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HE ETHICAL IDEAL 
 OF RENUNCIATION 
 
 cA thesis 
 
 BY 
 
 CORDIE JACOB CULP, M. A. 
 
THE ETHICAL IDEAL OF RENUNCIATION 
 
 A THESIS 
 
 BY 
 
 CORDIE JACOB CULP, M. A, 
 
 Accepted by the Graduate School of New York University, 
 
 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
 Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 I914 
 
To 
 F. B. C. 
 
 Companion, Adviser, Helper 
 
 This Monograph is 
 Affectionately Dedicated 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Pages 
 I. INTRODUCTION :-The Nature of the Ethical 
 
 Problem 7-8 
 
 1. The Older View: Life as enjoyment, Epicu- 
 
 rean. Life as obligation, Stoic. Consequent 
 dualism. Hedonism and Rationalism. The 
 search after a reconciling principle 7 
 
 2. The Newer View: Life as realization, Aesthet- 
 
 ics. Life as renunciation. Religion. Eudae- 
 monism and Rigorism. Life in its unity. The 
 aim of this thesis 7-8 
 
 XL RENUNCIATION IN ITS HISTORICAL 
 
 Development 8-46 
 
 A. Orientalism. 
 
 1. Taoism: The speculative principle of the 
 Tao, nihilistic. The ethical principle of the 
 Teh, doing nothing. Non-resentment and 
 non-resistance 8-1 1 
 
 2. Yogaism: Compared with Taoism. The 
 Universal Self. The practical principle of 
 worklessness. The basis for non-resentment 
 
 and non-resistance 1 1-14 
 
 3. Buddhism: Compared with Taoism and 
 Yogaism. The Buddhistic motive. Annihila- 
 tion of desire. Nirvanism 14-16 
 
 4. Christianity: Compared with other forms of 
 orientalism. Teaching of Jesus, self-denial 
 and self-hatred. Teaching of St. Paul, inva- 
 lidity of good works. Transition of Christi- 
 anity to the Occident. Conflict with Pagan- 
 
 (3) 
 
 305620 
 
Contents 
 
 Pages 
 ism. Augustine. *'Via negativa" Renais- 
 sance and the Reformation. The rise of Ra- 
 tionalism 16-23 
 
 B. Modernity: — The Rationalistic Withdrawal 
 
 from Nature. 
 
 1. The problem of Descartes: The dualism of 
 mind and matter. Interaction of body and 
 mind 23-24 
 
 2. Occasionalism: Geulincx: Virtue ''Amor Dei 
 ac Rationis." "Inspectio sui" ''Despectio sui'' 
 "Contemptio sui." Malebranche. Seeing in 
 God. Loving God. Spinoza and Occasional- 
 ism, ''Amor intellectualis Dei" Pascal, con- 
 tempt of reason. Exaltation of will 24-31 
 
 C. Revival of Renunciation in the igth Century. 
 
 1. Schopenhauer: The World as Will and Idea, 
 The Will-to-live. Life as evil. Denial of 
 The Will-to-live. Pessimism of Bahnsen. 
 
 The contention of Frauenstadt 32-37 
 
 2. Hartmann: Compared with Schopenhauer. 
 Will unconscious but intelligent. Affirmation 
 of the Will-to-live. Final annihilation of the 
 
 will . • • 37-38 
 
 3. Wagner: The superman. Nirvanism of 
 Wotan in "The Ring" The "Black flag" of 
 Tristan and Isolde. Parsifal 3^-40 
 
 4. Ibsen: Brand, "All or none." Peer Gynt, 
 "Barrel of self." Emperor and Galilean, 
 "Thou hast conquered." Rosmersholm, "The 
 Rosmer view of life" 40-41 
 
 5. Russian Submission and Sympathism: Tol- 
 stoi, doctrine of non-resistance. Dostoieffsky, 
 egoism and repentance 41-43 
 
 6. Opposition to renunciation. Sudermann, in- 
 dividualism and immoralism. Repudiation of 
 
Contents 5 
 
 Pages 
 
 moral standards. Nietzsche, WUl-to-powcr. 
 Superman. Ascetic ideals. Contempt for 
 Christianity 43-46 
 
 III. RENUNCIATION AS AN ETHICAL 
 
 IDEAL 46-55 
 
 J. Negative. 
 
 1. Life can not contain nor content man: Per- 
 sistency and universality of renunciatory 
 ideals. The lack in human life. Nature and 
 spirit 46-50 
 
 2. The spiritual nature of man: No place in 
 nature. The historical negation of nature. 
 
 The problem of self-hood 49-50 
 
 B. Positive. 
 
 1. Renunciation as the path to spiritual life. The 
 more in human life. Man's critical attitude 
 toward the world. The affirmation of the self 50-51 
 
 2. Self-realization through renunciation: The 
 self and nature. Subdual of the world of 
 sense. Renunciation as conceived by Russian 
 thought and Christianity. Metaphysical and 
 moral grounds. A valid ideal for complete- 
 ness of life. The home and the work of the 
 
 self 51-55 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 56-57 
 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The problem of renunciation arises in connection with the 
 newer and more profound conception of the moral life, as 
 it has been developed by modern writers. According to the 
 traditional view, the ethical decision and moral choice had 
 to do with one or other of the peculiar functions of con- 
 sciousness, as feeling or intellect, sensibility or reason. Thus 
 arose the dualism which occasioned the sharp conflict be- 
 tween Epicureanism and Stoicism, the ideal of the former 
 being the enjoyment of life, while the latter made life a mat- 
 ter of obligation. This dualism persisted in modern think- 
 ing in the form of Hedonism on the one hand and Rational- 
 ism on the other with a constant conflict which served in 
 time to reveal the inadequacy of either conception to meet 
 the ethical demands of humanity. Hedonism possessed ma- 
 terial and content in sensibility but lacked form and a regu- 
 lating principle, while Rationalism had the form and regu- 
 lating principle but lacked material and content. Consequent- 
 ly there was a search for a reconciling principle which would 
 recognize the rights of both Hedonism and Rationalism. 
 This search resulted in the conclusion that life must be con- 
 ceived as an unit which took the form of Eudaemonism, 
 where self-realization through the aesthetical impulse was 
 the ideal, or Rigorism, where the religious influence was para- 
 mount. Both views apprehended life as a whole but where 
 Eudaemonism counselled man to accept life. Rigorism de- 
 manded that he reject it. Therefore, the distinction which 
 now obtains in the moral field, instead of forcing the ethical 
 subject to choose between separate functions of consciousness, 
 man is called upon to regard his life as an unity and upon 
 this basis to either assert his life as a whole or deny it. Thus 
 arises our problem of renunciation. For its proper consid- 
 eration as an ethical ideal, its place in human thought and 
 
 (7) 
 
>• _•_•** 
 
 8 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 the forms in which it appears, it is necessary that this thesis 
 be historical and expository with some critical estimate of 
 renunciation as a problem in human life. 
 
 II. RENUNCIATION IN ITS HISTORICAL 
 DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 Following the superior conception of ethics as something 
 concerned with life as a whole, there arises the necessity of 
 exploring the whole field of historical ethical inquiry, so 
 that instead of beginning with Socrates or Hobbes, we must 
 consider the earlier forms of morality as these are found 
 in the oriental world. For this reason it is expedient that 
 we examine the subject of renunciation as it appears in 
 Taoism, Yogaism, Buddhism and Christianity as well as the 
 various forms of occidental thinking. With Taoism and 
 Yogaism, the problem concerns itself with activity. Each 
 system agreeing that all action must be repudiated, the one 
 ending in nihilism and the other in worklessness. Buddhism 
 and Christianity are ethical where Taoism and Yogaism are 
 more metaphysical. These have their seat in the spiritual 
 life of man and when they counsel their disciples to re- 
 nounce the world, the result of Buddhism is a pessimism of 
 a weak and negative sort, while with Christianity, it is a 
 pessimism of a stronger and more positive character. In 
 all four of these systems, renunciation is paramount. 
 
 A. Orientalism. 
 
 I. Both in point of time and development, Taoism of- 
 fers a fitting field for the beginning of our historical inquiry 
 as to the subject of renunciation. This early form of Mon- 
 golian thought is naive, naturistic and individualistic. It 
 finds its most perfect expression in the writings of Laotzc, 
 known as the Tao-Teh-King, a paradoxical and unsyste- 
 matical treatise on metaphysics and ethics. The Tao is the 
 speculative principle and the Teh the practical principle, 
 with no clear distinctions between them. The Tao is an- 
 alogous to the Greek principle of the Aoyos or the natura 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 9 
 
 naturans of Bruno and Spinoza. Laotze speaks of it thus: 
 "There is something undefined and complete, coming into 
 existence before Heaven and Earth. How still it was and 
 formless, standing alone, and undergoing no change, reach- 
 ing everywhere and in no danger (of being exhausted) ! It 
 may be regarded as the Mother of all things. I do not 
 know its name, and I give it the designation of the Tao."^ 
 He further declares that "It might appear to have been be- 
 fore God."^ A further examination of the Taoistic prin- 
 ciple indicates that its real nature is nihilistic. In fact Laotze 
 anticipates the Hegelian notion that pure being is equivalent 
 to nothing. He says "The Tao is like the emptiness of a 
 vessel."^ It is also likened to the space for the axle in the 
 hub of a wheel or to the openings for windows and doors in 
 the walls of a house.* The Tao is nihilistic in its operations. 
 It is impalpable. It eludes the senses. It is the equable, the 
 inaudible and the subtle.^ In its method of procedure, the 
 Tao moves by contraries: 
 
 "The movement of the Tao 
 By contraries proceeds; 
 And weakness marks the course 
 Of Tao's mighty deeds."* 
 
 Its existence is non-existence, its fullness is emptiness, its 
 l)rightness is darkness and its progress is retrogression.*^ Such 
 paradoxical illustrations as these serve to show the nihilism 
 which lies at the heart of the system, the most definite as- 
 sertion of which occurs in the 37th chapter of the first part 
 of the Tao-Teh-King where Laotze declares: "The Tao in 
 its regular course does nothing and so there is nothing which 
 it can not do." 
 
 Turning to the Teh, the ethical principle of the system, 
 we are met with the assertion that "Man takes his law from 
 the earth; the earth takes its law from heaven; heaven takes 
 
 I. 
 
 Tao-Teh-King, tr. Legge, pt. I, ch. 25. 
 
 2. 
 
 lb., ch. 4. 
 
 3- 
 
 lb., ch. 4, sec. I. 
 
 4- 
 
 lb., ch. II. 
 
 5- 
 
 lb., ch. 14. 
 
 6. 
 
 lb., pt. II, ch. 40. 
 
 7- 
 
 lb., pt. I, ch. 21. 
 
lO The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 its law from the Tao."^ Therefore, the law of man's life 
 is a form of quiescence which has its root in the metaphysical 
 nihilism of Taoism. Many and various are the ways in 
 which this quiescent state is portrayed. The man of Tao 
 is declared to be ^'Vacant like a valley and dull like muddy 
 water."^ Water is a favorite emblem of Laotze for both 
 the Teh and the Tao : '*There is nothing in the world more 
 soft and weak than water and yet for attacking things that 
 are firm and strong there is nothing that can take precedence 
 of it; — for there is nothing (so effectual) for which it can 
 be changed."^ It is the yielding character, stillness and ap- 
 parent weakness of water which make it such an attractive 
 figure for the way of human conduct.^ The ideal state for 
 humanity is one of listlessness and stillness where all desire 
 ceases to exist. Man must be ''Like an infant which has not 
 smiled."^ To attain to this ideal of "doing nothing" is 
 man's most sublime achievement and greatest enjoyment. 
 Kwang-sze says : "I consider doing nothing to be the greatest 
 enjoyment."^ Laotze in portraying this ideal is careful to 
 point out the road for its attainment which is the renuncia- 
 tion of all forms of activity, whether of the inner or the 
 outer life of man. He must constantly diminish his doing^ 
 until ''He arrives at doing nothing."^ All desire must be 
 stilled until it absolutely ceases.^ All human wisdom, be- 
 nevolence, righteousness and learning must be renounced.'* 
 By following such a path man will discover the principle 
 of all successful government, solve all social problems and 
 free society from all disorder.^^ Thus the real Utopia, ac- 
 
 I. 
 
 Tao-Teh-King, pt. I, ch. 25. 
 
 2. 
 
 lb., 15. 
 
 3. 
 
 lb., pt. II, ch. 78. 
 
 4. 
 
 lb., pt. I, ch. 8; pt. II, ch. 66 et al. 
 
 5. 
 
 lb., pt. I, ch. 20. 
 
 6. 
 
 Writings of Kwang-sze, tr. Legge, Bk. 18. 
 
 7. 
 
 Tao-Teh-ing, pt. II, ch. 48. 
 
 8. 
 
 lb., ch. I. 
 
 9- 
 
 lb., ch. 19. 
 
