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MANUAL OF LOGIC : 
 
 BEING ONE OF TWO SEQUELS TO " GRAMMAR ON ITS 
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PREFACE. 
 
 THIS Manual of Logic is humble in its size, and form 
 of publication; but in its principles it pretends to 
 originality, and in its purpose to interfere with 
 doctrines that have been advocated by some of the 
 profoundest teachers of our kind. I wish, therefore, 
 in this preface, to excuse such presumption as this 
 very statement carries with it, and to soften, as 
 well as I can, the prejudice which I may raise by 
 making it. 
 
 First, then, for my pretensions to originality. I 
 think I have the good fortune to start, in this work, 
 with a few self-evident, or nearly self-evident prin- 
 ciples, which have been overlooked by all who have 
 gone before me in this department of learning. 
 What they are, and how they affect the kind of 
 instruction here proposed, will appear on an exami- 
 nation of the work ; but I may as well indicate them 
 at present, in order that the critical examiner may 
 be prepared to trace their effect in the detail which 
 follows. In the first place, I think it all but self- 
 evident, if not quite so, that every single word com- 
 petently used, is the sign of knowledge, and that, in 
 calling it the sign of an idea, we either mean the 
 same thing, or we have no distinct, definite meaning 
 
 M311157 
 
Vi PREFACE. 
 
 in so using the term idea. Secondly, it appears to 
 me another self-evident truth, that every act of the 
 natural understanding which increases or which 
 develops our knowledge, involves three things, the ' 
 thing newly-known or newly-recognized ; the thing 
 or things in some relation to it, by being aware of 
 which relation, it is newly, or better known ; and 
 the knowledge itself; which knowledge it is the 
 privilege of our species to entertain separately, 
 (apart, abstractly,) so as to be applicable to other 
 things hypothetically, in order, by inquiry, to push 
 our knowledge further. If to others, as to myself, 
 this statement should not convey a self-evident truth, 
 I believe the obstruction to be no other than will be 
 removed by the examples, furnished in various 
 places throughout this work. Thirdly, it appears 
 also self-evident to me, and, with less difficulty than 
 attends the previous statement, will I think, appear 
 evident to others, that words which join to make 
 sense, lose their separate (their more abstract) 
 meaning, in a meaning which they unite to signify ; 
 so that the longest expression which can be formed 
 by words that, in this manner, make sense, are but 
 as one single word, with reference to the sense which 
 is thus attained and signified. 
 
 Such are the principles, few, simple, and self- 
 evident, or very nearly so, which have never- 
 theless been overlooked, or at least, not considered 
 up to their full weight, by those who have formed 
 systems of logic, especially by Aristotle and his 
 followers; by those who, in any past days, have 
 
PREFACE. vii 
 
 speculated on the laws of human thought, and on 
 the origin, the nature, and possible compass of 
 human knowledge. I take these principles with 
 me in the execution of the little work which follows ; 
 with what success must be judged by its contents. 
 
 But while I speak thus confidently of the ground 
 I take, I feel, and am ready to acknowledge, with deep 
 humility, the imperfections that must be discovered 
 in what I have done to build upon it. It is one 
 thing to plan, and another to execute ; and every- 
 one, even from the size of my volume will be ready 
 at once to say, Parturiunt monies, nascitur, &c. 
 
 There is another preconceived objection, which, I 
 cannot help feeling, will stand in my way. I am 
 nobody. I belong to no learned body. I have pre- 
 viously produced nothing that the world has much 
 regarded. May I be permitted, without the charge 
 of unnecessarily speaking of myself, to make such a 
 statement, as, with impartial persons, will, I trust, 
 have some weight against this objection. 
 
 A man can but do what the short space of life 
 allows ; and if his time has not been occupied in 
 pursuits adverse to, and calling him away from 
 some one pursuit in which he takes an interest, he 
 may achieve, in that one pursuit, as much as another ; 
 he may achieve much more than others of far 
 greater natural powers, if he comes after them, and 
 takes up what they have begun, but left unfinished. 
 Such, I believe to be my predicament. Nor do I 
 come forward for the first time, with the fruits of 
 my inquiries. Twenty years ago, I published in 
 
Viii PREFACE. 
 
 theory what I now offer in a practical work ; having 
 had abundant opportunity, in the intervening years, 
 of testing, with pupils of various age, and of every 
 degree of competency, the effect of such instruction 
 as the following pages contain. 
 
 And now, if it be asked what sect or denomination 
 of past teachers in logic and speculative science I 
 adhere to, I answer, to none. I have endeavoured 
 to keep clear of all extremes in opinion : I am not a 
 Sensationalist with the French philosophers ; I am 
 not an Idealist with the German : I give no coun- 
 tenance to Materialism; and I hold not, with 
 Berkeley, that there is nothing outward to the 
 mind. I am not of the Scottish school ; for I see no 
 scientific ground for a Philosophy of the Mind in 
 contradistinction to a Philosophy of Matter, or as a 
 part of the Philosophy of Man, yet fitted to be treated 
 distinctly from Man. I wonder therefore that Mr. 
 MORELL, in his able History of Modern Philosophy, 
 should have placed me among the &00-English 
 Metaphysicians. The following pages will, I think, 
 take me out of that category, and leave me purely 
 English. 
 
 On points transcending Philosophy, I do not 
 declare my creed ; for those are points that lie 
 beyond the limits of such a work as this ; and I 
 think the cause of religion is never served by forcing 
 religious considerations into science of human origin. 
 The structure built from the earth, ought indeed to 
 prove its own truth by meeting and coinciding with 
 truth that comes from the skies; and it must 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 coincide either now or eventually; for He who 
 gives the light from above, also gives the power to 
 raise the edifice from below. It is happy for me 
 that what I happen to have reached, or imagine I 
 have reached, of truth in these pages, does not, in 
 any part, stand in contradiction to the doctrines of 
 the Bible. 
 
 Something remains by way of advertisement to 
 my Readers. I have placed in the Index at the 
 end, some points that I was glad to exclude from the 
 body of the work : for instance, under the word 
 Locke, I have indicated in what manner both Locke 
 and Home Tooke, after beginning well, went com- 
 pletely astray. I conceive myself nevertheless to be 
 a follower of those two men ; and only hope I have 
 escaped the errors of my masters. If I have not 
 been able thus to avoid other controversial points in 
 making up what I intend for a practical work, yet I 
 have so placed the more abstruse matter, that the 
 learner may quite avoid it in pursuing his first 
 Course of instruction. For his guidance, and that 
 of the teacher who may not have time and oppor- 
 tunity to extract a better plan, I have given an 
 Outline for a First Course of Logic in the Appendix. 
 Under Philosophy, Philosophers, in the Index, I have 
 furnished a brief memorial of the changes in specu- 
 lative opinion among the Greeks, and a still slighter 
 intimation of the movement of such opinion into 
 times comparatively modern. Should the reader 
 desire an account to the same purpose, something 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 more extended, and much more elegantly stated, he 
 will find it in the " Philosophy of the Mind," by 
 Mr. J. DOUGLAS of Cavers. If he should wi<h to 
 know, beyond what he can learn from the hints 
 scattered in this Manual, the state of Speculative 
 Philosophy at the present day, he cannot do better 
 than consult Mr. MORELL'S History previously 
 alluded to. And if my meagre allusion, in the 
 Index, to Schoolmen and Scholastic learning, should 
 raise a desire to know more, Mr. HALLAM'S Intro- 
 duction to the Literature of Europe, and Dr. 
 WHEWELL'S two works, the History, and the Philo- 
 sophy, of the Inductive Sciences, will supply all that 
 can be needed. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Outline Theory of Logic, Sect. 1-4 101 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Inductive Logic, Sect. 1 104 
 
 Theory of Inductive Logic, Sect. 2-10 105 
 
 Practical Remarks, based on the foregoing Theory, Sect. 11-17 113 
 
 Recapitulation of Distinctions and Differences, Sect. 18-30 . 117 
 Suggestions for avoiding, during the Inductive Process, the 
 delusions of the Rhetorical Sophist, Sect. 30-36 . .121 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Definition, Sect. 1 129 
 
 Theory of Logical Definition, Sect. 2, 3 . . . .130 
 Practical Distinctions and Directions, grounded on the fore- 
 going Theory, Sect. 4-8 134 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Deductive Logic, Sect. 1 140 
 
 Theory of Deductive Logic, Sect. 2-6 141 
 
 Distinctions and Directions to assist in the practice of Deduc- 
 tive Logic, based on the foregoing Theory, Sect. 7-11 . 145 
 
 Practical Distinctions continued : (i.) Names of Arguments 
 from the Topics whence they are taken, Sect. 12-24 . . 148 
 
 Practical Distinctions continued : (ii.) Names of Arguments 
 from the data on which they rest, Sect. 25-32 . . .160 
 
 Practical Distinctions continued : (iii.) Names of Arguments 
 from the form in which the reasoning is expressed, Sect. 
 33-41 . . 163 
 
 Practical Directions continued : Exercises suggested for Im- 
 provement in Logic, Sect. 42-47 171 
 
xii CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Errors to which Learners are liable in attempts to develop Know- 
 ledge, Sect. 1-5 180 
 
 Errors in detail which come under the general head of Verbiage, 
 
 Sect. 6-14 188 
 
 Errors in detail which come under the general head of Confused 
 
 Reasoning, Sect. 15-17 204 
 
 Errors in detail which come under the general head of Dis- 
 jointed Reasoning, Sect. 18-22 211 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The Syllogism of formal Logic, Sect. 1 217 
 
 Some account of the Syllogism of formal Logic, Sect. 2-6 . 217 
 Recapitulation of the leading Principles in this Manual of Logic, 
 as opposed to the Principles on which (as explained in the 
 foregoing Account,) the Syllogism of formal Logic is based, 
 Sect. 7-11 225 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Outline of an Introductory Course of Instruction in Logic, for pupils 
 not yet competent to enter on the study of the whole Work . 228 
 
 Outlines for Themes 229 
 
 Examination Questions 234 
 
 Key for correcting at pages 203, 204, 206, the Sentences 
 
 logically defective 243 
 
 Alphabetical Index to the Manual of Rhetoric and Manual of 
 Logic, adapted not only for reference, but for occasional 
 further instruction 245 
 
MANUAL OF LOGIC. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 OUTLINE THEORY OF LOGIC. 
 
 1. LOGIC is a branch of learning connected with Grammar 
 and Rhetoric. While Grammar looks only to correctness of 
 construction, or properly putting the parts of speech together 
 so that they shall be accurate forms of language ; and Rhe- 
 toric varies those forms in order to make them expressive of 
 emotion ; Logic looks to the sense which language has to con- 
 vey, clear from any emotion which may, or may not be its 
 effect. The sense of any single word is the knowledge which 
 it signifies ; the sense of two or more words put together, is 
 the development of the knowledge included, or assumed to 
 be included, in each of the separate words, and meeting in 
 the more particular knowledge, which the two or more words 
 unite to express. Thus red denotes the knowledge of what 
 red is, derived from a great many particular things; earth 
 denotes the knowledge of what an earth is, derived in the 
 same way ; while red earth, which is one expression for one 
 meaning, indicates the development of the previous know- 
 ledge in one of the particulars assumed to be already included 
 in the knowledge denoted by each separate word. We may 
 call red and earth the premises of a conclusion which must 
 rationally follow from their union : we may call red earth the 
 conclusion from these premises. 
 
 2. The process of the understanding by which knowledge 
 is accumulated and included under a sign, is called Induction ; 
 the process by which the knowledge so accumulated is spread 
 again before the understanding in words, which being joined 
 together, make evident sense, that is to say, make one ex- 
 pression with one meaning, is called Deduction. 
 
 3. The logical function of a word is one thing ; its gram- 
 matical function, another : logical completeness is one thing ; 
 and grammatical completeness another. Take the four words, 
 
102* .MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. I. 
 
 Every man is mortal, separately, an- 1 each has a separate 
 meaning; each is tin- si;_m of kno\vli-dji-. Tin.- gramnL 
 function is something added to this its logical iunrti >n ; l>ut 
 being added, it has this -JlJ-<-t, that we are required not t 
 in the meaning of the separate parts, but to go on till a whole 
 is formed out of the parts, and to understand that whole as 
 one expression for one meaning. But logical com pi- 
 may, or may not coincide with grammatical completeness. 
 The construction is complete when we say Every man is 
 mortal ; yet we may go on developing our know !<<: 
 of expression grammatically independent of each oth 
 win -n we add to the foregoing expression, Every Jung is a man. 
 These two expressions which are grammatically <1: 
 the same ground of logical connection as the folio \ 
 which are grammatical parts of one construction : A kii 
 every other man ; and, Is mortal. In both instan< 
 pressions signify premises involving a conclusion. In t In- 
 former instance, the conclusion must be expressed, lil 
 premises, in a sentence of independent form ; Therefore, every 
 kimj is mortal. In the other instance, we have but to put the 
 two grammatical parts together, and the same conclusion will 
 be signified ; as, .1 ////// like every other man is mortal. 
 
 4. Every one who learns and uses a language learn s 
 practises logic both iwlurtivrly and deduct iv -ly. A book on 
 logic can do nothing more, and therefore ought to propose 
 nothing more, than to assist this practice by untold 
 theory, in order that the practice may, as far as possible, be 
 free from the mistakes and failures, to which all pran 
 liable, which is unsupported by correspondent theoretical 
 knowledge. 
 
 Note to Chapter I. 
 
 To any one acquainted with the Science of the formal Syllogism, it 
 will at once appear that the art or practice shadowed out in 
 brfof Motions, must be a logic distinct from Ari-t"t]--'>. I - 
 it is the logic of our race, with reference to which fact we may 
 OUR logic, the logic in use that always has been in use by mankind, in- 
 cluding the Aristotelians themselves when not occupied within their 
 Qgpecial domain. With this declaration, we might pass on, and leave the 
 Aristotelians to themselves, if their s.-i.-nce were not asserted to be the 
 theory of our logic, the science of reasoning as it is exercised by all man- 
 
 * The pages, on account of the common Indei, follow those of the 
 Manual of Khetoric. 
 
Sec. 4.] OUTLINE THEORY. 103 
 
 kind through the instrumentality of language. One writer indeed, under- 
 stood, I believe, to be Sir William Hamilton, profound beyond any man 
 of the present day in scholastic learning, appears to repudiate, although 
 himself an advocate of formal logic, any blending of it with other doctrine, 
 censuring, in a very learned Article of the Edinburgh Review (April 1833) 
 . " the attempts lately made to conciliate, to the declining study a broader 
 interest than its own." Dr. Whately, then of Oxford, now the Arch- 
 bishop of Dublin, has eminently succeeded in an attempt thus charac- 
 terized. Of him, the reviewer says that he is " a very shrewd, and (what 
 is rarer in Oxford) a very independent thinker." The effect of Dr. 
 Whately's Oxford education, joined to his shrewdness and independence of 
 mind, has been this, that the logic of Aristotle, rejected by philosophy 
 since she succeeded in throwing off the trammels imposed by the school- 
 men, has, through him, regained a footing in some places,* which, but for 
 him, she had lost for ever, " Oxford," as the reviewer observes, " being 
 the only British seminary where the study of logic-proper" (formal logic) 
 " can be said to have survived." Now as to this logic, we are ready to 
 admit before proceeding further with ours, that it is a science, and it is an 
 art, but a science and an art quite distinct from our logic, re-asserting 
 that ours is the logic in use by mankind : and what we have to say of 
 Dr. Whately's treatise, is, that it owes its popularity not to what it con- 
 tains of Aristotelian logic, but in spite of what it contains, by the excel- 
 lence of the matter which he erroneously arrogates as a part of that logic. 
 Had his volume presented nothing but what pertains to formal logic, we 
 might have left him to whatever arguments can be found in its favour : 
 but in order to bring it back into respect, he far transcends its proper 
 sphere. First alleging, what is not true, that all reasoning whatever has 
 its foundation in the principle of the formal syllogism, he proceeds to dis- 
 course, with admirable intelligence and skill, on the many causes of faulty 
 induction ; the notice of which properly belongs only to such a work as 
 the present, such for instance as the errors imbibed through the instru- 
 mentality of language, the force of prejudice on our thoughts, the crudi- 
 ties engendered by imperfect systems ; which kind of matter we affirm to 
 have no proper place within the limits of formal logic. How true an ob- 
 servation is the following ! "A fallacy which, stated barely, would not 
 deceive even a child, may deceive half the world when diluted into a 
 volume." (Logic : Of Fallacies, III. 6.) Of the soundness of this re- 
 mark, it would not be easy to find a better instance than Dr. Whately's 
 own volume. Let the logic of Aristotle stand separate and alone, and it 
 cannot be saved from the neglect into which it was confessedly falling : 
 dilute it through the excellent, but distinct matter, which forms the bulk 
 of Dr. Whately's volume, and half the world are inclined in its favour. 
 Of the half world thus biassed, one part will be incapable, and the rest 
 indisposed, that is too idle, to dissipate the superinduced error ; for, as 
 Dr. Whately says in another place, " there is probably not one person in 
 ten, who is physically capable of the degree of steady application requisite 
 for embracing the principles of logic, or any other science ; and, a much 
 
 * Wonderful to say, chiefly in America, the country celebrated for 
 goiny-a-head. 
 
 B2 
 
104 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 greater number to whom this, though not an impossibility, is a very great 
 difficulty." (Preface early editions.) Thus, then, it is possible that I>r. 
 Whately's " Logic," may have a<-,juir>-d a temporary popularity, in spite 
 of a radical (h-fcct, which, when known, must vitiate the whole as a 
 system, though what is unfairly made a part of that system cannot be de- 
 prived of its independent merit. And this possible defect we assert to be 
 actual. The formal syllogism, which h makes the basis of his .- 
 is not the basis of all reasoning. It is a purely gramin<iti>-<d ront I 
 for reducing every other form of expression to one single form, without 
 any change of the mental act by which the knowledge signified was re- 
 ceived. The things of sense inevitably suggest unnumbered n-lar 
 the understanding : the following is only one of them, that it' a t 
 contained in or under another, and this under a third, the first is contained 
 under the third. But so plastic is language by the possible variation of 
 terms, of propositions, and of larger forms of discourse, (all of whirr- 
 differ as (jrammat ical forms only, without corresponding differences in the 
 reasoning mind,) that we can, if we please, express any other understood 
 relation, in the form strictly appropriate to one; through which 
 bility, we have a science, of which the enunciation of the one particular 
 relation referred to above, is the axiom, while the art . gram- 
 
 inatical art,) is the reduction of every expression to the one form, 
 the axiom may be applied to it, and a demonstration scientifically ensue. 
 In all cases this will be a demonstration of what is already inevitably un- 
 derstood ; as Dugald Stewart says, the demonstration of a dem 
 tion; and the practice will he, (so far as we keep to the practice which 
 belong to the science,) that, dismissing fmm the mind the things concern- 
 ing which we reason, we shall reason with the words, and n<-t imiir 
 concerning the things the knowledge of which is included in the words : 
 briefly, we shall reason with words, and not by means of wori 
 latter of which is proposed by our logic. The value of this art and 
 science, needs not be here discussed : all we mean at present, is to assert 
 its distinctness from our logic : more about it will be learned as we pro- 
 ceed. It may be sufficient to have stated thus much now, with the hope 
 that what cannot be made quite clear to our student in the present stage 
 of his progress, will become so as he advances. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 
 
 1. Inductive Logic is the art or practice of gathering know- 
 ledge by the instrunicntalitv of words. In every act pertain- 
 ing to this practice, three things occur, the knowledge which 
 the word already includes, the thing known by reason of this 
 previous knowledge, and the increased knowledge which in- 
 cludes some other thing or thinu r >. What follows will, it Ls 
 hoped, make this doctrine understood. 
 
Sec. 1-4.] INDUCTION THEORY. 105 
 
 THEORY OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 
 
 2. We use a word inductively when, having some certain 
 knowledge which it represents, we advance, by its assistance, 
 to further knowledge, which we draw under or into the same 
 sign. Let us suppose the word red was originally an excla- 
 mation uttered on first becoming conscious of that sensation ; * 
 and let us suppose that it subsequently loses its exclamative 
 character, and remains a sign of that fist knowledge : when 
 the sensation re-occurs, the knowledge re-occurs, and with it 
 the sign ; and by the aid of the sign, we are able to entertain 
 our first knowledge of what red is, distinctly from the varying 
 circumstances of its re-occurrence, and to include under it 
 what is common to both occasions of knowledge ; to include, 
 for instance, under the same word red, the knowledge derived 
 from the red of the crocus, and from the red of a certain 
 earth; and thus we go on, including with our greater expe- 
 rience more and more knowledge under the same sign, till we 
 have extended its meaning as far as convenience or the custom 
 of language allows. 
 
 3. Let us take the word man as another example : let us sup- 
 pose it was at first an exclamation uttered on first having 
 knowledge of a creature that was not one's self, yet was like 
 one's self: let us suppose it to lose its exclamative character, 
 and to remain a sign of that first knowledge : when another 
 occasion of similar knowledge occurs, the former knowledge 
 occurs with it, and the sign enables us to include what is 
 common to both occasions; to include, for instance, under 
 the same word man, the knowledge of what a man is, derived 
 from the tall dark man, and the short fair man ; and thus we 
 go on till we include under the same sign all attainable know- 
 ledge of our species as distinguished from creatures of every 
 other species. 
 
 4. Let us take the word John as a third example : let us sup- 
 pose, that this was at first an exclamation uttered when we 
 first knew John distinctly from self: let us suppose it to lose 
 
 * If we know nothing except by reason of something already known, it 
 is a fair question to ask, how our knowledge can have had a beginning. 
 This question, which needs not stop us here, I have endeavoured to answer 
 in " Beginnings of a New School of Metaphysics ;" Second Essay (Sequel) 
 page 73. 
 
106 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 its exclamative character, and to remain as a sign of this our 
 first knowledge of John : when another occasion of knowing 
 John occurs, the former knowledge occurs with it, and we 
 now know him distinctly from each occasion in particular, 
 from the occasion when he was walking cheerful in the gar- 
 den, and this new occasion when he is lying sorrowful on the 
 bed. Thus we go on, augmenting our knowledge of John, 
 by familiarity with him under various circumstances of his 
 existence, and including this knowledge in the sign which is 
 his proper name. 
 
 5. Let us take the word proud or pride as a fourth example : 
 let us suppose it to have been an exclamation, when, for the 
 first time, some one person was known to treat another 
 proudly : let it lose its exclamative character, and remain a 
 sign of that first knowledge : the next occasion of similar 
 knowledge may be quite different in persons and circum- 
 stances ; yet, with the aid of the sign, we are able to hold 
 our knowledge of what it is to be proud, or to have pride, 
 distinctly from the variable circumstances ; and by the same 
 aid, we can go on increasing this knowledge, by deriving it 
 from a larger and larger number of instances; and including 
 our enlarged knowledge in the sign which helps us onward 
 to still larger. 
 
 6. We shall better understand the previous representation 
 of the manner in which our knowledge is increased, and of the 
 use of signs in fixing and helping it onward, by a few further 
 considerations. 
 
 First, we have to consider that all our knowledge is origi- 
 nally derived from the things of sense.* Yet a sensation is 
 
 * This, as it is well known, is Locke's doctrine ; a doctrine which, 
 carried out on mistaken principles by some of his followers, particularly 
 in France, has issued in what is called Sensationalism. The philosophers 
 of this school propose to show that all ideas begin by being sensations, 
 which doctrine another school of philosophers, chiefly Germans, oppose by 
 what is called Hc<ili*in ; or the assertion of certain principles or original 
 ideas existing in or being a part of the mind itself. Extremes of opinion 
 seldom foil to be erroneous ; and as seldom does it happen that, before 
 the extremes .ire reached, there is not, in whatever opposing doctrines, 
 some truth on both sides. With regard to the statement in the text, if 
 taken in connection with what immediately follows lY, it can scarce!} 
 ml. nee to either of the parties just alluded to : the Idealists cani; 
 that we reduce everything to sensation ; nor can the Sensationalists aver 
 
Sec. 5-7.] INDUCTION THEORY. 107 
 
 not knowledge ; nor can it, by itself, create, or be created 
 into knowledge : there must be a knowing faculty, or capacity 
 to know. Now, to know a thing is to be aware of its rela- 
 tion or relations to some other thing or things : to know red, 
 for example, there must be something else known at the same 
 time with it: we must know blue, black, or white, &c., at 
 the same time that we know red. Wherever there is know- 
 ledge, there are therefore premises, of which that knowledge 
 is the conclusion ; and red expresses a conclusion out of such 
 premises. Neither do we know what man is, but by know- 
 ing at the same time what is not a man : neither do we know 
 John as an individual, but by being aware of John's existence 
 distinctly from the changeable circumstances of his existence : 
 neither do we know what it is to be proud or have pride, but 
 by knowing what it is not to be proud. In all these instances, 
 (and in all other instances it is the same,) the word which 
 signifies knowledge, signifies a conclusion arising out of pre- 
 mises. 
 
 In this process of gathering knowledge, we suppose the 
 previous knowledge and the new phenomena to be so brought 
 before the intellect, that an inference instantly arises. But 
 new phenomena often present themselves under circumstances 
 that ought to occasion doubt ; and we then exert or ought to 
 exert some consideration before we admit an inference ; which 
 is called a use of our JUDGEMENT. This is a voluntary act, 
 and upon it we lay the blame or praise of the inference. We 
 have, for example, a new substance before us which seems to 
 be an earth, and we include it under that name. If it turn 
 out not to be an earth, we say our judgement has deceived us, 
 and what we calculated upon as warranting a conclusion in 
 the deductive process, remains a faulty inference in the induc- 
 tive. This observation was proper to be made in this place, 
 though it needs not further impede the development of the 
 theory in progress. * 
 
 7. Secondly, then, (to go on with our theoretical develop- 
 ment,) we have to consider that a sign cannot legitimately 
 
 that we suppose the existence of original ideas, inasmuch as we go no 
 further than the supposition of a power or capacity to receive knowledge ; 
 although, as it should seem, contrarily to the Sensationalists, we affirm it 
 to be a power or capacity distinct from the capacity or liability to have 
 sensations. 
 
108 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 signify more knowledge than we have attained ; and that, of 
 such knowledge, it may signify just so much as our immediate 
 purpose requires. We may, for instance, use the word red 
 only as the sign of knowledge derived from the experience of 
 one thing that produces the sensation, and from want of ex- 
 perience ; or by choice, we may exclude from the meaning of 
 the word the varieties of red derived from a wider experience, 
 for which, by the custom of speech, the word may be the 
 sign. We may use the word man, through ignorance or by 
 choice, only to signify our knowledge of what a man is, dis- 
 tinctly from a boy or a woman. We may use the word John, 
 by necessity or choice, to signify no more knowledge of him 
 than the slightest acquaintance gives to any person; and not 
 even so much knowledge as this, but only the knowledge that 
 John exists or has existed as an individual person. We may 
 use the word proud or pride, only as the sign of knowledge de- 
 rived from the single action of one single person toward another ; 
 and not include under it that wider knowledge which greater 
 experience brings. In all these instances, (and all single 
 words would but multiply the instances,) the sign is legiti- 
 mately used, provided our knowledge and the sign are co- 
 extensive, and we do not confuse our natural understanding 
 by using the sign to supply the place of knowledge. 
 
 8. But thirdly we have to consider that all our knowledge 
 is not gained by our own experience : we depend, as a race, 
 in a very great degree on the experience of others, and take 
 our knowledge, in large proportion, on credit. Hence we 
 embrace, as our own knowledge, all the credible parts of past 
 history ; all that is reported to us of credible present history ; 
 nay, all the facts of experimental science, which others and 
 not ourselves have arrived at, and which we may have never 
 witnessed, but believe to be. 
 
 9. And while, with the assistance of a carefully applied 
 logic, we are becoming, by experience, and by fairly received 
 testimony, better and better acquainted with the real world, 
 there is an ideal world, always enlarging, which we have to 
 keep clearly understood in its relation to the other. Our 
 senses, after having been operated upon by the things fitted 
 to affect them, are not quiescent even when the things are no 
 longer present : the nerves of those senses work internally, 
 though the outward organs are not impressed, and the things 
 
Sec. 8-10.] INDUCTION THEORY. 109 
 
 re-appear, but in such a manner that we cannot fail to dis- 
 tinguish them from the realities, unless in a state of sleep 
 when the realities are quite absent, or in certain states of 
 disease which preternaturally affect the nerves of those senses. 
 Supposing, then, a healthy waking state of the faculties, we 
 have to keep our knowledge of the one world clear from any 
 confusion which must arise from mingling the things of the 
 other as a part of it ; and this point being secured, we find 
 that as transcripts of the things of the real world, those of the 
 ideal materially assist the understanding in the inductive part 
 of learning. 
 
 Note to the previous Section. 
 
 The ideal world here spoken of, does not consist of the ideas of Platonic 
 philosophy ; these, under our own point of view, we have to speak of in 
 the next section ; it is a transcript of the outward world as it has reached 
 the understanding through the senses. But the character of this ideal 
 world must depend on the senses through which it has been received. 
 We commonly mean by it a transcript of the visual world. Now this it 
 cannot be to one born blind, or so early deprived of sight as to be equally 
 circumstanced. Yet such a one, (witness Blacklock the blind poet of 
 Scotland,) has an ideal world as complete, apparently, even for poetry, 
 as the ideal world of him who enjoys the full sense of vision. Do we 
 not attribute to Sight, as the inlet of the ideal world spoken of, a greater 
 instrumentality in the reception of our earliest knowledge than it can fairly 
 claim ? I have before me what I consider a most able philosophical 
 treatise communicated by the author, of whom I know nothing beyond 
 the favour of his gift sent without date or mention of residence, the title 
 of which is, " The Principles of Geometrical Demonstration deduced 
 from the original Conceptions of Space and Form : by H. Wedgwood, 
 M.A. late Fellow of Chr. Coll. Camb. ;" (Taylor and Walton, 1844;) in 
 following out which deduction, the author shows, that not our visual, but 
 our tactual impressions, are the early inlet of all the fundamental know- 
 ledge placed within the reach of our species. 
 
 10. In pursuing the theory of inductive logic, we next find, 
 that beyond the things of sense and the ideal things that 
 reflect them, there are things, the pure abstract stores of the 
 understanding, in following the relations of which, the under- 
 standing enjoys a peculiar triumph, as moving in a world 
 entirely its own. These things are properly called transcendental 
 or metaphysical, because they transcend real and ideal things, 
 because they lie beyond the bounds of nature.* Every single 
 
 * Msra beyond, q>v<ri$ nature. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
 term Metaphysics was at first meant to be understood as here explained. 
 
 B 3 
 
110 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 word whatever has its immediate corivspondonce with such a 
 thing, and only through tin- medium here indicated has it a 
 correspondence with the things of sense : that is to say, 
 knowledge itself is always metaphysical, though the things 
 we first know, are always things physical. The knowledge, 
 for instance, which we have of red is not, itself, either the 
 real or the ideal sensation of red, but something above or 
 beyond it : * the knowledge which we have of John is not 
 John himself, and it transcends, or is abstract from, our actual 
 perception of him, and from any idea, that is, image of him 
 which we distinctly form ; since in either of these cases, John 
 must be perceived or conceived sitting, standing, lying, or 
 walking, sick or well, older or younger ; while the knowledge 
 we have of John, though it includes all these circumstances 
 as they have arisen in our experience, is nevertheless separate 
 from them, since to know John, is to know him distinctly 
 from and beyond those variable circumstances, and from and 
 beyond every other variable circumstance that has arisen in 
 our experience, or may arise : t the knowledge which we 
 
 * Not distinguishing between these is the fundamental error of the 
 Sensationali>ts. Mr. .lames Mill, who is one of them, lays it down as a 
 fact that to be in pain and to be conscious of pain, is one and the same 
 tiling : it sroms so indeed, because, in the recollected experience of every 
 one of MS, they always come together. But if any one had existed in a 
 single continued state of pain from the moment when sensitive being com- 
 menced, (it may seem strange to say, but philosophical reflection will 
 sh(\v it to be true,) he would be in what we call pain, yet would not 
 know what it was ; which is only another way of saying, he would not 
 be conscious of it. If further words could make plainer, what perhaps is 
 beyond the reach of an understanding that requires more than a few 
 minutes reflection to embrace it, we might say that one unchanging state 
 of existence such as we have supposed, would not be a state that happens 
 to the person, it would be his very existence, his very self. We know 
 or are conscious of pain, because we know what is not pain, what is relief 
 from pain, what is pleasure. So we know pleasure because we know 
 pain ; we know good because we know evil, and evil because we know 
 good. 
 
 f The following passage from Dr. Whately's Logic, is to the same 
 purpose. u When we are speaking of an individual, it is usually an 
 abstract notion that we form ; e. g. Suppose we are speaking (in 1847) 
 of the present King of the French ; he must actually be either in Paris or 
 elsewhere ; sitting, standing, or in some other posture ; and in such and 
 such a dress, &c. We abstract from the separable accidents what we 
 consider essential to the individual, thus forming aii abstract notion of the 
 individual." (Book II. Chap. V. J 2.) 
 
Sec. 10.] INDUCTION THEORY. Ill 
 
 have of man transcends, in like manner, the perception or 
 conception of any man in particular; and the knowledge 
 we include under the word proud or pride is knowledge 
 abstracted or separated from any other knowledge we entertain 
 of the persons who are proud. Now though all knowledge is 
 originally derived from the things of sense, and is of value to 
 us here only in proportion as it is re-applicable to them ; yet 
 we have the power, as we advance in knowledge, to dismiss 
 the real and ideal things from which it is derived, and to 
 begin with the knowledge, abstract from the things, as the 
 ground of a higher kind of knowledge ; a knowledge which is 
 often distinctly called Science. Thus, for instance, without 
 any regard to the real or ideal points, or straight lines, or 
 circles, that originally suggested our knowledge, we can take 
 the knowledge as the ground of knowledge to spring from it : 
 in which proceeding, the point is not something we can see 
 or feel, or imagine we can see or feel; the straight line is 
 not something straight relatively to something that we can 
 see or feel to be crooked ; the circle is not the circle of the 
 sun or of the full moon : but the point, the straight line, the 
 circle, is separate from the times and the things that first 
 made us know what a point is, what a straight line is, what 
 a circle is. 
 
 Note to Section 10. 
 
 In a foregoing note (the former foot note above) we attempted a stand 
 against the Sensationalists. We may now attempt one against the Idealists, 
 in order, if possible, to keep the medium in which the truth is generally 
 found. The philosophers last named inculcate, after their own manner, 
 the old Platonic doctrine of ideas which exist originally in the mind, and 
 give form and consistency to all the things of sense. This is an extreme, 
 which, inasmuch as it is improved and wiprovable, our slow steps cannot 
 reach. Neither can we see any necessity for supposing these ideas ; while 
 we admit, on the other hand, against the Sensationalists, that the things 
 of sense could give us nothing but sensations, if there existed not a distinct 
 power, or distinct powers, through which we have knowledge also ; that 
 is, through which we are aware how the things producing sensation, stand 
 related to ourselves, and (still with relation to ourselves) stand related to 
 each other. We admit, (with an eminent English Idealist,) that sensa- 
 tions are not TRANsformed into ideas ; (See WhewelPs Philosophy of the 
 Inductive Sciences, Aphorisms concerning Ideas ;) and we admit, (stipu- 
 lating for our own mode of interpretation,) that they are iNformed, namely, 
 that they are received by the understanding in order to take the character 
 of knowledge ; our objection to the theory of ideas as a mode of accounting 
 for the fact, being this, that, inasmuch as it is a gratuitous doctrine, it 
 
112 AIAM A!, ul LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 carries mystery with it, such a-, we think, must leave good t": 
 Sense unsatisfied, while it ha> a / :;iind>that 1" 
 
 In short, we admit thus much, and n iimn-, that tin; things of sense 
 are adapted to reach man's intellect through his senses, and that hi 
 
 i iapted t-i receive them ; that is, to he aware of tin- n-lat; 
 which they stand t each other, but always with a regard to himself, 
 created as lie is to understand them in an apjH>inted way: a sta' 
 which will appear tin; more reasonable, by reflecting that among these 
 
 !: is placed, and among these only, during his present state of 
 nee. 
 
 1'iit, say tl 'hep; are ideas that form the things of sense, for 
 
 which \ve in vain se.-k the originals in the outward world. Let us take 
 one of thes.- id- as to serve for the rest, and see how, with our views, we 
 ran explain its existence; let it be the idea (as it is called) of a 1 
 line. Now, we admit that there is no line in nature which we cai: 
 to be straight, nav that there is no line in nature which pr<>' 
 straight, and consequently that no idea, in our sense of the word idea, 
 namely, a mental transcript of the outward thing, reflects to us that which 
 
 i i nly straight. Whence, then, do we obtain the knowledge of what 
 it is to be straight, independently of these physical conditions ; whence, 
 in other words, do we get at the metaphysical straight line ? 
 that the fact is sufficiently interpreted when we admit, what >uivly cannot 
 be denied, that all knowledge is abstract, and consequently free from 
 physical conditions. Ami our knowledge of the special fact before us thus 
 
 : we have before us a line which is sensibly crooked, and another 
 which, relatively to the former, is straight. Our original knowledge of 
 the straight, is therefore the relatively straight. But t. ! know- 
 
 ledge becomes an abstraction by merely setting aside all the particular 
 instances which led to it : and then our knowledge is expressed by this 
 definition, that a straight line is a line which is not crooked. In this 
 way, though our knowledge began with the rcl<tti> . we are 
 
 able to speak of what is straight absolutely ; but we speak of it in words 
 only : the tiling itvlf is unknown, either as existing, or possible to exist. 
 How, apiin say tin.- Ideali-ts. could you speak of the absolutely straight, 
 unless the previous iJc<t (in their sense of idea) existed in the mind? We 
 answer, that we are able to do so, by a repetition of the process which has 
 just lieen indicated. To the human understanding nothing absolute exists 
 in reality, but the /v/.tfiVc/// absolute. But the abstraction of that know- 
 dsts. In calling this abstraction an u/tM, Kant and the other 
 Idealists dwell upon the tact, and make much out of the fact, that it lies 
 beyond the limits of time and space. This of course we do n I 
 We object only to the //,<;>/V/v/ of their explanation. Let it be admitted 
 that a metaphysical straight line exists only in our knowledge of what a 
 straight line is, namely, a line that is not crooked : to such knowledge it 
 matters not whether the thinj; exists or not. The knowledge, h> 
 i> re-applicable to every line which is straight to our senses, that is, 
 rcl<itic<-li/ straight : if if were not so re-applicable, it would be an 
 abstraction, of no use but to darken understanding with the api?arance of 
 knowledge. 
 
Sec. 11, 12.] INDUCTION PEACTICE. 113 
 
 PRACTICAL REMARKS BASED ON THE FOREGOING THEORY. 
 
 11. The use of words to fix our knowledge, and carry it 
 onward to further knowledge, is the true process of inductive 
 logic ; but it too often happens that words are used to hide 
 the want of knowledge not only from others, but even from the 
 thinker himself. The education which is conducted through 
 the medium of books, makes a young person familiar with 
 words, far more rapidly than he can become, acquainted with 
 things : nor would there be mischief in this, if he were aware 
 of his real ignorance, if he regarded the words which he 
 hears, or reads, or repeats by rote, as signs, to a very great 
 extent, not of what he yet knows, but of what he has to learn. 
 The danger is, that he will deceive both himself and others, 
 by mistaking his familiarity with the signs of knowledge, for 
 the knowledge itself. Nor can anything be said to warn him 
 against this error, which has not often been said before, the 
 common sense of mankind, independently of theory, having 
 prescribed to the young student, from time immemorial, the 
 duty of asking himself what meaning he has with every word 
 he uses, or professes to understand; and the necessity of 
 betaking himself to the ordinary ways of learning, when his 
 knowledge falls short of his language. One powerful method 
 of bringing him to a consciousness of his deficiencies in the 
 inductive process of logic, will be, to require from him proofs 
 of his knowledge in deductive essays or themes; the nature 
 and methods of which are to be spoken of hereafter. These 
 essays, it is expected, will be an occasion of frequently send- 
 ing him back to the inductive process, to supply what has 
 been unconsciously omitted. In the meantime, he may be 
 saved from a great deal of fruitless use of words, by attention 
 to the following considerations : 
 
 12. All unrevealed knowledge springs originally from the 
 things of sense ; and though in its nature abstract from those 
 things, its truth or reality can be tested only by its re-appli- 
 cability to those things. By our own experience (meaning of 
 course the experience of our kind) we can know nothing 
 beyond these things ; and though it is the height of presump- 
 tion to believe that nothing beyond our experience remains to 
 be known, yet it is almost equal presumption to pretend that 
 we do or can of ourselves know more. Into such presumption, 
 
Ill MAXL'AL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 however, we are often led, ly the empty abstractions which 
 language generates, Lai. bo talk an-' 
 
 think with little knowledge, with l-ss knowledge, and even 
 lievond this, with no knowledge at all. The error, in any of 
 its derives, arises out of the power of abstracting knowledge 
 from n-alities; and, in its extreme, it will always be found 
 to consist in using a sign where nothing at all is signified, 
 except our inability to carry our knowledge further. We 
 must go back to our previous theory in order to ma!. 
 general caution proper! v understood. 
 
 13. In the metaphysi.-s of (juantity, we are saved from 
 wandering among prooflcss abstractions, bv ; ,t aj>- 
 plicability of those abstractions to tin- tilings of sense; and 
 during the progress of our learning, we are, at every step, 
 reminded of the connection betwe.-n the two, for in-- 
 between the metaphvsical point, or line, or circle, and 
 
 ">int, line, or circle, by the sensible or ideal representa- 
 tion we carry with us. 
 
 14. So likewise in making red, or John, or man, the subject 
 of our thoughts, although each word corresponds imme- 
 diatelv with an attraction, \vt W6 are saved from inutility 
 of thought, by the constant re-occurrence to our sen- - of til-- 
 individual things from which our knowledge 1, and 
 to which the word is immediately re-applicable, so as to 
 prevent the danger of supposing we know what we are par- 
 tially or wholly ignorant of. 
 
 15. Such, however, is the mechanism of language, that a 
 word may not only signify the abstract knowledge of a real 
 thing, or real things, (and this is what every word must 
 signify if it signifies anything, because knowledge is by its 
 nature abstract from the thing known,) but the word, before 
 it descends to the real thing or things, may be the name of 
 an abstraction, which abstraction, if it means anything, means 
 the knowledge of the real things which suggested it. Let the 
 following be our example of the manner in which this double 
 abstraction takes place. Suppose the word Proud to have 
 been originally a proper name applied to an individual from 
 his known character: no delusion of thought is likely to 
 arise while the word is so applied and understood : Suppose, 
 in the second place, that the word is used adjectively before 
 the proper name of another person, as proud John ; in which 
 
Sec. 13-16.] INDUCTION PRACTICE. 115 
 
 application the word indicates that John and the former 
 person are understood to agree in character : again, no delu- 
 sion of thought is likely to arise ; for though we may, for a 
 moment, have understood, under the word proud, something 
 separate from John, yet the grammatical form of the word 
 will have prevented our resting in that separate meaning 
 beyond the first moment : on the junction of the two words, 
 we understand them as one name for one thing, and are in no 
 danger of confounding the metaphysical separation and dis- 
 tinctness, with a real distinctness, of supposing, for an 
 instant, because proud and John are two words, that John is 
 resolvable into two correspondent things, But when, without 
 any change in the logical import, we change the grammatical 
 function of the word, when instead of proud we say pride, 
 we take the word away from that which would realize its 
 meaning, and render it not merely the sign of abstract know- 
 ledge, but the name of an abstraction, and we have, in conse- 
 quence, to descend a step lower before we get to the realities 
 which that abstraction includes, or ought to include, as the 
 things known by it. Now, the danger is, that the thinker or 
 reasoner may never have begun with, or may never go back 
 to take, this lower step ; that he may discourse to himself or 
 others concerning pride, " passion, or apathy, or glory, or 
 shame," without knowing by experience precisely what he 
 means; in which case, his discourse must be " vain wisdom 
 all, and false philosophy." * 
 
 16. It is further to be remembered, by way of caution, that 
 the forms of language into which abstract names are joined, 
 contribute in no small degree to a delusive use of words in 
 the acquirement of knowledge. We speak, for instance, of 
 the pride of John, or John's pride ; of pride belonging to John, 
 or John possessing pride, in phrases of the same form as when 
 
 * Others apart (other devils) sat on a hill retired, 
 In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high 
 Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will, and Fate, 
 Fixed-fate, Free-will, Foreknowledge-absolute, 
 And found no end, in wandering mazes lost : 
 Of Good and Evil much they argued then, 
 Of Happiness and final Misery, 
 Passion, and Apathy, and Glory, and Shame ; 
 Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy ! 
 
 Par. Lost, J3. II. 
 
116 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 we say the brotJier of Jo////, <>r .AV///'.s l>r<>ther; of houses belong- 
 ing to John, or John />oxx,<. S x//>// houses. It cannot but be evident 
 that such similarity of phrase, must have the ejlert of mislead- 
 ing a thinker, who trusts to tin- forms nf lamrua^e, and is not 
 in tin- habit of ron>iderin^ tin- things bowhich those forms are 
 applied. In the instances before us, we have to rememb.-r, 
 that tin-re is no such real tiling 88 pride distinct from John, 
 and pi-rsons like John in character; but that there are such 
 real things as the brother of John, and the houses belonging 
 to John, distinct from John himself: that is to say, pride is a 
 thin^ metaphysical or abstract, but John's brother, and John's 
 houses, are realities. 
 
 17. Suppose, in the next place, that there is nothing 
 within the reach of our human powers to which a word or 
 phrasr is applicable, the proper interpretation of such word or 
 phrase when attempted to be so applied, is, that it stands 
 as the sign of our ignorance. When we say infinite or end- 
 less space, infinite or endless time, all wo know or can 
 know of those things, is, space endless relatively to our- 
 selves, time endless relatively to ourselves: what time or 
 space may be beyond our experience of what it has been, 
 and what it continues to be, we know not : we can take 
 the known portions of time or of - 1 think of such 
 
 portions as still going on; but this is time or space unended, 
 and not endless, unless, as before said, we understand t 
 to mean rdnticely to ourselves; that is, only so far as our 
 race can have experience. The same reasoning belongs 
 to such words as absolute, perfect, complete: we know 
 nothing, and can know nothing but the n lute, the 
 
 relatively perfect, the relatively complete. We are justified, 
 nevertheless, in applying these words to the Divine Being ; 
 but let it be remembered that when so employe. I th-y do not 
 bring the nature of that Being within the reach of our facul- 
 ties: they say, if the v sav anvthinu, that how.-v.-r well we 
 mav understand what it is to be absolute and perfect when 
 things of sense are in (jiiestion, we apply the words in reve- 
 rence only, without pretence to knowledge, when we apply 
 them to God :' we use them as signs that represent what in 
 merely human science, is unknown and unknowable ; and so 
 
 * See Whately's Logic (Ambiguity of " same " Logomacf< 
 Book IV. c. v. $ 1) in confirmation of this point of view. 
 
Sec. 17-19.J INDUCTION PRACTICE. 117 
 
 used, they are serviceable elements in the structure of human 
 language. This indeed is the only way in which empty 
 abstractions, that is, abstractions which throw realities quite 
 out of question, can be legitimately used : and our system of 
 inductive logic having reached this point, makes no pretence to 
 go beyond it. 
 
 Note to Section 17. 
 
 And just where we leave off, METAPHYSICS, in their usual form and 
 purpose, begin ; especially the Metaphysics of Germany. The strength of 
 the systems which arise in that country of interminable speculation, 
 consists in their being improvable : for how shall we set about disproving 
 that, which, as it lies beyond the reach of proof, is equally beyond the 
 reach of contradiction. The German philosophers employ the abstractions, 
 all of which are obtained originally from the things of sense, to interpret 
 things which lie completely beyond our present state of existence. So 
 employed and so applied, they are hypotheses ; and if it were possible to 
 establish them by inductive proofs, we might accept them on credit till the 
 proofs were added. But the proofs are impossible, and the demand is 
 preposterous that we shall accept mere supposition for science. Call these 
 systems romances, and we may dip into them, perhaps, without danger. 
 That they are nothing more, is evidenced by the fact, that one of them is 
 no sooner promulgated, than it gives occasion to another to dispute its 
 pretension, Kant is succeeded by Fichte", Fichte by Schelling, Schelling 
 by Hegel : a kaleidoscope has not more shapes for the eye, than meta- 
 physics for the German mind. The mischief is, that these systems 
 pretend to be more than romances : they pretend to carry the human 
 intellect into the impenetrable unknown which everywhere surrounds us. 
 A lively faith can irradiate this unknown with a light from itself, and 
 take away all its gloom, without pretending to see into it with the eyes of 
 human reason : but these metaphysical romancers come with false lights, 
 offering what they call science in place of faith. " To-morrow," Fichte is 
 reported to have said, in the adjournment of the next point of his lecture, 
 " to-morrow we shall create God." Had his pretence been only to offer 
 a romance, the announcement, though profane, would have been harmless ; 
 for who, as he proceeded, would have been ready to say, "I believe in 
 Fichte, the maker of God ?" 
 
 RECAPITULATION OF DISTINCTIONS AND DIFFERENCES. 
 
 18. All knowledge is abstract, that is, separate, and of a 
 different nature, from the things that originally suggest it. 
 These things are real things, the things of sense ; and the way 
 in which we unavoidably understand them, is, that they exist 
 distinctly from oneself. But beside real things, there are 
 things ideal, and things metaphysical, which become the 
 subjects of knowledge. 
 
