GIFT OF 
 
THE FALL OF 
 THE MOGUL EMPIRE 
 
THE FALL OF 
 THE MOGUL EMPIRE 
 
 BY SIDNEY J. OWEN, M.A. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 
 1912 
 
<=>* 
 
 o* 
 
 \ 
 
PREFACE 
 
 THIS book is not a regular history of the period 
 over which it extends, but the substance of a 
 course of lectures intended to trace the operation 
 of the causes which, in the course of a century, 
 reduced the mighty and far-famed Empire of 
 the Great Mogul to a political shadow. Accord- 
 ingly, events of minor importance, or not materi- 
 ally affecting the main issue, are not noticed. 
 And others which are cognate to, and virtually 
 repetitions of, what has been already related, 
 are either omitted, or glanced at very summarily. 
 And throughout an attempt has been made not 
 to tax the memory with too many bald facts, 
 but to bring out the salient features of the story, 
 so as to enlist the imagination by suggesting a 
 series of historical pictures. 
 
 A common impression is, that, as is so often 
 the case in the East, the decline and fall of the 
 Mogul Empire were due to the degeneracy of its 
 Sovereigns. But it is the object of this book 
 to show that it was irretrievably ruined in the 
 reign of Aurungzib, a monarch of great ability, 
 energy, and determination, but lacking in political 
 insight, and a bigoted Mussulman. 
 
 42C50 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 He struck the first mortal blow by reversing 
 Akbar's wise and generous policy of ignoring 
 distinctions of race and religion, and reimposing 
 the jizya, or poll-tax, on his Hindoo subjects ; 
 whereby he estranged them, and turned the 
 noblest and most warlike of them the Rajputs, 
 hitherto the staunchest supporters of the throne 
 into deadly and persistent enemies. 
 
 And Sivaji and his followers not only vindi- 
 cated their independence, but struck a second 
 mortal blow at the integrity of the Empire. 
 
 They destroyed its military reputation. They 
 exhausted its accumulated treasure. They spread 
 disorder and devastation over the Dekkan and 
 beyond it. They loosened the ties of allegiance, 
 and led multitudes of the doubly oppressed 
 people to join them. They asserted a claim, by 
 way of blackmail, to a quarter of the Imperial 
 revenue, and exacted it by planting their own 
 chief officers, collectors, and troops in the Imperial 
 Provinces, and levying this tribute at the point 
 of the lance, and thus establishing an imperium 
 in imperio. Thus the Empire, though not dis- 
 solved, was hopelessly debilitated. How desper- 
 ate was this situation may be inferred from the 
 fact that Aurungzib's son and successor, Bahadur 
 Shah, in vain sought to arrest the further progress 
 of the Mahrattas by sanctioning this masterful 
 pretension to divided sovereignty in the Dekkan 
 Provinces. 
 
 The effective authority of the central govern- 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 ment was thenceforth in abeyance. And, as 
 usual in the East, the provincial rulers, without 
 repudiating the technical supremacy of the Em- 
 peror, became independent, and the Mahrattas 
 more aggressive and dominant in Hindostan as 
 well as in the Dekkan. 
 
 Lastly, Nadir Shah, after inflicting the ex- 
 tremity of humiliation on the Emperor and his 
 capital, annexed the Imperial territory west of 
 the Indus. The dissolution of the Empire was 
 complete. But the lack-land Sovereign retained 
 his imposing title and pretensions, which still 
 impressed the native mind, and were turned to 
 practical account by Clive in the grant to the 
 East India Company of the perpetual Dewani of 
 the Bengal Provinces. 
 
 The following narrative is derived almost 
 entirely from contemporary authorities. 
 
 For the nefarious process by which Aurungzib 
 cleared his way to the throne I have followed 
 Manucci, a Venetian in Dara's service, whose 
 Storia do Mogor has been lately translated and 
 edited by Mr. William Irvine. 
 
 The account of the reigns of Aurungzib and 
 his successors, to the final settlement of Nizam- 
 ul-Mulk in the Dekkan, has been taken from the 
 standard history of Khafi Khan, translated by 
 Professor Dowson, and inserted in the 7th volume 
 of The History of India from its own Historians. 
 This author served under Aurungzib in the 
 Dekkan. 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 For the later history I am most indebted to 
 Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas. 
 
 But the sketch of Aliverdi Khan's career is 
 taken from the Seir Mutaquerin, a contemporary 
 work, translated by a Frenchman under the 
 auspices of Warren Hastings. This work has 
 also supplied information on matters outside 
 Bengal. 
 
 The Paniput Campaign has been fully and 
 lucidly described by Casi Pundit, a Mahratta 
 in the service of the Nawab of Oude, who was 
 much concerned in the negotiations preceding the 
 battle, and was an eye-witness of it. The narra- 
 tive was translated and published anonymously 
 in the third volume of the Asiatic Researches. 
 
 In spelling Indian names I have endeavoured 
 to steer an even course between uncouth archa- 
 isms and the latest fashion of unfamiliar and 
 accentuated rendering, which perplexes and 
 troubles the general reader. But I have not felt 
 at liberty to alter the spelling in passages which 
 I have quoted. 
 
 For the Index I am indebted to my daughter, 
 Mrs. F. Boas, who kindly offered to compile it. 
 
 S. J. O. 
 
 OXFORD, January 1912. 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF 
 CHIEF EVENTS 
 
 1657. Shah Jehan falls seriously ill. 
 
 Shuja defeated by Solaiman Shukoh. 
 1658. Dara defeated by Aurungzib and Morad. 
 
 Shah Jehan deposed and imprisoned. 
 
 Morad arrested ; and Aurungzib becomes Emperor. 
 
 Solaiman flies to Sirinagar. 
 1659. Aurungzib defeats Shuja. 
 
 Aurungzib defeats and puts Dara to death. 
 
 Sivaji murders Afzal Khan. 
 1660. Shuja retires to Arakan. 
 
 Solaiman betrayed to Aurungzib. 
 1661. Morad murdered. 
 
 1662. Sivaji surprises Shaista Khan at Poona. 
 1664. Sivaji raids Surat, assumes title of Raja, and coins money. 
 1665. Sivaji submits, and goes to Delhi. 
 1666. Shah Jehan dies. 
 
 Sivaji returns to Rajgurh. 
 
 Is crowned as Raja with Mogul forms. 
 1677. Aurungzib reimposes the / 
 1679. The Rajputs revolt. 
 
 Prince Akbar joins them. 
 1680. Sivaji dies. 
 1681. Prince Akbar joins Sambaji. 
 1682. Sambaji raids near Burhampur. 
 1683. Aurungzib undertakes the Dekkan war. 
 1686. Aurungzib takes Bijapur. 
 1687. Aurungzib takes Golconda. 
 1689. Sambaji put to death. 
 1690. Ram Raja becomes Regent. 
 1694. Gingee besieged. 
 1698. Gingee surrendered. 
 
 Santaji Ghorepuray murdered. 
 1699. Aurungzib changes his plan of war. 
 1700. Ram Raja dies. 
 1707. Aurungzib dies. 
 
 Shao released, and established as Raja, at Satara. 
 1709. Bahadur Shah marches against the Sikhs. 
 1712. Bahadur Shah dies. 
 
 Farokhsir defeats Jahandar Shah. 
 
x CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF CHIEF EVENTS 
 
 1713. Husain Ali goes to the Dekkan. 
 
 1716. Baud Khan defeated and killed. 
 
 1717. Husain makes peace with Raja Shao. 
 
 1718. Farokhsir deposed and put to death. 
 
 1720. Nizam-ul-Mulk becomes strong in the Dekkan. 
 
 Defeats the Seiads' armies. 
 
 Husain assassinated. 
 
 Abdullah defeated and captured. 
 
 Baji Rao becomes Peishwa. 
 1722. Nizam-ul-Mulk made Vizier. 
 
 1723. Nizam-ul-Mulk resigns, and retires to the Dekkan. 
 1724. Mubariz defeated and slain. 
 1729. Nizam-ul-Mulk coerced by Baji Rao. 
 1731. Baji Rao defeats and kills Trimbuk. 
 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk and Baji Rao make peace. 
 1732-6. Baji Rao's success in Malwa, etc. 
 1737. Baji Rao threatens Delhi. 
 
 Blockades, and extorts concessions from, Nizam-ul-Mulk. 
 1738. Nadir Shah invades India. 
 1739. His extortions and massacre at Delhi. 
 
 Aliverdi becomes Viceroy of the Bengal Provinces. 
 
 The Mahrattas take Bassein. 
 1740. Baji Rao foiled by Nazir Jung. 
 
 Baji Rao dies. 
 1742. Balaji extorts the cession of Malwa. 
 
 First Mahratta invasion under Bhaskir Pundit. 
 1743. Aliverdi defeats and expels Rugoji from Bengal. 
 
 Second Mahratta invasion under Rugoji. 
 1744. Third Mahratta invasion under Bhaskir. 
 
 Aliverdi murders him and his officers. 
 1745. Mustapha defeated and slain. 
 
 Fourth Mahratta invasion by Rugoji. 
 1748. Mohammad Shah and Nizam-ul-Mulk die. 
 
 Rebellion of Sirdar Khan and Shumsur Khan. 
 
 Fifth Mahratta invasion. 
 
 Ahmed Shah Abdali's first invasion of India. 
 1749. Raja Shao dies. 
 1751. Balaji entraps the Guikwar. 
 
 Salabat Jung marches on Poona. 
 
 Aliverdi makes peace with the Bonsla. 
 
 Ahmed Shah's second invasion. 
 
 1754. Ghazi-u-din deposes and blinds the Emperor Ahmed Shah. 
 1756. The Abdali's third invasion. 
 1758. Rugonath Rao takes Delhi and Lahore. 
 1759. The Abdali's fourth invasion. 
 1760. The Bhow conquers the Nizam. 
 
 Marches to Hindostan, and takes Delhi. 
 1761. The battle of Paniput. 
 
 The Peishwa, Balaji, dies. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 I. THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH . . 1 
 
 II. AURUNGZIB MAKES* HlMSELF EMPEROR . .17 
 
 III. RESULTS OF AURUNGZIB'S USURPATION . . 44 
 
 IV. AURUNGZIB'S NEW POLICY . . . .48 
 V. SIVAJI'S CAREER . . . . .55 
 
 VI. THE REIMPOSITION OF THE JIZYA, AND THE RAJPUT 
 
 REVOLT . . . . . .74 
 
 VII. AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN . . 86 
 
 VIII. THE MAHRATTA WAR OF INDEPENDENCE . . 102 
 
 IX. AURUNGZIB UNDERTAKES TO MASTER THE MAHRATTA 
 BASE. THE MAHRATTAS RETALIATE BY SETTLING 
 IN THE DEKKAN IMPERIAL PROVINCES . .112 
 
 X. THE EMPEROR BAHADUR SHAH . . .127 
 
 XI. THE INTERREGNUM ..... 133 
 
 XII. THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR . . . .135 
 
 XIII. THE EMPEROR MOHAMMAD SHAH. PROGRESS OF 
 
 THE ANTI-MOGUL REACTION . . .155 
 
 XIV. MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION . . . l6l 
 
 XV. NlZAM-UL-MuLK's POLICY . . . .183 
 
 XVI. GROWTH OF THE MAHRATTA CONFEDERACY, AND OF 
 
 THE PEISHWA'S ASCENDANCY IN IT . .191 
 
xii CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XVII. PEACE BETWEEN THE NIZAM AND THE PEISHWA, 
 AND CONSEQUENT MAHRATTA PROGRESS IN 
 
 HINDOSTAN . . . . 194 1 
 
 XVIII. NADIR SHAH'S INVASION .... 200 
 
 XIX. CULMINATING PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 IN NATIVE INDIA .... 208 
 
 XX. ALIVERDI KHAN ..... 224 
 
 XXI. EPILOGUE . . . . . .234- 
 
 XXII. THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN .... 236 
 
 INDEX 267 
 
THE FALL OF THE 
 MOGUL EMPIRE 
 
 i 
 
 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 IN the middle of the seventeenth century, the 
 Empire of the " Great Mogul " was highly 
 renowned both in Asia and in Europe. It is 
 notable that Bernier, who lived many years in 
 India, and was very familiar with the Court of 
 the Emperor, thinks it worth while to institute 
 a comparison between the Mogul Empire and 
 that of le Grand Monarque at the height of 
 his power ; though, of course, he concludes in 
 favour of the latter. Nor was the reputation of 
 the Asiatic Monarchy undeserved. Whatever 
 its defects, it was, on the whole, a grandly 
 conceived, well-adjusted, and beneficent structure 
 of dominion. 
 
 The illustrious origin of its founder, Baber, 
 who was descended from the two mightiest 
 Asiatic conquerors, Ghenzis Khan and Timour, 
 gave to the dynasty high prestige, which its 
 
2 "THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 matrimonial alliances with Rajput princesses 
 tended to enhance among its Hindoo subjects. 
 And the vigorous vitality of the royal house 
 had been attested by the personal rule of five 
 successive emperors in lineal descent. After 
 its apparent extinction under Humayun, Akbar's 
 genius and indefatigable warfare had restored, 
 pacified, and extended the limits of Baber's 
 acquisition. And Shah Jehan was now the 
 undisputed sovereign of a vast territory, not 
 indeed, as is often assumed, conterminous with 
 India on the south, but, on the other hand, 
 extending beyond it into the Afghan mountains. 
 
 That a Mussulman emperor should thus quietly 
 command the allegiance of a great and warlike 
 population, the far larger number of which was 
 Hindoo, was remarkable, and an eloquent testi- 
 mony to the merits of the regime. And this 
 favourable impression was confirmed by a closer 
 inspection of the Mogul Government, and its 
 general results. 
 
 The habitual and ready submission of the 
 Hindoos to a sovereign alien to themselves in 
 race and religion was due to his lenient and 
 sympathetic treatment of them. Instead of 
 carrying out the harsher precepts of the Koran ; 
 maintaining an invidious distinction between the 
 followers of the Prophet and the unbelievers, 
 and narrowing the moral basis of his authority 
 by excluding the latter from office on the ground 
 of religious disqualification ; the Great Mogul 
 
THE EMPIRE BASED ON TOLERANCE 3 
 
 winked at and condoned the misbelief of the 
 bulk of his subjects, and their strange practices ; 
 showed special favour to their more eminent 
 men ; admitted them freely to high posts, 
 both civil and military, and thus, figuring in 
 the capacity of the Father of all his people, 
 made it their interest and their pride to serve 
 and sustain a regime so liberal, comprehensive, 
 and considerate. 
 
 Thus, while the Empire rooted itself more and 
 more in the hearts of the natives, its material 
 strength was proportionally increased. For, 
 though its regular armies were constantly re- 
 cruited by soldiers drawn from its Afghan 
 territory, and by mercenaries from Upper Asia, 
 who were Mahometans, as well as by men of 
 the same faith, though inhabitants of India, 
 the vast force which was at the disposal of the 
 Emperor, according to the Ayeen Akbery, may 
 be described rather as a quasi-national army, 
 if not as a militia, which must have been very 
 largely composed of Hindoos. 
 
 The naval weakness of the Empire was as 
 notable as its military strength. Practically, 
 it never had a fleet of its own, though the 
 Abyssinian " Seedys " were patronised and sub- 
 sidised for its occasional objects. And this is 
 the more remarkable, as the annual pilgrimage 
 by sea to Mecca required protection, and was 
 apt to be seriously interrupted by enemies or 
 marauders. 
 
4 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 Sivaji, as we shall see, took advantage of this 
 circumstance. 
 
 Though the Government was despotic, and 
 particular acts of great severity are recorded, 
 its general tone was mild and humane. Taxa- 
 tion was light ; and its most productive source, 
 the land revenue, was moderately assessed, and 
 equitably adjusted. Foreign commerce was pro- 
 tected and favoured ; and the English East 
 India Company throve, and multiplied its 
 factories, under the shadow of the Imperial 
 authority. The judicial system, though what 
 we should consider crude and capricious, as 
 well as too often corruptly exercised, was not 
 liable like our own to the tedious delays which 
 have been its reproach, and which have so much 
 tended to obstruct, and even defeat, the course 
 of justice. And the right of appealing to the 
 Emperor, from inferior tribunals, though too 
 generally a futile privilege, was sometimes really 
 remedial, and probably was, to a certain extent, 
 a standing check on judicial iniquity. Much 
 the same may be said as to the Provincial 
 Governors. Though their delegated authority 
 was, like their master's, arbitrary, its exercise 
 was open to the criticism and unfavourable 
 reports to Court of other officials, and of 
 unofficial but influential Jaghiredars ; as well 
 as to the periodical inquisitions of Imperial 
 Commissioners, like Charlemagne's Missi 
 Dominici ; on whose adverse judgment the 
 
LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, & ART FLOURISH 5 
 
 Governor was liable to removal and punish- 
 ment. 
 
 The comparative internal tranquillity of the 
 Empire in later years had favoured the pursuits 
 of peace, augmented the Imperial revenue, 
 and culminated in what may be called the 
 quasi- Augustan Age of the dynasty ; when the 
 pomp and magnificence of the Court were most 
 elaborately organised and profusely displayed ; 
 literature and philosophy were esteemed, and 
 cultivated in high quarters ; and the fine arts 
 flourished to an extent that may be fairly 
 appreciated by the noble and graceful monu- 
 ments that, as in the case of the Taj Mahal, 
 still appeal so forcibly to the aesthetic sense even 
 of Europeans at the present day. 
 
 Paradoxical as it may sound, it is not the 
 less true, that the greatness and prosperity of 
 the Empire were due to the Gallic disposition 
 of its sovereigns. Though professed votaries of 
 Islam, they were none of them animated by its 
 exclusive and fierce spirit ; and their instincts 
 as statesmen constrained them to ignore differ- 
 ences which they could not hope to remove ; 
 and to strengthen their power by conciliation, 
 rather than undermine and fritter it away in a 
 Quixotic tilt against the strongholds of Hindoo 
 superstition. Baber himself was not only too 
 sagacious and experienced, but too generous 
 a man to be a religious persecutor. And his 
 grandson Akbar not only inherited his large- 
 
6 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 hearted disposition, but was too independent a 
 religious thinker to feel bound to act on the 
 precepts of the Koran in their political applica- 
 tion. Thus his latitudinarian views found expres- 
 sion in his liberal and comprehensive policy. 
 Though, like our own Government, he set his 
 face against some of the worst social evils of 
 Hindooism, forbidding suttee, and sanctioning the 
 remarriage of widow r s, he was more than tolerant 
 to his Hindoo subjects for he not only, by 
 abolishing the jizya, or poll-tax on infidels, 
 removed a most invidious distinction between 
 his co-religionists and the majority of his people, 
 but he gave the strongest practical proof of his 
 resolution to ignore distinctions of race and 
 religion by employing both classes impartially in 
 his service, and by cementing domestic relations 
 between his family and the most typical and 
 venerable representatives of Hindoo nationality, 
 the Rajput Principalities. And he was person- 
 ally attached, and gave his fullest confidence, to 
 members of this noble race. They held high 
 commands in his armies, were Governors of 
 important provinces, and sat in his Council. 
 Their gallant troops distinguished themselves 
 in his w r ars ; and from them were selected a corps 
 of what may be called Guards, who were char- 
 acteristically stationed outside the palace. 
 
 His example was followed by his descendants ; 
 and the intermarriage of the Mogul princes with 
 the Rajput princesses tended much to promote 
 
HINDOO DEVOTION TO THE DYNASTY 7 
 
 sympathy between the races, to abate religious 
 prejudice on both sides, and in the end to half- 
 Hindooise the dynasty, and thereby to strengthen 
 its hold over the Hindoo community generally. 
 For it thus lost much of the aspect of an alien 
 and invidious Power, established by conquest, 
 and was more generally regarded as (so to speak) 
 a naturalised, normal, and congenial Paramount 
 Authority, rightfully entitled, by its beneficent 
 sway, to the allegiance and zealous support of 
 its native subjects. 
 
 This result was of course due not simply to 
 the introduction of Hindoo blood into the royal 
 family, but to the persistence in Akbar's line of 
 conduct. Jehangir and Shah Jehan, without 
 pledging themselves to his theological eclecti- 
 cism, steadily adhered to his liberal and compre- 
 hensive policy, which thus came to be recognised 
 as the fixed and inevitable order of things ; 
 though there was, of course, a back-water of 
 rigidly orthodox and fanatical Mahometan sen- 
 timent, very hostile to the system in favour 
 at Court. But the authority of the Emperor 
 counteracted, without entirely suppressing, its 
 indignant protest. On lower grounds also 
 than religious principle attempts seem to have 
 been made to reintroduce oppressive and 
 degrading inflictions on the Hindoos. One 
 audacious speculator, as the Emperor Jehangir 
 tells the story in his Memoirs, ventured to sug- 
 gest that he should " spoil the Egyptians " by 
 
8 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 reinstituting the jizya, and allowing the proposer 
 to hold the farm of it. But Jehangir, proud of 
 his great father's memory, and determined to 
 walk in his steps, and not blind to the self- 
 interested motive of the proposer, was not 
 content simply to repudiate the suggestion, and 
 rebuke the rash and selfish proposer of it, but 
 punished him after a fashion characteristically 
 Oriental. 
 
 More mindful of Akbar's policy than of Ma- 
 homet's precepts, he closed with the proposi- 
 tion, consented to farm out the impost to the 
 projector, exacted the money in advance, and 
 then cut off the unlucky fellow's head for having 
 had the temerity to seek his own profit at the 
 expense of his sovereign's reputation, the welfare 
 of the community, and the good-ordering of the 
 State. 
 
 This strange incident at least shows how 
 thoroughly Akbar had indoctrinated his son in 
 the principles of religious freedom and social 
 equality, though Jehangir 's peculiar dealing with 
 the impugner of them certainly leaves something 
 to be desired in the matter of equity and 
 humanity. 
 
 Again, the process of assimilation which had 
 approximated the Imperial family to the 
 Hindoo race had long been in operation in 
 various degrees, and from more than one cause, 
 among the Indian-born Mussulmans. As in 
 Ireland, immigrants after a time were proverb- 
 
DANGER OF REVERSING AKBAR'S POLICY 9 
 
 ially said to become Hibernis Hiberniores, so 
 local influences and associations, including inter- 
 marriage, and more irregular connexions, con- 
 tributed to soften the asperities of religious 
 antagonism, and to create common interests and 
 a common jealousy of foreigners of a different 
 type, though of their own faith. This feeling 
 was liable to be much intensified by the circum- 
 stance that there was a constant stream of 
 Mahometan adventurers from the North, seeking 
 their fortunes in the Imperial service ; and that 
 they were apt to be more highly esteemed, and 
 more liberally paid, than their Indian co-re- 
 ligionists. Moreover, it must be remembered 
 that the latter were often the descendants of 
 converted Hindoos ; and, as in the case of the 
 Moriscos of Spain, heredity might assert itself 
 in the shape of stronger sympathy with their 
 old stock than with their new and superficial 
 faith. And this was the more probable from the 
 remoteness and comparative isolation of India 
 from the capital of the Mussulman world, and 
 the influence of the Sultan of Roum. 
 
 Thus not only were the Emperor's native 
 Mahometan subjects only a fraction of the popu- 
 lation ; but it was very doubtful how far he 
 could count on their sympathy and co-operation 
 in an attempt to reverse Akbar's policy, and 
 depress and persecute the Hindoo majority. 
 
 The arduousness of such an enterprise will 
 be more evident if we consider the characteristics 
 
10 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 of the several peoples that were destined to 
 become the subjects of this rash experiment. 
 Foremost and most obviously formidable were 
 the inhabitants of Rajputana. Their alleged 
 origin, on which they prided themselves, their 
 authentic history, their institutions and estab- 
 lished character, and the prominent and 
 effective part which they had hitherto played 
 in the Imperial service, all betokened the serious 
 consequences that might be anticipated from 
 their estrangement and hostility. 
 
 They claimed descent from the original 
 warrior caste ; and their stereotyped character- 
 istics gave much plausibility to the pretension. 
 Their ancestors had undoubtedly fought obstin- 
 ately and valiantly against the early Mahometan 
 invaders, and had eventually preserved their 
 independence by retiring into the remote and 
 sequestered region which they had since occupied, 
 and where they retained their military char- 
 acter in all its vigour, sustained by institutions 
 which curiously combined the tribal peculi- 
 arities of the Scotch Highlanders, the feudal 
 relations of the more settled communities of 
 mediaeval Europe, and a chivalrous spirit,, akin 
 to that which was so closely associated with 
 feudalism in the West. The personal devotion 
 of the Highland clan to the patriarchal Chief 
 had a counterpart in the passionate fidelity of 
 the Rajput tribe to its Prince. Under him, as 
 in feudal Europe, the thakoors, or nobles, held 
 
FORMIDABLE CHARACTER OF THE RAJPUTS 11 
 
 their lands by military tenure, and were bound 
 to support their Prince in his wars. And while, 
 as in feudal Europe, their independent spirit, 
 their pride, and their readiness to take offence, 
 made their relations with him by no means 
 uniformly harmonious, their proficiency in war 
 was more habitually maintained by the jealousies, 
 quarrels, and consequent contests of the rival 
 tribes. And these were the more frequent and 
 obstinate, because the Rajput was, so to speak, 
 a true sportsman in the great game of war. 
 To distinguish himself in battle was his point 
 of honour ; he fought for fame, not like the 
 lower races for plunder ; and his great delight, 
 in his hours of relaxation, was to listen to the 
 spirit-stirring strains of his bhats or minstrel 
 bards, commemorative of the martial achieve- 
 ments of his Princes and their followers. But 
 as Akbar's policy was developed, the Rajputs 
 found ample occupation for their favourite 
 pursuit in the Imperial armies ; in which, 
 however, they still retained their separate 
 organisation, and thus preserved their peculiar 
 character and corporate spirit. 
 
 Akbar's remembrance of his grandfather's 
 experience of Rajput hostility must have strongly 
 impressed on him the importance of conciliat- 
 ing this remarkable people, and securing their 
 alliance rather than their subjection. For, after 
 his easy victory over Sultan Ibrahim, Baber 
 had been confronted by a great Rajput Con- 
 
12 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 federacy, headed by a typical hero, Rana Sanga ; 
 and though in the desperate battle which ensued 
 the invader conquered at last by employing a 
 Tartar manoeuvre, he bears full testimony to 
 the fighting power and gallantry of his oppon- 
 ents, whose undisciplined valour yielded only 
 to his superior tactics. And such as he found 
 them, they continued to be in the days of his 
 successors. 
 
 It must be remembered also that, besides 
 the Rajput communities established under their 
 half-independent Princes in the country which 
 bears their name, numbers of the same race 
 were widely dispersed elsewhere, and abounded 
 especially in their old home, Oude, and in 
 Behar, whose descendants so largely constituted 
 the Company's sepoy army in later times. 
 Many Rajas and Poligars throughout the country 
 claimed to be of Rajput descent ; and their 
 sympathies, and those of their followers, would 
 naturally be enlisted on behalf of their real or 
 alleged kinsmen and co-religionists. 
 
 And much to the point for our present 
 purpose, Sivaji himself claimed Rajput descent 
 on the mother's side. 
 
 On the whole, as the Empire had thriven 
 so much by its connexion with this noble and 
 powerful people, their estrangement would be 
 a very serious blow to its strength and integrity, 
 both directly and, from the example of so pre- 
 eminent a people, indirectly. 
 
CHARACTERS OF THE JATS AND SIKHS 13 
 
 The Jats were a very different type. Their 
 early history is obscure. But they were a 
 comparatively more indigenous race, and may 
 be classed among the sudras in caste. They 
 had none of the chivalrous spirit of the Rajputs. 
 But though a ruder and more ordinary people, 
 they were hardy, daring, pertinacious, and war- 
 like ; and in later times they approved their 
 military capacity by holding their capital Bhurt- 
 pore against Lake, and repulsing four assaults. 
 They also had a pronounced taste for plunder, 
 which if, as seems probable, the Gypsies are 
 their kinsmen, might be safely assumed. But 
 I mention it because, as with the Mahrattas, 
 if they were inclined to resent religious intoler- 
 ance, this filibustering appetency would be an 
 additional stimulus to resistance and lawless- 
 ness. 
 
 Again, though the Sikhs, originally Hindoos, 
 and probably Jats, had repudiated caste, and 
 their peculiar religious system had little in 
 common with popular Hindooism, they were 
 fanatically devoted to the Khalsa, or what I 
 may call their own Church; and circumstances, 
 which I need not now relate, transformed them 
 from a body of mild and mystical religionists 
 into stern and grim warriors, jealous for the 
 honour, and sanguine of the extension, of their 
 faith and polity ; and burning with hatred of 
 Islam and its rival pretensions and domineering 
 principles. Any attempts to enforce these would 
 
14 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 inevitably encounter most resolute resistance 
 from such a people. 
 
 That exclusively of any external assault, the 
 Empire could have survived the debilitating 
 and disintegrating consequences of reversing 
 the policy which had developed, cemented, and 
 consolidated it, is highly improbable. 
 
 The alienation of the Rajputs, even if it had 
 not amounted to active hostility, would alone 
 have availed to sap both its material and moral 
 strength. It would have been further weakened 
 by the indisposition of the native Mussulmans 
 to identify themselves with, and support heartily, 
 a regime which in a land where custom is an 
 all-powerful consideration did such violence to 
 their old associations and fixed habits, and, in 
 many cases, to their latent sympathies ; and 
 which was too likely to produce internecine war 
 with the majority of their compatriots. 
 
 Thus the Government would be compelled to 
 place its chief reliance on the foreign and more 
 bigoted Mahometans ; while the inevitable fail- 
 ure of the revenue, from the disturbed state of 
 the country, would make the payment of such 
 extraneous mercenaries, in adequate force, the 
 more difficult. Moreover, as I have already said, 
 the marked preference for these strangers habitu- 
 ally shown by the Government tended to divide 
 the Mussulman interest, by exciting jealousy 
 and antipathy to them among the native Mahom- 
 etans. And such feelings would now acquire a 
 
A RUINOUS EXPERIMENT IN ANY CASE 15 
 
 new and powerful stimulus. Hence, again, a new 
 danger to the dynasty. It was by no means 
 improbable, as I hope to show from what actu- 
 ally occurred later, that some distinguished 
 and influential native Mussulman might make 
 common cause with the Hindoo interest, and 
 attempt to re-establish the old order. Thus the 
 Seiads of Barha, long settled in India, had always 
 been distinguished for military prowess. They 
 were now a very numerous and powerful com- 
 munity, and, as appeared later, quite capable 
 of engaging in an anti-Mogul and quasi-nationalist 
 revolution, in concert with the Hindoos. 
 
 Thus, on the whole, had the critical experi- 
 ment been made in a time of profound peace, 
 and had not its inherent difficulties been aggra- 
 vated by external danger, and heavy demands 
 on the Imperial resources to meet the exigencies 
 of foreign warfare, it could hardly have failed 
 eventually to ruin the dynasty, and, unless the 
 counter-revolution had succeeded, and the new 
 ruler had possessed great governing qualities 
 the Empire also. 
 
 But the catastrophe came about in another 
 way ; though the experiment was made, and the 
 first fatal breach in the integrity of the Imperial 
 structure the alienation of the Rajputs rapidly 
 ensued. But before this had occurred, Aurung- 
 zib, the rash innovator, had already engaged 
 in another enterprise, which committed him, in 
 a new field, to a contest with militant Hindooism 
 
16 THE MOGUL EMPIRE AT ITS ZENITH 
 
 of an exceptionally formidable and insidious 
 character, which proved more than a match for 
 his utmost and prolonged efforts to suppress it, 
 and in the end a chief cause of the collapse which 
 his proceedings in Hindostan had threatened 
 to bring about. 
 
II 
 
 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 WHEN the Emperor, Shah Jehan, was attacked 
 by a sudden and dangerous illness at Delhi, Dara 
 Shukoh, his eldest son, was at the capital ; Shah 
 Shuja, his second son, was Governor of Bengal ; 
 Morad Buksh, the youngest, was Governor of 
 Guzerat ; and Alamgirh, styled later Aurungzib, 
 the third son, was in the Dekkan engaged in 
 the siege of Bijapur, the capital of one of the 
 two surviving Afghan monarchies there. The 
 Emperor's illness, and disappearance from public 
 view, produced general consternation, and threat- 
 ened serious disturbance at the capital and in the 
 Provinces. 
 
 Shah Jehan himself fully appreciated the 
 danger of the crisis. Disabled as he was, he seems 
 to have feared that the coup de grace might be 
 given him by the partisans of one or other of his 
 ambitious sons, rivals for the succession of their 
 moribund parent. And it is notable that, in 
 this extremity, he showed more confidence in 
 the Rajputs than in his Mogul subjects. Manucci, 
 who was in Dara's service, says : " He ordered 
 all the gates of the fortress to be closed, leaving 
 
18 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 only two wickets open. Placing no reliance on 
 the Mahometan commanders, he ordered Jeswunt 
 Sing to post himself at one gate with his men, 
 and the other he made over to Raja Ram Sing. 
 These officers guarded the fortress on all sides 
 with thirty thousand soldiers, all of them Raj- 
 puts." Dara himself was only allowed to " enter 
 the fortress twice a day, with a retinue of ten 
 persons, but not to sleep within it. And those 
 within were sworn on the Koran to be faithful 
 to him, he was afraid of being given poison." 
 
 Reports were circulated and sent to the 
 Provinces that the Emperor was dead ; and 
 a war of succession was imminent. 
 
 Dara assumed the conduct of affairs at 
 Delhi, and levied additional troops there. Shah 
 Shuja marched with a large army from Bengal. 
 Morad prepared for action, and took Surat in 
 the hope of finding much treasure there. Aur- 
 ungzib proceeded more deliberately and artfully. 
 He raised the siege of Bijapur, and, according 
 to Manucci, secured the neutrality of Sivaji 
 by a very remarkable concession no less, in 
 fact, than the grant of a fourth part of the 
 Imperial revenue in the Dekkan Provinces, 
 which, he asserts, was recorded on a golden 
 tablet, and was to be perpetual. If this state- 
 ment is true, the Mahratta claim to chout in 
 the Dekkan was thus early and formally sanc- 
 tioned by Aurungzib himself. And Manucci 
 taxes him with perfidy for ignoring it later. 
 
SHUJA DEFEATED BY SOLAIMAN SHUKOH 19 
 
 The Emperor, partially recovered, announced 
 his convalescence to his absent sons, and ordered 
 them to keep their stations, and renounce their 
 ambitious schemes. But suspecting or assuming 
 that his disease was mortal, and that he was 
 not a free agent, and jealous of Dara's ascendancy 
 at the capital, they evaded compliance, on the 
 plausible ground of the necessity of restoring 
 their father to independence. 
 
 The approach of Shuja compelled the Em- 
 peror to send an army against him. This was 
 composed of the best troops, under the command 
 of Solaiman Shukoh, Dara's eldest son, accom- 
 panied by Jei Sing, Raja of Ambir or Jeipur, 
 and Dilir Khan, an eminent Mogul noble. Jei 
 Sing was well affected to the Emperor, but 
 inimical to Dara, who had highly offended his 
 dignity by flippantly remarking that he looked 
 like a musician or, as we might say a fiddler. 
 This circumstance may partly explain the 
 contrast between Jei Sing's conduct and that 
 of the Rajputs, who were 'generally strongly 
 devoted to the cause of Dara. 
 
 Hence Jei Sing was not anxious that Solaiman 
 should confirm his father's ascendancy by a 
 decisive victory over Shuja. Moreover, he was 
 instructed by the Emperor to prevent, if 
 possible, a collision, and to induce Shuja to 
 return to his government. But his remon- 
 strances were ineffectual ; and both Princes 
 were eager for the fray. Shuja was defeated ; 
 
20 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 but Jei Sing contrived that the pursuit should 
 be slack ; and Shuja, with little loss, retreated, 
 and returned to Bengal. 
 
 Morad's demonstration was lightly regarded 
 at Delhi. Though he was brave and obstinate, 
 his weak character was known ; and it was 
 hoped that he might still be reclaimed to 
 allegiance on hearing of his father's recovery. 
 But Aurungzib's ability and declared intention 
 of subverting Dara's overweening influence were 
 considered far more serious. And the event 
 soon justified these apprehensions. 
 
 Aurungzib, secretly resolved to win the great 
 prize, went darkly to work. Hitherto, though 
 employed by his father in the field, he had 
 studiously disclaimed all ambitious views, and 
 had professed to be a religious devotee a 
 fakir in spirit intent only on his soul's salva- 
 tion. He now saw that, to gain his object, 
 his first step should be to make a cat's-paw 
 of his simple brother, Morad, and that this 
 would be best effected by posing still in his old 
 attitude. He accordingly wrote to him, repeat- 
 ing the report that Dara had poisoned Shah 
 Jehan, seized the government, and intended to 
 make himself Emperor, and that Shuja w r as 
 marching against him with the same object, 
 But, denouncing Dara as an infidel and idolater, 
 and Shuja as a heretic, and asserting his own 
 zeal for the orthodox faith, and desire to re- 
 nounce the world and devote himself to 
 
AURUNGZIB BEGUILES MORAD 21 
 
 religion ; he offered to do his utmost to secure 
 Morad's succession, if he would swear on the 
 Koran to protect and provide competently for 
 him and his family. The offer was, of course, 
 guaranteed by the same solemn sanction ; and, 
 as a further pledge of his sincerity, Aurungzib 
 sent a large sum of money, and urged his brother 
 to join him promptly. Morad, fired with am- 
 bition and blind to Aurungzib's real character 
 and designs, eagerly welcomed the overture, 
 employed the money in increasing his army, 
 and set no store by the warning of a faithful 
 officer, Shahbaz, who mistrusted the good faith 
 of the piously self-abnegating auxiliary. 
 
 Meanwhile, Aurungzib had induced the 
 Dekkan army to follow his fortune ; and the 
 junction of the two forces was shortly effected. 
 
 On this occasion Aurungzib ostentatiously 
 treated his brother in public with the greatest 
 deference, as his future sovereign ; and in 
 private redoubled his hypocritical assurances 
 to him. 
 
 The Emperor sent repeated orders to them 
 to return to their governments, promising to 
 pardon their rebellion. But Aurungzib per- 
 suaded Morad that these were forgeries, and 
 that, should they find their father alive, the 
 necessity of delivering him from Dara's control 
 would justify their persistence, and merit and 
 obtain their forgiveness. 
 
 Manucci says that at this time Shah Jehan 
 
22 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 was not secluded, and that he saw him seated 
 at a window for more than half an hour in the 
 presence of a vast concourse. But Aurungzib's 
 partisans at Delhi still maintained that the 
 Emperor's disease was a mortal one, and that 
 his end was near at hand. 
 
 Weak as he was, Shah Jehan was very 
 anxious to accompany the army which the 
 continued advance of the combined Princes 
 compelled him to send against them. He hoped 
 by his personal presence to overawe and reclaim 
 them. But Dara was opposed to this ; and 
 the direction of the campaign was confided to 
 him. He summoned his son, Solaiman Shukoh, 
 to hasten to his assistance, and meanwhile 
 Jeswunt Sing, the Raja of Joudpur, and Kasim 
 Khan, were sent to obstruct the advance of 
 the rebel Princes through a difficult country. 
 This, according to Manucci, was Shah Jehan's 
 own arrangement. Jeswunt was " the king's 
 loyal subject," but Kasim Khan's disposition 
 was more ambiguous, and " he was not well 
 affected to Dara." Aurungzib's impetuosity 
 baffled these tactics : the Nerbudda and the 
 defiles beyond it were traversed without opposi- 
 tion ; and the armies joined battle near Oojein, 
 where the Imperialists were completely defeated, 
 Manucci says, through the treachery and in- 
 activity of Kasim Khan ; while the Rajputs 
 fought with their usual bravery, and fell in 
 such numbers that Jeswunt, having lost ten 
 
DARA MARCHES AGAINST HIS BROTHERS 23 
 
 thousand men, retreated with only five hundred, 
 and regained his capital with a slender escort. 
 His wife characteristically reviled him for sur- 
 viving defeat ; and domestic harmony was with 
 difficulty restored later through Aurungzib's 
 mediation, when Jeswunt had conformed to the 
 new regime. 
 
 Aurungzib's partisans at Delhi strongly recom- 
 mended his immediate advance on the capital, 
 and, confident of the success of his intrigues 
 there, he reassured Morad and the army by 
 intimating that the Mogul troops of the Emperor 
 would desert Dara at the critical moment. 
 
 Manucci confidently asserts that Shah Jehan 
 had been hitherto a free agent, and in the full 
 exercise of his authority ; but that, on the 
 announcement of Jeswunt's defeat and retire- 
 ment, " finding himself in bodily weakness, 
 and desirous of pleasing Dara, he transferred 
 to him all his powers and dignities, and ordered 
 every one to yield him obedience." 
 
 Dara rapidly assembled an army of above 
 100,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, with 100 
 field-pieces, and above 200 European gunners, 
 among whom was Manucci, and a corps of 
 500 camels, armed with swivel-guns. 
 
 The Venetian was much impressed by the 
 brilliant spectacle of this vast array on the march. 
 " It moved over the heights and through the 
 vales like the waves of a stormy sea." On a 
 magnificent elephant, Prince Dara appeared like 
 
24 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 a crystal tower, resplendent as a sun shining over 
 all the land. Around him rode many squadrons 
 of Rajput cavalry, whose armour glittered from 
 afar, and their lances' heads, with a tremulous 
 motion, sent forth rays of light and so on. 
 
 But the imposing spectacle inspired him with 
 little confidence. The flower of the Imperial 
 army had been confided to Prince Solaiman, 
 and had not rejoined. And Manucci misdoubted 
 the quality of the new levies. Most of them, he 
 says, " were not very warlike they were butchers, 
 barbers, blacksmiths, carpenters, tailors, and 
 such like." He also mistrusted the disposition 
 of the Mogul nobles, among many of whom Dara 
 was not popular. And, he adds : " What dis- 
 concerted me was that no one would say that 
 Dara was sure of gaining the battle with all that 
 grand array." 
 
 Dara took up a position on the bank of the 
 Chumbul, securing all the passages across the 
 river. But Aurungzib discovered one more 
 remote and unguarded ; and, leaving his tents 
 standing, with part of his army, led the rest 
 rapidly through a broken and jungly country, 
 and across the river, and appeared suddenly 
 on Dara's flank. 
 
 Manucci thinks that had Dara at once 
 attacked his wayworn division, he would cer- 
 tainly have prevailed over it. But the oppor- 
 tunity was lost, and the enemy was reinforced 
 by the junction|of the rest of his army. 
 
DARA ATTACKS AURUNGZIB AND MORAD 25 
 
 Before the battle began, Manucci, from a hill 
 overlooking the scene of action, observed an 
 ominous symptom of treachery. Many horse- 
 men rode out of Dara's camp to that of the 
 enemy, and did not return. 
 
 In front of each army were ranged the guns, 
 and behind them the infantry, armed with 
 muskets, and the camel corps. The cavalry 
 were in the rear. The Princes were all con- 
 spicuous on elephants, Dara and Aurungzib in 
 the centre of their respective hosts, and Morad 
 on Aurungzib 's left. 
 
 Dara was the assailant. He opened the 
 battle by a general discharge of his artillery. 
 But the distance was too great, and the fire 
 ineffective. And Manucci says : "I was much 
 amazed at their making us work thus for nothing." 
 And this great tactical mistake revealed another 
 ominous circumstance. When Dara immediately 
 followed up this idle demonstration by a vehe- 
 ment order for a general advance, and the 
 cavalry rushed to the front, " the barbers, 
 butchers, and the rest turned right about face, 
 abandoning the artillerymen and the guns." 
 
 The enemy, more prudently, had reserved 
 his fire, replying only with a few shells. But 
 when Dara's cavalry arrived well within range, 
 a general discharge of cannon, swivel-guns, and 
 musketry arrested the charge, and threw the 
 assailants into disorder. But, well seconded 
 by Rustam Khan, one of his ablest officers, and 
 
26 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 Chhatar Sal, a Rajput chieftain, he rallied them, 
 and the onslaught was resumed with such vigour 
 that they " broke through the guns and pene- 
 trated to their opponents' camp, putting to the 
 rout camels and infantry." 
 
 Aurungzib sent the greater part of his troops 
 to stem the impetuous tide of war, keeping only 
 a slight body around him, but heartening his 
 men by a notable display of courage and resolu- 
 tion. He ordered his elephant to be chained, 
 to indicate his fixed purpose to conquer or die. 
 But again Dara's impetuous valour prevailed. 
 After a stubborn contest, the reinforcement 
 was worsted, and Dara still advanced. Had he 
 dashed on at once, Aurungzib's fate, Manucci 
 thinks, must have been sealed. But, wearied 
 by their severe exertions, and impeded by the 
 ground, he halted, and gave his men a short 
 breathing-time. And in this position he received 
 tidings which diverted his efforts elsewhere. 
 Chhatar Sal and Rustam Khan had both fallen, 
 but their troops, though wavering, were still 
 resisting. He hastened to their support, and 
 once more prevailed, and put their opponents to 
 the rout. 
 
 Meanwhile a desperate contest had been 
 waged between Ram Sing and Prince Morad. 
 Ram Sing and his fiery Rajputs had at last 
 forced their way close up to the Prince's elephant ; 
 and some of them had dismounted and leaped 
 on the beast, and were in the act of cutting the 
 
DARA'S ARMY SUDDENLY DISPERSES 27 
 
 girths of the howda, when Morad drew a bow, 
 and shot their bold leader in the breast ; who 
 fell to the ground, and was trampled to death by 
 the enraged animal. But the Rajputs, so far 
 from being intimidated, were exasperated at the 
 death of their chief, and " battled more violently 
 than ever." 
 
 Dara, informed of this, was on the point of 
 joining them, when, according to Khafi Khan, 
 " a rocket struck the howda of his elephant. 
 This alarmed and discouraged him so much 
 that he dismounted in haste from his elephant 
 and mounted a horse." This may be the true 
 explanation of this precipitate and ill-judged 
 act ; though it is not quite reconcilable with 
 Dara's undoubted courage. But Manucci gives 
 a very different reason. Khalilullah Khan, who 
 commanded one of Dara's divisions, but had 
 hitherto hung back, and was in heart a traitor, 
 and who certainly joined Aurungzib immediately 
 after the battle, suggested to Dara that, as the 
 latter was very slenderly guarded, a sudden 
 dash at him would be certain of success, and 
 even more decisive than the capture or death of 
 Morad ; and that it was for this purpose that 
 Dara took horse. Whatever the cause, the 
 result was fatal. The disappearance of the 
 leader habitually involves the dispersion and 
 flight of a native army. And there were, in this 
 case, special circumstances which aggravated 
 this tendency. The personal unpopularity of 
 
28 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 Dara among many of his officers, the death of 
 those most devoted to him, Aurungzib's in- 
 trigues and denunciation of him as an infidel, 
 the rawness, inexperience, and indiscipline of 
 his new levies, combined to impair the stability 
 of his vast but ill-assorted host. Hence his 
 abrupt disappearance was the signal for an 
 equally abrupt disintegration and flight. Hitherto 
 successful, and on the eve of victory, Dara saw 
 his army melt suddenly away, like a cloud 
 driven before a strong wind. It was not, pro- 
 perly speaking, a defeat. It was rather a general 
 stampede, the result of surprise, perplexity, in- 
 discipline, and deliberate treachery. But the 
 event proved that it was an irretrievable 
 catastrophe ; on which account I have described 
 the battle in more detail that I should otherwise 
 have done. 
 
 Dara reached Agra in the evening in a state 
 of the deepest dejection. Partly from shame, 
 partly for fear of being there besieged and 
 captured, he did not enter the city. Shah Jehan, 
 who had betaken himself to Agra, sent a con- 
 solatory message to him, with hopes that 
 Solaiman's army might still enable him to regain 
 his ground. He also furnished him with an 
 order to the Governor of Delhi, to admit him, 
 and consign to him the great treasure there 
 deposited. But Aurungzib had secured the 
 Governor in his interest ; and he refused to 
 open the gates. And Dara pushed on to Lahore, 
 
SOLAIMAN FLIES TO RAJA OF SIRINAGAR 29 
 
 where he proposed to assemble a new army, 
 and to renew the contest. 
 
 But his hopes of success were soon dashed 
 by the loss of the support on which he had 
 mainly counted. His son Solaiman was a brave 
 and vigorous man, thoroughly devoted to his 
 father's cause. He had already defeated his 
 uncle, Shuja ; and his army was the flower of 
 the Imperial forces. But, as I have mentioned, 
 Jei Sing, one of his chief officers, was secretly 
 hostile to Dara, and Dilir Khan, probably not 
 too friendly to him, and under Jei Sing's in- 
 fluence. Hence Aurungzib's overtures to them, 
 backed by his recent victory, shook their fidelity 
 to their commander, and from their timid 
 counsels, recommending a retreat, and intimating 
 that their soldiers were not to be trusted, he 
 saw clearly that they at least were prepared to 
 play him false, and perhaps to deliver him up 
 to the conqueror. He therefore quitted the 
 army, and with a small force escaped to the 
 Raja of Sirinagar, who received him hospitably, 
 and pledged himself to protect him. And his 
 army and his faithless chief officers entered 
 Aurungzib's service. 
 
 When the victorious brothers had taken 
 possession of Dara's camp, Aurungzib main- 
 tained his previous attitude ; congratulated 
 Morad on the result, which he ascribed mainly 
 to Morad's valour ; treated him with the greatest 
 deference as his future sovereign, and intro- 
 
30 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 duced to him the traitor Khalilullah as a loyal 
 subject, devoted to his interest, of which he 
 had given such recent and substantial evidence. 
 
