^ ^ GIFT OF Henry U, Brandenstein . T^cM.^. ^^*^< CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS; ALSO, TREATISES ON THE NATUKE OF THE GODS, AND ON THE COMMONWEALTH. LITERM.LY TRANSLATED, CHIEFLY BY c. D. yo:n^ge. NEW YORK AND LONDON: HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS, 1899. ^^4^/tcrl (/ylA.^AJ^^i/^tZc^/\^ HARPER'S NEW CLASSICAL LIBRARY. COMPKISING LITERAL TBANSLATIONB OF C^SAR. VIRGIL. SALLUST. HORACE. TERENCE. TACITUS. 2 Vols. LIVY. 2VoU. CICERO'S ORATIONS. CICKRO'S OFFICES, L^LIUS, CATO MAJOR, PARADOXE'5, SCIPIO'S DRZAJi, LKTT2H TO QUINTUS. CICERO ON ORATORY AND ORATORS. PLATO (SELECT CICERO'S TUSCULAN DISPUTA- TIONS, THE NATURE OF THE GODS, AND THE COMMON- WEALTH. JUVENAL. XENOPHON. HOMKH'S II IAD. .lOMER'b OOYSSEY. HERODOTUS. DEMOSTHENES. 2 Vols. '-H'JCYriDSS. .eSOHYLUS. SOPHOCLES. EURIPIDES. 2Vol. DIALOGUES). 12mo, Cloth, ^1 00 per Volume. PuBLiSHBD BY HARPER & BROTHERS, New York. jl^- The above viorks are for sale by all booksellers, or they will be sent by Harper & Brothers to any address on receipt of price as quoted. If ordered sent by mail, 10 per cent, should be addtd to the price to cover cost of postage. NOTE The greater portion of the Republic was previously translated by Frauds Barham, Esq., and. published in 1841. Although ably performed, it was not sufficiently close for the purpose of the " Classical Library," and was therefore placed in the hands of the present editor for revision, as well as for collation with recent texts. This has occasioned material alterations and additions. The treatise "On the Nature of the Gods" is a revision of that usually ascribed to the celebrated Benjamin Franklin. M103724 CONTENTS, PAGE Tusculan Disputations 7 On the Nature of the Gods 209 On the Commonwealth 357 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. INTRODUCTION. In the year a.u.c. 708, and the sixty - second year of Cicero's age, his daughter, Tullia, died in childbed ; and her loss afflicted Cicero to such a degree that he aban- doned all pubUc business, and, leaving the city, retired to Asterra, which was a country house that he had near An- tiura ; where, after a while, he devoted himself to philo- sophical studies, and, besides other works, he published his Treatise de Finibus, and also this treatise called the Tusculan Disputations, of which Middleton gives this con- cise description : " The first book teaches us how to contemn the terrors of death, and to look upon it as a blessing rather than an evil: " The second, to support pain and affliction with a man- ly fortitude; "The third, to appease all our complaints and uneasi- nesses under the accidents of life ; "The fourth, to moderate all our other passions; "And the fifth explains the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy." It was his custom in the opportunities of his leisure to take some friends with him into the country, where, in- stead of amusing themselves with idle sports or feasts, their diversions were wholly speculative, tending to im- prove the mind and enlarge the understanding. In this manner he now spent five days at his Tusculan villa in dis- cussing with his friends the several questions just men- tioned. For, after employing the mornings in declaiming and rhetorical exercises, they used to retire in the after- 8 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. noon into a gallery, called the Academy, Avhich he had built for the purpose of philosophical conferences, where, after the manner of the Greeks, he held a school, as they called it, and invited the company to call for any subject that they desired to liear explained, which being proposed accordingly by some of the audience became immediately the argument of that day's debate. These five conferences, or dialogues, he collected afterward into writing in the very words and manner in which they really passed ; and published them under the title of his Tusculan Disputa- tions, from the name of the villa in which they were held. BOOK I. ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. I. At a time when I had entirely, or to a great degree, released myself from my labors as an advocate, and from my duties as a senator, I had recourse again, Brutus, prin- cipally by your advice, to those studies which never had been out of my mind, although neglected at times, and which after a long interval I resumed ; and now, since the princi])les and rules of all arts which relate to living well depend on the study of wisdom, which is called philoso- phy, I have thought it an employment worthy of me to il- lustrate them in the Latin tongue, not because philosophy could not be understood in the Greek language, or by the teaching of Greek masters ; but it has always been my opinion that our countrymen have, in some instances, made wiser discoveries than the Greeks, with reference to those subjects which they have considered worthy of devoting their attention to, and in others have improved upon their discoveries, so that in one way or other we surpass them on every point ; for, with regard to the manners and hab- its of private life, and family and domestic affairs, we cer- tainly manage them with more elegance, and better than they did ; and as to our republic, that our ancestors have, beyond all dispute, formed on better customs and laws. What shall I say of our military affairs; in which our an- cestors have been most eminent in valor, and still more so ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 9 in discipline? As to those things whicli are attained not by study, but nature, neither Greece, nor any nation, is comparable to us; for what people has displayed such gravity, such steadiness, such greatness of soul, probity, faith such distinguished virtue of every kind, as to be equal to our ancestors. In learning, indeed, and all kinds of literature, Greece did excel us, and it was easy to do so where there was no competition ; for while among the Greeks the poets were the most ancient species of learned men since Homer and Ilesiod lived before the founda- tion of Rome, and Archilochus^ was a contemporary of Romulus we received poetry much later. For it was about five hundred and ten years after the building of Rome before Livius'^ published a play in the consulship of C. Claudius, the son of Coecus, and M. Tuditanus, a year befoie the birth of Ennius, who was older than Plautus and Naevius. II. It was, therefore, late before poets were either known or received among us ; though we find in Cato de Origini- bus that the guests used, at their entertainments, to sing the praises of famous men to the sound of the flute ; but a speech of Cato's shows this kind of poetry to have been in no great esteem, as he censures Marcus Nobilior for carrying poets with him into his province; for thafcon- sul, as we know, carried Ennius with him into JEtolia. Therefore the less esteem poets were in, the less were ^ Arcliilochus was a native of Paros, and flourished about 714-G7G B.C. His poems were chiefly Iambics of bitter satire. Horace speaks of him as the inventor of Iambics, and calls himself his pupil. Parios ego pvimns lambos Ostendi Latio, mimeros auimosqne eecatns Archilochi, nou res et agentia verba Lycamben. Epist. I. xix. 25. And in another place he says, Archilochuin proprip rabies armavit lambc A. P. 74. ' This was Livius Andronicus : he is supposed to have been a native of Tarentum, and he was made prisoner by the Romans, during their Avars in Southern Italy ; owing to which he became tlie slave of M. Liviiis Salinator. He wrote both comedies and tragedies, of which Cic- ero (Brutus 18) speaks very contemptuously, as "Livianaj fabulae non satis dignte qua; iterum legantur" not worth reading a second time. He also wrote a Latin Odyssey, and some hymns, and died probably about 221 B.C. 1* 10 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. those studies pursued ; though even then those who did dispLiy the greatest abilities that way were not very in- ferior to the Greeks. Do we imagine that if it had been considered commendable in Fabius/ a man of the highest rank, to paint, we should not have had many Polycleti and Parrhasii? Honor nourishes art, and glory is tlie spur with all to studies; while those studies are always neg- lected in every nation which are looked upon disparaging- ly. The Greeks held skill in vocal and instrumental mu- sic as a very important accomplishment, and therefore it is recorded of Epaminondns, who, in my opinion, was the greatest man among the Greeks, that he played excellent- ly on the flute ; and Themistocles, some years before, was deemed ignorant because at an entertainment he declined the lyre when it was offered to iiim. For this reason mu- sicians flourished in Greece; music was a general study ; and whoever was unacquainted with it was not considered as fully instructed in learning. Geometry was in high es- teem with them, therefore none were more honorable than mathematicians. But we have confined this art to bare measuring and calculating. III. But, on the contrary, we early entertained an esteem for the orator; though he was not at first a man of learn- ing,*but only quick at speaking : in subsequent times he became learned ; for it is reported that Galba, Africanus, and Loelius were men of learning; and that even Cato, who preceded them in point of time, was a studious man: then succeeded the Lepidi, Carbo, and Gracchi, and so many great orators after them, down to our own times, that we were very little, if at all, inferior to the Greeks. Philosophy has been at a low ebb even to this present time, and has had no assistance from our own language, and so now I have undertaken to raise and illusti-ate it, in order that, as I have been of service to my countrymen, when employed on public affairs, I may, if possible, be so likewise in my retirement; and in this I must take the more pains, because there are already many books in the ' C. Fabins, surnamed Pictor, painted the temjjle of Saliis, which the dictator C.Junius Brutus Bnbulns dedicated 302 u.c. The temple was destroyed by fire in the reign of Claudius. The painting is highly praised by Dionysius, xvi. G, ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 11 Latin language which are said to be written inaccurately, having been composed by excellent men, only not of suffi- cient learning ; for, indeed, it is possible that a man may think well, and yet not be able to express his thoughts elegantly ; but for any one to publish thoughts which he can neither arrange skilfully nor illustrate so as to enter- tain his reader, is an unpardonable abuse of letters and retirement: they, therefore, read their books to one an- other, and no one ever takes them up but those who wish to have the same license for careless writing allowed to themselves. Wherefore, if oratory has acquired any rep- utation from my industry, I shall take the more pains to open the fountains of philosophy, from which all my elo- quence has taken its rise. IV. But, as Aristotle,^ a man of the greatest genius, and of the most various knowledge, being excited by the glory of the rhetorician Isocrates,'^ commenced teaching young men to speak, and joined philosophy with eloquence : so it is my design not to lay aside my former study of ora- tory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in this greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought that to be able to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important questions was the most perfect philoso- phy. And I have so diligently applied myself to this pur- suit, that I have already ventured to have a school like the Greeks. And lately wlien you left us, having many of my friends about me, I attempted at my Tusculan villa what I could do in that way ; for as I formerly used to practise declaiming, which nobody continued longer than myself, so this is now to be the declamation of my old age. I de- sired any one to propose a question which he wished to have discussed, and then I argued that point either sit- ting or walking; and so I have compiled the "scholae, as the Greeks call them, of five days, in as many books. We pro- ceeded in this manner: when he who had proposed the subject for discussion had said what he thought proper, I ^ For an account of the ancient Greek philosophers, see the sketch at the end of the Disputations. "^ Isocrates was born at Athens 43G B.C. He was a pupil of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Socrates. He opened a school of rhetoric, at Athens, with great success. He died by his own hand at the age of ninety-eight. 12 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. spoke against liim ; for this is, you know, the old and So- cratic method of arguing against another's opinion ; for Socrates thought that thus the truth would more easily be arrived at. But to give you a better notion of our dispu- tations, I will not barely send you an account of them, but represent them to you as they were carried on ; therefore let the introduction be thus : V. A. To me death seems to be an evil. 3f. What, to those who are already dead? or to those who must die? A. To both. M. It is a misery, then, because an evil ? A. Certainly. M. Then those who have already died, and those who have still got to die, are both miserable ? A. So it appears to me. M. Then all are miserable ? A. Every one. 31. And, indeed, if you wish to be consistent, all that are already born, or ever shall be, are not only miserable, but always will be so; for should you maintain those only to be miserable, you would not except any one living, for all must die; but there should be an end of misery in death. But seeing that the dead are miserable, we are born to eternal misery, for they must of consequence be miserable who died a hundred thousand years ago ; or rather, all that have ever been born. A. So, indeed, I think. If. Tell me, I beseech you, are you afraid of the three- headed Cerberus in the shades below, and the roaring waves of Cocytus, and the passage over Acheron, and Tantalus expiring with thirst, while the water touches his chin ; and Sisyphus, Who sweats with arduous toil in vain The steepy summit of the mount to gain ? Perhaps, too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus; before whom neither L. Crassus nor M. Antonius can defend you ; and where, since the cause lies before Grecian judges, you will not even be able to employ Demosthenes; but you must plead for yourself before a ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 13 very great assembly. These things perhaps you dread, and therefore look on death as an eternal evil. VI. A. Do you take me to be so imbecile as to give credit to such things? M. What, do you not believe them? A. Not in the least. M. I am sorry to hear that. A. Why, I beg? 31. Because I could have been very eloquent in speak- ino^ ag^ainst them. A. And who could not on such a subject? or what trouble is it to refute these monstrous inventions of the poets and painters ?^ M. And yet you have books of philosophers full of ar- guments against these. A. A great waste of time, truly ! for who is so Aveak as to be concerned about them ? J\f. If, then, there is no one misei'able in the infernal regions, there can be no one there at all. A. I am altogether of that opinion. M. Where, then, are those you call miserable? or what place do they inhabit? For, if they exist at all, they must be somewhere. A. 1, indeed, am of opinion that they are nowhere. M. Then they have no existence at all. A. Even so, and yet they are miserable for this very reason, that they have no existence. 31. I had rather now have you afraid of Cerberus than speak thus inaccurately. A. In what respect? 3f. Because you admit him to exist whose existence you deny with the same breath. Where now is your sagacity ? When you say any one is miserable, you say that he who does not exist, does exist. A. I am not so absurd as to say that. ' So Horace joins these two classes as inventors of all kinds of improb able fictions : Pictoribws atque poetis Quidlibet nudendi semper fait tequa potestas. A. P. 9. Which Roscommon translates : Painters and poets have been still allow'd Their pencil and their fancies luicoutiued. 14 TflE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. M. What is it that yon do say, then ? A. I say, for instance, that Marcus Crassns is miserable in being deprived of such great riches as his by death ; that Cn. Pompey is miserable in being taken from such glory and honor; and, in sliort, that all are miserable who are deprived of this light of life. M. You have returned to the same point, for to be mis- erable implies an existence; but you just now denied that the dead had any existence: if, then, they have not, they can be nothing; and if so, they are not even miserable. A. Perhaps I do not express what I mean, for I look upon this very circumstance, not to exist after having ex- isted, to be very miserable. M. What, more so than not to have existed at all? Therefore, those who are not yet born are miserable be- cause they are not ; and we ourselves, if we are to be mis- erable after death, were miserable before we were born : but I do not remember that I was miserable before I was born ; and I should be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you recollect of yourself before you were born. VIT. A. You are pleasant: as if I had said that those men are miserable who are not born, and not that they are so who are dead. M. You say, then, that they are so ? A. Yes ; I say that because they no longer exist after having existed they are miserable. 31. You do not perceive that you are asserting contra- dictions ; for what is a greater contradiction, than that that should be not only miserable, but should have any existence at all, which does not exist? When you go out at the Capene gate and see tlie tombs of the Calatini, the Scipios, Servilii, and Metelli, do you look on them as mis- erable ? A. Because you press me with a word, henceforward I will not say they are miserable absolutely, but miserable on this account, because they have no existence. 31. You do not say, then, " M. Crassns is miserable," but only " Misei-able M. Crassns." A. Exactly so. M. As if it did not follow that whatever you speak of ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. -15 in that manner either is or is not. Are you not acquaint- ed with the first principles of logic ? For this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is asserted (for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of rendering the Greek term d^iioixa ; if I can think of a more accurate expression hereaftei", I will use it), is asserted as being ei- tlier true or false. When, therefore, you say, " Miserable M. Crassus," you either say this, "M. Crassus is misera- ble," so tliat some judgment may be made whether it is true or false, or you say nothing at all. A. Well, then, I now own that the dead are not miser- able, since you have drawn from me a concession that they who do not exist at all can not be miserable. What then ? We that are alive, are we not wretched, seeing we must die? for what is there agreeable in life, w^hen we must night and day reflect that, at some time or other, we must die? VIII. 31. Do you not, then, perceive how great is the evil from which you have delivered human nature? A. By what means? M. Because, if to die were miserable to the dead, to live would be a kind of infinite and eternal misery. Now, however, I see a goal, and when I have reached it, there is nothing more to be feared ; but yon seem to me to follow the opinion of Epicharmus,^ a man of some discernment, and sliar]) enough for a Sicilian. A. What opinion ? for I do not recollect it. M. I will tell you if I can in Latin ; for you know I am no more used to bring in Latin sentences in a Greek dis- course than Greek in a Latin one. A. And that is right enough. But what is that opinion of Epicharmus ? ]\, I would not die, but yet Am not concerned that I shall be dead. A. I now recollect the Greek ; but since you have ^ Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but lived at Megara, in Sicily, and when Megara was destroyed, removed to Syracuse, and lived at tiie court of Hiero, where he became tlie first writer of comedies, so that Horace ascribes tlie invention of comedy to him, and so does Theocritus. He lived to a great age. la THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. obliged me to grant that the dead are not miserable, pro- ceed to convince me that it is not miserable to be under a necessity of dying. M. That is easy enough ; but I have greater things in hand. A. How comes that to be so easy ? And what are those things of more consequence? 31. Thus : because, if there is no evil after death, then even death itself can be none ; for that which immediately succeeds that is a state where you grant that there is no evil : so that even to be obliged to die can be no evil, for that is only the being obliged to arrive at a place where we allow that no evil is. A. I beg you will be more explicit on this point, for these subtle arguments force me sooner to admissions than to conviction. But what are those more important things about which you say that you are occupied ? M. To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a good. A. I do not insist on that, but should be glad to hear you argue it, for even though you should not prove your point, yet you will prove that death is no evil. But I will not interrupt you; I would rather hear a continued dis- course. 31. What, if I should ask you a question, would you not answer? A. That would look like pride ; but I would rather you should not ask but where necessity requires. IX. 3. I will comply with your wishes, and explain as well as I can what you require; but not with any idea that, like the Pythian Apollo, what I say must needs be certain and indisputable, but as a mere man, endeavoring to arrive at probabilities by conjecture, for I have no ground to proceed further on than probability. Those men may call their statements indisputable who assert that what they say can be perceived by the senses, and who proclaim themselves philosophers by profession. A. Do as you please : we are ready to hear you. 31. The first thing, then, is to inquire what death, which seems to be so well understood, really is; for some imag- ine death to be the departure of the soul from the body,* ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. iV otliers think that there is no sucli departure, but that soul and body perish together, and that the soul is extinguished with the body. Of those who think that the soul does de- part from the body, some believe in its immediate disso- lution ; otliers fancy that it continues to exist for a time ; and otliers believe that it lasts forever. There is great dispute even what the soul is, where it is, and whence it is derived : with some, the heart itself (cor) seems to be the soul, hence the expressions, excordes^ vecordes, Con- cordes ; and that prudent Nasica, who was twice consul, was called Corculus, ^. e., wise-heart; and ^lius Sextus is described as Egregie cordatus homo, catiis yEliu' Sextus that great wise-hearted man, sage ^lius. Empedocles imagines the blood, which is suffused over the heart, to be the soul ; to others, a certain part of the brain seems to be the throne of the soul ; others neither allow the heart itself, nor any portion of the brain, to be the soul, but think either that the heart is the seat and abode of the soul, or else that the brain is so. Some would have the soul, or spirit, to be the anima, as our schools generally agree ; and indeed the name signifies as much, for we use the expressions cmimam agere, to live ; animam, efflare, to expire ; animosi, men of spirit ; bene cmitJiati, men of right feeling ; exanimi sententia, according to our real opinion ; and the very word animus is derived from anima. Again, the soul seems to Zeno the Stoic to be fire. X. But what I have said as to the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or lire being the soul, are common opinions : the others are only entertained by individuals; and, indeed, there w^ere many among the ancients who held singular opinions on this subject, of whom the latest was Aristoxe- nus, a man who was both a musician and a philosopher. He maintained a certain straining of the body, like what is called harmony in music, to be the soul, and believed that, from the figure and nature of the whole body, various mo- tions are excited, as sounds are from an instrument. He adhered steadily to his system, and yet he said something, the nature of which, whatever it was, had been detailed and explained a great while before by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the soul had any figure, or anything like a body ; but said it was a numbei", the power of which, as 18 THE TUSCULAN DISrUTATIONS. Pythagoras had fancied, some ages before, was the great est in nature : his master, Plato, imagined a threefold soul, a dominant portion of which that is to say, reason he had lodged in the head, as in a tower ; and the other two j^arts namely, anger and desire he made subservient to this one, and allotted them distinct abodes, placing anger in the breast, and desire under the prtecordia. But Dicoearchus, in that discourse of some learned disputants, held at Cor- inth, which he details to ns in three books in the first book introduces many speakers ; and in the other two he introduces a certain Pherecrates, an old man of Phthia, who, as he said, was descended from Deucalion ; asserting, that there is in fact no such thing at all as a soul, but that it is a name without a meaning ; and that it is idle to use the expression "animals," or "animated beings;" that neither men nor beasts have minds or souls, but that all that power by which we act or perceive is equally infused into every living creature, and is inseparable from the body, for if it were not, it would be nothing; nor is there any- thing whatever really existing except body, which is a single and simple thing, so fashioned as to live and have its sensations in consequence of the regulations of nature. Aristotle, a man superior to all others, both in genius and industry (I always except Plato), after having embraced these four known sorts of principles, from which all things deduce their origin, imagines that there is a certain fifth nature, from whence comes the soul ; for to think, to fore- see, to learn, to teach, to invent anything, and many other attributes of the same kind, such as to remember, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be pleased or displeased these, and others like them, exist, he thinks, in none of those first four kinds: on such account he adds a fifth kind, which has no name, and so by a new name he calls the soul h'hXexsia, as if it were a certain continued and perpetual motion. XL If I have not forgotten anything unintentionally, these are the principal opinions concerning the soul. I have omitted Democritus, a very great man indeed, but one who deduces the soul from the fortuitous concourse of small, light, and round substances ; for, if you believe men of his school, tliere is nothing which a crowd of atoms ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 23 cients for instances, so might I myself. But, somehow or other, there clings to our minds a certain presage of future ages ; and this both exists most firmly, and appears most clearly, in men of the loftiest genius and greatest souls. Take away this, and who would be so mad as to spend his life amidst toils and dangers ? I speak of those in power. What are the poet's views but to be ennobled after death ? What else is the object of these lines. Behold old Ennius here, who erst Thy fothers' great exploits rehearsed ? He is challenging the reward of glory from those men whose ancestors he himself had ennobled by his poetry. And in the same spirit he says, in another passage, Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I Claim from my works an immortality. Why do I mention poets? The very mechanics are de- sirous of fame after death. Why did Phidias include a likeness of himself in the shield of Minerva, when he was not allowed to inscribe his name on it? What do our philosophers think on the subject? Do not they put their names to those very books which they write on the con- tempt of glory ? If, then, universal consent is the voice of nature, and if it is the general opinion everywhere that those who have quitted this life are still interested in something, we also must subscribe to that opinion. And if we think that men of the greatest abilities and virtues see most clearly into the power of nature, because they themselves are her most perfect work, it is very probable that, as every great man is especially anxious to benefit posterity, there is something of which he himself will be sensible after death. XVI. But as we are led by nature to think there are Gods, and as we discover, by reason, of what description they are, so, by the consent of all nations, we are induced to believe that our souls survive; but where their habita- tion is, and of what character they eventually are, must be learned from reason. The want of any certain reason on which to argue has given rise to the idea of the shades below, and to those fears which you seem, not without 24 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. reason, to despise ; for as our bodies fall to the ground, and are covered with earth {humus), from whence we de- rive the expression to be interred {humari), that has oc- casioned men to imagine that the dead continue, during the remainder of their existence, under ground; which opinion has drawn after it many errors, which the poets have increased; for the theatre, being frequented by a large crowd, among which are women and children, is wont to be greatly affected on hearing such pompous verses as these, Lo ! here I am, who scarce could gain this place, Through stony mountains and a dreary waste ; Through cliffs, whose sharpen'd stones tremendous hung, Where dreadful darkness spread itself around. And the error prevailed so much, though indeed at pres- ent it seems to me to be removed, that although men knew that the bodies of the dead had been burned, yet they conceived such things to be done in the infernal re- gions as could not be executed or imagined without a body ; for they could not conceive how disembodied souls could exist; and, therefore, they looked out for some shape or figure. This was the origin of all that account of the dead in Homer. This was the idea that caused my friend Appius to frame his Necromancy; and this is how there got about that idea of the lake of Avernus, in my neighbor- hood, From whence the souls of undistinguish'd shape, Clad in thick shade, rush from the open gate Of Acheron, vain phantoms of the dead. And they must needs have these appearances speak, which is not possible without a tongue, and a palate, and jaws, and without the help of lungs and sides, and without some shape or figure ; for they could see nothing by their mind alone they referred all to their eyes. To witlidraw the mind from sensual objects, and abstract our thoughts from what we are accustomed to, is an attribute of great gen- ius. I am persuaded, indeed, that there were many such men in former ages; but Pherecydes' the Syrian is the ' rherecydes was a native of Scyros, one of the Cyclades ; and is said to have obtained his knowledge from the secret books of tiie Phoe- ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 25 first oil record who said that the souls of men were iiii- iiiortal, and he was a philosopher of great antiquity, in the reign of my namesake TuUius. His disciple Pythagoras greatly confirmed this opinion, who came into Italy in the reign of Tarquin the Proud ; and all that country which is called Great Greece was occupied by his school, and lie himself was held in high honor, and had the greatest au- thority ; and the Pythagorean sect was for many ages af- ter in such great credit, that all learning was believed to be confined to that name. XVII. But I return to the ancients. They scarcely ever gave any reason for their opinion but wiiat could be explained by numbers or definitions. It is reported of Plato that he came into Italy to make himself acquaint- ed with the Pythagoreans ; and that when there, among others, he made an acquaintance with Archytas^ and Ti- ma3us,^ and learned from them all the tenets of the Py- thagoreans; and that he not only was of the same opinion with Pythagoras concerning the immortality of the soul, but that he also brought reasons in support of it; which, if you have nothing to say against it, I will pass over, and say no more at present about all this hope of immortality. A. What, will you leave me when you have raised my expectations so high ? I had rather, so help me Hercules ! be mistaken with Plato, whom I know how much you es- teem, and whom I admire myself, from what you say of him, than be in the right with those others. nicians. He is said also to liave been a pupil of Pittacns, the rival of Thales, and the master of Pythagoras, His doctrine was that there were three principles (Ztvg, or iEUier ; XOwi', or Chaos; and Xpovog, or Time) and four elements (Eire, Earth, Air, and Water), from which everything that exists was formed. Vide Smith's Diet. Gr. and Rom. Eiog. ^ Archytas was a native of Tarentum, and is said to liave saved the life of Plato by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius, He Avac especially great as a mathematician and geometrician, so that Horace calls him Maris et terras numeroque careutis arense Meusorem. Od. i. 2S. 1. Plato is supposed to have learned some of his views from him, and Aristotle to have borrowed from him every idea of the Categories. ^ This was not Timaius the historian, but a native of Locri, who is said also in the De Einibus (c. 29) to have been a teacher of Plato. There is a treatise extant bearing his name, which is, however, proba- bly spurious, and only an abridgment of Plato's dialogue Tiraajus. 2 26 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. 31. I commend you ; for, indeed,! could myself willing. ly be mistaken in his company. Do we, then, doubt, as we do in other cases (though I think here is very little room for doubt in this case, for the mathematicians prove the facts to us), that the earth is placed in the midst of the world, being, as it were, a sort of point, which they call a KEvrpov, surrounded by the whole heavens ; and that such is the nature of the four principles which are the generating causes of all things, that they have equally di- vided among them the constituents of all bodies; more- over, that earthy and humid bodies are carried at equal angles by their own weight and ponderosity into tlie earth and sea; that the other two parts consist, one of fire, and the other of air? As the two former are carried by their gravity and weigiit into the middle region of the world, so these, on the other hand, ascend by right lines into the celestial regions, either because, owing to their intrinsic natui'e, they are always endeavoring to reach the highest place, or else because lighter bodies are naturally repelled by heavier; and as this is notoriously the case, it must evidently follow that souls, when once they have departed from the body, whether they are animal (by which term I mean capable of breathing) or of the nature of fire, must mount upward. But if the soul is some number, as some people assert, speaking with more sub- tlety than clearness, or if it is that fifth nature, for which it would be more correct to say that we have not given a name to than that we do not correctly understand it still it is too pure and perfect not to go to a great distance from the earth. Something of this sort, then, Ave must believe the soul to be, that we may not commit the folly of think- ing that so active a principle lies immerged in the heart or brain ; or, as Empedocles would have it, in the blood. XVIII. We will pass over Dicaarchus,^ with his con- temporary and fellow-disciple Aristoxenus,^ both indeed ' Dicaearchus was a native of Messana, in Sicily, thongli he lived chief- ly in Greece. He was one of the later disciples of Aristotle. He was a great geographer, politician, historian, and philosopher, and died about L'.Sr, i5.<-. ^ Aristoxenns was a native of Tarentnm, and also a pu])il of Aristo- tle. We know nothing of his opinions except that he held the soul to ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 27 men of learning. One of them seems never even to have been affected with grief, as he could not perceive that he had a soul ; while the other is so pleased with his musical compositions that he endeavors to show an analogy be- twixt them and souls. Now, we may understand har- mony to arise from the intervals of sounds, whose various compositions occasion many harmonies ; but I do not see how a disposition of members, and the figure of a body Avithout a soul, can occasion harmony. He had better, learned as he is, leave these speculations to his master Aristotle, and follow his own trade as a musician. Good advice is given him in that Greek proverb, Apply your talents where you best are skill'd. I will have nothing at all to do Avith that fortuitous con- course of individual light and round bodies, notwithstand- ino- Democritus insists on their beins: warm and havingj breath, that is to say, life. But this soul, which is com- pounded of either of the four principles from which we assert that all things are derived, is of inflamed air, as seems particularly to have been the opinion of Pansetius, and must necessarily mount upw^ard ; for air and fire have no tendency downward, but always ascend; so should they be dissipatecL that must be at some distance from the earth ; but should they remain, and preserve their original state, it is clearer still that tliey must be carried heavenward, and this gross and concrete air, which is nearest the earth, must be divided and broken by them ; for the soul is warmer, or rather hotter, than that air, which I just now called gross and concrete: and this may be made evident from this consideration that our bodies, be- ing compounded of the earthy class of principles, grow^ warm by the heat of the soul. XIX. We may add, that the soul can the more easily escape from this air, which I have often named, and break be a harmony of the body ; a doctrine which had been already discussed by Plato in the Phrcdo, and combated by Aristotle. He was a great musician, and the chief portions of his works which have come down to us are fragments of some musical treatises. Smith's Diet. Gr. and Kom. Biog. ; to which source I must acknowledge my obligation for nearly the wiiole of these biographical notes. 