i% f^l IIBRARY<9/^ #l'BRAr 11 l^i ! ^oim-i^"^ %J0WS01^ '^CAMvaaiH^ ^(?Aaviiai>i^^ ^riuoKYsov"^ ^^[UNivn?% ^lOSANCn^J-^ I "^ijJAiNa o '^/yiflAiNn3\^' ^lUBRARYQ^. u3 1 ir^^ ^(i/OJIlVDJO'^ ^OfCAllFW^ ''%)jnvDjo'^ .o M ^HfBRARY^?/ 1^ — ^- ^ < ^lUBRARYO^, -5^1-UBI prove(l by audiences that included, besides Conserva- tives, Liberals of all shades of opinions. It is hoped that the ' Crown and its Advisers' may serve as a useful constitu- tional Manual, and be the means of causing many to examine more fully for themselves the working of that great machine, the State. If it should help to make our working-classes understand a whit better the nature of the constitution under which they have the happi- ness to live, and induce them to search for themselves the pages of our great constitutional authorities, instead of being content with mere *' clap-trap" opinions, the object of the Author will be most fully gained. It only remains for me to make my grate- ful acknowledgments to the writers on our Constitution and its History from whose rich stores I have so freely drawn, and to whose antecedent labours these Lectures are indebted for their existence. The foUowins; is a list of PREFACE. Vll the chief authorities I have consulted : May's ' Constitutional History ' and ' Parliamentary Practice ; ' Cox's ' Institutions of the English Government ; ' Alpheus Todd, ' On Parlia- mentary Government in England ; ' Hallam's ' Constitutional History of England;' Black- stone's 'Commentaries on the Laics of Eng- land;' the Histories of England by Hume, Lingard, and Mackintosh ; Cooke's ' History of Party ; ' Earl Grey, ' On Parliamentary Government ; ' P. Palgrave's ' Lectures on the House of Commons ; ' R. Dudley Baxter's ' English Parties and Conservatism ; ' De Lolme, ' On the Constitution,' edited by Stephens ; Dod's ' Parliamentary Compan- ion;' 'Encyclopaedia Britannica;' and vari- ous constitutional articles in the Edinburgh, Quarterly, and Saturday Reviews. To those works in italics I am under the deepest ob- ligations. Junior Carltom Club, Oct. 1870. CONTENTS. LliCTUllE I-AGK I. THE QUEEN, • 1 II. THE MINISTIiY, 50 III, THE HOUSE OF LORDS, . . .125 IV. THE COMMONS, 171 THE CROWN ITS ADVISEES. LECTUEE I. THE QUEEN. "The country has a deep-rooted affection for kingly govern- ment, and would highly resent any attempt to change or destroy this key-stone of the Constitution : nor, as far as I can observe, is this sentiment confined to particular orders of men ; it pervades the whole country, from one end to the other." — Earl Eussell, English Government and Constitution. " A land of just and old renown, "Where freedom broadens slowly down From precedent to precedent." — Tennyson. Gentlemen, — I intend to lecture to you to-night upon the office and prerogatives of her Majesty the Queen. I shall endeavour to show you what A 2 THE QUEEN. powor the Crown has in the control of public affairs, and what limits there are to its authority since the introduction of parliamentary govern- ment. And here let me tell you at once that such a subject must necessarily be a dry one. Had I to talk to you about the non-political position of our gracious Sovereign, and to give you a biographical sketch of her Majesty, illustrated by different anec- dotes of her kindness and benevolence, or to con- trast her conduct \vith that of many of the other Sovereigns who have preceded her, my task would be perhaps a more interesting one. But I come among you to-night, not as an artist w-ho wishes to portray a pleasing picture of royalty, but as an anatomist who has to dissect its rights and privi- leges, and lay bare all that concerns its political system. Now I have no doubt you aU fancy that you know a good deal about tlie duties of a Sovereign of England. You hear of her Majesty moving about from one palace to another — now at London, then at Windsor; now at Osborne, and then again at Balmoral. You have seen her driving down to Westminster in royal state to open Parliament, with soldiers escorting her, officers in splendid uni- forms waiting on her, and a loj'al crowd cheering NOT EXEMPT FEOM AVORK. 3 " God save the Queen ! " And then you read of her giving state balls and dinners, holding drawing- rooms and levees, or else being present at the inau- guration of some great event, the observed of all observers, with everything that can flatter human vanity and gratify human ambition surrounding her, and you think what a brilliant and splendid life the Queen's must be. And so it is ; but you look upon the brilliant side of it only. You seem to forget that her Majesty has many very important duties to perform, and that the royal life is not one eternal freedom from care, anxiety, and hard work. You forget this ; and so, when you wish to typify happiness — and by happiness you mean idleness — you say, as " happy as a queen." Well, my friends, I hope I shall be able to disabuse your minds of this notion, and to show you that to be a king or queen of these realms is not entirely a life of bril- liant idleness. And if there are any among you who are accustomed to view with disrespect the position of her Majesty, and to hold derogatory ideas regarding her power and influence — looking upon her as a mere state puppet, and as only a tool in the hands of her ministers — I ask them to listen to me patiently for a little while, and then to see whether they can consistently support 4 TIIF. QUEEN. such views, and promulgate them as constitutional facts. But before I can tell you anything of the Queen, I must let you know something about the position she occupies in relation to the British Constitution. Xow what is the British Constitution ? You hear its name thundered forth on the hustings, at meet- ings, at debates, and perhaps you talk about it your- selves without understanding very well its mean- ing. "What, then, is this British Constitution? I will try to explain it to you. The political writers of antiquity recognised only three regular forms of government — namely, a Democracy in which the sovereign power is vested in the people, as is the case in the United States; Aristocracy, in which the supreme powder is confined to a few members of the community distinguished by birth or wealth, as was formerly the case in Venice ; and Monarchy, in which sovereign authority is wielded by a single person, as is the case in Eussia, Turkey, &c. These three species of government have ail of them their various good and bad points. Democracies are usually best calculated to direct the end of a law, aristocracies to invent the means by which that law is to be obtained, and monarchies to carry those means into execution. The British Constitu- THE BKITISH CONSTITUTION. 5 tion, however, conforms to none of the above defi- nitions, but is a mixed government formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each. This mixed government we call a limited monarchy — that is, a monarchy in which the Crown is not absolute, but must rule according to the usages of the Constitution, and in subjection to the laws of the realm. This form of government is one peculiarly suited to the character and temperament of the British people. A democracy, however popular among certain classes of our nation at first, would soon lose its authority, from the want of that social influence which is so dear to the English in general. No government in England would long continue popular whose members were taken entirely from the sons of the people. On the other hand, a government purely aristocra- tic would be one little calculated to further the interests of the nation at large, from the nature of its exclusive policy ; whilst an absolute mon- archy, as the history of England plainly shows, has ever been detested by the people as contrary to the very spirit of our Constitution, for Englishmen are subjects and not slaves. But a government like ours, in which the executive power is lodged in the Sovereign, while the legislative power is in- 6 Tin: QUF.F.N. tnistcd to llic Three Estates of the realm,* unites in itself the chief elements of democracy, aristocracy, and absolute monarchy, and hence is the most perfect plan of government that could possibly be adopted, for in no other form could we find a more impartial system *of administration. Were the supreme power placed in any one of the three branches separately, we should be exposed to the faults of either absolute monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. On the other hand, were the supreme power intrusted to any two of these three branches to the exclusion of the third, we should be none the less liable to evils, though of a different kind. If, for instance, all power were confined to the Sove- reign and the House of Lords, our laws might be providently made and well executed, but they would not, in all probability, have always the good of the people in view. Again, were the supreme power vested in the Sovereign and the House of Commons, Ave should want that " circum- spection and mediatory caution " which the wis- dom of the Peers secures, and which have in many critical cases been exerted to protect the powers * The Three Estates of the realm are the Lords Temporal, the Lords Spiritual, and the Commons — not Queen, Lords, and Commons. SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE. 7 of tlie executive and legislative government from mutual encroachment. And if the supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two Houses of Parliament only, they might be tempted to abolish the kingly office altogether, or to greatly weaken the executive power. Thus you see how perfectly our constitutional government is united, so that nothing can endanger its welfare save the destruc- tion of those balances of power which maintain the different parts of our complex political system in equipoise. Hence you will, I have no doubt, readily perceive that when we talk about the Brit- ish Constitution we mean a form of government in which the supreme power is virtually in the laws, though the majesty of government and the adminis- tration are vested in a single person. And now, hav- ing made these remarks, let us examine the power and office of the Queen. Succession to the throne of England is hereditary, but with certain limitations, for the right of inheri- tance may from time to time be changed by Act of Parliament — a power which, you well know. Parlia- ment has exercised in various reigns. Then, again, the title to the throne, since the passing of the Act of Settlement in 1701, is conditional upon the heir- apparent being a member of the Church of England, 8 THE QUEEN. and of the issue of the Princess Sojihia of Hanover, who was a granddaughter of James I. No one professing the Popish religion, or being married to a Papist, can, by the Bill of liights, rule over these realms ; so that when you hear people talking about the government of Great Britain and Ireland being an hereditary monarchy, you will remember that it is not absolutely hereditary, because it may be sub- ject to limitations by Parliament if necessary, and is conditional upon the heir to the throne being a Protestant, and of a certain family. I suppose you all are well aware that there is a great Council assembled at Eome to decide whether the Pope is infallible or not ; and all of you being stanch Protestants, of course look upon infallibility in man as utter nonsense. But what will you think of me when I tell you that her ^Majesty is infallible ? Yes, that the King or Queen of England can do no ivrong is one of the great principles of the British Constitution. But this statement need not shock your religious principles, as her Majesty's infalli- bility is only political ; for whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to her, nor is she answerable for it personally to her people. The maxim that the Queen " can do no wrong," though it suuuds like a moral paradox, HER POLITICAL INFAI.LIBILITY. 9 simply meanSj that if auy mismanagement of Gov- ernment arises, the Queen is not to be "blamed, because all acts of the Crown are presumed to have been done by some minister responsible to Parlia- ment, Supposing — indeed it is a supposition ! — that her Majesty were to command some unlawful act to be performed, that command would be no excuse to the minister for a wrong administration of power. Lord Danby was impeached by Parlia- ment for a letter which contained a postscript in the King's own handwriting, declaring that that very letter had been written by his command. In order that the Queen may do no wrong, there is not a moment in her life, from her accession to her demise, during wliich there is not some one responsible to Parliament for her public conduct. The personal actions of her Majesty, not being acts of Government, are not under the cognisance of the law. But here you must remember that though the Queen is not personally responsible to any human tribunal for the exercise of the functions of royalty, yet these functions are regulated by law, and must be discharged for the public welfare, and not merely to gratify her personal inclinations. In fact, it is an express part of the common law of England that the Sovereign of these realms must 10 THE QUERN. «»ovcrn accoidinj^' to ];i\v. In tho reign of William III. it was declared by statute that the laws of England are the birthright of the English people, and tliat all kings and queens of this realm, together with their officers and ministers, are to administer the government of the same according to the said laws. And this statute has never been repealed. But long before AYilliam III. it had l)een one of our constitutional maxims that the King of England was never an absolute monarch. Bracton, who flourished in the reign of Henry III., wrote, " It is the law which makes the King. Let the King therefore render to the law what the law has vested in him with regard to others — dominion and power : for lie is not truly King where will and pleasure rule, and not the law." And again, " The Iving also hath a superior — namely, God ; and also the law, by which he was made a king." For thougli the Queen is our sovereign lord, she does not possess the sovereign authority of the common- wealth, because that is vested, not in her ]Majesty singly, but in the Queen, Lords, and Commons jointly. "Wlien her ^Majesty was crowned Queen of England, she took the following oath, which is called the Coronation Oath: — "The Archhislwp : ' Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the THE COEONATION OATH. 11 people of this kingdom of England, and tlie dom- inions thereto belonging, according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on,- and the laws and customs of the same?' Tlie Queen : '1 solemnly promise so to do.' Arclibishop : 'Will you to the utmost of your power cause law and justice, in mercy, to be executed in all your judgments?' Queen: '1 will.' ArchhisJiop : ' Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel, and the Protestant reformed religion established by the law ? And will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall apper- tain unto them, or any of them ?' Queen : ' All this I promise to do.' After this, the Queen, laying her hand iipon the Holy Gospels, said : ' The things which I have here before promised I will perform and keep : So help me God:' and then her Majesty kissed the look" But an English Sovereign is not only infallible but immortal. Now, perhaps, you will think that this is downright nonsense, because you know that our Sovereigns are just as likely to die as the poorest peasant in the land. And if they do not die, what have become of our Norman, Planta- 12 THK QCKKN. genet, Liincastiiaii, Yorkist, Tudor, Stuart, aud Iluiioveriuu kings ? No, say you, we cannot quite swallow that, though we do belong to the "stupid party." l>ut you see, when I told you that the Queen was infallible, I meant only politically ; and so when I say that an English Sovereign is immortal, I mean only in a political and not in a natural sense. You have often read of the phrase, the Kinrj never dies; and it means simply this, that immediately upon the decease of the reigning prince in liis natural capacity, liis kingly office is vested at once in his heir, who is from that very moment King to all intents and pui-poses. So you see that it is not the king personally who never dies, but his title and office. When we talk of the demise of the crown, we only mean that in conse- quence of the disunion of the King's natural body from his body politic, the kingdom is demised or transferred to his successor, and hence the royal dignity remains perpetual. In addition to the Queen being politically infallible and immortal, her Majesty is also legeiUy omnipresent; for as she is considered i\\Q fountain of justice and general conservator of the peace of the kingdom, she is, in the eyes of the law, supposed always to be present in her various courts of jus- HER LEGAL OMNIPEESENCE. ]3 tice. So that when you enter a law court and take your hat off, it is not merely out of respect to the judge or magistrate on the bench, but to the imagined presence of the Queen. Should you or I ever have the misfortune to be committed for con- tempt of court, we should be punished, not only because we treated with contempt the judge or magistrate, but the Queen, whose representative such judge or magistrate is. The original power of judicature is lodged in society at large, but as justice could not be very well rendered to every one by the people collectively, every nation commits that power to certain select magis- trates. In England this authority has immemo- rially been exercised by the Sovereign, or his or her substitutes, the judges. Our monarchs have, however, delegated for many ages their judicial power to the judges, who, in their several courts, are the depositaries of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have a stated jurisdiction regulated by certain and established rules which the Crown itself cannot now alter but by Act of Parliament. And here you must remember that though the Queen is supposed to be present in all her courts of justice, her Majesty cannot personally assume to decide any case, civil or criminal, but 14 THE gUEKN. must leave such decision to her judges. And wlieu any judicial act is referred to the Queen by any Act of Parliament, it is understood to he done in some court of justice according to the law. So you see that the Queen is not the author of justice, but only the distributor, being, as it were, the steward of the public to dispense it to whom it is due : in fact, her Majesty is not the spring but the reservoir whence right and equity are conducted by a thou- sand channels to every individual. You have often seen in the daily papers, among the law intelligence, the Queen versus, and then the name of the person prosecuted. Perhaps this has puzzled you, and you cannot make out why her INIajesty should appear in the capacity oi prosccutoi\ Well, it is very simple. All offences are deemed to be theoretically against either the peace, crown, or dignity of the Queen. And though these offences seem to be rather against the kingdom than the Crown, yet as the public has delegated all its powers with regard to the execution of the laws to one visible magistrate, all affronts to those powers are offences against her ^Majesty, to whom they are so delegated. Hence the Queen is the proper person to prosecute for all public offences, as she is the one injured in the eye of the law. And for this THE FOUNTAIN OF HONOUK. 15 reason her Majesty lias the power to pardon ; for it is only fair that the one who is injured should have the power of forgiving. As her Majesty is what is termed the fountain of justice, so also is she the fountain of honour. The Queen of these realms can alone create a peer, baronet, or knight, or confer privileges upon private persons. It is also in the power only of her Ma- jesty to erect corporations, whereby a number of private persons are united together, and enjoy many powers and immunities in their political capacity which otherwise they could not possess. Xo char- ter, however, conferring political power or franchise in Great Britain or her colonies, can be granted by the Crown without the concurrence of Parliament. The Queen is the head of the army and navy, and in this capacity has the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies; but since 1688 this prerogative has been subjected to such constitu- tional restraints that it is impossible it can be exercised to the detriment of English liberty. As her Majesty is head of the army, so is she head of the Church established in England. She convenes and dissolves all ecclesiastical synods or convocations, and nominates to vacant bishoprics and certain other ecclesiastical preferments. All in THE QUEEN. appellate authority ^vllicll, previous to the Keforma- tion, was exercised over members of the Established Church by tlio. Pope, is now vested in the Crown of England, and ever}' ecclesiastical court in England must be held in the name of her Majesty. By the laws of our land, the Queen is also re- garded as the arbiter of domestic commerce ; but this branch of the royal prerogative is now mainly exercised by the Board of Trade, which is specially charged to superintend all Government measures brought before Parliament relating to trade and commerce. As regards foreign commerce, that is left to the law of merchants. The Queen, being the representative of her people, has the sole power of sending ambassadors to foreign states, and of receiving ambassadors at home. And in her Majesty is vested alone the right of making treaties and alliances, and of declaring war and peace. Thus, Gentlemen, you see that our gracious !Ma- jesty, whom some people wish to make out is a mere state puppet, has some power and authority not- withstanding. Perhaps you say. All very well ; but how about Parliament ? Cannot Parliament do ever}i:hiug, and make the Queen of no account ? "Well, let us look into the question a little. But THEOEY OF EOYAL IMPERSONALITY. 