AUSTRIAN MANIFESTO 
 AGAINST FRANCE 
 
 1813
 
 UCSB LIBRARY 
 
 V-
 
 Austrian Declaration 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 AUG. 1813. 
 
 MANIFESTO 
 
 OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA, KING OF 
 HUNGARY AND BOHEMIA. 
 
 THE Austrian Monarchy has been compelled by its situation, by 
 its various connections with the other Powers, and its importance 
 in the Confederacy of European States, to engage in most of 
 those wars which have ravaged Europe for upwards of twenty 
 years. Throughout the progress of these arduous struggles, the 
 same political principle has invariably directed his Imperial 
 Majesty. A lover of peace from a sense of duty, from his own 
 natural feelings, and from attachment to his people, free from all 
 ambitious thoughts of conquest and aggrandisement, his Majesty 
 has only taken up arms when called by the urgent necessity of 
 self-preservation, by an anxiety for the fate of contiguous States 
 inseparable from his own, or by the danger of beholding the 
 entire social system of Europe a prey to a lawless and absolute 
 Power. To promote justice and order has been the object of 
 his Majesty's life and reign ; for these alone has Austria con- 
 tended. If, in these frequently unsuccessful contests, deep wounds 
 have been inflicted on the monarchy, still his Majesty had the 
 consolation to reflect, that the fate of his empire had not been 
 
 M, Printer, Broxbwrnt, 
 tterts.
 
 hazarded upon needless and violent enterprises ; that all his deci- 
 sions were justifiable before GOD, his People, his Contemporaries, 
 and Posterity. 
 
 Notwithstanding the most ample preparations, the war in 1809 
 would have brought the State to ruin, had not the ever-memorable 
 bravery of the army, and the spirit of true patriotism which ani- 
 mated all parts of the monarchy, overbalanced every adverse 
 occurrence. The honour of the nation, and its antient renown 
 in arms, were happily upheld during all the mischances of this 
 war: but valuable provinces were lost; and Austria, by the ces- 
 sion of the countries bordering upon the Adriatic, was deprived of 
 all share in maritime commerce, one of the most efficient means 
 of promoting her industry; a blow which would have been still 
 more sensibly felt, had not, at the same time, the whole Conti- 
 nent been closed by a general and destructive System, preventing 
 all commercial intercourse, and almost suspending all communi- 
 cation amongst nations. 
 
 The progress and result of this war fully satisfied his Majesty, 
 that in the obvious impossibility of an immediate and thorough 
 improvement of the political condition of Europe, shaken as it 
 was to its very foundation, the exertions of individual States in 
 their own defence, instead of setting bounds to the general dis- 
 tress, would only tend to destroy the little strength they still 
 retained, would hasten the fall of the whole, and even destroy 
 all hopes of future and better times. Under this conviction, his 
 Majesty foresaw the important advantage that would result from 
 a Peace, which, if secured for some years, might check this over- 
 grown and hitherto irresistible Power ; might allow his monarchy 
 that repose which was indispensable to the restoration of his 
 finances and his army; and, at the same time, procure to the 
 neighbouring States a period of relaxation, which, if improved 
 with prudence and activity, might prepare the way to more for- 
 tunate times. Such a Peace, under the existing circumstances of 
 danger, was only to be obtained by an extraordinary effort. The 
 Emperor was sensible of it, and made this effort. For the preser- 
 vation of the empire, for the most sacred interests of mankind, 
 as a security against immeasurable evils, as a pledge of a better
 
 3 
 
 Order of things, his Majesty sacrificed what was dearest to his 
 heart. With this view, exalted above all common scruples, 
 armed against every misconstruction of the moment, an alliance 
 was formed, which was intended, by a sense of some security, to 
 reanimate the weaker and more suffering party, after the miseries 
 of an unsuccessful struggle, to incline the stronger and victorious 
 one to a course of moderation and justice, without which the 
 community of States can only be considered as a community of 
 misery. 
 
