rational power therefore leads us to acknowledge as good only that which is con- formable to reason, and to recognize as bad that which is not conformable to reason. The matter on which the good man labours is his rational facult}^ (to tSiov rjyefjioviKov) : that is the business of the philosopher (iii. c. 3). A man who wishes to be what he is by nature, by his constitution, adapted for becoming, must "struggle against appearj ances " (ii. c. 18). This is not an easy thing, but it is the only^way of obtaining true freedom, tranquillity of mind, and the dominion over the movements of the soul, in a word ha ppiness, which is the true end and purpose of man's existence on earth. ^ Every man carries in him his own enemy, whom he must carefully watch (Ench. xlviii.). There is danger that a]3pearances, which powerfully resist reason, will carry you away : if you are conquered twice or even once, there is danger that a habit of yielding to them will be formed. ''Generally, then, if you would make anything, a habit, do it: if you would not make it a habit, do not do it; but accustom yourself to do something else in place of it" (ii. c. 18). As to pleasure Epictetus says (Ench. xxxiv.) : "If you have received the impression (* Br. Farrar says in his 'Seekers after God* (Epictetus p. 213), *• That Epictetus approves of celibacy as a * counsel of perfection,' and indeed his views have a close and remarkable resemblance to those of St. Paul." I do not understand the first part of this sentence ; and the reader of Epictetus will see that the second part is not true. There is a note on the matter (pp. 258, 316). xl THE PHILOSUPHY OP EPICTETUS. tliat of the body : but as to the soul, what else cuukl you find in it tlian that which makes it filthy in respect to the acts which are her own ? Now tlie acts of the soul are movement towards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, preparation, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in these acts makes the soul filthy and impure ? Nothing else than her own bad judgments (Kptixara). Con- sequently the impurity of the soul is the soul's bad opinions ; and the purification of the soul is the planting in it of proper opinions; and the soul is pure which has / proper opinions, for the soul alone in her own acts is free from perturbation and pollution." Epictetus says (iv. c. 7) that man is not *' flesh nor bones nor sinews (vevpa), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs them and follows (understands) the appearances of things." This opinion seems to be the same or nearly the same as Bp. Butler's (iv. c. 7, note 10). If then Epictetus had any distinct notion of the soul, and he is a man whose notions are generally distinct, I think that his opinion of man's body and of man's soul are, that a man's body is not the man, but the body is that "finely tempered clay'' in which the man dwells, and without the body he could not live this carthl}^ life : and his notion of the soul is that which is stated above (iv. c. 11 and c. 7). As to the mode and nature of this connexion between the hody and the soul, I can ordy suppose that he would have disclaimed all knoAvledge of it, as he does of the nature of perception (p. 82) ; and I do not suppose that any philosopher or theologian would A'cnture to say what this connexion of soul and bod}^ is. In the life then which man lives on the earth I think that the opinions of Epictetus are the same or nearly the same as those of Swedenborg ; but after the event, which comes to all men, and which we name Death, iliq opinions are very different. THE PHILOSOrHY OF EPICTETUS. xli ^xxia what is Death? (p. 230 in the chapter on Solitude ). It is a going *' to the place from which you came, to your friends and kinsmen, to the elements : what there was in YOU of fire goes to fire, of earth to earth; of air (spirit j to air ; of water to Avater : no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pja'iphlegethon, hut all is full of Gods and Daemons.'* He says (p. 282) : " death is a greater chang* , not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now. , Shall I then no loni>;er exist? You will not exist, but 'y^un^dll be ^ the world now has need : for you also came into existeixee not when you chose, but when the world had need of you. ' Death is the resolution of the matter of the body into the things out of which it is composed (p. 347). This is dis- tinct and intelligible. Of the soul, which, as we have seen, he considers to be' in some way diiferent from the body during life, he does not speak so distinctly. I think that he means, iriie means any thing, something like what I have said in p. 347, note 4. The philosopher, who appears to have no belief in a future existence, as it is generally understood, teaches thnt we oirght to live such a life in all our thoughts and in all our acts as a Christian would teach. He says (p. 285), "Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, /that of being conscious that you are obeying God, that not 'in word, but in deed you are performing the acts of a wisi^ and good man.'* He looks for no reward for doing what he ought to do. Tbe virtuous man has his rew^ard in his own acts. If he lives conformably to nature, he will clo what is best in this short life, and will obtain all the hap- piness which he can obtain in no other way. He says (p. 310) : "Who are you and for what purpc^ ;• did ^^ou come into the world ? Did not God introduce you here, did he not shoAv 3^ou the light, did he not give yo fellow workers, and perception and n ason ? and as whom ■xlii THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. did Le introduce yon here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time ? "Will you not theu, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen " ? Perhaps we may say that the conclusion of Epictetus about the soul after the separation from the body is equiva- lent to a declaration that he knew nothing about it ; as he disclaims sometimes the knowledge of other things. Wo cannot assume that in the books which are lost he ex- pressed any opinions which are inconsistent with those contained in the books which exist. He must have known tlie opinion, of Socrates about the immortality of the soul, or the opinion a'ttributed to Socrates ; but he has not said that he assents to'it, nor does he express dissent from it. Bp. Butler in his Analogy of Religion Natural and Re- vealed (Part I. Of Natural Religion, Chap. I. of a Future Life) has examined the question of a Future Life with his usual modesty, good sense and sagacity. The inquiry is very difficult. He says at the end of the chapter : *' The credi- bility of a future life, which has been here insisted on, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the "purposes of religion, in like manner as a demon- strative proof would. Indeed, a proof, even a demon- strative one, of a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, th^t we are to live hereafter, is just as reconcileable with' the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is ; and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue ^von\ that scheme that there can be no future state. But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a state is a presumption against religion." THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. xllli I conclude that Epictetus, who was a religious man, and who believed in the existence of God and his administra- tion of all things, did not deny a future life ; nor does he say that he believes it. I conclude that he did not under- s'a'hSTit ; that it was beyond his conception, as the nature of God also was. His great merit as a teacher is that he " attempted to show that there is in man's nature and in the constitution of things sufficient reason for living a virtuous life."^^ He knew well what man's nature is, and he endeavoured to teach us how we can secure happiness in this life as far as we are capable of attaining it. More might be said; but this is enough. I will only add that the Stoics have been charged with arrogance ; and the charge is just. Epictetus himself has been blamed for it eyeniyjoaodern theologians, who are not always free from toTBmult themselves. If there is any arrogance or apparent arrogance in Epictetus, he did not teach it, for he has especially warned us against this fault, as the reader will see in several passages. "I am not sure that I rightly understood the Apostle Paul, wh§n I wrote the note 22 in p. 283. The words *'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," are said to be a quotation from a Greek writer. The words then may be taken not as Paul's, but as the conclusion of foolish persons. A friend who, as I understand his remarks, is of this opinion, also adds that as Paul was a learned man, and knew some- thing about the Greek philosophers, he would certainly give them credit for better and more rational opinions. This may be the true meaning of the words. Paul is not always easy to understand, even by those who make a special study of his Epistles, AEEIAN'S DISCOUESES OF EPICTETUS. -*o*- Arrian to Lucius Gellius, loith wishes for Ms happiness, I NEITHER wrote these Discourses ^ of Epictetus in the way in which a man might write such things ; nor did I make them public myself, inasmuch as I declare that I did not even write them. But whatever I heard him say, the same I attempted to write down in his own words as nearly as possible, for the purpose of preserving them as memorials to myself afterwards of the thoughts and the freedom of speech of Epictetus. Accordingly, the Dis- courses are naturally such as a man would address with- out preparation to another, not such as a man would write ^ A. Gellius (i. 2 and xvii. 19) speaks of the Discourses of Epictetus being arranged by Arrian ; and Gellius (xix. 1) speaks of a fifth book of these Discourses, but only four are extant and some fragments. The whole number of books was eight, as Photius (Cod. 58) says. There is fiilso extant an Encheiridion or Manual, consisting of short pieces selected from the Discourses of Epictetus ; and there is the valuable commentary on the Encheiridion written by Simplicius in the sixth century a.d. and in the reign of Justinian. Arrian explains in a manner what he means by saying that he did not write these Discourses of Epictetus ; but he does not explain his meaning when he says that he did not make them public. He tells us that he did attempt to write down in the words of Epictetus what the philosopher said ; but how it happened that they were first pub- lished, without his knowledge or consent, Arrian does not say. It appears, however, that he did see the Discourses when they were published ; and as Schweighaeuser remarks, he would naturally correct any errors that he detected, and so there would be an edition revised ' ' ■ '^If. Schweighaeuser has a note (i. ch. 26, 13) on the difliculties ' ~ •' find in the Discourses. B Z EPICTETUSI. with the view of others reading them. Now, being such, I do not know how they fell into the hands of the public, without either my consent or m}^ knowledge. But it concerns me little if I shall be considered incompetent to write ; and it concerns Epictetus not at all if any man shall despise his words ; for at the time when he uttered them, it was plain that he had no other purpose than to move the minds of his hearers to the best things. If, indeed, these Discourses should produce this effect, they will have, I think, the result which the words of philosophei's ought to have. But if they shall not, let those who read them know that, when Epictetus delivered them, the hearer could not avoid being affected in the way that Epictetus wished him to be. But if the Discourses themselves, as they are written, do not effect this le.sult, it may be that the fault is mine, or, it ]iiij 1 c tlj.it the tiling ig unavoidable. Farewell J BOOK I. CHAPTER I. OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IJT OUR POWER, AND NOT IN OUR POWER. Of all the faculties (except that which I shall soon men- tion), you will find not one which is capable of contem- plating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving.^ How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power ? As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write ; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds ; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What facultj'- then will tell you ? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this faculty ? The rational faculty ; ^ for this is the only faculty that wo " '^^'is moral approving and disapproving faculty" is Bp. Butler's 1 of the ^oKiuacTTiKr} and airodoKifiaa'TiK'^ of Epictetus (i. 1, 1) -sertation, Of the Nature of Virtue. See his note. ^,.^ rational faculty is the KoyiKT] ^vx-h of Epictetus and Anto- ninus, of which Antoninus says (xi. 1) : " These are the properties of the rational soul : it sees itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such a« it chooses; the fruit wl.ich it bears, itself enjoys." B 2 4 EPICTETUS. have received wliich. examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and exa- mines all other faculties : for what else is there which tells ns that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidentlj^ it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances.^ What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else. As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have placed in our power, the right use of appear- ances ; but all other things they have not placed in our power. Was it because they did not choose ? I indeed think that, if they had been able, they would have put these other things also in our power, but they certainly could not."* For as we exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, how was it pos- sible for us not to be hindered as to these things by externals ? But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this : this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you ' This is what he has just named the rational faculty. The S^ioics gave the name of appearances (^(pavraa-iai) to all impressions re«'eived by the senses, and to all emotions caused by external things. Chry- eippus said : (pavraala 4(TtI irddos iv rfj ^vxfi yiuSfievov^ ivdiiKvvfxivoif eavrS re Kot rh ireTroiyjKSs (Plutarch, iv. C. 12, De Placit. Philosoph.) * Compare Antoninus, ii. 3. Epictetus does not intend to limit the power of the gods, but he means that the constitution of things being what it is, they cannot do contradictories. They have so constituted things that man is hindered by externals. How then could they give to man a power of not being hindered by externals ? Seneca (De Providentia, c. 6) says : " But it may be said, many things happen which cause sadness, fear, and are hard to bear. Pscause (God says) I could not save you from them, I have armed your minr^j* against all." This is the answer to those who imagine that they have disproved the common assertion of the omnipotence of God, when they ask whether He can combine inherent contradictions, whether He can cause two and two to make five. Tliis is indeed a ver^- absurd way of talking. EPICTETUS. 5 what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us,^ this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things ; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only posses- sion, you will never be hindered, never meet with impedi- ments ; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. iBe content with them then and pray to the gods. But now when it is in our power to look after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many things, and to be bound to man}' things, to the body and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us ? When will the west wind blow ? When it shall choose, my good man, or when it shall please Aeolus ; for God has not made you the manager of the winds, but Aeolus.^ What then ? We must make the best use that we can of the things which are in our power, and use the I according to their nature. What is their nature "' i^s God may please. i '^ ihen alone have my head cut off? What, would all men lose their heads that you may be con- .gliaeuser observes that these faculties of pursuit and avoid- u,uce, ttiiu of desire and aversion, and even the faculty of using appearances, belong to animals as well as to man ; but animals in using appearances are move I by passion only, and do not understynd wiiat they are doing, while in man these passions are under his control. Salmasius proposed to change -rj/uLfrepoi/ into vfiirepoy, to remove the difficulty about tlese animal passions being called " a small portion of us (the gods)." Schweighaeuser, however, though ho sees the difficulty, does not accept the emendation. Perhaps Aniaii 1j.is here imperfectly represented what his master said, and i3erhap« b© 'did not. " He alludes to the Odyssey, X. 21 : K^Tfov yap rajxiriv avifxoov Troir]v a.TvxVf^^'^^^* Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6 : Spare Kal Trpoo-exerc dirS rrjs C^fivs, &o. Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike the Btyle of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which Epictetus was teaching. Schweighaeuser also refers to Wetstein*d New Testament. 14 EPIGTETUS. too that happiness ^ and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid ; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it,^ but he employs his aversion only on things which are de- pendent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a dis- play of it ? What is the product of virtue ? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement ? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus ? ^ But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus ? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chry- sippus. But now we admit that virtue produces ono thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own misfortunes ? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he msbj learn where to look for improvement ? * rh evpovi/ or 7} evpoLu is translated "happiness." The notion is that of " flowing easily," as Seneca (Epp, 120) exi^lains it : " beata vita, secimdo deuuens cursu." 2 vTr€pr4d€iTau The Latin translation is : " in futurum tempiis rejicit/* Wolf says : *• Significat id, quod in Enchiridio dictum est : philosophiae tironem non nimium tribuere sibi, sed quasi addubi- •tantem expectare dum confirmetur judicium." 3 Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. Vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word (TvyypdfxfJLara means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in B.c, 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he l>ecaTne a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. i EPICTETUS. 15 Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work ? In desire and in aversion, that you may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into that which you would avoid ; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and sus- pension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first things, and the most necessary, are those which I have named.* But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving. Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres ^ look to that. I should reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say : Take the treatise on the active powers (opixri), and see how I have studied it. I reply. Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making pro- gress : but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your books, but write such books yourself; and * Compare iii. c. 2. The word is tSttoi. ^ Halteres are gymnastic instruments (Galen, i. De Sanitate' tuenda ; Martial, xiv. 49 ; Juvenal, vi. 420, and the Scholiast. Upton). Halteres is a Greek word, literally " leapers." They are said to have been masses of lead, used for exercise and in making jumps. The effect of such weights in taking a jump is well known to boys who have used tl^m. A couple of bricks will serve the purpose, Martial says (xiv. 4^^"^ : — "Quid pereunt stulto fortes haltere lacerti? Exercet melius vinea fossa viros." Juvenal (vi. ^21) writes of a woman who uses dumb-bells till she sweats, and is then rubbed dry by a man, " Quum lassata gravi ceciderunt brachia raassa." (Macleane's Juvenal.) As to the expression, "Ox|/€i av, koI ol dXTrjpes, see Upton's note. It is ^-r a Latin form: "Epicurus hoc viderit," Cicero, Acad. ii. c. 7 ; iUec fortuna viderit," Ad Attic, vi. 4. It occurs in M. Antoninus, lii. 41, V, 25 ; and in Acta Apostol. xviii. 15. 16 EPICTETUS. what will yon gain by it? Do you not know tliat the whole book costs only five denarii ? Does then the ex- pounder seem to be worth more than five denarii ? Never then look for the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another. Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own will (Trpoatpeo-ts) to exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, un- impeded, faithful, modest ; and if he has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in His power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with them and be tossed abont with them as in a tempest,^ and of necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid ; finalty, when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man ; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his chief prin- ciples (tol 7rpor]yovjji€va) as the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice with reference to the voice — this is the man who truly makes progress, and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But ii he has strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there ; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying. Woe to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of mis- fortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters. Dear Crito,^ if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so ; and not to say. Wretched am I, an old man; have I kept my grey hairs for this? Who is it that speaks thus ? Do you think that I shall name some man of no repute and of low condition ? Does * fx^Tappmi^^adai. Compare James, Ep. i. 6: 6 yap diaKpivSfxcvos €0iK€ KXvhwvi 6a\d(rcn]s avefxiCop-^vcp Kcd ^LirL^o/jLevep. ^ This is said in the Criton of Plato, 1 ; but not in exactly tha same way. • EPICTETUS. 17 not Priam say this ? Does not Oedipus say tliis ? Kay, all kings say it ! ^ For what else is tragedy than the per- turbations {irdOrj) of men who value externals exhibited in this kind of poetry ? But if a man must learn by fiction that no external things which are independent of the will concern ns, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live happily and undisturbed. But yon must consider for yourselves what you wish. What then does Chrysippus teach us ? The reply is, to know that these things are not false, from which happi- ness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will leain how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune ! the great benefactor who points out the way ! To Triptolemus all men have erected ^ temples and altars, because he gave us food by cultivation ; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to light and commu- nicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who wor- ships God for this ? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them : but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they de- signed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this ? CHAPTER V. AGAINST THE ACADEMICS.^ * If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the * So kings and such personages speak in the Greek tragedies. Compare what M. Antoninus (xi. 6) says of Tragedy. ® av€(TrdKa(Ttv, See the note of Schweig. on the use of this form of the verb. ^ See Lecture V., The New Academy, Levin's Lectures Intro- ductory to the Phoilsophical Writings of Cicero, Cambridge, 1871. C / 18 EPICTETUS. man's strength or tlie teaclier's weakness ; for when the man, though he has been confuted,^ is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argument ? Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the un- derstanding, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of ns are afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul's mortification. And indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad condition : but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this we call even power (or strength). Do you comprehend that you are awake ? I do not, the man replies, for I do not even comprehend when in my sleep I imagine that I am awake. Does this appearance then not differ from the other ? Not at all, he replies. Shall I still argue with this man?^ And what fire or what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is deadened ? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. He is even worse than a dead man. He does not see the contradiction : he is in a bad condition. Another does see it, but he is not moved, and makes no improvement : he is even in a worse condition. His modesty is extirpated, and his sense of shame ; and the rational faculty has not been cut off from him, but it is brutalised. Shall I name this strength of mind? Cer- tainly not, unless we also name it such in catamites, through which they do and say in public whatever comes into their head. ' airaxOeis. See the note in Schweig.'s edition, 3 Ojmpare Cicero, Academ. Prior, ii. 6. w EPICTETUS. 19 CHAPTEE VI. OF PROVIDENCE. From everything wliicli is or happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see the use of things Which are and which happen ; another will not be thankful for them, even if he. does know them. If God had made colours, but had not made the facult}^ of seeing them, what would have been their use ? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? Kone at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that and that to this ? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife ? Is it no one?^ And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accus- tomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him ? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman ? If they do not, let us consider ^ the constitution of our understanding ^ Goethe has a short poem, entitled Gleich und Gleich (Like and Like) : . " Eia Bluraenglockchen Vom Boden hcrvor War friih gesprosset In lieblichem Flor ; Da kam ein Biencheu Und naschte fein : — Die miissen wohl beyde Fiir einander seyn." ^ See Schweig/8 note. I have given the sense of the passage?, 1 think. r *> 20 EPICTETUS. according to wliicli, when we meet with sensihle objects, we do not simply receive impressions from them, bnt wo also select ^ something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them : is not even this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman ? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that thinirs so wonderful and like the contrivances of ai't should exist by chance and from their own proper motion ? What, then, are* these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, of whicli the rational animal had peculiarly need ; but you will find many common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is done ? By no means. For use is one thing, and under- standing is another ; God had need of irrational animals^ to make use of appearances, but of us to imderstand the use of appearances.^ It is therefore enough for them to eat and to drink, and to sleep and to copulate, and to do all the otlier things which they severall}^ do. But for us, to whom He has given also the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient ; for unless we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For where the constitutions of living beings are different, there also the acts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough : but in an animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless thero be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use ; for which purposes what need is there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God ^ and of His ' Cicero, De Off. i. c. 4, on the difterence between man and beast. * See Schweig/8 note, torn. ii. p. 84. * The original is avrov, whicli I refer to God ; but it may be am- biguous. Schv/eighaeuser refers it to man, and explains it i. , ean EPICTETUS. 21 works ; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it^ is shameful fur man to begin and to end where irrational animals do ; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us ; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been spectators of these things. But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias,^ and all of you think it a misfortune to die with- out having seen such things. But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand them ? Will you not perceive either ^ what you are, or what you were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty of sight ? But you may say, there are some things disagreeable and trouble- some in life. And are there none at Olympia ? Are you not scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without comfortable means of bathing ? Are you nut wet when it rains ? Have you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other disagreeable things ? But I suppose that setting, all these things oif against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have that rnan should be a spectator of himself, according to the maxim, FvcodL (TeavTou. It is true that man can in a manner contemijlate liimself and his faculties as well as external objects; and as every man can be an object to every other man, so a man may be an object to himself when he examines his faculties and reflects on his own acts. Schweighaeuser asks how can a man be a spectator of God, except so far as he is a spectator of God's works? It is not enough, he says, to reply that God and the universe, whom and which man contemplates, are the same thing to the Stoics ; for Epictetus always distinguishes God the maker and governor of the universj from the universe itself. But here lies the difficulty. The universe is an all-comprehensive term : it is all that we can in any way perceive and conceive as existing ; and it may therefore comprehend God, not as something distinct from the universe, but as being the universe him- self. This form of expression is an acknowledgment of the weakness of the human faculties, and contains the implicit assertion of Locke that the notion of God is bc^yond man's understanding (Essay, etc. ii. c. 17). " This work was the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus (Jnpiter) by Phidias, which was at Olympia. This wonderful work is described by Pausanias (Eliaca, A, 11). ^ Compare Persius, Sat. iii. GQ — "Discite, io, miseri et causas cognoscite rerum, Quid 8umu3 aut quldnam vlcturi gignimur. 22 EPICTETUS. you not received faculties by which you will be able ta bear all that happens ? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received endurance ? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the pur- poses for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens ? Yes, but my nose runs.^ For what purpose then, slave, have you hands ? Is it not that you may wipe your nose ? — Is it then consistent with reason that there should be run- ning of noses in the world ? — Nay, how much better it is to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think that Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out ? And what would he have been doing if there had been nothing of the kind ? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped himself up and have slept? In the first place then he would not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all his life in such luxury and ease ; and even if he had been one, what would have been the use of him ? and what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circumstances and occasions had not roused and exercised him? Well then must a man provide for himself such means of exercise, and seek to in- troduce a lion from some place into his country, and a boar, and a hydra? This would be folly and madness: but as they did exist, and were found, they were useful for show- ing what Hercules was and for exercising him. Come then do you also having observed these things look to the faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say : Bring now, Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by thee and powers ^ * Compare Antoninus, viii. 50, and Epictetiis, ii. 16, 13. ^ a(popixas. This word in tliis passage has a different meaninoc from that which it has when it is opposed to o/^^^. See GataJver, Antoninus, ix. 1 (Upton). Epictetus says that the powers wliich man has were given by God : Antoninus says, from nature. They mean the same thing. See Schweighaeuser's note. EPIOTETUS. 23 for honouring myself through the things which happen. You do not so : but you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what does happen : and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety ? ^° And yet God has not only given us these faculties ; by which we shall be able to bear every- thing that happens without being depressed or broken by it ; but, like a good king and a true father. He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compul- sion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as your own, use them not : you do not even see what you have received, and from whom ; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even acknowledg- ing your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of soul and man- liness : but what powers you have for finding fault and making accusations, do you show me. CHAPTER VII. OF TEE USE OF SOPHISTICAL ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTIlEriCAI. AND THE LIKE.^ The handling of sophistical and hypothetical arguments, and of those which derive their conclusions from question- ing, and in a word the handling of all such arguments, " Compare Antoninus, ix. 1. ^ The title is ire pi ttjs xp^*"^ t'*'^ ^leraTvnrTSvrwv Koi vtvoB^tlku'V KoiX 7WU d/uLolooj/. Schweighaeuser has a big note on ixeraTriTrTovrcs \6yoi, which he has collected from various critics. Mrs. Carter translated the title ' Of the Use of Convertible and Hypothetical Propositions and the like.' But *' convertible " might be undei-stood in the common logical sense, which is not the meaning of Epictetus. Schweighaeuser. explains fxero^TrlTrTovTcs \6yoi to be sophistical arguments in which the meaning of propositions or of terms, which ought to remain the same, is dexterously changed and perverted to another meaning. 21 EPICTETU8. relates to tlie duties of life, though the many do not know this truth. For in eYery matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover the proper path and the proper method of dealing with the matter. Let then people either say that the grave man will not descend into the contest of question and answer, or, that if he does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not conducting himself rashly or carelessly in questioning and answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry ought to be made into those topics (tottcov) on which par- ticularly questioning and answering are employed. For what is the end proposed in reasoning ? To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only this ? It is enough, a man may reply. Is it then also enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the use of coined money, to have heard this precept, that he should receive the genuine drachmae and reject the spurious? It is not enough. What then ought to be added to this precept? What else than the faculty which proves and distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachmae ? Consequently also in j easoning what has been said is not enough ; but it is necessary that a man should acquire the faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the false, and that which is not plain? It is necessary. Besides this, what is proposed in reasoning? That you should accept what follows from that which you have properly granted. Well, is it then enough in this case also to know this? It is not enough; but a man must learn how one thing is a consequence of other things, and when one thing follows from one thing, and when it follows from several collectively. Consider then if it bo not necessary that this power should also be acquired bj'- liim, who purposes to conduct himself skilfully in reason- ing, the power of demonstrating himself the several things which ho has proposed,^ and the power of under- standing the demonstrations of others, and of not being deceived l)y sophists, as if they were demonstrating. Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and * See Scliweig.^s note on airoBel^eiv '4Kasions were made. For the inference is now not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have withdrawn from the premises which we granted. We ought then both to ex- amine such kinds of premises, and such change and varia- tion of them (from one meaning to another), by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way, the pre- mises undergo yariations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded, if they do not see what conclusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to ex- amine ? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an improper manner nor in a confused way. And the same in hypotheses' and liypothetical arguments ; for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one ? And if not every one, which should we allow ? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it ? or must he sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility. AVith such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him ? But what other man than the man of sense can use argu- mentation and is skilful in questioning and answering, and B, every B is also A, he miglit answer that it is. But if you put the conversion in this material form: "Every goose is an animal," ho immediately perceives that he cannot say, "Every animal is a goose." What does this show ? It shows that the man's comprehension of the proposition, every A is B, was not true, and that he took it to mean eomcthiiig dilferent from what the person intended who put the question. He understood that A and B were coextensive. "Whether we call this reasoning or something else, makes no matter. A man whose understanding is sound cannot in the nature of things reason wrong ; but his understanding of the matter on which he reasons may be wrong somewhere, and he may not be able to discover where. A man who has been trained in the logical art may show him that his conclusion is just according to his understanding of the terms and the propositions employed, ])ut yet it is not true. EPIOTETUS. 27 incapable of boing clieated and deceived by false reasoning ? And shall he enter into the contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not rashly and not carelessly ? And if he does not take care, how can he be such a man as we conceive him to be ? But without some snch exercise and preparation, can he maintain a con- tinuous and consistent argument ? Let them show this ; and all these speculations (^ecopT^/xara) become superfluous, and are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man. Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do we seek pretences for not labouring and not being watchful in cultivating our reason ? If then I shall make a mistake in these matters may I not have killed m}^ father? Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could kill him? What then have you done? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus ^ when he blamed me for not having dis- covered the one thing omitted in a certain syllogism : I suppose, I said, that I have burnt the Capitol. Slave, he replied, was the thing omitted here the Capitol ? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to kill your father ? But for a man to use the appearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration, nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent ; is there no error in this ? ^ Eufus is Musoniua Eufus (i. 1). To kill a father and to burn the Koman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Comp. Horace, Epode, iii. ; Cicero, Dc Amicifc. c. 11 ; Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus, c. 20. 23 EPICTETUS. CHAPTER VIII. THAT THE FACULTIES^ ARE NOT SAFE TO THE UNINSTRUCTED. In as many ways as we can cliange things^ which are equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we can change the forms of arguments {iTri^up-qixaTa) and enthymemes^ (ev^v/x-Ty/xara) in argumentation. This is an instance: if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe mo the money : you have not borrowed and you have not repaid ; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skilfully is suitable to no man more than to the philo- sopher ; for if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also. Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another in this manner ? Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this occupation ? and particularly as this would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit and arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and par- ticularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive additional ornament from language : and so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstruoted and weak brings with it the danger of these persons being elated "' The faculties, as Wolf says, are tho faculties of speaking and arguing, which, as he also says, make men arrogant and careless who have no solid knowledge, according to Bious maxim, ^ yap o'lrjcris iyKOTT^ TTjs TrpoKOTrrjs iariv^ " arrogance (self-conceit) is a hindrance to improvement.'* See viii. 8. - Things mean " propositions " and " terms." See Aristot. Analyt. Piior. i. 39, Se? Se kou /jLeraKa/jL^dveiVy &c. 'ETrix€Lpr]iJ.aTa are argu- ments of any kind with which we attack (i-mx^ipelp) an adversary. ^ The Enthymeme is defined by Aristotle : €vdvfxr)fxa yuez/ ovi/ eVrl avWoyKTjjLbs e| cIkotwv t) crrjincicov (Anal. Prior, il. c. 27). He has ex- plained, in the first part of this chapter, what he means by eUos and a-7ifx€7ov. Sec also De Morgan's Formal Logic, p. 237; and P. C. Organon, p. 6, note. EPICTETUS. 29 and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuade a young man who excels in these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage * to them, but to make them an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not en- during that any man should reprore him and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned aside ? \\ hat then was not Plato a philosopher ? ^ I reph^ and was not Hippocrates a physician ? but you see how Hippocrates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speak thus in respect of being a physician ? Why do 3'ou mingle things which have been accidentally united in the same man ? And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philo- sopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher ? AVill you not choose to see and to distinguish in resj)ect to what men become philosophers, and what things belong to them in other respects ? And if I were a philosophei-, ought you also to be made lame ? ^ What then ? Do 1 lake away these faculties which you possess ? By no means ; for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I cannot mention to you anything else than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect to appearances."^ * A man, as Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of speakin,'the treatise, Quomodo assentator ab amico dignoscatur, c. 30, states that when Philip asked Diogenes if he was a spy, he replied, Certainly I am a spy, Philip, of your want of judgment and of your folly, which lead you without any necessity to put to the hazard your kingdom and your life in one single houi\ 72 EPICTETUS, clave.* See, I put on the angiistielave. Lay aside this also. See, I have only my toga. Lay aside your toga. See, I am now naked. But you still raise my envy. Take then all my poor body ; when, at a man's command, I can throw away my poor body, do I still fear him ? But a certain person will not leave to me the succession to his estate. What then ? had I forgotten that not one of these things was mine. How then do we call them mine? Just as we call the bed in the inn. If then the innkeeper at his death leaves you the beds ; all well ; but if he leaves them to another, he will have them, and you will seek another bed. If then you shall not find one, you will sleep on the ground : only sleep with a good will and snore, and remember that tragedies have their place among the rich and kings and tyrants, but no poor man fills a part in a tragedy, except as one of the Chorus. Kings indeed commence with prosperity : *' ornament the palace with garlands " : then about the third or fourth act they call out, " Oh Cithaeron,^ why didst thou receive me " ? Slave, where are the crowns, where the diadem ? The guards help thee not at all. When then you approach any of these persons, remember this that you are approaching a tragedian, not the actor, but Oedipus himself. But you say, such a man is happy ; for he walks about with man}', and I also place myself with the many and walk about with many. In sum remember this : the door is open ;^ be not more timid than little children, but as they say, when the thing does not please them, *' I will play no longer,'* so do you, when things seem to you of such a kind, say I will no longer play, and be gone : but if you stay, do not complain. * The garment with the broad border, the laticlave, was the dress of a senator ; the garment with the narrow border, the angusticlave, was the dress of a man of the equestrian order. * The exclamation of Oedipus in the Oedipus Tyrannus of Sopho- cles, V. 1390. ® This means "you can die when you please." Comp. i. c. 9. The power of dying when you please is named by Plinius (N. H. ii. c. 7) the best thing that God has given to man amidst all the sufferings of life. Horace, Epp. ii. 2. 213, — " Vivere si recte ne?cis, decede pcritis : Liisisti satis, edisti satis atqne bibisti ; Tempus abire tibi." EPICTETUS. 73 CHAPTER XXV. ON THE SAME. If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are not acting hypocritically Avhen we say that the good of man is in the will, and the evil too, and that every thing- else does not concern us, wh}^ are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid ? The things about which we have been busied are in no man's power : and the things which are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have we still ? But give me directions. Why should I give yon direc- tions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free from hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own sub- ject to hindrance and impediment ? What directions then, what kind of orders did you bring when you came from him ? Keep by every means what is your own ; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtuous shame is your own ; who then can take these things from. you? who else than yourself will hinder 3'ou from using them ? But'how do you act ? when you seek what is not your own, you lose that whTch is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you still ask from me ? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy of confidence ? But if you observe these, do you want any others besides ? Well, but he has not given these orders, you will say. Produce your praecognitions (77/30X7^1/^619), produce the proofs of philoso- phers, produce what you have often-, heard, and produce what you have said yourself,^ produce what you have read, produce what you have meditated" on ; and you will then see that all these things are from God.^ How long then is * The conclusion *'and you will then see/' is not in the text, but it is what Epictetus means. The argument is complete. If we admit Ihe existence of God, and that he is our father, as Epictetus teaches, W"e have from him the intellectual powers which we possess ; and those men in whom these powers have been roused to activity, and are exercised, require no other instructor. It is true that in a large part of mankind those powers arc inactive and are not exercised, or if they 74 EPICTETUS. it fit to observe these precepts from God, and not to break tip the play ? ^ As long as the play is continued with pro- priety. In the Saturnalia ^ a king is chosen by lot, for it has been the custom to play at this game. The king com- mands : Do you drink, Do you mix the wine, Do you sing, Do you go. Do you come. I obey that the game may not be broken up through me. — But if he says, think that you are in evil plight : I answer, I do not think so ; and who will compel me to think so ? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me. Go to Achilles and tear from him Briseis. I go. He says, Come, and I come. For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical argu- ments, so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be night. I suppose that it is night. "Well then ; is it day ? No, for I admitted the hypothesis that it was night. Sup- pose that you think that it is night ? Suppose that I do. But also think that it is night. That is not consistent with the hypothesis. So in this case also : Suppose that you are unfortunate. Well, suppose so. Are you then un- happy? Yes. Well then are you troubled with an are exercised, it is in a very imperfect way. But those who contem- plate the improvement of the human race, hope that all men, or if not all men, a great number will be roused to the exercise of the powers which they have, and that human life will be made more conformable to Nature, that is, that man will use the powers which he has, and will not need advice and direction from other men, who professing that they are wise and that they can teach, prove by their teaching and often by their example that they are not wise, and are incapable of teaching. This is equally true for those who may deny or doubt about the existence of God. They cannot deny that man has the intellectual powers which he does possess ; and they are certainly not the persons w ho will proclaim their own want of these powers. If man has them and can exercise them, the fact is sufficient ; and we need not dispute about the source of these powers which are in man Naturally, that is, according to the constitution of his Nature. '-^ See the end of the preceding chapter. Upton compares Horace*s *'Incidere ludum" (Epp. i. 14, 36). Compare also Epictetus, ii. 16, 37. ^ A festival at Rome in December, a season of jollity and license (Livy, xxii. 1). Compare the passage in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 35, in which Nero is chosen by lot to be king : and Seneca, De Constant. Sapient, c. 12, " Illi (pueri) inter ipsoa magistratus gerunt, et praetex- tam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur." EPICTETUS. 75 ^unfavourable daemon (fortune)? Yes. But think also that you are in misery. This is not consistent with the hypothesis ; and another (Zeus) forbids me to think so. How long then must we obey such orders ? As long as it \ is profitable; and this means as long as I maintain that \ which is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are \ sour and of bad temper, and they say, " I cannot sup with this man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he fought in Mysia ": " I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill : then I began to be besieged again." But another says, *' I prefer to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as he likes." And do you compare these estimates (judg- ments) : only do nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to that. — Has it smoked in the chamber ? If the smoke is moderate, I will stay ; if it is excessive, I go |0ut : for^you must^-always remember this and hold it fast, that thedoor is open. — Well, but you say to me, Do not li^eltirNiCDpi^KsI T^ill not live there. — Nor in Athens. — I will not live in Athens. — Nor in Rome. — 1 will not live in Eome. — Live in Gyarus.* — I will live in Gyarus, but it seems like a great smoke to live in Gyarus ; and I depart to the place where no man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling place is open to all ; and as to tho last garment,^ that is the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond this. Thfs was the reason why Demetrius^ said to Nero, "You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you." If I set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave : if on my little pos- sessions, I also make myself a slave : for I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught ; as if tho snake * Gyarus or Gyara a wretched island in the Aegean sea, to which criminals were sent under the empire at Rome. Juvenal, Sat. i. 73. * See Schweighaeuser*s note. ^ Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca (De Benef. vii. 1) says : " He was in my opinion a great man, even if he is com- pared with the greatest." One of his sayings was ; " You gain more by possessing a few precepts of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning many, if you have them not at hand." Seneca often mentions Demetrius. The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (Life by Diogenes Laertius) and to Socrates by Xenophon (Apologia, 27j. 76 EPICTETUS. draws in his bead, I tell you to strike tliat part of liim which he guards ; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard, that part your master will attack. Remembering this whom will you still flatter or fear? But I should like to sit where the Senators sit.*^ — Do you see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself. — How then s\iall I see well in any other way in the amphitheatre ? Man, do not be a spec- tator at all ; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, seat yourse]gin the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, who put our-' selves in straits ; that is our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is it to be reviled ? Stand by a stone and revile it ; and what will you gain ? If then a man listens like a stone, what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishes something. — Strip him. — What do you mean by him ? ^ — Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do you. This was the practice of Socrates : this was the reason why he always had one face. But we choose to practise and study any thing rather than the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say. Philosophers talk paradoxes.^ But are there no paradoxes in the other arts ? and what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in order that he may see ? If any one said this to a man igno- rant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker ? Where^is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced? ^ At Kome, and probably in other towns, there were seats reserved for the different classes of men at the public spectacles. ^ See Schweighaenser's note. ^ Paradoxes (7rapa5o|a), " things contrary to opinion," are con- trasted with paralogies (-n-apaAoya), " things contrary to reason " (iv. 1. 173). Cicero says (Prooemium to his Paradoxes), that para- doxes are " something which cause surprise and contradict common opinion;" and in another place he says that the Romans gave the name of "admirabilia" to the Stoic paradoxes. — The puncture of the eye is tlie operation for c daiact. EPICTETUS. 77 CHAPTEK XXYI. WHAT IS THE LAW OF LIFE. When a person was reading* hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said, This also is an hypothetical law that wo must accept what follows from the hypothesis. But much before this law is the law of life, that we must act con- formably to nature. For if in every matter and circum- stance we wish to observe what is natural, it is plain that in every thing we ought to make it our aim that neither that which is consequent shall escape us, and that we do not admit the contradictory. First then philosophers exercise us in theory ^ (contemplation of things), which is easier ; and then next they lead us to the more difficult things ; for in theory, there is nothing which draws us away from following what is taught ; but in the matters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is ridiculous then who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things ; and we ought to employ this fact as an argument to those parents who are vexed at their children learning philosophy : Am I doing wrong then * iirl rT)s Becopias. " Intelligere quid verum rectumque sit, priua est et faciliiis. Id vero exsequi et observare, posterius et difficilius." —Wolf. This is a profound and useful remark of Epictetus. General prin- ciples are most easily understood and accepted. The difficulty is in the application of them. What is more easy, for example, than to understand general principles of law which are true and good ? But in practice cases are presented to us which as Bacon says, are " im- mersed in matter ;" and it is this matter which makes the difficulty of applying the principles, and requires the ability and study of an experienced man. It is easy, and it is right, to teach the young the general principles of the rules of life ; but the difficulty of ap- plying them is that in which the young and the old too often fail. So if you ask whether virtue can be taught, the answer is that the rules for a virtuous life can be delivered ; but the application of the rules is the difficulty, as teachers of religion and morality know well, if they are fit to teach. If they do not know this truth, they are neither fit to teach the rules, nor to lead the way to the practice of them by the only method which is possible ; and this method is by their own example, assisted by the example of those who direct the education of youth, and of those with whom young persons live. 78 EPICTETUS. my father, and do I not know what is suitable to me and becoming ? If indeed this can neither be learned nor taught, why do you blame me? but if it can be taught, teach me ; and if you can not, allow me to learn from those ;who say that they know how to teach. For what do you think? do you suppose that I voluntarily fall into evil and miss the good ? I hope that it may not be so. What is then the cause of my doing wrong ? Ignorance. Do you not choose then that I should get rid of my ignorance ? Who was ever taught by anger the art of a pilot or music ? Do you think then that by means of your anger I shall learn the art of life ? He only is allowed to speak in this way who has shown such an intention.^ But if a man only intending to make a display at a banquet and to show that he is acquainted with hypothetical arguments reads them and attends the philosophers, what other object has he than that some man of vsenatorian rank who sits by him may admire? For there (at Rome) are the really great materials (opportunities), and the riches here (at Nicopolis) appear to be trifles there. This is the reason why it is difficult for a man to be n aster of the appearances, where the things which disturb the judgment are great.^ I know a certain person who complained, as he embraced the knees of Epaphroditus, that he had only one hundred and fifty times ten thousand denarii ^ remaining. What then did Epaphroditus do ? Did he laugh at him, as we slaves of Epaphroditus did ? No, but he cried out with amazement, '* Poor man, how then did you keep silence, how did you endure it ? " When Epictetus had reproved ^ (called) the person who 2 " Such an intention " appears to mean '• the intention of learn- ing." " The son alone can say this to his father, when the son studies philosophy for the purpose of living a good Hfe, and not for the purpose of display." — Wolf. 2 I have followed Schweighaeuser's explanation of this difficult passage, and I have accepted his emendation iKcreiovra, in place of the MSS. reading e/ce? oura. * This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmae, or of the Roman equivalents denarii. In Roman language the amount would be briefly expressed by " sexagies centena millia H.S.," or simply by *' sexagies." ^ See Schweighaeuser's note ; and all his notes on this chapter, which is rather difficult. I EPICTETUS. 79 was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the teacher who had suggested the reading was laughing at the reader, Epictetus said to the teacher, " You are laughing at your- self: you did not prepare the young man nor did you ascertain whether he was able to understand these matters ; but perhaps, you are only employing him as a reader." Well then said Epictetus, if a man has not ability enough to understand a complex (s3^11ogism), do we trust him in giving praise, do we trust him in giving blame, do we allow that he is able to form a judgment about good or bad ? and if such a man blames any one, does the man care for the blame ? and if he praises any one, is the man elated, when in such small matters as an hypothetical syllogism he who praises cannot see what is consequent on the hypothesis ? This then is the beginning of philosophy,^ a man's per- ception of the state of his ruling faculty ; for when a man knows that it is weak, then he will not employ it on things of the greatest difficulty. But at present, if men cannot swallow even a morsel, they buy whole volumes and attempt to devour them ; and this is the reason why they vomit them up or suffer indigestion: and then come gripings, defluxes, and fevers.*^ Such men ought to con- sider what their ability is. In theory it is easy to convince an ignorant person ; but in the affairs of real life no one offers himself to be convinced, and we hate the man who has convinced us. But Socrates advised us not to live a life which is not subjected to examination.^ • See ii. c. 11. ^ Seneca, De Tranqiiillitate animi, c. 9, says : " What is the use of countless books and libraries, when the owner saircely reads in his whole life the tables of contents ? The number only confuses a learner, does not instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than to wander through many." • See Plato's Apology, c. 28 ; and Antoninus, iii. 5. 