 Four days after the battle, the victorious 
 Princes arrived before Agra. 
 
 Manucci was already there ; and he describes 
 minutely the gradual and artful process by 
 which the Emperor was dethroned, and forcibly 
 secluded in one quarter of his vast fortress- 
 palace. The united army was posted, in the 
 first instance, about two miles from the city. 
 
 Aurungzib made profuse professions of affec- 
 tion and fidelity to his father, and justified his 
 action on the ground of Dara's usurpation of 
 authority and criminal ambition. The Emperor 
 gave him fair words, but, according to Manucci, 
 tried to entrap him into a personal interview 
 with no lenient intentions. But Aurungzib was 
 too wary, and excused himself. Meanwhile he 
 was actively engaged in winning over the 
 chief nobles, and disposing them to acquiesce in 
 his masterful proceedings. Many indeed were 
 already his decided partisans ; Dara's sym- 
 pathisers who had not fallen or fled were dis- 
 heartened and cowed, and self-interest attracted 
 the undecided to the winning side. 
 
 Thus Aurungzib was emboldened to deal 
 strongly and decisively with his father. He 
 made his son, Sultan Mahmood, Governor of 
 the city ; and he was authorised to invest the 
 
AURUNGZIB DEPOSES THE EMPEROR 31 
 
 fort, and allow no one to enter it. Aurungzib's 
 troops were moved into the city, and closed 
 upon the fort. The Emperor, for three days, 
 tried to repel them by firing on them, but they 
 took shelter in the adjacent houses. Then the 
 artillerymen, who had been tampered with by 
 Aurungzib's agents, showed symptoms of de- 
 sertion, some letting themselves down from 
 the walls by ropes. Whereupon the garrison, 
 in despair, prepared to follow their example. 
 Aurungzib still maintained his hypocritical 
 attitude ; pleaded illness, which had prevented 
 him from waiting on the Emperor, and that, 
 while he was laid up, his impatient soldiers had 
 acted without orders ; and he proposed that his 
 son, Sultan Mahmood, should visit the Emperor, 
 and arrange matters a Vaimable. To this Shah 
 Jehan consented. The Prince had instructions 
 to secure the gate, introduce his troops, and make 
 himself master of the fort. In this he succeeded, 
 and the Emperor was restricted to the palace. 
 
 Then, master of the position, Aurungzib threw 
 off one mask, and plainly announced to his 
 father that he was no longer fit to rule, but must 
 take his ease in retirement, and leave the burden 
 of government to be sustained by more capable 
 hands in other words, that he was dethroned 
 and a prisoner. And, suiting the action to the 
 implied significance of this declaration, he 
 demanded, through his son, the keys of the 
 palace. And, as the inmates were very numerous 
 
32 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 and a close blockade was established, and no 
 provisions were allowed to enter, the forlorn 
 monarch was constrained to comply with the 
 demand. Then the palace itself was occupied, 
 many gates were closed, and guards were placed 
 at the entrance of the zenana, to which Shah 
 Jehan was thenceforth closely restricted. 
 
 Thus his reign came to an end, though the 
 succession was still undecided, and the ex-fakir 
 still professed to be acting only on behalf of 
 Morad's candidature. 
 
 The easy and complete success of this auda- 
 cious, unfilial, and treasonable proceeding en- 
 couraged its deviser to remove his second mask, 
 and disclose his real features as the avowed 
 pretender to the vacant throne. Morad's friends 
 recommended him to leave the pursuit of Dara 
 to his brother, and with his own army to secure 
 Agra and reduce Delhi. But he preferred to 
 accompany Aurungzib. The two armies marched 
 separately, at a mile's distance from each other, 
 and halted at six miles south of Mathura. 
 The ostensible reason for this halt was the 
 proposed formal elevation of Morad to the 
 throne. Elaborate preparations for the cere- 
 mony were made : Aurungzib was all smiles, 
 congratulation, and flattery ; and to inaugurate 
 the august function, invited his brother to a great 
 banquet. But he arranged that his chief officers 
 should entertain Morad's at their own quarters. 
 
AURUNGZIB ARRESTS MORAD 33 
 
 The eunuch Shahbaz and other faithful 
 followers of the infatuated Prince suspected 
 foul play, and strongly dissuaded him from 
 putting himself in his brother's power. And 
 Manucci, who was out of employment, but had 
 disguised himself as a holy mendicant, and as 
 such had the free run of the armies, gathered 
 from the ambiguous gossip in Aurungzib's camp 
 that mischief was brewing. But Morad was 
 in high spirits, and, imperturbably relying on 
 his brother's sworn fidelity, went to the feast. 
 Aurungzib, discarding on this great occasion 
 his religious scruples, took care that Morad 
 should be well plied with wine, and allowed to 
 retire to sleep off its effects, while the banquet 
 still proceeded. In this helpless condition Morad 
 was disarmed, fettered, placed in a covered 
 howda on an elephant, and sent off at speed 
 during the night to Delhi, escorted by four 
 thousand cavalry. Another similar cortege was 
 dispatched to Agra to baffle pursuit, should 
 an attempt be made to rescue the prisoner. 
 But the darkness of the night, the continuance 
 of the feast, and the dispersion of Morad' s 
 officers, prevented this, and in the morning 
 Aurungzib's agents saluted him as Emperor, 
 and Morad' s officers were invited to enter the 
 usurper's service, with a promise of double pay, 
 which, after some hesitation, in their desperate 
 circumstances, they did. 
 
 On arriving at Delhi the unhappy Prince 
 3 
 
34 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 was publicly paraded as a prisoner, previous to 
 his being consigned to the fortress of Selimgurh. 
 " It was," says Manucci, " very pitiful to see 
 poor Morad Buksh make this miserable entry 
 into Delhi, visible to all, his face dejected, 
 wearing a blue turban, ill put on ; behind him 
 an executioner with a naked sword in his hand, 
 ready upon any attempt at rescue to cut off 
 his head. It seemed as if some criminal were 
 being borne to the scaffold." 
 
 Aurungzib, on the other hand, lost no time 
 in revealing the object, and reaping the fruit, 
 of his hypocrisy and treachery. 
 
 " Hardly," says Manucci, " had Morad 
 Buksh fallen into his hands, Dara and Solaiman 
 Shukoh been defeated, and his father imprisoned, 
 than he proclaimed himself Emperor. He con- 
 ferred many distinctions and gifts on the men 
 of Shah Jehan, Dara, Morad Buksh, and 
 Solaiman Shukoh, who came over to his side, 
 thereby the more easily to gain their adherence." 
 
 Manucci, who had joined in the flight to 
 Agra, was eager to re-enter the service of Dara ; 
 and, after an adventurous and dangerous journey, 
 rejoined him at Lahore. The unhappy Prince 
 received him most graciously, contrasted his 
 fidelity with the desertion of so many on whom 
 he had long lavished his bounty, presented 
 him with a horse and five hundred rupees, and 
 raised his pay from eighty to one hundred and 
 
DARA RAISES A NEW ARMY 35 
 
 fifty rupees a month. He had already raised 
 a new army of thirty thousand men, mostly 
 Moguls, Seiads, and Pathans. He had also 
 strong hope of assistance from a certain Raja 
 Surup Sing, and gave him a large sum of 
 money to secure his fidelity to his sworn engage- 
 ment. But the Raja went off with the money ; 
 shirked his engagement, and paid no heed to 
 Dara's urgent remonstrances. 
 
 Daud Khan was Dara's ablest and staunchest 
 partisan. But Aurungzib, by the usual trick 
 of a letter, purposely intercepted, and implying 
 a treacherous understanding between himself 
 and Daud Khan, shook Dara's confidence in 
 the latter. And though Daud denounced the 
 letter as a forgery, and made every effort to 
 reassure Dara, persisting in following his fortune 
 on the resumption of Dara's flight, he was at 
 last formally dismissed, and joined Aurungzib, 
 though with an understanding that he was not 
 to serve against his old master. 
 
 Dara next attempted to reach Cabul, en 
 route for Persia. But the Governor, Mahabat 
 Khan, discouraged this plan ; and Dara's mind 
 seems to have been divided between a resolution 
 to fight out the quarrel in India, and a project 
 of reaching Persia by sea. He marched, with 
 a very reduced force, to Multan, closely pursued 
 by Aurungzib, and thence to Bakkar, which 
 Dara determined to occupy in force, as a strong 
 place d'armes and rally ing-point, if, as he hoped, 
 
36 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 he could raise a new army in Guzerat. He 
 gave the command of this to a valiant eunuch, 
 Khwajah Basant, or, as Manucci calls him, as 
 a European equivalent, Primivera, i.e. " Spring- 
 time." The garrison consisted of two thousand 
 select men and twenty-two Europeans, with 
 abundance of food, guns, ammunition, and 
 other supplies. Bahadur Khan, sent on in 
 pursuit by Aurungzib, was close on his track ; 
 and Dara, with a small and an ever- dwindling 
 force, pushed on for Tattah. Manucci was 
 very anxious to accompany him. But Dara 
 insisted that he would be more useful as an 
 artillerist in the defence of the fort. He made 
 him Captain of the Europeans, doubled his 
 pay, and gave him five thousand rupees to 
 divide among his men, recommending him 
 earnestly to the eunuch commandant. 
 
 Aurungzib, detaching a force to pursue Dara, 
 had left Multan, and gone off towards Agra, to 
 confront Shah Shuja, who was marching thither 
 with a large army from Bengal. On his way 
 he was met by Raja Jei Sing, who, on Solaiman's 
 flight, had gone over to Aurungzib and was 
 confirmed in his new allegiance by profuse 
 promises of favour. He was appointed Governor 
 of Delhi, and the province of Sambha was 
 conferred on him. Though at enmity with 
 Dara, Jei Sing was much attached to Shah 
 Jehan, a cause of no little anxiety to his new 
 master. 
 
DARA IN GUZERAT SHUJA DEFEATED 37 
 
 Dara, with six thousand horsemen, proceeded 
 through Cutch to Guzerat, where the Governor 
 of Ahmedabad, the provincial capital, though 
 his daughter was married to Aurungzib, sur- 
 rendered the city, on the alleged ground that 
 "it was not correct that he, a vassal, should 
 oppose a royal prince, heir to the Empire." 
 Thus Aurungzib's moral victory over his eldest 
 brother was by no means complete. And Shah 
 Nawaz Khan joined Dara, was present in the 
 final battle, and was murdered in cold blood 
 by Aurungzib's general, after it was over. 
 
 The fort of Bakkar meanwhile was closely 
 invested by Khalilullah Khan. But the defence 
 was obstinate and prolonged. How it fell at 
 last I shall explain later. " Dara's plan," says 
 Manucci, who was engaged in the operations, 
 ' was that if he did not succeed in the province 
 of Gujarat, and suffered defeat, this fortress of 
 Bakhar would serve as a base to help him 
 again." 
 
 Aurungzib found Shuja strongly entrenched 
 in a position near the village of Bajwah in the 
 Fathpur district. His assaults were repulsed. 
 And in the night, Raja Jeswunt Sing suddenly 
 changed sides and attacked Aurungzib's camp 
 in the rear, while Shuja assailed the army in 
 front. A desperate contest followed ; Aurungzib 
 displayed great presence of mind and constancy, 
 rallied his disordered forces, and in the end 
 gained a complete victory. Jeswunt Sing, on 
 
38 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 Shuja's defeat, retired to his own country. 
 Aurungzib committed the prosecution of the 
 war against Shuja to Mir Jumla, one of the 
 ablest generals of the time, sending with him 
 his eldest son, Sultan Mahmood, " but without 
 a command." Shah Shuja was compelled to 
 retreat successively to Allahabad, Benares, 
 Mongir, and Rajmahal. Thence he was dis- 
 lodged from an entrenched position by Jumla' s 
 artillery ; and took up another strongly fortified 
 near Dacca, while Mir Jumla halted, during 
 the monsoon in that city. Sultan Mahmood, 
 resenting bitterly his insignificant position, act- 
 ually went over to Shah Shuja, and married 
 his daughter. But Shuja seems to have con- 
 ceived suspicion of his fidelity ; his position 
 became awkward, and he returned to his father's 
 army, was ordered to Court, and consigned to 
 Gwalior. The campaign was prolonged. But 
 at last Shuja, despairing of success, and too 
 well aware of what awaited him if he fell into 
 his brother's hands, retired to Arakan, where 
 he was at first well received by the King, but 
 later maltreated, and impeded in his desire to 
 make his way by sea to Persia. And in a dis- 
 turbance that followed, he was killed, thus 
 removing another obstacle to Aurungzib's 
 ambition. 
 
 But while the contest with Shah Shuja was 
 being waged, Dara had mustered in Guzerat an 
 army of thirty thousand horsemen, and marched 
 
AURUNGZIB DEFEATS DARA NEAR AJMIR 39 
 
 northwards, relying on Jeswunt Sing's promised 
 co-operation. But Aurungzib contrived, through 
 Jei Sing's influence, and lavish promises of 
 forgiveness for his recent treachery, and high 
 favour in his own service, to neutralise him ; 
 and he remained quiescent. This defection 
 reduced Dara to a most embarrassing and 
 almost desperate condition. He had arrived in 
 the neighbourhood of Ajmir. His army was 
 unequal to cope with Aurungzib's forces. To 
 retreat would be difficult, and would discourage 
 his men, and be the signal for desertion. His 
 only alternative was to entrench himself in a 
 strong position among the hills, which he did. 
 For three days he successfully resisted Aurung- 
 zib's assaults, and by daring sallies did much 
 execution on the enemy. But on the fourth 
 day, according to Khafi Khan, a hill in the 
 rear of his position was occupied, and an effective 
 attack thence delivered. According to Manucci, 
 Aurungzib induced Dilir Khan, one of his chief 
 officers, to make an overture to Dara, promising 
 to desert to him, and thus Dilir obtained an 
 entrance within the lines, and in the crisis of 
 the battle turned his force against Dara's with 
 fatal effect. " Dara's army fell into the greatest 
 confusion, and, without making any stand or 
 resistance, the whole of them took to flight." 
 6 The fallen Prince had only time to carry off 
 his family and the chief valuables lying in his 
 tents." 
 
40 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 Jei Sing and Bahadur Khan were sent to 
 pursue him " their orders were to seize him, 
 dead or alive." 
 
 On his way to Ahmedabad he was rejoined 
 by many of the fugitives. But the governor of 
 the city had been gained over by Aurungzib, 
 and refused to admit him. And several of his 
 most intimate adherents now deserted him. 
 With two thousand men he resumed his flight 
 for Sind, suffering much by the way, intending 
 to rally again at Bakkar. But, finding it closely 
 invested by Khalilullah Khan, he once more 
 resolved to make his way to Persia. 
 
 Though personally inimical to Dara, Jei 
 Sing was not anxious to capture him, but to 
 drive him from India. Hence he contrived to 
 delay the pursuit so as to enable the fugitive 
 to effect his escape. 
 
 On the frontier was a Pathan chieftain, 
 Jiwan Khan, who was under special obligations 
 to Dara, who had thrice saved his life when 
 Shah Jehan had condemned him to death. 
 To him he applied for protection. Jiwan Khan 
 gave him fair words. But, anxious to curry 
 favour with Aurungzib, he treacherously sur- 
 rounded Dara and his family, and strictly 
 secluded them. Dara's favourite wife, in de- 
 spair, poisoned herself. And when Jei Sing and 
 Bahadur Khan arrived in pursuit, Dara was 
 made over to them ; " chains were put upon 
 his legs and manacles upon his wrists, and four 
 
DARA JUDICIALLY MURDERED 41 
 
 elephants conveyed him and his family and 
 suite, closely guarded." 
 
 At Bakkar, which was still holding out, the 
 force escorting the unhappy Prince and his 
 family, appeared suddenly, and were fired upon. 
 But the eunuch in command was promptly 
 informed of the fact of Dara's capture, and 
 summoned to surrender. This he refused to 
 do without Dara's sanction. This was obtained, 
 and the fort was evacuated. 
 
 At Delhi the pitiful spectacle presented by 
 Morad Buksh was repeated. Dara, with his son, 
 Sipihr Shukoh, was paraded on an elephant 
 in an uncovered howda, behind them a man 
 with a drawn sword, and round him horsemen 
 also with drawn swords. For two hours he was 
 thus exhibited in front of the palace, and thence 
 transferred to a garden. 
 
 Aurungzib, affecting indecision as to his fate, 
 consulted his council, who, well knowing his 
 mind, and the line he had taken against his 
 brother at the outset, with one dissentient 
 voice decreed his death, not only for the public 
 security, but " by reason of his being an idolater, 
 without any religion, and an enemy of the 
 Mahomedan faith." So says Manucci. Khafi 
 Khan's statement is : 
 
 " The order was given for Dara Shukoh to be 
 put to death under a legal opinion of the lawyers, 
 because he had apostatised from the law, had 
 vilified religion, and had allied himself with 
 
42 AURUNGZIB MAKES HIMSELF EMPEROR 
 
 heresy and infidelity." He adds : " After he 
 was slain, his body was placed on a howda and 
 carried round the city. So once alive and once 
 dead he was exposed to the eyes of all men, and 
 many wept over his fate. He was buried in the 
 tomb of Humayun. Sipihr Shukoh was ordered 
 to be imprisoned in the fortress of Gwalior." 
 
 Manucci tells a ghastly story that Aurungzib 
 sent Dara's head to be served up to the captive 
 Emperor in a box, at his dinner ; and that the 
 miserable parent was overwhelmed at the sight 
 with grief and horror. This may be true, but 
 it is to be hoped, for the honour of humanity, that 
 it was a bazaar rumour. 
 
 Dara's son, Solaiman Shukoh, as I have 
 mentioned, had taken refuge with the Raja 
 of Sirinagar. 
 
 Jei Sing was employed to induce the Raja 
 to give him up. But, faithful to the obligation 
 of hospitality, and relying on his secluded and 
 strong country, he scouted the allurements and 
 threats of the usurping and insidious Emperor. 
 But his son was more amenable to them. Solai- 
 man, aware of this, endeavoured to escape into 
 Tibet, but was pursued by the Raja's son, 
 captured, manacled, and handed over to Aurung- 
 zib's agents, sent to Gwalior, and there poisoned. 
 The old Raja of Sirinagar, Manucci says, " felt 
 greatly the vileness of the deed carried out by 
 his only son," and in a short space he ended 
 his days under the disgrace. 
 
MORAD JUDICIALLY MURDERED 43 
 
 Thus by force and fraud the ex-fakir had 
 removed one obstacle after another to his un- 
 disputed attainment of the object of his secret 
 ambition. But one crowning act of villainy 
 was still requisite before he could feel himself 
 secure. Morad Buksh might still give him 
 trouble. For, as Manucci says, " many nobles 
 had friendship and affection for him, and wanted 
 him for king, owing to his renown as good 
 soldier and liberal master." And he had at- 
 tempted to escape. 
 
 As in Dara's case, the Emperor endeavoured 
 to throw the responsibility for his death on 
 others. Morad had put to death a secretary, 
 when Governor of Guzerat. The relatives were 
 secretly incited to prosecute the blood feud 
 judicially. But they declined. But a poor 
 cousin was bribed to bring a capital charge before 
 a kazi duly tutored for the purpose, and the 
 Prince was condemned to death, and murdered 
 in his prison. Khafi Khan says that " His 
 gracious Majesty rewarded the eldest son for 
 not enforcing his claim of blood." 
 
 Such a refinement of hypocrisy is quite 
 characteristic of Aurungzib, and winds up 
 appropriately his conduct in relation to his 
 deluded victim. 
 
Ill 
 
 RESULTS OF AURUNGZIB'S USURPATION 
 
 IN tracing the causes of the decline of the Mogul 
 Empire under Aurungzib, his conduct previous 
 to his accession must be taken into account. 
 For, though he removed all obstacles to his 
 ambition, his triumph was dearly bought. He 
 had given a great shock to the Imperial author- 
 ity ; impaired its moral influence ; abjured its 
 character as the impartial and, so to speak, 
 undenominational sway of a paternal sovereign 
 over all his subjects ; and set an example of 
 what I may call political parricide, which was 
 only too likely to be imitated in due time by 
 his posterity. Thus, however successful at the 
 moment, he had sown a plentiful crop of troubles, 
 disaffection, and consequent weakness for the 
 future. 
 
 The deposition and close imprisonment of 
 his father was an audacious innovation - - a 
 breach of allegiance, and an act of high treason 
 perpetrated against an eminent and able monarch ; 
 and an act of cruelty to an indulgent father, 
 in violation of the primary instincts and obli- 
 gations of humanity. As such, it must have 
 
AURUNGZIB SHOCKS HIS SUBJECTS 45 
 
 sent a thrill of indignation and horror through 
 the heart of the Empire, and effectually arrested 
 the flow of the old sentiments of reverence 
 and devotion to the Head of the State, which 
 Akbar and his successors had inspired. This 
 revolting impression was deepened by the fate 
 to which he had consigned his eldest and young- 
 est brothers, and by the hypocritical expedients 
 which he had employed for their destruction. 
 Like Pilate, he had washed his hands, and 
 affected to be guiltless of their blood. But, like 
 Henry vin., he had poisoned the fountains of 
 justice by murdering them judicially. And the 
 simple Morad had been led, like a lamb to 
 the slaughter, by an elaborate tissue of sancti- 
 monious treachery. Genuine loyalty, personal 
 devotion to such a man, were out of the question : 
 he could neither be loved, respected, nor trusted ; 
 and must rely, for obedience, on fear, force, 
 cunning, and self-interested compliance. 
 
 While these remarks apply to his subjects 
 generally, the Hindoos had special and more 
 personal reasons of estrangement from the new 
 Emperor. The attitude he had assumed, and 
 the pretence which had been alleged for the 
 execution of Dara, obviously indicated a new 
 and to them unfriendly departure in Imperial 
 policy. Whether Aurungzib was, or was not, 
 sincere in hoisting the banner of the Crescent 
 against his eldest brother, and justifying his 
 exclusion from the succession, and his execution, 
 
46 RESULTS OF AURUNGZIB'S USURPATION 
 
 on the ground of his sympathy with the Hindoo 
 religion (as one historian distinctly states) the 
 Hindoos must have felt that such a war-cry, 
 followed by a capital condemnation in the same 
 sense, was an appeal to the hitherto discoun- 
 tenanced but lurking spirit of Mussulman fanati- 
 cism and political exclusiveness, and boded no 
 good to them, under the dominion of him who 
 had, on the strength of it, won his way to the 
 throne. 
 
 Such a conviction must have made them 
 rebels in their hearts from the first, though the 
 smouldering fire of disaffection was for the time 
 suppressed. 
 
 While such were the impressions produced 
 by Aurungzib's conduct on the minds and hearts 
 of his subjects, Nemesis was at work in his own 
 bosom. The stings of conscience he might ig- 
 nore, or alleviate them by his strong delusion 
 that he was the fated and favoured instrument 
 of Heaven. But he could not shut his eyes to 
 the danger of his sons availing themselves of his 
 unpopularity to retaliate upon him his treatment 
 of Shah Jehan. And in his lonely eminence, 
 conscious of his own falseness, and judging others 
 by himself, he was infinitely suspicious of ail 
 men. 
 
 Hence he adopted a system of minute super- 
 vision, secret espionage, checks and counter- 
 checks on officials, limitation of the discretion 
 and means of his employes, double appointments 
 
HIS SIN FINDS HIM OUT AS A RULER 47 
 
 of military commanders, resulting in mutual 
 jealousies, disputes, and counteraction, and cap- 
 ricious supersession, which, besides betokening 
 want of confidence, and so chilling zeal for the 
 service, clogged the machine of civil govern- 
 ment, and compromised the continuity and 
 systematic prosecution of military operations ; 
 and thus greatly contributed to make his admini- 
 stration ineffective and his arms unprosperous. 
 
 Thus his ambition in the end over-leaped 
 itself ; and his exaltation involved a humiliating 
 decadence of his power, and of the Empire, of 
 which he was the evil genius. 
 
IV 
 AURUNGZIB'S NEW POLICY 
 
 How Aurungzib came to adopt a course so 
 different from that of his predecessors, so obvi- 
 ously inexpedient from a political point of view, 
 and so fatal in its result, might seem strange, 
 did not history present many analogous phen- 
 omena. His conduct is usually accounted for 
 by his intense bigotry, if not fanaticism, which 
 blinded him to the inevitable consequences 
 of his rash proceedings, like his contemporary 
 James n., 
 
 "The Ass 
 Who lost three Kingdoms for a Mass." 
 
 There is no doubt truth in this view, but I 
 , believe that it is not the whole truth, and that 
 though he was a Mahometan devot, he had also 
 a political object in his persecution of the Hindoos 
 which was congenial to his natural character, 
 and confirmed by the circumstances of his 
 rivalry with his brother Dara. Even of James n. 
 Hallam says that it seems difficult to determine 
 whether love of Popery or love of despotism 
 was the stronger incentive to his mad course. 
 And, considering how unscrupulously and hypo- 
 
BIGOTRY NOT HIS ONLY INCENTIVE 49 
 
 critically Aurungzib made political capital of 
 his orthodoxy to enlist Morad, his youngest 
 brother, in the campaign against the alleged 
 infidel claimant of the throne, and to rid himself 
 of Dara in the end by a capital sentence on the 
 same ground, it might be even surmised that 
 his zeal for the faith was a mere cloak to cover 
 his ambitious design of making himself Emperor ; 
 which he retained as a justification of his violence 
 and cruelty. But this is inconsistent with a 
 more intimate knowledge of the man and his 
 later conduct. There can, I think, be no doubt 
 that he was a real zealot and stickler for the 
 Koran and its injunctions on their own account. 
 But it does not therefore follow that religious 
 zeal alone actuated him. 
 
 That he should have been attached to his 
 traditional faith was natural ; for, being a man 
 of narrow intellect, with no speculative tendency, 
 he was not tempted to depart from it ; while it 
 suited his morose temper, it encouraged his 
 ambition by its promises of divine aid to the 
 champion of the faith ; and in its fatalism it 
 enabled him to lay a flattering unction to his 
 soul, that though his means might be crooked, 
 his end the ascendancy of Islam would cover 
 a multitude of sins, and that, even in their 
 commission, he was but acting out a predestined 
 career. This strong delusion seems to have 
 sustained him through his long and arduous life, 
 but to have failed at the last, and left him 
 4 
 
50 AURUNGZIB'S NEW POLICY 
 
 miserably uncertain, and seriously apprehensive 
 of his fate in the after-world. His last utterance 
 in substance amounts to a palinode of his life- 
 long confidence in the divine condonation of 
 Jehu-like faith without works of mercy and 
 genuine morality. 
 
 To appreciate the political object, which in 
 practice coincided with Aurungzib's religious 
 bigotry, we must consider his personal char- 
 acter, and his position when he entered the 
 lists against Dara Shukoh. Austere in morals, 
 self-centred, and reserved, he was neither subject 
 to zenana influences nor swayed by favourites. 
 Indeed, he seems to have had no intimate 
 personal friends. His strength of will amounted 
 to obstinacy, and made him impervious alike 
 to the counsels of ministers, to prudential con- 
 siderations, and to the lessons of experience. 
 Indefatigable in the pursuit of his own objects, 
 he was equally ready to face difficulty, danger, 
 and suffering himself, and regardless of the 
 feelings, the sentiments, and the interests of 
 others. Proud, imperious, suspicious, and vigil- 
 ant, he was a proficient in cunning statecraft, 
 in inspiring awe, guarding against conspiracies, 
 and maintaining his personal authority ; but 
 deficient in real statesmanship and comprehen- 
 sive insight into the fundamental conditions 
 of his power, and the impolicy of abusing it. 
 Cold - hearted, exacting, unsympathetic, and 
 censorious on slight or inadequate grounds 
 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL OBJECTS 51 
 
 to his ablest and most trusty Mahometan ser- 
 vants, towards his Hindoo subjects he was 
 haughty, supercilious, and contemptuous : too 
 indifferent to them to appreciate their better 
 qualities, but keenly alive and antipathetic to 
 their strange, and, in his eyes, barbarous peculi- 
 arities, to the grossness of their vulgar super- 
 stitions, and the licentiousness of many of their 
 popular rites. 
 
 Moreover, he despised and vilipended the 
 Hindoos as an inferior and conquered race, 
 who, by Akbar's innovating policy had been 
 allowed to usurp a position of political and 
 social equality with their natural masters, 
 which was equally inappropriate and undesir- 
 able. 
 
 Thus, apart from his religious bigotry, to 
 such a man as Aurungzib, who was, moreover, 
 the son of a Tartar mother, it would seem as 
 anomalous and improper that the Hindoos 
 should be placed on a level with the northern 
 races, as in the Middle Ages it would have 
 appeared to the Anglo-Irish of the pale that 
 the Celtic population the " wild Irish," as 
 they were called should be incorporated with 
 them on equal terms ; and to the jealous main- 
 tainers of Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, 
 in the eighteenth century, that the Roman 
 Catholics should be placed on a political and 
 social level with themselves. That his pre- 
 decessors had so treated them would, to so 
 
52 AURUNGZIB'S NEW POLICY 
 
 proud, self-opinionated, and self-willed a man, 
 be no convincing argument for his continuing 
 to do so ; and all the less so, when he considered 
 that the most serious obstacle to his ambition 
 had been the result of this treatment, the 
 political prominence and military power of the 
 Rajputs, and their enthusiastic devotion to 
 Dara, from his extreme liberalism, and alleged 
 sympathy with their religion. 
 
 Hence he was inclined to reverse the policy 
 of his ancestors ; and not only to regard, but 
 to treat the Hindoos as an inferior race ; to 
 brand them with the old stamp of subjection 
 the jizya which Akbar had abolished ; and 
 thus prepare the way for their depression in the 
 social scale, the sapping of their political influ- 
 ence, and their eventual reduction to the status 
 of a subject population, dominated by the 
 privileged class, on whose rightful ascendancy 
 they had been allowed to encroach. 
 
 The time when the jizya was reimposed, 
 in 1677, tends to confirm the view that I have 
 taken of the mixed motives that suggested the 
 measure. For many years the precept of the 
 Koran, that the conquered infidel should be 
 taxed as such, had been ignored, and allowed 
 to remain a dead letter. But in the interval 
 events had occurred which, while they must 
 have mitigated the Emperor's contempt for 
 the Hindoos, had greatly inflamed his animosity 
 against them, and inclined him to avenge himself 
 

 SIVAJI'S SUCCESS MAKES HIM VINDICTIVE 53 
 
 upon them for the successful uprising of the 
 despised race in the South, and the challenge 
 of his authority, as the representative of foreign 
 and Mahometan sway, by the foundation of a 
 Hindoo anti-polity. The crushed worm had 
 turned, and had been transformed into a mor- 
 dant viper. Sivaji had successfully resisted his 
 generals in the field ; had outwitted him, when 
 he had tried to entrap him at Delhi ; had 
 afterwards consolidated his independent power, 
 ravaged the Imperial provinces with impunity, 
 and assumed the position of a Hindoo sovereign. 
 Such outrageous presumption was calculated 
 to exasperate the Emperor to the utmost, and 
 to rouse his vindictive spirit against the whole 
 detested race ; to induce him to adopt a policy 
 of depression in his dealings with his Hindoo 
 subjects, and, by the assumption of this dis- 
 paraging attitude, under the sanction of the 
 Koran, to enlist the sympathies and stimulate 
 the zeal of his Mahometan subjects and his 
 foreign Mahometan immigrants for the pro- 
 secution of what Khafi Khan calls the " holy 
 war " against the Mahrattas. Thus his tardy 
 conformity to the precept of the Koran seems 
 to have been occasioned by his exasperation, 
 and his resolve to lower the Hindoo crest at 
 home, on the eve of a great personal effort to 
 bring the defiant natives of the South within 
 the scope of his tyrannical and degrading 
 sway. 
 
54 AURUNGZIB'S NEW POLICY 
 
 Lastly, it is a significant circumstance, that 
 Khafi Khan states that the jizya was imposed 
 with the object of not only " distinguishing the 
 land of the faithful from an infidel land," but 
 also of " curbing the infidels." 
 
V 
 SIVAJI'S CAREER 
 
 THE Mogul Empire had gradually pushed its 
 way into the Dekkan, and had destroyed some, 
 threatened, weakened, and rendered tributary 
 others, of the older Mahometan kingdoms which 
 existed there. Under Shah Jehan Ahmednuggur 
 had been finally incorporated as a province 
 of the Empire. But farther south Bijapur 
 and Golconda, or Hyderabad, still remained 
 separate and almost independent, though over- 
 awed and assailed by Prince Aurungzib. 
 
 On the conquest of Ahmednuggur, one of 
 its sturdiest defenders, Sahu (otherwise Shahji), 
 a Mahratta officer, had transferred his allegiance 
 to the King of Bijapur, who had bestowed on 
 him some jaghires, or benefices, in the outlying 
 districts of the Western Ghats not far from 
 Bombay. Shahji was non-resident. He was 
 said to be, on his mother's side, of Rajput 
 descent. And he had a son, Sivaji, who com- 
 bined the Rajput gallantry and love of warlike 
 adventure with the extremely astute and wily 
 disposition characteristic of the Mahrattas. The 
 youth grew up in a region, and at a season, 
 
 55 
 
56 SIVAJI'S CAREER 
 
 well calculated to develop and crown with 
 success his daring project of achieving for him- 
 self and his tribesmen political independence. 
 He was the manager of his father's districts. 
 The country around was wild, broken, and 
 dense with jungles and forests. The steep hill- 
 tops, which studded it in profusion, were 
 crowned with rudely constructed but, from 
 their situation, often formidable forts. Deep 
 ravines and gloomy defiles favoured partisan 
 warfare, and made the approaches of regular 
 troops difficult and dangerous. The humid 
 climate was ill suited to the inhabitants of the 
 lower country, and the frequent and heavy 
 rains and violent tempests were a serious 
 obstacle to military operations, and involved 
 great hardship and danger to an invader, un- 
 familiar with the country and inexperienced 
 in warfare on such a scene. 
 
 This strong country was peopled partly by 
 Mahrattas, partly by more primitive tribes ; 
 but both classes were distinguished for hardi- 
 hood, enterprise, cunning, and love of inde- 
 pendence and plunder. 
 
 The central authority at Bijapur was weak, 
 distracted by internal dissensions during a 
 minority, and by the threatening attitude and 
 aggressive movements of Shah Jehan's repre- 
 sentative Prince Aurungzib. The young Sivaji 
 saw his opportunity, and, several years before 
 the Prince became the Emperor, entered on 
 
OPENING OF SIVAJI'S CAREER 57 
 
 an ingenious, daring, and systematic course of 
 self-aggrandisement and ambition. But never 
 was a great revolution begun more quietly 
 and unostentatiously. A movement which was 
 to pervade and convulse all India took its rise, 
 like one of the Dekkan rivers (so to speak), in 
 a corner, and in the bosom of the hills. 
 
 Sivaji, by good management and popular 
 arts, secured the devotion of his dependents, 
 and attracted daily new followers. He strength- 
 ened the defences of his father's districts ; 
 summarily annexed others, in the absence of 
 their holders, who had gone to pay court to 
 the rising Mogul sun. " This," says the Mogul 
 historian, Khafi Khan, " was the beginning 
 of that system of violence which he and his 
 descendants have spread over the rest of the 
 Kokan and all the territory of the Dakhin. 
 Whenever he heard of a prosperous town, or 
 of a district inhabited by thriving cultivators, 
 he plundered it and took possession of it. Before 
 the jagirdars in those troublous times could 
 appeal to Bijapur, he had sent in his own 
 account of the matter, with presents and offer- 
 ings, charging the jagirdars, or proprietors, with 
 some offence which he had felt called upon to 
 punish, and offering to pay some advanced 
 amount for the lands on their being attached 
 to his own jagir, or to pay their revenues direct 
 to the Government. He communicated these 
 matters to the officials at Bijapur, who in 
 
58 SIVAJI'S CAREER 
 
 those disturbed times took little heed of what 
 any one did. So, when the jagirdar's complaint 
 arrived, he obtained no redress, because no one 
 took any notice of it " (Elliot, vii. 257). 
 
 This he explains by the negligence, corrup- 
 tion, and selfish preoccupation of the officials, 
 and the diversion of government to more 
 serious menaces elsewhere. Hence he continues : 
 " The reins of authority over that country fell 
 into his hands, and he at length became the 
 most notorious of all the rebels. He assembled 
 a large force of Mahratta robbers and plunderers, 
 a,nd set about reducing fortresses. The first 
 fort he reduced was that of Chandan (Grant 
 Duff says Torna was his first capture). After 
 that he got possession of some other fortresses 
 which were short of supplies, or were in charge 
 of weak or inexperienced commandants. Evil 
 days fell upon the kingdom of Bijapur. The 
 operations of Aurungzib against that country 
 when he was a prince in the reign of his father 
 brought great evil upon the country, and other 
 troubles also arose. Sivaji day by day in- 
 creased in strength, and reduced all the forts 
 of the country, so that in course of time he 
 became a man of power and means. He had 
 drawn together a large force, and, protected 
 by mountains and jungles full of trees, he 
 ravaged and plundered in all directions, far 
 and wide. The inaccessible forts of Rajgarh 
 and Chakna were his abodes, and he had secured 
 
AURUNGZIB FOSTERS SIVAJTS GROWTH 59 
 
 several islands in the sea by means of a fleet 
 which he had formed. He built several forts 
 also in those parts, so that altogether he had 
 forty forts, all of which were well supplied with 
 provisions and munitions of war " (Elliot, vii. 258). 
 
 Such is the account of the rise of the heroic 
 leader of the Hindoo reaction given by a historian 
 who was engaged in Aurungzib's service, and 
 who, while he hated Sivaji as an infidel dog, 
 and denounced him as an arch-rebel and past- 
 master in the art of plundering, was not in- 
 sensible to his military skill and formidable 
 capacity as the creator and organiser of an 
 anti-Imperial polity. I have, therefore, quoted 
 it at length. But I must continue more 
 summarily. 
 
 This sudden and portentous growth of pre- 
 datory power was doubly owing to Aurungzib. 
 The above account ascribes the neglect of the 
 growing danger to the distracted attention of 
 the Bijapur Government caused by that Prince's 
 operations against it. And when he quitted 
 the Dekkan in quest of the Imperial throne, 
 he left the scene open to Sivaji's enterprise, 
 unchecked by the presence of the Mogul army. 
 
 Thus the establishment of Sivaji's power, 
 which might otherwise have been crushed in its 
 early stage, was indirectly at least not a little 
 due to Aurungzib himself. 
 
 A complete account of the reign of Aurungzib 
 would include a narrative of his so-called conquest 
 
60 SIVAJTS CAREER 
 
 of Assam. But this is not necessary for our 
 purpose. 
 
 It is, however, desirable to observe that the 
 conquest was incomplete and ephemeral ; that 
 the sufferings of the troops employed, and the 
 loss of life, were great ; that Mir Jumla, one 
 of the Emperor's most distinguished generals, 
 was worn out, and died at the close of the cam- 
 paign ; and that this ambitious and ill-advised 
 scheme of annexation exhibited abundant pre- 
 monitory symptoms of the dangerous and ex- 
 hausting tendency of such a policy of remote 
 aggression, where the country and the climate 
 fought on the side of the enemy. But the 
 warning was lost on the Emperor. 
 
 The Bijapur Government undertook to sup- 
 press the formidable rebel. Afzal Khan, an 
 eminent officer, was sent against him. Sivaji 
 was a many-sided man. He could fight well 
 on occasion. But, like Mahrattas in general, 
 he preferred to prevail by stratagem. He now 
 professed a desire of reconciliation with his 
 sovereign, and, affecting timidity, obtained a 
 private interview with the unwary general, and 
 assassinated him. Rejoining his followers, he 
 incited them to fresh efforts, and became more 
 formidable than before. He defeated another 
 Bijapur general, who had been sent to avenge 
 Afzal ; increased the number of his forts ; 
 organised the government of his territory ; 
 ravaged vigorously that of Bijapur ; plundered 
 
AURUNGZIB RESOLVES TO SUPPRESS SIVAJI 61 
 
 caravans, and rendered the open country every- 
 where insecure. 
 
 Though he respected mosques, copies of the 
 Koran (which he gave to his Mahometan fol- 
 lowers, for he had such in his service), and free 
 women, this conduct was a direct and bold 
 challenge to the Emperor's authority in the 
 Dekkan ; and he now prepared to assert it, 
 and accomplish what Bijapur had failed to do. 
 But little did the proud and powerful Sovereign 
 anticipate that he was thus pledging himself 
 to a lifelong and fruitless enterprise, and sign- 
 ing, in effect, the death-warrant of the Empire ! 
 
 Shaista Khan was deputed to conduct the 
 war, assisted by Jeswunt Sing. In January 
 1666 he began his operations. Supa, Poona, 
 and Sivapur were occupied without opposition. 
 Sivaji, Parthian-like, retired ; but only to harass 
 the Imperial army on its march, and seize every 
 opportunity of annoying and plundering it. 
 In vain a special force was detached to prevent 
 this. The Mahrattas were too nimble to be 
 effectually guarded against, or chastised. Chakan 
 was then besieged. But the defence was long 
 and desperate. Sivaji, from without, co-operated 
 with the garrison. The besiegers suffered severely, 
 both in the operations and from the heavy 
 rains. The native historian says plaintively : 
 6 The muskets were rendered useless, the powder 
 spoilt, the bows deprived of their strings " ; 
 and the troops were disgusted and disheartened. 
 
62 SIVAJTS CAREER 
 
 At last the place was taken by capitulation. 
 But such an opening of the war was inauspi- 
 cious, and too significant of its destined course. 
 The next incident was still more disconcerting. 
 Shaista Khan had taken up his quarters in 
 Sivaji's own house at Poona, and strict in- 
 junctions were issued that no Mahratta was to be 
 allowed to enter the town. But Sivaji's audacity, 
 ingenuity, and humour made him an unrivalled 
 partisan leader, and helped him now to achieve 
 one of his most notable feats. On the pretence 
 of escorting a bridal procession, a number of 
 his men gained admittance. Others had the 
 impudence to effect their entrance in the guise 
 of triumphant captors of a party of Mahrattas, 
 whom they dragged along through the streets. 
 At night, Sivaji, at the head of the united body, 
 fell suddenly on Shaista Khan's quarters. His 
 son, and an officer who resembled him, were 
 killed. Shaista Khan himself lost a thumb 
 in the scuffle, and owed his life to two slave 
 girls, who hid him in a corner. The assailants 
 caused the commandant's drums to be beaten, 
 and in the noise and confusion effected their 
 escape without loss. Shaista Khan evidently 
 suspected Jeswunt Sing's lukewarmness, if not 
 complicity, in this affair. He met his condolence 
 with the significant remark : "I thought the 
 Maharaja was in his Majesty's service when 
 such an evil befel me." And the Emperor 
 " passed censure both upon the Khan (i.e. 
 
JEI SING SENT TO MAKE SIVAJI SUBMIT 63 
 
 Shaista) and Raja Jeswunt." He recalled 
 Shaista, and replaced him by Prince Moazzam. 
 But Jeswunt was still employed under him. 
 
 The prospect darkened under the new regime. 
 Sivaji grew still, bolder, constantly assailed 
 the Imperial territory and convoys, seized 
 two forts on the shore near Surat, and thence 
 intercepted naval traffic ; and even fell on the 
 pilgrim ships, bound for Mecca, a grave profanity 
 in the eyes of the devout Aurungzib. This 
 assault on his religion was followed up by a 
 daring insult to his political pride. Sivaji began 
 to give himself royal airs, and coined money 
 of his own. Prince Moazzam was apparently 
 not equal to the emergency. He too was there- 
 fore recalled, and a new plan was adopted. 
 Sivaji was said to have Rajput blood in his 
 veins, and his military capacity was now well 
 established. But a pure-blooded Rajput Prince, 
 who was also an eminent and zealous imperial 
 general, might be well adapted both to cope 
 with him in the field, and to overawe and 
 negotiate with him, and by force and moral 
 influence combined induce him to submit to 
 the Imperial authority. The result seemed, 
 for the time, to justify the experiment. Jei 
 Sing [the Raja of Jeipur] promptly captured 
 Poorundhur, one of Sivaji's strongest fortresses ; 
 and for five months carried fire and sword into 
 his territory, reducing much of it to a desert. 
 Not, however, without retaliation. " The sudden 
 
64 SIVAJI'S CAREER 
 
 attacks by the enemy," says Khafi Khan, " their 
 brilliant success, their assaults in dark nights, 
 their seizure of the roads and difficult passes, and 
 the firing of the jungles full of trees, severely 
 tried the Imperial forces, and men and beasts 
 in great numbers perished " (vii. 273). Still 
 Jei Sing persevered ; and was fortunate enough 
 to blockade closely Rajgarh, in which were 
 Sivaji's wife and maternal relatives. For their 
 sake, and probably finding himself overmatched 
 for the time, and hoping to profit by the racial 
 and religious sympathies of the Rajput, Sivaji 
 opened negotiations ; and, being well received, 
 and led to expect not only pardon, but favour 
 and office from the Emperor, he came to terms ; 
 agreed to surrender his principal forts (retain- 
 ing twelve small ones), to enter the Imperial 
 service, and to send his young son, as a hostage 
 for his own fidelity, to Delhi. Aurungzib readily 
 ratified the agreement, and Sivaji marched with 
 Jei Sing against Bijapur, and much distinguished 
 himself in the campaign, especially in fort- 
 taking. At its close, he and his son Sambaji 
 were sent to Delhi, at his own request ; had an 
 audience of the Emperor ; and were graciously 
 received. 
 
 Thus the Mahratta troubles seemed to be 
 ended, and Aurungzib' s kingcraft to have 
 attained its object. But the end was not yet. 
 
 The recorded account of the reconciliation 
 and renewed breach between these two remark- 
 
AURUNGZIB'S VIEW ON SIVAJI'S SUBMISSION 65 
 
 able men suggests questions which it is difficult 
 to answer at all confidently. But I will en- 
 deavour, as they occur, to state what the 
 character of each, and the circumstances of the 
 case, seem to indicate as the most probable 
 conclusions. The first question arises out of 
 what I have already related. 
 
 How far was the formal reconciliation, ab 
 initio, concluded in good faith, on either side ? 
 That Aurungzib, informed of Sivaji's wholesale 
 surrender of the keys of his position his strong 
 forts, assumed that he had drawn the viper's 
 fangs, and that it had therefore ceased to be 
 dangerous, seems not improbable. And Sivaji's 
 putting himself and his son into the Emperor's 
 power at Delhi, was a strong additional reason 
 for inferring that he really meant to mend his 
 manners, and look to Aurungzib as his patron. 
 The Emperor also probably relied much on Jei 
 Sing's assurances of Sivaji's political conversion. 
 Thus he might be inclined not only at the 
 moment to hail with satisfaction the convenient 
 pacification, but to try the experiment of per- 
 manently reclaiming the formidable filibuster, 
 by condoning his offences and admitting him 
 to favour. Yet, I suspect, not without serious 
 repugnance and misgivings, and a resolution to 
 keep a tight hand over him, to trust him as 
 little as was compatible with professed friend- 
 liness, and to deal summarily with him on the 
 first symptoms of a relapse. 
 5 
 
66 SIVAJI'S CAREER 
 
 On the other hand, Sivaji, I believe, was 
 only acting a part, which he meant to make 
 subservient to a very different one, when it 
 should suit him to throw off the mask. He had 
 conceived high hopes of promotion in the Imperial 
 service, from Jei Sing's representations. To in- 
 gratiate himself with Aurungzib ; to distinguish 
 himself, as he had done at Bijapur, in active 
 service, in a command for which he had proved 
 his competence ; to acquire influence, and wield 
 resources, which he might insidiously and ab- 
 ruptly divert to his own purposes, and employ 
 against his employer : would be quite in accord- 
 ance with his profound subtlety, his unscrupu- 
 lousness, his personal ambition, and his national 
 aspirations in short, with the whole bent of his 
 peculiar genius. And such, I believe, was his 
 calculation. 
 