28 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. through it, because nothing is swifter than tlie soul; no swiftness is comparable to the swiftness of the soul, which, should it remain uncorrupt and without alteration, must necessarily be carried on with such velocity as to penetrate and divide all tliis atmosphere, where clouds, and rain, and winds are formed, which, in consequence of the exhalations from the earth, is moist and dark : but, when the soul has once got above this region, and falls in with, and recognizes, a nature like its own, it then rests upon fires composed of a combination of thin air and a moderate solar heat, and does not aim at any higher flight; for then, after it has attained a lightness and heat resembling its own, it moves no more, but remains steady, being balanced, as it were, between two equal weights. That, then, is its natural scat where it has penetrated to something like itself, and where, wanting nothing furthei', it may be supported and maintained by the same aliment M'hich nourishes and maintains the stars. Now, as we are usually incited to all sorts of desires by the stimulus of the body, and the more so as we endeavor to rival those who are in possession of what we long for, we shall certainly be happy when, being emancipated from that body, we at the same time get rid of these desires and this rivalry. And that which we do at present, when, dismissing all other cares, we curiously examine and look into anything, we shall then do with greater free- dom ; and we shall employ ourselves entirely in the con- templation and examination of things ; because there is naturally in our minds a certain insatiable desire to know the truth, and the very region itself where we shall arrive, as it gives us a more intuitive and easy knowledge of ce- lestial things, will raise our desires after knowledge. For it was this beauty of the heavens, as seen even here upon earth, which gave birth to that national and hereditary philosophy (as Theophrastus calls it), which was thus ex- cited to a desire of knowledge. But those persons will in a most especial degree enjoy this philosophy, who, while they w^ere only inhabitants of this woiid and enveloped in darkness, were still desirous of looking into these things with the eye of their mind. XX. For if those men now think that they have attain- ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 29 ed something who have seen the mouth of the Pontus, and those straits which were passed by the ship called Argo, because, From Argos she did chosen men convey, Bound to fetch back the Golden Fleece, their prey ; or those wlio have seen the straits of the ocean, Where the swift waves divide the neighboring shores Of Europe, and of Afric ; what kind of sight do you imagine that will be when the wdiole earth is laid open to our view? and that, too, not only in its position, form, and boundaries, nor those parts of it only which are habitable, but those also that lie un- cultivated, through the extremities of heat and cold to which they are exposed ; for not even now is it with our eyes that we view what we see, for the body itself has no senses ; but (as the naturalists, ay, and even the physicians assure us, who have opened our bodies, and examined them) there are certain perforated channels from the seat of the soul to the eyes, ears, and nose ; so that frequently, when either prevented by meditation, or the force of some bodily disorder, Ave neither hear nor see, though our eyes and ears are open and in good condition ; so that we may easily apprehend that it is the soul itself which sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as it were, but win- dows to the soul, by means of which, however, she can perceive nothing, unless she is on the spot, and exerts her- self. How shaU we account for tlie fact that by the same power of thinking we comprehend the most different things as color, taste, heat, smell, and sound which the soul could never know by her five messengers, unless every thing were referred to her, and she were the sole judge of all? And we shall certainly discover these things in a more clear and perfect degree when the soul is disengaged from the body, and has arrived at that goal to which nnt- nre leads her; for at present, notwithstanding nature has contrived, with the greatest skill, those channels which lead from the body to the soul, yet are they, in some way or other, stopped up with earthy and concrete bodies ; but wlien we sliall be nothing but soul, then nothing will inter- 30 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. fere to prevent our seeing everything in its real substance and in its true cliaracter. XXI. It is true, I might expatiate, did tlie subject re- quire it, on the many and vaiious objects witli whicli th.e soul will be entertained in those heavenly regions; wlien I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at the boldness of some philosophers, who are so struck with admiration at the knowledge of nature as to thank, in an exulting man- ner, the first inventor and teacher of natural philosophy, and to reverence him as a God ; for they declare that they have been delivered by his means from the greatest tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that molested them by night and day. What is this dread this fear? What old woman is there so weak as to fear these things, which you, forsooth, had you not been acquainted with natural philos- oi)hj, w^ould stand in aw^e of? The liallow'd roofs of Acheron, the dread Of Orcus, the pale regions of the dead. And does it become a philosopher to boast that he is not afraid of these things, and that he has discovered them to be false ? And from this we may perceive how acute these men were by nature, who, if they had been left without any instruction, would have believed in these things. But now they have certainly made a very fine acquisition in learning that when the day of their death arrives, they will perish entirely. And, if that really is the case for I say nothing either way what is there agreeable or glori- ous in it? Not that I see any reason why the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato may not be true ; but even although Plato were to have assigned no reason for his opinion (ob- serve how^ much I esteem the man), the weight of his au- thority would have borne me down; but he has brought so many reasons, that he appears to me to have endeav- ored to convince others, and certainly to have convinced himself. XXII. But there are many who labor on the other side of the question, and condemn souls to death, as if they were criminals capitally convicted ; nor have they any other reason to allege why the immortality of the soul ap- pears to them to be incredible, except that they are not ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 31 able to conceivG what sort of thing the soul can be when disentangled from the body; just as if they could really form a correct idea as to what sort of thing it is, even when it is in the body; what its form, and size, and abode are; so that were they able to have a full view of all that is now hidden from them in a living body, they have no idea whether the soul would be discernible by them, or whether it is of so fine a texture that it would escape their sight. Let those consider this, who say that they are unable to form any idea of the soul without the body, and then they will see whether they can form any adequate idea of what it is when it is in the body. For my own part, when I reflect on the nature of the soul, it appears to me a far more perplexing and obscure question to determine what is its character while it is in the body a place which, as it were, does not belong to it than to imagine what it is when it leaves it, and has arrived at the free aather, which is, if I may so say, its proper, its own habitation. For unless we are to say that we cannot apprehend the character or nature of anything which we have never seen, we certainly may be able to form some notion of God, and of the divine soul when released from the body. Dicaearchus, indeed, and Aristoxenus, because it was hard to understand the existence and substance and nature of the soul, asserted that there was no such thing as a soul at all. It is, indeed, the most difficult thing imaginable to discern the soul by the soul. And this, doubtless, is the meaning of the precept of Apollo, which advises every one to know himself. For I do not apprehend the meaning of the God to have been that we should understand our members, our stature, and form ; for we are not merely bodies ; nor, when I say these things t) you, am I addressing myself to your body : when, there- fore, he says, "Know yourself," he says this, "Inform yourself of the nature of your soul ;" for the body is but a kind of vessel, or receptacle of the soul, and whatever your soul does is your own act. To know the soul, then, unless it had been divine, would not have been a precept of such excellent wisdom as to be attributed to a God ; but even though the soul should not know of what nature it- self is, will you say that it does not even perceive that it 32 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. exists at all, or that it bas motion ? On which is founded that reason of Plato's, which is explained by Socrates in the Pha3drus, and inserted by me, in my sixth book of the Republic. XXIII. " That which is always moved is eternal ; but that which gives motion to something else, and is moved itfself by some external cause, when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That, therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never foi'saken by itself, can never cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and principle of motion to everything else ; but whatever is a principle has no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a principle did it proceed from anything else. But if it has no beginning, it never will have any end; for a principle which is once extin- guished cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it produce anything else from itself; inasmuch as all things must necessarily arise from some first cause. And thus it comes about that the first principle of motion must arise from that thing which is itself moved by itself; and that can neither have a beginning nor an end of its existence, for otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be overset, and all nature would stand still, and not be able to acquire any force by the impulse of which it might be first set in motion. Seeing, then, that it is clear that whatever moves itself is eternal, can there be any doubt that the soul is so? For everything is inanimate which is moved by an external force ; but everything which is animate is moved by an interior force, which also belongs to itself. For this is the peculiar nature and power of the soul ; and if the soul be the only thing in the whole world wliich has the power of self-motion, then certainly it never had a beginning, and therefore it is eternal." Now, should all the lower order of philosophers (for so I think they may be called who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school) unite their force, they never would be able to explain anything so elegantly as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this conclusion is drawn. The soul, then, perceives itself to have motion, ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 33 and, at the same time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that it derives that motion from its own power, and not from tlie agency of another; and it is impossible that it should ever forsake itself. And these premises compel you to allow its eternity, unless you have some- thing to say against them. A. I should myself be very well pleased not to have even a thought arise in my mind against them, so much am I inclined to that opinion. XXIV. 31. Well, then, I appeal to you, if the arguments which prove that there is something divine in the souls of men are not equally strong? But if I could account for the origin of these divine properties, then I might also be able to explain how they might cease to exist; for I think I can account for the manner in which the blood, and bile, and phlegm, and bones, and nerves, and veins, and all the limbs, and the shape of the whole body, were put together and made; ay, and even as to the soul itself, were there nothing more in it than a principle of life, then the life of a man might be put upon the same footing as that of a vine or any other tree, and accounted for as caused by nature; for these things, as we say, live. Besides, if desires and aversions were all that belonged to the soul, it would have them only in common with the beasts ; but it has, in the first place, memory, and that, too, so infinite as to recollect an absolute countless number of circum- stances, which Plato will have to be a recollection of a former life; for in that book which is inscribed Menon, Socrates asks a child some questions in geometry, with reference to measuring a square ; his answers are such as a child would make, and yet the questions are so easy, that while answering them, one by one, he comes to the same point as if he had learned geometry. From whence Socrates would infer that learning is nothing more than recollection ; and this topic he explains more accurately in the discourse ^s'hich he held the very day he died ; for he there asserts that any one, who seeming to be entirely illiterate, is yet able to answer a question well that is pro- posed to him, does in so doing manifestly show that he is not learning it tlien, but recollecting it by his memory. Nor is it to be accounted for in any other way, how chil- 34 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. dren come to have notions of so many and such important things as are implanted, and, as it were, sealed up, in their minds (which the Greeks call h'voiai), unless the soul, be- fore it entered the body, had been well stored with knowl- edge. And as it had no existence at all (for this is the invariable doctrine of Plato, who will not admit anything to have a real existence which has a beginning and an end, and who thinks that that alone does really exist which is of such a character as what he calls eidea, and we species), therefore, being shut up in the body, it could not while in the body discover what it knows; but it knew it before, and brought the knowledge with it, so that we are no longer surprised at its extensive and multifarious knowl- edge. Nor does the soul clearly discover its ideas at its iirst resort to this abode to which it is so unaccustomed, and which is in so disturbed a state ; but after having re- freshed and recollected itself, it then by its memory re- covers them ; and, therefore, to learn implies nothing more than to recollect. But I am in a particular manner sur- prised at memory. For what is that faculty by which we remember ? what is its force ? what its nature ? I am not inquiring how great a memory Simonides^ may be said to have had, or Theodectes,'' or that Cineas^ who w\as sent to Rome as ambassador from Pyrrhus ; or, in more modern times, Charraadas;" or, very lately, Metrodorus^ ^ The Simonides here meant is the celebrated poet of Ceos, the per- fecter of elegiac poetry among the Greeks. He flourished about the time of the Persian war. Besides his poetry, he is said to have been the inventor of some method of aiding the memory. He died at the court of Hiero, 467 B.C. ^ Theodectes was a native of Phaselis, in Pamphylia, a distinguished rhetorician and tragic poet, and flourished in the time of Philip of Mac- edon. He was a pupil of Isocrates, and lived at Athens, and died there at the age of forty-one. ^ Cineas was a Thessalian, and (as is said in the text) came to Rome as ambassador from Pyrrhus after the battle of Heraclea, 280 u.c, and his memory is said to have been so great that on the day after his an-i- val he was able to address all the senators and knights by name. He probably died before Pyrrhus returned to Italy, 27G b.c. * Charmadas, called also Charmides, was a fellow-pupil with Philo, the Larissncan of Clitomachus, the Carthaginian. He is said by some authors to have founded a fourth academy. ^ Metrodorus was a minister of Mithridates the Great ; and employed by him as supreme judge in Pontus, and afterward as an ambassador. ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 35 the Scepsian, or our own contemporary Ilortensius :^ I am speaking of ordinary memory, and especially of those men who are employed in any important study or art, the great capacity of whose minds it is hard to estimate, such num- bers of things do they remember. XXV. Should you ask what tliis leads to, I think we may understand what that power is, and whence we have it. It certainly proceeds neither from the heart, nor from the blood, nor from the brain, nor from atoms; whether it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, as those men are, ashamed, in cases where I am ignorant, to own that I am so. If in any other obscure matter I were able to assert anything positively, then I would swear that the soul, be it air or fire, is divine. Just think, I beseech you : can you imagine this wonderful power of memory to be sown in or to be a part of the composition of the earth, or of this dark and gloomy atmosphere? Though you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you see what kind of thing it is, or if you do not quite see that, yet you certainly see how great it is. What, then? Shall we imagine that there is a kind of measure in the soul, into which, as into a vessel, all that we remember is poured? That indeed is absurd; for how shall we form any idea of the bottom, or of the shape or fashion of such a soul as that? And, again, how are we to conceive how much it is able to contain? Shall we imagine the soul to receive impressions like wax, and memory to be marks of the impressions made on the soul? What are the characters of tlie words, what of the facts themselves? and what, again, is that prodigious greatness which can give rise to impressions of so many things? What, lastly, is that power which investigates secret things, and is called invention and contrivance? Does that man seem to be compounded of this earthly, mortal, and perishing nature who first invented names for every- Cicero speaks of him in other places (De Orat. ii, 88) as a man of won- derful memorv, ^ Quintus Hortensius was eight years older than Cicero ; and, till Cicero's fame surpassed his, he w-as accounted the most eloquent of all the Romans, lie was Verres's counsel in the prosecution conducted against him by Cicero. Seneca relates that his memory was so great that he could come out of an auction and repeat the catalogue backward. He died 50 b.c. 36 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. tiling, which, if you will believe Pythagorus, is the highest pitch of wisdom ? or he who collected the dispersed in- habitants of the world, and united them in the bonds of social life ? or he who confined the sounds of the voice, which used to seem infinite, to the marks of a few letters? or he who first observed the courses of the planets, their progressive motions, their laws? These were all great men. But they were greater still who invented food, and raiment, and houses; who introduced civilization among us, and armed us against the wild beasts; by whom we were made sociable and polished, and so proceeded from the necessaries of life to its embellishments. For we have provided great entertainments for the cars by inventing and modulating the variety and nature of sounds; we have learned to survey the stars, not only those that are fixed, but also those which are improperly called wander- ing; and the man who has acquainted himself with all their revolutions and motions is fairly considered to have a soul resembling the soul of that Being who has created those stars in the heavens: for w^hen Archimedes de- scribed in a sphere the motions of the moon, sun, and five planets, he did the very same thing as Platd's God, in his Timaeus, who made the world, causing one revolution to adjust motions differing as much as possible in their slowness and velocity. Now, allowing that what we see in the world could not be effected without a God, Archi- medes could not have imitated the same motions in his sphere without a divine soul. XXVI. To me, indeed, it appears that even those studies which are more common and in greater esteem are not without some divine energy: so that I do not consider that a poet can produce a serious and sublime poem with- out some divine impulse working on his mind ; nor do I think that eloquence, abounding with sonorous words and fruitful sentences, can flow thus without something be- yond mere human power. But as to philosophy, that is the parent of all the arts: what can we call that but, as Plato says, a gift, or, as I express it, an invention, of the Gods? This it was which first taught us the worship of the Gods ; and then led us on to justice, which arises from the human race being formed into society; and after that ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 37 it imbued us with modesty and elevation of soul. This it was which dispersed darkness from our souls, as it is dispelled from our eyes, enabling us to see all things that are above or below, the beginning, end, and middle of ev- erything. I am convinced entirely that that which could effect so many and such great things must be a divine powx'r. For what is memory of words and circumstances? What, too, is invention? Surely they are things than which nothing greater can be conceived in a God ! For I do not imagine the Gods to be delighted with nectar and ambrosia, or with Juventas presenting them with a cup ; nor do I put any faith in Homer, who says that Ganymede was carried away by the Gods on account of his beauty, in order to give Jupiter his wine. Too weak reasons for doing Laomedon such injury! These were mere inven- tions of Homer, who gave his Gods the imperfections of men. I would rather that he had given men the perfec- tions of the Gods ! those perfections, I mean, of uninter- rupted health, wisdom, invention, memory. Therefore the soul (which is, as I say, divine) is, as Euripides more bold- ly expresses it, a God. And thus, if the divinity be air or fire, the soul of man is the same ; for as that celestial nat- ure has nothing earthly or humid about it, in like manner the soul of man is also free from both these qualities : but if it is of that fifth kind of nature, first introduced by Ar- istotle, then both Gods and souls are of the same. XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in these very words, in my book on Consolation.^ The ori- gin of the soul of man is not to be found upon earth, for there is nothing in the soul of a mixed or concrete nature, or that has any appearance of being formed or made out of the earth ; nothing even humid, or airy, or fiery. For what is there in natures of that kind which has the power of memory, understanding, or thought? which can recol- lect the past, foresee the future, and comprehend the pres- ent? for these capabilities are confined to divine beings; nor can we discover any source from which men could de- rive them, but from God. There is therefore a peculiar ' This treatise is one which h:is not come down to ns, but which had been lately composed by Cicero in order to comfort himself for the loss of his daughter. 38 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. nature and power in the soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar to us. Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can God himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be any- thing ijlse except a soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion, acquainted with everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself endued with perpetual motion. XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man. Where, then, is this intellect seated, and of what character is it? where is your own, and what is its character? Are you able to tell? If I have not faculties for knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not even allow me to make use of those whicli I have ? The soul has not suffi- cient capacity to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye, tliough it has no distinct view of itself, sees other things : it does not see (which is of least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not, though it possibly may; but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees that it has vigor, sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are all great, divine, eternal properties. What its appearance is, or where it dwells, it is not necessary even to inquire. As when we behold, first of all, the beauty and brilliant ap- pearance of the heavens ; secondly, the vast velocity of its revolutions, beyond power of our imagination to conceive; then the vicissitudes of nights and days, the fourfold divis- ion of the seasons, so well adapted to the ripening of the fruits of the earth, and the temperatui-e of our bodies: and after that we look up to the sun, the moderator and governor of all these things ; and view the moon, by the increase and decrease of its light, marking, as it were, and appointing our holy days ; and see the five planets, borne on in the same circle, divided into twelve ])arts, preserving the same course with the greatest regularity, but with ut- terly dissimilar motions among themselves ; and the night- ly appearance of the heaven, adorned on all sides with stars ; then, the globe of the earth, raised above the sea, and placed in the centre of the universe, inhabited and cul- tivated in its two opposite extremities, one of which, the ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 39 place of our habitation, is situated towards the north pole, under the seven stars : Where the cold northern blasts, with horrid sound, Hiirden to ice the snowy cover'd ground ; the other, towards the south pole, is unknown to us, but is called by the Greeks avTix&ova: the other parts are uncul- tivated, because they are either frozen with cold, or burned up with heat; but where we dwell, it never fails, in its sea- son, To yield a placid sky, to bid the trees Assume the lively verdure of their leaves: The vine to bud, and, joyful in its shoots, Foretell the approaching vintage of its fruits : The ripen'd corn to sing, while all around Full riv'lets glide ; and flowers deck the ground : then the multitude of cattle, fit part for food, part for till- ing the ground, others for carrying us, or for clothing us; and man himself, made, as it were, on purpose to contem- plate the heavens and the Gods, and to pay adoration to them: lastly, the whole earth, and wide extending seas, given to man's use. When we view these and numberless other things, can we doubt that they have some being who presides over them, or has made them (if, indeed, they have been made, as is the opinion of Plato, or if, as Aris- totle thinks, they are eternal), or who at all events is the regulator of so immense a fabric and so great a blessing to men ? Thus, though you see not the soul of man, as you see not the Deity, yet, as by the contemplation of his works you are led to acknowledge a God, so you must own the divine power of the soul, from its remembering things, from its invention, from the quickness of its motion, and from all the beauty of virtue. Where, then, is it seated, you will say? XXIX. In my o])inion, it is seated in the head, and I can bring you reasons for my adopting that opinion. At pres- ent, let the soul reside where it will, you certainly have one in you. Should you ask what its nature is ? It has one peculiarly its own ; but admitting it to consist of fire, or air, it does not affect the present question. Only ob- serve this, that as you are convinced there is a God, though 40 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. you are ignorant where he resides, and what shape he is of; in like manner you ought to feel assured that you have a soul, though you cannot satisfy yourself of the place of its residence, nor its form. In our knowledge of the soul, unless we are grossly ignorant of natural philosophy, we cannot but be satisfied that it has nothing but what is simple, unmixed, uncompounded, and single ; and if this is admitted, then it cannot be separated, nor divided, nor dis- persed, nor parted, and therefore it cannot perish ; for to perish implies a parting-asunder, a division, a disunion, of those parts which, while it subsisted, were held together by some band. And it was because he was influenced by these and similar reasons that Socrates neither looked out for anybody to ])lead for him when he was accused, nor begged any favor from his judges, but maintained a man- ly freedom, which was the effect not of pride, but of the true greatness of his soul; and on the last day of his life he held a long discourse on this subject; and a few days before, when he might have been easily freed from his con- finement, he refused to be so; and when he had almost actually hold of that deadly cup, he spoke with the air of a man not forced to die, but ascending into heaven. XXX. For so indeed he thought himself, and thus he spoke: "That there were two ways, and that the souls of men, at their departure from the body, took different roads; for those which were polluted with vices that are common to men, and which had given themselves up en- tirely to unclean desires, and had become so blinded by them as to have habituated themselves to all manner of debauchery and profligacy, or to have laid detestable schemes for the ruin of their country, took a road wide of that which led to the assembly of the Gods ; but they who had preserved themselves upright and chaste, and free from the slightest contagion of the body, and had always kept themselves as far as possible at a distance from it, and while on earth had proposed to themselves as a model the life of the Gods, found the return to those beings from whom they had come an easy one." Therefore, he argues, that all good and wise men should take example from the swans, who are considered sacred to Apollo, not without reason, but particularly because they seem to have received ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 41 the gift of divination from him, by which, foreseeing how happy it is to die, they leave this world with singing and joy. Nor can any one doubt of this, unless it happens to us who think with care and anxiety about the soul (as is often the case with those who look earnestly at the setting sun), to lose the sight of it entirely ; and so the mind's eye, viewing itself, sometimes grows dull, and for that reason w^e become remiss in our contemplation. Thus our reason- ing is borne about, harassed with doubts and anxieties, not knowing how to proceed, but measui-ing back again those dangerous tracts which it has passed, like a boat tossed about on the boundless ocean. But these reflections are of long standing, and borrowed from the Greeks. But Cato left this world in such a manner as if he were de- lighted that he had found an opportunity of dying; for that God Avho presides in us forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when God himself has given us a just cause, as formerly he did to Socrates, and lately to Cato, and often to many others in such a case, certainly every man of sense would gladly exchange this darkness for that light : not that he would forcibly break from the chains that held him, for that would be against the law ; but, like a man released from prison by a magistrate or some lawful authority, so he too would walk away, being released and discharged by God. For the whole life of a philosopher is, as the same philosopher says, a meditation on death. XXXI. For what else is it that we do, when we call off our minds from pleasure, that is to say, from our attention to the body, from the managing our domestic estate, which is a sort of handmaid and servant of the body, or from du- ties of a public nature, or from all other serious business w^hatever ? What else is it, I say, that w^e do, but invite the soul to reflect on itself? oblige it to converse with it- self, and, as far as possible, break off its acquaintance with the body ? Now, to separate the soul from the body, is to learn to die, and nothing else whatever. Wherefore take my advice ; and let us meditate on this, and separate our- selves as far as possible from the body, that is to say, let ns accustom ourselves to die. Tliis will be enjoying a life like that of heaven even while we remain on earth ; and 42 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. when wc are can-ied thither and released from these bonds, our souls will make their progress with more rapidity; for the spirit which has always been fettered by the bonds of the body, even when it is disengaged, advances more slow- ly, just as those do who have worn actual fetters for many years : but when we have arrived at this emancipation from the bonds of the body, then indeed we shall begin to live, for this present life is really death, which I could say a good deal in lamentation for if I chose. A. You have lamented it sufficiently in yonr book on Consolation ; and when I read that, there is nothing which I desire more than to leave these tilings; but that desire is increased a great deal by what I have just heard. 31. The time will come, and that soon, and with equal certainty, whether you hang back or press forward ; for time flies. But death is so far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I am inclined to suspect, not that there is no other thing which is an evil to man, but rather that there is nothing else which is a real good to him ; if, at least, it is true that w^e become thereby either Gods ourselves, or companions of the Gods. However, this is not of so much consequence, as there are some of ns here who will not allow this. But I w^ill not leave off discussing this point till I have convinced you that death can, npon no consideration whatever, be an evil. A. How can it, after what I now know ? M. Do you ask how it can? There are crowds of ar- guers who contradict this ; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but, somehow or other, almost every man of letters ; and, above all, my favorite Dica3nr- chus is very strenuons in opposing the immortality of the soul : for he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs, because the discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove that souls are mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long a time for enjoyment as the life of a raven ; they allow the soul to exist a great while, but are against its eternity. XXXII. Are you willing to hear then why, even allow- ing this, death cannot be an evil. A. As you please; but no one shall drive me from my belief in mortality. ON THE CONTEMPT OE DEATH. 43 M. I commend you, indeocl, for that ; though we should not be too confident in our belief of anything; for we are frequently disturbed by some subtle conclusion. We give way and change our opinions even in things that are more evident than this; for in this there certainly is some ob- scurity. Therefore, should anything of this kind happen, it is well to be on our guard. A. You are right in that; but I will provide against any accident. M. Have you any objection to our dismissing our friends the Stoics those, I mean, who allow that the souls exist after they have left the body, but yet deny that they exist forever ? A. We certainly may dismiss the consideration of those men who admit that which is the most difticult point in the whole question, namely, that a soul can exist inde- pendently of the body, and yet refuse to grant that which is not only very easy to believe, but which is even the natural consequence of the concession which they have made that if they can exist for a length of time, they most likely do so forever. M. You take it right; that is the very thing. Shall we give, therefore, any credit to Panjetius, when he dissents from his master, Plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men, the Homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this single opinion of the soul's immortality : for he maintains what nobody denies, that everything which has been generated will per- ish, and that even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their resemblance to those of the men who begot them ; for that likeness is as apparent in the turn of their minds as in their bodies. But he brings another reason that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which is not also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must be liable to death. The soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is liable to perish. XXXHI. These arguments may be refuted ; for they proceed from his not knowing that, while discussing the subject of the immortality of the soul, he is speaking of the intellect, which is free from all turbid motion ; but not of those parts of the mind in which those disorders, 44 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. anger and lust, have their seat, and which he whom he is opposing, when he argues thus, imagines to be distinct and separate from the mind. Now this resemblance is more remarkable in beasts, whose souls are void of reason. But the likeness in men consists more in the configuration of the bodies: and it is of no little consequence in what bodies the soul is lodged ; for there are many things which depend on the body that give an edge to the soul, many which blunt it. Aristotle, indeed, says that all men of great genius are melancholy; so that I should not have been displeased to have been somewhat duller than I am. He instances many, and, as if it were matter of fact, brings his reasons for it. But if the power of those things that proceed from the body be so great as to influence the mind (for they are the tilings, whatever they are, that oc- casion this likeness), still that does not necessarily prove why a similitude of souls should be generated. I say nothing about cases of nnlikeness. I wish Panaetius could be here: he lived with Africanus. I would inquire of him which of his family the nephew of Af ricanus's brother was like? Possibly he may in person have resembled his father ; but in his manners he was so like every profligate, abandoned man, that it was impossible to be more so. Whom did the grandson of P. Crassus, that wise and elo- quent and most distinguished man, resemble? Or the re- lations and sons of many other excellent men, whose names there is no occasion to mention ? But what are we doing ? Have we forgotten that our purpose was, when we had sufficiently spoken on the subject of the immortality of the soul, to prove that, even if the soul did perish, there would be, even then, no evil in death ? A. I remembered it very well; but I had no dislike to your digressing a little from your original design, while you were talking of the soul's immortality. M. I perceive you have sublime thoughts, and are eager to mount up to heaven. XXXIV. I am not without hopes myself that such may be our fate. But admit what they assert that tlie soul does not continue to exist after death. A. Should it be so, I see that we are then deprived of the hopes of a happier life. ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 45 M. But what is there of evil in that opinion ? For let the soul perish as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeUng at all, in the body after death ? No one, in- deed, asserts that; though Epicurus charges Deniocritus with saying so ; but the disciples of Deniocritus deny it. No sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere. Where, then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected without pain ? But even should that be granted, how small a pain must that be ! Yet I think that it is false, and that it is very often unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and some- times even attended with pleasure ; but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is, for it is instantaneous. What makes us uneasy, or rather gives us pain, is the leaving all the good things of life. But just consider if I might not more properly say, leaving the evils of life; only there is no reason for my now occupying myself in bewailing the life of man, and yet I might, with very good reason. But what occasion is there, when what I am la- boring to prove is that no one is miserable after death, to make life more miserable by lamenting over it? I have done that in the book which I wrote, in order to comfort myself as well as I could. If, then, our inquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not from good. This subject is indeed so copiously handled by llegesias, the Cyrenaic philosopher, that he is said to have been forbid- den by Ptolemy from delivering his lectures in the schools, because some who heard him made away Avith themselves. There is, too, an epigram of Callimachus^ on Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, without any misfortune having befall- en him, as he says, threw himself from a wall into the sea, after he had read a book of Plato's. The book I mention- ed of that Hegesias is called 'ATrofv-ap-epdir, or "A Man who * The epigram is, Ei'7ra9 "HAie X^P^> KXeoju/SpoTO? "Q.