 19. Ideal things are those which we imagine to exist dis- 
 
118 MANUAL OF 1XX3IC. [Chap. II. 
 
 tinctly from oneself, by a voluntary delusion which our I 
 knowledge can at any time set aside ; as a fairy, a gorgon, Lilli- 
 put. Of ideal things, sonic are altogether fanciful ; but others 
 are more or less accurate representations of ival things that 
 are, or have been; as, London, Adam, Leviathan, Babylon. 
 
 20. A thing metaphysical is a state of one's thinking 
 which state we can make the subject of higher knowledge. It 
 is dilli-reiit both from real and ideal things, though liable to 
 be confounded with them. Thus the metaph \>i-al straight 
 line or circle, the moment it is realized, or imagined, cea 
 
 be metaphysical Thus, though we can personifv Virtus or 
 Pride, we cannot in any other way think of pride or of virtue 
 as having real existence. But we can know what ?:// 
 and \v\\BLtpride is : that is, we can know a certain state ol 
 thinking self as having been a state of previous knowledge, 
 the knowledge that such and such men acted in a < 
 manner, so as to be approved in the one case, to oftl-nd in 
 a certain way in the other. If indeed we have no such pre- 
 vious knowledge, and yet talk of virtue or of pride, the words 
 are empty names that only serve to conceal ignorance. 
 
 21. All words that are parts of speech are signs of things 
 metaphysical. But some of them can be immediately applied 
 as names of things real, or ideal ; while others can be aj 
 only as names of things metaphysical. Thus the name John, 
 the name of a familiar friend, although it signifies our know- 
 ledge of him abstractly from all the circumstances under 
 which we have known him, can be re-applied to him in 
 connection with any circumstances under which we may know 
 him again. Thus the name man, the name of any one of our 
 species, although it signifies our knowledge of what our species 
 is, abstractly from any one of our species, can be re-applied 
 to any one of that species. But the name virtue or 
 cannot be applied to any thing real, or to any thing 
 except by poetical personification : it can be applied only as 
 the name of previous knowledge, and if we have not the 
 previous knowledge, it is an empty name. 
 
 Hence, then, there are names of things reed, of things ideal, 
 and of things abstract or metaphysical. 
 
 22. In Grammar, it was found useful to borrow from Logic 
 the distinction of names into Names proper, common, and 
 abstract. A proper name is a name immediately applicable 
 
Sec. 20-25.] INDUCTION PRACTICE. 119 
 
 to some one particular real or ideal person or thing ; as, John, 
 London, Jupiter, Lilliput. A common name is a name that 
 can be immediately applied to a person or thing, with reference, 
 at the same time, to the class or kind of things to which the 
 person or thing belongs, whether real or ideal ; as man, fairy. 
 A name abstract is a name not applicable to a real or ideal 
 person or thing, (except by personification,) but only to a 
 state of knowledge, under which we apprehend something 
 concerning real or ideal persons or things ; as virtue, pride. 
 But a name abstract may become a name common if we make 
 it a name for several states of knowledge, Thus, the name 
 virtue may be a common name for the special virtues, Prudence, 
 Justice, Temperance, Fortitude ; or Faith, Hope, Charity. 
 
 23. Language is the instrument of reason by which we 
 collect knowledge, so that it shall be ready for re-application 
 to the things known. In order to serve its purpose, language 
 is very flexible ; and the logician, in availing himself of the 
 changeable import of a word, has to notice, 1. Its Etymo- 
 logical sense : 2. Its General sense : 3. And its Particular or 
 Applied senses. 
 
 24. The etymological sense of a word is its original sense, 
 so far as we are able to trace it. Thus the original sense of 
 To prevent is to go before ; the original sense of a villain, is 
 one who lives in a vill or small town ; the original meaning of 
 a regiment, is rule or command, or something ruled, or com- 
 manded ; the original meaning of the word thing, is that 
 concerning which we think. 
 
 25. The general sense of a word is that which includes 
 under it all more particular or special senses. Sometimes 
 this coincides with the etymological sense ; as regiment when 
 it means every thing that is ruled or commanded, which sense 
 will include the special object, a body of soldiers commanded 
 by a colonel. The general sense of the word man, is that 
 which includes every human being, male and female, in every 
 stage of life. The general meaning of animal, is that which 
 includes every organized being that is liable to sensations of 
 pleasure and pain; the general meaning of the word plant, is 
 that which includes every organized being that is destitute of 
 sensation. The general meaning of the word sensation is that 
 which includes every effect, pleasurable, indifferent, or painful, 
 which reaches the brain of an animal by the operation of an 
 
120 MANT'AL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 external cause.* The general meaning of the word fl- 
 that which includes every possible subject of our thoughts, 
 real, ideal, and metaphysical; and this general sense coincides 
 with the etymological i 
 
 20. The special sensef of a word, is some limited applica- 
 tion deduced or deducible from its general sense. Thus the 
 name man may be specially applied to any human being not a 
 lemal', nor a hoy or infant. Thus the word animal is some- 
 tinies applied to a brute animal only. Thus the word regiment 
 while it had a general meaning, was often special Iv applied to 
 a body of soldiers commanded by a colonel : w h . 
 meaning has now become the common meaning, and the 
 general meaning is now almost forgotten. 
 
 27. In the use of signs to advance and fix knowledge, it 
 appears that there may occur abstraction, generalization, and 
 specialization. 
 
 28. Abstraction is the separation of knowledge from the 
 tiling known. It is the beginning of knowledge, there being 
 no such thing as knowledge till abstraction takes place. And 
 abstraction is carried on by the use of language. The word 
 John, may have first meant, John, an infa M his nurse's 
 lap. But when we know John under other circumstance 
 knowledge of him is abstract, that is separate from those 
 circumstances : and not only is John the sign of abstraction 
 from tin- particular ciiTimistain.vs, but every other Word which 
 helps to form the description of John, is also the sign of 
 abstraction from particular circumstances. 
 
 29. Generalization is the process of abstraction by means of 
 a name made common to two individuals, and applied succes- 
 sively to more individuals, till we have included under it all 
 we find useful to include. Thus the word man may ha 
 meant a single individual, and then it was a proper name. It 
 may then have been applied indifferently to two individuals 
 by excluding what was peculiar to each. And so it continued 
 to be applied to three, four, five, &c. ; till it became a name for 
 any individual of the human kind. 
 
 30. Specialization J is the opposite of generalization, and 
 
 * That is, external as regards the brain. 
 
 -{ In Aristotelian logic, any special sense of a word is called a second 
 intention. 
 
 J J. Stuart Mill is the originator of this useful philosophical term. 
 
Sec. 26-32.] INDUCTION SUGGESTIONS. 121 
 
 properly belongs to deductive logic, because the ordinary way 
 to make a word special, is to join to it words that have that 
 effect. Thus the word man is, made partially special, when 
 we say, " a short old man in a brown coat."* But a single 
 word is sometimes made to take a special meaning deduced 
 from a meaning more general ; as the word doctor, whose 
 general and etymological meaning, is, a learned man; but 
 which sometimes means, specially, a man to whom the 
 diploma of a degree bearing that name has been given by a 
 university ; and sometimes, in common or vulgar use, one 
 who undertakes to cure diseases, whether he has received a 
 university diploma or not. A general word thus made special, 
 is an instrument of inductive logic, as well as all other single 
 words. 
 
 SUGGESTIONS FOR AVOIDING, DUEING THE INDUCTIVE PRO- 
 CESS, THE DELUSIONS OF THE RHETORICAL SOPHIST. 
 
 31. Sophistry is an unfair use of art in Ehetoric, in order, 
 for some partial end, " to make the worse appear the better 
 cause." The delusion, indeed, is not always designed, the 
 rhetorician as frequently cheating himself before he sets about 
 misleading others. But this makes no difference as to the 
 likely prejudicial effect ; and our learner has to be warned 
 against this effect, while pursuing (what every one pursues, 
 right or wrong, during his life,) the logical process by 
 which knowledge is stored up for subsequent development. 
 
 32. One common means of delusion, and the first we may 
 mention, because it will be the first against which the logi- 
 cian will be warned in his own deductive use of language, is 
 the use of high-sounding verbiage. He has already been cau- 
 tioned on this point, particularly in Sections 11 and 12 
 preceding ; but the caution cannot be too often repeated. It 
 is again urged in this place, because, when a point cannot be 
 otherwise carried, the rhetorician often addresses the ignorance 
 of his hearers, offering them sound for sense, the empty 
 parade of learned terms for the substance of learning. Even 
 the substance becomes a snare when used to bewilder the 
 understanding of the hearer or reader, and keep him from 
 
 * For the single word is not special in meaning ; but it merges its 
 single meaning in the logical noun it helps to construct ; and the meaning 
 of this logical noun is special. 
 
122 MANUAL OF IJ > [Cliap. II. 
 
 iii( I uiring after truth in the true direction. Thus th<- 
 makes a parade of medical knowledge, in order that von may 
 take his pill, which has been prepand, In- is well aware, quite 
 independently of such knowledge; and thus a rogue, as th-- 
 novelist shows, displays a single piece of learning, <_ ri 
 rote, whenever he meets with one who is likely to 
 ue\v < In PC, through the reverence in which we are disposed to 
 hold a learned man. 
 
 32. Akin to the means of delusion just mentioned, is the 
 parade of logical forms. This indeed is not so practicable a 
 snare since the formal logic of Aristotle has been i 
 repute ; but that it is still used with effect on some occasions 
 will appear from a few examples in the 10th Section of 
 Chapter V. In the mean time, we have to assure our scholar, 
 that t\\Qform in which a piece of reasoning may be couched, 
 is never a security that the reasoning is just, nor a defect in 
 the form an evidence that the reasoning is false. To say that, 
 '* All projectors are unfit to be trusted ; this man is a pro- 
 jector; therefore he is unfit to be trusted," will never con- 
 vince a sensible thinker, while he admits all habitual projectors 
 to be untrustworthy, that a prudent man who now and then 
 comes forward with a feasible project, is a man unfit to be 
 trusted. And to say, "All w" :-rs suit their laws to 
 
 the genius of their country ; Solon did this ; therefore he was 
 a wise legislator," will not prevent him who reasons by 
 means of words, and not m'fh words, from recemmj the reason- 
 in -_r as quite correct, although the Aristotelians/arm of reasoning 
 fails.* Neither when the argument for the existence of a 
 God from its being universally believed, is met by the instance 
 of a nation destitute of such belief, will our scholar be more, 
 we think he will be much less, in danger than the Aristotelian 
 of allowing the objector to go further than his objection war- 
 rants, bv asserting, namely, that because the existence of a God 
 is not universally believed, all argument for the existence of a 
 God is set aside. In any case like this, which demands 
 nothing more than efforts of the natural understanding ope- 
 rating by means of words, but not using them in place of 
 thought, to talk to our scholar of being on his guarcl against 
 
 * Both examples will be taken up again in Chapter V., (Sections 9 and 
 10,) and the true character of their taultiness explained. 
 
Sec. 32-33.] INDUCTION SUGGESTIONS. 123 
 
 an illicit process of the major term,* would be to prepare him 
 for being operated upon, when off his guard, by such means 
 of delusion as it is the object of this section to characterize. 
 
 33. f The next means of rhetorical delusion which may be 
 mentioned, is a means very much in use at the present day, 
 that of appending to an abstract or general proposition, every 
 special practical inference which it may suit the views of the 
 reasoner to draw from it. Thus, it having been said, and, in 
 general terms, safely said, that wholesome food is food fit for 
 our species ; and a certain article of food having been found 
 wholesome by such and such a people, we are required to act 
 on the general admission, and force its use on a different 
 people. Now the proof that it is wholesome does not reach 
 further than the experimented instances, and our general ad- 
 mission cannot fairly be extended to such an issue. With 
 regard to people who live in another climate, or under any 
 other different circumstances, the proof is yet to come, and 
 till it come, the issue proposed is a practical non-sequitur ; 
 
 * See Whately's Logic, Book III. 7. 
 
 f A great part of what follows in the remaining four sections under 
 the present head, though not literally quoted from, is suggested by the 
 excellent matter contained in Dr. Whately's Chapter or Book on Fallacies 
 (referred to in the previous note). That the author of this Manual has 
 not been able to draw greater benefit from the chapter in question, is 
 caused, as he thinks, by the mischievous interference in it of Aristotelian 
 principles. If Dr. Whately had not predetermined to be more consistent 
 than his fellow Aristotelians, if, like them, he had given up the doctrine 
 of the formal syllogism when he came to treat on fallacies, and spoken of 
 them in the language of common sense, the Chapter, which is now excel- 
 lent only in parts, would have been excellent as a whole. But Dr. 
 Whately, (unfortunately as the author thinks,) does his utmost to recon- 
 cile this part of his logic with what precedes, chiding his brethren for 
 having here renounced their science. " Whenever," he says, "they have 
 to treat of anything that is beyond the mere elements of logic, they totally 
 lay aside all reference to the principles they have been occupied in esta- 
 blishing and explaining, and have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular 
 kind of language." (Introd. Book III.) The effect of Dr. Whately's 
 greater consistency appears to be this, that in endeavouring to draw a 
 line between logical and non-logical fallacies, between what can be 
 explained on the principles of Aristotle, and what must be explained ac- 
 cording to common sense, he very much mystifies the latter mode of 
 explanation, while he is obliged to draw his intended line in so zig-zag a 
 way, that, for whatever purpose, one cannot help thinking it had better 
 not have been drawn at all. 
 
1 24 M A NUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 a case of having proved too little.* Again; we may allow 
 that every one has a natural claim to be free ; but the admis- 
 sion of this in the abstract, does not bind us to join in every 
 special act which it may be cited to justify. Employed in 
 this way, it is an argument that proves too much ;* for with 
 lax unconditional interpretation, it necessitates the freedom of 
 madmen, and of infants or idiots. Again; we may very 
 safely admit that a Representative is one who represents 
 others; but from this general admission, it can never be 
 inferred in what particular manner he is bound to repr 
 them; it may be as their messenger, it may be as their 
 spokesman, it may be as their delegate with special restricted 
 powers, it may be as the member of a legislative assembly. 
 What are his duties in any case or capacity whatever, will 
 evidently be undeterminable by the general signification of the 
 word : to ascertain these duties, we must ask in what way, 
 by prescription, or law, or usage, or power specially held and 
 specially granted, he is required to act. These thn examples 
 may stand for many others that might be given, im 
 such abstract terms as Socialism, Communism, Equality, Fra- 
 ternity. We may admit tin- justness of ^-n.-ral definitions 
 drawn from these and similar words; but we are not bound 
 to join in following out the definition into practical con- 
 sequences when we have no test from experience or custom to 
 warrant our proceed: 
 
 34. Another means of rhetorical delusion, is that <>f shifting 
 from one sense of a word or a proposition to another, so as to 
 lead the logician, in his inductive progress, to admit the con- 
 clusion of the one sense, as the conclusion of the other. This 
 delusion often takes place in thought, without any exterior 
 cause, other than the equivocal character of the wrd. 
 " Thus," says Dr. Whately, " a young divine per 
 truth of the maxim, that for the lower orders one's language 
 cannot be too plain, that is, clear and perspicuous, so as 
 to require no learning nor ingenuity to understand it : \vh.-n 
 he proceeds to practice, the word plain indistinctly ilits before 
 him, as it AY ere, and chocks him in the use of ornaments of 
 style, such as metaphor, epithet, antithesis, &c. : which are 
 opposed to plainness in a totally different sense of the word/' 
 
 * See Chapter V. Sections 11. l'_\ 
 
Sec. 35.] INDUCTIVE LOGIC SUGGESTIONS. 125 
 
 Hence, in many instances, " a dry and bald style, which has 
 no advantage in point of perspicuity, and is least of all suited 
 to the taste of the vulgar/' (Book III. 5.) The next exam- 
 ple is also from Dr. Whately, though with different arrange- 
 ment. In saying, " He who necessarily goes or stays," we 
 may mean he who goes of necessity, or stays of necessity : Or 
 we may mean this alternative, that he must either go or stay as 
 his will may determine. Now the person under the former 
 description is evidently not a free agent ; but the person under 
 the latter has all the freedom which we can attribute to a free 
 agent. The sophist may, however, so conceal his transition 
 from one of these two meanings to the other, as to get an ad- 
 mission of the doctrine of universal absolute necessity, the 
 doctrine which insists that no man is, in any case, a free 
 agent. 
 
 35. A further means of rhetorical delusion is that of 
 making a conclusion which is true of an aggregate, appear to 
 be true of the particulars of the aggregate ; or the reverse of 
 this. We need not notice the former mode at present, 
 because it can hardly be practised successfully on one who is 
 not trammelled by the forms of the Aristotelian syllogism, a 
 caution against the false forms of which has already been given 
 above (Section 32) ; and also because an occasion will occur 
 for exhibiting some examples in Chapter V. (Section 10.) 
 But the reverse of this mode of delusion may be here noticed, 
 namely, that of making a conclusion which is true of the par- 
 ticulars of an aggregate, appear to be true of the aggregate. 
 Now there can hardly be a delusion in so plain a case as the 
 following : we conclude, or more properly infer, when, in 
 throwing dice, a person casts two sixes now and then, that he 
 does so by what we call chance or good fortune ; but if he 
 casts two sixes fifty or a hundred times running, we can 
 hardly be driven or seduced into the same inference, reason 
 guided by experience teaching us, in such case, some very dif- 
 ferent inference. Yet in cases not dissimilar, a hearer or 
 reader may, by a juggle, be led away from this natural proce- 
 dure of the understanding. Let our example take the form of 
 a dialogue ; only, be it observed, the events supposed in it are 
 prospective, not determined. "Tom, I would advise you to 
 resign your place immediately." " What, in order that you 
 may be promoted to it ? " " No, not for that reason, though 
 
 C 
 
126 MANUAL OF LOGIC. 
 
 I am the next to succeed you; but because of some u- 
 
 have just learned, that you will be placed in a much 
 situation, if when it is vacant, v<m an- in a condition to have 
 it otli-n-d to you." " How so?" " \V! so ill that 
 
 his doctor- say In- cannot live a month." " And what t: 
 " Why his office being vacant, will be eligible for you, if, 
 which you know is an established proviso, vou are not in place 
 at the time/' kk Hut there are others lor whom it will also be 
 eligible." 4 ' Yes, but they are only a few : and.dou' 
 uncle will, by that time-, be returned from America, who has 
 interest sutlicieiit to make your superior qualification.- prop.-rlv 
 understood. \\'ith all these concurrent probabilit! 
 favour, I do say you must get this place, if you resign 
 whi<-h would decidedly prevent you from it." Now, if with- 
 out regard to further considerations, such as the po 
 v.-rv low value of the one place and very hi^li value of the 
 other, Tom .should, on this representation, p\v up his ; 
 he would be guilty of a practical non-sequitur of 
 deluded in a case of huriij proved too little. The s 
 speaks of' probabilities, as if, in the aggregate, they 
 
 made up a ///v</.'r ])robability, when the fact is, that the 
 nunilter of the probabilities diminishes the value of ea< 
 
 e of the aggregate, so that the value of the 
 whole m:: 'dated inversely to their number. 
 
 36. Perhaps the ivmuinin^ nn-ans of rhetorical d-l 
 inav be summed up by saying that they are all carried on with 
 the purpose of keeping out of [ .inch as possible, the 
 
 ) (articular point or points to which attention is required, for 
 the purpose of reaching the truth that ri 
 
 immediate intends of the sophist. If any accredited book of 
 rhetoric had svsteinati/.ed the particular means of carrying out 
 such a purpose, it would b- the business of logic to Oppose, 
 for the 1 "-IK -lit of its inductive learner, a correspondent 
 arrangement of means to avoid the several snares. But what- 
 ever mav U the corruption of our nature in j 
 not so lost as to tolerate such a system in theory,, any more 
 than we tolerate a written art of poison;: seduction. 
 
 As, therefore, there is no system to opp< 
 little system in the observations which follow. It cannot be 
 doubted, however, that unscrupulous persons who have par- 
 tial ends to carry, do find too easily, without express instruc- 
 
Sec. 36.] INDUCTIVE LOGIC SUGGESTIONS. 127 
 
 tion, the means to , their purpose : and it is for us to meet 
 these artifices, if not by instruction directed against each 
 means in detail, yet by general remarks which may indicate 
 their common, character, and how they are designed to operate. 
 Now, the ordinary plan of calling off attention from an 
 important questionable point, is, to refer to it as a point 
 not questioned among the select well-informed class of persons 
 who are presumed to be the leaders of opinion. By this 
 plan, a modest hearer or reader, not included, by his own 
 modesty, in the class, may doubt the extent of his information, 
 so as to suppose that he has not reached the knowledge 
 which persons of that select class enjoy. The plan here 
 spoken of, may be carried out variously. First, for example, 
 the questionable point may be delayed till tl^e end of a long 
 preliminary discourse, a discourse not at all touching the par- 
 ticular point, but dwelling on unquestionable generalities, 
 advanced, all along, on the understanding that they involve 
 the particular point yet to come ; which point, when it 
 comes, is stated as a thing of course, that all persons of com- 
 petent information have already admitted. Or, secondly, the 
 questionable point may be mingled with another, about which 
 there is no question ; and the two may be so shifted that at 
 last they seem one, and a conclusion may be insisted on which 
 carries the questionable point, though it truly carries only the 
 other. Or, thirdly, the questionable point may be so put to 
 the hearer or reader in the very form of a question, that if he 
 is seduced to answer it according to the form in which it is 
 proposed, and not according to the form in which the truth 
 requires it to be proposed, namely as being true or false, 
 he must give an answer suitable to the views of the sophist. 
 Or, fourthly, a series of cases may be proposed, as being all 
 the cases to which, respectively, an answer can be given ; 
 when there remains another case appertaining to the point at 
 issue, by omitting which, the sophist secures a triumphant 
 answer in favour of what it is his interest to prove. More- 
 over, any of these methods may receive considerable assistance 
 from the tone or style of the rhetorical reasoner; a tone 
 or style indicating his connection with a high grade of 
 thinkers, and a disparagement of those who, by then: way of 
 thinking, prove themselves not to belong to the same high 
 class. Some examples of these several observations (they 
 
 c2 
 
128 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. II. 
 
 be hypothetical) may be necessary. Suppose the so- 
 
 phist desires to establish, in the minds of his h-an-rs or 
 IV;I.ITS, the questionable fact that a certain minister of stat- 
 corrupt: using tin- means iiist indicated, he holds a long j 
 liminary discourse on the baseness of those who, being in 
 places of high ])olitical trust, abuse their power to serve their 
 private ends; and exciting in this manner a strung virtuous 
 indignation, without pointing to any person in particular 
 the object of it, he asks, at last, not whether A. B. is a man 
 that deserves this indignation, but assumes that he is known 
 to deserve it, except by people who are shut out, by ti. 
 station, from being acquainted with what is don.- in high 
 plan :\ ing so in words, but implying as much by his 
 
 tone or style); and thus, if his hearers or readers are not on 
 their guard against the delusion, he gains his point, by keeping 
 them 1mm the only inquiry which truth obliges tin-in to ii 
 tute. Suppose another instance for our first case :- 
 the sophist to lix it as a fact in his hearers' or readers' in 
 that a certain root is not a ch.-ap article of food. To all 
 ] ..... pie <>f common BeDae, \\\\> w.i ( M appear an aliair of mere 
 calrulation. Accordingly, the sophist begins with calculat; 
 elaborate and of th- produce per acre of this article 
 
 of food and of the other, sliding in, somewhere, a> a i 
 known and admitted in science, that the root in question 
 contains but a tenth part of the uutrit 
 
 in the substances opposed to it. Now it i> evident that all 
 the previous calculations will most likely amount to nothing, 
 unless the last point is clearly established, but instead of 
 
 ^blishinu; it, the ivasoner, by such an artiti.v as this, 
 may contrive to make it pass for granted, and thus his object 
 
 jained. Suppose further, in order to elucidate the second 
 means of sophistry indicated above, that the rheton 
 wishes his hearers or readers to admit the necessity of tn. 
 porting criminals to a foreign colony ; : mingle 
 
 this questionable point with one concerning which there is no 
 question, namely that it is oeoessaiT to i.-j.r.- crime in the 
 parent country ; when, bv passing frequently, in a long dis- 
 course, from one to the other of these two . he might 
 
 succeed in making them seem one; that is, in making it 
 appear that the <Wy way of repressing crime in the parent 
 country, is the transportation of its felons to the infant settle- 
 
Sec. 1.] DEFINITION. 129 
 
 ment. Suppose once more, in order to elucidate the third 
 means of sophistry which the previous remarks hint at, that 
 the sophist wishes to establish it as a fact, that A. B. evaded, 
 by a trick, the full payment of his just debts ; instead of 
 setting his hearers or readers to inquire whether such was the 
 fact, he may ask whether any one of them recollects the date 
 of the fact. Or, in order to elucidate the fourth means of 
 sophistry spoken of above, suppose the fact to be known that 
 A. B. did compromise with his creditors, but the question to 
 remain, whether it was through dishonesty, or imprudence, or 
 unavoidable misfortune, the sophist may stop his hearers 
 or readers from inquiring into the probability of the last cause, 
 by asking whether it was through dishonesty or imprudence, 
 shutting out, by this only alternative, the thought of any 
 other : And, lastly, as to the power of a certain tone or 
 style of speaking in eluding a questionable point, we may sup- 
 pose, for our example, a sincere holder of some religious tenet, 
 to be thrown among unbelievers. A sophist from among 
 these, instead of asking the grounds of the belief which he 
 wishes to undermine, and opposing them by direct argument, 
 may, by speaking of them with banter and contempt as not 
 worth an argument, gain the end which he could not have 
 reached by a direct road. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 DEFINITION. 
 
 1. Definition is the act of so fixing the limits of a term, 
 that nothing more nor less than it is intended to signify at the 
 time, shall be included in it. It is an art growing out of the 
 use of language, and possible only by having words to operate 
 with, or signs equivalent to words, Its general purpose is, 
 to assist the natural understanding ; and this it accomplishes 
 by subjecting all the knowledge acquired by it to one single 
 relation, not permanently to take place of those unnumbered 
 relations under which the things we live among are appre- 
 hended, (for this would be not to assist our knowledge it 
 would be to supplant it,) but that, in the inductive and de- 
 ductive process, we may stop at convenient stages, and fix, 
 and connect, and arrange, by the one pervading relation, the 
 
130 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Clup. III. 
 
 win il ; of what wo know, whether for the purpose of going on 
 to increase our stock, or of developing the stock acquired. 
 The art we speak of, is an essential part <>f formal logic, and 
 a ino.M. important part of ours. The formal syllogism, that 
 which works by extremes and middle term, would, without 
 it, have been an impossible construction; and with regard to 
 our logic, though it can, in a certain degree or condition. 
 without it, and does so exist in the practice of uneducated 
 people, yet, in such condition, it has no claim to rank 1. 
 than tin- many ordinary arts which wo learn and practise 
 without express instruction. We therefore willingly B 
 from formal logic, this part of its doctrine, the only part of 
 it which is truly useful. 
 
 THEORY OF LOGICAL DEFINITION. 
 
 2. We have seen in the previous chapter, (sect. 25,) that 
 the power of a name to extend its comprehensiveness, has no 
 limits luit the want of further things to receive its meaning; 
 and hence we have names, as thing , being, which include every 
 possible subject of thought.* And if we h;i i thus 
 
 comprehensive, the same process which led up to these, will 
 have produced others of l-ss and less de-jivs of comprehen- 
 siveness, till the names are those on which the process has 
 not yet been tried, that is to say, proper names, or the i. 
 of individuals. As the process c<>n>i>ts in superinducing a 
 relation upon the results of the natural understanding, and 
 therefore is an artificial process, so, though the prim-;; 
 always the same, then- are great differences of detail in apply- 
 ing it. For instance, almost every transcvnd-ntalist 1., 
 own set of categories, the summa genera under which he is 
 led, by the character of his inducth to marshal the 
 
 developments of his understanding. What these severally 
 are, needs not be stated ln-iv: it is sufficient to say that not 
 one of them exactly coincides with the views unfolded in this 
 Manual, which therefore proposes its own categories, namely 
 
 * Kxeept not/tin^ or not-being; a name which, shadowy as it is, still 
 keeps tli.' tact pivsrnt, that wherever th.-iv is kimwl.-.!-.'. there ir. 
 under it, the thing known, and the tiling by which it is known. Here, 
 the former is denoted by thin-] or bein : j ; the latter, by nothing, not-beinj, 
 nitty ; or, contnirily, we kiunv what wjt-': . isewc know 
 
 what bevy is. 
 
See. 2 ] THEORY OF DEFINITION. 131 
 
 the distribution of all things which can be the subject of 
 thought into Things-physical, and Things-metaphysical, the 
 former of these subdividing into Things-real and Things-ideal. 
 Now, as to things-ideal, since they are the counterparts or the 
 compositions of things-real, we need not pursue them dis- 
 tinctly from things-real, but go on to speak of the subdivisions 
 as equally belonging to both under their general denomination 
 of Things-physical. There is an old division of real things 
 into matter and mind ; a division which, in our days, has been 
 thought sufficient to warrant an inductive system of philosophy 
 built upon the latter, so as to be distinct from the sciences 
 professing to be concerned solely about the former. Whether 
 this is, or is not a sound purpose, requires no discussion here : 
 it is sufficient to assert that though the distinction on which it 
 is founded is a most convenient one for many logical ends, 
 it is one concerning which we can at present know nothing 
 (whatever we may believe) further than that man is a being 
 capable of constant progress in knowledge, and raised in this 
 respect above all other creatures perceptible by his senses. 
 We may state this fact by saying he has a mind; but in so 
 stating, we do not explain, or get beyond the fact as previously 
 stated.* Transferring, then, both matter and mind, from the 
 place sometimes assumed for them among things-physical, to 
 
 * Be it well observed that what is here said, interferes in no degree 
 with the Bible doctrine of man's immortality, but goes quite along with 
 it, as far as, on human grounds, any doctrine can go. Nay, even the 
 Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul, (a doctrine not identical 
 with the Bible doctrine, though not contrary to it, and therefore, by be- 
 lievers, often, perhaps almost always, joined to it,) even that doctrine is 
 not contradicted by what is said above, though its claim to scientific va- 
 lidity is questioned. Nor, again, do the remarks made above give any 
 countenance to what is called Materialism ; for if it asserts that mind is 
 an abstraction, that is, not a Thing-physical but metaphysical, it asserts 
 the same of matter, whose existence as a substratum or common essence 
 of all the things of sense, is, like the other point, quite unsusceptible both 
 of proof and disproof. Matter, as far as we can know anything about it, 
 has its existence only in an arbitrary definition, which comprehends just 
 so many of the things of sense as experience in physical science points out 
 to be expedient. In the meantime what more rational to believe than that 
 man, however assimilated to the things of sense among which he is now 
 placed, is designed for immortality, by having means within reach for 
 regaining the perfection of a nature that evidently struggles to raise itself 
 above them ? 
 
V.V1 MANUAL OF LOGIC.- [Chap. IIL 
 
 what we deem their proper place, namely among thin^s- 
 metaphysical, we come next, in our pi- 
 individual things, to the domains of acknowledged inductive 
 science; and what shall here be the summa genera or heads 
 of classification, depends on the judgement of those who, 
 having experience in those wide domains, are qualified 1. 
 experience to guide others. All that logic proposes, is, to 
 direct th<- pri/ triple of every classification, not to lay duwn the 
 classification itself. That principle is easily state* 1. The 
 summum genus or general name of the things alout which the 
 science, whatever it may be, is conversant, must be divided 
 into subordinate heads, each of these again into sab-subordinate 
 heads, and so on downwards till our last division brings us to 
 the individual things by which our earliest know 1 -dp- was 
 suggested, and for the better comprehension of which, this 
 systematizing principle has been put hi operation. The word 
 division, be it here observed, is not, in describing the fore- 
 going operation, used in the same sense as when used in 
 speaking of the division of any natural substance into pa 
 as for instance into halves, quarters, or eighths, and so forth, 
 but it is used to signify what, for common apprehe: 
 WQ mi^ht better sipiifv by the term </ ; di>tribu- 
 
 tioii implying that the whole is spread <>ut, remaining, as a 
 whole, what it was. Our meaning above, then, oth 
 stated, is, that the- chief head i> spread out into subordi- 
 nate heads, each ni' the>e, again, into sul-sul .ordinal. heads, 
 and so on till the lowest heads can but be spread out into 
 the individuals of which thev consist. Now it matters 
 not what the chief head, or the subordinate heads, or the sub- 
 subordinate heads are called ; * we have only to remember 
 that, in logic, the names employed are commonly these: 
 summum yen us for the chief head; genus for each of the heads 
 under it ; nulialtern genus for each of the sub-subordinate heads; 
 and for each of as many more as may be subjected to each of 
 these ; till we come to the proximum genus, or that next above 
 the species, and then under each species we have only indivi- 
 duals. Be it observed, however, that every subaltern genus 
 is a species with relation to the genus immediately above it, 
 
 * As, for instance, instead of the names which follow above, we may 
 use those of Class, Order, Genus, Species, Variety. 
 
Sec. 3.J THEORY OF DEFINITION. 133 
 
 and therefore every such genus is a proximum genus with 
 relation to such species. So much for the application of the 
 principle to physical things. Returning now to things-meta- 
 physical, we have this important observation to make ; that 
 as they have their existence only in the understanding, so the 
 enunciation of them in the form of definition, must always, if 
 the enunciation is adequate, be equivalent to the things them- 
 selves ; as, for instance, the definitions of a point, a line, a 
 circle, &c., in mathematics ; the definitions of virtue, vice, 
 pride, " passion, and apathy, and glory, and shame ;" and so 
 on with the terms of double abstraction * in whatever other 
 science. 
 
 3. Such are the effects, described generally, of superinducing 
 the indicated one relation upon all the knowledge which the 
 natural understanding collects. It is this that renders logical 
 definition possible. Uneducated persons do not define, they 
 describe ; that is to say, when they try to convey their know- 
 ledge to others, they refer only to individual things, distin- 
 guishing these from each other by every variety of mark 
 through which they differ to the natural understanding. And 
 this indeed is knowledge, the knowledge enjoyed by our 
 species at large : and logic in its superinduction of one uni- 
 versal relation to connect and arrange this knowledge, is a 
 most useful minister to knowledge. But when, beyond this, 
 it builds an art of reasoning upon its own arbitrary arrange- 
 ment, in order to take the place of, or even to explain the 
 natural acts of the understanding, it then becomes, so far as it 
 can attain its purpose, a mischievous innovator instead of a 
 useful minister. We say, so far as it can attain its purpose ; 
 which purpose fully attained would be, to put words arti- 
 ficially explained in place of thought derived from things, to 
 reason with words instead of by means of words. But in fact 
 the Aristotelians never have reached this point in perfecting 
 their art, fortunately in one respect, but unfortunately in 
 another ; since, if it could have been carried fully out, its 
 monstrous pretensions would have been earlier discovered. 
 But the bulk of mankind never have been drawn into the use 
 of their artificial syllogism ; and even themselves, nay, even 
 in illustrating that syllogism,- have in general used informal 
 
 * See the previous chapter, sect. 15. 
 
 c3 
 
104 MANUAL OF LOGIC. ("Chap. III. 
 
 shapes, as suggesting meaning more readily than the strict 
 forms of their own syllogism. Yet with these hindrances to 
 its presumed mischievous effect, the predominance of Aristo- 
 telian logic in the schools of Europe during several ayjes, was 
 accompanied by a sign sufficiently indicative of mischief some- 
 where, namely by activity in learning without progress and 
 without fruit. Inquiry, during that time, moved only in a 
 circle ; and he who left his place of education at twenty 
 of age, was sure to find, if he visited it at sixty, the same 
 questions going on, which employed him in his youth. When 
 philosophy spread her wing to reach the height she is still 
 seeking, the trammels of the Aristotelian syllogism dropped 
 from her, whether as effect or as cause is immaterial : the 
 fact itself is too notorious to be called in question. 
 
 PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS AND DIRECTIONS GROUNDED ON THE 
 FOREGOING THEORY. 
 
 4. Definitions are Nominal or Reed. Again, real definitions 
 are Accidental or Essential. And again, ossential definitions 
 are either Purely-logical or Phy ideological. * 
 
 5. A Nominal definition is one that is so only by name, 
 and not in reality. Or it may be otherwise explained by 
 si i vino; that it d<vs but put one name for another, on the sup- 
 position that the one substituted is more in use, and conse- 
 quently better understood. Thus we inav d<-iine nonentity by 
 nothiixj ; hiiidtt' by inborn; periphery by circumference; mono- 
 logue by soliloquy. In a nominal definition, only one word 
 must be used, or if more than one, it must be such a combi- 
 nation as is understood in the manner of one word : for if we 
 collect a meaning from two or more words, then there is a 
 development of knowledge, and the definition U a ival one. 
 
 :;: In this arrangement, and in the meaning of some of the terms, I have 
 felt it necessary to deviate from Dr. Whately. He justly points out that 
 Kominal and K.-al, ;'s la-, after others, explains them, furnish a distinct or 
 cross division as iv^ards the division into Accidental, Physical, and Logical ; 
 a (act which he complains that his brethren have overlooked, s<> 
 have introduced confusion and perplexity. I hope I avoid confusion by 
 not making ^'cntin'il and H division ; ir I do not use the terms 
 
 in the same souses as Dr. Whately, although in sense?- which custom fully 
 warrants. Further, I do not follow him in the unqualified contradistinc- 
 tion of Physical from Logical definitions ; my reasons for which may be 
 collected from the foregoing theory. 
 
Sec. ..' <.] DEFINITION PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS. 135 
 
 In defining man, a human-being, or explaining To prevent, by 
 the correspondent expression To go-before, the two words in 
 each definition would most likely be taken as the syllables of 
 a single word ; and if so taken, the definition is a nominal 
 one.* It is also a nominal definition, though the words may 
 be several, which repeats the word to be explained in another 
 grammatical shape ; as when we say, Justice is the quality of 
 being just.'j* 
 
 6. A Real definition, that is, a definition in reality, J is an 
 explanation developed in some form of two or more words, 
 with the effect that the thing defined is referred to some class, 
 and the difference in some way indicated between it and the 
 other things of its class. If \ve say John is always talking of 
 himself, we declare a fact concerning John, but we do not use 
 any form of definition. If, however, we say John is a man that 
 is always talking of himself, we do use a loose form of definition, 
 inasmuch as we refer our subject to his class or kind, man, 
 
 * The student will bear in mind that whenever the meaning is collected 
 out of words put together to suggest it, there is the logical process of 
 premises and a conclusion. (See chapter I.) But in combinations of fre- 
 quent and familiar occurrence, the logical process has become unnecessary, 
 and of such combinations we receive the meaning at once, as we receive it 
 from single words. The description applies to all the familiar phrases of 
 common speech. 
 
 f A subject which is sui generis hardly admits other than a nominal 
 definition ; as, for instance, Time,, or Space. So far as these can be un- 
 derstood by human faculties, every one capable of thought has a full 
 understanding of them : to explain them to one who did not already know 
 what they are, would be impossible. We may say, Time is the measure 
 of duration ; Space is the measure of extent : but a clock, and a surveyor's 
 rod, would, with almost as much propriety, come under these definitions ; 
 though the one is better called a measurer of time, (chronometer,) and 
 the other a measurer of space, (chorometer.) Perhaps, the nearest ap- 
 proach we can make to a real definition of time, is, " That which exists 
 between, and co-exists with events:" and of space, "That which is 
 occupied by the tangible things of sense, (or deemed tangible,) and exists 
 where they are not." Kant denies the objectivity of time and space, 
 making them parts of the mind itself, receptacles into which the matter 
 is poured, which the understanding subsequently forms into the things of 
 the material universe. We may safely leave this dogma to the fate of 
 German metaphysics in general, contradicting, as it does, a conviction quite 
 as strong as that which attaches to all other things that we deem external . 
 
 J For, be it observed, real is not here used in the restricted sense 
 assigned to it when we oppose it to ideal, but in its common and looser 
 
130 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap III. 
 
 and then indicate the difference between him and men in 
 general. Every form of real definition, strict or loose, has 
 these two parts, namely kind and difference. Thus in defining 
 man a rational animal, the latter term animal implies the kind 
 or genus, and rational the difference, which is here called the 
 specific difference. 
 
 7. An Accidental definition, commonly called a description, 
 is that w r hich explains a thing by its properties or accidents. 
 Now a property is something which uniformly belongs to a 
 subject, but is not so present to the understanding as I 
 thought at the moment essential, however it may be so. We 
 say, for instance, that it is the property of a triangle, (not its 
 essence,) to have its three angles equal to two right ; 
 but that it is its essence, (not its property,) to have three 
 sides. An accident differs from a property by being separable 
 from a subject ; as for instance, to be right, or obtuse, or acute, 
 is separable from the subject angle, in its general sense ; in 
 other words we may say, that to be right, obtuse, or acute, 
 is accidental to an angle generally, though essential to each 
 species. So when we define or describe John as a man t/tat /.s 
 always talking of himself , we describe him by what is accidental 
 to his kind, though essential to John's sp -cial rharaet.-r. But 
 we might go on describing him by an-id-nts that are not essen- 
 tial, as for instance, that he lives in Mich a ] 
 and such rompanv, and so forth ; all of which niav f..nn parts 
 in our definition or description, and all b,-i.,ng to what is 
 called an Accidental dd in it ion. We have n.-xt, i 
 observe, that though we can define or describe an individual 
 thing by what are purely accidental to it, as when we d. 
 an individual plant by saying it is a rose-bush growing at the 
 farther end of the south-mill, and n<>\r in full blossom, yet we 
 cannot so define or describe a kind of tiling : we then, in order 
 to form an accidental definition or description, have recor 
 the properties of the kind: as, for instance, in describing what 
 a plant is, (that is to say, any plant, not a particular or indi- 
 vidual plant,) we mav say that it is a natural pn.idw ' 
 out of the earth from a seed or a root, very . colour, 
 
 and form, having wit/tin it a principle of life, aucl decaying 
 wlien that principle is no longer active. The description might 
 be lengthened to any extent by adding other properties of 
 plants ; and the whole would be an accidental definition. 
 
Sec. 7, 8.] DEFINITION PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS. 137 
 
 8. An Essential definition is one that limits its subject to 
 that extent, neither more nor less, to which we design to adhere, 
 in our subsequent inductive or deductive process ; a purpose 
 which it accomplishes by adding to its proximum genus, its 
 specific (or characteristic) difference. Thus we define a square 
 by calling it an equilateral rectangle ; where rectangle is the 
 proximum genus, and equilateral the specific difference ; and, 
 in a similar manner we define man by calling him a ra- 
 tional animal. An Essential definition is either Purely-logical 
 or Physico-logical ; purely logical when the subject is meta- 
 physical or transcending nature ; physico-logical when the 
 subject is a natural object, or embraces natural objects.* 
 Thus of the two definitions used as examples above, the 
 former is purely logical, the other physico-logical.f It is 
 true that a naturalist might not be satisfied with the definition 
 given of man ; but this would be, only because it employs 
 not the mode of limitation which his system requires. He 
 might find it necessary, for his end, to define man, a mammal 
 having two hands with thumbs opposdble to the fingers, and three 
 kinds of teeth, cutting, canine, and grinding. \ But the other 
 definition, though formed with a different purpose as regards 
 the future deductive process, is a physico-logical definition as 
 well as the latter. In the latter, the characteristics forming the 
 specific difference, namely having two hands, c., have reference 
 to a different artificial genus, namely mammal. Thus various 
 for the different purposes of development, are physico-logical 
 definitions : and if so, it will be readily conceived that those 
 
 * We say subject when we refer to what exists only in the under- 
 standing, namely, the knowledge of what an outward thing is, distinct 
 from the outward thing so understood : we say object when we refer to 
 this outward thing. Hence the distinction into Subjective and Objective, 
 which will occur in some future statements. 
 
 f It must be borne in mind that physical things, in our view, include 
 both real and ideal things, and hence the definition of an ideal thing, 
 for instance, of a phoenix as a bird fabled so and so, is a physico-logical 
 definition. 
 
 J Genus and difference, if not capable of being respectively signified 
 by a mere grammatical substantive, and mere grammatical adjective, will 
 nevertheless still be so signified by constructed expressions equivalent to 
 those two parts of speech; that is to say, by what, in " Principles of 
 Grammar," are called a logical substantive and a logical adjective. Here, 
 a-mammal, is the logical substantive, what remains of the definition, 
 the logical adjective. 
 
138 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. III. 
 
 purely logical must bo still more subject to the choice or 
 arbitrary determination of the thinker. In forming these, he 
 is under no more than a prudential restraint ; as, for instance, 
 the custom of language, which ought to prevent him from 
 defining a word quite apart from its usual meaning. One 
 thing he has always to remember, that whatever limitation 
 he chooses to give to the meaning of a word, to that he should 
 strictly adhere in his subsequent development. Suppose, for 
 instance, that he has defined Pride to be inordinate self- 
 esteem, he could not, under such a definition, justly propose, 
 in any branch of his development, to treat of a proper or de- 
 cent pride ; for the very purpose is contradictory. To accom- 
 plish the purpose, his original, or some secondary definition, 
 must assign a less limited meaning to the subject, as, for in- 
 stance, by calling it self-esteem, simply ; and then treating of 
 it under the heads of an improper and a proper self-esteem. 
 
 First Note to Chapter III. 
 
 It may assist the student to the better understanding and application of 
 what precedes, to quote, however we may have anticipated them, the 
 following rules and cautions from Dr. Whately's Logic: u First, the 
 definition must be (/'//'/<//<; that is, neither ton extTi>ive nor too narrow 
 for the thing defined : for example, to define fish an animal that / 
 ihr >r>>t<r. would l.e ton extensive, because, many in>-ets and other crea- 
 tures live in the water: to define it an mutual th<it has an air-bladder, 
 would be too narrow, because many fish are without any. Or again, if 
 in a definition of money, you should specify its being made of metal, that 
 would be too narn.w. as excluding the >hel"ls used as money in some parts 
 of Africa: if again you should define it as <tu art > in ex- 
 
 change for SOI/K t/iin</ < />' , that would be too wide, as it would include 
 things exchanged hy barter. And observe, that such a defect in a defini- 
 tion cannot be remedied by making an arbitrary exception : if, for in- 
 stance, a person were to give such a definition mcapU 'I as should include 
 land, without meaning to have included it, and should then propose to 
 remedy the fault by saying, that capital is 
 
 adetcriptio* EXCEPT I..VM*. Secondly, the definition must be in itself 
 plainer than the thing defined, else it would not explain it : in itself 
 plainer, that is, generally ; because, to some particular person, the term 
 defined may happen to be even more familiar and better understood, than 
 the language of the definition. And thirdly, (though this rule may be 
 considered as included in the rule just given,) the definition should be 
 couched in a convenient number of appropriate words. Figurative words 
 are opposed to appropriate, and are apt to produce ambiguity or indistinct- 
 ness : too great brevity may occasion obscurity; and too great prolixity, 
 confusion." " Tautology, which is a distinct fault from prolixity or 
 verbosity, must also be avoided, that is, tautology which consists in in- 
 
Sec. 8.] DEFINITION PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS. 139 
 
 serting too much, not in mere words, but in sense ; not so as too much 
 to narrow the definition (in opposition to Rule first,) by excluding some 
 things which belong to the class of the thing defined, but only so as to 
 state something which has been already implied. Thus, to define a paral- 
 lelogram, a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are parallel AND EQUAL, 
 would be tautological ; because, though it is true that such a figure, and 
 such alone, is a parallelogram, the equality of the sides is implied in their 
 being parallel, and may be proved from it. Now the insertion of the 
 words and equal, leaves, and indeed leads, a reader to suppose that there 
 may be a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are parallel, but not equal. 
 Though therefore such a definition asserts nothing false, it leads to a sup- 
 position of what is false ; and consequently is to be regarded as an incor- 
 rect definition." The effect may be further illustrated by the following 
 examples. " If it be laid down that he who breaks into an empty house 
 shall receive a certain punishment, it may be inferred that this punish- 
 ment will not be incurred by breaking into an inhabited house : if it be 
 called a crime for people to violate the property of a humane landlord who 
 lives among them, it may perhaps be inferred that it is no crime to violate 
 the property of a landlord who is not humane, or is an absentee." 
 
 Second Note to Chapter III. 
 