17 you must remember, when you talk about Parlia- ment, that the Queen herself is a constituent part of the supreme legislative power, and that she has the prerogative of rejecting such provisions in Par- liament as she judges improper. Since the system of Parliamentary government, consequent upon the Eevolution of 1688, has be- come fully developed, the public authority of the Crown in England is only exercised in acts of repre- sentation, or through the medium of ministers, who are responsible to Parliament for every public act of her Majesty, as well as for the general policy which they have been called upon to administer. This is termed the theory of royal impersonality, which, from not being properly understood, has given rise to various misrepresentations concerning the true place and position the Queen occupies in the government of the state. Prior to 1688 the government of England was mainly carried on by virtue of the royal prerogative — that is to say, by the king in person, with the advice of his ministers, who were responsible only to their Sovereign for the ordinary conduct of public affairs. This, as you well know, occasioned frequent contests be- tween the Crown and Parliament, which at one time resulted in the horrors of civil war. But the B 18 TIIK gUKKN. development of the Constitution, effected Ly tlie Eevolutiou of 1G88, has resulted in the transference of the force of tlie State from the Crown to the House of Commons. Instead of government by prero'jatice, we have government Ly Parlianicnt ; but in all cases the sanction of the Queen is neces- sary for the passing of any measure. So that the leading principles of the British constitution, as now interpreted, are the personal irresponsibility of the sovereign, the responsibility of ministers, and the inquisitorial power of Parliament. Now, you often hear it said that the Ministry is the real Sovereign of this country, and that to it the whole of the executive power is assigned. This is not the case. Her Majesty retains full discretionary powers for deliberating and determining upon every recommendation which is tendered for her sanction by her ministers ; and as every important act of administration must be submitted for the approval of the Crown, her IMajesty is enabled to exercise a considerable control over the government of the country. It is true that the Crown seldom refuses to act upon the advice deliberately pressed upon it by its servants ; but the power of the Queen to con- trol the measures of her ministers could be exercised at any moment if the exercise became necessary, and HEE POWER TO REJECT LAWS. 19 was sanctioned by the approbation of the country. Should the Crown ever refuse to accept the advice of its minister, the inevitable consequence to the minister would be the tender of his resignation. But unless the views of the Crown find a response from the nation at large, and are accepted by Parlia- ment, they cannot ultimately prevail, for no policy can be carried out by the government of England but such as meets with the sober approval of Par- liament and of the people. Lord Palmerston said, " It is a fundamental error to suppose that the power of the Crown to reject laws has ceased to exist. . . . That power survives as before, but it is exercised in a different manner. Instead of being exercised upon the laws presented for the royal assent, it is exercised by anticipation in the debates in Parliament. It is delegated to those who are the responsible advisers of the Crown; and it is therefore not possible that a law passed by the two Houses should be presented to the Crown, and should then by the Crown be refused. And why is this ? Because it cannot be imagined that a law should have received the consent of both Houses of Parliament, in which the responsible ministers of the Crown are sitting, debating, acting, and voting, unless those who advise the Crown have agreed to 20 THE QUKKN. that law, and are tlierefore prepared to counsel the sovereign to assent to it." And on this point ^Ir Gathorne Hardy says, " Her Majesty has no consti- tutional right to alxlicate that part of her prero- gative wliich entitles her to put a veto upon any measure she thinks fit. . . . Nor is this veto of the English monarch an empty form. It is not difficult to conceive the occasion when, supported by the sympathies of a loyal people, its exercise might defeat an unconstitutional ministry and a corrupt Parliament." Again, the Queen has the unquestioned power of choosing her responsible ministers ; and the con- tinuance of the royal confidence in an existing Ministry is an essential requisite to its remaining in office. Should the Ministry exhibit internal dissensions, or differ from the Sovereign, or from the country at large ; or should their measures be ruinous to the interests of the nation, or there exist a general feeling of distrust of them through- out the country, her Majesty can dismiss them. The Houses of Parliament have, it is true, the undeniable right to advise the Queen on this matter ; but this right cannot be pressed so far as to render her Majesty accountable to Parliament for her conduct in changing her ad^'isers. All PRIME MINISTER NOMINATED BY HER, 21 ministers chosen by the Sovereign are entitled to receive from Parliament, if not implicit confiUence, at least a fair trial. And that this has been the practice of the Constitution the political student will easily see by examining the questions that arose upon the appointments of Mr Pitt as Prime Minister in 1783, of Mr Addington in 1801, of the Duke of Portland in 1807, of Sir Eobert Peel in .1834, and of the late lamented Earl of Derby in 1852, 1858, and in 1866, In all these instances the Prime Ministers were nominated solely by the Sovereign, in the face of a hostile majority in the House of Commons. It is now universally con- ceded that the Prime Minister should be the free choice of the Crown, and this is almost the only act which is the personal act of the Sovereign ;* yet, as no minister can carry on the government of the country for any length of time who does not pos- sess the confidence of Parliament, this selection is hence practically limited. And as incoming ministers are held responsible to Parliament for the policy which occasioned the retirement of their predecessors in office, ample security is offered that * *' I offered no opinion as to the choice of a successor. That is almost the only act which is the personal act of the sovereign ; it is for the sovereign to determine in whom her confidence sliall be placed." — Sir R. Peel on his resignation of office. 22 THE QUEEN. no ininisl*M-i:il cliMii^fs Avill 1)C effected Ly the antliority of the Crown l)nt sucli as commenrl themselves to the judgment of Parliament. Witli regard to the appointment of the other members of the Ministry, tlie Sovereign has no authoritative voice in their selection ; that duty is left to the Prime ^Minister, who cliooses liis colleagues, and then submits their names for royal approval. Of course, the expression of a strong personal feeling on the part of the Crown has great weight in ex- cluding a person from office or including him — at least for a time. Thus Fox was for a long time excluded from the Cabinet on account of George III.'s dislike to him. In the ]\Iinistr}' of Addington, in 1801, Lord Eldon became Lord Chan- cellor owing to the M'ish of George III. jNIr Can- ning was for some time excluded from the Cabinet owing to the dislike of George IV. towards him. In 1828, on the formation of the Wellington Coali- tion Ministry, George IV. objected to receive Lord Grey into tlie Cabinet. And in 18.35, the late Lord r>rougliam was not replaced in the office of Lord Chancellor, because he was personally displeasing to "William IV. However, all considerations on the part of the Crown must ultimately yield to a regard for the public interests and the Sovereign must HER EELATIONS WITH THE MINISTEY. 23 be prepared to accept as his or her advisers those selected by the Prime Minister. Shonkl difficulties occur in the formation of a Ministry, the Queen can send for any peer or privy cou.ncillor for advice, whose counsel she might con- sider serviceable to her in the emergency. Thus, upon the resignation of the Eussell Ministry in 1851, her Majesty sent for the Duke of Wellington, not for the purpose of intrusting him with the formation of a Cabinet, but that she might take counsel from him ; and again, in 1852, upon the resignation of the Derby Ministry, the Queen sent for the Marquess of Lansdowne for a similar pur- pose. For all advice, however, so given, the peer or privy councillor is liable to be called to account by Parliament, should such advice be followed by consequences requiring parliamentary interposition. The Ministry once formed, the members of the Administration are formally appointed to their offices by the Queen, at a meeting of the Privy Council held especially for the purpose. They are introduced by the Prime Minister to her Majesty, and then receive the seals of office from the royal hands. It is always in the power of the Crown, acting through its responsible advisers, to dismiss from office a minister of state, and Parliament has 24 THE QUEEN. nu ri^lit to interfere in such a case unless this prerogative has been exercised in an arbitrary manner. Thus, in 1795, Earl Fitzwilliam, when Lord - Lieutenant of Ireland, was recalled on ac- count of having favoured a policy with regard to Eoman Catholic emancipation which was em- barrassing to the Government. The motives of the recall were demanded by Parliament, but the Ministry refused to enter into particulars, as the power of dismissing its servants without assigning any cause was vested in the Crown, and their de- termination was sustained by large majorities in both Houses of Parliament. The Prime Minister, on account of his being the proper medium of com- munication between the Sovereign and the Ad- ministration, owing to his position as head of the Government and the minister personally selected by the Queen, is bound to inform her Majesty of all events of political importance — such as decisions of Parliament on matters of public concern, and those of the Cabinet on public policy, and to take the royal pleasure thereupon. Xo important act of Government, committing her Majesty to a par- ticular course, can be performed by ministers with- out the knowledge and consent of the Queen. Thus, in 1800, Mr Pitt, by neglecting this rule. HEK CONTEOL OYER THE GOVEKNMENT. 25 lost office and his King's confidence ; and in our own times, Lord Palmerston, in 1851, was rehioved from the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on account of having written and sent to its destination an important despatch without first having submitted it to her Majesty. In minor matters, the ministers have a separate discretion in their several departments. As a proof of the effective control which the Crown exercises over the govern- ment of the country, every day despatch- boxes containing official reports, correspondence, &c., are forwarded to her Majesty for the royal approval or signature from the offices of the Principal Secretaries of State, and the Admiralty, and from the Prime Minister. The consideration of these papers forms an important part of the daily routine of the Queen's labours. Till 1862, every separate com- mission for officers of the army, marines, &c., was signed by her Majesty ; but that duty now devolves upon the Commander-in-Chief and a Secretary of State. Should circumstances occur rendering the personal exercise of the royal functions incon- venient or impossible, the powers of the Crown may be delegated to commissioners or other sub- stitutes, provided that a special authority under the royal sign-manual be issued for the purpose. For- 26 THE QUKEN. inerly lords-justices and guardians were appointed for the administration of the government during tlie absence of the Sovereign from the realm ; but owing to royal visits abroad being of so infrequent occurrence, and the facilities afforded by railways, this custom has fallen into desuetude. At least, when her ^fajesty, in 1843, visited the King of the French, and in IS-to visited Germany, such officers were not appointed. From one duty which the sovereigns of England had in former times to perform the Queen is exempt. Her Majesty never attends at meetings of the Cabinet, owing to the necessity of the deliberations of the Council being private and con- fidential. The absence of the Sovereign on these occasions arose from the accidental circumstance of the inability of George I. to express himself in the English language. When formerly the mon- arch of these realms took an immediate part in the direction of public affairs, no Cabinet Council could be held without his presence ; but under the exist- ing system of government through responsible min- isters, the absence of the Sovereign during such meetings is in entire conformity with our theory of constitutional government. Having endeavoured to show the power of her SHE ONLY TO SUMMON PARLIA:\IEXT. 27 Majesty over her ministers, let us briefly regard her relations with the Parliament. In the first *place, her Majesty is a constituent part of Parliament, as I have already told you — Parliament being com- posed of the King or Queen, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons. The legal exist- ence of Parliament results altogether from the exer- cise of the royal prerogative. Her Majesty only has the power of summoning it; it must com- mence its deliberations at the time appointed by the Queen, and cannot continue them longer than she may allow. There have been only two in- stances in which the Lords and Commons have met of their own authority — namely, previous to the restoration of Charles IL, and at the Eevolution in 1688. There is one contingency upon which the Parlia- ment may meet without summons under the au- thority of an Act of Parliament. It was provided in the reign of Queen Anne that "in case there should be no Parliament in being at the time of the demise of the Crown, then the last preceding Par- liament should immediately convene and sit at "Westminster, as if the said Parliament had never been dissolved." By a statute in the reign of George III., a Parliament so revived would only 28 TIIK QUEEN. coiitiiiiu; ill existence for six mouths, if not sooner dissolved. Before I'arliiuiioiit can enter upon its duties it must be opened by the personal presence of the Queen, or by her delegated authority. At the beginning of every new Parliament, and of every session after a prorogaticm, the cause of summons must be declared to both Houses either by her Majesty or by commissioners appointed to repre- sent her, in a speech from the Throne. Till this has been done, neither House can enter upon any business. Since tlie introduction of the Ministers of the Crown into Parliament, much of the direct autliority of tlie sovereigns of England has been curtailed. The Sovereign is no longer called upon to perform ungracious acts towards liis Parliament, or held personally accountable for a policy distaste- ful to that body. There is now no necessity for invoking the royal veto for the rejection of bills disapproved of by the Crown, because the constitu- tional influence of the Ministry generally suffices to control their fate. In fact, the royal veto upon bills in Parliament has not been exercised for up- wards of 150 years ; but, as 1 have just said, circum- stances might arise at any time that would justify the Crown in resorting to such a coui-se. DELATIONS OF PARLIAMENT WITH THE CKOWX. 29 According to Earl Russell, it is the privilege, and even the duty, of the two Houses of Parliament to advise the Queen upon whatever subject it is her duty to act — a statement fully borne out by Burke, who says it is the privilege of Parliament to inter- fere by authoritative advice and admonition upon every act of executive government witliout excep- tion. You must remember here, thougli, that Par- liament is designed for counsel, not for rule — for control, and not for administirdion. Mr Canning defined the House of Commons to be a council of control as well as a council of advice ; and declared that in cases of adequate importance, especially where the prerogative was concerned, it should en- deavour by the timely interposition of advice to prevent the necessity of control. Any direct inter- ference by Parliament in the details of government is inconsistent with her Majesty's authority, and a departure from the fundamental principles of the British Constitution. The supreme executive autho- rity belongs to the Crown, nor do the measures adopted by its ministers in the exercise of this authority require the previous sanction of Parlia- ment. Parliament, when complaining of a griev- ance, or expressing its sense upon some objectionable system of administration, is perfectly competent to 30 THE yUEEX. approach tliu Crowii by address ■svitli advice upou the subject. Thus, iu 1836, the House of Commons begged liis jMajesty to discourage Orauge Lodges and secret societies generally, which led to the formal dissolution of the Orange Society of the United Kingdom. Again, in 1856, an address to the Queen for the issue of a commission to deter- mine the site of the New National Gallery was carried against the ^liuistry, and a commission granted by the Crown. Various other precedents also confirm this point. However, as long as any existing Government retains the confidence of Par- liament, it is unwise as a general principle to inter- fere with it in matters of administration. Should the Crown itself attempt to encroach upon the functions of Parliament, it is the duty of that august body to interpose, and to call to account the Minis- try wliich is responsible for any excess of executive authority. Her Majesty can neither alter, add to, nor dispense with any existing law of the realm; but iu times of emergency the Crown, acting under the advice of responsible ministers, may properly anticipate the futui-e action of Parliament by a tem- porary suspension of certain classes of statutes. Such power is exercised by Orders in Council or Royal Proclamations. ORDERS IN COUNCIL. 31 " A large proportion of what may be called the details of legislation rests upon the authority of Orders in Council. ... As examples of the variety and importance of the subjects to which the form of quasi-legislation is applicable, it may be stated that Orders in Council, or Eoyal Proclamations * which are usually issued in pursuance of the same, are promulgated for the assembling, prorogation, and dissolution of Parliament ; for declaring war ; for confirming or disaUowinr^ the Acts of Colonial Legislatures ; for giving effect to treaties ; for ex- tending the terms of patents ; for granting charters of incorporation to companies or municipal bodies ; for proclaiming ports, fairs, &c. ; for deciding causes on appeal; for creating ecclesiastical districts; for granting exemptions from the law of mortmain ; for the regulation of the Board of Admiralty, and of appointments to offices in the various departments of state ; for creating new offices, and defining the quahfications of persons to fill the same ; and for declaring the period at which certain Acts of Par- liament (the operation of which has been left by the legislature to the discretion of the Queen in Council) shall be enforced. When the Sovereign declares war * A Iloyal Proclamation cannot make a law, but it can add force to a law already made. 32 THE QUEEN. against a foreign Power, proclamations are usually issued, materially altering the ordinary laws relating to trade, and imposing rules for the conduct of trade with neutrals or belligerents. Proclamations are also issued to fix the mode, time, and circumstances of putting into execution certain laws, the operation of wliich has been left to the discretion of the exe- cutive government ; or, for the purpose of making formal declaration of existing laws and penalties, and of the intention of Government to enforce the same ; or, to appoint and direct the keeping of a day of observance, whether as a fast or thanks- giving." Abstractly, however, the Crown has no constitu- tional right to issue either Orders in Council or Pi.oyal Proclamations which appear to sanction any departure from the laws of the land, but trusts to the good sense of the people and to Parliament to in- demnify the issuers. And Parliament has always been willing to indemnify the Government for the timely exercise of authority for the public welfare, although it may have led to an overstepping of the constitutional limits of executive power. Xow let us see what control her Majesty has over the public expenditure. No doubt you are all aware, that from a very early period in the history HER CONTKOL OVER THE REVENUES. 33 of England the right of taxation, and the granting of supplies for the public service, belong exclusively to Parliament. You know that in Magna Charta it is enacted that " no scutage or aid shall be imposed in our kingdom unless by the general council ;" that in the statute Dc tallagio non concedendo it is de- clared that " no tallage or aid shall be levied without the assent of the archbishop, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land ;" that in the Bill of Rights it is guaranteed that " no man be compelled to make any gift, loan, or bene- volence or tax, without common consent by Act of Parliament ;" and that it is finally established by the Act of Settlement that " money levied for the use of the Crown, without grant of Parliament, is illegal." Thus, then, the Crown is entirely dependent upon ParKament for its revenues ; but, though dependent, it has a direct control over all supplies to be raised in the House. The true doctrine on this head has been briefly stated by IMay, in the following words : " The Crown, acting with the ad-\'ice of its respon- sible ministers, being the executive power, is charged with the management of all the revenues of the country, and with all payments for the public ser- vice. The Crown, therefore, in the first instance, makes known to the Commons the pecuniary neces- c 34 THE QUEEN. sities of the Government, and the Commons grant such aids or supplies as are required to satisfy these demands, and provide by taxes, and by tlie appro- priation of other sources of the public income, the ways and means to meet the supplies which are granted by them. Thus the Crown demands money, the Commons grant it, and the Lords assent to the grant. But the Commons do not vote money unless it be required by the Crown ; nor impose nor aug- ment taxes unless they be necessary for meeting the supplies which they have voted, or are about to vote, and for supplying general deficiencies in the revenue. The Crown has no concern in the nature or distribution of taxes ; but the foundation of all parliamentary taxation is, its necessity for the pub- lic service, as declared by the Crown through its constitutional advisers." Xo money can be voted by Parliament for any purpose whatever except at the demand of the Crown ; no petition for any sum of money relating to the public service can be re- ceived by Parliament unless recommended by the Crown. Parliament cannot proceed upon any mo- tion for a grant or charge upon the public revenue, whether payable out of the Consolidated Fund or out of moneys to be provided by Parliament, unless recommended from the Crown ; and all propositions PARLIAMENT AND THE SUPPLIES. 