STOREY 
 
 RECOGNITION 
 OF PANAMA 
 
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 University of California Berkeley 
 
THE RECOGNITION of PANAMA 
 
 DELIVERED AT MASSACHUSETTS REFORM CLUB 
 
 5, 190) 
 
 MOORFIEL1) STOREY 
 
 53- 
 
 BOSTON 
 Gio. H. FLU* Co. pMxrtRs, s-i CO*CRC*S Srttrr 
 
S 
 
 Gift 
 
 WraW.A. Croffut 
 24 '0 
 
THE RECOGNITION OF PANAMA. 
 
 In order to discuss intelligently the action of the ad- 
 ministration toward the Republic of Colombia, it is necessary 
 first to know the facts, and I will endeavor to state these 
 briefly. 
 
 The treaty of 1846 between the United States and New 
 Granada, in the words of Secretary Hay, " is not dependent 
 for hs efficacy on the personnel of the signers or the name of 
 the territory it affects," but " is a covenant, as the lawyers 
 say, that runs with the land." That is, it binds both the 
 United States and the Republic of Colombia, which has 
 succeeded to the rights and obligations of New Granada. 
 
 This treaty contained the following reciprocal agreements : 
 
 "The government of New Granada guarantees to the 
 government of the United States that the right of way or 
 transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of 
 communication that now exist, or that may hereafter be 
 constructed, shall be open and free to the government and 
 citizens of the United States," and "as an especial com- 
 pensation for the said advantages and for the favors they have 
 acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of this treaty 
 .the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to 
 New Granada by the present stipulation the perfect neutrality 
 of the before-mentioned isthmus with the view that the 
 transit from one sea to the other may not be interrupted or 
 embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists, and 
 in consequence the United States also guarantee in the same 
 manner the rights of sovereignty and property which New 
 Granada has and possesses oi-er tfie said territory. 9 * 
 
 Construing the language fairly, New Granada warrants to 
 the United States that travel across the isthmus shall not be 
 interrupted and the United States warrants to New Granada 
 
her rights of sovereignty and property over the isthmus. 
 The agreement of New Granada bound her to prevent any 
 interference by her citizens with travel across the isthmus, 
 and the agreement of the United States bound her to defend 
 the sovereignty of New Granada. If cither party failed to 
 keep its engagement, a claim for damages would arise in favor 
 of the other; and this was the clear understanding of the 
 parties, as is shown by this provision of the treaty. 
 
 "If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in this 
 treaty should be violated or infringed in any way whatever, it 
 is expressly stipulated that neither of the two contracting 
 parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall 
 declare war against the other on complaints of injuries or 
 damages, until the said party considering itself offended shall 
 have laid before the other a statement of such injuries or 
 damages verified by competent proofs, demanding justice and 
 satisfaction, and the same shall have been denied." 
 
 New Granada, in a word, agreed to protect travellers across 
 the isthmus against interference, and to pay damages in case 
 she failed. It was clearly her duty, and therefore her right, to 
 use all force necessary for the purpose. In consideration of 
 this the United States agreed to help New Granada and not 
 to act against her. It is impossible to torture language so as 
 to find in the treaty any right on our part to prevent her 
 keeping order and protecting travel on her own territory, 
 especially in the face of our " positive " and " efficacious " 
 guaranty of her sovereignty. Such language cannot mean, 
 "If any of your subjects revolt and so seem likely to inter- 
 fere with travel, we, the United States, shall have the right 
 to help them and prevent your asserting your sovereign rights 
 against them." 
 
 This construction of the treaty is supported by the lan- 
 guage of the next treaty made in 1857 which was a conven- 
 tion negotiated for the purpose of adjusting claims made by 
 Americans for losses caused by a riot at Panama. 
 
 The first article of. this treaty uses this language: "All 
 claims on the part of ... citizens of the United States upon 
 
the government of New Granada, . . . and especially those for 
 damages which were caused by the riot at Panama on the 1 5th 
 of April, 1856, for which the said government of New 
 Granada acknowledges its liability arising out of its privilege 
 and obligation to preserve peace and order along the transit 
 routed 
 
 This shows where the duty and of course the right to deal 
 with insurrection was then thought to reside by so aggressive 
 an American as Lewis Cass, then Secretary of State. 
 