 But at Delhi his sanguine hopes were 
 promptly dashed. He had counted without his 
 host, or rather, as so often happens when match- 
 makers and peace-makers interpose their well- 
 intentioned offices, the extent of the Emperor's 
 placability and readiness to employ him had 
 been exaggerated. At the opening of the 
 negotiations, Jei Sing had assured him that he 
 would receive a high munsub or honorary 
 military command. And in subsequent private 
 conferences he had gone much further, and 
 induced Sivaji to assume that he would be 
 placed in a position favourable for the further- 
 
WHY WAS SIVAJI SO DEEPLY MORTIFIED ? 67 
 
 ance of his ulterior, though carefully concealed, 
 purpose. But when Jei Sing reported the 
 progress of the negotiation to the Emperor, 
 he was less explicit ; for he did not venture to 
 prescribe any specific mode of treatment for 
 completing the cure of the convalescent political 
 patient. Or, as Khafi Khan puts it : " Raja 
 Jei Sing had flattered Sivaji with promises ; 
 but as the Raja knew the Emperor to have a 
 strong feeling against Sivaji, he artfully re- 
 frained from making known the promises he 
 had held out." Hinc illce lachrymce ! Sivaji's 
 annoyance, disappointment, and complaints, 
 which are recorded by the historian, and the 
 consequences of which were so eventful in the 
 sequel, were the natural results of this double- 
 dealing, though neither Ram Sing, Jei Sing's 
 son, to whom they were confided, nor the 
 historian himself, seems to have understood 
 their deepest ground. Khafi Khan implies that 
 Sivaji took offence at the mere circumstance 
 that the munsub granted to him was not high 
 enough, but only the same as was bestowed 
 on his young son and on one of his relatives, 
 who had done good service in the late campaign 
 against Bijapur, namely, that of a panj-hazari, 
 or nominal commander of five thousand men, 
 instead of a haft-hazari, or commander of seven 
 thousand. This was no doubt a grievance, 
 capable of being avowed as a breach of a specific 
 assurance at the opening of the negotiations, 
 
68 SIVAJI'S CAREER 
 
 and as placing Sivaji on the same level as his 
 boy and his follower. But this was not the 
 root of the bitterness of spirit which he ex- 
 hibited. He was not a man to resent wrathfully 
 the mere fact that, so to speak, he had been 
 made a C.B. instead of a K.C.B. Manucci 
 says that he took offence at being ranged at 
 Court in a low station, and openly expressed 
 his disgust and resentment. Hence a second 
 question occurs to which what I have already 
 said will supply what I believe to be the most 
 probable answer. Why was he so seriously 
 perturbed and so bitterly disappointed ? Was 
 it not because he realised that he was checked, 
 if not checkmated, in his deep, secret game ? 
 Because he had too good reason to suspect that 
 Aurungzib was resolved to give him no oppor- 
 tunity of playing it, and, whether the arch- 
 dissembler saw through him or not, judged 
 that he himself had done enough by putting 
 him off with a second-rate honorary decoration, 
 and had no intention of employing him in such 
 a position as was indispensable for his ulterior 
 purpose ? 
 
 To Ram Sing he complained that he had 
 not been properly treated, instancing, in par- 
 ticular, the minor honorary distinction. The 
 Emperor was informed of what is called " his 
 disrespectful bearing " ; whereupon " he was 
 dismissed with little ceremony, forbidden to 
 reappear at Court, relegated to a house in 
 
AURUNGZIB'S AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE 69 
 
 the suburbs, and orders were given to the 
 kotwal (i.e. the chief of the police) to place 
 guards round it." 
 
 A third question here presents itself : What 
 were the Emperor's real intentions with regard 
 to him at this moment ? 
 
 There can be no doubt that he was much 
 scandalised and very indignant at Sivaji's pre- 
 sumption, and testified his high displeasure by 
 banishing him from the Court, and secluding 
 him in his house. But was this all ? 
 
 The placing of a guard round his quarters 
 looks equivocal and sinister. 
 
 Had not the so-called " disrespectful bearing " 
 of Sivaji struck Aurungzib as symptomatic of 
 the spirit of self-assertion and latent disaffection 
 which he had never ceased to fear, might still 
 lurk in the breast of the wily though hitherto 
 obsequious suppliant for his favour ? And if 
 so, might he not be considering the expediency 
 of ridding himself of all danger from such a 
 quarter by putting Sivaji to death, or immuring 
 him, as he did so many other dangerous political 
 personages, in Gwalior ? This seems to me by 
 no means improbable. 
 
 If I have been rather lengthy in endeavouring 
 to thread the maze of this encounter of wit 
 between these consummately artful rivals, my 
 apology must be that the fate of the Empire 
 hung on the issue. 
 
 Bold as he was, Sivaji realised the imminence 
 
70 SIVAJI'S CAREER 
 
 of his peril, and with his characteristic ingenuity 
 extricated himself from it. Affecting severe 
 illness, he presently announced his recovery, 
 and in gratitude for it distributed copious alms 
 to Brahmins, fakirs, and others ; especially 
 of sweetmeats, which were sent out in large 
 covered baskets. He also sent, as presents to 
 Brahmins, some horses, which were stationed at 
 an appointed place some miles towards Muttra. 
 A devoted follower took his place on his couch, 
 with a veil over his face, and Sivaji's ring 
 prominently displayed on his hand, and affected 
 sleep when visited. Sivaji and his son passed 
 out of the city, concealed in the baskets, 
 reached the horses, and with a large body of 
 attendants galloped hard to Muttra. Three 
 alarms meanwhile of his suspected escape had 
 been given ; but not until the third did an 
 exact inspection detect the false convalescent. 
 Then active pursuit began, but was baffled 
 by Sivaji's arts and rapid movement. He and 
 his friends disguised themselves as mendicants, 
 and hurried forward on foot, until they were 
 apprehended on suspicion by an officer at an 
 unnamed place. But Sivaji, taking the bull 
 by the horns, avowed his identity, but by a 
 bribe of two valuable jewels procured his own 
 liberation and that of his companions. Their 
 headlong flight after escaping this danger proved 
 too much for the boy Sambaji ; and he was 
 left at Benares in the charge of a Brahmin, 
 
SIVAJI RECOVERS HIS GROUND 71 
 
 who, after his accession to the Rajaship, became 
 his Sejanus, and his associate in death. 
 
 The fugitives hastened through Behar by 
 Patna and Chanda, and, traversing a thickly 
 wooded country, diverged southwards, and 
 gained the Court of the King of Golconda. 
 Proscribed anew by the Emperor, Sivaji had 
 nothing to hope from his original sovereign, 
 the King of Bijapur. But his fame, and his 
 solemn promises to help his present host, the 
 Golconda King, to recover territory that had 
 been wrested from him by his and Sivaji's 
 common enemies, procured him the aid of a 
 military force, the nucleus of a new army, 
 which was rapidly increased by the contingents 
 of his own people. 
 
 His progress thenceforth was startlingly 
 rapid. The hostile but candid Mussulman his- 
 torian says : " By fraud and stratagem, and by 
 his marvellous skill in the conduct of sieges, 
 every fort that he approached fell into his 
 hands." He contrived, by ingenious excuses, 
 to evade the delivery of most of these places 
 to the King of Golconda's officers, and retained 
 possession of them. Not less vigorous and 
 successful were his operations in his own Western 
 country. Satara, Parnala, Rajgarh, and at last 
 almost all that he had surrendered were re- 
 covered. 
 
 And he recommenced his defiant campaign 
 in the lower country by a rapid and most 
 
72 SIVAJFS CAREER 
 
 lucrative raid on Surat, where, however, the 
 English factory stoutly and successfully re- 
 sisted him. He captured also some ten thousand 
 horses, and organised a cavalry force of bargeers, 
 that is, soldiers more immediately dependent 
 on him, as opposed to what we should call 
 irregular horse, who provided their own steeds 
 and equipments. Moreover, he rebuilt the forts 
 on the shore near Surat, which had been destroyed, 
 constructed a fleet, and preyed upon the shipping 
 of that flourishing port. 
 
 At Rajgarh he constructed a stronger fortress 
 than any of those hitherto in his dominions, 
 and took every precaution to make it impreg- 
 nable. There he fixed his abode, formally 
 assumed the throne, devised wise regulations 
 for the conduct of his civil government, and 
 the organisation of his increasing and powerful 
 army. There he defied his Imperial adversary ; 
 and thence, from time to time, he emerged, 
 to plunder the country from Guzerat to the 
 Coromandel coast ; to levy chout, a commuta- 
 tion of 25 per cent, of the land revenue, in lieu 
 of plunder ; to baffle, and at times defeat, the 
 Imperial armies ; and to approve himself an 
 irrepressible antagonist of the Great Mogul, an 
 heroic champion of Mahratta independence, and 
 an unrivalled master of guerilla and predatory 
 warfare. 
 
 I need not relate his after-career. For I 
 hope I have sufficiently illustrated the nature 
 
SIVAJI CHECKMATES AURUNGZIB 73 
 
 of the man and of his power, and the 
 formidableness of the problem which he had 
 propounded for solution to the haughty, 
 tyrannical, and aggressive Emperor. He died 
 in 1680. 
 
VI 
 
 THE REIMPOSITION OF THE JIZYA, 
 AND THE RAJPUT REVOLT 
 
 THE sudden death of Sivaji suspended for a 
 short time the contest in the Dekkan. But 
 Aurungzib's policy had meanwhile produced a 
 dangerous crisis in Hindostan. I need not 
 particularise his earlier measures, which were 
 calculated to annoy, depress, and estrange his 
 Hindoo subjects, but were endured without 
 positive resistance. But the reimposition of 
 the jizya was felt to be at once an intolerable 
 grievance, and a gross insult to the higher and 
 more influential classes, and it no doubt pre- 
 disposed the Rajputs to engage in the rising 
 which the Emperor immediately provoked by 
 his arbitrary and suspicious treatment of the 
 family of one of their deceased Princes. 
 
 The odiousness, the injustice, and the im- 
 policy of the jizya are forcibly urged in the re- 
 markable letter, of uncertain authorship, said 
 to have been addressed to Aurungzib, and 
 translated in Orme's Fragments of the Mogul 
 Empire. To its account of the disastrous results 
 of the measure I shall refer later. But I will 
 
RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO THE JIZYA 75 
 
 quote now what are evidently the genuine 
 impressions of a thoughtful Hindoo on the 
 injustice of this invidious mark of distinction, 
 urged on comprehensive religious grounds, thus 
 (so to speak) turning the tables on the bigoted 
 Emperor, and pointing out to him a more 
 excellent way than he had adopted, of pleasing 
 and conforming to the will of the Deity. 
 
 " If your majesty," he says, " places any 
 faith in those books, by distinction called divine, 
 you will there be instructed that God is the 
 God of all mankind, not the God of Mahomedans 
 alone. The Pagan and the Mussulman are 
 equally in his presence. Distinctions of colour 
 are of his ordination. It is he who gives 
 existence. In your temples, to his name the 
 voice is raised in prayer ; in a house of images, 
 where the bell is shaken, still he is the object 
 of adoration." This would, perhaps, be news 
 to Aurungzib, who, in his abhorrence of the 
 popular polytheism, would fail to discern, and 
 be equally unwilling to acknowledge, that the 
 more enlightened spirits then, as now, through 
 the veil of image-worship, recognised and adored 
 TO Oewv practically the Supreme Being in 
 the unity of His primordial essence, whence 
 subordinate deities are (in Gnostic phrase) emana- 
 tions. " To vilify the religion or customs of 
 other men, is to set at naught the pleasure of 
 the Almighty. When we deface a picture we 
 naturally incur the resentment of the painter ; 
 
76 THE REIMPOSITION OF THE JIZYA 
 
 and justly has the poet said, c Presume not to 
 arraign or scrutinise the various works of power 
 divine.' : Having thus combated the bigot on 
 his own ground religious obligation, the writer 
 sums up shortly and tellingly the case against 
 the imposition : 
 
 " In fine," he says, " the tribute you demand 
 from the Hindoo is repugnant to justice : it is 
 equally foreign from good policy, as it must 
 impoverish the country : moreover, it is an 
 innovation, and an infringement of the laws of 
 Hindostan " (pp. 254-255). 
 
 The passionate animosity excited by the tax 
 was displayed in various ways, and on very 
 different scenes. At Delhi itself a great mul- 
 titude assembled in front of the palace, and 
 petitioned the Emperor to recall the obnoxious 
 edict. "But," says the historian, "he would 
 not listen to their complaints." On his way to 
 pay his devotions in the mosque he was 
 obstructed by a still vaster assemblage of im- 
 portunate petitioners, and was unable to proceed. 
 In vain he gave orders to force a way through. 
 " At length," continues Khafi Khan, " an order 
 was given to bring out the elephants and direct 
 them against the mob. Many fell trodden to 
 death under the feet of the elephants and horses. 
 For some days the Hindus continued to assemble 
 in great numbers and complain, but at length 
 they submitted to pay the jizya " (p. 296). 
 Elsewhere the protest took a more violent 
 
RESISTANCE TO THE LEVYING OF JIZYA 77 
 
 and menacing form. Burhanpur was one of 
 the most important cities in the Dekkan, the 
 capital of the Mogul Province of Khandeish. 
 And there resistance showed itself in a doubly 
 ominous manner. First, in Khafi Khan's words : 
 " The infidel inhabitants of the city and the 
 country round made great opposition to the 
 payment of the jizya. There was not a district 
 where the people, with the help of the faujdars 
 and mukaddams, did not make disturbances and 
 resistance " (p. 310). That the Imperial officials 
 should connive at and abet the rebellious move- 
 ment was the strongest token of the inex- 
 pediency of the measure, and of the danger of 
 overstraining the administrative machinery, lest 
 it should, in the end, break down altogether. 
 Another fact, mentioned by Khafi Khan, is of 
 similar import. Kakar Khan, as I shall notice 
 immediately, was the first Collector of the jizya. 
 He was succeeded by a zealous officer, Mir Abdul 
 Karim. But on Aurungzib's arrival he requested 
 to be allowed to resign his office, " and that the 
 collection of the jizya might be deputed to 
 some one else." This plainly indicates that even 
 the Emperor's higher and most active Mahometan 
 ministers misliked the invidious task, and dis- 
 charged it reluctantly. But another equally 
 dangerous circumstance occurred on this oc- 
 casion. The two streams of disaffection and 
 resistance to Aurungzib's authority now began 
 to mingle. Sivaji was dead, and had been 
 
78 THE REIMPOSITION OF THE JIZYA 
 
 succeeded by his son Sambaji. His earliest 
 exploit was, at the head of twenty thousand men, 
 to co-operate with the malcontents by a sudden 
 dash at Kakar Khan, the collector of the jizya, 
 who fled before him into Bahadapur, a town in 
 the immediate vicinity of Burhanpur, and there 
 held out against his assailants, and repulsed 
 several attempts to carry the fort by assault. 
 Baffled in this, the Mahrattas raided severely 
 the town and its district around, and returned 
 home with an immense booty. 
 
 After what I have previously said, I need 
 not describe the feelings of the Rajputs, and 
 especially of their Princes, on the imposition 
 of the jizya. But it is worth while to mention 
 that the Rana of Oudipur, even while preparing 
 to resort to arms, and casting dust in the interval 
 in the Emperor's eyes by negotiation, scorned 
 even to affect literal compliance, but proposed 
 to commute the tax by a territorial cession. 
 
 Thus Aurungzib had abundant warning that 
 he was playing a dangerous game, and that any 
 new provocation to the proud Rajput temper 
 would be extremely likely to bring matters to 
 extremities, and to produce the explosion that 
 had been long pending. Yet he chose this 
 peculiarly inopportune time to act in a manner 
 specially calculated to exasperate the Rajputs, 
 and arouse the martial spirit of that gallant 
 people against him. 
 
 The Rajput Principalities were not regularly 
 
AURUNGZIB'S RELATIONS WITH JESWUNT 79 
 
 incorporated with the Empire. Their chieftains 
 paid tribute, and supplied their contingents to 
 the Imperial armies ; but otherwise home rule 
 prevailed in their dominions. Jeswunt Sing 
 was the Raja of Joudpur, and had long played 
 a prominent and versatile part in Imperial 
 politics. He had been a staunch partisan of 
 Dara against Aurungzib. But on Dara's, or 
 rather his own, defeat, he had, apparently in 
 despair, and worked upon by Aurungzib's arts, 
 acquiesced in his success, and joined him. But 
 in the renewed contest with Shuja he seems 
 to have discerned another chance of averting 
 what threatened to be a very unwelcome and 
 uncongenial regime ; and in the crisis of the war 
 he suddenly changed sides once more, and made 
 a treacherous night attack on Aurungzib's camp, 
 which, but for the presence of mind and en- 
 ergetic exertions of Aurungzib himself, might 
 have proved fatal to him. Nevertheless, he and 
 Jeswunt were afterwards reconciled ; and though 
 no doubt mutually distrustful, remained osten- 
 sibly on good terms throughout Jeswunt's life. 
 But the Emperor suspected the Raja of remiss- 
 ness in the Mahratta war, if not of actual collusion 
 with Sivaji ; and had also a standing grievance 
 against him respecting his tribute, the particulars 
 of which are not explained. Still he did not 
 find it convenient to break with him. He was 
 too powerful, and had too much influence with 
 other important persons. Hence he continued 
 
80 THE REIMPOSITION OF THE JIZYA 
 
 to be employed in military commands, though 
 the Emperor's distrust and want of cordiality 
 to him seem to have been no secret among the 
 Rajputs. 
 
 Aurungzib had unwisely provoked a contest 
 with the unsubdued Afghans, and Jeswunt Sing 
 had been sent against them. While engaged 
 on this service he died ; and his family returned 
 home, without awaiting regular Imperial passes 
 from Delhi. They were stopped at the Indus, 
 but forced their way onwards ; and the Emperor, 
 apparently availing himself of this irregularity, 
 made an insidious attempt to arrest them, and 
 get them into his own custody. The circum- 
 stances are not fully explained ; but the case 
 seems pretty clear, when the past relations of 
 the parties and the character of the Emperor 
 are taken into consideration. Aurungzib prob- 
 ably intended to dictate his own terms about 
 the tribute before releasing them, rather than to 
 visit upon them his ill-feeling towards Jeswunt. 
 But he was suspected of darker designs, and 
 Rajput pride was offended, and indignation 
 excited, by the travellers' camp being surrounded 
 and closely invested by an Imperial force. The 
 Ranis, that is, the widows of Jeswunt, and his 
 two young sons were escorted by a large com- 
 pany of their warlike attendants, commanded 
 by a gallant officer, Durga Das. By his con- 
 trivance the whole family made their escape, 
 and were conveyed to Joudpur. It had been 
 
OUTBREAK OF THE RAJPUT REVOLT 81 
 
 necessary to substitute other ladies and boys 
 in the place of the fugitives. These were 
 arrested ; and the Emperor sought to make 
 the best of the situation by recognising and 
 treating the captive youths as Jeswunt's actual 
 sons. But the truth could not be long con- 
 cealed ; and Ajit Sing, the elder son, lived to 
 become a formidable thorn in the side of the 
 Empire. 
 
 Thus what I called the smouldering fire of 
 disaffection, which Aurungzib's attitude arid con- 
 duct had kindled at the opening of his reign, 
 and which his many acts of intolerance had 
 tended to intensify, and his recent imposition 
 of the jizya to fan into a flame, burst out at last 
 in determined rebellion and desperate war. 
 
 Of the three chief Rajput States, Jeipur 
 was too near to Delhi, and too closely connected 
 with the Imperial family, to take part in the 
 insurrection. Jeswunt's principality, Joudpur, 
 was more remote, on the west of the Aravulli 
 range of mountains ; and there a large army 
 soon assembled, under Durga Das, who had 
 rescued the young Princes. Aurungzib in person 
 advanced against it, and called upon the Rana 
 of Oudipur, whose territories lay along the 
 south-eastern slopes of the Aravulli, to submit 
 to ihejizya, and to seize and bring to the presence 
 the runaway boys. This was perhaps to test 
 his disposition. The Rana disclaimed all com- 
 plicity with the rising, and, as I have men- 
 6 
 
82 THE REIMPOSITION OF THE JIZYA 
 
 tioned, proposed to cede territory in lieu of 
 paying the invidious tax. This seems to have 
 reassured the Emperor, and he returned to 
 Delhi, leaving the conduct of the war, and the 
 completion of the negotiation with the Rana 
 of Oudipur, to a lieutenant. 
 
 But it soon appeared that the Rana had 
 thrown in his lot with the insurgents. And the 
 Emperor, now realising the seriousness of the 
 crisis, made great and comprehensive prepara- 
 tions for meeting it. He marched in person to 
 Ajmir, as a central position in the theatre of 
 the coming war ; summoned in haste his sons, 
 Moazzam from the Dekkan, and Azam from 
 Bengal, at the head of their respective armies ; 
 and ordered the Subahdar of Guzerat to station 
 himself between Rajputana and Ahmedabad, 
 to cut off communication between the rebels and 
 the Mahrattas, while Prince Akbar was detached 
 to attack Oudipur. " When," says the native 
 historian, " the Rana heard of these preparations, 
 he laid Udipur, his capital, waste, and, with the 
 treasure and family and followers of himself and 
 Jeswunt Sing, he fled to the mountains and 
 difficult passes " (p. 299). The Prince was ordered 
 to pursue him with an expeditious mountain 
 corps, and on the prompt arrival of his brothers, 
 they were similarly employed ; and explicit in- 
 structions were issued to wage the war in the 
 most merciless and destructive manner. They 
 complied readily, and besides slaughtering the 
 
RAJPUT WAR OMINOUS OF LATER FAILURE 83 
 
 men wholesale, as per orders, "employed them- 
 selves in laying waste the country, destroying 
 temples and buildings, cutting down fruit trees, 
 and making prisoners of the women and children 
 of the infidels who had taken refuge in holes and 
 ruined places." The Rajputs retaliated in true 
 Highland style. More than twenty-five thousand 
 assailed the Imperial troops, and cut off their 
 supplies. " They allured several thousand of 
 the royal forces into the heart of the Rana's 
 fastnesses. There they attacked them, and 
 killed many, both horse and foot." 
 
 " The Rajputs held all the roads through the 
 hills, and came down occasionally from the hills, 
 and attacked the Prince's forces by surprise." 
 
 I have quoted these passages not only as 
 giving local colour to the course of the contest, 
 but because they prefigure clearly the character 
 of the previous and later Mahratta warfare in 
 the Ghat region, and in combination with 
 Sivaji's fort system and Mahratta " slimness " 
 illustrate the geographical causes of Aurungzib's 
 final collapse. 
 
 Thus the savage struggle went on. But it 
 assumed a new character when the skeleton in 
 Aurungzib's closet stepped forth, and the political 
 parricide, and murderer of his philo-Rajput 
 brother, was threatened with retribution in kind. 
 
 With professed desire of a reconciliation, the 
 Rajputs made overtures to Prince Moazzam, 
 requesting him to intercede for them with the 
 
84 THE REIMPOSITION OF THE JIZYA 
 
 Emperor. But this was only a veil for a deeper 
 design to win him over to their cause by the 
 promise of assisting him to supplant his father, 
 who was notoriously suspicious and jealous of 
 him. The Prince, under his mother's influence, 
 turned a deaf ear to the proposal. But the 
 tempters found a more pliant instrument in 
 Prince Akbar, the youngest son, who was dazzled 
 by the prospect, and joined the rebels. Moazzam 
 sent a timely warning to his father, but was not 
 believed, and was sternly admonished to look 
 to his own steps. Suddenly it was announced 
 that Akbar had assumed the throne, appointed 
 his chief officers to high places, and was march- 
 ing, at the head of seventy thousand men, against 
 his father. Aurungzib had detached almost all 
 his army, and had only a few hundreds of men 
 with him. He sent instantly for Moazzam, who 
 joined him, by a forced march, with ten thousand 
 soldiers. But the Emperor's confidence was 
 thoroughly shaken, and he was in a great strait 
 of misgivings on all sides. He feared Moazzam 
 as much as Akbar ; and actually turned his 
 guns against the reinforcement. Moazzam, how- 
 ever, obeyed the paternal injunction to leave his 
 army, and to come to him in all speed with his 
 two sons ; and the Emperor's suspicion was 
 thus dispelled for the time. 
 
 Meanwhile, Akbar showed himself quite un- 
 equal to the great game he had aspired to play. 
 He did not advance promptly. And Aurungzib 
 
AKBAR'S DEFECTION A FIASCO 85 
 
 had time, by his skilful emissaries, to detach 
 some of the rebellious Prince's Mogul supporters, 
 and to sow dissension and mutual distrust 
 among the insurgents. Whether he employed 
 the common device of an intercepted letter to 
 Akbar, assuming that father and son under- 
 stood each other, and that Akbar was to betray 
 his allies, is not certain, though it was currently 
 reported, and is quite in accordance with the 
 Emperor's style. But from what happened later 
 at the Court of Samba ji I am inclined to think 
 that the young and foolish Prince gave himself 
 airs intolerable to his proud confederates ; and 
 that, as his Imperial contingent melted away, 
 they became less and less inclined to back his 
 pretensions. At last, without a battle, he left 
 them, made his way into the Dekkan, was well 
 received by Sambaji ; but proved too over- 
 bearing, and lost heart. He escaped to Persia, 
 was sheltered by the Shah, and lived and died 
 there, having frequently, but vainly, solicited the 
 help of a military force to prosecute a renewed 
 attempt on the throne of the Great Mogul. 
 
 Thus the Emperor was delivered from his 
 great immediate peril ; but the Rajput war 
 continued, and though he ceased to take part 
 in it, tormented and weakened him to the end 
 of his reign. And in the long course of warfare 
 upon which he was about to engage in the 
 Dekkan, the names of Rajput commanders are 
 conspicuous by tlit'i absence. 
 
VII 
 
 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE 
 DEKKAN 
 
 SEVERAL considerations now determined the 
 Emperor to undertake the personal conduct of 
 the war in the Dekkan. 
 
 The objects of the war were two : to extend 
 the limits of the Empire by the subversion of 
 the two remaining Afghan monarchies, Bijapur 
 and Golconda, and the annexation of their 
 dominions ; and to suppress the Mahratta polity, 
 and predatory power. 
 
 To pursue simultaneously both these objects 
 was characteristic of Aurungzib's want of 
 political insight and military judgment. He 
 had already experienced the difficulty of effecting 
 the second object. And the conquest of the 
 Afghan monarchies, however practicable, and 
 in accordance with the previous forward policy 
 of the Empire, would be untimely and mis- 
 chievous, while the Mahrattas continued un- 
 subdued. For it would entail new and serious 
 administrative obligations, and a severe strain 
 on a system which was already exhibiting signs 
 of weakness and inefficiency. And it would, 
 
 86 
 
AURUNGZIB'S MISTAKEN MILITARY POLICY 87 
 
 moreover, tend to disorganise society in the 
 newly conquered territories ; to throw out of 
 employment numbers who had clustered around 
 the Court, or served in the armies of the con- 
 quered sovereigns; and tempt them and others 
 who were indisposed to acquiesce in Aurungzib's 
 regime to escape it, and continue their resist- 
 ance to it by joining the Mahrattas. Thus the 
 achievement of the one object would but increase 
 the difficulties, otherwise great enough and to 
 spare, of accomplishing the other. But, in 
 this, as in other cases, Aurungzib, obstinate 
 by nature, unteachable by experience, and 
 blinded by the passions, on the one hand, of 
 ambition, on the other of vindictiveness, ad- 
 dressed himself to this double enterprise as 
 unwisely as Charles the Bold went to war with 
 the Swiss, and with not dissimilar results. 
 
 From his own point of view, however, cir- 
 cumstances seemed to promise success to his 
 twofold aim, and to make his presence on the 
 scene, and his personal conduct of the war, 
 desirable. The kingdoms of Bijapur and Gol- 
 conda appeared quite incapable of withstanding 
 the great army which he intended to lead 
 against them. Their comparative weakness was 
 indicated by the fact that they had already 
 virtually acknowledged the supremacy of the 
 Empire. According to a practice, not infrequent 
 in India, when hard pressed, they had, from 
 time to time, paid tribute to it. The <case 
 
88 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 appears to have been somewhat analogous to 
 the relations of England to the Papacy, after 
 John's ignominious stipulation with Innocent m. 
 The thousand marks which, according to that 
 arrangement, were due annually to the Holy 
 See, were paid intermittently until Edward m. 
 repudiated the humiliating compact. And the 
 Mogul arms had long seriously threatened, and 
 gained occasional advantages over these isolated 
 and mutually jealous, and therefore still weaker, 
 monarchies. And if the Emperor's denunciat- 
 ing declaration of war against Golconda was 
 sincere, he believed that its luxurious and 
 corrupt condition would make it an easy prey 
 an assumption belied by its stout and pro- 
 longed defence. But, moreover, it was not 
 to his arms alone that he looked for victory. 
 He relied much on his insidious practices of 
 intrigue and corruption, and on the dazzling 
 prospect which he could hold out to traitors 
 of favour and exaltation in his own service. 
 Thus he thought that to complete the work 
 which he had begun as Prince would be both 
 appropriate and easy. 
 
 Moreover, he had special gravamina against 
 the King of Golconda. While he was intent on 
 depressing the Hindoos in the Empire, and 
 stamping out the Mahratta uprising in the 
 Dekkan, the King of Golconda was said to 
 give the chief place in his favour and counsels 
 to two Hindoos. This was, of course, Nehushtan 
 
WHY AFGHAN KINGS FIRST ATTACKED 89 
 
 to Aurungzib. And the re-establishment and 
 consolidation of Sivaji's power had been effected 
 through the aid of the same Sovereign, though 
 the upstart adventurer had been placed under 
 the ban of the Empire. Such facts alone would 
 amply account for Aurungzib's resolve to conquer 
 such an offensive potentate, and to annex his 
 dominions. 
 
 The Emperor was, I believe, the more in- 
 clined to wage war against the Afghan kings 
 for the very reasons that would have made a 
 more far-sighted statesman hesitate to engage 
 in it. The Rajput revolt showed that he could 
 no longer command the combined forces of 
 the hitherto united Empire, and this example 
 of armed resistance might be followed else- 
 where, and both diminish and divert to the 
 new scenes of disturbance the military strength 
 of his distracted dominions. But he had been 
 not only endangered, but humiliated in Raj- 
 putana ; his prestige as a great general had 
 suffered eclipse, and his Imperial dignity had 
 been grossly affronted and impaired. And I 
 believe that he was anxious to recover his 
 ground, and to restore his reputation, by a 
 striking military triumph, and the extension 
 of the Empire by the annexation of two new 
 provinces. 
 
 As to the Mahrattas, he not only affected, 
 but, I believe, really felt, in spite of Sivaji's 
 exploits, supreme contempt for them. In his 
 
90 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 eyes they were merely a barbarous community 
 of active, adroit, and greedy brigands, who had 
 been formidable to society so long as they were 
 animated and managed by a man of such 
 exceptional ability as Sivaji ; but who, having 
 lost their leader, would, if they did not disperse, 
 probably fall out among themselves, betray 
 each other, and be easily circumvented by his 
 combined arms, subtle intrigues, and appeals to 
 their cupidity. But he was totally unable to 
 appreciate their higher moral characteristics ; 
 the resolute passion for national independence 
 which their leader had kindled in their bosoms ; 
 their abhorrence of his new version of the ob- 
 ligations of a Mahometan sovereign towards 
 men of their own religion ; their intense devotion 
 to the memory, the example, and the institu- 
 tions of their heroic and indomitable chief ; 
 and the confidence which he had imparted to 
 them that the Imperial power, so far from 
 being irresistible, was extremely vulnerable, and 
 if persistently assailed, on his method, might be 
 brought low in the end. 
 
 Thus grievously underestimating the moral 
 strength of this bandit confederacy, Aurungzib 
 prepared to confront it, with an undiscerning 
 arrogance, and fixed idea of subduing and 
 tyrannising over it, similar to those of Philip n. 
 towards the Dutch " sea-beggars " ; and, as I said 
 of Charles the Bold, with not dissimilar results. 
 
 Khafi Khan attributes the Emperor's under- 
 
STRENGTH OF THE MAHRATTA BASE 91 
 
 taking the personal superintendence of the war 
 to the insolence of Sambaji in venturing to raid 
 almost up to the gates of Burhanpur. There 
 is a germ of truth in this statement. But I 
 think it would be more exact to say that 
 Aurungzib's mistrust of the fidelity of his deputy, 
 Khan Jehan, as well as of his son, Prince 
 Moazzam, besides the other reasons that I have 
 mentioned, weighed with him in this decision. 
 And as Burhanpur and its vicinity had been 
 the focus of the anti-jizya movement, and this 
 had been fomented and assisted by Sambaji' s 
 incursion, to make Burhanpur his headquarters 
 was an obviously expedient plan. There, accord- 
 ingly, he assembled a mighty host, and estab- 
 lished a splendid and imposing Court (1683). 
 
 The first operations against the Mahrattas 
 were confided to Prince Moazzam. He was to 
 invade the rugged, intricate, and wooded region 
 of the Concan, the western declivities of the 
 mighty Ghats ; to " capture the forts, and 
 punish the infidels." Such was his commission. 
 But to execute it was not so easy as the Emperor 
 chose to assume. The difficulties of Mahratta 
 warfare, and the geographical advantages of the 
 Mahratta base, at once became evident, and 
 the collapse of this expedition foreshadowed 
 the fate of Aurungzib's general undertaking. 
 Some passages of the hostile but truthful 
 historian's narrative will best describe the result 
 (pp. 314-315). 
 
92 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 " On the march through the narrow passes 
 there were many sharp fights with the enemy, in 
 which numbers of the royal soldiers fell. . . . The 
 air of the place did not suit the invaders. The 
 enemy swarmed around on every side, and cut 
 off the supplies. . . . The enemy cut down the 
 grass, which was a cause of great distress to 
 man and beast, and they had no food but cocoa- 
 nuts, and the grain called kudun, which acted 
 like poison upon them. Great numbers of men 
 and horses died. Grain was scarce and dear. 
 . . . Those men who escaped death dragged on 
 a half -existence, and with crying and groaning 
 felt as if every breath they drew was their last. 
 There was not a noble who had a horse in his 
 stable fit for use." 
 
 He then explains that the Emperor, to relieve 
 the army from starvation, ordered his officials 
 at Surat to send ample supplies of grain to it by 
 sea. But he continues : "As the ships had to 
 pass by their newly erected fortresses, [the enemy] 
 stopped them on their way, and took most of 
 them." And he concludes this lugubrious ac- 
 count thus : " The order at length came for 
 the retreat of the army, and it fell back fighting 
 all the way to Ahmadnagar, where Aurungzib 
 then was." 
 
 Such was the significant prelude to the great 
 tragedy that was to follow ! Yet the Emperor's 
 calculation, that the death of Sivaji had removed 
 the chief obstacle to his success, would have 
 
. 
 
 DEGENERACY OF SAMBAJI 93 
 
 been still more confident had he understood 
 better than he appears to have done, the char- 
 acter of his successor. For Sambaji, the new 
 Raja, was a complete contrast to his father. 
 Sivaji's versatile genius, amazing energy, sleep- 
 less vigilance, and lively sympathy with his 
 followers had given him a commanding ascend- 
 ancy over them ; had enabled him to maintain 
 strict discipline in his army, an admirable 
 organisation of his fort system, and appropriate 
 regulations for the conduct of his civil govern- 
 ment in short, to transmute a band of brigands 
 into an effective and formidable antagonist of 
 the Imperial power. But Sambaji was utterly 
 destitute of his great qualities, insensible to the 
 requirements of his position ; reckless, self- 
 indulgent, and disposed to be tyrannical ; and 
 shamelessly and perilously subservient to the 
 influence of an evil - minded favourite, the 
 Brahmin Kaloosha, who had taken charge of 
 him when his father was obliged to leave the 
 boy behind in the course of his precipitate 
 flight from Delhi. Such a regime threatened 
 the speedy undoing of Sivaji's work, and the 
 renewed triumph of the Crescent over militant 
 Hindooism. Sed dis aliter visum, as will soon 
 appear. 
 
 I will, however, first dispose of the Emperor's 
 transactions with the Afghan monarchies. He 
 first assailed that of Golconda. The immediate 
 conduct of the operations was entrusted to 
 
94 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 Prince Moazzam and Khan Jehan. They gained 
 victories ; but, as the Emperor thought, neglected 
 to push their advantage, and he sharply repri- 
 manded them. Still the Prince showed no great 
 alacrity to fight a general battle, but sent a 
 chivalrous challenge to engage with two or three 
 on each side, which came to nothing. At last 
 the desertion of one of his chief generals so 
 much alarmed the King, that he fled into the 
 strong fortress of Golconda, leaving his capital, 
 the adjacent city of Hyderabad, in a state of 
 wild panic, which was quickly justified by a 
 rising of the lawless classes, and a horrible 
 scene of indiscriminate cruelty and looting. But 
 matters became still worse when the Imperial 
 army attacked and forced its way into the city, 
 and the soldiers, in spite of the efforts of the 
 Prince to restrain them, emulated the worst 
 actions of the insurgent budmashes. 
 
 Meanwhile Prince Moazzam made a con- 
 vention with the Sovereign, which saved his 
 kingdom for the time, and was grudgingly 
 acquiesced in by the Emperor. War was then 
 resumed with Bijapur, and, after a tedious 
 siege, in which the assailants suffered much, the 
 capital was surrendered ; the Sovereign was 
 sent to Dowlatabad, pensioned, and imprisoned ; 
 and his dominions were reduced to a Mogul 
 province (1686). In the course of the siege 
 the Emperor had conceived new suspicions of 
 the fidelity of Prince Moazzam now called 
 
ou~u 
 
 AURUNGZIB ATTACKS GOLCONDA 95 
 
 Shah Alam, and had instituted a strict inquiry, 
 without ascertaining any material facts against 
 him. But his distrust remained, and his son 
 experienced the effects of it later. Nor was 
 Aurungzib's uneasy mind better satisfied with 
 his other general, Khan Jehan. " He was," 
 says Khafi Khan, " annoyed with him for not 
 having pursued and secured Prince Akbar when 
 that Prince was near his territory." He seems, 
 in fact, to have been constantly haunted by the 
 fear of a conspiracy to retaliate upon him his 
 unfilial conduct. 
 
 The attack on Golconda was now resumed ; 
 but Aurungzib made his approach in a character- 
 istically insidious manner. On the pretext of a 
 pilgrimage, he massed his army in the neighbour- 
 hood. He then formally demanded payment 
 of the tribute, affecting a friendly tone. But 
 he sent private instructions to his envoy to 
 extort as much money as he could his diplomacy 
 being reinforced by the proximity of the Imperial 
 forces. 
 
 When a large sum had been safely received, 
 the Emperor threw off the mask, denounced 
 the King's conduct in a fierce reply to a humble 
 petition for forgiveness, and marched upon 
 Golconda. Some of the counts of this indict- 
 ment are significant of Aurungzib's policy, and 
 its tendency to unite Mussulmans and Hindoos 
 against him, e.g. the King is accused of " placing 
 the reins of authority and government in the 
 
96 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 hands of vile tyrannical infidels " (this refers to 
 the two Hindoo ministers, Madana and Akana) ; 
 " making no distinction between infidelity 
 and Islam," and " waging obstinate war in 
 defence of infidels" (this refers to the aid given 
 to Sivaji) ; and a new grievance of the same kind 
 is now added : "It has lately become known 
 that a lac of pagodas has been sent to the 
 wicked Sambha." 
 
 The final defence of the royal fortress was 
 heroic. The place was amply supplied with 
 arms, ammunition, and food. The garrison 
 fought most gallantly and perseveringly ; they 
 poured upon the assailants an unceasing fire of 
 artillery and small arms ; made bold and fre- 
 quent sallies, repulsing the besiegers, destroying 
 their works, and disputing every step of their 
 advance. The assailants mined ; the assailed 
 countermined, and secretly withdrew or damped 
 the enemies' powder, so that it produced little 
 effect. In other cases the explosion took a 
 wrong direction and overwhelmed the besiegers. 
 " Then," we are told, " great wailing and com- 
 plaints arose from the troops engaged in the 
 siege." The efforts of the defenders were 
 vigorously seconded by their allies the Mah- 
 rattas : 
 
 " The forces of the hell-dog Sambha had come 
 to the assistance of Haidarabad, and, hovering 
 round the Imperial forces, they cut off the 
 supplies of grain." Famine was the result, and 
 
THE SIEGE OF GOLCONDA 97 
 
 its natural consequence, pestilence. An escalade 
 was attempted, but was repulsed. The be- 
 siegers and their works suffered much from a 
 heavy rain; and in their disorder were cut up 
 by another sally, and many were made prisoners. 
 Abul Hasan again tried to negotiate. But the 
 Emperor insisted on his surrendering at dis- 
 cretion, and the struggle was renewed. The 
 long delay kindled the anger of Aurungzib. 
 He called together his officers and chiefs, and, 
 placing himself at about a gun-shot distance 
 from the walls, ordered an assault to be made 
 under his eyes. Prodigies of valour are said 
 to have been exhibited by his army. But a 
 storm of wind and rain arose, and obstructed 
 the progress of the assailants ; and they were 
 forced to fall back, drenched with the torrent. 
 The garrison made another sally, took posses- 
 sion of the trenches, spiked the heavy guns, 
 on the mounting of which immense sums of 
 money and infinite labour had been expended ; 
 and carried away all that was portable. They 
 pulled out of the moat the logs of wood and 
 the many thousands of bags, which had been 
 used to fill it up, and with them repaired the 
 breaches made by the mines. Still the be- 
 siegers persevered. " They cast into the ditches 
 thousands of bags filled with dirt and rubbish, 
 and thousands of carcases of animals and men 
 who had perished during the operations. Several 
 times the valour of the assailants carried them 
 7 
 
98 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 to the top of the walls ; but the watchfulness 
 of the besieged frustrated their efforts, so they 
 threw away their lives in vain, and the fortress 
 remained untaken." 
 
 I have given this rather detailed account 
 of the siege of Golconda because it shows, what 
 the Emperor would not have acknowledged, 
 that if in the comparative integrity of his 
 military power he was so long and completely 
 baffled in his attempts to master a single fortress, 
 the prospect of reducing the long line of fast- 
 nesses that studded the crests of a region most 
 unfavourable to his operations, and exhausting 
 to his soldiers, was not a hopeful one. 
 
 Already, in the lower country, the troops 
 began to murmur, and many, we are told, 
 actually deserted. But, as I have already said, 
 the Emperor did not rely on arms alone. While 
 his inflexible determination told upon the de- 
 fenders, he was busily engaged in playing upon 
 their fears and their hopes, and thus seducing 
 them from their allegiance to a falling cause. 
 Thus, by degrees, he won over many, whom 
 he received gladly into his service. But there 
 was one notable contrast to these traitors. 
 Abdur Razzak, when the place was at last 
 betrayed, and the gates opened, is said to have 
 received more than seventy wounds in a last 
 desperate attempt to oppose the entrance of 
 the enemy. The Emperor, whether from genuine 
 admiration, or desirous to attach to himself so 
 
SAMBAJI, SON, AND MINISTER CAPTURED 99 
 
 valiant and steadfast a man, sent two surgeons, 
 a European and a Hindoo, to attend him, and 
 said that " if Abul Hasan had possessed one 
 more servant devoted like Abdur Razzak, it 
 would have taken much longer to subdue the 
 fortress." The hero did recover, and after an 
 interval did enter the Imperial service. The 
 conquered King behaved with great dignity. 
 He was courteously received, and pensioned ; 
 but consigned, like his Bijapur compeer, to 
 the strong fortress of Dowlatabad. And his 
 dominions became, as in the other case, an 
 Imperial province (1687) ; destined, however, 
 to be soon again virtually detached, and 
 appropriated by Nizam-ul-Mulk. 
 
 As I intimated above, pestilence had already 
 assailed the Imperial army. This, owing, no 
 doubt, to the disturbed state of the country 
 and the consequent scarcity, now spread over 
 the Dekkan, where it seems to have been closely 
 conterminous with the theatre of war ; and it 
 lasted eight years (1683-1691). The Imperial 
 army suffered severely from it ; the mortality 
 was enormous, and numberless victims lay 
 uncared for and unburied. 
 
 The Emperor, now free to devote his whole 
 attention to the Mahrattas, conceived new hopes 
 of success from a remarkable achievement, the 
 kidnapping of their new Raja. His best policy 
 would probably have been to leave Sambaji, 
 for the time, severely alone, as an objective; 
 
100 AURUNGZIB'S CONQUESTS IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 to repel Mahratta raids ; but to trust to the 
 internal dissensions of his enemies, provoked 
 by Sambaji's character and the ascendancy of 
 Kaloosha, whom he had made his minister ; 
 and to have fomented the strife by his intrigues 
 and bribery. But an enterprising officer pro- 
 posed a coup de main, which was approved, and 
 was successful in its immediate object. 
 
 The Raja and his favourite, instead of 
 attending to the business of government, had 
 retired to a secluded glen, and, in fancied security, 
 devoted themselves to untimely and questionable 
 enjoyments. Mukarrab Khan, an old servant 
 of the Golconda King, made a sudden dash into 
 the mountain region, and surprised and captured 
 the Raja, his young son, and his minister, 
 and conveyed them all to the Emperor's head- 
 quarters. When they were brought into his 
 presence, Aurungzib descended from his throne, 
 and thrice made solemn obeisance to Heaven, 
 in thankful recognition of the favour vouchsafed 
 him. This the fettered minister flippantly inter- 
 preted to his master as an involuntary homage 
 to the majesty of the Raja. And, desperate of 
 obtaining mercy, both vied in scurrilous abuse 
 of the Emperor and his religon. He was urged 
 to spare them, not in clemency, but from policy, 
 that is, on condition of Sambaji's surrendering 
 his forts. But Aurungzib preferred to inflict 
 signal and exceptional vengeance upon them 
 for their personal outrage on himself, and their 
 
SAMBA JI PUT TO DEATH WlTti TORTURE l*6r 
 
 blasphemies against his religion. But in putting 
 them to death he also had a politic object, in 
 which, as so often, he quite miscalculated. " The 
 Emperor," says Khafi Khan, " was in favour 
 of seizing the opportunity of getting rid of these 
 prime movers of the strife, and hoped that with 
 a little exertion their fortresses would be reduced " 
 (1689). Accordingly, " their tongues were cut 
 out, their eyes torn out, and they were put to 
 death with a variety of tortures." " Such," 
 concludes the historian, " is the retribution for 
 rebellious, violent, oppressive evil-doers" (p. 341). 
 The one-sided naivete of this sententious moral 
 is rather amusing. But another observation 
 of the same writer is more to the point. " It 
 was," he says, " the will of God that the stock 
 of this turbulent family should not be rooted 
 out of the Dakhin, and that King Aurungzeb 
 should spend the rest of his life in the work of 
 repressing them and taking their fortresses." 
 
 Whether, degenerate as he was, Sambaji 
 would have consented to save his life on the 
 proposed condition, had the Emperor been per- 
 suaded to forego his cruel vengeance, and simply 
 imprison him, may be doubted. But that Aur- "* 
 ungzib thus deliberately preferred a brutal 
 revenge to a possible chance of mastering the 
 Mahratta base, is clear. 
 
VIII 
 
 THE MAHRATTA WAR OF 
 INDEPENDENCE 
 
 THE Emperor counted the more on the effect 
 of Sambaji's removal, inasmuch as he had in his 
 hands his victim's young son and titular suc- 
 cessor in the Rajaship, who might prove a useful 
 hostage, and facilitate the submission of the 
 acephalous bandits. But once more his state- 
 craft was at fault, from his inability to realise 
 the situation, the disposition and sentiments, 
 the inflexible resolution, the versatile military 
 ability, of his despised enemies, and the im- 
 mense advantage which nature and art had 
 together conferred upon them in their mountain 
 base. 
 
 Moreover, the circumstances of Sambaji's 
 death intensified the spirit of resistance. In his 
 last hours he had in Mahratta estimation done 
 much to redeem his personal vices and his 
 political imbecility. He had died in the asser- 
 tion of his religion and the denunciation of 
 the False Prophet, and might be regarded 
 as a martyr to Hindooism ; and his blood, as 
 usual, was the seed of what I may venture to 
 
RAM RAJA ASSUMES THE REGENCY 103 
 
 call, by analogy, his Church. Thus love of 
 plunder and warlike enterprise, a sense of 
 growing influence and power in the lowlands, 
 attachment to their familiar and well-guarded 
 mountain haunts, a passionate spirit of inde- 
 pendence, and last, but not least, zeal for their 
 own religion and profound animosity to Aurung- 
 zib's cold-blooded and cruel persecution of its 
 professors, combined to sustain their resistance, 
 and completely baffle the Emperor's calculations. 
 Aurungzib now advanced to the vicinity of 
 Bijapur, and there encamped, to be at hand 
 for the contemplated attack on the Mahratta 
 country. But there he learned that, so far from 
 yielding, the enemy were preparing to take the 
 offensive. Sambaji's brother, Ram Raja, had 
 assumed the regency, pending his nephew's 
 captivity. Large forces were mustering in the 
 hills, and were to be employed in invading the 
 lowlands and assailing such mountain fast- 
 nesses as had been reduced by the Moguls. 
 Parnala was thus retaken, with much less 
 difficulty than had been experienced in master- 
 ing it. Indeed, already Imperial officers began 
 to quail before the Mahratta onslaught. Thus 
 Rajgurh was now tamely surrendered on capitu- 
 lation by its Mogul commandant, though a 
 force was hastening to its relief. And, in 
 breach of the terms, he was despoiled, and 
 sneaked into headquarters at night in a pitiable 
 condition. Elsewhere also, the Hindoo reaction 
 
104 THE MAHRATTA WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
 was in progress. The Rajputs were not recon- 
 ciled. And now, between them and the 
 Mahrattas, another Hindoo people, destined to 
 play a considerable part in the final drama of 
 Imperial dissolution the Jats, were stirring, 
 and had already, near Agra, attacked an Im- 
 perial convoy en route, and slain the officer in 
 command of it. The Emperor was so indignant 
 at the failure of his Viceroy to keep this people 
 in order, that he removed him, and replaced 
 him by Bidar Bakht, his grandson. 
 
 His increasing animosity to the Hindoos 
 was signified by a new edict of social intolerance. 
 No Hindoo was to ride in a palki, or on a horse, 
 without special permission. This restriction 
 may, however, have been partly intended to 
 check seditious gatherings. 
 
