IRLF 
 
1012 
 
 1012 
 
 OF ^ 
 
 ^IFOK^O^ 
 
 A STUDTTTT BATTLE 
 FORMATION 
 
 Monograph No. 6 
 
 Prepared in the 
 
 Historical Branch, War Plans Division 
 General Staff 
 
 February, 1920 
 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 1920 
 

 WAR DEPARTMENT 
 
 No. 1012 
 Office of The Adjutant General. 
 
WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 
 , WASHINGTON, April 28, 1920. 
 
 The following "Study in Battle Formation," prepared in the Historical Branch, 
 "War Plans Division, General Staff, is approved and published for the information of 
 all concerned. 
 
 [062.1, A. G.O.] 
 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR'. 
 
 PEYTON C, MARCH, 
 
 General, Chief of Staff. 
 OFFICIAL: 
 
 P. C. HARRIS, 
 
 The Adjutant General. 
 
 --51438 
 
PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS IN THIS SERIES. 
 
 Mono- 
 graph 
 No. 
 
 Title. 
 
 War De- 
 partment 
 Document 
 No. 
 
 1 
 
 A Survey of German Tactics 1918 
 
 883 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 Economic Mobilization in the United States for the War of 1917 
 A Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917 ... 
 
 885 
 908 
 
 4 
 
 A Studv in Troop Frontage 
 
 992 
 
 5 
 
 Cambrai 
 
 1017 
 
 
 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 1. Definition of formation and purpose 
 
 of this study. 
 
 2. Formation, as evidenced by organi- 
 
 zation and tactics in the American 
 Army before the war. 
 
 3. Formations in first four combat di- 
 
 visions sent overseas as evidencing 
 and determining American forma- 
 tions in the war. 
 
 4. Formations in 1st Division. 
 
 5. Formations in 2d Division. 
 
 6. Formations in 26th Division. 
 
 7. Formations in 42d Division. 
 
 8. Formations in 27th and 30th Divi- 
 
 sions. 
 
 9. Formations in other Divisions. 
 
 10. General discussion. 
 
 11. Conclusions as to a sound formation. 
 
 1. Definition of Formation and Purpose of this Study. 
 
 The definition of the word ' 'formation" in a military 
 
 ,,,*, -,. ... f . /-i\ T, Funk & Wag- 
 
 sense IS the disposition of troops. (1) It IS in pre- nails' Standard 
 
 cisely this sense that it is used in this work. The study 
 of battle formation, therefore, is the study of the dis- 
 position of troops in battle. 
 
 Innumerable volumes have been written on the em- f T1 w a ^ rin Foch S 
 ployment of troops in battle. In all sound works the condii?/of Wa 
 disposition is considered as a governing factor in the chap.xn, s. 
 employment. (2) When so much eminent authority on 
 the subject exists it would be superfluous to attempt any 
 general discussion of the principles of the disposition of 
 troops. This is especially true in that the war with Ger- W a 
 many exhibited the same general features as have marked L(3) 
 all other wars. (3) 
 
 A brief exposition, however, of the battle formation 
 actually used by American troops in the war with 
 Germany may be of value. Aside from the remote pos- 
 sibility of American participation in another great war 
 in the immediate future, there is a present necessity for 
 reorganization of our continuing military forces. (4) of 
 Troop formation is as inextricably bound up in organi- 
 zation as it is in employment of troops, (5) and battle m ^ n 
 experience will undoubtedly have weight in the reor-^ 
 ganization scheme. General principles of troop forma- 3 -<g> e or . f com 
 tion are sufficiently stated in reports of the high com- 
 mand in the war with Germany to enable authorities files A - E 
 charged with reorganization to lay the grand lines of the 
 scheme. (6) 
 
 u Chi s f 
 19> p - 
 
6 A STUDl r I_ST BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 Alsu nuipy officers charged with the details of reor- 
 ganization will have their personal knowledge of battle 
 formations to work from. Individual officers, however, 
 with few exceptions, can not be fully informed of de- 
 tailed battle formation in the American Expeditionary 
 Forces as revealed by a study of the mass of original 
 . documents in existence. Few officers are properly placed 
 with sufficient time to consult these documents, which 
 as records of actual experience are the best authority on 
 the subject. For the rest, Col. Ardant du Picq, an au- 
 thoTity on the psychology of war, in his "Etudes sur le 
 < 7 > Combat "(7), says "* * * nothing, especially in the 
 
 trade of war, is forgotten sooner than experience. So 
 many fine things can be done, beautiful maneuvers 
 executed, ingenious combat methods invented in the 
 musings of the office, or on the maneuver field." 
 
 2. Formations, as Evidenced by Organization and Tactics, in the 
 American Army before the War. 
 
 There was no actual tactical organization of the United 
 ^'States Army before the war. (8) A theoretical paper 
 o* organization into divisions based on study of foreign 
 the u a jStedsfates! armies was formulated before 1914. This formulation 
 9) visualized the incorporation of the minor tactical units 
 actually in existence, but was self -evidently merely a 
 makeshift necessary in a non-military country not yet 
 animated by a national desire for provision against 
 war. (9) 
 
 renj^jcf, 1 ap- With the progress of the European war an apprecia- 
 i9i6 V (?o) June 3 'tion of the necessity for military organization grew on 
 the country, and in 1916 an act was passed increasing 
 and providing for the organization of the military forces 
 sta'te? A^ra'TM tne nation. (10) Tables of organization based on this 
 1917, p. 39.(ii) ' ac t, prescribed the composition of units as large as In- 
 fantry divisions, which were, however to be divisions of 
 three Infantry brigades. (11) 
 
 Witn the entl T of tne United States into the war the 
 r S an ^ za ^i on f Infantry divisions for expeditionary duty 
 changed to include two Infantry brigades of two 
 regiments each. (12) 
 
 c Report ojc.^in This organization was further amended before the 
 pli d uai 20 i918jentl T of American troops into battle.(13) The organ- 
 ization actually used by the fighting unit, the American 
 A T i9is (H) 3cries Division, m ^ ne war w ith Germany was as follows: (14) 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 Table 1. Infantry division (combat) maximum strength. 
 (Series A. Aug. 27, 1918.) 
 
 1. 
 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 G 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 Units. 
 
 Table 
 No. 
 
 Approximate strength. 
 
 Offi- 
 cers. 
 
 Enlisted 
 men. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Division headquarters 
 
 2 
 3 
 11 
 9 
 29 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
 28 
 
 50 
 524 
 220 
 16 
 52 
 15 
 15 
 38 
 16 
 2 
 51 
 
 238 
 16,426 
 4.841 
 379 
 1,695 
 473 
 359 
 1,295 
 485 
 82 
 900 
 
 288 
 16,950 
 5,061 
 395 
 1,747 
 488 
 374 
 1,333 
 501 
 84 
 951 
 
 2 Infantry brigades 
 
 1 Field Artillery brigade 
 
 1 Machine-gun battalion.. 
 
 1 regiment of Engineers 
 
 1 field signal battalion 
 
 Train headquarters and military police 
 
 Ammunition train 
 
 Supply train ... . 
 
 Knejineer train 
 
 Sanitary train 
 
 \ggregate 
 
 
 999 
 
 27, 173 
 
 28, 172 
 
 
 
 Final report C. 
 
 A. E. p., 
 
 > 14 ~ 15 ' 
 
 The organization of superior units and of independent lll ^ >ri A ity I f che F" 
 units was prescribed as published in Tables of Crganiza-H.B.fiies.cis) 
 tion, Series A, 1918, and for units larger than a corps 
 followed the lines of an organization laid down in a 
 priority schedule prepared at G. H. Q., A. E. F.(lo) 
 
 Minor tactics, before the war, were laid down in the drill 
 regulations of the various arms. The mechanics of 
 minor tactics were naturally fitted to existing organiza- 
 tions and consequently varied somewhat from the 
 
 . . 
 
 tactics employed in the war with Germany. The pnn- 
 
 1 . ! -Ill 
 
 cipals and essentials prescribed, however, proved sound, (is) 
 (16) 
 
 The principal arms which assumed formations on the 
 battle field were Infantry, the machine-gun arm, and 
 Artillery. The Tank Corps(17) and troops of the w., P. 7e.(i7) 
 Chemical Warfare Service (18) either had limited oppor- ReportofSup e. 
 tunities or served as auxiliaries. Engineer regiments 5 cr A? r i9 A i9i9* 
 normally were used for special purposes. When used in cnies, A. E.F. 
 combat they were used as Infantry. (18) 
 
 In Infantry minor tactics, before the war, the battalion 
 was the combat unit. The principle of its employment pp - 78 - 89 -( 19 > 
 was to bring it properly organized to the enemy without 
 undue losses. This involved the use of a formation to 
 keep the battalion organized and in hand until the 
 necessity for avoiding loss required deployment. A 
 battalion support was provided for. The same principles 
 applied to higher Infantry commands to include the 
 brigade. (19) 
 
 
8 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 faS?randCavai" Pre-war machine-gun minor tactics enunciated the 
 
 maSc B ' 'Sacwnc principle that the machine gun was not a fourth arm, 
 
 Rme, 1915, p. 43. b^ an auxiliary. (20) The machine-gun arm was recog- 
 
 (2?)' f '' 1918- nized in the organization which governed throughout the 
 
 Re ofSu e waT ^^h Germany. (21) However, the tendency in 
 
 nor Board, A^E. battle to incorporate machine guns into the Infantry 
 
 ' E ' F ' arm was recognized in the A. E. F. in France. (22) 
 
 g overnm g purpose of pre-war Artillery minor 
 m ass i stm g the advance of the Infantry was to 
 iv, pp. 9-n.(23) secure unity of direction of Artillery fire, which is 
 characterized by the ease with which it can be shifted. 
 This unity was favored by keeping units, especially the 
 battalion, concentrated, and by employment in general 
 of no smaller unit than the battalion. (23) 
 
 Pre-war combined or major tactics were based on the 
 PP. 74-76. (24) principles that Infantry decided the issue of battle; 
 that Artillery, light and heavy, existed to assist the 
 Infantry by fire; that Engineer or other special troops 
 id., p. 79. (25) were t be used as Infantry. (24) They required the 
 fire action of the machine gun without, however, giving 
 to that weapon the prominence it later attained. (25) 
 
 3. Formations in the First Four Combat Divisions Sent Overseas, as 
 
 Evidencing and Determining American Formations in the War 
 with Germany. 
 