 10. 
 
 lb., pt. I, ch. 3 ; pt. II, ch. 57. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 1 1 
 
 cording to the Taoistic system is the *'Land of the great 
 vacuity" where after the manner of Heaven and Earth, 
 man sinks into the state where 
 
 "With no desire, at rest and still 
 All things go right as of their will."* 
 
 In Taoism, renunciation also appears in the forms of 
 non-resentment and non-resistance. It is said of the Taoistic 
 sage: "Because he does not strive, no one finds it possible to 
 strive with him."^ Speaking of war the sage declares: "I 
 do not dare to advance an inch; I prefer to retire a foot."^ 
 Non-resentment is counselled even more definitely. The sage 
 makes the mind of the people his mind and declares: "To 
 those who are good to me, I am good; and to those who are 
 not good to me, I am also good."* The teachings of Jesus 
 and Tolstoi are anticipated in the unexpected declaration: 
 "It is the way of the Tao to recompense injury with kind- 
 ness."^ The foundation of non-resistance and non-resent- 
 ment lies also in the nihilism of the system of Taoism with its 
 symbols of emptiness and non-action. If nothing exists ana 
 nothing needs to be done, naturally all reaction on the part 
 of humanity is not only out of place but entirely useless. 
 Renunciation, as the life ideal of Taoism, can not permit 
 activity even under the forms of non-resistance and non- 
 resentment. To the thorough-going Taoist, man's ordinary 
 life is valueless and to be negated as completely as the 
 nihilism of the system negates the world. 
 
 2. 1 he doctrine of Yogaism while agreeing with Taoism in 
 counselling non-activity as an ideal for human life, differs 
 from that system in being more intellectual but scarcely more 
 systematic. Where Taoism investigated nature and found 
 it empty, the Yoga affirms the absolute self in opposition 
 to the external world, therefore, the Yoga has a more sub- 
 
 I. 
 
 Tao-Teh-King, pt. I, ch. 37. 
 
 2. 
 
 Tao-Teh-King, pt. II, ch. 66. 
 
 3- 
 
 lb., ch. 69. 
 
 4- 
 
 lb., ch. 49. 
 
 5- 
 
 Tb., ch. 63 
 
12 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 stantlal metaphysics and while repudiating action, its form 
 of renunciation is of a higher and more logical nature than 
 that of Mongolian thought. The speculative basis for the 
 Yoga doctrine is the Brahman or universal self of the Ve- 
 danta philosophy, the Yoga being the practical aspect which 
 finds its clearest expression in the Bhagavadgita. Where 
 the Vedanta counsels the ideal of contemplation, the Yoga 
 of renunciation proceeds to realize the ideal, hence its con- 
 cern has to do with the emancipation of the individual self 
 from the delusion of the immediate and external and the 
 junction with the Absolute Self which is declared to be the 
 "Brahmic Bliss/'^ The Yoga is closely related to the Sankya 
 doctrine of knowledge as the path to the "Brahma-nirvana." 
 In fact they are declared to be one and the same; "He sees 
 truly" says Deity, "who sees Sankya and Yoga as one."^ Ac- 
 cording to the Sankya, the path of knowledge is secured by 
 renunciation in the form of a thorough-going asceticism. (The 
 Hatha Yoga), and by the mortification of all desires and the 
 absolute abandonment of all action, (The Raja Yoga), until 
 the mind attains to a state of undisturbed meditation.^ The 
 renunciation required by the Sankya doctrine, so far as it 
 pertains to activity, is as nihilistic as that of Taoism. How- 
 ever, in the Yoga, renunciation has to do with the purpose 
 and the motive of activity, rather than with activity itself, 
 thus yielding a kind of worklessness, in which man repudiates 
 all desire, ends and fruits of action.* The Yoga recognizes 
 a practical difficulty which seems to be entirely ignored by 
 Taoism and the Sankya and declares that "A man does not 
 attain freedom from action merely by not engaging in ac- 
 tion, for nobody ever remains even for an instant without 
 performing some action." Therefore, the Yoga counsels: 
 "Action is better than inaction."^ In this the Sankya doc- 
 trine is not so much repudiated by the Bhagavadgita as it is 
 
 I. 
 
 Bhagavadgita, tr., Telang, ch. 2. 
 
 2. 
 
 lb., ch. 5. 
 
 3. 
 
 lb., ch. 2. 
 
 4- 
 
 lb. ch. 3. 
 
 5. 
 
 Tb, ch 3 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 13 
 
 considered inferior. Deity says: "There is a two-fold path, 
 that of the Sankyas by devotion in the shape of true knowl- 
 edge; and that of the Yogins by devotion in the shape of ac- 
 tion,"^ however, Deity further says: "But of the two, pur- 
 suit of action is superior to the renunciation of action.''^ It 
 is quite evident, therefore, that the renunciation of the Yoga 
 passes from that of action itself to the motive for action and 
 thus reduces the ethical subject to a position where the rule 
 of work is the absence of all expectation of reward and the 
 complete detachment of all desire from activity, or as Deity 
 declares : "I will speak to you about action, and learning that, 
 you will be freed from this world of evil. He is wise among 
 men who sees inaction in action, and action in inaction. For- 
 saking all detachment to the fruit of action, always con- 
 tented, dependent on none, he does nothing at all, though he 
 engage in action."^ The principle underlying this ideal of 
 worklessness is that life itself must be one great act of re- 
 nunciation by which the whole is dedicated to Brahman. To 
 Arguna's plea for direction in attaining the highest good. 
 Deity answers by saying: "Dedicating all actions to me with 
 a mind knowing the relation of the supreme and individual 
 self."^ In chapter five of the same work, Arguna is troubled 
 with what seems to be a confusion between renunciation and 
 the pursuit of action, to which Deity replies: "He, who cast- 
 ing off all attachment, performs actions dedicating them to 
 Brahman, is not tainted by sin, as the lotus-leaf is not tainted 
 by water." We have in this form of Hindoo thinking a 
 world abandonment as a life ideal which is attained by re- 
 nunciation in the form of worklessness. This, however, is 
 not the only form in which renunciation appears in the Yoga 
 doctrine. As in Taoism, non-resentment and non-resistance 
 are definitely advocated but upon different grounds. If in 
 the Taoistic system, resentment and resistance must be re- 
 nounced because they are useless, in the Yoga they must be 
 
 1. Bhagavadgita. ch. 3. 
 
 2. lb., ch. 5. 
 
 3. lb., ch. 4. 
 
 4. lb., ch. 3. 
 
14 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 abandoned because they are injurious to the individual and 
 serve only to frustrate his attainment of Brahmic bliss. 
 While the Bhagavadgita does not draw any such direct con- 
 clusion, any consistency between its speculative and practical 
 principles, demands that non-resentment and non-resistance 
 be fundamental to a system where the Universal Self is all 
 and the individual self can only say, aham hrahma asmi! *'I 
 am Brahman." Deity not only claims to be the source of 
 forgiveness^ but demands it of the Yogin : "That devotee of 
 mine, who hates no being, who is friendly and compassionate, 
 who is forgiving, is dear to me." And again : "He who is 
 alike to friend and foe, as also in honor and dishonor, who 
 is alike in cold and heat, pleasure and pain, who is free from 
 attachments, to whom praise and blame are alike, is dear to 
 me. "2 While the Bhagavadgita thus promulgates a more 
 active form of negation than Taoism by its Yoga of renuncia- 
 tion, it makes man distrustful of existence and destroys his 
 sense of selfhood by taking from him the consciousness of 
 individuality and all desire for personal action. However, 
 such an ideal goes counter to man's native sense of selfhood. 
 Man is not content to believe that he has no business to exist 
 or that he has no value in the world. It is not strange, 
 therefore, that over against the negation of the individual 
 personality of the Vedanta with its practical Yoga of re- 
 nunciation, there arises a reaction in which the self becomes 
 positive and while not possessing satisfactory value, its real 
 problems are recognized and dealt with in the positive fash- 
 ion of Buddhism and Christianity. 
 
 3. In Buddhism the Universal Self of the Yoga becomes 
 the subjective self of the individual. The metaphysical prin- 
 ciple of the Tao and Yoga practically disappears and in its 
 place, the individual alone exists. Ethics becomes everything 
 and the self the center of all problems. If the Yoga found 
 something wrong with the individual. Buddhism finds every- 
 thing wrong with the individual life and catching up the weap- 
 on of renunciation it wields it with more deadly power than 
 
 I, Bhagavadgita, ch. 10. 
 2i. Bhagavadgita, ch. 12. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 15 
 
 either Taoism or the Yoga. Where they were content with 
 negation and inactivity, Buddhism must secure the complete 
 annihilation of the individual self and thereby of all things. 
 Further Buddhism differs from these older negative forms 
 of thought in seeking the final redemption of man. The 
 nihilism of Taoism and the worklessness of Yogaism 
 are only temporary measures which will not satisfy the 
 Buddhist. Human life is too painful, sorrowful and de- 
 lusive; evil too persistent, the rebirth of the soul too terrible, 
 for any thing to be sought but the complete extinguishment 
 of the spark of the soul as "Fire goes out for want of grass." 
 The motive for Buddhistic renunciation is purely pessimistic. 
 "Birth, decay, death, the unpleasant and unsatisfied craving, 
 are all painful," but these are the condition of the existence 
 of the individual.^ To escape this suffering, it is necessary 
 to destroy its root which is the desire for the gratification of 
 passion, for future life and for success in the present life.* 
 This craving or desire is overcome by means of a series of 
 renunciatory acts summed up in the "Eight fold path." By 
 this path the chain of causation, so fundamental to the 
 Buddhistic system, is counteracted and finally overcome. 
 When this chain is broken, man is free from the earthly 
 bonds and from the re-birth of the soul and attains to the 
 desired end of Nirvana or extinction which is likened to the 
 blowing out of a candle. Buddhism in marshalling its forces 
 against desire, attacks the very stronghold of the life of 
 man and in reality seeks to save him by destroying him. This 
 paradoxical procedure is not all concealed but rather set 
 forth in the spirit of exultation. It is recorded in the "Book 
 of the Great Decease" that when the Blessed One "Delib- 
 erately and consciously rejected the rest of his alloted life" 
 he broke out in this hymn of rejoicing: 
 
 "His sum of life the sage renounced, 
 The Cause of life immeasurable or small; 
 With inward joy and calm, he broke, 
 Like a coat of mail, his life's own cause."' 
 
 1. Ppanattana Sutta, sec. 5. 
 
 2. lb., sees. 6, 7, 8. 
 
 3. lb., ch. 3:10. 
 
1 6 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 This breaking of the cause of life is the attainment of 
 Nirvana which is not annihilation but a living Arahatship, a 
 condition of human existence where the fires of lust, hatred 
 and delusion have gone out by a process of contemplation 
 and asceticism combined. The Arahat has reached Nirvana 
 but continues to live in a state of bliss, like the "Gods who 
 feed on happiness."^ In this state the seeds of existence are 
 destroyed, desire and the sense of individuality are no more 
 and like a dying lamp, the Arahat gradually flickers out of 
 existence into complete and absolute annihilation.^ Like 
 Taoism and Yogaism, Buddhism counsels non-resentment 
 and non-resistance but upon a more practical basis, in fact 
 they are the natural corollaries of the system. To practice re- 
 sentment or resistance only adds to the strife and pain of life 
 from which it is the whole end of man to escape. "Angry 
 speech is painful, blows for blows will touch" says the Dham- 
 mapada.^ The teachings of Jesus are anticipated by the 
 declaration that "Hatred does not cease by hatred at any 
 time: Hatred ceases by love."^ The Path to Nirvana is 
 further described as one where anger is overcome by love, 
 evil by good, the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth and 
 where no one is injured by another.^ Buddhistic renuncia- 
 tion is thorough-going in all its aspects. Its foundation is 
 laid deeply in the weakest sort of pessimism. If Taoism can 
 find neither a home nor a work for man and the Yoga robs 
 him of all purpose and motive. Buddhism finds his life al- 
 together evil with no hope but utter extinction and annihila- 
 tion. 
 
 4. Christianity, the last form of orientalism to be con- 
 sidered in this historical survey, like the systems already re- 
 viewed, has a passion for renunciation but in other respects 
 it differs very fundamentally from these systems. Where 
 both Mongolian and Indian thought make light of the in- 
 
 1. Dhammapada, sees. 197-200. 
 
 2. Rattana Sutta, sec. 14. 
 
 3. Sec. 133. 
 
 4. lb., sec. 5. 
 
