^^ 
 
 \ 
 
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 i 
 
' 
 
ENIGMA OF LIFE. 
 
ETHIC 
 
 DEMONSTRATED IN GEOMETRICAL ORDER 
 AND DIVIDED INTO FIVE PARTS, 
 
 WHICH TREAT 
 
 I. OF GOD. 
 II. OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 
 
 III. OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 
 
 IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR OF THE STRENGTH OF THE AFFECTS. 
 
 V. OF THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT, OR OF HUMAN LIBERTY. 
 
 BENEDICT DE 8PIN0ZA. 
 
 STransIatcU from tijc ILatin 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM HALE WHITE. 
 
 NEW YOEK: 
 M A C M I L L A N & CO. 
 
 1S83. 
 
xy yy'^ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The present translation of Spinoza's Ethic was completed 
 more than twenty years ago, but at that time the interest 
 in Spinoza w^as too slight to justify its publication. Lat- 
 terly, however, a number of books and articles have been 
 written about him, and it is hoped therefore that a render- 
 ing into English of hiS central work may stand a chance 
 of being read. Before going any further I wish to ac- 
 knowledge the very great obligation under which I lie to 
 Miss Stirling, daughter of Dr. J. Hutchison Stirling of 
 Edinburgh. She has revised with singular patience and 
 care every word which I had written, and at innumerable 
 points has altered and adapted what before was a misfit, 
 so that I trust the dress will now be found not to disguise 
 but accurately to figure forth the original. I am quite 
 sure that those fortunate friends who know ]\Iis3 Stirling, 
 and what is the quality of her scliolarship, will congratu- 
 late me on having been able to find such help. My object 
 has been not to present an interpretation of the Etiiic, 
 but a translation of it, and I would beg tlie reader who 
 may here and there complain of obscurity to remember 
 that perhaps the Latin may also be obscure. Some 
 difficulties are not quite satisfactorily solved. For 
 example, Spinoza, although a scientific writer, frequently 
 uses a scientific term like modus in two difTerent senses. 
 At one time he means "mode," as he defines it in the fiftli 
 definition of the First Look, and at another time Le 
 
vi PREFACE. 
 
 means simply " way " or " manner." The best has been 
 done that I can do to distinguish between these mean- 
 ings, but it is possible that in some cases I have failed. 
 Again, it will frequently happen that the reader will 
 think that the right name has not been found for what 
 are called the affects, of which a list is given at the end 
 of the third book and elsewhere. Taking individual pas- 
 sages by themselves, better names might undoubtedly 
 liave been discovered, but individual passages cannot be 
 isolated, and the word to be selected must be one which 
 best meets the requirements of all the passages taken 
 together in which a particular affect is named. One 
 blemish, which has disfigured previous translations, both 
 French, German, and English, and indeed most Latin edi- 
 tions of Spinoza, has been removed. The references to 
 the different propositions, axioms, -postulates, and defini- 
 tions liave been carefully verified, and many corrections 
 have been the result. The new edition by Van Vloten 
 and Land came just in time, and their text has been the 
 one used in revising the proofs for the press. It is be- 
 lieved that now and for the first time there is presented 
 to the English reader a version in his own tongue of the 
 Ethic, which certainly may not be elegant, but is at least 
 tolerably literal, and does not in many cases miss the 
 sense. Xo doubt competent critics will discover many 
 possible improvements, and I can only say that I shall be 
 glad to hear of them in order that they may be incorpo- 
 rated in a second edition, should the book ever obtain 
 such a success. 
 
 The object which I have in view in this preface is not 
 to write an essay upon Spinoza. In the first place, I am 
 not equal to the task, and in the second place there have 
 been many essays upon him lately of more or less merit. 
 Those persons who wish to affiliate Spinoza with the 
 philosophy before and after him, cannot perhaps after all 
 do better than read Schwegler, whose excellent Handbook 
 
PREFACE. vii 
 
 Dr. Stirling has translated into English, '^[y purpose is 
 to offer one or two general observations which may serve 
 to tempt anybody who takes up ,this volume to go on 
 seriously with the study of Spinoza for himself. The 
 aim of every writer who writes upon any author who 
 is worth reading ought to be, not to prevent people from 
 reading him, but to induce them to do it, and not to 
 remain satisfied with reading about him in abstracts or 
 articles, be they ever so able and popular. 
 
 It may be as well to indicate to the ordinary reader 
 one central difficulty in Spinoza, for, until that is over- 
 come, advance will be impossible. Thought is generally 
 considered, or at least is generally considered by English- 
 men, to be limited by the imagination. What cannot be 
 depicted before the eye of the mind is simply nothing. 
 Spinoza, however, warns us in the 15 th proposition of the 
 first part to distinguish between the imagination and the 
 intellect, and in the scholium to the 48th proposition of 
 the second part the warning is repeated. " For, by ideas," 
 he says, " I do not understand the images which are formed 
 " at the back of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle of 
 " the brain, but rather the conceptions of thought." If 
 we deny what we cannot image, and if we consider it to 
 be a sufficient objection to a religious or philosophical 
 statement, " I cannot imagine it to be true," it is not worth 
 while to have anything to do with Spinoza. It may be 
 added too, that it is not worth while to have anything to 
 do with religion or with any philosophy properly so called. 
 Spinoza, insisting on the power of thought to go beyond 
 the imagination, is really claiming no more than the 
 orthodox Christian creeds claim from the humblest of 
 believers.^ 
 
 ^ A minor difficulty is the use of them. Upon this subject Dr. Stir- 
 
 the words "subjective " and "objec- ling has been good enough to furniwh 
 
 tive," which with Spinoza and with me with the accompanying notes 
 
 Descartes bear a meaning exactly which I transcribe :—" I'rantl (vol. 
 
 the reverse of that now assigned to " iii. p. 208} says of these words 'sub- 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 It may he worth while also to remove one prevalent mis- 
 conception as to Spinoza. He is usually supposed to be 
 destructive. lu reality he belongs in a remarkable degree 
 to the constructive class. It is quite true that he is the 
 founder of modern Biblical criticism, but he criticised 
 merely in order to remove obstacles. Were he simply 
 negative, his influence would have disappeared long ago. 
 It is the builder and believer whom we worship. 
 " Typhon," says Plutarch, " tears to pieces and puts out 
 of sight the sacred word which Isis again gathers up and 
 puts together." And it is Isis who is truly divine, while 
 Typhon is a demon. In the body putting together is 
 another name for life, and pulling asunder is death. So, 
 wlien the mind is alive it is affirmative, and when it is 
 
 "jective' and 'objective' in Duns 
 " Scottis — ' In innumerable places 
 "'from now on to the eighteenth 
 "'century (that is, until Alexander 
 "'I5auni{,'arten) we find this use of 
 " ' the words ' objective ' and ' sub- 
 " 'jective' which relates itself to 
 " ' the present one as exactlj' the re- 
 " ' verse : namely, ' subjective ' then 
 '"meant what refers itself to the 
 "'subject of the judgments; con- 
 " 'secjuently to the concrets objects 
 "'of thi nights : 'objective' again 
 " ' what lies in the mere objicere, 
 " ' that is, in the making conceivable 
 "'or mentally representable, and 
 " ' falls conse<juently to the score of 
 '"the conceiver— the mental repre- 
 " • scnter.' Trendelenburg ( Kl. Log. 
 "Ari8t<itel, p. 52, note) also ob- 
 " serves :— ' Thus snhject during the 
 " ' Middle Ages has the force of 
 "'underlying substance, as it has 
 " ' also with Descartes and Spinoza. 
 "'The latter (Princip. Philos. Car- 
 "'U'H., p. II, ed. I'aul.) says, — 
 " ' ' Kverything in which, as in a 
 '"subject, tiiere is immediately any 
 " ' jiropcrty, whose real idea is in 
 "'UB, is called substance.' So fs«c 
 " * tuhjectivum (to be subjective — 
 "'iubjective Being), quite contrary 
 " ' to the present usage amongst the 
 
 " ' Germans, is said by Occam (Sec. 
 '"XIV.) to be 'that which, as 
 " ' though a thing in nature, is 
 " ' placed outside of the forms of 
 " 'the mind, and is not imaged by 
 " ' thought alone ; ' whereas esse 
 " ' o'ljccthum (objective Being) on 
 " ' the contrary, is explained as 
 " ' ' Cognition itself, and conse- 
 " ' quently a certain imaged Being 
 " ' (esse quoddam fictwn).'' (Occam, 
 " ' sentent. lib. I. distinct. II. qusest. 
 "'8.) From which it will be evi- 
 " ' dent what is the meaning of 
 " ' objective reality with Descartes 
 " ' (e.g., in med. 3). Amongst the 
 " ' Germans, chiefly Kant and then 
 " ' Fichte being the originators of 
 " ' the change, the use of these 
 " ' words is completely inverted. 
 " ' While the subject is said to be he 
 " ' who knows ; the object, on the 
 " ' contrary, is something which, 
 " ' u-hile subjected in thinldng (i.e., the 
 "'subject of thought), still main- 
 " ' tains, nevertheless, its own nature 
 " ' in independence of the opinions 
 " ' of him who thinks. Hence it is 
 " ' that subjective is said to be that 
 "'which lies in the changing con- 
 " ' dition of the thinker, and objective, 
 " ' again, that which lies in the fixed 
 '"nature of the thing itself.' " 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 dead it is negative. iSTothing more, however, need be 
 said in this direction, because, although the Spinoza who 
 is current amongst those who have never read him is a 
 sceptic or atheist, it is impossible for any person who will 
 even look at him not to be aware that here is no waste 
 no-man's land with nothing on it but a deposit of broken 
 potsherds and miscellaneous rubbish, but at least archi- 
 tecture. A closer acquaintance will prove tliat we have 
 before us a temple. 
 
 The question which we have a right to ask of any 
 person who professes to have anything to say to us is, 
 Wherein can you help me ? And this is the question we 
 put to Spinoza. It may be answered boldly that Spinoza 
 is helpful to us through his system, or rather through what 
 there is in him which is systematic, through his much- 
 decried method. It has been pointed out that geometri- 
 cal demonstrations derive their cogency, not from their 
 form, but from the fact that they deal with intuitions, and 
 leave no room for doubt through liaziness of definition. 
 This is quite true: nevertheless Spinoza, in his consecutive- 
 ness, his advance from position to position in complete 
 connection and in perfect order, remains exemplary to us. 
 The power to go from one ascertained point to another 
 point, and so on and on, is what makes the strength of 
 the human mind. It is this which creates for us prin- 
 ciples, or at least the only principles worth the name. 
 Our usual habit is something quite different. We pick 
 up one rule to-day and act upon it, and we pick up 
 another to-morrow and act upon that. To-day we discern 
 that our only safety lies in self-government as strict as 
 that of the Stoics, and to-morrow we incline to a belief in 
 the natural man and in the divinity of all our passions. 
 It is even a settled and formulated article of belief that 
 nothing must be pushed to extremes; that a deduction 
 from an axiom is right so far, and that then it goes all 
 wrong, and another so-called axiom must be a.ssumed. 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 ^ye bold that black is black, but nevertheless, " under 
 " certain circumstances," &c. Contraries lie side by side in 
 us in peaceful repose, and if they were only to stir one 
 must devour the other. But they never do stir ; we never 
 take the trouble, in fact, to bring them together. Spinoza, 
 on the other hand, walks with a thread to guide him, 
 never stopping. Once a thing strikes him he exhausts it. 
 He fears no conclusions, and embraces every result which 
 his intellect offers him, no matter how extreme it may 
 seem to be. He knows well enough that the whole value 
 of any intellectual process lies in these extremities, that 
 they are its precious final fruit. 
 
 His system, therefore, is his recommendation ; not per- 
 haps in an age like the present, for it is not an age of 
 systems, but of disintegration, and all systems are ex vi 
 termini condemned. Every religion, however, has been a 
 system, and unless we have some kind of a religion, that 
 is to say, some linked and settled conclusions upon the 
 problems which incessantly confront us, we live aimlessly. 
 A man's mind ought to be open to the reception of new 
 light, but he ought not to allow vital questions affecting 
 his daily life to remain open. He is bound to close them, 
 and when he comes to mature years he should be able to 
 say that he has put forth all his strength on such and 
 such subjects, and has once for all decided in this way 
 and no other. The reason why we cannot do this is be- 
 cause we have never, after the manner of Spinoza, gone 
 resolutely to work and examined and thought to the very 
 end of our capacity. 
 
 Spinoza, as a necessary result of his consecutiveness, 
 was a perfectly formed character, and not a mere mass of 
 shapeless slush. He had acquired for himself certain 
 definite rules of procedure available under given circum- 
 .stances, and one of his rules is always at hand to meet 
 foreseen cases. His whole private life went on certain 
 lines prescribed for him by his Ethic. He was always 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 armed, and had not to look for a weapon when he wanted 
 one. It is most instructive that he even uses the eccle- 
 siastical word dogmata to describe the maxims which 
 were law to him, signifying thereby that they are unques- 
 tionable, and he counsels that we should commit them to 
 memory. They are his apostles' creed. 
 
 This habit of Spinoza is the same thing as the unity 
 which is remarkable throughout the whole of the Ethic, 
 and is its peculiar charm. Spinoza knows that the chief 
 delight of man is in unity, and that we rejoice not so 
 much in the perception of this thing and that thing as in 
 the perception that this thing and that thing are the same. 
 His unity is especially remarkable in his treatment of the 
 passions. " It will doubtless," he says in his Preface to 
 the Third Part, " seem a marvellous thing for me to en- 
 " deavour to treat by a geometrical method the vices and 
 " follies of men, and to desire by a sure method to demon- 
 " strate those things which these people cry out against 
 " as being opposed to reason, or as being vanities, ab- 
 " surdities, and monstrosities. The following is my reason 
 " for so doing. Nothing happens in nature whicli can be 
 " attributed to any vice of nature, for she is always the 
 " same and everywhere one. Her virtue is the same, and 
 " her power of acting ; that is to say, her laws and rules, 
 " according to which all things are and are changed from 
 " form to form, are everywhere and always the same ; so 
 " that there must also be one and the same method of 
 " understanding the nature of aU things whatsoever, that 
 " is to say, by the universal laws and rules of nature. The 
 " affects, therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, considered in 
 " themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of 
 " nature as other individual things ; they have therefore 
 " certain causes through which they are to be understood, 
 " and certain properties which are just as worthy of 
 " being known as the properties of any other thing in the 
 " contemplation alone of which we delight. I shall, there- 
 
xii PREFACE. 
 
 " fore, pursue the same method in considering the nature 
 " and strength of the affects and the power of the mind over 
 " them which I pursued in our previous discussion of God 
 " and tlie mind, and I shall consider human actions and 
 "appetites just as if I were considering lines, planes, or 
 " bodies." The popular religious belief tends the other 
 way. "We hear of a schism in us, a lower deep of mutiny 
 which requires suppression or even annihilation. We 
 have to ask ourselves, not whether such a view is of 
 service to man, but is it true ? If it is not true, it is of 
 no use whatever to preach it. It is better to preach at 
 once the truth wliich visits us, no matter how dangerous 
 it may seem to be to any or every cause, for we may be 
 sure that it will bring its own compensation and its own 
 restrictions. It is a fact that man does not stand outside 
 tlie general order of things, and that it is not necessary to 
 imagine a system for him alone. Man is governed as the 
 planet is governed. Spinoza knows that neither in planet 
 nor man can any law hold its way unchecked by the 
 operation of another and its opposite law. Neither tlie 
 earth itself nor the smallest atom of it can yield to its 
 centrifugal tendency in its course round the sun, but at 
 every instant is subject to the centripetal pull which, 
 together with centrifugal urge, gives the perfect curve. 
 In fact the pull is inconceivable without the urge, and 
 the urge without the pull. Everywhere it is the same ; 
 everywhere is the contrary not only an accompaniment to 
 any given force, but positively essential to its existence. 
 Spinoza holds that all desires are good. The desire to 
 appropriate is good, and is nothing but the impulse to 
 preserve our being, but man has other desires, and the 
 desire to appropriate brought under their influence is 
 altered and becomes moral. It would be an entire mis- 
 take, therefore, to suppose that Spinoza's creed lends itself 
 to licentiousness or loosens the hold which conscience 
 has upon us. No man ever supplied such reasons for a 
 
PREFACE. xiii 
 
 pure and upright life. Man properly instructed will 
 prefer mercy and love to lust, just as lie prefers bread to 
 swine's meat. Blyenbergh is told " that if any one sees he 
 " can live more comfortably on a cross than sitting at his 
 " table, he would act foolishly if he did not hang liiniself 
 " on the cross, and he who clearly sees that by perpetrating 
 " crimes he can really enjoy a more perfect and better life 
 " or essence than in the pursuit of virtue, is also a fool if 
 " he does not commit crimes." This is bold, but it is 
 surely a sharper incentive than a sermon on the text that 
 our passions are simply of the devil and must be put 
 down. Spinoza provides us with the strongest of all 
 reasons for being virtuous, and through him we come also 
 to see that what we have thought to be mere evil in us 
 is necessary to virtue, a discovery of immense practical 
 importance. The desires which we accuse so bitterly are 
 really indispensable to our purification. 
 
 Spinoza's unity is of course exemplified in all he has 
 to say about God ; but upon this subject I confess a dread 
 of insufficient power of expression and of inequality to 
 anything like coherent and intelligible comment. If I 
 were to attempt it, I should only lose myself in indefinite 
 phrases. Moreover, my desire now is, as before observed, 
 not to provide a commentary but a stimulus. An exposi- 
 tion, too, of the De Deo would have the disadvantage of 
 leading the mind of the student away from what is parti- 
 cularly serviceable to him — which he would, unaided, pro- 
 bably discover for himself— and of turning his attention 
 to what somebody else has seen to be serviceable. "NVe 
 will then content ourselves with the passing remark that 
 the Divine Unity with Spinoza is something very dillerent 
 from that of the theologians. It means, to use his own 
 language, that " whatever is is in God, and nothing can 
 " either be or be conceived without God." It is not Unity 
 as against Trinity, but it is the denial of any entity per- 
 sonal or metaphysical which can be set over against God. 
 
xiv PREFA CE. 
 
 God, in other words, becomes sufficiently extended to 
 cover every fact in the universe, and in every fact He is 
 present, whether to us it be evil or good. 
 
 Let us again ask the question. Wherein can you help me ? 
 And, returning to the subject just dropped, I say that 
 Spinoza will be found specially and practically serviceable 
 in all tliat he says about action and passion, and the 
 means by which passion is to be kept under control. The 
 remedies against the passions are thus summed up in the 
 scholium to the 20th proposition of the fifth part. They 
 lie— 
 
 "I. In the knowledge itself of the affects. (See Schol. 
 "Prop.4,pt. 5.) 
 
 " 2. In the separation by the mind of the affects from 
 " the thought of an external cause, which we imagine 
 " confusedly. (See Prop. 2, pt. 5, and Schol. Prop. 4, 
 " I't. 5-) 
 
 "3. In duration, in which the affections which are re- 
 " lated to objects we understand surpass those related to 
 " objects conceived in a mutilated or confused manner. 
 " (I'l'op- 7> pt. 5-) 
 
 " 4. In the multitude of causes by which the affections 
 " whicli are related to the common properties of things or 
 " to God are nourished. (Props. 9 and 11, pt. 5.) 
 
 " 5. In the order in which the mind can arrange its 
 " affects and connect them one with the other. (Schol. 
 " Prop. 10, pt. 5, and see also Props. 12, 13, and 14, pt. 5.) 
 
 The distinction between action and passion is one which 
 is vital throughout the whole of the Ethic. " I say that 
 " we act," Spinoza observes in the second definition of the 
 third part, " when anything is done, either within us or 
 " without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to 
 " say (by tlie preceding definition) when from our nature 
 " anything follows, either within us or without us, which 
 " by that nature alone can be clearly and distinctly under- 
 " stood. On the other hand, I say that we suffer when 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 " anything is done within us, or when anything follows 
 " from our nature, of which Ave are not the cause cxccpt- 
 " ing partially." So far as the mind has adequate ideas it 
 is active ; so far as it has inadequate ideas it is not active, 
 and the increase of adequate ideas is to be our great aim. 
 Virtue is action and power. " By virtue and power," says 
 the eighth definition of the fourth part, " I understand tlie 
 " same thing ; that is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), virtue, in so 
 " far as it is related to man, is the essence itself or nature 
 " of man in so far as it has the power of efTecting certain 
 " things which can be understood through the laws of its 
 " nature alone." The formal proof of the first remedy is 
 to be found in the third, fourth, and fourteenth propo- 
 sitions of the fifth book, which, for the reader's conve- 
 nience, I will venture to quote together and entire : — 
 
 " Peop. III. — An affect which is a passion ceases to be a 
 " passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea 
 " of it." 
 
 " Dcmonst. — An affect which is a passion is a confused 
 " idea (by the general definition of the Affects). If, there- 
 " fore, we form a clear and distinct idea of this affect, the 
 " idea will not be distinguished — except by reason — from 
 " this affect, in so far as the affect is related to the mind 
 "alone (Prop. 21, pt. 2, with its Schol.), and therefore 
 " (Prop. 3, pt. 3) the affect will cease to be a passion. — 
 
 " Q.E.D." 
 
 " Corol. — In proportion, then, as we know an aHl-ft 
 " better is it more within our control, and the less does 
 " the mind suffer from it." 
 
 " Prop. IV. — There is no affection of the body of which 
 " we cannot form some clear and distinct coucep- 
 " tion." 
 
xvi PREFACE. 
 
 " Dcmonst. — Those things which are common to all 
 " cannot be otherwise than adequately conceived (Prop. 
 " 38, pt. 2), and therefore (Prop. 12, andLem. 2, following 
 " Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 2) there is no affection of the body of 
 " which we cannot form some clear and distinct concep- 
 " tion. — Q.E.D." 
 
 " Corol. — Hence it follows that there is no affect of 
 " which we cannot form some clear and distinct concep- 
 " tion. For an affect is an idea of an affection of the body 
 " (by the general definition of the Affects), and this idea 
 " therefore (Prop. 4, pt. 5) must involve some clear and 
 " distinct conception." 
 
 " Schol. — Since nothing exists from which some effect 
 "does not follow (Prop. 36, pt. i), and since we under- 
 " stand clearly and distinctly everything which follows 
 " from an idea which is adequate in us (Prop. 40, pt. 2), it 
 " is a necessary consequence that every one has the power, 
 " partly at least, if not absolutely, of understanding clearly 
 " and distinctly himself and his affects, and consequently 
 " of bi iuging it to pass that he suffers less from them. We 
 " liave therefore mainly to strive to acquire a clear and 
 " distinct knowledge as far as possible of each affect, so 
 " that the mind may be led to pass from the affect to think 
 " those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, 
 " and with which it is entirely satisfied, and to strive also 
 " that the affect may be separated from the thought of an 
 " external cause and connected with true thought. Thus 
 " not only love, hatred, &c., will be destroyed (Prop. 2, 
 " pt. 5), but also the appetites or desires to which the 
 "affect gives rise cannot be excessive (Prop. 61, pt. 4). 
 " For it is above everything to be observed that the appe- 
 " tite by which a man is said to act is one and the same 
 "appetite as that by which he is said to suffer. For 
 " example, we have shown that human nature is so con- 
 " stituted that every one desires that other people should 
 
PREFACE. xvii 
 
 " live according to his way of thinking (Schol. Prop. 31, 
 " pt- 3), a desire which in a man who is not guided by 
 " reason is a passion which is called ambition, and is not 
 " very different from pride ; while, on the other hand, in 
 " a man who lives according to the dictates of reason it 
 "is an action or virtue which is called piety (Schol. i, 
 " Prop. 37, pt. 4, and Demonst. 2 of the same Prop.) In 
 " the same manner, all the appetites or desires are passions 
 " only in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas, and are 
 " classed among the virtues whenever they are excited or 
 " begotten by adequate ideas ; for all the desires by which 
 " we are determined to any action may arise either from 
 " adequate or inadequate ideas (Prop. 59, pt. 4). To return, 
 " therefore, to the point from which we set out : there is 
 " no remedy within our power which can be conceived 
 " more excellent for the affects than that which consists in 
 " a true knowledge of them, since the mind possesses no 
 " other power than tliat of thinking and forming adequate 
 " ideas, as we have shown above (Prop. 3, pt. 3)." 
 
 " PPlOP. XIV, — The mind can cause all the affections of 
 " the body or the images of things to be related to 
 " the idea of God (ideam Dei)." ^ 
 
 " Z^cmons^.— There is no affection of the body of which 
 " the mind cannot form some clear and distinct conception 
 "(Prop. 4, pt. 5), and therefore (Prop. 15, pt. i) it can 
 " cause all the affections of the body to be related to the 
 " idea of God. — q.e.d." 
 
 The particular mode in which these propositions are 
 demonstrated, more particularly the fourth, would lead to 
 a longer discussion than is possible in a preface ; but the 
 abstract of the whole matter is that it is possible to think 
 of any passion as we think of a crystal or a triangle, and 
 when we do so it is no longer injurious. A man, for 
 
 ^ See note, page 24. 
 
xviii PREFACE. 
 
 example, suffers an insult, and is hurried by passion to 
 avenge it. He is a victim for the time being (jpatitur). 
 A stream of images passes before him, over which he 
 exercises no authority. But it is possible to break that 
 series of images, — to reflect, to put the insult from him, 
 to consider it as if it were an efifect of gravitation or 
 electricity, to place himself outside it, to look at it as 
 God looks at it. This is to refer it to God's idea, or to 
 have an adequate idea of it. 
 
 For the meaning of the second remedy, which consists 
 " in the separation by the mind of the affects from the 
 " thought of an external cause, which we imagine con- 
 " fusedly," we turn to the second proposition of the fifth 
 part : — 
 
 " If we detach an emotion of the mind or affect from the 
 " thought of an external cause, and connect it with 
 " other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the 
 " external cause, and the fluctuations of the mind 
 " which arise from these affects, will be destroyed." 
 
 " Bcmonst. — That which constitutes the form of love or 
 " hatred is joy or sorrow, accompanied M'ith the idea of an 
 " external cause (Defs. 6 and 7 of the Affects). If this idea, 
 " therefore, be taken away, the form of love or hatred is alsoj 
 " removed, and therefore these affects, and any others whicl 
 " arise from them, are destroyed. — q.e.d." 
 
 Spinoza does not mean that each remedy is sovereign , 
 against all the affects. Those which are now in his mindj 
 are love and hatred. We hate, not because of any injury} 
 done to us, but because it has been done to us by a person | 
 like ourselves. The misery consequent on it is out of 
 proportion to the actual loss or pain. Spinoza impresses 
 on us that really the only thing which need concern us 
 is the actual loss or pain, and that these are due to the 
 operation of natural laws. So, too, he supposes that the 
 
PREFA CE. 
 
 disturbance due to a passion of any kind mf/['^e quelled. 
 It is the imagination, in fact, which M-anderg^)Q,5TDUd the 
 immediate here that is tlie cause of tlie mischief. '' ■■' '{ ■ ^ 
 For tlie explanation of the third remedy, which consists 
 " in duration, in which the affections which are rehited to 
 " objects we understand surpass those related to objects 
 " conceived in a mutilated or confused manner," we are 
 referred to the seventh proposition of the fifth part : — 
 
 " The affects which spring from reason, or which are 
 " excited by it, are, if time be taken into account, 
 " more powerful than those which are related to indi- 
 " vidual objects which we contemplate as absent." 
 
 " Dcmonst. — We do not contemplate an object as absent 
 " by reason of the affect by which we imagine it, but by 
 "reason of the fact that the body is affected with another 
 " affect, which excludes the existence of that object (Prop. 
 " 17, pt. 2). The affect, therefore, w^hich is related to an 
 " object which we contemplate as absent, is not of such a 
 " nature as to overcome the other actions and power of 
 " man (concerning these things see Prop. 6, pt. 4), but, 
 " on the contrary, is of such a nature that it can in some 
 " way be restrained by those affections which exclude the 
 " existence of its external cause (Prop. 9, pt. 4). But the 
 " affect which arises from reason is necessarily related to 
 " the common properties of things (see the definition of 
 " reason in Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2), which we always 
 " contemplate as present (for nothing can exist which ex- 
 " eludes their present existence), and which we always 
 " imagine in the same way (Prop. 38, pt. 2). Tliis affect, 
 " therefore, always remains the same, and consequently 
 " (Ax. I, pt. 5), the affects which are contrary to it, and 
 " which are not maintained by their external cause, must 
 " more and more accommodate themselves to it until they 
 " are no longer contrary to it. So far, therefore, the affect 
 " which springs from reason is the stronger. — q.e.d." 
 
XX PREFA CE. 
 
 The affect which arises from reason necessarily related 
 to the comuiou properties of things is an affect, as we see 
 from Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2, from generalisations and 
 adequate ideas — from laws, in fact. The meaning, there- 
 fore, is that the ever present which occupies the reason 
 will in time vanquish the affect due to that which is not 
 present. Hatred of a person not actually before me will 
 yield to the affects of the reason, because the objects of 
 the reason are always before me. It will yield to the 
 direct influence of the affects of the reason co7itinually at 
 work to show its folly, and it will yield also still more 
 signally to the indirect influence of the continual occupa- 
 tion of the reason with " the common properties of things," 
 One inference is obvious, that if we wish to know the 
 efficacy of this remedy, our reason must habitually dwell 
 upon " the common properties of things." Dwelling thus 
 upon them, we shall, when we suffer from passion, return 
 under their control, with more or less rapidity, as we lie 
 more or less open to their influence, and the passion will 
 " more and more accommodate itself " to the affect pro- 
 ceeding from them. 
 
 To find the meaning of the fourth remedy, which con- 
 sists " in the multitude of causes by which the affections 
 " which are related to the common properties of things 
 " or to God are nourished," we have to turn to the 9th and 
 nth propositions of the 5th part: — 
 
 " PiiOP. IX.— If we are affected by an affect which is re- 
 " luted to many and different causes which the mind 
 " contemplates at the same time with the affect itself, 
 " we are less injured, suffer less from it, and are less 
 " affected, therefore, towards each cause than if we 
 " were aflected by another affect equally great, which 
 " is related to one cause only, or to fewer causes." 
 " DemonsL— An affect is bad or injurious only in so far 
 
 " as it hinders the mind from thinking (Props. 26 and 27, 
 
PREFACE. xxi 
 
 " pt. 4), and therefore that afTect by wiiich the iniiul is 
 " determined to the conteniphation of a number of objects 
 " at the same time is less injurious than another all'ect 
 '■' equally great which holds the mind in the contemphi- 
 " tion of one object alone, or of a few objects, so that it 
 *' cannot think of others. This is the first thing we had to 
 " prove. Again, since the essence of the mind, tliat is to 
 " say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), its power, consists in thought alone 
 " (Prop. II, pt. 2), the mind suffers less through an affect 
 " by which it is determined to the contemplation of a 
 " number of objects at the same time than through an affect 
 " equally great which holds it occupied in the contempla- 
 " tion of one object alone or of a few objects. This is the 
 "second thing we had to prove. Finally, tliis affect 
 " (Prop. 48, pt. 3), in so far as it is related to a nuni- 
 " ber of external causes, is therefore less towards each. — 
 " Q.E.D." 
 
 " Prop. XI. — The greater the number of objects to which 
 '•' an image is related, the more constant is it, or tlie 
 " more frequently does it present itself, and the more 
 " does it occupy the mind." 
 
 Dcmonst. — " The greater the number of objects to wliich 
 " an image or affect is related, the greater is the number 
 " of causes by which it can be excited and cherished. All 
 " these causes the mind contemplates simultaneuusly i»y 
 " means of the affect (by hypothesis), and therefore tlie 
 " more constant is the affect, or the more frequently does 
 " it present itself, and the more does it occupy the mind 
 " (Prop. 8, pt. 5.)— Q.E.D." 
 
 To exhibit the distinct moments of tliis remedy wo 
 note — 
 
 Passion holds the mind to a single thought. 
 
 It therefore hinders the mind from thinking. 
 
 Observe by the way the characteristic selectiun by 
 
:,xii PREFACE. 
 
 Spinoza of this one as chief among the many evils of 
 passion. 
 
 An affect, therefore, by which we contemplate a number 
 of objects at the same time with the affect, is less inju- 
 rious than an affect which holds the mind to the contem- 
 plation of one object. 
 
 The greater the number of causes which can produce 
 any affect, the more frequently it recurs and occupies the 
 mind. 
 
 We look therefore to affects which are due to the 
 common properties of things, or to God, as the remedy 
 against the injurious absorption of the mind by passion. 
 
 It is, as we say, characteristic of Spinoza that his objec- 
 tion to passion is that it chokes thought. Everybody 
 who tries to lead a life from the intellect knows what 
 a calamity is that incessant apparition of the object 
 of a passion. It pursues the victim like a Fury. To be 
 capable of affection by the common properties of things, 
 or God, is the cure, and everything helps that w^ay. Day 
 unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth 
 knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their 
 voice is not heard. 
 
 The fifth and last remedy is derived from " the order in 
 " which the mind can arrange its affects and connect them 
 " one with the other.'"' 
 
 The entire comprehension of this remedy is not possible 
 without lengthened study of all the propositions involved. 
 'J'liere is no possibility of jumping Spinoza. He cannot 
 be understood without consecutive study and strait atten- 
 tion to every line from beginning to end. It is not, it is 
 to be hoped, necessary to reprint all these propositions 
 liere, as they would take up too much room, and the 
 reader who is serious with his subject will not mind the 
 trouble of turning to them. The proof proceeds as fol- 
 lows — 
 
 Mind and body are the same thing, considered at one 
 
PREFACE. xxiii 
 
 time under the attribiite of thought and at anotlier under 
 that of extension. The order and connection of things is 
 therefore one, whether viewed under this or that attribute, 
 and consequently the order of the actions or passions of 
 the body is the same as that of the actions or passions of 
 the mind. The mind has the power to form clear and 
 distinct ideas and of deducing others from them. Con- 
 sequently it has the power of arranging and Qonnecting 
 the afiections of the body according to the order of the 
 intellect. The mind, in other words, has the power of 
 joining one idea to another. If I conceive a triangle, 1 
 conceive that its three angles are equal to two right angles. 
 So I may chain (concatenare) hatred to love, that is to 
 say, I may establish it as a rule that hatred is to be over- 
 come by love, and the affections of the body will follow 
 the rule. These chained demonstrations in morals are 
 called by Spinoza dogmata, and these he counsels, as we 
 have before noticed, we should always have ready for 
 every emergency. 
 
 So much for the remedies for the passions. We have 
 now heard enough to convince us that to the question. 
 Wherein can you help mc ? Spinoza can give a solid 
 answer. The truth is, that this book is really an clhic. 
 It is not primarily a metaphysic. All there is in it whicli 
 is metaphysical is intended as a sure basis for the ethical. 
 The science of ethic is not much in fashion now. There 
 have been times in the history of the world when men 
 have thought that the science of sciences was tlie know- 
 ledge of self-control, of our duty to ourselves and our 
 neighbours. Socrates, Marcus Antoninus, and Epictetus 
 so thought : Spinoza so thought. The decay of religion, 
 however, amongst other innumerable evils, has also brought 
 upon us this evil, that the purely intellectual with no 
 reference whatever to the ethical is the sole subject of 
 research, and a man devotes all his life to the anatomy of 
 lepidoptera and never gives an hour to a solution of the 
 
xxiv PREFACE. 
 
 problem how he may best bring insurgent and tyrannous 
 desires under subjection or face misfortune. Xo doubt 
 the anatomy of lepidoptera does contribute ethical results, 
 but ethical science strictly so called is non-existent. No 
 preacher preaches it ; the orthodox churches are given 
 over to a philosophy of rags, and " free " pulpits do nothing 
 but mince and mash up for popular ears commonplaces 
 upon books and passing events. Neither does any school 
 teach it. It is frightful to think that at the present 
 moment the only ethic known to the great mass of the 
 cliildren of this countiy is a dim and decaying dread left 
 over by a departed religion, \vhile to the children of the 
 aristocracy it is nothing more than a blind obligation to 
 be technically honourable. " In my class, and it is a large 
 one," said a teacher to me the other day, " there is not one 
 girl who would not on the slightest pressure tell me a lie," 
 and this Avas in a school, not certainly for the rich, but 
 certainly not for the very poor. The world is alarmed 
 now at the various portents which threaten it. On every 
 side are signs of danger more terrible by far than that 
 which impended in 1793. But the germinating spot in 
 all the dangers ahead of us is the divorce of the intellect 
 from its chief use, so that it spends itself upon curiosities, 
 trifles, the fine arts, or in science, and never in ethical 
 service. Tlie peril is, of course, the more tremendous, 
 because the religions, M'hich with all their defects did at 
 least teach duty and invested it with divine authority, are 
 effete. 
 
 Spinoza, in this total absence of Ethic, is jierhaps not to 
 be recommended as a class-book. Nevertheless, I believe 
 there are to be found in him, more than in any other 
 modern author, great principles which, if translated into 
 the vulgar tongue, will be the best attainable etliic for 
 the people. One thing the student will observe, that 
 Spinoza relies altogetlier upon reason as effectual to cope 
 with passion. He does not content himself with a mere 
 
PREFACE. XXV 
 
 blind " Thou slialt or thou shalt not," whether as the voice 
 of a God or a conscience. He believes, too, in reason as 
 able to do what he expects of her. Commonplaces are 
 frequent enough of the powerlessness of reason over the 
 passions, but it is nearer the truth to say that men yield 
 to passion because they know no reason why they should 
 not. At any rate, if they are to be reclaimed, reason 
 alone can reclaim them. 
 
 Although Spinoza's aims are ethical, he is also specu- 
 lative. The question, Wherein do you help me? may be 
 answered, not merely by wise counsel but by a reve- 
 lation; that is to say, by ideas, by an insight wliich 
 removes the limits of the world in which we live and 
 shows us something beyond. There is no assistance 
 more efficient than that by wliich Ave are led to turn our 
 eyes away from the earth and raise them to lieaven. 
 Most religions, therefore, are speculative in the proper 
 sense of the word, and their power over men is due to the 
 lift which they give even to the feeblest of believers. A 
 religion constructed of the elements of this world and of 
 nothing more would indeed be no religion. It is of the 
 very essence of a genuine religion that it should take the 
 other side ; that it should be the counterpoise, the per- 
 petual affirmation against the perpetual negation whicli 
 lies in the routine and vulgarity of existence. The demand 
 to which the Christian doctrine of eternal life is an 
 answer is, in some shape or other, absolutely constant, 
 and there must, in some shape or other, be a reply to it. 
 The promise, however, of a future life is only one element 
 in religion. It tells the humblest of a supreme God to 
 whom we are each one of us personally rebated. It is a 
 window to men through which they look into tlie Infinite, 
 are satisfied and consoled. Now, although Spinoza may 
 be hard to understand, and although tlie reader may rise 
 from the perusal of some of his demonstrations and not 
 feel content, asking himself whether the thing be really 
 
 y 
 
xxvi PREFACE. 
 
 so or not, there is no writer probably who loosens more 
 effectually the hard tyranny of time and circumstance 
 and provides us with more of those thoughts which it is 
 the office of a real and speculative religion to supply. 
 I remember the self-given warning of a few pages back 
 against venturing out of my depth in the first book, and 
 yet is impossible in this connection to pass it by alto- 
 gether. Take, for example, the eleventh and following 
 propositions. " God, or substance consisting of infinite 
 " attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and 
 " infinite essence, necessarily exists." Note the " infinite 
 " attributes," each attribute infinite, and infinity also of 
 number. There is no cataloguing of them. A few only 
 are known to us. The sixteenth proposition affirms that 
 " from the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers 
 " of things in infinite ways (that is to say, all things 
 " which can be conceived by the infinite intellect) must 
 " follow." What a region is this into which we are 
 here introduced ! The effect on the mind is something 
 similar to that produced upon men when the sky ceased 
 to be a solid roof, or when the stars took their proper 
 places and the earth became a revolving planet, an atom 
 compared with the immense whole. For tlie first time, 
 too, as before pointed out, we find God enlarged so as 
 to cover every fact, even the most obstinate. "God," 
 says the corollary to this last-quoted proposition, " is the 
 " efficient cause of all things which can fall under the 
 " infinite intellect ; " and the second corollary determines 
 Him as "cause through Himself and not through that 
 " which is contingent." 
 
 In the scholium to the seventeenth proposition we have 
 a further development :— " There are some who think that 
 " God is a free cause, because He can, as they think, bring 
 " about that those things which we have said follow from 
 " His nature— that is to say, those things which are in 
 " His power— should not be, or should not be produced 
 
PREFACE. xxvii 
 
 "by Him. But this is simply saying that God could 
 " bring about that it should not follow from the nature of 
 " a triangle that its three angles should be equal to two 
 " right angles, or that from a given cause an effect should 
 " not follow, which is absurd. But I shall show further 
 '■' on, without the help of this proposition, that neither 
 " intellect nor M'ill pertain to the nature of God. I know, 
 '■ indeed, that there are many who think themselves able 
 " to demonstrate that intellect of the highest order and 
 " freedom of M'ill both pertain to the nature of God, for 
 " they say that they know nothing more perfect which 
 " they can attribute to Him than that which is the chief 
 " perfection in ourselves. But although they conceive 
 " God as actually possessing the highest intellect, they 
 " nevertheless do not believe that He can bring about that 
 " all those things should exist which are actually in His 
 " intellect, for they think that by such a supposition 
 " they would destroy His power. If He had created, 
 " they say, all things which are in His intellect. He could 
 " have created nothing more, and this, they believe, does 
 " not accord with God's omnipotence ; so then they prefer 
 " to consider God as indifferent to all things, and creating 
 " nothing excepting that which He has decreed to create 
 " by a certain absolute will. But I think that I have 
 " shown with sufficient clearness (Prop. i6) that from the 
 " supreme power of God, or from His infinite nature, in- 
 " finite things in infinite ways, that is to say, all things, 
 " have necessarily flowed, or continually follow by the 
 " same necessity, in the same way as it follows from the 
 " nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that 
 "its three angles are equal to two right angles. The 
 "omnipotence of God has, therefore, been actual from 
 "eternity, and in the same actuality will remain to 
 " eternity. In this way the omnipotence of God, in my 
 " opinion, is far more firmly established. My adversaries, 
 " indeed (if I may be permitted to speak plainly), seem to 
 
xxviii PREFACE. 
 
 " deny the omnipotence of God, inasmuch as they are 
 "forced to admit that He has in His mind an infinite 
 " numher of things which might be created, but which, 
 " nevertheless, He will never be able to create, for if He 
 " were to create all things which He has in His mind, He 
 " would, according to them, exhaust His omnipotence and 
 " make Himself imperfect. Therefore, in order to make a 
 " perfect God, tliey are compelled to make Him incapable 
 " of doing all those things to which His power extends ; 
 " and anything more absurd than this, or more opposed to 
 " God's omnipotence, I do not think can be imagined." 
 
 The meaning of this is not that everything which will 
 exist does exist. Spinoza, of course, could not intend 
 anything so obviously untrue. We have in the Scholium 
 to the eighth proposition of the second book, a clue to an 
 interpretation. The eighth proposition itself is, " The 
 " ideas of nonexistent individual things or modes are com- 
 '•' preliended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way 
 " that the formal essences of individual things or modes 
 " are contained in the attributes of God," and the scholium 
 gives us an illustration — " The circle, for example, pos- 
 " sesses this property that the rectangles contained by the 
 " segments of all straight lines cutting one another in the 
 " same circle are equal ; therefore in a circle there are con- 
 " tained an infinite number of rectangles equal to one 
 '•' another, but none of them can be said to exist unless in 
 '•' so far as the circle exists, nor can the idea of any one of 
 " these rectangles be said to exist unless in so far as 
 " it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Out of tliis 
 " infinite number of rectangles, let two only, E and D, be 
 " conceived to exist. The ideas of these two rectangles 
 " do not now exist merely in so far as they are compre- 
 " hended in the idea of the circle, but because they involve 
 " the existence of their rectangles, and it is this which 
 " distinguishes them from the other ideas of the other 
 " rectangles." AVe have here, then, in Spinoza, as we so 
 
PREFACE. xxix 
 
 often have, a realised tlieological doctrine, a doctrine 
 nominally taught by theology, but remaining unrealised. 
 This is the true unchangeableuess of God. All that He 
 is lies open before us, and has always been open ; what 
 He is now He will for ever be. Thus much, however, is 
 sufficient to show Spinoza's suggestiveness, and to indicate 
 how far he can be of any service to those who find a 
 solace in ideas. 
 
 Spinoza has recognised the support which the doctrine 
 of immortality gives to Ethic. It is quite true that Ethic 
 can subsist without immortality. Listen to the forty-first 
 proposition of the fifth part, with its scholium — 
 
 " Peop. XLI. — Even if we did not know that our mind is 
 " eternal, we should still consider as of primary im- 
 " portance Piety and Eeligion, and absolutely every- 
 " thing which in the Fourth Part we have shown to 
 " be related to strength of mind and generosity. 
 
 " Dcmonst. — The primary and sole foundation of virtue 
 " or of the proper conduct of life (by Corel. Prop. 22, and 
 " Prop. 24, pt. 4) is to seek our own profit. But in order 
 "to determine w^hat reason prescribes as profitable, we 
 " had no regard to the eternity of the mind, which we did 
 " not recognise till we came to the Fifth Part. Therefore, 
 " although we were at that time ignorant that the mind 
 ''is eternal, we considered as of primary importance those 
 " things which we have shown are related to strength of 
 "mind and generosity; and therefore, even if we were 
 " now ignorant of the eternity of the mind, we should 
 " consider those commands of reason as of primary im- 
 " portance. — q.e.d. 
 
 ">^cAo/.— The creed of the multitude seems to^ be 
 " different from this ; for most persons seem to believe 
 " that they are free in so far as it is allowed them to obey 
 " their lusts, and that they give up a portion of their 
 
XXX PREFACE. 
 
 " rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to 
 " the commands of divine law. Pietv, therefore, and 
 " religion, and absolutely all those things that are related 
 " to greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens which 
 " they hope to be able to lay aside after death ; hoping 
 " also to receive some reward for their bondage, that is to 
 " say, for their piety and religion. It is not merely this 
 " hope, however, but also and chiefly fear of dreadful 
 " punishments after death, by which they are induced to 
 " live according to the commands of divine law, that is to 
 " say, as far as their feebleness and impotent mind will 
 " permit ; and if this hope and fear were not present to 
 " them, but if they, on the contrary, believed that minds 
 " perish with the body, and that there is no prolongation 
 " of life for miserable creatures exhausted with the burden 
 " of their piety, they would return to ways of their own 
 " liking; they would prefer to let everything be controlled 
 " by their own passions, and to obey fortune rather than 
 " themselves. 
 
 " This seems to me as absurd as if a man, because he 
 " does not believe that he will be able to feed his body 
 " with good food to all eternity, should desire to satiate 
 " himself with poisonous and deadly drugs ; or as if, be- 
 " cause he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, 
 " he should therefore prefer to be mad and to live without 
 " reason, — absurdities so great that they scarcely deserve 
 " to be repeated." 
 
 Nevertheless Spinoza can neither avoid the desire to 
 know something about immortality, nor can he deny the 
 importance of this knowledge. It must be confessed too, 
 that there are few men who can be satisfied with simple 
 ignorance upon this subject, and all of us who are not 
 capable of a violent M-rench to our nature seek at some 
 time or other to come to a conclusion M'ith regard to it. 
 Tlie majority of mankind, tlie vast majority, including 
 
 J 
 
PREFACE. xxxi 
 
 even the best and wisest, cannot reconcile themselves to 
 the thought of a blank hereafter, and derive from their 
 liope the strongest stimulus to work and to patience. It 
 is not so much happiness in the ordinary sense of the 
 word which is coveted, but continued life, continued 
 thought, and continued progress through that great and 
 Liradual revelation which unfolds itself to us from birth to 
 death, and is gradually unfolding itself to the world. We 
 cannot help feeling that it makes some difference if in a 
 few more years we are no longer to be witnesses to the 
 evolution of all that is now stirring amongst mankind, 
 and our own development and ascent are to be sud- 
 denly arrested. It makes some difference if we believe 
 that the experience, the self-mastery, the slowly-acquired 
 knowledge, the slowly-reached reduction to harmony of 
 what was chaotic are to be stopped, and not only stopped, 
 but brought to nothing. Spinoza evidently could not 
 believe it — that is certain ; but when we try to under- 
 stand what it was exactly which he did believe we find 
 ourselves in difficulties. I trust I may be pardoned if, 
 departing from the general plan of this preface, which 
 was, not to give any complete account of Spinoza's 
 philosophy, but merely to present so much of it as may 
 induce a study of it, I attempt a somewhat more detailed 
 examination of the propositions in which his teaching 
 as to immortality is contained. Two things, however, 
 we must remember. In the first place, complete under- 
 standing is, from the very nature of the matter in hand, 
 altogetlier impossible. Obscurity must remain, and all I 
 that we can hope to do is to diminish it here and there. / 
 Secondly, Ave must recollect that our first duty is not to 
 criticise our author, but to comprehend him. The pro- 
 positions which deal with immortality in express terms 
 are somewhat abruptly introduced in the middle of the 
 fifth part. We are told in the twenty-first proposition 
 that the mind can neither imagine nor remember anything 
 
xxxii PREFACE. 
 
 excepting so long as the body lasts. Then comes Prop. 
 22 — 
 
 " In God, nevertheless, there necessarily exists an idea 
 " which expresses the essence of this or that human 
 " body under the form of eternity." 
 
 The demonstration being — 
 
 " God is not only the cause of the existence of this or 
 " that human body, but also of its essence (Prop. 25, pt. i), 
 " which, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through 
 " the essence of God itself (Ax. 4, pt. i), and by a certain 
 '•'eternal necessity (Prop. 16, pt. i). This conception, 
 " moreover, must necessarily exist in God (Prop. 3, 
 " pt. 2).— Q.E.D." 
 
 We have to remark here, firstly, the meaning of the 
 word essence. Essence, according to Def. 2, pt. 2, is "that, 
 " which being given, the thing itself is necessarily posited, 
 " and being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken ; 
 " or, in other words, that, without which the thing can 
 " neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn can- 
 " not be nor be conceived without the thing." 
 
 Furthermore, in Schol. 2, Prop. 10, pt. 2, Spinoza tells us 
 that " I did not say that that pertains to the essence of a 
 " thing without which the thing can neither be nor can be 
 " conceived ; and my reason is, that individual things can- 
 " not be nor be conceived without God, and yet God does 
 "not pertain to their essence. I have rather, therefore, 
 " said that the essence of a thing is necessarily that which 
 " being given, the thing is posited, and being taken away, 
 " the thing is taken away, or that, without which the 
 " thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its 
 " turn cannot be nor be conceived without the thing." 
 
 And again we are told in the corollary to the same pro- 
 position that " the essence of man consists of certain modi- 
 " fications of the attributes of God : for the Peing of sub- 
 
 i 
 
PREFACE. xxxiii 
 
 "stance does not pertain to the essence of man (Prop. lo, 
 " pt. 2). It is therefore something (Prop. 15, pt. i) which 
 " is in God, and which without God can neither be nor be 
 «' conceived, or (Corol. Prop. 25, pt. i), an aflection or mode 
 " which expresses the nature of God in a certain and 
 " determinate manner." 
 
 We have also to note that the phrase " under the form 
 " of eternity," in the 22d Prop., above quoted, has no 
 reference whatever to time. It does not mean indefinite 
 prolongation of time. Spinoza is express on tliis point. 
 "By eternity," he says (Def. 8, pt. i), "I understand 
 "existence itself, so far as it is conceived necessarily to 
 " follow from the definition alone of an eternal thing. 
 " Explanation — For such an existence is conceived as eter- 
 " nal truth, and also as the essence of the thing. It there- 
 " fore cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the 
 " duration be conceived without beginning or end." 
 
 Spinoza believes, therefore, in Being which has no rela- 
 tion to time, and he illustrates his doctrine by the example 
 of a trtith of pure thought like mathematics or geometry. 
 
 The idea also which expresses the essence of the human 
 body is the mind. " The object of the idea constituting 
 the human mind," according to Prop. 13, pt. 2, "is a body, 
 " or a certain mode of extension actually existing and 
 " nothing else." 
 
 We have got thus far, therefore, that the idea of this or 
 that human body, that is to say, the mind of this or that 
 human body exists in God under the form of eternity, in- 
 asmuch as each mind (Corol. Prop. 10, pt. 2) is a modifica- 
 tion of some attribute of God, and expresses the nature of 
 God in a certain and determinate manner. 
 
 We now advance to the 23d proposition — 
 
 "The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with 
 "the body, but something of it remains which is 
 " eternal. 
 
xxxiv PREFACE. 
 
 " Dcmonst. — In God there necessarily exists a conception 
 " or idea which expresses the essence of the human bod}^ 
 '•' (Prop. 22, pt. 5). This conception or idea is therefore 
 "necessarily something which pertains to the essence of 
 "the human mind (Prop. 13, pt. 2). But we ascribe to 
 " the human mind no duration which can be limited by 
 " time, unless in so far as it expresses the actual existence 
 " of the body, which is explained through duration, and 
 " which can be limited by time, that is to say (Corol. Prop. 
 " 8, pt. 2), we cannot ascribe duration to the mind except 
 " while the body exists. 
 
 " But nevertheless, since the something is that which is 
 " conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the 
 " essence itself of God (Prop. 22, pt. 5), this something 
 " which pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily 
 " be eternal. — q.e.d." 
 
 Perhaps this somewhat abstruse demonstration will be 
 better understood if we exhibit it in successive steps, 
 slightly altering the terminology. 
 
 • In God there is necessarily an idea of the essence of 
 this or that human mind. 
 
 This idea has an existence in time only in so far as the 
 body exists in time. 
 
 Nevertheless the idea exists in God by a certain eternal 
 necessity, and is explained through His essence. 
 
 Therefore the idea of this or that human mind is 
 eternah 
 
 There is no tliouglit here of bodily immortality in the 
 ordinary sense of the words. It strikes us as strange that 
 Spinoza should use the words essentia corporis instead of 
 onens, but this is explained if we recollect that according 
 to the ethic the mind is the idea of the body. " The 
 object of the idea constituting the human mind," says 
 Prop. 13, pt. 2, " is a body." 
 
 The scholium to Prop. 23, pt. 5, is as follows — 
 
 " This idea M'hich expresses the essence of the body 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 " under the form of eternity is, as we liave said, a certain 
 " mode of thought which pertains to the essence of the 
 " mind, and is necessarily eternal. It is impossible, never- 
 '•■ theless, that we should recollect that we existed before 
 " the body, because there are no traces of any such exist- 
 " ence in the body, and also because eternity cannot be 
 " defined by time, or have any relationship to it. Neverthe- 
 " less we feel and know by experience that we are eternal. 
 " For the mind is no less sensible of those things which it 
 " conceives through intelligence than of those which it 
 " remembers, for demonstrations are the eyes of the mind 
 " by which it sees and observes things. 
 
 " Although, therefore, we do not recollect that we existed 
 " before the body, we feel that our mind, in so far as it 
 " involves the essence of the body under the form of 
 " eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of the mind 
 " cannot be limited by time nor explained by duration. 
 " Only in so far, therefore, as it involves the actual exist- 
 " ence of the body can the mind be said to possess dura- 
 " tion, and its existence be limited by a fixed time, and so 
 " far only has it the power of determining' the existence 
 " of things in time, and of conceiving them under the form 
 " of duration." 
 
 We must not suppose that the phrase " we feel and 
 " know by experience that we are eternal " is mere senti- 
 ment, or signifies an unaccountable impression that we are 
 immortal. The eyes of the mind are demonstrations. They 
 are the mind, as the eyes are the body, and through them 
 the mind becomes aware of eternal truth ; through them 
 is eternal truth admitted to the mind to form a part of it, 
 and through them does the mind know its relationship to 
 truth which has nothing to do with time. 
 
 The 38th, 39th, and 40th Propositions again take up 
 the same subject. The 38th Proposition is to this ullect— 
 
 " The more objects the mind understands by the second 
 
xxxvi PREFACE. 
 
 '•'and third kinds of knowledge, the less it suffers 
 " from those affects which are evil, and the less it 
 " fears death." 
 
 And the scholium is — 
 
 " We are thus enabled to understand that which I 
 " touched upon in Schol. Prop. 39, pt. 4, and which I 
 " promised to explain in this part, namely, that death is 
 " by so much the less injurious to us as the clear and 
 '•'distinct knowledge of the mind is greater, and conse- 
 " quently as the mind loves God more. Again, since 
 " (Prop. 27, pt. 5), from the third kind of knowledge there 
 " arises the highest possible peace, it follows that it is 
 " possible for the human mind to be of such a nature that 
 " that part of it which we have shown perishes with its 
 " body (Prop. 21, pt. 5), in comparison with the part of it 
 " which remains, is of no consequence. But more fully 
 " upon this subject presently." 
 The 39th Proposition is — 
 
 " He who possesses a body lit for many things possesses 
 " a mind of which the greater part is eternal," the proof 
 being that the possessor of such a body is least agitated 
 by affects which are evil ; can consequently arrange and 
 concatenate the affections of the body according to the 
 order of the intellect ; can therefore cause all the affec- 
 tions of the body to be related to God's idea, and so attain 
 a love to God which must occupy or form the greatest 
 part of the mind. He has a mind therefore, the greatest 
 part of which is eternal. 
 
 The 40th Proposition with its corollary is as follows — 
 
 " The more perfection a thing possesses, the more it acts 
 " and the less it suffers, and conversely the more it 
 " acts the more perfect it is." 
 
 " Dcmonst.—ThQ more perfect a thing is, the more reality 
 
PREFACE. xxx^ii 
 
 " it possesses (Def. 6, pt. 2), and cousequently (Trop. 3, 
 " pt. 3 with the Schol.) the more it acts and tlie less it 
 " suffers. Inversely also it may be demonstrated in tlie 
 " same way that the more a thing acts the more perfect 
 " it is. — Q.E.D." 
 
 " Corol. — Hence it follows that that part of the mind 
 " which abides, whether great or small, is more perfect 
 " than the other part. For the part of the mind which is 
 " eternal (Props. 23 and 29, pt. 5) is the intellect, through 
 " which alone we are said to act (Prop. 3, pt. 3), but that 
 " part which, as we have shown, perishes, is the imagina- 
 '•' tion itself (Prop. 21, pt. 5), through which alone we are 
 " said to suffer (Prop. 3, pt. 3, and the general definition 
 " of the affects). Therefore (Prop. 40, pt. 5) that part 
 " which abides, whether great or small, is more perfect 
 " than the latter. — Q.E.D." 
 
 To sum up. The essence of this or that human body 
 being a modification of this or that attribute of God 
 expressing His nature in a certain determinate manner 
 exists in Him under the form of eternity ; that is to say, 
 the idea, of which this or that human body is the object 
 is eternal. What then, more exactly, is that idea, that 
 part which is eternal or which is not expressed by dura- 
 tion? It is what the mind knows by the second and 
 third kind of knowledge, by reason and by intuition. 
 It is the intellect as distinguished from the imagination 
 which perishes. It is that through which we are active 
 as distinguished from that through which we are subject 
 to passion. 
 
 Such is Spinoza's teaching. Although it becomes more 
 intelligible like many other difficulties when it is fairly 
 exhibited, it is still abstruse and many questions ari.sc 
 The difficulties lie in the conception of an eternity in 
 which there is no time, no succession, and in the con- 
 ception also of the body as the object of the mind. 
 
 With regard to eternity, the Christian reliyiou is at 
 
xxxviii PREFACE. 
 
 one with Spinoza, God, says the Larger Catechism, is 
 " eternal, unchangeable, incomprehensible." " Nothing," 
 adds the Confession of Faith, " is to Him contingent or 
 " uncertain ... in His sight all things are open and 
 " manifest . . . He hath not decreed anything because 
 " He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to 
 " pass upon such conditions." Here we have obviously 
 a conception of a Being in whom there is no before or 
 after, and to whom a million years hence is as truly 
 ])resent as to-day. The Christian religion is in truth full 
 of these mysteries which we mouth glibly enough, but 
 when they are originally presented to us and in different 
 language we exclaim against them as absurdities. 
 
 With regard to the second difficulty, it is one which is 
 carried over from Spinoza's assumption of the unity of 
 body and mind. To him they are one and the same thing 
 considered now under the attribute of thought and now 
 under the attribute of extension. We cannot see why, 
 if this be so, the idea of the body should only include the 
 active intellect. When, however, we hear simply that the 
 active intellect is immortal and increases in immortality 
 as it knows more things by the second and third kinds of 
 knowledge we are on firmer ground. Spinoza affirms an 
 immortality of degrees ; the soul which is most of a soul 
 being least under the dominion of death. Every adequate 
 idea gained, every victory achieved by the intellectual 
 part of us, is the addition of something permanent to us. 
 Surely no nobler incentive to the highest aims and the 
 most strenuous exertion has ever been offered to the 
 world. Every deed of self-denial done in secret, every 
 conviction wrought in secret, laboriously strengthened and 
 sharpened into distinct definition by diligent practice, is 
 recorded in a Book for ever with no possibility of mistake 
 or erasure. 
 
Jirst Part 
 
 OF GOD. 
 
 Definitions. 
 
 I. By cause of itself, I understand that, whose essence 
 involves existence ; or that, whose nature cannot be con- 
 ceived unless existing. 
 
 II. That thing is called finite in its own kind (in 
 suo genere) which can be limited by another thing of the 
 same nature. For example, a body is called finite, be- 
 cause we always conceive another which is greater. So 
 a thought is limited by another thought ; but a body is 
 not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a hotly. 
 
 III. By substance, I understand that which is in 
 itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, 
 that, the conception of which does not need the concep- 
 tion of another thing from which it must be formed. 
 
 lY. By attribute, I understand that which the intel- 
 lect perceives of substance, as if constituting its essence. 
 
 V. By mode, I understand the affections of substance, 
 or that which is in another thing through which also 
 it is conceived. 
 
 VL By God, I understand Being absolutely infinite, 
 that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, 
 each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. 
 
 Uxplanation. — I say absolutely infinite but not infinite 
 
 A 
 
2 ETHIC. 
 
 in its own kind {in suo gcnere) ; for of whatever is infinite 
 only in its own kind {in silo genere), we can deny infinite 
 attributes ; but to the essence of that which is absolutely 
 infinite pertains whatever expresses essence and involves 
 no negation, 
 
 VII. That thing is called free which exists from the 
 necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to 
 action by itself alone. That thing, on the other hand, 
 is called necessary, or rather compelled, which by another 
 is determined to existence and action in a fixed and pre- 
 scribed manner. 
 
 VIII. By eternity, I understand existence itself, so 
 far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the defi- 
 nition alone of an eternal thing. 
 
 Explanation. — For such an existence is conceived as 
 eternal truth ; and also as the essence of the thing. It 
 cannot therefore be explained by duration or time, even 
 if the duration be conceived without beginning or end. 
 
 Axioms. 
 
 I. Everything which is, is either in itself or in another. 
 
 II. That which cannot be conceived through another 
 must be conceived through itself. 
 
 III. From a given determinate cause an effect neces- 
 sarily follows ; and, on the other hand, if no determinate 
 cause be given, it is impossible that an effect can follow. 
 
 IV. The knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends 
 upon and involves the knowledge of the cause. 
 
 V. Those things which have nothing mutually in 
 common with one another cannot through one another 
 be mutually understood, that is to say, the conception 
 of the one does not involve the conception of the other. 
 
 VI. A true idea must agree with that of which it is 
 the idea {cum suo idcato). 
 
 VII. The essence of that thing which can be con- 
 ceived as not existing does not involve existence. 
 
OF GOD. 
 
 PiiOP. I. — Substance is hj its nature prior to its 
 affections. 
 
 Devionst. — This is evident from Defs. 3 and 5. 
 
 Prop. II. — Two substances having different attributes have 
 nothing in common with one another. 
 
 Demonst. — This is also evident from i)ef 3. For each 
 substance must be in itself and must be conceived through 
 itself, that is to say, the conception of one does not involve 
 the conception of the other. — q.kd. 
 
 Prop. III. — If tioo things have nothing in common with 
 one another, one cannot be the caiise of the other. 
 
 Demonst. — If they have nothing mutually in common 
 with one another, they cannot (Ax. 5) through one an- 
 other be mutually understood, and therefore (Ax. 4) one 
 cannot be the cause of the other. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. IV. — Ttvo or more distinct things are distinguished 
 from one another, either by the difference of the attri- 
 butes of the substances, or by the difference of their 
 affections. 
 
 ' Demonst. — Everything -which is, is either in itself or 
 in another (Ax. i), that is to say (I)efs. 3 and 5), outside 
 the intellect there is nothing but substances and their 
 affections. There is nothing therefore outside the intel- 
 lect by which a number of things can be distinguisiied 
 one from another, but substances or (which is the same 
 thing by Def 4) their attributes and their affections. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
4 ETHIC. 
 
 Pfior. V. — In nature there cannot he tioo or more sub- 
 stances of the same nature or attribute. 
 
 Demonst. — If there were two or more distinct sub- 
 stances, they must be distinguished one from the other 
 by difference of attributes or difference of affections 
 (Prop. 4). If they are distinguished only by difference 
 of attributes, it will be granted that there is but one 
 substance of the same attribute. But if they are distin- 
 guished by difference of affections, since substance is 
 prior by nature to its affections (Prop, i), the affections 
 therefore being placed on one side, and the substance 
 being considered in itself, or, in other words (Def. 3 and 
 Ax. 6), truly considered, it cannot be conceived as distin- 
 guished from another substance, that is to say (Prop. 4), 
 there cannot i3e two or more substances, but only one 
 possessing the same nature or attribute. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. VI. — One substance cannot be produced by another 
 substance. 
 
 Demonst. — There cannot in nature be two substances 
 of the same attribute (Prop. 5), that is to say (Prop. 2), 
 two which have anything in common with one another. 
 And therefore (Prop. 3) one cannot be the cause of the 
 other, that is to say, one cannot be produced by the 
 other. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Gorol. — Hence it follows that there is nothing by 
 which substance can be produced, for in nature there is 
 nothing but substances and their affections (as is evident 
 from Ax. i and Defs. 3 and, 5). But substance cannot 
 be produced by substance (Prop. 6). Therefore abso- 
 lutely there is nothing by which substance can be pro- 
 duced. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Another Dem.onst. — This corollary is demonstrated 
 more easily by the reductio ad absurdum. For if there 
 were anything by which substance could be produced, 
 the knowledge of substance would be dependent upon 
 
OF GOD. 
 
 V-. 
 
 the knowledge of its cause (Ax. 4), and therefore (1 )cf. 3) 
 it would not be substance. 
 
 Prop. YII. — It pertains to the nature of substance to ca-ial. 
 
 Demonst. — There is notliing by wliich substance can 
 be produced (Corol. Prop. 6). It will therefore be the 
 cause of itself, that is to say (Def, i), its essence neces- 
 sarily involves existence, or in other words it pertains to 
 its nature to exist. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. VIII. — Every sulstance is neccssarihi infinite. 
 
 Demonst. — Substance which has only one attribute 
 cannot exist except as one substance (Prop. 5), and to 
 the nature of this one substance it pertains to exist (Prop. 
 7), It must therefore from its nature exist as fmite or 
 infinite. But it cannot exist as finite substance, for (Def. 
 2) it must (if finite) be limited by another substance 
 of the same nature, which also must necessarily exist 
 (Prop. 7), and therefore there would be two substances 
 of the same attribute, which is absurd (Prop. 5). It exists 
 therefore as infinite substance. — Q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. I. — Since finiteness is in truth partly negation, 
 and infinitude absolute affirmation of existence of some 
 kind, it follows from Prop. 7 alone that all substance 
 must be infinite. 
 
 Sclwl. 2. — I fully expect that those who judge things 
 confusedly, and who have not been accustomed to cognise 
 things through their first causes, will find it difficult to 
 comprehend the demonstration of the 7th Proposition, 
 since they do not distinguish between the modiiications 
 of substances and substances themselves, and are igno- 
 rant of the manner in which things are produced. Hence 
 it comes to pass that they erroneously ascribe to substances 
 a beginning like that which they see belongs to natural 
 things ; for those who are ignorant of the true causes of 
 things confound everything, and witliout any mental 
 repugnance represent trees speaking like men, or imagine 
 
6 ETHIC. 
 
 that men are made out of stones as well as Legotten 
 from seed, and that all forms can be changed the one 
 into the other. So also those who confound human nature 
 with the divine, readily attribute to God human affects,^ 
 especially so long as they are ignorant of the manner in 
 which affects are produced in the mind. But if men 
 would attend to the nature of substance, they could not 
 entertain a single doubt of the truth of Proposition 7 ; 
 indeed this proposition would be considered by all to be 
 axiomatic, and reckoned amongst common notions. For 
 by " substance " would be understood that which is in 
 itself and is conceived through itself, or, in other words, 
 that, the knowledge of which does not need the know- 
 ledge of another thing. But by " modifications " would be 
 understood those things which are in another thing — those 
 things, the conception of which is formed from the concep- 
 tion of the thing in which they are. Hence we can have 
 true ideas of non-existent modifications, since although 
 they may not actually exist outside the intellect, their 
 essence nevertheless is so comprehended in something else, 
 that they may be conceived through it. But the truth 
 of substances is not outside the intellect unless in the 
 substances themselves, because they are conceived through 
 themselves. If any one, therefore, were to say that he 
 possessed a clear and distinct, that is to say, a true idea 
 of substance, and that he nevertheless doubted whether 
 such a substance exists, he would forsooth be in the same 
 position as if he were to say that he had a true idea and 
 nevertheless doubted whether or not it was false (as is 
 evident to any one who pays a little attention). Similarly 
 if any one were to affirm that substance is created, he 
 would affirm at the same time that a false idea had become 
 true, and this is a greater absurdity than can be conceived. 
 
 1 Affectum is translated by "af- Affectus has sometimes been trans- 
 feet " and affectio by "affection." lated "passion," but Spinoza uses 
 There seems to be no other way in jmssio for passion, and means some- 
 the English language of marking thing different from affectus. See 
 the relationship of the two words Def. III., part 3. 
 and preserving their exact meaning. 
 
 I 
 
OF GOD. y 
 
 It is therefore necessary to admit that the existence of sub- 
 stance, like its essence, is an eternal truth. Hence u 
 demonstration (which I have thought wortli while to 
 append) by a difierent method is possible, showing tliat 
 there are not two substances possessing the same nature. 
 But in order to prove this methodically it is to be noted : 
 I. That the true definition of any one thing neither 
 involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the 
 thing defined. From which it follows, 2. That a defini- 
 tion does not involve or express any certain number of 
 individuals, since it expresses nothing but the nature of 
 the thing defined. For example, the definition of a 
 triangle expresses nothing but the simple nature of 
 a triangle, and not any certain inimber of triangles. 
 3. It is to be observed that of every existing thing 
 there is some certain cause by reason of which it 
 exists. 4. Finally, it is to be observed that this cause, 
 by reason of which a thing exists, must either be con- 
 tained in the nature itself and definition of the existing 
 thing (simply because it pertains to the nature of the 
 thing to exist), or it must exist outside the thing. 
 This being granted, it follows that if a certain num- 
 ber of individuals exist in nature, there must neces- 
 sarily be a cause why those individuals, and neither 
 more nor fewer, exist. If, for example, there are twenty 
 men in existence (whom, for the sake of greater clearness, 
 I suppose existing at the same time, and that no otliers 
 existed before them), it will not be sullicient, in order 
 that we may give a reason why twenty men exist, to 
 give a cause for human nature generally ; but it will be 
 necessary, in addition, to give a reason why neither more 
 nor fewer than twenty exist, since, as we have already 
 observed under the third head, there must necessarily be 
 a cause why each exists. But this cause (as we have 
 shown under the second and third heads) cannot be con- 
 tained in human nature itself, since the true definition of 
 a man does not involve the number twenty, and therefore 
 
8 ETHIC. 
 
 (by the fourth head) the cause why these twenty men 
 exist, and consequently the cause why each exists, must 
 necessarily lie outside each one ; and therefore we must 
 conclude generally that everything of such a nature that 
 there can exist several individuals of it must necessarily 
 have an external cause of their existence. 
 
 Since now it pertains to the nature of substance to 
 exist (as we have shown in this scholium), its definition 
 must involve necessary existence, and consequently from 
 its definition alone its existence must be concluded. But 
 from its definition (as we have already shown under the 
 second and third heads) the existence of more substances 
 than one cannot be deduced. It follows, therefore, from 
 this definition necessarily that there cannot be two sub- 
 stances possessing the same nature. 
 
 PltOP. IX. — Tlic more reality or leing a thing j^ossesscs, the 
 more attributes belong to it. 
 
 Demonst. — This is evident from Def. 4. 
 
 PKOr. X. — Each attribute of a substance must he conceived 
 through itself. 
 
 Demonst. — For an attribute is that which the intel- 
 lect perceives of substance, as if constituting its essence 
 (Def. 4), and therefore (Def. 3) it must be conceived 
 through itself. — q.e.d. 
 
 Sehol. — From this it is apparent that although two 
 attributes may be conceived as really distinct — that is to 
 say, one without the assistance of the other — we cannot 
 nevertheless thence conclude that they constitute two 
 beings or two different substances ; for this is the nature of 
 substance, that each of its attributes is conceived through 
 itself, since all the attributes which substance possesses 
 were always at the same time in itself, nor could one be 
 produced by another ; but each expresses the reality or 
 being of substance. It is very far from being absurd. 
 
OF GOD. g 
 
 therefore, to ascribe to one substance a number of 
 attributes, since nothing in nature is clearer tlian that 
 each being must be conceived under some one attribute, 
 and the more reality or being it has, the more attributes 
 it possesses expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. 
 Nothing consequently is clearer than that IJeing abso- 
 lutely infinite is necessarily defined, as we have shown 
 (Def. 6), as Being which consists of infinite attributes, 
 each one of which expresses a certain essence, eternal 
 and infinite. But if any one now asks by what sign, 
 therefore, we may distinguish between substances, let 
 him read the following propositions, which show that in 
 nature only one substance exists, and that it is absolutely 
 infinite. For this reason that sign would be sought for in 
 vain. 
 
 Peop. XI. — God, or substance consisting of infinite attri- L 
 lutes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite 
 
 essence, necessarily exists. 
 
 Demonst. — If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, 
 that God does not exist. Then it follows (Ax. 7) that 
 His essence does not involve existence. But this (Prop. 
 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. — Q.E.D. 
 