80 EPICTETUS. CEAPTEE XXVII. IN now MANY WAYS appi:arancks exist, and what aids WE SHOULD PROVIDE AGAINST THE^F. Appearances are to us in four ways : for either things appear as they are ; or they are not, and do not even appear to be ; or they are, and do not appear to be ; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the mark) is tlie office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoj^s (troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho^ and of the Academics are what annex's (troubles), we must apply the remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we find against habit ? The contrary habit. You hear the igno- rant say : '* That unfortunate person is dead : his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow ; ^ he was cut off by an untimely death and in a foreign land." Hear the con- trary way of speaking : Tear yourself from these expres- sions : oppose to one habit the contrary habit ; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason ; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we ought to have manifest praecognitions (TrpoX-jij/eLs), cleared of all impurities and ready to hand. When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that ^ Pyrrho was a native of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He is said to have accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 61). The time of his birth is not stated, but it is said that he lived to the age of ninety. See Levin's Six Lectures, 1871. Lecture 11., On the Pynhonian Ethic ; Lecture III., On the grounds of Scepticism. 2 aircoAeTo doGS not mean that the father is dead, and that the mother is dead. They survive and lament. Compare Euripides^ Alcestis, v. 825 : aTrci>\6iJL^a6a irdyTcs, oh Keiyrj fxdvT], fePICTETUS. 81 death is a necessary thing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it ? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon,^ the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way : 1 will go and I am resolved either to behave bravel}^ myself or to give to another the opportunity of doing so ; if I cannot succeed in doing any thing myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something noble. — Suppose that it is above our power to act thus ; is it not in our power to reason thus ? Tell me where I can escape death : discover for me the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. Discover to me a \ charm against death. If I have not one, what do you wish | me to do ? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my wish, I change them ; but if I can not, I am ready to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil. Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for me, what are they to me ? — Yes, but you will be an impious man. — In what respect then will it be worse for me than it is now ? — To sum up, remember this that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem necessary (true) ? Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake th■ CHAPTER XXIX. ON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS). The being ^ (nature) of tlie Good is a certain Will ; the being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What then are externals? Materials for the Will, about which the will being conversant shall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the good. If it does not admire - (overvalue) the materials ; for the opinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good : but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has fixed this law, and sajs, "If you would have any thing good, receive it from yourself." You say. No, but I will have it from another. — Do not so : but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls me, I say, Whom do you threaten ? If he says, I will put you in chains, I say. You threaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will cut off j'our head, I reply. You threaten my head. If he says, I will throw you into prison, I say. You threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me with banishment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern me, he does not threaten me at all ; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear? the master of what ? The master of things which are in my own power ? There is no such master. Do I fear the * The word is ovcria. The corresponding Latin word which Cicero introduced is " essentia " (Seneca, Epist. 58). The English word *' essence" has obtained a somewhat different sense. The proper translation of ovaia is *• being " or " natnre." 2 This is the maxim of Horace, Epp. i. 6 ; and Macleane's note,— "Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici, Solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum." on which Upton remarks that this maxim is explained very philo- sophically and learnedly by Lord Shaftesbury (the author of the Characteristics), vol. iii. p. 202. Compare M. Antoninus, xii. 1. • Seneca, De Vita Beata, c. 3, writes, " Aliarum rerum quae vitam [ instruunt diligens, sine admiratione cujusquam." Antoninus (i. 15) ? expresses the '* sine admiratione " by rb adavfiaa-roy. 88 EPIOTETUS. master of things which, are not in my power? And wLab are these things to me? Do you philosophers then teach ns to despise kings? I hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they possess ? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take those who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, they may truly accuse me. — Yes, but I intend to command your opinions also. — And who has given you this power ? How can you conquer the opinion of another man ? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself,^ and is not conquered by another ? But nothing else can conquer Will except the Will itself. For this reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just, which is this : Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten are stronger than one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing, for dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In what then are the ten weaker ? If the one possesses right opinions and the others do not. W^ell then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How is it possible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale in which it is. How strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates ? Speak of the thing as it is : how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to prison by stronger men, and that any one should have given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things blame God ? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these things? Where then for him was the nature of good? Whom shall we listen to, you or him ? And what does Socrates say ? Anytus and Melitus^ can kill me, but they ^ This is explained by what follows. Opinion does not really con* qner itself; but one opinion can conquer another, and nothing else can, "* The two chief prosecutors of Socrates (Plato, Apology, c. 13; Epictetus, ii. 2, 15). EPIOTETUS. 89 cannot hurt me : and furtlier, he says, " If it so pleases God, so let it be." But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come near showing it ; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is superior. One body is stronger than another : many are stronger than one : the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the reason why I also lost my lamp,^ because in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price : for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, and is drawing me to the public place : then others bawl out. Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions ? see you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what system of philosophy (cto-aywyr^v) could I have made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged off; that if ten men should have laid hold of me and cast me finto prison, I should not be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have learned to see that every thing which happens, if it be independent of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if you have not gained by this.^ Why then do you seek advantage in any thing else than in that in which you have learned that -advantage is ? Then sitting in prison I say : The man who cries out in this way ^ neither hears what words mean, nor under- stands what is said, nor does he care at all to know what philosophers say or what they do. Let him alone. But now he says to the prisoner, Come out from your prison. — If you have no further need of me in prison, I come out : if you should have need of me again, I will enter the prison. — How long will you act thus? — So long as reason requires me to be with the body : but when reason does not require this, take away the body, and fare ' See i. 18, 15, p. 58. * cD(p4\7)(rat. See Schweighaenser's note. ' Oue of those who cry out " Philosopher," (&c. 90 EPTCTETUS. you well.*^ Only we must not do it inconsiderately, nor weakly, nor for any slight reason ; for, on the other hand, God does not wish it to be done, and he has need of such a world and such inhabitants in it.^ But if he sounds; the signal for retreat, as he did to Socrates, we must obey 1 him who gives the signal, as if he were a general.^^ j Well then, ought we to sa}^ such things to the many ? \ Why should we ? Is it not enough for a man to be per- suaded himself? When ' children come clapping their hands and crying out, ** To-day is the good Saturnalia," ^^ do we say, " The Saturnalia are not good " ? By no means, but we clap our hands also. Do you also then, when you are not able to make a man change his mind, be assured that he is a child, and clap your hands with him ; and if you do not choose ^^ to do this, keep silent. A man must keep this in mind ; and when he is called to any such difficulty, he should know that the time is come for showing if he has been instructed. For he who is come into a difficulty is like a young man from a school who has practised the resolution of syllogisms ; and if any person proposes to him an easy syllogism, he says, rather propose to me a syllogism^ which is skilfully complicated that I may exercise myself on it. Even athletes are dis- satisfied with slight young men, and say, " He cannot lift me." — " This is a youth of noble disposition." ^^ [You do not so] ; but when the time of trial is come, one of you must weep and say, " I wish that I had learned more." A little more of what ? If you did not learn these things in order to show them in practice, why did you learn them ? 8 See i. 9. 20. » See i. 6. 13. ^® Socrates was condemned by the Athenians to die, and he was content to die, and thought that it was a good thing ; and this was the reason wliy he made such a defence as he did, which brought on him condemnation ; and he preferred condemnation to escaping it by entreating the dicasts (judges), and lamenting, and saying and doing things unworthy of himself, as others did. — Plato, Apology, cc. 29-33. Compare Epict. i. 9, 16. 11 See i. 25, 8. *2 Read 64\r]s instead of 64\r). See Schweighaeuser's note. 1^ See Schweighaeuser's note. This appears to be the remark of Epictetus. If it is so, what fellows is not clear. Schweighaeuser explains it, " But most of you act otherwise." EPICTETUS. 91 1 think that there is some one among you who are sitting here, who is suffering like a woman in labour, and say- , ing, *' Oh, that such a difficulty does not present itself to me as that which has come to this man ; oh, that I should be wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia. When will any one announce to me such a contest?" Such ought to be the disposition of all of you. Even among the gladiators of Caesar (the Emperor) there are some who complain grievously that they are not brought forward and matched, and they offer up prayers to God and address themselves to their superintendents intreating that they may fight.^^ And will no one among you show himself such? I would willingly take a voyage I to Kome] for this purpose and see what my athlete is doing, how ho is studying his subject.^^ — I do not choose such a subject, he says. Why, is it in your power to take what subject you choose ? There has been given to you such a body as you have, such parents, such brethren, such a country, such a place in your country: — then you come to me and say, Change my subject. Have you not abilities which enable you to manage the subject which has been given to you ? [You ought to say] : It is your business to propose; it is mine to exercise myself well. However, you do not say so, but you say. Do not propose to me such a tropicj^^ but such [as I would ^* The Roman emperors kept gladiators for their own amusement and that of the people (Lipsius, Saturnalia, ii. 16). Seneca says ( De Provid. c. 4), " I have heard a mirmillo (a kind of gladiator) in the time of C. Caesar (Caligula) complaining of the rarity of gladiatorial exhibitions : " What a glorious period of life is wasting." " Virtue," says Seneca, " is eager after dangers ; and it considers only what it seeks, not what it may suffer." — Upton. ** The word is Hypothesis {virddcfris)^ which in this passage means , "matter to work on," "material," "subject," as in ii. 5, 11, where it means the " business of the pilot." In i. 7 hypothesis has the sense of a proposition supposed for the present to be true, and used as the foundation of an argument. ^^ Tropic (jpoTTLiiiv), a logical term used by Stoics, which Schweig- haeuser translates " propositio connexa in syllogismo hypothetico." The meaning of the whole is this. You do not like the work which is set before you : as we say, you are not content " to do your duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call you." Now this is as foolish, says Wolf, as for a man in any discussion to require that his adversary should raise no objection except such as may serve the man's own case. 92 * EPICTETUS. cliouse] : do not urge against me such an objection, but sucb [as I would choose]." There will be a time perhaps when tragic actors will suppose that they are [only] masks and buskins and the long cloak.^"^ I say, these things, man, are your material and subject. Utter something that we may know whether you are a tragic actor or a buffoon ; for both of you have all the rest in common. If any one then should take away the tragic actor's buskins and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a phantom, is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain ? If he has voice, he still remains. An example of another kind. " Assume the governor- ship of a province." I assume it, and when I have assumed it, I show how an instructed man behaves. " Lay aside the laticlave (the mark of senatorial rank), and clothing your- self in rags, come forward in this character." What then have I not the power of displaying a good voice (that is, of doing something that I ought to do)? How then do you now appear (on the stage of life) ? As a witness sum- moned by God. ** Come forward, ^^ you, and bear testimony for me, for you are worthy to be brought forward as a witness by me : is any thing external to the will good or bad? do I hurt any man? have I made every man's interest dependent on any man except himself? What testimony do you give for God?" — I am in a wretched condition. Master ^^ (Lord), and I am unfortunate ; no man *^ There will be a time when Tragic actors shall not know what their business is, but will think that it is all show. So, says Wolf, philosophers will be only beard and cloak, and will not show by their lite and morals what they really are ; or they will be like false monks, who only wear the cowl, and do not show a Ufe of piety and sanctity. ^* God is introduced as speaking. — Schweighaeuser. ^^ The word is Kuptoy, the name by which a slave in Epictetus addresses his master (dominus), a physician is addressed by his patient, and in other cases also it is used. It is also used by the Evangelists. They speak of the angel of the Lord (Matt. i. 24) ; and Jesus is addressed by the same term (Matt. viii. 2), Lord or master. Mrs. Carter has the following note : " It hath been observed that this manner of expression is not to be met with in the Heathen authors before Christianity, and therefore it is one instance of Scripture lan- guage coming early into common use." But the word (Kvpios) is used by early Greek writers to indicate one who has power or authority, and in a sense like the Eoman " dominus," EPICTETUS. 93 cares for me, no man gives me anything ; all blame me, all speak ill of me. — Is this the evidence that you are going to give, and disgrace his summons, who has conferred so much honour on you, and thought you worthy of beiog called to bear such testimony ? But suppose that he who has the power has declared, " I judge you to be impious and profane." What has hap- pened to you? I have been judged to be impious and profane? Nothing else? Nothing else. But if the same person had^ passed judgment on an hypothetical syllogism (o-wTy/x/JteVou), and had made a declaration, " the conclusion that, if it is day, it is light, I declare to be false," what has happened to the hypothetical syllogism? who is judged in this case ? who has been condemned ? the hypo- thetical syllogism, or the man who has been deceived by it ? Does he then who has the power of making any de- claration about you know what is pious or impious ? Has he studied it, and has he learned it ? Where ? From whom ? Then is it the fact that a musician pays no regard to him who declares that the lowest ^^ chord in the lyre is the highest ; nor yet a geometrician, if he declares that the lines from the centre of a circle to the circumference are as by Sophocles for instance. The use of the word then by Epictctus was not new, and it may have been used by the Stoic writers long before his time. The language of the Stoics was formed at least two cen- turies before the Christian aera, and the New Testament writers would use the Greek which was current in their age. The notion of " Scrip- ture language coming early into common use " is entirely unfounded, and is even absurd. Mrs. Carter*s remark implies that Epictetus used the Scripture language, whereas he used the particular language of the Stoics, and the general language of his age, and the New Testa- ment writers would do the same. There are resemblances between tlie language of Epictetus and the New Testament writers, such as the expression fx^ yevoiro of Paul, which Epictetus often uses ; but this is a slight matter. The words of Peter (Ep. ii. 1, 4), " that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature," are a Stoic expression, and the writer of this Epistle, I think, took them from the language of the Stoics. "^^ The words in the text are : trepX t^s j/^tt/s (yedr-ns) ehai viraTnv, " When viroLTi] is translated ' the lowest chord or note,* it must bo remembered that the names employed in the Greek musical termin- ology are precisely the opposite to ours. Compaie vcdry) ' the highest note,' though the word in itself means lowest." — Key's Philologic-al Essays, p. 42, note 1. 94 EPICTETUS. not equal ; and shall he who is really instructed pay any regard to the uninstructed man when he pronounces judgment on what is pious and what is impious, on what is just and unjust? Oh, the signal wrong done by the instructed. Did they learn this here ? ^^ Will you not leave the small arguments (Xoydpio) ^'^ about these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a comer and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them any thing ; and will you not come forward and make use of what you have learned ? For it is not these small arguments that are wanted now : the writings of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted ? A man who shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to his words.^^ Assume, I intreat you, this character, that we may no longer use in the schools the examples of the antients, but may have some example of our own. To whom then does the contemplation of these matters (philosophical inquiries) belong ? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal that loves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things as runaway slaves do : we should sit, as in a theatre, free from distraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another time to the lute-player ; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave has taken his station he praises the actor '^'^ and at the same time looks round : then if any one calls out his master's name, the slave is immediately frightened and disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers thus to con- template the works of nature. For what is a master ? Man is not the master of man ; but death is, and life and plea- ^^ I think that Schweighaeuser's interpretation is right, that " the instructed " are those who think that they are instructed but are not, as they show by their opinion that they accept in moral matters the judgment of an ignorant man, whose judgment in music or geometry they would not accept. ^- He names these " small arguments " \oydpia, which Cicero (Tusc. Disput. ii. 12) names " ratiunculae." .', 23 II What is the profit, my brethren, if any one should say that he ^ hath faith and have not works ? Thus also faith, if it hath not works, is dead in itself. But a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works : shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works." — Epistle of James, ii. 14-18. ^* See Schweighaeuser's note on eTrcVTT]. EPICTETU.S. fig ^llre and pain ; for if he comdS without these things, brino- 'resar to me and you will see how firm I am.^^ But when he shall come with these things, thundering and lightning,^^ and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except to recognize my master like the runaway slave ? But so long as I have any respite from these terrors, as a runaway slavtj stands in the theatre, so do I : I bathe, I drink, I sing; but all this I do with terror and uneasiness. But if 1 shall release myself from my masters, that is from those things by means of which masters are formidable, what further trouble have I, what master have I still ? What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we ought to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant ^^ (rots tStwrat?) and to say : " This man recom- mends to me that which he thinks good for himself: I excuse him." For Socrates also excused the jailor, who had the charge of him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to drink the poison, and said, How generously he laments over us.^^ Does he then say to the jailor that for this reason we have sent away the women? No, but he says it to his friends who were able to hear (understand) it ; and he treats the jailor as a child. *^ The word is eva-rada. The corresponding noun is evarddiia, which is the title of this chapter. 2« Upton supposes that Epictetus is alluding to the verse of Aristo- phanes (Acham. 531), where it is said of Pericles : "He flashed, he thundered, and confounded Hellas." 2^ He calls the uninstiucted and ignorant by the Greek wor<1 " Idiotae," *' idiots," which we now use in a peculiar sense. An IcL was a private individual as opposed to one who filled some pubiic office ; and thence it had generally the sense of one who was ignorant of any particular art, as, for instance, one who had not studied philosophy. 2« Compare the Phaedon of Plato (p. 116). The children of Socrates were brought in to see him before he took the poison by which he died ; and also the wives of the friends of Socrates who attended him to his death. Socrates had ordered his wife Xanthippe to be led home before he had his last conversation with his friencis, and she was taken away lamenting and bewailing. '"M 96 EPICTETUS. CHAPTEK XXX. WHAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE READY iN DIFFICULt CIRCUMSTANCES.^ When you are going in to any "great personage, remember that another also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please him rather than the other. He then who sees from above asks you : In the schools what used you to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace ? I used to say that they are things indifierent (neither good nor bad). What then do you say of them now? Are they changed at all? No. Are you changed then? No. Tell me then what things are indifferent? The things which are independent of the will. Tell me, also, what follows from this. The things which are inde- pendent of the will are nothing to me. Tell me also about the Good, what was your opinion? A will such as we ought to have and also such a use of appearances. And the end (purpose), what is it ? To follow thee. Do you say this now also ? I say the same now also. Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember these things ; and you will see what a youth is who has studied these things when he is among men who have nf>t studied them. I indeed imagine that you will have such thoughts as these ; Why do we make so great and so many preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which men name power? Is this the antechamber? this the men of the bedchamber ? this the armed guards ? Is it for this that I listened to so many discourses? All this is nothing : but I have been prej)aring myself as for some- thing great. * The reader may understand why Epictetus gave sucli a lesson as this, if he will remember the tyranny under which men at that time iived. BOOK 11. CHAPTER I. THAT CONFIDENCE (cOURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION. The opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some to be a paradox ; but still let us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do everj thing both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to many to be a para- dox in the matter under consideration in my opinion is of this kind : if we asserted that we ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. But now where is the difiiculty in what is said ? for if these things are ti-ue, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor of good, what paradox do the philo- sophers assert if they say that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there 3^ou should employ caution ? For if the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on the will. But if things inde- pendent of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence ; and H 98 EPICTETUS. thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed " ^ mt because of our caution. For by employing Luau ui towards things which are really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not so. We are then in the condition of deer;^ when they flee from the huntsmen's feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as safe ? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we also act : in what cases do we fear ? In thiuirs which are independent of the will. In what cases on liio contrary do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger ? In things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our will. But where there is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to r^n away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness ; and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will immediately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoiding what he chooses : but if he transfer it to the things which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable, he will be dis- turbed. For death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet ^ Wiio said Not death is evil, but a shameful death. ^ It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by displaying feathers of various colours on ropes or strings and thus frightening them towards the nets. Virgil, Georg. iii. 372 — Puniceaeve agitant pavidos fonnidine pennae; 2 Euripides, fragments. EPI0TETUJ3. 99 Confidence (courage) then ouglit to be employed against death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to escape ; and to our opinion about it we employ careless- ness, rashness and indifference. These things Socrates^ properly used to call tragic masks ; for as to children masks appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in like manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other reason than children are by masks. For what is a child ? Ignorance. What is a child ? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated * from the spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be sepa- rated now? for if it is not separated now, it will be separated afterwards. Why? That the period of the universe may be completed,^ for it has need of the pre- sent, and of the future, and of the past. What is pain ? A mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If this does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open -J if it ' In the Phaedon, c. 24, or p. 78. * It was the opinion of some philosophers that the soul was a portion of the divinity sent down into human bodies. * This was a doctrine of Heraclitus and of Zeno. Zeno (Diog. Laert. vii. 137) speaks of God as " in certain periods or revolutions of time exhausting into himself the universal substance (^ovala) and again generating it out of himself.'* Antoninus (xi. 1) speaks of the periodical renovation of all things. For man, whose existence is so short, the doctrine of all existing things perishing in the course of time and then being renewed, is of no practical value. The present is enough for most men. But for the few who are able to embrace in thought the past, the present and the future, the contemplation of the perishable nature of all existing things may have a certain value by elevating their minds above the paltry things which others prize above their worth. ^ Sec. i. 9, note 7. Schweighaeuser says that he does not quite see what is the meaning of ' ought to be open ' ; and ho suggests that Epictetus intended to say ' we ought to consider that the door is open for all occasions ' ; but the occasions, he says, ought to be when things are such that a man can in no way bear them or cannot honourably endure them, and such occasions the wise man considers to be the voico of God giving to him the signal to retire. n 2 100 EPICTETUS. does, bear (vvitli things). For the door ought to be open for all occasions ; and so we have no trouble. What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturba- tion, release from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philo- sophers who say that the educated only are free. How is this ? In this manner. Is freedom any thing else than the power of living as we choose ? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error ? We do not. No one then who lives in error is free. Do j'ou wish to live in fear ? Do you wish to live in sorrow ? Do you wish to live in per- turbation ? By no means. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free ; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you say, We only allow free persons to be educated ? For philosophers say we allow none to be free except the educated ; that is, God does not allow it. When then a man has turned"^ round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing? He has done something.' What? He has turned round his own slave before the praetor. Has he done nothing more ? Yes : he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free ? No more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round (free) others no 7 This is an allusion to one of the Eoman modes of manumitting a slave before the praetor. Compare, Persius, Sat. V. 75 — — Heu steriles veri, quibus una Quiritem Vertigo facit ; and again Verterit hunc dominus, momento turbinis exit Marcus Dama. The sum paid on manumission was a tax of five per cent., established 111 B.C. 356 (Livy, vii. 16), and paid by the slave. Epictetua here speaks i>f the tax being paid by the master ; but in iii. 26, he speaks of it as |)aid by the enfranchised slave. See Bureau de la Malle, Economie l*olitique des Remains, i. 290, ii. 469. EPICTETUS. 101 master ? is not money your master, or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant ? why do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind? It is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which you may determine what those things are with reference to which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those things with reference to which you ought to be cautious : courageous in that which does not depend on your will ; cautious in that which does depend on it. Well have I not read to you,^ and do you not know what I was doing ? In what ? In my little dissertations. — Show me how you are with respect to desire and aver- sion (cK/cAto-tv) ; and show me if you do not fail in getting what you wish, and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid : but as to these long and labored sentences ^ you will take them and blot them out. What then did not Socrates write ? And who wrote so much?^^ — But how? As he could not always have at hand one to argue against his principles or to be argued against in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he was always treating at least some one subject in a practical way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he- leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who being free from perturbations^^ have ® These are the words of some pupil who is boasting of what he has written. ^ The word is irepiS^ia. I am not sure about the exact meaning of trepiSSia I see the notes of Wolf and Schweig. ^* No other author speaks of Socrates having written any thing. It is therefore very difficult to explain this passage in which Arrian, who took down the words of Epictetus, represents him as saying that So- crates wrote so much. Socrates talked much, and Epictetus may have spoken of talking as if it were writing ; for he must have known that Socrates was not a writer. See Schweig.*s note. 1^ The word is virh arapa^ias. Mrs. Carter thinks that the true reading is virh airpa^ias, * through idleness * or * having notliing to do ' ; and she remarks that ' freedom from perturbations * is the very thing that Epictetus had been recommending through the whole chapter and is the subject of the next chapter, and therefore cannot be well supposed to be the true reading in a place where it is mentioned with contempt. It is probable that Mrs. Carter is right. Upton thinks that Epictetus is alluding to the Sophists, and that we should understand him as Bpcaking ironically : and this may also be right. Schweighaeuser 102 EPICTETUS. leisure, or to sucli as are too foolish to reckon con« sequences. And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and display those things which you possess, and recite them, and make an idle show,^^ and say, See how I make dialogues? Do not so, my man; but rather say; See how I am not disappointed of that which I desire : See how I do not fall into that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condemnation. This is the proper display of a young man who is come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and let no one ever hear you say a word about these things ; and if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and syllogisms : do you labour at thinking about death,^^ chains, the rack, exile ; ^* and do all this with confidence and reliance on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed you will show what things the rational governing power can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are not within the power of our will. And thus this para- dox will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, attempts to explain the passage by taking ^ free from perturbations ' in the ordinary simple sense ; but I doubt if he has succeeded. " ifiwepTrepeva-r}. Epictetus (iii. 2. 14) uses the adjective irepirepos to signify a vain man. Antoninus (v. 5) uses the verb '7r€pTr4p€V€a6ai : and Paul (Corinthians i. c. 13, 4), where our version is, * charity (love) vaunteth not itself.' Cicero (ad Attic, i. 14, 4) uses ivcTrepTrepevffdiJ.'nv, to express a rhetorical display. 13 < The whole life of philosophers,* says Cicero (Tusc. i. 30), following Plato, * is a reflection upon death.* ^* " Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, torture, exile and sudden executions, can be ranked among the common accidents of life, may be surprised to find Epictetus so frequently endeavouring to prepare his hearers for them. But it must be recol- lected that he addressed himself to persons who lived under the Eoman emperors, from whose tyranny the very best of men were perpetually liable to such kind of dangers.** — ^Mrs. Carter. All men even now are exposed to accidents and misfortunesjagainst which there is no security, and even the most fortunate of men must die at last. The lessons of Epictetus may be as useful now as they were in his time. See i. 30. EPICTETUS. 103 that a man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous : courageous towards the things which do not depend on the will, and cautious in things which are within the power of the will. CHAPTEE II. OP TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION). Consider, you who are going into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For who is the master of such things ? Who can take them away ? If you choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not to desire ? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not think fit to avoid ? But what do you say ? The judge will determine against you something that appears formid- able ; but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that ? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what else do you care for? Let this be your preface,^ this your narrative, this your confirmation, this your victory, this your pero- ration, this your applause (or the approbation which you will receive). Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his trial,^ Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my life ? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in my own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my private or in my public life. Epictetus refers to the rhetorical divisions of a speech. Xenophon (Mem. iv. c. 8, 4) has reported this saying of Socrates on the authority of Hermogenes. Compare the Apology of Xenophon near the beginning. 104 EPICTETUS. But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this moment all possible prepa- ration, and then consider both the nature of your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees ; if to weep, weep ; if to groan, groan. For when you have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not choose,- but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well bred cock or a mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once; and let it not happen to 3'ou to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the nature of evil and good ? It is where truth is : where truth is and where nature is, there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where nature is.^ For what do you think ? do you think that, if Socrates had wished to preserve externals, he would have come forward and said : Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, but to harm me they are not able ? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and fortune, but to another end ? What is the reason then that he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates them?* Just in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had a little suit in Khodes about a bit of land, and had proved to the judges (St/cao-rats) that his case was just, said when he had come to the peroration of his speech, I will neither intreat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it is you rather than I who are on your trial. And thus he ended the business.^ What need was there of this ? Only do not intreat ; but do not also say, ' I do not intreat ;' unless there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such a peroration, why do yon wait, why do you obey the order ' Schweighaeiiser says that he can extract no sense out of this passage. I leave it as it is. ^ There is some difficulty herein the original. See Schweig.'s note. ^ The words may mean either what I have written in the text, ci ' and so he lost his suit/ EPICTETUS. 105 to submit to trial ? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come : but if you choose to submit and to plead your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consistent with this object, provided you maintain what is your own (your proper character). For this reason also it is ridiculous to say. Suggest something to me^ (tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind so as to accom- modate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is ignorant of letters should say. Tell me what to write when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion but that of Theon, what will be done ? what will he write ? But if you have practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) any thing that is required. If ^ you are not, what can I now suggest? For if circumstances re- quire something else, what will you say, or what will you do? Eemember then this general precept and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is the master? He who has the powtr over the things which you seek to gain or try to avoid.^ 6 ** The meaning is, You must not ask for advice when you are como into a difficulty, but every man ought to have such principles as to bo ready on all occasions to act as he ought ; just as he who knows how to write can write any name which is proposed to him." — Wolf. ■^ " The reader must know that these dissertations were spoken extempore, and that one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker. So the reader will not be surprised that when tlie discourse is on the maintenance of firmness or freedom from pertur- bations, Epictetiis should now speak of philosophical preparation, which is most efficient for the maintenance of firmness." — Wolf. See also Schweig.'s note on section 21, '* Suggest something to me : " and ii. 24. * In the Encheiridion or Manual (c. 14) it is written, 'Every man's master is he who has the power to give to a man or take away that which he would have or not have : whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither seek any thing or avoid any thing which is in the power of others ; if he docs not act thus, he will be a slave.* 106 EPICTETUS, CHAPTEB III. TO THOSE WHO RECOMMEND PERSONS TO PHILOSOPHERS. Diogenes said well to one who asked from him letters of recommendation, " That you are a man, he said, he will know as soon as he sees you ; and he will know whether you are good or bad, if he is by experience skilful to distinguish the good and the bad; but if he is without experience, he will never know, if I write to him ten thousand times." ^ For it is just the same as if a drachma (a piece of silver money) asked to be recommended to a person to be tested. If he is skilful in testing silver, he will know what you are, for you (the drachma) will recommend yourself. We ought then in life also to have some skill as in the case of silver coin that a man may be able to say like the judge of silver. Bring me any drachma and I will test it. But in the case of syllogisms, I would say, Bring any man that you please, and I will distinguish for you the man who knows how to resolve syllogisms and the man who does not. Why ? Because I know how to resolve syllogisms. I have the power, which a man must have who is able to discover those who have the power of resolving syllogisms. But in life how do I act ? At one time I call a thing good, and at another time bad. What is the reason ? The contrary to that which is in the case of syllogisms, ignorance and inexperience. * Mrs. Carter says * This is one of the many extravagant refinements of the philosophers; and might lead persons into very dangerous mistakes, if it was laid down as a maxim ja ordinary life.* I think that Mrs. Carter has not seen the meaning of Epictetus. The philo- sopher will discover the man's character by trying him, as the assayer tries the silver by a test. Cicero (De legibus, i. 9) says that the face expresses the hidden character. Euripides (Medea, 518) says better, that no mark is im- 2)ressed on the body by which we can distinguish the good man from the bad. Shakspere says There 's no art . To find tlie mind's construction in the face. Macbeth, act i. sc. i. EPICTETUS. 107 CHAPTER lY. AGAINST A PERSON WHO HA*D ONCE BEEN DETECTED IN ADULTERY. As Epictetus was saying that man is formed for fidelity, and that he who subverts fidelity subverts the peculiar characteristic of men, there entered one of those who are considered to be men of letters, who had once been detected in adultery in the city. Then Epictetus con- tinued, But if we lay aside this fidelity for which we are formed and make designs against our neighbour's wife, what are we doing ? "What else but destroying and over- throwing? Whom, the man of fidelity, the man of modesty, the man of sanctity. Is this all? And are we not overthrowing neighbourhood, and friendship, and the community ; and in what place are we putting ourselves ? How shall I consider you, man? As a neighbour, as su friend? What kind of one ? As a citizen? Yv herein shall I trust you ? So if you were an utensil so worthless that a man could not use you, you would be pitched out on the dung heaps, and no man would pick you up. But if being a man you are unable to fill any place which befits a man, what shall we do with you ? For suppose that you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold the place of a slave ? And who will trust you ? Are you not then content that you also should be pitched somewhere on a dung heap, as a useless utensil, and a bit of dung ? Then will you say, no man cares for me, a man of letters ? They do not, because you are bad and useless. It is just as if the wasps complained because no man cares for them, but all fly from them, and if a man can, he strikes them and knocks them down. You have such a sting that you throw into trouble and pain any man that you wound with it. What would you have us do with you ? You have no place where you can be put. What thcD, are not women common by nature?^ So I ^ It is not clear what is meant by women being common by nature iu any rational sense. Zeno and his school said (Diogenes Laertius, vii. ; Zeno, p. 195. London, 1664) : ' it is their opinion also that the women 108 EPICTETUS. say also ; for a little pig is common to all the invited guests, but when the portions have been distributed, go, if you think it right, and snatch up the portion of him who reclines next to you, or slily steal it, or place your hand down by it and lay hold of it, and if you can not tear away a bit of the meat, grease your fingers and lick them. A fine companion over cups, and kSocratic guest indeed ! Well, is not the theatre common to the citizens ? When then they have taken their seats, come, if you think proper, and eject one of them. In this way women also are common by nature. When then the legislator, like the master of a feast, has distributed them, will you not also look for your own portion and not filch and handle what belongs to another. But I am a man of letters and understand Archedemus.^ — Understand Archedemus then, and be an adulterer, and faithless, and instead of a man, be a wolf or an ape : for what is the difference ? ^ CHAPTER V. HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE, Things themselves (materials) are indiffeient ;^ but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall a man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time should be common among the wise, so that any man should use any woman, as Zeno says in his Polity, and Chrysippus in the book on Polity, and Diogenes the Cynic and Plato ; and we shall love all the children equally like fathers, and tbe jealousy about adultery wiU be removed/ These wise men knew little about human nature, if they taught such doctrines. ^ Archedemus was a Stoic philosoplier of Tarsus. "We know little about him. ^ A man may be a philosopher cr pretend to be ; and at the same time he may be a beaat. ^ The materials ({/ A Ki) on wliich man works are neither good nor bad, and so they are, as Epictetus names them, indiiferent. But the use of things, or of material, is not indifferent. They may be used well or ill, conformably to nature or not. EPICTETUS. 109 be careful and neither rash nor negligent ? If he imitates those who play at dice. The counters are indifferent ; the dice are indifferent. How do I know what the cast will be ? But to use carefully and dexterously the cast of the dice, this is my business.^ Thus then in life also the chief business is this : distinguish and separate things, and say, Externals are not in my power: will is in my power. Where shall I seek the good and the bad ? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what does not belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage or any thing of the kind. What then ? Should we use such things carelessly ? In no way: for this on the other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequently against nature ; but we should act carefully because the use is not indifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom from perturbations because the material is indifferent. For where the material is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me nor compel me. Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things is not in my power, nor is it good or bad ; but the use is either bad or good, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and to bring together these two things, the carefulness of him who is affected by the matter (or things about him) and the firmness of him who has no regard for it ; but it is not impossible : and if it is, happiness is impossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What can I do ? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, the opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for ? for my part is done. The busi- ness belongs to another, the master. — But the ship is sink- ing — what then have I to do ? I do the only thing that I can, not to be droWtied full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish : for I am not an immortal being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day : * Terence says (Adelphi, iv. 7) — Si illud, quod est maxime opus, jactu non cad it, lUud quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas. ' Dexterously ' is * arte,* rexvucws in Epictetus. — Upton. 110 EPIOTETUS. I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What difference then does it make to me, how I pass away, whether "by being suffocated or by a fever, for I must pass through some such means ? This is just what you will see those doing who play at ball skilfully. No one cares about the ball^ as being good or bad, but about throwing and catching it. In this therefore is the skill, in this the art, the quickness, the judgment, so that even if I spread out my lap I may not be able to catch it, and another, if I throw, raay catch the ball. But if with perturbation and fear we receive or throw the ball, what kind of play is it then, and wherein shall a man be steady, and how shall a man see the order in the game ? But one will say. Throw ; or Do not throw ; and another will say. You have thrown once. This is quarrelling, not play. Socrates then knew how to play at ball. How ? By using pleasantry in the court where he was tried. Tell me, he says, Anytus, how do you say that I do not believe in God. The Daemons (Sat/Aoves), who are they, think you ? Are they not sons of Gods, or compounded of gods and men ? When Anytus admitted this, Socrates said, Who then, think you, can believe that there are mules (half asses), but not asses ; and this he said as if he were playing at ball.* And what was the ball in that case? Life, chains, banishment, a draught of poison, separation from wife and leaving children orphans. These were the things with which he was playing ; but still he did play and threw the ball skilfully. So we should do : we must employ all the care of the players, but show the same indifference about the ball. For we ought by all means ^ The word is apiraa-Tov, which was also used by the Romans. One threw the ball and the other caught it. Chrysippus used this simile of a ball in speaking of giving and receiving (Seneca, De Beneficiis, ii. 17). Martial has the word (Epig. iv. 19) ' Sive harpasta manu pulverulenta rapis * ; and elsewhere. * In Plato's Apology c. 15, Socrates addresses Meletus ; and he says, It would be equally absurd if a man should believe that there are foals of horses and asses, and should not believe that there are horses and asses. But Socrates says nothing of mules, for the word mules in some texts of the Apology is manifestly wrong EPICTETUS. Ill to apply our art to some external material, not as valuing the material, but, whatever it may be, showing our art in it. Thus too the weaver does not make wool, but exercises his art upon such as he receives. Another gives you food and property and is able to take them away and your poor body also. When then you have received the material, work on it. If then you come out (of the trial) without having suffered any thing, all who meet you will congratu- late you on your escape ; but he who knows how to look at such things, if he shall see that you have behaved properly in the matter, will commend you and be pleased with you ; and if he shall find that you owe your escape to any want of proper behaviour, he will do the contrary. For where rejoicing is reasonable, there also is congratu- lation reasonable. How then is it said that some external things are according to nature and others contrary to nature ? It is said as it might be said if we were separated from union (or society) . for to the foot I shall say that it is accord- ing to nature for it to be clean ; but if you take it as a foot and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for the good of the whole body ; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should think in some such way about ourselves alsc. What are you ? A man. If you consider yourself as detached from other men, it is according to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consider yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at another time be in want, and in some cases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled? Do you not know, that as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you are no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For what is a man?^ A part of a state, of that first which consists of Gods and of men ; then of that which is called ^ airSxvToi. Compare Antoninus, x. 24, viii. 34. « Compare Antoninus, ii. 16, iii. 11, vi. 44, xii. 36 ; and Seneca, de Otio Sap. c. 31 ; and Cicero, De Fin. iii. 19. 112 EPICTETUS. next to it, wliicli is a small image of the universal state. What then must I be brought to trial ; must another have a fever, another sail on the sea, another die, and another be condemned ? Yes, for it is impossible in such a body, in such a universe of things, among so many living to- gether, that such things should not happen, some to one and others to others. It is your duty then since you are come here, to say what you ought, to arrange these things as it is fit.*^ Then some one says, " I shall charge you with doing me wrong." Much good may it do you : I have done my part ; but whether you also have done yours, you must look to that ; for there is some danger of this too, that it may escape your notice. CHAPTER VI. OF INDIFFERENCE.^ The hypothetical proposition ^ is indifferent : the judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or opinion or error. Thus life is indifferent : the use is not indifferent. When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become negligent ; and when a man invites you to be careful (about such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of ma- terial things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation and power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be ^ He tells some imaginary person, who hears him, that since he is come into the world, he must do his duty in it. ^ This discussion is with a young philosopher who, intending to return from Nicopolis to Kome, feared tlie tyranny of Domitian, who was particularly severe towards philosophers. See also the note on i. 24. 3. Schweig. Compare Plin. Epp. i. 12, and the expression of Corelliua Kufus about the detestable villain, the emperor Domitian. The title ' of Indifference ' means ' of the indifference of things ; * of the things which are neither good nor bad. • t6 (TvvriixixivoVy p. 93. EPICTETUS. 113 vexed, if others have the advantage over you. For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them ; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console thera by saying, * I have learned them, and you have not.' Thus also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need (of such practice), but j^ield in that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind. Go and salute a certain person. How ? Not meanly. — ■ But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window ; and when I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through the window. — But still speak to him. — In what way ? Not meanly. But suppose that 3^ou have not got what j^ou wanted. Was this your business, and not his ? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what belongs to another ; and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to. those which are more adapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature ; for God himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even move towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move to go into the mud.^ For why are ears of corn produced ? Is it not that they may become dry ? And do they not become dry that they may be reaped ? * for they are not separated from communion with other things. If then they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped ? But this is a curse upon ears of corn, to be never reaped. So we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are reaped, 3 Sec. ii. 5, 24. ^ Epictetus alludes to the verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Compare Antoninus (vii. 40) : * Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn: one man is born ; another dies.' Cicero (Tuscul. Disp. iii. 25) has translated six verses from Euripides, and among them are these two ; turn vita omnibus Metenda ut fniges : sic jubet necessitas. I 114 EPiCTETtJS. we are vexed at it ; for we neither know what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chry- eantas^ when he was going to strike the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat : so it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer -what we do suffer, and we call them ' circumstances.' What kind of circum- stances, man ? If you give the name of circumstances to the things which are around you, all things are circum- stances ; but if you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying of that which has been pro- duced ? But that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. "Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades ? All ways are equal.^ But if you will listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months : but a fever is often a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty names. I am in danger of my life from Caesar. '^ And am not I in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes : and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what hazard do you run ? Is it not the hazard of your life ? But I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own ? how ? For who can compel you to have any opinion which you do not choose ? But is it as to another man's opinion ? and what kind of danger is ^ The story is in Xenophon's Cyropaedia (IV. near the beginning) "Where Cyrus says that he called Chrysantas by name. Epictetus, as Upton remarks, quotes from memory. 6 So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (ad inferos) is the same from all places. (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 43). "What follows is Dne of the examples of extravagant assertion in Epictetus. A tyrant may kill by a slow death as a fever does. I suppose that Epictetus would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic the ways to death are not indifferent : some ways of dying are painful, and even he who can endure with fortitude, would prefer an easy death. ' The text has eVl Kaltrapos] but iwl perhaps ought to be ^6 or aTrd. EPICTETUS. 115 yonrs, if others have false opinions ? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Eome ? Yes : what then if I should be sent to Gyara ? ^ If that suits you, you will go there ; but if it does not, you can go to another place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then do you go up to Rome as if it were something great ? It is not worth all this preparation, that an ingenuous youth should say, It was not worth while to have heard so much and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remember that division by which your own and not your own are distinguished : never claim any thing which belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high and the other low ; but the will can be maintained equal, if you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans in prison.^ But in our present disposition, consider if we could endure in prison another person saying to us, Would you like me to read Paeans to you ? — Why do you trouble me ? do you not know the evils which hold me ? Can I in -such circumstances (listen to paeans) ? — What circumstances ? — I am going to die. — And will other men be immortal ? ■ See i. 25, note 4. ® Diogenes Laertius reports in his life of Socrates that he wrote fn prison a Paean, and he gives the first line which contans an address to Apollo and Artemis. jui x> 1 ll'J EPlCTETUSi CHAPTER VIL now WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATIO!T, Through an unreasonable regard to divination many of "US omit many duties.