 Connected with the laws of definition, and indeed involved in them, is 
 the fixing of preliminary conditions, at least in the mind, before we enter 
 on a dispute or discussion. It should be settled, for instance, what is the 
 ground of dispute : is it a real or verbal question, that is, a question 
 concerning facts, or a question concerning the application of a word ? A 
 dispute otherwise interminable, may often be cut short if not adjusted, by 
 the application of this test. Two persons are disputing whether A. B. 
 was a man of genius : " Are you," it may be said by one of them, "are 
 you agreed with me that he was capable of such and such productions ; if 
 so, it is a question about the application of a word, and now let us see in 
 what way custom authorizes the use of the word, and what sense agrees 
 with our present meaning." Or suppose the parties use the word in 
 exactly the same sense ; then the dispute turns on facts or the character of 
 the facts ; to ascertain which, recourse must be had to inquiry, comparison, 
 and general estimation. Further ; the logician should be aware that on 
 many questions which are given out for the express purpose of provoking 
 discussion, a sensible person would express no opinion unless he were per- 
 mitted to qualify it. Thus, for instance, the often mooted question : Is 
 a public or private education preferable ? This, as a general question, 
 cannot be rationally answered: we ought to know exactly what the 
 education is, which, under each denomination, is proposed to be given, as 
 well as the disposition of the person who is to be subjected to it, and his 
 ulterior prospects in life. Thus limited, the question would present itself 
 in a very different shape, and probably leave room for little or no dif- 
 ference of opinion. In the wars which closed with the Pacification of Paris 
 in 1815, was Great Britain more indebted to her army or her navy 1 ? 
 Such a question in an assembly composed of the two different interests, 
 would probably have produced, some few years ago, a very animated dis- 
 cussion j but it is one which, instead of discussing, it would be wise to 
 
140 MANUAL OF L [Chap. IV. 
 
 object to alto'jvfhcr, OR the gfOUnd of its l.-ili'J impossible to he j 
 
 tliat the operations of each service for which en-lit w-.uld In- assumed, 
 did not arise out of, and take their character from. Die existence of the 
 rival service : the question is nearly like such a one as this, h the lieart 
 or the head more useful to the rest of the body? We might ind *-<{ reason- 
 al)ly ask, whether firenf Jirilnin nhndd .yW; In I, ./, a great 
 
 inilit'inj power 1 Such a question would permit a decision on rational 
 grounds ; but in proportion as we become rational, we leave less room 
 for contention, and tin: other question would probably be preferred by 
 those who propose subjects expressly to provoke discussion. Is the decline 
 of wit VMS mure <>;,<</ i n the misconduct of //ov/v<//"-/*/>-. <>r t/<>' <fjcncracy 
 of the people? Here two separate causes are assumed, before it h 
 established that they act separately. We might as well ask, v/<et/<tr t/t 
 decline <>f the tn/rkct into the well is more owing to t/ie rope or the wheel? 
 It would indeed be reasonable to inquire, whether wrong principles ami 
 j>ru<-ti'i:e in government do not produce degeneracy in the people 1 and, 
 whet/L-rtli-grnt'nirif in the people, does not leave little <-/t<mce of a good 
 government to reclaim them? The determination of these inquiries, which 
 would be attended with little or no difference of opinion, would show that 
 there is no rational ground for the alternative proposed in the previous 
 question. Is <> oorwtusiw />><, h/tinji, $/</< / late so oft' 
 
 nessed on //" oofttmatf, mischievous or beneficial to a nation? A 
 reasoner would allinn neither side of the question, unless permitt--d to 
 qualify, and then he would atlirm both: it is mischievous at the time; it 
 is likely to he benelicial in some uncertain number of years to come. Wo 
 thus walk aside from the snare, for which, it may i . ."U was 
 
 put. Had the answer allirnn-d such a revolution ' ial. it would 
 
 have opened the m.-aiis of rhetorical delusion specified in the last Chapter, 
 (Section :'.:'..) A> it is, the answers are quite innocent; the one atHrms 
 an experimented i' ;u t : the other permits no p. 
 
 though it is true that a man may get a new and a better house by Wing 
 burned out of an old one, we cannot rationally act upon this fart, 
 a house on tire to the imminent danger of the inmates olid the neighbour- 
 hood whenever a new one is wanted. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 
 
 1. Deduct i\v loo-ic is the art of developing in words, and 
 
 making sjMrial, for one's own conviction and ft, the 
 
 knowK'(L f - <il:taiiK'd l>y the inductive process. It ditVers from 
 Rhetoric by stopping short at the object st; vrthe- 
 
 less, as Logic ought to be exerci to j-n pare for 
 
 Rhetoric, every ik-vi'lopmont of deductive logic must be con- 
 sidered imperfect, unless, while it convinces and satisfies 
 oneself, it is also fitted to convince and satisfy all, who have 
 the same previous knowledge. 
 
Sec. 1, 2.] THEORY OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 141 
 
 THEORY OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 
 
 2. We have seen that, in the inductive process, every act 
 of the understanding includes three things, the thing known, 
 the thing by which it is known, and the knowledge gained. 
 Being gained, the knowledge remains abstract from the 
 things, not indeed ever present to consciousness, but revivable 
 upon occasions that require it, by the presence of real or of 
 ideal things, or by means of a sign audible or visible. But 
 when the knowledge is revived by its proper occasion, it does 
 not always bring with it all the things which suggested it; 
 and we have to develop these things by that conscious effort 
 which we call thinking. This is, in other words, to go back 
 to the steps (not exactly, which would scarcely be possible, 
 but virtually, to the steps) which led to our knowledge : and 
 such development is the practice of deductive logic; which 
 development never includes, in strict theory, more than we 
 already know. Thus, for instance, we may meet with some 
 instance of kingly magnificence which awes our thoughts, so 
 that we understand, for a moment, such condition of man as 
 something different from the ordinary lot of humanity ; but 
 considering afterwards, as a part of our knowledge already 
 acquired, that a king is but a man, we shall conclude that 
 kings are not exempted from the lot of other men, but, like 
 them, are mortal. The development of such knowledge may 
 be expressed in words by a single proposition, namely, 
 " Kings, who are but men, are mortal." Or it may be ex- 
 pressed in three propositions, which represent the three 
 things that originally constituted our knowledge : namely, 
 1. "Every man is mortal: 2. Every king is a man: 3. 
 Therefore, every king is mortal." When we develop our 
 knowledge in this manner, the three propositions are a syl- 
 logism. When we develop it in any other way which forces 
 assent from a person possessed of the pre-supposed knowledge, 
 the syllogism is virtually included in the expression ; because 
 the three things which the syllogism represents, are included 
 in every act of the understanding. Hence, the syllogism is 
 properly resorted to in all cases of doubt or difficulty, for the 
 purpose of testing the knowledge gained, with relation to the 
 conclusion which it necessarily includes. 
 
142 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 Note to Section 2. 
 
 Our Syllogism is the informal Syllogism, by which is meant the Syl- 
 logism that makes no use of the doctrine of comparison between extr- -in- > 
 and middle terms, which belong only to the doctrine of the formal syl- 
 logism of AristotK The syllogism given as our example above, happens 
 to exhibit those terms in the construction of the several propositions ; but 
 this is accidental to our syllogism, and not essential or important. In 
 our doctrine, each premise of the syllogism is one expn-s>ion with one 
 meaning ; and, in the instance above, is the statement, in each, of a 
 known truth or fact. But these facts are no sooner stated in connection, 
 than they inevitably suggest the conclusion which is expressed by the 
 third ; and the whole of them are now one expression with one meaning. 
 To ask why they are so, or to take in hand a demonstration of what i.s 
 thus attained, is a question, and a proceeding, as absurd as it would be to 
 ask why a rose is fragrant, and to set about a verbal demonstration that 
 it is so. Accordingly, with men of sense and education, but not so edu- 
 cated as to be trammelled by scholastic logic, the syllogism in actual use, 
 is the informal syllogism ; and to this they have recourse, when, in the 
 inductive process, not being quite satisfied with the grounds on which 
 they have come to some inference, they deduce the process in a syllogism, 
 that so the grounds and the conclusion (inevitable in the deduction) may 
 be clearly set forth, and the defect, if any, may be seen ; which fault will 
 always be found in the premises, ami never in the conclusion. 
 
 But say the Ari.stot.-lians, that is, they who arc trammelled by scho- 
 lastic logic, we find in the practice of reducing all to the 
 demonstration of extremes and middle term, a wonderful }nwer in sharp- 
 ening tin- intellect. It may be so: riddles, charades, and conundrums 
 have this power also. But is it an exercise which sharpens the intellect 
 for the hi^h practical purposes of life ? May not a person acquire great 
 skill in the reduction of reasoning to the Aristotelian formulas without 
 any benefit, nay even with prejudice, to the natural powers of the under- 
 standing exerted for the ends just alluded to? He who makes use of a 
 complicated instrument to effect that which nature has fitted him to do 
 with his naked hand, may possibly fail in usin^ the instrument, though 
 he could not fail in usin^ the natural means. We reserve our proofs of 
 what is In re suu^ested only as possible, to another opportunity. If we 
 shall be able to show that Dr. Whately himself is guilty of a gross fallacy, 
 that of the circle, in endeavouring to establish the claims of the 
 telian syllogism, the cause of the error must be set down, in him, not to 
 the want of great natural judgement, which Dr. Whately, of all men, 
 cannot be accused of, but to some defect in the emplovment of his instru- 
 mental means of coming at his conclusion. (See the next Chapter, Sec- 
 lion 9.) 
 
 There is an enormous delusion in the doctrine of the Aristotelian syl- 
 logism, which may be taken notice of before concluding this note. In 
 this doctrine it is pretended that the reasoning process can be exhibited 
 distinct from the subject-matter of reasoning. What we affirm, (and the 
 affirmation, we presume, carries conviction along with it,) is. that where 
 there is no subject-matter to be understood, there can be nothing under- 
 
Sec. 3, 4.] THEORY OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 143" 
 
 stood. When we say Y is X, but Z is Y we affirm what is not true, 
 and there is no conclusion : but if proviso is made that Y shall be the 
 same as X, and Z the same as Y, a conclusion follows ; and the cause is, 
 that, by the proviso, X, Y, and Z, become real subject-matter. 
 
 3. But though, in strict theory, the development of know- 
 ledge never can include more than we already know ; we 
 cannot, in practice, always distinguish between the inductive 
 and the deductive process. For in thinking, that is, in the 
 effort to develop our knowledge, it is the proper course, when 
 we do not find in our previous experience or accredited infor- 
 mation, sufficient ground for what we presume WQ know, to 
 go back to the inductive process, in order to collect the proofs 
 or disproofs of such presumed knowledge. Such proofs are 
 called External arguments ; and in the practice of deductive 
 logic, they very often occur among the Internal arguments ; 
 which in strict theory are alone proper to Deductive Logic. 
 Hence the principle of deductive logic, as it is to be practically 
 conducted, may be laid down as follows : It is, to develop 
 our knowledge, by following it into that which is necessarily 
 included in it, but which we do not at once recognize as so 
 included, either from defect of attention, or because our know- 
 ledge is assumed before we have legitimately reached it. 
 
 4. Every single word is, as we have seen, the sign of ab- 
 stract knowledge, and, if legitimately used, includes all the 
 steps by which the knowledge has been gained, and every 
 step was an act of the understanding, which, as already 
 stated, always implies the co-existence of three things. Now 
 when the knowledge, which we have abstracted to the utmost 
 degree that our faculties can reach, or the words we use 
 can signify, is to be deduced and specially applied, the 
 universal method of logic is this : to join words together 
 which have a separate or abstract meaning, so that each loses 
 its abstract meaning, by each helping the other to suggest a 
 more special meaning, the expression formed by the junction 
 of the words, becoming the instant they are joined only 
 one expression for the one more special meaning. This is 
 what we called, joining words together to make sense ; and it 
 is presupposed that while they make sense, they shall also 
 make grammar, that is, be accurate forms of construction. 
 Thus, for instance, red and earth, are respectively signs of 
 abstract knowledge : so likewise are Time and flies : so like- 
 
144 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 wise are every and man : so likewise are is and mortal. But 
 red earth being joined make sense, and are one expression for 
 one meaning, which meaning is special in comparison with 
 the separate meaning of red and the separate meaning of 
 earth. The same is to be said of Time flies and of Every man 
 and of Is mortal, when the respective words are joined. And 
 again, with regard to the last two expressions, each of which 
 is now to be esteemed only one logical element or part of 
 speech, the moment we join them together, we find they 
 make sense, and that sense is special in comparison with the 
 separate meaning of Every man and the separate meaning of 
 is mortal.* 
 
 5. The grammatical function of a sign, whether single, or 
 compounded of several that form one expression with one 
 meaning, does not affect the previous statement. It is true 
 that a sign whose form indicates that it is only a part of 
 speech, carries, in that form, a warning that we are not to 
 rest in its separate meaning, but to await the junction of 
 another sign for some more special meaning intended. But a 
 sentence completely constructed, though it does not carry the 
 same warning in its form, is nevertheless, if not the final 
 sentence, but one of a link in the chain of expression by which 
 the thought will at last be developed, as much a part of 
 speech as any individual word recognized by grammar as a 
 part. The complete logical expression or WORD, is nothing 
 less than the whole of the means used to develop the know- 
 ledge which the thinker chooses to unfold at the time ; and it 
 may amount to a large discourse, which being completed, is 
 one expression for the knowledge unfolded ; of which the 
 
 * So, man, horse, cards, a, horseback, on, o/, are each a single gram- 
 matical word, each implying abstract knowledge. Again, a-man, a-horse, 
 on-horscbctck, of-cards, are, respectively, signs of meaning less abstract, 
 that is, of knowledge in a degree more specially developed, the signs being 
 formed of mere grammatical words joined by grammar and by logic. And 
 again, a-man-on-/u>;>r/x /</;, a-pack-of-cards, are signs, similarly formed, 
 of meaning still less abstract. The examples, a little improved on those 
 in Aldrich, are given in Whately's Logic (Book II., Ch. 1, 1) as in- 
 stances of Simple Apprehension, Incomplex and Complex ; distinctions 
 founded, like the Aristotelian doctrine generally, on essentially wrong 
 notions of the way in which language is the exponent of thought. Dr. 
 Whately, as if suspicious of the fact, expresses himself with some caution 
 in his later editions, as compared with the earlier. 
 
Sac. 5-7.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 145 
 
 several portions are properly deemed parts of speech in Logic, 
 though devoid of forms to imply that they are parts in grammar. 
 
 6. But though a sentence may be, in Logic, and commonly 
 is, only a part of speech, yet the difference adverted to, 
 namely, that it does not carry in its form a warning to wait 
 for meaning to come, enables us to rest in its meaning, if we 
 please, although the rest may be temporary. A sentence 
 may therefore be described as an expression thai proposes or 
 lays before the thinker the development of his knowledge : 
 as " Time flies :" "Every man is mortal :" "'A king is but 
 a man." It is therefore called a proposition. A grammatical 
 part of speech only begins, or continues, or completes such a 
 proposition, and by its form indicates that it is -to be under- 
 stood as doing no more : for instance, Time ; Man ; 
 Is ; Every man ; Time as it flies ; A king, who is 
 but a man . These, by their form, are evidently only parts 
 of propositions ; that is they are grammatical parts of speech. 
 Among these we may distinguish from the mere grammatical 
 parts, such as (though grammatical also) exhibit a develop- 
 ment to a certain extent, though not a development in which 
 we rest. Such compounded parts of speech we have been 
 taught, in grammar, (" Grammar on its true basis,") to call 
 logical parts of speech. 
 
 DISTINCTIONS AND DIRECTIONS TO ASSIST IN THE PRACTICE 
 OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC ; BASED ON THE FOREGOING THEORY. 
 
 7. When we intend to develop our knowledge, we have 
 first to choose the form of expression by which the know- 
 ledge to be developed shall be signified. The expression may 
 be a single grammatical noun, or a logical noun, or a propo- 
 sition. Thus, Socrates ; Man ; Pride ; Knowledge ; are single 
 grammatical nouns ; The death of Socrates; The reason of 
 man compared with the instinct of brutes ; Pride of birth ; 
 Knowledge of the world, are logical nouns : Knowledge is 
 power ; Virtue is its own reward; It is Education that forms the 
 mind ; are propositions. Of these, the subjects expressed by 
 single words are the widest, including an indefinite number of 
 subordinate subjects to be expressed by logical nouns, or by 
 propositions. The subjects expressed by logical nouns, or by 
 propositions, are more limited; but are still resolvable into 
 subordinate subjects to be expressed in the same way. 
 
140 MAX UAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. I V. 
 
 8. When the subject to be developed is expressed lv a 
 single word, the first proof that can be given, logically, of the 
 existence of the knowledge presumed to be included under it, 
 (though the proof may not always be required,) is its expan- 
 sion in what is called a Definition. All knowledge consists 
 in being aware of the relations in which the thing known 
 stands to oneself and to other things. Suppose then, a sub- 
 ject to be expressed by a single word, it is almost ahvavs 
 possible, as we have seen in the previous chapter, to class the 
 subject with other things ; which are therefore said to be of 
 the same genus or kind ; and then to distinguish it from these 
 things by stating its difference. Genus and difference, as \\-\-- 
 there saw, form a definition. Each of these may sometimes 
 be expressed by a single word, as in defining Socrates to be a 
 Greek philosopher, Man to be a rational animal, Pride to be 
 inoi^dinate self-esteem. But it may not be possible, and if 
 possible, it may not be sufficient for our object, to begin thus 
 briefly the development we propose ; or if we so begin, we 
 may add much more, so that an essential definition becomes 
 an accidental one, or description. Thus, we may cam- out 
 our di.'iinition of Socrates into all the particulars of his life, 
 till the difference between Socrates and others of his 
 amounts to a biography of Socrates. Suppose for another 
 instance, that we have to define so common a thing as a chair 
 or a table, it must be done by genus and difference, by 
 stating what hind of thing it is, and how it differs from other 
 things of its kind. Thus both chair and table may be called 
 an article of furniture ; that is their genus : of a chair, the 
 dillerence is, so far raised from the ground, and so adapted, as 
 to receive a person in a sitting posture : of a table, the differ- 
 ence is, 50 far raised, <rc., and so adapted, by having a fat 
 surface, as to hold readily for the hand whatever may be placed 
 upon it. Again ; suppose we have to define such a subject 
 as Generosity : we must first seek for a generic term, such as 
 sentiment, and tlk-n add words to specialize the term; as, 
 " Generosity is the sentiment which takes pleasure in conferring 
 benefits." There are wider meanings of the word than this ; 
 but this may be all the meaning which the further develop- 
 ment is intended to carry out. 
 
 9. If the subject to be developed is expressed by several 
 words, as, for instance, A knowledge of the world, the general 
 
Sec. 8-11.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 147 
 
 term knowledge is evidently limited, being in fact thus far 
 developed. Still, as with a subject expressed by a single 
 word, there will remain an indefinite number of points or pur- 
 poses of development, at the choice of the thinker. But if 
 the subject is given in the shape of a proposition, as, A proper 
 knowledge of the world is favourable to virtue, there is then only 
 this one proposition to be established, in other words, only 
 one purpose of development. Now the means of develop- 
 ment are what are called arguments ; and we have next to 
 inquire what is an argument. 
 
 10. An Argument, often called a Reason, is a proposition 
 whose truth being admitted, the truth of the proposition 
 which it is used to establish must also be admitted ; as 
 " Kings are mortal, for they are but men :" " John lived in 
 London ; for he lived with his uncle." We say that the truth 
 of the proposition in italic being in each instance admitted, 
 requires us to admit the proposition which precedes, to be 
 true : but requires whom ? certainly not every one ; it 
 requires the admission only from those who, in each instance, 
 have certain further knowledge ; namely, as regards the first 
 instance, this further knowledge that men are mortal ; and as 
 regards the second instance, this further knowledge, that John's 
 uncle lived in London. The further knowledge supposed in 
 the first instance is knowledge that every body is presumed to 
 have, and the argument will as widely be received as valid ; 
 but the further knowledge supposed in the second instance 
 may be in possession only of a few ; only to which few can it 
 be offered as an argument ; but for them, it is quite as valid 
 as the argument in the other instance. We see, then, that 
 in the development of knowledge as in the induction, there 
 are three things present at every step or stage of progress, 
 and these three th/ings in the deductive procedure, may be 
 named the datum, commonly unexpressed, but always pre- 
 sent in thought, the argument, and the conclusion. When 
 these are all expressed in the order here mentioned, they form 
 the syllogism of deductive logic; as, " Men are mortal; 
 Kings are men ; therefore, Kings are mortal ;" " John's uncle 
 lived in London ; John lived with his uncle ; therefore, John 
 lived in London." 
 
 1 1 . Arguments have technical names derived from three 
 
148 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 sources, i. From the Topics whence they are taken, ii. From 
 the Data to which they are addressed. iii. From the 
 Forms of development. Our practical distinctions must be 
 continued by a statement in detail of the divisions and sub- 
 divisions under each of these heads. 
 
 PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS CONTINUED : (i.) NAMES OF AUGU- 
 ST i; NTS FROM THE TOPICS WHENCE THEY ARE TAKEN.* 
 
 1. External Arguments Experiment and Testimony. 
 12. If the argument or proof which we seek under a gene- 
 ral head or topic, is not already a part of our knowledge, 
 such general head or topic will be either EXPERIMENT or 
 TESTIMONY ; and the argument will be derived externally. 
 It will not, in this case belong to deductive logic, but inductive : 
 that is to say, it will be knowledge yet to be sought and made 
 our own, either by actual experience, or by admitting the ex- 
 perience of others in place of actual experience. Now all our 
 knowledge is originally suggested by external things, and 
 therefore differs not, in its beginning, from that belonging to 
 the topics here proposed under the two names Experiment 
 and Testimony. But the reason for the distinction is this ; the 
 arguments sought after under tin- h<-ads called interned, are pre- 
 sumed to be included in the subjects which w<- undertake to 
 develop; because to understand tin- t.-nn designating the 
 subject, is to have the knowledge which that understanding 
 necessarily includes. Thus, for instance, to understand what 
 is meant by a plant, a mineral, an animal, is to know what is 
 a plant, what is a mineral, what is an animal : to understand 
 what is meant by pride, or by virtue, is to know what con- 
 stitutes pride, what constitutes virtue. But the knowledge 
 here supposed is ordinary knowledge ; not the recondite 
 relations which the scientific experimentalist reaches; n-la- 
 tions which, as to a plant, a mineral, an animal, form the 
 physical sciences, Botany, Geology, Zoology ; any treatise or 
 development of which, must be founded on proofs called expe- 
 rimental. Thus, airain, if knowledge is proposed to be 
 
 * The Data and Topics of arguments are quite as necessary to be con- 
 sidered in Rhetoric, as in Deductive Logic; and they are accordingly- 
 exhibited, with appropriate differences of view, in the Manual of lihutoric. 
 
Sec. 12.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 149 
 
 developed from the proper names John or Socrates, all we can 
 presume the names to include, is, that there is, or was, a man 
 called John or Socrates :* if more than this is developed, or 
 sought to be developed, it must be, from the peculiar know- 
 ledge which the thinker enjoys, the fruit of his peculiar ex- 
 perience, or of the information he derives, as a learned man, 
 from the stores of history. The scientific knowledge thus 
 induced under the term, is not necessarily included in it till the 
 induction takes place ; and even then, the arguments are 
 fitted to convince only those who have the knowledge, and 
 not the generality of persons, who use and understand the 
 terms no further than in their ordinary sense. Deductive 
 logic is, however, the art of developing in words such know- 
 ledge as we have ; and therefore if the thinker has the know- 
 ledge here assigned to the two heads called external, the 
 knowledge is, to him, internal, and the distinction a name 
 without a difference ; though, as a name, it will be useful, 
 when we have to employ logic as a basis for rhetoric. 
 
 * Hence Mr. John S. Mill denominates a proper name a non-connota- 
 tive word. Connotative, according to him, is that which notes something, 
 and, along with it, something more, or, in addition. Thus the word man 
 is connotative ; for while it notes any one man, it notes his kind, or all 
 that constitutes him a man. Thus again the word white is connotative ; 
 for while it notes the quality, white, in any one thing, it notes or implies 
 it in all other white things. On the other hand, John and whiteness are 
 said to be non-connotative ; and we may perhaps exemplify the reason 
 given for this by saying, that they are words incapable of being used in 
 predication otherwise than specially: we cannot say, for instance, " This 
 man is John" by virtue of any general knowledge included in the word, 
 but only by virtue of our special accidental knowledge that such is his 
 name : neither can we say of anything, except of whiteness itself, that " It 
 is whiteness ;" for the word whiteness is so grammatically conditioned as 
 to be immediately applicable only to our knowledge of what whiteness is, 
 and not immediately to the white things from which that knowledge has 
 been derived. In thus explaining the distinction sought to be enforced by 
 the term non-connotative, we wish it to be seen that it arises entirely out 
 of the Aristotelian doctrine of predication : and its utility or inutility must 
 be estimated by the utility or inutility of that doctrine. Whether, with just 
 views of the relation which language bears to thought, John and whiteness 
 are not connotative, as well as man and white, we leave our student to 
 inquire. 
 
150 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 2. Internal Arguments Definition, Etymology, Enumeration, 
 (not Induction,) Genus and Species, Cause, namely, Efficient 
 or A-yriori, and Final or A-priori, Effect or A-poste/> 
 Antecedents, Consequents, Adjuncts; Comparison, namely, 
 Similitude, Analogy or Parity of case, Contraries^ Proportion, 
 and A-fortiori. 
 
 13. When, having laid down some point or purpose of de- 
 velopment, we go on to argue the truth of what we assert ) >y 
 appealing to the nature of our subject, as it is, or as it might 
 be exhibited in a definition, we are said to reason from DEFI- 
 MIIOX. If, for instance, we desire to develop the knowledge 
 contained in the proposition, Man is accountable for In- 
 actions, the argument may be, that he is a creature endowed 
 with reason and liberty ; which is a definition of man's na- 
 ture. This is an argument by virtue of the datum, that 
 ever}- creature endowed with reason and liberty is accountable 
 for his actions ; and both being admitted as a part of our pre- 
 vious knowledge, the conclusion is inevitable. Or if we desire 
 to place the truth evidently before us in words, that certain 
 lines are equal to one another, the argument may be, that 
 they are radii of the same circle. This is an argument by 
 virtue of the datum, that the radii of the same circle are 
 always equal; and both being admitted as belonging to our 
 previous knowledge, the conclusion is again inevitable. 
 
 14. When we develop our knowledge from the original 
 sense of the word that stands for our knowledge, we are said 
 to reason from ETYMOLOGY. If, for instance, we desire to 
 develop the knowledge, That the idle have no relaxation, 
 the argument may be, that the word relaxation originally sig- 
 nifies, the loosening of what is tight. Borrowing from 
 another topic hereafter mentioned, namely, Analogy or Parity 
 of case, we add to the argument from Etymology, the further 
 argument, That as the idle never apply, or draw their facul- 
 ties tight, so they can never be said to relax their faculties. 
 The former is an argument by virtue of the datum, that the 
 idle do not loosen what is Tight ; and the latter an argument 
 by virtue of the datum, that Not to draw the faculties tight 
 and not to apply them, are expressions that mean the same 
 thing. All this being admitted as a part of previous know- 
 ledge, the conclusion is inevitable. 
 
Sec. 13-15.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 151 
 
 15. When we develop the knowledge we entertain under 
 a general term, or a general proposition, by detailing the par- 
 ticulars which constitute our knowledge, we are said to reason 
 from ENUMERATION. Thus, for instance, we develop our 
 knowledge of what a dozen means, or a score, by counting 
 up to a dozen, or a score inclusively. This is an argument 
 by virtue of the datum that the number so counted is a dozen, 
 or a score ; and the conclusion follows inevitably. Thus, 
 again, if we wish to develop the knowledge contained in the 
 proposition, A fine art always addresses, as its appropriate 
 object, our imaginative sensibility, through the sense of 
 hearing or of sight ; our first argument may be an enumera- 
 tion of the fine arts, namely, Poetry, Music, Painting, Sculp- 
 ture, accompanied, in each instance, by the more special 
 proposition that Poetry addresses, as its appropriate object, 
 our imaginative sensibility, through the sense of hearing ; 
 Music addresses, &c., through the sense of hearing ; Painting 
 addresses, &c., through the sense of sight; Sculpture ad- 
 dresses, &c., through the sense of sight. This enumeration is 
 an argument by virtue of the datum, that Poetry, Music, 
 Painting, Sculpture are all the fine arts; and both being 
 admitted as a part of our previous knowledge, the conclusion 
 is inevitable. Thus, again, if we wish to develop our know- 
 ledge, that a heavy body lifted from the earth, has always 
 fallen to the earth again when the sustaining power was 
 removed, our argument may be, the enumeration of A, B, C, 
 D, &c., which in our own experience or that of others, has, 
 in each instance, fallen to the earth under the circumstances 
 stated. This again, is an argument by virtue of the datum, 
 that A, B, C, D, &c., are all the things, or represent all the 
 things, on which the experiment has been tried ; and both 
 being admitted as a part of our previous knowledge, again the 
 conclusion is inevitable. 
 
 The argument from Enumeration is sometimes confounded 
 with the argument from Induction ; but Induction as we have 
 seen, is not an internal argument ; and the conclusion it sug- 
 gests is not included in the premises, and therefore is not a 
 necessary conclusion but an inference, although we do not the 
 less receive it as true. Thus, for instance, having to ascer- 
 tain whether it is a truth or general law, that every heavy 
 tody being lifted from the earth, will fall again to it if every 
 
 D2 
 
l->'2 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Climp. IV. 
 
 in t<-i veiling thing be removed, we have recourse to experiment ; 
 an- 1 tin- cxjH-riiiK-nt answering our expectation, we then JiJ--r 
 that as A, B, C, D, &c., liave fallen again to the earth after 
 having been lifted from it, so all bodies whatever will fall to 
 earth under the same circumstances, in other words, that this 
 is a general property of bodies near the earth's surface. Now, 
 the inference here is not included in the premises ; the neces- 
 sary conclusion from which, is, that A has fallen, that B has 
 fallen, &c., not that Z, Y, X, &c., will fall. And this sort 
 of conclusion is called the Inference of Physics. 
 
 Yet the difference between the argument from Enumeration 
 and Induction is done away with, by conceding the know- 
 ledge, a knowledge which all people must acquire,* that 
 
 * But why must they acquire it ? The philosophers of the & 
 school here come in with what they call a fundamental principle of belief* 
 I am glad to avail myself of the objections to that dogma, which one of 
 their number, Mr. James Douglas of Cavers, thus urges: " That hvid, 
 Stewart, and Turgot, have been mistaken, in proposing such an original 
 law of thought, as a belief in the continuance of the laws of nature, will 
 easily appear. That can never be an original proposition which consists 
 of slowly acquired terms. Had we an innate idea of nature, of laws, or 
 of permanence, then we might have such an ultimate and instinctive prin- 
 ciple : but since the notion of nature is very gradually acquired, and since 
 the term laws is metaphorical, the absurdity of our forming a conclusion 
 while we are yet unfurnished with t! . will be abundantly appa- 
 
 rent. Should it be said that this law of thought remains dormant till we 
 become acquainted with the meaning <>t' nature and of laws, though this 
 supposition is sufficiently absurd in itself, it may be further observed, that 
 our belief of this permanence of the laws of nature, is certain and uniform : 
 but no certain conclusion can be attached to variable terms, such as the 
 very complex and fluctuating notions of nature and her laws. Unless we 
 had within us a model of what nature is, and what her laws are, and also 
 whether continuance is to be understood in an absolute, or in a qualified 
 it would be impossible to arrive with any certainty at the conclu- 
 >i.m, which is thus made the foundation of our belief, and of reasoning. 
 The truth is, here is a confusion between acquiescence and belief. To 
 acquiesce in the regularity of nature, is one of our earliest habits, but to 
 believe in the permanence of the laws of nature, is one of the ript 
 of the understanding. The process from childhood does not seem to be 
 well understood the child receives all things, according to the philosophic 
 expression of Wordsworth, in " a wise passiveness." It has no doubts, 
 and therefore can have no belief. The permanence of the laws of nature 
 mould the thoughts of the child to their own continual recurrence : what 
 is still more, the structure of his own frame corresponds and fits in with 
 the laws of external nature. Not only are all his thoughts moulded, for 
 example, to the succession of day and night, but the structure both of his 
 
Sec. 16.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 153 
 
 where an experiment never has failed, it never will fail. The 
 datum will then be, As A, B, C, D, &c., have fallen to the 
 earth after being lifted from it, so Z, Y, X, &c., will fall 
 under the same circumstance : the argument will be as before 
 that A, B, C, D, &c., have fallen : from which argument the 
 conclusion by virtue of the datum, That Z, Y, X, &c., will 
 fall ; now follows, as necessary and inevitable, because the 
 premises now include it. 
 
 16. When we develop our knowledge by going back to 
 knowledge that includes it, instead of using an argument that 
 comes immediately under the knowledge we purpose to de- 
 velop, we are said to reason from the GENUS. Thus if, in 
 order to develop our knowledge, that man will be punished 
 or rewarded, for which our special argument might be, that 
 he is accountable for his actions ; we choose to use the more 
 general argument, Every creature endowed with reason and 
 liberty is accountable for his actions; we shall properly be 
 said to reason from the genus : since, every creature endowed 
 with reason and liberty, includes the species, man. So again, 
 if we wish to develop our knowledge, that a devotion to 
 poetry quickens the imaginative sensibility, we may take our 
 argument from the general definition of the fine arts instead of 
 the definition of poetry in particular, and the argument will 
 then be from the genus instead of the species, although it will 
 also be taken from the definition or nature of the fine arts. 
 
 body and mind fit him for the alternate change of light and darkness, of 
 activity and repose. The moment that any doubt should occur to him, 
 which can only be after his reason is exercised, and his thoughts have 
 taken a free range, that moment they would be repelled by a principle 
 already familiar to him, not indeed in words, but implied in our earliest 
 reasonings, the principle to which Leibnitz has given the name of sufficient 
 reason. This is not an original principle itself, but is merely the logical 
 form of that original principle which we have already pointed out, that 
 every change refers to a cause. Where no adequate cause has operated, 
 no change can have taken place. The course of nature must continue, till 
 the power which gave it that course changes its direction. There can 
 therefore be no reasonable doubt as to the permanence of the laws of 
 nature, except in those cases where the interposition of God can be reason- 
 ably expected. Thus, then, we need not multiply original principles 
 without necessity, but may rest our belief in the continuance of the laws 
 of nature upon that fundamental belief that every event has a cause." 
 The Philosophy of the Mind: by James Douglas, Esq., of Cavers. 1839. 
 page 226, et seq. 
 
154 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 An argument from the SPECIES would of course be from the 
 definition of poetry in particular ; but such argument would 
 be more eligibly assigned to the topic definition, leaving to 
 the topic species only what is otherwise called exampk or 
 instance. Thus, if we sought to develop our knowledge that 
 Industry is the source of all the blessings of life, we might 
 give as an instance of one of these blessings, the improvement 
 of the mind by study ; which is an argument by virtue of 
 the implied datum, that this is but one of similar instances, 
 which instances, if completed, would form the argument 
 call i'd Enumeration; and that this instance may be rationally 
 accepted in place of all. 
 
 17. When we develop our knowledge, by so much of the 
 nature or definition of the thing known, as accounts for certain 
 effects, we are said to reason from the CAUSE. Thus, in 
 order to develop our knowledge that Pride is odious, we may 
 use for our argument, the proposition, that it offends the self- 
 love of others. This is an argument by virtue of the datum, 
 that every thing which offends the self-love of others, is 
 odious. Again ; if we wish to develop our knowledge, that 
 wine largely and frequently drunk, is a poison, we may use 
 for our argument, that it tends to dcstmv the constitution; 
 which is an argument by virtue of the datum that every thing 
 which tends to destroy the constitution is a poison. But 
 note, that in deductive logic, nothing can be called a cause 
 \\lrn h is not already admitted to be one. The discovery of 
 natural causes is the business of the physical sciences, and 
 tin- conclusion belonging to them is Inference; a conclusion 
 which is never included in the premises, and is therefore 
 never a necessary conclusion : it is always a conclusion which 
 may be set aside by subsequent experiment. Thus, for in- 
 stance, we may conclude from the fact, that a man has died 
 after having eaten of a certain herb, that it is a poison : this 
 is an inference. But if, subsequently, we find that thousands 
 of people have eaten of the same herb with no ill effect, we 
 are obliged to renounce that inference, and infer that the herb 
 is not a poison. In neither case, is the inference a conclusion 
 belonging to deductive logic, but an inference of physics, and 
 assignable to inductive learning. The examples given above 
 are examples of what is called Efficient cause. From this we 
 have to distinguish what is called Final cause. A final cause 
 
Sec. 17-19.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 155 
 
 is, in other words, the motive, end, or purpose, on account of 
 which something has existence : thus when a man dies by 
 poison, and by his own act, these are the efficient causes of his 
 death : the final cause, may be to escape from the tortures of 
 the rack, or the agonies of insanity, or despair. 
 
 18. When we develop our knowledge by so much of the 
 nature or definition of the tiling known, as may make its 
 nature evident in what it produces, we are said to reason from 
 the EFFECT or effects. Thus, in order to develop our know- 
 ledge that Pride is odious, we may use for our argument the 
 proposition, that all persons shun the society of the proud. 
 This is an argument by virtue of the datum that a quality must 
 be odious which makes all persons shun any one who has it. 
 Thus, again, we may develop our knowledge of a diseased 
 constitution in a person who drinks wine largely and fre- 
 quently, by affirming that the disease is the effect of such 
 practice ; which is an argument by virtue of the datum that 
 the disease uniformly follows the practice, and that whenever 
 there is this uniformity of sequence, that which precedes is the 
 cause, and that which follows is the effect. But note, that 
 in deductive logic, nothing can be called an effect which is not 
 already admitted to be an effect with reference to a correlative 
 cause. The discovery of natural effects is the business of the 
 physical sciences, and the conclusion belonging to them is 
 inference. If, for instance, in any particular case, there is 
 room to suspect that disease in a man who drinks largely and 
 frequently of wine, is not the effect of that practice, the sus- 
 picion must be admitted so far as to warrant the search after 
 the proper correlative cause ; but the certainty or uncertainty 
 of the inference resulting from such search, has nothing to do 
 with the certainty of the deductive conclusion ; for this being 
 contained in its premises, is always a necessary conclusion. 
 Yet it is to be remembered that the premises will be faulty, 
 if they state as a certainty what the inductive inference only 
 makes probable. 
 
 19. The phrases A-PRIORI, and, A-POSTERIORI, often 
 occur as terms belonging to logic ; implying the same things 
 as argument from Cause, and argument from Effect: but 
 their use instead of these terms requires explanation. Among 
 the ancients, there prevailed an opinion that all knowledge 
 flowed from certain original truths implanted in the mind, 
 
15G MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 and that every special truth was but a deduction from these 
 original truths. But if, as modem philosophy teaches, all 
 the knowledge we can reach, is the result of experience, while 
 we admit that the faculties of our race are such as to be 
 affected by the same experience in the same way, it follows, 
 notwithstanding this admission, that, taking the expression 
 absolutely, there is no such thing as a-priori knowledge. But 
 taking the expression relatively, that is, assuming certain 
 knowledge to be inevitable where there is the capacity for it, 
 and also the ordinary occasions of suggestion or of learning, 
 then all reasoning which is deductive will be a-priori reason- 
 ing, and all inductive reasoning will be a-posteriori or from 
 facts, that is from new facts. We may hence define a-priori 
 reasoning to be that which proceeds from truths already 
 known, and merely deduces the special truths included in 
 them ; while a-posteriori reasoning is that which infers general 
 truths from particular truths, which particular truths do not 
 necessarily constitute them, but are admitted to be quite suffi- 
 cient to establish them as science, from which we are entitled 
 to reason deductively, that is, on the a-priori principle. 
 Thus, we conclude a-priori or beforehand, that a man will 
 die as the effect of having drunk a mortal poison without an 
 antidote : thus, again, we conclude a-priori, that pride will 
 render a person odious to all who are made to feel its effects; 
 and thus, again, we conclude, a-prwri, that lines which we 
 propose to make radii of the same circle will be equal to one 
 another. But in every instance, (and it is the same in all 
 instances,) the a-priori knowledge has been obtained a-poste- 
 riori : thus, we know that the man will die because previous 
 effects had led us to infer the drug as a cause ; thus we know 
 that pride will make a person odious, because we have 
 inferred that sentiment as the cause, in a variety of observed 
 effects ; and thus we know that lines which are radii of the 
 same circle, are equal to one another, because experience has 
 made us aware that in knowing what a circle is, the equality 
 of its radii is included in our knowledge.* 
 
 * This point is in discussion. The old philosophers would have in- 
 sisted that the knowledge of the properties of a circle, is original know- 
 ledge in man. Dr. Whewell, following the German transcendental ists, 
 considers it to be an explicated u/tM, which indeed seems to come to the 
 samo thing. Dugald Stewart considers the definitions of geometry to be 
 hypotheses. As to myself, I may seem, in an opinion I expressed many 
 
Sec. 20, 21.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PEACTICE. 157 
 
 20. The word cause means a permanent antecedent, or 
 what we have found, by experience, to have a certain conse- 
 quent, or certain consequents, and which we hence call an 
 effect, or effects. But there are antecedents on which we 
 cannot yet rely, so as to call them, with certainty, the causes 
 of the consequents : and when we use such antecedents as 
 arguments in order to infer the consequents, we are said to 
 reason from the ANTECEDENTS. Thus, when a man has died 
 after taking a certain drug which was not previously known 
 to be poisonous, but which we now call so, we may be said 
 to reason from the antecedent. This, however, is an induc- 
 tive argument, and not deductive. In making it deductive, 
 we assume a datum which logically necessitates its conclusion 
 without diminishing the doubt accompanying the inference ; 
 as, When, after taking a drug, a person soon dies, it is very 
 probable that the drug has killed him : This person took, &c., 
 and soon after died : therefore it is very probable that his death 
 was caused by the drug. 
 
 21. The word effect means a permanent consequent, or 
 what we have found by experience always follow an ante- 
 cedent. But there are consequents on which we cannot yet 
 rely, so as to call them, with certainty, effects ; and when we 
 use such consequents as arguments in the development of our 
 knowledge in order to infer the antecedents, we are said to 
 reason from the CONSEQUENTS. Thus, when a man has died, 
 and exhibits certain marks usual in people who have swal- 
 lowed poison, we infer that he died through poison. But 
 this is an inductive argument : the marks may proceed from 
 other causes : and in transferring it to the deductive syllo- 
 
 years ago, almost to have anticipated Dr. Whewell's. In my Outline of 
 Sematology (Beginnings of a New School, &c., First Essay, foot-note 
 150) I ask whether the definitions in geometry are not expressed 
 "notions (knowledge) of and belonging to quantity, which, by the condi- 
 tion of the mind, we must reach, if setting aside the sensible instances of 
 a line, a circle, &c., we try to conceive them perfect." This mode of ex- 
 plaining what I meant, I now perceive to be defective. How con- 
 ceive them, an idealist will say, nature not certainly furnishing the 
 patterns, unless the ideas were already in the mind ? But I had no inten- 
 tion to describe them as ideas, that is conceptions. I meant and mean to 
 say, that the definition of a line, c., is nothing more than the statement 
 of our knowledge what a straight line, &c., is ; and how we get this know- 
 ledge independently of any idea of the thing, I have elsewhere shown : See 
 Chap. II. Note to Section 10, page 112 j "But, say the Idealists,'- &c. 
 
 D3 
 
158 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 gism, we must take care to assume, in the datum, no greater 
 certainty of knowledge than we have reached in the inductive 
 process. 
 
 22. When we develop our knowledge by entering on 
 details which are not necessarily, or, as the ancient logicians 
 consider, essentially included in the name of the thing known, 
 we are said to reason from the ADJUNCTS or Accidents of our 
 subject. Thus we may develop our knowledge of John, by 
 all that constitutes the history of John. The name John 
 itself is nothing more tlian the proper name of one of our 
 species, and it does not necessarily or essentially include more 
 knowledge than that John is a male of our species. All 
 beyond this we may call the adjuncts or accidents of John. 
 These adjuncts or accidents are nevertheless essential to the 
 individuality of John when they have occurred ; and all we 
 can truly say of them, is, that they do not belong to the indi- 
 viduality of any other person. 
 
 Essence, in the doctrine of the ancient logicians, is that 
 which makes a thing what it is. Thus rationality is the 
 essence of man : and yet an idiot is not rational, though we 
 still count him a man. An accident is that which belongs to 
 some individual thing of the kind, but not to others.* If we 
 are praising the pleasures of a country life generally, we may 
 dwell on the sublimities of mountain scenery, or on the sweet- 
 uly groves: but every country has not mountains; 
 and shady groves are pleasant only where the sun is scorch- 
 ing am! oppressive. These, therefore, are adjuncts or acci- 
 dents, and are non-essentials. Some accidents have been 
 calK-d properties: it is, for instance, the property of man to 
 become gray : but this is a property belonging to man in old 
 age, and not always even then. Again, it is a property of 
 man to be capable of laughing. It may be doubted whether 
 this is a property, or essential to the nature of man; but the 
 discussion involves a point of no moment. Provided we un- 
 derstand the meaning of the words as they have been, and as 
 they are still liable to be used, the theory of Logic on a true 
 foundation requires no other statement than this, that what- 
 ever we already know, is necessarily included in the develop- 
 ment of our knowledge, and that what we do not yet know, 
 
 * Compare Chapter III., Section 7, page 136. 
 
Sec. 22, 23.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 159 
 
 must be reached by observation and experiment, the conclu- 
 sions from which are not necessary, or included in the facts 
 observed, but are properly called Inferences. 
 
 23. In developing our knowledge, we are often said to 
 take our arguments from COMPARISON. Now, all knowledge 
 consists in being aware of relations ; and to take an argument 
 from comparison is therefore to take it from the store of all 
 arguments. But a subject already known, may be better un- 
 derstood by seeking and using comparisons that are not a part 
 of our knowledge at the moment of seeking them. Thus, we 
 can feel or understand more vividly, the previously known 
 fact, that novels of a certain kind are injurious, by comparing 
 them to poison. The things known are not of the same 
 nature, and the effects are in the one case moral, in the other 
 physical : still there is the relation of similitude which renders 
 the knowledge of the mischief done by novels more vivid. 
 This topic, namely, SIMILITUDE, is the source of all metaphor 
 in language : as may be exemplified by the previous instance, 
 which appears no more than an ordinary metaphor when we 
 say " Some novels poison the mind;" although, if expressed 
 at full, there would be the same things which every act of 
 knowledge includes, namely, the thing known ; the thing by 
 which it is known, or better known; and the knowledge 
 itself. Thus, again, if we wish to understand more clearly 
 the already acknowledged truth, that " The indolent cannot 
 obtain the favour of heaven," we may compare indolent 
 people with idle servants, and Heaven with the master : this, 
 as the things compared are deemed to be of the same kind or 
 nature, cannot so well be called an argument from Similitude, 
 but is more appropriately described as an argument from 
 ANALOGY or PARITY OF CASE. Further, in reasoning from the 
 comparison of things agreeing in kind, we may take those 
 that are known to be directly opposite in their qualities and 
 effects. Thus in order to increase the vividness of our con- 
 viction that " Vice is the source of disquiet, that it leads to 
 infamy here, and punishment hereafter," we may place these 
 truths, already admitted, by the side of the opposite truths, 
 and say that " As Virtue promotes peace, attracts honour and 
 reputation, and paves a road to eternal bliss," so Vice, &c., 
 which is called an argument from CONTRARIES. Still further ; 
 it is possible, in comparing things of the same kind, to take 
 
160 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 neither those that have exactly parallel or analogous effects, 
 nor those that have opposite effects, but things that hav- tin; 
 same effects so far as they approach perfect identity. Thus 
 if we desire to illustrate the admitted truth that " The wicked 
 are always more or less miserable," we may place it by the 
 side of another admitted truth, that " The entirely wicked are 
 entirely miserable, and other wicked people less so, only in 
 proportion as they are less wicked." And this may be called 
 an argument from PROPORTION. And fifthly, there is a special 
 way of arguing from comparison, when, in order to illustrate an 
 admitted truth, we place it by the side of one of the same 
 kind, which, though acknowledged as a truth, makes its way 
 to the understanding with more difficulty. Thus to under- 
 stand with greater force the truth that " A man ought to be 
 forgiving to his friends" we may place it by the side of 
 another truth, which is admitted, though less liable to be so, 
 and say that " A man ought to forgive even his enemies; 
 much more then ought he, &c." And this is called the argu- 
 ment A-FORTIORI, or from a bolder assertion in proof of one 
 less bold, that is, less difficult of admission. 
 
 24. It is chiefly in these special ways of reasoning from 
 comparison that the phrases C^ETERIS PARIBUS, and MUTATIS 
 MUTANDIS occur. The meaning of the former is, Other things 
 being equal ; of the latter, Those things being changed which the 
 difference in the persons or things compared may require to be 
 changed. Thus we may have occasion to say, " This mea- 
 sure was successful then, and, coeteris paribus, will succeed 
 now." " This course and method of study will benefit boys, 
 and, mutatis mutandis, may be adopted for girls." 
 
 PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS CONTINUED : ii. NAMES OF ARGU- 
 MENTS FROM THE DATA ON WHICH THEY REST. 
 
 25. In every act of the reasoning power there are three 
 things : the thing known ; that by which it is known ; and 
 the knowledge itself, abstracted from the things that suggested 
 it. In the deductive process of logic, the former two things 
 are likewise abstract knowledge ; and we may call the one the 
 datum, the other, the argument, or reason. It is sometimes 
 quite immaterial to which we apply the one or the other of 
 these two names : for instance, when we say, " Three feet are 
 
Sec. 2427.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 161 
 
 one yard ; thirty-six inches are three feet ; therefore thirty-six 
 inches are one yard : " here we may indifferently call the first 
 or the second proposition the datum or the argument ; out of 
 which the third proposition arises as the conclusion. The two 
 former propositions are called the premises. For the most 
 part, however, the premises out of which a conclusion arises, 
 will, in the deductive process, consist, first of a general pro- 
 position which includes many particulars ; and secondly of 
 one of those included particulars : the term datum will then 
 be properly applied to the general proposition ; and the term 
 argument to the one included in it : and the argument may, 
 under such circumstances, take its name from the nature of 
 the knowledge which is presupposed or assumed in putting it 
 forth as an argument. It is to be observed, that the doctrine 
 here held seems to belong only to the process of reasoning 
 with other minds, and therefore to Rhetoric, and not to Logic. 
 Yet, even in thinking within oneself, a person may proceed 
 from knowledge more or less deeply founded ; and the dis- 
 tinctions laid down under the head which is placed above, are, 
 on this account, claimed for Logic, although they will be 
 properly repeated when we have to consider the practice of 
 Rhetoric. 
 