 His Majesty was the more justified in these expectations, 
 because, at the time of the consummation of this union, the 
 Emperor Napoleon had attained that point of his career, when the 
 preservation of his conquests was a more natural and desirable 
 object than a restless struggle after new possessions. Any far- 
 ther extension of his dominions, long since outstretching their 
 proper limits, was attended with evident danger, not only to 
 France, already sinking under the burthen of his conquests, but 
 even to his own real personal interest. What his authority gained 
 in extent, it necessarily lost in point of security* By an union 
 with the most antient Imperial Family in Christendom, the edifice 
 of his greatness acquired, in the eyes of the French nation and of 
 the world, such an addition of strength and perfection, that any 
 ulterior scheme of aggrandisement must only weaken and destroy 
 its stability. What France, what Europe, what so many 
 oppressed and despairing nations earnestly demanded of Heaven, 
 a sound policy prescribed to the triumphant ruler as a law of 
 self-preservation ; and it was allowed to hope that so many great 
 and united motives would prevail over the ambition of an 
 individual. 
 
 If these flattering prospects were destroyed, it is not to be 
 imputed to Austria. After many years' fruitless exertions, after 
 boundless sacrifices of every description, there existed sufficient 
 motives for the attempt to procure a better order of things 
 by confidence and concession, when streams of blood had 
 hitherto produced nothing but misery and destruction ; nor 
 can his Majesty ever regret that he has been induced to at- 
 tempt it.
 
 The year 1810 was not yet closed; the war still raged in 
 Spain ; the people of Germany had scarce been allowed a sufficient 
 time to recover from the devastations of the two former wars, 
 when, in an evil hour, the Emperor Napoleon resolved to unite 
 a considerable portion of the North of Germany with the mass 
 of Countries which bore the name of the French Empire, and to 
 rob the antient free commercial cities of Hamburgh, Bremen, and 
 Lubec, first of their political, and shortly after of their com- 
 mercial existence, and, with that, of their means of subsistence. 
 This violent step was adopted without even any plausible pre- 
 tensions, in contempt of every decent form, without any previous 
 declaration, or communication with any other Cabinet under 
 the arbitrary and futile pretext, that the war with England 
 required if. 
 
 This cruel System, which was intended to destroy the Com- 
 merce of the World, at the expense of the independence, the 
 prosperity, the rights and dignity, and in utter ruin of the public 
 and private property of all the Continental Powers, was pursued 
 with unrelenting severity, in the vain expectation of forcing a 
 result, which, had it not fortunately proved unattainable, would 
 have plunged Europe, for a long time to come, into a state of 
 poverty, impotence, and barbarity ! 
 
 The Decree by which a new French dominion was established 
 on the German Coasts, under the title of a Thirty-second Mili- 
 tary Division, was in itself sufficiently calculated to raise the 
 suspicions of the adjoining States; and it was the more alarming 
 to them as the forerunner of future and greater dangers. By 
 this Decree it became evident, that the system which had been 
 created in France (although previously transgressed, yet still pro- 
 claimed to be in existence) the system of the pretended natural 
 limit <; of the French Empire was, without any farther justifica- 
 tion or explanation, overthrown, and even the Emperor's arbi- 
 trary acts were in the same arbitrary manner annihilated. 
 Neither the Princes of the Rhenish Confederacy, nor the kingdom 
 of Westphalia, no territory, great or small, was spared in the 
 accomplishment of this dreadful usurpation. The boundary 
 drawn apparently by blind caprice, without either rule or plan,
 
 without any consideration of antient or more recent political rela- 
 tions intersected rivers and Countries, cut off the Middle and 
 Southern States of Germany from all connection with the Ger- 
 man Sea, passed the Elbe, separated Denmark from Germany, 
 laid its pretensions even to the Baltic, and seemed to be rapidly 
 approaching the line of Prussian fortresses still occupied on the 
 Oder; and so little did this act of usurpation (however powerfully 
 it affected all rights and possessions, all geographic, political, and 
 military lines of demarcation) carry with it a character of deter- 
 minate and complete accession of territory, that it was impossible 
 to view it in any other light than as a forerunner of still greater 
 usurpations, by which one half of Germany was to become a 
 French Province, and the Emperor Napoleon the absolute Ruler 
 of the Continent. 
 