^ For what more can the diviner see than death or danger or disease, or generally things of that kind ? If then I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my duty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination ? Have I not within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil, and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of both? What need have I then to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds, and why do I submit when he says. It is for your interest? For does he know what is for my interest, does he know what is good; and as he has learned the signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs of good and evil? For if he knows the signs of these, he knows the signs both of the beautiful and of the ugly, and of the just and of the unjust. Do you tell me, man, w^iat is the thing which is signified for me : is it life or death, poverty or wealth? But whether these things are for my interest or Whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. Why don't you give your opinion on matters of grammar, and why do 3'ou give it here about things on which we are all in error and disputing with one another? 2 The woman therefore, who intended to ^ Divination was a great part of antient religion, and, as Epictetus says, it led men * to omit many duties.' In a certain sense there was some meaning in it. If it is true that those who believe in God can see certain signs in the administration of the w^orld by which they can judge Avhat their behaviour ought to be, they can learn what their duties are. If these signs are misunderstood, or if they are not seen right, men may be governed by an abject superstition. So the external forms of any religion may become the means of corruption and of human debasement, and the true indications of God's will may be neglected. Upton compares Lucan (ix. 572), who sometimes said a few good things. - A man who gives his opinion on grammar gives an opinion on a thing of which many know something. A man who gives his opinion on divination or on future events, gives an opinion on things of which we all know nothing. When then a man affects to instruct on things unknown, we may ask him to give his opinion on things which are known, and so we may learn what kind of man he is. EPICTETUS. 117 send by a vessel a montli's provisions to Gratilla^ in her banishment, made a good answer to him who said that Domitian would seize what she sent, I would rather, she replied, that Domitian should seize all than that I should not send it. What then leads us to frequent use of divination ? Cowardice, the dread of what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father ? Let us see : let us sacrifice on the occasion. — Yes, master, as fortune chooses. — When he has said. You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if we received the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they play upon us.^ What then should we do? We ought to come (to divina- •tion) without desire or aversion, as the wayfarer asks of the man whom he meets which of two roads leads (to his journey's end), without any desire for that which leads to the right rather than to the left, for he has no wish to go by any road except the road which leads (to his end). In the same way ought we to come to God also as a guide ; as we use our eyes, not asking them to show us rather such things as we wish, but receiving the appearances of things such as the eyes present them to us. But now we trembling take the augur (bird interpreter)^ by the hand, and while we invoke God we intreat the augur, and say Master have mercy on me ;^ suffer me to come safe out of this difficulty. Wretch, would you have then any thing other than what is best ? Is there then any thing better than what pleases God? Why do you, as far as is in your power, corrupt your judge and lead astray your adviser ? * Gratilla was a lady of rank, who was banished from Rome and Italy by Domitian. Pliny, Epp. iii. 11. See the note in Schweig/s ed. on iirifirivia. * As knavish priests have often played on the fears and hopes of the superstitious. * Schweighaeuser reads rhv opviddpioy. See his note. ® * Kvpic ike-ncroVf Domine miserere. Notissima formula in Christiana ecclesia jam usque a primis temporibus usurpata.* Upton, 118 EPICTETUS, CHAPTER Vin. WHAT IS THE NATURE {rj ovaia) OF THE GOOdM God is beneficial. But the Grood also is beneficial.^ It is consistent then that where the nature of God is, there also the nature of the good should be. What then is the nature of God ? ^ Flesh ? Certainly not. An estate in land ? By no means. Fame ? No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason ? Yes. Herein then simply seek the nature of the good ; for I suppose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal, why do you still seek it any where except in the supe- riority of rational over irrational animals?* Now plants have not even the power of using appearances, and for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it re- quire this use only ? For if you say that it requires this use only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhap- piness are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and you do right; for if they possess even in the highest degree the use of appearances, yet they have not the faculty of understanding the use of appearances ; and there is good reason for this, for they exist for the purpose of serving others, and they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, does not exist for any superiority over others. No ; but because we had need of a back which is able to bear something ; and in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for this reason he received also the faculty of making use of appearances, for other ^ Schweighaeuser observes that the title of this chapter would more correctly be b 0e6s eV v^uv, God in man. There is no better chapter in the book. 2 Socrates (Xenophon, Mem. iv. 6, 8) concludes * that the useful is good to him to whom it is useful.' ^ I do not remember that Epictetus has attempted any other descrip- tion of the nature of God. He has done more wisely than some who have attempted to answer a question which cannot be answered. But see ii. 14, 11-13. * Compare Cicero, de Oifio. i. 27. EPIOTETUS. 119 wise he would not have been able to walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appearances, it is plain that consistently with reason he would nofc then have beei;^ subjected to us, nor would he have done us these services, but he would have been equal to us and like to us. Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal ? for if it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal). What then ? are not plants and animals also the works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor yet parts of the Gods. But you are a superior thing ; you are a portion separated from the deity ; you have in your- self a certain portion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent?^ Why do you not know whence you came? will you not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat and whom you feed ? When you are in conjunction with a woman, will you not re- member who you are who do this thing ? When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god ? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not.^ Do you think that I mean some God of 5 Noble descent. See 1. c. 9. The doctrine that God is in man is an old doctrine. Euripides said (Apud Theon. Soph. Progym.) : — 'O yovs yap "fjfuv i•- >^ CHAPTER XVIII. HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES. Every habit and faculty^ is maintained and increased by the corresponding actions : the habit of walking by walk- ing, the habit of running by running. If you would be a good reader, read ; if a writer, write. But when you shall not have read for thirty days in succession, but have done something else, you will know the consequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten days„ get up ^* Compare i. 19. 4. ^* Schweighaeuser has no doubt that we ought instead of cvvo.'yoi'^Q.Sy •collections/ to read etVa7aj7as, * introductions/ ^* As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, H ; and Antipater, ii. 19, 2, ^ See iv. c. 12, fiPlCTETUS. 159 and attempt to make a long walk, and you will see how your legs are weakened. Generally then if yon would make any thing a habit, do it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustom yourself to do something else in place of it. So it is with respect to the affections of the soul : when you have Jbee^TL angry, yotTmiist know that not only has this evil befallen you, but that you have also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown fuel upon fire. When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also nurtured, increased your incontinence. For it is impossible for habits and faculties, some of them not to be produced, when they did not exist before, and others not be increased and strengthened by corresponding acts. In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also dis- eases of the mind grow up.^ For when you have once desired money, if reason be applied to lead to a per- ception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and the ruling faculty of our mind is restored to the original authority. But if you apply no means of cure, it no longer returns to the same state, but being again excited by the correspond- ing appearance, it is inflamed to desire quicker than be- fore : and when this takes place continually, it is hence- forth hardened (made callous), and the disease of the mind confirms the love of money. For he who has had a fever, and has been relieved from it, is not in the same state that he was before, unless he has been completely cured. Something of the kind happens also in diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in it, and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is again lashed on the same places, the lash will produce not blisters (weals) but sores. If then you wish not to be of an angry temper, do not feed the habit : throw nothing on it w hich will increase it : at first keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry. I used to be in passion every day ; now every second day ; then every third, then every fourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make a sacrifice to God. For the habit at first begins to 2 a^fxaa-T-fifxara. * Aogrotatioiies quae appellantiir a Stoicis upp(a(TTi]fxara^ Cicero, T'aso. iv. 10. 160 EPICTETUS. be weakened, and then is completely destroyed. " I have not been vexed to-day, nor the day after, nor yet on any succeeding day during two or three months ; but I took care when some exciting things happened." Be assured that you are in a good way.^ To-day when I saw a handsome person, I did not say to myself, I wish I could lie with her, and Happy is her husband ; for he who says this says, Happy is her adulterer also. Nor do I picture the rest to my mind ; the woman present, and stripping herself and lying down by my side. I stroke my head and say. Well done, Epictetus, you have solved a fine little sophism, much finer than that which is called the master sophism. And if even the woman is willing, and gives signs, and sends messages, and if she also fondle me and come close to me, and I should abstain and be victorious, that would be a sophism beyond that which is named the Liar, and the Quiescent.'* Over such a victory as this a man may justly be proud; not for proposing the master sophism. How then shall this be done ? Be willing at length to be approved by yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity with your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearance visits you, Plato says,^ Have recourse to expiations, go a sup- pliant to the tdmpTes of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you resort to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. Go to Socrates and see him lying down with Alcibiades, and mocking his beauty : ^ Kofxypws (Tol iffri. Compare the' Gospel of St. Jolin iv. 52, eirvdero oZy Trap' avrwv r^u Sopav iv f] Koixy\i6Tcpov eo-x^. * Placet enim Chrysippo cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad miilta perveniat quiescere ; id est quod ab iis dicitur 71(tvxo.C^iv. Cicero, Acad. ii. Pr. 29. Compart Persius, Sat. vi. 80 : Depinge ubi sistam, Inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi. s The pass-age is in Plato, Laws, ix. p. 854, '6rav croi irpoo-iriTrrrj n r^v TOLovrwv Soy/iidTooy, etc. The conclusion is, ' if you cannot be cured of your (mental) disease, seek death which is better and depart from life.* This bears some resemblance to the precept in Matthew vi. 29 *And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee/ tto. EPICTETUS. 161 consider wliat a victory he at last found that he had gained over himself ; what an Olympian victory ; in what number he stood from Hercules;^ ' so that, by the Gods, one may justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man, you who have conquered not these soiTy boxers^ and pancrat lasts, nor yet those who are like them, the gladiators. By placing these objects on the other side you will conquer the appearance : you will not be drawn away by it. But in the first place be not hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance, but say, Appearances, wait for me a little : let me see who you are, and what you are about : ^ let me put you to the test. And then do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow ; for if you do, it will carry you off wherevei* it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out this 'base appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only trifling- words, and nothing more. This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the combat, divine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from perturbation. Eemember God ; call on him as a helper and protector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri^ in a storm. For what is a greater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violent and drive away the reason ?^^ For the storm itself, what else is it but an appearance ? For take away the fear of death, and suppose * Hercules is said to have established gymnastic contests and to have been the first victor. Those who gained the victory both in wrestling and in the pancratium were reckoned in the Ust of victors as coming in the second or third place after him, and so on. "^ I have followed Wolff's conjecture iriKras instead of the old reading iraiKras. * Compare iii. 12. 15. ^ Castor and Pollux. Horkce, Carm. i. 12 :— Quorum slmul alba nautia Stella refulsit, etc. " Gellius, xix. c. 1, *visa quae vi quadam sua sese inferunt nosci- tanda hominibus.* M 162 EPICTETUS. as many thunders and lightnings as yon please, and yon will know what calm^^ and serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the same agair., be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a condition and so weak that you will not even know afterwards that you are doing wrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defences) for your wrong doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod^^ to be true, With constant ills the dilatory strives. •*^*~ CHAPTER XIX. AGAINST TH05E AVHO EMBRACE PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS ONLY IN WORDS.^ The argument called the ruling argument (6 Kvpuvuiv Xoyos)^ appears to have been proposed from such prin- ciples as these : there is in fact a common contradiction between one another in these three propositions, each two being in contradiction to the third. The propositions are, that every thing past must of necessity be true ; that an impossibility does not follow a possibility ; and that a thing is possible which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus^ observing this contradiction employed the probative force of the first two for the demonstration of this proposition, That nothing is possible which is not true and never will " * Consider that every thing is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, every thing stable, and a waveless pay.' Antoninus, xii. 22. 1- Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 411. ^ Compare Gellius xvii. c. 19. - See the long note communicated to Upton by James Harris ; and Schweighaeuser's note. ^ Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of Ptolemaeus Soter. He was of th « school named the Megaric, and dis- tinguished in dialectic. EPICTETUS. 163 be. Now another will hold these two : That something is possible, which is neither true nor ever will be : and That an impossibility does not follow a possibility. But he will not allow that every thing which is past is necessarily true, as the followers of Cleanthes seem to think, and Antipater copiously defended them. But others maintain the other two propositions, That a thing is possible which is neither true nor will be true : and That everything which is past is necessarily true ; but then they will maintain that an impossibility can follow a possibility. But it is impossible to maintain these three propositions, because of their common contradiction.^ If then any man should ask me, which of these propo- sitions do you maintain? I will answer him, that I do not know ; but I have received this story, that Diodorus maintained one opinion, the followers of Panthoides, I think, and Cleanthes maintained another opinion, and those of Chrysippus a third. What then is your opinion ? I was not made for this purpose, to examine the appear- ances that occur to me, and to compare what others say and to form an opinion of m}^ own on the thing. Therefore I differ not at all from the grammarian. Who was Hector's father? Priam. Who were his brothers ? Alexander and Deiphobus. Who was their mother? Hecuba. — I have heard this story. From whom ? From Homer. And Hel- lanicus also, I think, writes about the same things, and perhaps others like him. And what further have I about the ruling argument? Nothing. But, if I am a vain man, especially at a banquet I surprise the guests by enumerating those who have written on these matters. Both Chrysippus has written wonderfully in his first book about Possibilities, and Cleanthes has written specially on the subject, and Archedemus. Antipater also has written not only in his work about Possibilities, but also separately in his work on the ruling argument. Have you not read the work ? I have not read it. Eead. And what profit will 'a man have from it ? he will be more trifling and impertinent than he is now ; for what else have you gained by reading it ? What opinion have you formed on * If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradictiou to the third and destroy it. M 2 164 EPICTETUS. this subject? none; but you will tell us of Helen and Priam, and the island of Calypso which never was and never will be. And in this matter indeed it is of no great importance if you retain the story, but have formed no opinion of your own. But in matters of morality (Ethic) this happens to us much more than in^ these things of which we are speaking. Speak to me about good and evil. Listen : The wind from Ilium to Ciconian shores Brought me.*— Odyssey, ix. 39. Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things which partake of the virtues : the bad are the vices, and the things which partake of them ; and the indifferent are the things which lie between the virtues and the vices, wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain. Whence do you know this ? Hellanicus says it in his Egyptian history ; for what difference does it make to say this, or to say that Diogenes has it in his Ethic, or Chrysippus or Cleanthes ? Have you then examined any of these things and formed an opinion of your own? Show how you are used to behave in a storm on shipboard ? Do you remember this division (distinction of things), when the sail rattles and a man, who knows nothing of times and seasons, stands by 3^ou when you are screaming and says. Tell me, I ask you by the Gods, what you were saying just now. Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck : does it participate in vice ? Will you not take up a stick and lay it on his head ? What have, we to do with you, man? we are perishing and you come * * Speak to me,* etc. may he supposed to be said to Epictetus, who has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians' learning. When he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the Odyssey, the first which occurs to him^ and says, Listen. There is nothing to listen to, but it is as good for the hearer as any thing else. Then he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a philosopher. He is bantering the hearer : it makes no matter from what author I learned them ; it is all the same. The real question is, have you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an ox^iuion yoiu'self ? EPTCTETUS. 165 to mock us? But if Caesar send for you to answer a charge, do you remember the distinction ? If when you are going in pale and trembling, a person should come up to you and say, Why do you tremble, man ? what is the matter about which you are engaged ? Does Caesar who sits within give virtue and vice to those who go in to him ? You reply, Why do you also mock me and add to my present sorrows? — Still tell me, philosopher, tell me why you tremble ? Is it not death of which you run the risk, or a prison, or pain of the body, or banishment, or disgrace ? What else is there ? Is there any vice or anything which partakes of vice ? What then did joii use to say of these things ? — * What have you to do with me, man ? my own evils are enough for me.' And you say right. Your own evils are enough for you, 3^our baseness, your cowardice, your boasting which you showed when you sat in the school. Why did you decorate yourself with what belonged to others ? Why did you call yourself a Stoic ? Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find to what sect you belong. You will find that most of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics,^ and those feeble. For wheiein will 3'ou show that you really consider virtue equal to everything else or even superior ? But show me a Stoic, if you can. A V here or how? But you can show me an endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse ? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also with equal accuracy? who then is a Stoic ? As we call a statue Phidiac, which is fashioned according to the art of Phidias ; so show me a man who is fashioned according to the doctrines which he utters. Show me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, dying and happ}^, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him : I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic. You cannot show me one fashioned so ; but show me at least one who is forming, who has shown a ten- dency to be a Stoic. Do me this favour : do not grudge ^ The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed to a happy Ufe; but still they contended that the smallest mental excellence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Fin. v. 5. 31 . 166 EPICTETUS. an old man seeing a sight whicli I have not seen yet. Do you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or the Athena, a work of ivory and gold V Let any of you show me a human soul ready to think as God' does, and not to blame ^ either God 'or man, ready not to be disap- pointed about any thing, not to consider himself damaged by any thing, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous ; and why should I not say it direct ? desirous from a man to become a god, and in this poor mortal bod}^ thinking of his fellowship with Zeus.^ Show me the man. But you cannot. Why then do you delude yourselves and cheat others? and why do you put on a guise which does not belong to you, and walk about being thieves and pilferers of these names and things which do not belong to you ? And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in my school. And I have this purpose, to make you free from restraint, compulsion, hindrance, to make you free, prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great. And you are here to learn and practise these things. Why then do you not finish the work, if you also have such a purpose as you ought to have, and if I in addi- tion to the purpose also have such qualification as I ought to have ? What is that which is wanting ? When I see an artificer and material lying by him, I expect the work. Here then is the artificer, here the material ; what is it that we want ? Is not the thing one that can be taught ? It is. Is it not then in our power ? The only thing of all ^ See ii. c. 8. 20. ^ *to blame God' means to blame the constitution and order of things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked ; as absurd as for the potter's vessel to blame the potter, if that can be imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break. . ^ ' Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ,* 1 John i. 3. The attentive reader will observe several passages besides those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity between Epictetus and the Scriptures : and will perceive from them, either that the Stoics had learnt a good deal of the Christian language or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such strong expressions as we often lind in Scripture and sometimes in the philosophers, especially Epictetus.' Mrs. Carter. The word ' fellowship ' in the passage of John and of Epictetus is Koiyuvla, See i. 29. note 19. EPICTETUS. 167 that, is in our power. Neither wealth is in our power, nor health, nor reputation, nor in a word any thing else except the right use of appearances. This fright use) is by nature free from restraint, this alone is free from impediment. Why then do you not finish the work ? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it, or through jour own fault, or through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible, and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the fault is either in me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in both. Well then, are you willing that we begin at last to bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of the past ? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, and you will see. -•c^ 7< CHAPTER XX. AGAINST THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS. The propositions which are true and evident are of neces- sity used even by those who contradict them : and a man might perhaps consider it to 'be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies i^ to m5k:e use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must make the contra- dictory negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this ? For what else is this tlian to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and say : Know that there is nothing that can be known,^ but all things are incapable of sure evidence ; or if another say, Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ^ 'Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri jjosset, ne illud quidein ipsum, qucd Socrates sibi reliquisset. Sic omnfia latere c^nsebat in occiilto, neque esse quidquam quod cernl aut intelligi possit. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione adprobare.' Cicero, Academ. Post. 1, 12, I)iog. Laert. ix. 90 of the Pyrrhonists. 168 EPICTETUS. onglit not to believe any thing ; or again, if another should say, Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any thing ; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now in what respect do these differ from those ? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? * Men, agree [with us] that no man agrees [with another] : believe us that no man believes anybody.' Thus Epicurus^ also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For w^hat does he say ? ' Be not deceived, menr nor be led astray, nor be mistaken : there is no natural fellowship among rational animals ; • believe me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false reasons.* — What is this to you ? Permit us to be deceived. Will you fare w^orse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved ? Nay, it will be much better and safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us ? Why do you keep a^vake for us ? Why do 3'ou light your lamp ? Why do you rise early ? Why do you write so manj^ books, that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men ; or that no one may suppose the nature \ of good to be other than pleasure ? For if this is so, lie ' down and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you judged yourself worthy : eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore.^ And what is it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether right or wrong ? For what have we to do with you ? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable * Cicero, de Fin. ii. 30. 31, speaking of the letter, which Epicurus wrote to Hermarchus when he was dying, says ' that the actions of Epicurus were inconsistent with his sayings,* and * his writings were confuted by his probity and morality/ ^ Paul says, Cor. i. 15. 32 : ' If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not ? let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,' The words ' k-t us eat and drink, etc' are said to be a quotation from the Thais of Menander. The meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection cf the dead, why shoukl I not enjoy tlie sensual pleasures of life only ? This is not the doc trine* of Epictetus, as we see in the text EPICTETUS. 169 tiling if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked ? For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans : but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing ; in order that all things may be secured for you?^ Or ought we to maintain this fellow- ship with some and not with others ? With whom then ought we to maintain it ? With such as on their part also maintain it, OT with such as violate this fellowship ? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines ? What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepi- ness, and compelled him to write what he did write ? What else was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, nature, which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling and ' complaining ? For since, she says, you think that there is no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes and' Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele)? So strong and in- vincible is man's nature, For how can a vine be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree ? or on the other hand how can an olive tree bo moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine ? It is impossible : it cannot be con- ceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements (affects) of a man ; and even those who are deprived of their genital memb'ers are not able to deprive themselves of man's desires.^ Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a man, *and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a friend, but he did not * It would give security to the Epicureans, that they would enjoy all that they value, if otlier men should be persuaded that we am all made for fellowship, and that temperance ife a good thing. * See Upton's note. 170 EPICTETUS. mutilate human desires, for he could not ; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their might to do it. What a shame is this? when a man has received from nature measures and rules for the knowing of truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules and to improve ^ them, but just the contrary, endeavours to take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the truth ? What say you philosopher ? piety and sanctity, what do you think that they are ? If you like, I will demonstrate that they are good things. Weil, demonstrate it, that our citizens may be turned and honour the deity and may no longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have you then the demonstrations ? — I have, and I am thankful. — Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary : That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong doers."^ — Well done, philo- sopher, you have done something for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine. — What then, does not this satisfy j^ou? Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing. — Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as these have grown our well constituted states ; by these was Sparta founded : Lycurgus fixed these opinions 'in the Spartans by his laws and edu- cation, that neither is the servile condition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free men more honourable <5 I have followed Scliweigbaeuser who suggests irpoare^^pyoLffaaOai in place of the MSS. irpoa-epydo-ao-dai. ' Polybius (vi. 56), when he is speaking of the Roman state, com- mends the men of old time, who established in the minds of thu multi- tude the opinions about the gods and Hades, wherein, he says, they acted more wisely than those in his time who would destroy such opinions. EPICTETUS. 171 than base, and thai those viho died at Thermopylae ^ died from these opinions ; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city ? ^ Then those who talk thus, many and beget children, and employ themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and inter- preters. Of whom ? of gods who do not exist : and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and imposture. Man what are you doing ?^^ are you refuting yourself every day ; and will you not give up these frigid attempts ? When you eat, where do you carrj^ your hand to ? to your mouth or to your eye ? when 3'ou wash yourself, what do you go into ? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit ? If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I would rack him. If he said, * Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath,' I would take pickle sauce and pour it down qn his head. What is this ? he would say — An appearance was presented to me, 1 swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it — Here give me the barley- drink (tisane), he says — I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce — Did I not ask for the barley drink ? Yes, master : this is the barley drink ? Take it and smell ; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us? — If I had three or four fellow-slaves of the tame opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by using all the things which nature gives, and in words destroying them. Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do ^ Epictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae jj.c. 480 against Xerxes and his army. Herodotus (vii. 228) has recorded the inscription placed over the Spartans : — Stranger, go tell the Spartans, Here we lie Obedient to those who bade us die. The inscription is translated by Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 42. " When Xerxes was advancing on Athens, the Athenians left the city and embarked on their vessels before the battle of Salamis, B.C. 480. See Cicero, Do Officiis, iii. 11. '" He is now attacking the Academics, who asserted that we can know nothing. 172 EPIOTETUI?. nothing else, are daily eating -bread and yet are shameless enough to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto ; ^^ not to mention that they are enjoying the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the stars, and ilie sea and the land and the co-operation of mankind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these things to turn their attention to them ; but they only seek to belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. But what they shall say, and about what things or to what persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, they care not even in the least degree,. nor do they care if any generous youth after hear- ing such talk shpuld suffer any harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all the seeds of his generous nature ; nor if we ^^ should give an adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts; nor if a public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse from these doctrines; nor if anolher who neglects his parents should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching. — What then in your opinion is good or bad? This or that? — Why then should a man say' any* more in reply to such j)ersons as these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from them, or try to convince them ? By Zeus one might much sooner expect to make catamiics change their mind than those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils. ^^ " Epictetiis is speaking according to the popular notions. To deny Demeter and to eat the bread which she gives is the same thing in the common notions of tlie Greeks, as it woiikl be for Epictetiis to deny the existence of God and to eat the bread which he gives. *2 The MSS. have Trapao-xw^uej/. Uapda-xooo-i would be in conformity with the rest of the passage. But this change of persons is common in Epictetus. ^^ 'This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you.' Matthew, xxi. 31. Mrs. Carter. To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston replied, ' Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you ?' AVhen the Academic denied it, Ariston said, ' Who made you blind? who stoJo your power of sight ? * (Diog. Laert. vii. 163. Upton.) EPIOTETUS. 173 CHAPTEE XXI. OF INCONSISTENCY.^ Some things men readily confess, and other things they do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or without understanding ; but quite the contrary you will hear all men saying, I wish that I had fortune equal to my under- standing. But men readily confess that they are timid, and they say : I am rather timid, I confess ; but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish. A man will not readily confess that he is intemperate ; and that he is unjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no means confess that he is envious or a busy body. Most men will confess that they are compassionate. What then is the reason ? — The chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency and confusion in the things which relate to good and evil. But different men have difi'erent reasons ; and generally what they imagine to be base, the}'" do not confess at all. But they suppose timidity to be a charac- teristic of a good disposition, and compassion also; but silliness to be the absolute characteristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit (confess) the things which are offences against society. But in the case of most errors for this reason chiefly they are induced to confess them, because they imagine that there is something involuntary in them as in timidity and compassion ; and if a man confess that he is in any respect intemperate, he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what is involuntary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all involuntary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something in- voluntary ; and for this reason they confess to jealousy also. Living then among such men, who are so confused, so ignorant of what they say, and of the evils which they have or have not, and why they have them, or how they shall be relieved of them, I think it is worth the trouble ^ Schweig. has some remarks oa the title of this chapter. He says ' that this discourse does not keep to the game subject, but proceeds from that with which it began to other things.* 174 EPICTETUS. for a man to watcli constantly (and to assk) whether I slm am one of them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether I conduct myself as a temperate man, whether I ever say this, that I have been taught to be prepared for every thing that may happen. Have I the consciousness, which a man who knows nothing ought to have, that I know nothing? Do I go to my teacher as men go to oracles, prepared to obey ? or do I like a snivel- ling boy go to my school to learn history and understand the books which 1 did not understand before, and, if it should happen so, to explain them also to others ? — Man, you have had a fight in the house with a poor slave, you have turned the family upside down, you have frightened the neighbours, and 3'ou come to me ^ as if you were a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how I have ex- plained some word, and Low I have babbled whatever came into my head. You come full of envy, and humbled, because you bring nothing from home;^ and you sit during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how your father is disclosed towards you and your brother. ' What are they saying about me there ? now they think that I am improving, and are saying, Pie will return with all knowledge. I wish I could learn every thing before I return : but much labour is necessary, and no one sends me any thing, and the baths at Nicopolis are dirty ; every thing is bad at home, and bad here.' Then they say, no one gains any profit from the school. — Why, who comes to the school ? who comes for the purpose of being improved? who comes to present his opinions to be purified ? who comes to learn what he is in want of? Why do you wonder then if you carrj^ back from the school the very things which you bring into it? For you come not to lay aside (your principles) or to correct * /carao-ToAas 7roi-f}(Tas. I have omitted these words because I dou't luiderstand them ; nor do the commentators. The word KaraaroX-ii occurs in ii. 10. 15, where it is intelligible. ^ Literally, * because to you or for you nothing is brought from home.' Perhaps the meaning is explained by what follows. The man has no comfort at home ; he brings nothing by the thought of which he is comforted. EPICTETUS. 175 them or to receive other principles in place of them. By no means, nor any thing like it. Yon rather look to this, whether you possess already that for which you come. You wish to prattle about theorems ? What then ? Do you not become greater triflers ? Do not your little theorems give you some opportunity of display ? You solve sophis- tical syllogisms."* Do you not examine the assumptions of the syllogism named the Liar ? ^ Do you not examine hypothetical syllogisms ? Why then are you still vexed if you receive the things for which you come to the school ? Yes; but if my child die or my brother, or if I must die or be racked, what good will these things do me^? — Well, did you come for this ? for this do you sit by my side ? did you ever for this light your lamp or keep awake? or, when you went out to the walking place, did you ever propose any appearance that had been pre- sented to you instead of a syllogism, and did you and your friends discuss it together ? Where and when ? Then you say. Theorems are useless. To whom ? To such as make a bad use of them. For eye-salves are not useless to those who use them as they ought and when they ought. Fomentations are not useless. Dum-bells '^ are not useless ; but they are useless to some, useful to others. If you ask me now if syllogisms are useful, I will tell you that they are useful, and if you choose, I will prove it.^ — How then will they in any way be useful to me ? Man, did you ask if they are useful to you, or did you ask generally ? Let him who is suffering from dysentery, ask me if vinegar is useful ; I will say that it is useful. — Will it then be useful to me? — I will say, no. Seek first for the discharge to be stopped and the ulcers to be closed. And do you, O men, first cure the ulcers and stop the discharge ; be tran- quil in your mind, bring it free from distraction into the school, and you will know what power reason has. « See i. 7. * JSee ii. 17. 34. ^ ri ix€ ravra wcpeX-fiaei ; Schweig. in his note says that he has written the text thus ; but he has not. He has written ri fxera ravra oxpeXi^ffn ; The M€ appears to be necessary, and he lias rendered the paB&uii'iJ accordingly ; and rightly, I think. ' See i. 4, note 5 on Halteres. 8 See ii. 25. 176 EPIOTETUS. CHAPTEE XXII. ON FKIENDSHIP.^ What a man applies himself to earnestly, that he natu- rally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to the things which are bad ? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to things which in no way concern themselves? not to these either. It remains then that they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are good ; and if they are earnestly employed about things, they love such things also. "Whoever then understands what is good, can also know how to love : but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are neither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving ? To love then is only in the power of the wise. How is this ? a man may say ; I am foolish, and yet I love my child. — I am surprised indeed that you have begun by making the admission that you are foolish. For what are you deficient in? Can you not make use of your senses ? do you not distinguish appearances ? do you not use food which is suitable for your body, and clothing and habitation? Why then do you admit that you are foolish ? It is in truth because you are often disturbed by appearances and perplexed, and their power of persuasion often conquers you ; and sometimes you think these things to be good, and then the same things to be bad, and lastly neither good nor bad ; and in short you grieve, fear, envy, are disturbed, you are changed. This is the reason why you confess that you are foolish. And are you not change- able in love? But wealth, and pleasure and in a word * * In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic principle that friend- ship is only possible between the good.* Schweig. He also says that there was another discourse by Epictetus on this subject, in which he expressed some of the opinions of Musonius Eufus (i. 1. note 12). Schweig. draws this conclusion from certain words of Stobaeus ; and he supposes that this dissertation of Epictetus was in one of the last four boolcs of Epictetus' discourses by Arrian, which have been lost, Cicero (de Amicit. c, 5) says * nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse,* and 0. 18, EPICTOTUS. 177 tilings themselves, do you sometimes think them to be good, and sometimes bad ? and do you not think the same men at one time to be good, at another time bad? and have you not at one time a friendly feeling towards them, and at another time the feeling of an enemy? and do you not at one time piaise them, and at another time blame them? Yes; I have these feelings also. Well then, do you think that he who has been deceived about a man is his friend? Certainly not. And he who has selected a man as his friend and is of a changeable disposition, has he good will towards him ? He has not. And he who now abuses a man, and afterwards admires him .^ This man also has no good will to the other. Well then, did you never see little dogs caressing and playing with one another, so that you might say, there is nothing more friendly? but that you may know what friendship is; throw a bit of flesh among them, and 3'ou will learn. Throw between yourself and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to die. Then you will change your tone and say, what a son I have brought up ! He has long been wishing to bury me. Throw a smart girl between you ; and do you the old man love her, and the young one will love her too. If a little fame intervene or dangers, it will be just the same. You will utter the words of the father of Admetus ! Life gives yon pleasure : and why not your father ? ^ Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when he was little ? that he was not in agony when the child had a fever? that he did not often say, I wish I had the fever instead of the child ? then when the test (the thing) came and was near, see what words they utter. Were not Eteocles and Polynices from the same mother and from the same father? Weie they not brought up together, had they not lived together, drunk together, slept together, and often kissed one another? So that, if * The first verse is from the Alcestis of Euripides, v. 691. The second in Epictetus is not in Euripides. Schweighaeuser thinks that it has been intruded into the text from a trivial schohum. 178 EPICTETUS. any man, I think, had seen them, he would have ridiculed the philosophers for the paradoxes which they utter about friendship. But when a quarrel rose between them about the royal power, as between dogs about a bit of meat, see what they say Folynices. Where will you take your station before the towers ? Bteodes. "Why do you ask me this? Fol. I will place myself opposite and try to kill you. Et. I also wish to do the same.^ Such are the wishes that they utter. For universally, be not deceived, every animal i.s attached to nothing so much as to its own interest.'^ Whatever then appears to it an impediment to this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or a child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses : for its nature is to love nothing so much as its own interest ; this is father, and brother and kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods appear to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of Aes- culapius to be burned when his dear friend died.^ For this reason if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured : but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines : if in the flesh, there is the ruling power : if in the will, it is there : and if it is in externals, it is ^ From the Phoenissae of Euripides, v. 723, etc. * Compare Euripides, Hecuba, v. 846, etc, : — heivSv 7€ 6ur)To7s cos airavra crvinriTVCf Kot ras aydyKas ws vdfioi Zidopicrav, <})l\ovs riQivTiS rovs ye TroXe/jLicordrovs ixQpo{)S T6 rovs irpiy ev/xci/els Troiov/xevoi, * Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian. Expedition of Alexander, vii. 14. 3EPICTETUS. 179 there.^ If then I am there where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father; for this will be my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active co-operation, of observing my relations (towards all). But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous) J It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with both ; and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both ; and the Romans with the Getae.^ And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus; and if any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said that they were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now when you see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do not conclude from this any thing about their friendship, not even if they swear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another. For ® Matthew vi. 21, * for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.* ^ * By " self " is here meant the proper Good, or, as Solomon expresses it, Eccl. xii. 13, *' the whole of man." The Stoic proves excellently the inconvenience of placing this in any thing but a right choice (a right disposition and behaviour) : but how it is the interest of each individual in every case to make that choice in preference to present pleasure and in defiance of present sufferings, appears only from the doctrine of a future recompense.' Mrs. Carter. Compare Cicero, De Fin. ii. 15, where he is speaking of E^Dicurus, and translates the words airocpaiveiv ^ jurj^ev ilvai rh KaXhu ^ &pa rh ej/5o|ov, " ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur Honestum quod est populari fama gloriosum (epBo^ov)." See Schweig.'s note. • The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, i. 1). The quarrel of the great king, the king of Persia, is the subject of the history of Herodotus (i. 1). The great quarrel of the Macedo- nians with the Persians is the subject of Arrian's expedition of Alexander. The Romans were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may assume that Epictetus was still living then. n2 1 80 EPICTETtJS. the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appearances.^ But examine, not what other men examine, if they are born of the same parenis and brought up together, and under the same paedagogue; but examine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave or free : do not name them even men, if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains,^^ and in the courts of justice display the acts of robbers ; nor yet that which makes them intem- perate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them do whatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear that in jruth these men think the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associated a long time and are com- panions, but when you have ascertained this only, confi- dently declare that they are friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is a communion ^^ of honest things and of nothing else ? But you may say, such a one treated me with regard so long ; and did he not love me ? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his ® Aristotle, Eth. viii. c. 8. Mrs. Carter. ^* Schweig. thinks that this is the plain meaning : ' as wild beasts in the mountains lie in wait for men, so men lie in wait for men, not only in deserted places, but even in the forum.' ^* (iirov SocTLs rod KaXov. Lord Shaftesbury suggested B6ao-TiK'^y iu the text, and he has done right. 18G EPIOTETUS. but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It is through this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we blame one another, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this which if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we carefully look after it, makes happiness. But to take away the faculty of speaking and to say that there is no such faculty in reality, is the act not only of an ungrateful man towards those who gave it, but also of a cowardly man : for such a person seems to me to fear, if there is any faculty of this kind, that we shall not be able to despise it. Such also are those who say that there is no difference between beauty and ugliness. Then it would happen that a man would be affected in the same way if he saw Thersites and if he saw Achilles ; in the same way, if he saw Helen and any other woman. But these are foolish and clownish notions, and the notions of men who know not the nature of each thing, but are afraid, if a man shall see the difference, that he shall immediately be seized and carried off vanquished. But this is the great matter; to leave to each thing the power (faculty) which it has, and leaving to it this power to see what is the worth of the power, and to learn what is the most excellent of all things, and to pursue this always, to be diligent about this, considering all other things of second- ar}^ value compared with this, but yet, as far as we can, not neglecting all those other things. For we must take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the most excel- lent thing, but we must take care of them on account of the most excellent thing, because it will not be in its true natural condition, if it does not' rightly use the ether faculties, and prefer some things to others. What then is usually done ? Men generally act as a traveller would do on his way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being pleased with it should remain there. Man, yo-u have forgotten your purpose : you were not travelling to this inn, but you were passing through it. — But this is a pleasant inn. — And how many other inns are pleasant? and how many meadows are pleasant ? yet only for passing through. But your purpose is this, to return to your country, to relieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen, to marry, to EPIOTETUS. 187 beget children, to fill the usual magistracies.^® For you are not come to select more pleasant places, but to live in these where you were born and of which you were made a citizen. Something of the kind takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since by the aid of speech and such communication as you receive here you must advance to perfection, and purge your will and correct the faculty which makes use of the appearances of things ; and since it is necessary also for the teaching (delivery) of theorems to be efiected by a certain mode of expression and with a certain variety and sharpness, some persons captivated by these very things abide in them, one captivated by the ex- pression, another by syllogisms, another again by sophisms, and still another by some other inn (Trav^oKctov) of the kind ; and there they stay and waste away as if they were among Sirens. Man, your purpose (business) was' to make yourself capable of using comformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desires not to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into that which you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor ever to have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, conforming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able from your whole soul to utter these verses Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny.^* Then having this purpose before yon, if some little form of expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do ^° The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace (Ep. 1. 1. 16) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic principles : ' Nunc agilis flo et mersor civilibus undis.' but this was only talk. The Stoic should discharge all the duties of a citizen, says Epictetus ; he should even marry and beget children. But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty ; and tlio continuance of the human race is secured by the naturtil love of the male and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, wliich the Roman censor Metellus gave to his fellow citizens, that, as they could not live without women, they should make the best of this business of marriage. (Gellius, i. 6.) ^^ The rest of the verses are q^uoted in the Encheiridion, s. 52, 188 EPICTETUS. you abide among them and choose to dwell there, forgetting the things at home, and do you say, These things are fine ? Who says that they are not fine ? but only as being a way home, as inns are. For what hinders you from being an unfortunate man, even if you speak like Demosthenes ? and what prevents you, if you can resolve syllogisms like Chrysippus,^^ from being wretched, from sorrowing, from envying, in a word, from being disturbed, from being unhappy ? Nothing. You see then that these were inns, worth nothing; and that the purpose before you was sometliing else. When I speak thus to some persons, they think that I am rejecting care about speaking or care about theorems. But I am not rejecting this care, but I am rejecting the abiding about these things inces- santly ^^ and putting our hopes in them. If a man by this teaching does harm to those who listen to him, reckon me too among those who do this harm : for I am not able, when I see one thing which is most excellent and supreme, to say that another is so, in ord^r to please you. CHAPTEB XXIV. TO (or against) a person^ who was one of those who were NOT VALUED (eSTEEMEd) BY HIM. A CERTAIN person said to him (Epictetus) : Frequently I desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any answer : and now, if it is possible, I intreat you to say something to me. Do you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in any thing else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art, will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully? — I do think so. — He then, who by speaking receives benefit ^^ Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. Diogenes Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so famous amoug Dialec- ticians that most persons thought, if there was Dialectic amoug the Gods, it would not be any other than that of Chrysippus, ^' &ee Schweig.'s note on aKaraKrjKTiKois, EPICTETUS* 189 himself, and is able to benefit; others, will speak skilfully : bnt he who is rather damaged by speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art of speaking ? And you may find that some are damaged and others bene- fited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they hear? Or will you find that among them ako some are benefited and some damaged? — There are both among these also, he said. — In this case also then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear nnskilfnlly are damaged? He admitted this. Is Ihere then a skill in hearing also, as there is in speaking? — It seems so. — If you choose, consider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom does it belong? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it belongs? To a statuary. And the looking at a statue skilfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art? — This also requires the aid of art. — Then if speaking properly is the business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit is the business of the skilful man ? Now as to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully,^ let us for the present, if 3'ou please, say no more, for both of us are a long way from every thing of the kind. But 1 think that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear philosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so ? Tell me then about what I should talk to you : about what matter are you able to listen? — About good and evil. — Good and evil in what ? In a horse ? No. Well, in an ox ? No. What then ? In a man ? Yes. Do we know then what a man is, what the notion is which we have of him, or have we our ears in any degree practised about this matter? But do you understand what nature is? or can you even in any degree understand me when I say, I shall use demonstration to you? How? Do yon understand this very thing, what demonstration is, or how any thing- is demonstrated, or by what means ; or what things are ' '■ That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in tlie art of speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantage from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a philosophical discussion.* Schweig. 190 EPICTETUS. like demonstration, but are not demonstration? Do yoit know what is true or wliat is false ? "What is consequent on a thing, what is repugnant to a thing, or not con- sistent, or inconsistent? 