 Meanwhile, the energy and assurance of the 
 new Regent were shown in his marching com- 
 pletely across the peninsula to the relief of 
 Gingee, in the Carnatic Plain (where Sivaji had 
 acquired territory in his later years), which 
 was now besieged by Zulfikar Khan, one of 
 the ablest Imperial generals. Ram Raja was 
 well served in his absence, and the campaign 
 proved most disastrous and dispiriting to the 
 Imperialists. Two gallant and skilful officers, 
 trained by Sivaji, Santaji Ghorepuray and 
 Dhunaji Jadu, distinguished themselves by their 
 activity and boldness, repeatedly defeated the 
 Imperial commanders, thoroughly cowed their 
 
SUCCESS OF THE MAHRATTA TACTICS 105 
 
 spirits, frequently captured them, and charac- 
 teristically released them on the payment of 
 heavy ransom. The candid Mahometan historian 
 makes the fullest admissions on this subject. 
 Thus he says of Santaji : 
 
 tc Every one who encountered him was either 
 killed or wounded and made prisoner ; or if 
 any one did escape it was with his mere life, 
 with the loss of his army and baggage. Nothing 
 could be done, for wherever the accursed dog 
 went, and threatened an attack, there was no 
 Imperial amir bold enough to resist him, and 
 every loss inflicted on their forces made the 
 boldest warriors quake " (p. 347). And he pro- 
 ceeds to exemplify this remarkable testimony 
 by citing the successive overthrow and capture 
 of three officers ; the first of whom, he says, 
 " was accounted one of the bravest and most 
 skilful warriors of the Dakhin " ; and the second, 
 ;t the Rustam of the time, and as brave as a lion." 
 
 To these exploits in the Dekkan, the same 
 heroic partisan soon added another decisive 
 defeat of the Imperial generals on the distant 
 border of the Carnatic. 
 
 Aurungzib's reception of these repeated evil 
 tidings was characteristic. " He was," says 
 Khafi Khan, " greatly distressed, but in public 
 he said that the creature could do nothing, for 
 everything was in the hands of God." Fatalism 
 is a poor consolation to a would-be conqueror, 
 unless he is sure that Providence is on the side 
 
106 THE MAHRATTA WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
 of the strong battalions, and that those battalions 
 are his own ! 
 
 For a time the stress of the war centred in 
 the siege of Gingee. This was the place, the 
 capture of which, in the course of one night, 
 established Bussy's reputation in Dupleix's time. 
 But the Imperialists now blockaded it unsuccess- 
 fully for several years. They seem to have 
 had no heart or confidence to attempt the 
 Frenchman's bold operation. They did not even 
 completely invest the place. After a while, 
 the blockaders were themselves blockaded ; the 
 neighbouring population was hostile to them, 
 and joined the Mahrattas, who (we are told) 
 " surrounded the royal army on all sides, and 
 showed great audacity in cutting off supplies. 
 Sometimes they burst unexpectedly into an 
 entrenchment, doing great damage to the works, 
 and causing great confusion in the besieging 
 force." The garrisons also stoutly defended 
 themselves, being well armed and provisioned ; 
 and co-operated zealously with their friends 
 without. But this was not the worst. Internal 
 dissensions sprung up among the besiegers, 
 and reached a very dangerous. climax. Zulfikar 
 Khan was the working head of the army, and 
 acted independently of the Emperor's son, 
 Prince Kam Bakhsh, who was also present, 
 and wished his authority to be recognised. 
 Mortified at his subordinate position, he entered 
 into communications with the enemy, and, 
 
GINGEE SURRENDERED BY COLLUSION 10T 
 
 according to Khafi Khan, was actually " on the 
 point of going over to them"! Zulfikar Khan 
 and his supporters, availing themselves of the 
 pretext that they could not take the Emperor's 
 orders, as the Mahrattas had intercepted all com- 
 munication with him, and that the Prince was 
 meditating treason, took the strong step of 
 placing him in arrest. At this crisis, the redoubt- 
 able Santaji arrived on the scene. Whereupon 
 the Imperialists hastily broke up the siege, and 
 retired, skirmishing, into the neighbouring hills. 
 
 At length a show was made of resuming 
 the blockade. But this seems to have been a 
 mere feint to cover the fact that a bargain had 
 been struck, and Gingee, like other places later, 
 fell by bribery (1698). This is suavely intimated 
 by Khafi Khan : " According to report, a sum 
 of money reached the enemy, and they evacuated 
 the fortress and retired." 
 
 The Emperor's perplexity and mortification 
 on this occasion were extreme. The long dura- 
 tion of the blockade, the frequent reverses of 
 his arms in the prosecution of it, the unsatis- 
 factory mode of its eventual acquisition, the 
 high-handed action of his generals, and the 
 ambiguous conduct and public arraignment and 
 disgrace of his son, affected him greatly. He 
 coldly commended the generals ; but he released 
 the Prince, to whom he was much attached, 
 and bore a grudge against his accusers. 
 
 Santaji meanwhile was pursuing his brilliant 
 
108 THE MAHRATTA WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
 and terror- striking career in the Dekkan. His 
 destruction of an Imperial army under Kasim 
 Khan, one of Aurungzib's best generals, was 
 not only so serious a blow, but affords so char- 
 acteristic an example of Mahratta tactics, that 
 I would fain describe it in detail. But the 
 closing scene will suffice. After being sur- 
 rounded, and having tried in vain to cut 
 through the swarming and resolute host, the 
 Moguls fought their way to a fort Danderi. 
 "There," says Khafi Khan, "for a month they 
 were besieged within the four walls, and every 
 day affairs grew worse with them. They were 
 compelled to kill and eat their baggage [horses] 
 and riding horses, which were themselves nearly 
 starved. . . . The stores of grain were exhausted. 
 . . . To escape from starvation many men threw 
 themselves from the walls, and trusted to the 
 enemy's mercy. . . . Reverses, disease, deficiency 
 of water, and want of grain reduced the garrison 
 to the verge of death. Kasim Khan, according 
 to report, in despair poisoned himself " (p. 356). 
 
 After his death, the other officers were 
 similarly affected, and ransomed themselves for 
 the large sum of seven lacs of rupees, equivalent 
 to 70,000. Then they were allowed to steal 
 away, each with his horse and the clothes he 
 wore, but not without giving good security for 
 the payment of the ransom. The historian 
 adds : " The Government and personal property 
 lost during this war [i.e. Santaji's struggle with 
 
SANTAJI GHOREPURAY MURDERED 109 
 
 Kasim] and siege exceeded fifty or sixty lacs of 
 rupees." Hence we may appreciate the ruinous 
 drain on the public and private resources of the 
 Empire caused by the incessant wear and tear 
 of the protracted War of Mahratta Independence. 
 
 Himmut Khan and another Imperial general 
 had marched to relieve the blockaded force. 
 But they were lured into an ambush, and cut off 
 by the same gallant and wily leader. 
 
 This, however, was Santaji's last achieve- 
 ment. He was unpopular on account of his 
 strict discipline and severe punishments. And 
 he was basely assassinated by some of his own 
 people, apparently with the connivance, if not 
 at the instigation, of his rival, Dhunaji Jadu, 
 who is said to have been actuated by jealousy. 
 Santaji's family long continued estranged from 
 the Mahratta Confederacy, though they con- 
 tinued to harass the Moguls. I may mention 
 incidentally that the Morari Rao, who joined Clive 
 in the defence of Arcot, was a descendant of the 
 murdered Champion of Mahratta Independence. 
 
 The Imperialists were overjoyed at the tid- 
 ings of Santaji's death. But there was no lack 
 of men to take his place and carry on his work. 
 A Sindia now appears on the scene, and a 
 transaction in which he was concerned further 
 illustrates the tendency of the war to impoverish 
 the Empire, enrich the Mahrattas, and establish 
 corrupt relations with them among the Emperor's 
 own generals. 
 
110 THE MAHRATTA WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
 The Mahratta officer, with eight thousand 
 horse, was raiding in the neighbourhood of 
 Nundarbar, and demanded chout from the city. 
 But the inhabitants refused to pay it, and closed 
 their gates, which, we are told " greatly annoyed 
 the Mahrattas." Already they began to consider 
 it a right, and expected compliance. Husain 
 Ali Khan, an Imperial general, ventured to 
 encounter them with an inferior force, and, as 
 usual, was surrounded and worsted. He was 
 wounded and made prisoner, together with all 
 his men and equipage. As usual also, he was 
 held to ransom. But, unable to make up the 
 whole sum, he asked the bankers and merchants 
 to lend him the balance, which they declined 
 to do. Thus he and his captors had each a 
 grievance against the place, and accordingly 
 came to an agreement to avenge themselves, 
 to their common profit. Husain surrendered 
 the city to the Mahrattas, who extorted a vast 
 contribution from the rich men, and, besides 
 foregoing the balance of the ransom, handed 
 over a sum much exceeding it to Husain himself. 
 When Mogul officers, instead of defending, thus 
 took to betraying, their charge, and sharing 
 the spoils of the enemy, the decay of trade, the 
 neglect of industry, and the reinforcement of the 
 Mahrattas by those who objected to be not only 
 unprotected but doubly fleeced, are intelligible. 
 
 While thus defeat and humiliation attended 
 the Imperial armies, the open country was 
 
THE FLOODS FIGHT AGAINST THE MOGULS 111 
 
 ravaged, agriculture discouraged, famine and 
 pestilence propagated, the towns insecurely 
 defended, and their inhabitants exposed to 
 arbitrary exactions the very elements seemed 
 to combine against the Moguls. The royal 
 camp was pitched near the Bhima River. A 
 terrible flood suddenly submerged it, and created 
 a general panic ; and the wear and tear, and 
 consequent increasing aversion to the war in 
 the Imperial army, may be understood from what 
 happened on this occasion, which is given only 
 as a sample of a series of similar catastrophes. 
 " The waters," says the historian, " began to 
 overflow at midnight, when all the world was 
 asleep. The floods carried off about ten thousand 
 or twelve thousand men, with the establish- 
 ments of the King, and the Princes' and the 
 amirs' horses, bullocks, and cattle in countless 
 numbers, tents and furniture beyond all count. 
 Great fear fell on all the army." 
 
 The Emperor, in spite of his fatalism, 
 appealed to Heaven for deliverance. " The 
 King," continues Khafi Khan, " wrote out 
 prayers with his own hand, and ordered them to 
 be thrown into the water, for the purpose of 
 causing it to subside." But his suppliant charms 
 were as ineffectual to arrest the course of 
 nature as his arms to stem the human tide of 
 war which he had provoked, and which Provi- 
 dence had decreed was to undermine and sub- 
 merge his Empire. 
 
IX 
 
 AURUNGZIB UNDERTAKES TO MASTER 
 THE MAHRATTA BASE. THE MAH- 
 RATTAS RETALIATE BY SETTLING IN 
 THE DEKKAN IMPERIAL PROVINCES 
 
 NEARLY forty years had now elapsed since 
 Sivaji had first come into collision with the 
 Moguls, and nearly twenty since, after his 
 death, Aurungzib had undertaken the super- 
 intendence of the war in the Dekkan. He had 
 conquered Bijapur and Golconda; he had 
 put Sambaji to death, and still detained his 
 son and heir in mild durance at his military 
 Court. He had, from time to time, gained 
 advantages over the Mahrattas in the field ; 
 and by assault, treachery, or bribery, had ob- 
 tained possession of some of their strongholds. 
 He had, moreover, pushed his operations into 
 the Carnatic Plain, and Gingee, a most important 
 cluster of fortresses (for there were three, on 
 as many contiguous hills) in the centre of the 
 province, was in his hands. The most formidable 
 champion of Mahratta Independence since Sivaji, 
 the redoubted Santaji Ghorepuray, was no 
 more ; and the aged Emperor's determination 
 
AURUNGZIB'S NEW PLAN OF THE WAR 113 
 
 to subdue the obstinate rabble of infidels was 
 as inflexible as ever. 
 
 Yet he could not but realise that his fixed 
 purpose had hitherto been signally foiled ; that 
 matters were growing worse daily ; that cam- 
 paigning in the open country had proved a 
 miserable failure ; that there his regular armies 
 were no match for the agile and indefatigable 
 swarms of light horsemen, thoroughly acquainted 
 with the country, and aided by the sympathy 
 and co-operation of its Hindoo inhabitants, as 
 well as of more primitive tribes from the wilder 
 districts on its confines. If the plague was 
 to be stayed, a more drastic remedy must be 
 applied. If the devastating torrent was to 
 be arrested, it must be cut off or dammed up 
 at its source. In plain terms, the plan of the 
 war must be changed. A comprehensive and 
 resolute effort must be made, by concentrating 
 the bulk of the Imperial force in a systematic 
 attack on the enemy's base the strong and 
 almost impregnable region of the Ghats, to 
 reduce the whole chain of forts in that quarter, 
 and to overpower the Mahrattas in their mountain 
 home. That the experiment, even if feasible, 
 was a desperate one, will appear even from the 
 simile I have used. Most of the Dekkan rivers 
 rise in the Ghats. And were it possible to 
 arrest their flow thence, the Dekkan would be 
 reduced to a desert. But very different was 
 
 the case with the tide of insurrection that now 
 
 8 
 
114 AURUNGZIB AND THE MAHRATTA BASE 
 
 overspread it. That tide was swollen by the 
 forces of local anarchy, which had their source 
 in the heart of the Dekkan itself ; and which 
 the reduction of Bijapur and Golconda had 
 liberated and multiplied. A large part of the 
 population, doubly oppressed and suffering from 
 the recently established tyranny of the Mogul 
 Government, and the ravages and claim to 
 chout of the Mahrattas, preferred to abandon 
 their homes and join the invaders. Civil society 
 was, in fact, breaking up, and a state of things 
 supervening, analogous to that of Central India, 
 when the studiously non-intervention policy 
 pursued by Wellesley's successors stimulated 
 the mushroom growth of the Pindari bands. 
 
 Thus, even had the Mahratta base been 
 effectually mastered, the Dekkan would still 
 have remained unsubdued and unpacified. But, 
 as we shall see, it was not mastered, though 
 many forts fell, more with the aid of the golden 
 key than by force of arms. 
 
 However, the Emperor set to work in earnest 
 (1698). He rapidly and strongly entrenched 
 his headquarters, and there deposited his family 
 of ladies and their attendants ; issued strict 
 orders that his officers should follow his example, 
 and forbade his soldiers to take their wives 
 or children with them. But his orders were 
 very imperfectly obeyed. 
 
 Ram Raja, the Mahratta Regent, on the 
 approach of the Imperial army, attempted to 
 
OBSTINATE DEFENCE OF SATARA 115 
 
 divert it by making a raid into Berar, in concert 
 with the Raja of Deogarh. This chief had 
 joined the Emperor, and had professed to 
 become a Mussulman ; but he now deserted 
 him and fled, renounced Islam, and turned 
 filibuster a good illustration of the temper of 
 the time among the Hindoos, which was sweeping 
 high and low into the vortex of anarchy. But 
 Aurungzib was not to be diverted from his 
 purpose, and Satara was promptly invested. 
 It made a desperate resistance, and four months 
 were spent in vain efforts to reduce it. " The 
 garrison," says the historian, " rolled down 
 great stones, which . . . crushed many men and 
 animals. The rain obstructed the arrival of 
 corn ; the enemy were very daring in attacking 
 the convoys, and the country for twenty kos 
 round the fortress had been burnt, so that 
 grain and hay became very scarce and dear." 
 The Moguls, like natives in general, were never 
 expert in siege operations. Akbar himself lay 
 before Chitore, the old capital of Oudipur, for 
 years ; and even Hyder Ali was no exception 
 to the statement, though he took many places 
 by treachery and corruption of the commandants. 
 On this occasion the besiegers exploded one 
 mine with good effect, but suffered severely from 
 a second operation of the same kind. Khafi 
 Khan says : "A portion of the rock above was 
 blown up, but ... it came down on the heads 
 of the besiegers like a mountain of destruction, 
 
116 AURUNGZIB AND THE MAHRATTA BASE 
 
 and several thousands were buried under it. ... 
 The garrison then set about repairing the walls, 
 and they again opened fire, and rolled down 
 the life-destroying stones. When Aurungzib 
 was informed of the disaster, and of the despond- 
 ency of his men, he ... mounted his horse, and 
 went to the scene of action, as if in search 
 of death" Such are the significant words of 
 the historian, whose sympathies were strongly 
 against the Mahrattas. And he goes on to de- 
 scribe the passionate but utterly futile attempts 
 of the Emperor to reanimate his drooping 
 soldiers, and induce them to renew the assault. 
 And he concludes : " When he perceived that 
 his words made no impression on the men, he 
 was desirous to lead the way himself, but the 
 nobles objected to this rash proposition." So 
 despondent and disgusted were the soldiers, 
 that they actually set fire to the besieging 
 works, which (we are told) " had been con- 
 structed at great trouble and expense," and 
 which are said to have burned brightly for a 
 week ! 
 
 But a sudden and unexpected event seemed 
 to have changed the whole situation. Ram 
 Raja, like his father, on his return from his 
 raid in the north, had abruptly expired, leaving 
 only infant sons. His widow, Tara Bai, in 
 turn, assumed the Regency. On these tidings, 
 says Khafi Khan, " the Emperor ordered the 
 drums of rejoicing to be beaten, and the 
 
TARA BAI ASSUMES THE REGENCY 117 
 
 soldiers congratulated each other, saying that 
 another prime mover in the strife was removed, 
 and that it would not be difficult to overcome 
 two young children and a helpless woman." 
 But never did men miscalculate more. Tara 
 Bai was a woman of remarkable ability, energy, 
 and determination, and in the end proved 
 herself quite equal to the emergency. 
 
 But, for the moment, the death of her 
 husband undoubtedly much depressed the 
 Mahrattas, while it reanimated the Moguls. 
 And how much this was the case may be esti- 
 mated by the extraordinary fact that, after so 
 long and stoutly holding his own, the panic- 
 stricken commandant of Satara not only sur- 
 rendered the fortress, but actually entered the 
 Imperial service. 
 
 But the adjacent fort of Parli held out for 
 six weeks longer, the garrison displaying great 
 valour, and inflicting much loss on the besiegers, 
 who also suffered severely from the weather 
 and the cutting off of their supplies. At last, 
 however, they reduced the place ; and this 
 arduous campaign came to an end. Half a 
 year had been spent in achieving a Pyrrhus 
 victory. A few more such, and Aurungzib 
 would be undone. 
 
 The circumstances just related will sufficiently 
 illustrate the arduous, tardy, and indecisive 
 character of the Emperor's attempt to conquer 
 the Mahratta base. A detailed narrative of his 
 
118 AURUNGZIB AND THE MAHRATTA BASE 
 
 persistent operations during the next four years 
 would be tedious and unprofitable, and would 
 involve the repetition of obstacles, misadventures, 
 and military grievances similar to those already 
 given. I shall, therefore, only notice summarily 
 the general features and abortive result of this 
 last experiment of subjugation. 
 
 It was not without difficulty and much 
 suffering that, in the face of the active enemy, 
 and while the monsoon was still raging, the 
 army accomplished its retreat to the Dekkan. 
 The difficulty of transport, which afterwards 
 so sorely hampered the English in their early 
 wars in India, and which was never well over- 
 come until the future Duke of Wellington 
 devised and applied an effectual remedy, beset 
 the Moguls at every stage. The crossing of the 
 flooded rivers was always a serious difficulty, 
 and generally attended by great casualties. 
 Numbers were drowned, numbers were cut off 
 by the vigilant and daring pursuers : " thou- 
 sands," says Khafi Khan, " remained behind 
 and died." On one occasion it took seventeen 
 days to pass the Kistna. Even when the 
 monsoon was over, and the army was recruiting, 
 in fancied security, on the banks of the Man, 
 an untimely deluge of rain in the hills flooded 
 the river ; and the waters, pouring into the 
 camp, " caused confusion and distress which 
 defy description." The army, under the accu- 
 mulated hardships and dangers of the situation, 
 
FAILURE OF AURUNGZIB'S NEW PLAN 119 
 
 lost all power of expeditious marching, and 
 dragged itself painfully along, only to find 
 itself too late for its immediate object. Thus 
 on one occasion it took twelve days to reach 
 what ought to have been gained in two. On 
 another it took seven weeks to march twenty- 
 eight miles i.e. little more, on an average, than 
 half a mile a day ! And this, while the Mahrattas 
 were incredibly active and expeditious in all 
 directions. 
 
 From time to time forts were reduced. But 
 it was almost always after a prolonged invest- 
 ment, and not by siege or storm, but by system- 
 atic and lavish bribery. Many instances are 
 given ; but, as if weary of details, the historian 
 at last makes the following naif and remarkable 
 statement, putting, you will observe, the best, 
 but that a very sorry face, on the transaction. 
 His eulogistic apology, indeed, reads like sly 
 satire. " The clemency and long-suffering and 
 care of the Emperor were such, that when he 
 ascertained that several fortresses had been 
 long and vigorously besieged and that the 
 garrisons were in difficulty, he paid sums of 
 money to the commandants, and so got the 
 forts into his possession. It often happened 
 also that he gave the same sum of money, 
 neither more nor less, to the officer conducting 
 the siege." This was certainly a peculiar pro- 
 ceeding, and not calculated to economise his 
 fast-vanishing resources ! And the same writer 
 
120 THE MAHRATTAS SETTLE IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 mentions, as a notable exception, that Torna 
 was actually taken by assault ; " not," he adds, 
 " like the other forts by negotiations with the 
 commandants, and promises of material advance- 
 ment." Meanwhile the antipathy to the irk- 
 some and humiliating service grew more pro- 
 nounced in the army, especially among the 
 officers. 
 
 The Emperor was perplexed and embarrassed 
 by " the irresolution of his amirs, who pined for 
 ease, and complained of the dearness of grain, 
 and the insalubrity of the climate, and by the 
 grumbling of the . . . hard-tried soldiers." On 
 the whole, it was too evident that this last 
 plan also had failed, and that the end was near. 
 
 That end, the complete collapse of Aurung- 
 zib's design of conquering the Mahrattas, is 
 vividly illustrated in a remarkable passage of 
 the historian to whom I am so much indebted 
 for the materials of my narrative. For it dis- 
 closes unmistakably the irresistible progress of 
 the insidious and mighty tide of Hindoo reaction, 
 the practical subversion of the Imperial auth- 
 ority, and the establishment, within the territory 
 of the Empire, of a Mahratta dominion, crude, 
 barbarous, and grasping, but the natural conse- 
 quence, and in logical language the inseparable 
 accident, of the struggle which had initiated it, 
 and which was destined to exhibit a terrible 
 vitality and expansive power in the near future. 
 Long as it is, this passage is well worth quoting 
 
KHAFI KHAN'S EVIDENCE OF FAILURE 121 
 
 with little abridgment, as a luminous picture of 
 a great historical catastrophe, and as indisput- 
 able evidence that that catastrophe was the out- 
 come of Aurungzib's impolicy, encountered and 
 baffled by the creative and stimulating genius 
 of his originally despised antagonist " the 
 mountain rat," as Aurungzib had contemptuously 
 called him. 
 
 " When Ram Raja died, leaving only widows 
 and infants, men thought that the power of the 
 Mahrattas over the Dakhin was at an end. But 
 Tara Bai, the elder wife, made her son of three 
 years old successor to his father, and took the 
 reins of government into her own hands. She 
 took vigorous measures for ravaging the Imperial 
 territory, and sent armies to plunder the six 
 subas of the Dakhin as far as Sironj, Mandisor, 
 and the suba of Malwa. She won the hearts of 
 her officers, and for all the struggles and schemes, 
 the campaigns and sieges of Aurungzeb up to 
 the end of his reign, the power of the Mahrattas 
 increased day by day. By hard fighting, by 
 the expenditure of the vast treasures accumu- 
 lated by Shah Jehan, and by the sacrifice of 
 many thousands of men, he had penetrated 
 into their wretched country, had subdued their 
 lofty forts, and had driven them from house and 
 home ; still the daring of the Mahrattas in- 
 creased, and they penetrated into the old terri- 
 tories of the Imperial throne, plundering and 
 destroying wherever they went." 
 
122 THE MAHRATTAS SETTLE IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 Thus far he has shown how the Mahrattas 
 retaliated the attack on their base by an offensive 
 war on the Imperial territory in the Dekkan. 
 But he next proceeds to show that so far from 
 being mere plunderers and destroyers, they had 
 also a constructive policy, still more fatal to the 
 integrity of the Empire : how they deliberately 
 and systematically instituted and maintained 
 an authoritative fiscal establishment of their 
 own in the Imperial territory ; and so, like the 
 fabled vampire, sucked the blood out of the 
 body of their victim, and reduced it to inani- 
 tion, while they converted what had been, in the 
 first instance, black-mail, or a composition against 
 simple plunder by violence, into an established 
 and regularly enforced plan of political taxation, 
 as it was familiarly regarded in later days. The 
 peculiar interest and importance of the succeed- 
 ing passage is that it well illustrates this transition 
 period in the history of chout the older pro- 
 miscuous demand of it being now generalised, 
 and occasional raids being now superseded by 
 a comprehensive political organisation for the 
 extension of Mahratta authority over the whole 
 country, and securing the permanence of the 
 fiscal extortion the germ and essence of sover- 
 eignty in the East. 
 
 I must observe that the following account 
 of the Mahratta proceedings, though it may 
 anticipate in some respects their mature plan 
 of operations, does not include the elaborate 
 
THE MAHRATTAS SETTLE IN THE EMPIRE 123 
 
 scheme of confederacy, and partition of the 
 profits of exaction, devised by the first notable 
 Peishwa, Balaji Wishwanath. I now conclude 
 Khafi Khan's summary of the result of the War 
 of Mahratta Independence under Aurungzib : 
 
 " In imitation of the Emperor, who, with his 
 army and enterprising amirs, was staying in 
 those distant mountains, the commanders of 
 Tara Bai cast the anchor of permanence wherever 
 they penetrated, and, having appointed revenue 
 collectors, they passed the years and months 
 to their satisfaction, with their wives and children, 
 tents and elephants." [That is, in plain English, 
 they effected a solid lodgment in the Dekkan, 
 instead of simply making occasional incursions 
 into it.] " Their daring went beyond all bounds. 
 They divided all the districts among themselves, 
 and, following the practice of the Imperial rule, 
 they appointed their provincial governors, 
 revenue-collectors, and toll-collectors." 
 
 Here the narrator passes from the origin to 
 the consummation of this plan of establishing 
 an imperium in imperio in the Mogul territory ; 
 or, in other words, from the past to the present, 
 as it existed when he wrote. 
 
 " Their principal subadar [i.e. provincial 
 governor] is commander of the army. Whenever 
 he hears of a large caravan, he takes six or seven 
 thousand horse, and goes to plunder it [i.e. exact 
 transit duties]. He appoints kamaish-dars [i.e. 
 revenue-collectors] everywhere to collect the 
 
124 THE MAHRATTAS SETTLE IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 chauth, and whenever, from the resistance of 
 the zamindars and faujdars [i.e. the Imperial 
 civil or military officials] the revenue-collector 
 is unable to levy the chauth, he hastens to support 
 him, and besieges and destroys his towns. And 
 the tax-collectors of these evil-doers take from 
 small parties of merchants, who are anxious to 
 obtain security from plunder, a toll upon every 
 cart and bullock, three or four times greater 
 than the amount imposed by the faujdars of 
 the Government. This excess he shares with 
 the corrupt jagirdars and faujdars, and then 
 leaves the road open. In every province he 
 builds one or two forts, which he makes his 
 strongholds, and ravages the country round. 
 The mukaddams, or head men of the villages, with 
 the countenance and co-operation of the infidel 
 [i.e. the Mahratta] subadars, . . . have built forts, 
 and with the aid and assistance of the Mahrattas 
 they make terms with the royal officers as to the 
 payment of their revenues [i.e. instead of paying 
 the Imperial revenue as a matter of course, they 
 higgle over it, and bargain for as little as possible 
 as natives, in such circumstances, know too 
 well how to do]." 
 
 He then returns to the extensive range of 
 the Mahratta incursions : 
 
 " They attack and destroy the country as 
 far as the borders of Ahmadabad and the districts 
 of Malwa, and spread their devastations through 
 the provinces of the Dakhin to the environs of 
 
AURUNGZIB'S FAILURE DOUBLY ATTESTED 125 
 
 Ujjain. They fall upon and plunder large cara- 
 vans within ten or twelve kos of the Imperial 
 camp, and have even had the hardihood to attack 
 the royal treasure." 
 
 And he concludes his account of the result 
 of Aurungzib's last plan of subjugation, the 
 reduction of the fortresses in the Ghats, thus 
 significantly : " The sieges, after all, had no 
 effect in suppressing the daring of the Mahrattas " 
 (pp. 373-375). 
 
 With such evidence, tendered by a servant 
 of Aurungzib, before us, was I wrong in saying 
 that in resolving to engage in this unequal 
 contest, he virtually signed the death-warrant 
 of his Empire ? 
 
 A similar inference, as to the fatal effect of 
 the Emperor's cardinal act of impolicy in his 
 internal administration the reimposition of 
 the jizya, may be drawn from a passage in the 
 protest against it which, when I quoted the 
 writer's general argument, I said I should cite 
 later. After describing in glowing terms the 
 complete political toleration of Akbar, Jehangir, 
 and Shah Jehan, and its happy consequences, 
 he thus proceeds : 
 
 " Such were the benevolent inclinations of 
 your ancestors. Whilst they pursued these 
 great and generous principles, wheresoever they 
 directed their steps, conquest and prosperity 
 went before them ; and there they reduced 
 many countries and fortresses to their obedience. 
 
126 THE MAHRATTAS SETTLE IN THE DEKKAN 
 
 During your majesty's reign, many have been 
 alienated from the empire, and further loss of 
 territory must necessarily follow, since devasta- 
 tion and rapine now universally prevail without 
 rstraint." This evidently refers to the later 
 period of the reign, and proves that Jeswunt 
 Sing could not have been, as Orme thought, 
 the author of this remarkable document. It 
 continues : 
 
 " Your subjects are trampled under foot, 
 and every province of your empire is impover- 
 ished ; depopulation spreads, and difficulties 
 accumulate. When indigence has reached the 
 habitation of the Sovereign, and his princes, 
 what can be the condition of the nobles ? As 
 to the soldiery, they are in murmurs ; the 
 merchants complaining, the Mahomedans dis- 
 contented, the Hindoos destitute, and multitudes 
 of people, wretched even to the want of their 
 nightly meal, are beating their heads throughout 
 the day in rage and desperation " (pp. 253-254). 
 
 This respectable dual testimony, from such 
 
 opposite quarters, can leave little doubt that 
 
 ^Aurungzib was the evil genius, and he and 
 
 Sivaji the joint -underminers of the Mogul 
 
 Empire. Aurungzib died in 1707. 
 
THE EMPEROR BAHADUR SHAH 
 
 ANOTHER war of succession was inevitable on 
 the death of Aurungzib. The character and 
 positions of his sons, and his treatment of them, 
 combined to ensure it. 
 
 The late Emperor had always been very 
 jealous and suspicious of the eldest, successively 
 called Mohammed Moazzam, Shah Alum, and 
 Bahadur Shah ; had degraded, and for several 
 years imprisoned him ; but had afterwards 
 restored him to favour, and sent him to command 
 in the Punjab. The second surviving son, Azam 
 Shah, had counted upon permanently supplant- 
 ing his elder brother ; and having been, while 
 Bahadur Shah was under a cloud, treated as 
 heir to the throne, took it very ill that his elder 
 brother should recover his prospect of the 
 succession. But towards the end of his reign 
 the Emperor showed a marked affection and 
 partiality for the child of his old age, Kam 
 Bakhsh, and so encouraged him to expect to 
 rule over at least a part of the Empire. Whether 
 Aurungzib really, as was asserted, made a will, 
 dividing his dominions between his three sons, 
 
 127 
 
128 THE EMPEROR BAHADUR SHAH 
 
 seems very doubtful. But though the eldest 
 professed, sincerely or not, to believe and be 
 ready to acquiesce in such an arrangement, 
 while he was not at all disposed to forego his 
 claim to the Imperial throne, or to shirk the 
 enforcement of it, if necessary by the sword, 
 neither of the other Princes would hear of a 
 peaceful settlement ; thus a contest ensued in 
 which they both perished, and Shah Alum, or 
 Bahadur Shah, became sole and undisputed 
 Emperor. 
 
 His character presents a complete contrast 
 to that of his predecessor, and seems to have 
 much resembled that of Dara Shukoh, Aurung- 
 zib's unfortunate eldest brother. It is thus 
 sketched by Khafi Khan : 
 
 " For generosity, munificence, boundless 
 good-nature, extenuation of faults, and forgive- 
 ness of offences, very few monarchs have been 
 found equal to Bahadur Shah and especially 
 in the race of Timour. But though he had no 
 vice in his character, such complacency and 
 such negligence were exhibited in the protection 
 of the State, and in the government and manage- 
 ment of the country, that sarcastic people 
 found the date of his accession in the words 
 Shah-i-be-khabr' Heedless King.' " 
 
 There is probably here a good deal of exag- 
 geration, and possibly of misconception. For, 
 accustomed to his father's strict and meddle- 
 some policy, public opinion was probably too 
 
. 
 
 AHADUR'S CHARACTER AND POLICY 129 
 
 exacting, and hardly made allowance not only 
 for his acquired distaste for such a regime, 
 from which he had suffered much, but for a 
 deliberate and benevolent attempt to heal the 
 wounds of the lacerated Empire by a forbearing 
 and tolerant policy. Aurungzib had been a 
 sunni zealot. But Bahadur, like Dara, was not 
 orthodox, though he did not go so far in hetero- 
 doxy as his uncle. He made a shia innovation 
 in the ritual, and thereby occasioned serious 
 disturbance ; but, after much petitioning and 
 discussion, the Emperor gave way, and restored 
 the old formula. His chief supporter and 
 favourite minister, Munim Khan, was addicted 
 to the Sufi mysticism, and wrote a book which 
 was held to be unsound. Another indication of 
 Bahadur's liberal tendencies in religious matters 
 is his invitation to Govind, the Sikh guru, 
 and his admission of him into his service. 
 
 Banda's revolt compelled him to authorise 
 strong measures against the Sikhs ; for their 
 ferocities were manifest, and their renewed and 
 unprovoked rebellion was a real and serious 
 political danger. Bahadur, again, accepted the 
 submission of the Rajputs ; and, had he lived 
 longer, they would probably have been sincerely 
 reconciled, for a time at least, to the Imperial 
 authority. I cannot find that the edict for the 
 imposition of the jizya was formally rescinded. 
 But from its re-enactment in a later reign, as 
 well as from the nature of the case, there can, 
 9 
 
130 THE EMPEROR BAHADUR SHAH 
 
 I think, be no doubt that it remained a dead 
 letter under Bahadur. In Oudipur it was 
 formally abolished, as appears from a treaty 
 between the Emperor and the Rana, the text 
 of which is given by Colonel Tod, and one article 
 of which is to the above effect. But his most 
 remarkable and considerable measures of con- 
 ciliation were his concessions to the Mahrattas. 
 To these I shall revert later, in tracing the 
 development of the power of that people. But 
 I may at once say now, that these, however 
 well meant, were too characteristic of the 
 designation of him as " Heedless King." For 
 they were quite inconsistent, not only with the 
 authority of the Emperor, as supreme in the 
 Dekkan Provinces, but with the practical in- 
 tegrity of the Empire in that quarter, and a 
 powerful stimulus to Mahratta ambition in 
 Hindostan. The latter point, however, at least, 
 he possibly failed to appreciate. 
 
 Zulfikar Khan, whom I have already men- 
 tioned, was one of Aurungzib's most distin- 
 guished and influential generals. He was, when 
 that Emperor died, with Azarn Shah. And 
 Khafi Khan says that he " was very intimate 
 with Sahu, or Shao, the grandson and right heir 
 of Sivaji, and had long been interested in his 
 affairs." Shao was in the custody of Azam 
 Shah, and Zulfikar persuaded Azam to release 
 him, probably hoping that Shao's influence with 
 the Mahrattas might be exerted in Azam's 
 
BAHADUR'S CONCESSIONS TO MAHRATTAS 131 
 
 favour in his forthcoming contest for the 
 throne. Shao lost no time in mustering sup- 
 porters among his tribesmen, and was soon 
 re-established as Raja, and at the head of a 
 considerable army. Zulfikar, now in the service 
 of the victor, Bahadur Shah, and Subadar of 
 the Dekkan, still favoured him, and backed his 
 application to the easy-going Emperor for "a 
 firman conferring on Sahu the sur-deshmuki l 
 and the chout of the six subas of the Dakhin," on 
 condition of " restoring prosperity to the ruined 
 land." But, while Sahu had been secluded in 
 the Imperial Court, Tara Bai, as I have related, 
 had vigorously maintained the Mahratta War 
 of Independence after the death of her husband, 
 Ram Raja, and on behalf of her young son, 
 the Raja of Kolapore. She now also, favoured 
 by Munim Khan, the Khan Khanan and Zul- 
 fikar 's rival, petitioned for a firman, in the 
 name of her son, granting the sur-deshmuki 
 over the same subas, and on the same pledge 
 to abandon war and restore order in the country. 
 "The King," says Khafi Khan, "in his extreme 
 good-nature, had resolved in his heart that he 
 would not reject the petition of any one." He 
 was sorely perplexed by the counter-applica- 
 tions, but decided to grant both petitions. 
 But Shao, supported by Zulfikar, and his better 
 title, prevailed in the end, as the importance 
 
 1 This new impost was one-tenth of the revenue, levied from 
 theory ots directly. 
 
132 THE EMPEROR BAHADUR SHAH 
 
 of Kolapore rapidly declined, and Munim Khan 
 soon after died. 
 
 Such was the legalised ground of the per- 
 sistent pretension of the Mahrattas to levy 
 both chout and sur-deshmuki in the Dekkan, 
 which at a later period was extended to the 
 other provinces of the Empire by an extorted 
 grant from Mohammad Shah. 
 
 On the whole, I cannot but think that 
 Bahadur's character and policy have been mis- 
 understood ; and that, however inferior to his 
 father in attention to business, firmness of 
 purpose, and awe-inspiring majesty, and though 
 unquestionably lavish to a vicious and dangerous 
 extent, he was yet a Prince of no mean capacity, 
 who had a definite and benevolent design of 
 treading back his way to the earlier and better 
 path of Mogul rule ; and who, had he lived to 
 carry it out, might, even under the difficult 
 and disastrous circumstances of the time, have 
 accomplished much improvement, and given a 
 new lease of life to the moribund Empire. But 
 he was an elderly man when he came to the 
 throne. And in 1712, in his seventieth (lunar) 
 year, he died rather suddenly. He was the 
 last Emperor of whom anything favourable 
 can be said. Henceforth, the rapid and complete 
 abasement and practical dissolution of the 
 Empire are typified in the incapacity and 
 political insignificance of its Sovereigns. 
 
XI 
 
 THE INTERREGNUM 
 
 THE war of succession which had ended in 
 Bahadur's favour had a counterpart on his 
 death. He left four sons, who aspired to the 
 throne; and all raised forces to support their 
 respective pretensions. The eldest, Azimu-sh 
 Shan, was attacked by a confederacy of the three 
 younger, Jahandar Shah, Jahan Shah, and 
 Kafi'u Shan, and disappeared in the melee ; how 
 he met his death is uncertain. The victors 
 soon fell out among themselves ; Jahan Shah 
 and Kafi'u Shan successively were killed in 
 battle, and Jahandar Shah remained Emperor. 
 But on his death, after eleven months, " an 
 order," says Khafi Khan, " was made that the 
 reign of Jahandar Shah should be considered 
 an adverse possession," and that his successor's 
 accession should be antedated so as to ignore 
 the reputed interregnum. It deserved to be 
 reprobated and consigned to political oblivion. 
 For Jahandar Shah was an utterly degenerate 
 representative of the house of Timour, Baber, and 
 Akbar. Frivolous, profligate, cruel, and cowardly, 
 servilely devoted to a favourite lady, Lai Kun- 
 war, whose relatives he promoted wholesale to 
 
 133 
 
134 THE INTERREGNUM 
 
 high honours, to the disgust of the old nobles 
 and able and experienced servants of the State ; 
 he soon became generally odious and despicable. 
 Thus he could count on little support in case 
 of a rebellion. And with this he was at once 
 threatened by Farokhsir, a son of Azimu-sh Shan, 
 the vanished brother whom he had supplanted. 
 
 Assisted by two remarkable and valiant 
 brothers, Husain Ali, his father's deputy in the 
 Subadari of Patna, and Abdullah Khan, Subadar 
 of Allahabad, Farokhsir claimed to succeed his 
 father, whom he had proclaimed Emperor on 
 Bahadur's death. As the armies of the rivals 
 approached each other, some magnates deserted 
 openly to the pretender. Others, notably Kilich 
 Khan (the future Nizam-ul-Mulk), are said to 
 have come to a private understanding with 
 Farokhsir; and so general was the disaffection 
 that Khafi Khan goes so far as to say that 
 " the victory of Farrukh Siyar became the hope 
 of every man in the army, great and small." 
 Thus, though the latter 's force was less than 
 a third of the Emperor's, the conclusion was 
 almost a foregone one from the first. But 
 the unworthy successor of a line of heroes 
 sealed his fate by fleeing ignominiously in the 
 heat of the battle on Lai Kunwar's elephant. 
 He betook himself to Zulfikar Khan's father, who 
 gave him up to the tender mercies of the victor ; 
 and he was strangled in the fort of Delhi by the 
 recently introduced Turkish bow-string. 
 
XII 
 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 FAROKHSIR'S reign is throughout an agitated 
 and perplexing one, ending in another Imperial 
 tragedy. Its external aspect is that of frequent 
 attempts of the Emperor to assert his inde- 
 pendence, and, on the other hand, of the resolute 
 determination of the two Seiad brothers, to 
 whom he owed his exaltation, to retain the 
 effective management of his affairs. 
 
 Hence a series of violent crises, which at last 
 result in Farokhsir's deposition, followed by his 
 murder. 
 
 But, in view of later events, and of some 
 significant circumstances during this reign, it is 
 not easy to determine what were the actual 
 aims of the Seiads. Whether they were sincerely 
 loyal to their master at first, and estranged 
 from him in consequence of undeserved sus- 
 picions and treachery on his part, and rightfully 
 jealous of attempts to shake his confidence in 
 them, and to remove and ruin them, from fear 
 that they might prove not only intolerably 
 overbearing, but disloyal ; or whether, from the 
 first, they sought to reduce the Emperor to a 
 
 135 
 
136 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 mere figure-head, and monopolise power in his 
 name, as Mahadaji Sindia did in later days ; 
 or whether, again, they contemplated as they 
 were after his death suspected of doing the 
 actual subversion of the Imperial house, and 
 the erection of a new monarchy on a non-Mogul 
 and quasi-nationalist basis, seems to me by no 
 means clear. But whatever their original de- 
 signs, as the contest proceeded they certainly 
 formed associations which tended in the second, 
 if not even the third, direction ; though this 
 may have been in the first instance involuntary, 
 and adopted simply in order to strengthen their 
 hands, and confirm their grasp of power, as 
 chief ministers of the Great Mogul. 
 
 Hence, in order to appreciate their later 
 position, and the deeper and more than personal 
 aspects of the revolution in which they and 
 their schemes perished, it is necessary to 
 sketch the vicissitudes of their uneasy relations 
 with the Emperor, and the anti-Mogul and 
 quasi-nationalist, if not Hindooising, policy to 
 which, by choice or in self-defence, they were 
 gradually committed. 
 
 Many circumstances combined to promote 
 the prominence and commanding influence of 
 Abdullah and Husain Ali at the opening of the 
 new reign. They had been Farokhsir's earliest 
 and staunchest supporters in his contest for 
 the throne. It was an impetuous charge of 
 Husain's troops which had intimidated Jahandar, 
 
SOURCES OF THE SEIADS' POWER 137 
 
 and driven him to ignominious and fatal flight. 
 And the gratitude of the new Emperor had 
 been testified by his bestowing on Abdullah 
 the office of Vizier, or Chief Minister, and that 
 of Bukhshi, or virtually Commander-in-Chief, on 
 Husain. Thus they held the combined civil 
 and military authority under the Emperor. 
 But these official sources of strength were rein- 
 forced by personal qualities, and a distinguished 
 and trusty military clientele. They were both 
 men of great ability, resolution, and approved 
 valour. And their tribal kinsmen had so high 
 a traditional reputation for warlike gallantry, 
 that they had acquired a conventional claim 
 to lead the van in battle. Though reputed 
 Seiads, or descendants of the Prophet, they 
 had, for centuries, been established in India, 
 and swarmed in the Doab, in the district of 
 Muzaffarnagar (from the twelve villages which 
 they held there their name Barha is by some 
 authorities said to have been derived). Akbar 
 had gladly received one of their leading warriors 
 into his service, and employed him and his 
 kinsmen in his campaigns. And members of 
 the tribe or clan (as I may venture to call it) 
 had later figured in the Imperial service. But, 
 on the other hand, it must be remembered, 
 with reference to the later conduct and probable 
 designs of Abdullah and Husain, that the Seiads 
 of Barha, though of alleged exotic origin, were 
 old inhabitants of India, and prided themselves 
 
138 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 on being Hindostanees. As such, their sym- 
 pathies would naturally be with the natives, 
 rather than with the Mogul conquering class 
 of foreigners. And although they were Mussul- 
 mans, they were also Shias, another cause of 
 estrangement between them and the Moguls, 
 who were mostly Soonees, and a strong ground 
 for aversion to Aurungzib's reactionary and 
 persecuting policy, and for rallying what I may 
 call nationalist sentiment to their side under 
 the banner of toleration and political equality, 
 as established by Akbar. 
 
 The significance and importance of these 
 last circumstances will be more evident when 
 I reach the reign of Mohammad Shah. And I 
 will next sketch the course of the misunder- 
 standing and simultates between the King and 
 the king-makers down to its tragic close. 
 
 According to Khafi Khan, the fons et origo 
 mali was attributable to the personal defici- 
 encies of the Emperor himself. His relation 
 to the Seiad brothers much resembled that of 
 Akbar, on his accession, to Bairam and other 
 chief officers engaged in the reconquest of the 
 Empire. How Akbar, the young but sagacious 
 hero, gradually emancipated himself, and vin- 
 dicated his right to personal and independent 
 rule, I have shown in a former course of lectures. 
 But Farokhsir was in character the reverse of 
 Akbar. He was not only, like his illustrious pre- 
 decessor, young at his accession, but, according 
 
CHARACTER OF FAROKHSIR 139 
 
 to Khafi Khan, "he was inexperienced in busi- 
 ness and inattentive to affairs of State: . . . 
 entirely dependent on the opinions of others, 
 for he had no resolution or discretion. The 
 timidity of his character contrasted with the 
 vigour of the race of Timour, and he was not 
 cautious in listening to the words of artful men. 
 From the beginning of his reign he brought his 
 troubles on himself." 
 
 The truthfulness of this general character 
 will be too evident as I proceed. But the 
 last remark requires qualification. His initial 
 mistake, the author goes on to say, was his 
 appointment of Abdullah as Wazir. But it 
 may be doubted how far he could have safely 
 done otherwise, without producing, if not an 
 open rupture, a dangerous slackening of zeal 
 on his behalf on the part of the Seiad brothers. 
 
 It is obvious, however, that the appointment 
 was regarded with great jealousy by the leading 
 Moguls ; and that the Emperor was plied with 
 assiduous attempts to shake his confidence in 
 his Chief Minister, and to induce him to remove 
 and disgrace him. 
 
 In these Kilich Khan, now created Nizam- 
 ul-Mulk, took no part. He was sent as Subadar 
 of the Dekkan, and I shall have later to notice 
 his dealings with the Mahrattas on this first 
 occasion of his Viceroyalty there. 
 
 The most active agent in this anti-ministerial 
 intrigue was a favourite and confidant of the 
 
140 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 Emperor Mir Jumla ; and, not content with 
 insinuations, he matched his influence in an 
 irregular way against Abdullah's ministerial 
 responsibility, and so inflamed the Emperor's 
 jealousy of those who objected to this irregular 
 interference. The Seiads " desired that no 
 mansabs or promotions or appointments to office 
 should be made without consulting them." 
 This desire, in the case of the Prime Minister 
 at least, seems to have been not unreasonable. 
 But the Emperor heedlessly sanctioned his 
 favourite's use of his name in the exercise of 
 patronage. " This practice," says Khan Khan, 
 " was contrary to all the rules of the Wazir's 
 office ; it weakened the authority of the Seiads, 
 and was the cause of great annoyance to the two 
 brothers." 
 
 On the other hand, Abdullah had made 
 Ratan Chand, a Hindoo grain dealer, his dewan, 
 procured him the title of Raja, and " reposed 
 in him authority in all government and minis- 
 terial matters." Thus on both sides there was 
 provocation ; and a serious quarrel if not a 
 coup de main for the arrest of the Minister 
 was only averted by the intervention of the 
 Emperor's mother. 
 
 Mutual suspicion and animosity were in- 
 creased by Husain's request to assume the 
 Subadari of the Dekkan, but to exercise the 
 office through a deputy. He feared to leave his 
 brother exposed to enmity at Court, and especi- 
 
HUSAIN'S WARNING TO FAROKHSIR 141 
 
 ally to Mir Jumla's insidious influence. But, 
 at his instigation, the Emperor flatly refused 
 to appoint Husain to this important charge, 
 unless he would undertake it in person. " Husain 
 Ali," says Khafi Khan, " refused to go to the 
 Dakhin, and leave his brother [alone at Court], 
 A strong altercation arose, and matters went so 
 far that both brothers refrained from going to 
 Court and waiting upon the Emperor ; they 
 even meditated the levying of soldiers and 
 throwing up lines of defence round their resid- 
 ence." This implies that their ascendancy was 
 not due to superior force alone, and that they 
 had real reason to fear, rather than to initiate, 
 resort to violence. 
 
