DISEASES OF THE WILL AND DISEASES OF PERSONALITY BY 3- TH. RIBOT PROFESSOR IX THE COLLEGE OF FRANCE. NEW YORK : THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO. ASTOR PLACE. THE ni Physiology and Pathology of the Mind,'' p 167. t Ibid, p. 157. which, by general consent, receives, stores up and reacts. Now, an impression, once received, marks it with an imprint. Thereby, according to Maudsley, there is produced an aptitude and with it differentiation of the element, though we have no reason to sup- pose that originally that element differed from homologous nerve cells. " Every impression leaves a certain ineffaceable trace; that is to say, the molecules, once they are arranged otherwise and forced to vibrate in a different way, will not return exactly to their original state. If I brush the surface of still water with a feather, the liquid will not resume the form which it had before: it may again pre- sent a smooth surface, but molecules will have changed places, and a sufficiently pene- trating eye would certainly discover therein evidence of the passage of the feather. Ani- mal molecules that have been disarranged have thereby gained, in a greater or less de- gree, aptitude for undergoing disarrangement. Doubtless, if this same external agency does not again act anew upon the same molecules, they will tend to resume their own natural movement; but the case will be very differ- ent if they are again and again subjected to the same action. Then they will little by little lose the power of returning to their natural movement, and will become more and more identified with that which is impressed upon them, till at last it becomes natural to them in its turn, and they obey the slightest cause that will set them in vibration."* It is impossible to define wherein this mod- ification consists. Neither microscope nor reagents, neither histology nor histochemis- try can throw light upon it; but facts and reason assure us that it exists. The second condition, which consists in the establishment of stable associations between different groups of nerve-elements, has not hitherto attracted attention. I am not aware even that contemporary authors have recog- nized its importance; and yet it is a neces- sary consequence of their thesis upon the seat of memory. Some of them appear to hold, implicitly at least, that a memory, either organic or con- scious, is impressed upon a single cell which, with its nerve filaments, would seem to pos- sess a sort of monopoly of retaining and re- producing it. What has contributed to keep up this illusion is, I conceive, the fashion of speech which requires us to look on a move- ment, a perception, a thought, an image, a sentiment, as one thing, as a unit. But re- flection soon shows each of these supposed units to be made up of many and hetero- geneous elements; that it is an association, a group, a fusion, a complex, a multiplicity. Take the example already cited a locomo- tory movement. This may be regarded as a reflex action of great complexity, the initial * Delboeuf, "Theoric Generate de la Strsibilite," p. 60. 6 THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. impression of which is the contact of the foot with the ground each moment. Let us consider this movement at first in its complete form. Is the starting point a voluntary act ? Then, according to Ferrier, the impulsion that has its rise in a particular region of the cortex of the brain, traverses the white substance, passes into the corpora striata, through the crura cerebri, the pro- tuberance, the complex structure of the me- dulla; thence going over to the other side of the body, where it descends along the antero- lateral columns of the spinal cord to the lum- bar region, and thence alone; the motor nerves to the muscles. This transmission is accom- panied or followed by a return to the centers through the posterior columns of the cord and the gray matter, the medulla, the pons Varolii, the optic tract and the white matter to the cortex of the brain. Let us consider this movement in its abridged and most or- dinary form when it is automatic. In that case, according to the commonly received hypothesis, the transit proceeds only from the periphery to the cerebral ganglia and back again to the periphery, the superior brain not being involved in the movement. This movement, the principal stages of which we have roughly indicated, and all the details of which are not yet thoroughly known, even to the most learned anatomists, implies the calling into action of nerve-elements very numerous, and very diverse. Thus, the mo- tor and the sensory nerves differ in their his- tological structure from the nerves of the brain and the spinal cord. The cells differ in volume, in form ( there being fusiform cells, giant cells, pyramidal cells, etc.), in the directions in which they lie, in the number of their filaments, in their position in the sev- eral parts of the cerebro spinal axis, for they are d.stributed from the inferior extremity of the spinal cord to the cortical layers. All these elements play their respective parts in the concert of action. If the reader will glance at an anatomical chart, or at a few histological preparations, he will obtain an approximate idea of the enormous number of nerve-elements necessary to produce a move- ment, and consequently to retain and repro- duce it. We therefore hold it to be of the utmost importance to call attention to this point, viz., that organic memory supposes not only a modification of the nerve elements, but also the establishment between them of associa- tions adapted to each special action of certain dynamic associations which, by repetition be- come as stable as the primary anatomical con- nections. In our opinion the thing that is of importance, as supplying a basis for memory, is not only the modification impressed upon each element, but the way in which sundry elements are grouped together to form a complex. As this point is for us of the first import- ance, we shall have no hesitation in dwelling upon it. First, it will be observed, that our hypothesis, which is a necessary corollary of admitted facts regarding the seat of memory, simplifies certain difficulties, though at first view it may appear to complicate them. The question is asked, can each nerve cell pre- serve many different modifications; or, once modified, is it polarized forever after? Of course we are reduced hereto conjecture; yet we may without rashness suppose that though it may be capable of many modifica- tions, the number of these must be limited. So, too, we may suppose that it preserves only one. The number of the brain cells being 600,000,000, according to the calcula- tion made by Meynert (and Dr. Lionel Beale gives a very much higher number), the hy- pothesis of a single impression is in no wise inadmissible. But this question is of sec- ondary interest for us, for even though we accept the latter hypothesis the most un- favorable one for explaining the number and complexity of acts of organic memory we should find that this single modification, being capable of entering into different com- binations, may produce different results. We are to note not only each factor individu- ally, but the relations of all the factors to one another, and the combinations thence re- sulting. The modified cell may be compared to a letter of the alphabet. This letter, while it continues to be the same, has con- curred in forming millions of words in the living and dead languages. Combinations innumerable and of the highest complexity may result, through grouping, from a smalt number of elements. To return to our instance of locomotion : The organic memory that serves as its basis consists of a special modification of a multi- tude of nerve elements. But several of these elements, thus modified, may subserve another purpose, may enter into other com- binations, may take a part in other memories. The secondary automatic movements that constitute swimming or dancing presupposes certain modifications of the muscles, certain articulations already employed for locomotion, already registered in certain nerve elements; in short, they find a memory already organized, sundry elements of which they turn to their own advantage, causing them to enter intc* a new combination and to concur in form- ing another memory. Further, we would observe, that the neces- sity of a great number of cells and nerve fila- ments for the retention and reproduction of a movement, though the same be a compara- tively simple one, implies a greater possibility of permanence and reviviscence ; in conse- quence of the number of the elements and of the solidarity established between them, the chances of reviviscence are increased, each one tending to call forth the others. Finally, our hypothesis is in agreement with two facts of daily observation, viz. : I. An acquired movement that is well fixed THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. in the organism, firmly retained, is displaced only with great difficulty by another, having nearly the same seat, but involving a different mechanism. In fact, one association has to be broken up to form another; established relations have to be annulled to set up new ones. 2. It sometimes happens that, in lieu of one ac:ustomed movement, we involuntarily per- form another; this is accounted for by the fact that as the same elements enter into dif- ferent combinations capable of producing nerve-discharges in different directions, a trifling circumstance may suffice to call into activity one group instead of another, so producing different effects. Thus' at least do we explain the following fact, reported by Lewes (Op. Cit., p. 128): "I was one day relating a visit to the Epileptic Hospital, and, intending to name the friend, Dr. Bas- tian, who accompanied me, I said, ' Dr. Brinton,' then immediately corrected this with ' Dr. Bridges;' this also wa> rejected, and ' Dr. Bastian' was pronounced. I was under no confusion whatever as to the per- sons, but, having imperfectly adjusted the group of muscles necessary for the articula- tion of the one name, the one element which was common to that group and to the others, namely, B, served to recall all three." The explanation seems entirely correct, and we may note with the author another familiar fact which favors our theory : " Who dees not know," says Lewes, "how, in trying to recollect a name, we are tormented with the sense of its beginning with a certain letter, and how, by keeping this letter constantly before the the mind, at last the whole group emerges." A like observation may be made with regard to the acquired movements that constitute the act of writing. It is a mistake I have often found myself falling into, especially when writing rapidly and with a wearied brain; it is so trifling, so quickly corrected and so quickly forgotten, that I have had to make a note of it at the moment. Here are some instances : Intending to write the words " doit de bonnes, " I wrote "donne." Intend- ing to write " ne pas/atre une part" I wrote " ne part faire," etc. Evidently, in the first case the letter D, and in the second the letter P (and by letter I mean the psycho-physio- logical state which serves as the basis for their conception and graphic representation), called forth one group instead of another; and this confusion was all the easier as the remainder of the groups, "onne" and "art," were already in the consciousness. Doubt- less any one who will take the trouble of ob- serving his own practice in these respects will admit that such errors are of frequent occurrence. What has been said is hypothetical, but the hypothesis appears to be in agreement with scientific data, and to account for the facts. It enables us to contemplate in pretty definite! shape the bases of organic memory, of those acquired movements which constitute the memory of our several organs our eyes, our hands, our members. These bases do not, in our opinion, consist in a purely mechanical registration, nor, as the usual comparison would have it, in an impress preserved we know not where, like the image of the key already mentioned. These are similes bor- rowed from the world of physics and are out of place here. Memory is a biological fact. A rich and well-stored memory is not a col- lection of impressions, but an assemblage of dynamic associations, very stable and very readily called forth. II. We are now to study a more complex form of memory, that which is accompanied by consciousness, and which in ordinary lan- guage, and even in the language of psycholo- gists is regarded as the sum total of memory. We have to in'qjire how far what has just been said of organic memory applies to this, and what is added by consciousness. In passing from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher, from a stable form of memory to an instable one, we must not overlook the preliminary question of the relation between the unconscious and con- sciousness. So involved is this problem in its native obscurity and in artificial mysticism, i that it seems difficult to say anything clear j and decisive about it; but we shall try. Of course we have nothing to do with the metaphysics of the unconscious, as under- stood by Hartmann and others; we shall even begin by confessing that we know not how to explain the transition from the uncon- scious to consciousness. One may offer in- genious, plausible hypotheses upon the sub- ject, but nothing more However, psychology, as a science of facts does not need to concern itself with these points; it takes consciousness for granted, without caring for its genesis; all that it can do is to determine a few of its conditions of existence. The first of these is the mode of action of the nervous system, called by physiologists nervous discharge. But most nerve states do not awaken consciousness at all, or but rarely, and in an indirect way : for instance, the excitations and discharges whose scat is the great sympathetic; the normal action of the vaso-motor nerves ; a great many reflex actions, etc. Others are accompanied by consciousness intermittently; or, though they are conscious in the early period of life, they cease to be so in the adult; instance the secondary automatic actions already men- tioned. Nerve action is far more widely dis- tributed than psychic activity: all psychic acts involve nerve action, but the proposition is not reciprocally true. Between the nerve activity that is never, or hardly ever, accom- panied by consciousness, and the nerve activ- ity that is always, or nearly always, so accompanied, stands that which sometime THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. has for its concomitant consciousness. It is in this group of facts that the unconscious must be studied. Before we arrive at clearer and better- grounded conclusions on this subject, we would note two other conditions of conscious- ness, viz., intensity and duration. 1. Intensity is a condition of highly va- riable character. Our states of conscious- ness are ever striving to supplant one an- other, but victory may result equally either from the superior strength of the victor or" from the weakness of the other contestants. We know and this point has been very well elucidated by the school of Herbart that the most vivid state of consciousness may grow steadily fainter till at last it falls below the level of consciousness, in other words, till one of its comlitions of existence fails. We are justified in affirming for consciousness all possible degrees down to the lowest, to the state called by Maudsley sub-conscious ; but there is no warrant for maintaining that this descending scale has no end, though we may not discern it. 2. nuration, as a necessary condition of consciousness, has not received much atten- tion ; yet it is of the first importance. On this point we can reason from definite data. The researches, of the last thirty years have determined the time that is required for the different sense-perceptions, (hearing o. 16 to 0.14 sec., touch, 0.21 to o. 18 sec., sight, 0.20 to 0.22 sec., and for the sim- Slest act of discernment, that nearest to re- ex action 0.02 to 0.04 sec.). Though the results vary according to the experimenter, the person under experiment, the circum- stances and the nature of the psychical acts that are being investigated, so much is at least established, viz., that every psychical act re- quires an appreciable duration, and that the supposed infinite rapidity of thought is only a figure of speech. From this it follows that no nervous action, the duration of which is less than that required by psychic action, can awaken consciousness. An instructive comparison may be made between the nerv- ous act accompanied by consciousness, and simple reflex action. According to Exner* the time necessary for a reflex action is 0.0662 to 0.0578 sec., which is much less than that stated above for the different sense- perceptions. If, as Herbert Spencer ob- serves, the wing of a gnat makes from ten to fifteen thousand beats in a second, each involving a separate nervous act, we have nerve action of astounding rapidity, com- pared with which nervous acts accompanied by consciousness occupy an enormous length ot time. From all this it follows that since every act of consciousness necessarily requires * Pfliiger's " Archiv," viii (1874), p. 526. The du- ration of reflex actions varies according to the force of the stimulus, and the direction of the transmission, whether longitudinal or transverse, in the spinal cord. BLT this question is by no means cleared up. a certain duration, one essential condition of consciousness is wanting whenever the dura- tion of a nervous process falls short of that minimum.* The question of the unconscious is OD- scure and beset with contradictory opinions, simply because it is incorrectly stated, [f we look on consciousness as an entity, as a fundamental attribute of the soul, all becomes obscure ; if we consider it as a phenomenon having its own conditions of existence, ill becomes clear, and the unconscious is 10 longer a mystery. We must never forget that a state of consciousness is a compkx fact whicji supposes a special state of the nervous system ; that this nervous action is not a mere accessory but an integral part of the fact; that it is its base, its fundament- al condition ; that given the nervous action the fact exists in itself ; that, consciousness being added, the fact exists for itself ; that consciousness completes it, perfects it, but does not constitute it. If one of the condi- tions of consciousness be wanting, as inten- sity, or duration, or any other unknown to us, then a part of the complex whole con- sciousness disappears ; but another part the nervous process remains. All that is left ot the fact is its purely organic phase. It is not surprising, therefore, if later the re- sults of this cerebral activity turn up ; such activity there was, though it was not noted. Regarded from this point of view, the whole subject of unconscious action loses its mysterious character, and is readily explained, for example, the sudden in-rush of recollec- tions, apparently called up by no association, that occurs daily to every one ; the lessons read by a schoolboy at night, known by heart in the morning ; problems long studied, the solution of which bursts suddenly , on the consciousness; poetical, scientific, and me- chanical inventions; secret sympathies, etc. Unconscious cerebration does its work noise- lessly, and reduces obscure ideas to order. In a curious case mentioned by Carpenter,! a. * The researches as to the duration of psychic acts may throw new light upon certain facts of our men- tal life. Thus they help, I think, to explain the transition from the conscious to the unconscious in habits. An act is at first performed slowly, con- sciously: by repetition it becomes easier and is ex- ecuted more rapidly, i. ., the nervous process which is its basis, finding its course fully traced for it, takes place rapidly and by degrees falls below the minimum duration required for consciousness. t " Mental Physiology," p. 533. The whole chap- ter xiii contains interesting facts about unconscious cerebration. A mathematician, a friend of th<- au- thor, had been occupied with a geometrical problem, and had had a glimpse of the solution. He reverted to it again and again without success. Many yean afterward the solution occurred to him so suddenly that he " trembled as if in the presence of another being who had communicated the secret." If any one would witness the spectacle of a powerful ami penetrating mind hampered by a faulty method, he must read Sir William Hamilton's remarkable audy of " Latency," (" Metaphysics," vol. i, lect. rviii). With his theory of the faculties of the soul, and his willful disregard of all physiology, he is unftbie to escape from any difficulty. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. m in drunkenness, as in the well-known case of the Irish porter, who, having lost a package- while drunk, got drunk again, and remem- bered where he had left it. As has been already said, cases of periodic amnesia, curious though they may be, teach- us more as to the nature of the Ego than as- to the nature ot memory. Still they are in- structive, and we will return to them in tht next paragraph. III. Progressive amnesia is that form which by a slow and continuous process of dissolution leads to complete abolition of memory. This definition applies to the majority of cases, and it is only in exceptional instances that the morbid evolution fails to result in total extinction. The process of the disease is- very simple and does not impress the imagin- ation, precisely because it is gradual, but it is highly instructive because, in showing how the memory is disorganized, it teaches us how- it is organized. Here we are not called upon to cite special cases of rare occurrence or of exceptional character. It suffices to describe just one morbid type that is very nearly constant. The primary cause of the disease is some progressive lesion of the brain cerebral hemorrhage, apoplexy, softening of the brain,, general paralysis, senile atrophy and the like. In the early stages there exist only partial disorders. The patient is subject to frequent moments of forgetfulness, always with re- spect to recent occurrences. If he drops the work he happens to be doing, he forgets to. take it up again. The events of yesterday and the day before, the order he has received, the resolution he has taken all are blotted out at once. This partial amnesia is the habitual symptom of incipient general paral- ysis. Lunatic asylums are full of patients belonging to this category who, the day after they are received, declare that they have been a year, five years, ten years in the in- stitution. They have only a faint remem- brance of having left their homes and fami- lies; they cannot tell the day of the week nor the month of the year. But their memory of what they did and what they learned be- fore the onset of the disease is still intact. It is a familiar observation that in aged per- sons the characteristic failure of memory has reference to recent occurrences. That is about as far as the data of the re- ceived psychology go. The conclusion would seem to be that the dissolution of memory does not follow any law. I will offer proof to the contrary. To discover the law we must make a psy- chological study of the progress of demen- * Apud. Carpenter, oj>. cit., p. 444. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. tia. ' When the premonitory stages, of which we Jiave spoken, are past, there supervenes a general and gradual enfeeblement of all the faculties, till at last the individual is re- duced to a purely vegetative life. Physicians distinguish several species of dementia, as senile, paralytic, epileptic, etc., according to the cause which produces it. These dis- tinctions do not concern us. The break-up of the mind is always the same thing what- ever the cause may be, and in it alone are we interested. The question therefore is, in this breaking up of the mind, does the loss of memory proceed in a fixed order ? The many alienists who have described dementia have not dwelt on this question, as it has no importance for them. Their testi- mony, therefore, will be all the more valuable if we can find an answer in their writings: And we do. On consulting the best authors (Griesinger, Baillarger, Falret, Foville. etc.,) we learn that the amnesia, at first restricted to recent events, later extends to ideas, then to feelings and affections, and finally to acts. Here we have all the data of a law. To de- termine what the law is we have only to ex- amine successively these several groups. I. That the weakening of the memory first affects the recollection of recent events is an observation so familiar that we fail to notice how it contradicts our a priori ideas. One would suppose that the most recent occur- rences, those nearest to the present would be the most stable, the most distinctly remem- bered, and such is in fact the case in the normal state. But at the setting in of de- mentia there occurs a serious anatomical lesion the degeneration of the nerve cells begins. These elements, tending to atrophy, can no longer retain new impressions. In more precise language, no new modification of the cells, and no formation of new dynam- ic associations is possible, or at least durable. The anatomical conditions of stability and reviviscence are wanting. If the perception is entirely new, it is not registered in the nerve centers and is instantly blotted out. If it is only a repetition of prior experiences that are still vivid, the patient refers the per- ception to the past; the concomitant circum- stances of the actual perception are quickly effaced, and cannot be localized in time. But the modifications fixed years before in the nerve elements and now become organic; the dynamic associations and groups of associa- tions that have been repeated hundreds and thousands of times still persist; they have greater power of resistance to meet destructive forces. Thus is explained the paradox of memory, that the new dies before the old. 2. Soon this old-time store of organic and conscious memories, on which the patient for a time subsists, is in turn dissipated. His intellectual acquisitions are lost, one after * The term is used here in its medical sense, not as i synonym of insanity in general. another (scientific, artistic, professional knowledge, languages, etc.). His personal recollections fade away, those of later years first, those of childhood last. When the process of decay is in an advanced stage, the stories and ditties of childhood even return. Often the demented forget in great part their own language. A few expressions are re- membered by accident, but commonly the patient repeats automatically the words he retains. The anatomical cause of this intel- lectual dissolution is an atrophy which, little by little, invades the cortex of the brain, and then the white matter, producing a fatty and atheromatous degeneration of the cells, tubes and capillaries of the nerve-substance. 3. It has been noticed by the best observers that the affectional faculties are extinguished far more slowly than the intellectual. It may at first seem strange that states so vague as those of feeling and sentiment should be more stable than ideas and intellectual states in general. But reflection shows that the feel- ings are the deepest, the inmost, the most persistent features of our mental constitution. Whereas the intelligence is something ac- quired and as it were external to us, the feel- ings are inborn. Considered in their origin, aside from any refined and complex forms they may assume, they are the direct and permanent expression of our organism. Tha viscera, muscles, bones every tissue of our bodies contributes its share toward their form- ation. What are we but our feelings and sentiments ? to forget them is to forget our- selves. Hence amnesia of the feelings must naturally occur only at a period when disor- ganization has gone so far that the personality begins to break up. 4. The acquisitions that longest withstand dissolution are those whi*h are almost en- tirely organic the daily routine, habits to which we have long been addicted. Many patients can arise in the morning, dress themselves, take their meals regularly, go to bed, engage in manual labor, play cards and other games, sometimes with remarkable skill, though the judgment, the will, the affections are extinguished. This automatic activity, which presupposes only a minimum of conscious memory, belongs to that lower form of memory for which the cerebral gan- glia, the medulla and the spinal cord suffice. The progressive destruction of the mem- ory therefore follows a logical course, a law. // descends progressively from the instable to the stable. It begins with the recent recollec- tions which, being but faintly impressed on the nerve elements, seldom repeated, and consequently but feebly associated with other recollections, represent organization in its lowest stage. It ends with that sensorial, instinctive memory which, being rooted in the organism and become a pyt of it, or rather become the organism itself, -epresents organization in its most pronounced aspect. From the initial to the final term theorogres* THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. of amnesia, determined by the nature of things, follows the line of least resistance, that is, of least organization. Thus pathol- ogy fully bears out what we have said with regard to memory. It is a process of organ- ization in varying degrees between two ex- treme limits: the new state, organic registra- tion. This law, which I shall call the Law of Regression or of Reversion, seems to rest on facts and to be objectively true. Still, to remove all doubt and to obviate every objec- tion, I propose to verify this law by a counter demonstration. If memory, when failing, follows invariably the course indicated, then it must follow the reverse course when it is in process of restora- tion: the forms that disappear last must re- appear first, for they are the most stable; and the process of restoration must be an ascend- ing one. It is very difficult to find cases in proof. In the first place the memory must return of its own accord: cases of re-education prove but little. Again, recovery from progressive amnesia is of rare occurrence. Finally, as" attention has never been directed to this point, nothing is to be found upon it in the books. Physicians, whose attention is en- grossed with the other symptoms are content- to observe that memory "returns little by little." Louyer-Villermay in his essay, quoted above observes that "memory when in process of re-establishment, follows an order inverse to that followed when m decay: events, adject- ives, substantives, proper names." But little is t D be drawn from this not over-precise re- mark. Here is something more definite: " Late- ly a celebrated Russian astronomer forgot, successively, the events of the previous day, then those of the year, then those of the years last past, and so on, the chasm grad- ually increasing, till at last he could only recollect the events of his childhood. His case was considered hopeless; but by a sud- den stop and unforeseen return, the blank was filled up in an inverted manner; the events of his youth first reappearing, then those of his manhood, and finally the more recent, those of the previous day. His mem- ory was wholly restored at the time of his death."* The following observation is still more to the point: the facts were noted in this in- stance hour by hour. I quote the greater part of the narrative: f " I must in the first place mention two de- tails of no great importance in themselves, but which need to be noted because they are connected with a remarkable phenomenon. Toward the end of November, an officer of * Taine, " Intelligence," Part i, Bk. ii, ch. ii. t " Observation sur un cas de perte de Memoire," by Koempfen in the " Meraoire* do 1" Academic de Medeciae," 1835, rol. IT, p. 489. my regiment suffered an injury to the left foot from the chafing of the boot. On No* vember 30 he went to Versailles to visit hU brother. He dined in Versailles and in th evening went back to Paris, and on entering his lodging found on the mantelpiece a lettei from his father. ' ' Now for the principal fact. On Decem- ber i this officer was at the riding school, and his horse having fallen, he was thrown to the ground, falling 0.1 his right side, particularly on his right parietal bone. The concussion was followed by a slight syncope. Coming to himself he mounted his horse again ' to- get rid of a trace of giddiness,' and contin- ued his lesson in horsemanship for three- quarters of an hour. Still he would now and then remark to the groom, ' I am coming out of a dream. What is the matter with me ?' He was taken to his lodging. " As I lived in the same house, I was sum- moned immediately. He was standing as I entered, recognized me, saluted me as usual, and said, ' I am like one coming out of a dream: what is the matter with me?' His, utterance was unimpeded. He answered all questions rationally. He complained only of a buzzing in his head. "Though questioned by myself, his groom, and his servant, he remembered neither the injury of two days before, his journey to Versailles on the day before, his leaving the house in the morning, his orders to his do- mestic on going out, his fall, nor anything that followed thereafter. He fully recognized his friends, called each by name, knew that he was an officer, knew the day of the week> and so on. " I never allowed an hour to pass without noting his condition. At every call, he al- ways thought I had come then for the first time. He remembered none of the prescrip- tions he had been following footbaths, fric- tion, etc. ; in short for him nothing existed but the action of the present moment. Six hours after the accident his pulse commenced to grow quicker and he began to retain in mind the answer so many times made to his question ' You had a fall from your horse ? Eight hours after the accident, his pulse still rising, he remembered having seen me there once. Two hours and a-half later, the pulse being normal, he forgot nothing that was said to him. He then distinctly recollected the injury to his foot; and was also begin- ning to remember his visit to Versailles, but this in so uncertain a way that were any one to declare positively the contrary, he would have been inclined to believe him. But mem- ory coming back more and more, he became assured during the evening that he had been at Versailles. There the progress for that day stood still. When he went to sleep, he was still unable to remember what he had done at Versailles, how he had come back to Paris, or where he had found the letter from his father. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. "On December 2, after a night of un- troubled sleep, as soon as he awoke, he re- called in succession what he had done at Ver- sailles, and his finding the letter on the man- telpiece. But he still knew nothing of what he had done, or seen, or heard, on December I, prior to the accident that is to say, he knew nothing of his own knowledge, but only what he had heard from others. " The loss of memory was in the inverse ratio of the time that had elapsed between the several occurrences and his fall, and the return of memory was distinctly in the order from the more remote to the more recent." This observation, made without any inten- tion of bolstering up any hypothesis by a man who seems much surprised by the facts he records, strongly confirms our law of regres- sion. True, this was only a case of tempo- rary, limited amnesia; but it is seen that even within these narrow limits the law is verified. I regret that though I have searched a good deal, and made inquiries in many quarters, I am* unable to lay before the reader many other cases of this kind. But when attention has been called to the matter, I hope other cases will come to light. Our law, therefore, resting as it does on facts, and verified by this counter proof, may be held to be true till the contrary is shown. Then there are other considerations that go to corroborate it. This law, however universal it may be with regard to memory, is but a particular expres- sion of a still more general law a biological law. It is a fact well known in biology that the structures that are latest formed are the first to degenerate a fact, says a physiolo- gist, analagous to what takes place in great commercial crises. The old houses with- stand the hurricane, the new ones, less firm, .are brought down on all sides. Again, in the biological world, dissolution 'proceeds in an order inverse to that of evolution it proceeds from the complex to the simple. Hughlings Jackson was the first to prove in detail that the higher, complex, voluntary functions of the nervous system disappear first, and that the lower, simple, general and automatic functions disappear latest. We have seen both of these facts verified in the dissolution of the memory: what is new dies out earlier than what is old, what is complex earlier than what is simple. The law we have formulated is therefore only the psychological expression of a law of life; and pathology in turn ex- hibits to us in memory a biological fact. The study of periodic amnesia has thrown new light on our subject. In teaching us how memory is constituted and how de- stroyed, it shows what memory is. It has revealed to us a law by which we may guide ourselves through the multitudinous varieties of diseases of memory, and which will later enable us to view them as one whole. Without attempting a premature summary wre may recall what has just been said : First of all, and in every case, there is loss of recent recollections; in periodic amnesia there is a suspension of all the forms of memory except the semi-organized and the organic; in total temporary amnesia there is complete abolition of memory, except the organic forms; in one case, that described by Mac- nish, there is complete abolition, including the organic forms. We shall see in the next chapter that partial disorders of memory are governed by the same law of regression, es- pecially that most important group, amnesia of language. The law of regression accepted, we have next to determine how it acts. On this point I shall be brief, as I have nothing to offer but hypotheses. It were puerile to imagine that recollections are deposited on the brain in layers in the order of their priority in time, after the manner of geological strata; and that disease, descend- ing from the surface down to the deep- lying layers, acts after the manner of the experi- mentalist who removes slice after slice from the brain of an animal. To explain the course of the morbid process we must have resource to the hypothesis offered above with respect to the physical bases of memory. I will state it again in a few words : It is in the highest degree probable that recollections have the same anatomical seat as the primary impressions and that they call into action the same nerve-elements (cells and fibers). These elements may occupy very diverse positions from the cortex of the brain to the medulla. Retention and repro- duction depend, i. On a certain modification of the cells; 2. On the formation of more or less complex groups, which we denominate dynamic associations. Such are the physical bases of memory as we conceive them. The primary acquisitions those dating from infancy are the simplest, namely, the formation of automatic secondary move- ments, and the education of our senses: they depend principally on the medulla and on the inferior centers of the brain: and as we know, the cortex is at this period of life im- perfectly developed. r mte apart from their simplicity, there is ,\rery reason why they should be the most stable. In the first place the nerve-elements, when they receive these primitive impressions, are "virgin." Nutri- tion is in infancy very active, but this inces- sant molecular renovation serves only to fix the impressions, the new molecules take ex- actly the places of the old, and hence the acquired disposition of the nerve-elements becomes in the end equivalent to an innate disposition. Further, the dynamic associa- tions established between these elements at- tains a state of perfect fusion, from being re- peated innumerable times. Hence it is in- evitable that these first acquisitions should be better retained and more easily reproduced than any others, and that they should con- stitute the most enduring form of memory. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. 31 So long as the adult individual remains in the state of normal health, his new impres- sions and new associations, though far more complex than those of childhood, are never- theless very likely to be stable. The causes we have just enumerated are ever operative, though with less force. But if through the effects of old age or of disease the conditions are changed; if the vital actions, and in particular nutrition, are weakened; if the loss exceeds the gain; then the impressions become instable and the associations are easily broken up. Take an example. Suppose a man in that stage of progressive amnesia in which recent events are very soon forgotten. He listens to a narrative, he views a landscape, or sees a show. The psychic fact is in the last analy- sis reduced to a sum of auditive or visual impressions forming highly complex groups. In the new story or the new show there is usually only one thing that is new the grouping, the association. The sounds, forms, colors that make them up have been many a time experienced, and many a time remembered before. But now, owing to the morbid condition of the brain, this new com- plex of impressions fails to fix itself in the brain; the elements that constitute it are part of other associations or groups of far more stable character, that were formed in the period of normal health and that have been oft repeated. The strife is very unequal between the new complex that weakly tends to estab- lish itself in the nerve centers, and the older complexes that are firmly established. Hence all the chances are that the old combinations will be called up later, instead of the newer one. These hints must suffice. For the rest, this hypothesis as to the cause of progressive amnesia is only of secondary importance. Accepted or rejected, it in no wise affects the value of our law. IV. There is but little to be said of congenital amnesia. I will refer to it, so that nothing may be omitted. It is seen in idiots, in im- beciles, and in a minor degree in cretins. Most of the patients are afflicted with a gen- eral debility of memory. It varies according to individuals, and in some may be such as to render impossible the acquisition and re- tention of the simple habits which constitute the daily routine of life. But though a general debility of memory is the rule, frequent exceptions occur in prac- tice. Among these classes of patients there are some individuals who possess a very re- markable power of memory, within a re- stricted field. It is often observed in idiots and imbeciles that their several senses are affected in very different degrees. Thus, the hearing may be extremely acute and discriminating while the rest of the senses are dull. The arrest of development is not uniform at all points. Hence it is not surprising that debilitation of the general memory should coincide, in the same man, with the evolution or even the j hypertrophy of a special memory. Thus 1 some idiots, refractory to all other impres- sions, have a strong liking for music, and can remember an air they have heard only once. Others and these cases are more rare have memory of form and color, and show a certain skill in drawing. More fre- quently we find memory of numbers, dates, proper names, and words in general. "An imbecile remembered the date of every burial that occurred in a parish for thiity-five years. He could repeat with unfailing exactitude the names and ages of the deceased, as also of those who had conducted the funerals. Beyond this mortuary record he had not one idea; he could not answer the simplest ques- tion, he was incapable even of serving him- self with his food." Some idiots that are unable to make the simplest calculations, will repeat without a slip the multiplication table. Others will recite by heart whole pages that they have heard read from books, though they cannot name a single letter of the alpha- bet. Drobisch relates the following fact of which he was himself a witness: a boy of fourteen years, nearly idiotic, had great diffi- culty in learning to read; yet he remembered with wonderful facility the order in which the words and letters succeeded one another. Give him two or three minutes to go over a pflgc printed in a language unknown to him, or treating of subjects of which he knew nothing, and he could from memory spell all the words there found, precisely as though the book lay open before him.* The exist- ence of these partial memories is so common a fact that it has been turned to account in educating idiots and imbeciles, f It is further to be remarked that some idiots subject to mania or other acute disorders re- gain a temporary memory. Thus, "an idiot, become a maniac, narrated a rather complex occurrence of which he had many years be- fore been a witness, and which had seemed to make no impression upon him."J In congenital amnesia it is the exceptions that are instructive. Our law simply confirms the commonplace truth that the memory de- pends on the constitution of the brain, and in idiots and imbeciles the brain is* abnormal. But the formation of these limited, partial memories helps us to understand certain dis- * Drobisch, " Empirische Psychologic," p. 561. Dr. Herzen writes to me about a Russian, from Arch- angel, now twenty-seven years of age, who was stncken with imbecility at the close of a debauch. Of the brilliant faculties of his adolescence all that he retained was an extraordinary memory, so that he could instantaneously perform the most difficult operations in arithmetic or algebra, and repeat word for word long pieces of potry after hearing them read only once. t See Ireland's work " On Idiocy and Imbecility,"' Lor don, 1877. t Griesinger, op. cit., p. 431. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. orders of which we have not yet treated. I am inclined to believe that the methodical study of what occurs in idiots would enable us to determine the anatomical and physio- logical conditions of memory. We will re- turn to this point in the next chapter. CHAPTER III. PARTIAL AMNESIA. Reduction of memory 10 memories Anatomi- cal and physiological reasons for partial memories Amnesia of numbers, names, figures, forms, etc. Amnesia of signs Its nature; a loss of motor-memory Ex- amination of this point Progressive am- nesia of signs verifies completely the law of regression Order of dissolution : proper names ; common nouns ; verbs and adjec- tives ; interjections and language of the emotions; gestures Relation bet-ween this dissolution and the evolution of the Indo- European languages Counter-proof: re- turn of signs in inverse order I. Before we proceed to the consideration of partial amnesia we must first remark upon the varieties of memory. Without such pre- liminary remarks the facts we are about to state would appear inexplicable. That a man should lose only his memory of words, or should forget one language, retaining others, or that a language long forgotten should come back to him suddenly, or that he should be bereft of his musical memory and of that alone these things are so odd and strange on first view that were it not that they are vouched for by the most scrupulous ob- servers, they might well be relegated among fables. But if, on the other hand, we have a clear idea of what is meant by the word mem- ory, the marvelous disappears, and these facts, so far from surprising us, appear as the nat- ural, logical consequence of a morbid influ- ence. The employment of the word memory as a general term is perfectly correct. It desig- nates a property common to all sentient and thinking cr.eatures the possibility of retain- ing impressions and of reproducing them. But the history of psychology shows that there is a tendency to forget that this term, like all other terms, has a real signification only in particular cases: that memory resolves itself into memories, just as the life of an organ- ism resolves itself into the life of the or- gans, tissues, anatomical elements that com- pose it. "The ancient and still unexplod- ed error," says Lewes, "which treats mem- ory as an independent function, a faculty, for which a separate organ, or seat, is sought, arises from the tendency continu- ally to be noticed, of personifying an abstrac- tion. Instead of recognizing it as the short hand expression for what is common to all concrete facts of remembrance, or for the sum of such facts, many writers suppose it to have an existence apart."* Though everyday experience has long noted the natural inequality of the different forms of memory in one and the same per- son, psychologists either have not interested themselves in that fact, or have denied it o* principle. Dugald Stewart seriously main- tains that "original disparities among me| in this respect are by no means so immensf as they seem to be at first view, and tha( much is to be ascribed to different habits of attention, and to a difference of selection among the various objects and events pre< sented to their curiosity."! Gall, who wa| the first to make a stand against this tend- ency, ascribed to each faculty a memory of its own, and denied the existence of memory as an independent faculty. Contemporary psychology, more careful than the old-school psychology to omit noth- ing, and more concerned about exceptions that afford instruction, has brought to light a considerable number of facts which remove all doubt as to the natural inequality of the several memories in the same individual. Taine gives many excellent examples of this. We may cite in illustration Horace Vernet and Gustave Dor6, painters, who can paint a portrait from memory; chessplayers who caf carry on one or more games in mind; littj calculating prodigies like Zerah Colburn whfc " see their sums before their eyes"; \ the man mentioned by Lewes who, after walking half a mile down a street, could name all the shops in their respective positions; Mozart writing the notes of the Sistine chapel Miserere after hearing it twice. For details I refer the reader to special treatises,! as I have no occasion to discuss the question here. It is enough that the reader hold these inequalities of the memory for well established. Let us now see how they are explained ; we shall then see what they themselves explain. What is implied by these partial memories? Special development of a special sense with the anatomical structures dependent on it. To make this clearer, take a particular case for instance a good visual memory. This has for its condition a good structure of the eye, of the optic nerve, and of the portions of the brain which concur in the act of vision that is to say (according to the received no- tions of anatomists) certain portions of the pons, the crura, the optic tract, and the * Op. cit,, Vol. Ill, p. 119. t " Philosophy of the Human Mind." ( I have had occasion to note that many calculator* do not see their figures nor their sums, but that they "hear" them. So far as our theory is concerned it matters little whether the images are visual or auditive. ij Taine, "Intelligence," vol. i, part i, Book II. ch. i, i; Luys, ''The Brain and its Functions; ewes, loc. cit. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. hemispheres. These structures, higher by hypothesis than jthe average, are perfectly adapted to receive and to transmit impres- sions. Conseqnently the modifications which the nerve-elements undergo, as also the dy- namic associations formed between them and these, as we havi often said, are the bases of memory ought to be more stable, more definite, more easily revived, than in an ordinary brain. In short, to say that a visual organ has a good anatomical and phys- ical constitution, is to say that it presents the conditions of a good visual memory. We may go further, and say that the term "a good visual memory " is too broad. Daily experience shows us that one person recol- lects forms best, another person colors. It is probable that the former's memory de- pends mainly on the muscular sensibility of the eye, that of the latter on the reti- na and the nervous apparatus connected with it. These remarks apply to hearing, smell, taste, and those diverse forms of sensibility comprised under the general name of touch in short, all sense perceptions. If we reflect upon the close relations sub- sisting between the feelings, the emotions, the general sensibility, and the physical con- stitution of each individual, and if we con- sider how dependent these physical states are upon the organs of animal life, we shall un- derstand that these organs bear the same re- lation to the feelings that the organs of sense do to sense perceptions. Through differ- ences of constitution, the impression trans- mitted may be faint or strong, stable or trans- ient : here are so many conditions to modify the memory of feelings and sentiments. The preponderance of any system of organs those of generation for example gives the superiority to one group of recollections. There remain the higher psychic states abstract ideas and complex sentiments. These cannot be referred directly to any or- gan : the seat of their production and repro- duction has never been localized with pre- cision. But as they no doubt result from an association or a dissociation of primary states, there is no ground for supposing that they are exceptional. The foregoing remarks may be summed up thus. In the same individual an unequal de- velopment of the several senses and of the several organs produces unequal modifications in the corresponding parts of the nervous system, and consequently varieties of mem- ory. It is probable even that inequality of memories in the same person is the rule, not the exception. As we have no exact pro- cesses for weighing and measuring them separately, and comparing them with one another, we offer the foregoing only as a con- jecture. An indirect proof might be drawn from the antagonism between the different forms of memory : this is a point that might give occasion for much curious research, but it is beside our subject. * Finally, no objection can be brought from the influence of edu- cation. Of course education counts for much, but it hardly does anything more than to fos- ter what nature has already singled out ; and in certain cases it has been unable to act any part. In psychology, as in an sciences based on facts, experience decides in the last resort. We would remark however that the relative independence of the different forms of memory might have been demonstrative by reasoning alone. In fact it is a corollary of the two propositions following, viz.: i, Every recollection has its seat in certain determinate parts of the brain; 2, The brain and the cerebral hemispheres themselves " consist of a number of organs totally differentiated, each one of which possesses a function of its own, though it remains most closely con- nected with the others." This latter pro- position is now accepted by most authors who study the nervous system. In physiology indeed the distinction of partial memories is now currently received, + but in psychology the method of " faculties' has succeeded so well in having the memory regarded as a unit that the existence of partial memories has been completely forgotten or has been taken for an anomaly. It was needful that I should bring the reader back to the reality and remind him that in the last analysis there exist only special> or as sotne authors say, local memories. We willingly accept this latter term provided it be borne in mind that we have to do here with a distributed localiz- ation, according to the hypothesis of dynamic associations already set forth. The memory has often been compared to a store-house where all our items of knowledge are kept in separate shelves. If this simile is to be retained it must be presented in a more active form each particular memory would be compared to a squad of employees charged with a special and exclusive branch of business. One of these squads may be dropped Without throwing all the rest into confusion. This is what occurs in partial disorders of memory. After these preliminary observations, we proceed to study the pathology of memory. If in the normal state the different form} of memory are relatively independent, it is perfectly natural that in the morbid state one form should disappear, leaving the rest intact. This fact must appear to us now as simple, and needing no explanation, resulting as it does from the very nature of memory. * On the antagonism of memories, see Herbert Spencer, " Principles of Psychology," vol. i. t See in particular Ferrier, " Functions of the Brain." Even Gratiolet "Anatomic Comparee," Vol. II, p. 460, remarked that " to each sense corresponds a memory that is correlative to it, and that the mind like the body has its temperaments which result from the predominance of a given order of sensation in the natural habits of the mind." 34 THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. True, many partial disorders are not restrict- ed to only one group of recollections. This will not excite surprise if we reflect on the close solidarity of all the parts of the brain, their functions and the psychic states there- with connected. Still we shall find a certain number of cases in which the amnesia is limited. A complete study of partial amnesia would involve the examination, one after another, of the different manifestations of psychic activity, and proving from examples that each group of recollections may disap- pear, whether for a time or forever. We can by no means carry out that plan. We are unable even to say whether certain forms are never partially affected, and never dis- appear, save when there is total dissolution of the memory. We must look to the future for fuller or more conclusive pathological proofs. Properly speaking there is only one form of partial amnesia that may be studied thoroughly the amnesia of signs (whether spoken or written signs, interjections, gestures.) It is rich in all sorts of facts explicable by the law formulated in the preceding chapter. Leaving that for separate study, we will state what is known with regard to other forms of partial amnesia. "Some persons," writes Calmeil, * "have lost the power of reproducing certain sounds, or certain colors, and have had to abandon music or painting " others lose only the mem- ory of numbers, figures, a foreign language, proper names, or the existence of their near- est relatives. We offer a few examples. The case of Sir Henry Holland, narrated by himself in his "Mental Pathology" (p. i6o\ has often been quoted : " I descended on the same day two very deep mines in the Harz Mountains, remaining some hours under- ground in each. While in the second mine, and exhausted both by fatigue and inanition, I felt the utter impossibility of talking longer with the German inspector who accompanied me. Every German word and phrase deserted my recollection : and it was not until I had taken food and wine, and been some time at rest that I regained them again." This case, though the one best known is far from being unique. Dr. Beattie tells of a friend of his, who having received a blow on the head, lost all he ever knew of Greek, his memory in other respects appearing to be in- tact. This loss of languages that have been acquired by study, has often been noted as a result of sundry fevers. " So as regards music. A child having re- ceived a severe blow on the head, was uncon- scious for three days. On coming to himself he had forgotten all the music he had learned; nothing else was lost." f Other cases are more complex. A patient who had forgotten ' " Dictionnaire en trente volumes." art. Amnesie. * Carpenter, " Mental Physiology, p. 44$, the values of the musical notes, was ante to play a tune after hearing it. Another could write musical notes, even compose music and recognize a melody he heard executed ; but he was unable to play with the notes before him.* These facts showing as they do the complexity of our mental operations, even of those which seem most simple, will be con- sidered later. In some cases the best organized recol- lections, the most stable, disappear mome- ntarily, while others presenting the same character remain intact. Thus Abercrombie tells of a surgeon who having been thrown from his horse and suffered an injury in the head, gave the minutest directions upon coming to himself as to his treatment. But he no longer remembered that he had a wife and children, and this forgetfulness lasted for three days.f Is this fact to be explained on the theory of mental automatism ? This sur- geon, though half insensible, remembers his professional knowledge. Some patients lose entirely the memory of proper names, even their own. W shall see later, when we come to study the amnesia of signs, in its perfect evolution as it is seen in the aged that these proper names are al- ways soonest forgotten. In the cases that follow, this forgetfulness was the symptom of softening of the brain. A certain man, unable to recall the name of a friend, had to take his interlocutor to the door on which was a plate bearing the name. Another person, after an attack of apoplexy, was unable to recall the names of any of his friends, though he designated them correctly by their ages. Mr. von B., formerly Envoy to Madrid, and afterward to St. Petersburg, was about to make * visit, but could not tell the servants his name. " Turning round immediately to a gentleman who accompanied him, he said with much earnestness, ' For God's sake, tell me who I am !' The question exci'.ed laughter, but as Mr. von B. insisted on being answered, add- ing that he had entirely forgotten his own name, he was told it, whereupon he finished his visit." J In other instances an apoplectic attack is followed only by amnesia of numberr. A traveler after long exposure to cold expe- rienced a great weakening of the memory. He could not himself make any calculation, nor retain for a moment any operation in numbers. Forgetfulness of faces is frequent, nor need this excite surprise, for in the normal state many persons have this kind of mem- ory very ill developed and very instable; be- sides, the memory of faces must be the result of a pretty complex mental synthesis. Lou- yer Viflermay gives an amusing example : * Kussmaul, " Die Stowngen der Sprache," p. Proust, " Archives generates de medecine." 1871. t Abercrombi-, " Intellectual Powers." $ Forbes Winslow, of. cit. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. " An old man being in the company of his wife imagined her to be a lady whom he had in the past been wont to visit every evening, and he would repeat again and again, ' Mad- am I cannot remain longer; I must return to my wife and children.' " Carpenter tells us of a distinguished scientist whom he had known from child- hood, that though turned seventy years of age he was still full of vigor, but that his memory was failing. In particular, he forgot recent occurrences and words in most fre- quent use. "Though continually at the British Museum, the Royal Society, and the Geological Society, he would be unable to refer to either by name, but would speak of ' that public place.' He still continued his visits to his friends, and recognized them in their own homes, or in other places (as the Scientific Societies) where he had been ac- customed to meet them; but the writer, on meeting him at the house of one of the oldest friends of both, usually residing in London, but then staying at Brighton, found that he was not recognized; and the same want of recognition shewed itself when the meeting took place out of doors. The want of mem- ory of words then showed itself more con- spicuously, one word being substituted for another, sometimes in a manner that showed the chain of association to be (as it were) bent or distorted. Thus, he told a friend that 'he had had his umbrella washed,' the meaning of which was gradually discovered to be that he had had his hair cut. His memory steadily declined, and he died of apoplexy."* In this instance there is seen simulta- neously existing amnesia of proper names, and names of things, and amnesia of faces ; but what is most curious is the part played by the law of contiguity. Recognition of persons is not spontaneous, suggested simply by their presence. To have recognition, it must be suggested or rather aided by the actual im- pression of the places where they habitually are. The recollection of these places, fixed by the experience of a life-time, and become almost organic, remains stable : it serves as a fixed point to call out other recollections. The names of these " public places " is not revived : the association between the object and the sign is too faint. But the recollec- tion of faces is in operation, being dependent on a stable sort of association, namely conti- guity in place. The one category of associa- tion that has survived assists'in reviving an- other category, which, left to its own re- sources, would not have been called up. It were an easy thing, but profitless to the reader, to enumerate cases of partial amnesia. It is enough to have shown by a few exam- ples wherein partial amnesia consists. The question naturally arises whether the forms of memory which disease either dis- * Op. eft., p. 545. organizes for good or only temporarily sus- pends, are the ones that are best established, or only the weakest. We cannot answer posi- tively. Logically, it would seem that the morbid influences must follow the line of least resistance : and the facts appear to con- firm this hypothesis. In most cases of partial amnesia it is the least stable forms of memory that are attacked. At least I do not know of a single case in which, any organic form being suspended or abolished, the higher forms have remained intact. Yet it were rash to assert that this has never occurred. We may therefore only reply to the ques- tion with an hypothesis till we shall be in pos- session of fuller information. For the rest it would be contrary to scientific method to refer to one law all sorts of cases depending on special conditions. A thorough study of each case and its causes is necessary before we can declare them all to be reducible to one formula. Just now the problem is too obscure to permit of this being done. The same remarks apply to the process by which these forms of amnesia are produced. In the first place we know nothing about the physiological mechanism special to each form. Here all means of explanation fail us. At regards the psychological mechanism we may venture an hypothesis. In the cases of par- tial amnesia we have been considering there are two things in particular worthy of not*, viz., destruction and suspension. Destruction is the direct result of the disorganization of the nerve-elements. la the case of suspension * certain group of elements remains temporarily isolated and powerless, or, in psychological language, it stands outside of the mechanism of association. This explanation is suggested by the case cited by Carpenter. The solidarity ex- isting between the different parts of the brain, and consequently between the different psy- chic states persists, as a rule. These group* alone, with the sum of recollections that they represent, are in a manner made immobile, inaccessible to the other groups, incapable for a time of entering into the consciousness. This state must be the result of physiological conditions which escape our notice. H. We have reserved for special study one form of partial amnesia that of signs. Here we use the term signs in its broadest sense, comprising all the means man em- ploys for expressing his feelings and thoughts. The subject is one that is clearly defined and rich in facts at once like and unlike, inas- much as they possess a common psycholog- ical character in that they are signs, while they differ as to the nature of the signs, which are either vocal or written signs, ges- tures, drawings, or music. They are easily observed and of every-day occurrence, and well localized ; and owing to their variety they are well suited for comparison and analysis. Besides, as we shall see, this species of par- THE DISEASES OF MEMORY tial amnesia very strikingly confirms the law of the destruction of memory laid down in the preceding chapter in its most general form. But first we must guard against a misun- derstanding. The reader may suppose that we are about to study aphasia: but not so. In most cases, aphasia, it is true, implies a disorder of the memory, but it implies some- thing more; and it is only with disorders of memory that we are concerned. The re- searches made during the last forty years upon the diseases of the faculty of language, have shown that under this one term, aphasia, are included cases tha't differ very widely from one another. The reason is that aphasia being, not a disease, but a symptom, yaries according to the morbid conditions that produce it. Thus, some aphasic sub- jects are deprived of every mode of expres- iion; others are able to speak but not to write, or vice versa; the loss of gesture is much less frequent. Sometimes the patient retains a pretty considerable vocabulary of vocal and graphic signs, but spaks and writes in counter-sense (paraphasia, par- agraphia). Or he does not understand the signification of words whether written or spoken, though hearing and sight be intact, (word-deafness, word-blindness). Aphasia is either permanent or transitory: oftentimes, it is accompanied by hemiplegia. This hem- iplegia which nearly always attacks the right side is in itself, quite apart from am- nesia, an obstacle to writing. * These principal forms present varieties accord- ing to the individuals affected. From this, the reader may have some idea of the complexity of the question. Fortunately, we have not to discuss it here. Our task and it is one of no little difficulty consists in de- termining among these disorders of speech and of the expressive faculty in general, that which seems to belong to memory alone. Plainly, we have nothing to do with cases where aphasia results from idiocy, dementia, or loss of memory in general; neither with cases where the power of transmission alone is impaired: thus a lesion of the white master of the brain, in the neighborhood of the third left frontal convolution may impair the ex- pressive faculty, the gray matter being intact, f But after these two causes are eliminated, the difficulty is hardly lessened, for aphasia usually occurs under quite other conditions. We will examine it under its most ordinary form. There is no need to cite instances, which the reader may find everywhere. \ Usually, * In left-handed subjects of aphasia the hem- iplegia is always on the left side. + For cases of this kind, see Kussmaul, " Die Storungen d-r Sprache," p. op. f The literature of aphasia is so plentiful that a sim- ple enumeration of works or memoirs would occupy several pages. For the psychological aspects, the reader may consult Trousseau, " Clinique Medi- aphasia appears suddenly. The patient if unable to speak; if he tries to write, there i a like inability; at best he is able, with great difficulty, to trace a few unintelligible words. His physiognomy retains the look of intel- ligence. He strives to convey his meaning by gestures. For the rest, there is no paral- ysis of the muscles that serve to articulate words; the tongue moves freely. Such are the general traits, at least the ones which most interest us just now. What has occurred in the psychic state of the patient, and, as regards the memory, what is it that he has lost ? A little reflec- tion suffices to show that amnesia of signs is a phenomenon of quite a special character. It is not to be compared to the forgetfulness- of colors, sounds, a foreign language, or a period of life. It extends to all the activ- ities of the mind, and so far forth it is gen- eral; and yet it is partial only, for the patient retains his ideas and his recollections, and is conscious of his own situation. In our opinion, the amnesia of signs is above all a disease of the motor memory: that it is which gives it its special character and makes it assume for us a new aspect. But what is meant by " motor memory, " an ex- pression which may at first cause surprise ? The matter has been so little studied by psy- chologists, that it is difficult to discourse of it clearly in a summary way, and it cannot be treated here at any length. I have endeavored in another place,* though not with sufficient fullness, to show the psy- chological importance of movements, and to- prove that every state of consciousness im- plies in some degree motor elements. But to confine ourselves to the matter in hand, I would remark that no one finds difficulty in admitting that our perceptions, our ideas, our intellectual acts in general are not fixed in us, and have no part in memory except there exist in the brain certain residua modi- fications of nerve-elements and of the dynamic associations of those elements. On this condii- tion alone are they retained and recalled. But the same must of necessity hold good for movements. The movements under consid- eration, those which take place in articulate speech, writing, drawing, music, gestures, can be retained and reproduced only on con- dition that there are motor residua, i. e , ac- cording to the hypothesis so often set forth, modifications in the nerve-elements and dy- namic associations between those elements. But whatever opinion one may adopt, if nought remained of a word spoken or written for the first time, it were impossible either to- read or to write. cale," vol. II; Fabret, art. "Aphasia" in " Diet, encycl. des sciences medic;" Proust, "Archives gen. de med," 1872; Kussmaul, ubi supra: H. Jackson, " On the Affections of Speech, 1 ' in Brain* 1878, 1879 1880, etc. * " Revue Philosophique," Oct., 1879 ; see also an excellent chapter of Maudsley's work, " Physiology of Mind." THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. 37 The existence of motor residua admitted, we may understand the nature of sign-am- nesia. Our intellectual activity consists, as we know, in a series of states of consciousness Associated according to certain relations. Each term of a series seems to the conscious- ness simple, but it is not so in reality. When we speak or think with anything like precision, all the terms of a series form couples, made up of the thought and its expression. In the normal state the fusion of these two elements is so complete that they form one, but disease shows that they can be dissociated. Further, the expression ' ' couple " does not suffice. It is exact only for that portion of the human race that cannot write. When I think of a house, over and above the mental representa- tion which is the state of consciousness proper, over and above the vocal sign which translates that thought and which seems to form one thing with it, there exists a graphic clement that is almost as intimately blended with the thought, and which, when I write, becomes even predominant. Nor is that all: around the vocal sign, " house," are grouped, by a less intimate association, the vocal signs used in other languages with which I am acquainted maison, domus, Jfaus, casa, etc. Around the graphic sign, "house," are grouped the graphic signs of those same languages. Thus we see that in an adult mind, each clear state of consciousness is not a simple unit, but a complex unit, a group. The mental representation, the thought, is, properly speaking, only the nucleus, around which are grouped signs more or less numer- ous which determine it. This understood, the mechanism of sign- amnesia becomes clearer. It is a pathologi- cal state in which, the idea being intact or nearly so, a part of the signs or all the signs which translate it are temporarily or forever forgotten. This general proposition must be completed by a more detailed study. i. Is it true that in aphasic subjects, thought subsists, while its verbal and graphic expression has disappeared ? I would remark that it is not incumbent on us to inquire here whether one can think with- out signs. The question we have to discuss is altogether different. The aphasic subject has for a long time been using signs: do his ideas disappear with the power of giving them utterance? The facts answer in the negative. Though authors are unanimous in declaring that aphasia, especially when it is of long standing and of a serious character, is always accompanied by a certain decline of mental power, there is no doubt that mental activity persists even when it has no other mode of expression but gestures. Instances abound, but I will cite only a few. Some patients deprived only of a portion of their vocabulary, but unable to find the right word, substitute for it a paraphrase or a description. For "scissors" they will say " what you cut with;" for window, " what you see through." They will designate a person by the place he lives in, by his titles, his occupation, his inventions, the books he has written.* In more serious cases we see patients play- ing cards with considerable caution and re- flection: others again are able to superintend the management of their business. Thus we have a great proprietor mentioned by Trousseau, "who by means of signs intelli- gible to those around him directed the leases and deeds to be laid before him, pointed out modifications to be made in them, and in most cases these modifications were useful and based on sound judgment." A man who was totally deprived of the power of speech, sent to his doctor a detailed account of his trouble written by himself in very correct language, and in a very firm hand. We have furthermore the testimony of pa- tients themselves after their recovery. "I had forgotten all words," says one, "but I retained fully my consciousness and my will. I knew very well what I wanted to say, but could not. When you," (the physician), "asked me a question, I understood you perfectly; I made all sorts of efforts to reply, but it was impossible to recall the words, "f Rostan, on being stricken suddenly so that he was unable either to speak or to write a single word, ' ' analyzed the symptoms of his disease and sought to refer them to some special lesion of the brain, just as he would have done in a clinical lecture." Lordat's case is well known: " He was capable of ar- ranging in his mind the matter of a lecture, of altering the distribution of the several headings; but when his thoughts had to be uttered in speech or in writing, it was found to be impossible, though there was no par- alysis." \ We may therefore regard it as proven that, all means of expression having disappeared, the intelligence remains almost intact, and consequently that the amnesia extends only to signs. 2. Does this amnesia depend, as we have said it does, especially upon the motor ele- ments ? When on a preceding page we en- deavored to prove the necessary existence of motor residua, we did nbt examine the prob- lem in all its complexity. We must return to it : When we are learning: to speak our mother tongue or a foreign language, certain sounds, acoustic signs, are registered in the brain. But that registration is only a part of the * Very often the aphasic patient confounds words, and says " fire " when he means ' bread," or even coins words that aie unintelligible. But these disor- ders seem to me to be rather a language-disease than a disease of memory. + Legroux, " De 1'aphasie," p. 06. t For the facts see especially Trousteau, p. cit. Lordat, who is a strong spiritualist, ('. <., advocate of the doctrine of an immaterial principle or soul in man), has from these cases drawn conclusions favoring the independence of mind. 38 THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. task, tor we have to repeat these signs, to pass from the receptive to the active state, to translate these acoustic signs into vocal move- ments. This operation is at first very diffi- cult, for it consists in co-ordinating move- ments that are very complex. We are able to speak only when these movements are readily reproduced, that is, when the motor residua have been organized. In learning to write we fix our eyes on the copy ; optic signs are thus registered in the brain ; then, with much effort we strive to re- produce these by the motions of the hand. Here, too, there is co-ordination of very complex movements. We are able to write only when the optical signs are immediately translated into movements, that is, when the motor residua are organized. The same is to be said of music, drawing, acquired gestures, (for instance, those taught to deaf mutes). The expressive faculty is more complex than it seems to be. Our thoughts and feelings have need of an acoustic (or optical) memory a motor mem- ory. Now, what is there to prove that it is precisely this motor memory that is affected in cases of amnesia of signs ? Consider the phenomena observable in most cases of aphasia. Present to the apha- sic subject any familiar object, for instance a knife, and call it by some other name, as fork, book, etc. ; he will contradict you. Pronounce the true name and he expresses assent by gesture. If you ask him then and there to repeat the name, it is but seldom that he will be able to do so. Therefore, he has retained not only the idea but also its acoustic sign ; for this he recognizes among many other signs. But since he cannot translate it into speech, though his vocal organs are intact, it follows that the amnesia must affect the motor elements. The same experiment may be made with regard to writing. Among aphasic subjects, who are' not paralyzed, it leads to the same results. The patient retains the memory of the optical signs, but has lost the memory of the movements necessary for their reproduc- tion. Some patients can copy, but when the original is taken from them they are help- less. However, while I hold that motor amnesia exists in most cases, I do not claim that it is always present. In so complex a subject, it is best not to pronounce absolutely. When the aphasia is irremediable we sometimes find the patient forgetting the vocal or written signs, or recognizing them only with great difficulty and with much hesitation. In such cases amnesia is not restricted to the motor elements. Again, some aphasic patients can, as we have seen, repeat a word or copy it ; others can read aloud, though they are un- able to speak in conversation. This is an exceptional case (Falret, p. 618). On the other hand, many can read to themselves, though unable to read aloud. It has hap- pened, though rarely, that an aphasic patient would utter spontaneously one portion of a phrase, and then be unable to continue. Brown Sequard cites even the case of a phy- sician who spoke in his dreams, though aphasic in the waking state. These facts, infrequent though they be, show that motor amnesia is not always absolute. It is with this form of memory as with all other forms: under certain exceptional circumstances it revives. We may in passing note an analogy. The aphasic patient who succeeds in repeating a word, exactly resembles one who is unable to recall an occurrence save with the assistance of other persons : the psychological mech m- ism of the amnesia of signs is the same as for all other kinds of amnesia It consists of a dissociation : a fact is forgotten when it cannot be awakened by an association, when. it cannot enter into any series. In aphasia the thought no longer calls forth its appro- priate sign, or at least its motor expression. Here however, the dissociation is more com- plete: there is dissociation not only between terms united by prior experience, but between elements so knit together that they form for consciousness a unity ; to assert their rela- tive independence of one another would seem to be mere hair-splitting were it not demon- strated by pathological facts. * It is this perfect fusion of the thought, the sign (whether vocal or writte. ) and the motor element which makes it so difficult to prove clearly and indisputably that sign-amnesia is mainly motoi amnesia. As every state of consciousness tends to translate itself into motion ; and as, according to Bain's happy phrase, to think is to restain oneself from speech or action, it is impossible by analysis alone to draw clear lines of demarkatiou between these three elements. Still it ap- pears to me that the memory of vocal and written signs which survives in the intelligent aphasic patient, represents fairly what has- been called the inner speech, that minimum of ideation without which the mind would be on the way toward dementia ; and conse- quently that the motor elements alone are suppressed in sign-amnesia. On consulting what has been written by physicians who have studied the psychology of amnesia, and they are but few, I find that their doctrine differs in hardly any respect from that here set forth, save in terminology. "I have asked myself," says Trousseau, " whether [aphasia] is not simply a forgetting * Authors have in late years carefully described un- der the name of " Word-blindness " ( vVordblindheit> and " Word-deafness" (Worttaubheit) maladies that have long been confounded under the gmeral desig- nation of Aphasia. The patient is able to read and write; sight and hearing are well retained, and yet the words he reads or hears spoken have for him no meaning. For him they are simply optical or acoustic phenomena and are no longer signs. This is another and rarer form of dissociation. Kussmaul gives de- tails. Op. cit. chap i, aj. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. 