 AnothsT^ proof. — For the existence or non-existence of 
 everything there must be a reason or cause. For example, 
 if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why 
 it exists ; and if it does not exist, there must be a reason 
 or cause which hinders its existence or which negates 
 it. But this reason or cause must either be contained in 
 the nature of the thing or lie outside it. For example, 
 the nature of the thing itself shows the reason why a 
 square circle does not exist, the reason being that a 
 square circle involves a contradiction. And the reason, on 
 the other hand, why substance exists follows from its 
 nature alone, whibh involves existence (see Prop. 7). 
 But the reason why a circle or triangle exists or doca 
 
lo ETHIC. 
 
 not exist is not drawn from their nature, but from the 
 order of corporeal nature generally ; for from that it 
 must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, 
 or that it is impossible for it to exist. But this is self- 
 evident. Therefore it follows that if there be no cause 
 nor reason which hinders a thing from existing, it exists 
 necessarily. If, therefore, there be no reason nor cause 
 which hinders God from existing, or which negates His 
 existence, we must conclude absolutely that He neces- 
 sarily exists. But if there be such a reason or cause, it 
 must be either in the nature itself of God or must lie 
 outside it, that is to say, in another substance of another 
 nature. For if the reason lay in a substance of the 
 same nature, the existence of God would be by this very 
 fact admitted. But substance possessing another nature 
 could have nothing in common with God (Prop. 2), and 
 therefore could not give Him existence nor negate it. 
 Since, therefore, the reason or cause which could negate 
 the divine existence cannot be outside the divine nature, 
 it will necessarily, supposing that the divine nature does 
 not exist, be in His nature itself, which would therefore 
 involve a contradiction. But to affirm this of the Being 
 absolutely infinite and consummately perfect is absurd. 
 Therefore neither in God nor outside God is there any 
 cause or reason which can negate His existence, and 
 therefore God necessarily exists. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Another proof. — Inability to exist is impotence, and,' 
 on the other hand, ability to exist is power, as is self- 
 evident. If, therefore, there is notliing which necessarily 
 exists excepting things finite, it follows that things finite 
 are more powerful than the absolutely infinite Being, and 
 this (as is self-evident) is absurd ; therefore either nothing 
 exists or Being absolutely infinite also necessarily exists. 
 But we ourselves exist, either in ourselves or in some- 
 thing else which necessarily exists (Ax. i and Prop. 7). 
 Therefore the Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, 
 (Def. 6), God, necessarily exists. — Q.E.D. 
 
OF GOD. I, 
 
 SchoL — In this last demonstration I wished to prove 
 tlie existence of God ct posteriori, in order that tlic de- 
 monstration might be the more easily understood, and not 
 because the existence of God does not follow a jviori from 
 the same grounds. For since ability to exist is power, 
 it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of 
 anything, the greater is the power for existence it derives 
 from itself ; and it also folloM's, therefore, that the I'einj,' 
 absolutely infinite, or God, has from Himself an absolutely 
 infinite power of existence, and that He therefore neces- 
 sarily exists. Many persons, nevertheless, will perhaps 
 not be able easily to see the force of this demonstratinn. 
 because they have been accustomed to contemplate tliosc 
 things alone which flow from external causes, and they 
 see also that those things which are quickly produced from 
 these causes, that is to say, which easily exist, easily 
 perish, whilst, on the other hand, they adjudge those 
 things to be of a more difficult origin, that is to say, their 
 existence is not so easy, to which they conceive more 
 properties pertain. In order that these prejudices 
 may be removed, I do not need here to show in what 
 respect this saying, "What is quickly made quickly 
 perishes," is true, nor to inquire whether, looking at tla- 
 whole of nature, all things are or are not equally easy. 
 But this only it will be sufficient for me to observe, that 
 I do not speak of things which are produced by exter- 
 nal causes, but that I speak of substances alone which 
 (Prop. 6) can be produced by no external cause. For 
 whatever perfection or reality those things may have 
 which are produced by external causes, whether they 
 consist of many parts or of few, they owe it all to the 
 virtue of an external cause, and therefore their existencf 
 springs from the perfection of an external cause 
 alone and not from their own. On the other hand. 
 whatever perfection substance has is due to no extcrnnl 
 cause. Therefore its existence must follow fruin its 
 nature alone, and is therefore nothing el.se than it.s 
 
12 ETHIC. 
 
 essence. Perfection consequently does not prevent the 
 existence of a thing, but establishes it; imperfection, on the 
 other hand, prevents existence, and so of no existence can 
 we be more sure than of the existence of the Being 
 absolutely infinite or perfect, that is to say, God, For 
 since His essence shuts out all imperfection and involves 
 absolute perfection, for this very reason all cause of 
 doubt concerning its existence is taken away, and the 
 highest certainty concerning it is given, — a truth which 
 I trust will be evident to any one who bestows only 
 moderate attention. 
 
 Pkop. XII. — No attribute of substance can be truly con- 
 ceived from ichich it follows that substance can be 
 divided. 
 
 Demonst. — For the parts into which substance thus 
 conceived would be divided will or will not retain the 
 nature of substance. If they retain it, then (Prop. 8) 
 each part will be infinite, and (Prop. 6) the cause of itself, 
 and will consist of an attribute differing from that of 
 any other part (Prop. 5), so that from one substance more 
 substances could be ibrmed, which (Prop. 6) is absurd. 
 Moreover the parts (Prop. 2) would have nothing in 
 common with their whole, and the whole (Def. 4 and 
 Prop. 10) could be, and could be conceived without its 
 parts, which no one will doubt to be an absurdity. But 
 if the second case be supposed, namely, that the parts 
 will not retain the nature of substance, then, since the 
 whole substance might be divided into equal parts, it 
 would lose the nature of substance and cease to be, 
 which (Prop. 7) is absurd. 
 
 Prop. XIII. — Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible. 
 
 Demonst. — For if it were divisible, the parts into which 
 it would be divided will or will not retain the nature of 
 substance absolutely infinite. If they retain it, there will 
 
OF GOD. ,3 
 
 be a plurality of substances possessing the same nature, 
 which (Prop. 5) is absurd. If the second case be sup- 
 posed, then (as above), substance absolutely infinite can 
 cease to be, which (Prop. 1 1) is also absurd. 
 
 Cowl. — Hence it follows that no substance, and con- 
 sequently no bodily substance in so far as it is substance, 
 is divisible. 
 
 Schol. — That substance is indivisible is more easily to 
 be understood from this consideration alone, that the 
 nature of substance cannot be conceived unless as infinite, 
 and that by a part of substance nothing else can be 
 understood than finite substance, which (Prop. 8) involves 
 a manifest contradiction. 
 
 Prop. XIY. — Besides God, no suhsiance can he nor can 
 be conceived. 
 
 Demonst. — Since God is Being absolutely infinite, of 
 whom no attribute can be denied which expresses the 
 essence of substance (Def. 6), and since He necessarily 
 exists (Prop. 11), it follows that if there were any sub- 
 stance besides God, it would have to be explained by 
 some attribute of God, and thus two substances woulil 
 exist possessing the same attribute, which (Prop. 5) is 
 absurd ; and therefore there cannot be any substance ex- 
 cepting God, and consequently none other can be con- 
 ceived. For if any other could be conceived, it would 
 necessarily be conceived as existing, and this (by the first 
 part of this demonstration) is absurd. Therefore besides 
 God no substance can be, nor can be conceived. — Q.K.D. 
 
 Carol. I. — Hence it follows with the greatest clearness, 
 firstly, that God is one, that is to say (Def. 6), in nature 
 there is but one substance, and it is absolutely infinite, 
 as (Schol. Prop. 10) we have already intimated. 
 
 Carol. 2.— It follows, secondly, that tlie thing extende.l 
 (rem extensam) and the thing thinking (rem cogitantem) 
 are either attributes of God or (Ax. i) affectiona of the 
 attributes of God. 
 
14 ETHIC. 
 
 PiiOP. XV. — Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can 
 either he or he conceived ivithout God. 
 
 Demonst. — Besides God there is no substance, nor can 
 any be conceived (Prop, 14), that is to say (Def. 3), no- 
 thing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. 
 But modes (Def. 5) can neither be nor be conceived with- 
 out substance ; therefore in the divine nature only can they 
 be, and through it alone can they be conceived. But be- 
 sides substances and modes nothing is assumed (Ax. i). 
 Therefore nothing can be or be conceived without God. 
 — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — There are those who imagine God to be like 
 a man, composed of body and soul and subject to pas- 
 sions ; but it is clear enough from what has already been 
 demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from 
 the true knowledge of God. But these I dismiss, for 
 all men who have in any way looked into the divine 
 nature deny that God is corporeal. That He cannot be 
 so they conclusively prove by showing that by " body " we 
 understand a certain quantity possessing length, breadth, 
 and depth, limited by some fixed form; and that to 
 attribute these to God, a being absolutely infinite, is the 
 greatest absurdity. But yet at the same time, from other 
 arguments by which they endeavour to confirm their proof, 
 they clearly show that they remove altogether from the 
 divine nature substance itself corporeal or extended, affirm- 
 ing that it was created by God. By what divine power, 
 however, it could have been created they are altogether 
 ignorant, so that it is clear they do not understand what 
 they themselves say. But I have demonstrated, at least 
 in my own opinion, with sufficient clearness (see Corol. 
 Prop. 6 and Schol. 2, Prop. 8), that no substance can be 
 produced or created by another. Moreover (Prop. 14), 
 we have shown that besides God no substance can be 
 nor can be conceived ; and hence we have concluded 
 that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes 
 
OF GOD. 
 
 >5 
 
 of God. But for the sake of a fuller explanation, I will 
 refute my adversaries' arguments, which, taken aUojjothor, 
 come to this. First, that corporeal substance, in so far as 
 it is substance, consists, as they suppose, of parts, and 
 therefore they deny that it can be infinite, and con- 
 sequently that it can pertain to God. This they illustrate 
 by many examples, one or two of which I will adduce. 
 If corporeal substance, they say, be infinite, let us con- 
 ceive it to be divided into two parts ; each part, therefore, 
 will be either finite or infinite. If each part be finite, 
 then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which 
 is absurd. If each part be infinite, there is then an 
 infinite twice as great as another infinite, which is also 
 absurd. Again, if infinite quantity be measured by equal 
 parts of a foot each, it must contain an infinite number of 
 such parts, and similarly if it be measured by equal parts of 
 an inch each ; and therefore one infinite number will be 
 twelve times greater than another infinite number. Lastly, 
 if from one point of any infinite quantity it be imagined 
 that two lines, AB, AC, which at first are at a certain 
 
 and determinate distance from one another, be infinitely 
 extended, it is plain that the distance between B and C 
 will be continually increased, and at length from being 
 determinate will be indeterminable. Since therefore these 
 absurdities follow, as they think, from supposing quantity 
 to be infinite, they conclude that corporeal substance 
 must be finite, and consequently cannot pertain to the 
 essence of God. A second argument is assumed from 
 the absolute perfection of God. For God, they say, since 
 He is a being absolutely perfect, cannot suffer ; but cor- 
 poreal substance, since it is divisible, can suffer: it 
 
1 6 ETHIC. 
 
 follows, therefore, that it does not pertain to God's 
 essence. These are the arguments which I find in 
 authors, by which they endeavour to show that corporeal 
 substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot 
 pertain to it. But any one who will properly attend 
 will discover that I have already answered these argu- 
 ments, since the sole foundation of them is the supposi- 
 tion that bodily substance consists of parts, a supposition 
 which (Prop. 12 and Corol. Prop. 13) I have shown to 
 be absurd. ]\Ioreover, if any one will rightly consider the 
 matter, he will see that all these absurdities (supposing 
 that they are all absurdities, a point which I will now 
 take for granted), from which these authors attempt 
 to draw the conclusion that substance extended is finite, 
 do not by any means follow from the supposition that 
 quantity is infinite, but from the supposition that infinite 
 quantity is measurable, and that it is made up of finite 
 parts. Therefore, from the absurdities to which this 
 leads nothing can be concluded, excepting that infinite 
 quantity is not measurable, and that it cannot be com- 
 posed of finite parts. But this is what we have already 
 demonstrated (Prop. 12, &c.), and the shaft therefore 
 wliich is aimed at us turns against those who cast it. 
 If, therefore, from these absurdities any one should at- 
 tempt to conclude that substance extended must be finite, 
 he would, forsooth, be in the position of the man who 
 supposes a circle to have the properties of a square, 
 and then concludes that it has no centre, such that all 
 the lines drawn from it to the circumference are equal. 
 Tor corporeal substance, which cannot be conceived ex- 
 cept as infinite, one and indivisible (Props. 8, 5, and 
 12), is conceived by those against whom I argue to 
 be composed of finite parts, and to be multiplex and 
 divisible, in order that they may prove it finite. Just 
 in the same way others, after they have imagined a 
 line to consist of points, know how to discover many 
 arguments, by which they show that a line cannot be 
 
OF GOD. ,7 
 
 divided ad infinitum ; and indeed it is not less absurd 
 to suppose that corporeal substance is composed of 
 bodies or parts than to suppose that a body is composed 
 of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and that linos, linally, 
 are composed of points. Every one who knows that 
 clear reason is infallible ought to admit this, and 
 especially those who deny that a vacuum can exist. 
 For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its 
 parts could be really distinct, why could not one part 
 be annihilated, the rest remaining, as before, connected 
 with one another ? And why must all be so iitted 
 together that there can be no vacuum ? For of things 
 which are really distinct the one from the other, one can 
 be and remain in its own position without the other. 
 Since, therefore, it is supposed that there is no vacuum 
 in nature (about which I will speak at another time), but 
 that all the parts must be united, so that no vacuum can 
 exist, it follows that they cannot be really distinguished ; 
 that is to say, that corporeal substance, in so far as it is 
 substance, cannot be divided. If, nevertheless, any one 
 should now ask why there is a natural tendency to consider 
 quantity as capable of division, I reply that quantity is 
 conceived by us in two ways : either abstractly or super- 
 ficially ; that is to say, as we imagine it, or else as sub- 
 stance, in which way it is conceived by the intellect alone. 
 If, therefore, we regard quantity (as we do very often and 
 easily) as it exists in the imagination, we find it to bo 
 finite, divisible, and composed of parts ; but if we regard 
 it as it exists in the intellect, and conceive it in so far 
 as it is substance, which is very difficult, then, as we have 
 already sufficiently demonstrated, we find it to be infinite, 
 one, and indivisible. Tins will be plain enough to all 
 who know how to distinguish between the imagination 
 and the intellect, and more especially if we remember that 
 matter is everywhere the same, and that, except in so far 
 as we regard it as affected in different ways, parts are 
 not distinguished in it ; that is to say, they are dis- 
 
 B 
 
l8 ETHIC. 
 
 tinguislied with regard to mode, but not with regard to 
 reality. For example, we conceive water as being 
 divided, in so far as it is water, and that its parts are 
 separated from one another ; but in so far as it is 
 corporeal substance we cannot thus conceive it, for as 
 such it is neither separated nor divided. Moreover, 
 water, in so far as it is water, is begotten and destroyed ; 
 but in so far as it is substance, it is neither begotten nor 
 destroyed. By this reasoning I think that I have also 
 answered the second argument, since that too is based 
 upon the assumption that matter, considered as sub- 
 stance, is divisible and composed of parts. And even if 
 what I have urged were not true, I do not know why 
 matter should be unworthy of the divine nature, since 
 (Prop. 1 4) outside God no substance can exist from which 
 the divine nature could suffer. All things, I say, are in 
 God, and everything which takes place takes place by the 
 laws alone of the infinite nature of God, and follows (as I 
 shall presently show) from the necessity of His essence. 
 Therefore in no way whatever can it be asserted that 
 God suffers from anything, or that substance extended, 
 even if it be supposed divisible, is unworthy of the 
 divine nature, provided only it be allowed that it is eternal 
 and infinite. But enough on this point for the present. 
 
 Prop. XVI. — From the necessity of the divine nature 
 infinite numbers of things in infinite ways (that is 
 to say, all things xuhich can he conceived Toy the infinite 
 intellect^ must follow. 
 
 Demonst. — This proposition must be plain to every 
 one who considers that from the given definition of any- 
 thing a number of properties necessarily following from 
 it (that is to say, following from the essence of the thing 
 itself) are inferred by the intellect, and just iu proportion 
 as the definition of the thing expresses a greater reality, 
 that is to say, just in proportion as the essence of the 
 
OF GOD. 
 
 «9 
 
 tiling defined involves a greater reality, will more pro- 
 perties be inferred. But the divine nature possesses 
 absolutely infinite attributes (Def. 6), each one of which 
 expresses infinite essence in its own kind {in suo gcmrc), 
 and therefore, from the necessity of the divine nature, 
 infinite numbers of things in infinite ways (that is to say, 
 all things which can be conceived by the infinite intellect) 
 must necessarily follow. — q.e.d. 
 
 Cowl. I. — Hence it follows that God is the efficient 
 cause of all things which can fall under the infinite in- 
 tellect. 
 
 Corol. 2. — It follow^s, secondly, that God is cause 
 through Himself, and not through that which is con- 
 tingent {'per accidcns). 
 
 Corol. 3. — It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely , 
 the first cause. (L^v<^ i^''^ 
 
 Peop. XYII. — God acts from the laws of His own nature 
 only, and is compelled hy no one. 
 
 Dcmonst.—We have just shown (Prop. 16) that from 
 the necessity, or (which is the same thing) from the 
 laws only of the divine nature, infinite numbers of things 
 absolutely follow ; and we have demonstrated (Prop. 1 5) 
 that nothing can be, nor can be conceived, without CJod, 
 but that all things are in God. Therefore, outside Him- 
 self, there can be nothing by which He may be deter- 
 mined or compelled to act ; and therefore He acts fri.m 
 the laws of His own nature only, and is compelled by 
 no one. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. I.— Hence it follows, firstly, that there is no 
 cause, either external to God or within Him, which can 
 excite Him to act except the perfection of His own nature. 
 
 Coral 2.— It follows, secondly, that God alone is a 
 free cause ; for God alone exists from the necessity 
 alone of His own nature (Prop. 11, and Corol. I, Prop- 
 14), and acts from the necessity alone of His own 
 
20 ETHIC. 
 
 nature (Prop. 17). Therefore (Def. 7) He alone is a 
 free cause. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — There are some who think that God is a free 
 cause because He can, as they think, bring about that those 
 things which we have said follow from His nature — that 
 is to say, those things which are in His power — should 
 not be, or should not be produced by Him. But tliis is 
 simply saying that God could bring about that it should not 
 follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles 
 should be equal to two right angles, or that from a given 
 cause an effect should not follow, which is absurd. But 
 I shall show farther on, without the help of this proposi- 
 tion, that neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature 
 of God. 
 
 I know, indeed, that there are many who think them- 
 selves able to demonstrate that intellect of the highest 
 order and freedom of will both pertain to the nature of 
 God, for they say that they know nothing more perfect 
 which they can attribute to Him than that which is the 
 chief perfection in ourselves. But although they con- 
 ceive God as actually possessing the highest intellect, 
 they nevertheless do not believe that He can bring about 
 that all those things should exist which are actually in 
 His intellect, for they think that by such a supposi- 
 tion they would destroy His power. If He had created, 
 they say, all things which are in His intellect. He could 
 have created nothing more, and this, they believe, does 
 not accord with God's omnipotence ; so then they prefer 
 to consider God as indifferent to all things, and creating 
 nothing excepting that which He has decreed to create 
 by a certain absolute will. But I think that I have 
 shown with sufficient clearness (Prop. 16) that from the 
 supreme power of God, or from His infinite nature, infinite 
 things in infinite ways, that is to say, all things, have 
 necessarily flowed, or continually follow by the same 
 necessity, in the same way as it follows from the nature 
 of a triangle, from eternitv and to eteruitv, that its 
 
OF GOD. J, 
 
 three angles are equal to two riglit angles. The omni- 
 potence of God lias therefore been actual from eternity, 
 and in the same actuality will remain to eternity. In 
 this way the omnipotence of God, in my opinion, is far 
 more firmly established. My adversaries, indeed (if I 
 may be permitted to speak plainly), seem to deny the 
 omnipotence of God, inasmuch as they are forced to 
 admit that He has in His mind an infinite number of 
 things which might be created, but which, nevertheless, 
 He will never be able to create, for if He were to create 
 all things which He has in His mind. He would, accord- 
 ing to them, exhaust His omnipotence and make Himself 
 imperfect. Therefore, in order to make a perfect God, 
 they are compelled to make Him incapable of doing all 
 those tlnngs to which His power extends, and anytliing 
 more absurd than this, or more opposed to God's omni- 
 potence, I do not think can be imagined. Moreover — to 
 say a word, too, here about the intellect and will wliicli we 
 commonly attribute to God — if intellect and will pertain 
 to His eternal essence, these attributes cannot be under- 
 stood in the sense in which men generally use them, for 
 the intellect and will which could constitute His essence 
 would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, 
 and could resemble ours in nothing except in name. There 
 could be no further likeness than that between the celestial 
 constellation of the Dog and the animal which barks. Tliis 
 I will demonstrate as follows. K intellect pertains to the 
 divine nature, it cannot, like (jur intellect, follow the 
 things which are its object (as many suppose), nor can it 
 be simultaneous in its nature with them, since God is 
 prior to all things in causality (Corel, i, Prop. i6) ; but, 
 on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things 
 is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in 
 God's intellect. Therefore the intellect of God, in so far 
 as it is conceived to constitute His essence, is in truth 
 the cause of things, both of their essence and of their 
 existence, — a truth which seems to have been understood 
 
22 ETHIC. 
 
 by those who have maiatained that Gods intellect, will, 
 and power are one and the same thing. Since, therefore, 
 God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of their 
 essence and of their existence (as we have already 
 shown), it must necessarily differ from them with regard 
 both to its essence and existence; for an effect differs 
 from its cause precisely in that which it has from its 
 cause. For example, one man is the cause of the exist- 
 ence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is 
 an eternal truth ; and therefore witli regard to essence the 
 two men may exactly resemble one another, but with 
 regard to existence they must differ. Consequently if 
 the existence of one should perish, that of the other will 
 not therefore perish ; but if the essence of one could be 
 destroyed and become false, the essence of the other 
 would be likewise destroyed. Therefore a thing which is 
 the cause both of the essence and of the existence of any 
 effect must differ from that effect both with regard to 
 its essence and with regard to its existence. But the 
 intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and exis- 
 tence of our intellect ; therefore the intellect of God, so 
 far as it is conceived to constitvite the divine essence, 
 differs from our intellect both with regard to its essence 
 and its existence, nor can it coincide with our intellect in 
 anything except the name, which is what we essayed to 
 prove. The same demonstration may be applied to the 
 will, as any one may easily see for himself. 
 
 PEOr. XVIII. — God is the immanent, and not the transitive^ 
 cause of all things. 
 
 Demonst. — All things which are, are in God and must 
 be conceived through Him (Prop. 15), and therefore 
 (Corol. I, Prop. 16) He is the cause of the things which 
 are in Himself. This is the first thing which was to be 
 proved. Moreover, outside God there can be no sub- 
 
 ^ Transiens, passing over and into from the outside. 
 
OF GOD. 2, 
 
 stance (Prop. 14), that is to say (Def. 3), outsiile Ilim 
 nothing can exist which is in itself. This was the second 
 thing to be proved. God, therefore, is the immanent, but 
 not the transitive cause of all things. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XIX. — God is eternal, or, in other iconls, all //;,< 
 attributes are eternal. 
 
 Ifemonst. — For God (Def. 6) is substance, which (Prop. 
 1 1) necessarily exists, that is to say (Prop. 7), a sub- 
 stance to whose nature it pertains to exist, or (which 
 is the same thing) a substance from the definition of 
 which it follows that it exists, and therefore (Def. 8) 
 He is eternal. Again, by the attributes of God is to be 
 understood that which (Def. 4) expresses the essence of 
 the divine substance, that is to say, that which pertains to 
 substance. It is this, I say, which the attributes tliem- 
 selves must involve. But eternity pertains to the nature 
 of substance (Prop. 7). Therefore each of the attributes 
 must involve eternity, and therefore all are eternal. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — This proposition is as clear as possible, too, from 
 the manner in which (Prop. 1 1) I have demonstrated 
 the existence of God. From that demonstration I say 
 it is plain that the existence of God, like His essence, is 
 an eternal truth. Moreover (Prop. 1 9 of the " Principles 
 of the Cartesian Philosophy "), I have demonstrated by 
 another method the eternity of God, and there is no need 
 to repeat the demonstration here. 
 
 Prop. XX. — The existence of God a7id His essence are one 
 and the same thing. 
 God (Prop. 19) and all His attributes are eternal; 
 that, is to say (Def. 8), each one of His attributes 
 expresses existence. The same attributes of God, there- 
 fore, which (Def. 4) explain the eternal essence of God, 
 at the same time explain His eternal existence ; that is to 
 say, the very same thing which constitutes the essence of 
 
24 ETHIC. 
 
 God constitutes at the same time His existence, and there- 
 fore His existence and His essence are one and the same 
 thing. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. I. — Hence it follows, i. That the existence of 
 God, like His essence, is an eternal truth. 
 
 Corol. 2. — It follows, 2. That God is immutable, or 
 (which is the same thing) all His attributes are immutable ; 
 for if they were changed as regards their existence, they 
 must be changed also as regards their essence (Prop. 20) ; 
 that is to say (as is self-evident), from being true, they 
 would become false, which is absurd. 
 
 Prop. XXL — All things which follow from the absolute 
 nature of any attribute of God must for ever exist, 
 and must be infinite ; that is to say, through that same 
 attribute they are eternal and infinite. 
 
 Demonst. — Conceive, if possible (supposing that the 
 truth of the proposition is denied), that in some attribute 
 of God something which is finite and has a determinate 
 existence or duration follows from the absolute nature of 
 that attribute ; for example, an idea of God in thought.^ 
 But thought, since it is admitted to be an attribute of God, 
 is necessarily (Prop. 1 1) in its nature infinite. But so far 
 as it has the idea of God it is by supposition finite. But 
 (Def. 2) it cannot be conceived as finite unless it be deter- 
 mined by thought itself. But it cannot be determined 
 by thought itself so far as it constitutes the idea of God, 
 for so far by supposition it is finite. Therefore it must 
 be determined by thought so far as it does not constitute 
 the idea of God, but which, nevertheless (Prop. 1 1), neces- 
 sarily exists. Thought, therefore, exists which does not 
 form the idea of God, and therefore from its nature, in 
 so far as it is absolute thought, the idea of God does not 
 necessarily follow (for it is conceived as forming and as 
 
 ^ Not the idea which man forms either interpretation when taken 
 of God, but rather one of God's ideas, without the context. — Tb. 
 The original "idea Dei" admits 
 
OF GOD. 5j 
 
 not forming the idea of God), which is contrary to the 
 liypothesis. Therefore, if an idea of God in thouj;ht, or 
 anything else in any attribute of God, follow from tho 
 necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute (for the 
 demonstration being universal will apply in every case), 
 that thing must necessarily be infinite, which was the 
 first thing to be proved. 
 
 Again, that which thus follows from the necessity of 
 the nature of any attribute cannot have a determinate 
 duration. For, if the truth of this be denied, let it be 
 supposed that in some attribute of God a thing exists 
 which follows from the necessity of the nature of the 
 attribute — for example, an idea of God in tliouglit — and 
 let it be supposed that at some time it has either not 
 existed or will not exist. But since thought is supposed 
 to be an attribute of God, it must exist both necessarily 
 and unchangeably (Prop. 1 1, and Corel. 2, Prop. 20). 
 Therefore, beyond the limits of the duration of the idea 
 of God (for it is supposed that at some time it has either 
 not existed or will not exist), thought must exist with- 
 out the idea of God ; but this is contrary to hypothesis, 
 for the supposition is that thought being given, the idea 
 of God necessarily follows. Therefore neither an idea 
 of God in thought, nor anything else which necessarily 
 follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, 
 can have a determinate duration, but through the same 
 attribute is eternal ; which was the second thing to be 
 proved. Observe that what we have affirmed here is true 
 of everything which in any attribute of God necessarily 
 follows from the absolute nature of God. 
 
 Pkop. XXII. — JVJiatever folloivs from any attrihutr of God, 
 in so far as it is modified hy a modification which 
 through the same attribute exists necessarily and infi- 
 nitely, must also exist necessarily and infinitely. 
 Demonst. — This proposition is demonstrated in tho 
 
 same manner as the preceding proposition. 
 
26 ETHIC. 
 
 Pkop. XXTII. — Every mode which exists necessarily and 
 infinitely must necessarily follow either from the ab- 
 solute nature of some attribute of God, or from some 
 attribute modified by a modification which exists neces- 
 sarily and infinitely. 
 
 Dcmonst. — Mode is that which is in something else 
 through which it must be conceived (Def. 5), that is to 
 say (Prop. 15), it is in God alone and by God alone 
 can be conceived. If a mode, therefore, be conceived to 
 exist necessarily and to be infinite, its necessary existence 
 and infinitude must be concluded from some attribute 
 of God or perceived through it, in so far as it is con- 
 ceived to express infinitude and necessity of existence, 
 that is to say (Def. 8), eternity, or, in other words (Def. 
 6 and Prop. 19), in so far as it is considered absolutely. 
 A mode, therefore, which exists necessarily and infinitely 
 must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute 
 of God, either immediately (Prop. 21), or mediately 
 through some modification following from His absolute 
 nature, that is to say (Prop. 22), a modification which 
 necessarily and infinitely exists. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXIV. — The essence of things produced by God does 
 not involve existence. 
 
 C -^ '• 
 
 This is evident 'from the first Definition ; for that 
 thing whose nature (considered, that is to say, in itself) 
 involves existence, is the cause of itself and exists from 
 the necessity of its own nature alone. 
 
 Coral. — Hence it follows that God is not only the 
 cause of the commencement of the existence of things, 
 but also of their continuance in existence, or, in other 
 words (to use scholastic phraseology), God is the caus% 
 essendi rerum. Por if we consider the essence of things, 
 whether existing or non-existing, we discover that it 
 neither involves existence nor duration, and therefore 
 
OF GOD. 
 
 tlie essence of existing things cannot be the cause of 
 their existence nor of their duration, but (Jod only is 
 the cause, to whose nature alone existence pertains 
 (Corol. I, Prop. 14). 
 
 Pkop. XXV. — God is not only the efficient cauae 0/ th 
 existence of tilings, hut also of their essence. 
 
 Dcmonst. — Suppose that God is not the cause of tlio 
 essence of things ; then (Ax. 4) the essence of things 
 can be conceived \vithout God, which (Prop. 15) is 
 absurd. Therefore God is the cause of tlie essence of 
 things. — Q.E.D, 
 
 Schol — This proposition more clearly follows from 
 Prop. 16. For from this proposition it follows that, 
 from the existence of the divine nature, both the essence 
 of things and their existence must necessarily be con- 
 cluded, or, in a word, in the same sense in which God 
 is said to be the cause of Himself He must be called the 
 cause of all things. This will appear still more clearly 
 from the following corollary. 
 
 Corol. — Individual things are nothing but affections or 
 modes of God's attributes, expressing those attributes in 
 a certain and determinate manner. This is evident from 
 Prop. 15 and Def. 5. X 
 
 ]/ rrb 
 
 Pkop. XXVI. — A thing which has heen determined to any 
 action ivas necessarily so determined by God, and 
 that which has not been thus determined by God 
 cannot determine itself to action. 
 
 Bemonst. — That by which things are said to be deter- 
 mined to any action is necessarily something positive 
 (as is self-evident) ; and therefore God, from the neces- 
 sity of His nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence 
 and of its existence (Props. 25 and 16), which was the 
 first thing to be proved. From this also the second part 
 
28 ETHIC. 
 
 of the proposition follows most clearly. For if a thing 
 which has not been determined by God could determine 
 itself, the first part of the proposition would be false, 
 and to suppose this possible is an absurdity, as we have 
 shown. 
 
 Prop. XXVII. — A thing wJiich has been determined hij 
 God to any action cannot render itself indeterminate. 
 
 Demonst. — This proposition is evident from the third 
 Axiom. 
 
 Prop. XXVIII. — An individual thing, or a thing which 
 is finite and ivhich has a determinate existence, cannot 
 exist nor he determined to action unless it he deter- 
 mined to existence and action hy another cause which 
 is also finite and has a determinate existence ; and 
 again, this cause cannot exist nor he determined to 
 action unless hy another cause which is also finite and 
 determined to existence and action, and so on ad 
 infinitum, 
 
 Demonst. — AVhatever is determined to existence and 
 action is thus determined by God (Prop. 26 and Corol. 
 Prop. 24). But that which is finite and which has a de- 
 terminate existence could not be produced by the absolute 
 nature of any attribute of God, for whatever follows from 
 the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite 
 and eternal (Prop. 21). The finite and determinate 
 must therefore follow from God, or from some attribute 
 of God, in so far as the latter is considered to be affected 
 by some mode, for besides substance and modes nothing 
 exists (Ax. I, and Defs. 3 and 5), and modes (Corol. 
 Prop. 25) are nothing but affections of God's attributes. 
 But the finite and determinate could not follow from 
 God, or from any one of His attributes, so far as that 
 attribute is affected with a modification which is eternal 
 
OF GOD. 2g 
 
 find infinite (Prop. 22). It must, therefore, follow or W 
 determined to existence and action by God, or by si.nie 
 attribute of God, in so far as the attribute is modified 
 by a modification which is finite, and which has a 
 determinate existence. This was the first thing to be 
 proved. Again, this cause or this mode (by the same 
 reasoning by which we have already demonstrated the 
 first part of this proposition) must be determined by 
 another cause, which is also finite, and which has a 
 determinate existence, and this last cause (by the same 
 reasoning) must, in its turn, be determined by another 
 cause, and so on continually (by the same reasoning) ad 
 infinitum. 
 
 Schol. — Since certain things must have been immediately 
 produced by God, that is to say, those which necessarily 
 follow from His absolute nature ; these primary products 
 being the mediating cause for those things which, never- 
 theless, without God can neither be nor can be conceived ; 
 it follows, firstly, that of things immediately produced 
 by God He is the proximate cause absolutely, and not 
 in their own kind (in siio gencre), as we say ; for eflocts 
 of God can neither be nor be conceived without their 
 cause (Prop. 15, and CoroL Prop. 24). 
 
 It follows, secondly, that God cannot be properly called 
 the remote cause of individual things, unless for tlie 
 sake of distinguishing them from the things which He 
 has immediately produced, or rather which follow from 
 His absolute nature. Por by a remote cause we under- 
 stand that which is in no way joined to its effect. But 
 all things which are, are in God, and so depend upon 
 Him that without Him they can neither be nor be con- 
 ceived. 
 
 I'kop. XXIX. — In nature there is nothing contiiujcnt, Ivt 
 all tilings are determined from the neccssitij of the 
 divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner. 
 
30 ETHIC. 
 
 Demonst. — Whatever is, is in God (Prop. 15); but 
 (xod cannot be called a contingent thing, for (Prop. 11) 
 He exists necessarily and not contingently. Moreover, 
 the modes of the divine nature have followed from it 
 necessarily and not contingently (Prop. 16), and that, 
 too, whether it be considered absolutely (Prop. 21), or as 
 determined to action in a certain manner (Prop. 27). 
 But God is the cause of these modes, not only in so far 
 as they simply exist (Corol. Prop. 24), but also (Prop. 
 26) in so far as they are considered as determined to 
 any action. And if they are not determined by God 
 (by the same proposition), it is an impossibility and not 
 a contingency that they should determine themselves ; 
 and, on the other hand (Prop. 27), if they are determined 
 by God, it is an impossibility and not a contingency that 
 they should render themselves indeterminate. Where- 
 fore all things are determined from a necessity of the 
 divine nature, not only to exist, but to exist and act 
 in a certain manner, and there is nothing contingent. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — Before I go any farther, I wish here to explain, 
 or rather to recall to recollection, what we mean by 
 natura naturans and what by natura naturata} For, 
 from what has gone before, I think it is plain that by 
 natura naturans we are to understand that which is in 
 itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes 
 of substance which express eternal and infinite essence, 
 that is to say (Corol. i. Prop. 14, and Corol. 2, Prop. 
 17), God in so far as He is considered as a free cause. 
 But by natura naturata I understand everything which 
 follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of 
 any one of God's attributes, that is to say, all the modes 
 of God's attributes in so far as they are considered as 
 
 1 These are two expressions de- ■world, and yet at the same time to 
 
 rived from a scholastic philosophy mark by a difference of inflexion 
 
 which strove to signify by the same that there was not absolute identity. 
 
 verb the oneness of God and the — Tb. 
 
OF GOD. 3, 
 
 things which are in God, and which without God can 
 neither be nor can be conceived. 
 
 Prop. XXX. — The actual intellect,'^ irhdhcr Jhiitc or in- 
 finite, must comprehend the attrihutes of God and the 
 affections of God, and nothing else. 
 
 Demonst. — A true idea must agree witli that of which 
 it is the idea (Ax. 6), that is to say (as is self-evident), 
 that which is objectively contained in the intellect 
 must necessarily exist in nature. But in nature (Corel, i, 
 Prop. 14) only one substance exists, namely, God, nor any 
 affections (Prop. 15) excepting those which are in God, 
 and which (by the same proposition) can neither be nor 
 be conceived without God. Therefore the actual intellect, 
 whether finite or infinite, must comprehend the attributes . 
 of God and the affections of God, and nothing else. — Q.E.D. y 
 
 ^^^ ';t. 
 
 Prop. XXXI. — The actual intellect, whether it he finite or 
 infinite, together with the will, desire, love, c£r., muf't 
 he referred to the natura naturata and not to the 
 natura naturans. 
 
 Demonst. — Por by the intellect (as is self-evident) we 
 ""do not understand absolute thought, but only a certain 
 mode of thought, which mode differs from other modes, 
 such as desire, love, &c., and therefore (Def. 5) must be 
 conceived through absolute thought, that is to say (Prop. 
 15 and Def. 6), it must be conceived through some 
 attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite 
 essence of thought in such a manner that witliout tliat 
 attribute it can neither be nor can be conceived. There- 
 fore (Schol. Prop. 29) the actual intellect, &c., must bo 
 referred to the natura naturata, and not to the natura 
 naturans, in the same manner as all other modes of 
 thought. — Q.E.D. 
 
 ^ Distinguished from potential intellect, Schol. Trop. 31.— Tb. 
 
32 ETHIC. 
 
 Schol. — I do not here speak of tlie actual intellect 
 because I admit that any intellect potentially exists, but 
 because I wish, in order that there may be no con- 
 fusion, to speak of nothing excepting of that which we 
 perceive with the utmost clearness, that is to say, the 
 understanding itself, which we perceive as clearly as we 
 perceive anything. I'or we can understand nothing 
 through the intellect which does not lead to a more 
 perfect knowledge of the understanding. 
 
 Prop. XXXII. — The will cannot be called a free cause, 
 but can only be called necessary. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The will is only a certain mode of thought, 
 like the intellect, and therefore (Prop. 28) no volition 
 can exist or be determined to action unless it be de- 
 termined by another cause, and this again by another, 
 and so on ad infinitum. And if the will be supposed 
 infinite, it must be determined to existence and action by 
 God, not in so far as He is substance absolutely infinite, 
 but in so far as He possesses an attribute which expresses 
 the infinite and eternal essence of thought (Prop. 23). 
 In whatever way, therefore, the will be conceived, 
 whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which 
 it may be determined to existence and action, and there- 
 fore (Def. 7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only 
 necessary or compelled. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. I. — Hence it follows, firstly, that God does not 
 act from freedom of the will. 
 
 Corol. 2. — It follows, secondly, that will and intellect 
 are related to the nature of God as motion and rest, and 
 absolutely as all natural things, which (Prop. 29) must 
 be determined by God to existence and action in a cer- 
 tain manner. For the will, like all other things, needs 
 a cause by which it may be determined to existence and 
 action in a certain manner, and although from a given 
 will or intellect infinite things may follow, God cannot 
 
OF GOD. 
 
 33 
 
 on this account be said to act from freedom of will, any 
 more than He can be said to act from freedom of motion 
 and rest by reason of the things -^vhich follow from motion 
 and rest (for from motion and rest iuQnite numbers of 
 things follow). Therefore, will does not appertain to the 
 nature of God more than other natural things, but is 
 related to it as motion and rest and all other things are 
 related to it ; these all following, as we have shown, from 
 the necessity of the divine nature, and beiug determiued 
 to existence and action in a certain manner. 
 
 Pkop. XXXIII. — Things could have been produced In 
 God in no other manner nor in any other order 
 than that in which they have been produced. 
 
 Dcmonst. — All things have necessarily followed from 
 the given nature of God (Prop. 1 6), and from the neces- 
 sity of His nature have been determined to existence and 
 action in a certain manner (Prop. 29). If, therefore, 
 things could have been of another nature, or could have 
 been determined in another manner to action, so that 
 the order of nature would have been different, the nature 
 of God might then be different to that which it now is, 
 and hence (Prop. 1 1) that different nature would neces- 
 sarily exist, and there might consequently be two or 
 more Gods, which (CoroL i, Prop. 14) is absurd. There- 
 fore, things could be produced by God in no other manner 
 nor in any other order than that in which they have been 
 produced. — q.e.d. 
 
 Scliol. I.— Since I have thus shown, with greater clear- 
 ness than that of noonday light, that in things there is 
 absolutely nothing by virtue of which they can be called 
 contingent, I wish now to explain in a few words what 
 is to be understood by contingent, but firstly, what^ is to 
 be understood hj necessary and impossiUc. A thing is 
 caUed necessary either in reference to its essence or its 
 cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows 
 
34 ETHIC. 
 
 either from the essence and definition of the thing 
 itself, or from a given efficient cause. In the same 
 way a thing is said to be impossible either because the 
 essence of the thing itself or its definition involves a 
 contradiction, or because no external cause exists deter- 
 minate to the production of such a thing. But a thing 
 cannot be called contingent unless with reference to a 
 deficiency in our knowledge. For if we do not know 
 that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or 
 if we actually know that it involves no contradiction, 
 and nevertheless we can affirm nothing with certainty 
 about its existence because the order of causes is con- 
 cealed from us, that thing can never appear to us either 
 as necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either 
 contingent or possible. 
 
 Schol. 2. — From what has gone before it clearly follows 
 that things have been produced by God in the highest 
 degree of perfection, since they have necessarily followed 
 from the existence of a most perfect nature. Nor does 
 this doctrine accuse God of any imperfection, but, on the 
 contrary. His perfection has compelled us to affirm it. 
 Indeed, from its contrary would clearly follow, as I have 
 shown above, that God is not absolutely perfect, since, if 
 things had been produced in any other fashion, another 
 nature would have had to be assigned to Him, different from 
 that which the consideration of the most perfect Being 
 compels us to assign to Him. I do not doubt that many 
 will reject this opinion as ridiculous, nor will they care 
 to apply themselves to its consideration, and this from 
 no other reason than that they have been in the habit of 
 assigning to God another liberty widely different from 
 that absolute will which (Def. 6) we have taught. On 
 the other hand, I do not doubt, if they were willing to 
 study the matter and properly to consider the series of 
 our demonstrations, that they will altogether reject this 
 liberty which they now assign to God, not only as of no 
 value, but as a great obstacle to knowledge. Neither is 
 
OF GOD. ■; 
 
 there any need that I shoukl here repeat those ihin-s 
 which are said in the scholium to Prop. 17. lUit fur 
 the sake of those who differ from me, I will here show 
 that although it be granted that will pertains to Ciod's 
 essence, it follows nevertheless from His perfection that 
 things could be created in no other mode or order by 
 Him. This it will be easy to show if we first consider 
 that which my opponents themselves admit, that it 
 depends upon the decree and will of God alone that 
 each thing should be what it is, for otherwise Clod 
 would not be the cause of all things. It is also admitted 
 that all God's decrees were decreed by God Himself from 
 all eternity, for otherwise imperfection and inconstancy 
 would be proved against Him. But since in eternity 
 there is no when nor before nor after, it follows from the 
 perfection of God alone that He neither can decree nor 
 could ever have decreed anything else tlian tliat which 
 He has decreed ; that is to say, God has not existed 
 before His decrees, and can never exist witliout them. 
 But it is said that although it be supposed that God had 
 made the nature of things different from that which it 
 is, or that from eternity He had decreed something else 
 about nature and her order, it would not thence foHow 
 that any imperfection exists in God. But if this be said, 
 it must at the same time be allowed that God can change 
 His decrees. For if God had decreed something about 
 nature and her order other than that which He has 
 decreed — that is to say, if He had willed and conceived 
 something else about nature — He would necessarily have 
 had an intellect and a will different from those which 
 He now has. And if it be allowed to assign to God 
 another intellect and another will without any change of 
 His essence and of His perfections, what is the rea.son 
 why He cannot now change His decrees about creation 
 and nevertheless remain equally perfect ? For His intel- 
 lect and will regarding created things and their onler 
 remain the same in relationship to His essence and per- 
 
36 ETHIC. 
 
 fection in whatever manner His intellect and will are 
 conceived. Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have 
 seen admit that there is no such thing as an intellect 
 existing potentially in God, but only an intellect existing 
 actually. But since His intellect and His will are not 
 distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows 
 from this also that if God had had another intellect actu- 
 ally and another will, His essence would have been neces- 
 sarily different, and hence, as I showed at the beginning, 
 if things had been produced by God in a manner different 
 from that in which they now exist, God's intellect and 
 will, that is to say, His essence (as has been granted), 
 must have been different, which is absurd. 
 
 Since, therefore, things could have been produced by 
 God in no other manner or order, this being a truth which 
 follows from His absolute perfection, there is no sound 
 reasoning which can persuade us to believe that God was 
 unwilling to create all things which are in His intellect 
 with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His 
 intellect. But we shall be told that there is no perfection 
 nor imperfection in things, but that that which is in them 
 by reason of which they are perfect or imperfect and are 
 said to be good or evil depends upon the will of God alone, 
 and therefore if God had willed He could have effected 
 that that which is now perfection should have been the 
 extreme of imperfection, and vice versa. But what else 
 would this be than openly to affirm that God, who neces- 
 sarily understands what He wills, is able by His will to 
 understand things in a manner different from that in which 
 He understands them, which, as I have just shown, is a 
 great absurdity K 1 can therefore turn the argument on 
 my opponents in this way. All things depend upon the 
 power of God. In order that things may be differently 
 constituted, it would be necessary that God's will should 
 be differently constituted ; but God's will cannot be other 
 than it is, as we have lately most clearly deduced from 
 His perfection. Things therefore cannot be differently 
 
OF GOD. 37 
 
 constituted. I confess that this opinion, which subjoctd 
 all things to a certain indifferent God's will, and affirms 
 that all things depend upon God's good pleasure, is at a 
 less distance from the truth than the opinion of those 
 who affirm that God does everything for the sake of the 
 Good. For these seem to place something outside of God 
 which is independent of Him, to which He looks while 
 He is at work as to a model, or at which He aims as if 
 at a certain mark. This is -indeed nothing else than to 
 subject God to fate, the most absurd thing which can be 
 affirmed of Him whom we have shown to be the first 
 and only free cause of the essence of all things as woll 
 as of their existence. Therefore it is not worth whiU; 
 that I should waste time in refuting this absurdity. 
 
 Pkop. XXXIV. — The poivei' of God is His essence itself. 
 
 Demonst — From the necessity alone of the essence 
 of God it follows that God is the cause of Himself 
 (Prop, ii), and (Prop. i6 and its Corel) the cause of 
 all things. Therefore the power of God, by which He 
 Himself and all things are and act, is His essence itself. 
 — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXXV. — Whatever we conceive to be in God's 'power 
 
 necessarily exists. 
 
 Demonst. — For whatever is in God's power must 
 (Prop. 34) be so comprehended in His essence that it 
 necessarily follows from it, and consequently exists neces- 
 sarily. — Q.E.D. ^ l'\i' 
 
 Prop. XXXVI. — Nothing exists from whose nature an 
 effect does not follovj. 
 
 Demonst. — Whatever exists expresses the nature or 
 the essence of God in a certain and determinate manner 
 
38 ETHIC. 
 
 (Corol. Prop. 25); that is to say (Prop. 34), whatever 
 exists expresses the power of God, which is the cause of 
 all things, in a certain and determinate manner, and 
 therefore (Prop. 16) some effect must follow from it. 
 
 APPEXDIX. 
 
 I have now explained the nature of God and its pro- 
 perties. I have shown that He necessarily exists ; that 
 He is one God ; that from the necessity alone of His 
 own nature He is and acts ; that He is, and in what way 
 He is, the free cause of all things ; that all things are in 
 Him, and so. depend upon Him that without Him they 
 can neither be nor can be conceived ; and, finally, that 
 all things have been predetermined by Him, not indeed 
 from a freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, 
 j but from His absolute nature or infinite power. 
 
 Moreover, wherever an opportunity was afforded, I have 
 
 endeavoured to remove prejudices whicli might hinder 
 
 the perception of the truth of what I have demonstrated ; 
 
 but because not a few still remain which have been and 
 
 are now sufficient to prove a very great hindrance to the 
 
 comprehension of the connection of things in the manner 
 
 in which I have explained it, I have thought it worth 
 
 while to call them up to be examined by reason. But 
 
 'all these prejudices which I here undertake to point out ^■ 
 
 depend upon this solely : that it is commonly supposed 
 
 that all things in nature, like men, work to some end ; 
 
 and indeed it is thoudit to be certain that God Him- , 
 
 self directs all things to some sure end, for it is said 
 
 that God has made all things for man, and man that he 
 
 . may worship God. This, therefore, I will first investi- 
 
 \ gate by inquiring, firstly, why so many rest in this 
 
 \prejudice, and why all are so naturally inclined to 
 
 embrace it ? I shall then show its falsity, and, finally, 
 
 the manner in which there have arisen from it pre- 
 
 I 
 
OF GOD. /T ,j 
 
 judices concerning good and evil, merit and iij^i, prai^f 
 and Ua7ne, order and disorder, heauty and dfformity, 
 and so forth. This, however, is not the place to de- 
 duce these things from the nature of the human mind. 
 It will be sufficient if I here take as an axiom that which 
 no one ought to dispute, namely, that man is born igno- 
 rant of the causes of things, and that he has a desire, 
 of which he is conscious, to seek that which is profitable 
 to him. From this it follows, firstly, that he thinks 
 himself free because he is conscious of his wishes and 
 appetites, whilst at the same time he is ignorant of 
 the causes by which he is led to wish and desire, not 
 dreaming what they are ; and, secondly, it follows that 
 man does everything for an end, namely, for that which 
 is profitable to him, which is what he seeks. Hence it 
 happens that he attempts to discover merely the final 
 causes of that which has happened ; and when he lias 
 heard them he is satisfied, because there is no longer 
 any cause for further uncertainty. But if he cannot hear 
 from another what these final causes are, nothing remains 
 but to turn to himself and reflect upon the ends which 
 usually determine him to the like actions, and thus by 
 his own mind he necessarily judges that of another. 
 Moreover, since he discovers, both within and without 
 himself, a multitude of means which contribute not a 
 little to the attainment of what is profitable to himself 
 — for example, the eyes, which are useful for seeing, the 
 teeth for mastication, plants and animals for nourish- 
 ment, the sun for giving light, the sea for feeding fish, 
 &c. — it comes to pass that all natural objects are con- 
 sidered as means for obtaining what is profitable. These 
 too being evidently discovered and not created by man, 
 hence he has a cause for believing that some other per- 
 son exists, who has prepared them for man's use. For 
 having considered them as means it was impossible to 
 believe that they had created themselves, and so ho 
 was oblicred to infer from the means which he wm lu 
 
40 ETHIC. 
 
 the habit of providing for himself that some ruler or 
 rulers of nature exist, endowed with human liberty, 
 who have taken care of all things for him, and have 
 made all things for his use. Since he never heard any- 
 thing about the mind of these rulers, he was compelled 
 to judge of it from his own, and hence he affirmed 
 that the gods direct everything for his advantage, in 
 order that he may be bound to them and hold them in 
 the highest honour. This is the reason why each man 
 has devised for himself, out of his own brain, a different . 
 mode of worshipping God, so that God might love him 
 above others, and direct all nature to the service of his 
 blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. 
 
 Thus has this prejudice been turned into a superstition 
 and has driven deep roots into the mind — a prejudice 
 which was the reason why every one has so eagerly tried 
 to discover and explain the final causes of things. The 
 attempt, however, to show that nature does nothing in 
 vain (that is to say, nothing which is not profitable to 
 man), seems to end in showing that nature, the gods, 
 and man are alike mad. 
 
 Do but see, I pray, to what all this has led. Amidst so 
 much in nature that is beneficial, not a few things must 
 liave been observed which are injurious, such as storms, 
 earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed that these 
 things happened either because the gods were angry 
 because of wrongs which had been inflicted on them by 
 man, or because of sins committed in the method of wor- 
 shipping them ; and although experience daily contradicted 
 this, and showed by an infinity of examples that both the 
 beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed 
 on the pious and the impious, the inveterate prejudices 
 on this point have not therefore been abandoned. For it 
 was much easier for a man to place these things aside 
 with others of the use of which he was ignorant, and thus 
 retain his present and inborn state of ignorance, than to 
 destroy the whole superstructure and think out a new 
 
OF GOD. ,, 
 
 one. Hence it was looked upon as indisputal.lo that 
 the judgments of the gods far surpass our coniprehonsiou ; 
 and this opinion alone would have been suflicicnt to 
 keep the human race in darkness to all cterniiv, if 
 mathematics, which docs not deal with ends, but with 
 the essences and properties of forms, had not placed before 
 us another rule of truth. In addition to mathematics, 
 other causes also might be assigned, which it is super- 
 fluous here to enumerate, tending to make men reflect 
 upon these universal prejudices, and leading them to a 
 true knowledge of things. 
 
 I have thus sufficiently explained what I promised in 
 the first place to explain. There will now be no need of 
 many words to show that nature has set no end before ' 
 herself, and that all final causes are nothing but human 
 fictions. For I believe that this is sufficiently evident 
 both from the foundations and causes of this prejudice, 
 and from Prop. i6 and Corol. Prop. 32, as well as 
 from all those propositions in which I have shown that 
 all things are begotten by a certain eternal necessity of 
 nature and in absolute perfection. Thus much, never- 
 theless, I will add, that this doctrine concerning an end 
 altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth 
 the cause it considers as the effect, and vice versa. Again, 
 that which is first in nature it puts last ; and, finally, that 
 which is supreme and most perfect it makes the most 
 imperfect. For (passing by the first two assertions as self- 
 evident) it is plain from Props. 21,22, and 23, tliat that 
 effect is the most perfect which is immediately produceil 
 by God, and in proportion as intermediate causes are 
 necessary for the production of a thing is it imperfect. 
 But if things which are immediately produced by God 
 were made in order that He might obtain the end He had 
 in view, then the last things for the sake of which the 
 first exist, must be the most perfect of all. ' Again, thi.s 
 doctrine does away with God's perfection. For if God 
 works to obtain an end. He necessarily seeks something 
 
42 ETHIC. 
 
 of which he stands in need. And although theologians 
 and metaphysicians distinguish between the end of want 
 and the end of assimilation {finem indigenticc et finem 
 assimilationis), they confess that God has done all things 
 for His own sake, and not for the sake of the things to 
 be created, because before the creation they can assign 
 nothing excepting God for the sake of which God could 
 do anything ; and therefore they are necessarily com- 
 pelled to admit that God stood in need of and desired 
 those things for which He determined to prepare means. 
 This is self-evident. Nor is it here to be overlooked that 
 the adherents of this doctrine, who have found a pleasure 
 in displaying their ingenuity in assigning the ends of 
 things, have introduced a new species of argument, not 
 the redudio ad impossibile, but the 7xductio ad ignorantiam, 
 to prove their position, which shows that it had no other 
 method of defence left. For, by way of example, if a 
 stone has fallen from some roof on somebody's head 
 and killed him, they will demonstrate in this manner 
 that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man. For 
 if it did not fall for that purpose by the will of God, 
 how could so many circumstances concur through chance 
 (and a number often simultaneously do concur) ? You 
 will answer, perhaps, that the event happened because 
 the wind blew and the man was passing that way. But, 
 they will urge, why did the wind blow at that time, and 
 why did the man pass that way precisely at the same 
 moment ? If you again reply that the wind rose then 
 because the sea on the preceding day began to be stormy, 
 the weather hitherto having been calm, and that the 
 man had been invited by a friend, they will urge again 
 — because there is no end of questioning — But why 
 was the sea agitated ? why was the man invited at that 
 time ? And so they will not cease from asking the 
 causes of causes, until at last you fly to the will of God, 
 the refuge for ignorance. -^ 
 
 So, also, when they behold the structure of the human 
 
OF GOD. 
 
 body/tliej are amazed ; and because tlicy aro i-n. r.int 
 of the causes of such art, they conclude that the IkxIv 
 was made not by mechanical but by a supernatural or 
 divine art, and has been formed in such a way so that, 
 the one part may not injure the other. Hence it lmj)pt'n.< 
 that the man who endeavours to find out the true causes 
 of miracles, and who desires as a wise man to understand 
 nature, and not to gape at it like a fool, is gonerally con- 
 sidered and proclaimed to be a heretic and impious hv 
 those whom the vulgar worship as the interpreters hotii 
 of nature and the gods. For these know that if ignorance 
 be removed, amazed stupidity, the sole ground on which 
 they rely in arguing or in defending their authority, is 
 taken away also. But these things I leave and pass on 
 to that which I determined to do in the third place. 
 
 After man has persuaded himself that all things which 
 exist are made for him, he must in everything adjudge 
 that to be of the greatest importance which is most use- 
 ful to him, and he must esteem that to be of surpass- 
 ing worth by which he is most beneficially affectetl. In 
 this way he is compelled to form those notions by which 
 he explains nature ; such, for instance, as good, rvil, 
 order, confusion, heat, cold, heautij, and deformity, &c. ; 
 and because he supposes himself to be free, notions like 
 those of praise and hlame, sin and vicrit, have arisen. 
 These latter I shall hereafter explain when I have treated 
 of human nature ; the former I will here briefly unfold. 
 
 It is to be observed that man has given tlie name 
 good to everything which leads to health and the wor- 
 ship of God ; on the contrary, everything which doe.s 
 not lead thereto he calls evil. But because those wlio do 
 not understand nature affirm nothing about things them- 
 selves, but only imagine them, and take the imagination 
 to be understanding, they therefore, ignorant of thing-s 
 and their nature, firmly believe an order to be in things ; 
 for when things are so placed that, if they are repre- 
 sented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine 
 
44 ETHIC. 
 
 them, and consequently easily rememter them, we call 
 them well arranged ; but if they are not placed so that we 
 can imagine and remember them, we call them badly 
 arranged or confused. Moreover, since those things are 
 more especially pleasing to us wliich we can easily 
 imagine, men therefore prefer order to confusion, as if 
 order were something in nature apart from our own 
 imagination ; and they say that God has created every- 
 thing in order, and in this manner they ignorantly 
 attribute imagination to God, unless they mean perhaps 
 that God, out of consideration for the human imagina- 
 tion, has disposed things in the manner in which they 
 can most easily be imagined. No hesitation either 
 seems to be caused by the fact that an infinite number 
 of things are discovered which far surpass our imagina- 
 tion, and very many which confound it through its weak- 
 ness. But enough of this. The other notions which I 
 have mentioned are nothing but modes in which the 
 imagination is affected in different ways, and nevertheless 
 they are regarded by the ignorant as being specially 
 attributes of things, because, as we have remarked, men 
 consider all things as made for themselves, and call the 
 nature of a thing good, evil, sound, putrid, or corrupt, 
 just as they are affected by it. For example, if the 
 motion by which the nerves are affected by means of 
 objects represented to the eye conduces to well-being, 
 the objects by which it is caused are called beautifid ; 
 while those exciting a contrary motion are called de- 
 formed. Those things, too, which stimulate the senses 
 through the nostrils are called sweet-smelling or stink- 
 ing ; those which act through the taste are called sweet 
 or bitter, full-flavoured or insipid ; those which act 
 through the touch, hard or soft, heavy or light ; those, 
 lastly, which act through the ears are said to make a 
 noise, sound, or harmony, the last having caused men to 
 lose their senses to such a degree that they have believed 
 that God even is delighted with it. Indeed, philosophers 
 
OF GOD. ^5 
 
 may be found who have persuaded themselves tliat the 
 celestial motions beget a harmony. AH these tliinf^ 
 sufficiently show that every one judges things by iho 
 constitution oiJiis brain, or rather accepts the alTcc- 
 tions of his imagination in the place of things, tt 
 is not, therefore, to be wondered at, as we may ob- 
 serve in passing, that all those controversies which we 
 see have arisen amongst men, so that at last scepticism 
 has been the result. For although human bodies agree 
 in many things, they differ in more, and therefore that 
 which to one person is good will appear to another evil, 
 that which to one is well arranged to another is con- 
 fused, that which pleases one will displease another, and 
 so on in other cases which I pass by both because we 
 cannot notice them at length here, and because they are 
 within the experience of every one. For every one has 
 heard the expressions : So many heads, so many ways of 
 thinking; Every one is satisfied with his own way of 
 thinking ; Differences of brains are not less common 
 than differences of taste ; — all which maxims show that 
 men decide upon matters according to the constitution 
 of their brains, and imagine rather than understand 
 things. If men understood things, they would, as mathe-v 
 matics prove, at least be all alike convinced if they wercj 
 not all alike attracted. We see, therefore, that all tliose 
 methods by which the common people are in the habit 
 of explaining nature are only different sorts of imagina- 
 tions, and do not reveal the nature of anything in itself, 
 but only the constitution of the imagination ; and bo- 
 cause they have names as if they were entities existing 
 apart from the imagination, I call them entities not of 
 the reason but of the imagination. All argument, 
 therefore, urged against us based upon such notions can 
 be easily refuted. Many people, for instance, arc accus- 
 tomed to argue thus :— If all things have followed from 
 the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, how \3 
 it that so many imperfections have arisen in nature— cor- 
 
46 ETHIC. 
 
 ' ruption, for instance, of things till they stink ; deformity, 
 exciting disgust ; confusion, evil, crime, &c. ? But, as I 
 have just observed, all this is easily answered. For the! 
 perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and 
 power alone ; nor are they more or less perfect because 
 they delight or offend the human senses, or because they 
 are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature. But to 
 those who ask why God has not created all men in 
 such a manner that they might be controlled by the 
 dictates of reason alone, I give but this answer : Because 
 to Him material was not wanting for the creation of 
 everything, from the highest down to the very lowest 
 grade of perfection ; or, to speak more properly, because 
 the laws of His nature were so ample that they sufficed 
 for the production of everything which can be con- 
 ceived by an infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated 
 in Prop. 1 6. 
 
 These are the prejudices which I undertook to notice 
 here. If any others of a similar character remain, they 
 can easily be rectified with a little thought by any one. 
 
 END OF THE FIRST PART. 
 
( 47 ) 
 
 ETHIC. 
 
 ^ttonXi ^art. 
 
 OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 
 
 I PASS on now to explain those things which must neces- 
 sarily follow from the essence of God or the Being eternal 
 and infinite ; not indeed to explain all these things, for 
 we have demonstrated (Prop. i6, pt. i) that an infini- 
 tude of things must follow in an infinite number of ways, 
 — but to consider those things only which may conduct 
 us as it were by the hand to a knowledge of the human 
 mind and its highest happiness. 
 
 Definitions. 
 
 I. By body. I understand a mode which expresses in 
 a certain and determinate manner the essence of Clod in 
 so far as it is considered as the thing extended. (See 
 Corel. Prop. 25, pt. i.) 
 
 II. I say that to the essenrp of anything pertains 
 that, which being given, the thing itself is necessarily 
 posited, and being taken away, the thing is necessarily 
 taken ; or, in other words, that,|without which the thing 
 can neither be nor be conceivecl and which in its turn 
 cannot be nor be conceived without the thing. 
 
 III. gY^ea , I understand a conception of the mincl, 
 which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing. 
 
 Exjolanation. — I use the word conception rather than 
 perception because the name perception seems to indicate 
 
48 ETHIC. 
 
 that the mind is passive in its relation to the object. But 
 the word conception seems to express the action of the mind. 
 
 IV. By_^equatgjde^, I understand an idea which, 
 in so far as iFis considered in itself, without reference 
 to the object, has all the properties or internal signs 
 (denominationes intrinsecas) of a true idea. 
 
 Explanation. — I say internal, so as to exclude that 
 which is external, the agreement, namely, of the idea with 
 its object. 
 
 V. ^uratiou^is the indefinite continuation of existence. 
 Explanation. — I call it indefinite because it cannot be 
 
 determined by the nature itself of the existing thing nor 
 by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the exist- 
 ence of the thing but does not take it away. 
 
 VI. ]^yrealit^ and perfection I understand the same 
 thing. { • ) 
 
 VII. By in dividual thi ngs I understand things which 
 are finite and which have a determinate existence ; and 
 if a number of individuals so unite in one action that 
 they are all simultaneously the cause of one effect, I 
 consider them all, so far, as a one individual thing. 
 
 Axioms. 
 
 I. The essence of man does not involve necessary 
 existence ; that is to say, the existence as well as the 
 non-existence of this or that man may or may not follow 
 from the order of nature. 
 
 II. Man thinks. 
 
 III. Modes of thought^ such as love, desire, or the 
 affections of the mind, by whatever name they may be 
 called, do not exist, unless in the same individual the 
 idea exist of a thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea 
 may exist although no other mode of thinking exist. 
 
 IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in 
 many ways. 
 
 V. No individual things are felt or perceived by us 
 excepting bodies and modes of thought. 
 
 The postulates will be found after Proposition 13. 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 49 
 
 Peop. I. — Tlioujht is an attribute of God, or God is a 
 tliinhing thing. 
 
 Demonst. — ludiviJual thoughts, or this aiul that 
 thought, are modes M'hieh express the nature of C.od 
 in a certain and determinate manner (Corol. Prop. 25, 
 pt. i). God therefore possesses an attrihute (Def. 5, 
 pt. 1), the conception of which is involved in all indi- 
 vidual thoughts, and through which they are conceived. 
 Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of 
 God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of 
 God (Def. 6, pt. i), or, in other words, God is a thinking 
 thing. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Scliol. — This proposition is plain from the fact tliat 
 we can conceive an infinite thinking Being. For the 
 more things a thinking being can think, the more reality 
 or perfection we conceive it to possess, and therefore 
 the being which can think an infinitude of things in 
 infinite ways is necessarily infinite by his power of 
 thinking. Since, therefore, we can conceive an iufmito 
 Being by attending to thought alone, thought is neces- 
 sarily one of the infinite attributes of God (Defs. 4 and 
 6, pt. 1), which is the proposition we wished to prove. 
 
 Peop. II. — Extension is an attrihute of God, or God is an 
 extended iking. 
 Demonst. — The demonstration of this proposition is of 
 the same character as that of the last. 
 
 Peop. III. — In God there necessarily exists the idea of His 
 
 essence, and of all things which necessarily fullmc from 
 
 His essence. 
 
 Demonst.— Tov God (Prop, i, pt. 2) can think nn 
 
 infinitude of things in infinite ways, or (which is the 
 
 same thing, by Prop. 16, pt. i) can form an idea of His 
 
 essence and of all the things which necessarily follow 
 
 from it. But evcvvthing wliich is in the power of God 
 
 D 
 
50 ETHIC. 
 
 is necessary (Prop. 35, pt, i), and therefore this idea 
 necessarily exists, and (Prop, i 5, pt. i) it cannot exist 
 unless in God. 
 
 Scliol. — The common people understand by God's power 
 His free will and right over all existing things, which 
 are therefore commonly looked upon as contingent ; for 
 they say that God has the power of destroying every- 
 thing and reducing it to nothing. They very frequently, 
 too, compare God's power with the power of kings. That 
 there is any similarity between the two we have disproved 
 in the first and second Corollaries of Prop. 3 2, pt. i, and in 
 Prop. 16, pt. I, we have shown that God does everything 
 with that necessity with which He understands Himself ; 
 that is to say, as it follows from the necessity of the divine 
 nature that God understands Himself (a truth admitted by 
 all), so by the same necessity it follows that God does an 
 infinitude of things in infinite ways. Moreover, in Prop. 
 34, pt. I, we have shown that the power of God is no- 
 thing but the active essence of God, and therefore it 
 is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not 
 act as that He does not exist. If it pleased me to 
 go farther, I could show besides that the power which 
 the common people ascribe to God is not only a human 
 power (which shows that they look upon God as a man, 
 or as being like a man), but that it also involves weak- 
 ness. But I do not care to talk so much upon the same 
 subject. Again and again I ask the reader to consider 
 and reconsider what is said upon this subject in the 
 first part, from Prop. 16 to the end. For it is not pos- 
 sible for any one properly to understand the things 
 which I wish to prove unless he takes great care not to 
 confound the power of God with the human power and 
 right of kings. 
 
 Prop. IV. — The idea of God^ from u-hieh infinite nunibcrs 
 of things folloiv in infinite icays, can he one onli^. 
 Demonst. — The infinite intellect comprehends nothing 
 
 ^ Or God's idea {Idea Dei), see p. 24. — Tb. 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 51 
 
 but the attributes of God aud His afrections (rrop. 30, 
 pt. i). But God is one (Corel, i, Trop. 14, pt 1). 
 Therefore the idea of God, from which infinite numbers of 
 things follow in infinite ways, can be one only. — q.e.I). 
 
 Peop. Y. — The formal Being of ideas recognises God for 
 its cause in so far only as He is considered as a 
 thinking thing, and not in so far as He is c,q)laincd 
 ly any other attribute ; that is to say, the ideas both 
 of God's attributes and of individtial things do not 
 recognise as their efficient cause the objects of the ideas 
 or the things which are perceived, but God Himself in 
 so far as He is a thinJci7ig thing. 
 
 Demonst. — This is plain, from Prop. 3, pt. 2 ; for wo 
 there demonstrated that God can form an idea of 1 1 is 
 own essence, and of all things which necessarily follow 
 from it, solely because He is a thinking thing, and not 
 because He is the object of His idea. Therefore the 
 formal Being of ideas recognises God as its cause in so 
 far as Pie is a thinking thing. But the proposition can 
 be proved in another way. The formal Being of ideas 
 is a mode of thought (as is self-evident) ; that is to say, 
 (CoroL Prop. 25, pt. i), a mode which expresses in a 
 certain manner the nature of God in so far as He is a 
 thinking thing. It is a mode, therefore (Prop. 10, 
 pt. i), that involves the conception of no other attribute 
 of God, and consequently is the effect (Ax. 4, pt. I ) of 
 no other attribute except that of thought ; therefore the 
 formal Being of ideas, &c. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Peop. VI. — The modes of any attribute have God for a 
 cause only in so far as He is considered under that 
 attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far 
 as He is considered under any other attribute. 
 
 Demonst. — Each attribute is conceived by itsc-lf and 
 without any other (Prop. lo, pt. l). Therefore the 
 modes of any attribute involve the conception of that 
 
52 ETHIC. 
 
 attribute and of no other, and therefore (Ax. 4, pt. i) 
 have God for a cause in so far as He is considered under 
 that attribute of which they are modes, and not so far as 
 He is considered under any other attribute. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that the formal Being of 
 things which are not modes of thought does not follow 
 from the divine nature because of His prior knowledge 
 of these things, but, as we have shown, just as ideas 
 follow from the attribute of thought, in the same manner 
 and with the same necessity the objects of ideas follow 
 and are concluded from their attributes. 
 
 Peop. YII. — The order and connection of ideas is the same ^ 
 as the order and connection of things. 
 
 This is evident from Ax. 4, pt. i. For the idea of 
 anything caused depends upon a knowledge of the cause 
 of which the thing caused is the effect. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that God's power of thinking 
 is equal to His actual power of acting ; that is to say, 
 whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, 
 follows from the idea of God [idea Dei], in the same 
 order and in the same connection ohjectivdy in God. 
 
 Schol. — Before we go any farther, we must here recall to 
 our memory what we have already demonstrated, that 
 everything which can be perceived by the infinite in- 
 tellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains 
 entirely to the one sole substance only, and consequently 
 that substance thinking and substance extended are one 
 and the same substance, which is now comprehended 
 under this attribute and now under that. Thus, also, 
 a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one 
 and the same thing expressed in two different ways — a 
 truth which some of the Hebrews appear to have seen 
 as if through a cloud, since they say that God, the 
 intellect of God, and the things which are the objects of 
 that intellect are one and the same thing. For example, 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 53 
 
 the circle existing in nature and the idea that is in CKkI 
 of an existing circle are one and the same thin;j, which 
 are explained by different attributes ; and, therefore, 
 whether we think of nature under the attribute of v\- 
 tension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any 
 other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and tho 
 same order, or one and the same connection of causes ; 
 that is to say, in every case the same sequence of tilings. 
 Nor have I had any other reason for saying that God 
 is the cause of the idea, for example, of the circle in 
 so far only as He is a thinking thing, and of the circle 
 itself in so far as He is an extended thing, but this, that 
 the formal Being of the idea of a circle can only he 
 perceived through another mode of thought, as its proxi- 
 mate cause, and this again must be perceived through 
 another, and so on ad injlnitum. So that when things 
 are considered as modes of thought, we must explain the 
 order of the whole of nature or the connection of causes 
 by the attribute of thought alone, and when things are 
 considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole 
 of nature must be explained through the attribute of 
 extension alone, and so with other attributes. Therefore 
 God is in truth the cause of things as they are in them- 
 selves in so far as He consists of infinite attributes, nor 
 for the present can I explain the matter more clearly. 
 
 Tkop. YIII. — The ideas of non-existent individual things 
 or modes are comprehended in the infinite idea of 
 God, in the same way that the formal essences of 
 individual things or modes are contained in the 
 
 attributes of God. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This proposition is evident from the pre- 
 ceding proposition, but is to be understood more clearly 
 from the preceding scholium. 
 
 Coral. — Hence it follows that when individual things 
 do not exist unless in so far as they are comprehended lu 
 
54 ETHIC. 
 
 the attributes of God, their objective Being or ideas do not 
 exist unless in so far as the infinite idea of God exists ' 
 and when individual things are said to exist, not only 
 in so far as they are included in God's attributes, but 
 in so far as they are said to have duration, their ideas 
 involve the existence through which they are said to 
 have duration. 
 
 Schol. — If any one desires an instance in order that 
 what I have said may be more fully understood, I cannot 
 give one which will adequately explain what I have been 
 saying, since an exact parallel does not exist : never- 
 theless, I will endeavour to give as good an illustration 
 as can be found. 
 
 The circle, for example, possesses this property, that 
 the rectangles contained by the segments of all straight 
 lines cutting one another in the same circle are equal; 
 therefore in a circle there are contained an infinite 
 number of rectangles equal to one another, but none of 
 them can be said to exist unless in so far as the circle 
 exists, nor can the idea of any one of these rectangles be 
 said to exist unless in so far as it is comprehended in the 
 idea of the circle. Out of this infinite number of rect- 
 angles, let two only, E and D, be conceived to exist. 
 The ideas of these two rectangles 
 do not now exist merely in \so far 
 as they are comprehended in the 
 idea of the circle, but because they 
 involve the existence of their rect- 
 angles, and it is this which distin- 
 guishes them from the other ideas 
 (\) , .1 of the other rectangles. 
 
 >VJ 
 
 Peop. IX. — The idea of an individual thing actually 
 existing has God for a cause, not in so far as He 
 is infinite, but in so far as He is considered to be 
 afected by another idea of an ijidividual thing 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 55 
 
 actually existing, of rchich idea also Ih is the cause 
 in so far as He is affected bj a third, and so on 
 
 ad infinitum. 
 