 5. lb., sees. 223-225. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 17 
 
 dividual and depreciate his worth, Christianity literally dis- 
 covers the individual and posits the soul over against the 
 world. It repudiates the nihihsm of the Tao, the pantheism 
 of the Yoga and the atheism of Buddhism and affirms a 
 thorough-going theism. Like Buddhism, Christianity is a 
 life-system which Is concerned in the redemption of man but 
 where Buddhism would rescue man by annihilating him, 
 Christianity redeems him by a positive salvation process 
 based upon the conception of human values which Buddhism 
 Is unable to discover. There is another sharp contrast be- 
 tween Christianity and the other oriental systems reviewed 
 in that while Taoism has an empty world and the Vedanta 
 a worldless self, Christianity affirms a world-soul to which 
 man stands In living relation but with which he can never be 
 identified. As man seeks God In whom he lives and moves 
 and has his belng,^ it is not that he may be Brahmically ab- 
 sorbed In Deity but rather that his own personality may be 
 preserved by right relations with an objective God. Sharper 
 still Is the contrast between the inactivity, so characteristic 
 of the Taolstic and Indian thinking, and the Christian phil- 
 osophy of activity. Jesus was no ascetic. He was the doer 
 of mighty deeds. However, the activity of Christianity is 
 not to be confused with the form of activity repudiated by 
 other oriental thought but Is rather to be conceived as the 
 performance of a mighty deed whereby the soul, escaping 
 the world of nature, becomes engaged In the great spiritual 
 tasks of filling out the proportions of its own peculiar nature. 
 This Is the meaning of the paradoxical teaching of Jesus: 
 ''Whosoever shall seek to gain his life {ri]v \}n)xi]v) shall lose 
 it; but whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve It."^ The 
 renunciation advocated by Christianity rests upon grounds 
 both thelstic and moral and proceeds toward a goal of pos- 
 itive values for man. With these general characteristics of 
 the Christian system before us, we shall seek to exhibit its 
 requirements for, and the use it makes of, renunciation. 
 
 1. Acts xvii:28. 
 
 2. Luke xvii 133. 
 
1 8 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 The sharp antithesis which Jesus makes between the flesh 
 {(rapt) and the spirit {irvcv^a) must be our starting point. 
 The uap^ is the hfe of the natural man which must be re- 
 nounced in favor of the 7ri/cv/>ia which is a higher form of life 
 known as C^ mwnos with the world-order of its own // BamXda 
 rov Oeov. To enter this kingdom, Christianity requires the/xeravota 
 by which a man repudiates his whole life of conduct 
 and thought as completely as a new beginning or a new 
 birth. ^ Man is required to enter into the Christian life by 
 the way of baptism which is a symbol of death^ and pro- 
 claim his Christian discipleship by the use of the Sacrament 
 of the Lord's Supper, another symbol of death. ^ The de- 
 sires and values of the man of nature must give way for the 
 new desires and values of the man of the spirit.* It is this 
 transvaluation of values which drew the bitter attack of 
 Nietzsche, the great foe of the Christian system. The val- 
 ue-judgment under which Christianity proceeds has its seat in 
 the inner and personal life. "For what shall a man be prof- 
 ited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life? or 
 what shall a man give in exchange for his life."^ As com- 
 pared with the soul values, earthly possessions must occupy a 
 lower plane nor do they contribute to these values.^ The 
 abandonment of worldly goods is not because they are essen- 
 tially evil, as Buddhism declares, but they stand in the way 
 of a higher good. When the wealthy young man sought en- 
 trance into the kingdom, he was told by Jesus to sell all he 
 possessed and distribute the proceeds to the poor.'^ Christian 
 renunciation may even extend to the maiming of the physical 
 body. If the hand or the foot or the eye leads estray, it is 
 to be taken from the body.^ Separation from one's own fam- 
 ily and relatives and the very hating of one's own life are 
 
 1. Matt. iv:i7 with John iii:3. 
 
 2. Rom. vi:5. 
 
 3. I Cor. xi:26. 
 
 4. Gal. v: 19-22. 
 
 5. Matt. xvi:26. 
 
 6. Luke xii:is. 
 
 7. Mark x:2i. 
 
 8. Mark ix :43{. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 19 
 
 counselled by Jesus/ and finally this renunciation extends to 
 the sacrificing of earthly life itself: "Whosoever doth not 
 bear his own cross (Roman instrument of execution) and 
 come after me, cannot be my disciple. "^ Under the figures of 
 the tower builder and the king going to war, Jesus teaches 
 that this painful renunciation must be deliberately and 
 thoughtfully accomplished.^ Nothing less than the complete 
 abandonment of the man of nature with his desires and pos- 
 sessions can satisfy the Christian ideal. "Whosoever he be of 
 you that renounceth not all that he hath, he cannot be my dis- 
 ciple."^ It was under the realization of the thorough-going 
 renunciation of the Christian system which led Luther to 
 say: "Have done with thy body, goods, honor, child and 
 wife; let them go." (Nehmen sie Leib, Gut, Ehr, Kind und 
 Weib, Lass fahren dahn.)^ 
 
 In the teachings of St. Paul, Christian renunciation takes 
 a specific direction which can be summed up under the phrase 
 "The Road to Damascus," that is to say the great renuncia- 
 tion which followed his conversion to Christianity becomes 
 for him the ideal form. Like the modern Huysmans, St. 
 Paul sets down his conversion to the mercy and grace of 
 God and from this conviction he develops his doctrine of the 
 invalidity of works of merit. The value element in Chris- 
 tianity for St. Paul is the KcuVo-n/s ^0)17?^ but for the attaining 
 of which he absolutely distrusts human activity. He seems 
 almost Taoistic in his demand that so far as attempting to 
 perform the requirements of the ceremonial or moral law, 
 one had better do nothing: "Neither circumcision availeth 
 anything nor uncircumcision."*^ The moral law is as helpless 
 as the ceremonial: "By the works of the law shall no flesh 
 
 1. Luke xiv:26. 
 
 2. Luke xiv 127. 
 
 3. Luke xiv:28, 
 
 4. Luke xiv:33. 
 
 5. Quoted by Wendt "The Teaching of Jesus," tr. John Wilson, Vol. 
 II, ch. vii, sec. 3. 
 
 6. Rom. vi., 4. 
 
 7. Gal. v., 6. 
 
20 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 be justified."^ Having thus cleared the way, St. Paul states 
 his great thesis of Christianity: "A man is justified by faith 
 apart from the works of the law."^ This faith he makes 
 the gift of the supernatural^ and teaches the necessity for a 
 quiescent state in which man renounces all personal merit 
 and self activity.^ Like other forms of oriental thought, 
 Christianity affirms the necessity of practicing non-resent- 
 ment and non-resistance, but upon theistic grounds. Jesus 
 teaches the love of enemies and the non-resistance of evil be- 
 cause such a course exhibits a certain Divine likeness.^ St. 
 Paul makes the practice of non-resistance a preparation for 
 the play of Divine justice: ''Avenge not yourselves, beloved, 
 but give place unto the wrath of God."^ 
 
 These renunciatory teachings of Christianity bore fruit 
 in practical life in many and various ways, often in extremx 
 forms and also suffered certain modifications as Christianity 
 took its way from its oriental home of inactivity and quies- 
 cence to the more active conception of life as held by Pagan 
 culture in the Roman Empire. The conflict between Pagan- 
 ism and Christianity was very sharp and when the latter won 
 the day, humanity experienced one of the greatest revolu- 
 tions of history. Because of the universal appeal of Chris- 
 tianity and its conception of its task of converting the whole 
 race of mankind, this revolution concerned more than Euro- 
 pean races but effected the human interests of a world. This 
 revolution meant nothing else than the complete overthrow 
 of all life's theories which Nietzsche terms the "Transvalua- 
 tion of all values." This transformation of values made its 
 mark deeply upon all religious and philosophic thinking of 
 medievalism and modernity. Where Pagan culture affirmed 
 the world of nature and made self-preservation the first law, 
 Christianity denied the world and taught the losing of self. 
 
 I. 
 
 Gal. ii., 16. 
 
 2. 
 
 Rom. iii., 28. 
 
 3- 
 
 Eph. ii, 8. 
 
 4. 
 
 Rom. iii, 19. 
 
 5. 
 
 Matt. 38ff. 
 
 6. 
 
 Rom. xiiriQ. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 21 
 
 For the self-assertive virtues of courage, justice, and tem- 
 perance as these were conceived by pagan thinkers, Chris- 
 tianity substituted the submissive virtues of patience, 
 non-resentment, non-resistance and abstention. Hu- 
 mility was put in the place of ambition, silence In the place 
 of eloquence, pity and mercy In the place of the natural vir- 
 tues of the Greeks. In fact the virtues of the Greek and 
 Roman morality were considered by such Christian thinkers 
 as Augustine but splendid vices. In practical life, therefore, 
 the negative position of Christianity found expression in 
 many extreme ethical practices as witnessed by such move- 
 ments as Gnosticism, Monasticism and other forms of as- 
 ceticism. Especially Is it worthy to note the place of the *'Fia 
 negativa'' of the Mystics, a form of renunciation which pre- 
 dominated In the medieval period. The '^Fia negativa** has 
 its roots In the teachings of Augustine who took the position 
 that life has no meaning apart from God and union with 
 God is the highest end of man.^ Augustine divorced the will 
 from the human consciousness and found It wholly incapable 
 of moral or spiritual conquest, therefore there is nothing 
 which man can do and his salvation Is wholly determined by 
 the arbitrary will of God. For those whom God determines 
 to redeem there exists the "Momentous WIU."^ Like St. 
 Paul, Augustine does away with all works of human merit as 
 useless. It Is by surrender that man comes into union with the 
 Divine but this union demands the contempt of self: "The 
 two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly love 
 of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the 
 love of God even to the contempt of self."^ It was left for 
 Dionyslus to coin the phrase ^^Via negativa'* which he con- 
 trasts with the ^'Fia afirmata'* and Illustrates It by the figure 
 of the sculptor who "Cuts away all superfluous material and 
 brings to light the beauty hidden within, so we negate every- 
 thing in order that without veils we may know that Un- 
 
 1. Confessions, tr., J. G. Pilkingston, bk., I, ch. I. 
 
 2. Confessions, bk. viii, chs, 8. 9. 
 
 3. City of God, bk. v, ch. 18. 
 
22 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 known who Is concealed by all the light in existing things."^ 
 It is this road which leads to that "Union above all thought, 
 above the states of consciousness, above all knowledge. "^ 
 Those who follow this road will lay aside all mental energies 
 and by pure contemplation will participate "With unim- 
 passioned and immaterial mind."^ This "Via negativa" pro- 
 vides for Albertus Magnus a state of quiescence and mental 
 inactivity which appears Buddhistic in character: "Nothing 
 pleases God more than a mind free from all occupations and 
 distractions. Such a mind is In a manner transformed into 
 God; other creatures and itself It sees only in God."* Again 
 in German mysticism, the ''Fia negativa" holds sway in the 
 thinking of Tauler who advocates the poverty of the inner 
 life, entire resignation and the absolute denial of self and 
 all self-love.^ The hold which the *'Via negativa^^ had upon 
 the minds of ethical thinkers through the medieval period is 
 well summed up by Inge: "God can best be described by 
 negatives, discovered by the stripping off of all qualities and 
 attributes which veil him. He can only be reached by di- 
 vesting ourselves of all the distinctions of personality and the 
 sinking or the rising into our 'uncreated nothingness,' and 
 he can only be Imitated by aiming at an abstract spirituality, 
 the passionless 'apathy' of an universal which is nothing In 
 particular."^ 
 
 But while medieval life was seemingly dominated by the 
 Christian Ideals of self-denial and world-abandonment, there 
 were undercurrents of life and thought which escaping this 
 domination found expression in the life of the Germanic na- 
 tions, which were never converted to Christianity as such but 
 only to the Church. Therefore, along with the poetry of the 
 Church with Its dream of deliverance from world-weariness 
 and Its exaltation of the passive virtues of patience and obed- 
 
 1. Mys. Theo., ch. 2:1. 
 
 2. Div. name, ch. 14. 
 
 3. lb. 
 
 4. De adhaerendo Deo, quoted by Inge, Christian Mysticism. Lecture iv. 
 
 5. The Inner Way, tr. A. W. Hutton. 
 
 6. Christian Mysticism, Lecture iii. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 23 
 
 ience, there flourished the epic poem with its heroes and its 
 heroines, its virtues of ferocious courage and hatred of 
 enemies. It is not without significance that such an exhibition 
 of heroism and strength as is embodied in the Nibelungen- 
 lied should be a product of medieval life. While the epic 
 was exploiting the hero of strength, the lyric was singing of 
 the joy of life and the love of the world. Even St. Paul's 
 discount of worldly wisdom was not generally accepted and 
 the teachings of Christianity were cast into the rationalistic 
 moulds of Scholastic theology. It was this counter-move- 
 ment, which smouldering in the Middle Ages, finally burst 
 forth and ushered in the modern era with its two great 
 revolutions: the Renaissance and the Reformation. The 
 former, with its ardent admiration for the Pagan ideals of 
 life, was a rebellion against the Christian renunciation of the 
 world and the denial of self. The latter was a rebellion 
 against the dead dogmas and authority of the Church but 
 agreed with the Renaissance in the desire for freedom and 
 individualism. The Reformation did not turn from the 
 Christian ideals of self-denial and world-estrangement but 
 rather from the false ways into which these had fallen. 
 Luther considered the earth but a vale of tears and de- 
 manded self-denial of the most thorough-going character. It 
 was this element in the Reformation which served to check 
 the Renaissance movement toward a worldly life and artistic 
 culture, especially in northern Europe. But whatever be 
 the historical relation of the two movements, they made pos- 
 sible the rise of the rationalistic spirit which is the character- 
 istic of the modern era. It is the work of this spirit which 
 opened a new era for the ethical ideal of renunciation. 
 