 On April 30, 1 866, Secretary Seward wrote to our minister 
 at Bogota : " The United States desire nothing else, nothing 
 better, and nothing more in regard to the State of Colombia 
 than the enjoyment on their part of complete and absolute 
 sovereignty and independence. If those great interests shall 
 ever be assailed by any power at home or abroad, the United 
 States will be ready, co-operating with the Government and 
 their ally, to maintain and defend them." 
 
 On October 27, 1873, Secretary Fish said in an official 
 despatch to Mr. Keeler, referring to the provision under 
 discussion : ^ 
 
 " This engagement, however, has never been acknowledged 
 to embrace the duty of protecting the road across it from the 
 violence of local factions. Although such protection was of 
 late efficiently given by the force under the command of 
 Admiral Almy, it appears to have been granted with the con- 
 sent and at the instance of the local authorities. It is, how- 
 ever, regarded as the undoubted duty of the Colombian 
 government to protect the road against attacks from local in- 
 surgents. The discharge of this duty will be insisted upon? 
 
 Secretary Bayard thus stated our position : 
 
 "On several occasions the Government of the United 
 States, at the instance and always unth the assent of Colom- 
 bia, has, in times of civil tumult, sent its armed forces to 
 the Isthmus of Panama to preserve American citizens and 
 property along the transit from injuries which the Govern- 
 ment of Colombia might at the time be unable to prevent. 
 But, in taking such steps, this Government has alivays recog- 
 
nized the sovereignty and obligation of Colombia in the prem- 
 ises % and has never acknowledged, but, on the contrary, has 
 cxfrcssly disclaimed) the duty of protecting the tfansit against 
 domestic disturbance" 
 
 President Cleveland in his annual message of December, 
 1885, sp<>kc thus: 
 
 " Emergencies growing out of civil war in the United 
 States of Colombia demanded of the government at the be- 
 ginning of this Administration the employment of armed force 
 to fulfil its guarantees under the thirty-fifth article of the treaty 
 of 1846, in order to keep the transit open across the Isthmus 
 of Panama. Desirous of exercising only the powers expressly 
 reserved to us by the treaty, and mindful of the rights of 
 Colombia, the forces sent to the isthmus were instructed to 
 confine their action to positively and efficaciously ' preventing 
 the transit and its accessories from being 'interrupted or em- 
 barrassed/ The execution of this delicate and responsible 
 task necessarily involved police control where the local au- 
 thority was temporarily powerless, but ahvays in aid of the 
 sovereignty in Colombia. The prompt and successful fulfil- 
 ment of its duty by this government was highly~appreciat cd 
 by the government of Colombia, and has been followed by 
 expressions of its satisfaction. . . . The restoration of peace on 
 the isthmus by the re-establishment of the constituted govern- 
 ment there being accomplished, the forces of the United 
 States were withdrawn." 
 
 While, therefore, we had once or twice landed troops when 
 there were riots or insurrections on the isthmus, we had done 
 so in aid of the sovereignty of Colombia, sometimes at the 
 request of her authorities, and always with her approval. 
 We had insisted that upon her rested the duty of protecting 
 the transit against attacks from insurgents, and had notified 
 her that. *' the discharge of this duty will be insisted upon." 
 Our interpretation of the treaty and our action under it had 
 been in accordance with the clear language of the treaty. 
 We had helped Colombia to discharge her duty and to assert 
 her sovereignty. We had never interfered nor claimed the 
 right to interfere against her. 
 
There is another diplomatic precedent which should not 
 be forgotten in this connection. I refer to the famous 
 Ostcnd Manifesto. In 1854 Messrs. Buchanan, Mason, and 
 Soule, the ministers of the United States at London, Paris, 
 and Madrid, met at Ostend and issued a joint declaration 
 advising the purchase of Cuba by the United States for 
 $ 1 20,000,000, and proceeding : 
 
 "If Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest and 
 actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should 
 refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question 
 will arise, What ought to be the course of the United States 
 under the circumstances ? " 
 
 They answered their own question by saying, 
 
 " After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far 
 beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, . . . 
 then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in 
 wresting it from Spain, if we have the power." 
 
