M3 UC-NRLF CO o o r- o IQ ^ Zbc llnivcrsitv? ot Cbicaoo l-iilNllKl) BV JOHN U. KOCKKfKl.l.HK The Impersonal Judgment: Its Nature^ Origin, and Significance A niSSKklAllON PRKSENTED ID IHK FACULTY Ol" AR'IS, I.HKKA- TUKE. AND SCIENCE OF IHK UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, IN CANDIDACY FOK IHK DEGREE OF DOCTOR OK I'liii osoi-m- l)F.I'ARTMENT OF PHlLOSUl'llY By SIMON FRASFR MacI.I.W.W ^ ciiiCA(;() •irt)e tlnibfcsitjp of vTbirago tlrrsa 1897 ^ V THK IMl'i;idmann says,^ " In all of them (impersonal judgments) a cause, be it ever so undetermined, is presented .... since an event without a substrat, a cpiality without a subject, is altogether unpresent- able." Kaindl,'* although .endeavoring to solve the problem on tra- ditional lines, recognizes very clearlv the basis on which most of the investigations have been made. His words are worth quoting : "The ' For details see below, pp. 8 ff. ^Logik, p. 304. ' For details see below, pp. 8 ff. * Wesen und Hedeutun);? der Impersonalien, p. 278. Cf. Schuppe, Zeilschr. fiir V., Psy. It. Sprach'tviss., Hd. 16. pp. 244 ff. ; Venn, Empirical Logic, p. 233; .Steinthal, Zeilschr.fiir \'. Psy. u. .Sf>rach7viss., Bd. 4, pp. 235-7. 6 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT question as to the essence and meaning of inipersonals is old. The ground of interest lies near enough. While, according to grammar, each proposition must have a subject and a predicate, and, according to logic, of a subject, a predicate notion is atfirmed or denied, in the expressions, ' Es donnert,' ' Es istmir wohl,' ' Es ist Tag,' the subject seems to be lacking. Now, since from the grammatical standpoint it could not be denied that ' Es donnert,' etc., were propositions, from the logical point of view they had to be considered as judgments. Thus there arose a contradiction which gave rise to many attempts at explanation." Kaindl spoke truly when he remarked that contradic- tion seemed to be the only outcome of previous investigation. This makes it all the more evident that a criticism of the underlying pre- supposition is necessary to further investigation of the impersonal. B. HISTORICAL RESUME. The various theories of the impersonal may be classed under two general heads : (I), doctrines which emphasize the place where the sub- ject is to be sought ; (II), doctrines which are characterized by the kind of subject which must be sought. 1. The first general division falls into several minor parts ; I. The subject is sought in the grammatical form. This view is peculiarly characteristic of ancient thought, and the reason is not far to seek. The clear-cut distinctions which moderns make between the subjective and the objective, between thought and expression, or, again, between judgment and proposition, are a late acquisition.' At first the mind recognizes no distinction between them and interprets botli from the objective side. Thus Aristotle derived his doctrine of the judg- ment from the analysis of propositions. The logicians who followed hiui were rhetoricians as well as logicians, and for a great length of time logic and rhetoric were inseparable. Hence the early form of the controversy under consideration was concerned with the possibility ot finding a subject in the structure of the proposition. Three types of this view appear: [a) the Greek, (d) the Latin, [c] the Italian. (a) The Greek grammarians thought that a nominative should be supplied, and for this purpose "Zeus" seems to have been the favorite — Zeus rained, thundered, snowed. This points to a comparatively advanced stage in thought, a stage in which jxirticular gods (and finally one god) were supposed to be the causes of natural changes in general, ' See Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy, Introduction. THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT 7 and especially of those not referable to some known, finite cause. These verbs were denominated ^ela p^fiara,' on account of their reference to the deitv as the cause of the events thev indicated. .\ number of exceptions (e. .^,^, Act, xpv) ^vere found to this rule. In these Zeus could not verv well be taken as the subject. 'I'o obviate the difficulty such verbs were straightway interpreted as adverbs, and tlic Greek logical conscience seems to have been satisfied. {/>) In the main the Roman in\ estimators expounded and defended the position of the Greek grammarians ; in all tilings literary the latter were always the ins[)iration of the former. About the only contribution made by the Romans was in seeking the subject in the infinitive. Quintilian,' who set Roman rhetoric upon a firm basis, remarked upon the difference between the personal and the impersonal forms. He perceived a difference between "panditur interea domus oinnipotentis Olvmpi " and ''totis usque adeo turbatur agris." in the latter a start- ing point, an " initiiiiii," is lacking. According to Priscian,^ he who wishes to understand tlic impersonal must seek a subject in the nomi- native of the activity implied in the verb. For example, when we say "curritur" we mean "cursus curritur," also "eventus evenit," etc. That is, Priscian accepts the position, but finds the subject otherwise than in Zeus. The opponents of those who sought a subject in the grammatical structure of the proposition contented themselves with pointing out that a real subject was lacking, and that every attempt made to supply such a subject had vitiated the original meaning. Here we niav cite Maximus Planudes and .\ugustinus Saturnius. Planudes'* said, "There are cer- tain verbs that in no respect signify a subject or a person (which indeed we are also want to call impersonals), having the appearance or form of the third person, but belonging to none." Saturnius,' in com- bating Priscian. gave the key to the ordinary objection in ancient days: " The gods destroy you, Priscian. with this doctrine of yours. In the first place you annihilate all impersonals with passive termina- tions ; for those verbs to which one supplies such a nominative (/. <'., nominative of the activity implied) are manifestly of this sort. Then, afterward you attribute to all of them a passive meaning. But in truth this, your principle, if it be true, iinist also be understood ' .\pollonius (Egger), p. 174. ■• Hachmann's Anecdota Gritca. 2 : 47. 'Miklosich, Subjectlose Satze, p. 7. SSanctii Minerva, p. 305. ' I'riscian. 2 : 230. 2 : 231. 8 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT throughout the whole conjugation of the verb. And so, whatever nominative is understood (or the nominative of a verb in the passive tense), tliis of course must be understood throughout all the remaining forms of its declension. Wherefore, when Tacitus says 'procursum est ab hoste,' here I beg vou, Priscian, can that nominative of yours be rightly understood for verbs of the perfect tense?" (rac/i7C'/ss., Bd. 2, pp. 244-9"; R. F. Kaindl, Wesen u. Bedeutung der Impersonalien, /%//. Moiiat., Bd. 28, pp. 278-305 ; J. Venn, Mind, Vol. XlII, p. 413; Empirical Logic, p. 233. Tin: IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT I 5 psychical processes. The historical review has shown that the theories appearing from this point of view luav be reduced to two great types. In one the subject is universal and undetermined; in the other it is individual and determinetl. rmkr ilitsc two great types maybe sub- sumed views representing every grade of determination ; so that we have a series running from tlie clearly determined and j)articular impression up to the universal am! indeterminate "Totality of Heing," the ".