 26. When we develop our knowledge by an argument 
 which is included in such general knowledge as all mankind 
 possess, the argument is said to be ARGUMENTUM AD 
 JUDICIUM, that is, an argument to [ordinary] judgement, 
 an argument which all people of common sense and ordinary 
 information must admit, as well as oneself. And this is the 
 ground of almost every argument ; to which every particular 
 ground every one, for instance, which is described and 
 exemplified in the six following sections (27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 
 32), is an exception. 
 
 27. When a person develops knowledge in which others 
 have no share, the arguments are fitted to convince himself 
 alone. For instance, if I know, and no one else knows, that 
 " John lived with his uncle," the fact which may be known 
 to many people that " John's uncle always lived in London," 
 is an argument with me that " John lived in London ; " but 
 can be no argument with those who have no share with me 
 in the knowledge implied by the first proposition. An argu- 
 ment thus peculiarly founded, is the type of that kind, which 
 
102 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 in Rhetoric is called ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM, that is, an 
 argument addressed to the knowledge, the principles, or per- 
 suasion, entertained by the one man in particular whom they 
 are intended to convince ; the difference being that which 
 holds universally between Logic and Rhetoric, namely that, in 
 the former, the reasoning is confined to oneself, and the pecu- 
 liar knowledge is one's own ; while, in the latter, the reasoning 
 is applied to convince another, and the peculiar knowledge or 
 persuasion belongs to that other person. 
 
 28. When the knowledge we develop is a particular de- 
 partment of learning or science, the arguments are fitted to 
 convince all who are instructed in that part of learning or 
 science, but not to convince people of common or ordinary 
 information. Thus if I know the distance between myself 
 and a certain column to be two hundred feet, and that the 
 angle formed by the lines reaching from my feet to the base 
 and to the top of the column is an angle of forty-five degrees, 
 I shall conclude that the column is two hundred feet high : 
 but this will be a conclusion only to my mind, and to others 
 instructed in the science on which the reasoning proceeds. 
 An argument thus founded is called Ait<;t MKMUM AD DOO 
 TRINAM, that is, an argument addressed to or derived from 
 some particular part of learning. 
 
 29. When we develop knowledge which rests for its truth 
 on the reverence entertained for its source, each included 
 argument takes the name, ARGUMENTUM AD VERECUNDIAM, 
 that is, an argument derived from, or addressed to, the st-nti- 
 ment of reverence or respect. Thus, for instance, if I believe 
 all to be true which a certain respected friend solemnly avers, 
 I shall believe every particular to be true which makes a part 
 of the whole ; and the conclusion will be, that since the 
 whole is true, the particular is true. 
 
 30. When we develop knowledge which rests for its truth 
 on the religious faith we embrace, each included argument 
 takes the name ARGUMENTUM AD FIDEM, that is, an argument 
 di -rived from, or addressed to, the religious faith of the person 
 or persons embracing such faith. Thus, with regard to 
 persons who admit the Bible to be the inspired word of God, 
 every particular included in the Bible is admitted to be a 
 part of that revelation, and consequently admitted to be 
 true. 
 
Sec. 28-33.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 1 63 
 
 31. In Rhetoric, it is possible to address inferior motives of 
 action, and to keep back, in order to gain some temporary 
 end, the truth as it exists in the mind of the artful reasoner. 
 In Logic, it is not possible so to deceive oneself; but there 
 are ways, nevertheless, by which, even in one's own thoughts, 
 one may wilfully go astray. A person may choose, for in- 
 stance, to remain in a state of ignorance on a certain subject, 
 when the ways to inform himself are open. Whatever con- 
 clusion he may reach while in this state, will be a conclusion 
 derived from ignorance, and the process, with such differ- 
 ence as the difference between Logic and Rhetoric creates, 
 will correspond to what, in the latter, is called, ARGUMENTUM 
 AD IGNORANTIAM. Such, for example, will be the process 
 with a thinker, who, having imbibed the opinion that all 
 people that belong to a sect in religion different from his own, 
 are bad people, concludes that A. B., one of these people, is 
 a bad man ; which may or may not be true in point of fact, 
 but is not made true by an argument thus derived. 
 
 32. Again, it is not only possible, but is the great error of 
 our lives, to be led away from truth in our own thoughts by 
 the allurement or the violence of our passions. In every case 
 of tins kind, there are two sets of data, the one set abstract, 
 or free from our passions, the other set derived from, or 
 suggested by them. Thus, tor instance, the murderer knows 
 that the act he is about to commit, is a crime, but there is 
 some good suggested by his passions, which, in the blindness 
 they create at the moment, seems to outweigh the good he 
 leaves behind ; and the conclusion which he reaches, urges 
 him to the deed. Such a case corresponds to the process 
 which, in Rhetoric, is called ARGUMENTUM AD PASSIONES. 
 
 PRACTICAL DISTINCTIONS CONTINUED : iii. NAMES OF ARGU- 
 MENTS FROM THE FORM IN WHICH THE REASONING IS 
 EXPRESSED. 
 
 33. The forms of language are changeable at pleasure, 
 while the reasoning process which gives occasion to the par- 
 ticular form that includes the result, remains, or may remain, 
 precisely the same. Every single word is the fit expression 
 of intellectual acts, not perhaps ascertainable as to all the 
 steps after the knowledge indicated by it has been attained ; 
 
164 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 but however many those steps may have been, each step in 
 tin- progress to the result which the word expresses, compre- 
 hended three things, the thing known, the tiling by which 
 it was known, and the knowledge itself abstracted from both. 
 Thus the word man cannot express the knowledge we have 
 under that word, unless there is first apprehended a creature 
 distinct from other creatures, as, for instance, a creature like 
 oneself, yet not oneself, and in most respects unlike other 
 creatures. Such, or something like it, is the knowledge we 
 include under the name ; which knowledge involves the three 
 things stated, the thing known, the thing or things by which 
 it is known, and the knowledge itself. When, afterwards, 
 our knowledge under the same word becomes mature through 
 the force of instruction or of observation, and we understand 
 man as a rational animal, there are still the three things 
 already referred to ; for we understand him to be rational 
 because we understand other animals to be irrational, and our 
 knowledge, included under, and abstracted by the word, is 
 the result. We may, if we like, develop the knowledge 
 which this word thus includes, in such a form as the fol- 
 lowing : " Every creature on earth that is not irrational is 
 man ; the creature now under notice or knowledge, is not 
 irrational : therefore the creature now under notice is man." 
 These three propositions, the moment they are recognised in 
 their connection with each other, are one expression with 
 one meaning ; and the word man includes the whole of 
 that meaning ; but the word man is, in form, a grammatical 
 noun-substantive : the three propositions are, in form, what, 
 in logic, is called a syllogism. Now in this way may every 
 result of the understanding, if not already expressed in the 
 form of a syllogism, be expanded or reduced into that form ; 
 and this form, since it represents the three things included in 
 every act of the intellect, is commonly assumed to be the funda- 
 mental form, to which every other form is referrible, when 
 we desire to examine its soundness. 
 
 34. But the syllogism is a fundamental form, only because 
 it represents, in three distinct propositions, every natural act 
 of the understanding. It has no other merit. Its claim to 
 be demonstrative, that is, to exhibit a necessary conclusion, 
 rests on the fact, that the first two propositions, which are 
 called the Premises, contain the conclusion. If the premises 
 
Sec. 34.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 165 
 
 are denied, we must go back to another syllogism, and 
 perhaps to another ; and if we thus fairly go back to the 
 beginning of our knowledge, that beginning will always be 
 an induction, that is, knowledge growing out of two things 
 which do not include the knowledge, but spring from the 
 natural capacity of the intellect, operated upon by the things 
 of sense. A phrase constructed of two words, may represent 
 the syllogism as thus described, namely the syllogism whose 
 premises contain the conclusion as well as the syllogism 
 whose premises infer it. For example, the phrase, Reasoning 
 man, exhibits premises containing the conclusion which the 
 phrase expresses ; for he who knows what the word reasoning 
 means, must know that it includes man; again he who 
 knows what the word man means, must know that it in- 
 cludes the power of reasoning which is essential in man. 
 The whole phrase, then, which is one expression with one 
 meaning, exhibits a necessary conclusion out of the premises 
 indicated by the words which form the phrase. This is an 
 example of a phrase representing the syllogism whose pre- 
 mises contain the conclusion. Let us take another example ; 
 Mortal Man. He whose experience goes so far as to assure 
 him that man is mortal universally, that is, including men 
 that live, and men that will live, will find this phrase corre- 
 spondent with the other : but if the premises should be 
 doubted, that is, if it should be doubted whether the know- 
 ledge we have under the term mortal can be applied thus 
 universally to man ; or whether the word man includes thus 
 universally of man what we mean by mortal, then we have 
 to await further facts in order to confirm or set aside what 
 the phrase expresses. Suppose the facts at length suggest 
 the result, such result will be an inference, not a necessary 
 conclusion ; till at length the previous knowledge being 
 granted, the conclusion is necessarily granted with it. Now 
 every syllogism drawn out in form, if we deny or question 
 its premises, will lead us thus back to the same state of 
 things, namely, a state in which the conclusion will not be a 
 necessary consequence, but an inference. Hence, then, as 
 there is no virtual difference between a syllogism, and any 
 expression constructed of two words that make sense, we 
 may take the latter, namely two words that make sense, as 
 the original, because the simpler form of expression, which 
 Logic employs in the deductive process, and refer all other 
 
166 MANUAL OF LOGIC. :Chap. IV. 
 
 forms, including the syllogism itself, to that simpler form of 
 expression. Two words that make sense may not, however, 
 form a sentence or proposition : they may form only a part 
 of a sentence, that is a part of speech. This indeed 
 no moment to Logic, if we look only to Logic independently 
 of Grammar. But logic though distinct in theory from 
 grammar, is, in practice, indissolubly connected with it ; and 
 hence a complete expression of logical deduction must be at 
 least a sentence. Now the shortest sentence that can be 
 constructed, is that which consists of nominative and verb ; 
 and this, as being the shortest and simplest form of expres- 
 sion, may be regarded as the original form in which know- 
 ledge is developed in deductive Logic; as, "Man reas< 
 " Man dies ; " " John lives ; " " Fairies frolic." 
 
 35. But the noun and the verb, which are the only essen- 
 tial parts in the logical development of knowledge, ma\ 
 be a constructed part, that is, may be a part indicative of 
 further logical development. Instead of saying " reasons," 
 (see above,) we may say, " is a reasoning creature ; " and 
 the whole proposition will then be, " Man is a reasoning 
 creature." The other propositions may be developed in a 
 similar manner. Whether develnpi-d in this way or not, the 
 process of the understanding will be the same : the result 
 must always be expressed by instrumental signs, which being 
 joined, form one expression with one meaning. Thus, for 
 instamv, the following sentence, when all its parts are put 
 together, is one expression for one meaning, "Man, noMe in 
 reason, infinite in faculties, in form and moving express and 
 admirable, in action like an angel, in apprehension like a god, 
 is a wonderful piece of work." The development of its one 
 meaning is, primarily, into two parts, which two parts may 
 be called nominative and verb. These two parts are sub- 
 ordinal -ly divisible, till we reach the grammatical single 
 parts of speech which form the larger grammatical part-. In 
 Rhetoric, it might be advisable to reach the result by sev.-ral 
 distinct sentences; and each sentence, in Rhetoric, might 
 advisedly take the form of exclamation : * but these expe- 
 
 * For instance, as it stands in Shakspeare, " What a piece of work is 
 man ! How noble in reason ! How infinite in faculties ! In form and 
 moving, how express and admirable ! In action, how like an angel ! In 
 apprehension, how like a god !" 
 
Sec. 35-38.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PEACTICE. 167 
 
 dients are forms for influencing other minds, not forms which 
 the thinking mind requires for the development of knowledge 
 in order to satisfy itself. This doctrine being admitted, we 
 conclude that the sentence consisting of nominative and verb, 
 however these two parts are subordinately divisible, is the 
 original or primary form in the logical development of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 36. Still, as the custom of Logic, from time immemorial, 
 has been, to refer all forms of speech to that of the SYLLOGISM; 
 and as this agrees essentially with the doctrine unfolded in 
 the previous remarks ; there is no necessity to oppose such 
 reference. The following names and distinctions, which 
 assume the syllogism for their foundation, may therefore be 
 acquiesced in : * 
 
 37. An EN'THY-MEME is a form of language which includes 
 the three propositions of a syllogism, while it expresses only 
 two of them. Thus, if we say, " Brutes are not rational 
 agents, and therefore are not accountable," we imply, but 
 do not express the datum, " None but rational agents are 
 accountable." Again, when we say " John lived in London ; 
 for he lived with his uncle ; " the reason given in the second 
 proposition for what is stated in the first, includes the datum 
 that his uncle lived in London ; since without that datum, it 
 would be no reason at all. 
 
 38. A SORI'-TES is a form of language which includes two 
 or more syllogisms, while it so expresses the reasoning, that 
 each proposition is the ground of the following one, till we 
 reach that in which we design to rest : in other words, it is 
 the accumulation of one argument upon another; as, " Man 
 is a creature endowed with reason and liberty ; every creature 
 so endowed is accountable for his actions; an accountable 
 creature will be punished for his evil, and rewarded for his 
 good deeds ; therefore man will be punished or rewarded." 
 
 39. A Logic which builds its principles on the arbitrary 
 
 * The reader has to be admonished, that in all these remarks, we are 
 contending against the formal logic of Aristotle, of which the pervading 
 characteristic, is, to attribute to the changing forms of language essential 
 differences of mental act. Against such doctrine, a more explicit oppo- 
 sition is offered in the sixth chapter of this work ; to which chapter the 
 reader is referred for a better understanding of the purpose of the several 
 remarks now in progress. 
 
168 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 forms of language, so that the parts of speech, whether 
 simple or compounded, are made to act differently and dis- 
 tinctly in the process of coming to a conclusion from pre- 
 mises, is an art quite apart from the Logic treated of in these 
 pages. The former is the art of reasoning with words, so as 
 to keep the things signified as much as possible absent from 
 the understanding : the latter is the art of reasoning by means 
 of words so used as to keep the things signified ever present 
 to the understanding, in order that our conclusions may be, 
 not from the words, but from the things they signify. Now 
 with regard to this logic, which is the logic existing in the 
 common daily use of language, the grammatical character of 
 a word, or the peculiar form of a phrase or sentence, is un- 
 essential to the validity of its acts. It is, for instance, of no 
 moment in our logic, whether we say, Man, or Reasoning 
 man, or Man reasons, or Man is a reasoning creature, the 
 thing meant being in each the same, and the whole of the 
 words in the last example forming one expression for the one 
 meaning expressed by the first. True it is that we are called 
 upon, by the form of the first, and of the second expression, to 
 esteem the expression only an instrument of meaning to be de- 
 veloped, and not as meaning yet developed; while, with regard 
 to the last two examples, we are at liberty either to rest in 
 the development so far made, or expect it to proceed further; 
 and in this way Logic accepts the ministry of Grammar : 
 but the differences are unessential in logic, and belong, pro- 
 perly, to the other department of learning. In our logic, 
 again, it is of no moment whether we say, Every man is 
 liable to error, or, No man is free from the liability to error, 
 since each proposition, as one expression for one meaning, 
 stands for the same meaning ; and since each resolves, pri- 
 marily, into two parts, namely the former proposition into 
 Every man, and, Is liable to error ; the latter, into, No man, 
 and, Is free from the liability to error, out of which two parts, 
 in the respective instances, the same one meaning springs. 
 When therefore, the former is called an affirmative, and the 
 latter a negative proposition, we leave the distinction to 
 grammar, and consider that logic is in no way concerned 
 with it, though in Rhetoric there will generally be a ground 
 of preference for the one or the other. In our logic, once 
 more, it is of no moment whether we say, Kings, like other 
 
Sec. 40 ] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 169 
 
 men, are mortal, or If kings are men, they are mortal ; whether 
 we say, If the world is a sphere, we must be able to reach the 
 same point, by moving from it in any one direction; or The world 
 being a sphere, we must be able, &c. We may admit the one 
 form in each of these instances to be called a categorical pro- 
 position, and the other a hypothetical or conditional one : we 
 may also admit, on rhetorical grounds, sometimes the one, 
 sometimes the other, to be preferable : but we do not admit 
 that Logic, in its own strict province, has any concern with 
 such differences, either in propositions, or in the syllogisms 
 which may be developed from them. 
 
 40. There is, however, one description of syllogism, whose 
 difference from others our logic acknowledges, because it is 
 not a mere difference in form of expression, but a peculiarity 
 in the character of the knowledge developed. The syllogism 
 referred to, is called the DILEM'MA ; a form of expression 
 never justly possible but when the knowledge to be developed 
 includes something true and something not true, while it 
 does not include which is which : for instance, the knowledge 
 or datum, that The blessed in heaven will be fully content, either 
 because they will have no desires, or because their desires will be 
 completely gratified : the knowledge or datum, that ^Eschines 
 joined in the public rejoicings, in which case he is inconsistent ; or 
 did not join in them, in which case he is unpatriotic : the know- 
 ledge or datum, that A certain man spoke irreverently of 
 scripture in jest, in which case he is not wise ; or in earmst, in 
 which case he is not good. These, unfolded into syllogisms, 
 will be examples of the Dilemma ; as, 
 
 " If the blessed in heaven have no desires, they will be 
 fully content ; so they will if their desires are completely 
 gratified ; But either they will have no desires, or have 
 them completely gratified: Therefore they will be fully 
 content." 
 
 " If ^schines joined in the public rejoicings, he is incon- 
 sistent ; if he did not, he is unpatriotic ; But he either joined 
 or not : Therefore he is either inconsistent or unpatriotic." 
 
 " If this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently 
 of scripture in jest ; and if he were good, he would not do so 
 in earnest : But he does it either in jest, or in earnest : 
 Therefore he is either not wise, or not good." 
 
 The manner of reasoning called Eeductio ad absurdum, 
 (bringing to an absurdity,) may be mentioned with the 
 
170 MA N'UAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 dilemma, as requiring, like it, a double supposition ; the 
 diilerence being that it completely establishes one of them ; 
 as, " This road to our house is either straight or crooked. 
 I affirm it to be straight, but I have no direct proof: say, 
 then, that it is crooked. But it is of the same length, and 
 extends between an equal distance, with one which we know 
 to be straight. Thus we have two lines of the same length, 
 and extending between an equal distance, the one by ad- 
 mission straight, the other by supposition crooked; which 
 supposition is absurd. Therefore the line or road in ques- 
 tion is not crooked ; that is, it is straight. 
 
 41. An EPICHIRE'MA is a syllogism with arguments or 
 proofs appended to one or both of the premises. Let the 
 following syllogism be the foundation of an epichirema : 
 
 Datum. " An event that has always followed an act, 
 will continue to follow it when circum- 
 stances are the same. 
 Argument. " Death has always quickly followed the 
 
 drinking of this juice. 
 
 Conclusion. " Therefore, the circumstances continuing the 
 same, death will, in this instance, (juicklv 
 follow the act of having drunk of this juice." 
 The following further development will give to this syl- 
 logism the name Epichirema : 
 
 Datum. u An event that has ahvavs followed an act, 
 will continue to follow it when circum- 
 stances are the same. This is not a ne- 
 cessary truth, but the persuasion of ha- 
 bitual experience, and we acknowledge its 
 certainty by calculating, without hesitation 
 or doubt, on issues that have often been tried. 
 Argument. " Now the drinking of this juice has ah 
 
 been quickly followed by death ; as I can 
 alHrm from instances that have come under 
 my own observation; from many more 
 that have been reported to me by friends ; 
 and from innumerable others which past 
 recorded experience bears witness to. 
 Conclusion. " Therefore, unless something can instantly 
 be done to change the circumstances in the 
 present case, death will quickly follow the 
 act that has been committed." 
 
Sec. 41-44.] . DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 171 
 
 In this laborious way does Logic, if left entirely to its own 
 mode, develop knowledge Logic which is without passion, 
 without impulse to action. Rhetoric would be much 
 more brief notwithstanding her repetitions, " He'll die ! 
 he'll die ! he has drunk poison ! Oh ! for an antidote ! " 
 Virtually, we here have the whole of the previous argument, 
 with emotion, and urgency to action, superadded. 
 
 PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS CONTINUED : EXERCISES SUGGESTED 
 FOR IMPROVEMENT IN LOGIC. 
 
 42. There can be no proper practice of Logic which is 
 different in principle from that which directs the ordinary 
 use of language. In the previous pages we have been em- 
 ployed in ascertaining what that principle is ; and now that 
 we know it, we have to act upon it as before, but with the 
 caution which theoretical knowledge confers. It is true that 
 the ordinary use of language aims at rhetorical effect as well 
 as logical precision ; in other words it is meant to influence 
 others, as well as to develop the knowledge in the reasoner's 
 mind. But in practice it is not wise, nor would it be easy, 
 to separate Logic from Rhetoric by any very rigid line : for 
 Logic is the proper ground of Rhetoric, and the practice of 
 Rhetoric includes or ought to include Logic. In following 
 such exercises as are hereafter suggested, the learner is there- 
 fore only cautioned against any style which dispenses with a 
 patient and laborious employment of thought ; but provided 
 he fulfils his duty in the clear development of his own know- 
 ledge, he needs not be the less satisfied, if his language has a 
 correspondent effect upon other understandings.* 
 
 43. Improvement in Logic is best promoted by the 
 writing of what are called THEMES. The word theme pro- 
 perly means the subject of a discourse ; but the discourse 
 itself, if merely an exercise, is also called a theme. We 
 begin with a title, which title may be a single grammatical 
 noun, or a logical noun, or a proposition. t 
 
 44. The title or subject of a theme being a mere gram- 
 matical noun, will be the name of a thing real, or ideal, or 
 metaphysical ; f while the name itself will be proper, common, 
 
 * Compare Section 1 of the present Chapter, p. 140. 
 f Compare Section 7 of the present Chapter, p. 145. 
 { Compare Sections 18, 19, 20, Chapter II. pages 117, 118. 
 
172 MANUAL OF LOGIC. fChap. IV. 
 
 or abstract. Thus Solomon, Socrates, Alexander, King Alfred, 
 Homer, Virgil, Stiakspeare, Milton, Aristotle, Bacon ; London, 
 Rome, Paris; Thames, the Rhine; Vesuvius, the Alps; are 
 proper names of real persons and things : Ceres, Bacchus, 
 Queen Mob, Lilliput, Brobdignad ; are proper names of ideal 
 persons or things: Animals, Vegetables, Minerals; Man, 
 Beast, Bird, Fish, Insect ; Tree, Shrub, Herb ; Earth, Stone, 
 Metal ; * Fire, Air, Earth, Water ; are common names of 
 real things : Fairies, Ghosts, Fauns, Nymphs ; are common 
 names of ideal things : Virtues, Vices, Qualities, Attributes ; 
 are common names of things metaphysical. Faith, Hope, 
 Charity ; Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude ; are 
 names abstract of things metaphysical. And any one of 
 tin-si- becomes the title of a theme by putting the word On 
 before it. 
 
 45. Among the previous classes of names or subjects, that 
 of most frequent choice or occurrence will be the last, a 
 thing metaphysical under a name abstract: of which the 
 following are given as further instances, with hints subjoined 
 to assist the learner in developing his knowledge. 
 
 On Conversation. On Writing. On Reading. On Tra- 
 velling. On History. On Building or Architecture. On 
 Sculpture. On Painting. On Music. On Poetry. 
 
 These are things exercised, or done, or known, and imply 
 persons who exercise or know them. Hence they are things 
 metaphysical, and the cautionary principles | must be kept 
 in mind. The generic name will be, an ability or practice, 
 an art, a science : an art may be further developed by the 
 distinction mechanic ; or fine, (ornamental ;) and the spe- 
 cific nature or more particular description will complete the 
 first point. Then may come some one, or more, or all of the 
 following points : the improvement or the use derived or 
 derivable : the pleasure derived or derivable ; the abuse or 
 omission, and consequent disadvantage or mischief. In 
 some instances, the progress of the art or science from early 
 times to the present may be glanced at. Such are the points 
 which may be taken in treating the foregoing subjects. 
 
 * Ordinary arid not scientific knowledge, is .limed at in suggesting 
 these titles. 
 
 f In Chapter II. Sections 15, 16 at pages 114, 115 ; and Sections 20, 
 21 at page 118. 
 
Sec. 45.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PEACTICE. 173 
 
 These being left for the learner to develop,- one, or more, 
 or all, another subject of the same class is added, with 
 a development appended by way of example. 
 
 " On Observation. 
 
 Observation is the practice of using the natural 
 powers of sense and understanding, so as to reach and 
 retain all the knowledge we can. With regard to this 
 practice, there are great differences among us. Some, 
 with powers naturally good, and with extensive oppor- 
 tunities of gaining the wisdom that grows with expe- 
 rience, seem to pass through life with their senses and 
 understanding closed, and leave the world almost as 
 ignorant as they entered it. They hear wise converse, 
 and read wise books, but derive no practical advantage 
 from either. They see others fall into difficulties and 
 dangers, of which the causes and consequences are 
 easily traceable ; but they neglect to trace them, and 
 learn nothing by which they may avoid the same 
 mischiefs. They travel through countries, and see 
 new manners and customs ; but they make no com- 
 parisons, nor draw any useful conclusions. In short, 
 their minds resemble a stagnant pool of water, which, 
 if it collects anything, covers itself only with weeds. 
 In the meantime, there are others, whose sphere of 
 remark is very limited, but who appear nevertheless 
 to gain experience at every step, and to grow in 
 wisdom as they grow in years. 
 
 The difference which has been alluded to, arises 
 from nothing but the imperfect exertion of the natural 
 powers in the one case, and their proper and active 
 use in the other. A habit of inattention, or a habit 
 of quick-sighted observation, appears to be gained or 
 lost, much in the same way as habits of bodily indo- 
 lence or activity are gained or lost. It is the deter- 
 mination of the will, or the want of it, that in either 
 case, produces the good habit, or allows the evil one 
 to form itself. Let us determine to keep the senses 
 and the understanding closely applied at proper times 
 to their appropriate objects ; and, with perseverance, 
 the good habit will be gained, and the evil one avoided/' 
 
174 MANUAL OF LOGIC. CChap. IV. 
 
 The following are other instances of subjects that are 
 things metaphysical under names abstract: 
 
 On. Curiosity. On Hope. On Fear. On Anger. On 
 Pride. On Humility. On Envy. On Emulation. On 
 Piety. On Patriotism. On Generosity. On Selfishness. 
 On Avarice. On Prodigality. 
 
 The generic name of these will be, a principle in human 
 nature, or an impulse, or a feeling, or a sentiment, or a 
 passion. The particular description from the effects pro- 
 duced will be the difference. The definition thus made out, 
 the next point may be, the benefit or the evil. In some of 
 tin- subjects there will be both a benefit and an evil, depend- 
 ing upon the proper and ill regulation of the principle, the 
 sentiment, or passion. Instances from history, or from ex- 
 perience may be added to verify the previous conclusions. 
 It must be observed, further, that some of the subjects, as 
 Hope and Fear, Pride and JluiiuUtij, are so obviously op- 
 posed in nature, that the one cannot be considered without 
 reference to the other. Of others, though not opposed, it- 
 must nevertheless be observed, that the one cannot be ac- 
 curafflv dfatingcaahed without some allusion to the other; 
 for instance, Envy and Emulation, which are passions that 
 spring from the same root, namely, a desire of superiority, 
 but differ by growing the one in a base, narrow, selfish mind, 
 the other in a generous one. Courage and Fortitude are 
 subjects that require also to be distinguished, not on the 
 same, but on peculiar grounds. As an example to guide the 
 learner, the latter of these subjects is developed under certain 
 points hereunder : 
 
 " On Fortitude. 
 
 Fortitude and Courage are not synonymous words, 
 though each quality in some degree implies the other. 
 Fortitude is passive, Courage is active. Fortitude is 
 >tivngth to endure pain, or other calamity ; Courage 
 is the absence of dismay in meeting and contending 
 with that which threatens pain or death. Yet a 
 courageous man can scarcely maintain his title, if he 
 has no fortitude : a woman of fortitude can scarcely 
 be so deemed, if she has no courage. 
 
 We may distinguish these virtues by other marks* 
 
Sec. 45, 46.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 175 
 
 Courage is much more frequently a constitutional 
 quality, than one derived from thought and moral 
 principle : the other may also be constitutional, but 
 it is much more frequently derived from the latter 
 source, or at least improved by aid from it. Men are 
 more courageous than women, because with them the 
 bodily frame is stronger. Women are often found to 
 have more fortitude than men, partly from a difference 
 of constitution, but frequently because religious or 
 moral feelings are purer and stronger in them than 
 in the other sex. 
 
 But equally in woman and in man, Fortitude is a 
 quality indispensable to the perfection of the human 
 character. We are born to pain, or to calamity that 
 produces or threatens pain. Without strength to 
 endure, the pain or calamity is more than doubled, 
 and a person who has no portion of such strength, 
 is not only more miserable than they who have it, 
 but is less respected and esteemed. 
 
 The question however remains, whether Fortitude 
 depends upon discipline, or is altogether a gift of 
 nature. We may safely answer that the best source 
 of Fortitude is religious and moral instruction. It 
 will aid natural strength where nature is already 
 strong : it will supply it where nature is weak. He 
 who, in affliction, feels that the hand which afflicts 
 means the transient evil for future good, will be able 
 to bear the weight of that hand without repining. 
 Like the virtuous Job of old, he will rise above his 
 trials, and, like him, will find, sooner or later, a 
 reward for his endurance." 
 
 46. We have seen * that the arguments or means used 
 in developing knowledge, are internal or external ; in other 
 terms, subjective or objective. When the name or title of a 
 theme is immediately applicable to an external thing, that is 
 to a real, or an ideal thing, and not immediately to a thing 
 metaphysical bearing an abstract name, the difficulty of de- 
 
 * Section 12 of the present Chapter, page 148. 
 
 E2 
 
176 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. IV. 
 
 vclopment is increased, because the tiring itself 
 
 under a double aspect, namely in its individual, outward, 
 objective shape, and as a subject that may be tract ( I from the 
 stoivs which the mind has already appropriated; stores 
 which may be said to be already a part of tin- mind itself. 
 Let us say, for instance, that Socrates, the proper name of an 
 individual person, is proposed as a theme : to treat this ob- 
 jectively would be, to detail the facts belonging to the in- 
 dividual, the place and time of his birth, who were his 
 parents, what were the acts and events of his life, what the 
 time and manner of his death. But we may omit these 
 facts or take them for granted as known to all persons of 
 education, and confine our development to thoughts gene- 
 rated by these facts, so that in truth the theme would more 
 properly be entitled, An Estimate of the Character of So< 
 or Thoughts on the Character, &c. Thus named, and thus 
 pursued, the theme would class with those already exem- 
 plified, namely a metaphysical subject under a name ab- 
 stract ; for the several words form one name with one 
 meaning ; and that name taken as one, is a name abstract. 
 We are at lilTt\, ho\\wt-r, to develop our knowledge in 
 both ways ; and all that, in such case, we have to remember, 
 is, to keep the points clear and distinct both in thought and 
 in expression, and not to let the single name Socrates be a 
 hindrance to the fixing of proper points for consideration. 
 Let us take, for another instance, the common name Man, 
 as including knowledge proposed to be developed by a 
 tlu-me: how shall we proceed? We art- distracted at 
 first by the apparently interminable considerations that spring 
 indistinctly, like blending rays, from this centre. To consider 
 man objectively requires the thinker to be an anatomist, a 
 physiologist, a tracer of the race in every variety which 
 climate or original constitution has generated ; which is to 
 t more than can be fulfilled by any one person. For 
 an ordinary theme, if some objective points are taken, they 
 must be such as present themselves to every observer ; as 
 for instance the human shape compared with that of other 
 animals ; and the superior intelligence by which the strongest 
 and most cunning of those animals are subdued. But under 
 the name Man, it is not uncommon to find that the knowledge 
 developed is merely subjective ; which happens when man is 
 
Sec. 46,47.] DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 177 
 
 considered not in his physical, but only in his moral relations.* 
 The title in this case would strictly be, On the Moral Relations 
 of Man ; and thus named, the theme would class with those 
 already exemplified. Let us take, for a third instance, the 
 plural word Ghosts, a name of certain things ideal: an ob- 
 jective development of knowledge under this title, would be 
 a description of the times, the places, and the appearances of 
 ghosts, either according to special reports, or founded upon 
 opinions that are, or have been prevalent. But, retaining 
 the title, all objective reference to ghosts might be omitted, 
 and the theme pursued subjectively, as if the title had been, 
 On the Belief in Ghosts : when it would appear to be a theme 
 classing with those already exemplified. 
 
 47. It further appears from what precedes, that the title of 
 a theme may be a grammatical noun-substantive, as On 
 Ghosts, On Knowledge, or a logical, that is a constructed 
 noun-substantive, as On the Belief in Ghosts, On the Know- 
 ledge of the World. But a proposition, a moral saying, or a 
 proverb, may be placed as the title of an exercise; as, A 
 proper Knowledge of the World is favourable to Virtue : Trust 
 not Appearances : Honesty is the best Policy. A theme thus 
 given out is commonly called a Thesis. There is, however, 
 no essential or necessary difference between a thesis and a 
 theme, f except the form of title ; for without requiring any 
 change of what may have been developed under one form, 
 the title may at pleasure take the other form ; as On the 
 moral Advantages of a proper Knowledge of the World : On 
 the Danger of trusting to Appearances : On the Policy of 
 being Honest. The following exercise, for instance, which is 
 called a thesis, would be a theme, by such change of title as 
 is suggested above. 
 
 " Trust not Appearances. 
 
 It is highly imprudent to be guided in our opinions 
 and conduct by first appearances. For the worst of 
 
 * Pope's poetical Essay on Man is an instance. 
 
 f The terms, moreover, are etymologically the same. Some teachers 
 make a difference between both of these, and an Essay. Such distinctions, 
 being, as they are, distinctions without a difference, are made either in 
 ignorance, or for the sake of practical differences which would be better 
 indicated in some other way. 
 
178 MANUAL OF LOGIC. fChap. IV. 
 
 persons and of things wear at times the most engaging 
 aspect : the wily thief approaches in the garb of 
 pulous honesty : the corrupter of hearts carries on his 
 brow nothing but benevolence and candour : vices of 
 every kind assume the guise of virtues : and pleasures 
 that end in misery promise, at first, nothing but delight. 
 In things of less importance, deception and fraud are 
 equally common. The unjust trader gives a false ap- 
 pearance to his wares ; and mere empirics in art or 
 science make larger promises than they who are really 
 skilful. 
 
 This description of what we meet with in the 
 world is supported by further proofs. It is because 
 the arts of deception are spread in every direction, 
 that parents are careful to impress on their inexpe- 
 rienced children the necessity of caution. It is on this 
 account that all reflecting people consider the heedless, 
 the giddy, the easily-confiding, to be in constant 
 danger. It is for this that, as we grow in years, we 
 alter many, if not most of our judgements, and become 
 more suspicious even when, by an increase of our 
 experience, we are less in danger of being deceived. 
 
 The world may be called a garden abounding with 
 noxious fruit, among which much may be found that 
 is wholesome : but unfortunately the far greater part 
 of the former is more enticing to the eye, and, on first 
 taste, far sweeter than the latter. If the simile has 
 any truth in it, we are warned never to pluck and eat 
 without the utmost caution. 
 
 Poets as well as moralists bid us beware how we 
 trust to the world. Shakspeare calls it 
 
 the guiled shore 
 
 To a most dangerous sea, the beauteous scarf 
 Veiling an Indian beauty ; in a word, 
 The seeming truth which cunning times put on 
 To entrap the wisest. 
 
 As to History, it is full of practical warnings on 
 the subject before us. Let us take one as an example 
 of the rest. When the Greeks, after a ten years' 
 siege, found themselves unable to take Troy by 
 force, they feigned an abandonment, and left behind 
 
Sec. 47.1 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC PRACTICE. 179 
 
 them a large wooden horse filled with armed men. 
 This being dragged into the city by the credulous 
 Trojans, the men left their concealment in the night, 
 opened the city gates, and gave admission to the be- 
 siegers. Thus fell Troy : and thus are all persons 
 liable to be lured to their destruction, who will not 
 mistrust appearances when there is danger of being 
 deceived. 
 
 Let us, then, in passing through life, never be too 
 secure or confiding, but when new doctrines are 
 offered to our notice ; or new inventions that throw 
 the old into the shade ; or new acquaintances whose 
 manners are more engaging than those of tried friends, 
 let us suspend our Judgement, and not be carried 
 away by first impressions : let us wait till time and 
 experience furnish some sure grounds for the opinion 
 we are inclined to form, or the conduct we are dis- 
 posed to pursue." 
 
 The points signified by the several divisions or paragraphs 
 of this example, are named, by some teachers, the PROPO- 
 SITION and REASON; the CONFIRMATION, or additional reasons ; 
 the SIMILE ; the QUOTATION or testimony ; the EXAMPLE ; 
 the CONCLUSION.* Such divisions may, or may not occur in 
 the development of knowledge under any other title. 
 
 The following are other theses on which exercises may be 
 written : Home is home. A rolling stone gathers no moss. A 
 burnt child dreads the fire. Charity begins at home. There's 
 many a slip 'twixt cup and lip. Necessity is the mother of in- 
 vention. Harm watch, harm catch. Let the shoemaker keep 
 to his last. Ignorance is full of wonder. Nothing ven- 
 ture, nothing have. Well begun is half done. Enough is as 
 good as a feast. 'Tis an ill wind that blows nobody good. 
 Tread on a worm, and it will turn. Penny wise and pound 
 foolish. Take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care 
 of themselves. Good words cost nothing. Better lose a jest 
 than a friend. Pardon others, but not thyself. He lives long 
 enough who hath lived well. The worst of crosses, is, never to 
 have had any. Fools rush in where angels dare not tread. 
 
 * The several topics (see Sections 12-24) whence the arguments are 
 derived for the parts of this exercise, are, for the Reason, experiment ; for 
 the Confirmation, effects; for the Simile, comparison; for the Quotation, 
 testimony ; for the Conclusion, adjuncts. 
 
180 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chmp. V 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ERRORS TO WHICH LEARNKIIS ARE LIABLE IN ATTEMPTS 
 TO DEVELOP KNOWLEDf;K.* 
 
 1 . Experience in aiding pupils to develop their knowledge, 
 will soon make manifest that, according to the disposition of 
 each, and the qualities of his understanding, he will infringe 
 the laws of logical deduction in one or the other of the follow- 
 ing ways : 
 
 1. BY VERBIAGE ; 
 
 2. BY CONFUSED REASONING. 
 
 3. BY DISJOINTED REASONING ; 
 
 VERBIAGE. 
 
 2. Verbiage is an art which stands by itself: it is the art 
 of joining well-sounding words into correct forms of sentences, 
 with little or no regard to any resulting sense ; the art of 
 using language grammatically, but not logically ; the art of 
 appearing to reason, and employing words for this end, but of 
 employing them in the absence of the knowledge which they 
 ought to include. We here call it an art : it is an art in the 
 bad sense of the term. 
 
 f A pupil who has read, but has not thought a great deal, 
 will have his memory stored with book phraseology, but will 
 be deficient in such knowledge as may be justly called his 
 own. He can supply this deficiency, only by a determination 
 carried into practice, of reasoning from things ; and, con- 
 sequently, of going back to the inductive process, whenever 
 his knowledge of things shall fail him. But if, instead of 
 taking this course, he seeks only to make a parade of know- 
 ledge, by joining terms and phrases familiar to his memory 
 which look well to the eye, and perhaps sound well to the 
 oar, his beginning exercise will, in kind and character, re- 
 semble the following example: 
 
 * Much of what follows, and portions of what precedes, I have already 
 jmhli.shed in a little work called " Practical Logic, or Hints to Theme- 
 Writers,'* which first appeared in 1823. I state the fact, lest it should 
 he thought I have borrowed from certain compilers of grammar what they 
 have borrowed, without acknowledgement, from me. 
 
 f The pupil pursuing the First Course indicated in the Appendix, will 
 (, \v.'ll to read what immediately follows, but the question put to him 
 will K' sufficiently met by what precedes. Wherever a correspondent 
 remark is needed hereafter, this note will be referred to. 
 
See. 1,?.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 181 
 
 " On Education. 
 
 The invaluable blessings of a refined education, are 
 so multifarious in their extent, and so incalculable in 
 their essence, that the understanding and the imagina- 
 tion are equally unable to "comprehend the phenomena 
 involved in the boundless subject. Who, indeed, can 
 justly appreciate the ineffable advantages which ac- 
 crue to gifted individuals, ardent to exhume the 
 germs of scientific lore, and attain the opulent results 
 of disciplinary progress ? Educational instruction exalts 
 the faculties, animates the mind, improves the under- 
 standing, and, by throwing a divine light on the 
 abstract operations of human intellect, gives a new 
 grace to the whole character. Through the instru- 
 mentality of the influence which education alone can 
 impart, we are lifted to another sphere. In short, 
 education is the first of things, the master-key, the 
 universal good; and we are bound at once to reve- 
 rence its authority, and apply to its pure fountain for 
 mental delight, and intellectual improvement." 
 Let it be supposed that this exercise has been written by a 
 pupil, after a conversation with his teacher on the subject to 
 be developed. Now, when a pupil makes proper use of a 
 conversation so given in aid, the fact that all the immediate 
 knowledge he develops has been supplied by the teacher, is 
 no impeachment of the soundness or reality of the pupil's 
 knowledge: for all our knowledge is acquired chiefly from 
 what others communicate : how, and at what time, is of 
 little moment, provided the instructed mind completely em- 
 braces and appropriates the knowledge. But there is this 
 difference between two pupils so assisted by a teacher : the 
 one forgets the phrases, and forms of speech, because his un- 
 derstanding has been intent on the things signified, and not 
 on the words ; and, therefore, in embodying the reasoning, 
 his style will be his own, not an imitation of his teacher's : 
 the other carries away little more than words and phrases, 
 such as he has been accustomed to admire in reading, and 
 these he puts together in the best way he can, so as to form 
 an exercise more or less resembling the example just given. 
 Such an exercise is not a beginner's essay in methodical think- 
 
 E3 
 
182 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 ing : it is an exercise in an art whose purpose is, to conceal 
 the absence of distinct thought : and the teacher, to do his 
 pupil justice, must run his pen through the whole essay, and 
 require a new beginning upon what, to such a pupil, will be 
 altogether a new principle. Not so with the other supposed 
 pupil. Let the expression of thought be ever so poor and 
 meagre, yet if his exercise contain clear evidence that the 
 mind has been at work on the subject suggested, it ought to 
 be accepted as a beginning of logical effort: improvement 
 will come with practice, if the early deficiencies are pointed 
 out and understood. The faults which such a learner is 
 likclv to commit, are described and exemplified under the 
 two general heads that follow : 
 
 CONFUSED REASON IN-.. 
 
 3. This fault, when it becomes evident in language, will 
 be found to arise from the absence of proper distinctions and 
 divisions. 
 
 * The following, which is an exercise by a very young 
 logician on the same subject as the previous example, and 
 may be supposed the result of the same previous suggestions, 
 will serve to show the nature of the fault. 
 
 " On Education. 
 
 Education is certainly one of the most important 
 things which belong to man, and the most useful and 
 essential of any, it' we reflect what a wild savage 
 race we should be, if it were not for this inestimable 
 blessing, and how very fortunatr they ought to think 
 themselves who have friends both able and willing 
 to provide the means of it, without which we should 
 not know the Author of our existence, to whom we 
 are indebted for all our blessings and comforts, and 
 we should not be able to provide for ourselves, for 
 it is not the same with man as it is with birds, which 
 instinct teaches to provide for themselves when they 
 leave the nest of their paients, instead of which we 
 are not only made agreeable in society, but if we 
 
 * See the second foot-note, page 180. 
 
Sec, 3.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 183 
 
 make a proper use of it, it is the source of all hap- 
 piness, and therefore since we are sensible of its 
 worth, let us who possess it think ourselves unspeak- 
 ably happy, and never think it too much trouble to 
 obtain, for surely it is the least we can do for such a 
 valuable benefit." 
 
 This production, deficient as it is in all the other requisites 
 of good composition, is not without some evidence of real 
 thinking. Let this, then, serve as an example of the first 
 formal attempt in the art which is treated of in these pages. 
 The correction of the exercise, with a clear understanding, on 
 the pupil's part, of the nature and purpose of the corrections, 
 will complete and constitute his first practical lesson in logic. 
 Let him observe, then, that he has run on, from the beginning 
 to the end of his exercise, without a single division ; and that 
 he has used no stop but the comma, till he has reached his 
 full stop at the end. Now, though it is true that grammar is 
 one thing in theory, and logic another, and that the stops are 
 regulated by grammar and not by logic ; yet grammar and 
 logic go together in practice, and there cannot be confusion in 
 the former, that does not tend to obscurity in the latter. Let 
 him, therefore, look with the eye of a grammarian on his 
 work, and he will see that grammatical construction is often 
 complete, where he has put only a comma. Complete con-, 
 struction always requires one of the higher stops, strictly 
 the periodic or full stop, but at least the colon or semi-colon. 
 The logical connection is not broken by these marks of gram- 
 matical completeness, but, on the contrary, is made clearer. 
 Construction may and must frequently pause, while the logical 
 process continues, supposing this process to be of any length : 
 and these constructional pauses must be indicated by the 
 usual points. Further, let the learner observe, that his line 
 of argument naturally diverges from two points, namely, 
 1. The importance of education; and, 2. Our consequent duty 
 as young students ; so that the whole theme separates into two 
 subjected themes, that ought to be implied, though not for- 
 mally named, by a division or break in the writing, exhibiting 
 the whole theme in two paragraphs. Thus by logical sul> 
 division and grammatical division, with a few minor correc- 
 tions, the whole theme will take the following shape : 
 
184 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 " On Education. 
 
 Education is the most important and essential 
 concern of man. For let us reflect what a wild, 
 savage creature he would be, without this inestimable 
 blessing. He would not know the Author of his 
 existence, to whom he is indebted for all his comforts. 
 He would not be able to provide for himself. For 
 it is not the same with man as it is with birds : 
 they know, almost entirely by instinct, how to provide 
 for themselves ; but all knowledge necessary to man 
 comes by education. It is education which lifts him 
 from his helpless state, makes him an agreeable mem- 
 ber of society, and prepares him for all happiness. 
 
 Since, then, education is so important, let us to 
 whom it is offered think ourselves unspeakably happy, 
 and never imagine we can employ too much pains to 
 secure all its advantages. Let us reflect how very 
 fortunate we are, in having friends both able and 
 willing to provide the means of instruction ; and let 
 us show our gratitude by our willingness to learn; 
 which is surely the least return we can make for 
 benefits so valuable." 
 
 DISJOINTED REASONING. 
 
 4. Disjointed Reasoning is the development of knowledge 
 in parts not properly connected with each other. The pro- 
 positions may be separately true, but the truth of the one 
 a not lead to, or flow from that of the other. 
 
 * Warned by the confusedness which appeared in his first 
 attempt, and aiming at the greater distinctness of the cor- 
 rected copy, the learner will, perhaps, at the next attempt, 
 produce an exercise formed of sentences after the following 
 manner : 
 
 " On Friendship. 
 
 Friendship is a subject which has often employed 
 the pen of the moralist. We all feel that friendship 
 is necessary to our happiness. Many persons pretend 
 to be influenced by friendship, who are incapable of 
 
 * See the second foot-note, page 180. 
 
Sec. 3,4.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 185 
 
 so noble a sentiment. Without a friend, the world," 
 &c. &c. 
 
 Sentences of this kind do not form discourse : they indeed 
 all relate to the same subject or theme in one sense of the 
 word, but they do not constitute a theme in the other sense :* 
 they are so many distinct propositions, and ought indeed not 
 to be written down in immediate succession, but with breaks 
 in the manner of paragraphs, thus : 
 
 " Friendship is a subject that has often employed 
 the pen of the moralist." 
 
 " We all feel that friendship is necessary to our 
 happiness." 
 
 11 Many persons pretend to be influenced by friend- 
 ship, who are incapable of so noble a sentiment." 
 This is the way to write maxims or proverbs, but a theme 
 must be managed very differently. We must not start from 
 one proposition to another which has no immediate relation 
 to it, but consider in what way our knowledge may be 
 further and further developed in the direction which the 
 initiatory proposition indicates, till nothing more in this direc- 
 tion seems necessary to be said. Suppose a proposition 
 should appear destitute of a purpose which can be thus car- 
 ried out, we must either reject it altogether, or, by some 
 addition, give it a purpose with relation to what we choose 
 shall follow it. The first of the foregoing propositions will 
 exemplify what is here meant, " Friendship is a subject that 
 has often employed the pen of the moralist." It seems hardly 
 worth while to make this observation for the sake of itself ; 
 we expect something to follow which may define its purpose : 
 for example : 
 
 " Friendship is a subject that has so often employed the 
 pen of the moralist, that the few thoughts it may sug- 
 gest to my mind, cannot be either novel or striking. 
 Yet my remarks, though trite, may deserve some 
 attention, because the subject itself is of the highest 
 importance." 
 