^PpaKiw-ty': riXar' a<}) v^r\\ov reixeoi ei? 'Ai8r)v, cif joi/ ovSev \6u)v OavaTou kukov, uW nXfiTwvov ev TO irepl i/zi'-XI? TP"MM' uvaXe^dfxevo^. Whicli ma}' be translated, perhaps, Farewell, O sun, Cleombrotus exclaim'd, Then plunged from off a height beneath the sea ; Stung by pain, of no disgrace ashamed. But moved by Plato's high philosophy. 46 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. starves liimselfj" in which a man is represented as kilHng himself by starvation, till he is prevented by his friends, in reply to whom he reckons up all the miseries of human life. I might do the same, though not so fully as he, who thinks it not worth any man's while to live. I pass over others. Was it even worth my while to live, for, had I died before I was deprived of the comforts of my own family, and of the honors which I received for my public services, would not death have taken me from the evils of life rather than from its blessings? XXXV. Mention, therefore, some one, who uexev knew distress; who never received any blow from fortune. The great Metellus had four distinguished sons; but Priam had fifty, seventeen of whom were born to him by his lawful wife. Fortune had the same power over both, though she exercised it but on one ; for Metellus was laid on his funeral pile by a great company of sons and daugh- ters, grandsons, and granddaughters; but Priam fell by the hand of an enemy, after having fled to the altar, and having seen himself deprived of all his numerous progeny. Had he died before the death of his sons and the ruin of his kingdom. With all his mighty wealth elate, * Under rich canopies of state ; would he then have been taken from good or from evil? It would indeed, at that time, have appeared that he was being taken away from good; yet surely it would have turned out advantageous for him ; nor should we have had these mournful verses, Lo ! these all perish 'd in one flaming pile ; The foe old Priam did of life beguile, And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defile. As if anything better could have happened to him at that time than to lose his life in that manner ; but yet, if it had befallen him sooner, it would have prevented all those con- sequences; but even as it was, it released him from any further sense of them. The case of our friend Pompey* * This is alluded to by Juvenal : Provida Ponipeio dederat Campania febres Optaudaa : sed multje urbes et publica vota Vicenint. I^itur Fortuiia ipeius et Urbip, Servatum victo caput abstulit Sat. x. 283. ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 47 was soinetliing better: once, when he had been very ill at Naples, the Neapolitans, on his recovery, put crowns on their heads, as did those of Puteoli; the people flocked from the country to congratulate hira it is a Grecian custom, and a foolish one; still it is a sign of good fort- une. But the qu-estion is, had he died, would he have been taken from good, or from evil? Certainly from evil. He would not have been engaged in a war with his father-in-law;^ he Avould not have taken up arms before he was prepared ; he would not have left his own house, nor fled from Italy; he would not, after the loss of his army, have fallen unarmed into the hands of slaves, and been put to death by them ; liis children would not have been destroyed ; nor would his whole fortune have come into the possession of the conquerors. Did not he, then, who, if he had died at that time, would Jiave died in all his glory, owe all the great and terrible misfortunes into which he subsequently fell to the prolongation of his life at that time ? XXXVI. These calamities are avoided by death, for even though they should never happen, there is a possibil- ity that they may; but it never occurs to a man that such a disaster may befall him liimself. Every one hopes to be as happy as Metellus : as if the number of the happy exceeded that of the miserable; or as if there were any certainty in human affairs; or, again, as if there were more rational foundation for hope than fear. But should we grant them even this, that men are by death deprived of good things ; would it follow that the dead are there- fore in need of the good things of life, and are miserable on that account? Certainly they must necessarily say so. Can he who does not exist be in need of anything? To be in need of has a melancholy sound, because it in effect amounts to this he had, but he has not; he regrets, he looks back upon, he wants. Such are, I suppose, the dis- She died the year before the death of Crassus, in Partliia. Virgil speaks of Cajsar and Pompey as relations, using the same expression (socer) as Cicero : Aorgeribns socer Alpinis atque arce Mouoeci Desceudeus, geuer udversis iustructus Eois. ^n. vl. 830. 48 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. tresses of one wlio is in need of. Is he deprived of eyes? to be blind is misery. Is be destitute of children ? not to have them is misery. These considerations apply to the living, but the dead are neither in need of the blessings of life, nor of life itself. But when I am speaking of the dead, I am speaking of those who have no existence. But would any one say of us, who do exist, that we want horns or wings? Certainly not. Should it be asked, why not? the answer would be, that not to have what neither custom nor nature has fitted you for would not imply a want of them, even though you were sensible that you had them not. This argument should be pressed over and over again, after that point has once been estab- lished, which, if souls are mortal, there can be no dispute about I mean, that the destruction of them by death is so entire as to ^-emove even the least suspicion of any sense remaining. When, therefore, this point is once well grounded and established, we must correctly define what the term to want means; that there may be no mistake in the word. To vvnut, then, signifies this: to be without that which you would be glad to have; for inclination for a thing is implied in the word want, excepting when we use the word in an entirely different sense, as we do when we say that a fever is wanting to any one. For it admits of a different interpretation, when you are witliout a cer- tain thing, and are sensible that you are without it, but yet can easily dispense with having it. " To w^ant," then, is an expression which you cannot apply to the dead ; nor is the mere fact of wanting something necessarily lamen- table. The proper expression ought to be, " that they want a good," and that is an evil. But a living man does not want a good, unless he is dis- tressed without it; and yet, we can easily understand how any man alive can be without a kingdom. But this cannot be predicated of you with any accuracy : it might have been asserted of Tarquin, when he was driven from his kingdom. But when such an expression is used re- specting the dead, it is absolutely unintelligible. For to want implies to be sensible; but the dead are insensible: therefore, the dead can be in no want. XXXVII. But what occasion is there to philosophize ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 49 here in a matter with which we see tliat philosophy is but little concerned ? How often have not only our generals, but whole armies, rushed on certain death ! But if it had been a thing to be feared, L. Brutus would never have fallen in fight, to prevent the return of that tyrant whom he had expelled; nor would Decius the father have been slain in fighting with the Latins; nor would his son, w^hen engaged with the Etruscans, nor his grandson with Pyrrhus, have exposed themselves to the enemy's darts. Spain would never have seen, in one campaign, the Scip- ios fall fighting for their country ; nor would the plains of Canna3 have witnessed the death of Paulus and Gemi- nus, or Yenusia that of Marcellus ; nor would the Latins have beheld the death of Albinus, nor the Leucanians that of Gracchus. But are any of these miserable now? Nay, they w^ere not so even at the first moment after they had breathed their last; nor can any one be miserable af- ter he has lost all sensation. Oh, but the mere circum- stance of beino: without sensation is miserable. It misjht be so if being without sensation were the same thmg as wanting it; but as it is evident there can be nothing of any kind in that which has no existence, what can tliere be afflicting to that which can neither feel want nor be sensible of anything? We might be said to have repeat- ed this over too often, only that here lies all that the soul shudders at from the fear of death. For whoever can clearly apprehend that which is as manifest as the light that when both soul and body are consumed, and there is a total destruction, then that which was an animal be- comes nothing will clearly see that there is no difference between a Hippocentaur, which never had existence, and King Agamemnon ; and that M. Camillus is no more con- cerned about this present civil war than I was at the sacking of Rome, when he w^as living. XXXVIII. Wiiy, then, should Camillus be affected with the thoughts of these things happening three hundred and fifty years after his time ? And why should I be uneasy if I were to expect that some nation might possess itself of this city ten thousand years hence ? Because so great is our regard for our country, as not to be measured by our own feeling, but by its own actual safety. 3 50 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. Death, then, which threatens us daily from a thousand accidents, and whicli, by reason of the shortness of life, can never be far off, does not deter a wise man from mak- ing such provision for his country and his family as he hopes may last forever ; and from regarding posterity, of which he can never have any real perception, as belonging to himself. Wherefore a man may act for eternity, even though he be persuaded that his soul is mortal ; not, in- deed, from a desire of glory, which he will be insensible of, but from a principle of virtue, which glory will inevita- bly attend, though that is not his object. The process, indeed, of nature is this: that just in the same manner as our birth was the beginning of things with us, so death will be the end; and as we were noways concerned with anything before we were born, so neither shall we be after we are dead. And in this state of things where can the evil be, since death has no connection with either the living or the dead? The one have no existence at all, the other are not yet affected by it. They who make the least of death consider it as having a great resemblance to sleej) ; as if any one would choose to live ninety years on condi- tion that, at the expiration of sixty, he should sleep out the remainder. The very swine would not accept of life on those terms, much less I. Endymion, indeed, if you listen to fables, slept once on a time on Latmus, a moun- tain of Caria, and for such a length of time that I imagine he is not as yet awake. Do you think that he is concern- ed at the Moon's being in difHculties, though it was by her that he was thrown into that sleep, in order that she might kiss him while sleeping. For what should he be concerned for who has not even any sensation ? You look on sleep as an image of death, and you take tliat on you daily ; and have you, then, any doubt that there is no sen- sation in deatl), when you see there is none in sleep, which is its near resemblance? XXXIX. Away, then, with those follies, which are little better than the old women's dreams, such as that it is mis- erable to die before our time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she lias only lent you life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint. ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 61 tlien, lliat slie recalls it at lier pleasure? for you received it on these terms. They that complain thus allow that if a young child dies, the survivors ought to bear his loss with equanimity ; that if an infant in the cradle dies, they ought not even to utter a complaint; and yet nature has been more severe with them in demanding back what she gave. Tiiey answer by saying that such have not tasted the sweets of life; while the other had begun to conceive hopes of great happiness, and, indeed, had begun to realize them. Men judge better in other things, and allow a part to be preferable to none. Why do they not admit the same estimate in life? Though Callimachus does not speak amiss in saying that more tears had flowed from Priam than his son ; yet they are thought happier who die after they have reached old age. It would be hard to say why; for I do not apprehend that any one, if a longer life were granted to him, would find it happier. There is nothing more agreeable to a man than prudence, which old age most certainly bestows on a man, though it may strip Iiim of everything else. But what age is long, or what is there at all long to a man ? Does not Old np;e, though unregarded, still attend On childhood's pastimes, as the cares of men ? But because there is nothing beyond old age, Ave call that long : all these things are said to be long or short, accord- ing to the proportion of time they were given us for. Artistotle saith there is a kind of insect near the river Ilypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially wlien the days are at the longest. Compare our longest life with eter- nity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals. XL. Let us, then, despise all these follies for what softer name can I give to such levities? and let us lay the foundation of our happiness in the strength and great- ness of our minds, in a contempt and disregard of all eartlily things, and in the practice of every virtue. For at present we are enervated by the softness of our imagi- 62 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. nations, so that, slionld we leave this world before the promises of our fortune-tellers are made good to us, wc should think ourselves deprived of some great advantages, and seem disappointed and forlorn. But if, through life, we are in continual suspense, still expecting, still desiring, and are in continual pain and toi-ture, good Gods ! how pleasant must that journey be which ends in security and ease ! How pleased am I with Theramenes ! Of how ex- alted a soul does he api3ear ! For, although we never read of him without tears, yet that illustrious man is not to be lamented in his death, who, when he had been imprisoned by the command of the thirty tyrants, drank off, at one draught, as if he had been thirsty, the poisoned cup, and threw the remainder out of it with such force that it sounded as it fell; and then, on hearing the sound of the drops, he said, with a smile, "I drink this to the most ex- cellent Critias," who had been his most bitter enemy; for it is customary among the Greeks, at their banquets, to name the person to whom they intend to deliver the cup. This celebrated man was pleasant to the last, even when he had received the poison into his bowels, and truly fore- told the death of that man whom he named when he drank the poison, and that death soon followed. Who that thinks death an evil could approve of the evenness of tem- per in this great man at the instant of dying ? Socrates came, a few years after, to the same prison and the same cup by as great iniquity on the part of his judges as the tyrants displayed when they executed Theramenes. What a speech is that which Plato makes him deliver before his judges, after they had condemned him to death ! XLI. "I am not without hopes, O judges, that it is a favorable circumstance for me that I am condenmed to die; for one of these two things must necessarily happen eitlier that death will deprive me entirely of all sense, or else that, by dying, I shall go from hence into some other place; wherefore, if all sense is utterly extinguished, and if death is like that sleep which sometimes is so undisturbed as to be even without the visions of dreams in that case, O ye good Gods! what gain is it to die? or what length 'of days can be imagined which would be preferable to Buch a night? And if the constant course of future time ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 63 is to resemble that nigbt, who is happier than I am ? But if, on the other liand, what is said be true, namely, that death is but a removal to those regions where the souls of the departed dwell, then that state must be more happy- still ^to have escaped from those who call themselves judges, and to appear before such as are truly so Minos, Rhadamanthus, ^acus, Triptolemns" and 'to meet with those who have lived with justice and probity !* Can this change of abode appear otherwise than great to you? What bounds can you set to the value of conversing with Orplieus, and Musa^us, and Homer, and Hesiod ? I would even, were it possible, willingly die often, in order to prove the certainty of what I speak of.V What delight must it be to meet with Palamedes, and Ajax, and others, who have been betrayed by the iniquity of their judges ! Then, also, should I experience the wisdom of even that king of kings, who led his vast troops to Troy, and the prudence of Ulysses and Sisyphus : nor should I then be condemned for prosecuting my inquiries on such subjects in the same w^ay in which I have done here on earth.' And even you, my judges, you, I mean, who have voted for my acquittal, do not you fear death, for nothing bad can befall a good man, whether he be alive or dead; nor are his concerns ever overlooked by the Gods ; nor in niy case either has this befallen me by chance ; and I have nothing to charge those men with who accused or condemned me but the fact that they believed that they were doing me harm." In this manner he proceeded. There is no part of his speech which I admire more than his last words j/" But it is time," says he, " for me now to go hence, that I may die; and for you, that you may continue to live. Which condition of the two is the best, the immortal Gods know ; but I do not believe that any mortal man does." * This idea is beautifully expanded by Byron : Yet if, as holiest men have deem'd, there be A land of sonls beyond that sable shore To shame the doctrine of the Sadducee And sophist, madly vain of dubious lore, How sweet it were in concert to adore With those who made our mortal labors light, To hear each voice we fear'd to hear no more, Behold each mighty shade reveal'd to sight, The Bactriau, Saraiau sage, and all who taught the right ! Childe Harold, ii. 64 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. XLII. Surely I would rather have had this man's soul than all the fortunes of those who sat in judgment on him ; although that very thing which he says no one ex- cept the Gods know, namely, whether life or death is most preferable, he knows himself, for he had previously stated his opinion on it; but he maintained to the last that fa- vorite maxim of his, of affirming nothing. And let us, too, adhere to this rule of not thinking anything an evil which is a general provision of nature ; and let us assure ourselves, that if death is an evil, it is an eternal evil, for death seems to be the end of a miserable life ; but if death is a misery, there can be no end of that. But why do I mention Socrates, or Theramenes, men distinguished by the glory of virtue and wisdom ? when a certain Lacedemo- nian, whose name is not so much as known, held death in such contempt, that, wlien led to it by the ephori, he bore a cheerful and pleasant countenance; and, when he was asked by one of his enemies whether he despised the laws of Lycurgus, " On the contrary," answered he, "I am greatly obliged to him, for he has amerced me in a fine which I can pay without borrowing, or taking uj) money at interest." This was a man worthy of Sparta. And I am almost persuaded of his innocence because of the greatness of his soul. Our own city has produced many such. /But why should I name generals, and other men of high rank, when Cato could wi'ite that legions have marched with alacrity to that place from whence they never expected to return? With no less greatness of soul fell the Lacedaimonians at Thcrmopylas, on whom Si- mouides wrote the following epitaph : Go, stranger, tell the Spartans, here we lie, Who to support their laws durst boldly die.* What was it that Leonidas, their general, said to them ? "March on with courage, my Lacedaemonians. To-night, perhaps, we shall sup in the regions below."^This was a brave nation while the laws of Lycurgus were in force. One of them, when a Persian had said to him in conversa- * The epitaph in the original is : ''il fe'i/' iiffuXov \aKe6atiiovioii ojt r^ie ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 66 tion, "We shall hide the sun from your sight by the num. ber of our arrows and darts," replied, " We shall fight, then, in the shade." Do I talk of their men ? How great was that Laceda3monian woman, who had sent her son to battle, and when she heard that he was slain, said, "I bore him for that purpose, that you might have a man who durst die for his country !" However, it is a matter of notoriety that the Spartans were bold and hardy, for the discipline of a republic has great influence. XLIH. What, then, have we not reason to admire Theodorus the Cyrenean, a philosoplier of no small dis- tinction, who, when Lysimachus threatened to crucify him, bade him keep those menaces for his courtiers? "To Theodorus it makes no difference whether he rot in the air on underground." By wliich saying of the philoso- pher^'! am reminded to say something of the custom of func^ral^^and sepulture, and of funeral ceremonies, which is, indeed, not a difticult subject, especially if we recollect what has been before said about insensibility. The opin- ion o^r SocratesC"especting this matter is clearly stated in the book which treats of his death, of which we have al- ready said so much ; for when he had discussed the im- mortality of the soul, and when the time of his dying was approaching rapidlyjbeing asked by Criton how he would be buried, "I have taken a great deal of pains," saith he, " my friends, to no purpose, for I have not convinced our Criton that I shall fly from hence, and leave no part of me behind/ Notwithstanding, Criton, if you can overtake me, wheresoever you get hold of me, bury me as you please : (but believe me, none of you will be able to catch me when I have flown away from hence.'/ CTliat was ex- cellently said, inasmuch as he allows his friend to do as he pleased, and yet shows his indifference about anything of this kind.) /Diogenes was rougher, though of the same opinion ; but in his character of a Cynic he expressed him- self in a somewhat liarsher manner; he ordered himself to be thrown anywhere without being buried. And when his friends replied, " What ! to the birds and beasts ?" " By no means," saith he; "place my staff near me, that I may drive them away." " How can you do that," they answer, " for you will not perceive them ?" " How am I then in- 5G THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. jured b;^ being torn by those animals, if I have no sensa^ lion?"^7Anaxagoras, when he was at the point of death at Lampsacns, and was asked by his friends, whether, if anything shonld happen to him, he would not choose to be carried to Clazomenae, his country, made this excellent answer, " There is," says he, " no occasion for that, for all places are at an equal distance from the infernal re- gions." There is one thing to be observed with respect to the whole subject of burial, that it relates to the body, whether the soul live or die. Now, with regard to the body, it is clear that, Avhether the soul live or die, that has no sensation. XLIV. But all things are full of errors. Achilles drags Hector, tied to his chariot ; he thinks, I suppose, he tears his flesh, and that Hector feels the pain of it ; therefore, he avenges himself on him, as he imagines. But Hecuba bewails this as a sore misfortune : I saw (a dreadful sight) great Hector slain, Dragg'd at Achilles' car along the plain. What Hector? or how long w^ill he be Hector? Accius is better in this, and Achilles, too, is sometimes reasonable : I Hector's body to his sire convey 'd, Hector I sent to the infernal shade. It was not Hector that you dragged along, but a body that had been Hector's. Here another starts from underground, and will not suffer his mother to sleep : To thee I call, my once-loved parent, hear, Nor longer with thy sleep relieve tliy care ; Thine eye which pities not is closed arise ; Ling'ring I wait the unpaid obsequies. When these verses are sung with a slow and melancholy tune, so as to affect the whole theatre with sadness, one can scarce help thinking those unhappy that are unburied : Ere the devouring dogs and hungry vultures He is afraid he shall not have the use of his limbs so well if they are torn to pieces, but is under no such a})prehen- sions if they arc burned : ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 67 Nor leave my naked bones, ray poor remains, To shameful violence and bloody stains. I do not understand wliat he could fear who could pour forth such excellent verses to the sound of the flute. We must, therefore, adhere to this, that nothing is to be re- garded after we are dead, though many people revenge themselves on their dead enemies. Thyestes pours forth several curses in some good lines of Ennius, praying, first of all, that Atreus may perish by a shipwreck, which is certainly a very terrible thing, for such a death is not free from very grievous sensations. Then follow these un- meaning expressions : May On the sharp rock his mangled carcass lie, ' His entrails torn, to hungry birds a prey ! May ho convulsive writhe his bleeding side, And with his clotted gore the stones be dyed ! llie rocks themselves were not more destitute of feeling than he who was hanging to them by his side; though Thyestes imagines he is wishing him the greatest torture. It would be torture, indeed, if he were sensible; but as ho is not, it can be none; then how very unmeaning is this: Let him, still hovering o'er the Stygian Avave, Ne'er reach the body's peaceful port, the grave ! You see under what mistaken notions all this is said. He imagines the body has its haven, and that the dead are at rest in their graves. Pelops was greatly to blame in not having informed and taught his son what regard was due to everytliing. XLV. But what occasion is there to animadvert on the opinions of individuals, when we may observe whole na- tions to fall into all sorts of errors? The Egyptians em- balm their dead, and keep them in their houses; the Per- sians dress them over with wax, and then bury them, that they may preserve their bodies as long as possible. It is customary with the Magi to bury none of their order, un- less they have been first torn by wild beasts. In Hyrca- nia, the people maintain dogs for the public use; the no- bles have their own and we know that they have a good breed of dogs; but every one, according to his abilitv, 3* 58 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. provides himself with some, in order to be torn by them ; and they hold that to be the best kind of interment. Chry- sippns, who is curious in all kinds of historical facts, has collected many other things of this kind ; but some of them are so offensive as not to admit of being related. All that has been said of burying is not worth our regard with re- spect to ourselves, though it is not to be neglected as to our friends, provided we are thoroughly aware that the dead are insensible. But the living, indeed, should con- sider what is due to custom and opinion ; only they should at the same time consider that the dead are noways inter- ested in it. But death truly is then met with the greatest tranquillity when the dying man can comfort himself with his own praise. No one dies too soon who has finished the course of perfect virtue. I myself have known many occasions when I have seemed in danger of immediate death ; oh ! how I wish it had come to me ! for I have gained nothing by the delay. I had gone over and over again the duties of life ; nothing remained but to contend with fortune. If reason, then, cannot sufficiently fortify us to enable us to feel a contempt for death, at all events let our past life prove that we have lived long enough, and even longer than was necessary; for notwithstanding the deprivation of sense, the dead are not without that good which peduliarly belongs to them, namely, the praise and glory which they have acquired, even though they are not sensible of it. For although there be nothing in glory to make it desirable, yet it follows virtue as its shadow ; and the genuine judgment of the multitude on good men, if ever they form any, is more to their own praise than of any real advantage to the dead. Yet I cannot say, how- ever it may be received, that Lycurgus and Solon have no glory from their laws, and from the political constitution which they established in their country; or that Themis- tocles and Epaminondas have not glory from their martial virtue. XLVI. For Neptune shall sooner bury Salamis itself with his waters than the memory of the trophies gained there ; and the Boeotian Leuctra shall perish sooner than the glory of that great battle. And longer still sliall fame be before it deserts Curius, and Fabricius, and Calatinus, ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. .59 and the two Scipios, and the two Africani, and Maximus, and Marcellus, and Paulus, and Cato, and Lselius, and num- berless other heroes; and whoever has caught any resem- bLance of them, not estimating it by common fame, but by the real applause of good men, may with confidence, when the occasion requires, approach death, on which we are sure that even if the chief good is not continued, at least no evil is. Such a man would even wish to die while in prosperity ; for all the favors that could be heaped on him would not be so agreeable to him as the loss of them would be painful. That speech of the Laceda3monian seems to have the same meaning, who, when Diagoras the Rhodian, who had himself been a conqueror at the Olympic games, saw two of his own sons conquerors there on the same day, approached the old man, and, congratulating him, said, "You should die now, Diagoras, for no greater happiness can possibly await you." The Greeks look on these as great things; perhaps they think too highly of them, or, rather, they did so then. And so he who said this to Di- agoras, looking on it as something very glorious, that three men out of one family should have been conquerors there, thought it could answer no purpose to him to continue any longer in life, where he could only be exposed to a re- verse of fortune. I might have given you a sufficient answer, as it seems to me, on this point, in a few words, as you had allowed the dead were not exposed to any positive evil ; but I have spoken at greater length on the subject for this reason, be- cause this is our greatest consolation in the losing and be- wailing of our friends. For we ought to bear with mod- eration any grief which arises from ourselves, or is endured on our own account, lest we should seem to be too much Influenced by self-love. But should we suspect our de- parted friends to be under those evils, which they are gen- erally imagined to be, and to be sensible of them, then such a suspicion would give us intolerable pain ; and according- ly I wished, for my own sake, to pluck up this opinion by the roots, and on that account I have been perhaps some- what more prolix than was necessary. XLVII. A. More prolix than was necessary ? Certain- ly not, in my opinion. For I was induced, by the former 60 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. part of your speech, to wish to die; but, by the latter, sometimes not to be unwilling, and at others to be wholly indifferent about it. But the effect of your whole argu- ment is, that I am convinced that deatii ought not to be classed among the evils. M. Do you, then, expect that I am to give you a regu- lar peroration, like the rhetoricians, or shall I forego that art? A. I would not have you give over an art which you have set off to such advantage ; and you w^ere in the right to do so, foi-, to speak the truth, it also has set you oft". But what is that peroration? For I should be glad to hear it, whatever it is. M. It is customary, in the schools, to produce the opin- ions of the immortal Gods on death; nor are these opin- ions the fruits of the imagination alone of the lecturers, but they have the authority of Herodotus and many oth- ers. Cleobis and Biton are the first they mention, sons of the Argive priestess; the story is a well-known one. As it was necessary that she should be drawn in a chariot to a certain annual sacrifice, which was solemnized at a temple some considerable distance from the town, and the cattle that were to draw the chariot had not arrived, those two young men whom I have just mentioned, pulling off their garments, and anointing their bodies with oil, harnessed themselves to the yoke. And in this manner the priestess was conveyed to the temple ; and when the chariot had ar- rived at the proper place, she is said to have entreated the Goddess to bestow on them, as a reward for their piety, the greatest gift that a God could confer on man. And the young men, after having feasted with their mother, fell asleep ; and in the morning they were found dead. Tro- phonius and Agamedes are said to have put up the same petition, for they, having built a temple to Apollo at Del- phi, offered suppHcations to the God, and desired of him some extraordinary reward for their care and labor, par- ticularizing nothing, but asking for whatever was best for men. Accordingly, Apollo signified to them that he would bestow it on them in three days, and on the third day at daybreak they were found dead. And so they say that this was a formal decision pronounced by that God to ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 61 whom the rest of the deities have assigned the province of divining with an accuracy superior to that of all the rest. XL VIII. There is also a story told of Silenus, who, when taken prisoner by Midas, is said to have made him this jDresent for his ransom namely, that he informed him' that never to have been born was by far the great- est blessing that could happen to man ; and that the next best thing was to die very soon ; which very opinion Eu- ripides makes use of in his Cresphontes, saying. When man is born, 'tis fit, with solemn sliow, We speak our sense of liis approacliing woe ; Witli other gestures and a different eye, Prochiim our pleasure when he's bid to die.'^ There is something like this in Grantor's Consolation ; for he says that Terina3us oi Elysia, when he was bitterly la- menting the loss of his son, came to a place of divination to be informed why he was visited with so great affliction, and received in his tablet these three verses : Thou fool, to murmur at'Euthynous' death! The blooming youth to fate resigns his breath : The fate, whereon your happiness depends, At once the parent and the son befriends.^ On these and similar authorities they affirm that the ques- tion has been determined by the Gods. Nay, more ; Al- cidamas, an ancient rhetorician of the very highest reputa- tion, wrote even in praise of death, which he endeavored to establish by an enumeration of the evils of life; and his Dissertation has a great deal of eloquence in it; but ^ This was expressed in the Greek verses, 'Apx'/r fJiiv fii^ (pvvat inixOoviottriv apiarov, (piiVTa d' OTTO)? wKicTTa 7ru\a9 'Aidiio wepJjjat* which by some authors are attributed to Homer. ^ This is the first fragment of the Cresphontes. Ed. Var. vii., p. 594. "Edei flip rjjua? cruWoyov Troiov/jitvov^ Toi/ ^I'w-ra Opt)vel^v, e\^ oa epxerat kukcx. Tov 6' av OavouTa Ka't irovcov ireTrav/Jievov XaipovTui eu(pr]/j.o'ivTav eKTrefineiv boixatv ^ The Greek verses are quoted by Plutarch : Hirov vrjTTie, iiXiOtoi cppeve^ avdpwv EvOui/oo^ Keirai ixoipibiw OavuTW OvK r]v 7ap ^weiv KaXov auTi^ out*- "yovi'vJt. 62 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. he was unacquainted with the more refined argnments of the philosophers. By the orators, indeed, to die for our country is always considered not only as glorious, but even as happy : tliey go back as far as Erechtheus,^ whose very daughters underwent death, for the safety of their fellow-citizens : they instance Codrus, who threw himself hito the midst of his enemies, dressed like a common man, that his royal robes might not betray him, because the oracle had declared the Athenians conquerors, if their king was slain. Menoeceus^ is not overlooked by them, who, in compliance with the injunctions of an oracle, freely shed his blood for his country. Iphigenia order- ed herself to be conveyed to Aulis, to be sacrificed, that her blood might be the cause of spilling that of her ene- mies. XLIX. From hence they proceed to instances of a fresh- er date. Harmodius and Aristogiton are in everybody's mouth ; the memory of Leonidas the Lacedaemonian and Epaminondas the Theban is as fresh as ever. Those phi- losophers were not acquainted with the many instances in our country to give a list of whom would take up too much time who, we see, considered death desirable as long as it was accompanied with honor. But, notwith- standing this is the correct view of the case, we must use much persuasion, speak as if we were endued with some higher authority, in order to bring men to begin to wish to die, or cease to be afraid of death. For if that last day does not occasion an entire extinction, but a change of abode only, what can be more desirable ? And if it, on the other hand, destroys, and absolutely puts an end to us, what can be preferable to the having a deep sleep fall on us, in the midst of the fatigues of life, and being thus overtaken, to sleep to eternity ? And, should this really * This refers to the story that when Eumolpns, the son of Neptune, whose assistance tlie Kleusinians had called in against the Athenians, had been slain by the Athenians, an oracle demanded the sacrifice of one of the daughters of Erechtheus, the King of Athens. And when one was drawn by lot, the others voluntarily accompanied her to death. ^ Mcnoeceus was son of Creon, and in the war of the Argives against Thebes, Teresias declared that theTlicbans should conquer if Menoeccus would sacrifice himself for his country; and accordingly he killed him- self outside the gates of Thebes. ON THE CONTEMPT OF DEATH. 63 be the case, then Ennius's language is more consistent with wisdom than Solon's ; for our Ennius says, Let none bestow upon my passing bier One needless sigh or unavailing tear. But the wise Solon says, Let me not unlamented die, but o'er my bier Burst forth the tender sigh, the friendly tear.