39 of the instinctive and harmonic movements which we learned in early childhood, and which constitute articulate language ; and whether, owing to this forgetting, the aphasic patient is not in the condition of a babe who is learn- ing to babble his first few words, or of a deaf mute who, suddenly cured of his deafness, strives to imitate the speech of those whom he hears for the first time. The difference between the asphasic patient and the deaf mute then would be that the one has forgot- ten what he had learned and that the other has not yet learned at all." (Op. cit. p. 718. To the same effect Kussmaul : " If we con- sider memory as a general function of the nervous system, then, in order that the sounds be combined to make words, there must be both an acoustic and a motor memory. Thus the memory of words is a , double memory, first a memory of words as far as they con- stitute a group of acoustic phenomena, and second a memory of words as motor images. (Bewegungsbi Ider)" . It has been justly remarked by Trousseau that aphasia is always reducible to loss of the memory either of vocal signs or of the means whereby we articulate words. W. Ogle also distinguishes two word-memories, one uni- versally known, whereby we have conscious- ness of a word, and the other whereby we give expression to it." (Op cit. p. 156). Is there any ground for affirming that the residua which correspond to an idea, those which correspond to its vocal or graphic sign and to the movements which translate both of these, have their seats side by side in the cortex ? What anatomical inferences are to be drawn from the fact that one may lose memory of movements without losing memory of the inner signs of speech, these without tnat of writing, or of writing without that of speech ? Are the motor residua located in Broca's convolution, as some authors appear to hold ? We can only state these questions ; it is not for us to answer them. The relation between the sign and the idea, simple as it appears to the psychologist who follows the subjective method, is highly complex for the positive psychologist, who is helpless until anatomy and physiology have made further progress. We have now to consider sign-amnesia under another aspect. We have studied it in itself, we will now study it in its evolution. I have endeavored to sho\v that it affects especially the motor elements, and that this gives it its distinctive character : whether this be accepted or not does not concern what follows. Sometimes the aphasia is of brief duration. Anon, it becomes chronic, and in seeing the patient after an interval of some years we notice no appreciable change. But there are cases where fresh apoplectic attacks increase the intensity of the malady, and then its course is progressive : such cases are of higher interest from our point of view. There is a gradual breaking up, and the memory of signs declines little by little in. a certain fixed order. Briefly stated, the order is, first, words, that is, rational speech ; second, exclamatory phrases, interjections, what Max Muller calls "emotional Uuu guage ; " third, (in very rare cases), gestures. We will examine in detail these three stages of dissolution ; we shall thus have con- sidered amnesia of signs in its totality. I. The first stage is by far the most im- portant, as it comprises the higher forms of language, those which are distinctively hu- man, which express deliberate thought. Some physicians, even prior to the contemporane- ous researches in aphasia, have remarked that all other things being equal, the memory of proper names is lost earlier than that of common nouns, and that the loss of commoh nouns precedes the loss of adjectives. This observation has since been confirmed by sundry investigations. '" Substantives, " says Kussmaul, in his latest work, "and in particular proper and concrete names (Sach- nainen) are more readily lost than verbs, ad- ject'ves, conjunctions, and other parts of speech."* This fact has been noted only incidentally by medical men, and very few of them have inquired into its causes. In fact it possesses for them no clinical interest, while it is highly important for the psychologist. We see at the first glance that amnesia pro- gresses from the particular to the general. It first affects proper names, which are purely individual, then the names of things, next all substantives which are but adjectives in a special signification; f lastly, adjectives and verbs expressive of qualities, modes of being, acts and the like. The scholar mentioned by Gratiolet, who, having forgotten all proper names, was wont to say, "My associate who made such or such an inven- tion," designated persons, by their qualities. It has also been observed that idiots often have no memory save for adjectives. The idea of quality is the most stable, because it is the one first acquired, and because it is the basis of our most complex conceptions. Now, since the particular is that which has least extension, and the general that which has most, we may say that the rapidity with which the memory of signs disappears is in inverse ratio to their extension ; and since, cateris paribus, a term has all the better chance of being repeated and fixed in the memory in proportion as it designates a greater number of objects, and all the less chance of being repeated and fixed in the memory in propor- tion as it designates only a few objects, we see that this law of dissolution rests in the last resort upon experimental conditions. * " Die Storungen der Sprache." p. 164. t The transformation of Adjectives into substan- tive?, one of the constant processes in the formation of languages, is still to be seen. Thus, we speak of a " special' meaning, " special" correspondent, a "bril- liant,'' etc. 40 THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. As a complement of these remarks, I will quote a passage from Kussmaul : "When the memory is failing, the more concrete an idea is, the more quickly is the term that ex- presses it lost. The reason of this is that our mental images of persons and things are more loosely connected with their names than are abstract notions, such as their con- dition, their relations, their qualities. W.e easily figure to ourselves persons and things without their names, because here the' sen- sorial image is more important than that other image which is the sign, in other words their name. On the other hand, we do not acquire abstract ideas save by the aid of words which alone give to them a suitable form. Hence it is that verbs, adjectives, pronouns, and particularly adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions are more intimately associated with thoughts than are substantives. It may well be conceived that in the network of the corticul cells, many more phenomena of excitation and combination occur in the case of an abstract idea than in that of a concrete one, and that consequently the organic con- nections that attach an abstract idea to its sign are far more numerous than in the case of a concrete idea" (op. cit. p. 164). Trans- lated into psychological language, this last phrase amounts to what we have already said, namely, that the stability of ihe sign is as its organization, i. e., as the number of ex- periences repeated and registered. The science of language also furnishes us with very valuable data. At the risk of wearying the reader by a superabundance of proof, I must take note of these. As was to have been expected, the evolution of language has followed an order inverse to that of the loss of language in aphasia. Before we cite in favor ot our law the his- toric development of languages, it might seem natural that we should ascertain the process of language development in the individual. That, however, is impossible. When we are learning to speak, our language is given to us ready-made. Though the babe, as has been well observed by Mr. Taine, ' ' learns a language already made, as the true musician learns counterpoint, or the true poet prosody; in other words, as an original genius," still in reality he creates nothing at all. We must therefore confine ourselves to the historical evolution of language. It is certain that the Indo-European lan- guages are descended from a certain number of roots, and that these roots were of two kinds, namely, verb or predicative roots, and pronominal or demonstrative roots. The former, comprising verbs, adjectives and sub- stantives are, says Whitney, signs indicating acts or qualities. The others, whence come the pronoun and the adverb (the preposition and conjunction are of secondary formation), are few in number, and denoted relative po- sition. The original form of language signs therefore is the attribution of qualities. Then the verb and the adjective became discrimina- ted. " Nouns are derived from verbs through the participles, which are only adjectives whose derivation from verbs is not yet oblite- rated."* As for the transformation of com- mon nouns into proper nouns, that admits of no question. Does not the natural evolution of language explain the stages of its dissolu- tion in aphasia, in so far as we may compare a spontaneous creation with the decay of a language artificially acquired ? 2. In etting forth in its most general form the law of the regression of memory, we have seen that the memory of feelings is effaced later than the memory of ideas. Logic leads us to infer that in the case we are considering progressive sign-amnesia the language of the emotions must disappear later than the language of the reason. Facts fully confirm this deduction. The most careful observers as Broca, Trousseau, Hughlings Jaclfon, Broadbent have noted a great nurr.be f of cases where aphasic patients entirely deprived of speech, incapable of articulating spontaneously a sin- gle word, are able to utter not only interjec- tions, but also complete phrases, brief habit- ual sentences expressive of anger or vexation, or of pain for their privation. One of the most persistent forms of such emotional lan- guage is that of profanity. We have said that generally that which is of recent formation dies out first, whatever is of old formation disappears last. The re- mark is confirmed by what we see here: the language of the emotions is formed before that of ideas; it disappears later. So, too, the complex disappears earlier than the sim- ple : and rational language, compared with the language of the emotions, is exceedingly complex. 3. All the foregoing remarks are applicable to gestures. That form of language and it is the most natural of all is, like the inter- jection, only a reflex mode of expression. It appears in the babe long before articulate language. Among some savage tribes stricken with arrest of development, gestures play as important a part as words This inborn form of language is seldom lost. "Cases of aphasia in which disorders of the mimic fa- culty occur are always," says Kussmaul, "of an exceedingly complex character. In such cases the patients sometimes are conscious that they err in the use of gestures, some- times again they are not." (Op. cit. p. 160). Hughlings Jackson, who has carefully studied this subject, notes that some aphasic subjects can neither laugh nor smile, nor cry except in case of extreme emotion. Further he has noted that some patients express affirmation or negation by purely chance gestures: one of them, who had still at his command a few interjections and a few gest- * Baudry, " La Science du Langage." p. 16. For fuller details consult the works of Max Milller and Whitney. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. 41 ures, employed them in a contrary sense, in an unintelligible way. Trousseau gives a very remarkable in- stance of pure motor amnesia affecting gest- ures: " I would raise both hands and move my ringers, as though playing the clarionet, and tell the patient to do the same. He forthwith would perform these movements with perfect precision. ' You see,' I would say. ' I am acting as though I played the clarionet,' to which he would signify assent. After a few minutes I would ask him to exe- cute the movement again. He would de- liberate, but in most instances it was impos- sible for him to perform this very simple piece of mimicry." Thus, then, we have seen that sign-amne- sia proceeds from proper nouns to common, thence to adjectives and verbs, and finally affects the language of the emotions, and gesture. This destructive process does not advance at random, but follows a fixed order, from the less organized to the better organ- ized, from the complex to the simple, from the less to the more automatic. What was said above when we laid down the general law of the reversion of memory might be re- peated here, and it is one evidence of its correctness that it is verified in sign-am- nesia, the most important, the most syste- matic and the best-known form of partial amnesia. We may now proceed to give a counter- proof. When the amnesia of signs is com- plete and memory is gradually coming back, does this process follow an order inverse to that of the disappearance of memory? In- stances of recovery are rare. I find one case, however, mentioned by Dr. Grasset, where a. man was seized with "entire disability to express his thoughts whether in words, or in writing, or by gestures. Some days later his power of making himself understood by gest- ures was seen to return little by little then successively the power of expression by means of words, and finally by means of writing."* It is highly probable that other instances might be found were the attention of observers directed to this point. CHAPTER IV. EXALTATION OF MEMORY. OR HYPERMNESIA. General excitation Partial excitation Re- turn of lost memories Return of forgotten languages Reduction of this fact to the law of regression Case of false memory Examples and a suggested explanation. Hitherto, our pathological study has been limited to cases of impairment of memory. But there are cases cf a very different kind. * " Revue des Science* Medicales," 1873, vol. ii, p' where that which seemed to have been de- stroyed revives and faint recollections recov- er their original intensity. Is this exaltation of memory, called by physicians hypermnesia, a morbid state? It is at least an anomaly; and since it is always associated with some organic trouble or some singular and unusual condition, it unques- tionably belongs to our subject. It is a less instructive object of study than amnesia, but it must not on that account be omitted. Be- sides, as we shall see, it teaches us some- thing about the persistence of recollections. Excitations of memory are either general or partial. I. General excitation of memory is not easy to determine, the degree of excitation being relative. We should have to compare mem- ory with itself in the same individual. Since the power of this faculty differs widely be- tween different persons, there is no common measure; the amnesia of one person may be the hypermnesia of another. It is in fact a change of tone occurring in the memory, such as may occur in any other form of psychic activity; whether thought, imagination, or sensibility. Again, when we say that the ex- citation is general, that is merely a probable induction. As memory is subject to the condition of consciousness, and as conscious- ness exists only in the form of a series, all that we can prove is simply that during a longer or shorter period a multitude of recol- lections arise on all sides. General excitation of memory seems to depend entirely on physiological causes, and in particular upon the rapidity of the cerebral circulation. Hence, it is of frequent occur- rence in high fevers. It also occurs in cases of mania, ecstasy, hypnotism, occasionally in hysteria, and in the incubation-period of some brain diseases. Besides these strictly pathological cases, there are others of a more unusual character which probably depend on the same cause. Thus, there are narratives of drowning per- sons saved from imminent death, all of which agree on this point, viz., that "when asphyxia began, the drowning person seemed to review in an instant the whole of his past life with all its little details." One man affirmed that ' ' every instant of his former life seemed to glance across his recollection in a retrograde succession, not in mere out- line, but the picture being filled with every minute and collateral feature forming a kind of panoramic picture of his entire existence, each act of it accompanied by a sense of right and wrong." Under analogous circumstances, "a man of remarkably clear head was crossing a rail- way in the country when an express train, at full speed, appeared closely approaching him. He had just time to throw himself down in the center of the road between the two lines 42 THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. of rails, and as the train passed over him, the sentiment of impending danger to his very existence brought vividly to his recollection every incident of his former life in such an array as that which is suggested by the promised opening of ' the great book at the last great day.' " * Even when we make allowance for exag- geration, these facts reveal to us a superact- ivity of memory of which we can have no idea in the normal state. 1 will quote one more instance due to opium intoxication, and I beg the reader to note how this confirms the explanation already given of the mechanism of recollection. Says Thos. De Quincey : "I sometimes seemed to have lived for seventy or one hundred years in one night. * * * The minutest details of childhood, or forgotten scenes of later years, were often revived. I could not be said to recollect them, for if I had been told of them when waking I should not have been able to acknowledge them as parts of my past expe- rience. But placed as they were before me, in dreams like intuitions, and clothed in all their evanescent circumstances and accom- panying feelings, I recognized them instan- taneously." f All these general excitations of memory are transitory, never outliving the causes that produce them. Is there a permanent form of hypermnesia? If the term may be used in rather wide sense, we might apply it to the curious development of memory that follows certain injuries. Upon this point we find in old authors stories that are now controverted; instance the cases of Pope Clement VI., Mabillon, and others. There is no reason to question these stories, for modern observ- ers, Romberg among them, have noticed a remarkable permanent development of mem- ory as the result of brain concussion, small- pox, etc. The mechanism of this change being inscrutable, we need not dwell upon it. II. Partial excitations of memory are, by their very nature, definitely limited. When the habitual tone of the memory is as a whole preserved, whatever goes beyond that is easily ascertained. Such hypermnesia is the neces- sary correlative of partial amnesia ; it proves again and under a new form that memory is made up of memories We find nothing resembling a law in the production of partial hypermnesia. It mani- fests itself in isolated facts, that is to say as the result of a concurrence of conditions which elude observation. Why is one group cf cells forming one particular dynamic asso- ciation affected rather than another ? No reason can be given, whether physiological or psychological. The only Instances in which there is any appearance of law are those to * For these cases and others of like nature, see Wins- tow, op. cit., p. 333. et seq. t " English Opium-Eater." be mentioned further on, where several Ian. guages come back successively to the memory. Partial excitation most usually results from morbid causes: these have been already indi- cated. But sometimes it occurs in the state of health. Here are some examples: " A., lady in the last stages of a chronic disease / was carried from London to a lodging in the country; there her infant daughter was taken to visit her, and after a short interview car- ried back to town. The lady died a few days after, and the daughter grew up without any recollection of her mother till she was of mature age. At this time she happened to be taken into the room in which her mother died, without knowing- it to have been so;- she started on entering it, and when a friend who was along with her asked the cause of her agitation, she replied. ' I have a distinct impression of having been in this room be- fore, and that a lady who lay in that corner and seemed very ill, leaned over me, and wept.' " A clergyman, of marked artistic tempera- ment (this is worthy of note), went with a party of friends to visit a castle in Sussex, which he had no recollection of having ever seen before. "As he approached the gate- way, be became conscious of a very vivid ircpressiou of having seen it before; and he ' seemed to himself to see ' not only the gate- way itself, but donkeys beneath the arch, and people on the top of it. His conviction that he must have visited the castle on some former occasion made him inquire from his mother if she could throw any light on the matter. She at once informed him that, be- ing in that part of the country when he was about eighteen months old, she had gone over with a large party and taken him in the pan- nier of a donkey; that the elders of the party, having brought lunch with them, had eaten it on the roof of the gateway where thsy would have been seen from below, while he had been left on the ground with the attend- ants and donkeys."! The mechanism of remembering in these two instances leaves no room for question: it is a revival of memories produced by nearness in space. They simply present in a more striking and less accustomed way that which we see every moment of our lives. Who is there that, in order to regain a recollection that he has for the moment lost, has not gone back to the place where the thought first pre- sented itself, thus placing himself as nearly as possible in the same material situation, and so bringing back the recollection in an in- stant ? As for hypermnesia due to any morbid cause, I will cite only one instance, which will serve as a type: " A boy, at the age of four, received a fracture of the skull, for *Abercrombie, " Essay on the Intellectual Powers," p. 120. t Carpenter, loc. cit., p. 431. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. which he underwent the operation of trepan. He was at the time in a state of perfect stupor, and after his recovery retained no recollection either of the accident or of the operation. At the age of fifteen, during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a cor- rect description of the operation, and the persons who were present at it, with their dress and other minute particulars. He had never been observed to allude to it before, and no means were known by which he coukl have acquired the circumstances which he mentioned."* The recovery of languages that have been quite forgotten, may well engage our atten- tion for a moment. The case recorded by Coleridge is so well known that I shall not speak of it. There are many other cases of the same kind to be found in the works of Abercrombie, Hamilton and Carpenter. The anaesthetic sleep produced by chloroform or ether may produce the same effects as febrile excitation. " An aged forester had lived in early life on the Polish frontier and there had spoken Polish almost exclusively. Later he lived only in German districts. His children said that for thirty or forty years he had neither heard nor spoken a word of Polish. During two hours of anaesthesia, he spoke, uttered prayers, and sung only in Polish, f Still more curious than the recovery of one language is the retrogressive return of many languages. Unfortunately the authors who have written about this fact, report it simply as a matter of curious interest, without stat- ing all the particulars needed for its inter- pretation. The most clearly defined case is the one observed by Dr. Rush, of Philadelphia, and recorded in his " Medical Inquiries and Ob- servations upon Diseases of the M ind. " " Dr. Scandella, an ingenious Italian who visited this country a few years ago, was master of the Italian, French and English languages. In the beginning of the yellow fever, which terminated his life, he spoke French only ; but on the day of his death he spoke only in the language of his native country." The same author writes in rather confused terms of a woman subject to attacks of tem- porary insanity. First she spoke in broken Italian ; at the crisis of her disorder, in French ; when the fever was abating, in Ger- man ; when she was beginning to convalesce, she returned to English, her mother tongue. Quitting these cases of regression through many languages, and turning our attention to simpler cases, we find an abundance of indis- putable testimony. A Frenchman living in England and speaking English fluently, re- ceived a blow on the head. During his ill- ness, he was able to answer questions only in French. But there is no case more instructive than * Abercrombie, op. cit.^ p. 149. t Duval, art Hypnotisme, in "Nouv.au Diet, de Medecine," p. 144. one recorded by Dr. Rush. I have it, he says in substance, from a German Lutheran min- ister residing in America, and who had in his congregation a considerable number of Ger- mans and Swedes, that when at the point of death they nearly all utter their prayers in their mother tongue. In visiting old Swedes upon their death- beds he was " much struck in hearing some of them pray in the Swedish, language, who, he was sure had not spoken it for fifty or sixty years before, and who had probably forgotten it." Winslow too notes how Catholics converted to Protestantism, during the delirium which precedes death, pray almost exclusively in the Roman formulas. * This return of forgotten languages and formulas, properly undersood, is sim- ply a special instance of the law of regres- sion. In consequence of a morbid action that usually ends in death, the most recent men.ory-deposits are first destroyed, and the work of destruction proceeding by degrees to> the earliest acquisitions which are also the: most firmly grounded, gives to them a mo- mentary activity and then effaces them forever. Hypermnesia therefore is simply the result of conditions entirely negative ; regression re- sults, not from a normal return to conscious- ness, but from the suppression of more vivid,, more intense states. These revived mem- ories are like a feeble voice that can make it- self heard only when more" powerful voices are stilled. These acquisitions and habits of childhood or of youth come into the fore- ground, not because there is anything urging them to the front, but because th.re is nothing any longer to overlie them. Revivi- scenccs of this kind are, strictly speaking, only a reversion back to conditions of exist- ance that seemed to have vanished forever, but which the work of demolition brings to light again. I retrain however from the re- flections that these facts so naturally suggest, and leave them for the moralist. He will be able to point out for instance how certain religious reversions occurring in the last mo- ments of life, and which make so much noise in the world of polemics, are tmt the neces- sary effect of irremediable dissolution. Independently of this unexpected con- firmation of our law of regression, the out- come of our study of hypermnesia is a knowledge of the surprising persistence of those latent conditions of recollection which have been called "residua." But for these disorders of memory, we should not have suspected their existence, for consciousness, of itself, can only affirm the conservation of the states which constitute our everyday life and of certain other states which the will holds in dependence upon itself, because habit has fixed them. Are we to infer from the fact 'of these re- viviscences that nothing is lost from the Op. cit. p. 253; see also p 265, 266, 305. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY memory ? That whatever is once registered therein is indestructible, and that even the most transient impression may at one time or another be revived. Many authors, Maury in particular, have contributed striking ex- amples in support of this opinion. But should any one maintain that, even in the absence of morbid causes, some residua dis- appear, there is nothing known whereby he might be peremptorily refuted. Possibly some cellular modifications and some dynamic associations are too instable to last. Still it may be said that persistence, if not the rule without exceptions, is nevertheless the rule: it embraces the great majority of cases. Of the mode in which these old time recol- lections are preserved and reproduced, we know nothing, but I may point out how this might take place on the hypothesis set forth in the present work. If we accept as the material substratum of -our recollections cell modifications and dynam- ic associations, any memory, however bur- dened it may be with impressions, may keep them all. For though cell modifications are limited in number, dynamic associations are innumerable. We may suppose that the old associations reappear when the new ones, dis- organized for a time or permanently, leave the field clear for them. The number of possible reviviscences being much reduced, the chances are proportionately increased for the return of the more stable, i. e., the oldest associations. But I will not dwell on an hy- pothesis that cannot be verified. I desire to confine my observations to that which can be ascertained. We cannot refer to any of the preceding morbid types one illusion of a singular char- acter, one besides that is of rare occurrence or seldom observed. Three cases of this il- lusion only are on record, and no specific name has been offered to designate it. Wigan has called it, inaptly enough, double-con sciousness, and Sander defines it to be an il- lusion of memory (Erringerungstauschung). Other authors have given it the name of false memory, and this seems to me to be preferable. It consists in a belief that a state of consciousness that in reality is new was experienced oefore, so that when it first occurs it is thought to be a repetition. Wigan in his well-known work, "Duality of the Mind," states that while he was at- tending the obsequies of the Princess Char- lotte in Windsor Chapel, of a sudden the feeling came upon him that before he had witnessed the same spectacle. The illusion was transitory, but we shall see cases in which it it more lasting. Lewes justly classts this phenomenon with others of more frequent occurrence. While journeying in regions never before visited by us, a turn of the road or a bend in the river brings us in sight of some landscape that we have seen before; meeting a person for the first time, we feel that we must have seen him elsewhere; on reading in a book a passage that certainly we never read before, we feel that the thoughts have once been in our minds. This illusion is easily explained. The new impression evokes from the past similar im- pressions, which, though indistinct, confused, evanescent, still suffice to give to the new state of consciousness the appearance of be- ing a repetition. There is a ground of re- semblance quickly perceived between the two states of consciousness which leads us to identify them. It is an error, but only a partial one, for there is in reality in our past something that resembles a prior experience of this present impression. While this ex- planation may do for very simple cases, there are others to which it will not apply. A patient, says Sander, on hearing of the death of one he had known, was seized with an indefinable terror, because it seemed to him that he had already had the impression. " It was as though, some time ago, while he was lying on this very bed, X came and told me that Miiller was dead. I replied, ' Muller died some time since; he cannot die twice.'" Dr. Arnold Pick relates the most perfect instance of false memory I know of, the dis- order assuming an almost chronic form. Am educated man who reasoned clearly about his malady, and who wrote a description of it, was, at about the age of thirty-two, seized with a peculiar mental disorder. If he at- tended a festival, or visited any place, or fell in with any one, the occurrence, with all its circumstances, seemed to him so familiar, that he firmly believed that he had already had the self-same impressions, in the com- pany of the same persons, under the same skies, the same weather, etc. If he did a piece of work, it seemed to him that he had done the very same work before under the same circumstances. This feeling occurred to him the same day, at the end of a few minutes, or a few hours, sometimes on the next day, but always with perfect distinctness. * In false memory there is an anomalous condition of the mental mechanism that eludes observation, and which it is difficult to understand in the healthy state. The patient, even though he were a good observer, could only analyze it by ceasing to be under the illusion. Slill I think these instances show that the impression received is reproduced in the form cf a sensorial image- in physiologi- cal terms, there is a repetition of the primary cerebral process. This is nothing extraordi- nary, it is what occurs in every recollection that is not called forth by the actual presence of its object. The difficulty is to say why this image, appearing a minute, an hour, a day, subsequent to the real state of conscious- ness, gives to the latter the appearance of being a repetition. We may suppose the mechanism of recollection, of localization id * " Archiv fiir Psychiatric," 1876. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. time to be working retrogressively. I venture to offer the following explanation : The image thus formed, as has been said, is highly intense of the nature of an fuilluci- nation. Consequently the real impression is thrown into the background, bearing the less distinct character of a recollection. It is localized in the past, erroneously if you consider the facts objectively, rightly if you consider them subjectively. This hallucina- tional state, though very vivid, does not, in fact, efface the real impression ; but as it is produced by it and becomes detached from it, it appears like a subsequent experience. It takes the place of the real impression, ap- pears the more recent of the two, and in fact is the more recent. For us who look at the thing from without and in the light of what has taken place outside of the mind of the subject, it is not true that the impression has been received twice ; but from the point of view of the subject himself, who judges according to what consciousness tells him, it is true that the impression has been re- ceived twice, and within those limits his as- severation is incontestable. In support of this explanation I may add that false memory is nearly always associated with mental disorder. The patient spoken of by Pick was subject to one form of in- sanity he supposed himself to be the victim of persecution. Hence the formation of hallucinational images is quite natural. Still I do not pretend that my explanation is the only possible one. The case being so very uncommon, further and more careful obser- vation is requisite CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION. Relations between tht retention of perceptions and nutrition, between the reproduction of recollections and the general and local circu- lation Influence of the quantity and qual- ity of the blood Examples The law of regression connected with a physiological principle and a psychological principle Recapitulation. I. So far we have been describing the dis- eases of memory and seeking the law which governs them. Before we conclude we must say a word as to the causes, of course we mean immediate, organic causes. But even reduced to these terms the etiology of dis- orders of memory is very obscure, and very little is clearly ascertained with regard to it. Memory consists in retaining and repro- ducing: retention seems to depend above all on nutrition; reproduction on the general or the local circulation. I. Retention, which plays the more im- portant part since without it reproduction is impossible, presupposes a primary condition which can only be vaguely defined as a nor- mal constitution of the brain. As we have seen, idiots suffer from congenital amnesia, from innate inability to fix impressions in. the memory. This primary condition is a postulate, not simply a condition of memory, but the necessary condition of the existence of memory. This normal condition of the brain being granted, it is not enough that impressions be received, they must be fixed, organically registered, incrusted, so to speak: they must become a permanent modification of the- brain; the modifications impressed upon the nerve-cells and nerve-filaments, and the dynamic associations between these elements must be made stable. This result can be produced only by nutrition. The brain, and particularly the gray matter, receives an enormous volume of blood. In no other part of the body is the nutritive function so active or so rapid. We know not the inner mechan- ism of this function. The minutest histo- logical research is unable to trace the ar- rangements and rearrangements of the mole- cules. We know only the effects all beside is but induction. But all sorts of facts go to- show the close connection between nutrition and memory. It is matter of every-day observation that children learn with wonderful facility, and that anything, as languages, which calls only for memory, is readily learned by them. We know, furthermore, that habits that is to say one form of memory are far more easilyformed in childhood, in youth, than in maturity. At that period of life, so great is the activity of the nutritive process that new connections are rapidly formed. In the aged, on the con- trary, a rapid effacement of new impression* coincides with a considerable decline of this activity. That which is too quickly learned does not endure. When we say that a thing is ' ' as- similated," we use no metaphor. I shall not dwell upon a truth that every one is ever re- peating, little suspecting that this psychic fact has an organic cause. To fix recollec- tions requires time, because nutrition does not accomplish its work instantaneously: the molecular movement constituting nutrition must proceed in one constant direction, and this end is served by the periodic renewal of the same impression.* *"A distinguished theatrical performer," says Abercrombie, " in consequence of the sudden illness of another actor, had occasion to prepare himseif , on very short notice, for a part which was entirely new to him ; and the part was long and rather difficult. He acquired it in a very short time, and went through it with perfect accuracy, but immediately after the performance forgot every word of it. Character* which he had acquired in a more deliberate manner he never forgets, but can perform them at any time without a moment's preparation; but in regard to the character now mentioned, there was the further and very singular fact that, though he has repeatedly 46 THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. Fatigue in every shape is fatal to memory. The impressions received under such condi- tions are not fixed, and the reproduction of them is very laborious and often impossible. Now, fatigue is regarded as a stats wherein, owing to the over activity of an organ, the nutrition suffers and halts. When the nor- mal conditions are restored, memory comes back again. The case already quoted from Sir Henry Holland is decisive upon this point. We have seen that in cases of temporary -amnesia, caused by concussion of the brain, the amnesia is always retroactive, extending back to a period of greater or less duration, anterior to the accident. This rule is almost "without exception. Most physiologists who have studied this phenomenon, refer it to de- fective nutrition ; the organic registration, which consists in a nutritive modification of the cerebral matter, has not had time to take place. Finally it is to be noted that the gravest form of disease of memory, namely the pro- gressive amnesia of the demented, of the aged, and of general paralytics, is produced by a steadily increasing atrophy of the nerve- -elements. The tubes and the cells undergo a process of degenerescenca, and the latter eventually disappear, leaving behind an un- differentiated mass of matter. These physiological and psychological facts -all show that there exists between nutrition -and retention the relation of cause and effect. There is exact coincidence between their periods of rise and fall. Variations short or long in the one are repeated in the other. If the one be active, or moderate, or lauguish- ing, so is the other. Hence the retention of recollections must not be regarded metaphy- sically, and as a " state of the soul" subsist- ing no one knows where, but as an acquired state of the cerebral organ implying the pos- sibility of states of consciousness whenever their conditions of existence are present. The extreme rapidity of nutritive changes in the brain, though at first it might appear to cause instability, in fact,explains the fix- ation of recollections. " The waste follow- ing activity is restored by nutrition, and a trace or residuum remains embodied in the -constitution of the nervous center, becoming more complete and distinct with each suc- ceeding repetition of the impression; an ac- quired na.ure is grafted on the original nature of the cell by virtue of its plastic power." * performed it since that time, he has been obliged each time to prepare it anew, and has never acquired in regard toil that facility which is familiar to him in other instances. When questioned respecting the mental process which he employed the first time he performed this part, he says that he lost sight entirely of the audience, and seemed to have nothing before him but the pages of the book from which he had learned it ; and that if anything had occurred to in- terrupt the illusion, he should have stopped instant- ly." (>p. cit., p. 103.) * Mautfcley, " Physiol. and Pathol. of the Mind". We here touch the ultimate cause of mem- ory biologically considered; it is an impreg- nation. It is therefore not surprising that an eminent English surgeon, in treating of the indellible impression made by infectious diseases on living tissues, should have in dited the following passage, which seems made to our hand: " It is asked," says Sir James Paget, "how can the brain be the organ of memory when you suppose its sub- stance to be ever changing? or how is it that your assumed nutritive change of all the par- ticles of the brain is not as destructive of all memory and knowledge of sensuous things as the sudden destruction by some great in- jury is ? The answer is, because of the ex- actness of assimilation accomplished in the formative process; the effect once produced by an impression on the brain, whether in perception or in intellectual act, is fixed and there retained ; because the part, be it what it may, which has been thereby changed, is exactly represented in the part which, in the course of nutrition, succeeds to it." * Paradoxical as the connection between an infectious disease and memory may seem, it is nevertheless rigorously exact, from the biological point of view. II. In a general way the reproduction of recollections seems to depend on the state of the circulation. This point is much more obscure than the preceding, and the data concerning it are very incomplete. One diffi- culty arises out of the rapidity with wh ch | the phenomena succeH one another, and . their continual changes. Another difficulty I is due to their complexity. For reproduction i does not depend on the general circulation I alone, but also on the special circulation of the brain, and probably there are in the latter, j too, local variations that may exert a strong ! influence. Nor is that all. We have, fur- ther, to take into account the quality no less than the quantity of the blood. It is impossible to determine, even roughly, the part played by each of these factors in the mechanism of reproduction. We must be content with showing that circulation and re- production present correlative variations. The main facts going to confirm this view are as follows : Fever in its several degrees is accompanied by cerebral over-activity, and in this memory largely shares. We have already seen to what a degree of excitation it may attain. We j know that in fever the rapidity of the circu- i lation is excessive, that the constitution of the blood is changed, that it is loaded with elements resulting from too accelerated a pro- cess of combustion. Here we see a variation in quality and in quantity, which finds ex- pression in hypermnesia. Even when no fever exists, ' ' impressions of trivial things, in which no particular inter- est was taken, often survive in memory when * " Lecture on Surgical Pathology." THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. 47 impressions of much more important or im- posing things fade away; and in considering the circumstances, it will frequently be found that such impressions were received when the energies were high when exercise, or pleas- ure, or both, had greatly raised the action of the heart. That at times, when strong emotion has excited the circulation to an exceptional degree, the clustered sensations yielded by surrounding objects are revivable with great clearness, often throughout life, is a fact no- ticed by writers of fiction as a trait of human nature."* Note again how easy and how rapid repro- duction is in that period of life when the "blood flows swift and strong, but how slow and labored, when age slows the circulation. Also how in the aged the constitution of the blood is changed, being less rich in globules and in albumen. In persons debilitated by protracted disease, memory grows weak with the circulation. " Highly nervous subjects, in whom the ac- tion of the heart is greatly lowered, habitu- ally complain of loss of memory and inability to think symptoms which diminish as fast as the natural rate of circulation is re- gained." f There is exaltation of memory whenever the circulation has been modified by stimu- lants, as hasheesh, opium, etc., which excite the nervous system first, and then depress it. Other therapeutic agents produce the oppo- site effect; for instance, bromide of potassium, the action of which is sedative, hypnotic, retards the circulation, when taken in strong doses. A certain preacher had to give up the use of the bromide, having lost nearly all power of memory. It returned when he ceased to take the medicine. The general conclusion to be drawn from all these facts is that the normal exercise of memory presupposes an active state of the circulation and a constitution of the blood rich in the materials necessary for integra- tion and disintegration. When this activity becomes excessive there is a tendency to morbid excitation; when it decreases, there is a tendency to amnesia. More definite con- clusions would have to rest on pure hypothe- sis. Why is it that one category of recol- lections rather than another is revived or effaced ? We know not. There is in every case of amnesia and of hypermnesia so much that cannot be foreseen that it were vain to attempt an explanation. Probably it is flit- ting organic modifications, causes infinitesi- mally small, that make one series of impres- sions more easy or more difficult of recall than others. Some physiologists are of the opinion that limited and temporary eclipses of memory are due to local, transitory modi- fications of the caliber of arteries, under the action of the vaso-motor nerves; and have * Herbert Spencer, " Principles of Psychology," I,J.|35. f/*..p. 237. cited as proof of this the fact that the return of memory is sudden, that it is caused by emotion and that the emotions have a special influence upon the vaso-motor system. In cases of complete loss of memory, of which we have cited many, return depends on the circulation and nutrition. If it is sudden, and it but rarely is, the more proba- ble hypothesis is that of an arrest of function, a state of inhibition which is suddenly ter- minated: this problem is one of the most in- tricate in nerve physiology. If the return is the result of reeducation and this is more usual nutrition appears to play the principal part. The rapidity with which the patient learns again shows that all was not lost. The cells may have been atrophied, but if their nuclei (generally re- garded as the sources from which they are reproduced) give rise to other cells, then the bases of memory are by that very fact re- established: the new cells resemble the parent cells in virtue of the tendency of all organ- isms to maintain their type, and of all acquired i modifications to become transmitted modifica- tions ; in this case, memory is only a form of heredity. II. To sum up, memory is a general function of the nervous system. Its basis is the property possessed by the nerve-elements of retaining a received modification and of form- ing associations. These associations, the re- sult of experience, we have called dynamic, to distinguish them from those which are natural or anatomical. Retention is assured by nutrition, which is ever making the modi- fications and associations stable, because it is ever renewing the modified nerve-sub- stance. The power of reproduction seems to depend above all on the circulation. Retention and reproduction: thus does all that is essential to memory depend on the fundamental conditions of life. The rest consciousness, exact localization in the past is only a perfectionment. Psychic memory is only the highest and most complex form of memory. To restrict oneself to that, as most psychologists do, is to condemn one- self in advance to wrestle with mere abstrac- tions. These preliminaries settled, we have classi- fied and described the diseases of memory; and as a precise observation is always of far more value than a general description, being more instructive and more suggestive, we have offered clear and authentic instances of each morbid type. Having traversed a multitude of facts, we have pointed out their principal results, viz., first the necessity of resolving memory into memories, the mutual independence of which is clearly proved by pathological cases. Then we have shown that the destruction of memory proceeds according to a law. Set- ting aside secondary disorders, those of fcrief 48 THE DISEASES OF MEMORY duration and which are less instructive, and studying those whose evolution is normal, we have shown that: In general dissolution of memory, the loss of recollections, follows an invariable order, namely : first, recent events ; next, ideas in general ; then, feelings ; lastly, acts. In partial dissolution of the most usual type.namely, sign-amnesia, the loss of recollec- tion again proceeds according to an invariable order, viz., proper names, common nouns, adjectives and verbs, interjections, gestures. The order is the same in both, namely, theie is a regression from the more recent to the older, from the complex to the simple, from the voluntary to the automatic, from the less to the more organized. The exactitude of this law of regression is proved by the very rare instances in which progressive dissolution of memory is followed by recovery; the recollections in that c*9* come back in the inverse order of their dis- appearance. By the aid of this law of regression we have been enabled to explain the extraordi- nary reviviscence of certain recollections as a reversion of the mind back to states that seemed to have been effaced forever. We have connected our law with the phy- siological principle that degenerescence first affects that which is of most recent forma- tion; and with the psychological principle, that the complex disappears before the sim- ple, because it is less often repeated in expe- rience. Finally, our pathological study has led us to the conclusion that memory consists of an organization process having varying de- grees of perfection between these two extreme limits the new state, the organic registration. CONTENTS. PAGB. PREFACE, . i CHAPTER I. MEMORY AS A BIOLOGICAL FACT, --. i Memory essentially a biological fact, incidentally a psychic fact Organic memory Modifications of nerve-elements; dynamic associations between these elements Conscious memory Conditions of consciousness: intensity; duration Uncon- scious cerebration Nerve action is the fundamental condition of memory; con- sciousness is only an accessory Localization in the past, or recollection Mech- anism of this operation It is not a simple and instantaneous act; it consists of the addition of secondary states of consciousness to the principal state of con- sciousness Memory is a vision in time Localization, theoretical and practical Reference points Resemblance and difference between localization in the future and in the past All memory an illusion Forgetfulness a condition of memory Retuin to the starting point: conscious memory tends little by little to become automatic. CHAPTER II. GENERAL AMNESIA, - - -- - - - - - I? Classification of the diseases of memory Temporary amnesia Epileptics Forget- fulness of certain periods of life Examples of re-education Slow and sudden recoveries Case of provisional memory Periodical or intermittent amnesia Formation of two memories, totally or partially distinct Cases of hypnotism recorded by Macnish, Azam and Dufay Progressive amnesia Its importance; reveals the law which governs the destruction of memory Law of regression; enunciation of this law In what order memory fails Counter-proof; it is recon- stituted in inverse order Confirmatory facts Congenital amnesia Extraordi- nary memory of some idiots. CHAPTER III. PARTIAL AMNESIA, 3* Reduction of memory to memories Anatomical and physiological reasons for partial memories Amnesia of numbers, names, figures, forms, etc. Amnesia of signs Its nature; a loss of motor-memory Examination of this point Progressive amnesia of signs verifies completely the law of regression Order of dissolution; proper names; common nouns; verbs and adjectives; interjections and language of the emotions; gestures Relation between this dissolution and the evolution of the Indo-European languages Counter-proof: return of signs in inverse order. CHAPTER IV. EXALTATION OF MEMORY, OR HYPERMNESIA AI General excitation Partial excitation Return of lost memories Return of forgot- ten languages Reduction of this fact to the law of regression Case of false memory Examples, and a suggested explanation. CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 45 Relations between the retention of perceptions and nutrition, between tne reproduc- tion of recollections and the general and local circulation Influence of the quantity and quality of the blood Examples The law of regression connected wfth a physiological principle and a psychological principle Recapitulation. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL BY TH. RIBOT, AUTHOR OF "THE DISEASES OF MEMORY." Translated from the French by J. Fitzgerald, A.M. [COPYRIGHT, 1884, BY J. FITZGERALD.] CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. THE QUESTION STATED. DURING the last few years several au- thors have treated in detail certain depart- ments of psychology according to the principle of evolution, and it has appeared to me that these questions might be dis- cussed with advantage in the same spirit though in a different form, by studying the process of dissolution. I propose therefore in the present work to attempt such a study of the Will as I before made of the Memory ; to investigate its anoma- lies, and from this research to draw some conclusions touching the normal state. In many respects the problem that con- fronts us here is more difficult than the former one : the term will denotes some- thing more vague than the term memory. Whether we regard memory as a function, a property or a faculty, it is at all events a stable mode of being, a psychic situation that all may understand. The will on the other hand is resolvable into volitions, each one of which is a thing apart, an instable form of activity, a resultant vary- ing according to the causes that produce it. Besides this first difficulty there is another one that might seem greater still, but this we shall have no hesitation in dismissing summarily. Is it possible to study the pathology of the will without touching upon the irresolvable problem of free will ? I hold it to be possible, and even indispensable, to abstain from such discussion ; nor is it timidity that imposes this abstention upon us, but simply method. Psychology, like all other exper- imental sciences, must strictly eschew all research into first causes, and to that class of studies does the problem of free will belong. One of the great services rendered to philosophy by Kant and his disciples consisted in proving that the problem of the freedom of the will resolves itself into the question whether we are able to place ourselves outside the series of effects and causes so as to make an absolute beginning. This power " which summons, suspends, or dismisses," as it has been defined by a contemporary writ- er who has studied it profoundly,* can be affirmed only on the condition that we enter the domain of metaphysics. The task before us here is different. Experience both inward and outward is the one object of our research : its limits are our limits. We take volitions as facts, with their immediate causes, that is to * Renouvier, " Essai de Critique Generate," ad edition, I., 395-406. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. say the motives which produce them, without inquiring whether these causes suppose causes in infinitum, or whether there is not some measure of spontaneity added to them. Hence the question pre- sents itself in a form equally acceptable to the determinists and to their opponents, being consistent with either hypothesis. We expect furthermore to pursue our re- searches in such a manner that the ab- sence of any sort of solution of the free will problem will not even be noticed. I shall endeavor to show that in every voluntary act there are two distinct ele- ments, namely the state of consciousness the " I will " which indicates a mental situation but which of itself possesses no efficiency ; and a highly complex psycho- physiological mechanism in which alone the power of acting or of inhibiting has its seat. As this general conclusion can only be reached as the result of particu- lar conclusions furnished by pathology, I will for the time being abstain in this introduction from any systematic view of the subject, and will simply consider the will in its twofold mechanism of impul- sion and inhibition, and in its source the individual character regardless of details that do not concern our subject.* The fundamental principle governing the psychology of the will in its impulsive form both in the healthy and the morbid state, is that every state of consciousness always tends to express itself, to interpret itself by a movement, by an act. This principle is only a particular phase, special to psychology, of the fundamental law that reflex action is the sole type of all nerve action, of all life of relation. Properly speaking activity in an animal is not a be- ginning but an end, not a cause but a re- sult, not a first appearance but a sequel. This point is of the highest importance, and it must not be lost sight of. It alone can explain the physiology and the pathol- ogy of the will, for this tendency of the state of consciousness to expend itself in a psychological or a physiological act whether conscious or unconscious, is the one simple fact to which are reducible all the combinations and all the complexities of the highest will activity. The new-born babe, as Virchow define: it, " is but a spinal creature." Its activity is purely reflex, manifested by such a mul- * The reader will find in a recent work by Schnei- der, " Der Menschliche Wille vom Standpunkte der neueren Entwickelungstheorien " (Berlin, 1882), s ;good monograph on the will in its normal state and from the point of view of evolution. liplicity of movements that for a good while ts education must consist in suppressing or in checking the greater part of them. This prodigality of reflex actions, which aas its ground in anatomical relations, ex- libits in all its simplicity the transforma- tion of excitations into movements. These movements, whether they are conscious or whether they awaken only an inchoate consciousness, in neither case represent voluntary action : properly they do but ex- cess the activity of the species that vhich has been acquired, organized, and fixed by heredity : but these are the mate- rial out of which the will shall be fash- oned. Desire marks a higher step in the prog- ress from the reflex state to the voluntary. By desire we understand the more ele- mentary forms of the affective life the only ones that can exist prior to the birth of the intelligence. Physiologically these do not differ from reflex actions of a complex nature : psychologically they differ from the latter by the state of consciousness, often very intense, which accompanies them. Like as in reflex action, they tend directly and irresistibly to express them- selves in acts. In the natural state, and so long as it is free from admixture, desire tends to satisfy itself immediately : such is its law imprinted in the organism. Children and savages are good instances. In the civilized adult desire is no longer in the natural state, being altered or curbed by education, habit or reflection. Often however it resumes its right ; and history shows that in the case of despots, who in their own esteem and in that of others stand above all law, desire rules uncon- trolled. Pathology will show us that this form of activity grows as will power declines, and persists when the latter has disap- peared. Nevertheless it marks a progress from the first period, inasmuch as it de- notes a beginning of individuality. On the common ground of the activity which belongs to the species, desire limns in faint outline the individual character : it reflects the mode of reaction peculiar to an individual organism. When a sufficient store of experiences exists to allow of the birth of the intelli- gence, there appears a new form of activ- ity, ideomotor activity it has been called, ideas, thoughts, being here the cause of movements. The term ideomotor has the further advantage that it points out the relationship between these movements and those of reflex action, of which the former are but a development. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. How can a thought produce a move- ment ? This question is one that seriously embarrassed the old psychology, but it presents no difficulty when we look at the facts as they really are. It is now a truth currently accepted in cerebral physiology, that the anatomical basis of all our mental states comprises both motor and sensorial elements. I shall not dwell upon a ques- tion that has been treated fully in another place * and which would involve a digres- sion. I would simply repeat that our sense perceptions, especially the important ones of sight and touch, involve as inte- gral elements movements of the eye or of the members. And if movement is an essential element when we see an object actually, it must play the same part when we see an object ideally. Mental images and ideas, even abstract ideas, involve an anatomical substratum in which move- ments are represented in one way or another. ' True, on studying the question more closely, it might be said that we must dis- tinguish two kinds of motor elements, viz.: those which serve to constitute a state of consciousness, and those which serve to expend it the former being intrinsic, the latter extrinsic. The idea of a ball, for in- stance, is the resultant of impressions made by surfaces, and of special muscular adjustments ; but the latter are the result of muscular sensibility, and as such they are sensations of movement rather than movements proper they are elements going to make up our idea of the object, rather than a mode of giving it expression. Nevertheless this close relation estab- lished by physiology between ideas and movement enables us in some measure to see how the one produces the other. In reality, an idea does not produce a movement. Were an idea, as defined by the spiritualists,! to produce a play of the muscles, it were little short of a miracle. It is not the state of consciousness, as such, but the corresponding physiological state, which is transformed into an act., In short the relation is not between a psy- chic event and a movement, but between two states of the same kind between two physiological states, two groups of ner- vous elements, the one sensitive, the other motor. So long as we persist in regard- ing consciousness as a cause, all is ob- scure ; but when we look upon it as sim- ply the accompaniment of a nervous proc- * " Revue Philosophique," Oct., 1879. t As opposed to "Materialists." It need hardly be said that the author has not in mind " Spirit- ists." or " Spirit Rappers." TRANSLATOR. ess, which alone is the essential element, all becomes clear, and factitious difficul- ties vanish. This granted, we can roughly classify ideas in three groups, according as their tendency to transform themselves into acts is strong, moderate or weak and in a certain sense null. 1. The first group comprises intellect- ual states of high intensity : fixed ideas may be regarded as the type of these. They pass into act almost with the rapid- ity of reflex actions. These are ideas that " come home to us." The old psy- chology, affirming a fact of every day ex- perience, used to say in its own language that the intelligence does not act upon the will save through the intermediation of the sensibility. This means that the nervous state corresponding to an idea is more readily translated into a movement, in proportion as it is accompanied by those other nervous states, whatever they may be, which correspond to feeling or sentiment. Nervous action is more en- ergetic in proportion to the number of ele- ments upon which it acts. Most of the passions when they rise above the level of mere appetite, are to be referred to this group as principles of action. The whole difference is one of degree only, according as the affective elements predominate, or vice "versa, in the complex thus formed.* 2. The second gjroup is the most im- portant for us. It represents rational activity the will in the common accepta- tion of the word. Here the thought is followed by the act after longer or shorter deliberation. If we reflect we shall find that most of our actions are reducible to this type, allowance being made for the forms already mentioned, and for habits. Whether I rise to take the air at my win- dow, or whether I enlist in the army with the purpose of becoming some day a general, the difference is only one of more and less ; a highly complex volition like that last instance resolving itself into a series of simple volitions successively adapted to times and places. In this * The relative independence of thought and feel- ing as causes of movement is clearly demonstrated by certain pathological cases. It may happen that the idea of a movement is of itself incapable of pro- ducing that movement : but let emotion be added and it is produced. A man that is paralyzed cannot by any effort of will move, say, his arm, yet it will be strongly agitated under the influence of an emo- tion caused by the arrival of a friend. In the case of softening of the spinal cord inducing paralysis an emotion, or a question addressed to the pa- tient may give rise to more violent movements in the inferior members, upon which the will has no action. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. group the tendency to act is neither in- stantaneous nor violent. The concomi- tant affective state is moderate. Many of the actions which constitute the ordi- nary course of our lives were at first ac- companied by a feeling of pleasure, or curiosity and the like : now that feeling is weakened, still the connection between the idea and the act is fixed : when the idea comes up in the mind, the act follows. 3. With abstract ideas the tendency to movement is at a minimum. These ideas being representations of representations, pure schematisms, generalized concepts, the motor element is minimized in the same degree as the representative element. If we were to look upon all the forms of activity we have been considering as successive complications of simple reflex action, we might say that abstract ideas are a collateral ramification weakly at- tached to the main trunk, and which has developed in its own way. Their motor tendency is restricted to that inner speech, feeble as it is, which accompanies them, and to the awakening of some other state of consciousness. For just as in physiol- ogy the centrifugal period of a reflex ac- tion does not always end in a movement, but quite as often in the secretion of a gland or in some trophic action ; so in psychology a state of consciousness does not always end in a movement, but in the summoning up of other states of con- sciousness, according to the well known mechanism of association. The contrast so often noted between contemplative minds, who live among ab- stractions, and practical men is only the outward palpable expression of the psy- chological differences just mentioned. A few commonplace observations may be cited here, as the difference between knowing what is right and practicing it, between recognizing the absurdity of a creed and renouncing it, between con- demning an unlawful passion and with- standing the same. All this is explained by the fact that the motor tendency of ideas, left to themselves, is exceedingly weak. We know not what are the anatom- ical and physiological conditions requisite for the production of an abstract idea, but we may without rashness affirm that once it becomes a motive to action other ele- ments are added to it : this is the case with those who are " devoted to an idea." Men are governed by feeling and senti- ment. In the light of the foregoing remarks vol- untary activity appears to us as a stage in that progressive evolution which proceeds from simple reflex action, where the ten- dency to movement is irresistible, to the abstract idea.where the tendency to action is at the minimum. We are unable to de- termine precisely its beginning or its end, the transition from one forrn to another being almost imperceptible. Of set purpose and for the sake of clearness we have not examined the problem in its complexity : we have even eliminated one of the essen- tial characteristic elements of will. Re- garded as we have regarded it so far, will might be defined as a conscious act, more or less deliberate, having in view an end whether simple or complex, proximate or remote. It is thus that contemporary authors, as Maudsley and Lewes, under- stand it, when they define it to be impulse by ideas, or the motor reaction of feelings and ideas. Thus understood, volition would be simply permissive. But it is something very different. It is also a power of arrestation, or, to use the lan- guage of physiology, a power of inhibi- tion. For a psychology grounded only on in- ner observation this distinction between permitting and hindering is of little im- portance ; but for a psychology that seeks to find in the physiological mechanism some explication of the operations of mind, and which regards reflex action as the type of all activity, it is of vital signifi- cance. The currently received doctrine teaches that the will is a. fiat which the muscles obey no one knows how. On this hy- pothesis it matters little whether the fiat commands a movement or an inhibition. But if with all contemporary physiologists we hold that reflex action is the type and the basis of all action whatever, and if consequently there is no occasion to ask why a state of consciousness is trans- formed into a movement for that is the law we have still to explain why it is not transformed. Unfortunately physiology is full of obscurity and indecision touching this point. The simplest instance of the phenome- non of inhibition is seen in the suspension of the movements of the heart by excita- tion of the pneumogastric nerve. We know that the heart (independently of the intracardiac ganglia) is innervated by nerve filaments coming from the great sympathetic which accelerate its pulsa- tions, and by filaments from the vagus nerve. Section of the latter increases the movements ; excitation of its central ter- minus on the contrary suspends them for THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. a longer or shorter time. The vagus therefore is an inhibiting nerve, and inhi- bition is generally regarded as the result of interference. The reflex activity of the cardiac centers is retarded or suspended by excitations coming from the medulla. In other words, the motor action of the pneumogastric expends itself in the car- diac centers and produces an arrest of movement. This has no direct psycho- logical significance, but here is something that concerns us more nearly : It is a well known fact that the reflex excitability of the spinal cord becomes greater when it is withdrawn from the action of the brain. The state of decapi- tated animals gives striking evidence of this. But not to recur to those extreme cases, we know that reflex action is much more intense during sleep than in the waking state. To account for this some authors have held that there are in the brain centers of inhibition. Setschenow locates them in the optic thalami and in the region of the tubercula quadrigemina, his ground being the fact that when we stimulate by chemical or other means the parts named, we produce a depression of the reflex actions. Goltz locates the cen- ters of inhibition in the brain proper. These and other similar hypotheses * have been sharply criticized, and many physiologists hold simply that in the nor- mal state excitations are distributed both to the brain taking an upward route and to the spinal cord by a transverse route ; and that on the other hand in cases where the brain cannot play a part, the excitations now finding only one route open, the result is a sort of accumulation, the effect of which is an excessive reflex excitability. Ferrier t holds that in the frontal lobes are to be found controlling centers which are the essential factor of attention. Not to go into further detail, it is seen that for explaining the mechanism of in- hibition we have no clear and generally accepted theory such as we have with re- gard to reflex action. Some authors hold that inhibition results from two con- trary tendencies clashing or destroying each other ; others maintain the existence of inhibition centers (and even inhibiting nerves) capable of suppressing instead of re-enforcing a transmitted impulse ; and 33 seq. He will mere find an account ol the ex- iments of Setschenow, Goltz, Schiff, Herzeri, on. and others, with their interpretations. " The Functions of the Brain, 103, 104. there are sundry other hypotheses, out it would be of no advantage to enumerate them.* In this state of ignorance, we must examine the question as best we may. In all voluntary inhibition two things have to be considered : the mechanism that produces it of . this we have just spoken ; and the state of consciousness that accompanies it : of this we have to speak now. In the first place there are cases where the inhibition needs no expla- nation where the will incitation ceases of its own accord : for instance, when one throws aside a decidedly tedious book. Other cases appear to be explained by one or other of the hypotheses mentioned. We voluntarily arrest laughter, yawning, coughing and certain passionate move- ments, by putting in action, apparently, the antagonistic muscles. In cases where as yet we know not how inhibition is produced, where the physio- logical mechanism is unknown, pure psy- chology may teach us something. Take the most commonplace instance a fit of anger stayed by the will. Lest we exag- gerate the power of the will, we would remark that such inhibition is far from being the rule. Some individuals appear to be utterly incapable of it. Others ex- ercise it, but very unequally, their power of inhibition varying according to times and circumstances. Few men are at all times masters of themselves. The first condition of the exercise of this power is time. If the incitation to anger be so violent as to pass immediately into action, that is the end of it. What- ever may be the excess of passion there is no help for it. But if the condition of time be filled ; if the state of conscious- ness calls up antagonistic states, and if these are sufficiently stable, then there is inhibition. The new state of conscious- ness tends to suppress the other one, and by weakening the cause puts a check on the 'effects. It is of supreme importance for the pathology of the will to investigate the physiological phenomenon that takes place in such cases. There is no doubt that the quantity of the nervous influx whatever our opinion may be as to its nature va- ries between individuals, and from one moment to another in the same person. Neither is there any doubt that, at a given moment, in any individual, the available quantity may be variably distributed. It * See Wundt's" Mechanikder Nerven :" Lewes's " Physical Basis of Mind " 6 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. is clear that in the case of the mathema- tician making a computation and in that of a man gratifying a physical passion the quantity of nervous influx is not ex- pended in the same way, and that one form of expenditure prevents the other, as the available capital cannot be employed at once for two purposes. " We see," says a physiologist, " that the excitability of certain nerve centers is reduced by calling other nerve centers into action, if the excitations that reach the latter possess a certain intensity. If we consider the normal f unctionment of the nervous system, we find that there exists a necessary equilibrium be- tween the different apparatus of this system. This equilibrium may be destroyed by the abnormal predominance of certain centers, which seem to divert to their own advantage too large a proportion of the nervous activity ; as a consequence, the f unctionment' of the other centers appears to be disturbed There are certain general laws that govern the distri- bution of the nervous activity at the differ- ent points in the system, as there are mechan- ical laws which govern the circulation of the blood in the vascular system: if any great perturbation occurs in an important vascular department the effect is necessarily felt at all other points in the system. These laws of hydrodynamics we can appreciate because the fluid in circulation is accessible to us, and because we know the properties of the vessels that contain it, the effects of elasticity, of muscular contraction, etc. But who knows the laws of the distribution of nervous activ- ity, of the circulation of what has been called the nerve fluid ? We recognize the effects of breaks in the equilibrium of nerve activity, but these are disturbances essentially variable, nor can they be reduced under any theory. We can only note their production, taking account of the conditions that accompany them."* Applying these general considerations co our particular case, what do we find ? The original state of consciousness (an- ger) has called forth antagonistic states which necessarily vary in different indi- viduals the idea of duty, the fear of God, the opinion of men, the law, disastrous consequences, etc. The result is the pro- duction of a second center of action, or in physiological language, a diversion of the nervous afflux, a weakening of the first state to the advantage of the second. Is this diversion sufficient to restore the equilibrium ? The event alone can decide. Still when the inhibition takes place, it is always only relative, and its only re- sult is that the action is weaker. What remains of the original impulse expends * Franck, " Dictionnaire Encyclopeclique des Sci- ences M&licales," art. NERVEUX. itself as best it can through half-restrained gestures, in perturbation of the viscera, through some artificial outlet, as for in- stance in the case of the soldier who when he was being shot to death, chewed a bullet so that he might not make any exclamation. Very few persons are so endowed by na- ture or so formed by habit as to be able to reduce their reflex actions to impercep- tible movements. This diversion of the nervous influx therefore is not a primordial fact, but a state of secondary formation, set up by means of an association at the expense of the state which it displaces. We would observe that in addition to- these two antagonistic centers of action there are other causes which tend to weaken directly the primitive impulse. But we must examine the difficulty more closely, for though the coexist- ence of their two antagonistic states * suf- fices to produce indecision, incertitude, non-action, it is not sufficient to produce voluntary inhibition in the true sense of the phrase, " I will not." One condition more is needed, and this is found in an af- fective element of the highest importance, of which we have not yet spoken. The feelings and emotions are not all stimu- lants to action : many of them have a de- pressive effect. Of these terror may be regarded as the extreme type. In its highest degree, terror paralyzes. A man suddenly visited with a great affliction is incapable of any reaction, whether volun- tary or reflex. The cerebral anaemia, the arrest of the heart's action often produc- ing death by syncope the profuse per- spiration with chilling of the skin, the re- laxation of the sphincter muscles : all these prove the excitability of the muscular, vaso-motor, secretory and other centers to be for the time being suspended. The case is an extreme one, but it gives us a view of the subject as through a magni- fying glass. Between terror and indiffer- ence we have all possible degrees of fear with the corresponding degrees of depres- sion. If from this maximum we descend to- moderate fear, the depressive effect grows less, but without changing its character. How do we arrest the movements of an- ger in a child ? By threats, by reprimands, that is to say by producing a new state of consciousness of a depressing kind, ca- pable of checking action. " An infant of three and a half months," says B. Perez. * Of course we do not separate them from their physiological conditions, which are the principal el- ement. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. '' knows from one's looks, from the tone of one's voice, when he is reprimanded. He frowns, his lips quiver convulsively, he pouts for an instant, his eyes fill with tears, and he is ready to cry." The new state therefore tends to supplant the old not only by its own force, but also by the weakness it imposes on the whole physi- cal structure. If, in spite of repeated menaces there is no inhibition, the individual is hardly, if at all, capable of education in this respect. But if inhibition is produced the result is that, in virtue of a well known law, an as- sociation tends to be formed between the two states : the first calls forth the second its corrective and from habit inhibition becomes more and more easy and rapid. With those who are masters of themselves inhibition takes place with the certainty that always marks a fully developed habit. Of course temperament and character are of more importance than education. Hence it is not matter of surprise that a storm of passion should give way before a passionless idea, before states of con- sciousness whose motor tendency is quite weak. The reason is that back of these lies an accumulated force, latent and un- conscious, as we shall see. To understand this paradox, we must study, not the educated adult person, who reflects, but the child. In the child and the savage, the man of gross nature and incapable of education is comparable to a child the tendency to act is immediate. The work of education consists precisely in awakening these antagonistic states. And by education we understand not only the training the child gets from others, but also that which he acquires by him- self. I do not consider it necessary to prove that all sentiments and feelings which produce inhibition, as fear or respect for persons, law, usage, fear of God, and the like, originally were and ever are depres- sive states which tend to diminish action. In short, the phenomenon of inhibition may be accounted for, in a way sufficient for our purpose, by an analysis of the psychological conditions under which it occurs, whatever theory one may enter- tain as to its physiological mechanism. It were no doubt desirable to have clearer notions on this point, to have a fuller understanding of the modus operandt whereby two almost simultaneous exci- tations neutralize each other. Were this obscure question cleared up our concep- tion of the will as a power of inhibition would be more precise, and perhaps it would be different. But we must needs wait for this consummation. We shall again meet this difficult problem under other forms. So far we have been considering volun- tary activity under an exclusively analyti- cal form, but this can give us no exact idea of it, nor exhibit it in its totality. It is neither a simple transformation of states of consciousness into movement, nor a mere power of inhibition : it is a reaction proper to the individual. We must dwell upon this point, for without it the pathol- ogy of the will is unintelligible. The primary character of voluntary movements consists in their \>u\., a theoretic affirmation, from a volition, save that the latter expresses itself by an act and thus is a judgment put in exe- cution. But what is it considered in its essence and not merely in its form ? We will dwell for a moment on this point and will endeavor to throw some light upon it. By descending to a few very lowly biological facts we shall perhaps better understand wherein a choice consists. I shall not wander afield in search of analogies for instance, the affinity of the magnet for iron. In the vegetable kingdom I shall simply quote the fact that insectivorous plants, as Dionasa, choose certain bodies that come in contact with them, to the exclusion of other bodies. So too the Amoeba chooses certain organic frag- ments for its nourishment. These facts are incontestable, but they are difficult of interpretation. They are explained in a general way on the theory of a relation between the molecular composition of the * Physiologists distinguish between voluntary and involuntary muscles, but admit that the dis- tinction is in no wise absolute. There are persons, like E. F. Weber, the physiologist, who can at will stay the movements of the heart ; others, like Fon- tana, who can produce contraction of the iris, and so on. A movement is voluntary when, after re- peated successful experiments, it becomes asso- ciated with a state of consciousness and falls under its control. organism choosing and the organic sub- stance chosen. No doubt the choice is exercised here in a very narrow field ; no doubt, too, this is the rudest form of choice. With the rise and development of a more and more complex nervous sys- tem this blind affinity is transformed into a conscious tendency, and then into sev- eral contradictory tendencies whereof one gains the mastery the one which repre- sents the maximum of affinity. Exam- ple : a dog hesitating between several pieces of meat and choosing one. But in every case the choice expresses the nature of the individual at a given moment, un- der given circumstances, in a given de- gree : that is to say, the weaker the affin- ity the less marked the preference. Hence we may affirm that the choice, whether it results from one tendency or from many tendencies, from a present sensation, from images recalled, from complex ideas, or from complicated calculations projected into the future, is always based on an affinity, an analogy of nature, an adapta- tion. This is true of animals whether the lower or the higher, and of man, with re- spect either to vice or to virtue, science, pleasure or ambition. To restrict our re- marks to man, two or more states of con- sciousness arise as possible ends of action ; after some oscillations one end is pre- ferred, chosen. Why so, unless it is that between this state and the sum of states conscious, subconscious and unconscious (the latter purely physiological) which at this moment constitute the person, the Ego, there exists agreement, analogy of nature, affinity ? This is the only possi- ble explanation of the choice, unless we say it is without a cause. Some one sug- gests that I kill my friend : that tendency is rejected with horror, excluded ; that is to say it is in contradiction to my other tendencies and feelings, there is no asso- ciation possible between it and them, and by that very fact it is suppressed. In the mind of the criminal on the con- trary there appears to be a certain agree- ment, that is an analogy, between the murder and his feelings of hate or avarice, and consequently it is chosen, affirmed as something that ought to be. Hence con- sidered as a state of consciousness, voli- tion is nothing but an affirmation (or a negation) . It resembles a judgment, with this difference, that the one expresses a relation of agreement (or disagreement) between ideas, while the other expresses the same relation between tendencies ; that while the one is a repose for the mind, the other is a stage of progress THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 9 toward action; while the one is an ac- quisition, the other is an alienation, for intelligence is a saving and will an ex- penditure. But volition in itself, as a state of consciousness, has no more power of producing an act than the judgment has of producing a truth. That power comes from another source. We will re- turn, toward the conclusion, to this im- portant point.