 To Russia and Prussia this unnatural extension of the French 
 territory could not fail of producing the most serious alarm. The 
 latter, surrounded on all sides, no longer capable of free action, 
 deprived of every means of obtaining fresh strength, appeared 
 hastening to its dissolution. Russia, already in fear for her 
 western frontier, by the conversion of the city of Dantzic 
 (declared a free city by the Treaty of Tilsit) into a French military 
 port, and of a great part of Poland into a French province, 
 could not but see, in the advance of the French dominion along 
 the sea coast, and in the new chains prepared for Prussia, the 
 imminent danger of her German and Polish possessions. From 
 this moment, therefore, the rupture between France and Russia 
 was as good as decided. 
 
 Not without deep and just anxiety did Austria observe the 
 storm which was gathering. The scene of hostilities would in 
 every case be contiguous to her Provinces ; which, owing to the 
 necessary reform in the financial system which had cramped the 
 restoration of her military means, were in a very defenceless 
 state. In a higher point of view, the struggle which awaited 
 Russia appeared still more doubtful, as it commenced under the 
 same unfavourable conjuncture of affairs, with the same want of 
 co-operation on the part of other Powers, and with the same 
 disproportion in their relative means j consequently, was just as
 
 hopeless as all former struggles of the same nature. His Majesty 
 the Emperor made every effort in his power, by friendly media- 
 tion with both parties, to avert the impending storm. No human 
 judgment could at that time foresee that the period was so near 
 at hand, when the failure of these friendly attempts should 
 prove more injurious to the Emperor Napoleon than to his 
 opponents. Thus, however, it was resolved by the wisdom of 
 Providence. 
 
 When the commencement of hostilities was no longer doubt- 
 ful, his Majesty was compelled to have recourse to measures 
 which, in so unnatural and dangerous a conjuncture, might com- 
 bine his own security with just considerations for the real interests 
 of neighbouring States. The system of unarmed inaction, the 
 only neutrality which the Emperor Napoleon, according to his 
 own declarations, would have permitted, was by every sound 
 maxim of policy wholly inadmissible, and would at last have 
 proved only a vain endeavour to shrink from the approaching 
 trial. A power so important as Austria could not renounce all 
 participation in the interests of Europe ; nor could she place her- 
 self in a situation in which, equally ineffective in peace or war, 
 she would lose her voice and influence in all great negotiations, 
 without acquiring any guarantee for the security of her own 
 frontier. To prepare for war against France would have been, 
 under the existing circumstances, as little consonant with equity 
 as with prudence. The Emperor Napoleon had given his Majesty 
 no personal ground for hostile proceedings ; and the prospect of 
 attaining many beneficial results, by a skilful employment of the 
 established friendly relations, by confidential representations and 
 by conciliatory councils, had not yet been abandoned as hopeless. 
 And with regard to the immediate interest of the State, such a 
 resolution would inevitably have been attended with this conse- 
 quence that the Austrian territory would have become the first 
 and principal seat of war; which, with its well-known deficiency 
 of means of defence, could in a short time have overthrown the 
 monarchy. 
 
 In this painful situation, his Majesty had no other resource 
 than to take the field on the side of France. To take up arms
 