 The basis existing before the war with Germany for 
 
 formations to be adopted in war has been indicated in 
 
 the preceding numbered paragraph. It will be seen 
 
 cIn n c 1 A I E rt F 0ftnat formations were changed and improved during the 
 
 P . i4.(26) ' progress of the war as experience dictated. The fullest 
 
 advantage was taken of the experiences of our allies, 
 
 and the training of the first divisions sent to France was 
 
 begun in close association with the French Army. (26) 
 
 These divisions, the 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d, following 
 
 their early experience with French armies, participated 
 
 id., pp. 32, 42 in many of the major operations of the American forces 
 
 (27), and the formations they adopted influenced forma- 
 
 F. o. NO. 2,tions adopted bv subsequently arriving divisions. (28) 
 
 90th Division, * .*- i .. . . 
 
 Au.i9,i9i8. H,Tne development of formations in these first divisions 
 therefore offers the most fruitful field for study. 
 
 4. Formations in the 1st Division. 
 
 c.S^SJSV*! The first complete occupation of a sector by American 
 
 P. i9.(29) troops was the occupation of the Ansauville sector north 
 
 of Toul by the 1st Division in January, 1918. (29) This 
 
 occupation was ordered by the French 1st Army, and 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLK FORMATION. 9 
 
 naturally followed French customs. The Infantry for- 
 mation was one brigade in line, one brigade in reserve in 
 the training area. The regiments of the brigade in li ne Fr?nchistArm 8 y' 
 were abreast ; the right regiment with one battalion in line, ^vision Journal 
 one in regimental support, and one in reserve; f he left c/^fSIs"^!' 
 regiment with two battalions in line, one in regimental (30) 
 reserve. The division Engineer regiment was not treated 
 as an Infantry force, and only work was required of it. (30) 
 The division machine-gun units were merely required to i ns t. NO. 5. op. 
 relieve the French machine guns. (31) The di visional 
 Artillery was merely required to relieve the French Artil- 
 lery and occupy prepared or designated positions. (32) A * E>F-(31 
 This was a period rigidly restricted to defense in con- 693/3> Fren ch 
 templation of a German offensive. (33) The occupation S, D jtur J nai "f 
 of divisional defensive sectors was exactly laid down in BPvisKn'fiies! 
 French regulations for French divisions, later published G " 3;A ' E ' F-(32) 
 for American use. (34) The first formations adopted Final report of 
 
 ,-1 f i i ,. i - n 7i C.inC.,A.E. F., 
 
 therefore have no especial national significance, as they p.is.(33) 
 appear to have been dictated by the necessity of fitting 
 the American divisional organization into the general fjj 
 French defensive scheme. 794,1918. (34) 
 
 A characteristic formation in the 1st Division ap- j^visk^May i o* 
 peared during its tour in Picardy following the German ^1 |^g } ' G - 3 
 offensive of March 21, 1918. In anticipation of a further 
 German offensive on Amiens a counter offensive was 
 prepared although it never became necessary to execute 
 it. The infantry formation ordered for the 1st Division 
 was: Brigades abreast; regiments abreast; right regi- 
 ment, battalions in depth; right center regiment, two 
 battalions in line, one in support; left center regiment, 
 two battalions in line, one in reserve; left regiment, bat- 
 talions in depth. This approached the later normal for- 
 mation of the 1st Division, although still showing French 
 influence. Batteries of machine guns for indirect fire 
 were provided for, to be organized from the division 
 machine gun battalion and from machine gun units with 
 Infantry reserve battalions. Orders showed an habitual 
 attachment of machine-gun companies to Infantry bat- 
 talions. (35) This followed French custom (36), in oppo- Tableaux d'Ef- 
 
 ,, A . . ft- fectifs, G. S. Col- 
 
 sition to the American organization of machine-gun iege Library. (36) 
 companies into separate battalions. (37) The Artillery A, T i9i8. (37) S<a 
 formation ordered, contemplated three groupements, and a 
 reserve, each including both 75's and 155's.(35) This 
 showed a French tendency to constitute temporary 
 tactical units in place of using existing organizations ; at 
 
 1 7QQ49 OH 9 
 
10 A STUDY IX BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 the same time it showed a tendency, more apparent 
 later, to assign Artillery organizations to support Infan- 
 try organizations within the division. Orders for tanks 
 assigned tank units to accompany and support Infantry 
 organizations (35) and so far their mission as prescribed 
 in this division, under French command, was analogous 
 CI ' to that prescribed for accompanying guns when American 
 divisions began to fight under American high command. 
 . (38) 
 
 'ca n - The first actual offensive operation of the 1st Division 
 p! e (39) V ' 2 ' 1918 'was against Cantigny.(39) This was a local operation, 
 ,' 'Ma 1 ? ?o" an d the Infantry formation ordered for the attacking 
 1 ~ regiment conse( l uen tly did not show the depth which 
 appears in major operations. All three Infantry bat- 
 talions were in the front line, with reserves consisting of 
 companies. The machine-gun formation showed the 
 dual role of the weapon. Barrage groups were formed 
 from available companies to act by fire, but the charac- 
 teristic incorporation of machine-gun companies in front- 
 line Infantry battalions was again evident, and in this 
 case the machine-gun companies were broken up into 
 detachments for front-line Infantry companies. The 
 Artillery, greatly reinforced, was employed as a unit in 
 accordance with the demands of such an operation. 
 Twelve tanks accompanied the Infantry to assist in its 
 advance. (40) In this operation, with an advance limited 
 to one or two thousand yards, it is evident that there 
 was no occasion for the use of accompanying guns. 
 c ioc Ac Following the Cantigny operation, the 1st Division 
 p.34.(4i) 'was organized for defense against an expected German 
 DSon fr jSie 1 4 tma J or offensive which actually came between Noyon and 
 S. Q$, ITMontdidier on June 9, 1918. (41) The Infantry formation 
 adopted was that of brigades abreast, regiments abreast, 
 with battalions in depth. (42) 
 
 ' ^ui st ?5 This Infantry formation became the basis of the normal 
 -' 201 ~ formation of the division. In the Aisne-Marne offensive 
 of July 18, south of Soissons, the Infantry had the normal 
 formation, brigades abreast, regiments abreast, battalions 
 in depth, the interior third line battalions in brigade 
 reserve, the exterior third line battalions in division 
 reserve. The division machine-gun battalion was in 
 division reserve; all other machine-gun companies were 
 attached to and participated in action with Infantry 
 battalions. The divisional Artillery was reinforced by 
 a regiment of French 75 's and by other organizations 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 11 
 
 of heavier artillery. One battalion of 75's was assigned 
 to act with the Infantry in each regimental zone. This 
 was the characteristic assignment of subordinate Light 
 Artillery organizations to act in direct liaison with sub- 
 ordinate Infantry organizations. The necessity for hav- 
 ing Light Artillery guns up behind the front line Infantry 
 was recognized by prescribing that the 75's unable to 
 cover the advance to the second objective would move 
 forward and take position to cover further advances. 
 One groupement of French tanks, assigned to act with 
 the Infantry, consisted of 48 tanks and filled ther61e 
 assigned to accompanying Artillery in later operations. 
 The division Engineer regiment was broken up. One 
 company was assigned to each Infantry brigade for 
 engineer work, the other four companies were held in 
 division reserve. (43) 
 
 The formation adopted by the 1st Division for the 
 St. Mihiel operation was dictated by its mission, which 
 was to cover the left flank of its own advance and the 
 left flank of the whole southern attack. The Infantry 
 formation w^as normal, in so far as it provided that the 
 two Infantry brigades and the two Infantry regiments 
 in each brigade attack abreast. The 26th, 28th, and 16th 
 Infantry, from right to left, were in the formation normal 
 to the division; that is, with battalions in depth. The 
 18th Infantry on the extreme left flank of the whole 
 southern attack naturally had to take dispositions to 
 cover the flank. In consequence, it had two battalions 
 in the front line, the left battalion covering the advance 
 of the right battalion. Each of these battalions, however, 
 was reduced by one company. One of these detached 
 companies remained in regimental reserve to replace the 
 support battalion which would have been at the disposi- 
 tion of the regimental commander in the normal forma- 
 tion, and one company was assigned to duty with tanks 
 which were to commence operations principally in the 
 regimental zone of the 18th Infantry. The machine-gun 
 strength of the 1st Division was reinforced for this opera- 
 tion by the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3d Division. 
 The machine-gun disposition for this attack was one 
 machine-gun company with each Infantry battalion, these 
 companies coming from the Infantry regiments and 
 from the brigade battalions. The division machine-gun 
 battalion remained in division reserve while the 7th 
 Machine Gun Battalion of the 3d Division was placed 
 
12 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 in reserve of the 1st Brigade, which it was believed would 
 have to occupy a long defensive front on the left flank 
 of the whole southern attack. 
 