2 But must I excite you to philo- sophy, and how ? Shall I show to you the repugnance in the opinions of most men, through, which they differ about things good and evil, and about things which are profit- able and unprofitable, when you know not this very thing, what repugnance (contradiction) is ? Show me then what I shall accomplish by discoursing with you: excite my inclination to do this. As the grass which is suitable, when it is presented to a sheep, moves its inclination to eat, but if you present to it a stone or bread, it will not be moved to eat ; so there are in us certain natural incli- nations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear to be somebod3% when he himself shall excite us : but when he shall sit by us like a stone or like grass, how can he excite a man*s desire (to speak) ? Does the vine say to the hus- bandman, Take care of me ? No, but the vine by showing in itself that it will be profitable to the husbandman, if he does take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When children are attractive and lively, whom do they not invite to play with them, and crawl with them, and lisp with them ? But who is eager to play with an ass or to bray with it ? for though it is small, it is still a little ass. Why then do you say nothing to me ? I can only say this to you, that he who knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is this world, and witli whom he is associated, and what things are the good and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire according to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor intend (to act), nor assent, nor dissent nor suspend his judgment : to say all in a few words, he will go about dumb and blind, thinking that he is some- body, but being nobody. Is this so now for the first time ? Is it not the fact that ever since the human race existed, all errors and misfortunes have arisen through this igno- * See Schweig.'fl note. EPICTETUS. 191 l*ance ? Why did Agc\memnon and Acliilles quarrel Avith one another ? Was it not through not knowing what things are profitable and not profitable? Does not the one say it is profitable to restore Chryseis to her father, and does not the other say that it is not profitable ? does not the one say that he ought to take the prize of another, and does not the other say that he ought not ? Did they not for these reasons forget, both who they were and for what purpose they had come there ? Oh, man, for what purpose did you come ? to gain mistresses or to fight? To fight. With whom ? the Trojans or the Hellenes ? With the Trojans. Do you then leave Hector alone and draw your sword against your own king ? And do you, most excel- lent Sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are the people's guardian and have such cares ; and are you quar- relling about a little girl with the most warlike of your allies, whom you ought by every means to take care of and protect? and do you become worse than (inferior to) a well behaved priest who treats you these fine gladiators with all respect ? Do you see what kind of things igno- rance of what is profitable does ? But I also am rich. Are you then richer than Aga- memnon ? But I am also handsome. Are you then more handsome than Achilles ? But I have also beautiful hair. But had not Achilles more beautiful hair and gold co- loured ? and he did not comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also strong. Can you then lift so great a stono as Hector or Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. Arc you the son of a goddess mother ? are you the son of a father sprung from Zeus ? What good then do these things do to him, when he sits and weeps for a girl ? But I am an orator. And was he not ? Do you not see how he handled tbe most skilful of the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix ? how he stopped their mouths ? ^ This is all that I have to say to you ; and I say even this not willingly. Why ? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look to in order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are roused by generous * In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messengers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonderful example of eloquence. * 192 EPICTETUS. horses? Must I look to your bod}^? You treat it dis- graoelVill}^ To your dress ? That is luxurious. To your behaviour, to your look? That is the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do not say to him. You tell me nothing; but only show yourself worthy of hearing or fit for hearing ; and 3^ou will see how you will move the speaker. — •<>« X CHAPTER XXy. THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY.^ When one of those who were present said, Persuade me that logic is necessary, he replied7 Do you wish me to prove this to you ? The answer was — ^Yes. — Then I must use a demonstrative form of speech. — This was granted. — How then will you know if I am cheating you by my argu- ment ? The man was silent. Do you see, said Epictetus, that you 3'ourself are admitting that logic is necessary, if without it you cannot know so much as this, whether logic is necessary or not necessary ? -V^ CHAPTER XXVI. WHAT IS THE PROPERTY OF ERROR. Every error comprehends contradiction : for since he who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it is plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what does the thief wish to do? That which is for his own interest.^ If then the theft is not for his interest, he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational soul is by nature oifended at contradiction, and so long as it does not understand this conti-adiction, it is not hindered from doing contradictory » See i. 17. ^ * Compare XenopliOD, Mem. ill. 9. 4. EPICTETUS. 193 things: but when it does understand the contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the contradiction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from the false when he sees that a thing is false ; but so long as this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to truth. He then is strong in argument and has the faculty of exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to each man the contradiction through which he errs and clearly to prove how he ioes not do that which he wishes and does that which he does not wish. For if any one shall show this, a man will himself withdraw from that which he does ; but so long as you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man persists in his practice ; for having the appearance of doing right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates also trusting to this power ^used to say, I am used to call no other witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him with whom I am discussing, and I ask him to give his opinion and call him as a witness, and though he is only one, he is sufficient in the place of all. For Socrates knew by what the rational soul is moved, just like a pair of scales, and then it must incline, whether it chooses or not.^ Show the rational governing faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from it ; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him who is not persuaded.^ 2 There is some deficiency in the text. Cicero (Acad. Prior. 1. 12), * ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi ; sic animum perspicuis cedere,' appears to supply the deficiency. ^ M. Antoninus, v. 28 ; x. 4. Lliil? A U\ UNIVKHSIT BOOK III. ^ CHAPTER I. OF FINERY IN DRESS. A CERTAIN young iBian a rhetorician came to see Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his attire in an ornamental style; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of all other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some men also beautiful and others ugly ? Certainly. Do we then for the same reason call each of them in the same kind beau- tiful, or each beautiful for something peculiar ? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we see a dog natu- rally formed for one thing, and a horse for another, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we ma}^ generally and not improperly declare each of them to be beautiful then when it is most excellent according to its nature ; but since the nature of each is different, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so ? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog beautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It seems to bo so. For I tliink that what makes a Pancratia st beautiful, makes a wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridicu- lous; and he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling.^ It is so said he. What then makes ^ A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is, both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised five exercises, which are expressed by one Greek line. Leaping, running, tbe quoit, throwing tlie javelin, wrestling. Compare Aristotle, Eliet. i. 5. 2 ^•'^JNV- 196 EPICTETUS. a mau beautiful? Is it that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful ? It is, he said. What then makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes a horse beautiful ? The possession of the excellence of a horse. What then makes a man beautiful ? Is it not the possession of the excellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, young man, labour at this, the acquisition of human excellence. But what is this? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons without partiality : do you praise the just or the unjust ? The just. Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate ? The moderate. And the temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you make yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself beautiful: but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly (atcrxpov), even though you contrive all you can to appear beautiful. Further I do not know what to say to you : for if I say to you what I think, I shall offend you, and you will perhaps leave the school and not return to it : and if I do not say what I think, see how I shall be acting, if you come to me to be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if yon come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave you uncorrected. If at any time afterwards you shall acquire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say. What did Epictetus observe in me that when he saw me in such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition, he neglected me and never said a word ? did he so much despair of me ? was I not young? was I not able to listen to reason ? and how many other young men at this age commit many like errors ? I hear that a certain Polemon from being a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change. Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a Polemon ; J^ yet he 2 Comp. Horace, Sat. ii. 3, v. 253. Quaero, faciasne quod olim Mutatus Polemon ? etc. The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laertius. He was a dis- solute youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates EPICTETUS. 197 might have set my hair right, he might have stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from plucking the hair out of my body ; but when he saw me dressed like — what shall I say ? — he kept silent. I do not say like what ; but you will say when you come to your senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such a dress. If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what defence shall I make? Why, shall I say that the man will not be persuaded by me ? Was Laius persuaded by Apollo ? Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for the oracle ? ^ Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to tell him the truth? I indeed do not know, whether you will be persuaded by me or not; but Apollo knew most certainly that Laius would not be persuaded and yet he spoke. But why did he speak ? I say in reply, But why is he Apollo, and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed himself in this place as a prophet and source of truth and for the inhabitants of the world to resort to him ? and why are the words Know yourself written in front of the temple, though no person takes any notice of them? Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of themselves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he had been placed in this position by the deity, as he himself says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his judges ? '* If you acquit me on these con- ditions that I no longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I will not desist; but I will go up both to young and to old, and, to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask the questions which I ask now ; and most particularly will I do this to you my fellow citizens, because you are more nearly related to me." * — Are you so was lecturing, he and his drunken companions burst into the school, but Polemon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the school of the Academy. See Epict. iv. 11. 30. ^ Laius consulted the oracje at Delphi how he should have children. The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child Oedipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer of Laius. * Plato, Apology, i. 9, etc. and c. 17. 198 EPICTETUS. curious, Socrates, and siicli a busy-body ? and how does it concern you how we act ? and what is it that you say ? Being of the same community and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to your kinsmen, and a bad neighbour to your neighbours. Who then are you ? — Here it is a great thing to say, " I am he whose duty it is to take care of men ; for it is not every little heifer which dares to resist a lion ; but if the bull comes up and resists him, say to the bull, if you choose, * and who are you, and what business have you here ? ' " Man, in every kind there is produced something which excels ; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that which excels. Who then are you? If you do, it will find a voice in some way and say, I am such a thing as the j)urple in a garment : ^ do not expect me to be like the others, or blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest of men. What then ? am I such a man ? Certainly not. And are you such a man as can li&ten to the truth ? I wish you were. But however since in a manner I have been condemned to wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant by ' rationally ' ? Con- formably to nature ^ and completely. What then do you possess which is peculiar ? Is it the animal part ? No. Is it the condition of mortality ? No. Is it the power of using appearances ? ^ No. You possess the rational faculty as a peculiar thing : adorn and beautify this ; but leave ^ i. 2. note 4. ^' Cicero, dc Fin. ii. 11 : Horace, Epp. i. !10, 12. This was the great principle of Zeno, to live according to nntiire. Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted in following nature, that it is " a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true."' ^ The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals ; a rational use of tiiem is peculiar to nian. Mrs. Carter, Introd. § 7. EPICTETUS. 199 your liair to him who made it as he chose. Come, what other appellations have you? Are you man or woman? Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate ; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Eome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair ; and if he has no hair, he is a monster ; but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man. \Vhat a terrible sight ! There' is no man who will iixjl wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man what fault have you to find with your nature ? That it made you a man ? AYhat then ? was it fit that nature should make all human creatures women ? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being adorned ? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women? But you are not pleased with the matter : set to work then upon the whole business.'^ Take away — what is its name ? — that which is the cause of the hairs : make yourself a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken : do not make one half man, and the other half woman. Whom do you wish to please ? The women ? Please them as a man. Well ; but they like smooth men. 'Will you not hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, would you become one ? Is this your business ? were you born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight in you ? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Corinth and perchance a praefect of the city, or chief of the youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well, and when 3'ou have taken a wife, do you intend to have your hairs plucked out? To please whom and for what purpose? And when you have begotten children, will you introduce them also into the state with the habit of plucking their hairs ? A beautiful citizen, and senator ® o\ou 5t' o\oov avrh TToi-qaov, Wolf proposed au emendation wliicli Schweighaeuser does not j)ut in his text, but he has expressed it in the Latin version. The Greek is intelligible, if we look to what follows. 200 EPICTETUS. and rhetorician, We ouglit to pray that such young men be born among us and brought up. Do not so, I intreat you by the Gods, young man : but when you have once heard these words, go away and say to yourself, ' Epictetus has not said this to me ; for how could he ? but some propitious God through him : for it would never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger.' You say, No. But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies any thing to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God through the crow; and if he signifies any thing through a human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and concerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through the noblest messenger ? What else is it which the poet says : For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent • Hermes the careful watcher, Argus' slayer, The husband not to kill nor wed the wife.® AVas Hermes going to descend from* lieaven to say this to him ( Aegisthus) ? And now the Gods say this to you and send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to pervert thai which is well arranged, nor to busy your- self about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are will (Trpoatpeo-ts) ; and if your will is beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for 1 think that you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men Alcibiades : Try then to be beau- tiful. What does he say to him ? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs? Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad opinions. How with • From the Odyssey, i. 37, where Zeus is speaking of Aegistlius. EPICTETUS. 201 the body? Leave it as it is by nature. Another has looked after these things : intrust them to him. What then, mnst a man be uncleaned ? Certainly not ; but what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. You say no : but let us also pluck out the lion's mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock's comb for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog. CHAPTEE 11. IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE PROFICIENCY; ^ A:ND THAT WE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS. There are three things (topics, tottol) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good.'^ The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not desire.^ The second concerns the movements (towards an object) and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents (crvyKara^eo-ets). Of these * In place of TrpoK6\pavTa Schweig. suggests that we should read irpoKSxl/ovra : and this is probable. 2 KaXhs KoL ay a96s is the usual Greek expression to signify a perfect man. The Stoics, according to Stobaeus, absurdly called 'virtue,* Ka\6i/ (beautiful), because it naturally * calls' (/caAe?) to itself those who desire it. The Stoics also said that every thing good was beautiful (^Ka\6s), and that the good and the beautiful were equivalent. The Koman expression is Yir bonus et sapiens. (Hor. Epp., i. 7, 22 and 16, 20). Perhaps the phrase Ka\hs Kal ayadSs arose from the notion of beauty and goodness being the combination of a perfect human being. ■^ Antoninus, xi. 37, ^ as to sensual desire he should altogether 'keep away from it ; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.' 202 EPICTETUS. topics tlie chief and the most urgent is that which relates to the affects (ra TrdOr], perturbations) ; for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that whi(;h a man desires or falling into that which a man would wiyh to avoid. This is that which brings in per- turbations, disorders, bad fortune, misfortunes, soitows, lamentations, and envy; that which makes men envious and jealous ; and by these causes we are unable even to listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic con- cerns the duties of a man; for I ought not to be free from affects (airaOr]) like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations (crxeo-etg) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen. Tlie third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxica- tion, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power. But the present philosophers neglecting the fii'st to])ic and the second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, using sophistical arguments (/-leraTrtTrTorra?), making conclusions from questioning, em- ploying hypotheses, lying. For a man must, as it is said, when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who must? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest ? Are you free from deception in the matter of money ? If you see a beautiful girl, do you resist the appearance? If your neighbour obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed ? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable firmness of mind (tt/xeraTrrcDo-ta)? Wretch, you hear these very things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in a certain conversa- tion in which the question was, Who is the best philoso- pher, a man who was present said that a certain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who is pi-esent says, You are mistaken ; it is not worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he EPICTETUS. 203 know? he has only the fii'st principles, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, T will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher. — It is seen by these very things : why do you wish to show it by others? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger?^ And then when the man was wild with rage. This, he said, is the certain person : I have pointed him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece of wood ; but when any person shows the man's principles, then he shows him as a man. Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you value not at all your own will (Trpoatpeo-ts), but you look externally to things which are independent of your will ? For instance, what will a certain person say ? and what will people think of you? will you be considered a man of learning ; have you lead Chrysippus or Antipater? for if you have read Archedeuius '' also, you have every thing [that you can desire]. W hy are you still uneasy lest you should not show us who you are ? Would you let mo tell you what manner of man you have shown us that you are ? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with every thing, blaming every body, never quiet, vain : this is what you have exhibited to us. Go away now and read Arche- demus; then if a mouse should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you as it did ^ — what was the man's name ? — Crinis ; and he too was proud, because he understood Archedemus. .AVretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not concern you at all ? These things are suitable to those who are able to learn them without perturbation, to those who can say : " I am not subject to anger, to grief, to envy : I am not hindered, I am not restrained. What * To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the greatest contempt for him. ^ As to Archedemus, see ii.4, 11. 'ATre'xfiy arrauTa : tliis expression is compared by Upton with Mattlicw vi. 2, anexova-i ixicrShf. ^' Wolf sug.t^ests olos. Crinis was a Stoic philosopher mentioned by TJiogones Laeitius. We may suppose that he v.as no real philosopher, - and that he died of fright. 204 EPICTETUS. remains for me ? I have leisure, I am tranquil : let us see how we must deal with sophistical arguments ; ^ let us see how when a man has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any thing absurd." To them such things belong. To those who are happy it is appropriate to light a fire, to dine ; if they choose, both to sing and to dance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails.^ -♦o^ r CHAPTER III. WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT AVE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTISE OURSELVES. The material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty : and the body is the material for the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons) ; the land is the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances conformably to nature : and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain ; so it is its nature to be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion from the evil ; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad if feels indifferent. For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar's coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin ; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately 7 See tliis chapter above. ® Tovs orKpdpovs. On this reading the student may consnlt the note in Schweighaeuser's edition. The word a-Kpdpovs, if it is the right reading, is not clear ; nor the meaning of this conclusion. The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those only who are free from disturbing passions and are quite happy, which is not the philosopher's condition. He is compared to a sinking ship, and at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless labour of hoisting the sails. EPIOTETUS. . 205 attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any- more than persons will reject Caesar's coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man and God.^ For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relation- ship between me and my father, but there is between me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted? Yes, for such is my nature ; and this is the coin which God has given me. For this reason if the good is something different from the beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neglected), and brother and countrj^ and everything. But shall I overlook my own good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give it up to you ? Why ? I am your father. But you are not my good. I am your brother. But you are not my good. But if we place the good in a right determination of the will, the very observance of the relations of life is good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things, obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your property. But he does not injure j^ou. Your brother will have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection ? For who will eject you from this possession ? Not even Zeus, for neither has he chosen to do so ; but he has made this in my own power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it himself, free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment. When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if a man presents this coin, he receives that which is sold for it. Suppose that there comes into the province a thievish proconsul, what coin does he use? Silver coin. Show it to him, and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is an adulterer : what coin does he use ? Little girls. Take, a man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the seller, and buy [what you want]. Another is eager to possess boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. Another is fond of hunting : give him a fine nag or a dog. Though he groans and laments, he will sell for it that which you want. For another > Comp. i. 19, II, *' 206 EPICTETUS. compels him from within, he who has fixed (determined) this coin.^ Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every man whom you see, every man whom you hear ; answer as to a question, What have you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this independent of the will, or dependent ? Independent, Take it away. What have you seen ? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it awa}'. Has the proconsul met you ? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a proconsul's office? Independent of the will, or dependent on it ? Independent. Take this away also : it does not stand examination : cast it away : it is nothing to you. If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning to night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caught half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a poor man, we say, He is wretched : he has nothing to eat. We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting ? Opinion. What is bad fortune ? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is 2 Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21-23. Schweighaeuser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing willingly ; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away by the passion which rules him. The ' another ' who compels is God, Schweig. says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must postpone every thing else to that tiling in which he plnccs his Good : and he adds, that it is man's fault if he places his good in that thing, in which God has not placed it. Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is 'compelled and allows himself to be carried away,' etc. The notion of ' compulsion' is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is .mlucky. He is like him ' who sees,' as the Latin poet says, ' the Detter things and approves of them, but follows the worse.' 1 EriCTETUS. 207 trifling ? All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the w^ater, such are the appearances. When the w^ater is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are restored.^ CHAPTEE IV. AGAINST A PERSON WHO SHOWED HIS PARTIZANSHIP IN AN UNSEEM].Y WAY IN A THEATRE. The governor of Epirus having shown his favour to an actor in an unseemly way and being publicly blamed on 1his account, and afterwards having reported to Epictetus that he was blamed and that he was vexed at those who blamed him, Epictetus said, What harm have they been doing ? These men also were acting as partizans, as you Avere doing. The governor replied, Does then any person show his partizanship in this way? When they see 3^ou, said Epictetus, who are their governor, a friend of Caesar and his deputy, showing partizanship in this way, was it not to be expected that they also should show their par- tizanship in the same way? for if it is not right to show partizanship in this way, do not do so yourself; and if it is riglit, why are you angry if they followed your example ? For whom have the many to imitate except you, who are their superiors? to whose example should they look whtn . ' See Schweig-.'s note on this obscure passage. 208 EPICTETUS. tliey go to the theatre except yours ? See how the deputy of Caesar looks on : he has cried out, and I too then will cry out. He springs up from his seat, and I will spring up. His slaves sit in various parts of the theatre and call out, I have no slaves, but I will myself cry out as much as I can and as loud as all of them together. You ought then to know when you enter the theatre that you enter as a rule and example to the rest how they ought to look at the acting. Why then did they blame you? Because every man hates that which is a hindrance to him. They wished one person to be crowned; you wished another. They were a hindrance to you, and you were a hindrance to them. You were found to be the stronger ; and they did what they could ; they blamed that which hindered them. What then would you have ? That you should do what you please, and they should not even say what they please? And what is the wonder? Do not the husband- men abuse Zeus when they are hindered by him ? do not the sailors abuse him ? do they ever cease abusing Caesar ? What then? does not Zeus know? is not what is said reported to Caesar? What then does he do? he knows that, if he punished all who abuse him, he would have nobody to rule over. What then ? when jou enter the theatre, you ought to say not, Let Sophron (some actor) be crowned, but you ought to say this, Come let me maintain my will in this matter so that it shall be conformable to nature : no man is dearer to me than mj^self. It would be ridiculous then for me to be hurt (injured) in order that another who is an actor may be crowned. Whom then do I wish to gain the prize ? Why the actor who does gain the prize ; and so he will always gain the prize whom I wish to gain it. — But I wish Sophron to be crowned. — Celebrate as many games as you choose in your own house, Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympian, and proclaim him victor. But in public do not claim more than your due, nor attempt to appropriate to yourself what belongs to all. If you do not consent to this, bear being abused : for when you do the same as the many, you put yourself ,on the same level with them. EPIOTETUS. ' 209 i O A 1 CHAPTER V AGAINST THOSE WHO ON ACCOUNT OF SICKNESS GO AWAY HOME. I AM sick here, said one of the pupils, and I wish to return home. — At home, I suppose, you were free from sickness. Do you not consider whether you are doing any thing here which may be useful to the exercise of your will, that it may be corrected? For if you are doing nothing towards this end, it was to no purpose that you came. Go away. Look after your affairs at home. For if your ruling power cannot be maintained in a state conformable to nature, it is possible that your land can, that you will be able to increase your money, you will take care of your fatlier in his old age, frequent the public place, hold magisterial office : being bad you will do badly any thing else that you have to do. But if you understand j^ourself, and know that you are casting away certain bad opinions and adopting others in their place, and if you have changed your state of life from things which are not within your will to things which are within your will, and if you ever sa}^ Alas ! 3^ou are not saying what you say on account of your father, or your brother, but on account of j^ourself, do you still allege your sickness ? Do you not know that both disease and death must surprise us while we are doing something? the husbandman while he is tilling the ground, the sailor while he is on his voyage ? what would you be doing when death sui'prises you, for you must be surprised when you are doing something? If you can be doing anything better than this when you are surprised, do it. For I wish to be surprised by disease or death when I am looking after nothing else than my own will, that I may be free from perturbation, that I may be free from hindrance, free from compulsion, and in a state of libert3^ I wish to be found practising these things that I may be able to say to God, Have I in any respect transgressed thy commands ? have I in any respect wrongly used the powers which thou gavest me ? have I misused my perceptions or my preconceptions 210 EPICTETUS. (TrpoXTyi/^eo-t) ? ^ have T ever blamed tliee? have I ever found fault with thy administration? I have been sick, because it was thy will, and so have otheirs, but I was content to be sick. I have been poor because it was thy will, but I was content also. I have not filled a magisterial office, because it was not thy pleasure that I should : I have never desired it. Hast thou ever seen me for this reason discontented ? have I not always approached thee with a cheerful countenance, ready to do thy commands and to obey thy signals ? Is it now thy wdll that I should depart from the assemblage of men ? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy administration. May death surprise me while I am thinking of these things, while I am thus writing and reading. But my mother will not hold my head when I am sick. Go to your mother then ; for you are a fit person to have your head held when you are sick. — But at home I used to lie down on a delicious bed. — Go away to your bed : indeed you are fit to lie on such a bed even when you are in health : do not then lose what you can do there (at home). But what does Socrates say ? '-^ As one man, he sa^^s, is pleased with improving his land, another with improving his horse, so I am daily pleased in observing that I am growing better. Better in what? in using nice little words ? Man, do not say that. In little matters of specu- lation (d^ixyprjfjLara) ? what are you saying ? — And indeed I do not see what else there is on which philosophers employ their time. — Does it seem nothing to you to have never found fault with any person, neither with God nor man ? to have blamed nobody ? to carry the same face always in going out and coming in ? This is what Socrates knew, and yet ' On ' preconceptions,' see i. 2. ^ Xenophon (Memt»rab. i. 6, 14) ; bnt Epictetus does not; quote the words, he only gives the mt aiiin.ij:. Antoninus (viii. 43) says, ' Difter- ent things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from auy man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes, and using every thing according to its value/ EPICTETUS. 211 he never said that he knew any thing or taught any thing.^ But if any man asked for nice little words or little specu- lations, he would carry him to Protagoras or to Hippias ; and if any man came to ask for potherbs, he would carry him to the gardener. Who then among you 'has this purpose (motive to action) ? for if indeed you had it, you would both be content in sickness, and in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I say ^rhat is true.^ CHAPTER VL MISCELLANEOUS. When some person asked him how it happened that since reason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, the progress made in former times was greater. In what respect, he answered, has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the progress greater then ? For in that in which it has now been more cultivated, in that also the progress will now be found. At present it has been cultivated for the purpose of resolving syllogisms, and progress is made. But in former times it was culti- vated for the purpose of maintaining the governing faculty in a condition conformable to nature, and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are different, and do not expect, when you are labouring at one thing to make progress in another. But see if any man among us when he is intent upon this, the keeping himself in a state * Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing himself to be a virtuous man he expected to make his companions virtuous by imitating his example. (Xenophon, Memorab. 1. 2, 3.) * Upton explains this passage thus : * He who loves knows what it is to endure all things for love. If any man then being captivated with love for a girl would for her sake endure dangers and even death, what would he not endure if he possessed the love of God, the Uni* versal, the chief of beautiful things?* p 2 212 EPIOTETUS. conformable to nature and living so always, does not make progress. For yon will not find sncli a man. The good man is invincible, for he does not enter tbe contest where he is not stronger. If yon (his adversary) want to have his land and all that is on it, take the land ; take his slaves, take his magisterial office, take his poor body. But yon will not make his desire fail in that which it seeks, nor his aversion fall into that which he would avoid. The only contest into which he enters is that about things which are within the power of his will ; how then will he not be invincible ? Some person having asked him what is Common sense, Epictetus replied, As that may be called a certain Common hearing which only distinguishes vocal sounds, and that which distinguishes musical sounds is not Common, but artificial ; so there are certain things which men, who are not altogether perverted, see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named Common sense.^ It is not easy to exhort weak young men ; for neither is it easy to hold (soft) cheese with a hook.^ But those who have a good natural disposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to reason. Wherefore Eufus ^ generally attempted to discourage (his pupils), and he used this method as a test of those who had a good natural disposition and those who had not. For it was his habit to say, as a stone, if you cast it upwards, will be brought down to the earth by its own nature, so the man whose mind is naturally good, the more you repel him, the more he turns towards that to which he is naturally inclined. ^ The Greek is koIvos povs, the Commuuis sensus of the Romans, and our Common sense. Horace (Sat. i. 3, 65) speaks of a man who ' com- muni sensu plane caret,' one who has not the sense or understanding which is the common property of men. 2 This was a proverb used by Bion, as Diogenes Laertius says. The cheese was new and soft, as the antients used it. 3 Rufus is mentioned i. 1, note 12. EPICTETUS, 213 CHAPTEE VII. TO THE ADMINISTEATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN. # When the administrator ^ came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire of you who are philoso- phers,^ as those who come to a strange city inquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is the best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to man, soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It remains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we say to men ? Is the flesh the best ? and was it for this that Maximus^ sailed as far as Cas- siope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and ac- companied him that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man said that it was not, and added. Far be that from him. — Is it not fit then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best ? It is certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is better than the flesh ? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the best, are tbey better, or the good things of the worse ? The good things of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of the will or not within the power of the will ? They are within the power of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power of the will ? It is, he replied. 1 The Greek is BiopOoor-ns. The Latin word is Corrector, which occurs in inscriptions, and elsewhere. ^ The Epicureans are ironically named Philosophers, for most of them were arrogant men. See what is said of them in Cicero's De Natura Deorum, i. 8. Schweig. 3 Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against the Parthians, in which he lost his life. Dion Cassius, ii. 1108, 1126, Heimarus. Cassiope or Cassope is a city in Epirus, near the eea, and between Pandoeia and Nioopolis, where Epictetus lived. 214 EPICTETUS. And on what shall this pleasure depend ? On itself? But that can not be conceived : for there must first exist a certain substance or nature (ovala) of good, by obtaining which we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul ? for if it shall depend on things of the soul,* the substance (nature) of the good is discovered ; for good can not be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted another thing ; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But jou would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for you would then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from things of the body : and again that those bodily things must be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the good. For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh, that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts foolishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others, when he is a judge (StKao-r^,-?) and able to take it. But, if you please, let us consider this only, how this thing may be done secretly, and safely, and so that no man will know it. For not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad,^ but he admits that detection is; and because it is impossible to have security against detection, for this reason he says, Do not steal. But I say to you that if stealing is done cleverly and cautiously, we shall not be detected : further also we have powerful friends in Eomo both men and women, and the Plellenes (Greeks) are weak, and no man will venture to go up to Rome for the purpose (of complaining). Why do jon refrain from your own good ? This is senseless, foolish. But even if you tell me that you do refrain, I will not believe you. For as it is ^ ypvxiKo7s is Lord Shaftesbury's emendation in place of ay a6o7s, and it is accepted by Scliweighaeuser. ' Diogenes Laertius (x. 151), quoted by Upton. ^ Injustice,' says Epicurus, ' is not an evil iti itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on account of suspicion,* EPICTETUS. 215 impossible to assent to that which appears false, and to turn away from that which is true, so it is impossible to abstain from that which appears good. But wealth is a good thing, and certainly most efficient in producing pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth ? And why should we not corrupt our neighbor's wife, if we can do it without detection ? and if the husband foolishly prates about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house ? If you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a perfect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines, [you must act thus]. If you would not, you will not differ at all from us who are called Stoics ; for we also say one thing, but we do another : we talk of the things whicli are beautiful (good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse in the contrary way, teaching what is bad, practising what is good.*^ In the name of God, '^ are you thinking of a city of Epi- cureans ? [One man says], ' I do not marry.' — ' Nor I, for a man ought not to marn*}^ ; nor ought we to beget children, nor engage in public matters.' What then will happen ? whence will the citizens come? who will bring them up? who will be governor of the youth, who preside over gym- nastic exercises ? and in what also will the teacher instruct them ? will he teach them what the Lacedaemonians were taught, or what the Athenians were taught? Come take a young man, bring him up according to your doctrines. The doctrines are bad, subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becoming to women. Dismiss them, man. You live in a chief city : it is your duty to be a magistrate, to judge justly, to abstain from that which belongs to others ; no woman ought to seem beautiful to you except your own * The IVISS., with one exception, have doy/xaTi^cou ra KaAa, iroiwu tA aXao-KovTos). To you every thing appears small that you possess : to me all that I have appears great. Your desire is insatiable : mine is satisfied. To (children) who put their hand into a narrow- necked earthen vessel and bring out figs and nuts, this happens ; if tliey fill the hand, they cannot take it out, and then they cry. Drop a few of them and you will draw things out. And do j^ou part with j^our desires: do not desire many things and you will have what you want. 2 The Roman word * patronus,* which at that time had the sense of a protector. ^ On the syllogism named * lying ' (ypevdofievos) see Epict. ii. 17. 34. * * Murrhina vasa ' were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they were made. Pliny (xxxvii. c. 2) has something about them. \ 222 EPICTETUS. CHAPTEE X. IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS. When the need of each opinion comes, we ought to have it in readiness : ^ on the occasion of breakfast, such opinions as relate to breakfast ; in the bath, those that concern the bath ; in bed, those that concern bed. Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes Before each daily action thou hast scanuM ; What's done amiss, what done, what left undone ; From first to last examine all, and then Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice.^ And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim ' Paean Apollo.' ^ Again in fever we should have ready such opinions as concern a fever ; and we ought not, as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all. (A man who has a fever) may say : If I philosophize any longer, may I be hanged : wherever I go, I must take care of the poor bod}^, that a fever may not come.* But what is philosophizing ? Is it not a preparation against events which may happen ? Do you not understand that you are saying something of this kind ? " If I shall still prepare myself to bear with patience what happens, may I be hanged." But this is just as if a man after receiving ^ M. Antoninus, iii. 13. * As physicians have always their instru- ments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles (poy/jiaTa) ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine ; nor the contrary.' 2 These verses are from the Golden verses attributed to Pythagoras. See iv. 6. 32. 3 The beginning of a form of prayer, as in Macrobius, Sat. i. 17 : ' namque Vestales Virgines ita indigitant : Apollo Maedice, Apollo Paean.' •* This passage is obscure. See Schweig.'s note here, and also his note on s. 6. . EPICTETUS. 223 blows should give up the Pancratium. In the Pancratium it is in onr power to desist and not to receive blows. But in the other matter if we give up philosophy, what shall we gain ? What then should a man say on the occasion of each painful thing ? It was for| this that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. God s-ays to yon, Give me a proof that you have duly practised athletics,^ that you have eaten what you ought, that you have been exercised, that you have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler and rubber). Then do you show yourself weak when the time for action comes ? Now is the time for the fever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it well ; now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your power ? who shall hinder you ? The physician will hinder you from drinking; but he cannot prevent you from bearing thirst well : and he will hinder you from eating ; but he cannot prevent you from bearing hunger well. But I cannot attend to my philosophical studies.^ And for what purpose do you follow them? Slave, is it not that 3'ou may be happy, that you may be constant, is it not that you may be in a state conformable to nature and live so ? What hinders you when you have a fever from having your ruling facult}^ conformable to nature ? Here is the proof of the thing, here is the test of the philosopher. For this also is a part of life, like walking, like sailing, like journeying by land, so also is fever. Do you read when you are walking? No. Nor do j^ou when you have a fever. But if you walk about well, you have all that belongs to a man who walks. If you bear a fever well, you have all that belongs to a man in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well ? Not to blame God or man ; not to be afflicted at that which happens, to expect death well, and nobly, to do what must be done : when the physician comes in, not to be frightened at what he says ; nor if ho PQ-ys, *you are doing well,'^ to be overjoyed. For what good has he told you? and when you were in health, what good was that to you ? And even if he says, ' you ^ et voixijjLws i)9K7}(ras. * St. Paul hath made use of this very exprcs- eion eav ixT) vojxi^cjos a9\r)(Tr), 2 Tim. ii. 3.* Mrs. Carter. ^ The Greek is ov (piKo\oyw, See Schweighaeuser*s note. ' See ii. 18. 14. 224 EPICTETUS. are in a bad way,' do not despond. For what is it to be ill ? is it that you are near the severance of the soul and the body ? what harm is there in this ? If you are not near now, will you not afterwards be near ? Is the world going to be turned upside down when you are dead? Why then do you flatter the physician ? ^ Why do you say if you please, master, I shall be well ? ^ Why do you give him an opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud ; or showing his importance)?^'' Do you not value a physician, as you do a shoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a carpenter when he is building your house, and so treat the physician as to the body which is not yours, but by nature dead ? He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this : if he does these things, he has what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to look after these externals, neither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own ruling power. But as to externals how must he act ? so far as not to be careless about them. Where then is there reason for fear ? where is there then still reason for anger, and of fear about what belongs to others, about things which are of no value ? For we ought to have these two principles in readiness, that except the will nothing is good nor bad; and that we ought not to lead events, but to follow them.^^ — My brother ^2 ought not to have behaved thus to me. — No ; but he will see to that : and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself towards him as I ought. For this is my own business : that belongs to another ; no man can pre- vent this, the other thing can be hindered. ^ Et quid opus Cratero magnos promittere monies ? Persius, ill. Go. . Craterus was a physician. ^ Upton compares Matthew, viii. 2. * Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean/ '° Compare M. Antoninus, iv. 48. ras o^pOs. . .(rva-irdo-ai/res. ^^ To this Stoic precept Horace (Epict. i. 1. 19) opposes that of Aristippus. Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor. Both wisely said, if they are rightly taken. Schweig., who refers to i. 12. 17. ^2 Lord Shaftesbury proposed to read rhv larpov for rhv h.Z^K s nearly what Epicharmus said, quoted by Plutarch, irapafivd. irphs ^hiroWcaviov, vol. i. p. 435 ed. Wytt. crvveKpidt) Ka\ dieKplOri koI aTr7i\6€j/ *66€P ^XOe irdhiv^ ya fihu is yav, irv€u/xa S' &vca ' ri rcDvSe xaA€7r(Ji/ ; ou5e eV. Euripides in a fragment of the Chrysippus, fr. 836, ed. Nauck, says Ttt fiev €/c yaias ♦- CHAPTEE XVI. THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE WITH MEN. If a man has frequent intercourse with others either for talk, or drinking together, or generally for social purposes, he must either become like them, or change them to his * Eufus was a philosopher. See i. 1, i. 9. Galba is the emperor Galba, who was murdered. The meaning of the passage is rather obscure, and it is evident that it does not belong to this chapter. Lord Shaftesbury remarks that this passage perhaps belongs to chapter 11 or 14, or perhaps to the end of chapter 17. EPICTETUS. 237 own fashion. For if a man places a piece of quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, either the quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning charcoal will light that which is quenched. Since then the danger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such intimacies with those of the common sort, and remember that it is impossible that a man can keep com- pany with one who is covered with soot without being- partaker of the soot himself. For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, about horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men ? Such a person is bad, such a person is good : this was well done, this was done badly. Further, if he scoff, or lidicule, or show an ill-natured disposition ? Is any man among us prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, so that as soon as he lias touched the strings, he discovers which are dis- cordant, and tunes the instrument ? such a power as Socrates had who in all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his own purpose? How should you have this power? It is therefore a necessary consequenco that you are carried about by the common kind of people. Why then are they more powerful than you ? Because they utter these useless words from their real opinions : but you utter your elegant words only from your lips ; for this reason they are without strength and dead, and it is nauseous ^ to listen to your exhortations and your miser- able virtue, which is talked of every where (up and down). In this way the vulgar have the advantage over you : for every opinion (Soy/xa) is strong and invincible. Until then the good (/co/xi/^at) sentiments (i»7roX>Ji/^€ts) are fixed in you, and you shall have acquired a certain power for your security, I advise you to be careful in your association with common persons : if you are not, every day like wax in the sun there will be melted away whatever you inscribe on your minds in the school. Withdraw then yourselves far from the sun so long as you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason also philosophers advise men to leave their native country, because antient habits distract them and do not allow a beginning to be 1 r The word is criKxavai. See Antoninus v. 9. 238 EPICTETUS. made of a different habit ; nor can we tolerate tliose who meet us and say : See such a one is now a philosopher, who was once so and so. Thus also physicians send those who have lingering diseases to a different country and a different air ; and they do right. Do you also introduce other habits than those which you have ; fix your opinions and exercise yourselves in them. But you do not so : you go hence to a spectacle, to a show of gladiators, to a place of exercise (iva-Tov), to a circus; then you come back hither, and again from this place you go to those places, and still the same persons. And there is no pleasing (good) habit, nor attention, nor care about self and observation of this kind. How shall I use the appearances presented to me ? according to nature, or contrary to nature ? how do I answer to them ? as I ought, or as I ought not ? Do I say to those things which are independent of the will, that they do not concern me ? For if you are not yet in this state, fly from your former habits, fly from the common sort, if you intend ever to begin to be something. CHAPTER XVII. ON PROVIDENCE. When you make any charge against Providence, consider, and you will leani that the thing has happened according to reason. — Yes, but the unjust man has the advantage. — In what ? — In money. — Yes, for he is superior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, and is watchful. \Vhat is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage over you in being faithful, in being modest : for you will not find it to be so ; but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you have the advantage. And I once said to a man who was vexed because Philostorgus was fortunate : Would you choose to lie with Sura ? ^ — ^ Upton suggests that Sura may be Palfurius (Juvenal, iv. 53), or Palfuriua Sura (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 13), EPICTETUS. 239 May it never happen, he replied, that this day should come ? Why then are you vexed, if he receives something in return for that which he sells ; or how can you consider him happy who acquires those things by such means as you abominate ; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives the better things to the better men? Is it not better to be modest than to be rich ? — He admitted this — Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess the better thing? Remember then always and have in readiness the truth, that this is a law of nature, that the superior has an ad- vantage over the inferior in that in which he is superior ; and you will never be vexed. But my wife treats me badly. — Well, if any man asks you what this is, say, my wife treats me badl^^ — Is there then nothing more? Nothing. — My father gives me nothing — [What is this ? my father gives me nothing — Is there nothing else then ? — Nothing] ^ : but to say that this is an evil is something which must be added to it exter- nally, and falsely added. For this reason we must not get rid of poverty, but of the opinion about poverty, and then we shall be happy. CHAPTER XVIII. THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE DISTURBED BY ANY NEWS. When any thing shall be reported to you which is of a nature to disturb, have this principle in readiness, that the news is about nothing which is within the power of your will. Can any man report to you that you have formed a bad opinion, or had a bad desire ? By no means. But perhaps he will report that some person is dead. What then is that to you? He may report that some person speaks ill of you. What then is that to you? Or that your father is planning something or other. Against whom ? Against your will (Trpoatpco-ts) ? How can he ? But is it against your poor body, against your little pro- * Seo Schweig/s note. 240 EPICTETUS. perty ? You are quite safe : it is not against you. But the judge declares that you have committed an act of impiety. And did not the judges (StKao-Tat) make the same declaration against Socrates? Does it concern you that the judge has made this declaration ? No. Why then do 3'ou trouble yourself any longer about it ? Your father has a certain duty, and if he shall not fulfil it, he loses the character of a father, of a man of natural affection, of gentleness. Do not wish him to lose any thing else on this account. For never does a man do wrong in one thing, and suffer in another. On the other side it is your duty to make your defence firmly, modestly, without anger : but if you do not, you also lose the character of a son, of a man of modest behavior, of generous character. Well then, is the judge free from danger? No; but he also is in equal danger. Why then are you still afraid of his decision ? AVhat have you to do with that which is another man's evil ? It is your own evil to make a bad defence : be on your guard against this only. But to be condemned or not to be condemned, as that is the act of another person, so it is the evil of another person. A cer- tain person threatens you. Me? No. He blames you. Let him see how he manages his own affairs. He is going to condemn you unjustly. He is a wretched man. CHAPTEE XIX. WHAT IS THE CONDITION OF A COMMON KIND OF MAN AND OF A PHILOSOPHER. The first difference between a common person (l8Luyrrj<;) and a philosopher is this : the common person says, Woe to me for my little child, for my brother, for my father.^ The philosopher, if he shall ever be compelled to say, Woe to me, stops and says, * but for myself.' For nothing which is independent of the will can hinder cr damage ' Compare ill. 5. 4. EPICTETUS. 