 r 
 
 for France, in the real sense of the word, would have been a 
 measure not only in contradiction with the duties and principles 
 of the Emperor, but even with the repeated declarations of his 
 Cabinet, which had, without any reserve, disapproved of this 
 war. On the signature of the Treaty of the 1 2th of March, 1812, 
 his Majesty proceeded upon two distinct principles : the first, as 
 is proved by the words of the Treaty, was to leave no means 
 untried which might sooner or later obtain a peace ; the other was 
 to place himself, internally and externally, in a position which, 
 if it should prove impossible to effect a peace, or in case the turn 
 of the war should render decisive measures on his part necessary, 
 would enable Austria to act with independence ; and in either of 
 these cases, to adopt the measures which a just and wise policy 
 should prescribe. Upon this principle it was that only a fixed 
 and comparatively small part of the army was destined to 
 co-operate in the war ; the other military resources, at that time in 
 a state of readiness, or that still remained to be prepared, were not 
 called forth for the prosecution of this war. By a kind of tacit 
 agreement between the Belligerents, the Austrian territory was 
 even treated as neutral. The real end and views of the system 
 adopted by his Majesty could not escape the notice of France, 
 Russia, or any intelligent observer. 
 
 The campaign of 1812 furnished a memorable example of the 
 failure of an undertaking supported by gigantic powers, con- 
 ducted by a Captain of the first rank, when, in the confidence of 
 great military talents, he despises the rules of prudence, and out- 
 steps the bounds of Nature. The illusion of glory carried the 
 Emperor Napoleon into the heart of the Russian Empire ; and a 
 false political view of things induced him to imagine that he 
 should dictate a peace in Moscow, should cripple the Russian 
 Power for half a century, and then return victorious. When the 
 magnanimous constancy of the Emperor of Russia, the glorious 
 deeds of his warriors, and the unshaken fidelity of his people, 
 put an end to this dream, it was too late to repent it with im- 
 punity. The whole French army was scattered and destroyed : in 
 less than four months we have seen the theatre of war transferred 
 from the Dnieper and the Dwina to the Oder and the Elbe.
 
 8 
 
 ', This rapid and extraordinary change of fortune was the fore- 
 runner of an important revolution in all the political relations of 
 Europe. The confederacy of Russia, Great Britain, and Sweden, 
 presented a point of union to all neighbouring States. Prussia, 
 whom report had long declared determined to risk all, to prefer 
 even the danger of immediate political destruction to the lingering 
 sufferings of continued oppression, seized the favourable moment, 
 and threw herself into the arms of the Allies. Many greater and 
 smaller Princes of Germany were ready to do the same. Every- 
 where the ardent desires of the people anticipated the regular 
 proceedings of their Governments. Their impatience to live in 
 independence, and under their own laws, the sentiment of 
 wounded national honour, and the hatred of a foreign dominion, 
 broke out in bright flames on all sides. 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor, too intelligent not to consider this 
 change of affairs as the natural and necessary consequence of a 
 previous violent political convulsion, and too just to view it in 
 anger, was solely bent upon securing, by deep-digested and well- 
 combined measures, the real and permanent interest of the Euro- 
 pean Commonwealth. Already, in the beginning of December, 
 considerable steps had been taken on the part of the Austrian 
 Cabinet, in order to dispose the Emperor Napoleon to quiet and 
 peaceful policy, on grounds which equally interested the world 
 and his own welfare. These steps were from time to time 
 renewed and enforced. Hopes had been entertained that the 
 impression of last year's campaign, the recollection of the fruit- 
 less sacrifice of an immense army, the severe measures of every 
 description that would be necessary to replace that loss, the 
 decided disinclination of France, and of all those nations con- 
 nected with her, to a war which, without any prospect of future 
 indemnification, exhausted and ruined her internal strength, 
 that, lastly, even a calm reflection on the doubtful issue of this 
 new and highly imminent crisis, would move the Emperor to listen 
 to the representations of Austria. The tone of these representa- 
 tions was carefully adapted to the circumstances of the times; 
 serious as the greatness of the object, moderate as the desire of 
 a favourable issue, and as the existing friendly relations required.
 