 Demonst. — The idea of any individual thing actuallv 
 existing is an individual mode of thouglit, and is distinct 
 from other modes of thought (Corol. and Schol. rrop. 8, 
 pt. 2), and therefore (Prop. 6, pt. 2) lias God for a cause 
 in so far only as He is a thinking thing ; not indeed as a 
 thinking thing absolutely (Prop. 28, pt. i), but in so 
 far as He is considered as affected by auother mode of 
 thought. Again, He is the cause of this latter mode of 
 thought in so far as He is considered as aflected by 
 another, and so on ad infinitum. But the order and 
 connection of ideas (Prop. 7, pt. 2) is the same as the order 
 and connection of causes ; therefore every individual idea 
 has for its cause another idea, that is to say, God in so far 
 as He is affected by another idea; while of this second 
 idea God is again the cause in the same way, and so on 
 ad infinitum. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — A knowledge of everything which happens in 
 the individual object of any idea exists in God in so far 
 only as He possesses the idea of that object. 
 
 Demonst. — The idea of everything which happens in 
 the object of any idea exists in God (Prop. 3, \*i. 2), nut 
 in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is con- 
 sidered as affected by another idea of an individual thing 
 (Prop. 9, pt. 2) ; but (Prop. 7, pt. 2) the order and con- 
 nection of ideas is the same as the order and connection 
 of things, and therefore the knowledge of that which 
 happens in any individual object will exist in God in so 
 far only as He has the idea of that object. 
 
 Pp.op. 'K.—TJie Being of substance does not pertain to the 
 essence of man ^ or., in other words, substance dues 
 not constitute the form of man. 
 
56 ETHIC. 
 
 Demonst. — The Being of substance involves necessary 
 existence (Prop. 7, pt, i). If, therefore, the Being of 
 substance pertains to the essence of man, the existence 
 of man would necessarily follow from the existence of 
 substance (Def. 2, pt. 2), and consequently he would 
 necessarily exist, which (Ax. i, pt. 2) is an absurdity. 
 Therefore the Being of substance does not pertain, &c. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Sclwl. — This proposition may be demonstrated from 
 Prop. 5, pt. I, which proves that there are not two sub- 
 stances of the same nature. For since it is possible for 
 more men than one to exist, therefore that which consti- 
 tutes the form of man is not the Being of substance. 
 This proposition is evident also from the other properties 
 of substance ; as, for example, that it is by its nature 
 infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as any one may 
 easily see. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that the essence of man con- 
 sists of certain modifications of the attributes of God; 
 for the Being of substance does not pertain to the 
 essence of man (Prop. 10, pt. 2). It is therefore some- 
 thing (Prop. 15, pt. i) which is in God, and which 
 without God can neither be nor be conceived, or (Corol. 
 Prop. 25, pt. i) an affection or mode which expresses 
 the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner. 
 
 Schol. — Every one must admit that without God nothing 
 can be nor be conceived ; for every one admits that 
 God is the sole cause both of the essence and of the 
 existence of all things ; that is to say, God is not only 
 the cause of things, to use a common expression, secundum 
 fieri, but also secundum esse. But many people say that 
 that pertains to the essence of a thing without which the 
 thing can neither be nor can be conceived, and they there- 
 fore believe either that the nature of God belongs to the 
 essence of created things, or that created things can 
 be or can be conceived without God : or, which is 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 57 
 
 more probable, there is no consistency in their thou'^'ht, 
 I believe that the cause of this confusion is tlmt tln-y 
 have not observed a proper order of philosophic study. 
 For although the divine nature ought to be studied first, 
 because it is first in the order of knowledge and in the 
 order of things, they think it last ; while, on the otlier 
 hand, those things which are called objects of the souses 
 are believed to stand before everything else. Hence it 
 has come to pass that there was nothing of which men 
 thought less than the divine nature while they have 
 been studying natural objects, and when they afterwanls 
 applied themselves to think about God, there was nothing 
 of which they could think less than those prior fictions 
 upon which they had built their knowledge of natural 
 things, for these fictions could in no way help to tlie 
 knowledge of the divine nature. It is no wonder, there- 
 fore, if we find them continually contradicting themselves. 
 But this I pass by. For my only purpose was to give a 
 reason why I did not say that that pertains to the 
 essence of a thing without which the thing can neitlier 
 be nor can be conceived ; and my reason is, that indivi- 
 dual things cannot be nor be conceived without God, 
 and yet God does not pertain to their essence. I have 
 rather, therefore, said that the essence of a thing is 
 necessarily that which being given, the thing is posited, 
 and being taken away, the thing is taken away, or that 
 without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, 
 and which in its turn cannot be nor be conceived with- 
 out the thing. 
 
 Peop. XI.— The first thing which forms the actual Being 
 of the human mind is nothing else than the idea 
 of an individual thing actualhj existing. 
 
 Demonst— The essence of a man is formed (Cord. 
 Prop. 10, pt. 2) by certain modes of the attrihutcs of 
 God. that is to say (Ax. 2, pt. 2), modes of thought, the 
 
58 ETHIC. 
 
 idea of all of them being prior by nature to the modes of 
 thought themselves (Ax. 3,pt. 2) ; and if this idea exists, 
 other modes (which also have an idea in nature prior to 
 them) must exist in the same individual likewise (Ax. 3, 
 pt. 2). Therefore an idea is the first thing which forms 
 the Being of the human mind. But it is not the idea 
 of a non-existent thing, for then the idea itself (Corol. 
 Prop. 8, pt. 2) could not be said to exist. It will, there- 
 fore, be the idea of something actually existing. Neither 
 will it be the idea of an infinite thing, for an infinite 
 thing must always necessarily exist (Props. 21 and 22, 
 pt. i), and this (Ax. i, pt. 2) is absurd. Therefore the 
 first thing whicli forms the actual Being of the human 
 mind is the idea of an individual thing actually existing. 
 — Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that the human mind is a 
 part of the infinite intellect of God, and therefore, when 
 we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing, 
 we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea ; 
 not indeed in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He 
 is explained through the nature of the human mind, or in 
 so far as He forms the essence of the human mind ; and 
 when we say that God has this or that idea, not merely in 
 so far as He forms the nature of the human mind, but in 
 so far as He has at the same time with the human mind 
 the idea also of another thing, then we say that the human 
 mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately. 
 
 Schol. — At this point many of my readers will no 
 doubt stick fast, and will think of many things which 
 will cause delay ; and I therefore beg of them to advance 
 slowly, step by step, with me, and not to pronounce 
 judgment until they, shall have read everything which 
 I have to say, 
 
 Vrov. XII. — Whatever happens in the object of the idea 
 constituting the human mind must he perceived hy 
 the human mind ; ar,,^ in other words, an idea 0/ that 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 59 
 
 tJiwg will 77ecessarib/ exist in the }nnna7i mitul. That 
 is to say, if the object of the idea constiluting the 
 huma7i mi?ui he a lady, nothing can happen in that 
 lady which is not perceived by the mind. 
 
 Demo?ist. — The knowledge of everything which liappcns 
 in the object of any idea necessarily exists in God (Corol. 
 Prop. 9, pt. 2), in so far as He is considered as all'ectcd 
 with the idea of that object ; that is to say (Trnp i i, 
 pt. 2), in so far as He forms the mind of any ht'in'j. 
 The knowledge, therefore, necessarily exists in God of 
 everything which happens in the object of the idea con- 
 stituting the human mind ; that is to say, it exists in 
 Him in so -frir as He forms the nature of the human 
 mind ; or, in other words (Corol. Prop. 11, pt. 2), the 
 knowledge of this thing will necessarily be in the mind, 
 or the mind perceives it. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — This proposition is plainly deducible and more 
 easily to be understood from Schol. Prop. 7, jit. 2, t<' 
 which the reader is referred. 
 
 Peop. XIII. — The object of the idea constituting the huiimn 
 mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actuall;/ 
 existing, and nothing else. 
 
 Bcmonst. — For if the body were not the object of the 
 human mind, the ideas of the aflections of the body 
 would not be in God (Corol. Prop. 9, pt. 2) in so far as 
 He has formed our mind, but would be in ]Iini in so far 
 as He has formed the mind of anotlier thing ; that is 
 to say (Corol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 2), the ideas of the afTections 
 of the body would not be in our mind. But (Ax. 4, I't. 
 2) we have ideas of the affections of a body ; therefore 
 the object of the idea constituting the human mind is 
 a body, and that too (Prop, il, pt. 2) actually existin- 
 Again, if there were also any other object of the mind be- 
 sides a body, since nothing exists from whicli some efTect 
 does not follow (Prop. ^6, pt. i), the idea of some efTect 
 
6o ETHIC. 
 
 produced by this object would necessarily exist in our 
 mind (Prop. 1 1, pt. 2). But (Ax. 5, pt. 2) there is no 
 such idea, and therefore the object of our mind is a body 
 existing, and nothing else. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that man is composed of 
 mind and body, and that the human body exists as we 
 perceive it. 
 
 Scliol. — Hence we see not only that the human mind 
 is united to the body, but also what is to be understood 
 by the union of the mind and body. But no one can 
 understand it adequately or distinctly without know- 
 ing adequately beforehand the nature of our' body ; 
 for those things which we have proved hitherto are 
 altogetlier general, nor do they refer more to man than 
 to other individuals, all of which are animate, although 
 in different degrees. For of everything there necessarily 
 exists in God an idea of which He is the cause, in the 
 same way as the idea of the human body exists in Him ; 
 and therefore everything that we have said of the idea 
 of tlie human body is necessarily true of the idea of 
 any other thing. We cannot, however, deny that ideas, 
 like objects themselves, differ from one another, and that 
 one is more excellent and contains more reality than 
 another, just as the object of one idea is more excel- 
 lent and contains more reality than another. There- 
 fore, in order to determine the difference between the 
 human mind and other things and its superiority over 
 them, we must first know, as we have said, the nature 
 of its object, that is to say, the nature of the human 
 body. I am not able to explain it here, nor is such 
 an explanation necessary for what I wish to demon- 
 strate. 
 
 Thus much, nevertheless, I will say generally, that in 
 proportion as one body is better adapted than another 
 to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion 
 will the mind at the same time be better adapted to 
 perceive many things, and the more the actions of a 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 6| 
 
 body depend upon itself alone, and the less otlicr 
 bodies co-operate with it in action, the better adajitc-J 
 will the mind be for distinctly understanding. Wq 
 can thus determine the superiority of one n'lind to 
 another ; we can also see the reason why we liavu only 
 a very confused knowledge of our body, together 
 with many other things which I shall deduce in what 
 follows. For this reason I have thought it worth 
 while more accurately to explain and demonstrate the 
 truths just mentioned, to which end it is necessary for 
 lue to say beforehand a few words upon the nature uf 
 bodies. 
 
 Axiom i. — All bodies are either in a state of motion 
 or rest. 
 
 Axiom 2. — Every body moves, sometimes slowly, some- 
 times quickly. 
 
 Lemma I. — Bodies are distinguished from one another in y 
 respect of motion and rest, guicJcness and slowness, ^ 
 and 7iot in respect of suhstctnce. 
 
 Demonst. — I suppose the first part of this proposition 
 to be self-evident. But it is plain that bodies are not 
 distinguished in respect of substance, both from Prop. 5, 
 pt. I, and Prop. 8, pt. i, and still more plainly from 
 what I have said in the scholium to Prop. 15, pt. i. 
 
 Lemma II. — All ladies agree in some reqxdx. 
 
 Demonst.— Y or all bodies agree in this, that they 
 involve the conception of one and the same attribute 
 (Def. I, pt. 2). They have, moreover, this in couiuion, 
 that they are capable generally of motion and of rest, 
 and of motion at one time quicker and at another 
 slower. 
 
 Lemma III.— ^ hodg in motion or at rest must Ic deter- 
 mined to motion or rest ly another hodg, tchich uas 
 
62 ETHIC. 
 
 also determined to motion or rest hy another, and that 
 in its turn hy another, and so on ad infinitum. 
 
 Demonst. — Bodies (Def. i, pt. 2) are individual things, 
 "wliicli (Lem. i) are distinguished from one another in 
 respect of motion and rest, and therefore (Prop. 28, 
 pt. i) each one must necessarily be deteruiined to motion 
 or rest by another individual thing ; that is to say (Prop. 
 6, pt. I ), by another body which (Ax. i ) is also either in 
 motion or at rest. But this body, by the same reasoning, 
 could not be in motion or at rest unless it had been 
 determined to motion or rest by another body, and this 
 again, by the same reasoning, must have been determined 
 by a third, and so on ad infinitum. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that a body in motion will 
 continue in motion untd it be determined to a state of 
 rest by another body, and that a body at rest will con- 
 tinue at rest until it be determined to a state of motion 
 by another body. This indeed is self-evident. For if I 
 suppose that a body. A, for example, is at rest, if I pay 
 no regard to other bodies in motion, I can say nothing 
 about the body A except that it is at rest. If it 
 should afterwards happen that the body A should move, 
 its motion could not certainly be a result of its former 
 rest, for from its rest nothing could follow than that 
 the body A should remain at rest. If, on the other 
 hand, A be supposed to be in motion, so long as we 
 regard A alone, the only thing we can affirm about it is 
 that it moves. If it should afterwards happen that A 
 should be at rest, the rest could not certainly be a result 
 of the former motion, for from its motion nothing could 
 follow but that A should move ; the rest must therefore 
 be a result of something which was not in A, that is to 
 say, of an external cause by which it was determined 
 to rest. 
 
 Axiom i . — All the modes by which one body is affected 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 63 
 
 hj another follow from the nature of the hotly affected, 
 and at the same time from the nature of the affectiii;^ 
 body, so that one and the same body may be moved 
 in different ways according to the diversity of tlio 
 nature of the moving bodies, and, on the other hand, 
 so that different bodies may be moved in different ways 
 by one and the same body. 
 
 Axiom 2. — When a body in motion strikes against 
 another which is at rest and immovable, it is reflected, in 
 order that it may continue its motion, and the angle of 
 the line of reflected motion with the plane of the body at 
 rest against which it struck will be equal to the angle 
 which the line of the motion of 
 incidence makes with the same \ ^ 
 
 plane. ^^ ^ — 
 
 Thus much for simplest bodies / 
 
 which are distinguished from one /_ _^ 
 
 another by motion and rest, speed 
 
 and slowness alone ; let us now advance to composite 
 
 bodies. 
 
 Def. — When a number of bodies of the same or of 
 different magnitudes are pressed together by others, so 
 that they lie one upon the other, or if they are in 
 motion with the same or with different degrees of speed, 
 so that they communicate their motion to one another in 
 a certain fixed proportion, these bodies are said to be 
 mutually united, and taken altogether they are said to 
 compose one body or individual, which is distinguished 
 from other bodies by this union of bodies. 
 
 Axiom 3. — Whether it is easy or difficult to force the 
 parts composing an individual to change their situation, 
 and consequently whether it is easy or difficult fur the 
 individual to change its shape, depends upon whether the 
 parts of the individual or of the compound body lie with 
 less, or whether they lie with greater surfaces upon one 
 another. Hence bodies whose parts lie upon each other 
 with "reater surfaces I will call hard ; those soft, whose 
 
64 ETHIC. 
 
 parts lie on one another with smaller surfaces ; and 
 those flaiJ, whose parts move amongst each other. 
 
 Lemma. IV. — If a certain numher of todies he separated 
 from the hody or individual loliieli is composed of a 
 numler of todies, and if their place he supplied hy 
 the same numher of other hodies of the same nature, 
 the individual ivill retain the nature ivhich it had 
 hefore luithout any change of form. 
 
 Demonst. — Bodies are not distinguished in respect of 
 substance (Lem. i) ; but that which makes the form 
 of an individual is the union of bodies (by the preced- 
 ing definition). This form, however (by hypothesis), is 
 retained, although there may be a continuous change of 
 the bodies. The individual, therefore, will retain its nature, 
 with regard both to substance and to mode, as before. 
 
 Lemma. V. — If the parts coynposing an individual tecome 
 greater or less 2J^'opo^'^^07iately, so that they preserve 
 toivards one another the same kind of motion and , 
 rest, the individual ivill also retain the nature luhich 
 it had tcfore ivithout any change of form. 
 
 Demonst. — The demonstration is of the same kind as 
 that immediately preceding. 
 
 Lemma YI. — If any numher of hodies composing an indi- 
 vidual are compelled to divert into one direction the 
 motion they pireviously had in another, hut are 
 nevertheless ahle to continue and reciprocally com- 
 municate their motions in the same manner as hefore, 
 the individual will then rctai?i its nature luithout 
 any change of form. 
 
 Demonst. — This is self-evident, for the individual is 
 supposed to retain everything whicli, according to the 
 definition, constitutes its form. 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 65 
 
 Lemma A'II. — The individual thus composed will, monovcr, 
 retain its nature whether it move as a whole or he at 
 rest, or whetlier it move in this or that direction, pro- 
 vided that each part retain its oivn motion and com- 
 municate it as lefore to the rest. 
 
 Demonst. — The proof is evident from the definition 
 preceding Lemma 4. 
 
 Sehol. — We thus see in what manner a composite 
 individual can he affected in many ways and yet retain 
 its nature. Up to this point we have conceived an indi- 
 vidual to be composed merely of bodies which are dis- 
 tmguished from one another solely by motion and rest, 
 speed and slowness, that is to say, to be composed of the 
 most simple bodies. If we now consider an individual 
 of another kind, composed of many individuals of diverse 
 natures, we shall discover that it may be aflected in 
 many other ways, its nature nevertheless being preserved. 
 For since each of its parts is composed of a number of 
 bodies, each part (by the preceding Lemma), without any 
 change of its nature, can move more slowly or more 
 quickly, and consequently can communicate its motion 
 more quickly or more slowly to the rest. If we now 
 imagine a third kind of individual composed of these of 
 the second kind, we shall discover that it can be affected 
 in many other w^ays without any change of form. Thus, 
 if we advance ad infinitum, we may easily conceive the 
 whole of nature to be one individual, whose parts, that is 
 to say, all bodies, differ in infinite ways without any 
 change of the whole individual If it had been my 
 object to consider specially the question of a body, I 
 should have had to explain and demonstrate these tiungs 
 more fully. But, as I have already said, I have anotiicr 
 end in view, and I have noticed them only becau.sc I 
 can easily deduce from them those things which I have 
 proposed to demonstrate. 
 
 Fostulatc I. — The human body is composud of a 
 
66 ETHIC. 
 
 number of individuals of diverse nature, each of which 
 is composite to a high degree. 
 
 Postulate 2. — Of the individuals of which the human 
 body is composed, some are fluid, some soft, and some 
 hard. 
 
 Postulate 3. — The individuals composing the human 
 body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected 
 by external bodies in many ways. 
 
 Postulate 4. — The human body needs for its preserva- 
 tion many other bodies by which it is, as it were, con- 
 tinually regenerated. 
 
 Postulate 5. — When a fluid part of the human body is 
 determined by an external body, so that it often strikes 
 upon another which is soft, the fluid part changes the 
 plane of the soft part, and leaves upon it, as it were, 
 some traces of the impelling external body. 
 
 Postulate 6. — The human body can move and arrange 
 external bodies in many ways. 
 
 Pkop. XIV. — The human mind is adapted to the perception 
 of many things, and its aptittcde increases in propor- 
 tion to the number of ways in which its body can be 
 disposed. 
 
 Demonst. — The human body is affected (Post. 3 and 
 6) in many ways by external bodies, and is so dis- 
 posed as to affect external bodies in many ways. But 
 the human mind must perceive (Prop. 12, pt. 2) every- 
 thing which happens in the human body. The human 
 mind is therefore adapted, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XV. — The idea which constitutes the formal Being of 
 the human miiid is not simple, but is composed of a 
 number of ideas. 
 
 Demonst. — The idea which constitutes the formal Being 
 of the human mind is the idea of a body (Prop. 1 3, pt. 2) 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIXP. 67 
 
 which (Post. 1) is composed of a iiunibcr of iiuliviihiala 
 composite to a high degree. But aa idea of eacli indi- 
 vidual composing the body must necessarily exist in (Jod 
 (Corol. Prop. 8, pt. 2) ; therefore (Prop. 7, pt. 2) the 
 idea of the human body is composed of these several 
 ideas of the component parts. — q.e.d. 
 
 PkOP. XVI. — The idea of every %cmj in which the human 
 body is affected hy external bodies must involve the 
 nature of the human tody, and at the same time the 
 nature of the external hody. 
 
 Demonst. — All ways in which any body is affected 
 follow at the same time from the nature of the affected 
 body, and from the nature of the affecting body (Ax. i, 
 following Corol. Lem. 3) ; therefore tlie idea of these 
 affections (Ax. 4, pt. i) necessarily involves the nature 
 of each body, and therefore the idea of each way in which 
 the human body is affected by an external body involves 
 the nature of the human body and of the external body. 
 — Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. I. — Hence it follows, in the first place, tliat the 
 human mind perceives the nature of many bodies together 
 with that of its own body. 
 
 Corol. 2. — It follows, secondly, tliat the ideas we liave of 
 external bodie? indicate the constitution of our own body 
 rather than the nature of external bodies. This I have 
 explained in the Appendix of the First Part by many 
 examples. 
 
 Prop. XVII. — If the human hody he affected in a way 
 which involves the nature of any external hody, the 
 human mind will contemplate that external hody as 
 actually existing or as present, until the human hody 
 he affected by an affect which excludes the existence or 
 presence of the external hody. 
 
 Demonst. — This is evident. For so long as the 
 
68 ETHIC. 
 
 human body is thus affected, so long will the human 
 mind (Prop. 12, pt. 2) contemplate this affection of the 
 external body, that is to say (Prop, 16, pt. 2), it will 
 have an idea of a mode actually existing which involves 
 the nature of the external body, that is to say, an idea 
 which does not exclude the existence or presence of the 
 nature of the external body, but posits it ; and therefore 
 the mind (Corol. i, Prop. 16, pt. 2) will contemplate the 
 external body as actually existing, &c. — q.e.d, 
 
 Corol. — The mind is able to contemplate external things 
 by which the human body was once affected as if they 
 were present, although they are not present and do not 
 exist. 
 
 Dcmonst. — When external bodies so determine the 
 fluid parts of the human body that they often strike ujDon 
 the softer parts, the fluid parts change the plane of the 
 soft parts (Post. 5) ; and thence it happens that the fluid 
 parts are reflected from the new planes in a direction 
 different from that in which they used to be reflected 
 (Ax." 2, following Corol. Lem. 3), and that also afterwards 
 when they strike against these new planes by their own 
 spontaneous motion, they are reflected in the same way 
 as when they were impelled towards those planes by ex- 
 ternal bodies. Consequently those fluid bodies produce 
 an affection in the human body while they keep up this 
 re|[ex motion similar to that produced by the presence 
 of an external body. The mind, therefore (Prop. 12, pt. 
 2), will think as before, that is to say, it will again con- 
 template the external body as present (Prop. 1 7, pt. 2). 
 This will happen as often as the fluid parts of the 
 human body strike against those planes by their own 
 spontaneous motion. Therefore, although the external 
 bodies by which the human body was once affected do not 
 exist, the mind will perceive them as if they were pre- 
 sent so often as this action is repeated in the body. 
 
 Scliol. — We see, therefore, how it is possible for us to 
 contemplate things which do not exist as if they were 
 
THE NATURE AXD ORIGIN OF THE MIXD. 69 
 
 actually present. This may indeed be produced by other 
 causes, but I am satisfied with having here sliown ono 
 cause through which I could explain it, just as if I had 
 explained it through the true cause. I do not think, 
 however, that I am far from the truth, since no postulate 
 which I have assumed contains anything which is not 
 confirmed by an experience that we cannot mistrust after 
 we have proved the existence of the human body as we 
 perceive it (Corol. following Prop, i 3, pt. 2). ]\Ioreover 
 (Corol. Prop. 17, pt. 2, and Corol. 2, Prop. 16, pt. 2), 
 we clearly see what is the difference between the idea, 
 for example, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of 
 the mind itself of Peter, and the idea of Peter himself 
 which is in another man ; for example, in Paul. For the 
 former directly explains the essence of the body of Peter 
 liimself, nor does it involve existence unless so long as 
 Peter exists ; the latter, on the other hand, indicates rather 
 the constitution of the body of Paul than the nature of 
 Peter ; and therefore so long as Paul's body exists with 
 that constitution, so long will Paul's mind contemplate 
 Peter as present, although he does not exist. But in 
 order that we may retain the customary phraseology, we 
 will give to those affections of the human body, the ideas 
 of which represent to us external bodies as if they were 
 present, the name of images of things, although they do 
 not actually reproduce tlie forms of the things. Wh^en 
 the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we will say 
 that it imagines. Here I wish it to be observed, in order 
 that I may begin to show what error is, that these ima- 
 ginations of the mind, regarded by themselves, contain no 
 error, and that the mind is not in error because it ima- 
 gines, but only in so far as it is considered as wanting in 
 an idea which excludes the existence of those tilings which 
 it imagines as present. For if the mind, when it ima- 
 gines non-existent things to be present, could at the same 
 time know that those things did not really exist, it would 
 think its power of imagination to be a virtue of its nature 
 
70 
 
 ETHIC. 
 
 and not a defect, especially if this faculty of imagining 
 depended upon its own nature alone, that is to say (Def. 
 7, pt. i), if this faculty of the mind were free. 
 
 Prop. XVIII. — If the huinan hody lias at any time been 
 simultaneously affected hy two or more bodies, when- 
 ever the mind aftenvards imagines one of them, it 
 loill also remember the others. 
 
 Demonst. — The mind imagines a body (Corol. Prop. 
 1 7, pt. 2) because the human body is affected and dis- 
 posed by the impressions of an external body, just as 
 it was affected when certain of its parts received an im- 
 pulse from the external body itself. But by hypothesis, 
 the body was at that time disposed in such a manner 
 that the mind imagined two bodies at once ; therefore it 
 will imagine two at once now, and whenever it imagines 
 one, it will immediately recollect the other. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — We clearly understand by this what memory 
 is. It is nothing else than a certain concatenation of 
 ideas, involving the nature of things which are outside 
 the human body, a concatenation which corresponds in 
 the mind to the order and concatenation of the affections of 
 the human body. I say, firstly, that it is a concatenation 
 of those ideas only which involve the nature of things 
 which are outside the human body, and not of those 
 ideas which explain the nature of those things, for there 
 are in truth (Prop. 16, pt, 2) ideas of the affections of 
 the human body, which involve its nature as well as the 
 nature of external bodies. I say, in the second place, that 
 this concatenation takes place according to the order 
 and concatenation of the affections of the human body, 
 that I may distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas 
 which takes place according to the order of the intellect, 
 and enables the mind to perceive things through their 
 first causes, and is the same in all men. Hence we 
 can clearly understand how it is that the mind from 
 the thought of one thing at once turns to the thought 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. ;, 
 
 of another thing which is not in any way like the 
 first. For example, from the thonght of tlie word pomnni 
 a Eoman immediately turned to the thought of the 
 fruit, which has no resemblance to the articulate sound 
 po7mim, nor anything in common with it, excepting this, 
 that the body of that man was often aflected by tlio 
 thing and the sound ; that is to say, he often heard the 
 word po7mwi when he saw the fruit. In this manner 
 each person will turn from one thought to another 
 according to the manner in which the habit of each has 
 arranged the images of things in the body. The soldier, 
 for instance, if he sees the footsteps of a horse in the sand, 
 will immediately turn from the thought of a horse to the 
 thought of a horseman, and so to the thought of war. 
 The countryman, on the other hand, from the thought of 
 a horse will turn to the thought of his plough, his field, 
 &c. ; and thus each person will turn from one thought 
 to this or that thought, according to the manner in which 
 he has been accustomed to connect and bind together the 
 images of things in his mind. 
 
 Prop. XIX. — The human mind does not hiow the human 
 hody itself, nor does it know that the hody exists, 
 except through ideas of affections ly which the hody 
 is affected. 
 
 Devionst. — The human mind is the idea itself or the 
 knowledge of the human body (Prop. 13, pt. 2). This 
 knowledge (Prop. 9, pt. 2) is in God in so far as He is 
 considered as affected by another idea of an individual 
 thing. But because (Post. 4) the human body needs a 
 number of bodies by which it is, as it were, continu- 
 ally regenerated, and because the order and connection 
 of ideas is the same as the order and connection of 
 causes (Prop. 7, pt. 2), this idea will be in God in so 
 far as He is considered as affected by the ideas of a 
 multitude of individual things. 
 
 God, therefore, has the idea of the human body or 
 
72 ETHIC. 
 
 knows the human body in so far as He is affected by 
 a multitude of other ideas, and not in so far as He 
 forms the nature of the human mind ; that is to say 
 (Corol. II, pt. 2), the human mind does not know the 
 human body. But the ideas of the affections of the 
 body are in God in so far as He forms the nature 
 of the human mind; that is to say (Prop. 12, pt. 2), the 
 human mind perceives these affections, and consequently 
 (Prop. 16, pt. 2) the human body itself actually existing 
 (Prop. 17, pt. 2). The human mind, therefore, perceives 
 the human body, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XX. — Theix exists in God the idea or knowledge 
 of the human mind, which follows in Him, and is 
 related to Him in the same way as the idea or knovj- 
 ledge of the human hody. 
 
 Dcmonst. — Thought is an attribute of God (Prop, i, 
 pt. 2), and therefore there must necessarily exist in God 
 an idea of Himself (Prop. 3, pt. 2), together with an idea 
 of all His affections, and consequently (Prop. 1 1, pt. 2) an 
 idea of the human mind. Moreover, this idea or know- 
 ledge of the mind does not exist in God in so far as He 
 is infinite, but in so far as He is affected by another 
 idea of an individual thing (Prop. 9, pt. 2). But the 
 order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
 and connection of causes (Prop. 7, pt. 2). This idea or 
 knowledge of the mind, therefore, follows in God, and is 
 related to God in the same manner as the idea or know- 
 ledge of the bod}^ — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXL — This idea of the mind is united to the mind 
 in the same way as the mind itself is united to the lody. 
 
 Bemonst. — We have shown that the mind is united to 
 the body because the body is the object of the mind 
 (Props. 12 and 13, pt. 2), therefore, by the same reason- 
 
THE NATURE .AXD ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 73 
 
 ing, the idea of the mind must be united with its ohject. 
 the mind itself, in the same way as the mind itself is 
 united to the body. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — This proposition is to be understood nnu-h 
 more clearly from what has been said in the scliolium to 
 Prop. 7, pt. 2, for we have there shown that the idea of 
 the body and the body, that is to say (Prop. 13, pt. 2), 
 the mind and the body, are one and the same individual, 
 which at one time is considered under the attribute of 
 thought, and at another under that of extension : the idea 
 of the mind, therefore, and the mind itself are one and the 
 same thing, which is considered under one and the same 
 attribute, that of thought. It follows, I say, that tlie idea 
 of the mind and the mind itself exist in God from tlie 
 same necessity and from the same power of tliought. 
 For, indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea 
 of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far 
 as this is considered as a mode of thought and without 
 relation to the object, just as a person who knows 
 anything, by that very fact knows that he knows, and 
 knows that he knows that he knows, and so on ad iiijiiii- 
 tum. But more on this subject afterwards. 
 
 Prop. XXII. — Tlic human mind not only perceives the 
 affections of the hody, hut also the ideas of these 
 
 affections. 
 
 Demonst. — The ideas of the ideas of affections follow 
 in God and are related to God in the same way as the 
 ideas themselves of affections. This is demonstrated 
 like Prop. 20, pt. 2. But the ideas of the afTections 
 of the body are in the Imman mind (Prop. 12, i«t. 2), 
 that is to say, in God (Corol. Prop. 11, pt. 2), in so 
 far as He constitutes the essence of the human mintl ; 
 therefore, the ideas of these ideas will be in God in so far 
 as He has the knowledge or idea of the liuman Tiiind ; 
 that is to say (Prop. 21, pt. 2), they will be in the 
 
74 ETHIC. 
 
 human mind itself, which, therefore, not only perceives 
 the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these 
 affections. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXIII. — The inind does not knoiv itself except in 
 so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the 
 body. 
 
 Demonst. — The idea or knowledge of the mind (Prop. 
 20, pt. 2) follows in God and is related to God in the 
 same way as the idea or knowledge of the body. But 
 since (Prop. 19, pt. 2) the human mind does not know 
 the human body itself, that is to say (Corol, Prop. 11, pt. 
 2), since the knowledge of the human body is not re- 
 lated to God in so far as He constitutes the nature 
 of the human mind, therefore the knowledge of the mind 
 is not related to God in so far as He constitutes the 
 essence of the human mind ; and therefore (Corol. Prop. 
 II, pt. 2) the human mind so far does not know itself. 
 Moreover, the ideas of the affections by which the body 
 is affected involve the nature of the human body itself 
 (Prop. 16, pt. 2), that is to say (Prop. 13, pt. 2), 
 they agree with the nature of the mind ; therefore a 
 knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve a know- 
 ledge of the mind. But (Prop. 22, pt. 2) the knowledge 
 of these ideas is in the human mind itself, and therefore 
 the human mind so far only has a knowledge of itself. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXIV. — The human mind does not involve an ade- 
 quate knowledge of the parts composing the human 
 hody. 
 
 Demonst. — The parts composing the human body per- 
 tain to the essence of the body itself only in so far as 
 they communicate their motions to one another by some 
 certain method (see Def. following Corol. Lem. 3), and 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 7- 
 
 not in so far as tliey can be consitlevcd as individuals 
 without relation to the human body. For the parts of 
 the human body are individuals (Post, i), composite to a 
 high degree, parts of which (Lem. 4) can be separated 
 from the human body and communicate their motions 
 (Ax. I, following Lem, 3) to other bodies in another 
 way, although the nature and form of the human body 
 itself is closely preserved. Therefore (Prop. 3, pt. 2) 
 the idea or knowledge of each part will be in Goil in 
 so far as He is considered as affected (Prop. 9, pt. 2) 
 by another idea of an individual thing, whicli indi- 
 vidual thing is prior to the part itself in tlie order of 
 nature (Prop. 7, pt. 2). The same thing may be saitl of 
 each part of the individual itself composing the human 
 body, and therefore the knowledge of each part compo.s- 
 ing the human body exists in God in so far as He is 
 affected by a number of ideas of things, and not in so 
 far as He has the idea of the human body only ; that is 
 to say (Prop. 13, pt. 2), the idea which constitutes the 
 nature of the human mind ; and therefore (Corol. Prop. 
 I I, pt. 2) the human mind does not involve an adequate 
 knowledge of the parts composing the human body. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXV. — The idea of each a^cction of the human htuhj 
 does not involve an adequate hiowledyc of an external 
 hody. 
 
 Lemonst. — We have shown that the idea of an afTcc- 
 tion of the human body involves the nature of an ex- 
 ternal body so far as (Prop. 16, pt. 2) the external body 
 determines the human body in some certain maniicr. 
 But in so far as the external body is an individual which 
 is not related to the human body, its idea or knowledj,'e 
 is in God (Prop. 9, pt. 2) in so far as He is considered 
 as affected by the idea of another thing, which idea 
 (Prop. 7, pt. 2) is prior by nature to the external bo.ly 
 
76 ETHIC. 
 
 itself. Therefore the adequate knowledge of an external 
 body is not in God in so far as He has the idea of the 
 affection of the human body, or, in other words, the idea 
 of the affection of the human body does not involve an 
 adequate knowledge of an external body. — q.e.d. 
 
 Pkop. XXVI. — Tlie human mind 2yerccives no external 
 body as actually existing, U7ikss through the ideas of 
 the affections of its body. 
 
 De.jnonst. — If the human body is in no way affected 
 by any external body, then (Prop. 7, pt. 2) the idea of 
 the human body, that is to say (Prop. 1 3, pt. 2), the 
 human mind, is not affected in any way by the idea of 
 the existence of that body, nor does it in any way perceive 
 the existence of that external body. But in so far as 
 the human body is affected in any way by any external 
 body, so far (Prop. 16, pt. 2, with its Corol.) does it 
 perceive the external body. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — In so far as the human mind imagines an 
 external body, so far it has not an adequate knowledge 
 of it. 
 
 Demo7ist. — When the human mind through the ideas 
 of the affections of its body contemplates external bodies, 
 we say that it then imagines (Schol. Prop. 1 7, pt. 2), nor 
 can the mind (Prop. 26, pt. 2) in any other way imagine 
 external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (Prop. 25, 
 pt. 2) in so far as the mind imagines external bodies it 
 does not possess an adequate knowledge of them. — q.e.d. 
 
 Pkop. XXVII. — The idea of any nffeefion of the human 
 body docs not involve an adequate 'knowledge of the 
 human body itself 
 
 Demonst. — Every idea of any affection of the human 
 body involves the nature of the human body in so far as 
 the human body itself is considered as affected in a certain 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE Mis: 
 
 manner (Prop. i6, pt. 2). But in so far as the l.uinun 
 body is an individual which can be alTected in a inulii- 
 tude of other ways, its idea, &c. (See Demoust. \'toi>. 
 
 25, pt. 2.) 
 
 Trot. XXVIII. — The ideas of the affections of tlu human 
 lady, in so far as they are related only to the human 
 mind, are not clear and distinet, but confused. 
 
 Demoust. — The ideas of the affections of tlie human 
 body involve the nature both of external bodies and 
 of the human body itself (Prop. 16, pt. 2), and mu.st 
 involve the nature not only of the human body, but 
 of its parts, for the affections are ways (Post. 3) in 
 which the parts of the human body, and consequently 
 the whole body, is affected. But (Props. 24 and 25, jit. 
 2) an adequate knowledge of external bodies and of the 
 parts composing the human body does not exist in Goil 
 in so far as He is considered as affected by the liumau 
 mind, but in so far as He is affected by other ideas. 
 These ideas of affections, therefore, in so far as they aro 
 related to the human mind alone, are like conchisiona 
 without premisses, that is to say, as is self-evident, they 
 are confused ideas. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — The idea which forms the nature of the mind 
 is demonstrated in the same way not to be clear and 
 distinct when considered in itself. So also with the 
 idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas 
 of the affections of the human body, in so far as they 
 are related to the mind alone, as every one may easily 
 see. 
 
 Prop. XXIX. — The idea of the idea of any afedion of 
 the human lody does not involve an adcjuulc knoxc- 
 ledge of the human mind. 
 
 Demonst. — The idea of an affection of tlie human body 
 
78 ETHIC. 
 
 (Prop. 27, pt. 2) does not involve an adequate knowledge 
 of the body itself, or, in other words, does not adequately- 
 express its nature, that is to say (Prop. 13, pt. 2), it does 
 not correspond adequately with the nature of the human 
 mind, and therefore (Ax. 6, pt. i) the idea of this idea 
 does not adequately express the nature of the human 
 mind, nor involve an adequate knowledge of it. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — From this it is evident that the human mind, 
 when it perceives things in the common order of nature, 
 has no adequate knowledge of itself nor of its own body, 
 nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated 
 knowledge ; for the mind does not know itself unless 
 in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the 
 body (Prop. 23, pt. 2). Moreover (Prop. 19, pt. 2), it 
 does not perceive its body unless through those same 
 ideas of the affections by means of which alone (Prop. 26, 
 pt. 2) it perceives external bodies. Therefore in so far as 
 it possesses these ideas it possesses an adequate knowledge 
 neither of itself (Prop. 29, pt. 2), nor of its body (Prop. 
 27, pt. 2), nor of external bodies (Prop. 25, pt. 2), but 
 merely (Prop. 28, pt. 2, together with the scholium) a 
 mutilated and confused knowledge. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — I say expressly that the mind has no adequate 
 knowledge of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, 
 but only a confused knowledge, as often as it perceives 
 things in the common order of nature, that is to say, as 
 often as it is determined to the contemplation of this 
 or that externally — namely, by a chance coincidence, 
 and not as often as it is determined internally — for 
 the reason that it contemplates^ several things at once, and 
 is determined to understand in what they differ, agree, or 
 oppose one another ; for whenever it is internally disposed 
 in this or in any other way, it then contemplates things 
 clearly and distinctly, as I shall show presently. 
 
 1 In this latter case. — Tr. 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIX OF Til II .\//.\7). -,; 
 
 Prop. XXX. — About the duration of our hody wc ran 
 have hut a very inadequate knowledge. 
 
 Demonst. — The duration of our body does not depend 
 upon its essence (Ax. i, pt. 2), nor upon tlie absolute 
 nature of God (Prop. 21, pt. i), but (Prop. 28, pt. i) the 
 body is determined to existence and action by causes whicli 
 also are determined by others to existence and action in 
 a certain and determinate manner, \vhilst these, again, 
 are determined by others, and so on ad infinitum. The 
 duration, therefore, of our body depends upon the common 
 order of nature and the constitution of things. lUit an 
 adequate knowledge of the way in whicli things are con- 
 stituted, exists in God in so far as He possesses the 
 ideas of all things, and not in so far as He possesses 
 only the idea of the human body (Corol. Prop. 9, pt. 2). 
 Therefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is 
 altogether inadequate in God, in so far as He is only 
 considered as constituting the nature of the human mind, 
 that is to say (Corol. Prop. 11, pt. 2), this knowledge in 
 our mind is altogether inadequate. — Q.F..D. 
 
 Prop. XXXI. — About the duration of individual thitu/s 
 which are outside us we can have but a very inadequate 
 knowledge. 
 
 Demonst. — Each individual thing, like the human body, 
 must be determined to existence and action by anotlier 
 individual thing in a certain and determinate nmnnL-r, 
 and this again by another, and so on ad infinitum (Prop. 
 28, pt. i). But we have demonstrated in the preceding 
 proposition, from this common property of individual 
 things, that we have but a very inadequate knowledgi.' of 
 the duration of our own body ; therefore the same con- 
 clusion is to be drawn about the duration of individual 
 things, that is to say, that we can have but a very in- 
 adequate knowledge of it. — q.e.d. 
 
Bo ETHIC. 
 
 Cowl. — Hence it follows that all individual things are 
 contingent and corruptible, for we can have no adequate 
 knowledge concerning their duration (Prop. 31, pt. 2), 
 and this is what is to be understood by us as their con- 
 tingency and capability of corruption (Schol. i , Prop. 3 3 , 
 pt. i); for (Prop. 29, pt. i) there is no other contingency 
 but this. 
 
 Pkop. XXXII. — All ideas, in so far as they are related to 
 God, are true. 
 
 Demonst. — All the ideas which are in God always 
 agree with those things of which they are the ideas 
 (Corol. Prop. 7, pt. 2), and therefore (Ax. 6, pt. i) they 
 are all true. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXXIII. — In ideas there is nothing positive on 
 account of which they are called false. 
 
 Demonst. — If the contrary be asserted, conceive, if it be 
 possible, a positive mode of thought which shall consti- 
 tute the form or error of falsity. This mode of thought 
 cannot be in God (Prop. 32, pt. 2), but outside God it 
 can neither be nor be conceived (Prop. 15, pt. i), and 
 therefore in ideas there is nothing positive on account 
 of which they are called false. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXXIV. — Every idea which in vs is absolute, that 
 is to say, adequate and ijcrfcct, is true. 
 
 Demonst. — When we say that an adequate and perfect 
 idea is in us, w^e say nothing else than (Corol. Prop. 1 1, 
 pt. 2) that an adequate and perfect idea exists in God in 
 so far as He constitutes the essence of the human mind, 
 and consequently (Prop. 32, pt. 2) we say nothing else 
 than that this idea is true. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXXV. — Falsity consists in the privation of know- 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 8| 
 
 ledge, u-hich inadequate, that is to say, mut dated and 
 
 co7}fuscd ideas ijivolve. 
 
 Dcmonst. — There is nothing positive in iJcas which can 
 constitute a form of falsity (Prop. 33, pt. 2). But falsity 
 cannot consist in absolute privation (for we say that minds 
 and not bodies err and are mistaken) ; nor can it consist in 
 absolute ignorance, for to be ignorant and to be in error aro 
 different. Falsehood, therefore, consists in the privation 
 of knowledge which is involved by inadequate knowledge 
 of things or by inadequate and confused ideas. — q.F-D. 
 
 Scliol. — In the scholium of Prop. 1 7, pt. 2, I have ex- 
 plained how error consists in the privation of knowledge ; 
 but for the sake of fuller explanation, I will give an 
 example. For instance, men are deceived because they 
 think themselves free, and the sole reason for thinking 
 so is that they are conscious of their own actions, and 
 ignorant of the causes by which those actions are deter- 
 mined. Their idea of liberty therefore is this — that they 
 know no cause for their own actions ; for as to saying 
 that their actions depend upon their will, these are words 
 to which no idea is attached. What the will is, and in 
 what manner it moves the body, every one is ignorant, 
 for those who pretend otherwise, and devise seats and 
 dwelling-places of the soul, usually excite our laughter 
 or disgust. Just in the same manner, when we look at 
 the sun, we imagine his distance from us to be about 200 
 feet; the error not consisting solely in the imagination, 
 but arising from our not knowing what the true distance 
 is when we imagine, and what are the causes of our 
 imagination. For although we may afterwards know 
 that the sun is more than 600 diameters of the eartli 
 distant from us, we still imagine it near us, since wo 
 imagine it to be so near, not because we are ign(jrant i-f 
 its true distance, but because an affection of our body 
 involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our body 
 itself is affected by it. 
 
82 ETHIC. 
 
 Peop. XXXVI. — l7iadc(iuate and confused ideas follow ly 
 the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct 
 ideas. 
 
 Dcmonst. — All ideas are in God (Prop. 15, pt. i), and 
 in so far as tliey are related to Ood are true (Prop. 32, 
 pt. 2) and (Corol. Prop. 7, pt. 2) adequate. No ideas, 
 therefore, are inadequate or confused unless in so far as 
 they are related to the individual mind of some person 
 (see Props. 24 and 28, pt. 2). All ideas, therefore, both 
 adequate and inadequate, follow by the same necessity 
 (CoroL Prop. 6, pt. 2). 
 
 Peop. XXXVII. — That which is common to everything 
 {see Lemma 2), and which is egiially in the -part and 
 in the ivhole, forms the essence of no individual 
 thing. 
 
 Bemonst. — For if this be denied, let that which is 
 common be conceived, if possible, to constitute the 
 essence of some individual thing, — the essence, for ex- 
 ample, of B. Without B, therefore (Def. 2, pt. 2), that 
 which is common can neither be nor be conceived. But 
 this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore that 
 which is common does not pertain to the essence of 
 B, nor does it form the essence of any other individual 
 thing. 
 
 Peop. XXXVIII. — Those things ivhich are common to 
 cvcrythiiig, and which are eqiially in the 'part and in 
 the whole, can only he adequately conceived. 
 
 Bemonst. — Let there be something, A, which is com- 
 mon to all bodies, and which is equally in the part of 
 each body and in the whole. I say that A can only be 
 adequately conceived. Por the idea of A (Corol. Prop. 7, 
 pt. 2) will necessarily be adequate in God, both in so far 
 as He has the idea of the human body and in so far as 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. S^ 
 
 He has the idea of its affections, which (Props. 16, 25, 
 and 27, pt. 2) involve the nature of the liuniau body, 
 and partly also the nature of external bodies ; that is to 
 say (Props. 12 and i 3, pt. 2), this idea M'ill necessarily be 
 adequate in God in so far as He constitutes the human 
 mind, or in so far as He has ideas which are in the human 
 mind. The mind, therefore (Corel. Prop. 1 1, pt. 2), neces- 
 sarily perceives A adequately, both in so far as it per- 
 ceives itself or its own or any external body ; nor can 
 A be conceived in any other manner. — q.e.d. 
 
 Cowl — Hence it follows that some ideas or notions 
 exist which are common to all men, for (Lem. 2) all 
 bodies agree in some things, which (Prop. 38, pt. 2) 
 must be adequately, that is to say, clearly and distinctly, 
 perceived by all. 
 
 Prop. XXXIX. — There will exist in the human mind an 
 adequate idea of that which is common and 2iroper to 
 the human tody, and to any external bodies by which 
 the human body is generally affected — of that which 
 equally in the part of each of these external bodies and 
 in the whole is common and pi'Ojjer. 
 
 Dcynonst. — Let A be something which is common and 
 proper to the human body and certain external bodies ; 
 let it exist equally in the human body and in those ex- 
 ternal bodies, and let it exist equally in the part of each 
 external body and in the whole. An adequate idea of A 
 itself will exist in God (Corel. Prop. 7, pt. 2), both in s^ 
 far as He has the idea of the human body and in so far 
 as He has the idea of the given external bodies. Let it 
 be supposed that the human body is affected by an ex- 
 ternal body through that which it has in common with 
 the external body, that is to say, by A. The idea of this 
 affection will involve the property of A (Prop. 1 6, pt. 2), 
 and therefore (Corel. Prop. 7, pt. 2) the idea of this affec- 
 tion, in so far as it involves the property of A, will exist 
 
84 ETHIC. 
 
 adequately in God in so far as He is affected by the 
 idea of the human body, that is to say (Prop. 1 3, pt. 2), 
 in so far as He constitutes the nature of the human 
 mind. Therefore (Corel. Prop. 11, pt. 2) this idea is 
 also adequate in the human mind. — q.e.d. 
 
 Carol. — Hence it follows that the more things the 
 body has in common with other bodies, the more things 
 will the mind be adapted to perceive. 
 
 Peop. XL. — Those ideas are also adequate wJiicJi folloio in 
 the mind from ideas which are adequate in it. 
 
 Demonst. — This is evident. For when we say that 
 an idea follows in the human mind from ideas which 
 are adequate in it, we do but say (Corel. Prop. 11, pt. 2) 
 that in the divine intellect itself an idea exists of which 
 God is the cause, not in so far as He is infinite, nor in so 
 far as He is affected by the ideas of a multitude of indi- 
 vidual things, but in so far only as He constitutes the 
 essence of the human mind. 
 
 Schol. — I have thus explained the origin of those 
 notions which are called common, and which are the 
 foundations of our reasoning ; but of some axioms or 
 notions other causes exist which it would be advan- 
 tageous to explain by our method, for we should thus be 
 able to distinguish those notions which are more useful 
 than others, and those which are scarcely of any use ; 
 those which are common ; those which are clear and dis- 
 tinct only to those persons who do not suffer from preju- 
 dice ; and, finally, those which are ill-founded. Moreover, 
 it would be manifest whence these notions which are called 
 second, and consequently the axioms founded upon them, 
 have taken their origin, and other things, too, would be ex- 
 plained which I have thought about these matters at different 
 times. Since, however, I have set apart this subject for 
 another treatise, and because I do not wish to create disgust 
 with excessive prolixity, I have determined to pass by this 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 85 
 
 matter here. But not to omit anything which is neces- 
 sary for us to know, I will biietly give the causes from 
 which terms called Transcendental, such as L'einj, Thinr/, 
 Something, have taken their origin. These terms have 
 arisen because the human body, inasmuch as it is limited, 
 can form distinctly in itself a certain number only of 
 images at once. (For the explanation of the word imagf, 
 see Schol. Prop. 1 7, pt. 2.) If this number be exceeded, 
 the images will become confused ; and if the numk'r of 
 images which the body is able to form distinctly be greatly 
 exceeded, they wall all run one into another. Since this 
 is so, it is clear (Corol. Prop. 17, and Prop. 18, pt. 2) 
 that in proportion to the number of images which can be 
 formed at the same time in the body will be the number 
 of bodies which the human mind can imagine at the same 
 tinie. If the images in the body, therefore, are all con- 
 fused, the mind will confusedly imagine all the bodies 
 without distinguishing the one from the other, and will 
 include them all, as it were, under one attribute, that of 
 being or thing. The same confusion may also be caused by 
 lack of uniform force in the images and from other analo- 
 gous causes, which there is no need to discuss here, the 
 consideration of one cause being sufficient for the pur- 
 pose we have in \dew. For it all comes to this, that 
 these terms signify ideas in the highest degree confused. 
 It is in this way that those notions have arisen which 
 are called Universal, such as, Mctn, Horse, Dog, kc. ; that 
 is to say, so many images of men, for instance, are formed 
 in the human body at once, that they exceed the power 
 of the imagination, not entirely, but to such a degree that 
 the mind has no power to imagine the determinate number 
 of men and the small differences of each, such as colour 
 and size, &c. It will therefore distinctly imagine Hint 
 only in which all of them agree in so far as the Uxly 
 is affected by them, for by that the body was chielly 
 affected, that is to say, by each individual, and this it 
 will express by the name man, covering thereby an inOnite 
 
86 ETHIC. 
 
 number of individuals ; to imagine a determinate number 
 of individuals being out of its power. But we must ob- 
 serve that these notions are not formed by all persons in 
 the same way, but that they vary in each case according 
 to the thing by which the body is more frequently affected, 
 and which the mind more easily imagines or recollects. 
 Tor example, those who have more frequently looked 
 with admiration upon the stature of men, by the name 
 man will understand an animal of erect stature, while 
 those who have been in the habit of fixing their thoughts 
 on something else, will form another common image of 
 men, describing man, for instance, as an animal capable 
 of laughter, a biped without feathers, a rational animal, 
 and so on; each person forming universal images of 
 things according to the temperament of his own body. 
 It is not therefore to be wondered at that so many con- 
 troversies have arisen amongst those philosophers who 
 have endeavoured to explain natural objects by the images 
 of things alone. 
 
 Schol. 2. — From what has been already said, it clearly 
 appears that we perceive many things and form univer- 
 sal ideas : 
 
 1. From individual things, represented by the senses 
 to us in a mutilated and confused manner, and without 
 order to the intellect (Corol. Prop. 29, pt. 2). These 
 perceptions I have therefore been in the habit of calling 
 knowledge from vague experience. 
 
 2. From signs ; as, for example, when we hear or read 
 certain words, we recollect things and form certain ideas 
 of them similar to them, through which ideas we imagine 
 things (Schol. Prop. 18, pt. 2). These two ways of 
 looking at things I shall hereafter call knowledge of the 
 first kind, opinion or imagination. 
 
 3. From our possessing common notions and adequate 
 ideas of the properties of things (Corol. Prop. 38, Prop. 
 39, with Corol. and Prop. 40, pt. 2). This I shall call 
 reason and knowledge of the second kind. 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 87 
 
 Besides these two kinds of knowledge, tlicre is a 
 third, as I shall hereafter show, which we shall call 
 intuitive science. This kind of knowing advances 
 from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain 
 attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the 
 essence of things. All this I will explain by one example. 
 Let there be three numbers given through which it is 
 required to discover a fourth which shall be to the third 
 as the second is to the first. A merchant does not 
 hesitate to multiply the second and third together and 
 divide the product by the first, either because he has not 
 yet forgotten the things which he heard without any 
 demonstration from his schoolmaster, or because he has 
 seen the truth of the rule with the more simple num- 
 bers, or because from the 19th Prop, in the 7th book of 
 Euclid he understands the common property of all pro- 
 portionals. 
 
 But with the simplest numbers there is no need of all 
 this. If the numbers i, 2, 3, for instance, be given, 
 every one can see that the fourth proportional is 6 
 much more clearly than by any demonstration, because 
 from the ratio in which we see by one intuition that the 
 first stands to the second we conclude the fourth. 
 
 Pkop. XLI. — Knouicdge of the first kind alone is the cause 
 of falsity ; knowledge of the second and third orders 
 is necessarily true. 
 Dcmonst.—To knowledge of the first kind we have 
 said, in the preceding scholium, that all those ideas 
 belong which are inadequate and confused, and, there- 
 fore (Prop. 35, pt. 2), this knowledge alone is the cause 
 of falsity. Moreover, to knowledge of the second and 
 third kind we have said that those ideas belong which 
 are adequate, and therefore this knowledge (Prop. 34, 
 pt. 2) is necessarily true. 
 
 Prop. XLII. — It is the knowledge of the second and third, 
 
88 ETHIC. 
 
 and not that of the first hind, which teaches us to 
 distinguish the true from the false. 
 
 Demonst. — This proposition is self-evident. For he 
 ■who knows how to distinguish between the true and the 
 false must have an adequate idea of the true and the 
 false, that is to say (Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2), he must 
 know the true and the false by the second or third kind 
 of knowledge. 
 
 Peop. XLIII. — He who has a true idea knows at the same 
 time that he has a true idea, oior can he douht the 
 truth of the thing. 
 
 Demonst. — A true idea in us is that which in God is 
 adequate, in so far as He is explained by the nature of 
 the human mind (Corol. Prop. 11, pt. 2). Let us sup- 
 pose, therefore, that there exists in God, in so far as He 
 is explained by the nature of the human mind, an ade- 
 quate idea, A. Of this idea there must necessarily exist 
 in God an idea, which is related to Him in the same 
 way as the idea A (Prop. 20, pt. 2, the demonstration of 
 which is universal). But the idea A is supposed to be 
 related to God in so far as He is explained by the nature 
 of the human mind. The idea of the idea A must there- 
 fore be related to God in the same manner, that is to 
 say (Corol. Prop, i i,pt. 2), this adequate idea of the idea 
 A will exist in the mind itself which has the adequate 
 idea A. He therefore who has an adequate idea, that is 
 to say (Prop. 34, pt. 2), he who knows a thing truly, 
 must at the same time have an adequate idea or a true 
 knowledge of his knowledge, that is to say (as is self- 
 evident) he must be certain. — q.e.d. 
 
 8chol. — In the scholium to Prop. 21, pt. 2, I have 
 explained what is the idea of an idea, but it is to be 
 observed that the preceding proposition is evident by 
 itself. For no one who has a true idea is icrnorant 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. ^ 
 
 that a true idea involves tlie highest certitude ; to have 
 a true idea signifying just this, to know a thing iicrfcctly 
 or as well as possible. No one, in fact, can doubt this, 
 unless he supposes an idea to be something duml), like a 
 picture on a tablet, instead of being a mode of thought, that 
 is to say, intelligence itself. Moreover, I ask wlio can 
 know that he understands a thing unless he first of all 
 understands that thing ? that is to say, who can know tliat 
 he is certain of anything unless he is first of all certain 
 of that thing ? Then, again, what true idea can be given 
 more clearly and surely which shall be the standard of 
 truth ? Just as light reveals both itself and the dark- 
 ness, so truth is the standard of itself and of the false. 
 I consider what has been said to be a sufficient answer 
 to the objection that if a true idea is distinguished from a 
 false idea only in so far as it is said to agree with that of 
 which it is the idea, the true idea therefore has no reality 
 nor perfection above the false idea (since they are dis- 
 tinguished by an external sign alone), and consequently 
 the man who has true ideas will have no greater reahty 
 or perfection than he who has false ideas only. I con- 
 sider, too, that I have already replied to those who inquire 
 why men have false ideas, and how a man can certainly 
 know that he has ideas which agree with those thing.s of 
 which they are the ideas. For with regard to the dif- 
 ference between a true and a false idea, it is evident 
 from Prop. 3 5, pt. 2, that the former is related to the 
 latter as being is to non-being. The causes of falsity, 
 too, I have most clearly shown in Props. 19-35. including 
 the scholium to the last. From what has there been 
 said, the nature of the- difference between a man who 
 has true ideas and one who has only false ideas is 
 clear. AVith regard to the last-mentioned point— how a 
 man can know that he has an idea which agrees witli 
 that of which it is the idea— I have shown almost more 
 times than enough that he knows it simply because he 
 has an idea which agrees with that of which it is the 
 
90 ETHIC. 
 
 idea, that is to say, because truth is its own standard. 
 We must remember, besides, that our mind, in so far as 
 it truly perceives things, is a part of the infinite intellect 
 of God (Corol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 2), and therefore it must be 
 that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as true 
 as those of God. 
 
 Peop. XLIV. — It is not of the nature of reason to con- 
 sider things as contingent hut as necessary. 
 
 Bemonst. — It is in the nature of reason to perceive 
 things truly (Prop. 41, pt. 2), that is to say (Ax. 6, 
 pt. i), as they are in themselves, that is to say (Prop. 29, 
 pt. i), not as contingent but as necessary. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. I. — Hence it follows that it is through the 
 imagination alone that we look upon things as contin- 
 gent both with reference to the past and the future. 
 
 ^chol. — How this happens I will explain in a few 
 words. We have shown above (Prop. 17, pt. 2, with 
 Corol.) that unless causes oppose preventing the present 
 existence of things, the mind always imagines them pre- 
 sent before it, even if they do not exist. Again (Prop. 
 18, pt. 2), we have shown that if the human body has 
 once been simultaneously affected by two external bodies, 
 whenever the mind afterwards imagines one it will imme- 
 diately remember the other ; that is to say, it will look 
 upon both as present before it, unless causes oppose which 
 prevent the present existence of the things. N"o one 
 doubts, too, that we imagine time because we imagine 
 some bodies to move with a velocity less, or greater thau, 
 or equal to that of others. Let us therefore suppose 
 a boy who yesterday, for the first time, in the morning 
 saw Peter, at midday Paul, in the evening Simeon, and 
 to-day in the morning again sees Peter. It is plain 
 from Prop. 18, pt. 2, that as soon as he sees the 
 morning light he will imagine the sun passing through 
 the same part of the sky as on the day preceding ; that 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 91 
 
 is to say, he will imagine the whole day, and at the snin« 
 time Peter will be connected in his imagination with 
 the morning, Paul with midday, and Simeon with the 
 evening. In the morning, therefore, the existence of 
 Paul and Simeon will be imagined in relation to future 
 time, while in the evening, if the boy should see Simeon, 
 he will refer Peter and Paul to the past, since they will 
 be connected with the past in his imagination. This 
 process will be constant in proportion to the regularity 
 with which he sees Peter, Paul, and Simeon in this order. 
 If it should by some means happen that on some other 
 evening, in the place of Simeon, he should see James, 
 on the following morning he will connect in his imagina- 
 tion with the evening at one time Simeon and at another 
 James, but not both together. For he is supposed to 
 have seen one and then the other in the evening, but not 
 both together. His imagination will therefore fluctuate, 
 and he will connect with a future evening first one and 
 then the other ; that is to say, he will consider neither 
 as certain, but both as a contingency in the future. 
 
 This fluctuation of the imagination will take place in 
 the same way if the imagination is dealing with things 
 which we contemplate in the same way with reference 
 to past or present time, and consequently we imagine 
 things related to time past, present, or future as con- 
 tingent. 
 
 Corol. 2. — It is of the nature of reason to perceive 
 things under a certain form of eternity. 
 
 Demonsf. — It is of the nature of reason to consider 
 things as necessary and not as contingent (Prop. 44. pt. 2). 
 This necessity of things it perceives truly (Prop. 41, 
 pt. 2); that is to say (Ax. 6, pt. i), as it is in itself. 
 But (Prop. 16, pt. i) this necessity of things is the 
 necessity itself of the eternal nature of God. Therefore 
 it is of the nature of reason to consider things under this 
 form of eternity. Moreover, the foundations of reason are 
 notions which explain those things which are common 
 
93 ETHIC. 
 
 to all (Prop, 38, pt. 2), and these things explain the 
 essence of no individual thing (Prop. 37, pt. 2), and 
 must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, 
 but under a certain form of eternity. — q.e.d. 
 
 Pkop. XLV. — Every idea of any hody or actucdly existing 
 ijidividual tiling necessarily involves the eternal and 
 infinite essence of God. 
 
 Bemonst. — The idea of an individual thing actually 
 existing necessarily involves both the essence and ex- 
 istence of the thing itself (Corol. Prop. 8, pt. 2). But 
 individual things (Prop. 15, pt. i) cannot be conceived 
 without God, and since (Prop. 6, pt. 2) God is their 
 cause in so far as He is considered under that attribute 
 of which they are modes, their ideas (Ax. 4, pt. i) must 
 necessarily involve the conception of that attribute, or, in 
 other words (Def. 6, pt. i), must involve the eternal and 
 infinite essence of God. — q.e.d. 
 
 ScJiol. — By existence is to be understood here not 
 duration, that is, existence considered in the abstract, as 
 if it were a certain kind of quantity, but I speak of 
 the nature itself of the existence which is assigned to 
 individual things, because from the eternal necessity of 
 the nature of God infinite numbers of things follow in 
 infinite ways (Prop. 16, pt. i). I repeat, that I speak of 
 the existence itself of individual things in so far as they 
 are in God. For although each individual thing is de- 
 termined by another individual thing to existence in a 
 certain way, the force nevertheless by which each thing 
 perseveres in its existence follows from the eternal neces- 
 sity of the nature of God (see Corol. Prop. 24, pt. i). 
 
 Pkop. XLVI. — The hnowlcdge of the eternal and infinite 
 essence of God which each idea involves is adequate 
 and jperfcct. 
 
 Demonst. — The demonstration of the preceding pro- 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. 93 
 
 position is universal, and ^vhether a thing be considercl 
 as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether it be of a part 
 or whole, will involve the eternal and infinite essence of 
 God (Prop. 45, pt. 2). Therefore that which Rivts a 
 knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God is 
 common to all, and is equally in the part and in the 
 whole. This knowledge therefore (Prop. t,S, pt. 2) \YilI 
 be adequate. — q.e.d. 
 
 Peop. XLVII. — The human mind jJosscsscs an adequate 
 knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. 
 
 Demonst. — The human mind possesses ideas (Prop. 22, 
 pt. 2) by which (Prop. 23, pt. 2) it perceives itself and its 
 own body (Prop. 19, pt. 2), together with (Corol. i, Prop. 
 16, and Prop. 17, pt. 2) external bodies, as actually ex- 
 isting. Therefore (Props, 45 and 46, pt. 2) it possesses 
 an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence 
 of God. Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — Hence we see that the infinite essence and the 
 eternity of God are known to all ; and since all things 
 are in God and are conceived through Him, it follows 
 that we can deduce from this knowledge many things 
 which we can know adequately, and that we can thus 
 form that third sort of knowledge mentioned in Schol. 2, 
 Prop. 40, pt. 2, of whose excellence and value the Fifth 
 Part will be the place to speak. The reason why we do 
 not possess a knowledge of God as distinct as that which 
 we have of common notions is, that we cannot imagine 
 God as we can bodies ; and because we have attaclu-d tlie 
 name God to the images of things which we are in the 
 habit of seeing, an error we can hardly avoid, ina.snmch 
 as we are continually affected by external bodies. Many 
 errors, of a truth, consist merely in the application of tlio 
 wrong names to things. For if a man says that the lines 
 which are drawn from the centre of the circle to the 
 circumference are not equal, he understands by the circle, 
 
94 ETHIC. 
 
 at all events for the time, sometliing else than matlie- 
 maticians understand by it. So when men make errors 
 in calculation, the numbers which are in their minds 
 are not those which are upon the paper. As far as their 
 mind is concerned there is no error, although it seems as 
 if there were, because we think that the numbers in their 
 minds are those which are upon the paper. If we did 
 not think so, we should not believe them to be in error. 
 For example, when I lately heard a man complaining 
 that his court had flown into one of his neighbour's 
 fowls, I understood what he meant, and therefore did 
 not imagine him to be in error. This is the source from 
 which so many controversies arise — that men either do 
 not properly explain their own thoughts, or do not 
 properly interpret those of other people ; for, in truth, 
 when they most contradict one another, they either think 
 the same things or something different, so that those 
 things which they suppose to be errors and absurdities in 
 another person are not so. 
 
 ^ ^ Tkop. XLVIII. — In the mind there is no absolute or 
 
 1 free loill, hut the mind is determined to this or that 
 
 volition ly a cause, which is also determined hy 
 
 another cause, and this again hy another, and so on 
 
 ad infinitum. 
 
 Demonst. — The mind is a certain and determinate 
 mode of thought (Prop, ii, pt. 2), and therefore (CoroL 
 2, Prop. 17, pt. i) it cannot be the free cause of its own 
 actions, or have an absolute faculty of willing or not 
 willing, but must be determined to this or that volition 
 (Prop. 28, pt. i) by a cause which is also determined by 
 another cause, and this again by another, and so on ad 
 infinitum. — q.e.d. 
 
 S>chol. — In the same manner it is demonstrated that in 
 the mind there exists no absolute faculty of understand- 
 ing, desiring, loving, &c. These and the like faculties, 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE Ml/fp. 
 
 therefore, are either altogether fictitious, or^^^lso are 
 nothing but metaphysical or universal entities, \nuch wo 
 are in the habit of forming from individual cases. The 
 intellect and will, therefore, are related to this or that 
 idea or volition as rockiness is related to this or that 
 rock, or as man is related to Peter or Paul. The reason 
 why men imagine themselves to be free we have explained 
 in the Appendix to the Pirst Part. Before, however, I 
 advance any farther, I must observe that by tlic will I 
 understand a faculty of affirming or denying, but not a 
 desire ; a faculty, I say, by which the mind affirms or 
 denies that which is true or false, and not a desire by 
 which the mind seeks a thing or turns away from it. 
 But now that we have demonstrated that these faculties 
 are universal notions which are not distinguishable from 
 the individual notions from which they are formed, we 
 must now inquire whether the volitions themselves are 
 anything more than the ideas of things. We must 
 inquire, I say, whether in the mind there exists any 
 other affirmation or negation than that which the idea 
 involves in so far as it is an idea. Por this purpose see 
 the following proposition, together with Def. 3, pt. 2, so 
 that thought may not fall into pictures. For by ideas 
 I do not understand the images which are formed at the 
 back of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle of the 
 brain, but rather the conceptions of thought. 
 
 Prop. XLIX. — l7i the mind there is no volition or affirma- 
 tion and negation excelling that which the idea, in 
 so far as it is an idea, invohcs. 
 
 Demonst. — In the mind there exists (Prop. 48, \\. 2) 
 no absolute faculty of willing or not willing. Unly 
 individual volitions exist, that is to say, tliis and that 
 affirmation and this and that negation. Let us conceivM 
 therefore, any individual volition, that is, any mode of 
 thought, by which the mind affirms that the three angles 
 
96 ETHIC. 
 
 of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This 
 affirmation involves the conception or idea of the triangle, 
 that is to say, without it the affirmation cannot be con- 
 ceived. For to say that A must involve the conception 
 B, is the same as saying that A cannot be conceived 
 without B. Moreover, without the idea of the triangle 
 this affirmation (Ax. 3, pt. 2) cannot be, and it can 
 therefore neither "be nor be conceived without that 
 idea. But this idea of the triangle must involve this 
 same affirmation that its three angles are equal to two 
 right angles. Therefore also, vice versa, this idea of the 
 triangle without this affirmation can neither be nor be 
 conceived. Therefore (Def. 2, pt. 2) this affirmation per- 
 tains to the essence of the idea of the triangle, nor is it 
 anything else besides this. Whatever too we have said 
 of this volition (since it has been taken arbitrarily) applies 
 to all other volitions, that is to say, they are nothing 
 but ideas. — Q.e.d. 
 
 Cowl. — The will and the intellect are one and the 
 same. 
 
 Demonst. — The will and the intellect are nothing but 
 the individual volitions and ideas themselves (Prop. 48, 
 pt. 2, and its Schol.) But the individual volition and 
 idea (Prop. 49, pt. 2) are one and the same. Therefore 
 the will and the intellect are one and the same. — q.e.d. 
 
 Scliol. — I have thus removed what is commonly thought 
 to be the cause of error. It has been proved above that 
 falsity consists solely in the privation which mutilated and 
 confused ideas involve. A false idea, therefore, in so far 
 as it is false, does not involve certitude. ' Consequently, 
 when we say that a man assents to what is false and does 
 not doubt it, we do not say that he is certain, but merely 
 that he does not doubt, that is to say, that he assents 
 to what is false, because there are no causes sufficient 
 to make his imagination waver (Schol. Prop. 44, pt. 2). 
 Although, therefore, a man may be supposed to adhere to 
 what is false, we shall never on that account say that he 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISn: 97 
 
 is certain. For by certitude wc understaiul soiuelhin-^' 
 positive (Prop. 43, pt. 2, with the Schol.), and not the 
 privation of doubt ; but by the privation of certitude we 
 understand falsity. If the preceding proposition, how- 
 ever, is to be more clearly comprehended, a word or two 
 must be added ; it yet remains also tliat I should answer 
 the objections which may be brought against our doctrine, 
 and finally, in order to remove all scruples, I have thought 
 it worth while to indicate some of its advantages. I suy 
 some, as the principal advantages will be better understood 
 when we come to the Fifth Part. I begin, therefore, with 
 the first, and I warn my readers carefully to distinguish 
 between an idea or conception of the mind and the 
 images of things formed by our imagination. Secondly, 
 it is necessary that we should distinguish between ideas 
 and the words by which things are signified. For it is 
 because these three things, images, words, and ideas, are 
 by many people either altogether confounded or not dis- 
 tinguished with sufficient accuracy and care that such 
 ignorance exists about this doctrine of the will, so neces- 
 sary to be known both for the purposes of speculation 
 and for the wise government of life. Those who think 
 that ideas consist of images, which are formed in us by 
 meeting with external bodies, persuade themselves that 
 those ideas of things of which we can form no similar 
 image are not ideas, but mere fancies constructed by the 
 free power of the will. They look upon ideas, therefore, 
 as dumb pictures on a tablet, and being prepossessed 
 with this prejudice, they do not see that an idea, in so 
 far as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. 
 Again, those who confound words with the idea, or with 
 the affirmation itself which the idea involves, think that 
 they can will contrary to their perception, because they 
 affirm or deny something in words alone contrary to their 
 perception. It will be easy for us, however, to divest 
 ourselves of these prejudices if we attend to the nature 
 of thought, which in no way involves the conception of 
 
98 ETHIC. 
 
 extension, and by doing this "we clearly see that an idea, 
 since it is a mode of thought, is not an image of any- 
 thing, nor does it consist of words. For the essence of 
 words and images is formed of bodily motions alone, 
 which involve in no way whatever the conception of 
 thought. 
 
 Let thus much suffice under this head. I pass on 
 now to the objections to which I have already alluded. 
 
 The first is, that it is supposed to be certain that the 
 will extends itself more widely than the intellect, and is 
 therefore different from it. The reason why men suppose 
 that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect 
 is because they say they have discovered that they do 
 not need a larger faculty of assent — that is to say, of 
 affirmation — and denial than that which they now have 
 for the purpose of assenting to an infinite number of 
 other things which we do not perceive, but that they do 
 need a greater faculty for understanding them. The will, 
 therefore, is distinguished from the intellect, the latter 
 being finite, the former infinite. The second objection 
 which can be made is that there is nothing which experi- 
 ence seems to teach more clearly than the possibility of 
 suspending our judgment, so as not to assent to the things 
 we perceive ; and we are strengthened in this opinion 
 because no one is said to be deceived in so far as he ]Der- 
 ceives a thing, but only in so far as he assents to it or 
 dissents from it. For example, a man who imagines a 
 winged horse does not therefore admit the existence of a 
 winged horse ; that is to say, he is not necessarily de- 
 ceived, unless he grants at the same time that a winged 
 horse exists. Experience, therefore, seems to show nothing 
 more plainly than that the will or faculty of assent is free, 
 and different from the faculty of the intellect. 
 
 Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does 
 not seem to contain more reality than another ; that is to 
 say, it does not appear that we need a greater power for 
 affirming a thing to be true which is true than for 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIM), ,,^ 
 
 affirming a tiling to be true which is false. Xeverthe- 
 less, we observe that one idea contains more reality or 
 perfection than another, for as some oltjects are nohk-r 
 than others, in the same proportion are their idt-as more 
 perfect. It appears indisputable, therefore, that there 
 is a difference between the will and the intellect. 
 