 This immoral declaration was justly condemned at the 
 time and by none more distinctly than by the Republican 
 party, which in its national platform in 1856 asserted the true 
 doctrine in these words : 
 
 " The highwayman's pica that ' might makes right * embodied 
 in the Ostend circular was in every respect unworthy of 
 American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor 
 upon any. government or people that gave it their sanction." 
 
 We have also a statement of the true American position 
 from President Roosevelt, who in his message to Congress in 
 1902 said: 
 
 44 No independent nation in America need have the slightest 
 fear of aggression from the United States. It behooves each 
 one to maintain order within its own borders and to discharge 
 its just obligations to foreigners. When this is done, be they 
 strong or weak, they have nothing to dread from outside inter- 
 ference." 
 
 Surely there is nothing in these words to indicate that a 
 nation whose sovereignty we had expressly guaranteed was 
 in a less favorable position than other American nations. 
 
8 
 
 These precedents show what we had considered our obliga- 
 tions to Colombia under the treaty of 1846, and how aggres- 
 sion on a weak power was regarded by the Republican party 
 at its birth and by its present official chief, while we may 
 recall the peaceful declaration of Secretary Hay that our con- 
 duct to other nations is regulated by the Monroe Doctrine 
 and the Golden Rule." 
 
 Let us now compare these avowed principles with the 
 recent action of our government. Within the dominions of 
 Colombia lies the half-finished Panama canal, begun under 
 a concession from that government to a French company. 
 This concession in terms provided that the company might 
 transfer it to another company or individuals, but " not to any 
 foreign nation or government." This was a reasonable con- 
 dition, as no nation could afford to admit another nation into 
 its territory as the owner of such a canal without a very dis- 
 tinct understanding as to the respective rights of each. The 
 French company became involved, and finally after much ne- 
 gotiation the United States agreed to buy its rights for $40,- 
 000,000, but in order to go on with the work it was necessary 
 to reach some agreement with Colombia. 
 
 Colombia was enjoying from the trans-isthmian railroad an 
 income of about $600,000, which was an important part of 
 her revenues. Her two cities of Panama and Colon owe 
 their prosperity to the fact that they arc the termini 'of steam* 
 ship lines, where goods and passengers are embarked and dis- 
 embarked for transit from ocean to ocean. \Vhen the canal 
 is built, the}* become way-stations by which steamers will sail, 
 taking from them perhaps some snr*31 supplies, but otherwise 
 contributing little or no business to their citizens. Colombia, 
 therefore, had a right to some compensation for the loss 
 which she would probably sustain from the buflding of the 
 canal, and it was vital to her that the relations between her 
 government as sovereign over the territory, and the United 
 States as the owner of the canal, should be defined clearly 
 and satisfactorily. A great power is a dangerous subject of 
 a weaker nation. 
 
The Hay-Herran treaty was an attempt to reach a satisfac- 
 tory agreement on all these points, but it was rejected by the 
 Colombian legislature, as our Senate rejected the Hay-Paunce- 
 fote treaty and the many other treaties which are buried in 
 that " graveyard of treaties." A conspicuous case was the 
 rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty for the settlement 
 of the " Alabama " claims, which was given but a scant consid- 
 eration because we could not present such large claims under 
 it as we thought should be presented. 
 
 The Colombian Senate acted strictly within its rights, and 
 we have no more right to abuse the citizens of that Republic 
 or their representatives because they did so, than England 
 had to abuse us for endangering the peace between two 
 great nations by rejecting the Johnson-Clarendon treaty, or 
 than any man has to denounce another for refusing to sell 
 his property at the price which the first wishes to pay for it. 
 As a matter of fact, the provisions regulating the jurisdiction 
 of Colombia over the canal were very unsatisfactory. It is 
 from Harpers Weekly that I quote the following : 
 
 "The Hay-Herran treaty was unsatisfactory on these 
 grounds: first, the lease was. not perpetual, but renewable at 
 long intervals ; secondly, the canal zone leased was too nar- 
 row; thirdly, a conflict of jurisdiction within the canal zone 
 seemed inevitable by reason of the complexity of the provi- 
 sions of the convention." 
 