35 for the levying of a new tax or duty, or the repeal of an existing impost, must emanate from thb min- isters of the Crown. On the other hand, Parliament will not permit any person to lend money to the Crown, or to any department of State, for public purposes, without its sanction. All money transac- tions between the Bank of England and the Treasury, without express parliamentary authority, are forbid- den. Advances out of the public funds can only be made by authority of Parliament, except in certain very special cases. The Crown cannot remit any loans or debts due to it by foreign powers, corpora- tions, or individuals, without the consent of Parlia- ment, though the conduct of the Crown in this re- spect has been occasionally irregular. When a sum of money to which the Crown is entitled is surren- dered by a foreign power, it is customary to sur- render the same by treaty, which is not contingent upon the assent of Parliament. But when the Crown undertakes to pay a sum of money, such payment is made conditional upon the assent of Parliament. I daresay many of you remember reading in Eng- lish history about the conflicts between the King and Parliament respecting the question of granting supplies. Since the introduction of parliamentary government, however, the demands of the Crown for 36 Tin: QUEEN. supplies for particular services have seldom been re- fused. As a general rule, whatever sums are required for tho use of the State, the Commons freely grant ; though it is always in the power of the House to refuse to grant any particular item until satisfied with the reasons given for it. The House of Com- mons lias the right of withholding altogether the supplies asked for on the part of the Crown ; and before the introduction of jmrliamentary govern- ment, as you all well know, this power w^as often made use of to wrest from an arbitrary' monarch the redress of grievances. But now there is no longer any need to resort to such an extreme measure. The precedent of 1784 is the solitary instance since 1688 in which the Commons have ex- ercised their power of delaying the supplies, and then the experiment failed, and has never been repeated. Though all money matters ought first to receive the sanction of Parliament, yet there are certain occasions when the Crown may be compelled to de- fray expenses which have not been provided for by Parliament, and hence assume the responsibility of incurring expenditure without the p^e^'ious know- ledge of Parliament. Such was the case when Mr Pitt, at the commencement of the French revolu- tionary war, adv^anced upwards of £1,200,000 to THE CONSOLIDATED FUND. 37 Germany without the knowledge of Parliament; and again in 1859 and 1860, when there had been an excess of expenditure of more than £1,000,000 not voted by Parliament. To meet these unforeseen disbursements, provision is made by means of the " Treasury Chest " and the " Civil Contingencies Fund." The " Treasury Chest " is a fund maintained to supply specie required by the treasury chests in the colonies, and to make the necessary advances for carrying on the public service at the various naval and military stations. This fund is Imiited to £1,300,000. The "Civil Contingencies Fund" is limited to £120,000, and is for the purpose of de- fraying unforeseen expenditure for civil services at home. There is also another fund, that for " Secret Services," but the greater part of the amount is annually voted in supply. In former times the taxes which were granted by Parliament were handed over to the King, to be expended by him in main- taining his state, and for keeping up the military and naval services. He had also estates in various parts of the country, called the croivn-lands, the rents and profits of which were paid into his treasury. The revenue, or annual income of the country derived from the taxes imposed by Parliament, and the in- come from these estates (with the exception of the ayi7?« 3S THE QUEEX. Ducby of Lancaster, wliicli belongs to her Majesty, not as Queen of England, but as Duchess of Lan- caster) is now collected into one fund called the Consolidated Fund. The first charge upon this fund is the payment of interest upon the Na- tional Debt called the Funds, and upon the un- funded debt. The next charge is an allowance called the Civil List, apportioned to the Queen for the support of her household and the dignity of her crown. This was fixed by statute at £385,000, to be paid annually, and to be appropriated as follows : Her Majesty's privy pui'se, £GO,000 ; salaries of her Majesty's Household, and retired allowances, £131,000 ; ex- penses of the household, £172,500 ; royal bounty and special services, £13,200 ; pensions, £12,000 ; and miscellaneous, £8040. On the Consolidated Fund are likewise charged various sums allowed to members of the royal family. The sum for carrying on the civil government, including the salaries of the Ministers of State, judges, and others, is also charged upon the Consolidated Fund, the remainder of which is paid into the Exchequer, for the public service, to defray the expenses of our army, naxx, civil service, &c. I have said that all naval and military authority HEK RELATIONS "WITH OUR FORCES. 39 is centred in the Sovereign, but subject to such con- stitutional restraints that it cannot be exercised to the detriment of English liberty. By the Bill of Eights it is expressly enacted " that the raising or keeping a standing army within the Idngdom, un- less it be with consent of Parliament, is against law." This consent to the continual existence of a standing army is given only for the period of one year at a time by a resolution of the House of Com- mons. By modern practice, the numbers of men to be employed in the army and navy are annually fixed by resolutions in Committee of Supply, and afterwards included in respect to the army in the Mutiny Act, and in respect to the navy in the Act of Appropriation. It is a direct infringement of the constitution for the Crown to raise more men for the land and sea forces than have been voted by Parlia- ment; but upon occasions of great emergency the Government have assumed the responsibility of in- creasing the army or navy beyond the numbers actually voted, and have afterwards applied to Par- liament to make good the deficiency in the supplies granted for this service. The constitutional security against the abuse of the royal prerogative in the direction and control of our forces lies in the general responsibility of ministers, and the necessity for 40 THE QUEEN. the sanction of Parliament to the continued exist- ence of the army and navy, ])y the annual appro- priations for the support of these services, and the annual renewal of the Mutiny Acts. Parliament has the full right of interfering in all cases of abuse; of inquiring into the causes of disasters befalling our arms in "vvar; and of advising upon all general questions affecting the wellbeing and efficiency of the army and navy. The Crown has the power, through a responsible minister, of dismissing any of its officers from the army or navy at its own dis- cretion, and Mithout assigning any reason for the Act. In fact, this power is so absolute that even if an officer is acquitted by a court of inquiry, the Crown is justified in removing him from office, upon the advice of a minister responsible to Parliament. In cases of insurrection or rebellion, the Crown is entitled to proclaim martial law M-hen the ordinary authorities are unable to quell disturbances. This power being invoked by the Sovereign, or her repre- sentative in any colony or district within the realm, the ordinary laws are therein suspended for a time, and an absolute discretion is vested in the military authorities with regard to their proceedings for the restoration of peace and good order. ^Ministers of the Crown, however (through w^hose instrumental- HER RIGHT OF DECLARING WAR. 41 ity resort should be had under any circumstances to martial law), are responsible to Parliament for their conduct, and must be able to justify their acts under penalty of impeachment or removal from office. Thus in 1865, as you well know, Governor Eyre was removed from office, owing to his having been censured by a Eoyal Commission for permit- ting unjustifiable severity whilst suppressing an insurrection in the island of Jamaica, when under martial law. I now come to the power of the Sovereign with regard to the right of declaring war and making peace. This power is vested exclusively in the Crown, but, like all other prerogatives, must be ex- ercised by the advice and under the responsibility of ministers who are accountable to Parliament, and are liable to impeachment for the improper conduct of a war. The consent of Parliament is not formally required by the constitution, either to the com- mencement of a war or the conclusion of a peace ; but as Parliament furnishes all supplies, and con- trols the numbers of our army and navy, it becomes difficult for this prerogative to be improperly used. If hostilities about to be entered into are likely to involve serious consequences, it is the duty of ministers to ask for the advice and co-operation of 42 THE QUKEN. Parliament in carrying on the ^va^. Parliament is, however, at perfect liberty to offer advice unfavour- able to the Ministry, and to refuse its assistance. Thus, in 1782, the American war was brought to a close, contrary to the wishes and intentions of George III., by the interposition of the House of Commons. In 1791, Mr Pitt had to abandon an intended war with Pussia, owing to the adverse opinions of the House of Commons; and in 1857, the House of Commons condemned the policy of the war with China, which occasioned a dissolution of Parliament, though the result of such condemnation was in favour of the Ministry. However, with re- gard to this liberty of Parliament, it appears that if the Government enter upon a foreign war in defence of the honour or interests of the State, it is the duty of Parliament to afford the Crown an adequate sup- port ; for in 1854, upon the declaration of the war with Paissia, ^Mr Disraeli said — " If her Majesty informs us that she has found it necessary to engage in war, I hold that it is not an occasion when we are to enter into the policy or impolicy of the advice by which her Majesty has been guided. It is our duty to rally round the throne, and on a subsequent occasion to question the policy of the Ministry." And now, Gentlemen, I come to the last act of HEE CONTEOL OVEE FOEEIGN AFFAIRS. 43 the royal prerogative whicli T intend discussing in my lecture to-night — the power of the Crown with regard to foreign affairs. And, firstly, her Majesty is the constitutional representative of the nation in its intercourse with foreign powers. The medium of communication between the Queen and the re- presentatives of foreign nations is the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose duty it is to convey the opinions and conclusions of the Government upon matters arising out of the relations of the British Crown with other countries. Parliament has to be informed from time to time of everything which is necessary to explain the policy of the Government, in order that it may interpose with advice or remonstrance. Of course, a certain amount of discretion is always allowed to the Government in communicating or withholding docu- ments asked for by Parliament. Occasionally the Government have laid before Parliament papers in regard to disputes still pending, but this is only in especial cases ; Parliament has, however, no right to dictate the answers to such disputes. Private and confidential correspondence, and autograph letters from sovereign princes to her Majesty, are not com- municated to Parliament. The Queen, as repre- sentative of her people, has, as I have already said. 44 THE QUEEN. the exulusive right of sending ambassadors to foreign States, and of receiving ambassadors at home. This prerogative is unquestionable, and should not be interfered witli by either House of Parliament, except in cases of manifest corruption or abuse. It would be a breach of this prerogative for either House of Parliament to communicate directly with any foreign power : all such com- munications must be made officially through the Government, and by a responsible minister of the Crown. Secondly, it is the peculiar function of her Majesty to make treaties and alliances with foreign states, acting under the advice of her responsible ministers. The sanction or ratification by Parlia- ment of any treaty is not necessary to constitute its validity. Parliament has, however, the right of withholding its sanction to those parts of a treaty requiring a legislative enactment to give it force, or to impeach the ministers of the Crown, who are responsible for the treaty if it disapproves of the measure. Our history contains numerous instances of the censure by Parliament of ministers of the Crown for misconduct of public affairs. Tims, in 1451 the Earl of Suffolk was impeached for making a peace without the assent of the Privy Council ; HER POWER OF INTERVENTION. 45 in 1529, among the articles against Wolsey were charges of carrying on diplomatic correspondence without the King's knowledge ; in 1701 the Earl of Oxford was impeached by the Commons for advising treaties for dividing the dominions of Spain, &c. Parliament has, however, no power to change or modify in any way a treaty itself. With regard to pending negotiations, if Parliament be satisfied with the general principles upon which such negotiations are being conducted, and approve of the general policy of the Government, it should abstain from all interference. Papers regarding pending negotiations with foreign powers are only communicated to Parliament at the discretion of the Crown. When the result of the negotiations conducted by ministers has been communicated to Parliament, it is the duty of both Houses to support or condemn those negotiations as they may deem the interests of the nation require. And now, lastly, let us look at the Crown's power of interfering with the internal concerns of foreign nations. This power, whenever occasion requires it, is always exercised by her Majesty, acting through the Secretary of State for Poreign Affairs. Great delicacy, however, is always neces- sary in all acts of intervention lest they should 46 THE QUEEN. irritate instead of conciliate. Direct interference by Parliament in the domestic concerns of a foreign country would be highly unconstitutional Should the Crown possess a distinct ground for interposi- tion in a domestic matter within a foreign territor}'', Parliament can address her ^Majesty to exercise that right ; but if the Ministry, on the grounds of political expediency, oppose such address, it should not be persevered in. Thus, in 1836 the House of Commons moved an address to King William IV. to intercede with the King of the French for the release of Prince Polignac and other state prisoners confined in prison ; but Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, declared such a step inexpedient, and the motion was withdrawn. But in 1832 and 18-42 the Ministry acquiesced in motions made in the House of Commons for addresses for copies of ukases issued by Eussia relating to the adminis- tration of Poland, because England had been party to a treaty in 1815 by which the condition of Poland had been regulated, and Pussia had acted in contravention to that treaty. During the present reign, three points, hitherto undetermined, have been decided by constitutional authority. The first is the right of her ^Majesty to employ a Private Secretary. Until 1805 no Eng- HER PRIVATE SECRETARY. 47 lish monarch ever required the services of a Private Secretary, but George III., owing to failure of sight, employed one for the first time — a precedent which was followed by George IV., "William IV., and our gracious Queen. This appointment has been opposed as unconstitutional, because it allows the secrets of the Cabinet to pass through a third per- son, and thus subjects the advice of ministers to their sovereign to the revision of his private secretary. Such appointment is, however, now justifiable, owing to the increasing amount of routine duty devolving upon an English Sovereign at the present day.* The second point is, that the great offices * The 'Saturday Review,' in an article on the death of General Grey, her Majesty's late Private Secretary, remarks : " The Private Secretary of the Queen has to lead a very laborious life, for the simple reason that the life of the Sovereign he serves is necessarily very laborious. He has the reward of doing really good work, and of doing it under the eyes of a person who can appreciate what he does. He has also the reward of exercising an important but very indirect influence over the course of public affairs. But it is a great mistake to suppose that the Queen's Private Secretary has power in the shape of commanding patron- age, or of influencing the mind of the Sovereign on questions where the head of the Ministry is brought into direct contact with the Queen. "What amount of influence he has will depend upon, not only on the man himself, but on the accidental circum- stances in which he may find himself. The Queen has an enor- mous amount of daily business to go through, . . . Every- 48 THE QUEEN. of the Court, and situations in the Household held Ly members of Parliament, should be included in the political arrangements made on a change of the Administration. The offices of Mistress of the Eobes and Ladies of the Bed-Chamber, \vhen held by ladies connected with the outgoing ministers, are resigned on a change of Ministry. And the tliird point is, tliat for the first time the constitutional position of a Prince-Consort has been defined as " the con- fidential adviser and assistant of a female sove- reign." And now, Gentlemen, I here conclude. Within the brief limits of a lecture I do not pretend to have exhausted my subject, but I have endeavoured to pass under review the duties and principal pre- rogatives of her Majesty, and the proper functions of Parliament in relation to them. I have endea- voured to show you that the supreme executive thing that is done in every department is made known to her, and her pleasure taken upon it. Much of the departmental business is, of course, mere routine, and the Queen has not really to keep a watch over it. But every important question arising in every department has to be brought before her, and in some departments the Sovereign has always taken an especial interest. Everything connected with the troops and with the fleet is watched with the iitmost vigilance by the Sovereign, and it is a part of the traditions of English Koyalty not to relax this viirilance." HOLDS NO NOMINAL OFFICE. 49 authority of the State in all matters, civil and military, together with jurisdiction and supremacy over all causes and persons ecclesiastical in the realm, belongs to her Majesty by virtue of her queenly ofSce. I have said that she is the fountain of all State authority, dignity, and honour, and the source of all political jurisdiction; that she is the head of the Imperial Legislature, which derives its existence from the Crown ; and that it is her Ma- jesty's especial prerogative to declare war and make peace, and also to contract alliances with foreign nations. But still I have left much unsaid, for volumes might be written upon the subject ; but if in my lecture to-night I have proved to you that the Queen of these realms holds a real and not a nominal oftice — that she is a substantive power in our mixed constitution, and not a State puppet in the hands of her ministers — my object in coming among you has been attained. God save the Queen ! LECTURE 11. THE MINISTRY. "A patriot both the king and country serves, Prerogative and privilege preserves ; Of each our laws the certain limit show, One must not ebb, nor th' other overflow ; Betwixt the Prince and Parliament we stand, The barriers of the State on either hand : May neither overflow, for then thty drown the land." — Dryden. " The patriot aims at his private good in the public : the knave makes the public subservient to his private interest. The former considers himself as part of a whole, the latter considers himself as the whole." "A man who hath no sense of God or conscience, would you make such a one guardian to your child ? If not, why guardian to the State?" "When the heart is right there is true patriotism." — BisuoP Berkeley, Maxims concerning Patriotism. Gentlemen, — As in my last lecture to you I stated that much of the power which formerly belonged to English sovereigns had, owing to the development of the system of parliamentaiy government, been DIVIDED INTO THREE CLASSES. 51 delegated to the hands of resposible ministers, I shall to-night try to explain to you who those min- isters are, what offices they control, and what is their exact constitutional position ; and in order to facilitate this explanation, I shall divide my sub- ject into three heads. I. The ]\Iinisters who are Privy Councillors ex officio. II. The Ministers who belong to that select com- mittee of the Privy Council which we call the " Cabinet Council ; " and III. The Ministers who are not Privy Councillors. Firstly. — Ever since the introduction of monar- chial institutions into Britain, the Sovereign has always been surrounded by a select band of confi- dential advisers to assist him or her in the govern- ment of the country. At no time could the Sover- eign act according to law, without advice, in the public concerns of the kingdom. The institution of the Crown of England and the institution of the Privy Council are coeval — that is to say, the one never existed without the other. At the era of the Norman Conquest, the King's Council, or, as we now call it, the Privy Council, was composed of certain select persons of the nobility and great 52 THE MINISTRY. officers of state, specially summoned by the royal command, and with whom the King usually advised in matters of state and government. At first the King's councillors, as confidential servants of the Crown, were present at every meeting of the High Court of Parliament, to advise upon matters judi- cial in the House of Lords ; but in the reign of Richard II. the Privy Council dissolved its judicial connection with tlie Lords, and assumed an inde- pendent jurisdiction of its own. To trace to you the rise and fall of the power of the Privy Council would be beyond the object of my lecture ; suffice it to say, that in the earlier stages of our history the Council, with a vigorous prince on the throne, became the mere instrument of his will ; and at other times its influence was exerted to curb the arbitrary exercise of kingly rule, and to aggrandise the authority of the ministers. The King's coun- cillors were pri\dleged to approach the Sovereign with advice or remonstrance upon any matter affect- ing the common weal. Through the instrumentality of the Chancellor they could refuse to give effect to the King's wishes or to legalise his grant, for from a very early period they had claimed to take cog- nisance of every grant or writ issued by the King ; and as the Great Seal was always in the custody of THE PRIVY COUNCIL. 