 Fourthly, it may be objected that if a man does not act 
 from freedom of the will, what would lie do if lie were 
 in a state of equilibrium, like the ass of Buridanus ? 
 Would he not perish from hunger and thirst ? and if 
 this be granted, do we not seem to conceive him as a 
 statue of a man or as an ass ? If I deny that he would 
 thus perish, he will consequently determine himself and 
 possess the power of going where he likes and doing 
 what he likes. 
 
 There may be other objections besides these, but as I 
 am not bound to discuss what every one may dream, I 
 shall therefore make it my business to answer as briclly 
 as possible those only which I have mentioned. In 
 reply to the first objection, I grant that the will extends 
 itself more widely than the intellect, if by the intellect 
 we understand only clear and distinct ideas ; but I deny 
 that the will extends itself more widely than the percep- 
 tions or the faculty of conception ; nor, indeed, do I see 
 why the faculty of will should be said to be infinite any 
 more than the faculty of feeling ; for as by the same 
 faculty of will we can affirm an infinite number of things 
 (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an inlinite 
 number of things at once), so also by the same faculty 
 of feeling we can feel or perceive (one after another) an 
 infinite number of bodies. If it be said that tliere are 
 an infinite number of things which we cannot ])erceive, 
 I reply that such things as these we can reach hy "o 
 thought, and consequently by no faculty of will. But it 
 is said that if God wished us to perceive those things, 
 it would be necessary for Ilim to give us a larger 
 faculty of perception, but not a larger faculty of will than 
 
100 ETHIC. 
 
 He lias already given us, which is the same thing as say- 
 ing that if God wished ns to understand an infinite 
 number of other beings, it would be necessary for Him 
 to give us a greater intellect, but not a more universal 
 idea of being (in order to embrace that infinite number 
 of beings), than He has given us. For we have shown 
 that the will is a universal being, or the idea by which 
 we explain all individual volitions, that is to say, that 
 which is common to them all. It is not to be wondered 
 at, therefore, that those who believe this common or 
 universal idea of all the volitions to be a faculty should 
 say that it extends itself infinitely beyond the limits of 
 the intellect. For the universal is predicated of one or 
 of many, or of an infinite number of individuals. 
 
 The second objection I answer by denying that we 
 have free power of suspending judgment. For when we 
 say that a person suspends judgment, we only say in 
 other words that he sees that he does not perceive the 
 thing adequately. The suspension of the judgment, there- 
 fore, is in truth a perception and not free will. In order 
 that this may be clearly understood, let us take the case 
 of a boy who imagines a horse and perceives nothing 
 else. Since this imagination involves the existence of 
 the horse (Corol. Prop. 17, pt. 2), and the boy does not 
 perceive anything which negates its existence, he will 
 necessarily contemplate it as present, nor will he be able 
 to doubt its existence although he may not be certain of 
 it. This is a thing which we daily experience in dreams, 
 nor do I believe that there is any one w^ho thinks that he 
 has the free power during dreams of suspending his judg- 
 ment upon those things which he dreams, and of causing 
 himself not to dream those things which he dreams that 
 he sees ; and yet in dreams it nevertheless happens that 
 we suspend our judgment, for we dream that we dream. 
 
 I grant, it is true, that no man is deceived in so far 
 as he perceives ; that is to say, I grant that the imagina- 
 tions of the mind considered in themselves involve no 
 
THE NATURE AXD ORIGIX OF THE .U/.\7). ,oi 
 
 error (Scliol. Prop. 17, pt. 2); but I deny tlmt a man 
 in so far as he perceives affirms notlung. For what 
 else is it to perceive a winged liorse than to alhrm of 
 the horse that it has wings ? For if the mind per- 
 ceived nothing else but this winged horse, it would 
 regard it as present, nor would it have any reason fur 
 doubting its existence, nor any power of refusing assent 
 to it, unless the imagination of the winged horse be 
 joined to an idea which negates its existence, or the mind 
 perceives that the idea of the winged horse which it 
 has is inadequate. In either of the two latter cases 
 it will necessarily deny or doubt the existence of tiie 
 horse. 
 
 With regard to the third objection, what has been said 
 will perhaps be a sufficient answer, — namely, tliat the 
 will is something universal, which is predicated of all 
 ideas, and that it signifies that only which is common 
 to them all, that is to say, affirmation. Its adequate 
 essence, therefore, in so far as it is thus considered in the 
 abstract, must be in every idea, and in this sense only 
 must it be the same in all; but not in so far as it is 
 considered as constituting the essence of an idea, for so 
 far, the individual affirmations differ just as the ideas 
 differ. For example, the affirmation which the idea of 
 a circle involves differs from that which the idea of 
 a triangle involves, just as the idea of a circle dillers 
 from the idea of a triangle. Again, I absolutely deny 
 that we need a power of thinking in order to atlirm 
 that to be true which is true, equal to that which we 
 need in order to affirm that to be true which is false. 
 For these two affirmations, if we look to the mind, are 
 related to one another as being and non-being, for there 
 is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes a form of 
 falsity (Prop. 35, pt. 2, with its Schol., and Schol. t.» 
 Prop. 47, pt. 2). 
 
 Here therefore particularly is it to be observed how 
 easily we are deceived when we confuse universal with 
 
102 ETHIC. 
 
 individuals, and the entities of reason and abstractions 
 with realities. 
 
 With regard to the fourth objection, I say that I 
 entirely grant that if a man were placed in such a state 
 of equilibrium he would perish of hunger and thirst, sup- 
 posing he perceived nothing but hunger and thirst, and 
 the food and drink which were equidistant from him. 
 If you ask me whether such a man would not be thought 
 an ass rather than a man, I reply that I do not know; 
 nor do I know what ought to be thought of a man who 
 hangs himself, or of children, fools, and madmen. 
 
 It remains for me now to show what service to our 
 own lives a knowledge of this doctrine is. This we 
 shall easily understand from the remarks which follow. 
 Xotice — 
 
 1. It is of service in so far as it teaches us that we 
 do everything by the will of God alone, and that we 
 are partakers of the divine nature in proportion as our 
 actions become more and more perfect and we more and 
 more understand God. This doctrine, therefore, besides 
 giving repose in every way to the soul, has also this 
 advantage, that it teaches us in what our highest happi- 
 ness or blessedness consists, namely, in the knowledge of 
 God alone, by which we are drawn to do those things 
 only which love and piety persuade. Hence we clearly 
 see how greatly those stray from the true estimation of 
 virtue who expect to be distinguished by God with the 
 highest rewards for virtue and the noblest actions as 
 if for the completest servitude, just as if virtue itself 
 and the service of God were not happiness itself and the 
 highest liberty. 
 
 2. It is of service to us in so far as it teaches us how 
 we ought to behave with regard to the things of fortune, 
 or those which are not in our power, that is to say, 
 which do not follow from our own nature ; for it teaches 
 us with equal mind to wait for and bear each form of 
 fortune, because we know that all thinc^s follow from 
 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MISD. ,03 
 
 the eternal decree of God, according to that same noccssitv 
 by which it follows from the essence of a triun-de that 
 its three angles are equal to two riglit angles. 
 
 3. This doctrine contributes to the welfare of our 
 social existence, since it teaches us to hate no one, to 
 despise no one, to mock no one, to be angry with no 
 one, and to envy no one. It teaches every one, mor.;- 
 over, to be content with his own, and to be helpful to 
 his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, from par- 
 tiality, or superstition, but by the guidance of reason 
 alone, according to the demand of time and circunistanci.', 
 as I shall show in the Third Part. 
 
 4. This doctrine contributes not a little to the advan- 
 tage of common society, in so far as it teaches us by 
 what means citizens are to be governed and led ; not in 
 order that they may be slaves, but that they may freely 
 do those things which are best. 
 
 Thus I have discharged the obligation laid upon nn^ 
 in this scholium, and with it I make an end of the Secoml 
 Part, in which I think that I have explained the nature 
 of the human mind and its properties at suflicient length, 
 and, considering the difficulties of the subject, with sulli- 
 cient clearness. I think, too, that certain truths liave 
 been established, from which much that is noblf, most 
 useful, and necessary to be known can be deduced, as wt^ 
 shall partly see from what follows. 
 
 END OF THE SECOND TART. 
 
( I04 ) 
 
 ETHIC. 
 
 EJirti Part 
 
 ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 
 
 Most persons who have written about the affects and 
 man's conduct of life seem to discuss, not the natural 
 things which follow the common laws of nature, but 
 things which are outside her. They seem indeed to 
 consider man in nature as a kingdom within a king- 
 dom. For they believe that man disturbs rather than 
 follows her order ; that he has an absolute power over 
 his own actions ; and that lie is altogether self-deter- 
 mined. They then proceed to attribute the cause of 
 human weakness and changeableness, not to the common 
 power of nature, but to some vice of human nature, 
 which they therefore bewail, laugli at, mock, or, as is 
 more generally the case, detest ; whilst he who knows 
 how to revile most eloquently or subtilly the weakness of 
 the mind is looked upon as divine. It is true that very 
 eminent men have not been wanting, to whose labour 
 and industry we confess ourselves much indebted, who 
 have written many excellent things about the right 
 conduct of life, and who have given to mortals counsels 
 full of prudence, but no one so far as I know has deter- 
 mined the nature and strength of the affects, and what the 
 mind is able to do towards controlling them. I remember. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 
 
 los 
 
 indeed, that the celebrated Descartes, although he believed 
 that the mind is absolute master over its own actions, 
 tried nevertheless to explain by their first causes human 
 affects, and at the same time to show the way by 
 •which the mind could obtain absolute power over them ; 
 but in my opinion he has shown nothing but the acute- 
 ness of his great intellect, as I shall make evident in the 
 proper place, for I wish to return to those who prefer 
 to detest and scoff at human affects and actious than 
 understand them. To such as these it will doubt- 
 less seem a marvellous thing for me to endeavour to 
 treat by a geometrical method the vices and follies of 
 men, and to desire by a sure method to demonstrate those 
 things which these people cry out against as being opposed 
 to reason, or as being vanities, absurdities, and monstrosi- 
 ties. The following is my reason for so doing. Xothing 
 happens in nature which can be attributed to any vice 
 of nature, for she is always the same and everywhere 
 one. Her virtue is the same, and her power of acting ; 
 that is to say, her laws and rules, according to which all 
 things are and are changed from form to form, are every- 
 where and always the same ; so that there must also be 
 one and the same method of understanding the nature c>f 
 all things whatsoever, that is to say, by the universal laws 
 and rules of nature. The affects, therefore, of hatred, 
 anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow from tht; 
 same necessity and virtue of nature as other individual 
 things ; they have therefore certain causes through wliich 
 they are to be understood, and certain properties which 
 are just as worthy of being known as the properties of 
 any other thing in the contemplation alone of which we 
 delight. I shall, therefore, pursue the same metliod in 
 considering the nature and strength of the affects and 
 the power of the mind over tliem which I pursued in 
 our previous discussion of God and the mind, and I 
 sliall consider human actions and appetites just as if I 
 were considering lines, planes, or bodies. 
 
io6 ETHIC. 
 
 Def. I. — I call tliat an adequate cause -^liose effect 
 can be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the 
 cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose 
 effect cannot be understood by means of the cause alone. 
 
 Def. II. — I say that we act when anything is done, 
 either within us or without us, of which we are the 
 adequate cause, that is to say (by the preceding Def.), 
 when from our nature anything follows, either within us 
 or without us, which, by that nature alone can be clearly 
 and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that 
 we suffer when anything is done within us, or when any- 
 thing follows from our nature, of which we are not the 
 cause excepting partially. 
 
 Def. III. — By affect I understand the affections of 
 the body, by which the power of acting of the body 
 itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, toge- 
 ther with the ideas of these affections. 
 
 If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any of 
 these affections, I understand the affect to be an action, 
 otherwise it is a passion. 
 
 Postulate I . — The human body can be affected in many 
 ways by which its power of acting is increased or 
 diminished, and also in other ways which make its 
 power of acting neither greater nor less. 
 
 This postulate or axiom is based upon Post, i and 
 Lems. 5 and 7, following Prop. 13, pt. 2. 
 
 Postulate 2. — The human body is capable of suffering 
 many changes, and, nevertheless, can retain the impres- 
 sions or traces of the objects (Post. 5, pt. 2), and conse- 
 quently the same images of things. (For the definition 
 of images see Scliol. Prop. 17, pt. 2.) 
 
 Peop. I. — Our mind acts at times and at times suffers : in so 
 far as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts ; and in 
 so far as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily suffers. 
 
 Demonst. — In every human mind some ideas are 
 
ORIGIX AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. r- 
 
 adequate, and others mutilatea and confused (Sc-hol. 
 Prop. 40, pt. 2). But the ideas which in any mind are 
 adequate are adequate in God in so far as He fornn 
 the essence of tliat mind (Corol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 2). whilt? 
 those again which are inadequate in tlie mind are nlsd 
 adequate in God (by the same Corol.), not in so far a.^ 
 He contains the essence of that mind only, but in so far 
 as He contains the ideas ^ of other things at the same 
 time in Himself. Again, from any given idea some 
 efiect must necessarily follow (Prop. 36, pt. i), of whicli 
 God is the adequate cause (Def. i, pt. 3), not in so far as 
 He is infinite, but in so far as He is considered as ant'ct<.'J 
 with the given idea (Prop. 9, pt. 2). P>ut of that 
 effect of which God is the cause, in so far as He is 
 affected by an idea which is adequate in any mind, that 
 same mind is the adequate cause (Corol. Prop, i i , 
 pt. 2). Our mind, therefore (Def. 2, pt. 3), in so far as ii 
 has adequate ideas, necessarily at times acts, which i.s 
 the first thing we had to prove. Again, if there be any- 
 thing which necessarily follows from an idea which is 
 adequate in God, not in so far as He contains within 
 Himself the mind of one man only, but also, togetluT 
 with this, the ideas ^ of other things, then the mind of 
 that man (Corol. Prop. 11, pt. 2) is not the adequatt' 
 cause of that thing, but is only its partial cause, ami 
 therefore (Def. 2, pt. 3), in so far as the mind has 
 inadequate ideas, it necessarily at times sufTers. Tiiis 
 was the second thing to be proved. Therefore our miml. 
 
 &c. Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that the mind is subject to 
 passions in proportion to the number of inadequate ideas 
 which it has, and that it acts in proportion to llie 
 number of adequate ideas which it has. 
 
 1 "Mentes," both in Paulus, Bru- 2, will show. Kirchrr.ann ^ (•• - > 
 
 der. and Van Vloten and Land, but tion omits " nientes ' in i-' ; 
 
 obviously a mistake for " ideas," as passage marked, ami rfii.l.-n-. ■". 
 
 a referencetoCorol.Prop.il, pt. fern er andere Dingo m .ich cuU»*it. 
 
ic8 ETHIC. 
 
 Peop. II. — The hody cannot determine the mind to tlionglit, 
 neither can the mind determine the hody to motion nor 
 rest, nor anything else, if there he anything. 
 
 Demonst. — All modes of thought have God for a 
 cause in so far as He is a thinking thing, and not in so 
 far as He is explained by any other attribute (Prop. 6, 
 pt. 2). That which determines the mind to thought, 
 therefore, is a mode of thought and not of extension, 
 that is to say (Def. i, pt. 2), it is not the body. This is 
 the first thing which was to be proved. Again, the 
 motion and rest of the body must be derived from some 
 other body, M'hich has also been determined to motion or 
 rest by another, and, absolutely, whatever arises in the 
 body must arise from God, in so far as He is considered 
 as affected by some mode of extension, and not in so far 
 as He is considered as affected by any mode of thought 
 (Prop. 6, pt. 2), that is to say, whatever arises in the body 
 cannot arise from the mind, which is a mode of thought 
 (Prop. II, ])t 2). This is the second thing which was 
 to be proved. Therefore, the body cannot determine, &c. 
 
 — -Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — This proposition will be better understood 
 from what has been said in the scholium of Prop. 7, 
 pt. 2, that is to say, that the mind and the body are one 
 and the same thing, conceived at one time under the 
 attribute of thought, and at another under that of ex- 
 tension. For this reason, the order or concatenation of 
 things is one, whether nature be conceived under this or 
 under that attribute, and consequently the order of the 
 actions and passions of our body is coincident in nature 
 with the order of .the actions and passions of the mind. 
 This is also plain from the manner in which we have 
 demonstrated Prop. 12, pt. 2. 
 
 Although these things are so, and no ground for doubting 
 remains, I scarcely believe, nevertheless, that, without a 
 proof derived from experience, men will be induced calmly 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AIFECTS. lo, 
 
 to weigh what has been said, so firmly are they per- 
 suaded that, solely at the bidding of the miiul, the bodv 
 moves or rests, and does a number of things whicii 
 depend upon the will of the mind alone, and upon tlio 
 power of thought. For what the body can do no one has 
 hitherto determined, that is to say, experience has taught 
 no one hitherto what the body, without being determined 
 by the mind, can do and what it cannot do from the laws 
 of nature alone, in so far as nature is considered merely 
 as corporeal. For no one as yet has understood the 
 structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain 
 all its functions, not to mention the fact that many things 
 are observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, 
 and that sleep-walkers in their sleep do very many thinLj.s 
 which they dare not do when awake ; all this showing 
 that the body itself can do many things from the laws of 
 its own nature alone at which the mind belonging to 
 that body is amazed. Again, nobody knows by what 
 means or by what method the mind moves the body, 
 nor how many degrees of motion it can communicate to 
 the body, nor with what speed it can move the body. 
 So that it follows that when men say that this or tliat 
 action of the body springs from the mind which has com- 
 mand over the body, they do not know what they say, 
 and they do nothing but confess with pretentious words 
 that they know nothing about the cause of the action, 
 and see nothing in it to wonder at. But they will say, 
 that whether they know or do not know by what means 
 the mind moves the body, it is nevertheless in their ex- 
 perience that if the mind were not fit for thinking the 
 body would be inert. They say, again, it i^ in their ex- 
 perience that the mind alone has power both to sjtcak 
 and be silent, and to do many other things which thoy 
 therefore think to be dependent on a decree of tl>o 
 mind. But with regard to the first assertion, I ask them 
 if experience does not also teach that if the body bo 
 slui:,^gish the mind at the same time is not fit for 
 
no ETHIC. 
 
 thinking ? When the body is asleep, the mind slum- 
 bers "with it, and has not the power to think, as it has 
 wlien the body is awake. Again, I believe that all 
 have discovered that the mind is not always equally 
 fitted for thinking about the same subject, but in pro- 
 portion to the fitness of the body for this or that image 
 to be excited in it will the mind be better fitted to 
 contemplate this or that object. But my opponents will 
 say, that from the laws of nature alone, in so far as it is 
 considered to be corporeal merely, it cannot be that the 
 causes of architecture, painting, and things of this sort, 
 which are the results of human art alone, could be deduced, 
 and that the human body, unless it were determined and 
 guided by the mind, would not be able to build a temple. 
 I have already shown, however, that they do not know 
 what the body can do, nor what can be deduced from the 
 consideration of its nature alone, and that they find that 
 many things are done merely by the laws -of nature 
 which they would never have believed to be possible 
 without the direction of the mind, as, for example, those 
 things which sleep-walkers do in their sleep, and at which 
 they themselves are astonished when they wake. I adduce 
 also here the structure itself of the human body, which 
 so greatly surpasses in w^orkmanship all those things 
 which are constructed by human art, not to mention 
 what I have already proved, that an infinitude of things 
 follows from nature under whatever attribute it may be 
 considered. 
 
 With regard to the second point, I should say that 
 human affairs w'ould be much more happily conducted 
 if it were equally in the power of men to be silent and 
 to speak ; but experience shows over and over again that 
 there is nothing which men have less power over than 
 the tongue, and that there is nothing which they are less 
 able to do than to govern their appetites, so that many 
 persons believe that we do those things only with freedom 
 which we seek indifferently ; as the desire for such things 
 
ORIGIX AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. ni 
 
 can easily be lessened by the recollection of another thiiiii 
 which we frequently call to mind ; it being iniiK)ssiblts 
 on the other hand, to do those tilings with freedom 
 which we seek with such ardour that tlie recollection of 
 another thing is unable to mitigate it. But if, however, 
 we had not found out that we do many things whicli wo 
 afterwards repent, and that when agitated by conlUcting 
 affects we see that which is better and follow that whicli 
 is worse, nothing would hinder us from believing that we 
 do everything with freedom. Thus the infant believes 
 that it is by free will that it seeks the breast ; the angry 
 boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance ; the 
 timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks llight ; the 
 drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind 
 he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had 
 left unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer, the boy, 
 and others of the same kind, all believe that they speak 
 by a free command of the mind, whilst, in truth, they 
 have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to 
 speak, so that experience itself, no less than reason, clearly 
 teaches that men believe themselves to be free simply 
 because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing 
 nothing of the causes by which they are determined : it 
 teaches, too, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but 
 the appetites themselves, which differ, therefore, according 
 to the different temper of the -body. For every man 
 determines all things from his affect ; those who are agi- 
 tated by contrary affects do not know what they want, 
 whilst those who are agitated by no aflect are easily 
 driven hither and thither. All this jdainly shows that 
 the decree of the mind, the appetite, and determination 
 of the body are coincident in nature, or rather that they 
 are one and the same thing, which, when it is considered 
 under the attribute of thought and explained by timt, is 
 called a decree, and when it is considered under the 
 attribute of extension and is deduced from the laws of 
 motion and rest, is called a determination. This, how- 
 
112 ETHIC. 
 
 ever, will Le better miJerstood as we go on, for there is 
 another thing which I wish to be observed here — that we 
 cannot by a mental decree do a thing unless we recollect 
 it. We cannot speak a word, for instance, unless we re- 
 collect it. But it is not in the free power of the mind 
 either to recollect a thing or to forget it. It is believed, 
 therefore, that the power of the mind extends only thus 
 far — that from a mental decree we can speak or be silent 
 about a thing only when we recollect it. But when we 
 dream that we speak, we believe that we do so from a 
 free decree of the mind ; and yet we do not speak, 
 or, if we do, it is the result of a spontaneous motion of 
 the body. We dream, again, that we are concealing 
 things, and that we do this by virtue of a decree of the 
 mind like that by which, when awake, we are silent 
 about things we know. We dream, again, that, from a 
 decree of the mind, we do some things which we should 
 not dare to do when awake. And I should like to know, 
 therefore, whether there are two kinds of decrees in the 
 mind — one belonging to dreams and the other free. 
 If this be too great nonsense, we must necessarily grant 
 that this decree of the mind, which is believed to be free, 
 is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, 
 and is nothing but the affirmation which the idea 
 necessarily involves in so far as it is an idea (Prop. 
 49, pt. 2). These decrees of the mind, therefore, arise 
 in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of 
 things actually existing. Consequently, those who be- 
 lieve that they speak, or are silent, or do anything else 
 from a free decree of the mind, dream with their eyes 
 open. 
 
 Peop. III. — The actions of the mind arise from adequate 
 ideas alone, hut the passions depend upon those alone 
 u'hich are inadequate. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The first thinc^ which constitutes the essence 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 113 
 
 of the mind is nothing but the idea of an actually existing; 
 body (Props. 1 1 and 13, pt. 2). This idea is composed 
 of a number of others (Prop, I 5, pt. 2), some of which 
 are adequate and others inadequate (Corol. Prop. 38, pt 
 2, and Corol. Prop. 29, pt. 2). Everything, therefore, of 
 which the mind is the proximate cause, and which follows 
 from the nature of the mind, through which it must bo 
 understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate or 
 from an inadequate idea. But in so far as the mind 
 (Prop. I, pt. 3) has inadequate ideas, so far it necessarily 
 suffers ; therefore the actions of the mind follow from 
 adequate ideas alone, and the mind therefore suffers only 
 because it has inadequate ideas. 
 
 Schol. — We see, therefore, that the passions are not 
 related to the mind, unless in so far as it possesses 
 something which involves negation; in other words, 
 unless in so far as it is considered as a part of nature, 
 which by itself and without the other parts cannot be 
 clearly and distinctly perceived. In the same way I 
 could show that passions are related to individual 
 things, just as they are related to the mind, and that 
 they cannot be perceived in any other way ; but my pur- 
 pose is to treat of the human mind alone. 
 
 Peop. IY. — A thing cannot he destroyed except ly an 
 external cause. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This proposition is self-evident, for tlie 
 definition of any given thing affirms and does not deny 
 the existence of the thing ; that is to say, it posits the 
 essence of the thing and does not negate it. So long, 
 therefore, as we attend only to the thing itself, and .not 
 to external causes, we shall discover nothing in it which 
 can destroy it. — q.e.d. 
 
 Peop. V. — 171 so far as one thinrj is allc to destroy another 
 
114 ETHIC. 
 
 are they of contrary natures ; that is to say, they can- 
 not exist in the same suhject. 
 
 Bemonst. — If it were possible for them to come to- 
 gether, or to coexist in the same subject, there would 
 then be something in that subject able to destroy it, 
 ■which (Prop. 4, pt. 3) is absurd. Therefore, in so far, 
 &c. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Peop. VI. — Each thing, in so far as it is in itself 
 endeavours to persevere in its being. 
 
 Demonst. — Individual things are modes by which the 
 attributes of God are expressed in a certain and deter- 
 minate manner (Corol. Prop. 25, pt. i) ; that is to say 
 (Prop. 34, pt. i), they are things which express in a 
 certain and determinate manner the power of God, by 
 which He is and acts, A thing, too, has nothing in 
 itself through which it can be destroyed, or which can 
 negate its existence (Prop. 4, pt. 3), but, on the contrary, 
 it is opposed to everything which could negate its exist- 
 ence (Prop. 5, pt. 3). Therefore, in so far as it can and 
 is in itself, it endeavours to persevere in its own being. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. VII. — The effort hy which each tiling endeavours 
 to persevere in its own being is nothing hut the actual 
 essence of the thing itself. 
 
 Demonst. — From the given essence of anything certain 
 things necessarily follow (Prop. 36, pt. i); nor are things 
 able to do anything else than what necessarily follows 
 from their determinate nature (Prop. 29, pt. i). There- 
 fore, the power of a thing, or the effort by means of 
 which it does or endeavours to do anything, either by 
 itself or with others — that is to say (Prop. 6, pt. 3), the- 
 power or effort by which it endeavours to persevere in 
 its being — is nothing but the given or actual essence of 
 the thing itself. — q.e.d. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. n- 
 
 PeOP. VIII. — The effort hj which each thing cndcnvourH 
 to persevere in its own Icing does not involve Jinitc 
 
 hut indefinite time. 
 
 Demonsf. — If it involved a limited time, which would 
 determine the duration of the thing, then from that 
 power alone by which the thing exists it would follow 
 that, after that limited time, it could not exist but must 
 be destroyed. But this (Prop. 4, pt. 3) is absurd. The 
 effort, therefore, by which a thing exists does not involve 
 definite time, but, on the contrary (Prop. 4, pt. 3), if the 
 thing be destroyed by no external cause, by the same 
 power by which it now exists it will always continue to 
 exist, and this effort, therefore, by which it endeavours 
 to persevere, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. IX. — The mind, both in so faf as it has clear and 
 distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, 
 endeavours to persevere in its heing for an indefinite 
 time, and is conscious of this effort. 
 
 Demonst. — The essence of the mind is composed of 
 adequate and inadequate ideas (as we have shown in 
 Prop. 3, pt. 3), and therefore (Prop. 7, pt. 3), both in so 
 far as it has the former and in so far as it has the latter, 
 it endeavours to persevere in its being, and endeavours 
 to persevere in it for an indefinite time (Prop. 8, pt. 3). 
 But since the mind (Prop. 23, pt. 2), through the ideas of 
 the affections of the body, is necessarily conscious of itself, 
 it is therefore conscious (Prop. 7, pt. 3) of its effort. 
 
 Schol. — This effort, when it is related to the mind 
 alone, is called will, but when it is related at the same 
 time both to the mind and the body, is called appetite, 
 which is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, 
 from the nature of which necessarily follow those tilings 
 which promote his preservation, and tlms he is deter- 
 mined to do those things. Hence there is no difference 
 
ii6 ETHIC. 
 
 between appetite and desire, unless in tliis particular, 
 that desire is generally related to men in so far as they 
 are conscious of tlieir appetites, and it may therefore be 
 defined as appetite of which we are conscious. From 
 ' -what has been said it is plain, therefore, that we neither 
 strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything because we think 
 it to be good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing to 
 be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it. 
 
 PnOP, X. — There can he no idea in the mind v:hich ex- 
 cludes the existence of the hody, for such an idea is 
 contrary to the mind. 
 
 Dcmonst. — There can be nothing in our body which is 
 able to destroy it (Prop. 5, pt. 3), and there cannot be, 
 therefore, in God an idea of any such thing in so far as 
 He has the idea of the body (Corol. Prop. 9, pt. 2) ; that 
 is to say (Props. 1 1 and 13, pt. 2), no idea of any such 
 thing can exist in our mind, but, on the contrary, since 
 (Props. 1 1 and I 3, pt. 2) the first thing which constitutes 
 the essence of the mind is the idea of a body actually 
 existing, the first and chief thing belonging to our mind 
 is the effort (Prop. 7, pt. 3) to affirm the existence of our 
 body, and therefore the idea which denies the existence 
 of our body is contrary to our mind. — q.e.d. 
 
 Piior. XI. — If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or 
 limits our lady's 'power of action, the idea of that 
 thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our 
 mind's power of thought. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This proposition is evident from Prop. 7, 
 pt. 2, and also from Prop. 14, pt. 2. 
 
 Schol. — We thus see that the mind can suffer great 
 changes, and can pass now to a greater and now to a 
 lesser perfection ; these passions explaining to us the 
 affects of joy and sorrow. By Joy, therefore, in what 
 
ORIGIN AXD NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 117 
 
 follows, I shall understand the passion by which tho 
 mind passes to a greater perfection ; by sorrow, on tho 
 other hand, the passion by which it passes to a less 
 perfection. The affect of joy, related at the same time 
 both to the mind and the body, I call pleasurable excite- 
 ment {titillatio) or cheerfulness ; that of sorrow I call pain 
 or melancholy. It is, however, to be observed tliat pleasur- 
 able excitement and pain are related to a man when one 
 of his parts is affected more than the others ; cheerful- 
 ness and melancholy, on the other hand, when all parts 
 are equally affected. What the nature of desire is I 
 have explained in the scholium of Prop. 9, pt. 3 ; and 
 besides these three — ^joy, sorrow, and desire — I know 
 of no other primary affect, the others springing from 
 these, as I shall show in what follows. But before I 
 advance any farther, I should like to explain more fully 
 Prop. 10, pt. 3, so that we may more clearly understand 
 in what manner one idea is contrary to another. 
 
 In the scholium of Prop. 17, pt. 2, we have shown 
 that the idea which forms the essence of the mind in- 
 volves the existence of the body so long as tlie body 
 exists. Again, from Corol. Prop. 8, pt. 2, and its scholium, 
 it follows that the present existence of our mind depends 
 solely upon this — that the mind involves the actual 
 existence of the body. Finally, we have shown tliat tlie 
 power of the mind by which it imagines and remembers 
 things also depends upon this — that it involves the 
 actual existence of the body (Props. 17 and 18, pt. 2, 
 with the Schol.) From these things it follows, tliat the 
 present existence of the mind and its power of imagina- 
 tion are negated as soon as the mind ceases to afTinn 
 the present existence of the body. But the cause by 
 which the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the 
 body cannot be the mind itself (Prop. 4, pt. 2), nor can 
 it be the body's ceasing to be; for (Prop. 6, pt. 2) the 
 mind does not affirm the existence of the body because 
 the body began to exist, and therefore, by the same reason- 
 
ii8 ETHIC. 
 
 ing, it does not cease to affirm the existence of tlie body 
 because the body ceases to be, but (Prop. 1 7, pt. 2) because 
 of another idea excluding the present existence of our 
 body, and consequently of our mind, and contrary, there- 
 fore, to the idea ^vhich forms the essence of our mihd. 
 
 Prop. XII. — The mind endeavours as much as possible to 
 imagine those things tvhich increase or assist the 
 hodys pou-cr of acting. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The human mind will contemplate any 
 external body as present so long as the human body is 
 affected in a way which involves the nature of that 
 external body (Prop. 17, pt. 2), and consequently (Prop. 
 7, pt. 2) as long as the human mind contemplates any 
 external body as present, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 1 7, 
 pt. 2), imagines it, so long is the human body affected 
 in a way which involves the nature of that external 
 body. Consequently as long as the mind imagines those 
 things which increase or assist our body's power of 
 action, so long is the body affected in a way which 
 increases or assists that power (Post, i, pt. 3), and con- 
 sequently (Prop. II, pt, 3) so long the mind's power of 
 thought is increased or assisted ; therefore (Props. 6 and 
 9, pt. 3) the mind endeavours as much as possible to 
 imagine those things. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XIII. — JFJie7iever the mind imagines those things 
 which lessen or limit the hodi/s power of action, it 
 endeavours as much as possible to recollect vjhat ex- 
 cludes the existence of these things. 
 
 Demonst. — So long as the mind imagines anything of 
 this sort, the power of the body and of the mind is 
 lessened or limited (as we have shown in the preced- 
 ing proposition). ISTevertheless the mind will continue 
 to imagine these things until it imagines some other 
 thing which will exclude their present existence (Prop. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 119 
 
 1 7, pt. 2) ; that is to say, as wc have just shown, tho 
 power of the mind and of the body is diiuinishi-d or 
 limited until the mind imagines something wliich ex- 
 cludes the existence of these things. This, thfreforo 
 (Prop. 9, pt. 3), the mind will endeavour to imagiue or 
 recollect as much as possible. — q.e.d. 
 
 Cowl. — Hence it follows that the mind is averse to 
 imagine those things which lessen or hinder its power and 
 that of the body. 
 
 ScJwl. — From what has been said we can clearly see 
 what love is and what hatred is. Love is nothing but 
 joy accompanied with the idea of an external cause, and 
 hatred is nothing but sorrow with the accompanying idea 
 of an external cause. We see too that he who loves a 
 thing necessarily endeavours to keep it before him and to 
 preserve it, and, on the other hand, he who hates a thing 
 necessarily endeavours to remove and destroy it. But we 
 shall speak at greater length upon these points in what 
 follows. 
 
 Prop. XIV. — If the mind at any time has been simul- 
 tancouslij affected hj two affects, whenever it is after- 
 wards affected ly one of them, it will also he affected 
 hy the other. 
 
 Bemonst. — If the human body has at any time been 
 simultaneously affected by two bodies, whenever the 
 mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will imme- 
 diately remember the other (Prop. 18, pt. 2). IJut the 
 imaginations of the mind indicate rather the affects of our 
 body than the nature of external bodies (Corol. 2, Prop. 1 6, 
 pt. 2), and therefore if the body, and consequeully tho 
 mind(Def. 3, pt. 3), has been at any time, &c. — g.K.D. 
 
 Prop. XV. — Anything may he accidentally the cause 
 
 of Joy, sorrovj, or desire. 
 Bemonst.— LQt the mind be supposed to be affected 
 
120 ETHIC. 
 
 at the same time by two affects, its power of action 
 not being increased or diminished by one, while it is in- 
 creased or diminished by the other (Post, i, pt. 3). From 
 the preceding proposition it is plain that when the mind 
 is afterwards affected by the first affect through its true 
 cause, which (by hypothesis) of itself neither increases 
 nor diminishes the mind's jpower of thinking, it will at 
 the same time be affected by the other affect, which does 
 increase or diminish that power, that is to say (Schol. 
 Prop. II, pt. 3), it will be affected with joy or sorrow ; 
 and thus the thing itself will be the cause of joy or of 
 sorrow, not of itself, but accidentally. In the same way 
 it can easily be shown that the same thing may acciden- 
 tally be the cause of desire. — q.e.d. 
 
 Co7vl. — The fact that we have contemplated a thing 
 with an affect of joy or sorrow, of which it is not the 
 efficient cause, is a sufficient reason for being able to love 
 or hate it. 
 
 Dcmonst. — For this fact alone is a sufficient reason 
 (Prop. 14, pt. 3) for its coming to pass that the mind in 
 imagining the thing afterwards is affected with the affect 
 of joy or sorrow, that is to say (Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), that the 
 power of the mind and of the body is increased or dimi- 
 nished, &c., and, consequently (Prop. 12, pt. 3), that the 
 mind desires to imagine the thing or (Corol. Prop. 1 3, 
 pt. 3) is averse to doing so, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 
 13, pt. 3), that the mind loves the thing or hates it. 
 
 Schol. — We now understand why we love or hate 
 certain things from no cause which is known to us, but 
 merely from sympathy or antipathy, as they say. To 
 this class, too, as we shall show in the following proposi- 
 tions, are to be referred those objects which affect us with 
 joy or sorrow solely because they are somewhat like 
 objects which usually affect us with those affects. I know 
 indeed that the writers who first introduced the w^ords 
 " Sympathy " and " Antipathy " desired thereby to signify 
 certain hidden qualities of things, but nevertheless I 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. i:i 
 
 believe that we shall be permitted to tinderstaiiil by 
 those names qualities which are plain and Wfll known. 
 
 Prop. XVI. — If v:c imagine a certain thing to poaufss ttovif- 
 thing which resembles an object which vsuallij afftcU 
 the mind with joy or sorroiv, although the qunlitij in 
 tvhich the thing resembles the object is not the eficitnt 
 cause of these affects, we shall ncrcrtheless, by virtue 
 of the resemblance alone, love or hate the thing. 
 
 Demonst. — The quality in which tlie thing resembles 
 the object we have contemplated in the object itself 
 (by hypothesis) with the affect of joy or sorrow, and since 
 (Prop. 14, pt. 3), whenever the mind is affected by tho 
 image of this quality, it is also affected by tiie former or 
 latter affect, the thing which is perceived by us to possess 
 this quality will be (Prop. 15, pt. 3) accidentally tlic 
 cause of joy or sorrow. Therefore (by the preceding 
 Corol.), although the equality in which the thing resembles 
 the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, we 
 shall nevertheless love the thing or hate it. 
 
 Prop. XYII. — If u-e imagine that a thing that usually 
 affects ns ivith the affect of sorrow has any rcscm- 
 hlance to an ohject which visually affects vs equally 
 with a great affect of joy, we shall at the same time 
 hate the thing and love it. 
 
 Demonst — This thing (by h}-pothesis) is of itself tho 
 cause of sorrow, and (Schol. Prop, i 3, pt. 3) in so far aa 
 we imagine it with this affect we hate it ; but in so far as 
 we imagine it to resemble an object which usually affecU 
 us equally with a great affect of joy do we love it with 
 an equally great effort of joy (Prop. 16, pt. 3), and so we 
 shall both hate it and love it at the same time.— y.HD. 
 
 Schol. — This state of mind, which arises from two con- 
 trary affects, is called vacillation of the miml. It is 
 related to affect as doubt is related to the imaginutiuii 
 
122 ETHIC. 
 
 (Schol. Prop. 44, pt. 2). Xor do vacillation and doubt 
 differ from one another except as greater and less. It is 
 to be observed that in the preceding proposition I have 
 deduced these vacillations of the mind from causes which 
 occasion the one affect directly and the other contingently. 
 This I have dgne because the affects could thus be more 
 easily deduced from what preceded, and not because I 
 deny that these vacillations often originate from the 
 object itself which is the efficient cause of both affects. 
 For the human body (Post, i, pt. 2) is composed of a 
 number of individuals of different natures, and therefore 
 (Ax. I, after Lem. 3, following Prop. 13, pt. 2) it can 
 be affected by one and the same body in very many and 
 in different ways. On the other hand, the same object 
 can be affected in a number of different ways, and con- 
 sequently can affect the same part of the body in different 
 ways. It is easy, therefore, to see how one and the same 
 object may be the cause of many and contrary affects. 
 
 Pkop. XYIII. — A man is affected ly the i7)iage of a past 
 or future thing with the same affect of joy or sorrov: 
 as that with ivhieh he is affected hy the image of a 
 present thing. 
 
 Demonst. — As long as a man is affected by the image 
 of anything, he will contemplate the thing as present 
 although it does not exist (Prop. 17, pt. 2, with Corol.), 
 nor does he imagine it as past or future, unless in so far 
 as its image is connected with that of past or future time 
 (Schol. Prop. 44, pt. 2). Therefore the image of the 
 thing considered in itself alone is the same whether it 
 be related to future, past, or present time ; that is to say 
 (Corol. 2, Prop. 16, pt. 2), the state of the body or the 
 affect is the same whether the image be that of a past, 
 present, or future thing. The affect, therefore, of joy 
 and sorrow is the same whether the image be that of a 
 past, present, or future thing. — q.e.d. 
 
ORIGIN AXD NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 123 
 
 Schol. I. — I call a thing here past or future in so far 
 as we have been or shall be affected by it; for exaini'l.-. 
 in so far as we have seen a thing or are about to soJ it* 
 in so far as it has strengthened us or will strengthen us ; 
 has injured or will injure us. For in so far as we thus 
 imagine it do we affirm its existence ; that is to say, 
 the body is affected by no affect which excludes tlio 
 existence of the thing, and therefore (Prop. 17, pt. 2) 
 the body is affected by the image of the thing in tlie 
 same way as if the thing itself were present. But because 
 it generally happens that those who possess much ex- 
 perience hesitate when they think of a tiling as past or 
 future, and doubt greatly concerning its issue (Schol. 
 Prop. 44, pt. 2), therefore the affects which spring 
 from such images of things are not so constant, but 
 are generally disturbed by the images of other things, 
 until men become more sure of the issue. 
 
 Schol. 2. — From what has now been said we understand 
 the nature of Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Gladness, 
 Eemorse. ITojje is nothing but unsteady joy, arising 
 from the image of a future or past thing about whoso 
 issue we are in doubt. Feai', on the other hand, is. an 
 unsteady sorrow, arising from the image of a doubtful 
 thing. If the doubt be removed from these affects, tlien 
 hope and fear become Confidence and De>ipair, that is to 
 say, joy or sorrow, arising from the image of a thing for 
 which we have hoped or which we have feared. Glad- 
 ness, again, is joy arising from the image of a past thing 
 whose issues we have doubted. Hcmorse is the sorrow 
 which is opposed to gladness. 
 
 Prop. XIX. — Re vjJio imagines that vhat hr loirs is 
 destroyed will soirow, hut if he imajiiies that it w 
 preserved he will rejoice. 
 
 Demonst. — The mind endeavours as much as it can to 
 imadue those things which increase or assist the body s 
 
124 ETHIC. 
 
 power of action (Prop. 12, pt. 3), that is to say (Scbol. 
 Prop. I 3, pt. 3), to imagine those things which it loves. 
 Put the imagination is assisted by those things whicli 
 posit the existence of the object and is restrained by 
 those whicli exclude its existence (Prop. 17, pt. 2). 
 Therefore the images of things which posit the existence 
 of the beloved object assist the mind's effort to imagine 
 it, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 11, pt. 3), they affect the 
 mind with joy ; whilst those, on the other hand, which 
 exclude the existence of the beloved ol)ject restrain that 
 same effort of the mind, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 1 1 , 
 pt. 3), they affect the mind with sorrow. He, therefore, 
 who imagines that what he loves is destroyed, &c. — 
 Q.E.D, 
 
 Pkop. XX. — JIc who imagines that what he hates is 
 destroyed ivill rejoice. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The mind (Prop. 13, pt. 3) endeavours to 
 imagine those things which exchide the existence of 
 whatever lessens or limits the body's power of action ; 
 that is to say (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), it endeavours to 
 imagine those things which exclude the existence of 
 what it hates, and therefore the image of the thing which 
 excludes the existence of what the mind hates assists 
 this .endeavour of the mind, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 
 II, pt. 3), affects the mind with joy. He, therefore, 
 who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will re- 
 joice. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Pkop. XXI. — He who imagines that vjhat he loves is 
 affected with joy or sorrow will also he affected with 
 joy or sorrow, and these affects will he greater or less 
 171 the lover as they are greater or less in the thi7ig 
 loved. 
 
 Demonst. — The images of things (Prop. 19, pt. 3) which 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 
 
 posit the existence of the beloved object assist the tlluit 
 of the mind to imagine it ; but joy posits the existence of 
 the thing which rejoices, and the greater the joy the 
 more is existence posited, for (Schol. Prop. 1 1 , pt. \) \ny 
 is the transition to a greater perfection. The ima^e, there- 
 fore, in the lover of the joy of the beloved object assists 
 the effort of his mind to imagine the object, that is to 
 say (Schol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), affects the lover with joy 
 proportionate to the joy of the object he loves. This 
 was the first thing to be proved. Again, in so far as 
 anything is affected with sorrow, so far is it destroyed, 
 and the destruction is greater as the sorrow with which 
 it is affected is greater (Schol. Prop. 1 1 , pt. 3). Therefore 
 (Prop. 19, pt. 3) he who imagines that what he loves is 
 affected with sorrow will also be affected with sorrow, 
 and it will be greater as this affect shall have been 
 greater in the object beloved. 
 
 Prop. XXII. — If we imagine that a pcrsoji affects with 
 joy a thing which v:e love, we shall he affected with 
 love towards him. If, on the contrary, we imagine 
 that he affects it with sorrow, we shall also be affected 
 vjith hatred tovjards him. 
 
 Demonst. — He who affects with joy or sorrow the 
 thing we love affects us also with joy or sorrow when- 
 ever we imagine the beloved object so affected (Prop. 2 1, 
 pt. 3). But this joy or sorrow is supposed to exist in 
 us accompanied with the idea of an external cause; 
 therefore (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3) if we imagine tliat a 
 person affects with joy or sorrow a thing which we love, 
 we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol — Prop. 21 explains to us what commiseration 
 is, which we may define as sorrow which springs from 
 another's loss. By what name the joy is to be called 
 which springs from another's good I do not know, Luvo 
 
126 ETHIC. 
 
 toward the person who has done good to another we shall 
 call favour {favor), whilst hatred towards him who has 
 done evil to another we shall call i?idignation (indignatio). 
 It is to be observed, too, that we not only feel pity for 
 the object which we have loved, as we showed in Prop. 2 i, 
 but also for that to which we have been attached by no 
 affect ; provided only -we adjudge it to be like ourselves 
 (as I shall show hereafter), and so we shall regard with 
 favour him who has done any good to the object which 
 is like us, and, on the contrary, be indignant with him 
 who has done it any harm. 
 
 Prop. XXIII. — He wJio imagines that what he hates is 
 affected with sorroio will rejoice ; if, on the other 
 hand, he imagines it to he affected with joy he tvill he 
 sad ; and these affects ivill he greater or less in him 
 in proportion as their contraries are greater or iess 
 in the ohject he hates. 
 
 Demonst. — In so far as the hated thing is affected 
 with sorrow is it destroyed, and the destruction is greater 
 as the sorrow is greater (Schol. Prop. 11, pt. 3). He, 
 therefore (Prop. 20, pt. 3), who imagines that the thing 
 which he hates is affected with sorrow will on the con- 
 trary be affected with joy, and the joy will be the greater 
 in proportion as he imagines the hated thing to be affected 
 with a greater sorrow. This was the first thing to be 
 proved. Again, joy posits the existence of the thing 
 which rejoices (SchoL Prop. 11, pt. 3), and it does so 
 the more in proportion as the joy is conceived to be 
 greater. If a person, therefore, imagines that he whom 
 he hates is affected with joy, this idea (Prop, i 3, pt. 3) 
 will restrain the effort of the mind of him who hates, 
 that is to say (SchoL Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), he will be affected 
 with sorrow. — q.kd. 
 
 Schol. — This joy can hardly be solid and free from any 
 mental conflict. For, as I shall show directly in Prop. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 
 
 27, in so far as we imngine that what is like oursclvtii 
 is affected with sorrow, we nmst be sad ; and, 011 tlie con- 
 trary, if we imagine it to be affected with joy, we rejoice. 
 Here, however, we are considering merely hatred. 
 
 Prop. XXIV. — If we imagine that a person ajfccts vith 
 joy a thing lohich tve hate, we are therefore ajfatcd 
 with hatred toivards him. On the other haiul, if ire 
 imagine that he affects it with sorrow, ice are t/urc' 
 fore affected with love toivards him. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This proposition is proved in the same 
 manner as Prop. 22, pt. 3, which see. 
 
 Schol. — These and the like affects of hatred are related 
 to envy, which is therefore nothing but hatred in so far 
 as it is considered to dispose a man so that he rejoices 
 over the evil and is saddened by the good which befals 
 another. 
 
 Prop. XXV. — We endeawur to affirm everything, loth con- 
 cerning ourselves and concerning the beloved object which 
 we imagine will affect us or the object with joy, ami, 
 on the contrary, we endeavoiir to deny everything that 
 will effect either it or ourselves with sorroiv. 
 
 Bemonst. — Everything which we imagine as affecting 
 the beloved object with joy or sorrow affects us also with 
 joy or sorrow (Prop. 2 i, pt. 3). But the mind (Prop, i 2, 
 pt. 3) endeavours as much as it can to imagine those 
 things which affect us with joy, that is to say (Prop. 1 7, 
 pt. 2 and its CoroL), it endeavours to consider them as 
 present. On the contrary (Prop. 13, pt. 3), it endea- 
 vours to exclude the existence of what affects us with 
 sorrow : therefore we endeavour to affirm everything both 
 concerning ourselves and concerning the beloved object 
 which we imagine will affect us or it with joy, &c.— Q.K.i>. 
 
128 ETHIC. 
 
 Peop. XXVI. — If vje hate a thing, vje endeavour to affirm 
 concerning it everything ivhich we imagine will affect 
 it tvith sorroiu, and, on the other hand., to deny every- 
 thing concerning it ivhich vje imagine will affect it 
 with joy. 
 
 Demooist. — This proposition follows from Prop. 23, as 
 the preceding proposition follows from Prop. 2 i . 
 
 Schol. — We see from this how easily it may happen, 
 that a man should think too much of himself or of the 
 Ijeloved object, and, on the contrary, should think too 
 little of what he hates. When a man thinks too much 
 of himself, this imagination is called pride, and is a kind 
 of delirium, because he dreams with his eyes open, that 
 he is able to do all those things to which he attains in 
 imagination alone, regarding them therefore as realities, 
 and rejoicing in them so long as he cannot imagine any- 
 thing to exclude their existence and limit his power of 
 action. Pride, therefore, is that joy which arises from a 
 man's thinking too much of himself. The joy which 
 arises from thinking too much of another is called over- 
 estimation, and that which arises from thinking too little 
 of another is called contempt. 
 
 Prop. XXVII. — Although we may not have hccn moved 
 towards a thing by any affect, yet if it is like our- 
 selves, ivhenever we imagine it to he affected ty any 
 affect tve are therefore affected hy the same. 
 
 Bemonst. — The images of things are affections of the 
 human body, and the ideas of these affections represent to 
 us external bodies as if they were present (Schol. Prop. 1 7, 
 pt. 2), that is to say (Prop. 1 6, pt. 2), these ideas involve 
 both the nature of our own body and at the same time 
 the present nature of the external body. If, therefore, 
 the nature of the external body be like that of our body, 
 then the idea of the external body which we imagine 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 1:9 
 
 will involve an affection of our body like tliat of tho 
 external body. Therefore, if we imagine any one who 
 is like onrselves to be affected with any atrect, this 
 imagination will exj-jress an afiection of our body liko 
 that affect, and therefore we shall be affected with a 
 similar affect ourselves, because we imagine sometiiing liko 
 us to be affected with the same. If, on the other hand, 
 we hate a thing which is like ourselves, we shall so far 
 (Prop. 23, pt. 3) be affected with an affect contrary and 
 not similar to that with which it is affected. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — This imitation of affects, when it is connected 
 with sorrow, is called commiseration (see Schol. Prop. 22, 
 pt. 3), and where it is connected with desire is called 
 emulation, which is nothing else than the desire which is 
 engendered in ns for anything, because we imagine that 
 other persons, who are like ourselves, possess the same 
 desire. 
 
 Corol. I. — If we imagine that a person to whom we 
 have been moved by no affect, affects with joy a thing 
 which is like us, we shall therefore be affected with love 
 towards him. If, on the other hand, we imagine that he 
 affects it with sorrow, we shall be affected with hatred 
 towards him. 
 
 Bcmonst. — This Corol. follows from the preceding pro- 
 position, just as Prop. 22, pt. 3, follows from Prop. 21, 
 
 pt. 3- 
 
 Corol. 2. — If we pity a thing, the fact that its misery 
 affects us with sorrow will not make us hate it. 
 
 Demonst. — If we could hate the thing for this reason, 
 we should then (Prop. 23, pt. 3) rejoice over its sorrow, 
 which is contrary to the hypothesis. 
 
 Corol. 3. — If we pity a thing, we shall endeavour as 
 much as possible to free it from its misery. 
 
 Demonst. — That which affects with sorrow the thing 
 that we pity, affects us likewise with the same sorrow 
 (Prop. 27, pt. 3), and we shall, therefore, endeavour to 
 devise every means by which we may take away or destroy 
 
I30 ETHIC. 
 
 the existence of tlie cause of the sorrow (Prop, i 3, pt. 3) ; 
 that is to say (Schol. Prop. 9, pt. 3), we shall seek to 
 destroy it, or sliall be determined thereto, and therefore 
 we shall endeavour to free from its misery the thing 
 we pity. 
 
 Scliol. — This will or desire of doing good, arising from 
 our pity for the object which we want to benefit, is 
 called henevolence, which is, therefore, simply the desire 
 which arises from commiseration. AVith regard to the 
 love or hatred towards the person who has done good or 
 evil to the thing we imagine to be like ourselves, see 
 Schol. Prop. 22, pt. 3. 
 
 PiiOP. XXVIII. — IVe endeavour to hring into existence 
 everything icliicK we imagine conduces to joy, and to 
 remove or destroy everything oji-posed to it, or ivhich 
 conduces to sorroto. 
 
 Demonst. — We endeavour to imagine as much as pos- 
 sible all those things which we think conduce to joy 
 (Prop. 12, pt. 3), that is to say (Prop. 17, pt. 2), we 
 strive as much as possible to perceive them as present or 
 actually existing. But the mind's effort or power in 
 thinking is equal to and correspondent with the body's 
 effort or power in acting, as clearly follows from Corol. 
 Prop. 7, pt. 2, and CoroL Prop. 11, pt. 2, and therefore 
 absolutely whatever conduces to joy Ave endeavour to 
 make exist, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 9, pt. 3), we seek 
 after it and aim at it. This is the first thing which was 
 to be proved. Again, if we imagine that a thing which 
 we believe causes us sorrow, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 
 13, pt. 3), which we hate is destroyed, we shall rejoice 
 (Prop. 20, pt. 3), and therefore (by the first part of this 
 demonstration) we shall endeavour to destroy it, or (Prop. 
 I 3, pt. 3) to remove it from us, so that we may not per- 
 ceive it as present. This is the second thing which was 
 to be proved. We endeavour, therefore, to bring into 
 existence, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
ORIGIN AND XATCRE OF TUB AIFECTS. 131 
 
 PiiOP. XXIX. — We shall endeavour to do everything ichich 
 we imagine nien^ loill look upon with joy, and, on the 
 contrary, we slmll he averse to doing anything to which 
 
 we imagine men are averse. 
 
 Dcmonst. — If we imagine men to love or liate a thin?, 
 we shall therefore love or hate it (Prop. 27, pt. 3); that 
 is to say (Schol. Prop. 1 3, pt. 3), we shall tlierefore re- 
 joice or be sad at the presence of the thing, and therefore 
 (Prop. 28, pt. 3) everything which we imagine that men 
 love or look upon with joy, we shall endeavour to do, &c. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — This effort to do some things and omit 
 doing others, solely because we wish to please men, i.s 
 called avibition, especially if our desire to please tlio 
 common people is so strong that our actions or omissions 
 to act are accompanied with injury to ourselves or to 
 others. Otherwise this endeavour is usually called 
 humanity. Again, the joy with which we imagine 
 another person's action, the purpose of which is to 
 delight us, I call ^j^razsc, and the sorrow with whicli 
 we turn away from an action of a contrary kind 1 call 
 hlame. 
 
 Pkop. XXX. — If a person has done anything which he 
 imagines tvill affect others with joy, lie also will he 
 affected with joy, accompanied with an idea of himself 
 as its cause ; that is to say, he u'ill look upon himself 
 with joy. If, on the other hand, he has done any- 
 thvng tvhich he imagines will affect others with sorrow, 
 he will look up)on himself with surroiu. 
 
 Demonst — He who imagines that he affects others 
 with joy or sorrow will necessarily be affected with joy 
 or sorrow (Prop. 27, pt. 3). Lut since man is conscious 
 
 1 Both here and in what follows to whom we are moved by no alTtrt 
 I understand by the word men, men (Sp.) 
 
132 ETHIC. 
 
 of liimself (Props. 19 and 23, pt. 2) by means of the 
 affections by which he is determined to act; therefore 
 he who has done anything which he imagines will affect 
 others with joy will be affected with joy accompanied 
 with a consciousness of himself as its cause ; that is to 
 say, he will look upon himself with joy, and, on the 
 other hand, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — Since love (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3) is joy 
 attended with the idea of an external cause, and hatred 
 is sorrow attended with the idea of an external cause, 
 the joy and sorrow spoken of in this proposition will be 
 a kind of love and hatred. But because love and hatred 
 are related to external objects, we will therefore give a 
 different name to the affects which are the subject of 
 this proposition, and we will call this kind of joy which 
 is attended with the idea of an external cause sclf- 
 exaltation, and the sorrow oj)posed to it we will call 
 shame. The reader is to understand that this is the 
 case in which joy or sorrow arises because the man 
 believes that he is praised or blamed, otherwise I shall 
 call this joy accompanied with the idea of an external 
 cause contentment with one's-self, and the sorrow opposed 
 to it repentance. Again, since (Corol. Prop. 17, pt. 2) 
 it may happen that the joy with which a person 
 imagines that he affects other people is only imaginary, 
 and since (Prop. 25, pt. 3) every one endeavours to 
 imagine concerning himself what he supposes will affect 
 himself with joy, it may easily happen that the self- 
 exalted man becomes proud, and imagines that he 
 is pleasing everybody when he is offensive to every- 
 body. 
 
 Prop. XXXI. — If ive imagine that a person loves, desires, 
 or hates a thing which we ourselves love, desire, or 
 hate, we shall on that account love, desire, or hate the 
 thing more steadily. If, on the other hand, we imagine 
 that he is averse to the thing we love or loves the thing 
 
ORIGIX AXD NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 133 
 
 to n-kick we arc averse, ur shall tlini sufcr vacillation 
 
 of mind. 
 
 Dcmonst. — If we imagine tliat another person loves a 
 thing, on that very account we shall love it (I'rop. 27. 
 pt. 3). But we suppose that we love it independently 
 of this, and a new cause for our love is therefore added. 
 by which it is strengthened, and consequently the object 
 we love will be loved by us on this account the more 
 steadily. Again, if we imagine that a person is averse 
 to a thing, on that very account we shall be averse to it 
 (Prop. 27, pt. 3); but if we suppose that we at the same 
 time love it, we shall both love the thing and be averse 
 to it, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 17, pt. 3), we shall 
 suffer vacillation of mind. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol — It follows from this proposition and from Prop. 
 28, pt. 3, that every one endeavours as much as possible 
 to make others love what he loves, and to hate what he 
 hates. Hence the poet says — 
 
 " Speremus pariter, pariter metuainus amantes; 
 Ferreus est, si (|uis, ijuod siiiit aller, aiiiat." 
 
 This effort to make every one approve what we love or 
 hate is in truth ambition (Schoh Prop. 29, pt. 3), and so 
 we see that each person by nature desires that other 
 persons should live according to his way of thinking; 
 but if every one does this, then all are a hindrance to one 
 another, and if every one wishes to be praised or beloved 
 by the rest, tl^en they all hate one another. 
 
 PiiOP. XXXII. — If we imagine that a person delights in a 
 thing ivhich only one can jJossess, we do all u'c ran (0 
 lirevent his possessing it. 
 
 Dcmonst.— li we imagine that a person delights in a 
 thing, that will be a sufficient reason (Prop. 27, pt 3. 
 with Corol. i) for makmg us love the thing and desiring 
 
134 ETHIC. 
 
 to delight in it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine that 
 his delighting in the thing is an obstacle to our joy, and 
 therefore (Prop. 28, pt. 3) we endeavour to prevent his 
 possessing it. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Scliol. — We see, therefore, that the nature of man is 
 generally constituted so as to pity those who are in ad- 
 versity and envy those who are in prosperity, and (Prop. 
 32, pt. 3) he envies with a hatred which is the greater in 
 proportion as he loves what he imagines another possesses. 
 We see also that from the same property of human nature 
 I'rom which it follows that men pity one another it also 
 follows that they are envious and ambitious. If we will 
 consult experience, we shall find that she teaches the same 
 doctrine, especially if we consider the first years of our life. 
 For we find that children, because their body is, as it were, 
 continually in equilibrium, laugh and cry merely because 
 they see others do the same ; whatever else they see 
 others do they immediately wish to imitate ; everything 
 which they think is pleasing to other people they want. 
 And the reason is, as we have said, that the images of 
 things are the affections themselves of the human body, 
 or the ways in which it is affected by external causes 
 and disposed to this or that action. 
 
 Prop. XXXIII. — If ive love a thing which is like ourselves, 
 v-e endeavour as much as possible to make it love us 
 ill return. 
 
 Demonst. — We endeavour as much as possible to ima- 
 gine before everything else the thing we love (Prop, i 2, 
 pt. 3). If, therefore, it be like ourselves, we shall en- 
 deavour to affect it with joy before everything else (Prop. 
 29, pt. 3) ; that is to say, we shall endeavour as much as 
 possible to cause the beloved object to be affected with joy 
 attended with the idea of ourselves, or, in other words 
 (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), we try to make it love us in 
 return. — Q.E.D. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 135 
 
 Pkop. XXXI Y. — T/fc grcatci' the. ajfcd vUh vhich xrr 
 imagine that a beloved object is affected towards us, 
 the greater ivill be our seJf-excdtation. 
 
 Demonst. — We endeavour as much as possiMe to make 
 a beloved object love us in return (Prop. 33, pt. 3), that 
 is to say (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), to cause it to be 
 affected with joy attended with the idea of ourselves. 
 In proportion, therefore, as we iuiagine the beloved object 
 to be affected with a joy of which we are the cause, will 
 our endeavour be assisted, that is to say (Prop. 1 1 , pL 3 
 with Schol.), will be the greatness of the joy with which 
 we are affected. But since we rejoice because we have 
 affected with joy another person like ourselves, we shall 
 look upon ourselves with joy (Prop. 30, pt. 3); and 
 therefore the greater the affect with whicli we imagine 
 that the beloved object is affected towards us, the j^reater 
 will be the joy with which we shall look upon ourselves, 
 that is to say (Schol. Prop. 30, pt. 3), the greater will bo 
 our self-exaltation. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXXV. — Jf I imagine that an object hclored hj/ me 
 is iinited to another jJerson by the same, or by a closer 
 bond of friendship than that by which I myself (dont 
 held the object, I shcdl be affected with hatred towards 
 the beloved object itself and shall envy that other 
 person. 
 
 Demonst. — The greater the love M'itli wliich a person 
 imagines a beloved object to be affected towaixls him, the 
 greater will be his self-exaltation (Prop. 34, pt. 3), tlmt 
 is to say (Schol. Prop. 30, pt. 3), the more will he 
 rejoice. Therefore (Prop. 28, pt. 3) he will emleavour 
 as much as he can to imagine the beloved object united 
 to him as closely as possible, and this effort or desiro 
 is strengthened if he imagines that another pereon 
 
136 ETHIC. 
 
 desires for himself the same oLject (Prop. 31, pt. 3). 
 But- this effort or desire is supposed to be checked by 
 the image of the beloved object itself attended by the 
 image of the person whom it connects with itself. There- 
 fore (Schol. Prop. II, pt. 3) the lover on this account 
 will be affected with sorrow attended with the idea of the 
 beloved object as its cause together with the image of 
 another person; that is-^to say (Schoh Prop. 13, pt. 3), 
 he will be affected with hatred towards the beloved object 
 and at the same time towards this other person (Corol. 
 Prop. I5,pt. 3), whom he will envy (Proj). 23, pt. 3) as 
 being delighted with it. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — This hatred towards a beloved object when 
 joined with envy is called Jealousy, wdiich is there- 
 fore nothing but a vacillation of the mind springing from 
 the love and hatred both felt together, and attended with 
 the idea of another person whom we envy. Moreover, 
 this hatred towards the beloved object will be greater in 
 proportion to the joy with which the jealous man has been 
 usually affected from the mutual affection between him 
 and his beloved, and also in proportion to the affect with 
 which he had been affected towards the person who is 
 imagined to unite to himself the beloved object. Por if 
 he has hated him, he will for that very reason hate the 
 beloved object (Prop. 24, pt. 3), because he imagines it 
 to affect with joy that which he hates, and also (Corol. 
 Prop. 15, pt. 3) because he is compelled to connect the 
 image of the beloved object with the image of him whom 
 he hates. This feeling is generally excited when the 
 love is love towards a woman. The man who imagines 
 that the woman he loves prostitutes herself to another is 
 not merely troubled because his appetite is restrained, 
 but he turns away from her because he is obliged to con- 
 nect the image of a beloved object with the privy parts 
 and with what is excremental in another man ; and in 
 addition to this, the jealous person is not received with 
 the same favour which the beloved object formerly be- 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS, 137 
 
 stowed on him, — a new cause of sorrow to the luver, m 
 1 shall show. 
 
 Trot. XXXVI. — JIc ivho recollects a thing vith vhich hr 
 has once been clclighted, desires to possess it wil/i rrrrif 
 condition which existed when he was first dclighied 
 with it. 
 
 JDcmonst. — Whatever a man has seen toj^cthcr with an 
 ohject which has delighted him will be (rrop. i 5, pt 3) 
 contingently a cause of joy, and therefore (Prop. 28, pt. 3) 
 he will desire to possess it all, together witli the object 
 which has delighted him, that is to say, he will desire to 
 possess the object with every condition which existed whcu 
 he was first delighted with it. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — If, therefore, the lover discovers that one of 
 these conditions be wanting, he will be sad. 
 
 Dcmonst. — For in so far as he discovers that any one 
 condition is wanting does he imagine something whicli 
 excludes the existence of the object. But since (I'rop. 
 36, pt. 3) he desires the object or condition from love, ho 
 will therefore be sad (Prop. 19, pt. 3) in so far as lie 
 imagines that condition to be wanting. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — This sorrow, in so far as it is related to the 
 absence of what we love, is called longing. 
 
 I'rop. XXXVII. — The desire which springs from sorrow or 
 joy, from hatred or love, is greater in piroportion as the 
 
 affect is greater. 
 
 Demonsi. — Sorrow lessens or limits a man's power of 
 action (Schol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), that is to say (Prop. 7. pL 
 3), it lessens or limits the effort by wliich a man endea- 
 vours to persevere in his own being, and tlierefore (Prop. 5, 
 pt. 3) it is opposed to this effort ; consequently, if ft man 
 be affected with sorrow, the first thing lie attempts is to 
 remove that sorrow ; but (by the defmition of sorrow) 
 
138 ETHIC. 
 
 the greater it is, the greater is the human power of action 
 to which it must be opposed, and so much the greater, 
 therefore, will be the power of action with which the 
 man will endeavour to remove it ; that is to say (Schol. 
 Prop. 9, pt. 3), with the greater eagerness or desire will 
 he struggle to remove it. Again, since joy (Schol. Prop. 
 II, pt. 3) increases or assists a man's power of action, it 
 is easily demonstrated, by the same method, that there is 
 nothing which a man who is affected with joy desires 
 more than to preserve it, and his desire is in proportion 
 to his joy. Again, since hatred and love are themselves 
 affects either of joy or sorrow, it follows in the same 
 manner that the effort, desire, or eagerness which arises 
 from hatred or love will be greater in proportion to the 
 hatred or love. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXXVIII. — If a man lias begun to hate a helovccl 
 thing, so that his love to it is altogether destroyed, he 
 ivill for this very reason, hate it more than he would 
 have done if he had never loved it, and his hatred will 
 he in greater 2'>'>''oportion to his previous love. 
 
 Demonst. — If a man begins to hate a thing which he 
 loves, a constraint is put upon more appetites than if he 
 had never loved it. For love is joy (Schol. Prop. 13, 
 pt. 3), which a man endeavours to preserve as much as 
 possible (Prop. 28, pt. 3), both by looking on the beloved 
 object as present (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), and by affect- 
 ing it with joy as much as possible (Prop. 21, pt. 3); 
 this effort (Prop. 37, pt. 3) to preserve the joy of love 
 being the greater in proportion as his love is greater, 
 and so also is the effort to bring the beloved object to 
 love him in return (Prop. 33, pt. 3). But these efforts 
 are restrained by the hatred towards the beloved object 
 (Corol. Prop. 13, and Prop. 23, pt. 3) ; therefore the lover 
 (Schol. Prop. I I, pt. 3) for this reason also will be affected 
 with sorrow, and that the more as the love had been 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 139 
 
 greater ; that is to say, in adilition to tlie sorrow which wtui 
 the cause of the hatred there is anotlior i)roauce(l l.y his 
 having loved the object, and consequently he will con- 
 template with a greater affect of sorrow the beloved 
 object; that is to say (Schol. Trop. 13, pt. 3), he will hato 
 it more than he would have done if he had not loved it, 
 and his hatred will be in proportion to his previous 
 love. — Q.E.D 
 
 Prop. XXXIX. — If a man hates another Jic will cndca%y)ur 
 to do him evil, unless he fears a greater evil will there- 
 from arise to himself; ami, on the other hand, ht 
 who loves another will endeavour to do him fjoinl bi/ 
 
 the same rule. 
 
 Dcmonst. — To hate a person (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3) 
 is to imagine him as a cause of sorrow, and therefore 
 (Prop. 28, pt. 3) he who hates another will endea- 
 vour to remove or destroy him. But if he fears lest a 
 greater grief, or, which is the same thing, a greater evil, 
 should fall upon himself, and one wliich he thinks he 
 can avoid by refraining from inflicting the evil ho 
 meditated, he wall desire not to do it (Prop. 28, 
 pt. 3) ; and this desire will be stronger than the former 
 with which he was possessed of inflicting the evil, and 
 will prevail over it (Prop. 37, pt. 3). This is the first 
 part of the proposition. The second is demonstrated 
 in the same way. Therefore if a man hates another, &c. 
 — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — By good, I understand here every kind nf joy 
 and everything that conduces to it; chielly, however, 
 anything that satisfies longing, whatever that thing may 
 be. By evil, I understand every kind of sorrow, and 
 chiefly whatever thwarts longing. For we have shown 
 above (SchoL Prop. 9, pt. 3) that we do not desire o 
 thing because we adjudge it to be good, but, on the con- 
 trary, we call it good because we desire it, and couse- 
 
I40 ETHIC. 
 
 quently everything to wliicli we are averse we call evil. 
 Each person, therefore, according to his affect judges or 
 estimates what is good and what is evil, what is better 
 and what is worse, and what is the best and what is the 
 worst. Thus the covetous man thinks plenty of money 
 to be the best thing and poverty the worst. The ambitious 
 man desires nothing like glory, and on the other hand 
 dreads nothing like shame. To the envious person, again, 
 nothing is more pleasant than the misfortune of another, 
 and nothing more disagreeable than the prosperity of 
 another. And so each person according to his affect 
 judges a thing to be good or evil, useful or useless. We 
 notice, moreover, that this affect, by which a man is so 
 disposed as not to will the thing he wills, and to will 
 that which he does not will, is called fear, which may 
 therefore be defined as that apprehension which leads a 
 man to avoid an evil in the future by incurring a lesser 
 evil (Prop. 28, pt. 3). If the evil feared is shame, then 
 the fear is called modesty. If the desire of avoiding 
 the future is restrained by the fear of another evil, 
 so that the man does not know what he most wishes, 
 then this apprehension is called consternation, especially 
 if both the evils feared are very great. 
 
 Prop. XL. — If we imagine that we are hated hy another 
 unthoid having given him any cause for it, loe shall 
 hate him in return. 
 
 Demonst. — If we imagine that another person is 
 affected with hatred, on that account we shall also be 
 affected with it (Prop. 27, pt. 3) ; that is to say, we 
 shall be affected with sorrow (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), 
 accompanied with the idea of an external cause. But (by 
 hypothesis) we imagine no cause for this sorrow excepting 
 the person himself wlio hates us, and therefore, because we 
 imagine ourselves hated by another, we shall be affected 
 with sorrow accompanied with the idea of him who hates 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 14, 
 
 US ; that is to say (Scliol. Prop, i 3, j.t. 3), we shall halo 
 him. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — If we imagine that we have given just cause 
 for the hatred, we shall then (Prop. 30, pt. 3. with its 
 Schol.) be affected with shame. This, however (Prop. 25. 
 pt. 3), rarely happens. 
 
 This reciprocity of hatred may also arise from the fact 
 that hatred is followed by au attempt to bring evil' upon 
 him who is hated (Prop. 39, pt. 3). If, therefore, we ima- 
 gine that we are hated by any one else, we shall imagine 
 them as the cause of some evil or sorrow, and thus we 
 shall be affected with sorrow or apprehension accorapanied 
 with the idea of the person who hates us as a cause ; that 
 is to say, we shall hate him in return, as we have said 
 above. 
 
 Cowl. I. — If we imagine that the person we love is 
 affected with hatred towards us, vre shall be agitated at 
 the same time both with love and hatred. For in so far 
 as we imagine that we are hated are we determined (Prop. 
 40, pt. 3) to hate him in return. But (by hypothesis) wo 
 love him notwithstanding, and therefore we shall be agi- 
 tated both by love and hati-ed. 
 
 Corol. 2. — If we imagine that an evil has been brought 
 upon us through the hatred of some person towards whom 
 we have hitherto been moved by no affect, we shall 
 immediately endeavour to return that evil upon him. 
 
 Demoyist. — If we imagine that another person is 
 affected with hatred towards us, we shall hate him in 
 return (Prop. 40, pt. 3), and (Prop. 26, pt. 3) we sliall 
 endeavour to devise and (Prop. 39, pt. 3) bring ujton him 
 everything which can affect him with sorrow. But (by 
 hypothesis) the first thing of this kind we imagine is 
 the evil brought upon ourselves, and therefore we sliall 
 immediately endeavour to bring that upon him. — Q.E.I). 
 
 Schol — The attempt to bring evil on those we hate 
 is called anger, and the attempt to return the evil in- 
 flicted on ourselves is called tengeancc. 
 
142 ETHIC. 
 
 Prop. XLI. — If we imagine that we are hclovcd ly a per- 
 son without having given any cause for the love 
 (which may he the case hy Corol. Prop. 1$, pt. 3, a?id 
 by Prop. 1 6, pt. 3), loe shall love him in return. 
 
 Demonst — This proposition is demonstrated in tlie 
 same way as the preceding, to the scholium of which the 
 reader is also referred. 
 