 Thus carried out into a rational consequence, and a re- 
 joinder to that consequence, the original proposition becomes 
 a proper introductory paragraph. The next independent pro- 
 position may now be taken, and followed up thus : 
 
 * See Section 43, page 171. 
 
186 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Cliap. V. 
 
 " We all feel that friendship is necessary to our hap- 
 piness. Individually weak, we stand in continual need 
 of assistance, support, advice, and sympathy. But 
 the coldness of the world, and even the indifference 
 of our own hearts to all except a few by whom we 
 are surrounded, soon teach us, that, without sincere 
 friends, we may look for these good offices in vain. 
 Therefore, we always flatter ourselves we possess 
 friends, though there are many who pass through life 
 unendeared to a single heart, and who are never 
 served or assisted but through motives of interest or 
 of fear." 
 
 This paragraph being completed, we may take the next 
 independent proposition as the ground for a third : 
 
 " Many persons pretend to be influenced by friend- 
 ship, who are incapable of so noble a sentiment. The 
 selfish cannot feel it : they will connect themselves 
 with others to reap some immediate advantage, but 
 they are ever strangers to that regard which frames 
 to itself a happiness out of the happiness of others : 
 all their views are of profit or of pleasure solely to 
 themselves. Yet none are more ready than the selfish 
 to give the colouring of friendship to all their actions; 
 because they know this to be the most likelv means 
 of securing the return of greater benefits than they 
 yield." 
 
 It is to be observed that not only should the sentences of 
 the same paragraph K> lo t iri< -ally connected, but the paragraphs 
 themselves should have a closer relation than merely that of 
 treating of the same subject. Therefore, though the foregoing 
 i-aph may not be liable to any objection in itself, yet 
 when placed beside the other, it appears to be defective by 
 not being consequent on what preceded it This fault may 
 be corrected, by drawing such a consequence from the second 
 paragraph as may serve for the ground of the third: for 
 example : 
 
 " As friendship is so important toward the hap- 
 piness of life, we cannot be too careful in our choice 
 of friends, l-st \v<> place a reliance on those who will 
 desert and betray us in the hour of difficulty and dis- 
 tress. For it is but too true that many persons 
 pretend to be influenced," &c. 
 
>ec. 4, 5.J ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 187 
 
 A short practical conclusion carried on from the word 
 " yield," in unison with the commencement thus prefixed to 
 the paragraph, will give a finish to the whole theme : thus : 
 
 " Against such pretended friendship, let confiding 
 generosity be ever on its guard." 
 
 5. Thus it appears that a theme ought to be free from 
 verbiage, that the parts ought to be properly arranged, 
 and that the thoughts should flow from, and support each 
 other. Every fault which the learner is likely to incur, will 
 be some special mode of violating one or the other of these 
 three general rules. 
 
 Under VERBIAGE, the more special names may be, Petitio 
 principii, a Latin phrase, implying the demand (for our proof) 
 of the wry thing to be proved : Non-sequitur, another Latin 
 phrase, which means, that what is appended as a consequence, 
 does not follow as a consequence : and Error in distinction or 
 division, which amounts to no distinction or division at all. 
 Again ; Petitio-principii may so occur as to allow of still more 
 special designations, namely, Begging the question; Identical 
 proposition ; Explaining a thing ty itself; and Reasoning in a 
 circle. So the fault of Non-sequitur may occur in such a 
 manner as to be designated, Irrelevant premises, in which the 
 inconsequence is obvious ; and Proving too little, or Proving too 
 much, in which the inconsequence is real, yet less obvious. 
 So, again, Error in distinction or division, branches into Dis- 
 tinction without a difference, and Confusion of cross divisions. 
 
 Under CONFUSED REASONING, the special descriptions of 
 fault may be, Saying other than is meant ; Not distinguishing 
 different senses of the same word; Neglecting the means of dis- 
 tinction and division which grammar provides for the clear develop- 
 ment of thought. 
 
 Under DISJOINTED REASONING, the special descriptions may 
 be, Omitting necessary propositions ; Proposing too much or too 
 little ; Deviation from the proposition ; Discoursing short of the 
 proposition ; Discoursing wide of the proposition. All these 
 may have for their general title, as well Disjointed Eeasoning 
 as the Latin phrase Ignora'tio elen'-chi, which implies forge t- 
 fulness, or omission, of the point to be made out or developed. 
 
 The following synopsis will render the previous explanation 
 at once intelligible : 
 
183 MANUAL OF LOGIC. rChap. V. 
 
 ( Begging the question. 
 
 r D<,-; ; J Identical proposition. 
 ( Petltl P"V'. j Explaining a tiling by itself. 
 
 (.Reasoning in a circle. 
 VEBBIAOE J /Irrelevant premises (void of consequence) 
 
 ' ff ase tti '" r > 
 
 [ Saying other than is meant. 
 I 
 
 CONFUSKD I Not distinguishing different senses of the same \\nrd. 
 KKASONINO, j Neglecting the means of distinction and division which gra 
 [ provides for the clear development of thought by 
 
 /"Omitting necessary propositions. 
 -p, ^ I Proposing too much or too little. 
 
 > Ignoratio elcnchi. < Deviation from the proposition. 
 INO ' Discoursing short of the proposition. 
 
 v Discoursing wide of the proposition. 
 
 ERRORS IN DETAIL WHICH COME UNDER THE GENERAL HEAD 
 OF VERBIAGE. 
 
 6. BEGGING THE QUESTION is verbiage exhibited in such 
 form of the petitio principii, that the pretended reasoner, in a 
 more palpable way than under the other forms, begs that to 
 admitted for a reason of what he asserts, which is no reason 
 at all, but only the assertion repeated in the same, or in tan- 
 tamount words : as, 
 
 " Pride is odious, because it is disliked by all ; for it pro- 
 duces universal hatred." 
 
 Here, the words because and for, lead us to expect a de- 
 velopment of the cause that makes pride odious, and of the 
 effects which prove it so ; instead of which we have two pro- 
 positions which only repeat, in tantamount words, what the 
 first had said. Omit the words because andybr, and the defect 
 disappears. We shall indeed have three propositions each 
 meaning the same thing ; but such repetition, though logically 
 superfluous, is not always a fault in rhetoric, and in the pre- 
 sent instance must be indulged by logic, as minister to the 
 sister art; as, "Pride is odious; it is disliked by all; it 
 produces universal hatred." Such is one way of correcting 
 the fault, namely, by not raising the question of the truth oi 
 what is asserted, and therefore making no pretence of giving 
 a reason for it.* But the mode of correction more agreeable 
 
 * To give a reason is but to develop our knowledge with greater detail. 
 Wo have ahvavs to jutl^f whether this is, or is not expedient. In saying 
 Pride is odious, we already express a conclusion from premises, namely 
 
Sec. 6, 7.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 189 
 
 to logic will be, to carry out the purpose of because or /or, by 
 adding a legitimate reason; for instance, " Pride is odious; 
 because our self-love makes us feel it as an injury done to our 
 own importance;" which is an argument from the topic 
 cause : and " Pride is odious ; for all persons shun the society 
 of the proud ;" which is an argument from the topic effect. 
 
 7. IDENTICAL PROPOSITION. This form of petitio prindpii 
 differs from the last in no greater degree than its name indi- 
 cates. It is a grammatical period whose two parts are iden- 
 tical in meaning. Thus in saying " All being exists," we 
 have a period dividing into nominative and verb ; but the one 
 means the same as the other, and therefore in putting them 
 together, there is no resulting sense no conclusion from the 
 two, but only a repetition of the same thing under a different 
 form. Again, in saying " As the tree enlarges, so does its 
 size increase," we have a period dividing into two sentences 
 rendered grammatically dependent by as and so ; but the one 
 sentence means exactly what the other means, and no sense 
 results from their grammatical union. So likewise in saying 
 " Home is home," we have a grammatical sentence dividing 
 into home, the nominative, and is home, the verb ; and if we 
 understand no more from the latter, than from the former, the 
 sentence says nothing : it is, in fact, an illogical, because an 
 identical proposition ; though rhetoric vindicates it, by imply- 
 ing under the verb a great deal more than it actually ex- 
 presses. The following are other examples that neither logic 
 nor rhetoric vindicates : 
 
 11 The vain and empty glory of this world, is but nothing- 
 ness." 
 
 Here the verbiage will be corrected, and the sentence be- 
 come rational, by leaving out " vain and empty." 
 
 " Foolishly do the vain triflers we so often meet with in 
 life, squander their useless hours in futile pursuits, while they 
 neglect the needful duties which they ought to perform, and 
 are guilty of continual faults which they ought to avoid." 
 
 from pride, and is odious. Knowing what pride is, we know the feeling 
 it produces in others ; knowing what it is to be odious, we know what 
 effects go along with the quality. In the deductive process, the alleging 
 of reasons is nothing more or other than bringing forward prominently 
 what thus lies behind the premises of our first proposition. 
 
l&O MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 The verbiage of this example will appear by comparing it 
 with the following correction : 
 
 " Many whom we meet with in life, neglect their duties, 
 and squander their hours in futile pursuits." 
 
 " A good definition should include all the things to which 
 the word defined is applied." 
 
 The verbiage lies in using good in constructing the nomi- 
 native, along with should in constructing the verb. We ought 
 to say, either " A definition should include," &c., or " A 
 good definition includes," &c. 
 
 8. EXPLAINING A THING BY ITSELF. This form of petitio 
 principii differs so little from the last, that it may scarcely 
 seem to require a distinct designation. But as, when only a 
 verbal explanation is meant, using another word having ex- 
 actly the same signification is not a fault ; * the learner may 
 require to be reminded that this will be verbiage when the 
 thing is to be explained ; that is to say, the equivalent word 
 will not explain the thing, but only be another word for it. 
 It is, for instance, a fair verbal explanation of Justice to say 
 that it is the quality of being just ; but it is a cheat upon the 
 understanding to deem that, by saying so, we have in any 
 degree developed our knowledge of the thing. We should 
 equally fail, though the fault might be more concealed, if, 
 with an exactly equivalent meaning, we were to use a different 
 word ; if, for instance, we said, justice is the quality of being 
 equitable. Hence, the following passage is a failure : 
 
 " Justice regards both magistrates and private individuals : 
 the former show themselves to be influenced by it, when they 
 make an equitable distribution of rewards and punishments ; 
 the latter, when they are sincere in their words, and just in 
 their dealings." 
 
 Let impartial and honest be substituted for equitable and 
 Just, and the verbiage will be corrected. 
 
 9. REASONING IN A CIRCLE. Tliis form of petitio principii 
 takes place, when we go on proving one proposition by 
 another, on the understood condition that the last, which is 
 to establish the rest, will be self-evident : and then, instead 
 of fulfilling the implied condition, we return to our first 
 assertion, and use that for our proof, when it was the very 
 
 * See Chapter III. Section 5, page 134. 
 
Sec. 8, 9.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 191 
 
 thing to be proved. Thus, it is obvious verbiage to say, 
 " Pride is odious, because it offends our self-love ; and it 
 offends our self-love, because it is odious." The fault is less 
 obvious, but equally present in the following example : 
 
 " Wealth makes the mind uneasy; for it fills it full of 
 care ; of care for its increase ; of care, lest it should diminish ; 
 of care to prevent one portion from being lost, while we are 
 watching for another : and that all these effects are engendered 
 by the possession of wealth, is established by the fact, that wherever 
 we find riches, we are sure to find uneasiness and disquietude 
 also:' 
 
 The latter part of this example, so far as it pretends to be 
 an argument for what precedes, is verbiage. 
 
 * We proceed to a third example : 
 
 " The formal syllogism of Aristotle is the test of all valid 
 reasoning, all reasoning being invalid which conforms not to 
 its formulae : e.g. ' All vegetables grow : an animal grows : 
 therefore it is a vegetable.' ' All wise legislators suit their 
 laws to the genius of their country : Solon did this : therefore 
 he was a wise legislator.' Now both these [apparent] syllo- 
 gisms, and all similar to them " (so the argument continues,) 
 " refuse the test which Aristotelian logic provides, and both 
 of them " (so the argument still continues,) " are instances of 
 invalid reasoning." 
 
 When, in proceeding to answer the argument, it is asked, 
 why the latter instance, as well as the former, is an instance 
 of invalid reasoning, the answer given is this ; 
 
 " That the latter as well as the former, refuses the test 
 which the Aristotelian syllogism provides." 
 
 Here, it is clearly evident that the reasoner goes back to 
 the proposition he had to prove, namely that " the formal 
 syllogism of Aristotle is the test of all valid reasoning," in 
 order to answer the question, why the reasoning is wrong in 
 saying, " All wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of 
 their country : Solon did this : therefore he was a wise legis- 
 lator." That the reasoning here is confusedly expressed, we 
 acknowledge ; f but that it is wrong reasoning, can never be 
 established by so palpable an argument in a circle as the 
 
 * See the second foot-note, page 180. 
 
 f* The true character of the fault with which this latter of the two 
 examples is chargeable, will be assigned in the next Section. 
 
192 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap.V 
 
 instance supplies. And yet it is one of the modes of proof 
 pursued in favour of Aristotelian logic, in the most popular 
 logical treatise of the day. 
 
 10. IRRKLKVANT PREMISES. Prem ises are irrelevant \vlin 
 what is said to follow from them, does not follow ; as, 
 " Every horse is an animal; sheep are not horses; therefore 
 they are not animals." It is a designation by which we may 
 distinguish one of the modes of the general fault called a non- 
 sequitur, namely, that in which the premises are quite void 
 of consequence. 
 
 *If our theory of deductive logic is true, a non-seqmtur in 
 thought is impossible. In the induction of knowledge, that 
 is, in gathering it into the mind, we may indeed make the 
 most unwarrantable assumptions, and the most fatal mistakes, 
 and in developing our knowledge these errors will re-appear ; 
 but they will appear as premises, with no possibility (if we 
 do not give up thought for words) with no possibility of flaw 
 in the validity of our conclusions : inasmuch as every conclu- 
 sion from premises, is but the fact of developing our know- 
 ledge, real or assumed, and of understanding our premises ; 
 and with relation to its actual premises, a conclusion cannot 
 but be what it is. We can no more choose in the case, than 
 we can choose in the case of sensation ; than we can choose, 
 for instance, what our s-nsation shall !>, wh.-n certain food is 
 oil! -red to the palate, or a certain shape to the eye. Let us 
 know what red, and also what earth is, and the moment these 
 are embraced as premises by the understanding, is the moment 
 of our beinn aware of the meaning which, as one expression, 
 they signify ; and this is the conclusion from those premises ; 
 which conclusion, if the premises are not mistaken, cannot be 
 other than it is. In like manner, let us know that men are 
 mortal, and that kings are men, and the moment the under- 
 standing embraces these as premises, is the moment of our 
 l)cinu' aware of the conclusion, that kings are mortal; a con- 
 clusion which, with regard to the actual premises, cannot be 
 avoided, and cannot but be what it is. 
 
 A false conclusion, then, with relation to its actual pre- 
 mises, l>eino; impossible, we have to ask how there can be 
 such a thing as a false conclusion at all : and the answer is, 
 
 * See the second foot-note, page 180. 
 
Sec. 10.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 193 
 
 that, in the deductive process, there can indeed be no such 
 thing, except when words are made to take the place of 
 thought. Let us know what square means, and what a circle 
 means, and it will be impossible for the understanding to 
 embrace these as premises, and receive the grammatical com- 
 bination as a conclusion : nevertheless, the grammatical com- 
 bination, a square circle, may be offered as a conclusion, and 
 may be by him accepted who takes words for thought. In 
 like manner, let us know what vegetables are, and what ani- 
 mals are, and it will be impossible though our knowledge 
 includes the fact that they both grow it will be impossible 
 for the understanding to embrace these as premises, so as to 
 receive, as a conclusion, that an animal is a vegetable. Yet 
 this again may be offered as a conclusion, and may again be 
 by him accepted, who reasons not by means of words, but 
 imitates that process by operating with words, and failing in 
 the operation, which it is not difficult to do, reaches that, 
 which in the true process of reasoning, is an impossible 
 result. Now if the shrewdest of the present, or any other 
 generation, were to employ his wits in devising an instrument 
 by which, in failing to use it according to rule, it should be 
 possible to come to conclusions of the kind here exemplified, 
 he would not be likely to contrive anything so extremely 
 ingenious as the instrument which has been in existence, and 
 partially in use for some two thousand years, the syllogism 
 of Aristotle, with its apparatus of extremes and middle term. 
 For this instrument, as its advocates declare, proposes rules 
 of reasoning, " which have nothing to do with the truth or 
 falsity of premises, but merely teach us to decide, not whether 
 the premises are fairly laid down, but whether the conclusion 
 fairly follows from the premises." * If the theory of our 
 logic is true, this is something more preposterous than pro- 
 viding spectacles for them who cannot but see clearly, or 
 crutches for them who cannot but walk well. Let us, how- 
 ever, take the instrument as it is put into our hands ; and, 
 acknowledging that it guards the reasoner against a wrong 
 use of its forms, acknowledging this, we say that in using 
 it, we are rendered liable to traps and snares, which would 
 not come in our way, if we reasoned without it. " The 
 
 * Whately's Logic: Province of Reasoning, Chap. i. 1, ad finem. 
 
194 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap.V. 
 
 conclusiveness of an argument," say its advocates, " is" (by 
 this instrument) " ma<k- manifest by the mere force" ( 
 " of the expression, i. e. without considering the meaning of the 
 terms" * Admitted : but when the reasoner has dismissed 
 all attention to the meaning, there is at least a possibility that 
 he should fail to employ the exact form, and employ one 
 which seems a legitimate syllogism, but is not one : " All 
 vegetables grow : an animal grows : therefore it is a vege- 
 table." The apparent conclusion is of course a non-sequitur 
 both in Aristotle's logic and in ours: in Aristotle's, with 
 reference to its defect in form, the fault is specially described 
 as an illicit process of the major, or non-distribution of the 
 major term in the premises: in ours, we call it irrelevant 
 premises, that is premises that cannot be embraced by the 
 understanding cannot be correctly understood so that the 
 last proposition is inevitable in the act of understanding them. 
 And the practical difference we insist on, is this, that in 
 using Aristotle's instrument, there may occur the failure which 
 produces the apparent conclusion : in using language for the 
 purpose of reasoning as our theory requires, the failure cannot, 
 in t/ie shape exemplified, occur. 
 
 Before we conclude the present section with a few examples 
 to the same purpose as the foregoing, we must vindicate from 
 thf charge of irrelevant premises, though we cannot from that 
 of illicit process, an example associated in Section 9 above, 
 with a foregoing example, in which an animal is made a vege- 
 tul>l'. That other example was, "All wise legislators suit 
 their laws to the genius of their country: Solon did this: 
 therefore he was a wise legislator." According to our logic, 
 this is correct though confused reasoning ; and as an example 
 of confused reasoning, it will again occur in a subsequent 
 section. It is correct, because the argument with its conclu- 
 sion, " Solon suited his laws to the genius of his country, and 
 therefore was a wise legislator," implies, by its being put 
 forward as an argument for that conclusion, the datum which 
 really exists in the understanding of the reasoner, namely that 
 " All are wise legislators who suit their laws," &c. The confu- 
 sion lies in his previously saying other than he means ; which 
 
 * Whately's Logic : Synthetical Compendium, Book (or Chap.) II., 
 Chap, (or Part) iii., $ 1, ad finem. 
 
Sec. 10.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 195 
 
 confusion is removed by removing the irrelevant proposition, 
 when what remains will be the premises, namely datum and 
 argument, compendiously expressed : or the irrelevant propo- 
 sition may be changed so that it shall accurately correspond to 
 the datum in his mind. 
 
 Of examples of irrelevant premises, the snares and traps 
 into which we are liable to run through an incautious trust in 
 Aristotelian forms, and a non-observance of their rules, the 
 following are appended as further specimens. 
 
 " If the hour-hand of a clock be any distance, say a foot, 
 before the minute-hand, the last, though moving twelve times 
 faster, can never overtake the other. For while the minute- 
 hand is moving over those twelve inches, the hour-hand will 
 have moved over one inch ; so that they will then be an inch 
 apart ; and while the minute-hand is moving over that one 
 inch, the hour-hand will have moved over T V of an inch ; so 
 that it will still be a-head : and again, while the minute-hand 
 is passing over the space of -j^- inch, which now divides them, 
 the hour-hand will pass over T-^ inch ; so that it will still be 
 a-head, though the distance between the two is diminished ; 
 &c. &c. &c. ; and thus it is plain we may go on for ever. 
 Therefore, the minute-hand can never overtake the hour-hand." 
 
 This example, which brings us to a conclusion contradictory 
 to our clearest experience, is liable to be startling to a person 
 who has any reliance on the mere forms of reasoning, more 
 especially if he is acquainted with the truth, that, in mathe- 
 matics, there are lines under certain conditions, which, though 
 they are always approaching, can never meet. But this, 
 which in certain cases can be true of abstract lines, that is 
 lines unlimited by place, time, or dimensions, cannot, of 
 course, be true in physics. How, then, is the appearance of 
 truth given to the foregoing form of reasoning ? By relying 
 on the farm, so as to keep the true datum or knowledge out 
 of sight; namely, that " the hour-hand can never overtake 
 the minute-hand within the space at which they are at any time 
 asunder, but that this space will continually diminish till at 
 last there shall be no space between them." It is now 
 evident that no argument can be joined with this datum, 
 which shall not be irrelevant to that which is appended as 
 a conclusion, namely, " Therefore the minute-hand can 
 never overtake the hour-hand." 
 
196 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 "None but whites were civili/.-d ; the ancient Gen: 
 were whites; therefore they wen- civili/.-l." 
 
 " None but whites are civilized ; the Hindoos are not 
 whites; therefore they are not civilized." 
 
 " None but civili/ed people were whites; the Greeks \ 
 whites; therefore they were civil;/' <!." 
 
 These are traps intended for the non-Aristotelian reasoner, 
 who, in trying to grasp the knowledge held out in the ] >i\- 
 mises, is beset by difficulties which the Aristotelian do< 
 concern himself with; difficulties arising ironi the nature of 
 the subjects, inasmuch as white men and dark men, civilized 
 men and uncivilized men, are not separated in point of fact by 
 any determinate line, but run into each other. Our reasoner 
 will hence be inclined to deem each example inconcli 
 and when the Aristotelian <l->hvs him to take the prenii 
 each for granted, and then to distinguish the faulty example, 
 he will find no one faulty beyond some confusion of expression ; 
 inasmuch as, in each instance, the argument (the second pro- 
 position) involves the datum required, in the very act of 
 being put forward to reach the appended conclusion. Thus 
 the </atum which he understand in the first example, is, "All 
 whites were civilized; " nor is it of moment to him, (except 
 from the confusion it creates,) that the first proposition is 
 irrelevant as tJiere expressed, since the second and third con- 
 tain, to his understanding, the premises he is called upon to 
 admit. The Aristotelian, indeed, exclaims " Non-sequitur 
 undistributed middle;" but what is this to him who reasons, 
 not with words, but only by means of words? or what ad- 
 mission has been drawn from him, which is likely to mislead 
 his understanding in the future course of the reasoning ? 
 
 " Light food is good for me: o. e. food light of digwtioo.) 
 
 But this food is light : (i.e.lightm.pecific weight.) 
 
 Therefore, it is good for me." 
 
 " Projectors are unfit to be trusted: o.ygjpjto ~yp- 
 But this man is a projector : ( Vroj^T wb ""* br U * btfol 
 Therefore, he is unfit to be trusted." 
 
 " What is bought in the market is eaten : 
 But raw meat is bought in the market : 
 Therefore, raw meat i> eaten*' 1 
 
Sec. 10.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 197 
 
 " All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
 
 angles : (I. e. all taken together.) 
 
 This is the angle of a triangle: o.e. one of the angles.) 
 Therefore, it is equal to two right angles." 
 " Five is one number : 
 
 Three and tWO are five : (i.e. they makeup when joined.) 
 
 Therefore, three and two are one number." 
 
 These are traps for the Aristotelian reasoner, and not foi 
 ours. It is true, the latter may, in the induction of his 
 knowledge, have been led, in such a case as the first, to bring 
 under one term things in their nature different, and hence, 
 because his premises were wrong, to deduce, in thought and 
 practice, a wrong conclusion; to deem, for instance, as 
 indicated by the example in view, that food which weighs 
 light in proportion to its quantity, is on this account light of 
 digestion. But being taught to look to the subject-matter of 
 his premises as the only source of invalidity in his conclusions, 
 he is surely less likely than a reasoner not so taught, to rest 
 satisfied with his deductions. The other examples can 
 scarcely deceive him for a moment : to his understanding, the 
 premises in all will at once appear irrelevant to their re- 
 spective conclusions ; nor can they, in fact, deceive any one 
 but a reasoner who gives up all attention to the subject- 
 matter of his argument, and trusts entirely to its form. 
 Indeed we may fairly ask of the Aristotelian reasoner, why, 
 on his principles, these forms of argument are not received ? 
 To say that we must not here rely on the forms, but go back 
 to the meaning of the terms, is to confess, after all, that the 
 subject-matter is everything, and the forms nothing. Hence, 
 it is matter of complaint with Dr. Whately, that when 
 Aristotelian teachers come to fallacies thus protected, as it 
 were, by the very form of the syllogism, they have recourse, 
 in order to expose them, " to a loose, vague, and popular 
 kind of language ; " * which may be translated to mean, that 
 they now employ, for the first time, the language of common 
 sense, in order to reach the common human understanding. 
 Dr. Whately would have them more cautious, reminding 
 them of the shelter of technical language, by which the 
 esoterical disciple may still be kept aloof from the common 
 
 * Whately's Logic : Book (or Chap.) III. of Fallacies : Introd. 
 
198 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 herd; as, for instance, by denominating the errors in the 
 foregoing examples, ambiguous middle; confusion of different 
 intentions ; faUacium a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpli- 
 city , &c. Will an age so advanced as the present, tolerate 
 much longer this learned trifling ? 
 
 11. PROVING TOO LITTLE. This must be a non-sequitur ; 
 a physical or real one, the facts of the case not reaching what 
 we seek to establish; as when we say, " Our friend John 
 never cheats or steals ; and therefore he is a man of every 
 virtue." The words and therefore are verbiage : what follows 
 them may be true, but not true as a consequence of what 
 precedes. The same fault, a little more concealed, is exem- 
 plified in the following : 
 
 " No man can be happy who pursues nothing but pleasure. 
 For to procure what the world calls pleasure, requires money, 
 health, and spirits ; but most men who always pursue plea- 
 sure, will be always wanting some of these." 
 
 Nothing more is here proved, admitting what is averred, 
 than that most men who pursue pleasure cannot be happy. 
 The full proof would not be difficult by a wider induction of 
 particulars; and it is only necessary to remind the young 
 logician, that when he intends to establish a truth, he should 
 bring forward all the facts, which may force a reasonable 
 mind to admit it. He might, for instance, aver, as to the 
 proposition in view, that, " the constant pursuit of what the 
 world calls pleasure, unwarranted as it is by reason and 
 conscience, will ever be found to harass the spirits, undermine 
 the health, produce languor and satiety, and, at last, instead 
 of real enjoyment, leave nothing to the feelings but disgust 
 and pain." 
 
 Returning to the uncorrected examples, it may be observed, 
 that in all cases of proving too little, we supply, mentally, an 
 unwarranted datum ; and we prove too little, because that 
 datum must be proved before our conclusion will hold. 
 Tims, in the first example above, the implied datum is, "He 
 who never cheats or steals, is a man of every virtue." Grant 
 this, and the conclusion is undeniable: but it cannot be 
 granted, and hence the defect of having proved too little. It 
 is indeed the error of our lives to take the data which our 
 wishes, our passions, our prejudices suggest, before we have 
 accumulated knowledge on adequate grounds. But the error, 
 
Sec. ll.J ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 199 
 
 be it observed, is always in the inductive process. In this 
 process, the conclusion, which is properly and strictly called 
 an inference, never follows necessarily from the premises, 
 because it is never included in them, but is more or less 
 probable up to the highest degree of certainty which our 
 knowledge can reach ; a certainty different in kind from neces- 
 sary certainty, though it is the certainty from which flow all 
 our necessary conclusions in the deductive process. Let us 
 take the following instance : " This stone, which I have 
 lifted from the ground, and let go, has fallen to the ground 
 again : therefore, if I lift it again, and again let it go, it mil 
 again fall to the ground." The inference is not a necessary 
 conclusion; but who, for a moment, doubts its certainty? 
 That on which its certainty rests, is the wide, universal 
 induction of particular facts, which, never having failed, the 
 habit of our understandings leads us to accept as what never 
 will fail.* In the deductive process, then, the datum which 
 the foregoing inference supplies, has the utmost possible 
 degree of strength, namely, that " Every stone lifted from 
 the ground and let go, having fallen to the ground, every 
 stone that shall be lifted and let go, will fall." Very dif- 
 ferent in degree of certainty, are the data supplied by innu- 
 merable inferences, which we incautiously accept in the accu- 
 mulation of our knowledge ! Let us take a few by way of 
 specimen : 
 
 " I am sure . the man is a rogue, he has such an evil- 
 looking face :" (i. e. He has an evil-looking face ; therefore he 
 is a rogue.) 
 
 " I have often observed that when it rains on Friday it 
 also rains on Sunday: now yesterday was Friday, and it 
 rained hard : therefore I am sure it will rain to-morrow." 
 
 " I got well while I was taking this drug: therefore it 
 cured me." 
 
 " I have never begun anything on a Friday without being 
 unlucky : therefore it is unlucky for any one to begin any- 
 thing on a Friday." 
 
 " Everybody suspects John of having taken my purse : 
 therefore he stole it." 
 
 * See, on this subject, the explanation afforded by Mr. James Douglas 
 <&f Cavers, quoted in the note to Section 15, Chapter IV., page 152. 
 
 F2 
 
200 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 " This dish which people praise so much, is, to my taste, 
 very nasty : therefore it is unfit for anybody." 
 
 " Miss A., according to my idea, is very ugly, though I 
 hear her beauty so much cried up : therefore she is very 
 ugly." 
 
 " This food is extremely grateful and nutritious to the 
 people living within the tropics : therefore it is fit food for all 
 people." 
 
 In all the foregoing examples, after the prior shape of 
 the first, the word therefore is so used as to be palpable 
 verbiage, and thus the fault is in each made more manifest 
 than it would be, if couched in more common forms of 
 speech. But the more it is concealed, the more cause has 
 the young logician to be on his guard. He must remember 
 that whenever he reaches an inference by too narrow an 
 induction, his conclusion in the development of his knowledge, 
 necessary as it will be from the datum he assumes, must at 
 the same time be without value ; for he will always, in such 
 a case, prove too little. The conclusion he reaches will not be 
 a logical, or, in other words, a metaphysical non-sequitur, but 
 it will be a physical or real one. 
 
 12. PROVING TOO MUCH. This will also be a real non- 
 sequitur; because if our proof includes more than can be 
 true, that which may be true will not follow from it. It may 
 be true that the drug which John took when he was ill 
 cured him; but when, in order to establish this presumed 
 truth, we aver that the illness of Samuel, and that of Thomas, 
 and that of William, were cured by the same drug, the 
 several diseases being distinct and in some degree opposite in 
 character, so that the same drug could not have had the 
 sunn- effect on all, we prove too much, and the proposition, 
 " Because John took the drug, he got well," remains un- 
 proved by it. Hence the connecting word because is verbiage, 
 and to correct the example, we must leave it out, and put 
 and between the sentences. The same fault of proving too 
 much occurs in the following example : 
 
 " No one can live a happy life who pursues nothing but 
 pleasure. For it is in the nature of things that when a man 
 gives himself up to one pursuit, it becomes tiresome. There- 
 fore, people who are always following pleasure, do not take 
 delight in it, but pass a troubled, uneasy, dissatisfied life." 
 
Sec. 12.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 201 
 
 If it were generally true, as here said, that when a man 
 gives himself up to one pursuit, it becomes tiresome, then 
 would it be true that in giving himself up to the pursuit of 
 wisdom, knowledge, virtue, or other excellent thing, the 
 pursuit would grow tiresome ; a conclusion which we know 
 to be false. It is true only of pleasure, that when pursued 
 to the exclusion of other occupations, it no longer produces 
 the effect desired from it, but becomes disgust and pain. 
 
 In these last examples, as well as in those of the previous 
 section, we supply, mentally, an unwarranted datum. The 
 difference is, that, in the former cases, the induction on 
 which we assume each datum, is too narrow, that is, it has 
 not collected a sufficient number of facts to warrant the 
 datum ; while in the latter case it is too wide, that is, it has 
 included more facts than there was just ground for. An 
 example of the latter occurred in the last section but one ; in 
 which a reasoner is supposed, in the induction of his know- 
 ledge, to have included under the word light, things of a very 
 different nature, so as to persuade himself that all light food 
 is good for him. The argument proves too much; for it 
 includes all food specifically light. Further experience may 
 correct the error ; and then he will be aware why his former 
 conclusion was wrong, namely, that the argument included in 
 the word light, proved too much, and therefore, for his true 
 instruction and benefit, proved nothing. A few more exam- 
 ples of the same kind, may be sufficient to show how liable 
 we are to these conclusions which flow from proving too much. 
 
 " Liberty is a blessing to man;" (without limiting the cir- 
 cumstances that make it a blessing ;) " therefore, let us im- 
 pose no laws on these uninstructed men, but allow them to 
 do whatever they wish." 
 
 " Pleasure is a good which I eagerly desire;" (without 
 discriminating between pleasure which is enduring, and plea- 
 sure which must turn to evil;) " therefore, I will plunge into 
 the sensual revelry which invites me on every side." 
 
 "Wealth procures great advantages;" (without discri- 
 minating advantages, which, by itself, it cannot procure;) 
 " therefore, I will accumulate wealth in every way, and at all 
 hazards." 
 
 " Rank and power are highly desirable;" (without discri- 
 
202 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 minating the circumstances that make them so;) " therefore, 
 I will scruple no means to raise myself to rank and power.* 7 
 
 " To make others fear to injure me, is judicious ; " (without 
 regard to the fact that fear may keep all at a distance who 
 would otherwise befriend me;) " therefore, I will never 
 allow the least injury, or even the least slight, to remain un- 
 revenged." 
 
 " A. B. is our representative in parliament ; " (without 
 adverting to the variety of opinion in those he represents, and 
 the understood condition, that he who is a member of parlia- 
 ment, ought to consult the interests of the nation at large, as 
 well as of his constituency ;) " therefore, A. B. is, on this 
 question, bound to vote as we, namely C. D. and E., direct 
 him." 
 
 The conclusion which the reasoner attains in all these 
 instances, though, by granting him in each the implied datum, 
 it is logically (metaphysically) correct, is nevertheless really 
 (physically) false ; in other words, a real non-sequitur. 
 
 13. DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE. We now reach 
 another of the general forms of verbiage, namely, Error in 
 distinction or division, of which, one of the species is that 
 named above. It may be sufficient to warn the learner 
 against the fault above-named, by the following examples: 
 
 " I propose to consider, first, the evils which arise from 
 procrastination; and then, the miseries we should avoid by 
 performing our duties at their proper time and place." 
 
 The reasoner is guilty of verbiage in this distinction ; or, if 
 he really means different things, he must mean " first, the 
 evils of procrastination ; and then, the benefits of performing, 77 
 &c. The following are two other examples : 
 
 " Books are the receptacles of knowledge, and the deposi- 
 tories in which the collected wisdom of ages is treasured up." 
 " Docility is a readiness to receive instruction, and a 
 willing obedience to those who teach." 
 
 In both these instances, the word and converts what follows 
 into verbiage : leave it out, and the verbiage is corrected. 
 We shall, it is true, then have, in each example, two expres- 
 sions to the same purpose ; but these will be used as two 
 nouns are used in apposition, the one to make the meaning of 
 the other better understood, without pretending to add any- 
 
Sec. 13, 14.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 203 
 
 thing new to the meaning. And, as adding what is no addi- 
 tion, always amounts to a distinction without a difference, so 
 likewise does disjoining what is not distinct ; as, 
 
 " To be neither merciful nor compassionate, is unsuitable 
 to the condition of man." 
 
 Here, to avoid verbiage, we must say, " Not to be mer- 
 ciful not to be compassionate, is unsuitable,'* &c. : or, 
 avoiding the repetition, " Not to be compassionate is unsuit- 
 able," &c. 
 
 In rhetoric, the earnestness of a speaker to make the most 
 of a point, frequently produces a redundancy of words when 
 nothing is added to the meaning .But in logic, such a redun- 
 dancy is a fault, and, if very palpable, will not answer the 
 purpose even of the rhetorician. The following sentences * 
 are therefore faulty. 
 
 " This great politician desisted from, and renounced his 
 designs, when he found them impracticable." 
 
 " He was of so high and independent a spirit, that he 
 abhorred and detested being in debt." 
 
 " Though raised to an exalted station, he was a pattern of 
 piety, virtue, and religion." 
 
 " His end soon approached; and he died with great 
 courage and fortitude." 
 
 " He was a man of so much pride and vanity, that he 
 despised the sentiments of others," 
 
 " Poverty induces and cherishes dependence; and depend- 
 ence increases and strengthens corruption." 
 
 " This man, on all occasions, treated his inferiors with 
 great haughtiness and disdain." 
 
 " There can be no regularity or order in the life and con- 
 duct of that man, who does not give and allot a due share of 
 his time to retirement and reflection." 
 
 " Such equivocal and ambiguous expressions, mark a 
 formed intention to deceive and abuse us." 
 
 "His cheerful, happy temper, remote from discontent, keeps 
 up a kind of daylight in his mind, excludes every gloomy 
 prospect, and fills it with a steady and perpetual serenity." 
 
 14. CONFUSION OF CROSS DIVISIONS. A cross division is a 
 division for some purpose, or on some principle, distinct from 
 
 * Taken from Murray's Exercises : a key for correcting the instances 
 will be found in the ADpendix. 
 
204 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 another division. Thus, a bookbinder divides books into 
 folio, quarto, octavo, duodecimo, &c. : a philosopher into 
 poetical, historical, &c. : a philologist into Greek, Latin, 
 English, French, &c. Now a logician would be guilty of 
 a great error, if he were to confuse these several divisions by 
 dividing books, in general, into the several species of poetical, 
 historical, folio, quarto, Greek, Latin, &c. ; for these are not 
 divisions under one general head which includes them, but 
 divisions under particular heads for special purposes. Sup- 
 pose, therefore, that in a theme on History the writer should 
 set out with a division into Sacred, Profane, Ancient, and 
 Modern, he at once plunges into verbiage; because sacred 
 history is not distinct from ancient, but happens to be in- 
 cluded in it ; and because profane history is not distinct from 
 modern, but happens to include it. The divisions are never- 
 theless just, if he does not confuse the one set with the other. 
 We run into the same fault when we say, 
 
 " The human body is divided into the head, trunk, limbs, 
 and vitals." 
 
 For the vitals are included in the head, or trunk, or 
 both; and the division should be into " head, trunk, and 
 limbs;" so that the vitals, if spoken of at all, may be taken 
 in subordination to what includes them. 
 
 The following are other instances * in which the fault is 
 sufficiently apparent : 
 
 " The things brought out to me were some square, some 
 white, some artificial, some round, some blue, some natural, 
 and some red." 
 
 " He was a man of great temperance and high birth, very 
 generous, and quick to discover fraud, of extensive riches and 
 exalted virtue." 
 
 " In treating of Poetry, I shall consider it under the 
 heads of Epic, Classical, Ancient, English, Lyric, Written- 
 in-Rhyme, Modern, Dramatic, and Written-in-blank- Verse." 
 
 " Men, as to constitution, temper, and habits, are either 
 phlegmatic, gay, devoted to business, sanguine, gloomy, 
 devoted to pleasure, or choleric." 
 
 ERRORS IN DETAIL WHICH COME UNDER THE GENERAL HEAD 
 
 OF CONFUSED REASONING. 
 15. SAYING OTHER THAN is MEANT. The faults now to 
 
 * A key for correcting them will be found in the Appendix. 
 
Sec. 15.J ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 205 
 
 be noticed are faults of expression ; being faults of reasoning 
 only so far as faulty expression can scarcely fail to cloud and 
 confuse the reasoning. We assume Logic to be the art of 
 developing knowledge for our own security and satisfaction ; 
 but always with a view of applying our skill, ultimately, to 
 the purposes of rhetoric, that is of informing, convincing, and 
 persuading others. Now if we say other than we mean, 
 although what we mean may, in some sort, be present to our 
 own understanding, and although others may not altogether 
 mistake what we mean ; yet there will, on both sides, be a 
 degree of confusion, which it is among the objects of logic to 
 prevent. The following examples, therefore, though faulty 
 only in expression, are properly deemed illogical. 
 
 * ' Ambition is so insatiable, that it will make any sacrifice 
 to attain its objects." 
 
 " As to be content with what we have, is to be truly rich, 
 it follows that no covetous man is truly rich." 
 
 " Solon was a wise legislator; for all wise legislators suit 
 their laws to the genius of their nation." 
 
 Each of these examples exhibits a non-sequitur in expression ; 
 but it is in expression only. The meaning which the reasoner 
 designs to convey, and that which, in spite of the faulty ex- 
 pression, the hearer or reader receives, is the following : "Am- 
 bition is so insatiable, that, however much it gets, it will still 
 desire more, and make any sacrifice to attain it." "As no one 
 is truly rich but he who is content, it follows that no covetous 
 man is truly rich." " Solon was a wise legislator ; for all 
 are wise legislators who suit their laws to the genius of their 
 nation." The expression in each example may be made cor- 
 rect in another way, namely by foregoing the logical connec- 
 tion understood between the facts, and stating them as things 
 that only happen to come together ; as " Ambition is insa- 
 tiable : it will make any sacrifice to attain its objects." " To 
 be content with what we have, is to be truly rich : no covetous 
 man is truly rich." " Solon was a wise legislator : he and 
 all other wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of 
 their nation." This way of correcting a non-sequitur is left 
 to our choice in cases like these, when the fault was only in 
 the expression, and not in point of fact : but we have no 
 choice we must take the latter mode, when the non-sequitur 
 is of the latter kind ; as " All vegetables grow ; an animal 
 
 F3 
 
2 G MA X UAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 grows:" we cannot connect these by any logical conse- 
 quence ; they must be left in their independent state, or joined 
 in expression as we usually join things that happen to come 
 together; for example, "All vegetables grow, and so do-.s 
 an animal." Again in proposing to join round and square, we 
 find them irrelevant to any conclusion, in other words they 
 will not make sense, and therefore instead of saying a rouitd 
 square, we must leave them independent of each other's 
 meaning, and say a round, and a square. Returning now to 
 examples in which the non-sequitur is only in the expr< 
 we may indicate to the learner, as specimens in point, all those 
 which were furnished in the Manual of Grammar (pages 92, 
 93,) to discriminate between grammar and logic. Thus, 
 " He that was dead, sat up :" Each being taken strictly, the 
 two members of this sentence cannot unite and imply one 
 sense : but the former member is neither meant nor received 
 according to its strict import ; and therefore it does unite 
 with what follows. The same thing might be shown of all 
 the other examples at the pages referred to ; yet they all 
 come under the censure of confused reasoning, (except one or 
 two vindicated by rhetoric,) because in all of them the rea- 
 soner says other than he means. 
 
 It must be further borne in mind, that not only should an 
 expression convey none other than is meant, but should like- 
 wise be free from a double meaning, though one of the mean- 
 ings may be the one intended. Sometimes, as in the case of 
 pretended prophecy, there may be a purpose in equivocation ; 
 but with such a purpose, logic is not concerned ; and in cor- 
 recting a few more examples* continued from the Manual of 
 Grammar, the student will take care that each sentence shall 
 convoy one, and only one meaning. 
 
 * Pyrrhus the Romans shall I say subdue." 
 
 ' The duke yet lives that Henry shall depose." 
 
 1 The rising tomb a lofty column bore." 
 
 4 And thus the son the fervent sire addressed." 
 
 * And all the air a solemn stillness holds." 
 
 ' He was mounted upon a hot and fiery steed, which his 
 aspiring rider seemed to know.'' 
 
 * Some of them are from Murray's Exercises : a key for the correction 
 of each, is furnished in the Appendix. 
 
Sec. 15,16.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 207 
 
 " If this day happen to be Sunday, this form of prayer shall 
 
 be used, and the fast day kept the next day following." 
 " A collection is making to protect and uphold such electors 
 
 as refused, contrary to their desires and consciences, to vote 
 
 for A. and B. regardless of threats, and unmindful of intimi- 
 dation." 
 
 " He was more than commonly civil to me." 
 
 " You can only arrive in time by starting early." 
 
 " Though he had been charitable to others, he found but a 
 
 few friends in his own extremity." 
 
 " Persons not having an income amounting to a hundred 
 
 and fifty pounds a year, are not liable to the income-tax," 
 " The Romans understood liberty at least as well as we," 
 " Theism can only be opposed to Polytheism or Atheism." 
 " These are not such designs as any man, who is born a 
 
 Briton, in any circumstances, in any situation, ought to be 
 
 ashamed or afraid to avow." 
 
 " The eagle killed the hen, and eat her in her own nest." 
 "It has been said that not only Jesuits can equivocate." 
 " You will not think that these people, when injured, have 
 
 the least right to our protection." 
 
 " Solomon, the son of David, who built the temple of 
 
 Jerusalem, was the richest monarch that reigned over the 
 
 Jewish people." 
 
 " Solomon, the son of David, who was persecuted by 
 
 Saul, was the richest monarch of the Jews." 
 
 " Lisias promised his father, never to abandon his friends." 
 " The Divine Being heapeth favour on his servants, ever 
 
 liberal and faithful." 
 
 " Every well-instructed scribe is like a housekeeper, who 
 
 bringeth out of his treasure things new and old." 
 
 16 Dryden makes a very handsome observation, on Ovid's 
 
 writing a letter from Dido to Eneas, in these words." 
 
 " Imprudent associations disqualify us for the instruction 
 
 or reproof of others." 
 
 16. NOT DISTINGUISHING DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE SAME 
 
 WORD. This fault is the opposite of one which was ranged 
 under the general head of Verbiage; namely, a distinction 
 without a difference. Our present title might be, a difference 
 without a distinction ; but it will be better to limit our ex- 
 amples to those which exhibit the fault in the particular way 
 
208 MAN U <VL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 described above, namely, by not distinguishing different 
 of the same word. Be it observed, however, that we are 
 concerned with this fault, only so far as it confuses the rea- 
 soning, and not with that effect which was the subject of a 
 previous section, where it is shown that the reasoner, in the 
 induction of his knowledge, is led to include under the same 
 word, as things of the same nature, those that are essentially 
 distinct ; and hence, though he reasons rightly in the deduc- 
 tive process, to come to a wrong conclusion, because his pre- 
 vious knowledge is wrong. (See Sect. 12, at page 201, 
 where the word light is alluded to.) In the following, and 
 other similar examples, the reasoning, independent of the 
 words, is correct ; but the expression makes it confused : 
 
 "To write well is an accomplishment of the first import- 
 ance, because we form an immediate judgement of a person's 
 education from the manner in which he writes. If we receive 
 from any one a letter scarcely legible, scrawled rather than 
 written, we hardly think well of the writer's education, 
 though perhaps the sentiments may be tolerably expressed. 
 But if the language is ungrammatical, and all the sentences 
 confused ; in short, if there appears a total deficiency of skill 
 in the art of writing, we immediately conclude that the per- 
 son is altogether ignorant and illiterate." 
 
 Here bad writing hi the sense of bad manuscript, and in the 
 different sense of bad composition, are confounded. The in- 
 tended reasoning is made clearer thus : "To write a fair 
 hand is an accomplishment of much importance, because we 
 often form an immediate judgement of a person's other acquire- 
 ments from the hand he writes. But it is of much more im- 
 portance to obtain a correct and graceful style of expression. 
 The one is a manual, the other, a mental art. If we receive 
 from any one a letter scarcely legible, scrawled rather than 
 written, we hardly think well of the writer's education. But 
 if the language is ungrammatical, and all the sentences con- 
 fused ; in short, if there appears a total deficiency of skill in 
 the art of composition, we," c. 
 
 The following is another example : 
 
 "It is better to be sensible than witty. A witty man 
 may raise admiration, but he seldom gains love. A sensible 
 man, though perhaps not much listened to at first, gains con- 
 stantly increasing attention, till, at last, he is consulted by all, 
 
Sec. 16,17,] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 209 
 
 and loved by all. To be sure it may be a disadvantage to be 
 too sensible; for instance, to be too sensible to reproach, or 
 ingratitude, or neglect. But the very quality of being sensible 
 will enable the person to surmount this failing, and render 
 him superior to the injustice of the world." 
 
 Here, there is confusion between sensible in understanding, 
 and sensibility on account of what others do or say. Correct 
 part of the example thus : " To be sure, a sensible person is 
 liable, like others, to incur unmerited reproach, ingratitude, 
 or neglect. But the quality of being sensible, will enable 
 him to see such dispositions in their true light, and render," &c. 
 
 A third example may be added : 
 
 " My friend Brown was the strongest man I ever knew, 
 and yet sometimes the most timorous. In body and limb, 
 he was so nervous, that he could overcome, in wrestling, 
 men who were twice his weight ; and yet, if he had to pass 
 through a church-yard at night, his nervousness was such, 
 that he would shake all over. So we see that the strongest 
 frame does not protect a man from superstitious fears." 
 