241 the will, and the will can only hinder or damage itself. If then we ourselves incline in this direction, so as, when we are unlucky, to blame ourselves and to remember that nothing else is the cause of perturbation or loss of tranquillity except our own opinion, I swear to you by all the gods that we have made progress. But in the present state of affairs we have gone another way from the beginning. For example, while we were still children, the nurse, if we ever stumbled through want of care, did not chide us, but would beat the stone. But what did the stone do ? Ought the stone to have moved on account of your child's folly ? Again, if we find nothing to eat on coming out of the bath, the paedagogue never checks our appetite, but he flogs the cook. Man, did we make you the paedagogue of the cook and not of the child ?2 Correct the child, improve him. In this way even when we are grown up we are like children. For he who is unmusical is a child in music ; he who is without letters is a child in learning : he who is untaught, is a child in life. -•♦•- CHAPTEE XX. THAT WE CAN DERIVE ADVANTAGE FROM ALL EXTERNAL THINGS. In the case of appearances which are objects of the vision,'^ nearly all have allowed the good and the evil to be in ourselves, and not in externals. No one gives the name of good to the fact that it is day, nor bad to the fact that it is night, nor the name of the greatest evil to the opinion that three are four. But what do men say ? They 2 I have not followed Schweighaeuser's text here. See his note. * The original is dccoprjriKMv *- CHAPTER XXIII. TO THOSE WHO READ AND DISCUSS FOE THE SAKE OF OSTENTATION.^ FiKST say to yourself \Yho you wish to be : then do accordingly what you are doing ; for in nearly all other things we see this to be so. Those who follow athletic exercises first determine what they wish to be, then they do accordingly what follows. If a man is a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of walking, rubbing, and exercise : if a man is a runner in the stadium, all these things are different ; if he is a Pentathlete, they are still more different. So you will find it also in the arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such and such things : if a worker in metal, such things. For every thing that we do, if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose ; and if we refer it to 1 Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists, Ehetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger Pliny, Juvenal, INIartial, and the author of the t-xnitL-se de Causis corruptae eloquentiae. Upton. EPICTETUS. 265 the wrong end, we shall miss the mark. Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is compre- hended in this? We must not be like a sheep, though gentle; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the particular end has reference to each person's mode of life and his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rhetorician as a rhertorician. When then you say, Come and hear me read to you : take care first of all that you are not doing this without a purpose ; then if you have discovered that you are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is the right purpose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised? Immediately you hear him saying. To me what is the value of praise from the many ? and he says well, for it is of no value to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geome- trician. Do you then wish to be useful ? in what ? tell us that we may run to your audience room. Now can a man do anything useful to others, who has not received some- thing useful himself? No, for neither can a man do any thing useful in the carpenter's art, unless he is a carpenter ; nor in the shoemaker's art, unless he is a shoemaker. Do you wish to know then if you have received any advantage? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the thing which desire promises ? Not to fail in the object. What does aversion promise? Not to fall into that which you would avoid. W^ell; do we fulfill their pit)mise ? Tell me the truth ; but if you lie, I will tell }0u. Lately when your hearers came together rather coldl3% and did not give you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when you had been praised, you went about and said to all. What did you think of me ? Wonderful, master, I swear by all that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular matter ? Which? The passage in which I described Pan and the nymphs?^ Ex- cellently. Then do you tell me that in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature? Be gone; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not praise a cer- 2 Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day Cie* lighted in. 266 IJPICTETUS. tain person contrary to your opinion? and did you not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator? Would you wish your own children to be such persons? — I hope not — Why then did you praise and flatter him? He is an ingenuous youth aad listens well to discourses — How is this? — He admires me. You have stated your proof. Then what do you think ? do not these very people secretly despise you ? When then a man who is conscious that he has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a philosopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think that he says except this, This man has some need of me ? Or tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown ? Observe ; he has been in your company a long time ; he has listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading ; has he become more modest ? has he been turned to reflect on himself? has he per- ceived in what a bad state he is ? has he cast away self- conceit ? does he look for a person to teach him ? He does. A man who will teach him to live ? No, fool, but how to talk ; for it is for this that he admires you also. Listen and hear what he says : This man writes with perfect art, much better than Dion.^ This is altogether another thing. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from perturbations ? and even if he did say it, I should say to him. Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is. And if he could not tell me, I should add this, First understand what you say, and then speak. You then, who are in a wretched plight and gaping after applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be useful to others ? — To-day many more attended my discourse. Yes, many; we suppose ^ye hundred. That is nothing; suppose that there were a thousand — Dion never had so many hearers — How could he? — And they understand what is said beautifully. What is fine, master, can move even a stone — See, these are the words of a ' Dion of Prnsa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus (golden- mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist, as the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in Greek are still extant, and some fragments of fifteen. EI»ICTETUS. 26? philosopher. This is the disposition of a man whd will do good to others ; here is a man who has listened to dis- courses, who has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. * I have often wondered by what arguments.' * Not so, but * by what argument ' : this is more exact than that — What, have you read the words at all in a different way from that in which you read little odes ? For if you read them as you ought, you would not have been attending to such matters, but you would rather have been looking to these words : ** Anytus and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me : " " and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to nothing of my own except to the reason which on inquiry seems to me the best." ^ Hence who ever heard Socrates say, " I know something and I teach;" but he used to send different people to different teachers. Therefore they used to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by him ; and he would take them and recommend them. — Not so; but as he accompanied them he would say. Hear me to-day dis- coursing in the house of Quadratus.^ Why should I hear you? Do you wish to show me that you put words together cleverly? You put them together, man; and what good will it do you ? — But only praise me. — What do you mean by praising ? — Say to me, admirable, won- derful. — . Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which philosophers mean by the name (^Karrjyopta) "^ of * These words are the beginning of Xenophon's Memorabilia, i. 1. The small critics disputed whether the text should be ricri KSyois, or rivt xSycf, ^ From the Crito of Plato, c. 6. ® The rich, says Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, a3 we learn from Pliny, Ep. viii. 12 and Juvenal, vii. 40. Si dulcedine famae Succensus recites, maculosas commodat aedes. Qnadratus is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between Socrates and Quadi'atus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do so : but he would do, as a man might do now. He would say on the road ; I hope you will come to hear me. I don't find any- thing in the notes on this passage ; but it requires explanation. ^ Kar-qyopia is one of Aristotle's common terms. ?»• 268 EPICTETUS. good, what have I to praise in you ? If it is good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you. — What then ? ought a man to listen to such things without pleasure ? — I hope not. For my part I do not listen even to a lute- player without pleasure. Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute ? Hetr what Socrates says, Nor would it he seemly for a man of my age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before you.^ Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them together, and to come forward and gracefully to read them or to speak, and while he is reading to saj^ There are not many who can do these things, I swear by all that you value. Does a philosopher invite people to hear him ? As the sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive benefit? What physician invites a man to be treated by him? Indeed I now hear that even the physicians in Eome do invite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were invited. I invite you to come and hear that things are in a bad way for you, and that you are taking care of every thing except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are ignorant of the good and the bad and are unfortunate and unhappy. A fine kind of invitation : and yet if the words of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is dead, and so is the speaker. Eufus was used to say : If you have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose.^ Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of us who were sitting there suj)posed that some one had accused him before Eufus : he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man's faults. The philosopher's school, je men, is a surgery: you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you are not in sound health when you enter : one has dislocated his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a fourth a head ache. Then do I sit and utter to • From Plato's Apology of Socrates. * Aulus Gellius v. 1. Seneca, Ep. 52, Upton. EPICTETUS. 269 you little thoiights and exclamations that you may praise me and go away, one with his shoulder in the same con- dition in which he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third with his fistula or his abscess just as they were ? Is it for this then that young men shall quit home, and leave their parents and their friends and kins- men and property, that they may say to you, Wonderful ! when you are uttering your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or Cleanthes ? What then? is there not the hortatory style? Who denies it? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these, the style of display ? What is the hortatory style? To be able to show both to one person and to many the struggle in which they are engaged, and that they think more about any thing than about what they really wish. For they wish the things w^hich lead to hap- piness, but they look for them in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thousand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen, and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I intreat you by the gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can. Nothing can have more power in exhortation than when the speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But tell me who when he hears you reading or discoursing is anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself? or when he has gone out says. The philosopher hit me well : I must no longer do these things. But does he not, even if you have a great reputation, say to some person ? He spoke finely about Xerxes ; ^° and another says. No, but about the battle of Thermopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher ? *• Cicero, de Officiis i. 18 : * Quae magno animo et fortiter excel- lenterque gesta simt,'ea nescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc Rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctria.* 270 EPICTETUS, CHAPTEE XXIV. THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT IN OUR POWER. Let not that which in another is contrary to nature be an evil to you : for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault : for God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this purpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his own, and other things not as his own : some things subject to hindrance and compulsion and deprivation ; and these things are not a man's own : but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own ; and the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes care of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own. — But you say, I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved. — Why did ho consider as his own that which belongs to another ? why, when he looked on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country? Therefore he sutlers the consequences of his own folly. But why do you ^ or for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have not thought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing, you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would always enjoy them, both places and men and conversation ; and now you sit and weep because you. do not see the same persons and do not live in the same places. — Indeed j^ou deserve this, to be more wretched than crows and ravens who have the power of flying where they please and changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas without lamenting or regretting their former condition. — Yes, but this happens to them because they are irrational creatures. — Was reason then given to us by the gods for * See Schweig.*9 note. EPICTETUS. 271 the purpose of unliappiness and misery, that we may pass our lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons be immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we ourselves not go abroad, but remain rooted like plants ; and if any of our familiar friends goes abroad, must we sit and weep ; and on the contrary, when he re- turns, must we dance and clap our hands like children? Shall we not now wean ourselves and remember what we have heard from the philosophers ? if we did not listen to them as if they were jugglers : they tell us that this world is one city,^ and the substance out of which it has been formed is one, and that there must be a certain period, and that some things must give way to others, that some must be dissolved, and others come in their place ; some to remain in the same place, and others to be moved; and that all things are full of friendship, first of the gods,^ and then of men who by nature are made to be of one family ; and some must be with one another, and others must be separated, rejoicing in those who are with them, and not grieving for those who are removed from them ; and man in addition to being by nature of a noble temper and having a contempt of all things which are not in the power of his will, also possesses this property not to be rooted nor to be naturally fixed to the earth, but to go at different times to different places, sometimes from the urgency of certain occasions, and at others merely for the sake of seeing. So it was with Ulysses, who saw Of many men the states, and learned their ways.* t And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all the inhabited world Seeing men*8 lawless deeds and their good rules of law :' casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and intro- ducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many friends do you think that he had in Thebes, how many in Argos, how many in Athens ? and how many do 2 See ii. 5, 26. * Homer, Odyssey i. 3. 3 See iii. 13. 15. * Odyssey, xvii. 487. 272 EncTETUs. you think that he gained by going about ? And he married also, when it seemed to him a proper occasion, and begot children, and left them without lamenting or regretting or leaving them as orphans ; for he knew that no man is an orphan ; but it is the father who takes care of all men always and continuously. For it was not as mere report that he had heard that Zeus is the father of men, for he thought that Zeus was his own father, and he called him so, and to him he looked when he was doing what he did. Therefore he was enabled to live happily in all places. And it is never possible for happiness and desire of what is not present to come together. For that which is happy must have all^ that it desires, must resemble a person who is filled with food, and must have neither thirst nor hunger. — But Ulysses felt a desire for his wife and wept as he sat on a rock. — Do you attend to Homer and his stories in every thing ? Or if Ulysses really wept, what was he else than an unhappy man ? and what good man is unhappy ? In truth the whole is badly administered, if Zeus does not take care of his own citizens that they may be happy like himself. But these things are not lawful nor right to think of: and if Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man. For who is good if he knows not who he is ? and who knows what he is, if ho forgets that things which have been made are perishable, and that it is not possible for one human being to be with another always ? To desire then things which are impos- sible is to have a slavish character, and is foolish : it is the part of a stranger, of a man who fights against God in the only way that he can, by his opinions. But my mother laments when she does not see me. — Why has she not learned these principles ? and I do not say this, that we should not take care that she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in every way what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is another's sorrow : but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means, for it is in my power : and the sorrow of another I will endeavour to stop as far as I can ; but I will not attempt to do it by ever}^ means ; • avex^Lv, See iii. 2, 13. Paul to the PhiliiDpians, iv. 18. iEPICTETUg. 273 for if I do, I shall be fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus and shall be placing myself against him in the administration of the universe ; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against God and of this disr obedience not only will the children of my children pay, but I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillity depending on the letters of others.— Some person has arrived from Eome. I only hope that there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you, where you are not? — From Hellas (Greece) some one is come : I hope that there is no harm. — In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, and must you be so even beyond sea, and by the report of letters ? Is this the way in which your affairs are in a state of security? — Well then suppose that my friends have died in the places which are far from me. — What else have they suffered than that which is the condition of mortals ? Or how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age, and at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you love ? Know you not that in the course of a long time many and various kinds of things must happen; that a fever shall overpower one, a robber an- other, and a third a tyrant? Such is the condition of things around us, such are those who live with us in the world : cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of^ivin^^^and journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and various circumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, lamenting, unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent not on one or two, but on ten thousands upon ten thousands. Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers ? did you learn this? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one man must keep watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third must fight ? and it is not pos- sible that all should be in one place, nor is it b^ter that it should be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the general complain when any thing more hard than T 274 EPICTETUS. •usual is imposed on you, and 3'ou do not observe wliat you make the army become as far as it is in your power ; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man will put a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, but will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in a vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And if you are ordered to climb the mast, refuse ; if to run to the head of the ship, refuse ; and what master of a ship will endure you? and will he not pitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad example to the other sailors ? And so it is here also : every man's life is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observe the duty of a soldier and do every thing at the nod of the general ; if it is possible, divining what his wishes are: for there is no resemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor in superiority of character. You are placed in a great office of command and not in any mean place ; but you are always a senator. Do you not know that such a man must give little time to the affairs of his household, but be often away from home, either as a governor or one who is governed, or discharging some office, or serving in war or acting as a judge? Then do you tell me that you wish, as a plant, to be fixed to the same places and to be rooted? — Yes, for it is pleasant. — Who says that it is not ? but a soup is pleasant, and a handsome woman is pleasant. What else do those say who make pleasure their end ? Do you not see of what men you have uttered the language ? that it is the language of Epicureans and catamites ? Next while you are doing what they do and holding their opinions, do you speak to us the words of Zeno and of Socrates ? Will you not throw away as far as you can the things belonging to others with which you decorate yourself, though they do not fit you at all ? For what else do they desire than to sleep without hindrance and free from com- pulsion, and when they have risen to yawn at their leisure, and to wash the face, then write and read what they choose, and then talk about some trifling matter being praised by their friends whatever they may say, then to go forth for a walk, and having walked about a little to bathe, and then EPICTETUS. 275 eat and slc^ep, sucli sleep as is the fashion of such men ? why need we say how? for one can easily conjecture. Come, do you also tell your own way of passing the time which you desire, you who are an admirer of truth and of Socrates and Diogenes. What do you wish to do in Athens? the same (that others do), or something else? Why then do you call yourself n Stoic ? Well, but they who falsely call themselves Koman citizens,^ are severely punished ; and should those, who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing and name, get off unpunished? or is this not possible, but the law divine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the severest punishments from those who commit the greatest crimes ? For what does this law say ? Let him who pretends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a vain-glorious man : ^ let him who disobeys the divine administration be base, and a slave ; let him suffer grief, let him be envious, let him pity ; ^ and in a word let him be unhappy and lament. Well then ; do you wish me to pay court to a certain person ? to go to his doors ?^^ — If reason requires this to be done for the sake of country, for the sake of kinsmen, for the sake of mankind, why should you not go ? You are not ashamed to go to the doors of a shoemaker, when you are in want of shoes, nor to the door of a gardener, when you want lettuces ; and are you ashamed to go to the doors of the rich when you want any thing ? — Yes, for I have no awe of a shoemaker — Don't feel any awe of the rich — Nor ' Suetonius (Claudius, 25) says: *Peregrinae conditionis homines vetuit usurpare Romana nomina, duntaxat gentilia. Civitatem Romanam usurpantes in campo Esqiiilino securi percussit.' Upton. * This is a denunciation of the hypocrite. ^ * Pity ' perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity, when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning. 10 t^Yhat follows hath no connection with what immediately pre- ceded; but belongs to the general subject of the chapter.' Mrs Carter. * The person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems to have been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, iii. 4. 1) and to visit his house.* Schweig* T 2 276 EPICTETUS. will I flatter tlie gardener — And do not flatter the rich- How then shall I get what I want ? — Do I say to you, go as if you were certain to get what you want ? And do not I only tell you, that you may do what is becoming to your- self? Why then should I still go? That you may have gone, that you may have discharged the duty of a citizen, > of a iDrother, of a friend. And further remember that you have gone to the shoemaker, to the seller of vegetables, who have no power in any thing great or noble, though he may sell dear. You go to buy lettuces : they cost an oboliis (penny), but not a talent. So it is here also. The matter is worth going for to the rich man's door — Well, I will go — It is worth talking about — Let it be so ; I will talk with him — But you must also kiss his hand and flatter him with praise — Away with that, it is a talent's worth : it is not profitable to me, nor to the state nor to my friends, to have done that which spoils a good citizen and a friend. — But you will seem not to have been eager about the matter, if you do not succeed. Have you again forgotten why you went ? Know you not that a good man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right ? — What advantage is it then to him to have done right ? — And what advantage is it to a man who writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought ? — The advantage is to have written it. — Is there no reward then ^^ ? — Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just ? At Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and *^ The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few- people believe it ; and like the man here, they inquire what reward they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer : ' For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it ? just as if the eye de- manded a recompense for seeing or the feet for walking.' M. Anto- ninus, ix. 42. Compare Seneca, dc Vita Beata, c. 9. EPICTETUS. 277 liappy? For these purposes being introduced by tlie gods into this city (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their weeping moA^e you and make you effeminate? Will you thus never cease to be a foolish child ? know you not that he who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is ? In Athens did you see no one by going to his house? — I visited any man Ihat I pleased — Here also be ready to see, and you will see whom you please ; only let it be without meanness, neither with desire nor with aversion, and your affairs will be well managed. But this result does not depend on going nor on standing at the doors, but it depends on what is within, on your opinions. When you have learned not to value things which are external and not dependent on the will, and to consider that not one of them is your own, but that these things only are your own, to exercise the judgment well, to form opinions, to move towards an object, to desire, to turn from a thing, where is there any longer room for flattery, where for meanness ? why do you still long for the quiet there (at Athens), and for the places to which you are accustomed ? Wait a little and you will again find these places familiar : then, if you are of so ignoble a nature, again if you leave these also, weep and lament. How then shall I become of an affectionate temper ? By being of a noble disposition, and happy. For it is not reasonable to be mean-spirited nor to lament yourself, nor to depend on another, nor ever to blame God or man. I entreat you, become an affectionate person in this way, by observing these rules. But if through this affection, as you name it, you are going to be a slave and wretched, there is no profit in being affectionate. And what prevents you from loving another as a person subject to mortality, as one who may go away from you. Did not Socrates love his own children ? He did ; but it was as a free man, as one who remembered that he must first be a friend to the gods. For this reason he violated nothing which was be- coming to a good man, neither in making his defence nor 278 EPICTETUS. by fixing a penalty on liimself,^^ nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier. But we are fully supplied with every pretext for being of ignoble temper, some for the sake of a child, some for a mother, and others for brethren's sake. But it is not fit for us to be unhappy on account of any person, but to be happy on account of all, but chiefly on account of God who has made us for this end. Well, did Diogenes ^^ love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so much labour and bodily sufferings ? He did love mankind, but how? As became a minister of God, at the same time caring for men, and being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth was his country, and no particular place ; and when he was taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and friends there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to improve them ; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as before at Athens ; and he would have behaved the same, if he had gone to the country of the Perrhaebi.^^ Thus is freedom acquired. For this reason he used to say. Ever since Antisthenes made me free, I have not been a slave. How did Antisthenes make him free ? Hear what he says : Antisthenes taught me what is my own, and what is not my own ; possessions are not my own, nor kinsmen, domestics, friends, nor reputation, nor places familiar, nor mode of life ; all these belong to others. What then is your own? The use of appearances. This he showed to me, that I possess it free from hindrance, and from com- " It was the custom at Athens when the court (the dicasts) had de- termined to convict an accused person, in some cases at least, to ask him what penalty he proposed to be inflicted on himself; but Socrates refused to do this or to allow his friends to do it, for he said that to name the penalty was the same as admitting his guilt (Xenophon, Apologia, 23). Socrates said that if he did name a proper penalty for himself, it would be that he should daily be allowed to dine in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apology, c. 26 ; Cicero, De Oratore, i. 54). ^* The character of Diogenes is described very differently by Epic- tetus from that which we read in common books. ^* A people in Thessaly between the river Peneius and Mount Olympus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country. EPICTETUS. 279 pulsion, no person can put an obstacle in my way, no person can force me to use appearances otherwise than I %vish. Who then has any power over me? Philip or Alexander, or Perdiccas or the great king ? How have they this power ? For if a man is going to be overpowered by a man, he must long before be overpowered by things. If then pleasure is not able to subdue a man, nor pain, nor fame, nor wealth, but he is able, when he chooses, to spit out all his poor body in a man's face and depart from life, whose slave can he still be ? But if he dwelt with pleasure in Athens, and was overpowered by this manner of life, his affairs would have been at every man's command ; the stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How do you think that Diogenes would have flattered the pirates that they might sell him to some Athenian, that some time he might see that beautiful Piraeus, and the Long Walls and the Acropolis ? In what condition would you see them ? As a captive, a slave and mean : and what would be the use of it for you ? — Not so : but I should see ihem as a free man — Show me, how you would be free. Observe, some person has caught j^ou, who leads you away from your accustomed place of abode and says, You are my slave, for it is in my power to hinder you from living as you please, it is in my power to treat you gently, and to humble you : when I choose, on the contrary you are cheerful and go elated to Athens. What do you say to him who treats you as a slave ? What^ means have you of finding one who will rescue you from slavery ?^^ Or cannot you even look him in the face, but without saying more do you intreat to be set free ? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison, hastening, going before those who lead you there. Then, I ask you, are you unwilling to live in Eome an^ desire to live in Hellas (Greece) ? And when you must die, will you then also fill us with your lamentations, because you will not see Athens nor walk about in the Lyceion ? Have you gone abroad for this ? was it for this ; reason you have sought to find some person from whom you might receive benefit? What benefit? That you may I ** On the word Kapiria-r-fju see the notes in Schweig/s edition. The word is supposed to be formed from /capTrts, Kapcpisj festucft. 280 EPICTETUS. solve syllogisms more readily, or handle hypotlietical arguments? and for this reason did you leave brother, country, friends, your family, that you might retiim when you had learned these things ? So you did not go abroad to obtain constancy of mind, nor freedom from perturbation, nor in order that being secure from harm you may never complain of any person, accuse no person, and no man may wrong you, and thus you may maintain your relative position without impediment? This is a fine traffic that you have gone abroad for in syllogisms and sophistical arguments ^^ and hypothetical: if you like, take your place in the agora (market or public place) and proclaim them for sale like dealers in physic. ^^ Will you not deny even all that you have learned that you may not bring a bad name on your theorems as useless ? What harm has philosophy done you? Wherein has Chrysippus injured you that you should prove by your acts that his labours are useless ? Were the evils that you had there (at home) not enough, those which were the cause of your pain and lamentation, even if you had not gone abroad ? Have you added more to the list ? And if you again have other acquaintances and friends, you will have more causes for lamentation ; and the same also if you take an affection for another countrj^ Why then do you live to surround yourself with other sorrows upon sorrows through which you are unhappy? Then, 1 ask you, do you call this affection ? What affection, man ! If it is a good thing, it is the cause of no evil : if it is bad, I have nothing to do with it. I am formed by nature for my own good : I am not formed for my own evil. What then is the discipline for this purpose ? First of all the highest and the principal, and that which stands as it were at the entrance, is this ; when you are delighted with anything, be delighted as with a thing which is not ^•^ MeTaTriirTovras. See i. 7. "^ , , ^^ This is an old practice, to go about and sell physic to people. Cicero (Pro Cluentio, c. 14) speaks of such a quack (pharinacopola), who would do a poisoning job for a proper sum of money. I have seen a travelling doctor in France who went about in a cart, and rang a bell,, at the sound of which people came round him. Some who were deaf had stuff poured into their ears, paid their money, and made way for others who had other complaints. EPICTETUS. 281 one of those whicli cannot be taken away, but as with something of such a kind, as an earthen pot is, or a glass cup, that when it has been broken, you may remember what it was, and may not be troubled. So in this matter also : if j^ou kiss your own child, or your brother or friend, never give full license to the appearance ((j^avTao-Lav), and allow not your pleasure to go as far as it chooses ; but check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their triumphs and remind them that they are mortal. ^^^ Do you also remind yourself in like manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what you love is nothing of your own : it has been given to you for the present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it been given to you for all time, but as a &g is given to you or a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. So if you wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to 3'ou, you must know that you are wishing for a fig in winter.^^ For such as winter is to a fig, such is every event which happens from the universe to the things which are taken away according to its nature. And further, at the times when you are delighted with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances. What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with a lisping voice, To-morrow 3'ou will die; and to a friend also, To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never shall we see one another again? — But these are words of bad omen — And some incantations also are of bad omen ; but because they are useful, I don't care for this ; only let them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen except those which are significant of some evil ? Cowardice is a word of bad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and grief and shamelessness. These words- are of bad omen : and yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to protect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which is significant of any natural thing is of evil omen ? say that even for the ears of corn to be *^ It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a slave to stand behind the triumphant general in his cliariot and to remind him that he was btill mortal. Juvenal, x. 41. ^ ^^ Compare Antoninus xi. 33 and 34. 282 EPICTETUS. reaped is of bad omen, for it signifies the destrnction of the ears, but not of the world. Say that the falling of the leaves also is of bad omen, and for the dried fig to take the place of the green ^g, and for raisins to be made from the grapes. For all these things are changes from a former state into other states ; not a destruction, but a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is going away from home and a small change : such is death, a greater change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now.^o — Shall I then no longer exist? — You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need : '^^ for you also came into existence not when you chose, but when the world had need of you. 22 **^ Marcus AntonJlius, xi. 35. Compare Epict., iii. 13, 14, and iv. 7. 75. ^^ Upton altered the text ovkcti olv earofxai ; Ouk tcrri • ctA-A* ISlWo tl, ov vvv 6 K6 which means what I have translated. The purpose of circumvallation was to take and sometimes also to destroy a fortress. Schweig. translates the word by *destruam,' and that is perhaps not contrary to the moaning of the text; but it is not the exact meaning of the word. 308 EPICTETUS. my movements lowards action (opiju^v) in obedience to God.^^ Is it his will that I shall have fever ? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any thing? It is my wish also.^^ Does he not will? I do not wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the rack ? It is my will then to die : it is my will then to be put to the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hinder or compel Zeus. Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers ; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companion- ship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world ^"^ the wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. Where is there any place of refuge ? how shall he pass along without being attacked by robbers ? what company shall he wait for that he may pass along in safety ? to whom shall he attach himself? To what person generally? to the rich man, to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me and becomes my robber, what shall I do ? I will be a friend of Caesar : when I am Caesar's companion no man will wa'ong me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what things must I endure and ^® In this passage and in what follows we find the emphatic affirma- tion of the duty of conformity and of the suhjection of man's will to the will of Qod. The words are conclusive evidence of the doctrine of Epictetus that a man ought to subject himself in all things to the will of God or to that which he believes to be the will of God. No Christian martyr ever proclaimed a more solemn obedience to God's will. The Christian martyr indeed has given perfect proof of his sincerity by endm-ing torments and death : the heathen philosopher was not put to the same test, and we cannot therefore say that he would have been able to bear it. ^^ In this passage the distinction must be observed between OeXcD and BovKofjLai, which the Latin translators have not observed, nor Mrs. Carter. See Schweig.'s note on s. 90. 2* iy rc^ K6(rfi(i> : he means * on earth.' EPICTETUS. 309 snfter? how often and by how many must 1 t)e robbed? Then, it' I become Caesar's friend, he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire ? Into a desert ? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done then? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faithful one, strong, secure against all surprises ? Thus he considers and per- ceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey in safety. How do you understand * attaching yourself to God ?* In this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will; and what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then shall this be done ? In what other way than by examining the movements (6/3/>ta9, the acts) of God^^ and his administration? What has he given to me as my own and in my own power? what has he reserved to himself? He has given to me the things which are in the power of the will (to. irpoatp^TiKa) : he has put them in my power free from impediment and hindrance. How was he able to make the earthy body free from hindrance ? [He could not], and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole (ttj tCjv oXwv irepLoSw)^'^ possessions, household things, house, children, wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what does not depend on the will? why do I will to have absolutely what is not granted to me ? But how ought I to will to have things ? In the way in which they are given and as long as they are given. But he who has given takes away.^^ Why then do I resist ? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For whence had I things when I came into the world? — • 2^ Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word {bpfjLois) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it * Dei appetitionem/ and Upton ' impetum.' He says that he has translated it ' consinum.' It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words in which they speak of man. 32 See ii. 1. 18. Schweig. expected that Epictetus would have said * body and possessions etc' I assume that Epictetus did say * body and possessions etc./ and that his pupil or some copyist of MSS. has omitted the word * body.* 33 'The Lord gave und the Lord hath taken a^'ey. Job i. 21.' Mrs, Carter. 310 EPICTETUS. My father gave tliem to me — And who gave them to him ? and who made the snn ? and who made the fruits of the earth ? and who the seasons ? and who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship ? Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are yon angry and do you blame the giver if he takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world ? Did not he (God) introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he not intro- duce you as subject to deathj and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen ? — No ; but I would still enjoy the feast. — The initiated too would wish to be longer in the initiation :^* and jDcrhaps also those at Olympia to see other athletes ; but the solemnity is ended : go away like a grateful and modest man ; make room for others : others also must be born, as you were, and being born they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains ? Why are you in- satiable ? Why are you not content ? why do you contract the world ? — Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife — What, are they yours ? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who made you ? then will you not give up what belongs to others ? will you not give way to him who is superior ? — Why then did he introduce me into the world on these conditions ? — And if the conditions do not suit you, depart.^^ He has no need of a spectator who ^* The initiated (/xvo-rai) are those who were introduced with solemn ceremonies into some great rehgious body. These ceremonies are de- scribed by Dion Prus. Orat. xii., quoted by Upton. ^^ "And is this all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can give to the good man under severe distress? 'Either tell yourself that present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your existence and mingle with the elements of the Universe * ! Unspeakably more rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blcsticd EIICTETUS. 811 is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the fe^iival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly (Train^yvpis) ; for they did not when they were present be- have as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place XDroperly, but they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions ; not seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, free- dom. — For what purpose then have I received these things ? — To use them — How long ? — So long as he who has lent them chooses. — ^What if they are necessary to me ? — Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary : do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary. This study you ought to practise from morning to even- ing, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small estate in land : then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. Look all round and throw these things from you (which are not yours). Purge 3'Our opinions, so that nothing cleave to you of the things which are not 3^our own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you ;^^ and say, while you Master's exhortation to the persecuted Christian : * Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven.' '* Mrs. Carter. I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, as he assumes, behevers in God or in the Gods, and his argument is that a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are from God. If he cannot be contented with things as they are, and make the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also ' a beUever in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to him also. The case is past help or advice. The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is * very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. *<* See the note of Schweig. on this passage. 312 EPICTETUS. are daily exercising yourself as you do there (in tfie school), not tliat you are pliilosopliizing, for this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are presenting an asserter of freedom :^^ for this is really freedom. To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For this reason when he was taken prisoner,^^ how did he behave to the pirates ? Did he call any of them master ? and I do not speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of the state of mind, by which the word is pro- duced. How did he reprove them for feeding badly their captives ? How was he sold ? Did he seek a master ? no ; but a slave. And when he was sold how did he behave to his master ?^^ Immediately he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner ; and about the children he told them how he ought to bring them up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had bought an exorcise master, would he have emplo3'ed him in the exer- cises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master? and so if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in ever}^ matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then generally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than master ? For who is master in a ship ? The man who governs the helm ? Why ? Because he who will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then without suffering for it ? So I also used to think. But because he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is not in his power : and no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains?**^ what do j^ou think that is? The fact of putting the slave in chains : — and you also will admit this, ^' The word is Kapirla-Trjp Bidccs. See iii. 24. 76 and the note 15 : also Upton's note on this passage. Schweig. says that he does not quite understand why Epictetus here says diddpai Kafnria-Trjy, * dare vindicem * or * adsertorem/ instead of saying ' vindicare sese in hbertatem.' 3« See iii. 24. 66, ii. 13. 24. ^^ See the same story in Aulus Gellius (ii. c. 18), who says that Xeniades, a Corinthian, bought Diogenes, manumitted him and made him the master of his children. *® See Schweig.'s note 15, EPICTETUS. 813 if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly ? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then is a man's nature ? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead? No; but to do good, to co-operate with others, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condition, whether you chose to admit it or not, when he is acting foolishly. Socrates then did not fare badly? — No; but his judges and his accusers did. — Nor did Helvidius*^ at Eome fare badly ? — No ; but his murderer did. How do you mean ? — The same as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when he has gained the victory and been severely wounded ; but that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and is unhurt : nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pursues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating,*^ when you see him in pain and panting violently after running. What paradox (un- usual thing) do we utter if we say that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing ? Is this a paradox ? for do you not say this in the case of all other things ? Why then in the case of man only do you think differently ? But because we say that the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you will not say that this is a paradox?*^ It is not — What then is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded ? does he not, if ho suffers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and profit ? But is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or viper or wasp ? Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is .free, to whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be ; but he who can be restrained or com- pelled or hindered, or thrown into any circumstances *^ See i. 2, note 5. *2 I do not know if dogs sweat ; at least in a state of health I liave never seen it. But this is a question for the learned in dog science. ^' See Schweig.'s note. 314 EPICTETUS. against Iris will, is a slave. But who is free from restraint ? He who desires nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what are the things which belong to others ? Those which are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner.^^ Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to another, possession (property) belongs to another. If then you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pa}^ the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from slavery, to be ablo to say at last with all your soul Lead me, O Zeus, and tliou O destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go.*** But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not ? Answer me — Let me consider — Will you consider now ? But when you were in the school, what was it which you used to consider ? Did you not study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what things are neither one nor the other ? — I did. — What then was our opinion? — That just and honourable acts were good ; and that unjust and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad. — Is life a good thing? — No. — Is death a bad thing? — No. — Is prison? — No. — But what did we think about mean and faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant ? — That they are bad. — Well then, you are not considering, nor have you considered nor de- liberated. For what. is the matter for consideration, is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to avoid) the greatest evils ? A fine inquiry indeed, and necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you mock us ? Such an inquiry is never raade. If you really ** As Upton remarks, Epictetus is referring to the four categories of the Stoics. " Epictetus, Encheiridion c. 52. M. Antoninus, Gatak. 2d. ed. 1697, Annot. p. 96. EPTCTETUS. 315 imagined tliat base things were bad and honourable things Avere good, and that all other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have approached this enquiry, nor have come near it ; but immediately you would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses ? How then do you now say that you are consider- ing whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more than things which are bad ? But you do not possess these opinions ; and neither do these things seem to you to be neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest evils ; nor do you think those other things (mean and faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have accustomed yourself. Where am I? In the schools : and are any listening to me ? I am discours- ing among philosophers. But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of scholars and fools. Thns a friend is overpowered by the testimony of a philosopher : '^^ thus a philosopher becomes a parasite ; thus he lets him- self for hire for money : thus in the senate a man does not s ly what he thinks ; in private (in the school) he proclaims his opinions.^''^ You are a cold and miserable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a hair. But keep your- self strong and fit for the uses of life and initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the report) ? — I do not say, that your child is dead — for how could you bear that? — but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by 3'ou while you are making a great noise, may say this only, Philo- *« Stoicus occidit Baream, delator amicum, Discipulumque eenex. Juvenal, iii. 116. Epictetns is supposed to allude to the crime of Eguatius Celer who accused Barea Soranus at Rome in the reign of Nero (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 32). ^^ Mrs. Carter says that 'there is much obscurity and some variety of reading in several lines of the original.' But see Schweig.'s notes. Epictetus is showing that talk about philosophy is useless ; philosophy fihould be practical. 316 EPICTETUS. soplier, yon say sometliing different in the school. AVhy do you deceive us ? Why, when you are only a worm, do you say that you are a man ? I should like to be present when some of the philosophers is lying with a woman, that I might see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is uttering, and whether he remembers his title of philo- sopher, and the words which he hears or says or reads. ~ And what is this to liberty ? Nothing else than this, whether you who are rich choose or not. — And who is your evidence for this ? — who else than yourselves ? who have a powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedi- ence to his nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a scowling countenance; you who court old women*^ and old men, and say, I cannot do this: it is not in my power. Why is it not in your power ? Did you not lately contend with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla^^ has hindered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one to assert your freedom {KapiTia-rrjv), when you have so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the strength to follow it, one might consider him still more worthy cf excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a manner a divine power.^^ But who could endure you who are in ^® Horace Sat. 11. 5. ^^ Aprulla is a Roman woman's name. It means some old woman wlio is courted for her money. ** Compare Plato (Symposimn, p. 206) : * All men conceive both as to the body and as to the soul, and when they have arrived at a certain age, our nature desires to procreate. But it cannot procreate in that which is ugly, but in that which is beautiful. For the conjunction of man and woman is generation; but this act is divine, and this in the animal which is mortal is divine, conceiving and begetting.' See what is said in ii. 23, note 10 on marrying. In a certain sense the procreation of children is a duty, and consequently the providing for them is also a duty. It is the fulfilling of the will and purpose of the Deity to people the earth ; and therefore the act of procreation is divine. So a man's duty is to labour in some way, and if necessary, to earn his living and sustain the life which he lias received; and this is also a divine act. Paul's opinion of marriage is contained in\Or. i. 7. Some of his teach- ing on this matter has been justly condemned. He has no conception of the true nature of marriagr ; at least he does not show that he lias in EPICTETUS. 817 love with old women and old men, and wipe the old women's noses, and wash them and give them presents, and also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead, and question the physicians whether they are sick unto death ? And again, when in order to obtain these great and much admired magistracies and honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your consulship, who gave it to you ? I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help of Felicion^^ and endure his arrogance and servile insolence : for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. You then, a man may say, are you free ? I wish, by the Gods, and pray to be free ; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire.^^ But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free ? — not because he was born of free parents,^^ but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it : if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg ; if of all his body, all his poor body ; his intimates, friends, country, just the same. For he knew this chapter. His t'eaching is impracticable, contrary to that of Epictetiis, and to the natiure and constitution of man ; and it is rejected by the good sense of Christians who affect to receive his teaching ; except, I suppose, by the superstitious body of Christians, who recommend and commend the so-called religious, and unmarried life. *» Felicion. See i. 19, p. 62. ^2 Epictetus alludes to his lameness : compare i. 8. 14, i. 16. 20, and other passages. Upton. *' Schweig. doubts if the words ov yap ^Vy which I have omitted, are genuine, and gives his reasons for the doubt. S18 EPICTETUS. from whence be had them, and from whom, and on w^hat conditions. His true parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remem- bered that every thing which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it.^* Therefore see what Dio- genes himself says and writes: — ''For this reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the Lacedaemonians, as you please." Was it because he was born of free parents ? I suppose all the Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not talk wdth them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. \Vhy then does he say that it is in his power ? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want nothing, because law ^^ is every thing to me, and nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to bo free. And that you may not think that I show you the ex- ample of a man who is a solitary person,^^ who has neither wife nor children, nor country, nor friends nor kinsmen, by whom he could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not consider them as his own ; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit ; friends and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in w^ar he exposed himself to danger ^"^ Schweig, has a note on this difiScult passage, which is rather obscure. ^^ The sense of * law' (o i/6ijlos) can be collected from what follows. Compare the discourse of Socrates on obedience to the law. (Criton. c. II, &c.) ^^ See Schweig.'s note on airepiaroirov. EPICTETUS. 31& most unsparingly ; ^^ and when he was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal), if it so happened.^^ And what difference did that make to him ? for he in- tended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he behave like a man who had children, who had a wife ? No, but he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do when he was (ordered) to drink the poison,^^ and when he had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socrates say?