 Is it necessary to assume that the Colombians were 
 actuated only by base motives in refusing to admit their pow- 
 erful and not too careful neighbor into their territory until 
 this complexity was removed? When a supporter of the 
 President's policy thus describes the rejected treaty, it is safe 
 to infer that the Senate of Colombia could give good reasons 
 for refusing to accept it! With any powerful nation we 
 should have begun fresh negotiations; but Colombia was 
 weak, and a different course suggested itself to our rulers. 
 
 Let me state it in the words which President Roosevelt 
 intended to use in his annual message to Congress : 
 
 ** It seems evident that in a matter such as this we should 
 
10 
 
 finally decide which is the best route ; and, if the advantages 
 of this route over any other possible route are sufficiently 
 marked, we should then give notice that we can no longer 
 submit to trifling or insincere dealing op the part of those 
 whom the accident of position has placet! in temporary control 
 of the ground through which the route must pass : that, if 
 they will come to agreement with us in straightforward 
 fashion, we shall, in return, act not only with justice, but with 
 generosity ; and that, if they fail to come to such agreement 
 with us, we must forthwith take the matter into our own 
 hands." 
 
 Can any one point out the difference between this doctrine 
 and that of the Ostend Manifesto ? There our right to seize 
 Cuba, if Spain refused to sell it, was placed upon " the law 
 of self-preservation." The President would have placed our 
 right to take a canal zone on " sufficiently marked advan- 
 tages " of the Panama route over other routes. Spain's prob- 
 able refusal to sell Cuba was attributed to " stubborn pride 
 and a false sense of honor." Colombia's rejection of our offer 
 was to be treated as "trifling or insincere dealing." In both 
 cases we were to take by force what the owner refused to sell 
 at a price fixed by us, which in our own opinion was just and 
 generous. 
 
 While the administration was in this mood, occurred what 
 Mr. Hay calls "the sudden and startling events which have 
 so recently attracted the attention of this country and of the 
 world" 
 
 His account of these events may be quoted from his state- 
 ment to the country made on November 7. The people of 
 Panama, he tells us, "went to work with that talent for 
 prompt and secret organization to which there is no parallel 
 among people of Northern blood. They prepared the ma- 
 chinery *of revolution in advance, and suddenly in a single day 
 without the firing of a shot with the exception of a few 
 shells that were thrown into the city from a Colombian 
 steamer in the harbor of Panama -- they accomplished then- 
 independence. A government, consisting of the leading 
 
II 
 
 citizens of the State, was at once organized and proclaimed to 
 the world. A part of the Colombian forces joined the .revo- 
 lution : the rest returned to Colombia ; and, so far as we arc 
 able to judge, the new republic begins its career with no 
 organized opposition throughout the entire extent of the 
 Isthmus." 
 
 There is no word in all this to indicate that this revolution 
 was not as sudden and startling to him as to the country, or 
 that the success of the revolution was in any way due to the 
 United States. 
 
 He proceeds: "The course of the President in this con- 
 junction was marked out in advance by our principles and 
 precedents. He gave orders that traffic from one side of the 
 Isthmus to the other should be kept unimpeded by either 
 party, and charged our officers in the Isthmus to use their ut- 
 most influence" (and "influence" is a pleasant, peaceful 
 word) "to prevent any attack by one of the contending fac- 
 tions upon the other which would be calculated to cause a 
 disturbance of traffic. When it was reported to him that 
 a government capable of maintaining order had been estab- 
 lished and was working without opposition, he did what was 
 always done under such circumstances. He directed our 
 representative at Panama, as soon as ho was certain that a 
 government cajxible of maintaining the public peace had been 
 established by the consent of the people, that he was to enter 
 into official relations with it. He also directed our minister 
 at Bogota to inform the Colombian Government that we had 
 entered into relations with the new provisional Government of 
 Panama." 
 
 \Ve may note, in passing, that our representative was in- 
 structed to enter into relations with the new government 
 when he became satisfied of certain things ; but the adminis- 
 tration did not wait for his report on this question, and imme- 
 diately informed the government of Colombia that relations 
 had actually been established with the new State. 
 