* The ultimate reason of choice is there- fore in the character, that is to say in that which constitutes the distinctive mark of the individual in the psychologi- cal sense, and differentiates him from all other individuals of the same species. Is the character, or, to use a more general term, the person, the Ego, which for us is a cause is it in its turn an effect ? Un- doubtedly it is, but we are not concerned here with the causes which produce it. The science of character, which 40 years ago John Stuart Mill regarded as a de- sideratum, does not yet exist, nor will it ever, in my opinion. Were there such a science we should have only to accept its results, without essaying an excursion in- to its domain, for to be ever tracing ef- fects to their causes would be to follow the devious steps of metaphysics. As regards the matter in hand, we repeat, character is an ultimate fact, a true cause, though for another order of research it is an effect. We would remark in passing, and as a simple suggestion, that character the Ego so far as it reacts is an ex- ceedingly complex product to the forma- tion of which heredity and physiological circumstances both anterior and posterior to birth, as education and experience, have contributed. We may also affirm that what constitutes character is affective states, and the individual's own feelings, much more than any intellectual activity. It is the general tone of the individual's feelings, the general tone of his organism that is the first and the true motor. If this is lacking, the individual cannot ex- ercise will at all, as we shall learn from pathology. It is precisely because this * What has been said amounts simply to a 'state- ment of the evident fact that a choice proceeds al- ways in the direction of the greatest pleasure. No animal, whether void of reason or gifted with it, whether sound or diseased can will anything save what seems to it at the moment to be its greater food or its less evil. Even the man who elects eath rather than disgrace or apostasy, chooses the less disagreeable alternative. Individual character and development of the reason cause the choice now to rise very high, again to fall very low ; yet always it tends toward that which promises more pleasure. The contrary is impossible. This is a psychologi- cal truth so clear that the ancients held it to be an axiom, and it has taken volumes of metaphysics to obscure ;*. fundamental state is, according to the in- dividual constitution, stable or fluctuating, continuous or variable, strong or weak, that we have* three principal types of will strong, weak and intermittent with all intermediate degrees and shades of difference between the three. But these differences, we repeat, spring from the character of the individual, and that de- pends upon his special constitution. We cannot push the inquiry beyond that point. We are thus fully in agreement with those who say that the predominance of a motive by itself does not explain voli- tion. The preponderant motive is only a part of the cause, and always the weak- est part too, though the most visible : nor has it any efficaciousness except inasmuch as it is chosen, that is, as it forms an in- tegral part in the sum of the states con- stituting the Ego at a given moment, and as its tendency to action is added to the group of tendencies that spring from the character, forming one with them. Hence it is not necessary to look on the Ego as an entity nor to place it in some transcendental region, in order to recog- nize in it a causality of its own. It is a very plain fact of experience* the contrary is incomprehensible. Physiologically all this meanc that the voluntary act differs both from simple re- flex action, where one impression is fol- lowed by one contraction, and from the more complex forms of reflex action where one impression is followed by a number of contractions ; that it is the result of the entire nervous organization, which itself reflects the nature of the whole organism, and which reacts in con- sequence. Psychologically it means that the vol- untary act in its complete form is not merely the transformation of a state of consciousness into movement, but that it presupposes the participation of that whole group of conscious or subconscious states which make up the Ego at a given moment. We are therefore justified in defining the will to be an individual reaction, and in regarding it as that which is inmost to us. The Ego, albeit an effect, is a cause, and that in the strictest sense. To sum up, we have seen that from the lowest reflex action to the highest act of will the transition is imperceptible, and that we cannot say precisely where volition proper, that is the personal reaction, be- gins. The difference is most pronounced at the two ends of the series : at one end extreme simplicity, at the other extreme. 10 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. complexity ; on one hand a reaction that is ever the same in all the individuals of the same species, on the other a reaction which varies according to the individual. Simplicity and permanence, complexity and change are here paired. From the evolution standpoint all these reactions clearly were in their origin in- dividual. They have become specific, from having been repeated times beyond number in the individual and in the race. The beginning of will is found in the property of reacting possessed by all liv- ing matter, and its extinction in the property possessed by living matter of acquiring habits ; and it is this involuntary activity, fixed and unalterable, which serves as the groundwork and the instru- ment of the individual activity. But among the higher animals the he- reditary legacy, the chance circumstances of birth, the continual adaptation to con- ditions that vary every instant, do not per- mit the individual reaction to become fixed nor to assume the same form in all the individuals. The complexity of their en- vironment is their safeguard against au- tomatism. Here we bring to an end these prelim- inary remarks, the only purpose of which was to prepare the ground for the pathol- ogy of the will, which we are now to consider. CHAPTER II. IMPAIRMENT OF THE WILL. LACK OF IMPULSION. As we have seen, the term will denotes acts differing widely with respect to the conditions of their genesis, but all pos- sessing this character in common, that they represent in one form or another, in one degree or another, a reaction of the individual. Without reverting to that analysis we would for clearness' sake note two external characters which distinguish all true volition : it is a definitive state ; and it is expressed by act. Irresolution, which is the beginning of a morbid state, has inner causes which pathology will enable us to grasp ; it springs from the weakness of the incite- ments, or from their ephemeral action. Of persons of irresolute character some though these are very few indeed are such from affluence of ideas. The work of comparing motives, of balancing argu- ments, of calculating consequences con- stitutes an exceedingly complex cerebral state, wherein the tendencies to action interfere with one another. But affluence of ideas is not 6"Htself a sufficient cause of irresolution ; it is only an adjuvant. The true cause here as everywhere is in the character. This is seen more clearly in persons of irresolute will who have few ideas. They always act in the direction of least action or of weakest resistance. Their delibera- tion results with difficulty in making up their minds, and after they have made a choice the next step, action, is more difficult still. Volition on the contrary is a definitive state ; it closes the debate. By it a new state of consciousness the motive chosen is imported into the Ego as an integral part of it, to the exclusion of other states. The Ego is thus constituted fixedly. In fickle natures this definitive action is al- ways provisional, that is, the Ego willing is so instable a compound that the most insignificant state of consciousness that happens to arise modifies it, alters it. The compound formed at this moment has no- force of resistance the moment following. In all the states conscious and uncon- scious that each moment represent the causes of volition, the part played by the individual character is a minimum, the part played by external circumstances a maximum. Here we have that lower form of will mentioned before which is simply- permissive. We must not forget that to will is to- act and that volition is a passing to action. To reduce the will as some do to a simple resolution, that is, to the theoretic affirma- tion that such or such an act will be done, is to base it upon an abstraction. Making the choice is but one step in the will proc- ess. If it does not translate itself into- act, whether immediately or at the fit time, then it is in no wise distinguishable from a logical operation of the mind. The diseases of the will we divide into two principal classes, accordingly as they indicate that the will is impaired, or that it is abolished, Impairment of the will constitutes the most important part of its pathology ; it exhibits the will mechanism deranged. We shall consider cases of impairment of the will under two heads, viz.: i. Impair- ment of the will from lack of impulse ; 2. Impairment of the will from excess of im- pulse. We will consider separately, 3, im- pairment of voluntary attention, on ac- count of its great importance. And 4, un- der the head of " Caprices," we will study a special state, wherein will either is not constituted at all, or only by accident. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. The first group comprises certain sim- ple and well denned phenomena that may be studied with profit. We find in the normal state many of the elements of this group in those soft and pliant characters who in order to act require that another will should be joined to theirs ; but dis- ease will exhibit to us this state enor- mously exaggerated. Guislain has de- scribed in general terms that impairment which physicians designate by the term aboulia : "The patients," he says, "can will to themselves, mentally, according to the dictates of reason. They may feel a desire to act, but they are powerless to make a move toward that end. . . . Their will cannot overpass certain bounds : one might say that this force of action under- goes an arrest. The / will is not trans- Formed into impulsive will, into active de- termination. Some patients are them- selves surprised at the impotence with which their will is stricken. . . . Left to themselves, they will pass whole days in bed, or sitting in a chair. When spoken to or aroused, they speak rationally though curtly ; they judge of things fairly enough."* As those patients are the most interest- ing whose intelligence is intact, we shall cite such cases only. One of the earliest observations, and the best known of all, we owe to Esquirol. " A magistrate," he writes, " highly distinguished for his learn- ing and his power as a speaker, was seized with an attack of monomania, in conse- quence of certain troubles of mind. He regained entirely his reason, but he would not go into the world again, though he acknowledged himself to be in the wrong in not doing so ; neither would he attend to his business though he well knew that it suffered in consequence of this whim. His conversation was both rational and sprightly. When advised to travel or to attend to his affairs, ' I know,' he would answer, ' that I ought to do so, but I am unable. Your advice is very good ; I wish I could follow it ; I am convinced ; but only enable me to will, with the will that determines and executes. ... It is cer- tain,' said he one day to me, ' that I have no will save not to will, for I have my reason unimpaired, and I know what I ought to do, but strength fails me when I ought to act.' " t Prof. J. H. Bennett records the case of * Guislain, " Lemons Orales sur les Phrenopath- ies," vol. i., p. 479. See also Griesinger, " Traite des Maladies Mentales" (French translation), p. 46 ; Leubuscher, " Zeitschrift fiir Psychiatric," 1847. t Esquirol, I.. 420. " a gentleman who frequently could rot carry out what he wished to perform. Often on endeavoring to undress he was- two hours before he could get off his coat,, all his mental faculties, volition excepted, being perfect. On one occasion having ordered a glass of water, it was presented to him on a tray, but he could not take it,, though anxious to do so ; and he kept the servant standing before him half an hour, when the obstruction was overcome." He described his feelings to be " as if an- other person had taken possession of his will." * Thomas De Quincey describes this pa- ralysis of the will from personal observa- tion. His remarks are the more valuable as coming from a man of subtile mind and fine literary tact. From the effects of long continued abuse of opium he was. compelled to give up the studies in which, he had been wont to delight. " I shrunlc from them," he writes, " with a sense of powerlessness and infantine feebleness the greater from remembering the time when. I grappled with them [mathematics, intel- lectual philosophy, etc.] to my own hourly- delight ; and for this further reason, be- cause I had devoted the labor of my whole life to constructing one single work. . . . This was now likely to stand a memorial of hopes defeated, of baffled efforts, of materials uselessly accumulated. ... In this state of imbecility I had for amuse- ment turned my attention to political econ- omy." He speaks of " the utter feeble- ness of the main herd of modern econo- mists " with whose writings he had been familiar. At length he read Mr. Ricar- do's book, and before he had finished the first chapter, wonder and curiosity that had long been dead in him were re-awak- ened. Conceiving however that some important truths had escaped even Ricar- do's eye, he drew up his " Prolegomena to all Future Systems of Political Econ- omy." Arrangements were made for printing this work, and it was even twice advertised. But the author had a preface to write and a dedication to Ricardo, and he found himself quite unable to accom- plish all that. So the arrangements were countermanded and the '' prolegomena " was not published. " I have thus de- scribed and illustrated my intellectual tor- por in terms that apply more or less to- every part of the four years during which I was under the Circean spells of opium. But for misery and suffering-, I might in- uoted by Carpenter, " Mental Physiology," p_ rom Bennett, " The Mesmeric Mania of 1851. '* 12 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. deed be said to have existed in a dormant state. I seldom could prevail on myself to write a letter ; an answer of a few words to any that I received was the utmost that I could accomplish; and often that not until the letter had lain weeks or even months on my writing table. Without the aid of M. all records of bills paid or to be paid must have perished, and my whole domestic economy, whatever be- came of Political Economy, must have .gone into irretrievable confusion. I shall not afterward allude to this part of the case ; it is one however which the opium eater will find in the end as oppressive and tormenting as any other, from the sense of incapacity and feebleness, from the direct embarrassments incident to the neglect or procrastination of each day's appropriate duties, and from the remorse which must often exasperate the stings of these evils to a reflective and conscien- tious mind. The opium eater loses none of his moral sensibilities or aspirations ; he wishes and longs as earnestly as ever to realize what he believes possible and feels to be exacted by duty ; but his intel- lectual apprehension of what is possible infinitely outruns its power not of exe- cution only but even the power to at- tempt. He lies under the weight of in- cubus and nightmare ; he lies in sight of all that he would fain perform, just as a man forcibly confined to his bed by the mortal languor of a relaxing disease, who is compelled to witness injury or outrage offered to some object of his tenderest love : he curses the spells which chain him down from motion ; he would lay down his life if he might but get up and walk ; but he is powerless as an infant and cannot even attempt to rise." * I shall cite only one observation more. It is recorded by Billod in the " Annales Medico-pathologiques," and exhibits the disease in all its aspects. The patient was a man 65 years of age, " of strong constitution, of lymphatic temperament, with a faculty specially developed for business, and of middling sensibility." Being strongly attached to his profession (he was a notary) he hesitated long before he decided to sell his office. Having done so, he fell into a state of profound melancholy, refusing all food, deeming himself undone, and going so far in his desperation as to attempt suicide. In the narrative which follows I omit only a few details of purely medical interest, and per- * " Confessions of an Opium Eater," Boston edi- tion, 1851, p. 1 06 ft seqq. mit the observer to describe the case in his own words : " The faculty that seemed to us to be most notably affected was the will. The patient oftentimes manifests an inability for willing to perform certain acts although he has the wish, and although his sound judgment, after prudent deliberation, convinces him of the fitness and often even the necessity of so acting." The patient was at this time confined in the asylum at Ivry, and it was desired that he should go to Italy with Dr. Billod. " When told that he must soon leave, ' I never can,' said he, ' yet I am tired of this place.' On the eve of his departure he again protested that he never could leave. The next morning he rose at six o'clock to go and make the same declaration to Mr. M. Some resistance therefore was anticipated, yet when I presented myself he made no opposition whatever, saying only, as though he felt that his will was ready to lapse, 'Where is the coach, so I may lose no time in getting into it.' ' " It would be tiresome were we to take the reader with us and exhibit to him all the phe- nomena presented by the patient during this tour. These phenomena may conveniently be represented by three or four of the princi- pal ones which I shall offer as a sample of all the rest. The first presented itself at Mar- seilles. The patient was requested, before he took ship, to execute a paper authorizing his wife to sell a house. He drew up the document himself, made a copy on stamped paper, and was in the act of signing his name when a difficulty arose for which we were quite unprepared. After having written his name, he was utterly unable to make the flourish. In vain he struggled to overcome the difficulty. A hundred times at least he went through the requisite movements with his hand raised above the paper proving that the obstacle was not in the hand ; a hun- dred times the will was unable to command the fingers to bring the pen down to the pa- per. Mr. P. was in an agony. He would rise from the desk with impatience, and stamp on the floor : then he would sit down again and try once more. Still he could not bring the pen to the paper. Will any one deny Mr. P.'s strong desire of completing his sig- nature or assert that he does not understand the importance of the act ? Will any one question the soundness of the organ that has to execute the flourish ? The agent (the hand) seems to be as free from defect as the legal instrument, but the former cannot apply it self to the latter. Plainly the will is at fault. This struggle lasted three quarters of an hour. At last the effort had some result, after I had given up all expectation of any. The flour- ish was very imperfect, but it was executed. I was an eye witness of this struggle, taking the liveliest interest in it, and I declare thaf THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. it was impossible to give more manifest proof of the impossibility of willing, in spite of the desire.* " A few days later I observed another in- stance of disability of a kindred nature. It was proposed to go out for a little while after dinner. Mr. P. wished very much to do so, desiring, as he told me, to get some idea of the appearance of the city. For five days in succession, he took his hat, arose from table, and got ready to go out. Vain hope ! His will could not command his legs to put themselves in motion, and carry him into the street. 'Evidently I am my own prisoner,' he would say ; ' it is not you that prevent me from going out, nor is it my legs that refuse ; then what is it ? ' Thus would Mr. P. com- plain of his not being able to will, much as he wished it. At last, after five days, he made a final effort, and succeeded in getting out of doors, but five minutes later he came back perspiring and out of breath, as though he had run a distance of several kilometers, and much astonished himself at what he had just done. " Instances of such inability were occurring every moment. If the patient longed to go to the theater, he could not will to go. If at table with agreeable company he wished to take part in the conversation, the same inabil- ity was experienced. True, oftentimes this lack of force existed, so to speak, in appre- hension only : the patient feared lest he should not be able, and yet he succeeded in more instances than he failed : often however, it must be admitted, his apprehensions were justified." After passing six days at Marseilles, patient and physician took ship for Naples, " though not without the utmost difficul- ty." During these six days " the patient formally expressed his disincli- nation to embark, and his desire of going back to Paris, dreading in advance the thought of finding himself , with his diseased will, in a strange country, and declaring that he would have to be taken on board in irons. On the day appointed for sailing, he made up his mind to leave the hotel only when he believed that I was about to resort to force. Once outside the door, he stopped on the street, and there no doubt would have remained, were it not for the intervention of some sailors, and they had only to show them- selves. " Another circumstance goes to show still further the lesion of the will. We reached Rome on the day of Pius the Ninth's election. ' This is a fortunate circumstance, I should say,' he remarked, ' were I not ill. I wish I could assist at the coronation, but I do not * Je declare qu 1 il 4ta.it impossible de constater plus manifestement une impossibilite de vouloir, malgre' it desir. I transcribe this observation lit- erally, without any reflection upon the author's psycholop-ical doctrine. (Author's note.) know that I can. I shall try.' On the morn- ing of the day he arose at five o'clock, shaved, took out his black coat, etc., and said to me, ' You see I am doing a good deal ; I do not yet know whether I shall be able to go.' At last, when the hour for the ceremony was- come, he made a great effort, and with much ado succeeded in going down stairs. Ten days afterward, on the feast of St. Peter, after making the like preparations, and the same efforts, no result was reached. ' You see,' he said, ' I am still my own prisoner. It is not the wish that is wanting seeing that I have been getting ready for the last three hours. Here I am dressed, shaven and gloved, yet I cannot budge from here.' In short it was im- Eossible for him to attend the ceremony. I ad used a good deal of urgency, but judged that I must not force him. " I will conclude this narrative, already too- long, with one observation. It is that the instinctive movements those which are not subject to the will proper were not affected in this patient like those which may be called the ordinated movements. Thus, on arriving at Lyons, upon our return journey, our coach ran over a woman that the horses had thrown down : my patient regained all his energy, and not waiting for the vehicle to stop, threw off his cloak, opened the door, and was the first to descend and offer assistance to the woman.'* The author adds that the voyage had not the good effect he had anticipated ; that the patient however felt better when riding in a carriage, especially in a jolting vehicle over a rough road ; and thus he went home to his family in about the same state.* The cases just cited represent a very definite group. From them we gather some very pr-cise facts, and a few highly probable inferences. And first let us con- sider the facts. 1. The muscular system and the organs of movement remain intact : they offer no impediment. The automatic activity which constitutes the ordinary routine of life persists. 2. The intelligence is intact at least there is nothing that would warrant us in saying that it has suffered in the least. Ends are clearly apprehended, means like- wise, but to pass to action is impossible. Here then we have a disease of the will in the strictest sense. And we may re- mark that disease makes for our behoof a curious experiment. It creates excep- tional conditions, such as can be produced in no other way : it makes two halves of the man, utterly extinguishing all power of individual reaction, but leaving intact all else ; it produces for us, so far as the * " Annales M&lico-Psychologiques," vol. x. 14. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. cthing is possible, a being reduced to pure .intelligence. Whence comes this impotence of will ? Here the inductions begin. As to its im- mediate cause two hypotheses only are possible : it consists of an impairment either of the motor centers or of the in- citements they receive. The first hypothesis has no valid reason to rest on.* At least we know too little about this matter to warrant even con- jecture. . The second hypothesis remains. Ex- perience confirms it. Esquirol has pre- served for us the remarkable answer made to him by a patient who had been cured : " This lack of activity was owing to the fact that my sensations were too faint to exert any influence on my will." The same author has also noted the profound change such patients experience in their general sense of existence (coenaesthesia). " My existence is incomplete," writes one of his patients to him. " The functions, the power of performing the ordinary acts of life, remain with me : but in the per- formance of them there is always some- thing wanting, to wit, the sensation proper to each and the pleasure that follows them. Each one of my senses, each part of my- self is, so to speak, separated from me, nor can it now procure for me any sen- sation." No psychologist could better define the point at which the affective life of the patient was impaired. Billod relates the case of a young Ital- ian woman " of brilliant education " who became insane from having been crossed in love ; she recovered, but afterward fell into a profound apathy. " She reasons soundly on every subject, but no longer has any power of will or of love ; no con- sciousness of what happens to her, of what she feels or of what she does. She says she is as one that is neither dead nor alive ; like one living in continual sleep, to whom objects appear as though wrapt in a cloud, to whom persons seem to move like shad- ows, and words to come from a world far away."t If, as we shall see later, the voluntary act is made up of two distinct elements, viz., a state of consciousness totally inca- pable either of producing action or pro- hibiting it, and organic states which alone have this power, then it must be admitted that the two elements, though usually they * It must be remembered that we are speaking not of the motor organs, but of the centers, what- ever opinion may be held as to their nature and their localization. + " Annales Meclico-Psychologiques," ubi supra. are simultaneous, as being the effects of one same cause, are here dissociated. The inability to act is a fact. But the in- tensity of the state of consciousness, which intensity is clearly intermittent is that a fact ? If so, then we must say that the requisite conditions are present here, but only so far as this element is concerned. But is this intensity of consciousness an illusion ? I am inclined to believe that it is. The strong desire to act that some of the patients suppose themselves to have seems to me to be simply an illusion of consciousness. The intensity of a wish is something entirely relative. The pa- tient being in a state of general apathy, an impulse that to him appears to be strong is in fact below the average : hence inac- tion. When we come to study the state of the will in somnambulism we shall see that though some patients firmly believe their acts while in that state to be con- trollable by their will, experience at last compels them to admit that this judgment is erroneous and that their consciousness deludes them completely.* When however an excitation happens to be very strong, sudden, unexpected, that is when it combines all the conditions of intensity, then in most cases it serves as an impulse to action, as in the case of the patient who recovered his energy to save a woman from being run over.f Every one can realize for himself this state of aboulia, for there is no one but has had his hours of weakness when all incite- ments, whether inward or outward, all sensations and all ideas have been inef- fective, leaving him impassive. Between this state and aboulia there is only a quan- titative difference the difference between a transient and a chronic state. If these patients are unable to will the reason is that however many projects they may conceive, only a feeble desire to act is awakened. I employ these terms in order to conform myself to the current phraseology, still it is not the weakness of the desire, as a simple state of con- sciousness, that produces inaction. To infer that it is, is to reason from mere ap- pearances. As we have already shown, every nervous state every sensation, every idea is allthe more surely trans- lated into movement, as it is accompanied by those other nervous states, whatever they may be, which correspond to feeling and sentiment. It is from the weakness * See Chapter VI., infra. t I learn from Dr. Billod that this patient regained his activity, in consequence of the events of June, 1848, and the emotions they excited in him. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 15 of these states that aboulia results, and not from weakness of desire, which is only a sign. The cause therefore is a comparative insensibility, a general impairment of sen- sibility : that which is impaired is the af- fective life, the emotional faculty. But whence comes this morbid state? The -question is purely a physiological one! Indisputably there exists in these patients a notable depression of the vital activities ; and this may attain to such a degree as to involve all the faculties, so that the indi- vidual becomes like some inanimate thing. Physicians call this state melancholia, lypemania, stupor, and its symptoms are a slowing of the circulation, a lowering of the temperature of the body, and an al- most absolute immobility. These extreme iorms do not belong to our theme, but they exhibit to us the ultimate causes of impotence of the will. Every depression in the vital tone, be it slight or be it grave, transient or lasting, has its effect. So little is the will like a faculty controlling as a master, that it depends momentarily upon the most trivial causes : it is at their mercy. And yet, inasmuch as it has its source in biological actions that take place in our inmost tissues, we see how truly it is said to be our very self. The second group is like the first in its effects (impairment of the will) and in its causes (depressive influences). The only difference is that the incitement to act is not suppressed. The first group presents positive causes of inaction ; the second, negative causes. Inhibition results here from an antagonism. In all the cases now to be mentioned the impairment of the will springs from a sense of fear, based on no rational ground, and varying from simple anxiety to an- guish and paralyzing terror. In some in- stances the intelligence appears to be intact, in others impaired. Again, some of these cases are of an indefinite character, and it is difficult to say whether they indicate a disease of the will alone.* The following case shows the transition from one group to the other ; in fact it belongs to both. " A man of 30 years found himself involved in certain civic tumults which frightened him greatly. Thereafter, though he retained perfectly his mental balance, managing his private * Here it is well to remark once for all that, as we are studying the diseases special to the will, we have had to eliminate all cases where the psychic activity is affected as a whole, and those in which affections of the will are only the effect and the ex- pression of intellectual insanity. affairs very well and carrying on a large business, he wou'd not remain alone either on the street or in his chamber, but was always accompanied. If he went out, it was impossible for him to return home alone. Whenever he went out unattend- ed, which he rarely did, he would soon halt on the street, and there remain in- definitely, neither going on nor turning back, unless some one led him. He seemed to have a will, but it was the will of those around him. Whenever the at- tempt was made to overcome this resist- ance of the patient, he would fall into a swoon."* Several alienists have recently described under the names of " peur des espaces," " Platzangst," and agoraphobia, a curious sort of anxiety that paralyzes the will, and against which the individual is powerless to react, or at least does so only in a roundabout way. A case observed by Westphal may serve as a type. A trav- eler of strong 5 constitution, perfectly sound of mind and presenting no disorder of the motor faculty, is suddenly seized with a feeling of alarm at the sight of an open space as a public square of some little size. If he must cross one of the great squares of Berlin, he fancies the distance to be several miles and despairs of ever reaching the other side. This feeling grows less or disappears if he goes around the square, following the line of houses, also if he has some person with him, or even if he supports himself on a walking cane. Carpenter t quotes from Bennett a case of " paralysis of the will " which seems to me to belong to the same class. "If when walking in the street this indi- vidual [a patient of Dr. Bennett's] came to a gap in the line of houses, his will suddenly became inoperative and he could not proceed. An unbuilt-on space in the street was sure to stop him. Crossing a street also was very difficult, and on go- ing in or out of a door he was always ar- rested for some minutes." Again, some persons while walking in the open country are more or less un- easy unless they keep close to the hedges or to the trees. Many other illustrations might be given, but that is needless, for they would add nothing to the fundamen- tal fact.J * Billed, loc. cit., p. 191. t Op. cit., p. 385. t For further details see Westphal, " Archiv fur Psychiatric," vol. iii. (two articles); Cordes, ibi- dem; Legrand du Saulle, " Annales Medico-psy- chologiques " (1876), p. 405 ; Ritti, " Dictionnaire Encyclopedique des Sciences Medicates," art. FOLIB AVEC CONSCIENCE ; Maudsley, " Pathology of Mind." 16 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. Tne medical discussions of this morbid state do not concern us here. The psy- chological fact is reducible to a sense of fea.r, and that this fear is puerile and im- aginary as regards its causes makes no difference for us : we have to do only with its effect, which is to disable the will. But we must inquire whether this depress- ive influence only arrests the will-impulse, the latter being in itself intact, or whether the power of individual reaction also is weakened. The latter hypothesis is well grounded for, the sense of fear not being insurmountable as these patients prove in some instances we must infer that the individual's power of reaction is fallen be- low the general level. Hence the arrest of volition results from two causes acting in the same direction. Unfortunately we are ignorant of the physiological conditions of this impair- ment. Many are the conjectures that have been made. Cordes himself subject to this infirmity, regards it as " a function- al paralysis symptomatic of certain modi- fications of the motor centers, and capable of producing upon us impressions, in par- ticular an impression of fear, which gives rise to a momentary paralysis ; this effect is almost nothing if the imagination alone is in play, but it is carried to a very high degree by the operation of the accompa- nying circumstances." According to Cor- des, then, the primary cause is " a paresic exhaustion of the motor nervous system, of that portion of the brain which governs not only locomotion but muscular sensi- bility also." This explanation, were it firmly estab- lished, would be of great consequence for our research. It would show that the impotence of the will depends on an im- potence of the nerve centers and this would have the advantage of supplying to our inquiries an assured basis in physiolo- gy. But it would be premature to draw here conclusions that will come in more fitly at the end of our work. I shall have little to say of the mental state denominated "griibelsucht." It rep- resents the pathological .form of irresolu- tion of character, just as aboulia repre- sents that of the apathetic character. It consists of a state of continual hesitation, for the most frivolous reasons, with ina- bility to reach any definitive results. This hesitation is seen at first in the purely intellectual order. The patient keeps asking himself questions continu- ally. I take an illustration from Legrand du Saulle. " A very intelligent woman could not go into the street but she would be asking herself, ' Is some one going to jump out of a window and fall at my feet ? Will it be a man or a woman ? Will the person be wounded or killed ? If wound- ed, will it be in the head or the legs ? Will there be blood on the pavement ? Shall I call for assistance, or run away, or recite a prayer ? Shall I be accused of being the cause of this occurrence ? Will my innocence be admitted?' and so on. These questionings go on without end. Several cases of a like nature are record- ed in special treatises." * If it involved only this " psychological rumination," to use Mr. du Saulle 's ex- pression we should have nothing to say about this morbid state ; but the perplex- ity of the mind expresses itself in acts. The patient durst not attempt anything- without endless precautions. If he has written a letter, he reads it over and over again, for fear he should have forgotten a word or committed some fault of spell- ing. If he locks a drawer, he must make sure again and again that it was done aright. It is the same as to his dwelling : he has to satisfy himself repeatedly as to the doors being locked, the keys in his pocket, the state of his pocket, etc. In a graver form of the malady the pa- tient, haunted by ridiculous abhorrence of contact with anything dirty or unclean, will not touch a piece of money, a door knob, a window fastening or the like ; and he lives in a state of constant apprehen- sion. Such was the cathedral beadle mentioned by Morel, who, worried for twenty-five years by absurd fancies, feared to touch his staff ; the man would reason with himself, and rail at himself till his apprehensions were counteracted, yet he always was afraid that the next time he should not succeed.f This malady of the will results in part from weakness of character, in part from the state of the intelligence. It is quite natural that this current of vain im- aginings should find expression in frivo- lous acts ; but the impotence of the indi- vidual reaction plays an important part. We find also a lowering of the general tone, and the proof of this is seen in the causes of this morbid state, namely hered- itary neuropathy and debilitating mala- dies ; also in the crises and the syncope brought on by the effort to act ; so too in those extreme forms of the disease where THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 17 the patient, harassed by his unceasing apprehensions, will neither write, nor listen, nor speak, but keeps muttering to himself, or perhaps only moving his lips. Finally let us ' notice those cases in which the impairment of the will ap- proaches extinction. When a persistent state of consciousness is accompanied by an intense feeling of terror, there is pro- duced an almost absolute inhibition, and the patient seems stupid without really being so. Such was the case with the young man mentioned by Esquirol, who appeared to be idiotic, who had to be dressed, put to bed, fed like a child, and who after his recovery declared that an inward voice used to say t6 him, " Do not budge, or you are dead." * Guislain also reports a curious case, but in this instance the lack of psycholog- ical data leaves us in a quandary and no positive explanation can be offered. " A young lady, courted by a young man, was seized with an alienation of mind the true cause of which was unknown, but its dis- tinctive feature was a strong aversion to society, which soon was transformed into a morbid mutism. During twelve years she made answer to questions only twice, the first time under the influence of her father's imperative words, and the second time on her being committed to an asy- lum. "On both occasions she was strangely, surprisingly laconic." For two months Guislain made re- peated efforts to effect a cure. But " my efforts were vain, and my exhortations without effect. I persisted, and before long noted a change in her features, and a more intelligent expression in her eyes. Shortly afterward, from time to time, she would utter sentences, expressing her thoughts clearly, but this was at long in- tervals, for she manifested extreme repug- nance to comply with my requests. It was evident that her self-love was each time gratified by the victory she gained over herself. In her answers it was im- possible to detect the slightest sign of dis- ordered intellect : her insanity was purely a disease of the impulsive will. Often- times a sort of bashfulness seemed to restrain this patient, whom I was begin- ning to regard as convalescent. For two or three days she ceased to speak, and then, yielding to renewed solicitations, she recovered speech again, till finally she took part of her own accord in the conver- sation going on in her hearing. . . . This recovery is one of the most surprising in- * Esquirol, vol. ii., p. 287. stances of cure that have come under my observation." The author adds that res- toration was complete and permanent. This state of morbid inertia, of which aboulia is the type, where the "I will " is never followed by action, shows volition, as a state of consciousness, and the effective power of acting to be two distinct things. Not to dwell on this point at present, let us direct our attention to this fact of effort a vital point in the psychology of the will, and which is lacking here. The feeling of muscular effort has been studied so thoroughly and so minutely by Dr. William James * that there is no need of going over the ground again ; it will suffice to recall his conclusions. That physiologist has shown that the sense of the muscular force expended in the per- formance of an act is a complex afferent sensation coming from the contracted muscles, the tense ligaments, the com- pressed articulations, the shut glottis, etc. Be considers in detail, taking his stand upon the results of experiment, the opin- ion which holds it to be an efferent sensa- tion connected with the motor discharge and coincident with the outgoing current of nervous energy. In particular he has shown, after Ferrier and other writers, that if in case of paralysis the patient retains the feeling of effort though quite unable to move the paralyzed member, the reason is because the conditions of the conscious- ness of effort persist, the patient moving the opposite member or organ. But Dr. James justly distinguishes the muscular from the volitional effort which in many cases either involves no immediate movement at all, or only an exceedingly weak muscular energy. This we see in the case of the man who, after long hesitation, decides to put arsenic in- to his wife's glass to poison her : and every one is familiar through personal ex- perience with this state of mental struggle in which the effort is all internal. But here we part regretfully with this author who locates this effort in a region apart and supersensible. To us it seems to dif- fer from muscular effort only in this one point : its physiological conditions are ill understood, and we can offer only hypoth- eses. There are two types of this volitional ef- fort, of which the one consists in arresting the instinctive, the passional, the habitual movements, the other in overcoming lan- guor, torpor, timidity. The one is an ef- fort with a negative and the other an ef- * "The Feeling of Effort," Boston, 1880 18 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. fort with a positive result : the one pro- duces inhibition the other impulsion. These two types may themselves be re- duced to one formula : there is effort when the volition follows the line of greatest resistance. This volitional effort never takes place when the impulsion (or the in- hibition) and the choice coincide, when our natural tendencies and the " I will " go in the same direction : in simpler lan- guage, when that which is immediately agreeable to the individual and that which is chosen by him are the same. It always takes place when two groups of antago- nistic tendencies are struggling to sup- plant each other. As every one knows, this struggle takes place between the lower tendencies, whose adaptation is re- stricted, and the higher tendencies, whose adaptation is manifold. The former are always by nature the stronger ; the latter are sometimes the stronger on account of adventitious circumstances. Again, the former represent a force enregistered in the organism ; the latter a recent acquisi- tion. How comes it then that these naturally weaker tendencies prevail ? It is because the " I will " is an element in their favor this, of course, not inasmuch as it is a mere state of consciousness, but because underneath this volition there exist the causes known, half-known, or unknown which we have often designated by the term individual character. These minor active causes, which constitute the individ- ual physically and psychically, are not mere abstractions : they are physiological or psychophysiological processes ; they presuppose work done in the several ner- vous centers. Is it rash to maintain that the feeling of volitional effort too is an effect of these physiological processes? The only objection that can be urged is our inability to determine its mechanism. This point is all the more obscure because the mechanism must be different accord- ing as the effect to be produced is an im- pulsion or an inhibition ; so too the feeling of volitional effort is not the same in the two cases. The inward struggle is accompanied by a sense of fatigue often intense. Though we know but little about the nature and the causes of this state, it is generally supposed that even in muscular effort the seat of fatigue is in the nerve centers that call forth the contraction, not in the mus- cles : that there is nervous exhaustion, not muscular. In reflex contractions no fatigue is felt. Among subjects of hyste- ria contractions are seen to persist indefi- nitely, and yet the patient has no sense of assitude ; hence it is the voluntary effort that causes fatigue and not the contrac- tion of muscle.* Apart from our ignorance, we have no reason to attribute to the volitional effort a peculiar character. Are the nerve ele- ments capable of furnishing a surplus of >vork for a given period in all cases where this volitional effort comes into play ? Or, on the contrary, are they, owing to their nature or for the want of training and ex- ercise, quickly exhausted and incapable of acquiring fresh strength ? Have they or have they not a sufficiency of available force stored up ? The problem of action in the direction of greatest resistance is reduced to its ultimate terms. It is this hidden, almost unsuspected work that makes itself known through the feeling of volitional effort. Hence the feeling of ef- fort in all its forms is a subjective state corresponding to certain processes going on in the nerve centres and in other por- tions of the organism, but differing from them even as the sensation of light or of sound differ from their objective causes. To be capable of great muscular effort, the appropriate nerve centers must be able to produce a good deal of work for a pro- longed period, and this depends on their constitution and on the rapidity with which they repair losses. So too, to produce a great moral or intellectual effort, the ap- propriate nerve centers, whatever they may be (and our ignorance touching this point is nearly total), must be able to pro- duce intense work over and over again, and must not be quickly exhausted and slow to repair losses. The capacity for effort is therefore in the last analysis a natural gift. To make our meaning clearer take the case of a vicious character. Suppose that never in his life, whether spontaneously or under the influence of others, he has experienced any faint desire of amend- ment : the reason is, because he entire- ly lacks the moral elements and their corresponding physiological conditions. Should the thought of amendment by any chance occur to him, it is to be remarked in the first place that this occurrence is no act of the will, though it supposes the pre- existence of certain psychophysiological elements and their being called into play. Now suppose he elects to pursue this ob- ject, approves this course, wills it ; if the * Richet, " Physiologic des Nerfs et des Muscles," PP- 477-490 f Delboeuf , " Etude PsychophysiqueJ' pp. 92 et segg., in " Elements de Psychophysique,' vol i. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 19 resolution does not persist, it is because in the man's organization there exists no capacity for that iterated work of which we have spoken ; but if the resolution does persist, it is because it is supported by an effort, by that inner work which produces arrest of the opposite states. Organs are developed by exercise, and this holds good here ; so that repetition becomes easy. But if nature has laid no foundation, given no potential energy, there is no result. Hence the theological doctrine of grace as a free gift appears to be bottomed on a far more correct psy- chological theory than the opposite opin- ion,* and we see how easily it might be made to undergo a physiological transfor- mation. To return to the morbid forms that are the objects of our study, they involve a temporary, accidental incapacity for effort, which however extends to almost the en- tire organism. CHAPTER III. IMPAIRMENT OF THE WILL. EXCESS OF IMPULSION. WE have just been considering in- stances in which, though the intellectual adaptation that is the correspondence between the intelligent being and his envi- ronment is normal, the impulse toward action is either null, very weak, or at least insufficient. In the language of physiol- ogy, the cerebral actions which are the basis of intellectual activity (as the thought of ends and of means, choice, etc.), remain intact, but they lack the concomitant states which are the physiological equivalents of the feelings, and the absence of these causes failure to act. We are now to study phenomena quite the opposite of these in certain respects. In this second group the intellectual adap- tation is very little, or at all events very instable ; the motives dictated by reason are forceless either for action or for re- straint ; and the lower impulses gain what the higher impulses lose. The will, that is to say the rational activity, disappears, and the individual reverts to the domain of instinct. Nothing could prove more effectually that the will, in the strict sense of the term, is the crown, the final term of an evolution, the result of a multiplicity * The doctrine of grace is found even among the Hindus, particularly in the " Bhagavad Gita, xi.. 53; Consult Earth, " Les Religions de 1'Inde, pp. 48, 136. of disciplined tendencies coordinated with one another ; that it is the most perfect species of activity. Let us examine the facts. We will divide them into two groups: i. Those which, being hardly if at all conscious, de- note an absence rather than an impair- ment of will ; 2. Those which are accom- panied by perfect consciousness, but in which, after a longer or shorter struggle, the will succumbs, or is saved only by as- sistance from without. i . In the former case " the impulsion may be sudden and unconscious, followed by immediate execution, the understand- ing even not having had time to take cog- nizance of it. ... In such case the act possesses all the characters of a purely re- flex phenomenon, without any interven- tion whatever of the will : it is in fact a convulsion differing from ordinary con- vulsions only in that it consists of move- ments associated and combined in view of a determinate result. Such is the case of the woman who, seated on a bench in a garden, oppressed with unwonted sad- ness, suddenly rose to her feet, threw her- self into a ditch full of water, as if to drown herself, and who, after being rescued and restored to herself fully, declared a few days later that she was unconscious of having wanted to commit suicide and had no recollection of the attempt she had made." * " I have seen," says Luys, " a number of patients who repeatedly attempted suicide in the presence of those who watched them, but they had no recollection of the fact in their lucid state. And what proves the uncon- sciousness of the mind under these conditions is the fact that the patients do not perceive the inefficiency of the methods they employ. Thus a lady who attempted suicide whenever she saw a table knife, did not notice one day when I was watching her that I had substi- tuted for the knife a harmless instrument. Another patient tried to hang himself with a half rotten cord that was not strong enough to bear even slight tension." t Impulses of this kind are so frequent among epileptics that pages might be filled with accounts of them. Hysterical patients too furnish innumerable examples : they manifest an uncontrollable tendency toward the immediate gratification of their caprices or the satisfaction of their wants. Other impulsions produce effects that * Foville, " Nouveau Dictionnaire de Medecine,' art. FOLIE, p. 342. t " Maladies Mentales," pp. 373, 439, 440. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. are less serious, but they indicate the same psychic state. " In some patients the overexcitation of the motor forces is such that they keep walking for hours at a time without stopping, never looking about them, like mechanical figures that have been wound up." " A marchioness possessed of very great intelligence," says Billod, " would in conversation interrupt a sentence with an unseemly or an obscene epithet addressed to some one in the com- pany, and then take up the broken sen- tence again. The utterance of this epi- thet was accompanied by a blush ; the lady seemed to be annoyed and confound- ed, and the word was as it were jerked out, like an arrow that is shot unawares from the bow." "An aged victim of hysteria, a woman of much intelligence and very clear-headed, used to feel at certain times the need of going into some lonely place and shouting aloud ; there she would give vent to her grievances and her complaints against her family and her surroundings. She knew perfectly well that it was wrong to publish certain secrets, but, as she used to say, she must speak and satisfy her grudges." * This last case brings us to irresistible impulses that are conscious. But at pres- ent we have to do with those which are unconscious. Cases of this kind we might cite in abundance. They exhibit the individual reduced to the lowest de- gree of activity that of pure reflex action. His acts are unconscious (or at least not deliberate), immediate, irresistible, and their adaptation is of little complexity and invariable. Considered from the point of view of physiology and of psychology, the human being, under these conditions, is like an animal that has been decapitated, or at least deprived of its cerebral lobes. It is generally held that the brain can govern the reflex actions, and this opinion rests upon the following grounds : An excitation, starting from any point of the body becomes divided on reaching the spinal cord, and then pursues two routes. It is transmitted to the reflex center by a transverse route, and to the brain by a longitudinal and ascending route. Since the transverse route presents the greater resistance, transmission in that direction takes some time, while transmission lon- gitudinally on the contrary is much more rapid. Hence there is time for the sus- pensive action of the brain to take place and to regulate the reflex actions. The brain being in the causes just mentioned without action, its activity remains at its lower degree and volition does not occur, its necessary and sufficient conditions not being present. 2. The phenomena of the second group are worthy of more detailed study : they explain the overthrow of the will and the artificial means that support it. The patient is fully conscious of his situation ; he feels that he is not master of himself, that he is dominated by an inner force and irresistibly urged on to perform ac- tions that he condemns. The intelligence remains sufficiently sane, and the insanity affects only the acts. We find in a work by Marc that is now almost forgotten* a rich collection of facts upon which later writers have freely drawn. We quote a few. A lady subject at times to homicidal impulses used to request to be put under restraint by means of a strait waistcoat, and would let her keeper know when the danger was passed and when she might be allowed her liberty. A chemist haunted with similar homicidal impulses used to have his thumbs tied together with a ribbon, and in that simple restraint found the means of resisting the temptation. A servant woman of irreproachable char- acter asked her mistress to let her go away, because she was strongly tempted to disembowel the infant she took care of whenever she saw it stripped. Another woman, a person of much intellectual cultivation and very affectionate to her relatives, " began to beat them in spite of herself and called for assistance, begging that she might be held down in an arm- chair." A victim of melancholia haunted with the thought of suicide arose in the night, knocked at his brother's door and cried out to him, " Come quick ; suicide is pursuing me and soon I shall be unable to withstand it." Calmeil in his "Traite des Maladies Inflammatoires du Cerveau" cites the following cases, of which he was a wit- ness and which I will give in detail, for so I shall be dispensed from recounting many more : " Glenadel having lost his father in child- hood, was brought up by his mother who adored him. On attaining 'his i6th year his character underwent a change. Till then he had been a good and dutiful son, but now he became gloomy and taciturn. Being pressed * Luys. loco citato, 167, 212 ; Billod, loco fitato, 193 *? * "De la Folie consid^r^e dans ses Rapports avec les Questions M&lico-judiciaires." a vols. 8vo, Paris, 1840. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 21 with questions by his mother, he at length re- solved to make a confession : " ' To you I owe everything,' he said, ' and I love you dearly : still for the last few days a thought that is ever in my mind has been driving me to kill you. Do not let me at last give way to it, do not let so great a mis- fortune befall, but give me leave to enlist.' In spite of her urgent solicitations he was immovable in his resolution, left his home and made a good soldier ; yet a lurking desire was ever urging him to desert, so that he might return and kill his mother. At the close of his term of service this thought was as strong as on the first day. He enlisted for another term, and still the homicidal in- stinct persisted, though now another victim was substituted. He no longer thinks of killing his mother ; night and day he now is conscious of a horrid impulse to murder his step-sister. In order to withstand this second impulse he condemned himself to lifelong ex- ile from his home. " At this juncture a man from his own neigh- borhood joined the regiment, and to him Glenadel confided his distressing secret. * Cheer up,' said the other, 'that crime is out of the question, for your step-sister died a short time ago.' On hearing these words Glenadel sprung to his feet like a captive set free. He was filled with joy and set out for his home, which he had not seen since his boyhood. Arrived there he saw his step-sister alive. He uttered a cry, and the terrible impulse instantly seized him again. That evening he had his brother to put him under restraint. ' Take a strong cord,' he said, ' and tie me up in the barn like a wolf, and send word to Dr. Calmeil.' The physician ob- tained for him admission to an asylum for the insane. On the eve of his admission he wrote to the director of the asylum : ' Sir, I am about to enter your establishment : I shall behave there as in my regiment. Peo- ple will think I have recovered, and at times perhaps I shall feign recovery. You must not believe me, and I must never be permit- ted to leave under any pretext. When I beg to be allowed to go at large, redouble your vigilance, for the only use I shall make of that liberty will be to commit a crime I abhor.' " It is not to be supposed that this case is unique or even a very uncommon one : in works on insanity we find recorded many instances of persons who, torment- ed by the impulse to kill those who are dear to them, take refuge in asylums, becoming voluntary prisoners. The irresistible though conscious im- pulse to steal, to set fire to houses, to com- mit suicide by alcoholic excess, belongs to the same category.* Maudsley in his " Pathology of Mind " (Chapt. VIII.) pre- sents so many examples that I cannot do * See Trelat, " Folie Lucide ; " Maudsley, 1 Crime and Insanity." better than to refer to that work. I thus spare the reader useless repetition. For me it suffices to point out the enormous multitude of facts which justify the con- siderations I am about to offer. It is to be remarked that the transi- tion from the sane state to these patholog- ical forms is almost imperceptible. Per- sons that are perfectly rational expe- rience insane impulses, but these sudden and unwonted states of consciousness are without effect, do not pass into acts, being suppressed by opposite forces, by the dominant mental habit. Between this iso- lated psychic state and the states antago- nistic to it there exists so great a dispro- portion that there is even no struggle between them. In other cases, usually regarded as of very little moment, " there is some eccentricity of behavior but noth- ing reprehensible or dangerous simple oddity, capriciousness. Or again, a per- son is given to acts which though not seriously compromising are nevertheless mischievous as destroying or beating an inanimate object, tearing one's clothing, etc. We have at the present time under observation a young woman who chews up all her gowns. Then there is the oft quoted case of the art amateur who, happening at a museum to see a valuable painting, felt an instinctive impulse to punch a hole through the canvas. Often- times these impulsions go unnoticed, except by the consciousness of the one who experiences them."* Sometimes fixed ideas of a character frivolous or unreasonable find lodgment in the mind which, though it deems them absurd, is powerless to prevent them from passing into acts. Many cu- rious examples of this are to be found in a work by Westphal. A man, for instance, is haunted by the thought that perchance he might commit to writing that he has been guilty of some crime, and lose the paper. Accordingly he carefully pre- serves every bit of paper he finds, picks up paper on the streets to make sure that it contains no writing, takes it home and hoards it. He is fully conscious of the absurdity of the phantasy which worries him continually : he does not Relieve in it, nevertheless he is powerless to dismiss it.f * Foville, opus citatum^ p. 341. t Westphal, " Ueber Zwangsvorstellungen," Ber- lin, 1877. We ma V ad d that the fear of doing an act sometimes leads one inevitably to do it. This we see illustrated in vertigo, when a person throws himself down in the street through fear of falling, when one wounds himself through fear lest he should wound himself, etc. These phenomena are explained by the nature of the mental representa- tion, which by reason of its intensity passes into act THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. Between acts that are frivolous and those which are dangerous the difference is only quantitative : what the former ex- hibit to us foreshortened, the latter exhibit in enlarged proportions. We will try to explain the mechanism of this disorgan- ization of the will. In the normal state an end is chosen, approved, attained ; that is to say the ele- ments of the Ego, whether all or a major- ity of them, concur toward attaining it. Our states of consciousness feelings and ideas, with their respective motor tenden- cies and the movements of our members form a consensus that converges toward this end with more or less effort by means of a complex mechanism made up both of impulsions and inhibitions. Such is the will in its perfect, typical form. But this is not a natural product ; it is the result of art, of education, of ex- perience. It is a structure that has been built up slowly, bit by bit. Observation both subjective and objective shows that each form of voluntary activity is the fruit of a conquest. Nature supplies only the raw material in the physiological order a few simple movements, in the psycholog- ical order a few simple associations. To assist these simple and almost invariable adaptations, there must be formed other adaptations more and more complex and variable. For instance, the babe must ac- quire the power of using its legs, arms, and all the movable portions of its body, by means of experiment, combining the move- ments that are appropriate and suppress- ing those which are of no advantage. The simple groups so formed must be com- bined in complex groups, these into groups more complex still, and so on. A similar operation is necessary in the psychological order. What is complex is never won at the first effort. But it is plain that in the edifice so built up little by little the original materials alone are stable, and that as complexity increases stability diminishes. The sim- plest actions are the most stable anatomi- cally, because they are congenital, regis- tered in the organism ; and physiologically, because they are continually repeated in the experience of the individual, as also if we take account of heredity, which opens up an illimitable field in the innumerable experiences of the species and of all spe- cies.* * The will-power being constituted when certain groups of movements obey certain states of con- sciousness, we may cite as a pathological case the fact mentioned by Meschede (" Correspondenz- blatt," 1874) of a man who " found himself in this curious condition, that when he would do anything. On the whole, the surprising thing is that the will, the complex and higher order of activity, should become predominant. The causes which raise it to that rank and hold it there are the same which in man raise and hold the intelligence above the sensations and the instincts : and tak- ing humanity as a whole, facts prove the dominion of the one to be as precarious as that of the other. The great develop- ment of the mass of the brain in civilized man, and the influence of education and of the habits it produces, explain how it is that, in the face of so many adverse chances, rational activity so often retains the mastery. The pathological facts that have been cited prove that the will is no entity reign- ing by right of birth, but a resultant that is always instable, always liable to break up, and in truth only a lucky accident. These facts and they are innumerable represent a state that may be regarded equally as a dislocation of the will and a retrograde form of activity. If we study cases of irregular im- pulsions accompanied by full conscious- ness, we find that this subordination of tendencies the will is here broken in twain : for the consensus which alone con- stitutes the will is substituted a conflict be- tween two groups of opposite and nearly equal tendencies, and hence it may truly be said that the will is dislocated.* Considering the will not as a constituted" whole but as the culminating point of ark evolution, we must say that the lower forms of activity have the mastery and that the activity which is distinctively human retrogrades. We would observe however that the term " lower " has no moral implication here. One group is lower because it is evident that the activ- ity which expends itself wholly in ex- pressing a fixed idea or a blind impulse is by its nature restricted, adapted only to whether of his own accord or at the instance of others, he, or rather his muscles, did just the con- trary. If he would look to the right, his eyes turned to the left ; and this anomaly extended to all his movements. It was simply a contra-direction of movement without any mental derangement, and it differed in this from involuntary movements, that he never produced a movement save when he willed it, though the movement was always the> reverse of what he willed." * We might show, were this the place, how fickle a thing is the unity of the Ego and how unreliable. In these cases of conflict which is the true Ego s that which acts or that which resists ? If you de- cide in favor of neither, then there are two Egos. If you decide in favor of either, you must admit that the preferred group represents the Ego about as in politics the party that is slightly in the major- ity represents the state. But these questions can- not be discussed incidentally. I hope some day to devote a monograph to them. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. the present and to a very small number of circumstances, while rational activity on the other hand transcends the present and is adapted to a great number of cir- cumstances. It must be admitted, though language does not lend itself readily to such a form of expression, that the will, like the intel- ligence, has its idiots and its geniuses, with all the degrees intermediate between these two. From this point of view the cases cited in the first group (impulses not attended by consciousness) would represent will-idiocy, or, in more precise language, will-dementia; the facts of the second group would exhibit a weakness of will analogous to weakness of intellect. Pursuing our research, we must now pass to an analysis of the facts and must determine their causes. Is it possible to ascertain the conditions upon which this weakening of the higher activity depends ? First of all we have to inquire whether the overthrow of the will is an effect of the predominance of the reflex actions, or whether on the contrary it is the cause of that predominance : in other words, whether the weakening of the will is the primary or the secondary fact. This question admits of no general answer. Observation shows that both propositions are true with respect to different cases, and consequently we can give only a special answer for a special case whose circumstances are fully known. No doubt oftentimes the irresistible impulse is the origo malt : it constitutes a permanent pathological state. There is then pro- duced in the psychological order a phe- nomenon analogous to hypertrophy of an organ, or to the overproliferation of a tissue, as for example that which leads to the formation of certain forms of can- cer. In both instances, whether the phys- iological or the psychological, this vicious development makes itself felt throughout the entire organism. The cases wherein voluntary activity is affected directly and not as an indirect effect, are of most interest for us. What takes place in such cases ? Is it the power of coordination or the power of inhibition that is affected, or both? An obscure point upon which only a conjecture may be offered. To obtain some light upon it, let us investigate two new groups of facts, viz., the artificial and momentary impair- ment of the will produced by intoxication ; and the chronic impairment produced by lesion of the brain. As every one knows, the intoxication caused by alcoholic liquors, by hashish, by opium, after a first period of superex- citation brings about a notable impair- ment of the will. The individual is more or less conscious of this : other persons see it more distinctly. Soon especially under the influence of alcohol the im- pulsions become excessive. The extrav- agances, violences and crimes committed in this state are innumerable. The mech- anism of the onset of intoxication is sub- ject of warm controversy. It is generally supposed that it begins with the brain, later acting upon the spinal cord and the medulla, and lastly upon the great sympa- thetic. There is produced an intellectual hebetude that is to say, the states of consciousness are vague, indefinite, of little intensity : the physiopsychological activity of the brain is reduced. This decline of ac- tivity extends also to the motor power. Obersteiner has proved by experiments^ that under the influence of alcohol one reacts less promptly, though he imagines that the contrary is the fact.* It is not the ideation alone that is affected but also the ideomotor activity. At the same time the power of coordination becomes null or ephemeral and forceless. Now since coordination consists both in con- verging certain impulsions toward an end and in directing impulsions that are use- less or antagonistic to that end, it fol- lows from the fact that the reflex actions are excessive or violent in any case, that the power of inhibition whatever may be its nature and mechanism is impaired, and that its part in constituting and main- taining will-action is all-essential. The pathology of the brain affords other confirmatory facts, all the more striking because they show a sudden and perma- nent change in the individual. Ferrier and other writers cite cases where lesion of the frontal convolutions, especially the first and second, led to almost total loss of will, and reduced the patient to autom- atism, or at least to that state wherein the instinctive activity reigns almost alone, without possibility of inhibition. An infant was wounded by a knife in the frontal lobe. Seventeen years after- ward his physical health was good, " but he was incapable of occupations that de- manded mental exertion. He was irrita- ble, especially when he drank intoxicating * " Brain," Jan., 1879. A considerable number a experiments have been made with respect to thic point, with uniform results. See Exner, in " Pflli ger's Archiv," 1873 ; Dietl and Vintschgau, ibidem 1877 ; also an account of an important research madv by Kraepelin in Wundt's psychophysiological labo- ratory, published in " Philosophische Studien," pp. 573 Se 9<7- 24 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. liquor or when he was under any extraor- dinary excitement." A patient of Lepine's suffering from an abscess in the right frontal lobe " was in a state of hebetude. He seemed to understand what was said to him, but only with difficulty could he pronounce a word. On being bidden he would sit down ; raise him from the chair and he could walk a few steps unassisted." A man who had received a violent blow which destroyed the greater part of the first and second frontal convolutions " lost all will-power. He understood what was said and acted as he was bid to act, but in an automatic, mechanical way." Many similar cases are on record,* but the one which is most important for us is that of the " American carrier." A bar of iron shot from a mine passed through his skull, injuring only the prae- frontal region. He recovered and sur- vived the accident twelve years and a half ; but of the patient's mental state af- ter recovery the following particulars are given : His employers, who before the ac- cident regarded him as one of their best foremen, found him so changed that they could not restore him to his former posi- tion. The equilibrium, the balance be- tween his intellectual faculties and his in- stinctive tendencies, seemed to have been destroyed. He had become nervous, disrespectful and grossly profane. He showed now but little politeness to his equals, was impatient of contradiction, and would listen to no advice that ran counter to his own ideas. At times he was exceedingly obstinate, though capri- cious and indecisive. He would make plans for the future, and forthwith reject them and adopt others. He was a child intellectually, a man in passions and in- stincts. Before the accident, though he had not received a school education, he had a well-balanced mind, and was re- garded as a man of good natural ability, sagacious, energetic and persevering. In all these respects he was now so changed that his friends said they no longer recog- nized him.t In this case we see the will impaired in proportion as the inferior activity becomes stronger. Furthermore we have here an experiment, for here is a sudden change brought about by an accident under clearly defined circumstances. It is to be regretted that we have not many observations of this kind, for with their aid a great deal might be done T * See Huxley's essay on " Animal Automatism." It will be published in No. 53 HUMBOLDT LIBRARY. t Ferrier, " Localization of Diseases of the Brain." toward the interpretation of the diseases of the will. Unfortunately the researches so vigorously prosecuted with regard to localization of functions in the brain have had to do mostly with the motor and the sensorial regions, and these, as we know, occupy only a portion of the frontal region. So too there is need of a critical examina- tion of the opposite class of facts, those namely which go to show that though the brain has suffered lesion, the will-power is apparently undiminished. This work accomplished, then Ferrier 's theory that there exist in the frontal lobes centers of inhibition for the intellectual operations, would assume greater consistence and would supply a solid basis for the deter- mination of the causes. As things stand, we may not attempt anything beyond con- jectures. When we compare the case of aboulia with that of the existence of irresistible impulses, we see that in the two cases will is in default owing to totally opposite conditions. In the one case the intelli- gence is intact, but impulsion is wanting ; in the other, the power of coordination and of inhibition being absent, the impulse expends itself in purely automatic fashion. CHAPTER IV. IMPAIRMENT OF VOLUNTARY ATTEN- TION. WE are now to study impairment of the will in a less striking form, namely, impairment of the power of voluntary at- tention. This does not in its essence dif- fer from the impairments belonging to the group we have just been considering, since like them it consists in an impairment of the power of directing and of adaptation. It is a diminution of will-power in the strictest, straitest, and narrowest sense of the term, and it is indisputable even in the eyes of those who restrict themselves most obstinately to interior observation. Before we turn our attention to acquired impairment, let us consider congenital im- pairment of voluntary attention. Wewil! take no note of narrow or mediocre minds, in which feelings, intelligence and will are at one dead level of weakness. It is more interesting to study a great mind, some man gifted with high intelligence, with a quick sensibility, but who lacks the power of direction : thus we shall see a perfect contrast between thought and will. We have in Coleridge an instance of this. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 25 " There was probably no man of his time or perhaps of any time who surpassed Cole- ridge," says Dr. Carpenter,* "in the combina- tion of the reasoning powers of the philoso- pher with the imagination of the poet and the inspiration of the seer ; and there was perhaps not one of the last generation who has left so strong an impress of himself in the subsequent course of thought of reflective minds engaged in the highest subjects of human contemplation. And yet there was probably never a man endowed with such re- markable gifts who accomplished so little that was worthy of them, the great defect of his character being the want of Will to turn his gifts to account; so that with numerous gigantic projects constantly floating in his mind, he never brought himself even seriously to attempt to execute any of them. It used to be said of him that whenever either nat- ural obligation or voluntary undertaking made it his duty to do anything, the fact seemed a sufficient reason for his not doing it. Thus at the very outset of his career, when he had found a bookseller generous enough to prom- ise him thirty guineas for poems which he recited to him, and might have received the whole sum immediately on delivering the manuscript, he went on week after week beg- ging and borrowing for his daily needs in the most humiliating manner, until he had drawn from his patron the whole of the promised purchase money, without supplying him with a line of that poetry which he had only to write down to free himself from obligation. The habit of recourse to nervine stimulants (alcohol and opium) which he early formed and from which he never seemed able to free himself doubtless still further weakened his power of volitional self-control, so that it be- came necessary for his welfare that he should yield himself to the control of others. " The composition of the poetical fragment ' Kubla Khan ' in his sleep, as told in his * Biographia Litteraria,' is a typical example of automatic mental action. He fell asleep whilst reading the passage in ' Purchas's Pilgrimage ' in which the ' stately pleasure house ' is mentioned, and on awaking he felt as if he had composed from two to three hundred lines, which he had nothing to' do but to write down, ' the images rising up as things, with a parallel production of the cor- respondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of effort.' The whole of this singular fragment as it stands, consist- ing of fifty-four lines, was written as fast as his pen could trace the words ; but having been interrupted by a person on business who stayed with him above an hour, he found to his surprise and mortification that ' though he still retained some vague and dim recol- lection of the general purport of the vision, yet with the exception of some eight or ten scattered lines and images, all the rest had passed away like the images on the surface of a stream into which a stone has been cast, * " Mental Physiology," pp. 266-7. but, alas ! without the after-restoration of the latter.' " Dr. Carpenter then quotes the descrip- tion of Coleridge given in Chapter VII. of Carlyle's " Life of John Sterling " : " Coleridge's whole figure and air, good and amiabje, otherwise, might be called flabby and irresolute, expressive of weakness under possibility of strength. He hung loosely on his limbs, with knees bent and stooping atti- tude. In walking he rather shuffled than decisively stepped; and a lady once re- marked he never could fix which side of the garden walk would suit him best, but con- tinually shifted in corkscrew fashion and kept trying both. " Nothing could be more copious than his talk ; and furthermore it was always virtually or literally of the nature of a monologue ; suffering no interruption however reverent : hastily putting aside all foreign additions, annotations or most ingenious desires for elucidation as well-meant superfluities which would never do. Besides it was talk not flowing any whither like a river, but spread- ing everywhither in inextricable currents and regurgitations like a lake or sea ; terri- bly deficient in definite goal or aim, nay, often in logical intelligibility ; what you were to believe or do on any earthly or heavenly thing, obstinately refusing to appear from it. So that most times you felt logically lost, swamped, near to drowning in this tide of in- genious vocables spreading out boundless as if to submerge the world. " He began anywhere. You put some question to him, made some suggestive ob- servation ; instead of answering this or de- cidedly setting out toward answering it, he would accumulate formidable apparatus, log- ical swim-bladders, transcendental life-pre- servers and other precautionary and vehicu- latory gear for setting out ; perhaps did at last get under way, but was swiftly solicited, turned aside by the glance of some radiant new game on this side or that into new courses and ever into new, and before long into all the universe, where it was uncertain what game you would catch or whether any. His talk, alas ! was distinguished like himself by irresolution : it disliked to be troubled with conditions, abstinences, definite fulfil- ments ; loved to wander at its own sweet will and make its auditor 'and his claims and humble wishes a mere passive bucket for itself. " Glorious islets too, balmy, sunny islets of the blest and the intelligible I have seen rise out of the haze, but they were few and soon swallowed in the general element again. " Eloquent, artistically expressive words you always had ; piercing radiances of a most subtle insight came at intervals ; tones of noble pious sympathy, recognizable as pious though strangely colored, were never wanting long ; but in general you could not call this aimless, cloud-rapt, cloud-based, 26 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. lawiessiv meandering human discourse of reason by the name of ' excellent talk,' but only of ' surprising,' and were bitterly re- minded of Hazlitt's account of it : 'Excel- lent talker, very if you let him start from no premises and come to no conclusion.' " We now turn to familiar instances of acquired impairment of voluntary atten- tion. It occurs in two forms. The first is characterized by excessive intellectual ac- tivity, superabundance of states of con- sciousness and abnormal production of feelings and ideas in a given time, as we have seen when speaking of alcoholic in- toxication. This exuberance of cerebral activity is more noticeable still in the more intellectual intoxication produced by hashish'and opium. The individual feels himself to be overwhelmed by the irresistible tide of his ideas, and language is too slow to render the rapidity of his thoughts ; but at the same time the power of directing the course of his ideas becomes weaker and weaker, and the lucid mo- ments shorter and shorter.* This state of psychic exuberance, whatever its cause, fever, cerebral anaemia, emotion always has the same result. Between this state and attention there is a perfect antagonism : one excludes the other. We have here in fact only a spe- cial case of excessive reflex action, only that here we have to do with psychic re- , flex action. In other words all states of consciousness tend to expend themselves, and this they can do only in two ways, either by producing a movement, an act ; or by calling forth other states of con- sciousness, according to the law of asso- ciation. The latter process is a case of reflex action of a complex kind psychic reflex action but like physiological reflex action it is only a form of automatism. The second form brings us back to the type of aboulia. It consists in a progres- sive diminution of the directive power and eventual impossibility of intellectual effort. " In the incipient stage of disease of the brain," says Forbes Winslow.t "the patient complains of an incapacity to control and direct the faculty of attention. He finds he cannot without an obvious and painful effort accomplish his usual mental work, read or master the contents of a letter, newspaper or even a page or two of a favorite book. The ideas become restive and the mind lapses into a flighty condition, exhibiting no capacity for continuity of thought. * Moreau " Du Hashish et de 1'Alidnation Men- tale, p. 60 ; Richet, " Les Poisons del'Intelligence," * *' n S on e .Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Mind, chap. xn. " Fully recognizing his impaired and failing, energies, the patient repeatedly tries to con- quer the defect, and seizing hold of a book,, is resolved not to succumb to his sensations of intellectual incapacity, physical languor and cerebral weakness ; but he often discov- ers (when it is too late to grapple with the mischief) that he has lost all power of healthy mental steadiness, normal concentration, or coordination of thought. In his attempt to comprehend the meaning of the immediate subject under contemplation, he reads and re-reads with a determined resolution, and apparently unflagging energy, certain striking passages and pages of a particular book, but without being able to grasp the simplest chain of thought, or follow successfully an elementary process of reasoning; neither is he in a condition of mind fitting him to com- prehend or retain for many consecutive sec- onds the outline of an interesting story, un- derstand a simple calculation of figures or narrative of facts. The attempt, particularly if it be a sustained one, to master and con- verge the attention to the subject which he is trying to seize, very frequently increases the pre-existing confusion of mind, producing eventually physical sensations of brain lassi- tude and headache." Many general paralytics, after passing through the period of intellectual over- activity the period of gigantic projects, of immoderate purchases, of purposeless voyages, of incessant loquacity, during which the will is dominated by the reflex actions, reach later the period when it is impotent from atonicity : effort persists but for a moment, till at last this ever increasing passivity ends in dementia.* The reader sees without any commen- tary that the diseases of voluntary atten- tion are reducible to the types already considered. It will be best therefore without citing any further instances to- inquire what instruction may be derived from that state of the mind called atten- tion, as to the nature of the will, and what suggestions bearing upon the present research. For this purpose it is not nec- essary that we make a study of attention, however interesting, however ill-under- stood that subject may be. The question: * Of this class of patients some, but they are few pass through a period of struggle which shows wherein the will is master and how it eventually succumbs. " I have seen at Bicetre," says Billed, " a general paralytic whose delire des grandeurs was of the most ultra type, escape from the estab- lishment and go barefoot through a driving rain, ilddle of the night from Bicetre storm and in the m ..M.J in t etui OL mo lillt-lICVLUetl UC11I I UII1 , K.IMJ V\ Illg well that should he betray the first symptom of in- sanity, he would be sent back to Bicetre. He came back nevertheless. I have met with several other instances of soundness of will persisting for a con- siderable lime in general paralytics." THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 27 can be considered here only in part, that is so far as it concerns the wiR. I shall restrict my conclusions upon this point to the following propositions : 1. Voluntary attention, which is com- monly credited with marvelous feats, is only an imitation, artificial, instable and precarious, of spontaneous attention. 2. The latter alone is natural and ef- fective. 3. It depends, as regards its origin and its permanence, upon certain affective states, upon the presence of agreeable or disagreeable feelings : in a word it is sen- sitive in its origin, and hence allied to the reflex actions. 4. The inhibiting action appears to play an important but as yet indefinable part in the mechanism of attention. To establish these propositions it is well first to examine spontaneous attention, considering it in all its different forms. The crouching animal watching its prey ; the child intently gazing at a common- place spectacle ; the assassin awaiting his victim in a nook of a wood here the mental image takes the place of the real object ; the poet contemplating an inward vision ; the mathematician studying out the solution of a problem : * all present essentially the same interior and exterior characters. With Sergi I define the state of intense spontaneous attention to be a differentia- tion of perception producing greater psy- chic energy in some of the nerve centers, and a sort of temporary catalepsy in other centers.! But I have not to study atten- tion in itself, only to determine its origin, its cause. Plainly in the states above enumerated and in their analogues, the true cause is an affective state, a feeling of pleasure, love, hate, curiosity : in short a state more or less complex, agreeable, disagreeable or mixed. Because the prey, the specta- cle, the thought of the victim, the problem to be solved produce in the animal, the child, the assassin, the mathematician, an emotion that is intense and sufficiently dur- able, they are attentive. Eliminate emo- tion, and all is gone : but while emotion lasts, so does attention. The modus operandi is as in those reflex actions which seem to be continuous, because an excita- tion that is incessantly repeated and which * Of course we speak of poets and mathemati- cians that are such by nature, not by education. t Sergi, "Teoria Fisiologica della Percezione." See also Lewes, "Problems of Life and Mind," Third Series; Maudsley, "Physiology of Mind ; " Wundt, " GrundzUge der Physiologischen Psycho- logic ; " Ferrier, " The Functions of the Brain." is ever the same keeps them up till ner- vous exhaustion is produced. Is a counter proof required ? Observe the incapacity for protracted attention of children, women, and in general those of inferior mental force. The reason is that objects awaken in them only superficial, instable feelings, and they are quite inat- tentive to high, complex, profound ques- tions, for these do not touch their emotions. On the other hand they are attentive to trifles, for these interest them. I might add that the orator and the writer hold the attention of their public by addressing- their feelings. Look at the matter from whatever side, and the same conclusion is inevitable ; nor would I dwell upon so evident a fact were it not that the authors who have studied the subject of attention seem to have forgotten this all-important influence. Spontaneous attention gives a maximum) effect with a minimum of effort, while vol- untary attention gives a minimum effect with a maximum of effort, and the con- trast between the two is sharper in pro- portion as the one is more spontaneous, and the other'more voluntary. Voluntary- attention in its highest degree is an arti- ficial state in which with the aid of facti- tioas emotion we keep up certain states, of consciousness that are ever tending to die out for instance when for politeness" sake we carry on a wearisome conversa- tion. In the case of spontaneous atten- tion it is our own individuality that pro- duces this specialization of consciousness ; in voluntary Attention it is an exceedingly limited portion of our individuality. Many- questions suggest themselves here, but as I have already said, I have only to study attention in itself. I had simply to show and this point I hope is beyond contro- versy that attention is by its origin of the nature of reflex action ; that under the form of spontaneous attention it possesses the regularity of the reflex actions and their potency of action ; but that in both cases it is a sensitive excitation that causes it, keeps it up, and measures its intensity. Again we see that the voluntary rests- upon the involuntary and derives from it all its force, and that, compared with the latter, it is very precarious. Education of the power of attention consists in the last resort simply in calling out and develop- ing these factitious emotions, and in striv- ing to make them stable by repetition ; but as there is no creation ex nihtlo, they must have some basis however weak in nature. To conclude as regards this point, I con- fess that for my part I accept the paradox THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. of Helvetius so often disputed, that " all intellectual differences between one man and another spring only from attention," with the proviso that attention here be taken to mean spontaneous attention alone : but then the dictum amounts only to this, that the differences between men are innate and natural. Having shown how attention is pro- duced, we have next to inquire how it is kept up. The difficulty is with voluntary attention only, for, as we have seen, spon- taneous attention explains itself. It is continuous because the excitation which causes it is continuous. On the other hand, the more voluntary it is, the more effort does attention require, and the more instable is it. The two cases are in effect a struggle between states of consciousness. In the first case (spontaneous attention) a state of consciousness or rather a group of states of consciousness possesses such intensity that no struggle against it is possible, and it assumes the mastery by sheer force. In the second case (volun- tary attention) the group of states of con- sciousness is not of sufficient intensity to dominate competing states, and it gets the upper hand only by the aid of an addi- tional force, namely, by the intervention of the will. By what mechanism does attention act ? Apparently by an inhibition of movements. Thus we are brought back to the problem of inhibition, more involved in obscurity here than anywhere else. Let us see what is to be learned upon this point. In the first place it is hardly necessary to repeat that the brain is a motor organ, that is to say that many of its elements have for their function to produce motion, and that there is hardly a single state of conscious- ness which does not contain in some de- gree motor elements. It follows that every state of attention implies the existence of these elements. " In movements of the limbs and trunk the feelings of operation are very conspicuous ; they are less so in the delicate adjustments of the eye, ear, -etc., and are only inductively recognizable in the still more delicate adjustments of attention and comprehension, which are also acts of the mind in more than a met- aphorical sense. . . . The purest intellect- ual combinations involve motor impulses {feelings of operation) quite as necessarily as the combination of muscles in manipu- lation. The feelings of effort and relief in seeking and finding our way through an obscure and tangled mass of ideas the tentatives of hypothesis and induction are but fainter forms of the feelings in seeking and finding our way along- a dark road or thick forest, checked by failure and enlightened by every successful step." * Again every state of consciousness, particularly when it is highly intense, tends to pass into movements ; and so soon as it enters its motor phase, it loses its intensity, it is in decline, it tends to disappear out of the consciousness. But a state of consciousness has another way of expending itself : it may transmit its tension to other states through the mech- anism of association an expenditure in- ward, if you please, in lieu of an expendi- ture outward. But association does not proceed in one fashion only. In sponta- neous attention certain associations gain the mastery themselves alone, and by themselves alone, in virtue of their own intensity. In voluntary attention of which reflection is the highest form we are conscious of a radiation in different directions ; and in cases where we have much difficulty in being attentive, the as- sociations which have the upper hand are those which we do not wish, that is to say those which are not chosen, not af- firmed as the ones that ought to be kept up. By what means then are the weaker associations maintained ? In order to get as clear an idea as may be of the process, let us consider some analogous phenom- ena, though of a less abstruse kind. A man is learning to play a musical instru- ment, or to handle a tool, or better still, a child is learning to write. At first he makes many movements that are quite useless : he keeps moving his tongue, his head, his legs, and only by degrees does he learn to hold his members in subjection, and to confine himself to the required movements of the hands and the eyes. In voluntary attention the process is similar. The associations which go out in all directions may be likened to these useless motions. The problem in both cases is to substitute a limited for an un- limited association. For this purpose, we eliminate all associations not helpful to the end we have in view. Properly speak- ing, we do not suppress states of con- sciousness, but we do prevent their sur- viving to call forth like states and to in- crease and multiply at pleasure. As every one knows the attempt to do this often fails and is always laborious, and while we check divagation, the available nerve force is economized to our advantage, for * G. H. Lewes, " Problems of Life and Mind.' 3d Series cont'd, page 397. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. to lessen purposeless diffusion is to increase useful concentration. Such is the idea we may form of this obscure phenomenon when we strive to get at its mechanism, instead of having recourse to any supposed " faculty " of attention, which explains nothing. Still we must admit with Ferrier that " on what physiological basis this psychological fac- ulty rests is an extremely difficult ques- tion, and is one scarcely capable of ex- perimental determination."* We would add that the foregoing remarks do not pretend to be an explication, but only an approximation. CHAPTER V. THE REALM OF CAPRICE. To will is to choose in order to act: such is for us the formula of normal will. The anomalies so far considered may be classed in two great groups : in one im- pulsion is absent, and no tendency to act appears (aboulia) ; in the other a too rapid or too intense impulsion prevents the act of choice. Before we consider in- stances of extinction of the will, where there is neither choice nor acts, let us study a type of character in which either the will is not formed at all or at best ex- ists only in an extremely instable and in- efficient form. The best instance of this is seen in the hysterical constitution. Properly speaking we find here rather a constitutional state than a mere derange- ment. A simple irresistible impulse is like an acute disease ; permanent and in- vincible impulses are like a chronic mal- ady ; but the hysterical character is a diathesis. It is a state in which the con- ditions of volition are nearly always lack- ing. From the description recently given by Dr. Huchard of the characters of hys- terical subjects I take the following par- ticulars bearing upon our subject : " One prominent trait of their character is mobility. From day to day, from hour to hour, from minute to minute they pass with incredible rapidity from joy to sadness, from laughter to tears. Changeable, freakish or capricious, at one moment they talk with amazing loquacity, but the next they are gloomy and taciturn, have not a word to say, being lost in reverie or plunged in pro- found depression. Then they are possessed by a vague indefinable feeling of sadness ac- * " Functions of the Brain." The two para- graphs devoted to this question will be read with profit. companied by a choking sensation and op- pression in the epigastric region. They have fits of sobbing, and seek to hide their tears in solitude ; again on the other hand they have outbursts of immoderate laughter, without sufficient cause. ' They behave,' says Ch. Richet, ' like children who oftentimes can be made to laugh heartily, while their cheeks are still wet with the tears they have shed.' . ' Their character changes like the views of a kaleidoscope, a fact which led Sydenham justly to remark that inconstancy is their most constant trait. Yesterday they were joyous, amiable, gracious : to-day they are ill-humored, touchy, irascible, vexed by every trifle, testy and snappish, dissatisfied with everything ; nothing interests them, they are tired of life. They conceive a strong antip- athy to-day toward the person they esteemed and loved yesterday, or vice -versa, and they are as zealous to hate certain persons now as. before they were eager to show them every mark of affection. " Sometimes their sensibility is aroused by a most trivial cause, while the profounder emotions scarcely touch it: they are indifferent, unmoved by the recital of a real sorrow, while they shed abundant tears and give themselves up to despair on account of some harmless speech that they misinterpret, or some trivial pleasantry that they transform into an affront. This moral ataxy is exhibited even with regard to their nearest interests. One hysterical sub- ject will be entirely indifferent about the con- duct of her husband ; another will be heedless of the danger that threatens her fortunes. By turns they are gentle or violent, says Moreau of Tours, kind or cruel ; impressionable to excess ; rarely master of the first movement of passion ; incapable of resisting impulses of the most opposite kinds ; they show a lack of equilibrium between the higher moral faculties will, conscience, and the lower faculties instincts, passions and desires. " This extreme mobility in their state of mind and their affectional disposition, this instability of character, this want of fixed- ness, this absence of stability in their ideas and volitions, explains their incapacity to- keep the attention long fixed upon a book, a study or a task of any kind whatever. " All these change.' :ake place with great rapidity. In hysterical subjects the impul- sions are not altogether free from control by the intelligence, as they are in epileptics, but they are quickly followed by acts. This is the explanation of those sudden movements of anger and indignation, those outbursts of enthusiasm, those fits of desperation ; the^ mad gayety, the sudden affectionateness or* the equally sudden transports of wrath dur- ing which they stamp the floor like spoiled children, break the furniture, and so on. " Hysterical women are governed by the passions. Nearly all the different phases of their character, of their mental state, may be summed up in these words : they know not how to will, they cannot will, they will not will. Just because their will is ever waver- :30 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. ing and tottering ; because it is ever in a state of instable equilibrium ; because it turns like the weather, vane to the slightest gust : for all these reasons do hysterical subjects show such variableness, such incon- stancy in their desires, their ideas and their affections."* Heaving reproduced this faithful por- trait we may abridge our comments. The reader has here placed before his eyes this state of incoordination, of broken equilibrium, of anarchy and of " moral ataxy ; " but it still remains for us to jus- tify the assertion made at the beginning of this chapter, that we see here a consti- tutional impotence of will ; that the will cannot exist here because the conditions of its existence are wanting. For clear- ness' sake, I will anticipate what will be established by proofs and in fuller detail when I sum up the conclusions of the work. If we take an adult person endowed with an average will, we find that his ac- tivity (that is to say his power to produce .acts) is of three degrees. In the lowest degree are automatic acts, simple or com- posite reflex actions, habits ; next above these come the acts produced by the feel- ings, the emotions and the passions ; high- est of all the acts dictated by reason. These last presuppose the other two, rest upon them and consequently depend upon them, though they give to them coordina- tion and unity. Capricious characters, of which the hysterical character is the type, possess only the two lower forms ; the third is as it were atrophied. The rational activity is by nature, the very rare excep- tions apart, always the wea'kest. It be- comes predominant only on condition that the ideas in the mind call into action cer- tain feelings that are far more apt than ideas to pass into acts. As we have seen, the more abstract an idea, the weaker is its motor tendency. In subjects of hys- teria the regulative ideas either do not come into being at all, or they remain simply theoretic concepts. It is because certain ideas, as those of utility, conven- ience, duty and the like remain in this state of theoretic conceptions, that they are not/?// by the individual, that they produce in him no affectional reverbera- tion, so to speak, that they do not enter into his moral fiber but remain as it were a foreign element : hence they are with- out action ; hence they are practically as though they did not exist. * Axenfe'.d et Huchard, "Traitd des Nevroses " ^d edition, 1881. pp. 958-971. The individual's power of acting is maimed and imperfect. The tendency of the feelings and passions to pass into acts is doubly strong, both in itself and because there is nothing above it to hamper it or to be a counterpoise to it. And as it is the characteristic of the feelings as of the reflex actions to go straight to their ob- ject, and to have an adaptation in one direction only unilateral, whereas ra- tional adaptation is multilateral, the de- sires, rapidly conceived and immediately satisfied, leave the ground free for other desires whether like or opposite, according to the ever changing whims of the indi- vidual. There is nothing but caprice, or at most velleity, the merest simulacrum of volition. Still the fact that desire proceeds only in one direction and tends to expend it- self unchecked, does not explain the insta- bility of the hysteric character nor its lack of will. If a desire that is ever satisfied is ever recurring, there is stability. The predominance of the affectional life does not of necessity preclude will : indeed a passion intense, stable, consented to is the very basis of an energetic wilL Such passion we find in men of great ambition in the martyr whose faith is not to be shaken ; in the redskin who in the midst of his tortures defies his enemies. We must search deeper therefore for the cause of the instability found in the hysteric character ; and this cause cannot be any- thing else but a state of the individuality, that is, in the last resort, of the organism. We say that will is strong whose aim, whatever it be, is fixed. If circumstances change, means are changed : adaptations are successively made, in view of new en- vironments ; but the center toward which all converges does not change. Its stabil- ity expresses the permanency of charac- ter in the individual. If the same end is ever chosen, approved, the reason is that the individual continues to be the same. But suppose an organism with instable functions, whose unity which is simply a consensus is ever in process of dissolution and reconstitution upon anew plan accord- ing to the sudden variations of the func- tions that make it up : clearly in such a case choice can hardly exist and cannot be enduring : there are only velleities and caprices. , This is what takes place in sub- jects of hysteria. The instability is a fact : its cause is very probably to be found in functional disorders. Anaesthesia of the special senses or of the general sensibility, hyperaesthesia, derangement of the motor apparatus, contraction of muscles, convul- THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 31 sions, paralysis, derangement of the vaso- motor, secretory and other functions a'll of these causes occurring successively or simultaneously, keep the organism con- stantly in a state of instable equilibrium ; and the character, which is only the psy- chic expression of the organism, varies in the same degree. For a stable character to rest upon so wavering a base were a miracle. Here therefore we see the true cause of the impotence of will, and this impotence is, as we have said, constitu- tional. Certain facts, while they seem to con- flict with this theory, only give confirma- tion to it. Hysterical patients are some- times possessed by a. fixed idea, of which it is impossible to disabuse them. One re- fuses to eat, another to speak, a third to use her eyes, on the ground that the work of digestion or the exercise of the vocal or the visual organs would, as they imagine, cause them pain. More frequently we find the species of paralysis known as " psychic " or " ideal." The patient re- mains abed for weeks, months or even years, in the belief that she is unable to stand or to walk. Some moral shock, or simply the influence of some one who possesses her confidence, or who acts with authority effects a cure. One be- takes herself to her feet at the alarm of fire ; another rises from her bed and goes to meet her long-absent brother ; a third decides to partake of food out of fear of her physician. Briquet, in his " Traite de 1'Hysterie," mentions several cases of women whom he cured by inspiring them with faith in their recovery. We might quote many of those so-called miraculous cures which have amused the curiosity of the public from the time of the deacon Paris to our own day. The physiological causes of this sort of paralysis are subject of keen disputation. Looking at it from the psychological point of view, we recognize the existence of a fixed idea the result of which is an inhibi- tion. Now since an idea does not exist of itself, nor without certain cerebral con- ditions, and since it is only a part of a psychophysiological whole the conscious part it must correspond to an abnormal :state of the organism, of the motor cen- ters perhaps, and thence it must have its origin. However that may be, there is no " exaltation " of the will, as some physicians have stoutly contended : on the contrary there is absence of will. We come again upon a morbid type that we have already studied, differing from that only in form : it is inhibitory. But there is no reaction springing direct from the individual, against the fixed idea. It is an influence from without that interposes and produces an opposite state of conscious- ness, with the concomitant feelings and physiological states. The result of this is a strong impulsion to act, which sup- presses and takes the place of the state of inhibition : but it is hardly a volition : at best it is a volition produced with the as- sistance of others. The conclusion to which we are led by these phenomena is, again, that the condi- tions of will are wanting, and will cannot exist. CHAPTER VI. EXTINCTION OF THE WILL. THE cases of extinction of the will, which we are now to study, are those in which there is neither choice nor action. When the whole psychic activity is, or seems to be completely suspended, as in deep sleep, in artificial anaesthesia, in coma and similar states, there is a return to the vegetative life. Of this we will not treat : the will disappears because all psychic life disappears. We have to do here with cases where one form of mental activity continues, though there remains no possi- bility of choice followed by act. This ex- tinction of the will is seen in ecstasy and in somnambulism. Authors distinguish divers kinds of ec- stasy as mystic, morbid, physiological, cataleptic, somnambulic, and so forth. These distinctions are of no consequence here, for at bottom the mental state is the same in all the forms. Most ecstasists reach the ecstatic condition naturally, in virtue of their physical constitution ; but others assist nature by artificial processes. The religious and philosophical literature of the Orient, India particularly, abounds in writings from which it has been possi- ble to compile a sort of working manual showing how to bring about ecstasy. To stand motionless ; to gaze fixedly at the sky, or a luminous object, on the tip of the nose, or on one's navel (after the man- ner of the monks of Mt. Athos hence called Omphalopsycht) ; to repeat continually the monosyllable OM (Brahm) contemplat- ing the while the supreme being ; to " hold in the breath," i.e. to retard respiration ; " to have no heed of time or place : " such are the acts which " cause one to be like 32 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. unto tne placid light of a lamp set in a place where the wind blows not." " Having attained this state the ecstasist presents certain physical characters : now he is motionless and mute ; anon he inter- prets the vision that holds him entranced, by speech and song and gesture. Seldom does he quit the spot where he stands. His physiognomy is expressive, but his eyes though open see not. Sounds no longer reach his sense, save in some cases the voice of a particular person. The general sensibility is gone : he feels no contact : neither pricking nor burning causes pain. What he feels inwardly the ecstasist alone may tell, and were it not that at waking he retains a very distinct recollec- tion of it, the profane would have to rely on inductions. The speeches and the writings of ecstasists show striking uni- formity amid differences of race, of belief, of mental constitution, of time and of place. Their mental state is reduced to one im- age-idea standing either isolated or as the center of a single group which engrosses the entire consciousness and maintains it- self there with extreme intensity. Many mystics have described this state with great precision, and above all St. Theresa. I take a few passages from her autobiog- raphy in order thus to place before the reader an authentic description of ecstasy. In communion w/th God there are four degrees pf " prayer," which she compares to four ways of watering a garden, " the first by drawing the water by main force out of a well : this is sheer hard work ; the second, by drawing it by means of a norm (Persian wheel) in this way one obtains more water with less fatigue ; the third, by conducting the water from some river or brook ; the fourth and incompar- ably the easiest is an abundant fall of rain, God himself undertaking to water the gar- den without the slightest fatigue on our part." ' " Bhagavad Gita," VI. The Buddhist teach- ers say that there are four degrees in the contempla- tion which leads to the earthly nirvdna. The first degree is the inward feeling of happiness which springs up in the soul of the ascetic when he de- clares himself to have at length come to distinguish the nature of things. The yogki is then detached from all other desire save the nirvana: he still exercises judgment and reason ; his intelligence is mil centered on the nirvdna., and feels only the pleas- ure of inner satisfaction, without judging of it, with- out even understanding it. In the third degree, the pleasure of satisfaction is gone, and the sage is indifferent about the felicity which his intelligence still experiences. The sole pleasure that remains for him is a vague sense of physical well-being, obscure and all as it is ; he has also lost all memory ; he has lost even the sense of his indifference. Free of all pleasure and of all pain, he has attained impassibility: he is as near to nir- vdna as he can be in this life. (Barth. Saint-Hi- Uire, Le Bouddha et sa Religion," pp. 136, 137.) In the first two degrees there are as yet only the rudiments of ecstasy, as she observes in passing : " Sometimes while reading I would suddenly experience a sense of the presence of God. It is utterly impossible for me to doubt that he was within me or that I was quite lost in him. This was not a Vision. . . It suspends the soul in such' a way that it seems to be quite outside of itself. The will loves, the memory to me appears almost lost, the understanding acts not at all, yet it is not lost." In a higher degree which is " neither a ravishment nor a spiritual sleep," " the will alone acts and, not knowing how it is made captive, gives simply to God its con- sent, that he may imprison it, in the as- surance that it becomes the thrall of him whom it loves. . . . The understanding- and memory come to the assistance of the will, to the end it may become more and more capable of enjoying so great a good. Sometimes however their aid serves only to disturb the will, in this close union with God. But then the will, not suffering it- self to be disturbed by their importunity, must cleave to the delights and to the pro- found calm which it is enjoying. The at- tempt to exercise these other two powers [faculties] would lead the will astray with them. They are then like doves which, dissatisfied with the food provided for them by their master without any exertion on their part, go in search of other food, but which, after seeking in vain, make haste to return to the dove-cote." In this degree " I look on it as a great advan- tage, when writing, to find myself in the prayer of which I am speaking, for I then see clearly that neither the expression nor the thought comes from me ; and after it has been written, I cannot understand how I could ever have done it : this hap- pens to me often." In the third degree we have the ecstasy : " This state is a sleep of the powers [facul- ties] wherein, though not altogether lost in God, they nevertheless know not how they operate. ... It is as though one who longs for death were already holding in Kis hand the blessed candle, and had but to draw one breath more to attain the fulfillment of his longings. It is for the soul an agony full of inexpressible delights, wherein it feels itself dying almost entirely to all the things of the world, and reposes with rapture in the enjoy- ment of its God. No other terms do I find to portray or to explain what I experience. In this state the soul knows not what to do : knows not whether it is speaking or is silent : whether it laughs or weeps : it is a glorious delirium, a heavenly madness, a supremely delicious mode of enjoyment. . . . And while it THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 33 thus searches for its God, the soul feels with a very lively and a very sweet pleasure that it is fainting almost quite away : it falls into a sort of swoon which little by little deprives the body of respiration and of all its strength. It is unable without a very laborious effort to make the slightest movement of the hands. The eyes close without any purpose of the soul to shut them ; and if it keeps them open it sees almost nothing. It is incapable of reading, even if it would ; it sees indeed the letters, but can neither distinguish them nor assemble them. When spoken to it hears the sound of the speaker's voice, but no dis- tinct words. So too it receives no service of its senses. . . . All its outer strength de- parts : conscious that thereby its own strength is increased, it can the better enjoy its glorious privilege. ... In truth, if I am to judge from my own experience, this ' prayer is at first of so brief duration as not to reveal itself in so manifest a way by external signs and the suspension of the senses. It is to be observed, at least in my opinion, that this suspension of all the powers never lasts long : the sus- pension is a protracted one that lasts half an hour, and I do not think with me it ever lasted so long. Still it must be confessed that it is difficult to judge of this matter, see- ing that one is at the time deprived of feeling. I would simply call attention to one point, namely that whenever this general suspension occurs hardly any time elapses before some one or other of the powers [faculties] comes to itself. The will is the faculty which per- sists best in the divine union, but the other two soon begin to importune it. As it is in serenity, it brings them back and suspends them again ; thus they remain tranquil for a moment, and then resume their natural life. With these alternations the prayer may con- tinue and does in fact continue for some hours. . . . But that state of perfect ecstasy in which the imagination does not wander to any external object is, I repeat, of short du- ration. I would add that as the powers come to themselves only imperfectly, they may re- main in a sort of delirium for some hours, during which God from time to time enrapt- ures them anew and fixes them in himself. . . . What occurs in this secret union is so hidden that it is impossible to speak of it more clearly. The soul then sees itself to be so near to God, and so strong is its certitude touching that fact, that it cannot have the slightest doubt that it enjoys such a favor, all its powers lose their natural activity : they have no knowledge of their operations. . . . Thus the butterfly, memory, sees its wings scorched here, and it no longer can flit hither and thither. The will no doubt is oc- cupied with loving, but it understands not how it loves. As for the understanding, if it understands at all it does so in a vay that remains unknown to itself, nor can it com- prehend aught of what it understands."* * " Vie de Sainte Therese ecrite pur elle-meme." Compare Plotinus, " Enneades, VI. ; Tauler, " Institutio Christiana." I will not follow St. Theresa in her de- scription of "rapture" "that divine eagle which with sudden impetuosity seizes you and carries you off." These extracts suffice, and whoever reads them attentively will not hesitate to attribute to them all the value of a good psychologi- cal observation.* On examining the detailed narratives of other ecstasists, which I cannot present here, I find that ecstasy may be conven- iently for the purpose of our work divided into two classes. In the first motor power persists in a certain degree. The ecstasist follows the several phases of the Passion, the Nativity or some other relig- ious drama, reproducing it with appropri- ate movements. There is a series of highly intense images with one invariable order of succession, being repeated again and again with perfect automatism. Ma- rie von Moerl and Louise Lateau are well known instances. The other class is that of ecstasy in re- pose. Here the idea alone reigns, com- monly an abstract or metaphysical idea : in the case of St. Theresa and Plotinus it is the idea of God ; for Buddhists it is Nirvdna. All movements are repressed : there is felt only " a residuum of inward agitation." Observe in passing how all this agrees with what has already been said, that with abstract ideas the tendency to movement is at the minimum, and that these ideas being representations of rep- resentations pure schematisms the mo- tor element grows weaker in the same de- gree as the representative element. But in both cases the mental state of ecstasy is a complete reversal of the laws of the normal mechanism of conscious- ness. Consciousness exists only on the condition of perpetual change : it is essen- tially discontinuous. An homogeneous and continuous consciousness is an impos- sibility. Ecstasy fulfills the conditions of * St. Theresa thus describes her physical state during her " raptures ": "Oftentimes my body would become so light that it no longer possessed any weight sometimes I no longer felt my feet touching the ground. While the body is in rapt- ure it remains as though it were dead, and often is absolutely powerless to act. It retains whatever attitude it may have assumed at the moment of the access ; thus it continues standing or seated, the hands open or closed, in a word it continues in the state wherein the rapture found it. Though commonly a person does not }ose feeling, still it has happened to me to be entiiely deprived of it. This has occurred very rarely and it has lasted only for a very short time. Most frequently feel- ing remains ; but a person experiences an inde- finable disturbance ; and though it is impossible to perform any external act, one still can hear a sort of confused sounds coming from a distance. And even this kind of hearing ceases when the rapture is in the highest degree. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. such consciousness in the highest degree possible, but as St. Theresa remarks, either consciousness disappears, or the understanding and the memory that is discontinuity come back at intervals bringing consciousness back with them. This psychological anomaly is compli- cated with another. All states of con- sciousness tend to expend themselves in proportion to their intensity. In the high- est ecstasy the expenditure is naught, and it is owing to the absence of the motor phase that the intellectual intensity is maintained. The brain, which is in the normal state an organ at once intellective and motor, ceases to be a motor organ. Furthermore, in the intellectual order the heterogeneous and manifold states of con- sciousness which constitute the ordinary staple of life have disappeared. The sen- sations are suppressed, and with them the associations they call out. One single representation absorbs everything. If we compare the normal psychic activity to circulating capital that is continually mod- ified by receipts and outlays, then we may say that here the capital is massed in one sum ; concentration takes the place of dif- fusion, extensive force, is transformed into intensive. It is no wonder therefore if in this state of mental erethism the ecstasist seems to be transfigured, lifted above her- self. Certainly the visions of the rude peasant girl of Sanderet who saw a virgin all of gold in a silvery paradise, bear but little resemblance to those of a Saint The- resa ; but every intelligence does its max- imum in the moment of ecstasy. Is there any need now of inquiring why there is neither choice nor acts in that state ? How could there be choice, seeing that choice presupposes the existence of that complex whole, the Ego, which has disappeared ? The personality being re- duced to one idea or one vision, there is no state that can be chosen, that is in- corporated with the whole, to the exclu- sion of others. In a word there is nothing that can choose, nothing that can be chosen. As well might we suppose an election without either electors or candi- dates. Thus action is nipped in the bud, utterly estopped. Only its elementary forms re- main, as the respiratory movements, etc., without which organic life were impossi- ble. We have here a curious instance of psychological correlation or antagonism : whatever one function gains is lost by some other : whatever thought gains is lost by movement. In this respect ecstasy is the opposite of the states in which mo- tility is predominant, as epilepsy, chorea, convulsions, etc. In these cases we see maximum of movements, minimum of consciousness : in ecstasy intensity of con- sciousness with minimum of movement. There is at all times only a certain sum of nervous and psychic force available : if this is monopolized by one function, the other functions are impoverished. Whether the excess shall be on the one side or on the other depends on the nature of the individual. Having studied extinction of the will in its highest phase, we may remark that we find in the act of contemplation, of pro- found reflection, modified and minor forms of the same phenomenon. The un- fitness of contemplative minds for action has its physiological and psychological reasons, and these are explained to us by the state of ecstasy. It is of equal interest to the psycholo- gist and to the physiologist to know what it is that produces abolition of conscious- ness in somnambulism whether natural or artificially induced, and from what or- ganic conditions it results. But though the subject has been a matter of eager research for some years, we have nothing to offer but theories, and the reader may choose between several hypotheses. Some authors, as Schneider and Berger, regard it as a result of " expectant atten- tion " producing a unilateral and abnor- mal concentration of consciousness. Preyer holds it to be a special case com- ing under his theory of sleep. Other authors, as Rumpf, favor the theory of reflex changes in the cerebral circulation hyperasmia and anaemia in the surface of the hemispheres of the brain. Heiden- hain who opposes this last theory refers hypnotism to an inhibiting action. There occurs, he says, a, suspension of the activ- ity of the cortical nerve cells, probably resulting from a change in their molecu- lar arrangement, and in this way the func- tional movement of the gray matter is in- terrupted. This hypothesis seems to be most in favor, and since it is, at least from the psychological standpoint, simply a statement of fact, we may adopt it. There is no need to describe a state so many times described before, and that so carefully. We would merely remark that the terms somnambulism, hypnotism and their analogues do not designate a state identical in all individuals and in every case. This state varies in the same indi- vidual from simple drowsiness to profound stupor ; between one individual and THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 35 anther it varies according to their re- spective constitutions,* pathological con- ditions, etc. It would therefore be illogi- cal to affirm that there is always abolition of the will power. As we shall see, some cases are very doubtful. Take first hypnotism in the form des- ignated by many authors Lethargic. The mental inertia here is absolute ; conscious- ness is utterly gone ; the reflex actions are in excess an excess which always keeps pace with the decline of the higher activ- ity. At a word from the operator, the hypnotized subject rises, walks, sits down, sees absent persons, goes on a journey, describes the landscape, and so on. The only will, as we say, is that of the oper- ator. The meaning of this expressed in more precise terms, is : In the vacant field of consciousness a state is called up ; and since states of consciousness tend to action, whether immediately or after having called forth associations, an act follows. The passage to action is here all the easier because there is nothing that hinders it, neither power of inhibition nor an antag- onistic state, the idea suggested by the operator having the sole dominion in the slumbering consciousness. Other phe- nomena apparently more anomalous are explained in the same way. We know that by giving to the members of the hyp- notized subject certain postures we can awaken in him the emotion of pride, ter- ror, lowliness, devotion, etc. ; if we place "him in the position for climbing, he makes as though he were going up a ladder ; if we put in his hands any instrument he has been wont to employ, he goes to work with it. Plainly the position given to the members awakens in the cerebral centers the corresponding states of consciousness with which they have become associated by much repetition. The idea, once it is awakened, is in the same condition as one coming from the direct order or sugges- tion of the operator. All these cases there- fore are reducible to the same formula : the hypnotized subject is an automaton that is made to act according to the nature of his organization. There is absolute abolition of will, the conscious personality being reduced to one single state which is neither chosen nor rejected, but suffered, imposed. The automatism is spontaneous in nat- ural somnambulism ; in other words, it has for its antecedent some cerebral state, and that in turn has for its antecedent some special excitation in the organism. Often the automatism is of a high order : the series of states of consciousness called out is long and each term of the series is complex. As its type we may cite the singer whose history is given by Mesnet. If a cane were offered to him he would take it to be a musket, his recollections of army life coming back to him ; he would load his weapon, lie prone upon the ground, take aim and fire. Give him a roll of pa- per, and his recollection of his present call- ing were called forth ; he would open the roll and sing at the top of his voice.* But the unvarying repetition of the same acts in the same order in each paroxysm gives to all these phenomena a very definite char- acter of automatism from which all will power is eliminated. Some cases however are doubtful. Bur- dach tells of " a very fine ode " that was composed in the somnambulic state. The story has often been told of the abb6 who in preparing a sermon corrected and pruned his sentences, changed the places of epithets, etc. Again, a man made sun- dry attempts at suicide and each time tried different means. Facts of this kind are so numerous that, even making allow- ance for credulity and exaggeration, it is impossible to reject them all. It might be said that such acts involve comparison followed by a choice, a pref- erence in other words a volition : and hence that we have here will power, that is a true reaction of the individual, faint, indeed, obscure, limited, but active. But we may also hold that automatism is of itself sufficient. For is it not a rec- ognized truth that in the normal state the intellectual work is often automatic, and all the more valuable on that account? Is not what the poets call inspiration an involuntary and almost unconscious sort of brain work at least is it not conscious only in its results ? We read our own writings over again, and our corrections are often spontaneous, that is to say, the movement of thought brings a new asso- ciation of words and ideas which is immediately substituted for the other. Hence it may be that the individual as one that chooses and prefers is here of no account. Examining the matter more minutely, we may hold that all these cases are not strictly comparable : if to compose an ode automatism suffices, it does not suffice for correcting it ; in the latter case there is choice, however rapid, however insignificant we may suppose it to be. In- stead of a zero of will we should have a minimum of will. This opinion is reduci- * " De rAutomatisme de la M&noireetdu Souve- nir dans le Somnambulisme Pathologique." Paris, 1874. oti THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. ble to the first, and differs from it only by a hair's breadth. The reader will choose between these two interpretations. I pass now to cases in which the data are more definitely as- certained. We find among hypnotized subjects instances of resistance. An or- der is not obeyed, a suggestion is not fol- lowed immediately. The mesmerists of the last century recommended the opera- tor to assume the tone of authority and advised the subject to practice trust, con- fidence, which produce assent and pre- vent resistance. " While in the state of somnambulism B. performed certain acts at the word of command, but others she refused to per- form. Usually she would not read though we are confident she could see, despite the apparent occlusion of her eyelids. When her hands were placed in the atti- tude of prayer, her mind was impressed accordingly. Asked what she was doing, she said she was praying to the Blessed Virgin, but that she did not see her. So long as her hands remained in the same position, she continued her prayer, and showed displeasure if any one sought to distract her. When the position of the hands wa changed, the praying ceased immediately. However exempt it may be from will action, the praying is in this case in some sort under the control of the reason, for the subject shows a dislike to being distracted, and is able to argue with any one who would interrupt her prayer." * One of Richer 's subjects readily allowed himself to be metamorphosed into an of- ficer, a sailor, etc., but he refused with tears in his eyes to be transformed into a priest. This was sufficiently explained by the man's habits and the atmosphere in which he had lived. Hence there are cases in which two states co-exist one produced by outside influences, the other by influences from within. We know what the automatic power of the former is. But in the other state this is effaced by a contrary state : there is here something resembling inhi- bition. But the inhibition is so weak that commonly it succumbs before repeated attacks : and it is so vague that we cannot say what its nature is. Is it not simply an antagonistic state of consciousness awak- ened by the very suggestion, so that it would all amount to the co-existence of two contrary states of consciousness ? Or is the case more complex, and must we * P. Richer, " fitude sur 1'Hyst^ro-fipilepsie," pp. 426, 427. say that it represents the sum of the ten- dencies still existing in the individual, and some residue of that which constitutes his character ? If we accept Heidenhain's theory we must recognize in the so called lethargic state a complete arrest of func- tional activity ; the order or the suggestion of the operator would set in action an ex- ceedingly limited number of nerve ele- ments in the cortex ; but in the state of resistance we should see awakening from their sleep some of those elements which in the normal state constitute the physio- logical and psychological basis of the in- dividuality, being the synthetic expression of the organism. It must be confessed that, even admitting this second hypothe- sis, all that would remain of will power, of the individual's power of reacting accord- ing to his nature, would be an embryo, a power so stripped of efficacity that it is hardly to be called will. Again it may be remarked that if it is difficult for the observer to say what power of reacting persists in the person who resists, the person himself is no better judge. " A close analysis of the phenom- ena such as can be made by educated, intelligent men submitting to the action of animal magnetism, proves how difficult it is even for the magnetized patient to make sure that he is not simulating. To make these observations, the sleep should not be very profound. In the period of engourdissement consciousness is retained, but nevertheless there is a very plain au- tomatism." A physician of Breslau told Heidenhain that magnetization made no impression on him ; yet after he had been brought into the state of engour dissentient, he was unable to pronounce a single word. On being awakened, he declared that he could have spoken easily enough, and that if he had said nothing, it was because he had preferred not to speak. Put in the state of engourdissement again by a few passes, he was again unable to speak. Once more he was awakened, and had to con- fess that if he had not spoken the reason was that he could not speak. A friend of mine having been engourdi, and not quite put to sleep, observed closely this phe- nomenon of impotence coincident with the illusion of the possession of power. When I indicate to him a movement to be per- formed, he always executes it, though be- fore being magnetized he was quite de- termined to resist. This he has the greatest difficulty in accounting for after awakening. ' Certainly,' he says, ' I could resist, but I have not the will to do so.' Sometimes he is tempted to believe that THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 37 he is simulating. ' When I am dozing,' he says, ' I simulate automatism though I could, as it seems to me, act otherwise. I begin with the firm resolve not to simu- late, but in spite of me when sleep begins it seems to me that I simulate.' Of course this sort of simulation of a phenomenon is absolutely identical with its reality. Automatism is demonstrated by the very fact that perfectly honest subjects are un- able to act otherwise than as automata. It is of little consequence that they im- agine that they are able to resist. They do not resist. That is the fact that must be taken into consideration, and not the illusion that possesses them that they have the power of resistance."* Still this power of resistance, weak though it be, is not equal to zero : it is a last survival of the individual reaction ex- ceedingly reduced ; it is on the confine of nullity but does not pass over. The illu- sion of this feeble power of inhibition must answer to some equally precarious physi- ological state. In short the state of som- nambulism whether natural or induced may justly be regarded as a state of abo- lition of the will. Exceptions are rare and obscure, but they bring their own measure of instruction". They prove once again that volition is not an invariable quantity, but that it diminishes till the point is reached where we may with equally good reason either affirm or deny its existence. I will mention in passing a fact that hardly belongs to the pathology of the will but which furnishes matter for reflection. Certain hypnotized subjects may be com- manded to perform an action at some fu- ture time, at a given time in the same day, or even at a later time, say eight or ten days hence. After they have come to, they execute the command at the pre- scribed time, on the appointed day, com- monly saying that they know not why. In some curious instances these persons give specious reasons to explain their con- duct, to justify this act which does not spring from their own spontaneity, but is imposed upon them though they know it not. I cite a case that came untier my own observation. A young man at 10 o'clock ordered his mistress who was in the hypnotic state to leave him at three o'clock in the morning ; then he restored her to the normal state. Toward three o'clock she awoke, made ready to go, and though he begged her to stay, she found reasons to excuse and justify her going at * Ch. Richet, in the " Revue Philosophique," 5883. that unseasonable hour. " Our illusion of free will," says Spinoza, " is only ignorance of the motives that lead us to act." Do not facts of this kind support the dic- tum?* CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION. HAVING examined the different morbid types, let us now see whether we can dis- cover a law which shall sum up the pathol- ogy of the will and throw some light upon the normal state. As a matter of fact, volition alone ex- ists, that is to say a choice followed by acts. Certain conditions are requisite to produce a volition. A lack of impulsion or of inhibition, an excess of automatic ac- tivity, of a tendency, of an appetite, a fixed idea, all these may prevent volition for a moment, an hour, a day, a period of one's life. The sum of these necessary and suf- ficient conditions may be called will. With respect to volition the will is a cause, though it is itself a sum of effects, a re- sultant varying with its elements. This has been proved by pathology. These elements, briefly stated, are as follows : i . Tendencies toward action (or inhibition) resulting from the circum- stances, the surroundings, the counsels, the education that influence a person. In a word all tendencies which are the effect of external causes. 2. Character, the principal element, which is the effect of interior causes, and not an entity but the resultant of the in- numerable infinitesimal states and tenden- cies of all the anatomical elements that constitute a given organism. Or briefly, character is for us the psychological ex- pression of a given organism, deriving from it its proper complexion, its special tone and its relative permanence. It is the ultimate stratum whereon rests the possibility of will and which makes the will strong or weak, intermittent, average or extraordinary. If now we consider the will not in its constituent elements but in the phases through which it passes in its evolution, we see that volition is the final term in a progressive series whereof simple reflex action is the first step. It is the highest form of activity activity being understood * Many similar facts are recorded in Ch. Richet's article already quoted, " Rev. Philos.," March, 38 THE DISEASES OF TBE WILL. in the precise sense of power to produce acts, power of reaction. The will has for its basis a legacy com- ing down from generations innumerable, and registered in the organism, namely primordial automatic activity, which is almost invariable, and quite unconscious, although in the distant past it must have been accompanied by a rudiment of con- sciousness which later faded away, in proportion as coordination, growing more perfect, became organic in the species. Upon this basis rests the conscious and individual activity of the appetites, de- sires, feelings, passions, whose coordina- tion is more complex and far less stable. Higher still we have ideomotor activity whicn in its extreme manifestations at- tains a coordination at once very stable and very complex : this is perfect volition. It may therefore be said that perfect volition has for its coordination a hierar- chic coordination, that is to say, it is not enough that reflex actions be coordinated with reflex actions, rational tendencies with rational tendencies, but there must be coordination between these different groups coordination with subordination, so that all shall converge toward a single point, namely the end to be attained. Let the reader recall the morbid cases already cited, and in particular those ir- resistible impulses which in themselves represent almost the entire pathology of the will, and he will see that they are all reducible to this formula : Absence of hierarchic coordination, independent, ir- regular, isolated, anarchic action. Hence whether we regard the will in its constituent elements or in the succes- sive phases of its genesis and the two aspects are inseparable, we see that its ultimate result, volition, is not a phenom- enon supervening we know not whence, but that it has its root deep in the nature of the individual, nay beyond the individ- ual in the species and in all species. It comes not from above but from below ; it is a sublimation of the lower elements. Volition may be compared to the key- stone of an arch. To that stone the arch owes its strength, even its existence ; nevertheless this stone derives its power from the other stones that support it and press it on all sides, as it in turn presses them and gives them stability. These preliminary observations were requisite for an understanding of the law which governs overthrow of the will ; for if the foregoing considerations be just, then since dissolution always pursues a course the reverse of that followed by ev- olution, it follows that the more complex will manifestations must disappear before the more simple and the more simple be- fore automatism. To express the law in its exact form, and regarding volition not as a phenomenon sui generis but as the highest manifestation of individual activ- ity, we should say that dissolution pro- ceeds in a retrograde direction from the more voluntary and the more complex to the less voluntary and the more simple, i.e. toward automatism. We have now to show that this law is confirmed by facts, and here we have only to select our materials. In 1868 Hughlings Jackson, while en- gaged in the study of certain disorders of the nervous system, observed, for the first time as I believe, that the more vol- untary and the more specialized move- ments and faculties are the first to be af- fected, and that in a greater degree than the others.* This " principle of dissolu- tion," or of " reduction to a more auto- matic state " was proposed by Dr. Jack- son as the correlative of Herbert Spen- cer's doctrines touching the evolution of the nervous system. He takes a very simple case, that of hemiplegia from lesion of the corpus striatum. A clot of blood here makes an experiment for us. The patient, whose face, tongue, one arm and one leg are paralyzed, has lost the more voluntary movements of a portion of his body, without losing the more auto- matic movements. The study of cases of hemiplegia, says he,f proves that the external parts which suffer most are those which psychologically speaking are most controlled by the will, and which physiolog- ically speaking imply the greatest num- ber of different movements, produced with the greatest number of different in- tervals. If the lesion be serious and if it affect not only the more voluntary parts, as face, arms, legs, but also those which are less voluntary, as when the patient loses the power of certain movements of the eyes, the head and one side of the chest, we find that the more voluntary parts are much more gravely paralyzed than the others. So too Ferrier observes \ that the gen- eral destruction of the motor region in the cortex, as of the corpus striatum, produces the same relative disorder of the different movements, those movements being most * " Clinical and Physiological Researches on the- Nervous System." London, 1875. t " Clinical and Physiological Researches on the Nervous System." t " Localization of Diseases of the Brain." THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 39 affected and paralyzed which are most under the influence of the will, at least after the first shock has passed away. Facial paralysis has its seat especially in the inferior facial region, and affects the more independent movements, the frontal and the orbicular muscles being only slightly affected. The movements of the legs are less affected than those of the arm, and those of the arm less than those of the hand. The same author draws a distinction between the different kinds of movements and their respective centers those which imply consciousness (and which are called voluntary in the strict sense of the word), and those which are described as automat- ic, instinctive, responsive (including mo- tor-adaptations of the equilibrium and of motor-coordination, and the instinctive ex- pression of the emotions) which are more or less perfectly organized in the centers underlying the cortex. And he says that the latter possess a relative independence which is at its maximum in the lower ver- tebrates (the frog, the pigeon) and at the minimum in the monkey and in man. He thinks that in animals whose motor facul- ties do not seem to suffer much from de- structive lesion of the nervous centers, those movements are paralyzed which imply consciousness (voluntary move- ments) and which are not automatically organized. This, he adds, is proved by the researches made by Goltz. That au- thor has shown that though the paw of a dog is not absolutely paralyzed as an or- gan of locomotion by lesion of the cortex, it is absolutely paralyzed in so far as it serves as a hand and is employed as such. This observation is of prime importance for us, as showing that when an organ is adapted both for locomotion and prehen- sion, the former function persists, though impaired, while the latter function, which is the more delicate one, disappears.* The instability of the voluntary, com- plex, higher action as compared with the automatic, simple, lower action is seen again in a progressive form in general paralysis of the insane. " The earliest imperfections of the motor power," says Foville, " those which betray themselves * Ferriar, " Localization," etc. From Goltz'sex- periments it appears that if the lesion is in the left brain, then in all movements in which the dog was wont to employ the fore paw as a hand, he gives up the use of the right paw. Thus he will hold a bone with the left fore paw only, and will employ only that paw in scratching the ground, or in touching his wound. If the dog has been trained to give his paw, he will, after mutilation, give only the left paw. (Goltz, in " Diet. Encycl. des Sci. M^d.," art. NERVE--X.) by a beginning, and hardly a beginning even of a break in the harmony of the muscle contractions, are the more readily appreciated because they concern the more delicate movements, and those which re- quire the greatest precision and the great- est perfection. Hence it is not surprising that the delicate muscular movements which go to produce phonation should be the first affected." It is known that an impediment of speech is one of the first symptoms of this malady. Though at first this is so slight that only a practiced ear can detect it, the defect of pronunci- ation increases steadily and ends at last in unintelligible babble. " The muscles which aid in articulation lose all their har- mony of action ; they are able to contract only with an effort ; the words spoken cannot be understood. In the several members lesions of the motility at first affect only the movements that require the greatest precision. The patient can walk long distances and can use the arm in work that only calls for general move- ments ; but he is unable to perform any of the minor and more delicate operations of the fingers without some degree of tre- mor, and he has to try again and again. The defect is noticed when the man is asked to pick up a pin from the ground, to wind his watch, etc. Artisans accus- tomed in their trade to work of great exactitude are incapacitated far more quickly than those whose tasks require but little precision. In writing the* pen is held with a degree of indecision which manifests itself in the more or less irregu- lar form of the letters. And as the dis- ease progresses the handwriting becomes more tremulous and irregular, so that by comparing a series of letters written at dif- ferent periods, we may trace the progress of the malady, till in the end the patient becomes quite unable to write. " At a later stage the vacillation of the superior members is seen even in their general movements : owing to tremulous- ness and feebleness of the muscles of the arm the patient is unable to pass food to his mouth, to take out his handkerchief or to replace it in his pocket, etc. " In the inferior members the course of the malady is much the same. At first insane general paralytics are able to walk firmly when going st r aight forward : but when they have to turn to the right or to the left, and above all when they have to wheel round in order to retrace their steps, they show hesitation and lack of precis- ion in their movements. Later, even when they are walking straight forward, they 40 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. advance with a heavy tread and with ill- coordinated steps. Later still they have difficulty in making even a few paces." * Compare the disorders of the motor sys- tem which follow the abuse of alcohol. Tremor is one of the earliest phenomena. " The hands are first affected, next the arms, the legs, the tongue and the lips. As the disorder progresses the tremulous- ness becomes complicated with another affection of a more serious kind, muscu- lar debility. This too first affects the superior member in nearly every case. The fingers lose their cunning, the hand holds objects imperfectly and lets them slip from its grasp. Then this feebleness extends to the forearm and to the arm. The patient now can .use his superior members only in a very imperfect fashion, and in time he is unable to take his food without assistance. Later these phenom- ena extend to the inferior members. To stand becomes difficult ; the gait is un- steady, tottering ; and these symptoms become more and more pronounced from day to day. The muscles of the back in turn succumb, and the patient must keep his bed." f Compare also what takes place in con- vulsions, chorea, etc. This steady advance, which for the physician possesses only a clinical interest, has for us a psychologi- cal interest. These familiar facts will suffice, I hope, to prove that the course of dissolution is from the complex to the simple, from the voluntary to the auto- matic, and that the final term of evolution is the initial term of dissolution. We have so far studied, it is true, only the disorganization of movements, but those who treat psychology as a natural science will find here nothing that needs to be re- stated. Inasmuch as volition is for us not an imperative entity reigning in a world apart, but the ultimate expression of an hierarchic coordination i and as each movement or group of movements is rep- resented in the nerve centers, it is plain that with each group that is paralyzed an element of coordination disappears. If the dissolution is progressive, the co- ordination, which is continually being stripped of some element, becomes more and more restricted : and since experience shows that the disappearance of move- rnejits is in direct ratio to their complexi- ty and their precision, our theory is justi- fied. We might further pursue this verifi- * Foville in the " Dictionnaire de Mddecine,'' art. PARALYSIS GNRALE. t Fournier, i6idem,axi. ALCOOLISME. cation of our law by calling attention to what takes place in diseases of speech. Here we touch upon the inmost mechan- ism of the mind : but I will not discuss over again a subject I have already treated at length. In " The Diseases of Mem- ory," * I have endeavored to show that many cases of aphasia result from motor amnesia, that is, from a forgetfulness of motor elements, of those movements which constitute articulate speech. I will simply repeat that it was an observation of Trousseau that " aphasia is always re- ducible to a loss of memory either of the vocal signs or of the means whereby words are articulated ; " and that W. Ogle also recognizes two word memories one, recognized by every one, whereby we are conscious of a word, and besides this another whereby we express it. This forgetfulness of the movements, though primarily it is a disease of memory, reveals to us furthermore an impairment of the motor power, a disordered condition of voluntary coordination. The patient wishes to express himself, but his volition comes to naught or manifests itself im- perfectly ; that is to say the sum of the coordinated tendencies which at the mo- ment constitute the individual in so far as he would express himself, is partially hindered in its passage into act ; and ex- perience teaches us that this impotence of expression affects first words, t.e. ra- tional speech ; next exclamatory phrases, interjections, what Max Miiller calls emo- tional language ; lastly, and only in rare cases, gesture. -Here too then dissolution proceeds from the more complex to the less complex and to the simple : from the voluntary to the semivoluntary and the automatic ; but the latter is in most cases unaffected. We may now advance further into the purely psychic life, but here all becomes vague and fluctuating. As we no longer can refer each volition to a group of move- ments of the vocal, locomotory or prehen- sile organs, we must needs grope. Still we cannot but perceive that the highest form of volition, voluntary attention, is rarest of all and the most instable. If in- stead of considering voluntary attention f after the fashion of the subjective psychol- ogist Who studies himself and there halts, we consider it in the mass of sane adult persons, in order to determine approxi- * See HUMBODLT LIBRARY, No, 46, Chapter III., page 39. t We do not speak of involuntary attention, which is natural, spontaneous. This point has already been explained in Chapter IV. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. 41 mately what place it holds in their mental life, we shall see how seldom it occurs and for how short a time it lasts. If it were possible to survey humanity as a whole for a given period of time, and to compare the sum of the acts produced by voluntary attention with the sum of the acts pro- duced without it, We should find the ratio to be nearly as zero to infinity. By rea- son of its very superiority and its extreme complexity, it is a state, a coordination * that can seldom come into existence and which begins to break up as soon as it is formed. To confine ourselves to admitted facts, is it not a familiar observation that inabil- ity to hold the mind attentive is one of the first symptoms of mental impairment whether temporary as in fevers, or perma- nent as in insanity? The highest form of coordination therefore is the most in- stable, even in the purely psychological order. And what is this law of dissolution but a phase of the great biological law already pointed out with respect to memory, viz., that the functions last to be acquired are the first to degenerate. In the individual automatic coordination precedes coordi- nation springing from the appetites and passions ; this latter precedes voluntary coordination : and the simpler forms of voluntary attention precede the more com- plex. In the development of species, ac- cording to the evolution theory, the lower forms of activity existed alone for ages ; then with the increasing complexity of the coordinations came will. Hence a return to the reign of impulsion, with whatever brilliant qualities of mind it may be ac- companied, is in itself a regression. This being so, the following passage from Her- bert Spencer will serve us as a summation and a conclusion upon this point : f " There is one other trait of nervous debil- ity on which a few words may be said the accompanying change of character or modifi- cation of the emotional nature. " Even small ebbings of the nervous fluid hardly to be called abnormal produce slight modifications of this kind, as is observable in children. The highest coordinating plexuses being in them the least developed, children "betray more quickly than adults any defective action of these plexuses ; and they habitually do this when the general nervous pressure is * Just as groups of simple movements have to be organized and coordinated to allow of the higher coordination from which come delicate and complex movements ; so must groups of simple states of con- sciousness be organized, associated and coordinated to allow of this higher coordination called attention. t" Principles of Psychology,'' vol. i.. 262. below par. Sluggishness of the alimentary canal, implying partial failure of nutrition and decreased genesis of energy, is accompanied by fretfulness by a display of the lower im- pulses uncontrolled by the higher. " It is however in the chronically nervous whose blood, deteriorated in quality and fee- bly propelled, fails to keep up a due activity of molecular change, that we see this connec- tion of phenomena most clearly. The irasci- bility of persons in this state is matter of common remark; and irascibility implies a relative inactivity of the superior feelings. It results when a sudden discharge, sent by a pain or annoyance through those plexuses which adjust the conduct to painful and an- noying agencies, is unaccompanied by a dis- charge through those plexuses which adjust the conduct to many circumstances instead of a single circumstance. That deficient gen- esis of nervous fluid accounts for this loss of emotional balance is a corollary from all that has gone before. The plexuses which coor- dinate the defensive and destructive activi- ties, and in which are seated the accompany- ing feelings of antagonism and anger, are in- herited from all antecedent races of creatures, and are therefore well organized so well or- ganized that the child in arms shows them in action. But the plexuses which by connect- ing and coordinating a variety of inferior plex- uses adapt the behavior to a variety of ex- ternal requirements have been but recently evolved ; so that besides being extensive and intricate they are formed of much less per- meable channels. Hence when the nervous system is not fully charged these latest and highest structures are the first to fail. In- stead of being instant to act, their actions, if appreciable at all, come too late to check the actions of subordinate structures." Having step by step followed the course of dissolution of the will, the fundamental result seems to be that the will is a co- ordination varying in complexity and in degree ; that this coordination is the con- dition of all volition ; and that when the co- ordination is either partially or wholly broken up, volition is either abolished or maimed. Upon this result we would now insist, limiting ourselves to a few brief sug- gestions upon certain points. I. Let us first examine the material con- ditions of this coordination. Will, though among a privileged few it attains extraordi- nary power and performs great feats, has a very lowly origin. It has its rise in a bio- logical property inherent in all living mat- ter and known as irritability, that is to say reaction against external forces. Irrita- bility the physiological form of the law of inertia is in some sense a state of pri- mordial indifferentiation whence shall spring, by an ulterior differentiation, sen- sibility properly so called and motility, those two great bases of psychic life. 42 THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. Motility, which alone concerns us here, manifests itself even in the vegetal king- dom under divers forms, as by the move- ments of certain spores, of the Sensitive Plant, of Dionaa and sundry other plants to which Darwin has devoted a well known work. The apparently homogeneous pro- toplasmic mass which alone constitutes certain rudimentary organisms, is pos- sessed of motility. The amoeba, the white corpuscle of the blood, move little by little by the aid of the processes | which they send out. These facts which j are described in many special works teach us that motility made its appearance long before the muscles and the nervous system. We have no occasion to follow the evo- lution of these two apparatus through the animal series. We would only remark that researches upon the localization of the motor centers a subject that very nearly concerns the mechanism of the will have led some physiologists to study the state of these centers in new-born ani- mals. " This investigation,very carefully made by Soltmann in 1875, gave the fol- lowing results : In hares and dogs, there does not exist, immediately after birth, any point in the cortex capable, under electric irritation, of producing movements. Not until the tenth day are the centers for the anterior members developed. On the thirteenth day the centers for the poste- rior members appear. On the sixteenth these centers are distinguishable from one another and from those belonging to the face. One conclusion to be drawn from these results is that the absence of volun- tary motor direction coincides with the ab- sence of the corresponding organs, and that the more the animal becomes master of its movements, the cerebral centers in which the volitional process takes place gain a more manifest independence."