53 the Chancellor, it could not be affixed to any docu- ment except by his hand. The business befote the Council was an extraordinary combination of the executive and legislative functions of the Govern- ment — grave affairs of state and questions of domes- tic and foreign policy, the preservation of the King's peace, the management of the finances, the affairs of aliens, the regulation of trade, the settle- ment of ecclesiastical disputes, and numerous other duties, appear to have formed part of its ordinary administrative labours. It was in the reign of Henry VI. that the King's Council first assumed the name of the " Privy Council," and it was also during the minority of this King that a select Council was gradually emerging from out of the larger body of the Privy Council, which ultimately resulted in the institution of our modern Cabinet. From the acces- sion of Henry VII. to the reign of Charles I. the Privy Council was wholly subservient to the royal will, and the instrument of unconstitutional and arbitrary proceedings. The first act of the Long Parliament was to deprive the Council of most of its judicial power, leaving, however, its consti- tution and political functions unchanged. Since the Eevolution of 1688 the Privy Council has dwindled into comparative insignificance, when con- 54 THK MINISTRY. trasted witli its ori^'inal authoritative position. Its judicial functions are now restrained within very narrow limits. The only relic of its ancient authority in criminal matters is its power of taking examinations, and issuing commitments for treason. It still, however, continues to exercise an original jurisdiction in advising the Crown concerning the grant of charters, and it has exclusively assumed the appellate jurisdiction over the colonies and depen- dencies of the Crown, which formerly appertained to the Council in Parliament Tlieoretically, the Privy Council still retains its ancient supremacy, and in a constitutional point of view is presumed to be the only legal and responsible Council of the Crown. Though, as I have just said, most of the high and important powers of the Privy Council have been curtailed, yet it still possesses no inconsiderable amount of its original functions, both in the pro- secution of public inquiries, and also in the dis- charge of special administrative duties. As her Majesty can only act through her privy councillors, or upon their advice, all the higher and more formal acts of administration must proceed from the authority of the Sovereign in CouncU, and their performance be directed by orders issued by the Sovereign at a meeting of the Pri\y Council POLITICAL ACTS "IN COUNCIL. 55 specially convened for that purpose. No rule can be laid down defining those political acts Of the Crown which may be performed upon the advice of particular ministers, or those which must be ex- ercised only "in Council" — the distinction de- pends partly on usage and partly on the wording of Acts of Parliament. The subjects generally disposed of by the authority of an Order in Council I have already specified to you in my lecture on the 'Queen.'* The law officers of the Crown are also invariably consulted upon such Orders, and are responsible for their legality. When the matter to be determined in Council re- lates to a mere question of administration — such as the creation of additional secretaries of state from time to time, and the appointment of the necessary establishments for the new departments — it is usual for a declaration of the Queen in Council to be made thereupon. Again, all declarations of, or public engagements by, the Sovereign, all consents to marriages by members of the royal family, all appointments of sheriffs for England and Wales, and the like, are made by the Queen in Council. The ancient functions of the Privy Council are now performed by committees, excepting those formal * See p. 31. 66 THE MINISTRY. measures which proceed from the authority of her Majesty in Council. The acts of these committees are designated as tliose of tlie Lords of the Coun- cil. These Lords of Council (who are usually selected by the Lord President of the Council, of Miiom more hereafter) constitute a high court of record for the investigation of all offences against the Government, and of such other extraordinary matters as may be brought before them. It is competent for the Queen in Council to receive petitions and appeals from India and the colonies, and to refer these or any other matter whatever to the consideration of a committee of the Privy Council, upon whose report the decision of the Sovereign in Council is pronounced. If the matter be one properly cognisable by a legal tribunal, it is referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This committee, which is composed of the Lord President, the Lord Chancellor, and such members of the Privy Council as from time to time hold certain high judicial offices, has jurisdiction in appeals from all colonial courts : it is also the supreme court of maritime jurisdiction, and the tribunal wherein the Crown exercises its judicial supremacy in ecclesiastical cases. The Privy Council has also to direct local authorities through- MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL. 57 out the kingdom in matters affecting the preser- vation of the public health. A committee of the Privy Council is also appointed to provide " for the general management and superintendence of Edu- cation," and subject to this committee is the Science and Art Department for the United Kingdom. There is also another important committee of the Privy Council which performs administrative func- tions as a distinct department of government, and that is the committee of her Majesty's Privy Council appointed for the consideration of matters relating to Trade and Foreign Plantations. Such, briefly, are the chief functions of the Privy Council in these days. Formerly meetings of the Council were frequently held, but they now seldom occur oftener than once in three or four weeks, and are always convened to assemble at the royal re- sidence for the time being. The attendance of seven Privy Councillors used to be regarded as the quorum necessary to constitute a Council for ordi- nary purposes of state, but this number has been diminished frequently to only three. No Privy Councillor presumes to attend upon any meeting of the Privy Council unless specially summoned. The last time the ivhole Council was convoked was in 1839. 68 TUE MINISTRY. Privy Councillors are appointed absolutely, with- out patent or grant, at the discretion of the Sove- reign. Their number is unlimited, and they may be dismissed, or the whole Council dissolved, at the royal pleasure. No qualification is necessary in a Privy Councillor except that he be a natural-boni subject of Great Britain, and even this disability may be removed by special Act of Parliament, as in the cases of the late Prince-Consort and the late King of the Belgians. On tlie accession of a new Sovereign, the Privy Councillors of the preceding reign are resworn. The ancient oath of office which Privy Councillors had to take was as follows : — " 1. To advise the Sovereign according to the best of their cunning and discretion. 2. To advise for the Sovereign's honour and good of the public ; witliout partiality through affection, love, meed, doubt, or dread. 3. To keep the Sovereign's coimsel secret. 4. To avoid corruption. 5. To help and strengthen the execution of what shall be resolved. 6. To with- stand all persons who would attempt the contrary. 7. To observe, keep, and do all that a true and good councillor ought to do to his Sovereign." The fol- lowiiig declaration embodies the substance of the oath now in force : — " You shall solemnly and sin- PEIVY COUNCILLOES TO OBSERVE SECEESY. 59 cerely declare that you will be a true and faithful servant unto her Majesty Queen Victoria "as one of her Majesty's Privy Council ; you shall keep secret all matters committed and revealed unto you, or that shall be secretly treated of in Council, and generally in all things you shall do as a faithful and true servant ought to do to her Majesty." This obligation of secrecy is a great constitutional principle, for it is of the greatest importance that there should be entire freedom in the confidential intercourse between the Crown and its advisers. Without the express permission of her Majesty, nothing that has passed between the Queen and her Ministers in their confidential relations with each other can be disclosed to Parliament or to any other body. And this permission would only be granted for state purposes, so as to enable a minister to explain and justify to Parliament his poKtical conduct. Since the separate existence of the Cabinet Council, meetings of the Privy Council for purposes of deliberation have ceased to be held. The Privy Council consists ordinarily of the members of the Eoyal Family, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishop of London, all the Cabinet Ministers, the Lord Chancellor, the chief 60 THE MINISTRY. officers of the Royal Household, the Judges of the Courts of Equity, the Chief Justices of the Courts of Common Law, and some of tlie Puisne Judges, the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Judges and the Judge-Advocate, the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, the Speaker of the House of Conmions, the Ambassadors and the Chief Ministers Plenipotentiary, the Gov- ernors of the chief colonies, the Commander-in- Chief, the Vice-President of the Committee of Council for Education, certain other officials I need not particularise, and occasionally a Junior Lord of the Admiralty, though it is not usual for Under Secretaries of State or Junior Lords of the Treasury or Admiralty to have this rank conferred upon them. A seat in the Privy Council is sometimes given to persons retiring from the public service, Avho have filled responsible situations under the Crown, as an honorary distinction. A Privy Councillor is styled Plight Honourable, and he takes precedence of all baronets, knights, and younger sous of viscounts and barons. Now having thus brietly sketched the history and duties of the Privy Council, I shall proceed to tell you what members of the Vrivj Council, not being Cabinet Ministers, constitute the Ministry; and here we find the following: — LORD-LIEUTENANT OF IRELAND. 61 The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. The Chief Secretary for Ireland. * The Judge- Advocate General. The Vice-President of the Council for Educa- tion; and The Chief Ofiicers of the Eoyal Household. Tlie government of Ireland is formally intrusted to the Queen's Viceroy, usually called the Lord-Lieu- tenant, but whose official designation is the Lord- Lieutenant General and General Governor of Ire- land. This high officer represents the person of her Majesty in Ireland. He is commissioned to keep the peace, the laws and customs of Ireland, to govern the Irish people, to chasten and correct offenders, and to encourage such as do well. He is placed in supreme authority, and has power to pardon criminals or to commute their sentences. The police is subject to his entire control, and he can issue such orders as he thinks necessary to the officers commanding the troops in Ireland. He has almost the entire disposal of all Crown patronage in Ireland, and the right of filling up numerous sub- ordinate posts. No complaint concerning Ireland can be made to her Majesty, unless it has first been brought before the Lord-Lieutenant. In fact, no other subject of the Queen is vested with so ex- 62 TirK MINISTRY. tensive regal powers, except perhaps the Viceroy of India. Notwitlistanding his power, however, he has to act under the Ministry for tlie time being, and the Cabinet minister who is ordinarily respon- sible for advising the Lord-Lieutenant is the Home Secretary, but in matters of moment the Prime Minister interposes his authority. In carrying on the executive government of Ireland, the Lord-Lieu- tenant is assisted by an Irish Privy Council, consist- ing of about sixty members, whose sanction is neces- sary to give validity to many of his official acts. His great officers of state are the Chief Secretar}', the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, and the permanent Under-Secretar}', who all (of course, excepting the permanent Lender-Secre- tary) vacate their offices on a change of administra- tion. The Chief Secretary is the Prime Minister of the Lord-Lieutenant, whose duty it is to see that the commands of the Lord-Lieutenant in keeping the peace and the laws of Ireland are fulfilled. He is generally a member of the House of Commons, and sometimes a Cabinet minister.* The duties of • In the present Gladstone llinistry the Chief Secretan- for Ire- land is a Cabinet minister, though, in the opinion of Sir Kobert Peel, grave objections exist to this dignity being conferred on such an official, " as it not only disturbs the relations of a chief JUDGE-ADVOCATE GENEKAL. 63 the other officers resemble those of the similar ap- pointments in England. * The Judge -Advocate General presides over the judicial department of the army, and is the sole re- presentative of the Government in all military pro- ceedings before general courts-martial. He prose- cutes either in person or by deputy in the Queen's name, and all matters arising out of the adminstra- tion of martial law come under his supervision. He has no absolute judicial authority, nor any voice in the sentence of the court ; but after the trial the case is transmitted to the Horse Guards, and thence to the Judge-Advocate General, who then examines into the sentence, and advises her Majesty as to its confirmation or rejection. This done, the proceedings are returned to the Com- mander-in-Chief. The Judge- Advocate has usually a seat in the House of Commons, where he acts as the legal adviser of the Government on military questions.* The permanent and working officer of his department is the Deputy Judge- Advocate. to his subordinate (the Lord - Lieutenant never being included among the Cabinet councillors), but directly inverts those rela- tions, and encourages the Chief Secretary still more to assume for himself the exercise of independent powers." * It is intended to amalgamate the office of the Paymaster-General with that of the Judge-Advocate. 64 Tlir: MINISTRY. The Vice-President of the Education Committee • (which is a Committee of the Privy Council, com- posed usually of Cabinet ministers, with authority to provide for the general management and super- intendence of education, regulated by various Minutes of Council) transacts the current business of the Education Department, The authorising of building grants, and the general distribution of the Educational grant as at present settled by Parlia- ment, is exclusively managed by this officer. The Vice-President is not a responsible official, but has to act in obedience to the Lord President of the Privy Council and the Committee. He is sworn a Privy Councillor in order to attend the meetings of the Education Committee. Until 1867 there was a Vice-President of the Board of Trade, who was a Privy Councillor and a member of the Administra- tion, but this office is now abolished. The chief officers of the Eoyal Household are the Lord Steward of the Household, the Lord and Vice Chamberlains, the jNIaster of the Horse, the Treasurer and Comptroller of the Household, the Captain of the corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, the Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard, the ]\Lister of the Buck- * The present Vice-President has been made a Cabinet minister, but it is a most unusual proceeding. THE CABINET COUNCIL. 65 hounds, the Chief Equerry and Clerk Marshal, and the Lords-in-waiting. These offices are for the most part usually held hy peers or members of the House of Commons who are the political adherents of the existing Ministry. To describe the duties of these officers would extend my lecture beyond its pro- posed limits. I now come to my second heading — the ministers belonging to the Cabinet Council, and who consti- tute the chief members of an Administration. I was obliged to defer describing their duties till now, be- cause without saying something of the Privy Council I could not have mentioned the Cabinet, as the Cabinet is an unrecognised select committee of the Privy Council. The practice of consulting a few confidential advisers instead of the whole Privy Council has been resorted to by English Sovereigns from a very early period ; but the first mention of the term Cabinet Council, in contradistinction to Privy Council, occurs in the reign of Charles I., when the burden of state affairs was intrusted to the Com- mittee of State, which Clarendon says was enviously called the " Cabinet Council." This form of govern- ment was at first extremely unpopular, and it was not till 1783 that the Cabinet Council was regu- lated by those rules which it now enforces, and E 6d THE MINISTHY. wliieli arc essential to its wellbeing. Before that date the Cabinets were often composed of rnen of different judgment and principles, and who seldom were of one mind in matters of importance. "Wil- liam III. attempted the first successful reform (Sir W. Temple's scheme was a failure) in the Cabinet, by constructing a Ministry whose members should be of accord upon the general principles of state policy, and be willing to act in unison in their places in Parliament. Before this reformation, the introduction of the King's ministers into Parliament, for the purpose of representing the Crown in the conduct of public business within its walls, was a thing unknown in England. True, that from an early period various ministers had obtained seats in the House of Commons, but they occupied no recog- nised position, and it was often a mooted point whether they were entitled to sit at all in the House. It was not till the formation of the first parliamentary Ministry by "William III. that minis- ters of the Crown were cordially received by the Commons. " Under the Plantagenets, Tudors, and Stuarts there had been ministers, but no Ministry, The servants of the Crown were not, as now, bound in frank pledge for each other. They were not ex- pected to be of the same opinion even on questions UNANIMITY IN THE CABINET NOT YET RECOGNISED. 67 of tte gravest importance. Often they were politic- ally and personally hostile to each other, and* made no secret of their hostility." It was not long before the nation began to appreciate the advantages of having Cabinet ministers in the legislature to ex- plain and defend the measures and policy of the executive government. But more than a century had to elapse before political unanimity in the Cabinet was recognised as a political maxim. From the first parliamentary Ministry of William III. until the rise of the second William Pitt in 1783 (with the exceptions of the anarchy that existed from 1699 to 1705, when there was no Ministry, and the political agreement during the Ministry of Eobert Walpole), divisions in the Cabinet were con- stantly occurring. At the same council-board were AYhigs and Tories, men who advocated High-Cliurch principles and men who favoured Dissent ; and it was no uncommon thing to see colleagues in office opposing one another in Parliament upon measures that ought to have been supported by a united Cabinet. In 1812 an attempt was made to form a Ministry consisting of men of opposite political principles, who were invited to accept office not avowedly as a coalition government, but with an offer to the Whig leaders that their friends should 68 THK MINISTRY. be allowed a majority of one in the Cabinet. Tliis ofTer was declined on the plea that to construct a Cabinet on " a system of counteraction was incon- sistent with the prosecution of any uniforai and beneficial course of policy." And from that time it has been an established principle that all Cabinets are to be constructed on some basis of political union agreed upon by the members composing the same, when they accept office together. It is also distinctly understood that the members of a Cabinet are jointly and severally responsible for each other's acts, and that any attempt to separate between a particular minister and his colleagues in such mat- ters is unfair and unconstitutional. On the resigna- tion of the Prime Minister in deference to an adverse vote of the House of Commons, all his colleagues also now resign. It was not always so. From 1688 to George I. changes in the Ministry were always gradual, and there is no instance of the simultaneous dismissal of a whole ^Ministry and their replacement by another till the accession of George I. to the tlnone, who effected a total change in all the chief ofiicers of state, though this change was due to his dislike to the ministers of Queen Anne, and not on account of prevailing opinions in Parliament. The resignation of Sir Eobert "Walpole is the first FIKST APPEAL OF MINISTERS TO THE NATION. 69 instance of the resignation of a Prime Minister in deference to an adverse vote of the Comtnons ; and the resignation of the Ministry of Lord North is the first instance of a simultaneous change of the whole Administration (excepting Lord Chancellor Thurlow) in deference to the opinions of the House of Commons. From that time, when a change of Ministry has occurred it has been invariably simultaneous and complete. If upon the retirement of a Cabinet any ministers have remained in office, they have been obliged to make a fresh agreement with the incoming Prime Minister before forming part of the new Adminis- tration. Soon after the resignation of Lord North's INIinis- try, another event occurred which has ever since been regarded as an important precedent in the re- lation of the King's Council to Parliament — viz., the first instance (after the practice of changing the whole Cabinet at once had been established) of an appeal by the Ministry to the nation at large to reverse the preponderance of parties in Parliament. In 1784 the King resolved to dismiss his ministers, who were personally obnoxious to him, although they were supported by a majority of the House of Conmions, and he called Mr Pitt to his counsels. 