 Now what were the facts ? 
 
 The insurrection broke out late in the evening of November 3. 
 
12 
 
 ^ 
 
 On June 9 Mr. Hay cabled our minister at Bogota: "11 
 Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its 
 ratification, the friendly understanding between the two coun- 
 tries would be so seriously compromised that action might be 
 taken by the Congress next winter which every friend of 
 Colombia would regret." 
 
 On October 24 the cruiser " Dixie " was ordered to put to 
 sea at once with 400 marines in addition to her regular crew, 
 and it was reported that she was sent to Guantanamo, but in 
 fact she went to Colon. 
 
 On November 2 the Navy Department cabled to the com- 
 mander of the " Nashville " at Colon : 
 
 14 Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption 
 threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad, pre- 
 vent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either 
 government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or 
 other points." 
 
 The same orders were sent to the commanders of the 
 " Boston " and " Dixie," while to Admiral Glass at Acapulco 
 was sent the following : 
 
 " Proceed with all possible despatch to Panama. Telegraph 
 in cipher your departure. Maintain free and uninterrupted 
 transit. If interruption is threatened by armed force, occupy 
 the line. Prevent landing of any armed force, either govern- 
 ment or insurgent, with hostile intent, at any point within fifty 
 miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intent of any armed 
 force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artillery. If the 
 ' Wyoming f would delay 4 Concord ' or * Marblehead/ her dis- 
 position must bo left to your discretion. Government force 
 reported approaching the isthmus in vessels. Prevent their 
 landing, if in your judgment landing would precipitate a 
 conflict." 
 
 These orders were given to a force which had been gathered 
 at and near the isthmus before any insurrection had occurred. 
 
 On the next day, November 3, at 3.40 P.M., the Assistant 
 Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, sent to our consul at Panama 4 
 this despatch : 
 
13 
 
 " Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep department 
 promptly and fully informed." 
 
 At 8.15 on the same day the consul replied: "No upris- 
 ing yet. Reported will be to-night. Situation is critical." 
 
 About an hour and a half later the revolution occurred, and 
 the department was informed of the "sudden and startling 
 event " for which the government had made such complete 
 preparations in advance. 
 
 On the night of November 2, 1903, Captain Hubbard of 
 the " Nashville " reports that he allowed four or five hundred 
 Colombian troops to land at Colon, not feeling justified in pre- 
 venting them as the insurrection had not broken out, though 
 he knew it was imminent, for he telegraphed on November 3 
 to the Navy Department, " It is possible that movement may 
 be made at Panama to-night to declare independence." At 
 8. 20 P.M. on the 3d the landing of these troops was reported 
 to the State Department. At 8.45 P.M. the department replied, 
 "The troops which landed from the 'Carthagena' should not 
 proceed to Panama." An hour later came the first news of 
 tfie insurrection. 
 
 The Colombian generals in-eemmand went to Panama on 
 November 3, and were seized when the revolution began- 
 "Except to a few people" nothing was known of this in 
 Colon till the morning train arrived from Panama on the 4th; 
 but on the 3d Captain Hubbard went ashore, and learned 
 what had happened and that the Colombian generals wanted 
 their troops sent across to Panama. On the 3d Captain 
 Hubbard refused to allow this, and early on the 4th he gave 
 written notice that they could not leave. On the afternoon 
 of the 4th he ordered a force from the Nashville ashore, and 
 took possession of the railroad station, so that the Colombian 
 troops could not move, The Colombian troops withdrew to a 
 hill outside while their colonel sent a messenger to Panama, 
 who was to return on the 5th. Hubbard occupied Colon on 
 the fth, and the Colombian troops were confronted by our 
 marines, and on the afternoon of the 5th, reports Captain 
 Hubbard, their colonel "was finally persuaded to embark 
 . . . and return to ' Carthagena.* ** 
 
* 14 
 
 Now let us compare the language of Secretary Hay: 
 " They prepared the machinery of revolution in advance. . . . 
 They accomplished their independence. ... A part of the 
 Colombian forces joined the revolution : the rest returned to 
 Colombia, " 
 
 The machinery of revolution was on board our gunboats. 
 It was our forces that accomplished the independence of 
 Panama. \Ve cannot doubt for a moment that Dr. Manuel 
 Amador spoke the truth when he said in the Ittdcpendtnt last 
 week, 
 
 " Of course we expected that the United States would not 
 let the Colombian troops attack us." 
 