 The confusion here is between strong in bodily nerve, and 
 liable to fears which affect the nerves* Instead of saying " his 
 nervousness was such," say, " his timorousness was such," 
 and the example will be corrected. 
 
 17. NEGLECTING THE MEANS OF DISTINCTION AND DIVI- 
 SION WHICH GRAMMAR PROVIDES FOR THE CLEAR DEVELOP- 
 MENT OF THOUGHT BY WORDS. 
 
 The means which grammar provides, are sentences periodic 
 and non-periodic ; paragraphs, otherwise called sections ; and 
 parts made up of paragraphs or sections. All that grammar 
 looks to in these, is the accuracy of the outward structure. 
 It is for logic to take care that the structure has its foundation 
 in the purposed development of thought, so that there shall 
 be union where that purpose requires union, and distinctness, 
 where it requires distinction. We must not overload a sentence, 
 or paragraph, or higher division of discourse, with what cannot be 
 readily apprehended as a part of its purpose. Hence the young 
 theme-writer fails in the examples given hereunder : 
 
 Example 1. '"Courage leads us to face danger without 
 fear ; fortitude, to bear calamity without complaining, and is 
 a virtue all ought to possess ; for being, as we all are, born 
 to trouble, afflictions of some kind must fall to our lot." 
 
210 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 The proper business of the former part of this sentence 
 appears to be, if clearly settled in the writer's intention, to 
 define fortitude in contradistinction to courage ; and that pur- 
 po0e in-iii^ completed, the sentence should have ended, namely, 
 at the word complaining. What follows should be not only 
 in a different sentence, but should begin a new paragraph 
 with the word fortitude repeated as nominative to the verb is. 
 For it appears that the reasoner, having made his way clear 
 by defining his subject, is about to consider its necessity, c. 
 
 Example 2. " The high-born, the rich, and the beautiful, 
 are peculiarly exposed to flattery; and the sweet incense is 
 offered to them in abundance, by those whom all good men 
 justly abhor for their deceitful servility." 
 
 In this sentence, the reasoner proposes to show the dangers 
 arising from flattery which attend birth, wealth, and beauty, 
 and also to show the baseness of flatterers. These purposes 
 should be enunciated distinctly ; they should not be attempted 
 even in the same paragraph. Let us sav that the first para- 
 graph shall confine itself to the former object, and begin thus : 
 " The high-born, the rich, and the beautiful are peculiarly 
 exposed to flattery. Their favours are eagerly sought by 
 multitudes, and every stratagem is 'inplmx-d to attain them. 
 The sweet incense is, therefore, offered in abundance, and is 
 eagerly inhaled, till the victims intoxicated by the fumes ;" &c. 
 In this strain, or something like it, let us carry out the former 
 of the two purposes. The development of thought being, as 
 to this point, sufficiently extended, let the development 
 the next point, have also its appropriate paragraph, beginning 
 perhaps thus: "But the flatterer is justly abhorred by ail 
 good men ; for the art he uses is deceit and servility. To 
 gain his own ends, he wears a constant mask, and belies the 
 real sentiments of his breast. He oilers what he knows must 
 poison the mind ; a worse effect than," I 
 
 Example 3. " We may therefore come to these conclusions, 
 that perfect bliss is not to be found in this life; that our 
 ielicity consists in the pursuit, much more than in the attain- 
 ment of our wishes ; and that happiness without alloy is re- 
 served for another state of being : as the most fortunate of 
 men, when they have reached all they once desired, are still in 
 f sumi'thi>i<j to complete their happiness" 
 
 If the reasoner had previously stated arguments sufficient 
 
Sec. 17, 18.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 211 
 
 to infer the conclusions, the after-thought in italics is out of 
 place. It is either superfluous ; or it ought to have been 
 brought forward among the previous arguments. 
 
 *It belongs to rhetoric to bring forward arguments in such 
 order, and with such outward admonitions of order, as may 
 best fit them for reception, and clear understanding, as re- 
 gards the persons addressed. In logic, that is the best 
 order, which the reasoner finds most effectual for the clear 
 development of his own knowledge to himself. What this 
 may be, depends upon his habits of thinking. Some order 
 he must have, or the development of his knowledge will be 
 confused and valueless. He must fix points for development ; 
 and each of these being pursued to a satisfactory extent, he 
 must then bring them all to issue in some one general result, 
 which, during the progress of each, he has kept steadily in 
 view. A reasoner whose exercises in logic are thus conducted, 
 will, when he is required, to be a rhetorician, find little diffi- 
 culty in dividing an extensive discourse into parts subordinate 
 and principal, whatever be the names he chooses to employ, 
 sections, chapters, books, &c. ; or other names, or external 
 indications of division without formal names, he may choose 
 to employ. To interfere, by express directions, with this 
 liberty of choice, would be, to curb originality in the conduct 
 of thought; and to attempt to teach those who have no 
 originality, would be, to show how fields may be divided, 
 which produce no fruit worthy of division. Our next general 
 head, Ignoratio elencki, will add something to the instruction 
 which the present head proposed. 
 
 ERRORS IN DETAIL WHICH COME UNDER THE GENERAL HEAD 
 OF DISJOINTED REASONING. 
 
 18. OMITTING NECESSARY PROPOSITIONS. This is one of 
 the forms of ignoratio elenchi; a phrase which may mean, 
 having no proposition in view which the arguments in pro- 
 gress are intended to establish ; or forgetting the proposition 
 which has been laid down to be established. Both of these 
 are the errors of a learner who has collected his knowledge by 
 efforts of memory, and can perhaps clearly recover it in parts 
 as his memory happens to serve him; but who has never 
 
 * See the second foot note, page 180. 
 
212 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chtp. V. 
 
 meditated on his knowledge, so as to make it completely his 
 own. Knowledge, in all cases, is the apprehension of rela- 
 tions ; but these relations are separately innumerable ; and 
 many of them may, in their separate state, exist clearly in a 
 mind of inferior power or industry. To collect them under 
 higher and higher relations, is the effect of what we call think- 
 ing ; a process which brings the separate relations under 
 higher ones that include them. There are no limits to this 
 process ; and once begun, we may hope it will continue. 
 All that can be proposed in a work of instruction like t; 
 to indicate the ordinary modes of failure, one of which is 
 specified by the present title. An example is afforded by the 
 following extract from a learner's theme, in which several 
 propositions are required to make the train of thinking clear. 
 
 " The treasures of wisdom, like the precious ores, lie not 
 on the surface to be picked up by the casual traveller, but 
 must be sought for with pains and labour. Books and 
 teachers may show how and where the treasure is to be sought, 
 but it can be gained for us by none other than ourselves, by 
 our own perseverance, our own patient examination, our own 
 frequent reflection. If the limbs were muffled up, they would 
 soon lose their strength : and so the faculties of the mind, if 
 not employed, and directed to the acquisition and arrange- 
 ment of knowledge, will fail in their natural acuteness, and 
 become incapable of any steady and useful effort. In solitude 
 we may learn with what wisdom the Creator has fashioned 
 even the least of his works: in society we may observe 
 characters and manners, and grow wise in the knowledge of 
 mankind." 
 
 The correction of the example will show the importance of 
 attending to the caution which heads the present section. 
 (Title:) " ON STUDY." (First division or paragraph:) 
 "Knowledge cannot be obtained without study. The treasures 
 of wisdom, like the precious ores, lie not on the surface to be 
 picked up by the casual traveller, but must be sought for 
 with pains and labour. And the labour must be our own : ice 
 cannot here enjoy the profit while others have the toil. Books 
 and teachers may show how and where the treasure is to be 
 sought, but it can be gained for us by none other than our- 
 selves, by our own perseverance, our own patient examina- 
 tion, our own frequent reflection." (Second paragraph:) 
 
Sec. 18, 19.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 213 
 
 ' ' Let us further observe that study is as necessary to the mind 
 as action is to the body. If the limbs were muffled up, they 
 would soon lose their strength : and so the faculties of the 
 mind, if not employed, and directed to the acquisition and 
 arrangement of knowledge, will fail in their natural acuteness, 
 and become incapable of any steady and useful effort." 
 (Third paragraph :) " Nor is it in books alone that we may find 
 the means and opportunity of study. In solitude we may learn 
 with what wisdom the Creator has fashioned even the least of 
 his works : in society we may observe characters and man- 
 ners, and grow wise in the knowledge of mankind." 
 
 It may be necessary to add, that the divisions or para- 
 graphs require not to be named, if the manuscript distin- 
 guishes them in the usual way ; and that italics are used 
 above only to call attention to the propositions which are 
 supplied. 
 
 19. PROPOSING TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE. A proposition 
 ought not to contain more than the arguments are intended to 
 prove ; since, in the mind of the reasoner, it is, or ought to 
 be, the conclusion from those arguments. Suppose, for in- 
 stance, that the theme-writer intends, in one division of his 
 exercise on Astronomy, to dwell upon the sublimity of its 
 objects, he ought not, in that division, to say that " astro- 
 nomy is a noble, an interesting, and a useful science," but 
 only say that "it is sublime, noble, and interesting." Yet 
 the omission of the word useful, would be a fault at the 
 commencement of the theme, in proposing all the points 
 which the reasoner intends to consider ; since the utility of 
 the science, it is presumed, would be one of the points. 
 
 A writer should be careful of even seeming to promise too 
 much ; and therefore, in a theme, all high sounding transi- 
 tions or introductions should be avoided. Suppose, for in- 
 stance, that the theme-writer, after dwelling on the sublimity 
 of Astronomy, were to proceed thus : 
 
 " Having thus described and illustrated, to the best of my 
 ability, the sublime thoughts, and correspondent emotions, to 
 which the noble science of astronomy gives birth, I shall 
 now proceed to show, that this branch of study is not less 
 useful to man, than it is sublime and interesting." 
 
 This would be a transition of disproportionate length to 
 suit a brief theme. The writer needs only say, " But the 
 
214 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V. 
 
 study of astronomy is as useful as it is sublime ;" and then 
 proceed to show its uses. 
 
 20. DEVIATION FROM THE PROPOSITION. This fault occurs 
 when the reasoner lays down a proposition, which he follows 
 up by arguments that do not especially belong to it, but to 
 some other proposition, which embraces both the first propo- 
 sition, and the others. His reasoning, therefore, may not be 
 wrong, if referred to something in his mind which he leaves 
 unexpressed, but is irrelevant with regard to the proposition 
 with which he starts : for example : 
 
 " Anger has been called a short madness ; and people of 
 the weakest understandings are most subject to it. It is 
 remarkable that when a disputant is in the wrong, he tries to 
 make up in violence, what he wants in argument. This 
 arises from his pride. He will not own his error ; and be- 
 cause he is determined not to be convicted of it, he falls into 
 a passion." 
 
 There may be truth in all that is here said, but it is not 
 truth to the purpose, at least, if the commencing proposition 
 is meant to indicate the purpose. To follow up that pur- 
 pose, the reasoner should have proceeded in the following 
 manner, or in some manner like the following : 
 
 " Anger has been called a short madness. To be con- 
 vinced that the appellation is just, let us look to the effects 
 of anger. It disturbs a man's judgement, so that he inflicts 
 an injury on his dearest friend, whom, the next moment, he 
 loads with caresses. It makes him run headlong into dangers, 
 which, if his mind were clear, he would be the first to see 
 and avoid. It is true that anger does not always disturb the 
 mind to tin's degree ; but that it disturbs the mind to a de- 
 gree proportionate to its violence, is certain ; and, therefore, 
 it may be justly denominated a madness." 
 
 21. DISCOURSING SHORT OF THE PROPOSITION. This fault 
 arises from regarding a subject in some partial point of 
 which happens to be familiar to the reasoner, instead of re- 
 garding it in the extent implied by the term or terms pro- 
 posing it. Suppose, for instance, that Education is the 
 subject proposed to be developed, and that the reasoner is a 
 young female ; she would ill suit the arguments to so gene- 
 ral a subject, although she would correctly proceed according 
 to her limited experience, if she began thus : 
 
Sec. 21, 22.] ERRORS IN DEDUCTIVE PRACTICE. 215 
 
 " My opinion of education is this, that reading, writing, 
 and arithmetic, are the groundwork, and that English gram- 
 mar comes next in importance. A child ought to begin 
 French very early, because the pronunciation of that language 
 is difficult in maturer years. I would also recommend atten- 
 tion to the accomplishments of dancing, drawing, and music ; 
 and, above all, I would not have needle-work neglected." 
 
 It is evident that such a detail does not meet the subject in 
 the universal sense in which it is proposed. But how can we 
 expect, from a reasoner, the development of more knowledge 
 than experience has provided ? Yet it may be useful to point 
 out, to such a reasoner, that if the subject is proposed in its 
 widest sense, the arguments should be equally comprehensive : 
 for instance : 
 
 " My opinion of education is this, that it is then only 
 just, when it fits the individual for his duties. For this pur- 
 pose, both the mind and the body stand in need of discipline. 
 The mind must be made acquainted with the duties of life, 
 and instructed in all science necessary to their performance ; 
 and the body must be formed to whatever habits will most 
 effectually conduce to the same end." 
 
 All this is applicable, whether we speak of a male or a 
 female, a prince or a peasant, a member of civilized society, 
 or a savage who lives by hunting and fishing ; and the argu- 
 ments, as to their extent, therefore agree with the proposition. 
 Yet a writer is not bound to treat a subject thus generally : 
 he may choose a special view, because he feels competent to 
 no other. All that is required, in such case, is a statement, 
 at the beginning, of what he intends a proposition which 
 limits the general subject, and saves the arguments from the 
 charge of irrelevancy. Thus, the female reasoner in the 
 example furnished above, would have been free from censure, 
 had she begun thus : 
 
 " Of education, generally, I am incompetent to speak. I 
 can but point out, from the experience I have had, what I 
 think necessary to be taught to young females, raised, in our 
 country, above the necessity of manual labour. They must 
 learn reading, writing, and arithmetic ; and English grammar 
 comes next in importance. A child ought," &c. 
 
 22. DISCOURSING WIDE OF THE PROPOSITION. This fault 
 arises from an indistinct view of the subject. Hence the 
 
216 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. V 
 
 writer, instead of using arguments which agree with the pro- 
 position, and with nothing else, employs such as agree with 
 some general proposition under which the particular one is 
 included: he may be compared to a person that shoots 
 toward the mark, but does not take aim precisely at it. 
 
 Example 1. "Prudence is a sure road to reputation. They 
 who are obedient to their parents and teachers when young, 
 obtain accomplishments which are of the highest value in 
 maturity. As they advance in years, they fear God, honour 
 the king, and do as they would be done by. By this manner 
 of conduct, they may sometimes miss immediate advantages, 
 such as short-sighted, cunning people would snatch at ; but 
 they gain what is much better, the approbation of their own 
 hearts, and, finally, the respect and applause of mankind." 
 
 These arguments do not belong to prudence in particular, 
 but to virtue in general, and would accordingly be suitable 
 to this proposition, " Virtue is the surest road to reputation. 
 They who are obedient," &c. Arguments suitable to the 
 other proposition, will be such as these : 
 
 " Prudence is a sure road to reputation. A man whose 
 abilities are of a common, or even of an inferior order, but who 
 determines cautiously, and chooses the proper time for all he 
 says and does, will advance with certainty, though perhaps 
 slowly. The chief cause of his progress will be, the confi- 
 dence he secures : for all feel the value of his advice, assist- 
 ance, and agency, who knows exactly when to speak, and 
 when to be silent, when to act, and when to cease from 
 action." 
 
 Example 2. " Disappointments are a great part of our 
 portion in this life. In our infancy we are liable to dreadful 
 accidents, and must trust entirely to others for safety and pre- 
 servation. As we grow older, we think we can take care of 
 ourselves, and we become confident and presuming. But 
 almost every day brings with it some greater or less mis- 
 fortune, and thus we are gradually taught not to depend en- 
 tirely upon ourselves, but to put our chief trust in God." 
 
 To keep to the point, the reasoner should have proceeded 
 thus: "Disappointments are a great part of our portion in 
 this life. The wishes and hopes even of our childhood are as 
 frequently checked as gratified ; but this may seem inevitable, 
 because we have not yet acquired sufficient experience to 
 
Sec. 1, 2.] SYLLOGISM OF FORMAL LOGIC. 217 
 
 form proper expectations. As we grow older, we think our 
 better judgement enables us to calculate less erroneously, and 
 we become confident," &c. 
 
 An indistinct view of a subject is often betrayed by a 
 single expression. Suppose the theme-writer is treating of 
 melancholy ; in urging the duty of not giving way to it, he 
 should not say, " We are bound to bear the evils of life with 
 patience" but " with cheerful resignation" On the other 
 hand, if he is treating of fretfulness, he ought to argue that 
 we are bound to bear the afflictions of life with patience. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 THE SYLLOGISM OF FORMAL LOGIC. 
 
 1. We deem some account of this syllogism to be expe- 
 dient, not because it can be of the least practical value to our 
 student, but because the technical language pertaining to it, 
 has, from time immemorial, been associated with the pre- 
 vailing notions of logic, and we would not have our student 
 quite ignorant of what, through the force of habit, is wont to 
 be thought necessary in a work upon Logic. And that the 
 account given for this purpose may be clearly understood in 
 contradistinction to the doctrine held in this Manual, we shall 
 conclude the chapter with a recapitulation of the leading 
 principles of our doctrine. 
 
 Some Account of the Syllogism of Formal Logic. 
 
 2. The Syllogism which is worked by extremes and middle 
 term, is constructed under a persuasion that the act of the in- 
 tellect by which, from two things known, we reach a third, is 
 a voluntary act ; and that, in the deduction of our knowledge, 
 real or assumed, we can, with relation to this knowledge, 
 come to wrong conclusions, as, in the induction of it, we 
 can wrongly apply what we know, to interpret what we do 
 not yet know, in other words, can make wrong inferences. 
 The persuasion is completely erroneous ; but it is one into 
 which we almost inevitably fall, if we embrace the ordinary 
 or vulgar notion of the way in which language is the exponent 
 of thought. The syllogism of Aristotle is built upon the 
 common notion : let us then see what this notion is. 
 
218 MANUAL OF LOGIC. ^Chap.VJ. 
 
 3. The vulgar notion of thought expressed by language, is, 
 that the one represents the other with a perfect correspondence 
 of part to part, and a correspondence of operations in joining 
 the parts. Acting on this notion, we shall, when we desire to 
 ascertain what exists or what is going on within the mind, 
 examine what exists outwardly, and how we operate with 
 Avluit so exists. Proceeding upon this principle, altogether a 
 false one, we shall, in the first place, arrive at ideas, as the 
 presumed mental originals of single words, and at an appro- 
 priate faculty of the mind, by which these ideas, primarily 
 received into the mind from the things of sense, are revived 
 by words ; which faculty is called simple apprehension. But 
 words, without being formed into sentences, can be joined by 
 fvit;iin grammatical particles; and we must again look into 
 the mind for the correspondent originals. Hence the division 
 of apprehension into complex and incompkx, the latter being the 
 apprehension of ideas signified by single words, the former by 
 words united so as not to be sentences. The next operation of 
 language is the joining of words into sentences. This is done 
 by verbs. But verbs are many, while the effect of a verb is 
 always the same. We have therefore to find a verb, which 
 shall produce this common effect, without embarrassing the 
 outward operation with more than it produces. Such a verb 
 is found in what is called the copula, is. This verb, placed 
 between the signs of two ideas, is supposed to indicate another 
 operation of the mind called Judgement ; for, admitting that 
 the one idea agrees with the other, the judgement pronounces 
 that they do agree, and the verb is presents itself as the sign 
 of that verdict. But they may not agree ; and we have fur- 
 ther to find, in the outward operation, a sign correspondent 
 to the opposite determination of the judgement; which, if 
 found, we are to take as an evidence of a correspondent mental 
 act. The sign required is found in the grammatical term not 
 or H0. Advancing now from words formed into sentences, to 
 sentences formed into discourse, we have again to ascertain, 
 from the outward act, the (presumed) correspondent mental 
 operation. Why should propositions which the judgement 
 pronounces to be true, because it has compared the ideas in 
 each, and affirmed or denied that they agree, why should 
 these necessitate another proposition which is true because the 
 others are true ? This is the problem which the syllogism 
 
Sec. 3, 4.] SYLLOGISM OF FORMAL LOGIC. 219 
 
 undertakes to solve, and in taking up this problem, we enter 
 upon a third operation of the mind, called Reasoning. 
 
 4. To solve this problem in the Aristotelian way, we must 
 suppose that, in innumerable cases, the judgement is unable 
 to pronounce, of two ideas, either that they agree or disagree. 
 In this difficulty, the reason comes forward, and provides a 
 third idea by which to measure these two. What really does 
 take place in every act of the intellect, here comes in to give 
 plausibility to the Aristotelian doctrine, namely, the occur- 
 rence of premises, which are always two, and the inevitable 
 intellection from them.* But in the doctrine of the syllogism 
 this is proposed to be accounted for, not as an inevitable, but 
 a voluntary act. We have to prove that two ideas agree or 
 disagree, when the judgement cannot pronounce that they do 
 so ; and, as above-said, reason is supposed to provide us with 
 a third idea. With this idea each of the two ideas is mea- 
 sured, and if each idea agrees with the third, then Reason de- 
 termines that they agree with each other ; but if either of them 
 disagrees with the third idea, then it determines that the two 
 disagree. The mental process here described, if manifested 
 with accurate correspondence outwardly, requires three pro- 
 positions, two in which the ideas whose agreement or dis- 
 agreement is sought to be proved, are severally measured with 
 the idea signified by the middle term; and one in which, 
 consequently upon the two-fold comparison, the two extremes, 
 as they are called, receive from this reasoning process, the 
 judgement of agreement or disagreement. It is, of course, 
 admitted by the Aristotelians, that sentences united into dis- 
 
 * The doctrine of the Aristotelian syllogism has the effect of the jug- 
 gler's art, who talks to his audience of something which he seems to be 
 doing, yet is not doing, in order to call off their attention from his real 
 proceeding : the difference is, that the ordinary juggler does not deceive 
 himself, and the Aristotelian does. Dugald Stewart indeed intimates that 
 the prime juggler knew what he was about ; but this is hardly credible ; 
 and with regard to his followers, nothing can be more conscientious than 
 their belief in the truth of what they teach: see, for instance, Dr. 
 Whately, passim. The fact is, that they feel the true ground of the syl- 
 logism even while describing the false one. And so capital is the trick, 
 that Locke and others, though they see it must be a trick, are not able to 
 describe how it is done. Locke merely says, with characteristic simplicity 
 and plain English sense, " God hath not been so sparing to men to make 
 them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them 
 rational. He hath been more bountiful to mankind than so." 
 
220 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. VI. 
 
 course do not always appear in the forms of syllogism ; but 
 it is insisted upon, that their syllogism, namely, the syllogism 
 which works by extremes and middle term, lies concealed 
 under every operation of language transcending the repre- 
 sentation of ideas by single terms, the representation of ideas 
 by terms joined by particles not being verbs, and the junction 
 of terms by means of a verb into a sentence ; which last 
 mentioned fact yields what they call a proposition in outward 
 form, and a judgement when spoken of as the correspondent 
 operation in the mind. But this is not the whole of the 
 matter : The doctrine thus briefly described, carries with it 
 much other doctrine, both in the preliminary stages, and in the 
 syllogism which results from them. First, for ideas, we have 
 the doctrine of the Categories or Predicaments, which are ten 
 in number; Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, 
 Time, Situation, Possession, Action, Suffering. These are pre- 
 sumed to contain, as summa genera, all our ideas ; in other 
 words, all the subject-matter of judgement and predication. 
 Passing to the next stage, that is to the operations of the 
 Judgement upon these materials, we have a division into 
 subject and predicate, the term expressing an idea concerning 
 which a judgement is to take place being called a subject, 
 the term expressing the idea affirmed or denied to agree with 
 it, being called a predicate. Hence, ideas and their cor- 
 respondent terms, when they are to be predicated, are called 
 predicables ; and the doctrine is, that they can be predicated 
 as genus, or as species, or as difference, or as a property, or as 
 an accident. Thus animal, which belongs to the category 
 substance, can be predicated as genus of the subject, man ; 
 (also belonging to the category, substance). Thus rational, 
 belonging to the category quality, can also, as a difference, be 
 predicated of the subject, man. Thus again rational animal, 
 now again belonging to the category substance, can be pre- 
 dicated, as his species, of the subject, man, the difference and 
 the added genus making up the species. Thus, once more, 
 nubility, which belongs to the category quality, can be pre- 
 dicated as a property of the subject, man. And thus, lastly, 
 being young or old, tall or short, rich or poor, digging in his 
 garden, or asleep in his bed, and so forth, can be predicated as 
 an accident of the subject, man. Such doctrine under the first 
 and second of the assumed three operations of the mind, fur- 
 
Sec. 4.1 SYLLOGISM OF FORMAL LOGIC. 221 
 
 nishes the ground .for constructing the formal syllogism ; by 
 which, as already said, when the judgement cannot pronounce 
 on the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, it is proposed 
 to demonstrate their agreement through the instrumentality of 
 a third idea. To a demonstration an axiom is necessary ; and 
 the axiom of the formal syllogism is the dictum de omni et 
 nullo ; whose purport is, that whatever is affirmed or denied of 
 all the members of a doss, may be affirmed or denied of every 
 member of it ; where, be it observed, the word all is required 
 to be understood distributively, and not collectively ; so that a 
 less equivocal statement of the axiom is this Whatever is 
 affirmed or denied of every member of a class, is affirmed or de- 
 nied of every member of it ; as pure an axiom, no doubt, as 
 another often referred to, namely, Whatever is, is. In our 
 logic, we call this an identical proposition, and consider it to 
 be verbiage. But let us accept them both as axioms, and 
 pass on to other doctrine necessary to the construction of the 
 formal Syllogism. The terms expressing the ideas whose 
 agreement or disagreement is to be demonstrated, are to be 
 received under the names of minor, and of major term, the 
 former being the subject, the other the predicate ; as, for 
 instance, in saying Kings are mortal, Kings is the minor, and 
 mortal the major term. Then we have a difference of pro- 
 positions with regard to their quality, and to their quantity ; 
 a proposition which affirms the agreement of the two ideas 
 being said to differ in quality from one which denies their 
 agreement ; and a proposition which affirms or denies uni- 
 versally of a class of things, being said to differ in quantity 
 (and this is, of course, a difference mour logic also,) from one 
 which affirms or denies only concerning some of a class ; for 
 instance, it is one thing to say, " All your servants are 
 rogues;" and another to say, " Some of them are rogues," or 
 " Some one is a rogue." Another necessary doctrine towards 
 the construction of the formal syllogism, is that of the distri- 
 bution or non-distribution of terms. The purport of this may 
 be indicated by an example. If we say that " Every mare is 
 ahorse," it does not follow that "Every horse is a mare:" 
 but if we say that " No goose is a swan," it does follow that 
 "No swan is a goose." Accordingly, it is one of the prin- 
 ciples in the doctrine of the formal syllogism that the minor 
 term of an affirmative proposition is distributed, that is, it in- 
 
 G 
 
222 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. VI. 
 
 eludes all that it can be applied to ; while the major term is 
 undistributed, that is, it does not include all the things it can 
 be applied to; as, for instance, in saying " Every mar< 
 horse," the term horse understood only of those horses that 
 are mares, does not include all* that the term horse can be 
 applied to: but with regard to a negative proposition, both 
 the major and the minor terms are distributed. And now 
 with the apparatus of the syllogism, and its doctrine in hand, 
 ! t us proceed with the demonstration it proposes. When w- 
 have to show, on the principles of the science, that two ideas 
 agree or disagree, we must hunt among the categories for a 
 suitable third or middle term, with which to compare, first tin- 
 major, and then the minor term : the proposition arising out 
 of the comparison of the middle with the major term, is then 
 called the major premise; and that arising out of the com- 
 parison of the middle with the minor term is called the minor 
 premise. If, in these two acts of comparison, the judgement 
 determines an agreement between the major term and the 
 middle, and again between the minor term and the middle, 
 then reason comes in, and affirms, in what is called the con- 
 clusion, the agreement which was to be demonstrate I I" 
 the terms that have been thus measured with tin- middle 
 term: but if tin- judgement determines, in its two acts of 
 comparison, that either the major or the minor term, does not 
 agree with the middle term, then reason determines, in the 
 conclusion, what, as an alternative, was to be demonstrated, 
 namely, the disagreement of the terms that have been mea- 
 sured with the middle term; in other words, that the major 
 of the conclusion must be predicated negatively of the minor. 
 But the conclusion arrived at through this process, cannot, 
 after all, be depended upon, except under the safeguard of 
 laws growing out of the doctrine of the quality and quant ity 
 of propositions, and the distribution or non-distribution of 
 terms. Thus, for instance, we are required to distribute the 
 middle term once at least in the premises ; a failure in which, 
 is called an undistributed middle. Thus, also, we are required 
 to distribute the major or the minor term in the premises, if WL- 
 propose to distribute it in the conclusion ; a failure in which, 
 is called an illicit process of the major or of the minor : either 
 of which failures vitiates the demonstration. Prepared, in this 
 manner, to distinguish between a legitimate and an illegitimate 
 
Sec. 4, 5.] SYLLOGISM OF FORMAL LOGIC. 223 
 
 syllogism, we come next to consider in how many ways three 
 propositions can be constructed out of extremes, that is, out of 
 the minor and major terms which are to form a conclusion 
 when we reach it, and the middle term by which we propose to 
 reach it. Now, disregarding the laws concerning the quality 
 and quantity of propositions, which laws determine what 
 forms are to be accepted as legitimate syllogisms, and what 
 are not, we have no fewer than 256 of these triads of pro- 
 positions, out of which, only 19, by virtue of the laws 
 referred to, will be legitimate syllogisms ; that is, syllogisms, 
 which the dictum of Aristotle, referred to as their axiom, will 
 be found to warrant. To make this understood by our 
 scholar, the technical expedients in the doctrine of the formal 
 syllogism, depending on the quality and quantity of pro- 
 positions, and the relative situation of the three terms in the 
 premises of a syllogism, must be further explained. 
 
 5. Propositions, in the doctrine of formal logic, are of four 
 kinds; 1. Universal affirmative, signified by the letter A ; as, 
 " Every man is mortal;" " Every mare is a horse :" Universal 
 negative, signified by the letter E ; as, " No man is sinless ;" 
 " No goose is a swan :" Particular affirmative, signified by the 
 letter I; as, " Some men are rogues :" Particular negative, sig- 
 nified by the letter O ; as, " Some men are not rogues." These 
 varieties of quality and quantity in the propositions, produce, 
 when the propositions are formed into syllogisms, what are 
 called the different moods of the syllogisms. Now the four sym- 
 bols, A, E, I, O, and consequently the sorts of propositions that 
 answer to them, can be varied by threes in 64 ways, so that 
 we have 64 triads of propositions without any change of the 
 relative situation of major, minor, and middle terms in each 
 triad ; which situation is this, that the middle term is sub- 
 jected in the major premise, and predicated in the minor one ; 
 and, of course, the minor term, by its name, (see the previous 
 section) is the subject of the conclusion, as the major term is 
 its predicate. When, in forming a syllogism, the three terms 
 are thus disposed relatively to each other, the syllogism is 
 said to be in the first figure. There are three other figures. 
 In what is called the secand figure, the middle term is pre- 
 dicated in both premises ; in what is called the third figure, 
 it is subjected in both premises; in what is called the fourth 
 figure, it is predicated in the major premise, and subjected in 
 
 G2 
 
224 MANUAL OF LOGIC. > VI. 
 
 the minor. And as in the first figure, we can have 64 triads 
 of propositions, making up apparent syllogisms of so many 
 chili-rent moods, we can, in all the figures, have four times ( '4, 
 that is, as already stated, 250. But the laws of the syll< , 
 exclude in the first figure all but four moods, A A A; E A K : 
 All; and E I O : in the second figure all but four, E A E ; 
 A K !: ; E I O ; and A O O : in the third figure, all but six, 
 AAI; I A I ; All; EAO; OAO; and EIO: 
 arid in the fourth figure, all but five, A A I; AEE; I A I; 
 K A (") ; and K I O; thus leaving, as above stated, out of 
 'J,M'>, onlv l ( .i forms which are legitimate syllogisms; that is, 
 which at lord the demonstration proposed by the science. 
 
 (i. In order that tin- nineteen legitimate forms of syll. 
 may be remembered by appropriate names, the symbolic 
 leii.-rs of <-ach are formed with consonants into words, <>th-r- 
 wisi- meaningless,* and the words are put together so as to 
 exhibit the following imitation of Latin verse: 
 
 Fig. 1. BArbArA, cEUrKnt, dArn, fi;rioque prioris. 
 
 Fig. 2. CKSAI-K, c.\mi:strKs, fi;stino, bAroko, secundae. 
 
 -p. o (TKrtIA, dAi-Apti, dlsAinls, dAtlsi, fi-:l.\pton, 
 J * '\BokArdO, fi-:risn, habet: quarta insuper addit 
 
 Fi'_T. -1. lirAiiiAiitip, cAmKiiKs, diiiiAris, fi.>.\jn, frKsisOn. 
 
 Hence, for example, to say of a svllogism that it is in 
 iv that it is in tin- lirst iL'inv. with a universal 
 allirmative conclusion arising out of universal affirmative 
 premises :( to say that it is in camestres, is to say that it is 
 in the second figure, with a uni\ ;ti\v conclusion 
 
 arising out of a universal affirmative major premise, and a 
 universal negative minor premise :J to say that it is in fresisOn, 
 is to sav that it is in the fourth figure, with a particular nega- 
 te.- conclusion arising out of a universal negative major pre- 
 and a particular affirmative minor ]>n-mis.-. h is to be 
 
 * The iv is a si'jMiiiirunt jmrjtosi- in the aMe.l o . lating to the 
 
 (ii\cr>ioii of syllogisms; but o'liMiWiu^ the whole business to be mere 
 trilliiii:, we inav b.- ,-xrusol t'roin a further let;iil. 
 
 f As, Kvi-ry man is nmrtal ; every king is a man; therefore every 
 killer," \c. 
 
 trot phil"M>j)her is one who counts virtue a good in 
 itself; ao advocate of pieteure is one who i be., therefore, no ad- 
 
 vocate ct' ph-asuiv is a true philosopher." 
 
 ^j A<, " No tools are thoughtful ; some men .ire thoughtful; therefore, 
 some men are not tools." 
 
Sec. 6-8.] PRINCIPLES OPPOSED TO FOEMAL LOGIC. 225 
 
 remarked, before leaving this account of the formal syllogism, 
 that a syllogism in any of the last three figures, can, under the 
 safeguard of certain rules, be converted into a syllogism of the 
 first, which is deemed the only perfect figure. For instance, 
 the syllogism in the fourth figure exemplified in the third note 
 below, can be converted into Ferio ; as, " Thoughtful men are 
 not fools : Some men are thoughtful : Therefore, some men. 
 are not fools." The fourth figure does not appear in Aris- 
 totle, but was added by his followers. 
 
 Recapitulation of the Leading Principles in this Manual of 
 Logic ; as opposed to the Principles on which (as explained 
 in the foregoing Account) the Syllogism of Formal I^ogic is 
 based. 
 
 7. In our logic, we presume not to inquire, much less to 
 demonstrate, how or why an intellection takes place. We 
 esteem it a fact, which can no more be accounted for than the 
 fact of a sensation ; though we estimate these facts as things 
 in their nature different : we deem, for instance, that a sen- 
 sation is one thing, and that the knowledge of a sensation, the 
 result of intellection, is another. 
 
 8. We deny that, in using words for logical purposes, 
 three operations of the mind are concerned. We affirm that 
 the operation is always the same, however it may be signified 
 outwardly, that is, whether by single terms, or by complex 
 terms, or by propositions, or by propositions united into forms 
 of greater extent and complexity. We affirm, in short, that 
 the difference between terms, and proposition, and syllogism, 
 is a mere grammatical difference, having no foundation in any 
 correspondent original processes of the mind, but being means 
 sometimes convenient in one shape, sometimes in another, for 
 fixing, or for developing the knowledge we have acquired, or 
 for presenting it to another mind. For, in our doctrine, a single 
 term, quite as much as a proposition, and quite as much as 
 a syllogism, is an indication of knowledge arising out of 
 premises. Thus red expresses our knowledge of a colour; 
 which knowledge is the fact of our being aware of one sen- 
 sation relatively to others of its kind ; that is to say, we know 
 what is red, because we know what it is not to be red ; nor 
 could we know the one, unless at the same time we knew 
 
226 MANUAL OF LOGIC. [Chap. VI. 
 
 the other. That of which we have knowledge, and that by 
 which we know it, are the premises, the consequent know- 
 led;:'- is the conclusion expressed by this term. In a pro- 
 position, there is the same fact, with this only difference, 
 that the premises are indicated as well as the resulting know- 
 ledge, though not indicated so distinctly as by the syllogism. 
 In this last, the two premises and the conclusion are stated 
 in so many sentences of independent grammatical construction ; 
 and the syllogism is therefore the most explicit form in which 
 we can lay down what at any moment we know. 
 
 9. But in speaking thus of the svll.<_ r ism, we do not mean 
 the syllogism which operates by extremes and middle term, 
 under the doctrine of allirmation and negation. With us, 
 affirmation and negation belong to Grammar, not to Logic. 
 No man, and every man, are equally signs of positive know- 
 ledge, in the one case arising out of the premises no and man, 
 in the other out of the premises every and man. The same 
 may he said of the know led '^-expressed by is-not : it is positive 
 knowledge, quite as much as that expressed by is. In all 
 
 the resulting expression is one expression with one 
 moaning : Such is the datum of our syllogism, such the 
 related argument. But the- are no sooner expressed than 
 the conclusion unites tin -in and makes thorn one ; so that now 
 the whole syllogism is on -n with one meaning, an 
 
 expression of the knnwlf: loped; just as a 
 
 single term is such an expression ; just as a complex term is 
 such an oxpression ; just as a proposition is such an 
 
 10. With regard to the Categories, the GKXKKAL HI: ADS of 
 all we know, they seem at present to have lost their reputation 
 even with the Aristotelians themselves.* We may indeed 
 i'airly ask why they are so many, or why they are not more. 
 As to one of them, RELATION, we affirm this to be included 
 in all the others. A substance, whatever it be, is known, 
 because we are aware of its relation to other substances ; so 
 of a quality ; so of each of the other heads. Wo ask also, 
 as to these general heads, or the special heads under them, or 
 the singulars under these, what is meant by calling them 
 ideas. If by ideas is meant the knoidedge which they signify, 
 
 * " The catalogue certainly is but a very crude one." Whately's 
 Logic, Book IV. eh. II. 1 (a foot note). 
 
Sec. 9, 10, 11.] PRINCIPLES OPPOSED TO FORMAL LOGIC. 227 
 
 our only objection to the word is, that custom has rendered it, 
 for this meaning, a vague and indistinct expression : if other 
 is meant than knowledge of the things to which the term can 
 be applied, we object to its application in this way, till it can 
 be shown what it is that words can signify other than things 
 real, things ideal, (both of which come under the common 
 term of things physical,) and things metaphysical : the 
 words in all three cases being immediately significant of know- 
 ledge, which, in its nature, is distinct from the things com- 
 prehended by it; that is to say, words are, in all cases, 
 immediately significant of what is metaphysical, but can next 
 be applied as names to things real, or to things ideal, or to 
 things which are neither the one nor the other, but are the 
 relations under which those things suggest themselves to the 
 human understanding, which relations we have the power to 
 entertain apart from the things. 
 
 1 1 . The science of the formal syllogism proposes a demon- 
 stration of its conclusions. Our doctrine is, that we cannot 
 come to a false conclusion in deductive reasoning except by 
 depending on the forms which that syllogism provides, and 
 then neglecting its rules. The science, then, is necessary only 
 to those who use its forms : to propose it for others, is to 
 propose spectacles for people who, without them, cannot but 
 see clearly, or crutches for people who, without them, cannot 
 but walk well. The use of the syllogism in our logic, is, 
 not to test the validity of conclusions, but to spread out our 
 premises, that so we may be induced to consider on what 
 grounds we have assumed them. In a word, our logic leads 
 us always back to what we have acquired, or what we 
 presume we have acquired, in order that, if our knowledge 
 is not sound, we may supply its deficiencies, or set it altogether 
 aside. 
 
228 APPENDIX. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 OUTLINE OF AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE OF INSTRUCTION 
 IN LOGIC ; 
 
 FOR PUPILS NOT YET COMI'KI KM TO ENTER OX THE STUDY 
 OF THE WHOLE WORK. 
 
 IN order to feel what he can, and what he cannot accomplish 
 in developing his knowledge, the learner should at once be 
 set to theme-writing.* All the instructions immediately re- 
 quired for this purpose will be found between Section 42, 
 Chapter IV., and Section 4, Chapter V., both sections inclu- 
 sive (pages 171-187). This having been diligently read and 
 well considered, let a subject be chosen either from among 
 those suggested, or from such as may occur in reading or in 
 conversation. Say, that Curiosity is the subject chnsvn. It 
 is most likely that his iirst thoughts will perplex and confuse 
 him. He will be disposed to consider curiositv only as a 
 mischief, an impertinence, a meanness, because his attention 
 has been most frequently called to these effects; and yet he 
 will suspect that some higher point of view should l>e taken, 
 which may discover the good, as well as the bad enV 
 curiositv. A definition will here be needed, "Curiosity, or 
 eagerness of search after knowledge, is" what ? Let him 
 reflect for a time, and he cannot fail to add something to the 
 following purpose : " either a good or an evil, according to 
 the purposes to which it is applied." The subject thus 
 1 tranches into two, and his subsequent development will bring 
 forth what his experience and reading make him know, rir>t, 
 of well-directed curiosity, and then of curiosity idly and im- 
 pertinently directed. 
 
 It is not always necessary to begin by a definition. If the 
 name of the subject is at once suggestive of all that it includes, 
 
 * We are here supposing the pupil to have passed through the Exercises 
 pertaining to Grammar and to Rhetoric. 
 
COURSE FOR EARLY LEARNERS. 229 
 
 it will be best to begin, not by a definition, but by some very 
 general proposition. In treating of Industry, for instance, it 
 would be an obvious thing to say, that " It is the source of 
 all the blessings of life." Having stated this general fact, 
 which is to be developed by particulars, it is very likely that 
 the young thinker will find himself lost amid the multitude 
 that crowd into his mind. He is conscious that it will not 
 do to note them down in heterogeneous order, just as the}' 
 happen to occur, as in making out a catalogue : how, then, 
 must he proceed? He must adopt sojaie general heads, 
 standing, as it were, midway between the first general state 
 merit, and the infinite particulars which still lie beneath : 
 for instance, he might go on to say, ' ' First, let us see what 
 industry does for the poor man :" and having developed his 
 knowledge under this head, the following might be another : 
 " Next, let us see what industry does for the young, and 
 consequently ignorant person." Other heads might be, the 
 effects of industry on sterile land, or on land partially covered 
 by sea ; on the people of a whole country ; on the arts which 
 refine a people ; and on the sciences which improve those 
 arts. His mode of developing this subject would be a guide 
 in developing the opposite, cm Sloth, of which subject, the 
 following is an outline for his guidance ; and to it are added 
 a few other outlines, after filling up which, it is hoped that 
 further assistance of the same kind may be discontinued. 
 
 Ox SLOTH. 1. It is the root of all evil : what condition 
 it brings even a rich man to. 2. What it prevents in the 
 young. 3. What will be the character and condition of a 
 once flourishing farm after years of neglect by a slothful 
 owner. 4. What effect sloth produces, or is likely to produce 
 on a whole people. 5. What effect it has upon the bodily 
 health. 6. What effect on the mind and morals. 
 
 ON ENTHUSIASM. Ardour of mind engendered by some- 
 / thing that affects the imagination : may be an evil ; may be 
 a good. 2. An evil whenever it operates against reason 
 tor instance, in certain enterprises ; in the religious temper of 
 the mind; in the reception of new opinions. 3. A good, 
 when it is controlled by reason for instance, in our enter- 
 prises, in our religious feelings, in our opinions. 4. It ministers 
 to excellence in the fine arts ; it confers the capacity for appre- 
 ciating and enjoying them. 
 
 G3 
 
230 APPENDIX. 
 
 Ox GOOD TKMPKI:. A greater Lfod than any other per- 
 sonal endowment, or other Lfitt of Providence. For every 
 thing is valuable in proportion to the happiness it secures. 
 Now a good temper, &c. A good temper may be the gift of 
 nature, but it may also be the growth of reason and habit. 
 For let a person be convinced, &c., and let him day by day, 
 nay, hour by hour, watch and control, &c. 
 
 ON II.M-i'iNKss. 1. U tin- -rent ol.ject of all our actions: 
 the ways are different : this man imagines it is to be found 
 in, &c. ; another ift, &c. ; a third in, &c. Some suppose, 
 &c., others, c. But though the wavs are thus different, the 
 end is ever the same, namely, &c. 2. The greater number 
 of these supposed ways must be wrong; for the greater 
 number of those who follow them confess that, in their s 
 pursuits, they never reach their object. 3. Happiness - 
 in the iiiind, and only to a certain extent is it dependent on 
 external circumstances. 4. What the circumstances are, both 
 external and internal, on which happiness depends. 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 1. A subject that seldom fails to raise our 
 wannest emotions : we think of the heroes of Greece and 
 of Rome, of Switzerland and of Britain: say, who they were, 
 and what they attempted. 2. Our love of liberty is ji. 
 by the evils that attend a star.- ..f slavery : <level,,p these evils. 
 :5. Hut liberty must not be confounded with licentiou 
 Shew that wherever there is real liberty, there is sul; ; 
 to authority, which controls the evil-intentioned, and protects 
 the good. 
 
 ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE. 1. All moral improvement depends 
 upon it. If we know not our defects, we cannot. \< . J. 
 What are the hindrances to self-knowledge. 3. What will 
 follow in proportion as we improve in it. 
 
 ON SKLF-DKXIAL. 1. Consists in abstaining from some 
 present gratification for the sake of greater expected good : is 
 the -Teat principle of religion, and of morals : of religion; for 
 all the rewards which she Imlds out, are promised on the con- 
 dition, &c. : of morals ; for all the virtues imply that we resist, 
 &c. 2. Self-denial is necessary, in a certain degree, to real 
 enjoyment ; for, &c. 
 
 ON OBEDIENCE. Our progress in virtue, in knowledge, and 
 in happiness, depends upon it : first in virtue ; for we must 
 conform to the laws, &c. 2. Secondly in knowledge ; be- 
 
COURSE FOR EARLY LEARNERS. 231 
 
 cause we learn from others, either by teachers who commu- 
 nicate through the ear, or by books, which communicate 
 through the eye ; and if, &c. 3. Thirdly, in happiness ; be- 
 cause we are prone to evil courses, in other words, to courses 
 that end in misery, from which we can be preserved only, &c. 
 
 ON ADVERSITY. To creatures whose present existence is 
 a state of trial, is calculated to be an ultimate good : first, by 
 opening the heart to, fellow feeling with the woes of others. 
 2. Secondly, by correcting vices engendered by prosperity, 
 namely, &c. 3. Thirdly, by qualifying us to enjoy what is 
 good, when the good returns ; for he who knows not, &c., 
 cannot truly know and enjoy, &c. 
 
 ON HABIT. 1. Is second nature : whatever is possible to 
 be done, however difficult at first, is made easy by repeated 
 trials, in other words by acquiring the habit : examples from 
 the arts. 2. If it forms our practice in the mechanic and the 
 ornamental arts, it has equal power in forming all our practice ; 
 hence our conduct in life will be dependent, &c. 3. However 
 much we may wish to be good, yet if our habits, &c. On 
 the other hand, our temptations to evil will be less strong, if 
 our habits, &c. 
 
 ON ORDER. 1. Is of the utmost importance in all the 
 concerns of life. It conduces to comfort in a household ; for, 
 &c. 2. It is the source of internal prosperity and external 
 strength in a nation ; for, &c. 3. It is necessary in our 
 studies, because in all things to be learned there is subordi- 
 nation of one part of knowledge to another ; and if, &c. 4. 
 It forms the virtues ; for each virtue has its bounds as, for 
 instance, &c. 
 
 ON TIME. 1. Is, with regard to every human being, the 
 opportunity for accomplishing the great ends of his existence. 
 These are, happiness here, and immortality hereafter. To 
 secure happiness here, we must, &c. 2. To secure happiness 
 hereafter, we must so rule our present conduct, as, c. 3. 
 The short period of the longest life, calls upon us, &c. 
 
 ON PREJUDICE. 1. Is the habit or act of thinking and 
 speaking, as if we had certain knowledge, when the subjects 
 are such or so circumstanced, that we know either nothing 
 about them, or very little. All persons are liable to pre- 
 judices, sometimes erring by being favourable, sometimes by 
 being unfavourable : for instance, when we see any one for 
 
232 APPENDIX. 
 
 the first time, &c. So when we visit foreign countries, and 
 see manners and customs different from our own, &-. 
 tinue with other instances. 2. But though all persons are 
 liable to prejudices, all persons are not governed 1\ them. 
 It is in this n -spirt that people differ, and they differ great Iv. 
 One man is unconscious of his prejudices, and accordingly , 
 &c. Another man is quite aware of the different character 
 of his certain and uncertain knowledge, and therefore takes 
 care, c. 
 