 9 
 
 That overtures flowing from so pure a motive should be 
 decidedly rejected, could not certainly be foreseen. But the man- 
 ner in which they were received, and, still more, the striking con- 
 trast between the sentiments entertained by Austria and the whole 
 conduct of the Emperor Napoleon, to the period of these unsuc- 
 cessful endeavours for peace, soon destroyed the best hopes that 
 were entertained. Instead of endeavouring, by a moderate lan- 
 guage, to improve at least our view of the future, and to lessen 
 the general despondency, it was on every occasion solemnly 
 declared, before the highest Authorities in France, that the Empe- 
 ror would hear of no proposition for peace that should violate 
 the integrity of the French Empire, in the French sense of the 
 word, or that should make any pretension to the arbitrarily incor- 
 porated Provinces. 
 
 At the same time, eventual conditions, with which this self- 
 created boundary did not even appear to have any relation, were 
 spoken of, at one time menacing indignation, at another with 
 bitter contempt; as if it had not been possible to declare in terms 
 sufficiently distinct, the resolution of the Emperor Napoleon, NOT 
 
 TO MAKE TO THE REPOSE OF THE WORLD EVEN ONE SINGLE 
 NOMINAL SACRIFICE. 
 
 These hostile demonstrations were attended with this particular 
 mortification to Austria, that they placed even the invitations to 
 peace, which this Cabinet, with the knowledge and apparent con- 
 sent of France, made to other Courts, in a false and highly dis- 
 advantageous light. The Sovereigns united against France, instead 
 of any answer to Austria's propositions for negotiation, and her 
 offers of mediation, laid before her the public declarations of the 
 French Emperor. And when, in the month of March, his 
 Majesty sent a Minister to London, to invite England to share 
 in a negotiation for peace, the British Ministry replied, " that 
 they would not lelieve Austria still entertained any hopes of 
 peace, when the Emperor Napoleon had in the mean time ex- 
 pressed sentiments which could only tend to the perpetuation of 
 war;" a declaration which was the more painful to his Majesty 
 the more it was just and well founded. 
 
 Austria, however, did not upon this account cease to impress,
 
 in more forcible and distinct terms, the necessity of peace upon 
 the mind of the Emperor of France; directed in all her mea- 
 sures by this principle, that, as all order and balance of power 
 in Europe had been destroyed by the boundless superiority of 
 France, no real peace was to be expected, unless that superiority 
 were diminished. His Majesty in the mean time adopted every 
 necessary measure to strengthen and concentrate his armies; 
 sensible that Austria must be prepared for war, if her mediation 
 were not to be entirely unavailing. His Imperial Majesty had 
 moreover been long since persuaded, that the probability of an 
 immediate share in the war should no longer be excluded from his 
 calculations. The actual state of things could not be continued ; 
 of this the Emperor was convinced: this conviction was the 
 mainspring of his actions, and was naturally strengthened by the 
 failure of any attempt to procure a peace. The result was appa- 
 rent. By one means or the other, either by negotiation or by 
 force of arms, a new state of things must be effected. 
 
 The Emperor Napoleon was not only aware of the Austrian 
 preparations for war, but even acknowledged them as necessary, 
 and justified them in more than one instance. He had sufficient 
 reason to believe that his Majesty the Emperor, at so decisive a 
 period for the fate of the whole world, would lay aside all personal 
 and momentary feelings, would alone consult the lasting welfare 
 of Austria, and of the Countries by which she is surrounded, and 
 would resolve nothing but what this great motive should impose as 
 a duty upon him. The Austrian Cabinet had never expressed 
 itself in terms that would warrant any other construction ; and 
 yet the French did not only acknowledge that the Austrian media- 
 tion could only be an armed mediation, but declared, upon more 
 than one occasion, that Austria, under existing circumstances, 
 ought no longer to confine herself to act a secondary part, but 
 should appear in force upon the stage, and decide as a great and 
 independent Power. Whatever the French Government could 
 either hope or fear from Austria, this acknowledgment was of 
 itself a previous justification of the whole intended and hitherto 
 adopted measures of his Imperial Majesty. 
 