 B. Modernity,— Rationalistic Withdrawal from 
 
 Nature. 
 
 Amid the profound changes wrought by the revival of 
 learning, the consequent breaking of traditional authority, 
 the rise of freedom and individualism and the ascendency 
 
24 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 of the autonomy of reason, renunciation emerges as a prob- 
 lem within the nature of man. Up to the dawning of mod- 
 ernity, it had served to relate man to some external principle 
 as the nihilistic metaphysics of the Tao, or the Brahman of 
 the Yoga, the Nirvana of Buddhism or the Kingdom of God 
 of Christianity or in other words its field was metaphysical 
 and moral but with the entrance of the modern spirit, its 
 field became rationalistic. 
 
 The great problem raised by Descartes (1596-1650) was 
 the interaction of mind and body. He conceived of matter 
 and mind as distinct substances absolutely independent of one 
 another. The body has extension for its essential attribute 
 while the mind has thought. The former has nothing of 
 thought and the latter nothing of extension, therefore, ex- 
 tended substance and thinking substance have nothing what- 
 ever in common. The two substances are entirely opposed to 
 each other and absolutely exclude one another. There can be 
 no reciprocal action between them, the attributes of each ex- 
 cluding the other from the very nature of their constitution. 
 Therefore the seeming interaction of body and mind can not 
 exist. In this abrupt and dogmatic fashion, Descartes created 
 the dualism between mind and matter which lead Hobbes and 
 the Materialists to cry: "There is no spiritual substance*' and 
 Berkley and the Idealists to say "There are no bodies.'* 
 However, there is a reciprocal relation between body and 
 mind which can not be so dismissed and Descartes, while 
 never identifying matter and mind, does not deny the in- 
 teraction but ascribes it to the power of God. By this aban- 
 donment of any attempt to explain upon natural grounds this 
 interaction of body and mind, Descartes opened the way for 
 the rise of Occasionalism as formulated by the Cartesians, 
 Cordemoy and De La Forge and systematically developed 
 by Arnold Geulincx (1624-69) and Nicolas Malebranche 
 (163 8-17 15). Occasionalism is the theory of causae oc- 
 casionales. Since neither body nor mind can effect each 
 other in any way, it is God "on the occasion" of physical 
 stimulus produces the sensation in the mind and "on the oc- 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 25 
 
 caslon" of a determination of the will, produces the bodily 
 movements. Geulincx bases his occasionalistic position upon 
 the Cartesian principle : "Cogito, ergo sum." All knowledge 
 rests upon the certainty of self and all activity upon con- 
 sciousness. Any activity of which I have no knowledge is 
 not mine: "Quod nescis, quomodo fiat, id non facis," (Un- 
 less I know how an event happens, I am not the cause.) It is 
 upon this principle that Geulincx builds his system. If I am 
 not the cause, there must be some cause for this activity. A 
 decision of the will does effect bodily movements and sense- 
 stimuli produce sensations in the mind but I am ignorant of 
 how the will influences the body, and the body, from its 
 nature, can not effect the mind, therefore both bodily move- 
 ments and mental sensations are produced by God. Sense- 
 stimulus or will-decision serve only as the occasion for the 
 Divine activity. It follows from this metaphysical position 
 that the individual has no power beyond the mere act of 
 willing and the ethical system of Geulincx is a natural and 
 logical deduction from his metaphysical principles. Since 
 we can effect nothing in the material world, why will any- 
 thing? God does not require works but dispositions for the 
 results of volition are beyond our power. "Ubi nihil vales, 
 ibi nihil velis" — (Where thou canst do nothing, there will 
 nothing.) This is the ethical principle for Geulincx and 
 from it he deduces our moral vocation which consists in the 
 renunciation of the world and the retirement into ourselves. 
 In developing this ethical system, Geulincx makes virtue to 
 be: "Amor Dei ac Rationis" — (The love of God and Rea- 
 son.)^ The foundamental principle is the love of reason 
 which is the law of God in us. Reason gives us the true 
 knowledge of self and it is the highest virtue to bring our 
 wills and actions into harmony with this knowledge. Our 
 love to God must be self-renouncing and obedient but as 
 an ethical principle, love of reason is to be prefered: "Virtus 
 potius est amor Rationis.*'^ Geulincx discusses the four car- 
 
 1. Ethica, Tr. I, cap. I, sec. 2. 
 
 2. lb., Tr. I, cap. I, sec. 2. 
 
26 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 dinal virtues or properties of moral excellence (Virtues Car- 
 dlnales sunt Proprletates Virtutls.) These are Diligentia, 
 Obedientia, Justitia and Humilitas.^ By Diligentia is meant 
 the listening to the commands of reason (Diligentia est aus- 
 cultation. )2 The result of listening and waiting for the voice 
 of reason is wisdom (Frustus Diligentia est prudentia) but 
 wisdom In the sense of prudence.^ Obedientia is executing 
 the commands of reason (Obedientia est executio ratlonls.)* 
 It has two parts; to omit what reason prohibits and to do 
 what reason commands (Partes Obedientia sunt duae: 
 Facere & Mittere, quod vetat Ratio, facere quod jubet.)^ 
 Obedientia is the way to human liberty. "Obedientia est Lib- 
 ertas: Nemini enim servit, qui RatlonI servit, sed llberrimus 
 est hoc ipso: facit quod vult" — (Obedience Is liberty, for he 
 serves no one who serves reason but is free himself. He 
 does what he wishes.)^ The third cardinal virtue Is Justitia 
 which is conforming the whole conduct of life to what reason 
 says Is right (Justitia est adaequatio ratlonls.)^ There are 
 also two parts of the Justitia: purity and perfection. The 
 former removes what is excessive and is the right arm of 
 justice, while the latter supplies what is lacking and is the 
 left hand of justice (Purltas resecat quod nimis est: estque 
 velut dexterum brachium Justitia: Perfectio supplet quod 
 minus est; estque velut sinistra.)® That which is excessive 
 in our lives is vice (Vltlum per excessum) and that which is 
 lacking is also vice (Vitlum per defectum.) By equalizing 
 the excessive and defective, Justitia leads to satiety and satis- 
 faction (Frustus Justitia est Satletas.)^ Our worthiest inner 
 feelings find satisfaction In justice as Geulincx conceives it. 
 Finally, Humilitas the recognition of our impotence is ac- 
 
 I. 
 
 Ethica, Tr. I, cap. II. 
 
 2. 
 
 lb., Tr. I, cap. II, sec. i. 
 
 3- 
 
 lb., Tr. I, cap. II, sec. i. 
 
 4. 
 
 lb., Tr. I, cap. II, sec. 2. 
 
 5- 
 
 lb., sec. 2:2. 
 
 6. 
 
 lb., sec. 2:4. 
 
 7- 
 
 lb., sec. 3:1. 
 
 8. 
 
 lb., sec. 3:1. 
 
 9 
 
 lb., Tr. I, cap. II, sec. 3:4 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 27 
 
 cording to Geulincx the sum of all the cardinal virtues (Vir- 
 tutem Cardinalium summa) and is defined as "Contempt of 
 self because of love of God and Reason" (Humilitas est con- 
 temptio sui prae Amore Dei ac Rationis.) ^ It is this cardinal 
 virtue which leads us into the very heart of the ethical sys- 
 tem of Geulincx. By ''Contemptio siii'^ he does not mean a 
 positive contempt of self but a negative contempt; "Con- 
 temptlo, inquam, non positiva, sed negativa."^ Humilitas 
 does not require that one condemn himself positively, defame 
 himself, beat himself, or otherwise do evil to himself: that 
 indeed is not humility per se : but it is the greatest madness, 
 for reason per se enjoins no such thing upon us."^ While 
 there may be necessity for a positive contempt of self as the 
 confession of a crime or the cutting away of incurable por- 
 tions of the body, such a course is not humility which re- 
 quires the negative contempt of the self.* Geulincx divides 
 this virtue into two parts : **Inspectio ^ Despectio suiJ'^ By 
 the former he means, like Socrates, "Know thyself" by ac- 
 curate investigation and by the latter, the despising and the 
 surrendering of the self to God as the consequence of '7w- 
 spectio suiJ* 
 
 Proceeding to inspect the self, Geulincx begins with self- 
 consciousness and studies the relation between mind and body. 
 He is unable to discover any connection or interaction be- 
 tween them. He wills and bodily movements follow but how 
 he does not know. He says "Sed motum ego ilium non 
 facio: nescio enim quomodo peragatur" (But I did not make 
 that motion; I do not know how it is done.)^ Further he 
 says: "Nescio enim, quomodo, & per quos nervos, aut alias 
 vias, motus e cerebro in artus meos derivetur? nescio quo- 
 modo ad ipsum cerebrum perveniat? & an perveniat? (I do 
 not even know how and through what nerves or other ways a 
 
 1. Ethica, sec. 2:1. 
 
 2. lb., sec. 2:1. 
 
 3. lb., sec. 2:1. 
 
 4. lb., sec. 2:1. 
 
 5. lb., sec. 2:1. 
 
 6. lb., Tr. I, sec. 2 :2. 
 
28 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 motion from my brain, is directed to my limbs; I do not 
 know how it reached that very brain, and whether it did.)^ 
 If there is an union between body and mind, who is the cause 
 of it? Geulincx does not believe that it can be the individual 
 for he does not know how the union takes place or that it 
 takes place at all. As a result of the inspection of self, 
 Geulincx comes to this conclusion "J^"^ itaque novi condi- 
 tionem mean, Nudus sum hujusce Mundi contemplator ; spec- 
 tator sum in hac scena, non actor." (Thus now I know my 
 condition: I am only a contemplator of this world; a specta- 
 tor am I in this scene, not an actor. )^ How he came into 
 such a condition, Geulincx declares he does not know and 
 concludes that God alone causes him to see the spectacle. 
 The consequence of this inspection of self is '^Despectio sui/' 
 This is the other part of humility and its complement (Altera 
 pars Humilitas est sui Despectio; Haec est Humilitatis com- 
 plementum.)^ Geulincx defines despectio sui as follows: 
 "Consistit ea Despectio in mei ipsius derelictione, qua ego 
 Deo, cujus, ut vidi totus sum" (This contempt con- 
 sists in the abandoning of myself, by which I surrender all 
 to God whose, as I have seen, I am entire.)* The individual 
 thus is nothing and God is all. Man has no will and God is 
 all will. Man is only a tool in the hand of God and hence 
 man's greatest virtue is to be a willing tool. Certain obliga- 
 tions follow the '^Contemptio sui." Primarily we must will 
 nothing: '^Ubi nihil valeo, ibi nihil volo. . . nihil valeo 
 denotat inspectionem sui, nihil volo denotat despectionem 
 sui." (Where I effect nothing, there I will nothing. 
 I effect nothing marks the inspection of self, I will nothing 
 marks the contempt of self.)^ Another moral obligation is 
 to preserve our lives. Since we are here by the will of God, 
 It is our duty to abide here until he commands "Non exire 
 ex hac vita, nisi Deus revocaverit." (Not to depart from this 
 
 I. 
 
 Ethica, sec. 2 :2. 
 
 2. 
 
 lb., Tr. I, sec. II 
 
 3- 
 
 lb., iii:i. 
 
 4 
 
 lb., iii:i. 
 
 5. 
 
 lb., iv:i. 
 
 11, II 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development ig 
 
 life unless God recalls.) ^ Geulincx was a sharp opponent of 
 suicide. We must abide by the will of God even if circum- 
 stances of life be dreadful and we be threatened with a thou- 
 sand deaths.^ It is not only our duty to preserve our lives 
 but to preserve the race. Man is under obligation to pro- 
 create: "Sicut edere debeo, ut ego hie maneam sic & aliqui 
 generare debent, ut genus humanum hie maneat." (Just as 
 I ought to eat that I may remain here, so even ought we to 
 procreate that the race of men may remain here.)^ Here 
 Geulincx is in sharp oppostion to the Buddhist and Schopen- 
 hauer who advocate the extinction of the race as the great- 
 est blessing for mankind. Unlike Taoism, Geulincx believes 
 in work and activity but only so far as they make for the 
 preservation of the self and posterity and must be free from 
 all self-interest that every thing may be submitted to God. 
 In this respect Geulincx approaches the Yoga doctrine. Dis- 
 cussing the question of happiness, he believes that man is un- 
 happy because he seeks happiness, '*Umbra est felicitas; fugit 
 te, cum, sequeris sam; sequiturte, cum fugis." (Happiness 
 is a shadow; it flees you when you follow it and it follows 
 you when you flee it.)* Happiness is not attained by pursuing 
 it but it will pursue those who flee from it. Man must take 
 care of his obligation to God and he will have no time to 
 pursue happiness. His premises granted, Geulincx is logical 
 to the end. If we are related to the world as mere specta- 
 tors, totally unable to effect any thing in it, then our ethical 
 vocation must consist in renouncing the world, obediently 
 fulfilling the obligations consequent upon inspectio sui. Ac- 
 cording to Geulincx, therefore, the highest morality is the 
 willing submission to God founded upon a thorough con- 
 temptio sui. 
 