* But let us, if indeed it should be our fate to know the time which is appointed by the Gods for us to die, prepare ourselves for it with a cheerful and grateful mind, think- ing ourselves like men W'ho are delivered from a jail, and released from their fetters, for the purpose of going back to our eternal habitation, which may be more emphatically called our ow^n ; or else to be divested of all sense and trouble. If, on the other hand, we should have no notice given us of this decree, yet let us cultivate such a disposi- tion as to look on that formidable hour of death as happy for us, though shocking to our friends ; and let us never imagine anything to be an evil which is an appointment of the immortal Gods, or of nature, the common parent of all. For it is not by hazard or without design that we have been born and situated as we have. On the contrary, beyond all doubt there is a certain power which consults the happiness of human nature ; and this would neither have produced nor provided for a being which, after hav- ing gone through the labors of life, was to fall into eternal misery by death. Let us rather infer that we have a re- treat and haven prepared for us, which I wish we could crowd all sail and arrive at; but though the winds should not serve, and we should be driven back, yet we shall to a certainty arrive at that point eventually, though somewhat later. But how can that be miserable for one which all must of necessity undergo? I have given you a perora- tion, that you might not think I had overlooked or neglect- ed anything. A. I am persuaded you have not; and, indeed, that peroration has confirmed me. * The Greek is, IJ.{]6e fJioi a(cXai/o-TOf ddvaroi noXot, uWa (piXoiat Trott](TaiiJ.t OavMV aXyea Kal o-roi/ax^f. 64 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. M. I am glad it has had that effect. But it is now time to consult our health. To-morrow, and all the time we continue in this Tusculan villa, let us consider this sub- ject; and especially those portions of it which may ease our pain, alleviate our fears, and lessen our desires, which is the greatest advantage we can reap from the whole of philosophy. BOOK 11. ON BEARING PAIN. T. N'eoptolemus, in Ennius, indeed, says that the study of philosophy was expedient for him; but that it re- quired limiting to a few subjects, for that to give himself np entirely to it was what he did not approve of. And for my part, Brutus, I am perfectly persuaded that it is expedient for me to philosophize ; for what can I do bet- ter, especially as I have no regular occupation ? But I am not for limiting my philosophy to a few subjects, as he does; for philosophy is a matter in which it is diffi- cult to acquire a little knowledge without acquainting yourself with many, or all its branches, nor can you well take a few subjects without selecting them out of a great number; nor can any one, who has acquired the knowl- edge of a few points, avoid endeavoring with the same eagerness to understand more. But still, in a busy life, and in one mainly occupied with military matters, such as that of Neoptolemus was at that time, even that limited degree of acquaintance with philosophy may be of great use, and may yield fruit, not perhaps so plentiful as a thorough knowledge of the whole of philosophy, but yet such as in some degree may at times deliver us from the dominion of our desires, our sorrows, and our fears; just as the effect of that discussion which we lately maintained in my Tusculan villa seemed to be that a great contempt of death was engendered, which contempt is of no small efficacy towards delivering the mind from fear; for who- ever dreads what cannot be avoided can by no means live with a quiet and tranquil mind. But he who is under no ON BEARING PAIN. 65 fear of death, not only because it is a thing absolutely in- evitable, but also because he is persuaded that death itself hath nothing terrible in it, provides himself with a very great resource towards a happy life. However, I am not ignorant that many will argue strenuously against us; and, indeed, that is a thing which can never be avoided, except by abstaining from writing at all. For if my Orations, which were addressed to the judgment and ap- probation of the people (for that is a popular art, and the object of oratory is popular applause), have been criti- cised by some people who are incUned to withhold tiieir praise from everything but what they are persuaded they can attain to themselves, and who limit their ideas of good speaking by the hopes which they conceive of what they themselves may attain to, and who declare, when they are overwhelmed with a flow of words and sen- tences, that they prefer the utmost poverty of thought and expression to that plenty and copiousness (from which arose the Attic kind of oratory, which they who pro- fessed it were strangers to, though they have now been some time silenced, and laughed out of the very courts of justice), what may I not expect, when at present I cannot have the least countenance from the people by whom I used to be upheld before? For philosophy is satisfied w^ith a few judges, and of her own accord industriously avoids the multitude, who are jealous of it, and utterly displeased with it ; so that, should any one undertake to cry down the whole of it, he would have the people on his side ; while, if he should attack that school which I par- ticularly profess, he would have great assistance from those of the other philosophers. II. But I have answered the detractors of philosophy in general, in my Hortensius. And what I had to say in favor of the Academics, is, I think, explained with suffi- cient accuracy in my four books of the Academic Ques- tion. But yet I am so far from desiring that no one should write against m.e, that it is what I most earnestly wish ; for philosophy would never have been in such esteem in Greece itself, if it had not been for the strength which it acquired from the contentions and disputations of the 66 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. most learned men ; and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities to follow my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and to transport it to this city; as our ancestors by their study and industry have imported all their other arts which were worth having. Thus the praise of oratory, raised from a low degree, is arrived at such perfection that it must now decline, and, as is the nature of all things, verge to its dissolution in a very short time. Let ])hilosophy, then, derive its birth in Latin language from this time, and let us lend it our as- sistance, and bear patiently to be contradicted and re- futed; and altliough those men may dislike such treat- ment who are bound and devoted to certain predeter- mined opinions, and are under such obligations to main- tain them that they are forced, for the sake of consist- ency, to adhere to them even though they do not them- selves wholly approve of them ; we, on the other hand, who pursue only probabilities, and who cannot go beyond that which seems really likely, can confute others with- out obstinacy, and are prepared to be confuted ourselves without resentment. Besides, if these studies are ever brought home to us, we shall not want even Greek libra- ries, in which there is an infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of authors among them ; for it is a common practice with many to repeat the same things which have been written by others, which serves no pur- pose but to stuff their shelves; and this will be our case, too, if many apply themselves to this study. in. But let us excite those, if possible, who have had a liberal education, and are masters of an elegant style, and who philosophize with reason and method. For there is a certain class of them who would willing- ly be called philosophers, whose books in or.r language are said to be numerous, and which I do not despise; for, indeed, I never read them: but still, because the authors themselves declare that they wn-ite without any regularity, or method, or elegance, or ornament, I do not care to read what must be so void of entertainment. There is no one in the least acquainted with literature who does not know the style and sentiments of that school ; wherefore, since they arc at no pains to express themselves well, I ON BEARING PAIN. 67 do not see why they should be read by anybody except by one another. Let them read them, if they please, who are of the same opinions; for in the same manner as all men read Plato and the other Socratics, with those who sprang from them, even those who do not agree with their opinions, or are very indifferent about them; but scarcely any one except tlieir own disciples take Epicurus or Metrodorus into their hands; so they alone read these Latin books who tliink that the arguments contained in them are sound. But, in my opinion, whatever is pub- lished should be recommended to the reading of every man of learning; and though we may not succeed in this ourselves, yet nevertheless we must be sensible that this ought to be the aim of every writer. And on this ac- count I have always been pleased with the custom of the Peripatetics and Academics, of disputing on both sides of the question; not solely from its being the only method of discovering what is probable on every subject, but also because it affords the greatest scope for practising elo- quence; a method that Aristotle first made use of, and afterward all the Aristotelians ; and in our own memory Philo, whom we have often heard, appointed one time to treat of the precepts of the rhetoricians, and another for philosophical discussion, to which custom I was brought to conform by my friends at my Tusculuin ; and accord- ingly our leisure time was spent in this manner. And therefore, as yesterday before noon we applied ourselves to speaking, and in the afternoon ^vent down into the Academy, the discussions which were held there I have acquainted you with, not in the manner of a narration, but in almost the very same words which were employed in the debate. IV. Tlie discourse, then, was introduced in this manner while we were walking, and it was commenced by some such an opening as this : A. It is not to be expressed how much I was delighted, or rather edified, by your discourse of yesterday. For although I am conscious to myself that I have never been too fond of life, yet at times, when I have considered that there would be an end to this life, and that I must some time or other part with all its good things, a certain dread 68 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. and uneasiness used to intrude itself on my thoughts; but now, believe me, I am so freed from that kind of un- easiness that there is nothing that I think less worth any regard. M. I am not at all surprised at that, for it is the effect of philosophy, which is the medicine of our souls ; it ban- ishes all groundless apprehensions, frees us from desires, and drives away fears : but it has not the same influence over all men ; it is of very great influence when it falls in with a disposition well adapted to it. For not only does Fortune, as the old proverb says, assist the bold, but rea- son does so in a still greater degree ; for it, by certain precepts, as it were, strengthens even courage itself. You were born naturally great and soaring, and with a con- tempt for all things which pertain to man alone ; there- fore a discourse against death took easy possession of a brave soul. But do you imagine that these same argu- ments have any force with those very persons who have invented, and canvassed, and published them, excepting in- deed some very few particular persons ? For how few l^hilosophers will you meet with whose life and manners are conformable to the dictates of reason ! who look on their profession, not as a means of displaying their learn- ing, but as a rule for their own practice ! who follow their own precepts, and comply with their own decrees ! You may see some of such levity and such vanity, that it would have been better for them to have been ignorant; some covetous of money, some others eager for glory, many slaves to their lusts ; so that their discourses and their actions are most strangely at variance ; than which noth- ing in my opinion can be more unbecoming : for just as if one who professed to teach grammar should speak with impropriety, or a master of music sing out of tune, such conduct has the worst appearance in these men, because they blunder in the very particular with which they pro- fess that they are well acquainted. So a philosopher who errs in the conduct of his life is the more infamous be- cause he is erring in the very thing which he pretends to teach, and, while he lays down rules to regulate life by, is irregular in his own life. V. A. Should this be the case, is it not to be feared that ON BEARING PAIN. 69 you arc dressing up philosophy in false colors ? For what stronger argument can there be that it is of little use than that some very profound philosophers live in a discredita- ble manner? 31. That, indeed, is no argument at all, for as all tlie fields Avhich are cultivated are not fruitful (and this senti- ment of Accius is false, and asserted without any founda- tion, The ground yon sow on is of small avail ; To yield a crop good seed can never fail), it is not every mind which has been properly cultivated that produces fruit; and, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may be naturally fruitful, cannot pro- duce a crop without dressing, so neither can the mind without education ; such is the weakness of either with- out the other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind : this it is which plucks up vices by the roots ; pre- pares the mind for the receiving of seeds ; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest. Let us proceed, then, as we began. Say, if you please, what shall be the subject of our disputation. A. I look on pain to be the greatest of all evils. 3L What, even greater than infamy? A. I dare not indeed assert that ; and I blush to think I am so soon driven from my ground. M. You would have had greater reason for blushing had you persevered in it ; for what is so unbecoming what can appear worse to you, than disgrace, wickedness, immorality? To avoid which, what pain is there which we ouglit not (I will not say to avoid shirking, but even) of our own accord to encounter, and undergo, and even to court? A. I am entirely of that opinion; but, notwithstanding that pain is not the greatest evil, yet surely it is an evil. 31. Do you perceive, then, how much of the terror of pain you liave given up on a small hint? A. I see that plainly; but I should be glad to give up more of it. 3f. I will endeavor to make you do so; but it is a great VO THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. undertaking, and I must have a disposition on your part which is not inclined to offer any obstacles. A. You shall have such : for as I behaved yesterday, so now I will follow reason wherever she leads. VI. M. Fii'st, then, I Avill speak of the weakness of many philosophers, and those, too, of various sects ; the head of whom, both in authority and antiquity, was Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, who hesitated not to say that pain was the greatest of all evils. And after him Epicurus easily gave in to this effeminate and enervated doctrine. After him Hieronymus the Rhodian said, that to be with- out pain was the cliief good, so great an evil did pain ap- pear to him to be. Tlie rest, with the exceptions of Zeno, Aristo, Pyrrho, were pretty much of the same opinion that you were of just now that it was indeed an evil, but that tiiere wero many worse. When, then, nature her- self, and a certain generous feeling of virtue, at once pre- vents you from persisting in the assertion that pain is the chief evil, and when you were driven from such an opin- ion when disgrace was contrasted with pain, shall philoso- phy, the preceptress of life, cling to this idea for so many ages? What duty of life, what praise, what reputation, would be of such consequence that a man should be desir- ous of gaining it at the expense of submitting to bodily pain, when he has persuaded himself that pain is the greatest evil? On the other side, what disgrace, Avhat ig- nominy, would he not submit to that he might avoid pain, when persuaded that it was the greatest of evils? Be- sides, v/hat person, if it be only true that pain is the great- est of evils, is not miserable, not only when he actually feels pain, but also whenever he is aware that it may be- fall him. And who is there whom pain may not befall? So that it is clear that there is absolutely no one who can possibly be happy. Metrodorus, indeed, thinks that man perfectly happy whose body is free from all disorders, and who has an assurance that it will always continue so; but who is there who can be assured of that? VII. But Epicurus, indeed, says such things that it should seem that his design was only to make people laugh ; for lie affirms somewhere that if a wise man were to be burned or put to the torture you expect, perhaps, ON BEARING PAIN. 11 that he is going to say he would bear it, he would support himself under it with resolution, he would not yield to it (and that, by Hercules ! would be very commendable, and worthy of that very Hercules whom I have just invoked) : but even this will not satisfy Epicurus, that robust and hardy man ! No; his wise man, even if he were in Phal- aris's bull, would say. How sweet it is ! how little do I regard it ! What, sweet ? Is it not sufficient, if it is not disagreeable ? But those very men who deny pain to be an evil are not in the habit of saying that it is agreeable to any one to be tormented ; they rather say that it is cruel, or hard to bear, afflicting, unnatural, but still not an evil: while this man who says that it is the only evil, and the very worst of all evils, yet thinks that a wise man would pronounce it sweet. I do not require of you to speak of pain in the same woixls which Epicurus uses a man, as you know^, devoted to pleasure : he may make no difference, if he pleases, between Phalaris's bull and his own bed; but I cannot allow the wise man to be so indif- ferent about pain. If he bears it with courage, it is suffi- cient: that he should rejoice in it, I do not expect; for pain is, beyond all question, sharp, bitter, against nature, hard to submit to and to bear. Observe Philoctetes: We may allow him to lament, for he saw Hercules himself groaning loudly through extremity of pain on Mount QEta. The arrows with which Hercules presented hiui were then no consolation to him, when The viper's bite, impregnating liis veins With poison, rack'd him with its bitter pains. And therefore he cries out, desiring help, and wishing to die. Oh tliat some friendly hand its aid would lend, My body from this rock's vast height to send Into the briny deep ! I'm all on fire, And by this fatal wound must soon expire. It is hard to say that the man who was obliged to cry out in this manner was not oppressed with evil, and great evil, too. VIII. But let us observe Hercules himself, who was sub- dued by pain at the very time when he was on the point V2 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. of attaining immortality by death. What words does Sophocles here put in his mouth, in his Trachinite ? who, when Deianira had put upon him a tunic dyed in the cen- taur's blood, and it stuck to his entrails, says. What toitnves I endure no words can tell, Far greater these, than those which erst befell From the dire terror of thy consort, Jove E'en stern Eurystheus' dire command above ; Tliis of thy daughter, OEneus, is the fruit, Beguiling me with her envcnom'd suit, Whose close embrace doth on my entrails prey, Consuming life ; my lungs forbid to play ; The blood forsakes ray veins ; my manly heart Forgets to beat ; enervated, each part Neglects its office, while my fiital doom Proceeds ignobly from the weaver's loom. The hand of foe ne'er hurt me, nor the fierce Giant issuing from his parent earth. Ne'er could the Centaur such a blow enforce, No barbarous foe, nor all the Grecian force ; This arm no savage people could withstand, Whose realms I traversed to reform the land. Thus, though I ever bore a manly heart, I fall a victim to a woman's art. IX. Assist, my son, if thou that name dost hear, My groans preferring to thy mother's tear : Convey her here, if, in thy pious heart. Thy mother shares not an unequal part : Proceed, be bold, thy father's fate bemoan, Nations will join, you will not weep alone. Oh, what a sight is this same briny source, Unknown before, through all my labors' course ! That virtue, which could brave each toil but late^ With woman's weakness now bewails its fate. Approach, my son ; behold thy father laid, A wither'd carcass that implores thy aid ; Let all behold : and thou, imperious Jove, On me direct thy lightning from above : Now all its force the poison doth assume. And my burnt entrails with its flame consume. Crestfallen, unembraced, I now let fall Listless, those hands that lately conquer'd all ; When the Nemrcan lion own'd their force, And he indignant fell a breathless corse ; The serpent slew, of the Lernean lake. As did the Hydra of its force ])artake: ]iy this, too, fell the Erymanthian boar: E'en Cerberus did his weak strength deplore. ON BEARING PAIN. 73 This sinewy ann did OA'ercome with ease That dragon, guardian of the Golden Fleece. My many conquests let some others trace ; It's mine to say, I never knew disgrace. ^ Can we, then, despise pain, when we see Hercules himself giving vent to his expressions of agony with such impa- tience ? X. Let us see what ^schylus says, who was not only a poet, but a Pythagorean philosopher also, for that is the account which you have received of him; how doth he make Prometheus bear the pain he suffered for the Lem- nian theft, when he clandestinely stole away the celestial fire, and bestowed it on men, and was severely punished by Jupiter for the theft. Fastened to Mount Caucasus, he speaks thus : Thou heav'n-born race of Titans here fast bound, Behold thy brother! As the sailors sound With care the bottom, and their ships confine To some safe shore, with anchor and with line ; So, by Jove's dread decree, the God of fire Confines me here the victim of Jove's ire. With baneful art his dire machine he shapes ; From such a God what mortal e'er escapes ? When each third day shall triumph o'er the night, Then doth the vulture, with his talons light. Seize on my entrails ; which, in rav'nous guise, He preys on ! then Avith wing extended flies Aloft, and brushes with his plumes the gore : But when dire Jove my liver doth restore, Back he returns impetuous to his prey, Clapping his wings, he cuts th' ethereal way. Thus do I nourish with my blood this pest, Confined my arms, unable to contest ; Entreating only that in pity Jove Would take my life, and this cursed plague remove. But endless ages past unheard my moan, Sooner shall drops dissolve this very stone. '^ And therefore it scarcely seems possible to avoid calling a man who is suffering, miserable ; and if he is miserable, then pain is an evil. ' Soph. Trach. 1047. ^ The lines quoted by Cicero here appear to have come from the Latin play of Prometheus by Accius ; the ideas are borrowed, rather than trans- lated, from the Prometheus of ^Eschylus. 4 14 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. XT. A. Hitherto you are on my side ; I will see to that by-and-by; and, in the mean while, whence are those verses? I do not remember them. M. I will inform you, for you are in tlie right to ask. Do you see that I have much leisure ? A, What, then ? M. I imagine, when you were at Athens, you attended frequently at the schools of the philosophers. A. Yes, and with great pleasure. M. You observed, then, that though none of them at that time were very eloquent, yet they used to mix verses with their harangues. A. Yes, and particularly Dionysius the Stoic used to employ a great many. 31. You say right; but they were quoted without any appropriateness or elegance. But our friend Philo used to give a few select lines and well adapted; and in imita- tion of him, ever since I took a fancy to this kind of el- derly declamation, I have been very fond of quoting our jDoets; and where I cannot be supplied from them, I trans- late from the Greek, that the Latin language may not want any kind of ornament in this kind of disputation. But do you not see how much harm is done by poets? They introduce the bravest men lamenting over their mis- fortunes: they soften our minds; and they are, besides, so entertaining, that we do not only read them, but get them by heart. Thus the influence of the poets is added to our want of discipline at home, and our tender and delicate manner of living, so that between them they have deprived virtue of all its vigor and energy. Plato, therefore, was right in banishing them from his commonwealth, where he required the best morals, and the best form of govern- ment. But we, who have all our learning from Greece, read and learn these works of theirs from oui- childhood ; and look on this as a liberal and learned education. XII. But why are we angry with the poets? We may find some philosophers, those masters of virtue, who have taught that pain was the greatest of evils. But you, young man, when you said but just now that it appeared so to you, upon being asked by mo what appeared greater than infamy, gave up that opinion at a word. Suppose I ask ON BEARING PAIN. 75 Epicurus the same question. He Avill answer that a tri- fling degree of pain is a greater evil than the greatest in- famy ; for that there is no evil in infamy itself, unless attended with pain. What pain, then, attends Epicurus, when he says that very thing, that pain is the greatest evil! And yet nothing can be a greater disgrace to a phi- losopher than to talk thus. Therefore, you allowed enough when you admitted that infamy appeared to you to be a greater evil than j^ain. And if you abide by this admis- sion, you will see how far pain should be resisted ; and that our inquiry should be not so much whether pain be an evil, as how the mind may be fortified for resisting it. The Stoics infer from some petty quibbling arguments that it is no evil, as if the dispute were about a word, and not about the thing itself. Why do you impose upon me, Zeno? For when you deny what appears very dreadful to me to be an evil, I am deceived, and am at a loss to know why that which appears to me to be a most miser- able thing should be no evil. The answer is, that nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. You return to your trifling, for you do not remove what made me un- easy. I know that pain is not vice you need not inform me of that : but show me that it makes no difference to me whether I am in pain or not. It has never anything to do, say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon virtue alone; but yet pain is to be avoided. If I ask, why? It is disagreeable, against nature, hard to bear, woful and afliicting. XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms which we call by the single word evil. You are defining pain, instead of removing it, when you say, it is disagreeable, unnatural, scarcely possible to be endured or borne, nor are you wrong in saying so : but the man who vaunts himself in such a manner should not give way in his conduct, if it be true that nothing is good but what is honest, and nothing evil but what is disgrace- ful. This would be wishing, not proving. This argu- ment is a better one, and has more truth in it that all things which Nature abhors are to be looked upon as evil ; that those which she approves of are to be consider- ed as good : for when this is admitted, and the dispute 16 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. about words removed, that which they with reas'on em- brace, and which we call honest, right, becoming, and sometimes include under the general name of virtue, ap- pears so far superior to everything else that all other things which are looked upon as the gifts of fortune, or the good things of the body, seem trifling and insignifi- cant; and no evil whatever, nor all the collective body of evils together, appears to be compared to the evil of in- famy. Wherefore, if, as you granted in the beginning, infamy is worse than pain, pjiin is certainly nothing; for while it appears to you base and unmanly to groan, cry out, lament, or faint under pain ; while you cherish notions of probity, dignity, honor, and, keeping your eye on them, refrain yourself, pain will certainly yield to virtue, and, by the influence of imagination, will lose its whole force. For you must either admit tiiat there is no such thing as virtue, or you must despise every kind of pain. Will you allow of such a virtue as jjrudence, without which no vir- tue whatever can even be conceived ? What, then ? Will that suffer you to labor and take pains to no purpose? Will temperance permit you to do anything to excess ? Will it be possible for justice to be maintained by one who through the force of pain discovers secrets, or betrays his confederates, or deserts many duties of life? Will you act in a manner consistently with courage, and its at- tendants, greatness of soul, resolution, patience, and con- tempt for all worldly things? Can you hear yourself call- ed a great man when you lie grovelling, dejected, and de- ploring your condition with a lamentable voice; no one would call you even a man while in such a condition. You must therefore cither abandon all pretensions to cour- age, or else pain must be put out of the question. XIV. You know very well that, even though part of your Corinthian furniture were gone, the remainder might be safe without that; but if you lose one virtue (though virtue in reality cannot be lost), still if, I say, you shoukl acknowledge that you were deficient in one, you would be stripped of all. Can you, then, call yourself a brave man, of a great soul, endued with patience and steadiness above the frowns of fortune? or Philoctetes? for I choose to in- stance him, rather than yourself, for he certainly was not ON BEARING TAIN. 11 a brave man, who lay in his bed, which was watered with his tears. Whose gronns, bewailings, and whose bitter cries, With grief incessant rent the very skies. I do not deny pain to be pain for were that the case, in what would courage consist? but I say it should be tis- suaged by patience, if there be such a thing as patience : if there be no such thing, why do we speak so in praise of philosophy? or why do we glory in its name? Does pain annoy us ? Let it sting us to the heart : if you are with- out defensive armor, bare your throat to it; but if you are secured by Vulcanian armor, that is to say by resolu- tion, resist it. Should you fail to do so, that guardian of your honor, your courage, will forsake and leave you. By the laws of Lycurgus, and by those which were given to the Cretans by Jupiter, or which Minos established under the direction of Jupiter, as the poets say, the youths of the State are trained by the practice of hunting, running, enduring hunger and thirst, cold and heat. The boys at Sparta are scourged so at the altars that blood follows the lash in abundance; nay, sometimes, as I used to hear when I was there, they are whipped even to death; and yet not one of them was ever heard to cry out, or so much as groan. What, then? Shall men not be able to bear what boys do? and shall custom have such great force, and rea- son none at all ? XV. There is some difference between labor and pain ; they border upon one another, but still there is a certain difference between them. Labor is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp mo- tion in the body, disagreeable to our senses. Both these feelings, the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the common name of Uorog: therefore they call industrious men painstaking, or, rather, fond of labor ; we, more conveniently, call them laborious ; for la- boring is one thing, and enduring pain another. You see, O Greece ! your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you think you are always so rich in them. I say, then, that there is a difference between laborinoj and beino- in 78 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. pain. When Cains Marins had an operation performed for a swelling in his thigh, he felt pain ; when he headed his troops in a very hot season, he labored. Yet these two feelings bear some resemblance to one another ; for the accustoming ourselves to labor makes the endurance of pain more easy to us. And it was because they were influenced by this reason that the founders of the Grecian form of government provided that the bodies of their youth should be strengthened by labor, which custom the Spartans transferred even to their women, who in other cities lived more delicately, keeping within the walls of their houses ; but it was otherwise with the Spartans. The Spartan women, with a manly air, Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share ; They in fantastic sports liave no delight, Partners with them in exercise and fight. And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. They are thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the labor itself produces a sort of callous- ness to pain. XVI. As to military service (I speak of our own, not of that of the Spartans, for they used to march slowly to the sound of the flute, and scarce a word of command was given without an anapaest), you may see, in the first place, whence the very name of an army {exercitusy is derived; and, secondly, how great the labor is of an army on its march : then consider that they carry more than a fort- night's provision, and whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the stakes,'^ for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no more encumbrance than their own limbs, for they say that arms are the limbs of a soldier, and those, indeed, they carry so commodiously that, when there is occasion, they throw down their bur- dens, and use their arms as readily as their limbs. Why need I mention the exercises of the legions? And how great the labor is which is undergone in the running, en- counters, sliouts ! Hence it is that their minds are worked * From exerceo. ^ Each soldier carried a stake, to help form a palisade in front of the camp. ON BEARING PAIN. ^9 up to make so light of wounds in action. Take a soldier of equal bravery, but undisciplined, and he will seem a woman. Why is it that there is this sensible difference between a raw recruit and a veteran soldier? The age of the young soldiers is for the most part in their favor; but it is practice only that enables men to bear labor and de- spise wounds. Moreover, we often see, when the wounded are carried off the field, the raw, untried soldier, though but slightly wounded, cries out most shamefully ; but the more brave, experienced veteran only inquires for some one to dress his wounds, and says, Patroclus, to thy aid I must appeal Ere worse ensue, my bleeding wounds to heal ; The sons of ^sculapius are employ'd, No room for me, so many are annoy'd. XVII. This is certainly Eurypylns himself. What an experienced man ! While his friend is continually enlarg- ing on his misfortunes, you may observe that he is so far from weeping that he even assigns a reason why he should bear his wounds with patience. Who at his enemy a stroke directs, His sword to light upon himself expects. Patroclus, I suppose, will lead him off to his chamber to bind up his wounds, at least if he be a man : but not a word of that; he only inquires how the battle went: Say how the Argives bear themselves in fight? And yet no words can show the truth as well as those, your deeds and visible sufferings. Peace ! and my wounds bind up ; but though Eurypylus could bear these afflictions, ^sopus could not, Where Hector's fortune press'd our yielding troops ; and he explains the rest, though in pain. So unbounded is military glory in a brave man! Shall, then, a veteran soldier be able to behave in this manner, and shall a wise and learned man not be able? Surely the latter might be 80 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. able to bear pain better, and in no small degree either. At present, however, I am confining myself to what is engen- dered by practice and discipline. I am not yet come to speak of reason and philosophy. You may often hear of old women living without victuals for three or four days ; but take away a wrestler's provisions but for one day, and he will implore the aid of Jupiter Olympius, the very God for whom he exercises himself : he will cry out that he cannot endure it. Great is the force of custom ! Sportsmen will continue whole nights in the snow ; they will bear being- aim ost frozen upon the mountains. From practice boxers will not so much as utter a groan, however bruised by the cestus. But what do you think of those to whom a vic- tory in the Olympic games seemed almost on a par with the ancient consulships of the Roman people? What wounds will the gladiators bear, who are either barbarians, or the very dregs of mankind ! How do they, who are trained to it, prefer being wounded to basely avoiding it ! How often do they prove that they consider nothing but the giving satisfaction to their masters or to the people ! for when covered with wounds, they send to their masters to learn their pleasure: if it is their will, they are ready to lie down and die. What gladiator, of even moderate rep- utation, ever gave a sigh? who ever turned pale? wlio ever disgraced himself either in the actual combat, or even when about to die? who that had been defeated ever drew in his neck to avoid the stroke of death ? So great is the force of practice, deliberation, and custom ! Shall this, then, be done by A Samnite rascal, wovtliy of his trade ; and shall a man born to glory have so soft a part in his soul as not to be able to fortify it by reason and reflection? The sight of the gladiators' combats is by some looked on as cruel and inluiman, and I do not know, as it is at present managed, but it may be so; but when the guilty fought, we might receive by our ears perhaps (but certainly by our eyes we could not) better training to harden us against pain and death. XVIII. I have now said enough about the effects of ex- ercise, custom, and careful meditation. Proceed we now ON BEAKING PAIN. 81 to consider the force of reason, unless you have something to reply to what has been said. A. That I should interrupt you ! By no means ; for your discourse has brought me over to your opinion. Let the Stoics, then, think it their business to determine wheth- er pain be an evil or not, while they endeavor to show by some strained and trilling conclusions, which are nothing to the purpose, that pain is no evil. My opinion is, that whatever it is, it is not so great as it appears; and I say, that men are influenced to a great extent by some false representations and appearance of it, and that all which is really felt is capable of being endured. Where shall I be- gin, then ? Shall I superficially go over what I said be- fore, that my discourse may have a greater scope? This, then, is agreed upon by all, and not only by learned men, but also by the unlearned, that it becomes the brave and magnanimous those that have patience and a spirit above this world not to give way to pain. Nor has there ever been any one who did not commend a man who bore it in this manner. That, then, which is expected from a brave man, and is commended when it is seen, it must sure- ly be base in any one to be afraid of at its approach, or not to bear when it comes. But I would have you con- sider whether, as all the right affections of the soul are classed under the name of virtues, the truth is that this is not properly the name of them all, but that they all have their name from that leading virtue which is superior to all the rest : for the name " virtue" comes from vir, a man, and courage is the peculiar distinction of a man : and this virtue has two principal duties, to despise death and pain. We must, then, exert tliese, if we would bo men of virtue, or, rather, if we would be men, because virtue {virtus) takes its very name from vir, man. XIX. You may inquire, perhaps, how ? And such an inquiry is not amiss, for philosophy is ready with her as- sistance. Epicurus offers himself to you, a man far from a bad or, I should rather say, a very good man : he ad- vises no more than he knows. " Despise pain," says he. Who is it saith this? Is it the same man who calls