-Mi-comprehending Reality," or the completely unknown condi- tion of the event. These views would seem to exhaust the possibilities as regards the impersonal on the basis of the ordinary presujjposition. For if a subject is to be sought, -it must be found either in the outward lin- guistic expression or in the inner thought. If language fails, then our only resource is thought. Hut if it be sought in ihnught, the subject must either be particular and completely determined, universal and undeter- mined, or it must lie somewhere between these two limits. Now we have seen that the search for a subject of whatever kind has resulted in nothing lasting. After all the criticism of the ages the j)rol)lem seems to be as vexed as ever. This has been the reason why a new investigation on somewhat different lines seemed to be in order. The point of view represented by our criticism is that first indicated by Miklosich.' It is to the exposition of his theory that the present section is directed. It seemed clear to him that every subject which had been brought forward was untrue, and vet it was equally clear that the admission that all judgment is twofold drove logically to a quest for a subject. He escaped the dilemma by attacking the presup]iosition which lay at the basis of all previous investigation. Mis criticism, however, sim- ply indicated that the ordinary view of the judgnient must be remod- eled. The full justification of this criticism remains as something yet to be accomplished. If we admit that the results of previous investigations have been suf- ficiently paradoxical to warrant a new investigation, several courses may be jmrsued : (.cit. Cf. Marty. \'ierteljahrslv meets the emergencv. ()utwardly 32 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT Stages. The two forms are those of the immediate and mediate; the three stages those of the impersonal, the discursive, and the intuitive. In the impersonal judgment an experience is immediatelv recog- nized, asserted, and felt as real. But although the experience is more or less definite, in that it is an experience, no exact measurement has as vet been introduced through the use of an exact svmbol. But as the experience becomes more complex and definite within itself, and as greater demands are made, this svmbol finallv arises through the abstraction, isolation, and definition of some particular qualitv. In this stage of judgment tlie form becomes discursive. The whole can- not be measured immediatelv, but must be broken up into parts which are controlled bv the various svmbols. The svmbols have reference beyond their own immediate existence. Thev indicate the particulars for which they stand, and build the meaning which thev present into some consistent, definitely universal, but mediatelv recognized whole. the two activities may appear the same, but inwardly there is all the difference of light and darkness between the two. In the one case there is simply a machine, and in the other a living personalitv. 2. We are forced to make a distinction between the thinker lost in his thought, yet to whom every shade and turn of the argument is clear, and the mystic who has driven every idea out of mind, and who has passed the subject-object stage. The thinker lives above the subject-object stage, the mvstic below it. In the one case the mind is full of ideas, feelings, activities, the whole being is active and alive. In the other there is a dearth of ideas, a passivity of being, a mere existence. 3. The reflex interpretation of the intuitive experience fails to account both for the mental alertness of the musician, thinker, plaver, or sportsman, and for the rapid accommodation made necessary bv the changing environment. The expert must " in a flash "size up each situation, and his expertness consists just in this. On the other hand, the paralyzed musician may play very delicately, but he must run along in the grooves of past experience. His behavior is like that of a locomotive which has lost its engineer. If the switches happen to be properlv arranged, the locomotive will make wonderful excursions. But they must be arranged ; itself can do nothing. So the activities of the musician may show themselves in many different forms, but they lack spontaneity antl adjustment. This adjustment to individual experiences is char- acteristic of all stages of consciousness, but especiallv of the subject-object and the intuitive stages. There is this difference between the latter that in the subject-object stage we are trying to adjust our.>elves, anil in the intuitive stage we really succeed in the sense that we can perform the action immediately and without friction. For these reasons it would seem that the intuitive stage is the unitv of the sub- jective and objective phases of consciousness, and not their loss. .\nd it would seem more reasonable. For if as action becomes perfected it disappears, and we never get the full value of the means in the end of the techniijue as technique, the process of experience would seem to be worthless and selfcontradictorv. TllK IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT 33 Here judgment leaves out of account tlie individuality in existence of each particular, but through the svuibol it becomes n)ore and more exact, both in meaning and in reference, until it figures forth the uni- versal in which the svmbol has been whoUv freed from the individualitv of particular existences, presenting a meaning perfcctlv definite and identical with itself, and a reference whi( h takts in the whole scope of its meaning and is. therefore, universal. Thus the discursive stands for perfect exactness and universality through complete svmbolization or abstraction of certain cpialities required for the particular references and indicated in the meaning, to the detriment of appreciation of the detail of individual existence. The imperson;^! fails in definiteness, and the discursive in appreciation. Both, however, are united in the intui- tion. When the discursive form has completed itself in the exjjert judgment which immediately and without reference recognizes the exact nature and range of meaning of their symbols, thev pass over into the intuitive judgment. In this stage judgment realizes com- pletelv the individualitv of each particular, and gets the full coloring which pertains to the particular. But at the same time the exactness and definiteness which are gained onlv through mediation of the symbolic stage are present. Hence in the perfect form of the judgment the immediacv as well as the exactness and certaintv of the earlier stages are represented. As immediate it has all the warmth, fullness, and glamor which per- tain to anv immediate exj)erience, while as summing up the move- ment of the discursive statre it is inexact and universal. To sunnnarize this stage of our discussion : Judgment has to do essentiallv with the apprehension of meaning, the recognition of realitv. In its earlier stages this apprehension takes the form of the immediate