 The Cartesian schism between mind and body not only 
 profoundly influenced Geulincx and his ethical system but 
 
 1. Ethica, Tr. I, sec, II, v. 
 
 2. lb., v:3. 
 
 3. lb., vi :2. 
 
 4. lb., Tr. I, sec. II, pt, 11, 
 
30 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 It affected certain of his contemporaries along similar lines. 
 For Nicolas Malebranche, the problem of mind and body 
 maintained its reality and Occasionalism offered the only 
 solution. However, where God was the actor for Geullncx, 
 he became the thinker for Malebranche "God is the intelligi- 
 ble world or the place of minds, as the material world is the 
 place of bodies."^ We see, therefore, the material world 
 only because God reveals it to us. He is to the mind what 
 light is to the eye. As the eye dwells in light, so the mind 
 is in God, thinks in God and sees in God. Objects are ideas 
 in God in archetypal form and we being in God, see objects 
 through these ideas so that all knowledge consists In seeing 
 as God sees. It follows then that if all knowledge consists 
 In knowing God, all morality consists In loving God. The 
 error of life comes from the fact that the soul is united to 
 the body as well as to God and the sensuous rises and mingles 
 with the ideas from God and the will is misled. The true 
 conduct of life, therefore consists in making the body sub- 
 ordinate to the mind, subduing the passions, all of which 
 amounts to a decided asceticism. Like Geullncx, Male- 
 branche can find no place for man's will. He has no will. 
 God is all will and the human virtue Is to surrender every- 
 thing, body, passions, will and the world for the love of 
 God that we may be able to think his thoughts purely and 
 absolutely. 
 
 With Spinoza, the schism of Carteslanism disappears. 
 Thought and extension become attributes of one substance, 
 God, impersonal and unintelligible and with indifferent will. 
 Soul Is but the modification of the thought of God and 
 body but the modification of his substance. Will and In- 
 tellect are identical in their essence. As a part of the Divine 
 Being we are passive beings, limited. Impotent and the slave 
 of things. Our freedom comes through the knowledge of 
 things as they are. A passion ceases to be a passion as soon 
 as we know its real nature. Morality is the knowledge of 
 
 I. The Search after truth, tr. T. Taylor, pt. II, ch. 6. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 31 
 
 things as they are. *'The highest good of the mind is the 
 knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is 
 to know God."^ To be virtuous is to act in accordance with 
 this knowledge. This is similar to Guelincx. In fact the 
 "Amor intellectualis Dei" of Spinoza^ corresponds with the 
 "Amor Dei et rationis" of GeuHncx. Spinoza would make 
 the highest end of conduct a constant and eternal love of 
 God and consequently, man's attitude toward the world must 
 be one of mental acquiescence. Necessity and joyful resigna- 
 tion sum up the ethical teachings of Spinoza. 
 
 It is quite evident that the ultimate end of these lines of 
 thought from Cartesianism through Geulincx, Malebranche 
 and Spinoza would be a determinism of pronounced char- 
 acter. God becomes the real agent and man but a will-less and 
 passive being. This particular form of thought found an un- 
 willing mind in another thinker of this period who also was 
 influenced by Cartesianism, — Blaise Pascal (1623-62). He 
 turned away from reason fpr it failed to satisfy and from 
 nature because it made him pessimistic and took refuge in 
 the feelings. In a sense Pascal resembled Kant. As Kant 
 did away with speculative reason to make a place for the 
 practical reason, Pascal put away all natural philosophy and 
 turned to ethics where he believed there was stability. God 
 is not conceived through reason but felt by the heart is Pas- 
 cal's principle. Sin has driven out our love for God with 
 which we were created and self-love has taken its place. Our 
 moral vocation, therefore, consists in hating and renouncing 
 self and despising the world in order to make a place for the 
 grace of God. The merit of human volition is in not re- 
 sisting this transforming grace of God. Pascal's contempt 
 for philosophy, his pessimistic outlook upon nature and man, 
 his exaltation of the will above reason, make him a forerun- 
 ner of Schopenhauer to whose system of ethics we must now 
 turn. 
 
 1. Ethic, pt. 5, prop. 25, tr. W. H. White. 
 
 2. lb., prop. 36. 
 
32 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 C. Revival of Renunciation in the Nineteenth 
 Century. 
 
 As yet our historical inquiry has yielded no substantial 
 metaphysical basis for our ethical ideal of renunciation. 
 This, however, is the contribution of the Nineteenth Century 
 to our subject. In the systems of Taoism and Yogaism, re- 
 nunciation received some metaphysical support, but it was 
 crude, naive and dogmatic in character, while in Buddhism 
 and Christianity, the ground was predominantly ethical. 
 With the rise of rationalism, renunciation was placed on a 
 rational basis in the Occasionalism of Geulincx and Male- 
 branche. 
 
 The reign of renunciation in this field was brief and in 
 the strife which succeeded Cartesianism between Empiricism 
 on the one hand and Idealism on the other, it practically dis- 
 appeared from the philosophical field, both in the pre-Kant- 
 ian period and in the German Idealism which followed the 
 development of the Kantian principles. Traces of renuncia- 
 tion, however, are not lacking in the general literature of 
 the earlier periods of the Nineteenth Century, but they ap- 
 peared in the unreasoned and impulsive pessimism which was 
 common. Striking examples of renunciation may be found 
 in the poetry of Leopardi and A. de Lamartine. In the 
 former there is a denial of the value of human life and an ur- 
 gent counselling to despise self and nature,^ while the latter 
 seeks Christian resignation as an anodyne for the pains and 
 ills of human existence.^ Schelling, also, in his Nachtwachen 
 makes the life of man but the mask of nonentity, only some- 
 thing which will be torn in pieces and cast away.^ But it is 
 not until the system of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) 
 appeared that renunciation is thoroughly revived and placed 
 on metaphysical grounds. Like Buddha, Schopenhauer con- 
 demned human life in toto. He could find no such thing as 
 human happiness for the evil in the world far outweighs the 
 
 1. Quoted by James Sully, "Pessimism," pg. 26. 
 
 2. lb., pg. 27. 
 
 3. lb., pg. 28. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 33 
 
 good. This world is the worst possible of worlds because 
 if it were slightly worse it could not exist at all. Human life 
 is valueless and if there appear to be elements of value in 
 it, these are over-balanced by the worthless elements with 
 which life abounds. Non-existence is, therefore, to be pre- 
 ferred to existence and the complete renunciation of life and 
 the world is the only course for man to pursue. To see 
 Schopenhauer's contribution to our subject, it will be neces- 
 sary to examine his metaphysical grounds and trace some- 
 thing of the way in which he lays the foundation and pro- 
 ceeds to build his ethical system with its hedonic pessimism, 
 which ends in his thorough-going ideal of renunciation. 
 
 Starting with the subjective idealism of Kant and proceed- 
 ing apriori, Schopenhauer reduces the phenomenal world to 
 Idea^ and the noumenal world or the *'Ding an sich" to 
 Will.- This Will, which is the metaphysical principle of the 
 system and "The inmost nature, the kernel of every par- 
 ticular thing and of the whole" is in its nature but a striving 
 impulse, ever striving for objectification but blindly and un- 
 intelligently. This objectification of the Will appears in 
 every grade of nature from the lowest blind force to the 
 highest and most deliberate action of man. In man this prin- 
 ciple comes to self-consciousness and knows itself as volition- 
 al activity. The whole phenomenal world leaps into ex- 
 istence as the mirror of the Will but as we shall see later, 
 the Will has over-reached itself in kindling this light of 
 knowledge for it develops the power to react upon the Will 
 and to bring about its self-surrender.^ The stimulus of this 
 activity of the world principle is found in want which arises 
 from deficiency and, therefore, from suffering. Suffering is 
 the ever present companion of the Will and the higher the 
 grade of objectification the more intense the suffering. For 
 this reason the Genius would suffer most of all men.* Man 
 finds relief from this suffering in Art, which serves to quiet 
 
 1. The World as Will and Idea, tr. Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, bk. i. 
 
 2. lb., bk. 2. 
 
 3. lb., Vol. I, bk. 2, sees. 24-27. 
 
 4. lb., bk. 3, sec. 36. 
 
34 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 the striving of the Will. Art provides the opportunity for 
 contemplation during which man becomes a "Will-less, pain- 
 less and timeless subject of knowledge." This relief, how- 
 ever, is limited to only a few for contemplation is difficult 
 to attain, and even for these favored few the relief is only 
 temporary, for the state of contemplation is fleeting. Aesthe- 
 tics, thus failing to give man any lasting satisfaction or re- 
 lief from his suffering incident to the incessant striving of the 
 Will, Schopenhauer turns to the ethical field.^ A further 
 study of the World-Will, leads Schopenhauer to see that 
 it is always willing life and in its essence is the "WILL-TO- 
 LIVE." Now if the essence of man is the Will-to-live and 
 he has in his power the control of this metaphysical principle, 
 and man has such a power in his intellect, the human problem 
 is, therefore, the assertion or the denial of the Will-to-live '*■ 
 Schopenhauer does not hesitate in his course of action but 
 proceeds to suppress the W^ill-to-live. With knowledge as 
 either the motive or the quieter of the Will, man may well 
 ask what is to be gained by the assertion of the Will. Schop- 
 enhauer answers that only dissatisfaction and suffering can 
 result. The Will has no goal and is therefore susceptible to 
 no final satisfaction. The striving goes on forever, restrain- 
 ed only by hindrances which produce suffering. There be- 
 ing no end of striving, there can be no end of suffering.^ In 
 the individual, there may seem to be an aim for the Will 
 which will be the satisfaction of a want but a posterori, we 
 know that if the want is satisfied, satiety is begotten and ennui 
 ensues which is only another form of pain. The want of lif * 
 is pain and the satisfaction of want leads to pain, thus hu- 
 man life "Is tossed backwards and forwards between pain 
 and ennui. "^ Whatever happiness there is in life is purely 
 negative,— only the deliverance from pain, and therefore at 
 the best, can never be enduring.^ To assert the Will is to 
 
 1. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I, bk. 3, sec. 52. 
 
 2. lb., bk. 4, sec. 54. 
 
 3. lb., bk. 4, sec. 56. 
 
 4. lb., bk. 4, sec. 57. 
 
 5. lb., sec. 58. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 35 
 
 continue this miserable existence in a world which like "All 
 bad ware is covered over by a false lustre.*' To escape 
 the badness and the delusion of existence, the denial of the 
 Will-to-live is the only remedy. This denial can never take 
 the form of suicide which is only a very strong assertion of 
 the Will and effects the particular manifestation of the 
 World- Will only. Equipped with knowledge, man sees suf- 
 fering in the world and feeling it in his own life, he pierces 
 the veil of delusion which hangs over his existence and delib- 
 erately sets himself, by various practices, to deny the Will. 
 Ultimately this means the Will-to-live turning upon itself 
 and surrendering its existence. When this is absolutely and 
 completely done, all things are abolished and there remain 
 ''No Will, no idea, no world, "^ and the renunciation is vic- 
 torious. Nothing remains. This nothingness is the high- 
 est goal and by no means should be evaded or as Schopen- 
 hauer sums it up: "We must banish the dark impression of 
 that nothingness which we discern behind all virtue and holi- 
 ness as their final goal, and which we fear as children fear 
 the dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, through 
 myths and meaningless words, such as re-absorption in 
 Brahma or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. Rather do we 
 freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire ab- 
 solution of the Will is for all those who are still full of 
 Will, certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the 
 Will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which 
 is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways is nothing."^ 
 Sharp is the contrast between Schopenhauer and the Oc- 
 casionalists. Where Geulincx and Malebranche left man 
 without will, Schopenhauer made him all will. For the 
 former, the world must be renounced because the will can 
 effect nothing and for the latter renunciation of the world 
 is the only escape from the will which effects too much. The 
 Occasionalists did not advocate asceticism nor chastity but for 
 Schopenhauer these are useful instruments in subduing the 
 
 1. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I, bk. 4, sec. 71. 
 
 2. lb., sec. 71. 
 
36 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 will and making for the complete extinction of the race, 
 which to him is the greatest of blessings. 
 