 The divisional Artillery was reinforced by the 58th Field 
 Artillery Brigade, less one battalion of 155's, by one regi- 
 ment of 75 's from the 3d Field Artillery Brigade, and by 
 two batteries of 8-inch howitzers. The principal mission of 
 the Artillery was destruction fire and barrage. The 75 's 
 were required to deliver barrage to protect the Infantry to 
 the second objective. Certain units of 75's were required 
 to move forward before the Infantry reached the third 
 objective in order to support any further advance. The 
 customary battalions, or larger units, were designated to 
 act with subordinate commands in the various Infantry 
 zones. Notation of the designation of gun platoons to 
 accompany the Infantry appeared for the first time in 
 the orders of this division in the first purely American 
 great attack in which it participated. Forty-nine 
 American-manned tanks were assigned to the support of 
 the division. They were accompanied by detachments 
 of Engineers and Infantry detachments from the 18th 
 Infantry. Their mission, in brief, was to assist the 
 advance of the Infantry, and consequently they had 
 much the .same mission as did the accompanying Artil- 
 lery platoons. The division Engineer regiment, rein- 
 forced by two companies of the 51st Pioneer Infantry, 
 was used on purely engineering work which required its 
 breaking up into many details for the purpose of cutting 
 wire, assisting the advance of tanks, constructing bridges, 
 repairing roads, etc. (44) 
 
 vMo?,' 4 oJt ^2, * n i ts entry into the Meuse-Argonne operation the 1st 
 i3!(45) H ' B '' m ~ Division used its normal Infantry formation, brigades 
 abreast, regiments abreast, with their three battalions 
 in depth. The regiments from right to left were the 
 26th, 28th, 18th, and 16th Infantry. Two companies, 
 one from each of the first and second line battalions of the 
 16th Infantry, were detached for combat patrol duty in 
 the Aire Valley where it was believed that liaison with 
 the 28th Division on the left would be difficult. The 
 characteristic attachment of machine-gun companies to 
 first and second line Infantry battalions was evident. It 
 was prescribed, however, that these companies should 
 advance by bounds, thereby indicating that they might 
 have had some trouble heretofore in rigidly conforming 
 to the Infantry advance. The machine-gun companies 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 13 
 
 normally attached to third-line battalions were all placed 
 in brigade reserve of their respective brigades. This in- 
 cluded the companies normally attached to Infantry 
 battalions in division reserve. The employment ordered 
 for the machine-gun companies in brigade reserve was to 
 fill gaps and protect the flanks of the advance. The 
 division machine-gun battalion was held in division re- 
 serve. The principal mission of the Artillery for this ad- 
 vance was to furnish barrage. The customary forward 
 movement by echelon was ordered and the accompanying 
 guns again appeared in the assignment of two 75 's to each 
 first-line Infantry battalion. Thirty tanks of the 1st 
 Brigade Tanks were assigned to support the advance of 
 the division. The mission of the tanks, in general, was to 
 assist the advance of the Infantry by attacking strong 
 points. The division Engineer regiment was held in divi- 
 sion reserve. (4 5) 
 
 During the progress of the attack of the 1st Division c R ^pp ^ c -* 
 from October 4 the most powerful opposition was encoun- ^ NOV. 20/1918, 
 tered and some of the hardest fighting of the campaign 
 was necessary. (4 6) Consequently it was necessary to use F 48 lstl>i . 
 divisional reserves to carry on the fight. (47) Nightly Jj^'n ( B Ct ' 20 ?: 
 reorganization of battalion units and the employment, " 
 when necessary, of Infantry battalions which had origi- 
 nally been in brigade and division reserve characterized f|' 
 this advance. (48) 
 
 By October 8, 1918, the 1st Division had been 
 forced by the 181st Infantry Brigade of the 91st Divi-^ 1 ! 
 sion(49) which had recently been withdrawn from 
 line. (50) It was necessary to use this brigade as well 
 all combat elements in the division, including the division A - E - F - (50) 
 Engineer regiment and the division machine-gun battalion, 
 in order to continue the advance. The normal Infantry 
 formation was held to only in that the three Infantry 
 brigades attacked abreast. The 181st Brigade had the 
 361st Infantry in line. It had, however, only a holding 
 mission and was required to advance only to conform to 
 the advance on the rest of the front of th,-e division. 
 The 2d Infantry Brigade was in the center. On the 
 right of this brigade was one battalion of Engineers and 
 one company of the divisional machine-gun battalion. 
 In its center were two battalions of the 26th Infantry 
 organized in depth. On its left was the 28th Infantry 
 organized in depth. The 1st Infantry Brigade was on 
 the left of the division. It had one battalion of the 
 
14 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 16th Infantry, which up to this time had been in divi- 
 sion reserve, on the right of the brigade front. This 
 fresh battalion delivered the main assault. Next to 
 it was the 18th Infantry organized in depth, and, on 
 the left, the 16th Infantry with its two remaining bat- 
 talions organized in depth. One battalion of the 26th 
 Infantry, one battalion of the 1st Engineers, one com- 
 pany of the division machine-gun battalion and the 362d 
 Infantr}* were in division reserve. The customary as- 
 signment of machine-gun companies to Infantry bat- 
 talions appeared. The division machine-gun battalions 
 and the companies with the third-line Infantry battalions 
 of the 2d Brigade were organized in four groups for bar- 
 rage work. (49) 
 
 irtiSvisto'oct' ^ n interesting feature of the participation of the 181st 
 aentar' instruct I n ^ an ^ry Brigade in the attack of the 1st Division ap- 
 BTi S g f a r dc lst G n -3l :>eare( ^ * n ^ e detailed disposition ordered in that brigade 
 files, A. E. F.(5i) by the ist Division, in order to have it conform in part 
 to the normal formations of the 1st Division. The 361st 
 Infantry and the 347th Machine Gun Battalion were the 
 troops of the 181st Brigade in line. They were organized 
 in depth. Two Infantry battalions were in the first line 
 and one in regimental reserve for counter attack. The 
 battalions in line each had two companies in the front 
 line and two companies 100 to 300 meters in rear. The 
 machine guns were echeloned in checkerboard formation. 
 A platoon of Infantry and a section of machine guns wore 
 combined into a combat liaison group on each flank. (51) 
 P.O. 50, 1st DI- During the participation of the 181st Infantry Brigade 
 ^V B C ,2oi- i n the attack of the 1st Division, an individual Artillery 
 regiment, the 124th, was definitely assigned to its sup- 
 port, just as within the 1st Division the 7th Field Artillery 
 was assigned to the 2d Infantry Brigade and the 6th 
 Field Artillery to the 1st Infantry Brigade. (52) 
 F.o.ei,istDi- The next appearance of the 1st Division in attack was 
 Si8 0n 'H. B.T'2oi- on November 6, 19 18. (53) The First Army attack of No- 
 vember 1, 1918, had been increasingly successful (54) and 
 ^Fmai reporter the 1st Division went into line on the left of the 2d Divi- 
 pi 51. (so ' "' s i on to exploit the success of the 5th Corps to which it then 
 belonged. The Infantry formation in the operation of 
 this day was as follows: The two Infantry brigades were 
 abreast, the 2cl Brigade on the right, the 1st Brigade on 
 the left. The 1st Brigade was in normal formation ex- 
 cept that the interior, in place of the exterior third line 
 battalion, was in division reserve. The 2d Brigade had 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 15 
 
 one regiment in line with two battalions in the front line 
 and one in the second line. The other regiment was in re- 
 serve. The Artillery was directed to furnish accompany- 
 ing guns, this matter to be arranged directly between the 
 Artillery brigade and Infantry battalion commanders. (53) 
 
 Following the success of the operation of November 6, .F.o.62,istDi- 
 1918, the 1st Division moved on Sedan that night. The 5?8%5 V fiies,' 
 advance was made in five columns, to take advantage of A< 
 all available roads. A tendency to follow the normal 
 attack formation was, however, evident. The right-hand 
 column, which moved directly down the Meuse, consisted 
 of one battalion of the 16th Infantry, and had more or 
 less the mission of a flank guard. The second column 
 was composed of the 16th Infantry less one battalion, 
 and one company of Engineers. The third column was 
 composed of the 18th Infantry less one battalion in divi- 
 sion reserve. The fourth column was composed of the 28th 
 Infantry and one company of Engineers. The fifth col- 
 umn was composed of the 26th Infantry. The division 
 reserves which conformed to the movement of the divi- 
 sion commander in following up the advance were one bat- 
 talion of the 18th Infantry, the 1st Machine Gun Bat- 
 talion, and the 1st Engineers less two companies. (55) 
 
 Following the night march on Sedan, on November 7, Vi ^on' 6 
 the division attacked the heights southwest of Sedan. The \ 91 | '<* 
 
 A* J f . ( 
 
 usual attack formation was prescribed. (56) 
 5. Formations in the 2d Division. 
 
 The 2d Division, like the 1st Division, first entered 
 line under French command. Occupation and daily 
 servation of the French defensive trench system in its J 
 sector near Verdun unconsciously taught the command 
 the value of organization in depth. (57) 
 
 Following the early German offensives of 1918, the 2d Final report of 
 Division was withdrawn from the defensive sector near P- -33.(5$ 
 Verdun and placed in reserve in the vicinity of Gisors 
 northwest of Paris. It was there when the German offen- 
 sive of May 27 developed an unexpected success, and had 
 to be hurriedly moved to check the German advance. (58) 
 The disposition it assumed on its second entry into the 
 line was dictated by necessity. 
 