pain the greatest of all evils? It is not, indeed, very consist- ent in him. Let us hear w^hat he savs : " If the pain is ex- 4^^ 82 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. cessive, it must needs be short." I must have that over again, for I do not apprehend what you mean exactly by " excessive " or " short." That is excessive than which nothing can be greater; that is short than which noth- ing is shorter, I do not regard the greatness of any pain from which, by reason of the shortness of its continuance, I shall be delivered almost before it reaches me. But if the pain be as great as that of Philoctetes, it will appear great indeed to me, but yet not the greatest that I am capable of bearing ; for the pain is confined to my foot. But my eye may pain me, I may have a pain in the head, or sides, or lungs, or in every part of me. It is far, then, from being excessive. Therefore, says he, pain of a long continuance has more pleasure in it than uneasiness. Now, I cannot bring myself to say so great a man talks nonsense; but I imagine he is laughing at us. My opin- ion is that the greatest pain (I say the greatest, though it may be ten atoms less than another) is not therefore short, because acute. I could name to you a great many good men who have been tormented many years with the acutest pains of the gout. But this cautious man doth not deter- mine the measure of that greatness or of duration, so as to enable us to know what he calls excessive with regard to pain, or short with respect to its continuance. Let us pass him by, tlien, as one who says just nothing at all; and let us force him to acknowledge, notwithstanding he might behave himself somewhat boldly under his colic and his strangury, that no remedy against pain can be had from him who looks on pain as the greatest of all evils. We must apply, then, for relief elsewhere, and nowhere better (if we seek for what is most consistent with itself) than to those who place the chief good in honesty, and the greatest evil in infamy. You dare not so much as groan, or discover the least uneasiness in their company, for vir- tue itself speaks to you through them. XX. Will you, when you may observe children at Lace- daimon, and young men at Olympia, and barbarians in the amphitheatre, receive the severest wounds, and bear them without once opening their mouths will you, I say, if any pain should by chance attack you, cry out like a woman ? Will you not rather bear it with resolution and constan. ON BEARING PAIN. 83 cy ? and not cry, It is intolerable ; nature cannot bear it ! I hear what you say : Boys bear this because they are led thereto by glory ; some bear it through shame, many through fear, and yet are we afraid that nature cannot bear what is borne by many, and in such different cir- cumstances? Nature not only bears it, but challenges it, for there is nothing with her preferable, nothing which she desires more than credit, and reputation, and praise, and honor, and glory. I choose here to describe this one thing under many names, and I have used many that you may have the clearer idea of it ; for what I mean to say is, that whatever is desirable of itself, proceeding from vir- tue, or placed in virtue, and commendable on its own ac- count (which I would rather agree to call the only good than deny it to be the chief good) is what men should pre- fer above all things. And as we declare this to be the case with respect to honesty, so w^e speak in tlie contra- ry manner of infamy ; nothing is so odious, so detesta- ble, nothing so unworthy of a man. And if you are thor- oughly convinced of this (for, at the beginning of this dis- course, you allowed that there appeared to you more evil in infamy than in pain), it follows that you ought to have the command over yourself, though I scarcely know how this expression may seem an accurate one, which appears to represent man as made up of two natures, so that one should be in command and the other be subject to it. XXI. Yet this division does not proceed from igno- rance; for the soul admits of a twofold division, one of which partakes of reason, the other is wdtliout it. When, therefore, we are ordered to give a law to ourselves, the meaning is, that reason should restrain our rashness. There is in the soul of every man something naturally soft, low, enervated in a manner, and languid. Were there nothing besides this, men would be the greatest of mon- sters ; but there is present to every man reason, which pre- sides over and gives laws to all ; which, by improving it- self, and making continual advances, becomes perfect vir- tue. It behooves a man, then, to take care that reason shall have the command over that part wdiich is bound to practise obedience. In what manner? you will say. Why, as a master has over his slave, a general over his 84 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. army, a father over his son. If that part of the soul which I have called soft behaves disgracefully, if it gives itself up to lamentations and womanish tears, then let it be restrained, and committed to tlie care of friends and relations, for we often see those persons brought to or- der by shame whom no reasons can influence. Therefore, we should confiire those feelings, like our servants, in safe custody, and almost with chains. But those who have more resolution, and yet are not utterly immovable, we should encourage with our exhortations, as we would good soldiers, to recollect themselves, and maintain their honor. That wisest man of all Greece, in the Niptrae, does not la- ment too much over his wounds, or, rather, he is moderate in his grief : Move slow, my fiiends ; your hasty speed refrain, Lest by your motion you increase my pain. Pacuvius is better in this than Sophocles, for in the one Ulysses bemoans his wounds too vehemently; for the veiy people who carried him after he was wounded, though his grief was moderate, yet, considering the dignity of the man, did not scruple to say, And thou, Ulysses, long to war inured, Thy wounds, though great, too feebly hast endured. The wise poet understood that custom was no contempti- ble instructor how to bear pain. But the same hero com- plains with more decency, though in great j^ain : Assist, support me, never leave me so ; Unbind my wounds, oh ! execrable woe ! He begins to give way, but instantly checks himself: Away ! begone ! but cover first tlie sore ; For your rude hands but make my pains the more. Do you observe how he constrains himself? not that his bodily pains were less, but because lie checks the anguish of his mind. Therefore, in the conclusion of the Niptrae, he blames others, even when he himself is dying : Complaints of fortune may become the man, None but a woman will thus weeping stand. ON BEARING TAIN. 86 And so that soft place in liis soul obeys his reason, just as an abashed soldier does his stern commander. XXII. The man, then, in whom absolute wisdom exists (such a man, indeed, we have never as yet seen, but the philosophers have described in their writings what sort of man he will be, if he should exist) ; such a man, or at least that perfect and absolute reason which exists in him, will have the same authority over the inferior part as a good parent has over his dutiful children : he will bring it to obey his nod without any trouble or difficulty. He will rouse himself, prepare and arm himself, to oppose pain as he would an enemy. If you inquire what arms he will provide himself with, they will be contention, encourage- ment, discourse with himself. He will say thus to himself: Take care that you are guilty of nothing base, languid, or unmanly. He will turn over in his mind all the different kinds of honor. Zeno of Elea will occur to him, who suf- fered everything rather than betray his confederates in the design of putting an end to the tyranny. He will reflect on Anaxarchus, the pupil of Democritus, who, having fall- en into the hands of Nicocreon, King of Cyprus, without the least entreaty for mercy or refusal, submitted to every kind of torture. Calanus the Indian will occur to him, an ignorant man and a barbarian, born at the foot of Mount Caucasus, who committed himself to the flames by his own free, voluntary act. But we, if we have the toothache, or a pain in the foot, or if the body be anyways affected, cannot bear it. For our sentiments of pain as well as pleasure are so trifling and effeminate, we are so enervated and relaxed by luxuries, that we cannot bear the sting of a bee without crying out. But Caius Marius, a plain countryman, but of a manly soul, when he had an operation performed on him, as I mentioned above, at first refused to be tied down ; and he is the first instance of any one's having had an operation performed on him without be- ing tied down. Why, then, did others bear it afterward ? Why, from the force of example. You see, then, that pain exists more in opinion than in nature; and yet the same Marius gave a proof that there is something very sharp in pain, for he would not submit to have the other thigh cut. So that he bore his pain with resolution as a man ; but, 86 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. like a reasonable person, he was not willing to undergo any greater j^ain without some necessary reason. The whole, then, consists in this that you should have com- mand over yourself. I have already told you wliat kind of command this is ; and by considering what is most con- sistent with patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul, a man not only restrains himself, but, somehow or otlier, mit- igates even pain itself. XXIII. Even as in a battle the dastardly and timorous soldier throws away his shield on the first appearance of an enemy, and runs as fast as he can, and on that account loses his life sometimcG, though he has never received even one wound, wlicn he who stands his ground has noth- ing of the sort happen to him, so they who cannot bear the appearance of pain throw themselves away, and give themselves up to affliction and dismay. But they that oppose it, often come off more than a match for it. For the body has a certain resemblance to the soul: as bur- dens ai'e more easily borne the more the body is exerted, while they crush us if we give way, so the soul by exert- ing itself resists tlie whole weight that would oppress it; but if it yields, it is so pressed that it cannot support it- self. And if Ave consider tilings truly, the soul should ex- ert itself in every pursuit, for that is the only security for its doing its duty. But this should be principally regard- ed in pain, that we must not do anything timidly, or das- tardly, or basely, or slavishly, or effeminately, and, above all things, we must dismiss and avoid that Philoctetean sort of outcry. A man is allowed sometimes to groan, but yet seldom ; but it is not permissible even in a woman to howl ; for such a noise as this is forbidden, by the twelve tables, to be used even at funerals. Nor does a wise or brave man ever groan, unless when he exerts himself to give his resolution greater force, as they who run in the stadium make as much noise as they can. The wrestlers, too, do the same when they are training; and the boxers, when they aim a blow with the cestus at their adversary, give a groan, not because they are in pain, or from a sink- ing of their spirits, but because their whole body is put upon the stretch by the throwing-out of these groans, and the blow comes the stroncjer ON BEARING PAIN. 87 XXIV. What ! they who would speak louder than ordi- nary, are they satisfied with working their jaws, sides, or tongue, or stretching the common organs of speech and utterance? The whole body and every muscle is at full stretch, if I may be allowed the expression ; every nerve is exerted to assist their voice. I have actually seen the knees of Marcus Antonius touch the ground when he was speak- ing with vehemence for himself, with relation to the Ya- rian law. For, as the engines you throw stones or darts with throw them out with the greater force the more they are strained and drawn back; so it is in speaking, run- ning, or boxing the more people strain themselves, the greater their force. Since, therefore, this exertion has so much influence if in a moment of pain groans help to strengthen the mind, let us use them; but if they be groans of lamentation, if they be the expression of weak- ness or abjectness, or unmanly weeping, then I should scarcely call him a man who yielded to them. For even supposing that such groaning could give any ease, it still should be considered whether it v/ere consistent with a brave and resolute man. But if it does not ease our pain, why should we debase ourselves to no purpose? For what is more unbecoming in a man than to cry like a woman? But this precept which is laid down with re- spect to pain is not confined to it. We should apply this exertion of the soul to everything else. Is anger in- flamed? is lust excited? we must have recourse to the same citadel, and apply to the same arms. But since it is pain which we are at present discussing, we will let the other subjects alone. To bear pain, then, sedately and calmly, it is of great use to consider Avith all our soul, as the saying is, how noble it is to do so, for we are naturally desirous (as I said before, but it cannot be too often re- peated) and very much inclined to what is honorable, of which, if we discover but the least glimpse, there is noth- ing which we are not prepared to undergo and suffer to attain it. From this impulse of our minds, this desire for genuine glory and honorable conduct, it is that such dan- gers are supported in war, and that brave men are not sensible of their wounds in action, or, if they are sensible of them, prefer death to the departing but the leflst step 88 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. from their honor. The Decii saw the shining swords of their enemies when they were rusliing into tlie battle. But the honorable character and the glory of tlie death whicli they were seeking made all fear of death of lit- tle weight. Do you imagine that Epaminondas groaned when he perceived that his life was flowing out with his blood? No; for he left his country triumphing over the Lacedgemonians, whereas he had found it in subjection to them. These are the comforts, these are the things that assuage the greatest pain. XXV. You may ask, How the case is in peace? What is to be done at home ? How we are to beliave in bed ? You bring me back to the jDhilosopherSj who seldom go to war. Among these, Dionysius of Heraclea, a man cer- tainly of no resolution, having learned fortitude of Zeno, quitted it on being in pain ; for, being tormented with a pain in his kidneys, in bewailing himself he cried out that those things were false which ho had formerly conceived of pain. And when his fellow-disciple, Cleanthes, asked him why he had changed his opinion, he answered, " That the case of any man who had applied so much time to philosophy, and yet was unable to bear pain, might be a sufHcient proof that pain is an evil ; that he himself had spent many years at philosophy, and yet could not bear pain : it followed, therefore, that pain was an evil." It is reported that Cleanthes on that struck his foot on the groimd, and repeated a verse out of the Epigonae: Amphiaraus, hear'st thou this below? He meant Zeno: he was sorry the other had degenerated from him. But it was not so with our friend Posidonius, whom 1 have often seen myself ; and I will tell you what Pompey used to say of him : that when he came to Rhodes, after his departure from Syria, he had a great desire to hear Posidonius, but was informed that he was very ill of a se- vere fit of the gout; yet he had great inclitiation to pay a visit to so famous a ])hilosopher. Accordingly, when he had seen him, and paid his com])liments, and had spoken with great respect of him, he said he was very sorry that he could not hear him lecture. "But indeed you may," ON BEARING PAIN. 89 replied the other, " nor will I suffer any bodily pain to oc- casion so great a man to visit me in vain." On this Pom- l^ey relates that, as he lay on his bed, he disputed with great dignity and fluency on this very subject : that noth- ing was good but what was honest; and that in his par- oxysms he would often say, " Pain, it is to no purpose ; notwithstanding you are troublesome, I will never ac- knowledge you an evil." And in general all celebrated and notorious afflictions become endurable by disregard- ing them. XXVI. Do we not observe that where those exercises called gymnastic are in esteem, those who enter the lists never concern themselves about dangers? that where the praise of riding and hunting is highly esteemed, they who practice these arts decline no pain ? What shall I say of our own ambitious pursuits or desire of honors ? What fire have not candidates run through to gain a single vote? Therefore Africanus had always in his hands Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, being particularly pleased w^ith his saying, that the same labors were not equally heavy to the general and to the common man, because the honor itself made the labor lighter to the general. But yet, so it happens, that even with the illiterate vulgar an idea of honor is of great influence, though they cannot un- derstand what it is. They are led by report and common opinion to look on that as honorable whicli has the general voice. Not that I would have you, should the multitude be ever so fond of you, rely on their judgment, nor ap- prove of everything which they think right: you must use your own judgment. If you are satisfied with your- self when you have approved of what is right, you will not only have the mastery over yourself (which I recom- mended to you just now), but over everybody, and every- thing. Lay this down, then, as a rule, that a great ca- pacity, and lofty elevation of soul, which distinguishes it- self most by despising and looking down with contempt on pain, is the most excellent of all things, and the more so if it does not depend on the people and does not aim at applause, but derives its satisfaction from itself. Besides, to me, indeed, everything seems the more commendable the less the peo])le are courted, and the fewer eyes there 90 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. are to see it. ISTot that you should avoid the public, for every generous action loves the public view ; yet no the- atre for virtue is equal to a consciousness of it. XXVII. And let this be principally considered : that this bearing of pain, which I have often said is to be strengthened by an exertion of the soul, should be the s^me in everything. For you meet with many who, through a desire of victory, or for glory, or to maintain their rights, or their liberty, liave boldly received wounds, and borne themselves up under them ; and yet those very same persons, by relaxing that intenseness of their minds, were unequal to bearing the pain of a disease; for they did not support themselves under their former sufferings by reason or philosophy, but by inclination and glory. Therefore some barbarians and savage people are able to fight very stoutly with the sword, but cannot bear sick- ness like men ; but the Grecians, men of no great courage, but as wise as human nature will admit of, cannot look an enemy in the face, yet the same will bear to be visited with sickness tolerably, and with a sufficiently manly spir- it; and the Cimbrians and Celtiberians are very alert in battle, but bemoan themselves in sickness. For nothing can be consistent which has not reason for its foundation. But when you see those who are led by inclination or opinion, not retarded by pain in their pursuits, nor hin- dered by it from succeeding in them, you may conclude, either that pain is no evil, or that, notwithstanding you may choose to call an evil whatever is disagreeable and contrary to nature, yet it is so very trifling an evil that it may so effectually be got the better of by virtue as quite to disappear. And I would have you tliink of this night and day ; for this argument will spread itself, and take up more room some time or other, and not be confined to pain alone; for if the motives to all our actions are to avoid disgrace and acquire honor, we may not only despise the stings of pain, but the storms of fortune, especially if we have recourse to that retreat which Avas pointed out in our yesterday's discussion ; for, as if some God had ad- vised a man who was pursued by pirates to throw himself overboard, saying, "There is something at hand to receive you; either a dolphin will take you up, as it did Arion of ON GtllEF OF MIND. 91 Methymna; or those horses sent by Neptune to Pelops (who are said to have carried chariots so rapidly as to be borne up by the waves) will receive you, and convey you wherever you please. Cast away all fear." So, though your pains be ever so sharp and disagreeable, if tbe case is not_ such that it is worth your while to endure them, you see whither you may betake yourself. I think this will do for the present. But perhaps you still abide by your opinion. A. Not in the least, indeed ; and I hope I am freed by these two days' discourses from the fear of two things that I greatly dreaded. M. To-morrow, then, for rhetoric, as we were saying. But I see we must not drop our philosophy. A. No, indeed ; we will have the one in the forenoon, and this at the usual time. 31. It shall be so, and I will comply with your very laudable inclinations. BOOK III. ON GRIEF OF MIXD. I. What reason shall I assign, O Brutus, wdiy, as we consist ol; mind and body, the art of curing and preserv- ing the body should be so much sought after, and the in- vention of it, as being so useful, should be ascribed to the immortal Gods; but the medicine of the mind should not have been so much the object of inquiry while it was un- known, nor so much attended to and cultivated after its discovery, nor so well received or approved of by some, and accounted actually disagreeable, and looked upon with an envious eye by many ? Is it because we, by means of the mind, judge of the pains and disorders of the body, but do not, by means of the body, arrive at any perception of the disorders of the mind ? Hence it comes that the mind only judges of itself when that very faculty by which it is judged is in a bad state. Had nature given us facul- ties for discerning and viewing herself, and could we go through life by keeping our eye on her our best guide 92 thp: tusculan disputations. there would be no reason certainly why any one should be in want of philosophy or learning; but, as it is, she has furnished us only with some feeble rays of light, which we immediately extinguish so completely by evil habits and erroneous opinions that the light of nature is nowhere visible. The seeds of virtues are natural to our constitu- tions, and, were they suffered to come to maturity, would naturally conduct us to a happy life; but now, as soon as we are born and received into the world, we are instantly familiarized with all kinds of depravity and perversity of opinions; so that we may be said almost to suck in error with our nurse's milk. When we return to our parents, and are put into the hands of tutors and governors, we are imbued with so many errors that truth gives place to falsehood, and nature herself to established opinion. II. To these we may add the poets ; who, on account of the appearance they exhibit of learning and wisdom, are heard, read, and got by heart, and make a deep impres- sion on our minds. But when to these are added the peo- ple, who are, as it were, one great body of instructors, and the multitude, who declare unanimously for what is wrong, then are we altogether overwhelmed with bad opinions, and revolt entirely from nature; so that they seem to de- prive us of our best guide who have decided that there is nothing better for man, nothing more worthy of being de- sired by him, nothing more excellent, than honors and commands, and a high reputation with the people ; which indeed every excellent man aims at ; but while he pursues that only true honor which nature has in view above all other objects, he finds himself busied in arrant trifles, and in pursuit of no conspicuous form of virtue, but only some shadowy representation of glory. For glory is a real and express substance, not a mere shadow. It consists in the united praise of good men, the free voice of those who form a true judgment of pre-eminent virtue; it is, as it were, the very echo of virtue; and being generally the attendant on laudable actions, should not be slighted by good men. But popular fame, which would pretend to imitate it, is hasty and inconsiderate, and generally com- mends wicked and immoral actions, and throws discredit upon the appearance and beauty of honesty by assuming ON GRIEF OF MIND. 93 a resemblance of it. And it is owing to their not beii liv- able to discover the difference between them that some men, ignorant of real excellence, and in what it consists, have been the destruction of their country and of them- selves. And thus the best men have erred, not so much in their intentions as by a mistaken conduct. What? is no cure to be attempted to be applied to those who are carried away by the love of money, or the lust of pleasures, by which they are rendered little short of madmen, which is the case of all weak people ? or is it because the disor- ders of the mind are less dangerous than those of the body ? or because the body will admit of a cure, while thei'c is no medicine whatever for the mind ? III. But there are more disorders of the mind than of the body, and they are of a more dangerous nature ; for these very disorders are the more offensive because they belong to the mind and disturb it; and the mind^ when disordered, is, as Ennius says, in a constant error : it can neither bear nor endure anything, and is under the per- petual influence of desires. Now, what disorders can be worse to the body than these tv\^o distempers of the mind (for I overlook others), weakness and desire? But how, indeed, can it be maintained that the mind cannot pre- scribe for itself, when she it is who has invented the med- icines for the body, when, witli regard to bodily cures, constitution and nature have a great share, nor do all who suffer themselves to be cured find tliat effect instantly; but those minds which are disposed to bo cured, and sub- mit to the precepts of the wise, may undoubtedly recover a healthy state ? Philosophy is certainly the medicine of the soul, whose assistance we do not seek from abroad, as in bodily disorders, but we ourselves are bound to exert our utmost energy and power in order to effect our cure. But as to philosophy in general, I have, I think, in my Hortensius, sufficiently spoken of the credit and attention which it deserves: since that, indeed, I have been contin- ually either disputing or writing on its most material branches ; and I have laid down in these books all the dis- cussions which took place between myself and my particu- lar friends at my Tusculan villa. But as I have spoken in the two former of pain and death, this book shall be 94 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. devoted to the account of the third day of our disputa- tions. We came down into the Academy when the day was ah-eady declining towards afternoon, and I asked one of those who were present to propose a subject for us to dis- course on ; and then the business was carried on in this manner : IV. A. My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief. M. What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts, anger? For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call TraOri. I might call them diseases, and that would be a literal translation, but it is not agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy, delight, and pleasure are all called by the Greeks diseases, being affections of the mind not in subordination to reason ; but we, I think, are right in calling the same motions of a disturbed soul perturbations, and in very seldom using the term diseases; though, perhaps, it appears otherwise to you. A. I am of your opinion. M. And do you think a wise man subject to these? A. Entirely, I think. M. Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so little from madness ? A. What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness? 31. Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been surprised at it, that it appeared so to our an- cestors many ages before Socrates; from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to life and morals. A. How so ? M. Because the name madness^ implies a sickness of the mind and disease ; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind, which they call madness. But the philosophers call all perturbations of the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from these ; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all fools arc diseased ; thei'efore all fools are mad. For they held that soundness of the mind depends on a cer- * Insnniii from in, a particle of negative force in composition, and sanus, Jjcalthy, sound. ON GRIEF OF MIND. 96 tain tranquillity and steadiness; and a mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane, because soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much as with a disordered body. V. Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid of the light of the mind, " a being out of one's mind," ''' a being beside one's self." From whence we may understand that they who gave these names to things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly people were unsound, which the Stoics have care- fully preserved as being derived from him ; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as I just now said, the philoso- phers call all perturbed motions of the mind distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sick- ness. Hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one's mind: and these are much better ex- pressed by the Latin words than the Greek, which you will find the case also in many other topics. But we will discuss that point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject. The very meaning of the word de- scribes the whole thing about which we are inquiring, both as to its substance and character. For we must necessarily understand by "sound" those whose minds are under no perturbation from any motion as if it were a disease. They who are differently affected we must necessarily call "unsound." So that nothing is better than what is usual in Latin, to say that they who are run away with by their lust or anger have quitted the com- mand over themselves; though anger includes lust, for anger is defined to be the lust of revenge. They, then, who are said not to be masters of themselves, are said to be so because they are not under the government of reason, to which is assigned by nature the power over the whole soul. Why the Greeks should call this ixavia^ I do not easily apprehend; but we define it much bet- ter than they, for we distinguish this madness {insania), which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what we call furor, or raving. The Greeks, indeed, would do so too, l3ut they have no one word that will express it : what we call furor, they call fieXayxoXia, as if the reason 96 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. were affected only by a black bile, and not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or grief. Thus we say Athamas, Alcmajon, Ajax, and Orestes were raving (fu- rere) ; because a person affected in this manner was not allowed by the Twelve Tables to have the management of his own affairs ; therefore the words are not, if he is mad {insamis), but if he begins to be raving (furiosus). For they looked upon madness to be an unsettled humor that proceeded froui not being of sound mind ; yet such a person might perform his ordinary duties, and dis- charge the usual and customary requirements of life : but they considered one that v>'as raving as afflicted with a total blindness of the mind, which, notwithstanding it is allowed to be greater than madness, is nevertheless of such a nature that a wise man may be subject to raving (furor), but cannot possibly be afflicted by insanity (in- sania). But this is another question: let us now return to our original subject. VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was liable to grief. A. And so, indeed, I think. 31. It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls, which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm ; nor did that Grantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our Academy lias ever pro(5uced, say this amiss : " I am by no means of their opinion who talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility, which neither can exist, nor ought to exist. " I would choose," says he, " never to be ill ; but should I be so, still I should choose to retain my sensa- tion, whether there was to be an amputation or any other separation of anything from my body. For that insensi- bility cannot be but at the expense of some unnatural fe- rocity of mind, or stupor of body." But let us consider whether to talk in this manner be not allowing that we are weak, and yielding to our softness. Notwithstanding, let us be hardy enough, not only to lop oft' every arm of our miseries, but even to pluck up every fibre of their roots. Yet still something, perhaps, may be left behind, so deep does folly strike its roots: but whatever may be ON GRIEF OF MIND. 97 left, it will bo no more than is necessary. Bat let us be persuaded of this, that unless the mind be in a sound state, which philosophy alone can effect, there can be no end of our miseries. Wherefore, as we began, let us submit our- selves to it for a cure ; we shall be cured if we choose to be. I shall advance something further. I shall not treat of grief alone, though that indeed is the principal thing; but, as I originally proposed, of every perturbation of the mind, as I termed it; disorder, as the Greeks call it: and first, witli your leave, I shall treat it in the manner of the Stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into a very small space; afterward I shall enlarge more in my own way. VII. A man of courage is also full of faith. I do not use the word confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from confiding, which is commendable. But he who is full of faith is certainly un- der no fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith and fear. Now, whoever is subject to grief is subject to fear; for whatever things we grieve at when present we dread when hanging over us and approaching. Thus it comes about that grief is inconsistent with courage : it is very probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to grief is also liable to fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and sinking. Now, whenever these befall a man, he is in a servile state, and must own that he is overpowered ; for whoever admits these feelings, must admit timidity and cowardice. But these cannot enter into the mind of a man of courage; neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of courage is the only wise man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise man. It is, besides, necessary that w^hoever is brave should be a man of great soul ; that whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible ; whoever is in- vincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and considers them beneath him. But no one can despise those things on account of which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows that a wise man is never af- fected with grief : for all wise men are brave ; therefore a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye, when disordered, is not in a good condition for performing its 5 98 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. office properly ; and as the other parts, and the whole body itself, when unsettled, cannot perform their office and business ; so the mind, when disordered, is but ill- fitted to perform its duty. The office of the mind is to use its reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in condition to make the best use of his reason, and there- fore is never out of order. But grief is a disorder of the mind ; therefore a wise man will be always free from it. VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call aojcppioy: and they call that virtue (rojtppocruvrjy, which I at one time call temperance, at another time mod- eration, and sometimes even modesty; but I do not know whether that virtue may not be properly called frugality, which has a more confined meaning with the Greeks; for they call frugal men -xprjcrlfiovg, which implies only that they are useful; but our name has a more extensive mean- ing: for all abstinence, all innocency (which the Greeks have no ordinary name for, though they might use the word a/3\a/3fta, for innocency is that disposition of mind which would offend no one) and several other virtues are comprehended under frugality; but if this quality were of less importance, and confined in as small a compass as some imagine, the surname of Piso^ would not have been in so great esteem. But as we allow him not the name of a frugal man [frugi), who either quits his post through fear, which is cowardice; or who reserves to his own use what was privately committed to his keeping, which is in- justice; or who fails in his military undertakings through- rashness, which is folly for that reason the word frugali- ty takes in these three virtues of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though it is indeed common to all virtues, for they are all connected and knit together. Let us allow, then, frugality itself to be another and fourth virtue; for its peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all tendencies to too eager a desire after anything, to re- strain lust, and to preserve a decent steadiness in every- thing. The vice in contrast to this is called prodigality (nequitia). Frugality, I imagine, is derived from the * The man who first received this surname was L. Calpiirnins Piso, who was consul, 133 B.C., in the Servile War. ON GRIEF OF MIND. 99 word /ri/^e, the best thing wliicli tlie earth produces; ne- quitia is derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained; still, let us try it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if there is nothing in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no purpose {nequicquam) in such a man ; from which circumstance he is called also Nihil, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more agreeable to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of course be consistent ; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet man must be free from all per- turbation, therefore from grief likewise: and these are the properties of a wise man ; therefore a wise man must be f i-ee from grief. IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of Achilles in Homer, Well hast thon spoke, but at the tyrant's name My rage rekindles, and my soul's in flame : 'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave, Disgraced, dishonor'd like the vilest slave^ he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with a swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of order? But the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of disorder: it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in anger is in a different state. A wise man, there- fore, is never angry; for when he is angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry naturally has a longing desire to give all the pain he can to the person who he thinks has injured him; and whoever has this earnest desire must necessarily be much pleased with the accom- plishment of his wishes; hence he is delighted with his neighbor's misery; and as a wise man