 S>chol. — If we imagine that we have given just cause 
 for love, we shall pride ourselves upon it (Prop. 30, 
 pt. 3, with its Schol.) This frequently occurs (Prop. 25, 
 pt. 3), and we have said that the contrary takes place 
 when we believe that we are hated by another person 
 (Schol. Prop. 40, pt. 3). This reciprocal love, and conse- 
 quently (Prop. 39, pt. 3) this attempt to do good to the 
 person who loves us, and who (by the same Prop. 39, 
 pt. 3) endeavours to do good to us, is called thankful- 
 ness or gratitude, and from this we can see how much 
 readier men are to revenge themselves than to return a 
 benefit. 
 
 Oorol. — If we imagine that we are loved by a person 
 we. hate, we shall at the same time be agitated both by 
 love and hatred. This is demonstrated in the same way 
 as the preceding proposition. 
 
 Schol. — If the hatred prevail, we shall endeavour to 
 bring evil upon the person by whom we are loved. This 
 affect is called Cruelty, especially if it is believed that 
 the person who loves has not given any ordinary reason 
 for hatred. 
 
 Prop. XLII. — If, moved hy love or hope of self -exaltation, 
 we have conferred a favour upon another person, we 
 shall he sad if we see that the favour is received with 
 ingratitude. 
 
 Demonst. — If we love a thing which is of the same 
 nature as ourselves, we endeavour as much as possible to 
 
ORIGIN AXD NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. ,43 
 
 cause it to love us in return (rrop. ^^, pt 3). If wo 
 confer a favour, therefore, upon any one because of our love 
 towards him, we do it with a desire by which we aro 
 possessed that we may be loved in return ; that is to gay 
 (rrop. 34, pt. 3), from the hope of self-exaltation, or 
 (Schol. rrop. 30, pt. 3) of joy, and we shall consequelitly 
 (Prop. 1 2, pt. 3) endeavour as much as possible to ima- 
 gine this cause of self-exaltation, or to contenijilate it as 
 actually existing. But (by hypothesis) we imagine some- 
 thing else which excludes the existence of that cause, 
 and, therefore (Prop. 19, pt. 3), this will make us sad.— 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XLIII. — Hatred is increased throiujh return i^f 
 hatred, hut may he destroyed hy love. 
 
 Dcmonst. — If we imagine that the person we liate is 
 affected with hatred towards us, a new hatred is tliereby 
 produced (Prop. 40, pt. 3), the old hatred still remaining 
 (by hypothesis). If, on the other hand, we imagine him to 
 be affected with love towards us, in so far as we imagine 
 it (Prop. 30, pt. 3) shall we look upon ourselves with joy, 
 and endeavour (Prop. 29, pt. 3) to please him ; that is to 
 say (Prop. 41, pt. 3), in so far shall we endeavour not 
 to hate him nor to affect him with sorrow. This effort 
 (Prop. 37, pt. 3) will be greater or less as the affect from 
 which it arises is greater or less, and, therefore, should 
 it be greater than that which springs from hatred, and 
 by which (Prop. 26, pt. 3) we endeavour to affect with 
 sorrow the object we hate, then it will prevail and banish 
 hatred from the mind. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XLIY. — Hatred vjhich is altogether overcome hy lott 
 2KISSCS rata love, and the love is there/ore greater than 
 if hatred had not ^preceded it. 
 
 Deriionst. — The demonstration is of the same kiml as 
 
144 ETHIC. 
 
 that of Prop. 38, pt. 3. For if we begin to love a tliiug 
 which we hated, or upon which we were in the habit of 
 looking with sorrow, we shall rejoice for the very reason 
 that we love, and to this joy which love involves (see its 
 definition in the Schol. of Prop. 1 3, pt. 3) a new joy 
 is added, which springs from the fact that the effort to 
 remove the sorrow which hatred involves (Prop. 37, 
 pt. 3) is so much assisted, there being also present 
 before us as the cause of our joy the idea of the person 
 whom we hated. 
 
 Schol. — Notwithstanding the truth of this proposition, 
 no one wall try to hate a thing or will wish to be affected 
 with sorrow in order that he may rejoice the more ; that 
 is to say, no one will desire to inflict loss on himself in 
 the hope of recovering the loss, or to become ill in the 
 hope of getting well, inasmuch as every one will always 
 try to preserve his being and to remove sorrow from 
 himself as much as possible. Moreover, if it can be 
 imagined that it is possible for us to desire to hate a per- 
 son in order that we may love him afterwards the more, 
 we must always desire to continue the hatred. For tlie 
 love will be the greater as the hatred has been greater, 
 and therefore w^e shall always desire the hatred to be 
 more and more increased. Upon the same principle we 
 shall desire that our sickness may continue and increase 
 in order that we may afterwards enjoy the greater plea- 
 sure when we get well, and therefore we shall always 
 desire sickness, which (Prop. 6, pt. 3) is absurd. 
 
 Prop. XLV. — If ive imagine that any one like ourselves is 
 affected loith hatred toivards an ohjeet like ourselves 
 ivhich we love, we shall hate him. 
 
 Demonst. — The beloved object hates him who hates it 
 (Prop. 40, pt. 3), and therefore we who love it, who imagine 
 that any one hates it, imagine also that it is affected 
 with hatred; that is to say, with sorrow (Schol. Prop. 13, 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. ,4; 
 
 pt. 3), aud consequently (Prop. 21, pt. 3) we arc sn.l 
 our sadness being accompanied with the idea of the 
 person, as the cause thereof, who liatcs the beloved object ; 
 that is to say (Schol Prop. 13, pt. 3), we shall hate him! 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Peop. XLYL— If wt have been affected with j,vf or sor- 
 roio hy any one who Iclongs to a class or nation 
 different from our own, and if our joy or sorrow w 
 accompanied ivith the idea of this person as its catute, 
 under the common name of his class or nation, tr«f 
 shall not love or hate him merely, hit the whole of 
 the class or nation to which he hclonys. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This proposition is demonstrated in the 
 same way as Prop. 16, pt. 3. 
 
 PliOr. XL VI I. — Tlte joy which arises from onr imarfin- 
 ing that what ive hate has been destroyed or has been 
 injured is not unaccomixinied with some sorrow. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This is evident from Prop. 27, ])t. 3 ; for 
 in so far as we imagine an object like ourstdves allecteJ 
 with sorrow shall we be sad. 
 
 Schol. — This proposition may also be demonstrated 
 from Corol. Prop. 1 7, pt. 2. For as often as we recollect 
 the object, although it does not actually exist, we con- 
 template it as present, and the body is affected in the 
 same way as if it were present. Tiierefore, so long as 
 the memory of the object remains, we are so determined 
 as to contemplate it with sorrow, and this determination, 
 while the image of the object abides, is restrained by 
 the recollection of those things which exclude the e.\i.st- 
 ence of the object, but is not altogether removed. There- 
 fore we rejoice only so far as the deterniinatiou is 
 restrained, and hence it happens that the juy which 
 springs from the misfortune of the object we liate is re- 
 newed as often as we recollect the object. For, as wo 
 
 K 
 
146 ETHIC. 
 
 have already shown, whenever its image is excited, inas- 
 much as this involves the existence of the ohject, we are 
 so determined as to contemplate it with the same sorrow 
 with which we were accustomed to contemplate it when 
 it really existed. But because we have connected with 
 this image other images which exclude its existence, the 
 determination to sorrow is immediately restrained, and 
 we rejoice anew ; and this happens as often as this 
 repetition takes place. This is the reason why we rejoice 
 as often as we call to mind any evil that is past, and 
 why we like to tell tales about the dangers we have 
 escaped, since whenever we imagine any danger, we con- 
 template it as if it were about to be, and are so determined 
 as to fear it — a determination which is again restrained 
 by the idea of freedom, which we connected with the idea 
 of the danger when we were freed from it, and this idea of 
 freedom again makes us fearless, so that we again rejoice. 
 
 Peop. XLVIII. — Zove and hatred toivards any ohject, for 
 example, towards Peter, are destroyed if the joy and 
 the sorrotv which they respectively involve he joined to 
 the idea of another cause; and they are respectively 
 diminished in proportion as we ima/jine that Peter 
 has not been their sole cause. 
 
 Pemo?isf. — This is plain from the very definition of 
 love and hatred (see Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), joy being 
 called love to Peter and sorrow being called hatred to 
 him, solely because he is considered to be the cause of 
 this or that affect. Whenever, therefore, we can no 
 longer consider him either partially or entirely its cause, 
 the affect towards him ceases or is diminished. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XLIX. — For the same reason, love or hatred towards 
 an ohject vje imagine to he free must he greater than 
 towards an ohject which is under necessity. 
 
 Demonst. — An object which we imagine to be free must 
 
ORIGIN AXD NATURE OF THE AI-TLCIS. 147 
 
 (Uef. 7, pt. i) be perceived throu";!! itself ami without 
 others. If, therefore, we imagine it to be the cnuso of 
 joy or sorrow, w^e shall for that reason alone love or halo 
 it (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), and that too with the <,'reat«st 
 love or the greatest hatred which can spring from tlio 
 given affect (Prop. 48, pt. 3). But if wq iniagiiin that 
 the object which is the cause of that affect is necessary, 
 then (by the same Def. 7, pt. i) we shall imagine it as 
 the cause of that affect, not alone, but together with otlior 
 causes, and so (Prop. 48, pt. 3) our love or hatred towards 
 it will be less. — q.e.d. 
 
 Sc/iol. — Hence it follows that our hatred or love to- 
 wards one another is greater than towards otlior things, 
 because we think we are free. We must take into account 
 also the imitation of affects which we have discussed in 
 Props. 27, 34, 40, and 43, pt. 3. 
 
 Prop. L. — Anything may he, accidentally ihr mus, < illicr 
 of hope or fear. 
 
 This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as 
 Prop. 15, pt. 3, which see, together with Schol. 2, Trop. 
 18, pt. 3. 
 
 Schol. — Things which are accidentally the causes either 
 of hope or fear are called good or evil oinen.s. In so far 
 as the omens are the cause of hope and fear (by the Def. 
 of hope and fear in Schol. 2, Prop. 18, pt. 3) are they 
 the cause of joy or of sorrow, and consequently (Corol. 
 Prop. 15, pt. 3) so far do we love them or hate them, 
 and (Prop. 28, pt. 3) endeavour to use them as means to 
 obtain those things for which we hope, or to remove tliem 
 as obstacles or causes of fear. It follows, too, fr<jm Prop. 
 25, pt. 3, that our natural constitution is such that wo 
 easily believe the things we hope for, and believe with 
 difficulty those we fear, and that we think too much 
 of the former and too little of the latter. Tli»i3 have 
 superstitions arisen, by which men are everywh-T.' di.s- 
 
148 ETHIC. 
 
 quieted. I do not consider it worth while to go any 
 farther, and to explain here all those vacillations of 
 mind which arise from hope and fear, since it follows 
 from the definition alone of these affects that hope can- 
 not exist without fear, nor fear without hope (as we shall 
 explain more at length in the proper place). Besides, 
 in so far as we hope for a thing or fear it, we love it 
 or hate it, and therefore everything which has been 
 said about hatred and love can easily be applied to hope 
 and fear. 
 
 Pkop. LT. — Different men may he affected hy one mid the 
 same object in different ways, and the same maji may 
 he affected hy one and the same ohjcct in different 
 ways at different times. 
 
 Bcmonst. — Tlie human body (Post. 3, pt. 2) is affected 
 by external bodies in a number of ways. Two men, 
 tiierefore, may be affected in different ways at the same 
 time, and, therefore (Ax. i, after Lemma 3, following 
 Prop. 13, pt. 2), tliey can be affected by one and the 
 same object in different ways. Again (Post. 3, pt. 2), 
 the human body may be affected now in this and now in 
 that way, and consequently (by the axiom just quoted) 
 it may be affected by one and the same object in different 
 ways at different times. — q.e.d. 
 
 Bchol. — We thus see that it is possible for one man to 
 love a thing and for another man to hate it ; for this 
 man to fear what this man does not fear, and for the 
 same man to love what before he hated, and to dare to 
 do what before he feared. Again, since each judges 
 according to his own affect what is good and what is 
 evil, what is better and what is worse (Schol. Prop. 39, 
 pt. 3), it follows that men may change in their judgment 
 as they do in their affects,^ and hence it comes to pass that 
 when we compare men, we distinguish them solely by 
 
 1 That this may be the case, the divine intellect, we have shown 
 althuiiL;h the human mind is part of in Corol. Prop, ii, pt. 2 (Sp.) 
 
ORIGIN AND XATURE OF THE AFFECTS. t^) 
 
 the difference in their affects, callini; some brave, otlh-rs 
 timid, and others by other names. For cxanipU', I slmll 
 call a man hrave who despises an evil which I usually fear, 
 and if, besides this, I consider the fact that his desire of 
 doing evil to a person whom he hates or doing goc.d to 
 one whom he loves is not restrained by that fear of evil 
 by which I' am usually restrained, I call him aiofnrums. 
 On the other hand, the man who fears an evil wliich I 
 usually despise will appear timid, and if, besides this, I 
 consider that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil 
 which has no power to restrain me, I call him pu.fil- 
 lanimous ; and in this way everybody will pass judgment. 
 Finally, from this nature of man and the inconstancy of 
 his judgment, in consequence of wliich he often judges 
 things from mere affect, and the things which he believes 
 contribute to his joy or his sorrow, and which, therefore, 
 he endeavours to bring to pass or remove (Prop. 28, pt. 3), 
 are often only imaginary — to say nothing about what wo 
 have demonstrated in the Second Part of this book about 
 the uncertainty of things — it is easy to see that a man 
 may often be himself the cause of his sorrow or his joy, 
 or of being affected with sorrow or joy accomi-anied with 
 the idea of himself as its cause, so that we can easily 
 understand what repentance and what self-approval are. 
 Piepentance is sorrow accompanied with the idea of ones 
 self as the cause, and self-approval is joy accompanied 
 with the idea of one's self as the cause ; and these alVeels 
 are very intense because men believe themselves free 
 (Prop. 49, pt. 3). 
 
 Prop. LI I. — An object which v.-c have sent, hrfure tofjtthn- 
 ivith other objects, or tvhich v:e imarjinc posnessfH 
 nothinrj which is not common to it with many othrr 
 objects, we shall not contemplate so long as that w/iir/t 
 
 we imar/ine jjossesscs somcthinrj prruhar. 
 
 Dcmonst. — Whenever we imagine an object whicli wo 
 
I50 ETHIC. 
 
 have seen with others, we immediately call these to mind 
 (Prop. 1 8, pt. 2, with Schol.), and thus from the con- 
 templation of one object we immediately fall to contem- 
 plating another. This also is our way with an object 
 which we imagine to possess nothing except what is 
 common to a number of other objects. For this is the 
 same thing as supposing that we contemplate nothing in 
 it which we have not seen before with other objects. 
 On the other hand, if we suppose ourselves to imagine in 
 an object something peculiar which we have never seen 
 before, it is the same as saying that the mind, while it 
 contemplates that object, holds nothing else in itself to 
 the contemplation of which it can pass, turning away 
 from the contemplation of the object, and therefore it is 
 determined to the contemplation solely of the object. 
 Therefore an object, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — This affection of the mind or imagination of a 
 particular thing, in so far as it alone occupies the mind, 
 is called astonishment, and if it is excited by an object 
 we dread, we call it consternation, because astonishment 
 at the evil so fixes us in the contemplation of itself, that 
 we. cannot think of anything else by which we might 
 avoid the evil. On the other hand, if the objects at 
 which we are astonished are human wisdom, industry, or 
 anything of this kind, inasmuch as we consider that their 
 possessor is by so much superior to ourselves, the astonish- 
 ment goes by the name of veneration ; whilst, if the 
 objects are human anger, envy, or anything of this sort, 
 it goes by the name of liorror. Again, if we are 
 astonished at the wisdom or industry of a man we love, 
 then our love on that account (Prop. 12, pt. 3) will be 
 greater, and this love, united to astonishment or venera- 
 tion, we call elevotion. In the same manner it is possible 
 to conceive of hatred, hope, confidence, and other affects 
 being joined to astonishment, so that more affects may 
 be deduced than can be named by the received vocabu- 
 lary. From this we see that names have been invented 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. J51 
 
 for afiects from common usage, ratlior than from accurate 
 knowledge of them. 
 
 To astonishment is opposed contempt, which is usually 
 caused, nevertheless, by our being determined to astonish- 
 ment, love, or fear towards an object either because we see 
 that another person is astonished at, loves or fears this 
 same object, or because at first sight it appears like other 
 objects, at which we are astonished or which we love or 
 fear (Prop. 15, with Corol. pt. 3, and Prop. 27, pt 3). 
 But if the presence of the object or a more careful con- 
 templation of it should compel us to deny that there 
 exists in it any cause for astonishment, love, fear, &c., 
 then from its presence itself, the mind remains deter- 
 mined to think rather of those things which are not in 
 it than of those which are in it, although from the pre- 
 sence of an object the mind is accustomed to think chiefly 
 about what is in the object. We may also observe that 
 as devotion springs from astonishment at a tiling we love, 
 so derision springs from the contempt of a thing we hate 
 or fear, whilst scoim arises from tlie contempt of folly, as 
 veneration arises from astonishment at wisdom. "We may 
 also conceive of love, hope, glory, and other affects being 
 joined to contempt, and thus deduce other affects which also 
 we are not in the habit of distinguishing by separate words. 
 
 Prop. LIII. — When the mind contemplates itself and its 
 oivn iJoiver of acting, it rejoices, and it rejoices in 
 proportion to the distinctness with which it imai/iius 
 
 itself and its power of action. 
 
 Demonst. — Man has no knowledge of himself except 
 through the affections of his own body and their idcjis 
 (Props. 19 and 23, pt. 2) ; whenever, therefore, it hapiHjn.-J 
 that the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby sujh 
 posed to pass to a greater perfection, that is to say (SchoL 
 Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), it is supposed to be affected with joy. 
 and the joy is greater in proportion to the distinctness with 
 
153 ETHIC. 
 
 •which it imagines itself and its power of action. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — The more a man imagines that he is praised 
 by other men, the more is this joy strengthened ; for 
 the more a man imagines that he is praised by others, 
 the more does he imagine that he affects others with joy 
 accompanied by the idea of himself as a cause (Schol. 
 Prop. 29, pt. 3), and therefore (Prop. 27, pt. 3) he is 
 affected with greater joy accompanied with the idea of 
 himself. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Peop. LIV. — The mind endeavours to imagine those things 
 only v:hich j^osit its power of acting. 
 
 Demonst. — The effort or power of the mind is the 
 essence of the mind itself (Prop. 7, pt. 3), but the essence 
 of the mind, as is self-evident, affirms only that which 
 the mind is and is able to do, and does not affirm that 
 which the mind is not and cannot do, and therefore the 
 mind endeavours to imagine those things only which 
 affirm or posit its power of acting. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. LV. — When the mind imagines its own weahncss if 
 7ieccssarily sorrovjs. 
 
 Demonst. — The essence of the mind affirms only that 
 which the mind is and is able to do, or, in other words, 
 it is the nature of the mind to imagine those things only 
 which posit its power of acting (Prop, 54, pt. 3). If we 
 say, therefore, that the mind, while it contemplates itself, 
 imagines its owm weakness, we are merely saying in other 
 words that the effort of the mind to imagine something 
 which posits its power of acting is restrained, that is to 
 say (Schol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), the mind is sad. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — This sorrow is strengthened in proportion as 
 the mind imagines that it is blamed by others. This is 
 demonstrated in the same way as Corol. Prop. 53, pt. 3. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 153 
 
 ScJwI. — This sorrow, accompanied \vitli tlie i.lea of 
 our own weakness, is called humiUfy, and the joy which 
 arises from coutemplating ourselves is called sdf-Unx or 
 self-approval. Inasmuch as this joy recurs as often as 
 a man contemplates his own virtues or his own power of 
 acting, it comes to pass that every one loves to tell of 
 his own deeds, and to display the powers both of his 
 body and mind ; and that for this reason men become an 
 annoyance to one another. It also follows that men aro 
 naturally envious (Schol. Prop. 24, and Schol. Prop. 32, 
 pt. 3), that is to say, they rejoice over the weaknesses of 
 their equals and sorrow over their virtues. For whenever 
 a person imagines his own actions he is affected with joy 
 (Prop. 53, pt. 3), and his joy is the greater in proportion 
 as he imagines that his actions express more i)erfection, 
 and he imagines them more distinctly ; that is to .say (hy 
 what has been said in Schol. i. Prop. 40, pt. 2), in pro- 
 portion as he is able to distinguish them from others, and 
 to contemplate them as individual objects. A man's joy 
 in contemplating himself will therefore be greatest when 
 he contemplates something in himself which lie denies 
 of other people. For if he refers that which he artirms of 
 himself to the universal idea of man or of animal nature, 
 he will not so much rejoice; on the other hand, he will 
 be sad if he imagines that his own actions when compared 
 with those of other people are weaker than theirs, and 
 this sorrow he will endeavour to remove (Prop. 28, pt 3), 
 either by misinterpreting the actions of his equals, or giving 
 as great a lustre as possible to his own. It appears, there- 
 fore, that men are by nature inclined to hatred and envy, 
 and we must add that their education assists them in 
 this propensity, for parents are accustomed to excite their 
 children to follow virtue by the stimulus of honour and 
 envy alone. But an objection perhaps may be rai-sed that 
 we not unfrequently venerate men and admire their 
 virtues. In order to remove this objection I will add tlie 
 following corollary. 
 
154 ETHIC. 
 
 Corol. — No one envies the virtue of a person who is 
 not his equal. 
 
 Dcmond. — Envy is nothing but hatred (Schol. Prop. 
 24, pt. 3), that is to say (Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 3), sorrow, 
 or, in other words (Schol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), an affection 
 l)y which the effort of a man or his power of action is 
 restrained. But (Schol. Prop. 9, pt. 3) a man neither 
 endeavours to do nor desires anything excepting what 
 can follow from his given nature, therefore a man will 
 not desire to af&rm of himself any power of action, or, 
 which il||^'the same thing, any virtue which is peculiar 
 to another nature and foreign to his own. His desire, 
 therefore, cannot be restrained, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 
 1 1, pt. 3), he cannot feel any sorrow because he contem- 
 plates a virtue in another person altogether unlike himself, 
 and consequently he cannot envy that person, but will 
 only envy one who is his own equal, and who is supposed 
 to possess the same nature. 
 
 Scliol. — Since, therefore, we have said in Schol. Prop. 
 52, pt. 3, that we venerate a man because we are astonished 
 at his wisdom and bravery, &c., this happens because 
 (as is evident from the proposition itself) we imagine 
 that he specially possesses these virtues, and that they 
 are not common to our nature. We therefore envy them 
 no more than we envy trees their height or lions their 
 bravery. 
 
 Prop. LVI. — Of joy, sorrow, and desire, and consequently 
 of every affect which either, like vacillation of mind, 
 is compounded of these, or, like love, hatred, hope, and 
 fear, is derived from them, there are just as many 
 kinds as there are kinds of objects by which ive are 
 affected. 
 
 Dcmonst. — Joy and sorrow, and consequently the affects 
 which are compounded of these or derived from them, 
 are passions (Schol. Prop. 11, pt. 3). But (Prop, i, pt. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE .1/-T£fi^.-- ,j; 
 
 3) we necessarily suffer in so far as we have ihai(oiiimt4i 
 ideas, and (Prop. 3, pt. 3) only in so far as wc haw 
 them ; that is to say (see Schol, Prop. 40, i)t. 2), wi; 
 necessarily suffer only in so far as we ima^'ino, or (seu 
 Prop. 17, pt. 2, with its Schol.) in so far as we are 
 affected with an affect which involves the nature of our 
 body and that of an external body. The nature, therefoR', 
 of eacli passion must necessarily be explaiued iu sucli a 
 manner, that the nature of the object by whicli we are 
 affected is expressed. The joy, for example, wliith sprini^s 
 from an object A. involves the nature of that dijjoct A., 
 and the joy which springs from B. involves tile nature of 
 that object B., and therefore these two affects of joy an» 
 of a different nature, because they arise from causes of a 
 different nature. In like manner the affect of sorrow 
 which arises from one object is of a different kind from 
 that which arises from another cause, and the same tiling 
 is to be understood of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacilhition 
 of mind, &c. ; so that there are necessarily just as many 
 kinds of joy, sorrow, love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds 
 of objects by whicli vre are affected. But desire is the 
 essence itself or nature of a person in so far as this nature 
 is conceived from its given constitution as determined 
 towards any action (Schol. Prop. 9, pt. 3), and therefore as 
 a person is affected by external causes with this or tliat 
 kind of joy, sorrow, love, hatred, &c., that is to say, as his 
 nature is constituted iu this or that way, so umst his 
 desire vary and the nature of one desire differ from that of 
 another, just as the affects from which each desire arises 
 differ. There are as many kinds of desires, therefore, as 
 there are kinds of joy, sorrow, love, &c., and, consc(iuenlly 
 (as we have just shown), as there are kinds of objects by 
 which we are affected. — Q.E.D. 
 
 /S'c/w^.— Amongst the different kinds of affects, which 
 (by the preceding Prop.) must be very great in nuniher, the 
 most remarkable are voluptuoiisness, drunkcmuss, lust, 
 avarice, and amhUlon, which are notliing but uotioua 
 
156 ETHIC. 
 
 of love or desire, which exphaiu the nature of this or 
 that affect through the objects to which they are related. 
 For by voluptuousness, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and 
 ambition we understand nothing but an immoderate love 
 or desire for good living, for drinking, for women, for 
 riches, and for glory. It is to be observed that these af- 
 fects, in so far as we distinguish them by the object alone 
 to which they are related, have no contraries. For tem- 
 pcranee, sobriety, and chastity, which we are in the habit 
 of opposing to voluptuousness, drunkenness, and lust, 
 are not affects nor passions : but merely indicate the 
 power of the mind which restrains these affects. 
 
 The remaining kinds of affects I cannot explain here (for 
 they are as numerous as are the varieties of objects), nor, 
 if I could explain them, is it necessary to do so. For it 
 is sufficient for the purpose we have in view, the deter- 
 mination, namely, of the strength of the affects and the 
 mind's powder over them, to have a general definition of 
 each kind of affect. It is sufficient for us, I say, to under- 
 stand the common properties of the mind and the affects, 
 so that we may determine what and how great is the 
 power of the mind to govern and constrain the affects. 
 Although, therefore, there is a great difference between 
 this or that affect of love, of hatred, or of desire — 
 for example, between the love towards children and the 
 love towards a wife — it is not worth while for us to take 
 cognisance of these differences, or to investigate the nature 
 and origin of the aff'ects any furtlier. 
 
 PPtOP. LVII. — The affect of one 'person differs from the cor- 
 responding affect of a.nother as much as the essence of 
 the one p)crson differs from that of the other. 
 
 Demonst.— This proposition is evident from Ax. i, 
 following Lem. 3, after Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 2. Neverthe- 
 less, we will demonstrate it from the definitions of the 
 three primitive affects. All affects are related to desire, 
 
ORIGIN AND XATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 157 
 
 joy, or sorrow, as the definitions show wliich wo hnve 
 given of those affects. But desire is the very nature or 
 essence of a person (Schoh Prop. 9, pt. 3), and therefore 
 the desire of one person differs from the desire of 
 another as much as the nature or essence of tlic one 
 differs from that of the other. Again, joy and sorrow arc 
 passions by wliich the power of a person or Ids effort to 
 persevere in his own being is increased or diminished, 
 helped, or limited (Prop. 11, pt. 3, with its Schol.) 
 But by the effort to persevere in his own being, in so far 
 as it is related at the same time to the mind and the 
 body, we understand appetite and desire (Schol. Prop. 9, 
 pt. 3), and therefore joy and sorrow are desire or appetite 
 in so far as the latter is increased, diminished, helped, 
 or limited by external causes ; that is to say (Schol. 
 Prop. 9, pt. 3), they are the nature itself of eacli person. 
 
 The joy or sorrow of one person therefore differs from 
 the joy or sorrow of another as much as the nature or 
 essence of one person differs from that of the other, and 
 consequently the affect of one person differs from the 
 corresponding affect of another, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 ScJwl. — Hence it follows that the affects of animals 
 which are called irrational (for after we have learnt the 
 origin of the mind we can in no way doubt that brutes 
 feel) differ from human affects as much as the nature of 
 a brute differs from that of a man. Both the man and 
 the horse, for example, are swayed by the lust to proi)a- 
 gate, but the horse is swayed by equine lust and the man 
 by that which is human. The lusts and appetites of 
 insects, fishes, and birds must vary in the same way ; and 
 so, although each individual lives contented with its own 
 nature and delights in it, nevertheless the life with which 
 it is contented and its joy are nothing but tlie idea or soul 
 of that individual, and so the joy of one differs in diaracter 
 from the joy of the other as much as the essence of the one 
 differs from the essence of the otlier. Finally, it follows 
 from the preceding proposition that the joy by which tho 
 
158 ETHIC. 
 
 drunkard is enslaved is altogether different from the 
 joy which is the portion of the philosopher, — a thing I 
 wished just to hint in passing. So much, therefore, for 
 the affects which are related to man in so far as he suffers. 
 It remains that I should say a few words about those 
 things which are related to him in so far as he acts. 
 
 Peop. LYIII. — Besides the Joys and sorroius which are 
 passions, there are other affects of joy and sorrow which 
 are i^elated to 2cs in so far as ive act. 
 
 Bemonst. — When the mind conceives itself and its 
 own power of acting, it is rejoiced (Prop. 53, pt. 3). 
 But the mind necessarily contemplates itself whenever 
 it conceives a true or adequate idea (Prop. 43, pt. 2); 
 and as (Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2) it does conceive some 
 adequate ideas, it is rejoiced in so far as it conceives 
 them, or, in other words (Prop, i, pt. 3). in so far as it 
 acts. Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and 
 distinct ideas and in so far as it has confused ideas, en- 
 deavours to persevere in its own being (Prop. 9, pt. 3). 
 But by this effort we understand desire (Schol. Prop. 9, 
 pt. 3), and therefore desire also is related to us in so far 
 as we think ; that is to say (Prop.i, pt, 3), in so far as 
 we act. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. LIX. — Amongst all the affects which are related to 
 the mind in so far as it acts, there are none which are 
 not related to joy or desire. 
 
 Bemonst. — All the affects are related to desire, joy, or 
 sorrow, as the definitions we have given of them show. 
 By sorrow, however, we understand that the mind's power 
 of acting is lessened or limited (Prop. 11, pt. 3, and its 
 Schol.), and therefore, in so far as the mind suffers 
 sorrow is its power of thinking, that is to say (Prop, i, 
 pt. 3), its power of acting, lessened or limited. There- 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 159 
 
 fore no affects of sorrow can be related to the niiinl in 
 so far as it acts, but only affects of joy and di'sire, whicli 
 (by the preceding Prop.) are also so far related to the 
 mind. — q.e.d. 
 
 Sc/iol. — All the actions which follow from the affects 
 which are related to the mind in so far as it thinks I 
 ascribe to fortitude, which I divide into strength of mind 
 (cinimositas) and generosity. By strength of mind, I nioun 
 the desire by which each person endeavours from the 
 dictates of reason alone to preserve his own being. I5y 
 generosity, I mean the desire by which from the dictates 
 of reason alone each person endeavours to help other 
 people and to join them to him in friendship. Those 
 actions, therefore, which have for their aim the advantapo 
 only of the doer I ascribe to strength of mind, wliilst 
 those which aim at the advantage of others I ascribe l«» 
 generosity. Temperance, therefore, sobriety, and presence 
 of mind in danger, are a species of strength of mind, while 
 moderation and mercy are a species of generosity. 
 
 I have now, I think, explained the princi])al affects 
 and vacillations of the mind which are compounded of 
 the three primary affects, desire, joy, and sorrow, ami 
 have set them forth through their first causes. From 
 what has been said it is plain that we are disturbed 
 by external causes in a number of ways, and that, like 
 the waves of the sea agitated by contrary winds, wo 
 fluctuate in our ignorance of our future and destiny. I 
 have said, however, that I have only explained the jirin- 
 cipal mental complications, and not all which may exist. 
 For by the same method which we have pursued above 
 it would be easy to show that love unites it.self to re- 
 pentance, scorn, shame, &c. ; but I think it has already 
 been made clear to all that the affects can be combined 
 in so many ways, and that so many variations can arise, 
 that no limits can be assigned to their number. It is 
 sufficient for my purpose to have enumerated only tho.H« 
 which are of consequence; the rest, of which 1 have 
 
i6o ETHIC. 
 
 taken no notice, being more curious than important. 
 There is one constantly recurring characteristic of love 
 which I have yet to notice, and that is, that while we are 
 enjoying the thing which we desired, the body acquires 
 from that fruition a new disposition by which it is 
 otherwise determined, and the images of other things are 
 excited in it, and the mind begins to imagine and to 
 desire other things. For example, when we imagine 
 anything which usually delights our taste, we desire 
 to enjoy it by eating it. But whilst we enjoy it the 
 stomach becomes full, and the constitution of the body 
 becomes altered. If, therefore, the body being now other- 
 wise disposed, the image of the food, in consequence of 
 its being present, and therefore also the effort or desire to 
 eat it, become more intense, then this new disposition of 
 the body will oppose this effort or desire, and consequently 
 the presence of the food which we desired will become 
 hateful to us, and this hatefulness is what we call loathing 
 or disgust. As for the external affections of the body 
 which are observed in the affects, such as trembling, pale- 
 ness, sobbing, laughter, and the like, I have neglected 
 to notice them, because they belong to the body alone 
 without any relationship to the mind. A few things 
 remain to be said about the definitions of the affects, and 
 I will therefore here repeat the definitions in order, ap- 
 pending to them what is necessary to be observed in each. 
 
 The Affects. — Def. I. — Desire is the essence itself 
 of man in so far as it is conceived as determined to any 
 action by any one of his affections. 
 
 Ex'planation. — We have said above, in the Schol. of 
 Prop. 9, pt. 3, that desire is appetite which is self-con- 
 scious, and that appetite is the essence itself of man in so 
 far as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his 
 preservation. But in the same scholium I have taken care 
 to remark that in truth I cannot recognise any difference 
 between human appetite and desire. For whether a man 
 be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. ,6i 
 
 the same appetite, and so, lest I might appear to Iw j:uiltv 
 of tautology, I have not exphiined desire by appetite, but 
 have tried to give such a delinitiou of desire as woiilj 
 include all the efforts of human nature to which we "ivo 
 the name of appetite, desire, will, or impulse. For I 
 might have said that desire is the essence itself of man 
 in so far as it is considered as determined to any action ; 
 hut from this definition it would not follow (I'rop. 23, 
 pt. 2) that the mind could be conscious of its desire or 
 appetite, and therefore, in order that I might include 
 the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the 
 same proposition) to add the words, in so far an it w 
 conceived as determined to any action hj any one of his 
 affections. For by an affection of the human essence we 
 understand any constitution of that essence, whether it 
 be innate, whether it be conceived through the attribute 
 of thought alone or of extension alone, or whether it be 
 related to both. By the word "desire," therefore, I 
 understand all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and voli- 
 tions of a man, which vary according to his changing 
 disposition, and not unfrequently are so opposed to one 
 another that he is drawn hither and thither, and knows 
 not whither he ought to turn. 
 
 II, Joy is man's passage from a less to a greater per- 
 fection. 
 
 III. Sorroiu is man's passage from a greater to a less 
 perfection. 
 
 Explanation. — I say passage, for joy is not perfection 
 itself. If a man were born with the perfection to which 
 he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy ; 
 a truth which will appear the more clearly from tlio 
 affect of sorrow, which is the opposite to joy. For that 
 sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but 
 not in the less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in 
 so far as a man shares any perfection he cannot bo sail. 
 Nor can we say that sorrow consists in tlie privation of 
 a greater perfection, for privation is nothing. But the 
 
1 62 ETHIC. 
 
 affect of sorro-w is a reality, and it therefore must be the 
 reality of the passage to a lesser perfection, or the reality 
 by which man's power of acting is diminished or limited 
 (Schol. Prop. II, pt. 3). As for the definitions of cheer- 
 fulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, and grief, I 
 pass these by, because they are related rather to the body 
 than to the mind, and are merely different kinds of joy 
 or of sorrow. 
 
 TV. Asto7iisJimcnt is the imagination of an object in 
 which the mind remains fixed because this particular 
 imagination has no connection with others. 
 
 Explanation. — In the Schol. of Prop. 18, pt. 2, we 
 liave shown that that which causes the mind from the 
 contemplation of one thing immediately to pass to the 
 thought of another is that the images of these things 
 are connected one with the other, and are so arranged 
 that the one follows the other; a process which can- 
 not be conceived when the image of the thing is new, 
 for the mind will be held in the contemplation of the 
 same object until other causes determine it to think of 
 other things. The imagination, therefore, considered in 
 itself, of a new object is of the same character as other 
 imaginations ; and for this reason I do not class astonish- 
 ment among the affects, nor do I see any reason why I 
 should do it, since this abstraction of the mind arises 
 from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from 
 other things, but merely from the absence of any cause 
 by which from the contemplation of one thing the mind 
 is determined to think other things, I acknowledge, 
 therefore (as I have shown in Schol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), 
 only three primitive or primary affects, those of joy, sorrow, 
 and desire ; and the only reason which has induced me 
 to speak of astonishment is, that it has been the custom 
 to give other names to certain affects derived from the 
 three primitives whenever these affects are related to 
 objects at which we are astonished. This same reason 
 also induces me to add the definition of contempt. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF 111 II Am 
 
 ;cn. 
 
 V. Contempt is the imagination of an object wl.Jch 
 so little touches the mind that tl.e mind is movoil by 
 the presence of the object to inia-iue those qualitie-H 
 which are not iu it rather than tlioso wliich are in it. 
 (See Schol. Prop. 52, pt. 3.) 
 
 The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass by 
 here, because they give a name, so far as 1 know, to 
 none of the affects. 
 
 VI. Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an 
 external cause. 
 
 JExplanation. — This definition explains with sunicient 
 clearness the essence of love; that which is given by 
 some authors, who define love to be the will of the 
 lover to unite himself to the beloved object, expressing 
 not the essence of love but one of its properties, and in a.s 
 much as these authors have not seen with sufHcient clear- 
 ness what is the essence of love, they could not have 
 a distinct conception of its properties, and consequently 
 their definition has by everybody been thought very ob- 
 scure. I must observe, however, when I say that it is a 
 property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, 
 that I do not understand by will a consent or delilK-Mlion 
 or a free decree of the mind (for that this is a fiction wo 
 have demonstrated in Prop. 48, pt. 2), nor even a desire 
 of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when 
 it is absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when 
 it is present, for love can be conceived without either one 
 or the other of these desires ; but by will I understand 
 the satisfaction that the beloved object produces iu tiio 
 lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the 
 lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported. 
 
 VII. Hatred is sorrow with the accoiiii)anying idea of 
 an external cause. 
 
 Uxplanation. — What is to be observed here will i-'a-iiy 
 be seen from what has been said in the explanation of 
 the preceding definition. (See, moreover, Schol. Prop, i 3, 
 pt. 3) 
 
1 64 ETHIC 
 
 VIII. Inclination (jj»?'q2JC7iszo) is joy with the accom- 
 panying idea of some object as being accidentally the 
 cause of the joy. 
 
 IX. Aversion is sorrow with the accompanying idea 
 of some object which is accidentally the cause of the 
 sorrow. (See Schol. Prop. 15, pt. 3.) 
 
 X. Devotion is love towards an object which aston- 
 ishes us. 
 
 Explanation. — That astonishment arises from the 
 novelty of the object we have shown in Prop. 52, pt. 3. 
 If, therefore, it should happen that we often imagine the 
 object at which we are astonished, we shall cease to be 
 astonished at it, and hence we see that the affect of 
 devotion easily degenerates into simple love. 
 
 XL Derision is joy arising from the imagination that 
 something we despise is present in an object we hate. 
 
 Explanation. — In so far as we despise a thing we hate 
 do we deny its existence (Schol. Prop. 52, pt. 3), and so 
 far (Prop. 20, pt. 3) do we rejoice. But inasmuch as 
 we suppose that a man hates what he ridicules, it 
 follows that this joy is not solid. (See Schol. Prop. 47, 
 
 pt. 30 
 
 XII. Hope is a joy not constant, arising from the idea 
 of something future or past, about the issue of which we 
 sometimes doubt. 
 
 XIII. Fear is a sorrow not constant, arising from the 
 idea of something future or past, about tlie issue of 
 which we sometimes doubt. (See Schol. 2, Prop. 18, 
 
 pt. 3-) 
 
 Explanation. — From these definitions it follows that 
 there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope, for 
 the person who wavers in hope and doubts concerning 
 the issue of anything is supposed to imagine something 
 which may exclude its existence, and so far, therefore, 
 to be sad (Prop. 19, pt. 3), and consequently while he 
 wavers in hope, to fear lest his wishes should not be 
 accomplished. So also the person who fears, that is 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF Til II Al'riXTS. tft 
 
 to sa}^ who doubts whether avIkU he liatcs will not 
 come to pass, imagines something wliich oxdiulcs the 
 existence of what he hates, and therefore (Prop. 20, pt, 
 3) is rejoiced, and consequently so far hopes that it will 
 not happen. 
 
 XIV. Confidence is joy arishig from tlic idea of a 
 past or future object from whicli cause for doubtiii" is 
 removed. 
 
 XV. Despair is sorrow arising from the idea of a pa-st 
 or future object from wliich cause for doubting is removed. 
 
 Explanation. — Confidence, therefore, springs from hope 
 and despair from fear, whenever the reason for d(iul»tin'» 
 the issue is taken away; a case which occurs either because 
 we imagine a thing past or future to be present and con- 
 template it as present, or because we imagine other 
 things which exclude the existence of those which madi» 
 us to doubt. 
 
 For although we can never be sure about the issue of 
 individual objects (CoroL Prop. 31, pt. 2), it may never- 
 theless happen that we do not doubt it. For else- 
 where we have shown (SchoL Prop. 49, pt. 2) that it is 
 one thing not to doubt and another to possess certitude, 
 and so it may happen that from the image of an object 
 either past or future we are affected with the same afTect 
 of joy or sorrow as that by which we sliould be affected 
 from the image of an object present, as we have demon- 
 strated in Prop. 18, pt. 3, to which, together with the 
 scholium, the reader is referred. 
 
 XVI. Gladness {gaudium) is joy with the accomi»any- 
 ing idea of something past, wliich, unlioi)ed for, lias 
 happened. 
 
 XVII. Remorse is sorrow with the accompanying idea 
 of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened. 
 
 XVIII. Commiseration is sorrow witli the accompany- 
 ing idea of evil which has happened to some one whom 
 we imagine like ourselves (Schol. Prop 22, and Schol. 
 Prop. 27, pt. 3). 
 
1 66 ETHIC. 
 
 Ecqylanation. — Between commiseration and compassion 
 there seems to be no difference, excepting perhaps that 
 commiseration refers rather to an individual affect and 
 compassion to it as a habit. 
 
 XIX. Favour is love towards those who have benefited 
 others. 
 
 XX. Indignation is hatred towards those who have 
 injured others. 
 
 Explanation. — I am aware that these names in common 
 bear a different meaning. But my object is not to ex- 
 plain the meaning of words but the nature of things, 
 and to indicate them by words whose customary meaning 
 shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning which I 
 desire to bestow upon them. I consider it sufficient to 
 have said this once for all. As far as the cause of these 
 affects is concerned, see Corol. i, Prop. 27, pt. 3, and 
 SchoL Prop. 22, pt. 3. 
 
 XXI. Over-estimation consists in thinking too highly 
 of another person in consequence of our love for him. 
 
 XXII. Contempt consists in thinking too little of 
 another person in consequence of our hatred for him. 
 
 Explanation. — Over-estimation and contempt are there- 
 fore respectively effects or properties of love or hatred, 
 and so over-estimation may be defined as love in so 
 far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much of 
 the beloved object; and, on the contrary, contempt may 
 be defined as hatred in so far as it affects a man so that 
 he thinks too little of the object he hates. (See SchoL 
 Prop. 26, pt. 3.) 
 
 XXIII. Eiuy is hatred in so far as it affects a man 
 so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person 
 and is glad when any evil happens to him. 
 
 Explanation. — To envy is generally ojjposed com- 
 passion (miscricordia), which may therefore be defined as 
 follows, notwithstanding tlie usual signification of the 
 word : — 
 
 XXIY. Compassio7i is love in so far as it affects a 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. ,67 
 
 man so that he is glad at the prosperity of another iK?r- 
 sou and is sad when any evil liappens to him. 
 
 Explanation. — Witli regard to the other properties of 
 envy, see SchoL Prop. 24, and Schol. Prop. 32, pt. 3. 
 These are affects of joy and sorrow which are attended 
 by the idea of an external object as their cau.se, either 
 of itself or accidentally. I pass now to consider other 
 affects which are attended by the idea of something within 
 us as the cause. 
 
 XXV. Self-satisfaction is the joy which is produced 
 by contemplating ourselves and our own power uf 
 action. 
 
 XXVI. Humility is the sorrow which is produced by 
 contemplating our impotence or helplessuess. 
 
 Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as 
 we understand by the former the joy which arises from 
 contemplating our power of action, but in so far as we 
 understand by it joy attended with the idea of something 
 done, which we believe has been done by a free decree 
 of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may 
 thus define : — 
 
 XXVII. Bepentancc is sorrow accompanied with the 
 idea of something done which we believe has been doue 
 by a free decree of our mind. 
 
 Explanation. — We have shown what are the causes of 
 these affects in Schol. Prop. 51, pt. 3, Props. 53 and 54, 
 pt. 3, and Prop. 55, pt. 3, together with its Schol. With 
 regard to a free decree of the mind, see Schol. Prop. 35, 
 pt. 2. Here, however, I must observe, that it is not to 
 be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all those 
 actions which are from custom called wicked, and that 
 joy should follow those which are called good. But tliat 
 this is chiefly the effect of education will be evident 
 from what we have before said. Parents, by reprobat- 
 ing what are called bad actions, and frequently blaming 
 their children whenever they commit them, while they 
 persuade them to what are called good actions, and praise 
 
1 68 ETHIC. 
 
 their cliildren when they perform them, have caused the 
 emotions of sorrow to connect themselves with the former, 
 and those of joy with the latter. Experience proves 
 this, for custom and religion are not the same every- 
 where ; but, on the contrary, things Avhich are sacred to 
 some are profane to others, and what are honourable with 
 some are disgraceful with others. Education alone, there- 
 fore, will determine whether a man will repent of any 
 deed or boast of it. 
 
 XXVIII. Pride is thinking too much of ourselves, 
 through self-love. 
 
 Explanatioji. — Pride differs, therefore, from over-esti- 
 mation, inasmuch as the latter is related to an external 
 object, but pride to the man himself who thinks of 
 himself too highly. As over-estimation, therefore, is an 
 effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or pro- 
 perty of self-love, and it may therefore be defined as love 
 of ourselves or self-satisfaction, in so far as it affects us 
 so that we think too highly of ourselves. (See Schol. 
 Prop. 26, pt. 3.) 
 
 To this affect a contrary does not exist, for no one, 
 through hatred of himself, thinks too little of himself; 
 indeed, we may say that no one thinks too little of him- 
 self, in so far as he imagines himself unable to do this 
 or that thing. Eor whatever he imagines that he cannot 
 do, that thing he necessarily imagines, and by his imagina- 
 tion is so disposed that he is actually incapable of doing 
 what he imagines he cannot do. So long, therefore, as he 
 imagines himself unable to do this or that thing, so long 
 is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long 
 it is impossible for him to do it. If, however, we pay 
 attention to what depends upon opinion alone, we shall 
 be able to conceive it possible for a man to think too 
 little of himself, for it may haj^pen that while he sorrow- 
 fully contemplates his own weakness he will imagine 
 himself despised by everybody, although nothing could 
 be further from their thoughts than to despise him. A 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 169 
 
 man may also think too little of himself if in the pre- 
 sent he denies something of himself in relation to a future 
 time of which he is not sure ; for example, wlien he denies 
 that he can conceive of nothing with certitude, and tliat 
 he can desire and do nothing which is not wicked and 
 hase. AVe may also say that a man thinks too little of 
 himself when we see that, from an excess of fear or 
 shame, he does not dare to do M'hat others who are his 
 equals dare to do. This affect, to which I will give 
 the name of Despondency, may therefore he opposed to 
 pride ; for as self-satisfaction springs from pride, so 
 despondency springs from humility, and it may therefore 
 be defined thus — 
 
 XXIX. Despondency is thinking too little of ourselves 
 through sorrow. 
 
 Explanation. — We are, nevertheless, often in the hahit 
 of opposing humility to pride, but only when we attend 
 to their effects rather than to their nature. For we are 
 accustomed to call a man proud who boasts too much 
 (Schol. Prop. 30, pt. 3), who talks about nothing but 
 his own virtues and other people's vices, who wislics 
 to be preferred to everybody else, and who marches 
 along with that stateliness and pomp which belong to 
 others whose position is far above his. On the other 
 hand, we call a man humble who often blushes, who 
 confesses his own faults and talks about the virtues of 
 others, who yields to every one, who walks with bended 
 head, and who neglects to adorn himself. These 
 affects, humility and despondency, are very rare, ^ for 
 human nature, considered in itself, struggles against 
 them as much as it can (Props. 13 and 54, pt. 3), 
 and hence those who have the most credit for bein;; 
 abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and 
 envious. 
 
 XXX. Self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying 
 idea of some action we have done, wlii'-h wr mmgmo 
 people praise. 
 
17 o ETHIC. 
 
 XXXI. Shame is sorrow, with the accompanying idea 
 of some action which we imagine people blame. 
 
 Explanation. — With regard to these affects see Schol. 
 Prop. 30, pt. 3. A difference, however, is here to be ob- 
 served between shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow 
 which follows a deed of which we are ashamed. Modesty 
 is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps a man from 
 committing any disgraceful act. To modesty is usually 
 opposed impudence, which indeed is not an affect, as I 
 shall show in the proper place ; but the names of affects, 
 as I have already said, are matters rather of custom than 
 indications of tlie nature of the affects. I have thus 
 discharged the task which I set myself of explaining the 
 affects of joy and sorrow. I will advance now to those 
 which I ascribe to desire. 
 
 XXXII. Begret is the desire or longing to possess 
 something, the affect being strengthened by the memory 
 of the object itself, and at the same time being restrained 
 by the memory of other things which exclude the exist- 
 ence of the desired object. 
 
 Explanation. — Whenever we recollect a thing, as we 
 have often said, we are thereby necessarily disposed to 
 contemplate it with the same affect as if it were present 
 before us. But this disposition or effort, while we are 
 awake, is generally restrained by the images of things 
 which exclude the existence of the thing which we 
 recollect. Whenever, therefore, we recollect a thing 
 which affects us with any kind of joy, we thereby 
 endeavour to contemplate it with the same affect of 
 joy as if it were present, — an attempt which is, how- 
 ever, immediately restrained by the memory of that 
 which excludes the existence of the thing. Eegret, 
 therefore, is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy 
 which arises from the absence of what we hate. (See 
 Schol. Prop. 47, pt. 3.) But because the name regi'et 
 seems to connect this affect with desire, I therefore 
 ascribe it to desire. 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 171 
 
 XXXIII. Emulation is the desire wliicli is begotten in 
 us of a thing because we imagine that other persons have 
 the san^e desire. 
 
 JSxjjIatiation. — He who seeks flight because others .seek 
 it, he who fears because he sees others fear, or even ho 
 who withdraws his hand and moves his body as if his 
 hand were burning because he sees that another person 
 has burnt his hand, such as these, I say, althougli thev 
 may indeed imitate the affect of another, are not said lu 
 emulate it ; not because we have recognised one cause for 
 emulation and another for imitation, but because it has 
 been the custom to call that man only emulous who 
 imitates what we think noble, useful, or pleasant. With 
 regard to the cause of emulation, see also Prop. 27, 
 pt. 3, with the Schol. Por the reason why envy is 
 generally connected with this affect, see Prop. 32, pt. 3, 
 with its Schol. 
 
 XXXIV. Thanlcfulncss or gratitude is the desire or 
 endeavour of love with which we strive to do good to 
 others who, from a similar affect of love, have done good 
 to us (Prop. 39, with Schol. Prop. 41, pt. 3). 
 
 XXXV. Benevolence is the desire to do good to tho.-e 
 whom we pity (SchoL Prop. 27, pt. 3). 
 
 XXXVI. Anger is the desire by which we are inipelh-d, 
 through hatred, to injure those whom we hate (I'rop. 
 
 39, pt. 3)- 
 
 XXXVII. Vengeance is the desire whicli, springing 
 from mutual hatred, urges us to injure those who, from a 
 similar affect, have injured us (Corol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 3, 
 with Schol.) 
 
 XXXVIII. Cruelty ov ferocitij is the desire by which a 
 man is impelled to injure any one whom we love or pity. 
 
 Explanation. — To cruelty is opposed mercy, whicli is 
 not a passion, but a power of the mind by which a man 
 restrains anger and vengeance. 
 
 XXXIX. Fear is the desire of avoiding the greater of 
 two dreaded evHs by the less (Schol. Prop. 39. I't- 3)- 
 
172 ETHIC. 
 
 XL. Audacity is the desire by wliicli we are impelled to 
 do something which is accompanied with a danger which 
 our equals fear to meet. 
 
 XLI. A person is said to be 'pusillanimous whose 
 desire is restrained by the fear of a danger which his 
 equals dare to meet. 
 
 Explanation. — Pusillanimity, therefore, is nothing but 
 the dread of some evil which most persons do not usually 
 fear, and therefore I do not ascribe it to the affects of 
 desire. I wished, notwithstanding, to explain it here, 
 because in so far as we attend to desire, pusillanimity 
 is the true opposite of the affect of audacity. 
 
 XLII. Consternation is affirmed of the man whose 
 desire of avoiding evil is restrained by astonishment at 
 the evil which he fears. 
 
 Explanation. — Consternation is therefore a kind of 
 pusillanimity. But because consternation springs from a 
 double fear, it may be more aptly defined as that dread 
 which holds a man stupefied or vacillating, so that he can- 
 not remove an evil. I say stupefied, in so far as we under- 
 stand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by 
 his astonishment. I say also vacillating, in so far as we 
 conceive the same desire to be restrained by the fear of 
 another evil which equally tortures him, so that he does 
 not know which of the two evils to avoid. See Schol. 
 Prop. 39, and Schol. Prop. 52, pt. 3. With regard to 
 pusillanimity and audacity, see Schol. Prop. 51, pt. 3. 
 
 XLIII. Courtesy or moderation is the desire of doing 
 those things which please men and omitting those which 
 displease them. 
 
 XLIV. Amhition is the immoderate desire of glory. 
 
 Explanation. — Ambition is a desire wliich increases 
 and strengthens all the affects (Props. 27 and 31, pt. 3), 
 and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under 
 control. For so long as a man is possessed by any desire, 
 he is necessarily at the same time possessed by this. 
 Every noble man, says Cicero, is led by glory, and even 
 
ORIGIN AXD NATURE OF THE AFFECTS. 173 
 
 the pliilosophers who write books about despising glon- 
 place their names on the title-page. 
 
 XLV. Luxuriousness is the immoderate desire or lovo 
 of good living. 
 
 XLYI. Drunkenness is the immoderate desire and 
 love of drinking. 
 
 XLVII. Avarice is the immoderate desire and love of 
 riches. 
 
 XLVIII. Lust is the immoderate desire and love of 
 sexual intercourse. 
 
 Explanation. — This desire of sexual intercourse '\a 
 usually called lust, whether it be held within bounds or 
 not. I may add that the five last-mentioned affects (as 
 we have shown in Schol. Prop. 56, pt. 3) have no con- 
 traries, for moderation is a kind of ambition (see Schol. 
 Prop. 29, pt. 3), and I have already observed that tem- 
 perance, sobriety, and chastity show a power and not a 
 passion of the mind. Even supposing that an avaricious, 
 ambitious, or timid man refrains from an excess of eating, 
 drinking, or sexual intercourse, avarice, ambition, and 
 fear are not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, 
 drunkenness, or lust. For the avaricious man gent-rally 
 desires to swallow as much meat and drink as he can, 
 provided only it belong to another person. The ambitious 
 man, too, if he hopes he can keep it a secret, will restrain 
 himself in nothing, and if he lives amongst drunkards 
 and libertines, will be more inclined to their vices just 
 because he is ambitious. The timid man, too, does what 
 he does not will ; and although, in order to avoid death, 
 he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious ; 
 nor does the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because 
 he is Sorry that he cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, 
 therefore, these affects have reference not so much to the 
 acts themselves of eating and drinking as to the appetite 
 and love itself. Consequently nothing can be opposed to 
 these affects but nobility of soul and strength of mind, as 
 we shall see afterwards. 
 
174 ETHIC. 
 
 The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of 
 the mind I pass over in silence, both because they are 
 compounded of the affects which we have already de- 
 fined, and also because many of them have no names, — a 
 fact which shows that, for the purposes of life, it is suffi- 
 cient to know these combinations generally. Moreover, 
 it follows from the definitions of the affects which we 
 have explained that they all arise from desire, joy, or 
 sorrow, or rather that there are none but these three, 
 which pass under names varying as their relations and 
 external signs vary. If, therefore, we attend to these 
 primitive affects and to what has been said above about 
 the nature of the mind, we shall be able here to define 
 the affects in so far as they are related to the mind alone. 
 
 General definition of the affects. — Affect, which is called 
 animi pathema, is a confused idea by which the mind 
 affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less 
 power of existence than before ; and this increase of 
 power being given, the mind itself is determined to one 
 particular thought rather than to another. 
 
 Explanation. — I say, in the first place, that an affect 
 or passion of the mind is a confused idea. For we have 
 shown (Prop. 3, pt. 3) that the mind suffers only in so 
 far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, 
 ty which the mind affirms of its hody, or any part of it, a 
 greater or less power of existence than before. For all ideas 
 which we possess of bodies indicate the actual constitu- 
 tion of our body rather than the nature of the external 
 body (Corol. 2, Prop. 16, pt. 2); but this idea, which 
 constitutes the form of an affect, must indicate or express 
 the constitution of the body, or of some part of it ; which 
 constitution the body or any part of it possesses from 
 the fact that its power of action or force of existence 
 is increased or diminished, helped or limited. But it is 
 to be observed, that when I say a greater or less power of 
 existence than hefore, I do not mean that the mind com- 
 pares the present with the past constitution of the body, 
 
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE AFI-IICTS. 175 
 
 Imt that the idea which constitutes the form of nflVct 
 affirms something of the body which actually involves 
 more or less reality than before. Moreover, since the 
 essence of the mind (Props. 1 1 and 13, pt. 2) consists in 
 its affirmation of the actual existence of its body, and 
 since we understand by perfection the essence itself of 
 the thing, it follows that the mind passes to a greater 
 or less perfection when it is able to affirm of its body, 
 or some part of it, something which involves a greater 
 or less reality than before. "When, therefore, I have 
 said that the mind's power of thought is increased or 
 diminished, I have wished to be understood as mean- 
 ing nothing else than that the mind has formed an idea 
 of its body, or some part of its body, which expresses 
 more or less reality than it had hitherto aflirmed of the 
 body. For the value of ideas and the actual power of 
 thought are measured by value of the object. Finally, I 
 added, ivhicli being given, the mind itself is dctcrmiiud to 
 one ^particular tliouglit rather than to another, that I might 
 also express the nature of desire in addition to that of 
 joy and sorrow, which is explained by the first part of 
 the definition. 
 
 END OF THE TIIIItD PART. 
 
I' 
 
 f 
 
 ( 176 ) 
 ETHIC. 
 
 ^ 
 
 OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR OF THE STRENGTH 
 OF THE AFFECTS. 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The impotence of man to govern or restrain the afifects 
 I call bondage, for a man who is under their control is 
 not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose 
 power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse, 
 although he sees the better before him. I propose in this 
 part to demonstrate why this is, and also to show what 
 of good and evil the affects possess. But before I begin 
 I should like to €ay a few words about perfection and 
 imperfection, and about good and evil. If a man has pro- 
 posed to do a thing and has accomplished it, he calls it 
 perfect, and not only he, but every one else who has 
 really known or has believed that he has known the mind 
 and intention of the author of that work will call it 
 perfect too. For example, having seen some work (which 
 I suppose to be as yet not finished), if we know that the 
 intention of the author of that work is to build a house, we 
 shall call the house imperfect; while, on the other hand, 
 we shall call it perfect as soon as we see the work has 
 been brought to the end which the author had determined 
 for it. But if we see any work such as we have never 
 seen before, and if we do not know the mind of the 
 workman, we shall then not be able to say whether the 
 
OF II UMAX DOXDAGE. ,-, 
 
 work is perfect or imperfect.^ This seems to have hem 
 the first siguification of these words; but aftorwanU 
 men began to form universal ideas, to think out for 
 themselves types of houses, buildings, castles, and to pn- 
 fer some types of things to others ; and so it happened 
 that each person called a thing perfect which seemed to 
 agree with the universal idea which he had formed of 
 that thing, and, on the other baud, he called a thin" 
 imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typal con- 
 ception, although, according to the intention of the work- 
 man, it had been entirely completed. This appears to be 
 the only reason why the words perfect and imperfect are 
 commonly applied to natural objects which are not made 
 with human hands ; for men are in the habit of forming', 
 both of natural as well as of artificial objects, universal 
 ideas which they regard as types of things, and which 
 they think nature has in view, setting them before Ijer- 
 self as types too ; it being the common opinion that she 
 does nothing except for the sake of some end. When, 
 therefore, men see something done by nature wliich does 
 not altogether answer to that typal conception which 
 they have of the thing, they think that nature herself ha3 
 failed or committed an error, and that she has left the 
 thing imperfect. Thus we see that the custom of apj)ly- 
 ing the words perfect and imperfect to natural objects lm>< 
 arisen rather from prejudice than from true knowledge of 
 them. For we have shown in the Appendix to the First 
 Part of this work that nature does notliing for the sake of 
 an end, for that eternal and infinite Being whom we 
 call God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which 
 He exists ; for we have shown that He acts by the 
 same necessity of nature as that by whicli He exists 
 (Prop. 1 6, pt. i). The reason or cause, therefore, why 
 
 1 A translation cannot show the however, to hear in mind that r'r/rrf 
 
 etymology of the word j^erfwt as it and accomjihhtd are cxprt-^blB i..r 
 
 is shown in the original Latin, so the same word in Latin, »"'•"'"* 
 
 that this passage may perhaps seem accomjAUh u the pnuiary meaning ci 
 
 rather obscure. It is only necessary, pe/;/(Vere.— Tiu-vs. 
 
178 ETHIC. 
 
 God or nature acts and the reason why He exists are 
 one and the same. Smce, therefore, He exists for no end, 
 He acts for no end ; and since He has no principle or 
 end of existence, He has no principle or end of action. 
 A final cause, as it is called, is nothing, therefore, but 
 human desire, in so far as this is considered as the prin- 
 ciple or primary cause of anything. For example, when 
 we say that the having a house to live in was the final 
 cause of this or that house, we merely mean that a man, 
 because he imagined the advantages of a domestic life, 
 desired to build a house. Therefore, having a house to 
 live in, in so far as it is considered as a final cause, is 
 merely this particular desire, which is really an efficient 
 cause, and is considered as primary, because men are 
 usually ignorant of the causes of their desires ; for, as I 
 have often said, we are conscious of our actions and 
 desires, but ignorant of the causes by which we are 
 determined to desire anything. As for the vulgar 
 opinion that nature sometimes fails or commits an error, 
 or produces imperfect things, I class it amongst those 
 fictions mentioned in the Appendix to the First Part. 
 
 Perfection, therefore, and imperfection are really only 
 modes of thought ; that is to say, notions which we are 
 in the habit of forming from the comparison with one 
 another of individuals of the same species or genus, and 
 this is the reason why I have said, in Def. 6, pt. 2, that 
 by reality and perfection I understand the same thing ; 
 for we are in the habit of referring all individuals in 
 nature to one genus, wliich is called the most general ; 
 that is to say, to the notion of being, which embraces ab- 
 solutely all the individual objects in nature. In so far, 
 therefore, as we refer the individual objects in nature to 
 this genus, and compare them one wuth another, and 
 discover that some possess more being or reality than 
 others, in so far do we call some more perfect than 
 others ; and in so far as we assign to the latter anything 
 which, like limitation, termination, impotence, &c., involves 
 
OF H UMA N BOX DA GE. , . ^ 
 
 negation, shall we call them imperfect, becauso thoy tU. 
 not affect our minds so strongly as those we call perfect, 
 but not because anything which really belongs to tliein is 
 wanting, or because nature has committed an error. For 
 nothing belongs to the nature of anything excepting that 
 which follows from the necessity of the nature of tlie efli- 
 cient cause, and whatever follows from the necessity of 
 the nature of the efficient cause necessarily liappens. 
 
 With regard to good and evil, these terms indicate 
 nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor 
 are they anything else than modes of thought, or notions 
 which w^e form from the comparison of one thing with 
 another. For one and the same thing may at the sanjo 
 time be both good and evil or indillerent. Music, for ex- 
 ample, is good to a melancholy person, bad to one mourning, 
 wdiile to a deaf man it is neither good nor bad. I'ut 
 although things are so, we must retain these words. For 
 since we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon 
 which we may look as a model of human nature, it will 
 be of service to us to retain these expressions in the sense 
 I have mentioned. By good, therefore, I understand in the 
 following pages everything which we are certain is a means 
 by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the moilel 
 of human nature we set before us. By evil, on the con- 
 trary, I understand everything which we are certain hin- 
 ders us from reaching that model. Again, I shall call 
 men more or less perfect or imperfect iu so far as they 
 approach more or less nearly to this same model. For it 
 is to be carefully observed, that when 1 say that an indi- 
 vidual passes from a less to a greater perfection and ri<r 
 versa, I do not understand that from one essence or form 
 he is changed into another (for a horse, for instance, 
 would be as much destroyed if it were changed into a 
 man as if it were changed into an insect), but rather 
 we conceive that his power of action, in so far as it ia 
 understood by his own nature, is increased or dimin- 
 ished. Finally, by perfection generally, I umlcrstand, 
 
i8o ETHIC. 
 
 as I have said, reality ; that is to say, the essence of 
 any object in so far as it exists and acts in a certain 
 manner, no regard being paid to its duration. "For no 
 individual thing can be said to be more perfect because 
 for a longer time it has persevered in existence ; inas- 
 much as the duration of things cannot be determined 
 by their essence, the essence of things involving no fixed 
 or determined period of existence ; any object, whether 
 it be more or less perfect, always being able to persevere 
 in existence with the same force as that with which it 
 commenced existence. All things, therefore, are equal 
 in this respect. 
 
 Definitions. 
 
 I. — By good, I understand that which we certainly 
 know is useful to us. 
 
 II. By evil, on the contrary, I understand that which 
 we certainly know hinders us from possessing anything 
 that is good. 
 
 With regard to these two definitions, see the close of 
 the preceding preface. 
 
 III. I call individual things contingent in so far as 
 we discover nothing, whilst we attend to their essence 
 alone, wliich necessarily posits their existence or which 
 necessarily excludes it. 
 
 IV. I call these individual things possible, in so far as 
 we are ignorant, whilst we attend to the causes from which 
 they must be produced, whether these causes are deter- 
 mined to the production of these things. In Schol. I, 
 Prop. 3 3, pt. 1,1 made no difference between possible and 
 contingent, because there w^as no occasion there to dis- 
 tinguish them accurately. 
 
 V. By contrary affects, I understand in the following pages 
 those which, although they may be of the same kind, draw 
 a man in different directions ; such as voluptuousness and 
 avarice, which are both a species of love, and are not con- 
 trary to one another by nature, but only by accident. 
 
OF HUMAN BOXDACR. ,g, 
 
 YI. What 1 unJerstaiuI by alTect towanU a thin;' 
 future, present, and past, I have explained in Scl>ol. i 
 and 2, Prop. 1 8, pt. 3, to which the reader is referred. 
 
 Here, however, it is to be observed tliat it is the samo 
 M-ith time as it is %yith place ; for as beyond a certain 
 limit we can form no distinct imagination of distance — 
 that is to say, as we nsually imagine all objects to be 
 equally distant from us, and as if they were on the same 
 plane, if their distance from us exceeds 200 feet, or if their 
 distance from the position we occupy is greater tiian w« 
 can distinctly imagine — so we imagine all objects to be 
 equally distant from the present time, and refer them as 
 if to one moment, if the period to which their existence 
 belongs is separated from the present by a longer interval 
 than we can usually imagine distinctly. 
 
 VII. By end for the sake of which we do anything, I 
 understand appetite. 
 
 VIII. By virtue and power, I understand the same 
 thing ; that is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), virtue, in so far as it 
 is related to man, is the essence itself or nature of the 
 man in so far as it has the power of effecting certain things 
 which can be understood through the laws of its nature 
 
 alone. > $r S< 1^ 
 
 Axiom. ^ d) 
 
 There is no individual thing in nature which is not 
 surpassed in strength and power by some other thing, but 
 any individual thing being given, another and a stronger 
 is also given, by which the former can be destroyed. 
 
 Prop. I. — Nothing positive contained in a false ulra w 
 removed by the presence of the true in so fir " 
 true. 
 Demonst.—Y^\s\iy consists in nothing but the privation 
 
 of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (I'rop. 35. 
 
 pt. 2), nor do they possess anything positive on account 
 
 of which they are called false (I'rop. 33. V^- 2)) on the 
 
1 82 ETHIC. 
 
 contrary, in so far as they are related to God, they are 
 true (Prop. 32, pt. 2). If, therefore, anything positive 
 contained in a false idea were removed by the presence 
 of the true in so far as it is true, a true idea would be 
 removed by itself, which (Prop. 4, pt. 3 ) is absurd. No- 
 thing positive, therefore, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — This proposition can be understood more 
 clearly from Corol. 2, Prop. 16, pt. 2. For an imagina- 
 tion is an idea which indicates the present constitution 
 of the human body rather than the nature of an external 
 body, not indeed distinctly but confusedly, so that the 
 mind is said to err. For example, when we look at the 
 sun, we imagine his distance from us to be about 200 
 feet, and in this we are deceived so long as we remain in 
 ignorance of the true distance. When this is known, the 
 error is removed, but not the imagination, that is to say, 
 the idea of the sun which explains his nature in so far 
 only as the body is affected by him ; so that although we 
 know his true distance, we nevertheless imagine him close 
 to us. For, as we have shown in Schol. Prop. 35, pt. 2, 
 it is not because we are ignorant of the sun's true distance 
 that we imagine him to be so close to us, but because 
 the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun just in so 
 far as the body is affected by him. So when the rays of 
 the sun falling upon a suiface of water are reflected to 
 our eyes, we imagine him to be in the water, although his 
 true place is known to us. So with the other imagina- 
 tions by which the mind is deceived ; whether they indi- 
 cate the natural constitution of the body or an increase 
 or diminution in its power of action, they are not opposed 
 to the truth, nor do they disappear with the presence of 
 the truth. We know that when we groundlessly fear 
 any evil, the fear vanishes when we hear correct intel- 
 ligence ; but we also know, on the other hand, that when 
 we fear an evil which will actually come upon us, the 
 fear vanishes when we hear false intelligence, so tliat 
 the imaginations do not disappear with the presence of 
 
OF HUMAN BOXDAGE. ,53 
 
 the truth, in so far as it is true, but because other i!naj,'inu. 
 tions arise which are stronger, and which exchule" the 
 present existence of the objects we imagine, as we liavc 
 shown in Trop. 17, pt. 2. 
 
 PKOr. 11. — JVe suffer in so far as we are apart of nature, 
 which part cannot Ic conceived hj itself nur vithnut 
 the other ]parts. 
 
 Demonst. — We are said to suffer when anythini^ occurs 
 in us of which we are only the partial cause (Pef. 2, i)t. 
 3), that is to say (Def. i, pt. 3), anything wliich cannot 
 be deduced from the laws of our own nature alone ; wo 
 suffer, therefore, in so far as we are a part of nature, 
 which part cannot be conceived by itself nor without tlje 
 other parts. — q.e.d. 
 
 PiiOP. III. — The force hj which man perseveres in existern-^ 
 
 is limited, and infinitely/ sinpassed hi/ the poircr of 
 
 exteriial causes. 
 
 Demonst. — This is evident from the Axiom, pt. 4. Fur 
 any man being given, there is given something else — fur 
 example, A — more powerful than he is, and A being given, 
 there is again given something, B, more powerful than 
 A, and so on ad ii^finitum. Hence the power of niati i.s 
 limited by the power of some other object, and is infi- 
 nitely surpassed by the power of external causes. — Q.E.I». 
 
 ritop. lY. — It is impossille that a man shoidd not he a 
 
 part of nature, and that he shoidd svftr no chanyt-^ 
 
 hut those which can he understood thruiKjh his oicn 
 
 nature cdone, and of which he is the adupuUe cauit. 
 
 Demonst. — The power by which individual things and 
 
 consequently man preserve their being is the actual 
 
 power of God or nature (Corel. Prop. 24, pt. l), not in 
 
 so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explamwi 
 
 by the actual essence of man (Prop. 7, p? '' ^'"^ 
 
1 84 ETHIC. 
 
 power therefore of man, in so far as it is explained by 
 his actual essence, is part of the infinite power of God 
 or nature, that is to say (Prop. 34, pt. i), part of His 
 essence. This was the first thing to be proved. Again, 
 if it were possible that man could suffer no changes but 
 those which can be understood through his nature alone, 
 it would follow (Props. 4 and 6, pt. 3) that he could 
 not perish, but that he would exist for ever necessarily ; 
 and this necessary existence must result from a cause 
 w^hose power is either finite or infinite, that is to say, 
 either from the power of man alone, wdiicli would be able 
 to place at a distance from himself all other changes 
 which could take their origin from external causes, or it 
 must result from the infinite power of nature by which 
 all individual things would be so directed that man could 
 suffer no changes but those tending to his preservation. 
 But the first case (by the preceding proposition, whose de- 
 monstration is universal and capable of application to all 
 individual objects) is absurd ; therefore if it were possible 
 for a man to suffer no changes but those which could be 
 understood through his own nature alone, and conse- 
 quently (as we have shown) that he should always neces- 
 sarily exist, this must follow from the infinite power of 
 God; and therefore (Prop. 16, pt. i) from the necessity 
 of the divine nature, in so far as it is considered as affected 
 by the idea of any one man, the whole order of nature, in 
 so far as it is conceived under the attributes of thought 
 and extension, would have to be deduced. From this it 
 would follow (Prop. 21, pt.' i) that man would be infinite, 
 which (by the first part of this demonstration) is an ab- 
 surdity. It is impossible, therefore, that a man can suffer 
 no changes but those of which he is the adequate cause. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that a man is necessarily 
 always subject to passions, and that he follows and obeys 
 the common order of nature, accommodating himself to 
 it as far as the nature of things requires. 
 