 On June 2, 1918, the 23d Infantry, one battalion of the 
 5th Marines, the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and one 
 company of the 2d Engineers filled a gap in the French 
 line northwest of Chateau-Thierry. For the rest of June, 
 the division was engaged in bitter fighting in the vicinity A- E ' F>(59) 
 
I 
 16 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 of Belleau Wood, whose capture was not completed until 
 June 25. On June 23, an Infantry battalion commander 
 stated: "Infantry alone can not dislodge guns." This 
 view was accepted by the command, and two days later 
 the Infantry lines were withdrawn, and an artillery 
 concentration was placed on the northern part of the 
 wood, which was then taken. (59) 
 
 c R A! O E F.?'C O n July !> a formal prepared attack by this division 
 i9f8, P . 1 iS7(60) 20 ' ca P tlired tiie village of Vaux.(60) The 3d Brigade was 
 Dh ; isio ( n',june3 2 ol cnar S e( i w ^ n this attack, which was made by one battal- 
 ^1 ^f } flles ' A -ion each of the 9th and 23d Infantry accompanied by 
 Engineer detachments. One battalion of the 9th In- 
 fantry was in reserve to be used in case of necessity. (61) 
 15> jSe Tne disposition o f the 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry, 
 which was one of the assaulting battalions, was two com- 
 panies in the front line, one in reserve. A machine-gun 
 company and one company of Engineers for demoli- 
 tion, together with various 1-pounder and trench 
 mortar detachments, were attached to the battalion for 
 the operation. It sent out liaison detachments of one 
 platoon and one machine gun from the supporting com- 
 pany to one flank, and one-half of a platoon and one 
 OI S?ion?f rt the machine gun to the other flank. (62) Each of the assault- 
 the 9t1f infantry m & companies of this battalion had two platoons in the 
 v n aiS e GS I 2es ffirst l ine ancl two in support.(63) The disposition of 
 A F E 6 F 43 6 23din- tne assaulting battalion of', the 23d Infantry was three 
 iSfs^fc-SSesA* companies, less two platoons, in line; one company and 
 E.p'.(64). {.wo platoons in reserve. (64) 
 
 in F c nal A e E >r V C ' ^l 16 ^ TS ^ > participation of the 2d Division in a major 
 P. 35 fa)" *' offensive was in that of July 18, 1918.(65) The Infantry 
 formation for this attack was brigades abreast, the 3d 
 Brigade with regiments abreast, the 4th Brigade with 
 vision,' \ 5 u?y ? tne 5tn Marines in the front line and the 6th Marines 
 A 1 ! F G (66) files ' m reserve. (66) Initial formations were naturally broken 
 up in the desperate fighting, but some disposition in 
 2d R Battai?o^; Sh f l P th was held to throughout . A b at t alion com n i a 1 1 < 1 e r 
 reported finduig his battalion with the left flank entirely 
 11 tne & ^j ^ ut w ^ n tne tnr ee companies of the battalion 
 present disposed in two lines. (67) A note sent to the 2d 
 Division on July 16, 1918, by the French 20th Corps, 
 under which it attacked on July IS, prescribed the use 
 ^ t*mks. This note prescribed a depth organization for 
 'tanks in the contemplated operation, this formation to 
 be secured by assigning tanks to the direct support of 
 successive Infantry units. (68) 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 17 
 
 The first participation of the 2d Division in a 
 offensive under American command was in the St. 42 ^ >27 
 
 Mihiel operation. (69) The Infantry formation for 
 attack was brigades in depth, regiments abreast in each ^ 
 brigade, with battalions in depth within the regiments - 
 The first-line Infantry brigade, which was the 3d Brigade, 
 disposed of its own machine-gun battalion for the ad- 
 vance. The regimental machine-gun companies re- 
 mained with the regiments. The machine-gun battalion 
 of the 4th Brigade and the division machine-gun battal- 
 ion were grouped under the division machine-gun officer 
 for barrage fire, until the 4th Brigade should pass the 
 jump-off line in following up the attack. Both battalions 
 then passed to the command of the 4th Brigade. One 
 .battalion of Artillery was assigned to assist the advance 
 of the first-line Infantry battalions as forward guns. 
 The tanks attached to the division for the operation were 
 used to assist the advance of the Infantry and reduce 
 strong points. The engineer regiment was used purely 
 for engineer work in this attack. (70) 
 
 The Blanc Mont operation of the 2d Division in early ^0,' 3 oct! 
 October showed another variation in Infantry formation. 
 The initial attack was a converging attack by brigades 
 both of which were in the front line with an interval 
 between them; each brigade had its regiments in 
 depth, and each front-line regiment had its battalions in 
 depth. The machine-gun disposition showed the division 
 machine-gun battalion in division reserve. The orders 
 for the Artillery in this operation required that it be 
 brought forward in echelon. It is interesting to note 
 that this division was at this time serving under French 
 command and that accompanying guns were not re- 
 quired in the division order. A battalion of French tanks 
 was assigned to each brigade. (71) They are reported by 
 the commanding general, 3d Brigade, to have been useful. 
 (72) The front-line Infantry formation generally used 
 throughout the 4th Brigade in this attack consisted of 
 light line of scouts followed by mobile combat groups. (73) 
 
 The Infantry formation of the 2d Division, for its 
 initial attack on November 1 in the Meuse-Argonne 
 operation, was with brigades abreast. The 3d Brigade 
 had its regiments in depth, with the 23d Infantry com- 
 mitted to a separate operation against a strong position 
 and the 9th Infantry in reserve. The formation of the 
 
 178842 20 - 3 
 
18 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 lon' 4 o'ct d: 3i"4th Brigade was regiments abreast, each regiment with 
 ion'its battalions in depth. (74) In the 5th Marines the 
 No 1 v nj n ov 'i9i t 8 : ^ rst "^ me battalion had two companies in the front line 
 A 0t E F G (74) mes ' anc ^ two m support. Each of the front-line companies 
 had two platoons in the first wave, and two platoons 
 following in combat groups. There was a distance of 
 800 yards between the first and second line battalions. 
 The formation ordered for the second-line battalion was 
 men't 6 Marine g s" w ^ n l mes f combat groups in single file. The third-line 
 o-3fiies,A.E. F. battalion followed at 800 yards in the same formation. (7 5) 
 
 disposition of the Gth Marines was with 
 
 machine-gun disposition required a delivery of barrage 
 fire, after which regimental and brigade machine-gun 
 companies were required to join Infantry organizations, 
 for the advance. The division machine-gun battalion 
 participated in the harassing and barrage fire and event- 
 ually passed into division reserve. Orders for the Artil- 
 lery required its advance by echelon, as the attack pro- 
 gressed. Orders for a detachment of the 1st Brigade 
 Tanks required their use to reduce strong points. (74) 
 
 Following the success of the attack of November 1, 
 the 2d Division adopted an extraordinary night attack 
 formation with the greatest success. On the night of 
 November 2-3, and on the night of November 3-4, the 
 3d Brigade advanced along a road through the enemy 
 position in column of twos, making successful use of an 
 advance-guard formation. An advance was made on 
 Report of Oper- tne n ig nt f November 3-4, of 6 kilometers through the 
 the n Meuse W and ma i n enem y position. In this advance one battalion 
 BrigadTSov u f the 9th. Infantry, accompanied by a battery of Light 
 A 91 I.R(77)^ es ' Artm ery, was in the lead. (77) The 2d Field Artillery 
 '.~ Brigade was required to place guns at the disposition of 
 F(78) flles '^e front-line Infantry commanders following the suc- 
 cess of this night's advance. (78) 
 
 The initial success of the 2d Division in the Meuse- 
 operation was attributed to complete coordi- 
 < 79 ) nation of the two principal arms, the Infantry and the 
 
 Artillery. Its later success was due to daring and 
 advances. (79) The best use of machine-gun 
 Ba a tta I iion e fo?aS com P ail i es attached to Infantry battalions was made 
 to Nov^i^ms 1 wnen tne company was employed directly under the 
 <rjj3ffles,A'.E.F. company commander to assist the advance of the In- 
 fantry. (80) The best result in the use of Artillery 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 19 
 
 throughout the advance was secured by placing re- 
 sponsibility for the support of the Infantry in the hands {^NoVa 
 of the Artillery regimental and battalion command erSp d ri g^ A ^ u g y 
 in direct liaison with Infantry commanders. (81 ) .<) 
 
 Fifteen tanks jumped off on November 1 with the 2d Report of oper. 
 
 , J ~ r . . . . . . ations of the First 
 
 Division. At the first objective four continued in sup-Prov. Tank Co., 
 port of the 5th Marines and were useful in the reductionTanks.forNov.i. 
 
 % ,. . . . , - H.B., 202-53. (82) 
 
 of machine-gun nests, so lar playing the role 01 accom- 
 panying guns. (82) 
 
 Various reports of the 2d Division rendered subse- 
 quent to the armistice have a value either as revealing 
 formations taken in particular cases or as setting forth 
 opinions as to customary formations held by subordi- 
 nate officers with combat experience. One interesting m SfingGeSS" f 
 report gives the varying formation adopted by a liaison | d JzoSaMss) H ' 
 group which acted between the 2d Division and the 80th 
 Division in the attack of November 1. This group was 
 composed of one company from each of the divisions. 
 Each company was reinforced by a machine-gun platoon. 
 The formation adopted was one of echelon in depth, one 
 company about 350 yards behind the other. In advanc- 
 ing between the main zones of attack of the two divi- 
 sions it connected, this group had occasion to utilize 
 the rear company for flanking action to turn resistance 
 on the front of the leading company. The distance 
 between the two companies varied according to the 
 varying rate of progress of the two divisions, and at 
 tunes it was necessary for the rear company to keep 
 at a distance of 1 % kilometers to the rear of the leading 
 company. (83) 
 
 Another report of value was rendered some time after 
 the armistice by the commanding officer, 9th Infantry, 
 which set forth the opinions of various Infantry com- f J 
 pany officers of this regiment, a part of the 2d files(84) 
 Division. (84) While such opinions have not the com- 
 prehensive value of opinions formulated in division Etudes sur ie 
 attack orders, they are of interest as exhibiting the (85? l 
 mental attitude of commanding officers of company and 
 smaller units, which are the essential elements of all bat- 
 tle combination. (85) The questions treated of in this 
 report, which are of especial interest in the present study ; 
 were: that of the proper formation of small Infantry 
 units for attacking machine-gun nests; that of a proper 
 formation for advancing through Artillery fire ; and that of 
 the value of the accompanying guns. Conflict of opinion 
 
20 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 was found even among officers of the same class in the 
 same regiment. There was, however, general agreement 
 that speed and open formation was necessary in attack- 
 ing machine-gun nests. Flanking action was generally 
 recommended, if possible. The value of fire action, 
 either of Artillery, auxiliary Infantry arms, or machine 
 guns, was recognized. But the tendency not to be 
 delayed by the absence of such fire action was illuminat- 
 ing. The formation for advancing through Artillery 
 fire, which was almost universally recommended, was 
 that of small open columns not greater than a platoon. 
 One officer advocated the open skirmish line, but most 
 of the officers recognized the difficulty of control of such 
 a line. Difference of opinion existed again as to the 
 value of the accompanying gun. One officer made a 
 definite recommendation that one or two guns be put 
 under the immediate command of the Infantry battalion 
 commander. This opinion, however, was not sustained 
 by all of the other officers, one of whom noted invariably 
 successful support of Infantry advance by Artillery fire 
 when liaison could be maintained with Artillery in the 
 rear. (84) 
 
 6. Formations in the 26th Division. 
 
 ^MemoJorA.^c. The first appearance of the 26th Division in line waa 
 24 wis^ Journal in defensive sectors under French command, and its 
 
 of Operations. 
 
 26th -Piv. G-3 formation showed the characteristics adopted to fit into 
 
 Dies, A. t,. r .(oo) / 1 s~\ 
 
 the existing French organization of the terrain. On 
 April 20, 1918, the 26th Division was occupying the 
 Ansauville sector north of Toul. The general occupa- 
 tion of this sector by the 1st Division has already been 
 shown. On the date in question the 26th Division had 
 the 102d Infantry in line as the right regiment. Of two 
 battalions in the front line, the right battalion held the 
 front-line trenches with two companies, one less one 
 platoon, the other less two platoons. The three de- 
 tached platoons were in support to the rear one of 
 them as much as 2,000 meters to the rear. The left 
 battalion had two companies in the front line, each less 
 one platoon; these two platoons were on the main 
 position some 2,000 meters to the rear. (86) The de- 
 tailed formation of the advance companies noted is 
 principally interesting as indicating a characteristic 
 tendency to break up small organizations in order to 
 take the fullest advantage of the shelter existing in 
 defensive sectors. 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION". 21 
 
 For the Aisne-Marne offensive from July 18, 1918, the ^..^5^ 26th 
 26th Division was a part of the 1st Corps operating in 191 | 
 the general vicinity of Chateau-Thierry. (87) 
 
 The Infantry formation ordered for the advance on July Di ^- S 2o ^H 6 * 
 19, 1918, was Infantry brigades abreast. The divisional F ^ files! 
 orders required advance by regimental columns with 
 small advance guards if the defensive action of the enemy 
 permitted this formation. The division machine gun 
 battalion was attached to the 52d Brigade and the attach- 
 ment of subordinate machine-gun units to subordinate 
 Infantryunitswas evidenced in the composition of the liai- 
 son group formed to maintain connection with the French 
 division on the right. One regiment of 75 's was assigned 
 to support each Infantry brigade, the 155's remaining 
 under the control of the Artillery brigade. (88) There at j^$K 
 was no actual advance made by this division on July 5 8 ra e 9 n 1 C 8 ng 2 J 6 u t 1 J 
 19, 1918. (89) The use of accompanying batteries 
 the close support of the front-line Infantry and to reduce 
 machine-gun nests first appeared in this division in this 
 offensive. It was noted, however, that the best use 
 such batteries was at 2,000 yards, at least, in rear of the 
 front line with very forward observers. (90) 
 
 For the St. Mihiel operation, September 12, 1918, the 
 initial Infantry formation in the 26th Division was brig- 
 ades abreast. The 51st Brigade had one regiment in 
 line with two battalions in the first line and one in the 
 second. The second regiment was in division reserve. 
 The 52d Brigade had its regiments abreast, each regi- 
 ment with battalions in depth. To each front-line bat- 
 talion there was attached one machine-gun company, one 
 75 accompanying gun and various auxiliary Infantry observations 
 weapons. Each second-line battalion had one machine- " dl c r Jion U o? the 
 gun company. (91) The first-line battalion had two g 
 
 companies in the firing line and two in support. Each ^Sf fe?St? a 
 company had a similar organization in depth. (92) i 91 |.F G (92) iiles ' 
 
 On October 23, 1918, the 26th Division attacked on D^Sn^oct 2 ^ 
 the eastern heights of the Meuse north of Verdun. The i 91 ^ F ^ } files > 
 51st Brigade was used for the attack and the brigade in 
 turn used the 101st Infantry for the attack with the 
 102d Infantry in reserve. The formation of the 101st 
 Infantry was with two front-line battalions in converg- 
 ing attack. Each battalion had two companies in the 
 firing line and two in support. The third battalion in 
 brigade reserve followed a front-line battalion at 500 
 
22 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 meters distance. Each of the front-line battalions had 
 a machine-gun company and auxiliary Infantry weapon 
 attached. The 101st and 102d Machine Gun Battalions 
 were placed under command of the commanding general 
 51st Brigade for the attack ; which was supported by the 
 fire of the 51st Field ArtiUery Brigade. (93) 
 
 Dh-'isionl^bv 6 ?! It may be noted that on November 7 there appeared 
 i 9 !!. FT(94? les 'in the field orders of this division a new statement of the 
 Infantry formations to be adopted in the event of the 
 enemy withdrawal. It conformed to the general prin- 
 ciples of formation in depth already evidenced in the 
 orders of the division but it showed a striking similarity 
 to the normal formation of the 1st Division. This ap- 
 pearance followed the taking over of command of the 
 26th Division by a general officer who had lately served 
 with and for a time commanded the 1st Division. This 
 formation was brigades abreast, regiments abreast, each 
 regiment with battalions in depth, 600 meters between 
 first and second line battalions, 1,000 meters between 
 second and third line battalions. The first-line battalion 
 had one machine-gun company, a 75-millimeter accom- 
 panying gun, and auxiliary Infantry weapons attached. 
 The second-line battalion had a machine-gun company 
 attached. Orders for the Artillery required it to change 
 position by battalion, but attached one 75-millimeter gun 
 to each Infantry assault battalion. (94) 
 
 7. Formations in the 42d Division. 
 
 Report of oper- The first appearance of the 42d Division on the front 
 
 ations in Cham- l A 
 
 pagne,command- W as under French command and this condition existed 
 
 ing General, 42d 
 
 Si? si G-? e nies' tnrou gh tne Marne defensive up to July 18, 1918. (95) 
 ' ration Re- ^ e re P or * ^ the commanding general, 42d Division, 
 ~ coverm g the division's participation in the Aisne-Marne 
 offensive, from July 18, 1918, formulated some general 
 principles as a result of experience gained in that opera- 
 tion. It recommended the use of Infantry formations ca- 
 pable of delivering heavy fire-action in support of the at- 
 tack of machine-gun nests and noted that Infantry ap- 
 proach formations should be used cautiously in pursuit. 
 A formation with advance-guard detachments was re- 
 ported to progress much more rapidly. In the absence 
 of tanks it recommended the aggressive use of a portion 
 of the divisional light artillery to assist the advance of 
 the Infantry by destroying machine-gun nests by direct 
 fire. (96) 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 23 
 
 For the St. Mihicl operation the 42d Division used a 
 formation which it had developed from previous experi- *}$> g^ 
 ences. The Infantry formation was brigades abreast, A E - r -(97) 
 regiments abreast, each regiment with battalions in depth. 
 The interior third-line battalions were brigade reserves. 
 The third-line battalions of exterior regiments were di- 
 vision reserves but were placed about 500 yards directly 
 in rear of the third-line battalions of interior regiments. 
 The distance between first and second and second and 
 third line battalions was about 500 yards. (97) In ad- 
 dition to its component units each Infantry brigade had^l^gf^ 163 ' 
 one battery of 75 7 s, attached as accompanying artillery 
 from the taking of the first objective, a detachment of 
 tanks, two companies of engineers, and auxiliary troops. 
 One regiment of 75 's was the nucleus of each of two 
 groups of Artillery which supported Infantry brigades in 
 their zones and on capture of the first day's objective, 
 passed to the control of Infantry brigade commanders. 
 The use of brigade machine-gun organizations was left to 
 the Infantry brigade with the provision that they should 
 be used in depth. The division machine-gun battalion 
 was in division reserve. (98) 
 
 Orders for the first participation of the 42d Division vision,' 6ct. 13, 
 
 ,, ,, a- - - - , j J.T i 1918 - G ~ 3 files 
 
 in the Meuse-Argonne offensive insisted on th.3 actual A. E. r.(99) 
 accompaniment of front-line battalions by two accompa- 
 nying guns per battalion. (99) 
 
 The Infantry formation of the 42d Division for the 
 attack of October 14, 1918, in the Meuse-Argonne 
 offensive was with brigades abreast. (99) The detailed fantry' Brigade" 
 
 p .* r ,1 V,o i T f T^ i Oct. 13, 1918. H. 
 
 formation of one, the 83d Infantry Brigade, was regi-B., 242-23. (ioo) 
 ments abreast, each with battalions in depth. The 
 front-line battalions had two companies each in the 
 front line and t\vo in support. Each front-line com- 
 pany had half its strength in two assault waves 20 meters 
 apart, the remainder in support. The support battalions 
 followed the assault battalions at 1 kilometer. The 
 regimental machine-gun companies in this brigade 
 supported assault battalions as companies. The brigade 
 machine-gun battalion furnished details for liaison 
 groups, etc., and used fire action from position. (100) 
 
 Later orders for the 42d Division in the Meuse-viSm,' 4 %ct. d ?7~ 
 Argonne offensive contemplated the use of brigades ill JL^E. p.(ioi) es ' 
 depth with 3 kilometers between brigades, the front- 
 line brigade with regiments abreast and supported by 
 the divisional artillery and machine-gun battalions. (101) 
 
24 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 appearance of the 42d Division in action 
 ?!. F^Io2? lfl8>was m the pursuit toward Sedan, following the break 
 through of November 1, 1918. Here the normal Infan- 
 try formation of the division reappeared. It was 
 brigades abreast, regiments abreast, each regiment with 
 its battalions in depth. In this case, hoAvever, all 
 Infantry was left at the disposition of the brigade com- 
 manders and in addition the division machine-gun 
 battalion and one company of division engineers were 
 attached to the 84th Infantry Brigade. The division 
 reserve consisted of the division engineer regiment less 
 one company. (102) 
 
 Final report C. 8. Formations in the 27th and 30th Divisions. 
 pp.33,54.(io3) ' Several divisions had their first training with the 
 British, but two only, the 27th and the 30th, had all 
 their war service under British command. These divi- 
 sions under the 2d Corps participated in very heavy 
 fighting, including the breaking of the Hindenburg line, 
 in September and October, 1918. (103) It is interesting- 
 to note what difference, if any, existed between the 
 formations adopted by these divisions and the diA'isions 
 which w^ere more within the sphere of French influence. 
 
 Report of O per- . 
 
 Di?ion f ^aiS attack of September 29, 1918, on the Hmden- 
 
 the Hindenburg burg lino the 30th Division had the 60th Brigade in 
 
 line, Sept. 27-30. . 
 
 B., 182- Ime with the 120th Infantry on the right and the 119th 
 on the left. Both regiments had two battalions in the 
 front line and one in support. The 117th Infantry of 
 the 59th Brigade had the special mission of following 1 
 the 120th Infantry and facing and acting south to protect 
 the right flank. The regimental machine-gun com- 
 panies acted with the Infantry front-line battalions. It 
 is noted that they had difficulty in keeping up with the 
 battalions, but were useful against enemy machine 
 guns. The division machine-gun battalion was assigned 
 to the 117th Infantry for use in its mission of protecting 
 the flank. (104) 
 
 One company of this battalion, which Avas assigned 
 to the support of a cleaning-up company of the 117th 
 Infantry, did good work. Both brigade machine-gun 
 battalions Avere on barrage work. They A\vre grouped 
 under corps orders to deliver overhead covering fire and 
 later were assembled to move on orders from diAnsion 
 headquarters. The divisions of the 2d Corps were sup- 
 ported by Australian Artillery, as their own artillery 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 25 
 
 did not serve with them. The mission of the support- 
 ing Artillery was barrage. Following the advance, sup- 
 porting batteries were moved forward with daring and 
 skill, while close liaison between Infantry and Artillery 
 was maintained at all times. Tanks were assigned to the 
 support of the three Infantry regiments actively en- 
 gaged. Those assigned to the 117th and 120th Infantry 
 were up in time to accompany the Infantry. Those as- 
 signed to the 119th Infantry were not. All tanks were 
 troubled by the fog, but were effective in destroying many 
 machine-gun nests. (104) 
 
 In a later attack, October 9, 1918, the 30th Div ision . Battle instruo- 
 
 tions No. 1, series 
 
 had the 59th Brigade in the front line with one battalion ^ t 30 * h g\ x s isi< g; 
 from the 60th Brigade as brigade reserve of the 59thB.,is2-7.(io5) 
 Brigade. The Infantry regiments in the first-line 
 brigade were abreast. The 117th Infantry had its 
 battalions in depth and the 118th had two battalions 
 in the front line. There was the customary use of tanks, 
 one battalion of heavy tanks being assigned for action 
 with the front-line Infantry, and two companies of 
 whippets to assist in the exploitation. No use was 
 made of accompanying Artillery. (105) 
 
 For the attack of October 17 the 2d Corps had both ^P^ <' c 
 the 27th and 30th Divisions in line. The 27th Division IJ*^ B ' 
 had brigades abreast, regiments in depth, each regiment 
 wath battalions in depth. The regimental machine-gun 
 companies were at the disposition of the regimental 
 commander. The brigade machine-gun, battalions were 
 used for barrage work, and the division battalion was 
 in reserve. There was the customary use of tanks ten 
 heavy tanks from the 301st Tank Battalion assisting 
 the advance Infantry, and so far filling the r61e of accom- 
 panying guns, of which no mention was made. (106) 
 
 The 30th Division had its Infantry brigades in depth, 
 regiments abreast, each regiment with its battalions in t^N^f and 
 depth. The third-line battalions were available as ffc^Son, o'cSs! 
 brigade reserves. The regimental machine-gun com- 8 ^ 1 1 8 ( J7) H<B '' 182 ~ 
 panics were at the disposition of the regimental com- 
 manders for use with the advance Infantry. The 114th 
 Machine-Gun Battalion was required to provide one 
 company to follow the advance battalion of each Infantry 
 regiment at not more than 1,200 yards, with the various 
 missions of protecting the flank, delivering fire from com- 
 manding positions, reducing machine gun nests, and re- 
 placing the forward machine guns. The other companies 
 
26 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 were to move forward in support. The 113th and 1 loth 
 Machine Gun Battalions were assigned to harassing fire. 
 The mission of the Artillery was barrage, with provision 
 for the moving up of the mobile Artillery at the leap 
 frog provided for Infantry brigades. Twelve tanks were 
 assigned to assist the Infantry in the attack. (107) 
 
 It should not be considered that the 27th and 30th Divi- 
 sions as a part of the 2d Corps, serving under British 
 tactical command, were far removed from the influence 
 of the tactics developed in the new American Armies. 
 The relationship between the development of tactics in 
 these isolated divisions and in the divisions serving under 
 purely American command was shown in the publica- 
 tion for the information and guidance of the 30th Divi- 
 sion of extracts from a report of a brigade commander in 
 the First American Army. 
 
 3oth n Di vision 6 This report recommended the assignment of battal- 
 P 1 " ^ attack, to areas one-half kilometer in 
 m or der to provide shelter. It recommended the 
 Bt> moving up of the second-line battalion just previous to 
 the jump-off in order to get through the barrage quicker, 
 and that the third battalion hold its distance and pick its 
 way between shelled areas in advancing. The Infantry 
 formation recommended within the brigade was that of 
 regiments abreast, each regiment with battalions in 
 depth and one company taken from each third-line 
 battalion to follow the brigade commander at 200 meters 
 as his reserve. .The formation recommended for the 
 first-line companies was two platoons in the first wave, 
 and two platoons in support at 100 meters. The use of 
 machine guns was provided for by assigning one com- 
 pany to each battalion as the fifth company of that 
 battalion and prescribing the use of overhead fire when 
 possible. (108) 
 
 The Infantry formations used by divisions serving 
 with the British appeared, therefore, to have followed 
 much the same lines as those used by American divisions 
 serving under French tactical command and American 
 divisions serving under purely American command. In 
 the use of machine guns there was evidenced a tendency 
 to .use only regimental machine guns in intimate con- 
 nection with the advancing Infantry and to use the 
 in c.^A^K.V, machine-gun battalions rather more as units for barrage 
 I9i8, e p.3.(io9) 'work. This use followed closely that which must have 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION". 27 
 
 been visualized for the machine gun when the tables of 
 
 organization which governed American divisions in 
 
 France were drawn up. (109) A report of a board ofoJ^J^gifJ 
 
 machine-gun officers from the 27th Division, concurred SsSmf'ja!? ? 
 
 in by the division commander, recommended the use of ^o) H ' B> ' 227 * 
 
 machine guns as a fourth arm. (HO) 
 
 9. Formations in Other Divisions. 
 
 Formations in other divisions, as evidenced by division 
 orders, conformed essentially to the formations found 
 in the six divisions already instanced. They naturally 
 varied somewhat according to conditions. 
 
 In the St. Mihiel operation the 90th Division held^^; 8 ^ 1 *- 
 quite a wide front and attacked initially only on a part of g^y -' B<> 290 ~ 
 the front. The formation adopted was brigades abreast^ 
 regiments abreast. One machine-gun company was 
 attached to each assault battalion. The Artillery was 
 charged with barrage. (Ill) 
 
 In participation in this operation this division found ce ^ t ote Q S^tiSS 
 that the most successful formation for an Infantry bat-jjjj^y^ ] jjjj' 
 talion on a front of five to six hundred meters was a square H - B.29d-i4.(ii2> 
 formation, with two companies in assault and two in 
 support. More companies in assault on a wider front 
 resulted in loss of control and driving power. The for- 
 mation adopted in one of its Infantry regiments was as 
 above, with two platoons in each company in the assault 
 and two in support, with 150 meters between the assault 
 and support companies and with each support company 
 formed in one-half platoon columns. In this regiment a 
 machine-gun company was attached to each Infantry 
 battalion, with one platoon of the machine-gun company 
 on each flank and to the rear and with the third platoon 
 50 meters to the rear. A question was raised as to the 
 value of machine-gun companies with the assault bat- 
 talions when Infantry is following the barrage. (1 12) 
 
 Toward the end of .the Meuse-Argonne operation, c ^gi ypg rt F f 
 which had developed in a manner into a battle of attri- p -p 9 -$ 3 } 3 90t h 
 tion,(113) this division employed its brigades one J^g ision ' H Ct ' B' 
 behind the other. The attacking brigade had its regi- 290 ~ 11 - (114) 
 ments in depth. The reserve brigade had its regiments 
 abreast with battalions in depth. A machine-gun 
 company was attached to each assault battalion. One 
 Artillery battery was designated as an accompanying 
 battery for the leading battalion of the 360th Infantry. 
 (114) 
 
28 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 A report of the French Military Mission with this 
 Division Juiyao 1 division throws an interesting sidelight on the use of 
 K?. (ii!)' B - machine guns with Infantry in attack maneuvers before 
 entering the line. The report criticized the use of 
 machine-gun battalions in large batteries, out of liaison 
 with the Infantry, and insisted that the employment 
 of machine-gun units with Infantry battalions is essen- 
 tial. This is, of course, an established French doctrine 
 supported by their organization of the Infantry bat- 
 talion to include a machine-gun company. (115) 
 
 The Meuse-Argonne operation was the only major 
 offensive in which, the 80th Division participated as a 
 
 Special report, , , T . , , , . 
 
 soth Division, unit. The normal Infantry formation used by this 
 
 Sept. 9-Nov. 11, .... T i iir . 
 
 1918. H.B. mes, division throughout the Meuse-Argonne operation was 
 F. 6. 16, soth column of brigades. On September 26, 1918, the divi- 
 
 Division, Oct. 22, . fe . f . .11 
 
 1918. H.B. mes, sion attacked in its normal formation with the 160th 
 Infantry Brigade in front. This brigade had its regi- 
 ments abreast, each regiment with battalions in depth. 
 The machine-gun battalion of the assaulting brigade 
 was at the disposition of the brigade, with machine-gun 
 companies attached to each front line Infantry battalion. 
 The other two battalions were used to deliver overhead 
 covering fire, which prisoners reported very effective. 
 One battalion of 75's was assigned to the direct support 
 of the 160th Infantry. Brigade; one battery from this 
 battalion was assigned to each front-line Infantry bat- 
 talion, the third battery was placed under the direct 
 orders of the Infantry brigade commander and was to 
 be moved up with the supporting Infantry. The use 
 planned for this Artillery was fire in support of the In- 
 fantry at from 300 to 1,500 meters. (11 6-1 17) 
 
 In the attack of October 4 the 80th Division employed 
 the same Infantry formation. Front-line battalions used 
 two companies in the front line and two in support. One 
 battalion of 75's was assigned to the attacking Infantry 
 brigade as accompanying Artillery. This battalion, how- 
 ever, was actually incorporated in the ban-age and did 
 not move forward on the first day. In the attack of 
 November 1 the 80th Division was supported by the 
 157th Field Artillery Brigade of the 82d Division. In 
 this attack one regiment of 75's was utilized only 600 
 yards from the front line. (116) 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 29 
 
 A note published by this division during the latter 
 of the Meuse-Argonne operation prescribed the use 
 accompanying guns in accordance with instructions from A : E - F -( 118 > 
 higher authority. (1 18) 
 
 The first experience of the 91st Division was in the of 
 Meuse-Argonne offensive on September 26. This divi- 
 sion attacked with its Infantry brigades abreast. The A. 1 !. R(U9) files> 
 181st Brigade on the right had its regiments abreast each 
 with one battalion in line and one in support. The 182d 
 Brigade had its regiments in column each with one bat- 
 talion in the front line and one in support. On Septem- 
 ber 27 the 182d Brigade changed its formation to place 
 its Infantry regiments abreast. On September 28 both 
 brigades had their regiments in depth. The third-line 
 Infantry battalions were held in reserve, one battalion 
 in each brigade was the brigade reserve, the other third- 
 line battalion forming part of the division reserve. 
 There was a characteristic attachment of machine-gun 
 companies to Infantry battalions. One regiment of 75's 
 was assigned to the support of each Infantry brigade. 
 Accompanying guns taken from the supporting Artillery 
 were reported to have been used successfully with assault 
 battalions, as were the Infantry 37's.(119) 
 
 Following its participation in the Meuse-Argonne of- D^on oct3o! 
 fensive, in the middle of October, the 91st, together with ^I.^Jof es ' A 
 the 37th Division, was attached to the French 6th Army 
 in Belgium. The 91st Division was accompanied by the 
 Field Artillery brigade of the 28th Division. On Oc- 
 tober 31 this division attacked with its Infantry brigades 
 abreast. The 181st Brigade on the right had its regi- 
 ments in depth and the first-line regiment had two bat- 
 talions in the front line; the 182d Brigade on the left 
 had but one regiment in line. This regiment had its 
 battalions in depth. A minimum depth of 300 meters 
 was prescribed for each battalion and the minimum dis- 
 tance of 500 meters between battalions. In each assault 
 battalion two companies were in the front line, the other 
 two companies in support at 300 meters distance. The 
 characteristic attachment of subordinate machine-gun 
 units to subordinate Infantry units appeared in the for- 
 mation of a cleaning-up battalion. After the first ob- 
 jective had been taken by the Infantry one regiment of 
 75's passed to the command of each Infantry brigade. 
 One platoon of 75's was assigned for use as accompany- 
 ing guns to each front-line Infantry battalion. (120) 
 
30 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 On September 26, 1918, at the beginning of the Meuse- 
 ' fii2? Ar g onne offensive the Infantry formation of the 35th 
 A.E.F.(i2i) Division was brigades in depth, with the 69th Brigade in 
 the front line. This brigade had its regiments abreast, 
 with the 138th Infantry on the right, the 137th Infantry 
 on the left. Both regiments had their battalions in 
 depth. One battalion was detached from the 70th 
 Brigade, as the 69th Brigade's reserve. Each assault 
 and support battalion had a machine-gun company 
 attached. Combat liaison groups each of one company 
 and a machine-gun platoon were sent out by the 69th 
 Brigade to flanking divisions. (121) The remainder of 
 Division, se'pt. 24, the machine guns were designated to fire barrage. One 
 A.E.F.(i22) cs ' platoon of Light Artillery was designated to support 
 tanks against antitank guns, and one battery used as 
 forward guns with advance Infantry. The Artillery fired 
 barrage and moved forward by echelon. The 344th 
 Tank Battalion less one company assisted the advance 
 of the Infantry. (122) September 27 the 70th Brigade 
 passed through to attack with regiments abreast, each 
 regiment with two battalions in the front line and one in 
 support. The 69th Brigade was in support, with regi- 
 ments abreast and battalions in depth. (121) 
 
 On September 28 on the assumption that the main 
 of the enemy had retreated, and that the advance 
 would be opposed principally by Artillery and machine- 
 gun fire, a two-column formation was ordered for Septem- 
 ber 29. (123) Both Infantry brigades were split in this 
 new formation. These columns were essentially provi- 
 sional brigades abreast, the right column consisting of 
 the 138th and the 140th Infantry and the 129th Machine 
 Gun Battalion, the left column of the 137th and the 
 139th Infantry and the 130th Machine Gun Battalion. 
 Of the leading regiments, the 138th Infantry had its 
 battalions in depth. The 137th had two assaulting bat- 
 talions, one in support. A machine-gun company was 
 attached to each assault and support battalion. (121) 
 As in the case of the 35th Division, the first participa- 
 
 se'pt. 2o v c i t s !i;tion of the 79th Division in a major offensive was be- 
 A 91 E.F. < (T2 3 4) flks 'tween the Meuse and the Argonne on September 26. 
 The initial Infantry formation was elaborate. Brigades 
 were in depth with the 157th Brigade in the front line. 
 This brigade had its regiments abreast, the 314th In- 
 fantry on the right, the 313th on the left. Each regiment 
 had two battalions in the front line and one in brigade 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 31 
 
 reserve. The front-line battalions were echeloned in 
 depth by companies, with one company in the front line, 
 one in support, one in battalion reserve, and one in regi- 
 mental reserve. One company from each battalion in 
 brigade reserve was returned to be distributed through- 
 out the regiment for cleaning up. Subordinate machine- 
 gun units were attached to subordinate Infantry units. 
 The 147th Field Artillery was designated as accompany- 
 ing Artillery for both front-line regiments and ordered 
 to proceed forward to report to them on conclusion of its 
 barrage mission. (124) 
 
 On September 27, however, both brigades of this 
 division were split and two provisional brigades abreast 
 with regiments in depth were created as in the case of 
 the 35th Division. To push the advance the command- 
 ing general of the 158th Brigade was placed in command 
 of the Provisional 158th Brigade consisting of the 315th 
 Infantry, and the 314th Infantry from the 157th Brigade. 
 The commanding general of the 157th Brigade was 
 placed in command of a provisional brigade consisting of 
 the 313th Infantry, in the front line, and the 316th In- 
 fantry, from the 158th Brigade, in support. (124) 
 
 The 90th Division has been seen to have changed from 
 a prior formation of brigades abreast to one of brigades in 
 depth in its participation in the Meuse-Argonne offen- 
 sive. The 80th Division has been seen to have used the 
 latter throughout this battle of attrition. It is self- 
 evidently useful as prolonging the period of battle avail- 
 ability of a division by making possible entire internal 
 Infantry relief. But the parallel instances of the 35th 
 and 79th Divisions, changing from an established forma- 
 tion of brigades in depth to an improvised one of pro- 
 visional brigades abreast, even in the midst of battle, 
 would seem to indicate the value in times of stress of the 
 simpler formation of brigades abreast. 
 10. General Discussion. 
 
 The instances quoted show the formations adopted by 
 various divisions under various circumstances in an 
 endeavor to utilize to the fullest the power of the various 
 arms. This was naturally also the preoccupation of 
 General Headquarters, A. E. F., which published from 
 time to time, during the participation of American forces 
 in the war with Germany, " Notes on Recent Operations," 
 in order to disseminate among the command knowledge 
 
32 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 gained from experience. Following the armistice various 
 
 boards were convened by General Headquarters, A. E. F., 
 
 to study and make available for future utilization late 
 
 perio?Boar f d S o U n experiences. Finally a superior board was appointed to 
 
 tartte^A^. a 5? study the sam e questions in a more general manner, to 
 
 A. X E. F.cra^'pass on the reports of the boards on the various arms, 
 
 and to render a final report on organization and tactics. 
 
 (125) From a study of the documents just mentioned. 
 
 and especially from a study of the report of the Superior 
 
 Board, general conclusions as to what formations gave 
 
 the best results may be drawn. 
 
 The organization of the Infantry division was sound and 
 
 appropriate to the requirements of modern battle tactics. 
 
 A three-unit system in divisional organization might 
 
 have been more appropriate for envelopment, but the 
 
 two-unit system was better for penetration. (125) No 
 
 man e <^ r gGener?i", necessity existed for a three-unit system in divisions in 
 
 G-3fijSfi?E! K the experience of the A. E. F. as the division was always 
 
 a part of an army. The existing two-unit system was 
 
 better for relief, liaison, etc. (126) 
 
 Report of supe- The Infantry continued to be the basic arm. Infantry 
 P p r ilS r a27 e ) tc '' attacks alone were found to be decisive. (127) In order 
 rtoH^?2to defeat the enemy the Infantry must be prepared to 
 pp.2i-27.<i28) cloge with him The unit ^^h must be charged with 
 
 this duty, the combat unit, was found to be the Infantry 
 
 battalion. (128) 
 
 cen t te opjr n a ti?S The essential in all Infantry formation within the 
 G-s 3 . B.' Mis! division was found to lie in a disposition in depth, to 
 
 combine facility of command with avoidance of losses. 
 
 This dictated attacks in thin waves supported by small 
 
 columns. (129) 
 Notes on Re- The proper formation to secure the most effective use 
 
 cent Operations . 
 
 NO. i. NO. 1322, o f machine guns was constantly in question. Ihe neces- 
 
 G-5, and Notes > * 
 
 a ?ions 3 No 1 Y ) $o'~ s i t y ^ or tne P nvs i ca l advance of the machine guns with 
 files '(Sot **' B ' tne Infantry and the necessity for utilizing machine gun 
 fire effect to assist the advance of the Infantry were con- 
 stantly in conflict. (130) Even after the armistice dif- 
 rio? e SSrd f fet p ctfe r ence of opinion existed as to the proper formation to 
 p p .i27-i28.'(i3i)' be adopte( } by machine-gun units. The Superior Board, 
 however, found that as the Infantry battalion was the 
 essential combat unit and as a machine-gun organization 
 must be an essential part of that unit, a machine-gun 
 company should form a part of each Infantry battalion. 
 The board also found that the number of machine-gun 
 companies in the division, fourteen, was correct, as giv- 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 33 
 
 ing one company for each Infantry battalion and the 
 division machine-gun battalion as a reserve. (131) 
 
 The use of Infantry auxiliary arms was constantly structions NO! 
 made the subject of comment in notes on operations or mS .'(?32)' 
 combat instructions. The agreement was general that 
 the 37 millimeter, 1 -pounder gun should be used by the 
 front-line Infantry battalions and that the Infantry 
 trench mortars should be used so far as the difficulties of 
 ammunition supply permitted. (132) 
 
 The mission of tanks was found to be the destruction rio? e Soard, S eK 
 of strong points which impeded Infantry advance and the p ' 2 
 employment of tanks distinctly advantageous to morale. 
 It was found that tank units should be organized in 
 association with and fight as a part of Infantry com- 
 mands. It was believed that all tanks should be armed 
 with 75-millimeter guns. (133) 
 
 The principle of unity of direction of Artillery fire as rio? e B oard, S e; 
 laid down in Field Artillery Drill and Service Regula- pp<3& 
 tions was found to be sound, and it was found that com- 
 mand of Artillery units should normally remain in the 
 hands of Artillery officers. It appeared essential, how- 
 ever, that there should be the closest possible contact 
 between Infantry and the supporting Artillery and that 
 consequently within the division the subordinate Artil- 
 lery units should be regularly assigned to work with sub- 
 ordinate Infantry units, one 75-millimeter regiment to 
 each Infantry brigade. (134) 
 
 Some inefficiency was found as a result of the employ- c?m p m a nding 
 ment in support of divisional Infantry of French Artil- 
 lery or of American Artillery not belonging to the ( Ji v i- 
 sion, with a consequent loss of intimate association and 
 teamwork. (135) 
 
 This lack of teamwork between Infantry and Artillery Araty,'oct.' 2? 
 may have prompted the use of accompanying guns, i 9 *|. F ^f 6) files> 
 which has been seen to have been consistently adhered 
 to in operations under American command and which 
 was directly ordered by such superior units as an army. 
 (136) The use of the accompanying gun conformed to 
 
 German tactics in the German offensives of 1918. Itjgf- 
 may be noted that the Germans notoriously lacked tanks, 1918 -< 137 ) 
 of which no use was made in these offensives. (13 7) 
 
 It has been seen that this device was not used by Amer- 
 ican divisions under French or British command except 
 in the case of a division serving under French control 
 in the last days of the war after its habits had been 
 
34 A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 B<SX?\ftme?y ^ orme d un ^ er American command. The Field Artillery 
 ?9i8 rd) 'a Spies' Board found that the previous use of accompanying guns 
 A.E. F.(i38) h ac i b een a failure and recommended the use of tank 
 mounts for accompanying Artillery. (13 8) The Superior 
 Board found physical difficulties in getting up the accom- 
 rio? e Card f , S ct p c e ; panying gun. (139) This recalls Gen. Chaff ee's statement: 
 PP- 36and4 ^ 139 >' 'Nothing whatever should be included in the Infantry 
 that can not be moved by hand over any kind of ground, 
 an y kind of weather, and at any hour of the day or 
 The Superior Board consequently con- 
 use ^ a tank mount for the accompanying 
 gun. This board, however, insisted on the value of the 
 psychological effect of intimate association between the 
 Infantry and Artillery as exemplified in the support of 
 subordinate Infantry commands by subordinate Artillery 
 commands. (139) 
 11. Conclusions. 
 
 It is evident that formations must vary according to 
 conditions. Two distinct formations for an Infantry 
 division have been seen; they are that of Infantry 
 brigades abreast and that of Infantry brigades in depth. 
 It may be said that the formation with brigades abreast 
 has the virtue of simplifying the problems of command 
 and communication, always so difficult in battle, and 
 that it possesses greater power for an initial blow than 
 does the other formation. 
 
 It may be said that the formation with brigades in 
 depth lends itself better to a continuing battle by mak- 
 ing possible, within a division, complete Infantry relief, 
 and that it presents greater opportunity for maneuver. 
 
A STUDY IN BATTLE FORMATION. 
 
 35 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 (In order of citation.) 
 
 Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary. 
 
 The Principles of War, Foch. 
 
 The Conduct of War, Von der Goltz. 
 
 Features of the War, Haig. 
 
 Report of Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, 1919. 
 
 Report of Commander in Chief, A. E. F., 
 
 cabled November 20, 1918. 
 Report of Commanding General, 1st 
 
 Army, A. E. F. 
 
 Etudes sur le Combat, du Picq. 
 Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 
 
 1919. 
 Report on the Organization of the Land 
 
 Forces of the United States, 1912. 
 National Defense Act, Approved June 3, 
 
 1916. 
 
 Tables of Organization, U. S. Army, 1917. 
 Tables of Organization for Expeditionary 
 
 Divisions, Provisional. H. B. files. 
 Tables of Organization, Series A, 1918. 
 Priority Schedule, A. E. F. 
 Final Report of Commander in Chief, 
 
 A. E. F., 1919. 
 
 Report of Superior Board, A. E. F. 
 Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911. 
 Combined Infantry and Cavalry Drill 
 
 Regulation for Automatic Machine 
 
 Rifle, 1915. 
 Provisional Drill and Service Regulations 
 
 for Field Artillery, 1916. 
 Field Service Regulations, 1914. 
 Field Orders and Memos, 90th Division. 
 Journal of Operations, G-3, A. E. F. 
 Instructions on the Defensive Action of 
 
 Large Units in Battle. W. D. D. 794, 
 
 1918. 
 
 Field Orders and Memos, 1st Division. 
 Tableaux d'Effectifs, G. S. College Li- 
 brary. 
 Combat Instructions No. 1348, G-5, 
 
 A. E. F. 
 
 1st Division Maps, G-3, A. E. F. 
 Reports and Field Orders, 2d Division 
 
 and subordinate organizations. 
 Note on use of Tanks, French 10th Army, 
 
 July 15, 1918. H. B. files. 
 Field Orders and Reports, 26th Division 
 
 and subordinate organizations, G-3, 
 
 A. E. F. 
 Field Orders and Reports, 42d Division. 
 
 G-3, A. E. F. 
 
 Field Orders and Reports, 30th Division. 
 Field Orders and Reports, 27th Division. 
 Letter from Commanding General, 27th 
 
 Division, January 12, 1920. H. B. files. 
 Report of French Military Mission to 90th 
 
 Division, July 30, 1918. H. B. files. 
 Report and Memos, 80th Division, G-3, 
 
 A. E. F. 
 Reports and Field Orders, 91st Division, 
 
 G-3, A. E. F. 
 Reports and Field Orders, 35th Division, 
 
 G-3, A. E. F. 
 Reports and Field Orders, 79th Division, 
 
 G-3, A. E. F. 
 
 Notes on Recent Operations, G-5, A.E.F. 
 Field Orders, 1st Army. 
 A Survey of German Tactics, Monograph 
 
 No. 1. Historical Branch, 1918. 
 Report of Hero Board, December 9, 1918, 
 
 A.E.F. 
 Infantry Journal, January, 1920. 
 
 o 
 
is 
 
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Gaylord Bros. 
 
 Makers 
 
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