^° did he consider the power of escape as an unexpected gain? By no means : he considered what was fit and proper ; but the rest he did not even look at or take into tlio reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor bod}^ but to save that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act ; he who would not ]Dut the Athenians to the vote when they clamoured that he should do so,^^ he who refused to obey *' Socrates fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium. He is said to have gained the prize for courage at Delium. He was a brave soldier as well as a philosopher, a union of qualities not common. (Plato's Apology.) ^* Socrates with others was ordered by the Thirty tyrant^, who at that time governed Athens, to arrest Leon in the island of Salamis aTid to bring him to bo put to death. But Socrates refused to obey the order. Few men would have done what he did under the circum- gtanees. (Plato's Apology ; M. Antoninus, yii. 66.) *» Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. i. 29. *^® The Dialogue of Plato, named Criton, contains the arguments which were used by his friends to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, and the reply of Socrates. ^^ This alludes to the behaviour of Socrates when he refused to pat to the vote the matter of the Athenian generals and theii* behaviour after the naval battle of Arginusoe. The violence of the weather prevented tlie commanders from collecting and honorably burying those who fel' in the battle ; and the Athenians after their hasty fashion, wislied all the commanders to be put to death. But Socrates, who was in office at this time, resisted the unjust clamour of the people. Xenophon Hellenica, i. c. 7, 15 ; Plato, Apologia ; Xenophon, Memorab. i. 1, 18. 320 EHOTETU^. the tyrants, lie who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man's life by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running av^ay. For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting beyond the proper time. What then shall the children of Socrates do ? " If," said Socrates, " I had gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of them ; and if I depart to the world below, will there be no man to take care of them ?" See how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you and I had been in his place, we should have immediately answered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, and we should have added, " I shall be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be useful to no man.'' For, if it had been neces- sary, we should have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And how in that case should we have been useful to any man ? for where would they have been then staying? ^2 or if we were useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been much inore useful to them by dying when we ought to die, and as we ought ? And now Socrates being dead, no less useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or said when he was alive. ^^ *^ The original is ttoD yhp ti.v %ri e/xepop kK^lpoi ; this seems to mean, if we had escaped and left the country, where would those have heen to whom we might hj^ve been useful ? They would have been left behind, and we could have done nothing for them. ^^ This is the coDclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued : the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than his life. " The life of the dead," says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the great Eoman jurist and Cicero's friend, " rests in the remembrance of the living." Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which prove him to have been a brave and honest man He does not tell us here what Socrates said, which means what he taught ; but he knew what it was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form which Epictetus would not or could not have used. — Socrates left to others the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, as we are told, the things which concern man's daily life and his intercourse with other men : in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in his social state will; and nitm then is the proper subject of the philosopiiy of Socrates. The begiuTiing of this knowledge was, as he said, to know himself according EPICTETUS. 321 Think of these things, these opinions, these words : look to these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so man}'- and so great ? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down p]e- cipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished : and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he has given ? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure tor- ture, and exile, and scourging and in a word to give up all. which is not your own? If you will not, you will be to the precept of the Delphic oracle, Know thyself (yvSodi a-eavrSu) : and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend the nature of man as a moral being in all relations ; and among these the relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the end of man ; death is only the road to another life. The death of Socrates was con* formable to his life and teaching. " Socrates died not only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenoplion, Apol. § 22), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind." (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus, by F. C. Baur.) This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of Socrates and Christus. However the essay is well worth the trouble of reading. The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. " What prejudices, what blindness must a man have,*' says Rousseau, " when he dares to compare the son of Sophroniscus with the son of T^Iary ! — The death of Socrates philosoiDhising tranquilly with his friends is the most gentle that a man could desire ; that of Jesus ex- l)iring in torments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible that a man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him who presents it -and weeps; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God." (Rousseau, Eraile, vol. iii. p. 16G. Amsterdam, 1765.) Y S22 EPICTETU?!, a slave among slaves, even if you be ten tlionsand times a consul ; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar's residence), you will no less he a slave ; and you Avill feel, that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words conirary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them ; and to those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination (cfyavraa-Lo), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them ; then, when the}^ are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things which are not present ; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you have laboured for those things, so transfer your lahonr to these ; be vigilant for the purpcse of acquiring an oj)inion whicli will make you free ; pay court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man : be seen about a philosopher's doors : you will not disgrace youiself by being seen ; you will not go away empty nor without profit, if you go to th( philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you do not suc- ceed), try at least : the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful. ■*o^ CHAPTEE IT. ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY. To this matter before all you mu^t attend, that you be never so closely connected with any of your former in- timates or friends as to come down to the same acts as he does.^ If you do not observe this lule, you will ruin your- self. But if the thought arises in your mind, " I shall seem disobliging to him and he will not have the same feeling towards me," remember that nothing is done with- ^ He means tliat you must not do as lie dors, because he does this or that act. Tlie advice is in substauce. Do not do as your friend doeti eimj)ly because he is your friend. EPTCTETUS. 323 out cosi^, nor is it possible for a man if lie does not do the same thiii<^s to be the same man that he was. Choose then which of the two you will ^have, to be equally loved by those by whom you were formerly loved, being the same with your former self; or being superior, not to obtain from 3'onr friends the same that you did before. For if this is better, immediately turn away to it, and let not other considerations draw you in a different direction. For no man is able to make progress (improvement), when he is wavering between opposite things ; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose to attend to this only, to work out'ihis only, give up every thing else. But if you will not do this, your wavering will produce both these results : you will neither improve as you ought, nor will you obtain what you formerly obtained. For before by plainly desiring the things which were worth nothing, you pleased your associates. But you cannot excel in both kinds, and it is necessary that so far as jou share in the one, you must fall short in the other. You cannot, when you do not drink with those with whom you used to drink, be agreeable to them as you were before. Choose then whether you will be a hard drinker and pleasant to your former associates or a sober man and disagreeable to them. You cannot, when you do not sing with those with whom you used to sing, be equally loved by them. Choose then in this matter also which of the two you will have. For if it is better to be modest and orderly than for a man to say, He is a jolly fellow, give up the rest, lenonnce it, turn away from it, have nothing to do with such men. But if this behaviour shall not please you, turn altogether to the opposite : be- come- a catamite, an adulterer, and act accordingly, and you will get what you wii>h. And jump up in the theatre and bawl out in praise of the dancer. But characters so different cannot be mingled : you cannot act both Thersites and Agamemnon. If you intend to be Thersites,^ 3^on must be humpbacked and bald : if Agamemnon, you must be tall and handsome, and love those who are placed in obedience to you. 2 See Iliad, ii. 216 ; and for the description of Agamemnon, Iliad, iii. 167. Y 2 324 EPICTETUS. CHAPTER III. WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER THINGS. Keep this thought in readiness, when you lose any thing external, what you acquire in place of it; and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss ; neither ^ if you have got a horse in place of an ass, or an ox in place of a sheep, nor a good action in place of a bit of money, nor in place of idle talk such tranquillity as befits a man, nor in place of lewd talk if you have acquired modesty. If you remember this, you will always maintain your character such as it ought to be. But if you do not, consider that the times of opportunity are perishing, and that whatever pains you take about yourself, you are going to waste them all and overturn them. And it needs only a few things for the loss and overturning of all, namely a small deviation from reason. For the steerer of a ship to upset it, he has no need of the same means as he has need of for saving it: but if he turns it a little to the wind, it is lost ; and if he does not do this purposely, but has been neglecting his duty a little, the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in this case also : if you only fall a nodding a little, all that you have up to this time collected is gone. Attend therefore to the appearances of things, and watch over them ; for that which you have to preserve is no small matter, but it is modesty and fidelity and constancy, freedom from the affects, a state of mind undisturbed, freedom from fear, tranquillity, in a word liberty. For what will you sell these things ? See what is the value of the things which you will obtain in ex- change for these. — But shall I not obtain any such thing for it ? — See, and if you do in return get that, see what you receive in place of it.^ I possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship : he possesses a praetorship, I possess modestj^ But I do not make acclamations where it is not becoming : I will not stand up where I ought not ; ^ * See Schweig.'s note. " The text is obscure, and perhaps there is something wrong. Schweighaeuser has a long note on the passage. ^ He alludes to the factions in the theatres, lii. 4, 4 ; iv, 2-9. Upton. EPICTETUS. 825 for I am free, and a friend of God, and so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek) any thing else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor good re- port, nor in fact any thing. For he (God) does not allow me to claim (seek) them : for if he had chosen, he would have made them good for me ; but he has not done so, and for this reason I cannot transgress his commands.^ Preserve that which is your own good in every thing ; and as to every other thing, as it is permitted, and so far as to behave con- sistently with reason in respect to them, content with this only. If you do not, you will be unfortunate, you will fail in all things, you will be hindered, you will be im- peded. These are the laws which have been sent from thence (from God) ; these are the orders. Of these laws a man ought to be an expositor, to these he ought to submit, not to those of Masurius and Cassius.^ ■♦o*- CHAPTER IV. TO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE IN TRANQUILLITY. Remember that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. What then is the dif- ference between desiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one ; what is the difference between desiring power or being content with a private station ; what is the dif- ference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse ; or saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as saluta- tions ^ and power are things external and independent of * See 1. 25. note 1 ; iv. 7. 17. ^ Masurius Sabinus was a great Roman jurisconsult in the times of Augustus and Tiberius. He is sometimes named Masurius only (Persius, v. 90). C. Cassius Longinus was also a jurist, and, it is said, a descendant of the Cassius, who was one of the murderers of the dic- tator 0. Caesar. He lived from the time of Tiberius to that of Ves- pasian. ^ a(Tna(TiJLoi. See this chapter further on. 32G EPICTETUS. the will, so is a book. For what purpose do you cliooso to read ? Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of enduring labour.^ But if you refer reading to the proper end, wbat else is this than a tranquil and happy life (evo-ota) ? But if reading does not jsecure for you a happy and tranquil life, what is the use of it ? But it does secure this, the man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it. — And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say Caesar or Caesar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things ? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as con- tinuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do something : I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I must keep,^ of acting with modesty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things external;^ and then that I may attend to men, what they say, how they are moved ;^ and this not with any bad disposition, or that I ma}'' have some- thing to blame or to ridicule ; but I turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then shall I 2 See Bishop Butler's remarks in the Preface to his Sermons vol. ii. He speaks of the ' idle way of reading and considering things : hy this means, time even in solitude is happily got rid of without the pain of attention : neither is any part of it more put to the account of idleness, one can scarce forbear saying, is spent with less thought than great part of that which is spent in reading.* ' Sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae. Hor. Epp. ii. 2. 144. M. Autoninus, iii. 1. * * The readers perhaps may grow tired with being so often told what they will find it very difficult to believe. That because externals are not in our power, they are nothing to us. But in excuse for this frequent repetition, it must be considered that the Stoics had reduced themselves to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, by rejecting stronger aids. One cannot indeed avoid highly admiring the very few, who attempted to amend and exalt themselves on this foundation. No one perhaps ever carried the attempt so far in practice, and no one ever spoke so well in supj^ort of the argument as Epictetus. Yet, notwithstanding his great abilities and the force of liis example, one finds him strongly complaining of the want of success ; and one sees from this circumstance as well as from others in the Stoic writings, That virtue can not be maintained in the world without tho hope of a future reward.* Mrs. Carter. ^ Compare Horace, Sat. i. 4. 133 : Neqne cnim cum lectulus etc. EPICTETUS. 827 cease to commit them? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do not : thanks to God. Come, when you have done these things and have at- tended to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read a thousand verses or written as many ? For when you eat, are you grieved because you are not reading ? arc you not satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by reading, and so with bathing and with exer- cise? Why then do you not act consistently in all things, both when you approach Caesar, and when you approach any person ? If you maintain yourself free from pertur- bation, free from alarm, and steady ; if you look rather at the things which are done and happen than are looked at yourself; if you do not envy those who are preferred before you ; if surrounding circumstances (yXat) do not strike you with fear or admiration, what do you want? Books? How or for what purpose? for is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life? and is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than this ? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters the stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it. It was for this purpose that you used to practise exercise ; far this purpose were used the halteres (weights),^ the dust, . the young men as antagonists ; and do you seek for those things now when it is the time of action ? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of assent when appearances pre- sent themselves, some of which can be comprehended, and some cannot be comprehended, we should not choose to distinguish them but should choose to read what has been written about comprehension (KaraXT/i/^ts). What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we have never read for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in away conformable to nature the appearances presented to us ; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in Ijeing able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllo- gism,^ and in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For « See 1. 4. note 5, iii. 15. 4 ; and i. 24. 1, i. 29. 34. The athletes were oiled, but tiiey used to rub themselves with dust to be enabled to lay hold of one another. ^ M. Antoninus, i. 17, thanks the Gods that he did not waste his time in the resolution of syllogisms. 328 EPICTETUS. this reason where our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by all means the things which are not in your power ? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about action (efforts, opfxy),^ not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well : if we read what is said about desire and aversion {avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid ; if we read what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the relations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these rela- tions ; we should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts Avhich are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon : To-day I have read so many verses, I have written so many ; but (we should say), To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers ; I have not employed my desire ; I have used avoidance (e/cKAtb-et) only with respect to things which are within the power of my will ; I have not been afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of another ; I have exercised my patience,^ my abstinence, my co-operation with others ; and so we should thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we do not know that we also in another way are like the many. Another man is afraid that he shall not have power : you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man ; but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have a dread of water like a man who is mad. Or how will you still be able to say as Socrates did. If so it pleases God, so let it be ? Do you think that Socrates if he had been eager to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to discourse daily with the young men, would have readily served in military • See ill. c. 2. ^ See Aulus Gellius xvii. 19, where he quotes Epictetus on what Gellius expresses by ' intolcrantia ' and ' incontinentia.' Compare M. Antoninus (v. 33) on the precept 'Av4xov and 'ATrexov. EPICTETUS. 329 expeditions so often as he did ; and would he not have lamented and groaned, Wretch that I am ; I must now be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum ? Why, was this your business, to sun yourself? And is it not your business to be happy, to be free from hindrance, free from impediment ? And could he still have been Socrates, if he had lamented in this way : how would he still have been able to write Paeans in his prison ?^'' In short remember this, that what you shall prize which is beyond jour will, so far you have destroyed your will. But these things are out of the power of the will, not only power (authority), but also a private condition : not only occupation (business), but also leisure. — Now then must I live in this tumult ?— Why do you say tumult ? — I mean among many men. — Well what is the hardship? Suppose that you are at Olympia : imagine it to be a panegyris (public assembly), where one is calling out one thing, another is doing another thing, and a third is push- ing another person : in the baths there is a crowd : and who of us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it unwillingly? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious about what happens. — Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is sharp ; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like leisure ; it is a desert : I do not like a crowd ; it is confusion. — But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought : talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (pre- sented to you), work up your preconceptions.^^ If you fall into a crowd, call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a festival : try to enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleasant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men ? We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen : we are delighted when we see many ships : who is pained when he sees many men? — But they deafen me with their cries. — Then your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you ? Is then the power of making use of appearances hindered ? And who prevents you 1® Plato in the Phaedon (c. 4) says that Socrates in his prison wrote a hymn 1o Apollo. 1^ i, 22. 330 El^ICTETUS. from using according to nature inclination to a thing and aversion from it ; and movement towards a thing and move- ment from it? What tumult (confusion) is able to do this? Do you only bear in mind the general rules : what is mine, what is not mine ; what is given (permitted) to me ; what does God will that I should do now ? what does he not will ? A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to prepare yourself. You had .sufficient tiaie for this. Now he says to you : Come now to the contest, show us what you have learned, how you have practised the athletic art. How long will you be exercised alone ? Now is the opportunity for you to learn wliether you ai-e an athlete worthy of victory, or one of those who go about the world and are defeated. Why then are you vexed ? No contest is without confusion. There must be many who exercise themselves for the contest, many who call out to those w^ho exercise themselves, many masters, many spectators. — But my wish is to live quietly. — Lament then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, to envy, in a word to be disappointed and to be unhappy? Would you not release yourself from these things ? — And how shall I release myself? — Have you not often heard, that you ought to remove entirely desire, apply aversion (turning away) to those things only which are within your power, that you ought to give up every thing, body, property, fame, books, tumult, power, private station ? for whatever way you turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness. Lead me, O Zeus, and thou necessity. ^^ Is it your will that I should go to Rome ? I will go to Eome. To Gyara ? I will go to Gyara. To Athens ? I *2 Compare Encheiridion, 52. Cleanthes was a Stoic philosopher, who also wrote some poetry. See p. 292, note. El;ICrETUS. '331 will go to Athens. To prison ? I will go to prison. If you should once say, When shall a man go to Athens? you are undone. It is a necessary consequence that this desire, if it is not accomplished, must make you unhappy ; and if it is accomplished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at things at which you ought not to be elated; and on the other hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched because you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give up then all these things. — Athens is a good place. — But happiness is much better ; and to be free from passions, free from disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There is tumult at Eome and visits of salutation.^^ But happiness is an equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish to avoid them ? what necessity is there to carry a burden like an ass, and to be beaten with a stick ? But if you do not so, consider that jou must always be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect 3'our release, and also to impede you, and you must serve him as an evil genius.^* There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in the morning and during the day and by night : the rule is not to look towards things which are out of the power of our will, to think that nothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinit}^, to Fortune ; to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which cannot be hindered ; and when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call the man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes ; and even if a man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he knows not to what he should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl; ^^ nor do I. But if he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a ^3 He alludes to the practice of dependents paying formal visits in the morning at the honses of the great and powerful at Home. Upton refers to Virgil, Georgics, ii. 461, »* Compare i. 19. 6. 1* Compare Horace Sat. i. 5. S3. 832 EPiCTETas. lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a lover of money, not a lover of labour ; and if he does it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learning, But if he refers his labour to his own ruling power (rjyeiJioviKov), that he may keep it in a state con- formable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles) ; for these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Kemembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season. ^^ If you see any thing which you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling; if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness ; if you are not moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a province ? These things come to you from yourself and from the gods. Eemember this, who gives these things and to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish your- self in these thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, where you shall please God ? Are not the gods equally distant from all places ? ^^ Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on ? ^* See Antoninus, vi. 2 ; and ix. 6 * Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with everything wliich happens — that is enough.' ^^ Compare Upton's note on airexovcri, and Schweig.'s version, and the Index Graecitatis. These commentators dv> not appear to be quite certain about the meaning of the text. EPICTETUS, 333 CHAPTEE y. AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS. The wise and good man neither himself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can pre- vent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's Symposium ^ how many quarrels he settled, how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles ; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son ^ who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no man has in his power another man's ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing- else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not that this or that man may act according to nature ; for that is a thing which belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, he may "^ever the less be in a condition conformable to nature and live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that others also may be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the object always set before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (a praetor) ^ of an army ? No : but if it is permitted him, his object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to marry ? No ; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object is to maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he would have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to another not to belong to another : and to be instructed is this, to learn what things are a man's own and what belongs to another. How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrel- ling) to a man who has this opinion (which he ought to have) ? Is he surprised at any thing which happens, » See 11. 12. 1.5. * See Xenophon, Memorabilia, 11. 2. 3 The word a-rparriyrja-aL may be translated either way. 331 EPICTETUS. and does it appear new to him ? ^ Does lie not expect that which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than what actually "befals him ? And does he not reckon as pure gain whaterer they (the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness ? Such a person has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But he wounded me also.' Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he learn or in what school that man is a tame ^ animal, that men love one another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it. Since then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shall he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your neighbour has thrown stones. Have you then done any thing wrong? But the things in the house have been broken. Are you then a utensil ? No ; but a free power of will.^ What then is given to you (to do) in answer to this ? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more stones. But if you consider what is proper for a man, examine your storehouse, see with what facul- ties you came into the world. Have you the dispomion of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an injury? When is a horse wretched ? When he is deprived of his natural faculties, not when he cannot crow like a cock, but when he cannot lun. When is a dog wretched ? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track his game. Is then a man also unhappy in this way, not because he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues,"^ for he did not come into the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for this purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidelity? People ought to meet and lament such a man for the misfortunes into which he ** See iv. 1. 77, and the use of dav/ndCcii/. ^ See ii. 10. 14, iv. 1. 120. So Plato says (Legg. vi.), that a man wlio has had right education is wont to be the most divine and the tamest of animals. Upton. On the doing wrong to another, see Plato's Critc, and Epictetus iv 1. 167. « See iii. 1. 40. ' Like Hercules and Diogenes See iii. 12. 2. EPICTETUS. • 835 lias fallen ; not indeed to lament because a man has been born or has died,^ but because it has happened to him in his life time to have lost the things which are his own, not that which he received from his father, not his land and house, and his inn,^ and his slaves ; for not one of these things is a man's own, but all belong to others, are servile, and subject to account (ywcvOwa), at different times given to difierent persons by those who have them in their power : but I mean the things which belong to him as a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which he came into the world, such as we seek also on coins, and if we find them, we approve of the coins, and if we do not find the marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on this Sestertius ? ^^ The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero. Throw it away : it cannot be accepted, it is counterfeit.^^ So also in this case : What is ® Tlie alKision is to a passage (a fragment), in the Cresphontes of Euripides translated by Cicero into Latin Iambics (Tusc. Disp. i. 48) — edei yap 7]jxas avWoyov iroLOVfxepovs Tov (pvvra Qp'qv^tv els oV epx^^c^i kolku, rhv 5^au davSura koI ttSvuv TveTvavix^vov Xaipopras, €V(pr)fiovvras iKireixireiv do/xwv. Herodotus (v. 4) says of the Transi, a Thraciau tribe : ' when a child is born, the relatives sit round it and lament over all the evils which it must suffer on coming into the world and enumerate all the calamities of mankind : but when one dies, they hide him in the eaith with rejoicing and pleasure, reckoning all the evils from which he is now released and in possession of all happiness.' ^ The word is irav^oKelov, which Schweig. says that he does not understand. He supposes the word to be corrupt; unless we take it to mean the inn in wliich a man lives wdio has no home. I do not understand the word here. ^® See the note of Schweig. on the word rerpdo-aapop in the text. " This does not mean, it is said, that Nero issued counterfeit coins, for there are extant many coins of Nero which both in form and in the purity of the metal are complete. A learned numismatist, Francis Wise, fellow of Trinity College Oxford, in a letter to Upton, says that he can discover no reason for Nero's coins being rejected in commercial dealings after his death except the fact of the tyrant having been declared by the Senate to be an enemy to the Commonwealth. (Suetonius, Nero, c. 49.) "When Domitian was murdered, the Senate oidored his busts to be taken down, as the French now do after a revolution and all memorials of him to be destroyed (Suetonius, Domitian, c. -25). Dion also reports (lx.) that when Caligula wan 336 ' EPICTETUS. the stamp of his opinions ? It is gentleness, a sociable dis- position, a tolerant temper, a disposition to mutual affec- tion. Produce these qualities. I accept them: I consider this man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour, a com- panion in my voyages. Only see that he has not Nero's stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he fault-finding ? If the whim seizes him, does he break the heads of those who come in his way ? (If so), why then did you say that he is a man ? Is every thing judged (determined) by the bare form ? If that is so, say that the form in wax ^^ is an apple and has the smell and the taste of an apple. But the external figure is not enough : neither then is the nose enough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the opinions of a man. Here is a man who does not listen to reason, who does not know when he is refuted : he is an ass : in another man the sense of shame is become dead : he is good for nothing, ho is any thing rather than a man. This man seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast. What then ? would you have me to be despised ? — By whom? by those who know you? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and modest ? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you ? What is that to you ? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not his art. — But they will be more hostile to me^^ for this reason. — Why do you say* me'? Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using •in a natural way the appearances which are presented to murdered, it was ordered that all the brass coin which bore his imai^e should be melted, and, I suppose, coined again. There is more on this subject in Wise's letter. I do not believe that genuine coins would be refused in commercial dealings for the reasons which Wise gives, at least not refused in parts distant from Rome. Perhaps Epictetus means that some people would not touch the coins of the detestable Nero. ^'^ He says rh Kr^pipov, which Mrs. Carter translates ' a piece of wax.' Perhaps it means ' a piece of wax in the form of an apple.' *^ The word is iirKpv-ncroi'rai, the form of wliieh is not Greek. Schweig. has no remark on it, and he translates the Avord by * adorientur.* The form ought to be iiri^v€K€s. Upton. z 2 340 EPICTETUS. tence must be supported. It will be necessary for you to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, and to ex- hibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the same, and to have splendid garments, and all other things for display, and to show that you are a man honoured by the great, and to try to sup at their houses, or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and nobler than you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first way is both im- practicable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been able to do, to convince all men what things are good and bad.^ Is this power given to you? This only is given to you, to convince yourself ; and you have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to persuade other men ? and who has lived so long with you as you with yourself ? and who has so much power of convincing you as 3^ou have of convincing yourself; and who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? How then have you not yet convinced yourself in order to learn? At present are not things upside down? Is this what you have been earnest about doing,^ to learn to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to be free ? Have you not heard then that there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others ? For another man then to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it ? — It is a thing independent * Here it is implied that there are things which God cannot do. Perhaps he means that as God has given man certain powers of will and therefore of action, he cannot at the same time exercise the contra- dictory powers of forcing man's will and action ; for this would be at the same time to give power and to take it away. Butler remarks (Analogy, chap. 5) "the present is so far from proving in event a discipline of virtue to the generality of men that on the contrary they seem to make it a discipline of vice." In fact all men are not convinced and cannot be convinced in the present constitution of tliings ' what tilings are good and bad.' 2 Something is perhaps wrong in the text here. See Schweig.'s note. EPICTETUS. 841 of the will. — Then is it no thing to you ? — It is nothing — When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are convinced about good and evil ? AVill you not then letting others alone be to yourself both scholar and teacher ? — The rest of mankind will look after this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives in a state contrary to nature : but to me no man is nearer than myself. What then is the meaning of this, that I have listened to the words of the philosophers and I assent to them, but in fact I am no way made easier (more content) ? Am I so stupid ? And yet in all other things such as I have chosen, I have not been found very stupid ; but I learned letters quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve syllogisms. Has not then reason convinced me? and indeed no other things have I from the beginning so approved and chosen (as the things which are rational) : and now I read about these things, hear about them, write about them ; I have so far discovered no reason stronger than this (living according to nature). In what then am I deficient? Have the contrary opinions not been eradi- cated from me ? Have the notions (opinions) themselves not been exercised nor used to be applied to action, but as armour are laid aside and rusted and cannot fit me ? And yet neither in the exercises of the palaestra, nor in writing or reading am I satisfied with learning, but I turn up and down the syllogisms which are proposed, and I make others, and sophistical syllogisms also."^ But the necessary theorems by proceeding from which a man can become free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hindrance, and a free man, these I do not exercise myself in nor do I prac- tise in these the proper practice (stud}^). Then I care about what others will say of me, whether I shall appear to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy. — W^retohed man, will you not see what you are saying about yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be ? in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from things (ev T(3 IkkKlvuv), in your movements (purposes, iv opfjLYJ) in your preparation (for anything), in your de- ' In place of fxcirairiTrrovras Scliweig. suggests that Arriaii wrote Kol T&Wa wffavTws or sometliing of the kiud. On fieraTriirTovras see Kpictetus, i. 7« 342 EPICTETUS. signs (plans), and in other acts suitable to a man? But do you trouble yourself about this, whether others pity you ? — Yes, but I am pitied not as I ought to be. — Are you then pained at this ? and is he who is pained, an object of pity ? — Yes — How then are you pitied not as you ought to be ? For by the very act that you feel (suffer) about being pitied, you make yourself deserving of pity. What then says Antisthenes? Have you not heard? 'It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be ill spoken of.'^ My head is sound, and all think that I have the head ache. AVhat do I care for that ? I am free from fever, and people sympathize with me as if I had a fever, (and say), Poor man, for so long a time you have not ceased to have fever. I also say with a sorrowful countenance. In truth it is now a long time that I have been ill. What will happen then ? As God may please : and at the same time I secretly laugh at those who are pitying me. What then hinders the same being done in this case also ? I am poor, but I have a right opinion about poverty. Why then do I care if they pity me for my poverty ? I am not in power (not a magistrate) ; but others are : and I have the opinion which I ought to have about having and not having power. Let them look to it who pity me ;^ but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor do I suffer cold ; but because they are hungry or thirsty they think that I too am. ' What then shall I do for them? Shall I go about and proclaim and ssay. Be not mistaken, men, I am very well, I do not trouble myself about poverty, nor want of power, nor in a word about anything else than right opinions. These I have free from restraint, I care for nothing at all. — What foolish talk is this ? How do I possess right opinions when I am not content with being what I am, but am uneasy about what I am supposed to be ? But you say, others will get more and be preferred to me — What then is more reasonable than for those who have laboured about any thing to have more in that thing in which they have laboured? They have laboured for power, you have laboured about opinions ; and they have laboured for wealth, you for the proper use of appearances. * M. Antoninus, vii. 36. • ^T^fovTai. See 1. 4, note 4, EPICTETUS. 343 See if they have more than yijii in this about which you have laboured, and which they neglect; if they assent better than you with respect to the natural rules (measures) of things ; if they are less disappointed than you in their desires ; if they fall less into things which they would avoid than you do ; if in their intentions, if in the things which they propose to themselves, if in their purposes, if in their motions towards an object they take a better aim ; if they better observe a proper behaviour, as men, as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other names by which we express the relations of life. But if they exercise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this (power), and they do all? But it is most unreasonable that he who looks after anything should obtain less than he who does not look after it. Not so : but since I care about right opinions, it is more reasonable for me to have power. — Yes in the matter about which you do care, in opinions. But in a matter in which they have cared more than you, give way to them. The case is just the same as if because you have right opinions, you thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better than an archer, and in working in metal you should succeed better than a smith. Give up then your earnestness about opinions and employ yourself about the things which you wish to acquire ; and then lament, if you do not succeed; for you deserve to lament. But now you say that you are occupied with other things, that you are looking after other things; but the many say this trul}^ that one act has no community with another.^ He who has risen in the morning seeks whom (of the house of Caesar) he shall salute, to whora he shall say something agreeable, to whom he shall send a present, how he shall please the dancin^^ man, how by bad behaviour to one he may please another. When he prays, he prays about ^ Schweig. says that he has not observed that this proverb is men- tioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv. 10. 24)^ *alterum opus cum altero nihil commune habet/ I think that the context explains it : if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper means, and not the means which do not make for that end. 344 EPICTETUS. these things ; when he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these things : the saying of Pythagoras Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes 7 he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery ? What have I done ? Any thing like a free man, any thing like a noble minded man ? And if he finds any thing of the kind, he blames and accuses himself : " Why did you say this ? Was it not in your power to lie ? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders us from telling a lie." But do you, if indeed you have cared about nothing else except the proper use of appear- ances, as soon as j^ou have risen in the morning reflect, " What do I want in order to be free from passion (affects), and free from perturbation ? What am 1 ? Am I a poor body, a piece of property, a thing of which something is said ? 1 am none of these. But what am I ? I am a rational animal. What then is required of me?" Keflect on your acts. Where have I omitted the things which conduce to happiness (^evpoiav) ? What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial? what have I not done as to these things which I ought to have done? So great then being the difference in desires, actions, wishes, would you still have the same share with others in those things about which you have not laboured, and they have laboured ? Then are you surprised if they pity you, and are you vexed ? But they are not vexed if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have that which is good, and you are not convinced. For thia reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they have : but they are satisfied with their own, and do not desire what j^ou have : since if you were really convinced, that with respect to what is good, it is you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have thought of what they say about you. ^ See iii. i. note 2. Epictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pytha- goras. See Schweig.'s remarks on the words ' He who has risen etc' I liave of necessity translated KaKor}di(T(i/j.€vos in an active sense ; bat if this is right, I do not understand how the word is used so. EPICTETUS. 345 CHAPTEE VII. ON FREEDOM FROM FEAR. What makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, yon say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid ; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards ? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be per- mitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear ? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body ; and also about his children and his wife, and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then for- midable to him or what guards or what swords ? Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit, ^ and is it possible that no man can learn from reason * See Scliweig.*s note on the text. By the Galilaeans it is probable that Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Antoninus also mentions (xi. 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about the Christians, and only knew some examples of their obstinate adherence to the new faith and the fanatical behaviour of some of the converts. That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on undoubted authority ; and also that there always have been such, and now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed no argument against such doctrines or religious opinions ; and it is a fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be perverted, misunderstood, and misused. 346 EPICTETUS. and from demonstration tbat God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the ii.se of the whole ? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it ; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others ; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from haim, mag- nanimous, pious, thankful to Grod^ for all things ; in no matter finding J^xult with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them.^ But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears ; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him ; and he must of necessity be abject and mean. What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (com- prehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened ? Would you have me to bear poverty ? Come and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you 2 * This agrees with Eph. v. 20 : " Giving thanks always for all things to God/' ' Mrs. Carter. The words are the same in both except that the Apostle has evxapia-TovpTcs, and Epictetus has x"P'^ ^X^^' ® 3ee Schweig.'s note. EPICTETUS. 347 have me to possess power ? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment ? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me ; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but */ because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me : ^^y^ for neither can any man deprive me of them ; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die ? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is : it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here ? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe ? ^ what new thing or wondrous is going to happen ? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable ? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp ? Say this to others ; but I have considered about all these things ; no man has power over me. I have been made free ; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom ; ^ I have proper judges. (1 say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me ? Are you not the master of my property ? What then is that to me ? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains ? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches. Whom then can I still fear ? Those who are over the bedchamber ? ^ Lest they should do, what ? Shut me out ? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors ? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out ? Because unless some * He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which id is composed : ncne of them will perish. The soul, as he has said elsewhere, w^ill go to him who gave it (iii. 13. note 4). But I do not suppose that . he means that the soul will exist as having a separate consciousness. * Kap-jTKTrrjVj see iv. 1. 113, 6 See i. 19. note 6. 348 EPICTETU8. one allows me to go in» 1 do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens ; for I think tha what God chooses is better than what I choose.'^ I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him ; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires ; in a word, I have the same will ((nr^cAo)). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in' Because I know that nothing good is distribute have got into (Caesiir's) chamlK^r, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which are not goixl, which the philosoj^hers have persnaded mo not to think good. Show me the swoixls of the guanls. See how big thev are, and how sharp. What then do these big and shar{ ' * Nevertheless not as I will, but fts thou wilt,* ^latthew xxvi. 30. Mrs, Carter. 'Our r* ''on to the will of Gvxl mu ' ' ' ' . perfect, when our will uul resolveil up iuto his; \^ i ids will us our end, as beinji: itself most just and right and good. Bp, Butler, Sermon on the Love of God. EPICTETUS* 349 words do? They kill. And what does a fever do? othing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing i>se. ^\"ould you then have me to wonder at these things ud worship them, and go about as the slave of all of lem ? I hope that this will not happen : but when I ave once learned that every thing which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. Bnt if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I btill confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is ho a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am ? Have I been eager to imitate his morals ? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or un- reasonable. But if he says to me. Go and bring Leon ^ of Salamis, I say to him. Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says) : Lead him away (to prison). I follow ; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off — Does the tyrant's head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him ? — But you will bo cast out unburied ? — If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out ; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's school and knows not what he is, he deserv^es to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards ^ he used to flatter ; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews (vivpa), but he is that w^hich makes • See iv. 1. note ,59. » I do not see the meaning of varepov : it may perhaps mean * after leaving the school.* See Schweig.'s note. 350 KPICTETUS. use of these parts of tlie body and governs them and follows (understands) the appearances of things.^ "^ Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws — And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws w^ho employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law.^^ And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men' (fools) ; since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all ; it only makes an exception of the opinions, v^hich even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you : on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me ] for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones,^^ how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these ? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty ? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how ^^ Here Epictetus admits that there is some power in man which uses the body, directs and governs it. He does not say what the power is nor wliat he supposes it to be. " Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with.'* Butler's Analogy, chap. i. *^ The will of a fool does not make law, he says. Unfortunately it does, if we use the word law in the strict sense of law : for law is a general command from a person, an absolute king, for example, who lias power to enforce it on those to whom the command is addressed or if not to enforce it, to punish for disobedience to it. This strict use of the word ' law * is independent of the quality of the command, which may be wise or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word ' law * in the strict sense. ^2 The word is XiOoa-rpdoTois, which means what we name Mosaic floors or pavements. The word \id6•- CHAPTER IX. TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A CHARACTER Ot' SHAMELESSNESS.^ When you see another man in the possession of power (magistracy), set against this the fact that you have not the want (desire) of power; when you see another rich, see what you possess in place of riches : for if you possess nothing in place of them, you are miserable ; but if you have not the want of riches, know that you possess more than this man possesses and what is worth much more. Another man possesses a handsome woman (wife) : you " See Schweig/s note. * * They, who are desirous of taking refuge in Heathenism from the strictness of the Christian morality, will find no great consolation in reading this chapter of Epictetus,* Mrs. Carter. 358 EPICTETUS. have the satisfaction of not desiring a handsome wife. Do these things appear to you to be small ? And how much would these persons give, these very men who are rich, and in possession of power, and live with handsome women, to be able to despise riches, and power and these ver^^ women whom they love and enjoy ? Do you not know then what is the thirst of a man who has a fever ? He possesses that which is in no degree like the thirst of a man who is in health : for the man who is in health ceases to be thirsty nfter he has drunk ; but the sick man being pleased for a short time has a nausea, he converts the drink into bile, vomits, is griped, and moie thirsty. It is such a thing to have desire of riches and to po^ssess riches, desire of power and to possess power, desire of a beautiful woman and to sleep with her: to this is added jealousy, fear of being deprived of the thing which you love, indecent words, indecent thoughts, unseemly acts. And what do I lose ? you will say. My man, you were modest, and you are so no longer. Have you lost nothing ? In place of Chrysippus and Zeno you read Aristides and Evenus ; ^ have you lost nothing ? In place of Socrates and Diogenes, you admire him who is able to corrupt and seduce most ^Yomen. You wish to appear handsome and try to make yourself so, though you are not. • You like to display splendid clothes that you may attract women; and if you find any fine oil (for the hair),^ you imagine that you are happy. But formerly you did not think of any such thing, but only where there should be decent talk, a worthy man, and a generous conception. There- fore you slept like a man, walked forth like a man, wore a manly dress, and used to talk in a way becoming a good - Aristides was a Greek, but his period is not known. He was the author of a work named Milesiaca or Milesian stories. All that we know of tlie work is that it was of a loose description, amatory and licentious. It was translated into Latin by L. Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of the Dictator Sulla ; and it is mentioned by Plutarcli (Life of Crassus, c. 32), and several times by Ovid (Tristia ii. 413 etc.). Evenus was perhaps a poet. We know nothing of this Evenus, but we may conjecture from being here associated with Aristides what his character was. ^ See Schweig.*s note on the word fjLvpa\€i(piov, which he has in his text. It should be ixvpa\oi*- CHAPTER XI. ABOUT PURITY (CLEANLINESS). Some persons raise a question whether the social feeling ^ is contained in the nature of man ; and yet I think that these same persons would have no doubt that love of purity is certainly contained in it, and that if man is distinguished from other animals by any thing, he is dis- tinguished by this. When then we see any other animal cleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with surprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man : and on the other hand, if a man blames an animal for being dirty, straightway as if we were making an excuse for it, we say that of course the animal is not a human creature, ^o we suppose that there is something superior in man, and that we first receive it from the Gods. For since the Gods by their nature are pure 5nd free from corruption, so far a€ men approach them by reason, so far do they cling to purity and to a love (habit) * Tlie word is rh Koiva>viK6p, Compare i. 23, 1, ii. 10, 14, ii. 20, 6. EPICTETUS. 367 of purity. But since it is impossible tliafc man's nature (ovo-io) can be altogether pure being mixed (composed) of such materials, reason is applied, as far as it is possible, and reason endeavours to make human nature love purity.^ The first then and highest purity is that which is in the soul ; and we say the same of impurity. Now you could not discover the impurity of the soul as you could dis- cover that of the body : but as to the soul, what else could you find in it than that which makes it filthy in respect to the acts which are her otnoi ? Now the acts of the soul are movement towards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, preparation, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in these acts makes the soul filthy and impure ? Nothing else than her own bad judgments (K/)t)u,aTa). Consequently the impuritj' of the soul is the soul's bad opinions ; and the purification of the soul is the planting in it of proper opinions; and the soul is pure which has proper opinions, for the soul alone in her own acts is free from perturbation and pollution. Now we ought to work at something like this in the body also, as far as we can. It was impossible for the defluxions of the nose not to run when man has such a mixture in his body. For this reason nature has made hands and the nostrils themselves as channels for carrying off the humours. If then a man sucks up the defluxions, I say that he is not doing the act of a man. It was im- possible for a man's feet not to be made muddy and not be soiled at all when he passes through dirty places. For this reason nature (God) has made water and hands. It was impossible that some impurity should not remain in the teeth from eating : for this reason, she says, wash the teeth. Why ? In order that you may be a man an I not a wild beast or a hog. It was impossible that from the sweat and the pressing of the clothes there should not remain some impurity about the body which requires to be cleaned away. For this reason water, oil, hands, * In the text there are two words, Ka6ap6s which means * pure,* and KaOdpios which means * of a pure nature,* * loving purity.' 