recognition of wholes which are definite enough to be used as centers of experience, but in which there is not vet a clear and exact definition of parts. The experience is apj^rehended as a totalitv. But this experience gradually becomes more definite within itself, until there is a necessitv of adjusting the parts within one another in refer- ence to the whole. Division arises. Qualities are abstracted from the whole and are used as svmbols in terms of which the whole experience is measured. Through continued growth the symbols acquire definite- ness, both as to their own meaning and as to their range of inference. The final stage is that in which the exact nature of the symbol is known, and its exact range of reference is also known. Where this is 34 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT the case, the identitv of the symbol and the universality or complete- ness of its range are both known. This gives us the universal form of judgment. To most of us this identity and universality are purely formal, /. i\. we have learned to recognize that there is such a thing as identity and universality in judgment, but we practically never get within our own minds a complete and exact definition either of the nature of any of our symbols or of the exact range of their significa- tion. In those few cases in which, in any department and in the minds of a few men, this identity and universality have been realized, with ref- erence to any content, in these cases freedom in the manipulation and apj)reciation of the material is seen. But when this stage is reached — the stage of ilic expert judgment — there is no longer hesitancy in regard to the use of material, no retardation in inhibition. The con- tent is fullv apj)reriated in its individuality of coloring and existence, and is also grasped in the exactness, identity, universality, and perfect placing of the material. That is, once more the division into subject and object disappears, and we are in the presence of an immediately recognized reality. But it is immediacy which differs from the imper- sonal in that it is definite and universal, whereas the earlier experience was indefinite and individual. Thus the discursive judgment logically arises out of and returns into the immediate judgment. In the discur- sive stage the judgment must be twofold, but in both the impersonal and intuitive stages subject and predicate disappear. In the imper- sonal stage they have not vet been differentiated, while in the intuitive they disappear into an exact and immediately recognized whole. II. SIGNIFICANCE FOR PSVCHOLOGV. When once we have clearly in mind the fact that the discursive judgment arises out of the impersonal and tends to pass over into the intuitive or expert judgment, the significance of the impersonal in the construction of our theory of the development of consciousness becomes exceedingly important. The impersonal judgment points to a state of consciousness in which all experience is recognized as a totality, and not by conscious mediation of the parts. The discursive judgment, in which the subject and predicate appear, and in which immediate recognition passes over into mediate recognition, indicates not a totality, but a whole. It grasps, or endeavors to grasp, through the definition and conscious reference of part to part. Consciousness is split up, a dualism appears THE IMTEKSONAI. JUDGMENT 35 within it. The movement involves every phase of consciousness and is most fullv expressed in the o])position of subject and object, of the known and the unknown. Finaliv. this opjjosition, which occupies us almost exclusively, is never consciously transcended, except in a few rare moments when we lose ourselves in our thou<;ht or actions. Hut in so doiui; we maintain clear and definite consciousness, while feelinij ourselves absolutely one witii our content or ex])erience. Judired from an (///•/<>/•/ standpoint this loijical relation in the judi^Miant would seem to point to the origin of the subject- object consciousness out of a state of consciousness identical with that given in the intellect. The imper- sonal judgment, on the other hand, tends to pass over and find its complete fulfillment in a state of consciousness where the meaning of subject and object is contained in a higher state of consciousness, but a stage which is clear, definite, expert, but not discursive. The facts bearing on the origin of the subject-object conscious- ness should be found {(J) in child psychology. {/>) in race psychology. The evidence to be adduced for the development of self-consciousness into a higher phase should evidently be found in adult psychology, if anywhere. The first two points, when developed, should give us insight, not only into origin and function of the subject-object con- sciousness, but should also add insight to the arguments in favor of the theory of the impersonal advanced above. I.' The child enters life apparently at a great disadvantage when compared with the young of animals. They soon learn to perform the movements and to engage in the activities peculiar to their kind. Children, on the other hand, have to serve a long apprenticeship before they can take part in the simplest distinctively human activities. But although this is so, the huuian animal is born into the heritage of a social and psychical environment which makes him rise far above all others. In short, the child life furnishes us with a magnificent example of growth from very small to very great and complex things. In examining the stage of this growth, our attention must neces- sarily be directed chiefly to the development of the child's longer age. Here we get the expression of the childs thought in ilefinite, conciete forms, and while reference to other |)hases of the child's activity will not be omitted, our point of view is necessitated from the fact that we ' In whole section c/.: Tracy, I'sychology of Chilillujod ; I'reyer, Development of the Intellect ; it/ei/i. Development of the Will ; Perez, First Three Years of Childhood; •Moore, .Mental Development of a Child ; Baldwin. Mcnt.nl Deveh-pment. 36 THE IMPERSONAL lUDGMENT approacli tlie whole subject in connection with one aspect of the judg- ment. During the lirst six niontlis of life the infant does not make anv appreciable advance in language. He, as it were, is simply soaking in his environment. His speech consists simply of spontaneous babbling produced automatically bv impulsive exercise of his vocal nmscles. One of the most interesting things in connection with these early sounds is the wide range of their compass. All shades of emotion are expressed in forms incapable of repetition as the child grows older. Graduallv out of this strange prattling mass definite sounds come to be distinguished; vowels usually precede consonants. These are repeated over and over again, stimulating themselves^ until long before the sixth moni"h syllables arise. At this stage reduplication plavs a great ]xirt ; for instance, " ma" becomes "■mama." This shows that the activities involved in luaking these sounds tend to continue and stimulate them- selves. This has been called the "circular form of reaction." Indi- cative of the above mentioned form of activitv, vocal imitation arises. At first it is vague and. shadowy, suggestive