 The Emperor was sorely perplexed, and his 
 well-affected advisers were much divided in 
 opinion as to the solution of the dilemma. 
 But at last his mother brought about a recon- 
 ciliation. The Seiads were allowed to ensure 
 their safety by planting their followers in the 
 fort. And there they formally apologised to 
 the Emperor, earnestly assured him of their 
 loyalty, and deprecated his listening to their 
 calumniators. Husain agreed to proceed in 
 person to take up his government in the Dekkan, 
 and Mir Jumla was to be sent, in a similar 
 capacity, to Patna. But, before Husain de- 
 parted, he significantly forewarned his Sovereign : 
 "If in my absence you recall Mir Jumla - 
 or if my brother again receives similar treatment, 
 
142 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 you may rely upon my being here in the course 
 of twenty days." The brothers also exacted 
 the power of appointing commandants of forts 
 and other officers independently of the royal 
 nomination. Thus the crisis had greatly in- 
 creased their power, at the expense of the Im- 
 perial prerogative. 
 
 But from his ignominious position the weak 
 and rash monarch hoped to emancipate himself 
 by an act of political treachery. Baud Khan 
 was Subadar of Ahmedabad, or Guzerat. 
 Farokhsir transferred him to Kandeish ; secretly 
 stimulating him to resist Husain, and promis- 
 ing him, if successful, the reversion of Husain's 
 viceroyalty of the whole Dekkan. Baud acted 
 on his private instructions. But Husain was 
 not to be trifled with. He discovered the 
 secret ; brought Baud Khan to action ; and 
 the treacherous Sub-Viceroy was slain. The 
 Emperor hypocritically lamented his fate to 
 Abdullah : "It was a pity such a renowned 
 and noble chief had been killed." The Minister, 
 with grim suggestiveness, replied : "If my 
 brother had been slain, it would have given 
 your Majesty satisfaction." 
 
 Another dangerous crisis was occasioned by 
 the return of Mir Jumla to the capital. His 
 pretext was a financial embarrassment and in- 
 ability to pay his troops. But as they swarmed 
 after him and threatened serious disturbance 
 at Belhi, Mir Jumla's proceeding was suspected 
 
CONTEST MORE THAN A PERSONAL ONE 143 
 
 to be a ruse, preliminary to another attempt to 
 arrest Abdullah. Again he prepared to defend 
 himself against the covert scheme of violence. 
 "The officers," says Khafi Khan, "of Seiad 
 Abdullah, with suitable forces, ready accoutred 
 and mounted on elephants and horses, held 
 themselves ready for a conflict." This, how- 
 ever, was averted by Mir Jumla's being formally 
 censured for quitting his government without 
 leave, and being translated to the Punjab. But 
 a strong suspicion prevailed that the Emperor 
 was still playing false, and would presently 
 recall the Seiad's enemy for his own sinister 
 purpose. Abdullah, on his side, strengthened 
 himself by a new contingent of his Barha 
 clansmen. 
 
 Hitherto though involving an extremely 
 important political question, how far the Em- 
 peror, incapable as he was, was to be a free 
 agent ? the aspect of the growing quarrel has 
 been simply personal. The Emperor has been 
 instigated to mistrust the fidelity of his powerful 
 ministers, has favoured their adversaries, and 
 committed himself to sinister plotting against 
 one at least of the brothers. And though they 
 continue to serve him, they utterly mistrust 
 him ; and the Vizier thinks it necessary to raise 
 recruits for the maintenance of his authority, 
 and even, as he assumes, for his personal security. 
 But the next moves in this intricate game imply 
 that issues deeper, more general, and more 
 
144 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 vital to the character, if not the existence, of the 
 Mogul Empire were impending, if not already 
 involved, in the personal rivalries and dissensions. 
 
 I mentioned that Abdullah had appointed 
 as his dewan Ratan Chand, a Hindoo grain 
 dealer, and, besides making him a titular Raja, 
 had, in Khafi Khan's words, " reposed in him 
 authority in all government and ministerial 
 matters." This included patronage ; and under 
 Ratan Chand's auspices Aurungzib's reaction- 
 ary policy had been extensively reversed, and 
 Hindoos and other natives had been largely 
 promoted and beneficed. Whether from the 
 jealous desire to restore Mogul ascendancy, or 
 to discredit and impugn Abdullah's conduct of 
 affairs, and to weaken his influence over the 
 community, two measures were now adopted, 
 which tended to complicate the personal an- 
 tagonism, and incline the Seiads to become the 
 opponents of Mogul ascendancy, and the ad- 
 herents with whatever ulterior views of Ak- 
 bar's comprehensive policy of enlisting native 
 support in all quarters. 
 
 The jizya was ordered to be reimposed or re- 
 inforced, and the mansubs, jaghires, and other 
 recent acquisitions of Hindoos and other proteges 
 of the Hindoo dewan to be reduced or confiscated. 
 I need not dwell on the significance and dangerous 
 tendency of the former step. As to the latter, 
 Khafi Khan (who, as a bigoted Mussulman, 
 though a candid historian, seems to approve 
 
SEIADS' SYMPATHY WITH HINDOOS 145 
 
 it yet says : " This was very distasteful to 
 Ratan Chand and other revenue officials. They 
 addressed themselves to ... Abdullah, and he 
 was opposed to the issue of the order. All the 
 Hindus were greatly enraged because of the 
 order for collecting the jizya, and of the advice 
 about the cutting down of the mansubs" 
 
 These measures would thus naturally tend 
 to promote a combination between the Seiads 
 and the natives against the Mogul domina- 
 tion ; and the more so as, though Mussulmans, 
 the Seiads were not only Hindostanees, but 
 prided themselves on being so ; and would be 
 the less inclined to acquiesce in the view that an 
 Empire re-established by Akbar with the aid 
 of Indian allies, entitled the descendants of the 
 original conquerors of Baber's time, or the Soonee 
 immigrants from Higher Asia, to treat the 
 natives as a conquered, inferior, and non- 
 privileged race. 
 
 While such was the tendency of the policy 
 sanctioned by Farokhsir in Hindostan, his treat- 
 ment of his Viceroy in the Dekkan produced 
 the same effect. Husain Ali at first made a 
 vigorous effort to establish the Imperial authority 
 there, to coerce the Mahrattas, and settle the 
 country. But he experienced unexpectedly for- 
 midable resistance, and his arms sustained 
 several reverses ; and he presently ascertained 
 that the enemy were emboldened by the secret 
 incitement of the Emperor himself. Farokhsir 
 
 10 
 
146 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 was, in fact, playing the same treacherous game 
 to which he had resorted in the case of Baud 
 Khan. Khafi Khan says: " The fact of the 
 disagreement between the Emperor and the 
 Saiyids was well known from the firmans and 
 orders which had been sent secretly to Raja 
 Sahu, the dewans and the chief zamindars of the 
 Karnatik [i.e. Bala Ghat], desiring them not 
 to obey Husain Ali Khan. They had accordingly 
 showed resistance, and no settlement of Bija- 
 pur and Haidarabad had been effected." But 
 again, as I said in Baud's case, Husain was not 
 a man to be trifled with, and thus thwarted, 
 with impunity. He now changed his tactics ; 
 negotiated with the Mahrattas, and concluded 
 with them a most important compromise, which 
 practically recognised them as co-partners in 
 the revenue of the Imperial provinces, and, as a 
 corollary, in political power there. As before, 
 when Bahadur Shah had made such important 
 concessions to the Mahrattas, the arrangement 
 was made ostensibly as a treaty of peace, with 
 an enemy too powerful, as experience had 
 shown, to be conquered. Raja Shao was to 
 receive one quarter of the land revenue col- 
 lections, and the Government lands. More- 
 over, 10 per cent, from the ryots as sur-deshmuki. 
 But besides this he was to share the abwabs, 
 or additional cesses. These altogether would 
 amount to nearly half the total Government 
 revenue. Transit dues, or road duties, as they 
 
HUSAIN'S TREATY WITH SHAO 147 
 
 were called, were not to be levied. But this 
 prohibition was futile, as the Mahratta col- 
 lectors were too active and too strong to be 
 resisted. 
 
 And the sting and humiliating circumstance 
 of the arrangement was that the dues were not 
 to be paid to the Raja by the Mahometan 
 Government, but levied actively and haughtily 
 by a body of Mahratta officials, while Balaji 
 Washwanath and Jamnaji (the Raja's repre- 
 sentatives), " with a suitable escort," were form- 
 ally installed at Aurungabad, the Imperial 
 capital of the Dekkan, as deputies of the Raja, 
 " so that all civil and revenue matters might 
 be settled through them." Thus the Mahratta 
 plan of establishing virtually an anti-polity 
 within the limits of the Mogul Empire was 
 realised, and exhibited in a most glaring and 
 provoking form. But this was not all. This 
 so-called pacification amounted actually to an 
 alliance between the Seiad and the essentially 
 anti-Mogul community. Husain then, in Khan 
 Khan's words, " made no delay in writing for 
 a royal firman confirmatory of this document 
 [i.e. of the sanad containing the conditions of 
 peace, which he had sent to Sahu, the Raja of 
 Satara]. Several well-wishers of the State urged 
 that it was not well to admit the vile enemy to 
 be overbearing partners in matters of revenue 
 and government" This was, in itself, true 
 enough. But it was the outcome of the 
 
148 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 Emperor's intrigue, suicidal equally in a personal 
 and political sense. But ignoring this fact, and 
 the danger of confirming his formidable lieutenant 
 in his new friendship with the aspiring Hindoos, 
 he " rejected the treaty." 
 
 Thus his Viceroy and the Mahratta Raja 
 had a common grievance against him ; and 
 *Husain Ali, like his brother at Delhi, was the 
 more inclined to sympathise and combine with 
 the Hindoos against Mogul ascendancy. The 
 Emperor, on the other hand, was not unconscious 
 of his perilous position. And this was impressed 
 upon him by a new favourite, a Kashmirian 
 of low origin and " disreputable character." 
 Jealous of the Seiads, he instigated his Sovereign 
 to compass their overthrow with the aid of three 
 powerful men Nizam-ul-Mulk, Surbuland Khan, 
 Governor of Patna, and Raja Ajit Sing, the 
 Rajput Viceroy of Ahmedabad. But Abdullah 
 vigilant and well-informed won over the 
 Raja to his interest. " Nizam-ul-Mulk and 
 Surbuland Khan," says Khan Khan, " were at 
 first led to expect the appointments of wazir 
 and mirbakhshi," i.e. the former was to succeed 
 Abdullah as Prime Minister, and the latter 
 Husain, as Commander - in - Chief . But they 
 found that the fatuous Emperor was bent on 
 appointing his miserable favourite to the former 
 office. Whereupon, in great indignation and 
 despair of such a Sovereign, they renounced 
 the commission, and left him to his fate. Khan 
 
NIZAM-UL-MULK PASSIVE 149 
 
 Khan says : " They were heart-broken, but 
 they were not disposed to obey and submit to 
 Itikad Khan " i.e. the favourite. In other 
 words, they were ripe for desertion, if not for 
 active rebellion. 
 
 Nizam - ul - Mulk was the more indignant, 
 because not only had he lost his Government 
 of Muradabad, and as yet received no other, 
 but the despised and hated favourite had been 
 appointed his (I presume non-resident) successor 
 there, and Nizam-ul-Mulk's jagir there had been 
 conferred on him. This was adding insult to 
 injury. So, like Achilles, when Agamemnon 
 deprived him of Briseis, he chewed the cud of 
 bitter resentment, and passively awaited the 
 gathering of the impending storm. 
 
 The Emperor, meanwhile, on occasion of a 
 great festival, collected nearly 70,000 soldiers 
 at the capital. While Abdullah, fearing a coup 
 de main against himself, issued an order for 
 enlisting 20,000 men, of all tribes. Hitherto 
 he had relied almost entirely on his Barha 
 clientele. But this looks as if he was extending 
 his connexion among the natives generally ; 
 in other words, throwing himself more on Indian 
 support, as opposed to the Mogul party and 
 their countrymen from Central Asia. 
 
 Once more, however, though a violent crisis 
 was generally anticipated, a hollow reconcilia- 
 tion was patched up. The vacillating and timid 
 Emperor visited the Minister, disclaimed all 
 
150 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 hostile intentions, and sent Ikhlas Khan, " an 
 old and devoted friend of the two brothers," 
 to reassure Husain Ali. Husain was much 
 perplexed at the contradictory accounts trans- 
 mitted to him successively of the relations of 
 his brother with the Emperor. But receiving 
 pressing and repeated letters from Abdullah, 
 urging him to return to Delhi at once, he 
 mobilised a strong army, including 16,000 
 Mahrattas, under one of the Raja's best generals, 
 who was also, under the late arrangement, 
 Mahratta Subadar of Kandeish, and marched 
 northward. Ikhlas Khan delivered his con- 
 ciliatory message en route, and Husain was 
 otherwise informed officially that it was peace. 
 Thereupon he publicly professed loyal intentions, 
 if the Emperor " will deal with us kindly and 
 without malice." But this qualified intimation 
 of fidelity to the throne was quickly exchanged 
 for a very different attitude on receipt of infor- 
 mation from " trustworthy and confidential 
 correspondents," who assured him that the 
 general impression was that " the Emperor's 
 proceedings were merely devices and snares that 
 he was weaving to catch fools." Whatever 
 had been Husain' s real designs hitherto, he 
 seems now to have made up his mind to dethrone 
 the Emperor, or reduce him to a puppet. For 
 he learned that Abdullah had gained over the 
 very men whom the Emperor had hoped to 
 employ as his champions. Surbuland had been 
 
HUSAIN OPENLY REBELLIOUS 151 
 
 appointed Subadar of Cabul through the 
 Minister's influence, who had also " furnished 
 him with money, elephants, and horses " ; and 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk had received from Abdullah the 
 promise of the Subadari of Malwa; and other 
 " waiters on providence " had also been won 
 over to the Seiad's interest. Ajit Sing, Rana 
 of Oudipur, on whom the Emperor had relied 
 to take part against them, and whose daughter 
 Farokhsir had married, had now, in spite of 
 this connexion, " become a firm ally of the 
 Minister." So much so, indeed, that the 
 Emperor resolved to arrest him, but was 
 foiled by Ajit's betaking himself to Abdullah's 
 quarters. 
 
 Thus on approaching Delhi, Husain assumed 
 an openly rebellious attitude, " by ordering his 
 drums to be beaten loudly in defiance ; for it 
 is contrary to all rule for [a subject's] drums to 
 be beaten near the residence of the Emperor." 
 These are Khafi Khan's words ; and he adds 
 that Husain repeatedly said that he no longer 
 reckoned himself among the servants of the 
 monarch : "I will maintain the honour of my 
 race''' This rather ambiguous expression seems 
 to me to imply more than simple rebellion against 
 the actual Sovereign. Representative and leader 
 of a race of Indian warriors, traditionally famed 
 for valour, he repudiates allegiance to the de- 
 generate and faithless representative of foreign 
 domination and Mogul ascendancy. 
 
152 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 And this interpretation seems to agree with 
 the view taken of Husain's attitude by the 
 Emperor's advisers. They urged him to open 
 war, " particularly," says Khafi Khan, " the 
 Mughals, who knew all about the matter." This 
 also ambiguous phrase probably means that 
 they plainly saw that more than a personal 
 quarrel was on the tapis, and that what I may 
 venture to call a quasi-nationalist movement 
 against the foreign dynasty, and the ascendancy 
 of its foreign supporters, was threatened. 
 
 Farokhsir, however, remained passive, until 
 Abdullah in a public audience vented his own 
 and his brother's grievances, and as a con- 
 dition of peace and reconciliation demanded 
 the removal of obnoxious persons, the appoint- 
 ment of officials generally, and the custody of 
 the fortress by men of his and his brother's 
 choice. Unable to resist, the Emperor granted 
 these abject terms. Another bitter and mutually 
 provocative interview followed, which ended in 
 the Emperor's abruptly retiring to the zenana. 
 Outside the palace there was much commotion. 
 And eventually a party, supported by a brother 
 of the Seiads, invaded the palace, discovered, 
 seized, and blinded the unfortunate Sovereign, 
 and consigned him to the same small, close 
 chamber in which his predecessor, Jahandar 
 Shah, had been strangled. And soon after, on 
 his attempting to escape, he suffered the same 
 fate. 
 
THE SEIADS PREDOMINANT 153 
 
 The power of the Seiad brothers was now 
 completely predominant at Delhi. The palace 
 was occupied by their agents, and guarded by 
 their soldiers. Their troops, and those of their 
 confederates, Ajit Sing, the Rajput Rana of 
 Oudipur, the Mahratta contingent contributed 
 by the Raja of Satara, and other native forces 
 co-operated with their stout Barha clansmen. 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk, the most powerful of the Mogul 
 party, and other influential men of the same 
 class, who had been alienated by Farokhsir's 
 devotion to his disreputable favourite, and had 
 been courted by Abdullah, at least passively 
 supported them ; other would-be adherents of 
 the fallen Emperor had been paralysed by his 
 timidity and surrender of himself and his strong- 
 hold to the plausible demands of the Seiads, 
 that they meant to obey him when assured of 
 their own safety ; and no organised resistance 
 to them was, for the time, feasible. Thus, 
 without opposition, they selected a grandson of 
 Bahadur Shah, and proclaimed him Emperor. 
 Whatever their ulterior designs, it was evident 
 from their treatment of him, and of those who 
 quickly succeeded him, that for the present 
 their intention was to rule through the medium 
 of an Imperial puppet. Thus Khafi Khan says 
 of Kafi'u-din, the one now chosen : " This 
 monarch had not the slightest control in matters 
 of government." And when he shortly died, 
 from consumption, and they replaced him by his 
 
154 THE EMPEROR FAROKHSIR 
 
 elder brother, Kafia-u-Doula, the latter also 
 soon died from dysentery ; and the king- 
 makers replaced him by Mohammad Shah, son 
 of Jahan Shah, and grandson of Aumngzib a 
 young prince of eighteen years of age. Feeble 
 health might have afforded a pretext for secluding 
 the two moribund Princes. But the plan was 
 pursued in this case without any such excuse. 
 Khafi Khan thus describes the treatment of 
 Mohammad Shah : " All the officers and servants 
 around the Emperor were, as before, the servants 
 of Saiyid Abdullah. When the young Em- 
 peror went out for a ride, he was surrounded, 
 as with a halo, by numbers of the Saiyid's ad- 
 herents ; and when occasionally he went out 
 hunting, or for an excursion into the country, 
 they went with him, and brought him back." 
 
XIII 
 
 THE EMPEROR MOHAMMAD SHAH. 
 PROGRESS OF THE ANTI- MOGUL 
 REACTION 
 
 WHILE the Barha prcetorians thus sequestered 
 the Emperor from free intercourse with his 
 subjects, the civil administration evinced the 
 ascendancy of the Hindooising Seiad in a manner 
 equally obnoxious to the Mogul temper. " Ratan 
 Chand," continues Khafi Khan, " held firm his 
 position. His authority extended over all civil, 
 revenue, and legal matters, even to the appoint- 
 ment of kazis in the cities and other judicial 
 offices. All the other Government officials were 
 put in the background, and no one would under- 
 take any business but under a document with 
 his seal." 
 
 Imperialist sentiment and the pride of the 
 Mogul race were further outraged by other 
 circumstances. The magnificence of the Great 
 Mogul's Court had been proverbial ; and its 
 hoarded treasures and works of art were of 
 world-wide celebrity, and had increased its 
 prestige. But it was now reported that the 
 rude and uncourtly Seiad Chieftains had taken 
 
 155 
 
156 THE EMPEROR MOHAMMAD SHAH 
 
 " possession of, and selected for themselves, 
 whatever they pleased of the royal treasure, 
 jewels, works of art, elephants, and horses." And, 
 worse and more insulting still, Abdullah was 
 said to have appropriated to himself some of the 
 late Emperor's most beautiful inmates of the 
 zenana. 
 
 The same greedy and reckless disposition 
 to strip majesty of its externals, and to despoil, 
 with military license, instead of treating with 
 decent reverence, the Sovereign whom they had 
 themselves placed on the throne, was again 
 exhibited by Husain Ali at Agra. There the 
 soldiers had, in defiance of the Seiad's choice, 
 extracted from a long imprisonment Prince 
 Neku Siyar, a son of Prince Akbar, Aurungzib's 
 rebellious son, and proclaimed him Emperor. 
 But Husain besieged and reduced Agra by 
 famine, and imprisoned the Pretender. And he 
 treated as spoil of war, and, says Khafi Khan, 
 " took possession of the treasure, jewels, and 
 valuables which had accumulated there in the 
 course of three or four hundred years, from the 
 days of Sikander Lodi and Babar Badshah." 
 Some of these he specifies, and estimates the 
 value of the whole at two or three krors of 
 rupees, i.e. the same number of millions sterling. 
 And so completely had the filibustering spirit 
 superseded that of the politic statesman, that 
 he fell out with his brother by monopolising 
 the spoil ; and only through the mediation of 
 
BOLDNESS OF THE RAJPUT REACTION 157 
 
 Ratan Chand at last " grudgingly surrendered 
 to him twenty-one lacs of rupees." 
 
 Another insult to the Imperial majesty 
 and to the religious susceptibilities of the Moguls 
 was offered by Ajit Sing, the close ally and 
 active coadjutor of the Seiads. I mentioned 
 that his daughter had been married to Farokh- 
 sir. He now sent her home with her jewels 
 and paraphernalia, and was reported to have 
 made her " throw off her Mussulman dress, 
 and dismiss her Muhammadan attendants." 
 Whereupon Khafi Khan remarks : 
 
 " In the reign of no former Emperor had 
 any Raja been so presumptuous as to take 
 his daughter after she had been married to a 
 King and admitted to the honour of Islam." 
 
 A little later Ajit ventured on another piece 
 of outrecuidance, similarly obnoxious to Mussul- 
 man sentiment, and indicative of the increasing 
 boldness of the Hindoo reaction. As Subadar of 
 Ahmedabad, he forbade the slaughter of cows. 
 But what Khafi Khan calls a " sharp warn- 
 ing " from Nizam-ul-Mulk constrained him to 
 draw in his horns, and cancel the offensive 
 order. 
 
 His rival Rajput Prince, Jei Sing, of Amber, 
 or Jeipur as it was called later, had hitherto 
 been an anti-Seiad. But he now submitted 
 to them, and was appointed faujdar, or military 
 commandant of Surat. " Under this arrange- 
 ment," says Khafi Khan, " the two Rajas held 
 
158 THE EMPEROR MOHAMMAD SHAH 
 
 all the country from thirty cos of Delhi to 
 the shores of the sea at Surat." Thus the 
 Seiads were extending and confirming their 
 Indian connexion in various directions. And 
 their anti-Mogul policy was comprehensively 
 indicated by the formal abolition once more 
 of thejizya. This had been effected immediately 
 on the fall of Farokhsir. Khafi Khan's record 
 of the fact is significant of the influence at 
 work, and of his antipathy to that influence. 
 He says : "In the council of the first day, in 
 accordance with the desire of Raja Ajit Sing, 
 and of the bigoted Raja Ratan Chand, an 
 order was passed for the abolition of the jizya, 
 and assurances of security and protection [i.e. 
 of the Hindoos] were circulated all over the 
 country." 
 
 The general impression of the state of affairs 
 at this period, and the profound indignation it 
 engendered in the breasts of the old nobles and 
 adherents of the Mogul interest, are forcibly 
 conveyed in the following passage of the sym- 
 pathetic author whom I have used so freely : 
 
 " The Emperor had no power in the govern- 
 ment of the State, and . . . everything was directed 
 by Ratan Sing and other vile infidels. The 
 two Saiyids, the real rulers, thought themselves 
 masters of the pen and masters of the sword in 
 Hindostan, and as opposed to their judgment 
 and the swords of the Barhas, the Mughals of 
 Iran and of Turan were as nobodies. They did 
 
MOGUL VIEW OF THE SITUATION 159 
 
 not remember that these Mughals had come 
 1000 or 2000 miles from their native countries, 
 and that by their courage and sound judgment 
 the wide realm of Hindostan, with its great 
 kings and famous rajas, had by hard fighting 
 been won for the Emperor Babar. For two 
 hundred years they had lived in the favour 
 of the house of Timur, and they now felt the 
 ignominy of seeing their Emperor without any 
 power in his own State. Pride, courage, and 
 honour continually spurred this lion-hearted 
 noble [i.e. Haidar Kuli Khan, of whom more 
 hereafter] to make an end of this state of things, 
 and to take revenge." 
 
 While such sentiments would at any period 
 have been strongly operative among the Mogul 
 magnates, they had been naturally intensified 
 by the policy of Aurungzib, and his exclusive 
 reliance, in his later years, on their co-operation 
 in its execution. He had alienated the Rajputs,, 
 and they figure no more in his anti-Mahratta 
 campaigns after Sivaji's final revolt. 
 
 The Mahratta War of Independence after 
 Sivaji's death had both exasperated and humi- 
 liated the Mogul partisans of the Emperor's 
 obstinate but vain attempt to restore his military 
 prestige, and realise his programme of proving 
 and treating the Hindoos as a twice-conquered 
 people. And that not only this should fail, but 
 that the crushed worm should have turned, 
 and, under the auspices of Indian Shia leader- 
 
160 THE EMPEROR MOHAMMAD SHAH 
 
 ship, should turn the tables on their former 
 masters, reduce the Great Mogul to a puppet, 
 and the proud nobles of his race to political 
 inanity, and monopolise power, patronage, and 
 wealth, was an unspeakable degradation and 
 cause of offence to those trained in the school of 
 Aurungzib. Hence another revolution, and a 
 desperate attempt to subvert the Seiads and 
 reverse the position, was inevitable. Nor was 
 the initial agent of such a policy far to seek. 
 
XIV 
 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 CHIN KILICH KHAN, or as he was now entitled 
 and is best known to history as Nizam-ul- 
 Mulk, was both an able and experienced soldier 
 and a wily and far-sighted politician. Though 
 born in India, he was a Mogul to the core, a 
 strong Imperialist, a bigoted Mussulman, and 
 an inveterate opponent of native predominance 
 and Mahratta independence. His father had 
 been a distinguished general under Aurungzib ; 
 and both he and his son had served long and 
 well in the Dekkan wars. Nizam-ul-Mulk's 
 military reputation and political consideration 
 were well established, as might be inferred from 
 Farokhsir's attempt to employ him for his 
 liberation from the yoke of the Seiads, and 
 from Abdullah's courting and conciliating him 
 on the eve of the Imperial tragedy. In that 
 tragedy he took no active part, though he 
 remained passive on its occurrence. But he 
 was biding his time, and preparing resources 
 for a contre-coup. And though, for the present, 
 a good understanding seemed to prevail between 
 
 him and the Seiads, each party had good reason 
 ii 
 
162 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 to distrust the other. The Seiads were well 
 aware that Nizam-ul-Mulk had been selected, 
 and had been quite willing, to compass their 
 overthrow. And he well knew that both on this 
 account, and from his prominence and his 
 notorious character, reputation, and political 
 views, they could not but regard him as a 
 formidable danger to their usurped authority 
 and hybrid political connexion. For the time 
 they propitiated and got rid of him at Delhi, 
 by appointing him Subadar of Malwa. But, 
 as I shall show presently, they calculated on 
 hemming him in between, and coercing if not 
 destroying him by the instrumentality of, their 
 own adherents. 
 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk, on the other hand, was not 
 only personally clear - sighted, cautious, and 
 vigilant, but was put on his guard from head- 
 quarters, and stimulated by an appeal to his 
 loyalty, to exert himself in his own defence, 
 and for the emancipation of the Emperor. 
 Mohammad Shah's mother was, says Khafi 
 Khan, " well acquainted with State business, 
 and was a woman of much intelligence and tact." 
 And in frequent letters she informed him " that 
 the constraint used by the Saiyids was so strict 
 that the Emperor had only liberty to go to 
 service on the Sabbath, and that he had no 
 power of giving any orders ; and that the 
 Saiyids . . . proposed ... to get rid of Nizam-ul- 
 Mulk, and then to do as they pleased ; that the 
 
NIZAM-UL-MULK HOSTILE TO THE SEIADS 163 
 
 Emperor and his mother had full reliance on 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk, that he would not fail in the 
 loyalty which his ancestors had ever exhibited." 
 Such an intimation, and such an appeal, were 
 quite in accordance with the views and resolves 
 of the able and ambitious man to whom they 
 were addressed. 
 
 "Nizam-ul-Mulk," says Khafi Khan, "per- 
 ceived that the brothers had the fixed intention 
 of overthrowing the royal house and removing 
 the Khalifa of the world." Though hitherto 
 the conduct of the Seiads seemed to imply a 
 design to reduce the Emperor permanently to a 
 mere roi faineant, and to wield independent power 
 in his name, as the Peishwas did later in the 
 name of the imprisoned Raja of Satara, and 
 Mahadaji Sindia in the name of the later Em- 
 peror, Shah Alam ; these words indicate rather 
 his suspicion that they aimed ultimately at 
 founding a new dynasty of their own, a nation- 
 alist power, subversive of the foreign Mogul 
 element, and based upon native Indian support, 
 Hindoo, and probably the earlier Afghan element, 
 which had dominated India for centuries before 
 Baber's incursion, and had been overthrown by 
 him, and in its later phase by Akbar. But in either 
 case he foresaw the ruin not only of the Imperial 
 house, but of the ascendancy of the race which 
 it represented, and which was identified with 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk' s antecedents, associations, and 
 personal interests. Hence to overthrow the 
 
164 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 Seiads, and restore the Emperor to his old 
 position of an independent Sovereign, and con- 
 spicuous and dignified Head of the conquering 
 race, in fact, as the Great Mogul, was his im- 
 mediate and urgent aim. But " the longest 
 way round is the shortest way home." And as 
 a coup d'etat at Delhi was not at once feasible, he 
 preferred to take up his appointment in Malwa, 
 and there accumulate and organise at his leisure 
 the means for striking a decisive blow later. His 
 preparations for this were systematic and elabo- 
 rate. Thus Khafi Khan tells : " There accom- 
 panied him more than a thousand companions, 
 mansubdars and jagirdars, who were poor and 
 sick at heart with the unkindness shown by the 
 Saiyids, and through pay being in arrear. Nizam- 
 ul-Mulk busied himself in collecting soldiers and 
 artillery, which [observes the writer signifi- 
 cantly] are necessary for governing the world 
 and keeping it in order." [In other words 
 for effecting a counter-revolution, as " revolu- 
 tions are not made with rose-water."] " He gave 
 five hundred horses with accoutrements and 
 arms to Muhammad Ghiyas Khan for his Mughal 
 fraternity, and turned them into horsemen. 
 He lent large sums of money to others, binding 
 them to himself by the bonds of debt and kind- 
 ness." With characteristic adroitness he secured 
 another partisan, while literally conforming to 
 the orders of Husain, as Commander-in-Chief. 
 Murhamat Khan, the commandant of a fortress 
 
SEIADS' SCHEME AGAINST NIZAM-UL-MULK 165 
 
 at Mandu, had held back, on pretence of ill- 
 ness, when summoned to join Husain on his late 
 march to Delhi, and had been in consequence 
 superseded. But he had resisted the mandate, 
 and Husain instructed Nizam-ul-Mulk to remove 
 him. This he did by diplomacy, but only to 
 attach him to his own service. And he had 
 at this time " collected," says Khafi Khan, 
 " 7000 or 8000 horse and materials of war." 
 
 On the other hand, the Seiads were on their 
 guard, and preparing to circumvent him. They 
 had appointed him to Malwa, not only to get 
 rid of him, for the time, from the capital, but 
 because they relied, if necessary, on concentrating 
 against him forces adequate to overpower him. 
 " Malwa," says Khafi Khan, " was half-way 
 between Delhi and the Dakhin." Husain's 
 forces were in possession of the capital. And 
 Alam Ali, Husain's adopted son, " with a 
 sufficient army," had been left as Deputy Suba- 
 dar in the Dekkan. And a third force, under 
 a Rajput Bhim Sing, had been commissioned to 
 march against the zamindar of Bundi. But on 
 the promise of promotion to the dignity of 
 Maharaja, Bhim Sing was secretly engaged to 
 hold himself in readiness to act against Nizam- 
 ul-Mulk in the projected triple combination. 
 Then Husain, throwing aside the veil, " began 
 to pick a quarrel " with his formidable rival. 
 His charges were conclusively answered. But, 
 probably as a test of his doubtful obedience to 
 
166 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 the usurped authority of the Seiad brothers, or 
 as a plausible ground for attacking him if he 
 refused to obey the order, Husain announced 
 that he wished himself to assume the Govern- 
 ment of Malwa, and Nizam-ul-Mulk was sum- 
 moned to return to Court, with the promise of 
 an appointment to a Subadary elsewhere. 
 
 This capricious supersession might well ex- 
 asperate him. And he was too acute not to see 
 that, in one way or another, his ruin was in- 
 tended. And private information combined to 
 impress upon him the conviction that the time 
 was come for him also to throw off the mask, 
 and begin his campaign against his personal 
 enemies, and the obnoxious regime which they 
 had established and were consolidating. Khafi 
 Khan says : " He had received letters from the 
 Emperor and from private friends, telling him 
 there was no time to be lost, and that what he 
 had to do he must do quickly." This writer 
 asserts that " he had formed the design of con- 
 quering the Dakhin, and of setting free that land 
 of treasure and of soldiers." In other words, 
 he realised that the military command of the 
 Dekkan would be the most effectual means of 
 neutralising the league between the Seiads and 
 the Mahrattas, and would be a most serious 
 blow to their Hindooising policy. He could also 
 rely on Mogul sympathy in that quarter, as 
 proved the case speedily. On crossing the 
 Nerbudda, he at once received an overture for 
 
NIZAM-UL-MULK IN THE DEKKAN 167 
 
 the surrender of the great fort of Asseergurh, 
 which was executed; and the day after, the 
 capital of Kandeish, Burhanpur, was similarly 
 given up without a blow, by the officer specially 
 deputed by Alam Ali Khan to defend it. There 
 he was also joined by Iwaz Khan, another offi- 
 cial in Berar, and by " troop after troop of 
 adherents." Thus his position grew rapidly 
 stronger. The surrender of Asseergurh was well 
 calculated to excite the alarm of the Seiads. 
 For, besides its great strength, it showed that 
 the military superiority on which they relied 
 was being sapped by their astute adversary. 
 An emissary of Nizam-ul-Mulk had tampered 
 with the garrison, and his own soldiers had com- 
 pelled the Seiad's commandant to open his 
 gates. The Nizam was moreover joined by 
 Minbulkar, "a famous Mahratta chieftain, with 
 his followers." " And," adds Khan Khan, " all 
 the officials of Burhanpur, and many of the 
 zamindars of the neighbourhood, had taken the 
 
 same course." 
 
 The Seiads were now seriously alarmed, and 
 much perplexed and divided in their counsels. 
 Husain was inclined to go in person to the 
 Dekkan. Ratan Chand " advised a peace and 
 the surrender of the subas of the Dakhin to 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk." But to this Husain would not 
 consent. And it was hoped that the previously 
 conceived plan of exposing Nizam-ul-Mulk to a 
 combined attack by Bhim Sing and his col- 
 
168 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 leagues, Dilawar Khan and Alam Khan, would 
 suffice to overpower him. Dilawar was Hus- 
 ain's bakshi or chief military officer in Malwa, and 
 in obedience to pressing orders he increased his 
 forces, and crossed the Nerbudda, while Alam 
 Ali was engaged in " enlisting as many Mah- 
 rattas as he could," and gathering together the 
 great faujdars at Aurungabad, "intending to 
 place the enemy between two armies." But while 
 he tarried for intelligence of Dilawar's approach, 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk marched promptly against Dila- 
 war and his Rajput confederates, engaged them 
 in a bloody and obstinate battle, and utterly 
 defeated them. Dilawar, Raja Bhim, and 
 another Rajput Raja, Gaj Sing, and 4000 or 
 5000 soldiers were killed. The writer notices that 
 when, at last, the army of the Barhas fled, the 
 Rajputs, true to their traditional character, 
 " disdained to escape," and fell upon the 
 field. 
 
 The tidings of this event further distracted 
 the councils of the Seiad brothers. So serious 
 was the prospect in the south, that they were 
 half inclined to march thither together, taking 
 the Emperor with them. But they were averse 
 to risk their hold over the capital, and, on 
 tidings of another catastrophe, they decided to 
 separate. 
 
 Alam Khan, Husain's Deputy Subadar in 
 the Dekkan, was a young man, twenty-two 
 years of age, " distinguished," says our author, 
 
ALAM ALI DEFEATED AND SLAIN 169 
 
 " by all the determination and bravery of the 
 Barha Saiyids." But he was rash, self-willed, 
 and no general. The Mahratta sirdars and his 
 own officers advised him to await, behind the 
 walls of Aurungabad or Ahmednuggur, the 
 arrival of Husain Ali, while the Mahrattas might 
 hang upon and harass Nizam-ul-Mulk's army, 
 and " carry on that Cossack warfare for which 
 the people of the Dakhin are so famous." But 
 this he disdained to do. His able and wily 
 adversary, though seriously impeded by the 
 monsoon, skilfully accomplished the crossing of 
 a flooded river, to the surprise of Alam Ali Khan ; 
 repulsed the daring onslaughts of the Mahratta 
 skirmishers, and brought on an action on ground 
 chosen by himself. Again he gained a decisive 
 victory. Alam, fighting bravely to the last, was 
 slain, together with many other leading officers, 
 " men of renown," as the author calls them. 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk's loss was small ; and the moral 
 effect of his success was attested by the defection 
 to him of the Subadar of Hyderabad, with six 
 or seven thousand horse. 
 
 But more notable and momentous was this 
 moral effect in Hindostan. 
 
 The Seiad brothers prepared to make an 
 extraordinary effort to meet the crisis. They 
 resolved to raise an army of 100,000 men, from 
 among their clansmen, and a significant fact 
 from among the (Indian) Afghans. With this 
 army Husain was to march against Nizam- 
 
170 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 ul-Mulk, taking the Emperor in his train, as 
 Henry vi. was taken, for the same purpose, in 
 the Wars of the Roses, while Abdullah was to 
 maintain order in the capital. 
 
 But " the jamadars" or, as we might call 
 them, the recruiting officers, " far and near had 
 noticed the declining fortunes of the two Saiyids, 
 and they were unwilling to go to the Dakhin, so 
 the desired army was not raised." With difficulty 
 about half the proposed force was eventually 
 collected and sent forward, while Husain tarried 
 at Tira, " thirty cos from Fathpur," in company 
 with the Emperor. 
 
 Besides the chronic hostility of the decided 
 Mogul party, even the previous adherents and 
 beneficiaries of the Seiads were now inclined to 
 desert them. This was probably, in a great 
 degree, from a strong disposition to be found on 
 the winning side. But Khafi Khan ascribes it 
 to more respectable motives. He says : ' The 
 infamous murder of the martyr Emperor 
 (Farokhsir), the sight of the indignities which 
 the Emperor, the representative of the house 
 of Timur, had to endure, and the fact of the 
 administration being under the direction of a 
 base-born shopkeeper (Ratan Chand) had, under 
 the guidance of the Converter of Hearts, 
 changed their feelings." In other words, the 
 general sentiment among the proteges as well 
 as the foes of the brothers was hostile to them 
 as Ratan Chand' s patrons, and favourable to 
 
HUSAIN ALI ASSASSINATED 171 
 
 the emancipation of the Emperor the warcry 
 of the counter-revolutionists. 
 
 In these circumstances, a plot was concerted, 
 in the deepest privacy, for assassinating Seiad 
 Husain Ali. The arch-conspirator was a Mogul 
 noble, Itimadu-d Daula, or Mohammed Amin 
 Khan, with two confederates, his " close and 
 trusted friend," Sadut Khan, of Persian origin, 
 and the founder of the later Oude dynasty, and 
 Haider Khan, a Chaghati Turk, of illustrious 
 descent, though Elphinstone describes him as 
 " a savage Calmuc." 
 
 Only the Emperor's mother and a protege* 
 of Seiad Abdullah were privy to the plot, which 
 was not disclosed either to the Emperor him- 
 self or to Itimadu-d Daula's own son. At least 
 so says Khafi Khan ; though I suspect that 
 Haidar Kuli Khan (of whom more presently) was 
 apprised of it just before it was carried into 
 execution. The third conspirator, Haider Khan, 
 undertook the deed, and, while Husain read a 
 petition which he had presented to him, accom- 
 plished his fatal object at a single stroke of a 
 dagger. The assassin was cut down promptly, 
 and a fierce contest ensued between Husain' s 
 partisans and the Moguls, who, says the his- 
 torian, " assembled from every side." Itimad 
 had in the meantime betaken himself to the 
 tent of Haidar Kuli Khan. I have already 
 quoted an account of his strong sympathy with 
 the cause of the Mogul Imperialists. Husain 
 
172 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 had just made him commandant of the 
 artillery. But Itimad now probably informed 
 him of the intended coup de main. And 
 after it was delivered he at once ranged himself 
 on the side of the conspirators. " He stepped 
 boldly forward, ready to show his loyalty and 
 devotion in vigorous action." Itimad and he 
 directed Sadut Khan to visit the Emperor in 
 his private quarters, and induce him to show 
 himself. This was done ; and Itimad then 
 " mounted him on his own elephant, and sat 
 behind him as his attendant." In the con- 
 fusion only a very slender escort could be mus- 
 tered, and this was exposed to a fierce onslaught, 
 headed by " that raging lion of the Barhas, 
 Izzut Khan," a nephew of the Seiad brothers. 
 " On one side," says Khafi Khan, " the braves 
 of Barha rushed boldly into the fray ; on the 
 other, the valiant men of Iran and Turan came 
 from every side eager for the fight." But Izzut 
 was killed ; and the victory remained with 
 the Imperialists. 
 
 The Emperor signalised his recovered freedom 
 by appointing Itimad Vizier, and bestowing 
 various distinctions on Haidar Kuli Khan, Sadut 
 Khan, and other active promoters of the counter- 
 revolution. 
 
 Though thus, both in the Dekkan and in 
 Hindostan, the toils were closing around Ab- 
 dullah, he made strenuous exertions to recover 
 his ascendancy. His brother and his valiant 
 
ABDULLAH RAISES A NEW ARMY 173 
 
 nephew Izzut, as well as his other nephew in 
 the Dekkan, were no more. His Minister, Ratan 
 Chand, had been maltreated by the Mogul mob 
 and the budmashes of the camp, carried to the 
 Emperor's quarters, and confined in chains 
 by Itimad. Another of his favoured Hindoo 
 officials had fled. And Husain's army had 
 become the Emperor's, though there was 
 treachery in the camp, and some officers and 
 their troops were meditating desertion. Ab- 
 dullah's first step was to set up an anti-Emperor, 
 as another puppet. In this he experienced 
 much difficulty. More than one Prince posi- 
 tively refused his overtures. But he succeeded 
 at last in raising to the throne a brother of the 
 roi faineant who had died of consumption, as 
 Muhammad Ibrahim. 
 
 He then made strenuous efforts to secure 
 partisans, and to raise a new and large army, 
 to confront that which had now passed over 
 to the real Emperor. He was constrained to 
 fall back upon many who had been unemployed, 
 disgraced, even imprisoned, under his previous 
 regime. Among these were Itikad Khan, Far- 
 okhsir's old favourite, who had plotted his 
 destruction under that Emperor, and Hamid 
 Khan, Nizam-ul-Mulk's uncle, whom he had 
 deprived of his jaghire when the nephew had 
 declared against the rule of the Seiads, and 
 proceeded to hostilities. Such officers were little 
 to be trusted, and their appointment showed 
 
174 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 that Abdullah's game was a desperate one. 
 He was also much embarrassed for money, in 
 consequence of the exorbitant demands of the 
 soldiers, who were the more inclined to insist 
 upon high terms for their services, because 
 they were in bad case from previous arrears 
 of pay, or in the instance of the Barha recruits, 
 because they rated themselves by no means 
 modestly. Thus a brother of Abdullah brought 
 with him, says Khafi Khan, from the Doab, 
 " ten or twelve thousand horse, also one hundred 
 and fifty carts full of Barha Saiyids, each of 
 whom thought himself equal to twenty well- 
 accoutred horsemen, and had come in the 
 expectation of making himself an amir, an 
 elephant rider, and a general." Their gallantry 
 in the battle that followed, as on other occasions, 
 went some way to justify the soaring ambition of 
 these soldiers of fortune. Indian Afghans also 
 flocked to the quasi-nationalist standard in great 
 numbers. And from the now Imperial army 
 numbers of Husain's old troops deserted and 
 joined Abdullah, as did Churaman, the Chief of 
 the Jats, after an unsuccessful attempt to fire 
 the Emperor's magazine, in which he was 
 foiled by Haidar Kuli Khan's vigilance. Thus 
 Abdullah contrived to muster an enormous 
 but heterogeneous army. It is said to have 
 amounted to nearly 100,000 men, and to have 
 been twice as numerous as that of the Emperor. 
 But it was a disorderly and ill-disciplined host. 
 
RATAN CHAND BEHEADED 175 
 
 Thus Khafi Khan says : " There were such 
 contentions among the officers, who were un- 
 willing to serve under the orders of each other, 
 that a proper disposition could not be made. 
 Each chief raised his standard where he 
 chose, and would not consent to obey any 
 other." 
 
 Before the battle began, the character of the 
 contest was illustrated by the execution of 
 the captive Hindoo Minister, who had lately 
 given its tone to the administration of the 
 Seiads. Khafi Khan's sympathies are vigorously 
 intimated in his record of this retributive act. 
 " The Emperor . . . ordered that the head 
 of the vile Ratan Chand, who had been the 
 chief cause of the unpopularity of the Saiyids, 
 should be struck from his filthy body, so that 
 the world might be gladdened by being cleansed 
 from his polluting existence. So his head was 
 cut off and thrown as a propitious omen before 
 the feet of the Emperor's elephant." 
 
 The battle that followed was long and 
 well contested. But it was decisive, not only 
 as an Imperialist victory, but of the great 
 political issues which were involved in the 
 contest. The desperate gallantry of the Barha 
 chiefs and their followers was pitted against 
 the skilful and terribly effective fire of the 
 Imperial artillery, directed by Haidar Kuli 
 Khan ; and the fortune of war, at the close of 
 the day, still trembled in the balance. Haidar 
 
176 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 Kuli's guns " shook the new levies in the enemy's 
 army," and a flight began among them, in 
 which older soldiers joined. But Najm-ud-din 
 Ali, another of Abdullah's many brothers, and 
 on this occasion, according to our author, " the 
 leading spirit of the Barha army," planted a 
 battery on a hill commanding the battlefield, 
 and followed up this manoeuvre by a bold 
 charge with 14,000 or 15,000 horse upon the 
 royal artillery. A fierce contest followed ; and 
 Khafi Khan says that the Seiads " nearly won 
 the battle." But the Imperialists attacked and 
 captured the battery on the hill ; and night 
 closed on an undecided strife. But Haidar 
 Kuli gave the enemy no respite. In the darkness, 
 " he pushed forward his guns, and opened a 
 heavy fire " on the hostile army, which was 
 constrained to fall back, and many made off in 
 the obscurity and confusion. 
 
 " Out of the 100,000 horsemen of the enemy's 
 army," says Khafi Khan, " only 17,000 or 18,000 
 held their ground through the terrible cannon- 
 ade of that night." Whether these alone took 
 part in the final struggle is not clear ; but it 
 seems to be implied in these words, as well as 
 by what follows : 
 
 " In the morning the Imperial army advanced, 
 and was met by Najm-ud-din Khan with some 
 other brave and devoted Barha chiefs, and a 
 hard fight ensued." Abdullah, seeing " the 
 desperate position of his brother, . . . brought 
 
ABDULLAH DEFEATED AND TAKEN 177 
 
 up a party of the Barha braves to his rescue." 
 Thereupon Najm-ud-din and his followers " re- 
 covered their powers, and fought so fiercely 
 that . . . the royal army began to waver." But 
 again Haidar Kuli interposed, and with decisive 
 effect. He led a charge on Abdullah's flank, 
 which Khafi Khan describes as " overwhelm- 
 ing." Abdullah, following a practice which re- 
 sembled that of knights in the Middle Ages, as 
 Hallam notices, " dismounted from his elephant 
 in the hope that the Barha braves would dis- 
 mount from their horses and join him [in a 
 charge]." But his action was misunderstood, 
 and interpreted as a commencement of flight. 
 And thereupon, except 2000 or 3000 horse in 
 his immediate neighbourhood, the whole army 
 broke and fled. Haidar Kuli himself captured 
 Abdullah, and led him on an elephant, and 
 wounded, into the presence of the Emperor, 
 who " spared his life, and gave him in charge 
 to his captor." His gallant brother had been 
 mortally wounded. And Hamid Khan, Nizam- 
 ul-Mulk's uncle, gave himself up, and was 
 pardoned ; as was also the pseudo-Emperor, 
 Sultan Ibrahim, who was taken prisoner, but 
 released as having been an involuntary tool 
 in the Seiad's hands. 
 
 It would not be easy to exaggerate the im- 
 portant consequences of this counter-revolution 
 
 on the future fortunes of India. Had not the 
 12 
 
178 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 main knot been cut by the assassination of 
 Husain, the Seiads might have prevailed. And 
 they might have established and maintained a 
 strong government on a tolerant basis, with the 
 support of the Indian Mussulmans and the 
 Hindoo Princes. 
 