OF HUMAN BOXDAGE. ,85 
 
 Tlior. Y. — The force mid increase of am/ paaniun ami ii» 
 perseverance i7i existence are not limited hj the potrtr 
 by luliich ive endeavour to persevere in cxistauc, but 
 hi/ the poivcr of an external cause compared xcith our 
 
 own poiccr. 
 
 Lemonst. — The essence of a passion cannot le c-.\i»laincil 
 by our essence alone (Defs. i and 2, pt. 3) ; that is to 
 say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), the power of a passion cannot bo 
 limited by the power by which we endeavour to jxjrse- 
 vere in our being, but (as has been shown in Proj). 16. 
 pt. 2) must necessarily be limited by the power of an 
 external cause compared with our own power. — y.K.i). 
 
 Pkop. VI. — The other actions or poicer of a man may he 
 so far surpassed hy force of some p)assion or ajffct, 
 that the affect may ohstinatcly cling to him. 
 
 Dcmo?2st. — The force and increase of any passion and 
 its perseverance in existence are limited by the power 
 of an external cause compared with our own jx)wer 
 (Prop. 5, pt. 4), and therefore (Prop. 3, pt. 4) may sur- 
 pass the power of man. — q.e.d. 
 
 Piior. VII. — An affect cannot le restrained nor rnnoird 
 unless hy an opposed ami stronger affect. 
 
 Demonst. — An affect, in so far as it is rehitcd to tho 
 mind, is an idea by which the mind allirnis a <,'roater or 
 less power of existence for its body than the boily pos- 
 sessed before (by the general definition of aHect-s nt tlio 
 I -end of Third Part). AVhenever, therefore, the mind is 
 agitated by any affect, the body is at the same tiuie 
 affected with an affection by which its power of action is 
 increased or diminished. Again, this afiection of the 
 body (Prop. 5, pt. 4) receives from its own cause a jiowtT 
 to persevere in its own being, a power, therefore, whidi 
 cannot be restrained nor removed uii!'->s hy a bo«h.y 
 
1 86 ETHIC. 
 
 cause (Prop. 6, pt. 2) affecting tlie body with an affection 
 contrary to the first (Prop. 5, pt. 3), and stronger than it 
 (Ax. I, pt. 4). Thus the mind (Prop. 1 2, pt. 2) is affected 
 by the idea of an affection stronger than the former 
 and contrary to it ; that is to say (by the general defini- 
 tion of the affects), it will be affected with an affect 
 stronger than tlie former and contrary to it, and this 
 stronger affect will exclude the existence of the other or 
 remove it. Thus an affect cannot be restrained nor 
 removed unless by an opposed and stronger affect. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Cowl. — An affect, in so far as it is related to the 
 mind, cannot be restrained nor removed unless by the 
 idea of a bodily affection opposed to that which we suffer 
 and stronger than it. For the affect which we suffer 
 cannot be restrained nor ]'e moved unless by an opposed 
 and stronger affect (Prop. 7, pt. 4) ; that is to say (by the 
 general definition of the affects), it cannot be removed 
 unless by the idea of a bodily affection stronger than 
 that which affects us, and opposed to it. 
 
 Prop. A^III. — Knouiedgc of good or evil is nothing hut 
 an affect of Jog or sorrow in so far as we are con- 
 scious of it. 
 
 Demonst. — We call a thing good which contributes to 
 the preservation of our being, and we call a thing evil if 
 it is an obstacle to the preservation of our being (Defs. i 
 and 2, pt. 4) ; that is to say (Prop. 7, pt, 3), a thing is 
 called by us good or evil as it increases or diminishes, 
 helps or restrains, our power of action. In so far, there- 
 fore (Defs. of jog and sorrow in Schol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), 
 as we perceive that any object affects us with joy or 
 sorrow do we call it good or evil, and therefore the know- 
 ledge of good or evil is nothing but an idea of joy or 
 sorrow which necessarily follows from the affect itself of 
 joy or sorrow (Prop. 22, pt. 2). But this idea is united 
 
OF HUMAN DOS DAG E. ,S; 
 
 to the affect in the same way as the mind is unil.-.l l.* 
 the body (Prop. 21, pt. 2), or, in other words (as we l.nvo 
 shown in the Schol. to Prop. 21, pt. 2), this idea is nut 
 actually distinguished from the afiect itself; that is tosny 
 (by the general definition of the affects), it is not actually 
 distinguished from the idea of ihe aflection of the lx)dy, 
 unless in conception alone. This knowledge, therefore,' 
 of good and evil is nothing but the affect itself of joy 
 and sorrow in so far as we are conscious of it.— y.i:.i). 
 
 Peop. IX. — If we imagine the cause of an affcd to If 
 actually present with us, that affect will he stronger 
 than if tec imagined the cause not to he })rcscnt. 
 
 Demonst. — The imagination is an idea by which the 
 mind contemplates an object as present (see the delinitittn 
 of the imagination in Schol. Prop. 17, pt. 2), an idea 
 which nevertheless indicates the constitution of tlie liunian 
 body rather than the nature of the external object (Corol. 
 2, Prop. 1 6, pt. 2). Imagination, therefore (by the general 
 definition of the affects), is an affect in so far as it indi- 
 cates the constitution of the body. But the imagination 
 (Prop. 17, pt. 2) increases in intensity in proportion as 
 we imagine nothing wdiich excludes the present existence 
 of the external object. If, therefore, we imagine tlio 
 cause of an affect to be actually present with us, that 
 affect will be intenser or stronger than if we imagined 
 the cause not to be present. — q.e.d. 
 
 Carol. — When I said (in Prop, i 8, pt. 3) that wc are 
 affected by the image of an object in the future or the 
 past with the same affect with which we should be 
 affected if the object we imagined were actually present, 
 I was careful to warn the reader that this was true in 
 so far only as we attend to the image alone of the object 
 itself, for this is of the same nature whether wo have 
 imagined the object or not ; but I have not di-nied thai 
 the image becomes weaker when we contemj'Ialo as pre- 
 
iS8 ETHIC. 
 
 sent otlier objects whicli exclude the present existence of 
 the future object. This exception I neglected to make, 
 because I had determined to treat in this part of my work 
 of the strength of the affects. 
 
 Corol. — The image of a past or future object, that is 
 to say, of an object which we contemplate in relation to 
 the past or future to the exclusion of the present, other 
 things being equal, is weaker than the image of a pre- 
 sent object, and consequently the affect towards a future 
 or past object, other things being equal, is weaker then 
 than the affect towards a present object. 
 
 Prop. X. — We are affected with regard to a future object 
 which we imarjine will soon he present more -poxoer- 
 fully than if we imagine that the time at which it 
 luill exist is further removed from the present, and 
 the memory of an object which toe imagine has but just 
 passed away also effects us more powerfully than if v:e 
 imagine the object to have passed away some time ago. 
 
 Dcmonst. — In so far as we imagine that an object 
 will quickly be present or has not long since passed 
 away, do we imagine something which excludes the 
 presence of the object less than if we imagine that the 
 time of its existence is at a great distance from the 
 present, either in the future or the past (as is self-evi- 
 dent), and therefore (Prop. 9, pt. 4) so far shall we be 
 affected more strongly with regard to it. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — From the observations which we made upon 
 Def. 6, pt. 4, it follows that all objects which are separated 
 from the present time by a longer interval than our ima- 
 gination has any power to determine affect us equally 
 slightly, although we know them to be separated from 
 one another by a large space of time. 
 
 Prop. XL — The affect towards an object which we ima- 
 gine as necessary, other things being equal, is stronger 
 
OF HUMAN BOXDAGE. ,3^ 
 
 than that toicards an ohjcH that «;)«,.<.;/,/,• ,..,., ^z,,-^,,/ 
 or not necessary. 
 
 Demonst.—ln so far as we imagine any object to bo 
 necessary do ^ye affirm its existence, and, on tlie other hand, 
 we deny its existence in so far as we imagine it to ho 
 not necessary (Schol. i, Prop. 33, pt. 1), and tliereforo 
 (Prop. 9, pt. 4) the affect towards a necessary ohject, 
 other things being equal, is stronger than tliat which wo 
 feel towards one that is not necessary. 
 
 Peop. XII. — The affect towards an ohject which vc hwir 
 does not exist m the present, and which we imagine as 
 possible, other thiyigs being equal, is stronger than the 
 affect toicards a contingent object. 
 
 Demonst. — In so far as we imagine an object as con- 
 tingent, we are not affected by the image of any other 
 object which posits the existence of the first (Def. 3, pt. 
 4), but, on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine 
 some tilings which exclude its present existence. l>ut in 
 so far as we imagine any object in the future to bo 
 possible do we imagine some things which posit its 
 existence (Def. 4, pt. 4), that is to say (Schol. 2, Prop. 
 1 8, pt. 3), things wliich foster hope or fear, and there- 
 fore the affect towards a possible object is stronger, &c. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — The affect towards an object wluch we know 
 does not exist in the present, and which we- imagine as 
 contingent, is mucli weaker llian if we imagined that the 
 object were j)resent to us. 
 
 Bemonst. — The affect towards an object which wo 
 imagined to exist in the present is stronger than if wo 
 imagined it as future (Corol. Prop. 9, pt. 4), and is much 
 stronger if w^e imagined the future to be at no grt-at 
 distance from the present time (Prop. 10, pt. 4). Tho 
 affect, therefore, towards an object which we imngino will 
 
l$o ETHIC. 
 
 not exist for a long time is so much feebler than if we 
 imagined it as present, and nevertheless (Prop. 1 2, pt. 4) 
 is stronger than if we imagined it as contingent ; and 
 therefore the affect towards a contingent object is much 
 feebler than if we imagined the object to be present to 
 us. Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XIII. — The affect towards a contingent oljject which 
 ive Icnoiv does not exist in the present, other things 
 being equal, is much weaker than the affect towards a 
 past object. 
 
 Demonst. — In so far as we imagine an object as con- 
 tingent, we are affected with no image of any other 
 object which posits the existence of the first (Def. 3, pt. 
 4). On the contrary, we imagine (by hypothesis) certain 
 things which exclude its present existence. But in so far 
 as we imagine it in relationship to past time are we sup- 
 posed to imagine something which brings it back to the 
 memory or which excites its image (Prop. 1 8, pt. 2, with 
 the Schol.), and therefore so far causes us to contem- 
 plate it as present (Corol. Prop. 17, pt. 2). Therefore 
 (Prop. 9, pt. 4), the affect towards a contingent object 
 which we know does not exist in the present, other 
 things being equal, will be weaker than the affect 
 towards a past object. — q.e.d. 
 
 Peop. XIV. — No affect can he restrained hj/ the trice hiow- 
 Icdge of good and evil in so far as it is true, hut only 
 in so far as it is considered as an affect. 
 
 Demonst. — An affect is an idea by which the mind 
 affirms a greater or less power of existence for the 
 body than it possessed before (by the general definition 
 of the affects); and therefore (Prop, i, pt. 4) this idea 
 has nothing positive which can be removed by the pre- 
 sence of the truth, and consequently the true knowledge 
 
OF HUMAN BOXDACn. ,,, 
 
 of good and evil, in so far as it is true, can restrain no 
 affect. But in so far as it is an affect (see Proji. 8, j.i. 
 4) ^viU it restrain any other affect, provided tlmt'tlie 
 latter be the weaker of the two (Prop. 7, pt. 4). q.^i,. 
 
 J Prop. XV. — Desire wJiich arises from a fntc Inojclah/r of 
 (jood and evil can he extinguished or reslrainol hi/ 
 meiny other desires tvliich take their orit/in from the 
 
 affects hi/ which we are agitated. 
 
 Demonst. — From the true knowledge of good and evil, 
 in so far as this (Prop. 8, pt. 4) is an alfect, necessarily 
 arises desire (Def. i of the affects, pt. 3), which is greater 
 in proportion as the affect from which .it springs is 
 greater (Prop. 37, pt., 3). But this desire (by hypothesis), 
 because it springs from onr understanding something 
 truly, follows therefore in us in so far as we act (I'rop. 
 I, pt. 3), and therefore must be understood througli our 
 essence alone (Def. 2, pt. 3), and consequently its strength 
 and increase must be limited by human power nlone 
 (Prop. 7, pt. 3). But the desires which spring from the 
 affects by which we are agitated are greater as the alTect.s 
 themselves are greater, and therefore their strength and 
 increase (Prop. 5, pt. 4) must be limited by the power 
 of external causes, a power which, if it be comjiare«l 
 with our own, indefinitely surpasses it (Prop. 3, pt 4). 
 The desires, therefore, which take their origin frum such 
 affects as these may be much stronger than that which 
 takes its origin from a true knowledge of good and evil. 
 and the former (Prop. 7, pt. 4) may be able to restrain 
 and extinguish the latter. — q.e.d. 
 
 // Peop. XVI. — The desire which springs from a knowUdge of 
 good and evil can he easily cxiinguishal or rc^Urainfd, 
 in so far as this knouicdge is connected %nth the 
 future, hy the desire of things which in the presait are 
 sweet. 
 
192 ETHIC. 
 
 Demonst. — The affect towards an object wliicli \ve 
 imagine as future is weaker than towards that which we 
 imagine as present (Corol. Prop. 9, pt. 4). But the 
 desire which springs Jrom a true knowledge of good and 
 evil, even although the knowledge be of objects which 
 are good at the present time, may be extinguished 
 or restrained by any casual desire (Prop. 15, pt. 4, 
 the demonstration of this proposition being universal), 
 and therefore the desire which springs from a knowledge 
 of good and evil, in so far as this knowledge is con- 
 nected with the future, can be easily restrained or 
 extinguished. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XVII. — The desire wJiicJi springs from a true know- 
 ledge of good and evil can he still more easily restrained, 
 in so far as this knowledge is connected ivith objects 
 which are contingent, hj the desire of ohjects ivhich are 
 preseiit. 
 
 Demonst. — This proposition is demonstrated in the same 
 way as the preceding proposition from CoroL Prop. 1 2, 
 pt. 4. ^ 
 
 Schol. — In these propositions I consider that I have 
 explained why men are more strongly influenced by an 
 opinion than by true reason, and why the true knowledge 
 of good and evil causes disturbance in the mind, and 
 often gives way to every kind of lust, whence the saying 
 of the poet, " Video mcliora j^roboque, deteriora scquor." 
 The same thought appears to have been in the mind of 
 the Preacher when he said, " He that increaseth know- 
 ledge increaseth sorrow-." I say these things not because 
 I would be understood to conclude, therefore, that it is 
 better to be ignorant than to be wise, or that the wise 
 man in governing his passions is nothing better than the 
 fool, but I say them because it is necessary for us to 
 know both the strength and weakness of our nature, so 
 that we may determine what reason can do and what it 
 
OF HUMAN BOSDACn. ,93 
 
 cannot do in governing our affects. This, moreover, let 
 it be remembered, is the Part in which I meant to treat 
 of human weakness alone, all consideration of the power 
 of reason over the passions being reserved for a future 
 portion of the boolc 
 
 // Prop. XVIII. — The desire which springs from joy, other 
 things being equal, is stronger than that which springs 
 from sorrow. 
 
 Deriionst. — Desire is the very essence of man (Def. i 
 of the Affects, pt. 3), that is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), tho 
 effort by which a man strives to persevere in liis being. 
 The desire, therefore, which springs from joy, by tliat very 
 affect of joy (by the definition of joy in Schol. Prop. 1 1, 
 pt. 3) is assisted or increased, while that which sprintj.s 
 from sorrow, by that very affect of sorrow (by the same 
 Schol.) is lessened or restrained, and so the force of tho 
 desire which springs from joy must be limited by Imman 
 power, together with the power of an external cause, 
 while that which springs from sorrow must be limited 
 by human power alone. The latter is, therefore, weaker 
 than the former.— q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — I have thus briefly explained the cau.ses of 
 human impotence and want of stability, and why men 
 do not obey the dictates of reason. It remains for mo 
 now to show what it is which reason prescribes to u.^, 
 which affects agree with the rules of human reason, and 
 which, on the contrary, are opposed to these rules. Ik- 
 fore, however, I begin to demonstrate these things by our 
 full geometrical method, I should like briefly to sot forth 
 here these dictates of reason, in order that what I have 
 in my mind about them may be easily comprehended by 
 aU. / Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to 
 nature, it demands, therefore, that every person shouM 
 love himself, should seek his own profit,— what is tru y 
 profitable to him,— should desire everything that really 
 
194 ■ ETHIC. 
 
 leads man to greater perfection, and absolutely that every 
 one should endeavour, as far as in him lies, to preserve 
 his own being. This is all true as necessarily as that the . 
 whole is greater than its part (Prop. 6, pt. 3), Again, 
 since virtue (Def. 8, pt. 4) means nothing but acting 
 according to the laws of our own nature, and since no 
 one endeavours to preserve his being (Prop. 7, pt. 3) 
 except in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it 
 follows : Firstly, That the foundation of virtue is that 
 endeavour itself to preserve our own being, and that 
 happiness consists in this — that a man can preserve his 
 own being. Secondly, It follows that virtue is to be 
 desired for its own sake, nor is there anything more 
 excellent or more useful to us than virtue, for the sake 
 of which virtue ought to be desired. Thirdly, It fol- 
 lows that all persons who kill themselves are impotent 
 in mind, and have been thoroughly overcome by external 
 causes opposed to their nature. Again, from Post. 4, 
 pt. 2, it follows that we can never free ourselves from 
 the need of something outside us for the preservation of 
 our being, and that we can never live in such a manner 
 as to have no intercourse with objects which are outside 
 us. Indeed, so far as the mind is concerned, our intellect 
 would be less perfect if the mind were alone, and under- 
 stood nothing but itself. There are many things, there- 
 fore, outside us which are useful to us, and which, there- 
 fore, are to be sought. Of all these, none more excellent 
 can be discovered than those which exactly agree with 
 our nature. If, for example, two individuals of exactly 
 the same nature are joined together, they make up a 
 single individual, doubly stronger than each alone. 
 Nothing, therefore, is more useful to man than man. 
 Men can desire, I say, nothing more excellent for the 
 preservation of their being than that all should so agree 
 at every point that the minds and bodies of all should 
 form, as it were, one mind and one body ; that all should 
 together endeavour as much as possible to preserve their 
 
 i 
 
OF HUMAN BOXDAGE. ,95 
 
 being, and that all should together seek the conunon ^'(xxl 
 of all. Trom this it follows that men who are <,'ovcrned 
 by reason, — that is to say, men who, under the ;,'uidanco 
 of reason, seek their own profit, — desire nothing for tiiem- 
 selves which they do not desire for other men, and thai. 
 therefore, they are just, faithful, and honourable. 
 
 These are those dictates of reason which 1 |>urposi'<l 
 briefly to set forth before commencing their demonstration 
 by a fuller method, in order that, if possible, I niigiit win 
 the attention of those who believe that this principle, — that 
 every one is bound to seek his own profit, — is the founda- 
 tion of impiety, and not of virtue and piety. Having 
 now briefly shown that this belief of theirs is the con- 
 trary of the truth, I proceed, by the same metliod as that 
 which we have hitherto pursued, to demonstrate what 1 
 have said. 
 
 Peop. XIX. — Accordiiuj to the laws of his oivn miturc aic/t 
 person necessarily desires that which he considers to 
 he good, and avoids that which he considers to he ecU. 
 
 Demonst. — The knowledge of good and evil (Prop. 8, 
 pt. 4) is the affect itself of joy or sorrow, in so far as we 
 are conscious of it, and, therefore (Prop. 28, pt. 3), each 
 person necessarily desires that which he considers to bo 
 good, and avoids that which he considers to be evil. liut 
 this desire is nothing but the essence itself or nature of 
 man (Def. of appetite in Schol. Prop. 9, pt. 3, and Def. 
 I of the Affects, pt. 3)- Therefore, according to the 
 laws of his own nature alone, he necessarily desires or 
 avoids, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XX. — The more eaxh person strives and is nUt to 
 seek his own profit, that is to say, to preserve hU being, 
 the more virtue does he possess; on tlu other htnd, in 
 so far as each person neglects his own profit, that u 
 to say, neglects to preserve his own being. « h^ 
 impotent. 
 
196 ETHIC. 
 
 Dcmonst. — Virtue is human power itself, wliich is 
 limited by the essence alone of man (Def. 8, pt. 4), that 
 is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), which is limited by the effort 
 alone by which man endeavours to persevere in his being. 
 The more, therefore, each person strives and is able to 
 preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess, and 
 consequently (Props. 4 and 6, pt. 3), in proportion as he 
 neglects to preserve his being is he impotent. 
 
 Schol. — ISTo one, therefore, unless defeated by exter- 
 nal causes and those which are contrary to his nature, 
 neglects to seek his own profit or preserve his being. 
 No one, I say, refuses food or kills himself from a ne- 
 cessity of his nature, but only when forced by external 
 causes. The compulsion may be exercised in many ways. 
 A man kills himself under compulsion by another when 
 that other turns the right hand, with which the man had 
 by chance laid hold of a sword, and compels him to 
 direct the sword against his own heart ; or the command 
 of a tyrant may compel a man, as it did Seneca, to open 
 his own veins, that is to say, he may desire to avoid a 
 greater evil by a less. External and hidden causes also 
 may so dispose his imagination and may so affect his 
 body as to cause it to put on another nature contrary to 
 that which it had at first, and one whose idea cannot 
 exist in the mind (Prop. 10, pt. 3); but a very little 
 reflection will show that it is as impossible that a man, 
 from the necessity of his nature, should endeavour not to 
 exist, or to be changed into some other form, as it is 
 that something should be begotten from nothing. 
 
 Prop. XXI. — iVo one can desire to he happy, to act well 
 and live well, who does not at the same time desire to 
 he, to act, and to live, that is to say, actually to exist. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The demonstration of this proposition, or 
 rather the proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also 
 evident from the definition of desire. Por desire (Def. i 
 
OF HUMAN DON DAG n. 
 
 of the Affects, pt. 3), whether it be desire of liviu- or 
 acting happily or well, is the very essence of man. tlmt 
 is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), the endeavour by which rvery 
 one strives to preserve his own being. Xo one, thtTL-furo. 
 
 can desire, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Pnor. XXII. — iVb virtue can be concciird prior to this {th( 
 endeavour, namely, after self -preservation). 
 
 Dcriionst. — The endeavour after self-preservation is 
 the essence itself of a thing (Prop. 7, ])t. 3). If, there- 
 fore, any virtue could be conceived prior to tliis of self- 
 preservation, the essence itself of the thing would be 
 conceived (Def. 8, pt. 4) as prior to itself, which (as is 
 self-evident) is absurd. Xo virtue, therefore, &c. — g.E.n. 
 
 Co7vl. — The endeavour after self-preservation is the 
 primary and only foundation of virtue. For itrior to 
 this principle no other can be conceived (Prop, 22, 
 pt. 4), and without it (Prop. 21, pt. 4) no virtue run 
 be conceived. 
 
 Prop. XXIII. — In so far as a man is determined to anti 
 
 action because he has inadequate ideas, he cannot hf 
 
 absolutely said to act in conformity unth rirtue, hut 
 
 only in so far as he is determined because hi undo-' 
 
 stands. 
 
 Demonst. — In so far as a man is determined to action 
 
 because he has inadequate ideas (Prop, i, pt. 3), he 
 
 suffers, that is to say (Defs. i and 2, pt 3), lie does 
 
 something which through his essence alone cannot be 
 
 perceived, that is to say (Def. 8, pt. 4), which does not 
 
 follow from his virtue. But in so far as he is deter- 
 
 mined to any action because he understands, he acta 
 
 (Prop. I, pt. 3), that is to say (Def. 2, pt 3). he «loe« 
 
 something which is perceived through liis essence alone, 
 
 or (Def. 8, pt. 4) which aderiuately follows from his 
 
 virtue. — q.e.d. 
 
iqS ethic. 
 
 PROr. XXIV. — To act absolutely in conformity with virtue 
 is, in us, nothing hut acting, living, and preserving 
 our being (these three things have the same meaning) 
 as reason dii-ects, from the ground of seeking our own 
 profit. 
 
 Demonst. — To act absolutely in conformity with virtue 
 is nothing (Def. 8, pt. 4) but acting according to the 
 laws of our own proper nature. But only in so far as 
 we understand do we act (Prop. 3, pt. 3). Therefore, 
 to act in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting, 
 living, and preserving our being as reason directs, and 
 doing so (Corol. Prop. 22, pt. 4) from the ground of 
 seeking our own profit. 
 
 Prop. XXV. — No one endeavours to preserve his own heing 
 for the sake of another object, 
 
 Demonst. — The effort by which any object strives to 
 persevere in its own being is limited solely by the 
 essence of the object itself (Prop. 7, pt. 3), and from 
 this given essence alone it necessarily follows (and not 
 from the essence of any other object) (Prop. 6, pt. 3) 
 that each object strives to preserve its being. This pro- 
 position is also evident from Corol. Prop. 22, pt. 4. Por 
 if a man endeavoured to preserve his being for the sake 
 of any other object, this object would then become the 
 primary foundation of virtue (as is self-evident), which 
 (by the Corol. just quoted) is an absurdity. N"o one, 
 therefore, endeavours to preserve his being, &c. — Q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXVI. — All efforts tvhich we make through reason 
 are nothing but efforts to understand, and the onind, 
 in so far as it uses reason, adjudges nothing as pro- 
 fitdble to itself excepting that which conduces to under- 
 standing. 
 
 Demonst. — The endeavour after self-preservation is 
 
OF HUMAN BONDAGE. „^, 
 
 nothing but the essence of the object itself (Trop. 7, pi, 
 3), which, in so far as it exists, is conceived to havo 
 power to persevere in existence (Prop. 6, pt. 3), ami to do 
 those things which necessarily follow from its givuu naturi-. 
 (See the definition of desire in Schol. Prop. 9, pt. 3.) 
 But the essence of reason is nothing but our mind, in so 
 far as it clearly and distinctly understands. (See detinitinu 
 of clear and distinct understanding in Schol. 2, Prop. 40, 
 pt. 2.) Therefore (Prop. 40, pt. 2), all efforts wliich we 
 make through reason are nothing else than efTorta to 
 understand. Again, since this effort of the mind, by 
 which the mind, in so far as it reasons, endeavours to 
 preserve its being, is nothing but the effort to understand 
 (by the first part of this demonstration), it follows (Corul. 
 Prop. 22, pt. 4), that this effort to understand is the 
 primary and sole foundation of virtue, and that (Prop. 
 25, pt. 4) we do not endeavour to understand things for 
 the sake of any end, but, on the contrary, the mind, in 
 so far as it reasons, can conceive nothing as being go<Kl 
 for itself except that which conduces to understanding 
 (Def. I, pt. 4). Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXVII. — TVe do not know that anythiwj is urtainhj 
 good or evil excepting that vMch actually conducts to 
 understanding, or vMch can prevent ns from uruitr- 
 
 standing. 
 
 Demonst. — The mind, in so far as it reasons desires 
 nothing but to understand, nor does it adjudge aiiyth:u- 
 to be profitable to itself excepting what condu 
 understanding (Prop. 26, pt. 4). But the mind .1 
 41 and 43, pt. 2, with the Schol.) possesses no cer 
 unless in so far as it possesses adequate ideas, or ; 
 by Schol. Prop. 40, pt. 2, is the same thing) in so far u. 
 it reasons. We do not know, therefore, that anyllnng .s 
 certainly good, excepting that which actually conduce. 
 to understanding, and, on the other hand, we do not kuuw 
 
/ 
 
 200 ETHIC. 
 
 that anything is evil excepting that which can hinder 
 "US from understanding. — q.e.d. 
 
 Peop. XXVIII. — The highest good of the mind is the 
 knowledge of God, and the highest viiiue of the mind 
 is to know God. 
 
 Demonst. — The highest thing which the mind can 
 understand is God, that is to say (Def. 6, pt. i), Being 
 absolutely infinite, and without whom (Prop. 15, pt. i) 
 nothing can be nor can be conceived, and therefore (Props. 
 26 and 27, pt. 4) that which is chiefly profitable to the 
 mind, or (Def. i, pt. 4) which is the highest good of the 
 mind, is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind acts 
 only in so far as it understands (Props, i and 3, pt. 3), 
 and only in so far (Prop. 23, pt. 4) can it be absolutely 
 said to act in conformity with virtue. To understand, 
 therefore, is the absolute virtue of the mind. But the 
 highest thing which the mind can understand is God (as 
 we have already demonstrated), and therefore the highest 
 virtue of the mind is to understand or know God. — q.e.d. 
 
 PiiOP. XXIX. — JVo individual ohject whose nature is alto- 
 gether different from our own can either help or 
 restrain our power of acting, and alsolutely nothing 
 can he to us either good or evil unless it possesses 
 something in common with ourselves. 
 
 Demonst. — The power of an individual object, and con- 
 sequently (Corol. Prop. 10, pt. 2) that of man, by which 
 he exists and acts, is determined only by another indivi- ■ 
 dual object (Prop. 28, pt. i), whose nature (Prop. 6, pt. 
 2) must be understood through the same attribute as that 
 by means of which human nature is conceived. Our 
 power of acting, therefore, in whatever way it may be 
 conceived, can be determined, and consequently helped or 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DAG E, ^, 
 
 restraiued, by the power of another individual ohjoct jmjs- 
 sessing something in common ^Yith us, and cannot be 
 thus determined by the power of an object whose nature 
 is altogether different from ours. Inasmuch, therefore. 
 as a thing is called good or evil because it is the cause 
 of joy or sorrow (Prop. 8, pt. 4), that is to say (Schol. 
 Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), because it increases or diminishes, lielps 
 or restrains, our power of action ; an object, whose nature 
 is altogether different from our own, cannot be either 
 good or evil to us. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXX. — Nothing can he evil throiujh thai irhich U 
 possesses in common with our nature, hut in so far as 
 a thing is evil to us is it contrary to us. 
 
 Demonst. — We call that thing evil which is tlie cause of 
 sorrow (Prop. 8, pt. 4), that is to say (by tlie definition of 
 sorrow in SchoL Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), which lessens or restrains 
 our power of action. If, therefore, any object were evil 
 to us through that which it possesses in common with us, 
 it could lessen or restrain what it possesses in common 
 with us, which (Prop. 4, pt. 3) is absurd. Xulhinj,', 
 therefore, through that whicli it possesses in common 
 with us can be evil to us, but, on the contrary, in so far 
 as it is evil, that is to say (as we have already shown), 
 in so far as it can lessen or restrain our power of action 
 (Prop. 5, pt. 3), is it contrary to us. — Q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXXI. — In so far as an object agrcca v'.th .>ur 
 nature is it necessarily good. 
 
 Demonst. — In so far as any object agrees witli our 
 nature (Prop. 30, pt. 4) it cannot be evil. It must, 
 therefore, necessarily be either good or indiflerent. If it 
 be supposed as indifferent, that is to say, as neither good 
 nor evil, nothing (Ax. 3, pt. i) will follow from its nature 
 which conduces to the preservation of our nature, that is 
 
202 ETHIC. 
 
 to say (by hypothesis), which conduces to its own pre- 
 servation. But this (Prop. 6, pt. 3) is absurd, and, 
 therefore, in so far as the object agrees with our nature, 
 it will necessarily be good. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that the more an object 
 agrees with our own nature, the more profitable it is to 
 us, that is to say, the better it is for us, and, conversely, 
 the more profitable an object is to us, the more does it 
 agree with our own nature. For in so far as it does not 
 agree with our nature it will necessarily be either diverse 
 from our nature or contrary to it. If diverse, it can 
 (Prop. 29, pt. 4) be neither good nor evil, but if con- 
 trary, it will therefore be contrary also to that which 
 agrees with our own nature, that is to say (Prop. 3 1 , 
 pt. 4), contrary to the good, or, in other words, it will be 
 evil. IsTo thing, therefore, can be good except in so far 
 as it agrees with our nature, and therefore the more an 
 object agrees with our nature the more profitable it will 
 be, and vice versa. — q.e.d. 
 
 Peop. XXXII. — In so far as men are suhject to passions, 
 they can7iot he said to agree in nature. 
 
 Demonst. — Things which are said to agree in nature 
 are understood to agree in power (Prop. 7, pt. 3), and 
 not in impotence or negation, and consequently (Schol. 
 Prop. 3, pt. 3), not in passion, and therefore men, in so 
 far as they are subject to passion, cannot be said to agree 
 in nature. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — This proposition is self-evident, for he who 
 says that black and white agree solely in the fact that 
 neither of them is red, absolutely affirms that black and 
 white agree in nothing. So also if we say that a stone 
 and a man agree solely in this, they are both finite or 
 impotent, or do not exist from the necessity of their 
 nature, or are both to an indefinite extent dominated by 
 external causes, we affirm that a stone and a man 
 
OF HUMAN BONDAGE. 303 
 
 agree in nothing, for things which agree in nogatjon 
 only, or in that which they have not, really a^ree in 
 
 nothing. 
 
 Peop. XXXIII. — 3fcn may differ in nnfure from nu^ 
 another in so far as they arc agitated by affecta vhirk 
 are passions, and in so far also as one and the sauir 
 man is agitated ly passions is he changeable and in- 
 
 constant. 
 
 Demonst. — The natnre or essence of the afTocts cannot 
 be explained through our essence or nature alone (Defs. 
 I and 2, pt. 3), but must be determined by the power. 
 that is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), the nature of exlcrnal 
 causes compared with our own nature. Hence it fol- 
 lows that there are as many kinds of each affect as there 
 are kinds of objects by which we are affected (Prop. $6, 
 pt. 3) ; that men are affected in different ways by one and 
 the same object (Prop. 51, pt. 3), and so far differ in 
 nature; and, finally, that one and the same man (I'rop. 
 51, pt. 3) is affected in different ways towards the same 
 object, and so far is changeable and inconstant. — Q.F..I). 
 
 Prop. XXXIV. — In so far as men are agitated by affcctn 
 
 which are passions can they he contrary to one anotlur. 
 
 Demonst. — A man, Peter, for example, may be a cause 
 of sorrow to Paul, because he possesses something,' re- 
 sembling that which Paul hates (Prop. 16, pt. 3), or 
 because he alone possesses something wliich Paul him- 
 self also loves (Prop. 32, pt. 3, witli its Schol.). or fur 
 other reasons (the chief of which are mentioned in Schol. 
 Prop. 5 5, pt. 3). Hence it will come to pass (Def. 7 of 
 the affects) that Paul hates Peter, and, consequently, it 
 will easily happen (Prop. 40, pt. 3, with its Schol.) that 
 Peter in turn hates Paul, and that they endeavour (Prop. 
 39, pt. 3) to injure one another, or, in other wortU 
 
204 ETHIC. 
 
 (Prop. 30, pt. 4), that they are contrary to one another. 
 But the affect of sorrow is always a passion (Prop. 59, 
 pt. 3), and therefore men, in so far as they are agitated 
 by affects wliicli are passions, can be contrary to one 
 another. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — I have said that Paul hates Peter because he 
 imagines that Peter possesses something which he him- 
 self loves, from which at first sight it appears to follow, that 
 because they both love the same thing, and consequently 
 agree in nature with one another, they are, therefore, injur- 
 ious to one another ; and if this be true. Props. 30 and 31, 
 pt. 4, would be false. But if we will examine the matter 
 impartially, we shall see that all these things are quite in 
 accord. For Peter and Paul are not injurious to one another 
 in so far as they agree in nature, that is to say, in so far 
 as they both love the same object, but in so far as they 
 differ from one another. For in so far as they both love 
 the same object is the love of each strengthened (Prop. 
 3 I, pt. 3), that is to say (Def. 6 of the Affects), so far is 
 the joy of both increased. It is far from true, therefore, 
 that in so far as they love the same object and agree in 
 nature they are injurious to one another. They are in- 
 jurious to one another, on the contrary, as I have said, 
 solely because they are supposed to differ in nature. For 
 we suppose Peter to have an idea of a beloved object 
 which he now possesses, and Paul, on the other hand, to 
 have an idea of a beloved object which he has lost. The 
 former, therefore, . is affected with joy, and the latter, on 
 the contrary, with sorrow, and so far they are contrary to 
 one another. In this manner we can easily show that the 
 other causes of hatred depend solely on the fact that men 
 differ by nature and not on anything in which they agree. 
 
 Prop. XXXV. — So far as men live in conformity with the 
 guidance of reason, in so far only do they always neces- 
 sarily agree in nature. 
 Demonst. — In so far as men are agitated by affects 
 
OF H UMA N BOX DA GE. 305 
 
 which are passions can they differ in nature (Proiv 33, 
 pt. 4) and be contrary to one another (rrop. 34, pt 4).' 
 But men are said to act only in so far as they livo 
 according to the guidance of reason (Prop. 3, pt. 3), ami 
 therefore, whatever follows from human nature, in so far 
 as it is determined by reason (Def 2, pt. 3), must bo 
 understood through human nature alone as tliroui,'h iu 
 proximate cause. But because every one, according to tlio 
 laws of his own nature, desires that which he adjudges 
 to be good, and endeavours to remove that which he ad- 
 judges to be evil (Prop. 1 9, pt. 4), and because that which 
 from the dictates of reason we judge to be good or evil 
 is necessarily good or evil (Prop. 41, pt. 2), it follows 
 that men, only in so far as they live according to the 
 guidance of reason, necessarily do those things wliich are 
 good to human nature, and consequently to each man, 
 that is to say (Corol. Prop. 31, pt. 4), whicii agree with 
 the nature of each man, and therefore also men neces- 
 sarily always agree with one another in so far as they 
 live according to the guidance of reason. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. I. — There is no single thing iu nature which is 
 more profitable to man than a man who lives according 
 to the guidance of reason. For that is most profitable 
 to man which most agrees with his own nature (Corol. 
 Prop. 31, pt. 4), that is to say, man (as is self-evident). 
 But a man acts absolutely from the laws of his own 
 nature when he lives according to the guidance of rea.s«>n 
 (Def. 2, pt. 3), and so far only does he always necessarily 
 agree with the nature of another man (Prop. 35, pt. 4); 
 therefore there is no single tiling more proGtidde t» a 
 man than man, &c. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. 2.— When each man seeks most that which i« 
 profitable to himself, then are men most profitable to ono 
 another; for the more each man seeks his own profit 
 and endeavours to preserve himself, the more virtue 
 does he possess (Prop. 20, pt. 4), or, in other words (Def. 
 8, pt. 4), the more power does he possess to act accord- 
 
2o6 ETHIC. 
 
 ing to the laws of his own nature, that is to say (Prop. 
 3, pt. 3), to live according to the guidance of reason. 
 But men most agree in nature wdien they live according 
 to the guidance of reason (Prop. 35, pt. 4), therefore (by 
 the previous Corol.) men will be most profitable to one 
 another when each man seeks most what is profitable to 
 himself. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — To what we have just demonstrated daily ex- 
 perience itself testifies by so many and such striking 
 proofs, that it is in almost everybody's mouth that man 
 is a God to man. It is very seldom indeed that men 
 live according to the guidance of reason ; on the con- 
 trary, it so happens that they are generally envious and 
 injurious to one another. But, nevertheless, they are 
 scarcely ever able to lead a solitary life, so that to most 
 men the definition of man that he is a social animal 
 entirely commends itself, and indeed it is the case that 
 far more advantages than disadvantages arise from the 
 common society of men. Let satirists therefore scoff at 
 human affairs as much as they please, let theologians de- 
 nounce them, and let the melancholy praise as much as 
 they can a life rude and without refinement, despising 
 men and admiring the brutes, men wdll nevertheless find 
 out that by mutual help they can much more easily pro- 
 cure the things they need, and that it is only by their 
 united strength they can avoid the dangers which every- 
 where threaten them, to say nothing about its being far 
 nobler and worthier of our knowledge to meditate upon 
 the doings of men than upon those of brutes. But more 
 of this elsewhere. 
 
 I Peop. XXXVI. — The highest good of those who follow after 
 virtue is common to all, and all may equally enjoy it. 
 
 Dcinonst. — To act in conformity with virtue is to act 
 according to the guidance of reason (Prop. 24, pt. 4), 
 and every effort which we make through reason is an 
 
 J 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DACE. 
 
 effort to understand (Prop. 26, pt. 4), aiul ll»ert?foro 
 (Prop. 28, pt. 4) the highest good of those who follow 
 after virtue is to know God, that is to say (rrf>p. 47. 
 pt. 2, with its Schol.), it is a good which is ci.imnon to 
 all men, and can be equally possessed by all men in so 
 far as they are of the same nature. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — If anybody asks, What if the highest goo<l of 
 those who follow after virtue were not common to all { 
 would it not thence follow (as above, see Prop. 34, pt. 4) 
 that men who live according to the guidance of reason, 
 that is to say (Prop. 35, pt. 4), men in so far as they 
 agree in nature, would be contrary to one another ? We 
 reply that it arises from no accident, but from the nature 
 itself of reason, that the highest good of man is com- 
 mon to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the human 
 essence itself, in so far as it is determined by reason, and 
 also because man could not be nor be conceived if he had 
 not the powder of rejoicing in this highest good. For it 
 pertains (Prop. 47, pt. 2) to the essence of the human 
 mind to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and 
 infinite essence of God. 
 
 Peop. XXXYII. — The good which evert/ one who foUmra 
 after virtue seeks for himself he will desire for other 
 mm ; and Ms desire on their hchalf will be greater in 
 jjroportion as he has a greater knowledge of God. 
 
 Demonst. — Men are most profitable to man in so far 
 as they live according to the guidance of reason (CoroL I, 
 Prop. 35, pt. 4), and therefore (Prop. 19, pt- 4). accord- 
 ing to the guidance of reason, we neces.sarily endeavour 
 to cause men to live according to the guidance of reason. 
 But the good which each person seeks who lives accord- 
 ing to the dictates of reason, that is to say (Proj*. 24. 
 pt. 4), who follows after virtue, is to understand (Prop. 
 26, pt. 4), and therefore the good which each iK;r«on 
 seeks 'who follows after virtue he will also desiro for 
 
2o8 ETHIC. 
 
 other men. Again, desire, in so far as it is related to 
 the mind, is the essence itself of the mind (Def. i of the 
 Affects). But the essence of the mind consists in know- 
 ledge (Prop. II, pt. 2), which involves the knowledge of 
 God (Prop. 47, pt. 2), and without this knowledge the 
 essence of the mind can neither be nor be conceived 
 (Prop. I 5 , pt. I ) ; and therefore the greater the know- 
 ledge of God which the essence of the mind involves, 
 the greater will be the desire with which he who follows 
 after virtue will desire for another the good which he 
 seeks for himself. — q.e.d. 
 
 Another Demonstration. — The good which a man seeks 
 for himself and which he loves he will love more un- 
 changeably if he sees that others love it (Prop. 3 i, pt. 3), 
 and therefore (Corol. Prop. 31, pt. 3) he will endeavour 
 to make others love it ; and because this good (Prop. 3 6, 
 pt. 4) is common to all and all can rejoice in it, he will 
 endeavour (by the same reasoning) to cause all to rejoice 
 in it, and (Prop, 37, pt. 3) he will do so the more the 
 more he rejoices in this good himself. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. I. — He who strives from an affect alone to make 
 others love what he himself loves, and to make others 
 live according to his way of thinking, acts from mere 
 impulse, and is therefore hateful, especially to those who 
 have other tastes, and who therefore also desire, and by 
 the same impulse strive to make others live according to 
 their way of thinking. 
 
 Again, since the highest good which men seek from an 
 affect is often such that only one person can possess it, 
 it follows that persons who love are not consistent with 
 themselves, and, whilst they delight to recount the praises 
 of the beloved object, fear lest they should be believed. 
 But he who endeavours to lead others by reason does 
 not act from impulse, but with humanity and kindness, 
 and is always consistent with himself. 
 
 Everything which we desire and do, of which we are 
 the cause in so far as we possess an idea of God, or in 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DAG n. ^^ 
 
 so far as we know God, I refer to RcWji.n. Tho desiro 
 of doing well which is horn in us, because wo liv« accord- 
 ing to the guidance of reason, I call Piety. Tho dcairo 
 to join others in friendship to himself, with which a man 
 living according to the guidance of reason is possessed, I 
 call Honour. I call that thing Eonourahle which men 
 who live according to the guidance of reason praise ; an»l 
 that thing, on the contrary, I call Base which sets itself 
 against the formation of friendship. Moreover, I have 
 also shown what are the foundations of a State. 
 
 The difference also between true virtue and impotence 
 may, from wdiat has already been said, be easily seen to 
 be this — that true virtue consists in living according to 
 the guidance of reason alone ; and that impotence there- 
 fore consists in this alone — that a man allows hiiiisi'lf to 
 be led by things which are outside himself, and by tljctn 
 to be determined to such actions as the connuon consti- 
 tution of external things demands, and not to such as his 
 own nature considered in itself alone demands. These 
 are the things which I promised in Schol. Prop. 1 8, pt. 4, 
 I would demonstrate. From . them we see that the law 
 against killing animals is based upon an empty supersti- 
 tion and womanish tenderness, rather than upon sound 
 reason. The law, indeed, of seeking one's own protit 
 teaches us to unite in friendship with men, and not with 
 brutes, nor with things whose nature is diflerent from 
 human nature. It teaches us, too, that the same right 
 which they have over us we have over them. Indeed, 
 since the right of any person is limited by his virtue or 
 power, men possess a far greater riglit over brutes than 
 brutes possess over men. I by no means deny tliat 
 brutes feel, but I do deny that on tliis account it is 
 unlawful for us to consult our own profit by usiiij; them 
 for our own pleasure and treating them as is most con- 
 venient for us, inasmuch as they do not agree in nature 
 with us, and their affects are diilerent frum our own 
 (Schol. Prop. 57, pt. 3). 
 
210 ETHIC. 
 
 It now remains that I should explain what are Justice, 
 Injustice, Crime, and, finally, Merit. With regard to 
 these, see the following scholium. 
 
 ScJiol. 2. — In the Appendix to the First Part I promised 
 I would explain what are praise and hlame, merit and 
 crime, justice and injustice. I have already shown what 
 is the meaning of praise and blame in Schol. Prop. 29, 
 pt. 3, and this will be a fitting place for the explanation 
 of the rest. A few words must, however, first be said 
 about the natural and civil state of man. 
 
 It is by the highest right of nature that each person 
 exists, and consequently it is by the highest right of 
 nature that each person does those things which follow 
 from the necessity of his nature ; and therefore it is by 
 the highest right of nature that each person judges what 
 is good and what is evil, consults his own advantage as 
 he thinks best (Props. 19 and 20, pt. 4), avenges him- 
 self (Corol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 3), and endeavours to pre- 
 serve what he loves and to destroy what he hates (Prop. 
 28, pt. 3). If men lived according to the guidance of 
 reason, every one would enjoy this right without injuring 
 any one else (Corol. i, Prop. 35, pt. 4). But because 
 men are subject to affects (Corol. Prop. 4, pt. 4), which 
 far surpass human power or virtue (Prop. 6, pt. 4), they 
 are often drawn in different directions (Prop, 33, pt. 4), 
 and are contrary to one another (Prop. 34, pt. 4), 
 although they need one another's help (Schol. Prop. 35, 
 pt. 4). 
 
 In order, then, that men may be able to live in har- 
 mony and be a help to one another, it is necessary for 
 them to cede their natural right, and beget confidence 
 one in the other that they will do nothing by which one 
 can injure the other. In what manner this can be done, 
 so that men who are necessarily subject to affects (Corol. 
 Prop. 4, pt. 4), and are uncertain and changeable (Prop. 
 33, pt. 4), can beget confidence one in the other and 
 liave faith in one another, is evident from Prop. 7, pt. 4, 
 
OF HUMAN DOXDAGE. ,,, 
 
 and Prop. 39, pt. 3. It is there shown tlmt no nlFiTt 
 can be restrained unless by a stronger and contrary 
 affect, and that every one abstains from doin.u' ^n injury 
 through fear of a greater injury. T.y this hnv. thon-fon'.. 
 can society be strengthened, if only it claims for itself 
 the right which every individual possesses of avpnj,»in" 
 himself and deciding what is good and wliat is evil, and 
 provided, therefore, that it possess the power of proscrih- 
 ing a common rule of life, of promulgating laws and 
 supporting them, not by reason, which cannot restrain 
 the affects (Schol. Prop. 17, pt. 4), but by penalties. 
 
 This society, firmly established by law and willi a 
 2)ower of self-preservation, is called a State, and those 
 who are protected by its right are called Citizens. We 
 can now easily see that in the natural state there i.s 
 nothing which by universal consent is good or evil, since 
 every one in a natural state consults only his own profit ; 
 deciding according to his own way of thinking what i.s 
 good and what is evil with reference only to liis own 
 profit, and is not bound by any law to obey any one but 
 himself. Hence in a natural state sin cannot l»e con- 
 ceived, but only in a civil state, where it is decided by 
 universal consent what is good and what is evil, and 
 where every one is bound to obey the State. Sin, there- 
 fore, is nothing but disobedience, which is punished by 
 the law of the State alone ; obedience, on the other liantl. 
 
 beino- re^i-arded as a 7nerit in a citizen, because on aceount 
 
 • ■If 
 of it he is considered worthy to enjoy the pnvileu'os of 
 
 the State. Again, in a natural state no one by common 
 
 consent is the owner of anything, nor is tiiere anyihin;,' 
 
 in nature which can be said to be the rightful projnirty 
 
 of this and not of that man, but all things belong to all, 
 
 so that in a natural state it is impossiljle to conceive a 
 
 desire of rendering to each man his own or takinj; from 
 
 another that which is his ; that is to say, in a natural 
 
 state there is nothing which can be called juet or nnjii»t, 
 
 but only in a civil state, in which it is decided by un»- 
 
212 ETHIC. 
 
 versal consent what is one person's and what is another's. 
 Justice and injustice, therefore, sin and merit, are exter- 
 nal notions, and not attributes, which explain the nature 
 of the mind. But enough of these matters. 
 
 Prop, XXXVIII. — TJiat ivJdcJi so disposes the human lody 
 that it can he affected in many ways, or which renders 
 it ccqjaUe of affecting external bodies in many ivays, is 
 profitahh to man, and is more profitable in proportion 
 as by its means the body becomes better fitted to be 
 affected in many ivays, and to affect other bodies ; on 
 the other hand, that thing is injurious which renders 
 the body less fitted to affect or be affected. 
 
 Demonst. — In proportion as the body is rendered more 
 fitted for this is the mind rendered more capable of per- 
 ception (Prop. 14, pt. 2), and, therefore, whatever dis- 
 poses the body in this way, and renders it fitted for this, 
 is necessarily good or profitable (Props. 26 and 27, pt. 4), 
 and is more profitable in proportion to its power of ren- 
 dering the body more fitted for this, while, on the con- 
 trary (by Prop. 14, pt. 2, conversely, and Props. 26 and 
 27, pt. 4), it is injurious if it renders the body less fitted 
 for this. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXXIX. — Whatever is effective to preserve the 
 proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the 
 human body bear to each other is good, and, on the 
 contrary, that is evil which causes the parts of the 
 human body to have a different proportion of ^notion 
 and rest to each other. 
 
 Demonst. — The human body needs for its preservation 
 very many other bodies (Post. 4, pt. 2). But what 
 constitutes thfe form of the human body is this, that its 
 parts communicate their motions to one another in a certain 
 fixed proportion (Def. preceding Lem. 4, following Prop. 1 3, 
 
OF HUMAN BOS DAG n. ,,. 
 
 pt. 2). Whatever, therefore, is effective to preserve ll.o 
 proportion of motion and rest whicli tlie parts of the l.umftn 
 body bear to each other, preserves the form of tl»e human 
 body, and, consequently (Posts. 3 and 6, j^t. 2). is clToc- 
 tive to enable the body to be affected in many ways, and 
 to affect external bodies in many ways, and, tllcTcforc 
 (Prop. 38, pt. 4), is good. A'^am, whatever causes the 
 parts of the human body to get a different propcrtion of 
 motion and rest (by the definition just quoted), causes 
 the human body to assume another form, that is to say 
 (as is self-evident, and as we observed at the end of llj'e 
 preface to this part), causes the human body to W de- 
 stroyed, rendering it consequently incapable of being 
 affected in many ways, and is, therefore (Prop. 38, pt. 4>, 
 bad. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — In what degree these things may injure or 
 profit the mind will be explained in the Fiftli PurU 
 Here I observe merely that I understand tlie body to 
 die when its parts are so disposed as to acquire a differ- 
 ent proportion of motion and rest to each other. For I 
 dare not deny that the human body, though the circu- 
 lation of the blood and the other tilings l»y moans of 
 which it is thought to. live be preserved, may, nevertlie- 
 less, be changed into another nature altogetiier different 
 from its own. No reason compels me to allirm tiiut ihu 
 body never dies unless it is changed into a coijt.se. Ex- 
 perience, indeed, seems to teach the contrary. It liapiHjns 
 sometimes that a man undergoes such changes that he 
 cannot very well be said to be the same man, as was the 
 case with a certain Spanish poet of whom I liave heani, 
 who was seized with an illness, and although lie recovured, 
 remained, nevertheless, so oblivious of his i»a8t lifo 
 that he did not believe the tales and tragedies he had 
 composed were his own, and he miglit, indeed, hnvc 
 been taken for a grown-up child if he had also forgoiu-n 
 bis native tongue. I'.ut if this seems incredible, whnt 
 sliall we say of children ? The man of mature year* 
 
214 ETHIC. 
 
 believes the nature of children to be so different from 
 his own, that it would be impossible to persuade him 
 he had ever been a child, if he did not conjecture 
 regarding himself from what he sees of others. But in 
 order to avoid giving to the superstitious matter for new 
 questions, I prefer to go no farther in the discussion of 
 these matters. 
 
 ■ Prop. XL. — Whatever conduces to the universal fellowship 
 of men, that is to say, ivhatever causes men to live in 
 harmony with one another, is profitable, and, on the 
 contrary, vjhatever hrinys discord into the State is evil. 
 
 Demonst. — For whatever causes men to live in har- 
 mony with one another causes them to live according to 
 the guidance of reason (Prop. 35, pt. 4), and, therefore 
 (Props. 26 and 27, pt. 4), is good, and (by the same reason- 
 ing) those things are evil which excite discord. — q.e.d. 
 
 r 
 
 Prop. XLI. — Joy is not directly evil, hut good ; sorrow, 
 on the other hand, is directly evil. 
 
 Demonst. — Joy (Prop. 1 1, pt. 3, with its Schol.) is an 
 affect by which the body's power of action is increased 
 or assisted. Sorrow, on the other hand, is an affect by 
 which the body's power of action is lessened or re- 
 strained, and, therefore (Prop. 38, pt. 4), joy is directly 
 good. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XLI I. — Cheerfulness can never he excessive, hut is 
 always good ; melancholy, on the contrary, is always evil. 
 
 Demonst. — Cheerfulness (see its definition in Schol. 
 Prop. II, pt. 3) is joy, which, in so far as it is related to 
 the body, consists in this, that all the parts of the body 
 are equally affected, that is to say (Prop. 11, pt. 3), the 
 body's power of action is increased or assisted, so that 
 
OF HUMAN BOiWDAGF 
 
 nil the parts acquire the same proportion of .notion an.l 
 rest to each other. Cheerfulness, therefore (I'mp ,o 
 pt. 4), IS always good, and can never l-e excessive * H»i 
 melancholy (see its definition in Schol. Prop, i i.pt 3) j^ 
 sorrow, which, in so far as it is related to the'lKKlv 
 consists in this, that the body's power of action is abso^ 
 lutely lessened or restrained, and melancholy, therefore 
 (Prop. 38, pt. 4), is always evil.— q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XLIII. — Pleasurable excitement may U excessirf 
 and an evil, and pain may he good in so fur a.i 
 pleasurable excitement or joy is evil. 
 
 Demonst. — Pleasurable excitement is joy, wliich, in so 
 far as it is related to the body, consists in tin's, tiiat one or 
 some of the parts of the body are affected more than 
 others (see Def. in Schol. Prop. 11, pt. 3). The power 
 of this affect may, therefore, be so great as to overcoino 
 the other actions of the body (Prop. 6, pt. 4) ; it ninv 
 cling obstinately to the body ; it may impede the body 
 in such a manner as to render it less capable of bein;; 
 affected in many ways, and therefore (Prop. 38, pt 4) 
 may be evil. Again, pain, which, on the contrary, is 
 sorrow, considered in itself alone cannot be good (Prop. 
 4 1, pt. 4). But because its power and increase is limited 
 by the power of an external cause compared with our 
 own power (Prop. 5, pt. 4), we can tliercfore conceive 
 infinite degrees of strength of this affect, and infmito 
 kinds of it (Prop. 3, pt. 4), and we can therefore con- 
 ceive it to be such that it can restrain an excess of 
 pleasurable excitement, and so far (by the first part of 
 this proposition) preventing the body from becoming 1cm 
 capable. So far, therefore, will pain be good. — g.JLU. 
 
 Prop. XLIV. — Love and desire may be exctsnrr. 
 Demonst.— Love is joy (Def. 6 of the Affects) with iho 
 
2i6 ETHIC. 
 
 accompanying idea of an external cause. Pleasurable 
 excitement, therefore (Schol. Prop. 1 1, pt. 3), with the 
 accompanying idea of an external cause, is love, and there- 
 fore love (Prop. 43, pt. 4) may be excessive. Again, 
 desire is greater as the affect from "which it springs is 
 greater (Prop. 37, pt. 3). Inasmuch, therefore, as an 
 affect (Prop. 6, pt. 4) may overpower the other actions of 
 a man, so also the desire which springs from this affect 
 may also overpower the other desires, and may therefore 
 exist in the same excess which we have shown (in the 
 l^receding proposition) that pleasurable excitement pos- 
 sesses. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — Cheerfulness, which I have affirmed to be 
 good, is more easily imagined than observed ; for the 
 affects by which we are daily agitated are generally re- 
 lated to some part of the body which is affected more 
 than the others, and therefore it is that the affects exist 
 for the most part in excess, and so hold the mind down 
 to the contemplation of one object alone, that it can 
 think about nothing else ; and although men are subject 
 to a number of affects, and therefore few are found who 
 are always under the control of one and the same affect, 
 there are not wanting those to whom one and the same 
 affect obstinately clings. We see men sometimes so 
 affected by one object, that although it is not present, 
 they believe it to be before them ; and if this happens to 
 a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or 
 mad. Nor are those believed to be less mad who are in- 
 flamed by love, dreaming about nothing but a mistress or 
 harlot day and night, for they excite our laughter. But 
 the avaricious man who thinks of nothing else but gain 
 or money, and the ambitious man who thinks of nothing 
 but glory, inasmuch as they do harm, and are, therefore, 
 thought worthy of hatred, are not believed to be mad. 
 In truth, however, avarice, ambition, lust, &c., are a kind 
 of madness, although they are not reckoned amongst dis- 
 eases. 
 
OF HUMAX BOXDAGE. „y 
 
 '' Trot. XLY.— Hatred can nnrr k' goo<i 
 
 Bemonst. — The man whom we liate wc endeavour lo 
 destroy (Prop. 39, pt. 3), that is to say (Prop. 37, pt 4). 
 we endeavour to do something whicli is evil. Tlierefore 
 liatred, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — It is to be observed that liere and in tlio 
 following propositions I understand by hatred, lulred 
 towards men only. 
 
 Corol. I. — Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenue, 
 and the other affects which are related to hatred or ariso 
 from it, are evil. This is also evident from Prop. 39, 
 pt. 3, and Prop. 37, pt. 4. 
 
 Corol. 2. — Everything which we desire because we arc 
 affected by hatred is base and unjust in the State. This 
 is also evident from Prop. 39, pt. 3, and from the defi- 
 nition in Schol. Prop. 37, pt. 4, of wluit is base and 
 unjust. 
 
 Scliol. — I make a great distinction between mockery 
 (which I have said in Corol. i of this Prop, is bad) and 
 laughter; for laughter and merriment are nothing bnt 
 joy, and therefore, provided they are not excessive, ore 
 in themselves good (Prop. 41, pt. 4). Nothing but n 
 gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoynient. Ft>r 
 why is it more seemly to extinguish hunger and thirst 
 than to drive away melancholy ? My reasons and my con- 
 clusions are these : — No God and no human being, except 
 an envious one, is delighted by my impotence or my 
 trouble, or esteems as any virtue in us tears, sighs, fears, 
 and other things of this kind, which are signs of inentfll 
 impotence ; on the contrary, the greater the joy with 
 which we are affected, the greater tlie perfection to which 
 we pass thereby, that is to say, the more do we neces- 
 sarily partake of the divine nature. To njake use of 
 things, therefore, and to deliglit in them as much oa pos- 
 sible (provided we do not disgust ourselvas with ihcin, 
 which is not delighting in them), is tlie part of o wiw 
 
2i8 ETHIC. 
 
 man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and 
 invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating and 
 drinking, with sweet scents and the beauty of green plants, 
 with ornament, with music, with sports, with the theatre, 
 and with all things of this kind which one man can enjoy 
 without hurting another. For the human body is com- 
 posed of a great number of parts of diverse nature, 
 which constantly need new and varied nourishment, in 
 order that the whole of the body may be equally fit for 
 everything which can follow from its nature, and conse- 
 quently that the mind may be equally fit to understand 
 many things at once. This mode of living best of all 
 agrees both with our principles and with common practice ; 
 therefore this mode of living is the best of all, and is to 
 be universally commended. There is no need, therefore, 
 to enter more at length into the subject. 
 
 PPtOP. XLVI. — He ivho lives according to the guidance of 
 reason strives as much as possible to repay the hatred, 
 anger, or contempt of others towards himself with 
 love or generosity. 
 
 Demonst. — All affects of hatred are evil (Corol. i. Prop. 
 45, pt. 4), and, therefore, the man who lives according 
 to the guidance of reason will strive as much as possible 
 to keep himself from being agitated by the affects of 
 hatred (Prop. 19, pt. 4), and, consequently (Proj). 37, pt. 
 4), will strive to keep others from being subject to the 
 same affects. But hatred is increased by reciprocal 
 hatred, and, on the other hand, can be extinguished by 
 love (Prop. 43, pt. 3), so that hatred passes into love 
 (Prop. 44, pt. 3). Therefore he who lives according to 
 the guidance of reason will strive to repay the hatred of 
 another, &c., with love, that is to say, with generosity (see 
 definition of generosity in Schol. Prop. 59, pt. 3). — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — He who wishes to avenge injuries by hating 
 in return does indeed live miserablv. But he who, on 
 
OF HUMAN DOS'DAGE. „, 
 
 the contrary, strives to drive out Imtred by love finhm 
 joyfully and confidently, .vitli equal ease resisting ono 
 man or a number of men, and needing scarcely any assis- 
 tance from fortune. Those whom he conquers yield 
 gladly, not from defect of strength, but from an incrca.se 
 of it. These truths, however, all follow so plainly {umx 
 the definitions alone of love and the intellect, that then- 
 is no need to demonstrate them singly. 
 
 Prop. XLYIl. — The affects of hope awl fear eannot U 
 
 good of tlicm selves. 
 
 Demonst. — The affects of hope and fear cannot exist 
 without sorrow; for fear (Def. 13 of the Allects) is 
 sorrow, and hope (see the explanation of Defs. 1 2 and 
 1 3 of the Affects) cannot exist without fear. Therefore 
 (Prop. 4 1 , pt. 4) these affects cannot be good of them- 
 selves, but only in so far as they are able to restrain the 
 excesses of joy (Prop. 43, pt. 4). — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — We may here add that these affects indicate 
 want of knowledge and impotence of mind, and, for the 
 same reason, confidence, despair, gladness, and remorso 
 are signs of weakness of mind. For although confidence 
 and gladness are affects of joy, they nevertheless siip|)08« 
 that sorrow has preceded them, namely, hope or fear. In 
 proportion, tlierefore, as we endeavour to live according 
 to the guidance of reason, shall we strive as much as 
 possible to depend less on hope, to liberate ourselves from 
 fear, to rule fortune, and to direct our actions by the sure 
 counsels of reason. 
 
 Prop. XLYIII. — The affects of over-estimation ami conlrmjtt 
 are alvxtys evil. 
 
 Demonst.— These affects (Defs. 21 and 22 ui ll..- 
 Affects) are opposed to reason, and therefore (I'rops. 26 
 
 and 27, pt. 4) are evil. — Q.ED. 
 
220 ETHIC. 
 
 Pkop. XLIX. — Over-estimation easily renders the man 
 who is over-estimated proud. 
 
 Donortst. — If we see that a person, tlirougii love, thinks 
 too much of us, we shall easily glorify ourselves (Schol. 
 41, pt. 3), or, in other words, be affected with joy (Def. 30 
 of the Affects), and easily believe the good which we hear 
 others affirm of us (Prop. 25, pt. 3), and consequently, 
 through self-love, we shall think too much of ourselves, 
 that is to say (Def. 28 of the Affects), we shall easily 
 grow proud. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. L. — Pity in a man who lives according to the guidance 
 of reason is in itself evil and ii.nprofitcd)le. 
 
 Demonst. — Pity (Def. i 8. of the Affects) is sorrow, and 
 therefore (Prop. 41, pt. 4) is in itself evil. The good, 
 however, which issues from pity, namely, that we endea- 
 vour to free from misery the man we pity (Corol. 3, 
 Prop. 27, pt. 3), we desire to do from the dictate of 
 reason alone (Prop. 37, pt. 4); nor can we do anything 
 except by the dictate of reason alone, which we are sure 
 is good (Prop. 27, pt. 4). Pity, therefore, in a man who 
 lives according to the guidance of reason is in itself bad 
 and unprofitable, — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that a man who lives accord- 
 ing to the dictates of reason endeavours as much as 
 possible to prevent himself from being touched by 
 pity. 
 
 Schol. — ^The man who Las properly understood that 
 everything follows from the necessity of the divine 
 nature, and comes to pass according to the eternal 
 laws and rules of nature, will in truth discover nothing 
 which is worthy of hatred, laughter, or contempt, nor 
 will he pity any one, but, so far as human virtue is 
 able, he will endeavour to do ivell, as we say, and to 
 rejoice. AVe must add also, that a man who is easily 
 
OF II UMAX BOX DAG IL „, 
 
 touched by tlie affect of pity, and is moved by the miaory 
 or tears of another, often does something of which ho 
 afterward repents, both because from an nITect wo do 
 nothing which we certainly know to be good, and also 
 because we are so easily deceived by false tears. But 
 this I say expressly of the man who lives according to 
 the guidance of reason. For he who is moved neither 
 by reason nor pity to be of any service to othera is pro- 
 perly called inhuman ; for (Prop. 27, pt. 3) he secm.s L. 
 be unlike a man. 
 
 Pkop. LI. — Favour is not opposed to reason, hut ajrfc,^ 
 ivltli it, and may arise from it. 
 
 Demonst. — Favour is love towards him who does good 
 to another (Def. 19 of the Affects), and therefore can bo 
 related to the mind in so far as it is said to act (Prop. 
 59, pt. 3). that is to say (Prop. 3, pt. 3), in so far as it 
 understands, and therefore favour agrees with reason. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Another Demonstration. — If we live according to tho 
 guidance of reason, we shall desire for otliers the goo«l 
 which we seek for ourselves (Prop. 37, pt. 4). Tliere- 
 fore if we see one person do good to another, our endea- 
 vour to do good is assisted, that is to say (Scliol. Prop. 
 II, pt. 3), we shall rejoice, and our joy (by hypotliesi'*; 
 will be accompanied with the idea of the person wl»o 
 does good to the other, that is to say (Def. 19 of tho 
 Affects), we shall favour him. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — Indignation, as it is defined by us (Def. 20 of 
 the Affects), is necessarily evil (Prop. 45, pt. 4); but it 
 is to be observed that when the supreme authority, con- 
 strained by the desire of preserving peace, i)uni.shc« a 
 citizen who injures another, I do not say that it is indig- 
 nant with the citizen, since it is not excited by hatrcti 
 to destroy him, but punishes him from motives of 
 piety. 
 
222 ETHIC. 
 
 Pkop. lit. — Self-satisfaction may arise from reason, and 
 the self-satisfaction alone tuhich arises from reason is 
 the highest which can exist. 
 
 Demonst. — Self-satisfaction is the joy ■wliich arises 
 from a man's contemplating himself and his power of 
 action (Def. 25 of the Affects). But man's true power 
 of action or his virtue is reason itself (Prop. 3, pt. 3), 
 which he contemplates clearly and distinctly (Props. 40 
 and 43, pt. 2). Self-satisfaction therefore arises from 
 reason. Again, man, when he contemplates himself, per- 
 ceives nothing clearly and distinctly or adequately, ex- 
 cepting those things which follow from his power of 
 action (Def. 2, pt. 3), that is to say (Prop. 3, pt. 3), 
 those things which follow from his power of understand- 
 ing ; and therefore from this contemplation alone the 
 highest satisfaction which can exist arises. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — Self-satisfaction is indeed the highest thing for 
 ■which we can hope, for (as we have shown in Prop. 25, 
 pt. 4) no one endeavours to preserve his being for the 
 sake of any end. Again, because this self-satisfaction is 
 more and more nourished and strengthened by praise 
 (Corol. Prop. 53, pt. 3), and, on the contrary (CoroL 
 Prop. 55, pt. 3), more and more disturbed by blame, 
 therefore we are principally led by glory, and can scarcely 
 endure life with disgrace. 
 
 Prop. LIII. — Rumility is not a virtue, that is to say, it 
 does not spring from reason. 
 
 Demonst. — Humility is sorrow, which springs from this, 
 that a man contemplates his own weakness (Def. 26 of 
 the Affects). But in so far as a man knows himself 
 by true reason is he supposed to understand his essence, 
 that is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), his power. If, therefore, 
 while contemplating himself, he perceives any impotence 
 of his, this is not due to his understanding himself, but, 
 as we have shown (Prop. 55, pt. 3), to the fact that his 
 
OF HUMAN BOXDACn. „, 
 
 power of action is restrained. ]lut if we suppose that 
 he forms a conception of his own impotence becnuso ho 
 understands something to be more powerful than him- 
 self, by the knowledge of which lie limits his own power 
 of action, in this case we simply conceive that ho un- 
 derstands himself distinctly (Prop. 26, pt. 4), and \m 
 power of action is increased. Humility or sorrow, there- 
 fore, which arises because a man contemplates Iiis own 
 impotence, does not spring from true contemj)lation or 
 reason, and is not a virtue, but a passion. — q.k.d. 
 
 Prop. LIV. — Repentance is not a virtue, that is to my, it 
 does not spring from reason ; on the contrary, the vtan 
 who repents of what he has done is dmihly wretched or 
 
 impotent. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The first part of this proposition is demon- 
 strated in the same manner as the preceding projiosi- 
 tion. The second part follows from the definition alono 
 of this affect (Def. 27 of the Affects). For, in tiie first 
 place, we allow ourselves to be overcome by a depraved 
 desire, and, in the second place, by sorrow. 
 
 Schol. — Inasmuch as men seldom live as reason dic- 
 tates, therefore these two affects, humility and repent- 
 ance, together with hope and fear, are productive of more 
 profit than disadvantage, and therefore, since nu-n must 
 sin, it is better that they should sin in this way. 
 For if men impotent in mind were all equally proud, 
 were ashamed of nothing, and feared nothing, by what 
 bonds could they be united or constrained ? The mul- 
 titude becomes a thing to be feared if it has nothing to 
 fear. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the 
 prophets, thinking rather of the good of the coniniuniiy 
 than of a few, should have commended so greatly 
 humility, repentance, and reverence. Indeed, those who 
 are subject to these affects can be led much more easily 
 than others, so that, at last, they come to live accord- 
 
224 ^ ETHIC. 
 
 ing to tlie guidance of reason, that is to say, become 
 free men, and enjoy the life of the blessed. 
 
 Prop. LV. — The greatest 'pride or the greatest despondency 
 is the greatest ignorance of one's self. 
 
 Dcrnonst. — This is evident from Defs. 28 and 29 of 
 the Affects. 
 
 Peop. LVI. — The greatest pride or despondency indicates 
 the greatest impotence of mind. 
 
 Demonst. — The primary foundation of virtue is the 
 preservation of our being (Corel. Prop. 22, pt. 4) accord- 
 ing to the guidance of reason (Prop. 24, pt, 4). The 
 man, therefore, who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of 
 the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently is 
 ignorant of all the virtues. Again, to act in conformity 
 with virtue is nothing but acting according to the guid- 
 ance of reason (Prop. 24, pt. 4), and he who acts ac- 
 cording to the guidance of reason must necessarily know 
 that he acts according to the guidance of reason (Prop. 
 43, pt. 2). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, 
 and consequently (as we have just shown) altogether 
 ignorant of all the virtues, cannot in any way act in 
 conformity with virtue, that is to say (Def. 8, pt. 4), 
 is altogether impotent in mind. Therefore (Prop. 55, 
 pt. 4), the greatest pride or despondency indicates the 
 greatest impotence of mind. — Q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — Hence follows, with the utmost clearness, that 
 the proud and the desponding are above all others sub- 
 ject to affects. 
 
 Schol. — Despondency, nevertheless, can be corrected 
 more easily than pride, since the former is an affect of 
 sorrow, while the latter is an affect of joy, and is, there- 
 fore (Prop. I 8, pt. 4), stronger than the former. 
 
OF HUM AS BOX DAG n. ^j 
 
 Vrov. LVIL—Thc proud man loves the presence o/panuiUt 
 or flatterers, and hates that of tlu noUc-mindtd. 
 
 Demonst. — rride is joy firisiug from a man's having too 
 high an opinion of himself (Defs. 28 and 6 of the Affecla). 
 This opinion a proud man will endeavour, as much as 
 he can, to cherish (Schoh Prop. 13, pt. 3), and, there- 
 fore, will love the presence of parasites or Hatterers (the 
 definitions of these people are omitted, hecause they are 
 too well known), and will shun that of the noble-minded 
 who think of him as is right. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — It would take too much time to enumerate 
 here all the evils of pride, for the proud are subject to all 
 affects, but to none are they less subject tiiau to those of 
 love and pity. It is necessary, however, to observe hero 
 that a man is also called proud if he thiuks too little of 
 other people, and so, in this sense, pride is to be defined 
 as joy which arises from the false opinion that wo are 
 superior to other people, while despondency, the contrary 
 to this pride, would be defined as sorrow arising from tho 
 false opinion that we are inferior to otlier people. This 
 being understood, it is easy to see that the proud man is 
 necessarily envious (Schol. Prop. 55, pt. 3), and that he 
 hates those above all others who are the most prai.scd on 
 account of their virtues. It follows, too, that his hatred of 
 them is not easily overcome by love or kindness (SchoL 
 Prop. 41, pt. 3), and that he is delighted by the presence 
 of those only who humour his weakness, and from a fool 
 make him a madman. Although despondency is con- 
 trary to pride, the despondent man is closely akin to the 
 proud man. For since the sorrow of the de-sixjndeut 
 man arises from his judging liis own imjwtcnco by tlio 
 power or virtue of others, his sorrow will be mitigaUnl, 
 that is to say, he will rejoice, if his imagination be occu- 
 pied in contemplating the vices of others. Hence tho 
 proverb— It is a consolation to the wretched to have bad 
 
 P 
 
2 26 ETHIC. 
 
 compauions in their misfortunes. On the other hand, 
 the more the despondent man believes himself to be below 
 other people, the more will he sorrow ; and this is the 
 reason why none are more prone to envy than the de- 
 spondent ; and why they, above all others, try to observe 
 men's actions with a view to finding fault with them 
 rather than correcting them, so that at last they praise 
 nothing but despondency and glory in it ; but in such a 
 manner, however, as always to seem despondent. 
 