and impulsive, rather than clearlv directed and controlled. In the second six months imitation becomes ail-absorbing, and consequentlv words begin to be used with meaning. The vague and shadowv form of imitation which characterized the first six months gives wav to a more definite form. Simple imitation tends to pass over into the persistent form. With this growth in imitation comes an increased power of attention. In earlv life the child's attention is almost altogether at the mercv of external circumstances. But through imitation control is developed, and the child is enabled to continue doing something suggested. At this time, also, the child commences to recognize members of ihe household bv name and to recognize parts of his own bodv. This shows us that a period of cjuite extended duration is reipiired before there is developed out of the undifferentiated whole of early expe- rience the consciousness of definite experiences and of definite objects. This statement, which is true of all sides of the child's life, is beauti- fully illustrated from the side of language. Taine, in speaking of the acquisition of language by his own child and in dealing with this period, savs : ' " .Vs vet she attaches no meaning to anv word she utters, but there are two or three words to which she attaches meaning when ^ Revue Pliilosophiqtie, No. I; Mind, Vol. II, p. 252. THE IMl'KHSONAI. JUDGMENT 37 she hears them. She sees her grandfather every day, and a chalk por- trait of him, much smaller than life, but a very ijood likeness, has often been shown her, from about two months. When asked 'Where is grandfather ? ' she turned to this portrait and laughed. Before the portrait of her grandmother, not so good a likeness, she made no such gesture and gave no sign of intelligence. From eleven monihs. wiicn asked ' Where is mamma ?' she turned toward her mother, and she did the same thing for her father." Here we have intelligence and recog- nition. The "big. buzzing, blooming confusion" of early life has gradually passed into the recognition of e.xperiences separated out from the undifferentiated totalitv and forming more or less definite centers. But we must not suppose that in these e.xperiences we have anything more than situations immediately recognized and grasped in their totality. Taine continues: "I should not venture to say that these three actions surpass the intelligence of animals. A little dog under- stands as well when it hears the word "sugar ;' it comes from the end of the »rarden to tret a bit. There is nothing more in this than asso- elation : for the dog, between a sound and some sensation of taste; for the child, between a sound and the form of an individual face perceived. The object denoted by the sound has not yet a general charaeter.^ However, I believe a step was made at twelve months. Here is a fact decisive in mv opinion. This winter she was carried everv day to her grandniother who showed her a painted copy of a picture by Luini, of the infant Jesus, naked, saving at the same time, 'There isbebe.' .\ week ago, in another room, when she was asked 'Where is bebe ? ' meaning herself, she turned at once to tiie pictures and engravings that happened to be there. Bebe has tlien a general signification for her, viz.: what ever she thinks is common to all pictures and engravings of figures and landscapes — that is to sav, if I am not mistaken, something t'ariegated in a shining frame. In fait, it is clear that the objects painted or drajvn in a frame are as Greek to her. On the other hand, the bright square enclosing any representation must have struck her.' This is her first general word. The meaning she gives it is not what we give it, but it is only the better fitted for showinj,-- the original work of infant intelligence. For if we supply the word we did not supj)ly the mean- ing : the general character which we wish to make the child catch is not that which she has chosen. She has caught another suited to her mental state, for which we have no jirecise word." • Italics mine. » 38 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT This quotation will make clear to us that in this recognition bv the child we have no reference at all to definite objects. Taine himself admits this. All that existed for the child's mind was simply a defi- nite image, which she recognized, and which we call something "varie- gated and in a shining frame." But if this be so, there can be no meaning in speaking of the child's image at this stage as a general idea. We cannot trulv s])eak of an abstraction, for as vet the onlv definite thing is tlie recognized experience. In it there is no reference of an idea beyond itself, no separation between existence and symbol. \Miat we are inclined to call the svmbol can be no svmbol. for it is the only realitv definitelv recognized bv the child. In short, to speak at this stage of a general image in any sense in which it can be used as a svm- bol is incorrect. It is a case of the psvchologists' fallacv. To the child there is neither a particular nor an idea. We distinguish differ- ent things, and recognize that we abstract certain qualities which are used as svmbols or signs of these existences. But, as we have seen, there is no distinction of objects to the child at this stage. Hence, there can be no abstraction of (pialities in anv sense in which thev indi- cate some object. In short, the vague and schematic image is all the object there is, so that it cannot stand for anything else. We do put it otherwise to the child, and there is one stimulus and one reaction in the experiences which we adults regard as different. The above interpretation throws great light on the child's develop- ment between the twelfth and eighteenth months. As we should expect, there is a marked progress in the understanding of words, and in their intelligent application. In longer words children reproduce the important part alone, and thev now begin to express themselves in sentence words. But perhaps the most interesting feature of all is that the childish concept endeavors to make itself exact and definite. On this point Tracv says :' "But perhaps the the most interesting thing of all this time is the gradual 'clearing-up' of the childish con- cepts, as indicated bv the steadv circumspection of the api)lication of names. Even yet, however, names are applied imuh too widelv ; much more experience is necessary before thev accpiirc in the voung mind a clear and defi'uite connotation. It is interesting, also, to note how the principle of association enters as a factor in the determina- tion of the ap[)lication of the name, ^^'hen the child (alls the moon a lamp, or applies his word 'bo' (ball) to oranges, bubbles, and other ' Psychology of Childhood, p. 73. Till. IMl'ERSONAL JUDGMENT 39 round objects; calls everything * bow-wow' which bears anv sort of resemblance to a dog (including bronze dogs on the staircase, and the goat in the yard); applies his word ' papa' and ' nianima' to all men and all women, respectively; makes his word 'cutie' do dutv, not only for 'knife,' but also for 'scissors,' 'shears,' 'sickle,' etc ; savs ' ba' (bath) on seeing a crust dipped in lea; applies 'ati' (asses) to 'tliair,' ' foot- stool,' ' bench,' ' sitting down,' ' sit down.' fit .; ii is evident ///(// onf great