 Thus far were circumstances developed, when the Emperor
 
 11 
 
 Napoleon left Paris, in order to make head against the progress of 
 the Allied Armies. Even their enemies have done homage to the 
 valour of the Russian and Prussian troops in the sanguinary 
 actions of the month of May. Tlxat, however, the result of this 
 first period of the campaign was not more favourable to them, 
 was owing partly to the great numerical superiority of the French 
 force, and to the universally acknowledged military talents of 
 their leader, and partly to the political combinations by which the 
 Allied Sovereigns were guided in all their undertakings. They 
 acted under the just supposition, that a cause like the one in 
 which they were engaged could not possibly be confined to them- 
 selves ; that sooner or later, whether successful or unfortunate^ 
 every State which still preserved a shadow of independence must 
 join their confederacy, every independent army must act with 
 them. They therefore did not allow further scope to the bravery 
 of their troops than the moment required, and preserved a con- 
 siderable part of their strength for a period when, with more 
 extended means, they might look to the attainment of greater 
 objects. For the same cause, and with a view to the develope- 
 ment of events, they consented to the Armistice. 
 
 In the mean time, the retreat of the Allies had, for the mo- 
 ment, given an appearance to the war which daily became rnpre 
 interesting to the Emperor, from the impossibility, if it should 
 proceed, of his remaining an inactive spectator of it. The fate 
 of the Prussian Monarchy was a point which peculiarly attracted 
 the attention of his Majesty, feeling, as the Emperor did, that 
 the restoration of the Prussian Monarchy was the first step 
 towards that of the whole political system of Europe; and he 
 viewed the danger in which she now stood as equally affecting 
 himself. Already, in the month of April, had the Emperor 
 Napoleon suggested to the Austrian Cabinet, that he considered 
 the dissolution of the Prussian Monarchy as a natural conse- 
 quence of her defection from France, and of the continuation of 
 the war, and that it now only depended upon Austria to add the 
 most important and most flourishing of her provinces to its own 
 State ; a suggestion which shewed distinctly enough that no means 
 could properly s be oeglected to save that Power. ,lf this great
 
 12 
 
 object could not be obtained by a just peace, it was necessary to 
 support Russia and Prussia by a powerful co-operation. From 
 this natural view of things, upon which even France could no 
 longer deceive herself, his Majesty continued his preparations with 
 unwearied activity. He quitted, in the early part of July, his 
 residence, and proceeded to the vicinity of the scene of action, in 
 order the more effectually to labour at the negotiation for peace, 
 which still continued to be the object of his most ardent desires; 
 and partly to be able the more effectually to conduct the prepara- 
 tions for war, if no other choice should remain for Austria. 
 
 A short time before, the Emperor Napoleon had declared, " that 
 he had proposed a Congress, to be held at Prague, where Pleni- 
 potentiaries from France, the United States of North America, 
 Denmark, the King of Spain, and the other Allied Princes on the 
 one hand ; and on the other, Plenipotentiaries of England, Russia, 
 Prussia, the Spanish Insurgents, and the other Allies of this 
 hostile mass, should meet, and lay the ground-work of a peace." 
 To whom this proposition was addressed, in what manner, in what 
 diplomatic form, through whose organ it could have been done, 
 was perfectly unknown to the Austrian Cabinet, which only was 
 made acquainted with the circumstance through the medium of 
 the public prints. How, too, such a project could be brought to 
 bear how, from the combination of such dissimilar elements, 
 without any generally acknowledged principle, without any pre- 
 viously regulated plan, a negotiation for peace was to be set on 
 foot, was so little to be comprehended, that it was very allowable 
 to consider the whole proposition rather as a play of the imagina- 
 tion, than as a serious invitation to the adoption of a great politi- 
 cal measure. 
 