 Among the disciples of Schopenhauer, there is a turning 
 away from his extreme pessimistic conclusions with the ex- 
 ception of Junius Bahnsen (i 830-1 881) who went to the 
 greatest length, even denying the consolation of Aesthetics 
 and the possibility of the final annihilation of the Will-to- 
 live. He could find no evidence of intelligence, order or de- 
 sign in the universe and therefore any representation of it in 
 Art, instead of bringing quiet and satisfaction as Schopen- 
 hauer contended, could only produce disturbances and even 
 anguish to the logical mind of man. Having dispensed with 
 the intellect, Bahnsen destroyed the only instrument which 
 Schopenhauer possessed for the subduing of the will and left 
 nothing but the "Will rending itself in an eternal self-parti- 
 tion. '' He concludes that all affirmation of life and the 
 world is useless. "Enough, so far our senses, our search, 
 our thought, our speculative grubbing, reach, we obtain noth- 
 ing but a vain moaning in the world and no prospect of re- 
 lease."^ 
 
 The human mind, however, can not content itself with 
 a view of life entirely devoid of hope or consolation. Even 
 Schopenhauer sought something of consolation in his idea of 
 eternal justice, the exaltation of Art and the freedom from 
 the fear of death. It is to be expected that there would be 
 disciples of Schopenhauer who would seek to soften the hard 
 lines of their Master's conclusion. Such a disciple was Frau- 
 enstadt (18 13-1878) who denied that the term pessimist 
 could be applied to a cosmical system which asserts the de- 
 nial of the Will-to-live and sought some consolation for the 
 Will. He distinguishes between the higher Will of man and 
 the inferior will of the animal which Schopenhauer had 
 identified.^ By rejecting the subjective idealism of his mas- 
 ter, he is able to find a reality in human history and an end 
 and plan for the historical process. Thus he gave Will the 
 
 1. Sully's Pessimism, pg. 107. 
 
 2. Sully's Pessimism, pg. 108. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 37 
 
 element of purpose in which resides the consolidation and of- 
 fers a basis for a sort of reconciliation between pessimism 
 and optimism. 
 
 But by far the most important follower of Schopenhauer 
 is Edward von Hartmann (1842-1906) who, while accept- 
 ing the general position of the founder of the Pessimistic 
 School, sought to escape his extreme conclusions. Hartmann 
 admits the misery of the human existence and advocates the 
 denial of the Will-to-live as the only hope for man but upon 
 a more optimistic basis than Schopenhauer. In his "Philoso- 
 phy of the Unconscious" he attempts to reconcile Schopen- 
 hauer and Hegel by making the Will unconsciously intelli- 
 gent and by so doing, approaches the optimism of Leibnitz. 
 Where Schopenhauer had his Platonic ideas to serve as 
 stages in the evolution of the Will, Hartmann makes the idea 
 the guide of the Will as it realizes itself in the world. By 
 the introduction of the principle of intelligence, Hartmann is 
 able to agree with Leibnitz that this is the best possible 
 world. He says: "If, in the all-wise Unconscious, among all 
 possible representations, that of a better world had had a 
 place, this other would certainly have been produced."^ 
 However, since it is the nature of the Will to be eternally 
 unsatisfied and all pleasure consists in such satisfaction, this 
 world, while the best possible, is only a world of pain and 
 misery, to which nothingness is decidedly preferable. Thus 
 so far as the nature of the world is concerned, Hartmann and 
 Schopenhauer are in agreement, but where the latter makes 
 evil irreparable, the former by assuming an end for the world, 
 makes evil reparable. Again Hartmann differs from his 
 master, in the effect of the denial of the Will. When the 
 Unconscious comes to consciousness, the intellect is emanci- 
 pated from the Will and man becomes conscious of the na- 
 ture of the Will and the pain and the misery which it must 
 ever cause unless it is subdued, but where Schopenhauer 
 makes the intellect the quieter of the Will, Hartmann makes 
 
 I. Philosophy of the Unconscious, Vol. Ill, ch. xvi, tr. W. C. Coupland. 
 
38 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 the conscious denial of the Will set up an antagonism within 
 the Will itself between a willing-to-will movement and a non- 
 willing-to-will movement. The result of this antagonism is 
 that the Will devours itself and returns to nothing. Accord- 
 ingly, Hartmann believes that Schopenhauer's contention for 
 the denial of the Will-to-live, is premature and that instead 
 of the individual denying the Will, he should affirm the 
 Will-to-live or in other words, since the end of the world 
 is to emancipate the intellect from the will, it becomes man's 
 duty to work in harmony with the Unconscious and help on 
 with the world process. Hartmann claims that his optimism 
 supplies an adequate basis for practical effort and hopeful 
 endeavor, the end of which is to so further the cause of in- 
 telligence that the race will be brought the more quickly to 
 recognize the futility of willing and all unite in one universal 
 aim to end the misery of the world by one great act of Will- 
 denial.^ 
 
 The influence of Schopenhauer's pessimism is not confined 
 to philosophic speculation but appears in certain artistic cir- 
 cles, especially in the works of Richard Wagner ( 1813-1883. 
 In his earlier thinking, Wagner was under the influence of 
 the Romantic School with its conception of the joy of life, 
 the music of which can be heard in Lohengrin and Tannhaus- 
 er. However, the very pronounced atmosphere of Hegelian 
 thought had its effect upon Wagner, especially the left school 
 of Hegelianism under the leadership of Feuerbach (1804- 
 72) who turned away from the Hegelian notion that God 
 comes to consciousness in man and posited the principle of 
 self -consciousness as the Absolute and man the beginning, the 
 middle and the end of all things. Under the inspiration of 
 this idea, Wagner began a work which finally developed into 
 the Triology of the Nibelung. It is anarchistic in char- 
 acter and aims to make Siegfried, the superman, completely 
 triumphant over Wotan the god. But before the completion 
 of the Nibelung Triology, Wagner came under the influence 
 of Schopenhauer, with his principle of the Will of sorrow and 
 weakness. Siegfried, while vanquishing the god, Wotan, by 
 
 I. Philosophy of the Unconscious, Vol. Ill, ch. xiv. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 39 
 
 breaking his spear, begins to weaken and the Triology ends 
 with the sublime renunciation of "Rest, rest Thee Oh God** 
 (Ruhe! Ruhe, du Gott.)^ The influence of Schopenhauer 
 upon Wagner is seen more in the latter's "Tristan and 
 Isolde," a work of which Wagner said himself, in a letter to 
 Liszt: "I have in my head 'Tristan and Isolde' the simplest 
 and most full blooded musical conception : with the black flag 
 that floats at the end of it I shall cover myself to die." As 
 Siegfried and Brunhilda express the joy of living and the 
 exaltation of the will, Tristan and Isolde express the misery 
 of life and the negation of the will. They praise the night of 
 oblivion and curse the day.^ Personality is a delusion : "No 
 more Tristan. . . . no more Isolde" (Nicht mehr Tri- 
 stan. . . . nicht mehr Isolde.)^ Death is sought as 
 the supreme bliss. The highest joy is unconscious oblivion. 
 As Tristan takes the cup in which he believes is the deadly 
 poison and places its brim to his lips he cries: 
 
 "Vergessen's giit'ger Trank, — 
 dich trink 'ich sonder Wank V* 
 
 Thus Wagner would make the renunciation of life and the 
 denial of the will the highest joy. Tristan also practises non- 
 resistance in refusing to defend himself against Melot^ and 
 King Mark manifests no resentment against Tristan but in 
 fact forgives him,** while the story ends in the complete nega- 
 tion of the will. As Isolde, in Buddhistic fashion sinks to the 
 breast of the dead Tristan, she utters these renunciatory 
 words: 
 
 
 "In dem wogenden Schwall. 
 
 
 in dem tonenden Schall, 
 
 
 in des Welt-Athems 
 
 
 wehendem All, — 
 
 
 ertrinken. 
 
 
 versinken, — 
 
 
 unbewiisst, — 
 
 
 hochste Lustr" 
 
 I. 
 
 Die Gotterdammerung, Act iii. 
 
 2. 
 
 Tristan and Isolde, ed. by Henderson, Act ii, sc. 2. 
 
 3- 
 
 lb., Act ii, sc. 2. 
 
 4- 
 
 lb., Act i, sc. 6. 
 
 5. 
 
 lb.. Act iii, sc. 3. 
 
 6. 
 
 lb., Act iii, sc. 3. 
 
 7. 
 
 lb.. Act iii, sc. 3. 
 
40 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 However, Wagner does not cover himself with the "Black 
 flag" of Buddhistic renunciation and Schopenhauerian pes- 
 simism as delineated in "Tristan and Isolde" but in the clos- 
 ing years of his life and thought he turned from this pes- 
 simism of weakness to the Christian pessimism of strength. 
 This he portrays in "Parsifal" which is really Wagner's 
 great confession of faith. When he wrote a friend near the 
 end of his life these words: "Can you conceive of a moral 
 duty without some form of renunciation" he had accepted 
 the Christian point of view and spoke of renunciation in the 
 Christian sense. 
 
 Like Wagner, Hienrik Ibsen (182 8- 1906) did not so 
 much argue the principle of renunciation as he portrayed it. 
 He, too, had his romantic period from which he turned to 
 the realistic. It is in this period when renunciation makes its 
 appearance. In "Brand" Ibsen follows to its logical con- 
 clusion, the morality of Rigorism with its cry: "All or 
 none."^ Here the self is nothing, life is nothing but duty is 
 everything; all of which ends in such a severe form of re- 
 nunciation that it reacts upon itself for its own destruction.^ 
 In "Peer Gynt" self-realization is the all but like the severe 
 renunciation of Brand, the "Barrel of self"^ in which Peer 
 Gynt lived, lead him at last to the Button Moulder and his 
 own undoing. Since the empire of the spirit as in "Brand" 
 and the empire of the flesh, as in "Peer Gynt" have neither 
 succeeded, Ibsen combines the two in "Emperor and Galil- 
 lean" with the intention of creating a third empire, "An 
 empire of Man asserting the eternal validity of his own 
 will."* But in the conflict between the empire of the spirit, 
 represented by Christianity and the empire of the flesh, repre- 
 sented by Julian, Ibsen is unable to secure a victory for his 
 third empire and on the plains of Persia, his empire of 
 flesh succumbs to the empire of the spirit in the dying cry of 
 
 1. Brand. Act ii. 
 
 2. lb., Act iii. 
 
 3. Peer Gynt, Act iv, sc. 13. 
 
 4. Bernard Shaw, Quintessence of Ibsenism, pg. 56. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 41 
 
 Julian: "Thou hast conquered, GaHlean.''^ Thus the will 
 surrenders to the intellect, the flesh to the spirit and the third 
 empire fails of realization. Maximus standing over the dead 
 Julian can only say: "What is it worth to live? All is sport 
 and mockery, — to will is to have to will."^ In "Rosmersholm" 
 Ibsen's philosophy of religion with its renunciatory element 
 is well illustrated. The individualist, radical and free-think- 
 er, Rebecca, invades the rigorist Rosmer home and seeks to 
 win the country parson to her ideals. To accomplish her 
 purpose she does not hesitate to plot the destruction of Ros- 
 mer's wife who is finally driven to commit suicide. However, 
 before Rebecca goes the whole way with her plans, she re- 
 pents, confesses the crime of causing the death of Mrs. 
 Rosmer, thus renouncing her egoistic ideals and accepting the 
 "Rosmer view of life."^ The story ends with Rosmer and 
 Rebecca expiating the wrongs of their lives by sacrificing 
 themselves in the same millstream in which Mrs. Rosmer 
 had cast herself. It is quite evident that while Ibsen is a 
 strong individualist, he never loses the sense of moral re- 
 sponsibility and this weighs upon him so heavily that he is 
 regoristic and therefore unable to escape the element of re- 
 nunciation. 
 
 In the literature of Russia, especially that of Tolstoi and 
 Dostoieffsky, the misery and sorrow of life are so keenly 
 felt that renunciation takes root easily. In his earlier life 
 Tolstoi was a realist. Turning from the teachings of the 
 Church in which he had been brought up, he gave himself to 
 the world of sense. Dissatisfaction overtaking him, he be- 
 gan to feel the emptiness of the world as he saw it. Find- 
 ing no peace of mind, he became an ardent student of the 
 teachings of Jesus, especially the Sermon on the Mount. He 
 became convinced that he had discovered the fundamental 
 principle of these teachings and of the whole system of Chris- 
 tianity In Matthew 5:38, 39: "Ye have heard that it hath 
 
 1. Emperor and Galilean, Act v, sc. 4. 
 
 2. Emperor and Galilean, Act v, sc. 4. 
 
 3. Rosmersholm, Act v. 
 
42 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 been said, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth : But I 
 say unto you, that ye resist not evil." This Tolstoi inter- 
 preted as meaning: '^Whatever injury the evil disposed may 
 inflict upon you, bear it, give all that you have, but resist 
 not."^ Non-resistance became the real principle of all Tol- 
 stoi's teaching. He not only taught this form of renunciatioa 
 but practiced it. He passed through, on account of it, a pro- 
 found spiritual experience. He repudiated his former course 
 of life and sought to renounce the world of sense. He agrees 
 with Schopenhauer in doing away with all self-love but is 
 entirely out of sympathy with his conclusions in respect to the 
 human race. Where Schopenhauer seeks to extinguish the 
 race, Tolstoi would have it continue its existence and serve 
 God through the non-resentment of evil and the activity of 
 love. 
 