70 THE MINISTRY. The House of Commons passed resolutions adverse to his Ministry, and addressed the Crown for his re- moval. Instead of resigning, Mr Pitt advised the King to dissolve Parliament, and in the new Parlia- ment procured a large majority in his favour. " The precedent of 1784-," says Earl Russell, "therefore establishes this rule of conduct — that if the minis- ters chosen by the Crown do not possess the confi- dence of the House of Commons, they may advise an appeal to the people, with whom rests the ulti- mate decision." And this course has been followed on different occasions. Such, briefly, is a sketch of the rise and develop- ment of the Cabinet. The powers of this council have now attained to maturity, and in its hands is placed the entire administration of the foreign and domestic affairs of this kingdom. But though uni- versally recognised as an essential part of our polity, it has no legal existence, and is a body unrecognised by Act of Parliament. The names of those persons who comprise the Cabinet are never officially com- municated to the public. The London Gazette simply states that her Majesty has been pleased to appoint certain privy councillors to fill certain high offices in the State, and the fact that they have been called to seats in the Cabinet is not formally pro- NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN CABINET. 71 mulgated. The numbers of those constituting this council are indefinite, for the statesman constructinsr a Ministry can put as many persons as he pleases into it, with his Sovereign's consent. The first Cabinet of George I. consisted of eight members ; in 1760, the Cabinet consisted of fourteen mem- bers ; in 1770, of only seven ; in 1782, of ten : and in 1783, of eleven. After the death of Mr Pitt, the Cabinet generally consisted of from ten to sixteen persons. At the present time it comprises about fifteen members belonging to the more eminent portion of the Administration. Formerly the Lord Chief Justice of the Kimr's Bench, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Master of the Mint, and the Commander-in-chief, were included in the Cabinet, but they are now excluded. Occa- sionally statesmen of high character and experience have seats in a Cabinet without taking any office, as was the case with Earl Fitzwilliam in 1807, with the Marquess of Camden in 1812, with the Earl of Mulgrave in 1820, with the Marquess of Lansdowne and Lord John Eussell in 1854, with Lord John Russell again in 1855 and 1856, and with various other statesmen at different times. The members who, cx-officio, compose a Cabinet, are — 72 THE MINISTRY. The Prime Minister, or First Lord of the Treasury, The Lord High Chancellor, The Lord President of the Council. The Lord Privy Seal, The Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Secretary of State for the Home Department. Do. do. for Foreign Affairs. Do. do. of tlie Colonies, Do. do. for "War, Do, do, for India. The First Lord of the Admiralty. The President of the Board of Trade. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lan- Usually, caster, hut not ( The First Commissioner of Works, invariably, The President of the Poor Law Board, ^ The Postmaster-General. Like the Cabinet Council, the office of Prime Minister is unknown to the law and the constitu- tion. Legally and constitutionally, no one Privy Councillor has, as such, any superiority over another. The Prime Minister is simply the mem- ber of the Cabinet who possesses pre-eminently the confidence of the Crown, and to whom the Sove- reign thinks fit to intrust the chief direction of the Government. The choice of a Premier, however, is THE PEIME MINISTER. 73 only a matter of private understanding, as there is no express appointment of any member 6f tlie Administration to be the Prime Minister. Before 1688 the Prime Minister was the favourite of the King, and his rise and fall depended solely on his royal master's goodwill ; but since the development of this office, consequent upon the introduction of parliamentary government, the Premier is now the acknowledged head of a responsible Administration, whose tenure of office mainly depends upon his ability to obtain parliamentary support. It was in the person of Sir Piobert Walpole that the office of Prime Minister first began to assume importance, but it will be beyond the scope of these lectures to sketch to you those different stages in the growth of tliis office which have finally resulted in the supremacy of the First Minister under parliament- ary government. The Prime Minister may be either a peer or a commoner, and his appointment is a personal and not an official distinction. Lord Eockingham in 1765, the Duke of Portland in 1782, and Mr Addington in 1812, had held no office when they were first made Prime Ministers. Lord Bute became Prime Minister before he had ever spoken in Parliament, and Mr Pitt was Premier before 74 THE MINISTRY. he was twenty-four. Usually the Prime ^Minister holds the office of First Lord of the Treasury, either alone or in connection M-itli that of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Before 1806 the Premiership was occasionally held in connection with different other offices, such as the Secretaryship of State, Lord Privy Seal, and the like, but it is now invariably asso- ciated with the office of First Lord of the Treasury. The Treasury, as you w^ell know, is the most im- portant department of the Executive Government, and consists of a board of five members — the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer, and three Junior Lords — who are officially known as " the Lords Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Treasurer." The last Lord High Treasurer was the Duke of Shrewsbury in 1714. The First Lord of the Treasury, as head of the Government, occupies a position of great dignity and authority. He does not confine himself to the departmental business of the Treasury, but is cognisant of all matters of real importance that take place in the different departments, so as to be able to exercise a controlling influence in the Cabinet. He is the medium of intercourse between the Cabinet and the Sovereign, and has to conduct all official communications which may be necessary DUTIES OF THE PREMIER. 75 between lier Majesty and her responsible advisers. He is expected to be present almost continually in Parliament during the session to explain and defend the policy of the Government, and to guide the deliberations of the Legislature. He is virtually responsible for the disposal of the entire patronage of the Crown. He recommends to the Queen all appointments to vacant archbishoprics, bishoprics, and deaneries of the Established Church, and to all the church livings belonging to the Crown which are not in the gift of the Lord Chancellor. The Premier virtually selects all his colleagues in the Ministry, and it is upon his recommendation that new peers are created, and other distin- guished honours conferred by the Crown. Though he meets his colleagues in the Cabinet Councils upon a footing of perfect equality, yet he possesses a degree of weight and authority which is not shared by any other member. He can insist upon the Cabinet deciding in any matter in accordance with his own particular views ; otherwise, he has the power of dissolving the Ministry by his own resignation of ofl&ce. Ordinary questions, however, are generally decided by vote, the opinion of the majority, even though adverse to that of the Pre- mier, being adopted. H any member desires a re- 76 . THE MINISTRY. uiTangeinent of miiiisterial offices, he must make known liis views to the Prime Minister. It is only the First Minister wlio can make changes in an Administration, subject, of course, to the appro- bation of the Queen. If he should vacate office, the Ministry is dissolved. I have placed the Lord Chancellor second, in- stead of first, on my list of Cabinet ministers, because, though, in point of precedence, the Lord Chancellor is, with the exception of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the highest officer in the realm, yet the Prime Minister is regarded as the head of the Cabinet. The Lord Chancellor is a Privy Councillor by his office ; a Cabinet Minister ; and, according to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, prolocutor of the House of Lords by prescription. To him belongs the appointment of all the justices of the peace throughout the kingdom. Being in former times commonly an ecclesiastic (for none else were then capable of an office so conversant with writing), and presiding over the royal chapel, he became keeper of the Sovereign's conscience; visitor, in right of the Crown, of all hospitals and colleges of the King's foundation ; and patron of all the King's livings under the value of £20 per annum in the Kind's books. He is the general guardian of THE PEESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. 77 all infants, idiots, and lunatics ; and has the general superintendence of all charitable uses in the' king- dom. And all this over and above the exten- sive jurisdiction which he exercises in his judicial capacity in the Court of Chancery. In former times the Lord Chancellor was frequently Prime Minister. The Earl of Clarendon, in the reign of Charles II., was the last who occupied this position; but his successors in office have invariably been leading members of the Cabinet, and for this reason objections have often been urged against the union of judicial and political functions in the office of Lord Chancellor, But the advantage to the Cabinet in having the assistance of the highest equity judge is very great, whilst no injury has ever yet occurred to the interests of justice from the frequent changes of this functionary, which are incidental to parliamentary government. The Lord President of the Council is an officer of great dignity and importance, though he no longer possesses the powers he anciently exercised. He presides over the department of the Privy Council, and has the patronage of its entire establishment. He sits next the Sovereign at the Council-table, to propose the business to be transacted, and to take her Majesty's pleasure thereupon. He has the 78 THE MINISTRY. general superintendence and control of the Educa- tion department (which 1 hope will soon have a special minister of its own), and has to frame min- utes of Council upon subjects which do not belong to any other department of State. He is also responsible for appointing and summoning such special commit- tees of Council as may be required from time to time, and for receiving their reports. Subordinate to his department are separate establishments in relation to pul)lic health, the cattle plague, and quarantine. The Lord President is generally a member of tlie House of Lords. The office of Lord Privy Seal is one of great trust, though its duties are not very onerous, for they simply consist in applying the Privy Seal once or twice a - week to a number of patents. Ever since Henry VIII. the Privy Seal has been the warrant of the legality of grants from the Crown, and the authority of the Lord Chancellor for affix- ing the Great Seal.* All grants of the Crown for appointments to office, creations of honours, * There are some important instruments, however, wliicli pass under the Great Seal without warrants of Privy Seal — viz., pat- ents of appointments of various Common-Law Judges and officers, and commissions for opening and proroguing Parliament, and for giving the royal assent to bills in Parliament. THE LOED PRIVY SEAL. 79 patents of inventions, &c., must be made by charters or letters -patent under tlie Great Seal ;- and the command of the Lord Chancellor to pre- pare such a document is by means of a writ or a bill sealed with the Privy Seal, because the Queen can- not herself make letters-patent except by means of her ministers, who act according to her legal com- mands. The Lord Privy Seal is always in the Cabinet, and as his official duties are light, he is at liberty to afford assistance to the Administration in other ways, and he often has to attend to matters which require the investigation of a meml)er of the Government. With regard to this official, a daily paper remarks : — " He is, as a rule, a man who has served the State in other capacities, and is conver- sant with the duties of probably more than one department. Eeleased from official routine, he is in the first place free to assist his leader of the Upper House in debate, and to master any subject likely to come up for discussion. But beyond this obvious work there is a large part of statesmanship which consists in confidential investigation and preparative study. While the ordinary executive work of the country accrues from day to day, requiring daily decision and daily despatch, the work of renewing and reforming our lecrislation also 80 thp: ministuy. demands the time and tliou;,dits of our Cabinet. If every member of the Cabinet Council were, like the Secretaries of State, abundantly occupied with urgent affairs arising day by day, there wouM be nobody to forecast the necessary legislation, to note the currents of public opinion, to observe the signs of the times, to perceive the new needs that arise in the ' stress and storm ' of modern competition and the daily struggles of our mixed society and affluent national life. The Prime Minister of the day has this duty imperatively imposed on him, but he re- quires aides. He cannot ask men cumbered with the reading and answering of a hundred dailv letters or a score of serious despatches, and with the governance of hundreds of thousands or even millions of men, to turn aside from such pressing work in order to assist him in some preparative task intended to lay the basis of legislation, perhaps this session, perhaps next year. He wants for such purposes accomplished and experienced men, with the full sense of responsibility, and with ample leisure. No head-clerk, however able, could fulfil these conditions ; and hence the use of retaining such offices as that of the Lord Privy Seal and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who may be in the Cabinet, but who have no heavy duties of THE PRIVY SEAL NO SINECURE. 81 tlieir own, and can at any time be detached for temporary and special work." * I now come to that important official, the Chan- cellor of the Exchequer. You know what a very thankless office his is, and how we hate the visits of his subordinates the tax-collectors. And not with- out reason — for if there be one people who fuUy and completely enjoy the privilege of being taxed, * On July 26, 1870, Sir C. Dilke moved in the House of Com- mons, "that the sinecure office of Lord Privy Seal should be abolished." Mr Gladstone in reply said, "that some supply of great officers of State was really requisite for the discharge of public business over and above that which was furnished by heads of departments. It was scarcely possible to exaggerate the im- portance of the non-departmental business of the Cabinet. If men had their minds fully occupied with departmental subjects, it was not possible for them to give disengaged and concentrated attention to great matters wholly apart from departmental inter- ests; but which, at the same time, it was absolutely necessary should be given by uon-departmental members of the Govern- ment. Sometimes this arises in the case of bills which, though they may be brought to a particular department, were of such magnitude that they required the concentration of many minds. Take, for example, the bill relating to laud tenure in Ireland. Though his right hon. friend the Chief Secretary possessed great ability and much knowledge of the subject, no department was equal to the formation of such a measure. He (Mr Gladstone) spent fully half his recess upon it, but neither he nor his right hon. friend could be alone equal to such a measure. The Cabinet bestowed a great deal of time on measures which it was absolutely necessary there should be men responsible for their introduction, F 82 THE MINISTRY. it is tlie inhabitants " of this bright little tight little island." The ' Edinburgh Eeview,' when describing our state of taxation many years ago, summed up our taxes in the following pithy manner : " Taxes upon every article which enters the mouth or covers the back or is placed upon who should not be absorbed by other business. His noble friend (Lord Kimberlej-), who was Lord Privy Seal, but who had now got an office more worthy of his energies and abilities, was of the greatest assistance in the fonnation of the J>and Bill. It was the constant practice of ("abinets to appoint committees, and upon these committees the most laboriously-worked heads of depart- ments could not sit, as a rule. The Government were represented by six members in the House of Lords. Four of these — the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, the Colonial Secretary, and the Indian Secretary — were hardly-worked officers of State ; and with regard to the Lord President of the Council, he had to-day been asked whether, in consequence of the immense increase of duty which would be caused by the Education Bill, it would not be necessary to effect a separation of some of the duties of that dppartment. The only adviser of the Crown in the House of Lords who, as a general rule, could take charge of measures not connected with particular departments was the Lord Privy Seal ; and he could say that, for nine months of the year, the holder of that office was a fully-worked member of the Cabinet. There would be every desire on the part of the Government to give fiiir consideration to the subject, but they could not assent to the motion of his hon. friend." The House divided — For the motion, ..... 60 Against, . . . . . .170 Majority against, 110 TAXES ! TAXES ! 83 tlie feet — taxes upon everything which it is j)leas- ant to see^ hear, feel, smell, or taste — taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion — taxes on every- thing on earth and the waters under the earth — on everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home — taxes on the raw material — taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man — taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite and the drug that restores him to health — • on the ermine which decorates the judge and the rope wdiich hangs the criminal — on the poor man's salt and the rich man's spice — on the brass nails of the coffin and the ribbons of the bride — at bed or board, couchant ov levant, v:e must pay; — the school- boy whips his taxed top ; the beardless youth man- ages his taxed horse wdth a taxed whip on a taxed road ; and the dying Englishman, pouring his medi- cine, which has paid seven per cent, into a spoon that has paid fifteen per cent, flings himself back upon his chintz bed which has paid twenty-two per cent — makes his w^ill on an eight-pound stamp, and expires in the arms of an apothecary wdio has paid a licence of an hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from two to ten per cent. Be- sides the probate, large fees are demanded for bury- 84 THE MINISTRY. ing him in the cliancel ; his virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble ; and he is then gathered to his fathers — to he taxed no more." Many of these taxes are now happily obsolete, but still both you and I have often to tliank that important functionary, the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer, for attentions we could readily dispense with. The Chancellor of the Exchequer at present exer- cises all the powers wliich formerly devolved upon the Treasury Board. He has the entire control and management of all matters relating to the receipt and expenditure of public money, including even the private revenues of the Queen. He has to frame regulations, Sec, for conducting the business of all the financial departments of the country, and also to control the expenditure and fix the salaries and expenses of every department in which there is an expenditure of public money. He decides within the limits of the law upon all questions between the Queen and the subject M-hich may arise out of the receipt and expenditure of public money, &c. The annual estimates of the sums required to defray the expenditure of Government in every branch of the public service, though submitted to Parliament by the Cabinet collectively, are framed upon the CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER. 85 especial responsibility of tlie Chancellor of the Ex- chequer. It is his duty to advise the Houee and the country in all financial matters, including the relations, the course, and the prospects both of revenue and expenditure. He lays before the House the annual statement of the estimated ex- penses of Government, and 'of the ways and means by which it is proposed to defray these charges, includ- ing the imposition or remission of taxes. This annual statement we call the " Budget," from the . French hougettc, a bag. Since 1661 the office of Chancellor of the Ex- chequer has been combined with that "of Under- Treasurer, which is properly the financial office, and by virtue of which he performs most of the functions anciently performed by the Lord High Treasurer. Formerly the Chancellor of the Exchequer was a principal officer of the Court of Exchequer and Re- ceipt of Exchequer, but he has now very little to do with the former, and nothing with the latter. The only occasion on which he takes his seat amongst the Barons of the Exchequer is on the annual nomi- nation of sheriffs. At the court which is held once in six years " for the trial of the pyx " — for determin- ing the sufficiency in weight and fineness of the gold and silver coins issued from the ]\Iint — tlie 86 TIIH MINISTRY. Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the absence of the Lord Chancellor, has to preside and to deliver a charge to the pyx jury. "When the office of Chan- cellor of the Exchequer is vacant, the seals of it are delivered to the Chief-Justice of the King's Bench for the time being, so tliat there may be no inter- ruption in sealing writs, which issue daily from the Court of Exchequer. Thus, in 1757, Lord Man.sfield continued nominally Finance ^linister for three months ; and, iu 1834, Lord Chief-Justice Denman held the office for eight days. As a leading member of tlie Treasury Board, the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer has much influence in the disposal of the patronage belonging to it. I shall describe the duties of the Junior Lords of the Treasury and Joint Secretaries when I describe those officials of the Administration who are not Pri\'y Councillors. The Secretaries of State are the next most impor- tant officials* in a Ministry. Tlie ancient English mouarchs were always attended by a learned eccles- iastic, known at first as their clerk, and afterwards as secretary, who conducted the royal correspon- dence ; but it was not till the end of the reign of * They rank before the Chancellor of the Exchecjuer, but for convenience' sake I hare included the duties of the Chancellor in my account of the Treasury. THE SECEETARIES OF STATE. 