 These things follow from this affect as necessarily as 
 it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three 
 angles are equal to two right angles. It is true, indeed, 
 that I have said that I call these and the like affects evil, 
 in so far as I attend to human profit alone ; but the laws 
 of nature have regard to the common order of nature of 
 whichman is a part — a remark I desired to make in passing, 
 lest it should be thought that I talk about the vices and 
 absurdities of men rather than attempt to demonstrate 
 the nature and properties of things. As I said in the 
 Preface to the Third Part, I consider human affects and 
 their properties precisely as I consider other natural 
 objects ; and, indeed, the affects of man, if they do not 
 show his power, show, at least, the power and workman- 
 ship of nature, no less than many other things which we 
 admire and delight to contemplate. I proceed, however, 
 to notice those things connected with the affects which 
 are productive either of profit or loss to man. 
 
 Prop. LVIII. — Self- exaltation is not opjoosccl to reason, hut 
 may spring from it. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This is plain from Def. 30 of the Affects, 
 and also from the definition of honour in Schol. i. Prop. 
 
 37, Pt- 4- 
 
 Schol. — What is called vainglory is self-satisfaction, 
 nourished by nothing but the good opinion of the multi- 
 
OF HUMAN BONDAGE. ,37 
 
 tude, so that wLeu that is withilrawn, tii.' s.iusiaciion, 
 that is to say (Schol. Prop. 52, j.t. 4), the cliii-f gooti 
 which every one loves, ceases. For this reason those 
 who glory in the good opinion of the nniltitudc anxiously 
 and with daily care strive, labour, and stni-^i;lo to pre- 
 serve their fame. For the multitude is chani,'oable and 
 fickle, so that fame, if it be not preserved, soon \msacs 
 away. As every one, moreover, is desirous to catch the 
 praises of the people, one person will readily destroy the 
 fame of another ; and, consequently, as the object of con- 
 tention is what is commonly thought to be the highest 
 good, a great desire arises on the part of every one to 
 keep down his fellows by every possible means, and ho 
 who at last comes off conqueror boasts more because he 
 has injured another person than because he lias profited 
 himself. This glory of self-satisfaction, therefore, is in- 
 deed vain, for it is really jio glory. WhaL is worthy of 
 notice with regard to shame may easily be gathered from 
 what has been said about compassion and repentance. 
 I will only add that pity, like shame, although it is not 
 a virtue, is nevertheless good, in so far as it shows that a 
 desire of living uprightly is present in the man who is 
 possessed with shame, just as pain is called good in so 
 far as it shows that the injured part has not yet putrefied. 
 A man, therefore, who is ashamed of what he has done, 
 although he is sorrowful, is nevertheless njore perfect 
 than the shameless man who has no desire of living 
 uprightly. These are the things which I undertook to 
 establish with regard to the affects of joy and sorrow. 
 With reference to the desires, these are good or evil 04 
 they spring from good or evil affects. All «( theru, how- 
 ever, in so far as they are begotten in us of atrect-s which 
 are passions, are blind (as may easily be inferred fruni 
 what has been said in Schol. Prop. 44. I't- 4). nor would 
 they be of any use if men could be easily prauaded Uj 
 live according to the dictates of reason alone, as I shall 
 show in a few words. 
 
228 ETHIC. 
 
 Peop. LIX. — To all actions to which we are determined hy 
 an affect which is a passion ice may, without the 
 affect, he determined hy reason. 
 
 Demonst. — To act according to reason is nothing (Prop. 
 3, and Def. 2, pt. 3) but to do those things which follow 
 froni the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. 
 But sorrow is evil so far as it lessens or restrains this 
 power of action (Prop. 41, pt. 4) ; therefore we can be 
 determined by this affect to no action which we could 
 not perform if we were led by reason. Again, joy is evil 
 so far only as it hinders our fitness for action (Props. 4 1 
 and 43, pt. 4); and therefore also we can so far be de- 
 termined to no action which we could not do if we were 
 led by reason. Finally, in so far as joy is good, so far 
 it agrees with reason (for it consists in this, that a man's 
 power of action is increased or assisted), and it is not 
 a passion unless in so far as man's power of action is 
 not increased sufficiently for him to conceive adequately 
 himself and his actions (Prop. 3, pt. 3, wath its Schol.) 
 If, therefore, a man affected with joy were led to such 
 perfection as to conceive adequately himself and his 
 actions, he would be fitted — better even than before — 
 for the performance of those actions to which he is now 
 determined by the affects which are passions. But alii 
 the affects are related to joy, sorrow, or desire *(see the] 
 explanation of Def. 4 of the Affects), and desire (Def. i \ 
 of the Affects) is nothing but the endeavour itself to act ;j 
 therefore to all actions to which we are determined byj 
 an affect which is a passion we may without the affect bej 
 determined by reason alone. — q.e.d. 
 
 Another Demonstration. — Any action is called evil inj 
 so far as it arises from our being affected with hatred 01 
 some evil affect (Corol. i. Prop. 45, pt. 4). But no! 
 action considered in itself alone is either good or evil (asj 
 we have already shown in the preface to this part), but! 
 one and the same action is sometimes good and some-l 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DAG n. ^^ 
 
 times evil. Therefore we may be led by reason (Trop. 1 9, 
 pt. 4) to that same action wliich is sometimes evil, or 
 which arises from some evil affect. — q.e.d. 
 
 Scliol. — This can be explained more clearly by nn ex- 
 ample. The action of striking, for insUxnce, in so far ns 
 it is considered physically, and we attend only to ll»e 
 fact that a man raises his arm, closes his hand, and 
 forcibly moves the whole arm downwards, is a virtue 
 which is conceived from the structure of the human 
 body. If, therefore, a man agitated by anger or hatred 
 is led to close the fist or move the arm, this comes to 
 pass, as we have shown in the Second Tart, because one 
 and the same action can be joined to different images of 
 things, and therefore we may be led to one and the same 
 action as well by the images of things which we conceive 
 confusedly as by those which we conceive clearly and 
 distinctly. It appears, therefore, that every desire which 
 arises from an affect which is a passion would be of no 
 iise if men could be led by reason. We shall now see 
 why a desire which arises from an affect which is a pas- 
 sion is called blind. 
 
 Pkop. LX. — The desire u-kich arises fr<m juy or sorraw, 
 loliich is related to 07ie or to somf, hut not to all, the 
 parts of the hodij, has no regard to the j^^'f^ "f ''" 
 
 whole man. 
 
 Dcrnonst. — Let it be supposed that a part of th-j U"ly 
 — A, for example — is so strengthened by the force of 
 some external cause that it prevails over the others 
 (Prop. 6, pt. 4). It will not endeavour, therefore, to 
 lose its strength in order that the remaining parts of the 
 body may perform their functions, for in that case it 
 would have a force or power of losing its strength, wh:.-h 
 (Prop. 6, pt. 3) is absurd. It will endeavour, thm-fon-. 
 and consequently (Props. 7 and i 2, pt. 3) the mind al»» 
 will endeavour, to preserve this same state ; and so the 
 
230 ETHIC. 
 
 desire whicli arises from such an affect of joy has no 
 regard to the whole man. If, on the other hand, it be 
 supposed that the part A is restrained so that the other 
 parts prevail, it can be demonstrated in the same way 
 that the desire which springs from sorrow has no regard 
 to the whole man. 
 
 Schol — Since, therefore, joy is most frequently related 
 to one part of the body (Schol. Prop. 44, pt. 4), we 
 generally desire to preserve our being without reference 
 to our health as a whole ; and, moreover, the desires by 
 which we are chiefly controlled (Corol. Prop. 9, pt. 4) 
 have regard to the j)resent only, and not to the future. 
 
 Prop. LXI. — A desire ivhich s'prings from reason can 
 never he in excess. 
 
 Devwnst — Desire (Def. i of the Affects), absolutely 
 considered, is the very essence of man, in so far as he is 
 conceived as determined in any way whatever to any 
 action, and therefore the desire which springs from reason, 
 that is to say (Prop. 3, pt. 3), which is begotten in us in 
 so far as we act, is the very essence or nature of man in 
 so far as it is conceived as determined to actions which 
 are adequately conceived by the essence of man alone 
 (Def 2, pt. 3). If, therefore, this desire could be in 
 excess, it would be possible for human nature, considered 
 in itself alone, to exceed itself, or, in other words, more 
 would be possible to it than is possible, which is a mani- 
 fest contradiction, and therefore this desire can never be 
 in excess. — q.e.d. 
 
 Pkop. LXII. — III so far as the co^icejotion of an oljcct 
 is formed hy the mind according to the dictate of 
 reason, the mind is equally affected, ivhether the idea 
 he that of something future, j'^ast, or 2')rcsent. 
 
 Demonst. — Everything which the mind, under the 
 guidance of reason, conceives, it conceives under the 
 
OF HUMAN DOS'DAGF.. 33, 
 
 same form of eternity or necessity (Corol. 2, I'rop. 44. 
 pt. 2), and it is affected with tlie same certainty (Prop. 43' 
 pt. 2, and its Schol.) Therefore, wliethcr the'idoa bo" one' 
 of a future, past, or present object, the mind conci'ivcs 
 the object with the same necessity, and is alTcGted with 
 the same certainty ; and whether the idea be that of a 
 future, past, or present olyect, it will nevertheless bo 
 equally true (Prop. 41, pt. 2), that is to say (Def. 4, 
 pt. 2), it will always have the same properties of nn 
 adequate idea. Therefore, in so far as the conception of 
 an object is formed by the mind according to the dictates of 
 reason, the mind will be affected in the same way whelhor 
 the idea be that of something future, past, or itnsi-iit.^ — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 ScJiol. — If it were possible for us to possess an ade- 
 quate knowledge concerning the duration of things, and 
 to determine by reason the periods of their existence, wo 
 should contemplate with the same affect objects futuni ami 
 present, and the good M'hich the mind conceived to be 
 future, it would seek just as it would seek the jirest-nt j;ootl. 
 Consequently it would necessarily neglect the present ^'ood 
 for the sake of a greater future good, and would, as wo 
 shall presently show, be very little disjiosed to seek a 
 good which was present, but which would be a cause of 
 any future evil. But it is not possible for us to liave any 
 other than a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of 
 things (Prop. 3 1, pt. 2), and we determine (Schol. Prop. 44, 
 pt. 2) the periods of the existence of objects by the inia},'ina- 
 tion alone, which is not affected by the image of a present 
 object in the same way as it is by that of a future object. 
 Hence it comes to pass that the true knowlcd;,'e of {•ood 
 and evil which we possess is only abstract or univer«al, 
 and the judgment we pass upon the order of thinj-s nnd 
 the connection of causes, so that we may detennino what 
 is good for iis in the present and what is evil, is rather 
 imaginary than real. It is not, therefore, to be wondcrcl 
 at if the desire which arises from a knowledge of good 
 
232 ETHIC. 
 
 and evil, in so far as tLis knowledge has regard to the 
 future, is cajDable of being easily restrained by the desire 
 of objects which are sweet to us at the present moment. 
 (See Prop. 1 6, pt. 4.) 
 
 Peop. LXIII. — He loJio is led hy fear, and does vjhat is 
 good in order that he may avoid what is evil, is 
 not led hy reason. 
 
 Demonst. — All the affects which are related to the 
 mind, in so far as it acts, that is to say (Prop. 3, pt. 3), 
 which are related to reason, are no other than affects of 
 joy and desire (Prop. 59, pt. 3) ; and therefore (Def. i 3 of 
 the Affects), he who is led by fear and does good through 
 lear of evil is not led by reason. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — The superstitious, who know better how to 
 rail at vice than to teach virtue, and who study not to 
 lead man by reason, but to hold him in through fear, in 
 order that he may shun evil rather than love virtue, aim 
 at nothing more than that others should be as miserable as 
 themselves, and, therefore, it is not to be wondered at if 
 they generally become annoying and hateful to men. 
 
 Corol. — By the desire which springs from reason we 
 follow good directly and avoid evil indirectly. 
 
 Demonst. — For the desire which springs from reason 
 cannot spring from sorrow, but only from an afi'ect of joy, 
 which is not a passion (Prop. 59, pt. 3), that is to say, 
 from joy which cannot be in excess (Prop. 6 1, pt. 4). This 
 desire springs, therefore (Prop. 8, pt. 4), from the know- 
 ledge of good, and not from the knowledge of evil, and 
 therefore, according to the guidance of reason, we seek 
 what is good directly, and so far only do we shun what 
 is evil. — Q.E.D. 
 
 &chol. — This corollary is explained by the example of 
 a sick man and a healthy man. The sick man, through 
 fear of death, eats what he dislikes ; the healthy man 
 takes a pleasure in his food, and so enjoys life more than 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DAG II. 
 
 if he feared death and directly desired to avoid it S. 
 also the judge who condemns a guilty man to death Dot 
 Irom hatred or anger, but solely from love for the public 
 
 welfare, is led by reason alone. 
 
 Pr.OP. LXIV.~The hwwledffc of evil is inadcqu.tU 
 
 hwidcdje. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The knowledge of evil (Prop. 8, pt. 4) is 
 sorrow itself, in so far as we are conscious of it. lint 
 sorrow is the passage to a less perfection (Def. 3 of the 
 Affects), and it cannot, therefore, be understood through 
 the essence itself of man (rrops. 6 and 7, pt. 3). It i.s, 
 therefore (Def. 2, pt. 3), a passion which (Prop. 3, pt 3) 
 depends upon inadequate ideas, and consequently (Prop. 
 29, pt. 2) the knowledge of sorrow, tliat is to say, the 
 knowledge of evil, is inadequate. — q.k.p. 
 
 Cowl. — Hence it follows that if the human mind had 
 but adequate ideas, it would form no uotiou of evil. 
 
 none 
 
 Pkop. LXY. — According to the (jiiidancc of reason, of txco 
 things which are good, wc shall follow the greater gooti, 
 
 and of two evils, we shall follow the less. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The good which hinders us from enjoying a 
 greater good is really an evil, for good and evil (aa we 
 have shown in the preface to this part) arc aflinuetl of 
 things in so far as we compare them with one another. 
 By the same reasoning a less evil is really a good, and 
 therefore (Corol. Prop. 61, pt. 4), according to the j.a>id- 
 ance of reason, we shall seek or follow the greater gi>ud 
 only and the lesser evil. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — According to the guidance of reason, we shall 
 follow a lesser evil for the sake of a greater good, and n 
 lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil we shall 
 neglect. For the evil which we here call less is really 
 a good, and the good, on the other hand, is evil; and ihea- 
 
234 ETHIC. 
 
 fore (Corol. Prop. 6 2, pt. 4) we shall seek tlie former and 
 neglect the latter. — q.e.d. 
 
 Peop. LXVI. — According to the guidance of reason, vje shall 
 seek the greater future good lefore that ivhich is less 
 and present, and we shall seek also the less and 'present 
 evil hcfore that which is greater and future . 
 
 Demonst. — If it were possible for the mind to have an 
 adequate knowledge of a future object, it would be 
 affected by the same affect towards the future object as 
 towards a present object (Prop. 62, pt. 4). Therefore, in 
 so far as we attend to reason itself, as we are supposing 
 in this proposition that we do, it is the same thing whe- 
 ther the greater good or evil be supposed to be future or 
 present, and therefore (Prop. 65, pt. 4) we shall seek the 
 greater future good before that which is less and present, 
 &c. Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — According to the guidance of reason, we shall 
 seek the lesser present evil which is the cause of the 
 greater future good, and the lesser present good which is 
 the cause of a greater future evil we shall neglect. This 
 corollary is connected with the foregoing proposition in 
 the same way as Corol. Prop. 65 is connected with 
 Prop. 65. 
 
 Schol. — If what has been said here be compared with 
 what has been demonstrated about the strength of the 
 passions in the first eighteen Props, pt. 4, and in Schol. 
 Prop. 18, pt. 4, it will easily be seen in what consists 
 the difference between a man who is led by affect or 
 opinion alone and one who is led by reason. The former, 
 whether he wills it or not, does those things of which he 
 is entirely ignorant, but the latter does the will of no one 
 but himself, and does those things only which he knows 
 are of greatest importance in life, and which he therefore 
 desires above all things. I call the former, therefore, a 
 slave, and the latter free. 
 
OF HUMAN BONDAGE. 
 
 *3> 
 
 I will add here a few \\-ords concerning th,> , l.:,r., ,. r 
 of the free man and his manner of life. 
 
 PEOr. LXVII.--^/;rc man thinks of nothing less than of 
 death, and his wisdom is not a meditation upon dmth 
 hut iipon life. 
 
 Demonsf.—A free man, that is to say, a man who livoii 
 according to the dictates of reason alone, is not led l.y 
 the fear of death (Prop. 63, pt. 4), hut directly desired 
 the good (Corol. Prop. 63, pt. 4); that is to say (I'nip. 
 24, pt. 4), desires to act, to live, and to preserve hit 
 being in accordance with the principle of seeking his 
 own profit. He thinks, therefore, of nothing less "than 
 of death, and his wisdom is a meditation uj.un lif.-.— 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 , Prop. LXVIII. — If men were horn free, they would f/rm 
 no conception of good and evil so long as they were free. 
 
 Demonst. — I have said that that man is free who m 
 led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is Iwrn free nn«l 
 remains free has no other than adequate ideas, and tiien?- 
 fore has no conception of evil (Corol. Prop. 64, pt 4). 
 and consequently (as good and evil are correlative) no 
 conception of good. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — It is clear from Prop. 4, ])t. 4, that the hypo- 
 thesis of this proposition is false, and cannot he conct-ivetl 
 unless in so far as we regard human nature nlonc, or 
 rather God, not in so far as He is infinite, hut in so far 
 only as He is the cause of man's existence. Thia (to- 
 gether with the other things we have before ilenion- 
 strated) appears to have been what was meant by Mrtf*.** 
 in that history of the first man. In that histoiy no oilier 
 power of God is conceived excepting that by which Ho 
 created man ; that is to say, the power with which Ho 
 considered nothing but the advantage of man. lhcrw« 
 
236 ETHIC. 
 
 fore we are told that God forbad free man to eat of the 
 tree of knowledge of good and evil, and warned him that 
 as soon as he ate of it he would immediately dread death 
 rather than desire to live. Afterwards we are told that 
 when man found a wife who agreed entirely with his 
 nature, he saw that there could be nothing in nature 
 which could be more profitable to him than his wife. 
 But when he came to believe that the brutes were like 
 himself, he immediately began to imitate their affects 
 (Prop. 27, pt. 3), and to lose his liberty, which the Patri- 
 archs afterwards recovered, being led by the spirit of 
 Christ, that is to say, by the idea of God, which alone 
 can make a man free, and cause him to desire for other 
 men the good he desires for himself, as (Prop. 37, pt. 4) 
 we have already demonstrated. 
 
 Prop. LXIX. — The virtue of a free man ds seen to he as 
 great in avoiding danger as in overcomirig it. 
 
 Demonst. — An affect cannot be restrained or removed 
 unless a contrary and stronger affect restrains it (Prop. 
 7, pt. 4) ; but blind audacity and fear are affects which 
 may be conceived as being equally great (Props. 5 and 
 3, pt. 4). The virtue or strength of mind, therefore 
 (for the definition of this, see Schol. Prop. 59, pt. 3), 
 which is required to restrain audacity must be equally 
 great with that which is required to restrain fear ; that 
 is to say (Defs. 40 and 41 of the Affects), a free man 
 avoids danger by the same virtue of the mind as that 
 by which he seeks to overcome it. — q.e.d. 
 
 Corol. — Plight at the proper time, just as well as 
 fighting, is to be reckoned, therefore, as showing strength 
 of mind in a man who is free ; that is to say, a free man 
 chooses flight by the same strength or presence of mind 
 as that by which he chooses battle. 
 
 Schol. — What strength of mind is, or what I under- 
 stand by it, I have explained in Schol. Prop. 59, pt. 3. 
 
OF HUMAN BOS DAG E. ,.37 
 
 By danger, I understand anything which may be iho 
 cause of sorrow, hatred, discord, or any otljcr evil like 
 
 them. 
 
 LXX. — The fire man who lives ammgst those who are i,j,uj- 
 rant strives as much as 2J0Ssihlc to avoid their /aruury. 
 
 Dcmonst. — Every one, according to his own disposition, 
 judges what is good (Schoh Prop. 39, pt. 3). Tli- ' 
 rant man, therefore, who has conferred a favour on ;.: 
 person, will value it according to his own way of O.i.iX- 
 ing, and he will be sad if a less value seems to bo placed 
 upon it by the person who has received it (Prop. 42, 
 pt. 3). But a free man strives to unite other men 
 with himself by friendship (Prop. 37, pt. 4), and not to 
 return to them favours which they, according to their 
 affects, may consider to be equal to those wliich they 
 have bestowed. He desires rather to govern himself and 
 others by the free decisions of reason, and to do those 
 things only which he has discovered to be of the first 
 importance. A free man, therefore, in order that he may 
 not be hated by the ignorant, nor yet yield to their apj*- 
 tites, but only to reason, will endeavour as much as jws- 
 sible to avoid their favours. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — I say as much as jyossible. For although men 
 are ignorant, they are nevertheless men, who, when we ar« 
 in straits, are able to afford us human assistance — the U-at 
 assistance which man can receive. It is often n»< • 
 therefore, to receive a favour from the ignorant, . 
 thank them for it according to their ta.ste ; an<l 
 this, care must be used, even in declining favour., 
 seem either to despise the givers or tlirough aviir;co l^ 
 dread a return, so that we may not, while striving to 
 escape their hatred, by that very act incur their ■: 
 sure. In avoiding favours, therefore, we must U- : 
 by a consideration of what is profitable and honourmWe. 
 
238 ETHIC. 
 
 PiLOP. LXXI. — Xone hut those who arc free arc very grate- 
 ful to one another. 
 
 Demonst — None but those who are free are very pro- 
 fitable to one another, or are united by the closest bond 
 of friendship (Prop. 35, pt. 4, and Corol. i), or with 
 an equal zeal of love strive to do good to one another 
 (Prop. 37, pt. 4), and therefore (Def. 34 of the Affects) 
 none but those who are free are very grateful to one an- 
 other. Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — The gratitude to one another of men who are 
 led by blind desire is generally a matter of business or a 
 snare rather than gratitude. Ingratitude, it is to be ob- 
 served, is not an affect. It is nevertheless base, because 
 it is generally a sign that a man is too much affected by 
 hatred, anger, pride, or avarice. For he who through 
 stupidity does not know how to return a gift is not 
 ungrateful ; and much less is he ungrateful who is not 
 moved by the gifts of a harlot to serve her lust, nor by 
 those of a thief to conceal his thefts, nor by any other 
 gifts of a similar kind. On the contrary, a man shows 
 that he possesses a steadfast mind if he does not suffer 
 himself to be enticed by any gifts to his own or the 
 common ruin. 
 
 Prop. LXXII. — A free man never acts cleceiffidhj, hut 
 alicays honouTably. 
 
 Demonst. — If a free man did anything deceitfully, in 
 so far as he is free, he would do it at the bidding of 
 reason (for so far only do we call him free) ; and there- 
 fore to act deceitfully would be a virtue (Prop. 24, pt. 4), 
 and consequently (by the same projDosition) it would be 
 more advantageous to every one, for the preservation of 
 his being, to act deceitfully; that is to say (as is self- 
 evident), it would be more advantageous to men to agree 
 only in words and to be opposed in reality, which (Corol. 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DAG E. j^ 
 
 Prop. 3 I, pt. 4) is absurJ. A free man, therefore. Sec — 
 
 Q.E.D, 
 
 Schol. — If it be asked whether, if a man by breach of 
 faith could escape from the danger of instant death. 
 reason does not counsel him, for the preservation of hi.i' 
 being, to break faith ; I reply in the same way. iljat if 
 reason gives such counsel, she gives it to all men. and 
 reason therefore generally counsels men to make no 
 agreements for uniting their strength and possessing laws 
 in common except deceitfully, that is to say, to Lave in 
 reality no common laws, which is absurd. 
 
 Prop. LXXIII. — A man ivho is guided hi/ nason w frttr 
 in a State where he lives according to the common laws 
 than he is in solitude, where he obeys himself alune. 
 
 Dcmonst. — A man who is guided by reason is not led 
 to obey by fear (Prop. 6^, pt. 4), but in so far as ho 
 endeavours to preserve his being in accordance with the 
 bidding of reason, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 66, pt. 4), 
 in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom, does ho 
 desire to have regard for the common life and the common 
 profit (Prop. 37, pt. 4), and consequently (as we havo 
 shown in Schol. 2, Prop. 37, pt. 4) he desires to livo 
 according to the common laws of the . State. A man, 
 therefore, who is guided by reason desires, in onlcr that 
 he may live more freely, to maintain the common right« 
 of the State. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — These, and the like things whii-h wc liavo 
 demonstrated concerning the true liberty of man, are re- 
 lated to fortitude, that is to say (Schol. Prop. 59. \>t 3), 
 to strength of mind and generosity. Nor do I tliink it 
 worth while to demonstrate here, one by one, all the pn*- 
 perties of fortitude, and still less to show how iu i^.*- 
 sessor can hate no one, be angry with no one, can neithiT 
 envy, be indignant with, nor despise anybody, and cnii 
 least of all be proud. For all this, together with trulli» 
 
240 ETHIC. 
 
 of a like kind whicli have to do "with, the true life and 
 religion, are easily deduced from Props, ^y and 46, pt. 4, 
 which show that hatred is to be overcome by love, and 
 that every one who is guided by reason desires for 
 others the good which he seeks for himself. In addition, 
 we must remember what we have already observed in 
 Schol. Prop. 5 o, pt. 4, and in other places, that the brave 
 man will consider above everything that all things follow 
 from the necessity of the divine nature; and that, conse- 
 quently, whatever he thinks injurious and evil, and, more- 
 over, whatever seems to be impious, dreadful, unjust, 
 or wicked, arises from this, that he conceives things in a 
 disturbed, mutilated, and confused fashion. For this rea- 
 son, his chief effort is to conceive things as they are in 
 themselves, and to remove the hindrances to true know- 
 ledge, such as hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and 
 others of this kind which we have before noticed ; and so 
 he endeavours, as we have said, as much as possible to 
 do well and rejoice. How far human virtue reaches in 
 the attainment of these things, and what it can do, I shall 
 show in the following part. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 My observations in this part concerning the true 
 method of life have not been arranged so that they could 
 be seen at a glance, but have been demonstrated here 
 and there according as I could more easily deduce one 
 from another. I have determined, therefore, here to col- 
 lect them, and reduce them under principal heads. 
 
 I. 
 
 All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of 
 our nature in such a manner that they can be understood 
 either through it alone as their proximate cause, or in so 
 far as we are a part of nature, which part cannot be ade- 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DAG n. , , 
 
 qiiately conceived through itself and without the other 
 
 individuals. 
 
 II. 
 The desires which follow from our nature in such a 
 manner that they can he understood through it alone, ore 
 those which are related to the mind, in so far as it is 
 conceived to consist of adequate ideas. The renminin- 
 desires are not related to the mind, unless in so far aa it 
 conceives things inadequately, whose power and in. : 
 cannot he determined hy human power, but by the : 
 of objects which are without us. The first kind ..t .ic- 
 sires, therefore, are properly called actions, but the lattor 
 passions; for the first always indicate our power, and the 
 latter, on the contrary, indicate our impotence and imper- 
 fect knowledge. 
 
 III. 
 Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are 
 determined by man's power or reason, are always good ; 
 the others may be good as well as evil. 
 
 IV. 
 
 It is therefore most profitable to us in life to make 
 perfect the intellect or reason as far as possible, and in 
 this one thing consists the highest hapjiiness or blessed- 
 ness of man ; for blessedness is nothing but the peace of 
 mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God. 
 and to perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand 
 God, together with the attributes and actions of tloj, 
 which flow from the necessity of His nature, llie final 
 aim, therefore, of a man who is guided by reason, that is 
 to say, the chief desire by which he strives to govern all 
 his other desires, is that by which he is led adequately to 
 conceive himself and all things which can be conceived 
 by his intelligence. 
 
 V. 
 
 There is no rational life therefore, without iutelligenw. 
 
242 ETHIC. 
 
 and things are good only in so far as they assist man to 
 enjoy that life of the mind which is determined by intel- 
 ligence. Those things alone, on the other hand, we call 
 evil which hinder man from perfecting his reason and 
 enjoying a rational life. 
 
 VI. 
 
 But because all those things of which man is the effi- 
 cient cause are necessarily good, it follows that no evil 
 can happen to man except from external causes, that is 
 to say, except in so far as he is a part of the whole of 
 nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey — 
 compelled also to accommodate himself to this wdiole of 
 nature in almost an infinite number of ways. 
 
 VII. 
 
 It is impossible that a man should not be a part of 
 nature and follow her common order ; but if he be placed 
 amongst individuals who agree with his nature, his power 
 of action will by that very fact be assisted and supported. 
 But if, on the contrary, he be placed amongst individuals 
 who do not in the least agree with his nature, he will 
 scarcely be able without great change on his part to 
 accommodate himself to them. 
 
 viir. 
 
 Anything that exists in nature which we judge to be 
 evil or able to hinder us from existing and enjoying a 
 rational life, we are allowed to remove from us in that 
 way which seems the safest ; and whatever, on the other 
 hand, we judge to be good or to be profitable for the pre- 
 servation of our being or the enjoyment of a rational life, 
 we are permitted to take for our use and use in any way 
 we may think proper ; and absolutely, every one is allowed 
 by the highest right of .nature to do that which he be- 
 lieves contributes to his own profit. 
 
OF HUMAN BOX DAG i:. ,^3 
 
 IX. 
 
 Nothing, therefore, can agree better witli the nature of 
 any object than other individuals of the same kind, and 
 so (see § 7) there is nothing more profitable to nmn for 
 the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of a 
 rational life than a man who is guided by reason. Ajinin. 
 since there is no single thing we know which is m..r.. 
 excellent than a man who is guided by reason, it follows 
 that there is nothing by which a person can better show 
 how much skill and talent he possesses than by so e<hj- 
 cating men that at last they will live under the dirn t 
 authority of reason. 
 
 X. 
 
 In so far as men are carried away by envy or any 
 affect of hatred towards one another, so far are they con- 
 trary to one another, and consequently so much the 
 more are they to be feared, as they have more power than 
 other individuals of nature. 
 
 xr. 
 Minds, nevertheless, are not conquered by arms, but ly 
 love and generosity. 
 
 XII. 
 
 Above all things is it profitable to men to form com- 
 munities and to unite themselves to one another by bonds 
 which may make all of them as one man ; and absolutely, 
 it is profitable for them to do whatever may lend to 
 strengthen their friendships. 
 
 XIII. 
 But to accomplish this skill and watchfulness are re- 
 quired; for men are changeable (those bem- vi-ry ffW 
 who live according to the laws of rea.«on). and nevt-rlhr- 
 less generally envious and more inclined to v. i-v niv - 
 than pity. To bear with "each, therefore, :.' 
 his disposition and to refrain from imitaiin- : 
 
244 E THIC. 
 
 requires a singular power of mind. But those, on the 
 contrary, who know how to revile men, to denounce vices 
 rather than teach virtues, and not to strengthen men's 
 minds but to weaken them, are injurious both to them- 
 selves and others, so that many of them through an excess 
 of impatience and a false zeal for religion prefer living 
 with brutes rather than amongst men ; just as boys or 
 youths, unable to endure with equanimity the rebukes of 
 their parents, fly to the army, choosing the discomforts 
 of war and the rule of a tyrant rather than the comforts 
 of home and the admonitions of a father, suffering all 
 kinds of burdens to be imposed upon them in order that 
 they may revenge themselves upon their parents. 
 
 Although, therefore, men generally determine every- 
 thing by their pleasure, many more advantages than dis- 
 advantages arise from their common union. It is better, 
 therefore, to endure with equanimity the injuries inflicted 
 by them, and to apply our minds to those things which 
 subserve concord and the establishment of friendship. 
 
 XV. 
 
 The tilings which beget concord are those which are 
 related to justice, integrity, and honour ; for besides that, 
 which is unjust and injurious, men take ill also anything 
 w^hich is esteemed base, or that any one should despise 
 the received customs of the State. But in order to win 
 love, those things are chiefly necessary which have refer- 
 ence to religion and piety. (See Schols. i and 2, Prop. 
 37, Schol. Prop. 46, and Schol. Prop. 73, pt. 4.) 
 
 XVI. 
 
 Concord, moreover, is often produced by fear, but it 
 is without good faith. It is to be observed, too, that 
 fear arises from impotence of mind, and therefore is of no 
 
OF HUMAN DOS DACE. j^j 
 
 service to reason ; nor is pity, althougli it seems to pw- 
 
 sent an appearance of piety. 
 
 Men also are conqnered by liberality, ospocinlly t ■ 
 who Lave not the means wherewith to procure wl,,i: :, 
 necessary for the support of life. But to as.si.st every one 
 who is needy far surpasses the strength or profit of a 
 private person, for the wealth of a private person is alto- 
 gether insufhcient to supply such wants. IJesides, the 
 power of any one man is too limited for liim to bo oblo 
 to unite every one with himself in friendship. Tl»e care, 
 therefore, of the poor is incumbent on the whole of 
 society and concerns only the general profit 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 In the receipt of benefits and in returning thanks, can 
 altogether different must be taken — concerning which seo 
 Schol. Prop. 70, and Schoh Prop. 71, pt. 4. 
 
 XIX. 
 The love of a harlot, that is to say, the lust of soxunl 
 intercourse, which arises from mere external form, nn.l 
 absolutely all love which recognises any other cause than 
 the freedom of the mind, easily passes into hatri'd, unle.-w. 
 which is worse, it becomes a species of delirium, and 
 thereby discord is cherished rather than concord (Corel. 
 Prop. 3i> pt- 3)- 
 
 XX. 
 
 AVith regard to marriage, it is plain that it is in ncconl- 
 ance with r°eason, if the desire of connection is en-c-nd-rx-.! 
 not merely by external form, but by a love of U-'.-ttM.'.' 
 children and wisely educating tliem ; and if in nddil.on. 
 the love both of the husband and wife has for U« cauw 
 not external form merely, but chiefly liberty of mmd. 
 
246 ETHIC. 
 
 Flattery, too, produces concord, but only by means of 
 the disgraceful crime of slavery or perfidy ; for there are 
 none who are more taken by flattery than the proud, who 
 wish to be first and are not so. 
 
 There is a false appearance of piety and religion in 
 dejection ; and although dejection is the opposite of pride, 
 the humble dejected man is very near akin to the proud 
 (Schol. Prop. 57, pt. 4). 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 Shame also contributes to concord, but only with re- 
 gard to those matters which cannot be concealed. Shame, 
 too, inasmuch as it is a kind of sorrow, does not belong 
 to the service of reason. 
 
 XXIV. 
 
 The remaining affects of sorrow which have man for 
 their object are directly opposed to justice, integrity, 
 honour, piety, and religion ; and although indignation may 
 seem to present an appearance of equity, yet there is no 
 law where it is allowed to every one to judge the deeds of 
 another, and to vindicate his own or another's right. 
 
 Affability, that is to say, the desire of pleasing men, 
 which is determined by reason, is related to piety (Schol. 
 Prop. 37, pt. 4). But if affability arise from an affect, 
 it is ambition or desire, by which men, generally under 
 a false pretence of piety, excite discords and seditions. 
 For he who desires to assist other people, either by advice 
 or by deed, in order that they may together enjoy the 
 highest good, will strive, above all things, to win their 
 love, and not to draw them into admiration, so that a 
 doctrine may be named after him, nor absolutely to give 
 
OF HUMAN BON DAG I 
 
 any occasion for envy. Li common convcrsntr.n i-... h.. 
 \vill avoid referring to the vices of men, nnd will ukl 
 care only sparingly to speak of human impotence while 
 he will talk largely of human virtue or power, aiuluf 
 the way by which it may be made perfect, so that men 
 being moved not by fear or aversion, but solely by the 
 aifect of joy, may endeavour as much as they can to Uvc 
 under the rule of reason. 
 
 XXVI. 
 
 Excepting man, we know no individual thin? in 
 nature in whose mind we can take pleasure, nor "any- 
 thing which we can unite with ourselves by friend.ship or 
 any kind of intercourse, and therefore the law of our own 
 profit does not demand that we should preserve anythini: 
 which exists in nature excepting men, but teaches us to 
 preserve it or destroy it in accordance with its varied use*, 
 or to adapt it to our own service in any way whatever. 
 
 xxvii. 
 
 The profit which we derive from objects without us, 
 over and above the experience and knowledge which wo 
 obtain because we observe them and change them from 
 their existing forms into others, is chiefly the preserva- 
 tion of the body, and for this reason those objects aro 
 the most profitable to us which can feed and nourish the 
 body, so that all its parts are able properly to iK;rf«)riu 
 their functions. For the more capal)le the body is of 
 being affected in many ways, and affecting exlcnial 
 bodies in many ways, the more capable of tliinkinjj is 
 the mind (Props. 38 and 39, pt. 4). But there st-cm 
 to be very few things in nature of this kind, and il »« 
 consequently necessary for the requisite nouri.shmont 
 of the body to use many different kinds of fo(jd ; for the 
 human body is composed of a great number of parts of 
 different nature, which need constant and varied fowl in 
 order that the whole of the body may be cqunlly 
 adapted for all those things which can follow fruoi iU 
 
248 ETHIC. 
 
 nature, and consequently that the mind also may be 
 equally adapted to conceive many things. 
 
 XXVIII. 
 
 The strength of one man would scarcely suffice to 
 obtain these things if men did not mutually assist one 
 another. As money has presented us with an abstract 
 of everything, it has come to pass that its image above 
 every other usually occupies the mind of the multitude, 
 because they can imagine hardly any kind of joy without 
 the accompanying idea of money as its cause. 
 
 XXIX. 
 
 This, however, is a vice only in those who seek money 
 not from poverty or necessity, but because they have 
 learnt the arts of gain, by which they keep up a grand 
 appearance. As for the body itself, they feed it in ac- 
 cordance with custom, but sparingly, because they believe 
 that they lose so much of their goods as they spend upon 
 the preservation of their body. Those, however, who 
 know the true use of money, and regulate the measure of 
 wealth according to their needs, live contented with few 
 things. 
 
 XXX. 
 
 Since, therefore, those things are good which help the 
 parts of the body to perform their functions, and since 
 joy consists in this, that the power of man, in so far as 
 he is made up of mind and body, is helped or increased, 
 it follows that all those things which bring joy are good. 
 But inasmuch as things do not work to this end — that 
 they may affect us with joy — nor is their power of action 
 guided in accordance with our profit, and finally, since 
 joy is generally related chiefly to some one part of the 
 body, it follows that generally the affects of joy (unless 
 reason and watchfulness be present), and consequently 
 the desires which are begotten from them, are excessive. 
 It is to be added, that an affect causes us to put that 
 
OF IIUMA.\ BOX D AGE. ^^ 
 
 thing first wliicli is sweet to us in the present, nn.l ihnt 
 we are not able to judge the future with nn cqiuU nffcct 
 of the mind (Schol. Prop. 44, and Sehol. Prop. Co. pt. 4). 
 
 XXXI. t 
 Superstition, on the contrary, seems to animi thnt what 
 brings sorrow is good, and, on the contrary, that what 
 brings joy is evil. But, as we have ah-eady said (SclpL 
 Prop. 45, pt. 4), no one excepting an envious man is 
 delighted at my impotence or disadvantage, for the jjrealcr 
 the joy with which we are affected, the greater the jwr- 
 fection to which we pass, and consequently tlie more do 
 we participate in the divine nature ; nor can joy ever be 
 evil w^hich is controlled by a true consideration for our 
 own profit. On the other hand, the man who is led by 
 fear, and does what is good that he may avoid wliat is 
 evil, is not guided by reason. 
 
 XXXII. 
 
 But human power is very limited, and is infinitely snr- 
 passed by the power of external causes, so tliat we do 
 not possess an absolute power to adapt to our service the 
 things which are without us. Kevertheless we shall bear 
 with equanimity those things which hajtpen to u.s con- 
 trary to what a consideration of our own profit demand.<». 
 if we are conscious that we have performed our duty, that 
 the power we have could not reach so far as to enable \in 
 to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the whole 
 of nature, whose order we follow. If we clearly and dis- 
 tinctly understand this, the part of us which is deter- 
 mined by intelligence, that is to say, the better part of 
 us, will be entirely satisfied therewith, and in that satis- 
 faction will endeavour to persevere ; for, in so far as wc 
 understand, we cannot desire anything excepting,' what is 
 necessary, nor absolutely, can we be satisfied with any- 
 thing but the truth. Therefore in so far as wo under- 
 stand these things properly will the efforts of the Wllcr 
 part of us agree with the order of the whole of nature. 
 
( 250 ) 
 
 ETHIC. 
 
 Jift}} ^art. 
 
 OF THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT, OR OF 
 HUMAN LIBERTY. 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 I PASS at length to the other part of Ethic which con- 
 cerns the method or way which leads to liberty. In this 
 part, therefore, I shall treat of the power of reason, show- 
 ing how much reason itself can control the affects, and 
 then what is freedom of mind or blessedness. Thence 
 we shall see how much stronger the wise man is than the 
 ignorant. In what manner and in what way the intel- 
 lect should be rendered perfect, and with what art the 
 body is to be cared for in order that it may properly per- 
 form its functions, I have nothing to do with here ; for 
 the former belongs to logic, the latter to medicine. I 
 shall occupy myself here, as I have said, solely with the 
 power of the mind or of reason, first of all showing the 
 extent and nature of the authority which it has over the 
 affects in restraining them and governing them ; for that 
 we have not absolute authority over them we have already 
 demonstrated. The Stoics indeed thought that the affects 
 depend absolutely on our will, and that we are absolutely 
 masters over them ; but they were driven, by the contra- 
 diction of experience, though not by their own principles, 
 to confess that not a little practice and study are required 
 in order to restrain and govern the affects. This one of 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE IMl I.ILCT. 35, 
 
 them attempted to illustrate, if I rcmomber rightly, by 
 the example of two dogs, one of a domestic and Uie olhrr 
 of a hunting breed ; for he was able by liabit to make ilu' 
 house-dog hunt, and the hunting dog, on the contmn-. U) 
 desist from running after hares. To the Stoical oi,in'i.,n 
 Descartes much inclines. He affirms that the soul or mind 
 is united specially to a certain part of the brain call.-.l 
 the pineal gland, which the mind by the mere i-xi-rt-iM' 
 of the will is able to move in different ways, and by 
 whose help the mind perceives all the movements wliich 
 are excited in the body and external objects. Tliis gland 
 he affirms is suspended in the middle of the brnin in 
 such a manner that it can be moved by the least motion 
 of the animal spirits. Again, he affirms tliat any varia- 
 tion in the manner in which the animal spirits inipinj:!* 
 upon this gland is followed by a variation in the manner 
 in which it is suspended in the middle of the brain, and 
 moreover that the number of different impressions on the 
 gland is the same as that of the different external object« 
 which propel the animal spirits towards it. Hence it 
 comes to pass that if the gland, by the will of the soul 
 moving it in different directions, be afterwards susiiended 
 in this or that way in which it had once been susjHjndftl 
 by the spirits agitated in this or that way, then the j:land 
 itself will propel and determine the animal spirits them- 
 selves in the same way as that in which they had before 
 been repelled by a similar suspension of tlie gland. 
 Moreover, he affirmed that each volition of tlje mind in 
 united in nature to a certain motion of the gland. For 
 example, if a person wishes to behold a remote object, 
 this volition will cause the pupil of the eye to ddaU-. but 
 if he thinks merely of the dilation of the ptjpil, to have 
 that volition will profit him nothing, l>ecau.«5e natur« h«« 
 not connected a motion of the gland which 8er\-es to im- 
 pel the animal spirits towards the optic nen'e iu a way 
 suitable for dilation or contraction of the pupil with iho 
 volition of dilation or contraction, but only w»ih U.o 
 
252 ETHIC. 
 
 volition of beholding objects afar off or close at band. 
 Finally, be maintained tbat altbougb eacb motion of this 
 gland appears to be connected by nature from the com- 
 mencement of our life with an individual thought, these 
 motions can nevertheless be connected by habit with other 
 thoughts, a proposition which he attempts to demonstrate 
 in his " Passions of the Soul," art. 50, pt. i. 
 
 From this he concludes that there is no mind so feeble 
 that it cannot, when properly directed, acquire absolute 
 power over its passions ; for passions, as defined by him, 
 are " perceptions, or sensations, or emotions of the soul 
 which are related to it specially, and which are produced, 
 preserved, and strengthened by some motion of the 
 spijits." (See the " Passions of the Soul," art. 27, pt. 
 I.) But since it is possible to join to a certain volition 
 any motion of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, 
 and since the determination of the will depends solely 
 on our power, we shall be able to' acquire absolute 
 mastery over our passions provided only we determine 
 our will by fixed and firm decisions by which we desire 
 to direct our actions and bind with these decisions the 
 movements of the passions we wish to have. So far as 
 I can gather from his own words, this is the opinion of 
 that distinguished man, and I could scarcely have 
 believed it possible for one so great to have put it for- 
 w^ard if it had been less subtle. I can hardly wonder 
 enough that a philosopher who firmly resolved to make 
 no deduction except from self-evident principles, and to 
 affirm nothing but what he clearly and distinctly per- 
 ceived, and who blamed all the schoolmen because they 
 desired to explain obscure matters by occult qualities, 
 should accept a hypothesis more occult than any occult 
 quality. What does he understand, I ask, by the union 
 of the mind and body ? What clear and distinct con- 
 ception has he of thought intimately connected with a 
 certain small portion of matter ? I wish that he had 
 explained this union by its proximate cause. But he 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLE 
 
 (fr -'53 
 
 conceived the inind to be so distinct fro,„ theSlody thit 
 he was able to assign no single cause of thj, union nor 
 of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to 
 the canse of the whole universe, that is to say to (jcl 
 Again, I should like to know how many dejrriM^ o*f 
 motion the mind can give to that pineal gland, and with 
 how great a power the mind can hold it suspemictl. For 
 I do not understand whether this gland is acted on by 
 the mind more slowly or more quickly tlian by the 
 animal spirits, and whether the movements of the i^. 
 sions, which we have so closely bound witli firm deci- 
 sions, might not be separated from them again by Ixxlily 
 causes, from which it would follow tliat although the 
 mind had firmly determined to meet danger, and had 
 joined to this decision tlie motion of boldness, th.- ■ • 
 of the danger might cause the gland to be susj. :. ; 
 in such a manner that the mind could think of u<-u-::^ 
 but flight. Indeed, since there is no relation bttw.-i, 
 the will and motion, so there is no comparison between 
 the power or strength of the body and that of tjje mind, 
 and consequently the strength of the body can never 
 be determined by the strength of the mind. It is to bo 
 remembered also that this gland is not found to be «o 
 situated in the middle of the brain that it can be driven 
 about so easily and in so many ways, and that all the 
 nerves are not extended to the cavities of the brain. 
 Lastly, I omit all that Descartes asserts concerning the 
 will and the freedom of the will, since I have sliown 
 over and over again that it is false. Therefore, inasmuch 
 as the power of the mind, as I have shown above, ii 
 determined by intelligence alone, we shall detennine bjr 
 the knowledge of the mind alone the remedit-s a'.;aiu»t 
 the affects — remedies which every one, I believe, haji ex- 
 perienced, although there may not have been any accurals 
 observation or distinct perception of them, and fn'ta 
 this knowledge of the mind alone shall we deduce every- 
 thinfi which relates to its blessedness. 
 
254 \^ ETHIC. 
 
 "p- Axioms. 
 
 1. If two contrary actions be excited in the same 
 subject, a change must necessarily take place in both, or 
 in one alone, until they cease to be contrary. 
 
 2. The power of an affect is limited by the power of 
 its cause, in so far as the essence of the affect is ex- 
 plained or limited by the essence of the cause itself. 
 
 This axiom is evident from Prop. 7, pt. 3. 
 
 Prop. I. — As tlwughts and the ideas of things are arranged 
 and conneeted in the mind, exactly so are the affec- 
 tions of the body or the images of things arranged and 
 connected in the tody. 
 
 Demonst. — The order and connection of ideas is the 
 same (Prop, 7, pt. 2) as the order and connection of 
 things, and vice versa, the order and connection of things 
 is the same (Corol. Props. 6 and 7, pt. 2) as the order and 
 connection of ideas. Therefore, as the order and connec- 
 tion of ideas in the mind is according to the order and 
 connection of the affections of the body (Prop. 1 8, pt. 2), 
 it follows, vice versa (Prop. 2, pt. 3), that the order and 
 connection of the affections of the body is according to 
 the order and connection in the mind of the thoughts and 
 ideas of things. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. II. — If we detach an emotion of the mind or affect 
 from the thought of an external cause and connect it 
 uiith other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the 
 external cause and the fluctuations of the mind which 
 arise from these affects will he destroyed. 
 
 Demonst. — That which constitutes the form of love or 
 hatred is joy or sorrow, accompanied with the idea of an 
 external cause (Defs. 6 and 7 of the Affects). If this idea 
 therefore be taken away, the form of love or hatred is also 
 removed, and therefore these affects and any others which 
 arise from them are destroyed. — Q.e.d. 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLLU. ^jj 
 
 rnop. lll.~An affect which i. a passion ceases to U a 
 
 passion as soo>i as tec form a clear ami ,listi,ut idnt 
 
 of it. 
 
 Dernonst.~An afTect which is a passion is a confiwod 
 idea (by the general defiuition of the Aflects). If, there- 
 fore, we form a clear and distinct idea of this' afTccl. 
 the idea will not be distinguished— except by reaaon— 
 from this affect, in so far as the affect is related to iho 
 mind alone (Prop. 21, pt. 2, with its Schol.), and there- 
 fore (Prop. 3, pt. 3) the affect will cease to be a passion. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Coral. — In proportion, then, as we know an afTect 
 better is it more within our control, and the less docs 
 
 the mind suffer from it. 
 
 Pkop. IV. — Tliere is no affection of the lochj of ichich tc€ 
 cannot form some clear and distinct conception. 
 
 Demonst. — Those things which are common to all can- 
 not be otherwise than ade(iuately conceived (Prop. 38, 
 pt. 2), and therefore (Prop. 12, and L-ni. 2, following' 
 Schol. Prop. 13, pt. 2) there is no affection of the hotly 
 of which we cannot form some clear and distinct concep- 
 tion. Q.E.D. 
 
 Corol. — Hence it follows that there is no affect of which 
 we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For 
 an affect is an idea of an affection of the body (by tho 
 general definition of the Affects), and this idea therefore 
 (Prop. 4, pt.' 5) must involve some clear and distinct con- 
 ception. 
 
 Schol. — Since nothing exists from which some cfTt-ct 
 does not follow (Prop. 36, pt. l), and since we under- 
 stand clearly and distinctly everything which follows from 
 an idea which is adequate in us (Prop. 40, pL 2). it U 
 a necessary consequence that every one luw ihf i»uwcr. 
 partly at least, if not absolutely, of uudersUmdmi' clearly 
 
256 ETHIC. 
 
 and distinctly himself and his affects, and consec[uently 
 of bringing it to pass that he suffers less from them. We 
 have therefore mainly to strive to acquire a clear and 
 distinct knowledge as far as possible of each affect, so 
 that the mind may be led to pass from the affect to think 
 those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and 
 with which it is entirely satisfied, and to strive also that 
 the affect may be separated from the thought- of an 
 external cause and connected with true thoughts. Thus 
 not only love, hatred, &c., will be destroyed (Prop. 2, 
 pt. 5), but also the appetites or desires to which the affect 
 gives rise cannot be excessive (Prop. 61, pt. 4). For it 
 is above everything to be observed that the appetite by 
 which a man is said to act is one and the same appetite 
 as that by which he is said to suffer. For example, we 
 have shown that human nature is so constituted that every 
 one desires that other people should live according to his 
 way of thinking (Schol. Prop. 31, pt. 3), a desire which 
 in a man who is not guided by reason is a passion which 
 is called ambition, and is not very different from pride ; 
 while, on the other hand, in a man who lives according 
 to the dictates of reason it is an action or virtue which 
 is called piety (SchoL i, Prop. 37, pt. 4, and Demonst. 2 
 of the same Prop.) In the same manner, all the appe- 
 tites or desires are passions only in so far as they arise 
 from inadequate ideas, and are classed among the virtues 
 whenever they are excited or begotten by adequate ideas; 
 for all the desires by which we are determined to any 
 action may arise either from adequate or inadequate ideas 
 (Prop. 59, pt. 4). To return, therefore, to the point from 
 which we set out : there is no remedy within our power 
 which can be conceived more excellent for the affects 
 than that which consists in a true knowledge of them, 
 since the mind possesses no other power than that of 
 thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have shown 
 above (Prop. 3, pt. 3). 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLFXT. 
 
 Trot. Y.~A,i affect towards an object ivhich tr< 
 imagine as ncccssari/, possible, or amtinqnit, hu 
 we simphj imagim, is, other thbujs bruv, .-,. 
 greatest of all. ' ' 
 
 Demoiist.— The affect towards an object which we 
 imagine to be free is greater than towards one which is 
 necessary (Prop. 49, pt. 3), and consequently still -rcalcr 
 than towards one which we imagine as possible or con- 
 tingent (Prop. 1 1, pt. 4). But to imagine an object as 
 free can be nothing else than to imagine it simply, while 
 we know not the causes by which it was determined to 
 action. (See Schol. Prop. 35, pt. 2.) An affect, then- 
 fore, towards an object which we simj.ly imagine is, other 
 things being equal, greater than towards one which we 
 imagine as necessary, possible, or contingent, and conse- 
 quently greatest of all. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. VI. — In so far as the miiul nndcrstamU all (huujt 
 as necessary, so far has it greater poirrr ocrr the 
 
 affects, or suffers less from them. 
 
 Demonst. — The mind understands all things to b- 
 necessary (Prop. 29, pt. i), and determined by un intinii" 
 chain of causes to existence and action (Proj). 28, pL i). 
 and therefore (Prop. 5, pt. 5) so far enables iUielf to 
 suffer less from the affects which arise from these ihiti^'t. 
 and (Prop. 48, pt. 3) to be less affected towards lii- in. 
 — Q.E.D. 
 
 Sc/(ol. — The more this knowledge tliat lhiii;.'H art- 
 necessary is applied to individual things whicli we 
 imagine more distinctly and more vividly, the gn-atcr w 
 this power of the mind over the affects,— a fact to which 
 experience also testifies. For we see that sorrow for the 
 loss of anything good is diminished if the i^rsou who 
 has lost it considers that it could not by any |x>-»ibjlity 
 have been preserved. So also we see that nobody pilie* 
 
an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk, 
 or reason, and lives so many years not conscious, as it 
 were, of itself ; but if a number of human beings were 
 born adult, and only a few here and there were born 
 infants, every one would pity the infants, because we 
 should then consider infancy not as a thing natural and 
 necessary, but as a defect or fault of nature. Many 
 other facts of a similar kind we might observe. 
 
 Prop. VII. — Tlie affects ivhich spring from reason or icliich 
 are excited hy it are, if time be taken into account, more 
 powerful than those which are related to individual 
 objects which we contemplate as absent. 
 
 Demonst. — We do not contemplate an object as absent 
 by reason of the affect by which we imagine it, but by 
 reason of the fact that the body is affected with another 
 affect, which excludes the existence of that object (Prop. 
 17, pt. 2). The affect, therefore, which is related to an 
 object which we contemplate as absent, is not of such a 
 nature as to overcome the other actions and power of 
 man (concerning these things see Prop. 6, pt. 4), but, 
 on the contrary, is of such a nature that it can in some 
 way be restrained by those affections which exclude the 
 existence of its external cause (Prop. 9, pt. 4). But the 
 affect which arises from reason is necessarily related to 
 the common properties of things (see the definition of 
 reason in Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2), which we always con- 
 template as present (for nothing can exist which excludes 
 their present existence), and which we always imagine 
 in the same way (Prop. 38, pt. 2). This affect, there- 
 fore, always remains the same, and consequently (Ax. i, 
 pt. 5), the affects which are contrary to it, and which are 
 not maintained by their external cause, must more and 
 more accommodate themselves to it imtil they are no 
 longer contrary to it. So far, therefore, the affect which 
 springs from reason is the stronger. — q.e.d. 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLU i. 
 
 Vnor.VlU.-Tkc r,natrr the nu.a.r of the causes ^kick 
 simulancousl>/ concur to excite any nfot, (J,, grtattr 
 
 it will he. '' 
 
 Demonst.—X number of simultineous causes can do 
 more than if they M'ere fewer (Prop. 7. pt, 3).a,ul iherv- 
 fore (Prop. 5, pt. 4) the greater tlie number of the simul- 
 taneous causes by wliich an allect is excited, tlu- greater 
 it is. Q.E.D. 
 
 ScM.—Thh proposition is also evident fmm Ax - 
 
 pt. 5- 
 
 Prop. IX.— // wc are affected hj an affect ichich is rtlattd 
 to many and different causes, which the mind eontem- 
 plates at the same time with the aff,ct itself, we are less 
 
 injured, suffer less from it, and are less affected (i. ■ 
 towards each ccmse than if we were affected In, ■■ 
 affect ecjiLolUj great which is related to one coum wwi'y 
 or to fewer causes. 
 
 Dcmonst. — An affect is bad or injuriou.s only in «o fur 
 as it hinders the mind from tliinkinu' (Props. 26 and 
 27, pt. 4), and therefore that affect by which the mind 
 is determined to the contempUition of a nuinl»cr of 
 objects at the same time is less injurious tlian n?i<>t)i<'r 
 affect equally great which holds the mind in t!;- 
 templation of one object alone or of a few ol'j . 
 that it cannot think of others. This is the first li*ui>^ 
 we had to prove. Again, since the essence of tlic jnind. 
 that is to say (Prop. 7, pt. 3), its power, con 
 thought alone (Prop, i i, pt. 2), the mind .sul!« : 
 through an aifect by which it is determined to i:. 
 templation of a number of oiyects at the same tin.' 
 through an affect equally great whicli liolds it oc<m:: 
 the contemplation of one object alone or of a few - 
 This is the second thing we had to j»rove. 1 
 this affect (Prop. 48, pt. 3), in so far as it is reltt:- . 1 
 a number of external causes, is therefore less lowaxiU 
 eauh. — ^.E.D. 
 
26o ETHIC. 
 
 Prop. X. — So long as vje are not agitated hy affaU wliicli 
 are contrary to onr nature do we possess the poiuer 
 of arranging and connecting the affections of the tody 
 according to the order of the intellect. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The affects wbicli are contrary to our 
 nature, that is to say (Prop. 30, pt. 4), which are evil, 
 are evil so far as they hinder the mind from understand- 
 ing (Prop. 27, pt. 4). So long, therefore, as we are not 
 agitated by affects which are contrary to our nature, so 
 long the power of the mind by which it endeavours to 
 understand things (Prop. 26, pt. 4) is not hindered, and 
 therefore so long does it possess the power of forming 
 clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing them the one 
 from the other (see Schol. 2, Prop. 40, and Schol. Prop. 
 47, pt. 2). So long, consequently (Prop, i, pt. 5), do we 
 possess the power of arranging and connecting the affec- 
 tions of the body according to the order of the intellect. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — Through this power of properly arranging and 
 connecting the affections of the body we can prevent 
 ourselves from being easily affected by evil affects. For 
 (Prop. 7, pt. 5) a greater power is required to restrain 
 affects which are arranged and connected according to 
 the order of the intellect than is required to restrain 
 those M-hich are uncertain and unsettled. The best 
 thing, therefore, we can do, so long as we lack a perfect 
 knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a right rule of life, 
 or sure maxims {dogmata) of life, — to commit these latter 
 to memory, and constantly to apply them to the particu- 
 lar cases which frequently meet us in life, so that our 
 imagination may be widely affected by them, and they 
 may always be ready to hand. For example, amongst the 
 maxims of life we have placed this (see Prop. 46, pt. 4, 
 with its Schol.), that hatred is to be conquered by love 
 or generosity, and is not to be met with hatred in return. 
 Put in order that we may always have this prescript 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLFXT. 
 
 of reason in readiness whenever it will l)o of son-jco. w« 
 must think over and often meditate upon iho comiiH.n 
 injuries inflicted by men, ami consider how and in what 
 wny they may best be repelled by generosity ; f..r \hv.^ 
 we shall connect the image of injury witli the iniaum i; •.••:» 
 of this maxim, and (rrop. 1 8, pt 2) it will W at hand 
 whenever an injury is offered to us. If we also have nt 
 liand the law of our own true profit anil yofKJ whirh 
 follows from mutual friendsliip and common fell- .w si, i]., 
 and remember that the higliest peace of niin«l 
 from a right rule of life (Prop. 52, pt. 4), and al 
 man, like other things, acts according to the ni 
 of nature, then the injury or the hatred which 1: 
 arises from that necessity will occupy hut the Ica^^t | :irt .f 
 the imagination, and will be easily overcome: or .xiipi"*- n„' 
 that the anger which generally arises from the ■: 
 injuries is not so easily overcome, it will ni'V«rtli« ; 
 overcome, although not without fluctuation of mma. m 
 a far shorter space of time than would have been nr.-. .- 
 sary if we had not pcssessed those maxims on which wo 
 had thus meditated beforehand. This is evident fri»in 
 Props. 6, 7, and 8, pt. 5. 
 
 Concerning strength of mind, we must roflect in the 
 same way for the purpose of getting rid of fear, thai w 
 to say, we must often enumerate and imagine the rom- 
 mon dangers of life, and think upon the manner in which 
 they can best be avoided and overcome by prcsi-nco of 
 mind and courage. It is to be observed, however, lliat 
 in the ordering of our thoughts and iinu'^es wo niiwl 
 always look (Corol. Prop. 63, pt. 4. «'>'l ^'^?- 59. I»«- 3) 
 to those qualities which in each thing are gocl. 5.. tliat wo 
 may be determined to action always by an affect of joy. 
 
 For example, if a man sees that he pursueH j; ..ry t-. 
 eacrerly, let him think on its proper use. f..r wh.v. . vi 
 it is to be followed, and by what means it can hr 
 obtained; but let him not think upon iU abu*, .M 
 
 lity, and on tlie inconstancy 
 
 of men and ibinj,'* of lhi» 
 
263 ETHIC. 
 
 sort, about wliicli no one thinks unless through disease 
 of mind ; for with such thoughts do those who are 
 ambitious greatly torment themselves when they despair 
 of obtaining the honours for which they are striving ; 
 and while they vomit forth rage, wish to be thought 
 wise. Indeed it is certain that those covet glory the 
 most who are loudest in declaiming against its abuse 
 and the vanity of the world. Nor is this a peculiarity 
 of the ambitious, but is common to all to whom fortune 
 is adverse and who are impotent in mind ; for we see 
 that a poor and avaricious man is never weary of speak- 
 ing about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich, 
 thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself and 
 show to others that he is unable to bear with equani- 
 mity not only his own poverty but also the wealth of 
 others. So also a man who has not been well received 
 by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of 
 women, their faithlessness, and their other oft-proclaimed 
 failings, — all of which he forgets as soon as he is taken 
 into favour by his mistress again. He, therefore, who 
 desires to govern his affects and appetites from a love 
 of liberty alone will strive as much as he can to know 
 virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with that 
 joy which springs from a true knowledge of them. Least 
 of all will he desire to contemplate the vices of men and 
 disparage men, or to delight in a false show of liberty. 
 He who will diligently observe these things (and they 
 are not difficult), and will continue to practise them, will 
 assuredly in a short space of time be able for the most 
 part to direct his actions in accordance with the com- 
 mand of reason. 
 
 Peop. XI. — The greater the numher of objects to which an 
 image is 'related, the more constant is it, or the 7nore 
 frequently does it jprescnt itself and the more does it 
 occupy the mind. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The greater the number of objects to which 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLFXT. >Sj 
 
 an image or affect is related, the greater is the number 
 of causes by Avhich it can be excited and cherished. All 
 these canses the mind contemplates simultancoiHlv by 
 means of the affect (by hypothesis), and llH-roforv the 
 more constant is the affect, or the more frequently docs 
 it present itself, and the more does it occupv ih.' mind 
 (Prop. 8, pt. 5)._Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XII. — The images of things arc inorf tasUy eon- 
 meted with those images which are related to th\ny$ 
 which we clearly and distinctly understand than iri/A 
 
 any others. 
 
 Demonst. — Things which we clearly and (ii>tiimy 
 understand are either the common properties of things 
 or what are deduced from them (see the definition of reason 
 in Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2). and consequently (Prop. 1 1. 
 pt. 5) are more frequently excited in us ; and thercforu 
 it is easier for us to contemplate other things together 
 with these which we clearly and distinctly underKtand 
 than with any others, and consequently (Prop. 18, pt. 2), 
 it is easier to connect things with these which we clearly 
 and distinctly understand than with any others. 
 
 Prop. XIII. — The greater the numher of other things tritk 
 which any image is connected, tlic viore frequently dot* 
 
 it 'present itself. 
 
 Demonst. — For the greater the number of other thin^ 
 with which an image is connected, the greater is iho 
 
 number of causes (Prop. 18. pt. 2) by whi-h .t m-y l-- 
 excited. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XIY.—The mind can cause all the affeetioM of tki 
 body or the images of things to he rrlated to the ulot 
 
 of God {ideam Dei). ^ 
 
 I See note, p. 24.— Te. 
 
264 ETHIC. 
 
 Dnnonst. — There is no affection of the body of which 
 the mind cannot form some clear and distinct conception 
 (Prop. 4, pt. 5), and therefore (Prop. 15, pt. i) it can 
 cause all the affections of the body to be related to the 
 idea of God. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XV. — He ivlio clearly and distinctly understands 
 himself and his affects loves God, and loves Him tetter 
 the tetter he understands himself and his affects. 
 
 Demonst. — He who clearly and distinctly understands 
 himself and his affects rejoices (Prop. 53, pt. 3), and his 
 joy is attended with the idea of God (Prop. 14, pt. 5)- 
 therefore (Def. 6 of the Affects) he loves God, and (by 
 the same reasoning) loves Him better the better he un- 
 derstands himself and his affects. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XVI. — This love to God above every thiny else ouyJit 
 to occupy the mind. 
 
 Demonst. — For this love is connected with all the affec- 
 tions of the body (Prop. 14, pt. 5), by all of which it is 
 cherished (Prop, i 5, pt. 5), and therefore (Prop. 1 1, pt. 5) 
 above everything else ought to occupy the mind. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XVII. — God is free from, passions, nor is He affected 
 ivith any affect of joy or sorrow. 
 
 Demonst. — All ideas, in so far as they are related to 
 God, are true (Prop. 32, pt. 2); that is to say (Def. 4, 
 pt. 2), are adequate, and therefore (by the general defini- 
 tion of the Affects) God is free from passions. Again, God 
 can neither pass to a greater nor to a less perfection 
 (Corol. 2, Prop. 20, pt. i), and therefore (Defs. 2 and 3 
 of the Affects) He cannot be affected with any affect of 
 joy or sorrow. — q.e.d. 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLECT. ^^ 
 
 Coro/.— Properly speakin.Lr, God loves no on 
 no one; for God (Prop. 17, pt. 5) is not a:; 
 any affect of joy or sorrow, and consequfiuly (be*, ana 
 7 of the Affects) lie neither loves nor hates any c.no. 
 
 Trop. XVI II.— To o)ic can hate ^^>7. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The idea of Crod which is in us is adequaln 
 and perfect (Props. 46 and 47, pt. 2), and therefore in 
 so far as we contemplate God do we act (Prop. 3, pt 3). 
 and consequently (Prop. 59, pt. 3) no sorrow can exist 
 with tlie accompanying idea of God ; that is to say (Duf. 
 7 of the Affects), no one can hate God. — q.e.p. 
 Corol. — Love to God cannot be turned into liatreiL 
 Schol. — But some may object, that if we undersUml 
 God to be the cause of all things, we do for that very 
 reason consider Him to be the cause of sorrow. But 
 I reply, that in so far as we umlerstaud tlie c-ati<»<'.< "f 
 sorrow, it ceases to be a passion (Prop. 3, pt. 5), that 
 is to say (Prop. 59, pt. 3), it ceases to ho. .sorrow; ami 
 therefore in so far as we understand God to be the cauM 
 of sorrow do we rejoice. 
 
 Prop. XIX. — He who loves God cannot stnir tnut '/."-/ snoiuU 
 love him in return. 
 
 Dcmonst. — If a man were to strive after this, he wooM 
 desire (Corol. Prop. 17, pt. 5) that God, whom he lovw. 
 should not be God, and consequently (I'rop. 19. pt. 3) ho 
 would desire to be sad, which (Prop. 28, pt. 3) is absurd 
 Therefore he who loves God, &c. — Q.K.i>. 
 
 Prop. XX.— This love to God cannot he defiled either bji tMi 
 
 affect of envy or jealous)/, hU u tlu more .<' 
 the more people we imar/ine to he connedtd , 
 the same bond of love. 
 Dcmonst— Thi^ love to God is the highest good which 
 
266 ETHIC. 
 
 we can seek according to the dictate of reason (Prop. 28, 
 pt. 4) ; is common to all men (Prop. 36, pt. 4) ; and we 
 desire that all may enjoy it (Prop. 37, pt. 4). It cannot, 
 therefore (Def. 2 3 of the Affects), be snllied by the affect 
 of envy, nor (Prop. 18, pt. 5, and Def. of Jealousy in 
 Schol. Prop. 35, pt. 3) by that of jealousy, but, on the 
 contrary (Prop. 31, pt. 3), it must be the more strength- 
 ened the more people we imagine to rejoice in it. — 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — It is possible to show in the same manner that 
 there is no affect directly contrary to this love and able 
 to destroy it, and so we may conclude that this love to 
 God is the most constant of all the affects, and that, in 
 so far as it is related to the body, it cannot be destroyed 
 unless with the body itself. What its nature is, in so far 
 as it is related to the mind alone, we shall see hereafter. 
 
 I have, in what has preceded, included all the remedies 
 for the affects, that is to say, everything which the mind, 
 considered in itself alone, can do against them. It 
 appears therefrom that the power of the mind over the 
 affects consists — 
 
 1. In the knowledge itself of the affects. (See Schol. 
 Prop. 4, pt. 5.) 
 
 2. In the separation by the mind of the affects from 
 the thought of an external cause, which we imagine con- 
 fusedly. (See Prop. 2, pt. 5, and Schol. Prop. 4, pt. 5.) 
 
 3. In duration, in which the affections which are re- 
 lated to objects we understand surpass those related to 
 objects conceived in a mutilated or confused manner. 
 (Prop. 7, pt. 5.) 
 
 4. In the multitude of causes by which the affections 
 which are related to the common properties of things or 
 to God are nourished. (Props. 9 and 1 1, pt. 5.) 
 
 5. In the order in which the mind can arrange its 
 affects and connect them one with the other. (Schol. Prop. 
 10, pt. 5, and see also Props. 12, 13, and 14, pt. 5.) 
 
 But that this power of the mind over the affects may 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLECT. ^7 
 
 be better understood, it is to be carefully obsorvnl ihat 
 we call tbe affects great when we conipure iho ulWt of 
 one man with that of another, and see that one man w 
 agitated more than another by the same airuct. or when 
 we compare the affects of one and tlie s:ime mnn with 
 one another, and discover that he is affected or movtil 
 more by one affect than by another. 
 
 For (Prop. 5, pt. 4) the power of any affect is limited 
 by the power of the external cause as compared with our 
 own power. But the power of the mind is limited solely 
 by knowledge, whilst impotence or passion is estimated 
 solely by privation of knowledge, or, in other words, by 
 that through which ideas are called inadequate ; and it 
 therefore follows that that mind suffers the mo.st whoso 
 largest part consists of inadequate ideas, so that it is 
 distinguished rather by what it suffers than by what it 
 does, while, on the contrary, that mind acts the most 
 whose largest part consists of adequate ideas, so that 
 although it may possess as many inadequate ideas as the 
 first, it is nevertheless distinguished rather by those which 
 belong to human virtue than by those which are a sijjn 
 of human impotence. Again, it is to be observed that 
 our sorrows and misfortunes mainly proceed fn»m to«i 
 much love towards an object which is subject to many 
 changes, and which we can never possess. For no one 
 is troubled or anxious about any object he does not love. 
 neither do wrongs, suspicions, hatreds, &c., arise except 
 from love towards objects of which no one can be truly 
 the possessor. 
 
 From all tliis we easily conceive what is the power 
 which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that 
 third kind of knowledge (see Schol. Prop. 47. pt 2) 
 whose foundation is the knowledge itself of God. poMcMM 
 over the affects ; the power, namely, by which it i» able. 
 in so far as they are passions, if not actually to dcrtroy 
 them (see Prop. 3, pt. 5. with the Schol. to Prop. 4. pt- 
 5), at least to make them constitute the smallest part of 
 
268 ETHIC. 
 
 the mind (see Prop. 14, pt. 5). Moreover, it begets a 
 love towards an immutable and eternal object (see Prop. 
 15, pt. 5) of which we are really partakers (see Prop. 45, 
 pt. 2) ; a love which therefore cannot be vitiated by the 
 defects which are in common love, but which can always 
 become greater and greater (Prop. 15, pt. 5), occupy the 
 largest part of the mind (Prop. 16, pt. 5), and thoroughly 
 affect it. 
 
 I have now concluded all that I had to say relating to 
 this present life. For any one who will attend to what 
 has been urged in this scholium, and to the definition of 
 the mind and its affects, and to Props, i and 3, pt. 3, 
 will easily be able to see the truth of- what I said in the 
 beginning of the scholium, that in these few words all 
 the remedies for the affects are comprehended. It is 
 time, therefore, that I should now pass to the considera- 
 tion of those matters which appertain to the duration of 
 the mind without relation to the body. 
 
 Prop. XXI, — The mind can imagine nothing, nor can it 
 recollect anything that is past, except while the hochj 
 exists. 
 
 Demonst. — The mind does not express the actual exist- 
 ence of its body, nor does it conceive as actual the affec- 
 tions of the body, except while the body exists (Corol. 
 Prop. 8, pt. 2), and consequently (Prop. 26, pt. 2) it 
 conceives no body as actually existing except while its 
 own body exists. It can therefore imagine nothing (see 
 the definition of. Imagination in Schol. Prop. 1 7, pt. 2), 
 nor can it recollect anything that is past, except while the 
 body exists (see the definition of Memory in Schol. Prop. 
 1 8, pt. 2). — Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop. XXII. — In God, nevertheless, there necessarily exists 
 an idea which expresses the essence of this or that Minian 
 body under the form of eternity. 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLECT. .^^ 
 
 Demonsf.— God is not only tlio cause of the cxist«nco 
 of this or that human body, but also of its essence (l»rop. 
 2 5, pt. I), which therefore must necessarily l* conceivca 
 through the essence of God itself (Ax. 4.' pt i) and by 
 a certain eternal necessity (Prop. 1 6, pt i ). Thia con- 
 ception, moreover, must necessarily exist in Cod (IW 
 
 3, pt. 2). Q.E.D. 
 