 ON TRUTH. 1 (see in the Index). 2. If we speak of Truth 
 und'T three points of view, we may distinguish it as Moral, 
 Scientific, and Divine. Moral truth is opposed to falsehood : 
 it is the conformity of our won Is and actions to our thoughts. 
 Thus we are said to speak the truth when, &c. In such a 
 case, what we say may not be scientific truth, yet if, &c. 
 3. Scientific truth is that which we reach by study and ex- 
 periment. Its amount will consequently be different at dif- 
 ferent periods of one's life, and at different periods of the 
 world. Exemplify each observation. 4. Divine truth is 
 that which belongs to the Deity, portions only of which He 
 reveals to his creatures. Where do we find such revelation? 
 
 ON YOUTH. 1. It is that part of life which presents the 
 greatest number of enjoyments, the most important opportu- 
 nities, the dangers most to be apprehended. 2. The < 
 ments. 3. The opportunities. 4. The dangers. 
 
 ON AGE. 1. Though a state which we may not all attain, 
 is one for which, throughout the previous parts of lit' 
 should all make preparation. The nature of this preparation, 
 that so, old age, if we reach it, may be happy. 2. The 
 blessings of age when the proper preparation has been made. 
 
 ON SOLITUDE. 1. Is a state not meant for man, v 
 an occasional state, indispensable to the formation of some of 
 the best qualities of our nature. Its likely effects on the un- 
 derstanding, and thence on the heart. 2. The unreasonable- 
 ness of devoting life wholly to solitude. 
 
 ON SOCIETY. 1. The nature of man is such as to demand 
 society, both for the development of his powers, and for pro- 
 viding his true means of happiness. Prove these points. 
 2. How we may fail of these effects, though always in society. 
 
 Ox GEOGRAPHY. 1. Define it. 2. It must have begun 
 by the knowledge of small tracts of the earth's surface : 
 
COURSE FOR EARLY LEARNERS. 233 
 
 show in what way the knowledge must have increased, 
 travellers commerce inventions. 3. Its use in accompany- 
 ing the study of history. 
 
 ON ASTRONOMY. 1. Define it. 2. The shepherds of 
 Chaldea are the first recorded astronomers. Keeping watch 
 over their flocks by night under a clear sky, they, &c. 
 3. What was the Ptolemaic system, and what is that which 
 now has its place ? 4. The kind of emotions which astrono- 
 mical inquiries produce. 5. The practical benefits which the 
 science yields. 
 
 ON AGRICULTURE. 1. One of the two primeval occupa- 
 tions of mankind explain the fact. 2. All wise nations 
 have held, and still hold, the cultivators of the land in high 
 respect. Give proofs. 
 
 ON COMMERCE. 1. Its necessity to the well-being and 
 improvement of our race. Its simplest state. Indications, 
 from history, of its early existence. 2. The states that, in 
 modem times, have successively flourished by means of 
 commerce. 
 
 ON MORALS AND MANNERS. 1. These are not the same, 
 though they are understood, to imply each other, and though, 
 to be perfect, they must go together. That they are not the 
 same, is proved by the facts which we often witness, of a 
 man sterling in morals without the recommendation of man- 
 ners ; and of one of superficially agreeable manners con- 
 cealing the most corrupt morals. Explain the regret which 
 accompanies our observation of either fact. 2. The union of 
 morals and manners necessary to the perfection of both : there 
 must be something deficient in morals themselves, if manners 
 are wanting ; and manners must often betray their flimsy 
 character, if they do not rest on morals. 
 
 ON RELIGION AND SUPERSTITION. 1. Light and darkness 
 are not more different than, &c., and yet, &c. Religion is 
 the friend of man ; Superstition, &c. Religion is clear-sighted, 
 considerate, compassionate ; Superstition, &c. Religion is 
 full of hope, and rational though humble confidence ; Super- 
 stition, &c. 2. The deficiencies through which Superstition 
 gets possession of the mind, explained by the kind of persons 
 in whom it is found, and the places where it most prevails. 
 3. The kind of persons in whom genuine religious feelings are 
 observed, and the places where genuine religion is found. 
 
234 APPENDIX. 
 
 *** While the learner is prosecuting his practical exercises in 
 logic, he should be required to study such parts of the Manual as 
 will jit him to answer the following questions; reserving his study 
 of the entire work for a more mature state of his urtdertahli<(j. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Sect. 1, page 101. With what 1 tranches of learning is logic 
 connected ? In what different ways are the three branches 
 you refer to, concerned with language ? What is meant by 
 the sense of a single word ? What is meant by the sense of 
 two or more words combined ? 
 
 Sect. 2, ib. Explain the difference between induction and 
 deduction. 
 
 Sect. 3, ib. Is there any difference between the gram- 
 matical and logical function of a word, and between logical 
 and grammatical completeness ? 
 
 Sect. 4, page 102. Who are they that learn and practise 
 logic, both inductively and deductively ? 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Sect. 11, page 1 1 '>. What is the true process of inductive 
 logic? What too often happens in this process? Wl 
 a powerful method of bringing a pupil to a consciousness of 
 his deficiencies in the inductive process ? 
 
 Sect. 12, ib. From what does all unrevealed knowledge 
 originally spring ? How are we led into the presumption that 
 we can, of ourselves, know more than experience teaches ? 
 
 Sect. 13, page 114. How are we preserved in the meta- 
 physics of quantity (mathematics), from wandering among 
 proofless abstractions ? 
 
 Sect. 14, ib. How, in using words denoting things of 
 sense, are we saved from inutility of thought ? 
 
 Sect. 15, ib. In using the name of an abstraction, say, 
 pride instead of proud, while we must apply proud to certain 
 persons or certain acts, and we do not so apply the former 
 word, we immediately mean by it nothing but the abstrac- 
 tion : what have we in consequence to do ? What is the 
 the danger, (" Now the danger is," &c., page 15) when we 
 
COURSE FOR EARLY LEARNERS. 235 
 
 thus use a word to denote, not immediately, the things we 
 know, but the form of thought under which we are supposed 
 to include certain things which we know ? 
 
 Sect. 16, page 115. In such phrases as the following, 
 what have we to remember as essential differences : the pride 
 of John, the brother of John ; John's pride, John's brother : 
 pride belonging to John, houses belonging to John; John pos- 
 sessing pride, John possessing houses ? 
 
 Sect. 17, page 116. If there is nothing within the reach 
 of our human faculties to which a word is applicable, what 
 interpretation should we give it ? 
 
 Sect. 18, page 117. What have you to remark concerning 
 knowledge, and the things that originally suggest it ? What 
 things exist as the subjects of thought, beside real things ? 
 
 Sect. 19, ib. and 119. What are things ideal ? 
 
 Sect. 20, page 118. What is a thing metaphysical ? Give 
 examples. 
 
 Sect. 21, ib. Of what things are words that are parts of 
 speech the immediate signs ? What differences of application 
 are there among these words ? 
 
 Sect. 22, ib. What is a proper name ? a common 
 name ? a name abstract ? How may a name abstract be- 
 come a common name ? 
 
 Sect. 23, page 119. Are not words very flexible by 
 which I mean liable to different extent of meaning ? What 
 three points are to be kept in mind relatively to what you 
 have just admitted ? 
 
 Sect. 24, ib. What is the etymological sense of a word ? 
 Give examples. 
 
 Sect. 25, ib. What is the general sense of a word ? Give 
 examples. 
 
 Sect. 26, page 120. What is the special sense of a word ? 
 Give examples. 
 
 Sect. 27, ib. In the use of signs to advance and fix know- 
 ledge, what operations occur ? 
 
 Sect. 28, ib. What is abstraction ? Give examples. 
 
 Sect. 29, ib. What is generalization ? Give examples. 
 
 Sect. 30, ib. What is specialization ? Give examples. 
 
236 APPENDIX. 
 
 CHAPTi:i; III. 
 
 Sect. 4, page 1 34. State the different kinds of , 
 
 Sect. 5, ib. What is a Nominal definition? 
 amples. 
 
 Sect. 6, page 135. What is a Real definition? Give 
 examples. 
 
 Sect. 7, page 136. What is an Accidental definition? 
 What is a Property? Explain what, in different cases, is an 
 Accident in Logic. 
 
 Sect. 8, pages 137, 138. What is an Essential definition ? 
 Give examples. Into what two kinds docs , : ; defi- 
 
 nition divide? Give in>tan<vs. Define Pride, so that you 
 cannot speak of a proper pride : define it so that you can* 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Sect. 1, page 140. What is Deductive logic? 
 
 Sect. 7, page 145. When we intend to develop our k 
 ledge, what have we first to choose? What may be the 
 different forms of titles? 
 
 Sect. 8, page 146. Suppose our subject is expressed by a 
 single word, what is the first proof that can be given of the 
 existence of the knowledge presumed to be included und* -r 
 such title ? Are we always obliged to begin by a definition ? 
 lMim_ i some of the things you see around you. 
 
 Sect. 9, ib. Suppose a subject to be given out in such a 
 form as the following On a Knoidedge of the World is it 
 more or less limited than if given out thus On Knowledge? 
 Are we tied, in the consideration of such subjects, to any 
 definite number of points or purpose of development '.' Sup- 
 pose our subject to be stated in the form of a proposition, as 
 A proper hmnrlcdge of the world is f<irur<i}fe to rirtue, will 
 the plan of treatment be quite open to choice, as with subjects 
 stated in the previous w;i 
 
 Sect. 10, page 147. What is an Argument? Give in- 
 stances. What three things exist in every argument ? 
 
 Sect. 11, ib. From how many sources do arguments take 
 their technical names ? 
 
 Sect. 12, (including title,) page 148. What are the names 
 of External Arguments ? Is not all our knowledge originally 
 
COURSE FOR EARLY LEARNERS. 237 
 
 suggested by things external ? Then why do we call certain 
 arguments internal? 
 
 150 (title.) Mention the names of internal arguments. 
 
 Sect. 13, ib. When are we said to reason from definition ? 
 Give instances. 
 
 Sect. 14, ib. When are we said to reason from Ety- 
 mology ? Give an instance. 
 
 Sect. 15, pages 151, 152. When are we said to reason 
 from Enumeration ? Give instances. What is the argument 
 from enumeration sometimes confounded with ? Give an 
 instance of an inductive argument. How is the difference 
 between an argument from Enumeration and from Induction 
 done away with ? 
 
 Sect. 16, pages 153, 154. When are we said to reason 
 from the Genus ? Give instances. What is left to the topic 
 Species for its usual mode of proof ? Give an instance. 
 
 Sect. 17, page 154. When are we said to reason from the 
 Cause ? Give instances. Give, an example of what is called 
 an Inference. 
 
 Sect. 18, page 155. When are we said to reason from the 
 Effect ? Give instances. 
 
 Sect. 19, pages 155, 156. What Latin phrases often 
 occur in logic, implying the same as argument from cause, and 
 argument from effect ? How do you define a-priori reasoning ? 
 What is a-posteriori reasoning ? 
 
 Sect. 20, p. 157. As every cause is an Antecedent, why 
 do we not consider every antecedent to be a cause ? Give an 
 instance of an argument from antecedents. 
 
 Sect. 21, ib. As every effect is a consequent, why do we 
 not consider every consequent to be an effect ? Give an 
 instance of an argument from consequents. 
 
 Sect. 22, page 158. When are we said to reason from the 
 Adjuncts ? Suppose we develop our knowledge of John by 
 all that constitutes his history, why shall we be said to reason 
 from the Adjuncts or Accidents of our subject ? What did 
 the ancients mean by Essence ? What are Accidents ? What 
 are Properties ? 
 
 Sect. 23, page 159. What general head of several topics 
 have you now to mention ? Give an instance of reasoning 
 from Similitude ; from Analogy, or Parity of case ; from 
 Contraries; from Proportion. Page 160: When are we 
 said to argue a fortiori? Give an instance. 
 
238 APPENDIX. 
 
 Sect. 24, page 160. Explain the phrase Cceteris paribus. 
 Explain Mutatis mutandis. Exemplify their 
 
 Sect. 25 (and Title), ib. What is the next source whence 
 the names of arguments are derived ? Page 161 : What do 
 you call the first two propositions of a syllogism when taken 
 together? What are they called separately? Give an 
 instance to show that it is sometimes indifferent which ot the 
 two premises we call the datum, and which the argu 
 What, for the most part, will be the premise to which the 
 name datum will be properly applied ? 
 
 Sect. 26, page 161. When are we said to use the Argu- 
 mentum adjudidum ? 
 
 Sect. 27, ib. When is it that, in reasoning to oneself, one 
 may be said to use the Argumentum ad hanunem ? 
 
 Sect. 28, page 162. When are we said to use the Argu- 
 mentum ad doctrinam ? Give an instance. 
 
 Sect. 29, ib. When are we said to use the Argumentum 
 ad verecundiam ? Give an instance. 
 
 Sect. 30, ib. When are we said to use the Argument an, 
 adfidem? Exemplify your meaning. 
 
 Sect. 31, page 163. In what manner may a person wil- 
 fully go astray in his own thoughts ? What expedient in 
 rhetoric, will such error in logic correspond to ? Give an 
 example. 
 
 Sect. 32, ib. What error in one's own reasoning corre- 
 sponds to what is called Argumentum ad passiones? Gi 
 Instance. 
 
 Sect. 33 (and Title), ib. What is the next source whence 
 the names of arguments are derived ? Does the reasoning 
 process necessarily change with the changing forms of lan- 
 guage ? Page 164 : Explain, as one instance for many, what 
 it is to have the knowledge which the word man expresses* 
 When we know man to be a rational animal, how may that 
 knowledge be developed in a syllogism? Why may the 
 syllogism be deemed the fundamental form of reasoning ? 
 
 Sect. 34, page 165. Give instances to show that two 
 words, properly put together, are tantamount to a syllogism. 
 Page 166 : What may be regarded as the original form of 
 speech in which knowledge is developed in deductive logic ? 
 
 Sect. 35, page 166. Give an instance of what you call the 
 original form of speech, but so constructed that each of the 
 two parts is made up of many subordinate parts, and these 
 
COURSE FOR EARLY LEARNERS. 239 
 
 again of others, till at length we reach the mere grammatical 
 parts. 
 
 Sect. 36, page 167. Although the period constructed of 
 noun and verb, is the original form of logical development, yet 
 to what form dp logicians more commonly refer all other forms ? 
 
 Sect. 37, ib. What is an Enthymeme? Give instances. 
 
 Sect. 38, ib. What is a Sorites ? Give an instance. 
 
 Sect. 39, page 168. Is Logic, or is Grammar, the de- 
 partment of learning concerned with the distinction of proposi- 
 tions as affirmative or as negative, as categorical or as hypo- 
 thetical (or conditional) ? Give instances of these different 
 sorts of propositions. 
 
 Sect. 40, page 169. What is a Dilemma ? Give instances 
 of data which can be unfolded into syllogisms exemplifying 
 the dilemma. Unfold the instances into syllogisms. Page 170 : 
 Give an instance of the method of reasoning called Reductio ad 
 absurdum. 
 
 Sect. 41, page 170. What is an Epichirema? Give an 
 instance of a syllogism which may be the foundation of an 
 epichirema. I will now develop this syllogism so that it shall 
 be an epichirema : what have I added to the datum ? What 
 to the argument ? Page 171 : In what brief manner would 
 rhetoric lead you to say all this ? 
 
 Sect. 42, page 171. In following out the exercises you 
 will have to write, what are you cautioned against ? 
 
 Sect. 43, ib. How is improvement in logic best pro- 
 moted ? What does the word theme properly mean ? What 
 may it also mean ? 
 
 Sect. 44, ib. When the subject of a theme is expressed 
 by a mere grammatical noun, what kind of thing, different at 
 different times, may it be the name of? What, at different 
 times, will the name itself be ? Page 172 : Give instances of 
 what you state. 
 
 Sect. 45, page 172. Give a few instances of subjects 
 which are things metaphysical under names abstract. In 
 treating these, where may you find certain cautionary prin- 
 ciples that you ought to keep in mind ? Now say, how you 
 would in general begin, and how proceed, in developing your 
 knowledge on such subjects. Page 174 : Give some other 
 instances of subjects that are things metaphysical under names 
 abstract. How would you in general begin, and how proceed, 
 in treating these ? 
 
240 AH'KNIJJX. 
 
 Sect. 46, page 175. What are internal, and what are 
 external arguments, otherwise called ? When a real or an 
 ideal thing is given out for treatment, what mak.-s a develop- 
 ment of our knowledge difficult ? Page 170: Suppose Socrates 
 were given out for a theme, how should we treat it ol >j. i . 
 Under what implied title might we otherwise treat it ? 
 
 Sect. 47, page 177. The title of a theme, you formerly 
 told me, might be a mere grammatical noun-substantm-, or a 
 logical, that is, a constructed noun : in what other way can 
 a theme be given out? Page 179 : Mention a few theses. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Sect. 1, page 180. By what three ways will a v 
 writer be liable to logical errors in his deductive: practice? 
 
 Sect. 2, ib. What is Verbiage ? 
 
 Sect. 3, page 182. What, when it becomes evident in 
 language, does confused Reasoning arise from ? 
 
 Sect. 4, page 184. What is Disjointed Reasoning? 
 
 Sect. 5, page 187. Under Verbiage, what are more special 
 names for errors in logical deductive practice? What 
 nations, still more special, come under Petitio-principii ? \ 
 under Non-sequitur ? What under Error in distinction or 
 division? Under Confused reasoning, what are the special 
 descriptions of faults ? Under Disjointed reasoning, or Igno- 
 ratio elenchi, what an- th- sprdal descriptions of faults? 
 
 Sect. 6, page 188. What is Begging the question ? Give 
 an instance. Correct the instance in different ways. 
 
 Sect. 7, page 189. What is an Identical proposition ? 
 Give instances. 
 
 Sect. 8, page 190. When you mean to give a verbal *.-x- 
 planutiun of a word, is it a fault to use for the purpose another 
 word having tin- same- nu-aning? When will it be verbiage 
 to do so ? The following is given as an example of the fault 
 of Explaining a thing by itself: " Justice regards both magis- 
 trates and private individuals : the former show themseh 
 be influenced by it when they make an equitable distribution 
 of rewards and punishments ; the latter, when they are sin- 
 cere in their words, and just in their dealings." Correct the 
 example. 
 
COURSE FOR EARLY LEARNERS. 241 
 
 Sect. 9, ib. When does the error of Reasoning in a circle, 
 take place? Page 191. Give an obvious example. 
 
 Sect. 10, page 192. When are Premises irrelevant ? Give 
 an example. 
 
 Sect. 11, page 198. When you prove too little, what sort 
 of logical fault must it be ? Give an instance. In all cases 
 of proving too little, what do you mentally supply? Page 199 : 
 Give an example of an inference, in contradistinction to a 
 necessary conclusion, and let your inference have the utmost 
 certainty that an inference can have. Give a further instance 
 or two of the error of proving too little. 
 
 Sect. 12, page 200. Why will proving too much be a non- 
 sequitur ? Give an example. Correct the example. Page 201 : 
 In any case of proving too much, as in any of proving too little, 
 an unwarranted datum is assumed ; but what is the difference 
 of the datum in the two cases ? Give a further instance or 
 two of the error of proving too much. 
 
 Sect. 13, page 202. What general form of verbiage do 
 we next reach ? What is the species you have here to speak 
 of ? Give instances of the fault. I will repeat your instances, 
 and you must correct each instance as I go on. 
 
 Sect. 14, page 203. What is a cross division ? Give 
 instances. I will repeat your instances, and you must correct 
 each as I go on. 
 
 Sect. 15 (and Title), page 204. What description of faults 
 come now to be noticed ? What is the particular sort you 
 have here to speak of? Page 205 : What will be the effect 
 of saying other than we mean, even supposing we are not 
 entirely misunderstood ? Give instances. I will repeat your 
 instances, and you must tell me, after each, what the rea- 
 soner truly means. Page 206 : Is it a fault to use a sentence 
 that can be understood in two ways ? Give some further 
 instances of sentences that do not clearly say what is meant. 
 I will repeat your instances, and you must correct each as I 
 go on ; rendering meaning in two ways when you are not sure 
 of the one intended. 
 
 Sect. 16, page 207. To what fault is that of Not dis- 
 tinguishing different senses of the same word, opposed ? What 
 might our present title be ? Page 208 : How far are we at 
 present concerned with this fault ? I will read, as an instance, 
 the faulty passage, which runs thus : "To write well is an 
 
242 Al'I'KNMX. 
 
 accomplishment," &c. Now tell me. in what wav it is wroncr. 
 I will read the next example : " It is better to be sensible," 
 &c. Tell me the faulty parts, and correct them. 
 
 Sect. 17, page 209. What are the means which grammar 
 provides, for the clear development of thought by words ? 
 While grammar looks to accuracy in the outward structure of 
 language, what is it that lo^ic must care for? Give a rule 
 concerning what a sentence should not be made to bear. I 
 will read each of the three examples, and you must tell me, 
 alter each, the nature of tin- fault. 
 
 Sect. 18, page 211. What is the Latin term for the errors 
 that come next under notice? What inav tin- phrase mean ? 
 Describe the sort of learner who !y liable to such 
 
 errors as you mention. Pa-e '2 1 2 : What is the effect of what 
 we call thinking upon the relations which constitute our know- 
 ledge ? I will read you the example of part of a theme in 
 which several propositions are required to make the train of 
 thinking clear : " The treasures of wisdom," c. Now tell 
 me how you would correct this. 
 
 Sect. 19, page 213. What ought a proposition not to con- 
 tain ? Give an instance. In order to keep clear of even 
 seeming to promise too much, what should the theme-writer 
 avoid? I will read von the in>tance : " Having thus de- 
 scribed and illustrated," &c. Now, correct it. 
 
 Sect. 20, page 214. When does the fault of Deviating 
 from the proposition occur? I will read you the instance: 
 44 Anger has been called a short madness; and people," &c. 
 Now describe how it is faultv. 
 
 Sect. 21, il). What does the fault of Discoursing short of 
 the proposition arise from? Page 215: Is a writer always 
 bound to treat a subject in the general way in which it may 
 be given out? 
 
 Sect. 22, page 215. What does the fault of Discoursing 
 wide of the proposition arise from? Page 216 : What j>erson 
 may a writer be compared to, who is guilty of the fault? I 
 will read you the tw examples of the fault, and you will say, 
 after each! why it is wron^. Pajv iM 7 : Ciive instances to 
 show that an indistinct view of a subject may be betrayed by 
 a single expression. 
 
KEY. 243 
 
 KEY 
 
 FOR CORRECTING, AT PAGES 203, 204, AND 206, THE 
 SENTENCES LOGICALLY DEFECTIVE. 
 
 Page 203. 
 
 This great politician desisted from his designs, when he found them 
 impracticable. 
 
 He was of so high and independent a spirit, that he abhorred being in 
 debt. 
 
 Though raised to an exalted station, he was a pattern of piety and 
 virtue. 
 
 His end soon approached ; and he died with great fortitude. 
 
 He was a man of so much pride, that he despised the sentiments of 
 others. 
 
 Poverty induces dependence ; and dependence increases Corruption. 
 
 This man, on all occasions, treated his inferiors with great disdain. 
 
 There can be no order in the life of that man, who does not allot a due 
 share of his time to retirement and reflection. 
 
 Such equivocal expressions, mark an intention to deceive. 
 
 His cheerful, happy temper, keeps up a kind of daylight in his mind, 
 and fills it with a steady and perpetual serenity. 
 
 Page 204. 
 
 The things brought out to me, were some square, some round ; some 
 white, some blue, some red ; some natural, some artificial. 
 
 He was a man of extensive riches, high birth, and exalted virtue ; quick 
 to discover fraud ; very generous, and of great temperance. 
 
 In treating of poetry, I shall consider it under the heads of Epic, Lyric, 
 and Dramatic ; Ancient and Modern ; Classical and English ; Written-in- 
 rhyme, and Written-in-blank-verse. 
 
 Men, as to constitution, temper, and habits, are phlegmatic, sanguine, 
 or choleric ; gay or gloomy ; devoted to pleasure, or devoted to business. 
 
 Page 206. 
 
 The Komans shall, I say, subdue Pyrrhus. Or, Pyrrhus shall, I say, 
 subdue the Romans. 
 
 The duke yet lives that shall depose Henry. Or, Henry shall depose 
 the duke that yet lives. 
 
 The rising tomb bore a lofty column. Or, a lofty column bore the 
 rising tomb. 
 
 And thus the son addressed the fervent sire. Or, Thus the fervent sire 
 addressed the son. 
 
 And a solemn stillness holds all the air. 
 
 He was mounted upon a hot and fiery steed, which seemed to know his 
 aspiring rider. 
 
244 
 
 If this day happen to be Sunday, then on the next day following, this 
 form of prayer shall be used and tin- fa>t day kept. 
 
 A collection is making to prote.-t and uphold sucli electors, a*, p 
 less of threats and unmindful of intimidation, n-fiiM-d to vot\ contrary 
 to their de>ires and con>cirn< ,-. for A. and Ji. 
 
 He was more civil to me than lie commonly is. Or, He was more 
 civil to me than people commonly are to one another. 
 
 You can arrive in time, only 1-y starting early. Or, You can do no 
 more than arrive in Time, hy starting early. 
 
 Though he had been charitable to others, he found but few friends in 
 his own extremity. 
 
 Person -i having an income not amounting to a hundred and fifty pounds 
 a year, an- not liable to the inmim-tax. 
 
 The Romans understood liberty ,-is well, at least, as we. 
 
 Theism can be opposed only to Polytheism or Atheism. 
 
 Thesi- ;ii-e not such de>igns as any man who is born a Briton, ought to 
 :!iiifd or afraid, in any situation, in any <in u instances, to a\ 
 
 The lien being in her inM. wtt killed and eaten there by the eagle. 
 (>/\ 'I'd" eagle having killed the hen, carried off her prey, and dep 
 it in her own mM, eat it there. 
 
 It has been said that .Iesuit> an not only equivocate. Or, Jesuits are 
 not the only persons that ran equivocate. 
 
 You \\ill not think that tlics,- people, when injured, have no right at 
 all to our protection. Or, Have !>>> ri^ht than others to our protection. 
 
 Solomon, the son of I>avid, and the builder of the temple of Jerusalem, 
 was the riche>t monarch that iv^nM i.vi-r th- .b-wi>h people. 
 
 Solomon, whos.- tath.-i- I >avid W;LS persecuted by Saul, was the richest 
 monarch of the .! 
 
 I.i>ias, speaking f his friends, pn-ini^d his father never to abandon 
 them. Ci t \ Lisias speaking of his father's friends. pn.rni-M his lather 
 never to abandon tin in. 
 
 The Divii:- : 1 faithful, heapeth favours 
 
 servants. < h\ The DivilM P.einj; heapeth favours on his liberal and faith- 
 ful ser\ 
 
 K\ cry well-instructecl scribe is like a householder, who bringeth out of 
 his treasure new things and old. 
 
 Dryden, in the following \\ y handsome observation, 
 
 on Ovid's writing a letter from Dido to 1.- 
 
 Imprudent associations disqualify us for instructing or reproving others. 
 O, Disqualify us tor receiving instruction or reproof from others. 
 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX 
 
 MANUAL OF RHETORIC, AND THE MANUAL 
 OF LOGIC. 
 
 ADAPTED NOT ONLY FOR REFERENCE, BUT FOR OCCA- 
 SIONAL, FURTHER INSTRUCTION.* 
 
 %* The first figures indicate the page : those within parenthesis, the section. 
 
 ABSTRACT, Abstraction. Abstract means, drawn off or separate from that 
 in which it adheres, and which is called the CONCRETE. Thus, white 
 or whiteness indicate an abstraction from any white substance ; as, for 
 instance, from a white man ; which expression being applied to a par- 
 ticular white man, is the name of a concrete, though, till so applied, 
 the name is abstract. All words have an immediate correspondence 
 only with things abstract; page 109 (10). And many words are 
 doubly abstract ; ib. ; also, 114 (15). A name or noun abstract is 
 distinguished in logic from a name proper, and a name common ; 118 
 
 (22). 
 
 Absurd, Absurdity, Reductio ad absurdum. Absurd means, contrary to 
 reason. An assertion may be false without being absurd : it is false 
 but not absurd to say that London is the capital of France. Absurd is 
 what in thought cannot be ; false, what in fact is not. It is absurd to 
 say that a straight line can be a crooked one ; false would be a word 
 wrongly used in such a case. For an example of Reductio ad absurdum , 
 see 169 (40). 
 
 Accents. These are otherwise called slides or inflections of the speaking 
 voice; 57 (7). 
 
 Accident, Accidental. Accidental, in logic, means sometimes happening, 
 and sometimes not. Accidents are also called Adjuncts ; 7 (II. 2) ; 
 and 158 (22). An Accident must be distinguished from a Property; 
 and an Accidental definition from an Essential one ; 136 (7). Accident 
 is one of the Aristotelian predicables ; 220 (4). 
 
 Accumulation. This, in rhetoric, is otherwise called Synathroesmus ; 16 
 
 * Controversial points, though they could not be altogether avoided in 
 the body of the foregoing Manual of Logic and its Notes, (into the latter 
 of which they are principally thrown,) are reserved for some further 
 elucidation in this Index ; over which the reader is requested to cast an 
 inquiring glance, even though he may not have occasion to refer to ijb for 
 the usual purposes of an Index. 
 
 H 
 
246 INDEX. 
 
 Adjective. In logic, the difference, in a definition, is expressed by an 
 adjective, which may be a mere adjective, or a logical, that is, a con- 
 structed adjective; 137 (third foot-note). 
 
 Adjunct. See Acci<l<-nt. 
 
 Affirmation, Affirmative. An affirmation or affirmative proposition is dis- 
 tinguished, in Aristotelian logic, from a negative one ; 223 (5) : in our 
 logic, the difference is considered to be purely grammatical ; 167 (39), 
 and 226 (9) ; unless indeed when one person says no, or what is 
 tantamount, and we oppose it by yes, or what is tantamount. See 
 Positive. 
 
 Aggregate. This is one of the sources of sophistical delusion ; 125 (35) ; 
 
 . and 197 (the Syllogisms). 
 
 Allegory. A method of speech proper only to rhetoric ; 20 (19). 
 
 Alliteration. One of the minor expedients of rhetoric; 19 (15). 
 
 Analysis. That wliich in rhetoric is otherwise called climax or gradation ; 
 16 (12). 
 
 Anaccenosis. Communication, one of the expedients of rhetoric; 21 (23). 
 
 Anacolution. A failure of the grammatical construction, vindicated for 
 the purposes of rhetoric ; 15 (n) ; see also 70 (first foot-note). 
 
 Analepsis. A rhetorical method of recovering the construction of a period 
 in proceeding to complete it ; 14 (9). 
 
 Analogy. Parity of case, one of the topics of internal argument, 8 
 (TI. 3); 159(23). 
 
 Analysis. In logic, the procedure of the understanding in which we seek 
 or seem to seek a conclusion not yet attained, in contradistinction to 
 /?//M//io % <X in which we first lay down what we intend to prove. The 
 former i^ .1 <//>v/^m<//t^/ of arguments; the latter a putting of argu- 
 ments tn'jrt/Hr. The former is the Inductive process ; the latter, the 
 Deductive. 
 
 Anaphora. A method of analepsis ; 14(9); 17 (12). 
 
 An:i>tn.ph.\ A rhrtoriral transition ; 15 (10). 
 
 Antannrlasis. A term in rhetoric used in two ways ; 14 (9) ; and 18 
 
 (14). 
 Ant. .,-,!, tits. One of the topics of internal arguments; 7 (II. 2); and 
 
 157 (20). 
 
 Antic Umax. In rhetoric, the opposite proceeding to climax ; 16 (12). 
 Antimetabole. A sort of antithesis in rhetoric; 18 (14). 
 Antithesis. Opposition of meaning and of words; 17 (14). 
 Antonomasia. In rhetoric, the use of a proper, for a common name ; 20 
 
 (I?)- 
 
 Aparithmesis. A term in rhetoric for enumeration; 16 (12). 
 Apodosis. The former of the two members of a period ; 14 (7). 
 Apophasis. The same in rhetoric as paraleipsis, or omission ; 21 (23). 
 Aporia. An expedient in rhetoric, when the speaker chooses to appear in 
 
 a state of doubt; 21 (23). 
 Aposiopesis. An expedient in rhetoric when the speaker chooses to hold 
 
 back what he pretends he was about to say; 15 (u). 
 Apposition. A grammatical repetition of a noun in the same case, often 
 
 used with good effect in rhetoric ; 14 (9). 
 A-posteriori. An argument from the effect, as distinguished from an 
 
 argument A-priori, or from the cause ; 7 (II. 2) ; and 155 (19). 
 
INDEX. 247 
 
 Apostrophe. A rhetorical address to an imaginary, a dead, or an absent 
 person ; 22 (24). 
 
 Apprehension. Erroneously considered by the Aristotelians to be a dis- 
 tinct operation of the mind, and divided into Incomplex and Complex ; 
 144 (foot-note) ; 218 (3); 225 (8). 
 
 A-priori. An argument from the cause, as distinguished from an argu- 
 ment A-posteriori, or from the effect; 7 (II. 2) ; and 155 (19). 
 
 Argument ; Argumentum ad judicium ; ad hominem, &c.; Argumentative. 
 An Argument is that which being itself admitted to be true, proves 
 something else to be true ; 147 (10) ; Arguments derive their names 
 from three sources, 147 (n) ; Arguments investigated for the purposes 
 of Rhetoric; 3-9 (I. i.-II. 3) ; for the purposes of Logic; 148-171 
 (1241). The Argumentative, in rhetoric, is comprehended under 
 Didactic composition ; 2 (4). 
 
 Aristotle. The doctrine of the syllogism as taught by him and his fol- 
 lowers, repudiated ; 102 (note to Chap. I.) ; 142 (note to Sect. 2) ; 
 144 (foot-note). His doctrine of definition the only useful part of his 
 logic ; 129 (i). Alluded to as a juggler, but one who deceived him- 
 self before he deceived others, 219 (foot-note). See also in this Index, 
 Formal Logic. See further in this Index, Philosophy, Philosophers. 
 
 Articulation. A constituent part of oral speech ; 56 (2). 
 
 Asteism. A civil kind of sarcasm ; 20 (21). 
 
 Asyndeton. The omission of conjunctions for the sake of rhetorical effect ; 
 16 (12). 
 
 Attention. The will to retain a present state of the understanding by 
 means of that which suggests it, till other states arise that are related 
 to the first in a desired and expected manner. 
 
 Auxesis. A method of rhetorical exaggeration ; 21(22). 
 
 Barbarous words. An Exercise for avoiding ; 28. 
 
 Bathos. A sinking in expression, which is almost always a fault; 16 
 
 (12). 
 
 Blacklock. The blind poet of Scotland, an allusion to his case ; 109 
 (note to the previous Section). 
 
 Being. A name including every possible subject of thought, except Not- 
 being; 130 (2). See Thing, in this Index. 
 
 CaBteris paribus. Other things being equal, a Latin phrase often used in 
 argument; 160(24). 
 
 Case. State of the case is one of the parts of a judicial oration ; 10 (2) ; 
 84, 85. 
 
 Catabasis. A descent or sinking in expression, otherwise called Bathos ; 
 16 (12). 
 
 Catachresis. A metaphor bold to excess, an abuse of figurative speech tn 
 gain a certain end ; 19 (17). 
 
 Category, Categorical, Categorematic. Categorical means collected or 
 assembled in order to declare : hence it means positive as opposed to 
 hypothetical. A category is a class of assembled things; 130 (2). 
 Aristotelian Categories ; 220 (4) ; and 226 (10). Categorematic is an 
 expression used by the Aristotelians to denote a word which is capable 
 of being employed by itself as a term, as man and mortal, in saying 
 
 H2 
 
248 INDEX. 
 
 Mnn is mortal. If a word cannot be so employed, as, for instance, an 
 adverb, a preposition, &c., they call it Syncategorematic. In our sys- 
 tem, a Categorematic term will be better called, a logical part of sjjeech 
 unconstructed ; and a Syncategorematic term, a mere grammatical part 
 of speech. 
 
 Cause. One of the topics of internal arguments; 7 (II. 2); 154 (17). 
 A cause is that which we have found by experience to have one uniform 
 consequent or consequents; 157 (20). It must be added, however, 
 that this is not all that makes up what we mean by cause. We con- 
 ceive an antecedent Will wherever there is an effect, and if the immediate 
 antecedent cannot have a will because devoid of sense, we go to a 
 higher Will that disposes all things, and among them the conditions of 
 the immediate antecedent with relation to its uniform consequent. 
 See at Philosophy, Philosophers, in this Index, the concluding remarks. 
 
 Characteristic. In logic, the same as specific ; 137 (8). 
 
 Charientism. A civil kind of sarcasm; 20 (21). 
 
 Circle. The etymological sense of the word period; 14 (7). The fallacy 
 of reasoning in a circle ; 190 (9). 
 
 Class, Classification. By class, we mean, several things assembled under 
 one common designation. Classification is the origin of logical defini- 
 tion; 130 (2). Order, genus, kind, species, sort, variety, are words 
 that mean the same as class. 
 
 Climax. A gradation, or rising of one circumstance above another in 
 speaking; 16 (12). 
 
 Colloquial. Colloquial style ; 12 (2). Exercise for improvement in ; 32. 
 
 Common name. A name applicable in common to many things; 118 
 
 (22). 
 
 Comparison, Comparates. Comparison is the generic name of several 
 topics of internal arguments; 8 (II. 3); 159 (23). Comparates are 
 any two things which are compared together. 
 
 Composition. As a general term, it implies a putting of parts properly 
 together to form a whole. Accordingly in literature, it is the formation 
 of discourse according to the laws of grammar, of logic, and of rhetoric. 
 
 Conceits in poetry. See Fancy. 
 
 Conception, Conception is thus distinguished from Perception : When 
 we see, or hear, or feel, or touch, or taste, we have a perception of the 
 thing seen or heard, &c. ; but if, not seeing, or hearing, &c., we never- 
 theless have the thing mentally present, we are said to have a conception 
 of it. A conception is otherwise called an idea ; but note, that idea is 
 liable to many other applications : see 108 (9, 10, and the following 
 note) ; 117 (19, 20). 
 
 Concrete. The whole of that from which we mentally draw off (abstract) 
 what we think and speak of separately. Every word stands immedi- 
 ately for what is Abstract, but if it should be a noun common or a noun 
 proper, the moment we apply it to a real or ideal person or thing, it is 
 the name of a concrete, and may then, and not till then, be called a 
 name-concrete. An adjective, as foolish, cannot be a term -concrete, 
 though it may be a part of such a term, as of the phrase a foolish 
 saying, which is a concrete name when applied to some particular say- 
 ing. The forms of language often lead us to mistake mere abstractions 
 for things concrete ; 115 (16). 
 
INDEX. 249 
 
 Conclusion. The expression which declares what the understanding attains 
 or deduces from premises; 101 (i) ; 141 (2); 147 (10). Conclusion 
 in the deductive process distinguished from Inference in the inductive ; 
 164 (34). 
 
 Concurrent probabilities. A rhetorical delusion in speaking of them ; 125 
 
 (35). 
 
 Conditional, Conditions. Conditional, in logic, is the same as hypothetical. 
 But the difference indicated by either of the words, if it extends no 
 further than to the form of a proposition, is purely grammatical ; 168 
 (39, ad finem). For preliminary conditions of a dispute or discussion, 
 see 139 (second note to Chap. III.) 
 
 Confirmation. The argumentative part of a regular oration ; 10 (2). 
 
 Confutation. An occasional part of a regular oration ; 10 (2). 
 
 Connotative. That which notes something, and, along with it, something 
 more ; 149 (foot-note). In our logic, all words are connotative : the 
 distinction sought to be enforced by non-connotative will be sufficiently 
 met by calling such a word as John, a term of single application ; and 
 such a word as whiteness, a term of double abstraction. 
 
 Consciousness. Error of the Sensationalists with regard to this part of 
 our nature ; 110 (first foot-note). 
 
 Consequence, Consequents. A consequence, in logic, is either an inference, 
 or a conclusion. Consequents, the name of one of the topics of internal 
 arguments 7 (II. 2); 157 (21). 
 
 Conviction, to Convince. The object of the rhetorician is to convince, as 
 well as to instruct and delight : to persuade implies all three of these, 
 when, and in what proportion, needed. Logic enables us to convince 
 others, by the practice of developing, for our own security and satis- 
 faction, the means of conviction obtained by our studies generally in the 
 several departments of learning ; 1 (1-4) ; 140 (i). 
 
 Copula. The verb is, in Aristotelian logic ; 218 (3). 
 
 Correlative. Terms are correlative which imply each other, as father, 
 which implies son or daughter; and sow, which implies father and 
 mother. So likewise king and subject, master and servant, cause and 
 effect, antecedent and consequent, are correlatives. But note, that the 
 principle which such words make peculiarly and strikingly evident, is 
 universally operative. We could not have the knowledge included in 
 any word whatever, if we had not other knowledge which the word 
 implies, though it does not directly express it. Thus we could not 
 know what a man is, if we did not know what is not a man ; and so 
 with all things whatever; 163 (33). 
 
 Cross divisions. The error of confounding ; 203 (14). 
 
 Datum, pi. Data. The datum is that which, in an argument, is given or 
 
 conceded, and occurring in a syllogism, forms one of the two premises ; 
 
 147 (10). It is one of the sources from which arguments derive, their 
 
 technical names ; 3 (I. 1-7); 160 (25-32). 
 Decrementum. A species of sinking or bathos in style ; 16 (12). 
 Deduction, Deductive. Deduction is the process by which knowledge is 
 
 spread out before the understanding in words ; 101 (2) ; 140-145 (1-6). 
 Definition. An important part of logic; its theory and practice; 129- 
 
 140 (1-8, including the two notes). In attempting to develop know- 
 
250 INDEX. 
 
 ledge, it is the first proof that can be given that we have the knowledge ; 
 146 (8). A general topic of internal arguments; 6 (II. i) ; 150-158 
 (13-21). 
 
 Deliberative. A term applied to the oratory of the senate, and of assemblies 
 of the people; 2 (4). Subjects for exercise in; 82 (9, 10, u). 
 
 Delivery. The fourth part of rhetoric ; 3 (4) ; 56-59 (1-16). 
 
 Delusions of the rhetorical sophist. Cautions against; 121-129 (31-36). 
 
 Demonstrative. A term applied to oratory, so far as it embraces eulogy 
 and instruction, when it is not proposed, for any immediate object, to 
 move the will ; 2 (4). Subjects for Exercise in ; 82 (1-8). demon- 
 strative, in logic is said of argument which proceeds from admitted 
 premises, to conclusions involved in those premises. 
 
 Descriptive, Description. Descriptive, in rhetoric, is comprehended under 
 Narrative composition; 2 (4). Description, in logic, is called Acci- 
 dental definition, 136 (7) ; 146 (8). Subjects for exercising learners 
 in description ; 74 (r-io). 
 
 Diasyrm. Another name for sarcasm, especially when applied with some 
 degree of moderation ; 20 (21). 
 
 Diction. The manner or style in which, as to his words and sentences, 
 a person speaks or writes-: it is the third part of rhetoric; 11-23 
 (1-24). Instruction and Exercises for improvement in ; 26-55. 
 
 Dictum. Aristotle's dictum, the axiom of the formal syllogism, is 
 referred to at 104 in the continuation of the note. See also 221 (" To 
 a demonstration, an axiom," &c.) 
 
 Didactic. One of the general divisions of rhetorical composition ; 2 (4). 
 
 Difference. A part in every real definition; 137 (8). It is always ex- 
 pressed by a grammatical or logical adjective, frequently, in the latter 
 case, of very complicate construction ; ib. (third foot-note). The dif- 
 ference, in an Accidental definition, may be carried out into a biography ; 
 146 (8). Difference is one of the five Aristotelian predicables ; 220 (4). 
 
 Dilemma. A description of syllogism whose peculiarity is not of a merely 
 grammatical character ; 169 (40). 
 
 Disposition. The art of arranging the arguments of a discourse. It is 
 the second part of rhetoric; 10 (i, 2). 
 
 Disputation. Hints for ascertaining the reasonableness of a dispute or 
 discussion, or of fixing its conditions ; 139 (second note to Chap. III.) 
 
 Distribution. The meaning of the word division, in logic, explained by 
 it; 132 (2, ad fiuem). The doctrine of distribution in Aristotelian 
 logic ; 221 (" Another necessary doctrine towards," &c.) 
 
 Division. See Distribution above. Division is also a term for one of the 
 sub-parts of an oration ; 10 (2). 
 
 Double abstraction. See 114 (15). 
 
 Douglas. Mr. James Douglas of Cavers alluded to, and quoted from ; 
 152, 153 (foot-note); and 199 (foot-note). 
 
 Echo. A name sometimes used in place of other names of certain figures 
 of speech; 14 (9); 17 (13). 
 
 Ecphonesis, Exclamation. A form of sentence in rhetoric; 13 (6). 
 
 Education. Specimens of faulty themes, and of a corrected one, on Edu- 
 cation; 181, 182, 184. 
 
 Effect. One of the topics of internal arguments ; 7 (II. 2) ; 155 (18). 
 
INDEX. 251 
 
 Elenchus, Ignoratio elenchi. Elenchus (or elencK), as a general term, 
 means an argument, but, specially, the point or purpose which a course 
 of argument keeps, or ought to keep in view. Ignoratio elenchi means 
 the neglect to have such a point or purpose while arguing, or the 
 neglect of keeping it steadily and clearly in view after having had it ; 
 211-217 (.18-22). 
 
 Elocution, Eloquence. Elocution means either Diction, or Delivery; 3 
 (foot-note). Eloquence is another form of the same word ; but is 
 commonly employed with a larger meaning, such as includes all the 
 requisites of oratory. 
 
 Emotion. Rhetoric alone, of the three arts which teach the use of lan- 
 guage, (Grammar and Logic being the other two,) concerns itself with 
 our emotions ; 1 (2) ; 101 (i). 
 
 Enantiosis. Antithesis or Opposition ; a figure in rhetoric ; 17(14). 
 
 English History. Subjects for Narrative Exercises from ; 71. 
 
 Enthymeme. A form of argument in which the datum is not expressed , 
 167(37). 
 
 Enumeration. A topic of internal argument ; 6 (II. i) ; 151 (15). Also, 
 a form of speech in rhetoric ; 16 (12). 
 
 Epanalepis. j 
 
 Epanaphora. > Modes of rhetorical verbal repetition; 17 (13). 
 
 Epanodos. J 
 
 Epanorthosis. Correction; an expedient in rhetoric ; 21(23). 
 
 Epiphora or Epistrophe. A mode of rhetorical verbal repetition ; 17 (13). 
 
 Epizeuxis. A passionate repetition of words in rhetoric ; 17 (13). 
 
 Erotesis. Interrogation, a form of sentence in rhetoric ; 13 (5). 
 
 Essence, Essential. Essence is that (supposed something) which makes 
 a thing what it is ; 158 (22). Essential definition ; 137 (8). 
 
 Etymological, Etymology. The etymological sense of a word ; 119 (24), 
 Etymology is one of the topics of internal arguments ; 6 (II. i) 
 150 (14). 
 
 Eulogy. A speech belonging to the class called Demonstrative ; 2 (4). 
 Outline for a Eulogy on a schoolboy ; 82 (i). 
 
 Euphemism. A delicate way of saying what might otherwise give offence ; 
 
 21 (22). 
 
 Examination questions. In Rhetoric, page 9 : page 17: pages 22, 23: 
 page 60. In logic, Introductory course, page 234. 
 
 Exclamation. See Ecphonesis. 
 
 Exergasia. A mode of rhetorical repetition by phrases of the same mean- 
 ing; 17 (13). 
 
 Exordium. The Proemium or opening of an oration ; 10 (2). 
 
 Experiment, Experience. Experiment is one of the two topics of externa. 
 arguments ; 6 (I.) ; 148 (12). Experience is the original source of all 
 human knowledge ; 155 (19). 
 
 Expression. In oratory, expression is the language of nature, mingling 
 with, and giving soul to artificial language ; 57 (8). 
 
 External arguments. These are employed in rhetoric when the auditors 
 require instruction in what they do not yet know ; 6 (i). Such argu- 
 ments do not properly make a part of deductive logic, yet are usefully 
 considered under it, because logic should be so studied as to prepare for 
 rhetoric; 148 (12). 
 
252 INDEX. 
 
 Extremes. The minor and major terms in the Aristotelian syllogism ; 
 219 (4). 
 
 Fallacy, False, Falsity, Falsehood. Fallacy is a deceptive argument, 
 which may not be intended to deceive. False means not true, either 
 with, or without intention to deceive. A Falsity should mean what is 
 false when there is no intention to deceive ; but this meaning is not 
 always adhered to. A Falsehood is, what is false when there is an 
 intention to deceive ; in which sense Falsity is also liable to be less 
 properly used. 
 
 Familiar letters. Subjects for, 74-81. 
 
 Fancy. This is often used as a term synonymous with Imagination, but 
 the best custom seems to warrant this difference : Imagination implies 
 emotion as causing the presence of the conceptions, their character, 
 combination, and sequence : (see Imagination :) Fancy implies con- 
 ceptions formed and continued voluntarily, that is, by choice, and with- 
 out emotion. Fancy therefore is the origin of the conceits, as they are 
 called, by which the school of poetry is distinguished which was pre- 
 valent in Italy at a certain period, and in our own country during the 
 period which intervened between the Romantic school that closed about 
 the end of Elizabeth's reign, and the Classical school that opened after 
 the Restoration. The poets of that intervening school are called the 
 metaphysical poets. Even Milton is often guilty of these conceits. 
 Thus, in a sonnet which begins very naturally by saying that Shakspeare 
 needs not a stone monument, he goes on with the conceit, that since we 
 are all astonished by his genius, that is, turned into stone, we are all 
 stone monuments to record his excellence; and in this manner, he/a- 
 cifully makes out that any other monument is rendered unnecessary. 
 