* Flechsig and Parrot have studied the development of the brain in the foetus and in the infant. From the researches of the latter author f it appears that if we follow the development of the white matter of an entire hemisphere, we find it rising suc- cessively from the peduncle to the optic thalami, then to the internal capsule, to the hemispheric center, and finally to the mantle of the brain. The parts which are slowest to develop are those which are destined to perform the highest functions. The formative period past, the mechan- ism of will action seems to be as follows : The incitation starts from the so called * Francpis-Franck, in the " Dictionnaire En- cycl. des Sci. Med.." art. NERVEUX, p. 585. t " Archives de Physiologic," 1879. motor regions of the cortex (parietofron- tal region) and follows the pyramidal fasciculus called by some authors the vol- untary fasciculus. This fasciculus which is formed by the grouping of all the fibers- coming from the motor convolutions, de- scends through the oval center, and forms a small part of the internal capsule, which as we know penetrates into the corpus striatum " like a wedge into a piece of timber." Then it follows the peduncle and the medulla where it undergoes more or less perfect decussation and passes to the opposite side of the cord, so forming a great commissure between the motor convolutions and the gray matter of the cord, from which are given out the motor nerves. This rough sketch gives some notion of the complexity of the elements requisite for will action, and of the close connection which exists between them.* Unfortunately there are differences as to the interpretation of the real nature of the brain centers from which comes the in- citation. According to Ferrier and many other authors these are motor centers in the strict sense, that is to say, in them and through them the movement begins. Schiff , Hitzig, Nothnagel, Charlton Bastian and Munk have given other interpretations not all of equal clearness or of equal prob- ability. But they generally agree in re- garding these centers as being rather " sen- sory " in their nature, the motor function proper being referred to the corpus stria- tum. " The nervous fibers that extend from the cerebral cortex, in higher animals and in man, down to the corpora striata are in their nature strictly comparable with the fibers connecting the ' sensory ' and the ' motor ' cells in an ordinary nervous * The process is described as follows by Dr. Charlton Bastian. Taking the spinal and medullary mechanisms as being either developed or in process of development we may now turn our attention more particularly to a consideration of the parts whence and of the channels through which cerebral incita- tions pass in emotional, ideomotor and volitional movements. One part of the route has been pretty clearly defined. Motor stimuli pass from certain parts of the cere- bral cortex downward to the corresponding corpora striata. These bodies are called into activity in a way which cannot be defined, though from them the motor stimuli seem to be continued and redi- rected toward the motor mechanisms in the medulla and spinal cord. The tracks of these latter stimuli are fairly well known. They pass from each corpus, striatum through the inferior layers of the crus cere- bri and througTi thepons Varolii on the same side ; while below this bridge they are gathered together in the anterior pyramid of the medulla, which after a course of a little more than an inch decussates in part with its fellow, so that many of the fibers of each pyramid pass over into the opposite lateral column of the cord, while some continue to descend on the same side in the anterior column." The Brain as an Organ of Mind," chap. xxvi. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. mechanism for reflex action." * In other words, there exists in the cortex " circum- scribed regions experimental excitation of which produces in the opposite side of the body determinate localized move- ments. Seemingly these points ought to be regarded much rather as centers of voluntary association than as motor cen- ters properly so called. They are the seat of incitements to voluntary move- ments, and not actual starting points of movements. They are to be compared rather to the peripheric organs of sense than to the motor apparatus of the ante- rior cornua of the medulla. These cen- ters then are psychomotor centers be- cause by their purely psychic action they command true motor apparatus. . . . We believe that the different points indicated as motor centers for the members, the face, etc., correspond to the apparatus which receive and transform into volun- tary incitation the sensations of peripheric origin. These are volitional centers, not true motor centers."! But notwithstanding this question re- mains still undecided, and notwithstand- ing the matters of detail respecting the part played by the cerebellum that are as yet undetermined, we may say with Charl- ton Bastian that " if since Hume's time we have not learned in any full sense of the term ' the means by which the motion of our bodies follows upon the command of our will,' we have at least learned something as to the parts chiefly concerned, and thus as to the paths trav- ersed by volitional stimuli." J II. If we look at the question on its psy- chological side, voluntary coordination as- sumes so many forms and exists in so many degrees that we can only note its principal features. It would be the nat- ural course to consider the lowest form, but I judge it best, for the sake of clear- ness, to follow the reverse order. Coordination of the most perfect kind is seen in great men of action whatever be the nature of their activity in Caesar, Michelangelo or Saint Vincent de Paul. Its properties are unity, stability, power. The outer unity of such men's lives is founded on the unity of their aim which they steadily pursue, and which according to circumstances makes new coordinations and adaptations. But this outer unity it- self is but the expression of an inner unity the unity of their character. It is be- * Bastian, " The Brain as an Organ of Mind," chap. xxvi. t Fran?ois-Franck, loc. cit. \ Loc, cit. cause they remain the same that their aim\ is the same. What is fundamental in their nature is a mighty, irrepressible pas- sion which controls all their thoughts.. This passion is the man the psychic ex- pression of his constitution as nature made it. Such men present the type of a life- always in harmony with itself, because ia them everything conspires and converges to a definite aim. Such characters are found in everyday life, but they are un- known to fame because either loftiness of aim, or circumstances, or, above all,, strength of passion has been lacking. They possess only stability. The great historic Stoics, as Epictetus and Thraseas I speak not of their Sage, who is only an abstract ideal have realized this higher type of will in its negative form inhibi- tion conformably to the maxim of the school, Bear and refrain. Below this grade of perfect coordination,, there are characters that show an inter- mittence of coordination : whose center of gravity, while ordinarily stable, oscil- lates nevertheless from time to time. A group of tendencies will temporarily se- cede from the coordination, expressing, so- far as they are active, one side of the char- acter. Neither as regards themselves nor as regards others have these individuals the unity characteristic of strong wills ;. the more frequent and the more complex these infractions of perfect coordination, the less is the will power. Lower in the scale we find lives in which two contrary or two different tendencies reign alternately. There are in the indi- vidual two alternating centers of gravity, two points of convergence for coordina- tions successively preponderant but partial.. This type is perhaps the most common one, as we may convince ourselves by- looking about us or by consulting the poets and the novelists of every age who- are ever declaring that there are two na- tures in every one. The number of these successive coordinations may be larger still ; but it is useless to pursue further this analysis. One step more and we enter the region of pathology. Take a case where sudden and irresistible impulses hold the will every moment in check : here is an unduly strong tendency ever destroying the equi- librium, for its intensity will not allow of its being coordinated with the other ten- dencies : it commands instead of subordi- nating itself. And when such impulses have come to be not an accident but a habit, not one side of the character but the character itself, then there is only an. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. intermittent coordination it is the will that becomes the exception then. Lower still, and will is simply accidental. In the indefinite succession of impulsions that vary from minute to minute, a chance volition finds only at long intervals its con- ditions of existence. Caprices take the place of volitions. The hysterical charac- ter furnishes the type of this perfect inco- .ordination. Here we reach the final term of the will. At a grade lower than this there are no diseases of the will, but an arrest of development which precludes will altogether. Such is the state of idiots and imbeciles. We will add a few re- marks upon these mental states in order to complete our pathological study. " In profound idiocy," says Griesinger, " ef- fort and determination to action are always instinctive. Generally they are prompted by the craving for food, and in most instances they possess the character of reflex actions of which the individual is hardly conscious. Certain simple ideas however may incite them to effort and movement, as when they amuse themselves by playing with bits of paper or the like. Without taking into account those sunk in the profoundest idiocy, the question arises, Is there here anything that represents will ? What is there in them that can will ? " In many idiots of this last class the only thing that seems to arouse the mind in some degree to action, is the desire to eat. The lowest idiots manifest this desire only by .grunts and bodily agitation. Those in whom mental degeneration has not gone so far move the lips or the hands slightly, or even cry : thus do they express their desire of food. In idiocy of a less pronounced type, the basis of the character is inconstancy and obtuseness of feeling and weakness of will. The humor of idiots belonging to this class depends on their surroundings and the treatment they re- ceive. They are docile and obedient when well cared for, but perverse and malicious when ill used." * Before we quit this subject, we would remark that if the will is a coordination, that is to say a sum of relations, it may be affirmed a priori that it will be of far rarer occurrence than simpler forms of psychic activity, because a complex state has much less chance of coming into existence and of enduring, than a sim- . pie state. And so it is in fact. If in any human life we take note of the parts played by automatism, by habit, by the passions, and above all by imitation, we shall find that the number of acts that are in the strict sense of the term purely voluntary is yery small. For the majority of mankind imitation suffices : they are contented to accept that which has been matter of vol- * Griesinger, opus citatum^ pp. 433, 434. untary choice by others, and as they think in the thoughts, so they act with the will of the multitude. Viewed in connection with the habits that render it of no use, and with the diseases that maim or destroy it, the will, as we have already said, is a happy accident. We need hardly observe how closely this coordination, ever growing more com- plex, of tendencies, which comstitutes the different degrees of will, resembles the co- ordination, ever growing more complex, of sensations and mental images which con- stitutes the different degrees of intelli- gence. The one has for its basis and fundamental condition character, the other "forms of thought." They are each a more or less perfect adaptation of the in- dividual to his surroundings whether in respect to action or to cognition. We are now ready to formulate the gen- eral conclusion of this inquiry, already in- cidentally indicated. It will, I hope, throw light retrospectively upon the path we have been pursuing. It is as follows : Volition is a final act of consciousness resulting from the more or less complex coordination of a group of states whether conscious, subconscious or unconscious (purely physiological) which all together find expression in an action or in an in- hibition. The principal factor of the co- ordination is character, and character is simply the psychic expression of an indi- vidual organism. It is character which gives unity to the coordination, not the abstract unity of the mathematical point, but the concrete unity of a consensus. The act whereby this coordination takes place and is affirmed is choice founded on a natural affinity. Thus volition, so often observed, anal- yzed and explained by subjective psychol- ogists, is in our view simply a state of con- sciousness. It is only an effect of that psychophysiological activity, so often de- scribed, whereof a part only enters con- sciousness under the form of a deliberation. Furthermore, -volition is not a cause at all. The acts and movements that follow vo- lition result directly from the tendencies, feelings, mental images and ideas which have succeeded in being coordinated in the form of a choice : from this group comes all the efficiency. In other terms, and to leave no ambiguity, the psycho- physiological work of deliberation results on the one hand in a state of conscious- ness, the volition ; on the other hand in a sum of movements or inhibitions. The I will " shows that a situation exists, THE DISEASES OF THE WILL. but does not constitute it. I should com- pare it to the verdict of a jury which may be the result of very passionate pleadings and of the charge of the judge, and which may be attended by grave consequences extending far into the future, but which is an effect and not a cause, being in law a simple determination, or ascertainment. If the will be insisted on as a faculty, an entity, all is contradiction, obscurity, confusion. If on the contrary we take the facts as they are, we at least free our- selves of factitious difficulties. We do not have to ask ourselves how an " I will " can make my members to move. That is a mystery that does not need to be ex- plained, for the simple reason that it does not exist, volition being in no sense a cause. We must look for the secret in the natural tendency of feelings and men- tal images to find expression in move- ments. Here we have only a very highly complicated case of the law of reflex ac- tion in which between the period of exci- tation and the motor period there appears a capital psychic fact volition showing that the first period ends and the second begins. Observe further how the strange mal- ady called aboulia may be easily explained, and with it the analogous forms considered in Chapter II., and even the simple feeble- ness of will-*-hardly a morbid state so common among persons who say they have the will and act not. The explana- tion is that the individual organism had two effects to produce and produces only one the state of consciousness, choice, affirmation ; but the motor tendencies are too weak to pass into acts. There is suf- ficient coordination, but insufficient impul- sion. In the case of irresistible acts, on the contrary, impulsion is in excess, while coordination is defective or non-existent. Thus then we obtain from the study of the pathology these two results, viz., that the " I will " has no efficacy in producing action ; and that will in the sane man is a coordination exceedingly complex and instable, and by reason of its very supe- riority easily broken up, being " the high est force yet introduced by nature the last consummate efflorescence of all her wondrous works." * * Maudsley, " Pbvsiolo^ of fhe Mind. 1 ' CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION THE QUESTtON STATED. PAGE. The question stated The will as an impulsive force The will as a power of inhibition Individual character Choice : its nature I CHAPTER II. IMPAIRMENT OF THE WILL LACK OF IMPULSION. Division of diseases of the will Aboulia, or impotence of will: case of Thomas De Quincey Instances recorded by Billed Probable cause of this state Analogous cases : Agoraphobia ; Griibelsucht ; cases bordering on extinction of will The feeling of effort : its two forms 10 CHAPTER III. IMPAIRMENT OF THE WILL EXCESS OF IMPULSION. Sudden unconscious impulsions Irresistible impulsions accompanied by conscious- ness Gradual transition from the sane to the morbid state : fixed ideas Dislo- cation of the will Its probable causes Impairments from intoxication, brain le- sions, etc 19 CHAPTER IV. IMPAIRMENT OF VOLUNTARY ATTENTION. Intellectual power and impotence of the will Coleridge : his portrait by Carlyle Two forms of impairment The meaning of attention : it has its seat in feeling How it is sustained 24 CHAPTER V. THE REALM OF CAPRICE. Absence of the essential conditions of will The hysterical character Whence comes its instability " Psychic Paralysis." 29 CHAPTER VI. EXTINCTION OF THE WILL. Two states of will-extinction Ecstasy : described by St. Theresa Anomalousness of that mental state Somnambulism : cases of absolute extinction of will Ambig- uous cases : instances of resistance Illusion of some hypnotized subjects as to the possession of will power 3! CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION. The will the last term of a progressive evolution, the first term being simple reflex action Law of the dissolution of the will Verification of this law Material conditions of will Coordination Physiological development of this coordination Psycho- logical development The will in idiots General conclusion : Volition is a simple state of consciousness 37 - - THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. BY TH. RIBOT. TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY J. FITZGERALD, M.A. (Copyright, 1887, by J. Fitzgerald.) CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. PERSONALITY. INDI- VIDUALITY. CONSCIOUSNESS. IN the language of psychology the gen- eral meaning of the term " person " is, an individual being that has a clear conscious- ness of itself and that acts consequently it is the highest form of individuality. Metaphysical psychology, to explain this character (which it reserves for man ex- clusively) merely assumes a Me \_ego\, ab- solutely one, simple, and identical. Un- fortunately, the explanation is illusive, the solution only apparent. Unless we assign a supernatural origin to this Me. we must needs explain how it comes to be, and from what lower form it springs. Ex- perimental psychology can neither state the problem in the same way nor treat it by the same method. It learns from nat- ural history how difficult it is in many cases to determine the characters of indi- viduality, far less complex though they be than those of personality; simple, easy solutions it mistrusts, and far from sup- posing the problem to be resolvable at the first attack, it finds the solution at the final term of its researches, as the result of laborious investigations. It is there- fore quite natural that the representatives of the old school, being a little off their bearings, should accuse those of the new school of " stealing their Me," though nobody has attempted anything of the kind. But the language of either side is so different from that of the other, and their methods are so opposite that they no longer understand one another. At the risk of increasing the confusion, I would try to find out what is to be learned from teratological, or morbid, or merely rare cases, touching the formation and disorganization of personality, but without pretending to treat the subject in its entirety : that undertaking were, it seems to me, premature. Personality being the highest form of psychic individuality, a preliminary ques- tion arises : What is an individual ? Few problems have in our days been more dis- cussed by naturalists than this, and few remain more obscure as regards the lower grades of animal life. It is not yet time to treat it in detail : in the conclu- sion of this work, after we shall have studied the constituent elements of per- sonality, we will consider personality itself as a whole. Then we shall take oc- casion to compare personality with the lower forms through which nature has essayed to produce it, and to show that the psychic individual is only the expres- sion of the organism : like it of low grade, undifferentiated, incoherent, or complex and integrated. For the present it suffices to remind the reader who has already some acquaintance with these studies, that as we descend in the animal series, we see the psychic individual formed by more or less perfect fusion of less complex individuals a colony-con- sciousness being produced by the co-op- eration of local consciousness. These discoveries in natural history are of the utmost importance for psychology. Ow- ing to them the problem of personality takes a new form : it must be approached from below ; and one is led to ask whether the human personality itself is not a " coalition whole " whose extreme complexity makes its origin difficult to discover, or even inscrutable, did not the existence of elemental forms throw some light upon the process of this fusion. Human personality and of this alone can we treat to any purpose, especially in a pathological essay is a concrete whole, a complex. To know what it is, we must THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. analyze it, and here analysis is of neces- sity artificial, for it separates groups of phenomena that are not merely juxta- posed but co-ordinated, and standing toward one another not in the relation of mere simultaneity but of mutual depend- ence. Still analysis is indispensable. Adopting therefore a division of the sub ject which I hope will be its own justifi- cation, I will consider successively the Organic, the Affective, and the Intellect- ive conditions of personality, laying stress upon anomalies and irregularities. Upon a final survey of the subject we shall group together again these dissevered elements. But before we begin the exposition and interpretation of the facts, it will be well to have an understanding as to the nature of consciousness. I do not propose to write a monograph on consciousness, for that would cover pretty nearly the whole field of psychology ; it will be enough to state the problem with precision. Details apart, we find only two hypoth- eses : one very ancient, according to which consciousness is the fundamental property of the " soul," or the " mind," constituting its essence ; the other very recent, which regards consciousness as a simple- phenomenon superadded to the cerebral activity, as an occurrence having its own conditions of existence, and which comes or goes as circumstances decide. The former hypothesis has been in vogue so long that it is easy to judge of its merits and its defects. I am not called upon to pass sentence upon it ; I will simply show its utter powerlessness to explain the mind's unconscious life. In the first place, for a long time it took no cognizance of this unconscious life. Leibnitz's clear and profound observa- tions on that point lie forgotten or at least in abeyance ; and till well on in the present century the most distinguished psychologists (with a few exceptions) re- stricted themselves to consciousness. At last, when the question must be heard, and when it was clear to every one that to regard psychic life as embracing simply the data of consciousness is a conception so poor and jejune as to be of no use in practice, then the metaphysical psycholo- gists were in a quandary. They adoptee the hypothesis of " unconscious states.' an ambiguous and semi-contradictory term soon widely accepted : the term it- self betrays the confusion of ideas amic which it arose. What is meant by " un- conscious states?" The wise note their existence, without trying to account for hem ; the less wise talk of latent thought, of unconscious consciousness expres- sions so vague, so illogical, that many au- thors have admitted as much. In truth, if the soul be defined to bethinking sub- stance, whereof states of consciousness are modifications, it is plainly a contradic- tion in terms to ascribe to it unconscious states. No fetch of language, no trick of dialectic can help the matter : and foras- much as the high importance of these un- conscious states as factors of psychic life is undeniable, there is no escape from the situation. The second hypothesis clears the ground of all this logomachy. It does away with the factitious problems that swarm in the first (e.g. whether con- sciousness be a general or a particular faculty, etc.), and we may fearlessly claim for it the benefit of the lex parcimonice, It is the simpler, the clearer, the more cqnsistent of the two. Compared with the other, it may be characterized as ex- pressing the unconscious in physiolog- ical terms (states of the nervous system) and not in psychological terms (latent thought, sensations not sensed, etc.). But this is only a particular case of the hypothesis : we have now to consider it as a whole. I would remark first that conscious- ness, like all general terms, must be re- solved into concrete data. Just as there is not a will in general, but only volitions, so there is not a consciousness in general, but only states of consciousness : and these alone are real. As for defining the state of consciousness, the fact of being conscious, that were a vain and idle at- tempt . it is a datum of observation, an ultimate fact. Physiology shows that its production is always associated with the activity of the nervous system and in par- ticular of the brain. But the converse proposition is not true : though psychic activity always implies nerve activity, nerve activity does not always imply psychic activity. Nerve activity has far greater extension than psychic activity : hence consciousness is something super- added. In other words, we must regard a state of consciousness as a complex fact (evenement, event, occurrence) which presupposes a particular state of the ner- vous system ; nor is this nervous process an accessory but on the contrary an inte- gral part of the fact nay, its ground- work, its fundamental condition ; once produced, the fact exists in itself ; when THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. consciousness is added, the fact exists for itself ; consciousness completes it, gives it the finishing touch, but does not constitute it. Upon this hypothesis we readily under- stand how every manifestation of psychic life sensations, desires, feelings, voli- tions, recollections, reasonings, inven- tions, etc., may be alternately conscious and unconscious. There is nothing mys- terious in this alternation, because in every case the essential conditions, i.e., the physiological conditions, remain the same, and consciousness is only comple mentary the finish. The question would remain, why this finish sometimes is added, sometimes is lacking ; for were there not in the phys- iological phenomenon itself something more in the former case than in the lat- ter, the adverse hypothesis would be in- directly strengthened. If it could be shown that whenever certain physiologi- cal conditions are present there is con- sciousness, that when they disappear, consciousness too disappears, and that when they vary, consciousness varies : then we should have no longer an hy- pothesis but a scientific truth. That is a distant prospect indeed. Still we may confidently predict that consciousness at least will never give us these revelations touching itself. As Maudsley justly says, consciousness cannot be at once effect and cause cannot be at once itself and Its molecular antecedents : it lives for an instant only and cannot by a direct intu- ition turn back to its immediate physio- logical antecedents ; and besides, to de- scend again to these material antecedents were to lay hold not of itself but of its cause. It would be for the present chimerical to undertake to define even roughly the necessary and sufficient conditions of the apparition of consciousness. We know that the cerebral circulation, as regards the quantity and the quality of the blood, has a good deal to do with the case. Of this we have striking proof in experi- ments made on the heads of animals im- mediately after decapitation. So too we know that the duration of the nervous processes in the centers is an important point. Psychometric research daily shows that a state of consciousness takes longer time in proportion to its greater complex- ity, and that on the other hand automatic acts, whether primordial or acquired, the rapidity of which is extreme, do not en- ter the consciousness. It may also be affirmed that the apparition of conscious- ness is connected with the period of the disassimilation of nerve tissue, as Herzen has shown in detail.* But all these re- sults are but partial gains, while a scien- tific account of the genesis of a phenom- enon requires a determination of all its essential conditions. This the future will yield perhaps. In the mean time we shall best strengthen our hypothesis by showing that it alone explains one highly important character and not merely a condition of con- sciousness, namely its intermittence. To avoid all misunderstanding at the outset, be it noted that the question is not as to the discontinuity of states of conscious- ness with one another. Each has its limits which, while they allow it to be as- sociated with others, preserve its own in- dividuality. Not of this do we speak, but of the well known fact that con- sciousness has interruptions : in ordinary language, a man is not always thinking. True it is, that this assertion has been contradicted by the majority of rAetaphy- sicians. But they have never furnished proof in support of their thesis ; and,-as all the facts apparently are against it, the burden of proof seems to lie upon its ad- vocates. Their whole argument is in effect that since the soul is essentially a thing that thinks, consciousness must needs always exist in some degree, even though no trace of it subsists in the mem- ory. But this is simply begging the ques- tion, for the hypothesis we maintain chal- lenges their major premise. Their alleged proof is, after all, only an inference drawn from a contested hypothesis. . Let us put aside all a priori solutions and look at the question as it is in itself. Let us consider, not cases of syncope, artificial anaesthesia, epileptic vertigo, co- ma, etc., but the familiar and frequently occurring psychic state of sleep. It has been asserted that sleep is never dream- less ; but that is a purely theoretic asser- tion, based on the thesis that the soul is ever thinking. The only fact that can be cited in support of this proposition is that sometimes a sleeper, when called or questioned, responds in suitable fashion, but on waking has no recollection of the occurrence. But this fact does not justi- fy a general conclusion, and the theory of the metaphysicians is met by the physiologists with another. Physiology teaches us that the life of every organ comprises two periods, one of compara- *La Condizione fisica delta Conscienza. Roma, 1879. 4 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. tive repose, or of assimilation, the other of activity, or of disassimilation ; that the brain presents no exception to this law, and that experience shows the duration of sleep, in the several epochs and circum- stances of life, to be in direct ratio to the need of assimilation. The cause of sleep is the necessity of repairing losses, of making the nutritive circulation succeed to the functional circulation. In wake- fulness, the brain burns up more material than is given to it by the blood, so that oxidation soon grows less, and with it the CKcitability of the nerve tissue. Preyer's experiments show that sleep comes when, in consequence of prolonged activity, the substance of the brain, like that of a fatigued muscle, finds itself overloaded with a certain quantity of acid detritus. The very presence of these products ar- rests, at a given moment, the cerebral activity, which does not reappear till re- pose has allowed complete elimination of these waste matters. * It must be ad- mitted that complete 1 absolute sleep, without any dream, is the exception ; but that such sleep occurs, and that not rarely, is sufficient to establish the intermittent character of consciousness. The physiological thesis possesses a probative value very different from, and much stronger than, that of the meta- physical thesis. And it must be remem- bered an important point that all those vrho have investigated the question whether there exists perfect cerebral sleep, are men of cultivated and active minds psychologists, physicians, literary men in whom the brain is ever wakeful, vi- brating like a sensitive musical instru- ment in response to the slightest excita- tion : in them consciousness is a habit, so to speak. Those who put to them- selves the question whether sleep is al- ways accompanied by dreams, are, in fact, the ones least fitted to give a reply in the negative. Among hand workers, this is not the case. A farm-laborer living re- mote from all intellectual agitation, ever restricted to the same occupations, to the same routine, usually does not dream, know several peasants who look on a dream as a rare occurrence in their hours ef sleep. " The most convincing proof that the mind can be completely inactive during sleep that it can have its existence momentarily in- * By absorbing a. certain quantity of lactate 9! soda, taken as a type of disassimilation products in the brain, Preyer produced yawning, somnolence and even sleep. :errupted or suspended would indisputably >e afforded if the instant of falling asleep hould connect immediately with the instant of awaking, and if the intervening time should be as though it had not been. The jhilosophers who do not believe in perfect sleep have themselves pointed out this test,, at the same time declaring that it has never jeen verified. But I have been witness of the fact under the following circumstances : One morning, at 2 o'clock, I was called to attend a person in the neigborhood attacked by cholera. As I was about to go out, my wife gave me some direction about the can- dle I held in my hand, and then fell asleep. I came back after about half an hour The noise of the key turning in the lock as I opened the door, awakened my wife suddenly. So deep had been her sleep, so close was the conjunction of the moment when she fell asleep, with the moment when she was awak- ened, that she supposed she had not slept at all, and that she took the sound of the key upon my return, for the same sound at my going. Seeing me re-enter, she believed I was simply turning back on my steps, and asked me the reason ; great was her aston- ishment on learning that I had been absent half an hour." t I know not how facts of this kind can be met, except by falling back upon the inevitable hypothesis of states of con- sciousness that have left no trace in the memory : but that hypothesis, I repeat, is gratuitous and improbable. Those who are subject to fits of swooning with loss of consciousness, know by experience that, while the fit is on, they may suffer a fall or contusion of a member, or over- turn a chair, and, yet, on coming to them- selves, have no idea of what has hap- pened. Is it likely that these rather se- rious accidents, had they been accompa- nied by consciousness, would have left no memory lasting at least a few seconds. I do not in any wise deny that in certain circumstances, whether normal or morbid, for instance, in hypnotism states of consciousness that leave no trace appar- ent at the awakening, may later be re- called ; I will restrict as much as any one may wish, the cases of complete interrup- tion of consciousness ; but one single case suffices to raise up insuperable diffi- culties against the hypothesis of the soul being substance which thinks. On the opposite hypothesis, all is easily explained. If consciousness is an occurrence depend- t Despine, Psychologic Naturelle, I., p. 522. Writers on insanity mention cases where, a patho- logical state suppressing consciousness abruptly, the patient, after a longer or shorter interval, re- sumes his conversation at the word where he had been stricken. See other facts of like nature ia Winslow, On Obscure Diseases, etc., p. 322 et seq. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. ent on determinate conditions, it need not surprise us if sometimes it is wanting. Were this the place to discuss the question of consciousness thoroughly, we might show that on our hypothesis the relation of the conscious to the uncon- scious is no longer unsettled or contra- dictory. The term unconscious may al- ways be expressed by this periphrasis : A physiological state which, though sometimes, and even most frequently it is accompanied by consciousness, or may have been so accompanied originally, is at present not accompanied by conscious- ness. This characterization, though neg- ative as regards psychology, is positive as regards physiology. It declares that in every psychic happening the funda- mental, active element, is the nervous process, and that the other is but con- comitant. Consequently it is easy to see that all of the manifestations of psy- chic life may be unconscious and con- scious by turns : for the former case there is required (and this suffices) a determinate nervous process, that is to say, the calling into action of a determi- nate number of nerve elements forming a determinate association, to the exclu- sion of all other nerve elements and of all other possible associations. For the second case it is required (and this suffices) that supplementary conditions of whatever kind be added, without changing aught in the nature of the phenomenon, save to render it conscious. And here we see how unconscious cere- bration does so much work quietly, and how, oftentimes after protracted incuba- tion, it manifests itself by unexpected results. Each state of consciousness represents only a very small part of our psychic life, for unconscious states ever underlie it and as it were thrust it for- ward. Every volition, for instance, has roots deep down in our being ; the mo- tives that accompany and apparently ex- plain it are never more than a part of the true cause. So it is with many of our sympathies ; and so evident is this fact, that minds most deficient in observation often wonder that they cannot account for their likes and dislikes. It were tedious as well as needless to pursue this demonstration farther. Should the reader wish to do so he may consult, in Hartmann's Philosophy of the Uncon- scious, the section entitled " Phenomenol- ogy." There he will find classified all the manifestations of the mind's uncon- scious life, and he will see that there is not one fact that is not explained by the hypothesis here maintained. Let him then apply to the same facts the other hypothesis. One point more remains to be con- sidered. The theory which regards con- sciousness as a phenomenon, and which springs (as could be shown were the di- gression allowable here) from that funda- mental principle in physiology that " re- flex a stomach, intestines, brain, etc. This state can be explained only by a .suppression or an alteration of the inward sensations that exist in the normal state, and which go to make up the conception of the physical Me. To the same cause, sometimes conjoined with cutaneous anaesthesis, are to be referred cases where the patient believes that some one of his members or even that his whole body is wood, or glass, or stone, or but- ter, etc. A little later he will be saying that he now has no body, that he is dead. Es- quirol tells of a woman who believed that the Devil had carried her body away : in her the cutaneous surface was totally in- sensible. The physician Baudelocque, toward the end of his life, was uncon- scious of the existence of his body. He used to say that he had no head, no arms, etc. Finally, every one is familiar with the fact recorded by Foville : A certain sol- dier who had been severely wounded in the battle of Austerlitz ever afterward believed himself dead. On being askec what was the news he would answer 4< You wish to know how is old Lam- bert ? He is no more, a cannon ball put an end to him. What you see is no Lambert, but a clumsy machine made to resemble him. You must ask them to make another." In speaking of himsel he never said " mot " (I, me) but " cela ' (this thing). The skin was insensible and he oftentimes would fall into a state of utter insensibility and immobility last- ing for several days. Here we come to grave disorders meeting for the first time a double per- sonality, or more strictly a discontinuity between two periods of psychic life, a failure of them to connect. The case just mentioned may be explained thus Before his injury, this soldier, like every one, had his organic consciousness, the sense of his own body, of his physica personality. After it, an essentia * Griesinger. Traitt des Maladies Mentales p. 92. Doumic's translation. change took place in his nervous organ- zation. As regards the nature of this ange unfortunately we can only offer lypotheses ; the effects alone are known o us. Whatever the change may have Deen its result was to produce another organic consciousness, the consciousness of a " clumsy machine." Between this and the former consciousness, memory of which persisted tenaciously, no con- nection, had been established. The feel- ing of identity was wanting because, as regards organic as well as other states, it can result only from a slow, progres- sive and continuous assimilation of the new states. In this case the new states did not enter the former Me as an in- tegral part. Hence the odd situation, in which the former personality appears to itself as having been but now no longer existent ; and in which the pres- ent state appears as something external and foreign. Finally I would remark that in states where the surface of the body is no longer sensitive ; where sen- sations coming from the several organs are nearly null, and the superficial and the deeper sensibility is extinct, the or- ganism no longer calls up those feelings, images and ideas which are its bond of union with the higher psychic life : it is restricted to the automatic actions that constitute the habitude and routine of life. It is properly speaking " a ma- chine." Should any one maintain that in this instance the only personality is that which remembers, he may do so abso- lutely, but it must be admitted that this personality is of a very peculiar kind, existing only in the past : hence it might be called more properly a memory than a personality. What distinguishes this case from those we shall consider later is that here the aberration is entirely physical : it has its rise in the body, and it refers only to the body. This old soldier does not believe himself to be some one else (Napoleon, for instance, though he was at Austerlitz) : the case is as free as pos- sible from mental elements. To perturbations of sensibility is also to be referred the illusion of some pa- tients or convalescents who fancy them- selves to be double. Sometimes there is illusion pure and simple without dupli- cation. In that case the morbid state is projected outside of the patient he alienates a part of his physical person- ality. Instances of this illusion are seen in cases like that recorded by Bouillaud THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. where the patient having lost sensibility | on one side of the body, imagines that he has lying beside him on the bed another person, or even a dead body. But when the group of morbid organic sensations, instead of being thus alien- ated, cling to the normal organic person- ality, but without fusion, then and so long as that state lasts, the patient be- lieves that he has two bodies. " A man convalescing after a fever believed him- self to be made up of two individuals, one abed, the other walking about. Though he had no appetite, he ate a good deal, having, as he said, two bodies to feed." * " Pariset having in his early years been prostrated by epidemic typhus, remained several days in a state of collapse nigh to death. One morning a more distinct sense of himself awoke within him ; he fell a think- ing, and it was like a resurrection from the dead. But, strange to tell, he had at that moment, or believed that he had, two bod- ies, which appeared to him to be lying in two separate beds. While his soul was present in one of these bodies, he felt well and enjoyed a delightful repose. In the other body the soul endured the suffering incident to the disease, and the patient would say, How is it that I am so easy in this bed and so ill, so wretched in the other? These thoughts engaged his mind for a long time, and with his extraordinary power of psychological analysis he oftentimes enter- tained me with the details of the impres- sions he then received." t Here we have two instances of double physical personality. Though we are still but a little way on in our study, the reader may already see how these cases differ from one another when closely examined. The current phrase " double personality " is only 'an abstraction : once translated into the language of concrete facts, of authentic observations, it is seen to comprise all sorts of diver- sity. Each case, so to speak, requires a special interpretation. A priori, the special interpretation might be found. If, as we hold and as we will try to show as we proceed, personality is a highly complex composite, plainly its pertur- bations must needs be multiform. Each separate case shows it to us broken up in a different way. Here disease be- comes a subtile instrument of analysis ; it makes for us experiments not to be had otherwise. The difficulty is to in- * Leuret, Fragments Psychologiques sur la Folie, p. 95. t Gratiolet, Anatontie Comparte du Systhne j/erveujc, tome 2, p. 548. terpret them aright ; but our very mis- takes can lead us astray only for a moment, for the facts the future will develop will serve to correct our conclu- sions or to verify them. The province of the physical personal- ity as an element of the total personality is so important a one and has been so overlooked, often on purpose, that we can hardly lay too much stress upon it. Here we may with some advantage study- certain rare cases little regarded by- psychologists, but which bring to the support of our thesis some additional facts not more conclusive than those already cited, but more striking : I mean cases of double monsters. It must be confessed that the number of such cases is rather small. Nature does not multiply monsters, and of the seventy or eighty species defined by tera- tologists the major part have no interest for us. Furthermore, of double monsters many fail to reach adult age. The anat- omist and the physiologist may study these with profit, not so the psychologist. Finally, accurate observations on this matter date back hardly one hundred years. Observations of an earlier date are so tinged with credulity and so im- perfectly recorded as to be of no value. The Me, as has oft been repeated, is impenetrable : it forms in itself a perfect whole strictly limited and this is a proof of its essential oneness. This statement is indisputable, nevertheless the impene- trability of the Me is only the subjective expression of the impenetrability of the organism. One personality cannot be another personality, just because one or- ganism cannot be another organism. But if through a concurrence of causes that need not be enumerated, two human beings from the foetal period be partially united, the heads the essential organs of human individuality remaining per- fectly distinct, then what happens is this r each organism is no longer completely- limited in space and distinct from every other; there is an undivided ownership, common to both, of a part of the econ- omy, and if, as we maintain, the unity and the complexity of the Me are but the subjective expression of the unity and the complexity of the organism, then there must be partial penetration of one per- sonality by the other, and a portion of the common psychic life must be com- mon to the two, belonging not to a Me THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. but to a We. Each individual here is a little less than an individual This infer- ence is fully confirmed by experience. " Anatomically considered, a double mon- ster is always more than a unitary individual and less than two, but in some cases it comes nearer to unity, in others to duality. So too, ^physiologically considered, it always has more than a unitary life, and less than two lives ; but its twofold life may approach near- er to unity on the one hand or on the other to duality. "If we consider only the phenomena of sensibility and of will, a monster made up of two nearly perfect individuals joined only at one point of their bodies will be twain men- tally and morally as well as physically. Each individual will have its own sensibility and its own will, and these will have relation to its own body and to that alone. It may even happen that the twins will differ widely in their physical constitution, their stature, their physiognomy, and not less widely in personal -character and intelligence. When one is happy the other may be sad; one will be wakeful while the other sleeps ; or one will want to walk while the other prefers to rest : and out of this conflict of two wills govern- ing two indissolubly united bodies may come movements without results and that are neither walking nor resting. The two moi- eties may quarrel with each other, or come to blows. . . . Thus their moral duality, a consequence of their physical duality, will be demonstrated in a hundred ways ; neverthe- less, as there is a point in the double body situate on the dividing line between the two individuals and common to both, certain other phenomena not so numerous, demon- strate in them a beginning of unity. " Impressions made upon the region where the two are united, especially at its central point, are perceived simultaneously by both brains, and both, too, may react in response to them. . . . We may add that if at times the peace between the twins is disturbed, there exists between them nearly always a harmony of feelings and desires and a mutual sympathy and attachment that can hardly be appreciated by one who has not read all the testimony. " Phenomena of the same and of a differ- ent kind are seen in cases where, the union becoming closer, the two heads have between them only one body and one pair of legs. Anatomic analysis shows that in such crea- tures each individual possesses as his own one side of the one body and one of the two legs. Physiological and psychological observation fully confirms this singular result Impressions made along the whole length 01 the axis of union are perceived simultane ously by both the heads ; those made on either side of the axis and at some distance from it are perceived by one head only; anc the same is true of the will as of sensations The brain to the right will alone receive sen nations through the right leg and it alone will act upon that leg, while the brain to the left will alone act on the left leg : so that the act of walking will be the result of movements >erformed by two limbs belonging to two different individuals, and coordinated by two distinct wills. " Finally, in parasital monsters, as the or- ^anization is here nearly unitary, all the vital acts, all the sensations, all the manifestations of will take place almost exactly as in normal Beings. The smaller of the two individuals, laving become an accessory and inactive jart of the larger, exerts upon him only a weak and limited influence and that only in a very small number of functions."* To these general outlines I will add a :ew details taken from the most famous nstances of double monstrosity. There are a good many documents ex- tant relating to Helen and Judith, a dual female monster born at Szony, Hungary, in 1701, deceased at Presburg aged twenty-two years. Helen and Judith stood nearly back to back, being united at the nates and partly in the lumbar re- gion. The sexual organs were double externally, but there was only one womb ; there were two intestinal canals opening into one anus. The two aortas and the two inferior venae cavas were united at their extremities, thus opening two wide and direct communications between the two hearts: from this resulted a semi- community of life and function. ' The sisters had neither the same tem- perament nor the same character. Helen was taller, handsomer, more sprightly, more intelligent and more amiable in disposition than her sister. Judith, stricken at the age of six years with hemiplegic paralysis, was always smaller and of less active mind. She was slightly deformed, and her speech some- what impeded. Still, like her sister, she spoke the Hungarian, German, French, and even a little English and Italian. The sis- ters were tenderly affectionate to each other, though in childhood they sometimes quar- reled and even came to blows. The calls of nature came to both simultaneously, except as regarded urination. They had the measles and later the small-pox simultaneously, and whenever it happened that only one of the sisters was ill of any complaint, the other would be miserable and worried. At last Judith was taken with a brain trouble and an affection of the lungs. Helen, who for a few days had suffered from a slight fever, al- most instantly lost all her strength, though her intellect remained clear and her power of speech unimpaired. After a brief agony she * Isidore Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire, Histoire des A nomalies, tome 3, p. 373. The monster known as " Home's epicome had a parasitic head which presented but a very imperfect semblance of nor- mal life. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. succumbed, not to her own ailment but to those of her sister. The twins expired at the same instant." The Siamese Twins, Chang and Eng, born in 1811 in the kingdom of Siam, were connected from the navel to the xiphoid appendix. I. G. de Saint-Hilaire, after describing their outward habitus, adds that, " The two brothers, even in their other functions [besides respiration and the ar- terial pulsation] exhibit a concordance that is remarkable, though not absolutely con- stant as has been affirmed, and as Chang and Eng themselves have been wont to assure those who went no farther than to put to the twins a few vague questions. No doubt there is nothing more curious than the contrast of almost complete physical du- ality with absolute moral unity but there is nothing so opposed to sound theory. I have carefully made every observation, and gathered all the information that could help me to determine the truth of what has been .so often asserted, and I have found that, in this conflict between the ill-understood prin- ciples of teratology and the many physio- logical doctrines that have been based on the unity of the Siamese brothers, the facts, as was to have been expected, are entirely in favor of the former. These twin brothers, cast in two nearly identical moulds, of neces- sity subject throughout their lives to the in- fluence of the same physical and moral en- vironment, having a similar organization and receiving the same education, present the .spectacle of two creatures whose functions, actions, words, whose very thoughts are nearly always concordant and parallel Their joys, their sorrows, are in common : the same desires arise at the same instant in these twin souls, the sentence that is begun by one is often completed by the other. Nevertheless these concordances prove parity, not unity. Twins in the normal state often exhibit analogous concordances, and no doubt they would present agreements quite as remarkable if they had during their whole lives seen the same objects, experi- enced the same sensations, shared in the same pleasures, undergone the same suffer- ings." * And I may add that as the Siamese twins grew older, their differences of character became more and more pro- nounced : one of the latest observers de- .scribes one of the brothers as morose and taciturn, the other as sprightly and cheerful. Inasmuch as the present work is not intended to be a Psychology of Double Monsters, which find a place in this * Hist, des A ttomalies, tome 3, p. 90, et seq. treatise only as instances of deviation of personal identity, I shall simply men- tion the recent case of Millie and Chris- tine, in whom the sensibility of the lower members is in common ; consequently the two spinal cords must form a regular chiasma at the point of union. The law, both civil and ecclesiastical, takes cognizance of this phenomenon of double monsters, as involving questions of civil status, marriage, right of succes- sion, baptism, etc. ; it has unhesitatingly recognized two persons wherever such monsters present two distinct heads. And justly so, though in practice embar- rassing questions may arise. The head being in man the true seat of personality and the place where the synthesis of per- sonality takes place though this does not appear so certain as we descend the animal scale it fairly stands for the in- dividual. But when the question is dis- cussed scientifically it is impossible, in the case of double monsters, to consider each individual as complete. I will not weary the reader with un- necessary comments, since the facts speak for themselves. Whoever exam- ines attentively what has been said, will see that even in cases where the person- alities are most distinct, there is such a blending of organs and functions that each of the twins can be himself only bjr being more or less the other and by hav- ing consciousness of that other. The Me therefore is not an entity that acts where and how it pleases, controlling the organs in its own way, limiting its own province at will. On the contrary it is so truly a resultant that its domain is strictly determined by its anatomical connections with the brain, and that it represents, now a complete body less some undivided part, again a part of a body and, in the case of parasital mon- sters, so small a part that it cannot sub- sist, and becomes aborted. To prove once more and in another way that the organism is the principle of individuation ; and that it is such without any restriction, directly through the or- ganic sensations, indirectly through the affective and intellective states of which we shall speak later ; let us see what takes place in twins. Psychology has hardly concerned itself about twins any more than about double monsters, but biologists have brought to light some cu- rious facts. First it is to be remarked that double i6 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. births occur in the ratio of about one to seventy normal births. Triple and quad- ruple births are far more infrequent as one to 5000 and one to 150,000 respec- tively : but we will consider here only cases of twin births, for the study of triple and quadruple births would only complicate matters. Again, it is to be remarked that there are two kinds of twins, coming each from a separate ovum, and in such cases they may be of the same or of different sex ; or from two germinative spots in one ovum, and then they are enveloped in the same membrane and are invariably of one sex. This latter case alone gives us two per- sonalities strictly comparable. We will not take account of animals, but will consider the human species only, and will attack the problem in all its com- plexity. It is evident that since the phys- ical and the moral state of the parents is the same for the two individuals at the instant of procreation, one cause of dif- ference is eliminated. And as their de- velopment has for its starting point one single fecundated ovum, it is highly pro- bable that there will be an exceedingly close resemblance between the two in physical constitution, and hence, accord- ing to our thesis, in mental constitution. Let us first see what are the (acts in our favor; we will then consider objections and exceptions. Perfect likeness between twins is a matter of every-day observation. In ancient times it was turned to account by comic poets, and ever since novelists have made use of it. But usually they have dealt only with external resem- blances, as stature, figure, features, voice. There are resemblances far deeper than these. Physicians have for a long time remarked that most twins exhibit an extraordinary agreement in tastes, apti- tudes, faculties, and even in their for- tunes. Mr. Gallon has investigated this subject by sending out a list of question to which he received eighty replies where- of thirty-six entered into circumstantia" details. Mr. Gallon's purpose was en- tirely different from ours. In pursuing his researches on heredity he wished to determine by a new method the respec- tive parts played by nature and education but much of his material will be of grea use to us.* He gives many anecdotes of the same * Seethe title 'History of Twins ''in Gallon' Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Develop mcnt. haracter as those which have long been urrent, e. g. : one sister taking two music lessons a day so as to leave her win sister free ; the perplexities of a col- ege janitor who whenever the twin jrother of one of the students came to ee his brother, was at a loss which of the wo to let out, etc. In other cases the wins exhibit a persistent likeness to each ther under circumstances little calcu- ated to preserve it. Thus : " A was coming home from India on leave ; he ship did not arrive for some days after it vas due ; the twin brother B had come up rom his quarters to receive A, and their old mother was very nervous. One morning A rushed in saying, ' Oh, mother, how are rou ? ' Her answer was, ' No, B, it's a bad oke. You know how anxious I am ' and t was a little time before A could persuade icr that he was the real man." t But facts regarding mental organiza- tion have more interest for us. " The next point," says Gallon, ' which I shall mention in illustration of the extremely close resemblance between certain twins is the similarity in the association of their ideas. No less than eleven out of the thirty-five cases testify to this. They make the same remarks on the same occasion, begin singing the same song at the same moment, and so on ; or one would commence a sentence and the other would finish it. An observant friend graphically described to me the effect produced on her oy two such twins whom she had met casually. She said : ' Their teeth grew alike, they spoke alike and together, and said the same things, and seemed just like one person. One of the most curious anecdotes that I have received concerning this similarity of ideas was that one twin, A, who happened to be at a town in Scotland, bought a set of champaign glasses which caught his attention, as a sur- prise for his brother B, while at the same time, B, being in England, bought a similar set of precisely the same pattern for A. Other anecdotes of a like kind have reached me about these twins.' " | Bodily and mental diseases, in ihem- selves and in iheir evolution, supply many confirmatory facts. And though the latter are of interest only lo ihe psychologist, the former disclose a like- ness in ihe inmost constitution of the two organisms not to be seen at a glance like external resemblances. Says Trousseau : " I have had as patients twin brothers that were so extraordinarily alike that it was t Gallon, Inquiries into\Human Faculty. (Lon- don, 1883), p. 224. \ Ibid., p. 231. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. impossible for me to distinguish them except when they were side by side. This bodily re- semblance went further still : there was even a more remarkable pathological likeness be- tween them One of them, whom I saw in Paris suffering from rheumatic ophthalmia, said to me : ' This very moment my brother is no doubt suffering from ophthalmia too.' I scouted the idea, but a few days afterward he showed me a letter he had just received from his brother, then at Vienne, in which he wrote : ' I have my ophthalmia, you too must be having yours.' Strange as this may seem, the fact was even so. This I have not on hearsay, but I myself have seen it, and similar cases have come to my knowledge in my practice." * Galton gives many similar cases, but I quote only one. Two twins bearing a perfect resemblance to each other, with a strong mutual attachment and with identical tastes, were in government em- ploy, and lived together. One fell sick of Bright's disease and died ; the other was attacked by the same disorder and died seven months later. Pages might be filled with similar cases. And it is the same with mental maladies. A few instances will suffice. Moreau of Tours had under treatment two twins physically alike and both insane. In them "the dominant ideas are absolutely the same. Both believe themselves to be the victims of imaginary persecutions. The self-same enemies have sworn to undo them and employ the self-same means of attaining their ends. Both have hallucina- tions of hearing. They never address a word of conversation to any one, and are loth to answer questions. They always hold themselves aloof and do not communi- cate with each other. An exceedingly curi- ous fact, and one again and again noticed by the attendants in their ward and by ourselves is, that from time to time, at very irregular intervals two, three or more months with- out ascertainable cause and by a spontaneous effect of their complaint, a very marked change occurs in the condition of the two brothers. Both of them, about the same period, often on the same day, quit their habitual state of stupor and prostration ; they utter the self-same complaints and present themselves before the physician, earnestly begging to be allowed their liberty. I have been witness of this rather singular fact even when the twins happened to be several kilo- meters apart, one at Bicetre, the other at the Ste. Anne farm." t Recently the Journal 'of Mental Science published two observations on insanity in twins. Here we see two sisters much alike in features, manners, speech and mental traits, so that they might easily be taken for one another. They were placed in different wards of the same asylum without the possibility of seeing one another, and yet the symptoms of in- sanity were the same in both. But we must meet some objections. There are some twins of one sex who do not resemble each other, and though the observed facts do not tell us in what pro- portion true twins (from one ovum) pre- sent these differences, one instance suf- fices to make the subject worthy of dis- cussion. We have in another place J enumerated the many causes that in every individual, from conception till death, tend to produce variations, that is to say marks proper to that individual and dif- ferentiating him from all others. Here, as we have said, one class of causes must be eliminated, viz., those which come im- mediately from the parents. But the fecundated ovum represents also the an- cestral influences four, twelve, twenty- eight possible influences, accordingly as we go back to the grand-parents, great- grand-parents, great-great-grand-parents, and so on. Only by experience do we learn which influences prevail and in what degree. Here indeed one same ovum serves to produce two individuals ; but there is nothing to prove that always and everywhere division is made between the two with strict equivalence in quan- tity and quality of the materials. The ova of all animals not only possess the same anatomic composition, but further- more chemical analysis can discover in them only infinitesimal differences ; nev- ertheless one ovum produces a sponge, another a human being. It follows that this apparent likeness hides profound dif- ferences which our keenest investigation fails to detect. Are these differences due to the nature of the molecular motions, as some authors think ? We may suppose what we please, provided it be under- stood that the ovum is a complex prod- uct, and that the two individuals that come from it may not be rigorously alike. Our difficulty springs simply from igno- rance of the processes according to which the primordial elements group themselves * Trousseau Clinique Medicale I., p. 253. t Psychologic Morbide, p. 172. See also an ex- ceedingly curious case in the A nnafes Medico-psy- (Jtologiques, 1863, tome I., p, 312. On the question of twins the reader may consult Kleinwaechter's special work, Die Lehre von den Zwilligen. Prag. 1871 : also Dr. B. Ball, Insanity in Twint (Huii- BOLDT LIBRARY, No. 87, page 37). L 'HMditi Psychologique, 2d edition, part II., ch. iv. 18 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. HI order to constitute each individual, and , consequently from our ignorance of the physical and psychical differences thence resulting. Some of Gallon's correspond- ents mentioned the curious fact of some twins being " complementary to each other." The mother of a pair of twins wrote : " There seemed to be a sort of interchange- able likeness in expression that often gave to each the effect of being more like his brother than himself." * "A fact struck all our school contemporaries, that my brother and I were complementary, so to speak, in point of ability and disposition. He was contem- plative, poetical, and literary to a remarkable degree, showing great power in that line. I was practical, mathematical, and linguistic. Between us we should have made a very de- cent sorf of a man." t If the reader will consider how complex man's psychic organization is, and, in con- sequence of this complexity, how un- likely it is that two persons should be simply copies of each other, he will be in- evitably led to the conclusion that one well-proved fact of this kind outweighs ten exceptions, and that the moral like- ness is only the correlative of the physi- cal. If per impossibile there were two men so constituted that their organisms should be identical, and their hereditary influences exactly the same : if per impos- sibilius both of them received the same physical and moral impressions at the same moment : then the only difference between them would be their position in space. In concluding this chapter, I am a little ashamed to have collected so many proofs and arguments to establish what in my eyes is a plain truth, viz., that as the or- ganism is, so is the personality. I should have hesitated to do it, were it not that this truth has been forgotten and miscon- ceived rather than denied, and that au- thors have nearly always contented them- selves with mentioning it under the vague heading of " influence of the physical upon the moral." The facts so far studied do not of them- selves lead to a conclusion : they only prepare the way. They prove that phys- ical personality presupposes the proper- ties of living matter and their coordina- tion ; that as the body is but the organ- ized and coordinated sum of the ele- ments that make it up, so the psychical personality is but the organized and co- * Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 214. f Ibid. p. 240. ordinated sum of the same elements re- garded as psychic values. It expresses :heir nature and their action, nothing more. This is proved by the normal itate, by teratological cases, and by the likeness between twins. The aberrations of physical personality, or as Bertrand \ happily denominates them, " hallucina- tions of the bodily sense " (les hallucina- tions du sens du corps) confirm this view. But there are deviations of human per- onality produced by other causes, by a more complex mechanism : these we are now to study. CHAPTER III. AFFECTIVE DISTURBANCE. ONCE for all the reader must be re- minded that in this chapter (as also in the one on intellective disorders) we are still pursuing, under another form, the study of organic conditions. The desires, feel- ings, passions that give the fundamental tone to character, have their roots in the organism, are pre-determined by it. The same is true of the highest intellectual manifestations. Nevertheless since the psychic states have here a predominant role, we will treat them as immediate causes of changes of personality, the while never forgetting that these causes are in their turn themselves effects. Without pretending strictly to classify affective manifestations (which we shall not have to consider in detail) we will re- duce them to three groups of increasing psychological complexity but decreasing physiological importance. These are i. Tendencies connected with the conserva- tion of the individual (nutrition, defense) ; 2. Those which relate to the conservation of the species ; and 3. The highest of them all, those which presuppose the de- velopment of mind (manifestations of a moral, religious, aesthetic, or scientific kind ; ambition in all its forms ; and the like). If we consider the development of the individual we find that it is in this order that feelings and sentiments make their appearance. It is seen more clearly still in the evolution of the human spe- cies. The inferior races, where educa- tion does not come in to correct nature, when they bring together the accumulated result of ages of labor, have little to show beyond the conservation of the individual t De FAperception du Corps Humain par /* Conscience, p. 269, et seg. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. and of the species, and present only the faintest trace of the sentiments enumer- ated under the third head. The affective states relating to nutrition are, in the child during its early years, the only element, so to speak, of the nas- cent personality. From these come well- being and discomfort, desire and aver- sion : here we see that " bodily sense," of which we have spoken so often, arrived at its highest psychic expression. Inas- much as certain natural causes, too evi- dent to need enumeration, make nutrition the almost exclusively dominant concern- ment in the infant, the babe has and can have only an almost entirely nutritive personality, /. e., the vaguest and lowest form of personality. The Me, in the view of whoever does not consider it as an entity, cannot be here anything but an extremely simple composite. As we quit the period of infancy, nu- trition plays a less dominant part, but it never loses its just place, for, of all the properties of the living being, this one alone is fundamental. Hence with vari- ations in nutrition are connected serious alterations of personality. With nutri- tion reduced, the individual feels himself depressed, enfeebled, diminished. With nutrition increased, he feels himself stim- ulated, strengthened, reinforced. Of all the functions whose harmonious action constitutes this fundamental property of living beings, the circulation appears to be the one whose sudden variations have the greatest influence upon the affective states, and are most speedily answered by a counter-stroke. But we must quit conjectures about details, and look at the facts. In the states known as hypochondria, lypemania, melancholia (in all its forms), we find alterations of personality rang- ing through all possible degrees, includ- ing complete metamorphosis. Physicians draw lines of clinical distinction between these different morbid states, but they do not concern us just now, and we may comprise them under one common de- scription. There is a certain feeling of fatigue, oppression, anxiety, down-heart- edness, sadness, absence of desire, per- sistent ennui. In the worst cases, the springs of the emotions are quite dried up. " The patients become insensible to everything. They are without affection, whether for their parents or for their chil- dren, and even the death of those who once were dear to them leaves them ut- terly cold and indifferent. They can no longer weep, and nought save their own sufferings moves them."* Then, as re- gards bodily or mental activity : such pa- tients exhibit torpor, powerlessness to act or even to will, insuperable inaction for hours at a time : in a word that " abu- lia " all the forms of which we studied in the work on Diseases of the Will, f As regards the outer world, the patient, though not hallucinated, finds all his re- lations to it changed. His habitual sen- sations seem to have lost their usual char- acter. " Everything about me," .said such a patient, "is still as it used to be, yet there must have been some changes. Things still wear their old shapes : I see them plainly, and yet they have -changed a good deal too." One of Esquirol's pa- tients complained " that his existence was incomplete. 'Every one of my senses,' he used to say, ' every part of myself is, so to speak, separated from me, and no longer gives me any sensation : it seems to me that I never come quite up to' the things I touch.' " This state, due some- times to cutaneous anaesthesia, may be- come so intensified that to the patient " it seems as though the real world had com- pletely vanished or is dead, and that only an imaginary world remains in which he is anxious to find his place." \ To all this, add the physical symptoms, viz., dis- ordered circulation, respiration, and se- cretion. There may be great emaciation, and the weight of the body may decline rapidly during the period of depression. The respiratory function is retarded as also the circulation, and the body's temperature is lowered. By degrees these morbid states become embodied, organized, and combine to produce a false conception which becomes a center of attraction toward which everything converges. One patient avers that his heart is a stone, another that his nerves are burning coals ; and so on. These aberrations have all sorts of forms, and they differ from one patient to an- other. In extreme forms, the individual doubts of his own existence, or denies it. A young man who said he was for two years dead, expressed as follows his per- plexity : " I exist, but outside of real, material life, and in spite of myself, noth- ing having given me death. Everything is mechanical with me, and everything is done unconsciously." This contradictory situation, in which the subject says that * Falret, Archives Generates de Me'decine, Dec., 1878. t No. 52 HUMBOLDT LIBRARY. J Griesinger, TraiM des Maladies Mentatcs ( French Trans.), p. 265. 2O THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. he is at once living and dead, would seem to be the logical, natural expression of a condition of things in which the former Me and the present Me, vitality and an- nihilation, come to equilibrium. The psychological interpretation of all these cases admits of no doubt : here are organic perturbations whose first result is to reduce the sense-faculty in general, and whose second is to pervert it. Thus is found a group of organic and psychic states that tend to modify the constitution of the Me profoundly and in its inmost nature, because they act not after the manner of sudden emotions whose effect is violent and superficial, but slowly, si- lently, persistently. At first, this new state seems strange to the individual, something outside of himself. Little by little, through custom, it finds its place, becomes an integral part of the individ- ual's being, and, if it is progressive, trans- forms him entirely. Seeing how the Me is broken up, we can understand how it comes to be. Doubtless, in most cases, the change is only partial. The individual, while be- coming for himself and for those who know him, other than he used to be, re- tains a residuum of himself. Complete transformation can, in fact, be only of rare occurrence -, and it. may be remarked that when the patient says he is changed, transformed, despite the contradiction or the ridicule of his friends, he is right and not they. He cannot feel otherwise, for his consciousness is but the expression of his organic state. Subjectively, he is not at all under an illusion : he is just what he must be. On the contrary it is the un- conscious, unavowed hypothesis of a Me, independent and existing by itself as an unchangeable entity, that instinctively leads us to believe this change to be an external occurrence or, as it were, some unwonted or ridiculous garb, while the fact is that the change is inward and in- volves gains or losses in the very sub- stance of the Me itself. The counterpart of these partial altera- tions of the Me is seen in cases where it becomes exalted, amplified, and where it immeasurably transcends its normal tone. Instances of this are seen in the beginning of general paral- ysis; also in certain cases of mania. This is in every respect the reverse of what occurs in those other cases. Here we see the patient possessed of a sense of physical and mental well-being, of abounding strength, of exuberant activ- ity . he talks unceasingly, is a fertile de- viser of projects and undertakings, ever traveling hither and thither to no pur- pose. The superexcitation of his psychic life has a corresponding superactivity of the organic functions. Nutrition be- comes more active and is often excessive ; respiration and circulation are acceler- ated ; the genital function is quickened. Yet, despite the great expenditure of force, the patient feels no fatigue. Then these states become grouped and unified, and at length they in great part trans- form the Me. One man is conscious of herculean strength, is able to lift prodig- ious weights, to beget thousands of chil- dren, run a race with a railroad train, etc. Another possesses an inexhaustible store of science, is a great poet, great inventor, great artist, and so on. Sometimes the transformation comes still nearer to com- plete metamorphosis : mastered by the sense of boundless power, the patient calls himself pope, emperor, god. As Griesinger justly remarks, " The patient feeling proud, daring, light hearted, conscious to himself of unwonted freedom in executing his projects, his mind swarming with ideas, is naturally led to con- ceive thoughts of greatness, station, wealth, great moral or intellectual power. * * * This overweening sense of strength and free- dom must however have a reason : there must exist in the Me something to corre- spond to this ; the Me must have become for the time being something quite different from what it was before, and this change can be expressed by the patient only by declar- ing himself to be Napoleon, the Messiah, or some other exalted personage."* We will not waste time in proving that this transformation of the Me, whether, partial or complete, momentary or perma- nent, is in kind the same as the preceding cases and that it presupposes the same mechanism, with this only difference, that here the Me undergoes dissolution in the reverse way, by excess, and not by default. These plus or minus alterations of personality, this metamorphosis of the Me, which raises it or lowers, would be still more striking if they succeeded one another regularly in the same individual. Now this occurs often in what is called folie ctrculaire, or folie a double forme, a malady characterized essentially by suc- cessive periods of depression and exalta- tion following one another in fixed order, with intermissions of lucidity in some pa- tients. Here we observe a curious fact. Upon the personality that may be called * Op. cit., p. 333. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. 21 the original and fundamental one, are grafted, one after the other, two new per- sonalities not only quite distinct, but to- tally exclusive of each other. Upon this point it is necessary to give the gist of a few observations.