 Perfectly acquainted with all the obstacles to a general peace, 
 Austria had long considered whether this distant and difficult ob- 
 ject was not rather to be attained progressively; and in this 
 opinion had expressed herself both to France and to Russia and 
 Prussia, upon the subject of a Continental peace. Not that the 
 Austrian Court had misconceived, even for a moment, the neces- 
 city and importance of <m Universal Peace among all the great 
 Powers of Europe, and without which there was no Jiope of either
 
 13 
 
 safety or happiness ; on, had imagined that the Continent could 
 exist, if the separation of England were not invariably con- 
 sidered as a most deadly evil ! The mediation which Austria 
 proposed after the alarming declaration of France had nearly 
 destroyed all hopes of England uniting her' endeavours in 
 the attempt to procure a genei-al peace was an essential part of 
 the great approaching negotiation for a general and effective 
 Congress for Peace : it was intended, as preparatory to this, to 
 draw up the preliminary articles of the future Treaty, to pave 
 the ivay, by a long Continental Armistice, to a more extended 
 and durable negotiation. Had the principle upon which 
 Austria advanced leen other than this, neither Russia nor 
 Prussia, bound by the strongest ties to England, would certainly 
 ever have listened to the proposals of the Austrian Cabinet. 
 
 After the Russian and Prussian Courts, animated by a confi- 
 dence in his Majesty highly flattering to the Emperor, had already 
 declared their concurrence in the proposed Congress under the 
 mediation of Austria, it became necessary to obtain the formal 
 assent of the Emperor Napoleon, and to determine upon what 
 principles the negotiations for peace were to be carried on. For 
 this purpose his Imperial Majesty resolved, towards the end of 
 the month of June, to send his Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
 Dresden. The result of this mission was a Convention, concluded 
 upon the 30th of June, accepting the mediation of his Imperial 
 Majesty in the negotiation of a general, and, if that could not be 
 effected, of a preliminary Continental peace. The city of Prague 
 was fixed upon for the meeting of the Congress, and the 5th of 
 July for the day of its opening. In order to obtain a sufficient 
 time for the negotiation, it was determined by the same Conven- 
 tion that the Emperor Napoleon should not give notice of the 
 rupture of the Armistice, which was to terminate on the 20th of 
 July, at that time existing between himself and Russia, till the 
 10th of August; and his Majesty the Emperor took upon himself 
 to obtain a similar Declaration from the Russian and Prussian 
 Courts. 
 
 The points which had been determined in Dresden were here- 
 upon imparted to the two Courts. Although the continuation of
 
 14 
 
 the Armistice was attended with many objections, and with much 
 serious inconvenience to them, the desire of giving to his Imperial 
 Majesty another proof of their confidence and at the same time to 
 satisfy the world that they would not reject any prospect of Peace, 
 however confined it might be, that they would not refuse any 
 attempt which might prepare the way to it overcame every con- 
 sideration. The only alteration made in Convention of the 
 30th of June was, that the term of the opening the Congress, 
 since the final regulations could not so soon be determined, should 
 be deferred until the 1 2th of July. 
 
 In the mean time, his Majesty, who would not as yet aban- 
 don all hopes of completely terminating by a general peace the 
 sufferings of mankind and the convulsions of the political 
 world, had also resolved upon a new attempt with the British 
 Government. The Emperor Napoleon not only received the 
 proposal with apparent approbation, lut even voluntarily offered 
 to expedite the business, by allowing the persons to be despatched 
 for that purpose to England a passage through France. When 
 it was to be carried into effect, unexpected difficulties arose, the 
 passports were delayed from time to time, under trifling pre- 
 texts, and at length entirely refused. This proceeding afforded 
 tt fresh and important ground for entertaining just doubts as to 
 the sincerity of the assurances which the Emperor Napoleon had 
 more than once publickly expressed of his disposition to peace, 
 although several of his expressions at that particular period 
 afforded just reason to believe that a MARITIME PEACE was the 
 object of his most anxious solicitude. 
 
 During that interval, their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and 
 the King of Prussia had nominated their Plenipotentiaries to the 
 Congress, and had furnished them with very decisive instructions. 
 On the 12th of July they both arrived at Prague, as well as his 
 Majesty's Minister, charged with the concerns of the Mediation. 
 