 Figurative language, Figures of speech. See from page 12 to 22 (3-24). 
 See an alphabetical Index, and the etymology of the names of the figures, 
 page 24. Instruction and Exercise for the proper use of figurative 
 language, pages 52-55 (Section 10, et seq.) 
 
 Figure of a Syllogism. The difference of the four figures of the Aristo- 
 telian syllogism explained; 223-225 (5, 6). 
 
 Flatness of style. Exercise for correcting; pages 30, 31. 
 
 Forensic. See Judicial. 
 
 Formal logic, Forms of an argument, Forms of language. The Formal 
 logic of Aristotle objected to ; 102 (Note) ; 122(32); 133(3); 142 
 (Note) ; 144 (foot-note), 167 (39). Some account of the syllogism of 
 formal logic; 217-225 (2-6). Its principles opposed; 225-227 
 
 (?-") 
 
 For Forms of an Argument, see 163-171 (33-41). 
 
 For certain Forms of language which are liable to produce error of thought, 
 see 115 (16). 
 
 Fortitude. Example of a theme upon ; 174. 
 
 French Speculative Philosophy. This subject alluded to; 106 (foot- 
 note). 
 
 Friendship. Example of a theme upon ; 185, et seq. 
 
 Function. Logical and Grammatical function distinguished ; 101 (3) ; 
 144 (5). 
 
INDEX. 253 
 
 General proposition. Such a proposition is often put forward by the rhe- 
 torician with a delusive purpose ; 123 (33). 
 
 Generalization. A process carried on by means of a sign, which in logic 
 is always a word ; 120 (29). 
 
 Genus, Genera. For the purpose of clear comprehensive thought, we 
 assemble things under kinds (genera) ; 130 (2, 3) ; 137 (8) ; 146 (8). 
 Genus (kind) is one of the topics of internal argument ; 6 (II. i) ; 153 
 (16). It is one of the predicables of Aristotelian logic; 220 (4). 
 
 German Speculative philosophy. Remarks upon; 106 (foot-note); 111 
 (Note to Sect. 10) ; 117 (Note to Sect. 17). 
 
 Grammar. Distinguished from Rhetoric and Logic ; 1 (i, 2) ; 101 (i) ; 
 144 (5, 6). 
 
 Grecian History. Subjects for Narrative Exercises from ; 73. 
 
 Habit. Our acquiescence in the permanence of the natural course of 
 things is moulded by habit; 152 (foot-note). 
 
 High style. Contrasted with the Colloquial and Middle style ; 12 (2). 
 
 History of to-day. Example of a theme upon this subject ; 65. 
 
 Homoioteleuton. One of the minor expedients of rhetoric; 19 (15). 
 
 Homonymous. ffomonymous words are the same to the eye and ear, but 
 different in meaning ; as bull, a papal decree, and bull, the animal ; in 
 contradistinction to synonymous words, which are different to the eye 
 and ear, but the same in meaning ; as angle and corner. Paronymous 
 words are either such as are nearly but not quite synonymous, or such 
 as are grammatically allied to each other; for example, logician to 
 logic ; firmness to firm ; human to humanity. 
 
 Hyperbaton. Transposition, when made for rhetorical effect; 15 (10). 
 
 Hyperbole. Rhetorical exaggeration ; 21(22). 
 
 Hypothesis, Hypothetical. Supposition, the state of mind under which 
 knowledge is proposed, in order to be confirmed or set aside by experi- 
 ment. A hypothetical proposition, when it is a mere form of language, 
 takes its name from grammar ; our logic is not, in this way, concerned 
 with it; 168 (39, adfinem). 
 
 Hypotyposis. Vision, a figure in rhetoric ; 22 (24). 
 
 Hysteron. A species of transposition in rhetoric ; 15 (10). 
 
 Idea, Ideal, Idealism. Idea is a term liable to be so variously and vaguely 
 applied, that, in a philosophical work, it is difficult to use it with safety. 
 In Locke, it signifies what in this Manual is explained as the knowledge 
 included under a word, whatever that word may be applied to signify. 
 In many writings it means a conception, that is, the mental representa- 
 tion of some real thing, (see Conception), or what, in our doctrine, is 
 called an ideal thing : it is often restricted to signify a visual ideal thing : 
 and lastly by the German Transcendentalists, it is used to signify 
 what, in our doctrine, is called a thing metaphysical ; Idealism is the 
 doctrine of those who consider ideas, in this last mentioned sense, to 
 exist originally in the mind ; 106 (foot-note) ; 108 (9 and note) ; 109- 
 112 (10 and note); 116 (17 and note). 
 
 Ignoratio elenchi. See Elenchus. 
 
 Image, Imagination. Image, in rhetoric, signifies the representation of 
 something to the mind as an effect of emotion. Imagination is the 
 
 H 3 
 
254 INDEX. 
 
 power or capacity to have emotions with such effects (compare Fancy, 
 above). All the figures of speech, when in proper taste, spring from 
 this power, and especially the more forcible ; 22 (24) ; 52 (section 10). 
 
 Immortality. The Bible doctrine of the Immortality of man beyond the 
 grave, and the Platonic doctrine of the Immortality of the soul, alluded 
 to; 131 (foot-note). 
 
 Improvement in Style or Diction. The principle of such improvement as 
 a part of Rhetoric, shown to differ from the improvement sought for in 
 Grammar, and in Logic ; 26 (Introduction). 
 
 Incrementum. A rhetorical ascent or gradation ; 16 (12). 
 
 Induction, Inductive. Induction is the process of gathering knowledge ; 
 Inductive logic, that part of the art which teaches the use of words for 
 this end; 101 (2); 104-111 (i-io). External arguments belong to 
 Induction; 148 (12). Induction distinguished from Enumeration; 
 151, 152 (15). 
 
 Inference. A conclusion from premises in the inductive process; 107 
 (" In this process," c.) ; 151 (" The argument from Enumeration," 
 &c.); 154, 155(17, 18). 
 
 Inflection. A slide or accent of the speaking voice ; 57 (7). 
 
 Instinct. See Reason. 
 
 Intellection. The faculty of, (capacity for,) understanding: also, an 
 act of the understanding, as a sensation is an act of the senses. 
 
 Interrogation. A form of sentence in rhetoric, otherwise called Erotesis ; 
 13 (5). 
 
 Invention. The second part of Rhetoric ; 3 (i). 
 
 Inward world. The same as ideal world ; 108 (9). 
 
 Irony. A rhetorical figure in which, by our mode of delivery, we use 
 terms of praise so as to signify the contrary ; 20 (20). 
 
 Irrelevant premises. One of the modes of verbiage; 192 (10). 
 
 Is. This very abstract verb is called the copula, when employed to con- 
 struct the syllogism of formal logic ; 218 (3). 
 
 Judgement. Case in which we are properly said to use our judgement ; 
 107 (" In this process," &c.). Judgement in Aristotelian logic is erro- 
 neously made a faculty of the mind, in contradistinction to Perception 
 or Simple Apprehension, and Reasoning; 218 (3) : 225 (8). 
 
 Judicial. A term applied to one of the three kinds of public speeches ; 2 
 (4). Schoolboy cases for Judicial speeches ; 84, 85. 
 
 Kant. His doctrine alluded to ; 112 (note, ad finem) ; 117 (note to sect. 
 17); 1 35 (second foot-note). 
 
 Keeping the important point out of sight. A mode of rhetorical delusion ; 
 126 (36). 
 
 Key to the Exercises for improving Style or Diction ; 87-98. Key for cor- 
 recting the sentences logically defective at pages 203, 204, and 20t> : 
 
 Knowledge. Every separate word is the sign of knowledge, and all know- 
 ledge is in its nature abstract ; 101 (3) ; 105-108 (2-9) ; 113 (12) ; 
 117 (18); 118 (21); 120 (28); 133 (3); 141 (2); 143 (4). 
 
 Language. Three arts, each having its own province, yet each assisting 
 
 the others, join to render language perfect ; 1 (i) ; 101 (i). 
 Letters. Subjects for familiar letters in writing rhetorical exercises ; 74-81 . 
 
INDEX. 255 
 
 Literature. Literature may be said to grow out of a perfect use of lan- 
 guage, such as Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric teach. But Rhetoric ia 
 more immediately connected with Literature, with which indeed it is 
 co-extensive ; 2 (3, 4). 
 
 Litotes. A mode of rhetorical extenuation, otherwise called Meiosis ; 21 
 
 (22). 
 
 Lively. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of certain 
 emotive feelings ; 58 (12) ; 59 (15). 
 
 Locke. Locke alluded to ; 106 (foot-note). When logic shall be an art 
 resting on a foundation universally admitted to be true, the merit of 
 having turned inquiry concerning its nature and purpose, from the false 
 direction into which Aristotle and his followers had led mankind, must 
 be conceded, after Bacon, to John Locke, and to Home Tooke. Yet 
 both these men, in following out the well-conceived purpose of their 
 respective inquiries, fell into egregious errors. Locke's purpose was, 
 to inquire into the origin of human knowledge. This he pursues with 
 too little regard to the moulding influence of language ; and his distinc- 
 tion of Ideas into Simple and Complex, and these last into Modes, 
 Substances, and Relations, are scarcely more than distinctions without 
 a difference. On the other hand, Tooke attributes everything to lan- 
 guage : he is a decided sensationalist, who, admitting Locke's founda- 
 tion that our knowledge begins with sensation, admits nothing, except 
 language, which is more than sensation ; and while he argues justly 
 against Locke's doctrine of Complex Ideas, sees nothing beyond the 
 instrumentality of language in all beyond sensation. He hence con- 
 cludes that nouns are the primary elements of language, and that verbs 
 arose from nouns by the addition of something, which his Treatise 
 ("Diversions of Purley") leaves unexplained. Home Tooke was 
 obliged to leave his speculation thus unfinished ; he had begun well, 
 but he had taken a wrong turning. A course continued in the true 
 direction, would have led him to the fact, that verbs are the primary lan- 
 guage of our race, are the speeches out of which, nouns are artificially 
 evolved. 
 
 Logic. Logic discriminated from Grammar and Rhetoric ; 1 (i, 2) ; 101 
 (i, 3) ; Aristotelian logic repudiated ; 102 (note to chap. I.) ; Induc- 
 tive Logic ; 104 (i) Deductive Logic, 140 (i) ; the Aristotelian doc- 
 trine of logic explained, and then opposed by the Principles advanced m 
 this Manual; 217-227 (i-n). 
 
 Major. An epithet applied to the term which is the predicate of the con- 
 clusion in the Aristotelian syllogism, 221 (4) ; and to the premise in 
 which this major term is compared with the middle term, 222 ({6.). 
 This premise is, in our logic, called the datum. 
 
 Materialism, Matter. These subjects alluded to; 131 ("There is an old 
 division," &c. and foot-note). 
 
 Meditative. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out ot 
 certain circumstances attending the speaker; 58 (n). 
 
 Meiosis. A mode of rhetorical extenuation, otherwise called Litotes ; 21 
 
 (22). 
 
 Memory. Memory is conception, accompanied by the knowledge of time 
 past, relatively to the actual present. But the term is often applied 
 
256 INDEX. 
 
 to the readiness of reviving a whole series of mental acts, by reviving 
 any one link of the series. 
 
 Metalepsis. A complicated metaphor ; 20(19). 
 
 Metaphor. A turn of a word from its proper application, so as to include 
 a simile; 19 (17). 
 
 Metaphysical, Metaphysics. Metaphysical means the same as Tran- 
 scendental, that is, transcending nature. Metaphysics are all those 
 parts of learning which keep real and ideal (in one word, physical) 
 things out of sight, or, at least only so far in sight as the weakness 
 of the understanding may require; 109 (10, and note); 114-117 
 (15-17, and note); 118 (20, 21). 
 
 Method. Mct/uxl, in many works on logic, follows Perception (or Simple 
 Apprehension), Judgement, and Reasoning, as the fourth part of the 
 art. As the first three distinctions are built on wrong grounds, so the 
 fourth may be objected to, because it belongs to rhetoric much more 
 than to logic: See page 211, (" * It belongs to rhetoric," &c.) So 
 far as our pupil in logic can be assisted with respect to Method in his 
 essays to develop his knowledge, he will find appropriate instruction in 
 Chapter V., from page 211, extending from Section 18 to the end of 
 the Chapter. 
 
 Metonymy. A rhetorical use of one name for another; 19 (18). 
 
 Middle Style. Contrasted with the Colloquial and High Style ; 12 (2). 
 
 Middle Term. That term in the formal syllogism with which the major 
 and minor terms are separately compared ; 219 (4) ; 222 (16.) 
 
 Mill. Allusion to the doctrine of Mr. James Mill ; 110 (first foot-note) ; 
 of Mr. John Stuart Mill ; 120 (30, foot-note); 149 (foot-note). 
 
 Mimesis. Mimicry, or the >ar<-astic imitation of another's manner ; 20 
 
 (21). 
 
 Mind. This subject alluded to; 131 (2, "There is an old division," 
 &c., and foot-note). 
 
 Minor. An epithet applied to the term which is the subject of the con- 
 clusion in the Aristotelian syllogism ; J21 (4); and to the premise in 
 which the minor term is compared with the middle term ; 222 (&.) 
 This premise, ir. our logic, is called the argument or reason. 
 
 Mode or Mood of a Syllogism. The difference in an Aristotelian syllo- 
 gism, which is determined by the quality (affirmative or negative) and 
 the quantity (universal or particular) of its premises; 223 (5). 
 
 Modulation. The management of the accents and the key of the voice in 
 delivery ; 57 (7). 
 
 Moral. As a term in loo;ic, this word means customary, or having all the 
 force which can be derived from custom. In this sense it is opposed to 
 "metaphysical. Thus, it is morally certain that we shall have thunder 
 when the weather becomes very hot ; it is metaphysically certain that 
 the angles of even- triangle an- equal t two right angles. 
 
 Mutatis mutandis. Those things being changed, which the changed cir- 
 cumstances require ; a Latin phrase often used in argument ; 160 (24). 
 
 Names. These are proper, common, or abstract; 118 (20). Names of 
 Arguments from three sources; 147 (n). 
 
 Narration, Narratives. The X-irr<ttli-t' is one of the three kinds of Com- 
 position in rhetoric ; 2 (4). The term is also applied to one of the 
 
INDEX. 257 
 
 varieties of manner in delivery ; 58 (9). Specimens of Narratives ; 
 65, 67. Subjects for Narratives ; 71-74. 
 
 Necessary. This term is properly applied to knowledge which is a part of 
 some knowledge that includes it; 147 (10) ; 148 (12); 154, 155 
 (17-19); 164 (34). 
 
 Negation, Negative. See Affirmation. See also, No, Not. 
 
 Nerves. These, as they connect the organs of sense with the brain, seem, 
 in the absence of the things of sense, to originate the ideal world ; 
 108(9). 
 
 No, Not. No or Not is an important element in the construction of the 
 Aristotelian syllogism, but is viewed, in our logic, as a mere gram- 
 matical particle of no more logical importance than other grammatical 
 parts of speech, 168 (39, " In our logic, again," &c.) ; 218 (3); 
 226 (9). 
 
 Nominal, Nominalist. A definition is called nominal when it does not 
 explain the thing ; in contradistinction to a real one, which in some 
 way does so ; 134 (5). A Nominalist is one of a logical sect that, 
 throughout the middle ages, opposed the Realists. (See in this Index 
 Scholastic, Schoolmen.) The Realists maintained that universals corres- 
 pond to real substantive ideas existing in the mind ; while the Nomalists 
 affirmed that they are names only ; (viz., such names as, in this Manual, 
 are called Common and Abstract.) The dispute in the old shape is now 
 at rest, though in a new shape it still in some degree remains. Thus 
 in a new shape we, in this Manual, are Nominalists, so far as we oppose 
 the doctrine of original ideas, and the Idealists are Realists, so far as 
 they maintain this doctrine. See 106-112 (6-10, and note). 
 
 Not. See No, above. 
 
 Not-being, Nothing. These words alluded to ; 130 (2, and foot-note). 
 
 Notion. Notion may mean the knowing or knowledge of something. 
 Having this sense, it is better to say of any single word that it is the 
 sign of a notion, than that it is the sign of an idea. See Idea, above. 
 
 Object, Objective. These terms, as contradistinguished in modern phi- 
 losophical use to Subject, Subjective, are alluded to ; 137 (first foot- 
 note) ; 175 (46). 
 
 Observation. Theme upon; 173. 
 
 Onomatopreia. The coming of a word from some natural sound; 19 (15). 
 
 Operations of the mind. These, which are said to be three in Aristotelian 
 logic, are maintained to be but one in ours ; 225 (8). 
 
 Opinion. This is a judgement or inference from limited facts, and there- 
 fore in different degrees, a real non-sequitur that awaits further facts. 
 
 Oration, Oratory. An oration is a speech : Oratory the art of speaking, 
 a term commonly used with a less comprehensive meaning than Rhetoric, 
 which includes all that conduces both to good speaking, and good 
 writing; 1, 2 (i, 2, 3, 4). An example of a school-boy's oration to 
 his master ; 69. 
 
 Outward. Objective ; terms which, in the doctrine of logic, are applied 
 to anything that is not already included in the mind. See Objective. 
 
 Oxymoron. In rhetoric, a saying which, though foolish if taken plainly, 
 means a great deal ; 18 (14). 
 
258 INDEX. 
 
 Parade of logical forms. Caution against the delusion of such forms ; 
 122 (32). 
 
 Paradiastole. In rhetoric, a peculiar sort of antithesis ; 18 (14). 
 
 Paraleipsis. The same in rhetoric as apophasis, or omission ; 21 (23). 
 
 Paralogy. False reasoning. 
 
 Paraphrase. The development in many words of what is, or may bo 
 expressed briefly. Its propriety can be justified only by its necessity. 
 For an exercise to correct it when faulty, see page 32. 
 
 Parathesis. In rhetoric, the brief parenthetical notice of something, on 
 which the speaker intends to enlarge when he has dispatched what is 
 immediately in view. 
 
 Paregmenon. In rhetoric, a sort of antithesis ; 18 (14). 
 
 Parenthesis. The insertion of a sentence within a sentence ; 14 (8). 
 Exercise including sentences requiring parenthesis ; 45. 
 
 Parcemia. In rhetoric, an allusion to a proverb ; 20 (19). 
 
 Paronomasia. A pun ; 18 (14). 
 
 Paronymous. See Homonymous. 
 
 Particular proposition. This in logic is opposed to a universal proposi- 
 tion ; 223 (5). 
 
 Parts of speech. In what way logic is concerned with what are called 
 so in grammar; 144, 145 (5, 6). 
 
 Pathetic. One of the general divisions of rhetorical composition ; 2 (4). 
 
 Pedantic style. Exercise for correcting it ; 32. 
 
 Pen. Its proper use in rhetoric ; 2 (3). 
 
 Perception. The knowledge or recognition of an object through the 
 senses ; in other words, a sensation accompanied by a revival of ac- 
 quired knowledge. Compare Conception and Sensation. The division 
 of Man into Mind and Matter (see page 131) has always been the 
 source of infinite perplexity, when philosophers have attempted to ex- 
 plain how perception takes place. The difltadtj remained to recent 
 times, till tlu- Scottish philosophers cut the knot, in utter hopelessness 
 to solve it. What it was before their time, I shall quote from the 
 Sequel to Sematology to show. " How the mind could have cogni- 
 zance of matter, was with the Greeks a question in very early times. 
 Shut up, as they assumed it to be, like a light in a dark lantern, how 
 did it become acquainted with the things out of the body ? It was 
 agreed on all hands that the mind could operate only where it w. 
 sent ; and how could it be present to the things of the material uni- 
 verse ? In answer to this query, some asserted that the mind walked 
 out of the body in order to take cognizance of the things of 
 while another set asserted that it did not walk out of the body, and 
 consequently that it did not perceive the things of sense at all, but only 
 the species, images, or ideas of them. This was explained by assum- 
 ing that all matt-rial things dispersed from themselves filmy or shadowy 
 representations, which, being received by the senses, were by them 
 transmitted to the mind, which treasured them up ; and that, with re- 
 gard to most of them, the mind, by its peculiar chemistry, sub! 
 the particular into general ideas. The difficulty was met in later times 
 by Leibnitz, with a theory still more fanciful. He taught that the 
 soul and the body could have nothing to do with each other, being sub- 
 
INDEX. 259 
 
 stances altogether different ; and that the correspondence of their actions 
 arose from this, that the Creator had pre-ordained a perpetual simi- 
 larity of action between them, so that whatever one did, however 
 different in nature from what was done by the other, was nevertheless 
 accompanied by a correspondent act, the soul and the body always 
 chiming together with unfailing exactitude." 
 
 Period. A sentence whose parts are grammatically dependent to the end ; 
 14 (7). Exercise for the construction of periods, with preliminary in- 
 struction ; 33-38 (sect 4 et seq.) 
 
 Periphrase. A circumlocution, a roundabout expression. 
 Peroration. The concluding division of a regular oration; 10, 11 (2). 
 Persuade. To persuade is the object of the rhetorician ; but to accom- 
 plish this, he must be able to instruct, to convince, and to delight ; 
 1 (i, 2, and foot-notes). See also Conviction above. 
 Personal subjects for exercise in rhetoric ; 71. 
 
 Petitio principii. Various forms of this logical error; 188-191 (69). 
 Philosophy, Philosophers. These are connected with Logic, because if 
 Philosophers go astray, there must be something wrong in their means 
 or purpose, while trying to come at the wisdom which they profess to 
 love. But in a Manual of Logic, an examination of past and present 
 philosophy, with a view to test, by its rules, what is sound or what 
 is unsound in means or purpose, will at once appear an impossible 
 undertaking. In place of such an examination where it would properly 
 come in the body of a larger book, it is proposed, in this Index, to fur- 
 nish, nearly in chronological order, the names of certain leaders of 
 sects, especially those of Greece, accompanied by slight notices of 
 the perpetual opposition of opinion by which the sects were multiplied 
 and kept distinct. 
 
 THA'LES, the earliest Grecian philosopher of distinguished name, 
 is supposed to have flourished nearly seven centuries before the 
 Christian era. He was a native of Mile'tus in lo'nia ; and because 
 Anaximan'der, Anaxim'enes, Diog'enes of Apollo'nia, (who must be 
 distinguished from Diogenes the Cynic,) and Archela'us, were either 
 taught by him, or were also natives of Ionia, they are all included 
 in what is called the lo'nian or lon'ic school, although they did not 
 all profess the same speculative opinions. In this they coincided, that 
 the universe springs from some one material ; but whether from 
 water as Thales taught, or from air as others insisted ; whether it 
 was palpable and finite, or imperceptible and infinite, they were not 
 
 PYTHAG'ORAS, a native of the isle of Sa'mos not far from Ionia, 
 is supposed to have flourished a little less than six centuries before 
 the Christian era, though some make him contemporary with Thales. 
 He taught that number was the essence and principle of all things, 
 deemed the souls of men to be emanations of the divine substance, 
 and joined to this doctrine that of the transmigration of souls. He 
 founded his school at Crotona in Italy, and hence it is called the 
 Italian, though sometimes the Doric school. 
 
 XENOPH'A-NES of Col'ophon, contemporaneously with Pythagoras, 
 also founded in Italy, namely at the town of E'lea, a school, hence 
 called the Eleat'ic, which changed the emanative system of the 
 
260 INHKX. 
 
 Italian school for the doctrine of one eternal infinite being, identical 
 with the universe; a doctrine now called pantheism. The other 
 most eminent men of this sect were I'armen'i-des and Z-'n<>. The 
 date of this last philosopher, who must he (Uftfagirfihed 1'rnm / 
 the founder of the Stoics, is about four centuries and a half before 
 the Christian era. 
 
 HERACLI'TUS of Eph'esus also flourished, as is supposed, about 
 four centuries and a half before the Christian era. Though he pro- 
 perly belongs to the Italian school, yet he so far thought for himself, 
 as in general to be distinguished individually. He deemed the one 
 pervading principle of the universe to be fire, but not the elemental 
 fire or flame, for this he held to be the excess of fire : it is, accord- 
 ing to him, a warm dry vapour ; and this is the same as vital energy 
 or the soul. 
 
 LEUCIP'PUS, the disciple of Zeno the Eleatic (see above), and the 
 teacher of Democ'ritus, was the founder of what is sometimes termed 
 the lower Eleatic school. He- discarded the tranx-i-ndpntal universe 
 of the elder Eleatics, and placed the foundation of his theory in the 
 world of the senses. He is regarded as the original propounder of 
 the Atom'ic doctrine, afterwards taken up by the Epicure / ans. De- 
 mocritus was his disciple with some degree of dissent from his 
 master, by a less exclusive adherence to what we at present call 
 sensational philosophy. Democ'ritus has been called the laughing 
 philosopher, because he inculcated < -heei-fulness as the main end of 
 our pursuits, while the melancholy Heracli'tus is often spoken of as 
 the crying philosopher. Protag'oras was the disciple of Democritus, 
 and made himself remarkable by his maxim, that man is the measure 
 of all things. 
 
 SOC'RATES, the philosopher rather of practical morals, than of 
 speculative opinions which propose to include morals in wider doc- 
 trines, was born at Athens 468 B.C., and put to death 399 B.C. 
 Laying aside the problems onnvrnini: the origin and nature of the 
 universe, and how and why man exists as a part of it, the object of 
 his instruction was to make men good, as the only way to make 
 them happy. As to his mode of teaching, see Socratic in this Index. 
 A host of disciples succeeded ; but some exaggerated and some cor- 
 rupted his doctrines. Ce'-bes, indeed, in his Picture of Human Life, 
 conveys the doctrine of his master with beauty and truth, although 
 there is a slight colouring borrowed from Pythagoras. Xen'ophon 
 acted up to his master's principles, and in that way demonstrated 
 their value. Diog'enes, the founder of the Cyn'ics (men who lived 
 like dogs and snarled like them,) exaggerated his tenets and his 
 manners. To another of his disciples we must give a distinct place, 
 namely to 
 
 PLA'TO. The immortal sa^e who bears this name was born at 
 Athens 429 B.C., and died iu\ -47. lie is the founder of the Aca- 
 dem'ic school, an epithet derived from the grove of Acade'mus, in 
 which he lectured. Instructed in all philosophy that preceded him, 
 he taught what best harmonized with his own capacious and com- 
 prehensive mind. His leading doctrine is the independence of God 
 07 spirit, and Matter, as the two distinct eternal principles by which 
 
INDEX. 261 
 
 all things exist, the one operating formatively on the other, but not 
 creatively. Our impressions of outward objects are the produce of 
 ideas and matter, the ideas of the human soul being copies of ex- 
 emplars that reside in the divine mind ; and these divine exemplars 
 are more and more remembered by man, the more he sees of their 
 imperfect copies without. Hence, the striving of the well-taught 
 soul to reach perfection. See at Plato in this Index, references to 
 allusions in the Manual. 
 
 AR'ISTOTLE, who was born at Stagi'ra in Mesopotamia, B.C. 384, 
 and died 322, was for twenty years the disciple of Plato, but he at 
 length divided from his master, and became the head of the Peripa- 
 tet'ics, who were so called from the place in the Lyce'um, where they 
 walked and discoursed. Among the points on which Aristotle differed 
 from his master, one was his theory of ideas. Aristotle taught that 
 ideas are the phantasms of things, and not the eternal intellectual 
 types, which in Plato's doctrine give form to the things of sense : 
 See at Aristotle in this Index, references to parts in the Manual 
 where his Logic is considered. See also Scholastic, Schoolmen. 
 
 ZE'NO, who must be distinguished from Zeno the Eleatic (see 
 above), was the disciple of Pol'emo, an Academic ; but he divided 
 from his school, and became the founder of the Stoic philosophy. ' 
 He was born in Cyprus, in some year between 357 and 352 B.C. and 
 died in some year between 263 and 259 B.C. He taught at Athens 
 in a place called the Porch or Portico, (Stoa,) whence the name of 
 the Sect. To him must be attributed a sound division of all learning 
 into Physics, Ethics, and what may be called Semeiotics, which latter 
 department includes the Trivium, Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. 
 It was for its ethics that the Stoical philosophy was remarkable. A 
 wise man, it taught, is unmoved by joy, grief, or other passion, 
 esteeming all things as governed by an unavoidable necessity. In 
 physics, it taught that the universe consists of cause and of matter. 
 Death is the separation of the soul and body, but they are both mate- 
 rial, and the former, though it continues after death, is perishable. 
 The soul of all things is indeed imperishable, and of that soul all 
 that has life, is part. Among the great men that, in subsequent 
 times, were of this sect, may be mentioned Ca'to of Utica, (ob. 46 
 B.C.,) Sen'eca, the Roman tragic poet, (ob. A.D. 65,) Marcus Aure- 
 lius, the emperor, (ob. A.D. 180,) and Epicte'tus, the Phrygian, the 
 time of whose death is uncertain, but he is known to have lived into 
 the times of the last-mentioned emperor. 
 
 EPICU'RUS taught at Athens while that city was thronged with 
 Academics, Cynics, Peripatetics and Stoics, in all the vigour of 
 recent institution. He died 270 B.C. His philosophy contrasts, in 
 morals, most strongly with that of the Stoics. He made the senses 
 the test of truth, and prudence the chief of virtues, because it re- 
 strains the appetite for pleasure only so far as indulgence would be 
 hurtful to it. He maintained the atomic philosophy in physics, or 
 that which attributes the universe to the confluence of atoms, that, 
 being endued with gravity and motion, formed all the things of sense 
 without the aid of a supreme intelligent power. 
 
 PYR'RHO is the best known of philosophers who bore the name of 
 
262 INDEX. 
 
 Sceptics or doubters. He flourished about three hundred years before 
 the Christian era at Elis in the Peloponne'sus. Wh.-ii the 6 
 divided from the Academy, the remaining disciples of this school set 
 themselves in opposition to the Stojr.s, .-ui-l Sr.-ptk-ism was the effect, 
 or the practice of controverting whatever was attempted to be taught 
 as truth : in fact the aim of the sceptical philosophy was to main- 
 tain the incomprehensibility of all subjects, and their art was the 
 ability to speak with equal plausibility on both sides of every 
 question. The school is called the New Academy, which further 
 divided into the Second, Third and Fourth Academy. 
 
 In passing from philosophy and philosophers of ancient days to 
 those of comparatively modern times, it will scarcely be fitting, in this 
 Manual, to mention much more than the names of some philosoj 
 who led the way for speculation as it exists in our days. Something 
 concerning modern speculators has already been offered : see the 
 references in this Index to Sensationalism and Idealism : and 
 for the peculiar character of all learning during the dark and 
 middle ages, see in this Index Scholastic, Schoolmen. In Italy, 
 Cardan, Bruno, and Campanella, who flourished from about the 
 middle of the sixteenth to the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
 opposed their own ways of thinking on the universe, the Deity, and 
 the destinies of man, to the prevalent religious doctrines. The latter 
 two met the then fate of heretics ; a fate which entitles them to a 
 respect which their opinions would scarcely claim ; since these were 
 nothing more than revivals, or mixtures, or modifications of the doc- 
 trines of the ancients. Descartes (ob. 1650) was the first of modern 
 speculative philosophers, that, casting off the authority of the 
 ancients, determined to think for himself. His philosophy, however, 
 in the hands of his followers soon passed nearly into the old chan- 
 nels ; Spinosa (ob. 1677) and Malebranche (ob. 1715) being both of 
 them pantheists, the former material, with the Eleatics of old ; the 
 latter spiritual, with the Stoics and Pythagoreans. Hobbes, the 
 philosopher of Malmsbury in Wiltshin 1 , tl-m>hed about the same 
 time as Des Cartes, and published bold opinions, that militated n-_ 
 religious motives of action, in a work called Leviathan. Leibnitz, a 
 German, was also a contemporary; and his speculations, while they 
 were more ingenious, were less offensive to the religious world. He 
 is mentioned here on account of his doctrine relating to spirit and 
 matter. (See Perception in this Index.) Hume was an English 
 philosopher of the last century, whose doctrine threatened to under- 
 mine our reliance both on secondary causes, and on a First Great 
 Cause. He has been met by many antagonists since his time, and 
 among them by Dr. Brown, one of the Scottish School, whose In- 
 quiry into the relation of Cause and Effect might be far more 
 triumphant than it is ; for " it is vitiut r John Herschell, 
 
 '* by one enormous oversight, the omission, namely of a distinct 
 and immediate personal consciousness of causation in his enumeration 
 of the sequence of events by which volition is made to terminate in 
 the motion of external objects." It is by observations like this last, 
 which trace our highest knowledge from our first and firmest expe- 
 rience, that truth is more effectually served than by whatever spocu- 
 
INDEX. 263 
 
 lative opinions, if they have no other foundation than the busy 
 agitation of the human brain. 
 
 Physical. Natural, including real and ideal, in contradistinction to 
 Metaphysical, or transcending the real, and ideal; that is, the ideal 
 which is a transcript or a combination of the real; 109 (10) ; 118 
 (12); 131(2). 
 
 Physico -logical. An essential definition of a thing-physical is so called ; 
 137 (8). 
 
 Plain. Style or diction so called in contradistinction to figurative ; 12 (3). 
 A delusion from confounding this sense of the word with another ; 
 124 (34). 
 
 Plaintive. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of cer- 
 tain emotive feelings ; 59 (14). 
 
 Plato. The doctrines of this philosopher alluded to ; 109 (Note to 
 Sect. 9); 111 (Note to Sect 10); 131 (foot-note). See also Philoso- 
 phy, Philosophers in this Index. 
 
 Pleonasm. Rhetorical redundancy ; 17 (13). 
 
 Ploce. A peculiar figure of speech in using a proper name ; 18 (14). 
 
 Polyptoton. A sort of antithesis in rhetoric; 18 (14). 
 
 Polysyndeton. A way of prolonging an emimeration in rhetoric ; 16 (12). 
 
 Positive. Placed, set, appointed : to this meaning negative may be op- 
 posed, and in the sense requiring such opposition, the word negative 
 has in our system a logical value : not so when opposed to affirmative ; 
 see No, Not : see also Affirmative. 
 
 Practical, Practice. Practical directions concerning Inductive Logic, 
 113-129 (11-36) : Concerning Definition ; 134-140 (4-8, and Notes) : 
 Concerning Deductive logic ; 145-179 (7-45) : Concerning Errors in 
 deductive pract ice ; 180-217 (1-22). 
 
 Predicables. What they are in formal logic ; IOOA / \ 
 
 Predicaments. What they are in formal logic ; j * 
 
 Preliminary conditions. The necessity of such conditions on proposing a 
 dispute or discussion ; 139 (second Note to Chap. III.) 
 
 Prolepsis. Anticipation, a rhetorical expedient : 21(23). 
 
 Premises. What they are in our logic ; 101 (i) ; 141 (2) ; 147 (10). 
 What they are informal logic ; 222 (" When we have to show," &c.) 
 
 Pronunciation. The limited or special meaning of this term in modern 
 tuition ; 56 (5). 
 
 Proper names. This is a logical distinction, though commonly borrowed 
 by grammar; 118(22). 
 
 Property. Property distinguished from Accident; 136 (7); 158 (22). 
 It is one of the five predicables in Aristotelian logic : 220 (4). 
 
 Proposition. In rhetoric, one of the occasional divisions of a regular 
 oration ; 10 (2). In logic, a proposition is a sentence which develops 
 knowledge in a greater or less degree, and in our logic considered to be 
 a virtual syllogism ; 145 (6) ; in Aristotelian logic, considered to be the 
 enunciation of a judgement, and hence distinguished from reasoning as 
 expressed by the syllogism ; 218 (3) ; 223 (5). 
 
 Prose. A purely logical exercise must be in prose : rhetoric employs 
 prose for its ordinary productions ; but since it includes poetry, it also 
 includes verse; 2 (4). 
 
 Proximum genus. The genus immediately next above the subject of defi- 
 
204 INDEX. 
 
 nition, to which genus we have to add the specific difference, and the 
 subject is defined ; 132 (2). 
 
 Purely logical. An essential definition of a thing metaphysical is w 
 called; 137 (8). 
 
 Quaintness of style. Instruction and Exercise for correcting it; 27, 
 et seq. 
 
 Quality and Quantity of Propositions. These are distinctions in Aris- 
 totelian logic, the former of whiuh our logic resigns to grammar, 
 admitting only the latter; 221 ("Then we have a difference," &c.), 
 and 223 (5). 
 
 Questions for discussion. Outlines for school speeches; 82 (9-11). 
 Absurdity of some such questions ; 139 (second note to Chap. III.) 
 
 Real. Real things in contradistinction to ideal; 108(9); 117 (18) ; 
 131 (2). A real definition in contradistinction to a nominal one; 
 where, it must be remembered, the epithet is used with a less strict 
 application ; 135 (6). 
 
 Realist. See Nominalist. 
 
 Reason. Reason, in a special sense, means the same as Argument ; which 
 see. As the name of that capacity in man which distinguishes him 
 from brutes, we may say, that it is the capacity to use signs of know- 
 ledge gained, in order to accumulate further knowledge ; and to use 
 the same signs in order to develop the knowledge accumulated. Briefly, 
 man is a creature capable of language, to use the Homeric epithet, a 
 voice-dividing creature, that is, one who divides a natural cry into 
 parts of speech. Be it observed that the born-deaf, and consequently 
 dumb, have the mental capacity, though they want the exterior organ 
 for language. We may again, in other words, say, that Reason is the 
 power of abstraction. Brutes have knowledge with their sensations, 
 but their knowledge is never abstract, that is, cannot be entertained 
 apnrt from their sensations : this is Instinct ; and this its true differ- 
 ence from Reason. 
 
 Relation. Relation, in Aristotelian logic, and even in Locke's Essay, is a 
 distinct general head, set in contradistinction to other general heads 
 under which the subjects of thought are accumulated. In our logic, it 
 is that in which all knowledge has its origin and its existence : : 
 to say, in our logic, to know anything is to be aware of its relation to 
 some other thing or things, and the relation of all these things to 
 oneself. 
 
 Repetition. Rhetorical figures of repetition ; 17 (13). 
 
 Rhetoric. Rhetoric distinguished from Grammar and Logic; 1 (i, 2) ; 
 101 (i). 
 
 Roman history. Subjects for Narrative Exercises from ; 72. 
 
 Sarcasm. A figure in rhetoric that derives its force from the speaker's 
 manner ; 20 (2 1). 
 
 Scepticism. See Philosophy, Philosophers, above. All speculative phi- 
 losophy, that is, philosophy (if so it must be called) which builds on 
 hypothetical grounds, must, through its very character, terminate in 
 scepticism. 
 
INDEX. 265 
 
 Science. Strictly, that which can be demonstrated from self-evident 
 truths ; and as such demonstration is impossible in physics, we must 
 look for it, strictly, in metaphysics alone ; 109 (10). 
 Scholastic, Schoolmen. Scholastic learning and the Schoolmen alluded to ; 
 134 (3). The father of the Schoolmen was John Scotus Erigena, a 
 native of Ireland, who lived in the ninth century, and first introduced, 
 from what source is unknown, the philosophy of Aristotle. Though at 
 first opposed, it was soon adopted by churchmen as a scientific basis of 
 the doctrines they taught, and it continued to be mixed with divinity and 
 all other learning during full five centuries, in which time, however, we 
 may trace certain eras and changes. A new era commenced with the rise 
 of the Nominalists (see Nominalist) under John Roscelin, a Frenchman, 
 who flourished in the twelfth century. The celebrated Abelard was his 
 disciple. The third period saw the introduction into Europe of the 
 writings of the Arabian philosophers, the translation of Aristotle from 
 different versions into Latin, his undisputed predominancy in all the 
 schools, and the complete triumph of Realism. It is at this time, 
 namely, in the thirteenth century, that we have the great names among 
 the schoolmen, such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns 
 Scotus ; the latter two of whom had their sects distinguished by the 
 names of Thomists and Scotists. In reaching the days of William of 
 Ockam, who died in 1374, we attain another era. His mind, better 
 constituted or better taught, threw off much that was trifling, and more 
 that was erroneous, in the prevalent learning ; and in a little more than 
 a century from his Jime, we begin to lose the distinctive features which 
 the term scholastic is intended to signify when applied to literature. 
 
 Second intention. A term in formal logic to signify what in our logic is 
 called a special meaning ; 120 (26). 
 
 Sensation, Sensationalism, Sense. A sensation in itself is nothing more 
 than a state of one's animal being ; it is not perception till knowledge 
 is joined to it. Sensationalism is the doctrine of those who think that 
 knowledge begins by being sensation. A sense is the organ through 
 which a sensation is received ; 106 (6, and foot-note) ; 109 (note to 
 Sect. 9) ; 110 (first foot-note) ; 111 (note to Sect. 10). The sense of 
 any single word is the knowledge which it signifies ; of two or more 
 words is the development of knowledge ; 101 (i, 2) ; 143 (4). 
 
 Sentiment. This term, though etymologically allied to the preceding, de- 
 viates from them in meaning, at least when the former are strictly 
 applied. It includes knowledge, and emotion joined to knowledge ; and 
 is connected in meaning with the word sense only when the latter is 
 loosely applied, so as to imply both sensation and thought ; as in 
 saying " He has a grateful sense of your kind acts." 
 
 Shifting senses of a word. Caution against the delusion hence arising ; 
 124 (34). 
 
 Simile, Similitude. This is a figure in rhetoric ; and also one of the 
 topics of internal argument both in rhetoric and logic ; 8 (II. 3) ; 
 19 (16) ; 159 (23). 
 
 Slides of the voice. The tones that form the modulation of speech ; 
 57 (7). 
 
 Socratic. The Socratic method of reasoning, consisted in so putting ques- 
 
266 INDEX. 
 
 tions, that the respondent, by his admissions, was led, step by step, to 
 yield the conclusion in view. Socrates, see Philosophy, Philosoj.J 
 
 Solemn. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of certain 
 emotive feelings ; 59 (i 6). 
 
 Sophistry. Suggestions for avoiding the delusions it creates, during the 
 inductive process of learning ; 121-129 (31-36). 
 
 Sorites. A form of language arising from an accumulation of arguments ; 
 167 (38). 
 
 Special, Specialize, Specialization, Species. Special means, singled out by 
 particular characteristics from the genus or kind to which the thing 
 belongs ; Specialize is to make special by reduction from a general 
 application. Species means a sort under a kind or genus; 6 (II. i) ; 
 120 (26) ; ib. (30) ; 137 (8) ; 146 (8); 153 (16). 
 
 Spiritualism. In speculative philosophy, this word signifies the doctrine 
 that all which exists to the understanding is spirit or mind ; a conclu- 
 sion inevitable if we admit the doctrine of ideas as taught of old, or 
 even as expounded by Locke. For if the mind is cognizant only of 
 ideas, it is as much as to say, that the other presumed substance, 
 namely matter, exists not to the mind, ideas being of the nature of the 
 mind itself. Berkeley's theory is, in fact, incontrovertible while we 
 adhere to the distinction between mind and matter, and the doctrine of 
 ideas in connection with that distinction. 
 
 State of the case. One of the divisions of a judicial oration ; 10 (2). 
 
 Stewart. Dugald Stewart alluded to ; 104 (in the note to Chap. I.) ; 
 156 (foot-note) ; 219 (foot-note). 
 
 Style. Colloquial, Middle, and High Style exemplified ; 12 (2). In- 
 struction and Exercises for improvement in style ; 26-55. 
 
 Subaltern genus. That which is a species with respect to some higher 
 genus ; also that which has only species immediately under it ; 132 (2). 
 
 Subject, Subjective. See Object, Objective. 
 
 Subject-matter. \\Tiere there is no subject-matter to be understood, 
 there can be nothing understood. Hence, a monstrous absurdity in 
 the doctrine of the formal syllogism ; 142 (note to Sect. 2, ad finem.) 
 
 Summum genus; pi. Summa genera. The highest genus; 130 (2). 
 The sumrna genera of Aristotelian logic ; 220 (4). 
 
 Syllogism. The syllogism virtually exists in every form of speech develop- 
 ing thought by two or more words. The name, however, is strictly 
 given only to the form consisting of three propositions, the first and 
 second being premises, out of which a necessary truth arises, which is 
 expressed by a third preposition called the conclusion ; 101 (i); 141, 
 14:! (2 and note); 163-167 (33-36). 
 
 The syllogism of formal logic. 217-225 (1-6). 
 
 Symploce. A mode of repetition in rhetoric; 17 (13). 
 
 Synathroesmus. Accumulation, a figure in rhetoric ; 16 (12). 
 
 Syncategorematic. See Category, Categorematic. 
 
 Synchoresis. Concession, one of the expedients of rhetoric ; 21 (23). 
 
 Synecdoche. Comprehension, a figure in rhetoric; 19 (18). 
 
 Synepy. The complete union in delivery of words tliat join to make 
 sense ; 57 (6). 
 
 Synoeceiosis. A sort of antithesis in rhetoric ; 18 (14). 
 
INDEX. 267 
 
 Synonymous, Synonymy. Synonymous words are those that differ in 
 spelling and sound, but are the same in meaning ; as periphery and 
 circumference : compare Homonymous. Synonymy in rhetoric is one 
 of the figures of repetition ; 17 (13). 
 
 Synthesis. See Analysis. 
 
 Tactual impressions. These are probably the early inlet of all our 
 fundamental knowledge ; 109 (note to Sec. 9). 
 
 Tapinosis. A method of rhetorical extenuation ; 21 (22). 
 
 Technical language. Though in the argumentum ad doctrinam technical 
 language is justifiable, it ought not to be used in ordinary cases ; 4 (3) ; 
 27 (Sect 1, and examples at bottom of page 28 and top of page 29). 
 
 Testimony. This is one of the topics of external arguments ; 6 (I.) ; 
 148 (12). 
 
 Themes. Themes are an admirable means of bringing a learner to a con- 
 sciousness of his deficiencies in the inductive process of logic : the 
 word theme has two meanings; examples of themes ; 113 (n); 171 
 (43) ; 173, 174 (45) ; 184 (3) ; 185 (4). Outlines for themes ; 229. 
 
 Thesis. A Thesis is a theme given out in the form of a proposition ; 
 177-179 (47). 
 
 Thing. This is a term includiug every possible subject of thought, except 
 Nothing or Not-being ; 130 (2). In this Manual, things are distributed 
 into things-physical and things-metaphysical ; and the former into 
 things-real and things-ideal ; 131 (2). Nothing or Not-being is a thing- 
 metaphysical. 
 
 Thinking. That conscious state in which things present themselves 
 really, or ideally, or in part really, in part ideally, either under familiar 
 relations or under new relations to each other and to the thinker ; 
 141 (2). One of the effects of thinking described ; 212 (j 8). 
 
 Tooke. For an allusion to Home Tooke's doctrines, see Locke above. 
 
 Topic. Topics are so called, as being the places, where arguments are to 
 be found ; 5-9 (II. i, II. 3) ; 148-160 (12-24). 
 
 Transposition. Examples of rhetorical transposition ; 15 (10). Also of 
 sentences whose parts require redistribution ; 38-42 (Sect. 5). 
 
 Triads of propositions. The number of these that can be made up out of 
 the Aristotelian extremes and middle term, joined by is and is not ; 
 223 (" Now disregarding," &c.), and 224 (" And as, in the first," &c.) 
 
 Trope. A trope is distinguished, by some teachers, from a figure of 
 speech ; 12 (3, and foot-note) ; 19 (16). 
 
 Trust not appearances. Example of a thesis on this subject ; 177-179 
 
 (47)- 
 
 Truth. Truth is knowledge that is held with certainty. But what is 
 truth to one individual mind, may not be truth to others. Hence, we 
 often justly speak of truth as something independent of the mind, 
 namely as knowledge yet to be reached, and even as knowledge beyond 
 all present reach. 
 
 Vehement. One of the varieties of manner in delivery, arising out of 
 
 certain emotive feelings ; 59 (13). 
 Verb or Word. The verb or word is never logically complete, till all is 
 
 expressed by it which we intend to develop ; 144 (5). 
 
268 INDEX. 
 
 Verbiage. Varieties of error under this name exemplified; 180 (2); 
 
 188-204 (6-14). 
 Vowel sound. What a vowel-sound is ; 56 (3). 
 
 Universal. A universal proposition stands opposed, both in Aristotelian, 
 and in our logic, to a particular proposition; 221 (" Then we have a 
 difference," &c.), and 223 (5). 
 
 Wedgwood. Mr. H. Wedgwood alluded to ; 109 (note to Sect. 9). 
 Whately. Dr. Whately alluded to; 102-104 (note to Chap. I.); 110 
 
 (second foot-note); 116 (foot-note); 122, 123 (32, and foot-notes) ; 
 
 124, 125 (34); 134 (4, and foot-note); 138 (first foot-note to 
 
 Chap. III.); 142 (note to Sect. 2); 144 (foot-note) ; 191 (9); 193, 
 
 194 (9, continued) ; 197 (" Hence it is matter of complaints," &c.) ; 
 
 219 (foot-note) ; 226 (foot-note). 
 Whewell. Dr. Whewell alluded to; 111 (note, sect. 10); 156, 157 
 
 (foot-note). 
 Will. The impulse of desire, accompanied by the knowledge, that what 
 
 we desire we have the power to compass. 
 
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