striking resemhlanif has overshado7i't'ii all differ t-uces in the object.'" ' This whole i)aragraph illustrates the point which we made above in regard to the "concept." The childish ''concepts" are no concepts at all. Differences exist in the objects only for us. Hence, what we take to be the reference of a vague recognition of similarities in objects to different objects, is not all indicative of the true state of things in the child's mind. What he reallv has in mind is an indefinite image. Given stimulations which have any similarity at all, as we conceive them, the child interprets in one wav. That is, to the child there is but one stimulus, one reaction, one object, viz., an experience sutificientlv dif- ferentiated to be grasped as a totality, and to be recognized in and through itself. The child has not yet got to a stage where its experi- ence, or life, is sufficientlv differentiated to admit of a conscious recog- nition and reference of parts in a whole. This stage, however, is reached in some children just before the end of this period. Short sentences are used, in which onlv the prominent ideas appear. The full meaning of the stage is seen in the period ranging from the eigh- teenth to the twentv-fourth month. I'rever records at this period, "the greatest progress, however, is indicated bv the combination of two woids into a sentence." The two words really used are a noun and a verb. Here we see that the immediately recognized situation which was formed out of the chaotic totalitv of early conscious experience has itself become so differentiated that unitv in differences must be con- sciously recognized within the former totality. A dualism has apj)eared, which is represented on the intellectual side in the discursive judgment through the development of the nominal and verbal tendencies. Ikit this is not all. Simple imitation, which was expressed in the circular reaction of earlv life, gradually passed over into j)ersistent imi- tation. This, when once differentiated, developed rapidly, showing itself in the more comjilete ajiprehension of meaning, and in the devel- opment of control. In this |)eriod an independence of activity (jiiite 'Italics mine. 40 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT Strong and marked showed itself. The ambition of the child was aroused, and he desired to go his own way without hindrance. It is evident from this that we have here to do with the dawn of self- consciousness ill llic child. That is, we begin to see traces of the recognition of self as self at the time when the impersonal form of expression begins to pass over into the discursive judgment. Thus the analysis of early child life directly confirms the account of the impersonal judgment given above, with the added fact that the passage from the impersonal to the discursive judgment is indica- tive of the development of self-consciousness in the child. Now, if these things be so, some trace of this process should also be found in the differentiation of the subject-object consciousness in the race. If we turn our thought to the development of language, we should expect to find the different parts of speech disappearing, first, into a twofold movement expressive of the nominal and verbal tend- encies, and, secondly, into a stage in which meaning is represented by a form of thought corresponding to the impersonal. At the point where this impersonal stage of thought passes over into the discursive judg- ment\ve should expect to find the passage from the animal conscious- ness into the human. 2. In entering upon this division of our subject, a distinction must be made between the science of language and the science of thought. The Science of Language observes and systematizes the various facts and forms of language, and seeks to formulate the laws by which it has been and is governed in its transformations. It seeks to under- stand the vehicle of thought, not as a vehicle, but in itself. The Science of Thought endeavors to investigate the psychological aspect of the subject-matter presented by the Science of Language. Lansfuacfe as a vehicle is made to contribute to the understanding of the thought of which it is the vehicle. Now, in this procedure it would seem that the Science of Thought is dependent upon the Science of Language, and must wait until the latter has handed in its results. Tliis is true to a very great extent. A Science of Thought cannot be manufactured or spun out of our heads, and inasmuch as it endeavors to construct the thought move- ment, it must await the elucidation of the forms in which past thought has expressed itself. But although the psychologist may depend upon the comparative philologist for material, it is as material that he receives it, and he mav feel himself free to interpret the facts as an understand- Till". IMPERSONAL JUDCMENT 4I ing of them from the psychological standpoint niav demand. Just as the philologist, on the historical side, demands that he should be free from all interference from psychologists while investigating the facts and forms of language, so just as truly may the psvclujlogist demand that the philologist should give simply the results of his labor as material and spare the advice which is so often given. As there has been evolution in the ph\si< a! and organic worlds, so there has been exolution in ihe conscious world. ( )f this the develoj)- ment of language' is one of the most evident proofs. As civilization has advanced, language has been continually refined, until the efficient and graceful instrument which we find in mort- advancetl nations in both past and present has been produced. It may further be noticed that the earliest stage of language wliich the philologist can reach is still immeasurably far removed in time from primitive human speech. But although the barrier of time can never be overcome and we can never present the primitive language, still, from the nature of the development within language itself, we tan form a quite trustworthy opinion of what its psychological nature must have been. This, however, is to presuppose the result of our analvsis, to which we must now proceed. In the unity of the discursive judgment (recognized by all and considered by most to be the only true form of judgment) two move- ments are usually distinguished — that of the subject and that of the predicate. These united in the copula represent the content of the unified thought. In these two movements certain distinctions are now made : nouns, adjectives from nouns, adverbs, etc. Hut while these various distinctions are recognized by philologists, it is emphasized that they were not ahvavs as clearly worked off as they now are. As we go backward in the history of language, the differ- ences which distinguish the nominal and verbal movements begin to disapj)ear. Not only do the differences in the inflectional forms dis- appear, but also the two movements themselves become confused, in certain cases nouns are derived from verbs and verbs irom nouns. For this reason endeavors have been made to reduce nouns to verbs, and rice versa. l>ut the general consensus of opinion now seems to ' (.y. Paul, I'rinciples nf l..-ini;iia>,'c ; liruifmann, Cumparative Grammar of tlic Indo-Germanic Lanis'uaijes, Morphology, Pt. I, p. 2; Max Miiller. Science of I.an guage and Science of Thought; Sayce, Introtluction to the Science of Language; Delbriick, Introduction to the .Study of I.anz.'aiagc ; Giles, Comparative Philologv. 42 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMKNT be that so far language does not admit of this reduction. As far back as we can go the two movements remain, the one as distinct as the other. But contained in both nominal and verbal stems there has been a unity, which seems to indicate that they arose out of one oriirinal form. Concerning this point a great deal of controversy has ariseji, and the end is not yet. Those who follow the Science of Language most closely, and to whom philology is purely formal and historical, insist that there is no reason to suppose that any root form which we have is original and indivisible; e.g., Brugmann says:' "Strictly speaking we are never sure in the case of a suffix which has come down to us from the Indo-Germanic j)arent language, whether it ever existed as an independent word, exactly in the same shape as we extract it from the body of the word, or whether it originally consisted of elements which passed into this shape by a regular phonetic change. It is theoretically correct when we say that the root of a word is found after we have removed all formative syllables from it. But in the first place, we do not know what shape Indo-Germanic words had toward the end of the root period, and this applies especially to the fact that we are unable to say whether the language at this stage j)Ossessed only monosyllabic, or only polysyllabic, or words of both categories. Secondly, the analysis of elements which were directly annexed to the ends of roots is of a most doubtful nature. And, lastly, we are unable to determine what phonetic changes inflexional compounds had under- gone from the beginning up to the dissolution of the primitive com- munity. Hence, it must not be supposed that the roots which we in ordinary practice, abstract from words are at all to be relied upon, as representing the word forms of the root period. A\'e are utterly unable to understand, c. g., whether the complex a. ii.3. represents a unitary word of the root period, or whether it is to be resolved into a. n. .'., that is, whether j was a suffix and thus originally an independent element. Such being the state of things, we shall retain the terms root and suffix in this work for such part of the word as'seq' and ' e,' ' tai,' ' sequetai.' .... "We do not, however, assert that the elements to which we give these names ever existed as independent words. We merely indicate by means of hyphens (-) what was probably felt at any particular period as the nucleus (so to speak) of the whole system of word 'Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages, Morphology, I't. L pp. 13-1S. THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT 43 forms — 'secj' and " e," what was rei^arded as the formative ele- ment." It is evident from this tluit the root has been taken in a purely formal wav and from the standpoint of the Science of Language, as dealing simj)lv with the facts and laws of linguistic transformation. It is just what would be exjiected. There is no reason to suppose that the word forms which we are able to obtain from anv known language are primitive and indivisible. It is the same here as in child language. The external forms mav be divided and subdivided, until the external, formal root or generalized concept as expressed in language has disappeared into the crudest articulations. From the historical and formal standpoint it mav be said that the death blow has been given to anv system which would abstract any root and sav that it was the primitive form. But the matter ends here onlv from the purelv formal and liistorical standpoint. The logical consideration of the formation of roots still remains, and there seems to be no doubt, even among philologists who emphasize the historical side, that a root period existed. What this root period stood for, and what its general nature and formation were, is a further and legitimate question. And, further, it is not to be sup- posed that it is our purpose to indicate what particular meaning primi- tive roots had. Rather, it must be our endeavor to find out whether it is more natural to suppose that the nominal and verbal stems are ultimate, and, therefore, the root purelv ideal, or whether the root was the real unity out of which the nominal and verbal stems differentiated. Kven in Hrugmann wc find the conception that the root is a nucleus or kernel around which the thought in the nominal and verbal stem centers. Further, it is now agreed that as far back as we can go the two forms of stem begin to shade into one another. Novv, if we carry this thought back far enough, we see that the nominal and verba' stems must gradually become less clearlv differentiated from one another, until finally thev disappear into an experience in whidi meaning is grasped in what we have called a situation or totalitv, as represented in the impersonal judgment. How manv of these roots there were, and what their particular meaning was, we cannot sav. N'or need we concern ourselves about it. All that interests us is the function which this root stage plaved in language. Here we may make a quotation from Delbriick,' which deals directly ' Intrixliirtiiin tn the Slmlv rif Languages, pp. 77 ff. 44 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT with the idea of roots. He savs : " Bopp derived from the gram- matical tradition of his time the principle that the whole word material of a language must be traced back to roots. However, he did not express any opinion whether or not those so-called roots shall be regarded as real linguistic structures or onlv as abstractions of the grammarians. But Pott savs : ' Roots are the chieftains of a word familv. They are the unitv. the j)vramidal points, in which all mem- bers of such a familv terminate. Only composites can, like married pairs, belong to two families. Roots are, furthermore, onlv imagined, as mere abstraction: in realitv there can be no roots in language. Whatever may wear the outward appearance of a pure root is a word or a word form, not a root ; for a root is an abstraction of all word classes and their differences — a possessing of them without refraction. A root is not like a letter or a syllable simplv. It is also the unitv of meaning of words and forms which genetically belong together, and at their creation were present as prototypes in the soul of the language maker. When not wholly obscured, it is felt more or less plainly by every speaker in connection with the language which he uses.' Add to this : ' Roots are ever mere ideal abstractions necessary to the grammarian in his calling, which he must nevertheless extract from lan- guage in strict conformity with the given reality.' Pott accordingly denies that roots can have existed before the inflectional form. If now it must be asserted that declension arises in the Sanskritic languages by the affixion of inflectional suffixes to the fundamental forms of the noun and conjugation through the affixion of others to the root or stem, this must not be understood to imply that the fundamental form and the root are something existing independently and out of con- nection