 The negotiations were not to be protracted beyond the 10th of 
 August, except in the event of their assuming such a character as 
 to induce a confident hope of a favourable result. To that day 
 the Armistice had been extended through the mediation of Austria : 
 the political and military situation of the Allied Sovereigns, the
 
 condition of the Countries they occupied, and their anxious wish 
 to terminate an irksome period of uncertainty, prevented any 
 further extension of it. With all these circumstances the Empe- 
 ror Napoleon was acquainted; he Well knew that the period of 
 the negotiations was necessarily defined by that of the Armistice ; 
 and he could not moreover conceal from himself how much his 
 own determinations would influence the happy abridgment and 
 successful result of the pending negotiations. 
 
 It was therefore with real sorrow that his Majesty soon per- 
 ceived, not only that no serious step was taken by France to accele- 
 rate this great work, but, on the contrary, it appeared as if a 
 procrastination of the negotiations, and evasion of a favourable 
 issue, had been decidedly intended. There was, indeed, a French 
 Minister at the place of Congress, but without any orders to 
 proceed to business, until the appearance of the first Plenipo- 
 tentiary. 
 
 The arrival of that Plenipotentiary was in vain'expected from day 
 to day. Nor was it until the 21st of July that it was ascertained 
 that a demur which took place on settling the renewal of the 
 Armistice between the French and Russian and Prussian Com- 
 missioners, an obstruction of very subordinate importance, having 
 no influence whatever upon the Congress, and which might have 
 been very easily and speedily removed by the interference of 
 Austria, was made use of as the justification of this extraordinary 
 delay. And when this last pretext was removed, it was not until 
 the 28th of July, sixteen days after that appointed for the opening 
 of the Congress, that the first French Plenipotentiary arrived. 
 
 Even in the very first days after this Minister's arrival, no doubt 
 remained as to the fate of the Congress. The form in which 
 the full powers were to be delivered and the mutual explanations 
 should be conducted, a point which had already been treated by 
 all parties, became the object of a discussion which rendered all 
 the endeavours of the mediating Power abortive. The apparent 
 insufficiency of the powers entrusted to the French Negotiator 
 occasioned a silence of several days. Nor was it until the 6th 
 of August that this Minister gave in a new Declaration, by which 
 the difficulties with respect to forms were by no means removed,
 
 16 
 
 nor the negotiation by one step brought nearer to its object. 
 After a useless exchange of notes upon every preliminary 
 question, the 10th of August arrived. The Prussian and Russian 
 Negotiators could not exceed this term; the Congress was at an 
 end ; and the resolution which Austria had to form was previously 
 determined, by the progress of this negotiation by the actual 
 conviction of the impossibility of peace by the no longer doubt- 
 ful point of view in which his Majesty examined the great question 
 in dispute by the principles and intentions of the Allies, wherein 
 the Emperor recognised his own and, finally, by the former 
 positive declarations, which left no room for misconception. 
 
 Not without sincere affliction, and alone consoled by the cer- 
 tainty that every means to avoid the war had been exhausted, does 
 the Emperor now find himself compelled to action. For three 
 years has his Majesty laboured with unceasing perseverance to 
 effect, by mild and conciliatory measures, real and durable peace 
 for Austria and for Europe. All his endeavours have failed: 
 there is now no remedy, no recourse to be had but to arms. The 
 Emperor takes them up without any personal animosity, from a 
 painful necessity, from an irresistible duty, upon grounds which 
 any faithful citizen of his realm, which the world, which the 
 Emperor Napoleon himself, in a moment of tranquillity and 
 reason, will acknowledge and justify. The necessity of this war 
 is engraven in the heart of every Austrian, of every European, 
 under whosesoever dominion he may live, in such legible charac- 
 ters, that no art is necessary to distinguish them. The nation 
 and the army will do their duty. An union established by 
 common necessity, and by the mutual interest of every Power that 
 is in arms for its independence, will give due weight to our exer- 
 tions; and the result, with the assistance of Heaven, will be such 
 as must fulfil the just expectations of every friend of Order and 
 of Peace. 
 
 n r attt, Printtr, Broxtournt,
 
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