87 Queen Elizabeth that these functionaries were called Secretaries of State. On the direction of ^public affairs passing from the Privy Council to the Cabinet after 1688, the Secretary of State began to assume those high duties which now render his office one of the most important in the Government. Up to the reign of Henry VIII. there was generally only one Secretary of State, but at the latter end of his reign a second Principal Secretary was appointed. In 1708 a third Secretary was created, owing to the increase of business consequent upon the Union of Scotland. But a vacancy occurring in this office in 1746, the third secretaryship was dispensed with till 1768, when it w^as again created to take charge of the increasing colonial business. In 1782 the office was again abolished, and the charge of the colonies transferred to the Home Secretary; but owing to the war with France in 1794, a third Secretary was once more appointed to take charge of the War Department, and in 1801 the colonial business w^as attached to liis department. In 1854 a fourth Secretary of State for the exclusive charge of the War Department, and in 1858 a fifth secretary- ship for India, were created, so that there are now five Principal Secretaries of State, four of whom, with their political under-secretaries, occupy seats 88 THE MINISTRY. in tlie House of Commons. One of the five Sec- retaries of State is always a nicmLer of the House of Lords. Tliese Principal Secretaries have the sole control of the business of their respective offices — subject, of course, to the general superintendence of the Cabinet. They are the only authorised channels whereby the royal pleasure is signified to any part of the body politic, and the counter-signature of one of them is necessary to give validity to the sign-manual ; so that while the personal immunity of tlie Sovereign is secured, a responsible adviser for every act is provided, who has to answer for what the Crown has done. Whatever be the num- ber of the Secretaries of State, they constitute but one office, and are co-ordinate in rank and equal in authority. Each is competent in general to exe- cute any part of the duties of the Secretary of State, the division of duties being a mere matter of arrangement. A Secretary of State is appointed directly by the Crown by letters - patent, and is removable at the royal pleasure. He receives his investiture by the delivery of the seals of office from the hand of the Queen in Council, and his appoint- ment is formally terminated by the return of the seals to the Sovereign's hands. These seals are three in number — viz., the Signet, which contains THE HOME SECRETARY. 89 the royal arms and supporters ; another seal of a smaller size, having an escutcheon of the King's arms only; and a still smaller seal, called the Cachet, which is similarly engraved. The Cachet is only used for sealing the Queen's letters to sovereign princes. The Secretaries of State have to be in personal attendance upon the Sovereign on all public ceremonies and state occasions. During her Majesty's visits to various parts of the kingdom, a Secretary of State is always in attendance on her, and it is a rule that one must be always present in London. These high officers are always Privy Councillors, and invariably have a seat in the Cabinet ; and as Cabinet Ministers, it is necessary that they should sit in one or other of the Houses of Parliament. Let me now briefly sketch their various duties. The Home, Secretary controls all matters relat- ing to the internal affairs of Great Britain and Ireland. He maintains the internal peace of the LTnited I^ngdom, the security of the laws, and the general superintendence of the admin- istration of criminal justice. He is responsible for the preservation of the public peace, and for the security of life and property throughout the king- dom. He is a magistrate, and can commit to prison 90 THE MINISTRY, by warrant for just cause. He exercises extensive powers over the civil and military authorities of the country, and has a direct controlling power over the administration of justice and police in the muni- cipal boroughs, over the police in and around Lon- don, and over the county constabulary. He com- mits for trial, and examines persons charged with offences against the State, and delivers to their respective Governments certain fugitive offenders from France, the United States, or the Colonies. In connection with the Privy Council, he superin- tends the means taken for the local improvement and the preservation of the public health in towns. He has the general oversight and ultimate control of all matters relating to prisons, penitentiaries, reformatories, criminals, and the administration of criminal justice ; and he is especially responsible for the exercise of the royal prerogative in the reprieve or pardon of convicted offenders, or the commutation of their sentences. The Home Sec- retary receives all addresses to the Queen (except those presented at levees), and all memorials and petitions, upon which he takes the royal pleasure, and acts as the official channel of communication between her Majesty and her subjects. He pre- pares all royal warrants, grants, patents, approba- THE FOKEIGN SECllETARY. 91 tions of lords-lieutenant, &c., which do not belong to the departments of the other Secretaries of State or to the Treasury. The regulation of factory labour,, and of labour in mines and factories, the inspection of fisheries and coal-mines, the supervi- sion of pauper lunatics and lunatic asylums gene- rally, the registration of births, marriages, and deaths, the registration of aliens, the granting of certificates of naturalisation, and various other duties, belong also to his department. The author- ity of the Home Secretary extends over England, Wales, Scotland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man ; and he is the organ of communication between the Cabinet and the viceregal Government of Ireland, for which he is personally responsible. Subordinate to him are the two law officers of the Crown, the President and Secretary of the Poor- Law Board, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, the Attorney-General for Ireland, and the Lord Advo- cate for Scotland. The Home Secretary, to assist liim in his labours, has two under-secretaries, one permanent and the other political, and a staff of clerks. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the official organ of the Crown in all communications between Great Britain and foreign powers. He 02 THE MINISTRY. negotiates all treaties and alliances with foreign states, protects l>ritish subjects residing abroad, and demands satisfaction for any injuries they may sustain at the hands of foreigners. He introduces to the Queen all foreign ministers accredited to the British Government; and it is his duty to inform the ministers of foreign Gov- ernments of any acts of his own Government or of her jNIajesty's subjects which may be liable to misconstruction, and to explain their nature and purport. For this reason he is in constant communication Mith the diplomatic agents of the British Government abroad, either by public de- spatches or by private diplomatic correspondence. No decision can be given in the Foreign Office to any business without his knowledge and consent — in fact, every paper of any importance whatever upon which any action is to be taken comes under the personal notice of the Foreign Secretary. All passports to native-born or naturalised British sub- jects going abroad are granted by this Secretary of State, and in his hands is the selection of all ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, accredited from Great Britain to foreign powers. The nature of the responsibility of the Foreign Secretary may be partly understood from the following extract from RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY. 93 a letter of her Majesty read by Earl (then Lord John) Eussell in the House of Commons, February 3, 1852. The Queen required, first, that the Foreign Secretary should " distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, that the Queen may as distinctly know to what she is giving her royal sanction; secondly, that having once given her sancj^ion to a measure, it be not altered or modified by the minister. . . . She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and foreign ministers before important decisions are taken based upon that intercourse, and to receive foreign despatches in good time, and to have the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off." Formerly the language in which diplo- matic intercourse was conducted by the representa- tives of the British Government with the agents of foreign states was French, but now English is inva- riably employed, it being considered unbefitting the greatness of England to be dependent upon France for the language of diplomatic communicatious. No important political instruction is ever sent to any British miinster abroad without its draft being first submitted to the Prime ^Minister, in order that the royal pleasure may be taken thereupon. " The lead- 94 Til?: MINISTRY, ing features of our foreign policy are, to extend our commercial relations, not to interfere unnecessarily in the affairs of other countries, and to endeavour legitimately to promote the good government and prosperity of other countries." The Secretary of State is assisted in his labours by the political and permanent under-secretaries, an assistant under- secretary, and a staff of clerks. In 1660 the direction of the colonies of England was intrusted to a committee of the Privy Council called the " Council of Foreign Plantations," which was afterwards consolidated with the Council of Trade, and was known as the " Board of Trade and Plantations." On the loss of a large j^ortion of the North American colonies, the Plantation Board was abolished, and the remaining colonies placed under the charge of the Home Secretary. From 1801 to 1854< the business of the colonies was consolidated with the AVar Office ; but in 1854 the two depart- ments became separate, and each imder the control of its own Secretary of State. The Secretary of State for the colonies has to superintend the government of the various colonial possessions of the British Crown. He appoints the governors over the dif- ferent dependencies of the Crown, and sanctions or disallows the enactments of the colonial legisla- THE COLONIAL SECRETAEY. 95 tiires. He corresponds with the colonial governors, iand makes such recommendations or suggestions as may be expedient to assist the deliberations of the colonial councils, and to promote the welfare of colonial subjects. In his hands is placed the res- ponsibility of devising and submitting to Parliament laws peculiarly affecting the colonies, and in these matters he is often assisted by the Privy Council Committee for Trade. The Secretary of State for the colonies is directly resjDonsible for every act of the governor of any of the colonial dependencies of the British Crown ; and all colonial governors act under his immediate directions and instructions. All colonial enactments are brougbt under the con- sideration of this important officer of state, by whom they are referred to legal officers whose duty it is to examine and report upon every act, for the purpose of discovering any defect, and of deter- mining the expediency of allowing or disallowing the same. Under the supervision of the Colonial Secretary is the Colonial Land and Emigration Board, which considers all questions relating to colonial lands, and the conveyance of emigrants to the various colonies. Owing to the establishment of responsible government in many of our colonies, the correspondence of the Colonial Office has much 1)6 THE MINISTRY. decreased ; and as much of tliis correspondence is of a routine description, it is not necessary that every particular despatch need be submitted to lier Majesty. The Colonial Office is divided into several branches, each of which takes cognisance of the affairs of a group of colonies. The despatches from the several colonies are examined in these departments, and ultimately by the Colonial Secre- tary, who is solely responsible for the replies sent to them. The Colonial Secretary is assisted by two under-secretaries — one political and the other per- manent — ond a staff of clerks. Until the commencement of the present century, the control of the army was more in the hands of the CroM'n than in the hands of its responsible advisers. Before 1854 the direction of military affairs, although formally centred in the administration of the time being, ^\•as practically divided between the Com- mander-in-chief at the Horse Guards, the Master- General and the Board of Ordnance, the Secretary- at-War, and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. On the declaration of war against Eussia in 1854, the duties of "War ^Minister were, as I have just said, separated from those of Colonial Secretary, and a Secretary of State for War appointed, in whose hands the supreme and responsible authority POSITION OF COMMAXDEE-IN-CHIEF. 97 over the whole military business of the country, formerly transacted by the various departments, was placed. In the following year, the separate departments of the Ordnance and the Commis- sariat, together with the office of Secretary at War and the control of the militia, yeomanry, and volun- teers, were consolidated, and committed to the charge of the new War Secretary. The two great functionaries who now superintend the control of military matters are the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief. The duties of the Commander-in-Chief embrace the discipline and patronage of the army, and the direct superintend- ence of the personnel of the army. His duties are carried on to a very great extent imder the control and in every respect under the responsibility of the War Secretary'. If irreconcilable differences should occur between the Secretary of State and the Com- mander-in-Chief on any question, appeal must be made to the Prime Minister or to the Cabinet, and the Commander-in-Chief must ultimately defer to their decision or retire from office. With the ex- ception of the duties performed by the Commander- in-Chief, everything connected with the manage- ment of the army, in peace or war (its maUriel and civil administration, &c.), remains in the hands of G 98 Tin: MINISTRY. the Minister for War. During active service the War Minister has entire control over the operations as bearing npon the conduct of tlie Commander-in- chief, of the Admiralty, Transport Board, Commis- sariat, and even of the Treasury itself. It is his duty to conil)iiie the various powers of these depart- ments in such a manner as to conduce to the pro- per management of the military operations of the country. As long as war continues, the operations of the War Office and the Admiralty, and the directions of the movements both of the army and navy, become a part of the special duty of the Secretary for "War; but in time of peace the Ad- miralty is a totally independent office. When troops are required to be sent abroad, the matter is considered first by the whole Cabinet, and their decision communicated by the "War ]\Iinister to the Commander-in-Chief, with instructions to take her Majesty's pleasure as to the regiments to be selected for the service. All general and other superior ofl&cers recommended by the Commander-in-Chief for commands or appointments must be first sub- mitted to the Secretary for "War (first commissions in the cavalry and infantry are, however, the pecu- liar patronage of the Commander-in-Chief). Should anything in the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief AUTHOEITY OF THE WAR SECEETARY. 99 require the interference of the War IMinister, not only has he the right but it is his bounden* duty to interfere. As, however, the administration of the dis- cipline of the army is intrusted to the Commander- in-Chief, the War Minister ought not to interfere, except under peculiar circumstances. To sum up the relations that exist between the War Secretary and the Commauder-in-Cliief, we may assert that the Se- cretary of State for War has the supreme authority and responsibility in all matters affecting the admin- istration of the army ; that he may act either directly himself or through the Commander-in-Chief, who is his military adviser, and subordinate to him ; and that there is no act of the Commander-in-Chief that does not constitutionally come within the revision of the AYar Secretary, and for which he is not re- sponsible. During a war the commanding officer reports direct to the Secretary of State for War, as the official organ of the Queen's Government, and receives his instructions. It is only upon strictly military details that he corresponds with the Com- mander-in-Chief The Secretary for War, though he presides over the administration of the army unaided, has around him experienced professional advisers, whose opinions he often consults. His department consists of the Principal Secretary of 100 Tlir, MINISTKV. State, a parliameutary uiider-secretaiy, a perma- nent inider-secretaiy witli an assistant, a controUer- in-cliief — who has under liim the barrack, commis- sariat, purveying store, and transport departments — an assistant controller, a military assistant, and numerous other officials. The Commander-in-Chief is not a Cabinet Minister ; and as he is the executive head of the army, he exercises no 'political func- tions. His subordinate officers — the Quartermaster- General, Adjutant-General, and Military Secretar}' — are not allowed to have seats in the House of Commons.* * Since these lecturt-s were wTitten, an Order in Council, defining the duties of the Field-Marshal Commanding the Forces, has been approved of by her Majesty. It states that, "subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for "War, and to his respon- .sibility for the administration of the Royal authority and prero- gative in respect of the army," the Commander-in-Chief sliall, in addition to the military command, be charged with the discipline and distribution of the army, and of the reserve forces when em- bodied or called out for actual military service ; with the military education and training of lioth ofhcers and men of the same ; with enlisting men for, and discharging men from, the army and army reserves ; with the collection and record of strategical informa- tion, including topography, in relation to the military circum- stances of this and other countries ; " with the selection of fit and proper persons to be recommended to her Majesty for appointment to commissions in the army, for promotion, for staff and other military appointments, and for military honours and rewards ; " and with the duty of rendering such advice and assistance on ABOLITION OF THE BOAIID OF CONTROL. 101 From tlie year ITS-i to 1858, the territories be- longing to the British Crown in the East Indies were governed by a department of State called the Board of Control, in conjunction with the Court of Directors of the East India Company. In 1858, however, this double government was abolished, and the entire administration of the British Empire in India was assumed by her Majesty, and all the powers formerly exercised by the East India Com- pany and the Board of Control were transferred to military affairs as may be required of him b}' the Secretary of State for "War. This Order in Council, however, asserts no new doctrine, but only afSrms the old-established principle in thus making the actions of the Commander-in-Chief subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for War. To those acquainted with the ques- tion, there has never existed any doubt upon this point. The error has arisen from forgetfulness of the fact that the "War Mini- ster is the Minister of the Crown and not of Parliament ; and that although .he is responsible to Parliament for the advice which he may give to her Majesty, yet it is in the execution of the Koyal authority and prerogative that he is superior to the officer Com- manding in Chief. "The principle of our constitutional army is, that command, preferment, and honour come to it from tlie Crown ; but the general principle is equally undisputed, that for all pecuniary remuneration it is made to depend on Parliament." But by the Constitution the Crown exercises its authority only through responsible Ministers, and thus it follows that the Secre- tary of State for War is supreme over any other authoiity in the army, including the officer Commanding in Chief. 102 . THE MINISTilV. II lifLli riincipal Secretary of State. To assist tin's Principal Secretary in the transaction of Indian business, a Council of State for India, consisting of fifteen members, lias been established, which meets at least once a-week, and is presided over by the Secretary of State, or by his vice-president. Ques- tions are determined in Council by a majority of voices, but the Indian Secretary is at liberty to overrule the decisions of his Council on all questions but those relating to the appointment to the Supreme Council of India, or to the Council of the several Presidencies, and to the appropriation of any part of tlie Indian revenues : these questions must be decided by a majority of the Council. The Council is divided into six committees of five members each, every member being on two committees — viz., the Revenue, Judicial, I'ublic Works, Political, Military, and ^Miscellaneous committees. Each committee is charged with its own particular branch of adminis- tration, and has to discuss all matters referred to it by the whole Council, or by the Secretary of State. In fact, the Council of State for India is the deputy of the House of Commons, exercising an efficient vigilance over the acts of the Secretary of State, and is to some extent a check upon the exercise of his otherwise arbitrary administrative powers, for there THE SECRETARY FOR IKDIA. 