 The encroaching and predatory character 
 of the Mahratta polity would undoubtedly 
 have been a difficulty. But the compromise 
 suggested by Ratan Chand, to cede the Dekkan 
 Provinces to Nizam-ul-Mulk, might have been 
 adopted, by making them over unreservedly to 
 the Raja of Satara or in fact, to the Peishwa 
 and his subordinate Chieftains. Whether this 
 would have prevented them from pushing on into 
 Hindostan and trying conclusions with the new 
 monarchy of the Seiads, acting in the name of a 
 puppet Emperor, or in their own name, if they 
 preferred to establish a new dynasty, is doubt- 
 ful. But the Mahrattas might have seen that 
 their safest course was to keep on friendly terms 
 with the rulers at Delhi, for fear of another 
 counter-revolution in the Mogul interest, especi- 
 ally when the Europeans began to enter the list, 
 and threatened to break up the whole political 
 system of native India. 
 
 And meanwhile the Seiads would have 
 avoided the fatal carelessness and lethargy which 
 opened India to the incursion of Nadir Shah, 
 and the consequent utter prostration of the 
 Imperial majesty and authority. 
 
THE RESULT OF THE VICTORY ABORTIVE 179 
 
 On the other hand, the counter-revolution, 
 though successful at the moment, failed, through 
 the personal defects of the Emperor, to retrieve 
 the failing fortunes of the Empire. It restored 
 the Emperor to personal freedom, and to the 
 exercise of his personal sovereignty, according 
 to the traditional practice of the Mogul monarchy. 
 And had Mohammad Shah, like his illustrious 
 predecessors, been a Prince of mature age, 
 versed in affairs, and from experience capable 
 of discerning, and from disposition inclined to 
 pursue, his true interests, and steadily supporting 
 a sagacious and loyal Minister ; though he could 
 not have succeeded in restoring the Empire to 
 its pristine vigour, or re-extending it to its old 
 limits, he might probably have retarded the 
 day of its dissolution ; ruled respectably ; and 
 avoided the fatal concessions which we shall 
 see he was constrained to make to the 
 Mahrattas, and the crushing overthrow and 
 abject humiliation which he suffered from Nadir 
 Shah. 
 
 The most singular and, at first sight, para- 
 doxical circumstance connected with the counter- 
 revolution is the attitude and conduct of Nizam- 
 ul-Mulk, contrasted with his subsequent assump- 
 tion of virtual independence of the Emperor 
 in the Dekkan. Though absent from the scene 
 of the contest, and though there is no reason to 
 suspect that he was privy to the assassination 
 plot, he was unquestionably the master-spirit 
 
180 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 of the Mogul party's movement against the 
 regime of the Seiads. And the professed objects 
 of that movement were to restore the power of 
 the Emperor, and to re-establish Mogul domina- 
 tion. Yet, when these objects had been attained, 
 he practically repudiates the Emperor's author- 
 ity, and becomes himself a dismemberer of 
 the Empire. This inconsistency may be readily 
 accounted for by assuming that he was actuated 
 simply by personal feelings. And, to a certain 
 extent, this is no doubt true. It is true also that 
 he was a wily politician, who was given to alter- 
 ing his course according to the circumstances 
 of the time in fact, that he was an opportunist. 
 But I shall show later that he was not so incon- 
 sistent as he seems ; and that his later line was 
 an alternative adopted on the conviction that 
 the Emperor was a bruised reed, and the restora- 
 tion of his effective power impracticable ; and 
 that (if I may use a strong metaphor) when the 
 vessel of State was hopelessly doomed, it was 
 time to take to a boat, and save himself and some 
 of the crew from shipwreck. 
 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk had been, in the first in- 
 stance, appointed Subadar of the Dekkan by the 
 Seiads, in acknowledgment of his at least passive 
 co-operation with them in the deposition of 
 Jehandar Shah (whom he had previously served) 
 and in the exaltation of Farokhsir. 
 
 But when they recalled him, and Husain Ali 
 took his place, although no open quarrel followed, 
 
SADUT KHAN FOUNDS THE OUDE DYNASTY 181 
 
 the seeds of hostility were sown ; and though 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk did not oppose the new revolution, 
 which displaced Farokhsir and raised Mohammad 
 Shah to the throne, he was much scandalised 
 at the murder of the unfortunate Emperor ; 
 was by no means reconciled to the new regime 
 by his appointment to the Viceroyalty of Malwa ; 
 and (as we have seen) both in self-defence against 
 those whom he now considered enemies both of 
 himself and of his class, and incited by the new 
 Emperor and his mother, he marched again into 
 the Dekkan ; struck down the lieutenants of the 
 Seiads there ; made himself master of the Mogul 
 Provinces south of the Nerbudda ; and thus 
 facilitated the counter-revolution in Hindostan 
 which emancipated Mohammad Shah, and re- 
 sulted in the death of Husain and the defeat and 
 captivity of Abdullah. 
 
 Of the three conspirators, the actual murderer 
 of Husain had perished. But the Emperor, 
 now free to choose his ministers, made Itam- 
 u-dowla, the contriver of the plot, his Vizier ; 
 and his friend, the third conspirator, Sadut Khan, 
 became Viceroy of Oude, and the founder of the 
 dynasty which came to an end on the eve of 
 the great Sepoy Mutiny in 1857. And Sadut's 
 previous service, together with his vigorous 
 character and conduct, enabled him to root 
 himself so tenaciously in Oude, that it virtually 
 became an independent Principality, like the 
 Dekkan under Nizam-ul-Mulk in the period on 
 
182 MOGUL COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
 which we are entering. Thus, in both cases, the 
 revolution that was to restore the vitality of 
 the moribund Empire resulted in its further 
 dismemberment, and reduced it to a shrivelled 
 and attenuated carcass ! 
 
XV 
 NIZAM-UL-MULK'S POLICY 
 
 THE new Vizier did not long survive his eleva- 
 tion. And, on his death, Nizam-ul-Mulk was 
 appointed to succeed him, and returned to the 
 capital, without, however, resigning his Vice- 
 royalty, or giving up the control of the strong 
 places which he had entrusted to his supporters, 
 and which gave him the effective command of 
 the country. At Delhi he did his utmost to 
 act the part of a loyal and efficient Prime 
 Minister. But the youthful, weak, and pleasure- 
 loving Sovereign was under the influence of 
 volatile and vicious companions of his own 
 age, and of a female favourite, who distracted 
 him from all serious application to business, 
 contrived to misappropriate and squander in 
 profligacy the slender resources of the restricted 
 and impoverished Empire, and poisoned the 
 Sovereign's mind against the faithful and saga- 
 cious, but severe, free-spoken, and, according 
 to the temper of the Court, ludicrously old- 
 fashioned and exacting Minister. His position 
 not a little resembled that of Clarendon at the 
 Court of Charles u. In vain he tried to rouse 
 
184 NIZAM-UL-MULK'S POLICY 
 
 Mohammad Shah to a sense of his duties, and 
 the personal supervision of public affairs. His 
 remonstrances were irksome, and only provoked 
 dislike and jealousy, and, in the end, fear and 
 enmity. 
 
 The Vizier showed no disposition to imitate 
 the unconstitutional and dangerous practice of 
 his predecessors, and, depriving the Emperor 
 of power, to rule arbitrarily in his name. But 
 he saw too clearly that the experiment of re- 
 storing him to the position of the older Sovereigns 
 had failed ; that Mohammad Shah was unfit 
 for personal rule ; and instead of persevering 
 in so uncongenial, mortifying, and hopeless an 
 attempt to galvanise the torpid Sovereign into 
 political vitality, or trying to find a fitter Prince, 
 and plunging anew into direct rebellion, he 
 preferred to resign his office, and, retiring into 
 the Dekkan, to consolidate his own power 
 there, and leave the ill-starred and crumbling 
 Empire to its inevitable fate. 
 
 Before he did this, however, he had for the 
 time broken the power of the Jats, and had 
 subdued a refractory Viceroy in Guzerat, and 
 added that province to his own charge, ad- 
 ministering it through his uncle, Hamid Khan. 
 
 However conscious of his own shortcomings, 
 and of the original fidelity of Nizam-ul-Mulk, 
 the Emperor might well be alarmed at such a 
 monopoly of power by a servant at once so 
 able and so discontented ; and he soon began 
 
MAHRATTAS CONQUER GUZERAT & MALWA 185 
 
 to play the old game of intrigue against him. 
 He superseded him in Malwa and Guzerat ; 
 but thereby only left these provinces exposed 
 to the incursions of the Mahrattas, who soon 
 after overran, conquered, and annexed them. 
 Indeed, they were already swarming in Guzerat : 
 and Nizam-ul-Mulk, however strongly opposed 
 to the authority of Shao in the Dekkan, or 
 rather to the rising influence of Shao's great 
 Minister, the Peishwa, found his account in 
 leaguing himself with Trimbuk Rao, the Sena- 
 putti, or Commander-in-Chief of the Raja in 
 Guzerat, whom he played off successively against 
 the Imperial Viceroy and the Mahratta Peishwa ; 
 and thereby promoted the rise of Trimbuk' s 
 lieutenant, the ancestor of the Guikwar, who 
 still rules in the same region. I am anticipating 
 the course of my narrative. But I have done 
 so in order to show how, once more, the revolu- 
 tion that overthrew the Seiads, though directed 
 against their Hindooising policy, indirectly led 
 to the establishment of a Hindoo Principality 
 on the ruins of the Imperial power in Guzerat. 
 I mentioned formerly that Mubariz Khan, 
 the sub-Viceroy of Hyderabad, went over to 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk in his contest with Alam Khan. 
 Mubariz was now secretly stimulated by the 
 Emperor to play a similar part again, and 
 promised that if he succeeded in conquering 
 the too-powerful subject, he should be appointed 
 Subadar of the whole Mogul Dekkan. Mubariz 
 
186 NIZAM-UL-MULK'S POLICY 
 
 threw for the splendid prize ; but Nizam-ul- 
 Mulk again triumphed, and, sending the spolia 
 opima to the foot of the throne, with bitter 
 irony congratulated Mohammad Shah on the 
 destruction of a rebel, who had, in reality, obeyed 
 his Sovereign not wisely but too well. The 
 hint was, however, taken, and no further attempt 
 was made from Delhi to molest the victor, who 
 was meanwhile otherwise amply occupied in 
 adjusting his relations with the Mahrattas. 
 
 However anti-Hindoo in his sentiments as 
 well as his antecedents, and obnoxious to that 
 people, Nizam-ul-Mulk was far too wise and 
 wily a statesman to neglect the signs of the 
 times ; and though steadfast in his general 
 aims, his policy varied greatly according to 
 circumstances. He had supported the Em- 
 peror, in the hope that he would deserve 
 that support, and act conformably with his 
 position and its obligations. But this not 
 proving to be the case, he had (so to speak) 
 dissolved partnership with him. Yet later, as 
 we shall see, he saw good reason for once more 
 throwing the weight of his influence into the 
 Imperial scale, though with no happier result 
 than before. So he had once fought stoutly 
 to suppress the Mahrattas ; and as Vizier at 
 Delhi had even advised the reimposition of the 
 jizya throughout the Empire. 
 
 But in his second Viceroyalty in the Dekkan 
 he had found that the Mahrattas were far too 
 
BALAJI WISHWANATH'S REVENUE SYSTEM 187 
 
 strong to be suppressed, and after Husain All's 
 compact with them he had reluctantly ac- 
 quiesced in their claim to the chout and sur- 
 deshmuki, i.e. to the levy of twenty-five per cent, 
 on the land revenue and customs, and ten per 
 cent, on the ryots, or peasantry, in the Mogul 
 Dekkan. A very artful and complicated system 
 of collecting and distributing these dues had 
 been devised by Balaji Wishwanath, the first 
 prominent Peishwa, based on an old and now 
 purely ideal assessment, and subdivided among 
 many chiefs, so that, in the exhausted state of the 
 country, there were constant alleged deficiencies 
 and demands of arrears ; standing grounds 
 for vexatious and oppressive visitations, and 
 eager competition among the chiefs and their 
 followers, each equally bent on promoting the 
 common cause, and making the best bargain 
 for his separate share. 
 
 The Peishwa was a Brahmin, from the 
 Concan ; and, as the accountants were mostly 
 Brahmins, his influence in the community was 
 greatly enhanced by this subtle and com- 
 prehensive scheme for the national aggrandise- 
 ment. 
 
 He was also a soldier, and in that capacity 
 had commanded the Mahratta contingent which 
 accompanied Husain AH to Delhi, on his march 
 against Farokhsir. He was now dead, but 
 had been succeeded in his office by his son, 
 Baji Rao, a man of remarkable ability and 
 
188 NIZAM-UL-MULK'S POLICY 
 
 gallantry, the greatest of the Peishwas, and a 
 worthy rival of Nizam-ul-Mulk. 
 
 But he had a competitor nearer home in 
 Sreeput Rao, the pirtinidi, or first minister of the 
 Raja, whereas the Peishwa was, as yet, entitled 
 formally only to the second place. 
 
 The Raja, Shao, had never recovered the 
 debilitating effect of his seclusion in the Imperial 
 zenana ; but he was still a free agent, and even 
 inclined to appear in the field. Sreeput urged 
 him to consolidate his internal government, and 
 content himself with his share of the revenues 
 of the Dekkan, which he already enjoyed to 
 so large an extent. But Baji Rao advocated 
 a forward policy, as better suited to the char- 
 acter and established practice of the adventurous 
 and predatory people, and recommended further 
 by the enfeebled and discordant condition of 
 Hindostan. The Raja approved of the Peishwa's 
 counsel, and the rather, as the anti-Raja at 
 Kolapore had ceased to be formidable, and was 
 sinking into insignificance. 
 
 Nizam - ul - Mulk had formerly, while not 
 denying the right of the Mahrattas to levy the 
 imposts, sought to evade them by professing in- 
 ability to determine the nice question, whether 
 Shao or his cousin at Kolapore was the true 
 Raja. Such a dilatory plea had now lost much 
 of its force. And he preferred to avail himself 
 of Baji Rao's absence on an expedition beyond 
 the Nerbudda, to conclude an arrangement with 
 
BAJI RAO COERCES NIZAM-UL-MULK 189 
 
 Sreeput Rao, whereby the demands on his terri- 
 tory were to be estimated once for all, and com- 
 muted for a lump sum, to be paid annually by 
 himself, without the vexatious and harrying 
 interposition of the Mahratta tax-gatherers and 
 their armed bands. And he began to remove 
 these obnoxious officials ; and when Baji Rao, 
 on his return, condemned the arrangement, and 
 a quarrel ensued between him and Sreeput, the 
 Nizam (as we may henceforth call him) took a 
 higher tone : suspended the payment of the 
 stipulated sum, and again raised the question 
 whether it was properly due to Shao or to his 
 rival at Kolapore. 
 
 The Raja was furious, and was with difficulty 
 dissuaded from leading his own forces against 
 the Mogul. In the end, Baji Rao was deputed 
 to wage the war ; and his success in the cam- 
 paign gave him an ascendancy in the State 
 which soon reduced the Raja to a cipher, and 
 advanced the Peishwa far on the way to suprem- 
 acy in the Mahratta community. 
 
 Again, as in Aurungzib's days, the superior 
 numbers and extraordinary agility of the Mah- 
 rattas proved more than a match for the Mogul 
 army ; brought it to a stand ; and hemmed it 
 in on every side. The haughty and wily old 
 soldier was compelled to yield to his young 
 and dashing rival, and to admit the claims 
 which he had questioned. He pledged himself 
 to defray all arrears of what was, in fact, tribute, 
 
190 NIZAM-UL-MULK'S POLICY 
 
 and to surrender several strong places as security 
 for the future payment of the chout and sur- 
 deshmuki (1729). 
 
 But the Nizam had not played his last card. 
 I have mentioned his alliance with Trimbuk, the 
 Senaputti, or Mahratta Commander-in-Chief in 
 Guzerat. Him he now instigated to march into 
 the Dekkan, and rescue the Raja from the 
 ascendancy of the Peishwa and the Brahmin 
 faction, which Baji Rao represented and favoured, 
 proposing to co-operate with him. But Baji Rao, 
 taking a leaf out of Nizam-ul-Mulk's own book, 
 anticipated the junction of his enemies by dash- 
 ing at and destroying Trimbuk on his march ; 
 and this victory, says Grant Duff, left him " all 
 but nominal control of the Mahratta sover- 
 eignty " (1731). 
 
XVI 
 
 GROWTH OF THE MAHRATTA CONFED- 
 ERACY, AND OF THE PEISHWA'S 
 ASCENDANCY IN IT 
 
 THAT is to say, the Raja continues to reign, but 
 he does not rule ; the official hierarchy which 
 Sivaji had established, and which had become to 
 a great extent hereditary in certain families, 
 loses most of its consideration, though it is not 
 formally abolished ; the Peishwa becomes the 
 leading Minister in effective power sole Minister 
 at Satara, though (as we shall see) another deter- 
 mined effort is made to remove him, and to 
 subvert the Brahmin faction, which forms the 
 nucleus of his strength. His lieutenants in turn, 
 Sindia, Holkar, and Puar, disengage themselves 
 from the throng of generals and collectors ; be- 
 come localised in the newly conquered country 
 of Malwa, as minor potentates, actively sup- 
 porting their patron ; and the Guikwar, having 
 already obtained a footing in Guzerat, and 
 another Chief, of the name if not of the lineage 
 of Sivaji, the Bonsla, having been established 
 by the Raja in Berar, has a constant tendency 
 to push on eastward and northward. 
 
192 GROWTH OF MAHRATTA CONFEDERACY 
 
 Thus gradually arises the great Mahratta 
 Confederacy, of which, after vindicating his 
 superiority over his older rivals, the Peishwa 
 becomes the acknowledged hegemonic leader, 
 though the utterly passive and imprisoned Raja 
 is still the nominal Sovereign. 
 
 In explaining the import of Grant Duff's 
 expression, I have anticipated the course of 
 events to which we must now revert. 
 
 Baji Rao's interference in Guzerat had been 
 jealously regarded by Trimbuk, who considered 
 that country his own hunting - ground. And 
 this was one chief cause of his hostility. The 
 Peishwa, however, now thought it politic to 
 heal the breach, and obtained for his enemy's 
 son the father's office of Senaputti. But the feud 
 smouldered ; and Trimbuk' s client, the future 
 Guikwar, who soon eclipsed and virtually super- 
 seded the titular Senaputti, re-enacted (as we 
 shall see) later his patron's part against Baji 
 Rao's son and successor in the Peishwaship. 
 
 Meanwhile, the concessions which the 
 Peishwa had extorted from the Imperial Viceroy 
 in Guzerat mark another distinct step in the 
 advance of the Mahratta dominion, and in the 
 dismemberment of the Empire. The chout and 
 sur-deshmuki were granted in perpetuity. And 
 this was enough to ensure the whole control of 
 the country's passing into the hands of the 
 ingenious and indefatigable armed tax-gatherers. 
 In vain attempts were made to limit the grant 
 
THE MAHRATTAS ACQUIRE GUZERAT 198 
 
 to its exact terms, and to prevent abuse and 
 encroachment. In vain the Emperor at first 
 refused to ratify the concession, and superseded 
 the Viceroy who had made it. His successor 
 was equally unsuccessful in removing the wedge, 
 which was steadily splitting up the rotten fabric 
 of the Imperial organisation. Before long, Ah- 
 medabad alone remained to the Moguls ; and 
 Ahmedabad itself fell at last to the Mahrattas, 
 and, typifying their complex relations, was 
 occupied partly by the Peishwa's, partly by the 
 Guikwar's troops. 
 
XVII 
 
 PEACE BETWEEN THE NIZAM AND THE 
 PEISHWA, AND CONSEQUENT MAH- 
 RATTA PROGRESS IN HINDOSTAN 
 
 RUT another and much more considerable result 
 of Raji Rao's enterprise and Mohammad Shah's 
 fatal feebleness was now to follow. The Nizam 
 and the Peishwa had hitherto been uncompro- 
 mising enemies, and twice the young Mahratta 
 Brahmin's tactics had foiled his able and veteran 
 adversary. But Baji Rao's position was still 
 critical ; he had reason to fear the arts, if not 
 the arms, of the wily political intriguer ; and he 
 could not prudently prosecute his great designs 
 in Hindostan while Nizam-ul-Mulk was threaten- 
 ing his base in the Dekkan. The Nizam, on the 
 other hand, had every inducement to seek an 
 accommodation with him. He was anxious to 
 consolidate his own power, and to nurse his 
 resources. He had renounced all hope of main- 
 taining, or rather of restoring, the integrity and 
 independence of the doomed Empire ; and he 
 would find his best security against molestation 
 if his still jealous Sovereign, instead of making 
 common cause, as Farokhsir had done under 
 
PEACE BETWEEN NIZAM AND PEISHWA 195 
 
 similar circumstances, with the Mahrattas against 
 his own Viceroy, and secretly or openly sanction- 
 ing an attack by them upon him, were himself 
 to be exposed to the enterprising incursions of 
 the Peishwa. Thus a common interest drew the 
 two competitors together ; and they came to 
 an understanding that hostilities between them 
 should cease, and that Baji Rao should be free 
 to push his conquests in the north. The im- 
 mediate results of this compact were startling 
 and momentous. The Mahrattas poured, like 
 an irresistible torrent, into Malwa ; defeated 
 and killed the Imperial Viceroy ; and, bearing 
 down all opposition, took forcible possession of 
 the country. Thence they penetrated into 
 Bundelcand ; and though gallantly resisted by a 
 force of Rohilla Afghans, and unable to master 
 the warlike and stubborn Boondelas of Rajput 
 origin effected a lodgment in the Province, 
 which subsisted to the days of Wellesley. 
 
 The imbecile ministers meanwhile took no 
 effectual steps to arrest the course of conquest 
 and assert the majesty of the Empire. They 
 assembled large armies, and made loud profes- 
 sions of an intention to march and exterminate 
 the insolent invaders. But they cared not to 
 come to close quarters with them ; and their 
 timid and languid military parades were soon 
 exchanged for a brisk retreat to the capital. 
 They next stooped to negotiation, and were pre- 
 pared to make abject concessions. Whereupon 
 
196 PEACE BETWEEN NIZAM AND PEISHWA 
 
 Baji Rao, trading on their fears, rose in his 
 terms, and made demands which even such 
 negotiators could not venture to entertain. 
 Then the Mahrattas pushed on to the neighbour- 
 hood of the capital. But Sadut AH, the sur- 
 viving conspirator against the Seiads, and now 
 Subadar of Oude, again struck a bold blow 
 for the honour of his Sovereign, and the defence 
 of the heart of the Mogul Empire against Hindoo 
 aggression. Leaving his own province, he 
 crossed the Ganges, engaged and repulsed the 
 Mahrattas, and drove them out of the Doab. 
 He was preparing to follow up his success, when 
 an imperious message from Delhi enjoined him 
 to await the junction of one of the very minis- 
 ters who had already so conspicuously failed to 
 check the Peishwa's growing audacity. While 
 Sadut Ali tarried reluctantly, in obedience to 
 this order, the nimble enemy, recovering courage 
 when they found themselves unpursued, re- 
 turned ; wheeled round his flank ; and, headed 
 by Baji Rao in person, suddenly appeared before 
 Delhi, and inspired there extreme terror. But 
 he did not attack the city, and even refrained 
 from plundering the suburbs. Whereupon a 
 body of Imperialists took heart, and sallied out 
 against him, but were soon repulsed by Holkar, 
 Sindia, and other lieutenants of the Peishwa. 
 Having extorted an ignoble promise from the 
 Emperor, or his Minister, that the government 
 of Malwa should be conferred on him, he retired, 
 
EMPEROR SEEKS HELP FROM THE NIZAM 197 
 
 on the approach of Sadut Khan and the Imperial 
 army which had joined that Viceroy, and re- 
 turned for the time to the Dekkan (1736). 
 
 This brilliant campaign was followed by one 
 still more decisive. The Emperor, after all that 
 had occurred to estrange Nizam-ul-Mulk, con- 
 ceived the hope of re-enlisting him as his cham- 
 pion against the Mahrattas, and summoned him 
 to his aid. 
 
 The old soldier of Aurungzib in the Mahratta 
 War of Independence, the statesman who had 
 striven to liberate his Sovereign from the yoke 
 of Hindooising ministers, the standing rival of 
 Baji Rao in the Dekkan, could not be insensible 
 to the appeal. And he was probably seriously 
 alarmed, on personal grounds, at the rapid 
 success of the Mahratta arms, and the extrava- 
 gant pretensions of the Peishwa in the late 
 negotiation. He repaired to Delhi, and was 
 entrusted with the amplest authority for levying 
 forces. But though the Rajputs joined him in 
 considerable numbers, and he was very strong 
 in artillery, he could only muster half as many 
 men as the Peishwa. He was also enfeebled 
 by age ; and, knowing too well the wonderful 
 agility and terrible impetuosity of the Mahratta 
 cavalry, he resorted to the precaution of at 
 once entrenching his position ; which, as a sign 
 of fear and a confession of inferiority, greatly 
 elated his enemies, and made them more auda- 
 cious than ever. In short, the course of his 
 
198 PEACE BETWEEN NIZAM AND PEISHWA 
 
 former contest with Baji Rao was repeated. 
 His movements were carefully watched and 
 anticipated. His convoys were cut off ; his 
 foragers intercepted ; provisions became scarce 
 in his camp ; his march was obstructed ; and 
 at last, near Bhopal, he was fairly blocked 
 up, and compelled to enter into a convention 
 equally ignominious to himself and his royal 
 master. He had been re-appointed Viceroy of 
 Malwa. But now, so far from being able to 
 take up that appointment, he was obliged to 
 promise " in his own hand- writing to grant to 
 Baji Rao the whole of Malwa, and the complete 
 sovereignty of the territory between the Ner- 
 buddha and the Chumbul ; to obtain a con- 
 firmation of this cession from the Emperor ; and 
 to use every endeavour to procure the payment 
 of fifty lacs of rupees, to defray the Peishwa's 
 expenses." * 
 
 Thus not only had the Dekkan previously 
 been cut off irretrievably from the Empire, but 
 the Mahratta power, already established de 
 facto, was now to be de jure also in Hindostan, 
 and at easy striking distance from Agra and 
 Delhi. 
 
 Such were the fruits of the Emperor's self- 
 indulgence, and the recklessness and incapacity 
 of his ministers, in the past. The whole South 
 was lost. But, as if infatuated, and foredoomed 
 to destroy what remained, they were at this 
 
 1 Grant Duff, i. 341. 
 
THE EMPEROR'S AND MINISTERS' FATUITY 199 
 
 very time engaged in displaying the same quali- 
 ties in another direction, and thereby inviting 
 nay provoking attack from a still more 
 formidable and ruthless conqueror in the 
 north. 
 
XVIII 
 NADIR SHAH'S INVASION 
 
 THE native author of the Siyar-ul-Mutakherin 
 traces very clearly, in much detail, and with 
 appropriate indignation and scorn, how the 
 corruption, short-sightedness, and obstinate dis- 
 regard of significant and successive warnings, 
 and of the most obvious precautions, led to the 
 awful catastrophe which placed the Emperor 
 at the mercy of a foreign invader ; deluged the 
 proud capital in the blood of its citizens ; de- 
 spoiled it of untold treasure ; rent away for 
 ever three northern provinces ; and, divesting 
 the central authority of such respect as it had 
 hitherto retained, precipitated the final and 
 complete dissolution of the Empire. 
 
 Nadir Shah was a Persian of low origin, a 
 soldier of fortune, whose early career was stained 
 with many dark deeds ; but a man of extra- 
 ordinary ability, both military and political, 
 of great ambition, indomitable energy, and 
 fiery valour, but cold-hearted, stern, pitiless, 
 and unscrupulous. In the year 1722, Persia 
 had been invaded and the capital and much 
 of the country conquered, by the Western 
 
NADIR SHAH'S EXPLOITS IN PERSIA 201 
 
 Afghans, under a leader who captured the 
 Shah and assumed the throne. He was, how- 
 ever, too weak to complete his conquest; and 
 after his death, two years later, his relative 
 and successor, Ashraff, was threatened by a 
 combination of Peter the Great and the Turkish 
 Sultan, who proposed to treat Persia as Poland 
 was afterwards treated. But the Shah's son, 
 Prince Tamasp, had escaped ; and, taking 
 Nadir into his service, made successful head 
 against his various enemies. Peter the Great 
 died ; the Russians were checked, and a peace 
 was concluded with them. The Turks were 
 signally defeated ; the Afghans were routed 
 and expelled ; and the whole country was 
 gradually recovered. But the young Prince 
 was restored to the throne of his fathers only 
 to be promptly superseded by his perfidious 
 deliverer, who, after thoroughly organising the 
 national forces, and compelling the Persians to 
 adopt the Sunnee formula, such was his extra- 
 ordinary ascendancy over them, entered on a 
 career of foreign conquest ; retaliated on the 
 Western Afghans the evils they had inflicted 
 on Persia ; subdued and occupied the Mogul 
 Province of Cabul ; crossed the Attok, and 
 invaded the Punjab, bent upon marching to 
 Delhi, and exacting satisfaction for alleged 
 injuries which he exaggerated, but also for 
 insults and supercilious treatment on the part 
 of the imbecile Emperor and his reckless 
 
202 NADIR SHAH'S INVASION 
 
 ministers, of which he had too good reason to 
 complain. 
 
 Nadir's severe handling of the Afghan in- 
 truders had scattered them in all directions. A 
 complete stampede took place ; and swarms of 
 them poured into the Cabul Province, and through 
 that into India. 
 
 I may mention incidentally that the most 
 notable of these were the Rohilla Afghans, 
 Macaulay's interesting clients, the alleged peace- 
 ful, industrious, and poetical victims of Warren 
 Hastings's unscrupulous policy; but who were 
 really in every respect much the reverse. 
 
 The Mogul Government, in its better days, 
 had adopted systematic precautions to secure 
 this critical frontier region : able Viceroys had 
 been employed in Cabul ; a strong force had 
 been stationed there ; the wild tribes in the 
 hills overhanging the defiles, through which 
 enemies or questionable immigrants might pene- 
 trate into India, had been regularly subsidised, 
 to give timely notice of their approach, and to 
 dispute their progress ; and a constant and 
 brisk communication of political intelligence 
 had been maintained between Cabul and the 
 Mogul capital. 
 
 But, of late years, all this had been neglected. 
 Jobbery, corruption, and carelessness, which 
 had already laid open Guzerat and Malwa to 
 the Mahrattas, now exposed Northern India 
 to Nadir's attack, as well as to its pretext, the 
 
FADIR INVADES INDIA 203 
 
 harbouring of his enemies. Incapable Viceroys 
 were appointed by favouritism ; the garrisons, 
 says the author of the Seir Mutaquerin, were 
 " totally neglected " ; the tribal subsidies were 
 withheld, to swell the illicit gains of those in 
 power, or their dependants; and the frivolous 
 Sovereign and his like-minded ministers heard 
 little, and cared less, about what was going on 
 beyond the mountains. 
 
 Nadir sent message after message, complain- 
 ing, with growing urgency and imperiousness, 
 of the shelter afforded to his foes by the Indian 
 Government. But his power was underrated ; 
 his applications remained unanswered ; his 
 messengers were detained on futile grounds ; 
 and at last a party, escorting a fresh and more 
 imperative emissary, was attacked and cut off 
 at Jelalabad by the Emperor's subjects. Nadir, 
 who had already occupied Cabul for some 
 months, on learning this cruel deed from the 
 sole survivor, instantly marched on the place, 
 and massacred all its inhabitants. He thence 
 advanced to Peshawur, where the Viceroy of 
 Cabul, who had been characteristically out of 
 the way when the Persian overran his province, 
 made a feeble stand against him, but was cap- 
 tured ; and Nadir, says the native historian, 
 16 having put to the sword every one that 
 attempted to stand before him, whether Indian 
 or Afghan," swept on, in his irresistible course ; 
 crossed the Attok in boats, and routed with the 
 
204 NADIR SHAH'S INVASION 
 
 greatest ease the Viceroy of Lahore, who im- 
 mediately afterwards tendered his submission, 
 and, like his colleague of Cabul, was graciously 
 treated, and led in the conqueror's train, on his 
 rapid march to Delhi. 
 
 The Emperor, with Khan Douran, the 
 Ameer-ul-Omra, or Head of the Peerage (who 
 together with the Vizier was responsible for 
 the maladministration), marched from the 
 capital, at the head of a considerable army, 
 to confront the invader. Nizam-ul-Mulk was 
 also in camp, and Sadut Khan joined soon 
 after, with his own forces. Vain attempts were 
 made to raise the Rajputs; and this failure 
 seems to have much disheartened the already 
 craven - hearted Imperialists ; and, advancing 
 very slowly, they came to a stand at four days' 
 march from Delhi. Many circumstances dis- 
 close the wretched state of military organisation 
 among them. Thus they had no exact know- 
 edge of the enemy's whereabouts until Nadir's 
 advanced guard fell upon Sadut Khan's baggage 
 train. And the discordant counsels and sepa- 
 rate action in the engagement that followed 
 show the utter want of a general plan and a 
 commanding and authoritative mind. Sadut 
 hastened to succour his own followers ; Nizam- 
 ul-Mulk insisted that the day was too far spent 
 for fighting ; Khan Douran, displaying un- 
 wonted spirit, inveighed against the ignominy of 
 leaving Sadut unsupported, and led a body of 
 
NADIR ADVANCES TO DELHI 205 
 
 roops to his assistance. This body was quickly 
 routed ; and the Ameer-ul-Omra was mortally 
 wounded, and was rescued only to die. Sadut 
 Khan's men fought better, but shared the fate 
 of their comrades ; and Sadut himself was 
 taken prisoner, and, like the other captured 
 Viceroys, was well received by the victor. A 
 negotiation followed, set on foot by the Viceroy 
 of Oude, and concluded by Nizam-ul-Mulk ; 
 and Nadir agreed to retire, on payment of two 
 crores of rupees. The Emperor then visited 
 him, and received the highest honour. The 
 grim conqueror was all smiles and deference. 
 But the end was not yet ! 
 
 It is not easy to account for the caprices of 
 such a man. But the native historian states 
 confidently that Sadut jealous of the Emperor's 
 having conferred the vacant office of Ameer-ul- 
 Omra, which he coveted, on Nizam-ul-Mulk 
 incited Nadir to persevere in marching to Delhi, 
 and rifling its ample wealth. It is more probable 
 that Nadir had been acting a part, and that 
 this had been all along his intention. However 
 that may have been, certain it is that the Per- 
 sian suddenly changed his tone ; insisted on 
 Mohammad Shah's again visiting his camp, with 
 his family and officials ; and that the helpless 
 monarch obeyed the summons, and was led in 
 a sort of triumph to his own capital (1739). 
 
 There, though Nadir's strict discipline main- 
 tained perfect order in his army of occupation, 
 
206 NADIR SHAH'S INVASION 
 
 a course of systematic and cold-blooded spo- 
 liation took place. The Imperial Court was 
 stripped of its splendid appliances, including 
 the world-renowned Peacock Throne, which was 
 profusely decorated with magnificent jewels, the 
 value of the whole being estimated by Tavernier, 
 himself a jeweller, at six millions sterling ; 
 the nobles and other rich men were compelled 
 to disgorge their accumulated wealth ; the 
 citizens generally were laid under heavy con- 
 tribution ; and the Provinces did not escape 
 the rigorous application of the principle : Vce 
 Victis ! Terror, dejection, and shame sat on 
 every countenance, from Mohammad Shah in 
 his palace to the meanest subject in his hovel. 
 And Nadir's ascendancy was emphatically as- 
 serted by the kutba being read in his name in 
 the mosques, i.e. his being recognised as supreme 
 in the Moslem Bidding Prayer. 
 
 But a far darker and more tragic scene was 
 to succeed this spectacle of imperial and national 
 humiliation. The ardent wish being father to 
 the thought, a fatal report was spread in the 
 city that Nadir had suddenly died. A popular 
 rising, acquiesced in, if not excited, by the 
 higher classes, instantly took place. Seven 
 hundred of Nadir's soldiers were slaughtered 
 in the streets during the night. After vainly 
 trying, by showing himself, to quell the tumult, 
 the justly exasperated conqueror gave loose to his 
 fury, and ordered a general massacre, wherever 
 
 
WHOLESALE MASSACRE AT DELHI 207 
 
 the body of a slain Afghan should be found. His 
 orders were obeyed with terrific alacrity. The 
 number of the victims was never accurately ascer- 
 tained ; but it was certainly enormous. Houses 
 were sacked in all directions; the horrors and 
 crimes worse than death usual on such occa- 
 sions were perpetrated ; fire added its terrors to 
 the scene ; and a great part of the city was 
 consumed. At midday Mohammad Shah inter- 
 ceded for mercy to his unhappy subjects ; Nadir 
 then relented, and such was his discipline the 
 avenging swords were instantly sheathed. 
 
 After this coup de grace to the majesty of the 
 Empire, the conqueror lingered a while in the 
 devastated and blood-stained capital ; married 
 his second son, who had accompanied him, to 
 one of the Imperial Princesses ; formally re- 
 instated Mohammad Shah in his degraded 
 sovereignty ; gave him much advice, and ex- 
 horted his subjects to obey him, with severe 
 threats if his injunctions should not be complied 
 with ; collected his vast spoil ; and, at the 
 head of his victorious army, conveyed it to 
 Persia. But he did not long survive his triumph. 
 Intoxicated with success, he gave loose to his 
 passions, became hideously cruel, and at last 
 mad, and not less hateful as a tyrant than he 
 had once been popular as the deliverer of his 
 country from the yoke of foreigners. And his 
 strange and wild career was cut short by assas- 
 sination (1747). 
 
XIX 
 
 CULMINATING PERIOD OF MAHRATTA 
 ASCENDANCY IN NATIVE INDIA 
 
 THE political outlook in India was now most 
 gloomy and perplexing. The strong Govern- 
 ment that had formerly maintained order 
 throughout the greater part of the country was 
 no more. The actual dominions of the Emperor 
 had shrunk to the neighbourhood of the capital, 
 and even over these the feeble and utterly 
 discredited Mogul retained only a precarious 
 and relaxing grasp. The Hindoo reaction, 
 stimulated by Nadir's prostration of the Ma- 
 hometan authority, seemed destined to go on 
 absorbing revenue, and annexing territory, until 
 it should become the supreme disposer of the 
 fate of the country, in which Mussulman rule 
 had been predominant for so many centuries. 
 But, to say nothing of Sikh fanaticism and 
 Jat lawlessness, the prospect of Mahratta 
 ascendancy was by no means hopeful for the 
 welfare of India. In the work of political 
 destruction, marauding, and financial extortion 
 and assessment, Sivaji's people were unrivalled. 
 
 But it remained very questionable whether 
 
 208 
 
NAZIR JUNG FOILS THE PEISHWA 209 
 
 they were capable of reconstructing a regular 
 and tolerable scheme of civil government. And 
 failing this, constant warfare, general anarchy, 
 and the extreme social misery that these in- 
 volve, seemed the inevitable alternative. And 
 the course of events soon after tended to confirm 
 such dismal forebodings. This I will illustrate 
 by glancing summarily at the progress of the 
 Mahratta power in the coming years, before 
 recounting events in more detail. 
 
 Sadut Khan, who had conspired to over- 
 throw the Seiads, remove the Hindoo influence 
 in the administration, liberate the Emperor, 
 and restore the political ascendancy of the 
 Mogul party ; who had recently defeated Holkar 
 in the Doab, and fought stoutly, though un- 
 successfully, against Nadir Shah, died before 
 that conqueror retired from Delhi. Nizam-ul- 
 Mulk, after his late failure against the Peishwa, 
 had cut a rather poor figure in the campaign 
 against the Persian, while Baji Rao's reputa- 
 tion was at its height, and his forces were intact. 
 Might it not be possible, while the Nizam still 
 lingered at Delhi, to give another signal triumph 
 to the Mahratta arms, by conquering his terri- 
 tory in the Dekkan ? Such was Baji Rao's 
 calculation. A pretext was readily found in 
 the withholding of the stipulated grant of the 
 government of Malwa. But the attempt mis- 
 carried through the unexpected energy of Nazir 
 Jung, the Nizam's eldest son. And Baji Rao 
 14 
 
210 PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 died soon afterwards (1740). But before his 
 death he had organised a great expedition in a 
 new direction, and at the same time had familiar- 
 ised the community with the idea of the Peishwa's 
 general control over its operations. He had 
 concerted an invasion of the Carnatic, and 
 constituted his rival, Rugoji Bonsla, of Berar, 
 generalissimo of the invading army. (Tanjore, 
 in the same region, it must be remembered, was 
 already under Mahratta rule, its Raja being a 
 collateral descendant of Sivaji.) Distant Mysore 
 too, under its Hindoo Raja, was about this 
 time first laid under contribution by the 
 Mahrattas. Soon after Baji Rao's death, the 
 same people, under Rugoji, the Raja (as we 
 may now call him) of Berar, invaded the eastern 
 provinces of the Empire, Bengal, Behar, and 
 Orissa, or Cuttak, which had hitherto escaped 
 their incursions. And though they were bravely 
 encountered there, and worsted both by arms 
 and by perfidious stratagem, they returned 
 indefatigably, and in the end effected a com- 
 promise, which involved both a territorial cession 
 and the payment of tribute to the Bonsla. 
 
 The new Peishwa, Balaji Baji Rao, though 
 less distinguished than his father in war, gave 
 full indeed dangerous scope to the national 
 propensity. His brother, Rugonath Rao, levied 
 exactions in Rajputana, and even on the Jats ; 
 took part in another dynastic revolution at 
 Delhi ; and waging a rash war in the Punjab, 
 
MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY BALEFUL 211 
 
 precipitated another Mussulman invasion of 
 India, destined to be as fatal to Mahratta pre- 
 ponderance as Nadir's had been to Mogul 
 ascendancy. Jeiapa Sindia meanwhile over- 
 ran the Rohilla country, and was involved in 
 hostilities with Sadut Khan's successor in Oude. 
 The Peishwa's uncle, Chimnaji, accomplished 
 the proud feat of taking Bassein from the 
 Portuguese, and threatened Goa itself. Again, 
 but for French help, the old dream of conquer- 
 ing the Nizam's territory would have been 
 accomplished by the Mahrattas ; and the Berar 
 Raja actually annexed a portion of it, and the 
 audacious freebooters made a raid across the 
 hills into the French jaghire on the Eastern 
 Coast. 
 
 Thus it might seem that the Mahrattas, 
 though frequently driven back for a time, were 
 destined to prevail everywhere in the end ; that, 
 obeying as it were a natural law, the great 
 flood of predatory power, which had been run- 
 ning for a century in ever-widening volume and 
 circuit, was appointed to rise still higher ; and, 
 overleaping all barriers, to submerge the whole 
 Indian Continent. In such a case, what but 
 general havoc and misery could be the result ? 
 
 It was a melancholy prospect, not only for 
 the fallen but still proud Mogul noble, but for 
 the peaceable and would-be industrious Hindoo 
 peasant, and the timid and thrifty tradesman 
 and native merchant. So utterly had the old 
 
212 PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 political organisation broken down, that in many 
 parts of the country, but for the village com- 
 munities, society itself must have perished. 
 But the night is darkest before the dawning. 
 And already the dawn of a better day was 
 breaking, though in turbulence and the tempest 
 of warfare on the Coromandel Coast ; and Wel- 
 lesley's inscription on Fort William College 
 Esc Oriente Lux was to have a political 
 application. 
 
 I must now fill up the details of this summary 
 sketch of the expansion of the Mahratta power. 
 
 On the death of Baji Rao, and for some time 
 afterwards, it seemed not improbable that that 
 power might be dissolved, so violent were the 
 rivalries and internal dissensions among its 
 leading members. Rugoji ran an opposition 
 candidate to Balaji, Baji Rao's son, for the 
 Peishwaship. But the attempt failed ; and 
 the hereditary right to the office was thenceforth 
 undisputed. The Raja Shao, however, was 
 childless ; and this led to fresh troubles. He 
 was disposed to adopt his Kolapore cousin, the 
 anti-Raja, and so heal the schism; but his 
 cousin was also childless. Sukwar Bhye, Shao's 
 wife, wished him to adopt an heir from a more 
 remote branch of the family, hoping to become 
 Regent to a minor, and thus oust the Peishwa 
 from his growing ascendancy. But, to conceal 
 her ambitious design, she gave hints of her in- 
 tention to become suttee, on her husband's 
 
MAHRATTA LEADERSHIP DISPUTED 213 
 
 death. Balaji, with characteristic Brahmin craft 
 and cold-blooded cruelty, taunted her w,ith this 
 alleged intention, and drove her unwillingly to 
 immolate herself, thus ridding himself of one 
 rival. But he had still a more formidable one 
 in Tara Bhye, the widow of Ram Raja, Sivaji's 
 second son, after whose death she had assumed 
 the Regency on behalf of Ram Raja's and her 
 young son, the second Sivaji, and had (as I 
 related) ably sustained the war of independence 
 against Aurungzib. And popular feeling was 
 strongly in favour of her present claim to occupy 
 the same position. Moreover, she enlisted the 
 sympathies of all who were averse to the Brahmin 
 ascendancy ; and this included both the party 
 of Trimbuk, who had perished in the same cause, 
 and whose son was now in the guardianship of 
 Dunnaji Guikwar, and Dunnaji himself, who 
 was fast overshadowing the titular authority of 
 the Senaputti. 
 
 Tara Bhye's pretensions were grounded not 
 only on her past services to the community, 
 but on the fact that she told a singular story, 
 which, however suspicious, may have been true, 
 and was accepted at the moment. She asserted 
 that Sivaji n. had had a son, whom she had 
 concealed, and brought up privately ; and she 
 identified him with a youth whom she now 
 produced, and who, in fact, became Shao's 
 successor. In the first instance, Balaji found it 
 convenient to acquiesce in this tale, as a counter- 
 
214 PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 poise to Sukwar Bhye's plan of the adoption 
 of a stranger. But he thus laid himself open to 
 Tara's ambition of ruling in her alleged grand- 
 son's name. By his precautions against this 
 danger, he not only staved it off for the time, 
 but established the authority of the Peishwa on 
 a more regular and explicit basis than it had 
 hitherto occupied. By a strong display of force, 
 he overawed those who were ready to declare on 
 Tara's behalf on the death of Shao. He con- 
 ciliated Tara herself by promising to share the 
 government with her, though with no intention of 
 doing so. He bribed the other chiefs by caus- 
 ing the Raja to confirm and enlarge their terri- 
 torial possessions and fiscal rights. And he 
 procured from him a document which em- 
 powered him, says Grant Duff, " to manage the 
 whole government of the Mahratta Empire, on 
 condition of his perpetuating the Raja's name, 
 and keeping up the dignity of the house of 
 Sivajee, through the grandson of Tara Bhye and 
 his descendants" (ii. 35). Thus the Peishwa's 
 leadership received a constitutional sanction ; 
 the doubtful lineage, as well as the feeble 
 character, of the new Raja made him passive 
 in the hands of his Mayor of the Palace ; he 
 vegetated in strict seclusion at Satara ; while 
 Poona, the Peishwa's residence, became the 
 military and political capital of the State. By 
 the measures now adopted (1750), the Mahratta 
 power was in fact converted into a confederacy of 
 
BALAJI ENTRAPS THE GUIKWAR 215 
 
 chiefs, permanently and avowedly presided over 
 by the Peishwa, as an almost sovereign Prince 
 loosely and grudgingly obeyed indeed, but far 
 more distinctly recognised as supreme on his 
 own account, than he had previously been; 
 while the Raja retired into unapproachable and 
 inactive isolation. 
 
 This political arrangement, however, was 
 not finally established without another desperate 
 attempt to frustrate it. When, in the following 
 year, Balaji marched against the new Nizam, 
 Salabat Jung, Tara Bhye invited the Guikwar 
 Dunnaji, as Nizam-ul-Mulk had invited Trimbuk 
 Rao to join her from Guzerat, and co-operate 
 in overthrowing the Brahmin Peishwa. He 
 complied, and joined her at Satara, where she 
 had vainly tried to rouse the young Raja 
 in the same cause. She there shut him up 
 closely, rated him soundly, and declared him 
 spurious, no doubt intending to adopt a more 
 compliant tool. But Balaji returned by forced 
 marches ; entrapped the Guikwar into his power 
 by a perfidious stratagem; and, shrinking from 
 a direct attack upon Tara, came to a com- 
 promise with her, allowing her to command in 
 the fort of Satara, and retain the custody of 
 her naughty boy, which as the Peishwa recom- 
 mended her to release him she took care 
 should be strict. The Guikwar was not liber- 
 ated until he had solemnly agreed " to accept 
 the Peishwa's lead, and to yield permanently 
 
216 PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 the right to half the revenues of Guzerat, and 
 to fulfil other stringent stipulations." Thus 
 Balaji triumphed ; but his perfidy was not 
 forgotten. The Bonsla's jealousy of the 
 Peishwa' s power was aggravated by another 
 circumstance. Balaji, anxious to procure the 
 long-deferred Imperial sunnud for the govern- 
 ment of Malwa, secured it at last, on condition 
 of restraining the Mahrattas from attacking the 
 remaining provinces of the Empire. And, in 
 pursuance of this engagement, he actually co- 
 operated (as I shall describe later) against 
 Rugoji, when the latter invaded Bengal. But 
 not long afterwards, the Peishwa again followed 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk's example, and entered into a 
 secret compact with his rival, whereby Rugoji 
 was left free to prosecute his designs on the 
 Bengal Provinces, on condition of leaving the 
 Peishwa undisturbed. Thenceforth their re- 
 lations were peaceable, though not cordial. 
 And the Bonsla took no part in the Paniput 
 Campaign. 
 