is not capable of such feelings as these, he is therefore not capable of anger. But should a wise man be subject to grief, he may like- * The Greek is, 'AWri /uot oibitveTat Kpahit] x6\io ottttot' 6Ke'ivov MvrjaoiJiut 09 ix ucTu^t]\ov tf 'Ap-yet'oto-tv tpe^ev. II. ix. 642. I have given Pope's translation in the text. 100 TJIE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. wise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must likewise be free from grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to grief, he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a disposition towards envy {inviden- tki) ; I do not say to envy {invidia), for that can only ex- ist by the very act of envying : but we may fairly form the word invidentia from invidendo, and so avoid the doubt- ful name iiividla; for this word is probably derived from in and video, looking too closely into another's fortune ; as it is said in the Melanippus, Who envies me the flower of my children ? where the Latin is invidit florem. It may appear not good Latin, but it is very well put by Accius ; for as video governs an accusative case, so it is more correct to say in- video floretn than j^or/. We are debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own right, and expressed himself with more freedom. X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man ; for whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity is also uneasy at another's prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his companion Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of Alexander; and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with a man of the greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make use of his good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from the misfortunes of an- other, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from the good success of another : therefore whoever is capable of pity is capable of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently incapable of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also would be familiar to him ; there- fore to grieve is a feeling which cannot affect a Avise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and their con- clusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and manly turn of thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics, notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language, do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases ON GRIEF OF MIND. , , , _101 o ' ,--' ' iv '' ' ,'- ' " ' of the soul which they insist lipon ;foi^ every ^i;l,t)l6tiglt moderate, is in its nature great. But our object is to make out that tlie wise man is free from all evil ; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so slightly affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its soundness; therefoi-e the Romans have, with their usual accuracy of expression, called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of the analogy between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. The Greeks call all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name; for they name every turbid motion of the soul ttuSoc, that is to say, a dis- temper. But we have given them a more proper name ; for a disorder of the mind is very like a disease of the body. But lust does not resemble sickness ; neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated and exulting pleas- ure of the mind. Fear, too, is not very like a distemper, though it is akin to grief of mind, but properly, as is also the case with sickness of the body, so too sickness of mind has no name separated from pain. And therefore I must explain the origin of this pain, that is to say, the cause that occasions this grief in the mind, as if it were a sickness of the body. For as physicians think they have found out the cure when they have discovered the cause of the dis- temper, so we shall discover tlie method of curing melan- choly when the cause of it is found out. XL The wdiole cause, then, is in opinion; and this ob- servation applies not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which are of four sorts, but consist- ing of many parts. For as every disorder or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in de- spite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations are divided equally into two parts : for two of them proceed from an opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say, a joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present great good ; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a lust, and is an immoderate inclination af- ter some conceived great good without any obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the exulting pleasure and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of good, as 102 .THE. TUSGIH^AN DISPUTATIONS. the^bthev tY^o, ie&r m\^ ^nfe'f, have from an opinion of evil. For fear is an opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief is an opinion of some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freslily conceived o])inion of an evil so great that to grieve at it seems right: it is of that kind that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good reason to be so. Now we should exert our utmost efforts to oppose these perturbations which are, as it were, so many furies let loose upon us and urged on by folly if we are desirous to pass this share of life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction. But of the other feelings I shall speak elsewhere : our business at present is to drive away grief if we can, for that shall be the object of our present dis- cussion, since you have said that it was your opinion that a wise man might be subject to grief, which I can by no means allow of; for it is a frightful, miserable, and detest- able thing, which we should fly from with our utmost ef- forts with all our sails and oars, as I may say. XIL That descendant of Tantalus, how does he appear to you he who sprung from Pelops, who formerly stole Ilippodamia from her father-in-law. King (Enomaus, and married her by force? he who was descended from Ju- piter himself, how broken-hearted and dispirited does he not seem ! Stand off, my friends, nor come within my shade, That no pollutions your sound hearts pervade, So foul a stain my body doth partake. Will you condemn yourself, Thyestes, and deprive yourself of life, on account of the greatness of another's crime? What do you think of that son of Pha3bus? Do you not look upon him as unworthy of his own father's light? Hollow his eyes, his body worn away. His furrow'd cheeks his frequent tears betray ; His beard neglected, and his hoary hairs Hough and uncomb'd, bespeak his bitter cares. O foolish ^etes ! these are evils which you yourself have been the cause of, and are not occasioned by any accidents with which chance has visited you; and you behaved as you did, even after you had been inured to your distress, and after the first swelling of the mind had subsided ! whereas grief consists (as I shall show) in the notion of ON GRIEF OF MIND. 103 some recent evil but your grief, it is very plain, proceeded from the loss of your kingdom, not of your daughter, for you hated her, and perhaps with reason, but you could not calmly bear to part with your kingdom. But surely it is an impudent grief which preys upon a man for not be- ing able to command those that are free. Dionysius, it is true, the tyrant of Syracuse, when driven from his country, taught a school at Corinth ; so incapable was he of living without some authority. But what could be more impu- dent than Tarquin, who made war upon those who could not bear his tyranny; and, Avhen he could not recover his kingdom by the aid of the forces of the Veientians and the Latins, is said to have betaken himself to Cuma, and to have died in that city of old age and grief ! XIII. Do you, then, think that it can befall a wise man to be oppressed with grief, that is to say, with misery ? for, as all perturbation is misery, grief is the rack itself. Lust is attended with heat, exulting joy with levity, fear with meanness, but grief with something greater than these ; it consumes, torments, afflicts, and disgraces a man ; it tears him, preys upon his mind, and utterly destroys him : if we do not so divest ourselves of it as to throw it completely off, we cannot be free from misery. And it is clear that there must be grief where anything has the ap- pearance of a present sore and oppressing evil. Epicurus is of opinion that grief arises naturally from the imagina- tion of any evil; so that whosoever is eye-witness of any great misfortune, if he conceives that the like may pos- sibly befall himself, becomes sad instantly from such an idea. The Cyrenaics think that grief is not engendered by every kind of evil, but only by unexpected, unforeseen evil; and that circumstance is, indeed, of no small effect on the heightening of grief; for whatsoever comes of a sudden appears more formidable. Hence these Hues are deservedly commended : I knew my son, when first he drew his breath, Destined by fate to an untimely death ; And when I sent him to defend the Greeks, War was his business, not your sportive freaks. Xiy. Therefore, this ruminating beforehand upon fut- ure evils which you see at a distance makes their approach 104 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. more tolerable ; and on this account what Euripides makes Theseus say is much commended. You will give me leave to translate them, as is usual with me : I treasured up what some learn'd sage did tell, And on my future misery did dwell ; I thought of bitter death, of being drove Far from my home by exile, and I strove With every evil to possess my mind. That, when they came,.I the less care might find.^ But Euripides says that of himself, which Theseus said he had heard from some learned man, for the poet had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, who, as they relate, on hearing of the death of his son, said, " I knew that my son was mor- tal;" which speech seems to intimate that such tilings afflict those men who have not thought on them befoi-e. Therefore, there is no doubt but that all those things whicli are considered evils are the heavier from not being fore- seen. Though, notwithstanding this is not the only cir- cumstance which occasions the greatest grief, still, as the mind, by foreseeing and preparing for it, has great power to make all grief the less, a man should at all times consid- er all the events that may befall him in this life ; and cer- tainly the excellence and divine nature of wisdom consists in taking a near view of, and gaining a thorough acquaint- ance with, all human affairs, in not being surprised when anything happens, and in thinking, before the event, that there is nothing but what may come to pass. Wherefore ev'ry man, When his affairs go on most swimmingly, E'en then it most behooves to arm himself Against the coming storm : loss, danger, exile, Returning ever, let him look to meet ; His son in fault, wife dead, or daughter sick : All common accidents, and may have happen'd That nothing shall seem new or strange. But if Aught has fall'n out beyond his hopes, all that Let him account clear gain.'' * This is from the Theseus : 'Eyu> 6e TOVTO napu croopiii t' t/3aXA<)jLinv (jyv^dv'T e/iufTcp 7rpo(TT(/t<9 Trarpav fr7i)9. OavuTOVi t' uwpov^, Kai kukwv (iXXay odovv M>; fioi vkopjov npoamaov jUaWoi/ duKOi. Tcr. rhorm. II. i. 11. ON GRIEF OF MIND. 105 XV. Therefore, as Terence has so well expressed what he borrowed from philosophy, shall not we, from whose fountains he drew it, say the same thing in a better man- ner, and abide by it witli more steadiness ? Hence came that steady countenance, whicli, according to Xantippe, her husband Socrates always had; so that she said that she never observed any difference in his looks when he went out and when he came home. Yet the look of that old Roman, M. Crassus, who, as Lucilius says, never smiled but once in his lifetime, was not of this kind, but placid and serene, for so we are told. He, indeed, might well have had the same look at all times who never changed his mind, from which the countenance derives its expres- sion. So that I am ready to borrow of the Cyrenaics those arms against the accidents and events of life by means of which, by long premeditation, they break the force of all approaching evils; and at the same time I think that those very evils themselves arise more from opinion tlian nature, for if they were real, no forecast could make them lighter. But I shall speak more particularly on these matters after I have first considered Epicurus's opinion, who thinks that all people must necessarily be uneasy who believe themselves to be in any evils, let them be either foreseen and expected, or habitual to them; for with him evils are not the less by reason of their contin- uance, nor the lighter for having been foreseen ; and it is folly to ruminate on evils to come, or such as, perhaps, never may come : every evil is disagreeable enough when it does come ; but he who is constantly considering that some evil may befall him is loading himself with a perpet- ual evil ; and even should such evil never light on him, he voluntarily takes upon himself uimecessary misery, so that he is under constant uneasiness, whether he actually suf- fers any evil, or only thinks of it. But he makes the alle- viation of grief depend on two things a ceasing to think on evil, and a turning to the contemplntion of pleasure. For he thinks that the mind may possibly be under the power of reason, and follow her directions : he forbids us, therefore, to mind trouble, and calls us off from sorrowful reflections; he throws a mist over our eyes to hinder us from the contemplation of misery. Having sounded a rc- 5* 106 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. treat from this statement, he drives our thoughts on again, and encouraojes them to view and enoraoe the wliole mind in the various pleasures with which he thinks the life of a wise man abounds, either from reflecting on the past, or from the hope of what is to come. I have said tliese things in my own way ; the Epicureans have theirs. How- ever, let us examine what they say ; how they say it is of little consequence. XVI. In the first place, they are wrong in forbidding men to premeditate on futurity and blaming their wish to do so ; for there, is nothing that breaks the edge of grief and lightens it more tlian considering, during one's whole life, that there is nothing which it is impossible should happen, or than, considering what human nature is, on what conditions life was given, and how we may comply with them. The effect of which is that we are always grieving, but that we never do so ; for whoever reflects on the nature of things, the various turns of life, and the weak- ness of human nature, grieves, indeed, at that reflection ; but while so grieving he is, above all other times, behaving as a wise man, for he gains these two things by it: one, that while he is considering the state of human nature he is performing the especial duties of philosophy, and is pro- vided with a triple medicine against adversity in the first place, because he has long reflected that such things might befall him, and this reflection by itself contributes much towards lessening and weakening all misfortunes; and, sec- ondly, because he is persuaded that we should bear all the accidents which can happen to man with the feelings and spirit of a man; and, lastly, because he considers that what is blamable is the only evil. But it is not your fault that something haj happened to you which it was impossible for man to avoid. For that withdrawing of our thoughts which he recommends when he calls us off from contem- plating our misfortunes is an imaginary action ; for it is not in our power to dissemble or to forget those evils which lie heavy on us; they tear, vex, and sting us they burn us up, and leave no breathing-time. And do you order us to forget them (for such forgetfulness is contrary to nat- ure), and at the same time deprive us of the only assist- ance which nature affords, the beinc: accustomed to them? ON GRIEF OF MIND. 107 For that, though it is but a slow medicine (I mean that which is brought by lapse of time), is still a very effectual one. You order me to employ my thoughts on something good, and forget my misfortunes. You would say some- thing Avorthy a great philosopher if you thought those things good which are best suited to the dignity of human nature. XVII. Should Pythagoras, Socrates, or Plato say to me, Why are you dejected or sad? Why do you faint, and yield to fortune, which, perhaps, may have power to harass and disturb you, but should not quite unman you? There is great power in the virtues ; rouse them, if they chance to droop. Take fortitude for your guide, which will give you such spirits that you will despise everything that can befall man, and look on it as a trifle. Add to this temper- ance, which is moderation, and which was just now called frugality, which will not suffer you to do anything base or bad for what is woi'se or baser than an effeminate man ? Not even justice will suffer you to act in this manner, though she seems to have the least weight in this affair ; but still, notwithstanding, even she will inform you that you are doubly unjust Avhen you both require what does not belong to you, inasmuch as though you who have been born mortal demand to be placed in the condition of the immortals, and at the same time you take it much to heart that you are to restore what was lent you. What answer will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one? And, indeed, if she were fettered by external circumstances, and dependent on others, and if she did not originate in herself and return to lierself, and also embrace everything in herself, so as to seek no adventitious aid from any quarter, I cannot imag- ine why she should appear deserving of such lofty pane- gyrics, or of being sought after with such excessive eager- ness. Now, Epicurus, if you call me back to such goods as these, I will obey you, and follow you, and use you as my guide, and even forget, as you order me, all my mis- fortunes ; and I will do this the more readily from a per- suasion that they are not to be ranked among evils at all. But you are for bringing my thoughts over to pleasure. 108 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. What pleasures? Pleasures of the body, I imagine, or such as are recollected or imagined on account of the body. Is this all? Do I explain your opinion riglitly? for your disciples are used to deny that we understand at all what -Epicurus means. This is what he says, and wliat that subtle fellow, old Zeno, who is one of the sharpest of them, used, when I was attending lectures at Athens, to enforce and talk so loudly of; saying that he alone was liappy who could enjoy present pleasure, and who was at the same time persuaded that he should enjoy it without pain, either during the whole or the greatest part of his life ; or if, should any pain interfere, if it was very sharp, then it must be short; should it be of longer continuance, it would have more of what was sweet than bitter in it; that whosoever reflected on these things would be happy, especially if satisfied with the good things which he had already enjoyed, and if he were without fear of death or of the Gods. XVIII. You have here a representation of a happy life according to Epicurus, in the words of Zeno, so that there is no room for contradiction in any j^oint. What, then ? Can the proposing and thinking of such a life make Thy- estes's grief the less, or ^etes's, of whom I spoke above, or Telamon's, who was driven from his country to penury and banishment? in wonder at whom men exclaimed thus: Is tliis the man surpassing glory raised? Is this that Telamon so highly praised By wondering Greece, at whose sight, like the sun, All others with diminish'd lustre shone ? Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink with the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers of antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries : for what great abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be without pain is the chief good? Yet that is not called pleasure. But it is not necessary at present to go through the whole : the question is, to what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that to be in pain is the great- est evil : whosoever, then, has proceeded so far as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of the greatest good ? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, ON GRIEF OF MIND. 109 and not allow in our own words the same feeling to be pleasure which you are used to boast of with such assur- ance? Are these your words or not?' This is what you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school; for I will perform on this occasion the office of a translator, lest any one should imagine that I am invent- ing anything. Thus you speak; "Nor can I form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those pleasures which are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing music, or abstracted from ideas raised by exter- nal objects visible to the eye, or by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which are perceived by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can it pos- sibly be said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by what is good, for I have perceived men's minds to be pleased with the hopes of enjoying those things which I mentioned above, and with the idea that it should enjoy them without any interruption from pain." And these are his exact words, so that any one may understand what were the pleasures with which Epicurus was ac- quainted. Then he speaks thus, a little lower down: "I have often inquired of those who have been called wise men what would be the remaining good if they should exclude from consideration all these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing but words. I could never learn any- thing from them; and unless they choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing, they must say with me that the only road to happiness lies through those pleasures which I mentioned above." What fol- lows is much the same, and his whole book on the chief good everywhere abounds with the same opinions. Will you, then, invite Telamon to this kind of life to ease his grief? And should you observe any one of your friends under affliction, would you rather prescribe him a stur- geon than a treatise of Socrates? or advise him to listen to the music of a water-organ rather than to Plato? or lay before him the beauty and variety of some garden, put a nosegay to his nose, burn perfumes before him, and bid him crown himself with a garland of roses and wood- bines? Should you add one thing more, you would cer- tainly wipe out all his grief. 110 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. XIX. Epicurus must admit these arguments, or he must take out of his book what I just now said was a literal translation ; or, rather, he must destroy his whole book, for it is crammed full of pleasures. We must inquire, then, how we can ease him of his grief who speaks in this manner: My present state proceeds from fortune's stings ; By birth I boast of a descent from kings; Hence may you see from what a noble height I"m sunic by fortune to this abject pHght. What! to ease his grief, must we mix him a cup of sweet wine, or something of that kind ? Lo ! the same poet pre- sents us with another sentiment somewhere else : I, Hector, once so great, now chiim your aid. We should assist her, for she looks out for help: Where shall I now ap])ly, where seek support ? Where hence betake me, or to whom resort ? No means reninin of comfort or of joy, In flames my pahice, and in ruins Troy ; Each wall, so late superb, deformed nods, And not an altar's left t' appease the Gods. You know^ what should follow, and particularly this : Of father, country, nnd of friends bereft, Not one of all tliese sumptuous temples left. Which, wbile tlie fortune of our house did stand, With rich-wrought ceilings spoke the artist's hand. O excellent poet ! though despised by those who sing the verses of Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set oft' the riches of Priam to the best ad- vantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance, what does he add ? Lo ! these all perish'd in one blazing pile ; The foe old Priam of bis life beguiled, And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled. Admirable poetry ! There is something mournful in the subject, as well as in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of hers: liow is that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down; introduce a singer; ON GRIEF OF MIND. Ill shall we burn cedar, or present her with some pleasant liquor, and provide her something to eat? Are these the good things which remove the most afflicting grief ? For you but just now said you knew of no other good. I should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called off from grief to contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon wliat was good. XX. It may be said, What ! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, and that he maintained anything so sen- sual ? Indeed I do not imagine so, for I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments, and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said before, I am speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he should hold those pleasures in contempt which he just now commended, yet I must remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not contented with barely saying this, but he has explained Avhat he meant : he says that taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I invented this? have I misrepre- sented him ? I should be glad to be confuted ; for what am I endeavoring at but to clear up truth in every ques- tion? Well, but the same man says that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. Here are three very great mistakes in a very few words. One is, that he con- tradicts himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good unless the senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says that to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. Can any one contradict him- self more? The next mistake is, that where there is natu- rally a threefold division the first, to be pleased ; next, to be in pain ; the last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor pain he imagines the first and the last to be the same, and makes no difference between pleasure and a cessation of pain. The last mistake he falls into in common with some others, which is this: that as virtue is the most de- sirable thing, and as philosophy has been investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he has separated the chief good from virtue. But he commends virtue, and that fre- quently ; and indeed C. Gracchus, when he had made the 112 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. largest distributions of the public money, and had ex- hausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke much of defend- ing the treasury. What signifies what men say when we see what tliey do? That Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued against the law that was proposed for distributing the corn ; but when it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to receive the corn. Gracchus observed Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take corn by a law he had himself opposed. "It was," said he, "against your distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you do so, I claim my share." Did not this grave and wise man suffi- ciently show that the public revenue was dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read Gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the treasury. Epicu- rus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not lead a life of virtue ; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise man ; he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains tliat a wise man is always happy. All these things become a philosopher to say, but they are not con- sistent with pleasure. 13ut the reply is, that he doth not mean that pleasure : let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a one as makes no part of virtue. But suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure ; are w^e so, too, as to his pain ? I maintain, therefore, the impropriety of language which that man uses, when talking of virtue, who would measure every great evil by pain. XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, those best of men for there is no order of men more innocent complain that I take great pains to inveigh against Epicurus. We are rivals, I suppose, for some honor or distinction. I place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in vir- tue, he in pleasure ; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore the assistance of their neighbors, and many are ready to fly to their aid. But as for my part, I de- clare that I am very indifferent about the matter, and that I consider the Avhole discussion which they are so anxious about at an end. For what ! is the contention about the Punic war? on which very subject, though M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of dift'erent opinions, still there was no ON GRIEF OF MIND. 113 difference between them. But these men behave with too much heat, especially as the opinions which they would uphold are no very spirited ones, and such as they dare not plead for either in the senate or before the assembly of the people, or before the army or the censors. But, however, I will argue with them another time, and with such a disposition that no quarrel shall arise between us ; for I shall be ready to yield to their opinions when found- ed on truth. Only I must give them this advice : That were it ever so true, that a wise man regards nothing but the body, or, to express myself with more decency, nev- er does anything except what is expedient, and views all things with exclusive reference to his own advantage, as such things are not very commendable, they should confine them to their own breasts, and leave off talking with that parade of them. XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men grieve when anything happens unex- pectedly. And that is indeed, as I said before, a great aggravation of a misfortune ; and I know that it appeared so to Chrysippus " Whatever falls out unexpected is so much the heavier." But the whole question does not turn on this; though the sudden approach of an enemy some- times occasions more confusion than it would if you had expected him, and a sudden storm at sea throws the sail- ors into a greater fright than one which they have fore- seen ; and it is the same in many other cases. But when you carefully consider the nature of what was expected, you will find nothing more than that all things which come on a sudden appear greater; and this upon two ac- counts : first of all, because you have not time to consider how great the accident is ; and, secondly, because you are probably persuaded that you could have guarded against it had you foreseen it, and therefore the misfortune, hav- ing been seemingly encountered by your own fault, makes your grief the greater. That it is so, time evinces ; which, as it advances, brings with it so much mitigation that though the same misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the less, but in some cases is entirely removed. Many Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, and many Mace- donians, when Perseus their king was taken prisoner. I saw, 114 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. too, when I was a young man, some Corinthians in the Pelo- ponnesus. They might all have lamented with Andromache, All these I but they hud perhaps given over lamenting themselves, for by their countenances, and speech, and other gestures you might have taken them for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myself was more concerned at the ruined walls of Corinth than the Corinthians themselves were, whose minds by frequent reflection and time had become callous to such sights. I have read a book of Clitomachus, which he sent to his fellow-citizens who were prisoners, to com- fort them after the destruction of Carthage. There is in it a treatise written by Carneades, which, as Clitomachus says, he had inserted into his book ; the subject was, " That it ap- peared probable that a wise man would grieve at the state of subjection of his country," and all the arguments which Carneades used against this proposition are set down in the book. There the philosopher applies such a strong medicine to a fresh grief as would be quite unnecessary in one of any continuance ; nor, if this very book had been sent to the captives some years after, would it have found any Avounds to cure, but only scars ; for grief, by a gen- tle progress and slow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. Not that the circumstances which gave rise to it are alter- ed, or can be, but that custom teaches what reason should that those tilings which before seemed to be of some con- sequence are of no such groat importance after all. XXIII. It may be said, AVIiat occasion is there to apply to reason, or to any sort of consolation such as we gen- erally make use of, to mitigate the grief of the afflicted ? For we have this argument always at hand, that nothing ought to appear unexpected. But how will any one be enabled to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that it is unavoidable that such things sliould happen to man ? Saying this subtracts nothing from the sum of the grief : it only asserts that nothing has fallen out but what might have been anticipated ; and yet this manner of speaking has some little consolation in it, though I ap- prehend not a great deal. Therefore those unlooked-for things have not so much force as to give rise to all our ON GRIEF OF MIND. 115 grief; tlie blow perhaps may fall the heavier, but whatever happens does not appear the greater on that account. No, it is the fact of its having happened lately, and not of its having befallen us unexpectedly, that makes it seem the greater. There are two ways, tlien, of discerning the truth, not only of things that seem evil, but of those that have the appearance of good. For we either inquire into the nature of the thing, of what description, and magni- tude, and importance it is as sometimes with regard to poverty, the burden of which we may lighten when by our disputations we show how few things nature requires, and of wliat a trifling kind they are or, without any subtle ar- guing, we refer them to examples, as here we instance a Soc- rates, there a Diogenes, and then again that line in Caecilius, Wisdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire. For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what reason can be given why what Avas borne by Fabricius should be spoken of by any one else as unsupportable when it falls upon themselves ? Of a piece with this is that other way of comforting, which consists in pointing out that nothing has happened but what is common to human nature; for this argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that all things are tolerable which others have borne and are bearing. XXIV. Is poverty the subject? They tell you of many who have submitted to it with patience. Is it the con- tempt of honors? They acquaint you with some who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of those who have preferred a private retired life to public employment, mentioning their names with respect; they tell you of the verse^ of that most powerful king who praises an old man, and pronounces him happy because he was unknown to fame and seemed likely to arrive at the hour of death in obscurity and without notice. Thus, too, they have examples for those who are deprived of their children : they who are under any great grief are comforted by instances of like aflliction ; and thus the en- ^ This refers to the speech of Agamemnon in Euripides, in the Iphi- genia in Aulis, ZrjXfi tre, yepov, ^t}\S> V uvSpSiv or uKivdvvov piov efcTrepacr', uyvw^, uKXet'ji. V. 15. 116 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. durance of every misfortune is rendered more easy by the fact of others having undergone the same, and the fate of others causes what has liappened to appear less important than it has been previously thought, and reflection thus discovers to us how much opinion had imposed on us. And this is what the Telamon declares, " I, when my son was born," etc.; and thus Theseus, "I on my future mis- ery did dwell ;" and Anaxagoras, " I knew my son was mortal." All these men, by frequently reflecting on hu- man affairs, had discovered that they were by no means to be estimated by the opinion of the multitude ; and, indeed, it seems to me to be pretty much the same case with those who consider beforehand as with those who derive their remedies from time, excepting that a kind of reason cures the one, and the other remedy is provided by nature ; by wbich we discover (and this contains the whole marrow of the matter) that what was imagined to be the greatest evil is by no means so great as to defeat the happiness of life. And the effect of this is, that the blow is greater by reason of its not liaving been foreseen, and not, as they suppose, that when similar misfortunes befall two different people, that man only is affected with grief whom this calamity has befallen unexpectedly. So that some persons, under the oppression of grief, are said to have borne it actually worse for hearing of this common condition of man, that we are born under such conditions as render it impossible for a man to be exempt from all evil. XXV. For this reason Carneades, as I see our friend Antiochus writes, used to blame Chrysippus for commend- ing these verses of Euripides : Man, doom'd to cave, to pain, disease, and strife, Walks liis short journey thro' tlie A'ale of life : Watchful attends the cradle and the grave, And passing generations longs to save : Last, dies himself: yet wherefore should we mourn? For man must to his kindred dust return ; Submit to the destroying hand of fate, As ripen'd ears the harvest-sickle wait.* * This is a fragment from the Ilypsipyle : E^u fxiv oiidelv (';<7T(V ou irovei /3f)OTWv' Otinrct re rtKva X"Tep' av Krarat veit, auTor TC OviiaKei. Ka't t(i5' tix^oi/Tui ftpOTOt elf fTv (jiepovrei f^iv' uvw^KaioiV S' t'x^* ftiov Oepi^etv iuaje KiipiriiJiov ajdxw. ON GRIEF OF MIND. 117 lie would not allow a speech of this kind to avail at all to tlie cure of our grief, for he said it was a lamentable case itself that we were fallen into the hands of such a cruel fate; and that a speech like that, preaching up comfort from the misfortunes of another, was a comfort adapted only to those of a malevolent disposition. But to me it appears far otherwise ; for the necessity of bearing what is the common condition of humanity forbids your resist- ing the will of the Gods, and reminds you that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates grief; and the enu- meration of tliese examples is not produced with a view to please those of a malevolent disposition, but in order that any one in affliction may be induced to bear what he ob- serves many others have previously borne with tranquillity and moderation. For they who are falling to pieces, and cannot hold together through the greatness of their grief, should be supported by all kinds of assistance. From whence Chrysippus thinks that grief is called Xvttt], as it were Xvaig, that is to say, a dissolution of the whole man the whole of which I think may be pulled np by the roots by explainiiyg, as I said at the beginning, the cause of grief; for it is nothing else but an opinion and judg- ment formed of a present acute evil. And thus any bodi- ly pain, let it be ever ,50 grie\ous, may be endurable where any hopes are proposed of some considerable good ; and we receive such consolation from a virtuous and illustrious life that they who lead such lives are seldom attacked by grief, or but slightly affected by it, XXVI. But as besides this opinion of great evil there is this other added also that we ought to lament-what has happened, that it is right so to do, and part of our duty, then is brought about that terrible disorder of mind, grief. And it is to this opinion that we owe all those various and horrid kinds of lamentation, that neglect of our persons, that womanish tearing of our cheeks, that striking on our thighs, breasts, and heads. Thus Agamemnon, in Homer and in Accius, Tears in his grief his uncomb'd locks;' from whence comes that pleasant saying of Bion, that the * IloXXae Ik Ke(paXijg TrpoOeXvfivovg eX/cero x^^T^i^- H- x. 15. 