 Who gave him the right to expect this ? 
 
 What is the government now called " the new republic " ? 
 A self-constituted junta of three men. Who is their repre- 
 sentative in Washington? A French engineer connected 
 with the French Canal Company, appointed by the three. 
 They have no courts, no constitution, no frame of govern- 
 ment, no legislature, no evidence of popular assent. 
 
 " So far as we are able to judge, the new republic," says 
 Secretary Hay, " begins its career with no organized opposi- 
 tion throughout the entire extent of the isthmus." 
 
 Why ? Because the United States withstood the forces of 
 the government, forbade them to fire, and forced them to 
 leave the isthmus. The organized opposition of the Colom- 
 bian government was paralyzed by our superior force. It 
 takes a few days to organize a new opposition. The insur- 
 rection began on the night of the 3d. Secretary Hay's state- 
 ment was issued on the 7th. 
 
 That opposition exists, and the reason why it is not or- 
 ganized may be gathered from the news brought by passengers 
 on the "Alliance" from Colon and telegraphed from New 
 York on December i. 
 
 " It was denied that the prisons were filled with political 
 prisoners, but about 130 persons in all, it was said, were de- 
 ported for showing discontent.** 
 
 A government of three men have already banished one 
 
15 
 
 hundred and thirty for showing discontent, and this arbitrary 
 junta is called a republic. Surely, these men do not feel very 
 secure of their fellow-citizens, or they could afford to neglect 
 a few malcontents. With the forces of the United States 
 behind the junta, their fellow-citizens, cannot resist them if 
 they would. 
 
 On the 5th the United States received from Panama a 
 formal announcement, signed by the three persons calling 
 themselves a junta, that the Republic of Panama was es- 
 tablished. 
 
 On the 6th the new government of Panama is recognized. 
 Thus reads the despatch of that date to our minister at 
 tiogota : 
 
 " The people of Panama, having by an apparently unani- 
 mous movement dissolved their political connection with the 
 Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, and 
 having adopted a government of their own, republican in 
 form/' 
 
 Since when was a self-elected junta of three, supported by 
 foreign bayonets against their lawful rulers, not elected by the 
 people, and with absolute power unfettered by constitutional 
 restraint, a government " republican in form " ? What did 
 our government know as to the sentiments of the people of 
 Panama in less than two days after this junta had seized the 
 power ? 
 
 On the lyth of November the conmissioners from the 
 j[unta sent to negotiate a new treaty reached this country. 
 The treaty was ready for them when they reached Wash- 
 ington; and it was negotiated, signed, and sealed between 
 lunch and dinner. Its first article is as follows: 
 
 "The United States guarantees and agrees to maintain the 
 independence of the Republic of Panama." 
 
 Its second article cedes to the United States a strip of land 
 across the isthmus. 
 
 The treaty is sent to the junta for ratification. The ten 
 million dollars which Colombia rejected is now to be paid to 
 Panama, and on December 2d the junta ratifies the treat}*. 
 
i6 
 
 All this has been done against the protest of Colombia, 
 prevented by the forces of the United States from quelling 
 the revolt at once, and now notified that the United States 
 will resist any attempt by it to assert that sovereignty which 
 the United States by solemn treaty agreed practically and 
 efficaciously " to maintain. 
 
 These facts are undisputed. They appear by official docu- 
 ments. It is not necessary to point out that the revolution 
 was hatched in New York. It is not necessary to inquire 
 whether the revolutionists consulted Mr. Hay in September, 
 informed him that the outbreak was " scheduled to take place 
 on September 23," and were ad vised to postpone it, as is 
 stated in the New York papers. We know that the plan was 
 known to our authorities in advance, that they prepared to 
 aid the revolutionists by force, that they did so, and that to 
 their interposition the success of the revolution is due. 
 