 Moorar Rao also, the descendant of the 
 murdered Santaji Ghorepuray, the hero of the 
 War of Independence, was reconciled by Balaji 
 to the national association, and joined in the 
 Carnatic expedition already referred to. Sindia 
 and Holkar were settled in Malwa, under the 
 patronage of the Peishwa, and on excellent 
 terms with him. Thus, on the whole, the 
 imminent danger of the disruption of the 
 
BALAJI SUBADAR OF MALWA 217 
 
 Mahratta power by internal dissension was 
 avoided ; the Confederacy waxed stronger by 
 the aggrandisement of its several members ; 
 and rapidly attained the culminating stage of 
 its progress on the eve of its experiencing a 
 terrific disaster, which, for the time, paralysed 
 it, and from which as a whole it never re- 
 covered. 
 
 Though the Peishwa's legati, Sindia and 
 Holkar, were cantoned in Malwa, where Oojein 
 and Indore became their respective capitals, 
 the Emperor had not formally ratified the 
 concession of its government to Baji Rao, as 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk had promised in his name. But 
 Mohammad Shah at length granted this, in con- 
 sideration of the assistance which, as I have 
 said, was to be afforded against Mahratta in- 
 vasions, and which was rendered to Aliverdi 
 Khan (1743). With a poor attempt to save 
 his dignity and evade the explicit recognition 
 of the rising Mahratta polity, the Emperor 
 professed to make Balaji the deputy of his 
 own heir apparent, Prince Ahmed, and imposed 
 conditions, which were not likely to be too 
 scrupulously observed, especially the one I have 
 mentioned, which was soon after ignored, when 
 the Peishwa and Rugoji came to the accommo- 
 dation I have specified. Moreover, as the levy 
 ing of chout and sur-deshmuki was invariably a 
 preliminary step to conquest and annexation, 
 we may almost say that Mohammad Shah dis- 
 
218 PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 solved his empire with his own hand, when, 
 about the same time, he granted to the Mahrattas 
 the chout in all the remaining provinces. This 
 donation does not seem to have been reduced 
 to writing with due formality ; but those to 
 whom it was made took good care that it should 
 be known, and acted upon. 
 
 Dupleix's policy was now in the ascendant; 
 and the new Nizam, Salabat Jung, was sup- 
 ported by Bussy. Thus, when the Peishwa, 
 after disposing of his domestic rivals, resumed 
 his campaign against Salabat, he was hard 
 pressed, compelled to retreat, and to witness 
 the devastation of his own country, and to 
 tremble for his capital, Poona. But this reverse 
 only illustrated the policy of his late compact 
 with the Bonsla, and the potency of the Con- 
 federation which he had established among the 
 Mahratta Chiefs. While others were hastening 
 to his assistance from the north, Rugoji himself 
 created a formidable diversion in his favour. 
 " He surprised," says Grant Duff, " and took 
 Gawelgurh and Nurnallah, made himself master 
 of Manikdroog, occupied the districts dependent 
 on those forts, and . . . not only laid the whole 
 country between the Payn Gunga and the 
 Godavery under contribution, but drove out 
 the Mogul thannas, and established his own " 
 (ii. 55, 56). The Peishwa meanwhile cleverly 
 promoted by his intrigues internal dissension 
 among his enemies, and jealousy of the French; 
 
ENTERPRISE OF SINDIA AND HOLKAR 219 
 
 and thus Salabat was fain to make peace, with 
 the loss of the territory occupied by the Bonsla 
 (1752). 
 
 Sindia and Holkar meanwhile had been giving 
 equally good proof of the ubiquitous activity 
 of their people, and of the consideration shown 
 to it by the Moguls. Safder Jung, Viceroy 
 of Oude, had called them in against the Afghan 
 Rohillas, whom they had defeated, and driven 
 into the Kumayoon mountains. This service was 
 acknowledged by a large grant of the conquered 
 territory ; and although, bent on other projects, 
 they evacuated the country soon after, it was not 
 without obtaining fifty lacs of rupees as the 
 price of their retirement. And they soon re- 
 turned to triumph on a wider field in Hindostan, 
 though that triumph was but the prelude to 
 the catastrophe which shortly overwhelmed them- 
 selves and their patron. 
 
 For the present, however, we must return 
 to the Dekkan, where the fortunes of the 
 Mahrattas are materially influenced by the 
 Seven Years' War in Europe, and the con- 
 sequent struggle between the English and the 
 French on the Coromandel Coast. Count Lally, 
 on his landing in India, lost no time in recall- 
 ing Bussy to the Carnatic, and dissolving the 
 French connexion with the Nizam. And the 
 victorious English, though they allied them- 
 selves with Salabat, evaded the obligation of 
 defending him. So formidable at this time was 
 
220 PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 the Peishwa's power, that, to their disgust, he 
 levied chout from Mahomet Ali, their own Nawab 
 of the Carnatic. He also invaded the as yet 
 Hindoo State of Mysore, besieged its capital, 
 occupied several districts, and, on one occasion, 
 extorted from its ruler thirty-two lacs of rupees 
 or pagodas. But on the same occasion Hyder 
 Ali, who was rising into power in Mysore, dis- 
 tinguished himself by his brilliant services against 
 an enemy hitherto thought invincible. 
 
 On the opposite side of the peninsula Bed- 
 nore was invaded, and the Peishwa's forces 
 co-operated with the English, under Clive and 
 Watson, in reducing the pirate, Angria. He 
 also concluded a treaty with the Bombay 
 Government, and through that medium twice 
 transmitted letters to the King of England. 
 
 While thus exerting his energies, and direct- 
 ing his views, so variously and remotely, it will 
 be readily conceived that Balaji was not in- 
 clined to forego the opportunity of assailing 
 his old rival and immediate neighbour, the 
 Nizam, now no longer buttressed by European 
 aid. The Peishwa, as I have said, rarely 
 appeared personally in the field. But his 
 brother, Rugonath Rao, had been pursuing an 
 adventurous course in the north, which was not 
 approved by their cousin, Sedasheo or " the 
 Bhow," as he was commonly called. A quarrel 
 ensued, and ended in Rugonath' s scornfully 
 resigning the command of the army to the Bhow, 
 
THE BHOW ADOPTS EUROPEAN ARMAMENT 221 
 
 who had hitherto conducted the civil administra- 
 tion, but was now fired with the ambition of 
 distinguishing himself in war. As this ambition 
 drove him to the fatal field of Paniput, it will be 
 necessary later to compare him with his great 
 adversary, Ahmed Shah Abdali, and to show how 
 his character and tactics contributed to his 
 overthrow. But it will be enough at present to 
 account more summarily for the immediate and 
 signal success of his campaign against a more 
 familiar and weaker antagonist. He was the 
 son of Chimnajee Appa, the able brother of the 
 late Peishwa, Baji Rao, who had prosecuted to a 
 successful issue the long siege of Bassein (1739). 
 This triumph over Europeans, and especially in 
 a branch of warfare in which Orientals are 
 generally so unskilful, was not only an occasion 
 of great elation to the Mahrattas, but seems to 
 have permanently prejudiced the conqueror's 
 son, the Bhow, in favour of a fundamental 
 change in the national armament and style of 
 warfare. Hitherto, the great Mahratta arm had 
 been cavalry. The Bhow was inclined to rely 
 henceforth much on regular infantry, and especi- 
 ally on artillery. And, fortunately for his im- 
 mediate object, he secured the services of a 
 clever and experienced artillerist, Ibrahim Khan 
 Gardee, who had been trained under Bussy in 
 the Nizam's army, but who now took service 
 with the Mahrattas. 
 
 The Nizam also was strong in guns, but 
 
222 PERIOD OF MAHRATTA ASCENDANCY 
 
 they were old - fashioned lumbering cannon ; 
 while Ibrahim furnished a good train of the light 
 and mobile field-pieces which the French had 
 introduced, and which had been one of the most 
 important factors of their success, The Bhow 
 had also at his disposal the very numerous and 
 as yet unimpaired hosts of cavalry, so long accus- 
 tomed to triumph over the Moguls in the Dekkan. 
 Salabat, deserted by the French, and un- 
 supported by the English, had already fallen 
 under the influence of his brother, Nizam Ali, 
 who soon after supplanted him. The Bhow, 
 by intrigue, procured the surrender of Ahmed- 
 nuggur. The brothers marched to recover it. 
 But the vast force of Mahratta cavalry, as so 
 often before, surrounded their army, and brought 
 it to a stand. Their heavy guns of position 
 were no match for Ibrahim's easily manoeuvred 
 and swiftly discharged field-pieces. And, after 
 a vain struggle in the toils, they were summoned 
 to surrender at discretion. Though this was 
 refused in form, it may be said to have been 
 yielded in substance. For Salabat sent to the 
 Bhow his seal of state, thus leaving to the victor 
 the dictation of terms. They were not only 
 hard and humiliating, but virtually concluded 
 (for the present at least) the long rivalry between 
 the houses, by transferring to the Mahratta a 
 very large part of the dominions of his opponent. 
 The whole province of Bijapur, almost the 
 whole of that of Aurungabad, and part of 
 
THE BHOW DELUDED BY SUCCESS 223 
 
 Beder, together with the famous and impreg- 
 nable fortress of Dowlutabad and others 
 destined to become famous in our later wars 
 with the victors on this occasion, were conceded 
 unreservedly (1760). 
 
 Sedasheo Bhow might well be proud of such 
 an opening of his warlike career. But there 
 can be no doubt that this easy and complete 
 success threw him off his guard, and led him to 
 underrate the difficulties of the war in Hindostan, 
 to which he had pledged himself, and which was 
 to be conducted against a very different foe. 
 
XX 
 
 ALIVERDI KHAN 
 
 THE Bengal Provinces had been exempted from 
 the earlier incursions of the Mahrattas into 
 Hindostan, though their fertility and conse- 
 quent wealth were a strong inducement to 
 the inveterate spoilers. But when the Raja of 
 Berar, otherwise called the Bonsla, emulous of 
 his rival, the Peishwa, began to push his way 
 eastward, it was not long before he was attracted 
 by so promising a field for his enterprise ; though 
 there he found an antagonist very different from 
 the poor-spirited Emperor and his imbecile 
 favourites, and more determined and successful 
 in his resistance than Nizam-ul-Mulk himself. 
 The result was a long, obstinate, and desperate 
 struggle, which ended in a compromise, indicative 
 of the inability of the Mogul champion to throw 
 off the yoke of the Hindoo reactionist, and which 
 indicates the culminating period of Mahratta 
 ascendancy. 
 
 The three eastern provinces, Behar, Bengal 
 proper, and Orissa, had been massed into one 
 Viceroy alty under an able ruler, Shuja-u-Dowla, 
 who died in 1738. He was succeeded by his 
 
 224 
 
THE RISE OF ALIVERDI KHAN 225 
 
 son, Serfiraz Khan, a very inferior man. Shuja 
 had been zealously served by two brothers, 
 soldiers of fortune, Mahummud AH and Haji 
 Hamud ; and the former became Sub- Viceroy 
 of Behar under Serfiraz. But on a rather com- 
 plicated quarrel, which I need not now stop to 
 disentangle, the brothers rose against the new 
 Viceroy, and destroyed him (1739). Mahum- 
 mud Ali then petitioned the Emperor to ratify 
 the decision of the sword, and to confer the 
 Viceroyalty of the three provinces on himself. 
 And as he backed the petition with a large part 
 of Serfiraz's treasures, and the Emperor, just 
 after Nadir Shah's departure, was in no con- 
 dition to disoblige so powerful a suppliant, the 
 request was granted. Henceforth, Mahummud 
 Ali figures as Aliverdi Khan. I may add that 
 he soon after quarrelled with his brother, who 
 retired into private life. But his two sons were 
 actively employed by their uncle, who had no 
 sons of his own, and Hybut, one of these 
 nephews, was married to a daughter of Aliverdi. 
 The other, Said Ahmed Khan, Aliverdi appointed 
 Governor of Cuttak. But an insurrection soon 
 broke out there ; Said Ahmed was made prisoner, 
 and handed over to Baukir Khan, a relative of 
 Serfiraz. 
 
 Aliverdi lost no time in marching to his 
 
 nephew's rescue ; routed Baukir ; delivered his 
 
 nephew ; appointed another Governor in the 
 
 disturbed district ; and was making his way 
 
 15 
 
ALIVERDI KHAN 
 
 homewards, when he was called upon to do 
 battle with a new and more formidable enemy. 
 
 Bhaskir Pundit, a general of the Bonsla, 
 Rugoji, pursued him with 40,000 cavalry. After 
 some fighting, he offered to retire, on payment 
 of ten lacs. Aliverdi's army was not more 
 than 5000 effectives; he was encumbered with 
 a large number of helpless and obstruc 
 fugitives from the Mahratta inroad; and the 
 already very high reputation of the enemy 
 had been enhanced by their recent triumph 
 over Nizam-ul-Mulk. But Aliverdi scorned sub- 
 mission, and fought his way gallantly, though 
 with severe loss, to Cutwa, where his nephew 
 joined him with reinforcements. Then, under 
 Meer Hubeeb, a deserter from his own service, 
 a Mahratta party tried to capture his capital, 
 Moorshedabad. But he saved it by a forced 
 march. The enemy, however, overran the whole 
 country westward of the Ganges, during the 
 rains. But, taking them by surprise, he put 
 them to flight, and drove them into the difficult 
 country on the south. They turned up again 
 in Cuttak; again he routed them, and they 
 retreated homewards. 
 
 This spirited conduct excited great interest 
 at Delhi; and the Emperor recognised it by 
 honorary gifts. 
 
 But Rugoji himself now repeated the in- 
 vasion. And, on the Emperor's summons, 
 Balaji, the new Peishwa, co-operated with Ali- 
 
BHASKIR AND HIS OFFICERS MURDERED 227 
 
 verdi in resisting it. Thus Mahratta met 
 Mahratta in the tug- of -war or rather, in a 
 pursuit too fleet for Aliverdi to keep up with 
 it. Rugoji was fain to evacuate Behar ; and 
 Balaji's service on this occasion was (as I have 
 mentioned) rendered in consideration of the 
 grant of the Viceroyalty of Malwa (1743). 
 
 Next year, however, Bhaskir reappeared, 
 and again offered to retire on payment of a 
 large sum. Aliverdi had no scruples in dealing 
 with such a social pest ; and the overture 
 enabled him to employ negotiation to entrap 
 his enemies. He arranged an interview with 
 Bhaskir and his principal officers, and murdered 
 them all. Then he fell upon and routed their 
 army, and thus foiled the third invasion. 
 
 The Mahrattas, great as was their intrin- 
 sic strength, and especially the extraordinary 
 marching power of their irregular and hardy 
 cavalry, had almost invariably been much 
 favoured by the division of counsels and dis- 
 sensions in the Empire. Aliverdi was not, like 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk and Husain Ali before him, 
 intrigued against and hampered by the Court 
 of Delhi. On the contrary, Mohammad Shah's 
 feeling towards him seems to have been friendly 
 throughout ; though he had some reason to 
 fear the designs of Safder Jung, Sadut's suc- 
 cessor in the Oude Viceroyalty. But, on the 
 other hand, his raw and forcibly established 
 authority was exposed to constant and extreme 
 
228 ALIVERDI KHAN 
 
 danger from internal disturbances, arising from 
 the circumstances of his position as a military 
 adventurer, and the character of the instruments 
 whom he was constrained to employ. The 
 inhabitants of Bengal are notoriously most un- 
 warlike. But this was not the case with the 
 other parts of his dominions. And Northern 
 India at the time swarmed with the fierce 
 Afghan soldiery, whom Nadir had expelled from 
 Persia and their own country, and whose settle- 
 ment in India had been the original pretext 
 of his invasion. These men, arrogant, brutal, 
 treacherous, and insubordinate, could only 
 be kept in good temper by lavish indulgence 
 of their greedy disposition. They resented 
 Aliverdi's strict discipline. They had no 
 sympathy with his desire to husband the re- 
 sources of the country, and to improve its 
 civil administration. Bent upon this, and 
 cramped by constant military requirements, 
 Aliverdi was unable to gratify their insatiable 
 appetites, or even to fulfil the expectations 
 which he had led them to entertain as the 
 reward of their services in the field. Hence 
 they were ever ready to join in disturbances, 
 to break out into rebellion against him, and 
 to become tools of leaders as unprincipled 
 as themselves, and ambitious to repeat the 
 subversive part which Aliverdi had played 
 against Serfiraz. And what made the long and 
 stout resistance which he offered to the Mahratta 
 
MUSTAPHA DEFEATED AND SLAIN 229 
 
 advance the more remarkable, was that it was 
 conducted in spite of this frequent and most 
 serious danger from within. 
 
 Thus, no sooner had Bhaskir Pundit and 
 his army been disposed of, than Mustapha Khan, 
 Aliverdi's right-hand man, availed himself of 
 this military discontent, and demanded to be 
 made Governor of Behar. This was in the 
 hands of Hybut, Aliverdi's nephew and son- 
 in-law, and the demand was rejected. Hence 
 a quarrel, which ended in the dismissal of 
 Mustapha, who marched oft with a large force 
 of his own veterans, and attempted to conquer 
 Behar on his own account. Twice Hybut rashly 
 encountered him with an inferior army ; twice 
 circumstances enabled him to avoid an actual 
 defeat ; and, on Aliverdi's advance, Mustapha 
 retreated. He was actively pursued by the 
 combined forces, and compelled to retire into 
 Oude. But when Aliverdi had departed to 
 meet once more his old enemies, the Mahrattas, 
 Mustapha again invaded Behar, fought another 
 battle with Hybut, and was defeated and slain. 
 
 Rugoji, indignant at the fate of Bhaskir 
 and his officers, and encouraged by Aliverdi's 
 preoccupation with the rebels, for a fourth time 
 renewed the incursion. Again he was arrested 
 for awhile by plausible negotiations ; when 
 hostilities were resumed, his rapidity at first 
 baffled his opponent. But he was presently 
 brought to bay, and sustained several defeats, in 
 
230 ALIVERDI KHAN 
 
 one of which he was nearly taken prisoner. 
 Again, too, Moorshedabad was saved from his 
 attack ; he was defeated again at Cutwa ; 
 and he was forced to retreat (1745). Cuttak, 
 however, he still retained, through Meer Hubeeb, 
 who commanded a joint force of Mahrattas and 
 Afghans. 
 
 The last circumstance was ominous. And 
 the omen was soon fulfilled. Aliverdi in vain 
 tried to expel the enemy from Cuttak ; and in 
 the course of these operations was obliged to 
 cashier two officers who had shown symptoms 
 of treachery. One of them, Meer Jaffier, was 
 afterwards the English Nawab of the Bengal 
 Provinces. A third attempt to reach Moor- 
 shedabad was made by Janoji, Rugoji's eldest 
 son. But again, Aliverdi was too active, and 
 saved his capital. 
 
 But he now incurred the greatest danger 
 to which he was ever exposed. For suspected 
 complicity with Rugoji he had dismissed two 
 other chief officers, Afghans, Shumsur Khan and 
 Sirdar Khan, but had rashly allowed them to 
 settle with their numerous followers in Behar. 
 That province already teemed with the old 
 soldiers of the defunct rebel, Mustapha. And 
 the attraction of a common cause of disaffection 
 drew these forces together. The Afghan leaders 
 acted craftily, and, professing penitence, sought 
 to be readmitted into the Viceroy's service, 
 through Hybut, who was still Governor of 
 
LOYALTY OF ALIVERDI'S ARMY 231 
 
 Behar. Whether he was simply credulous, or 
 secretly ambitious of engaging them in an attempt 
 on his own account to supplant his uncle, has 
 been doubted. But he solicited and gained a 
 reluctant consent to re-enlist Shumsur and 
 Sirdar Khan. The former like Afzul Khan 
 with Sivaji affected timidity in the negotiation, 
 and Hybut, like Afzul Khan, fell into the snare ; 
 appeared slightly attended, and was murdered 
 by Shumsur's own hand ; and Patna, where the 
 deed was done, became the prey of the licentious 
 and brutal soldiery. Ahmed, Hybut' s father, 
 was tortured to death, in the vain hope of forcing 
 him to reveal where he had secreted his wealth. 
 Hybut's wife, Aliverdi's daughter, was carried 
 off ; and the rebels, raising new forces with the 
 plunder of the city, prepared to invade Bengal 
 (1748). 
 
 In these desperate circumstances, the forti- 
 tude, prudence, and energy of the Viceroy were 
 equally conspicuous. 
 
 " He [made] an earnest and pathetic appeal 
 to his chief officers, acknowledging his great 
 obligations to them, and [promising ample] re- 
 wards to those who might enable him to retrieve 
 his affairs." But he gave to any who were 
 inclined to abandon a possibly hopeless cause 
 permission to depart. The result was a unani- 
 mous and enthusiastic declaration of a resolve 
 to support him. This was solemnly confirmed 
 by an oath on the Koran ; and all consented 
 
232 ALIVERDI KHAN 
 
 to forego, until a more convenient season, their 
 claims to pay. Some, however, on second 
 thoughts, were not so sympathetic. But he 
 bore with them, and even restored to active 
 service the two officers who had been removed 
 in Cuttak, making one of them, Atta Oolla, 
 joint commander, along with his surviving 
 nephew, of his capital in his absence. This 
 he could not spare troops to guard effect- 
 ually from the Mahrattas ; and he there- 
 fore recommended the inhabitants to retire 
 behind the Ganges. With a large army he 
 marched against the rebels, who had now made 
 common cause with the Mahrattas, and offered 
 to enter the service of the Bonsla. But Shum- 
 sur overreached himself. He treacherously 
 arrested Meer Hubeeb, who had come to arrange 
 terms by way of hostage for the payment of the 
 subsidy. Hence, in the battle that followed, 
 the Mahrattas stood aloof ; and Aliverdi gained 
 a complete victory, killed Sirdar Khan, and 
 recovered his daughter. The Afghan confederacy 
 was entirely broken up, and the Mahrattas once 
 more retreated, except from Cuttak. 
 
 After a new disturbance, caused by the 
 rebellion of Aliverdi' s degenerate grandson, 
 Suraja Dowlah, the future captor of Calcutta, 
 which was soon subdued, though the rebel was 
 treated with undeserved lenity by his doting 
 grandsire ; and after again and again pursuing 
 and repelling for the time his Parthian foes ; 
 
TERMS OF PEACE WITH RUGOJI 233 
 
 Aliverdi, as age advanced upon him, seems to 
 have grown weary of the interminable strife ; 
 and he at last came to a compromise : Cuttak, 
 which he had never recovered, he ceded outright 
 to the Bonsla ; and he agreed to pay twelve lacs 
 of rupees a year as a commutation of chout to 
 the same Chief. On the other hand, the Mahratta 
 incursions were to cease (1751). 
 
 During the short residue of his reign this 
 agreement was faithfully observed. 
 
 Thus he did, at last, become a tributary of 
 the Berar Raja, as Nizam-ul-Mulk had become 
 of the Peishwa. But his stout and prolonged 
 resistance, and the frequent defeats he had 
 inflicted on the invaders, had contrasted greatly 
 with the Nizam's repeated collapses, and at last 
 almost utter overthrow. 
 
 I may add that Aliverdi discerned the in- 
 capacity of his grandson, and the danger of 
 English encroachment. But his senile partiality 
 for Suraja Dowlah prevented his debarring him 
 from the succession ; and prudence and a sense 
 of justice seem to have combined against his 
 adopting the suggestion that he should expel 
 the formidable Europeans, before it should be 
 too late. 
 
XXI 
 
 EPILOGUE 
 
 HERE I might conclude these lectures, for I 
 have traced summarily their proper subject : 
 the decline and dissolution of the Mogul Empire. 
 I have endeavoured to show how Aurungzib's 
 character, conduct, and policy fatally impaired 
 his military strength, his moral authority, and 
 his administrative system. I have shown how 
 the Mahrattas arrested his course of conquest, 
 vindicated their independence, and established 
 an anti-polity, and an imperium in imperio in 
 the Mogul Dekkan Provinces ; how Aurungzib's 
 son and immediate successor was fain to sanction 
 this fiscal imperium in imperio ; how they estab- 
 lished themselves and subverted the Imperial 
 authority in Guzerat ; and, after forcibly occupy- 
 ing Malwa, extorted from the degenerate Emperor 
 the right to govern it ; and later a right to levy 
 tribute in all the remaining provinces of the 
 Empire, which involved ubiquitous extortion, 
 spoliation, and disorder ; how Nizam-ul-Mulk 
 in the Dekkan, and Aliverdi Khan in the Bengal 
 Provinces, while on the one hand practically 
 emancipating themselves from the Imperial 
 authority, on the other were constrained to 
 
 234 
 
COLLAPSE OF MAHRATTA POWER 235 
 
 become tributaries of the Mahrattas; how they 
 effected a lodgment in Bundelcand'; and, after 
 Nadir Shah had given the coup de grace to the 
 majesty of the Empire, and wrested from it its 
 North- West Provinces, they threatened universal 
 predominance in Native India, with the destruc- 
 tive consequences inevitably entailed by the 
 ascendancy of a community essentially predatory. 
 
 Such is the melancholy anticipation deducible 
 from the course of events which I have described. 
 
 But though European interposition is beyond 
 my present province, I do not think it would 
 be right to conclude without recounting how 
 this anticipation was rapidly falsified by the 
 advent of another great conqueror from the 
 same country whence Baber had marched to 
 the conquest of Upper India, and the establish- 
 ment of the Mogul Empire. In the course of 
 one memorable campaign, and by the issue of 
 one terrible battle, the Mahratta power was, 
 for the time, shattered to atoms ; and though 
 the hydra-headed monster was not killed, it 
 was so effectually scotched, that it remained 
 practically almost quiescent, until great British 
 statesmen were in a condition to cope with, and 
 ultimately to master and disintegrate it. 
 
 Hence I think that it is not only allowable, but 
 desirable, to supplement my proper subject with a 
 narrative of this remarkable and important con- 
 flict, by way of epilogue to the great political and 
 military tragedy which has occupied us so long. 
 
XXII 
 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 IF the decline and dissolution of the Mogul 
 Empire was a remarkable and tragic pheno- 
 menon, still more tragically startling was the 
 sudden collapse of the Mahratta power, when 
 it had attained a position which threatened to 
 make it the predominant tyrant of Native 
 India, and the subverter of every native govern- 
 ment, if not of the framework of civil society 
 in their dominions. 
 
 A short retrospect will explain how this 
 catastrophe came about. 
 
 Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1747. In 
 his army was a young Afghan officer of noble 
 lineage, the son of a man distinguished as a 
 diplomatist, and popular among his countrymen. 
 Young as he was, Ahmed, called the Abdali, 
 from the name of his ooloos, or tribe, had studied 
 war to good effect in the school, and under the 
 eye, of Nadir Shah. And when their master 
 fell he led his Afghan comrades back to their 
 native hills. There his high birth, his father's 
 reputation, and his own already established 
 character, with the interposition of an influ- 
 
 a 3 6 
 
GHAZI-U-DIN'S WILD AMBITION 237 
 
 ential and saintly man, procured his election to 
 the throne ; and this was promptly justified by 
 a display of political ability very remarkable 
 in so youthful a sovereign, and which soon 
 made him undisputed master of the allegiance, 
 if not of the affections, of his wild subjects. 
 His military organisation was equally able ; 
 and he followed the example of his instructor 
 in the art of war, and invaded India (1748). 
 But on this occasion he was repulsed by his 
 namesake, Prince Ahmed, Mohammad Shah's 
 son, who on his return to Delhi found the old 
 Emperor dead, and succeeded him as Ahmed 
 Shah. His own reign, however, was short and 
 disastrous. On the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk's 
 eldest surviving son, Ghazi-u-din, in the Dekkan, 
 his son and namesake at Delhi entered on a wild 
 career of ambition. As his father, anxious to 
 supplant Salabat Jung, had allied himself with 
 the Peishwa ; so now the younger Ghazi-u-din 
 formed a connexion with Jeiapa Sindia and 
 Mulhar Rao Holkar, and with their help made 
 himself master of Delhi ; assumed the office 
 of Vizier, which Safder Jung had hitherto held ; 
 deposed and blinded Ahmed Shah, and set up 
 another phantom sovereign as Alumgeer the 
 Second (1754). Safder Jung died soon after, 
 and was succeeded in Oude by Shuja-u-Dowla, 
 who plays a prominent part in Anglo-Indian as 
 well as in native history. 
 
 Meanwhile Ahmed Shah Abdali had repeated 
 
238 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 his incursion into India ; and, having conquered 
 the Punjab, had placed it under the government 
 of Meer Munnoo, a former Mogul Viceroy (1752). 
 After the death of Munnoo and his infant son, 
 Ghazi-u-din had overrun the province, carried 
 off Munnoo' s widow to Delhi, and appointed a 
 Governor of his own, Adina Beg. Ahmed Shah, 
 resenting this aggression, advanced once more 
 now to Delhi itself, " which," says Grant 
 Duff, " was plundered, and its unhappy people 
 again subjected to pillage, and its daughters to 
 pollution." 
 
 Ghazi-u-din bowed to the storm, and was 
 pardoned. But, after the victor retired, he 
 resumed his mischievous activity. Again he 
 called in the Mahrattas, now commanded by 
 Rugonath Rao. He recovered Delhi, and the 
 custody of his puppet, Alumgeer n. ; deprived 
 Nujeeb-u-Dowla, a leading chief of the Rohilla 
 Afghans, of a high Imperial office which Ahmed 
 Shah Abdali had procured him, and would have 
 put him to death, had not Holkar interposed 
 to save him. Moreover, Ghazi-u-din instigated 
 Adina Beg, his former Governor of the Punjab, 
 to revolt against Ahmed's son, Timour, who 
 had been left in charge of that province, and 
 the Sikhs joined in the rising. 
 
 Rugonath Rao was invited to co-operate ; 
 he invaded the Punjab, routed Ahmed Shah's 
 general, and entered Lahore in triumph (1758). 
 Soon after, another Sindia, Duttaji, was incited 
 
AHMED'S LAST INVASION OF INDIA 239 
 
 by Ghazi-u-din to invade Rohilkund, which he 
 did ; and again the Rohillas countrymen of 
 Ahmed Shah fled to the Kumayoon mountains. 
 Duttaji also quarrelled with Shuja-u-Dowla, 
 whose predecessor had employed the Mahrattas 
 to conquer his troublesome Rohilla neighbours, 
 Ahmed Shah was not only a king and a con- 
 queror, but, as an Afghan, he sympathised with 
 the Rohillas ; and, as a devout Mussulman, 
 he resented Mahratta aggression on his co- 
 religionists in Hindostan. The cup of his fury 
 was full ; and he resolved to bring to a decisive 
 issue his quarrel with the Hindoo power which 
 had thus crossed his track of conquest, ill- 
 treated his allies, and made war on true believers. 
 
 Rugonath had returned to the Dekkan ; 
 and Ghazi-u-din had fled to the Jat Raja, 
 Suraj Mull, when Ahmed Shah advanced once 
 more into India ; drove the Mahrattas under 
 Holkar and Duttaji Sindia before him ; engaged 
 and killed Duttaji, and, hotly pursuing Holkar, 
 defeated him with heavy loss. This was before 
 the Bhow appeared on the scene. 
 
 I shall henceforth follow chiefly an excellent 
 narrative by Casi Raja Pundit, who was not 
 only an eye-witness of the battle of Paniput, 
 but was much engaged in the negotiations 
 which preceded it. And he was well circum- 
 stanced for forming an impartial estimate of 
 events and characters. For he was, on the 
 one hand, a Dekkanee Mahratta ; and, on the 
 
240 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 other, an employe of Shuja-u-Dowla, having 
 been for some time in the service of the Oude 
 Government. Shuja-u-Dowla's own sympathies 
 were divided, though in the end he joined 
 Ahmed Shah. And though Casi Raja has been 
 suspected of writing under Holkar's influence, 
 this does not seem to have impaired the veracity 
 of his account, which is very clear, compre- 
 hensive, and rational, except probably in one 
 case, most material in explanation of the sudden 
 collapse of the desperate Mahratta resistance. 
 
 He gives a very favourable estimate of the 
 Bhow's ability in civil administration, and of 
 his influence in the Peishwa's Cabinet ; and he 
 expressly states that Rugonath Rao's expedition 
 was designed and equipped for completing the 
 conquest of Hindostan ; but that, in spite of 
 the easy success of the military operations, the 
 Bhow, on inspecting the accounts, ascertained 
 that " a debt of eighty-eight lacs of rupees was 
 due to the army ; so much had the expenses 
 been allowed to exceed all the collections of 
 tribute, peshcush, etc." This, though not 
 difficult to explain (for as Rugonath, though a 
 beau sabreur, was an easy-going man, studious 
 of popularity, he had probably allowed his 
 subordinates to help themselves freely to the 
 fruit of their exertions), was certainly, from a 
 Mahratta point of view, a conclusive proof of 
 military incapacity. But other qualities than 
 those of a good Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 
THE BHOW'S CONCEIT AND ARROGANCE 241 
 
 were required to retrieve Rugonath's financial 
 carelessness, and to meet the crisis which he had 
 provoked. And the Bhow was, as a strategist 
 and tactician, not less incompetent than Rugonath 
 as a reaper of the spoils of war. 
 
 But, elated by his recent success in the 
 Dekkan, he assumed the command of the army 
 of Hindostan " with a light heart " ; and set 
 out, accompanied by Wiswas Rao, the Peishwa's 
 eldest son, who, though a youth of seventeen, 
 was nominally the leader of the expedition. 
 
 In his new sphere the Bhow soon displayed 
 his defects, which boded serious mischief in the 
 campaign. " He began," says Casi Raja, " to 
 exercise his authority in a new and offensive 
 manner, and ... in all public business he 
 showed a capricious and self-conceited conduct. 
 He totally excluded from his council Mulhar Rao 
 and all the other chiefs, who were experienced 
 in the affairs of Hindostan, and who had credit 
 and influence with the principal people in the 
 country ; and carried on everything by his own 
 opinion alone." He made overtures in various 
 quarters, and especially to Shuja-u-Dowla. But 
 the young ruler of Oude preferred at present 
 to remain a neutral spectator of the inevitable 
 contest, and to choose his side later according 
 to the fortune of war. The Bhow also applied 
 to Suraj Mull, the Jat Raja, who insisted on 
 negotiating through his usual medium Holkar 
 
 and Sindia. After this preliminary rebuke to 
 16 
 
242 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 Sedasheo's self-sufficiency, Suraj Mull proceeded 
 to tender advice on the conduct of the war, 
 which was very judicious, but which the Bhow 
 received very flippantly, relishing it the less 
 because Holkar and the other chiefs, who well 
 knew the proposed theatre of war and the 
 character of the enemies they would have to 
 meet, cordially approved of it. The Jat Raja 
 urged that the Mahratta operations would be 
 much hampered by the multitude of women 
 and children the families of the officers and 
 soldiers who accompanied the army ; by the 
 profusion of baggage with which the growing 
 luxury of the Peishwa's Court had stored the 
 camp ; and by the long train of heavy artillery 
 which the Bhow specially affected. Let all 
 these, he urged, be deposited in Jansi or Gwalior, 
 or in his own forts of Bhurtpore, Deeg, or 
 Combeir. " Your troops," he observed, " are 
 more light and expeditious than those of Hin- 
 dostan, but the Douranies are still more expeditious 
 than you" 
 
 This statement was surprising if not incredible 
 to the Bhow. But it was based on experience. 
 And the following words show that Suraj Mull's 
 insight into the military situation was by no 
 means contemptible, and, if turned to account, 
 might have averted the ensuing catastrophe : 
 
 " In this arrangement you will have the 
 advantage of a free communication with a 
 friendly country behind you, and need be under 
 
THE BHOW REJECTS WISE ADVICE 243 
 
 no apprehensions respecting supplies to your 
 army." In support of this advice, Mulhar Rao 
 added that " trains of artillery were suitable 
 to the royal armies, but that the Mahratta mode 
 of war was predatory, and their best way was 
 to follow the method to which they had been 
 accustomed." 
 
 They might thus drag out the campaign 
 without a general action till the rains set in, 
 and the enemy would then be driven to retreat. 
 But the Bhow's vanity was touched ; he was 
 jealous of Rugonath, and feared being invidiously 
 contrasted with his cousin, who had reached 
 Lahore in conquering guise. " It never should 
 be reproached to him, that he, who was the 
 superior, had gained nothing but the disgrace 
 of acting defensively." The wisest were shocked 
 at this arrogance ; and a general murmur pre- 
 vailed that "it is better that this Brahmin 
 should once meet with a defeat, or else what 
 weight and consideration shall we be allowed ? 5: 
 
 This was not a sentiment likely to second the 
 ambitious hopes of the self-opinionated general. 
 
 He now marched to Delhi, and besieged the 
 fort, which was still held for the Afghan King by 
 a nephew of his Vizier, who was soon obliged 
 to capitulate. Again the victor wantonly out- 
 raged the feelings of the Hindostanees, Hindoos 
 as well as Mussulmans, who from old associations 
 revered the Empire, even in its dotage. He 
 plundered such monuments of Mogul splendour 
 
244 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 as had been left by Nadir Shah and later devas- 
 tators. Thus he stripped the magnificent Hall 
 of Audience of its fine silver ceiling, which he 
 coined into seventeen lacs of rupees. And our 
 author mentions, on the authority of his master, 
 Shuja-u-Dowla, a project far more outrageous in 
 the eyes of Moguls, Rajputs, and, indeed, of all 
 Imperialists : the Bhow is said to have meditated, 
 when the campaign should be over, placing Wiswas 
 Rao, the Peishwa's son, on the throne of Delhi ! 
 
 In striking contrast to this reckless course 
 were the wary precautions of the Abdali to 
 strengthen his interest in Hindostan. Nujeeb- 
 u-Dowla, the most powerful of the Rohilla 
 chiefs, was bound to him by the strongest ties, 
 not least by a bitter personal animosity between 
 himself and the Bhow and Sindia. The other 
 Rohilla leaders were also thoroughly engaged 
 on the same side. But Shuja-u-Dowla was 
 undecided, and the Shah saw the great import- 
 ance of securing him ; and he effected this 
 adroitly. Through Nujeeb-u-Dowla Shuja was 
 made to feel his own insecurity as a neutral, 
 and his danger in case victory should attend 
 the Bhow, whose hatred of all Mussulmans was 
 notorious. He was convinced, and marched 
 into the Afghan camp, where he was received 
 with much distinction, both by the Shah and by 
 his Vizier, who solemnly hailed him as their son. 
 
 The Shah, who had advanced to Anopsher 
 for the purpose of effecting his junction with 
 
FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 245 
 
 the Rohillas, soon after took up a position on 
 the bank of the Jumna, opposite to Delhi ; 
 but the swollen state of the river arrested active 
 operations for the present. Native belligerents, 
 Mahrattas especially, have always had an odd 
 habit of continuing negotiations in the midst 
 of war, and of mutually sending and entertaining 
 vakeels, or agents, for this purpose. Wellesley 
 highly resented this practice ; and his brother 
 Arthur, in the Mahratta war, put a summary 
 stop to it. But it flourished luxuriantly in the 
 Paniput campaign ; and our author, who was 
 busily engaged in it, devotes much space to 
 describing it. An unwary reader, who did not 
 understand the character and manners of 
 Asiatics, might thus be led much astray, and 
 imagine that peace was constantly on the point 
 of being concluded on moderate terms. But 
 in reality this was not at all the case. The 
 Bhow was finessing in the hope of extricating 
 himself from a position which was becoming 
 more and more embarrassing. 
 
 The Abdali, calmly confident, did not care 
 to interrupt the hollow game, in which his 
 Indian allies took pleasure, and probably felt 
 much like the cat sporting with the mouse 
 before springing upon it. Hence I shall not 
 detain you by dwelling on these unreal over- 
 tures. But I must mention that the Bhow did 
 make not only repeated but earnest efforts first 
 to detach Shuja-u-Dowla from the Shah's adhe- 
 
246 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 sion, and lure him into his own camp ; next, 
 to induce him at least to stand neutral ; and, 
 lastly, as his prospects darkened, and the fortune 
 of war seemed disposed to declare against 
 himself, to persuade Shuja to exert his influence 
 towards securing him an opportunity of effect- 
 ing the inglorious retreat, the mere semblance 
 of which, when recommended to him by Suraj 
 Mull as a measure of strategic precaution, had, 
 before the opening of the campaign, so deeply 
 wounded his vanity. But all these attempts 
 failed. Shuja confided all these overtures to 
 the Shah, who took care neither to interrupt 
 the futile negotiations, nor to commit himself 
 to any inexpedient concession. He was thor- 
 oughly resolved to inflict a severe chastisement 
 on the Mahrattas. And he heartily sympa- 
 thised with the view of his chief adviser, 
 Nujeeb-u-Dowla, who urged : " At present we 
 may be said to have the whole Dekkan at our 
 mercy ; when can we hope for another juncture 
 so favourable ? By one effort we get this thorn 
 out of our sides for ever." Nor did the wily 
 Rohilla argue only in the interests of the Hindo- 
 stanees. He appealed to the ambition of the 
 Abdali King ; and, repeating his expressive 
 metaphor, he added : " The Mahrattas are the 
 thorn of Hindostan ; if they were out of the 
 way, the Empire might be your Majesty's 
 whenever you should please." 
 
 Shuja-u-Dowla, turning the Bhow's diplo- 
 
SURAJ MULL DESERTS THE BHOW 247 
 
 matic arts against him, through his vakeels 
 strongly advised the Jat Raja to abandon the 
 Mahratta cause. It is stated that Mulhar Rao 
 and the other disaffected chiefs joined in this 
 advice, which was addressed to willing ears. 
 This admission that Casi Pundit's patron thus 
 deliberately weakened the Bhow's force, seems 
 to tell favourably as to his credibility ; while the 
 fact indicates forcibly the unpopularity, not to 
 say the hatred, of the Brahmin generalissimo, one 
 chief cause of the result of his ill-fated enterprise. 
 
 Distrusted, slighted, and snubbed by the 
 Bhow, Suraj Mull had little inducement to 
 remain. And he went off by forced marches ; 
 and thus, through the folly of its commander, 
 the Mahratta army was deprived of a most 
 important, nay, an indispensable ally. 
 
 During the monsoon the Shah, though im- 
 mediately opposite Delhi, at Shahdere, on the 
 bank of the Jumna, made no attempt to cross 
 the river. The Bhow, when the rains abated, 
 but before the Jumna was passable, marched 
 with a picked force against Kunjpoora, which 
 was held by the Rohillas, and captured it. It 
 lay nearly 100 miles north ; and his object 
 was to command the passage of the river, and 
 to be able to cross, and become the assailant. 
 But he returned to Delhi without making any 
 use of the opportunity. On the other hand, 
 the Abdali, in this as in other respects, showed 
 his superior generalship. He suddenly broke 
 
248 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 up his camp, and by a night march reached 
 Baugput, 36 miles above Delhi. There, while 
 the Bhow was out of the way, and his main 
 army at Delhi, he resolved to effect the passage. 
 And this he successfully accomplished without 
 interruption. But the operation was more 
 difficult and protracted than he had anticipated. 
 "He searched in vain," says Casi Pundit, "for 
 the ford, the river being still very high, and 
 several horsemen, attempting to pass, were 
 drowned. The Shah, having fasted, and per- 
 formed religious ceremonies for two days, on 
 the third a ford was discovered ; but it was very 
 narrow, and on each side the water was so deep 
 as to drown whoever went the least out of the 
 proper track. . . . The Shah passed as soon as half 
 of his army was on the other side. The whole 
 army was completely crossed in two days ; but 
 from their numbers, and the great expedition 
 used, many people lost their lives." Such is 
 Casi Raja's account of a proceeding which may 
 seem rash on Ahmed Shah's part. But what 
 are we to think of his antagonist, who neglected 
 to interrupt the crossing, and thereby forfeited 
 the enormous advantage which he would have 
 had in assailing his enemy in such a situation ? 
 The editor of the narrative answers the question. 
 He says : " This seems to have been the crisis 
 of the Bhow's fortune : had he boldly attacked 
 the Shah while he was passing the Jumna, he 
 would probably have totally defeated him." 
 
THE BHOW ENCAMPS AT PANIPUT 249 
 
 On the very next day (26th October) the 
 two armies neared each other, and a partial 
 action took place between the advanced guards, 
 in which the Mahrattas were worsted, and lost 
 twice as many men as the Afghans. Similar 
 skirmishes followed, the Bhow constantly re- 
 tiring, till he reached the already memorable 
 field of Paniput, about 60 miles north of Delhi. 
 There he took up an elaborate position, enclosing 
 his camp and the town " with a trench 60 feet wide 
 and 12 deep, with a good rampart, on which 
 he mounted his cannon." This proceeding was 
 ominously like that previously adopted more 
 than once by Nizam-ul-Mulk in his wars with 
 the Mahrattas themselves, and in each case 
 with such disastrous results. And the Bhow's 
 people were very certain to take note of, and to 
 be much disheartened by, such a coincidence. 
 
 The Shah encamped to the eastward, and 
 surrounded his position with felled trees, as 
 Baber had done, on his last invasion of India. 
 His front is said to have extended seven miles, 
 so large was his force, of which more presently. 
 
 Though the Bhow had rejected Suraj Mull's 
 wise suggestion, which would have assured his 
 commissariat, he had attempted to starve out 
 the invaders. He had appointed Govind Pundit, 
 the Peishwa's Collector for the Doab and Bundel- 
 cand, to muster all the force he possibly could, 
 and to cut off the Shah's communication for 
 provision in his rear. Govind with two thousand 
 
250 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 men had reached Meerut, and obeyed his orders 
 so effectually " that the Shah's army was in the 
 greatest distress for provisions." But the Abdali 
 was not a man to endure this tamely. He de- 
 tached a body of chosen men, under his Vizier's 
 nephew, who was largely reinforced by Douranee 
 irregulars, acting on their own account. Accord- 
 ing to orders, they made a rapid march of 80 
 miles in a single night, and " at daybreak," says 
 Casi Pundit, " they fell like lightning upon the 
 camp of Govind Pundit " ; routed and cut up 
 his force ; and taking him prisoner, promptly 
 presented his head to the Shah, whose foraging 
 parties were not again molested ; and who, in 
 fact, rapidly turned the tables in this respect 
 upon the Mahrattas. Another serious mishap 
 soon after increased the difficulties of the rash 
 commander. He dispatched two thousand 
 horsemen to convoy a large amount of treasure 
 from Delhi, for the use of the army. Travelling 
 by by-roads, they gained the capital undis- 
 turbed ; but on their return they missed their 
 way, and rode into the enemy's quarters. They 
 were cut to pieces, and the money was, of course, 
 lost. 
 
 Remembering what the Mahrattas had hither- 
 to been ; how their terrible agility had baffled 
 Aurungzib, at the height of his power ; how 
 they had circumvented Nizam - ul - Mulk, and 
 reduced him to extremity ; how they had out- 
 marched Aliverdi Khan ; it does seem strange 
 
THE MAHRATTA CAMP BLOCKADED 251 
 
 that they should have allowed themselves to 
 be cooped up in their camp by the Afghans ; 
 denuded of supplies, and gradually brought to a 
 state of positive starvation. Yet such was the 
 case. 
 
 The Bhow's want of enterprise and skill will 
 partially explain this. To send out small parties 
 would have been to ensure their destruction. 
 And he seems to have been reluctant to move 
 out in force, for fear of endangering his 
 cumbrous train of artillery. The effects of his 
 jealous, capricious, and overbearing temper, and 
 the consequent disaffection and at least passive 
 insubordination of several of his chiefs and their 
 followers, must also be taken into account. 
 But this was not all. There was a paralysing 
 spell upon the army. The Mahrattas, from an 
 early period of the campaign, seem to have felt 
 themselves to be doomed to destruction. And, 
 on the other side, Suraj Mull had not exaggerated 
 the superior agility of the Afghans, even when 
 compared with the veteran predatory hosts of 
 the Dekkan. And the Afghan Sovereign's watch- 
 fulness was unsleeping ; his beleaguering arrange- 
 ments were most systematic ; his discipline was 
 most strict; and his orders, says Casi Pundit, 
 ;c were obeyed like destiny." Daily, at sunrise, 
 he says, Ahmed Shah " visited every post of 
 the army. . . . He also reconnoitred the camp of 
 the enemy, and . . . saw everything with his 
 own eyes, riding usually 40 or 50 coss every 
 
252 THE PANIPUT CAMPAIGN 
 
 day. ... At night there was a body of 5000 horse, 
 advanced as near as conveniently might be, 
 towards the enemy's camp, where they remained 
 all night under arms ; other bodies went the 
 rounds of the whole encampment [i.e. of the 
 Mahrattas]." 
 
 Under such circumstances, unless they were 
 prepared for a general action, it was not easy for 
 the Bhow's troops to forage, nor indeed to 
 emerge safely from their quarters. 
 
 Yet there were several partial engagements, 
 and daily cannonading and skirmishing. On 
 one occasion twenty thousand camp-followers 
 made their way out to cut wood for fuel ; but the 
 night guard of five thousand men intercepted 
 them, and put them all to the sword. The 
 depressing effect of this wholesale butchery on 
 the Mahrattas was great ; and the Bhow, who 
 had hitherto affected cheerfulness, now betrayed 
 " fear and despondency." No convoys could 
 reach his camp, and provisions and forage were 
 almost exhausted. 
 