368 EPICTETUS. towels, scrapers (strigils),^ nitre, sometimes all other kinds of means are necessary for cleaning the body. You do not act so : but the smith will take off the rust from the iron (instruments), and he will have tools prepared for this purpose, and you yourself wash the platter when you are going to eat, if you are not completely impure and dirty : but will you not wash the body nor make it clean ? "Why ? he replies. I will tell you again ; in the first place, that you may do the acts of a man ; then, that you may not be disagreeable to those with whom you associate. You do something of this kind even * in this matter, and you do not perceive it : you think that you deserve to stink. Let it be so : deserve to stink. Do you think that also those who sit by you, those who recline at table with you, that those who kiss you deserve the same?^ Either go into a desert, where you deserve to go, or live by yourself, and smell yourself. For it is just that you alone should enjoy your own impurity. But when you are in a city, to behave so inconsiderately and foolishly, to what character do you think that it belongs ? Jf nature had entrusted to you a horse, would you have over- looked and neglected him ? And now think that you have been entrusted with jour own body as with a horse ; wash it, wipe it, take care that no man turns away from it, that no one gets out of the way for it. But who does not get out of the way of a dirty man, of a stinking man, of a man whose skin is foul, more than he does out of the way of a man who is daubed with muck ? That smell is from without, it is put upon him ; but the other smell is ^ The ^va-rpa^ as Epictetus names it, was the Roman ' strigilis,' ■which was used for the scraping and cleaning of the body in bathing. Persius (v. 126) writes — • I, puer, et strigUes Crispin! ad balnea defer.*- The strigiles " were of bronze or iron of various forms. They were applied to the body much in the same way as we see a piece of hoop applied to a sweating horse." Pompeii, edited by Dr. Dyer. * See Schweig.'s note. * See Schweig.'s note. If the text is right, the form of expression is inexact and does not clearly express the meaning ; but the meaning may be easily discovered. EPiOTETUS. 369 from Want of care, from within, and in a manner from a body in putrefaction. But Socrates washed himself seldom — Yes, but his body was clean and fair: and it was so agreeable and sweet that the most beautiful and the most noble loved him, and desired to sit by him rather than by the side of those who had the handsomest forms. It was in his power neither to use the bath nor to wash himself, if he chose ; and yet the rare use of water had an effect. [If you do not choose to wash with warm water, wash with cold.^] But Aristo- phanes says Those who are pale, unshod, 'tis those I mean. • (Nubes V. 102.) For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the air and stole clothes from the palaestra.^ But all who have written about Socrates bear exactly the contrary evidence in his favour ; they say that he was pleasant not only to hear, but also to see.^ On the other hand they write the same about Diogenes.^ For Ave ought not even by the appearance of the body to deter the multitude from philosophy; but as. in other things, a philosopher should show himself cheerful and tranquil, so also he should in the things that relate to the body : See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I want nothing : see how I am without a house, and without a city, and an exile, if it happens to be so,^^ and without a hearth I live more free from trouble and more happily than all of noble birth and than the rich. But look at my poor body also and observe that it is not injured by my hard way of living — But if a man says this to me, who has the appearance (dress) and face of a condemned man, what God shall persuade me to approach philosophy, if^^ it makes men such persons? Far from it; I would not choose to do so, even if I • See wliat is said of this passage in the latter pai-t of this chapter. • ' Aristophanes, Nubes, v. 225, and v. 179. ® Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 12. 9 See iii. 22, 88. ^^ Diogenes, it is said, was driven from his native town Sinope in Asia on a charge of having debased or counterfeited the coinage Upton. It is probable that this is false. ^^ On the T,vord & B 4^ 372 EPICTETUS. CHAPTER XIL ox ATTENTION When you have remitted yonr attention for a short time^ do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose; but let this thought be present to you, that in consequence of the fault committed to-day your affairs must be in a worse condition for all that follows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of not attend- ing is 'formed in you ; then a habit of deferring your attention. And continually from time to time you drive away by deferring it the happiness of life, proper be- haviour, the being and living conformably to nature.^ If then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the complete omission of attention is more profitable ; but if it is not profitable, why do you not maintain your atten- tion constant? — To-day I choose to play — Well then, ought you not to play with attention? — I choose to sing — What then hinders you from doing so with atten- tion? Is there any part of life excepted, to which attention does not extend? For will you do it (any thing in life) worse by using' attention, and better by not attending a*t all? And what else of the things in life is done better by those who do not wse attention ? Does he who works in wood work better by not attending to it ? Does the captain of a ship manage it better by not attending ? and is any of the smaller acts done better by inattention ? Do you not see that when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety, or to modesty, or to moderation : but you do every thing that comes into your mind in obedi- ence to your inclinations. To what things then ought I to attend ? First to those general (principles) and to have them in readiness, and without them not to sleep, not to rise, not to drink, not to * See Schweig/s note on the words eludei virepri64fA€vovy in place of which he proposes i^wdfj virepnGcix^vos. Compare Persius, Sfit. y. 66. •' Cras hoc Set.*' Idem eras fiet, etc., Rnd Martial, v. 58. EPICTETUS. 873 eat, not to converse (associate) with men ; that no man is master of another man's will, but that in the will alone is •the good and the bad. No man then has the power either to procure for me any good or to involve me in any evil, but I alone myself over m3^self have power in these things. When then these things are secured to me, why need I be disturbed about external things ? What tyrant is formidable, what disease, what poverty, what offence (from any man)? Well, I have not pleased a certain person. Is he then (the pleasing of him) my work, my judgment? No. Why then should I trouble myself about him? — But he is supposed to be some one (of importance) — He will look to that himself; and those who think so will also. But I have one whom I ought to please, to whom I ought to subject myself, whom I ought to obey, God and those who are next to him.^ He has placed me with myself, and has put my will in obedience to myself alone, and has given me rules for the right use of it ; and when I follow these rules in syllogisms, I do not care for any man who says any thing else (dilferent) : in sophistical argument, I care for no man. Why then in greater matters do those annoy me who blame me ? What is the cause of this perturbation? Nothing else than because in this rbatter (topic) I am not disciplined. For all knowledge (science) despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Produce any shoemaker that you please, and he ridicules the many in respect to his own work^ (business). Pro- duce any carpenter. First then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, and to do nothing without them, and we ought to keep the soul directed to this mark, to pursue nothing external, and nothing which belongs to others (or is in the power of others), but to do as he has appointed who has the * Compare iv. 4, 39, i. 14, 12 ; and Encheirid. c. 32, and the remark of Simplicius. Schweig. explains the words ro7s fx^r* eKuvov thus : *qui post Ilium (Deum) et sub lUo rebus humanis praesunt; qui proximum ab lUo locum tenent.' ^ Compare ii. 13, 15 and 20; and Antoninus, vi. 35: *Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason (the principles) of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him and the gods ? * 374 EPICTETUS. power ; we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the power of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. Next to this we ought to remember who we are,^ and what is our name, and to endeavour to direct our duties towards the character (nature) of our several rela- tions (in life) in this manner : what is the season for singing, what is the season for play, and in whose presence ; what will be the consequence of the act ; ^ whether our associates will despite us, whether we shall despise them;^ when to jeer (o-Kwi/^at), and whom to ridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with whom; and finally, in complying how to maintain our own character.'^ But wherever you have deviated from ' any of these rules, there is damage immediately, not from any thing external, but from the action itself. What then ? is it possible to be free from faults, (if you do all this)? It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by never remitting this attention we shall escape at least a few errors. But now when you have said. To-morrow I will begin to attend, you must be told that 3'OU are saying this. To-day I will be shameless, disregard ful of time and place, mean ; it will be in the 230 wer of others to give me pain ; to-day I will be passionate, and envious. See how many evil things yon are permitting yourself to do. If it is good to use atten- tion to-morrow, how much better is it to do so to-day ? if to-morrow it is in your interest to attend, much more is it to-day, that you may be able to do so to-morrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day.^ * ' Quid sumus, aut quidnam victuri giguimur.' Persius, Sat. iii. 67. ^ Scliweig. thinks that the text will be better translated according to Upton's notion and H. Stephen's (hors de propos) by * Quid sit abs re futurum,' * what will be out of season.' Perhaps he is right. ^ Schweig. says that the sense of the passage, as I have rendered it, requires the reading to be Karacfypovqa'ova-i ; and it is so, at least in the better Greek writers. 7 See iii. 14, 7, i. 29, 64. * Compare Antoninus, viii. 22: "Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion, or an act, or a word. Thou sufferest this justly, for thou chooscst rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day." EPICTETUS. 375 CHAPTER XIIL AGAINST OR TO 'XHOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. Wheis' a man has seemed to us to have talked with simplicity (candour) about his own affairs, how is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to discover to him ^ our own secrets and we think this to be candid behaviour ? In the first place because it seems unfair for a man to have listened to the affairs of his neighbour, and not to com- municate to him also in turn our own affairs : next, because we think that we shall not present to them the appearance of candid men when we are silent about our own affairs. Indeed men are often accustomed to say, I have told you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing of your own? where is this done? — Besides, we have also this opinion that we can safely trust him who has already told us his own affairs ; for the notion rises in our mind that this man could never divulge our affairs because he would be cautious that we also should not divulge his. In this way also the incautious are caught by the soldiers at Eome. A soldier sits by you in a common dress and begins to speak ill of Caesar ; then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter yourself also what 3'ou think, and then you are carried off in chains.^ Something of this kind happens to us also generally. Now as this man has confidently intrusted his affairs to me, shall I also do so to any man whom I meet ? (No) , * Schweig. writes ira>s irore, etc., and translates * excitamur quodam- modo et ipsi,* etc. He gives the meaning, but the troos Trore is properly a question. 2 The man, whether a soldier or not, was an informer, one of those vile men who carried on this shameful business under the empire. He was what Juvenal names a * delator.' Upton, who refers to the life of Hadrian by Aelius Spartianus, speaks even of this emperor employing soldiers named Frumentarii for the purpose of discovering what was said and done in private houses. John the Baptist (Luke iii. 14) i-i answer to the question of the soldiers, * And what shall we do ? ' said unto them * Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely ; and bo content with your wages.' XJptou. 376 * EPICTETUS. for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am of such a difj position ; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has heard. Then if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I resolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I both disturb others and am disturbed myself. But if I remember that one man does not injure another, and that every man's acts injure and profit him, I secure this, that I do not any thing like him, but still I sufier what I do suffer through my own silly talk. True : but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of your neighbour for you in your turn to communicate nothing to him. — Did I ask you for your secrets, my man ? did you communicate your affairs on certain terms, that you should in return hear mine also ? If you are a babbler and think that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be like you? But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs to me, and it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be so rash ? It is just the Fame as if I had a cask which is water-tight, and you one with a hole in it, and you should come and deposit with me your wine that I might put it into my cask, and then should complain that I also did not intrust my wine to you, for jou have a cask with a hole in it. How then is there any equality here? You intrusted your affairs to a man who is faithful, and modest, to a man who thinks that his own actions alone are injurious and (or) useful, and that nothing external is. Would you have me intrust mine to you, a man who has dishonoured his own faculty of will, and who wishes to gain some small bit of money or some office or promotion in the court (emperor's palace), even if you should be going to murder your own children, like Medea ? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness)? But show yourself to me to be faithful, modest, and steady : show me that you have friendly opinions ; show that your cask has no hole in it ; and you will see how I shall not wait for you to trust me with your affairs, but I myself shall come to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not choose to make use of a good vessel ? Who does not value a benevolent and faithful adviser? who will not willingly receive a man EPICTETUS. 377 7I10 is ready to bear a sliare, as we may say, of the diffi- culty of his circumstances, and by this very act to ease the burden, by taking a part of it. True : but I trust you ; you do not trust me. — In the first place, not even do you trust me, but you are a babbler, and for this reason you cannot hold any thing ; 'or indeed, if it is true that you trust me, trust your affairs to me only ; but now whenever you see a man at leisure, you seat yourself by him and say: Brother, I have no friend more benevolent than you nor dearer; I request you to listen to my affairs. And you do this even to those who are not known to you at all. But if you really trust me, it is plain that you trust me because I am faithful and modest, not because I have told my affairs to you. Allow me then to have the same opinion about you. Show me that if one man tells his affairs to another, he who tells them is faithful and modest. For if this were so, I would go about and tell my affairs to every man, if that would make me faithful and modest. But the thins: . . . ' . *^ IS not so, and it requires no common opinions (principles). If then you see a man who is busy about things not de- pendent on his will and subjecting his will to them, you must know that this man has ten thousand persons to compel and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the wheel to compel him to declare what he knows :^ but a little girl's nod, if it should so happen, will move him, the blandishment of one who belongs to Caesar's court, desire of a magistracy or of an inheritance, and things without end of that sort. You must remember then among general principles that secret discourses (discourses about secret matters) require fidelity and corresponding opinions. But where can we now find these easily? Or if you cannot answer that question, let some one point out to me a man who can say ; I care only about the things which are my own, the things which are not subject to hindrance, the things which are by nature free. This I hold to be the nature of the good : but let all other things be as they are allowed ; I do not concern myself. 3 The wheel and pitch were instruments of torture to extract con- fessions. See 11. 6, 18, and Schweig.'s note there. THE ENCHEIEIDION, OR MANUAL,^ I. Of tilings some are in our power, and otters are not. In our power are opinion (v7r6X.rj\l/Ls)y movement towards a hing (op/xT^), desire, aver.^iou (l/cKAtcrts, turning from a thing); and in a word, wlia t ever ^ajca^Qlir own acts: not ''jOi our power are the body, property, reputation, offices Imagisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not ouv fwn acts. And the things in our power are by nature iree, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the 'fliings not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others. Kemember then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men : but if you think that only which is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is another's, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man, you will do nothing involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm. If then you desire (aim at) such great things, remember that you must not (attempt to) Jay hold of them with a ,^mall effort; but you must leave alone some things en- tirel}^ and postpone others for the present. But if 3^ou wish for these things also (such great things), and powex* ^ In Schweigliaeuser's edition the title is ' 'EiriKT'fjrov iyx^ipidioy.. Epicteti IVIanuale ex recensione et iiiterpretatione Joannis Uptoni. No*abiliorem Lectionis vaiietatem adjecit Job. Schweigliaeuscr,' There are also notes by Upton, and some by Schweighaeuser. 380 EPi (office) and wealth, perhap very things (power and ^\ those former things (such will fail in those things t and freedom are secured, ing to every harsh appear and in no manner what yoi it by the rules which you chiefly, whether it relates t power or to things which a^ relates to any thing which . say, that it does not concern Eemember that desire contains in it the profession (Lope) of obtaining that which you desire; and. the professioi (hope) in aversion (turning from a thing) is ^at you will not fall into that which you attempt to avoid : and he who fails in his desire is unfortunate ; and he who falls into that which he would avoid,^is unhappjiC, If then you attempt to-avoid only the things contrary to nature which are within your power, you will not be involved in any of the things which you would avoid. But if you attempt to avoid disease or death or poverty, you will be imhappy. Take away then aversion from all things which are not in onr power, and transfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power. But destroy desire completely for the present. For if you desire anything which is not in our power, you must be unfortunate : but of the things in our power, and which it would be good to desire, nothing yet is before you. But employ only the power of moving towards an object and retiring from it ; and these powers indeed only slightly and with exceptions and with i-emission.^ ^ This passage will be obscure in the original, unless it is examined "well. I have followed the explanation of Simplicius, iv. (i. 4.) ^ Appearances are named * harsh' or * rough * when they are * con- trary to reason and overexciting and in fact make life rough (uneven) by the want of symmetry and by inequality in the movement^ ' Simplicius, v. (i. 5.) * See the notes in Schweig.'s edition. I EPICTETUS. S81 III. H In every thing whicli pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this to the (descrip- tion, notion) ; what is the nature of each thing, beginning from the smallest ? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love ; for when it has been broken, you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed. IV. When you are going to take in hand any act, remind yourself what kind of an act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself what happens in the bath : some splashing the water, others pushing against one another, others abusing one another, and some stealing : and thus with more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself, I now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner conformable to nature. And so you will do in every act : for thus if any hindrance to bathing shall happen, let this thought be ready : it was not this only that I intended, but I intended also to maintain my will in a way conformable to nature ; but I shall not maintain it so, if I am vexed at what happens. V. Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things : for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it were, it would have seemed so to Socrates; for the opinipn about death, that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. -' When then we are impeded or disturbed or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves, that is, our opinions/ Itis the act of an ill- instructfd man to blame others for his own bad condition ; it is the act of one^who has begun to be instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose instruction is completed, neither to blame another, nor himself. VI. Be noi elated at any advantage (excellence), which belongs to another. If a horse when he is elated should EPICTETtTS. t ^ , I am beautiful, one might endure it. But when you are elated, and say, I have a beautiful horse, you must know that you are elated at having a good horse. ^ What then is your own ? The use of appearances. Consequently when in the use of appearances you are conformable to nature, then you will be elated, for then you will be elated at something good which is your own. VII. As on a voyage when the vessel has reached a port, if you go out to get water, it is an amusement by the way to pick up a shell fish or some bulb, but your thoughts ought to be directed to the ship, and you ought to be constantly watching if the captain should call, and then you must throw away all those things, that you may not be bound and pitched into the ship like sheep : so in life also, if there be given to you instead of a little bulb and a shell a wife and child, there will be nothing to prevent (you from taking them). But if the captain should call, run to the ship, and leave all those things without regard to them. But if you are old, do not even go far from the ship, lest when you are called you make default. VIII. Seek not that the things which happen^ should happen as you wish ; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life. IX. Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will. And add this :i flection on the occasion of every thing that happens ; ior you will find it an impediment to something else, but not to yourself. * TTpton proposes to read e^' iTrirov ayaO^ instead of eVl 'irnrfp ayaB^. The .neaning then will he * elated at something good which is in tho horse.' I think that he is right. 2 The text has ret y^ydfieua : but it should be ra yiv6/i€va. See Uptf. I's note. ;,. lilPICTETUS. " 383 X. On the occasion of every accident (event) that befals yon, remember to turn to yourself and inquire what joower you have for turning it to use. If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power to resist is temperance (continence). If labour (pain) be presented to you, you will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you will find it to be patience. And if 3^ou have been thus formed to the (proper) habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them. XI. Never say about any thing, I have lost it, but say I have restored it. Is your child dead ? It has been re- stored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored. Has your estate been taken from you? Has not then this also been restored ? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But what is it to you, by whose hands the giver demanded it back ? So long as he may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to another, as travellers do with their inn. XII. If you intend to improve, throw away such thoughts as these : if I neglect my affairs, I shall not have the means of living : unless I chastise my slave, he will be bad. For it is better to die of hunger and so to be released from grief and fear than to live in abundance with perturbation ; and it is better for your slave to be bad than for you to be unhappy.^ Begin then from little things. Is the oil spilled? Is a little wine stolen? Say on the occasion, at such price is sold freedom from perturbation ; at such price is sold tranquillity, but nothing is got for nothing. And when you call your slave, consider that it is pos- sible that he does not hear ; and if he does hear, that ^ He means. Do not chastise your slave while you are in a passion, lest, while you aro trying to correct him, and it is very doubtful whether you will succeed, you fall into a vice which is a man's great and only calamity. Schweig. 884 EPICTETUS* he will do nothing which, you wish. But matters aro not 80 well with him, but altogether well with you, that it should be in his power for jou to be not disturbed.^ XIII. If you would improve, submit to be considered without sense and foolish with respect to externals. Wish to be considered to know nothing : and if you shall seem to some to be a person of importance, distrust yourself. For you should know that it is not easy both to keep your will in a condition conformable to nature and (to secure) external things : but if a man is careful about the one, it is an absolute necessity that he will neglect the other. XIV. If you would have your children and your wife and your friends to live for ever, you are silly ; for you would have the things which are not in your power to be in your power, and the things which belong to others to be yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from faults, you are a fool ; for you would have badness not to be badness, but something else.^ But if you wish not to fail in your desires, you are able to do that. Practise then this which you are able to do. He is the master of every man who has the power over the things, which another person wishes or does not wish, the power to confer them on him or to take them away. Whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither wish for any thing nor avoid anything which depends on others : if he does not observe this rule, he must be a slave. ^ The passage seems to mean, that your slave has not the power of disturbing you, because you have the power of not being disturbed. See Upton's note on the text. 2 Qe\€iv is used here, as it often is among the Stoics, to * wish absolutely.' ' to will/ When Epictetns says ' you would have badness not to be badness,' he means that " badness ' is in the will of liiin who lias the badness, and as you wish to subject it to your will, you are a fool. It is your business, as far as you can, to improve the slave : you may wish this, It is his business to obey yuur instruction: this is what he ought to wish to do ; but for him to will ■- '> do l!iis, that lies in himself, not in you. Schweig. EPIOTETUS, 385 xy. Eemeraber that in life you ouglat to behave as at a banquet. Suppose that something is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your hand and take a portion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. Do not detain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your desire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so with respect to children, so with respect to a wife, so with respect to magisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be some time a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. But if you take none of the things which are set before you, and even despise them, then you will be not only a fellow banqueter with the gods, but also a partner with them in power. For by acting thus Diogenes and Heracleitus and those like them were deservedly divine, and were so called. XVI. When you see a person weeping in sorrow either when a child goes abroad or when he is dead, or when the man has lost his property, take care that the appearance do not hurry you away with it, as if he were suffering in external things.^ But straightway make a distinction in your own mind, and be in readiness to say, it is not that which has happened that afflicts this man, for it does not afflict \ another, but it is the opinion about this thing which ^ afflicts the man. So far as words then do not be un- willing to show him sympathy,^ and even if it happens so, to lament with him. But take care that you do not lament internally also. * This is obscure. * It is true that the man is wretched, not because of the things external which have happened to him, but through the fact that he allows liimself to be affected so much by external things which are placed out of his power.* Schweig. 2 It has been objected to Epictetus that he expresses no sympathy with those who suffer sorrow. But here he tells you to show sympathy, a thing which comforts most people. But it would be contrary to his teaching, if he told you to suffer mentally with auot\ier. 2 c 386 EPIOTETUS. XVII. Eem ember that thou art an actor in a play/ of such a "kind as the teacher (author) ^ may choose; if short, of a short one ; if long, of a long one : if he wishes you to act the part of a poor man, see that you act the part naturally ; if the part of a lame man, of a magistrate, of a private person, (do the same). For this is your duty, to act well the part that is given to you; but to select the part, belongs to another, XVIII. When a raven has croaked inauspiciously^ let not the appearance hurry you away with it; but straightway make a distinction in your mind and say, None of these things is signified to me, but either to my poor body, or to my small property, or to my reputation, or to my children or to my wife : but to me all significations arc auspicious if I choose. For whatever of these things results, it is in my power to derive benefit from it. XIX. You can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in which it is not in your power to conquer. Take care then when you observe a man honoured before others or possessed of great power or highly esteemed for any reason, not to suppose him happy, and be not carried away by the appearance. For if the nature of the good is in our power, neither envy nor jealous}^ will have a place in us. But you yourself will not wish to be a general or senator (Trpvravts) or consul, but a free man : and there is only one way to this, to despise (care not for) the things which are not in our power. XX. Eemember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults you, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. When then a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinion which > Compare Antoninus, xi. 6, xii. 36. * Note, ed. Schweig. , EPIOTETUS. 887 has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be carried away by the appearance. For if you once gain time and delay, you will more easily master yourself. '^ XXI. Let death and exile and every other thing which appears dreadful be daily before your eyes ; but most of all death : and you will never think of any thing mean nor will you desire any thing extravagantly. XXII. If 3'^ou desire philosophy, prepare yourself from the beginning to be ridiculed, to expect that many will sneer at you, and say. He has all at once returned to us as a philosopher; and whence does he get this supercilious look for us ? Do you not show a supercilious look ; but hold on to the things which seem to you best as one appointed by God to this station. And remember that if you abide in the same principles, these men who first ridiculed will afterwards admire you : but if you shall have been overpowered by them, you will bring on your- self double ridicule. XXIII. If it should ever happen to you to be turned to externals in order to please some person, you must know that you have lost your purpose in life.^ Be satisfied then in every thing with being a philosopher ; and if you wish to seem also to any person to be a philosopher, appear so to yourself, and you will be able to do this. XXIV. Let not these thoughts afflict you, I shall live un- honoured and be nobody nowhere. For if want of honour (aTLfjLLa) is an evil, you cannot be in evil through the means (fault) of another any more than you can be involved in any thing base. Is it then your business to obtain the rank of a magistrate, or to be received at a banquet ? By no means. How then can this be want of * * If I yet pleased men, I sliould not be the servant of Christ.* Gal. i. 10. Mi-s. Carter. 2 c 2 388 EPICTETUS. honor (dishonor) ? And how will you be nobody nowhere, when yon onght to be somebody in those things only which are in your power, in which indeed it is peimitted to you to be a man of the greatest worth? But your friends will be without assistance ! What do you mean by being without assistance? They will not receive money from you, nor will you make them Eoman- citizens. Who then told you that these are among the things which are in our power, and not in the power of others ? And who can give to another what he has not himself? Acquire money then, your friends say, that we also may have something. If I can acquire money and also keep myself modest, and faithful and magnanimous, point out the way, and I will acquire it. But if you ask mo to lose the things which are good and my own, in order that you may gain the things which are not good, see how unfair and silly you are. Besides, which would you rather have, money or a faithful and modest friend? For this end then rather help me to be such a man, and do not ask me to do this by which I shall lose that character. But my country, you say, as far as it depends on me, will be without my help. I ask again, what help do you mean? It will not have porticoes or baths through you.^ And what does this mean ? For it is not furnished with shoes by means of a smith, nor with arms by means of a shoe- C maker. But it is enough if every man fully discharges the work that is his own : and if you provided it with another citizen faithful and modest, would you not be useful to it ? Yes. Then you also cannot be useless to it. What place then, you say, shall I hold in the city ? What- ever you can, if you maintain at the same time your fidelity and modesty. But if when you wish to be useful to the state, you shall lose these qualities, what profit could you be to it, if you were made shameless and faithless ? XXV. Has any man been preferred before you at a banquet, or in being saluted, or in being invited to a consultation ? If these things are good, you ought to rejoice that he has obtained them : but if bad, be not grieved because you * See the text. EPICTETUS. 389 have not obtained them ; and remember that yon cannot, if you do not the same things in order to obtain what is not in o"ir own pover, be considered worthy of the same (equal) things. lor how can a man obtain an equal share with another when he does not visit a man's doors as that other man does, when he does not attend him when he goes abroad, as the other man does ; when ho does not praise (flatter) him as another does ? You will be unjust then and insatiable, if you do not part with the price, in return for which those things are sold, and if you wish to obtain them for nothing. Well, what is the price of lettuces ? An obolus ^ perhaps. If then a man gives up the obolus, and receives the lettuces, and if you do not give up the obolus and do not obtain the lettuces, do not suppose that you receive le>s than he who has got the lettuces; for as he has the let'uces, so you have the obolns which you did not give. In the same way then in the other matter also you have not been invited to a man's feast, for you did not give to the host the price at which the supper is sold ; but he sells it for praise (flattery), he sells it for personal attention. Give then the price,'^ if it is for your interest, for which it is sold. But if you wish both not to give the price and to obtain the things, you are insatiable and silly. Have you nothing then in place of the supper? You have indeed, you have the not flattering of him, whom you did not choose to flatter ; you have the not enduring^ of the man when he enters the room. XXYL We may learn the wish (will) of nature from the things in which we do not differ from one another : for instance, when your neighbour's slave has broken his cup, or any thing else, we are ready to say forthwith, that it is one of the things which happen. You must know then that when your cup also is broken, you ought to think as you did when your neighbour's cup was broken. Transfer this reflection to greater things also. Is another man's child or wife dead? There is no one who would not say, this * The sixth par' of a drachma. - * Price ' is here rh Sia euo-fjSes Koi (TvixipipoVy ov hvyarai aroodrjvat rh evacfies €v rivi. This ifi what is said here (s. 31). 894 EPICTETUS. sopher. For if it is any of the tilings "wLicli are not in our power, it is absolutely necessary that it mnst be neither good nor bad. Do not then bring to the diviner desire or aversion (cKKXto-tv) : if you do, you will approach him with fear. But having determined in your mind that every thing which shall turn out (result) is indifferent, and does not concern you, and whatever it may be, for it will be in your power to use it well, and no man will hinder this, come then with confidence to the Gods as your advisers. And then when any advice shall have been given, remember whom you have taken as advisers, and whom you will have neglected, if you do not obey them. And go to divination, as Socrates said that you ought, about those matters in which all the inquiry has reference to the result, and in which means are not given either by reason nor by any other art for knowing the thing which is the subject of the inquiry. Wherefore when we ought to share a friend's danger or that of our country, you must not consult the diviner whether you ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you that the signs of the victims are unlucky, it is plain that this is a token of death or mutilation of part of the body or of exile. But reason prevails that even with these risks we should share the dangers of our friend and of our country. Therefore attend to the greater diviner, the Pythian God, who ejected from the temple him who did not assist his friend when he was being murdered.^ XXXIII. Immediately prescribe some character and some form to yourself, which you shall observe both when you are alone and when you meet with men. And let silence be the general rule,^ or let only what is necessary be said, and in few words. And rarely and" when the occasion calls we shall sj-y something; but about none of the common subjects, not about gladiators, nor horse races, nor about athletes, nor about eating or drinking, which are the usual subjects; and * The story is told by Aelian (ill. c. 44), and by Simplicius in his commentary on the Encheiridion (p. 411, ed. Schweig.). Upton. EPIOTETUS. 395 especially not about men, as blaming them or praising them, or comparing them. If then yon are able, bring over by yonr conversation the conversation of your asso- ciates to that which is proper ; but if you should happen to be confined to the company of strangers, be silent. Let not your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor excessive. . Eefuse altogether to take an oath, if it is possible : if it is not, refuse as far as you are able. Avoid banquets which are given by strangers ^ and by ignorant persons. But if ever there is occasion to join in them, let your attention be carefully fixed, that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar (the uninstructed). For you must know, that if your companion be impure, ho also who keeps company with him musst become impure, though he should happen to be pure. Take (apply) the things which relate to the body as far as the bare use, as food, drink, clothing, house, and slaves : but exclude every thing which is for show or luxury. As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage : but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom.^ Do not however be disagreeable to tho.^e who indulge in these pleasures, or reprove tbein ; and do not often boast that you do not indulge in them yourself. If a man has reported to you, that a certain person speaks ill of you, do not make any defence (answer) to what has been told you : but reply. The man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not have men- tioned these only. It is not necessary to go to the theatres often : but if there is ever a proper occasion for going, do not show yourself as being a partisan of any man except your- self, that is, desire only that to be done which is done, and for. him only to gain the prize who gains the prizo ; for in this way you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from shouts and laughter at any (thing * * Convivia cum hominibus extraneis et rudibus, disciplina iiou imbutis * is the Latin version. '^ Tlie text is ws voixifxov: and the Latin explanation is *qua fas est "uti ; (jua uti absque flagitio licet.* 396 EPICTETUS. or person), or \iolent emotions. And wlien you are come away, do not talk much about what has passed on the stage, except about that which may lead to your own improvement. For it is plain, if you do talk much that you admired the spectacle (more than you ought).^ Do not go to the hearing of certain persons' recitations nor visit them readily. ^ But if you da attend, observe gravity and sedateness, and also avoid making yourself disagreeable. When you are going to meet with any person, and par- ticularly one of those who are considered to be in a superior condition, place before yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances, and you will have no difficulty in making a proper use of the occasion. When you are going to any of those who are in great power, place before yourself that you will not find the man at home, that you will be excluded, that the door will not be opened to you, that the man will not care about you. And if with all this it is your duty to visit him, bear what happens, and never say to yourself that it was not worth the trouble. For this is silly, and marks the character of a man who is offended by externals. In company take care not to speak much and exces- sively about your f)wn acts or dcingers : for as it is plea- sant to you to make mention of your own dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what has happened to 3'ou. Take care also not to provoke laughter; for this is a slippery way towards vulgar habits, and is also adapted to diminish the respect of your neighbours. It is a dangerous habit also to approach obscene talk. When then any thing of this kind happens, if there is a good opportunity, rebuke the man who has proceeded to this talk : but if there is not an opportunity, by your silence at least, and blushing and expression of dissatisfaction by your countenance, show plainly that you are displeased at such talk. * To admire (BavfjcdCeip) is contrary to the precept of Epictetus ; i. 29, 11. 6, ill. 20. Upton. 2 Sucl; recitations were common at Kome, when authors read their works anil invited persons to attend. Tliese recitations are often mentioned in the letters of the younger Pliny. See Epictetus, lit. 23. EPICTETUS. 897 XXXIV. If you have received the impression {fj^avTacrUv) of any pleasure, guard yourself against being carried away by it; but let the thing wait for you, and allow yourself a certain delay on your own part. Then think of both times, of the time when you will enjoy the pleasure, and of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure when you will repent and will reproach yourself. And set against these things how you will rejoice if you have abstained from the pleasure, and how you will commend yourself. But if it seem to you seasonable to undertake (do) the thing, take care that the charm of it, and the pleasure, and the attraction of it shall not conquer you : but set on the other side the consideration how much better it is to bo ' conscious that you have gained this victory. XXXV. When you have decided that a thing ought to be done and are doing it, never avoid being seen doing it, though the many shall form an unfavourable opinion about it. Por if it is not right to do it, avoid doing the thing ; but if it is right, why are you afraid of those who shall find fault wrongly ? XXXVI. As the proposition it is either day or it is night is of great importance for the disjunctive argument, but for the conjunctive is of no value, ^ so in a symposium (enter- tainment) to select the larger share is of great value for the body, but for the maintenance of the social feel- ing is worth nothing. When then you are eating mth another, remember to look not only to the value for the body of the things set before you, but also to the value of the behaviour towards the host which ought to be observed.^ ♦ * Compare i. 25, 11, etc. 2 See the note of Schweig. on xxxvi. 398 EPICTETUS. XXXVII. If you have assumed a cliaracter above your strength, you have both acted in this matter in an unbecoming way, and you have neglected that which you might have fulfilled. XXXVIII. In walking about as you take care not to step on a nail or to sprain your foot, so take care not to damage your own ruling faculty : and if we observe this rule in every act, we shall undertake the act with more security. XXXIX. The measure of possession (property) is to every man the body, as the foot is of the sboe.^ If then you stand on this rule (the demands of the body), you will maintain the measure : but if you pass beyond it, you must then of necessity be hurried as it were down a precipice. As also in the matter of the shoe, if you go beyond the (necessities of the) foot, the shoe is gilded, then of a purple colour, then embroidered : ^ for there is no limit to that which has once passed the true measure. SR^ ■ XL. ^ Women forthwith from the age of fourteen ^ are called by the men mistresses (Kvptai, duminae). Therefore since they see that there is nothing else that they can obtain, but only the power of lying with men, they begin to decorate themselves, and to place all their hopes in this. ^ Cut non conveniet sua res, nt calceus olira, 61 pede major erit, subvortet ; si minor, uret. Horat. Epp. i, 10, 42, and Epp. i. 7, 98. ' The word is KtvrrirSu *acu piotum,* ornamented with needle- work. ■ Fourteen was considered the age of puberty in Roman males, but in females tb© age of twelve (Justin, Inst. I, tit. 22). Compare Gaius, i. 196. EPICTETUS. 399 It is woiiih our while then to take care that they ma;) know that they are valued (by men) for nc>thing else than appearing (being) decent and modest and discreet. XLI. It is a mark of a mean capacity to spend much time on the things which concern the body, such as much exercise, much eating, much drinking, much easing of the body, much copulation. But these things should be done as subordinate things : and let all your care be directed to the mind. XLIU When any person treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that he does this or says this because he thinks that it is his duty. It is not possible then for him to follow that which seems right to you, but that which seems right to himself. Accordingly if he is wrong in his opinion, he is the person who is hurt, for he is the person who has been deceived; for if a man shall suppose the true conjunction 2 to be false, it is not the conjunction which is hindered, but the man who has been deceived about it. If you proceed then from these opinions, you will be mild in temper to him who reviles you : for say on each occasion, It seemed so to him. XLIII. Every thing has two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the other by which it may not. If your brotlier acts unjustly, do not lay hold of the act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this is the handle which cannot be borne : but lay hold of the other, that he is your brother, that he was nurtured with you, and you will lay hold of the thing by that handle by which it can be borne. * See Mrs. C.*8 note, in which she says * Epictetus seems to be in part mistaken here,' etc. ; and I think that he is. 2 rh aAi70es (TvyLimrXeyf^Uvov is rendered in the Latin by * verum con- jiinctura.* Mrs. Carter renders it by *a true proposition/ which I suppose to be the meaning. 400 EPICTETUS. XLiy. These reasonings do not cohere : I am richer than you, therefore I am better than you ; I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better than you. On the contrary these rather cohere, I am richer than you, therefore my possessions are greater than yours : I am more eloquent than you, therefore my speech is superior to yours. But you are neither possession nor speech. XLY. Does a man bathe quickty (early) ? do not say that he bathes badly, but that he bathes quickly. Does a man drink much wine ? do not say that he does this badly, but say that he drinks much. For before you shall have deter- mined the opinion,^ how do you know whether he is acting wrong? Thus it will not happen to you to comprehend some appearances which are capable of being compre- hended, but to assent to others. XLYI. On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not speak much among the uninstructed about theorems (philosophical rules, precepts) : but do that which follows I'rom them. For example at a banquet do not say how a man ought to eat, but eat as you ought to eat. For remember that in this way Socrates^ also altogether avoided ostentation : persons used to come to him and ask to be recommended by him to philosophers, and he used to take them to philosophers: so easily did he submit to being overlooked. Accordingly if any conversation should arise among uninstructed persons about any theorem, gene- rally be silent; for there is great danger that you will immediately vomit up what you have not digested. And when a man shall say to you, that you know nothing, and you are not vexed, then be sure that you have begun the work (of philosophy). For even sheep do not vomit up * Mrs. Carter translates this, *' Unless you perfectly understand the principle [from which anyone acts].'* 2 See iii. 23, 22 ; iv. 8, 2. iEPICTETUS. 401 til el r grass and show to the shepherds how much they have eaten ; but when they have internally digested the pasture, they produce externally wool and milk. Do you ^Iso show not your theorems to the uninstructed, but show the acts which come from their digestion. XLVII. When at a small cost you are supplied with every thing for the body, do not be proud of this ; nor, if you drink water, say on every occasion, I drink water. But consider first how much more frugal the poor are than we, and how much more enduring of labour. And if you ever wish to exercise yourself in labour and endurance, do it for your- self, and not for others : do not embrace statues.^ But if you are ever very thiisty, take a draught of cold water, and spit it out, and tell no man. XLVIII. The condition and characteristic of an uninstructed per- son is this : he never expects from himself profit (advan- tage) nor harm, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is this : he expects all ad- vantage and all harm from himself. The signs (marks) of one who is making progress are these : he censures no man, he praises no man, he blames no man, he accuses no man, he says nothing about himself as if he were some- body or knew something ; when he is impeded at all or hindered, he blames himself: if a man praises him, he ridicules the praiser to himself: if a man censures him, he makes no defence : he goes about like weak persons, being careful not to move any of the things which are placed, before they are firmly fixed : he removes all desire from himself, and h-e transfers aversion (JkkXlo-lv) to those things only of the things within our power which are contrary to nature : he employs a moderate movement towards every thing: whether he is considered foolish or ignorant, he cares not : and in a word he watches himself as if he were an enemy and lying in ambush. 1 See ill. 12. 2 D 402 EPICTETUS. XLIX. When a man is proud because lie can understand and explain the writings of Chry.^ippiis, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of. But what is it that I wish ? To understand Nature and to follow it. I inquire therefore who is the interpreter ; and when I have heard that it is Chrysippus, I come to him (the interpreter). But I do not understand what is written, and therefore I seek the interpreter. And so far there is yet nothing to be proud of. But when I shall have found the interpreter, the thing that remains is to use the precepts (the lessons). This itself is the only thing to be proud of. But if I shall admire the exposition, what else have I been made unless a grammarian instead of a philosopher? except in one thing, that I am explaining Chrysippus instead of Homer. "When then any man says to me. Bead Chrysippus to me, I rather blush, when I cannot show my acts like to and consistent with his words. L. Whatever things (rules) are proposed ^ to you [for the conduct of life] abide by them, as if they were laws, as if 5'^ou would be guilty of impiety if you tiansgressed any of them. And whatever any man shall say about you, do not attend to it ; for this is no affair of yours. How long will you then still defer thinking yourself worthy of the best things, and in no matter transgressing the distinctive reason ? ^ Have you accepted the theorems (rules), which it was your duty to agree to, and have you agreed to them? what teacher then do you still expect that you defer to him the correction of yourself? You are no longer a youth, but already a full-grown man. If then you are ' This may mean, * what is proposed to yon by philosophers,' and especially in tiiis little book. Scliweighaeu^-er thinks that it may mean ' wJiat you have proposed to yourself:' but he is inclined to understand it simply, ' what is proposed above, or taught above.' ^ rhv diatpovvra x6yov. * Eam pariitioiitm miSonU intelligo, qua initio dixit, Quaedam in po testate nostra esse, quaedum non esse.' Wolf. EPICTETXTS. 403 negligent and slothful, and are continnally making pro- crastination after prociastination, and proposal (intention) after proposal, and fixing day after day, after which you will attend to yourself, you will not know that you are not making improvement, but you will continue ignorant (uninstructed) both while you live and till you die. Im- mediately then think it right to live as a full-grown man, and one who is making proficiency, and let every thing which appears to you to be the best be to you a law which must not be transgressed. And if any thing laborious, or pleasant or glorious or inglorious be presented to you, 3 emember that now is the contest, now are the Olympic games, and they cannot be deferred ; and that it depends on one defeat and one giving way that progress is either lost or maintained. Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates. LI. The first and most necetisary place (part, tottos) in philosophy is the use of theorems (precepts, ^ecDpT^/xara), for instance, that we must not lie : the second part is that of demonstrations, for instance, How is it proved that we ought not to lie : the third is that which is confirmatory of these two and explanatory, for example. How is this a demonstration ? For what is demonstration, what is con- sequence, what is contradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood ? The third part (topic) is necessary on account of the second, and the second on account of the first ; but the most necessary and that on which we ought to rest is the first. But we do the contrary. For we spend our time on the third topic, and all our earnestness is about it : but we entirely neglect the first. Therefore we lie ; but the demonstration that we ought not to lie we have ready to hand. 2 D 2 404 EPICTETUS. n LIT. In every thing (circumstance) we should hold these maxims ready to hand : Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go : To follow I am ready. If I choose not, I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.* But whoso nobly yields unto necessity, "We hold him wise, and skill'd in things divine.^ And the thir^also : Crito, if so it pleases the Gods, so let it be ; Anytiis and Melitus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me.^ ^ The first four verses are by the Stoic Cleanthes, the pupil of Zeno, and the teacher of Chrysippus. He was a native of Assus in Mysia ; and Simplicius, who wrote his commentary on the Encheiridion in the sixth century, a.d., saw even at this late period in Assus a beautiful statue of Cleanthes erected by a decree of the Roman senate in honour of this excellent man. (Simplicius, ed. Schweig. p. 522.) ^ The two second verses are from a play of Euripides, a writer who has supplied more verses for quotation than any antient tragedian. ^ The third quotation is from the Criton of Plato. Socrates is the speaker. The last part is from the Apology of Plato, and Socrates is also the speaker. The words * and the third also,* Schweighaeuser e^ays, have been introduced from the commentary of Simplicius. Simplicius concludes his commentary thus : Epictetus connects the end with the beginning, which reminds us of what was said in the beginning, that the man who places the good and the evil among the things which are in our power, and not in externals, will neither be compelled by any man nor ever injured. FRAGMENTS OP EPICTETUS. ■*<>•- These Fragments are entitled " Epieteti Fragmenta maxime ex loanne Stobaeo, Antonio, et Maximo collecta'* (ed. Schweig.). There are some notes and emendations on the Fragments ; and a short dissertation on them by Schweig- haeuser. Nothing is known of Stobaeus nor of his time, except the fact that he has preserved some extracts of an ethical kind from the New Platonist Hierocles, who lived about the middle of the fifth century a.d. ; and it is there- fore concluded that Stobaeus lived after Hierocles. The fragments attributed to Epictetus are preserved by Sto- baeus in his work entitled ^AvOoXoyiov, or Florilegium or Sermones. Antonius Monachus, a Greek monk, also made a Flori- legium, entitled Melissa (the bee). His date is uncer- tain, but it was certainly much later than the time of Stobaeus. Maximus, also named the monk, and reverenced as a saint, is said to have been a native of Constantinople, and born about a.d. 580. Some of the Fragments contained in the edition of Schweighaeuser are certainly not from Epictetus. Many of the fragments are obscure ; but they are translated as accurately as I can translate them, and the reader mnst give to them such meaning as he can. 406 EPIOTETUS. I. The life whicli is implicated with forttme (depends on fortune) is like a winter torrent : for it is turbulent, and full of mud, and difficult to cross, and tyrannical, and noisy, and of short duration. IL A soul which is conversant with virtue is like an ever flowing source, for it is pure and tranquil and potable and sweet ^ and communicative (social), and rich and harmless and free from mischief. III. If you wish to be good, first believe that you are bad. IV. It is better to do wrong seldom and to own it, and to act right for the most part, than seldom to admit that you have done wrong and to do wrong often. V. Cheek (punish) your passions (jrdOrj), that you may not be punished by them. VI. Do not so much be ashamed of that (disgrace) which proceeds from men's opinion as fly from that which comes from the truth. VII. If you wish to be well spoken of, learn to speak well (of others) : and when you have learned to speak well of * them, try to act well, and so you will reap the fruit of being well spoken of. VIII. Freedom and slavery, the one is the name of virtue, and the other of vice: and both are acts of the will. But where there is no will, neither of them touches (afteots) * Consult til© Lexicons for tins sense of yda-rifxos^ EPICTETUS. 