 Dostoieflsky portrays renunciation in the career of Ras- 
 kolnikoff, the leading character in ''Crime and Punishment," 
 who reaches a point where he must do something or renounce 
 his life or as he says: "Renounce life altogether and obedient- 
 ly submit to fate as it is, stifle everything and dismiss the right 
 to act, live and love."^ He discarded the thought of renun- 
 ciation and under the spell of the self-assertive Napoleon, he 
 proceeded to commit a double murder and then justified it by 
 his philosophy of self-assertion. According to his line of 
 reasoning, men are divided into ordinary and extraordinary 
 men. The former live, from their very nature, in a state of 
 obedience and have no right to break the law ; while the lat- 
 ter, from the sheer force of their individuality, are permitted 
 to overstep all bounds so far as the realization of their own 
 ideas require. For such men there can be the repudiation of 
 all law: "Men for whom, to a certain extent, laws do not 
 exist." This division rests upon nature which separates men 
 into these two catagories and the morality of the ordinary 
 man is inferior and that of the extraordinary man is super- 
 ior.^ But a doubt begins to take shape in the mind of Ras- 
 
 1. My Religion, ch. i. 
 
 2. Crime and Punishment, ch. iv. 
 
 3. lb., ch. V. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 43 
 
 kolnikofif that he may not belong to the superior class, a 
 doubt which, under the compunctions of conscience, finally 
 sweeps the ground from under his major morality and at the 
 suggestion of Sonia, he confesses his crime and willingly goes 
 to Siberia. Here is a complete break-down of the ideal of 
 self-realization and a definite repentance and repudiation of 
 the self. Dostoleffsky leaves Raskolnikoff seeking Christian 
 regeneration.^ 
 
 While the 19th Century thus witnessed a pronounced re- 
 vival of renunciation, it is also true that this Century pro- 
 duced the most violent opposition to the idea. This op- 
 position centered principally in two egoistic thinkers, Nietz- 
 sche and Sudermann. With the former self-realization 
 through disobedience is posited over against renunciation, 
 while with the latter, it is self-realization both in joys and 
 sins. Both thinkers agree in repudiating renunciation in 
 every form and in setting up in opposition a thorough-going 
 egoism. Wagner and Ibsen did the same in the earlier 
 periods of their thinking but both return from the revolt to a 
 religious basis, but not so with Nietzsche and Sudermann,— 
 they never return. W^Ith Sudermann, the opposition to re- 
 nunciation is found in his portrayal of an individualism which 
 brooks no denial of self in any form. His heroes are not 
 so much immoral as unmoral. They repudiate the law rath- 
 er than disobey It. They revolt against all social standards 
 and know nothing of repentance or confession of wrong do- 
 ing. Paul, in ''Dame Care" finds his Individuality in commit- 
 ting arson and when he confesses his crime in the law court, 
 there Is no sense of sin but rather the sense of joy for he says, 
 speaking of his crime, '*This deed has given me happiness.'* 
 In "Magda" the Protagorean view is taken that "Man is 
 the measure of all things." Magda does as she pleases in 
 the world, a world, which to her, has no law. She says to 
 her father, when he asks concerning what she considers to 
 be true: 'True to myself," "I am what I am," "I do what 
 
 I. Crime and Punishment, Epilogue ch. ii. 
 
44 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 I do." To her pastor, she declares that to be happy, you 
 must sin and be greater than your sin. In "The Cat's 
 Bridge" Regina has really no sense of right or wrong, while 
 Beata in the "Joy of living" cries out in her individualism 
 "Must every instinct end in remorse?" Sudermann's attack 
 upon the rigoristic ideal of renunciation is intended to make 
 it appear that such an ideal is misleading and unnecessary and 
 he does this by setting up his uncompromising ideal of in- 
 dividualism that it may make its own appeal. This opposi- 
 tion of Sudermann, is very mild as compared with the open 
 and bitter attack of Nietzsche upon all depreciatory ideals 
 of human life. Like Schopenhauer, he made the will the 
 very essence of man but where Schopenhauer conceived of 
 this essence as the Will-to-live and human happiness to con- 
 sist in over-coming it, Nietzsche developed the notion of the 
 Will-to-power and made human happiness to consist in the 
 very exercise of this power and in "The feeling that power 
 increases." For this reason, Nietzsche was at bitter war 
 with everything which found any weakness or evil in the will. 
 He hated science and religion because he believed that the 
 former belittled man and the latter treated him as though 
 he were sick and placed God over him. Nietzsche argued 
 that all moral standards are man-made and must be con- 
 stantly changing. Anything which tends to fix a standard of 
 morality is an enemy of man because such a standard hinders 
 the free action of his natural instincts and powers. By the 
 means of will man must rise above all ethical standards, even 
 above the conception of good and evil. By the will man may 
 become the superman. Nietzsche is an immoralist, material- 
 ist and empiricist. The superman, which he never really por- 
 trays, is the goal of the earth. "Man is a bridge connecting 
 ape and superman. . . . The superman will be the final 
 flower and ultimate expression of the earth. "^ With such a 
 goal conceived for humanity, Nietzsche sweeps away every- 
 thing which tends to give man a depressing view of himself. 
 He must "Be hard" to all want, pain or misery in the world, 
 
 I. Also Sprach Zarathustra, I. 
 
Renunciation in Its Historical Development 45 
 
 absolutely devoid of all pity or sympathy. As is to be ex- 
 pected every idea which has the appearance of renunciation 
 draws the fire of this immoralist. The despectio sui of 
 Geulincx, the return of Wagner to the religious position, the 
 Christian view of life, — all are sharply denounced and often 
 with but little critical estimation. The Third Essay in the 
 Genealogy of Morals is given over to the discussion of the 
 question "What do ascetic ideals mean?" Nietzsche answers 
 that for Schopenhauer the ascetic ideal means "To get rid of 
 torture,"^ by which he means, that for the philosopher or the 
 educated classes, the ascetic ideal is a form of self-assertion 
 by which independence is secured.^ But having permitted 
 the philosopher to have a "Hard and cheerful will to renun- 
 ciation," he proceeds to show that all others who practice or 
 advocate renunciation are "Sickmakers" who treat life as a 
 wrong way which we had best retrace or an error which 
 should be disproved by our deeds. Such an ascetic ideal, 
 Nietzsche considers a self-contradiction in that it is the Will- 
 to-power lording over life itself and "Is prompted by the 
 self-protective and self-preservative instinct of degenerating 
 life."^ In other words, the ascetic ideal is the means by 
 which the instinct of self-preservation attempts to counteract 
 the effect of some partial physiological stagnation. Nietzsche 
 thus seeks a physical explanation of this ideal and makes its 
 priest but the victim of delusion, the product of the Will-to- 
 power, operating in the realm of human sickness and weak- 
 ness. Renunciation is, therefore, only a hypnotic means of 
 getting rid of a physiological depression. Self-contempt is 
 only an attack of bad conscience or to sum it up "The ascetic 
 ideal in the service of an extravagance of feelings."^ Espec- 
 ially does Nietzsche pour out his contempt and wrath upon 
 Christianity which he believes places a premium upon weak- 
 ness and has brought about a transvaluation of all values in 
 that it has placed the weak in the ascendency and fostered 
 
 1. Genealogy of Morals, Tr. W. A. Haussmann, Third Essay, sec. 6. 
 
 2. lb., Third Essay, sees, 7, 8. 
 
 3. lb., Third Essay, sec. 13. 
 
 4. lb., sec. 20. 
 
46 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 slave-morality. The ascetic ideal for Nietzsche is only a dis- 
 ease of the common herd of mankind. It stands in the way 
 of the few strong men, — the "Lucky cases of man," who 
 have the healthy Will-to-power, as a dangerous source of con- 
 tamination. But why does man will nothing? Nietzsche 
 answers this question by declaring that such is the nature of 
 the Will-to-power that even if man be deluded with the idea 
 of life as a horror, something to be willed away, yet "Rather 
 would man will the Nothing, than not will.''^ This bitter 
 attack of Nietzsche upon all ascetic ideals serves, at least, 
 to emphasize the very important part which renunciation has 
 played in the life of mankind. For this reason, Nietzsche 
 is of particular value in this historical survey. While he 
 fails to make out a good case for immoralistic individualism, 
 in that he is the victim of the weakness of all subjectivism 
 and is unable to satisfactorily substantiate his theory of the 
 rise of morality, yet he serves us well in being the connecting 
 link between our historical investigation of the renunciatory 
 ideal and its critical estimate. 
 
 III. RENUNCIATION AS AN ETHICAL IDEAL. 
 
 Our historical review of renunciation as an ethical ideal is 
 now sufficient to indicate something of its universality and 
 persistency in human life, the forms in which it appears and 
 the ends which it seeks. Nietzsche was appalled by the extent 
 and endurance of renunciation. He went so far as to say 
 that an observer from another planet could "Infer that our 
 earth is the essentially ascetic star."^ In the same connection 
 he notes: "How regularly, how universally, how almost at 
 any period, the ascetic priest makes his appearance ; he does 
 not belong exclusively to any race; he flourishes anywhere; 
 he grows out of all classes."^ This observation of Nietzsche 
 is scarcely exaggerated. We have already seen the great fas- 
 cination of renunciation for the oriental mind, especially in 
 China and India. While its domination is not so marked in 
 
 1. Gen. Morals, sec. 28. 
 
 2. lb., pt. III., sec. II. 
 
 3. lb., Third Essay, sec. 28. 
 
Critical Estimate of Renunciation 47 
 
 the Occident with its ideals of life and activity, nevertheless 
 it is a fundamental principle of Christianity, producing mo- 
 nasticism and mysticism. Even rationalism did not escape its 
 influence as is seen in the teachings of Geulincx and Male- 
 branche. It becomes the great weapon of the pessimism of 
 Schopenhauer and his school. It introduces the melancholy 
 note into the music of Richard Wagner, so pro- 
 nounced in "Tristan and Isolde" and "Parsifal." It 
 accompanies the sympathism of Russian thought, par- 
 ticularly attractive for Tolstoi and Dostoieffsky. These 
 are only the principle fields in which it appears for 
 scarcely any phase of human life is free from its 
 presence in some form, either to be accepted or dismissed. 
 In form, too, it greatly varies. For the Taoist it takes the 
 form of nihilism, nothing exists, therefore nothing needs to 
 be done. For the Brahman it is a worklessness where- 
 in all motive and purpose disappear from activity. For the 
 Buddhist and Schopenhauer it Is life turning upon itself be- 
 cause non-existence is to be preferred to existence. In all 
 these forms, the end of renunciation is the complete extinc- 
 tion of the Individual human being because he Is a stranger 
 in the world, without a home and without a work. For Geu- 
 lincx and the Occasionallsts, the form is that of a rationalistic 
 withdrawal from nature because man has no work to per- 
 form. He has no will to effect anything, and Is but a specta- 
 tor in his world with the ethical vocation of loving God and 
 reason. For Christianity and the Russian Sympathists, the 
 form is rather self-denial with the purpose of building up a 
 spiritual existence upon the ruins of self-love and self-en- 
 deavor. This form admits that man has a home in the world 
 and a work to accomplish but both home and work are of an 
 unearthly character. 
 
 Now how shall we explain the existence of this ideal, so 
 universal, so varied in form and for the most part so in- 
 imical to human existence in the world? Nietzsche offers a 
 physiological explanation which we can not accept. Here 
 is a power holding sway over great masses of mankind, often 
 bringing to them a form of satisfaction and inspiring them 
 
48 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 to lofty deeds. Man has proven himself as capable of deny- 
 ing himself as of affirming himself. To say with Nietzsche 
 that ascetic ideals are due to the effort of the self-preserving 
 instinct to overcome some ''partial physiological stagnation 
 and languishment,"^ is to underestimate the strength and 
 value of these ideals and to offer a puerile explanation. We 
 must look for more adequate grounds for the renunciatory 
 ideals and we discover these in fields both negative and posi- 
 tive. According to the former, life neither contains nor con- 
 tents man and on the latter basis the ideal of renunciation 
 is a means by which man can affirm his higher nature and 
 assert his essential superiority to the world of sense and 
 immediacy. 
 
 I. It is Nietzsche who calls our attention to the "Lack" 
 element^ in the consciousness of humanity and thus renders 
 us a service in suggesting the question so fundamental in our 
 problem, viz. why is man, the seeming child of nature, so dis- 
 satisfied and discontented with his natural life in the world? 
 That such is the fact is revealed by his logic by which he seeks 
 to recreate his world from sense impressions; by his aesthe- 
 tics by which he desires to improve upon nature and in so 
 doing give play to an inner impulse which goes out beyond 
 nature; by his ethics wherein he is continually adjusting and 
 re-adjusting himself with humanity and by his religion 
 wherein he conceives of God and is ever after unable to be- 
 lieve that nature can contain or content him or satisfy his 
 ideals. Again we must make Nietzsche an unwilling con- 
 tributor to our negative position because he points out that 
 man has "Suffered from the problem of his significance,"'^ 
 but we part company with him as to the meaning of this sig- 
 nificance. Nietzsche, keeping man wholly ensconced in nature, 
 makes this significance to reside wholly in the will, a char- 
 acteristic of which he says, is to will something even if it be 
 nothingness.* We take the position, however, that man is. 
 
 1. Gen. Morals, pt. Ill, sec. 13. 
 
 2. lb., sec. 28. 
 