103 is no representative system in India to control liis acts. The Secretary for India is, however, r*espon- sible for everything connected with Indian govern- ment at home and abroad, and must be prepared to defend in Parliament his conduct and policy. The whole of the Indian revenues are at the disposal of the Secretary and his Council, and tl^iey can draw upon these revenues for all expenditure required for the service of India, whether at home or abroad. An annual statement upon the revenue and ex- penditure, and upon the moral and material pro- gress and condition of the country, known as the Indian budget, is presented to the House of Com- mons by the Secretary of State, and gives rise to a debate upon the policy of the Government in rela- tion to India. The Governor-General of India, to M'hom the internal government of India is intrusted, and who is possessed of immense executive powers, is entirely subject to the constitutional control of the Sovereign, through this Secretary of State. Any law or regulation of the Governor-General or his Council may be disallowed by the Crown, upon the advice of the Secretary of State for India. The permanent establishment of the Secretary of State for India in Council consists of two under-secreta- ries, an assistant-secretary, and the Council already 10-i Till-: MINISTRY. ineutioned. I'lie Secretary for India and one umler- secretary are allowed to sit in the House of Com- mons, but the members of the Council for India can- not possess that privilege. The origin of the Admiralty may be dated from 1512, when Henry VIII. created an office for the transaction of naval affairs, and commissioners were appointed to report upon the state of the ships to the Lord High Admiral, to whom the government of the Navy was then intrusted, and whose office was one of such dignity that it was frequently con- ferred upon a member of the royal family, and occasionally retained by the King himself. The first Lord IJigh Admiral was appointed in 1385, but it is only from 1405 that an uninterrupted series of these high functionaries can be traced. In 1636, this office was for the first time put into commission, the great officers of state being the commissioners. During the Commonwealth, naval affairs were man- aged by a Committee of Parliament. From the date of the Eestoration to 1673, James Duke of York was appointed Lord High Admiral; from 1673 to 1685 the office was a second time put into commis- sion, but on the accession of James 11. he again declared himself to be Lord High Admiral. In 1690, on account of the abuses of power by the THE BOAED OF ADMIRALTY. 105 Lords High Admiral in the reign of the Stuarts, an Act was passed constituting a commission of Ad- miralty composed of men experienced in maritime affairs, through whose hands all orders for the management of the fleet were to pass. Such is the origin of the present Board of Admiralty. In 1702 the Earl of Pembroke was appointed Lord High Admiral for four months, and to him succeeded for six years in that office Prince George of Denmark. In 1827 the Duke of Clarence was appointed Lord High Admiral for a very short period; and, with these exceptions only, the Board of Admiralty has endured as first constituted until the present time. The commissioners consist of the First Lord and four Junior Lords, who are called the Lords of the Admiralty. They conduct the administration of the entire naval force of the empire both at home and abroad, command the royal marines, control the royal dockyards, and have an exclusive juris- diction in respect to harbours and inlets throughout the United Kingdom. The Pirst Lord is the only officer of the Board who is a Cabinet ^Minister, and from his position he exercises supreme power, and is responsible for the whole naval administration, his authority being only limited by the necessity of carrying the naval lords with him in his measures, lOG TIM': MINISTRY. SO long as tliey remain in office. As it is essential that lie sliDuld 1)C a ^Minister of the Crown, it is of necessity generally given to a civilian, for few naval officers properly qualified for the office would he found in Parliament. The duties of the First Lord are very responsible and laborious. He has the general supervision of every department in the service, the determination of all political questions, and the settlement of all questions connected with naval expenditure and the preparation of the naval estimates. The patronage of the Admiralty lies principally in his hands ; in fact, about 9000 naval and 2000 civil officers are dependent upon him for promotion. In the exercise of this patronage, how- ever, the First Lord can act only in couj unction with the Board. The commissions of all naval officers are from the Lords of the Admiralty, but commissions of officers of tlie marines are signed by a Secretary of State. As the Admiralty is but an executive Board, it is subject on certain matters to the control of the Government. The number of men required for the naval service is considered by the Cabinet, and the result of their deliberations communicated to the Admiralty, upon whom it devolves to carry out the decision of the Government. Again, the manner in which her ^Majesty's ships are to be distributed upon THE BOARD OF TRADE. 107 home or foreign service is a Cabinet question ; and with respect to the strength of foreign squadrons, tlie Admiralty is guided by the Colonial and Foreign Offices. Any Secretary of State conveying to the Admiralty the Queen's pleasure must be implicitly obeyed by that department, for the Admiralty is subordinate to the Secretaries of State when they convey the royal commands. The duties of the Junior Lords I shall describe in the concludincr portion of this lecture. The President of the Board of Trade is always an important member of an Administration, as you will soon see when you hear what are the duties he has to perform. In 1660 Charles II. established two councils, one for trade and another for plantations, which were afterwards united as a board, and called the Board of Trade. In 1782 the Board was abo- lished, and affairs of trade were placed under the direction of a committee of the Privy Council. At the commencement of every reign this committee is appointed by Order in Council, and consists of a President, with certain ex-officio members — viz., the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Chancellor, First Lord of the Treasury, Principal Secretaries of State, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and certain Cabinet Ministers, with other Privy Councillors who do not 108 TIII^ MINI.STItV. Ibnn ])ait of tlio Administration, Lut are added to tlic Ijoard or committee on account of tlieir official position or s[»ccial knowledge. V>nt owing to it being inconvenient for these hvAi officers of state to attend the committee meetings, the office has by degrees become departmental, so that at the present time the Board of Trade means the President, who, witli the aid of his secretaries and official staff, tran- sacts all the business assigned to this department. Until 18G4 it was not necessary for the President to have a seat in the Cabinet ; but since that time he has always been a Cabinet ^Minister, in order to insure for his advice on commercial matters a due consideration. It is his duty to take cognisance of all matters relating to trade and commerce, and to protect the mercantile interests of the United King- dom ; to advise the Foreign Office in commercial matters arisincf out of treaties or negotiations with foreign powers ; the Home Office with respect to the grant and provisions of charters or letters-patent from the Crown ; the Colonial Office upon questions affecting commercial relations Mith the colonies ; and the Treasury as to contemplated alterations in the customs and excise laws. He has also to super- intend the progress of bills and questions before Parliament relating to commerce ; to exercise a CONTROL OF THE BOARD OF TRADE. 100 supervision over railway, patent, telegraph, liarhour, and shipping Ijills ; to collect and publish stat*istical information ; and to exercise a surveillance over all railway companies. United to his department are the Government School of Design, the offices for the Eegistration of Designs and Joint-Stock Companies, the General Eegister Office for jMerchant Seamen, the Inspectorships of Lime and Alkali Works, of Oyster Fisheries and of Corn Eeturns, and the Standard Weights and Measures department. The Board of Trade also represents the general light- house' service in Parliament, superintends duties in connection with harbours and navigation under local Acts, and discharges duties under the jNIetro- politan AVaterworks Act and the Fisheries Conven- tion Act, together with various other duties, too numerous to mention to you here. To carry on effectively the work assigned to it, the Board of Trade is divided into six departments — the Com- mercial and Miscellaneous ; the Eailways and Tele- graphs ; the Mercantile, Marine, and Wreck ; the Statistical, the Financial, and the department relat- ing to Harbours, including Fisheries and Foreshores. Until 1867 there was a Vice-President of the Board of Trade, who was a Privy Councillor and a member of the Administration, though not a Cabinet Minis- 110 THE MINISTHY. ter. llu usually held his office in connection with that of the Paymaster-General, hut now no such office as this exists, and the Board of Trade con- sists of only the President, two secretaries, — one of whom sits in Parliament, — four assistant-secretaries, and a large staff of clerks. In addition to the First Lord of the Treasuiy, the Lord Chancellor, the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the five I'rincipal Secretaries of State, the Pirst Lord of the Admiralty, and the President of the Board of Trade, all of -vNliom are, cx-ojicio, Cabinet jNIiuisters, there are some other members of the Administration who usually, but not invariably, have seats in the Cabinet ; and these are, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the First Commissioner of "Works, the President of the Poor-Law Board, and the Postmaster-General. In the present Gladstone ^Ministry the Chief Secretaiy for Ireland is also a Cabinet Minister. The Chan- cellor of the Ducliy of Lancaster was an office in ancient times of considerable importance, but it is now practically a sinecure, and is usually filled by a leading statesman, whose time is at the service of the Government for the consideration of such important questions as do not come immediately THE BOARD OF WOEKS. Ill witliin the province of other departments. He exercises jurisdiction concerning all matfers of equity relating to lands held of the Crown in right of the Duchy of Lancaster. In 1832 the puhlic works and buildings of Great Britain were for the first time placed under the con- trol of a responsible Minister of the Crown, and were assigned to the charge of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests. In 1851, however, the de- partment of Public Works was separated from the Woods and Forests, and erected into a Board, under the name of the Office of Her Majesty's AVorks and Public Buildings. The Board consists of a First Commissioner, and of the Principal Secretaries of State and the President of the Board of Trade as ex-officio members. The Board has the custody and supervision of the royal palaces and parks, and of all public buildings not specially assigned to the care of other departments ; and also the adminis- tration of sums voted by Parliament for the main- tenance and erection of all such works. Besides various other duties I need not trouble you with, the Office of Works is intrusted with the task of providing free walks and parks for the recreation of the public, as well as access to the national build- ings and collections. This Board is subject to the 112 TIIH MIN'lSTnV. Treasury. It lias hef;ii often urged in Parliament, and wifli very good reason, that tlic Chief Commis- sioner, being merely the principal surveyor of the State, and his office a department for carrying out such public works as have been sanctioned by Par- liament, his appuintnient should be permanent — in other words, independent of all changes of miuistr}^ The condition of the Board of "Works is far from satisfactory, and the manner in which it performs its duties has given rise to numerous stories. One of them is, that a castor came otf a clerk's chair in a Government office, and as the Board of Works has to provide the furniture of all the Government offices and other public buildings, it was immedi- . ately communicated with to repair the defect. After a hundred and fifty letters and forms had been written and filled up, a van and ten men were sent by the Board for the offending cliair. It was kept three weeks, and the day after it was returned the castor came off again. Since 1823 the Chief Com- missioner has frequently had a seat in the Cabinet. Before 1847 the administration of poor relief in England and Wales was intrusted to commissioners actins]; under the control of the Home Secretarv, but owing to the amount of labour which devolved upon the Home Office, the Poor-Law Commissioners were THE POOE-LAW BOAPD. 113 erected into a Board in 1847. This Board consists of a President, to be appointed by the Queen, and of four Cabinet Ministers, who are members ex- officio, — viz., the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the Home Secretary, and the Chan- cellor of the Exchequer. In 1867 the Poor-Law Board, from being a temporary commission, sub- ject to renewal from time to time by Acts of Parlia- ment, was made permanent, with a considerable enlargement of its powers. The President of the Board is responsible for all that is done, and his duties are exceedingly onerous. " There is not," said Mr Villi ers, when President of the Poor-Law Board, " a question which may arise upon anything which affects the moral, physical, or economical condition of the poor, that must not be examined and decided by him ; and in order that he may give a decision, he must read all the papers that bear upon the subject. . . . Besides all this, additional permanent business has been thrown upon the office by the transfer, within the last two years, from the Privy Council to the Poor-Law Board, of the man- agement of the education of the poor, so far as it depends upon State grants." The President of the Poor-Law Board has also to determine all matters of complaint against medical men, and other officers H 11-1 THE MINISTRY. charged with misconduct or ncfjlect of paupers. Tie is assisted in his labours Ly two secretaries, one of whom is entitled to sit in the House of Commons, and is a political appointment, two assistant-secre- taries, and a staff of poor-law inspectors and clerks. The President of the Poor-Law Board was first ad- mitted into the Cabinet in 1859, and the first time the office was represented in the Lords was in 1867. The Irish and Scotch Poor-Law Boards are repre- sented in Parliament respectively by the Chief Sec- retary for Ireland and the Lord Advocate. Tlie Postmaster-General, who is usually, but not invariably, a Cabinet Minister, is the last Minister I shall have to say anything to you about. It is only since 1831, when the offices of Postmaster- General of Great Britain and of Ireland were consolidated, that the appointment has been con- sidered a political office. Until the accession of George IV. it was held by two joint- commissioners, expressly disqualified from sitting in the House of Commons on account of the office having been created in 1711, subsequent to the statute of Queen Anne, which declared that all neio offi.ces should render their possessors ineligible for a seat in the Commons. In 1866, however, an Act was passed renderino- the Postmaster-General eligible for the DUTIES OF THE POSTMASTEE-GEXEEAL. 115 House of Commons. "When he is a member of tlie Lords it is the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to represent the dej)artment in the Lower House. The Postmaster-General has to negotiate postal treaties with foreign powers, to determine ques- tions connected with the establishment of increased postal facilities at home and in the colonies (sub- ject to the approval of the Treasury in pecuniary matters, for, as a revenue department, the Post- Ofifice is subordinate to the Treasury), and to distribute the patronage of his department, which is very great. He has to report annually to the Lords of the Treasury upon the condition of his department, and these reports are invariably laid before Parliament. In addition to his former duties, the Postmaster-General has now the man- agement of tlie Electric Telegraph also within the United. Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. To assist him in his labours the Postmaster-General has a secretary, two assistant-secretaries, and a large staff of clerks. I now come to the last portion of my lecture — viz., those members who belong to the Adminis- tration, but are not Cabinet or Privy Councillors, and here I shall be very brief. These officials are, the Junior Lords of the Treasury, who are chosen 116 TlIK MINISTIIV. OIK! from each (jf the three kingdoms, and who have hardly any departmental duties whatever, hut undertake the less important husiness that belongs to the Treasury — superannuating questions, exami- nations into breaches of the revenue laws, receiving deputations, &c. ; the two Joint- Secretaries to the Treasury, one of whom is called the Parliamentary and the otlier the Financial Secretary, who assist in the transaction of the business of the Board, and in preparing its decisions upon all matters submitted to it ; in fact, through their instrumentality the whole Treasury business (under the direction of the political chiefs) is conducted, for the Board has little more than a nominal existence ; the Faij- master-Gencral, who has to pay all voted ser\*ices and other charges connected with the naval, mili- tary, and civil expenditure, according as credits are given, from time to time, upon the public monies in the Bank of England by the Comptroller- General of the Exchequer, pursuant to applica- tions from the Treasury (it is proposed to amal- gamate his office with that of the Judge-Advocate General); the /our Junior Lords of the Admiralty, three of whom are ^N'aval Lords, and who have to attend to the composition and discipline of the fleet, the appointments of officers, the courts-mar- LAW OFFICEES OF THE CKOWK. 1 1 7 tial, the superintendence of the various departments the Admiralty is divided into, &c., &c., whilst the fourth Lord, who is called the Civil or Financial Lord, manages the naval finances, the engineering and architectural works, &c., and sits in the House of Commons ; the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, who is the mouthpiece and organ of the department in the Llouse of Commons if the First Lord should be in the House of Lords ; the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State for the Home, Foreign, Colonial, War, and Lidia Offices, who have the general supervision of all that is done in their respective departments, and who, if any of their chiefs should be members of the House oi Lords, have to represent their department in the House of Commons ; the Parliamentary Scerctaries of the Board of Trade and Poor-Law Board ; tlie Latv Officers of the Crown, who are the Attorney- General, Solicitor-General, and the Queen's Advo- cate-General, and who constitute the advisers of tlie Crown in all cases of legal difficulty. The Attorney and Solicitor General advise the heads of the departments of state in matters relating to common or municipal law, and in regard to all prosecutions proposed to be instituted against public offenders. They conduct the prosecution or defence in all 118 THE MIXrSTKV. cases where proceedings arc instituted for or against any public department or servant of the Crown, or in obedience to the orders of Parliament. In all proceedings at law or in equity whicli involve the security of the Crown or the proper discharge of the royal functions, the Attorney-General is the leading advocate. He is the representative of the sovereign in the courts, and has to prosecute all public offenders. The Solicitor-General shares the labours of his colleague, and, in the absence of the Attorney-General, is empowered to execute every authority of the Attorney-General, his powers being co-ordinate. The Queen's Advocate-General advises the Crown in questions relating to civil and inter- national law, but his appointment is not now con- sidered a political one. I have l.iut one more important official to add to my number, and then my list is complete — the Lord Advocate of Scotland. At the union of England and Scotland in 1707 the Executive Government of Scotland -consisted of a Lord High Chancellor, a Lord Justice-General, a Lord Justice-Clerk, a Lord Privy Seal, and a Lord Advocate ; but, by degrees, the entire political functions of these of&ces devolved upon the Lord Advocate, and he is now intrusted with the particular care of the whole Executive Government of Scot- THE LORD ADVOCATE. 119 laud, subject to a geueral control exercised over all Ills acts by the Home Secretary. The Lord Advo- cate is the principal public prosecutor in Scotland. He is assisted by a Solicitor-General and four junior counsel, termed advocates-depute. He is understood to have the power of appearing as pro- secutor in any court in Scotland where any person can be tried for an offence, or in any action where the Crown is interested ; but it is not usual for him to act in the inferior courts, which have their respective public prosecutors, called procurators- fiscal, acting under his instructions. He does not, in prosecuting for offences, require the intervention of a grand jury, except in prosecutions for treason, which are conducted according to the English method. The Lord Advocate is virtually Secretary of State for Scotland, and is intrusted substantially with the conduct of Scotch business in the House of Commons. The Queen's Lord High Commis- sioner to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, who is the representative of her Majesty at the meetings of the General Assembly of the Established Church of Scotland in Edinburgh, is to a certain extent a political office, but it is not invariably changed with the Administration of the day. 120 TIIH MINISTIIV. And now, in conclusion, lot nie make a few re- marks regarding the co-operation of the Mini.stry with the Houses of Parliament. I have told you that the Ministers to wliom the executive functions of the Crown are intrusted must sit in Parliament ; and according to the confidence that Parliament — especially the House of Commons — has in them, so long will they be in power. If Parliament declare that the ]\Iinisters have forfeited their confidence, a change, no matter how long the Ministers may try to hold out, must take place. You see, therefore, that we really are a self-governing country. The Queen appoints the Prime ^Linister, the Prime ^Minister appoints his colleagues, his colleagues appoint their political subalterns, and then they all together Avork the machinery of the State. But if Parliament — and by Parliament I mean more especially the House of Commons — does not believe in its engin- eers, it moves a vote of want of confidence ; and if carried, the Ministry resigns. So that the ultimate verdict upon every exercise of political power must be sought for in the judgment of the House of Com- mons, and the House of Commons means the people. Plenty of opportunities are offered to members of Parliament to exercise their duty as jurymen upon the actions of the Government, for it is necessary MINISTERS TO BE REPEESEXTED IX PARLIAMENT. 