407 these things. But the soul is accustomed to be master of the body, and the things which belong to the body have no share in the will. For no man is a slave who is free in liis will.i ^ IX. It is an evil chain, fortune (a chain) of the body, and vice of the soul. For he who is loose (free) in the body, but bound in the soul is a slave : but on the contrary he who is bound in the body, but free (unbound) in the soul, is free. X. The bond of the body is loosened by nature through death, and by vice through money : ^ but the bond of the soul is loosened by learning, and by experience and by discipline. XI. If you wish to live without perturbation and with plea- sure, try to have all who dwell with you good. And you will have them good, if you instruct the willing, and dismiss those who are unwilling (to be taught) : for there will fly away together with those who have fled away both wickedness and slavery ; and there will be left with those who remain with you goodness and liberty. XII. It is a shame for those who sweeten drink with the gifts of the bees, by badness to embitter reason which is the gift of the gods. XIII. No man who loves money, and loves pleasure, and loves fame, also loves mankind, but only he who loves virtue. ^ See Schweig.'s note. 2 " He does not say this * that it is bad if a man by money should rcjdeem himseif from bonds,' but he means that ' even a bad man, if he has money, can redeem himself from the bonds of the body and so Bccure his liberty.* " Schweig. 408 EPICTETUS. XIV. As you would not choose to sail in a large and decorated and gold-laden ship (or ship ornamented with gold), and to be drowned ; so do not choose to dwell in a large and costly house and to be disturbed (by cares). XV. When we have been invited to a banquet, we take what 18 set before us : but if a guest should ask the host to set before him fish or sweet cakes, he would be considered to be an unreasonable fellow. But in the world we ask the Gods for what they do not give ; and we do this though the things are many which they have given. XVI. They are amusing fellows, said he (Epictetus), who are proud of the things which are not in our power. A man says, I am better than you, for I possess much land, and you are wasting with hunger. Another says, I am of consular lank. Another says, I am a Procurator (ctti- T/ooTTog). Another, I have curly hair. But a horse does not say to a horse, I am superior to you, for I possess much fodder, and much barley, and my bits are of gold and my harness is embroidered : but he says, I am swifter than you. And every animal is better or worse from his own merit (virtue) or his own badness. Is there then no virtue in man only ? and must we look to the hair, and our clothes and to our ancestors ? XVII. The sick are vexed with the physician who gives them no advice, and think that he has despaired of them. But why should they not have the same feeling towards the philosopher, and think that he has despaired of their coming to a sound state of mind, if he says nothing at all that is useful to a man ? , EPICTETUS. - 409 XVIII. Those who are well constituted in the body endure l)oth heat and cold : and so those who are well constituted in the soul endure both anger and grief and excessive joy and the other afi'ects. XIX. Examine yourself whether you wish to be ri<>h or to be li^PP3^' If yo^ wish to be rich, you should know that it is neither a good thing nor at all in your power : but if you wnsh to be happy, you should know that it is both a good thing and in your power, for the one is a temporary loan of fortune, and happiness comes from the will. XX. As when you see a viper or an asp or a scorpion in an ivory or golden box, you do not on account of the costli- ness of the material love it or think it happy, but because the nature of it is pernicious, you turn awa3^ from it and loathe it ; so when you shall see vice dwelling in wealth and in the swollen fulness of fortune, be not struck by the splendour of the material, but despise the false cha- racter of the morals. XXI. Wealth is not one of the good things ; great expenditure is one of the bad ; moderation (o-oxf^poo-vvr}) is one of the good things. And moderation invites to frugality and the acquisition of good things : but wealth invites to great expenditure and draws us aw^ay from moderation. It is difficult then for a rich man to be moderate, or for a mode- rate man to bejich.^ ^ * How hardly sluiU they that have riches enter the kingdom of God.' Mark x. 23 (Mrs. Carter). This expression in Mark sets fortli the danger of riches, a fact which all ruen know who use their observa- tion. In the next verse the truth is expressed in this form, ' How hard it is for them tliat trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God.* The Stoics viewed wealth as among the things which are indifferent, neither good nor bad. 410 ' EPIOTETUS, XXII. As if you were begotten or born in a ship, you would not be eager to be the master of it (^KvflipvrjTYjs), so — .^ For neither there (in the ship) will the shij) naturally be connected with you, nor wealth in the other case ; but reason is every where naturally connected with you. As then reason is a thing which naturally belongs to yon and IS born in you, consider this also as specially yuur own and take care of it. XXIII. If you had been born among the Persians, you would not have wished to live in Hellas (Greece), but to have lived in Persia happy : so if you are born in poverty, why do you seek to grow rich, and why do you not remain in poverty and be happy ? ^ * The other member of the comparison has been omitted by sotne accident in the MSS. Wolf in his Latin version supplied by conjecture the omission in this manner : * ita neque in terris divitiae tibi expe- tendae sunt/ Schweig. ^ To some persons the comparison will not seem apt. Also the notion that eveiy man should be taught to rise above the condition in which he is born is, in the opinion of some persons, a better teaching. I think that it is not. Few persons have the talents and the character which enable them to rise from a low condition ; and the proper lesson for them is to stay in the condition in which they are born and to be content with it. Those who have the power of rising from a low condition will rise whether they are advised to attempt it or not : and generally they will not be able to rise without doing something useful to society. Those who have ability sufficient to raise themselves from :i low estate, and at the same time to do it to the damage of society, are perhaps only few, but certainly there are such persons. They rise by ability, by the use of fraud, by bad means almost innumerable. They gain wealth, they fill high places, they disturb society, they are plagues and pests, and the world looks on sometimes with stupid admiration until death removes the dazzling and deceitful image, and honest men breathe freely again In the Church of Englanil Catechism there are two answers to two questions, one on our duty to God, the other on our duty to our 5ieighbour. Both the answers would be accepted by Epictetus, except such few words as were not applicable to the circumstances of his age. The second answer ends with the words ' to Icawi and labour to get mine own living and to do my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me/ EPIOTETUS. 411 XXIV. As it is better to lie compressed in a narrow bed and be Koalthy than to be tossed with disease on a broad coiich, so also it is better to contract yourself within a small com- petence and to be happy than to have a great fortune and to be wretched. XXV. It is not poverty which produces sorrow, but desire ; nor does wealth release from fear, but reason (the power of reasoning, Xoyto-fioq). If then you acquire this power of reasoning, you will neither desire wealth nor complain of poverty. XXVI. Neither is a horse elated nor proud of his manger and trappings and coverings, nor a bird of his little shreds of cloth and of his nest : but both of them are pioud of their swiftness, one proud of the swiftness of the feet, and the other of the wings. Do you also then not be greatly proud of your food and dress and, in short, of any external things, but be proud of your integrity and good deeds (ei'Troaa). XXVII. To live well differs from living extravagantly : for tho first comes from moderation and a sufficiency (aurapKeta?) and good order and propriety and frugality ; but the other comes from intemperance and luxury and want of order and want of propriety. And the end (the consequence) of the one is true praise, but of the other blame. If then you wish to live well, do not seek to be commended for profuse expenditure. XXVJII. lict the measure to you of all food and drink be the first satisfying of the desire ; and let the food and the pleasure be the desire (appetite) itself : and you will neither take more than is necessary, nor will you want cooks, and you will be satisfied with the drink that comes in the way. 412 EPIOTETUS. XXIX. Make your iDanner of eating neither luxurious nor gloomy, but lively and frugal, that the soul may not be perturbed through being deceived by the pleasures of the body, and that it may despise them ; and that the soul may not be injured by the enjoyment of present luxury, and the body may not afterwards suffer from disease.^ XXX. Take care that the food which you put into the stomach does not fatten (nourish) you, but the cheerfulness of the mind : for the food is changed into excrement, and ejected, and the urine also flows out at the same time ; but the cheerfulness, even if the soul be separated, remains always uncorrupted,^ XXXI. In banquets remember that you entertain two guests, body and soul : and whatever you shall have given to the body you soon eject : but what you shall have given to the soul, you keep always. XXXIL Do not mix anger with profuse expenditure and serve them up to your guests. Profusion which fills the body is quickly gone ; but anger sinks into the soul and remains for a long time. Consider then that you be not trans- ported with anger and insult your guests at a great expense ; but rather please them with frugality and by gentle behaviour.^ * Mrs. Carter says, * I have not translated this fragment, because I do not understand it.' Schweighaeuser says also that he does not understand it. I have given what may be the meaning ; but it is not an exact translation, which in the present state of the text is not possible. 2 This fragment is perhaps more corrupt than XXIX. See Schweig.'s note. I see no sense in eiraLvos, and I have used the word ovpos^ which is a possible reading. The conclusion appears quite unintelligible. ^ See Schweig.'s note. EPICTETtS. 413 XXXIII. In your banquets (meals) take care that those who serve (your slaves) are not more than those who are served ; for it is foolish for many souls (persons) to wait on a few couches (seats). XXXIV. It is best if even in the preparations for a feast you take a part of the labour, and at the enjoyment of the food, while you are feasting, you share with those who serve the things which are before you. But if such behaviour be unsuitable to the occasion, remember that you are served when you are not labouring by those who are labouring, when you are eating by those who are not eating, when you are drinking by those who are not drinking, while you are talking by those who are silent, while you are at ease by those who are under constraint ; and if you remember this, you will neither being heated with anger be guilty of any absurdity yourself, nor by irritating another will you cause any mischief.^ XXXV. Quarrelling and contention are every where foolish, and particularly in talk over wine they are unbecoming : for a man who is drunk could not teach a man who is sober, nor on the other hand could a drunken man be convinced by a sober man. But where there is not sobriety, it will appear that to no purpose have you laboured for the result of persuasion.^ XXXVI. Grasshoppers (cicadae) are musical : snails have no voice. Snails have pleasure in being moist, but grass- hoppers in being dry. Next the dew invites forth the snails and for this they crawl out : but on the contrary the sun when he is hot, rouses the grasshoppers and they sing in the sun. Therefore if you wish to be a musical * I am not sure about the exact meaning of the conclusion. See Schvfeig.*s note. 2 This is not a translation of the conclusion. Perhaps it is some- thing like tlie meaning. See Schweig.'s note. 414 EPICTETTJ9. man aiiJ to liarmonize well "vvitli others, when orer th0 Clips the soul is bedewed with wine, at that time do not permit the soul to go forth and to be polluted ; but when in company (parties) it is fired by reason, then bid her to utter oracular words and to sing the oracles of justice. XXXYII. Examine in three ways him who is talking with you, as superior, or as inferior, or as equal : and if he is supe- rior, you should listen to him and be convinced by him : but if he is inferior, you should convince him ; if he is equal, you should agree with him ; and thus you will never be gnilty of being quarrelsome. XXXVIIL It is better by assenting to truth to conquer opinion, than by assenting to opinion to be conquered by truth. XXXIX. If you seek truth, you will not seek by every means to gain a victory ; and if you have found truth, you will have the gain of not being defeated. XL. Truth conquers with itself; but opinion conquers among those who are external.^ XLT. ., It is better to live with one free man and to be without fear and free, than to be a slave with many. XLII. "What you avoid suffering, do not attempt to make others suffer. You avoid slavery : take care that others are not your slaves. For if jon endure to have a slave, you appear to be a slave yourself first. For vice has no community with virtue, nor freedom with slavery. * This is not clear. EPICTETUS. 416 XLIIL As lie who is in health would not choose to be served (ministered to) by the sick, nor for those who dwell with niin to be sick, so neither would a free man endure to bo served by slaves, or for those who live with him to b© slaves. XLIV. Whoever you are who wish to be not among the number of slaves, release yourself from slavery : and you will be free, if you are released from desire. For neither Aris- tides nor Epaniinondas nor Lycurgus through being rich and served by slaves were named the one just, the other a god, and the third a saviour, but because they were poor and delivered Hellas (Greece) from slavery.^ XLY. If you wish your house to be well managed, imitate the Spartan Lycurgus. For as he did not fence his city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants by virtue and pre- served the city always free ; ^ so do you not cast around (your house) a large court and raise high towers, but strengthen the dwellers by good will and fidelity and friendship, and then nothing harmful will enter it, not even if the whole band of wickedness shall array itself against it. XLYI. Do not hang your house round with tablets and pictures, but decorate it with moderation (o-oycjypocTvvr}) : for the one is of a foreign (unsuitable) kind, and a temporary decep- tion of the eyes ; but the other is a natural and indelible, and perpetual ornament of the house. ^ It is observed that the terra *jiist* applies to Aristides; the terra • god ' was given to Lycurgus by the Fytbia or Delphic oracle ; the name ' saviour ' by his own citizens to Epaminondas. * Schweig. quotes Poly bins ix. 10, 1, 'a city is not adorned by external things, but by the virtue of those who dwell in it.* Alcaeua says, 22, Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, 18i3, — ov KiOot iXA* &udp€S tSXios TTvpyos ap-fjioi 416 EPICTETU^. XLVII. Instead of an herd of oxen, endeavour to assemble herds of friends in your house. XLYIII. As a wolf resembles a dog, so both a flatterer, and an adulterer and a parasite, resemble a friend. Take care then that instead of watch dogs you do not without know- ing it let in mischievous wolves. XLIX. To be eager that your house should be admired by being whitened with gypsum, is the mark of a man who has no taste : but to set off (decorate) our morals by the goodness of our communication (social habits) is the mark of a man who is a lover of beauty and a lover of man. L. If you begin by admiring little things,^ you will not be thought worthy of great things : but if you despise the little, you will be greatly admired. LI. Nothing is smaller (meaner) than love of pleasure, and love of gain and pride. Nothing is superior to magnani- mity, and gentleness, and love of mankind, and beneficence. LII. They bring forward (they name, they mention) the peevish philosophers (the Stoics), whose opinion it is that pleasure is not a thing conformable to nature, but is a thing which is consequent on the things which are con- formable to nature, as justice, temperance, freedom. What ' Schweig. says that in the reading iav OavixaQris ra fxiKpa irpSorov the word irpcaTov is wanting in four MSS., and that Schow omitted TTpooToy^ and that he has followed Schow. But votitTOf is in Schweig.'s test. EPICTETUS, 417 then ? is tlie soul pleased and made tranquil by the plea- sures of the body which are smaller, as Epicurus says ; and is it not pleased with its own good things, which are the greatest? And indeed nature has given to me modesty, and I blush much when I think of saying any thing base (indecent). This motion (feeling) does not permit me to make (consider) pleasure the good and the end (purpose) of life.^ LIII. In Eome the women have in their hands Plato's Polity (the Eepublic), because it allows (advises) the women to be common, for they attend only to the words of Plato, not to his meaning. Now he does not recommend mai - riage and one man to cohabit with one woman, nnd then that the women should be common : but he takes away such a marriage, and introduces another kind of marriage. And in fine, men are pleased with finding excuses for their faults. Yet philosophy snys that we ought not to stretch out even a finger without a reason.^ LIV. Of pleasures those which occur most larely give the greatest delight. LY. If a man should transgress moderation, the things which give the greatest delight would become the things which give the least. LYI. It is just to commend Agrippinus for this reason, that though he was a man of the highest worth, he never praised himself; but even if another person praised him, he would blush. And he was such a man (Epictetus said) that he would write in praise of any thing disagreeable that befel him ; if it was a fever, he would write of a fever ; if he was disgraced, he would write (;f disgrace ; if he were banished, of banishment. And on one occasion (he mentioned) when he was going to dine, a messenger * iice Schwelg.'s note. ^ See Sehweig.'s note. 2 E 418 EPICTETUS. brought liim news that Nero commanded hini to go into banishment ; on which Agrippiniis said, Well then we will dine at Aricia.^ LVII. Diogenes said that no labour was good, unless the end (purpose) of it was courage and strength (jovos) of the soul, but not of the body. LYIII. As a true balance is neither corrected by a true balance nor judged by a false balance, so also a just judge is neither corrected by just judges nor is he judged (condemned) by unjust judges. LIX. As that which is straight does not need that which is straight, so neither does the just need that which is just.'^ LX. Do not give judgment in one conrt (of justice) before you have been tried yourself before justice.^ LXI. If you wish to 'make your judgments just, listen not to (regard not) any of those who are parties (to the suit), nor to those who plead in it, but listen to justice itself. LXII. You will fail (stumble) least in your judgments, if you yourself fail (stumble) least in your life. LXIII. It is better when you judge justly to be blamed un- deservedly by him who has been condemned than when you judge unjustly to be justly blamed by (before) nature.'* ^ See 1. 1, note 13 and 14. 2 Eather obscure, says Schweig. Compare Frag. Iviii. and Ixvi. 3 Compare Iviii. Schweig. * See Schweig.'s note. EPIOTETUS, 419 LXIV. As the stone which tests the gold is not at all tested i fcself by the gold, so it is with him who has the faculty of judging.! LXV. It is shameful for the judge to be judged by others. LXYI. As nothing is straighter than that which is straight, so nothing is juster than that which is just. LXVII. Who among us does not admire the act of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian ? For after he was maimed in one of his eyes by one of the citizens, and the young man was deli- vered up to him by the people that he might punish him as he chose, Lycurgus spared him : and after instructing him and making him a good man he brought him into the theatre. When the Lacedaemonians expressed their sur- prise, Lycurgus said, I received from you this youth when he was insolent and violent : I restore him to you gentle and a good citizen. ^ LXVIIL Pittacus after being wronged by a certain person and having the power of punishing him let him go, saying. Forgiveness is better than revenge : for forgiveness is the sign of a gentle nature, but revenge the sign of a savage nature.^ * Schweig. suggests tliat 6 \6yos has been omitted before the words 6 TO KpiTTipiov exoov. See the fragment of Chile on the stone which tries gold. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, ed. 1, p. 568. 2 See Schweig.'s note. ^ Pittacus was one of the seven wise men, as they are named. Some authorities state that he lived in the seventh century B.C. By this maxim he anticipated one of the Christian doctrines by six centuries. 2 E 2 420 EPIOTETUS. LXIX. But before eveiy thing this is the act of nature to bind together and to fit together the movemei&t towards the appearance of that which is becoming (fit) and useful. LXX. To suppose that we shall be easily despised by others, if we do not in every way do some damage to those who first show us their hostility, is the mark of very ignoble and foolish men : for (thus) we affirm that the man is considered to be contemptible because of his inability to do damage ; but much rather is a man considered to be contemptible because of his inability to do what is good (useful).^ LXXI. When you are attacking (or going to attack) any person violently and with threats, remember to say to yourself first, that you are (by nature) mild (gentle) ; and if you do nothing savage, you will continue to live with- out repentance and without blame. LXXII. A man ought to know that it is not easy for him to have an opinion (or fixed principle), if he does not daily say the same things, and liear the same things, and at the same time apply them to life. LXXIII. [Nicias was so fond of labour (assiduous) that he often asked his slaves, if he had bathed and if he had dined.]- 1 See Mrs. Carter's note, who could only translate part of this fragment : and Schweig.'s emendation and note. - LXXIII.-LXXV. — Schweig. has inclosed these three fragments in [ ]. They are not from Epictetus, but from Plutarch's treatise EPICTETUS. 421 LXXIY. [The slaves of Archimedes used to drag him by force from his table of diagrams and anoint him ; and Archi- medes would then draw his figuies on his own body when it had been anointed.] LXXV. [Lampis the shipowner being asked how he acquired his wealth, answered, With no difficulty, my great wealth ; but my small wealth (my first gains), with much labour.] LXXVI. Solon having been asked by Periander over their cups (Trapa ttotov), since he happened to say nothing. Whether he was silent for want of words or because he was a fool, replied : No fool is able to be silent over his cups.^ LXXVII. Attempt on every occasion to provide for nothing so much as that which is safe : for silence is safer than speaking. And omit speaking whatever is without sense and reason. LXXVIIL As the fire-lights in harbours by a few pieces of dry- wood raise a great flame and give sufficient help to ships which are wandering on the sea; so also an illustrious man in a state which is tempest-tossed, while he is him- self satisfied with a few things does great services to his citizens. LXXIX. As if you attempted to manage a ship, you would certainly learn completely the steersman's art, [so if you would administer a state, learn the art of managing a state]. For it will be in your power, as in the first case to manage the whole ship, so in the second case also to manage the whole state.^ * See Schweig.'s note. * See Schweig.'s note. There is evidently something omitted in the text, which omission is supplied by the words inclosed thus [ ]. Schweig. proposes to change Kvpepuau into Kv^icrrav. See his remark ©n Traaav . . ttJAo'. Perhaps he is right. 422 EPICTETUS. LXXX. If you propose to adorn your city by the dedication ol offerings (monuments), first dedicate to yourself (decorate yourself with) the noblest offering of gentleness, and justice and beneficence. LXXXI. You will do the greatest services to the state, if you shall raise not the roofs of the houses, but the souls of the citizens : for it is better that great souls should dwell in small houses than for mean slaves to lurk in great houses. LXXXII. Do not decorate the walls of your house with the valuable stones from Euboea and Sparta; but adorn the minds (breasts) of the citizens and of those who administer the state with the insstruction which comes from Hellas f Greece). For states are well governed by the wisdom judgement) of men, but not by stone and wood.^ LXXXIII. As, if you wished to breed lions, you would not care about the costliness of their dens, but about the habits of the animals; so, if you attempt to preside over your citizens, be not so anxious about the costliness of the buildings as careful about the manly character of those who dwell in them. LXXXIV.2 As a skilful horse-trainer does not feed (only) the good colts and allow to starve those who are disobedient to the rein, but he feeds both alike, and chastises the one more * The marbles of Carystus in Euboea and the marbles of Taenarum near Sparta were used by the Romans, and perhaps by the Greeks also, for architectural decoration. (Strabo, x. 446, and viii. 367, ed. Cas.) Compare Horace, Carm. ii. 18. - Non ebur neque aureura Mea renidet in domo lacunar, etc. * This fragment contains a lesson for the administration of a state. The good must be protected, and the bad must be improved by dis- cipline and punishment. EPICTETUS. 423 and forces him to be equ^l to the other : ^ so also a careful mail and one who is skilled in political power, attempts to treat well those citizens who have a good character, but does not will that those who are of a contrary character should be ruined at once ; and he in no manner grudges both of them their food, but he teaches and urges on with more vehemence him who resists reason and law. LXXXV. As a goose is not frightened by cackling nor a sheep by bleating, so let not the clamour of a senseless multitude alarm you. LXXXVI.2 As a multitude, when they without reason demand of you any thing of your own, do not disconcert you, so do not be moved from your purpose even by a rabble when they unjustly attempt to move you. LXXXYII. What is due to the state pay as quickly as you can, and you will never be asked for that which is not due. LXXXVIII. As the sun does not wait for prayers and incantations to be induced to rise, but immediately shines and is saluted by all : so do you also not wait for clappings of hands, and shouts and praise to be induced to do good, but be a doer of good voluntarily, and you will be beloved as much as the sun. LXXXIX. Neither should a ship rely on one small anchor, nor should life rest on a single hope. XC. We ought to stretch our legs and stretch our hopes only to that which is possible. ^ I am not sure what fiep^i means. 2 See in the Index Graecit'itis the word dva-wiruy. 424 EPTCTETU55. XCL Wlien Thales was asked what is most miiversal, lio answered, Hope, for hope stays with those who have nothing else. XCII. It is more necessary to heal the soul than the body, for to die is better than to live a bad Jife. XCIII. Pyrrho nsed to say that there is no difference between dying and living : and a man said to him. Why then do you not die? Pyrrho replied, Because there is no difference. XCIV.i Admirable is nature, and, as Xenophon says, a lover of animated beings. The body then, which is of all things tlie most unpleasant and the most foul (dirty), we love and take care of; for if we were obliged for five days only to take care of our neighbour's body, we should not bo able to endure it. Consider then what a thing it would be to rise in the morning and rub the teeth of another, and after doing some of the necessary offices to wash those parts. In truth it is wonderful that we love a thing to which we perform such services every day. I fill this bag, and then I empty it;^ what is more troublesome? But I must act as the servant of God. For this reason I remain * Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 4, 17. The body is here, and elsewhere in Epictetus, considered as an instrument, which another uses who is not the body ; and that which so uses the body must be something which is capable of using the lx>dy and a power which possesses what we name intelligence and consciousness. Our bodies, as Bishop Butler says, are what we namo matter, and differ from other matter only in being more closely connected with us than other matter. It would be easy to pass from these notions to the notion that this intelligence and power, or to use a common word, the soul, is something which exists independent of the body, though we only know the soul while it acts within and on the body, and by the body. 2 This bag is tlie body, or that part of it whicli holds the food which is taken into tl)0 mouth. EPICTETUS. 425 (here), and I endure to wash this miserable body, to feed it and to clothe it. But when I was younger, God* im- posed on me also another thing, and I submitted to it. Why then do yon not submit, when Nature who has given us this body takes it away ? I love the body, you may say. Well, as I said just now, Nature gave you also this love of the body : but Nature says, Leave it now, and have no more trouble (with it). ^ xcv. When a man dies young, ho blames the gods. When he is old and does not die, he blames the gods because ho suffers when he ought to have already ceased from suffer- ing. And nevertheless, when death approaches, he wishes to live, and sends to the physician and in treats him to omit no care or trouble. Wonderful, he said, are men, who are neither willing to live nor to die.^ XCVI. To the longer life and the worse, the shorter life, if it is better, ought by all means to be preferred. XCVII. When we are children our parents deliver us to a paedagogue to take care on all occasions that we suffer no harm. But when we are become men, God delivers us to our innate conscience (avvciSrjo-ei) to take care of us. This guardianship then we must in no way despise, for we shall both displease God and be enemies to our own conscience.^ XCYIII. [We ought to use wealth as the material for some act, not for eveTj act alike.] 1 See Schweig.'s excellent note on this fragment. There is manifestly a defect in the text, which Scliweig.'s note supplies. ^ Mrs. Carter suggests that airdpea-roy in the text should be dirdpsaroi : and so Schweig. has it. 426 EPICTETUS. XCIX. [Virtue then slionld be desired by all men more than wealth which is dangerous to the foolish ; for the wicked- ness of men is increased by wealth. And the more a man is without sense, the more violent is he in excess, for ho has the means of satisfying his mad desire for pleasures. J C. What we ought not to do, we should not even think of doing. CI. Deliberate much before saying or doing an3'thing, for you will not have the power of recalling what has been eaid or done. CII. Every place is safe to him who lives with justice. cm. Crows devour the eyes of the dead, when the dead have no longer need of them. But flatterers destroy the souls of the living and blind their eyes. CIV. The anger of an ape and the threats of a flatterer should be considered as the same. CV. Listen to those who wish to advise what is useful, but not to those who are eager to flatter on all occasions ; for the first really see what is useful, but the second look to that which agrees with the opinion of those who possess power, and imitating the shadows of bodies they assent to what is said by the powerful. EPICTETUS. 427 CYI. The man who gives advice ought first to have regard to the modesty and character (reputation) of those whom he advises ; for those who have lost the capacity of blushing are incorrigible. CVII. To admonish is better than to reproach : for admonition is mild and friendly, but reproach is harsh and insulting ; and admonition corrects those who are doing wrong, but reproach only convicts them. CVIII. Give of what you have to strangers (f eVots) and to those who have need : for he who gives not to him who wants, will not receive himself when he wants. CIX. A pirate had been cast on the land and was perishing through the tempest. A man took clothing and gave it to him, and brought the pirate into his house, and sup- plied him with every thing else that was necessary. When the man was reproached by a person for doing kind- ness to the bad, he replied, I have shown this regard not to the man, but to mankind.^ ex. A man should choose (pursue) not every pleasure, but the pleasure which leads to the good.^ CXI. It is the part of a wise man to resist pleasures, but of a foolish man to be a slave to them. * Mrs. Carter in her notes often refers to the Christian precepts, but she says nothing liere. The fragment is not from Epictetus ; bnt, whether the story is true or not, it is an example of the behaviour of a wise and good man. ^ See Schweig.'s interpretation and emendation. I doubt if he is riglit. 428 EPICTETUS. CXII. Pleasure, like a kind of bait, is thrown before (in front of) every thing which is really bad, and easily allures greedy souls to the hook of perdition. CXIII. Choose rather to punish your appetites than to be punished through them. CXIY. No man is free who is not master of himself. cxv. The vine bears three bunches of grapes : the first is that of pleasure, the second of drunkenness, the third of violence. CXYI. Over your wine do not talk much to display your learning ; for you will utter bilious stuiF.^ CXYII. He is intoxicated who drinks more than tlnee cups: and if he is not intoxicated, he has exceeded moderation. CXYIII. Let your talk of God be renewed every day, rather than your food. CXIX. Think of God more frequently than you breathe. oxx. If you always remember that whatever you are doing in the soul or in the body, God stands by as an inspector, 3^ou will never err (do wrong) in all your prayers and in all your acts, but you will have God dwelling with you.2 * Xf>^€p^ y^p dnocpQiy^r]. See Schweig/s note. * This is the doctrine of God being in man. See the Index. i EPICTETUS. 429 CXXI. As it is pleasant to see the sea from the land, so it is pleasant for him who has escaped from troubles to think of them.^ CXXII. Law intends indeed to do service to human life, hut it is not able when men do not choose to accept her services ; for it is only in those who are obedient to her that she displays her special virtue. CXXIII. As to the sick physicians are as saviours, so to those also who are wronged are the laws. CXXIV. The justest laws are those which are the truest. CXXV. To yield to law and to a magistrate and to him who is wi:ser than yourself, is becoming. CXXYI. The things which are done contrary to law are the same as things which are not done. CXXVII. In prosperity it is very easy to find a friend; but in adversity it is most difficult of all things. CXXVIII. Time relieves the foolish from sorrow, but reason relieves the wise. CXXIX. He is a wise man who does not grieve for the things which he has not, but rejoices for those which he has. * Compare Lucretius ii. the beginning. 430 EPICTETUS. cxxx. Epictetus being asked how a man shoulc! give pain to his enemy answered, By preparing himself to live the best life that he can.^ CXXXI. Let no wise man be averse to undertaking the office of a magistrate (rov ap^etv) : for it is both impious for a man to withdraw himself from being useful to those who have need of our services, and it is ignoble to give way to the worthless ; for it is foolish to prefer being ill-governed to governing well. CXXXII. Nothing is more becoming to him who governs than to despise no man and not show arrogance, but to preside over all with equal care.^ CXXXIII. [In poverty any man lives (can live) happily, but very seldom in wealth and power (apxcus). The value of poverty excels so much that no just man (vo/ai/xos) would exchange poverty for disreputable wealth, unless indeed the richest of the Athenians Themistocles, the son of Neocles, was better than Aristides and Socrates, though he was poor in virtue. But the wealth of Themistooles and Themistocles himself have perished and have left no name. For all things die with death in a bad man, but the good is eternal.] ^ CXXXIV. Eemember that such was, and is, and will bo the nature of the universe, and that it is not possible that the things which come into being can come into being otherwise than they do now ; and that not only men have partici- pated in this change and transmutation, and all other living things which are on the earth, but also the things ^ Compare M. Antoninus, vi. 6. 2 For ovdeu Mrs. Carter prefers ovBhv fxaWop: and also Schweig. does, or ovdev &\\o fxaXXov. 2 This fragment is not from Epictetus. See Schweig.'s note. EPICTETUS. 431 which are divine. And indeed the very four elements are changed and transmuted up and down, and earth becomes water and water becomes air, and the air again is trans- muted into other things, and the same manner of trans- mutation takes place from above to below. If a man attempts to turn his mind towards these thoughts, and to persuade himself to accept with willingness that which is necessary, he will pass through life with complete moderation and harmony. CXXXY. He who is dissatisfied with things present and what is given by fortune is an ignorant man (IStiDTrjs) in life : but he who bears them nobly and rationally and the things \vhich proceed from them is worthy of being considered a good man. CXXXYI. All things obey and serve the world (the universe), earth and sea and sun and the rest of the stars, and the plants of earth and animals. And our body obeys it also both in disease and in health when it (the universe) chooses, both in youth and in age, and when it is passing- through the other changes. What is reasonable then and in our power is this, for our judgment not to be the only thing which resists it (the univei se) : for it is strong and superior, and it has determined better about us by admin- istering (governing) us also together with the whole. And besides, this opposition also is unreasonable and does nothing more than cause ns to be tormented uselessly and to fall into pain and sorrow. The fragments which follow are in part assigned to Epictetus, in part to others. CXXXVII. Contentment, as it is a short road and pleasant, has great delight and little trouble. 432 EPIOTETL'S. CXXXVIII. Fortify yourself "witli contentment, for tin's is an im- pregnable fortress. CXXXIX. Let nothing be valued more than truth : not even selec- tion of a friendship which lies without the influence of the aifects, by which (affects) justice is both confounded (dis- turbed) and darkened.^ CXL. Truth is a thing immortal and perpetual, and it gives to us a beauty which fades not away in time nor does it take away ^ the freedom of speech which proceeds from justice; but it gives to us the knowledge of what is just and lawful, separating from them the unjust and refuting them. CXLI. We should not have either a blunt knife or a freedom of speech which is ill managed. CXLII. Nature has given to men one tongue, but two ears, that we may hear from others twice as much as we speak. CXLIIL Nothing really pleasant or unpleasant subsists by nature, but all things become so through habit (custom).^ CXLIV. Choose the best life, for custom (habit) will make it pleasant. CXLV. • Be careful to leave your sons well instructed rather than rich, for the hopes of the instructed are better than the wealth of the ignorant. ^ The meaning of the second part is confused and uncertain. Boe ^chweig.'s note. *^ In place of a(paip€7 ti]v Mis. Carter proposes to read a(paip€Tt]v. ^ See Schweig.'s note. Et^ICTETUS, 433 CXLYI. A daughter is a possession to her father which is not his own. CXLVII. The same person advised to leave modesty to children i-ather than gold. CXLYIIL The reproach of a father is agreeahle medicine, for it contains more that is useful than it contains of that which gives pain. CXLIX. He who has been lucky in a son in law has found a son : but he who has been unlucky, has lost also a daughter. CL. The value of education (knowledge) like that of gold is valued in every place. CLI. He who exercises wisdom exerci&3s the knowledge which is about God. CLII. Nothing among animals is so beiiutiful as a man adorned by learning (knowledge).^ CLIIL We ought to avoid the friendship of the bad and the enmity of the good. CLIV. The necessity of circumstances proves friends and detects enemies. CLV. When our friends are present, we ought to treat them well ; and when they are absent, to speak of them well. * See Schweig/s note. 2 F 434 EPICTETUS. CLVI. Let no man think that he is loved by any man when he loves no man. CLVII. You ought to choose both physician and friend not the most agreeable, but the most useful. CLYIII. If you wish to live a life free from sorrow, think of what is going to happen as if it had already happened, CLIX. Be free from grief not through insensibility like the irrational animals, nor through want of thought like the foolish, but like a man of virtue by having reason as the consolation of grief. CLX. Whoever are least disturbed in mind by calamities, and in act struggle most against them, these are the best men in states and in private life. CLXI. Those who have been instructed, like those who have been trained in the palaestra, though they may have fallen, rise again from their misfortune quickly and skilfully. CLXII. We ought to call in reason like a good physician as a help in misfortune* CLXIII. A fool having enjoyed good fortune like intoxication to a great amount becomes more foolish* CLXIV. Envy is the antagonist of the fortunate. EPICTETUS. ^ 435 CLXV. He who bears in mind what man is will never be trou- bled at any thing which happens. CLXVI. For making a good voyage a pilot (master) and wind are necessary : and for happiness reason and art. CLXVII. We shonld enjoy good fortune while we have it, like tlio fruits of autumn. CLXYIII. He is unreasonable who is grieved (troubled) at the things which happen from the necessity of nature. Some Fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius. CLXIX. Of the things which are, God has put some of them in our power, and some he has not. In onr own power ho has placed that which is the best and the most important, that indeed through which he himself is happy, the use of appearances (ai/Tacrtas philosopbi appellant, ' qui- bus mens bominis prima statim specie accidentis ad ani- mum rei pellitur, non voluntatis sunt, neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese bominibus noscitanda. Probation es autem quas o-vyKaTaOecreis vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ao dijudicantur, voluntariae sunt fiuntque bominum arbitratu. Propterea quum sonus aliquis aut caelo aut ex ruina aut repentinus [nescius] periculi nuntius vel quid aliud ejusmodi factum, sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrabi et pallescere necessum est, non opinione alicujus mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium mentis atque rationis praevertentibus. Mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem [idem?] ras rotavra? (^ai^racrtas, id est, visa istaec animi sui terrifica non approlDat : boo est ov crvyKaTarWeraL ouSe TT/Qoa-cTrtSofa^et, sed abjicit respuitque, nee ei metu- endum esse in bis quidquam videtur. Atque boc inter incipient is sapientisque animum differre dicunt, quod insipiens, qualia esse primo animi sui pulsu visa sunt saeva et aspera, talia esse vero putat, et eadem incepta tamquam jure metuenda sint, sua quoque assensione approbat /cat irpocrein^o^at.u (boo enim verbo Stoici quum super ista re disserunt utuntur). Sapiens autem quum breviter et strict im colore atque vultu motus est, ov auy- Karart^cTat, sed statum vigoremque ^ententiae suae retinet, quam de bujuscemodi visis semper babuit, ut de minime metuendis, sed fronte falsa et formidine inani territantibus.' 440 EPICTETUS. CLXXXL Arnobius advers. Gentes, in fine libri secundi. Quum de animarum agitur salute ac de respectu nostri ; ' aliquid et sine ratione faciendum est,' ^ ut Epictetum dixisse approbat Arrianus. * *Nempe ubi ratio deficit, ibi sola fiducia in Deum reposita et obsequio voluntati ejus ab ipso declaratae unice subjecto ageudum est.' Schweig. See Encheiiid. xxxii. ( 441 ) INDEX. iCADEMICS, the, 17 , the folly of the, 171, 172 f , the, cannot blind their own senses though they have tried, i 176 JA^chilles, 40 A-ct, every, consider what it is, 381 A-cts which bear testimony to a man's words, 94 — -, indolence and indifference as to, Epictetus blames, 130 Actor in a play, man an, 386 Admetus, father of, 242 Administrator of all things, • proof that there is an, 144 Adonis, gardens of, 356 Adultery, 107 Affect, an, how it is produced. Affection, natural, 37 Affectionate, how to become, 277 Agamemnon and Achilles, quarrel of, 191 *Ayyap€laj a press, 305 Agrippinus, Paconius, 7, 9, 417 Alcibiades, 200 Alexander and Menelaus, 179 and Hephaestion, 178 the 202 Aliptic art, the, 136 Anaxagoras, 114 *Av4xov Kol 'Attcxov, 439 Animals, what they are made for, 50 Annonae, Praefectus, 35 Antipater, 136 Antisthenes, Xenophon, and Plato, 157, 158 , noMe saying of, 342 *- — made Diogenes free, 278 Anxiety, on, 136 Any t us and Melitus, 88 'Atfyop/xai, 22 'ATToreixiC^iVy 307 Appearances, (papraariai, right use of, 4, 20, 45, 64 , and the aids to be provided against them, 80 , we act according to, 86 , the nature of Good and also of Evil is in the use of, 97 , the faculty of understanding the use of, 118 drive away reason, 161 lead on ; and must be resisted, 161 — , right use of, free from re- straint, 167 — often disturb and perplex, 176 — , how we must exercise our- selves against, 218 should be examined, 380 Aqueduct, Marcian, at Rome, 150 Archedemus, 108 Archelaus and Socrates, 436 Archimedes, 421 Arguments, sophistical, 23, 25 Argument, he who is strong in, 193 Aristides, 415 and Evenus, 358 Aristophanes and Socrates, 369, 430 Arnobius, 440 Arrian, 1 Arrogance, self-conceit, 0^170-15, 28 and distrust, 233 , boasting, and pride, advice 442 INDEX. against, 286, 38 i, 387, 394, 395, 399 Assent, cause of, 83 to that which appears false cannot be compelled, 253 Asses, shod, 306 Attention, on, 372 Aversion, e/cKAto-is, 54 Babbler, a, 376, 377 Bath, the, 68 Beauty, 195, 196 , where it is, 370 Beggars, remarks on, 290 Belief cannot be compelled, 304 Best men, the, 434 Body, the, could not be made free from hindrance, 309 and spirit must be separated, 99 • , the, an instrument used by another power, 424 Books, what used for, 327 , a few better than many, 79 Brotherhood of men, 46 Butler, Bp., 3, 134, 198, 326, 338, 348, 350 Caesar's friend is not happy, 300 Cages, birds kept in, by the Romans, 297 Oarystus and Taenarum, marbles of, 422 Cassiope or Cassope, 213 Catechism of the Church of Eng- land, 410 Caution about familiar intercourse with men, 236 Character, on assuming a, above your strength, 398 Characters, different, cannot be mingled, 323 Christianity, Mrs. Carter's opinion of tlie power of, 234 Christians, promise of future happi- ness to, on certain conditions, 311 Chrysippus, 14, 17, 36, 43, 53, 54, 113, 402 , the Pseudomenos of, 157 on Possibilities, 163 Chrysippus on the resolution d syllogisms, 188 and Atitipater, 203 and Zeno, 358 Circumspection, on, 234 Circumstances, difficult, a lesc^o- for, 96 show what men are, 70 Cleanliness, 368 Clcanthes, 31, 163, 404 , an example of the pursuK of knowledge under difficulties, 292 Codicillus, a, 217 Colophon, the, 143 Common sense, 212 Company, behaviour in, 394, 390, 400 Conceit of thinking that we know something, 158 Confess, some things which a man will not, 173 Confession, general, of sins in thfi Prayer Book of the Church of England, 363 Conflagration, the great, 229 Conjunctive or complex axiom, 124 Conscience, rb (rvvei^Ss, power of, 262 Consciousness that he knows no- thing, a man who knows nothing ought to have the, 174 Contest unequal between a charm- ing young girl and a beginner in philosophy, 227 Contradictions, effect of demon- strating, 193 Convince himself, a power given to man to, 340 Courage and caution, 97, 98 and caution, when they are applicable, 101 Cowardice leads men to frequent divination, 117 Crates, a Cynic, and his wife, 260 Criton, Plato's Dialogue, named, 319 Cynic, the true ; his office corre- sponds to the modern teacher of religion, 250 INDEX. 443 Jynic, a, does not wish to Lide anything, 250 -, the true, a messenger from Zeus, 250 -, the father of all men and women, 261 /ynic's ruling faculty must be pure, 262 power of endurance, 263 Jynic, the, sent by God as an ex- ample, 355 Cynism, a man must not attempt it without God, 248 — , on, 248 Daemon, every man's, 48 Darkness, men seek, to conceal their acts, 249 Death, 81 — , fear of, 54 — or pain, and the fear of pain or death, 98 — , what a man should be doing when death surprises him, 209 — , what it is, 230, 282 — , exhortation to receive it thankfully, 310 and birth, how viewed by^a savage tribe, 335 — , the resolution of the matter of the body into the things of which it was composed, 347 -, a man must be found doing something when it comes ; and what it should be, 361 — , when it comes, what Epictetus wishes to be able to say to God, 862 — is the harbour for all, 364 sliould be daily before a man's eyes, 387 Demetrius, a Cynic, 75 Demonstration, what it is; and con- tradiction, 189, 190 De Morgan's Formal Logic, 28 Design, 19 Desire of things impossible is foolish, 272 Desires, consequences of, 358 Desire and aversion, what they are, 380 Determinations, right, only should be maintained, 145 Deviation, every, comes from some- thing which is in man's nature, 371 Dialectic, to be learned last, 291 Difficulties, our, are about external things, 360 Diodorus Cronus, 162 Diogenes, 71, 139, 203, 226, 369,418 , when he was asked for letters of recommendation, 106 and Philip, 250 in a fever, 256 a friend of Antisthenes, 257 and the Cynics of Epictetus' time, 260 — , his personal appearance, 261 how he loved mankind, 278 Diogenes' opinion on freedom, 298 Diogenes and Antisthenes, 312 , free, 317, 318 and Heraclitus, 385 Dion of Prusa, 266 Dirty persons, not capable of being improved, 370 Disputation or discussion, 133 Divination, 116, 393 Diviner, internal, 116 Doctors, travelling, 250 Domitian banishes philosophers from Rome, 71 Door, the open, 72, 99 Duty, what is a man's, 112 to God and to our neighbour, 410 Duties of life discovered from names, 127 of marriage, begetting chil- dren and other, 216 — are measured by ((TXeVecrO, 392 relations Education, Epictetus knew what it ought to be, 53, 58 , what it is, 67 , what ought to be the purpose of, 245 444 INDEX. '}ly€ fxoviKSv, rl, the governing faculty, 49, 332 , the rulhig faculty, described, 351 Encheiridion, 1 End, man's true, 20 End, every thing that we do ought to be referred to an, 264 Enthyinema, 28 Envy, the notion of; Socrates and Bp. Butler, 134 Epaminondas, 41^ Epaphroditus, 6, 62, 78 Epictetus, 1, 2, 220 ■ , and the style of the Gospels, 13 , mistake of, 31 misunderstood, 56, 311 and the New Testament writers, resemblances between, 93 , extravagant assertion of, 114 perhaps confounds Jews and Christians, 126 — , how he could know what God is, 141 — , what was the cflfect of his teaching, 149 disclaims knowledge of certain things, 82, 163 — , hia purpose in teaching, 166 — , great good sense of, in educa- tion, 245 -, some unwise remarks of, 289, 293 — aflSrms that a man cannot be compelled to assent io that which seems to him to be false, 303 — advises not to do as vour friend does simply because he is your friend, 322 — , what reflections he recom- mends, 344 misunderstood by Mrs. Carter, 365 Epictetus* advice as to giving pain to an enemy, 430 Epictetus, wise sayings of, 436 l-Ipicurus, 69, 417^ , doctrines of, 65, GG , the opinions of, 12o Epicurus, his opinions disproved, 168, 169 , his opinion of honesty, 179 , on the end of our being, and other XTorks of, 185 Epicurus* opinion of injustice, 214 Epicureans and Academics, 167 Epicureans and catamites, 274 Epicurean, an, 213 Epirus, governor of, 207 Eriphyle and Amphiaraus, 181 Error, the property of, 192 Errors of others, we should not bo angry with the, 56 Eteocles and Polynices, 177, 337 Eucharist in the Church of England service, 120 Euphrates, the philosopher, 235 did not act well for the sakcy of the spectators, 353 Euripides, 113, 178, 404 Euripides' Medea, 83 Euripides, fragmentof,on death, 336 , the great storehouse of noble thoughts, 361 Events, all, how to use, 383 Evidence, the assertion that all things are incapable of sure, 167 Evil, the origin of, is the abuse of rationality and liberty, 123 . , the, in everything, is that which is contrary to the nature of the thing, 313 -, the nature of, does not exi&t in the world, 390 to men, the cause of all their, is the being unable to adapt th© preconceptions (Trpo\-f}^€is) to the several things, 299 Exercise, on, 225 Exercising himself, method of a man, 206 Externals to the will, 92 , some according to nature, and others contrary, 111 men admire and are busy about, 148 — , judgment from, fallacious, 3^)2 — things, that advantage can bo derived from, 241 i INDEX. 445 the Face, the, does not express hidden character, 106 Faculty, rational, 3 — , ruling, 236 ' — , the ruling, how restored to the original authority, 159 — , the ruling, the material for the wise and good man, 204 Faith and works, 354 False, impossibility of assenting to that which appears, 215 Familiar intimacy, on, 322 Faults, not possible for a man to be free from all, 374 Favorinus, 438 Fever, a goddess at Kome, 60, G8 Firmness in danger, 109 Fool, a, cannot be persuaded, 146 Forgiveness better than revenge, 419 Fragments of Epictetus, 405 Free persons only allowed to be educated, 100 Free, what is, 253, 254 , no bad man is, 295 , who are, the question an- swered, 301, 302 Freedom is obtained not by desires satisfied, but by removing desire, 322 • and slavery, 406 Friendship, 176 , the test of, 177 , advice about, 181 , what it depends on, 180 , Epictetus' opinions of, 365 Oalilaeans, 126,345 Games, Greek, 287 Gellius, A.. 438, 439 Gladiators, 91 Glorious objects in nature, the, 151 God, what is, 65 , nature of; how far described by Epictetus, 118 , the works of, 122 , a guide, 117, 246 God's gifts, 23 God knows all things, 141 in man, 48 in man, an old doctrine, 119 God, the spirit of, in man, the doc- trine of Paul and of Epictetus, 120, 121 dwelling with a man, 42^ Gods everywhere, 250 God's law about the Good, 87 law that the stronger is always superior to the weaker, 88, 89 God and man, kinship of, 30 and man, and man's opinions of God, 141, 142 , address to, 152 -, the wise and good man's ad- dress to ; and his submission to God's will, 284 — beyond man's understanding, 21,65 — ought to be obeyed, 373 -, obedience to, the pleasure of, 285, 286 God's will, 330 will should be the measure of our desires, 156 — will, absolute conformity to, taught by Epictetus, 308, 309 will, when resignation to it is perfect, Bp. Butler, 348 God, blaming, 166 God's power over all things, 46, 47 God, supposed limitation of his power, 340 , what a man should be able to say to, 209 , the father of all, 12, 23, 61 , a friend of, 157 - — , without, nothing should be attempted, 256 , what he chooses is better than what man chooses, 348 and his administration of tho world, those who blame, 254 God's existence, to deny, and eat his bread, 172 God only, looking to, and fixing your afiections oa him onlv, 153 • has seit a man to sliow how a life under difficulties is possible, 254 has made all things perft^ct, 446 INDEX. and the parts of the universe for the use of the whole, 346 God arxd the gods, 12 Gods, various opinions on the, 41, 42 , actions acceptable to the, 45 • , man must learn the nature of the, and tiy to be like them, 141 we ask for what they do not give, 408 Goethe, 19, 251 Gold tested by a certain stone, 419 Good and bad, each a certain kind of will, 87 , bad, and things indifferent, 164 and evil consist in the will, intention, 130 could not exist without evil, 43^ ■■ and evil ; Ohrysippus and Sim- plicius, 43 , the, where it is, 253 , the nature (ovaia) of, 118 ■ man, a, not unhappy, 272 Gospel precepts which Christians do not observe, 289 Gyarus, Gyara, 75 Gyara, 284, 285, S30 Habit, how to oppose, 80 and faculty, how maintained and increased, 158, 159 , how weakened and destroyed, 160 Habits must be opposed by contrary habits, 226, 227 Habit cherished by corresponding acts, 288 Halteres, 15, 327 Hand'kissing, 62 Handles, two, every thing has, 399 Happiness and desire of what is not present never come together, 272 — — , only one way to, 331 Harpaston, a ball, 110 Hearing, he who is tit for, moves the speaker, 192 Hector's address to Andromache, 264 Hellenes, quarrels among the, 178 Helvidius, Prisons, 10 Heraclitus, 229 and Zeno, 99 Hercules, 152, 161, 256, 361 Hippocrates, 154 Homer, what he meant when he wrote certain things, 366 Hope, Thales' opinion of, 424 Human intelligence is a part of the divine, 44 race, the, continuance of, how secured, 187 being, a, definition of 198 Hypocrite, the, 356 Hypothesis (vTro^eo-ts), 91 Ideas innate, of good and evil, 131 Idiotes, <5twT7]s, the meaning of, 95 , ibtdoTTjs, a common person, 240 Ignorance the cause of doing wronj?, 78 Ignorant man, description of an, 190 Iliad, the, is only appearances and the use of appearances, 84 Immortality of the soul; Socrates and Epictetus, 231 Impressions, (pauraalai, guard against, 397 Indifferent, things which are, 64 Indifference of things ; of the things which are neither good nor bad, 112 Informers at Eome, 375 Initiated, the, fivo-rai, 310 Injustice, an act of, a great harm to the doer, 334 Inn, an, travboKcTov, 187 Interest, self; and common interest or utility, 61 , every animal attached to it8 own, 178 Invincible, how a man should be, 59 , how a man can be, 386 Jesus, prayer of, 31 and Socrates compared by Baur, 321 , and of Socrates, the death of, contrasted by Rousseau, 321 INDEX. 447 \a\hs Koi ayaOSs, 201 inow thyself, the maxim, 58, 197 thyself, the beginning of knowledge, 320 vTiow thyself, the precept written at Delphi, 437 \6(riJLos, sense of, 282 'Ivptos, the use of, 92 Laius, 197 Lateranus, Plautius, 6 ' fiaticlave, tlie, 72 L.aw of life is the acting conform- ably to nature, 77 [ , the divine, 150 aws, the, sent from God, 325 Liaw, what it is, 350 — , nature of, 429 Learning and teaching, what they mean, 125 evin's Lectures, 17, 80, 82 Liberty, what men do for, 321 life and practice of the civilized world, tho, 245 — , human, a warfare, 273, 274 — , the science of, 303, 312 — of the dead rests in the re- membrance of the living, 320 lions, tame, 297 Logic is necessary, proof that, 192 Logical art is necessary, the, 52 Love, a divine power, 316 Loves mankind, who, 407 Love, to, is only in the power of the wise, 176 Lycurgus, 170, 415 Lycurgus' generous behaviouj, 419 Man and other animals, 5, 20 — and beasts, how distinguished, 123 — a spectator of God and his works, and an interpreter, 20 Man's powers, 73, 74, 182 Man, powers in often no exercised, 73 — and a stork, the difference between, 85 — , wliat is a, 111 — , what is lie? 123 Man is improved or destroyed by corresponding acts, 124 , a, who has looked after every thing rather than what he ought, 143 Man supposed to consist of a soul and a body, 252 Man's own, what it is, 277 Man, for what purpose God intro- duced him into the world, 310, 311 , character of a, who is a fool and a beast, 336 Man's nature is to seek the Good ; and Bp. Butler's opinion, 338 , a, opinions only make his soul impregnable, 337 great faculties, 316 Man is that power which uses the parts of his body and under- stands the appearances of things, 350 , a, contemptible when he is unable to do any good, 420 Manumission, 100 Marry, not to ; and not to engage in public affairs, were Epicurean doctrines, 215 Marriage, 187 , the Roman censor Metellua on, 187 , Paul's opinion of; and the different opinion of Epictetus, 258 of a minister of God, in the opinion of Epictetus in the pre- sent state of things, 259 , the true nature of, not under stood by Paul, 317 Massurius and Cassius, Roman •lawyers, 825 Masters, our, those who have the power over the things which we love and hate and fear, 302 Materials, i^Ao/, are neither good nor bad, 108 Matthew, c. vi., 31, 33 Measure of every act, 84 Medea, 155 Menoeceus, 242 448 INDEX* Milesiaca, 358 Money not the best thing, 388 Murrhina vasa, 221 Names, examination of, the begin- ning of education, 53 , a man must first understand, 142 Nature, acting according to, 37, 38 , power of, 169 , following ; a manner of speak- ing, just and true, Bp. Butler, 198 -, living, according to; Zeno*s principle, 198 — of man, 313 of every thing which pleases or supplies a want, consider what is the, 381 , the will of, how known, 389 , the, of evil does not exist in the world, 390 Nero, 9 , coins of, 335 News, not to be disturbed by, 239 Nicias, 420 Nicopolis, 63, 71, 112, 174 Obstinacy, on, 144 Obstinate person who is persuaded to change his mind, instance of an, 145 Opinion, 162, 386 Opinions, right, the consequences of the destruction of, 85 • put in practice which are con- trary to true opinions, 125 disturb us, 150 about things independent of the will, 207 Opinion the cause of a man's acting, 219 , when the need of it comes, ought to be ready, 222 Opinions, the power of, 338 , right and wrong, and their consequences, 346 -, not things disturb 'men, 381 — , fixed principles, how ac- quired, 420 Organs of sense and limbs are in- struments used by the living man, Bp. Butler, 350 'Op/jL-fj, 15 Ostentation, those who read and discuss for, 264 Ouo-i'a, 29, 87 , substance or nature of Good, 214 , Nature of man cannot be altogether pure, 367 Paedagogue, a, 425 Pancratium, Pentathlon, 195 Paradoxes, paralogies, 76 Partisan, an unseemly, 207 Patronus, the Roman word, 221 Paul, imperfect quotation from, hy Mrs. Carter, 243 and Epictetus contemporary, 283 and Epictetus do not agree about marriage, 317 Penalties for those who disobey the divine administration, 225 Perception, 82 Periodical renovation of things, 99 Peripatetics, the, 165 Persons who tell you all their affairs and wish to know yours, 375 Persuasion, a man has most powe] of, with himself, 359 ^aiy6fjL€V0Vj rh ;