in language, or something, as it were, present in language before inflertion. What is reallv meant is onlv that the fundamental form is contained in all the cases of nouns, and the root in all verbal forms, as that which is still undifferentiated. as that which is common to them, which grammatical analysis alone for scientific ends tries to free from all the differentiated characteristics united with them, and to dis- play in all its simplicity. This definitio)i of Pott is correct in so far as it rightly defines the position a root occupies witliin a finished inflectional language. But it is one-sided, inasmuch as it does not state how the roots arrived at this fujietion. To this question only ine ans7>.'er is possitdefrom the standpoint of Bopp' s hypothesis. If the prototypes of the now existing inflectional forms really arose by means of composition, especially the proto- THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT 45 types of forms of the finite Vfrt\ by composition of ij rerlhil 'with a proiiom- inal root, then the root must hax'e existed before the jvord existed. Roots are contained in 7vords because they existed before them, and were merged in them. They arc the words of the pre-inflectionai period, and Z'anish tt'ith the development of inflection. Therefore, from the standpoint of the perfected inflectional speech, what was once a 7cord appears only as an ideal center of meaning. This 7vholly intelligible and consistent view of the root may be said to be universally accepted at the present day. " ' Pott was forced to believe that the root was really a center of meaning. But this center he believed to be purely ideal. That is, although the roots were present in the minds of i)rimitive men and were copied in language, there was nothing corresponding to them antecedent to the early stems and expressed in language. That is, the roots were to Pott virtually (oiicepts innate in the primitive minds and regulative of eailv lanijuage.* If this were so, thev must have been cmptv and formal. That is, all difference would fall on the side of the linguistic stem and the unitv on the side of the concepts. But if the concepts were emptv, there could be no distinction within them. Consequently, thev could not be distinguished one from another : nor could they be applied to particular thoughts, for there would be no reason within them whv thev should be applied to one rather than to another. That is, Pott abstracts the unity of movement present in early thought and sets it over against the particular differ- ences which have been differentiated. .\ true view is to note that the unitv present in the earlv thought gradually becomes less and less clear, until we are brought to a stage in which a meaning e.\isted, but not a meaning indicative of different objects consciously jiresented. This u)eaning e.xisted in totalities of experience immediately recog- nized. .-\nd in this sense we see that, as Delbriick says, roots may be consistently and intelligently maintained. Thus the study of language brings us to the same result as the study of the child. The discursive movement given in self-conscious thought and language disappears into a form of thought in which experiences identical with those which are expressed in the impersonal judgment appear. .And not only so, but we have seen that the passage from the im|>ersonal to the discursive form of thought occurs in the earliest stages of distinctively human life. That is, as far back as wc can trace a distinctively human experience, nominal and verbal stems . ' Italics mine. ^ Cf. Max Miillcr, <»/». cit., p. 1 10. 46 THI-: IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT are found. But these point on to an earlier and more primitive stage of root forms or impersonal thought. Once more we find the passage from the impersonal to the discursive form of thought co-eval with a passage from a merely conscious stage to a stage in which the oppo- sition between subject and object begins to appear. Impersonal judgments, as it were, begin to a])pear just below the threshold of what we ordinarily term self-consciousness, and on the threshold itself. In short, they seem to form the connecting link in thought between animal and human intelligence, as well as indicating the form of experience in which the differentiation as a whole is made. This conclusion to which we have been led through the investigation of the impersonal judgment should be compared with certain results reached by Romanes from the standpoint of comparative psvchologv. From a close studv of animal life he was led to believe that a definite type of thought was present in the life of the higher animals. Through this "receptual" thought, as he designated it. the life of these animals was distinguished, on the one hand, from mere sense-experi- ence, and, on the other hand, from the self-conscious life of man. When we inquire into the nature of this receptive process, we find that it corresponds exactlv to what we have shown to be the true nature of the impersonal judgment. It distinguishes itself from sense experi- ence in that it is composite, taking up into itself the results of past experience. It is distinguished from distinctivelv human experience in that it is immediate merelv. Differences are felt rather than abstracted. This we have found to be characteristic of the impersonal judgment, the childish " concept," and the racial root. The agreement in outcome thus materiallv strengthens each position, and forces us to believe more stronglv than ever that in the impersonal we have the original form of judgment and the connecting link between the con- scious and the self-conscious stages of experience.' SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. There remains the task of a brief recapitulation of the general movement and outcome of our investigation. Previous investigations of the impersonal judgment have been unsatisfactorv because of a general ])resuppositi(m in regard to the ' A criticism of Romanes' position at once suggests itself. To him the order of succession in thought is that of percept, recept, concept. For reasons which will be evident from the whole standpoint of the essay, percept and concept arise together. THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT 47 nature of judgment. According to the traditional view, all judgment must be discursive and must contain a subject and a ])redicate. The traditionalists are right in maintaining that we cannot separate the sub- ject from the predicate, for it is self-contradictorv to assert that we may have predication of nothing. But they are untrue to scientific procedure when they maintain that all judgments must conform to the discursive tvpe. A form of judgment in \vhi( h neither subject nor predicate appears would obviate entirely tlie dilticulty raised in regard to predication. It has been felt troiii earliest days both that imper- sonals are real judgments, and that they do not conform to the ordinary type. The search for a subject has shown the fruitlessness of the attempt, for either no subject is found or we must warp the natural meaning of the proposition. When we lay aside all presuppositions and examine ihc impersonal form of expression on its own basis, we reach the following result : In its essential