121 that every department of the State should be ade- quately represented in Parliament, either by the political chief of the department or by some func- tionary connected with the same, or by some other ofl&cer of Government who is specially charged to be the Parliamentary representative of the depart- ment. Nor should this representation be confined merely to one chamber, but should always, when practicable, include both Houses. If the head of a department is in the House of Lords, and has a seat in the Cabinet, his department should be represented in the House of Commons by an under-secretary or other subordinate officer, as the case may be. The Prime Minister is responsible for the distribu- tion of the chief offices of Government between the two Houses of Parliament, and this task is far from an easy one. But as the House of Commons is now such an influential portion of the Legislature, it is considered advisable that a larger proportion of Cabinet Ministers should have seats in that cham- ber. In the first Cabinet of George IIL only one of its members was in the House of Commons, and thirteen in the Lords. In 1783 ^h Pitt was the sole Cabinet Minister in the Commons. In 1801 four Cabinet ^Ministers were in the Commons and five in the Lords. In 1804 Mr Pitt and Lord 122 TIIK MIXISTKV. Castlereagh were, out of a Cabinet of twelve, the only Ministers in the Commons. In the Grenville Ministry (" All the Talents "), of a Cabinet of eleven, seven were in the Lords and four in the Commons. In 1809, of Mr Percival's Cabinet, six were Peers and four were Conmioners. In 1812, of Lord Liver- pool's Cal)inet, ten were Peers and only two Com- moners. In 1814 the Commoners were increased to four, and the Peers decreased to nine. In 1818, out of a Cabinet of fourteen, six were Commoners ; and in 1822, out of a Cabinet of fifteen, nine were Peers. Since the Eeform Bill of 1832 the leading members of Government have been more equally ap- portioned between the two Houses. In 1864 ^Ir Dis- raeli gave it as his opinion that the heads of the two great departments of the public expenditure — the army and navy — a decided majority of the secre- taries of state, and, on the whole, the great majo- rity of administrative officers, should have seats in the House of Commons. He showed that the con- stitution has provided for the adequate representa- tion of the Government in the House of Lords by allowing but four out of the five Secretaries of State to sit in the Commons, and by requiring the Lord Chancellor, the Lord President of the Council, and the Lord Privy Seal to be chosen from amongst the EESPONSIBILITY OF MINISTERS. 123 . Peers. And, as a general rnle, these principles are now followed more or less in the distribution of offices. The Prime Minister may be selected from either House. The Ministry, by modern constitutional prac- tice, is responsible for recommending to Parlia- ment whatever laws are required to advance the national welfare, or to promote the political or social progress of any class in the country, though formerly the Ministers were only responsible for the fulfilment of tlieir executive obliqations, and for obtaining the sanction of Parliament to such measures as they considered necessary to pass. In fact, all important public measures are expected to originate with the ^Ministry ; and though many im- portant public bills have been introduced by private members, yet they have never obtained the sanction of both Houses of Parliament without the consent and co-operation of the Ministry. And now. Gentlemen, I shall conclude this lec- ture — already too long, I fear — by quoting the admir- able remarks made by Rowlands, in his M'ork on the English Constitution, respecting the advantages of Parliamentary government. He says, the value of this form of government in bringing the " monarchy into unison with the freedom demanded and obtained 124 TIIK MINISTKV. Ly the otlior institutions of the Goveniment and by the people, cannot be too highly estimated. It has changed the vague, precarious, and irresponsible authority of the ancient nionarchs for an executive council, nominated by the monarch from the Peers and ]-epresentatives of the people, but acting under the direct inlhience of the House of Commons, and accountable there for all its proceedings. It has relieved the King from the burden, and from the moral as well as actual responsibility, of directing or conducting the State affairs ; and whilst he re- tains his high position as chief of the State, and the power of impressing his views of government on his Ministers when in office, and of selecting new Minis- ters when a change is required, he is not in-s'olved in the fluctuating fortunes of the rival statesmen who from time to time become his servants as Min- isters of the Crown. "With respect to the people, it has opened the road to the highest offices of the State to the ambition of all who can raise them- selves to distinction in the House of Commons ; and thus it places political power of the highest order in the most eminent and distinguished of the people themselves." LECTURE III. THE HOUSE OF LORDS. "Xobility is a graceful ornament to the civil order. It is the Corinthian capital of polished society. Omnes honi nohilltati sem- 2)er favcmus, was the saying of a wise and good man. It is, in- deed, one sign of a liberal and benevolent mind, to incline to it with some sort of partial propensity. He feels no ennobling prin- ciple in his own heart who wishes to level all the artificial insti- tutions which have been adopted for giving a body to opinion, and permanence to fugitive esteem. It is a sour, malignant, and envious disposition, without taste for the reality, or for any image or representation of virtue, that sees with joy the unmerited fall of what had long flourished in splendour and honour." — BriiKE, Beflections on the. Revolution in France. Gentlemen, — The subject of my lecture to-night is the House of Lords — that patrician assembly the members of which constitute the most brilliant aristocracy in Christendom. And if I detain you here a little while you must excuse me, for if there is one tliinu- an Enolishman likes to talk about 12G THE HOUSE OF LORDS. more tluiu anotlier, it is about a lord ; and as I have to talk to you this evening about not one lord hut the whole assembly of lords, it is very natural that such an engrossing topic should run away with me a little. I have no doubt you remember an anecdote, mentioned in Boswell's ' Life of Johnson,' of a Dr Oldfield who was always talking about the Duke of ^Marlborough. One day he came into a coffee-house and said that his grace had spoken in the House of Lords for half an hour. " And what did he say of you, doctor ? " said a surgeon present. " Of me ? why, nothing," replied the doctor, aston- ished. " Well then, sir," said the surgeon, " he was very ungrateful, for you could not have spoken a quarter of an hour without saying something of him." The race of Dr Oldfields is by no means extinct. AVe all of us know our Dr Oldfield, and we also know how long he will be before he men- tions his duke. The truth is, that we Englishmen have a great respect for the Peerage, let us try to hide it ever so closely. 'Mr Thackeray, who was one of the keenest observers of character, said "that there was not a man in England who would not be proud to walk down Pall ^Mall arm-in-arm between two dukes." And if our novelists portray life and character as they really exist, we see in their pages SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF THE PEEEAGE. 127 how dearly Englishmen lo^'e a lord, and all that belongs to him. The divinity which Shakespeare says hedges round a king is surely extended to the Peerage also. Some time ago I made the acquaintance of a distinguished American officer who had fought gal- lantly in that terrible war against the South, and when peace was restored had come over to England to study our manners and customs. He was a thorough American, full of ideas of equality, and wondered how Englishmen could tolerate such "slick fooleries " as the Peerage and all that kind of thing; but gradually his democratic notions considerably toned down, and he took as kindly to the society of the great as any man I ever met. One day, when I had accused him of becoming a stanch supporter of the aristocracy (for he was always talking about our " British lords," as he called them), he vindi- cated himself in the following words : " I must own my impressions air somewhat changed since my arrival in this country. The social influence of your Peerage is so strong with all of you that I reckon I'm pretty considerable infected likewise. No matter whether you aw* Tories or Pads, it's all the same, you're both bit by it. I don't believe the Britisher who says he don't care for your lords. 128 TIIK irr)U.SR OF LORDS. II(> mny rail at 'em, Imt it's only tlie spite of jeal- ousy. Ask liiin to dine with a duke, and then see what answer he'd give ; guess tliere wouldn't be much need of pressing the invitation. And it can't 1»(' otherwise as long as your peers occupy the high social position that tliey do among you. A lord with you is everything. If a man is related to a lord, he lets me know the fact before I've spoken to him for ten minutes. AVhen I call upon your lovely women, I find the cards of the aristocrats uppermost in their card-baskets. You can't do anything without a lord. You can't get up a society of any sort or natur' without shoving a lord in as its patron or president. You put him into city companies as a director ; into hospitals, asy- lums, bazaars, — into ever}'thing. A lord in the chair at a public meeting always draws ; and, in fact, as far as my experience goes, I don't know when a British lord don't draw. Such being the case, I suppose I've caught the lord-fever likewise, in order not to be singular. AVal, sir, look at America, where we are all preachin' equality (bar niggers), and abusin' this demoralised speck of land of yours because you don't do as we do ; why, if you send us a British lord, the dandies of Xew York and Boston stare at him as if he were a god, and do all they WHY WE RESPECT IT. ]29 can to imitate his dress and his manners ; and as for our women, why I guess tliat they would sooner marry a real live English lord than any man in all the States, Districts, and Territories of North America." And, with certain reservations, I am inclined to believe a good deal of what my Ame- rican friend said. Now, as Conservatives we profess openly to have a respect for our aristocracy — a healthy, honest re- spect, such as no Englishman need be ashamed of. We look upon the distinction of rank and honours as necessary in every well-governed State, in order to reward those who have distinguished themselves, and deserve well of their country. We respect the House of Lords, not because it represents the great bulk of the landed property* of the kingdom, but on account of the high personal qualities for which, as a class, its members are eminently distinguished. We believe that for cultivation, refinement, and moral Avorth, the aristocracy of England is superior * III point of wealth, however, the House of Lords exhibits a standard which cannot be equalled in any other country. Take tlie Dukes of Northumberland, Devonshire, Sutherland, and Buc- cleuch, the Marqiiesses of Westminster and Bute, the Earls of Derby, Lonsdale, Dudley, and Leicester, and Baron Overstone, and where (in the mere matter of wealth) will you find theif equals collectively ? I 130 THE HOUSE OF LOllDS. to that of any otlic^r nation. And therefore we are proud (jf our peers, and hope that tlie House of Lords will long continue to hold its high place in the State, and long enjoy its ancient privileges. My object to-night is not, however, to look upon the Lords in a social point of view, but as a legislative assembly. The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is composed of the Queen, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons. The origin of Parliament is one of those things which, as Lord Dundreary would say, no " fellow can understand" — at least, few subjects have afforded to antiquaries more cause for learned research and ingenious conjecture. Not to weary you, however, with their abstruse investigations, suffice it to say that, during the earlier reigns after the Conquest, the spiritual and temporal Lords were the only members of the legislative and judicial assemblies of the realm ; and though the opinions of an infe- rior class of the community were occasionally asked, the Commons had no real participation in the business of these councils before the forty- ninth year of Henry III, Indeed, it was not until the fifteenth year of the reign of Edward II. that it was enacted that the legislative autho- THE LOEDS SPIIUTITAL. 131 rity of the realm sliould be in the King, witli the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled. This was the first attempt at settling a free con- stitutionalgovernment. Originally the three Estates of the realm sat together in one chamber, and vari- ous dates have been assigned for their separation into two distinct Houses, — nor is it a question I need trouble you with. The House of Lords is now solely composed of the Lords spiritual and temporal. In the earlier Parliaments, the number of the Lords spiritual was generally greater than that of the Lords temporal. In the reign of Henry III. a hun- dred and twenty Prelates and only twenty-three temporal Lords were summoned. In subsequent reigns the number varied considerably, but the tem- poral Lords rarely exceeded the spiritual Lords in number. At the time of the dissolution of mon- asteries by Henry VIIL, the spiritual Lords were equal in number to the temporal nobility. Th-e Lords spiritual are the Archbishoijs of Canterbury, York, and Dublin (the latter only till 1871), twenty- four bishops of the Church of England, and three Irish representative bishops (the latter, owing to the Irish Church Bill, will cease to sit after January 1, 1871). The Lords spiritual have always had a seat in the 132 TlIK IIOUSK OF LOllDS. House of Lords, Lut by what right is not agreed — some saying that it was Ijy virtue of their ecclesi- astical office, or by their tenures as barons. The Lords spiritual, not being ennobled in blood, are now regarded as Lords of Parliament only, and not Peers. The Lords temporal are divided into Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts, and Barons, whose titles are all hereditary. They are called Peers, because, although there is a distinction of dignity among them, they are equal in all public actions ; as, for instance, in giving their votes in Parliament or at the trial of any nobleman. The title of Duke, though first in rank, is by no means the most ancient in this country. It was first con- ferred on Edward the Black Prince by Edward III., whom he created Duke of Cornwall. Mar- quesses were originally lords of the marches or borders, and derived their title from the offices held by them. The first who was created a ^Marquess as a title of honour was liobert de Yere, Earl of Oxford, in 1198. Earls were in existence before the Conquest by the title of eal dor men, and to their hands the administration of the shires was committed. After the Conquest they were called counts, and hence the shires intrusted to them were called counties ; but in course of time the original title NUMBER OF ITS MEMBERS UNLIMITED. 133 of Earl was revived. Viscounts were created for the first time in the reign of Henry VI. The first Viscount was John Beaumont. The title of Baron is a very old one, and was in existence long before the Norman Conquest. Unlike the House of Commons, the number of the members of the House of Lords is not limited. In the reiffn of Henry VII., the temporal Peers who were sum- moned to Parliament were only 29 ; at the death of Queen Elizabeth this number was increased to 60. The Stuarts again raised the number to al)out 150, which William III. and Queen Anne further in- creased to 168. On the Union of Scotland in 1707, 16 representative Peers of Scotland were added to the House of Lords. The two first kings of the House of Hanover continued to make additions to the Peerage, so that in 1760 that body amounted to 174. In the reign of George III., the creation of peers was freely resorted to by successive Ministers as an expedient for increasing the influence of the Crown. On the Union of Ireland in 1800, 28 re- presentative Peers of Ireland were admitted to the House of Lords, and 4 Lords spiritual, to sit by rotation of sessions, of whom an Archbishop of the Church in Ireland was always to be one. Since 1800 numerous additions have constantly been made 131 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. to the Peerage. George ITI. created 388 Peers; George IV., 59 ; "William IV., 55 ; and our present gracious Queen, about 110 ; so that now in this year of 1870 (in addition to the 30 Lords spiritual) there are sitting in the House of Lords 4 Peers of the blood-royal, 20 Dukes, 20 Marquesses, 127 Earls, 31 Viscounts, and 239 Barons — making a total of 471 Lords spiritual and temporal. Peers are created either by writ or by letters- patent, the latter being the more usual way, though the former is the more ancient. But the ^^Tit of summons to Parliament does not ennoble, unless the person summoned to Parliament actually takes his seat there. The method by letters-patent is therefore the more secure way of conferring nobility on a man and his heirs, because the title is not lost by his omission to sit in Parliament. A writ of summons is, however, generally used when the eldest son of a peer is called up to the House of Lords in his father's lifetime, because there is no fear of his children losing the nobility in case he never takes his seat, for they will succeed to their grandfather. According to the ancient law-writers, the sovereign can create either a man or a woman noble for life ; but this proposition was disputed in the debate in the House of Lords on the letters- DISPUTE ABOUT LIFE PEERAGES. 135 patent conferring a life peerage on Sir James Parke as Baron Wensleydale. It was argued tliat the Sovereign was not warranted by precedents in creating peers for life, and that, even if such prero- gative ever existed, it had become obsolete, as it was certain that no life peerages had been created for several centuries. It was also contended that a power in the Crown to grant such peerages might be attended with dangerous consequences to the in- dependence of the House of Lords, as the advisers of the Crown, being unrestrained by the fear of permanently increasing the number of peers, might on some occasions, in order to increase their poli- tical power, advise an exercise of that power. In consequence of the decision of the Lords, Lord Wensleydale was subsequently created an hereditary peer. From the time of the Conquest to the present day, there has been no breach in the continuity of the English j^eerage. The Lords who now sit at West- minster are the historical representatives of the Lords who sat at ]\Iertou six hundred years ago ; but among them there is not a single lineal male descendant of one of the earls and barons created by our Norman kings, or of one of the barons as- sembled at Eunnymede, or of one of the peers who 136 TIIK HOUSE OF LORDS. fought in 1415 under the Lanner of Henry V. at Agiiicourt. The historic names of Northumberland, Marlborough, Newcastle, Bath, Buckingham, Suf- folk, Dudley, Salisbury, Essex, Beauchamp, Grey de Euthyn, Grey de Wilton, &c., are all borne by personages who at the best are lieirs tlirough fe- males, and for the most part are connected by neither blood nor alliance with the ancient houses whose titles they have assumed.* Of existing dukedoms, only those of Norfolk and Somerset date before the rei^n of Charles II. Of existinjr marquessates only those of Winchester and Wor- cester were created before the reign of George III. Of the earldoms created by the Plantagenets and Tudors, eleven alone are still extant, — six of them merged in higher titles, the remaining five being * The Dukes of Northumberland are not Percies, but Smithsons ; the Wcllesleys are not "Wellesleys, but Colleys ; the Pagets are not Pagets, but Bailys ; Earl Nelson is a Bolton, not a Nelson ; Lord Carington is not a Carington, but Smith; Lord Braybrooke and Lord Abergavenny, though owning the names of Neville and Nevill, have no blood of the Nevilles, Earls of Westmoreland, in their veins ; the Earl of "Warwick is no descendant of the King- maker ; the Earl of Leicester is neither Plantagenet, nor Dudley, nor Sydney, nor even a Coke, but a Roberts ; and Lord De Ros is not a De Ros, but a Fitzgerald. *' Out of the twenty-five barons," says Sir B. Burke, "who were chosen to enforce the observances of Magna Carta, not one is at this day represented iu the House of Peers by a genuine male descendant." AN INSTITUTION, NOT A CASTE. 137 Shrewsbury, Derby, Huntingdon, Pembroke, and Devon. Of the sixty English peerages in existence at the death of Elizabeth, forty are now extinct. Among the peers of Scotland and Ireland there are not a few who are the lineal descendants and heirs-male of the original grantees of their peerages. In Scotland there are Argyll, Athole, Montrose, Huntly, Angus, Abercorn, Perth, Caithness, Strath- more, Dundonald, Borthwick, Forbes, &c. ; and in Ireland there are Kildare, Ormonde, Cork, Meath, Clanricarde, Kerry, Granard, Westmeath, Kinsale, Dunboyne, Fingall, &c. Mr Disraeli has remarked in ' Coningsby ' that our nobility owe their elevation to three principal causes : " The spoliation of the Church under Henry VIII., the open and flagrant sale of honours by the elder Stuarts, and the borough-mongering of modern times." But success at the Bar and behind the counter has always proved one of the most sure and certain means of attaining to a coronet. Lord Stanhope truly says that " it is this constant affluence which keeps the stream of the Peerage clear, and prevents it from becoming a stagnant and fetid pool. What has kept it firm and un- shaken, while so many neighbouring aristocracies have tottered to decay or fallen before political 138 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. convulsions ? It is because tlieir families are con- stantly coining fiuni the i)ejuj/unii Ji> ' rvt§i VHii . :.? ^.ifOJITVD JO"^ '^^OJIIVJJO'^ MIIBRARYQ^ ^lllBRARYQr^ \^\\m\'^^ ^iifOjnvDjo^ AMEUNIVE1?%J;|. CO so > ^0FCAIIF0% ^OFCAIIFOM*. .^WEUN[v^^% ^ ^^WEUNIVEK% ^lOSANCn^A ^>S^LIBRARYQ<;^ '^^iiawscn^ "VAevir UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES ^5^l•UBRA«Y(?/• .ScOFCAllF0% Sll3AJNfl ^\^t•uNivfflv^ MllBRARYa^ .^Wf•UN(VERS'/A ^^lOS•AMCF ^tfOJIWDJO^ %Oi\miQ'^ ^TiiaDNVSOl^ %ll3AINft- ^OFCAIIFOW:^ ^OFCAllFOff^ Oe IV /^-■^ * S Q= tV / >«% \ S "^^AHviaii'^ ^:lOSANCf o M-UBRAir