 3. lb., pt. Ill, sec. 28. 
 
 4. lb. 
 
Critical Estimate of Renunciation 49 
 
 both nature and spirit, deriving from the former his will and 
 from the latter his ideals. It is in the realm of the spirit 
 where his real significance lies. While man is a child of na- 
 ture in the realm of sense, he is a child of the spirit in his in- 
 ner life and it is for this reason that nature can never con- 
 tain nor content him. The introduction of this spiritual 
 conception, places man at once in an ambiguous position. 
 He is not at home in nature nor yet fully cognizant of his 
 place in the spiritual order. "Man's midway position as 
 well as the mixture of sense and spirit in his consciousness 
 make it needful for him to inquire concerning his place in 
 the world-whole and to posit his inner life in contrast to 
 his outer existence."^ It is this conception of man's rela- 
 tion to a higher order which lead Schiller to see 
 the "Grace and Dignity" in humanity and while not over- 
 looking the intolerable condition of the human lot, believed 
 that man by discovering his true nature and seeking to realize 
 it, could rise above nature and attain to a good, in compari- 
 son with which the world of immediacy dwindles into noth- 
 ingness.- That our problem of renunciation is due to this 
 characteristic of humanity is born out by the history of re- 
 nunciatory ideals. Why will man turn upon his world as in 
 Taoism and the Vedanta and willingly negate it? The an- 
 swer lies in the fact that the inner life is unsatisfied, hungry 
 and empty but has not realized its place in the real world-or- 
 der or even its relation thereto. Why will man turn upon his 
 own life as in Buddhism, unless it be that it appears value- 
 less? Why do Geulincx and Malebranche see no work for 
 man to do, unless it be that he lacks something to make his 
 life effective? Why will Schopenhauer and his school see 
 nothing but hopeless despair for miserable humanity, unless 
 it be that there is the failure to see anything but want? Why 
 this everlasting return of Ibsen, Wagner, Tolstoi and Dos- 
 toievsky from reahsm, individualism and materialism, to 
 
 1. Shaw, The Vahie and Dignity of Human Life, pt. I, sec. i. 
 
 2. Eucken, Prob. Human Life, Tr. W. S. Hough and W. R. Gibson, 
 pg. 476. 
 
50 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 their repudiation and the positing of something of a religious 
 character, unless it be that the spiritual life is demanding 
 recognition which man, from his very constitution, is willing 
 to give sooner or later. Negatively, therefore, nature can 
 never content nor contain man. The problem which emerges 
 is that of attaining spiritual self-hood in a world of sense and 
 immediacy. Renunciation has a service to render in the 
 solution of this problem. While it has been frequently mis- 
 used where all life and work, as such, have been repudiated, 
 yet the nature of the problem demands the proper use of this 
 subtle art of repudiation. It is in the positive field of the 
 affirmation of the self in its spiritual nature and in its rela- 
 tion to a new order of life, where renunciation comes to its 
 own rights and proves itself a necessary and important fac- 
 tor. 
 
 2. Corresponding to the "Lack" element, observed by 
 Nietzsche, which places man in the negative relation with 
 nature, there is the "More" element observed by Schiller and 
 Eucken. If nature can not contain or content man, it is be- 
 cause man is more than nature. Schiller found this "More" 
 element in the realm of Aesthetics while Eucken sees it in 
 the spheres of logic, morality and self-consciousness.^ Na- 
 ture being unable to account for this sense of the "More" 
 without involving itself in dire contradictions, leaves it to be 
 grounded in the ego of a spiritual character. The rise of 
 this spiritual life is not constant. As Eucken observes, his- 
 tory indicates that there are periods of affirmation when the 
 consciousness of the spiritual prevails and then periods of 
 negation when the consciousness of nature and immediacy 
 holds sway.2 This can be accounted for on the ground that 
 there is no sharp line between the world of spirit and sense 
 in man. However, the spiritual will not down and in its 
 struggle for realization and affirmation it uses renunciation 
 to subdue the world of sense. That man actually follows 
 such a course of precedure is confined by experience and his- 
 
 1. Eucken, Life's Basis and Life's Ideals, Tr. A. G. Widgery, pg. ii3ff. 
 
 2. Eucken, Life of the Spirit, Tr. F. L. Pogson, pg. 103. 
 
Critical Estimate of Renunciation 51 
 
 tory. Man refuses to receive the world in a passive or 
 uncritical spirit, thus indicating his superiority over it and 
 manifesting the dignity and validity of his inner life. The 
 nihilism of the Tao may be unreasonable and repulsive, yet 
 we are compelled to admit that it illustrates the naive strug- 
 gles of the ego to examine and estimate its world and find- 
 ing it empty and being unable to discover a positive order, 
 it turns and reduces its world to nothingness. We can not 
 ignore this power of the self to affirm something even if that 
 something be nothing. This struggle with the sense-world 
 underlies the worklessness of the Yoga and the Nirvanism 
 of Buddhism, for with all the weak pessimism of these sys- 
 tems, the Yoga dedicates the self to Brahman in one supreme 
 deed, while Buddhism would save the self by the **Eight- 
 fold path." Geulincx, while advocating the "Despectio sui/* 
 retains the dignity of being a spectator in the world. Schop- 
 enhauer relates the self to the world-will and thus gives it the 
 distinction of intellectual victory over the Will-to-live. The 
 self can even affirm itself by slaying itself. Ibsen has the 
 Button-moulder say to Peer Gynt: "To be one's self is to 
 slay one's self."^ Christianity announces the same principle 
 when it declares: "Whosoever shall lose his life shall pre- 
 serve it." Renunciation is in reality self-affirmation. By the 
 very act of renouncing, the ego proclaims its dignity and 
 superiority and enters into the realization of its own self- 
 hood. As Descartes realized his ontological self in the dic- 
 tum **Cogito, ergo sum,^^ man can realize his ethical self by 
 declaring; "I can renounce the sense world, therefore, I am 
 beyond it." 
 
 However, it is not enough to merely renounce even if such 
 an act provides the consciousness of inner integrity and dig- 
 nity. The world of sense can not be so handled. That it 
 has something of value is the testimony of all culture and 
 civilization. It is only on the basis that this sense-world 
 lies on a lower plain and when it is renounced it is in favor 
 of something higher, that renunciation becomes a valid and 
 
 I. Peer Gynt, Act v, sc. ix. 
 
52 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 worthy ideal. It was such a conception of the idea which 
 appealed to Goethe and enabled renunciation to secure his 
 favor. He turned away from Christianity largely because 
 of its negative attitude toward the world, but he believed in 
 renunciation in the sense that man must renew his life by 
 "Renouncing particular things at each moment, if he can 
 grasp something new in the next."^ 
 
 Under the influence of Spinoza, Goethe said: "Renuncia- 
 tion once for all in view of the eternal" and in this conception 
 he found an "Atmosphere of peace breathe upon him."^ It 
 is in some such positive fashion that renunciation renders its 
 service. Nature can not be dismissed as thoroughly bad. 
 That there is good in it the mass of mankind insists on believ- 
 ing. Pessimism exists but it does not flourish long nor well. 
 "No matter how convincing the arguments for renunciation 
 may appear to be, no matter how complete the reasoning oi 
 pessimism, life must be a benefit, and he who concludes 
 against it and seeks to negate it must admit that it possesses 
 value if only as an opportunity for the denial on the part 
 of man."^ It is only when renunciation is viewed as a path- 
 way to spiritual life and as an act of self-affirmation in the 
 process of self-realization, that it finds its true place and be- 
 comes a valid ideal for life. Humanity, in the long run, 
 turns from absolute renunciation of all life as advocated by 
 the Buddhists and Schopenhauer. Man is too much a part 
 of nature to believe that it is in no sense his home. Whilo 
 Geulincx will admit that man has a home in the world but 
 denies a work for him, he is unable to escape the snares of 
 Occasionalism and the individual is lost in the pantheism of 
 Spinoza who follows Occasionalism to its logical conclusions. 
 Neither the Metaphysical position of Schopenhauer which 
 makes man all will, nor that of Geulincx which destroys all 
 will, can be a satisfactory basis for the renunciatory ideal. 
 That it must have such a basis is true, but that of Schopen- 
 
 1. Dichtung und Wahrheit, quoted by Edward Caird, Literature and 
 Philosophy, Vol. I, pg. 8i. 
 
 2. Caird, Essays on Literature and Philosophy, Vol. i, pg. 8i. 
 
 3. Shaw, Value and Dignity of Human Life, pt. II, sec. 6. 
 
Critical Estimate of Renunciation 53 
 
 hauer is too abstract and subjective, while that of Geulincx 
 tends to pantheism and the loss of human freedom. Rather 
 must renunciation be grounded In the spiritual dignity of 
 man as a necessity for the subduing of the sense-world in 
 favor of the spiritual life. The world of sense need not lose 
 its value nor be repudiated, as such, but it must bow In sub- 
 mission to the real and higher order which can provide for 
 humanity its own sense of Immediacy and a genuine world- 
 hood. Such a grounding of renunciation Is best seen in Rus- 
 sian thought and Christianity. Tolstoi, who shares the Rus- 
 sian Sympathism with Its consciousness of suffering, makes 
 renunciation fundamental in his ideal of resignation, by 
 which he seeks to build a spiritual life around the center of 
 love to God and an active sympathy for humanity but upon 
 the ruins of self-love and self-seeking. Dostoleffsky uses 
 renunciation to prepare the way for redemption In the Chris- 
 tian sense. The Idea of regeneration is paramount In Rus- 
 sian thinking. The sense-world does not offer either home 
 or work sufficient for such a being as man for he never gets 
 so low In the meshes of the world that he Is hopeless. Even 
 Gorky, who Is very doubtful of man's work In the world, 
 believes that even for his most miserable characters there is 
 hope through regeneration. Here is a pessimism with a 
 positive hope. 
 
 Christianity has the distinguishing marks of the '^Con- 
 temttis mundi" and the ''Amor Christi** but the contempt of 
 the world is not Christianity without the ''Amor Christi" for 
 without the latter It would be no improvement over the 
 "hopeless pessimism of Schopenhauer.^ Its recognition of 
 the evil, sin, misery and death In the world is as thorough- 
 going as Buddhism. However, it possesses the pessimism of 
 strength In that Its "Comtemttis miindi" Is in order that its 
 "Amor Christi" may prevail. Furthermore Christianity in 
 positing a spiritual world-order, as the true home and work- 
 field for humanity, meets the demands of man's spiritual ego 
 as we acknowledge It. "For the spiritual life within us al- 
 
 I. Paulsen, System of Ethics, bk. I, ch. 2. 
 
54 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
 ways presents itself as something transcendent and is not 
 coincident with our life."^ Again Christianity in its idea of 
 redemption, considers the evil in the world not as a mere 
 appearance like the Hindoos, but as a moral guilt, some- 
 thing which has no fundamental relation to the world of 
 nature but rather the warping and misuse of it. Therefore, 
 there remains the hope of a positive life in the midst of na- 
 ture. This view of the world wins the assent of Eucken 
 who believes that it makes it impossible to affirm or negate 
 the world but rather to take a position where both affirma- 
 tion and negation are present.^ 
 
 It is such a view of renunciation as Christianity takes 
 which best satisfies this thesis. The universality and per- 
 sistence of the ideal finds explanation in the inherent struggle 
 between the sense and spirit always waged, but not always 
 understood, in humanity. The mixture of sense and spirit 
 is such that no clear lines are drawn in the conflict and for 
 this reason renunciation has not always been wisely or 
 properly used. When, however, the ego has realized its own 
 spiritual self-hood and world-hood as posited by religion 
 and especially by Christianity, it has found renunciation an 
 absolute necessity for its own self-affirmation and true activ- 
 ity. The metaphysical basis is thus secure in the spiritual 
 nature of the world and humanity. The moral grounds for 
 our ideal are to be found in the moral guilt of the world. 
 This relieves us of the more inimical character of our ethical 
 ideal but at the same time it reminds us of its necessity and 
 validity. Renunciation refuses to be dismissed from the field 
 of the human problem. There is nothing left but to regard it 
 in its real character and proceed to renounce all that stands 
 in the way of the spiritual order and God, and thus rest 
 in religion; and also to renounce all that stands in the way 
 of the welfare of humanity and rest in ethics. Such a 
 use of renunciation leads to the completeness of life as set 
 before us in Christianity for having attained by the renun- 
 
 1. Eucken, Life's Basis and Life's Ideals, pt. Ill, sec. i. 
 
 2. lb., pg. Z2,2. 
 
Critical Estimate of Renunciation 55 
 
 <:iatory pathway the immediacy of the spirit and the world- 
 hood of the self, man has found his home and his work. 
 For this home he surrenders all else and for his work he 
 gives himself, for as Goethe saw, it is cosmic toil. Such a 
 view of renunciation justifies its place in human thinking and 
 only by its employment can man achieve self-hood in a world 
 of sense and enter into that spiritual World-order where 
 the ego is at home and where its work-field lies. 
 
56 The Ethical Ideal of Renunciation 
 
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