 The Shah's Indian advisers, meanwhile, seeing 
 the enemy so completely in the toils, were im- 
 patient, and eager to fall on them. Casi Raja 
 says : " The Hindostany chiefs were out of all 
 patience, and entreated the Shah to put an end 
 to their fatigues, by coming at once to a decisive 
 action ; but his constant answer was, c This is a 
 matter of war, with which you are not acquainted. 
 In other affairs do as you please [a sly cut at their 
 
AHMED'S WISE DELAY OF BATTLE 253 
 
 fussy and futile negotiations], but leave this 
 to me. Military operations must not be pre- 
 cipitated. You will see how I will manage this 
 affair, and at a proper opportunity will bring 
 it to a successful conclusion.' ' 
 
 However unlike the Bhow was to Massena, 
 the calm confidence in himself and his plan 
 exhibited by Ahmed Shah, and his accurate 
 foresight of its working, were much akin to 
 Wellington's attitude at the lines of Torres 
 Vedras. With his own communications open, 
 and those of his adversary closed, the Shah 
 knew well that every day that the decisive 
 contest was delayed must tell to his advantage. 
 And the course of diplomacy proved this. For 
 our author tells us that, at this crisis, " the 
 Bhow often wrote letters to me with his own 
 hand, desiring that I would urge the Nawab 
 [i.e. of Oude] to mediate a peace for him that 
 he was ready to submit to any conditions, if 
 he could but preserve himself and his army, 
 and would by every means manifest his gratitude 
 to the mediators." Shuja-u-Dowla and most of 
 the Indian chiefs professed willingness to come 
 to terms ; but Nujeeb-u-Dowla was inexorable, 
 and the Shah was, of course, like - minded. 
 After in vain plundering the grain in the town of 
 Paniput, hunger compelled the Mahratta chiefs 
 and soldiers to insist upon an immediate general 
 action. The Bhow consented ; and it was 
 resolved " to march out of the lines an hour 
 
254 THE BATTLE OF PANIPUT 
 
 before daybreak, and, placing the artillery in 
 front, to proceed to the attack of the enemy. 
 They all swore to fight to the last extremity." 
 
 Just before the battle began, Casi Raja 
 received a pathetic note from the disillusioned 
 and desperate generalissimo. " The cup," he 
 said, "is now full to the brim, and cannot hold 
 another drop. If anything can be done, do it, 
 or else answer me plainly at once; hereafter 
 there will be no time for writing or speaking." 
 While this note was under consideration by 
 Shuja-u-Dowla, he learned that the Mahratta 
 army was already in motion. He at once aroused 
 the Shah, who " mounted one of the horses 
 which were always ready saddled at the tent 
 door," and rode forth to reconnoitre, " ordering 
 the troops under arms as he went along." He 
 was sitting on his horse, calmly smoking a 
 Persian pipe, when the Mahratta guns, in 
 advance of their line, opened a general fire. He 
 immediately arrayed his army in battle order ; 
 rode along the whole front, inspecting it care- 
 fully ; and then, posting himself at his tent, 
 between his camp and the army, gave the word 
 for opening the engagement. 
 
 Though seriously weakened by the retirement 
 of the Jats and the absence of the Bonsla's 
 forces, the Mahratta army was very numerous 
 and formidable. The Bhow's chief reliance was 
 upon the regular and experienced corps of 
 Ibrahim Khan, comprising " 2000 horse, and 
 
ESTIMATE OF RESPECTIVE FORCES 255 
 
 9000 sepoys, with firelocks, disciplined after 
 the European manner, together with 40 pieces 
 of cannon." These were field-pieces. Except 
 some five or six thousand inferior infantry, 
 equipped in native fashion, the rest of the army 
 consisted of cavalry, 53,000 in number, under 
 various leaders, who each supplied his own 
 contingent. Thus Holkar contributed 5000 ; 
 Sindia, 10,000 ; Amaji Guikwar, 3000 ; Jeswunt 
 Rao Powar, 2000 ; etc. 
 
 The whole train of artillery included 200 
 cannon, though the bulk of these were heavy 
 " guns of position," which, in spite of all the 
 sacrifices made on their behalf, were soon left 
 behind by the horsemen in their furious charge, 
 and, after the initial fusillade, played, in fact, 
 no part in the battle. 
 
 This was also much the case on the other 
 side. But both parties used shuternals, or camel- 
 swivels, and rockets, in great profusion. The 
 Bhow had also in his service two Pindari leaders, 
 with 15,000 of their irregular and vagabond 
 cavalry. The number of the Afghan cavalry was 
 not so great, being a little short of 42,000. 
 But, including the Rohillas and Shuja-u-Dowla's 
 troops, they had 38,000 foot, with between 
 70 and 80 cannon. There were also, besides 
 the shuternals, " 2000 camels, on each of which 
 were mounted two musketeers, armed with 
 pieces of a very large bore." 
 
 Casi Raja took great pains to verify these 
 
256 THE BATTLE OF PANIPUT 
 
 details. But, moreover, as to the Afghan army 
 he adds : " The number of irregulars which 
 accompanied these troops were four times that 
 number ; and the horses and arms were very 
 little inferior to those of the regular Douranies. 
 All the Douranies were men of great bodily 
 strength, and their horses of the Turkish breed ; 
 naturally very hardy, and rendered still more 
 so by continual exercise." 
 
 Thus, on the whole, whether we consider 
 the relative capacity of the commanders, the 
 numbers on each side, or the superior physique 
 of the Douranies, especially in the famished 
 state of the Mahrattas, the advantage seems 
 much in favour of the northerners, unless 
 Ibrahim Khan's disciplined battalions could 
 justify the expectation of the Bhow, and emulate 
 Bussy's and dive's triumphs with the same 
 instrument, though wielded by so inferior a pupil. 
 
 The same inference must be drawn from two 
 points of contrast in the conduct of the com- 
 manders on either side. 
 
 The Bhow brought all his forces at once into 
 action, and, personally leading a tremendous 
 and effective charge of cavalry, combated hotly 
 throughout the day in the centre of his line. 
 The Afghan King, on the contrary, taking his 
 station at the tent in front of his camp, which 
 had been his constant post of observation 
 during the blockade of the Mahratta lines, but 
 was now in the rear of his army, calmly directed 
 
ARRAY OP RESPECTIVE FORCES 257 
 
 its operations ; and observed, and influenced 
 by new dispositions, the varying fortunes of 
 the day, without distracting himself from the 
 discharge of his duties as a general by personal 
 participation in the encounter. And again, be- 
 sides a large body of special armed attendants, 
 for miscellaneous duties, he retained a strong 
 reserve which (as we shall see) he launched at 
 the critical moment, thereby restoring the battle, 
 and securing his ultimate victory. 
 
 The Mahratta army was arrayed as follows : 
 Ibrahim Khan Gardee, with nine battalions of 
 sepoys, and his field-pieces, was on its extreme 
 left, and next to him the Guikwar. The Bhow, 
 with Wiswas Rao, was in the centre of the 
 line, with other Mahratta chiefs and their con- 
 tingents. Sindia and Holkar were on the right. 
 The Shah's right was composed of a mixed body 
 of Persian and other Moguls and of Rohilla 
 Afghans. The Shah's Grand Vizier commanded 
 the centre, opposite to the Bhow. Next him, 
 on his left, was Shuja-u-Dowla ; and on his 
 left, Nujeeb-u-Dowla, the Rohilla chief of most 
 note, and the inveterate enemy of Janoji 
 Sindia, who was immediately opposed to him ; 
 and on Nujeeb's left was Shah Pussand Khan, 
 described as a " brave and experienced officer." 
 His division formed the extreme left of the 
 Shah's army. The Abdali's artillery and the 
 Bhow's large park of heavy cannon were ranged 
 in front of their respective lines. But, under 
 
258 THE BATTLE OF PANIPUT 
 
 the circumstances, neither of these armaments 
 rendered much service, nor contributed at all 
 to decide the fate of the day. The Bhow had 
 calculated greatly on the effect of his numerous 
 and powerful guns, and he began operations 
 by a general and heavy cannonade. But 
 whether, as is most probable, from the imperfect 
 training and the excitement of the gunners, 
 or, as Casi Pundit suggests, from a deficiency 
 of construction, which prevented the guns from 
 being sufficiently depressed to take the proper 
 range, the shot flew high over the heads of 
 the enemy, and fell (it is said) a mile beyond 
 the Douranee army, and did little execution. 
 Ibrahim Khan himself, realising this, presently 
 silenced all the guns, and resolved to come to 
 close quarters with the bayonet. Thus one of 
 the Bhow's best trump cards was thrown away 
 at once. But Ibrahim hastened to assure him 
 that he had no intention of proving false to 
 his salt, and to verify his assertion by bringing 
 into play the redoubtable force of his dis- 
 ciplined sepoys. The Mahratta army had 
 advanced obliquely, so that Ibrahim's corps 
 was nearing its opponents, while, on the other 
 wing, the distance between the armies was 
 considerable. Ibrahim, therefore, reserving two 
 battalions to keep the Moguls on the extreme 
 right of the Shah's army in check, with his 
 seven others fiercely assailed the Rohillas. They 
 received the charge with great resolution ; and 
 
AHMED'S RIGHT AND CENTRE BROKEN 259 
 
 a desperate hand-to-hand contest ensued. But, 
 in the end, the Rohillas were broken, and lost 
 nearly eight thousand killed or wounded. But, 
 on the other hand, Casi Pundit says, in the 
 action, which lasted three hours, " six of Ibrahim 
 Khan's battalions were almost entirely ruined, 
 and he himself [was] wounded in several places." 
 And he adds, that " the same happened to 
 the Guikwar, who behaved very well in his 
 support." 
 
 Meanwhile, the Bhow in the centre, with the 
 household troops, the flower of his army, fell 
 like an avalanche upon the Grand Vizier's 
 division. 
 
 The impetuous onslaught of the Mahratta 
 cavalry had always been most formidable. And 
 both the Bhow and his troops, however conscious 
 of their old renown, were not less conscious 
 that they had, at last, met at least their match, 
 and that nothing but victory on this day could 
 save them, not only from disgrace, but from 
 certain and prompt destruction. Hence, attenu- 
 ated as they were from previous privations, 
 they charged in their desperation with the utmost 
 impetuosity and terrible effect. " The Mah- 
 rattas," says Casi Pundit, " broke through a 
 line of 10,000 horse, 7000 Persian musketeers, 
 and 1000 camels, with zamburaks [long guns] 
 upon them, killing and wounding about 3000 
 of them." The whole centre was thrown into 
 confusion, and a disorderly retreat began. The 
 
260 THE BATTLE OF PANIPUT 
 
 Grand Vizier, with a small force, still stood firm, 
 and made a desperate effort to rally his scattered 
 soldiers. 
 
 Casi Raja had been sent by Shuja-u-Dowla, 
 who was yet unassailed, but could discern little 
 through the dense cloud of dust, to ascertain 
 the state of the case. And he found the Grand 
 Vizier " in an agony of rage and despair, reproach- 
 ing his men for quitting him, and exclaiming, 
 ' Our country is far off whither do you fly ? ' 
 But," adds the witness of this critical scene, " no 
 one regarded his orders or exhortations." Then, 
 suddenly recognising the narrator, he cried out : 
 " Ride to my son, Shuja-u-Dowla, and tell him 
 that if he does not support me immediately, 
 I must perish." But Shuja, on receiving this 
 pressing message, did not venture to move with 
 his small force of two thousand horse and one 
 thousand musketeers, lest he should open the 
 way to the enemy through the breach in the 
 line which his diversion would cause. And he 
 did stem the tide immediately opposed to him. 
 
 But thus, on the whole, both in the centre 
 and on the right, the Shah's army was in desperate 
 case, and defeat seemed inevitable. His left wing, 
 on the other hand, was not only unbroken, 
 but was holding in check, and steadily gaining 
 ground on, its opponents. There Nujeeb-u-Dowla 
 at the head of eight thousand Rohilla infantry 
 and six thousand horse, conscious of his vital 
 interest in the issue, animated by mortal hatred 
 
THE ABDALI'S LEFT SUCCESSFUL 261 
 
 of Sindia, and cool and crafty as he was brave 
 and implacable, kept the Mahrattas at bay, 
 and baffled their characteristic attack by two 
 devices. Being well supplied with rockets, he 
 plied the enemy with incessant volleys " of two 
 thousand at a time," which not only terrified the 
 horses by their noise, but did so much execution 
 that the enemy could not effect a charge in 
 compact order. And, under cover of this dis- 
 tracting fire, he threw up successively breast- 
 works of sand, and advanced from one of these 
 to another, until he had gained a coss, " and 
 was within a long musket shot of the enemy." 
 And in this operation he was well supported by 
 Shah Pussand and his Moguls on his flank. 
 
 In this undecided state the conflict continued 
 from dawn to noon ; when, says Casi Pundit, 
 " though we suffered least in point of killed 
 and wounded, the Mahrattas seemed to have 
 the advantage." 
 
 A comprehensive survey of the state of 
 affairs at this period of the battle might well 
 have inclined an unprofessional spectator to 
 take a more decidedly unfavourable view of the 
 Shah's prospect of success, in spite of his superior 
 numbers, the stronger physique of his soldiers, 
 and the inefficiency of the Mahratta artillery, 
 on which the Bhow had so confidently relied. 
 
 Ahmed Shah's right, after a desperate and 
 prolonged hand-to-hand conflict, had not only 
 been thrown into utter confusion, but had 
 
262 THE BATTLE OF PANIPUT 
 
 sustained a terrible slaughter ; while, though 
 six of Ibrahim Khan's battalions had been 
 similarly cut up, three were still compact and 
 efficient. The overwhelmingly impetuous charge 
 of the Show's cavalry in the centre had pierced 
 their opponents' ranks, routed them, and put 
 them to flight, though the Grand Vizier had 
 made despairing efforts to keep them up to the 
 mark, and with a small body of stalwarts still 
 maintained his ground. And though the Afghan 
 left had not only baffled the Mahratta cavalry 
 charge, but had advanced beyond the main 
 army, its actual position exposed it all the 
 more to the danger of a flank attack, which 
 Shuja-u-Dowla's small contingent would little 
 avail to resist, when the flight of the centre 
 left the Bhow free to divert his victorious cavalry 
 against the only corps that was still unbroken. 
 
 But the Abdali's eagle eye was scanning 
 each phase of the conflict, and his forecasting 
 mind had provided against such an emergency. 
 He saw that an immediate and a supreme effort 
 must be made to restore the battle, and for 
 this he had prudently held in hand his strong 
 reserve force. This he now promptly brought 
 into action. And he now commanded five 
 hundred of his special body of cavalry, retained 
 for emergent services, to " drive out by force 
 all armed people whom they should find in his 
 camp, that they might assist in the action." 
 And he appointed one thousand five hundred 
 
AHMED RESTORES AND WINS THE BATTLE 263 
 
 more of the same special service troops " to 
 meet the fugitives from the battle, and to kill 
 every man who should refuse to return to the 
 charge." Thus, besides some who were found in 
 the camp, seven or eight thousand of the 
 fugitives were reclaimed, who with the reserve 
 constituted a formidable force. 
 
 Four thousand were sent to cover the right 
 flank ; and the Grand Vizier was reinforced 
 with ten thousand, and ordered " to charge 
 the enemy, sword in hand, in close order, and 
 at full gallop." 
 
 Shah Pussand Khan and Nujeeb-u-Dowla 
 were to co-operate by a flank charge on the 
 Mahratta right. 
 
 These combined movements were vigorously 
 executed, and, says Casi Pundit, " produced a 
 terrible effect." 
 
 The sequel I will give in my author's own 
 words, which, concise and simple as they are, 
 sufficiently attest the stubbornness and desper- 
 ate determination of the attenuated and half- 
 famished Mahrattas, until their sudden collapse 
 and precipitate flight : 
 
 " This close and violent attack lasted for 
 near an hour, during which time they fought 
 on both sides with spears, swords, battle-axes, 
 and even daggers. Between two and three 
 o'clock Wiswas Rao was wounded, and dis- 
 mounted from his horse. . . . The Bhow himself 
 continued the action near half an hour longer 
 
264 THE BATTLE OF PANIPUT 
 
 on horseback, at the head of his men ; when, 
 all at once, as if by enchantment, the whole 
 Mahratta army at once turned their backs and 
 fled at full speed, leaving the field of battle 
 covered with heaps of dead. The instant they 
 gave way the victors pursued them with the 
 utmost fury ; and, as they gave no quarter, 
 the slaughter is scarcely to be conceived, the 
 pursuit continuing for ten or twelve coss in 
 every direction in which they fled." 
 
 The anonymous translator of the narrative 
 suggests that it was the fall of Wiswas Rao 
 that caused the abrupt flight of the Mahrattas. 
 But this is inconsistent with the statement 
 that the Bhow fought on for half an hour longer. 
 A more probable reason is, that Holkar, who 
 had throughout disapproved of the Bhow's 
 tactics, and bore no love to him, and who did 
 actually make his escape from this fatal field, 
 either lost heart or treacherously deserted his 
 uncongenial and despised leader, and set an 
 example which was quickly followed by the 
 exhausted and desponding Mahrattas, who may 
 have been the more panic-stricken from having, 
 in the interval, learned of the death of the 
 Peishwa's son. 
 
 Besides those who fell in the battle and in 
 the pursuit, numbers were put to death by the 
 zemindars of the country, who were naturally 
 glad to have an opportunity of avenging the 
 long-standing and grievous wrongs which they 
 
THE MAHRATTA POWER PROSTRATED 265 
 
 and their people had suffered from the preda- 
 tory confederacy. Moreover, besides the actual 
 combatants, the Mahratta camp supplied the 
 materials for another wholesale massacre. Casi 
 Pundit estimates its inmates, men, women, 
 and children, at half a million. And of these, 
 forty thousand only survived ; the rest were 
 slaughtered in cold blood by the ferocious 
 Afghans. 
 
 Shuja-u-Dowla gave refuge to six or seven 
 thousand, and was obliged to employ his troops 
 to protect them from the eager pursuit of the 
 savage victors. 
 
 Ahmed Shah returned to his own country, 
 and never revisited India. The awful tidings 
 including the death of his son, and the mys- 
 terious disappearance of the Bhow were a 
 mortal blow to the Peishwa; and, like Eli 
 when the Ark of God was taken, he promptly 
 expired. And the imminent prospect of Mah- 
 ratta predominance in India was obliterated in 
 a day, and for ever. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abdullah Khan, 134, 136, 137, 
 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 
 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 
 156, 161, 170, 172, 174, 177. 
 
 Abdur Razzak, 98, 99. 
 
 Abul Hasan, 97, 99. 
 
 Achilles, 149. 
 
 Adina Beg, 238. 
 
 Afzal Khan, 60, 231. 
 
 Agamemnon, 149. 
 
 Agra, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 104, 
 
 156, 198. 
 Ahmadnagar, 92. 
 
 Ahmed, son of Mohammad Shah, 
 
 217, 237. 
 
 Ahmed, father of Hybut, 231. 
 Ahmed Shah Abdali, 236, 237, 
 
 238, 240, 245, 246, 247, 257, 
 
 262. 
 Ahmedabad, 37, 40, 82, 124, 142, 
 
 157. 193- 
 
 Ahmednuggur, 55, 169, 222. 
 Ajit Sing, 81, 151, 153, 157, 158. 
 Ajmir, 39, 82. 
 
 Akana, 96. 
 
 Akbar, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, n, 45, 51, 52, 
 82, 84, 85, 95, "5, 125, 133, 
 137, 138, 144, 145, 163. 
 
 Alam Ali, 165, 167, 168, 169, 185. 
 
 Alamgirh, 17. See Aurungzib. 
 
 Aliverdi Khan, or Mahummud 
 Ali, 217 ; his rise to power and 
 his policy, 225-233, 234, 250. 
 
 Allahabad, 38, 134.' 
 
 Alumgeer, n, 238. 
 
 Amaji Guikwar, 255. 
 
 Amber, 19, 157. See Jeipur. 
 
 Angria, 220. 
 
 Anopsher, 244. 
 
 Arakan, 38. 
 
 Aravulli, 81. 
 
 Arcot, 109. 
 
 Ashraff, 201. 
 
 Assam, 60. 
 
 Asseerguhr, 167. 
 
 Atta Oolla, 232. 
 
 Attok, 201, 203. 
 
 Aurungabad, 147, 148, 168, 169, 
 
 222. 
 
 Aurungzib, 15, 17, 18; beguiles 
 Morad, 20-21 ; first campaign 
 against Dara, 22-30 ; makes 
 himself emperor, 31-34 ; sec- 
 ond campaign against Dara, 
 35-42 ; causes Morad to be 
 murdered, 43 ; results of his 
 usurpation, 44-47 ; mixture of 
 religious and political motives, 
 48-54; campaign against 
 Sivaji, and treatment of him, 
 63-73 ; reimposes jizya, and 
 causes Rajput revolt, 74-85 ; 
 conquests in the Dekkan, 86- 
 101 ; war with Mahrattas, 
 102-118 ; failure and death, 
 118-126. 127, 128, 129, 130, 
 138, 144, 154, 160, 161, 189, 
 197, 213, 234. 
 
 Ayeen Akbery, 3. 
 
 Azam, 82, 127, 130. 
 
 Azimu-sh Shan, 133, 134. 
 
 Babar. See Baber. 
 
 Baber, i, 2, 5, n, 133, 145, 156, 
 
 159, 163, 235, 249. 
 Bahadapur, 78. 
 Bahadur Khan, 36, 40. 
 Bahadur Shah, 127, 128 129, 130, 
 
 131, 132, 134, 146, 153. See 
 
 also Mohammed Moazzam and 
 
 Shah Alum. 
 Bairam, 138. 
 Baji Rao, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 
 
 194, 195, 196, 198, 209, 210, 
 
 212, 217, 221. 
 Bajwah, 37. 
 Bakkar, 35, 37, 40, 41. 
 Balaji Baji Rao, 210, 212, 213, 
 
 215, 216, 217, 220, 226, 227, 265. 
 Balaji Washwanath, 123, 147, 
 
 187. 
 
 Banda, 129. 
 Barha, 137, 143, 149, 153, 155, 
 
 174, 176, 177. 
 
268 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Bassein, 211, 221. 
 
 Baugput, 248. 
 
 Baukir Khan, 225. 
 
 Beder, 223. 
 
 Bednore, 220. 
 
 Behar, 12, 71, 210, 224, 225, 227, 
 229, 230, 231. 
 
 Benares, 38, 70. 
 
 Berar, 115, 167, 191, 192, 210, 233. 
 
 Bernier, I. 
 
 Bhaskir Pundit, 226, 227, 229. 
 
 Bhima, in. 
 
 Bhim Sing, 165, 167, 168. 
 
 Bhopal, 198. 
 
 Bhurtpore, 13, 242. 
 
 Bidar Bakht, 104. 
 
 Bijapur, 17, 18, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 
 60, 61, 64, 66, 67, 71, 86, 87, 
 94, 99, 103, 112, 114, 146, 222. 
 
 Boondelas, 195. 
 
 Briseis, 149. 
 
 Bundelcand, 195, 235, 249. 
 
 Bundi, 165. 
 
 Burhanpur, 77, 78, 91, 167. 
 
 Bussy, 106, 218, 219, 221, 256. 
 
 Cabul, 35, 151, 201, 202, 203, 204. 
 
 Calcutta, 232. 
 
 Carnatic, 104, 105, 112, 210, 216, 
 
 219, 220. 
 Casi Raja Pundit, 240, 241, 247, 
 
 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 
 
 258, 259, 260, 263, 265. 
 Chakan, 6l. .\ -, 
 Chakna, 58. ^y 1 
 Chanda, 71. 
 Chandan, 58. 
 Charles the Bold, 87, 90. 
 Charles n., 183. 
 Chhatar Sal, 26. 
 Chimnagee Appa, 211, 221. 
 Chitore, 115. 
 Chumbul, 24, 198. 
 Churamau, 174. 
 Clarendon, 183. 
 Clive, 109, 220, 256. 
 Combeir, 242. 
 Concan, 91, 187. 
 Coromandel, 72, 212, 219. 
 Cutch, 37. 
 
 Cuttak, 225, 226, 230, 232, 233. 
 Cutwa, 226, 230. 
 
 Dacca, 38. 
 
 Danderi, 108. 
 
 Dara Shukoh, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 ; 
 first campaign against Aurung- 
 zib, 22-30, 32, 34 ; second 
 campaign against Aurungzib, 
 
 35-40 ; his death, 41. 42, 43, 
 45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 79, 128, 129.* 
 
 Daud Khan, 33, 142, 146. 
 
 Deeg, 242. 
 
 Dekkan, 108, and passim. 
 
 Delhi, 17, and passim. 
 
 Deogarh, 115. 
 
 Dhunaji Jadu, 104, 109. 
 
 Dilawar Khan, 168. 
 
 Dilir Khan, 19, 29, 39. 
 
 Doab, 137, 174, 196, 209, 249. 
 
 Douranies, 242, 256. 
 
 Dowlatabad, 94, 99, 223. 
 
 Dunnaji Guikwar, 213, 215. 
 
 Dupleix, 106, 218. 
 
 Durga Das, 80, 81. 
 
 Duttaji Sindia, 238, 239. 
 
 East India Company, 4, 12. 
 Edward in., 88. 
 Elliot, 57, 58, 59. 
 Elphinstone, 171. 
 
 Farokhsir, opening of his reign, 
 
 134-138; character, 139; in- 
 trigues against Abdullah and 
 Husain, 142-144 ; alienates 
 Husain, 144 ; drives Husain 
 into alliance with Mahrattas, 
 145-148 ; dethroned and mur- 
 dered, 150-152. 153, 157, 161, 
 170, 173, 180, 187, 194. 
 
 Farrukh Siyar, 134. 
 
 Fathpur, 37, 170. 
 
 Fort William College, 212. 
 
 Gaj Sing, 168. 
 
 Ganges, 196, 232. 
 
 Gawelgurh, 218. 
 
 Ghats, 83, 91, 113, 125. 
 
 Ghazi-u-din, 237, 238, 239. 
 
 Ghenzis Khan, i. 
 
 Gingee, 104, 106, 107, 112. 
 
 Goa, 211. 
 
 Godavery, 218. 
 
 Golconda, 55, 71, 86, 87, 88, 93, 
 
 94, 95, 100, 112, 114. 
 Govind, Sikh guru, 129 ; Pundit, 
 
 249, 250. 
 Grant Duff, 58, 190, 192, 214, 218, 
 
 238. 
 
 Gujarat. See Guzerat. 
 Guzerat, 17, 36, 37, 38, 43, 72, 
 
 82, 142, 184, 185, 190, 192, 202, 
 
 216, 234. 
 Gwalior, 38, 42, 69. 
 
 Haidar Kuli Khan, 159, 171, 174, 
 175, 176, 177. 
 
INDEX 
 
 260 
 
 Haider Khan, 171. 
 
 Haji Hamud, 225. 
 
 Hallam, 48, 177. 
 
 Hamid Khan, 173, 177, 184. 
 
 Henry vi., 170. 
 
 Henry vni., 45. 
 
 Himmut Khan, 109. 
 
 Holkar, 191, 196, 216, 217, 219, 
 
 238, 240, 241, 242, 255, 257, 
 
 264. 
 
 Humayun, 2, 42. 
 Husain All Khan, no, 134, 136, 
 
 137, 140, 141, 145, 146, 147, 
 
 148, 150, 151, 152, 165, 181, 
 
 187, 227. 
 
 Hybut, 225, 229, 230. 
 Hyder All, 115, 220. 
 Hyderabad, 55, 94, 96, 146. 
 
 Ibrahim, Sultan, u. 
 
 Ibrahim Khan Gardee, 221, 254, 
 
 256, 257, 258, 259, 262. 
 Ikhlas Khan, 150. 
 Indore, 217. 
 Indus, 80. 
 Innocent in., 88. 
 Ireland, 8, 51. 
 Islam, 5, 13, 49, 115, 157. 
 Itikad Khan, 149, 173. 
 Itimadu-d-Daula, 171, 181. 
 Iwaz Khan, 167. 
 Izzut Khan, 172. 
 
 Jahan Shah, 133, 154. 
 Jahandar Shah, 133, 136, 152, 
 153, 180. 
 
 ames u., 48. 
 
 amnaji, 147. 
 
 anoji, Rugoji's son, 230. 
 
 anoji Sindia, 257. 
 
 ansi, 242. 
 
 ats, 13, 104, 174, 184, 210, 254. 
 
 ehangir, 7, 8, 125. 
 
 eiapa Sindia, 211, 237. 
 
 eipur, 19, 81. 
 ; ei Sing, 19, 20, 29, 36, 39, 40, 
 
 42, 63, 64, 66, 67, 157. 
 Jelalabad, 203. 
 Jeswunt Rao Powar, 255. 
 Jeswunt Sing, 18, 22, 23, 37, 39, 
 
 61, 62, 63, 79, 80, 81, 82, 126. 
 Jiwan Khan, 40. 
 John, King of England, 88. 
 Joudpur, 22, 79, 80, 81. 
 Jumna, 244, 247, 248. 
 
 Kafia-u-Doula, 154. 
 Kafi'u-din, 153. 
 Kafi'u Shan, 133. 
 
 Kakar Khan, 77, 78. 
 
 Kaloosha, 93, 100. 
 
 Kam Bakhsh, 106, 1271 
 
 Kandeish, 142, 150. 
 
 Karnatik, 146. 
 
 Kasim Khan, 22, 108, 109. 
 
 Khafi Khan, 27, 39, 41, 43, 53, 54, 
 
 57, and passim. 
 
 Khalilullah Khan, 27, 30, 37, 40. 
 Khalsa, 13. 
 Khandeish, 77. 
 Khan Douran, 204. 
 Khan Jehan, 91, 94, 95. 
 Khwajah Basant, 36. 
 Kilich Khan, 134, 139. See 
 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk. 
 Kistna, 118. 
 Kokan, 57. 
 
 Kolapore, 131, 132, 188, 189. 
 Koran, 2, 6, 18, 21, 49, 52 $53, 61, 
 
 231. 
 
 Kumayoon, 19, 239. 
 Kunjpoora, 247. / 
 
 Lahore, 28, 34, 204, 238, 243. 
 Lake, 13. 
 
 Lai Kunwar, 133, 134. 
 Lally, 219. 
 
 Macaulay, 202. 
 
 Madana, 96. 
 
 Mahabat Khan, 35. 
 
 Mahomet Ali, 220. 
 
 Mahmood, Sultan, 30, 31, 38. 
 
 Malwa. 121, 124, 151, 162, 164, 
 
 181, 185, 191, 195, 196, 198, 
 
 202, 209, 216, 227, 234. 
 Mandisor, 121. 
 Mandu, 165. 
 Manikdroog, 218. 
 Manucci, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
 
 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, 37, 
 
 39, 41, 42, 43, 68. 
 Massena, 253. 
 Mathura, 32. 
 Mecca, 3, 63. 
 
 Meer Hubeeb, 226, 230, 232. 
 Meer Jaffier, 230. 
 Meer Munnoo, 238. 
 Meerut, 250. 
 Minbulkar, 167. 
 Mir Abdul Karim, 77. 
 Mir Jumla, 38, 60/140, 141, 142, 
 
 M3- 
 Moazzam, 63, 82, 83, 84, 91, 94, 
 
 127. See also Bahadur Shah. 
 Mohammad Shah, 132, 138, 179, 
 
 181, 184, 186, 194, 205, 206, 
 
 207, 217, 227. 
 
270 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Mongir, 38. 
 
 Moorshedabad, 226, 230. 
 Morad Buksh, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 
 25, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 41, 43, 
 
 45. 49- 
 
 Morari Rao, 109, 216. 
 Moriscos, 9. 
 Mubariz Khan, 185. 
 Muhammad Ghiyas Khan, 164. 
 Muhammad Ibrahim, 173, 177. 
 Mukarrab Khan, 100. 
 Mulhar Rao Holkar, 237, 241, 
 
 243. 247. 
 Multan, 35, 36. 
 Munim Khan, 129, 131, 132. 
 Muradabad, 149. 
 Murhamat Khan, 164. 
 Mustapha Khan, 229. 
 Muttra, 70. 
 Muzaffarnagar, 137. 
 Mysore, 210, 220. 
 
 Nadir Shah, 178, 179, 200, 209, 
 
 225, 235, 236, 244. 
 Najm-ud-din Ali, 176, 177. 
 Nazir Jung, 209. 
 Neku Siyar, 156. 
 Nerbudda, 22, 166, 168, 181, 188, 
 
 198. 
 
 Nizam Ali, 222. 
 Nizam-ul-Mulk, 99, 134, 139, 148, 
 
 149, 150, 151, 153, 181, 234, 
 
 249, 250. 
 Nujeeb-u-Dowla, 238, 246, 253, 
 
 257, 260, 263. 
 Nundarbar, no. 
 Nurnallah, 218. 
 
 Oojein, 22, 217. 
 
 Orissa, 210, 224. See Cuttak. 
 
 Orme, 74, 126. 
 
 Oude, 12, 181, 196, 205. 
 
 Oudipur, 78, 81, 82, 115, 130, 151. 
 
 Paniput, 216, 221, 244, 249, 253. 
 
 Parli, 117. 
 
 Parnala, 71, 103. 
 
 Patna, 71, 134, 141. 
 
 PaynGunga, 218. 
 
 Peshawur, 203. 
 
 Peter the Great, 201. 
 
 Pilate, 45. 
 
 Pindaris, 114. 
 
 Poland, 201. 
 
 Poona, 61, 62, 214, 218. 
 
 Poorundhur, 63. 
 
 Primavera, 36. 
 
 Puar, 191. 
 
 Punjab, 127, 143, 238. 
 
 Rajgarh, 58, 64, 71, 72, 103. 
 
 Rajmahal, 38. 
 
 Rajputana, 10, 82, 210. 
 
 Ram Raja, 103, 114, 116, 121, 
 
 131* 213. 
 
 Ram Sing, 18, 26, 67, 68. 
 Rana Sanga, 12. 
 Ratan Chand, 140, 144, 145, 155, 
 
 i57 158, 167, 170, 173, 175, 
 
 178. 
 Rohilla Afghans, 195, 202, 238, 
 
 247, 255, 257, 258, 259. 
 Rohilkund, 239. 
 Roum, Sultan of, 9. 
 Rugoji, 210, 212, 217, 218, 226, 
 
 227, 229. 
 Rugonath Rao, 210, 220, 238, 
 
 240, 241, 243. 
 Rustam Khan, 25, 26. 
 
 Sadut Khan, 171, 181, 196, 197, 
 
 204, 205, 209. 
 Safder Jung, 219, 227, 237. 
 Said Ahmed Khan, 225. 
 Saiyid Abdullah, 154. 
 Salabat Jung, 215, 218, 219, 222. 
 Sambaji, 64, 70, 78, 85, 89, 91, 
 
 94, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 112. 
 Santaji Ghorepuray, 104, 105, 
 
 107, 108, 109, 112, 216. 
 Satara, 71, 115, 117, 147, 153, 163, 
 
 177, 178, 191, 214, 215. 
 Sedasheo, 220, 221, 222, 223, 242. 
 Selimgurh, 34. 
 Serfiraz Khan, 225, 228. 
 Shah Alam, 95. 
 Shahbaz, 21, 33. 
 Shahdere, 247. 
 Shah Jehan, 2, 7, 17, 20, 21, 22, 
 
 23, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 40, 46, 
 
 55, 56, 121, 125. 
 Shahji, or Sahu, father of Sivaji, 
 
 Shah Nawaz Khan, 37. 
 
 Shah Pussand Khan, 257, 261, 
 
 263. 
 Shah Shuja, 17, 18, 19, 20, 29, 36, 
 
 37, 38, 79, 246. 
 Shaista Khan, 61, 62, 63. 
 Shao, or Sahu, Raja of Satara, 
 
 130, 131, 146, 147, 185, 188, 
 
 189, 212, 213, 214. 
 Shias, 138. 
 Shuja-u-Dowla, 224, 225, 237, 
 
 239, 240, 241, 244, 245, -246, 
 
 253. 255, 257, 260, 262, 265. 
 Shumsur Khan, 230, 231, 232. 
 Sikander Lodi, 156. 
 Sind, 40. 
 
INDEX 
 
 271 
 
 Sindia, 109, 136, 163, igi, 196, 
 216, 217, 219, 241, 255, 257, 
 261. 
 
 Sipihr Shukoh, 41, 42. 
 
 Sirdar Khan, 230, 231, 232. 
 
 Sirinagar, 29, 42. 
 
 Sironj, 121. 
 
 Sivaji, 4 ; Rajput on his mother's 
 side, 12, 1 8, 53 ; early career, 
 56-59; campaigns against 
 Aurungzib, 60-70 ; successfully 
 defies Aurungzib, 70-72 ; death, 
 73- 74> 8 3, 90, 93> 94, 96, 104, 
 112, 126, 130, 159, 191, 208, 
 214, 231. 
 
 Sivapur, 61. 
 
 Siyar-ul-Mutakherin, 200, 203. 
 
 Solaiman Shukoh, 19, 22, 24, 28, 
 29, 34, 36, 42. 
 
 Soonees, 138, 145. 
 
 Sreeput Rao, 188, 189. 
 
 Sufi, 129. 
 
 Sukwar Bhye, 212, 214. 
 
 Supa, 61. 
 
 Suraj Mull, 239, 241, 242, 246, 
 247, 249, 251. 
 
 Suraja Dowlah, 232, 233. 
 
 Surat, 18, 63, 72, 92, 157, 158. 
 
 Surbuland Khan, 148, 150. 
 
 Surup Sing, 35. 
 
 Taj Mahal, 5. 
 Tamasp, 201. 
 Tara Bai, 116, 117, 121, 123, 131, 
 
 213, 214, 215. 
 Tattah, 36. 
 Tavernier, 206. 
 Tibet, 42. 
 Timour, Emperor, I, 128, 133, 
 
 .139- 
 
 Timour, son of the Abdali, 238. 
 Tira, 170. 
 Tod, Colonel, 130. 
 Torna, 58, 120. 
 Torres Vedras, 253. 
 Trimbuk Rao, 185, 190, 192, 213, 
 
 215- 
 
 Udipur, 82. See Oudipur. 
 Ujjain, 125. 
 
 Warren Hastings, 202. 
 Wars of the Roses, 170. 
 Watson, 220. 
 
 Wellesley, 114, 195, 212, 244. 
 Wellington, Duke of, 118,245, 2 53- 
 Wiswas Rao, 241, 244, 257, 263, 
 264, 265. 
 
 Zulfikar Khan, 104, 106, 107, 130, 
 
Printed by 
 
 MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED 
 Edinburgh 
 
VOLUMES IN THE INDIAN RECORDS SERIES. 
 
 THE DIARIES OF STREYNSHAM 
 
 MASTER (1675-1680), and other Contemporary Papers relating 
 thereto. Edited by Sir RICHARD CARNAC TEMPLE, Bart, C.LE. 
 Two Volumes. Medium 8vo, 12s. net each. 
 
 BENGAL IN 1856-57. A Selection of Public 
 
 and Private Papers dealing with the Affairs of the British in 
 Bengal during the Reign of Siraj-Uddaula. Edited, with Notes 
 and an Historical Introduction, by S. C. HILL, late Officer in 
 Charge of the Records of the Government of India. Three 
 Volumes. Demy 8vo, 12s. net each. 
 
 OLD FORT WILLIAM IN BENGAL. A 
 
 Selection of Official Documents dealing with its History. Edited 
 by C. R. WILSON, M.A., D.Litt. Two Volumes. Medium 8vo, 
 12s. net each. 
 
 VESTIGES OF OLD MADRAS (1640-1800). 
 
 Traced from the East India Company's Records preserved at 
 Fort St. George and the India Office, and from Other Sources. 
 By HENRY DAVISON LOVE, late Lieut.-Colonel Royal Engineers, 
 and Bt. -Colonel, Hon. Fellow of the University of Madras. In 
 Three Volumes. Medium 8vo, 12s. net each. 
 
 VOLUMES IN THE INDIAN TEXTS SERIES. 
 
 STORIA DO MOGOR; Or, MOGUL INDIA 
 
 (1653-1708). By NICCOLAO MANUCCI, Venetian. Translated, with 
 Notes and Introduction, by WILLIAM IRVINE, late of the Bengal 
 Civil Service ; Member of Council, Royal Asiatic Society. With 
 61 Illustrations and a Map. Four Volumes. Medium 8vo, 
 12s. net each. Edited under the supervision of the Royal Asiatic 
 Society. 
 
 AN ARABIC HISTORY OF GUJARAT, 
 
 Entitled "Zafar Ul-Walih Bi Mugaffar Wa Alih." By 'Abdallah 
 Muhammad Bin 'Omar Al-Makki, Al-Asafi, Ulughkhdnf. Edited 
 from the unique and Autograph Copy in the Library of the 
 Calcutta Madrasah by E. DENISON Ross, Ph.D. Volume I. 
 Demy 8vo, 12s. net. 
 18 
 
LIFE AND LABOUR IN INDIA. By A. 
 
 YUSUF-ALI, M.A., LL.M. (Cantab), M.R.A.S., Barrister-at-Law, 
 of His Majesty's Indian Civil Service. With Illustrations. In- 
 cluding Drawings by Native Artists. Demy 8vo, 12s. net. 
 
 " This work of an Indian born and bred who has a knowledge, not only of 
 his native country, but also of European life and ways of thought . . . will 
 prove profitable reading to any one who wishes a concise, readable, and trust- 
 worthy introduction to a knowledge of the life of India as it is." 
 
 Manchester Guardian. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF INDIA. By the Hon. 
 
 MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE. Ninth Edition. With Maps. 
 Demy 8vo, 15s. net. 
 
 "The book remains distinctly one of our indispensable works of interest and 
 reference, and it possesses graces of narrative and exposition which are absent 
 from most of its rivals." Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF THE 
 
 BRITISH DOMINION IN INDIA. By Sir ALFRED LYALI. 
 Fourth Edition. With a new Chapter bringing the History down 
 to 1907. With Maps. Demy 8vo, 5s. net. 
 
 INDIA AND TIBET. By Colonel Sir FRANCIS 
 
 YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.I.E. With Maps and Illustrations. 
 Medium 8vo, 21 S. net. 
 
 " The expedition to Lhasa six years ago has already had three historians, but 
 Sir Francis Younghusband's work is invested with a special value which none of 
 its predecessors can claim. He was the responsible leader of the Mission of 
 1904, and what he has to say about it, and about the circumstances which led to 
 its despatch, bears the stamp of final and indisputable authority ... a full and 
 balanced account of the political aspects of the Tibetan problem, the motives 
 which led to the unveiling of Lhasa, the results of the Mission, and the questions 
 which still await solution. His book, therefore, constitutes the most important 
 contribution yet made to the growing store of literature about Tibet." Times. 
 
 HOBSON-JOBSON. Being a Glossary of Col- 
 loquial Anglo-Indian Words and Phrases, and of Kindred Terms- 
 Etymological, Historical, Geographical, and Discursive. By the 
 late Colonel Sir HENRY YULE, R.E., C.B., and the late ARTHUR 
 COKE BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E. Second Edition, thoroughly 
 revised by WILLIAM CROOKE, B.A. Demy 8vo, 28s. net. 
 
 A NEW EDITION, THOROUGHLY REVISED. 
 
 A HANDBOOK FOR TRAVELLERS IN 
 
 INDIA, BURMA, AND CEYLON. Including the Provinces of 
 Bengal, Bombay, Madras, the United Provinces of Agra and 
 Lucknow, the Panjab, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the North - 
 West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and the Central Provinces, 
 and the Native States of Rajputana, Central India, Kashmir, 
 Hyderabad, Mysore, etc. With numerous Maps and Plans. 2Os. 
 
THE COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS OF 
 
 INDIA. Being an Abridgment of "The Dictionary of the 
 Economic Products of India." By Sir GEORGE WATT, C.I.E., 
 M.B., LL.D. Medium 8vo, 16s. net. 
 
 "A complete and exhaustive digest of all available information concerning 
 the numerous Indian products of actual or potential commercial importance . . . 
 a work of practical value to commerce and industry . . . should be in the hands 
 of everybody having commercial or industrial relations with the Indian Empire." 
 
 Chamber of Commerce Journal. 
 
 THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN INDIA. 
 
 By Sir THEODORE MORISON, K.C.I. E., Author of "The Industrial 
 Organization of an Indian Province." Demy 8vo, 5s. net. 
 
 " Students of the British East must on no account miss this book. In a 
 sense it forms really a history of India, from the workaday material standpoint. 
 This is a book to read and to keep for reference. " Standard. 
 
 THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
 
 AN INDIAN PROVINCE. By Sir THEODORE MORISON, 
 K.C.I.E., formerly Principal of the Mohammedan College at 
 Aligarh. Demy 8vo, 1Os. 6d. net. 
 
 " His opinions are expressed with lucidity and moderation, and even where 
 they provoke dissent they demand the closest attention." Manchester Guardian. 
 
 STUDIES OF INDIAN LIFE AND SEN- 
 TIMENT. By Sir BAMPFYLDE FULLER, K.C.S.I., C.I.E. 
 Second Impression. With Map. Crown 8vo, 6s. net. 
 
 " We ought to read and remember all that Sir Bampfylde Fuller says of the 
 history, the geography, the weather, and the peoples of India ; to have some 
 idea of the different religions and the numbers of their adherents, of the Caste 
 system and village communities, of domestic life and agricultural methods ; and 
 to know what causes famine, what famine and famine relief means, how com- 
 merce thrives in India, how the people is governed and educated, and whence 
 the revenue is derived. All these things are briefly set forth in these studies by 
 one who spent his life in the Government service, and who neither in his views 
 nor his sympathies can be accused of hide-bound officialism." World. 
 
 EVENTS OF THE INDIAN MUTINY AT 
 
 FEROZEPORE AND THROUGHOUT THE SIEGE OF 
 DELHI. Personal Reminiscences of Captain Griffiths. Edited 
 by Captain HENRY JOHN YONGE, formerly of the 6ist Regiment. 
 With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 9s. net. 
 
 "Such a volume as the present is an invaluable document, not merely for 
 historians of the Mutiny, but for all students of the history of the relations 
 between European and non-European races. . . . Graphic even to an exciting 
 degree, and he proves himself to have an eye for a fine scene, an heroic act, or a 
 humorous incident." Daily News. 
 
THE WISDOM OF THE EAST SERIES 
 
 contains original translations of the great religious, philosophical, 
 and literary classics of the East. Amongst the subjects treated 
 of are Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Judaism, the 
 Bahai Religion, Chinese, Persian and Arabian Mysticism, and the 
 Poetry of China and Japan. Price Is. or 2s. net. 
 
 INDIAN 
 
 THE HEART OF INDIA. Sketches in the History of Hindu Religion 
 and Morals. By L. D. BARNETT, M.A., LittD., Professor of Sanskrit at University 
 College, London. 2s. net. 
 
 BRAHMA-KNOWLEDGE: An Outline of the Philosophy of the 
 Vedanta. As set forth by the Upanishads and by Sankara. By L. D. 
 BARNETT, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Sanskrit at University College, London. 2s. net. 
 
 THE PATH OF LIGHT. Rendered for the first time into English from 
 the Bodhi-charyavatfira of 3anti-Deva. A Manual of Maha-Yana Buddhism. By L. D. 
 BARNETT, M.A., Litt.D. 2s. net. 
 
 LEGENDS OF INDIAN BUDDHISM. Translated from " L'Introduc- 
 
 tion a 1'Histoire du Buddhisme Indien " of Eugene Burnouf, with an Introduction by 
 WINIFRED STEPHENS. 2s. net. 
 
 THE WAY OF THE BUDDHA. Selections from the Buddhist texts, 
 together with the original Pali, with Introduction by HERBERT BAYNES, M.R.A.S. 
 2s. net. 
 
 IRANIAN (Persian, Pehlvl, Zend, etc.) 
 
 THE RUBA'IYAT OF HAFIZ. Translated with Introduction by SYED 
 ABDUL MAJID, LL.D. Rendered into English Verse by L. CRANMER-BVNG. Is. net. 
 
 THE SPLENDOUR OF GOD. Being Extracts from the Sacred Writings 
 of the Bahais. With Introduction by ERIC HAMMOND. 2s. net. 
 
 THE TEACHINGS OF ZOROASTER, and the Philosophy of the 
 Parsi Religion. Translated with Introduction by Dr. S. A. KAPADIA, 
 
 Lecturer, University College, London. 2s. net. 
 
 THE PERSIAN MYSTICS. 
 
 I. Jalalll'd-din Rumi. By F. HADLAND DAVIS. 2s. net. 
 II. Jami. By F. HADLAND DAVIS. 2s.net. 
 
 THE BUSTAN OF SA'DI. From the Persian. Translated with Intro- 
 duction by A. HART EDWARDS. 2s. net. 
 
 SA'DI'S SCROLL OF WISDOM. By SHAIKH SA'DI. With Introduc- 
 
 tion by Sir ARTHUR N. WOLLASTON, K.C.I.E. Is. net. 
 With Persian Script added. 2s. net. 
 
 THE ROSE GARDEN OF SA'DI. Selected and Rendered from the 
 Persian with Introduction by L. CRANMF.R-BYNG. la. net. 
 
 Full List of Boohs in the Series sent on application to 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, 5oa ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 
 
j, 
 
38813 
 
 *> * 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY