I 
 
 JIM 
 
 6524 
 /V159C 
 
 MILYOUKOV 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
 GOVERNMENT FOR 
 RUSSIA
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 i. I., No. 3 Prick, 10 CENxt 
 
 Constitutional 
 Government for Russia 
 
 ^n Address Delivered before THE CiVIC FORUM 
 in Carnegie Hall, New York City 
 January 14, 1908 
 
 BY 
 
 PROFESSOR PAUL MILYOUKOV 
 
 Member of the Third Duma for St. Petersburg 
 WITH PORTRAIT 
 
 New York 
 
 THE CIVIC FORUM 
 
 23 Wbst 44th Street 
 
 1908
 
 ■lU'JSOY LtSnA.: 
 
 NOTE 
 
 Professor Mlh-oukov made the Journey from St. Peters- 
 burg to America on the Invitation of The CIVIC FORUM. for the 
 sole purpose of dellverlnjt this one aJdress. He remained In 
 America but three days, helnn obliged to hasten back to Russia In 
 order to be present when the Duma resumed Its sessions after Its 
 three weeks' recess at the time of the Russian Christmas. At the 
 meeiinc In CamoEle Hall, when this address was delivered, Right 
 Rev. Henry C. Potter. Bishop of New York, acted as Chairman. 
 The Hall was crowded to Its utmost capacity by an audience which 
 numbered nearly four thousand persons, representing the most In- 
 fluential elements In the' city. The address made a profound Im- 
 pression, and at Its close, on motion of Hon. Elgin R. L. Gould. 
 President of the New Nelhe»land Bank and formerly City 
 Chamberlain, a vote of sympathy and appreciation, and of thanks 
 to the speaker was unanimously carried. 
 
 On the following evening. January 15. Hon. Herbert Parsons. 
 Member of Congress from New York, gave a dinner and reception 
 In Washington, In honor of Professor Milyoukov. There were 
 present as guests on this occasion: three members of President 
 Roosevelt's Cabinet, namely. Hon. William H. Taft. Secretary of 
 War; Hon. James R. Garfield, Secretary of the Interior; and Hon. 
 Oscar S. Straus, Secretary of Commerce and Labor ; Hon. Robert 
 Bacon. Assistant Secretary of State; Hon. William Loeb Jr., 
 Secretary to President Roosevelt; Hon. Joseph G. Cannon, 
 Speaker of the House of Representatives; Hon. Sereno E. Payne, 
 leader of the majority in the House, and over one hundred othei 
 members of the Senate and the House, besides many other promi- 
 nent officials of the national Government. In Introducing Pro- 
 fessor Milyoukov. Congressm.m Parsons said that he was certain 
 that this leader of the Constitutional Democratic party of Russia 
 had the complete sympathy of every member of the Government of 
 the United Slates. This statement was received with prolonged 
 applause by all present.
 
 ruM 
 
 iTKiUty
 
 Constitutional Government 
 ^ for Russia 
 
 ^ Four years ago, when I first came here to address an Amer- 
 l^lcan audience on Russian affairs, Russia was approaching its 
 \;politIcal downfall and I tried to unveil some threatening symp- 
 ■^^toms under the then placid surface of things. On my second 
 trip a year later, I hardly had time to complete the picture by 
 pointing out the urgency of radical reform, political and social. 
 We were already in the rapids of the year 1905 — the year of 
 ^he Russian Revolution. This year brought with it a real down- 
 fall of the autocracy, by the well-known Manifesto of October 
 ^30th. Some people thought then that the reasonable aim of the 
 ^movement had already been attained, since Russia was thence- 
 ^forth to be a modern constitutional state. Others took the event 
 ^as a new departure in the direction of something larger and 
 unprecedented. But few foresaw that the success achieved was 
 the highest mark to be recorded by this flood-tide, or that after 
 some few moments of surprise and bewilderment, a descending 
 ^course would set in. 
 
 o This was our case. The obstacles rose, more and more threat- 
 ^eningly, until now, after two years of struggles, after two Dumas • 
 dissolved, we find ourselves in a sort of political whirlpool. ^ 
 Whether or not a natural outlet will be discovered, whether the 
 flood will follow a quiet course or rush toward new cataclisms, 
 who can foretell! 
 
 The uncertainty in the great struggle of modern Russia could 
 not fail to slacken the general interest in it. People have grown 
 weary from the too many details, and have gradually lost sight 
 of the final aim of the movement. Of those who were enthu- 
 siastic admirers of this struggle for freedom in its dramatic be- 
 ginning, there are few who know how to preserve their keen 
 
 O^/i ^/3 '^
 
 lntorr»l nmldst nil \l» entangled devilopmonts. Of the many 
 mlUIons who cnsi a fiigltlvp slanco at the glorious cataract when 
 the nvolutlon was at Its height, how few are there who care to 
 follow the disorderly course of the waters down the gorge! 
 
 Now. ladles nnd gintlotncn. you may acoomi)any one who has 
 tftkeD Boim i.iil In the events. My eonipnrlson of the waterfall 
 luny Iw R disadvnntngrous Introiluetlon. But recently one of 
 your writers In this country threw upon me personally, as a 
 leader of the Constitutional Democratic party (that Is, the 
 Cadets), the rrsiwnslblUty for the failure of the two first Rus- 
 sian Dumas. Were this true, It would make of me as your guide 
 this evening, a very unreliable guide Indeed. 
 
 Of course an excuse was kindly found for mc — the excuse of 
 being an "idealist" — a complimentary term, I suppose, for "Uto- 
 pian." This Is far better, certainly, than to be characterized as a 
 "conspirator," a "revolutionary," or even an "anarchist," as one 
 of my countrymen in this country was recently called. But, I 
 mtist confess, not one of these terms appeals to my political 
 taste. In a certain sense I cannot object, and, I hope, nobody can. 
 to being called a political Idealist. Even in this country of 
 practical politicians, where politics and realism have long been 
 synonymous terms, there are times when idealism enjoys a certain 
 currency. When a great cause is at stake and great issues are 
 being fought for, political Idealism is never wanting. In fact, 
 I think that a real idealism is hardly ever superfluous, and I 
 am quite sure that you are not the people to make this term a 
 reproach. 
 
 In any case what is called idealism in a country of practical 
 politicians may pass as very sound realism in a country of po- 
 litical dreamers; and what is realism in times of general out- 
 break, may become idealism when the flood recedes and stagna- 
 tion sets in. I hope thai you will take these circumstances into 
 consideration before you "locate" me definitely. 
 
 The party to which I belong, which was the leading party in the 
 first two Dumas, has always kept, up to the last moment, at the 
 center of political movement. Some of our enemies consider 
 our policy too radical, while many others find it too moderate. 
 But everyone opposed to the policy of the Constitutional Demo- 
 cratic party, has found it particularly dangerous for this very 
 reason, that it has kept within the reach of practical possibilities. 
 Precisely for this reason the party was particularly hated and 
 feared by both extreme currents of the Russian movement — by 
 
 4
 
 the reactionaries as well as by the revolutionaries. Both extremes 
 appealed to violent methods of struggle and were busy preparing 
 new stroli.es and counterstrokes, which our party tried to make 
 unnecessary and impossible. And, of course were the constitu- 
 tion to strike root in Russia and v>'ere quiet to be secured by large 
 .social reforms, what hope would remain either for a restora- 
 tion of autocracy or for a social overthrow? That is why our 
 enemies on both sides have used violent means in the endeavor to 
 thwart the political course which our party has chosen. 
 
 As a result, we must admit that our position as mediator is 
 now vei*y much weakened. Other parties much more conserva- 
 tive than ours now play the role of peacemakers. Unfortunately, 
 r.e cannot find their good services quite disinterested. Nor do 
 we find general reconcilation to be acceptable on their condi- 
 tions. The order of things they are likely to bring about, we 
 cannot expect to be either coiistitjitional cr democratic. We 
 believe that the political situation they are going to create will 
 be extremely unstable, being too much of a compromise with the 
 autocracy and the nobility. And as this situation is likely to 
 bring with it new complications and to provoke new struggles, 
 we do not v/ish to take upon ourselves the responsibility for its 
 consequences. That is why we realists of yesterday are nov/ 
 classed as idealists; and having formerly been described as 
 opportunitists, suffer now from being termed revolutionaries. We 
 have not changed, but things have changed very much all 
 around us. Public opinion is with us. But the masters of the 
 present day do not represent public opinion. The leading ma- 
 jority of the third Russian Duma is governmental, while the 
 country remains what it was before — in opposition. 
 
 Now that you know the general situation and my own place 
 in it, let us enter into our subject. This, of course, cannot be 
 a detailed account of the Russian revolution. All that I can do 
 is to analyze the moving forces of that revolution and to outline 
 the principal phases through which it has passed. Thus I hope 
 to help you to a clearer insight into the real causes of the 
 origin and the failure of this movement, and to enable you to 
 form an independent judgment as to its possible outcome. 
 
 Of the four consecutive phases which one may distinguish in 
 the course of the events of the last three years, the first two 
 mark an ascending movement, while the last two show a gradual 
 but uninterrupted retrogression. I am tempted to call the first 
 
 5
 
 a»c<>ndin(; phaBp of the movement the natlonnl phase. For the 
 movement Is nntional In lis origin us wrll as In Its manifesta- 
 tions. Tlio revolutionary movement originated In a state of 
 general disaffection whleh grew aeute after the great national 
 disaster of the late war with Japan, and sjtread widely through 
 all classes of the population. The aim of the movement was 
 ono and unified — a current saying in those days was, "we do 
 not want reforms, but the Reform, the Constitution." And its 
 action was united. This accounts for the strength of the move- 
 ment and for the rapid success In the concession conveyed by 
 the Manifesto of October 30. 
 
 The second ascending phase begins with the fall of autocracy. 
 This was the neg;itlve aim of the movement, common to all of 
 the aggressive parties. As soon as it was reached, the diverg- 
 ence in the positive strivings of yesterday's allies became mani- 
 fest. The revolutionary elements of the movement, intoxicated 
 by their sudden victory of October 30, persuaded themselves that 
 the world stood on the eve of a social overthrow and that 
 Russia must give the signal for it. Thus the revolutionary 
 raovement first differentiated itself from the constitutional 
 movement. The revolutionary phase, however, was short and 
 proved fatal to the success of the whole movement. It began 
 with the October victory. It came to its close with the December 
 defeat of the armed insurrection at Moscow. Then the ebbing 
 tide was held back for a time by the initial activity of the first 
 Russian parliamentary representation. Thus the movement, with 
 the opening of the first Duma, entered upon its third stage. 
 
 I should call this ihlrd_ stage constitutional, from the 
 methods of struggle then tried. How did this phase end? I 
 should be very much pleased to tell you that the employment 
 of constitutional methods of struggle has not ended yet. But 
 this would not account for the predominant fact by which the 
 fourth phase of the movement is characterized, namely, the 
 increasing use of unconstitutional methods by the enemies of 
 the movement, who now take the offensive. Therefore I call the 
 fourth phase counter-revolutionary. It began with the violent 
 act of the dissolution of the first Duma, and it became particu- 
 larly emphatic after the "Fundamental Law" was flagrantly 
 violated simultaneously with the dissolution of the second Duma. 
 
 Will this counter-revolutionary phase end with the fifth phase, 
 that of a restoration of autocracy? Or rather will it bring us 
 back to the third — the constitutional phase? I do not wish to
 
 play the prophet, but one must at least prepare for the worst, and' 
 there is no use in attenuating the danger. 
 
 Let me now go a step further in our analysis. After having 
 discriminated political phases, we can discriminate between the 
 leading social groups involved in the movement. With each 
 political phase we shall be able to point out a definite social 
 group that is responsible for it. The first, or national phase, is 
 the one exception, characterized as it was by thie co-operation of 
 many advanced groups. In fact, with the national phase, social 
 groups just began to organize, and it was public opinion in 
 general, and its leaders, the intellectuals, that took the lead. . 
 The learned professions and the representatives of local self- ,/ 
 government, these were the chief moving forces which promoted 
 the movement and tried to formulate its demands. 
 
 In the second or revolutionary phase, the leadership belongs 
 to itfie socialists. They acted in the name of the proletarians, but 
 at the same time they sought for allies among the peasantry 
 and in the army. In the third phase, the constitutional, the 
 party which I have the honor to represent played the leading 
 role, the Constitutional Democrats. In the fourth phase, the 
 ^^urt, the bureaucracy and the nobility begin to prevail. The 
 court and the nobility in particular have become the leading 
 forces in an openly avowed movement which is now setting in i 
 for the restoration of autocracy. 
 
 Now, brief as this analysis is, I believe that it will throw a 
 certain light upon the delayed outcome of the general movement 
 and explain why it proved — partially and temporarily, let us hope 
 — a failure. The exactness of the analysis one can hardly dis- 
 pute; and it implies a certain explanation. To make this clear, 
 it remains for me to fill in the gaps and to supply the most neces- 
 sary links between the political movements and the social ele- 
 ments just analyzed. 
 
 To repeat, the national phase was distinguished by the fact 
 that the aims of all advanced groups were then held in com- 
 mon. Even groups which in the revolutionary stage went far 
 asunder, contributed together to the success of the initial phase. 
 Thus in its very origin the movement was two-fold. It opened 
 with the famous Petition of Right, formulated on November 22, 
 1904, by members of the gentry, and two months later it was 
 reinforced by the first appearance of the working masses, whom 
 Father Gapon led to the Winter Palace on the Red Sunday, 
 January 22, 1905. The final triumph, the Manifesto of October
 
 80. VJOo. waa also attnliu'd through the Indiscriminate co-oper- 
 ation of nil the ndvancod groups. After this first victory, won 
 through a gtnerul strike which was quite unprecedented in its 
 extension, the socialists rejieatedly issued ordrrs to the worldng- 
 men to strike again, and each time the attempt was a failure. 
 The one successful strike which wrung from the government the 
 decisive concession was prepared and led in great measure 
 by the Intellectuals, and in a quite spontaneous way was sup- 
 ported by various social groups. Tor example, even the capital- 
 ists, without exception, supported their laborers while on strike 
 by paying their wages for the entire time. Private shops and 
 ofBces voluntarily closed In compliance with the general state of 
 public opinion. Professors forcefully told the government that 
 it must not oppose the meetings held within the walls of the 
 higher institutions of learning. The juries declared themselves 
 unable to pronounce sentences during the days of the strike, 
 while judges and tribunals went on strike with the rest. Even 
 the oflBcials in several State offices stopped their work. In short. 
 It was an outbreak of universal enthusiasm, which proved to the 
 government that further resistance was impossible and brought it 
 to surrender. 
 
 Then it was that the revolutionary elements grew self-con- 
 fident, and went their own way, preparing for a more decisive 
 blow. Much later, the socialist leaders themselves were brought 
 to a realization that their own estimate of their power was 
 greatly exaggerated, as likewise the amount of real influence 
 which they had over the proletarians. But by this time their 
 optimism had grown boundless. Even the impossible had be- 
 gun to seem possible — I mean, the impossible according to their 
 own doctrine. The element of truth in their argument was that 
 no decisive results could be won from the government in the 
 way of voluntary concessions. And indeed, even such concessions 
 as had been granted on October 30 were by no means voluntary. 
 If proofs are wanted for this assertion, they will be found in 
 the present activities of the government — in Its attempt to with- 
 draw as far as possible even the concessions given. But from 
 an exact observation the socialists drew quite a wrong conclu- 
 sion, namely, that no concessions of any kind were wanted be- 
 cause the proletarians by themselves were strong enough to 
 bring about an armed Insurrection, to form a revolutionary 
 government, and thus to dictate the will of the people. The 
 general strike, according to them, was nothing more than a mod- 
 
 8
 
 est introduction to the real fight. They ordered new strikes after 
 strikes; they organized a nucleus for a revolutionary govern- 
 ment — their St. Petersburg Council of Workingmen Delegates, 
 elected by the workingmen in St. Petersburg factories. They 
 even anticipated an actual advent of socialism as a result of their 
 coming victory, though such a result was in formal contradiction 
 with their own accepted theory. The current doctrine then was ^ 
 that the coming revolution was to be bourgeois, not socialistic. 
 But in their growing impatience, the St. Petersburg socialists 
 were unwilling even to wait for this bourgeois victory for the 
 realization of their minimum program. The Council of Dele- 
 gates issued an order on November 11, according to which the 
 eight-hour day was to be introduced in all factories by the 
 workingmen themselves in a revolutionary way. 
 
 In vain some few delegates tried to persuade their comrades 
 that it was sheer madness to undertake the struggle with the ^ 
 capitalists before their struggle with autocracy itself had come 
 to a satisfactory ending. The results were, of course, disastrous. 
 The private and government factories, challenged by their work- 
 ingmen, replied with a series of lockouts. About 100,000 men 
 lost their work, and the threat of a new strike proved Inef- 
 fective. After two weeks of hopeless resistance, the Council 
 had to surrender and withdraw its order. The government felt 
 encouraged, and took the offensive. On December 9, the Presi- 
 dent of the Council was arrested. On December 16, one day after 
 the revolutionary manifesto was launched by the Council, all its 
 members were imprisoned. Then, as a last attempt, a new strike 
 was proclaimed, to serve as an introduction to the armed 
 insurrection which was to be tried at Moscow. The moment 
 could not have been more badly chosen for the decisive blow. 
 After some ten days of haphazard fighting, the Moscow insurrec- 
 tion was crushed by the guard regiments, and this put a speedy 
 end to all theories of a permanent revolution in Russia. More- 
 over, the Moscow defeat served as a signal for a relentless prose- 
 cution of the adherents of the revolutionary movement through- 
 out Russia. Special military trains were kept ready and mili- 
 tary expeditions were sent far and wide, especially to the 
 outskirts of the empire, the Caucasus, the Baltic provinces, and / 
 to Siberia, which proved particularly rebellious. The army 
 ransacked the population, with no discrimination between the 
 guilty and the innocent. Whole villages were burned, people were 
 hanged and killed on mere suspicion, contributions were levied 
 
 9
 
 on tho 'Intt'rnal «'iuMny." aiul ho forth. Hy intnina of all theso 
 atrocltlis. what still rt-nmliu'il of the revolutionary conflagration 
 was mercilossly stlflid. "IVace" was restored on the great 
 roads and In the large cities. 
 
 Still the end of the revolutionary movement was not yet. There 
 remained the villages, and the last hopes of the revolutionaries 
 were transferred to these. Of course the outbreaks In the vil- 
 lages were less dramatic and less calculated to attract public at- 
 tention than revolutionary i)roceedings by the workingmen, con- 
 centrated by tens and hundreds of thousands in the large cities. 
 But the agrarian troubles were far more perilous, and they af- 
 fected the well-being of the privileged and inHuontial class of 
 landlords more strongly than the strikes of workingmen affected 
 the Russian capitalists. Russia is not yet an industrial country, and 
 In spite of all the recent development of Russian industry, the 
 number of workingmen in the factories does not exceed two per 
 cent of the population, while the peasants constitute eighty-five 
 per cent. 
 
 The peasants of course were unable to march under the 
 banner of socialism and obey its orders. But we saw that even 
 among the proletarians the Influence of socialistic societies was 
 not so strong as their leaders presumed it to be. If socialism 
 had some elements of organization which lead to success, It 
 also had its theories which brought the movement to ruin. Social- 
 ism tried to impart to the Russian peasants its organization and 
 theories. A counterpart to the Council of Workingmen Dele- 
 gates was started under the name of The Peasants' Union, in 
 order to organize the agrarian outbreak. Socialism tried also 
 to adapt its doctrine to the kind of agrarian terrorism to which 
 Russian peasants were particularly inclined. But here the cen- 
 tralizing influence of socialism was still weaker; the movement 
 itself was even more spontaneous and depended more upon Its 
 own intrinsic causes. 
 
 These causes were never lacking in a Russian village, and 
 particularly so after the great emancipation reform of 1861. 
 "More land," this was for half a century the constant cry of 
 the Russian peasant. He got less than his expectation In the 
 "great reform," receiving only too little from the land he had 
 tilled for his landlord. And for this little he was compelled to 
 pay too much out of his scanty earnings. From that time, as the 
 population went on Increasing, the Individual land-holdings be- 
 came still smaller, while Indirect taxation grew out of all
 
 proportion to the increase in the population. The cry for more 
 land became the cry of distress, the cry of starvation. During 
 the summer months of 1903, an agrarian outbreak took place 
 quite spontaneously. Famine-stricken, the peasants came In 
 crowds to the neighboring landlords. Finding that these pos- 
 sessed much more grain than they needed, while they themselves 
 had nothing to eat, the peasants quietly carried off on their 
 carts what they considered superfluous. In the year 1905, the 
 year of revolution, amidst the general excitement of that time, 
 agrarian troubles broke out again on a much larger scale and 
 took a more violent form. In the autumn of 1905, the trouble 
 spread over more than a third of European Russia, that is, 
 in one hundred and sixty-one districts out of four hundred 
 and thirty-six — thirty-seven per cent of the area of the country. 
 About two thousand estates and country houses of landlords 
 were burned or ravaged. The entire loss suffered by the land- 
 lords at this time was estimated at about fifteen million dollars. 
 "Some one must perish, either we or our landlords," the peas- 
 ants were heard saying. And the landlords' utterance was no 
 less telling: "If we do not cut down our estates and give the 
 peasants new allotments, they will cut us down!" 
 
 Thus the agrarian question assumed first rank among the 
 burning questions of the day. The different proposals for the 
 solution of this question served thenceforth to differentiate 
 the political groups. After some brief period of hesitation, 
 corresponding to the third political phase, the government 
 sided with the land-owners, while the opposition took decidedly 
 the side of the peasants. Under such circumstances, the Con- 
 stitutional Democratic party was founded, which had to play the 
 Teading role in the constitutional phase of the movement. This 
 party was composed of the more advan ced elements among the 
 RuUnluu gculiy ana of^the more moderate elements ~smong_ the 
 members of thelearned professi^nsr~TEe~chreFaim^of the party '/ 
 was~~To reconcile the idealistic aspirations of the movement 
 with the practicability of the issued, and thus to inaugurate in 
 Russia a regime of political freedom. The elements of the new 
 party already existed in the previous political organizations; 
 and this is why only a few weeks after its constituent congress, 
 held in the very turmoil of the October strike, the party counted 
 already more than one hundred thousand members. A few com- 
 parisons will make clear the political position of the Constitu- 
 
 vX
 
 itonnl DtinorriuU' i>:irty In the midst of tlio cxtn-ines of tli' 
 movomont: 
 
 1. The rovolutlonnry movrniont nlmod nt a conimonwnnli 
 wlitlo the rracdonarlos wnnttd to ro-ostnblish antoi racy. '1 - 
 Constitutional Democratic party docidod to HkIU for a parli 
 u'.oniary rule under a constitutional monarch. 
 
 :'. The revolutionists wished to have a charter worked out i 
 a constitutional convention and sanctioned by a victorious n 
 lution. The reactionaries did not want any charter at all, 
 at the worst, a consultative rei)resentatlon granted by the Tt^:i. 
 Our i>arty proposed a charter worked out by the first repii 
 sentatlve assembly, subject to the ajiproval of the Tsar. 
 
 3. As to agrarian reform, the revolutionists defended f 
 principle, "The whole land lo the whole people," the land to 
 apjiropriated by the people themselves, acting through tli 
 delegates in local committees, which w'ere to be elected on ( 
 basis of universal suffrage. The government would pen 
 nothing except a regular sale of land through the medi 
 of the existing Peasant Bank, and at the open market prii 
 Our party proposed a systematic extension of the eraancipati' :; 
 reform of ISGl, by dealing out additional allotments to th- 
 communes from the free (crown) lands, and from the lars' r 
 private estates, to be expropriated by means of a compulsory 
 sale at a fair price. The price was to be settled by special coin- 
 niittees formed of private land-owners and rGprcsentative? 
 the peasant communes in equal numbers. 
 
 This was a very radical program, but to our view it cor 
 spouded thoroughly with the necessities of the moment and t' 
 peculiarities of Russian conditions. Of course we did not 1 
 lieve that the government would accept this program willing' 
 and voluntarily. But one must always remember that this v 
 the moment when the government, in spite of its Decemb r 
 victory, was quite cov.ed by apprehension at the coming agrarifm 
 troubles. And they knew but too well that even for the Ca 
 program, the peasants were yet to be won. 
 
 However, at the same time the government still cherished the ' 
 hope of being able to palliate discontent and disorder by soni^ 
 demagogic means. Owing to the state of public opinion in i 
 country Itself and abroad, considering the necessity of a fort in 
 loan, being conscious of its own v/eakness after the defeat in 
 the war with Japan, the government did not think of forsaking 
 entirely the principles of national representation. But it ex-
 
 pected to organize in the first Duma a subservient ministerial 
 party, formed chiefly of peasants, to whom the electoral law 
 secured a very large representation. And thus the government 
 decided to prepai'e for the electoral campaign. It even enlarged 
 the franchise by the additional law of December 24, 1905, as a 
 concession to general demands for universal suffrage. The revolu- 
 tionary elements, on their side, learned nothing. They continued 
 attacking the bourgeoisie furiously as being alone responsible for 
 their December defeat. They tried to discredit and denounce in 
 advance the coming Duma as an assembly of landlords and 
 officials, and in their blindness they proposed to the masses to 
 boycott the impending elections. The Constitutional Democratic 
 party was then the only party in opposition which did its best 
 to win public opinion to the idea of a struggle by parliamentary 
 means. Great was the disappointment of the government and 
 the astonishment of the revolutionists when the electoral returns 
 gave a prevailing part to the Constitutional Democrats in the 
 first Russian Duma. 
 
 The government then hastily took measures of precaution 
 against the "revolutionary" assembly. A foreign loan of two and 
 a quarter milliards of francs set the government free from 
 immediate dependence on the national representatives. A series 
 of "temporary" laws were hurriedly published in order to bring 
 into legal limits the "civil liberties" promised by the Manifesto. 
 And last but not least, this period of what was called in Russia, 
 "quick-fire gun" legislation, was crowned with a most important 
 declaration. A few days before the opening of the session, a sort 
 of charter or "fundamental law" was published which put as 
 narrow limits as possible to the legislative powers of the Duma. 
 These laws were not to be changed except by the initiative of the 
 Tsar. And yet even though thus muzzled, the national represen- 
 tatives held the government in a state of constant fear and be- 
 v/ilderment, or else of malicious expectation. The ministry re- 
 mained inactive and the Chamber was left to itself, particularly 
 after it answered the ministerial declaration by a vote of dissent. 
 The government was compelled to decide between a dissolution 
 and a ministerial change. A dissolution was then still considered 
 as fraught with every sort of danger. That is why, in its extreme 
 embarrassment, the government thought for an instant of regular 
 co-operation with the majority in the Duma. One of the high 
 dignitaries who was intrusted with the preliminary negotiations, 
 
 13 
 
 y
 
 told me openly what their motives were in proposlnK to call 
 a Cadet ministry to power. "When a house is on fire," this gen- 
 tleman said, "one is obliged to choose between leaping from the 
 fifth story at the risk of a broken leg, and the peril of being 
 burned alive." 
 
 I am intlined lo think that this argument did not appear to 
 the Tsar conclusive. The following considerations may likewise 
 have determined the government to try a dissolution instead of 
 "a leap from the fifth story": in the first place, the Cadets (or 
 Constitutional Democrats), whom the government regarded for 
 a while as leaders of the whole movement, proved unable to con- 
 trol the revolution, and even in the Duma did not always com- 
 mand a majority. There was another important group in the 
 Duma, the so-called Group of^.Toil, which became very popular 
 among the peasants, owing to its revolutionary program of land- 
 nationalization. The activity of this Group in the Duma and 
 outside it, re-kindled revolutionary hopes for the attainment of 
 power. The revolutionists now completely changed their minds 
 as to the part to be played by the Duma in the Russian revolu- 
 tion. After having discredited the Duma as bourgeois and 
 quite powerless, they now wanted it to take possession of the 
 executive power. The Cadets found themselves in an exceedingly 
 Qifficult position. On the one hand, they had to fight for a 
 responsible ministry in order to establish a normal Influence on 
 the part of the Duma over the executive power. On the other 
 hand, they had to hold in check every attempt to appropriate the 
 executive functions by the Duma itself. Of course this was 
 enough to paralyze any great measure of exertion. But the chief 
 reasons for the government to abstain from any co-operation 
 with the Cadets was the agrarian program, which frightened 
 the nobility. Here again the Cadets had to debate between the 
 government, which did not wish to decide for the principle of 
 compulsory sale, and the extremists, who proposed the pure 
 spoliation of landlords, to the groat satisfaction of the inexperi- 
 enced masses. Finally the government committed itself to the 
 unconstitutional step of publishing an announcement to the 
 people by which the legislative plans of the Duma were repudi- 
 ated in advance. The Duma tried to reply, insisting on the 
 fundamental principle of compulsory sale and inviting the popu- 
 lation — this latter point being opposed by the Group of Toll — to 
 remain quiet and await patiently the results of the Duma's legis- 
 lation. Upon this attempt to address the population, the Duma 
 
 14
 
 was dissolved and the address was never published. The leading 
 majority replied by the famous Viborg Manifesto, proclaiming >^ 
 the principle of passive resistance. 
 
 The fears of the government ran high at the moment of this 
 declaration. For some few days one dreaded military out- 
 breaks and revolutionary dictators at Tsarkoe Selo. One spoke 
 even of a foreign fleet to appear at the mouth of the Neva. A 
 circular letter of the Premier anticipated serious disorders in the 
 interior. Once more all this only showed that the government 
 itself greatly exaggerated the forces of the organized revolution- 
 ary movement. The few outbreaks that really followed the dis- 
 solution were easily stifled. The government then gradually 
 turned to another extreme, or rather to its habitual mistake. It 
 began again to underrate the amount of political disaffection 
 which had become endemic in the Russian masses. The reac- 
 tionary forces lifted up their heads and the counter-revolutionary 
 phase set in. 
 
 In fact the government never gave up its resistance to the 
 movement, and it never tried to change its usual methods of 
 administration. The liberties granted by the Manifesto were \/ 
 never regularly used. Many of the provinces of Russia (in . 
 1906, three-quarters of them) were administered by excep- 
 tional law, and this gave a legal pretext for not enacting the 
 constitutional liberties. The general evil from which Russia 
 always suffered — arbitrariness in administration and non-ob- 
 servance of law — greatly increased in the state of civil war 
 which practically prevailed in Russia after the Manifesto of 
 October 30. By long practice of arbitrariness, certain habits 
 were formed which made adaptation possible. But after the 
 Manifesto, private considerations of individual officials took the 
 place of an established routine. The country was divided into 
 two hostile camps, between which no compromise was possible. 
 High-handed deeds of petty officials were formally approved and 
 encouraged by their superiors. The feeling of general unsafety 
 increased immensely under these conditions, and this existing 
 misrule became largely responsible for that state of anarchy and 
 ■terror from which Russia now suffers. To quote some striking 
 instances: in the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, one hundred and thirty-four death sentences were pro- 
 nounced In Russia, on the average five sentences a year. In the 
 two years following the Manifesto, the number of criminals sen- 
 tenced to death (almost without exception for political offenses) . 
 
 15
 
 rose lo Uie enormous loiul ot two tliousund. seven hundred and 
 eevculeen, of whom one thousand, seven hundred and eighty 
 were executed. The whole number of persons condemned for 
 political offenses during these two years was eighteen thousand, 
 two hundred and seventy-four, while formerly It had not exceeded 
 one thousand a year, and the number for 190-1 — about four thou 
 sand — was considered as quite exceptional. 
 
 Out of the eighteen thousand, two hundred and seventy-four 
 condemned, one thousand one hundred and fourteen criminals 
 belonged to a class which Is rarely considered as criminal; they 
 were directors of newspapers and periodicals, who tried to make 
 use of the freedom of the press proclaimed by the Manifesto. 
 Nine hundred and thirty-eight newspapers and periodicals were 
 stopped forever In the same period of time. Public meetings — 
 another liberty granted by the Manifesto — are practically per- 
 mitted by the police only during the electoral campaigns and 
 almost exclusively In large cities. The right of forming unions 
 and societies, which makes the third liberty of the Manifesto, 
 can be of service only for such organizations as enjoy the pro- 
 tection of the government. Registration Is regularly refused to 
 organizations which are suspected of opposition, on most futile 
 pretexts. Not satisfied with the prosecution of such associations, 
 the government recently began a systematic prosecution of the 
 duly registered and legally existing professional unions. In 
 short, any one who would tell you that Russia really enjoys the 
 civil liberties granted by the Manifesto, would state a lie. The 
 truth is that only those liberties were and are permitted which 
 the government was and Is powerless to forbid; and such liberties 
 are often used without any legal restraint, while a regular and 
 law-abiding practice of civil liberties is nearly always refused 
 legal permission. 
 
 Thus, under the new r<;gime of national representation, the 
 executive power tried to remain what it had always been before, 
 and never thought of changing its former methods of adminis- 
 tration. And as long as the present misrule lasts, it is almost 
 Impossible for the legislative power to do its proper work. 
 
 The first Duma was forced to spend much of its time in useless 
 exertion to stop this evil in the only legal way by interpellations 
 on the subject of all the numberless mischiefs done by the Home 
 Office. About three hundred and eighty Interpellations were pre- 
 sented by the members during the hundred days of the existence 
 of the first Duma. The reply of the ministers was always the 
 
 i6
 
 same: everything is being done according to the existing law. 
 Very soon it became clear that unless the ministers were made 
 really responsible to the national representative assembly, and 
 unless the system of administration by exceptional laws was 
 abolished, no redress of administrative abuses was possible for 
 the Duma. That is why the second Duma made a very moderate 
 use of its right of interpellation, not because it turned a deaf ear 
 to the sufferings of the people, but because it knew the inefficiency 
 of its defense. 
 
 When we say then, that the government took to the offensive 
 and that a counter-revolutionary phase set in, we certainly 
 mean something new and still stronger than mere enforcing of 
 the old methods of administration, which were never stopped. The 
 new feature is that new means and facilities, given by the regime 
 of political freedom, are being used as a weapon against this 
 very regime. The government, it is true, proclaimed itself above 
 all parties, thus trying to set its autocratic system in opposition 
 to party politics, essential to parliamentary rule. But under the 
 disguise of mors elevated political maxims, it only tried to organ- 
 ize its own political party — that of autocracy. For this purpose 
 the government invited all elements to unite which were likely 
 to defend the "old, holy Russia," orthodox and autocratic. 
 
 A more fatal blow to the very idea of that "old, holy Russia" 
 could hardly have been struck, than by trying this truly crucial 
 experiment. Only two years ago, were not the high ideals of 
 a "little Father" of Russia, a holy Synod, a credulous, bigoted, 
 ignorant Russian peasant, supporting the edifice of the Omnipo- 
 tent Bureaucracy — was not all this rubbish given out for the 
 benefit of foreign readers, as the actual "truth about Russia"? 
 And in Russia herself, who could pretend to know the real num- 
 ber of "Old Believers," ready to support the ancient political 
 system? Now, the partisans of autocracy are counted by the 
 interested party itself, for the benefit of the whole civilized 
 world, and everybody can judge for himself who they are and 
 how many. 
 
 The illusion of an omnipotent bureaucracy dwindles at once 
 to something insignificant. Red tape, by its very nature, can 
 rarely come to real power. It may form powerful machinery, 
 but if not greased and directed from outside, the machinery 
 remains inactive. In its professional quality, bureaucracy neces- 
 sarily possesses a certain standard of intelligence, and, in spite 
 of all its routine, it is not necessarily averse to all reform. When 
 
 17
 
 burpnucrncy is left to Itself, in the periods of stagnation It uses 
 Its intelllKrnce for self-criticism and becomes slicjttical and 
 cyniral. Many writers on Russia were astonished to find those 
 peculiar features under the oflleial surface of the Russian civil 
 service. Russian bureaucracy — at least In its higher stages and 
 to a certain extent — has grown liberal for the obvious reason 
 that nobody knew better than it did, all the drawbacks of official 
 prosperity. 
 
 I trust that you will not take these remarks for a defense of 
 bureaucracy as a system of government. Bureaucracy is but an 
 engine which no modern state can do without. But the force 
 and the spirit must be brought to this engine from outside. All 
 I want to impress on you is that the responsibility for the spirit 
 now pervading Russian bureaucracy must be laid at another door. 
 /The real moving forces of the present counter-revolutionary 
 ^ phase are the court and the nobility. The attempts they are 
 now making for a new organization of self-defense have but little 
 In common with the regular work done by the bureaucratic 
 machine. As I have just said, they turn for a new experiment 
 to the building of political parties and to interfering with politi- 
 cal elections. These are new means through whicli they try to 
 perpetuate, under the new order of things, their former predoml- 
 
 /ance. 
 We can trace back the origin of reactionary organizations to 
 me very beginnings of political liberty in Russia. Some of you 
 may still remember a very expressive comparison used by Mr. 
 Stead, between what he called a "beautiful picture" drawn by his 
 Imperial Majesty in his October Manifesto, and the same Mani- 
 festo blackened on the very next day by the brutal "brush" of 
 General Trepofl. General Trepofl, in his quality of chief of the 
 Russian police, suffered the so-called "patriotic" disorders and 
 pogroms to take place in numerous towns in Russia, where they 
 were organized, with the evident connivance of the local authori- 
 ties, as counter-demonstrations against the Tsar's Manifesto. 
 Mr. Stead's mistake was only in thinking of General Trepoff's 
 "brush" as something incidental to the "beautiful picture." A 
 movement which, within a week's time, carried with it three 
 thousand victims killed outright, and ten thousand wounded and 
 maimed, evidently testifies to a certain organization behind the 
 scenes. Certain secret societies, organized by reactionary leaders 
 and well-known to the police, have existed since the spring of 
 1905. Their avowed aim has been to defend autocracy in the
 
 name of "patriotism." The elements of which local groups were 
 formed belonged to the most abject and ignorant part of the 
 mob in towns and cities, but the leading inspiration came from 
 persons connected with the Court, and several members of the 
 movement were known to belong to the Court. Favored by such 
 patronage, some few active propagandists succeeded in uniting 
 local reactionary groups into one "Union." The central organi- 
 zation took the presumptuous name of the "Russian People," 
 or, to distinguish themselves from the "depraved" part of Russia, 
 the "True-Russians." The fundamental conception was that the 
 Russian revolution was forged by Jews and foreigners, while 
 no genuine Russian would sympathize with it. All "True- 
 Russians" were invited to join the only party of the Russian 
 people — which was in itself a negation of party politics and 
 an adequate embodiment of the "True-Russian" idea of a state 
 in which all powers belong to the sovereign, while nothing but 
 "opinion" can belong to the people. This was, of course, only 
 the theoretical side, so to say, the sign-board, of the move- 
 ment. The practical side of it can be fully illustrated by the 
 reign of terror inaugurated by the "True-Russian" mob in 
 Odessa and in some other Russian cities, with the obliging 
 support of local administration. 
 
 Thus supported and protected, the "Union of the Russian 
 People" soon grew over the head of the ministry itself. They 
 openly organized their "fighting rings," to which fire-arms were 
 officially distributed. They called upon local authorities for help 
 and complained loudly against such as did not comply with 
 their demands. On the question of political reliability and patriot- 
 ism, they challenged ministers and Holy Synod; and they even 
 reproached the German Kaiser on the ground that he had showed 
 a friendly disposition toward Count Witte, "whom the whole of 
 Russia unanimously considers responsible for all the calamities 
 which befell our country, and who is the chief originator of ter- 
 rorism and a special protector of the Jews." The most astonish- 
 ing circumstance was that the Kaiser found it necessary immedi- 
 ately to exculpate himself, declaring that he "never displayed 
 such a disposition toward Mr. Witte as was imputed to him." 
 
 Of course very exceptional reasons were needed to call forth 
 such an exceptional declaration on the part of the Kaiser. The 
 reason was perhaps that the "True-Russians" pretended to enjoy 
 the special protection of the Tsar. It reads at the head of their 
 statutes that his Majesty on two occasions, December 23, 1905, 
 
 19
 
 and February 16, 1906. personally assured the "Russian People" 
 that his "autocracy remains the same as it had been from ancient 
 Umos." Twice also an allusion was made by tho Tsar to the 
 representatives of the "Union," that "the Sun of Truth would 
 6onie day shine brightly over Russia": "Unite yourselves, ye 
 Russian People, I count upon you." "With your help I hope to 
 succeed in vanquishing the enemies of Russia." 
 
 The last and the most explicit of these statements was ad- 
 dressed to the President of the "Union" a few days after the dis- 
 solution of the second Duma, as an answer to their thanks for 
 the dissolution: "Let the Union of the Russian People serve as a 
 reliable support. I am sure that all true Russians who love their 
 country will unite still closer and. while steadily increasing in 
 number, will help me to attain the peaceful renovation of our 
 holy and great Russia." They say the President of the Cabinet 
 first saw this telegram when it was printed in the official organ 
 of the "True-Russians." He grew furious and made representa- 
 tions to the Tsar, but it was too late; the thing was done. 
 The fault lay, as usual, at the door of a member of the imperial 
 household. What now was the result of all this high patronage 
 and exceptional favor? The elections repeatedly proved to every- 
 body who cared to know it, that if Russia was great, it was not 
 owing to the "True-Russians." They commanded a ludicrously 
 small vote. No one of them was elected to the first Duma. In 
 the traditional capital of "Holy Russia," Moscow, there was only 
 one vote cast for the leader of the party, Mr. Gringmoot, and evil 
 tongues asserted, it was his own! In the second electoral cam- 
 paign, many democratic elements were excluded from the vote 
 and every kind of pressure was used, in order to get a govern- 
 mental majority. Yet as a result, the Duma election was social- 
 istic and Constitutional Democratic. Only sixty-three members 
 out of the whole number of four hundred and sixty-one, called 
 themselves "monarchists," and of these only seven were unswerv- 
 ingly autocratic. Only three voters in every hundred were found 
 to be "True-Russians" In the Russian cities. Then, at the third 
 / election, the electoral law was changed and the "True-Russians" 
 / were repeatedly invited to "unite" and to "increase their mem- 
 bership, in order to support autocracy." What v/as the new 
 result this time? Out of the five thousand electors for the whole 
 of Russia, only seventy-two belonged to the "Union of the Rus- 
 sian People"! Thirty-four of them were made members of the 
 Duma, and yet they were hardly able to Increase the number of
 
 uncompromising adherents of autocracy to something like sixty, 
 out of four hundred and forty-two. If included with the so-called 
 "monarchists," still they do not form the majority. When, on the 
 occasion of the debates on the address to the Tsar they proposed 
 to insert in the text the title "autocratic," they were largely 
 outvoted even by this Duma, the "Duma of the land-owners." 
 The governmental Duma, refusing to the Tsar the title of "auto- 
 crat," which in a certain sense is still used by him according to 
 the existing law — such is the final result, which proves definitely . , ' 
 that there are no autocratists in Russia except a very small 
 group of people, whose sincerity and integrity are subject to very 
 serious doubts. 
 
 With this conclusion, we come now to the last point that needs 
 elucidation. In a country where so astonishingly few were to be 
 won for autocratic restoration, what are then the elements which 
 stand for political reaction? The middle classes being largely 
 liberal, the capitalists not averse to a constitution, the bureau- 
 cracy rather indifferent but closely watching the game and ready 
 to serve the winner, who then are decidedly on the side of the / 
 government? It is the nobility and the gentry. This class wouldV 
 lose very much from the impending social reform, as much as 
 the autocracy would lose from political reform. In their grave 
 peril, both decaying orders become natural allies. Of course, 
 even here natural interests are very far from being identical. 
 Now and then, autocracy in its struggle for self-preservation, 
 gives up the defense of the nobles' privileges. Thus, half a cen- 
 tury ago, by the great Emancipation Act, it destroyed the very 
 foundations of the social authority of nobility. And there was a 
 moment in the present struggle when autocracy seemed ready 
 to endorse the Constitutional Democratic program of the com- 
 pulsory sale of land, on the ground that this measure, if done 
 at all, should be done by the grace of the Tsar. 
 
 On the other hand, the nobility would easily be won for a 
 constitution, if only the political reform could be carried out 
 without the social one. It was conspirators among the nobility 
 who, a century ago, first demanded a constitutional charter. Had 
 such a charter been conceded then, it certainly would have had a 
 more or less outspoken aristocratic character. But the Russian 
 laobility proved powerless to win a constitution by themselves 
 ilone. And now, after new social elements have come to the 
 'ront, it would be too late, would be impossible, to separate
 
 political from social reform. The new order of things must neces- 
 tvirlly be at once constitutional and democratic. 
 
 According to the differences just stated, the parts played by 
 autocracy and nobility in their alliance were unlike, and it 
 was the nobility that got the better of It. While the exer- 
 tions of the autocracy proved fruitless, the nobility, with 
 much less of ostentation, achieved far more positive results. 
 They likewise started a private organization, under the name 
 of the Council of the United Nobility." But the political 
 activity of this "Council" did not awaken much attention at 
 the beginning, and was even purposely kept half secret. The 
 "Council" did not care for any open propaganda; it preferred to 
 use its connections at court, and with them as Its intermediary, 
 to act directly upon the Tsar. This policy proved successful. 
 The "Council" has played a decisive part in the all-Important 
 events of the last two years. Nearly all the demands of the 
 nobles are satisfied by the Government. It was owing to their 
 Instance that a special kind of court-martial was organized by 
 Mr. Stolypln, after the dissolution of the first Duma. The sec- 
 ond Duma succeeded in abolishing these abominable courts, but 
 they are now reestablished in a new form which has made them 
 independent of the legislative power of the present Duma. The 
 same "Council of United Nobility" urged the Tsar to Introduce 
 a special police service for the defense of the landlords and their 
 estates. This new army of "watchmen" was immediately organ- 
 ized at great expense to the treasury. Of course, agrarian 
 troubles did not make it impossible for the landlords to dwell 
 on their estates. It is common now to hear of country houses 
 transformed into veritable castles, manned with armed forces 
 hired from Caucasian warrior tribes, to protect the noble homes. 
 On some estates searchlights are actually used at night to disclose 
 the invisible foes who come to burn the house or even to blow 
 up its inhabitants. 
 
 Naturally such tension cannot last indefinitely. Therefore the 
 landlords insist upon a thorough change in the whole agrarian 
 policy of the Government. And here again the "Council" has 
 gained a complete triumph. For many years the policy of the 
 Government has consisted in keeping the peasantry quite apart 
 from the other social orders. The "tax-payers" were to be pre- 
 served In a state of absolute separation from the "lords"; and 
 their whole course of life, their standards and habits, their views 
 of property, family, and law, were to be peculiar to themselves.
 
 The results, as we have seen them, proved disastrous to the 
 landlords themselves. So the nobles came to realize that it was a 
 source of continual (Janger to preserve in their near neighbor- 
 hood the isolated existence of agrarian savages. And the "Coun- 
 cil^ of Nobility," not satisfied with endorsing the 'liberal efytor ^ 
 the equalization of peasants with the other social groups, 
 decided to change abruptly the very foundation of their social 
 existence. The primitive agrarian collectivism of the peasant 
 communes was now made responsible for all social and agrarian 
 troubles. The nobles wished this collectivism changed to a 
 rggime of private property. And the Government, in compliance 
 with their wishes, is now starting a new agrarian policy which 
 will doubtless revolutionize the masses more effectively than 
 anything else, because it provokes the social struggle of the rich 
 and the poor in its most venomous form. Of course the attention 
 of the peasants will thus be drawn from the landlords' estates 
 to their own internal disputes. 
 
 But the new policy was intended to take the place of the 
 agrarian program proposed by the opposition. In order to win 
 for it national representation, the entire composition of the 
 Duma was to be changed. This became now the chief object of 
 the reactionary clique. The "Council of Nobility" worked out a 
 scheme which is now in process of being completely executed by 
 the ministry. The Duma was to be dissolved, on the pretext of 
 its "revolutionary" disposition. A new electoral law was then 
 to be published, securing the majority of representation for the 
 land-owners. Then a new Duma was to be summoned on the 
 principle of the new franchise. 
 
 This scheme was quite ready after the dissolution of the first 
 Duma. But Mr. Stolypin was not yet to be won for the abolition 
 of the existing franchise, because it was guaranteed by the 
 "Fundamental Law" and could not be changed without the con- 
 sent of the Duma. It was then decided, as a first step, to change 
 only those parts of the Law which could be altered by means of 
 an "authentic" explanation of the Law by the senate. Measures 
 were also taken to influence the elections, the government being 
 sure of having the upper hand. To the general astonishment, 
 the country sent to the second Duma a representation much 
 more radical than to the first one. About two hundred members 
 belonged to different socialistic groups, some one hundred were 
 Constitutional Democrats, while no more than a hundred took 
 seats on the governmental side. Then the "Union of the Rua- 
 
 23
 
 Hlan People" came to the rescue. They began at once a cam- 
 imlgn against the "rebellious" Duma; anil though now even the 
 extreme parties were much more moderate In their opposition, 
 the government decided to dissolve the second Duma as soon as 
 the electoral law was ready In the Home Office. Even to take 
 precautions was scorned at this time, and no effort was made to 
 preserve even the external show of legality. The Duma was dis- 
 solved upon the demand for the extradition of all socialist 
 democratic members, before it had time to give any answer. 
 Simultaneously with the dissolution, the new electoral law of 
 .lune 20, 1{)()7, was published, and thus the "Fuudameiital Law" 
 was openly violated for the benefit of the nobles. According to 
 t he new fran chise, about thirty thousand large propr ietors 
 re ceived the iTgHl t" '^^^^^ t_l>£jmaj prity of the third Dum a. iPrac- 
 tically no more than nineteen thousand came to the polls, and 
 they chose for the electoral colleges more than half of the elec- 
 tors for the whole of Russia, 2,G18 out of 5,160. The remaining 
 2,542 might belong entirely to the opposition; the majority was 
 in advance assured to the large land-owners. Thus there is no 
 exaggeration in saying that the majority of the present Duma is 
 elected by 19,000 proprietors of the larger landed estates. They 
 control 300 and odd members, while cmly 100 to 150 members rep- 
 resent large democratic masses and belong to the opposition. 
 Sonne of them, as, for Instance, the St. Petersburg delegates, are 
 chosen by a larger vote (20,000 each) than all the three hundred 
 members of the majority. 
 
 The change of the electoral law and the composition of the new- 
 Duma are, of course, the most brilliant achievements of the 
 "United Nobility." The national representation is now at last 
 brought into an artificial harmony with the interests of the 
 ruling classes. But now that this result is accomplished, what can 
 be their reason for objection to the principle of national repre- 
 sentation? Is it not much better to be independent of the good 
 will of the Tsar for protection, while enjoying at the same time a 
 legal share in legislation and in the control of finance? And, on 
 the other hand, why should autocracy insist upon an immediate 
 and formal restoration, as long as it keeps in its pov/er the 
 "obedient" Duma? 
 
 As a result, we now witness a process of mutual accommoda- 
 tion between the autocracy and the landed gentry. The govern- 
 nent consents to withdraw or to postpone the project for a 
 democratic extension of the franchise in local self-government, 
 
 24
 
 and Is now ready to leave this local franchise in the happy pos- 
 session of the same ruling classes which now form the majority 
 of the national representation. It is also ready to start a new 
 agrarian policy, according to the wishes of the land-owners. 
 On the other hand, the nobles do not pretend to dispute in prin- 
 ciple the autocratic rights and privileges. They are quite ready 
 to admit, in theory, that the "historical power" of the Tsar re- 
 mains what it ever was, and that the Tsar preserves his "free- 
 will" in dealing with the "Fundamental Law" of the Empire, as 
 he dealt with it on June 20, 1907, to their great benefit. 
 
 Thus a kind of political equilibrium is certainly attained. The 
 immediate d anger that the national representation is to be abol- 
 ish ed entir ely, is now averted. And this is the consoling feature 
 in*the situation. But is this equilibrium stable? Is the collision 
 of class interests awakened by the revolution, now over, and is 
 a "peaceful renovation" of Russia likely to begin with the third 
 Duma? After all we have said, we cannot answer these questions 
 in a positive waJ^ 
 
 If any conclusion may be drawn from our preceding analysis, 
 it must be this: the struggle for a constitution became a violent 
 class struggle, with all its embitterment and mutual hatred. 
 Great masses arose to the consciousness of the real cause of 
 their social misery, and have learned to know who are their real 
 friends and enemies. If the revolution in Russia has lost some- 
 thing of its external dramatic character, it is not because the 
 movement has been obliterated, but because it now strikes much 
 deeper root in the lower social strata. The r^l and the terVibie' 
 dramatic sense of the events which may still unroll before your 
 eyes, ladies and gentlemen, does not confine itself to the rise 
 and fall of certain "heroes" or great personages, whose fate you 
 maj' follow with interest. And it is not exhausted by some ap- 
 palling statistics of people shot or hanged, houses burned, servants 
 of the Tsar blown up or assassinated, conspiracies discovered and 
 the like. The interest of the struggle lies much deeper. The 
 social composition of the future Russia is now at stake. The 
 fate of centuries to come is now being determined. And this 
 explains why the masses, silent and mute as they may appear, 
 put all their heart, all their hope, into the issue of the present 
 movement, and why the movement cannot end until, in one way 
 or in another, its main problems are settled. 
 
 And what are the forces that try to hold it in check? The 
 alliance of the two decaying political powers for their own self- 
 
 25 
 
 y
 
 defeiiso cannot obstruct the royal, historical road the nation Is 
 following. The childish explanation of the movrment, as In- 
 itiated and fostered by a foreign or antl-Russlan Intrigue, cannot 
 do away with Its deeper causes. And (he foolish Idea that the 
 peasants of our conimiints can bo changed at once Into private 
 proprietors, can only cause new IVrtiunt In our villages, honey- 
 combed with poverty and famine as they are. In short, wherever 
 we turn or look, we only meet with new trouble to come, no- 
 where with any hope for conciliation and social peace. 
 
 That, I am afraid, is not the message you expected from me. 
 I would be much happier myself if I could answer your wish for 
 information with words of good hope and with the glad tidings 
 that quiet and security have returned to Russia. But I am 
 here to tell you the truth. 
 
 What do I want from you in exchange? As soon as I left for 
 America, official newspai)ers in Russia began telling the He that I 
 was coming to this country in order to get money for my party. 
 This, as you know, is their way of discrediting everything and every- 
 body connected with the movement for Freedom in Russia. I need 
 not refute them. But perhaps I did really come here for some kind 
 of help? Anybody acquainted with the large liberality which is 
 practised here for everything that is humanely good, would not 
 be shocked or surprised by the supposition, and why not? Every 
 foreigner who comes to this "Sweet land of Liberty" is supposed 
 to want from her infinitely more than he can offer to her on his 
 part. "Well, then, I agree, ladies and gentlemen, that I really 
 want from you something very precious and of very great 
 moment for my country. I am wooing here for your human sym- 
 pathy; sympathy with all the enormous pain and suffering of the 
 poor and down-trodden in my country; sympathy with every noble 
 exertion which seeks to put an end to all this pain and suffer- 
 ing. And what can I give you back for It? Nothing, ladles and 
 gentlemen, nothing at all except this very feeling of the heart 
 which ennobles everyone who is capable of being affected by It. 
 If I really succeed in arousing in you once more that sympathy 
 for human suffering, well then, you and I shall have reached the 
 level where no difference in habits, in ways of thinking, no 
 varying shades of expression, can prevent us from feeling our- 
 selves an Integral part of a great whole, which never can feel 
 quite happy while one of Its members is suffering anywhere. I 
 appeal to you Ih the name of that great whole, humanity; and In 
 
 36
 
 doing 80, I am quite sure to give you back as much as I receive. 
 At least, for myself, I do not know of anything so apt to elevate 
 one's sentiment and one's Intelligence to higher spheres of exis- 
 tence as that feeling which keeps one In touch with new worlds 
 of humanity. That is why I was happy to cross the ocean in 
 order to address you this evening — an occasion which I shall 
 never forget. 
 
 Questions 
 
 At the close of Professor Milyoukov's address, the meeting 
 was thrown open to questions, all of which were submitted in 
 writing and signed. Professor Milyoukov replied extemporane- 
 ously, as follows: 
 
 Question: To what extent is the public discussion of political 
 questions permitted in Russia? 
 
 Signed, Judge Samuel Greenbaum. 
 
 Milyoukov: Public discussion in Russia is allowed to a very 
 limited extent. The law authorizes public meetings, but the 
 greater part of Russia is now ruled by '"exceptional law," and 
 this exceptional law puts quite out of force even the temporary 
 law which we still have and which permits public discussion. 
 No, practically the only time at which public discussion is per- 
 mitted in Russia is at the moment of elections; and the only 
 places where public discussion is practised even then is in the 
 large cities — indeed, almost exclusively in the two capitals, Mos- 
 cow and St. Petersburg. As far as the provincial towns are con- 
 cerned, the government does its best to forbid public meetings. 
 So I may say that the possibility of public discussion in Russia 
 is very limited. 
 
 Question: Are the Russian peasants fit to solve the present 
 political problems of their country? 
 
 Signed, Nathan Eseb and two others. 
 
 Milyoukov: That is a difHcult question to answer. But I 
 must tell you that if my answer seems indefinite and not entirely 
 satisfactory, it is not for the reason suggested by my friend In 
 the first question. Two years ago I was in America, and to 
 speak freely was far more dangerous for me then than It Is now. 
 
 27
 
 I dun't think that 1 could possibly withhold my free opinion on 
 any subject. (Applause.) So. If my answer to this or that 
 question is unsatisfactory, you must seek for some other explana- 
 tion than Is suggested in the first qut-stlon. 
 
 This second question Is difficult to answer because it Is formu- 
 lated in such general terms. "Are the Russian peasants fit to 
 solve the present political questions of their country?" The 
 Russian peasants are much more interested in their agrarian 
 questions than In any political question in RusFia, and yet pre- 
 cisely for this reason it is possible that in an indirect way it is 
 the peasants who help most toward solviug the political issues 
 or problems. You must recognize that the workingman in Rus- 
 sia has always been perfectly powerless to get things done, or to 
 command the results which an agrarian trouble or outbreak has 
 always brought with it. So, as a matter of fact, in a rather 
 spontaneous way the peasants are the most important moving 
 force in Russia, but certainly the peasants by themselves are not 
 able to solve the political problems of Russia. 
 
 Question: What does Professor Milyoukov think about the 
 Jewish question in Russia? What will the Third Duma do in 
 that matter? 
 
 Signed, S. Lubarsky. 
 
 Milyoukov: Another question has been handed in, to the 
 same effect: "What is the prospect of equal political rights for 
 the Jews in Russia?" My party, the Constitutional Democrats, 
 act with the Jews. They steadily supported us in the elections 
 for the first two Dumas, and we are the only party that prac- 
 tically introduced the question in the shape of an appeal for 
 equal rights for the Jews. Just as soon as we had gained the 
 majority, we would certainly have carried this point and have 
 brought the Jewish question to an issue, but you will see from 
 what I have said to-night about the present Duma, about its 
 present party composition and its character as representing class 
 interest, that there is no possibility of this Duma's solving the 
 Jewish question. I will say even more: If anything is done 
 about the Jewish question in the present Duma, it will be done 
 by people whose desire is to change the position of the Russian 
 Jew for the w^orse, and not for the better; and perhaps the best 
 interest of the Jew^s demands that the question be not approached 
 in the present Duma. It must be approached, attacked and 
 
 28
 
 settled, but in another way. Certainly, as to our party, we are 
 with the Jews, and we will continue to be with them. The only 
 true representatives of the Jewish people in Russia are the rep- 
 resentatives of our party. (Applause.) 
 
 Question: What was the direct cause of the great massacres 
 of the Jews in Russia? 
 
 Signed, Alexander Ular. 
 
 Milyoukov: This takes us back to the events of some forty 
 years ago. I think the Jewish massacres were first brought into 
 use as political means, or a political weapon, by Plehve. I believe 
 that the idea of Mr. Plehve was to disseminate the view of the 
 Russian revolution which I have just quoted in ray remarks, 
 namely, that the revolution was brought about by Jews and 
 foreigners. According to this view the Jews were to be blamed, 
 and the Jews must be stifled in order that the revolution might 
 be stopped; and this feeling obtains until the present day. So, 
 I think, the same Mr. Plehve, when he returned to power twenty 
 years after beginning this propaganda, took it up again and 
 tried the massacre of the Jews. The practice of the central gov- 
 ernment is quite evident in this matter, and I must answer the 
 question by repeating what I have already said — such a political 
 system and such political expedients bring as a necessary result 
 the division of Russia into two hostile camps. 
 
 Question: Who framed the Viborg Resolution, and is it true 
 that the Constitutional Democratic party afterward repudiated 
 this resolution? 
 
 Signed, John Colliee. 
 
 Milyoukov: In reply I shall state rather my personal view 
 than the views of my party. The manifesto was framed by us. 
 At the moment when the Viborg resolution was framed and 
 signed, the First Duma, as I have already mentioned, had been 
 dissolved. We considered, and I think it was a fact, that the 
 Duma had been dissolved violently and without the observance 
 of existing legal forms. Such a dissolution was not in accord 
 with the constitutional principle. 
 
 Well, what was the possible reply to such an act? The extreme 
 party planned an insurrection — an uprising of the army and the 
 fleet. We knew but too well that such an uprising would bring 
 
 29
 
 only a further Increase of reacliouary measures, and the sacri- 
 fice of the lives of soldiers and sailors. So my party decided 
 not to reply In that way to the Illegal violence of the govern- 
 ment, and we employed the only means remaining — a means 
 whii-h in Anglo-Saxon countries has been considered constitu- 
 tional, as an extreme measuie which a constitutional group may 
 take when it is attacked. We proi>osed passive resistance; and 
 the extremists endorsed our proposition because they recognized 
 that at that moment they were too weak to answer the govern- 
 ment in any other way. Both of us felt that this was the best 
 way to preserve our unity in the face of reaction. Then the 
 extremists tried other methods, in which we did not unite with 
 them; they tried outbreaks in various towns. Our view proved 
 correct, and the outbreaks were easily put down. Thereupon 
 the government, very much frightened, began its counter-revolu- 
 tionary movements, which I have described. 
 
 Xow, for the second part of the question. At the moment 
 when we framed the resolution we likewise put it forward, and 
 ir was signed by a majority of the First Duma. At the begin- 
 ning of the passive resistance movement, which was inaugu- 
 rated by the resolution, we laid down one condition, namely, 
 that the passive resistance must be the resistance of a collective 
 unity, and not an Individual resistance; for individual resist- 
 ance could have brought no result. And in order to be a col- 
 lective movement it was necessary first to prepare for the move- 
 ment, and then to start it in the whole of Russia. So in the 
 spring the Viborg Manifesto was signed by our party, and we 
 used the two or three summer months to prepare for the move- 
 ment of passive resistance throughout Russia and to determine 
 whether there was any chance of victory. 
 
 Well, the members of our party took an active part in the 
 preparation for the movement. Then we met in congress again, 
 discussed the situation once more, and decided that it was impos- 
 sible to start actively a movement of passive resistance, and 
 that we must renounce the bringing into execution of the Viborg 
 Manifesto until the time was more ripe. We must first prepare 
 the population. Therefore we renounced the bringing into action 
 of this principle, which as a principle we acknowledged always, 
 and do still acknowledge as a principle necessary for constitu- 
 tional government. 
 
 30
 
 Question: Will the Professor tell us why the present Duma 
 does not think it necessary to prevent the prosecution of the 
 members of the former Duma by the government? 
 Signed, L. Taylor. 
 
 MUyoukov : Well, you know the situation of the Third Duma, 
 so I have only to repeat what I have already said. Besides, 
 under any circumstances the Duma could not do what you sug- 
 gest. No, I think that from its oion point of view the govern- 
 ment was right from the beginning. The only manner in which 
 the issue could possibly have been pushed through, was a trial, 
 where we could openly proclaim our defense, as the members of 
 our party, the members of the First Duma, did in fact. That is 
 to say, they denied to the Russian tribunal the unconditioned 
 right to judge them, and they offered arguments, which I have 
 already brought to your attention. So my answer is, that from 
 the point of view of our party, interference by the Duma was 
 liable to block any trial in court at all, and therefore we did 
 not interfere. Even had my party been in the majority we 
 should not have interfered. 
 
 Question: Does the Professor really think that freedom in 
 Russia can be secured by peaceful means? The constitutional 
 members of the First Duma believed in the same means, and / 
 they are in prison now. No, I believe that force can only be ' 
 overpowered by force, and those who believe that freedom in 
 Russia can be brought about by making speeches are bitterly 
 mistaken. 
 
 Signed, Kbause. 
 
 MUyoukov : I think I have already answered that question in 
 my present address, and anyone who will read it when it is 
 printed, will find my answer in more substantial form than I 
 have been able to give it in words to-night. The substance of 
 my answer is, that it is quite true that force can only be over- 
 come by force. (Applause.) Only, I do not endorse that policy 
 which takes for force what is really lack of force, and brings 
 about, instead of victory, only a mere appearance of results. 
 (Applause.) 
 
 Question: What are the possibilities of Russia's ever becoming 
 a republic? 
 
 Signed, Alexander Ulab. 
 
 31
 
 Milyoukov: Well, I am not a prophet, and I will not undertake 
 to speak for the future times. Very likely the antl-dynastic feel- 
 ing, which is great in Russia, will grow, if the mistakes of the 
 Rovernnient are to be indtlinitcly repeated. I do not know what 
 will be the upshot, whether a new dynasty, or what. I do not 
 know. I must state that this possibility Is out of the reach of 
 practical politics at the present day. It is quite out of the ques- 
 tion now to think of introducing a commonwealth into Russia. 
 1 think myself that the greatest success we could achieve would 
 be the bringing about of a constitutional and representative re- 
 gime, but all these things have been too difilcult for accomplish- 
 ment at once. Of course we do not despair; along such lines we 
 shall go until we reach the goal. (Applause.) 
 
 Bishop Pottek: 
 
 Ladies and gentlemen: We thank Professor Jlilyouliov for 
 his coming, and for the scholarly presentation of facts which 
 he has given us to-night. I think it would be a gracious thing, 
 before he leaves this hall, to give him a vote of thanks. So on 
 behalf of The Civic Fohu.m and of this large, repi'esentative. and 
 deeply interested audience, I beg to express to the Professor the 
 appreciation which we feel for his magnificent address, and for 
 his statesman-like presentation of facts which we have all of us 
 longed to know, and before this evening could not know. 
 
 (The vote of thanks was unanimously carried.) 
 Adjournment. 
 
 32
 
 CIVIC FORUM ADDRESSES 
 
 WITH PORTRAITS 
 Volume I. 
 
 Season of 1907-1908 
 
 No. 1. PUBLIC OFFICE, 
 
 The Idea of Public Office 
 
 Hon. Charles E. Hughes, 
 
 Governor of the State of New York 
 Public Office in Relation to Public Opinion 
 Hon. David J. Brewer, 
 
 Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
 No. 2. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN GRAFT AND 
 DEMOCRACY, 
 
 Hon. William H. Langdon, 
 
 District Attorney for the City and County of San Francisco 
 
 The Vermin in the Dark 
 
 Poem by Edwin Markham, 
 
 Author of " The Man with the Hoe." etc. 
 
 No. 3. CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR RUSSIA, 
 Professor Paul Milyoukov, 
 
 Member of the Third Duma for St. Petersburg 
 
 No. 4. THOU SHALT NOT STEAL, 
 
 Hon. William Jennings Bryan, 
 
 Lincoln, Nebraska 
 
 No. 5. THE ERA OF CONSCIENCE, 
 Hon. Joseph W. Folk, 
 
 Governor of the State of Missouri 
 
 No. 6 PRACTICAL COMMUNISM— WORK AND BREAD. 
 Frederik Van Eeden, 
 
 A Working Sociologist and the foremost Poet and Author of 
 Holland. 
 
 The remaining four Addresses of this season will be issued in March 
 and April, 
 
 Price, lo cents each, postpaid 
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 PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL GOOD-WILL 
 
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 Sfcretar>' of War 
 
 Hon. Oscar S. Straus, 
 
 Secretary of Commerce and Labor 
 
 Rev Edward Everett Hale, D. D. , 
 
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 Right Rev. Henry C. Potter, D.D. , 
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 President Samuel Gompers, 
 American Federation of Labor 
 
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 United Mine Workers of America 
 
 BOARD 
 
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 PRESIDENTS 
 
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 Hon. William Jennings Bryan, 
 
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