118 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. foolish king in liis sorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that his grief would be alleviated by bald- ness. But men do all these things from being persuaded that they ought to do so. And thus ^schines inveighs against Demosthenes for sacriticing within seven days af- ter the death of his daughter. But with what eloquence, with what fluency, does he attack him ! what sentiments does he collect ! what words does he hurl against him ! You may see by this that an orator may do anything ; but nobody would approve of such license if it were not that we have an idea innate in our minds that every good man ought to lament the loss of a relation as bitterly as possi- ble. And it is owing to this that some men, when in sor- row, betake themselves to deserts, as Homer says of Bel- lerophon : Distracted in liis mind, Forsook by heaven, forsaking human kind, Wide o'er the Alcian field he chose to stray, A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way !^ And thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into stone, from her never speaking, I suppose, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to have been converted into a bitch, from her rage and bitterness of mind. There are others who love to converse with solitude itself when in grief, as the nurse in Ennius, Fain would I to the heavens and earth relate Medea's ceaseless woes and cruel fate.^ XXVH. Now all these things are done in grief, from a persuasion of their truth and propriety and necessity; and it is plain that those who behave thus do so from a con- viction of its being their duty; for should these mourners by chance drop their grief, and either act or speak for a moment in a more calm or cheei-ful manner, they presently check themselves and return to their lamentations again, and blame tliemselves for having been guilty of any inter- * "Htoi o KUTTTri^iov TO 'AXtjiov oloQ okaTO ov Ovjihv KUTtdwr, ttutov dvOpwTnov akuivojv. II. vi. 20!. ' This is a translation from Euripides : "ilaW 'ifAtpov fi virfiXOe 7p re k ovpavM Xi^at txoXovarf dePpo Mide\ov,X'''^^vov upTiu)? dcdtyfitvov' vvv d' u/i/j'Ai'/s cI/X(,KaJ KuT^pTUKu/r KaKwv. ON GRIEF OF MIND. 121 phy to the highest perfection, says, they must be either extremely foolish or extremely vain ; but that he himself could see that great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that philosophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. And Theophrastus is reported to have reproached nature at his death for giving to stags and crows so long a life, which was of no use to them, but allowing only so short a span to men, to whom length of days would have been of the greatest use; for if the life of man could have been lengthened, it would have been able to provide itself with all kinds of learning, and with arts in the greatest perfection. He lamented, therefore, that he was dying just when he had begun to discover these. What! does not every grave and distinguished philosopher acknowledge himself ignorant of many things, and confess that there are many things which he must learn over and over again? And yet, though these men are sensible that they are standing still in the very mid- way of folly, than which nothing can be worse, they are under no great affliction, because no opinion that it is their duty to lament is ever mingled with this knowledge. What shall we say of those who think it unbecoming in a man to grieve ? among whom we may reckon Q. Maximus, Avhen he buried his son that had been consul, and L. Pau- lus, who lost two sons within a few days of one another. Of the same opinion was M. Cato, who lost his son just after he had been elected praetor, and many others, whose names I have collected in my book on Consolation. Now what made these men so easy, but their persuasion that grief and lamentation was not becoming in a man ? There- fore, as some give themselves up to grief from an opinion that it is right so to do, they refrained themselves, from an opinion that it was discreditable ; from which we may infer that grief is owing more to opinion than nature. XXIX. It may be said, on the other side. Who is so mad as to grieve of his own accord ? Pain proceeds from nature, which you must submit to, say they, agreeably to what even your own Grantor teaches, for it presses and gains upon you unavoidably, and cannot possibly be re- sisted. So that the very same Oileus, in Sophocles, who had before comforted Telamon on the death of Ajax, on 6 122 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. hearing of the death of his own son, is broken-hearted On this alteration of his mind we have these lines : Show me the man so well by wisdom taught That what he charges to another's fault, When like affliction doth himself betide, True to his own wise counsel will abide.^ Now, when they urge these things, their endeavor is to prove that nature is absolutely and wholly irresistible; and yet the same people allow that we take greater grief on ourselves than nature requires. What madness is it, then, in us to require the same from others? But there are many reasons for our taking grief on us. The first is from the opinion of some evil, on the discovery and cer- tainty of which grief comes of course. Besides, many peo- ple are persuaded that they are doing something very ac- ceptable to the dead when they lament bitterly over them. To these may be added a kind of womanish superstition, in imagining that when they have been stricken by the afflictions sent by the Gods, to acknowledge themselves afflicted and humbled by them is the readiest way of ap- peasing them. But most men appear to be unaware what contradictions these things are full of. They commend those who die calmly, but they blame those who can bear the loss of another with the same calmness, as if it were possible that it should be true, as is occasionally said in love speeches, that any one can love another more than himself. There is, indeed, something excellent in this, and, if you examine it, something no less just than true, that we love those who ought to be most dear to us as well as we love ourselves; but to love them more than ourselves is absolutely impossible; nor is it desirable in friendship that I should love my friend more than myself, or that he should love me so; for this would occasion much confusion in life, and break in upon all the duties of it. 1 This is only a fragment, preserved by Stobacus : Toi'9 ^' av jj.eyio'Tov': Kal cro(f)U)TUTOVi (()pevl Toiouad' 'iSoU' av, otoy ea-rt vvv i>de, KaXSiv KaKuif Trf)U(T(Tovrt crvfL-nnpaivktrat' brav 6e balyaav av?)p6<; evTv\ow to irplv fxcioTTCf' epeiffrj tov /3iov iraKivTiJOTrov, Tu iroWu (jtpovdu Kui KuKuii- etpt]fxi:va. ON GRIEF OF MIND. 123 XXX. Bat we will speak of this anotliei* time : at pres- ent it is sufficient not to attribute our misery to the loss of our friends, nor to love them more than, if they themselves could be sensible of our conduct, they would approve of, or at least not more than we do ourselves. Now as to what they say, that some are not at all appeased by our consolations ; and, moreover, as to what they add, that the comforters themselves acknowledge they are miserable when fortune varies the attack and falls on them in both these cases the solution is easy : for the fault here is not in nature, but in our own folly ; and much may be said against folly. But men who do not admit of consolation seem to bespeak misery for themselves ; and they who can- not bear their misfortunes with that temper which they recommend to others are not more faulty in this particu- lar than most other persons ; for we see that covetous men find fault with others who are covetous, as do the vainglorious with those who appear too wholly devoted to the pursuit of glory. For it is the peculiar character- istic of folly to perceive the vices of others, but to for- get its own. But since we find that grief is removed by length of time, we have the greatest proof that the strength of it depends not merely on time, but on the daily consideration of it. For if the cause continues the same, and the man be the same, how can there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what occasioned the grief, nor in him who grieves ? Therefore it is from daily reflecting that there is no real evil in the circumstance for which you grieve, and not from the length of time, that you procure a remedy for your grief. XXXI. Here some people talk of moderate grief; but if such be natural, what occasion is there for consolation ? for nature herself will determine the measure of it : but if it depends on and is caused by opinion, the whole opinion should be destroyed. I think that it has been sufficiently said, that grief arises from an opinion of some present evil, which includes this belief, that it is incumbent on us to grieve. To this definition Zeno has added, very justly, that the opinion of this present evil should be recent. Now this word recent they explain thus : those are not the only recent things which happened a little Avhile ago ; but as 124 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. long as there sliall be any force, or vigor, or freshness in that imagined evil, so long it is entitled to the name of re- cent. Take the case of Artemisia, the wife of Mansolns, King of Caria, who made that noble sepnlchre at lialicar- nassus ; while she lived, she lived in grief, and died of it, being worn out by it, for that opinion was always recent with her: but you cannot call that recent which has al- ready begun to decay through time. Now the duty of a comforter is, to remove grief entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as much as you can, or else to keep it under, and prevent its spreading any further, and to divert one's at- tention to other matters. There are some who think, with Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to prove that what one is lamenting is by no means an evil. Oth- ers, as the Peripatetics, prefer urging tliat the evil is not great. Others, with Epicurus, seek to divert your atten- tion from the evil to good: some think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened but what you had reason to expect ; and this is the practice of the Cyrenaics. But Chrysippus thinks that the main thing in comforting is, to remove the opinion from the person w^ho is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden duty. There are others who bring together all these various kinds of consolations, for people are differently affected ; as I have done myself in my book on Consolation ; for as my own mind was much disordered, I have attempted in that book to discover ev- ery method of cure. But the proper season is as much to be attended to in the cure of the mind as of the body; as Prometheus in ^schylus, on its being said to him, I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold, That all men's reason should their rage control ? answers. Yes, Avhen one reason properly applies ; Ill-timed advice will make the storm but rise.* XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in consolation is, to maintain either that it is no evil at all, ' Qk. OlJKOVV TlpOfJ1]9iV TOVTO yiyVU)(TKllQ OTI dpyfiQ voaovarjQ ilaiv larpoi \6yoi. Tip. f('iv TiQ Iv Katpq) yt fiaXOnrrrry Kenp Kai JJ.IJ (TcppiyCovTa Ov/wv icfxvatvt) f3i{t. ^sch. Prom. v. 378. ON GRIEF OF MIND. 125 or a very inconsiderable one : the next best to that is, to speak of the common condition of life, having a view, if possible, to the state of the person whom you comfort par- ticularly. Tlie third is, that it is folly to wear one's self out with grief which can avail nothing. For the comfort of Cleanthes is suitable only for a wise man, who is in no need of any comfort at all ; for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for such precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that very thing which he himself al- lows to be the greatest misfortune. For what shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him, though a man of the highest rank, and a porter ; and when Alcibiades became uneasy at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes, to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position ; what shall we say to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what afflicted Alcibiades thus? What strange things does Lycon say? who, making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind. What, then? did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the defects and evils of the mind ? I have already said enough of Epicu- rus's consolation. XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, " That you are not alone in this." It has its effect, as I said, but not always, nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the application of it ; for you ought rather to show, not how men in gen- eral have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne them. As to Chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth ; but it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves merely be- cause he thinks it right so to do. Certainly, then, as in pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if I may adopt 126 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. the language of lawyers for a moment), but adapt what we have to say to the time, to the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person ; so, too, in alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party to be comforted can admit of. But, somehow or other, we have rambled from what you originally proposed. For your question was concerning a wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil that is not dishon- orable; or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it as to make it wholly disappear ; and such a man makes no addi- tion to his grief through opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure, nor to wear him- self out with grief, which is the meanest thing imagina- ble. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated (though it was not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can be called an evil except what is base) that it is in our power to discern that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it, and the error of opinion. XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which is the greatest ; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it may appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for the others. For there are certain things which are usually said about pov- erty ; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to re- tired and undistinguished life. There are particular trea- tises on banishment, on the ruin of one's country, on sla- very, on weakness, on blindness, and on every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks divide these into different treatises and distinct books ; but they do it for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are full of entertainment. And yet, as physi- cians, in curing the whole body, attend to even the most insignificant part of the body which is at all disordered, so does philosophy act, after it has removed grief in gen- eral ; still, if any other deficiency exists should poverty bite, should ignominy sting, should banishment bring a dark cloud over us, or should any of those things which I have just mentioned appear, there is for each its appropri- ON GRIEF OF MIND. 127 ate consolation, which you shall hear whenever you please. But we must have recourse again to the same original principle, that a wise man is free from all sorrow, because it is vain, because it answers no purpose, because it is not founded in nature, but on opinion and prejudice, and is engendered by a kind of invitation to grieve, when once men have imagined that it is their duty to do so. When, then, we have subtracted what is altogether voluntary, that mournful uneasiness will be removed ; yet some little anx- iety, some slight pricking, will still remain. They may in- deed call this natural, provided they give it not that hor- rid, solemn, melancholy name of grief, which can by no means consist with wisdom. But how various and how bitter are the roots of grief ! Whatever they are, I pro- pose, after having felled the trunk, to destroy them all; even if it should be necessary, by allotting a separate dis- sertation to each, for I have leisure enough to do so, what- ever time it may take up. But the principle of every un- easiness is the same, though they may appear under differ- ent names. For envy is an uneasiness ; so are emulation, detraction, anguish, sorrow, sadness, tribulation, lamenta- tion, vexation, grief, trouble, affliction, and despair. The Stoics define all these different feelings; and all those words which I have mentioned belong to different things, and do not, as they seem, express the same ideas ; but they* are to a certain extent distinct, as I shall make appear per- haps in another place. These are those fibres of the roots which, as I said at first, must be traced back and cut off and destroyed, so that not one shall remain. You say it is a great and difficult undertaking: who denies it? But what is there of any excellency which has not its difficulty ? Yet philosophy undertakes to effect it, provided we ad- mit its superintendence. But enough of this. The other books, whenever you please, shall be ready for you here or anywhere else. 128 THE l^SCULAN DISPUTATIONS. BOOK IV. ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OP THE MIND. I. I HAVE often wondered, Brutus, on many occasions, at tlie ingenuity and virtues of our countrymen ; but nothing has surprised me more than their development in those studies, which, though they came somewhat late to us, have been transported into this city from Greece. For the system of auspices, and religious ceremonies, and courts of justice, and appeals to the people, the senate, the establishment of an army of cavalry and infantry, and the whole miUtary discipline, were instituted as early as the foundation of the city by royal authority, partly too by laws, not without the assistance of the Gods. Then with Avhat a surprising and incredible progress did our ancestors advance towards all kind of excellence, when once the republic was freed from the regal power ! Not that this is a proper occasion to treat of the manners and customs of our ancestors, or of the discipline and consti- tution of the city ; for I have elsewhere, particularly in the six books I wrote on the Republic, given a sufficient- ly accurate account of them. But while I am on this subject, and considering the study of philosophy, I meet with many reasons to imagine that those studies were brought to us from abroad, and not merely imported, but preserved and improved; for they had Pythagoras, a man of consummate wisdom and nobleness of character, in a manner, before their eyes, who was in Italy at the time that Lucius Brutus, the illustrious founder of your nobil- ity, delivered his country from tyranny. As the doctrine of Pythagoras spread itself on all sides, it seems probable to me that it reached this city; and this is not only prob- able of itself, but it does really appear to have been the case from many remains of it. For who can imagine that, when it flourished so much in that part of Italy which was called Magna GraBcia, and in some of the ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 129 largest and most powerful cities, in which, first the name of Pythagoras, and then that of those men who wxre af- terward his followers, was in so high esteem ; who can imagine, I say, that our people could shut their ears to what was said by such learned men ? Besides, it is even ray opinion that it was the great esteem in which the Py- thagoreans were held, that gave rise to that opinion among those who came after him, that King Numa was a Py- thagorean. For, being acquainted with the doctrine and principles of Pythagoras, and having heard from their an- cestors that this king was a very wise and just man, and not being able to distinguish accurately between times and periods that were so remote, they inferred, from his being so eminent for his wisdom, that he had been a pu- pil of Pythagoras. II. So far ^ve proceed on conjecture. As to the ves- tiges of the Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I shall use but a few; because they have no connection with our present purpose. For, as it is reported to have been a custom with them to deliver certain precepts in a more abstruse manner in verse, and to bring their minds from severe tliought to a more composed state by songs and musical instruments; so Cato, a writer of the very highest authority, says in his Origins, that it was custom- ary with our ancestors for the guests at their entertain- ments, every one in his turn, to celebrate the praises and virtues of illustrious men in song to the sound of the flute ; from whence it is clear that poems and songs were then composed for the voice. And, indeed, it is also clear that poetry was in fashion from the laws of the Twelve Tables, wherein it is provided that no song should be made to the injury of another. Another argument of the erudition of those times is, that they played on instru- ments before the shrines of their Gods, and at the en- tertainments of their magistrates ; but that custom was pe- culiar to the sect I am speaking of. To me, indeed, that poem of Appius Caucus, which Pana3tius commends so much in a certain letter of his which is addressed to Quintus Tubero, has all the marks of a Pythagorean au- thor. We have many things derived from the Pythago- reans in our customs, which I pass over, that we may 6* 130 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. not seem to have learned that elsewhere which we look upon ourselves as the inventors of. But to return to our purpose. How many great poets as well as orators have sprung up among us ! and in what a short time ! so that it is evident that our people could arrive at any learning as soon as they had an inclination for it. But of other studies I shall speak elsewhere if there is occasion, as I have already often done. III. The study of philosophy is certainly of long stand- ing with us; but yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any philosopher before the age of Laelius and Scipio, in whose younger days we find that Diogenes the Stoic, and Carneades the Academic, were sent as ambas- sadors by the Athenians to our senate. And as these had never been concerned in public affairs, and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other a Babylonian, they certainly would never have been forced from their studies, nor chosen for that employment, unless the study of philoso- phy had been in vogue with some of the great men at that time; who, though they might employ their pens on oth- er subjects some on civil law, others on oratory, others on th8 history of former times yet promoted this most extensive of all arts, the principle of living well, even more by their life than by their writings. So that of that true and elegant philosophy (which was derived from Soc- rates, and is still preserved by the Peripatetics and by the Stoics, though they express themselves differently in their disputes with the Academics) there are few or no Latin records; whether this proceeds from the impor- tance of the thing itself, or from men's being otherwise em- ployed, or from their concluding that the capacity of the people was not equal to the apprehension of them. But, during this silence, C. Amafinius arose and took upon him- self to speak; on the publishing of whose writings the people were moved, and enlisted themselves chiefly under this sect, either because the doctrine was more easily understood, or because they were invited thereto by the ])leasing thoughts of an^usement, or that, because there was nothing better, they laid hold of what was offered them. And after Amafinius, wdicn many of the same sen- timents had written much about them, the Pythagoreans ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 131 spread over all Italy : but that these doctrines should be so easily understood and approved of by the unlearned is a great proof that they were not written with any great subtlety, and they think their establishment to be owing to this. IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, for every one is at liberty to choose what he likes : I shall keep to my old custom ; and, being under no restraint from the laws of any jjarticular school, which in philosophy every one must necessarily confine himself to, I shall always in- quire wliat has the most probability in every question, and this system, which I have often practised on other occa- sions, I have adhered closely to in my Tusculan Disputa- tions. Therefore, as I have acquainted you with the dis- putations of the three former days, this book shall con- clude the discussion of the fourth day. When we had come down into the Academy, as we had done the former days, the business was carried on thus : M. Let any one say, who pleases, what he would wish to have discussed. A. I do not think a wise man can possibly be free from every perturbation of mind. M. He seemed by yesterday's discourse to be free from grief; unless you agreed with us only to avoid taking uptime. A. Not at all on that account, for I was extremely satis- fied with your discourse. M. You do not think, then, that a wise man is subject to grief ? A. No, by no means. 3f. But if that cannot disorder the mind of a wise man, nothing else can. For what can such a man be disturbed by fear ? Fear proceeds from the same things when ab- sent which occasion grief when present. Take away grief, then, and you remove fear. The two remaining perturbations are, a joy elate above measure, and lust ; and if a wise man is not subject to these, his mind will be always at rest. A. I am entirely of that opinion. 31. Which, then, shall we do? Shall I immediately crowd all my sails? or shall I make use of my oars, as if I were just endeavoring to get clear cf the harbor? 132 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. A. What is it that you mean, for I do not exactly com- prehend you? V. M. Because, Chiysippus and the Stoics, when they discuss the perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to consist in definitions and distinctions; while they employ but few words on the subject of cur- ing the mind, and preventing it from being disordered. Whereas the Peripatetics bring a great many tilings to promote the cure of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions. My question, then, w^as, whether I should instantly unfold the sails of my eloquence, or be content for a while to make less way wdth the oars of logic? A. Let it be so ; for by the employment of both these means the subject of our inquiry will be more thoroughly discussed. 31. It is certainly the better way ; and should anything be too obscure, you may examine that afterward. A. I will do so ; but those very obscure points you will, as usual, deliver with more clearness than the Greeks. M. I will, indeed, endeavor to do so; but it well re- quires great attention, lest, by losing one word, the whole should escape you. What the Greeks call Trddrj we choose to name perturbations (or disorders) rather than diseases; in explaining which, I shall follow, first, that very old de- scription of Pythagoras, and afterward that of Plato; for they both divide the mind into two parts, and make one of these partake of reason, and the other they represent without it. In that which partakes of reason they place tranquillity, that is to say, a placid and undisturbed con- stancy; to the other they assign the turbid motions of an- ger and desire, which are contrary and opposite to reason. Let this, then, be our principle, the spring of all our rea- sonings. But notwithstanding, I shall use the partitions and definitions of the Stoics in describing these perturba- tions; who seem to me to have shown very great acute- iiess on this question. VL Zeno's definition, then, is this: "A perturbation" (which he calls a ttuOoc) " is a commotion of the mind re- pugnant to reason, and against nature." Some of them define it even more briefly, saying that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite ; but by too vehement ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 133 they mean an appetite that recedes further from the con- stancy of nature. But they would have the divisions of perturbations to arise from two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils ; and thus they become four : from the good proceed lust and joy joy having reference to some present good, and lust to some future one. They suppose fear and grief to proceed from evils : fear from something future, grief from something present ; for whatever things are dreaded as approaching always occasion grief when present. But joy and lust depend on the opinion of good ; as lust, being inflamed and provoked, is carried on eager- ly towards what has the appearance of good ; and joy is transported and exults on obtaining what was desired: for Ave naturally pursue those things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary. Wherefore, as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature incites ns to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where this strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the Stoics called povXrjtric, and the name which we give it is volition ; and tliis they allow to none but their wise man, and define it thus : Volition is a reasonable de- sire ; but whatever is incited too violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust, or an unbridled desire, which is dis- coverable in all fools. And, therefore, when we are affect- ed so as to be placed in any good condition, we are moved in two ways ; for when the mind is moved in a placid and calm motion, consistent with reason, that is called joy ; but when it exults with a vain, wanton exultation, or im- moderate joy, then that feeling may be called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they define to be an elation of the mind without reason. And as we naturally desire good things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is evil ; and this avoidance of which, if conducted in ac- cordance with reason, is called caution ; and this the wise man alone is supposed to have : but that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is attended with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is, therefore, caution destitute of reason. But a wise man is not affect- ed by any present evil ; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being affected with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and sunk, since it is not under the do- 134 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. minion of reason. This, then, is the first definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the mind contra- ry to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four pertur- bations, and but three cahii rational emotions; for grief has no exact opposite. VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations de- pend on opinion and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present evil, in which it seems to be right that the mind should shrink and be dejected. Joy is a recent opinion of a present good, in which it seems to be right that the mind should be elated. Fear is an opinion of an impend- ing evil which we apprehend will be intolerable. Lust is an opinion of a good to come, which would be of advan- tage were it already come, and present with us. But how- ever I have named the judgments and opinions of pertur- bations, their meaning is, not that merely the perturbations consist in them, but that the effects likewise of these per- turbations do so ; as grief occasions a kind of painful pricking, and fear engenders a recoil or sudden abandon- ment of the mind, joy gives rise to a profuse mirth, while lust is the parent of an unbridled habit of coveting. But that imagination, which I have included in all the above definitions, they would have to consist in assenting without warrantable grounds. Now, every perturbation has many subordinate parts annexed to it of the same kind. Grief is attended with enviousness {invidentid) I use that word for instruction's sake, though it is not so common; because envy (invidia) takes in not only the person who envies, but the person, too, who is envied em- ulation, detraction, pity, vexation, mourning, sadness, trib- ulation, sorrow, lamentation, solicitude, disquiet of mind, pain, despair, and many other similar feelings are so too. Under fear are comprehended sloth, shame, terror, coward- ice, fainting, confusion, astonishment. In pleasure they comprehend malevolence that is, pleased at another's mis- fortune delight, boastfulness, and the like. To lust they associate anger, fury, hatred, enmity, discord, wants, desire, and other feeliuirs of that kind. ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 135 But tliey define these in this manner : VIII. Enviousness {iiividentia), they say, is a grief aris< ing from the prosperous circumstances of another, which are in no degree injuiious to the person Avho envies ; for whei'e any one grieves at the prosperity of another, by which he is injured, such a one is not properly said to envy as when Agamemnon grieves at Hector's success ; but where any one, who is in no way hurt by the prosper- ity of another, is in pain at his success, such a one envies indeed. Now the name " emulation " is taken in a double sense, so that the same word may stand for praise and dispraise: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation (however, that sense of it I shall have no occasion for here, for that carries praise with it) ; but emulation is also a term applied to grief at another's enjoying what I desired to have, and am without. Detraction (and I mer.u by that, jealousy) is a grief even at another's enjoying what I had a great inclination for. Pity is a grief at the misery of another who suffers wrongfully; for no one is moved by pity at the punishment of a parricide or of a betrayer of his country. Vexation is a pressing grief. Mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who was dear to you. Sadness is a grief attended with tears. Tribulation is a painful grief. Sorrow, an excruciating grief. Lamentation, a grief where we loudly bewail our- selves. Solicitude, a pensive grief. Trouble, a continued grief. Affliction, a grief that harasses the body. De- spair, a grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. But those feelings which are included under fear, they define thus : There is sloth, which is a dread of some ensuing labor ; shame and terror, which affect the body hence blushing attends shame ; a paleness, and tremor, and chattering of the teeth attend terror cowardice, which is an apprehension of some approaching evil ; dread, a fear that unhinges the mind, whence comes that line of En- nius, Then dread discluirged all wisdom from my mind ; fainting is the associate and constant attendant on dread ; confusion, a fear that drives away all thought; alarm, a continued fear. 136 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. IX. Tiie different species into which they divide pleas ure come under this description ; so that malevolence is a pleasm-e in the misfortunes of another, without any advan- tage to yourself; delight, a pleasure that soothes the mind by agreeable impressions on the ear. What is said of the ear may be applied to the sight, to the touch, smell, and taste. All feelings of this kind fire a sort of melting pleas- ure that dissolves the mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an appearance, and setting off your- self with insolence. The subordinate species of lust they define in this manner: Anger is a lust of punishing anyone who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause. Heat is anger just forming and beginning to exist, which the Greeks call dufiojaiQ. Hatred is a settled anger. Enmity is anger w^aiting for an opportunity of revenge. Discord is a sharper anger conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want an insatiable lust. Regret is when one eagerly wishes to see a person who is absent. Now here they have a distinction ; so that with them regret is a lust con- ceived on hearing of certain things reported of some one, or of many, which the Greeks call KaTTjyoplj/iara, or predic- aments ; as that they are in possession of riches and hon- ors : but want is a lust for those very honors and riches. But these deiiners make intemperance the fountain of all these perturbations ; which is an absolute revolt from the mind and right reason a state so averse to all rules of reason that the appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained. As, therefore, temperance ap- peases these desires, making them obey right reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so in- temperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, con- founds, and puts every state of the mind into a violent mo- tion. Thus, grief and fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, liave their rise from intemperance. X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile, so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with sickness, from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition to one another. From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which they call voaiifiaTa', and also those feelings which are in opposi- ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 137 tion to these diseases, and which admit certain faulty dis- tastes or loathings ; then come sicknesses, which are called appioffrrjfiaTa by the Stoics, and these two have their op- posite aversions. Here the Stoics, especially Chrysippns, give themselves unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of the mind have to those of the body : but, overlooking all that they say as of little consequence, I shall treat only of the thing itself. Let us, then, under- stand perturbation to imply a restlessness from the varie- ty and confusion of contradictory opinions ; and that when this heat and disturbance of the mind is of any standing, and has taken up its residence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence diseases and sickness, and those aversions which are in opposition to these diseases and sicknesses. XI. What I say here may be distinguished in thought, though they are in fact the same; inasmuch as they both have their rise from lust and joy. For should money be the object of our desire, and should we not instantly apply to reason, as if it w^ere a kind of Socratic medicine to heal this desire, the evil glides into our veins, and cleaves to our bowels, and from thence proceeds a distemper or sick- ness, which, when it is of any continuance, is incurable, and the name of this disease is covetousness. It is the same with other diseases ; as the desire of glory, a passion for women, to which the Greeks give the name of (j)i\oyvyia : and thus all other diseases and sicknesses are generated. But those feelings which are the contrary of these are supposed to have fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, such as is displayed in the Woman-hater of Atil- ius; or the hatred of the whole human species, as Timon is reported to have done, whom they call the Misanthrope. Of the same kind is inhospitality. And all these diseases proceed from a certain dread of such things as they hate and avoid. But they define sickness of mind to be an overweening opinion, and that fixed and deeply implanted in the heart, of something as very desirable which is by no means so. What proceeds from aversion, they define thus : a vehement idea of something to be avoided, deep- ly implanted, and inherent in our minds, when there is no reason for avoiding it; and this kind of opinion is a de- 138 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. liberate belief that one understands things of which one is wholly ignorant. Now, sickness of the mind has all these subordinate divisions : avarice, ambition, fondness for women, obstinacy, gluttony, drunkenness, covetousness, and other similar vices. But avarice is a violent opin- ion about money, as if it were vehemently to be desired and sought after, whicli opinion is deeply implanted and inher- ent in our minds ; and the definition of all the other simi- lar feelings resembles these. But the definitions of aver- sions are of this sort : inhospitality is a vehement opinion, deeply implanted and inherent in your mind, that you should avoid a stranger. Thus, too, the hatred of women, like that felt by Hippolytus, is defined ; and the hatred of the human species like that displayed by Timon. XII. But to come to the analogy of the state of body and mind, which I shall sometimes make use of, though more sparingly than the Stoics. Some men are more in- clined to particular disorders than others ; and, therefore, we say that some people are rheumatic, others dropsical, not because they are so at present, but because they are often so : some are inclined to fear, others to some other perturbation. Thus in some there is a continual anxiety, owing to which they are anxious; in some a hastiness of temper, which differs from anger, as anxiety differs from anguish : for all are not anxious who are sometimes vexed, nor are they who are anxious always uneasy in that man- ner: as there is a difference between being drunk and drunkenness ; and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be given to women. And this disposition of particular people to particular disorders is very common : for it re- lates to all perturbations ; it appears in many vices, though it has no name. Some are, therefore, said to be envious, malevolent, spiteful, fearful, pitiful, from a propensity to those perturbations, not from their being always carried away by them. Now this propensity to these particular disorders may be called a sickness from analogy with the body; meaning, that is to say, nothing more than a pro- pensity towards sickness. But with i-egard to whatever is good, as some are more inclined to different good qual- ities than others, we may call this a facility or tendency : this tendency to evil is a proclivity or inclination to falling ; ox OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 139 but where anytliing is neither good nor bad, it may have tlie former name. XIII. Even as there may be, witli respect to the body, a disease, a sickness, and a defect, so it is with tlie mind. They call that a disease where the whole body is corrupt- ed ; they call that sickness where a disease is attended with a weakness, and that a defect wdiere the parts of the body are not well compacted together; from whence it follows that the membei's are misshapen, crooked, and deformed. So that these two, a disease and sickness, pro- ceed from a violent concussion and perturbation of the health of the whole body; but a defect discovers itself even when the body is in perfect health. But a disease of the mind is distinguishable only in thought from a sick- ness. But a viciousness is a habit or affection discordant and inconsistent with itself through life. Thus it happens that, in the one case, a disease and sickness may arise from a corruption of opinions ; in the other case, the con- sequence may be inconstancy and inconsistency. For ev- ery vice of the mind does not imply a disunion of parts; as is the case w^ith those who are not far from being wise men. With them there is that affection which is incon- sistent with itself while it is foolish ; but it is not distort- ed, nor depraved. But diseases and sicknesses are parts of viciousness ; but it is a question whether perturbations are parts of the same, for vices are permanent affections : perturbations are such as are restless ; so that they cannot be parts of permanent ones. As there is some analogy between the nature of the body and mind in evil, so is there in good ; for the distinctions of the body are beauty, strength, health, firmness, quickness of motion : the same may be said of the mind. The body is said to be in a good state when all those things on which health depends are consistent: the same may be said of the mind when its judgments and opinions are not at variance with one another. And this union is the virtue of the mind, which, according to some people, is temperance itself; others make it consist in an obedience to the precepts of temper- ance, and a compliance with them, not allowing it to be any distinct species of itself. But, be it one or the other, it is to be found only in a wnse man. But there is a cer- 140 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. tain soundness of mind, which even a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is removed by the care and management of his physicians. And as wliat is called beauty arises from an exact proportion of the limbs, to- gether with a certain sweetness of complexion, so the beauty of the mind consists in an equality and constancy of opinions and judgments, joined to a certain firmness and stability, pursuing virtue, or containing within itself the very essence of virtue. Besides, we give the very same names to the faculties of the mind as we do to the powers of the body, the nerves, and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the body is called swiftness : a praise which we ascribe to the mind, from its running over in its thoughts so many things in so short a time. XIV. Herein, indeed, the mind and body are unlike: that though the mind when in perfect health may be visit- -ed by sickness, as the body may, yet the body may be dis- ordered without our fault; the mind cannot. For all the disorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of reason ; these disorders, therefore, are confined to men: the beasts are not subject to such perturbations, though they act sometimes as if they had reason. There is a difference, too, between ingenious and dull men ; the ingenious, like the Corinthian brass, which is long before it receives rust, are longer before they fall into these per- turbations, and are recovered sooner : the case is different with the dull. Nor does the mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, for it never yields to any that are brutish and savage; and some of their per- turbations have at first even the appearance of humanity, as mercy, grief, and fear. But the sicknesses and diseases of the mind are thought to be harder to eradicate than those leading vices which are in opposition to virtues ; for vices may be removed, though the diseases of the mind should continue, which diseases are not cured with that expedition with which vices are removed. I have now acquainted you with the arguments which the Stoics put forth with such exactness ; which they call logic, from their close arguing : and since my discourse has got clear of these rocks, I will proceed witli the remainder of it, provided I have been sufiiciently clear in what I have al- ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 141 ready said, considering the obscurity of the subject I have treated. A. Clear enough ; but should there be occasion for a more exact inquiry, I shall take another opportunity of asking you. I expect you now to hoist your sails, as you just now called them, and proceed on your course. XV. M. Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and shall often have occasion to speak again (for a great many questions that relate to life and manners arise from the spring of virtue) ; and since, as I say, virtue con- sists in a settled and uniform affection of mind, making those persons praiseworthy who are possessed of lier, she herself also, independent of anything else, without regard to any advantage, must be praiseworthy ; for from her proceed good inclinations, opinions, actions, and the whole of right reason; though virtue may be defined in a few words to be right reason itself. The opposite to this is viciousness (for so I choose to translate what the Greeks call Kada, rather than by perverseness ; for perverseuess is the name of a particular vice; but viciousness includes all), from whence arise those perturbations which, as I just now said, are turl)id and violent motions of the mind, repugnant to reason, and enemies in a high degree to the peace of the mind and a tranquil life, for they introduce piercing and anxious cares, and afflict and debilitate the mind through fear ; they violently inflame our hearts with exaggerated appetite, which is in reality an impotence of mind, utterly irreconcilable with temperance and moder- ation, which we sometimes call desire, and sometimes lust, and which, should it even attain the object of its wishes, immediately becomes so elated that it loses all its resolu- tion, and knows not what to pursue ; so that he was in the right who said "that exaggerated pleasure was the very greatest of mistakes." Virtue, then, alone can effect the cure of these evils. XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid, than a man afflicted, weakened, and op- pressed with grief? And little short of this misery is one who dreads some approaching evil, and who, through faintheartedness, is under continual suspense. The poets, to express the greatness of this evil, imagine a stone to 142 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. hang over the head of Tantalus, as a punishment for his / wickedness, his pride, and his boasting. And this is the common punishment of folly ; for there hangs over the head of every one whose mind revolts from reason some similar fear. And as these perturbations of the mind, grief and fear, are of a most wasting nature, so those two others, though of a more meriy cast (I mean lust, which is always coveting something with eagerness, and empty mirth, which is an exulting joy), differ very little from madness. Hence you may understand what sort of person he is whom we call at one time moderate, at another mod- est or temperate, at another constant and virtuous ; while sometimes we include all these names in the word frugal- ity, as the crown of all; for if that word did not include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say that a frugal m.iii does everything rightly. But when the Stoics apply this saying to their wise man, they seem to exalt him too much, and to speak of him with too much admiration. XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constan- cy, is at rest in his mind, and in calm possession of him- self, so as neither to pine witii care, nor be dejected with fear, nor to be inflamed with desire, coveting something greedily, nor relaxed by extravagant mirth such a man is that identical wise man whom we are inquiring for : he is the happy man, to whom nothing in this life seems in- tolerable enough to depress him ; nothing exquisite enough to transport him unduly. For what is there in this life that can ai)pear great to him who has acquainted himself with eternity and the utmost extent of the universe? Foi' what is there in human knowledge, or the short span of this life, that can appear great to a wise man ? whose mind is always so upon its guard that nothing can befall him which is unforeseen, nothing which is unexpected, noth- ing, in short, which is new. Such a man takes so exact a survey on all sides of him, that he always knows the prop- er place and spot to live in free from all the troubles and annoyances of life, and encounters every accident that fort- une can bring upon him with a becoming calmness. Who- ever conducts himself in tliis manner will be free from grief, and from every other perturbation ; and a mind free from these feelings renders men completely happy ; where- ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 143 as a mind disordered and drawn off from right and un- erring reason loses at once, not only its resolution, but its liealth. Therefore the thoughts and declarations of the Peripatetics are soft and effeminate, for they say that the mind must necessarily be agitated, but at the same time they lay down certain bounds beyond which tliat agitation is not to proceed. And do you set bounds to vice ? or is it no vice to disobey reason? Does not reason sufficient- ly declare that there is no real good which you should de- sire too ardently, or the possession of which you should al- low to transport you ? and that there is no evil that should be able to overwhelm you, or the suspicion of which should distract you ? and that all these things assume too melan- choly or too cheerful an appearance through our own er- ror? But if fools find tliis error lessened by time, so that, though the cause remains the same, they are not affected in the same manner, after some time, as they were at first, why, surely a wise man ought not to be influenced at all by it. But what are those degrees by wliich we are to limit it? Let us fix these degrees in grief, a difficult sub- ject, and one much canvassed. Fannius writes that P. Rutilius took it much to heart that his brother was refused the consulship; but he seems to have been too much af- fected by this disappointment, for it was the occasion of his death : he ought, therefore, to have borne it with more moderation. But let us suppose that wliile he was bear- ing this with moderation, tlie death of his children had in-' tervened ; here would have started a fresh grief, whicli, ad- mitting it to be moderate in itself, yet still must have been a great addition to the other. Now, to these let us add some acute pains of body, the loss of his fortune, blindness, banishment. Supposing, then, each separate misfortune to occasion a separate additional grief, the whole would be too great to be supportable. XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could stop himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a perturbed and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it pleases. Certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth. Now grief and all other perturbations 144 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. are doubtless baneful in their progress, and have, there- fore, no small share of evil at the beginning ; for they go on of themselves when once tliey depart from reason, for every weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and does not know where to stop. So that it makes no difference whether you approve of moderate perturba- tions of mind, or of moderate injustice, moderate coward- ice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes bounds to vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself, becomes the more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once set forward, glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped. XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated, are not only natu- ral, but were given to men by nature for a good purpose? They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and they say that angry men exert themselves most against an enemy or against a bad citizen: that those reasons are of little weight which are the motives of men who think thus, as it is a just war; it becomes us to iight for our laws, our liberties, our country : they will allow no force to these arguments unless our courage is warmed by anger. Nor do they confine their argument to warriors; but their opinion is that no one can issue any rigid com- mands without some bitterness and anger. In short, they have no notion of an orator either accusing or even de- fending a client without he is spurred on by anger. And though this anger should not be real, still they think his words and gestures ought to wear the appearance of it, so that the action of the orator may excite the anger of his hearer. And they deny that any man has ever been seen who does not know what it is to be angry ; and they name what we call lenity by the bad appellation of indolence. Nor do they commend only this lust (for anger is, as I de- fined it above, the lust of revenge), but they maintain that kind of lust or desire to be given us by nature for very good purposes, saying that no one can execute anything well but what he is in earnest about. Themistocles used to walk in the public places in the night because he could ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 145 not sleep ; and when asked the reason, his answer was, that Miltiades's trophies kept him awake. Who has not heard how Demosthenes used to watch, who said that it gave him pain if any mechanic was up in a morning at his work before him? Lastly, they urge that some of the greatest philosophers would never have made that prog- ress in their studies without some ardent desire spurring them on. We are informed that Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato visited the remotest parts of the world; for they thought that they ought to go wherever anything was to be learned. Now, it is not conceivable that these things could be effected by anything but by the greatest ardor of mind. XX. They say that even grief, which we have already said ought to be avoided as a monstrous and fierce beast, was appointed by nature, not without some good purpose, in order that men should lament when they had committed a fault, well knowing they had exposed themselves to cor- rection, rebuke, and ignominy ; for they think that those who can bear ignominy and infamy without pain have ac- quired a complete impunity for all sorts of crimes; for with them reproach is a stronger check than conscience. From whence we have that scene in Afranius borrowed from common life; for when the abandoned son saith, " Wretched that I am !" the severe father replies, Let liim but grieve, no matter what the cause. And they say the other divisions of sorrow have their use; that pity incites us to hasten to the assistance of otherp, and to alleviate the calamities of men who have unde- servedly fallen into them; that even envy and detraction are not without their use, as when a man sees that another person has attained what he cannot, or observes another to be equally successful with himself; that he who should take away fear w^ould take away all industry in life, which those men exert in the greatest degree who are afraid of the laws and of the magistrates, who dread poverty, igno- miny, death, and pain. But while they argue thus, they allow indeed of these feelings being retrenched, though they deny that they either can or should be plncked up by the roots; so that their opinion is that mediocrity is 7 146 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. best in everything. When they reason in this manner, what think you is what they say worth attending to or not? A. I think it is. I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in reply to them. XXI. M. Perhaps I may find something to say; but I will make this observation first: do you take notice with what modesty the Academics behave themselves ? for they speak plainly to the purpose. The Peripatetics are an- swered by the Stoics ; they have my leave to fight it out, who think myself no otherwise concerned than to inquire for what may seem to be most probable. Our present business is, then, to see if we can meet with anything in this question which is the probable, for beyond such ap- ])roximation to truth as that human nature cannot proceed. The definition of a perturbation, as Zeno, I think, lias rightly determined it, is thus : That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind against nature, in opposition to right reason ; or, more briefly, thus, that a perturbation is a somewhat too vehement appetite; and when he says somewhat too vehement, he means such as is at a greater distance from the constant course of nature. What can I say to these definitions? The greater part of them we have from those who dispute with sagacity and acuteness : some of them expressions, indeed, such as the "ardors of the mind," and " the whetstones of virtue," savoring of the pomp of rhetoricians. As to the question, if a brave man can maintain his courage without becoming angry, it may be questioned with regard to the gladiators; though we often observe much resolution even in them : they meet, converse, they make objections and demands, they agree about terms, so that they seem calm rather than angry. But let us admit a man of the name of Placideianus, who was one of that trade, to be in such a mind, as Lucilius relates of him, If for liis blood yoti thirst, the task he iniiie; His laurels at my feet he shall resign ; Not but I know, before 1 reach his heart, First on myself a wound he will impart. I hate the man ; enraged I fight, and straight In action we had been, but that I wait Till each his sword had fitted to his hand. My rage I scarce can keep within command. ON OTHEU PERTUKBATIONS OF THE MIND. 147 XXII. But we see Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle clieerfully, without any of this boister- ous wrath. For he had no sooner taken up his arms than the first step which he made inspired his associates with joy, his enemies with fear; so that even Hector, as he is represented by Homer,^ trembling, condemned himself for having challenged him to fight. Yet these heroes conversed together, calmly and quietly, before they engaged; nor did they show any anger or outrageous behavior during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus, the first who obtained this surname, was in a rage when he plun- dered the Gaul of his collar ; or that Marcellus's courage at Clastidium was only owing to his anger. I could al- most swear that Africanus, with whom we are better ac- quainted, from our recollection of him being more recent, was noways inflamed by anger when he covered Alieims Pelignus with his shield, and drove his sword into the enemy's breast. There may be some doubt of L. Brutus, whether he was not influenced by extraordinary hatred of the tyrant, so as to attack iVruns with more than usual rashness; for I observe that they mutually killed each other in close fight. Why, then, do you call in the assist- ance of anger? Would courage, unless it began to get ^ Cicevo alludes here to 11. vii. 211, which is thus translated by Pope: His massy javelin quivering in his liand, He stood the bulwark of the Grecian band ; Through every Argive heart new transport ran, All Troy stood trembling at the mighty man : E'en Hector paused, and with new doubt oppress'd, Felt his great heart suspended in his breast ; 'Twas vain to seek retreat, and vain to fear, Himself had challenged, and the foe drew near. But Melmoth (Note on the Familiar Letters of Cicero, book ii. Let. 23) rightly accuses Cicero of having misunderstood Homer, who "by no means represents Hector as being thus totally dismayed at the approach of his adversary; and, indeed, it would have been inconsistent with the general character of that hero to have described him under such circum- stances of terror." Tov &e Kal 'ApycTo^ jut7' eyrjOeov eio-opocoi/rer, Tptocif dfc TpoiJioi 'ii/09 inrrjkvOe ivia tKaaTOV, "EKTOpt d' ahr(^ ifvfioi evi aTi]Oeaai itonavaev. But there is a great difference, as Dr. Clarke remarks, between %/oc kvl GTrjdtaaL TrdTaaoev and Kapdiri i^cj Grrjdeuv eBpuGKEV, or rp6/uo(; alvoQ VTrT/Xvde yvla. The Trojans, says Homer, trembled at tire sight of Ajax, and even Hector himself felt some emotion in his breast. 148 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. furious, lose its energy? What! do you imagine that Hercules, whom the very courage which you would try to represent as anger raised to heaven, was angry when he engaged the Erymanthian boar, or the Nemjean lion ? Or w^as Theseus in a passion when he seized on the horns of the Marathonian bull ? Take care how you make courage to depend in tlie least on rage. For anger is altogether irrational, and that is not courage which is void of reason. XXIII. We ouglit to hold all things here in contempt ; death is to be looked on with indifference; pains and la- bors must be considered as easily supportable. And when these sentiments are established on judgment and convic- tion, then will that stout and firm courage take place; unless you attribute to anger whatever is done with ve- hemence, alacrity, and spirit. To me, indeed, that very Scipio^ who was chief priest, that favorer of the saying of the Stoics, " That no private man could be a wise man," does not seem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus, even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though a private man himself, commanded, with the au- thority of a consul, that all who meant well to the repub- lic should follow him. I do not know whether I have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of cour- age ; but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth anything come nearer madness than anger? And indeed Ennius has well defined it as the beginning of mad- ness. The changing color, tlie alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how little do all these things indicate a sound mind ! What can make a worse appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon, during the quarrel? And as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the occasion of his death. Courage, therefore, does not want the as-, sistance of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself. We may as well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to courage, because those who ' Cicero means Scipio Nasica, who, in the riots consequent on the re- election of Tiberius Gracchus to the tribunate, 133 B.C., liaving called in vain on the- consul, Mucins Scajvola, to save tiio republic, attacked Gracchus himself, who was slain in the tumult. ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 149 are mad or drunk often do a great many things with un- usual vehemence. Ajax was always brave; but still be was most brave when he was in that state of frenzy , The greatest feat that Ajax e'er achieved Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved. Quitting the field ; urged on by rising rage, Forced the declining troops again t' engage. Shall we say, then, that madness has its use? XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not require the assistance of passion. Cour- age is, then, an affection of mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance, or a knowledge of what is formidable or oth- erwise, and maintaining invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or despise them ; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the above defi- nitions are Sphaerus's, a man of the first ability as a layer- down of definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty much alike : they give us only common notions, some one way, and some another). But what is Chrysip- pus's definition? Fortitude, says he, is the knowledge of all things that are bearable, or an affection of the mind which bears and supports everything in obedience to the chief law of reason without fear. Now, though we should attack these men in the same manner as Carneades used to do, I fear they are the only real philosophers; for which of these definitions is there which does not explain that obscure and intricate notion of courage which every man conceives within himself? And when it is thus ex- plained, what can a warrior, a commander, or an orator want more? And no one can think that they will be unable to behave themselves courageously without anger. What ! do not even the Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make the same inferences? for, take aw\ay per- turbations, especially a hastiness of temper, and they will appear to talk very absurdly. But what they assert is this : they say that all fools are mad, as all dunghills stink ; not that they always do so, but stir them, and you will perceive it. And in like manner, a warra-tempered man la 150 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. not always in a passion ; but provoke him, and you will see him run mad. Now, that very warlike anger, which is of such service in war, what is the use of it to him when he is at home with his wife, children, and family? Is there, then, anything tliat a disturbed mind can do bet- ter than one which is calm and steady? Or cnn any one be angry without a perturbation of mind ? Our people, then, were in the right, who, as all vices depend on our manners, and nothing is worse than a passionate dispo- sition, called angry men the only morose men.^ XXY. Anger is in no wise becoming in an orator, though it is not amiss to affect it. Do you imagine that I am angry when in pleading I use any extraordinary ve- hemence and sharpness? What! when I write out my speeches after all is over and past, am I then angry while writing? Or do you think ^sopus was ever angry Avhen he acted, or Accius was so when he wrote ? Those men, indeed, act very well, but the orator acts better than the player, provided he be really an orator ; but, then, they carry it on without passion, and with a composed mind. But what wantonness is it to commend lust ! You pro- duce Themistocles and Demosthenes; to these you add Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. What ! do you then call studies lust? But these studies of the most excellent and admirable things, such as those were which you bring forward on all occasions, ought to be composed and tran- quil; and what kind of philosophers are they who com- mend grief, than which nothing is more detestable ? Afra- nius has said much to this purpose: Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. But we are inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even allow a centurion or standard- bearer to be angry, or any others, whom, not to explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not men- tion here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come at, may have its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a wise man. * Morosus is evidently derived from mores ^^ Morosus, mos, stubborn- ness, self-will, etc." lllUdle and Arnold, Lat, Diet. ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 151 XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so ? Is it because you cannot be liberal with- out pity ? We should not take sorrows on ourselves upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of their grief if we can. But to detract from another's reputation, or to rival him with that vicious emulation which resem- bles an enmity, of what use can that conduct be? Now, envy implies being uneasy at another's good because one does not enjoy it one's self; but detraction is the being uneasy at another's good, merely because he enjoys it. How can it be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take the trouble of acquiring what you want to have ? for it is madness in the highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular happiness. But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity of evils ? Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being vexed ? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful? Do we look, then, on the Hbidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which I could speak very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible. And so I will merely say tliat wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns as inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it Avas your opinion that such a man was as nat- urally liable to perturbation as the sea is exposed to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and con- stancy ? Anything sudden or unforeseen ? How can any- thing^ of this kind befall one to whom nothino; is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to man ? Now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and only what is natural remain, what, I pray you, can be natural which may be too exuberant? XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated. But as I suspect that your in- 152 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. quiry is not so much respecting the wise man as concern-' ing yourself (for you allow that he is free from all pertur- bations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see what remedies there are which may be applied by ])hi- losophy to the diseases of the mind. There is certainly some remedy; nor has nature been so unkind to the hu- man race as to have discovered so many things salutary to the body, and none which are medicinal to the mind. She has even been kinder to the mind than to the body ; inas- much as you must seek abroad for the assistance which the body requires, while the mind has all that it requires within itself. But in proportion as the excellency of the mind is of a higher and more divine nature, the more dil- igence does it require; and therefore reason, when it is well applied, discovers what is best, but when it is neg- lected, it becomes involved in many errors. I shall apply, then, all my discourse to you ; for though you pretend to be inquiring about the wise man, your inquiry may pos- sibly be about yourself. Various, then, are the cures ol those perturbations which I have expounded, for every dis- order is not to be appeased the same way. One medicine must be applied to the man who mourns, another to the pitiful, another to the person who envies ; for there is this difference to be maintained in all the four perturbations : we are to consider whether our discourse had better be directed to perturbations in general, which are a contempt of reason, or a somewhat too vehement appetite ; or wheth- er it would be better applied to particular descriptions, as, for instance, to fear, lust, and the rest, and whether it ap- pears preferable to endeavor to remove that which has oc- casioned the grief, or rather to attempt wholly to eradi- cate every kind of grief. As, should any one grieve that he is poor, the question is. Would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at anything? Certainly this last is the best course ; for should you not convince him with regard to poverty, you must allow him to grieve ; but if you remove grief by particular arguments, such as I used yesterday, the evil of poverty is in some manner removed. XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it were, wiped away by the method of nppeas- ON OTHER PERTURBATIONS OF THE MIND. 153 ing the mind, if you succeed in showing that there is no good in tiiat which has given rise to joy and hist, nor any evil in that which has occasioned fear or grief. But cer- tainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by show- ing that all perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or necessary in them. As we see, grief itself is easily softened when we charge those who grieve with weakness and an effeminate mind; or when we commend the gravity and constancy of those who bear calmly whatever befalls them here, as accidents to which all men are liable ; and, indeed, this is generally the feeling of those who look on these as real evils, but yet think they should be borne with resignation. One imagines pleasure to be a good, another money ; and yet the one may be called oft: from intemperance, the other from covetousness. The other method and address, which, at the same time that it removes the false opinion, withdraws the disorder, has more subtlety in it; but it seldom succeeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are some dis- eases which that medicine can by no means remove. For, should any one be uneasy because he is without virtue, without courage, destitute of a sense of duty or honesty, his anxiety proceeds from a real evil; and yet wq must ap- ply another method of cure to him, and such a one as all the philosophers, however they may differ about other things, agree in. For they must necessarily agree in this, that commotions of the mind in opposition to right rea- son are vicious ; and that even admitting those things to be evils which occasion fear or grief, and those to be goods Avliich provoke desire or joy, yet that very com- motion itself is vicious; for w^e mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, one who is resolute, sedate, grave, and su])erior to everything in this life; but one who either grieves, or fears, or covets, or is transported with passion, cannot come under that denomination; for these things are consistent only with those who look on the things of this world as things with which their minds are unequal to contend. XXIX. Wherefore, as I before said, the philosophers have all one method of cure, so that we need say nothing about whnt sort of thing that is which disturbs the mind. 154 THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. but we must speak only concerning the perturbation itself. Thus, first, with regard to desire itself, when the business is only to remove that, the inquiry is not to be, whether that thing be good or evil which provokes lust, but the lust itself is to be removed; so that whether whatever is honest is the chief good, or whether it consists in pleasure, or in both these things together, or in the other three kinds of goods, yet should there be in any one too vehe- ment an appetite for even virtue itself, the whole discourse should be directed to the deterring him from that vehe- mence. But human nature, when placed in a conspicuous point of view, gives us every argument for appeasing the mind, and, to make this the more distinct, the laws and conditions of life should be explained in our discourse. Therefore, it was not without reason that Socrates is re- ported, when Euripides was exhibiting his play called Orestes, to have repeated the first three verses of that tragedy What tragic story men can mournful tell, Whate'er fiom fate or from the gods befell, That human nature can support ^ But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortune has happened that they can and ought to bear it, it is very useful to set before them an enumeration of other persons who have borne similar calamities. Indeed, the method of appeasing grief was explained in my dispute of yester- day, and in my book on Consolation, which I wrote in the midst of my own grief; for I was not myself so wise a man as to be insensible to grief, and I used this, notwith- standing Chrysippus's advice to the contrary, who is against applying a medicine to the agitations of the mind while they are fresh; but I did it, and committed a vio- lence on nature, that the greatness of my grief might give way to the greatness of the medicine. XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have al- ready said enough; but I must say a little more on that. Now, as grief proceeds from what is present, so does fear * In the original they run thus : OvK iffTiv oiibiv detvov w6' elneiv Hiror, Ovde ndOov, ov6e ^i)fi