 PliOP. XXIII. — The hnman mind cannot U „■■.,.< „i,., 
 destroyed ivith the hodi/, hut something of it remains 
 
 tvhich is eternal 
 
 Demonst. — In God there necessarily exists a conccjv 
 tion or idea which expresses the essence of tlie human 
 body (Prop. 22, pt. 5). This conception or idea is tliere- 
 fore necessarily something which pertains to the essence 
 of the human mind (Prop, i 3, pt. 2). But we ascribe to 
 the human mind no duration which can be limited by 
 time, unless in so far as it expresses the actual existenco 
 of the body, which is explained through duration, and 
 which can be limited by time, that is to say (Corol. 
 Prop. 8, pt. 2), we cannot ascribe duration to the mind 
 except while the body exists. 
 
 But nevertheless, since this something is tliat which 
 is conceived by a certain eternal necessity throu;,'h the 
 essence itself of God (Prop. 22, pt 5), this sunifihin;? 
 which pertains to the essence of the mind will neccsarily 
 be eternal. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — This idea wliich expresses the essence of tho 
 body under the form of eternity is, as we have said. • 
 certain mode of thought which pertains to the ess.-ncc of 
 the mind, and is necessarily eternal. It is impoMible, 
 nevertheless, that we should recollect that we fxi»l«d 
 before the body, because there are no traces of any »uch 
 existence in the body, and also because eternity ainnot 
 be defined by time, or have any rd itionship to it Never- 
 theless we feel and know by experience that we are 
 
270 ETHIC. 
 
 eternal. For the mind is no less sensible of those things 
 which it conceives through intelligence than of those 
 which it remembers, for demonstrations are the eyes of 
 the mind by which it sees and observes things. 
 
 Although, therefore, we do not recollect that we existed 
 before the body, we feel that our mind, in so far as it 
 involves the essence of the body under the form of eternity, 
 is eternal, and that this existence of the mind cannot 
 be limited by time nor explained by duration. Only in 
 so far, therefore, as it involves the actual existence of 
 the body can the mind be said to possess duration, and 
 its existence be limited by a fixed time, and so far only 
 has it the power of determining the existence of things 
 in time, and of conceiving them under the form of dura- 
 tion. 
 
 Pkop. XXIV, — The more we understand individual ohjeets, 
 the more ive understand God. 
 
 Dcmonst. — This is evident from Corol. Prop. 25, pt. i. 
 
 Prop. XXV. — The highest effort of the mind and its highest 
 ■ virtue is to understand things hy the third kind of 
 hnovjledge. 
 
 Demonst. — The third kind of knowledge proceeds from 
 an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an 
 adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its 
 definition in Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2) ; and the more we 
 understand things in this manner (Prop. 24, pt. 5), the 
 more we understand God; and therefore (Prop. 28, pt. 4) 
 the highest virtue of the mind, that is to say (Def. 8, pt. 
 4), the power or nature of the mind, or (Prop. 7, pt. 3) 
 its highest effort, is to understand things by the third 
 kind of knowledge. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXVI. — The letter the mind is adapted to uoidcr- 
 
OUJ. 
 
 OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELUa . 
 
 stand things ly tlic third khid of knoxcltdfff Jht « 
 it desires to understand them hj this kind of Ln 
 
 ledge. 
 
 Dciiio/ist. — Tliis is evident; for in so far as wi 
 ceive the mind to be adapted to understand tlniij,-* by 
 this kind of knowledge, do we conceive it to be deter- 
 mined to understand things by tliis kind of knowledp-. 
 and consequently (Def. i of the Affects) the Wllfr llio 
 mind is adapted to this way of understaudiug thin"9, Uie 
 more it desires it. — q.e.d. 
 
 Prop. XXYU.—From this third kind of knoidtdge ariM* 
 the highest possible peace of mind. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The highest virtue of the mind is to know 
 God (Prop. 28, pt. 4), or to understand thinjis by the 
 third kind of knowledge (Prop. 25, pt. 5). This virtue 
 is greater the more the mind knows things by this kind 
 of knowledge (Prop. 24, pt. 5), and tlierefore he who 
 knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the 
 highest human perfection, and consequently (I)of. 2 of 
 the Affects) is affected with the liighest joy, wliit-h w 
 accompanied with the idea of himself and his own virtue 
 (Prop. 43, pt. 2); and therefore (Def. 25 of the AfTecl*) 
 from this kind of knowledge arises the liighest |K>MiUf 
 peace of mind. — q.e.d. 
 
 Peop. XXYIU.—The effort or the desire to kn 
 the third kind of knowledge eannot arise Jr. 
 kind, but may arise from the seeond kind of kncndtdgt. 
 
 Bemonst. — This proposition is self-evident ; f«'r overr- 
 thing that we clearly and distinctly und.-r-' i:; ?. ^f^ 
 understand either through itself or throu-h 
 which is conceived through itself; or, in d 
 ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which aw 
 
272 ETHIC. 
 
 related to the third kind of knowledge (Schol. 2, Prop. 40, 
 pt. 2), cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas, 
 which (by the same scholium) are related to the first 
 kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, that is to 
 say (by the same scholium), from the second and third 
 kinds of knowledge. Therefore (Def. i of the Affects) 
 the desire of knowing things by the third kind of know- 
 ledge cannot arise from the first kind, but may arise 
 from the second. — q.e.d. 
 
 Pnop. XXIX. — Every tiling which the mind understands 
 binder the form of eternity, it understands not tecause 
 it conceives the present actual existence of the body, hut 
 hecause it conceives the essence of the body under the form 
 of eternity. 
 
 Dononst. — In so far as the mind conceives the present 
 existence of its body does it conceive duration which 
 can be determined in time, and so far only has it the 
 power of conceiving things in relation to time (Prop. 2 i , 
 pt. 5, and Prop. 26, pt. 2). But eternity cannot be 
 explained by duration (Def. 8, pt. i, and its explanation) ; 
 therefore the mind so far has not the power of conceiv- 
 ing things under the form of eternity : but because it is 
 the nature of reason to conceive things under the form 
 of eternity (Corol. 2, Prop. 44, pt. 2), and because it also 
 pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence 
 of the body under the form of eternity (Prop. 23, pt. 5), 
 and excepting these two things nothing else pertains to 
 the nature of the mind (Prop, i 3, pt. 2), therefore this 
 power of conceiving things under the form of eternity 
 does not pertain to the mind except in so far as it con- 
 ceives the essence of the body under the form of eternity. 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Schol. — Things are conceived by us as actual in two 
 ways ; either in so far as we conceive them to exist with 
 relation to a fixed time and place, or in so far as we 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTELLECT. 573 
 
 conceive them to be contained in God, and to follow from 
 the necessity of the divine nature. IJut lh«i9c l\iui^% 
 which are conceived in this second way as true or rt»«l 
 we conceive under the form of eternity, and thrir ideoii 
 involve the eternal and infinite essence of CIoil. as wo 
 have shown in Prop. 45, pt. 2, to the scholium of which 
 proposition the reader is also referred. 
 
 PitOP. XXX. — Okt mind, in so far as it kno\rs iLvl/and 
 the hodij under the form of eternity, ntctsaarUit hat a 
 knowledge of God, and knoics that it is in God and it 
 
 conceived through Him. 
 
 Dcmonsf. — Eternity is the very essence of t..M, ... ... 
 
 far as that essence involves necessary existence (Def. 8, 
 pt. i). To conceive things therefore under the fonn of 
 eternity, is to conceive them in so far as they are con- 
 ceived through the essence of God as actually .-x 
 things, or in so far as through the essence of G.' ; 
 involve existence. Therefore our mind, in so far :us jt 
 conceives itself and its body under tiie form of elcnuir. 
 necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows. &c 
 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Prop XXXI.— The third Jdnd ofknou-u"'f "-y f - 
 
 the mind as its formal cavse, in so far as the tmnd itMif 
 
 is eternal. 
 
 Damna.-The mind conceives notiM.,^ u...r i^ 
 form of eternity, unless in so far «» U co,.c...vc.. U-. 
 essence of its body under tl>e form of -■•'"»">■<'' 
 pt. 5), that is to say (Props. 21 and 23, I'M). <■- 
 so fi as it is eternal. Therefore (1^ 30. -^ 5 ■ - ' 
 far as the mind is eternal it has a kno» Ws. o( t.od. 
 
 ^vhich is necessarily aJeciuate (Prop 46. 1't- -)•••'•' 
 foreinsotarasitisete™al.t.shttcdloUo.a^. 
 
274 
 
 ETHIC. 
 
 things which can follow from this knowledge of God 
 (Prop. 40, pt. 2), that is to say, it is fitted to know things 
 by the third kind of knowledge (see the definition of this 
 kind of knowledge in Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pt. 2), of which 
 (Def. I, pt. 3), in so far as the mind is eternal, it is the 
 adequate or formal cause. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — As each person therefore becomes stronger in 
 this kind of knowledge, the more is he conscious of him- 
 self and of God ; that is to say, tbe more perfect and the 
 happier he is, a truth which will still more clearly appear 
 from what follows. Here, however, it is to be observed, 
 that although we are now certain that the mind is eternal 
 in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, 
 yet, in order that what we wish to prove may be more 
 easily explained and better understood, we shall consider 
 the mind, as we have hitherto done, as if it had just 
 begun to be, and had just begun to understand things 
 under the form of eternity. This we can do without 
 any risk of error, provided only we are careful to conclude 
 nothing except from clear premisses. 
 
 PPvOP. XXXII. — In whatever lue understand hy the third 
 kind of knowledge we delight, and our delight is accom- 
 panied with the idea of God as its cause. 
 
 Dcmonst. — From this kind of knowledge arises the 
 highest possible peace of mind, that is to say (Def. 25 of 
 the Affects), the highest joy, attended moreover with the 
 idea of one's self (Prop. 27, pt. 5), and consequently 
 (Prop. 30, pt. 5) attended with the idea of God as its 
 cause. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Carol. — From the third kind of knowledge necessarily 
 springs the intellectual love of God. For from this kind 
 of knowledge arises (Prop. 32, pt. 5) joy attended with 
 the idea of God as its cause, that is to say (Def. 6 of the 
 Affects), the love of God, not in so far as we imagine Him 
 as present (Prop. 29, pt. 5), but in so far as we under- 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE IS 
 
 T,:,.i^^ 
 
 stand that He is eternal; and that is \\W ■ '7 
 
 intellectual love of God. 
 
 Peop. XXXIIL— yV;^' intclhrfual loir i<j<:..: ^rurj 
 
 from the third kind of knowUdye is ettmal. 
 
 Demonst. — The tliird kind of knowled;,'o (rrop. 31, 
 pt. 5, and Ax. 3, pt. i) is eternal, and tht-reforu (by iho 
 same axiom) the love which springs from it is necessarily 
 eternal. — q.e.d. 
 
 Scliol. — Although this love to God lias no beglDtiiDg 
 (Prop. 33, pt. 5), it nevertheless has all tiie porlections 
 of love, just as if it had originated ; — as we suppostnl in 
 the corollary of Prop. 32, pt. 5. Nor is there here any 
 difference, excepting that the mind has eternally iiosseftSinl 
 these same perfections which we imagined as now accruin^j 
 to it, and has possessed them with the accunijwnyin;j 
 idea of God as the eternal cause. And if joy consi.st \\\ 
 the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must 
 indeed consist in this, that the mind is endowed with 
 perfection itself. 
 
 Prop. XXXIV. — TAe mind is suhfd to afftds whirh art 
 related to j^assions only so long as the body exisis. 
 
 JDemonst.— An imagination is an idea by which tlio mind 
 contemplates any object as present (see its dilltut: -u ui 
 Schol. Prop. 17, pt. 2). This idea nevertheb 
 the present constitution of the human boily i .: 
 the nature of the' external object (Corol. 2, Trup. 16, f»L 
 2). An affect, therefore (by the genend definition of (ho 
 Affects), is an imagination in so far as it indi. nt«-» tb« 
 present constitution of the body, and tlierefuru (Tnit 31, 
 pt. 5) the mind, only so long as the body exisU. it »ub- 
 ject to affects which are related to jjassions.— <J.E.l>. 
 
 Coro/.— Hence it follows that no love excel* intel- 
 lectual love is eternal. 
 
276 ETHIC. 
 
 Sdiol. — If we look at the common opinion of men, we 
 shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity 
 of their minds, but they confound it with duration, and 
 attribute it to imagination or memory, which they believe 
 remain after death. 
 
 Prop. XXXV. — God loves Himself with an infinite intellec- 
 tual love. 
 
 God is absolutely infinite (Def. 6, pt. i), that is to say 
 (Def. 6, pt. 2), the nature of God delights in infinite 
 perfection accompanied (Prop. 3, pt. 2) with, the idea of 
 Himself, that is to say (Prop. 1 1, and Def. i, pt. i), with 
 the idea of Himself as cause, and this is what, in Corol. 
 Prop. 32, pt. 5, we have called intellectual love. ' 
 
 Pkop. XXXVI. — The intellectual love of the mind towards 
 God is the very love with which He loves Himself, not 
 in so far as He is infinite, hut in so far as He can he 
 explained through the essence of the hiiman mind con- 
 sidered under the form of eternity ; that is to say, the 
 ■intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the 
 infinite love with which God loves Himself 
 
 Devionst. — This love of the mind must be related to 
 the actions of the mind (Corol. Prop. 32, pt. 5, and 
 Prop. 3, pt. 3), and it is therefore an action by which the 
 mind contemplates itself; and which is accompanied 
 with the idea of God as cause (Prop. 32, pt. 5, with the 
 Corol.); that is to say (Corol. Prop. 25, pt. i,and Corol. 
 Prop. II, pt. 2), it is an action, by which God, in so 
 far as He can be explained by the human mind, con- 
 templates Himself, the action being accompanied with 
 the idea of Himself; and therefore (Prop. 35, pt. 5), this 
 love of the mind is part of the infinite love with which 
 God loves Himself. — q.e.d. 
 
 Co7vl. — Hence it follows that God, in so far as He 
 
OF THE rOU-ER OF THE ISTl.U t.CT. 
 loves Himself, loves men, and consequcntlv ilml t^ 
 of God towards men and tl.e intellectual lovo . 
 mmd towards God are one and the same thing. 
 
 >S'c7w/.— Hence we clearly understand that onr Mira- 
 tion, or blessedness, or liberty consists in a r- • - 
 eternal love towards God, or in the love 
 wards men. This love or blessedness is cali-i i, 
 the sacred writings, and not without reason. For u . 
 it be related to God or to the mind, it mav proj. 
 called repose of mind, which (Defs. 25 and 30 . . 
 Affects) is, in truth, not distinguished from glory. Fur 
 in so far as it is related to God, it is (Trop. 35. pt 5) 
 joy (granting that it is allowable to use this'v ■ 
 accompanied with the idea of Himself, and it is th-' 
 thing when it is related to the mind (Trop. 27. • 
 Again, since tlie essence of our mind consists in i. 
 ledge alone, whose beginning and foundation is (iod 
 (Prop. 15, pt. I, and Schol. Prop. 47, pt 2). it ii rlcir 
 to us in what manner and by what method our n. :i i, 
 with regard both to essence and existence, follows ::uta 
 the divine nature, and continually depends upon (5od 
 I thought it worth while for me to notice this here, in 
 order that I might show, by this e.xnnij»lc, what that 
 knowledge of individual objects which I have callol 
 intuitive or of the third kind (Schol. 2, Prop. 40, pL 2) 
 is able to do, and how much more potent it i« than the 
 universal knowledge, which I have called knowlcd^.'c of 
 the second kind. For although I have show;: 
 in the First Part that all things, and cons*- 
 the human mind, depend upon God l»oth wv 
 existence and essence, yet that demonstral:' 
 legitimate, and placed beyond the possibility cf a '.; ui'.. 
 does not, nevertheless, so afl'ect our mind as a proof from 
 the essence itself of any individual object which wc wy 
 depends upon God. 
 
278 ETHIC. 
 
 Peop. XXXVII. — lliere is notliing in nature which is 
 contrary to this intellectual love, or ivhich can negate it. 
 
 This intellectual love necessarily follows from the 
 nature of the mind, in so far as it is considered, through 
 the nature of God, as an eternal truth (Proj)s. 33 and 
 29, pt- 5)- If there were anything, therefore, contrary 
 to this love, it would be contrary to the truth, and con- 
 sequently whatever might be able to negate thjs love 
 would be able to make the true false, which (as is self- 
 evident) is absurd. There exists, therefore, nothing in 
 nature, &c. — q.e.d. 
 
 Schol. — The axiom of the Fourth Part refers only to 
 individual objects, in so far as they are considered in 
 relation to a fixed time and place. This, I believe, no 
 one can doubt. 
 
 Prop. XXXVIII. — The more objects the mind understands 
 hy the second and third hinds of knoivledge, the less it 
 suffers from those affects which are evil, and the less 
 it fears death. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The essence of the mind consists in know- 
 ledge (Prop. II, pt. 2). The more things, therefore, the 
 mind knows by the second and third kinds of knowledge, 
 the greater is that part which abides (Props. 29 and 23, 
 pt. 5), and consequently (Prop. 37, pt. 5) the greater 
 is that part wliich is not touched by affects which are 
 contrary to our nature, that is to say (Prop. 30, pt. 4), 
 which are evil. The more things, therefore, the mind 
 understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, 
 the greater is that part which remains unharmed, and 
 the less consequently does it suffer from the affects. 
 
 Schol. — We are thus enabled to understand that which 
 I touched upon in Schol. Prop. 39, pt. 4, and which I 
 promised to explain in this part, namely, that death is 
 by so much the less injurious to us as the clear and 
 
OF THE POWER OF THE ISTUiu I. ^^ 
 
 distinct knowledge of the mind is greater, and conwnuenUr 
 as the mind loves God more. Atjain. since (I'ropc -7 
 pt. 5) from the third kind of knowledge theP- .-.-^ ' ' 
 highest possible peace, it follows that it is 
 the human mind to be of such a nature thai um. , .:-. 
 of it which we have shown i)erishes with iia iInIv 
 (Prop. 21, pt. 5), in comparison with the part of it 
 which remains, is of no consequence. But inort? fully 
 upon this subject presently. 
 
 Prop. XXXIX.— ^c who possesses a hod j/ Jit for manylhinyt 
 possesses a mind of which the greater jxirt w tttrnal. 
 
 Dcmo7isf. — He who possesses a body fitted for iWwi 
 many things is least of all agitated by those all.-.;, 
 which are evil (Prop. 38, pt. 4), that is to say (IV.i-. 30. 
 pt. 4), by affects which are contrary to our naturr. oud 
 therefore (Prop. 10, j^t. 5) he posses.ses the jNiwer of 
 arranging and connecting the aflections of ihe UhIv 
 according to the order of the intellect, and constNjuonily 
 (Prop. 14, pt. 5) of causing all the aflections of the botly 
 to be related to the idea of (lod (Prop. 15, pL 5); m 
 consequence of which he is affected with a love to God, 
 which (Prop. 16, pt. 5) must occupy or form the 
 greatest part of his mind, and therefore (Prop. 33. pL 5) 
 he possesses a mind of which the greatest part i.s clcmal. 
 
 ScJiol. — Inasmuch as human bodies are til f-T many 
 things, we cannot doubt the possibility of their |>oj«k'!»iii;{ 
 such a nature that they may be related to minds which 
 have a large knowledge of themselves and of (lod, wiJ 
 whose greatest or principal part is etenial, so that ihcy 
 scarcely fear death. To understand this more clemrly. 
 it is to be here considered that we live in consUnt 
 change, and that according as we chang«> f.>r th.- U-ti.-r 
 or the worse we are called happy or unhappy. K-r h.- 
 who passes from infancy or childho-nl to .i-aih i* «--vl.d 
 unhappy, and, on the other hand, we cuuiidcr ouml^.* 
 
28o ETHIC. 
 
 happy if we can pass through the whole period of life 
 with a sound mind in a sound body. Moreover, he who, 
 like an infant or child, possesses a body fit for very few 
 things, and almost altogether dependent on external causes, 
 has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is almost 
 entirely unconscious of itself, of God, and of objects. On 
 the other hand, he who possesses a body fit for many 
 things possesses a mind which, considered in itself alone, 
 is largely conscious of itself, of God, and of objects. In 
 this life, therefore, it is our chief endeavour to change 
 the body of infancy, so far as its nature permits and is 
 conducive thereto, into another body which is fitted for 
 many things, and which is related to a mind conscious 
 as much as possible of itself, of God, and of objects ; so 
 that everything which is related to its memory or imagina- 
 tion, in comparison with the intellect is scarcely of any 
 moment, as I have already said in the scholium of the 
 preceding proposition. 
 
 Peop. XL. — The innre 'perfection a thing j^ossesses, the more 
 it acts and the less it suffers, and conversely the more it 
 acts the more perfect it is. 
 
 Dcmonst. — The more perfect a thing is, the more reality 
 it possesses (Def. 6, pt. 2), and consequently (Prop. 3, 
 pt. 3, with the Schol.) the more it acts and the less it 
 suffers. Inversely also it may be demonstrated in the 
 same way that the more a thing acts the more perfect 
 it is. — Q.E.D. 
 
 Coral. — Hence it follows that that part of the mind 
 which abides, whether great or small, is more perfect than 
 the other part. For the part of the mind which is eterna 
 (Props. 23 and 29, pt. 5) is the intellect, through whic 
 alone we are said to act (Prop. 3, pt. 3), but that p? 
 which, as we have shown, perishes, is the imaginat 
 itself (Prop. 21, pt. 5), through which alone we are 
 to suffer (Prop. 3, pt. 3, and the general definition 
 
OF THE POU'ER OF THE IS 
 
 ii.i.i.iA I. ;f, 
 
 affects). Therefore (Prop. 40. pt. 5) that part irhich 
 abides, M-liether great or small, is more pcrfm ilmn iho 
 latter. — q.e.d. 
 
 SM.—These are the things 1 proposed to prove con- 
 cerning the mind, in so far as it is consi.lorcd without 
 rehation to the existence of tlie bodv, and fnun tho*o 
 taken together with Prop. 21, pt. i. and other prnj^*,." 
 tions, It is evident that our mind, in so far as it under- 
 stands, is an eternal mode of tliought, wliich i- ' 1 
 by another eternal mode of thouglit, and i . 
 another, and so on ad infinUum, so that all takm lu^-ahcr 
 form the eternal and infinite intellect of God. 
 
 Prop. XLI. — Even if wc did not Jniow thai our vii'ut T. 
 eternal, we shmdd stUl comider as of priman/ 
 ance Piety and Ecligion, and ahsdutdy tr> ^ 
 which in the Fourth Fart we hare shoun to U niattti 
 
 to strength of mind and (jcnerosity. 
 
 Dcriionst. — The primary and sole foundation of •. 
 or of the proi^er conduct of life (by Corol. Pri'p. 22, ntui 
 Prop. 24, pt. 4) is to seek our own profit. Uut in onU-r 
 to determine "what reason prescribes a.s profitahje. w« 
 had no regard to the eternity of the mind, which Wi- did 
 not recognise till we came to the Fifth Part Ti.' ; 
 although we were at that time ignorant that tli< 
 is eternal, we considered as of primary imiKirtanc- 
 things which we have shown are related to sini. 
 mind and generosity ; and therefore, even if wo wx ■ 
 ignorant of the eternity of the mind, wc .sh< "' ' 
 those commands of reason as of primary iniiMn: 
 
 Schol — The creed of the multitude wtm- ' 
 different from this; for most persons »ecni lo i- 
 that they are free in so far as it is allowe<l i: 
 their lusts, and that they give up a \^>r\ 
 rights, in so far as they are bound to live 
 the commands of divine law. Piety, ll- • 
 
282 ETHIC. 
 
 religion, and absolutely all those tilings that are related 
 to greatness of soul, they believe to be burdens which 
 they hope to be able to lay aside after death ; hoping also 
 to receive some reward for their bondage, that is to say, 
 for their piety and religion. It is not merely this hope, 
 however, but also and chiefly fear of dreadful punish- 
 ments after death, by which they are induced to live 
 according to the commands of divine law, that is to say, 
 as far as their feebleness and impotent mind will permit ; 
 and if this hope and fear were not present to them, but 
 if they, on the contrary, believed that minds perish with 
 the body, and that there is no prolongation of life for 
 miserable creatures exhausted with the burden of their 
 piety, they would return to ways of their own liking ; 
 they would prefer to let everything be controlled by their 
 own passions, and to obey fortune rather than themselves. 
 This seems to me as absurd as if a man, because he 
 does not believe that he will be able to feed his body 
 with good food to all eternity, should desire to satiate 
 himself with poisonous and deadly drugs ; or as if, be- 
 cause he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, 
 he should therefore prefer to be mad and to live without 
 reason, — absurdities so great that they scarcely deserve to 
 be repeated. 
 
 Peop. XLII. — Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, hut is 
 virtue itself; nor do we delight in blessedness because 
 we restrain our lusts ; hut, on the contrary, because we 
 delight in it, therefore are we ahle to resti'ain them. 
 
 Demonst. — Blessedness consists in love towards God 
 (Prop. 36, pt. 5, and its Schol.), which arises from the 
 third kind of knowledge (Corol. Prop. 32, pt. 5), and this 
 love, therefore (Props. 59 and 3, pt. 3), must be related 
 to the mind in so far as it acts. Blessedness^ therefore 
 'Def. 8, pt. 4), is virtue itself, which was the first thing 
 
 be proved. Again, the more the mind delights in this 
 
OF THE POU-ER OF THE ISTELLECT. ,fy 
 
 divine love or blessedness, the UK.ro it undcretund. (I'r,,,. 
 32, pt. 5), that is to say (Carol. I'rop. 3. pt. 5) H,. 
 greater is the power it has over its nnoctsan.l (I'n,,*, ;S 
 pt. 5) the less it suffers from affec-ts which nr.' ■ . 
 Therefore, it is because the mind deli-his in thus , 
 love or blessedness that it possesses the \w\n'r of r. ,-•: : 
 ing the lusts ; and because the power of man to r. - 
 the affects is in the intellect alone, no one. th.-r. • ■ 
 delights in blessedness because he has restrained his all".-, i.,, 
 but, on the contrary, the power of restraining his lu«l« 
 springs from blessedness itself. — q.e.p. 
 
 Schol. — I have finished everything I wishetl to explain 
 concerning the power of the mind over the alTctt 
 concerning its liberty. From what has been said ••■ 
 what is the strength of the wise man, and how niucli hv 
 surpasses the ignorant who is driven forwanl by lu»i 
 alone. For the ignorant man is not only aJ^tatt^l l>y 
 external causes in many ways, and never enjoy.-* tni«' 
 peace of soul, but lives also ignorant, as it were, l->t!i ■ i 
 God and of things, and as soon as lie ceases to suflV-r < ••.i^- - 
 also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in «<• tar 
 as he is considered as sucli, is scarcely ever moved ui li:< 
 mind, but, being conscious by a certain eternal ni"-e*j»iiy 
 of himself, of God, and of things, never cca-scs to be. and 
 always enjoys true peace of soul. If the way which, m I 
 have shown, leads hither seem very diflicult, it can never- 
 theless be found. It must indeed be diflicult since it u 
 so seldom discovered; for if salvation lay ready to liand 
 and could be discovered without *,'reat labour, how ct»ul.l 
 it be possible that it should be neglected ainiosl by every- 
 body ? But all noble things are as diflicult as they an 
 
 rare. 
 
 0^ 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Absent, afiFects related to absent 
 objects, 258. 
 
 Action, power of, cause of iov, i c r 
 152, 158. . ' 
 
 connection with adequate ideas, 
 
 106, 107, 112, 241, 256, 267. 
 
 definition, 106, 241. 
 
 determined by reason always 
 
 good, 241. 
 
 increase or diminution of, 106. 
 
 is perfection, 280. 
 
 not determined by reason may 
 
 be good or evil, 241. 
 
 Actions, contrary, in same subject, 
 254- 
 
 or passions, order in mind and 
 
 body the same, 108. 
 
 Adeijuate cause, definition, lo6. 
 
 idea, definition, 48. 
 
 Affability, its nature, 246. 
 
 Affect able to surpass action, 1 85. 
 
 active, relation to joy or de- 
 sire, 158. 
 
 animal, 157. 
 
 arrangement and connection of 
 
 affects, 266. 
 
 clear idea and knowledge of it, 
 
 255, 256, 26J, 266. 
 
 contrary, definition, 1 80. 
 
 correspondence with object, 
 
 154- 
 
 definition, 106, 1 74. 
 
 detachment from thought of 
 
 external cause, 254, 266. 
 
 differs according to essence of 
 
 person, 156. 
 
 • duration of, 258, 266. 
 
 ■ excited by numbers of simul- 
 taneous causes, 259. 
 
 • guidance by, as compared with 
 
 that by reason, 234. 
 
 imagination of cause of, as pre- 
 sent, 1^7. 
 
 Affect, mind'* nowrroTfr. it' 3(a 
 
 262, 266, 267. 
 
 n.c. ..ity ..f r.v;..-. |, C. 236. 
 
 ol..-tili.it.c:ili.:;:.- ;, |S^3|<i. 
 
 powirof it liuuUil b* lUOMHT, 
 
 254. 
 
 related to niaoy cau*t«, 15^ 
 
 266. 
 
 remedica for kflixi#, 3(A 
 
 rejitraint or rvmotai of, lt5, 
 
 186, 190, 260. 
 Btrength of, oa «b«l il fm 
 
 dent, 187. 
 towanlit pMt, pTMeat, or fatal* 
 
 object, iSl. 
 .tVff('Ction!>, bodily, arrmrevtDMit mc- 
 
 cordinir to urJ«:r o( iotoUacf, 3te\ 
 
 266. 
 bodily, cli-ar itlc* 
 
 ledge of thim, s^v 
 IxhIIIv, oim-*]- 
 
 with thoughu, 354. 
 bo<lily, rt- Utiun to UmcI Ood, 
 
 263. 
 Af!irniatii)n in the mind iiirt>l««d la 
 
 the id.a, 95. 
 Agrcimcnt cauMd by oooforwitjr l» 
 
 reaiMin, 204. 
 
 prevtnUd by {iMii(«^ XXL 
 
 with our DJklun ia good, Ml, 
 
 202, 204. 
 Ambition, dcfinllkio. tjl. Il> IJ*. 
 
 172. 
 Anger, .i. f'liiiti. n, m. i*i. 
 
 Antij • 
 App.li- 
 
 that ■■>■'. -, 
 
 Uk 
 
 .-ia. 
 
 Anton; 
 
 Attrib; 
 
 IJA Ite- 
 
 I 
 
286 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Attributes of substance, each must 
 be conceived through itself, 8. 
 
 distinct do not constitute dif- 
 ferent substances, 8. 
 
 Audacity, definition, 149, 172. 
 
 Avarice, definition, 156, 173. 
 
 Aversion, definition, 164. 
 
 Baseness, definition, 209. 
 Beauty, explanation, 43, 44. 
 
 prejudice concerning, 39. 
 
 Being, infinite thinking, 49. 
 
 of things, mode in which it 
 
 follows from God, 52. 
 
 origin of the term, 85. 
 
 Belief, connection with hope and 
 
 fear, 147. 
 Benevolence, definition, 130, 1 7 1. 
 Blame, origin of notion, 43, 131. 
 
 prejudice concerning, 39. 
 
 Blessedness, definition, 241, 275, 
 
 277. 
 not reward of virtue, but vir- 
 tue itself, 282. 
 Bodies, agi-eement, 61. 
 
 determination, 61, 62. 
 
 hard and soft, meaning of 
 
 terms, 63. 
 
 how distinguished, 61. 
 
 in moti(jn or at rest, 61. 
 
 mode of motion, 61. 
 
 — • — union, 63. 
 
 Body, affected in many ways, 48 
 
 212. 
 composite, retention of nature, 
 
 64, 65. 
 
 definition, 47. 
 
 constitution, 67. 
 
 idea of, involves essence of 
 
 God, 92. 
 
 imagination of it, 76. 
 
 knowledge of it, 75, 76, 78. 
 
 modes of its affection, 62. 
 
 perception of it, 48, 67, 76. 
 
 reflection of motion, 63. 
 
 human, affections by external 
 
 bodies, 67, 68, 70, 75, 76, 77, 212, 
 
 247, 279. 
 human, capable of affection 
 
 and suffering change, 106. 
 human, capacity of affecting 
 
 bodies, 212, 247, 279. 
 
 human, changes of, 213. 
 
 human, community with other 
 
 bodies, 84. 
 . human, death of it terminates 
 
 passion, 275. 
 
 Body, human, determination by 
 
 external body, 66. 
 human, determination by mind 
 
 of body, and of body by mind, 
 
 108, 109, no, III, 112. 
 human, existence of, cannot be 
 
 excluded by the mind, 116, 1 17. 
 human, fitness for many things, 
 
 human, idea of it exists in 
 
 God, 268. 
 human, inadequate idea of its 
 
 duration, 79. 
 human, increase in its power 
 
 of action, 106, 1 16, 118. 
 human, individuals composing 
 
 it, 66. 
 
 human is composite, 65, 66. 
 
 human, knowledge of it, 76. 
 
 human, knowledge of its parts, 
 
 74- 
 
 human, knowledge of its exis- 
 tence, 71. 
 
 human, knowledge or concep- 
 tion of it under form of eternity, 
 268, 269, 270, 272, 273, 276. 
 
 human, mind not absolutely 
 
 destroyed with it, 269. 
 
 human, moves external bodies, 
 
 66. 
 
 human, object of the human 
 
 mind, 59. 
 
 human, order of actions, &c. 
 
 same as in mind, 108. 
 
 human, perception of it by the 
 
 mind, 58, 59, 67, 73, 74, 78. 
 
 human, preservation, 66, 247. 
 
 human, simultaneous affec- 
 tions, 70. 
 
 human, union with mind, 60, 
 
 72, 73, 251, 252, 253, 268, 269. 
 
 human, ways in which it can 
 
 be disposed, 66. 
 
 Bondage, definition, 176. 
 
 Bravery, definition, 149. 
 
 Brutes, man's rights over, 209. 
 
 Cause, adequate, definition, 106. 
 
 determinate, effect follows, 2. 
 
 determination by other causes, 
 
 28. 
 
 external alone can destroy a 
 
 thing, 113. 
 
 inadequate, definition, 106. 
 
 knowledge of, 2. 
 
 Cause of itself, definition, i. 
 Causes, connection of, 54, 55. 
 
ISDEX. 
 
 Causes, external limit perseverance 
 in being, 183. 
 
 Certitude something positive, 97. 
 
 Change necessary to man, 183, 2S0. 
 
 Changeableness caused by passions, 
 203. 
 
 Chastity not an affect, 156. 
 
 Cheerfulness always good, 214. 
 
 definition, 1 17. 
 
 raritj' of, 216. 
 
 Cicero quoted, 172. 
 
 Citizens, definition, 211. 
 
 Class, love of a class or nation, 145. 
 
 Cold, explanation of action, 43. 
 
 Commiseration, definition, 125, 129, 
 165. 
 
 Common, things having nothing in 
 common, 2-3. 
 
 what is common is not essence, 
 
 82. 
 
 what is common, adequate con- 
 ception of it, 82, 83. 
 
 what is common, dependence 
 
 of perception on it, 84. 
 
 Community of nature as it affects 
 our good or evil, 200, 201. 
 
 profitable to man, 243, 244, 
 
 Compassion, definition, 166. 
 
 Conception, activity of it, 47. 
 
 Concord, things which beget it, 244, 
 246. 
 
 Confidence, definition, 123, 165. 
 
 sign of weakness, 219. 
 
 Confusion, explanation of it, 43, 44. 
 
 Consternation, definition, 140, 1 50, 
 172. 
 
 Contempt always evil, 219. 
 
 definition, 15 1, 163, 166. 
 
 nothing worthy of it, 220. 
 
 repayment of it by love, 218. 
 
 Contentment with one's self, defini- 
 tion, 132. 
 
 Contingency dependent on imagina- 
 tion, 90. 
 
 does not exist, 29. 
 
 imagination of it influences 
 
 affects, 188, 1 89, 190, 192, 257. 
 
 meaning of it, 33, 180. 
 
 reason does not recognise it, 
 
 90. 
 Contrary, actions contrary in same 
 
 subject, 254. 
 evil is contrarj- to us, 201. 
 
 men contrary to one another 
 
 through passion, 203. 
 
 things contrary alone can de- 
 stroy each other, 1 13. 
 
 Court<»«y, dofinition. 173, 
 Cruelty, dcfinilioo, 143. i;i. 
 
 Haxokr. fnn. ni»n »!..,! 
 
 Dtuth.d.-lit.- 
 
 f.aro! • 
 
 lf«inj ..... . 
 
 grv»UT. 278, 279. 
 not thought of by • I. 
 
 in frw, 235. 
 not to b« avoided by t»iaili ^ 
 
 faith, 239. 
 Deceit, never pr»cttw<J bj » mm 
 
 who ii« fro*, 25S. 
 Deformity. cxplanAtino o^ it, 4 v 44. 
 
 pr\'judic«? cimcrrnini;, 39. 
 
 Dejection, f«Iw piety in it, 2461 
 Derision, definition. 151, 164. 
 Descartes, his doctrine m to kflacU, 
 
 105. 
 his doctrine m to unioa at atM 
 
 and body. 251. 252, 253. 
 Desire, accidental cauar (•/, 1 1<). 
 
 connection with tifin td 
 
 others, 132. 
 
 definition, 1 16. i6<x i6t. 
 
 extinguiubment or mtralal <4 
 
 ^-it, 191, 192. 
 
 follows fmm a(lei{Q«t0 aaJ la 
 
 adequate id'-a«, ?4 • 
 
 may 1» 
 
 relation • •.^l<ll 
 
 gprin;.'i: :'f< 
 
 Bprin^;i' 
 
 4c., 137. I 
 
 undtT-' i 
 
 or as a p;i ' 
 Despair, d^ t : 
 
 sign nl : 
 
 Despondency, j. ! ti.-.i n. I'«>, M^ 
 ij,'norancc ut ooc's tull aad »»• 
 
 potencc, 224. 
 
 more caailj cncrwUd ik** 
 
 jiri«l»', 224. 
 
 Determination I a <aj«<«, J< 
 Devotion, .i. • ■ 
 Difference ■ • 
 
 men and t! 
 of nature x> it Allc-tt -«» f •J 
 
 or evil, 200, 201, 204. 
 
 of natuni causwl by 
 
 205. 
 
 Discord eWI to man. 3*4- 
 Dis-.rder, prejodioo 
 
 39. 
 Distinct things bo« 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Doubt, same as vacillation of mind, 
 
 122. 
 
 Drunkenness, definition, 156, 173. 
 Duration, definition, 48. 
 
 ECCLESIASTES quoted, 192. 
 
 Education, effect of it, 167, 168. 
 
 Effect follows a cause, 2. 
 
 follows from something which 
 
 exists, 37. 
 
 knowledge of it, 2. 
 
 Emotion, detachment from thought 
 of external cause, 254. 
 
 Emulation, definition, 129, 1 71. 
 
 End, definition, 181. 
 
 Envy, cause of it, 135. 
 
 definition, 166. 
 
 natural to man, 134, 153. 
 
 not excited by those who are 
 
 not our equals, 154. 
 
 Error, cause of it, 93, 96, 182. 
 
 definition, 69, 81. 
 
 Essence, definition, 47, 56, 57, 
 82. 
 
 of God, human mind has know- 
 ledge of it, 93. 
 
 of God, knowledge of it in- 
 volved in idea of body, 92. 
 
 of God, knowledge of it ade- 
 quate and perfect, 92. 
 
 of man, what it involves, 48. 
 
 of things not existing, 2. 
 
 of things produced by God, 26, 
 
 Eternity, definition, 2. 
 
 riot duration, 276. 
 
 things considered under form 
 
 of it, 91, 272, 273. 
 Evil avoided by all, 195. 
 conception of it as cornected 
 
 with freedom, 235. 
 
 contrary to us, 201. 
 
 due to external causes, 242. 
 
 explanation of it, 43, 139, 179, 
 
 180. 
 fear of it as a motive, 232. 
 
 knowledge of, desire arising 
 
 from it, 191, 192. 
 
 knowledge of it an effect of 
 
 sorrow, 186. 
 
 knowledge of it inadequate, 
 
 233- 
 
 knowledge of : restraint of af- 
 fects, 190. 
 
 necessity of it, 240. 
 
 nothing certainly evil but ab- 
 sence of imderstanding, 199. 
 
 prejudice concerning it, 39. 
 
 Evil produced by hatred, 139, 141, 
 
 142. 
 reason follows the lesser evil, 
 
 233. 234. 
 
 removal of it, 242. 
 
 Existence, desire of, 196. 
 Experience, vague, definition, 86. 
 
 vague, cause of falsity, 87. 
 
 Extension, attribute or affection of 
 
 attribute of God, 13, 49. 
 relation to thought, 52, 53. 
 
 Faculties absolute, their nature, 94, 
 
 95- 
 
 Faith, never to be broken, 239. 
 
 False idea, removal of what is posi- 
 tive in it, 181. 
 
 Falsity, cause of it, 87, 96. 
 
 definition, 80. 
 
 Favour, agreement with reason, 221. 
 
 definition, 126, 166. 
 
 Fear as a motive, 232. 
 
 cause of it, 147, 244. 
 
 causes disbelief, 147. 
 
 definition, 123, 140, 164, 171. 
 
 hope accompanies it, 164. 
 
 how to get rid of it, 261. 
 
 not good of itself, 219. 
 
 Fellowship profitable to man, 214. 
 
 Ferocity, definition, 17 1. 
 
 Final causes, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 178. 
 
 Finite in its own kind, definition, I. 
 
 Finiteness is negation, 5. 
 
 Flattery as a means of promoting 
 concord, 246. 
 
 Flight from danger sometimes neces- 
 sary, 236. 
 
 Food, varied kinds necessary, 247. 
 
 Fortitude, definition, 159. 
 
 properties of it, 239. 
 
 Free, man born free could not form 
 conception of good and evil, 235. 
 
 man who is free avoids danger, 
 
 236. 
 
 man who is free avoids favours 
 
 of the ignorant, 237. 
 
 man who is free does not think 
 
 of death, 235. 
 
 man who is free is the only 
 
 grateful man, 238. 
 
 man who is free never deceives, 
 
 238. 
 
 Freedom, connection with love and 
 hatred, 146, 147. 
 
 definition, 2. 
 
 ■ not an attribute of will, 32, 94, 
 
 99, 100, loi, 102, 103. 
 
Freedom, reasons why men attribute 
 
 it to themselves, 39, Si. 
 Friendship of beloved object with 
 
 another is a cause of hatred, 135. 
 
 profitable to man, 243. 
 
 Future objects, affect towards them, 
 
 122, 123, 1S7, iSS, 191, 230, 231, 
 
 234- 
 
 Generosity, definition, 159. 
 importance of it, 281. 
 
 repayment of anger, &c., by 
 
 generosity, 218, 243. 
 
 Gladness, definition, 123, 165. 
 
 sign of weakness, 219. 
 
 Gland pineal, opinion of Descartes 
 
 with regard to it, 251, 252, 253. 
 Glory, definition, 277. 
 
 how we are to think of it, 261. 
 
 God acts from no freedom of will, 32. 
 
 adequacy and perfection of 
 
 knowledge of His essence, 92. 
 
 amplitude of His laws, 46. 
 
 can be hated by nobody, 265. 
 
 cause of existence and essence 
 
 of things, 27. 
 cause of formal being of ideas, 
 
 51- 
 
 cause of modes of attributes, 
 
 51- 
 
 cause through Himself, 19. 
 
 compelled by no one, 19. 
 
 comprehension of non-existent 
 
 thingis in His idea, 53. 
 connection of causes in Hiin, 
 
 54, 55- 
 definition, I. 
 
 determination of things by 
 
 Him, 27, 28. 
 
 does not act for the sake of the 
 
 good, 37. 
 
 efficient cause, 19. 
 
 essence of things produced by 
 
 Him, 26. 
 essence of, involved by idea of 
 
 body, 92. 
 
 eternal, 23. 
 
 everything in Him, 14. 
 
 existence and essence the same, 
 
 23. 
 
 existence and essence eternal 
 
 truths, 24. 
 
 exists for no end, 1 78. 
 
 extension attribute of Hira, 49. 
 
 first cause, 19. 
 
 formal being of things, how it 
 
 follows from Him, 52. 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Godfrw, 
 
 :«o 
 
 0. JO. 
 
 tnv (mm pMtkioi nr aActu. 
 
 264. 
 
 human mind riiiu ia Hta^ 
 
 and is coccivrj U»nj«ch lltek 
 273. 2S1. ^ ^ 
 
 human mind baa kDo«UdM «4 
 
 Him, 49. 
 idea of human t 
 
 of tUniity «xii>t« -.■ 
 idea of humajj i...;,.. . .„_ ,_ 
 
 Him, 72. 
 idia of, iu unity, 5a 
 
 idea of, rwlaUoii U 
 
 ] to it, 263. 
 
 I identity with mbaUaea. 
 
 ! '3-. 
 
 immanent cauar, aj. 
 
 immutable cau<«, 24. 
 
 individual thinjj» afTccti<i«M <4 
 
 His attributea, 27. 
 
 infinite thingi follow frma IIm 
 
 nature, 18. 
 
 inU'llect doM not perlaia Us 
 
 21, 32- 
 
 lovo of cannot ba dvfiUd by 
 
 envy, At, 265. 
 
 love of, cunncdion ot it vttJt 
 
 undenttandin);, 264. 
 
 love of, cunntancy a( il, tiA 
 
 love of dcnuuiila out ion ia 
 
 return, 265. , 
 
 love of, intollcctoal, 174, tJi, 
 
 276, 277, 27.S. 270. 
 
 love of, DO affect coaU*ry to 
 
 it, 266. 
 
 lore of ought to oocupv tit* 
 
 mind, 264. 
 
 love of utrrngthrwd bj lot* 
 
 to Him of othrr |>«<f>pJ*, J6C 
 
 knowK-.lK''- <-' cM»m» d^in !•• 
 
 good of oth.n. ^'7 
 knowlfdj,'c ft i» bliaiiilBM^ 
 
 knowledge ct b Ii%Im« g-rf 
 
 and virtu.-, .'oo. 
 
 '"><' '' '■ .. -^ 
 
 „„. :,. IIU^ «6l 
 
 . til t'--k'^ ■ ' ''"X* ^, •fc'** *• 
 
 nfctA.li) ••( .r.lcr ia wbkk Il« 
 
 has produced tbisfi. XV 34. iV 
 36, 37. 
 
290 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 God, nothing can be conceived with- 
 out Him, 14. 
 
 omnipotence actual from eter- 
 nity, 21. 
 
 perfection of His nature excites 
 
 His action, 19. 
 
 perfection of things produced 
 
 by Him, 34, 35, 36, 37. 
 
 power of is His essence, 37. 
 
 power of, meaning of term, 49, 
 
 power of acting equal to His 
 
 power of thinking, 52. 
 
 proximate cause, 29. 
 
 relationship to essence of man, 
 
 56. 
 
 remote cause, meaning of the 
 
 term, 29. 
 
 substance with infinite attri- 
 butes, 9. 
 
 things which follow from abso- 
 lute nature of His attributes, 24. 
 
 things which follow from modi- 
 fied attributes, 25. 
 
 thought an attribute of Him, 
 
 48. 
 
 understanding of Him, 270. 
 
 unity of, 13. 
 
 why knowledge of Him is not 
 
 distinct, 93. 
 
 will does not pertain to Him, 
 
 21, 32, 34. 35, 36, 37- 
 
 works for no end, 38, 39, 40, 
 
 41, 42, 43, 44, 45>.46. 
 
 Good, agreement with our nature, 
 201, 202. 
 
 conception of, as connected 
 
 with freedom, 235. 
 
 desired by all, 195. 
 
 desired for others, 207. 
 
 explanation of, 43, 1 16, 1 39, 
 
 179, 180. 
 
 highest, common to all, 206. 
 
 highest is knowledge of God, 
 
 200. 
 
 knowledge of, an affect of joy, 
 
 186. 
 
 knowledge of, desire arising 
 
 from it, 191, 192. 
 
 knowledge of, restraint of af- 
 fects by it, 190. 
 
 nothing known to be good but 
 
 understanding, 199, 242. 
 
 prejudice concerning it, 39. 
 
 produced by love, 139. 
 
 reason follows greater good, 
 
 233, 234. 
 
 Good, reason why joy follows it, 167. 
 Gratitude, definition, 142, 1 7 1. 
 dependence on freedom, 238. 
 
 Happiness, in what it consists, 194, 
 Hardness, definition, 63. 
 Hatred by beloved object, 141. 
 
 can never be good, 217. 
 
 co-existence with love, 141, 
 
 142. 
 
 connection with desire, 137. 
 
 connection with freedom and 
 
 necessity, 146, 147. 
 connection with hatred of 
 
 others, 132, 133, 140, 141, 143. 
 connection with joy, 124, 126, 
 
 127, 128. 
 connection with sorrow, 120, 
 
 121, 125, 126, 12S, 129, 145, 146. 
 
 definition, 119, 163. 
 
 dependence on difference of 
 
 nature, 204. 
 
 desire to remove it, 144. 
 
 destruction of it, 143, 254. 
 
 — - — destruction of object of it, 145. 
 
 natural to man, 153. 
 
 nothing worthy of it, 220. 
 
 of beloved object, 135, 13S, 
 
 144. 
 of object dependent on its 
 
 causation of sorrow, 146. 
 
 overcome by love, 143, 260. 
 
 productive of evil to others, 
 
 139, 141, 142, 243. 
 
 repayment with love, 218. 
 
 Health of whole man, 230. 
 Heat, explanation of notion, 43. i 
 Honour, definition, 209. 
 Hope, cause of, 147. 
 
 causes belief, 147. 
 
 definition, 123, 164. 
 
 fear accompanies it, 164. , 
 
 not good of itself, 219. 
 
 Horror, definition, 150. 
 Humanity, definition, 13 1. 
 Humility, definition, 153, 167. 
 not a virtue, 222. 
 
 Idea adequate, definition, 48. 
 
 clear idea of a passion, 255. 
 
 definition, 47. 
 
 distinguished from images and 
 
 words, 97. 
 in the mind alone involves 
 
 volition, &c., 95. 
 true, agreement cum suo ideato, 
 
 2. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 191 
 
 Idea, true, he who has it knows ho 
 
 has it, 88. 
 Ideas, adequate, wliich follow from 
 
 adequate ideas, 84. 
 adequate, connection with ac- 
 tion, 106, 107, 112, 241, 256,267. 
 
 common, 83. 
 
 falsity in them, nothing posi- 
 tive, 80. 
 
 formal being of, 51. 
 
 inadequate and confused, 82. 
 
 inadequate, connection with 
 
 suffering or passion, loo, 107, 
 
 112, 241, 255, 256, 267. 
 inadequate, connection with 
 
 virtue, 197. 
 
 mutilated, 81. 
 
 order and connection of, 52. 
 
 254. 
 
 relation to God, 80. 
 
 true, 80. 
 
 universal, 86. 
 
 Ignorant, avoidance of favours of 
 
 ignorant men, 237. 
 
 man, his weakness, 283. 
 
 Images of things, connection of 
 
 them, 254, 263. 
 of things, constancy of them, 
 
 262. 
 
 of things, definition, 69. 
 
 of things, distinguished from 
 
 ideas, 97. 
 of things, frequency of them, 
 
 263. 
 of things, past, present, or 
 
 future, 122, 123, 187, 188. 
 of things, relation to a number 
 
 of objects, 262, 263. 
 of things, relation to idea of 
 
 God ,263. 
 . of things, relation to tilings we 
 
 understand, 263. 
 Imagination, cause of contingency, 
 
 90. 
 
 cause of falsity, 87, 182. 
 
 entities of, 45. 
 
 knowledge of the first kmd, 
 
 86. 
 Imperfection, definition, 176, I7"> 
 
 178, 179, 180. 
 
 . prevents existence, 12. 
 
 Impossibility, meaning of, 33. 
 Impotence, cause of, 193. 
 difference between it and vir- 
 tue, 209. 
 neglect to preserve our being, 
 
 195. 
 
 Impijl»4-, .v-tiiii: fr-.iti >-^ 
 
 In«.i. ^^ 
 
 Inclii. 
 
 Incn „^„^^ 
 
 20j. 
 
 IndignKtinn, drfinitiao, 136^ |64 
 evil of. ;ji, :.ii. 
 
 Individual tt 
 
 4& 
 
 thin^^. 
 
 
 Infinit*- in ii- 
 
 
 Intinitudo i" . 
 
 
 nt»tc<>ii., 
 
 »rU.I<k 
 
 Ingratitude i. 
 
 
 Rodni**- 
 
 
 Injiisticv in u , 
 
 :|. 
 
 InU-llect act' > . 
 
 Atnm 
 
 iwttntial, 3i 
 
 
 actual, rcfcrrvU to tmlmrm attm- 
 
 rata. 31. 
 
 
 actual, what it 
 
 3'- 
 
 amuip>-ni. lit nf 
 
 oa«p.«lMMl.. 
 
 ftfT.<Hui«M MP- 
 
 cording l" • 
 
 
 diH-.H n. ' . 
 
 Ji. ;? 
 
 p«.rfc'c:i. 1. ..., .. 
 
 . pnAU 
 
 241-242. 
 
 
 same a. wUl, 96* 97. 98. W^ 
 
 100, 101, 102, 103. 
 
 
 Int<llectt«iU lo»c of Cod, rfA. >7J. 
 
 276, 277, 27SL 
 
 
 Intuitive »ci'-T— '-• 
 
 ..;•. .. vA 
 
 Kicno' 
 
 
 BO far a» i'. 
 
 
 sciencf iiiii.iii^ui«... t.uUiii'-^> 
 
 falsity. S7- 
 
 
 
 - p^fcrtk. 
 
 and ! : -: 
 
 
 ari- 
 
 
 BCf III' 1- 1- 
 
 
 uci.iic.-. lU «• 
 
 irrl..|«, M>! 
 
 pow.r, :'>:. 2:<\ 2 
 
 1 
 
 jBAU)f»r, ilcfinllioo. I1& 
 Joy, accidenlal e»tt«» «. ••♦ 
 
 __ c..M..i-ti.«witbli«»^ia4»«'^ 
 
 ,i,ii.<-tiaO •rJth>oy «4 
 
 131. 
 
 . c.rtlD«<tJ.« will. »»~. »». »»'■ 
 
 123. 134, 115. »»7' '"^ 
 dcfinilioo. 116, 161. 
 
 193- 
 
292 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Joy, desire to produce what con- 
 duces to it, 1 30. 
 
 directly good, 214. 
 
 may be accompanied with sor- 
 row, 145. 
 
 may be excessive, 248. 
 
 mind's power of action is the 
 
 cause of it, 151. 
 
 praise is the cause of it, 152. 
 
 reasons why it follows good 
 
 actions, 167. 
 
 relation to action as well as 
 
 passion, 158. 
 
 relation to active affects, 158. 
 
 relation to parts of the body, 
 
 229. 
 resemblance is the cause of it, 
 
 121. 
 sameness of it whether object 
 
 be imagined as past, present, or 
 
 future, 122, 123, 187. 
 Judgment, suspension of it, 100. 
 Justice, in natural State, 21 1. 
 
 Knowledge, different kinds of it, 
 86,82, 
 
 of good and evil, 186, 190, 191, 
 
 192. 
 
 of second and third kind dimi- 
 nishes fear of death and subjec- 
 tion to passion, 278. 
 
 third kind of it depends on the 
 
 mind, so far as it is eternal, 273. 
 
 • third kind of it increases per- 
 fection and happiness, 274. 
 
 third kind of it, intellectual 
 
 love of God arises from it, 274, 275. 
 
 third kind of it, its excellence 
 
 and pow^r, 267, 270, 271. 
 
 third kind of it may arise from 
 
 second kind, 271. 
 
 third kind of it, our delight in 
 
 it, 274. 
 
 Laughter distinguished from mock- 
 ery, 217. 
 
 nothing worthy of it, 220. 
 
 Law, impossible with absolute exer- 
 cise of rights, 246. 
 
 reason counsels life under it, 
 
 239. 
 
 Liberality, men conquered by it, 
 
 245- 
 Liberty, in what it consists, 277. 
 Life, subject of thoughts of man 
 
 who is free, 235. 
 Likeness of an object to ourselves, 
 
 affects produced in us thereby, 
 
 128, 134, 144. 
 Longing, definition, 137. 
 Love by hated object, 142. 
 
 coexistence with hatred, 141, 
 
 142. 
 
 connection with freedom and 
 
 necessity, 146, 147. 
 
 connection with joy, 120, 121, 
 
 123, 124, 125, 127, 129, 146. 
 connection with love of others, 
 
 132, 133, 142. 
 
 connection with sorrow, 1 23, 
 
 124, 125, 127. 
 
 definition, 1 19, 163. 
 
 desire springing from it, 137, 
 
 destroys hatred, 143, 260. 
 
 destruction of it, 254. 
 
 fruition of, causes new disposi- 
 
 fr tion of body, 160. 
 
 lustful, passes into hatred, 245. 
 
 may be excessive, 2 1 5. 
 
 of class or nation, 145. 
 
 of God cannot be defiled by 
 
 envy, &c., 265. 
 
 of God cannot be turned into 
 
 hatred, 265. 
 of God, constancy of it, 266. 
 
 of God demands not love in 
 
 return, 265. 
 
 of God, dependence of it on 
 
 understanding, 264. 
 
 of God, intellectual, 274, 275, 
 
 276, 277, 278. 
 of God, no affect contrary to it, 
 
 266. 
 
 of God ought to occupy the 
 
 mind, 264. 
 
 of God strengthened by love to 
 
 Him of other people, 265. 
 
 of objectdependenton its causa- 
 tion of joy, 146. 
 
 preservation of object of it 
 
 causes joy, 123. 
 
 production of good thereby, 
 
 139- 
 
 repayment of hatred, &c., by it, 
 
 218, 243, 260. 
 Lust, definition, 156, 1 73. 
 
 restraint of it, 282. 
 
 Luxuriousness, definition, 173. 
 
 Madness, in what it really consists 
 
 216. 
 Man, consequences of agreememt or 
 
 disagreement of man with man, 
 
 242. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ^\ 
 
 Man, his essence, what it involves, 
 48. 
 
 his final aim, 241. 
 
 in what he consists, 56, 60. 
 
 Mosaic account of first man 
 
 235- 
 
 necessary to man, 194, 243. 
 
 substance is not his form, 55. 
 
 thought affirmed of him, 4S. 
 
 ]\Iarriage in accordance with reason, 
 
 245- 
 IVIaxims of life, 260. 
 Melancholy always evil, 2 1 4. 
 
 definition, 117. 
 
 Memory, definition, 70. 
 
 influence on affects, iSS. 
 
 Mercy is generosity, 159. 
 
 not a passion but a power, 171. 
 
 Merit, definition, 211. 
 
 origin of, 43. 
 
 prejudice concerning, 39. 
 
 Mind, huuian, actions arise from 
 
 adequate ideas, 112. 
 
 ■ human, acts and sufiFers, 106. 
 
 human, adequate ideas exist in 
 
 it, 83. 
 
 human, aptitude for percep- 
 tion, 66. 
 
 human, body its object, 59. 
 
 human, cannot be absolutely 
 
 destroyed with the body, 269. 
 
 human, confused ideas of affec- 
 tions, 77. 
 
 human, contemplation of things 
 
 absent, 6S, 69. 
 
 human, determination by 
 
 causes, 94. 
 
 human, determination of body 
 
 and of mind by body, 108, 109, 
 
 no. III, 112. 
 human, endeavours to imagine 
 
 increase in action of body, 1 1 8. 
 human, endeavours to imagine 
 
 its own action, 152. 
 
 human, endeavours to perse- 
 vere in its being, 1 15. 
 
 human, eternity of it, 269, 272, 
 
 276, 278, 279, 280, 281. 
 human, excludes things which 
 
 lessen body's action, llS, 119. 
 
 human, follows from God, 
 
 277- 
 
 human, formal being of iU 
 
 idea, 66. 
 
 human, has no absolute free 
 
 will, 32, 94, 95. 96, 97. 9S. 99. 
 100, loi, 102. 
 
 Mind, human, tuu no 1 
 
 culty, 94. 
 human, idra nUu ia (mJ. 7a. 
 
 human, i.i. a 1, t rU*/. rj, 
 
 human, ► ^ «iMa 
 
 '>^v, 71, :; .;. 
 
 Duman, < nmU 
 
 74. 77. 273- 
 
 huinnn. knowlMlf^ n( tb* UiiH 
 
 kind di'|K'n<lii cm th« mind m> laf 
 as it in tU-niAl. 373. 
 
 human, ..r>lcr .4 acCioM^ Aa, 
 
 same M in Uwly. 108, JJ4. 
 
 human, i>art o( Uod • iaUUMt. 
 
 58, 281. 
 
 human, pvrcoptiooa of H, (S. 
 
 59. 67. 73. 74. 7". JM- 
 
 huntan, |«><uH>ur« aicqaato 
 
 knowle<J){e of <;.«! . ..-..^ ..■ 
 
 human, |««««-«^ 
 
 excludeii exi*t<nco 
 
 116, 117. 
 human, power of actioo, vs<l«a- 
 
 vours to ima^nnc, 152. 
 
 human, power of actius, ffj 
 
 over, 151. 
 
 human, powt-r of tkoucht. In- 
 crease of it, 116. 
 
 human, power orer the afl«t«, 
 
 257, 260, 202, 266, 207. 
 
 human, |»>wir <i»er Um body, 
 
 loii, 109, I 10, I II, II]. 
 
 human, niinuilancou* afl«cti<«i 
 
 by two affect*. IIQ. 
 
 human, »orTt)Wi at lU 1 
 
 '52- 
 human, »ubjcctiun lo 
 
 107. 275, 27X. 
 human,iinl-r«*art!'n;'^ !»»•*{> 
 
 under fonii ' 
 
 human. 
 
 72. 73.^?' 
 
 I,,: .lu;u,U.«l 
 
 by t! 
 
 M.K.-kcry .i 
 U-r, 217. 
 Mo<lc, d.fli 
 M.Mj.r.V 
 
 tl. n, I 
 
 Mode ; 
 
 of allnl'Ut^ 
 
 God. 5 
 
 idia- 
 M<h1.-' 
 
 U'W caatw d »t 
 
 hi, .1 
 
 
294 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Money, uses of it, 248. 
 Moses quoted, 235. 
 Motion and rest, preservation of 
 proportions, 212. 
 
 Nation, love of a, 145. 
 
 Natura iiaturans and naturata, 30. 
 
 Nature, man as part of, 183, 240, 
 
 241, 242. 
 
 order of, man follows, 184. 
 
 Necessity, all things determined by 
 
 it, 29, 240. 
 
 definition, 2. 
 
 connection with love and 
 
 hatred, 146. 
 
 imagination of it influences, 
 
 affects, 188, 257. 
 
 meaning of, 33. 
 
 recognition of it by reason, 90. 
 
 Negation in the mind involved in 
 
 the idea, 95. 
 Non-existent things, comprehension 
 
 in God's idea, 53. 
 
 things, their objective being, 
 
 53, 54- 
 Notions, common, their origin, 84. 
 
 second, their origin, 84. 
 
 universal, their origin, 85. 
 
 Omens, definition, 147. 
 Opinion, cause of falsity, 87. 
 
 definition, 86. 
 
 Order, explanation of it, 43. 
 
 prejudice concerning it, 39. 
 
 Over-estimation always evil, 219. 
 
 definition, 166. 
 
 makes men proud, 220. 
 
 Ovid quoted, 133, 192. 
 
 Pain, definition, 117. 
 
 may be good, 215. 
 
 Passion able to surpass action, 
 185. 
 
 connection with inadequate 
 
 ideas, 106, 107, 112, 255. 
 
 definition, 106, 241. 
 
 definition according to Des- 
 cartes, 252. 
 
 limitation by external cause, 
 
 185. 
 
 man necessarily subject to it, 
 
 184. 
 reason can determine to actions 
 
 to which passion determines us, 
 
 228. 
 terminated by death of body, 
 
 275. 
 
 Passions and actions, order in mind 
 and body the same, 108. 
 
 cause of contrariety, 203. 
 
 cause of difference and change, 
 
 203. 
 
 involve negation, 1 1 3. 
 
 prevent agreement, 202. 
 
 Past objects, affect towards them, 
 122, 123, 187, 188, 190, 230, 231. 
 
 Peace of mind, how it arises, 271. 
 
 Peculiarity of an object induces con- 
 templation, 159. 
 
 Perception, passivity of it, 47. 
 
 Perfection, definition, 176, 177, 1 78, 
 179, 180. 
 
 establishes existence, 12. 
 
 identical with reality, 48. 
 
 is increase of action, 280. 
 
 Perseverance in being, actual essence 
 of the thing, 114. 
 
 in being, each thing strives 
 
 after it, 114. 
 
 in being, force causing it 
 
 limited, 183. 
 
 in being involves indefinite 
 
 time, 115. 
 
 in being, mind strives after it, 
 
 "5- 
 
 in being not a limit to passion, 
 
 185. 
 Piety, definition, 209. 
 
 importance of it, 281. 
 
 what it is commonly thought 
 
 to be, 282. 
 Pity, evil and unprofitable in itself, 
 
 220, 245. 
 may be good, 227. 
 
 misery of the object of it, 
 
 129. 
 
 natural to man, 134. 
 
 nothing worthy of it, 220. 
 
 Pleasurable excitement, definition, 
 117. 
 
 may be evil, 215. 
 
 Poor, care of them, 245. 
 
 Positive, removal of what is positive 
 in a false idea, 181. 
 
 Possession of an object by one per- 
 son, 133. 
 
 Possibility, definition, 180. 
 
 imagination of it influences the 
 
 affects, 1 88, 1S9, 257. 
 
 Power, degrees of, in nature, 1 81. 
 
 same as virtue, 181. 
 
 Praise, cause of joy, 152. 
 
 origin of, 43, 1 31. 
 
 prejudice concerning it, 39. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 *9\ 
 
 Presenceof mind is strength of mind, | RoajM.n coon^U Ul« ' 
 
 159 
 Present objects, affect towards them, 
 
 122, 123, 1S7, 1S8, 189, 190, 191, 
 
 192, 230, 231, 234. 
 Preservation of being foundation of 
 
 virtue, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198. 
 of being, no object superior to 
 
 it, 198. 
 
 of being, no one neglects it, 196. 
 
 of being, same as happiness, 194. 
 
 of being with reference to health 
 
 as a whole, 230. 
 Pride, definition, 16S, 225. 
 
 encourages flattery, 225, 246. 
 
 ignorance of one's self and im- 
 potence, 224. 
 Profit, agreement with our nature, 
 
 202. 
 capacity of body for affecting 
 
 and being affected is true pro fit, 
 
 212, 247. 
 everybody has the right to seek 
 
 his own, 242. 
 man under guidance of reason 
 
 is chief profit to man, 205, 243, 
 no one neglects to seek his own, 
 
 196. 
 of the whole man, partial joy 
 
 or sorrow has no regard to it, 
 
 229. 
 seeking our own profit is the 
 
 foundation of virtue, 195, 198. 
 
 what is the profit of one's self 
 
 is that of others, 205. 
 
 what the law of our own profit 
 
 demands, 247. 
 Property, rights of it, 21 1. 
 Punishment by supreme authority, 
 
 221. 
 Pusillanimity, definition, 149, 172. 
 
 Quantity, existence in imaginati>m 
 distinguished from existence in 
 intellect, 17. 
 
 Reality, connection between it and 
 attributes, 8. 
 
 identical with perfection, 48, 
 
 179, 180. 
 
 Reason, affects which spring from it, 
 
 258, 266. 
 conception of objects by it, 230. 
 
 conformity of men to it i» 
 
 agreement of nature, 204. 
 
 considers things as necewar)', 
 
 90. 
 
 law*, 2;.) 
 <|. liniii 
 
 S6. 
 
 nt .4 UtMj. 
 
 87. ' 
 fallow* gntktoT goad umA immt 
 
 e»il. .' ; ;. 
 
 wi! ■.,:x4 
 
 ■ . lu U b atoM. 
 
 urily Uuc, 67. 
 
 ninn under t^'^iUUnco at tl fm- 
 
 fitahlt! t<i man, lof,. 
 
 may dit<nninp to artto— le 
 
 which p.ift'iiin <1. trntuRM •>, JiA. 
 
 pcrciivi-* thing* oadar lavmof 
 
 eternity, 91. 
 ptrft-ction of it b oar (ot* ff- 
 
 fit, 241. 
 
 Hoek* (jn«tfr (uturr C"«J. JU 
 
 t«acheK dir>xt |iir»'i.l ■ f g>"i 
 
 and indirect AVoiviMtca U •«ii, 
 
 232. 
 Rocolli-ction, cau«r of drairr, 1 37 
 Kopret, dct^ri' ■• •■ 
 Religion, <i' 
 
 import 
 
 what ii ■» ^. ......... ..--^i^l* 
 
 be, 282. 
 Remontc, difiniti.«. Hi 165. 
 
 Kij.Ti of wrAkiMM, 119. 
 
 Repentanc«^ drfiniUoO, Ija, t4^ 
 
 167. 
 not a \; * "*' 
 
 RcpOM! of II 
 
 RfgimMan. 
 
 :ind Kalr. .1. I -m 
 K..t. j.r. -r«»tliiO o* 
 
 ni.ti.ii and rrrt, 3i; 
 Right, natural, Jia 
 
 SAi.VATlo?f. in what it 
 Sci' nc<, iiituili*o. JJi 
 
 .S<-li 
 
 Self 
 
 t: 
 
 Self 
 
 m 
 
296 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Self-satisfaction our highest hope, 
 222. 
 
 Shame, definition, 132, 170. 
 
 difference between it and mo- 
 desty, 170. 
 
 how caused, 141. 
 
 may be good, 227. 
 
 — — may produce concord, 246. 
 
 Sin, definition, 211. 
 
 origin of it, 43. 
 
 prejudice concerning it, 39. 
 
 Sobriety is strength of mind, 159. 
 
 not an affect, 156. 
 
 Social, man necessarily social, 206. 
 
 Society, its rights, 211. 
 
 Softness, definition, 63. 
 
 Solitude, reason does not counsel it, 
 239, 244. 
 
 Something, origin of the term, 85. 
 
 Sorrow, accidental cause of it, 1 19. 
 
 connection with hate, 120, 1 2 1, 
 
 125, 126, 128, 129. 
 
 connection with love, 123, 124, 
 
 127. 
 
 definition, 1 17, t6i. 
 
 desire springing from it, 137, 
 
 193- 
 
 desire to destroy what con- 
 duces to it, 130. 
 
 desire to remove it, I44. 
 
 directly evil, 214. 
 
 may be accompanied with joy, 
 
 145. 
 
 reason why it follows wicked- 
 ness, 167. 
 
 related to action as well as 
 
 passion, 158. 
 
 related to parts of the body, 
 
 229. 
 
 sameness of it, whether object 
 
 be past, present, or future, 122, 
 123, 187. 
 
 Stability, want of it, 193. 
 
 State, definition, 21 1. 
 
 reason counsels life in one, 239. 
 
 Stoics' opinion quoted, 250. 
 
 Strength, degrees of it in nature, 
 181. 
 
 of mind, definition, 159. 
 
 of mind, importance of it, 281. 
 
 Substance, attributes of it, con- 
 ceived through themselves, 8. 
 
 cannot be produced by another 
 
 substance, 4, 1 4. 
 
 cannot be produced by any- 
 thing, 4. 
 
 definition, i. 
 
 Substance, division impossible, 12, 
 
 13- 
 
 existence pertains to it, 5. 
 
 extended, not unworthy of God, 
 
 18. 
 
 is infinite, 5. 
 
 no other than God, 13. 
 
 not the form of man, 55. 
 
 prior to affections, 3. 
 
 thinking and extended, are the 
 
 same, 52. 
 Substances of the same nature, 4-8. 
 
 with different attributes, 3. 
 
 Suffering, connection with inade- 
 quate ideas, 106, 107, 1 12, 241, 
 
 256, 267. 
 consequent on our being part 
 
 of nature, 183. 
 
 definition, 106. 
 
 increase or diminution of it. 
 
 106. 
 Suicide, 194. 
 Superstition aflBrms sorrow to be 
 
 good, 249. 
 
 aim of it, 232. 
 
 cause of it, 147. 
 
 Sympathy, definition, 120. 
 
 Temperance is strength of mind, 
 
 159- 
 
 not an affect, 156. 
 
 Thankfulness, definition, 142, 171.'! 
 Thing, origin of the term, 85. 
 Thought, attribute or affection of 
 
 attribute of God, 13, 48. 
 correspondence with affections 
 
 of the body, 254. 
 
 perception of it, 48. 
 
 relation to extension, 52, 53. 
 
 Timidity, definition, 149. 
 Tolerance of men, 243. 
 Transcendental terms, their origin, 
 
 85- 
 Truth, standard of it, 89. 
 
 Understanding, connection of it 
 
 with love of God, 264. 
 evil is the prevention of it, 
 
 199. 
 
 necessary to virtue, 197. 
 
 nothing else certainly good, 
 
 199. 
 sole effort of reason, and sole 
 
 profit of the mind, 198. 
 Universal ideas, ideas of perfection 
 
 and imperfection depend on them, 
 
 177. 
 
isnr.x. 
 
 Vacillation of mind, cause of it, 
 
 definition, 121. 
 
 same as doubt, 12 ■» 
 
 Vainglory, definition, 226. 
 
 Veneration, definition, 150. 
 
 - — origin of it, 153. 15, 
 
 Vengeance, definition, 141, 171 
 
 —— misery of it, 218. 
 
 V ice, treatment by geometrical 
 method, 105. 
 
 Virtue, connection with inadequate 
 ideas, 197. 
 
 desirable for its own Pake, 194. 
 difference between it and im- 
 potence, 209. 
 
 foundation of it, 194, 195, 197, 
 
 ■ of the mind is knowledge of 
 
 God, 200. 
 
 >97 
 
 Virtue Mmr M pnw,». |g,, 
 
 undcmtAnJiBi, ■>~~-,^ „ j^ 
 
 Volition inrolvcj by tbo kW te iw 
 
 •iiiii'i, >»5. 
 
 «s» 
 
 VUuKSB«,c»u.eo».»„ 
 
 " ick«lnt«i, rrMi« wb» •urro« 14. 
 
 Iow« it, 1 07. 
 Will, dttinition, nj. 
 
 do*-* not {•PrtAin toUod. ai. ji 
 
 not frw but aiuffmmij, yt, <^ 
 
 95. 96, 97. 9!^ 99> 100^ loi, 108. 
 
 '03. 
 lamp %» intz-llcet, 96, ol^ obl 
 
 100, 101, 10;, 105. 
 Wise m&n. in whM hia itra^tk 9a^ 
 
 cista, 283. 
 Words di<tingui«b«d frooi UiM, fj. 
 
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