 It is clear that our action is in distinct violation of our 
 solemn treaty. Its language is plain, and the obvious inter- 
 pretation of that language is sustained by our action under 
 previous administrations. 
 
 It is clear that, if there had been no treaty, our action 
 would have been in flagrant violation of international law. 
 Our mere recognition of the new government as and when 
 was made was unjustified. 
 
 To quote three authorities ; John Quincy Adams in dealing 
 with the question of recognizing the South American Re- 
 publics said to President Monroe : " There is a stage in such 
 contests when recognition of independence may be granted 
 without departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is 
 the stage when independence is established as a matter of fact 
 so as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover 
 their dominion utterly desperate/' 
 
 Charles Sumner, in an elaborate speech on the action of 
 England in recognizing the Southern Confederacy as a bel- 
 ligerent, after a careful review of the precedents, said : 
 
 " The conclusion, then, is clear. To justify recognition, h 
 must appear beyond doubt that de facto the contest is 
 
and that df facto the new government is established secure 
 within fixed limits. Thtse are conditions precedent, not to be 
 avoided without open offence to a friendly power, and open 
 violation of that International Law which is the guardian of 
 the world's peace/' 
 
 "Armed recognition is simply recognition by coercion. It 
 is a belligerent act, constituting war, and can be vindicated 
 only as war. . . . But an attempt under guise of recognition to 
 coerce the dismemberment or partition of a country is in its 
 nature offensive beyond ordinary war." 
 
 In his message of April n, 1898, Mr. McKinley, seeking 
 to justify his refusal to recognize the independence of Cuba, 
 said: 
 
 " They arc evidences that the United States, in addition to 
 the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recog- 
 nition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the 
 revolted state shall constitute in fact a body politic, having 
 a government in substance as well as in name, possessed^ the 
 elements of stability/ and forming dc facto, * if left to itself, a 
 state among the nations reasonably capable of discharging the 
 duties of a state '), has imposed for its own governance in deal- 
 ing with cases like these the further condition that recogni- 
 tion of independent statehood is NOT DUE TO A REVOLTED 
 
 DEPENDENCY UNTIL THE DANGER OF ITS BEING SUBJUGATED 
 BY THE PARENT STATE HAS ENTIRELY PASSED AWAY/' 
 
 It is impossible to say that on November 6 the govern- 
 ment of Panama was such a government as Mr. McKinley de- 
 scribed, or that the danger of its being subjugated by Colombia 
 had passed away, when Colombia had hardly learned that an 
 insurrection had occurred. 
 
 Remember our denunciation of England's action during the 
 Civil War. Remember our repeated refusals to recognize 
 Cuba, our long delay in recognizing the South American re- 
 publics, our action toward the Transvaal Republic and the 
 Orange Free State, our denial that the Philippine Republic 
 existed, though it had legislature, courts, schools, and the de- 
 voted support of a whole people, and then tell me where arc 
 
i8 
 
 the precedents which justify the administration's course. It 
 is a gross violation of international law. It is the doctrine of 
 the Ostend Manifesto adopted and put in force by the gov- 
 ernment of the United States. It is war. 
 
 International law has no meaning, if it does not bind the 
 strong nation in its dealings with the weak, if it is obeyed 
 only when it is dangerous to disobey it. That great system of 
 jurisprudence built up by the labors of enlightened statesmen 
 and jurists during centuries rests ujxm principles of eternal 
 justice ; and, if its rules can be set aside from motives of in- 
 terest or ambition whenever a great people or its rulers for 
 the moment desire, there is no international law save " the 
 highwayman's plea that might makes right.' " It should be 
 the highest ambition of our great republic to be a leader 
 among the peoples in'scrupulous regard for the rights of the 
 weak rather than in the reckless exercise of overwhelming 
 .power at their expense. 
 