* A woman whose case was observed by Morel, had been abandoned to a vicious life by her mother from the age of fourteen years. " Later, in her shame and wretchedness, her only resource was to enter a brothel. She was taken thence one year afterward and placed in the convent of the Good Shepherd at Metz. Here she stayed two years, and the too strong reaction that took place in her feelings gave rise to religious mania, which was followed by a period of profound stupid- ity." Being now placed under the care of a physician, she would pass through two alternate periods, believing herself to be in turn prostitute and nun. On emerg- ing from the period of stupidity, 41 she would go to work regularly, and her language was always proper, but she would arrange her toilet with a certain coquetterie. Then this tendency would increase, her eyes growing brighter, her glance lascivious ; she would dance and sing. At last her obscene language and her erotic solicitations would compel her sequestration in solitary confine- ment. She would say her name was Mad- ame Poulmaire, and would give the fullest details of her former life in prostitution. Then, after a period of depression, she would become again gentle and timid, carry- ing even to scrupulousness the sense of pro- priety. She would now arrange her toilet with the utmost austerity. The tone of her voice too would assume a peculiar character, as she spoke of the Good Shepherd convent at Metz and of her longing to return thither. Now her name would be Sister Martha of the Five Wounds, Theresa of Jesus, Mary of the Resurrection, etc. She would not speak in the first person singular, but would say to the attendant sister, ' Take our dress ' ; * there is our handkerchief.' Nothing was her own any more, according to the rule in convents. She would have visions of angels smiling upon her, and moments of ecstasy." In a case reported by Krafft-Ebing, a neuropathic patient, son of an insane fa- ther, " during the period of depression was disgusted with the world, and all his thoughts were about the nearness of death, and about eternity, and his pur- pose then was to become a priest. Dur- ing his maniacal periods he was noisy * They can be found in extenso in Ritti, Traite Cliniaue de la Folie et Double Forme. Paris, 1883. Obss. XVII., XIX., XXX., XXXI. pursued his studies with mad ardor, would not hear of theology, and thought only of practicing medicine/' An insane woman at Charenton, pos- sessing very remarkable power and origi- nality of mind, " from day to day would change in personality, in condition, in life, and even in sex. Now she would be a young lady of blood royal betrothed to an emperor ; anon a plebeian woman and a democrat : to-day a wife and in the family way ; to-morrow still a maid. It would happen also that she would think her- self a man, and one day she imagined herself to be a political prisoner of importance, and composed some verses upon the subject." Finally in the observation which fol- lows we find the complete formation of a second personality. " A lunatic in the Maison de Vanves," says Billod,t " about every eight months would let his beard grow and would show himself to all the inmates in unusual garb and with unwonted behavior, giving himself out to be one Nabon, an artillery lieutenant lately re- turned from Africa to take the place of his brother. The patient would then remain several months in a state of great exultation, adapting all his conduct to his new charac- ter. After some time he would announce the return of his brother who, he would say, was in the village and was now to take his place. Then some day he would have his beard shaved off, would make a complete change in his habits and demeanor, and would resume his true name. But now he would present all the signs of melancholia, walking about slowly, loving silence and solitude, continually reading the Following of Christ and the Fathers of the Church. In this mental state, a lucid one if you please, but one that I am far from considering as normal, he would remain till the coming back of * Lieutenant Nabon.' " The two cases first cited are, in reality, but an exaggeration, a largely magnified copy, so to speak, of the normal state. The Me is always made up of contradic- tory tendencies virtues and vices, mod- esty and arrogance, avarice and prodi- gality, desire for rest and need of action, and so on. Usually these opposite tend- encies equilibrate one another, or at least the one which dominates is not without its counterpoise. In the cases before us, in virtue of pretty well ascertained or- ganic conditions, not only is equilibrium impossible, but a group of tendencies be- comes hypertrophied at the expense of the antagonist group, which becomes t Annales Medico-psychologiques, 1858. 22 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. atrophied ; then an inverse reaction takes place, so that the personality, instead of consisting of those mean oscillations whereof each one represents one side of human nature, passes ever from one ex- cess to another. We may remark that these diseases of personality consist of a reduction to a simpler state : but we must not yet dwell upon that point. Nutrition being less a function than the fundamental property of whatever has life, the tendencies and the feelings connected with it possess a very general character. The same cannot be said of what concerns the conservation of the species. That function, attached as it is to a definite part of the organism, finds expression in very definite feelings. Hence this is well fitted to verify our thesis ; for if personality is a composite varying according to its constituent ele- ments, a change in the sex instincts will change the personality, a perversion will pervert it, an interversion will intervert it : and this is just what happens. First let us recall some known facts, though commonly the conclusions they enforce are not drawn. At puberty a new group of sensations and consequently of feelings, sentiments and ideas comes into existence. This influx of unwonted psychic states stable because their cause is stable, coordinated to one another be- cause their source is one tends pro- foundly to modify the constitution of the Me. It feels undecided, troubled with a vague and latent unrest whose cause is hid. Little by little these new elements of the moral life are assimilated by the existing Me, enter into it, are converted into it, withal making it other than it was. It is changed ; a partial alteration of the personality has taken place, the result o) which has been to produce a new type oi character the sexual character. This development of an organ and of its func- tions, with their train of instincts, imagin- ings, feelings, sentiments and ideas, has produced in the neuter personality of the child a differentiation has made of it a Me male'or female, in the complete sense of the term. Till now there existed only a sort of rough draft \dbauche\ of the complete personality, but that has served to obviate all sudden shock in the change to prevent a rupture between the past and the present, to make the personality continuous. If now we pass from the normal devel- opment to exceptional and pathological cases, we shall find variations or trans- ormations of personality dependent on the state of the genital organs. The effect of castration upon animals is well-known. Not less known is its effect upon man. A few exceptions apart (and uch are found even in history) eunuchs present a deviation from the psychic type. ' Whatever we know about them," says Maudsley, " confirms the belief that they are for the most part false, lying, coward- ly, envious, revengeful, void of social and moral feeling, mutilated in soul as well as in body." Whether this moral degra- dation be the direct result of castration, as some authors assert, or whether it re- sult from an equivocal social situation, is a question that does not affect our thesis : whether the result comes directly or in- directly from the mutilation, the cause remains the same. As regards hermaphrodites experience verifies what we might have predicted a priori. With the characteristics of one sex they present some of those peculiar to the other, but instead of combining the functions of both, they possess only im- perfect organs, and commonly these are sexually impotent. The moral character of hermaphrodites is sometimes neutral, again masculine, in other cases feminine. Abundant instances are cited by writers who have treated the question. * " Some- times the hermaphrodite, after having shown a very strong liking for women, is animated with the very opposite instincts by the descent of the testicles." In a case recently observed by Dr. Magitot an her- maphrodite woman successively mani- fested feminine tastes and very pro- nounced masculine appetites. " In gen- eral the affective faculties and the moral dispositions show the effects of the mal- formation of the organs. Nevertheless, it is but fair " says Tardieu, " to make large allowance for the influence of the habits and occupations imposed upon these individuals by the error as to their real sex. Some of them being from the first educated as girls, dressed as girls, employed in women's work, married per- haps as women, retain the thoughts, the habits, the demeanor of the female sex. Such was the case with Maria Arsano, deceased at the age of eighty years, who was in fact a man whose character had been made feminine by habit." I do not propose here to detail the * For the facts see Isidore Geoffrey Saint-Hil- aire Histoire des Anomalies vol. II., p. 65, et sey. Also Taraieu and Laugier, Dictionnaire de Me'de- cine, art. HERMAPHRODISMK. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. perversions or aberrations of the sexual instinct, * each one of which imprints its mark upon the personality, altering it more or less, transiently or permanently. These partial alterations reach their term in total transformation, in change of sex. There are many instances of this : the following may serve as a type. Lalle- mant records the case of " a patient who believed himself to be a woman, and who wrote letters to an imaginary lover. At the autopsy there was found an hyper- trophy with induration of the prostate, and an alteration of the ejaculatory canals." It is probable that in many cases of this kind there has been perver- sion or abolition of the sexual feelings. Some exceptions, however, are to be noted. From sundry detailed observations (which see in Leuret, Fragments Psy- chol., p. 114 et seg.) we learn of individ- uals who assume the gait, the habit, the voice, and, as far as they may, the garb of the sex they imagine themselves to be- long to, though they present no anatomi- cal or physiological anomaly of the sex- ual organs. In such cases the starting point of the metamorphosis is to be sought elsewhere : it must be found in the cerebro-spinal organ. Indeed when we speak of the sexual organs as consti- tuting or as modifying personality, we are to be understood as speaking, not of those organs themselves alone as defined by their anatomic conformation, but also of their relations to the encephalon, in which they are represented. Physiolo- gists locate in the lumbar region of the spinal column the reflex genito-spinal center. From that center to the brain all is undiscovered territory ; for the hypoth- esis of Gall, who made the cerebellum the seat of physical love, is not much in favor, despite the confirmatory observa- tions of Budge and of Lussana. But however great our ignorance upon this point, sexilal impressions must reach the encephalon, for they are felt, and there are centers from which psychic incitations are sent out to the sexual organs to put them in action. These nerve-elements, whatever their nature, their number, or their seat ; whether they are localized or diffused, are the cerebral, and conse- quently the psychic, representatives of the sexual organs ; and since in produc- ing a special state of consciousness they usually produce others also, there must * For a full discussion of this question see the article by Dr. Gley, " Sur les Aberrations de 1' In- stinct Sexuel" in the Revue Philosophique, Jan. 1884. be some association between this group of psycho-physiological states and a cer- tain number of others. The conclusion to be drawn from the cases already cited, is that there has arisen a cerebral disorder of unknown character (a woman suppos- ing herself to be a man, or vice versa) whence results a fixed erroneous state of consciousness. This fixed state of con- sciousness, predominating over the nor- mal states, calls forth natural, almost anatomical associations, which are as it were its radiations (the feelings, the ways, the speech, the dress of the imaginary sex) : it tends to complete itself. Here is a metamorphosis from above not from below ; and here we have an instance of what is called the influence of the moral upon the physical. We will endeavor to show further on that the Me upon which most psychologists have based their rea- sonings is formed by a like process. Further these cases belong among the intellective deviations of personality, of which we shall treat in the next chapter. Before we quit this subject, I would notice a few facts hard to account for, but which nevertheless cannot be seri- ously alleged against our thesis. I refer to the phenomenon of " opposite sex- uality " {sexualit^ contraire} often men- tioned of late, and about which a few words will suffice. Certain patients ob- served by Westphal, Krafft-Ebing, Char- cot and Magnan, Servaes, Gock, et al., present a congenital introversion of the sexual instinct, whence results, despite their normal physical constitution, an in- stinctive and violent attraction to a per- son of the same sex, with strong repul- sion toward the opposite sex : in short, " a woman will be a woman physically but psychically a man : a man will be physi- cally a man, psychically a woman." These facts are entirely at variance with what logic and experience teach us : here the physical and the moral are in mutual contradiction. Strictly speaking, those who regard the Me as an entity might quote these facts as proving its indepen- dence, its autonomous existence. Never- theless that were a gross illusion, for their whole argument would rest upon two very weak bases, viz., on some facts of very rare occurrence, and on the present diffi- culty of finding an explanation of them. No one will deny that cases of " opposite sexuality " are but an infinitesimal fac- tion of the sum of the cases known to us by experience. By their rarity they form an exception, and by their nature a psychological monstrosity : but monstros-- THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. ities are not miracles, and it behooves us to find out whence they come. We might attempt to account for them in many ways, but that usually means that no explanation is sufficient. I will not inflict these explanations upon the reader. Like every other science, psy- chology must be resigned to be ignorant for a time, and must not fear to confess ignorance. Herein it differs from meta- physics, which undertakes to explain all things. Physicians who from their own medical point of view have studied these strange creatures, regard them as degen- erate individuals. The point of special interest for us would be to know why degenerescence takes this form and not another. Probably the explication of this mystery is to be sought in the mul- tiple elements of heredity, in the complex play of the conflicting male and female elements : I leave the question to minds more clear-sighted and more fortunate in discovering the causes of things. But aside from the question of the cause, one can hardly refuse to recognize a devia- tion of the cerebral mechanism, as in the cases quoted by .Leuret, and in like in- stances. But the influence of the sexual organs upon the nature and formation of character is so little open to question that to dwell upon it were to waste time, and an hypothetical explanation of " op- posite sexuality " would in no wise further our research. The instincts, desires, tendencies, senti- ments, etc., that relate to the conserva- tion of the individual and to that of the species, have their material conditions clearly determined, the former in the totality of organic life, the latter in a special set of organs. But when from the primordial and fundamental forms of the affective life we pass to those which are of secondary formation and which have sprung up later in the course of evolution (tendencies social, moral, intel- lectual, aesthetic, etc.), then, to say noth- ing of the impossibility of assigning to these their direct organic bases, we find that they are by no means so general ; none of them, except perhaps the moral and the social tendencies, express the individual in his totality ; they are partial, and represent only one group in the sum total of his tendencies. Hence no one of them has of itself the power of producing a metamorphosis of the personality. As long as the habitude we call bodily sense (or ccenassthesis) and that other habitude which is memory, do not come into play, there can be no complete transforma- tion : the individual may be changed, he ' does not become another. But these variations, though partial, are interesting. They show the tran- sition from the normal to the morbid state. In studying the diseases of the will * we found in ordinary life many fore- shadowings of the graver forms. Here, too, common observation shows us how little cohesion and unity the normal Me possesses. Apart from perfectly bal- anced characters (though in the strict sense of the term such characters do not exist) there are in every one of us ten- dencies of every kind, in every degree of contrariety, with all possible intermediate shades of difference, and with all sorts of combinations between them. For the Me is not merely a memory, an accu- mulation of recollections linked to the present moment, but a sum of instincts, tendencies, desires, which are simply its innate and acquired constitution entering into action. Memory is the Me statical, the group of tendencies is the Me dynam- ical. If, instead of being influenced un- consciously by the idea of the Me being an entity a prejudgment instilled into us both by education and by the so- called testimony of consciousness we were to take it for what it is, namely a coordination of tendencies and of psychic states whose proximate cause is to be sought in the coordination and consen- sus of the organism, we should no longer be surprised at its oscillations incessant in fickle, but rare in stable characters which for a longer or a shorter time, or even for an almost infinitesimal instant, exhibit the person in a new light. Some organic state, some external influence, reinforces some tendency ; it becomes a center of attraction toward which con- verge the directly associated states and tendencies ; then associations grow closer and closer ; the center of gravity of the Me becomes displaced, and the person- ality is altered. " Two souls " said Goethe "dwell in my breast." Nor two only! If the moralists, poets, dramatists have shown us to satiety these two Mes con- tending in one Me, common experience shows yet more ; it shows us many Mes, each as it comes to the forefront, exclud- ing the others. This is less dramatic, but more true. " Our Me differs widely from itself at different times: according * See the work so entitled (HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 52). THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. to a person's age, his various duties, the occurrences of his life, the excitements of the moment, such or such an aggrega- tion of ideas which at a given moment represents the Me, becomes more highly developed than others, and takes the foremost place. We are another and yet the same. My Me as physician, my Me as man of science, my sensuous, my moral Me, etc., in other words, the com- plex of ideas, inclinations, will-tenden- cies, so denominated, may at any time come into a state of mutual opposition and repulsion. This would result not only in discord and scission between thought and will, but also in total loss of power, for each of these two isolated phases of the Me, if in all these spheres there was not a more or less open way for the return of the consciousness of some of these fundamental directions." * The orator, master of speech, who while speaking judges himself ; the actor who notes his own performance ; the psychol- ogist who studies himself, all are in- stances of this normal scission of the Me. Between these momentary and partial transformations (which because they are common do not strike one as psychologi- cally important) and the more serious states we have yet to consider, there ex- ist intermediate variations either more stable or more far-reaching, or both. The dipsomaniac, for example, leads two alternate lives : in one he is sober, dis- creet, industrious; in the other quite overmastered by passion, reckless, heed- less. It is as though two incomplete and contrary individuals were grafted on a common trunk. The same is true of those who are subject to irresistible im- pulses and who declare that an external force constrains them to act in spite of themselves. We may cite also those transformations of character which are accompanied by cutaneous anaesthesia. One of the most curious instances of this was observed by Renaudin : A young man whose conduct had always been exem- plary, suddenly gave way to evil tenden- cies. His mental state gave no clear evi- dence of alienation, but it was noticed that the whole surface of his body had become absolutely insensible. The cutaneous anaesthesia was intermittent. " When it ceased, the young man's dispo- * Griesinger, Maladies Mentales, p. 53. See a good essay by Paulhan on Les Variations de la Personnalite" a f Etat Normal (Rev. Philos., June, 1882). sition was quite different; he was now docile, affectionate, fully conscious of his painful situation : when it returned, im- mediately his evil inclinations controlled him, and these, as we found out, might go even so far as to incite him to homicide. 1 ' Inevitably we come back in every case to the organism. But this excursus through diverse fields of observation, however monotonous it may be, exhibits to us the variations of personality in all its aspects. Since no two cases are iden- tical, each one offers a special decompo- sition of the Me. The cases last cited show us a transformation of character without lesion to the memory. As we proceed with our review of the facts, one conclusion will more and more impress itself upon our minds, viz. , that personal- ity results from two fundamental factors the bodily constitution with its tenden- cies and feelings, and the memory. If (as in the cases so far considered) only the first of these factors is modified, the result is a momentary dissociation followed by a partial change of the Me. If the modification is so profound that the organic bases of memory suffer a kind of paralysis, and become incapable of be- ing revived, then the disintegration of the Me is complete : there is no longer a past, and there is a different present. Then a new Me is formed, and usually it knows nothing of the former Me. The cases of this kind are so well known that I will simply mention them, viz., the case of the American lady described by Macnish, that of Felida, described by Dr. Azam, and those recorded by Dufay.f Just be- cause they involve the entire personality, these cases come under no specific head- ing, and we have no reason for mention- ing them here rather than anywhere else, except that we wish to remark that the tran- sition from one personality to another is always accompanied by a change of the character, associated no doubt with the unknown organic change which dominates the whole situation. This change is very clearly pointed out by Dr. Azam : his patient (Fdlida) is at one period gloomy, cold, reserved ; in the other pe- riod, gay, sprightly, cheerful, full of life, even boisterous. The change is greater still in the following case, which I give in t For a full account of the observations, see Taine, De f Intelligence, vol. I. p. 165 ; Azam, Revue Scient., 20 May, 1876, 18 Sept., 1877, 10 Nov. 1879 ; Dufay, ibidem, 15 July, 1876. As regards the part played by memory in pathological cases, see Diseases of Memory (HuMBOLDT LIBRARY No 46), page 1 6 et seq. 26 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. some detail because it is recent and little known.* The subject, a youth of seventeen years, V. L. had an attack of hystero-epilepsy and quite lost all recollection of one year of his life. His character underwent a total change. Born of " an unmarried vagabond girl and an unknown father, as soon as he was able to walk he began straying about the streets and begging. Later he be- came a thief, and was arrested and sent to the St. Urbain penal colony, where he worked as a farm-hand." One day while employed in the vineyard he grasped in his hand a snake concealed in a bundle of vine-cuttings. His fright was extreme, and on his return to the colony in the evening he lost consciousness. This fit returned again and again ; his legs grew weak ; at last came paralysis of his lower limbs, his intelligence remaining intact. He was now transferred to the Bonneval Asylum. There the physician reported of him that he had " a kindly, sympathetic expression" ; that he was " of a mild dis- position, and grateful for the care be- stowed upon him. He would tell the story of his life with fullest details, even his thefts, of which he was ashamed. He laid the blame to his homelessness and to the influence of his companions, who led him into evil. He regretted the past, and declared that in the future he would lead a better life." It was decided to tit him for some occupation compatible with his infirmity. He learned to read, also to write a little. He was taken every morning to the tailor's shop, and being placed upon a table, assumed quite nat- urally the tailor's posture, his legs being paralyzed and greatly atrophied and con- tracted. At the end of two months he could sew very well, and was a diligent worker." He had now an attack of hystero-epi- lepsy which continued for fifty hours, be- ing succeeded by a quiet sleep. Then his former personality came back. " On awaking, V wanted to get up. He asked for his clothes, and succeeded in put- ting them on, though awkwardly ; then he took a few steps about the room. The par- aplegia had disappeared. His gait was un- steady and his legs could not sustain the weight of his body, but that was due to the atrophied state of the muscles. When his clothes were on, he wanted to go out to work on the farm with his comrades. We saw at once that the lad thought he was still * The case is reported by Dr. Camuset in the Annales Mtdico-psychologiques, Jan., 1882. at St. Urbain's, and that he wanted to re* sume his habitual occupations. He had in. fact no recollection of his attack : did -not re- cognize any one here neither the doctor and nurses, nor his fellow-patients. He refused to believe that he had been paralyzed, say- ing that we were making sport of him. We attributed this to a momentary vesania, not an unusual sequel of strong hysteric seizures. But time went on, and still memory did not return. V remembered distinctly his hav- ing been sent to St. Urbain's, that 'the other day ' he was frightened by a snake, but from, that point forward all was blank. He re- membered nothing : he had no consciousness even of the lapse of time. " Naturally we suspected that he was feigning, as hysterical subjects are wont to do, and we tried in every way to make him contradict himself, but in vain. Thus, we had him taken to the tailor's shop without letting, him know where he was going. We walked alongside of him, careful not to give him a hint as to what direction he should take^ V did not know where he was going. Ar- rived at the shop, he gave no sign of know- ing where he was, and declared he came there now the first time. A needle was put in his hand and he was asked to use it in sewing, but he set about it as clumsily as- any one does who attempts for the first time to perform the task. Garments were shown him on which he had done the coarser stitching while in the paralytic state. In vain : he recalled nothing of all this. After a. month of experiments, observations, and tests of every kind, we were convinced that V remembered nothing." One of the most interesting points of this case is the modification of the pa- tient's character a reversion to his prior life and hereditary antecedents. " He is no more the same person : he is now quarrelsome, and an inordinate eater. He makes rude answers. He cared not for wine and usually gave his share of wine to his comrades : now he steals theirs. When some one tells him that once he used to steal, but that he ought not to begin thieving again, he boldly says that ' if he was a thief, he has paid for it, for they have put him in prison.' He is employed in the garden. One day he ran away, taking with him some property and sixty francs be- longing to one of the infirmarians. He was- captured five leagues away from Bonneval, just after he had sold his clothes to purchase others and was making ready to take the train for Paris. The arrest was not easily made, for he struck and bit the keepers who had come in pursuit of him. Brought back to the asylum, he became furious, shouting,, and rolling upon the ground, so that he had to be confined in a cell." Although we have not yet studied the THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. anomalies of personality in all its forms, it will not be out of place here to attempt a few partial and provisional conclusions which will serve to lessen the obscurity of the subject. I will confine myself however to one point to cases of false personality consisting essentially of a fixed idea, an overweening idea toward which converges the whole group of con- cordant ideas, all others being eliminated and as it were annihilated : as when persons believe themselves to be God, pope, emperor, and speak and act accord- ingly. The study of the intellectual con- ditions of personality will furnish us with many an instance of this hypno- tized subjects, for example, who assume a personality or enact a role at the oper- ator's will ; but the instances we are al- ready familiar with warrant a question as to what we are to learn from them. At first view, these cases are quite simple as regards the mechanism of their formation. The prime origin is ob- scure ; why is this particular idea pro- duced and not some other ? Commonly we know nothing whatever about it, but once the morbid conception produced, it grows and grows, till at last it reaches its highest point, through the mere au- tomatism of association of ideas. Hence it is not my intention to dwell upon this point, but to show that these pathologi- cal cases explain for us an illusion into which psychology has almost always fallen when it has based itself simply up- on internal observation the illusion of substituting for the real Me a factitious Me that is far simpler. In order to comprehend the real, con- crete personality and not an abstraction substituted in its room, what we must do is, not to shut ourselves up in our con- sciousness and, closing our eyes, proceed to question it : rather must we open our eyes and observe. The child, the peas- ant, the laborer, the millions of people who walk the streets or who work in the fields ; who have never heard of Fichte or Maine de Biran ; who have never read a dissertation on the Me and the non-Me, nor a single line on psychology have each one his own definite personality, and this personality they instinctively af- firm. Every moment ever since that for- gotten epoch when their Me was first constituted, /. e., when it was formed as a coherent group amid the occurrences that assail it, that group has maintained itself steadily, steadily undergoing modi- fication. In great part it is made up of states and acts nearly automatic which in each individual constitute the bodily- sense (or coenassthesis) and the routine of life ; which serve as support to all the rest, but whose every alteration, how brief or partial soever, is immediately- felt. In great part too it is made up of a complex of sensations, images, ideas, representing the habitual environment within which the individual lives and moves, with the recollections thereto at- tached. All this represents organized states, firmly linked together, mutually- calling each other forth, systemized. The fact we actually are cognizant of, though we may not inquire into the cause. Whatever is new, unwonted ; all changes in the state of the body or of its environment, are unhesitatingly adopt- ed, classed by an instinctive act as form- ing part of the personality or as being external to it. Not by a definite and ex- plicit judgment is this operation perform- ed each moment, but by an uncon- scious logic far more profound than the logic of the schools. Had we to charac- terize with one word this natural, spon- taneous, real, form of personality I should call it an habitude, nor can it be anything else, since, as we maintain,, it is but the expression of an organism. Let the reader, instead of observing him- self, proceed objectively : that is, let him observe and interpret with the aid of the data of consciousness the state of those who have never reflected upon their per- sonality, and he will see that the forego- ing thesis is true, and that real personal- ity affirms itself not by reflection but by acts. Let us now consider factitious or arti- ficial personality. When the psycholo- gist essays to comprehend himself, as he says, by inward observation, he attempts the impossible. When he sets about the task, either he restricts himself to the- present, and that helps him little : or, let- ting his reflection extend over the past, he affirms himself to be the same that he was a year or ten years ago ; he does but express learnedly and laboredly what any peasant knows as well as himself. By inner observation he can grasp only tran- sitory phenomena, and so far as I know answer has never been made to these just observations of Hume : "As for me, whenever I contemplate what is inmost in what I call my own self, I always come in contact with such or such special perception as of cold, heat, light or shadow,, love or hate, pleasure or pain. I never come unawares upon my mind existing in a state void of perceptions : I never observe aught 28 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. save perception. ... If any one, after seri- ous reflection and without prejudices, thinks he has any other idea of himself, I confess that I can reason no longer with him. The best I can say for him is that perhaps he is right no less than I, and that on this point our na- tures are essentially different. It is possible that he may perceive something simple and permanent which he calls himself, but as for me I am quite sure I possess no such prin- ciple." ilume, Works, vol. i, p. 321. Since Hume's day some one has said : " Through the sense of effort and of resist- ance we feel that we cause " {par I'effort et la resistance, nous nous sentons cause]. True ; and pretty nearly all schools agree that in this way the Me distinguishes it- self from the non-Me : but the sense of -effort nevertheless is still simply a state of consciousness the sense of the mus cular energy spent to produce a given act. To seek to grasp by analysis a syn- thetic whole as personality is, or by an in- tuition of consciousness lasting at most a few seconds to seize a complex like the Me, were to attempt the solution of a problem whose data are mutually con- tradictory. The psychologists have gone to work differently. They have con- sidered states of consciousness as ac- cessories, and the tie that connects them as the essential thing : and it is this mys- terious underlying something that, under "the name of unity, identity, or continuity, becomes the true Me. Nevertheless plainly we have here only an abstraction, or more precisely a schema. For the real personality has been substituted the idea of personality a very different thing. This idea of personality is like all general terms formed in the same way, as sensi- bility, will, etc.; but it is no more like the real personality than the plan of a city is like the city itself. And as in the cases of aberration of personality that have led to the present remarks, one idea has taken the place of a complex, forming an imaginary and a diminished personality, so by the psychologist the schema of person- ality is substituted for the concrete per- sonality, and it is upon this beggarly framework that he rests all his reasoning, inductions, deductions and dogmatizings. Of course this comparison is made on the condition of mutatis mutandis and with many restrictions, which the reader will find out for himself. In short, for one to reflect on his Me is to take an artificial position which changes its nature to substitute an ab- stract representation for a reality. The true Me is that which feels, thinks, acts, without exhibiting itself, so to speak, to itself upon a stage. For the Me is in' its nature and by its definition a subject ; and to become an object it must undergo a reduction, an adaptation to the mind's optical conditions, and that transforms it, mutilates it. Till now we have considered the ques- tion only on its negative side. To what positive hypothesis as to the nature of personality are we led by the observation of morbid cases ? First let us lay aside the hypothesis of a transcendental entity an hypothesis that cannot be recon- ciled with pathology, and which explains nothing. Let us put aside also the hypothesis which makes of the Me " a bundle of sen- sations " or of states of consciousness, as many have held it to be, following Hume. So to think is to take appearances for reality, a group of signs for a thing, or more exactly, to take effects for their cause. Besides, if, as we hold, conscious- ness is only an indicative phenomenon, it cannot be a constitutive state. We have to penetrate deeper, to that consensus of the organism of which the conscious Me is but the psychological ex- pression. Has this hypothesis any firmer ground than the other two ? Both ob- jectively and subjectively considered, the characteristic trait of personality is that continuity in time, that permanence which is called identity. This has been denied of the organism, on grounds so well known that there is no need to state them : but it is strange that those ( who refuse to concede continuity, identity, to the organism should fail to see that all the arguments for a transcendental prin- ciple hold good also for the organism, and that all the arguments that can be brought against the latter have the same force against the former. That every higher organism is one in its complexity is an observation at least as old as the Hippocratic writings , and since Bichat's time no one attributes this unity to a mysterious vital principle ; certain writers however make a great noise about the constant molecular renovation which con- stitutes life, and ask, Where is the iden- tity ? But as a fact every one believes in this identity of the organism. Identity is not immobility. If, as some savants hold, life has its seat not so much in the chemical substance of the protoplasm, as in the motions of the particles, then it is a " combination of motions," or a " form of motion," and this constant THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. molecular renovation must itself be sub- ordinate to more recondite conditions. However that may be, every unbiased mind will admit that the organism pos- sesses identity. What hypothesis then could be more simple or more natural than to consider the conscious identity as the inward manifestation of the external identity subsisting in the organism ? On this physical basis of the organism rests also, according to our thesis, what we call the unity of the Me, i.e., the in- terdependence which links together the states of consciousness. The unity of the Me is the unity of a complexus, and only by a metaphysical illusion do we accord to it the ideal unity of the mathematical point. It consists not in the act of a sup- posedly simple " essence," but in a co- ordination of the nerve centers, which themselves represent a coordination of the functions of the organism. It is true that here we have to do with hypotheses, but at least they have no supernatural character. Take man in the foetal state, before the beginning of psychic life : leave out all the hereditary dispositions already in any way impressed upon him, which will later come into play. At some undefined period, at the latest in the last weeks of the foetal life, some sort of body sense (ccenaesthesis) must come into existence a vague feeling of well-being or of dis- comfort. However confused this may be supposed to be, it implies certain mod- ifications in the nerve centers, as far as their rudimentary state may allow. When, later, sensations (objective or not) of external causation are added to these simple vital, organic, sensations, they too necessarily produce a modification in the nerve centers. But they are not in- scribed on a tabula rasa ; the warp of the psychic life is already laid, and this warp is general sensibility, the feeling of life, which, even though it be very vague, absolutely constitues, at this period of life, almost the total sum of conscious- ness. Thus we have a glimpse of the origin of the connection between states of consciousness. The first sensation supposing one to exist in the isolated state does not come like an aerolite in a desert : at its entrance even it is con- nected with others with the states which constitute the bodily sense, and which are simply the psychic expression of the organism. In terms of physiology, this means that the modifications of the nervous system representing materially sensations and the desires that arise out of them (these being the first elements- of the higher psychic life) are added to- prior modifications which are the material representatives of the vital and organic sensations ; and that thereby relations are established between these nervous elements ; so that from the first the com- plex unity of the Me has its conditions of existence, and these it finds in that gen- eral consciousness of the organism so much overlooked, though it is neverthe- ess the main support of all the rest. In short, all depends upon the unity of the organism : and when the psychic life, laving itself passed the embryonic stage,, nas taken shape, the mind may be com- pared to a rich piece of tapestry where :he warp has completely disappeared, Deing in some instances lightly overlaid with figures, in others being embroidered in high relief ; the psychologist who em- ploys inner observation only, sees but the figures and the embroidered designs, and loses himself in a maze of conjecture as to what may underlie them ; if he were but to change his position or to look at the reverse side, he would save himself many a useless induction, and would leant more. The same thesis might be discussed under the form of a criticism of Hume. The Me is not, as Hume held, a mere bundle of perceptions. Without appeal- ing to psychology, but confining one's self to simple ideological analysis, one ob- serves here the omission of one important point, viz., the relations between the pri- mordial states. Relation is an element vague in its nature, and hard to deter- mine, since it does not exist by itself. Still, it is something more and something else than the two states which limit it. In Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psy- chology is found a searching study (too- little noticed) of the elements of psychic life, with hypotheses as to their material conditions. Quite recently Mr. W. James has taken the question up again.* He compares the course of our con- sciousness with its uneven flow to the progress of a bird that alternately flies and perches. The resting-places are oc- cupied by relatively stable sensations and images : the spaces passed over in flight are represented by thoughts of re- lations between the points of rest : the latter the "transitive portions" are nearly always forgotten. It seems to me * See Mind, Jan., 1884, p. i et seq. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. that this is our thesis in another form the continuity of the psychic phenomena by reason of a deep, hidden substratum, to be sought in the organism. In truth, that were a precarious sort of personality which should have no other ground, but consciousness, and this hypothesis is found wanting when tested by the sim- plest facts : as for instance when an ex- planation is asked of the fact that after a .sound sleep of six or eight hours I unhes- itatingly declare my identity. To refer the essence of our personality to a mode of existence (consciousness) that disap- pears at least during one-third of our life, is to offer a curious solution. We therefore maintain, as we have elsewhere done with regard to memory, that individuality, in itself and such as it exists actually in the nature of things, is not to be confounded with individuality as it exists for itself in virtue of con- sciousness (personality). The organic memory is the basis of all the highest forms of memory, these being only its more perfect phases. The organic irtfli- -viduality is the basis of all the highest forms of personality, which are only its development. Of personality, as of mem- ory, 1 hold that it is completed, perfected, by consciousness, not constituted by con- .sciousness. Although, in order to keep these re- marks within due limits, I have carefully abstained from all digression, from criti- cism of opposite doctrines, and from ex- position of points of detail, I must, in passing, point out one question which .suggests itself naturally: Does the con- .sciousness of our personal identity rest upon memory, or vice versa ? One per- son will say, without memory I should be but a present existence incessantly re- newed, and that does away with all pos- sibility, however faint, of identity. An- other will say, without a feeling of iden- tity binding them together and impressing a character upon them, my recollections would not be mine : they would be for- eign to me. Is it then memory which produces the sense of identity, or is it the sense of identity which produces memory ? Neither ! These are both effects, whose cause is to be sought in the organism for on the one hand its (the organism's) objective identity is expressed in that sub- jective state which we call the sense oi personal identity ; and on the other hand, it is here (/>. in the organism) that are enregistered the organic conditions of our recollections, and here too is found ahe basis of our conscious memory. The 'eeling of personal identity, as well as memory in the psychological sense, are effects whereof the one cannot be the cause of the other. Their common ori- gin is in the organism; where identity and organic enregistration (i.e. memory) are one. Here we touch one of those mal- posited-questions which abound in the hypothesis of an entity-consciousness. CHAPTER IV. INTELLECTIVE DISTURBANCE. IN certain morbid states the traditional five senses are subject to serious pertur- bations, their functions becoming per- verted or distorted. Do these "paraes- thesias " and " dysasthesias " play any part in changes of personality ? Before we examine this point, we have first to ask, what happens when one or more of the senses are suppressed ? Is the per- sonality then altered, maimed, or trans- formed ? Experience seems to give an- swer in the negative. Total loss of any sense may be either acquired or congenital. We will first con- sider the former case. We will set aside the two secondary senses, taste and smell, as well as touch in its several forms, allied as it is to the general sensibility ; and we will consider only hearing and sight. In- stances of acquired blindness and deaf- ness are not rare : quite frequently they produce modifications of character, but such changes are not radical, and the in- dividual remains the same. Congenital blindness and congenital deaf-muteness affect the personality more profoundly. Those who are deaf-mutes from birth, if they have to depend on their own re- sources and are not instructed in the deaf- mute language, remain in a state of men- tal inferiority. This has sometimes been exaggerated,* but it is nevertheless incon- testable, and it is due to causes so often explained that there is no need to recall them here. The conscious personality falls below the normal stage : but in this case we have an arrest of development rather than an alteration of personality in the strict sense of the term. As for those born blind, many of them, as we know, are clever and ingenious, and there is no ground for supposing in their case any diminution or alteration of * See on this point the facts reported by Kuss- maul, Die Stbrungen der Sprache, VII. p. 16 et seq* THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. personality. However odd, to our minds, their conception of the visible world, which they image to themselves accord- ing to hearsay only, that does not seri- ously affect either the nature of their per- sonality or the idea they have of it. Take the case of Laura Bridgman the most noted case of sense privation on rec- ord, a case minutely studied, and fully detailed.* Here we see a woman bereft at the age of two years of sight and hear- ing, almost entirely deprived of the senses of smell and taste, and possessing only the sense of touch. Doubtless very great credit is due to the painstaking and intel- ligent training which has fashioned her mind: nevertheless her instructors could not endow her with new senses, and her one sense of touch had to suffice for all purposes. Now Laura Bridgman is seen to possess an individuality of her own, and a clearly marked character, being of a kindly disposition, almost invariably good-humored, untiring in her efforts toward self-instruction '. in short, she is a person. Disregarding the innumerable details involved in the foregoing cases, we may safely conclude that congenital or ac- quired privation of one or more of the senses involves no morbid state of the personality. In the less favorable cases there is a relative arrest of development, which is remedied by education. For those who hold the Me to be an exceedingly complex composite and such do we hold it to be every change, addi- tion, or subtraction, in its constituent ele- ments affects it more or less. But the aim of our analysis is precisely to distinguish, in these elements, what is essential from what is accessory. What the external senses (touch excepted) bring in is not an essential factor. The senses determine and circumscribe the personality ; they do not constitute it. Were it not rash to trust to pure logic in questions of observation and experience, this conclusion might be deduced a priori. Sight and hearing are pre-eminently objective : they reveal to us what is without, not what is within. As for touch, a complex sense which many physiologists resolve into three or four senses, this, in so far as it makes us acquainted ,with the properties of the outer world in so far as it is an eye for the blind belongs in one group with sight and hearing ; otherwise, it is only * See Mary Swift Lamson, Life and Education ^f Laura Deiuey Bridgman^ the Dtaf^ Dumb, and JSlind Girl. one form of the sense we have of our own body. It may seem strange to say that paraes- thesia and dysaesthesia, of which we are now to treat, /. ., simple sensorial per- turbations or alterations, disorganize the Me. Yet observation proves this, and reflection explains it. This work of de- struction comes not from them alone ; they are but an external episode of an in- ternal disorder that lies deeper, and which affects the bodily sense (or ccenaesthesis). These sensorial disturbances are causes assistant rather than efficient. This the facts will show. Alterations of personality with sensorial disturbances, but without noteworthy hallucinations, without loss of judgment, are found in certain morbid states. We select as a type the neurosis studied by Krishaber under the title " cerebro-card- iac neuropathy. " It matters little whether or no this group of symptoms deserves to be regarded as a distinct pathological unit : that is a question for physicians, t Our investigation is not concerned with it. First let us consider briefly the physio- logical disturbances whose immediate ef- fect is to produce a change in the ccenaes- thesis, or bodily sense. First, there are disorders of the circulation, consisting principally in an extreme irritability of the vascular system, due probably to excita- tion of the central nervous system, whence results contraction of the small vessels, ischaemia in certain regions, insufficient nutrition, and exhaustion. Then there is disordered locomotion, dizziness, a con- stant feeling of vertigo, unsteady gait as from intoxication, hesitating step, invol- untary impulse to walk " as though moved by a spring." Passing from interior to exterior, we find the sense of touch, which forms the transition from general sensibility to the special senses. Some subjects have a feeling as if they no longer weighed anything, or of being very light. Many lose all precise notion of resistance, and cannot by touch alone determine the shapes of objects. They believe them- selves to be " apart from the universe ": their body, as it were, surrounded by in- sulating media interposed between it and the outer world. " There was formed," says one who was so affected, " a sort of murky atmosphere round t Krishaber, De la Neuropathie CMbro-Cardi- | ague. Paris, Masson, 1873. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. about my person ; nevertheless, I saw per- fectly well that it was a clear day. The word ' murky ' does not express my thought ex- actly : in German I should call it ' dumpf,' which means heavy, thick, dull. This sensa- tion was not only visual, but cutaneous. The ' thick ' atmosphere enveloped me ; I saw it, felt it ; it was as if I were surrounded by a bad conductor of some kind which insulated me from the outer world. I cannot tell you how impressive this sensation was : I felt as though I had been carried away to an im- mense distance from the world, and involun- tarily I cried out aloud, ' I am far away, far away.' Still, I knew very well that I was not far away, and I remembered distinctly all that had happened to me : but between the moment before and the moment after my attack, stood an interval of immeasurable duration, a distance like that from earth to sun." The sense of sight is always affected. To say nothing of slight disorders of vis- ion (photophobia, amblyopia), some pa- tients see all objects double : to others, all surfaces seem flat, and to them a man looks like a reliefless silhouette. For many patients, surrounding objects appear to shrink in size, and to retreat into im- measurable distance. The troubles of the sense of hearing are of a similar nature. The patient does not recognize the sound of his own voice : it seems to come from far away, or to be lost in space, so that it never can reach the ears of those he is talking with j and their replies are no less difficult to hear. If we bring together in thought all these symptoms (which are accompanied by physical pain, and by changes in the sense of taste and of smell) we find our- selves in presence of a group of internal and external sensations of a new charac- ter, united by their simultaneity in time, but more deeply united by the morbid state which is their common source. Here we see all the elements of a new Me : sometimes a new Me is formed. " have lost consciousness of my being : I am no more myself " such is the lan- guage of patients as reported by most ob- servers. Some patients go farther and at times fancy themselves to be double ; ' A curious thought possesses my mind in spite of myself " said one patient, a civil engineer ; " I believe myself to be double. I feel within me a Me that thinks and a Me that acts." (Krishaber, Obs. 6.) This process of formation has been so well studied by Mr. Taine, that I need not do the work over again. " One might best compare the state ol the patient to the state of a caterpillar which, retaining all its ideas and all its recollections of the caterpillar state, should n an instant become a butterfly, with the senses and sensations of a butterfly. Be- tween the old state and the new, between the first Me (that of the caterpillar) and the second Me (that of the butterfly; there is a deep cleft, a complete rupture. The new sensations find no anterior series with which to connect, the patient cannot interpret them, cannot use them : he does not recognize them, for him they are as unknown. Hence two strange conclusions, first, ' I am not ' ; the sec- ond, a little later, ' I am another.' " * It is difficult for a sane, well-balanced mind to conceive of so extraordinary a mental state as this. The skeptical ob- server who looks at the matter from with- out, does not accept these conclusions, but the patient, who looks at it from with- in, finds them rigorously correct. For him this continual feeling of vertigo and intoxication is like a permanent chaos, in which the state of normal equilibrium and coordination either cannot exist or at least cannot endure. If now we compare with the other more or less serious forms this change of the personality a sensibus lasts, we find that a new Me is not in all cases formed : when it is formed, it always disappears with the sensorial disturbances. It never supplants entirely the normal Me ; there is an alternation between the two ; the elements of the original Me retain so much cohesion that it resumes at intervals the supremacy. Hence the illusion but which is not in the strict sense an illusion for the patient that he is double. As for the psychological mechanism by which he thinks himself double, that is explained by the memory. I have before endeavored to show that real personality, with its enormous mass of sub-conscious and conscious states, presents itself to our mind in an image or fundamental tendency which we call the idea of our personality. This vague conception (schema), which represents the real personality much as the general idea of " man " represents a man, or as the plan of a city represents that city, suffices for the ordinary needs of our mental life. In neuropathic patients there must be two images or schemas which succeed each' other in the consciousness, as the physi- ological state gives precedence to the new Me or the old. But in the transition * Revue Philosophique, vol. I., p. 289. See also L' Intelligence, 4th ed., vol. II., appendix. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. 33 from the one to the other, however sud- den it may appear, there is a certain con- tinuity. There is no absolute beginning of the one state of consciousness with absolute ending of the other, but with an hiatus, vacancy between. Like all states of consciousness, these have a certain duration : they occupy some portion of time, and the terminal end of one touches the initial end of the other. Nay they trench upon each other, while one is beginning the other still subsists, though vanishing : for a certain period they co- exist. In our opinion it is during this period of co-existence or of transition, that the patient thinks himself twain. Finally it is to be observed that the sensorial disorders are only the result of a deeper disorder that is felt throughout the organism ; and that consequently here again the bodily sense plays the principal part in the pathology of person- ality. We can now understand how the con- genital or acquired suppression of one or more of the senses leaves the personality intact at bottom, while momentary per- versions of a less serious aspect trans- form it. Physiologically considered, we have in the first case a sum of nervous elements condemned to inertia either at their origin or in the course of the indi- vidual's life : here the personality is like a weak or a weakened orchestra, which however serves for all necessary purposes. In the second case all the nervous ele- ments subsidiary to the impaired external senses, to muscular sensibility, and to or- ganic and visceral sensibility, have under- gone an unwonted modification : it is as with an orchestra in which most of the instruments have changed tone. A natural transition from sense percep- tions to ideas is seen in hallucinations, and we have now to consider the part played by these in anomalies of personal- ity. Let us at the outset recall some general considerations touching the hal- lucinatory state. * Four hypotheses have been offered to explain it. 1. The peripheric or sensorial theory which finds the seat of hallucinations in the sense-organs. 2. The psychic theory, which localizes it in the center of ideation. * For a full exposition of the question see Binet's important articles in the Revue Philosopkique, April and May, 1884. 3 3. The mixed, or psycho-sensorial the- ory. 4. The theory which refers hallucina- tion to the perceptive centers of the cor- tical layer. Observation teaches us that hallucina- tions affect now one sense only, again several senses; that usually they extend to both side's of the body, less often to only one side right or left indifferently ; more rarely still they are bilateral but at the same time present a different charac- ter at each side: thus one ear may be assailed by threats, abuse, evil counsels, while the other may hear only words of comfort ; or one eye may see only things depressing and repugnant, while the other may see gardens full of flowers. The latter cases, those at once bilateral and contradictory, are most interesting for us. Fortunately we have to explore only a very restricted area of this immense do- main. Let us clearly define our subject. In the normal state the individual that senses and thinks is adapted to his en- vironment. Between the group of inter- nal states and relations that constitute the mind, and the group of external states and relations that constitute the outer world, there exists a correspondence, as Herbert Spencer has shown in detail. In the hallucinate this correspondence is destroyed : hence false judgments and senseless acts, that is non-adapted acts. Nevertheless all this constitutes a disease of the reason, not of the personality. No doubt the Me suffers an impairment, but as long as the consensus which consti- tutes it has not disappeared, and has not split in two, or has not alienated a part of itself (as we shall see later) there is no proper disease of personality and the dis- orders are secondary and superficial. Consequently we may leave out of con- sideration the immense majority of cases of hallucination. Neither need we take account of the large number of patients who misappre- hend others' personalities who take the physicians and the nurses in the asylum for their own relatives, or who take their own relatives for the imaginary person- ages of their ravings, t The ground being thus cleared, the cases that remain to be studied are not t For some patients the same individual is alter- nately transformed into an imaginary personage and kept in his real personality. A woman patient would now recognize her husband, again would take him for an intruder. She had him arrested by the police, and he had much trouble in proving his identity. 34 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. very numerous, comprising only changes of personality with their basis in halluci- nation. Nearly always there is simply an alienation (in the etymological sense) of certain states of consciousness which the Me does not consider as its own, which it makes objective, which it sets outside itself, and to which it at last attributes an actual existence independent of its own. As regards hearing, the history of relig- ious insanity furnishes many instances: I will cite the simpler cases, those in which the hallucinatory state stands alone at first. A woman was beset by an inner voice " which she heard only in her ear," and which marie opposition to what- ever she herself willed. The voice was ever for evil, while the patient willed the good. It would at times cry out to her though it could not be heard externally " Take your knife and kill yourself." Another woman, subject to Hysteria, at first uttered words that he did not in- tend tp utter, and soon she began to ex- press these alien thoughts in a voice dif- ferent from her ordinary voice. At first this voice made remarks of an ordinary tenor or not inconsistent with reason : afterward it assumed a habit of nega- tion. " To-day, after thirteen years, the voice simply confirms what the patient has just said, or comments upon her words, criticises them, ridicules them. The tone of this voice, when the ' spirit ' speaks, always differs a little and sometimes differs totally from the patient's ordinary voice, and hence it is that she believes in the reality of the spirit. I have myself often observed these facts. " * As regards sight, aberrations of this kind are less frequent. " A very intelli- gent man " says Wigan (page 126), " had the faculty of bringing before him- self his own double. He would laugh heartily when the double appeared, and the double would laugh too. This was for a long time a matter of amusement for him but the final result was pitiable. The man gradu- ally came to believe that he was haunted by himself. To put an end to this, wretched life he arranged his affairs, and unwilling to enter on another year, at midnight of Dec. 31 he shot himself with a pistol in the mouth." Finally, Dr. Ball t describes the case of a young man who, while traveling in South America had a sunstroke which " left him very ill : he was unconscious for a month. A few days after having regained his senses, he heard distinctly a man's voice perfectly articulated, uttering the words, ' How are you to-day ? ' The patient an- swered and a short conversation ensued. The next day the same question was re- peated. This time the patient looked about, and could see no one in the room. ' Who are you ? ' he said, ' I am Mr. Cabbage,' answered the voice. Some days later the patient had a glimpse of his interlocutor, who thenceforward presented the same features and dress. He saw him always from the front, but only his bust ; he always wore a hunting costume, and had the look of a vigorous and well built man of about thirty-six years, with a heavy beard ; com- plexion dark, eyes large and black, and eye- brows strongly marked. Impelled by a justifiable curiosity, our patient would fain know the calling of his questioner and how and where he lived, but the man never con- sented to tell more about himself than his At last Cabbage grew more and more exacting, ordering the young man to throw into the fire his newspaper, his watch and chain, to poison a young woman and her -child, to throw himself out of a third-story window, etc. In these facts we see the beginning of a dissolution of personality. We will further on cite other cases not having their ground in hallucination, and which will enable us better to understand these. That coordination more or less perfect which in the normal state constitutes the Me, is here partially broken up. In the group of states of consciousness which we feel to be our own because they are produced or experienced by ourselves, there is in such cases one which, though it has its source in the organism, does not enter into this consensus, stands apart, appears as though foreign to it. Here we have in the or- der of thought the analogon of irresist- ible impulse in the order of action a partial incobrdination. J Certainly these voices and these vis- ions emanate from the patient: why then does he not regard them as his own ? It is a difficult question but I will endeavor to answer it. There must exist anatomical and physiological causes which would solve the problem, but un- fortunately they are hidden from us. * Gnesinger, Mental Diseases, French trans, p. 285. Baillarger reports a similar case in the A n- nales Mddico-Psych., ist. series, vol. VI. p. 151. t Cerebral Dualism. See HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 87- P. 31- t With regard to irresistible impulse as a phe- nomenon of partial incoordination, see Diseases of the Will, Chapter III. (HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 52.) THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. 35 Being ignorant of the causes, we can view only the surface, the symptoms, the states of consciousness, with the signs which interpret them. Take then a state of consciousness (with its organic conditions) having this special character of being local, /'. ears also to be initiative or preponder- ant with the possessed, demoniacs. It often acts upon the exorcist by contagion. To cite one instance of this, Father Surin, so long mixed up with the well- cnown doings at the Loudun Ursuline nunnery, was convinced that he had two souls, and sometimes, as it would appear, even three.! In short, transformation of personality through the dominance of an idea are not very frequent, and this affords new proof ot what we have again and again repeated : that personality comes from the more fundamental psychic elements. In the higher nerve centers it attains its unity and there does it come to full con- sciousness of itself, there it reaches per- fection. If by a mechanism acting in the reverse direction it proceeds from above downward, the result is superficial, pre- carious, momentary. Of this we have a demonstration when artificial personalities are produced in hypnotized subjects. The observations of Ch. Richet on this subject are full and onclusive.J I will sum them up briefly. t He has left us a detailed account of his mental state in his Historic des Diablts de Loudun, p. 297 et seq.: " 1 cannot describe to you what passes within me during this lime [/. e., when the demon passes from the body of the possessed nun into his body] and how this spirit unites with mine, with- out depriving me either of the cognition or of the liberty of my soul, nevertheless making himself like another me, and as though I had two souls whereof one is dispossessed of its body and of the use of its organs and stands aside, looking on while the intruder makes herself at home. The two spirits fight on one field, which is the body, and the soul .is as it were divided in twain : in one part of her, she is the subject of the diabolic impres- sions : in the other, she is the subject of the mo- tions that are proper to her or that God gives her. When I would, by the motion of one of these two souls, make the sign of the cross upon my lips, the other turns my hand away very rapidly, and seizes my finger with the teeth to bite it in its rage. * * When I would speak my speech is checked ; at the mass I am stopped quite short ; at the table I cannot raise a morsel to'my mouth ; at confession, I suddenly forget my sins, and I feel the devil go- ing and coming within me, as in his own house. $ Revue Philosophique, March, 1883. He gives some later observations in his work, Z' ' H online et r Intelligence. See also Carpenter, Mental Phys- iology. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. The hypnotized subject (usually a woman) is made to believe herself to be, now a peasant, again an actress, or a general, an archbishop, a nun, a sailor, a little girl, and so forth ; and she acts her part without any misgiving. Here the psychological data are perfectly clear. In this state of artificially produced som- nambulism the real personality is intact ; the organic, affective, and intellectual elements have undergone no considerable alteration, but they all remain in posse. A certain not well understood state of the nerve centers, an arrest of function, prevents them from passing into act. By suggestion an idea is evoked; in- stantly by the mechanism of association, this awakens analogous states of con- sciousness, and no others , and in con- nection with them always by associa- tion the appropriate gestures, acts, speech and sentiments. In this way is constituted a personality external to the real personality, made up of borrowed elements and depending on automatism. This experiment shows what an idea may do when freed from control by other ideas, but at the same time reduced to its own sole forces, and no longer sup- ported and aided by the totality of the individual. In some cases of imperfect hypnotism dualism is produced. Dr. North, pro- fessor of physiology in the Westminster Hospital, says, in speaking of the period of hypnotization when he was being in- fluenced by the fixing of the gaze . " I was not unconscious, but it seemed as if I lived as two beings. I fancied that an inner Me was alive to all that was pass- ing, but that it took no part in the acts of the outer Me, nor had any care to control them. The repugnance or the inability of the inner Me to direct the outer Me seemed to increase as the situation was continued."* * Hack Tuke, On the Mental Condition in Hyp- notism, published in the Journal of Mental Sci- ence, April. 1883. We have also in this article the case of a physician who, during 1 a troubled slumber after some twenty hours of climbing among the Alps, dreamt that he was twain : one Me had died, the other was making the autopsy. In some cases of intoxication and of delirium, the psychic coordination disappears, and there is a kind oi scission of the personality in two. See the articles by Dr. Azam on changes of personality (Revue Scientifique, Nov. 17, 1883) and of Dr. Galicier {^Reyue Philosophique, July, 1887). Taine gives a curiouscase of semi-pathological incoordination : " I have seen a person who, while singing or talking writes, without looking at the paper, consecutive phrases, even whole pages, quite unconscious of what she is writing. In my opinion she is per- fectly sincere, yet she declares that when she omes to the end of the page she has no idea what Can this inner personality the true personality ever be entirely suppressed ? Can the individual's proper character be reduced to nought, so as to be trans- formed into its opposite ? No doubt it can : the operator, by persistent enforce- ment of his authority, succeeds in doing this, after more or less resistance. Richet impressed upon a woman who was a very strong Bonapartist strict re- publican convictions. Braid having hyp- notized a " teetotaler," whose sobriety was without reproach, assured the man again and again that he was drunk. "This assertion was strengthened by a feeling of staggering (produced by mus- cular suggestion) and it was amusing to see the man wavering between this im- posed idea and the conviction resulting from his habits." This momentary met- amorphosis however is perfectly innocu- ous. As Richet justly remarks : " In these curious modifications what changes is simply the outer form, the habits and general demeanor, and not the individu- ality proper." As for the question whether by repeated suggestions to sus- ceptible subjects, we might be able at length to produce a modification of the character . that is a problem to be solved by experiment alone, and that is beyond our present purpose. Here perhaps is the place to note the fact of the disappearance of personality, a phenomenon that has been described by the mystics of every age, according to their own experience, and often in ele- gant language.t The pantheistic meta- she has set down on the paper. On reading it she is amazed, sometimes alarmed. The handwriting differs from her ordinary style. The movement of the fingers and of the pencil is stiff and seems automatic. The writing always ends with a signa- ture, the name of one who is dead and it bears the impress of a mental background \arriere-fond mental] that the author would be unwilling to divulge." (De t 'Intelligence, 3d edition, preface). t I will quote only one of these descriptions, and that one because by its style of language and its date it comes nearest to our own time. " I seem to have become a statue on the banks of the stream of time, and to be assisting at some mystery, whence I shall go forth aged or ageless. I feel my- self to be without name, impersonal, with the star- ing eyes of a corpse, with mind vague and universal like nothingness or the absolute: I am in suspense, I am as if non-existent. In such moments it seems to me that my consciousness withdraws into its eternity * * * it sees itself in its very essence, su- perior to every form containing its past, its present, and its future [sees itself as the] void which en- compasses all, an atmosphere (milieu) invisible and fecund, the virtuality of a world which detaches itself from its own existence to regain itself (st ressaisir) in its pure inwardness (intimite pure). In those sublime moments the soul re-enters her- self, goes back again to indetermination ; she be- comes retro-voluted (Sit venia verbo. The original has s'est rtimpliquee. Translator) beyond her own life, she becomes again a divine embryo. All isef- THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. physicians, too, without attaining to ec- stasy, speak of a state in which the mind thinks of itself " under the form of eter- nity," appears to itself as outside of time and space, as free from all contingent modality and forming one with the infi- nite. This psychological situation, though infrequent, must not be forgotten. To me it seems as an absolute engrossment of the mental activity by a single idea (in the mystics a positive one, negative in the empirics) which idea, from its high degree of abstractness, and from its be- ing exempt from all determination and limitation, contradicts and excludes all feeling of individuality. Let but one sen- sation, however commonplace, intervene, and the illusion disappears. This state is neither above the personality nor below it, but without and beyond. To sum up, the states of consciousness called ideas are only a secondary factor in constituting personality and in chang- ing it. Ideas play their part, but it is not a predominant one. These results do not agree with the time-honored teachings of psychology. Ideas have an objective character : hence they cannot express the individual as do his desires, his feelings, his passions. CHAPTER V. DISSOLUTION OF PERSONALITY. To complete our review of the facts, we have yet to treat of alterations of per- sonality in progressive dementia caused by old age, general paralysis, and all other morbid causes. If in the normal state personality is a psycho-physiological coordination of the highest degree possi- ble, which endures amid perpetual changes and partial and transitory incoordinations (such as sudden impulses, eccentric ideas, etc.), then dementia, which is a progres- sive movement toward physical and men- tal dissolution, must manifest itself by an ever increasing incoordination till at last the Me disappears in absolute incoher- ence, and there remain jn the individual only the purely vital coordinations those best organized, the lowest, the simplest, faced, dissolved, dissipated, resumes the, primor- dial state, is immersed again in the original fluidity without form, or angles, or fixed contours. This state is contemplation, not stupor: it is neither painful, nor joyous, nor sad ; it is beyond all special feeling and sentiment, as it is beyond all finite thought. It is the consciousness of Being (f etre) and the consciousness of the omnipossibihty latent in the depths of that Being. It is the sense of spiritual infinitude." Amiel, Journal Intime, 1856. and consequently the most stable, but these in turn disappear also. And it is perhaps in these states of progressive and inevitable dissolution alone that we find instances of double personality in the strict sense, that is, of co-existent person- alities. In the course of this work we have seen cases of successive personali- ties (cases mentioned by Azam, Dufay, Camuset) ; of a new personality supplant- ing another that is forgotten or thrust out and held to be extraneous and foreign (the case cited by Leuret, and that of the soldier of Austerlitz) ; of an invasion of the normal personality by unwonted sen- sations which it resists with more or less success, and which at times, and momen- tarily lead the patient to think himself twain (cases noted by Krishaber, etc.) But in the subjects of dementia disorgan- ization becomes organized : the demented are double in personality, think them- selves double, act as double personalities. This admits of no doubt. They retain- no trace of that indecision which, in the numerous cases we have cited, shows that the normal personality (or what remains of it) possesses some remainder of strength which, weeks or months later, will insure its return. To the demented it seems as natural to be double as to us to be of one personality. Such individu- als have no skepticism as to their own state and do not regard the opinions of others. Their mode of being, given to them by their consciousness, seems so- clear to them, so evident, as to be above all question. This point is worthy of notice because it shows in these morbid forms of personality, that spontaneous- ness of affirmation and of action which is characteristic of every natural state. Here are two cases of this kind : A retired soldier, D ,who afterward was a police sergeant, having been sev- eral times struck on the head, lost his memory by degrees, and at last was sent to an asylum. His mind becoming more and more affected, at last he came to think himself double. " In talking he always uses the pronoun we: we will go, we have made a long march, etc. He uses this form of speech, he says r because there is another with him. At the table he says, ' I have had enough, but the other is still hungry.' Sometimes you see him running, and if you ask why, the answer is that he would rather sit still, but ' the other ' makes him run. One day he at- tempted to choke a child to death, saying it was not himself but ' the other ' that was to- blame. At last he attempted his own life to THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. slay ' the other,' whom he supposes to lie hid in the left side of his body. Hence he calls ' the other ' the left D while he himself is the right D . This patient soon fell into dementia." * A case reported by Langlois exhibits a still lower grade. " The man G is imbecile, loquacious, with no hesitation in utterance, no paralysis of the limbs, and no disturbance of the cutaneous sensibility. Though he talks continually he does but repeat the same stereotyped phrases. He always speaks of himself in the third person, and almost every morning greets us with ' G is sick, he must go to the infirmary.' Often he goes upon his knees, and gives himself a sound pummeling ; then bursts out laughing, and rubbing his hands exclaims, ' G has been bad, he has had to do penance.' Often he will take up his wooden shoe, and beat him- self violently on the head, or he will bury his nails in his flesh, or will scratch his face. These fits of rage come on suddenly, and while he is disfiguring himself his counte- nance is expressive of anger, but it wears a look of satisfaction, as soon as he has done correcting the other. At times when he is not overwrought by these imaginary resent- ments, we ask him 'Where is G ?' ' Here he is,' he answers, striking his breast. We touch his head, asking whose that is. ' That,' he answers, ' is the pig's head.' ' W r hy do you beat it so ? ' ' Because I must punish the pig's head.' ' But you just now struck G .' ' No . G is not a bad boy to-day : it is the pig's head that has to be beaten.' For many months we asked him the same questions, and the answers were ever the same. Generally it is G that is displeased, but sometimes it is the other, and then it is not the head that is punished." t A certain subject of general paralysis, in a condition bordering on dementia, used to be continually giving himself advice, or reproaching himself. " Mr. G ," he would say, " you are aware that you have been placed in this institu- tion, and here you are. We tell you that we have no hope whatever of you," etc. As the general paralysis progressed his words became less intelligible, but in his raving this conversation with himself could always be made out. Sometimes he both asked the questions and answered them. When dementia had reached almost the last degree, he kept up the same practice. He would cry out, and show signs of agi- tation, but immediately growing calm would say in a low voice, and with a sig- * Jaffe, Archiv fiir Psychiatrie, 1870. t Annales Medico-Psychologiques, vol. VI., p. So. nificant gesture, "Won't you be still; speak low." Then he would answer, " Yes, I am going to speak low." " Once we found him very busy, making all the motions of tasting [wines, etc.], and spitting out. We asked him, ' You are amusing yourself, Mr. G ? ' ' Which ? ' was his reply, and then he relapsed into incoherence. This reply, repeated here literally, may seem to be the result of chance, buj it accords so well with the duality so long observed in this patient, that we have deemed it worthy of men- tion." \ In the following case the dissolution of personality is presented in a new aspect : the individual has no consciousness of a portion of himself, which is become for- eign to him, or hostile. We have already, while speaking of hallucinations, seen the. patient coming by degrees to embody his hallucinations, and finally giving them objective existence. In the demented the case is more serious. The acts and states that are perfectly normal for a per- son of sound mind and that have none of the morbid or imaginative characters of hallucination, are for the subject of de- mentia something external to himself, nor is he conscious that he is himself their cause. How may we account for this curious situation without supposing a profound change in the coenassthesis, and that certain portions of the body are no longer represented or sensed in the ruined brain. The sense o'f sight remains, as experience proves, but the patient sees his own movements as an external, an antagonistic phenomenon which he at- tributes neither to himself nor to others ; which he notices passively without more ado, because his internal sensations being effaced and his reasoning power reduced to impotence, there is no means of cor- recting this incoordination. Then we have the case of a general paralytic in the period of dementia, whose speech was almost unintelligible, and of J Descourtis, Du Fonctionnement des Operations Cdrdbrales. et en particulier de leur Dtdoublement dans Us Psychopathies, Paris, 1883, p. 33. Possibly this second personality which advises and admon- ishes the other is only the purely passive reproduc- tion of the phrases addressed to the patient by his physician or his attendants. It may be remarked that not seldom the demented speak of themselves in the third person. The same is seen in young children, and it has been accounted for by the fact that their personality is not jet formed. In my opinion we nave here simply imitation. The in- fant is used to hearing such remarks as these : " Paul has been bad, he must get a whipping," etc. He thus learns to speak of himself in the same way. Is the use of the third person by some sub. jects of dementia a sign of reversion ? 