form the impersonal is the immediate recognition and asser- tion of an experience, in which the whole is recognized in its totalit}- and not through its parts. But this totality graduallv differentiates, until recognition of the whole can take place onlv through the parts. Here the discursive judgment appears. Now. inasmuch as we cannot assert at just what moment the immediate form of the impersonal passes into the discursive judgment, a mediate form ai)pears, in which the symbolic subject indicates a content, however vague it may be. Here, again, growth changes the experience, until a definite, })articular subject appears, and we have the full-fledged discursive judgment. This point of view enables us to harmonize the various divergent types of theory. We can account for all the facts which they present without doing damage to any. We are enabled to see how those who asserted that the experience was individual and concrete had ground for their assertion, while at the same time admitting that those who maintained that the experience pointed to something general and uni- versal had equaUright to their opinion. Also, we are enabled to remove contradictions from both views by finding either that both subject and predicate are lacking, or else that both appear in a vague, schematic way. As K;int .say.s, percepts without concepts are blind, and concepts without percepts are empty. Each is meaningless when taken alone. Percepts present us with the dis- criminative side of the discursive process, while concepts give us the side of unit v. W c cannot have the one without the other. >' or TUF 48 THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT But if this be so, our analysis is of great importance both for logic and psychology. The most significant point as regards logic is that the ordinary view of the nature of judgment must be radically remodeled. The discur- sive form does not exhaust judgment. The discursive judgment arises out of an immediate concrete judgment and passes into an immediate concrete judgment. When the impersonal experience has differen- tiated to such an extent that, instead of a buzzing confusion, more or less definite centers of experience appear, these are recognized and asserted in their totality. When these in turn have become so full of content that friction arises within them, the parts are abstracted, and the whole is mediated through them. The parts become symbolic of the whole. But, again, when differentiation has proceeded so far that the symbols may -be used with exactness as regards their own nature and the extent of their reference, friction disappears, and we have once more an immediate stage in judgment. This, however, distinguishes itself from the impersonal judgment in that the whole is recognized through the parts, and both whole and parts are exact and definite.' 'Further implications of the impersonal are apparent. Much has been said concerning the relation of impersonal and existential judg- ments. From the standpoint of our analysis all judgment is existential. The imper- sonal takes its "totalities" for existences, the discursive judgment endeavors to make apparent the nature of the existence assumed in the impersonal ; while in the intuitive stage there is a definite assurance that the experience recognized is real. The different forms of judgment are thus stages in our recognition and exposition of existence. But this, again, involves the nature of belief and its relations to judgment. In all judgment there is an element of belief, whether in the forms of primitive credulity, of belief struggling through doubt, or of belief sothorougiily assured that its " what " and " why " are ever ready. Again, judgment mediates and grounds belief, while belief connects all judgment with reality. The criterion for the truth of judgment must be the criterion for the worth of belief. To sav that all judgment is existential is, therefore, but to say that thought as such believes that it has to do with reality. Such a view would lead us to believe that since all judgment is recognition or assertion of realitv, that the criterion for the truth of judgment, and the worth of belief, cannot lie in judgment or in belief. Judgment and belief both land us in the hypothetical stage. How do we pass to verification? If the scientific position be true, all verification comes through action — the testing of our hypotheses by crucial expe- riments. Judgment and belief simply prepare us for action. In this preparation judgment provides the mediation ; belief, the motive. Through thought we become convinced or believe that realitv is such as we take it to be, and that, if we act according to our belief, we shall gain certain experiences defined and expected Tin; IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT 49 'I'urning to psvchologv, our outcome has been that the impersonal judijmenl forms the connectiiu'" link between conscious and self- conscious experience in the adult, the child, and the race. Conscious experience bei^ins in vague indefiniteness, and it is long before anv definite image or center is recognized. Hut images or centers as totalities do finally appear. These become more definite and overlap in the uniiv of the life mediation ; then the mind is forced to the recognition of wholes through their parts. 'I'his recognition of wholes brings to clear consciousness the nature of the activitv as a unitv amid differences, as a process making use of means and ends. In short, consciousness now becomes self-consciousness. .Ml further development is that of the personality which has been produced. It is a process working bv means and through ends. When the recog- nition of the means for anv end has become perfect, and we can immediatelv control them, the richest form of self-consciousness in what we have called expert action appears. Whole and parts, end and means, subject and object, are one definite, unified existence. Such states mav, perhaps, be rare, but thev are seen in the musician lost in his music, in that perfection of thought in which we are lost to all about us, in the expert plaver who in tlic midst of the game must constantly adjust himself to new conditions. in thought and belief. If we do get them, then, we take it. our thought is true, and our belief is assured. Hut this means that we have come back to experiencing, through experience defined, directed, anil tested. Of this direct experiencing both judgment and belief are phases. Now the question comes. What is the relation of the Real to the fact of expe- riencing ? Is Reality Experiencing ? This opens up a fundamental metaphysical problem. The aspects of the prolilem twine and intertwine, and seem to liml their origin and outcome in the impersonal and intuitive judgments. This point of view suggests a further problem, viz.. the development of the self from mere experiencing through the impersonal and subject-object stages to tiie intuitive stage of which we are conscious at times. Our view of the judgment would suggest the reduction of thought, action, and impulse to one developing life movement. The inner nature of this movement would be given in an analvsis of the different stages, wliile the process of growth would be best seen by a section of the various layers. This, however, is a further problem.