 But we wan* the canal. That is true, but not at any cost. 
 We want many good things in this world. We should like to 
 see property more equally divided. We should like to see land 
 held by men who would use it 'best for the interests of all 
 rather than by the shiftless and inefficient. We should like 
 to see criminals promptly punished. We should like to sec 
 men who have plundered their neighbors compelled to disgorge 
 their ill-gotten gains. We should like to see corrupt politicians 
 driven from public life. But we do not believe in* securing 
 these good things by lawless violence. We wish ours to be . 
 "a government of laws, and- not of men." We believe in 
 courts, not in irresponsible despotism ; and we refuse to let the 
 most honest reformer redistribute our property or punish our 
 criminals as he thinks best. The crying evil of the time is 
 the tendency of men to make their desires the standard for 
 other men's duties, and to consider their wills backed by their 
 hands a substitute for law. It is not safe to let a strong 
 man decide what is just to the weak. Such a doctrine means 
 anarchy. Justice is the same for individuals and nations, and 
 a great power has no more right to rob a weak one than the 
 prize-fighter has to plunder the minister. 
 
The course of the administration is wrong legally and 
 morally. 
 
 It violates at once the solemn obligations of a treaty and 
 the well-settled rules of international law. It teaches the 
 weaker republics of this hemisphere to distrust and fear us, 
 and to adopt perhaps the Mexican proverb, M There is no such 
 wolf as the shameless Yankee." It tarnishes the fair name 
 of this country among the nations of the world. It estab- 
 lishes a precedent which is sure in the future to embarrass 
 us. It sets an unhappy example of lawlessness to our citi- 
 zens, already too prone to disregard the law at the dictates of 
 passion or interest. Far worse than all these it lowers the 
 moral standard of our whole people, since many just and 
 honest men struggle to apologize for action which their con- 
 sciences disapprove and which, if taken by Germany or Eng- 
 land, they would indignantly condemn, either because they 
 confound their country with the politicians who represent 
 it and believe that patriotism compels them to defend what- 
 ever these politicians do, or because they feel bound to stand 
 by their party, right or wrong, and to put their party above 
 their count ry. 
 
 Hear the voice of a friendly English journal : 
 
 "\Ye regret exceedingly that President Roosevelt has 
 allowed the fair name of his Administration to besmirched by 
 a transaction so utterly at variance with the most elementary 
 principles of public law and international morality. We can- 
 not conceive a more lamentable outrage on the public con- 
 science of the civilized world." (London Graphic?) 
 
 If you prefer American testimony, you may find it in the 
 history of Mr. Rhodes, where, sj>eaking of the Ostend Mani- 
 festo, he said its' sentiments were "abhorrent to justice and at 
 war with the opinion of the civilized world." 
 
 Emerson has well stated the universal law : 
 
 "The end for which man was made was not crime in any 
 form ; and a man cannot steal without incurring the penalties 
 of the thief, though all the legislatures vote that it is virtuous, 
 and though there be a general conspiracy among scholars and 
 
-o 
 
 official persons to hold him up, and to say, ' Nothing is good 
 but stealing/ " 
 
 It would be better for this country, for its teachers and its 
 young scholars, if we had tukcn the isthmus by open force than 
 it is to take it as it has been taken, while pretending that our 
 course is justified by international law and public morals. 
 Robbery is wrong, but it lacks the clement of mean hypocrisy 
 which attends obtaining goods by false pretences. Open 
 robber)* also is recognized as wrong, and is condemned ; but, if 
 crime is concealed by sj>ecious phrases, it g<>es undetected. 
 "The world is still deceived by ornament." 
 
 It is not patriotic to defend such action. The true 
 patriot must desire for his country that "righteousness" 
 which " cxalteth a nation/' May he not jealously guard her 
 honor, and treat as a public enemy him who would tarnish it ? 
 It is by such acts as this that a nation loses its greatest 
 strength, the strength which our country once enjoyed, and 
 which comes from the respect and confidence of our fellow- 
 men. \Ve have the same right and the same duty that the 
 first Republican National Convention exercised and discharged 
 when it declared that the Ostend Manifesto " was in every" 
 respect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring 
 shame and dishonor upon any government or jxx>ple that gave 
 it their sanction." 
 
 I-et us strive to save our country from such shame and dis- 
 honor now by vigorously protesting against the spoliation of 
 Colombia, and let us urge our countrymen to believe that a 
 deserved rqnitation for scrupulously regarding the rights of 
 others a sincere belief in justice is worth more than all 
 the dollars which can be piled upon our broad territory.