44 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. whose notions of the external world but littla remained. " One day he was employed in picking peas. Though inexpert, and naturally right- handed, he employed only the left hand. Once the right hand came forward as though to take its share of the work, but hardly had it touched the peas when the other hand <:ame down upon it, seized it and gave it a hard squeeze. The patient's countenance meanwhile bore an expression of anger and he repeated in a tone of authority, ' No, no.' His body trembled and shook with passion and it was plain that a violent struggle was going on within him. On another occasion he had to be tied down in an armchair. His countenance grew clouded, and seizing his right hand in his left, he exclaimed : ' There ! It is all your fault ; on your account they have tied me here,' and he struck the offend- ing hand again and again. Nor were such occurrences exceptional. Many times it was observed that on the right hand quitting its habitual state of inactivity the patient checked it with the left. He would become angry and excited, and would beat it with all the strength he had." * Some demented patients blame their fellow patients for the noise they them- selves make, and complain of being dis- turbed by their cries. Finally, we will quote the case, observed by Hunter, of an old man, whose faculties were very much impaired. He always referred to the present time the occurrences of his early life. Though he was capable of acting correctly upon certain impressions, and of referring them to the portions of the body affected by them, he habitually at- tributed his own sensations to those around him. Thus he would tell his keeper and the attendants that he was sure they were hungry or thirsty. But when food or drink was offered him, it became apparent that this absurd idea had been suggested to him by his- own feeling of hunger and thirst, and that the word they referred to himself, not to others. He had frequent violent fits of coughing, after each of which he would resume the thread of his conversation, first expressing in appropriate and sym- pathetic terms his concern on account of his friend's complaint. " It grieves me," he would say, " to see you suffering from so troublesome and so distressing a cough." t Little by little all these cases steadily advance toward absolute incoordination and complete incoherence. They come * Descourtis, Op. cit., p. 37. t Hunter, quoted by Winslt ef the Brain, p. 278. slow. Obscure Diseases to resemble congenital imbecility that has never been able to reach the mean level of human personality. In the gradual and progressive coordination which con- stitutes normal man, the idiot has met with arrest of development. In him the evolution has not preceded beyond the early stages : it has made provision for the physical life and some few elementary manifestations of the psychic life ; but the conditions of an ulterior development are lacking. We have now in conclusion to consider this fact of coordination as the groundwork of personality. But we must first attempt a rapid classification of the perturbations of per- sonality of which we have given so many illustrations, all so different from one an- other that it might seem impossible to refer them to a few fundamental types. Though in the normal state the bodily sense (coenaesthesis) undergoes different changes in the course of one's life in the evolution which goes on from birth to death this change is usually so slow, so continuous, that the assimilation of new sensations proceeds little by little, and the transformation is brought about in- sensibly, so producing what we call iden- tity, t.e., apparent permanence amid inces- sant variations. Nevertheless all serious maladies, as well as all profound changes (puberty, change of life) import more or less of indecision : between the new state and the old there is not immediate fu- sion and as it has been well expressed, " at first these new sensations present themselves to the old Me as an extrane- ous Thee." But should the general bod- ily sense (coenaersthesis) be modified sud- denly; should there be a large instanta- neous influx of unwonted states, then the fundamental element of the Me is com- pletely transformed : the individual is parted from his prior personality, and he appears to himself like another. More usually there is a period of disturbance and incertitude, and the break is not in- stantaneous. When the morbid state has become fixed, one or other of these three principal types of diseases of per- sonality will be presented : i. The general bodily sense is changed completely. The new state serves as basis for a new psychic life (new ways of sensing, perceiving, thinking, hence a new memory). Of the former Me there remain only the completely organized processes (language, manual dexterity, power of walking, etc.), activities that are THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. purely automatic and almost unconscious, faculties that are like slaves ready to serve any master. But it must be re- marked that in reality this type is subject to exceptions. Sometimes a portion of the automatic acquisitions are not trans- ferred to the new Me. Again, at long intervals, some few traces of the old per- sonality reappear, and produce momen- tary indecision in the new. Looking at the matter as a whole, and disregarding slight deviations, we may say that here we have an alienation of personality, the old personality having become alien to the new, so that the individual has no knowledge of his former life, or, when he is reminded of it, regards it objectively, as something apart from him. Of this we see an excellent example in the woman inmate of La Salpetriere who ever after her forty-eighth year spoke of herself as " the person of myself" (la personne de moi- mme). She gave a fairly correct account of her former personality, always, how- ever, identifying it with another. " La personne de moi-meme does not know the one that was born in 1779 " ner former personality. * The case of Father Lambert belongs also to this type. Hack Tuke tells of a patient at the Bed- lam hospital who had lost his Me, that is, the Me that was familiar to him, and would often go looking for himself under his bed. t 2. The second type has for its funda- mental character alternation of two per- sonalities, and to this type in particular properly belongs the current designation of double consciousness. As we have said, there are transition forms intermedi- ate between the first type and this one, but at present we are concerned only with what is clear and well defined. The physical cause of this alternation is very obscure, unknown we may say. At the point where the new personality first ap- pears, this case differs in nothing from those of the preceding class : the differ- ence begins when the first personality reappears. The hypothesis seems inevi- table, that in these subjects (who as a rule are hysterical, that is to say instable in a high degree) there exist, with secondary variations, two distinct habits in the phys- ical life, each serving as groundwork for a psychic organization. The hypothesis appears all the more probable when it is remarked that the alternation bears upon * See the'full details in Leuret, Frag. Psychols pp. 121-124. ^ Journal of Mental Science, April, 1883. character, the thing that in personality is- inmost, and which most fully expresses- the individual nature. (Cases observed by Azam, Dufay, Camuset.) Of this alternation type too, we have different forms. Sometimes the two per- sonalities know nothing of each other (Macnish). Again, one touches the whole life, while the other is but partial : such is the case observed by Azam. In this case, the most instructive of all because it now covers a period of twenty-eight years, we see the second personality con- tinually encroaching upon the first. la the beginning, the duration of the first personality was very protracted, but by degrees it has come to be shorter and shorter, so that in time it promises to- disappear entirely, leaving the second to stand alone. It would hence appear that this state of alternation, when prolonged, tends necessarily to be converted into the first type : thus it holds a place interme- diate between the normal state and com- plete alienation of personality. 3. The third type is more superficial: I "will call it substitution of personality.. To this_type I refer the rather frequent case of Individuals imagining themselves to have changed from one sex to the other from man to woman, and vice -versa, or from ragman to king, etc. The state of certain hypnotized subjects already mentioned may serve as an example of this whole class. The alteration is rather psychical, in the narrower sense of the term, than organic. I do not for a mo- ment suppose that it arises, or that it per- sists, without material conditions. I mean only to say that it is not caused and main- tained, like the other two groups, by any profound modification of the coenassthesis, involving a complete transformation of the personality. It arises from the brain,, and not from the inner recesses of the organism. It is a local rather than a gen- eral disorder the hypertrophy of a fixed idea, which makes impossible that co- ordination which is necessary for the normal psychic life. Hence, while in alienation and alternation of personality all conspires and co-operates, exhibiting the inner unity and logic of the organic processes, here, oftentimes, the one who- says he is a king admits that he has been a laborer, and the imaginary millionaire that once he earned only a couple of francs a day. Even outside of cases where the incoordination is manifest, we see that a fixed idea is a weak excrescence which does not at all imply total transformation of the individual. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. This classification, proceeding from the gravest forms to the slightest, does not pretend to be rigorously exact. It may serve to array the facts in something like order, and to show how they differ, and especially to show once again that per- sonality has its roots in the organism, un- dergoing like it change and transforma- tion. CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION. IT follows necessarily from the doctrine of evolution that the higher forms of in- dividuality must have arisen out of the lower by aggregation and coalescence. .It follows, also, that individuality in its .highest degree, in man, must be the ac- cumulation and condensation in the corti- -cal layer of the brain, of elemental con- sciousnesses that originally were auton- omous and dispersed through the organ- asm. The different types of psychic individ- uality in the .animal scale, from lowest to highest, cannot be described and defined save by a zoo-psychologist who makes his way cautiously through the tangle of facts, often trusting to conjecture. Hence we cannot do any more here than to note -a few forms, in view of the principal aim of this work, which is to show that the ascending progress toward higher indi- viduality is ever toward greater complex- ity and coordination. There is no plainer term than "indi- vidual," when there is question of a man, a vertebrate animal, even an insect : but no term is more obscure as you descend the scale : on this point all zoologists are agreed.* According to its etymology, that is individual \indivtduum) which is not divided. The individual, in this sense, must be sought far down in the scale. While there are no limits to the dimen- sions of inorganic compounds (crystals), " every protoplasmic mass having a max- imum diameter of a few tenths of a milli- meter splits up spontaneously into two or more distinct masses equivalent to the mass from which they come, and which in them is reproduced. Hence, proto- plasm does not exist save in the individ- ual state, having a limited magnitude * See in particular Hackel. General Morphology I., p. 241 (French trans.) ; Gegenbaur, Comparativt Anatomy, p. 24 et seq. (French trans.); Espinas. -Socie'tes A nimales, ad ed.. Appendix II.; Pouchet -Revue Scientifique, 10 Feb., 1883. and hence it is that all living things are necessarily made up of cells." f Life never attains any considerable augmentation except through the indefinite repetition of this fundamental theme, by the aggrega- tion of an infinite number of these minute elements, true types of individuality. The living, homogeneous matter which constitutes these elemental, primordial ' individualities, expands, contracts, draws itself out in slender filaments, creeps up to substances capable of affording it nour- ishment, involves them in its own sub- stance, decomposes them, and assimilates their debris. We hear of " rudiments of consciousness " in this connection of a sort of will reaching its determinations through external stimulations, and of vague wants. One may employ the term for want of a better, but let him not forget that it has for us no precise signif- ication. In an homogeneous mass pre- senting not the slightest trace of differ- entiation, and in which the essential vital properties (nutrition, generation) are in a diffused, indistinct state, the sole repre- sentative (and it is a lowly one indeed) of psychic activity is the irritability com- mon to all living things, and which will later, in the course of evolution, become general sensibility, special sensibility, and so on. May we call it a consciousness ? The first step toward a higher individ- uality consists of an association of indi- viduals almost completely independent of one another. " The forced contiguity, the continuity of tissues, the nearly con- stant unity of the digestive apparatus, es- tablish between them a number of rela- tions, and these prevent the several indi- viduals from remaining altogether stran- gers to what is taking place among their next neighbors : such is the case with sponges, colonies of Hydra polypes, co- rolla polypes, bryozoa, and some colonies of ascidia." \ But this is, properly speak- ing, only a juxtaposition of a number of contiguous, homogeneous conscious- nesses, having between them nothing in common save the limitation of their ag- gregate in space. The rise of the colony individuality, and of the colony consciousness marks a great step toward coordination. The colony, made up of elemental individuals, has a tendency toward transformation into an t Perrier, Les Colonies A nimales et la Formation des Organismes. Paris, 1881, p. 41. According to Cattaneo, Le Colonie Lineari e la Morfologia dei Molluschi, the division is carried farther still. % Perrier, Op. cit., p. 774 ; Espinas, Socie'tes An- \ imalcs, section 2. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. 47 individuality of a higher order, in which there shall be division of labor. In colo- nies of Hydractinia we find seven differ- ent kinds of individuals the nurses, the sexed individuals (male, female), those which capture prey, etc. In the Siphon- ophora and allied types, the faculty of lo- comotion is perfectly centralized : the in- dividuals seem independent as long as the animal lets the common axis float about, on which they are implanted : but when any danger impends, or if the animal is to perform any complex movement, then the axis contracts, carrying with it all the polypes. The Prysalia knows how to quicken or to slacken its movement, can at will rise above the surface, or descend below it, can move straight ahead, or turn about, all its organ-individuals concurring to perform these complicated acts. The wandering life of these creatures, as Per- rier remarks, favors the development of individuality. " From it necessarily results greater inter- dependence of the individuals; closer ties are formed between them ; impressions pro- duced upon any part of the whole must nec- essarily be transmitted to the locomotive air- bladders ; and the movements of these must needs be coordinated, else all is disorder. Hence arises a sort of 'colony conscious- ness,' and this tends to produce a new unity, tQ form what we call an individual." * In other colonies the common con- sciousness has its rise in a different way. In Botrylus, a genus of Tunicata, there is a common orifice, which is the cloaca around which all the individuals are ar- ranged. Each of these sends out in the direction of the cloaca a tongue -shaped process provided with nerves, whereby communication can be established per- manently between all the members of a group, t " But it by no means follows that because a colony gains the notion of its existence as a colony, therefore each of the individuals com posing it loses its particular consciousness On the contrary, each of these continues to act as if it stood alone. In some star-fishes, each severed branch keeps moving on, or turns aside, as the occasion may require : in short, appears to be conscious. Neverthe less, the consciousness of each of the rays is subordinate to the consciousness of the star- fish, as is proved by the harmony between the movements of the several parts when the creature changes position." J * Perrier, Op cit., p. 232. t Id. ibid., p. 771. 3 Ibid., pp. 772, 773. It is difficult for man, in whom central- zation is carried to so high a degree, to lave anything like a clear idea of a mode of psychic existence in which partial indi- vidualities co-exist with a collective indi- viduality. We might find some analogon n certain morbid states. So too it might 3e said that the human individual has consciousness of himself both as a person and as a member of the body social. But I do not wish to make comparisons that might be contested. But looking at the question objectively and from with- out, we see that this " colony conscious- ness," however imperfectly coordinated, however intermittent it may be in the be- ginning, has profound significance as re- gards evolution. It is the germ of the higher individualities, of personality. It will, little by little, rise to the highest grade, turning to its own advantage all these special individualities. In the po- litical order we see a like evolution in thoroughly centralized governments. There the central power, at first very weak and hardly recognized, oftentimes inferior to that of the constituent parts, or provinces, gains strength at their ex- pense, and by degrees absorbs them. The development of the nervous sys- tem, which is the coordinating agency par excellence, is the visible sign of an advance toward a more complex and a more harmonious individuality. But this centralization is not brought about in a moment. In the Annelida the brain-like ganglia which send out nerves to the or- gans of sense seem to perform the same functions as the brain in vertebrates . but these ganglia are by no means fully or- ganized. The psychological independ- ence of the several rings is very evident. " Consciousness, while pretty distinct in the brain, seems to grow fainter in pro- portion as the number of rings is greater. Some species of Eunice, which often at- tain a length of five or six feet, bite the posterior part of their own bodies with- out appearing to notice it. To this dim- inution of consciousness no doubt we must attribute the fact that Annelids kept in captivity, under unfavorable con- ditions, readily prey upon themselves." In linear colonies, the individual that holds the front position, since it has to give the initiative, to advance or to re- treat, to modify the gait of the colony which it draws after itself, becomes a head ; but the term head is here em- ployed by zoologists analogically only, and we must not suppose it to have the same meaning as when we speak of the 4 8 THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. head of an insect or of any articulate an- imal. The individuality it represents is so indefinite that in certain annulates, made up of forty rings or more, we may see the head of a sexed individual ap- pearing at the level of the third ring, ac- quiring tentacles and antennas, then sepa- rating itself from the original individual, and setting up for itself.* For details the reader is referred to special treatises. As regards the higher animals, there is no need to dwell upon the subject : in. them individuality, in the received meaning of the term, is estab- lished, being represented by the brain, which becomes more and more predom- inant. This excursus over the domain of zoology will not have been in vain if it shall have taught us that this coordina- tion, of which we have had so much to say, is not a mere subjective view, but on the contrary an objective fact, visible and tangible ; and that, in the words of Es- pinas, the psychic individuality and the physiological individuality are parallel that consciousness becomes unified or diffused with the organism. Neverthe- less the term " consciousness," or " psy- chic individuality " is highly ambiguous. If the psychic individuality is, as we maintain, simply the subjective expression of the organism, then the farther we go from the human type, the greater is the obscurity that surrounds us. Conscious- ness is a function that may be compared to generation, inasmuch as they both ex- press the whole individual. Grant that the most elementary organisms possess a consciousness, and that like all their vital properties, and generation in particular, it is diffused throughout their physical structure: now as regards generation, we see that this function, as the animal grade rises, becomes localized, and ap- propriates a part of the organism, and that this part, after countless modifica- tions, becomes, with respect to that func- tion and that alone, the representative of the whole organism. The psychic func- tion takes a like course. In its highest grade it is strictly localized, and has ap- propriated to itself a part of the organ- ism which becomes, for that function and for it only, the representative of the whole organism. In virtue of a long se- ries of successive transfers of function, the brain of the higher animals now con- centrates in itself most of the psychic ac- tivity of the colony : it has been entrusted, so to speak, with one function after an- other, till at last its associates have made complete abdication in its favor.t But take at random any species of animal, and who shall say to just what degree this delegation of psychic functions has in it proceeded. Physiologists have made many experiments upon the spinal cord in frogs . is its psychic value relatively the same in man ? We may well doubt it. Return we to man, and let us consider first his purely physical personality. \Ve will for the nonce eliminate all states of consciousness, and will consider only the material groundwork of personality. ' i. There is no need to show at. length the very close relations subsisting be- tween all the organs of the so-called veg- etative life the heart, vessels, lungs, in- testinal canal, liver, kidneys, etc. how- ever foreign they may appear to be one to another, and however much engrossed with their several tasks. The multitudi- nous agents in this coordination are cen- tripetal and centrifugal nerves of the great sympathetic and of the cerebro-spi- nal system (the difference between these two tends to disappear) together with their ganglia. Is their activity restricted to the simple molecular disturbance which constitutes the nervous influx, or has it also a psychic, conscious effect ? No doubt it has such an effect, in morbid cases: it is then felt. In the normal state it simply calls forth that vague con- sciousness of life of which we have so often spoken. But vague or not, that is of no importance. May we maintain that these nerve actions, which represent the totality of life, are the fundamental facts of personality, and that, as such, their value is, so to speak, in inverse ratio to their psychological intensity? They do far more than just to call forth a few transitory, superficial states of conscious- ness ; they shape the nerve centers, give them tone, give them a habit. Consider for a moment the enormous power of these actions (feeble though they appear) going on unceasingly, untiringly, repeat- ing forever the self-same theme with few variations. Why should they not result in forming organic states, that is (as im- plied in the definition of " organic ") sta- ble and continuous states which shall represent, anatomically and physiologi- cally, the inward life ? Of course all this does not depend on the viscera alone, for *Perrier, Op. cit., pp. 448, 491, 501. t Espinas, Let Societes Animates, p. 520. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. 49 the nerve centers too have their own proper constitution, in virtue of which they react. They are not merely recep- tive but incitative also, and they are not to be separated from the organs they represent, and with which they form one whole : between both there is reciprocity of action. Where do all these nerve actions come together and meet ? where do we find the resum of the organic life ? We know not. Ferrier thinks that the occipi- tal lobes have a special relation to the sensibility of the viscera, constituting the anatomical substratum of their sensa- tions. Taking this view simply as a working hypothesis, it follows that by successive stages, by one transfer after another, the visceral life has at last found here its ultimate representation ; that it is writ here in a language unknown to us indeed but which expresses the in- ward individuality and that only, to the exclusion of all other individuality. But in truth whether this anatomic represen- tation exists in the occipital lobes or elsewhere, and whether it be localized or diffused, does not affect our conclusion, provided only it exists. I have the less hesitation in dwelling on this subject, because this coordination of the multi- tudinous nervous actions of organic life is the groundwork of the physical and psychical personality, since all the other coordinations are based upon this ; be- cause this coordination is the inner man, the material form of his subjectivity, the ultimate reason of his feeling and action, the source of his instincts, sentiments and passions, and in the language of the mediaeval schoolmen, his principle of in- dividuation. To pass now from the inward to the outward, the periphery of the body forms a surface over which the nerve terminals are unequally distributed. Whether few or many, the nerve filaments receive and transmit from the different parts of the body impressions (that is to say, molecu- lar disturbances) ; are centralized in the spinal cord, and thence pass to the me- dulla oblongata and the pons Varolii. There a new contingent is added that from the cranial nerves: and now the transmission of sensorial impressions is complete. We must riot overlook the centrifugal nerves, which act in a simi- lar way, but in the direction of an in- creasing decentralization. In short, the spinal cord, which is a string of super- posed ganglia, and more particularly the medulla oblongata with its special centers (of respiration, phonation, deglutition etc.), while they are all organs of trans- mission, represent the reduction to unity of a vast multitude of nervous actions diffused throughout the organism At the point we have reached the question becomes full of obscurity. The mesencephalon seems to possess a more complex function than the medulla ob- longata, and that a more complex func- tion than the spinal cord. The corpora striata would seem to be the center in which are organized the habitual or au- tomatic actions, and the optic thalami to be the point where the sense impres- sions are reflexed in movements. However this may be, we know that the fasciculated portion of the crus cerebri, a bundle of white brain substance con- tinuous with the peduncle, traverses the opto-striate bodies, penetrating into the strait between the optic thalami and the lenticular nucleus, and that it branches out in the hemisphere, forming the cor- ona radiata of Reil. It is a pathway over which pass all the sensorial and motor fibers running to or from the opposite side of the body. The anterior portion contains only motor fibers. The pos- terior portion contains all the sensorial fibers, a certain number of motor fibers, and all the fibers coming from the sense organs. The bundle of sensorial fibers having received its full complement, divides into two : one portion ascends to the fronto-parietal convolution ; the other is turned back to the occipital lobe, and the bundle of motor fibers is distributed through the gray cortex of the motor zones. These details, tiresome as they will be to the reader despite their brevity, show the close interdependence of the different parts of the body and the cerebral hem- ispheres. Here the study of the localiza- tion of functions, though not yet carried very far, has settled a few points, as that there is a motor zone (formed of the as- cending frontal and ascending parietal convolutions, the paracentral lobe, and the base of the frontal convolutions) in which are represented the movements of the different parts of the body ; and that there is a sensitive zone far less clearly defined (embracing the occipital lobes and the temporo-parietal region). As for the frontal lobes, we have no definite knowledge with regard to them, but we may in passing notice the hypothesis re- cently offered by Dr. Hughlings Jackson that they represent, with respect to the other centers, combinations and cobrdi- THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. nations of a more complex kind, being thus a representation of representations. * We cannot notice past and present dis- cussions upon the physiological and psy- chological role of these centers : to do so would require a volume. But we may say that the cortical substance represents all the forms of nerve activity visceral muscular, tactile, visual, auditory, olfac- tory, gustatory, motor, significatory. This representation is not direct. An impression does not go from the pe- riphery of the brain as a telegram goes from one office to another near by. In one case, where the spinal cord was re- duced to the size of a goosequill and the gray substance was extremely small, the subject possessed sensation. But though indirect or even doubly indirect, this representation is, or may be, a total representation. Between the equivalents of these nervous actions dis- tributed throughout the body there exist innumerable connections co mmissures between the two hemispheres and between the several centers of each hemisphere some of them innate, the others estab- lished by experience, having all possible degrees, from highly stable to highly instable. The physical personality, or in more precise language, its ultimate rep- resentation, thus appears to us not as a central point whence all radiates and where all converges Descartes's pineal gland but as a wonderfully complex net-work where histology, anatomy and physiology are baffled every moment. From this very imperfect sketch the reader may see that the terms consen- sus, coordination, are not mere flatus vocis, abstractions, but that they truly express facts. Let us reinstate now the psychic ele- ment hitherto eliminated, and note the re- sult. It must be remembered that ac- cording to our view consciousness is not an entity, but a sum of states each of which is a specific phenomenon depend- ent on certain conditions of the brain's activity ; that it is present when these are, is lacking when they are absent, disap- pears when they disappear. It follows that the sum of a man's states of con- sciousness is far inferior to the sum of his nerve-actions (that is, his reflex actions of every kind, from the simplest to the most composite). A period of five min- * Lectures an the Evolution and Dissolution of the Nervous System, 1884. utes may embrace a multitude of sensa- tions, feelings, images, ideas, acts, and it is possible to determine the number of these with some degree of exactness. During the same lapse of time there will be a much larger number of nerve-ac- tions. Hence the conscious personality cannot represent all that is going on in the nerve centers : it is only an abstract, an epitome of them. This follows nec- essarily from the nature of our mental constitution : our states of consciousness range themselves in time, not in space, and according to one dimension, not all dimensions. By a fusion and an integra- tion of simple states are formed highly complex states, and these enter into the series as if they were simple : they may in some measure co-exist' for a little time ; but after all the compass (or extension) of consciousness [Umfang des Bewusst- seins], and particularly the compass of clear consciousness, is always very lim- ited. Hence we cannot regard the con- scious personality, in its relation to the objective, cerebral personality, as a trac- ing which corresponds exactly with the drawing from which it is copied: it rather resembles a topographical sketch as related to the face of the country it represents. Why do some nerve-actions (and which ones?) become conscious? To answer this question would be to solve the problem of the conditions of con- sciousness : but these, as we have said, are in great part unknown. There has also been much discussion as to the part played in the genesis of consciousness oy the five layers of the cortical cells, but on this point we have nothing save pure hypotheses. These we need not con- sider here, for it cannot be of any advan- tage to psychology to rest its conclusions upon an insecure physiological founda- tion. We know that states of conscious- ness, always unstable, evoke and sup- plant one another. This is the result of a transmission of force, and of a con- flict among forces ; and, for us, it is not a conflict between states of consciousness, as commonly supposed, but between the nervous elements which underlie and produce them. These associations and these antagonisms, which have been the object of deep study in our day, do not however belong to the present inquiry : we must go further back and consider the conditions of their organic unity. For states of consciousness are no ignes fatui, now flaring, anon extinguished ; there is something which unites them ) THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. and which is the subjective expression of their objective coordination : in this we find the ultimate ground of their continu- ity. Though we have already studied this point, it is so important that I have no hesitation about returning to it and viewing it under another aspect. Be it remarked that we are not speak- ing just now of self-conscious personality, but of that spontaneous, natural sense of our own being which exists in every nor- mal individual. Every one of my states of consciousness possesses the twofold character of being such or such a state, and of being mine ; pain is not simply pain, but my pain ; seeing a tree is not simply seeing it but my seeing it. Each one has a mark whereby it is known to me as mine only, and without which it seems foreign to me, as in some morbid cases already referred to. This mark common to all my states of consciousness is a sign of their common origin, and whence can it come if not from the organ- ism ? Suppose we were able to obliterate in a man the five special senses and with them their entire psychological product, such as perceptions, images, ideas, asso- ciations of ideas with one another and of emotions with ideas. In that case there would still remain the inward, organic life with its proper sensibility to the state and f unctionment of each organ, to the gen- eral or local variations of the organs, and to the elevation or the depression of the vital tone. The state of a man who is sound asleep pretty fully realizes these conditions. If now we try the opposite hypothesis, we find it absurd, contradic- tory. We cannot imagine to ourselves the special senses, together with the psy- chic life which they sustain, isolated from the general sensibility and suspended in vaciio. None of our sense-apparatus is an abstraction : there is no such thing as a visual or an auditive apparatus in gen- eral, as they are described in physiologi- cal treatises, but only a concrete, invidid- ual apparatus, and never, save perhaps sometimes in twins, are these apparatus alike in two individuals. Nor is this all, for not only is the sense apparatus of each individual peculiarly constituted a peculiarity directly and necessarily com- municated to all its products but it is at all times and in every respect dependent on the organic life on the circulation, digestion, respiration, secretion and so forth. These several expressions of the individuality attach to every perception, emotion, idea, and become one with them, like the harmonics with the fun- damental tone in music. The personal and possessive character of our states of consciousness therefore is not, as some authors have held, the result of a more or less explicit judgment affirming them to be mine at the instant they arise. The personal character is not superadded, but inherent : it is an integral part of the fact, and results from its physiologi- gal conditions. We do not find out the origin of a state of consciousness by ob- serving itself alone, for it cannot be at once effect and cause, subjective state and nerve-action. The pathological facts confirm this conclusion. As we have seen, the con- sciousness of selfhood rises or falls ac- cording to the state of the organism, and hence some patients declare that their " sensations are changed " the explana- tion being that in their case the fundamen- tal tone has no longer the same harmon- ics. So too we have seen states of con- sciousness lose by degrees their personal character, becoming for the individual ob- jective and extraneous. Can such facts be accounted for on any other theory? John Stuart Mill, in an oft-quoted passage, asks what is the bond, what the "organic union" between one state of consciousness and another the common and lasting element ; and his conclusion is that we can affirm nothing definitively of mind but states of consciousness. That is doubtless so if we confine our- selves to pure ideology. But a group; of effects is not a cause, and however minutely we study these, unless we go. deeper our labor is incomplete that is, unless we descend into that obscure region where, as Taine says, " innumerable cur- rents are ever circulating quite beyond our consciousness." The organic nexus desiderated by Mill exists by definition, so to speak, in the organism. The organism and the brain, its supreme representation, is the real per- sonality, containing in itself the remi- niscence of what we have been and the possibilities of what we shall be. On it is inscribed the entire individual character with all its aptitudes, active or passive, its sympathies and antipathies, its genius and talent or its stupidity, its virtues and its vices, its sloth or its activity. What comes forth in the consciousness is little compared with what lies hid though still active. The conscious personality is only a small part of the physical personality. Hence the unity of the Me is not, as THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY. taught by the spiritualists,* the unity of one entity manifested in multiple phenomena, but the coordination of a number of states that are continually arising, and its one basis is the vague sense of our own bodies coenaesthesis. This unity does not proceed from above downward, but from beneath upward : it is not an initial but a terminal point. Does such perfect unity exist ? In the strict sense, clearly not. In the relative sense it is seen, but rarely and momen- tarily. In the skilled marksman as he takes aim, or in the surgeon as he is per- forming an operation, there is a converg- ence of all the faculties mental and physi- cal. But observe the result : in such cir- cumstances the sense of the real person- ality disappears, and thus we see that perfect unity of consciousness and the sense of the personality are mutually ex- clusive. And we may reach the same conclusion by another route. The Me is a coordination. It oscillates between two extreme points perfect unity and absolute incoordination else it ceases to be ; and we find all the intermediate degrees exemplified without any line of * Opposed to Materialists. demarkation between normal and abnor- mal, health and disease, the one trench- ing upon the other.* The unity of the Me then, in the psy- chological sense, is the cohesion, for a given time, of a certain number of clear states of consciousness, accompanied by others less clear and by a multitude of physiological states, which, though unac- companied by consciousness, are not less effective than the conscious states, and even more effective. Unity means co- ordination. The gist of the whole matter is that the consensus of the consciousness, being subordinate to the consensus of the organism, the problem of the unity of the Me is, in the last resort, a biological problem, and it is for biology to explain, if it can, the genesis of organisms and the solidarity of their parts : the psycho- logical explanation can come only then. This we endeavored to show in detail by analyzing and discussing morbid cases. Here then our task ends. t Even in the normal state the coordination is often so lax that several series co-exist separately. One may walk about, or perform manual work with; a vague, intermittent consciousness of his move- ments, at the same time singing and musing ; but as he begins to think more intently, he stops sing- ing. CONTENTS. PAGE CHAP. I. INTRODUCTION i CHAP. II. ORGANIC DISTURBANCE 7 CHAP. III. AFFECTIVE DISTURBANCE 18 CHAP. IV. INTELLECTIVE DISTURBANCE 30 CHAP. V. DISSOLUTION OF PERSONALITY 42 CHAP. VI. CONCLUSION 46 THE Munjboldt Library of Science is the only publication of its kind, the only one containing popular scientific works at low prices. For the most part it contains only works of acknowledged excellence, by authors of the first rank in the world of science. Such works are landmarks destined to stand forever in the history of Mind. Here, in truth, is ''strong meat for them that are of full age." In this series are well represented the writings of DARWIN, HUXLEY, SPENCER, TYNDALL, PROCTOR, CLIFFORD, CLODD, BAGEHOT, BAIN, BATES, WALLACE, TRENCH, ROMANES, GRANT ALLEN, BALFOUR STEWART, GEIKIE, HINTON, SULLY, FLAMMARION, PICTON, WILLIAMS, WILSON, and other leaders of thought in our time. As well might one be a mummy in the tomb of the Pharaohs as pretend to live the life of the nineteenth century without communion of thought with these its Master Minds. Science has in our time invaded every domain of thought and research, throwing new light upon the problems of PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, MAN'S HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY, MEDICINE. In short, producing a revolution in the intellectual and moral world. No educated person, whatever his calling, can afford to keep himself out of the main current of contemporary scientific research and exposition. The price of the several numbers is fifteen cents each (double numbers thirty cents), which is less than one tenth what is charged by London and New York publishers for exactly the same reading- matter. THE HTJMBOLDT LIBRARY is published semi-monthly, and mailed free to any address in the United States, Canada, or Mexico, on receipt of $3. To Great Britain, France, Japan, &c., $4.00 a year. Subscribers get 24 numbers as they appear, single or double. Sub- scriptions can commence at any time within the current year. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO. 28 Lafayette Place, New York. CATALOGUE THE POPULAR SCIENCE. Containing the works of the foremost scientific writers of the age The Great Classics of Modern Thought. Strong meat for them that are of full age. Price, Fifteen Cents per number, except as otherwise noted in this catalogue. No. 1. LIGHT SCIENCE FOR LEISURE HOURS.-A Series of Familiar Essays on Scientific Subjects, Natural Phenomena, Ac. -By RICHARD A. PROCTOR, B.A., Camb., F.R.A.S., author of "The Sun," "Other Worlds than Ours," "Saturn," &c. Strange Discoveries respecting the Aurora. The Earth a Magnet. Our Chief Timepiece losing Time. Encke the Astronomer. Venus on the Sun's Face. Recent Solar Researches. Government Aid to Science. American Alms for British Science. The Secret of the North Pole. Is the Gulf Stream a Myth? Floods in Switzerland. CONTENTS. The Tunnel through Mont Cenis. The Greatest Sea -Wave ever known. The Usefulness of Earthquakes. The Earthquake in Peru. A Great Tidal Wave. Deep-Sea Dredgings. Tornadoes. Vesuvius. The Forcing Power of Rain. A Shower of Snow-Crystals. Long Shots. Influence of Marriage on the Death-Rate. The Topographical Survey of India. A Ship Attacked by a Sword- fish. The Safety-Lamp. The Dust we have to Brenthe. Photographic Ghosts. The Oxford and Cambridge Rowing Styles. Betting on Horse-Races; or, the State of the Odds. Squaring the Circle. The New Theory of Achilles' Shield. No. 2. THE FORMS OF WATER IN CLOUDS AND RIVERS, ICE AND GLACIERS. B y JOHN TYNDALL, LL.D., F.R.S., Professor of Natural Philos- ophy in the Royal Institution, London. With nineteen illustrations drawn under the direction of the author. Clouds. Rains, and Rivers. The Waves of Light. Oceanic Distillation. Tropical Rains. Architecture of Snow. Architecture of Lake Ice. Ice Pinnacles, Towers, and Chasms. CONTENTS. The Motion of Glaciers. Likeness of Glacier Motion to River Motion. Changes of Volume of Water by Heat and Cold. The Molecular Mechanism of Water-congelation. Sea Ice and Icebergs. Ancient Glaciers of Switzer- land. Ancient Glaciers of England. Scotland. Wales.and Ireland. The Glacial Epoch. Glacier Theories. The Bine Veins of Glaciers. Crevasses. No. 3. PHYSICS AND POLITICS: An Application of the Principles of Natural Selection and Heredity to Political Society. -By WALTER BAGEHOT, author of "The English Constitution." Chapter I. The Preliminary Age. Chapter II. The Use of Conflict. Chapter III. Nation-making. Chapter IV. Nation-making. CONTENTS. Chapter V. The Age of Discussion. Chapter VI. Verifiable Progress Politically Con- sidered. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 4. EVIDENCE AS TO MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE.-By THOMAS H. HUXLEY, F.K.S., F.L.S. With numerous illustrations. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Natural History of the Manlike I Chapter II. The Relations of Man to the Lower Apes. Animals. I Chapter III. Some Fossil Remains of Man. No. 5. EDUCATION: INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND HERBERT SPENCER. PHYSICAL.- By CONTENTS. Chapter I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth ? Chapter II. Intellectual Education. Chapter III. Moral Education. Chapter IT. Physical Education. No. 6. TOWN GEOLOGY. By the Rev. CHARLES KINGSLEY, F.L.S., F.G.S., Canon of Chester. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Soil of the Field. I Chapter IV. The Coal in the Fire. Chapter II. The Pebbles in the Street. Chapter V. The Lime in the Mortar. Chapter III. The Stones in the Wall. | Chapter VI. The Slates on the Roof. No. 7. THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY.- By BALFOUR STEWART, LL.D., F.B.S., Professor of Natural Philosophy at the Owens College, Manchester, Eng. With an Appendix "The Correlation of Nervous and Mental Forces," by Prof. ALEXANDER BAIN. CONTENTS. Chapter I. What is Energy? Chapter II. Mechanical Energy and its Change into Heat. Chapter III. The Forces and Energies of Nature : the Law of Conservation. Chapter IV. Transmutations of Energy. Chapter V. Historical Sketch: the Dissipation of Energy. Chapter VI. The Position of Life. APPENDIX. The Correlation of Nervous and Mental Forces. No. 8. THE STUDY OF LANGUAGES BROUGHT BACK TO ITS TRUE PRINCIPLES. By C. MARCEL, Kut. Leg. Hon., author of "Language as a Means of Mental Culture," &c. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Subdivision and Order of Study. Chapter II. The Art of Reading. Chapter III. The Art of Hearing. Chapter IV. The Art Speaking. Chapter V. The Art of Writing. Chapter VI. On Mental Culture. Chapter VII. On Routine. No. 9. THE DATA OF ETHICS. By HERBERT SPENCER. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Conduct in General. Chapter II. The Evolution of Conduct. Chapter III. Good and Bad Conduct. Chapter IV. Ways of Judging Conduct. Chapter V. The' Physical View. Chapter VI. The Biological View. Chapter VII. The Psychological View. Chapter Vm. The Sociological View. Chapter IX. Criticisms and Explanations. Chapter X. The Relativity of Pains and Pleas- Chapter XI. Egoism vergug Altruism, (ures. Chapter XII. Altruism verms Egoism. Chapter XIII. Trial and Compromise. Chapter XIV. Conciliation. Chapter XV. Absolute Ethics and Relative Eth- Chapter XVL The Scope of Ethics. [ies. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. ffi Chapter I. Periodic Movements: Vibration onorous Vibration. Vibration of a Bell. Vibra- tion of a Tuniiig-fork. Vibration of a String. Of Plates and Membranes. Vibration of Air in a Sounding-pipe. Method of the Monometric Flame. Conclusion. Chapter II. Transmission of Sound. Propaga- tion in Air. In Water and Other Bodies. Ve- locity of Sound in Air.- In Water and Other Bodies. Reflection of Sound. Echo. Chapter III. Characteristics of Sound, and Dif- ference between Musical Sound and Noise. Load- ness of Sound, and the Various Causes on which it depends. Principle of the Superposition of Sounds. Sounding-boards and Resonators. Chapter IV. Measure of the Number of Vibra- tions. Pitch of Sounds : Limit of Audible Sounds, of Musical Sonnds, and of the Human Voice. The "Normal Pitch." Laws of the Vibrations of a String, and of Harmonics. Chapter V. Musical Sounds. Law of Simple Ratio. Unison: interference. Beats: their ex- planation. Resultant Notes. Octaves, and other Harmonies. Consonant Chords and their limits. The Major fifth, fourth, sixth, and third: the Minor third and sixth. The Seventh Harmonic. CONTENTS. Chapter VI.-Helmholtz's Double Siren.-App*. cation of the Law of Simple Ratio to three or more notes. Perfect Major and Minor Chords: their nature. Their inversion. Chapter VII.- Discords. The Nature of Music and Musical Scales. Ancient Music. - Greek Scale. Scale of Pythagoras. Its decay. Ambro- sian and Gregorian Chants. Polyphonic Music: Harmony. The Protestant Reformation. Pales- trina. Change of the Musical Scale. The Tonic or Fundamental Chord. The Major Scale. Mu- sical Intervals. The Minor Scale. Key and Trans- position. Sharps and Flats. The Temperate Scale: its inaccuracy. The Desirability of aban- doning it. Chapter VIII. Quality or timbre of Musical Sounds. Forms assumed by the Vibrations. Laws of Harmonics. Quality or timbre of Strings and of Instruments. General Laws of Chords. Noises accompanying Musical Sounds. Quality or timbre of Vocal Musical Sounds. Chapter IX. Difference between Science and Art. Italian and German Music. Separation of the two Schools. Influence of Paris. Conclusion. Nos. 11 and 12. Double number, 30 cents. THE NATURALIST ON THE RIVER AMAZONS.-A Record of Adventures, Habits of Animals, Sketches of Brazilian and Indian Life, and Aspects of Nature under the Equator, during eleven years of travel. By HENRY WALTER BATES, P.L.S., Assistant Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society of England. CONTENTS. (In part.) Chapter I. Arrival at Para Aspect of the country First walk in the suburbs of Para Birds, lizards, and insects Leaf -carrying ant Sketch of the climate, history, and present condition of Para. Chapter H. The swampy forest of Para A Por- tuguese landed proprietor Life of a Naturalist under the Equator The dryer virgin forests Re- tired creeks Aborigines. Chapter III. The Tocantins River and Cameta Sketch of the River Grove of fan-leaved palms Native life on the Tocantins. Chapter V. Caripi and the Bay of Maraj6 Negro observance of Christmas A German family Bats Ant-eaters Humming-birds Domestic life of the inhabitants Hunting excursion with Indians White ants. Chapter VI. The Lower Amazons Modes of traveling on the Amazons Historical sketch of the early explorations of the river First sight of the great river Flat-topped mountains. Chapter VII. Ville Nova, its inhabitants, forest, and animals A rustic festival River Madeira Mura Indians Yellow Fever. Chapter VIII. Santarem Manners and customs of the inhabitants Sketches of Natural History- palms, wildf ruit-trees, mining- wasps, mason- wasps, bees, and sloths. Chapter IX. Voyage up the Tapajos Modes of obtaining fish White Cebus.and habits and dispo- sitions of Cebi monkeys Adventure with anaconda Smoke-dried monkey Boa-constrictor Hya- cinthine macaw Descent of river to Santarem. Chapter X. The Upper Amazons Desolate ap- pearance of river in the flood season Mental con- dition of Indians Floating pumice-stones from the Andes Falling banks Ega and its inhabitants The four seasons of the Upper Amazons. Chapter XL Excursions in the neighborhood of Ega Character and customs of the Passe Indians Hunting rambles with natives in the forest. Chapter XII. Animals of the neighborhood of Ega Scarlet-faced monkeys- Owl-faced night-apes Marmosets Bats Birds Insects Pendulous cocoons Foraging ants Blind ants. Chapter XIII. Excursions beyond Ega Steam- boat traveling on the Amazons Various tribes of Indians Descent to Pari Great changes at Par* Departure for England. % This is one of the most charming books of travel ever written, and is both interesting and in- structive. It is a graphic description of " a country of perpetual summer, where trees yield flower and fruit all the year round," "a region where the animals and plants have been fashioned in Nature's choicest moulds." THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 13. MIND AND BODY: The Theories of their Relation. By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. Chapter I. Question Stated. Chapter II. Connection of Mind and Body. Chapter III. The Connection Viewed as Corre- spondence, or Concomitant Variation. CONTENTS. Chapter IV. General Laws of Alliance of Mind and Body. The Feelings and the Will. Chapter V. The Intellect. Chapter VI. How are Mind and Bodv united' Chapter VII. History of the Theories of" the Soul. No. 14. THE WONDERS OF THE HEAVENS.-By CAMILLE FLAMMARION.- Translated from the French by Mrs. NORMAN LOCKTER. With thirty-two Actinoglyph Illustrations. CONTENTS. BOOK FIRST. Chapter I. Night. Chapter II. The Heavens. Chapter III. Infinite Space. [verse. Chapter IV. General Arrangement of the Uni- Chapter V. Clusters and Nebulae. Chapter VI.^The Milky Way. BOOK SECOND. Chapter I. The Sidereal World. Chapter II. The Northern Constellations. Chapter III. The Zodiac. Chapter IV. Southern Constellations. Chapter V. The Number of the Stars. Their Distances. Chapter VI. Variable Stars. Temporary Stars. Stars suddenly visible or invisible. Chapter VII. Distant Universes. Double, Mul- tiple, and Colored Suns. BOOK THIRD. Chapter I. The Planetary System. Chapter II. The Sun. Chapter III. The Sun (continued). Chapter IV. Mercury. Chapter V. Venus. Chapter VI. Mars. Chapter VII. Jupiter. Chapter Vm. Saturn. Chapter IX. Uranus. Chapter X. Neptune. Chapter XI. Comets. Chapter XII. Comets (continued). BOOK FOURTH. Chapter I. The Terrestrial Globe. Chapter II. Proofs that the Earth is round. That it turns on an axis, and revolves round the Sun. Chapter III. The Moon. Chapter IV. The Moon (continued). Chapter V. Eclipses. BOOK FIFTH. Chapter I. The Plurality of Inhabited Worlds. Chapter II. The Contemplation of the Heavens. No. 15. LONGEVITY: THE MEANS OF PROLONGING LIFE AFTER MIDDLE AGE. B y JOHN GARDNER, M.D. CONTENTS. What is the Natural Duration of Human Life ? Is the Duration of Life in any degree within our power ? Some General Considerations respecting Ad- vanced Age. Causes of Neglect of Health. Is Longevity Desirable? Physiology of Advanced Age. Heredity. The Means of Ameliorating and Retarding the Effects of Age. Recuperative Power. What is Life? Water : its bearing on Health and Disease. Mineral Waters. Stimulants Spirituous and Malt Liquors and Wine. Climate, its Effects on Longevity. Disregarded Deviations from Health in Aged Persons. (a). Faulty Nutrition General At- tenuation. (6). Local Failure of Nutrition. (c). Obesity. Pain the Use and Misuse of Narcotics. (a). Dolor-Senilis. (b). Narcotics. (c). Sarsapa- rilla and other Remedial Agents. Gout New Remedies for. Rheumatism. Lumbago. Limit to the Use of Narcotics. The Stomach and Digestion. The Liver. The Kidneys and Urine. Simple Overflow. Al- buminous Urine. Bright's Disease. Muddy Urine, Gravel, Stone. Irritable Bladder. Diabetes. The Lower Bowels. The Throat. Air-passages. Lungs. Bronchitis. The Heart. The Brain Mind, Motive Power, Sleep, Paralysis. Established Facts respecting Longevity. Diseases Fatal after hixty. Summary. An Experiment Proposed. Appendix. Causes of Premature Death. Notes on some Collateral Topics. (a). Longevity of the Patriarchs and in Ancient Times. (b). Flourens on Longevity. (c). Popular Errors respecting Longevity. (d). Waste of Human Life. (e). Moral and Religious Aspects of Longevity. (/). Importance of Early Treat- ment of "Disorders. (a). The Bones of Old People Brittle. (h). Condition of very Old People. (r). One Hundred and Five Years the Extreme Limit of Human Life. (j). A Case of Recuperation. (k). On the Water used in Country Towns. (1). Pure Aerated Water. (m). Anticipations. (n.) Adulteration of Food. &c., its Effects on Human Life. (o). Cases of Prolonged Life. (p). Appliances Useful to Aged Persons for Immediate Relief of Suffering. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES; or, The Causes of the Phenomena Ot Organic Nature. A Course of Six Lectures. By THOMAS H. HCXLET, F.R.S., F.L.S., Professor of Natural History in the Jermyn Street School of Mines, London. Chapter I. The Present Condition of Organic Nature. ftura Chapter II. The Past Condition of Organic Na- Chapter III. The Method by which the Causes of the Present and Past Conditions of Organic Nature are to be discovered. The Origination of Living Beings. Chapter IV. The Perpetuation of Living Beings. Hereditary Transmission and Variation. CONTENTS. Ch *? ter , v --Th Conditions of Existence as af- fecting the Perpetuation of Living Beings. Chapter VL- A Critical Examination of tEe Po- sition of Mr. Darwin's work on -The Origin or species, in relation to the Complete The- ory of the Causes of the Phenomena of Organic APPENDIX. Criticisms on Darwin's "Origin of Species." No. 17. PROGRESS: ITS LAW AND CAUSE.- With other Disquisitions, viz., The Physiology of Laughter. Origin and Function of Music. The Social Organism. Use and Beauty. The Use of Anthropomorphism. By HERBERT SPENCER. No. 18. LESSONS IN ELECTRICITY. To which is added an Elementary Lecture on Magnetism. By JOHN TYNDALL, D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S., Pro- fessor of Natural Philosophy in the Royal Institution of Great Britain. With Sixty Illustrations. CONTENTS. Introduction. Historic Notes. The Art of Experiment. Electric Attractions. Discovery of Conduction and Insulation. The Electroscope. Electrics and Non- Electrics. Electric Repulsions. Fundamental Law of Electric Action. Double or "Polar" Character of the Electric Force. What is Electricity! Electric Induction. The Electrophorus. Action of Points and Flames. The Electrical Machine. The Leyden Jar. Franklin's Cascade Battery. Leyden Jars of the Simplest Form. Ignition by the Electric Spark. Duration of the Electric Spark. Electric Light in Vacuo. Liehtenb erg's Figures. Surface Compared with Mass. Physiological Effects of the Electrical Discharge. Atmospheric Electricity. The Returning Stroke. The Leyden Battery. APPENDIX. An Elementary Lecture on Mag- netism. No. 19. FAMILIAR ESSAYS ON SCIENTIFIC SUBJECTS, viz., Oxygen in the Sun. Sun-spot, Storm, and Famine. New Ways of Measuring the Sun's Distance. Drifting Light-waves. The New Star which faded into Star-mist. Star-grouping, Star-drift, and Star-mist. By RICHARD A. PROCTOR. No. 20. THE ROMANCE OF ASTRONOMY.-By R. KALLET MILLER, M.A., Fel- low and Assistant Tutor of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, England. With an Appendix by RICHARD A. PROCTOR. The Planets. Astrology. The Moon. The Sun. CONTENTS. The Comets. Laplace's Nebular Hypothesis. The Stars. The Nebnlw. APPENDIX. The Past History of onr Moon. Ancient Babylonian Astrogony. THE HTJMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 21. ON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE.-With Other Essays, viz., The Scientific Aspects of Positivism. A Piece of Chalk. Geo- logical Contemporaneity. A Liberal Education. By THOMAS H. HUXLEY, F.E.S., F.L.S. No. 22. SEEING AND THINKING. By WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD, F.B.S., Pro- fessor of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics in University College, London, and sometime Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. CONTENTS. The Eye and the Brain. The Eye and Seeing. The Brain and Thinking. Of Boundaries in General. No. 23. SCIENTIFIC SOPHISMS. A Review of Current Theories con- cerning Atoms, Apes, and Men. By SAMUEL WAINWRIGHT, D.D. author of ''Christian Certainty," "The Modern Avernus," &c. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Right of Search. Chapter II. Evolution. Chapter in. "A Puerile Hypothesis." Chapter IV. " Scientific Levity." Chapter V. A House of Cards. Chapter VL Sophisms. Chapter VTI. Protoplasm. Chapter VOL The Three Beginnings. Chapter IX. The Three Barriers. Chapter X. Atoms. Chapter XL Apes. Chapter XH. Men. Chapter Xm. Animi Mundi. POPULAR SCIENTIFIC LECTURES, viz., On the Relation of Optics to Painting. On the Origin of the Planetary System. On Thought in Medicine. On Academic Freedom in German Uni- versities. By H. HELMHOLTZ, Professor of Physics in the University oi Berlin. No. 25. THE ORIGIN OF NATIONS.- In two parts.- On Early Civiliza- tions. On Ethnic Affinities, &C.~ By GEORGE BAWLINSON, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History, Oxford. CONTENTS. PART L EARLY CIVILIZATIONS. Chapter I. Introduction. Chapter II. On the Antiquity of Civilization in Egypt. Chapter m. On the Antiquity of Civilization at Babylon. Chapter IV. On the Date and Character of Phoenician Civilization. Chapter V. On the Civilizations of Asia Minor Phrygia, Lydia, Lycia, Troas. Chapter VI. On the Civilizations of Central Asia Assyria. Media. Persia, India. Chapter VII. On the Civilization of the Etruscans Chapter VIII. On the Civilization of the British Celts. Chapter IX. Results of the Inquiry. PART II. ETHNIC AFFINITIES r>* THE ANCIENT WORLD. Chapter L The Chief Japhetic Races. Chapter II. Subdivisions of the Japhetic Races, Gomer and Javan. Chapter m. The Chief Hamitic Races. Chapter IV. Subdivisions of Cush. Chapter V. Subdivisions of Mizraim and Canaan. Chapter VI. The Semitic Races. Chapter VH. On the Subdivisions of the Semitic Races. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers. 15 cents, OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 26. THE EVOLUTIONIST AT LARGE.-By GRANT ALLE>:. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Microscopic Brains. Chapter II. A Wayside Berry. Chapter HI. In Summer Fields. Chapter IV. A Sprig of Water Crowfoot. Chapter V. Slugs and Snails. Chapter VI. A Study of Bones. Chapter VII. Blue >fud. Chapter VIIL Cuckoo-pint. Chapter IX. Berries and Berries. Chapter X. Distant Relations. Chapter XI. Among the Heather. Chapter XII. Speckled Trout. Chapter XIII. Dodder and Broomrape. Chapter XIV. Dog's Mercnrv and Plantain. Chapter XV. Butterfly Psychology. Chapter XVI. Butterfly Esthetics. Chapter XV II. The Origin of Walnuts. Chapter XVIII. A Pretty Land-shell. Chapter XIX. Dogs and Masters. Chapter XX. Blackcock. Chapter XXI. Bindweed. Chapter XXIL On Cornish Cliffs. No. 27. THE HISTORY OF FISHER, F.R.H.S. I. The Aborigines. II. The Romans. III. The Scandinavians. LANDHOLDING IN ENGLAND.-By JOSEPH CONTENTS. IV. The Normans. V. The Plantagenets. VI. The Tudors. VII. The Stuarts. VIII The House of Hanover. FASHION IN DEFORMITY, AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE CUS- TOMS OF BARBAROUS AND CIVILIZED RACES.-By WILLIAM HENRY FLOWER, LL.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.S., P.Z.S., &c., Hunterian Professor of Comparative Anatomy, and Conservator of the Museum of the Koyal College of Surgeons of England. With illustrations. TO WHICH IS ADDED MANNERS AND FASHION.- By HERBERT SPENCER. No. 29. FACTS AND FICTIONS OF ZOOLOGY.- By ANDREW WILSON, Ph.D., F.R.P.S.E., &c., Lecturer on Zoology aud Comparative Anatomy in the Edin- burgh Medical School; Lecturer on Physiology, Watt Institution and School of Arts, Edinburgh, &c. With numerous illustrations. Zoological Myths. The Sea-serpents of Science. Some Animal Architects. CONTENTS. Parasites and their Development. What I Saw in an Ant's Nest. No. 30. and No. 31. ON THE STUDY OF Archbishop of Dublin. [15 cents each number. WORDS. By RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D.. Lecture I. Introductory Lecture. Lecture II. On the Poetry in Words. Lecture IH. On the Morality in Words. Lecture IV. On the History in Words. CONTENTS. Lecture V. On the Rise of New Words. Lecture VI. On the Distinction of Words. Lecture VTL The Schoolmaster's Use of Words. HEREDITARY TRAITS, AND OTHER ESSAYS.-By RICHARD A. PROCTOR B.A., F.R.A.S., author of "The Sun," "Other Worlds than Ours," "Saturn," &e. I. Hereditary Traits, n. Artificial Somnambulism. CONTENTS. I HI. Bodily Illness as a Mental Stimulant. IV. Dual Consciousness. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 33. VIGNETTES FROM tionist at Large." NATURE. By GRANT ALLEN, author of "The Evolu. I. Fallow Deer. II. Sedge and Woodbrush. III. Red Campion and White. IV. Butterfly-Hunting Begins. V. Red Campion Again. VI. The Hedgehog's Hole. VII. On Musbnry Castle. VIII A Big Fossil Bone. IX. Veronica. X. Guelder Rose. XI. The Heron's Haunt. TENT S. XII. A Bed of Nettles. XIII. Loosestrife and Pimpernel. XFV. The Carp Pond. XV. A Welsh Roadside. XVI. Seaside Weeds. XVII. A Mountain Tarn. XVm. Wild Thyme. XIX. The Donkey's Ancestors. XX. Beside the Cromlech. XXI. The Fall of the Leaf. XXII. The Fall of the Year. No. 34. THE PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE. By HERBERT SPENCER, author of "First Principles of Philosophy," "Social Statics," "Elements of Psychology," "Ele- ments of Biology," "Education," &c. CONTENTS. PART I. Causes of Force in Language, tchich depend upon Economy of lite Mental Energies. I. The Principle of Economy applied to Words. n. The Effect of Figurative Language Ex- plained. III. Arrangement of Minor Images in Build- ing up a Thought. IV. The Superiority of Poetry to Prose Explained. PART II. Causes of Force in Language wliicli depend upon Economy of the Mental Sensibilities. TO WHICH IS ADDED THE MOTHER TONGUE. By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. CONTENTS. Conditions of_ Language Acquisition Generally. I The Age for Commencing Grammar. The Mother Tongue. Teaching Grammar. The Higher Composition. English Literature. No. 35. ORIENTAL RELIGIONS. By JOHN CAIRO, S.T.D., President of the Univer- sity of Glasgow, and other authors. C I. Brahmanism. Religions of India. < _ ^n. Buddhism. By JOHN CAIRO, S.T.D. CONTENTS. Religion of China. Confucianism. By Rev. GEORGE MATHESOF. Religion of Persia. Zoroaster and the Zend Avesta. By Rev. JOHN MILNE. M.A. No. 36. LECTURES ON EVOLUTION.-With an Appendix on The Study of Biology. By THOMAS H. HUXLEY. CONTENTS. I. THREE LECTURES ON EVOLUTION. Lecture I. The Three Hypotheses respecting the History of Nature. Lecture II. The Hypothesis of Evolution. The Neutral and the Favorable Evidence. Lecture HI. The Demonstrative Evidence of Evolution. H. A LECTURE ON THE STUDY OF BIOLOGY. No. 37. SIX LECTURES ON LIGHT. By Prof. JOHN TYNDALL, F.R.S. CONTENTS. Lectnre I. Introductory. Lecture II. Origin of Physical Theories. Lecture HI. Relation of Theories to Experience. Lecture IV. Chromatic Phenomena produced by Crystals on Polarized Light. Lecture V. Range of Vision incommensurate with Range of Radiation. Lecture VI. Principles of Spectrum Analysis. Solar Chemistry. Summary and Conclusions." Published semi-montnly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 38 and No. 39. [15 Pentg earh GEOLOGICAL SKETCHES AT HOME AND ABROAD.- By ARCH- IBALD GEIKIE, LL.D., F.K.S., Director-General of the Geological Surveys of Great Britaiu uiid Ireland. In Two Parts, each complete in itself. PART I. No. 38. I. My First Geological Excursion, n. "The Old Man of Hoy." III. The Baron's Stone of Killochan. IV. The Colliers of Carrick. V. Among the Volcanoes of Central Prance. VI. The Old Glaciers of Norway and Scotland. VII. Rock-Weathering Measured by the Decay of Tombstones. CONTENTS. PART II. No. 39. I. A Fragment of Primeval Europe. II. In Wyoming. III. The Geysers of the Yellowstone. IV. The Lava Fields of Northwestern Europe. V. The Scottish School of Geology. VI. Geographical Evolution. VII. The Geological Influences which have affect- ed the Course of British History. No. 40. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION.- By GEORGE J. ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Zoological Secretary of the Linnean Society, London. CONTENTS. I. Introduction. II. The Argument from Classification. [ure. III. The Argument from Morphology or Stnict- IV. The Argument from Geology. V. The Argument from Geographical Distribu- VI. The Argument from Embryology. [tiou. VII. Arguments drawn from Certain ~ Considerations. General TO WHICH IS ADDED PALEONTOLOGY AND THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION.-By Prof. THOMAS H. HUXLEY. NATURAL SELECTION AND NATURAL THEOLOGY.-By EUSTACE R. CONDER, P.P. No. 41. CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN SCIENCE.- By W. MATTIBU WILLIAMS, F.R.A.S., F.C.S., author of "The Fuel of the Sun," "Through Norway with a Knapsack," "A Simple Treatise on Heat," &c. I. Meteoric Astronomy. II. Dr. Siemens's Theoiy of the Sun. III. Another World Down Here. IV. The Origin of Volcanoes. V. Note on the Direct Effect of Sun-Spots on Terrestrial Climates. VI. The Philosophy of the Radiometer and its Cosmical Revelations. VII. The Solidity of the Earth. VIII. Meteoric Astronomy. CONTENTS. IX.- X.- XI.- XII.- xin.- XIV.- xv.- XVI.- Aerial Exploration of the Arctic Region*. "Baily's Beads." World-smashing. On the so-called "Crater-Necks" and "Volcanic Bombs" of Ireland. Travertine. Murchison and Babbage. The "Consumption of Smoke." -The Air of Stove-heated Rooms. No. 42. HISTORY POLLOCK. OF THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS.- By FREDERICK Chapter I. Introductory. Place of the Theory of Politics in Human Knowledge. Chapter II. The Classic Period: Pericles Soc- rates Plato Aristotle. The Greek Ideal of the State. Chapter III. The Mediaeval Period: The Papacy and the Empire. Thomas Aquinas Dante Bracton Marsilio of Padua Chapter IV. The Modern Period: Machinvelli Jean Bodin Sir Thomas Smith Hobbes. CONTENTS. Chapter V. The Modern Period (continued) : Hooker Locke Rousseau Blnckstone. Chapter VI. The Modern Period (continued) : Hume Montesquieu Burke. Chapter VII. The Present Century: Politic*! Sovereignty Limits of State Intervention Bentham Austin Maine Bagehot Kant Ahrens Savismy Cornewall Lewis John Stuart Mill Herbert Spencer Labonlaye. DARWIN AND HUMBOLDT.-Their Lives and Work.-By Prof. HUXLEY and others. CONTENTS. CHARLES DARWIN. I Introductory Notice. By TH. H. HUXLEY. II Life and Character. By GEO. J. ROMANES. IIL-Work in Geology. By ARCHIBALD GEIKIE. IV.-Work in Botany.-ByW.T.THiSELTON DYER. V.-Work in Zoology By GEO. J. ROMANES. VI Work in Psychology. By GEO. J. ROMANES. ALEXANDER VON HIJMBOLDT. I An Address delivered by Louis AOASSIZ at the Centennial Anniversary of the birth of A LKX- ANDER VON HuMBOLDT, under the auspices pf the Boston Society of Natural History. Sept.: 14 . H._ Remarks by Prof. FREDERIC H. HEDOK, of Harvard University. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 44 and No. 45. THE DAWN OF HISTORY.- An Introduction to Prehistoric Study. Edited by C. F. KEARY, M.A., of the British Museum. In Two Parts, each complete in itself. CONTENTS. PART I. No. 44. Chapter I. The Earliest Traces of Man. Chapter II. The Second Stone Age. Chapter III. The Growth of Language. Chapter IV. Families of Language. Chapter V. The Nations of the Old World. Chapter VI. Early Social Life. Chapter VII. The Village Community. PART II. No. 45. Chapter VIII. Religion. Chapter IX. Aryan Religions. Chapter X. The Other World. Chapter XI. Mythologies and Folk-Tales. Chapter XII. Picture-Writing. Chapter XIII. Phonetic Writing. [hies. Chapter XIV. Conclusion. Notes and Author- No. 46. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY. By TH. KIBOT, author of "Heredity," "English Psychology," &c. Translated from the French by J. FITZGERALD, A.M. CONTENTS. Chapter I. MEMORY AS A BIOLOGICAL FACT. Memory essentially a biological fact, incident- ally a psychic fact. Organic memory. Mod- ifications of nerve-elements: dynamic associa- tions between these elements. Conscious mem- ory. Conditions of consciousness: intensity; duration. Unconscious cerebration. Nerve- action is the fundamental condition of memory; consciousness is only an accessoiy. Localiza- tion in the past, or recollection. Mechanism of this operation. It is not a simple and instan- taneous act; it consists of the addition of sec- ondary states of consciousness to the principal state of consciousness. Memory is a vision in time. Localization, theoretical and practical. Reference points. Resemblance and difference between localization in the future and in the past. All memory an illusion. Forgetfulness a condition of memory. Return to the starting- point : conscious memory tends little by little to become automatic. Chapter II. GENERAL AMNESIA. Classification of the diseases of memory. Tem- porary amnesia. Epileptics. Forgetfulness of certain periods of life. Examples of re-educa- tion. Slow and sudden recoveries. Case of pro- visional memory. Periodical or intermittent amnesia. Formation of two memories, totally or partially distinct. Cases of hypnotism re- corded byMaenish,Azam, and Dufay. Progress- ive amnesia. Its importance. Reveals the law which governs the destruction of memory. Law of regression : enunciation of this law. In what order memory fails. Counter-proof: it is recon- stituted in inverse order. Confirmatory facts. Congenital amnesia. Extraordinary memory of some idiots. Chapter III. PARTIAL AMNESIA. Reduction of memory to memories. Anatomical and physiological reasons for partial memories. Amnesia of numbers, names, figures.forms,&c. Amnesia of signs. Its nature : a loss of motor- memory. Examination of this point. Progress- ive amnesia of signs verifies completely the law of i-egression. Order of dissolution: proper names: common nouns; verbs and adjectives; interjections, and language of the emotions; gestures. Relation between this dissolution and the evolution of the Indo-European languages. Counter-proof : return of signs in inverse order. Chapter IV. EXALTATION OF MEMORY, OR HYPERMNESIA. General excitation. Partial excitation. Return of lost memories. Return of forgotten lan- guages. Reduction of this fact to the law of re- gression. Case of false memory. Examples, and a suggested explanation. Chapter V. CONCLUSION. Relations between the retention of perceptions and nutrition, between the reproduction of rec- ollections and the general and local circulation. Influence of the quantity and quality of the blood. Examples. The law of regression con- nected with a physiological principle and a psy- chological principle. Recapitulation. No. 47. THE CHILDHOOD OF RELIGIONS.-Embracing a Simple Account of the Birth and Growth of Myths and Legends. By EDWARD CLODD, F.E.A.S., author of "The Childhood of the World," "The Story of Creation," &c. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Introductory. [tion. Chapter II. Legends of the Past about the Crea- Chapter III. Creation as told by Science. Chapter IV. Legends of the Past about Mankind. Chapter V. Early Races of Mankind. [tions. Chapter VI. The Aryan, or Indo-European na- ChapterVII. The Ancient and Modern Hindu Religions. Chapter VTII. Zoroastrianism, the Ancient Re- ligion of Persia. Chapter IX. Buddhism. Chapter X. The Religions of China. Chapter XI. The Semitic Nations. Chapter XII. Mohammedanism, or Islam. Chapter XIII. On the Study of the Bible. Published semi-montlily. $3 a year. Single numbers. 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. LIFE IN NATURE. By JAMES HINTON, author of "Man and his Dwellinc Place," "The Mystery of Pain," &c. Chapter I. Of Function; or, How We Act. Chapter II. Of Nutrition; or. Why We Grow. Chapter III. Of Nutrition; The Vital Force. Chapter IV. Of Living Forms: or. Morphology Chapter V. Living Forms. The Law of Form. Chapter VI. Is Lire Universal? Chapter VII. The Living World. CONTENTS. Chapter VIII. Nature and Man Chapter IX.-The Phenomenal and the True. Chapter X. Force. Chapter XIII. Conclusion. No. 49. THE SUN: Its Constitution; Its Phenomena; Its Condition.- By NATHAN T. CARR, LL.D., Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Indiana. With an Appendix by RICHARD A. PROCTOR and M. W. WILLIAMS. CONTENTS. IL- m.- IV.- V- VI.- Section I. Purpose of this Essay. Difficulties of the Subject. Distance from the Earth to the Sun. The Diameter of the Sun. The Form of the Sun. Rotary Motion of the Sun. Perturbating Movement. The Sun's Orbital Movement. The_ Sun's Attractive Force. Den- sity of the Solar Mass. Section IX. The Sun's Atmosphere. Section X. The Chromosphere. Section XI. Corona, Prominences, and Faculse. Section XII. The Photosphere. Section XIII. The Sun's Heat. Section XIV. Condition of the Interior. Section XV. Effects of Heat on Matter. Section Section Section Section Section Section VII Section VIII Section Section Section Section Section Section Section Section Section Section Section Section Section XVI. XVII. XVIII, XIX. XX XXI. - The Expansive Power of Heat. -The Sun's Crust. The Gaseous Theory. The Vapor Theory. The "Cloud-like" Theory. Supposed Supports of the Fore- going Theories. XXII. The Crust in a Fluid Condition. XXIII. Production of the Sun-Spots. XXIV. The Area of Sun-Spots Limited. XXV. Periodicity of the Spots. XXVI. The Spots are Cavities in the Sun. XXVII. How the Heat of the Sun reaches ^^ the Earth. XXVIII. The Question of the Extinction of the Sun. Appendix. First. The Sun's Corona and his Spots. By RICHARD A. PBOCTOE. Second. The Fuel of the Sun. By RICHARD A. PROCTOR. Third. The Fuel of the Sun. A Reply, by W. M. WILLIAMS. No. 50 and No. 51. [15 cents each number. MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE.- By W. STANLEY JEVONS, M.A., F.R.S., Professor of Logic and Political Economy in the Owens College, Manchester, England. In Two Parts. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Barter. Chapter II. Exchange. Chapter HI. The Functions of Money. Chapter IV. Early History of Money. Chapter V. Qualities of the Material of Money Chapter VI. The Metals as Money. Chapter VII. Coins. Chapter VIII. The Principles of Circulation. Chapter IX. Systems of Metallic Money. Chapter X. The English System of Metallic Currency. Chapter XI. Fractional Currency. Chapter XII. The Battle of the Standards. Chapter XIII. Technical Matters relating to Coinage. Chapter XIV. International Money. Chapter XV. The Mechanism of Exchange. Chapter XVI. Representative Money. Chapter XVII. The Nature and Varieties of Promissory Notes. Chapter XVIII. Methods of Regulating a Paper Currency. Chapter XIX. Credit Documents. [System. Chapter XX. Book Credit and the Banking Chapter XXI. The Clearing-House System. Chapter XXII. The Check Bank. Chapter XXIII. Foreign Bills of Exchange. Chapter XXTV. The Bank of England and the Money Market. Chapter XXV. A Tabular Standard of Value. Chapter XXVI. The Quantity of Money needed by a Nation. No. 52. THE DISEASES OF THE WILL By TH. RIBOT, author of "The Dis- eases of Memory," &c. Translated from the French by J. FITZGERALD, A.M. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Introduction.- The Question Stated. Chapter II. Impairment of the Will. Lack of Impulsion. Chapter HI. Impairment of the Will. Excess of Impulsion. Chapter IV. Impairment of Voluntary Attention. Chapter V. The Realm of Caprice. Chapter VI. Extinction of the Will. Chapter VII. Conclusion. THE HUMBOL.DT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 53. ANIMAL AUTOMATISM, HEXRY HUXLEY, LL.D., F.R.S. AND OTHER ESSAYS.- By THOMAS CONTENTS. I. On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History. II. Science and Culture. IH. On Elementary Instruction in Physiology. IV. On the Border Territory between the Animal and the Vegetable Kingdoms. V. Universities: Actual and Ideal. No. 54. THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF MYTHS.- By EDWARD CLODD, F.R.A.S., author of "The Childhood of the World," "The Childhood of Re- ligions," "The Story of Creation," &c. CONTENTS. I. Nature as Viewed by Primitive Man. n. Personification of the Powers of Nature. HI. The Sun and Moon in Mythology. IV. The Theories of Certain Comparative Mythologists. V. Aryan Mythology. VT. The Primitive Nature-Myth Transformed. VII. The Stars in Mythology. Vni. Myths of the Destructive Forces of Nature. IX. The Hindu Sun-and-Clond Myth. X. Demonology. XI. Metempsychosis and Transformation. XH. Transformation in the Middle Ages. XIII. The Belief in Transformation Universal. XIV. Beast-Fables. XV. Totemism. XVI. Heraldry: Ancestor-worship. ftives. XVII. Survival of Myth in Historical Narra- XVIII. Myths of King Arthur and Llewellyn. XIX. Semitic Myths and Legends. XX. Conclusion. Appendix. An American Indian Myth. No. 55. THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF MORALS, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD, F.R.S. I. On the Scientific Basis of Morals. H. Right and Wrong: the Scientific Ground of their Distinction. CONTENTS. I III. The Ethics of Belief. IV. The Ethics of Religion. No. 56 and No. 57. [15 cents each number. ILLUSIONS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY.- By JAMES SULLY, author of "Sensation and Intuition." "Pessimism," &c. In Two Parts. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Study of Illusion. Chapter II. The Classification of Illusions. Chapter III. Illusions of Perception: General. Chapter IV. Illusions of Perception (continued). Chapter V. Illusions of Perception (continued). Chapter VI. Illusions of Perception (continued). Chapter VTI. Dreams. Chapter VIII. Illusions of Introspection. Chapter IX. Other Quasi-Presentative Illu- sions: Errors of Insight. Chapter X. Illusions of Memory. Chapter XI. Elusions of Belief. Chapter XII. Results. No. 58 and No. 59. Two double numbers, 3O cents each. THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELEC- TION, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. By CHARLES DARWIN, M.A., F.R.S. New edition, from the sixth and latest English edition, with additions and corrections. Two double numbers. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Variation under Domestication. Chapter II. Variation under Nature. Chapter III. Struggle for Existence. Chapter IV. Natural Selection: or, the Sur- vival of the Fittest. Chapter V. Laws of Variation. Chapter VT. Difficulties of the Theory. Chapter VII. Miscellaneous Objections to the Theory of Natural Selection. Chapter Vm. Instinct. Chapter EX. Hybridism. Chapter X. On the Imperfection of the Geo- logical Record. Chapter XI. On the Geological Succession of Organic Beings. Chapter XII. Geological Distribution. Chapter XIII. Geological Distribution (contirid). Chapter XIV. Mutual Affinities of Organic Be- ings: Morphology: Embryology: Rudimentary Organs. Chapter XV. Recapitulation and Conclusion. Index. Glossary of Scientific Terms. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 60. THE CHILDHOOD OF THE WORLD.-A Simple Account of Man in Early Times. By EDWARD CLODD, F.R.A.S., author of "The Childhood of Religions," "The Story of Creation," &c. CONTENTS. I.- II.- III.- IV.- V- VI.- VII.- VIII.- IX.- X.- XI.- XII.- XIII.- xrv.- xv.. XVI.- xvn.- xvni.- PABT L -Introductory. -Man's First Wants. -Man's First Tools. -Fire. -Cooking and Pottery. -Dwellings. -Use of Metals. -Man's Great Age on the Earth. -Mankind as Shepherds, Farmers, and Traders. -Language. - Writing. -Counting. -Man's Wanderings from his first Home. - Man's Progress in all things. -Decay of Peoples. PART II. - Introductory. -Man's First Questions. -Myths. XIX XX.- XXI.- XXII.- XXIII.- XXIV.- XXV.- XXVI.- XXVIL- XXVIII.- XXIX.- XXX.- XXXI.- XXXII.- XXXIII.- XXXIV- XXXV.- XXXVI.- XXXVII.- Myths about Sun and Moon. Myths about Eclipses. Myths about Stars. Myths about the Earth and Man. Man's Ideas about the Soul. Belief in Magic and Witchcraft. Man's Awe of the Unknown. - Fetish -Worship. - Idolatry. - Nature -Worship. 1. Water -Worship. 2. Tree -Worship. 3. Animal -Worship. -Polytheism, or Belief in Many Gods. -Dualism, or Belief in Two Gods. - Prayer. -Sacrifice. -Monotheism, or Belief in One God. -Three Stories About Abraham. -Man's Belief in a Future Life. -Sacred Books. -Conclusion. No. 61. MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS.- By RICHARD A. PROCTOR, B.A., F.R.A.S., author of "The Sun," "Other Worlds than Ours," "Saturn," &c. I. Strange Coincidences, n. Coincidences and Superstitions, ni. Gambling Superstitions. IV. Learning Languages. CONTENTS. V. Strange Sea Creatures. VI. The Origin of Whales. VII. Prayer and Weather. [Double number, O cents. THE RELIGIONS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD, including Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia, Persia, India, Phoenicia, Etruria, Greece, Rome. By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History, Oxford, and Canon of Canterbury. Author of "The Origin of Nations," "The Five Great Monarchies," &c. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Religion of the Ancient Egyptians. Chapter H. The Religion of the Assyrians and Babylonians. Chapter HI. The Religion of the Ancient Iranians. Chapter IV. The Religion of the Early Sanskritic Indians. Chapter V. The Religion of the Phoenicians and Carthaginians. Chapter VI. The Religion of the Etruscans. Chapter VTL The Religion of the Ancient Greeks. Chapter VIII. The Religion of the Ancient Romans. Concluding Remarks. No. 63. PROGRESSIVE MORALITY.-An Essay in Ethics.- By THOMAS FOWLER, M.A., LL.D., F.S.A., President of Corpus- Christi College, Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Introduction. The Sanctions of Conduct. Chapter II. The Moral Sanction or Moral Sentiment. Its Functions, and the Justification of its Claims to Superiority. Chapter III. Analysis and Formation of the Moral Sentiment. Its Education and Improvement. Chapter IV. The Moral Test and its Justification. Chapter V. The Practical Application of the Moral Test to Existing Morality. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 64. THE DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE, Animal and Vegetable, in Space and Time. By ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE and W. T. THISELTON DYER. CONTENTS. SECTION I. DISTRIBUTION OF ANIMALS. Geographical Distribution of Land Animals. A. Vertical Distribntio'n of Animals. B. Powers of Dispersal of Animals. C. Widespread and Local Groups. [mals. D. Barriers which Limit the Distribution of Ani- E. Zoological Regions. The Pauearctic Region. The Ethiopian Region. The Oriental Region. The Australian Region. The Neotropical Region. The Nearctic Region. Distribution of the Higher Animals during the Tertiary Period. A. Tertiary Faunas and their Geographical Rela- tions to those of the six Zoological Regions. B. Birthplace and Migrations of some Mamma- lian Families and Genera. Distribution of Marine Animals. Foraminifera. Cirrhipedia. Spongida. Mollnsca. Actinozoa. Fishes. Polyzoa. Marine Turtles. Bchinodermata. Cetacea. Crustacea. General Relations of Marine with Terrestrial Zoological Regions. Distribution of Animals in Time. SECTION II. DISTRIBUTION OF VEGETABLE LIFE. THE NORTHERN FLORA. The Arctic-Alpine Flora. The Intermediate or Temperate Flora. The Mediterraneo-Caucasian Flora. THE SOUTHERN FLORA. The Antarctic-Alpine Flora. The Australian Flora. The Andine Flora. The Mexico-Californian Flora. The South-African Flora. THK TROPICAL FLORA. The Indo-Malayan Tropical Flora. The American Tropical Flora. The African Tropical Flora. No. 65. CONDITIONS OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT, and Other Essays. By WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD, F.R.S., late Professor of Applied Mathematics in University College, London. CONTENTS. I. On some of the Conditions of Mental Development. II. Ou the Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought. HI. A Lecture on Atoms. IV. The First and the Last Catastrophe. A crit- icism on some recent speculations about the duration of the universe. No. 66. TECHNICAL EDUCATION, AND THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, F.R.S. OTHER ESSAYS.-By I. Technical Education. H. The Connection of the Biological Sciences with Medicine. III. Joseph Priestly. CONTENTS. IV. On Sensation and the Unity of Structure of Sensiferous Organs. V. On Certain Errors respecting the Structure of the Heart attributed to Aristotle. THE BLACK DEATH: An Account of the Deadly Pestilence of the Fourteenth Century. B y J - F - C. HECKER, M.D., Professor in the Frederick William University, Berlin; Member of various learned societies in London, Lyons, Netf York, Philadelphia, &c. Translated for the Sydenbam Society, of London, by B. G. BABINGTON, M.D., F.R.S. Chapter I. General Observations. Chapter II. The Disease. Chapter III. Causes. Spread. Chapter IV. Mortality. Chapter V. Moral Effects. Chapter VI. Physicians. CONTENTS. Appendix. I. The Ancient Song of the Flagellants. II. Examination of the Jews accused of Poisoning the Wells. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. Special number, 1O cents LAWS IN GENERAL, AND THE ORDER OF THEIR DISCOVERY THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL WORSHIP.- POLITICAL FETICHISM' Three Essays by HEHBERT SPENCER. ___ |rk ..,_.. [Double number, 3O cents. FETICH ISM.- A Contribution to Anthropology and the History of Religion.- By FRITZ SCHULTZE, Dr. Phil.- Translated from the German by J. FITZGERALD, M.A. Chapter 2.' 3. 4. 5. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Introductory. Chapter II. The Mind o'f the Savage in its In- tellectual and Moral Aspects. 1. The Intellect of the Savage. 2. The Morality of the Savage. 3. Conclusion. Chapter in. The Relation between the Savage Mind and its Object. 1. The Value of Objects. Meets. 2. The Anthropathic Apprehension of Ob- 3. The Causal Connection of Objects. Chapter IV. Fetichism as a Religion. 1. The Belief in Fetiches. 2. The Range of Fetich Influence. 3. The Religiositv of Fetich Worshipers. 4. Worship and Sacrifice. 5. Fetich Priesthoods. 6. Fetichism among Non-Savages. 7. Chapter 2! 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Chapter I. V. The Various Objects of Fetich Wor- Stones as Fetiches. r gll m Mountains as Fetiches. Water as a Fetich. Wind and Fire as Fetiches. Plants as Fetiches. Animals as Fetiches. Men as Fetiches. VI. The Highest Grade of Fetichism. The New Object. The Worship of the Stars. The Transition to Sun -Worship. The Worship of the Sun. The Worship of the Heavens. VIL The Aim of Fetichism. Retrospect. 2. The New Problem. No. 70. ESSAYS, SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.- By HERBERT SPENCER. CONTENTS. I. Specialized Administration, n. "The Collective Wisdom." III. Morals and Moral Sentiments. IV. Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of Comte. V. What is Electricity? No. 71. ANTHROPOLOGY. By DANIEL WILSON, LL.D., author of "Prehistoric Man.' CONTENTS. Chapter I. Scope of the Science. Chapter II. Man's Place in Nature. Chapter III. Origin of Man. Chapter IV. Races of Mankind. Chapter V. Antiquity of Man. Chapter VI. Language. Chapter VH. Development of Civilization. TO WHICH IS ADDED ARCHEOLOGY. By E. B. TYLOR, F.R.S., author of "The Early History of Mankind," "Primitive Culture," &c. No. 72. THE DANCING MANIA OF THE MIDDLE AGES.- By J. F. c. HECKER, M.D., Professor in the Frederick William University, Berlin; author of "The Black Death." Translated by B. G. BABINGTON, M.D., F.R.S. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Dancing Mania in Germany and the Netherlands. Sect. 1. St. John's Dance. Sect. 2. St. Vitus's Dance. Sect. 3. Causes. Sect. 4. More Ancient Dancing Plagues. Sect. 5. Physicians. Sect. 6. Decline and Termination of the Dancing Plague. Chapter n. The Dancing Mania in Italy. Sect. 1. Tarantism. Sect. 2. Most Ancient Traces. Causes. Sect. 3. Increase. Sect. 4. Idiosyncracies. Music. Sect. 5. Hysteria. Sect. 6. Decrease. Chapter III. The Dancing Masiia in Abyssinia, Sect. 1. Ti^retier. Chapter IV. Sympathy. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY EVOLUTION IN HISTORY, LANGUAGE, AND SCIENCE. Four addresses delivered at the London Crystal Palace School of Art, Science, and Literature. I. Past and Present in the East. -A- Parallelism demonstrating the principle of Causal Evolution, and the necessity of the study of General History. By G. G. ZERFFI, D.Ph., Fellow of the Royal Historical Society of London. A Plea for a More Scientific Study of Geography. By Rev. w. A. HALES, M.A., formerly Exhibitioner of Caius College, Cambridge. III. Hereditary Tendencies as Exhibited in History. B J HENRY ELLIOT MALDEN, M.A., F.R.H.S., Trinity Hall, Cambridge. IV. Vicissitudes of the English Language. By Rev. ROBINSON THORNTON, D.D., F.R.H.S., formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. Nos. 74, 75, 76, 77 (double number). THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX. By CHARLES DARWIN. With Illustrations. New Edition, Re- vised and Augmented. CONTENTS. PART I. THE DESCENT OR ORIGIN OP MAN. Chapter I. The Evidence of the Descent of Man from some Lower Form. Chapter II. On the Manner of Development of Man from some Lower Form. Chapter III. Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals. Chapter IV. Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals (continued). Chapter V. On the Development of the Intel- lectual and Moral Faculties dur- ing Primeval and Civilized Times Chapter VI. On the Affinities and Genealogy of Man. Chapter VTI. On the Races of Man. X. Secondary Sexual Characters of Insects. XI. Insects (continued) Order Lepi- doptera(butterflies and moths) XII. Secondary Sexual Characters of Fishes, Amphibians, and Rep- tiles. XIII. Secondary Sexual Characters of Birds. XIV. Birds (continued). XV. Birds (continued). XVI. Birds (concluded). XVII. Secondary Sexual Characters of Mammals. Chapter XVIII. Secondary Sexual Characters of Mammals (continued). Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter PART III. SEXUAL SELECTION IN RELATION TO MAN, AND CONCLUSION. Chapter XIX. Secondary Sexual Characters of Man. Chapter XX. Secondary Sexual Characters of Man (continued). [sion. Chapter XXI. General Summarv and Conelu- PART EL SEXUAL SELECTION. Chapter VIII. Principles of Sexual Selection. Chapter IX. Secondary Sexual Character in the Lower Classes of the An- imal Kingdom. * Numbers 74, 75, 76, are single numbers (15 cents each) ; Number 77 is a double number (30 cents). Price of the entire work 75 cents. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN ENGLAND, with Suggestions for some Improvement in the law. By WILLIAM LLOYD BIRKBECK, M.A., Master of Downing College, and Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge. CONTENTS. XIII. PART I. I. Anglo-Saxon Agriculture. Geneats and Geburs. Villani. II. Agriculture after the Conquest. Villein- age. Copyholders. Continental Serfs. III. Origin of Large Properties. Estates of Anglo-Saxon Nobility. Evidence of Domesday. IV. The Soke. Socage Tenure. V. Agricultural Communities. VI. Mr. Seebohm. VII. The First Taxation of Land. The Hide. VIII. Saxon Law of Succession to Land. IX. Effect of the Norman Conquest on the Distribution of Land. X. Norman Law of Succession. XL Strict Entails. The Statute "De Donis Condi tionalibns . ' ' XII. Effects of Strict Entails. Scotch Entails. Relaxation of Strict Entails. Common Recoveries. XIV. Henry VII. and his Nobles. The Statute of Fines. XV. Strict Settlements. XVI. Effect of Strict Settlements of Land. Mr. Thorold Rogers. XVII. Trustees to Preserve Contingent Re- mainders. XVIII. Powers of Sale. XIX. Inclosure of Waste Lands. Mr. John Walter. Formation of a Peasant Pro- prietary. _ PART II. I. Amendment of Law of Primogeniture. II. Proposed System of Registration. III. Modern Registration Acts. IV. The Present General Registration Act Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF SOME FAMILIAR THINGS.- By w. M. WILLIAMS, F.R.S., F.C.S. CONTENTS. I. On the Social Benefits of Paraffin. II. The Formation of Coal. HI. The Chemistry of Bog Reclamation. IV. The Coloring of Green Tea. V. "Iron-Pilings' 1 in Tea. VI. The Origin of Soap. VII. The Action of Frost in Water-Pipe* and on Building Materials. Vni. Pire-Clay and Anthracite. IX. Count Rumford's Cooking- Stoves. X. The Air of Stove- Heated Rooms. XI. Domestic Ventilation. No - 80 - Double number, 3O cents. CHARLES DARWIN: HIS LIFE AND WORK.- By GRANT ALLEN. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The World into which Darwin was born. Chapter II. Charles Darwin and his Antecedents. Chapter III. Early Days. Chapter IV. Darwin's Wander- Years. Chapter V. The Period of Incubation. Chapter VI. "The Origin of Species." Chapter VII. The Darwinian Revolution begin*. Chapter VIII. The Descent of Man. Chapter DC. The Theory of Courtship. Chapter X. Victory and Rest. Chapter XI. Darwin's Place in the Evolution- ary Movement. Chapter XII. The Net Result. No. 81. THE MYSTERY OF MATTER: and THE PHILOSOPHY OF IGNORANCE. By J. ALLANSON PICTON. No. 82. ILLUSIONS OF THE SENSES: AND OTHER ESSAYS.-By RICHARD A. PROCTOR. I. Illusions of the Senses. II. Animals of the Present and the Past. III. Life in Other Worlds. IV. Earthquakes. CONTENTS. V. Our Dual Brain. VI. A New Star in a Star-Cloud. VII. Monster Sea-Serpents. VIII. The Origin of Comets. No. 83. PROFIT-SHARING BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR.-Six Essays. By SEDLEY TAYLOR, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Eng. Essay I. Profit-Sharing in the Maison Leclaire. Essay II. Profit-Sharing in Industry. Essay III. Profit-Sharing in Industry (continued). Essay IV. Profit-sharing in the Paris and Orleans Railway Company. CONTENTS. Essay V. Profit-Sharing in Agriculture. Appendix to Essay V. Mr. Vande- leur's Irish Experiment. Essay VL Profit-Sharing in Distributive Enter- prise. No. 84. STUDIES OF ANIMATED NATURE.- Four Essays, viz., i. Bats. B 7 w - s - DALLAS, F.L.S. Dragon-Flies. By W. S. DALLAS, F.L.S. The Glow-worm and other Phosphorescent Animals. By G. G. CHIS- HOLM, M.A., B.Sc. TV. Minute Organisms. By FREDERICK P. BALKWILL. No. 85. THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF RELIGION.-By J. ALLANSON PICTON, author of "The Mystery of Matter," &c. I Religion and Freedom of Thought. II. The Evolution of Religion. Fetich CONTENTS. III. Nature -Worship. ;hism. IV. Prophetic Religious. V. Religious Dogma. The Future of Religion. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, Xew York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 86. THE UNSEEN UNIVERSE. By WILLIAM KINGDOM CLIFFORD, F.E.S. TO WHICH IS ADDED THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PURE SCIENCES.- By WILLIAM KING- DON CLIFFORD, F.R.S. CONTENTS. I. Statement of the Question. IE. Knowledge and Feeling. III. The Postulates of the Science of Space. IV. The Universal Statements of Arithmetic. No. 87. THE MORPHINE HABIT (MORPHINOMANIA).- Three Lectures by Professor B. BALL, M.D., of the Paris Faculty of Medicine. CONTENTS. I. Morphinomania. General Description. Effects of the Abuse of Morphine. II. Morphinomania. Effects of Abstinence from Morphine. III. Morphinomania. Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Treatment. To which is appended four other lectures, viz., ! The Border-Land of Insanity. II. Cerebral Dualism. ill. Prolonged Dreams. rv"- Insanity in Twins. No. 88. SCIENCE AND CRIME, AND OTHER ESSAYS.- By ANDREW WILSON, F.E.S.E. CONTENTS. L The Earliest Known Life-Relic. II. About Kangaroos. III. On Giants. IV. The Polity f a Pond. V. Skates and Rays. VI. Leaves. No. 89. THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. By HERBERT SPENCER. TO WHICH IS ADDED OF SPECIES."-By THE COMING OF AGE OF "THE ORIGIN Professor THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, F.R.S. No. 90. NOTES ON EARTHQUAKES: with Thirteen Miscellaneous Essays. By RICHARD A. PROCTOR. CONTENTS. I. Notes on Earthquakes. II. Photographing Fifteen Million Stars. III. The Story of the Moon. IV. The Earth's Past. V. The Story of the Earth. VI. The Falls of Niagara. VII. The Unknowable. Vni. Sun -Worship. IX. Herbert Spencer on Priesthoods. X. The Star of Bethlehem and a Bible Comet. XI. An Historical Puzzle. XII. Galileo, Darwin, and the Pope. XIII. Science and Politics. XIV. Parents and Children. No. 91. Double number, 3O cents. THE RISE OF UNIVERSITIES. By S. S. LAURIE, LL.D., Professor of the Institutes and History of Education in the University of Edinburgh. I. The Romano-Hellenic Schools and their Decline. II. Influence of Christianity on Education, and Rise of Christian Schools, m. Charlemagne and the Ninth Century. IV. InnerWork of Christian Schools (450-1100). V. Tenth and Eleventh Centuries. VI The Rise of Universities (A. D. 1100). VII. Th 3 First Universities. The Schola Saler- nitana and the University of Naples. VHI. The University of Bologna. CONTENTS. IX- X.- XI. XII. XIII. xrv.- XV.- The University of Paris. The Constitution of Universities. The terms "Studium Generale" and "Uni- versitas.'' Students, their Numbers aiid Discipline. Privileges of Universities. Faculties. Graduation. Oxford and Cambridge. The University of Prague. University Studies and the Conditions of Graduation. Published semi-montlily. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 92. THE FORMATION OF VEGETABLE MOULD Action of Earthworms, with Observations By CHARLES DARWIN, LL.D., F.R.S. CONTENTS. Double number, 3O cent*. THROUGH THE on their Habits.- Chapter I. Habits of Worms. Chapter II. Habits of Worms (continued). Chapter III. The Amount of Fiiie Earth brought up by Worms to the surface. Chapter IV. The Part which Worms have played in the Burial of Ancient Build- ings. Chapter V. The Action of Worms in the Denu da t ion of the Land. Chapter VI. The Denudation of the Land (eon- tinufd). Chapter Vn. Conclusion. No. 93. SCIENTIFIC METHODS MOUNT BLEYER, M.D. I. General Review of the Subject. II. Death by Hanging. III. Death by Electricity. IV. Death by Morphine Injection. OF CAPITAL CONTENTS. Special number, 1O cents. PUNISHMENT.-By J. V. Death by Chloroform. VI. Death by Prussia Acid. VII. Objections Considered. TO WHICH IS ADDED INFLICTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.- By PARK BENJAMIN. No. 94. THE FACTORS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION.-By HERBERT SPENCER. No. 95. THE DISEASES OF PERSONALITY.-ByTH. RIBOT.- Translated from the French by J. FITZGERALD, M.A. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Introduction. Chapter II. Organic Disturbance. Chapter III. Affective Disturbance. Chapter IV. Intellective Disturbance. Chapter V. Dissolution of Personality. Chapter VI. Conclusion. So. 96. A HALF-CENTURY OF SCIENCE.- By THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, F.R.S. TO WHICH IS ADDED THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE from 1836 to 1886-By GRANT No. 97. THE PLEASURES F.R.S., D.C.L., LL.D. OF LIFE. By Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M.P., Chapter I. The Duty of Happiness. Chapter II. The Happiness of Duty. Chapter III. A Song of Books. Chapter IV. The Choice of Books. Chapter V. The Blessing of Friends. PART FIRST. CONTENTS. Chapter VI. The Value of Time. Chapter VII. The Pleasures of Travel. Chapter VIII. The Pleasures of Home. Chapter IX. Science . Chapter X. Education. *% PAKT SECOND. For the contents of Part Second see No. Ill of this Catalogue. COSMIC EMOTION.-Aiso, THE TEACHING WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD, F.R.S. [Special number, 1O cents. OF SCIENCE.-By NATURE-STUDIES. Four Essays by various authors, viz., ! Flame. By Prof. F. R. EATON LO\VE. II- Birds of Passage. By Dr. ROBERT BROWN, F.L.S. III. Snow. By GEORGE G. CHISHOLM, F.R.G.S. IV. Caves. By JAMES DALLAS, F.L.S. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place. New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 100. SCIENCE AND POETRY, AND OTHER ESSAYS.-By ANDREW WILSON, F.R.S.E. I. Science and Poetry. -A. Valedictory Address to a Literary Society. n. The Place, Method, and Advantages of Biology in Ordi- nary Education. III. Science -Culture for the Masses. An Opening Lecture at a "People's College." IV. The Law of Likeness, and its Working. No. 101. AESTHETICS. By JAMES SULLY, M.A. CONTENTS. (A). Metaphysical Problems. (B). Scientific Problems. (C). History of Systems. DREAMS. B 7 JAMES SULLY, M.A. II. German Writers on Esthetics. HI. French Writers on Esthetics. IV. Italian and Dutch Writers on ^Esthetics. V. English Writers on Esthetics. CONTENTS. The Dream as Immediate Objective Experience. The Dream as a Communication from a Super- natural Being. Modern Theory of Dreams. The Sources of Dream-Materials. The Order of Dream-Combinations. The Objective Reality and Intensity of Dream- Imaginations. TO WHICH IS ADDED ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. By Prof. GEORGE GROOM ROBERTSON. No. 102. ULTIMATE FINANCE.-A True Theory ot Co-operation. WILLIAM NELSON BLACK. PART FIRST. CONTENTS. By Chapter L The Origin of Social Discontent. Chapter II. Definition of Capital. Chapter III. Men not Capitalists because not Creators of Capital. Chapter IV. Social Results Considered. Chapter V. The Evolution of Finance. Chapter VI. Every Man his own Householder. Chapter VII. Illustrations from Real Life. Chapter VIII. Effects of Material Growth. Chapter IX. Objections Answered. Chapter X. Some Political Reflections. Appendix. An Act for the Incorporation of Bond Insurance Companies. * PART SECOND. For the contents cf Part Second see No. 107 of this Catalogue. Ko. 103. i- The Coming Slavery. - The Sins of Legislators. 3. The Great Political Superstition. Three Essays by HERBERT SPENCER. No. 104. TROPICAL AFRICA. By HENRY DRUMMOND, LL.D., F.R.S.E., L.G-.S. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Water-Route to the Heart of Africa. The Rivers Zambesi and Shire. Chapter II. The East African Lake Country. Lakes Shirwa and Nyassa. Chapter III. The Aspect of the Heart of Africa. The Country and its People. Chapter IV. The Heart-Disease of Africa. Its Pathology and Cure. Chapter V. Wanderings on the Nyassa-Tangan- vika Plateau. A Traveler's Diary. Chapter VI. The White Ant. A Theory- Chapter Vn. Mimicry. The Ways of African Insects. Chapter VIIL A Geological Sketch. Chapter IX. A Political Warning. Chapter X. A Meteorological Note. Published semi-moiitlily. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 105. FREEDOM IN SCIENCE AND TEACHING.- By ERNST HAECKEL, Professor in the University of Jena. With a Prefatory Note by Professor THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, F.R.S. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Development and Creation. Chapter II. Certain Proofs of the Doctrine of Descent. Chapter IH. The Skull Theory and the Ape Theory. Chapter IV. The Celf-Soul and the Cellular Psychology. Chapter V. The Genetic and the Dogmatic Methods of Teaching. VI. The Doctrine of Descent and Social Democracy. Chapter Chapter VU. Ignorabimus et Restringamur. No. 106. FORCE AND ENERGY.-A Theory of Dynamics.- By GRANT ALLEN. CONTENTS. PART I. ABSTRACT OR ANALYTIC. Chapter I. Power. Chapter II. Force. Chapter III. Energy. Chapter IV. The Species of Force. Chapter V. The Species of Energy. Chapter VI. The Modes of Energy. Chapter VII. The Kinds of Kinesis. Chapter VIII. The Persistence of Force. Chapter IX. The Conservation of Energy. Chapter X. The Indestructibility of Power. Chapter XI. The Mutual Interference of Forces. Chapter XII. The Suppression of Energies. Chapter XIII. Liberating Energies. Chapter XIV. Miscellaneous Illustrations. Chapter XV. The Dissipation of Energy. Chapter XVI. The Nature of Energy. Chapter XVII. The Nature of Motion. PART II. CONCRETE OR SYNTHETIC. I. Dynamical Formula of the Uni- II. The Sidereal System. [verse. III. The Solar System. IV. The Earth. Chapter V. Organic Life. Chapter VI. The Vegetal Organism. Chapter VII. The Animal Organism. Chapter Vni. General View of Mundane No. 107. ULTIMATE FINANCE.- A True Theory of Wealth.- By WILLIAM NELSON BLACK. PART SECOND. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Origin of Property. Chapter II. The Evolution of Wealth. Chapter in. Banking, and its Relation to Accu- mulation. Chapter IV. The Relation of Insurance to Accu- mulation. Chapter V. The Creative and Benevolent Feat- ures of Fortune-Hunting. Chapter VI. Wealth an Enforced Contributor to the Public Welfare. Chapter VII. The Impairment and Destruction of Property. % PART FIRST. For the contents of Part First see No. 102 of this Catalogue. No. 108 is a double number. 3O cents. No. 108 and No. 109. ENGLISH: PAST AND PRESENT.- A Series of Eight Lectures by EICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. CONTENTS. Lecture I. The Enslish Vocabulary. Lecture II. English as it might have been. Lecture III. Gains of the English Language. Lecture IV. Gains of the English Language (continued). Lecture V. Diminutions of the English Lan- guage. Lecture VI. Diminutions of the English Lan- guage (continued). Lecture VU. Changes in the Meaning of English Words. Lecture VHI. Changes in the Spelling of English Words. Index of Subjects. Index of Words and Phrases. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 110. Double number, 30 cents. THE STORY OF CREATION.-A Plain Account of Evolution. By EDWARD CLODD, author of " The Childhood of the World," "The Childhood of Religions," "The Birth and Growth of Myths," &c. Eighty Illustrations. CONTENTS. Chapter I. THE UNIVERSE: ITS CONTENTS. 1. Matter. a. Force. 2. Power. b. Energy. Chapter II. DISTRIBUTION OP MATTER IN SPACE. Chapter III. THE SUN AND PLANETS. The Earth: General Features. Chapter IV. THE PAST LJFE-HISTOBY OF THE EARTH. Character and Contents of Rocks of 1. Primary Epoch. 3. Tertiary Epoch. 2. Secondary Epoch. 4. Quaternary Epoch. Chapter V. PRESENT LIFE-FORMS. Physical Constituents and Unity. A. Plants. 1. Flowerless. B. Animals. 1. Protozoa. 2. Ccelenterata. 3. Echinodermata. 2. Flowering. 4. Annulosa. 5. Mollusca. 6. Vertebrata. Chapter VI. THE UNIVERSE: MODE OF ITS BECOMING AND GROWTH. 1. Inorganic Evolution. 3. Evolution of the 2. Evolution of the So- Earth. lar System. Chapter VII. THE ORIGIN OF LIFE. Time. Place. Mode. Chapter VIII. THE ORIGIN OF LIFE-FORMS. Priority of Plant or Animal. Cell-Structure and Development. Chapter IX. THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES. Argument : 1. No two individuals of the same species are alike. Each tends to vary. 2. Variations are transmitted, and therefore tend to become permanent. 3. Man takes advantage of these transmitted un- likenesses to produce new varieties of plants and animals. 4. More organisms are born than survive. 5. The result is obvious : a ceaseless struggle for place and food. 6. Natural selection tends to maintain the balance between living things and their surround- ings. These surroundings change ; theref ore living things must adapt themselves thereto, or perish. Chapter X. PROOFS OF THE DERIVATION OF SPECIES. 1. Embryology. 4. Succession in Time. 2. Morphology. 5. Distribution in Space. 3. Classification. Objections. Chapter XI. SOCIAL EVOLUTION. 1. Evolution of Mind. 4. Evolution of Morals. 2. Evolution of Society. 5. Evolution of Theol- 3. Evolution of Language, ogy. Arts, and Science. Summary. No. 111. THE PLEASURES F.R.S., D.C.L., LL.D. Chapter I. Ambition. Chapter II. Wealth. Chapter in. Health. Chapter IV. Love. Chapter V. Art. Chapter VL Poetry. Chapter VII. Music. OF LIFE. B 7 Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M.P., PART SECOND. CONTENTS. Chapter VIII. The Beauties of Nature. Chapter IX. The Troubles of Life. Chapter X. Labor and Rest. Chapter XI. Religion. Chapter XII. The Hope of Progress. Chapter XIII. The Destiny of Man. * PART FIRST. For the contents of Part First see No. 97 of this Catalogue. No. 112. PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION. By TH. RIBOT. Translated from the French by J. FITZGERALD, M.A. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Purpose of this treatise: study of the mechanism of Attention. Attention defined. Chapter II. Spontaneous or Natural Attention. Its cause always affective states. Its physical manifestations. Attention simply the subjective side of the manifestations that express it. Origin of Sponta- neous Attention. Chapter HI. Voluntary or Artificial Attention. How it is produced. The three principal periods of its genesis: Chapter IV.. Chapter V.- actipn of simple feelings, complex feelings, and habits. Mechanism of Voluntary Attention. Atten- tion acts only upon the muscles and through the muscles. The feeling of effort. -Morbid States of Attention. Dis- traction. Hypertrophy of Atten- tion. Atrophy of Attention. Attention in idiots. - Conclusion. Attention dependent on Affective States. Physical Condition of Attention. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 113. Double number, 3O cents. HYPNOTISM: ITS HISTORY AND PRESENT DEVELOPMENT. By FREDRIK BJORNSTROM, M.D., Head Physician of the Stockholm Hospital, Professor of Psychiatry, late Royal Swedish Medical Councillor. Authorized Translation from the Second Swedish Edition, by Baron NILS POSSE, M.G., Director of the Boston School of Gymnastics. CONTENTS. I. Historical Retrospect. II. Definition of Hypnotism. Susceptibility to Hypnotism. III. Means or Methods of Hypnotizing. IV. Stages or Degrees of Hypnotism. V. Unilateral Hypnotism. VI. Physical Effects of Hypnotism. VII. Psychical Effect* of Hypnotism. Vni. Suggestion. IX. Hypnotism as a Remedial Agent. X. Hypnotism as a Means of Education, 01 as a Moral Remedy. XI. Hypnotism and the Law. XII. Misuses and Dangers of Hypnotism. Bibliography of Hypnotism. No - 114 - Double number, 3O cent*. CHRISTIANITY AND AGNOSTICISM.-A Controversy .-Consisting of papers contributed to The Nineteenth Century by HENRY WACE, D.D., Prof. THOMAS H. HUXLEY, THE BISHOP OF PETERBOROUGH, W. H. MALLOCK. Mrs. HUMPHRY WARD. I. On Agnosticism. By HENRY WACK, D.D., Prebendarv of St. Paul's Cathe- dral : Principal of King's College. London. II. Agnosticism. By Professor THOMAS H. HT7XLEY. III. Agnosticism. A Reply to Prof. HUXLEY. By HENBY WACE, D.D. IV. Agnosticism. By W. C. MAGEE, D.D., Bishop of Peterborough. V. Agnosticism. A Rejoinder. By Prof. THOMAS H. HCXLEY. VI. Christianity and Agnosticism. By HEXEY WACE, D.D. CONTENTS. VII.- vm.- rx.- X.- XI. -An Explanation to Prof. Huxley. By W. C. MAGEE, D.D., Bishop of Peter- borough. - The Value of Witness to the Mirac- ulous. By. Prof. THOMAS H. HUXLEY. -Agnosticism and Christianity. By Prof. THOMAS H. HUXLEY. -"Cowardly Agnosticism." A Word with Prof. HuxLKY.-ByW.H. MALLOCK. -The New Reformation. By Mrs. HUMPHRY WARD. No. 115 and No. 116. Two double numbers, 3O cents each. DARWINISM: AN EXPOSITION OF THE THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION, with some of its applications. By ALFRED RCSSEL WALLACE, LL.D., F.L.S., &e. With Portrait of the Author, Colored Map, and numerous illustrations. CONTENTS. Chapter I. What are "Species," and what is meant by their "Origin." Chapter IE. The Struggle for Existence. Chapter HI. The Variability of Species in a State of Nature. Chapter IV. Variation of Domesticated Animals and Cultivated Plants. Chapter V. Natural Selection by Variation and Survival of the Fittest. Chapter VI. Difficulties and Objections. Chapter VII. On the Infertility of Crosses be- tween Distinct Species, and the usual Sterility of their Hybrid Offspring. Chapter VOL The Origin and Uses of Color in Animals. Chapter IX. Warning Coloration and Mimicry. Chapter X. Colors and Ornaments character- istic of Sex. Chapter XL The Special Colors of Plants. Their Origin and Purpose. Chapter XII. The Geographical Distribution of Organisms. Chapter Xm. The Geological Evidences of Evo- lution. Chapter XTV. Fundamental Problems in Rela- tion to Variation and Heredity. Chapter XV. Darwinism applied to Man. The present work treats the problem of the Origin of Species on the same general lines as wer adopted by Darwin ; but from the standpoint reached after nearly thirty years of discussion, with an abundance of new facts and the advocacy of many new or old theories. While not attempting to deal, even in outline, with the vast subject of evolution in genera endeavor has been made to give such an account of the theory of Natural Selection as may enable an intelligent reader to obtain a clear conception of Darwin's work, and to understand something 01 power and range of his great principle. Extract from the Preface. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 117. [Double number, 3O cents. MODERN SCIENCE AND MODERN THOUGHT.-A Clear and Concise View of the Principal Results of Modern Science, and of the Revolution which they have effected in Modern Thought.- By S. LAING. PART I. MODERN SCIENCE. CONTENTS. Chapter I. Space. Primitive Ideas Natural Standards Dimensions of the Earth Of Sun and Solar System Distance of Fixed Stars- Their Order and Size Nebulae and Other Universes The Telescope and the Infinitely Great The Microscope and the Infinitely Small Uniformity of Law Law of Gravity Acts through all Space Double Stars, Comets, and Meteors Has acted through all time. Chapter II. Time. Evidence of Geology Stratification Denudation Strata identified by Superposition By Fossils Geological Record shown by Upturned Strata General Result Palaeozoic and Primary Periods Secondary Tertiary Time required Coal Formation Chalk Elevations and Depressions of Land Internal Heat of the Earth Earthquakes and Volcanoes- Changes of Fauna and Flora Astronomical Time Tides and the Moon Sun's Radiation Earth's Cooling Geology and Astronomy Bearings on Modern Thought. Chapter III. Matter. Ether and Light Color and Heat Matter and its Elements Molecules and Atoms Spectroscope Uniformity of Matter throughout the Universe Force and Motion Conservation of Energy Electricity. Magnetism, and Chemical Action Dissipation of Heat Birth and Death of Worlds. Chapter IV. Life. Essence of Life Simplest form, Protoplasm Monera and Protista Animal and Vegetable Life Spontaneous Genera- tionDevelopment of Species from Primitive Cells Super- natural Theory Zoological Provinces Separate Creations- Law or Miracle Darwinian Theory Struggle for Life Sur- vival of the Fittest Development and Design The Hand- Proof required to establish Darwin's Theory as a Law Species Hybrid* Man subject to Law. Chapter V. Antiquity of Man. Belief in Man's Recent Origin Boucher de Perthes' Dis coveries Confirmed by Prestwich Nature of Implements- Celts, Scrapers, and Flakes Human Remains in Kiver Drifts Great Antiquity Implements from Drift at Bournemouth Bone-caves Kent's Cavern Victoria.Gower.and other Caves Caves of France and Belgium Ages of Cave Bear, Mam- moth, and Reindeer Artistic Race Drawings of Mammoth, ic. Human Types Neanderthal, Cro-Magnon, Furfooz, &c. Attempts to hx Dates History Bronze Age Neolithic- Danish Kitchen-middens Swiss Lake-dwellings Glacial Pe- riodTraces of Ice Causes of Glaciers Croll's Theory Gulf Stream Dates of Glacial Period Rise and Submergence of Land Tertiary Man Eocene Period Miocene Evidence for Pliocene and Miocene Man Conclusions as to Antiquity. Chapter VI. Man's Place in Nature. Origin of Man from an Egg Like other Mammals Devel- opment of the Embryo Backbone Eye and other Organs of Sense Fish, Reptile, and Mammalian Stages Comparison with Apes and Monkeys Germs of Human Faculties in An- imals The Dog Insects Helplessness of Human Infant- Instinct Heredity and Evolution The Missing Link Races of Men Leading Types and Varieties Common Origin Dis- tant Language How Formed Grammar Chinese, Aryan. Semitic. &c. Conclusions from Language Evolution and Antiquity Religions of Savage Races Ghosts and Spirits- Anthropomorphic Deities Traces in Neolithic and Palaeo- lithic Times Development by Evolution Primitive Arts Tools and Weapons Fire Flint Implements Progress from Pala-olithic to Neolithic Times Domestic Animals Clothing Ornaments Conclusion, Man a Product of Evolution. No. 118. [Single number, 15 cents. MODERN SCIENCE AND MODERN THOUGHT.-With a Sup- plemental Chapter on Gladstone's "Dawn of Creation" and "Proem to Genesis," and on Drummond's "Natural Law in the Spiritual World."- By S. LAING. PART II. MODEEN THOUGHT. Chapter VII. Modern Thought. CONTENTS. Lines from Tennyson The Gospel of Modern Thought Change exemplified by Carlyle. Renan, and George Eliot Science becoming universal Attitude of Orthodox Writers- Origin of Evil First Cause unknowable New Philosophies and Religions Herbert Spencer and Agnosticism Comte and Positivism Pessimism Mormonism Spiritualism Dreams and Visions Somnambulism Mesmerism Great Modern Thinker* Carlyle Hero-worship. Chapter VUL Miracles. Origin of Belief in the Supernatural Thunder Belief in Miracles formerly Universal St. Paul's Testimony Now In- credibleChristian Miracles Apparent Miracles Real Mir- agesAbsurd Miracles Worthy Miracles The Resurrection and Ascension Nature of Evidence required Inspiration Prophecy Direct Evidence St Paul The Gospels What is Known of Them The Synoptic Gospels Resemblances *nd Differences Their Origin Papias Gospel of St. John- Evidence rests on Matthew, Mark, and Luke What each states Compared with one another and with St. John Hopelessly Contradictory Miracle of the Ascension Silence of Mark Probable Early Date of Gospels But not in their Present Form. Chapter LX. Christianity Without Miracles. Practical and Theoretical Christianity Example and Teaching of Christ Christian Dogma Moral Objections In- consistent with Facts Must be accepted as Parables Kail and Redemption Old Creeds must be Transformed or Die- Mohammedanism Decay of Faith Balance of Advantages Religious Wars and Persecutions Intolerance Sacrifice Prayer Absence of Theology in Synoptic Gospels Opposite Pole to Christianity Courage and Self-reliance Belief in God and a Future Life Based Mainly on Christianity Sci- ence gives no Answer Nor Metaphysics So-called Institu- tionsDevelopment of Idea of God Best Proof afforded by- Christianity Evolution is Transforming it Reconciliation of Religion and Science. Chapter X. Practical Life. Conscience Right is Right Self-revrence Courage- Respectability Influence of Press Respect for Women- Self-respect of Nations Democracy and Imperialism Self- knowledge Conceit Luck Speculation Money-making Practical Aims of Life Self-control Conflict of Reason and Instinct Temper Manners Good Habits in Youth Suc- cess in Practical Life Education Stoicism Conclusion. SUPPLEMENTAL CHAPTER. Gladstone's "Dawn of Creation" and "Proem to Genesis." Drum- mond's "Natural Law in the Spiritual World." Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 119. THE ELECTRIC LIGHT.- How the Electric Current is Produced. How the Electric Current is made to yield the Electric Light. By GERALD MOLLOY, D.D., D.Sc., Fellow of the Royal University. With numerous illustrations. CONTENTS. I. How the Electric Current is Produced. First Discovery of Induced Currents Faraday'* Exper- iment* described and repeated First machines founded on Faraday's discovery Pixii. Sexton, Clarke New form of Armature invented by Siemens-'Machine* of the Alliance Company in France and of Holme* in England Wilde'* machine A new principle discovered Land'* machine The machine* of Gramme ami Siemens-Ideal skeleton of Gramme's machine The principle of it* action explained I>etailsof construction The Volta Prize awarded to Gramme for hi* invention The machine of Siemens, how it differs from that of Gramme Most other machine* constructi-ii on one or other of these two type* The dynamo doe* not create energy, but convert* mechanical energy into electrical energy. II. How the Electric Current is made to yield the Electric Light. Simplest form of Electric Light-Principle of the Electric Light Sir Humphry Davy's experiment-Two type* of Elec- tric Light-The Arc Light-Duboscq's Lamp- New form* of Arc ;Lamp-l he JablochkuB Candle-The lncande*cent Light -Platinum Spiral-Why Carbon i* preferred to Platinum - A perfect vacuum Element* of Incandescent Lamp Prep- aration of the filament Edison '* proce** Swan ' proceu- Carbonization of the filament Exhaustion of the glaM globe -Light without heat The Arc Light and the Incandescent Light compared Comparison with other kind* of light -How far the Electric Light is now available for u*e Transforma- tions of Energy illustrated by the Electric Light TO WHICH IS ADDED THE STORING OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY.-The Recent Progress and Development of the Storage Battery. By the same author. With numerous illustrations. CONTENTS. A " marvelous box of electricity" What i* meant by the storing of energy Example* of energy stored up A sus- pended weight A watchspring wound up A stretched cross- how A flywheel Energy stored up in cloud* and rivers- Energy stored up in a coal-mine Energy stored up in sep- arated gases Storing of electrical energy not a new idea Energy stored up in a Leyden jar In a thunder-cloud In a voltaic battery Principle of the storage battery Experiment ment of the principle Ritter'* secondary pile Grove'* gas- battery Experiment* of Gaston Plantr The Plante second- ary cell Faure's improvement What a storage battery cn do Practical illustrations Convenience of the storage bat- tery for the production of the electric light The Morage bat- tery a* a motive power Application of the storage battery t<> tram-cars and private carriages The storage battery on its trial showing production of secondary currents-Gradual develop- RECENT PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STORAGE BATTERY. Unexpected difficulties Modifications of the Faure cell- Internal resistance diminished New mode of preparing the plates An alloy substituted for pure lead The paste of lead of main oxide Improved method ntaining insulation of the plate* Newest form of cell Buckling of the plate* The g the I available energy of a cell Kate at which the energy can be f lead I drawn off Application to tram-car* and to electric lighting. No. 120. THE MODERN THEORY OF HEAT, as Illustrated by the Phe- nomena of the Latent Heat of Liquids and of Vapors. By GERALD MOLLOY, D.D., D.Sc., Fellow of the Royal University. With nu- merous illustrations. CONTENTS. I. The Latent Heat of Liquids. Modern theory of heat Heat a form of Energy Familiar illustrations Count Kumford's experiment Argument founded on the experiment Heat produced by expenditure of Electrical Energy Latent Heat Black'* experiments- Heat disappears when ice i* melted Explanation of this fact according to the old theory Explanation offered by the mod- ern theory Latent Heat varies for different liquids Freezing mixtures Heat developed when a liquid become* olid- Water heated in freezing Experiment with solution of sul- phate of soda Latent Heat in the economy of Nature. II. The Latent Heat of Vapors. Heat expended when water is boiled This fact considered in the light of the modern theory Method of measuring the quantity of beat so expended Heat developed when steam i* condensed Experimental illustration Heating of buildings by steam Heat expended in evaporation Various illustra- tions Cold produced by evaporation of ether Water frozen by evaporation Leslie's experiment Carre's apparatus Pro- duction of solid carbonic acid Freezing of mercury Latent Heat of cloud* Effect in the economy of Nature Summary. TO WHICH IS ADDED THE SUN AS A STOREHOUSE OF ENERGY.- Immensity of the Sun's Energy. Source of the Sun's Energy. By the same author. With numerous illustrations. CONTENTS. I. Immensity of the Sun's Energy. Nearly all the energy available to man is derived from the sun Water-power Wind-power Steam-power Muscular power Electrical power Tidal power an exception Energy' of the tides derived from rotation of the earth on its axis- Only a small fraction of the energy which the earth derives from the sun i* used by man And the energy which the earth receives is only a small fraction of what the sun sends forth Measurement of energy sent out by the sun Exper- iments of Pouillet and Hersclifl Apparatus employed Method of adjustment Observations made Corrections- Practical estimate of the energy sent out by the sun What a wonderful storehouse of energy the sun must be How is this storehouse supplied ? II. Source of the Sun's Energy. The sun is not a great fire Such a fire would be choked by the products of combustion And beside* it would be burned out in course of time Difference between incandescence and combustion Practical illustrations How the sun is main- tained in a state of incandescence Theory of Sir William Thomson Meteors or Falling Stars- Heat developed when such bodies fall into the sun-Illustration from a bullet Hik- ing a target Thi* theory now abandoned Theory of Helm- holtz Heat of the sun produced bv compression or his mass- Heat lost by radiation is restored by further compression This theory probable and sufficient Bearing of the Nebular Hypothesis The past energy of the sun Summary- THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place. New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 121. UTILITARIANISM. By JOHN STUART MILL, authr of "A System of Logic," ''Principles of Political Economy," "On Liberty," &c. Chapter I. General Remarks. Chapter II. "What Utilitarianism is. Chapter III. Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility. CONTENTS. Chapter IV. Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is susceptible. Chapter V. Of the Connection between Justice and Utility. No. 122 and No. 123. [No. 122 is a double number, 3O cents. UPON THE ORIGIN OF ALPINE AND ITALIAN LAKES; AND UPON GLACIAL EROSION. By Sir A. C. RAMSAY, F.R.S., President of the Geological Society. JOHN BALL, M.R.I. A., F.L.S.,&c. Sir RODERICK I. MURCHISON, F.R.S., D.C.L., President of the Royal Geographical Society. Prof. B. STUDER, of Berne. Prof. A. FAVRE, of Geneva. EDWARD WHYMPER. With an Introduction and Notes upon the Origin and History of the Great Lakes of North America, by Prof. J. W. SPENCER, State Geologist of Georgia. CONTENTS. Introduction, with Notes upon the Origin and History of the Great Lakes of North America. By J. W. SPENCER, Ph.D.. F.G.S., State Geologist of Georgia I. On the Glacial Origin of Certain Lakes in Switzerland, the Black Forest, Great Britain, Sweden. North America, and Elsewhere. By Sir A. C. RAMSAY, F.R.S., President of the Geological Society. II. On the Formation of Alpine Valleys and Alpine Lakes. By JOHN BALL, M. R. I. A., F.L.S., &c. III. Glaciers of the Himalayan Mountains and New Zealand compared with those of Europe. On the Powers of Glaciers in Modifying the Sur- face of the Earth, and in the agency of Floating Icebergs. By Sir RODERICK I. MURCHISON, K.C.B.. D.C.L., F.R.S., &c. IV. On the Origin of the Swiss Lakes. By Prof. B. STUDER, of Berne. V. On the Origin of the Alpine Lakes and Valleys. A letter addressed to Sir RODERICK I. MURCHISON. K.C.B., D.C.L.. &c., by M. ALPHONSE FAVRE, Professor of Geology in the Academy of Geneva, author of the Geological Map of Savoy. VI. The Ancient Glaciers of Aosta. By ED- WARD WHYMPER. VII. Glacial Erosion in Norway and in High Latitudes. By Professor J. W. SPENCER, Ph.D., F.G.S., State Geologist of Georgia. No. 124. THE QUINTESSENCE OF SOCIALISM.-By Dr. A. lated from the eighth German edition under the supervision of BERNARD BOSAN- QUET. M.A., formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford. CONTENTS. Chapter I. FIKST OUTLINES OF THE FUNDA- MENTAL IDEA OF SOCIALISM. Chapter n. THE MEANS OF AGITATION. The Socialistic criticism of capital. Profit as : ' appropriation of surplus value." Property as theft. False interpretations of these allegations refuted. Ultimate buying-out of the modern plutocrats. Chapter in. PROPOSED TRANSFORMATION OF THE SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN NATIONAL ECONOMY. Determination of demand. Freedom of demand. Organization of labor and capital into a system of collective production. False interpretations re- futed. The doctrine of value as depending on sheer labor-cost useless for a practical organiza- tion of labor and capital. Chapter IV. TRANSFORMATION OF INSTITU- TIONS (continued). Abolition of all loan-capital, of credit, of lease, of hire, and of the exchange. Chapter V. TRANSFORMATION OF INSTITU- TIONS (continued). Abolition of trade in "commodities." and of the market for them, and of the system of advertise- ment and of display of wares. Chapter VI. TRANSFORMATION OF INSTITU- TIONS (continued.) Abolition of metallic money as the medium of exchange, arid its replacement as '-standard of value" by units of ' social labor-time" (''labor- money"). The value-estimate of the Socialistic State compared with the present market-price. Chapter VII. TRANSFORMATION OF INSTITU- TIONS (continued.) The Socialistic determination of value in ex- change, and freedom of labor in the Socialistic State. Chapter VHI. TRANSFORMATION OF INSTITU- TIONS (continued). Income, and the use of income in the formation of property, and in consumption. Private prop- erty and the law affecting it. Family life and marriage. Savings-banks and insurance system. Expenditure on charital.le.humanitarian.religious, and other ideal purposes. Chapter IX. CONCLUSION. Summary of criticisms. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers. 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 125. DARWINISM AND POLITICS.- By DAVID G. RITCHIE, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Jesus College, Oxford. CONTENTS. "The Struggle for Existence "in Malthas and Darwin. How the idea is applied to politics. Is the struggle "beneficent"? The Evolution Theory as applied to Human So- ciety by Darwin, Strauss, Spencer, Maine, Clodd. Ambiguity of the phrase "Survival of the Fit- test." Complexity of Social Evolution. Does the Doctrine of Heredity support Aristoc- racv? Huxley and Strauss. Ambiguity of "Nature." Conscious "Variations." Why fix ideas in institutions? Custom: iu use and abuse. Institutions and "the social factor" generally are neglected in the popular acceptation of the doctrine of Heredity. Mr. Gallon's views considered. Darwin's own opinion. Are the Biological Formulae adequate to express Social Evolution? Applications (1) The Labor Question. (2) The Position of Women. (3) The Population Question. Does the Evolution Theory justify Laissezfaire ? Struggle between ideas for survival. Conscious- ness as a factor in Evolution. Testimony of Prof. TO WHICH IS ADDED ADMINISTRATIVE NIHILISM.- By Prof. THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, F.R.S. No. 126 and No. 127. [Two double numbers, 3O cents each. PHYSIOGNOMY AND EXPRESSION.- By PAOLO MANTEGAZZA, Senator; Director of the National Museum of Anthropology, Florence ; President of the Italian Society of Anthropology. CONTENTS. PART I. THE HUMAN COUNTENANCE. Chapter I. Historical Sketch of the Science of Physiognomy and of Human Expression. Chapter II. The Human Face. Chapter III. The Features of the Human Face. Chapter IV. The Hair and the Beard. Moles. Wrinkles. Chapter V. Comparative Morphology of the Human Face. PART II. THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS. Chapter VI. The Alphabet of Expression. Chapter VII. The Darwinian Laws of Expression Chapter VIII. Classification of Expressions. General View of all Phenomena of Expression. Chapter IX. The Expression of Pleasure. Chapter X. The Expression of Pain. Chapter XI. Expression of Love and of Benev- olence. Chapter XII. Expression of Devotion, of Ven- eration, and of Religious Feeling. Chapter XIII. Expression of Hatred, of Cruelty, and of Passion. Chapter XIV. The Expression of Pride, Vanity, Haughtiness, Modesty, and Hu- miliation. Chapter XV. Expression of Personal Feelings, Fear, Distrust. Description of Timidity, according to the old Physiognomists. Chapter XVI. The Expression of Thought. Chapter XVII. General Expressions. Repose and Action, Disquietude, Im- patience, Expectation, Desire. Chapter XVTIL Racial and Professional Ex- pression. Chapter XIX. The Moderaters and Disturbers of Expression. Chapter XX. Criteria for the Determination of the Strength of an Emotion by the degree of the Expression Chapter XXI. The Five Verdicts on the Human Face. Chapter XXII. Criteria for Judging the Moral Worth of a Physiognomy. Chapter XXIII. Criteria for Judging the Intel- lectual Value of a Face. Chapter XXIV. The Physiognomy of Gestures and the Expression of Clothes. APPENDIX. The Eyes, Hair, and Beard, in the Italian Races. This work, by Professor Mantegazza, a brilliant and versatile author, and the leading Italian anthro- pologist, has already been translated into several European languages. Professor Mantegazza, whose name is well known to readers of Darwin, has cooperated in the present English edition of his work by writing a new chapter specially for it. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 128 and No. 129. [Two double mimbers, 3O cents each. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN ENGLAND. Popular Addresses, Notes, and other Frag- ments. By the late ARNOLD TOYNBEE, Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. Together with a short memoir by B. JOWETT, Master of Balliol College, Oxford. I. CONTENTS. RlCARDO AND THE OLD POLITICAL ECONOMY. The change that has come over Political Econ- omy. Ricardo responsible for the form of that .Science. The causes of his great influence. The economic assumptions of his treatise. Ricardo ignorant of the nature of his own method. Malthus's protest. Limitations of Ricardo's doc- trine recognized by Mill and Senior. Observation discouraged by the Deductive Method. The effect of the Labor Movement on Economics. Modifica- tions of the Science by recent writers. The new method of economic investigation. II. The philosophic assumptions of Ricardo. They are derived from Adam Smith. The worship of individual liberty. It involves freedom of com- petition and removal of industrial restrictions. The flaw in this theory. It is confirmed by the doctrine of the identity of individual and social interests. Criticism of this doctrine. The idea of invariable law. True nature of economic laws. Laws and Precepts. The great charge brought against Political Economy. Its truth and its falsehood. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. I. Introductory. II. England in 1760.- in. England in 1760.- IV. England in 1760.- V. England in 1760.- Yeomanry. VI. England in 1760. The Condition of the Wage-earners. -Population. -Agriculture. [Trade. -Manufactures and -The Decay of the VII. The Mercantile System and Adam Smith. VIII. The Chief Features of the Revolution. IX. The Growth of Pauperism. X. Malthus and the Law of Population. XI. The Wage-fund Theory. XII. Ricardo and the Growth of Rent. XIII. Two Theories of Economic Progress. XIV. The Future of the Working Classes. POPULAR ADDRESSES. 1. Wages and Natural Law. 2. Industry and Democracy. 3. Are Radicals Socialists? The Education of Co-operators. The Ideal Relation of Church and State. Notes and Jottings. No. 130 and No. 131. [Two double numbers, 3O cents each. THE ORIGIN OF THE ARYANS.-An Account of the Prehistoric Ethnology and Civilization of Europe. By ISAAC TAYLOR, M.A., Litt. D., Hon. LL.D. Illustrated. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Aryan Controversy. Chapter II. The Prehistoric Races of Europe. 1. The Neolithic Age. 4. The Celts. 2. The Methods of An- 5. The Iberians. thropologv. 6. The Scandinavians. 3. The Races of Britain. 7. The Ligurians. Chapter III. The Neolithic Culture. 1. The Continuity of De- 7. Dress. velopment. 2. Metals. 3. Weapons. 4. Cattle. 5. Husbandry. 6. Food. Habitations. 9. The Boat. 10. The Ox- Wagon. 11. Trades. 12. Social Life. 13. Relative Progress. Chapter IV. The Aryan Race. 1. The Permanence of Race. 2. The Mutability of Language. 3. The Finnic Hypothesis. 4. The Basques. 5. The Northern Races. Chapter V. The Evolution of Aryan Speech. 1. The Aryan Languages. 2. Dialect and Language. 3. The Lost Aryan Languages. 4. The Wave-Theory. 5. Language and Race. 6. The Genesis of Aryan Speech. Chapter VI. The Aryan Mythology. The last ten years have seen a revolution in the opinion of scholars as to the region in which the Aryan race originated, and theories which not long ago were universally accepted as the well- established conclusions of science now hardly find a defender. The theory of migration from Asia has been displaced by a new theory of origin in Northern Europe. In Germany several works have been devoted to the subject; but this is the first English work which has yet appeared embodying the results recently arrived at by philologists, archaeologists, and anthropologists. This volume affords a fresh and highly interesting account of the present state of speculation on a highly interesting subject. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 132 and No. 133. [Two double numbers, 30 cents eah. THE EVOLUTION OF SEX.- By Prof. PATRICK GEDDES and J. ARTHUR THOMSON. With 104 illustrations. CONTENTS. BOOK I. MALE AND FEMALE. Chapter I. The Sexes and Sexual Selection. Chapter II. The Sexes, and Criticism of Sexual Selection. Chapter III. The Determination of Sex (Hf. potheses and Observations. Chapter IV. The Determination of Sex (Con- structive Treatment). BOOK II. ANALYSIS OF SEX. ORGANS, TISSUES, CELLS. Chapter VIII. The Egg-cell or Ovum. Chapter IX. The Male-cell or Sperm. Chapter X. Theory of Sex: Its Nature and Origin. Chapter V. Sexual Organs and Tissues. Chapter VI. Hermaphroditism. Chapter VII. The Sex-elements (General and Historical. Chapter XI. Sexual Reproduction. Chapter XII. Theory of Fertilization. Chapter XIII. Degenerate Sexual Reproduction, or Parthenogenesis. BOOK III. PROCESSES OF REPRODUCTION. Chapter XIV. Asexual Reproduction. Chapter XV. Alternation of Generations. BOOK IV. THEORY OP REPRODUCTION. Chapter XVI. Growth and Reproduction. Chapter XVII. Theory of Reproduction (con- tinued). Chapter XVIII. Special Physiology of Sex and Reproduction. Chapter XIX. Psychological and Ethical As- pects. Chapter XX. Laws of Multiplication. Chapter XXI. The Reproductive Factor in Evolution. A work which, for range and grace, mastery of material, originality, and incisiveness of style and treatment, is not readily to be matched in the "long list of books designed more or less to popularize science. Scottish Leader. A model of scientific exposition. Scotsman. No. 134. [Double number, 3O cents. THE LAW OF PRIVATE RIGHT.-By GEORGE H. SMITH, author of "Elements of Right, and of the Law," and of Essays on "The Certainty of the Law, and the Uncertainty of Judicial Decisions," "The True Method of Legal Education," &e., &c. CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. I. Explanation of the Design and Scope of the Work. II. Of the Definition of the Law. III. Of the Division of the Law. PART I. Of the Nature of the Law of Private Right. Chapter I. Analytical Outline of the Law of Private Right. Chapter II. Of the Nature of Right, and of the Law of Private Right, and their Relation to Each Other. PART II. Of the Law of Private Right as Histor- ically Developed. Chapter I. Of the Historical Development of Jurisdiction. Chapter II. Historical Development of the Law (as opposed to Equity). Chapter HI. Historical Development of Equity. PART III. Of the Nature and of the Method and Principles of Right. Chapter I. Definition of Rights. Chapter II. The Same Subject Continued, and herein, of the Standard of Right and Wrong. Chapter HI. Of the Method and First Principles of Right. Chapter IV. Of the Limit to the Liberty of the Individual. Imposed by the Rights of the State. Chapter V. Natural Rights Demonstrated from the Above Principles. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY Nos. 135, 136, 137, 138. [Four double numbers, 3O cents each. CAPITAL: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. By KARL MAHX. Translated from the third German edition by SAMUEL MOORE and EDWARD AVELINQ, and edited by FREDERICK ENGELS. The only American Edition. Carefully Revised. PART I. COMMODITIES AND MONEY. Chapter I. Commodities. (a) Elementary or Accidental Form of Value. (b) Total or Expanded Form of Value. (c) The General Form of Value. (d) The Money Form. Chapter II. Exchange. Chapter III. Money, or the Circulation of Com- modities. 1. The Measure of Values. 2. The Medium of Circulation. 3. Money: hoarding, means of payment, uni- versal money. PART II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF MONEY INTO CAPITAL. Chapter IV. The General Formula for Capital. Chapter V. Contradictions in the General Form- ula of Capital. Chapter VI. The Buying and Selling of Labor- power. PART III. THE PRODUCTION OF ABSOLUTE SURPLUS VALUE. Chapter VII. The Labor-process and the Process of Producing Surplus Value. Chapter Vin. Constant Capital and Variable Capital. Chapter IX. The Rate of Surplus Value. Chapter X. The Working Day. Chapter XI. Bate and Mass of Surplus Value. PART IV. THE PRODUCTION OF RELATIVE SURPLUS VALUE. Chapter XII. The Concept of Relative Surplus Value. Chapter XIII. Co-operation. Chapter XIV. Division of Labor and Manufac- ture. Chapter XV. Machinery and Modern Industry. PART V. THE PRODUCTION OF ABSOLUTE AND OF RELATIVE SURPLUS VALUE. Chapter XVIII. Various Formula for the Rate of Surplus Value. Chapter XVI. Absolute and Relative Surplus Value. Chapter XVII. Changes of Magnitude in the price of Labor-power and in Surplus Value. PART VI. WAGES. Chapter XIX. The Transformation of the Value (and respectively the Price) of Labor- power into Wages. Chapter XX. Time-wages. Chapter XXI. Piece- wages. Chapter XXII. National Differences of PART VII. THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL. Chapter XXIII. Simple Reproduction. Chapter XXTV. Conversion of Surplus Value into Capital. Chapter XXV. The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation. PART VIII. THE SO-CALLED PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION. Chapter XXVI. The Secret of Primitive Accu- mulation. Chapter XXVII. Expropriation of the Agricul- tural Population from the Land. Chapter XXVIII. Bloody Legislation against the Expropriated from the End of the 15th Century. Forcing down of Wages by Acts of Parliament. Chapter XXIX. Genesis of the Capitalist Farmer. Chapter XXX. Reaction of the Agricultural Revolution on Industry. Creation of the Home Market for Industrial Capital. Chapter XXXI. Genesis of the Industrial Cap- italist. Chapter XXX1L Historical Tendency of Cap- italistic Accumulation. Chapter XXXIII. The Modern Theory of Col- onization. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY No. 139. LIGHTNING, THUNDER, AND LIGHTNING-CONDUCTORS.- By GERALD MOLLOY, D.D., D.Sc. Illustrated. CONTENTS. LECTURE I. LIGHTNING AND THUNDER. Identity of Lightning and Electricity Frank- lin's Experiment Fatal Experiment of Riehman Immediate Cause of Lightning Illustration from Electric Spark What a Flash of Lightning is Duration of a Flash of Lightning Experiments of Professor Rood Wheatstone's Experiments Experiment with Rotating Disk Brightness of a Flash of Lightning Various Forms of Lightning Forked Lightning, Sheet Lightning, Globe Light- ning St. Elmo's Fire Experimental Illustration Origin of Lightning Length of a Flash of Light- ningPhysical Cause of Thunder Rolling of Thunder Succession of Peals Variation of In- tensityDistance of a Flash of Lightning. LECTURE II. LIGHTNING-CONDUCTORS. Destructive Effects of Lightning Destruction of Buildings Destruction of Ships at Sea De- struction of Powder Magazines Experimental Illustrations Destruction of Life by Lightning The Return Shock Franklin's Lightning-rods- Introduction of Lightning-rods into England The Battle of Balls and Points Functions of a Light- ning-conductorConditions of a Lightning-con- ductorMischief Done by Bad Conductors Evil Effects of a Bad Earth Contact Danger from Rival Conductors Insulation of Lightning-conductors Personal Safety in a Thunder-storm Practical Rules Security afforded by Lightning-rods. APPENDIX. RECENT CONTROVERSY ON Theory of Lightning-conductors Challenged Lectures of Professor Lodge Short Account of his Views and Arguments Effect of Self-induction on a Lightning-rod Experiment on the Discharge of a Leyden Jar Outer Shell only of a Lightning- rod acts as a Conductor Discussion at the Meet- ing of the British Association, September, 1888 LIGHTNING-CONDUCTORS. Statement by Mr. Preece Lord Rayleigh and Sir William Thomson Professor Rowland and Pro- fessor Forbes M. de Fonvielle, Sir James Doug- lass, and Mr. Symons Reply of Prof essor Lodga Concluding Remarks of Professor Fitzgerald. Pres- ident of the Section Summary Showing the Pres- ent State of the Question. No. 140. WHAT IS MUSIC ? With an Appendix on How the Geometrical Lines have their Counterparts in Music. By ISAAC L. RICE. CONTENTS. PART I. I. Chinese Theory. II. Hindoo Theory. III. Egyptian Theory. IV. Grecian Theories. V. Arabic-Persian Theory. I. Space and Time (Rest and Motion). II. Vibrations. III. Colors and Forms. VI. Scholastic Theories. VII. Euler's Theory. VIII. Herbert Spencer's Theory. IX. Helmholtz's Theory. PART II. IV. Internal Government. V. States of Mind. Conclusion. As the final result of his speculations, Mr. Rice denies that music is an invention by man. and hold* that it exists in Nature : that it is "not accidental and human, but dynamical and cosmical." Hit rw seems to me to be sustained by att the physical facts of Nature and all the experience of man. RICHARD GRANT WHITE. Published semi-montnly. $3 a year. Single numbers. 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. No. 141. ARE THE EFFECTS OF USE AND DISUSE INHERITED? An Examination of the View held by Spencer and Darwin. By WILLIAM PLATT BALL. CONTENTS. IMPORTANCE AND BEARING OF THE INQUIRY. SPENCER'S EXAMPLES AND ARGUMENTS. Diminution of the Jaws. Diminished Biting Muscles of Lapdogs. Crowded Teeth. Blind Cave-Crabs. No Concomitant Variation from Concomitant Disease. The Giraffe, and Necessity for Concomitant Variation. Alleged Ruinous Effects of Natural Selection. Adverse Case of Neuter Insects. .^Esthetic Faculties. Lack of Evidence. Inherited Epilepsy in Guinea-pigs. Inherited Insanity and Nervous Disorders. Individual and Transmissible Tvpe not Mod- ified Alike. DARWIN'S EXAMPLES. Reduced Wings of Birds of Oceanic Islands. Drooping Ears and Deteriorated Instincts. Wings and Legs of Ducks and Fowls. Pigeon's Wings. Shortened Breastbone in Pigeons. Shortened Feet in Pigeons. Shortened Legs of Rabbits. Blind Cave-Animals. Inherited Habits. Tameness of Rabbits. [tion. Modifications Obviously Attributable to Selec- Similar Effects of Natural Selection and < t' Use-Inheritance. Inferiority of Senses in Europeans. Short-sight in Watchmakers and Engravers. Larger Hands in Laborers' Infants. Thickened Sole in Infants. A Source of Mental Confusion. Weakness of Use-inheritance. INHERITED INJURIES. Inherited Mutilations. The Motmofs Tail. Other Inherited Injuries Mentioned by Darwin. Quasi-Inheritauce. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS. True Relation of Parents and Offspring. Inverse Inheritance. Early Origin of the Ova. Marked Effects of Use and Disuse on the Individual. [ance ? Would Natural Selection Favor Use-Inherit - Use-Inheritance an Evil. Varied Effects of Use and Disuse. Use-Inheritance Implies Pangenesis. Pangenesis Improbable. Spencer's Explanation of Use-Inheritance. CONCLUSIONS. Use-Inheritance Discredited as Unnecessary, Unproven, and Improbable. Modern Reliance on Lse-Inheritance Mis- placed. No. 142 and No. 143. Two double numbers, 3O cents each. A VINDICATION OF THE RiGHTS OF WOMAN.- With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. By MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT. New Edition, with an Introduction by Mrs. HENRY FAWCETT. CONTENTS. Chapter I. The Rights and Involved Duties of Mankind Considered. Chapter II. The Prevailing Opinion of a Sexual Character Discussed. Chapter m. The Same Subject Continued. Chapter IV. Observations on the State of Deg- radation to which Woman is Reduced by Va- rious Causes. Chapter V. Animadversions on Some of the Writers who have Rendered Women Objects of Pity, bordering on Contempt. Chapter VI. The Effect which an Early Asso- ciation of Ideas has upon the Character. Chapter VII. Modesty. Comprehensively Con- sidered, and not as a Sexual Virtue. Chapter VIII. Morality Undermined by Sexual Notions of the Importance of a Good Repu- tation. Chapter IX. Of the Pernicious Effects which arise from the Unnatural Distinctions estab- lished in Society. Chapter X. Parental Affection. Chapter XI. Duty to Parents. Chapter XII. On National Education. Chapter XIII. Some Instances of the Folly which the Ignorance of Women generates .- with Con- cluding Reflections on the Moral Improvement that a Revolution in Female Manners j.-.ight naturally be expected to produce. This edition is a reprint of the first edition, which appeared nearly one hundred years ago. Women at the Present Time and Women a Hundred Years Ago. The women of today can scarcely realize the conditions their sex had to confront in those old times,- but the degradation was very real, and the protest against it was very much needed. Mrs. Fau-cet! ' introduction will be found highly interesting and helpful. New York Tribune. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York LIST OF BOUND BOOKS THE HUMBOLDT "LIBRARY SERIES. The prices here given include postage, or express charges, to any country in the l'otal I iin Complete sets of THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY, from No. 1 to No. 139, can be obtained uniform in size, style of binding, &c. The volumes average over 600 pages each, and are arranged thus: Vol. I. contains Numbers 112 " n. , 13 _ 24 " HI. .< 25-36 IV. " 37-48 v - " 4959 " VI. " 6070 " VII. 71 _g " VIII. - . * 81_ 91 " IX. " 92-1U3 " X. . . 104-111 "XI. " . " 112118 " XII. " . . . . . . . . 119-127 " XIII. " 128-133 " XIV. 134-139 Cloth, extra, $2 per vol., or $28 per set of 14 vols. Sold in separate vols., or in sets. # % We have some sets bound in finer bindings, half seal and half morocco, marble edges, which are sold only in complete sets (not odd volumes). Prices furnished on application. Additional bouud volumes of 6UO pages (average) are added when the semi-monthly numbers will make a volume of the usual size. WORKS BY CHARLES DARWIN. The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preserva- tion of Favored Eaces in the Struggle for Life. New edition, from the latest English edition, with additions and corrections. Cloth. . . . $1.25 The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. With illustra- tions. New edition, revised and augmented. Cloth $1.50 The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Earth- worms, with Observations on their Habits. Illustrated. Cloth. 75 cents. A COMPANION-BOOK TO DARWIN'S WORKS, Charles Darwin: His Life and Work. By GRANT ALLEN. Cloth. 75 cents. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY WORKS BY PROFESSOR HUXLEY. Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature. with numerous illustrations. On the Origin of Species; or, the Causes of the Phenomena of Organic Nature. Two books iii one volume. Cloth 75 cents. The Physical Basis of Life. With other Essays. Lectures On Evolution. With an Appendix on the Study of Biology. Two books in one volume. Cloth 75 cents. Animal Automatism, and other Essays. Technical Education, and other Essays. Two books in one volume. Cloth 75 cents. SELECT WORKS OF PROFESSOR JOHN TYNDALL. Forms of Water in Clouds and Rivers, Ice and Glaciers. Nineteen Illustrations. Lessons in Electricity. Sixty illustrations. Six Lectures on Light. Illustrated. Three books in one volume. Cloth $1.00 WORKS BY HERBERT SPENCER. The Data of Ethics. Cloth 75 cems. Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical. Progress: ItS Law and Cause. With other Disquisitions. Two books in one volume. Cloth 75 cents. The Genesis of Science. The Factors of Organic Evolution. Two books in one volume. Cloth 75 cents. SELECT WORKS OF GRANT ALLEN. The EvoKitionist at Large. Vignettes from Nature. Force and Energy. A Theory of Dynamics. Three books in one volume. Cloth $1.00 SELECT WORKS OF RICHARD A. PROCTOR, F.R.A.S. Light Science for Leisure Hours. Familiar Essays on Scientific Subjects. Hereditary Traits, and other Essays. Miscellaneous Essays. Illusions of the Senses, and other Essays. Notes on Earthquakes, with fourteen Miscellaneous Essays. Six books in one volume $1.50 Published semi-montlily. $3 a year. Single numbers. 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. SELECT WORKS OF WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD, F.R.A.S Seeing and Thinking. The Scientific Basis of Morals, and other Essays. Conditions of Mental Development, and other Essays. The Unseen Universe.-Aiso, The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences Cosmic Emotion. Also, The Teachings of Science. Five books in one volume. Cloth ..... SELECT WORKS OF EDWARD CLODD, F.R.A.S. The Childhood of Religions. The Birth and Growth of Myths and Legends. The Childhood of the World. Three books in one volume. Cloth ......... $LOO SELECT WORKS OF TH. RIBOT. Translated from the French by J. FITZGERALD, M.A. The Diseases of Memory. The Diseases of the Will. The Diseases of Personality. Three books in one volume. Cloth ......... $1.00 THE MILKY WAY. CONTAINING The Wonders of the Heavens. With thirty-two Actinoglyph Illustrations. By CAMILLE FLAMMARIOX. The Romance of Astronomy. By R. KALLEY MILLER, M.A. The Sun: Its Constitution; Its Phenomena; Its Condition. By NATHAN T. CARR, LL.D. Three books in one volume. Cloth ........ . $1.00 POLITICAL SCIENCE. CONTAINING Physics and Politics. An Application of the Principles of Natural Selection and Heredity to Political Society. By WALTER BAGEHOT, author of "The English Constitution." History of the Science of Politics. By FREDERICK POLLOCK. Two books in one volume. Cloth ........ 75 cents. THE LAND QUESTION. CONTAINING The History of Landholding in England.- By JOSEPH FISHER, F.R.H.S. Historical Sketch of the Distribution of Land in England. By By WILLIAM LLOYD BIRKBECK, M.A. Two books in one volume. Cloth ........ 75 cents. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY SELECT WORKS BY J. ALLANSON PICTON. The Mystery of Matter. Also, The Philosophy of Ignorance. The Essential Nature of Religion. Two books in one volume. Cloth ........ 75 cents. SELECT WORKS BY ANDREW WILSON, F.R.S.E. Science and Crime, and other Essays. Science and Poetry, and other Essays. Two books in one volume. Cloth ........ 75 cents. SELECT WORKS BY W. MATTIEU WILLIAMS, F.R.A.S., F.C.S. Current Discussions in Science. Scientific Aspects of Some Familiar Things. Two books in one volume. Cloth ........ 75 cents. SELECT WORKS BY J. F. C. HECKER, M.D. The Black Death. An Account of the Deadly Pestilence of the Fourteenth Century. The Dancing Mania of the Middle Ages. Two books in one volume. Cloth ..... "... 75 cents. STANDARD WORKS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS. The Naturalist on the River Amazons. A Record of Adventures, Habits of Animals, Sketches of Brazilian and Indian Life, and Aspects of Nature under the Equator, during Eleven Years of Travel. By HENRY WALTER BATES, F.L.S., Assistant Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society of England. Cloth. 75 cts. The Rise and Early Constitution of Universities, ^th a Survey of Mediaeval Education. By S. S. LAURIE, LL.D., Professor of the Institutes and History of Education in the University of Edinburgh. Cloth. ... 75 cents. The Religions Of the Ancient World: including Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia, Persia, India, Phoenicia, Etruria, Greece, Rome. By GEORGE RAW- LINSON, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History, Oxford, and Canon of Canterbury. Author of "The Origin of Nations," "The Five Great Monarch- ies," &c. Cloth ............ 75 cents. Fetichism. A Contribution to Anthropology and the History of Religion. By FRITZ SCHTJI/TZE, Dr.Phil. Translated from the German by J. FITZGERALD, M.A. Cloth ............. 75 cents. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. STANDARD WORKS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS. Money and the Mechanism of Exchange. By w. STANLEY JEVONS, M.A., F.R.S., Professor of Logic and Political Economy in the Owens College, Manchester, England. Cloth 75 On the Study of Words. By RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Cloth 75ceat8 The Dawn Of History. An Introduction to Prehistoric Study. Edited by C. F. KEARY, M. V., of the British Museum. Cloth 75 cents. Geological Sketches at Home and Abroad. By ARCHIBALD GEIKIE, LL.D., F.R.S., Director-General of the Geological Surveys of Great Britain and Ireland. Cloth. 75 cen t s . Illusions: A Psychological Study. By JAMES SULLY, author of "Sensation and Intuition," "Pessimism," &c. Cloth 75 cents. The Pleasures Of Life. Part I. and Part II. By Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart. Two Parts in One. Cloth 75 cents. English, Past and Present. Part I. and Part II. By RICHARD CHZNEVIX TRENCH, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Two Parts in One. Cloth. . 75 cents. The Story of Creation. -A- Plain Account of Evolution. By EDWARD CLODD, F.R.A.S. With over eighty illustrations 75 cents. Hypnotism: Its History and Present Development. By FREDRIK BJORNSTROM, M.D., Head Physician of the Stockholm Hospital, Professor of Psychiatry, late Royal Swedish Medical Councillor. Cloth. ... 75 cents. Christianity and Agnosticism. A controversy consisting of papers by HENRY WAGE, D.D., Prebendary of St. Paul's Cathedral; Principal of King's College, London. Professor THOMAS H. HUXLEY. W. C. MAGEE, D.D., Bishop of Peter- borough. W. H. MALLOCK, Mrs. HUMPHRY WARD. Cloth 75 cents. Darwinism: An Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection, with some of its applications. By ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, LL.D., F.L.S. With portrait of the author, colored map, and numerous illustrations. Cloth. $1.25 The ablest living Darwinian writer. Cincinnati Commercial Gazette. The most important contribution to the study of the origin of species and the evolution of man which has been published since Darwin's death. New York Hun. There is no better book than this in which to look for an intelligent, complete, and fair pres- entation of both sides of the discussion on evolution. New York Herald. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY STANDARD WORKS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS. Modern Science and Modern Thought. A Clear and Coucise View of the Principal Results of Modern Science, and of the Revolution which they have effected in Modern Thought. With a Supplemental Chapter on Gladstone's "Dawn of Creation" and "Proem to Genesis," and on Drummond's ''Natural Law in the Spiritual World." By S. LAING. Cloth. ... 75 cents. Upon the Origin of Alpine and Italian Lakes; and upon Glacial Erosion. By A. C. RAMSAY, F.R.S., &c.; JOHN BALL, M.R.I.A., F.L.S., &c.; Sir RODERICK I. MURCHISON, F.R.S., D.C.L., &c.; Pi-of. B. STUDER, of Berne; Prof. A. FAVRE, of Geneva; and EDWARD WHYMPER. With an Introduction, and Notes upon the American Lakes, by Prof. J. W. SPENCER, Ph.D., F.G.S., State Geologist of Georgia. Cloth 75 cents. Physiognomy and Expression. By PAOLO MANTEGAZZA, Senator; Director of the National Museum of Anthropology, Florence; President of the Italian Society of Anthropology. With Illustrations. Cloth. . . . . $1.00 The Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England. Popular Addresses, Notes, and other Fragments. By the late ARNOLD TOYNBEE, Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. Together with a short memoir, by B. JOWETT, Master of Balliol College, Oxford $1.00 The Origin Of the Aryans. An Account of the Prehistoric Ethnology and Civilization of Europe. By ISAAC TAYLOR, M.A., Litt. D., Hon. LL.D. Illustrated. Cloth $1.00 The Evolution of Sex. By Prof. PATRICK GEDDES and J. ARTHUR THOMSON. With 104 illustrations. Cloth $1.00 ' Such a work as this, written by Prof. Geddes, who has contributed many articles on the same and kindred subjects to the Encyclopedia Britannica, and by Mr. J. Arthur Thomson, is not for the specialist, though the specialist may find it good reading, nor for the reader of light literature, though the latter would do well to grapple with it. Those who have followed Darwin. Wallace, Huxley, and Haeckel in their various publications, and have heard of the later arguments against heredity brought forward by Prof. Weissmann, will not be likely to put it down unread. . . . The authors have some extremely interesting ideas to state, particularly Tvith regard to the great questions of sex and environment in their relation to the growth of life on earth. . . . They are to be congratulated on the scholarly and clear way in which they have handled a difficult and delicate subject." Times. The Law of Private Right. By GEORGE H. SMITH, author of "Elements of Right, and of the Law," and of Essays on "The Certainty of the Law, and the Uncertainty of Judicial Decisions," "The True Method of Legal Educa- tion," &c., &e. Cloth. ......... 75 cents. CAPITAL: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production. By KARL MARX. Translated from the third German edition by SAMUEL MOORE and EDWARD AVELING, and edited by FREDERICK ENGELS. The only American Edition. Carefully Revised. Cloth $1.75 "The great merit of Marx, therefore, lies in the work he has done as a scientific inquirer into the economic movement of modern times, as the philosophic historian of the capitalistic era. ' ' Encyclopcedia Britannica. " So great a position has not been won by any work on Economic Science since the appearance of The Wealth of Nations. . . . All these circumstances invest, therefore, the teachings of this partic- ularly acute thinker with an interest such as can not be claimed by any other thinker of the present day. The Athenceum. Published semi-montmy. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. The Tables of Contents of the works 011 the various subjects are enumerated in the Descriptive Catalogue. A CATALOGUE RAISONNf, Containing all the works in THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY, up to and including No. 138, GROUPED ACCORDING TO THEIR SUBJECT-MATTER, for the convenience of those who desire to become familiar with the results of scientific inquiry in any of the following departments : ASTRONOMY. No. 14. THE WONDERS OF THE HEAVENS FLAMMABION. No. 20. THE ROMANCE OF ASTRONOMY MlLLEB. No. 49. THE SUN: ITS CONSTITUTION; PHENOMENA; CONDITION. CASE. Essays on astronomical subjects are also contained in No. 1. LIGHT SCIENCE FOR LEISURE HOURS PEOCTOE. No. 19. FAMILIAR ESSAYS ON SCIENTIFIC SUBJECTS PBOCTOB. Xo. 24. POPULAR SCIENTIFIC LECTURES HELMHOLTZ. No. 41. CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN SCIENCE. . . . . . . . WILLIAMS. No. 82. ILLUSIONS OF THE SENSES, AND OTHER ESSAYS. . . PBOCTOB. No. 90. NOTES ON EARTHQUAKES, ETC PBOCTOB. No. 120. THE MODERN THEORY OF HEAT MOLLOY. BIOGRAPHY. HISTORY OF SCIENCE. No. 43. DARWIN AND HUMBOLDT AGASSIZ, ETC. No. 80.- CHARLES DARWIN: HIS LIFE AND WORK. . . . GBANT ALLEN. No. 89. THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE SPENCER. A HALF-CENTURY OF SCIENCE HUXLEY. THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE FROM 1836 to 1886. . . GBANT ALLEN. ). 96.5 BIOLOGY. ZOOLOGY. BOTANY. Nos. 11 and 12.- THE NATURALIST ON THE RIVER AMAZONS. . . BATES. No. 26. THE EVOLUTIONIST AT LARGE ALLEN. No. 29. FACTS AND FICTIONS OF ZOOLOGY WILSON. No. 33. VIGNETTES FROM NATURE ALLEN. No. 48. LIFE IN NATURE HiNTON. No. 64.- THE DISTRIBUTION OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS. . . WALLACE, DYEE. No. 84 STUDIES OF ANIMATED NATURE DALLAS. No. 92. THE FORMATION OF VEGETABLE MOULD DAB WIN. See also under the head " Evolution. "* ^ THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY EARLY HISTORY OF MAN. No. 25. THE ORIGIN OF NATIONS RAWLINSON. Nos. 44 and 45. THE DAWN OF HISTORY KEARY. No. 60. THE CHILDHOOD OF THE WORLD CLODD. No. 71. ANTHROPOLOGY. ARCHAEOLOGY WILSON. Nos. 130 and 131. THE ORIGIN OF THE ARYANS ISAAC TATLOE. EDUCATION. LANGUAGE. No. 5. EDUCATION : INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL. . . SPENCER. No. 8. THE STUDY OF LANGUAGES MAECEL. Nos. 30 and 31. THE STUDY OF WORDS . TBENCH. (THE PHILOSOPHY OF STYLK. . .... SPENCER. No. 34. < BODY BAIN. No. 22. SEEING AND THINKING CLIFFORD. No. 46. THE DISEASES OF MEMORY RlBOT. No. 52. THE "DISEASES OF THE WILL RlBOT. Nos. 56 and 57. ILLUSIONS : A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY SULLY. No. 82. ILLUSIONS OF THE SENSES PROCTOR. No. 87. -THE MORPHINE HABIT BALL. Published semi-monthly. $3 a year. Single numbers, 15 cents. OF POPULAR SCIENCE. PSYCHOLOGY. PHYSIOGNOMY. No. 95. DISEASES OF PERSONALITY RlBOT. No. 101. DREAMS ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS SULLY and ROBERTSON. No. 112. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION. . RIBOT. No. 113. HYPNOTISM: ITS HISTORY AND PRESENT DEVELOPMENT. BJORNSTROM. Nos. 127 and 128. PHYSIOGNOMY AND EXPRESSION MANTEGAZZA. See, also, No. 32. HEREDITARY TRAITS, AND OTHER ESSAYS PROCTOR. No. 53. ANIMAL AUTOMATISM, AND OTHER ESSAYS HUXLEY. No. 65. CONDITIONS OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT CLIFFORD. RELIGION. MYTHOLOGY. No. 35. ORIENTAL RELIGIONS CAIRO. No. 47. THE CHILDHOOD OF RELIGIONS CLODD. No. 54. THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF MYTH CLODD. No. 62. THE RELIGIONS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD RAWLINSON. No. 69. FETICHISM SCHULTZE. No. 81. THE MYSTERY OF MATTER, ETC PlCTON. No. 85. THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF RELIGION PlCTON. See also No. 68, Essays by Herbert Spencer. No. 90, Essays by Proctor. SCIENTIFICO-PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATION. No. 3. PHYSICS AND POLITICS BAOEHOT. No. 20. THE ROMANCE OF ASTRONOMY MILLER. No. 48. LIFE IN NATURE HlNTON. No. 81. MYSTERY OF MATTER PHILOSOPHY OF IGNORANCE. . . PlCTON. No. 85. THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF RELIGION. ....... PlCTON. No. 86.- UNSEEN UNIVERSE PHILOSOPHY OF PURE SCIENCES. . CLIFFORD. No. 89. THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE SPENCER. Nos. 97 and 111. THE PLEASURES OF LIFE LUBBOCK. No. 98. COSMIC EVOLUTION TEACHINGS OF SCIENCE. . . . CLIFFORD. No. 105 FREEDOM IN SCIENCE AND TEACHING. .... J1AECKEL. No. 114 CHRISTIANITY AND AGNOSTICISM Various authors. Nos. 117 and 118. MODERN SCIENCE AND MODERN THOUGHT. . . S. LAING. DARWINISM AND POLITICS RITCHIE. ADMINISTRATIVE NIHILISM. HUXLEY. ( DARW1 No. 125. { ( ADMIN v % Most of the Essays under this head are named in other divisions of this classified Catalogue; but they form a class by themselves. THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO., 28 Lafayette Place, New York. THE HUMBOLDT LIBRARY MISCELLANEOUS. No. 1. LIGHT SCIENCE FOR LEISURE HOURS PROCTOR. No. ]7. PROGRESS: ITS LAW AND CAUSE SPENCER. No. 19. FAMILIAR ESSAYS ON SCIENTIFIC SUBJECTS PROCTOR. No. 21. THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE, AND OTHER ASSAYS. . HUXLEY. No. 41. CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN SCIENCE WILLIAMS. No. 48. LIFE IN NATURE HlNTON. No. 53. ANIMAL AUTOMATISM, AND OTHER ESSAYS HUXLEY. No. 61. MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS PROCTOR. No. 70. ESSAYS, PRACTICAL AND SPECULATIVE SPENCER. No. 73. EVOLUTION IN HISTORY, LANGUAGE, AND SCIENCE. Various authors. No. 79. SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF SOME FAMILIAR THINGS. . . WILLIAMS. No. 82. ILLUSIONS OF THE SENSES, AND OTHER ESSAYS. . . PROCTOR. No. 86. UNSEEN UNIVERSE PHILOSOPHY OF PURE SCIENCES. . CLIFFORD. Nos. 97 and 111. THE PLEASURES OF LIFE LUBBOCK. No. 98. COSMIC EVOLUTION. TEACHINGS OF SCIENCE. . . . CLIFFORD. No. 99. NATURE-STUDIES Various authors. No. 100. SCIENCE AND POETRY WlLSON. No. 103. THE COMING SLAVERY, ETC SPENCER. No. 114. CHRISTIANITY AND AGNOSTICISM HUXLEY and others. A NEW SERIES TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE HUMBOLDT PUBLISHING CO. EDITED BY W. D. P. BLISS. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE LIBRARY ' OF THE BEST AUTHORS. In cheap editions for the Public. To be published monthly. Paper, 25 cents, or $2.5O a year. | Cloth, 75 cents, or 97.50 a year. PAYABLE IN ADVANCE. Heady, January 1, SIX CENTURIES OF WORK AND WAGES. By JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS. M.P., Professor of Political Economy, Oxford, England. Abridged, -with Charts and Summary, by W. D. P. BLISS. Ready, February 1, MILL ON SOCIALISM. The only collection of JOHN STUART MILL'S writings on Socialism. TO BE FOLLOWED BY WILLIAM MORRIS,-POET, ARTIST, SOCIALIST. AND FACTS ON SOCIALISM. A collection of facts, mainly American, bearing on Socialism or Nationalism. UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000 054 464 3